Plato to Xenophon in the Nude

Dialogs by Plato and Xenophon

Thursday, May 25, 2023

Dialectic

Or the Conjugate Binary Pair of Every Possible System of Grammar

Edited by John Clark

About

If one think to ask their computer, or the definition of a thing, or even their own biology, one might come to understand that every possible system of grammar is a form of binary recursion. This idea can be traced as far back as the Judeo-Christian Scriptures by summing up the story of Adam and Eve: Adam and Eve are a Conjugate Binary Pair, whereby, Complete Induction and Deduction produce the human race: this story is in intelligible metaphor which the Bible repeatedly tells the reader that it will only be solved at a certain time in man's evolution. Binary recursion is the only product one can acquire even from the definition of any thing as a relative difference constrained by correlatives.

This gives a mind a Grammar Matrix by which to process all information: Common Grammar, Arithmetic, Algebra and Geometry.

To trace out the evolution of the human mind, one locates and studies those sources which recognized that grammar is factually a system of binary recursion. I find the JCS, Dialogs *of Plato, and* Elements *of Euclid. To these I add my work in grammar which can be found in* The Art of Prophecy.

Plato was an advanced grammar teacher. That grammar he called Dialectic, grammar taught in accordance with the definition of a thing, i.e. as an ***intelligible*** *binary which is* ***perceptibly*** *expressed as grammar. Today, people use the word Dialectic, but are wholly ignorant as to its meaning: it means speech, or grammar, in accordance with the two elements of anything, i.e. binary recursion.*

For Plato this work contains the works of five translation sets; *Thomas Taylor*, *the Bohn Library*, *Benjamin Jowett*, 3*rd edition*, *Cooper*, *Bollinger*, *along with a number of separate works by translators*.

Xenophon was actually an eyewitness, a friend of Socrates who wrote what he remembered. To Xenophon's knowledge, he never heard Socrates that he claimed to teach philosophy.

For Xenophon's Memories of Socrates this work contains eight translation sets: 1722 Byshhe, 1762 Fielding, 1872 Levien, 1875 Watson, 1897 Dakyns, 1923 Marchant, 1994 Bonnette, 2013 revision Loeb: Each edited and reformatted for this comparative anthology.

This work contains over 220 translations. All notes, introductions, footnotes removed, just the translations without dress. The aim is to focus on the Plato's presentation of Dialectic and not the pedantry accumulated by those who imagined that they comprehended the Plato. Every Dialog that was not in Standard Dialog Format, explained by Plato in Theaetetus, has been edited and put into that format. This makes them easier to read and follow and easily converted for machine reading.

Introduction—Plato to Xenophon in the Nude

Thursday, May 25, 2023

What are You?

What may be predicated of anything is wholly determined by the definition of that thing.

What is Predication and Definition?

As there are two, and only two parts of speech by which to name any thing, and since we name many things, we have conventions of naming derived from this binary construct such that we can apply that convention recursively. A definition denotes a single recursion, i.e., we name a thing's relative and correlative, the container and the contained, and assign these names, once again, to the name of a container, i.e., Noun = noun + verb. Every form of Grammar, Common Grammar, Arithmetic, Algebra and Geometry is for the express biological purpose of computation, computation which we have yet to formalize.

Plato called this arrangement, exampled even today by the computer, Dialectic, speech via the two elements, or elementary names, we assign to correlatives, or nouns, and relatives called verbs.

A thing can be called a standard of behavior as standard is to the correlative or noun, as behavior is to the relative or verb.

We are the product of a living brain which is called Mind. A brain is one of the life support systems of the body within which it resides.

The foundation of the brain is memory and the power of a mind is afforded by its ability to recursively use memory. The ability to recursively employ memory for survival is afforded by processing that memory via grammar systems, of which, by the recursion of our two concepts, relative and correlative, produces exactly four categories of grammar called a Grammar Matrix whose members can be named as: Common Grammar, Arithmetic, Algebra and Geometry, i.e., we are not literate until we can correctly process information in all four of those categories.

Our ability to process and utilize information via grammar systems is very elementary, in fact, one can say and prove, once they know the standard for literacy, that mankind is still very much proto-linguistic, still stupid, and not sane.

We are a Mind. A mind can only read using the body which is called perception, process what we have read using standards of processing, and write the results of that processing back to the body to produce our behavior. In order to make a better world, we are going to have to learn our job. To date, I have not found a single person who has expressed any interest in that other than in books, such as Socrates, Plato, Confucius, the author of the Bible. My world is a conversation with ghosts but, I will probably never learn enough from them.

A thing is a standard of behavior, and we, as mind, as a life support system are responsible for the production of standards of life supporting behavior. Binary recursion can only produce a binary result; the recursion of standards of behavior can only produce standards of behavior called Law.

We have a never-ending job to perform and a perfect means of doing that job. And, since our behavior is the result of our own processing, our behavior is always broadcasting our level of intelligence.

Division

I open this work with the Socratic writings of Xenophon from which we can learn something of the reality of Socrates and what he taught and his phenomenal intelligence. The second part is the work which comes down to us as the Dialogs of Plato and those which are actually his, all are attempts to teach dialectic, i.e., Plato is teaching formal Grammar. Until recently, with the advent of the computer, no one had sufficient intelligence to realize that grammar is no more than four categories of how to effect binary recursion using names. The computer has proven it around the world. Everything a computer does is derived, rooted in, binary recursion.

Therefore, I divide Plato into Platonic and non-Platonic. The section of non-Platonic is labeled Plato has left the building. I have not found anything in those dialogs which aid in the teaching of dialectic. The Section called Socrates in Chains is a collection of dialogs, the first of which is First Alcibiades, where one learns why we have the dialogs to begin with, the next Parmenides, where Socrates learnt the principles of Predication in his youth and learnt to follow the demonstration using geometry. One might take this as to the reason one cannot enter into the study of Plato until they learn geometry and can use it to follow how to name, and how to follow names in reasoning. Theaetetus starts the day that Socrates was convicted and jailed. From there he went and found Euthyphro, from there his trial, then the Sophist, while he was in prison followed by the Statesman, Crito and lastly, Phaedo. There are six dialogs which start on the day Socrates was convicted until his death.

There is a section I call his other dialogs, all of which are useful in learning about dialectic, written by Plato or not.

I peeled off two dialogs as Plato's Iron Mountains; the Republic, and the Laws. These two are for advanced readers, so much so, that stupid PhD holders and even those who translated it, claim that the Republic is Utopian, when in fact, Plato went through great lengths in Book Two to explain that the object was to put the best of people in the wort circumstances and the worst in the best, i.e., hell. It was the worst hell he could imagine, and the recantation of the condition was set out in the midst of Book 10.

The Laws, he never actually finished or so it is said. And, in the rough state we may have them in, it is the hardest work to read. There is no introduction on the outline of the dialog, something you may see in other dialogs, artfully blended into it, but not the Laws until the last book. We are slowly reeled in by a superstitious, religious fanatic and sociopath recommending complete

micromanagement of the population and handing out horrid death sentences like candy. Points of reasoning disproved in other dialogs are even employed. One is brought down to hell complete with hell-fire and damnation, but again, the last book, in the midst of it, one will find the recantation, where our Athenian Stranger has completely convinced us that he is out of his damned mind recants, and tells us, Law cannot be prescriptive, but that we had to learn how to bond perception and conception, the perceptible and intelligible, body and mind, and that it can only be achieved by education. Thus, the Laws, is about its origins; is it prescriptive or descriptive? By biological fact, by grammatical fact, it is descriptive, of what is, and what we have to do, and have done, in order to maintain and promote life, which is a very long ways from mutilating bodies and tossing them over the county line.

The Laws are very hard, very tedious, and should have one screaming early and for a long time. It is so bad that one might be in no mood to pay attention to the recantation of everything which has gone before it. But that is dialectic and that is life, you have to work on achieving just that, integration of body and mind.

Plato was, like Socrates, a genius. If you believe that the Dialogs are for reading so that you can quote what you do not understand, well, idiots pretend to read too, in fact public education teaches, not reading, but the pretense of it. If you are satisfied with what you learnt in school, then you are satisfied to be just another object stumbling around the earth. So, personally, I do not care what you do, when I am not thinking about man's crimes against himself, and those around him, I, myself, have to learn dialectic so, I work on only that, for the most part. I live in a world, in a country, wholly enslaved to the corruption of government, corruption of education, corruption of social media, but take refuge in knowing, it really does not have to be a world in crisis, not at all.

Xenophon's Memorabilia Readers Edition

Memories of Socrates

Thursday, May 25, 2023

XENOPHON.

THE MEMORABLE THOUGHTS OF SOCRATES.

BY XENOPHON.

TRANSLATED BY EDWARD BYSSHE.

CASSELL & COMPANY,
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INTRODUCTION.

This translation of Xenophon's "Memorabilia of Socrates" was first published in 1712, and is here printed from the revised edition of 1722. Its author was Edward Bysshe, who had produced in 1702 "The Art of English Poetry," a well-known work that was near its fifth edition when its author published his translation of the "Memorabilia." This was a translation that remained in good repute. There was another edition of it in 1758. Bysshe translated the title of the book into "The Memorable Things of Socrates." I have changed "Things" into "Thoughts," for whether they be sayings or doings, the words and deeds of a wise man are alike expressions of his thought.

Xenophon is said to have been, when young, a pupil of Socrates. Two authorities have recorded that in the flight from the battle of Delium in the year 424, when Xenophon fell from his horse, Socrates picked him up and carried him on his back for a considerable distance. The time of Xenophon's death is not known, but he was alive sixty-seven years after the battle of Delium.

When Cyrus the Younger was preparing war against his brother Artaxerxes Mnemon, King of Persia, Xenophon went with him. After the death of Cyrus on the plains of Cunaxa, the barbarian auxiliaries fled, and the Greeks were left to return as they could from the far region between the Tigris and Euphrates. Xenophon had to take part in the conduct of the retreat, and tells the story of it in his "Anabasis," a history of the expedition of the younger Cyrus and of the retreat of the Greeks. His return into Greece was in the year of the death of Socrates, 399, but his association was now with the Spartans, with whom he fought, 394, at Coroneia. Afterwards he settled, and lived for about twenty years, at Scillus in Eleia with his wife and children. At Scillus he wrote probably his "Anabasis" and some other of his books. At last he was driven out by the Eleans. In the battle of Mantineia the Spartans and Athenians fought as allies, and Xenophon's two sons were in the battle; he had sent them to Athens as fellow-combatants from Sparta. His banishment from Athens was repealed by change of times, but it does not appear that he returned to Athens. He is said to have lived, and perhaps died, at Corinth, after he had been driven from his home at Scillus.

Xenophon was a philosophic man of action. He could make his value felt in a council of war, take part in battle — one of his books is on the duties of a commander of cavalry — and show himself good sportsman in the hunting-field. He wrote a book upon the horse; a treatise also upon dogs and hunting. He believed in God, thought earnestly about social and political duties, and preferred Spartan institutions to those of Athens. He wrote a life of his friend Agesilaus II., King of Sparta. He found exercise for his energetic mind in writing many books. In writing he was clear and to the point; his practical mind made his work interesting. His "Anabasis" is a true story as delightful as a fiction; his "Cyropædia" is a fiction full of truths. He wrote "Hellenica," that carried on the history of Greece from the point at which Thucydides closed his history until the battle of Mantineia. He wrote a dialogue between Hiero and Simonides upon the position of a king, and dealt with the administration of the little realm of a man's household in his "Œconomicus,"

a dialogue between Socrates and Critobulus, which includes the praise of agriculture. He wrote also, like Plato, a symposium, in which philosophers over their wine reason of love and friendship, and he paints the character of Socrates.

But his best memorial of his old guide, philosopher, and friend is this work, in which Xenophon brought together in simple and direct form the views of life that had been made clear to himself by the teaching of Socrates. Xenophon is throughout opposing a plain tale to the false accusations against Socrates. He does not idealize, but he feels strongly, and he shows clearly the worth of the wisdom that touches at every point the actual conduct of the lives of men.

H. M.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

SOCRATES NOT A CONTEMNER OF THE GODS OF HIS COUNTRY, NOR AN INTRODUCER OF NEW ONES.

I have often wondered by what show of argument the accusers of Socrates could persuade the Athenians he had forfeited his life to the State. For though the crimes laid unto his charge were indeed great — "That he did not acknowledge the gods of the Republic; that he introduced new ones" — and, farther, "had debauched the youth;" yet none of these could, in the least, be proved against him.

For, as to the first, "That he did not worship the deities which the Republic adored," how could this be made out against him, since, instead of paying no homage to the gods of his country, he was frequently seen to assist in sacrificing to them, both in his own family and in the public temples? — perpetually worshipping them in the most public, solemn, and religious manner.

What, in my opinion, gave his accusers a specious pretext for alleging against him that he introduced new deities was this — that he had frequently declared in public he had received counsel from a divine voice, which he called his Demon. But this was no proof at all of the matter. All that Socrates advanced about his demon was no more than what is daily advanced by those who believe in and practice divination; and if Socrates, because he said he received intelligence from his genius, must be accused of introducing new divinities, so also must they; for is it not certain that those who believe in divination, and practice that belief, do observe the flight of birds, consult the entrails of victims, and remark even unexpected words and accidental occurrences? But they do not, therefore, believe that either the birds whose flight they observe or the persons they meet accidentally know either their good or ill fortune — neither did Socrates — they only believe that the gods make use of these things to presage the future; and such, too, was the belief of Socrates. The vulgar, indeed, imagine it to be the very birds and things which present themselves to them that excite them to what is good for them, or make them avoid what may hurt them; but, as for Socrates, he freely owned that a demon was his monitor; and he frequently told his friends beforehand what they should do, or not do, according to the instructions he had received from his demon; and they who believed him, and followed his advice, always found advantage by it; as, on the contrary, they who neglected his admonitions, never failed to repent their incredulity. Now, it cannot be denied but that he ought to have taken care not to pass with his friends either for a liar or a visionary; and yet how could he avoid incurring that censure if the events had not justified the truth of the things he pretended were revealed to him? It is, therefore, manifest that he would not have spoken of things to come if he had not believed he said true; but how could he believe he said true, unless he believed that the gods, who alone ought to be trusted for the knowledge of things to come, gave him notice of them? and, if he believed they did so, how can it be said that he acknowledged no gods?

He likewise advised his friends to do, in the best manner they could, the things that of necessity they were to do; but, as to those whose events were doubtful, he

sent them to the oracles to know whether they should engage in them or not. And he thought that they who design to govern with success their families or whole cities had great need of receiving instructions by the help of divinations; for though he indeed held that every man may make choice of the condition of life in which he desires to live, and that, by his industry, he may render himself excellent in it, whether he apply himself to architecture or to agriculture, whether he throw himself into politics or economy, whether he engage himself in the public revenues or in the army, yet that in all these things the gods have reserved to themselves the most important events, into which men of themselves can in no wise penetrate. Thus he who makes a fine plantation of trees, knows not who shall gather the fruit; he who builds a house cannot tell who shall inhabit it; a general is not certain that he shall be successful in his command, nor a Minister of State in his ministry; he who marries a beautiful woman in hopes of being happy with her knows not but that even she herself may be the cause of all his uneasinesses; and he who enters into a grand alliance is uncertain whether they with whom he allies himself will not at length be the cause of his ruin. This made him frequently say that it is a great folly to imagine there is not a Divine Providence that presides over these things, and that they can in the least depend on human prudence. He likewise held it to be a weakness to importune the gods with questions which we may resolve ourselves; as if we should ask them whether it be better to take a coachman who knows how to drive than one who knows nothing of the matter? whether it be more eligible to take an experienced pilot than one that is ignorant? In a word, he counted it a kind of impiety to consult the oracles concerning what might be numbered or weighed, because we ought to learn the things which the gods have been pleased to capacitate us to know; but that we ought to have recourse to the oracles to be instructed in those that surpass our knowledge, because the gods are wont to discover them to such men as have rendered them propitious to themselves.

Socrates stayed seldom at home. In the morning he went to the places appointed for walking and public exercises. He never failed to be at the hall, or courts of justice, at the usual hour of assembling there, and the rest of the day he was at the places where the greatest companies generally met. There it was that he discoursed for the most part, and whoever would hear him easily might; and yet no man ever observed the least impiety either in his actions or his words. Nor did he amuse himself to reason of the secrets of nature, or to search into the manner of the creation of what the sophists call the world, nor to dive into the cause of the motions of the celestial bodies. On the contrary, he exposed the folly of such as give themselves up to these contemplations; and he asked whether it was, after having acquired a perfect knowledge of human things, that they undertook to search into the divine, or if they thought themselves very wise in neglecting what concerned them to employ themselves in things above them? He was astonished likewise that they did not see it was impossible for men to comprehend anything of all those wonders, seeing they who have the reputation of being most knowing in them are of quite different opinions, and can agree no better than so many fools and madmen; for as some of these are not afraid of the most

dangerous and frightful accidents, while others are in dread of what is not to be feared, so, too, among those philosophers, some are of opinion that there is no action but what may be done in public, nor word that may not freely be spoken before the whole world, while others, on the contrary, believe that we ought to avoid the conversation of men and keep in a perpetual solitude. Some have despised the temples and the altars, and have taught not to honor the gods, while others have been so superstitious as to worship wood, stones, and irrational creatures. And as to the knowledge of natural things, some have confessed but one only being; others have admitted an infinite number: some have believed that all things are in a perpetual motion; others that nothing moves: some have held the world to be full of continual generations and corruptions; others maintain that nothing is engendered or destroyed. He said besides that he should be glad to know of those persons whether they were in hopes one day to put in practice what they learned, as men who know an art may practice it when they please either for their own advantage or for the service of their friends; or whether they did imagine that, after they found out the causes of all things that happen, they should be able to cause winds and rains, and to dispose the times and seasons as they had occasion for them; or whether they contented themselves with the bare knowledge without expecting any farther advantage.

This was what he said of those who delight in such studies. As for his part, he meditated chiefly on what is useful and proper for man, and took delight to argue of piety and impiety, of honesty and dishonesty, of justice and injustice, of wisdom and folly, of courage and cowardice, of the State, and of the qualifications of a Minister of State, of the Government, and of those who are fit to govern; in short, he enlarged on the like subjects, which it becomes men of condition to know, and of which none but slaves should be ignorant.

It is not strange, perhaps, that the judges of Socrates mistook his opinion in things concerning which he did not explain himself; but I am surprised that they did not reflect on what he had said and done in the face of the whole world; for when he was one of the Senate, and had taken the usual oath exactly to observe the laws, being in his turn vested with the dignity of Epistate, he bravely withstood the populace, who, against all manner of reason, demanded that the nine captains, two of whom were Erasinides and Thrasilus, should be put to death, he would never give consent to this injustice, and was not daunted at the rage of the people, nor at the menaces of the men in power, choosing rather not to violate the oath he had taken than to yield to the violence of the multitude, and shelter himself from the vengeance of those who threatened him. To this purpose he said that the gods watch over men more attentively than the vulgar imagine; for they believe there are some things which the gods observe and others which they pass by unregarded; but he held that the gods observe all our actions and all our words, that they penetrate even into our most secret thoughts, that they are present at all our deliberations, and that they inspire us in all our affairs.

It is astonishing, therefore, to consider how the Athenians could suffer themselves to be persuaded that Socrates entertained any unworthy thoughts of the Deity; he who never let slip one single word against the respect due to the gods,

nor was ever guilty of any action that savored in the least of impiety; but who, on the contrary, has done and said things that could not proceed but from a mind truly pious, and that are sufficient to gain a man an eternal reputation of piety and virtue.

CHAPTER II.

SOCRATES NOT A DEBAUCHER OF YOUTH.

What surprises me yet more is, that some would believe that Socrates was a debaucher of young men! Socrates the most sober and most chaste of all men, who cheerfully supported both cold and heat; whom no inconvenience, no hardships, no labors could startle, and who had learned to wish for so little, that though he had scarce anything, he had always enough. Then how could he teach impiety, injustice, gluttony, impurity, and luxury? And so far was he from doing so, that he reclaimed many persons from those vices, inspiring them with the love of virtue, and putting them in hopes of coming to preferment in the world, provided they would take a little care of themselves. Yet he never promised any man to teach him to be virtuous; but as he made a public profession of virtue, he created in the minds of those who frequented him the hopes of becoming virtuous by his example.

He neglected not his own body, and praised not those that neglected theirs. In like manner, he blamed the custom of some who eat too much, and afterwards use violent exercises; but he approved of eating till nature be satisfied, and of a moderate exercise after it, believing that method to be an advantage to health, and proper to unbend and divert the mind. In his clothes he was neither nice nor costly; and what I say of his clothes ought likewise to be understood of his whole way of living. Never any of his friends became covetous in his conversation, and he reclaimed them from that sordid disposition, as well as from all others; for he would accept of no gratuity from any who desired to confer with him, and said that was the way to discover a noble and generous heart, and that they who take rewards betray a meanness of soul, and sell their own persons, because they impose on themselves a necessity of instructing those from whom they receive a salary. He wondered, likewise, why a man, who promises to teach virtue, should ask money; as if he believed not the greatest of all gain to consist in the acquisition of a good friend, or, as if he feared, that he who, by his means, should become virtuous, and be obliged to him for so great a benefit, would not be sufficiently grateful for it. Quite different from Socrates, who never boasted of any such thing, and who was most certain that all who heard him and received his maxims would love him forever, and be capable of loving others also. After this, whosoever says that such a man debauched the youth, must at the same time say that the study of virtue is debauchery.

But the accuser says that Socrates taught to despise the constitution that was established in the Republic, because he affirmed it to be a folly to elect magistrates by lots; since if anyone had occasion for a pilot, a musician, or an architect, he would not trust to chance for any such person, though the faults that can be committed by men in such capacities are far from being of so great importance as those that are committed in the government of the Republic. He says, therefore, that such arguments insensibly accustom the youth to despise the laws, and render them more audacious and more violent. But, in my opinion, such as study the art of prudence, and who believe they shall be able to render themselves capable of giving good advice and counsel to their fellow-citizens, seldom become

men of violent tempers; because they know that violence is hateful and full of danger; while, on the contrary, to win by persuasion is full of love and safety. For they, whom we have compelled, brood a secret hatred against us, believing we have done them wrong; but those whom we have taken the trouble to persuade continue our friends, believing we have done them a kindness. It is not, therefore, they who apply themselves to the study of prudence that become violent, but those brutish intractable tempers who have much power in their hands and but little judgment to manage it. — He farther said that when a man desires to carry anything by force, he must have many friends to assist him: as, on the contrary, he that can persuade has need of none but himself, and is not subject to shed blood; for who would rather choose to kill a man than to make use of his services, after having gained his friendship and goodwill by mildness?

The accuser adds, in proof of the ill tendency of the doctrine of Socrates, that Critias and Alcibiades, who were two of his most intimate friends, were very bad men, and did much mischief to their country. For Critias was the most insatiable and cruel of all the thirty tyrants; and Alcibiades the most dissolute, the most insolent, and the most audacious citizen that ever the Republic had. As for me, I pretend not to justify them, and will only relate for what reason they frequented Socrates. They were men of an unbounded ambition, and who resolved, whatever it cost, to govern the State, and make themselves be talked of. They had heard that Socrates lived very content upon little or nothing, that he entirely commanded his passions, and that his reasonings were so persuasive that he drew all men to which side he pleased. Reflecting on this, and being of the temper we mentioned, can it be thought that they desired the acquaintance of Socrates, because they were in love with his way of life, and with his temperance, or because they believed that by conversing with him they should render themselves capable of reasoning aright, and of well-managing the public affairs? For my part, I believe that if the gods had proposed to them to live always like him, or to die immediately, they would rather have chosen a sudden death. And it is easy to judge this from their actions; for as soon as they thought themselves more capable than their companions, they forsook Socrates, whom they had frequented, only for the purpose I mentioned, and threw themselves wholly into business.

It may, perhaps, be objected that he ought not to have discoursed to his friends of things relating to the government of the State, till after he had taught them to live virtuously. I have nothing to say to this; but I observe that all who profess teaching do generally two things: they work in presence of their scholars, to show them how they ought to do, and they instruct them likewise by word of mouth. Now, in either of these two ways, no man ever taught to live well, like Socrates; for, in his whole life, he was an example of untainted probity; and in his discourses he spoke of virtue and of all the duties of man in a manner that made him admired of all his hearers. And I know too very well that Critias and Alcibiades lived very virtuously as long as they frequented him; not that they were afraid of him, but because they thought it most conducive to their designs to live so at that time.

Many who pretend to philosophy will here object, that a virtuous person is always virtuous, and that when a man has once come to be good and temperate,

he will never afterwards become wicked nor dissolute; because habitudes that can be acquired, when once they are so, can never more be effaced from the mind. But I am not of this opinion; for as they who use no bodily exercises are awkward and unwieldy in the actions of the body, so they who exercise not their minds are incapable of the noble actions of the mind, and have not courage enough to undertake anything worthy of praise, nor command enough over themselves to abstain from things that are forbid. For this reason, parents, though they be well enough assured of the good natural disposition of their children, fail not to forbid them the conversation of the vicious, because it is the ruin of worthy dispositions, whereas the conversation of good men is a continual meditation of virtue. Thus a poet says,

"By those whom we frequent, we're ever led:

Example is a law by all obeyed.

Thus with the good, we are to good inclined,

But vicious company corrupts the mind."

And another in like manner:

"Virtue and vice in the same man are found,

And now they gain, and now they lose their ground."

And, in my opinion, they are in the right: for when I consider that they who have learned verses by heart forget them unless they repeat them often, so I believe that they who neglect the reasonings of philosophers, insensibly lose the remembrance of them; and when they have let these excellent notions slip out of their minds, they at the same time lose the idea of the things that supported in the soul the love of temperance; and, having forgot those things, what wonder is it if at length they forget temperance likewise?

I observe, besides, that men who abandon themselves to the debauches of wine or women find it more difficult to apply themselves to things that are profitable, and to abstain from what is hurtful. For many who live frugally before they fall in love become prodigal when that passion gets the mastery over them; insomuch that after having wasted their estates, they are reduced to gain their bread by methods they would have been ashamed of before. What hinders then, but that a man, who has been once temperate, should be so no longer, and that he who has led a good life at one time should not do so at another? I should think, therefore, that the being of all virtues, and chiefly of temperance, depends on the practice of them: for lust, that dwells in the same body with the soul, incites it continually to despise this virtue, and to find out the shortest way to gratify the senses only.

Thus, whilst Alcibiades and Critias conversed with Socrates, they were able, with so great an assistance, to tame their inclinations; but after they had left him, Critias, being retired into Thessaly, ruined himself entirely in the company of some libertines; and Alcibiades, seeing himself courted by several women of quality, because of his beauty, and suffering himself to be corrupted by soothing flatterers, who made their court to him, in consideration of the credit he had in the city and with the allies; in a word, finding himself respected by all the Athenians, and that

no man disputed the first rank with him, began to neglect himself, and acted like a great wrestler, who takes not the trouble to exercise himself, when he no longer finds an adversary who dares to contend with him.

If we would examine, therefore, all that has happened to them; if we consider how much the greatness of their birth, their interest, and their riches, had puffed up their minds; if we reflect on the ill company they fell into, and the many opportunities they had of debauching themselves, can we be surprised that, after they had been so long absent from Socrates, they arrived at length to that height of insolence to which they have been seen to arise? If they have been guilty of crimes, the accuser will load Socrates with them, and not allow him to be worthy of praise, for having kept them within the bounds of their duty during their youth, when, in all appearance, they would have been the most disorderly and least governable. This, however, is not the way we judge of other things; for whoever pretended that a musician, a player on the lute, or any other person that teaches, after he has made a good scholar, ought to be blamed for his growing more ignorant under the care of another master? If a young man gets an acquaintance that brings him into debauchery, ought his father to lay the blame on the first friends of his son among whom he always lived virtuously? Is it not true, on the contrary, that the more he finds that this last friendship proves destructive to him, the more reason he will have to praise his former acquaintance. And are the fathers themselves, who are daily with their children, guilty of their faults, if they give them no ill example? Thus they ought to have judged of Socrates; if he led an ill life, it was reasonable to esteem him vicious; but if a good, was it just to accuse him of crimes of which he was innocent?

And yet he might have given his adversaries ground to accuse him, had he but approved, or seemed to approve those vices in others, from which he kept himself free: but Socrates abhorred vice, not only in himself, but in everyone besides. To prove which, I need only relate his conduct toward Critias, a man extremely addicted to debauchery. Socrates perceiving that this man had an unnatural passion for Euthydemus, and that the violence of it would precipitate him so far a length as to make him transgress the bounds of nature, shocked at his behavior, he exerted his utmost strength of reason and argument to dissuade him from so wild a desire. And while the impetuosity of Critias' passion seemed to scorn all check or control, and the modest rebuke of Socrates had been disregarded, the philosopher, out of an ardent zeal for virtue, broke out in such language, as at once declared his own strong inward sense of decency and order, and the monstrous shamefulness of Critias' passion. Which severe but just reprimand of Socrates, it is thought, was the foundation of that grudge which he ever after bore him; for during the tyranny of the Thirty, of which Critias was one, when, together with Charicles, he had the care of the civil government of the city, he failed not to remember this affront, and, in revenge of it, made a law to forbid teaching the art of reasoning in Athens: and having nothing to reproach Socrates with in particular, he labored to render him odious by aspersing him with the usual calumnies that are thrown on all philosophers: for I have never heard Socrates say that he taught this art, nor seen any man who ever heard him say so; but Critias had taken

offence, and gave sufficient proofs of it: for after the Thirty had caused to be put to death a great number of the citizens, and even of the most eminent, and had let loose the reins to all sorts of violence and rapine, Socrates said in a certain place that he wondered very much that a man who keeps a herd of cattle, and by his ill conduct loses every day some of them, and suffers the others to fall away, would not own himself to be a very ill keeper of his herd; and that he should wonder yet more if a Minister of State, who lessens every day the number of his citizens, and makes the others more dissolute, was not ashamed of his ministry, and would not own himself to be an ill magistrate. This was reported to Critias and Charicles, who forthwith sent for Socrates, and showing him the law they had made, forbid him to discourse with the young men. Upon which Socrates asked them whether they would permit him to propose a question, that he might be informed of what he did not understand in this prohibition; and his request being granted, he spoke in this manner: "I am most ready to obey your laws; but that I may not transgress through ignorance, I desire to know of you, whether you condemn the art of reasoning, because you believe it consists in saying things well, or in saying them ill? If for the former reason, we must then, from henceforward, abstain from speaking as we ought; and if for the latter, it is plain that we ought to endeavor to speak well."

At these words Charicles flew into a passion, and said to him: "Since you pretend to be ignorant of things that are so easily known, we forbid you to speak to the young men in any manner whatever."

"It is enough," answered Socrates; "but that I may not be in a perpetual uncertainty, pray prescribe to me, till what age men are young."

"Till they are capable of being members of the Senate," said Charicles: "in a word, speak to no man under thirty years of age."

"How!" says Socrates, "if I would buy anything of a tradesman who is not thirty years old am I forbid to ask him the price of it?"

"I mean not so," answered Charicles: "but I am not surprised that you ask me this question, for it is your custom to ask many things that you know very well."

Socrates added: "And if a young man ask me in the street where Charicles lodges, or whether I know where Critias is, must I make him no answer?"

"I mean not so neither," answered Charicles.

Here Critias, interrupting their discourse, said: "For the future, Socrates, you must have nothing to do with the city tradesmen, the shoemakers, masons, smiths, and other mechanics, whom you so often allege as examples of life; and who, I apprehend, are quite jaded with your discourses."

"I must then likewise," replied Socrates, "omit the consequences I draw from those discourses; and have no more to do with justice, piety, and the other duties of a good man."

"Yes, yes," said Charicles; "and I advise you to meddle no more with those that tend herds of oxen; otherwise take care you lose not your own." And these last words made it appear that Critias and Charicles had taken offence at the discourse

which Socrates had held against their government, when he compared them to a man that suffers his herd to fall to ruin.

Thus we see how Critias frequented Socrates, and what opinion they had of each other. I add, moreover, that we cannot learn anything of a man whom we do not like: therefore if Critias and Alcibiades made no great improvement with Socrates, it proceeded from this, that they never liked him. For at the very time that they conversed with him, they always rather courted the conversation of those who were employed in the public affairs, because they had no design but to govern. — The following conference of Alcibiades, in particular, which he had with Pericles, his governor — who was the chief man of the city, whilst he was yet under twenty years of age — concerning the nature of the laws, will confirm what I have now advanced.

"Pray," says Alcibiades, "explain to me what the law is: for, as I hear men praised who observe the laws, I imagine that this praise could not be given to those who know not what the law is."

"It is easy to satisfy you," answered Pericles: "the law is only what the people in a general assembly ordain, declaring what ought to be done, and what ought not to be done."

"And tell me," added Alcibiades, "do they ordain to do what is good, or what is ill?"

"Most certainly what is good." Alcibiades pursued: "And how would you call what a small number of citizens should ordain, in states where the people is not the master, but all is ordered by the advice of a few persons, who possess the sovereignty?"

"I would call whatever they ordain a law; for laws are nothing else but the ordinances of sovereigns."

"If a tyrant then ordain anything, will that be a law?"

"Yes, it will," said Pericles.

"But what then is violence and injustice?" continued Alcibiades; "is it not when the strongest makes himself be obeyed by the weakest, not by consent, but by force only?"

"In my opinion it is."

"It follows then," says Alcibiades, "that ordinances made by a prince, without the consent of the citizens, will be absolutely unjust."

"I believe so," said Pericles; "and cannot allow that the ordinances of a prince, when they are made without the consent of the people, should bear the name of laws."

"And what the chief citizens ordain, without procuring the consent of the greater number, is that likewise a violence?"

"There is no question of it," answered Pericles; "and in general, every ordinance made without the consent of those who are to obey it, is a violence rather than a law."

“And is what the populace decree, without the concurrence of the chiefs, to be counted a violence likewise, and not a law?”

“No doubt it is,” said Pericles: “but when I was of your age, I could resolve all these difficulties, because I made it my business to inquire into them, as you do now.”

“Would to God,” cried Alcibiades, “I had been so happy as to have conversed with you then, when you understood these matters better.” To this purpose was their dialogue.

Critias and Alcibiades, however, continued not long with Socrates, after they believed they had improved themselves, and gained some advantages over the other citizens, for besides that they thought not his conversation very agreeable, they were displeased that he took upon him to reprimand them for their faults; and thus they threw themselves immediately into the public affairs, having never had any other design but that. The usual companions of Socrates were Crito, Chaerephon, Chaerecrates, Simmias, Cebes, Phædon, and some others; none of whom frequented him that they might learn to speak eloquently, either in the assemblies of the people, or in the courts of justice before the judges; but that they might become better men, and know how to behave themselves towards their domestics, their relations, their friends, and their fellow-citizens. All these persons led very innocent lives; and, whether we consider them in their youth or examine their behavior in a more advanced age, we shall find that they never were guilty of any bad action, nay, that they never gave the least ground to suspect them of being so.

But the accuser says that Socrates encouraged children to despise their parents, making them believe that he was more capable to instruct them than they; and telling them that as the laws permit a man to chain his own father if he can convict him of lunacy, so, in like manner, it is but just that a man of excellent sense should throw another into chains who has not so much understanding. I cannot deny but that Socrates may have said something like this; but he meant it not in the sense in which the accuser would have it taken: and he fully discovered what his meaning by these words was, when he said that he who should pretend to chain others because of their ignorance, ought, for the same reason, to submit to be chained himself by men who know more than he. Hence it is that he argued so often of the difference between folly and ignorance; and then he plainly said that fools and madmen ought to be chained indeed, as well for their own interest as for that of their friends; but that they who are ignorant of things they should know, ought only to be instructed by those that understand them.

The accuser goes on, that Socrates did not only teach men to despise their parents, but their other relations too; because he said that if a man be sick, or have a suit in law, it is not his relations, but the physicians, or the advocates who are of use to him. He further alleged that Socrates, speaking of friends, said it was to no purpose to bear goodwill to any man, if it be not in our power to serve him; and that the only friends whom we ought to value are they who know what is good for us, and can teach it to us: thus, says the accuser, Socrates, by persuading the

youth that he was the wisest of all men, and the most capable to set others in the right road to wisdom, made them believe that all the rest of mankind were nothing in comparison with him. I remember, indeed, to have heard him sometimes talk after this manner of parents, relations, and friends; and he observed besides, if I mistake not, that when the soul, in which the understanding resides, is gone out of the body, we soon bury the corpse; and even though it be that of our nearest relation, we endeavor to put it out of our sight as soon as decently we can. Farther, though every man loves his own body to a great degree, we scruple not nevertheless to take from it all that is superfluous, for this reason we cut our hair and our nails, we take off our corns and our warts, and we put ourselves into the surgeons' hands, and endure caustics and incisions; and after they have made us suffer a great deal of pain, we think ourselves obliged to give them a reward: thus, too, we spit, because the spittle is of no use in the mouth, but on the contrary is troublesome. But Socrates meant not by these, or the like sayings, to conclude that a man ought to bury his father alive, or that we ought to cut off our legs and arms; but he meant only to teach us that what is useless is contemptible, and to exhort every man to improve and render himself useful to others; to the end that if we desire to be esteemed by our father, our brother, or any other relation, we should not rely so much on our parentage and consanguinity, as not to endeavor to render ourselves always useful to those whose esteem we desire to obtain.

The accuser says further against Socrates, that he was so malicious as to choose out of the famous poets the passages that contained the worst instructions, and that he made use of them in a sly manner, to inculcate the vices of injustice and violence: as this verse of Hesiod,

"Blame no employment, but blame idleness."

And he pretends that Socrates alleged this passage to prove that the poet meant to say that we ought not to count any employment unjust or dishonorable, if we can make any advantage of it. This, however, was far from the thoughts of Socrates; but, as he had always taught that employment and business are useful and honorable to men, and that idleness is an evil, he concluded that they who busy themselves about anything that is good are indeed employed; but that gamesters and debauched persons, and all who have no occupations, but such as are hurtful and wicked, are idle. Now, in this sense, is it not true to say: —

"Blame no employment, but blame idleness"?

The accuser likewise says that Socrates often repeated, out of Homer, a speech of Ulysses; and from thence he concludes that Socrates taught that the poet advised to beat the poor and abuse the common people. But it is plain Socrates could never have drawn such a wild and unnatural inference from those verses of the poet, because he would have argued against himself, since he was as poor as anyone besides. What he meant, therefore, was only this, that such as are neither men of counsel nor execution, who are neither fit to advise in the city nor to serve in the army, and are nevertheless proud and insolent, ought to be brought to reason, even though they be possessed of great riches. And this was the true meaning of Socrates, for he loved the men of low condition, and expressed a great

civility for all sorts of persons; insomuch that whenever he was consulted, either by the Athenians or by foreigners, he would never take anything of any man for the instructions he gave them, but imparted his wisdom freely, and without reward, to all the world; while they, who became rich by his liberality, did not afterwards behave themselves so generously, but sold very dear to others what had cost them nothing; and, not being of so obliging a temper as he, would not impart their knowledge to any who had it not in their power to reward them. In short, Socrates has rendered the city of Athens famous throughout the whole earth; and, as Lychas was said to be the honor of Sparta, because he treated, at his own expense, all the foreigners who came to the feasts of the Gymnopaedies, so it may, with much greater reason, be said of Socrates that he was the glory of Athens, he who all his life made a continual distribution of his goodness and virtues, and who, keeping open for all the world the treasures of an inestimable wealth, never sent any man out of his company but more virtuous, and more improved in the principles of honor, than formerly he was. Therefore, in my opinion, if he had been treated according to his merit, they should have decreed him public honors rather than have condemned him to an infamous death. For against whom have the laws ordained the punishment of death? Is it not for thieves, for robbers, for men guilty of sacrilege, for those who sell persons that are free? But where, in all the world, can we find a man more innocent of all those crimes than Socrates? Can it be said of him that he ever held correspondence with the enemy, that he ever fomented any sedition, that he ever was the cause of a rebellion, or any other the like mischiefs? Can any man lay to his charge that he ever detained his estate, or did him or it the least injury? Was he ever so much as suspected of any of these things? How then is it possible he should be guilty of the crimes of which he was accused; since, instead of not believing in the gods, as the accuser says, it is manifest he was a sincere adorer of them? Instead of corrupting the youth, as he further alleges against him, he made it his chief care to deliver his friends from the power of every guilty passion, and to inspire them with an ardent love for virtue, the glory, the ornament, and felicity of families as well as of states? And this being fact (and fact it is, for who can deny it?), is it not certain that the Republic was extremely obliged to him, and that she ought to have paid him the highest honors?

CHAPTER III.

HOW SOCRATES BEHAVED THROUGH THE WHOLE OF HIS LIFE.

Having, therefore, observed myself that all who frequented him improved themselves very much in his conversation, because he instructed them no less by his example than by his discourses, I am resolved to set down, in this work, all that I can recollect both of his actions and words.

First, then, as to what relates to the service of the gods, he strictly conformed to the advice of the oracle, who never gives any other answer to those who inquire of him in what manner they ought to sacrifice to the gods, or what honors they ought to render to the dead, than that everyone should observe the customs of his own country. Thus in all the acts of religious worship Socrates took particular care to do nothing contrary to the custom of the Republic, and advised his friends to make that the rule of their devotion to the gods, alleging it to be an argument of superstition and vanity to dissent from the established worship.

When he prayed to the gods he besought them only to give him what is good, because they know better than we do what things are truly good for us; and he said that men who pray for silver, or for gold, or for the sovereign authority, made as foolish requests as if they prayed that they might play or fight, or desired any other thing whose event is uncertain, and that might be likely to turn to their disadvantage.

When he offered sacrifices he did not believe that his poverty rendered them despicable in the presence of the gods; and, while he offered according to his ability, he thought he gave as much as the rich, who load the altars with costly gifts, for he held that it would be an injustice in the gods to take more delight in costly sacrifices than in poorer ones, because it would then follow that the offerings of the wicked would for the most part be more acceptable to them than the gifts of the good; and that, if this were so, we ought not to desire to live one moment longer: he thought, therefore, that nothing was so acceptable to the Deity as the homage that is paid him by souls truly pious and innocent. To this purpose he often repeated these verses: —

"Offer to heaven according to thy pow'r:

Th' indulgent gracious gods require no more."

And not only in this, but in all the other occasions of life, he thought the best advice he could give his friends was to do all things according to their ability.

When he believed that the gods had admonished him to do anything, it was as impossible to make him take a contrary resolution as it would have been to have prevailed with him in a journey to change a guide that was clear-sighted for one that knew not the way, and was blind likewise. For this reason he pitied their folly, who, to avoid the derision of men, live not according to the admonitions and commands of the gods; and he beheld with contempt all the subtitles of human prudence when he compared them with divine inspirations.

His way of living was such that whoever follows it may be assured, with the help of the gods, that he shall acquire a robust constitution and a health not to be

easily impaired; and this, too, without any great expense, for he was content with so little that I believe there was not in all the world a man who could work at all but might have earned enough to have maintained him. He generally ate as long as he found pleasure in eating, and when he sat down to table he desired no other sauce but a sound appetite. All sorts of drink were alike pleasing to him, because he never drank but when he was thirsty; and if sometimes he was invited to a feast, he easily avoided eating and drinking to excess, which many find very difficult to do in those occasions. But he advised those who had no government of themselves never to taste of things that tempt a man to eat when he is no longer hungry, and that excite him to drink when his thirst is already quenched, because it is this that spoils the stomach, causes the headache, and puts the soul into disorder. And he said, between jest and earnest, that he believed it was with such meats as those that Circe changed men into swine, and that Ulysses avoided that transformation by the counsel of Mercury, and because he had temperance enough to abstain from tasting them.

As to love, his advice was to avoid carefully the company of beautiful persons, saying it was very difficult to be near them and escape being taken in the snare; and, having been told that Critobulus had given a kiss to the son of Alcibiades, who was a very handsome youth, he held this discourse to Xenophon, in the presence of Critobulus himself.

"Tell me, Xenophon, what opinion have you hitherto had of Critobulus? Have you placed him in the rank of the temperate and judicious; or with the debauched and imprudent?"

"I have always looked upon him," answered Xenophon, "to be a very virtuous and prudent man."

"Change your opinion," replied Socrates, "and believe him more rash than if he threw himself on the points of naked swords or leapt into the fire."

"And what have you seen him do," said Xenophon, "that gives you reason to speak thus of him?"

"Why, he had the rashness," answered Socrates, "to kiss the son of Alcibiades, who is so beautiful and charming."

"And is this all?" said Xenophon; "for my part, I think I could also willingly expose myself to the same danger that he did."

"Wretch that you are!" replied Socrates. "Do you consider what happens to you after you have kissed a beautiful face? Do you not lose your liberty? Do you not become a slave? Do you not engage yourself in a vast expense to procure a sinful pleasure? Do you not find yourself in an incapacity of doing what is good, and that you subject yourself to the necessity of employing your whole time and person in the pursuit of what you would despise, if your reason were not corrupted?"

"Good God!" cried Xenophon, "this is ascribing a wonderful power to a kiss forsooth."

“And are you surprised at it?” answered Socrates. “Are there not some small animals whose bite is so venomous that it causes insufferable pain, and even the loss of the senses?”

“I know it very well,” said Xenophon, “but these animals leave a poison behind them when they sting.”

“And do you think, you fool,” added Socrates, “that kisses of love are not venomous, because you perceive not the poison? Know that a beautiful person is a more dangerous animal than scorpions, because these cannot wound unless they touch us; but beauty strikes at a distance: from what place soever we can but behold her, she darts her venom upon us, and overthrows our judgment. And perhaps for this reason the Loves are represented with bows and arrows, because a beautiful face wounds us from afar. I advise you, therefore, Xenophon, when you chance to see a beauty to fly from it, without looking behind you. And for you, Critobulus, I think it convenient that you should enjoin yourself a year’s absence, which will not be too long a time to heal you of your wound.”

As for such as have not strength enough to resist the power of love, he thought that they ought to consider and use it as an action to which the soul would never consent, were it not for the necessity of the body; and which, though it be necessary, ought, nevertheless, to give us no inquietude. As for himself, his continence was known to all men, and it was more easy for him to avoid courting the most celebrated beauties, than it is for others to get away from disagreeable objects.

Thus we see what was his way of life in eating, drinking, and in the affair of love. He believed, however, that he tasted of those pleasures no less than they who give themselves much trouble to enjoy them; but that he had not, like them, so frequent occasions for sorrow and repentance.

CHAPTER IV.

SOCRATES PROVES THE EXISTENCE OF A DEITY.

If there be any who believe what some have written by conjecture, that Socrates was indeed excellent in exciting men to virtue, but that he did not push them forward to make any great progress in it, let such reflect a little on what he said, not only when he endeavored to refute those that boasted they knew all things, but likewise in his familiar conversations, and let them judge afterwards if he was incapable to advance his friends in the paths of virtue.

I will, in the first place, relate a conference which he had with Aristodemus, surnamed the Little, touching the Deity, for he had heard that he never sacrificed to the gods; that he never addressed himself to them in prayer; that he never consulted the oracles, and even laughed at those that practiced these things, he took him to talk in this manner: —

"Tell me, Aristodemus, are there any persons whom you value on account of their merit?"

He answered, "Yes, certainly."

"Tell me their names," added Socrates.

Aristodemus replied: "For epic poetry I admire Homer as the most excellent; for dithyrambics, Melanippides; Sophocles for tragedy; Polycletes for statuary; and Zeuxis for painting."

"Which artists," said Socrates, "do you think to be most worthy of your esteem and admiration: they who make images without soul and motion, or they who make animals that move of their own accord, and are endowed with understanding?"

"No doubt the last," replied Aristodemus, "provided they make them not by chance, but with judgment and prudence."

Socrates went on: "As there are some things which we cannot say why they were made, and others which are apparently good and useful, tell me, my friend, whether of the two you rather take to be the work of prudence than of hazard."

"It is reasonable," said Aristodemus, "to believe that the things which are good and useful are the workmanship of reason and judgment."

"Do not you think then," replied Socrates, "that the first Former of mankind designed their advantage when he gave them the several senses by which objects are apprehended; eyes for things visible, and ears for sounds? Of what advantage would agreeable scents have been to us if nostrils suited to their reception had not been given? And for the pleasures of the taste, how could we ever have enjoyed these, if the tongue had not been fitted to discern and relish them? Further, does it not appear to you wisely provided that since the eye is of a delicate make, it is guarded with the eyelid drawn back when the eye is used, and covering it in sleep? How well does the hair at the extremity of the eyelid keep out dust, and the eyebrow, by its prominence, prevent the sweat of the forehead from running into the eye to its hurt. How wisely is the ear formed to receive all sorts of sounds, and not to be filled with any to the exclusion of others. Are not the fore teeth of all animals fitted to cut off proper portions of food, and their grinders to reduce it to

a convenient smallness? The mouth, by which we take in the food we like, is fitly placed just beneath the nose and eyes, the judges of its goodness; and what is offensive and disagreeable to our senses is, for that reason, placed at a proper distance from them. In short, these things being disposed in such order, and with so much care, can you hesitate one moment to determine whether it be an effect of providence or of chance?"

"I doubt not of it in the least," replied Aristodemus, "and the more I fix my thoughts on the contemplation of these things the more I am persuaded that all this is the masterpiece of a great workman, who bears an extreme love to men."

"What say you," continued Socrates, "to this, that he gives all animals a desire to engender and propagate their kind; that he inspires the mothers with tenderness and affection to bring up their young; and that, from the very hour of their birth, he infuses into them this great love of life and this mighty aversion to death?"

"I say," replied Aristodemus, "that it is an effect of his great care for their preservation."

"This is not all," said Socrates, "answer me yet farther; perhaps you would rather interrogate me. You are not, I persuade myself, ignorant that you are endowed with understanding; do you then think that there is not elsewhere an intelligent being? Particularly, if you consider that your body is only a little earth taken from that great mass which you behold. The moist that composes you is only a small drop of that immense heap of water that makes the sea; in a word, your body contains only a small part of all the elements, which are elsewhere in great quantity. There is nothing then but your understanding alone, which, by a wonderful piece of good fortune, must have come to you from I know not whence, if there were none in another place; and can it then be said that all this universe and all these so vast and numerous bodies have been disposed in so much order, without the help of an intelligent Being, and by mere chance?"

"I find it very difficult to understand it otherwise," answered Aristodemus, "because I see not the gods, who, you say, make and govern all things, as I see the artificers who do any piece of work amongst us."

"Nor do you see your soul neither," answered Socrates, "which governs your body; but, because you do not see it, will you from thence infer you do nothing at all by its direction, but that everything you do is by mere chance?"

Aristodemus now wavering said, "I do not despise the Deity, but I conceive such an idea of his magnificence and self-sufficiency, that I imagine him to have no need of me or my services."

"You are quite wrong," said Socrates, "for by how much the gods, who are so magnificent, vouchsafe to regard you, by so much you are bound to praise and adore them."

"It is needless for me to tell you," answered Aristodemus, "that, if I believed the gods interested themselves in human affairs, I should not neglect to worship them."

"How!" replied Socrates, "you do not believe the gods take care of men, they who have not only given to man, in common with other animals, the senses of

seeing, hearing, and taste, but have also given him to walk upright; a privilege which no other animal can boast of, and which is of mighty use to him to look forward, to remote objects, to survey with facility those above him, and to defend himself from any harm? Besides, although the animals that walk have feet, which serve them for no other use than to walk, yet, herein, have the gods distinguished man, in that, besides feet, they have given him hands, the instruments of a thousand grand and useful actions, on which account he not only excels, but is happier than all animals besides. And, further, though all animals have tongues, yet none of them can speak, like man's; his tongue only can form words, by which he declares his thoughts, and communicates them to others. Not to mention smaller instances of their care, such as the concern they take of our pleasures, in confining men to no certain season for the enjoying them, as they have done other animals.

"But Providence taketh care, not only of our bodies, but of our souls: it hath pleased the great Author of all, not only to give man so many advantages for the body, but (which is the greatest gift of all, and the strongest proof of his care) he hath breathed into him an intelligent soul, and that, too, the most excellent of all, for which of the other animals has a soul that knows the being of the Deity, by whom so many great and marvelous works are done? Is there any species but man that serves and adores him? Which of the animals can, like him, protect himself from hunger and thirst, from heat and cold? Which, like him, can find remedies for diseases, can make use of his strength, and is as capable of learning, that so perfectly retains the things he has seen, he has heard, he has known? In a word, it is manifest that man is a god in comparison with the other living species, considering the advantages he naturally has over them, both of body and soul. For, if man had a body like to that of an ox the subtlety of his understanding would avail him nothing, because he would not be able to execute what he should project. On the other hand, if that animal had a body like ours, yet, being devoid of understanding, he would be no better than the rest of the brute species. Thus the gods have at once united in your person the most excellent structure of body and the greatest perfection of soul; and now can you still say, after all, that they take no care of you? What would you have them do to convince you of the contrary?"

"I would have them," answered Aristodemus, "send on purpose to let me know expressly all that I ought to do or not to do, in like manner as you say they do give you notice."

"What!" said Socrates, "when they pronounce any oracle to all the Athenians, do you think they do not address themselves to you too, when by prodigies they make known to the Greeks the things that are to happen, are they silent to you alone, and are you the only person they neglect? Do you think that the gods would have instilled this notion into men, that it is they who can make them happy or miserable, if it were not indeed in their power to do so? And do you believe that the human race would have been thus long abused without ever discovering the cheat? Do you not know that the most ancient and wisest republics and people have been also the most pious, and that man, at the age when his judgment is ripest, has then the greatest bent to the worship of the Deity?

“My dear Aristodemus, consider that your mind governs your body according to its pleasure: in like manner we ought to believe that there is a mind diffused throughout the whole universe that disposes of all things according to its counsels. You must not imagine that your weak sight can reach to objects that are several leagues distant, and that the eye of God cannot, at one and the same time, see all things. You must not imagine that your mind can reflect on the affairs of Athens, of Egypt, and of Sicily, and that the providence of God cannot, at one and the same moment, consider all things. As, therefore, you may make trial of the gratitude of a man by doing him a kindness, and as you may discover his prudence by consulting him in difficult affairs, so, if you would be convinced how great is the power and goodness of God, apply yourself sincerely to piety and his worship; then, my dear Aristodemus, you shall soon be persuaded that the Deity sees all, hears all, is present everywhere, and, at the same time, regulates and superintends all the events of the universe.”

By such discourses as these Socrates taught his friends never to commit any injustice or dishonorable action, not only in the presence of men, but even in secret, and when they are alone, since the Divinity hath always an eye over us, and none of our actions can be hid from him.

CHAPTER V.

THE PRAISE OF TEMPERANCE.

And if temperance be a virtue in man, as undoubtedly it is, let us see whether any improvement can be made by what he said of it. I will here give you one of his discourses on that subject: —

"If we were engaged in a war," said he, "and were to choose a general, would we make choice of a man given to wine or women, and who could not support fatigues and hardships? Could we believe that such a commander would be capable to defend us and to conquer our enemies? Or if we were lying on our deathbed, and were to appoint a guardian and tutor for our children, to take care to instruct our sons in the principles of virtue, to breed up our daughters in the paths of honor and to be faithful in the management of their fortunes, should we think a debauched person fit for that employment? Would we trust our flocks and our granaries in the hands of a drunkard? Would we rely upon him for the conduct of any enterprise; and, in short, if a present were made us of such a slave, should we not make it a difficulty to accept him? If, then, we have so great an aversion for debauchery in the person of the meanest servant, ought we not ourselves to be very careful not to fall into the same fault? Besides, a covetous man has the satisfaction of enriching himself, and, though he take away another's estate, he increases his own; but a debauched man is both troublesome to others and injurious to himself. We may say of him that he is hurtful to all the world, and yet more hurtful to himself, if to ruin, not only his family, but his body and soul likewise, is to be hurtful. Who, then, can take delight in the company of him who has no other diversion than eating and drinking, and who is better pleased with the conversation of a prostitute than of his friends? Ought we not, then, to practice temperance above all things, seeing it is the foundation of all other virtues; for without it what can we learn that is good, what do that is worthy of praise? Is not the state of man who is plunged in voluptuousness a wretched condition both for the body and soul? Certainly, in my opinion, a free person ought to wish to have no such servants, and servants addicted to such brutal irregularities ought earnestly to entreat Heaven that they may fall into the hands of very indulgent masters, because their ruin will be otherwise almost unavoidable."

This is what Socrates was wont to say upon this subject. But if he appeared to be a lover of temperance in his discourses, he was yet a more exact observer of it in his actions, showing himself to be not only invincible to the pleasures of the senses, but even depriving himself of the satisfaction of getting an estate; for he held that a man who accepts of money from others makes himself a servant to all their humors, and becomes their slave in a manner no less scandalous than other slaveries.

CHAPTER VI.

THE DISPUTE OF SOCRATES WITH ANTIPHON, THE SOPHIST.

To this end it will not be amiss to relate, for the honor of Socrates, what passed between him and the sophist Antiphon, who designed to seduce away his hearers, and to that end came to him when they were with him, and, in their presence, addressed himself to him in these words: — "I imagined, Socrates, that philosophers were happier than other men; but, in my opinion, your wisdom renders you more miserable, for you live at such a rate that no footman would live with a master that treated him in the same manner. You eat and drink poorly, you are clothed very meanly — the same suit serves you in summer and winter — you go barefoot, and for all this you take no money, though it is a pleasure to get it; for, after a man has acquired it, he lives more genteelly and more at his ease. If, therefore, as in all other sorts of arts, apprentices endeavor to imitate their masters, should these who frequent your conversation become like you, it is certain that you will have taught them nothing but to make themselves miserable."

Socrates answered him in the following manner: — "You think, Antiphon, I live so poorly that I believe you would rather die than live like me. But what is it you find so strange and difficult in my way of living? You blame me for not taking money; is it because they who take money are obliged to do what they promise, and that I, who take none, entertain myself only with whom I think fit? You despise my eating and drinking; is it because my diet is not so good nor so nourishing as yours, or because it is more scarce and dearer, or lastly, because your fare seems to you to be better? Know that a man who likes what he eats needs no other ragoût, and that he who finds one sort of drink pleasant wishes for no other. As to your objection of my clothes, you appear to me, Antiphon, to judge quite amiss of the matter; for, do you not know that we dress ourselves differently only because of the hot or cold weather, and if we wear shoes it is because we would walk the easier? But, tell me, did you ever observe that the cold hath hindered me from going abroad? Have you ever seen me choose the cool and fresh shades in hot weather? And, though I go barefoot, do not you see that I go wherever I will? Do you not know that there are some persons of a very tender constitution, who, by constant exercise, surmount the weakness of their nature, and at length endure fatigues better than they who are naturally more robust, but have not taken pains to exercise and harden themselves like the others? Thus, therefore, do not you believe that I, who have all my life accustomed myself to bear patiently all manner of fatigues, cannot now more easily submit to this than you, who have never thought of the matter? If I have no keen desire after dainties, if I sleep little, if I abandon not myself to any infamous amour, the reason is because I spend my time more delightfully in things whose pleasure ends not in the moment of enjoyment, and that make me hope besides to receive an everlasting reward. Besides, you know very well, that when a man sees that his affairs go ill he is not generally very gay; and that, on the contrary, they who think to succeed in their designs, whether in agriculture, traffic, or any other undertaking, are very contented in their minds. Now, do you think that from anything whatsoever there can proceed a satisfaction equal to the inward consciousness of improving daily in virtue, and acquiring the

acquaintance and friendship of the best of men? And if we were to serve our friends or our country, would not a man who lives like me be more capable of it than one that should follow that course of life which you take to be so charming? If it were necessary to carry arms, which of the two would be the best soldier, he who must always fare deliciously, or he who is satisfied with what he finds? If they were to undergo a siege who would hold out longest, he who cannot live without delicacies, or he who requires nothing but what may easily be had? One would think, Antiphon, that you believe happiness to consist in good eating and drinking, and in an expensive and splendid way of life. For my part, I am of opinion that to have need of nothing at all is a divine perfection, and that to have need but of little is to approach very near the Deity, and hence it follows that, as there is nothing more excellent than the Deity, whatever approaches nearest to it is likewise most near the supreme excellence."

Another time Antiphon addressed himself to Socrates: "I confess you are an honest, well-meaning man, Socrates; but it is certain you know little or nothing, and one would imagine you own this to be true, for you get nothing by your teaching. And yet, I persuade myself, you would not part with your house, or any of the furniture of it, without some gratuity, because you believe them of some small value; nay, you would not part with them for less than they are worth: if, therefore, you thought your teaching worth anything you would be paid for it according to its value; in this, indeed, you show yourself honest, because you will not, out of avarice, cheat any man, but at the same time you discover, too, that you know but little, since all your knowledge is not worth the buying."

Socrates answered him in this manner: — "There is a great resemblance between beauty and the doctrine of philosophers; what is praiseworthy in the one is so in the other, and both of them are subject to the same vice: for, if a woman sells her beauty for money, we immediately call her a prostitute; but if she knows that a man of worth and condition is fallen in love with her, and if she makes him her friend, we say she is a prudent woman. It is just the same with the doctrine of philosophers; they that sell it are sophists, and like the public women, but if a philosopher observe a youth of excellent parts, and teaches him what he knows, in order to obtain his friendship, we say of him, that he acts the part of a good and virtuous citizen. Thus as some delight in fine horses, others in dogs, and others in birds; for my part all my delight is to be with my virtuous friends. I teach them all the good I know, and recommend them to all whom I believe capable to assist them in the way to perfection. We all draw together, out of the same fountain, the precious treasures which the ancient sages have left us; we run over their works, and if we find anything excellent we take notice of it and select it: in short, we believe we have made a great improvement when we begin to love one another." This was the answer he made, and when I heard him speak in this manner I thought him very happy, and that he effectually stirred up his hearers to the love of virtue.

Another time when Antiphon asked him why he did not concern himself with affairs of State, seeing he thought himself capable to make others good politicians? He returned this answer: — "Should I be more serviceable to the State if I took an

employment whose function would be wholly bounded in my person, and take up all my time, than I am by instructing everyone as I do, and in furnishing the Republic with a great number of citizens who are capable to serve her?”

CHAPTERVII.

IN WHAT MANNER SOCRATES DISSUADED MEN FROM SELF-CONCEIT AND OSTENTATION.

But let us now see whether by dissuading his friends from a vain ostentation he did not exhort them to the pursuit of virtue. He frequently said that there was no readier way to glory than to render oneself excellent, and not to affect to appear so. To prove this he alleged the following example: —

"Let us suppose," said he, "that anyone would be thought a good musician, without being so in reality; what course must he take? He must be careful to imitate the great masters in everything that is not of their art; he must, like them, have fine musical instruments; he must, like them, be followed by a great number of persons wherever he goes, who must be always talking in his praise. And yet he must not venture to sing in public: for then all men would immediately perceive not only his ignorance, but his presumption and folly likewise. And would it not be ridiculous in him to spend his estate to ruin his reputation? In like manner, if anyone would appear a great general, or a good pilot, though he knew nothing of either, what would be the issue of it? If he cannot make others believe it, it troubles him, and if he can persuade them to think so he is yet more unhappy, because, if he be made choice of for the steering of ships, or to command an army, he will acquit himself very ill of his office, and perhaps be the cause of the loss of his best friends. It is not less dangerous to appear to be rich, or brave, or strong, if we are not so indeed, for this opinion of us may procure us employments that are above our capacity, and if we fail to effect what was expected of us there is no remission for our faults. And if it be a great cheat to wheedle one of your neighbors out of any of his ready money or goods, and not restore them to him afterwards, it is a much greater impudence and cheat for a worthless fellow to persuade the world that he is capable to govern a Republic."

By these and the like arguments he inspired a hatred of vanity and ostentation into the minds of those who frequented him.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

A CONFERENCE OF SOCRATES WITH ARISTIPPUS
CONCERNING PLEASURE AND TEMPERANCE.

In the same manner, likewise, he encouraged his hearers by the following arguments to support hunger and thirst, to resist the temptations of love, to fly from laziness, and inure themselves to all manner of fatigues. For, being told that one of them lived too luxuriously, he asked him this question:

"If you were entrusted, Aristippus, with the education of two young men, one to be a prince and the other a private man, how would you educate them? Let us begin with their nourishment, as being the foundation of all."

"It is true," said Aristippus, "that nourishment is the foundation of our life, for a man must soon die if he be not nourished."

"You would accustom both of them," said Socrates, "to eat and drink at a certain hour?"

"It is likely I should?"

"But which of the two," said Socrates, "would you teach to leave eating before he was satisfied, to go about some earnest business?"

"Him, without doubt," answered Aristippus, "whom I intended to render capable to govern, to the end that under him the affairs of the Republic might not suffer by delay."

"Which of the two," continued Socrates, "would you teach to abstain from drinking when he was thirsty, to sleep but little, to go late to bed, to rise early, to watch whole nights, to live chastely, to get the better of his favorite inclinations, and not to avoid fatigues, but expose himself freely to them?"

"The same still," replied Aristippus. "And if there be any art that teaches to overcome our enemies, to which of the two is it rather reasonable to teach it?"

"To him to," said Aristippus, "for without that art all the rest would avail him nothing."

"I believe," said Socrates, "that a man, who has been educated in this manner, would not suffer himself to be so easily surprised by his enemies as the most part of animals do. For some perish by their gluttony, as those whom we allure with a bait, or catch by offering them to drink, and who fall into the snares, notwithstanding their fears and distrust. Others perish through their lasciviousness, as quails and partridges, who suffer themselves to be decoyed by the counterfeit voice of their females, and blindly following the amorous warmth that transports them, fall miserably into the nets."

"You say true," said Aristippus.

"Well, then," pursued Socrates, "is it not scandalous for a man to be taken in the same snares with irrational animals? And does not this happen to adulterers, who skulk and hide themselves in the chambers and closets of married women, though they know they run a very great risk, and that the laws are very strict and

rigorous against those crimes? They know themselves to be watched, and that, if they are taken, they shall not be let go with impunity. In a word, they see punishment and infamy hanging over the heads of criminals like themselves. Besides, they are not ignorant, that there are a thousand honorable diversions to deliver them from those infamous passions, and yet they run hand over head into the midst of these dangers, and what is this but to be wretched and desperate to the highest degree?"

"I think it so," answered Aristippus.

"What say you to this," continued Socrates, "that the most necessary and most important affairs of life, as those of war and husbandry, are, with others of little less consequence, performed in the fields and in the open air, and that the greatest part of mankind accustom themselves so little to endure the inclemency of the seasons, to suffer heat and cold? Is not this a great neglect? And do you not think that a man who is to command others ought to inure himself to all these hardships?"

"I think he ought," answered Aristippus.

"Therefore," replied Socrates, "if they who are patient and laborious, as we have said, are worthy to command, may we not say that they who can do nothing of all this, ought never to pretend to any office?"

Aristippus agreed to it, and Socrates went on.

"Since then you know the rank which either of these two sorts of men ought to hold, amongst which would you have us place you?"

"Me!" said Aristippus; "why truly, not amongst those that govern; for that is an office I would never choose. Let those rule who have a mind for it; for my part, I envy not their condition. For, when I reflect that we find it hard enough to supply our own wants, I do not approve of loading ourselves, besides, with the necessities of a whole people; and that being often compelled to go without many things that we desire, we should engage ourselves in an employment that would render us liable to blame, if we did not take care to supply others with everything they want: I think there is folly in all this. For republics make use of their magistrates as I do of my slaves, who shall get me my meat and drink, and all other necessaries, as I command, and not presume to touch any of it themselves; so, too, the people will have those, who govern the State, take care to provide them with plenty of all things, and will not suffer them to do anything for their own advantage. I think, therefore, that all who are pleased with a hurry of affairs, and in creating business for others, are most fit to govern, provided they have been educated and instructed in the manner we mentioned. But, for my part, I desire to lead a more quiet and easy life."

"Let us," said Socrates, "consider whether they who govern lead more happy lives than their subjects: among the nations that are known to us in Asia, the Syrians, the Phrygians, and the Lydians, are under the empire of the Persians. In Europe, the Mæotians are subject to the Scythians; in Africa, the Carthaginians reign over the rest of the Africans. Which now, in your opinion, are the most happy? Let us look into Greece, where you are at present. Whose condition, think you, is

most to be desired, that of the nations who rule, or of the people who are under the dominion of others?"

"I can never," said Aristippus, "consent to be a slave; but there is a way between both that leads neither to empire nor subjection, and this is the road of liberty, in which I endeavor to walk, because it is the shortest to arrive at true quiet and repose."

"If you had said," replied Socrates, "that this way, which leads neither to empire nor subjection, is a way that leads far from all human society, you would, perhaps, have said something; for, how can we live among men, and neither command nor obey? Do you not observe that the mighty oppress the weak, and use them as their slaves, after they have made them groan under the weight of oppression, and given them just cause to complain of their cruel usage, in a thousand instances, both general and particular? And if they find any who will not submit to the yoke, they ravage their countries, spoil their corn, cut down their trees, and attack them, in short, in such a manner that they are compelled to yield themselves up to slavery, rather than undergo so unequal a war? Among private men themselves, do not the stronger and more bold trample on the weaker?"

"To the end, therefore, that this may not happen to me," said Aristippus, "I confine myself not to any republic, but am sometimes here, sometimes there, and think it best to be a stranger wherever I am."

"This invention of yours," replied Socrates, "is very extraordinary. Travelers, I believe, are not now so much infested on the roads by robbers as formerly, deterred, I suppose, by the fate of Sinnis, Scyron, Procrustes, and the rest of that gang. What then? They who are settled in their own country, and are concerned in the administration of the public affairs, they have the laws in their favors, have their relations and friends to assist them, have fortified towns and arms for their defense: over and above, they have alliances with their neighbors: and yet all these favorable circumstances cannot entirely shelter them from the attempts and surprises of wicked men. But can you, who have none of these advantages, who are, for the most part, travelling on the roads, often dangerous to most men, who never enter a town, where you have not less credit than the meanest inhabitant, and are as obscure as the wretches who prey on the properties of others; in these circumstances, can you, I say, expect to be safe, merely because you are a stranger, or perhaps have got passports from the States that promise you all manner of safety coming or going, or should it be your hard fortune to be made a slave, you would make such a bad one, that a master would be never the better for you? For, who would suffer in his family a man who would not work, and yet expected to live well? But let us see how masters use such servants.

"When they are too lascivious, they compel them to fast till they have brought them so low, that they have no great stomach to make love, if they are thieves, they prevent them from stealing, by carefully locking up whatever they could take: they chain them for fear they should run away: if they are dull and lazy, then stripes and scourges are the rewards we give them. If you yourself, my friend, had a worthless slave, would you not take the same measures with him?"

“I would treat such a fellow,” answered Aristippus, “with all manner of severity, till I had brought him to serve me better. But, Socrates, let us resume our former discourse.”

“In what do they who are educated in the art of government, which you seem to think a great happiness, differ from those who suffer through necessity? For you say they must accustom themselves to hunger and thirst, to endure cold and heat, to sleep little, and that they must voluntarily expose themselves to a thousand other fatigues and hardships. Now, I cannot conceive what difference there is between being whipped willingly and by force, and tormenting one’s body either one way or the other, except that it is a folly in a man to be willing to suffer pain.”

“How,” said Socrates, “you know not this difference between things voluntary and constrained, that he who suffers hunger because he is pleased to do so may likewise eat when he has a mind; and he who suffers thirst because he is willing may also drink when he pleases. But it is not in the power of him who suffers either of them through constraint and necessity to relieve himself by eating and drinking the moment he desires it? Besides, he that voluntarily embraces any laborious exercise finds much comfort and content in the hope that animates him. Thus the fatigues of hunting discourage not the hunters, because they hope to take the game they pursue. And yet what they take, though they think it a reward for all their toil, is certainly of very little value. Ought not they, then, who labor to gain the friendship of good men, or to overcome their enemies, or to render themselves capable of governing their families, and of serving their country, ought not these, I say, joyfully to undertake the trouble, and to rest content, conscious of the inward approbation of their own minds, and the regard and esteem of the virtuous? And to convince you that it is good to impose labors on ourselves, it is a maxim among those who instruct youth that the exercises which are easily performed at the first attempt, and which we immediately take delight in, are not capable to form the body to that vigor and strength that is requisite in great undertakings, nor of imprinting in the soul any considerable knowledge: but that those which require patience, application, labor, and assiduity, prepare the way to illustrious actions and great achievements. This is the opinion of good judges, and of Hesiod in particular, who says somewhere —

‘To Vice, in crowded ranks, the course we steer,

The road is smooth, and her abode is near;

But Virtue’s heights are reached with sweat and pain,

For thus did the immortal powers ordain.

A long and rough ascent leads to her gate,

Nor, till the summit’s gained, does toil abate.’

And to the same purpose Epicharmus: —

“The gods confer their blessings at the price

Of labor — .”

Who remarks in another place —

“Thou son of sloth, avoid the charms of ease,

Lest pain succeed — .”

“Of the same opinion is Prodicus, in the book he has written of the life of Hercules, where Virtue and Pleasure make their court to that hero under the appearance of two beautiful women. His words, as near as I can remember, are as follows: —

“‘When Hercules,’ says the moralist, ‘had arrived at that part of his youth in which young men commonly choose for themselves, and show, by the result of their choice, whether they will, through the succeeding stages of their lives, enter into and walk in the path of virtue or that of vice, he went out into a solitary place fit for contemplation, there to consider with himself which of those two paths he should pursue.

“‘As he was sitting there in suspense he saw two women of a larger stature than ordinary approaching towards him. One of them had a genteel and amiable aspect; her beauty was natural and easy, her person and shape clean and handsome, her eyes cast towards the ground with an agreeable reserve, her motion and behavior full of modesty, and her raiment white as snow. The other wanted all the native beauty and proportion of the former; her person was swelled, by luxury and ease, to a size quite disproportioned and uncomely. She had painted her complexion, that it might seem fairer and ruddier than it really was, and endeavored to appear more graceful than ordinary in her mien, by a mixture of affectation in all her gestures. Her eyes were full of confidence, and her dress transparent, that the conceited beauty of her person might appear through it to advantage. She cast her eyes frequently upon herself, then turned them on those that were present, to see whether anyone regarded her, and now and then looked on the figure she made in her own shadow.

“‘As they drew nearer, the former continued the same composed pace, while the latter, striving to get before her, ran up to Hercules, and addressed herself to him in the following manner: —

“I perceive, my dear Hercules, you are in doubt which path in life you should pursue. If, then, you will be my friend and follow me, I will lead you to a path the most easy and most delightful, wherein you shall taste all the sweets of life, and live exempt from every trouble. You shall neither be concerned in war nor in the affairs of the world, but shall only consider how to gratify all your senses — your taste with the finest dainties and most delicious drink, your sight with the most agreeable objects, your scent with the richest perfumes and fragrancy of odors, how you may enjoy the embraces of the fair, repose on the softest beds, render your slumbers sweet and easy, and by what means enjoy, without even the smallest care, all those glorious and mighty blessings.

“And, for fear you suspect that the sources whence you are to derive those invaluable blessings might at some time or other fail, and that you might, of course, be obliged to acquire them at the expense of your mind and the united labor and fatigue of your body, I beforehand assure you that you shall freely enjoy all from the industry of others, undergo neither hardship nor drudgery, but have everything at your command that can afford you any pleasure or advantage.”

"'Hercules, hearing the lady make him such offers, desired to know her name, to which she answered, "My friends, and those who are well acquainted with me, and whom I have conducted, call me Happiness; but my enemies, and those who would injure my reputation, have given me the name of Pleasure."

"'In the meantime, the other lady approached, and in her turn accosted him in this manner: — "I also am come to you, Hercules, to offer my assistance; I, who am well acquainted with your divine extraction and have observed the excellence of your nature, even from your childhood, from which I have reason to hope that, if you would follow the path that leads to my residence, you will undertake the greatest enterprises and achieve the most glorious actions, and that I shall thereby become more honorable and illustrious among mortals. But before I invite you into my society and friendship I will be open and sincere with you, and must lay down this as an established truth, that there is nothing truly valuable which can be purchased without pains and labor. The gods have set a price upon every real and noble pleasure. If you would gain the favor of the Deity you must be at the pains of worshipping Him; if you would be beloved by your friends you must study to oblige them; if you would be honored by any city you must be of service to it; and if you would be admired by all Greece, on account of your probity and valor, you must exert yourself to do her some eminent service. If you would render your fields fruitful, and fill your arms with corn, you must labor to cultivate the soil accordingly. Would you grow rich by your herds, a proper care must be taken of them; would you extend your dominions by arms, and be rendered capable of setting at liberty your captive friends, and bringing your enemies to subjection, you must not only learn of those that are experienced in the art of war, but exercise yourself also in the use of military affairs; and if you would excel in the strength of your body you must keep your body in due subjection to your mind, and exercise it with labor and pains."

"'Here Pleasure broke in upon her discourse — "Do you see, my dear Hercules, through what long and difficult ways this woman would lead you to her promised delights? Follow me, and I will show you a much shorter and easier way to happiness."

"Alas!" replied the Goddess of Virtue, whose visage glowed with a passion made up of scorn and pity, "what happiness can you bestow, or what pleasure can you taste, who would never do anything to acquire it? You who will take your fill of all pleasures before you feel an appetite for any; you eat before you are hungry, you drink before you are athirst; and, that you may please your taste, must have the finest artists to prepare your viands; the richest wines that you may drink with pleasure, and to give your wine the finer taste, you search every place for ice and snow luxuriously to cool it in the heat of summer. Then, to make your slumbers uninterrupted, you must have the softest down and the easiest couches, and a gentle ascent of steps to save you from any the least disturbance in mounting up to them. And all little enough, heaven knows! For you have not prepared yourself for sleep by anything you have done, but seek after it only because you have nothing to do. It is the same in the enjoyments of love, in which you rather force than follow your inclinations, and are obliged to use arts, and even to pervert

nature, to keep your passions alive. Thus is it that you instruct your followers — kept awake for the greatest part of the night by debaucheries, and consuming in drowsiness all the most useful part of the day. Though immortal, you are an outcast from the gods, and despised by good men.

Never have you heard that most agreeable of all sounds, your own praise, nor ever have you beheld the most pleasing of all objects, any good work of your own hands. Who would ever give any credit to anything that you say? Who would assist you in your necessity, or what man of sense would ever venture to be of your mad parties? Such as do follow you are robbed of their strength when they are young, void of wisdom when they grow old. In their youth they are bred up in indolence and all manner of delicacy, and pass their old age with difficulties and distress, full of shame for what they have done, and oppressed with the burden of what they are to do, squanderers of pleasures in their youth, and hoarders up of afflictions for their old age.

"On the contrary, my conversation is with the gods, and with good men, and there is nothing excellent performed by either without my influence. I am respected above all things by the gods and by the best of mortals, and it is just I should. I am an agreeable companion to the artisan, a faithful security to masters of families, a kind assistant to servants, a useful associate in the arts of peace, a faithful ally in the labors of war, and the best uniter of all friendships.

"My votaries, too, enjoy a pleasure in everything they either eat or drink, even without having labored for it, because they wait for the demand of their appetites. Their sleep is sweeter than that of the indolent and inactive; and they are neither overburdened with it when they awake, nor do they, for the sake of it, omit the necessary duties of life. My young men have the pleasure of being praised by those who are in years, and those who are in years of being honored by those who are young. They look back with comfort on their past actions, and delight themselves in their present employments. By my means they are favored by the gods, beloved by their friends, and honored by their country; and when the appointed period of their lives is come they are not lost in a dishonorable oblivion, but live and flourish in the praises of mankind, even to the latest posterity."

"Thus, my dear Hercules, who are descended of divine ancestors, you may acquire, by virtuous toil and industry, this most desirable state of perfect happiness."

"Such was the discourse, my friend, which the goddess had with Hercules, according to Prodicus. You may believe that he embellished the thoughts with more noble expressions than I do. I heartily wish, my dear Aristippus, that you should make such an improvement of those divine instructions, as that you too may make such a happy choice as may render you happy during the future course of your life."

CHAPTER II.

SOCRATES' DISCOURSE WITH HIS ELDEST SON LAMPROCLES CONCERNING THE RESPECT DUE TO PARENTS.

Socrates observing his eldest son Lamprocles in a rage with his mother, spoke to him in this manner: —

"Come hither, my son. Have you ever heard of a certain sort of men, who are called ungrateful?"

"Very often," answered the young man.

"And do you know," said Socrates, "why they are called so?"

"We call a man ungrateful," answered Lamprocles, "who, having received a kindness, does not return the like if occasion offers."

"I think, therefore," said Socrates, "ingratitude is a kind of injustice?"

"I think so too," answered Lamprocles.

Socrates went on: — "Have you never considered of what nature this injustice is? For since it is an injustice to treat our friends ill, and on the contrary, a piece of justice to make our enemies smart for their conduct, may it be said, with like reason, that it is an injustice to be ungrateful towards our friends, and that it is just to be ungrateful towards our enemies."

"On mature consideration," answered Lamprocles, "I think it is criminal to do injustice to either of them."

"If, then," pursued Socrates, "ingratitude be an injustice, it follows that the greater the favors are which we have received, the greater is the injustice in not acknowledging them."

Lamprocles granted this consequence, and Socrates continued — "Can there be any stricter obligations than those that children are laid under to their parents? For it is they who gave them a being, and who have put them in a condition to behold all the wonders of Nature, and to partake of the many good things exhibited before them by the bounty of Providence, and which are so delightful, that there is not anything that all men more dread than to leave them; insomuch that all governments have ordained death to be the punishment of the most enormous crimes, because there is nothing can more effectually put a stop to the rage of the wicked than the apprehension of death. In the affair of marriage, it is not merely the gratification of the appetite which Nature has so strongly implanted in both sexes for their preservation that we regard; no, that passion can be satisfied in a less expensive manner, even in our streets, and other places; but when we design to enter into that state, we make choice of a woman of such a form and shape, by whom we may expect to have fine children, and of such a temper and disposition as to assure us of future happiness. When that is finished, it is then the chief care of the husband to maintain his wife, and to provide for his children things useful for life in the greatest abundance he can. On the part of the wife, many are her anxieties and troubles for the preservation of her offspring during the time of her pregnancy; she gives it then part of her nourishment and life; and after having suffered the sharpest pangs at the moment of its birth, she then gives it suck, and

continues her care and love to it. All this she does to the poor helpless infant, so void of reason, that it knows not even her that is so good to it, nor can ask her for its own necessities. Full of tenderness for the welfare and happiness of her babe, her whole time, day and night, is spent in pleasing it, without the least prospect of any recompense for all her fatigue. After this, when the children are come to an age fit to be instructed, the fathers teach them all the good things they can for the conduct of their life; and if they know any man more capable to instruct them than themselves, they send them to him, without regard to the expense, thus indicating by their whole conduct, what sincere pleasure it would afford them to see their children turn out men of virtue and probity."

"Undoubtedly," answered Lamprocles, "if my mother had done all this, and an hundred times as much, no man could suffer her ill-humors?"

"Do not you think," said Socrates, "that the anger of a beast is much more difficult to support than that of a mother?"

"Not of a mother like her," said Lamprocles.

Socrates continued, "What strange thing has she done to you? Has she bit you, has she kicked you, as beasts do when they are angry?"

"She has a tongue that no mortal can suffer," answered Lamprocles.

"And you," replied Socrates, "how many crosses did you give her in your infancy by your continual bawling and importunate actions? How much trouble by night and by day? How much affliction in your illnesses?"

"At worst," answered Lamprocles, "I never did nor said anything that might make her blush."

"Alas!" said Socrates, "is it more difficult for you to hear in patience the hasty expressions of your mother, than it is for the comedians to hear what they say to one another on the stage when they fall into the most injurious reproaches? For they easily suffer it, knowing well that when one reviles another, he reviles him not with intent to injure him; and when one threatens another, he threatens not with design to do him any harm. You who are fully convinced likewise of the intentions of your mother, and who know very well that the hard words she gives you do not proceed from hate, but that she has a great affection for you, how can you, then, be angry with her? Is it because you imagine that she wishes you ill?"

"Not in the least," answered Lamprocles; "I never had such a thought."

"What!" continued Socrates; "a mother that loves you; a mother who, in your sickness, does all she can to recover your health, who takes care that you want for nothing, who makes so many vows to heaven for you; you say this is an ill mother? In truth, if you cannot live with her, I will say you cannot live at your ease. Tell me, in short, do you believe you ought to have any reverence or respect for anyone whatever? Or do you not care for any man's favor and goodwill, neither for that of a general, suppose, or of any other magistrate?"

"On the contrary," said Lamprocles, "I am very careful to gain the goodwill of all men."

“Perhaps you would endeavor to acquire the goodwill of your neighbor, to the end he might do you kind offices, such as giving you fire when you want it, or, when any misfortune befalls you, speedily relieve you?”

“Yes, I would.”

“And if you were travelling with any man, either by sea or land, would you count it a matter of indifference whether you were loved by him or not?”

“No, indeed.”

“Are you then so abandoned, Lamprocles,” replied Socrates, “that you would take pains to acquire the goodwill of those persons, and yet will do nothing to your mother, who loves you incomparably better than they? Know you not that the Republic concerns not herself with common instances of ingratitude; that she takes no cognizance of such crimes, and that she neglects to punish those who do not return the civilities they receive? But if anyone be disrespectful to his parents there is a punishment provided for such ingratitude; the laws reject him as an outlaw, and will not allow him to be received into any public office, because it is a maxim commonly received amongst us, that a sacrifice, when offered by an impious hand, cannot be acceptable to the gods, nor profitable to the Republic. Nobody can believe, that a person of such a character can be capable to perform any great or worthy action, or to act the part of a righteous judge. The same punishment is ordained likewise for those who, after the death of their parents, neglect to honor their funerals: and this is particularly examined into in the inquiry that is made into the lives of such as stand candidates for offices.

“Therefore, my son, if you be wise, you will beseech Heaven to pardon you the offences committed against your mother, to the end that the favors of the Deity may be still continued to you, and that you may not forfeit them by an ungrateful behavior. Take care, likewise, that the public may not discover the contempt you show her, for then would you be blamed and abandoned by all the world; for, if it were suspected that you did not gratefully resent the benefits conferred on you by your parents, no man could believe you would be grateful for any kind actions that others might do you.”

CHAPTER III.

SOCRATES RECONCILES CHAEREPHON AND CHAERECRATES, TWO BROTHERS WHO WERE FORMERLY AT VARIANCE.

Two brothers, whose names were Chaerephon and Chaerecrates, were at enmity with each other. Socrates was acquainted with them, and had a great mind to make them friends. Meeting therefore with Chaerecrates, he accosted him thus: —

"Are you, too, one of those who prefer the being rich to the having a brother, and who do not consider that riches, being inanimate things, have need of being defended, whereas a brother is himself a good defense, and, after all, that there is more money than brothers? For is it not extravagant in such men to imagine that a brother does them wrong because they enjoy not his estate? Why say they not likewise, that all the world does them wrong, because they are not in possession of what belongs to the rest of mankind? But they believe, with great reason, that it is better to live in society and to be ensured of a moderate estate than to have the sole possession of all that is their neighbors', and to be exposed to the dangers that are inseparable from solitude. Nevertheless, they are not of the same opinion as to the company of their brothers. If they are rich they buy themselves slaves to serve them, they procure themselves friends to stand by them; but for their brothers they neglect them; as if a brother were not so fit to make a friend of as another person. And yet it is of great efficacy towards the begetting and establishing of friendships to have been born of the same parents and brought up together, since even beasts, we see, retain some inclination for those who have come from the same dams, and have been bred up and nourished together. Besides, a man who has a brother is the more regarded for it, and men are more cautious to offend him."

Chaerecrates answered him thus: —

"You are indeed in the right to say that a good brother is a great happiness; and, unless there be a very strong cause of dissension, I think that brothers ought a little to bear with one another, and not part on a slight occasion; but when a brother fails in all things, and is quite the reverse of what he ought to be, would you have a man do what is impossible and continue in good amity with such a person?"

Socrates replied, "Does your brother give offence to all the world as well as to you? Does nobody speak well of him?"

"That," said Chaerecrates, "is one of the chief causes of the hatred I bear him, for he is sly enough to please others; but whenever we two happen to meet you would think his sole design were to fall out with me."

Socrates replied, "Does not this proceed from what I am going to say? When any man would make use of a horse, and knows not how to govern him, he can expect nothing from him but trouble. Thus, if we know not in what manner to behave ourselves toward our brother, do you think we can expect anything from him but uneasiness?"

“Why do you imagine,” said Chaerecrates, “that I am ignorant in what manner I ought to carry myself to a brother, since I can show him as much love and respect, both in my words and actions, as he can show me in his? But when I see a man endeavor to disoblige me all manner of ways, shall I express any goodwill for that man? No; this is what I cannot do, and will not so much as endeavor it.”

“I am astonished to hear you talk after this manner,” said Socrates; “pray tell me, if you had a dog that were good to keep your flocks, who should fawn on your shepherds, and grin his teeth and snarl whenever you come in his way, whether, instead of being angry with him, you would not make much of him to bring him to know you? Now, you say that a good brother is a great happiness; you confess that you know how to oblige, and yet you put it not in practice to reconcile yourself with Chaerephon.”

“I fear I have not skill enough to compass it.”

“I think,” said Socrates, “there will be no need of any extraordinary skill in the matter; and am certain that you have enough to engage him to wish you well, and to have a great value for you.”

“Pray,” cried Chaerecrates, “if you know any art I have to make myself beloved, let me know it immediately, for hitherto I never perceived any such thing.”

“Answer me,” said Socrates. “If you desired that one of your friends should invite you to his feast when he offered a sacrifice, what course would you take?”

“I would begin first to invite him to mine.”

“And if you would engage him to take care of your affairs in your absence on a journey, what would you do?”

“I would first, during his absence, take care of his.”

“And if you would have a foreigner entertain you in his family when you come into his country, what method would you take?”

“I would make him welcome at my house when he came to this town, and would endeavor to further the dispatch of his business, that he might do me the like favor when I should be in the city where he lives.”

“Strange,” said Socrates, “that you, who know the common methods of ingratiating yourself, will not be at the pains of practicing them. Why do you scruple to begin to practice those methods? Is it because you are afraid that, should you begin with your brother, and first do him a kindness, you would appear to be of a mean-spirited and cringing disposition? Believe me, my friend, you will never, on that account, appear such. On the contrary, I take it to be the part of an heroic and generous soul to prevent our friends with kindness and our enemies with valor. Indeed, had I thought that Chaerephon had been more proper than you to propose the reconciliation, I would have endeavored to have persuaded him to prevent you; but I take you to be more fit to manage this matter, and believe you will bring it to pass rather than him.”

“What you say is absurd and unworthy of you,” replied Chaerecrates. “Would you have me break the ice; I, who am the younger brother? Do you forget that among all nations the honor to begin is reserved to the elder?”

“How do you mean?” said Socrates. “Must not a younger brother give the precedency to the older? Must he not rise up when he comes in, give him the best place, and hold his peace to let him speak? Delay, therefore, no longer to do what I desire you; go and try to appease your brother. He will receive you with open arms; it is enough that he is a friend to honor, and of a generous temper, for as there is no readier way to gain the goodwill of the mean and poor than by being liberal to them, so nothing has more influence on the mind of a man of honor and note than to treat him with respect and friendship.”

Chaerecrates objected: “But when I have done what you say, if my brother should not be better tempered, what then?”

“What harm would it be to you?” said Socrates. “It will show your goodness, and that you love him, and make him appear to be ill-natured, and not deserving to be obliged by any man. But I am of opinion this will not happen, and when he sees that you attack him with civilities and good offices, I am certain he will endeavor to get the better of you in so kind and generous a contention. You are now in the most wretched condition imaginable. It is as if the hands which God has given us reciprocally to aid each other were employed only to hinder one another, or as if the feet, which by the divine providence were made to assist each other to walk, were busied only in preventing one another from going forward. Would it not, then, be a great ignorance, and at the same time a great misfortune, to turn to our disadvantage what was made only for our utility? Now, it is certain that God has given us brothers only for our good; and that two brothers are a greater advantage to one another than it can be to either of them to have two hands, two feet, two eyes, and other the like members, which are double in our body, and which Nature has designed as brothers. For the hands cannot at the same time reach two things several fathoms distant from one another; the feet cannot stretch themselves from the end of one fathom to another; the eyes, which seem to discover from so far, cannot, at the same time, see the fore and hind-part of one and the same object; but when two brothers are good friends, no distance of place can hinder them from serving each other.”

CHAPTER IV.

A DISCOURSE OF SOCRATES CONCERNING FRIENDSHIP.

I remember likewise a discourse which I have heard him make concerning friendship, and that may be of great use to instruct us by what means we ought to procure ourselves friends, and in what manner we should live with them. He said "that most men agree that a true friend is a precious treasure, and that nevertheless there is nothing about which we give ourselves so little trouble as to make men our friends. We take care," said he, "to buy houses, lands, slaves, flocks, and household goods, and when we have them we endeavor to keep them, but though a friend is allowed to be capable of affording us a far greater happiness than any or all of these, yet how few are solicitous to procure themselves a friend, or, when they have, to secure his friendship? Nay, some men are so stupid as to prefer their very slaves to their friends. How else can we account for their want of concern about the latter when either in distress or sickness, and at the same time their extreme anxiety for the recovery of the former when in the same condition? For then immediately physicians are sent for, and all remedies that can be thought of applied to their relief. Should both of them happen to die, they will regret more the loss of their slave than of their friend, and shed more tears over the grave of the former than of the latter. They take care of everything but their friends; they will examine into and take great notice of the smallest trifle in their affairs, which perhaps stand in no need of their care, but neglect their friends that do. In short, though they have many estates, they know them all; but though they have but few friends, yet they know not the number of them; insomuch that if they are desired to name them, they are puzzled immediately, so little are their friends in their thoughts. Nevertheless, there is nothing comparable to a good friend; no slave is so affectionate to our person or interest; no horse can render us so great service; in a word, nothing is so useful to us in all occasions. For a true friend supplies all the wants and answers all the demands of another, either in the conduct of his private affairs or in the management of the public. If, for instance, his friend be obliged to do a kindness to any man, he puts him in the way of it; if he be assaulted with any danger he immediately flies to his relief. At one time he gives him part of his estate, at another he assists him with the labor of his hands; sometimes he helps him to persuade, sometimes he aids him to compel; in prosperity he heightens his delight by rejoicing with him; in adversity he diminishes his sorrows by bearing a share of them. The use a man may make of his hands, his eyes, his ears, his feet, is nothing at all when compared with the service one friend may render another. For often what we cannot do for our own advantage, what we have not seen, nor thought, nor heard of, when our own interests were concerned, what we have not pursued for ourselves, a friend has done for his friend. How foolish were it to be at so much trouble in cultivating a small orchard of trees, because we expect some fruit from it, and yet be at no pains to cultivate that which is instead of a whole estate — I mean Friendship — a soil the most glorious and fertile where we are sure to gather the fairest and best of fruit!"

CHAPTER V.

OF THE WORTH AND VALUE OF FRIENDS.

To what I have advanced above I shall here relate another discourse of his, as far as I can remember, in which he exhorted his hearers to examine themselves, that they might know what value their friends might set upon them; for seeing a man who had abandoned his friend in extreme poverty, he asked Antisthenes this question in presence of that very man and several others: —

"Can we set a price upon friends as we do upon slaves? One slave may be worth twenty crowns, another not worth five; such a one will cost fifty crowns, another will yield a hundred. Nay, I am told that Nicias, the son of Niceratus, gave even six hundred crowns for one slave to be inspector of his silver mines. Do you think we might likewise set prices upon friends?"

"I believe we may," answered Antisthenes; "for there are some men by whom I would rather choose to be loved than to have twenty crowns; others for whose affection I would not spend five. I know some, too, for whose friendship I would give all I am worth."

"If it be so," said Socrates, "it would be well that each man should consider how much he can be worth to his friends, and that he should endeavor to render himself as valuable as he can in their regard, to the end they might not abandon him; for when I hear one complain that his friend has betrayed him; another that he, whom he thought faithful, has preferred a small gain to the preservation of his friendship, I reflect on these stories, and ask whether, as we sell a good-for-nothing slave for what we can get for him, we are not likewise tempted to get rid of an ill-friend when we are offered more for him than he is worth? Because I do not see men part with their slaves if they be good, nor abandon their friends if they be faithful."

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE CHOICE OF FRIENDS.

The following conversation of Socrates with Critobulus may teach us how we ought to try friends, and with whom it is good to contract friendship: —

"If we were to choose a friend," said Socrates to him, "what precaution ought we to take? Ought we not to look out for a man who is not given to luxury, to drunkenness, to women, nor to idleness? For with these vices he could never be very useful to his friend nor to himself."

"That is certain," answered Critobulus.

"Then," said Socrates, "if we found a man that loved to live great, though he had not an estate to support the expense, and who having daily occasion to employ the purses of his friends should show by his actions that whatever you lend him is so much lost, and that if you do not lend him he will take it ill of you, do you not think that such a man would be very improper to make a friend of?"

"There is no doubt of it," said Critobulus.

"And if we found another," continued Socrates, "who was saving of what he had, but who, on the other hand, was so covetous that it would be quite unfit to have anything to do with him, because he would always be very ready to receive and never to give again?"

"In my opinion," said Critobulus, "this would be a worse friend than the former."

"And if we should find a man who was so carried away with the desire of enriching himself that he applied his mind to nothing else, but getting all he could scrape together?"

"We ought not to have anything to do with him neither," answered Critobulus, "for he would be good to no man but himself."

"If we found a quarrelsome man," continued Socrates, "who was every day like to engage all his friends in new broils and squabbles, what would you think of him?"

"That he ought to be avoided," answered Critobulus.

"And if a man," said Socrates, "were free from all these faults, and were only of a humor to desire to receive kindnesses, but never to concern himself to return them, what would you think of him?"

"That neither he, too, would be proper to make a friend of:" replied Critobulus, "and indeed, after having rejected so many, I can scarce tell whom we should take."

"We ought to take," said Socrates, "a man who were the reverse of all those we have mentioned, who would be temperate in his manners, faithful in his promises, and sincere in all his actions; who would think it a point of honor not to be outdone in civilities so that it would be of advantage to have to do with him."

"But how can we be certain of all this," said Critobulus, "before we have tried him?"

“When we would give our judgment of statuaries, we have no regard,” replied Socrates, “to what they say of themselves, but consider their works; and he who has already made good statues is the person of whom we have the best opinion for those he shall make for the future. Apply this to the question you asked me, and be assured that a man who has served his former friends well will be likely to show no less affection for those that come after; as we may strongly conjecture that a groom, whom we have formerly seen dress horses very well, is capable of dressing others.”

“But,” said Critobulus, “when we have found a man worthy of our choice, how ought we to contract a friendship with him?”

“In the first place,” answered Socrates, “we must inquire whether the gods approve of it.”

“But supposing they do not dissuade us, how are we to take this precious prey?”

“Not by hunting, as we catch hares,” said Socrates; “nor in nets, as we take birds, nor by force, as we take our enemies; for it is very difficult to gain any man’s friendship against his will, or stop him by force, and detain him in prison as a slave, seeing such ill-usage would oblige him rather to wish us ill than to love us.”

“What, then, ought we to do?” pursued Critobulus.

“It is reported,” replied Socrates, “that there are some words so powerful that they who know them make themselves loved by pronouncing them, and that there are likewise other charms for the same purpose.”

“And where can one learn these words?” added Critobulus.

“Have you not read in Homer,” answered Socrates, “what the Syrens said to enchant Ulysses? The beginning of it is thus —

‘Oh, stay! oh, pride of Greece, Ulysses, stay!’

“You say true,” continued Critobulus; “but did not they say as much to the others, to stop them too?”

“Not at all,” said Socrates, “they enchanted with these words only the generous men who were in love with virtue.”

“I begin to understand you,” said Critobulus, “and seeing this charm, which is so powerful to enchant and captivate the mind, is nothing but praise, you mean that we ought to praise a man in such a manner that he may not distrust we laugh at him; otherwise, instead of gaining his affection, we shall incur his hate; for it would be insupportable to a man, who knows he is little and weak, to be praised for his graceful appearance, for being well-shaped, and of a robust constitution.”

“But do you know no other charms?”

“No,” answered Socrates; “but I have indeed heard it said, that Pericles knew a great many, by means of which he charmed the Republic, and gained the favor and esteem of all.”

Critobulus continued, “What was it that Themistocles did to make himself so esteemed?”

“He used no other charms,” said Socrates, “than the eminent services he rendered to the State.”

“Which is as much as to say,” replied Critobulus, “that to gain the friendship of the great, we must render ourselves capable to perform great actions.”

“And could you think it possible,” said Socrates, “that anyone should share in the friendship of men of merit without being possessed of one good quality?”

“Why not?” answered Critobulus; “I have seen despicable rhetoricians beloved by the most famous orators, and persons who knew nothing of war live in familiarity with great generals.”

“But have you seen men who are fit for nothing (for that is the question we speak of) get any friends of consequence?”

“I confess I have not,” answered Critobulus; “nevertheless, since it is impossible for a man of no worth whatever to have the friendship of men of condition and merit, tell me whether the man who acquires the character of worth and merit obtains, at the same time, the friendship of all who possess that excellent character?”

“The reason, I suppose, why you ask this question,” answered Socrates, “is because you frequently observe dissensions among those who equally cherish honor, and would all of them rather die than commit a base action; and you are surprised, that instead of living in friendship, they disagree among themselves, and are sometimes more difficult to reconcile than the vilest of all man.”

“This is a misfortune,” added Critobulus, “that arrives not among private men only; for dissensions, nay, even wars, will happen sometimes, to break out in the best-governed republics, where virtue is in the highest repute, and where vice is held in the utmost contempt. Now, when I revolve these considerations in my mind, I know not where to go in search of friends; for it is impossible, we see, for the wicked to cultivate a true friendship among themselves. Can there subsist a true and lasting friendship amongst the ungrateful, the idle, the covetous, the treacherous, and the dissolute? No, for persons of such a character will mutually expose themselves to hatred and contempt; to hatred, because of the hurtful effects of their vices; to contempt, on account of the deformity of them. Neither, on the other hand, can we expect, as you have well observed, to find friendship between a virtuous man and a person of the opposite character. For how can they who commit crimes be in good amity with those that abhor them? But what puzzles me most, my dear Socrates, is to see men of merit and virtue harassing one another, and endeavoring, to the utmost of their power, to crush and ruin their antagonists, when, in different interests, both are contending for the most lucrative posts of the Republic. I am quite at a loss to account for such a conduct on the principles of friendship; for when I daily observe the noblest affections of the mind rooted up by the sordid views of interest, I am in a great doubt whether there is any real friendship and affection in the world.”

“My dear friend,” replied Socrates, “this matter is very intricate; for, if I mistake not, Nature has placed in men the principles both of friendship and dissension. Of friendship, because they have need of one another, they have compassion of their

miseries, they relieve one another in their necessities, and they are grateful for the assistances which they lend one another: of dissension, because one and the same thing being agreeable to many they contend to have it, and endeavor to prejudice and thwart one another in their designs. Thus strife and anger beget war, avarice stifles benevolence, envy produces hate. But friendship overcoming all these difficulties, finds out the virtuous, and unites them together. For, out of a motive of virtue they choose rather to live quietly in a mean condition, than to gain the empire of the whole earth by the calamities of war. When they are pinched with hunger or thirst, they endure them with constancy, till they can relieve themselves without being troublesome to anyone. When at any time their desires for the enjoyments of love grow violent and headstrong, then reason, or self-government, lays hold on the reins, checks the impetuosity of the passion, keeps it within due bounds, and will not allow them to transgress the great rule of their duty. They enjoy what is lawfully their own, and are so far from usurping the rights and properties of others, that they even give them part of what they have. They agree their differences in such a manner, that all are gainers, and no man has reason to complain. They are never transported with anger so far as to commit any action of which they may afterwards repent. Envy is a passion they are ignorant of, because they live in a mutual communication of what they possess, and consider what belongs to their friends as things in their own possession. From hence you see that the virtuous do not only not oppose, but that they aid one another in the employments of the Republic; for they who seek for honors and great offices, only to have an opportunity of enriching themselves, and exercising a cruel tyranny, or to live an easy and effeminate life, are certainly very wicked and unjust, nor can they ever hope to live in friendship with any man.

"But why should he who desires not any authority, but only the better to defend himself from the wicked, or to assist his friends, or be serviceable to his country; why should such a man, I say, not agree with another, whose intentions are the same with his own? Is it because he would be less capable to serve the Republic, if he had virtuous associates in the administration of affairs? If, in the tournaments and other games, the most strong were permitted to enter into a league against the weaker, they would infallibly be victors in all the courses, and win all the prizes; for which reason they are not suffered to do so. Therefore, in affairs of State, since no man is hindered from joining with whom he pleases, to do good to the Republic, is it not more advantageous, when we concern ourselves in the government, to make friendship with men of honor and probity, who are generally, too, the most knowing and capable, and to have them for our associates than to make them our adversaries? For it is manifest, that when a man is engaged in a combat, he ought to have some to assist him, and that he will have need of a great many, if those whom he opposes be valiant and powerful. Besides, he must be liberal, and give presents to those who espouse his quarrel, to encourage them to make a more resolute and vigorous defense. Now, it is beyond all dispute, that it is much better to oblige the good, though they are but a few, than the wicked, of whom there is a great number, because the former are easily gained over to your side; whereas the

latter are hardly won by the best favors, and those in the greatest abundance, too, to espouse your interest.

"However it be, Critobulus, take courage, endeavor only to become virtuous, and then boldly pursue the friendship of honest men; this is a sort of chase in which I may be helpful to you, because I am naturally inclined to love. I attack briskly those I love, and lay out all my skill to make myself beloved by them. I endeavor to kindle in their minds a flame like mine, and to make them desire my company, as ardently as I long for theirs. You stand in need of this address when you would contract a friendship with anyone. Hide not, then, the secrets of your soul from me, but let me know who they are for whom you have a regard: for, having made it my study to please those who were agreeable to me, I believe that, by long experience, I have now got some considerable insight into the pursuits and ways of men."

"I have longed a great while," said Critobulus, "to learn this art, especially if it may be employed to gain me the friendship of those whose persons are not only comely and genteel, but whose minds are replenished and adorned with all virtue."

Socrates replied: "But my method forbids to use violence, and I am of opinion that all men fled from the wretch Scylla, because she detained them by force: whereas the Syrens did no violence to any man, and employed only their tuneful voices to detain those who passed near them, so that all stopped to hear, and suffered themselves to be insensibly charmed by the music of their songs."

"Be sure," said Critobulus, "that I will use no violence to them whose friendship I would gain, and therefore delay no longer to teach me your art."

"Will you give me your word likewise," said Socrates, "that you will not even give them a kiss?"

"I promise you," said Critobulus, "I will not, unless they are very beautiful persons."

"You mistake the matter," replied Socrates; "the beautiful permit not those liberties; but the ugly grant them freely enough, because they know very well that should any beauty be ascribed to them, it is only in consideration of that of the soul."

"I will not transgress in this point," said Critobulus; "only impart to me the secret you know to gain friends."

"When you would contract a friendship with anyone," said Socrates, "you must give me leave to tell him that you have a great esteem for him, and that you desire to be his friend."

"With all my heart," answered Critobulus; "for sure no man can wish ill to a man who esteems him."

"And if I add besides," continued Socrates, "that because you set a great value on his merit you have much affection for his person, will you not take it amiss?"

"Not at all," said Critobulus; "for I am sensible we have a great kindness for those who bear us goodwill."

“I may, then,” said Socrates, “speak in that manner to those whom you desire to love: but will you likewise give me leave to advance that your greatest pleasure is to have good friends, that you take great care of them, that you behold their good actions with as much joy as if you yourself had performed them, and that you rejoice at their good fortune as much as at your own: that you are never weary when you are serving them, and that you believe it the glory of a man of honor to surpass his friends in benefits, and his enemies in valor? By this means I think I shall be very useful to you in procuring you good friends.”

“Why do you ask me leave,” said Critobulus, “as if you might not say of me whatever you please?”

“No, indeed,” answered Socrates, “for I remember what Aspasia once said, that match-makers are successful in their business when they tell truth of the persons in whose behalf they court, but that the marriages made by their lies are unfortunate, because they who are deceived hate one another, and hate yet more the person that put them together. And therefore, for the same reason, I think I ought not to tell lies in your praise.”

“You are then so far only my friend,” replied Critobulus, “that if I have any good qualities to make myself be esteemed, you will assist me; if not, you will invent nothing in my behalf.”

“And do you think,” said Socrates, “that I should do you more service in giving you false praises, that are not your due, than by exhorting you to merit the praise of all men? If you doubt of this, consider the consequences of it. If, for instance, I should tell the owner of a ship that you are an excellent pilot, and he upon that should give you the conduct of the vessel, what hopes could you have that you should not perish? Or if I should say, publicly, that you are an experienced general, or a great politician, and if you, by that character which I should unjustly have obtained for you, should be promoted to the supreme magistracy, to what dangers would you expose your own life, and the fortune of the State? Or if I should make any private person believe that you were a good economist, and he should trust you afterwards with the care of his family, would not you be the ruin of his estate, and expose yourself to ridicule and contempt? Which is as much as to say, Critobulus, that the shortest and surest way to live with honor in the world is to be in reality what we would appear to be: and if you observe, you will find that all human virtues increase and strengthen themselves by the practice and experience of them. Take my advice, then, and labor to acquire them: but if you are of a different opinion, pray let me know it.”

“I might well be ashamed,” answered Critobulus, “to contradict you: for no good nor solid objection can be brought against so rational an assertion.”

CHAPTER VII.

SOCRATES SHOWS ARISTARCHUS
HOW TO GET RID OF POVERTY.

Socrates had an extreme tenderness for his friends, and if through imprudence they fell into any misfortune, he endeavored to comfort them by his good counsels; if they labored under poverty he did all he could to relieve them, teaching all men that they ought mutually to assist one another in necessity. I will set down some examples of his behavior in these occasions.

Meeting Aristarchus, who looked very dejected, he said to him, "I see, Aristarchus, that something troubles you, but impart the cause of your grief to your friends, and perhaps we may comfort you."

"Indeed," said he, "I am in great affliction; for since the late troubles, many persons having fled for shelter to the Piraeus, it has so fallen out that my sisters, nieces, and cousins have all thrown themselves upon me, so that I have no less than fourteen of them to maintain. You know very well that we receive no profit of our lands, the enemies being masters of the open country; our houses in the city are uninhabited, there being at present very little company in Athens; nobody will buy any goods; no man will lend money upon any interest whatever, and I believe we may as soon take it up in the middle of the streets as find where to borrow it. And I am much concerned that I shall not be able to assist my relations whom I see ready to perish, while it is impossible for me to maintain them in the present scarcity of all things."

Socrates having heard him patiently, said to him, "How comes it to pass that Ceramon, who has so many persons in his family, finds means not only to maintain them, but likewise to enrich himself by the profit he makes of them, and that you are afraid of starving to death, because you have a great many in your family?"

"The reason," answered Aristarchus, "is this, Ceramon has none but slaves to take care of, and I am to provide for persons who are free."

Socrates went on: "For which have you most esteem, for Ceramon's slaves, or for the persons who are at your house?"

"There is no comparison between them," said Aristarchus.

"Is it not then a shameful thing," replied Socrates, "that Ceramon should grow rich by means of those whom you acknowledge to be of less value, and that you should grow poor and be reduced to straits, though you keep men of condition in your house, whom you value more?"

"By no means," said Aristarchus, "there is a wide difference between the two; the slaves that Ceramon keeps follow some trades, but the persons I have with me have had a liberal education and follow none."

"May not he," replied Socrates, "who knows how to do anything that is useful be said to know a trade?"

"Yes, certainly."

"And are not," continued Socrates, "oatmeal, bread, the clothes of men and women, cassocks, coats, and other the like manufactures, things very useful?"

“Without doubt.”

“And do not the persons at your house know how to make any of these things?”

“On the contrary,” said Aristarchus, “I believe they know how to make all of them.”

“What are you then afraid of,” added Socrates? “Why do you complain of poverty, since you know how to get rich? Do not you observe how wealthy Nausicides is become, what numerous herds he is master of, and what vast sums he lends the Republic? Now what made this man so rich? Why, nothing but one of those manufactures we mentioned, that of making oatmeal. You see, too, that Cirthes keeps all his family, and lives at his ease upon what he has got by being a baker. And how does Demeas, of the village of Colyttus, get his livelihood? By making cassocks. What makes Menon live so comfortably? His cloak manufacture. And are not most of the inhabitants of Megara in good circumstances enough by the trade which they drive of coats and short jackets?”

“I grant all this,” said Aristarchus, “but still there is a difference between these persons and me: for, whereas, they have with them some barbarians whom they have bought, and compel to work what brings them in gain; I, for my part, keep only ladies and gentlemen at my house, persons who are free, and some of them my own relations. Now would you have me to set them to work?”

“And because they are free and your relations,” said Socrates, “do you think they ought to do nothing but eat and sleep? Do you observe that they, who live thus idle and at their ease, lead more comfortable lives than others? Do you think them more content, more cheerful, that is to say, happier than those who employ themselves in any of those manufactures we have mentioned, or in whatever else tends to the utility or convenience of life? Do you imagine that idleness and laziness contribute toward our learning things necessary; that they can enable us to retain those things we have already learnt; that they help to strengthen the body or keep it in health; that they can assist us to get riches, or keep what we have got already; and do you believe that labor and industry are good for nothing? Why did your ladies learn what you say they know. Did they believe them to be useless things, and had they resolved never to put them in practice? Or, on the contrary, was it with design to employ themselves in those matters, and to get something by them? Is it a greater piece of wisdom to sit still and do nothing, than to busy oneself in things that are of use in life, and that turn to account? And is it not more reasonable for a man to work than to be with his arms across, thinking how he shall do to live? Shall I tell you my mind, Aristarchus? Well, then, I am of opinion that in the condition you are in you cannot love your guests, nor they you for this reason, that you, on the one hand, feel they are a burden to you, and they, on the other, perceive you uneasy and discontented on their account. And it is to be feared that the discontent will increase on both sides, and that the sense of past favors will wear off; but when you set them to work you will begin to love them, because they will bring you some profit; and when they find that you regard them with more complacency they will not fail to have more love for you. The remembrance of your kindnesses will be more grateful to them, and the obligations they have to you will

be the greater. In a word, you will be kinder relations and better friends. Indeed, if what they were to do was a thing worthy of blame, it would be better to die than to think of it; but what they can do is honorable, and becoming of their sex, and whoever knows how to do a thing well will acquit himself of it with honor and pleasure. Therefore defer no longer to make the proposal to them, since it will be so advantageous to all of you, and be assured they will receive it with joy and pleasure."

"Good God! What a fine scheme you have proposed! Indeed, I cannot but approve of it; nay, it has made such a wonderful impression on my mind, that whereas I was lately against borrowing money at all, because I saw that when I had spent it I should not be in a condition to repay it, I am now resolved to go try where I can take some up upon any terms, to buy tools and other materials to set ourselves to work."

What was proposed was forthwith executed. Aristarchus bought what he wanted; he laid in a provision of wool, and the ladies worked from morning to night. This occupation diverted their melancholy, and, instead of the uneasiness there was before between them and Aristarchus, they began to live in a reciprocal satisfaction. The ladies loved him as their protector, and he considered them as persons who were very useful and necessary to him.

To conclude, sometime afterwards Aristarchus came to see Socrates, and related the whole matter to him with great content, and told him the women began to complain that none but he was idle.

"Why do you not put them in mind," said Socrates, "of the fable of the dog? For, in the days when beasts could speak, according to the fable, the sheep said to her master, 'You are a strange man; we yield you wool, lambs, and cheeses, and yet you give us nothing but what we can get upon the ground; and the dog, who brings you in no profit, is kindly used, for you feed him with the same bread you eat yourself.' The dog, overhearing this complaint, answered her: 'It is not without reason that I am used so well. It is I who protect you; it is I who hinder thieves from taking you away, and wolves from sucking your blood. If I were not always keeping watch about you, you would not dare so much as to go to feed.' This answer was the reason that the sheep yielded freely to the dog the honor they pretended to before. In like manner do you also let these ladies know that it is you who are their guardian and protector, and that you watch over them for their safety with as much care as a faithful and courageous dog watches over a herd committed to his charge. Tell them that because of you no man dares hurt them, and that it is by your means that they live at ease and in safety."

CHAPTER VIII.

SOCRATES PERSUADES EUTHERUS TO ABANDON HIS FORMER WAY OF LIVING, AND TO TAKE HIMSELF TO SOME MORE USEFUL AND HONORABLE EMPLOYMENT.

Another time, meeting with Eutherus, one of his old friends, whom he had not seen for a great while before, he inquired of him from whence he came?

"At present," answered Eutherus, "I come not from abroad; but towards the end of the war I returned from a voyage I had made, for, after having lost all the estate I had upon the frontiers, and my father having left me nothing in Attica, I was forced to work for my living, and I believe it better to do so than to be troublesome to others; besides, I can no longer borrow anything, because I have nothing left to mortgage."

"And how much longer," said Socrates, "do you think you shall be able to work for your living?"

"Alas! But a short while," answered Eutherus.

"Nevertheless," replied Socrates, "when you come to be old it will cost you something to maintain yourself, and yet you will not then be able to earn anything."

"You say very true."

"You had best, then," continued Socrates, "employ yourself now in business that will enable you to lay by something for your old age, and get into the service of some rich man, who has occasion for an economist, to have the inspection over his workmen, to gather in his fruits, to preserve what belongs to him, that he may reward you for the service you do him."

"I should find it very difficult," replied Eutherus, "to submit to be a slave."

"Yet," said Socrates, "the magistrates in republics, and all that are in employments, are not, therefore, reputed slaves; on the contrary, they are esteemed honorable."

"Be that as it will," said Eutherus, "I can never think of entering into any office where I might be liable to blame, for I would not like to be censured by another."

"But where," said Socrates, "will you find any employment in which a man is absolutely perfect, and altogether free from blame? For it is very difficult to be so exact as not to fail sometimes, and even though we should not have failed, it is hard to escape the censure of bad judges; and I should think it a very odd and surprising thing if in that very employment wherein you say you are now engaged you were so dexterous and expert as that no man should find anything amiss.

"What you are, therefore, to observe is to avoid those who make it their business to find fault without reason, and to have to do with more equitable persons; to undertake what you can actually perform, to reject what you find yourself unfit to do; and when you have taken in hand to do anything, to accomplish it in a manner the most excellent and perfect you can. Thus you will be less subject to be blamed, will find relief to your poverty, lead an easier life, be out of danger, and will sufficiently provide for the necessities of your old age."

CHAPTER IX.

IN WHAT MANNER SOCRATES TAUGHT HIS FRIEND CRITO
TO RID HIMSELF OF SOME INFORMERS,
WHO TOOK THE ADVANTAGE OF
HIS EASY TEMPER.

One day Crito, happening to meet Socrates, complained to him that it was very difficult for a man who would keep what he had to live in Athens; "for," said he, "I am now sued by some men, though I never did them the least injury, but only because they know that I had rather give them a little money than embroil myself in the troubles of law."

Socrates said to him, "Do you keep dogs to hinder the wolves from coming at your flocks?"

"You need not doubt but I do," answered Crito.

"Ought you not likewise," replied Socrates, "to keep a man who were able to drive away all those that trouble you without cause?"

"I would with all my heart," said Crito, "but that I fear that in the end he, too, would turn against me."

"Why so?" said Socrates; "is it not better to serve a man like you, and to receive favors from him, than to have him for an enemy? You may be certain that there are in this city many men who would think themselves very happy to be honored with your friendship."

After this they happened to see a certain person name Archedemus, who was a man of very good parts, eloquent, and extremely skillful in the management of affairs; but withal very poor and in a low condition, for he was not of that sordid disposition to take all he could get, by what means soever, but he was a lover of justice and of honest men, and abhorred to make rich, or to raise himself by informing and backbiting; for he held that nothing was more base than that wretched practice of those miscreants called sycophants or informers. Crito cast an eye upon him, and as often as they brought him any corn, or wine, or oil, or any other thing from his country-houses, he sent him some of it; when he offered sacrifices he invited him to the feasts, and showed him many civilities of the like nature. Archedemus, seeing the doors of that house open to him at all times, and that he always found so favorable a reception, laid aside all his former dependences, and trusted himself wholly to Crito; then he made it his business immediately to inquire into the characters of those sycophants who had slandered Crito or informed against him, and found them to be guilty of many crimes, and that they had a great number of enemies. This encouraged him to take them to task, and he prosecuted one of them for a crime which would have subjected him to a corporal punishment, or at least to a pecuniary mulct. This fellow, who knew his case to be bad, and that he could not justify himself, employed all sorts of stratagems to get rid of Archedemus, who nevertheless would not quit his hold till the other had discharged Crito, and given him money besides, in name of trouble and charges. He managed several of his affairs with like success, which made Crito be thought happy in having him; and as when a shepherd has an excellent dog,

the other shepherds are glad to bring their flocks near his that they may be safe likewise, so several of Crito's friends began to make their court to him, and begged him to lend them Archedemus to defend them. He, for his part, was glad to oblige Crito; and it was observed at length that not only Crito lived undisturbed, but all his friends likewise; and if anyone reproached Archedemus that self-interest had made him his master's creature, and to adore him and be so faithful and zealous in his service he would answer him thus: —

"Which of the two do you think most dishonorable — to do services to men of quality from whom we have received favors, and to enter into their friendship to declare war against bad men, or to endeavor to prejudice men of honor, and to make them our enemies, that bad men may be our friends?" From thenceforward Crito contracted a strict friendship with Archedemus, and all his friends had likewise a great respect for him.

CHAPTER X.

SOCRATES ADVISES DIODORUS TO DO JUSTICE
TO THE MERIT OF HERMOGENES, AND
TO ACCEPT OF HIS SERVICE AND FRIENDSHIP.

Socrates, meeting one day with Diodorus, addressed him thus: — "If one of your slaves ran away, would you give yourself any trouble to find him?"

"Yes, certainly," answered he; "and I would give public notice, and promise a reward to any that brought him to me."

"And if one of them were sick, would you take care of him, and send for physicians to endeavor to save his life?"

"Without doubt I would."

"And if you saw," replied Socrates, "one of your friends — that is to say, a person who renders you a thousand times more service than a slave, reduced to extreme want — ought you not to relieve him? I speak this to you on account of Hermogenes. You very well know he is not ungrateful, and that he would scorn to receive the least favor from you and not return you the like. You know likewise that a great number of slaves are not to be valued like one man who serves willingly, who serves with zeal and affection, and who is not only capable of doing what he is desired, but who can likewise of himself think of many things that may be of service to us; who reasons well, who foresees what may happen, and from whom we may expect to receive good advice. Now, the best managers hold it as a maxim that when we find anything of value to be sold cheap we ought to buy it. Think of it, therefore, for as times now go you may procure yourself many friends at a cheap rate."

"You say right," replied Diodorus, "and therefore pray send Hermogenes to me."

"Excuse me in that," answered Socrates, "you would do as well to go to him yourself as to send for him."

This discourse was the reason that Diodorus went to Hermogenes, and for a small gratification obliged him to be his friend; after which Hermogenes took particular care to please Diodorus, and sought all opportunities of serving him and of giving him content.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE QUALIFICATIONS OF A GENERAL.

Let us now see how Socrates was serviceable to those who were desirous to qualify themselves for employments of trust and honor, by advising them to apply themselves diligently to the study of their duty, that they might acquire a perfect knowledge of it.

Having heard that there was arrived at Athens one Dionysodorus, who undertook to teach the art of war, he made the following discourse to one of his friends, who pretended to one of the highest posts in the army: —

"It were a scandalous thing," said Socrates to him, "for a man who aims to be chief over others, to neglect to learn how to command, when so fair an opportunity offers; nay, I think he would rather deserve to be punished, than the man who should undertake to make a statue without having learnt the sculptor's trade; for as in war the whole fortune of the Republic is trusted to the general, it is to be presumed that his good conduct will procure success, and that his faults will be followed with great losses. And, therefore, a man who should neglect to make himself capable of such an employment, and yet pretend to it, ought to be severely punished." By these reasons he persuaded this young man to get himself instructed.

After the youth had imagined that he had acquired some knowledge of the art, he returned to pay Socrates a visit, who, jesting him, addressed the company that were present in this manner: — "Do not you think, gentlemen, that as Homer, when speaking of Agamemnon, gives him the surname of venerable, we ought also to bestow the same epithet on this young man, who justly deserves to be called by that name, since, like him, he has learned how to command? For, as a man who can play on the lute is a player on that instrument, though he never touches it; and as he who is knowing in the art of physic is a physician, though he never practice; so this young man, having learned to command is become a general, though not a man of us should ever give our voice to make him so. On the contrary, it is in vain for him who knows not how to command, to get himself chosen; he will not be one jot a better general for it, no more than he who knows nothing of physic is a better physician, because he has the reputation of being one." Then turning towards the young man, he went on — "But because it may happen that one of us may have the honor of commanding a regiment or a company in the troops that are to compose your army, to the end we may not be entirely ignorant of the military art, pray tell us by what he began to instruct you."

"By what he ended," answered the young man; "for he showed me only the order that ought to be observed in an army, either in marching, encamping, or fighting."

"But what is that," said Socrates, "in comparison of the many other duties incumbent on a general? He must, besides, take care for the preparations of war; he must furnish the soldiers with necessary ammunition and provisions; he must

be inventive, laborious, diligent, patient, quick of apprehension; he must be mild and rigorous together; he must be open and close; he must know to preserve his own, and take what is another's; he must be prodigal and a ravager; he must be liberal and covetous; he must be wary, and yet enterprising. I confess that he ought to know likewise how to draw up his troops in order of battle; and, indeed, order and discipline are the most important things in an army, and without them it is impossible to have any other service of the troops than of a confused heap of stones, bricks, timber, and tiles; but when everything is in its due place, as in a building, when the foundations and the covering are made of materials that will not grow rotten, and which no wet can damage, such as are stones and tiles, and when the bricks and timber are employed in their due places in the body of the edifice, they altogether make a house, which we value among our most considerable enjoyments." Here the young man, interrupting him, said: —

"This comparison puts me in mind of another thing that generals ought to observe; which is, to place their best soldiers in the first and last ranks, and the others in the middle; that those in the first rank may draw them on, and those in the last push them forward."

"He has taught you too," said Socrates, "how to know the good and the bad soldiers asunder, otherwise this rule can be of no use to you; for if you were to reckon money upon a table, and were ordered to lay the best at the two ends, and the worst in the middle, how could you do this, if you had not been shown how to distinguish between the good and the bad?"

"Indeed," replied the young man, "he did not teach me what you mention; and, I suppose, we must learn of ourselves to discern the good soldiers from the bad."

"If you please," continued Socrates, "let us consider how a general ought to govern himself in this matter. If it were to take any money, ought he not to make the most covetous march in the front? If it were an action of great peril, ought he not to send the most ambitious, because they are the men who, out of a desire of glory, rush into the midst of dangers? And as for them, you would not be much troubled to know them, for they are forward enough in discovering themselves. But tell me, when this master showed you the different ways of ordering an army, did he teach you when to make use of one way, and when of another?"

"Not at all," answered he.

"And yet," replied Socrates, "the same order is not always to be observed, nor the same commands given, but to be changed according to the different occasions."

"He taught me nothing of that," said the young man.

"Go to him, then," added Socrates, "and ask him concerning it; for if he know anything of the matter, and have ever so little honor, he will be ashamed to have taken your money and send you away so ill-instructed."

CHAPTER II.

THE CHARACTER OF A GOOD PRINCE.

Another time he asked a general, whom the Athenians had lately chosen, why Homer calls Agamemnon the pastor of the people? "Is it not," said he, "because as a shepherd ought to take care of his flocks, that they be well and want for nothing; so a general ought to take care to keep his soldiers always in a good condition, to see they be supplied with provisions, and to bring to a happy issue the design that made them take arms, which is to overcome their enemies, and to live more happily afterwards? And why does the same poet praise Agamemnon likewise for being —

'At once a gracious prince and generous warrior'?

For is it not true, that to gain a prince the character of being generous and a warrior too, it is not sufficient to be brave in his own person, and to fight with intrepidity; but he must likewise animate the whole army, and be the cause that every soldier behave himself like him? And to gain the reputation of a good and gracious prince, it is not enough to have secured his private affairs, he must also take care that plenty and happiness be seen in all places of his dominions. For kings are not chosen to take care of themselves only, but to render happy the people who choose them. All people engage in war only to secure their own quiet, and choose commanders that they may have guides to conduct them to the end which they propose to themselves. A general, therefore, ought to prepare the way of good fortune to those who raise him to that dignity; this is the most glorious success he can desire, as nothing can be more ignominious to him than to do the contrary."

We see by this discourse that Socrates, designing to give the idea of a good prince, required scarce anything of him but to render his subjects happy.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE BUSINESS OF A GENERAL OF HORSE.

Socrates at another time, as I well remember, had the following conference with a general of the cavalry: —

"What was your reason," said Socrates, "to desire this office? I cannot think it was that you might march first at the head of the troops, for the horse-archers are to march before you. Nor can I believe it was to make yourself be known, for no men are more generally known than madmen. Perhaps it was because you thought you could mend what was amiss in the cavalry, and make the troops better than they are, to the end that if the Republic should have occasion to use them, you might be able to do your country some eminent service."

"That is my design," answered the other.

"It were well you could do this," said Socrates, "but does not your office oblige you to have an eye on the horses and troopers?"

"Most certainly."

"What course will you then take," continued Socrates, "to get good horses?"

"It is not my business to look to that," replied the general; "every trooper must take care for himself."

"And what," said Socrates, "if they bring you horses whose feet and legs are good for nothing, or that are so weak and lean that they cannot keep up with the others, or so restive and vicious that it would be impossible to make them keep their ranks, what good could you expect from such cavalry? What service would you be able to do the State?"

"You are much in the right, Socrates, and I promise you I will take care what horses are in my troops."

"And will you not have an eye likewise on the troopers?"

"Yes," answered he.

"In my opinion then," answered Socrates, "the first thing you ought to do is to make them learn to get a horseback."

"No doubt of it," replied the general, "for by that means they would the more easily escape, if they should happen to be thrown off their horses."

Socrates went on: "You ought also to make them exercise, sometimes here, sometimes there, and particularly in places like those where the enemy generally is, that they may be good horsemen in all sorts of countries; for when you are to fight you will not send to bid the enemy come to you in the plain, where you used to exercise your horse. You must train them up, likewise, to lance the spear; and if you would make them very brave fellows, you must inspire them with a principle of honor, and inflame them with rage against the enemy."

"Fear not," said he, "that I will spare my labor."

"But have you," resumed Socrates, "thought on the means to make yourself obeyed? For without that all your brave troopers will avail you nothing."

“It is true,” said he, “but how shall I gain that point of them?”

“Know you not,” said Socrates, “that in all things men readily obey those whom they believe most capable? Thus in our sickness we most willingly submit to the prescriptions of the best physicians; at sea, to the most I skillful pilot; and in affairs of agriculture, to him who has most experience in it.”

“All this I grant you.”

“It is then to be presumed, that in the conduct of the cavalry he who makes it appear that he understands it best will be the person whom the others will be best pleased to obey.”

“But if I let them see that I am most worthy to command, will that be sufficient to make them obey me?”

“Yes, certainly,” said Socrates, “if you can persuade them besides that their honor and safety depend on that obedience.”

“And how shall I be able to make them sensible of this?”

“With less trouble,” answered Socrates, “than it would be to prove that it is better to be virtuous than vicious.”

“Then a general,” added the other, “ought to study the art of speaking well?”

“Do you imagine,” said Socrates, “that he will be able to execute his office without speaking a word? It is by speech that we know what the laws command us to learn for the conduct of our lives. No excellent knowledge can be attained without the use of speech; the best method to instruct is by discourse, and they who are thoroughly versed in the sciences speak with the applause of all the world. But have you observed,” continued he, “that in all sorts of occasions the Athenians distinguish themselves above all the Greeks, and that no Republic can show such youths as that of Athens? For example: when we send from hence a choir of musicians to the Temple of Apollo in the Isle of Delos, it is certain that none comparable to them are sent from other cities; not that the Athenians have better voices than the others, nor that their bodies are more robust and better made, but the reason is because they are more fond of honor, and this desire of honor is what excites men to excellent actions. Do not you think, therefore, that if good care were taken of our cavalry, it would excel that of other nations, in the beauty of arms and horses, in order of good discipline, and in bravery in fight; provided the Athenians were persuaded that this would be a means to acquire them glory and renown?”

“I am of your opinion.”

“Go, then, and take care of your troops,” said Socrates, “make them serviceable to you, that you may be so to the Republic.”

“Your advice is good,” said he, “and I will immediately follow it.”

CHAPTER IV.

A DISCOURSE OF SOCRATES WITH NICOMACHIDES, IN WHICH HE SHOWS THAT A MAN SKILLFUL IN HIS OWN PROPER BUSINESS, AND WHO MANAGES HIS AFFAIRS WITH PRUDENCE AND SAGACITY, MAY MAKE, WHEN OCCASION OFFERS, A GOOD GENERAL.

Another time, Socrates meeting Nicomachides, who was coming from the assembly where they had chosen the magistrates, asked him, "of whom they had made choice to command the army?"

Nicomachides answered: "Alas! The Athenians would not choose me; me! who have spent all my life in arms, and have gone through all the degrees of a soldier; who have been first a private sentinel, then a captain, next a colonel of horse, and who am covered all over with wounds that I have received in battles" (at these words he bared his breast, and showed the large scars which were remaining in several places of his body); "but they have chosen Antisthenes, who has never served in the infantry, who even in the cavalry never did anything remarkable, and whose only talent consists in knowing how to get money."

"So much the better," said Socrates, "for then the army will be well paid."

"A merchant," replied Nicomachides, "knows how to get money as well as he; and does it follow from thence that he is fit to be a general?"

"You take no notice," replied Socrates, "that Antisthenes is fond of honor, and desirous to excel all others in whatever he undertakes, which is a very necessary qualification in a general. Have you not observed, that whenever he gave a comedy to the people, he always gained the prize?"

"There is a wide difference," answered Nicomachides, "between commanding an army and giving orders concerning a comedy."

"But," said Socrates, "though Antisthenes understands not music, nor the laws of the stage, yet he found out those who were skillful in both, and by their means succeeded extremely well."

"And when he is at the head of the army," continued Nicomachides, "I suppose you will have him to find out too some to give orders, and some to fight for him?"

"Why not?" replied Socrates, "for if in the affairs of war he take the same care to provide himself with persons skillful in that art, and fit to advise him, as he did in the affair of the plays, I see not what should hinder him from gaining the victory in the former as well as in the latter. And it is very likely that he will be better pleased to expend his treasure to obtain an entire victory over the enemy, which will redound to the honor and interest of the whole Republic, than to be at a great expense for shows, to overcome his citizens in magnificence, and to gain a victory, which can be honorable to none but himself and those of his tribe."

"We must then infer," said Nicomachides, "that a man who knows well how to give a comedy knows well how to command an army?"

"Let us rather conclude," answered Socrates, "that every man who has judgment enough to know the things that are necessary for his designs, and can procure them, can never fail of success, whether he concern himself with the stage, or govern a State, or command an army, or manage a family."

“Indeed,” resumed Nicomachides, “I could never have thought you would have told me, too, that a good economist would make a good general.”

“Come, then,” said Socrates, “let us examine wherein consists the duty of the one and of the other, and see what relation there is between those two conditions. Must not both of them keep those that are under them in submission and obedience?”

“I grant it.”

“Must not both of them take care to employ everyone in the business he is fit for? Must he not punish those who do amiss and reward those that do well? Must they not make themselves be esteemed by those they command? Ought they not alike to strengthen themselves with friends to assist them upon occasion? Ought they not to know how to preserve what belongs to them, and to be diligent and indefatigable in the performance of their duty?”

“I own,” answered Nicomachides, “that all you have said concerns them equally; but if they were to fight it would not be the same as to both of them.”

“Why?” said Socrates. “Have not both of them enemies?”

“They have.”

“And would it not be the advantage of both to get the better of them?”

“I allow it,” said Nicomachides; “but what will economy be good for when they are to come to blows?”

“It is then it will be most necessary,” replied Socrates. “For when the good economist sees that the greatest profit he can get is to overcome, and that the greatest loss he can suffer is to be beaten, he will prepare himself with all the advantages that can procure him the victory, and will carefully avoid whatever might be the cause of his defeat. Thus, when he sees his army well provided with all things, and in a condition that seems to promise a good success, he will give his enemies battle; but when he wants anything he will avoid coming to an engagement with them. Thus you see how economy may be of use to him; and therefore, Nicomachides, despise not those who apply themselves to it; for between the conduct of a family and that of a State the sole difference is that of a greater or lesser number; for as to all besides there is much conformity between them. The sum of what I have advanced is this, that without men there could not be any policy or any economy, that they are often executed by the same persons, and that they who are called to the government of the Republic are the very same whom great men employ for their private affairs. Lastly, that they who make use of proper persons for their several businesses are successful in their economy and in politics; and that, on the contrary, they who fail in this point commit great faults both in one and the other.”

CHAPTER V.

A CONVERSATION BETWEEN SOCRATES AND PERICLES CONCERNING THE THEN PRESENT STATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ATHENS, IN WHICH SOCRATES LAYS DOWN A METHOD BY WHICH THE ATHENIANS MAY RECOVER THEIR ANCIENT LUSTER AND REPUTATION.

Socrates one day being in company with Pericles, the son of the great Pericles, introduced the following discourse: —

"I hope that when you command the army the Republic will be more successful and gain more glory in their wars than formerly."

"I should be glad of it," answered Pericles, "but I see little likelihood of it."

"We may bring this matter to the test," said Socrates. "Is it not true that the Bœotians are not more numerous than the Athenians?"

"I know it."

"Nor are they either braver or stronger?"

"True, they are not."

"Do you believe that they agree better among themselves?"

"Quite the contrary," said Pericles; "for there is a great misunderstanding between most of the Bœotians and the Thebans, because of the great hardships the latter put upon the former, and we have nothing of this among us."

"But the Bœotians," replied Socrates, "are wonderfully ambitions and obliging; and these are the qualities that naturally push men on to expose themselves for the sake of glory and of their country."

"The Athenians," answered Pericles, "come not short of them in either of those qualities."

"It is true," replied Socrates, "that there is no nation whose ancestors have done braver actions, and in greater number, than those of the Athenians. And these domestic examples excite us to courage, and create in us a true love of virtue and bravery."

"Notwithstanding all this," continued Pericles, "you see that after the defeat of Tolmides at Lebadia, where we lost a thousand men, and after another misfortune that happened to Hippocrates before Delium, the greatness of the Athenians is sunk so low, and the courage of the Bœotians so increased, that they, who even in their own country durst not look the Athenians in the face without the assistance of the Lacedemonians and of the other States of the Peloponnesus, now threaten Attica with their single forces. And that the Athenians, who before ravaged Bœotia when it was not defended by foreign troops, begin to fear, in their turn, that the Bœotians will put Attica to fire and sword."

"In my opinion," answered Socrates, "a governor ought to be well pleased to find a republic in such a condition, for fear makes a people more careful, more obedient, and more submissive. Whereas a too great security is attended with carelessness, luxury, and disobedience. This is plainly seen in men who are at sea. When they fear not anything, there is nothing in the ship but confusion and disorder; but when they apprehend that they shall be attacked by pirates, or that

a tempest is hanging over their head, they not only do whatever they are commanded, but even observe a profound silence, waiting the order of their captain, and are as decent and orderly in their behavior and motions as those who dance at a public entertainment."

"We shall yield, then," replied Pericles, "that the Athenians are obedient. But how shall we do to create in them an emulation to imitate the virtue of their ancestors to equal their reputation and to restore the happiness of their age in this present one?"

"If we would have them," answered Socrates, "make themselves masters of an estate, which is in the possession of others, we need only tell them that it is descended to them from their forefathers, and they will immediately be for having it again. If we would encourage them to take the first rank among the virtuous, we must persuade them that it is their due from all antiquity, and that if they will take care to preserve to themselves this advantage they will infallibly likewise surpass others in power. We must frequently represent to them that the most ancient of their predecessors were highly esteemed on account of their great virtue."

"You would be understood," said Pericles, "to speak of the contention of two of the divinities concerning the patronage of the city of Athens, of which the citizens, in the days of Cecrops, were chosen arbitrators on account of their virtue."

"You are in the right," said Socrates; "but I would have them be put in mind likewise of the birth and nourishment of Erictheus, and of the war that was in his time against the neighboring nations; as also of that which was made in favor of the descendants of Hercules against the people of Peloponnesus, and, in short, of all the other wars that were in the days of Theseus, in which our ancestors were always reputed the most valiant men of their age. If you think fit, they may likewise be told what the descendants of these ancients and our predecessors of the last age have done. They may be represented to them as resisting sometimes with their own forces only the nations whom all Asia obeyed, whose dominions extended into Europe as far as Macedonia, and who had inherited a potent empire from their fathers, together with formidable forces, and who were already renowned for many great exploits. Sometimes you must relate to them the victories they gained by sea and land in conjunction with the Lacedemonians, who are likewise reputed a very brave people. They should be told also that great commotions being arisen among the Greeks, and the most part of them having changed their places of abode, the Athenians always continued in their country, that they have been chosen by several people to arbitrate their differences, and that the oppressed have always fled to them for protection."

"When I reflect on all this," said Pericles, "I am surprised to see the Republic so much fallen off from what it was."

"In my opinion," replied Socrates, "she has behaved herself like those persons who, for having too great advantage over their rivals, begin to neglect themselves, and grow in the end pusillanimous, for after the Athenians saw themselves raised above the other Greeks they indulged themselves in indolence, and became at length degenerate."

“What course must they take now,” said Pericles, “to regain the luster of their ancient virtue?”

“They need only call to mind,” replied Socrates, “what were the exercises and the discipline of their ancestors, and if, like them, they apply themselves to those practices, they will no doubt arrive at their perfection; or if they will not govern themselves by that example, let them imitate the nations that are now uppermost; let them observe the same conduct, follow the same customs, and be assured they will equal, if not surpass them, if they labor to do so.”

“You seem to be of opinion, my dear Socrates, that virtue is much estranged from our Republic? And, indeed, when will the Athenians respect old age as they of Sparta do, since they begin, even by their own fathers, to deride men advanced in years? When, too, will they use themselves to the manly exercises of that Republic, since they not only neglect the good disposition and activity of body, but laugh at those who endeavor to acquire them? When will they be obedient to the magistrates, they who make it a glory to despise them? When will they be in perfect unity, they who, instead of assisting, daily prejudice one another, and who envy one another more than they do all the rest of mankind? They are every day quarrelling in the public and private assemblies; they are every day suing one another, and had rather find their own advantage in the ruin of their neighbors than get an honest gain by reciprocally assisting one another. The magistrates mind not the Government of the Republic any farther than their own interests are concerned, and, therefore, they use their utmost endeavors to be in office and authority; and for this reason in the administration of the State there is so much ignorance and malice, and such animosities, and so many different parties among private persons. And I much fear that this mischief will get such a head that at length there will be no remedy against it, and that the Republic will sink under the weight of its misfortunes.”

“Fear it not,” said Socrates, “and do not believe that the Athenians labor under an incurable disease. Do you not observe how skillful and obedient they are at sea, that in the combats for prizes they exactly obey the orders of those that preside there, and in the comedies how readily they comply with what they are bid to do?”

“I see it well,” answered Pericles, “and cannot but wonder that they are so ready to obey in these and the like occasions, and that the military men, who ought to be the chosen part of the citizens, are so mutinous and refractory.”

“And what say you,” pursued Socrates, “to the Senate of the Areopagus; are they not all of them persons of great worth? Do you know any judges who discharge their office with more integrity, and who more exactly observe the laws, who more faithfully render justice to private men, and who more worthily acquit themselves of all manner of affairs?”

“I blame them not,” said Pericles.

“Despair not, then, of the Athenians,” added Socrates, “as of an untractable people.”

“But it is in war,” replied Pericles, “that much discipline is required, and much modesty and obedience, and these things the Athenians wholly want in that occasion.”

“Perhaps, too,” continued Socrates, “they who command them know little of their own duty. Do you not take notice that no man undertakes to govern a company of musicians, or of comedians, or of dancers, or of wrestlers, unless he be capable of it; and that all who take such employments upon them can give an account where they have learnt the exercises of which they are become masters? Our misfortunes in war, then, I very much apprehend, must be owing in a great measure to the bad education of our generals.

“I know very well that you are not of this number, and that you have improved to your advantage the time you have spent in learning the art of war and other laudable exercises. I imagine, likewise, that in the memoirs of your father, the great Pericles, you have found many rare stratagems, and that by your diligence you have also collected up and down a great number of others. Nor do I doubt but that you frequently meditate on these matters, that nothing may be wanting in you that may be of use to a general. Insomuch, that if you find yourself in doubt of anything, you immediately have recourse to those that know it, and spare neither presents nor civilities to incline them to assist you and to teach you the things of which you are ignorant.”

“Alas! Socrates,” said Pericles, “you flatter me, and flatter me for many things that, I am afraid, I am deficient in; but by that you instruct me in my duty.”

Upon this Socrates, interrupting him — “I will,” said he, “give you an advice. Have you not observed that in the high mountains, which are the frontiers of Attica, and divide it from Bœotia, the roads through which you must of necessity pass to go from one country to the other are very rough and narrow?”

“Yes, I have.”

“Tell me, besides, have you never heard say that the Mysians and the Pisidians, who are in possession of advantageous places where they dwell in the dominions of the King of Persia, arm themselves lightly, and make continual inroads upon the neighboring provinces, and by that means are very troublesome to that king’s subjects, and preserve their own liberty?”

“I have heard so.”

“It is probable, too,” continued Socrates, “that if the Athenians would possess themselves of the mountains that are between Bœotia and Attica, and if they took care to send thither some young men with arms proper for inroaders, our enemies would be much prejudiced by them, and all those mountains would be as a great rampart to cover our country from their insults.”

“I believe what you say,” answered Pericles, “and take all the advices you have given me to be very good.”

“If you think them so,” replied Socrates, “endeavor, my friend, to put them in practice; for if any of them succeed you will receive the honor, and the Republic

the profit; and even though they should not meet with success the Republic would have no inconvenience to apprehend, nor you the least dishonor."

CHAPTER VI.

SOCRATES DISSUADES GLAUCON, A VERY FORWARD YOUTH, FROM TAKING UPON HIM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC, FOR WHICH HE WAS UNFIT.

A young man whose name was Glaucon, the son of Ariston, had so fixed it in his head to govern the Republic, that before he was twenty years of age he frequently presented himself before the people to discourse of affairs of state; nor was it in the power of his relations or friends to dissuade him from that design, though all the world laughed at him for it, and though sometimes he was dragged from the tribunal by force. Socrates had a kindness for him, upon account of Plato and Charmidas, and he only it was who made him change his resolution. He met him, and accosted him in so winning a manner, that he first obliged him to hearken to his discourse. He began with him thus: —

"You have a mind, then, to govern the Republic, my friend?"

"I have so," answered Glaucon.

"You cannot," replied Socrates, "have a more noble design; for if you can accomplish it you will be absolute. You will be able to serve your friends, you will raise your family, you will extend the bounds of your country, you will be known not only in Athens but through all Greece, and perhaps your renown will fly even to the barbarous nations, as did that of Themistocles. In short, wherever you come you will be respected and admired."

These words soothed up Glaucon, and won him to give ear to Socrates, who went on in this manner: — "But it is certain, my dear friend, that if you desire to be honored, you must be useful to the State."

"Certainly," said Glaucon.

"I conjure you, then, to tell me," replied Socrates, "what is the first service that you desire to render the State?" Glaucon was considering what to answer, when Socrates continued: — "If you intended to make the fortune of one of your friends, you would endeavor to make him rich, and thus perhaps you will make it your business to enrich the Republic."

"I would," answered Glaucon.

"Would not the way to enrich the Republic," replied Socrates, "be to increase its revenue?"

"It is very likely it would," said Glaucon.

"Tell me, then, in what consists the revenue of the State, and to how much it may amount? I presume you have particularly studied this matter, to the end that if anything should be lost on one hand, you might know where to make it good on another, and that if a fund should fail on a sudden, you might immediately be able to settle another in its place."

"I protest," answered Glaucon, "I have never thought of this."

"Tell me at least the expenses of the Republic, for no doubt you intend to retrench the superfluous."

“I never thought of this neither,” said Glaucon.

“You had best, then, put off to another time your design of enriching the Republic, which you can never be able to do while you are ignorant both of its expense and revenue.”

“There is another way to enrich a State,” said Glaucon, “of which you take no notice, and that is by the ruin of its enemies.”

“You are in the right,” answered Socrates; “but to this end it is necessary to be stronger than they, otherwise we should run the hazard of losing what we have. He, therefore, who talks of undertaking a war, ought to know the strength on both sides, to the end that if his party be the stronger, he may boldly advise for war, and that if it be the weaker, he may dissuade the people from engaging themselves in so dangerous an enterprise.”

“All this is true.”

“Tell me, then,” continued Socrates, “how strong our forces are by sea and land, and how strong are our enemies?”

“Indeed,” said Glaucon, “I cannot tell you that on a sudden.”

“If you have a list of them in writing, pray show it me, I should be glad to hear it read.”

“I never took a list of them.”

“I see, then,” said Socrates, “that we shall not engage in war so soon; for it is like that the greatness of the undertaking will hinder you from maturely weighing all the consequences of it in the beginning of your government. But,” continued he, “you have thought of the defense of the country, you know what garrisons are necessary, and what are not; you know what number of troops is sufficient in one garrison, and not sufficient in another; you will cause the necessary garrisons to be reinforced, and will disband those that are useless?”

“I should be of opinion,” said Glaucon, “to leave none of them on foot, because they ruin a country, on pretense of defending it.”

“But,” Socrates objected, “if all the garrisons were taken away, there would be nothing to hinder the first comer from carrying off what he pleased. But how come you to know that the garrisons behave themselves so ill? Have you been upon the place, have you seen them?”

“Not at all; but I suspect it to be so.”

“When, therefore, we are certain of it,” said Socrates, “and can speak upon better grounds than simple conjectures, we will propose this advice to the Senate.”

“It will be very proper to do so,” said Glaucon.

“It comes into my mind too,” continued Socrates, “that you have never been at the mines of silver, to examine why they bring not in so much now as they did formerly.”

“You say true, I have never been there.”

“Indeed, they say the place is very unhealthy, and that may excuse you.”

“You rally me now,” said Glaucon.

Socrates added, “But I believe you have at least observed how much corn our lands produce, how long it will serve to supply our city, and how much more we shall want for the whole year, to the end you may not be surprised with a scarcity of bread, but may give timely orders for the necessary provisions.”

“There is a deal to do,” said Glaucon, “if we must take care of all these things.”

“There is so,” replied Socrates; “and it is even impossible to manage our own families well unless we know all that is wanting, and take care to provide it. As you see, therefore, that our city is composed of above ten thousand families, and it being a difficult task to watch over them all at once, why did you not first try to retrieve your uncle’s affairs, which are running to decay, that after having given a proof of your care, faithfulness, and capacity in that smaller trust, you might have taken upon you a greater? But now, when you find yourself incapable of aiding a private man, how can you think of behaving yourself so as to be useful to a whole people? Ought a man who has not strength enough to carry a hundred pound weight to undertake to carry a burden that is much heavier?”

“I would have done good service to my uncle,” said Glaucon, “if he would have taken my advice.”

“How!” replied Socrates; “have you hitherto been unable to govern your uncle, who is but one person, and do you imagine, when you have failed in that, to govern the whole Athenians, whose minds are so fickle and inconstant? Take heed, my dear Glaucon, take heed, lest a too great desire of glory should render you despised. Consider how dangerous it is to speak and employ ourselves about things we do not understand. What a figure do those forward and rash people make in the world who do so: and you yourself may judge whether they acquire more esteem than blame, whether they are more admired than contemned. Think, on the contrary, with how much honor a man is regarded who understands perfectly what he says and what he does, and then you will confess that renown and applause have always been the recompense of true merit, and shame the reward of ignorance and temerity. If, therefore, you would be honored, endeavor to be a man of true merit, for if you enter upon the government of the Republic with a mind more sagacious than usual, I shall not wonder if you succeed in all your designs.”

CHAPTER VII.

SOCRATES PERSUADES CHARMIDAS, A PERSON OF MERIT AND GREAT CAPACITY, BUT VERY MODEST AND DIFFIDENT OF HIMSELF, TO UNDERTAKE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC.

As Socrates, who was ever watchful for the interests of his country, and consulted the good of everyone with whom he conversed, took care, on the one hand, to dissuade persons who had no capacity for it, however bent they were upon the thing, from entering upon any offices of trust, so he was ever mindful, on the other, to persuade those that were bashful and diffident to take upon themselves the government of the Republic, provided he knew they had proper talents and abilities for it. In confirmation whereof we shall here relate a conversation of his with Charmidas, the son of Glaucon. Socrates, who knew him to be a man of sense and merit, and more capable to govern the Republic than any that were then in that post, but withal a person very diffident of himself — one that dreaded the people, and was mightily averse from engaging himself in public business — addressed himself to him in this manner: —

"Tell me, Charmidas, if you knew any man who could gain the prizes in the public games, and by that means render himself illustrious, and acquire glory to his country, what would you say of him if he refused to offer himself to the combat?"

"I would say," answered Charmidas, "that he was a mean-spirited, effeminate fellow."

"And if a man were capable of governing a Republic, of increasing its power by his advices, and of raising himself by this means to a high degree of honor, would you not brand him likewise with meanness of soul if he would not present himself to be employed?"

"Perhaps I might," said Charmidas; "but why do you ask me this question?"

"Because you are capable," replied Socrates, "of managing the affairs of the Republic, and yet you avoid doing so, though in the quality of a citizen you are obliged to take care of the commonwealth."

"And wherein have you observed this capacity in me?"

"When I have seen you in conversation with the Ministers of State," answered Socrates; "for if they impart any affairs to you, I see you give them good advice, and when they commit any errors you make them judicious remonstrances."

"But there is a very great difference, my dear Socrates," replied Charmidas, "between discoursing in private and contending in a public manner before the people."

"And yet," replied Socrates, "a skillful arithmetician can calculate as well in presence of several persons as when alone; and they who can play well upon the lute in their closets play likewise well in company."

"But you know," said Charmidas, "that fear and shame, which are so natural to man, affect us more in public assemblies than in private companies."

“Is it possible,” said Socrates, “that you can converse so unconcernedly with men of parts and authority, and that you should not have assurance enough to speak to fools? Are you afraid to present yourself before dyers, shoemakers, masons, smiths, laborers, and brokers? For of such are composed the popular assemblies. This is the same thing as to be the most expert in a fencing-school, and to fear the thrust of an unskillful person who never handled a foil. Thus you, though you speak boldly in the presence of the chief men of the Republic, among whom there might perhaps be found some who would despise you, dare not, nevertheless, speak in the presence of an illiterate multitude, who know nothing of the affairs of state, and who are not capable of despising you, and you fear to be laughed at by them.”

“Do they not usually,” said Charmidas, “laugh at those who speak best?”

“So likewise,” said Socrates, “do the men of quality with whom you converse every day; and I am surprised that you have eloquence and persuasive sense sufficient to bring these to reason, and that you think not yourself capable even to approach the others. Learn to know yourself better, Charmidas, and take care not to fall into a fault that is almost general; for all men inquire curiously enough into the affairs of others, but they never enter into their own bosoms to examine themselves as they ought.

“Be no longer, then, thus negligent in this matter, consider yourself with more attention, and let not slip the occasions of serving the Republic, and of rendering it, if possible, more flourishing than it is. This will be a blessing, whose influence will descend not only on the other citizens, but on your best friends and yourself.”

CHAPTER VIII.

SOCRATES' DISPUTE WITH ARISTIPPUS CONCERNING THE GOOD AND BEAUTIFUL.

One day Aristippus proposed a captious question to Socrates, meaning to surprise him; and this by way of revenge, for his having before put him to a stand: but Socrates answered him warily, and as a person who has no other design in his conversations than the improvement of his hearers.

The question which Aristippus asked him was whether he knew in the world any good thing, and if Socrates had answered him that meat, or drink, or riches, or health, or strength, or courage are good things, he would forthwith have shown him that it may happen that they are very bad. He therefore gave him such an answer as he ought; and because he knew very well that when we feel any indisposition we earnestly desire to find a remedy for it, he said to him: "Do you ask me, for example, whether I know anything that is good for a fever?"

"No," said Aristippus.

"Or for sore eyes?" said Socrates.

"Neither."

"Do you mean anything that is good against hunger?"

"Not in the least," answered Aristippus.

"I promise you," said Socrates, "that if you ask me for a good thing that is good for nothing, I know no such thing, nor have anything to do with it."

Aristippus pressed him yet further, and asked him whether he knew any beautiful thing.

"I know a great many," said Socrates.

"Are they all like one another?" continued Aristippus.

"Not in the least," answered Socrates, "for they are very different from one another."

"And how is it possible that two beautiful things should be contrary one to the other?"

"This," said Socrates, "is seen every day in men: a beautiful make and disposition of body for running is very different from a beautiful make and disposition for wrestling: the excellence and beauty of a buckler is to cover well him that wears it. On the contrary, the excellence and beauty of a dart is to be light and piercing."

"You answer me," said Aristippus, "as you answered me before, when I asked you whether you knew any good thing."

"And do you think," replied Socrates, "that the good and the beautiful are different? Know you not that the things that are beautiful are good likewise in the same sense? It would be false to say of virtue that in certain occasions it is beautiful, and in others good. When we speak of men of honor we join the two qualities, and call them excellent and good. In our bodies beauty and goodness relate always to the same end. In a word, all things that are of any use in the world

are esteemed beautiful and good, with regard to the subject for which they are proper."

"At this rate you might find beauty in a basket to carry dung," said Aristippus.

"Yes, if it be well made for that use," answered Socrates; "and, on the contrary, I would say that a buckler of gold was ugly if it was ill-made."

"Would you say," pursued Aristippus, "that the same thing may be beautiful and ugly at once?"

"I would say that it might be good and bad. Often what is good for hunger is bad for a fever; and what is good for a fever is very bad for hunger; often what is beautiful to be done in running is ugly to be done in wrestling; and what is beautiful to do in wrestling is ugly in running. For all things are reputed beautiful and good when they are compared with those which they suit or become, as they are esteemed ugly and bad when compared with those they do not become."

Thus we see that when Socrates said that beautiful houses were the most convenient, he taught plainly enough in what manner we ought to build them, and he reasoned thus: "Ought not he who builds a house to study chiefly how to make it most pleasant and most convenient?" This proposition being granted, he pursued: "Is it not a pleasure to have a house that is cool in summer and warm in winter? And does not this happen in buildings that front towards the south? For the beams of the sun enter into the apartments in winter, and only pass over the covering in summer. For this reason the houses that front towards the south ought to be very high, that they may receive the sun in winter; and, on the contrary, those that front towards the north ought to be very low, that they may be less exposed to the cold winds of that quarter." In short, he used to say, that he had a very beautiful and very agreeable house, who could live there with ease during all the seasons of the year, and keep there in safety all that he has; but that for painting and other ornaments, there was more trouble in them than pleasure.

He said further that retired places, and such as could be seen from afar, were very proper to erect altars and build temples in; for though we are at a distance from them, yet it is a satisfaction to pray in sight of the holy places, and as they are apart from the haunts of men, innocent souls find more devotion in approaching them.

CHAPTER IX.

SOCRATES RETURNS SUITABLE ANSWERS
TO A VARIETY OF QUESTIONS PROPOSED TO HIM.

Another time being asked whether courage can be learnt as an art or was a gift of Nature, he answered: "In my opinion, as we see many bodies that are naturally more vigorous than others, and that better endure fatigue, so there are some souls that are naturally more brave, and look dangers in the face with greater resolution. For I see some men, who live under the same laws, who are brought up in the same customs, and who are not all equally valiant. Nevertheless, I believe that education and exercise add much to natural courage. Whence comes it to pass that the Scythians and the Thracians durst not face the Lacedemonians with pikes and targets; and, on the contrary, that the Lacedemonians would not fight against the Thracians with shields and darts, nor against the Scythians with bows? I see it to be the same in all other things, and that when some men are better inclined by nature for certain things than other men are, they very much advance and perfect themselves in those things by study and diligence. This shows that they who are most favored by Nature, as well as those to whom she has been less indulgent, ought to apply themselves assiduously to the things by which they would gain themselves a reputation."

He allowed no difference between knowledge and temperance; and he held that he who knows what is good and embraces it, who knows what is bad and avoids it, is learned and temperate; and when he was asked whether he believed that they who know very well what ought to be done, but do quite otherwise, were learned and temperate? "On the contrary," answered he, "they are very ignorant and very stupid, for, in my opinion, every man who, in the great number of possible things that offer themselves to him, can discern what is most advantageous for him to do, never fails to do it; but all who govern not themselves well and as they ought, are neither learned nor men of good morals."

He said likewise that justice and every other virtue is only a science, because all the actions of justice and of the other virtues are good and honorable; and that all who know the beauty of these actions think nothing more charming; as, on the contrary, they who are ignorant of them cannot perform anyone virtuous action, or, if they attempt to do it, are sure to perform it in a wrong manner. So that the persons only who possess this science can do just and good actions; but all just and good actions are done by the means of virtue, therefore justice and virtue is only a science.

He said, moreover, that folly is contrary to knowledge, and yet he did not allow ignorance to be a folly; but that not to know oneself, or to imagine one knows what he does not know, is a weakness next to folly. And he observed that among the vulgar a man is not accused of folly for being mistaken in things that are unknown to most of the world, but for mistaking in things which no man mistakes that knows anything at all; as if any man should think himself so tall as to be obliged to stoop when he came in at the gates of the city; or if he thought himself so strong as to undertake to carry away whole houses on his back, or to do any other thing

visibly impossible, the people would say that he had lost his wits, which they do not say of those who commit only some slight extravagances; and as they give the name of love to a violent affection only, so they give the name of folly only to an extraordinary disorder of the mind.

Reflecting on the nature of envy, he said that it is a certain grief of mind, which proceeds, not from the misfortune of friends or good fortune of enemies, but (which is very surprising) only from the prosperity of friends. “For,” said he, “those may be truly said to be envious who cannot endure to see their friends happy.” But, some wondering whether it were possible for a man to be grieved at the good fortune of his friend, he justified the truth of what he had advanced, by telling them plainly that there are some men so variously affected towards their friends, that, while they are in calamity and distress, they will compassionate and succor them, but when they are well and in prosperity will fret at and envy them. “But this,” he said, “is a fault from which wise and good men are free, and never to be found but in weak and wicked minds.”

As to idleness, he said that he had observed that most men were always in action, for they who play at dice, or who serve to make others laugh, are doing something, but in effect they are idle, because they might employ themselves more usefully. To which he added, that no man finds leisure to quit a good employment for an ill one, and that if he did he would deserve the greater blame, in that he wanted not something to do before.

He said likewise that the scepter makes not the king, and that princes and governors are not they whom chance or the choice of the people has raised to those dignities, nor those who have established themselves in them by fraud or force, but they who know how to command; for if it were allowed that it is the duty of a prince to command, as it is the duty of a subject to obey, he showed in consequence of it that in a ship, where there are several persons, the honor of commanding it is given to him who is most capable of it, and that all obey him, without excepting even the owner of the vessel; that likewise in husbandry, he to whom the land belongs obeys his own servants, if they understand agriculture better than himself; that thus the sick obey the physicians, and they who learn exercises, their masters; nay, that even women are masters of the men in working with the needle, because they understand it better than they; in short, that in all things which require care and industry men govern themselves when they think they are capable of doing so; otherwise, they leave themselves to the conduct of such as they judge to have more capacity, and take care to have them near at hand for that purpose. And if any man made him this objection, that a tyrant is at liberty not to believe the best advices, he answered, “Why do you say he is at liberty not to do so, seeing he will bear the smart of it? For every man who shuts his ears to good counsel commits a fault, and this fault is always attended with some damage.” And if it were said that a tyrant is permitted to put to death the men of the best parts and understanding in his State, he replied again, “Do you think he is not punished in losing his chief supports, or that he will be quit for a slight punishment? Is to govern in this manner the way to preserve himself? Or rather, is it not the certain means to hasten his own ruin?”

Being asked what was the best study for man to apply himself to, he answered, “To do well;” and being asked farther whether good fortune was the effect of study, “On the contrary,” said he, “I think good fortune and study to be two opposite things; for what I call good fortune is, when a man meets with what is necessary for him, without the trouble of seeking it; but when he meets with any good success after a tedious search and labor, it is an effect of study. This is what I call to do well; and I think that all who take delight in this study are for the most part successful, and gain the esteem of men, and the affection of the Deity. Such are they as have rendered themselves excellent in economy, in physic, and in politics; but he who knows not anyone thing perfectly is neither useful to men, nor beloved by the gods.”

CHAPTER X.

SOCRATES, IN CONVERSATION WITH SEVERAL ARTIFICERS, A PAINTER, A STATUARY, AND AN ARMORER, SHOWS HIS SKILL AND GOOD TASTE IN THE FINER ARTS.

As Socrates studied to be useful in all his conversations, so he never happened to be in company even with tradesmen but he always said something that might be of service to them. Going once into the shop of the painter Parrhasius, he entertained himself with him in the following manner: —

"Is not painting," said he, "a representation of all we see? For with a few colors you represent on a canvas mountains and caverns, light and obscurity; you cause to be observed the difference between soft things and hard, between things smooth and rough; you give youth and old age to bodies; and when you would represent a perfect beauty, it being impossible to find a body but what has some defect, your way is to regard several, and taking what is beautiful from each of them, you make one that is accomplished in all its parts."

"We do so," said Parrhasius.

"Can you represent likewise," said Socrates, "what is most charming and most lovely in the person, I mean the inclination?"

"How think you," answered Parrhasius, "we can paint what cannot be expressed by any proportion, nor with any color, and that has nothing in common with any of those things you mentioned, and which the pencil can imitate; in a word, a thing that cannot be seen?"

"Do not the very looks of men," replied Socrates, "confess either hatred or friendship?"

"In my opinion they do," said Parrhasius.

"You can then make hatred and friendship appear in the eyes?"

"I own we can."

"Do you think likewise," continued Socrates, "that they who concern themselves either in the adversity or prosperity of friends, keep the same look with those who are wholly unconcerned for either?"

"By no means," said he, "for during the prosperity of our friends, our looks are gay and full of joy, but in their adversity we look cloudy and dejected."

"This, then, may be painted likewise?"

"It may."

"Besides," said Socrates, "magnificence, generosity, meanness of mind, cowardice, modesty, prudence, insolence, rusticity, all appear in the looks of a man, whether sitting or standing."

"You say true."

"And cannot the pencil imitate all this likewise?"

"It may."

“And in which do you take most pleasure,” said Socrates, “in regarding the picture of a man whose external appearance discovers a good natural disposition, and bespeaks an honest man, or of one who wears in his face the marks of a vicious inclination?”

“There is no comparison between them,” said Parrhasius.

Another time, talking with Clito the sculptor, he said to him, “I wonder not that you make so great a difference between the statue of a man who is running a race and that of one who stands his ground to wait for his antagonist with whom he is to wrestle, or to box, or to play a prize at all sorts of defense; but what ravishes the beholders is, that your statues seem to be alive. I would fain know by what art you imprint upon them this wonderful vivacity?” Clito, surprised at this question, stood considering what to answer, when Socrates went on: — “Perhaps you take great care to make them resemble the living persons, and this is the reason that they seem to live likewise.”

“It is so,” said Clito.

“You must then,” replied Socrates, “observe very exactly in the different postures of the body what are the natural dispositions of all the parts, for when some of them stoop down, the others raise themselves up; when some are contracted, the others stretch themselves out; when some are stiff with straining, others relax themselves; and when you imitate all this, you make your statues approach very near the life.”

“You say true,” said Clito.

“Is it not true likewise,” replied Socrates, “that it is a great satisfaction to beholders to see all the passions of a man who is in action well expressed? Thus, in the statue of a gladiator who is fighting, you must imitate the sternness of look with which he threatens his enemy; on the contrary, you must give him, when victor, a look of gaiety and content.”

“There is no doubt of what you say.”

“We may then conclude,” said Socrates, “that it is the part of an excellent statuary to express the various affections and passions of the soul, by representing such-and-such motions and postures of the body as are commonly exerted in real life whenever the mind is so-and-so affected.”

Another time, Socrates being in the shop of Pistias the armorer, who showed him some corselets that were very well made: “I admire,” said Socrates to him, “the invention of these arms that cover the body in the places where it has most need of being defended, and nevertheless are no hindrance to the motions of the hands and arms; but tell me why you sell the suits of armor you make dearer than the other workmen of the city, since they are not stronger nor of better-tempered or more valuable metal?”

“I sell them dearer than others,” answered Pistias, “because they are better made than theirs.”

“In what does this make consist?” said Socrates, “in the weight, or in the largeness of the arms? And yet you make them not all of the same weight nor of the same size, but to fit every man.”

“They must be fit,” said Pistias, “otherwise they would be of no use.”

“But do you not know,” replied Socrates, “that some bodies are well-shaped and others not?”

“I know it well.”

“How, then,” continued Socrates, “can you make a well-shaped suit of armor for an ill-shaped body?”

“It will be sufficient if they are fit for him,” answered Pistias; “for what is fit is well made.”

“You are of opinion, then,” added Socrates, “that one cannot judge whether a thing be well made, considering it merely in itself, but in regard to the person who is to use it; as if you said that a buckler is well made for him whom it fits, and in like manner of a suit of clothes and any other thing whatsoever. But I think there is another convenience in having a suit of armor well made.”

“What do you take that to be?” said Pistias.

“I think,” answered Socrates, “a suit of armor that is well made does not load the bearer so much as one ill made, even though it weigh as much. For ill-made arms, by pressing too much upon the shoulders, or hanging cumbrous on some other part, become almost insupportable, and greatly incommode the person that wears them. But those arms which, as they ought, distribute an equal weight to all the parts of the body, that join upon the neck, the shoulders, the breast, the back, and the hips, may be said to be glued to the body, and to weigh nothing at all.”

“For this,” said Pistias, “I value the arms I make. It is true that some choose rather to part with their money for arms that are gilt and finely carved, but if with all this they fit not easy upon them, I think they buy a rich inconveniency.”

Socrates went on: — “But since the body is not always in the same posture, but sometimes bends, and sometimes raises itself straight, how can arms that are very fit be convenient and easy?”

“They never can,” said Pistias.

“Your opinion therefore is,” said Socrates, “that the best arms are not those that are most fit, and fit closest to the body, but those that do not incommode the person that wears them.”

“You, too, are of the same opinion,” replied Pistias, “and you understand the matter aright.”

CHAPTER XI.

DISCOURSE OF SOCRATES WITH THEODOTA, AN ATHENIAN LADY, OF NO GOOD CHARACTER; WHEREIN HE ENDEAVORS, IN THE MOST ARTFUL AND ENGAGING MANNER, TO WIN HER OVER FROM THE CRIMINAL PLEASURES TO WHICH SHE WAS ADDICTED UNTO THE SUBLIMER AND MORE INNOCENT DELIGHTS OF PHILOSOPHY AND VIRTUE.

There was at Athens a very beautiful lady called Theodota, who had the character of a loose dame. Some person was speaking of her in presence of Socrates, and saying that she was the most beautiful woman in the whole world; that all the painters went to see her, to draw her picture, and that they were very well received at her house. "I think," said Socrates, "we ought to go see her too, for we shall be better able to judge of her beauty after we have seen her ourselves than upon the bare relation of others." The person who began the discourse encouraged the matter, and that very moment they all went to Theodota's house. They found her with a painter who was drawing her picture; and having considered her at leisure when the painter had done, Socrates began thus: — "Do you think that we are more obliged to Theodota for having afforded us the sight of her beauty than she is to us for coming to see her? If all the advantage be on her side, it must be owned that she is obliged to us; if it be on ours, it must be confessed that we are so to her." Some of the company saying there was reason to think so, Socrates continued in these words: — "Has she not already had the advantage of receiving the praises we have given her? But it will be yet a much greater to her when we make known her merit in all the companies we come into; but as for ourselves, what do we carry from hence except a desire to enjoy the things we have seen? We go hence with souls full of love and uneasiness; and from this time forward we must obey Theodota in all she pleases to enjoin us."

"If it be so," said Theodota, "I must return you many thanks for your coming hither."

Meanwhile Socrates took notice that she was magnificently appareled, and that her mother appeared likewise like a woman of condition. He saw a great number of women attendants elegantly dressed, and that the whole house was richly furnished. He took occasion from hence to inform himself of her circumstances in the world, and to ask her whether she had an estate in land or houses in the city, or slaves, whose labor supplied the expenses of her family.

"I have nothing," answered she, "of all this; my friends are my revenue. I subsist by their liberality."

Upon which Socrates remarked that "friendship was one of the greatest blessings in life, for that a good friend could stand one instead of all possessions whatever." And he advised Theodota to try all her art to procure to herself some lovers and friends that might render her happy. The lady asking Socrates whether there were any artifices to be used for that purpose, he answered, "there were," and proceeded to mention several: — "Some for attracting the regard of the men, some for insinuating into their hearts; others for securing their affections and managing their passions."

Whereupon Theodota, whose soul then lay open to any impression, mistaking the virtuous design of Socrates in the whole of this discourse for an intention of another sort, cried out in raptures, “Ah! Socrates, why will not you help me to friends?”

“I will,” replied Socrates, “if you can persuade me to do so.”

“And what means must I use to persuade you?”

“You must invent the means,” said Socrates, “if you want me to serve you.”

“Then come to see me often,” added Theodota.

Socrates laughed at the simplicity of the woman, and in raillery said to her, “I have not leisure enough to come and see you; I have both public and private affairs which take up too much of my time. Besides, I have mistresses who will not suffer me to be from them neither day nor night, and who against myself make use of the very charms and sorceries that I have taught them.”

“And have you any knowledge in those things, too?” said she.

“Why do Apollodorus and Antisthenes,” answered Socrates, “never leave me? Why do Cebes and Simmias forsake Thebes for my company? This they would not do if I were not master of some charm.”

“Lend it me,” said Theodota, “that I may employ it against you, and charm you to come to me.”

“No,” said Socrates, “but I will charm you, and make you come to me.”

“I will,” said Theodota, “if you will promise to make me welcome.”

“I promise you I will,” answered Socrates, “provided there be nobody with me whom I love better than you.”

CHAPTER XII.

OF THE NECESSITY OF EXERCISE TO HEALTH AND STRENGTH OF BODY.

Among others who frequented Socrates, there was a young man whose name was Epigenes, and who was very awkward in his person and behavior, and had contracted an ill habit of body, having never learnt nor used any exercise. Socrates reproached him for it, and told him that it was unworthy of any man to be so negligent of himself. Epigenes slightly answered that he was under no obligation to do better.

"You are no less obliged to it," replied Socrates, "than they who train themselves up for the Olympic Games. For do you believe that to fight for one's life against the enemies of the Republic, which we are all obliged to do when the Athenians please to command us, is a less important occasion than to contend with antagonists for a prize? How many men are there who, for want of strength, perish in fights; or have recourse to dishonorable means to seek their safety? Some are taken prisoners, and remain in slavery all the rest of their days, or are forced to pay so great a ransom, as makes them live poor and miserable ever afterwards: others are ill thought of, and their weakness is imputed to cowardice. And do you value so little all these misfortunes, which constantly attend an ill habit of body, and do they seem to you so slight? In my opinion, there are no fatigues in the exercises but what are easier and more agreeable. But perhaps you despise the advantages of a good disposition of body: nevertheless, they are considerable; for men in that condition enjoy a perfect health, they are robust and active, they come off from combats with honor, they escape from dangers, they succor their friends, they render great services to their country. For these reasons they are well received wherever they come, they are in good reputation with all men, they attain to the highest offices, they live the more honorably and the more at ease, and they leave their posterity the most noble examples. If, therefore, you do not practice the military exercises in public, you ought not to neglect the doing so in private, but to apply yourself to them with all possible diligence.

"To have the body active and healthy can be hurtful to you in no occasions: and since we cannot do anything without the body, it is certain that a good constitution will be of great advantage to us in all our undertakings. Even in study, where there seems to be least need of it, we know many persons who could never make any great progress for want of health. Forgetfulness, melancholy, loss of appetite, and folly, are the diseases that generally proceed from the indisposition of the body; and these diseases sometimes seize the mind with so great violence, that they wipe out even the least remembrance of what we knew before. But in health we have nothing like this to fear, and consequently there is no toil which a judicious man would not willingly undergo to avoid all these misfortunes. And, indeed, it is shameful for a man to grow old before he has tried his own strength, and seen to what degree of dexterity and perfection he can attain, which he can never know if he give himself over for useless; because dexterity and strength come not of themselves, but by practice and exercise."

CHAPTER XIII.

SEVERAL APOTHEGMS OF SOCRATES.

1. A certain man being vexed that he had saluted one who did not return his civility, Socrates said to him, "It is ridiculous in you to be unconcerned when you meet a sick man in the way, and to be vexed for having met a rude fellow."

2. Another was saying that he had lost his appetite and could eat nothing. Socrates, having heard it, told him he could teach him a remedy for that. The man asking what it was, "Fast," said he, "for some time, and I will warrant you will be in better health, spend less money, and eat with more satisfaction afterwards."

3. Another complained that the water which came into the cistern was warm, and nevertheless he was forced to drink it. "You ought to be glad of it," said Socrates, "for it is a bath ready for you, whenever you have a mind to bathe yourself."

"It is too cold to bathe in," replied the other.

"Do your servants," said Socrates, "find any inconvenience in drinking it, or in bathing in it?"

"No, but I wonder how they can suffer it."

"Is it," continued Socrates, "warmer to drink than that of the temple of Æsculapius?"

"It is not near so warm."

"You see, then," said Socrates, "that you are harder to please than your own servants, or even than the sick themselves."

4. A master having beaten his servant most cruelly, Socrates asked him why he was so angry with him. The master answered, "Because he is a drunkard, a lazy fellow who loves money, and is always idle."

"Suppose he be so," said Socrates: "but be your own judge, and tell me, which of you two deserves rather to be punished for those faults?"

5. Another made a difficulty of undertaking a journey to Olympia. "What is the reason," said Socrates to him, "that you are so much afraid of walking, you, who walk up and down about your house almost all day long? You ought to look upon this journey to be only a walk, and to think that you will walk away the morning till dinner-time, and the afternoon till supper, and thus you will insensibly find yourself at your journey's end. For it is certain that in five or six days' time you go more ground in walking up and down than you need to do in going from Athens to Olympia. I will tell you one thing more: it is much better to set out a day too soon than a day too late; for it is troublesome to be forced to go long journeys; and on the contrary, it is a great ease to have the advantage of a day beforehand. You were better therefore to hasten your departure than be obliged to make haste upon the road."

6. Another telling him that he had been a great journey, and was extremely weary, Socrates asked whether he had carried anything. The other answered that he had carried nothing but his cloak.

“Were you alone?” said Socrates.

“No; I had a slave with me.”

“Was not he loaded?” continued Socrates.

“Yes, for he carried all my things.”

“And how did he find himself upon the road?”

“Much better than I.”

“And if you had been to carry what he did, what would have become of you?”

“Alas!” said he, “I should never have been able to have done it.”

“Is it not a shame,” added Socrates, “in a man like you, who have gone through all the exercises, not to be able to undergo as much fatigue as his slave?”

CHAPTER XIV.

SOCRATES PROPOSES SOME REGULATIONS
FOR THE BETTER MANAGEMENT OF THEIR PUBLIC FEASTS.

Socrates having observed that in public suppers everyone brought his own dish of meat, and that sometimes some brought more and others less, was wont, when this happened, to bid a servant set the least dish in the middle of the table, and to give some of it to all the company. No man could, in civility, refuse it, nor exempt himself from doing the like with his own dish, insomuch that every man had a taste of the whole, and all fared alike. This in some measure banished luxury and expensiveness from these feasts. For they who would have laid out a great deal of money in delicacies cared no longer to do so, because they would have been as much for others as for themselves.

Being one day in these assemblies, and seeing a young man who ate his meat without bread, he took occasion to rally him for it upon a question that was started touching the imposing of names. "Can we give any reasons," said he, "why a man is called flesh-eater — that is to say, a devourer of flesh? — for every man eats flesh when he has it; and I do not believe it to be upon that account that a man is called so."

"Nor I neither," said one of the company.

"But," continued Socrates, "if a man takes delight to eat his meat without bread, do you not take him to be, indeed, a flesh-eater?"

"I should think it difficult to find another who better would deserve that name." Upon which somebody else taking the word said,

"What think you of him who, with a little bread only, eats a great deal of flesh?"

"I should," replied Socrates, "judge him, too, to be a flesh-eater; and whereas others ask of the gods in their prayers to give them an abundance of fruits, such men in their petitions it is likely would pray only for abundance of flesh."

The young man whom Socrates had in mind, suspecting that he spoke upon his account, took some bread, but continued still to eat a great deal of flesh with it. Socrates perceived him, and showing him with his finger to those that sat next to him, said to them, "Take notice of jour neighbor, and see whether it be the meat that makes him eat his bread, or the bread that makes him eat his meat."

In a like occasion, seeing a man sop the same morsel of meat in several sauces, he said, "Is it possible to make a sauce that will cost more, and be not so good, as one that is made by taking out of several different sauces at once? For there being more ingredients than usual, no doubt it costs more; but then because we mix things together, which the cooks never used to mingle, because they agree not well with one another, we certainly spoil the whole; and is it not a jest to be curious in having good cooks, and at the same time to be so fantastical as to alter the relish of the dishes they have dressed? Besides, when we have once got a habit of eating thus of several dishes at once, we are not so well satisfied when we have no longer that variety. Whereas a man who contents himself to eat but of one dish at a time finds no great inconvenience in having but one dish of meat for his dinner."

He made likewise this remark: that to express what the other Greeks called “to eat a meal,” the Athenians said “to make good cheer;” and that the word “good” shows us that we ought to eat such things only as will neither disorder the body nor the mind, which are easily had, and purchased without great expense. From whence he inferred that they alone who live temperately and soberly can truly be said to make good cheer — that is to say, to eat well.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

THAT PERSONS OF GOOD NATURAL PARTS, AS WELL AS THOSE WHO HAVE PLENTIFUL FORTUNES, OUGHT NOT TO THINK THEMSELVES ABOVE INSTRUCTION. ON THE CONTRARY, THE ONE OUGHT, BY THE AID OF LEARNING, TO IMPROVE THEIR GENIUS; THE OTHER, BY THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE, TO RENDER THEMSELVES VALUABLE.

There was always, as we have already remarked, some improvement to be made with Socrates; and it must be owned that his company and conversation were very edifying, since even now, when he is no more among us, it is still of advantage to his friends to call him to their remembrance. And, indeed, whether he spoke to divert himself, or whether he spoke seriously, he always let slip some remarkable instructions for the benefit of all that heard him.

He used often to say he was in love, but it was easy to see it was not with the beauty of one's person that he was taken, but with the virtues of his mind.

The marks of a good genius, he said, were these — a good judgment, a retentive memory, and an ardent desire of useful knowledge; that is to say, when a person readily learns what he is taught, and strongly retains what he has learnt, as also when he is curious to know all that is necessary to the good government either of a family or of a republic; in a word, when one desires to obtain a thorough knowledge of mankind and of whatever relates to human affairs. And his opinion was that when these good natural parts are cultivated as they ought, such men are not only happy themselves, and govern their families prudently, but are capable likewise to render others happy, and to make republics flourish.

On the one hand, therefore, whenever he met with any who believed themselves men of parts, and for that reason neglected to be instructed, he proved to them that men of the best natural parts are they who have most need of instruction; and to this purpose he alleged the example of a high-mettled horse, who, having more courage and more strength than others, does us very great service, if he be broke and managed in his youth; but if that be neglected, he grows so vicious and unruly that we know not what to do with him. Thus also dogs of a good breed, and that by nature are the most strong and mettlesome, are excellent for game, if they are well taught; otherwise they are apt to become high rangers and at no command. In like manner among men they who are blessed with the greatest advantages of Nature, to whom she has given the most courage and the greatest strength to enable them to succeed in their undertakings, are likewise the most virtuous, and do more good than others, when they meet with a good education; but if they remain without instruction they fall into an excess of ill, and become most pernicious to themselves and others. Merely for want of knowing their duty they often engage themselves in very wicked designs; and being imperious and violent, it is very difficult to keep them within bounds and to make them change their resolution, which is the reason they do a great deal of mischief.

On the other hand, when he saw any of those men who pique themselves on their estates, and who believe because they are men of high condition that they are

above instruction, or have no need of it, because their riches alone are sufficient to gain them the esteem of the world, and to make them succeed in all their undertakings, he endeavored to convince them of their error, and to show them that they, too, have need of instruction. He told them that that man is a fool who imagines with himself that he can know the things that are useful from those that are hurtful, without having ever learnt the difference; or who, not discerning between them, fondly thinks that because he has wherewithal to buy whatever he has a mind to, he can therefore do whatever may lend to his advantage; or who, judging himself incapable to do what is useful for himself, thinks, nevertheless, that he is well in the world, and in a safe and happy condition of life. That it is likewise a folly for a man to persuade himself that, being rich and having no merit, he will pass for a man of parts; or that, not having the reputation of being a man of parts, he shall nevertheless be esteemed.

CHAPTER II.

CONFERENCE BETWEEN SOCRATES AND EUTHYDEMUS, IN WHICH HE CONVINCES THAT YOUNG MAN, WHO HAD A GREAT OPINION OF HIMSELF, THAT HE KNEW NOTHING.

When Socrates, on the other hand, found any who soothe themselves up in the belief that they are well instructed, and who boast of their own sufficiency, he never failed to chastise the vanity of such persons. Of his conduct in this particular I will relate the following instance —

He had been told that Euthydemus had bought up several works of the most celebrated poets and sophists, and that this acquisition had so puffed him up with arrogance, that he already esteemed himself the greatest man for learning and parts of any of the age, and pretended to no less than being the first man of the city, either for negotiating or for discoursing in public. Nevertheless, he was still so young that he was not admitted into the assemblies of the people, and if he had any affair to solicit, he generally came and placed himself in one of the shops that were near the courts of justice. Socrates, having observed his station, failed not to go thither likewise with two or three of his friends; and there, being fallen into discourse, this question was started: Whether it was by the improving conversation of philosophers or by the strength of his natural parts only, that Themistocles surpassed all his countrymen in wisdom and valor, and advanced himself to such a high rank and to so great esteem, that all the Republic cast their eyes upon him whenever their affairs required the conduct of a man of bravery and wisdom? Socrates, who had a mind to reflect upon Euthydemus, answered that "a man must be very stupid to believe that mechanic arts (which are comparatively things but of small importance) cannot be learnt without masters; and yet that the art of governing of States, which is a thing of the greatest moment and that requires the greatest effort of human prudence, comes of itself into the mind." And this was all that passed in this first interview.

After this Socrates, observing that Euthydemus always avoided being in his company, lest he should be taken for one of his admirers, attacked him more openly; and once when he happened to be where he was, addressed himself to the rest of the company in these words: — "Certainly, gentlemen, by what may be conjectured from the studies of this young man, it is very likely that when he shall have attained the age that permits him to be present in the assemblies of the people, if any important affair come to be debated there, he will not fail to give his judgment of it; and in my opinion he would introduce his harangue by a very pleasant exordium, if he should begin with giving them to understand that he had never learnt anything of any man whatsoever; he must address himself to them in words to this purpose: —

"'Gentlemen, I have never been taught anything, I never frequented the conversation of men of parts, I never gave myself the trouble to look out for a master that was able to instruct me. On the contrary, gentlemen, I have not only had an aversion to learn from others, but I should even have been very sorry to have it believed I had done so; nevertheless, I will venture to tell you what chance shall suggest to me in this present occasion.' At this rate they who present

themselves to be received physicians might introduce a like discourse as thus: — 'Gentlemen, I have never had any master to teach me this science; for, indeed, I would never learn it, nor even have the repute of having learnt it; nevertheless, admit me a physician, and I will endeavor to become learned in the art by making experiments on your own bodies.'"

All the company fell a-laughing at this pleasant preface, and from that time Euthydemus never avoided Socrates' company as he had done before; but he never offered to speak, believing that his silence would be an argument of his modesty. Socrates, being desirous to rally him out of that mistaken notion, spoke to him in this manner: —

"I wonder that they who desire to learn to play upon the lute, or to ride well, do not endeavor to learn it alone by themselves; but that they look out for masters, resolved to do everything they bid them, and to believe all they say, there being no other way to arrive at perfection in those arts; and that they who hope one day to govern the Republic, and to declaim before the people, imagine they can become fit to do so of themselves all of a sudden. Nevertheless, it must be owned that these employments are more difficult than the others, since among the great number of persons who push themselves into office so few discharge their duty as they ought. This shows us that more labor and diligence is required in such as would capacitate themselves for those offices than for anything else."

By these discourses, Socrates having prepared the mind of Euthydemus to hearken to what he intended to say to him, and to enter into conference with him, he came another time by himself into the same shop, and taking a seat next to this young man — "I have heard," said he to him, "that you have been curious in buying a great many good books."

"I have," said Euthydemus, "and continue to do so every day, designing to have as many as I can get."

"I commend you very much," said Socrates, "for choosing rather to hoard up a treasure of learning and knowledge than of money. For you testify by so doing that you are not of opinion that riches, or silver and gold, can render one more valuable, that is to say, a wiser or a better man; but that it is only the writings and precepts of the philosophers and other fine writers that are the true riches, because they enrich with virtue the minds of those that possess them."

Euthydemus was pleased to hear him say this, believing that he approved his method; and Socrates, perceiving his satisfaction, went on: "But what is your design of making a collection of so many books? Do you intend to be a physician? There are many books in that science."

"That is not my design," said Euthydemus.

"Will you be an architect, then?" said Socrates, "for that art requires a learned man. Or do you study geometry or astrology?"

"None of them."

"Do you mean to be a reciter of heroic verses?" continued Socrates, "for I have been told that you have all Homer's works."

“Not in the least,” answered Euthydemus, “for I have observed that men of that profession know indeed a great many verses by heart, but for anything else they are for the most part very impertinent.”

“Perhaps you are in love with that noble science that makes politicians and economists, and that renders men capable to govern, and to be useful to others and to themselves?”

“That is what I endeavor to learn,” said Euthydemus, “and what I passionately desire to know.”

“It is a sublime science,” replied Socrates; “it is that we call the royal science, because it truly is the science of kings. But have you weighed this point, whether a man can excel in that science without being an honest man?”

“I have,” said the young man, “and am even of opinion that none but honest men can be good citizens.”

“And are you an honest man?” said Socrates.

“I hope I am,” answered Euthydemus, “as honest a man as another.”

“Tell me,” said Socrates, “can we know who are honest men by what they do, as we know what trade a man is of by his work?”

“We may.”

“Then,” said Socrates, “as architects show us their works, can honest men show us theirs likewise?”

“No doubt of it,” replied Euthydemus; “and it is no difficult task to show you which are the works of justice, and which those of injustice, that we so often hear mentioned.”

“Shall we,” said Socrates, “make two characters, the one (J) to signify justice, the other (I) to denote injustice; and write under one of them all the works that belong to justice, and under the other all that belong to injustice?”

“Do,” said Euthydemus, “if you think fit.”

Socrates, having done what he proposed, continued thus his discourse: — “Do not men tell lies?”

“Very often,” answered Euthydemus.

“Under which head shall we put lying?”

“Under that of injustice,” said Euthydemus.

“Do not men sometimes cheat?”

“Most certainly.”

“Where shall we put cheating?” said Socrates.

“Under injustice.”

“And doing wrong to one’s neighbor?”

“There too.”

“And selling of free persons into slavery?”

“Still in the same place.”

“And shall we write none of all these,” said Socrates, “under the head of justice?”

“Not one of them,” answered Euthydemus; “it would be strange if we did.”

“But what,” replied Socrates, “when a general plunders an enemy’s city, and makes slaves of all the inhabitants, shall we say that he commits an injustice?”

“By no means.”

“Shall we own, then, that he does an act of justice?”

“Without doubt.”

“And when he circumvents his enemies in the war, does he not do well?”

“Very well.”

“And when he ravages their land, and takes away their cattle and their corn, does he not do justly?”

“It is certain he does,” said Euthydemus; “and when I answered you that all these actions were unjust, I thought you had spoken of them in regard only of friend to friend.”

“We must, therefore,” replied Socrates, “put among the actions of justice those very actions we have ascribed to injustice, and we will only establish this distinction, that it is just to behave ourselves so towards our enemies; but that to treat our friends thus is an injustice, because we ought to live with them uprightly, and without any deceit.”

“I think so,” said Euthydemus.

“But,” continued Socrates, “when a general sees that his troops begin to be disheartened, if he make them believe that a great reinforcement is coming to him, and by that stratagem inspires fresh courage into the soldiers, under what head shall we put this lie?”

“Under the head of justice.” answered Euthydemus.

“And when a child will not take the physic that he has great need of, and his father makes it be given him in a mess of broth, and by that means the child recovers his health, to which shall we ascribe this deceit?”

“To justice likewise.” “And if a man, who sees his friend in despair, and fears he will kill himself, hides his sword from him, or takes it out of his hands by force, what shall we say of this violence?”

“That it is just.” replied Euthydemus.

“Observe what you say,” continued Socrates; “for it follows from your answers that we are not always obliged to live with our friends uprightly, and without any deceit, as we agreed we were.”

“No; certainly we are not, and if I may be permitted to retract what I said, I change my opinion very freely.”

“It is better,” said Socrates, “to change an opinion than to persist in a wrong one. But there is still one point which we must not pass over without inquiry, and this relates to those whose deceits are prejudicial to their friends; for I ask you,

which are most unjust, they who with premeditate design cheat their friends, or they who do it through inadvertency?"

"Indeed," said Euthydemus, "I know not what to answer, nor what to believe, for you have so fully refuted what I have said, that what appeared to me before in one light appears to me now in another. Nevertheless, I will venture to say that he is the most unjust who deceives his friend deliberately."

"Do you think," said Socrates, "that one may learn to be just and honest, as well as we learn to read and write?"

"I think we may."

"Which," added Socrates, "do you take to be the most ignorant, he who reads wrong on purpose, or he who reads wrong because he can read no better?"

"The last of them," answered Euthydemus; "for the other who mistakes for pleasure need not mistake when he pleases."

"Then," inferred Socrates, "he who reads wrong deliberately knows how to read; but he who reads wrong without design is an ignorant man."

"You say true."

"Tell me likewise," pursued Socrates, "which knows best what ought to be done, and what belongs to justice, he who lies and cheats with premeditate design, or he who deceives without intention to deceive?"

"It is most plain," said Euthydemus, "that it is he who deceives with premeditate design."

"But you said," replied Socrates, "that he who can read is more learned than he who cannot read?"

"I did so."

"Therefore he who best knows which are the duties of justice is more just than he that knows them not."

"It seems to be so," answered Euthydemus, "and I know not well how I came to say what I did."

"Indeed," said Socrates, "you often change your opinion, and contradict what you say; and what would you yourself think of any man who pretended to tell the truth, and yet never said the same thing; who, in pointing out to you the same road, should show you sometimes east, sometimes west, and who, in telling the same sum, should find more money at one time than another; what would you think of such a man?"

"He would make all men think," answered Euthydemus, "that he knew nothing of what he pretended to know."

Socrates urged him yet further, and asked him: "Have you ever heard say that some men have abject and servile minds?"

"I have."

"Is it said of them because they are learned or because they are ignorant?"

"Surely because they are ignorant."

“Perhaps,” said Socrates, “it is because they understand not the trade of a smith?”

“Not in the least for that.” “Is it because they know not how to build a house, or to make shoes?”

“By no means,” said Euthydemus; “for most who are skilled in such professions have likewise abject and servile minds.”

“This character, then,” pursued Socrates, “must be given to those who are ignorant of the noble sciences, and who know not what is just nor what is honorable?”

“I believe so.”

“We ought, therefore, Euthydemus, to do all we can to avoid falling into that ignominious ignorance that sinks us down so low.”

“Alas, Socrates!” cried he out, “I will not lie for the matter; I thought I knew something in philosophy, and that I had learnt whatever was requisite to be known by a man who desired to make a practice of virtue; but judge how much I am afflicted to see that, after all my labors, I am not able to answer you concerning things which I ought chiefly to know; and yet I am at a loss what method to pursue in order to render myself more capable and knowing in the things I desire to understand.”

Upon this, Socrates asked him whether he had ever been at Delphi, and Euthydemus answered that he had been there twice.

“Did you not take notice,” said Socrates, “that somewhere on the front of the temple there is this inscription, ‘KNOW THYSELF’?”

“I remember,” answered he, “I have read it there.”

“It is not enough,” replied Socrates, “to have read it. Have you been the better for this admonition? Have you given yourself the trouble to consider what you are?”

“I think I know that well enough,” replied the young man, “for I should have found it very difficult to have known any other thing if I had not known myself.”

“But for a man to know himself well,” said Socrates, “it is not enough that he knows his own name; for, as a man that buys a horse cannot be certain that he knows what he is before he has ridden him, to see whether he be quiet or restive, whether he be mettlesome or dull, whether he be fleet or heavy — in short, before he has made trial of all that is good and bad in him — in like manner, a man cannot say that he knows himself before he has tried what he is fit for, and what he is able to do.”

“It is true,” said Euthydemus, “that whoever knows not his own strength knows not himself.”

“But,” continued Socrates, “who sees not of how great advantage this knowledge is to man, and how dangerous it is to be mistaken in this affair? For he who knows himself knows likewise what is good for himself. He sees what he is able to do, and what he is not able to do; by applying himself to things that he can do, he gets his bread with pleasure, and is happy; and by not attempting to do the things he cannot do, he avoids the danger of falling into errors, and of seeing

himself miserable. By knowing himself, he knows likewise how to judge of others, and to make use of their services for his own advantage, either to procure himself some good, or to protect himself from some misfortune; but he who knows not himself, and is mistaken in the opinion he has of his own abilities, mistakes likewise in the knowledge of others, and in the conduct of his own affairs. He is ignorant of what is necessary for him, he knows not what he undertakes, nor comprehends the means he makes use of, and this is the reason that success never attends his enterprises, and that he always falls into misfortunes. But the man who sees clear into his own designs generally obtains the end he proposes to himself, and at the same time gains reputation and honor. For this reason, even his equals are well pleased to follow his advices; and they whose affairs are in disorder implore his assistance, and throw themselves into his hands, depending upon his prudence to retrieve their affairs, and to restore them to their former good condition. But he who undertakes he knows not what, generally makes an ill choice, and succeeds yet worse; and the present damage is not the only punishment he undergoes for his temerity. He is disgraced forever; all men laugh at him, all men despise and speak ill of him. Consider likewise what happens to Republics who mistake their own strength, and declare war against States more powerful than themselves; some are utterly ruined, others lose their liberty, and are compelled to receive laws from the conquerors."

"I am fully satisfied," said Euthydemus, "that a great deal depends on the knowledge of oneself. I hope you will now tell me by what a man must begin to examine himself."

"You know," said Socrates, "what things are good and what are bad?"

"Indeed," answered Euthydemus, "if I knew not that, I were the most ignorant of all men."

"Then tell me your thoughts of this matter," said Socrates.

"First," said Euthydemus, "I hold that health is a good and sickness an evil, and that whatever contributes to either of them partakes of the same qualities. Thus nourishment and the exercises that keep the body in health are very good; and, on the contrary, those that cause diseases are hurtful."

"But would it not be better to say," replied Socrates, "that health and sickness are both good when they are the causes of any good, and that they are both bad when they are the causes of any ill?"

"And when can it ever happen," said Euthydemus, "that health is the cause of any ill, and sickness the cause of any good?"

"This may happen," answered Socrates, "when troops are raised for any enterprise that proves fatal; when men are embarked who are destined to perish at sea; for men who are in health may be involved in these misfortunes, when they who, by reason of their infirmities, are left at home, will be exempted from the mischiefs in which the others perish."

"You say true," said Euthydemus, "but you see, too, that men who are in health are present in fortunate occasions, while they who are confined to their beds cannot be there."

“It must therefore be granted,” said Socrates, “that these things which are sometimes useful and sometimes hurtful are not rather good than bad.”

“That is, indeed, the consequence of your argument,” replied Euthydemus; “but it cannot be denied that knowledge is a good thing; for what is there in which a knowing man has not the advantage of an ignorant one?”

“And have you not read,” said Socrates, “what happened to Dædalus for his knowing so many excellent arts, and how, being fallen into the hands of Minos, he was detained by force, and saw himself at once banished from his country and stripped of his liberty? To complete his misfortune, flying away with his son, he was the occasion of his being miserably lost, and could not, after all, escape in his own person; for, falling into the hands of barbarians, he was again made a slave. Know you not likewise the adventure of Palamedes, who was so envied by Ulysses for his great capacity, and who perished wretchedly by the calumnious artifices of that rival? How many great men likewise has the King of Persia caused to be seized and carried away because of their admirable parts, and who are now languishing under him in a perpetual slavery?”

“But, granting this to be as you say,” added Euthydemus, “you will certainly allow good fortune to be a good?”

“I will,” said Socrates, “provided this good fortune consists in things that are undoubtedly good.”

“And how can it be that the things which compose good fortune should not be infallibly good?”

“They are,” answered Socrates, “unless you reckon among them beauty and strength of body, riches, honors, and other things of that nature.”

“And how can a man be happy without them?”

“Rather,” said Socrates, “how can a man be happy with things that are the causes of so many misfortunes? For many are daily corrupted because of their beauty; many who presume too much on their own strength are oppressed under the burden of their undertakings. Among the rich, some are lost in luxury, and others fall into the snares of those that wait for their estates. And lastly, the reputation and honors that are acquired in Republics are often the cause of their ruin who possess them.”

“Certainly,” said Euthydemus, “if I am in the wrong to praise good fortune, I know not what we ought to ask of the Deity.”

“Perhaps, too,” replied Socrates, “you have never considered it, because you think you know it well enough.

“But,” continued he, changing the subject of their discourse, “seeing you are preparing yourself to enter upon the government of our Republic, where the people are master, without doubt you have reflected on the nature of this State, and know what a democracy is?”

“You ought to believe I do.”

“And do you think it possible,” said Socrates, “to know what a democracy or popular State is without knowing what the people is?”

“I do not think I can.”

“And what is the people?” said Socrates.

“Under that name,” answered Euthydemus, “I mean the poor citizens.”

“You know, then, who are the poor?”

“I do,” said Euthydemus.

“Do you know, too, who are the rich?”

“I know that too.”

“Tell me, then, who are the rich and who are the poor?”

“I take the poor,” answered Euthydemus, “to be those who have not enough to supply their necessary expenses, and the rich to be they who have more than they have occasion for.”

“But have you observed,” replied Socrates, “that there are certain persons who, though they have very little, have nevertheless enough, and even lay up some small matter out of it; and, on the contrary, there are others who never have enough how great soever their estates and possessions are?”

“You put me in mind,” said Euthydemus, “of something very much to the purpose, for I have seen even some princes so necessitous that they have been compelled to take away their subjects’ estates, and to commit many injustices.”

“We must, then,” said Socrates, “place such princes in the rank of the poor, and those who have but small estates, yet manage them well, in the number of the rich.”

“I must give consent to all you say,” answered Euthydemus, “for I am too ignorant to contradict you; and I think it will be best for me, from henceforward, to hold my peace, for I am almost ready to confess that I know nothing at all.”

Having said this, he withdrew, full of confusion and self-contempt, beginning to be conscious to himself that he was indeed a person of little or no account at all. Nor was he the only person whom Socrates had thus convinced of their ignorance and insufficiency, several of whom never came more to see him, and valued him the less for it. But Euthydemus did not act like them. On the contrary, he believed it impossible for him to improve his parts but by frequently conversing with Socrates, insomuch that he never left him, unless some business of moment called him away, and he even took delight to imitate some of his actions. Socrates, seeing him thus altered from what he was, was tender of saying anything to him that might irritate or discourage him; but took care to speak more freely and plainly to him of the things he ought to know and apply himself to.

CHAPTER III.

PROOFS OF A KIND SUPERINTENDING PROVIDENCE. — WHAT RETURNS OF GRATITUDE AND DUTY MEN OUGHT TO MAKE TO GOD FOR HIS FAVORS. — AN HONEST AND GOOD LIFE THE BEST SONG OF THANKSGIVING OR THE MOST ACCEPTABLE SACRIFICE TO THE DEITY.

As Socrates considered virtue and piety as the two grand pillars of a State, and was fully persuaded that all other qualifications whatever, without the knowledge and practice of these, would, instead of enabling men to do good, serve, on the contrary, to render them more wicked and more capable of doing mischief. For that reason he never pressed his friends to enter into any public office until he had first instructed them in their duty to God and mankind. But, above all, he endeavored to instill into their minds pious sentiments of the Deity, frequently displaying before them high and noble descriptions of the Divine power, wisdom, and goodness. But seeing several have already written what they had heard him say in diverse occasions upon this subject, I will content myself with relating some things which he said to Euthydemus when I myself was present.

"Have you never reflected, Euthydemus, on the great goodness of the Deity in giving to men whatever they want?"

"Indeed, I never have," answered he.

"You see," replied Socrates, "how very necessary light is for us, and how the gods give it us."

"You say true," answered Euthydemus, "and without light we should be like the blind."

"But because we have need of repose they have given us the night to rest in; the night, which, of all times, is the fittest for repose."

"You are in the right," said Euthydemus, "and we ought to render them many praises for it."

"Moreover," continued Socrates, "as the sun is a luminous body, and by the brightness of his beams discovers to us all visible things, and shows us the hours of the day; and as, on the contrary, the night is dusky and obscure, they have made the stars to appear, which, during the absence of the day, mark the hours to us, by which means we can do many things we have occasion for. They have likewise made the moon to shine, which not only shows us the hours of the night, but teaches us to know the time of the month."

"All this is true," said Euthydemus.

"Have you not taken notice likewise that having need of nourishment, they supply us with it by the means of the earth? How excellently the seasons are ordered for the fruits of the earth, of which we have such an abundance, and so great a variety, that we find, not only wherewith to supply our real wants but to satisfy even luxury itself."

"This goodness of the gods," cried Euthydemus, "is an evidence of the great love they bear to men."

"What say you," continued Socrates, "to their having given us water, which is so necessary for all things? For it is that which assists the earth to produce the

fruits, and that contributes, with the influences from above, to bring them to maturity; it helps to nourish us, and by being mingled with what we eat, makes it more easily got ready, more useful, and more delightful; in short, being of so universal an use, is it not an admirable providence that has made it so common? What say you to their having given us fire, which defends us from cold, which lights us when it is dark, which is necessary to us in all trades, and which we cannot be without in the most excellent and useful inventions of men?"

"Without exaggeration," said Euthydemus, "this goodness is immense."

"What say you, besides," pursued Socrates, "to see that after the winter the sun comes back to us, and that proportionally as he brings the new fruits to maturity, he withers and dries those whose season is going over; that after having done us this service he retires that his heat may not incommode us; and then, when he is gone back to a certain point, which he cannot transgress, without putting us in danger of dying with cold, he returns again to retake his place in this part of the heavens, where his presence is most advantageous to us? And because we should not be able to support either cold or heat, if we passed in an instant from one extreme to the other, do you not admire that this planet approaches us and withdraws himself from us by so just and slow degrees, that we arrive at the two extremes without almost perceiving the change?"

"All these things," said Euthydemus, "make me doubt whether the gods have anything to do but to serve mankind. One thing puts me to a stand, that the irrational animals participate of all these advantages with us."

"How!" said Socrates, "and do you then doubt whether the animals themselves are in the world for any other end than for the service of man? What other animals do, like us, make use of horses, of oxen, of dogs, of goats, and of the rest? Nay, I am of opinion, that man receives not so much advantage from the earth as from the animals; for the greatest part of mankind live not on the fruits of the earth, but nourish themselves with milk, cheese, and the flesh of beasts; they get the mastery over them, they make them tame, and use them to their great advantage in war and for the other necessities of life."

"I own it," said Euthydemus, "for some of them are much stronger than man, and yet are so obedient to him, that he does with them whatever he pleases."

"Admire yet further the goodness of the gods," said Socrates, "and consider, that as there is in the world an infinite number of excellent and useful things, but of very different natures, they have given us external senses, which correspond to each of those sensible objects, and by means of which senses we can perceive and enjoy all of them. They have, besides, endued us with reason and understanding, which enables us to discern between those things that the senses discover to us, to inquire into the different natures of things useful and things hurtful, and so to know by experience which to choose and which to reject. They have likewise given us speech, by means whereof we communicate our thoughts to each other, and instruct one another in the knowledge of whatever is excellent and good; by which also we publish our laws and govern States. In fine, as we cannot always foresee what is to happen to us, nor know what it will be best for us to do, the gods offer

us likewise their assistance by the means of the oracles; they discover the future to us when we go to consult them, and teach us how to behave ourselves in the affairs of life."

Here Euthydemus, interrupting him, said, "And indeed these gods are in this respect more favorable to you than to the rest of mankind, since, without expecting you to consult them, they give you notice of what you ought or ought not to do."

"You will allow, therefore, that I told you true," said Socrates, "when I told you there were gods, and that they take great care of men; but expect not that they will appear to you, and present themselves before your eyes. Let it suffice you to behold their works, and to adore them, and be persuaded that this is the way by which they manifest themselves to men, for among all the gods that are so liberal to us there is not one who renders himself visible to confer on us his favors. And that Supreme God, who built the universe, and who supports this great work, whose every part is accomplished in beauty and goodness; He, who is the cause that none of its parts grow old with time, and that they preserve themselves always in an immortal vigor, who is the cause, besides, that they inviolably obey His laws with a readiness that surpasses our imagination; He, I say, is visible enough in the so many wondrous works of which He is author, but our eyes cannot penetrate even into His throne to behold Him in these great occupations, and in that manner it is that He is always invisible. Do but consider that the sun, who seems to be exposed to the sight of all the world, does not suffer us to gaze fixedly upon him, and whoever has the temerity to undertake it is punished with sudden blindness. Besides, whatever the gods make use of is invisible; the thunder is lanced from above, it shatters all it finds in its way, but we see it not fall, we see it not strike, we see it not return. The winds are invisible, though we see the desolations they daily make, and easily feel when they grow boisterous. If there be anything in man that partakes of the divine nature it is his soul, which, beyond all dispute, guides and governs him, and yet we cannot see it. Let all this, therefore, teach you not to neglect or disbelieve the Deity, because He is invisible; learn to know His presence and power from the visible effects of it in the world around you; be persuaded of the universal care and providence of the all-surrounding Deity from the blessings He showers down upon all His creatures, and be sure to worship and serve this God in a becoming manner."

"I am sure," said Euthydemus, "I shall never derogate from the respect due to the gods; and I am even troubled that every man cannot sufficiently acknowledge the benefits he receives from them."

"Be not afflicted at that," said Socrates, "for you know what answer the Delphian Oracle is wont to return to those who inquire what they ought to do in order to make an acceptable sacrifice. 'Follow the custom of your country,' says he to them. Now, it is a custom received in all places for every man to sacrifice to them according to his power; and by consequence there is no better nor more pious a way of honoring the gods than that, since they themselves ordain and approve it. It is indeed a truth that we ought not to spare anything of what we are able to offer, for that would be a manifest contempt. When, therefore, a man has done all that is in his power to do, he ought to fear nothing and hope all; for, from whence can

we reasonably hope for more, than from those in whose power it is to do us the greatest good? And by what other way can we more easily obtain it, than by making ourselves acceptable to them? And how can we better make ourselves acceptable to them, than by doing their will?"

This is what Socrates taught, and by this doctrine, which was always accompanied with an exemplary devotion, he greatly advanced his friends in piety.

CHAPTER IV.

INSTANCES OF THE INVIOLABLE INTEGRITY OF SOCRATES. — HIS CONVERSATION WITH HIPPIAS CONCERNING JUSTICE.

Concerning justice, it cannot be said that Socrates concealed his opinion of it, for he plainly revealed his sentiments by his actions, as well in public as in private, making it his business to serve every man, and to obey the magistrates and the laws; insomuch, that as well in the army as in the city, his obedience and uprightness rendered him remarkable above all others. He fully discovered the integrity of his soul, when he presided in the assemblies of the people; he would never pass a decree that was contrary to the laws; he alone defended the cause of justice against the efforts of the multitude, and opposed a violence which no man but himself was able to resist. Again, when the Thirty commanded him anything that was unjust, he did not obey them. Thus, when they forbid him to speak to the young men, he regarded not their inhibition, and when they gave orders to him, as well as to some other citizens, to bring before them a certain man, whom they intended to put to death, he alone would do nothing in it, because that order was unjust. In like manner when he was accused by Melitus, though in such occasions others endeavor to gain their judges by flatteries and ignominious solicitations, which often procure them their pardon, he would not put in practice any of these mean artifices that are repugnant to the laws, and yet he might very easily have got himself acquitted, if he could have prevailed with himself to comply in the least with the custom, but he chose rather to die in an exact observance of the laws, than to save his life by acting contrary to them, for he utterly abhorred all mean or indirect practices; and this was the answer he gave to several of his friends who advised him to the contrary.

Since I am now illustrating the character of Socrates with regard to justice, I will, at the same time, relate a conversation I remember he had with Hippias of Elis on that subject.

It was a long while that Hippias had not been at Athens; and being arrived there, he happened to come to a place where Socrates was discoursing with some persons, and telling them that if anyone had a mind to learn a trade, there wanted not masters to teach him; nay, that if one would have a horse trained up there were persons enough to undertake it; but that if one desired to learn to be a good man, or to have his son, or any of his family taught to be so, it would be difficult to know to whom to apply himself. Hippias rallying him, said: — “What! Socrates, you are still repeating the same things I heard you say so long ago.”

“Nay, more,” replied Socrates, “and always upon the same subject; but you, perhaps, being learned as you are, do not always say the same thing upon the same subject.”

“Indeed,” said Hippias, “I always endeavor to say something new.”

“Is it possible,” replied Socrates?

“Pray tell me if you were asked how many letters there are in my name, and which they are, would you answer sometimes in one manner and sometimes in

another? Or if you were asked whether twice five be not ten, would you not always say the same thing?"

"In subjects like those," said Hippias, "I should be obliged to say the same thing as well as you; but since we are upon the theme of justice, I believe I can now say some things of it, against which, neither you nor any man else can make any objection."

"Good God!" cried Socrates, "what a mighty boast is here! Upon my word, Hippias, you have made an admirable discovery! And you have reason to value yourself upon it; for, let me tell you, if you can establish one single opinion of justice, the judges will be no longer divided in their sentiments, there will be no more quarrels, no more suits at law, no more seditions among citizens, no more wars between republics. Indeed, it much troubles me to leave you before you have taught me this secret, which you say you have discovered."

"I give you my word," answered Hippias, "that I will tell you nothing of it, till you have first declared your own opinion concerning justice; for it is your old way to interrogate others, and then to laugh at them by refuting what they have said; but you never make known your own opinions, that you may not be obliged to give a reason for them."

"Why do you lay this to my charge," said Socrates, "since I am continually showing to all the world what are the things I believe to be just?"

"How do you show it?" said Hippias.

"If I explain it not by my words," answered Socrates, "my actions speak it sufficiently; and do you think that actions deserve not rather to be believed than words?"

"Much rather," said Hippias, "because many may say one thing, and do another; nay, we see that, in fact, many who preach up justice to others are very unjust themselves; but this cannot be said of a man whose every action is good, and that never in his life did an unjust thing."

"Have you known, then," said Socrates, "that I have accused any man out of malice, that I have sown dissension among friends, that I have raised seditions in the Republic; in short, that I have committed any other sort of injustice?"

"Not in the least," said he.

"Well, then," added Socrates, "do you not take him to be just who commits no manner of injustice?"

"It is plain, now,'" said Hippias, "that you intend to get loose, and that you will not speak your mind freely, nor give us an exact definition of justice. For all this while you have only shown what just men do not, but not what they do."

"I should have thought," said Socrates, "I had given at once a good definition, and a clear instance of justice, when I called it an aversion from doing injustice. But since you will not allow it to be so, see whether this will satisfy you: I say, then, that justice 'is nothing but the observance of the laws.'"

"You mean," said Hippias, "that to observe the laws is to be just?"

"Yes," answered Socrates.

“I cannot comprehend your thought,” said Hippias.

“Do you not know,” pursued Socrates, “what the laws in a State are?”

“The laws,” answered Hippias, “are what the citizens have ordained by a universal consent.”

“Then,” inferred Socrates, “he who lives conformably to those ordinances observes the laws; and he who acts contrary to them is a transgressor of the laws.”

“You say true.”

“Is it not likewise true,” continued Socrates, “that he who obeys these ordinances does justly, and that he obeys them not does unjustly?”

“Yes.”

“But,” said Socrates, “he who acts justly is just, and he who acts unjustly is unjust?”

“Without doubt.”

“Therefore,” said Socrates, “whosoever observes the laws is just, and whosoever observes them not is unjust.”

“But how can it be imagined,” objected Hippias, “that the laws are a good thing, and that it is good to obey them, since even they that made them mend, alter, and repeal them so often?”

To this Socrates answered, “When you blame those who obey the laws, because they are subject to be abrogated, you do the same thing as if you laughed at your enemies for keeping themselves in a good posture of defense during the war, because you might tell them that the peace will one day be made: and thus you would condemn those who generously expose their lives for the service of their country. Do you know,” added he, “that Lycurgus could never have rendered the Republic of Sparta more excellent than other States if he had not made it his chief care to incline the citizens most exactly to observe the laws? This, too, is what all good magistrates aim at, because a Republic that is obedient to the laws is happy in peace, and invincible in war. Moreover, you know that concord is a great happiness in a State. It is daily recommended to the people; and it is an established custom all over Greece to make the citizens swear to live in good understanding with one another, and each of them takes an oath to do so. Now, I do not believe that this unity is exacted of them, only that they might choose the same company of comedians, or of musicians, nor that they might give their approbation to the same poets, or all take delight in the same diversions, but that they may all unanimously obey the laws, because that obedience is the security and the happiness of the State. Concord, therefore, is so necessary, that without it good polity and authority cannot subsist in any State, nor good economy and order in any family.

“In our private capacity, likewise, how advantageous is it to obey the laws? By what means can we more certainly avoid punishments, and deserve rewards? What more prudent conduct can we observe, always to gain our suits at law, and never to be cast! To whom should we with greater confidence trust our estates or our children, than to him who makes a conscience of observing the laws? Who can

deserve more of his country? Whom can she more safely entrust with public posts, and on whom can she more justly bestow the highest honors, than on the good and honest man? Who will discharge himself better of his duty towards his father or his mother, towards his relations or his domestics, towards his friends, his fellow-citizens, or his guests? To whom will the enemy rather trust for the observing of a truce, or for the performance of a treaty of peace? With whom would we rather choose to make an alliance? To whom will the allies more readily give the command of their armies, or the government of their towns? From whom can we rather hope for a grateful return of a kindness than from a man who strictly obeys the laws? and, by consequence, to whom will men be more ready to do good turns, than to him of whose gratitude they are certain? With whom will men be better pleased to contract a friendship, and, consequently, against whom will men be less inclined to commit acts of hostility, than against that person who has everybody for his well-wisher and friend, and few or none for his ill-wishers or enemies? These, Hippias, are the advantages of observing the laws. And now, having shown you that the observance of the laws is the same thing with justice, if you are of another opinion, pray let me know it."

"Indeed, Socrates," answered Hippias, "what you have said of justice agrees exactly with my sentiments of it."

"Have you never heard," continued Socrates, "of certain laws that are not written?"

"You mean the laws," answered Hippias, "which are received all over the earth."

"Do you think, then," added Socrates, "that it was all mankind that made them?"

"That is impossible," said Hippias, "because all men cannot be assembled in the same place, and they speak not all of them the same language."

"Who, then, do you think gave us these laws?"

"The gods," answered Hippias; "for the first command to all men is to adore the gods."

"And is it not likewise commanded everywhere to honor one's father and mother?"

"Yes, certainly," said Hippias.

Socrates went on: — "And that fathers and mothers should not marry with their own children, is not that too a general command?"

"No," answered Hippias, "this last law is not a Divine law, because I see some persons transgress it."

"They observe not the others better," said Socrates; "but take notice, that no man violates with impunity a law established by the gods. There are unavoidable punishments annexed to this crime; but we easily secure ourselves from the rigor of human laws, after we have transgressed them, either by keeping ourselves hid, or defending ourselves by open force."

"And what is this punishment," said Hippias, "which it is impossible for fathers, who marry with their own children, to avoid?"

“It is very great,” said Socrates; “for what can be more afflicting to men, who desire to have children than to have very bad ones?”

“And how do you know,” pursued Hippias, “that they will have bad children? What shall hinder them, if they are virtuous themselves, from having children that are so likewise?”

“It is not enough,” answered Socrates, “that the father and the mother be virtuous: they must, besides, be both of them in the vigor and perfection of their age. Now, do you believe, that the seed of persons who are too young, or who are already in their declining age, is equal to that of persons who are in their full strength?”

“It is not likely that it is,” said Hippias.

“And which is the best?” pursued Socrates.

“Without doubt,” said Hippias, “that of a man in his strength.”

“It follows, then,” continued Socrates, “that the seed of persons who are not yet come to their full strength, or who are past it, is not good.”

“In all appearance it is not.”

“In those ages, then, we ought not to get children?” said Socrates.

“I think so.”

“Such, therefore, as indulge their lust in such untimely fruition will have very weakly children?”

“I grant they will.”

“And are not weakly children bad ones?”

“They are,” said Hippias.

“Tell me, further,” said Socrates, “is it not a universal law to do good to those who have done good to us?”

“Yes,” said Hippias, “but many offend against this law.”

“And they are punished for it,” replied Socrates, “seeing their best friends abandon them, and that they are obliged to follow those who have an aversion for them. For are not they the best friends who do kindnesses whenever they are desired? And if he who has received a favor neglect to acknowledge it, or return it ill, does he not incur their hate by his ingratitude? And yet, finding his advantage in preserving their goodwill, is it not to them that he makes his court with most assiduity?”

“It is evident,” said Hippias, “that it is the gods who have ordered these things; for, when I consider that each law carries with it the punishment of the transgressor, I confess it to be the work of a more excellent legislator than man.”

“And do you think,” said Socrates, “that the gods make laws that are unjust?”

“On the contrary,” answered Hippias, “it is very difficult for any but the gods to make laws that are just.”

“Therefore, Hippias,” said Socrates, “according to the gods themselves ‘to obey the laws is to be just.’”

This is what Socrates said on the subject of justice, and his actions being conformable to his words, he from day to day created a greater love of justice in the minds of those who frequented him.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE MISCHIEFS OF INTEMPERANCE, AND THE ADVANTAGES OF SOBRIETY.

I will now set down the arguments that Socrates used to bring his friends to the practice of good actions, for being of opinion that temperance is a great advantage to such as desire to do anything that is excellent, he first showed them, by his way of living, that no man was more advanced than himself in the exercise of that virtue; and in his conferences he exhorted his hearers above all things to the practice of it, and his thoughts being continually employed in the means of arriving to be virtuous, he made it likewise the subject of all his discourses.

I remember that talking once with Euthydemus concerning temperance he delivered himself to this effect: — "In your opinion, Euthydemus, is liberty a very valuable thing?"

"To be valued above all things," answered Euthydemus.

"Do you believe that a man who is a slave to sensual pleasures, and finds himself incapable of doing good, enjoys his liberty?"

"Not in the least."

"You allow, then, that to do good is to be free, and that to be prevented from doing it, by any obstacle whatever, is not to be free?"

"I think so," said Euthydemus.

"You believe, then," said Socrates, "that debauched persons are not free?" "I do."

"Do you believe likewise," continued Socrates, "that debauchery does not only hinder from doing good, but compels to do ill?"

"I think it does."

"What would you say, then, of a master who should hinder you from applying yourself to what is honest, and force you to undertake some infamous occupation?"

"I would say he was a very wicked master," answered Euthydemus.

"And which is the worst of all slaveries?" added Socrates.

"To serve ill masters," said Euthydemus.

"Therefore," inferred Socrates, "the debauched are in a miserable slavery."

"No doubt of it."

"Is it not debauchery, likewise," said Socrates, "that deprives men of their wisdom, the noblest gift of the gods, and drives them into ignorance and stupidity, and all manner of disorders? It robs them of leisure to apply themselves to things profitable, while it drowns them in sensual pleasures; and it seizes their minds to that degree that, though they often know which is the best way, they are miserably engaged in the worst."

"They are so."

"Nor can we expect to find temperance nor modesty in a debauched person, since the actions of temperance and debauchery are entirely opposite."

"There is no doubt of it," said Euthydemus.

“I do not think neither,” added Socrates, “that it is possible to imagine anything that makes men neglect their duty more than debauchery.”

“You say true.”

“Is there anything more pernicious to man,” said Socrates, “than that which robs him of his judgment, makes him embrace and cherish things that are hurtful, avoid and neglect what is profitable, and lead a life contrary to that of good men?”

“There is nothing,” said Euthydemus.

Socrates went on: — “And may we not ascribe the contrary effects to temperance?”

“Without doubt.”

“And is it not likely to be true that the cause of the contrary effects is good?”

“Most certainly.”

“It follows, then, my dear Euthydemus,” said Socrates, “that temperance is a very good thing?”

“Undoubtedly it is.”

“But have you reflected,” pursued Socrates, “that debauchery, which pretends to lead men to pleasures, cannot conduct them thither, but deceives them, leaving them in disappointment, satiety, and disgust? And have you considered that temperance and sobriety alone give us the true taste of pleasures? For it is the nature of debauchery not to endure hunger nor thirst, nor the fatigue of being long awake, nor the vehement desires of love, which, nevertheless, are the true dispositions to eat and drink with delight, and to find an exquisite pleasure in the soft approaches of sleep, and in the enjoyments of love. This is the reason that the intemperate find less satisfaction in these actions, which are necessary and frequently done. But temperance, which accustoms us to wait for the necessity, is the only thing that makes us feel an extreme pleasure in these occasions.”

“You are in the right,” said Euthydemus.

“It is this virtue, too,” said Socrates, “that puts men in a condition of bringing to a state of perfection both the mind and the body, of rendering themselves capable of well governing their families, of being serviceable to their friends and their country, and of overcoming their enemies, which is not only very agreeable on account of the advantages, but very desirable likewise for the satisfaction that attends it. But the debauched know none of this, for what share can they pretend to in virtuous actions, they whose minds are wholly taken up in the pursuit of present pleasures?”

“According to what you say,” replied Euthydemus, “a man given to voluptuousness is unfit for any virtue.”

“And what difference is there,” said Socrates, “between an irrational animal and a voluptuous man, who has no regard to what is best, but blindly pursues what is most delightful? It belongs to the temperate only to inquire what things are best and what not, and then, after having found out the difference by experience and reasoning, to embrace the good and avoid the bad, which renders them at once most happy, most virtuous, and most prudent.”

This was the sum of this conference with Euthydemus. Now Socrates said that conferences were so called because the custom was to meet and confer together, in order to distinguish things according to their different species, and he advised the frequent holding of these conferences, because it is an exercise that improves and makes men truly great, teaches them to become excellent politicians, and ripens the judgment and understanding.

CHAPTER VI.

SOCRATES' FRIENDS ATTAIN, BY FREQUENTING HIS CONVERSATION, AN EXCELLENT WAY OF REASONING. — THE METHOD HE OBSERVED IN ARGUING SHOWN IN SEVERAL INSTANCES. — OF THE DIFFERENT SORTS OF GOVERNMENT. — HOW SOCRATES DEFENDED HIS OPINIONS.

I will show, in the next place, how Socrates' friends learnt to reason so well by frequenting his conversation. He held that they who perfectly understand the nature of things can explain themselves very well concerning them, but that a man who has not that knowledge often deceives himself and others likewise. He therefore perpetually conferred with his friends without ever being weary of that exercise. It would be very difficult to relate how he defined every particular thing. I will therefore mention only what I think sufficient to show what method he observed in reasoning. And, in the first place, let us see how he argues concerning piety.

"Tell me," said he to Euthydemus, "what piety is?"

"It is a very excellent thing," answered Euthydemus.

"And who is a pious man?" said Socrates.

"A man who serves the gods."

"Is it lawful," added Socrates, "to serve the gods in what manner we please?"

"By no means," said Euthydemus; "there are laws made for that purpose, which must be kept."

"He, then, who keeps these laws will know how he ought to serve the gods?"

"I think so."

"And is it not true," continued Socrates, "that he who knows one way of serving the gods believes there is no better a way than his?"

"That is certain."

"And will he not be careful how he does otherwise?"

"I believe he will."

"He, then, who knows the laws that ought to be observed in the service of the gods, will serve them according to the laws?"

"Without doubt."

"But he who serves the gods as the laws direct, serves them as he ought?"

"True, he does." "And he who serves the gods as he ought is pious?" "There can be no doubt of it."

"Thus, then," said Socrates, "we have the true definition of a pious man: He who knows in what manner he ought to serve the gods?"

"I think so," said Euthydemus.

"Tell me further," continued Socrates, "is it lawful for men to behave themselves to one another as they please?"

"In nowise," answered Euthydemus; "there are also certain laws which they ought to observe among themselves."

“And do they,” said Socrates, “who live together according to those laws, live as they ought?”

“Yes.”

“And do they, who live as they ought, live well?”

“Certainly they do.”

“And does he who knows how to live well with men understand well how to govern his affairs?”

“It is likely that he may.”

“Now, do you believe,” said Socrates, “that some men obey the laws without knowing what the laws command?”

“I do not believe it.”

“And when a man knows what he ought to do, do you think he believes that he ought not to do it?”

“I do not think so.”

“And do you know any men who do otherwise than they believe they ought to do?”

“None at all.”

“They, then, who know the laws that men ought to observe among themselves, do what those laws command?”

“I believe so.”

“And do they who do what the laws command, do what is just?”

“Most surely.”

“And they who do what is just are just likewise?”

“None but they are so.”

“We may, therefore, well conclude,” said Socrates, “that the just are they who know the laws that men ought to observe among themselves?”

“I grant it,” said Euthydemus.

“And as for wisdom,” pursued Socrates, “what shall we say it is? Tell me whether are men said to be wise in regard to the things they know, or in regard to those they do not know?”

“There can be no doubt,” answered Euthydemus, “but that it is in consideration of what they know; for how can a man be wise in things he knows not?”

“Then,” said Socrates, “men are wise on account of their knowledge?”

“It cannot be otherwise.”

“Is wisdom anything but what renders us wise?”

“No.”

“Wisdom therefore is only knowledge?”

“I think so.”

“And do you believe,” said Socrates, “that it is in the power of a man to know everything?”

“Not so much as even the hundredth part.”

“It is, then, impossible,” said Socrates, “to find a man who is wise in all things?”

“Indeed it is,” said Euthydemus.

“It follows, then,” said Socrates, “that every man is wise in what he knows?”

“I believe so.”

“But can we, by this same way of comparison, judge of the nature of good?”

“As how?” said Euthydemus.

“Do you think,” said Socrates, “that the same thing is profitable to all men?”

“By no means.”

“Do you believe that the same thing may be profitable to one and hurtful to another?”

“I think it may.”

“Then is it not the good that is profitable?”

“Yes, certainly.”

“Therefore, ‘what is profitable is a good to him to whom it is profitable.’”

“That is true.”

“Is it not the same with what is beautiful? For, can you say that a body or a vessel is beautiful and proper for all the world?”

“By no means.”

“You will say, then, that it is beautiful in regard to the thing for which it is proper?”

“Yes.”

“But tell me whether what is reputed beautiful for one thing has the same relation to another as to that to which it is proper?”

“No.”

“Then ‘whatever is of any use is reputed beautiful in regard to the thing to which that use relates?’”

“I think so.”

“And what say you of courage?” added Socrates. “Is it an excellent thing?”

“Very excellent,” answered Euthydemus.

“But do you believe it to be of use in occasions of little moment?”

“Yes; but it is necessary in great affairs.”

“Do you think it of great advantage in dangers,” continued Socrates, “not to perceive the peril we are in?”

“I am not of that opinion.”

“At that rate,” said Socrates, “they who are not frightened because they see not the danger are in nowise valiant.”

“There is no doubt of it,” said Euthydemus, “for otherwise there would be some fools, and even cowards, who must be accounted brave.”

“And what are they who fear what is not to be feared?”

“They are less brave than the others,” answered Euthydemus.

“They therefore,” said Socrates, “who show themselves valiant in dangerous occasions, are they whom you call brave; and they who behave themselves in them unworthily, are they whom you call cowards?”

“Very right.”

“Do you think,” added Socrates, “that any men are valiant in such occasions except they who know how to behave themselves in them?”

“I do not think there are.”

“And are not they, who behave themselves unworthily, the same as they who know not how to behave themselves?”

“I believe they are.”

“And does not every man behave himself as he believes he ought to do?”

“Without doubt.”

“Shall we say, then, that they who behave themselves ill know how they ought to behave themselves?”

“By no means.”

“They, therefore, who know how to behave themselves, are they who behave themselves well?”

“They and no others.”

“Let us conclude, then,” said Socrates, “that they who know how to behave themselves well in dangers and difficult occasions are the brave, and that they who know not how to do so are the cowards.”

“That is my opinion,” said Euthydemus.

Socrates was wont to say, that a kingly government and a tyrannical government were indeed two sorts of monarchy, and that there was this difference between them; that, under a kingly government, the subjects obeyed willingly, and that everything was done according to the laws of the State; but that, under a tyrannical government, the people obeyed by force, and that all the laws were reduced to the sole will of the sovereign.

Concerning the other sorts of government, he said: That when the offices of a Republic are given to the good citizens, this sort of State was called aristocracy, or government of good men; when, on the contrary, the magistrates were chosen according to their revenues, it was called a plutocracy, or government of the rich; and when all the people are admitted, without distinction, to bear employments, it is a democracy, or popular government.

If anyone opposed the opinion of Socrates, on any affair whatever, without giving a convincing reason, his custom was to bring back the discourse to the first proposition, and to begin by that to search for the truth. For example: if Socrates had commended any particular person, and any stander-by had named another, and pretended that he was more valiant, or more experienced in affairs, he would have defended his opinion in the following manner: — “You pretend,” would he

have said, “that he of whom you speak is a better citizen than the person whom I was praising. Let us consider what is the duty of a good citizen, and what man is most esteemed in a Republic. Will you not grant me, that in relation to the management of the public revenue, he is in the highest esteem who, while he has that office, saves the Republic most money? In regard to the war, it is he who gains most victories over the enemies. If we are to enter into a treaty with other States, it is he who can dexterously win over to the party of the Republic those who before opposed its interests. If we are to have regard to what passes in the assemblies of the people, it is he who breaks the cabals, who appeases the seditious, who maintains concord and unity among the citizens.” This being granted him, he applied these general rules to the dispute in question, and made the truth plainly appear, even to the eyes of those who contradicted him. As for himself, when he undertook to discourse of anything, he always began by the most common and universally received propositions, and was wont to say, that the strength of the argumentation consisted in so doing. And, indeed, of all the men I have ever seen, I know none who could so easily bring others to own the truth of what he had a mind to prove to them. And he said that Homer, speaking of Ulysses, called him “the certain or never-failing orator,” because he had the art of supporting his arguments upon principles that were acknowledged by all men.

CHAPTER VII.

METHOD TO BE OBSERVED IN STUDY. — ARTS AND SCIENCES NO FURTHER USEFUL, THAN THEY CONTRIBUTE TO RENDER MEN WISER, BETTER, OR HAPPIER. — VAIN AND UNPROFITABLE KNOWLEDGE TO BE REJECTED.

I presume now, that what I have said has been a sufficient evidence of the frankness and sincerity with which Socrates conversed with his friends, and made known his opinions to them. It remains now that I should say something of the extreme care Socrates showed for the advancement of his friends, and how much he had at heart that they might not be ignorant of anything that could be useful to them, to the end they might not want the assistance of others in their own affairs. For this reason, he applied himself to examine in what each of them was knowing; then, if he thought it in his power to teach them anything that an honest and worthy man ought to know, he taught them such things with incredible readiness and affection; if not, he carried them himself to masters who were able to instruct them. But he resolved within himself how far a person who was well-educated in his studies ought to learn everything.

Thus for geometry he said, that we ought to know enough of it not to be imposed upon in measure when we buy or sell land, when we divide an inheritance into shares, or measure out the work of a laborer, and that it was so easy to know this, that if a man applied himself ever so little to the practice of such things, he would soon learn even the extent and circumference of the whole earth, and how to measure it; but he did not approve that a man should dive into the very bottom of this science, and puzzle his brains with I know not what figures, though he himself was expert in it, for he said he could not see what all those niceties and inventions were good for, which take up the whole life of a man, and distract him from other more necessary studies.

In like manner he was of opinion that a man should employ some time in astronomy, that he might know by the stars the hour of the night, what day of the month it is, and what season of the year we are in, in order that we might know when to relieve a sentinel in the night, and when it is best to venture out to sea, or undertake a journey, and, in short, that we might know how to do everything in its proper season. He said that all this was easily learnt by conversing with seamen, or with such as go a-hunting by night, or others who profess to know these things; but he dissuaded very much from penetrating farther into this science, as even to know what planets are not in the same declination, to explain all their different motions, to know how far distant they are from the earth, in how long time they make their revolutions, and what are their several influences, for he thought these sciences wholly useless, not that he was ignorant of them himself, but because they take up all our time, and divert us from better employments. In fine, he could not allow of a too curious inquiry into the wonderful workmanship of the Deity in the disposition of the universe, that being a secret which the mind cannot comprehend, and because it is not an action acceptable to God to endeavor to discover what He would hide from us. He held, likewise, that it was dangerous to perplex the mind with these sublime speculations, as Anaxagoras had done, who

pretended to be very knowing in them, for in teaching that the sun was the same thing as fire, he does not consider that fire does not dazzle the eyes, but that it is impossible to support the splendor of the sun. He did not reflect, neither, that the sun blackens the sky, which fire does not; nor lastly, that the heat of the sun is necessary to the earth, in order to the production of trees and fruits, but that the heat of fire burns and kills them. When he said, too, that the sun was only a stone set on fire, he did not consider that a stone glitters not in the fire, and cannot last long in it without consuming, whereas the sun lasts always, and is an inexhaustible source of light.

Socrates advised, likewise, to learn arithmetic, but not to amuse ourselves with the vain curiosities of that science, having established this rule in all his studies and in all his conferences, never to go beyond what is useful.

He exhorted his friends to take care of their health, and to that purpose to consult with the learned; and to observe, besides, each in his own particular, what meat, what drink, and what exercise is best for him, and how to use them to preserve himself in health. For when a man has thus studied his own constitution, he cannot have a better physician than himself.

If anyone desired to attempt or to learn things that were above the power or capacity of human nature, he advised him to apply himself to divination; for he who knows by what means the gods generally signify their mind to men, or how it is they used to give them counsel and aid, such a person never fails to obtain from the Deity all that direction and assistance that is necessary for him.

CHAPTER VIII.

BEHAVIOR OF SOCRATES FROM THE TIME OF HIS CONDEMNATION TO HIS DEATH. — HIS CHARACTER SUMMED UP IN A FEW WORDS.

To conclude: if, because Socrates was condemned to death, anyone should believe that he was a liar to say that he had a good demon that guided him, and gave him instructions what he should or should not do, let him consider, in the first place, that he was arrived to such an age that if he had not died when he did, he could not have lived much longer; that by dying when he did he avoided the most toilsome part of life, in which the mind loses much of its vigor; and that in amends for it he discovered to the whole world the greatness of his soul, acquired to himself an immortal glory, by the defense he made before his judges, in behaving himself with a sincerity, courage, and probity that were indeed wonderful, and in receiving his sentence with a patience and resolution of mind never to be equaled; for it is agreed by all that no man ever suffered death with greater constancy than Socrates.

He lived thirty days after his condemnation, because the Delian feasts happened in that month, and the law forbids to put any man to death till the consecrated vessel that is sent to the Isle of Delos be come back to Athens. During that time his friends, who saw him continually, found no change in him; but that he always retained that tranquility of mind and agreeableness of temper which before had made all the world admire him. Now, certainly no man can die with greater constancy than this; this is doubtless the most glorious death that can be imagined; but if it be the most glorious, it is the most happy; and if it be the most happy, it is the most acceptable to the Deity.

Hermogenes has told me, that being with him a little after Melitus had accused him, he observed, that he seemed to decline speaking of that affair: from whence he took occasion to tell him that it would not be amiss for him to think of what he should answer in his own justification. To which Socrates replied: “Do you believe I have done anything else all my life than think of it?” And Hermogenes asking him what he meant by saying so? Socrates told him that he had made it the whole business of his life to examine what was just and what unjust; that he had always cherished justice and hated injustice, and that he did not believe there was any better way to justify himself.

Hermogenes said further to him — “Do you not know that judges have often condemned the innocent to death, only because their answers offended them, and that, on the contrary, they have often acquitted the guilty?”

“I know it very well,” answered Socrates; “but I assure you, that having set myself to think what I should say to my judges, the demon that advises me dissuaded me from it.”

At which Hermogenes seeming surprised, Socrates said to him, “Why are you surprised that this God thinks it better for me to leave this world than to continue longer in it? Sure, you are not ignorant that I have lived as well and as pleasantly as any man, if to live well be, as I take it, to have no concern but for virtue, and if to live pleasantly be to find that we have made some progress in it. Now, I have

good reason to believe that this is my happy case, that I have always had a steady regard for virtue, and made progress in it, because I perceive that my mind, at this time, does not misgive me, nay, I have the sincere testimony of my conscience that I have done my duty; and in this belief I strengthen myself by the conversation I have had with others, and by comparing myself with them. My friends, too, have believed the same thing of me, not because they wish me well, for in that sense every friend would think as much of his friend, but because they thought they advanced in virtue by my conversation.

"If I were to live longer, perhaps I should fall into the inconveniences of old age: perhaps my sight should grow dim, my hearing fail me, my judgment become weak, and I should have more trouble to learn, more to retain what I had learnt; perhaps, too, after all, I should find myself incapable of doing the good I had done before. And if, to complete my misery, I should have no sense of my wretchedness, would not life be a burden to me? And, on the other hand, say I had a sense of it, would it not afflict me beyond measure? As things now stand, if I die innocent the shame will fall on those who are the cause of my death, since all sort of iniquity is attended with shame. But who will ever blame me because others have not confessed my innocence, nor done me justice? Past experience lets us see that they who suffer injustice, and they who commit it, leave not a like reputation behind them after their death. And thus, if I die on this occasion, I am most certain that posterity will more honor my memory than theirs who condemn me; for it will be said of me, that I never did any wrong, never gave any ill advice to any man; but that I labored all my life long to excite to virtue those who frequented me."

This was the answer that Socrates gave to Hermogenes, and to several others. In a word, all good men who knew Socrates daily regret his loss to this very hour, reflecting on the advantage and improvement they made in his company.

For my own part, having found him to be the man I have described, that is to say, so pious as to do nothing without the advice of the Deity; so just as never to have in the least injured any man, and to have done very signal services to many; so chaste and temperate as never to have preferred delight and pleasure before modesty and honesty; so prudent as never to have mistaken in the discernment of good and evil, and never to have had need of the advice of others, to form a right judgment of either; moreover, most capable to deliberate and resolve in all sorts of affairs, most capable to examine into men, to reprehend them for their vices, and to excite them to virtue; having, I say, found all these perfections in Socrates, I have always esteemed him the most virtuous and most happy of all men; and if anyone be not of my opinion, let him take the pains to compare him with other men, and judge of him afterwards.

Xenophon's Memories of Socrates

Abstracted from

THE WHOLE WORKS OF XENOPHON,

TRANSLATED BY FIELDING, WELWOOD, BRADLEY.

SOCRATES: THE ***STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG*** ONCE FIXED, ALL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION AMONG THE JUDGES, ALL SEDITION AMONG THE PEOPLE, ALL LAWSUITS BETWEEN CITIZENS, ALL WARS AND CONTENTIONS AMONG COMMUNITIES, MUST BE AT AN END!

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THE DEFENSE OF SOCRATES, Sarah Fielding
MEMOIRS OF SOCRATES, Sarah Fielding
THE BANQUET OF XENOPHON, James Welwood, M. D.
THE SCIENCE OF GOOD HUSBANDRY, R. Bradley, F.R.S.

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XENOPHON'S MEMOIRS OF SOCRATES.

TRANSLATED BY

Sarah Fielding.

PREFACE TO THE MEMOIRS OF SOCRATES.

Although the translator of the following Memoirs was fully persuaded, that the far greater number of those who favored her with their names, and assisted her with their interest, were influenced by much nobler motives, than the expectation of receiving any thing very extraordinary from her hand; yet, so little did this appear to her any reason for relaxing her endeavors, that on the contrary, she considered it as laying her under an additional obligation to do all the justice she possibly could to her author. It was partly on that account; partly from sickness; and partly from some other accidents, not more within her power to regulate, than the state of her own health, that the publication of these Memoirs has been deferred beyond the time first mentioned in the proposals: but if the task is, at last, discharged tolerably, the mind of the translator will be set much at ease; and the reader find somewhat to repay him for his waiting.

That the Memoirs of Socrates, with regard to the greatest part, are held in the highest estimation, is most certain; and if there are some passages which seem obscure; and of which the use does not so plainly appear to us at this distance of time; and from the dissimilarity of our customs and manners; yet, perhaps, we might not do amiss, in taking Socrates himself for our example in this particular, as well as in many others; who being presented by Euripides with the writings of Heraclitus, and afterwards asked his opinion of their merit;—"What I understand," said he, "I find to be excellent; and therefore believe that to be of equal value, which I do not understand."

"And, certainly," continues the admired modern writer, from whom the quotation above was taken, "this candor is more particularly becoming us in the perusal of the works of ancient authors; of those works which have been preserved in the devastation of cities; and snatched up in the wreck of

nations: which have been the delight of ages; and transmitted as the great inheritance of mankind, from one generation to another: and we ought to take it for granted, that there is a justness in the connection, which we cannot trace; and a cogency in the reasoning, which we cannot understand." The translator of the following sheets would willingly bespeak the same candor, in reading the translations of the ancient writers, which has above been thought so necessary for judging right of the originals. In the preface to the Life of Cicero, the celebrated writer of it thus expresses himself:—"Nor has that part of the task," said he, (speaking of the several passages he had translated from the writings of Cicero) "been the easiest to me; as those will readily believe who have ever attempted to translate the classical writings of Greece and Rome." It may, perhaps, be objected, "That candor alone is not sufficient for the present occasion:" to which it can only be answered, "That something was to be done: and, that no pains has been spared, to do it as well as possible."

Note: The translator is sorry to find, that the title affixed to this work has not been approved of universally: and, in truth, that inundation of trifles, follies, and vices, lately introduced into the world, under the general appellation of Memoirs, has occasioned such an unhappy association of ideas, as does not well suit with a Xenophon's giving a relation of what a Socrates once said and did: but the translator takes shelter for herself, under the respectable names of Mr. Johnson and Mrs. Carter; the one having, as she thinks, explained the word Memoir in a manner consistent with the present application of it; and the other actually made choice of it for the very same purpose as is here done.

THE DEFENSE OF SOCRATES BEFORE HIS JUDGES.

I have always considered the manner in which Socrates behaved after he had been summoned to his trial, as most worthy of our remembrance; and that, not only with respect to the defense he made for himself, when standing before his judges; but the sentiments he expressed concerning his dissolution. For, although there be many who have written on this subject, and all concur in setting forth the wonderful courage and intrepidity wherewith he spoke to the assembly—so that it remains incontestable that Socrates did thus speak—yet that it was his full persuasion, that death was more eligible for him than life at such a season, they have by no means so clearly manifested; whereby the loftiness of his style, and the boldness of his speech, may wear at least the appearance of being imprudent and unbecoming.

But Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, was his intimate friend; and from him it is we have heard those things of Socrates, as sufficiently prove the sublimity of his language was only conformable to the sentiments of his mind. For, having observed him, as he tells us, choosing rather to discourse on any other subject than the business of his trial; he asked him, "If it was not necessary to be preparing for his defense?" And "What!" said he, "my Hermogenes, suppose you I have not spent my whole life in preparing for this very thing?" Hermogenes desiring he would explain himself: "I have," said he, "steadily persisted, throughout life, in a diligent endeavor to do nothing which is unjust; and this I take to be the best and most honorable preparation."

"But see you not," said Hermogenes, "that often here in Athens, the judges, influenced by the force of oratory, condemn those to death who no way deserve it; and, not less frequently, acquit the guilty, when softened into compassion by the moving complaints, or the insinuating eloquence of those who plead their cause before them?"

“I know it,” replied Socrates; “and therefore, twice have I attempted to take the matter of my defense under consideration; but the Genius always opposed me.”

Hermogenes having expressed some astonishment at these words, Socrates proceeded: “Does it then appear marvelous to you, Hermogenes, that God should think this the very best time for me to die? Know you not, that hitherto I have yielded to no man that he has lived more uprightly or even more pleasurably than myself; possessed, as I was, of that well-grounded self-approbation, arising from the consciousness of having done my duty both to the gods and men: my friends also bearing their testimony to the integrity of my conversation! But now,—if my life is prolonged, and I am spared even to old age,—what can hinder, my Hermogenes, the infirmities of old age from falling upon me? My sight will grow dim; my hearing, heavy; less capable of learning, as more liable to forget what I have already learned; and if, to all this, I become sensible of my decay, and bemoan myself on the account of it; how can I say that I still lived pleasantly? It may be too,” continued Socrates, “that God, through his goodness, has appointed for me, not only that my life should terminate at a time which seems the most seasonable; but the manner in which it will be terminated shall also be the most eligible: for, if my death is now resolved upon, it must needs be, that they who take charge of this matter will permit me to choose the means supposed the most easy; free too from those lingering circumstances which keep our friends in anxious suspense for us, and fill the mind of the dying man with much pain and perturbation. And when nothing offensive, nothing unbecoming, is left on the memory of those who are present, but the man is dissolved while the body is yet sound, and the mind still capable of exerting itself benevolently, who can say, Hermogenes, that so to die is not most desirable? And with good reason,” continued Socrates, “did the gods' oppose

themselves at what time we took the affair of my escape under deliberation, and determined, that every means should be diligently sought after to effect it; since, if our designs had been carried into execution, instead of terminating my life in the manner I am now going, I had only gained the unhappy privilege of finding it put an end to by the torments of some disease, or the lingering decays incident to old age, when all things painful flow in upon us together, destitute of every joy which might serve to soften and allay them.

"Yet think not, Hermogenes, the desire of death shall influence me beyond what is reasonable: I will not set out with asking it at their hands: but if, when I speak my opinion of myself, and declare what I think I have deserved both of gods and men, my judges are displeased, I will much sooner submit to it, than meanly entreat the continuance of my life, whereby I should only bring upon myself many and far greater evils, than any I had taken such unbecoming pains to deprecate."

In this manner Socrates replied to Hermogenes and others: and his enemies having accused him of "not believing in the gods whom the city held sacred; but as designing to introduce other and new deities; and, likewise, of his having corrupted the youth Hermogenes further told me, that Socrates, advancing towards the tribunal, thus spoke:

"What I chiefly marvel at, O you judges! is this; whence Melitus infers that I esteem not those as gods whom the city hold sacred. For that I sacrifice at the appointed festivals, on our common altars, was evident to all others; and might have been to Melitus, had Melitus been so minded. Neither yet does it seem to be asserted with greater reason, that my design was to introduce new deities among us, because I have often said, 'That it is the voice of God which gives me significations of what is most expedient;' since they themselves, who observe the chirping of birds, or those ominous words spoken by men, ground their conclusions on no other than voices. For who

among you doubts whether thunder sends forth a voice? or whether it be not the very greatest of all auguries? The Pythian priestess herself; does not she likewise, from the tripod, declare, by a voice, the divine oracles? And, truly, that God foreknows the future, and also shows it to whomsoever he pleases, I am no way singular either in believing or asserting; since all mankind agree with me herein; this difference only excepted, that whereas they say it is from auguries, omens, symbols, and diviners, whence they have their notices of the future; I, on the contrary, impute all those premonitions, wherewith I am favored, to a genius; and I think, that, in so doing, I have spoken not only more truly, but more piously, than they who attribute to birds the divine privilege of declaring things to come: and that I lied not against God, I have this indisputable proof, that whereas I have often communicated to many of my friends the divine counsels, yet has no man ever detected me of speaking falsely."

No sooner was this heard, but a murmuring arose among his judges; some disbelieving the truth of what he had said, while others envied him for being, as they thought, more highly favored of the gods than they. But Socrates, still going on; "Mark!" said he, "I pray; and attend to what is yet more extraordinary, that such of you as are willing, may still the more disbelieve that I have been thus favored of the deity: Chærephon, inquiring of the oracle at Delphos concerning me, was answered by Apollo himself, in the presence of many people, "That he knew no man more free, more just, or more wise than I."

On hearing this, the tumult among them visibly increased: but Socrates, still going on,—"And yet Lycurgus, the Lacedæmonian lawgiver, had still greater things declared of him: for, on his entering into the temple, the deity thus accosted him: "I am considering," said he, "whether I shall call you a god, or a man!" Now Apollo compared me not to a god.

This, indeed he said, “That I by far excelled man.” Howbeit, credit not too hastily what you have heard, though coming from an oracle; but let us thoroughly examine those things which the deity spoke concerning me.

“Say, then, where have you ever known any one less enslaved to sensual appetite; whom more free than the man who submits not to receive gift, or reward, from the hands of any other? Whom can you deservedly esteem more just, than he who can so well accommodate himself to what he has already in his own possession, as not even to desire what belongs to another? Or how can he fail of being accounted wise, who, from the time he first began to comprehend what was spoken, never ceased to seek, and search out, to the very best of his power, whatever was virtuous and good for man? And, as a proof that in so doing I have not labored in vain, you yourselves know, that many of our citizens, yes, and many foreigners also, who made virtue their pursuit, always preferred, as their chief pleasure, the conversing with me. Whence was it, I pray you, that when everyone knew my want of power to return any kind of pecuniary favor, so many should be ambitious to bestow them on me? Why does no man call me his debtor, yet many acknowledge they owe me much? When the city is besieged, and every other person bemoaning his loss, why do I appear as in no respect the poorer than while it remained in its most prosperous state? And what is the cause, that when others are under a necessity to procure their delicacies from abroad, at an exorbitant rate, I can indulge in pleasures far more exquisite, by recurring to the reflections in my own mind? And now, O you judges! if, in whatsoever I have declared of myself, no one is able to confute me as a false speaker, who will say I merit not approbation, and that not only from the gods, but men?

“Nevertheless, you, O Melitus, have asserted, that I,—diligently applying myself to the contemplation and practice of

whatever is virtuous—‘corrupt the youth—and, indeed, we well know what it is to corrupt them. But show us, if in your power, whom, of pious, I have made impious; of modest, shameless; of frugal, profuse? Who, from temperate is become drunken; from laborious, idle, or effeminate, by associating with me? Or, where is the man who has been enslaved, by my means, to any vicious pleasure whatsoever?”

“No, verily!” said Melitus; “but I know of many whom you have persuaded to obey you rather than their parents.”

“And with good reason,” replied Socrates, “when the point in question concerned education; since no man but knows that I made this my chief study: and which of you, if sick, prefers not the advice of the physician to his parents? Even the whole body of the Athenian people,—when collected in the public assembly,—do not they follow the opinion of him whom they think the most able, though he be not of their kindred? And in the choice of a general, do you not to your fathers, brothers, no, even to yourselves, prefer the man whom you think the best skilled in military discipline?”

“Certainly,” returned Melitus; “neither can anyone doubt of its being most expedient.”

“How then could it escape being regarded even by you, Melitus, as a thing deserving the highest admiration, that while in every other instance the man who excels in any employment is supposed not only entitled to a common regard, but receives many, and those very distinguishing, marks of honor; I, on the contrary, am persecuted even to death, because I am thought by many to have excelled in that employment which is the most noble, and which has for its aim the greatest good to mankind; by instructing our youth in the knowledge of their duty, and planting in the mind each virtuous principle!”

Now, doubtless, there were many other things spoken at the trial, not only by Socrates, but his friends, who were most zealous to support him; but I have not been careful to collect all that was spoken, yet think I have done enough to show, and that most plainly, that the design of Socrates in speaking at this time, was no other than to exculpate himself from anything that might have the least appearance of impiety towards the gods, or of injustice towards men. For, with regard to death, he was no way solicitous to importune his judges, as the custom was with others: on the contrary, he thought it the best time for him to die. And, that he had thus determined with himself, was still the more evident after his condemnation: for, when he was ordered to fix his own penalty, he refused to do it, neither would he suffer any other to do it for him; saying, that to fix a penalty implied a confession of guilt. And, afterwards, when his friends would have withdrawn him privately, he would not consent; but asked them with a smile, "If they knew of any place beyond the borders of Attica where death could not approach him?"

The trial being ended, Socrates, as it is related, spoke to his judges in the following manner:

"It is necessary, O you judges! that all they who instructed the witnesses to bear, by perjury, false testimony against me, as well as all those who too readily obeyed their instructions, should be conscious to themselves of much impiety and injustice: but that I, in any wise, should be more troubled and cast down than before my condemnation, I see not, since I stand here unconvicted of any of the crime whereof I was accused: for no one has proved against me that I sacrificed to any new deity; or by oath appealed to, or even made mention of the names of, any other than Zeus, Hera, and the rest of the deities, which, together with these, our city holds sacred: neither have they once shown what were the means I made use of to corrupt the youth, at the very time that I was inuring

them to a life of patience and frugality. As for those crimes to which our laws have annexed death as the only proper punishment,—sacrilege, man-stealing, undermining of walls, or betraying of the city,—my enemies do not even say that any of these things were ever once practiced by me. Wherefore I the rather marvel that you have now judged me worthy to die.

"But it is not for me to be troubled on that account: for, if I die unjustly, the shame must be theirs who put me unjustly to death; since, if injustice is shameful, so likewise every act of it; but no disgrace can it bring on me, that others have not seen that I was innocent. Palamedes likewise affords me this further consolation: for being, like me, condemned undeservedly, he furnishes, to this very day, more noble subjects for praise, than the man who had iniquitously caused his destruction.

And I am persuaded that I also shall have the attestation of the time to come, as well as of that which is past already, that I never wronged any man, or made him more depraved; but, contrariwise, have steadily endeavored, throughout life, to benefit those who conversed with me; teaching them, to the very utmost of my power, and that without reward, whatever could make them wise and happy."

Saying this, he departed; the cheerfulness of his countenance, his gesture, and whole deportment, bearing testimony to the truth of what he had just declared. And seeing some of those who accompanied him weeping, he asked what it meant. And why they were now afflicted. "For, knew you not," said he, "long ago, even by that whereof I was produced, that I was born mortal? If, indeed, I had been taken away when the things which are most desirable flowed in upon me abundantly, with good reason it might have been lamented, and by myself, as well as others; but if I am only to be removed when difficulties of every kind are ready to break

in upon me, we ought rather to rejoice, as though my affairs went on the most prosperously."

Apollodorus being present,—one who loved Socrates extremely, though otherwise a weak man,—he said to him, "But it grieves me, Socrates! to have you die so unjustly!" Socrates, with much tenderness, laying his hand upon his head, answered, smiling, "And what, my much-loved Apollodorus! would you rather they had condemned me justly?"

It is likewise related, that on seeing Anytus pass by, "There goes a man," said he, "not a little vain-glorious, on supposing he shall have achieved something great and noble, in putting me to death, because I once said, 'that since he himself had been dignified with some of the chief offices in the city, it was wrong in him to breed up his son to the trade of a tanner.' But he must be a fool," continued Socrates, "who sees not that he who at all times performs things useful and excellent, is alone the hero. And, truly," added Socrates, "as Homer makes some, who were near the time of their dissolution, look forward into futurity; I, likewise, have a mind to speak somewhat oraculously. Now it happened I was once, for a short time, with this same son of Anytus; and plainly perceiving he neither wanted talents nor activity, therefore I said, it was not fitting that the young man should continue in such a station: but continuing, as he still does, destitute at the same time of any virtuous instructor, to guide and restrain him within the bounds of duty, he must soon fall a prey to some evil inclination, that will hurry him headlong into vice and ruin."

And, in thus speaking, Socrates prophesied not untruly; for the young man delighted so much in wine, that he ceased not drinking, whether night or day; whereby he became perfectly useless to his country, to his friends, and even to himself. The memory of Anytus was likewise held in the highest detestation; and that not only on the account of his other

crimes, but for the scandalous manner in which he had educated his son.

Now, it cannot be doubted but Socrates, by speaking thus highly of himself, incurred the more envy, and made his judges still the more eager to condemn him; yet I think, indeed, he only obtained that fate which the gods decree to those they most love;—a discharge from life, when life is become a burden; and that by a means, of all others, the most easy. Yet here, as well as on every other occasion, Socrates demonstrated the firmness of his soul. For, although he was fully persuaded that to die would be the best for him, yet did he not discover any anxious solicitude, any womanish longings for the hour of his dissolution; but waited its approach with the same steady tranquility, and unaffected complacency, with which he afterwards went out of life. And, truly, when I consider the wisdom and greatness of soul, so essential to this man, I find it not more out of my power to forget him, than to remember and not praise him. And if, among those who are most studious to excel in virtue, there be any who has found a person to converse with, more proper than Socrates for promoting his design,—verily, we may well pronounce him the most fortunate of all mankind.

XENOPHON'S MEMOIRS OF SOCRATES

BOOK I.

I. I have often wondered by what arguments the accusers of Socrates could persuade the Athenians that he had behaved in such a manner towards the republic as to deserve death; for the accusation proffered against him was to this effect:

"Socrates is criminal; inasmuch as he acknowledged not the gods whom the republic holds sacred, but introduced other and new deities.

He is likewise criminal, because he corrupted the youth."

Now, as to the first of these, that he acknowledged not the gods whom the republic held sacred,—what proof could they bring of this, since it was manifest that he often sacrificed both at home and on the common altars? Neither was it in secret that he made use of divination; it being a thing well known among the people, that Socrates should declare his genius gave him frequent intimations of the future; whence, principally, as it seems to me, his accusers imputed to him the crime of introducing new deities. But, surely, herein Socrates introduces nothing newer, or more strange, than any other, who, placing confidence in divination, make use of auguries, and omens, and symbols, and sacrifices. For these men suppose not that the birds or persons they meet unexpectedly, know what is good for them: but that the gods by their means, give certain intimations of the future, to those who apply themselves to divination.

And the same also was his opinion, only with this difference, that while the greatest part say they are persuaded, by the flights of birds, or some accidental occurrence, Socrates, on the contrary, so asserted concerning these matters, as he knew them from an internal consciousness; declaring it was his genius from whom he received his information. And, in consequence of these significations,

(communicated, as he said, by his genius,) Socrates would frequently forewarn his friends what might be well for them to do, and what to forbear; and such as were guided by his advice found their advantage in so doing, while those who neglected it had no small cause for repentance.

Now, who is there that will not readily acknowledge, that Socrates could have no desire to appear to his friends either as an enthusiast or arrogant boaster? which, however, would have been unavoidable, had he openly asserted that notices of the future had been given him by the Deity; while a failure in the event made the falsehood of the assertion notorious to all. Wherefore, it is manifest Socrates foretold nothing but what he firmly believed would, hereafter, be fulfilled:—But where could he place this full confidence, exclusive of a deity; and how could one, who thus confided, be said to acknowledge no gods?

Further:—although Socrates always advised his followers to perform the necessary affairs of life in the best manner they were able; yet, with regard to everything, the event whereof was doubtful, he constantly sent them to consult the oracle, whether it ought or ought not to be undertaken. He likewise asserted, that the science of divination was necessary for all such as would govern successfully either cities or private families: for, although he thought every one might choose his own way of life, and afterwards, by his industry, excel therein; whether architecture, mechanics, agriculture, superintending the laborer, managing the finances, or practicing the art of war; yet even here, the gods, he would say, thought proper to reserve to themselves, in all these things, the knowledge of that part of them which was of the most importance; since he, who was the most careful to cultivate his field, could not know, of a certainty, who should reap the fruit of it. He who built his house the most elegantly, was not sure who should inhabit it. He who was the best skilled in the art of war, could

not say, whether it would be for his interest to command the army: neither he who was the most able to direct in the administration, whether for his to preside over the city. The man who married a fair wife, in hopes of happiness, might procure for himself a source of much sorrow; and he who formed the most powerful alliances, might come in time, by their means, to be expelled from his country. Socrates therefore, esteemed all those as no other than madmen, who, excluding the Deity, referred the success of their designs to nothing higher than human prudence. He likewise thought those not much better who had recourse to divination on every occasion, as if a man was to consult the oracle whether he should give the reins of his chariot into the hands of one ignorant or well versed in the art of driving; or place at the helm of his ship a skillful or unskillful pilot. He also thought it a kind of impiety to importune the gods with our inquiries concerning things of which we may gain the knowledge by number, weight, or measure; it being, as it seemed to him, incumbent on man to make himself acquainted with whatever the gods had placed within his power: as for such things as were beyond his comprehension, for these he ought always to apply to the oracle; the gods being ever ready to communicate knowledge to those whose care had been to render them propitious.

Socrates was almost continually in men's sight. The first hours of the morning were usually spent in the places set apart for walking, or the public exercises; and from thence he went to the forum, at the time when the people were accustomed to assemble The remainder of the day was passed where might be seen the greatest concourse of the Athenians; and for the most part, he so discoursed, that all who were willing might hear whatsoever he said: yet no one ever observed Socrates either speaking or practicing anything impious or profane; neither did he amuse himself, like others,

with making curious researches into the works of Nature; and finding out how this, which sophists call the world, had its beginning, or what those powerful springs which influence celestial bodies. On the contrary, he demonstrated the folly of those who busied themselves much in such fruitless disquisitions; asking, whether they thought they were already sufficiently instructed in human affairs, that they undertook only to meditate on divine? Or, if passing over the first, and confining their inquiries altogether to the latter, they appeared, even to themselves, to act wisely, and as became men. He marveled they should not perceive, it was not for man to investigate such matters; for those among them who arrogated the most to themselves, because they could with the greatest facility talk on these subjects, never agreed in the same opinion; but like madmen, some of whom tremble when no danger is near, while others fear no harm at the approach of things hurtful: so these philosophers; some of them asserting there was no shame in saying or doing anything before the people; others sending their disciples into solitude, as if nothing innocent could be performed by us in public: some regarding neither temples nor altars, nor reverencing anything whatsoever as divine; while others thought nothing could be found too vile for an object of their adoration. Even among those who laboriously employed themselves in studying the universe, and the nature of all things, some imagined the whole of being to be simply one only; others, that beings are in number infinite: some, that all things are eternally moving; others, that nothing can be moved at all: some, that all things are generated and destroyed; others, that there can never be any generation or destruction of anything.

He would ask, concerning these busy inquirers into the nature of such things as are only to be produced by a divine power, whether as those artists who have been instructed in some art, believe they are able to practice it at pleasure, so

they, having found out the immediate cause, believe they shall be able, for their own benefit, or that of others, to produce winds and rain, the vicissitudes of time, or the change of seasons? Or if indeed altogether destitute of this hope, they could content themselves with such fruitless knowledge?

In this manner would he reason concerning those people who gave themselves up to such useless speculations. As for himself, man, and what related to man, were the only subjects on which he chose to employ himself. To this purpose, all his inquiries and conversation turned upon what was pious, what impious; what honorable, what base; what just, what unjust; what wisdom, what folly; what courage, what cowardice; what a state or political community, what the character of a statesman or politician; what a government of men, what the character of one equal to such government. It was on these, and other matters of the same kind, that he used to dissert; in which subjects, those who were knowing he used to esteem men of honor and goodness; and those who were ignorant, to be no better than the basest of slaves.

That the judges of Socrates should err concerning him, in points wherein his opinion might not be apparently manifest, I marvel not; but that such things as had been spoken plainly, and acted openly, should have no weight with them, is indeed wonderful; for, being of the senate, and having taken, as was customary, the senatorial oath, by which he bound himself to act in all things conformable to the laws, and arriving in his turn to be president of the assembly of the people, he boldly refused to give his suffrage to the iniquitous sentence which condemned the nine captains, two Of whom were Erasmides and Thrasellus, to an unjust death; being neither intimidated with the menaces of the great, nor the fury of the people, but steadily preferring the sanctity of an oath to the safety of his person; for he was persuaded the gods watched over the actions and the affairs of men in a way altogether different to

what the vulgar imagined; for while these limited their knowledge to some particulars only, Socrates, on the contrary, extended it to all; firmly persuaded, that every word, every action, no, even our most retired deliberations, were open to their view; that they were everywhere present, and communicated to mankind all such knowledge as related to the conduct of human life: wherefore, I greatly wonder the Athenians could ever suffer themselves to be persuaded that Socrates retained sentiments injurious to the Deity! He in whom nothing was ever observed unbecoming that reverence so justly due to the gods; but, on the contrary, so behaved towards them, both in regard to his words and his actions, that whoever shall hereafter demean himself in such a manner, must be in fact, and ought also to be esteemed, a man of the truest and most exemplary piety.

II. But it is still matter of more wonder to me, that anyone could be prevailed on to believe that Socrates was a corrupter of youth! Socrates, the most sober and the most chaste of all mankind! supporting with equal cheerfulness the extreme, whether of heat or cold! who shrunk at no hardships, declined no labor, and knew so perfectly how to moderate his desires, as to make the little he possessed altogether sufficient for him! Could such a one be an encourager of impiety, injustice, luxury, intemperance, effeminacy? But, so far from any such thing, that on the contrary he reclaimed many from these vices, by kindling in their minds a love of virtue; encouraging them to think, that by a steadfast perseverance they might make themselves esteemed by becoming virtuous men: and although he never undertook to be a teacher of others, yet, as he practiced the virtues he sought to recommend, those who conversed with him were animated with the hopes of becoming one day wise, from the influence of his example. Not that Socrates ever omitted a due concern for his body; neither did he commend those who did: he would even frequently blame

the people whose custom it was to eat to excess, and afterwards use immoderate exercise; saying, that men should only eat till nature was satisfied, and then apply themselves to some moderate exercise; which would not only keep the body in health, but set the mind at liberty for the more proper discharge of its peculiar duties.

In his apparel nothing was either delicate or ostentatious; and the same might be said with respect to his whole manner of living: yet no man ever became avaricious from having conversed with Socrates: on the contrary, many were reclaimed from this infamous vice by his example, as they had been already from many others; while they observed him not only to forbear the taking any reward of those who sought his conversation, but heard him earnestly contend it was necessary to do so, for anyone who desired to avoid slavery: for such, he would say, as submit to receive a pecuniary return for the instructions they bestow, are no longer at liberty to give, or withhold them; but, like so many slaves, are at the will of those from whom they are content to receive wages: therefore he much admired, that the man who professed himself a teacher of virtue, should debase himself so far; unless he either understood not, that to gain a virtuous friend was the greatest of all acquisitions; or at least feared, that such as had been made wise and virtuous by his instructions, might yet be wanting in gratitude to their greatest benefactor.

But, far from any such absurdity, Socrates, without setting himself up for an instructor, had full confidence, that all who attended to his discourses, and embraced his doctrines, would never fail in point of friendship, either to him or to each other:—How then could a man like this, be a corrupter of youth; unless, haply, the study of virtue should be the way to corrupt the morals, and incline mankind to become more dissolute?

But, say his accusers, “Socrates makes those who converse with him contemners of the laws; calling it madness to leave to chance the election of our magistrates; while no one would be willing to take a pilot, an architect, or even a teacher of music, on the same terms; though mistakes in such things would be far less fatal than errors in the administration.” With these, and the like discourses, he brought (as was said) the youth by degrees to ridicule and contemn the established form of government; and made them thereby the more headstrong and audacious.

Now, it seems to me, that whoever applies himself to the study of wisdom, in hopes of becoming one day capable of directing his fellow-citizens, will not indulge, but rather take pains to subdue whatever he finds in his temper of turbulent and impetuous; knowing that enmity and danger are the attendants on force; while the path of persuasion is all security and good-will: for they who are compelled hate whoever compels them, supposing they have been injured; whereas we conciliate the affection of those we gain by persuasion; while they consider it as a kindness to be applied to in such a manner. Therefore it is only for those to employ force who possess strength without judgment; but the well-advised will have recourse to other means. Besides, he who pretends to carry his point by force, has need of many associates; but the man who can persuade, knows that he is of himself sufficient for the purpose: neither can such a one be supposed forward to shed blood; for, who is there would choose to destroy a fellow-citizen, rather than make a friend of him, by mildness and persuasion?

“But,” adds his accuser, “Critias and Alcibiades were two of his intimate friends; and these were not only the most profligate of mankind, but involved their country in the greatest misfortunes; for, as among the thirty none was ever found so cruel and rapacious as Critias; so, during the

democracy, none was so audacious, so dissolute, or so insolent, as Alcibiades."

Now I shall not take upon me to exculpate either of these men; but shall only relate at what time, and, as I think, to what end, they became the followers of Socrates.

Critias and Alcibiades were, of all the Athenians, by nature the most ambitious; aiming, at what price soever, to set themselves at the head of the commonwealth, and thereby exalt their names beyond that of any other: they saw that Socrates lived well satisfied with his own scanty possessions; that he could restrain every passion within its proper bounds, and lead the minds of his hearers, by the power of his reasoning, to what purpose he most desired. Understanding this, and being such men as we have already described them, will anyone say it was the temperance of Socrates, or his way of life, they were in love with; and not rather, that by hearing his discourses, and observing his actions, they might the better knowhow to manage their affairs, and harangue the people?

And, truly, I am thoroughly persuaded, that if the gods had given to these men the choice of passing their whole lives after the manner of Socrates, or dying the next moment, the last would have been preferred, as by much the most eligible. And their own behavior bears sufficient testimony to the truth of this assertion; for, no sooner did they imagine they surpassed in knowledge the rest of their contemporaries, who, together with themselves, had attended on Socrates, but they left him, to plunge into business and the affairs of the administration; the only end they could propose in desiring to associate with him.

But, perhaps, it may be objected, that Socrates ought not to have discoursed with his followers on the affairs of government, till he had first instructed them how to behave

with temperance and discretion. Far am I from saying otherwise, and shall only observe, that it is commonly the practice with those who are teachers of others, to perform in the presence of their pupils the things they would recommend; to the end, that while they enforced them on their minds, by the strength of their reasonings, they might set forth, by their example, the manner in which they are done.

Now, with respect to either of these methods of instruction, I know not of any who went beyond Socrates; his whole life serving as an example of the most unblemished integrity; at the same time that he ever reasoned with a peculiar force and energy, on virtue and those several duties which are becoming us as men. And it is certain, that even Critias and Alcibiades themselves behaved soberly and wisely all the time they conversed with him; not that they feared punishment; but as supposing a regular conduct would best serve the end they had in view.

Nevertheless, I know there are many who value themselves on the account of their philosophy who allow not that a virtuous man can ever be any other than virtuous, but that he who is once temperate, modest, just, must always remain so; because the habits of these virtues being deeply imprinted, cannot afterwards be erased out of the minds of men. But I hold not this opinion; for, as the body from disuse may come in time to be deprived of all its powers, so the mental faculties may lose all their energy, through a neglect of their being exerted duly, and the man no longer able to act, or not act in the manner that best becomes him. Therefore fathers, although otherwise well assured of the good disposition of their children, forget not to warn them against the company of ill men; knowing, that as to converse with the good must exercise and improve every virtue, so to associate with the bad must prove no less pernicious and baneful. And to this purpose also the poet:

"Although unconscious of the pleasing charm,
The mind still bends where friendship points the way;
Let virtue then your partner's bosom warm,
Lest vice should lead your soften'd soul astray."

And that other:

"In the same mind, now good, now bad, prevail."

And with these do I agree; for as we may observe people who have learnt verses soon forget them, if not frequently repeated, so will it prove with regard to the precepts of philosophy; they slip out of the memory, and along with them we lose the very ideas which kindled and nourished in our souls the love of virtue; which ideas once gone, no wonder if the practice of it ceases soon after. I have observed further, that such men as are hurried away with an inordinate love, whether of wine or women, become less capable of attending to what will be for their advantage, or refraining from what is to their harm; so that it has often happened, that many, who before were remarkable for their economy, no sooner became slaves to one or other of these passions, but all things went to ruin; and having squandered away their substance, were compelled, through want, to submit to such offices as they themselves had once thought shameful. How then shall we say, that he who is once temperate cannot become intemperate? or that he who acts uprightly at one time, cannot at another act the very contrary? For myself, I am persuaded that no one virtue can subsist that is not diligently and duly exercised, and temperance more especially; because our sensual desires, being seated with our minds in the same body, are continually soliciting us to a compliance with those appetites nature has implanted, though at the expense of virtue and all things virtuous; wherefore I can well imagine that even Alcibiades and Critias could restrain their vicious inclinations while they accompanied with Socrates and had

the assistance of his example: but being at a distance from him, Critias retiring into Thessaly, there very soon completed his ruin, by choosing to associate with libertines rather than with such as were men of sobriety and integrity; while Alcibiades, seeing himself sought after by women of the highest rank, on account of his beauty; and at the same time much flattered by many who were then in power, because of the credit he had gained, not only in Athens, but with such as were in alliance with her; in a word, perceiving how much he was the favorite of the people, and placed, as it were, above the reach of a competitor, neglected that care of himself which alone could secure him; like the athletic, who will not be at the trouble to continue his exercises, on seeing no one near able to dispute the prize with him. Therefore, in such an extraordinary concurrence of circumstances as befell these men, puffed up with the nobility of their birth, elated with their riches, and inflamed with their power, if we consider the company they fell into, together with their many unhappy opportunities for riot and intemperance, can it seem wonderful, separated as they were from Socrates, and this for so long a time too, if at length they became altogether degenerate, and rose to that height of pride and insolence to which we have been witnesses?

But the crimes of these men are, it seems, in the opinion of his accuser, to be charged upon Socrates; yet allows he no praise for keeping them within the bounds of their duty in that part of life which is generally found the most intemperate and intractable; nevertheless, on all other occasions, men judge not in this manner. For what teacher of music, or any other art or science, was ever known to incur censure, because the scholar, whom he had well instructed, forgot all he had been taught, when placed under the care of some other master? Or what father would condemn those companions of his son with whom the first years of his life had been spent innocently,

because afterwards he had been drawn aside into riot and debauchery by associating himself with very different people? Will he not rather bestow the greater praise on the one by how much more he sees his son has been corrupted by the other? Even parents themselves are not blamed for the faults of their children, though educated under their own eye, provided they are careful not to set before them any ill example.

Here, then, is the test whereby to have tried Socrates: "Has his life been wicked? let him be considered, and condemned, as a wicked man: but, if otherwise, if he has steadily and invariably persevered in the paths of virtue, accuse him not of crimes which his soul never knew."

"Yet it may be he countenanced those vices in others which in his own person he chose not to commit."

But far from Socrates were all such compliances! On the contrary, when Critias was ensnared with the love of Euthydemus, he earnestly endeavored to cure him of so base a passion; showing how illiberal, how indecent, how unbecoming the man of honor, to fawn, and cringe, and meanly act the beggar; before him, too, whom of all others he the most earnestly strove to gain the esteem of, and, after all, for a favor which carried along with it the greatest infamy. And when he succeeded not in his private remonstrances, Critias still persisting in his unwarrantable designs, Socrates, it is said, reproached him in the presence of many, and even before the beloved Euthydemus; resembling him to a swine, the most filthy and disgusting of all animals. For this cause Critias hated him ever after; and when one of the Thirty, being advanced, together with Charicles, to preside in the city, he forgot not the affront; but, in order to revenge it, made a law, wherein it was forbidden that any should teach philosophy in Athens: by which he meant, having nothing in particular against Socrates, to involve him in the reproach cast by this step on all the philosophers, and thereby render him, in

common with the rest, odious to the people; for I never heard Socrates say that he taught philosophy; neither did I know any whoever did hear him; but Critias was stung, and he determined to show it—Now, after the Thirty had put to death many of the citizens, and some of them of the best rank, and had given up the reins to all manner of violence and rapine, Socrates had said somewhere "that it would astonish him much, if he who lost part of the herd every day, while the rest grew poorer and weaker under his management, should deny his being a bad herdsman; but it would astonish him still more, if he who had the charge of the city, and saw the number of his citizens decrease hourly, while the rest became more dissolute and depraved under his administration, should be shameless enough not to acknowledge himself an evil ruler." These words, therefore, of Socrates, being told to Critias and Charicles, they sent for him; and showing him the law, straightly forbade him to discourse any more with the young men. Socrates then asked, "if it was permitted him to propose some questions touching some parts of the said law, which he said he could not thoroughly understand;" and being answered it was permitted: "I am always," said he, "most ready to obey the laws; but, to the end I may not transgress unwittingly, inform me, I pray you, whether you take philosophy, as it stands here condemned by you, to consist in reasoning right, or reasoning wrong; since, if you intend it to imply the first, then must we henceforth beware how we reason right; but if the latter is meant, the consequence is plain, then must we endeavor to mend our reasoning."

At these words Charicles, being much enraged, said to him, "Since you are so ignorant, Socrates, and withal so dull of apprehension, we will express ourselves in terms somewhat more easy to be understood; refrain altogether from talking with the young men."

“It is well,” answered Socrates; “but that nothing of ambiguity may remain in the present case, tell me, I pray you, how long are men called young?”

“So long,” replied Charicles, “as they are refused admittance into the senate, as supposed not yet arrived at maturity of judgment: or, in other words, till they are thirty.”

“But suppose I should want to buy something of a merchant, must I not ask the price of it if the man is under thirty?”

“Who says any such thing?” returned Charicles. “But, Socrates,” said he, “it is so much your custom to ask questions when you are not ignorant of the matter in hand, that I do not wonder at your doing so now. Let us, however, have done for the present with your trifling interrogatories.”

“But what if some young man, as he passes along, should ask me in haste, ‘Where lives Charicles? Where’s Critias gone?’ Must I not answer him?”

“It is hardly intended to prohibit such things,” returned Charicles: when Critias interrupting them; “And I, Socrates, I can inform you of something more you have to refrain from: keep henceforth at a proper distance from the carpenters, smiths, and shoemakers; and let us have no more of your examples from among them. And, besides, I fancy they are sufficiently tired with your bringing them in so often in your long discourses.”

“Must I likewise give up the consequences,” said Socrates, “deducible from these examples, and concern myself no longer with justice and piety, and the rules of right and wrong?”

“You must, by Zeus!” replied Charicles. “And, Socrates,” said he, “to make all sure, trouble not yourself any more with the herdsmen, for fear you should occasion the loss of more cattle.”

Now, from this, it is evident, that what Socrates once said concerning the cattle, being told these men, had greatly inflamed their rage against him. Hence also may be seen how long Critias continued to associate with Socrates, and what the affection they had for each other. I might here likewise add, how seldom it is we make proficiency under people who are not pleasing to us; and that the conversation of Socrates did not render him so either to Critias or Alcibiades, may well be supposed. Even at the very time they followed him, their chief delight was in conversing with such persons as they believed the most skillful in the affairs of state; their only design being to govern the republic. And, agreeably to this, they tell us that Alcibiades, when under the age of twenty, coming to Pericles his tutor, and at that time sole director of the Athenian state, entered into the following conversation with him concerning the laws:

"My Pericles," said he, "can you explain to me what a law is?"

"Undoubtedly," returned the other. "Then, I conjure you by the immortal gods!" said Alcibiades, "instruct me in this point: for when I hear men praised for their strict observance of the laws, it seems to me evident, that he can no way pretend to that praise who is altogether ignorant what a law is."

"Your request," Alcibiades, "is not difficult to be complied with: for that is a law, which the people agree upon in their public assemblies, and afterwards cause to be promulgated in a proper manner; ordaining what ought or ought not to be done."

"And what do they ordain; to do good, or to do evil?"

"Not evil, most assuredly, my young man."

"But what do you call that," said Alcibiades, which in states where the people have no rule, is advised and ordained by the few who may be then in power?"

“I call that likewise a law,” replied Pericles; “for the laws are nothing but the injunctions of such men as are in possession of the sovereign authority.”

“But when a tyrant is possessed of this sovereign authority, are the things he ordains to be received as laws?”

“As laws,” returned Pericles.

“What then is violence and injustice?” said Alcibiades. “Is it not when the strong compel the more weak, not by mildness and persuasion, but force, to obey them?”

“I think it is.”

“Will it not then follow, that what a tyrant decrees, and compels the observance of, not only without, but contrary to the will of the people; is not law, but the very reverse to it?”

“I believe it may,” answered Pericles; “for I cannot admit that as a law, which a tyrant enacts, contrary to the will of the people.”

“And when the few impose their decrees on the many, not by persuasion, but force, are we to call this also violence?”

“We are: and truly, I think,” said Pericles, “that whatever is decreed and enforced without the consent of those who are hereafter to obey, is not law, but violence.”

“Then ought that also, which is decreed by the people, contrary to the will of the nobles, to be deemed violence, rather than law?”

“No doubt of it,” replied Pericles: “But, Alcibiades,” continued he, “at your age we were somewhat more acute in those subtleties, when we made it our business to consider them, as we now see you.”

To which, it is said, Alcibiades returned answer: “Would to the gods then, Pericles, I might have conversed with you at the time when you best understood these sorts of things!” In consequence, therefore, of this most ambitious disposition, no

sooner did these men suppose they had acquired some advantages over the persons then employed in the administration, but they forbore to associate any longer with Socrates: for, besides that his company was no way pleasing to them, on other considerations, they could still less brook his frequent remonstrances for the many irregularities of their lives: therefore they plunged at once into business, and the affairs of the commonwealth; the only end for which they had ever been among his followers.

But Crito, Chærephon, Chærecrates, Simmias, Cebes, Phædo, and many others, were continually with him; not from the hope of becoming, by his means, better orators, whether at the bar, or before the people; but better men: capable of discharging all those duties which they owed to themselves, to their country, to their families, their friends, their fellow-citizens. And, so far were these men from practicing what was dishonest, that whether in youth or in age, not one of them ever incurred even the suspicion of any crime.

But, said his accuser, "Socrates encourages his followers to despise their parents; inasmuch as he persuades them that he is able to make them wiser than they; declaring still further, that as it is lawful for a son to confine his father in chains when convicted of madness, so ought the ignorant also to be confined by him who is possessed of superior knowledge."

Now, whatever his accuser might endeavor to insinuate, it is certain Socrates was very far from being of such an opinion. On the contrary, it was common with him to say; "that whoever pretended to confine another on the account of his ignorance, might himself be thus treated by those who were still more knowing." And, to this purpose, he would often discourse on the essential difference between madness, and ignorance; saying, on such occasions, plainly and clearly; "that it was indeed necessary, and for the benefit of himself,

as well as his friends, that the madman should be enchained; but, that he who was ignorant in anything useful, should only be instructed, by such persons as were qualified to give him proper instruction."

His accuser, however, went on to assert, "that Socrates not only taught the youth to have a contempt for their parents, but for the rest of their kindred; since he would frequently declare, that when men were sick, or had a lawsuit upon their hands, they had not recourse to any of their kindred for relief; but to the lawyer in one case, and the physician in the other. And, with regard to friendship, he would likewise say, "that a useless good-will, unaccompanied with the power of serving, was little to be accounted of; but the man to be esteemed and preferred, should be one who not only knows what is for our advantage, but can so explain it as to make us likewise know it;" thereby insinuating, as was pretended, into the minds of the youth, that he himself was the friend to be chosen before any other, as being the best able to direct in the way of wisdom: while the rest of mankind, in comparison with him, were of small estimation.

Now, that I myself have heard him talk after some such manner, concerning relations, fathers, and friends, is most certain. And I remember him saying, "that when the soul, in which thought and reason alone reside, retires from the body, although it may be the body of a father, or a friend, we remove it from our sight as speedily as well may be. And whereas no man can be doubted as to the love he bears to his own body, yet who is there, would he ask, that scruples to take away from it the part that is superfluous? to cut the hair, or pair the nails; or remove the whole limb, when mortified? for which purpose the surgeon is called in, and the steel and the caustic not only readily submitted to, but the hand which applies them liberally rewarded. The spittle, he would say, men were glad to cast from them, because, remaining in the mouth, it

was both useless and offensive. But, notwithstanding all this, Socrates never intended, though he talked in such a manner, that fathers were to be buried alive, or that he himself should have a limb taken off; but he intended to let us see, that whatever is useless can be of no estimation; in order to excite in his hearers a desire to improve, and make themselves, as far as may be, serviceable to others; to the end, that if they wished to be regarded, by their parents, or respected and honored by their brethren or kindred, they might urge their claim on the account of merit, and not owe the whole only to consanguinity."

"But," says his accuser, "Socrates, the better to convey, and at the same time conceal the malignity of his intentions, has chosen many passages from our most celebrated poets, whereby to convey his poison to the people, and dispose them the more readily to fraud and oppression for having often cited that fine of Hesiod's,

"Employ yourself in anything, rather than stand idle,"

it was pretended he meant to insinuate it as the poet's opinion, "that no employment whatever could be unjust or dishonorable from whence profit might arise:" whereas, in truth, nothing could be further from the design of Socrates: for, although he constantly maintained that labor and employment were not only useful, but honorable, and idleness no less reproachful than pernicious to man; yet he never concluded without saying, "that he alone could be considered as not idle who was employed in procuring some good to mankind; but that the gamester, the debauchee, and every other whose end was only evil, were emphatically to be called so; and, in this sense, he might, with good reason, adopt that line of Hesiod's,

"Employ yourself in anything, rather than stand idle."

But it was still further alleged, that Socrates frequently introduced these lines of Homer, where, speaking of Ulysses, he says,

"Each prince of name, or chief in arms approved,
He fired with praise, or with persuasion moved:
'Warriors like you, with strength and wisdom blest,
By brave examples should confirm the rest:'

"But if a clamorous vile plebeian rose,
Him with reproof he check'd, or tamed with blows:
'Be still, you slave, and to your betters yield;
Unknown alike in council and in field!'" Pope.

These words, it was said, he would explain in such a manner, as if the poet hereby meant to recommend roughness, severity, and stripes, as the only proper arguments to be made use of against the vulgar and the indigent. But Socrates was not absurd enough to draw such conclusions; for how then could he have complained, if he himself had been rudely treated? But he asserted, and might strengthen his assertion with these lines from Homer, "that such as could neither counsel nor execute, equally unfit, whether for the city or the camp, these, and such as these, and more especially when insolent and unruly, ought to be reduced to reason, without any regard to the extent of their possessions."

And it is certain nothing more could be in-tended; for as to himself, Socrates loved the people: his benevolence even extended to all mankind; insomuch that, although he was sought after by foreigners as well as Athenians, he took no reward from any who applied to him, but freely imparted that wisdom he was endued with. Yet so did not others. On the contrary, many who were become rich by his liberality, sold at

no mean price, but a small part of that which had cost them nothing: while, uninfluenced by his example, and bearing no resemblance to him in affection to the people, they refused to converse with any who were not able to pay, and that largely, for their instruction.

And, indeed, by this conduct Socrates had rendered the city of Athens renowned throughout all Greece; so that, if it was said of Lychas the Lacedæmonian, "that he was the glory of Sparta," because he entertained, at his own expense, the strangers who resorted thither at one of the feasts made in honor of Apollo, much rather might be said of Socrates, "that he was the glory of Athens," whose whole life was one continued largess; and who, dispensing with a liberal hand his inestimable treasure, sent no one ever away from him without making him, if willing, a wiser and a happier man. Wherefore, it should seem, that had Socrates been treated by the Athenians according to his merit, public honors would have been decreed him much rather than a shameful death. And, after all, for whom do the laws appoint this punishment? Is it not for the thief? for the assaulter on the highway? for the underminer of walls, and the committer of sacrilege? But where, among mankind, shall we find any one at so great a distance from any of these crimes as Socrates? Who can accuse him of holding intelligence with the common enemy? of spreading sedition and treason throughout the city? or of having been the cause of any one calamity whatsoever? Where is he who, in private life, can say, "Socrates has defrauded me of my possessions, or has injured me in any kind?" No, when did he incur even the suspicion of any of these things? And as to the points whereof he stood accused, could he be a denier of those very gods whom in so eminent a manner he worshipped? Could he be a corrupter of youth, whose only employment was to root out of the mind of man every vicious inclination, and plant in their stead a love of that virtue, which

is so amiable in itself, and so becoming us as men, and which alone has the power to make, whether cities or private families, flourishing and happy? This being so, who sees not how much his country stood indebted to Socrates? and that honors, not ignominy, should have been his reward?

III. Now, as I am persuaded the benefit arising to all those who accompanied with Socrates was not less owing to the irresistible force of his example than to the excellence of his discourses, I will set down whatever occurs to my memory, whether it relates to his words or his actions.

And first, with respect to sacred rites and institutions. In these things it was ever his practice to approve himself a strict observer of the answer the Pythian priestess gives to all who inquire the proper manner of sacrificing to the gods, or paying honors to their deceased ancestors: “Follow,” said the god, “the custom of your country:” and therefore Socrates, in all those exercises of his devotion and piety, confined himself altogether to what he saw practiced by the republic; and to his friends he constantly advised the same thing, saying, it only savored of vanity and superstition in all those who did otherwise.

When he prayed, his petition was only this—”That the gods would give to him those things that were good.” And this he did, forasmuch as they alone knew what was good for man. But he who should ask for gold or silver, or increase of dominion, acted not, in his opinion, more wisely than one who should pray for the opportunity to fight, or game, or anything of the like nature, the consequence whereof being altogether doubtful, might turn, for aught he knew, not a little to his disadvantage. When he sacrificed, he feared not his offering would fail of acceptance in that he was poor; but, giving according to his ability, he doubted not, but, in the sight of the gods, he equaled those men whose gifts and sacrifices overspread the whole altar. And, indeed, he made no scruple

to assert, that it would not be agreeable to the nature of the gods to respect the costly offerings of the rich and the great, while the poor man's gift was altogether disregarded. For by this means it might happen, nor yet infrequently, that the sacrifice of the wicked would find the most acceptance: which, if so, he thought life itself would not be desirable to a reasonable creature. But Socrates always reckoned upon it as a most indubitable truth, that the service paid the Deity by the pure and pious soul, was the most grateful sacrifice; and therefore it was, he so much approved that precept of the poet, which bids us "offer to the gods according to our power." And not only on these, but on every other occasion, he thought he had no better advice to give his friends, than "that they should do all things according to their ability." Further, whenever he supposed any intimation had been given him by the Deity concerning what ought or ought not to be done, it was no more possible to bring Socrates to act otherwise, than to make him quit the guide, clear sighted and well instructed in the road he was to go, in favor of one not only ignorant but blind. And to this purpose he always condemned the extreme folly of those, who, to avoid the ill opinion and reproach of men, acted not according to the direction of the gods; looking down with contempt on all the little arts of human prudence, when placed in competition with those divine notices and admonitions which it is often their pleasure to communicate to man.

As to his manner of living, it may be said, that whoever is willing to regulate and discipline his body and his mind after the example of Socrates, can hardly fail, no deity opposing, to procure for himself that degree of health and strength as cannot easily be shaken. Neither shall he want large sums for such a purpose. On the contrary, such was his moderation, that I question whether there ever was any man, if able to work at all, but might have earned sufficient to have

supported Socrates. His custom was to eat as long as it gave him any pleasure; and a good appetite was to him what delicious fare is to another: and as he only drank when thirst compelled him, whatever served to allay it could not fail of being grateful. So that it was easy for him, when present at their feasts, to refrain from excess, which other men find so much difficulty in doing. And as to such persons as gave proof how very little they could command themselves, to these he would counsel even the not tasting of those delicacies which might allure them to eat when they were not hungry, and drink when they were not dry; since the fruits (he said) of so doing were not only pains in the head and loss of digestion, but disorder and confusion in the mind of man. And it was frequent with him to say, between jest and earnest, "that he doubted not its being with charms like these that Circe turned the companions of Ulysses into swine; while the hero himself, being admonished by Mercury, and, from his accustomed temperance, refusing to taste the enchanting cup, happily escaped the shameful transformation."

With regard to love, his counsel always was to keep at a distance from beautiful persons; saying, it was difficult to approach any such and not be ensnared. As for himself, his great continence was known to every one; and it was more easy for him to avoid the most beautiful objects, than for others those who were the most disgusting. But although this was the manner in which Socrates lived, yet could he not be persuaded that he enjoyed less of the pleasures of life than the voluptuous man, who employed all his thoughts in the eager pursuit of them; at the same time that he escaped all that vexation and grief so sure to attend on those who too freely indulge in sensual gratifications.

IV. Now, should there be any inclined to believe what some on conjecture have undertaken to advance, both in their conversations and writings, "that Socrates could indeed

inflame his hearers with the love of virtue, but could never influence them so far as to bring them to make any great proficiency therein:" let these, I say, consider what his arguments were, not only when his design was to refute such men as pretended to know everything, but even in his retired and familiar conversation, and then let them judge whether Socrates was not fully qualified for the bringing his followers and his friends to make proficiency in the paths of virtue.

And, for this purpose, I will now relate the manner in which I once heard him discoursing with Aristodemus, surnamed the Little, concerning the Deity. For, observing that he neither prayed nor sacrificed to the gods, nor yet consulted any oracle, but, on the contrary, ridiculed and laughed at those who did, he said to him:

"Tell me, Aristodemus, is there any man whom you admire on account of his merit?"

Aristodemus having answered, "Many."

"Name some of them, I pray you."

"I admire," said Aristodemus, "Homer for his epic poetry, Melanippides for his dithyrambics, Sophocles for tragedy, Polycletes for statuary, and Xeuxis for painting."

"But which seems to you most worthy of admiration, Aristodemus;—the artist who forms images void of motion and intelligence; or one who has the skill to produce animals that are endued, not only with activity, but understanding?"

"The latter, there can be no doubt," replied Aristodemus, "provided the production was not the effect of chance, but of wisdom and contrivance."

"But since there are many things, some of which we can easily see the use of, while we cannot say of others to what purpose they were produced; which of these, Aristodemus, do you suppose the work of wisdom?"

“It should seem the most reasonable to affirm it of those, whose fitness and utility is so evidently apparent.”

“But it is evidently apparent, that He, who at the beginning made man, endued him with senses because they were good for him; eyes, wherewith to behold whatever was visible; and ears, to hear whatever was to be heard. For say, Aristodemus, to what purpose should odors be prepared, if the sense of smelling had been denied? Or why the distinctions of bitter and sweet, of savory and unsavory, unless a palate had been likewise given, conveniently placed, to arbitrate between them, and declare the difference? Is not that Providence, Aristodemus, in a most eminent manner conspicuous, which, because the eye of man is so delicate in its contexture, has therefore prepared eyelids like doors, whereby to secure it; which extend of themselves whenever it is needful, and again close when sleep approaches? Are not these eyelids provided, as it were, with a fence on the edge of them, to keep off the wind and guard the eye? Even the eyebrow itself is not without its office, but, as a penthouse, is prepared to turn off the sweat, which, falling from the forehead, might enter and annoy that no less tender than astonishing part of us! Is it not to be admired that the ears should take in sounds of every sort, and yet are not too much filled by them? That the fore-teeth of the animal should be formed in such a manner as is evidently best suited for the cutting of its food, as those on the side for grinding it in pieces? That the mouth, through which this food is conveyed, should be placed so near the nose and the eyes, as to prevent the passing, unnoticed, whatever is unfit for nourishment; while nature, on the contrary, has set at a distance, and concealed from the senses, all that might disgust or any way offend them? And can you still doubt, Aristodemus, whether a disposition of parts like this should be the work of chance, or of wisdom and contrivance?”

“I have no longer any doubt,” replied Aristodemus: “and, indeed, the more I consider it, the more evident it appears to me, that man must be the masterpiece of some great artificer; carrying along with it infinite marks of the love and favor of Him who has thus formed it.”

“And what do you think, Aristodemus, of that desire in the individual which leads to the continuance of the species? Of that tenderness and affection in the female towards her young, so necessary for its preservation? Of that unremitted love of live, and dread of dissolution, which take such strong possession of us from the moment we begin to be?”

“I think of them,” answered Aristodemus, “as so many regular operations of the same great and wise Artist, deliberately determining to preserve what he has once made.”

“But, further, (unless you desire to ask me questions), seeing, Aristodemus, you yourself art conscious of reason and intelligence, suppose you there is no intelligence elsewhere? You know your body to be a small part of that wide extended earth which you everywhere behold: the moisture contained in it, you also know to be a small portion of that mighty mass of waters whereof seas themselves are but a part, while the rest of the elements contribute, out of their abundance, to your formation. It is the soul then alone, that intellectual part of us, which is come to you by some lucky chance, from I know not where. If so be, there is indeed no intelligence elsewhere: and we must be forced to confess, that this stupendous universe, with all the various bodies contained therein—equally amazing, whether we consider their magnitude or number, whatever their use, whatever their order—all have been produced, not by intelligence, but chance!”

“It is with difficulty that I can suppose otherwise,” returned Aristodemus; “for I behold none of those gods, whom you

speak of, as making and governing all things; whereas I see the artists when at their work here among us."

"Neither yet do you see your soul, Aristodemus, which, however, most assuredly governs your body: although it may well seem, by your manner of talking, that it is chance, and not reason, which governs you."

"I do not despise the gods," said Aristodemus: "on the contrary, I conceive so highly of their excellence, as to suppose they stand in no need either of me or of my services."

"You mistake the matter, Aristodemus; the greater magnificence they have shown in their care of you, so much the more honor and service you owe them."

"Be assured," said Aristodemus, "if I once could be persuaded the gods took care of man, I should want no monitor to remind me of my duty."

"And can you doubt, Aristodemus, if the gods take care of man? Has not the glorious privilege of walking upright been alone bestowed on him, whereby he may, with the better advantage, survey what is around him, contemplate with more ease those splendid objects which are above, and avoid the numerous ills and inconveniences which would otherwise befall him? Other animals, indeed, they have provided with feet, by which they may remove from one place to another; but to man they have also given hands, with which he can form many things for his use, and make himself happier than creatures of any other kind. A tongue has been bestowed on every other animal; but what animal, except man, has the power of forming words with it, whereby to explain his thoughts, and make them intelligible to others? And to show that the gods have had regard to his very pleasures, they have not limited them, like those of other animals, to times and seasons, but man is left to indulge in them, whenever not hurtful to him.

“But it is not with respect to the body alone that the gods have shown themselves thus bountiful to man; their most excellent gift is that soul they have infused into him, which so far surpasses what is elsewhere to be found. For by what animal, except man, is even the existence of those gods discovered, who have produced, and still uphold, in such regular order, this beautiful and stupendous frame of the universe? What other species of creatures are to be found that can serve, that can adore them? What other animal is able, like man, to provide against the assaults of heat and cold, of thirst and hunger? That can lay up remedies for the time of sickness, and improve the strength nature has given by a well-proportioned exercise? That can receive, like him, information and instruction; or so happily keep in memory what he has seen, and heard, and learnt? These things being so, who sees not that man is, as it were, a god in the midst of this visible creation; so far does he surpass, whether in the endowments of soul or body, all animals whatsoever that have been produced therein! For, if the body of the ox had been joined to the mind of man, the acuteness of the latter would have stood him in small stead, while unable to execute the well-designed plan; nor would the human form have been of more use to the brute, so long as it remained destitute of understanding! But in you, Aristodemus, has been joined to a wonderful soul, a body no less wonderful: and you say, after this, ‘the gods take no thought for me!’ What would you then more to convince you of their care?”

“I would they should send, and inform me,” said Aristodemus, “what things I ought or ought not to do, in like manner as you say they frequently do to you.”

“And what then, Aristodemus? suppose you, that when the gods give out some oracle to all the Athenians, they mean it not for you? If, by their prodigies, they declare aloud to all Greece,—to all mankind,—the things which shall befall them,

are they dumb to you alone? And are you the only person whom they have placed beyond their care? Believe you they would have wrought into the mind of man a persuasion of their being able to make him happy or miserable, if so be they had no such power? or would not even man himself, long before this, have seen through the gross delusion? How is it, Aristodemus, you remember, or remark not, that the kingdoms and commonwealths most renowned as well for their wisdom as antiquity, are those whose piety and devotion have been the most observable? and that even man himself is never so well disposed to serve the Deity, as in that part of life when reason bears the greatest sway, and his judgment supposed in its full strength and maturity. Consider, Aristodemus, that the soul which resides in your body can govern it at pleasure; why then may not the soul of the universe, which pervades and animates every part of it, govern it in like manner? If your eye has the power to take in many objects, and these placed at no small distance from it, marvel not if the eye of the Deity can, at one glance, comprehend the whole! And as you perceive it not beyond your ability to extend your care, at the same time, to the concerns of Athens, Egypt, Sicily; why do you think, Aristodemus, that the providence of God may not easily extend itself throughout the whole universe? As, therefore, among men, we make best trial of the affection and gratitude of our neighbor, by showing him kindness; and discover his wisdom, by consulting him in our distress; do you, in like manner, behave towards the gods: and, if you would experience what their wisdom, and what their love, render yourself deserving the communication of some of those divine secrets which may not be penetrated by man; and are imparted to those alone, who consult, who adore, who obey the Deity. Then shall you, Aristodemus, understand there is a being whose eye pierce throughout all nature, and whose ear is open to every sound; extended to all

places; extending through all time; and whose bounty and care can know no other bounds than those fixed by his own creation!"

By this discourse, and others of the like nature, Socrates taught his friends that they were not only to forbear whatever was impious, unjust, or unbecoming before men; but even, when alone, they ought to have a regard to all their actions; since the gods have their eyes continually upon us; and none of our designs can be concealed from them.

V. And now, if temperance be a virtue conducing to the honor and happiness of man, let us see in what manner Socrates endeavored to stir up his followers to the practice of it.

"My fellow-citizens! would he say, when war is declared, and it becomes necessary for you to make choice of a general, choose you the man enslaved to wine or women; luxurious in his diet; intemperate in his sleep; incapable of labor; impatient of fatigue? Can you, from such a one, expect safety to yourselves; or conquest over your enemies? Or, when death draws nigh, and no thought remains but for the welfare of your children, do you then inquire for the debauchee wherewith to entrust them? Is it he who must direct in the virtuous education of your sons, and guard the chastity of your virgin daughters; or secure to them the inheritance from the hand of the oppressor? Do you entrust your flocks or your herds to the conduct of him who is overcharged with drunkenness? or expect from such a one dispatch to your affairs? Would even the slave be received, though sent as a gift, who came to us branded with so loathsome a vice? If, therefore, intemperance appears to us so odious when seen only in the slave, how should we dread the being ourselves degraded by it! The rapacious and covetous have the pleasure of growing rich, and add to their own substance what they take from others: but the dissolute man injures his neighbor

without profit to himself; no, he injures every one, and himself most of all, if the ruin of his family, his health, his body, and his mind, may be termed injuries? Neither can such a one add to the pleasures that arise from social conversation: for what pleasure can he give whose only delight is in eating and drinking, and, destitute of shame, prefers the company of the common prostitute to that of his best friend? Hence, therefore, we may see how necessary it is to make temperance our chief study; since, without this as its basis, what other virtue can we attain? How can we learn what is profitable, or practice what is praiseworthy? Neither can we conceive a state more pitiable, whether in respect to body or mind, than the voluptuary, given up to all the drudgery of intemperance. And, certainly, we should wish no worthy man may be encumbered with a slave of this disposition: or, however, we are sure all slaves who abandon themselves to such irregularities ought to entreat the gods that they may fall into the hands of mild and gentle masters,—their only chance to save them from utter ruin."

Thus would Socrates talk concerning temperance; and if the whole tenor of his discourse showed his regard for this virtue, the whole tenor of his life served more abundantly to confirm it. For he was not only superior to the pleasures of sense, but the desire of gain: it being his full persuasion, that the man who received money bought himself a master; whose commands, however humbling, could not honestly be rejected.

VI. It may not be improper, nor yet to the discredit of Socrates, to relate a conversation he had with Antipho the sophist. Now this man, having a design to draw to himself the followers of Socrates, came to him one day, and, in the presence of many of them, accosted him as follows:

"I always thought," said he, "that philosophy served to make men happier; but the fruit of your wisdom, Socrates,

seems to be the very reverse: for I know not that slave who would tarry with his master a single day, if compelled to live in the manner that you do. You eat and drink the meanest of everything. Your habit is not only coarser than others, but you make no difference between summer and winter; and your feet are always naked. You will take no money, though we find no little pleasure in accumulating wealth: and besides, when a man has once made his fortune, he has nothing more to do than to live nobly, and go on at his ease. Now, if all who attend to your instructions are to follow your example, as is commonly the case of pupils with their masters, may we not well say you only teach men how to be miserable?"

To which Socrates: "I perceive, Antipho, you have formed to yourself so woeful a picture of my manner of life, as shows you had much rather die than live as I do: let us therefore examine what it is you are so much afraid of. You think I am to be pitied for not taking money: is it because those who do, are no longer masters of their own time, but must perform their engagements, however contrary to their inclinations; while I am at liberty to talk or not talk, as best suits my humor? The manner in which I eat may not be to your mind: Does my dinner afford less nourishment than yours? Does it cost more? Or is it, do you think, more difficult to procure? And though I allow the things they provide for your table may be more delicious than those on mine, consider, Antipho, he who sits down with a good appetite has no want of rich sauce to give a relish to his food: neither will he wish for the high-flavored wine, who has already with delight quenched his thirst with water. As to my habit: You know, Antipho, he who changes his dress, does it on account of the heat or cold; and puts on shoes only that the ruggedness of the road may not prevent his passing it: but tell me, I desire you, when has the cold kept me within doors? Or where did you see me contend for the shade, to avoid the scorching heat of the sun? Or, when was I

hindered by the anguish of my feet from going wherever my fancy led me? Besides, you cannot but know many, whose constitution being naturally weak, have brought themselves by the force of exercise to bear labor and fatigue far better than those of a more robust make, who through indolence and sloth have shamefully neglected it. Why then should you not suppose that I, who have always accustomed myself to bear with patience whatever might fall to my lot, may do it at present with somewhat more ease than you, Antipho, who, perhaps, have not so much as once thought of the matter? If I am observed to be not over delicate in my diet, if I sleep little, nor once taste of those infamous delights which others indulge in, assign no other cause than my being possessed of pleasures in themselves far more eligible, which delight not alone for the moment in which they are enjoyed, but gladden with the hope of yielding perpetual satisfaction. Now, you must have remarked, Antipho, that people who doubt their affairs go ill, are never cheerful; while those who think they are in the way to succeed, whether in agriculture, traffic, or whatever it may be, are happy as if they had al-ready succeeded. But suppose you there can arise from any of these a pleasure equal to what the mind experiences while it is conscious of improving in the paths of virtue, and sees the wise and the good add to the number of its friends? Yet these are the purposes to which I think I employ myself; and this, the reward I have for my labor! Besides, should we suppose our friends or our country wanting assistance, who would be judged the best able to bestow it; he, Antipho, who lives as I do? Or he who engaged in that course of life which seems to you so very delightful? Or, when called on to bear arms, which would you think the most likely to discharge the duty of a good soldier; he who sits down dissatisfied to his table unless loaded with delicacies, however difficult to be obtained; or he who is not only content, but rises well pleased from whatever

is set before him? And if the city is besieged, which will be the first to advise the surrendering it up to the enemy? It should seem your opinion, Antipho, that happiness consisted in luxury and profusion; whereas, in truth, I consider it as a perfection in the gods that they want nothing; and consequently, he comes the nearest to the divine nature, who stands in want of the fewest things: and seeing there is nothing which can transcend the divine nature, whoever approaches the nearest thereto, approaches the nearest to sovereign excellence."

At another time, Antipho disputing with him, said, "I am willing to acknowledge you a just man, Socrates, but surely not a man of much knowledge; and of this you seem to be yourself aware, since you refuse to receive any reward for your instructions. Now it is certain you would not give your house, or even your cloak, for nothing; no, nor for less than the full worth of them; yet you will talk, it is well known, for a whole day gratis;—a plain proof how the case stands with you. Now it is for this very reason I commend your honesty, that will not suffer you, through desire of gain, to deceive any; but then you must give up all pretenses to knowledge, since you hereby declare you have none worth purchasing."

To which Socrates;—"You know, Antipho, that among us it is imagined there is no small similarity between beauty and philosophy; for that which is praiseworthy in the one, is so likewise in the other; and the same sort of vices are apt to blemish both. Now, when we see a woman bartering her beauty for gold, we look upon such a one as no other than a common prostitute; but she who rewards the passion of some worthy youth with it, gains at the same time our approbation and esteem. It is the very same with philosophy: he who sets it forth for public sale, to be disposed of to the best bidder, is a sophist, a public prostitute. But he who becomes the instructor of some well-disposed youth, and makes thereby a

friend of him, we say of such a one, he discharges as he ought the duty of a good citizen. And besides, Antipho, as there are some who delight in fine horses, others in dogs, and others in other animals, my pleasure is in the company of my friends. If I know anything whereby they may at all be profited, I communicate it to them, or recommend them to those whom I think better qualified for carrying them on in the paths of virtue. When we are together, we employ ourselves in searching into those treasures of knowledge the ancients have left us: we draw from the same fountains; and running over whatever these sages have left behind them, where we find anything excellent, we remark it for our use; and think ourselves not to have profited a little, when we see mutual love begin to flourish among us." Thus did Socrates reply: and truly, when I have heard him talk in this manner, I could not doubt of his being a happy man; nor yet of his kindling in the minds of his hearers an ardent love for that virtue which in him appeared so amiable.

Being asked at another time by the same man, "Why he, who fancied himself so able to make skillful statesmen of others, did not himself engage in state affairs?"

"And by which of these methods," said Socrates, "suppose you I shall most advantage the commonwealth? Taking on me some office, which, however well executed, would only be the service of one man; or, by instructing all I meet, furnish the republic with many good citizens, every one capable of serving it well?"

VII. And now let us examine, whether, by dissuading his friends from vanity and arrogance, he did not excite them to the practice of virtue. It was his custom to assert, "that the only way to true glory, was for a man to be really excellent, not affect to appear so and to show this the more plainly, he would often make use of the following example: "Let us suppose," said he, "that one altogether ignorant in music

desires to be thought an excellent musician. To this purpose he takes care to imitate whatever is imitable in those who are the greatest proficients in the art. He is uncommonly curious in the choice of his instruments; and a crowd must follow him, to cry him up for a wonder wherever he goes, as they do the most admired masters; but for all this, he must never venture the public with a specimen of his skill, lest his ignorance, as well as arrogance, should instantly appear, and ridicule, not fame, prove the reward of his ill-judged expenses. The case," he would say, "is the same with the man who endeavors to pass for an able general, or a good pilot, without knowing anything of the matter. If his word is not taken, he is displeased; if it is, what will become of him when called to preside at the helm, or command the army? What but shame to himself, and perhaps ruin to his best friends, can possibly be the result of the vain undertaking? Neither will he who foolishly affects the character of valiant, or rich, or strong, be exposed to less danger. By the help of some false appearance he may be called, indeed, to some honorable employment; but it is an employment exceeding his abilities to perform;; and his mistakes will not be pardoned by those I whom he imposed on. For as the man can be deemed no other than a cheat who refuses to return the money, or the cloak, which, through his fair demeanor, has been lent him by his neighbor, much rather ought he to be stigmatized as such, who, destitute of every talent necessary for the purpose, shall dare impose himself on the state, as one well qualified to direct in the administration."

Thus Socrates endeavored to make vanity and ostentation the more odious to his followers, by showing clearly how much folly attended the practice of it.

BOOK II.

I. It is likewise my opinion that Socrates contributed not a little by his discourses to make his followers more patient of hunger, and thirst, and labor; contemn heat and cold; despise sleep; with every other sensual gratification. For hearing that one of them lived too effeminately, he asked him, saying, "Suppose now, Aristippus, the education of two young men was submitted to your direction; the one intended to bear rule in the state, the other to obey; what method would you take with them? Shall we examine the matter, and begin with their food?"

"It will be right to do this, most certainly," replied Aristippus, "since food seems to be the support of life."

"It is probable then," said Socrates, "that you will accustom them both to eat and drink at certain stated hours?"

"Most probably."

"But which would you teach to relinquish this stated hour of repast when urgent business called him away from it?"

"He whom I intend for sovereignty, most assuredly, that the affairs of the commonwealth may not suffer from delay."

"And the power of enduring thirst patiently, ought not this likewise to be added?"

"Certainly."

"And which of these would you accustom to rise early and go to rest late, or pass, when necessary, whole nights in watching? Which to subdue even love itself, with every tender inclination, while fatigue and labor are not shunned, but with cheerfulness submitted to?"

"The same, no doubt of it."

"But if there is an art teaching us in what manner we may best subdue our enemies, which of these young men would you endeavor to make master of it?"

“He whom I intended for rule,” replied Aristippus; “since, without this art, all the rest will be useless.”

“One should suppose then,” said Socrates, “that a man thus educated would not so readily fall into the snares that are laid for him, as those animals, whereof some, we know, are destroyed by their gluttony, while they rush forward, however timorous by nature, to seize the bait thrown out to allure them: others, with equal greediness, swallow down the liquor which has been prepared and set for that very purpose; and, intoxicated therewith, are easily taken; while the partridge and quail find their destruction in running too eagerly after the female’s call.”

Aristippus assenting to this, Socrates went on: “But is it not then most shameful, Aristippus, when men do fall into the same snares with which those foolish animals are taken? Yet so does the adulterer. He meanly submits to be shut up like a prisoner in the chamber of the man whom he is seeking to injure. Neither the rigor of the laws, nor the fear of a discovery, though sensible how many evils besides that of infamy must attend it, are sufficient to restrain him; but, regardless of the danger, and neglecting those many rational and creditable amusements which are still within his power, and might serve to divert him from so shameful a passion, he rushes headlong to his ruin? And can any other be said of so wretched a being, but that some fury has possessed him?”

“So it should seem,” said Aristippus.

“But,” continued Socrates, “since so many, and those the most important employments of life,—as war, husbandry, and others,—are of necessity to be carried on in the open fields, from under shelter; do you not think, Aristippus, that mankind are much to blame in neglecting to inure themselves to the inclemencies of the air, and the changes of the seasons? Above all, should not he endeavor to bring himself to bear

these inconveniences with patience, who expects one day to command others?"

"I believe he should."

"But if he who has thus brought himself to endure pain and inconvenience, is alone qualified for command; they who have not done this, ought never to pretend to it?"

This being granted, Socrates went on:—"Seeing then you so well perceived, Aristippus, the rank to which each of these properly belong; in which would you rather we should place you?"

"Not with those, Socrates, who are intended to command; I envy not these: and, indeed, since men are obliged to take so much pains to provide for their own wants, I see no great wisdom in undertaking to supply the wants of a whole community. For, while he who does this is forced to relinquish many of the things he most ardently desires; it will be held highly criminal, if, during his administration, any one wish of the capricious multitude remains ungratified: these behaving towards their governors exactly in the manner I do to my slaves. I expect them to prepare what I am to eat and drink, and all other necessaries; but suffer them to take no part for themselves. The people likewise require that plenty and abundance should flow in upon them from every quarter; but permit not the person, to whose care they owe this, even to taste of those indulgences he has so amply provided for others. Such, therefore, Socrates, as are fond of employment, and have been educated in the manner you mentioned, may do very well to make governors; but, as for me, I am for a life of more ease and tranquility?"

"Let us see then, Aristippus, which of the two leads a life of the greatest tranquility and ease; those who govern, or they who obey? Among the nations that are known to us; in Asia, the Syrians, Phrygians, and Lydians are subject to the

Persians; in Europe, the Bœotians to the Scythians; and, in Africa, the Carthaginians lord it over all the rest; which of these do you take to be in the most eligible situation? Or here, in Greece, where you are placed, which seem to you the most happy; they who are possessed of the sovereign power, or those who are compelled to submit to it?"

"I do not desire to be ranked among slaves," returned Aristippus; "but there is a station equally remote from sovereignty and servitude; this is the true path of liberty; and in this I would walk, as the surest road to happiness."

"This path," replied Socrates, "which lies so equally clear, whether of sovereignty or servitude, might perhaps be supposed to have some existence in nature, could we place it beyond the bounds of human society: But how, Aristippus, to live among men without governing or being governed? Do you not see that the strong will always oppress the weak; and compel them at last, by repeated injuries, both public and private, to fly, as it were, to slavery for refuge! If they refuse to submit willingly, their lands are ravaged, their trees cut down, their corn ruined: till, wearied out at last by oppression of every kind, they are obliged to give up the unequal combat. Also, in private life; see you not how the bold and strong trample upon such as are weak, or want courage to defend themselves?"

I do see it," said Aristippus: "and to the end it may not fall out so with me, I confine myself to no one commonwealth, but move here and there, and think it best to be a stranger everywhere."

"Truly," said Socrates, "this method of providing for your safety has something peculiar in it: and it should seem, Aristippus, that since the days of Sinnis, Sciro, and Procrustes, no man has dared to molest the traveler. What, then! those who remain continually in their own country have

the laws to secure them against violence of every sort; they have their relations, their friends, their dependents, to assist them; their cities are fortified; they have arms for their defense: and, to strengthen them still more, they make alliance with their neighbors: yet shall not all this secure them from falling sometimes into the snares of bad men: while you, destitute of all those various advantages; exposed continually to the many dangers, in a manner unavoidable to those who pass from one place to another; nor yet can enter that city whose very meanest inhabitant does not surpass you in credit: you, who shall then be seen in that situation wherein all the world would wish the man whom they purposed to betray: will they then spare you, Aristippus, because you are a stranger? or, because the public faith has been given, that neither at your entrance into, or going from the city, you shall meet with any molestation? But perhaps you think yourself of so little worth, that no one will be found willing to purchase you: and in truth, Aristippus, I know not that man who would wish to have such a slave in his family, as would do nothing, and yet expect to live well. But shall we see how masters generally manage such sort of people? If their appetites and passions are very outrageous, fasting is made use of to reduce them to order. If they are inclined to take what does not belong to them, everything valuable is kept carefully out of their way. If escape is meditated, chains shall secure them: and when inclined to be lazy, stripes are called in, to quicken their motions. And you, Aristippus, if you discovered such a slave among your domestics, in what manner would you treat him?"

"I would certainly leave no sort of severity untried," said Aristippus, "till I had brought him to better manners. But let us return to our first subject, Socrates; and tell me, if you please, wherein the happiness of sovereignty consists, which you make such account of; if pain and fatigue, and hunger and cold, and ten thousand other inconveniences, not only

pave the way to it, but are afterwards the chosen portion of the man who undertakes to command others? As to my part, I see no greater difference between the strokes of the whip - which we give ourselves, and those laid on by the order of another: for, if my body is to be tortured, it matters not the hand by which it is done: except that folly may also be added to the account, when the pain appears of our own procuring."

"Is it so then, Aristippus, that you perceive no difference between the things we submit to voluntarily, and those we undergo, compelled to it by some other? Now, he who through choice abstains from his food may return to his food whenever he pleases: and he who endures thirst, because he is so minded, may, when minded otherwise, as easily remove it: but the case is not the same when we have constraint to encounter. Besides, he who of his own accord engages in what may be attended with labor, has the hopes of success to animate him in the way, and the fatigue of the chase never discourages the hunter.

"But, if the prospect of acquiring what he is in pursuit of, however worthless in itself, is sufficient to make him regard neither thirst nor hunger; what may not he, whose aim is to procure the friendship of the good, conquer his enemies, gain the command over himself, and wisely govern his own family, benefit his friends, serve his country? Will such a one shrink at fatigue and pain? Rather, will he not court them, while they add to the delight arising from his own consciousness, and the united approbation of those who best know him? And, to show still further how necessary labor and pain are judged for all who would perform any thing laudable; it is a maxim of those who instruct youth, to regard the exercises that are gone through with ease, or give pleasure on their first performance, as of little worth; whether in forming the body or improving the mind: whereas those which require patience, application, and labor, these are they which prepare the man for

illustrious deeds and noble undertakings, as many who were excellent judges have told us; and, among the rest, Hesiod, for he speaks somewhere or other after the following manner:

"See Vice, preventing even your wish, appears
To lead through down-hill paths and gay parterres,
Where Pleasure reigns; while Virtue, decent maid,
Retires from view in yon sequester'd shade.
Craggy and steep the way that to her leads;
Fatigue and pain, by order of the gods,
Stern sentry keep. But, if nor pain, nor toil,
Can check the generous ardor of your soul,
Exert your powers, nor doubt your labor's meed; Conquest and joy shall crown the glorious deed."

Epicharmus said likewise,

"Earn your reward—the gods give naught to sloth."

And again,

"Seek not the sweets of life, in life's first bloom;
They ill prepare us for the pain to come!"

And the wise Prodicus is also of the same opinion; for to him is the allegory given. Now this writer tells us, to the best of my remembrance, "that Hercules having attained to that stage of life when man being left to the government of himself, seldom fails to give certain indications whether he will walk in the paths of virtue or wander through all the intricacies of vice, perplexed and undetermined what course to pursue, retired into a place where silence and solitude might bestow on him that tranquility and leisure so necessary for deliberation, when two women, of more than ordinary stature, came on towards him. The countenance of the one, open and amiable, and elevated with an air of conscious dignity. Her person was adorned with native elegance, her look with modesty, every gesture with decency, and her garments were

altogether of the purest white. The other was comely, but bloated, as from too high living. Affecting softness and delicacy, every look, every action, was studied and constrained; while art contributed all its powers to give those charms to her complexion and shape which nature had denied her. Her look was bold, the blush of modesty she was a stranger to, and her dress was contrived, not to conceal, but display those beauties she supposed herself possessed of. She would look round to see if any observed her; and not only so, but she would frequently stand still to admire her own shadow. Drawing near to the place where the hero sat musing, eager and anxious for the advantage of first accosting him, she hastily ran forward; while the person who accompanied her moved on with her usual pace, equal and majestic. Joining him, she said, 'I know, Hercules! you have long been deliberating on the course of life you should pursue; engage with me in friendship, and I will lead you through those paths which are smooth and flowery, where every delight shall court your enjoyment, and pain and sorrow shall not once appear. Absolved from all the fatigue of business and the hardships of war, your employment shall be to share in the social pleasures of the table, or repose on beds of down no sense shall remain without its gratification; beauty shall delight the eye and melody the ear, and perfumes shall breathe their odors around you. Nor shall your care be once wanted for the procuring of these things: neither be afraid lest time should exhaust your stock of joys, and reduce you to the necessity of purchasing new, either by the labor of body or mind: it is to the toil of others that you alone shall owe them I Scruple not, therefore, to seize whatever seems most desirable; for this privilege I bestow on all who are my votaries.'

"Hercules, having heard so flattering an invitation, demanded her name.

‘My friends,’ said she, ‘call me Happiness; but they who do not love me endeavor to make me odious, and therefore brand me with the name of Sensuality.’

“By this time the other person being arrived, thus addressed him in her turn:

‘I also, O Hercules! am come to offer you my friendship, for I am no stranger to your high descent; neither was I wanting to remark the goodness of your disposition in all the exercises of your childhood; from whence I gather hopes, if you choose to follow where I lead the way, it will not be long before you have an opportunity of performing many actions glorious to yourself and honorable to me. But I mean not to allure you with specious promises of pleasure, I will plainly set before you things as they really are, and show you in what manner the gods think proper to dispose them. Know therefore, young man, these wise governors of the universe have decreed, that nothing great, nothing excellent, shall be obtained without care and labor. They give no real good, no true happiness, on other terms. If, therefore, you would secure the favor of these gods, adore them. If you would conciliate to yourself the affection of your friends, be of use to them. If to be honored and respected of the republic be your aim, show your fellow-citizens how effectually you can serve them. But if it is your ambition that all Greece shall esteem you, let all Greece share the benefits arising from your labors. If you wish for the fruits of the earth, cultivate it. If for the increase of your flocks or your herds, let your flocks and your herds have your attendance and your care. And if your design is to advance yourself by arms, if you wish for the power of defending your friends, and subduing your enemies, learn the art of war under those who are well acquainted with it; and, when learnt, employ it to the best advantage. And if to have a body ready and well able to perform what you wish from it be your desire,

subject yours to your reason, and let exercise and hard labor give to it strength and agility.'

"At these words, as Prodicus informs us, the other interrupted her:—'You see,' said she, 'my Hercules, the long, the laborious road she means to lead you; but I can conduct you to happiness by a path more short and easy.'

"'Miserable wretch!' replied Virtue, 'what happiness can you boast of? You, who will not take the least pains to procure it! Does not satiety always anticipate desire? Will you wait till hunger invites you to eat, or stay till you are thirsty before you drink? Or, rather, to give some relish to your repast, must not art be called in to supply the want of appetite? while your wines, though costly, can yield no delight, but the ice in summer is sought for to cool and make them grateful to your palate! Beds of down, or the softest couch, can procure no sleep for you, whom idleness inclines to seek for repose; not labor and fatigue, which alone prepare for it. Nor dost you leave it to nature to direct you in your pleasures, but all is art and shameless impurity. The night is polluted with riot and crimes, while the day is given up to sloth and inactivity: and, though immortal, you are become an outcast from the gods, and the contempt and scorn of all good men. You boast of happiness, but what happiness can you boast of? Where was it that the sweetest of all sounds, the music of just self-praise, ever reached your ear? Or when could you view, with complacency and satisfaction, one worthy deed of your own performing? Is there anyone who will trust your word, or depend upon your promise; or, if sound in judgment, be of your society? For, among your followers, which of them, in youth, are not altogether effeminate and infirm of body? Which of them, in age, not stupid and debilitated in every faculty of the mind? While wasting their prime in thoughtless indulgence, they prepare for themselves all that pain and remorse so sure to attend the close of such a life! Ashamed of

the past, afflicted with the present, they weary themselves in bewailing that folly which lavished on youth all the joys of life, and left nothing to old age but pain and imbecility!

"'As for me, my dwelling is alone with the gods and good men; and, without me, nothing great, nothing excellent, can be performed, whether on earth or in the heavens; so that my praise, my esteem, is with all who know me! I make the labor of the artist pleasant, and bring to the father of his family security and joy; while the slave, as his lord, is alike my care. In peace I direct to the most useful councils, in war approve myself a faithful ally; and I only can tie the bond of indissoluble friendship. Nor do my votaries even fail to find pleasure in their repasts, though small cost is wanted to furnish out their table; for hunger, not art, prepares it for them; while their sleep, which follows the labor of the day, is far more sweet than whatever expense can procure for idleness: yet, sweet as it is, they quit it unreluctant when called by their duty, whether to the gods or men. The young enjoy the applause of the aged, the aged are reverenced and respected by the young. Equally delighted with reflecting on the past, or contemplating the present, their attachment to me renders them favored of the gods, dear to their friends, and honored by their country. And when the fatal hour is arrived, they sink not, like others, into an inglorious oblivion, but, immortalized by fame, flourish forever in the grateful remembrance of admiring posterity! Thus, O Hercules! you great descendant of a glorious race of heroes! thus may you attain that supreme felicity wherewith I have been empowered to reward all those who willingly yield themselves up to my direction.' "

"See here Aristippus," continued Socrates, "see here the advice which, Prodicus tells us, Virtue gave the young hero. He clothes it, as you may suppose, in more exalted language than I have attempted; but it will be your wisdom if you

endeavor to profit from what he has said, and consider at present what may befall you hereafter."

II. Socrates, seeing his eldest son Lamprocles enraged with his mother, spoke to him in the following manner; "Tell me, my son," said he, "did you ever hear of any who are called ungrateful?"

"Many," replied Lamprocles.

"Did you consider what gained them this appellation?"

"They were called ungrateful, because, having received favors, they refused to make any return."

"Ingratitude, then, should seem one species of injustice!"

"Most certainly."

"Have you ever examined thoroughly what this sort of injustice is? Or do you think, Lamprocles, because we are only said to be unjust when we treat our friends ill, not so when we injure our enemies; therefore we are indeed unjust when we are ungrateful to our friends, but not so when only ungrateful to our enemies?"

"I have considered it thoroughly," replied Lamprocles; "and am convinced, that to be ungrateful, is to be unjust; whether the object of our ingratitude be friend or foe."

"If then," continued Socrates, "ingratitude is injustice, it will follow, that the greater the benefit of which we are unmindful, the more we are unjust?"

"Most assuredly."

"But where shall we find the person who has received from any one, benefits so great or so many, as children from their parents? To them it is they owe their very existence; and, in consequence of this, the capacity of beholding all the beauties of nature, together with the privilege of partaking of those various blessings which the gods have so bountifully dispensed to all mankind. Now these are advantages

universally held so inestimable, that to be deprived of them excites our very strongest abhorrence; an abhorrence well understood, when the wisdom of the legislator made death to be the punishment of the most atrocious crimes: rightly judging, that the terror wherewith every one beheld it, would serve the most powerfully to deter from the commission of such offences, as they saw must bring upon them this greatest of all evils. Neither should you suppose it sensuality alone which induces mankind to enter into marriage, since not a street but would furnish with other means for its gratification: but our desire is to find out one wherewith to unite ourselves, from whom we may reasonably expect a numerous and a healthful progeny. The husband then turns his thoughts in what manner he may best maintain the wife whom he has thus chosen, and make ample provision for his children yet unborn; while she, on her part, with the utmost danger to herself, bears about with her, for a long time, a most painful burden. To this she imparts life and nourishment, and brings it into the world with inexpressible anguish: nor does her task end here; she is still to supply the food that must afterward support it. She watches over it with tender affection; attends it continually with unwearied care, although she has received no benefit from it; neither does it yet know to whom it is thus indebted. She seeks, as it were, to divine its wants: night or day her solicitude and labor know no intermission; unmindful of what hereafter may be the fruit of all her pain. Afterward, when the children are arrived at an age capable to receive instruction, how does each parent endeavor to instill into their minds the knowledge which may best conduce to their future well-doing! And if they hear of any better qualified than themselves for this important task, to these they send them, without regard to the expense; so much do they desire the happiness of their children!”

“Certain it is,” replied Lamprocles, “although my mother had done this, and a thousand times more, no man could bear with so much ill humor.”

“Do not you think it easier to bear the anger of a mother, than that of a wild beast?”

“No, not of such a mother.”

“But what harm has she done you? Has she kicked you, or bit you, as wild beasts do when they are angry?”

“No, but she utters such things as no one can bear from anybody.”

“And you, Lamprocles, what have you not made this mother bear, with your continual cries and untoward restlessness! what fatigue in the day! what disturbance in the night! and what pangs when sickness at any time seized you!”

“But, however, I never did or said anything to make her ashamed of me.”

“It is well. But why, Lamprocles, should you be more offended with your mother, than people on the stage are with one another? There is nothing so injurious or reproachful that these do not often say, yet no one becomes outrageous against the man whom he hears threaten and revile him, because he well knows he intends him no real injury: but you, although you as well know that no hurt is designed you, but, on the contrary, every kindness, you fly out into rage against your mother; or, perhaps, you suppose she intended you some harm?”

“Not at all,” replied Lamprocles; “I never once suspected any such matter.”

“What! a mother who thus loves you! who, when you are sick, spares no means, no pains for your recovery; whose care is to supply your every want; and whose vows to the gods are so frequent on your behalf! Is she harsh and cruel? Surely the man who cannot bear with such a mother, cannot bear with

that which is most for his advantage. But tell me," continued Socrates, "does it seem to you at all necessary to show respect or submission to any one whatsoever? Or are you indeed conscious of such a degree of self-sufficiency, as makes it needless to pay any regard, whether to magistrate or general?"

"So far from it," said Lamprocles, "I endeavor all I can to recommend myself to my superiors."

"Perhaps, too, you would cultivate the goodwill of your neighbor, that he may supply you with fire from his hearth, when you want it; or yield you ready assistance, when any accident befalls you?"

"I would, most surely."

"And if you were to go a journey, or a voyage with any one, it would not be indifferent to you, whether they loved or hated you?"

"No, certainly!"

"Wretch! to think it right to endeavor to gain the good-will of these people; and suppose you are to do nothing for a mother, whose love for you so far exceeds that of any other! Surely you have forgot, that while every other kind of ingratitude is passed over unnoticed by the magistrate, those who refuse to return good offices, in any other case, being only punished with the contempt of their fellow-citizens; the man who is wanting in respect to his parents, for this man public punishments are appointed; the laws yield him no longer their protection; neither is he permitted any share in the administration, since they think no sacrifice offered by a hand so impious, can be acceptable to the gods, or beneficial to man: and conclude the mind so altogether degenerate, equally incapable of undertaking anything great, or executing anything justly. For such, too, as neglect to perform the rites of sepulture for their parents, for these, the same punishments have been allotted by the laws: and particular

regard is had to these points, when inquiry is made into the lives and behavior of those who offer themselves candidates for any public employment. You, therefore, O my son! will not delay, if wise, to entreat pardon of the gods; lest they, from whom your ingratitude cannot be hid, should turn away their favor from you: and be you likewise careful to conceal it from the eyes of men, that you find not yourself forsaken by all who know you; for no one will expect a return to his kindness, however considerable, from him who can show himself unmindful of what he owes to his parents."

III. Socrates having observed that Chærephon and Chærecrates, two brothers, with whom he was acquainted, were at variance, he wished very much to reconcile them to each other. To which end, meeting one of them, he said to him, "What, are you then, Chærecrates, one of those mercenary kind of people, who prefer riches to a brother, and forget that these being only inanimate things, require much vigilance and care to protect them; whereas a brother endued with reason and reflection, is able to give assistance and protection to you? And, besides, brothers are somewhat less plentiful than gold! It is strange a man should think himself injured because he cannot enjoy his brother's fortune! Why not equally complain of injury done him by the rest of his fellow-citizens, because the wealth of the whole community does not center in him alone? But in this case they can argue right, and easily see that a moderate fortune secured by the mutual aid of society, is much better than the riches of a whole city attended with the dangers to which solitude would expose them, yet admit not this reasoning in regard to a brother. If rich, they buy slaves in abundance to serve them: they endeavor all they can to gain friends to support them; but make at the same time no account of a brother, as if nearness in blood disqualified for friendship! But surely, to be born of the same parents, and educated in the same house, ought rather to be considered as

so many powerful cements, since even wild beasts themselves show some inclination to animals they are brought up with. And besides, Chærecrates, he who has a brother, is much more regarded than he who has none; his enemies too will be the less forward to molest him."

"I will not deny," replied Chærecrates, "that a brother, when such as he should be, is, as you say, an inestimable treasure, and therefore we ought to bear long with one another, so far from quarrelling on every slight occasion; but when this brother fails in every particular, and is indeed the very reverse of all he ought to be, to keep on terms with such a one, is next to an impossibility."

"Your brother then, Chærecrates, is displeasing to every one? Or are there some to whom he can make himself very agreeable?"

"Therefore he the more deserves my hatred," said Chærecrates, "because wherever he comes he fails not to make himself pleasing to others; whereas, he seems to aim at nothing but displeasing me."

"But may not this happen, Chærecrates, from your not knowing how to converse properly with a brother? As the horse, not un-tractable to others, becomes altogether unmanageable to the unskillful rider."

"And why should I, who well knowhow to return any kindness shown me either in words or actions, be supposed ignorant in what manner to behave properly to a brother? No: but when I see a man catch at every opportunity to vex and disoblige me, shall I, after this, show kindness to such a one? I cannot, Socrates; nor will I even attempt it!"

"You surprise me, Chærecrates! Suppose you had a dog who watched and defended your sheep diligently; this dog fawns and caresses your shepherds, but snarls at you whenever you come near him. What do you on this occasion?

Fly out into rage? Or endeavor, by kindness, to reconcile him to you? You acknowledge a brother, when such as he ought to be, an invaluable treasure: you say you are not unacquainted with the arts of conciliating favor and affection, but yet are resolved to employ none of them to gain the love of Chærephon!"

"I do not believe, Socrates, I have arts sufficient to succeed in such an attempt."

"And yet I should imagine," said Socrates, "no new one necessary: practice only those you are already master of, and you will find them sufficient to regain his affection."

"If you know what these are, of favor inform me," replied Chærecrates; "for they are unknown to me."

"Suppose, Chærecrates, you wished some friend to invite you to his feast when he offered sacrifice; what means would you take to induce him thereto."

"Invite him to one of mine."

"And if you wanted him, in your absence, to manage your affairs, what then?"

"I would try what I could to engage his gratitude, by first rendering him the service I wished to receive."

"But, suppose you desired to secure for yourself an hospitable reception in some foreign country, what would you do?"

"When any of that place came to Athens, I would invite them to my house," said Chærecrates; "and would spare no pains to assist them in dispatching the business they came for, that they, when I went thither, might help me in return to expedite mine."

"Is it so then!" replied Socrates; "and are you so well skilled in all the arts of conciliating favor and affection, yet know nothing of the matter? But you are afraid, Chærecrates, of

making the first advances to your brother, lest it should degrade you in the opinion of those who hear it? Yet surely it ought not to be less glorious for a man to anticipate his friends in courtesy and kind offices, than get the start of his enemies in injuries and annoyance! Had I thought Chærephon as well-disposed as you towards a reconciliation, I should have endeavored to have prevailed on him to make the first advances; but you seemed to me the better leader in this affair; and I fancied success the most likely to ensue from it."

"No, now, Socrates," cried out Chærecrates, "you certainly speak not with your usual wisdom. What! would you have me, who am the youngest, make overtures to my brother; when in all nations it is the undoubted privilege of the first-born to lead the way?"

"How!" replied Socrates; "is it not the custom everywhere for the younger to yield precedence to the elder? Must not he rise at his approach and give to him the seat which is most honorable; and hold his peace till he has done speaking? Delay not therefore, Chærecrates, to do what I advise: use your endeavor to appease your brother; nor doubt his readiness to return your love. He is ambitious of honor: he has a nobleness of disposition; sordid souls, indeed, are only to be moved by mercenary motives; but the brave and liberal are ever best subdued by courtesy and kindness."

"But suppose, Socrates, when I have acted as you advise, my brother should behave no better than he has done?"

"Should it prove so, Chærecrates, what other harm can arise to you from it, than that of having shown yourself a good man, and a good brother to one whose badness of temper makes him undeserving of your regard? But I have no apprehension of so unfavorable an issue to this matter: rather, when your brother shall see it your intention to conquer by courtesy, he himself will strive to excel in so noble

a contest. As it is, nothing can be more deplorable than your present situation; it being no other than if these hands, ordained of God for mutual assistance, should so far forget their office, as mutually to impede each other: or these feet, designed by Providence for a reciprocal help, should entangle each other to the hindrance of both. But surely, it shows no less our ignorance and folly, than works our harm, when we thus turn those things into evil which were not created but for our good. And, truly, I regard a brother as one of the best blessings that God has bestowed on us; two brothers being more profitable to each other than two eyes or two feet, or any other of those members which have been given to us in pairs, for partners and helps, as it were, to each other by a bountiful Providence. For, whether we consider the hands or feet, they assist not each other unless placed at no great distance: and even our eyes, whose power evidently appears of the widest extent, are yet unable to take in, at one and the same view, the front and the reverse of any one object whatsoever, though placed ever so near them: but no situation can hinder brothers, who live in amity, from rendering one another the most essential services."

IV. I also remember a discourse that Socrates once held concerning friendship; which I think could not but greatly benefit his hearers; since he not only taught us how we might gain friends, but how to behave towards them when gained. On this occasion he observed, "that although the generality of mankind agreed in esteeming a firm and virtuous friend an invaluable possession, yet were there very few things about which they gave themselves less trouble. They were diligent, he said, to purchase houses and lands, and slaves, and flocks, and household goods; and, when purchased, would take no little pains to preserve them; but were no way solicitous either to purchase or preserve a friend, however they might talk of the advantages of having one. No, he had seen people, who, if

they had a friend and a slave sick at the same time, would send for the physician, and try every means to recover the slave, while the friend was left to take care of himself; and, if both died, it was easy to see how each stood in their estimation. Of all their possessions this alone was neglected: they would even suffer it to be lost for want of a little attention. Their estates here and there they could with readiness point out to you; but ask them of their friends, how many and what they are, and you reduce them to some difficulty. The number, though acknowledged small, is more than they can well make out to you; so little do these people concern themselves about the matter. And yet, what possession shall be placed in competition with a friend? What slave so affectionate to our persons, or studious of our interest? What horse able to render us such service? From whence, or from whom, can we at all times and on every occasion receive so many and such essential benefits? Are we at a loss in our own private affairs, or in those the public have entrusted to our management? A friend will supply every deficiency. Do we wish for the pleasure of giving assistance to some other? A friend will furnish us with the power. Are we threatened with danger? He flies to our assistance; for he not only dedicates his fortune to our service, but his life to our defense.

Do we purpose to persuade? His eloquence is ever ready to second all we say.

Are we compelled to contend? His arm is ever found among the foremost to assist us. He doubles the joy which prosperity brings, and makes the load of affliction less heavy. Our hands, our feet, our eyes, can yield us small service in comparison to that we receive from a friend; for what we are not able to do for ourselves: that which we neither see, nor hear, nor think of, when our own interest is the question, a friend will perceive, and perform for us. And yet, this friend, while the plant that promises us fruit shall be carefully cultivated, this

friend we neglect to nourish and improve; though where else the tree from whence such fruit is to be found!"

V. I remember likewise another discourse of his, wherein he exhorts his hearers to look well into themselves, and see in what estimation they might reasonably hope their friends should hold them. For, having observed one of his followers desert a friend when oppressed with penury, he thus questioned Antisthenes in the presence of the man, together with many others: "Pray, say, Antisthenes, is it allowable to value our friends as we do our slaves: for one of these we perhaps rate at five mina; while we think another dear at two; these again we will give ten for; and for some, it may be, twenty; no, it is said that Nicias, the son of Nicerates, gave no less than a whole talent for one he intended to set over his mines. May we estimate our friends in the same manner?"

"I think we may," replied Antisthenes; "for, while I know some whose affection I would purchase at no mean price, there are others whom I would scarcely thank for theirs, if I might have it for nothing. And there are, Socrates, whose favor and friendship I should be glad to secure, though at the expense of the last farthing."

"If this is the case," replied Socrates, "it behooves us not a little to consider of how much worth we really are to our friends; at the same time that we use our diligence to raise our value with them as much as we can, that they may not lay us aside like useless lumber. For when I hear this man cry out, 'My friend has deserted me and another complain, 'that one whom he thought most strongly attached to him, had sold his friendship for some trifling advantage,' I am inclined to ask, Whether, as we are glad to get rid of a bad slave at any rate, so we may not wish to do the same by a worthless friend? since, after all, we seldom hear of the good friend being forsaken, any more than of the good slave wanting a master."

VI. And here, on the other hand, I will relate a conversation Socrates once had with Critobulus; from whence we may learn to try our friends, and find out such as are worthy of our affection.

"Suppose," said he, "Critobulus, we wanted to choose a worthy friend, what should be our method of proceeding in this matter? Should we not beware of one much addicted to high living? to wine or women? or of a lazy disposition? since, enslaved to such vices, no man could be of use either to himself, or any other."

"Certainly."

"Suppose we met with a man whose possessions being small, he is yet most lavish in his expenses; who stands daily in need of his friend's purse, as a necessary supply for his own profusion; with whom, however, all that is lent is lost; yet, whom to refuse is most deadly to offend: Would not such a one prove rather troublesome, think you?"

"No doubt, Socrates."

"And if there was a person, provident indeed enough, but withal so covetous, as never to be content unless he has the advantage of you on every occasion?"

"I think of him worse than of the other."

"But what do you say to the man, Critobulus, who is so much bent on making a fortune, as to mind nothing but what serves to that end?"

"I say, leave him to himself," returned Critobulus; "since it is sure he will never be of use to any other."

"And suppose one of so turbulent a disposition, as to be daily engaging his friends in some quarrel on his account?"

"I would keep clear of such a one, most certainly, Socrates."

"But what if the man were free from these defects, and had only such a sort of selfishness belonging to him, as made him

always ready to receive favors, not at all solicitous about returning any?"

"'Why certainly," replied Critobulus, "no person would wish to have anything to say to such a one. But, Socrates," continued he, "since none of these people will serve our purpose, show me, I desire you, what sort of man he must be whom we should endeavor to make a friend of?"

"I suppose," said Socrates, "he should be the very reverse of all we have been saying: moderate in his pleasures, a strict observer of his word, fair and open in all his dealings; and who will not suffer even his friend to surpass him in generosity; so that all are gainers with whom he has to do."

"But how shall we find such a one," said Critobulus; "or make trial of these virtues and vices, without running some hazard by the experiment?"

"When you are inquiring out the best statuary, Critobulus, you trust not to the pretenses of any, but examine the performances of all; and conclude that he who has hitherto excelled, gives the best grounded assurance of excelling for the future."

"So you would have us infer, Socrates, that he who has already discharged the duties of a good friend towards those with whom he has been formerly connected will not fail to do the same when connected with you?"

"Undoubtedly, Critobulus, just as I should infer, that the groom who has taken proper care of your horses, will do the same by mine, whenever I send him any."

"But, Socrates, when we have found out a man whom we judge proper to make a friend of, what means may we use to engage his affection?"

"In the first place," returned Socrates, "we must consult the gods, whether it be agreeable to their will that we engage in friendship with him."

“But suppose the gods disapprove not of our choice, what way shall we take to obtain his favor?”

“Not hunt him down, Critobulus, as we do hares; nor catch him by stratagem, as we do birds; neither are we to seize him by force, as we are wont to serve our enemies; for it would prove an arduous task to make a man your friend in spite of inclination. To shut him up like a criminal might create aversion, but would never conciliate favor and esteem.”

“But what must we do then?”

“I have heard,” said Socrates, “of certain words that have all the force in them of the most powerful charms. There are likewise other arts, wherewith such as know them seldom fail to allure to themselves whomsoever they please.”

“And where can we learn these words?” said Critobulus.

“You know the song the Sirens used to charm Ulysses? It begins with,

“O stay, O pride of Greece, Ulysses stay!” Pope’s Odyssey.

“I do know it, Socrates. But did they not mean to detain others by these charms, as well as Ulysses?”

“Not at all, Critobulus; words like these are only designed to allure noble souls, and lovers of virtue.”

“I begin to understand you,” said Critobulus; “and perceive the charm which operates so powerfully, is praise: but, in order to make it effectual, we must bestow it with discretion, lest ridicule should seem intended by us, rather than applause. And, indeed, to commend a man for his beauty, his strength, or his stature, who knows himself to be weak, little, and deformed, would be to incur his resentment, not conciliate his affection; and make mankind not seek but shun our society.

But do you know of no other charms?”

“No: I have heard, indeed, that Pericles had many, wherewith he charmed the city, and gained the love of all men.”

“By what means did Themistocles procure the affection of his fellow-citizens?”

“By no incantations, most certainly,” replied Socrates; “if you except that of serving the state.”

“You would insinuate then, Socrates, that, in order to obtain a virtuous friend, we must endeavor first of all to be ourselves virtuous?”

“Why, can you suppose, Critobulus, that a bad man can gain the affection of a good one?”

“And yet,” said Critobulus, “I have seen many a sorry rhetorician live in great harmony with the best orator in Athens; and a general, perfectly well skilled in the art of war, shall admit others to his intimacy, who know nothing of the matter.”

“But did you ever see a man, Critobulus, who had no one good quality to recommend him;—for that is the question;—did you ever see such a one gain a friend of distinguished abilities?”

“I do not know I ever did. But if it is so clear, Socrates, that those who have much merit, and they who have none, can never unite together in friendship; are the virtuous equally sure of being beloved by all the virtuous?”

“You are led into this inquiry, Critobulus, from observing that the great and the good, although alike enemies to vice, and equally engaged in the pursuit of glory, are so far from expressing their mutual good-will, that enmity and opposition sometimes prevail among them; and are with more difficulty reconciled to each other, than even the most worthless and vile of all mankind. This you see, and are concerned at.”

“I am so,” replied Critobulus; “and the more, as I observe this not confined to particulars, but communities: those, too, where vice finds its greatest discouragement, and virtue its best reward; even these shall engage in hostilities against each other! Now when I see this, Socrates, I almost despair to find a friend; for where shall I seek one? Not among the vicious; for, how can one who is ungrateful, profuse, avaricious, idle, intemperate, faithless, be a friend? He may hate, but cannot love. Neither yet is it more possible for the virtuous and the vicious to unite in the bonds of amity; since, what concord can subsist between those who commit crimes, and they who abhor them? And if, after this, we are to add the virtuous; if ambition can sow enmity among the best of men; if these, desirous all of the highest places, can envy and oppose each other, where can friendship be found? or where the asylum on earth for fidelity and affection?”

“My Critobulus,” answered Socrates, “we shall find it no easy matter to investigate this point. Man is made up of contrarieties. Inclined to friendship from the want he finds in himself of friends, he compassionates the sufferer; he relieves the necessitous; and finds complacency and satisfaction, whether his turn is to receive or confer an obligation. But as one and the same thing may be an object of desire to many; strife, enmity, and ill-will, become thereby unavoidable: benevolence is extinguished by avarice and ambition; and envy fills the heart, which till then was all affection! But friendship can make its way, and surmount every obstacle, to unite the just and good. For virtue will teach these to be contented with their own possessions, how moderate soever; no, infinitely prefer them to the empire of the world, if not to be had without hatred and contention. Assisted by this, they willingly endure the extreme of thirst and hunger, rather than injure, or bear hard on any; nor can love itself, even when the most violent, transport them beyond the rules of decency and

good order. They are satisfied with whatever the laws have allotted them: and so far from desiring to encroach on the rights of others, they are easily inclined to resign many of their own. If disputes arise, they are soon accommodated, to the contentment of each party: anger never rises so high, as to stand in need of repentance; nor can envy once find admission into the minds of those who live in a mutual communication of their goods; and plead a kind of right in whatever a friend possesses. Hence, therefore, we may be very sure, that virtuous men will not oppose, but assist each other in the discharge of the public offices. Those, indeed, who only aim at highest honors, and posts of the greatest power, that they may accumulate wealth, riot in luxury, and oppress the people, are too profligate and unjust to live in concord with any: but he who aspires to an honorable employment, for no other end than to secure himself from oppression, protect his friends, and serve his country; what should hinder his uniting with those whose intentions are no other? Would it render him less able to accomplish these designs? Or would not his power become so much the more extensive, from having the wise and good associate in the same cause with him? In the public games, continued Socrates, "we permit not the skillful and the strong, to unite themselves together, as knowing that in so doing they must bear away the prize in every contention: but here, in the administration of the public affairs, we have no law to forbid the honest from joining with the honest; who are generally, too, the most able; and on that account to be chosen rather for associates than opponents. Besides, since contentions will arise, confederates should be sought for; and the greater number will be necessary, if those who oppose us have courage and ability. For this purpose, and to make those whom we engage the more zealous in serving us, favors and good offices are to be dispensed with a liberal hand: and even prudence will direct us to prefer the virtuous, as not being

many: besides, evil men are always found insatiable. But however this may be, Critobulus, take courage; make yourself, in the first place, a virtuous man, and then boldly set yourself to gain the affection of the virtuous: and this is a chase wherein I may be able to assist you, being myself much inclined to love. Now, whenever I conceive an affection for any, I rest not till it becomes reciprocal; but, borne forward towards them by the most ardent inclination, I strive to make my company equally desirable. And much the same management will you find necessary, Critobulus, whenever you would gain the friendship of any: conceal not, therefore, from me the person whose affection you most desire. For, as I have made it my study to render myself pleasing to those who are pleasing to me, I believe I am not ignorant of some of the arts best calculated for such a purpose."

"And I," replied Critobulus, "have long been desirous of receiving some instructions herein; and more especially if they will help me to gain the affection of those who are desirable on account of the beauty of their persons as well as the graces of their minds."

"But all compulsion is entirely excluded from my scheme," continued Socrates; "and I verily believe," says he, "that the reason why all men fled the wretched Scylla, was, from her employing no other means; since we see them easily detained by the Siren's song; and, forgetful of everything, yield themselves up to the enchanting harmony."

"Be assured, Socrates," said Critobulus, "I shall never think of taking any man's affection by storm: of favor, therefore, proceed, I beseech you, to your instructions."

"You must promise me, likewise, to keep at a proper distance, and not give way to overmuch fondness."

"I shall make no great difficulty to promise you this, Socrates, provided the people are not very handsome."

“And those who are so will be in less danger, as far less likely to suffer you than those who are more plain.”

“Well, I will not transgress in this point,” said Critobulus; “only let me know how I may gain a friend.”

“You must permit me then,” said Socrates, “to tell him how much you esteem him, and how great your desire to become one of his friends.”

“Most readily, Socrates; since I never knew any one displeased with another for thinking well of him.”

“And that your observation of his virtue has raised in you great affection of his person; Would you think I did amiss, and might hurt you in the man’s opinion?”

“The very reverse, I should imagine; for I find in myself a more than ordinary affection towards those who express an affection for me.”

“I may go then so far in speaking of you to those you love: but will you allow me to proceed, Critobulus, and assure them, that the sweetest pleasure you know is in the conversation of virtuous friends? That you are constant in your care of them? That you behold their honorable achievements with no less satisfaction and complacency than if you yourself had performed them, and rejoice at their prosperity in like manner as at your own? That, in the service of a friend, you can feel no weariness, and esteem it no less honorable to surpass him in generosity than your enemy in arms? By this, or something like this, I doubt not to facilitate your way to the forming of many very excellent friendships.”

“But why do you ask my leave, Socrates, as if you were not at liberty to say what you please of me?”

“Not so,” returned Socrates; “for I have often heard Aspasia declare, that matchmakers succeed pretty well if they keep to the truth in what they say of each party; whereas, if falsehood is employed, nothing but vexation can ensue; for they who

have been deceived hate one another, and those most of all who brought them together. Now, I hold this observation of Aspasia to be right, and not less to concern the point in question: and, therefore, I think I cannot urge anything in your behalf, Critobulus, which strict truth will not make good."

"Which is as much as to say," replied Critobulus, "that if I have good qualities sufficient to make myself beloved, I may then have your helping hand: but, otherwise, you are not so very much my friend as to be at the trouble to feign any for me."

"And by which of these methods shall I best serve you, Critobulus? Bestowing on you some praise, which, after all, is not your due, or exhorting you to act in such a manner as may give you a just claim to it, and that from all mankind? Let us examine the matter, if you are still doubtful. Suppose I should recommend you to the master of a ship, as a skillful pilot, and on this you were admitted to direct at the helm, must not destruction to yourself, as well as the loss of the ship, be the inevitable consequence? Or suppose I spoke of you everywhere as a great general, or able statesman, and you, on the credit of this false representation, were called to determine causes, preside in the council, or command the army, would not your own ruin be involved in that of your country? No, were I only to commend you as a good economist to my neighbor, and thereby procure for you the management of his affairs, and the care of his family, would not you expose yourself to much ridicule, at the same time that you were exposing him to ruin? But the surest, as the shortest way, to make yourself beloved and honored, Critobulus, is to be indeed the very man you wish to appear. Set yourself, therefore, diligently to the attaining of every virtue, and you will find, on experience, that no one of them whatsoever but will flourish and gain strength when properly exercised. This is the counsel I have to give you,

Critobulus. But, if you are of a contrary opinion, let me know it, I entreat you."

"Far from it," replied Critobulus; "and I should only bring shame upon myself by contradicting you, since thereby I should contradict the sure principles of truth and virtue."

VII. Socrates had the greatest tenderness for his friends. Had ignorance or imprudence brought them into difficulties, Socrates, by his good advice, would often set them at ease.

Or, if sinking under poverty, he would procure to them relief, by pressing upon others the duty of mutual assistance.

I will give some instances of his sentiments on such occasions.

Perceiving on a time a deep melancholy on the countenance of one of his friends, "You seem oppressed," said he, "Aristarchus; but impart the cause of it to your friends; they may be able to relieve you.'

"I am indeed," said Aristarchus, "oppressed with no small difficulty: for since our late troubles, many of our men being fled for shelter to the Piræus, the women belonging to them have all poured down upon me; so that I have at present no less than fourteen sisters, and aunts, and cousins, all to provide for! Now, you know, Socrates, we can receive no profit from our lands; for these our enemies have got into their possession: nor yet from our shops and houses in the city; since Athens has scarcely an inhabitant left in it. Nobody to be found neither to purchase our wares; nobody to lend us money, at what interest soever: so that a man may as well hope to find it in the very streets as to borrow it anywhere. Now, what am I to do, Socrates, in this case? It would be cruel not to relieve our relations in their distress; and yet, in a time of such general desolation, it is impossible for me to provide for so great a number."

Socrates having patiently heard out his complaint,—”Whence comes it,” said he, “that we see Ceramo not only provide for a large family, but even become the richer by their very means; while you, Aristarchus, are afraid of being starved to death, because some addition has been lately made to yours?”

“The reason is plain,” replied Aristarchus;

“Ceramo’s people are all slaves; whereas those with me are every one of them free.”

“And which, in your opinion, do you rate the highest? Ceramo’s slaves, or the free people your house is filled with?”

“There can be no comparison.”

“But is it not then a shame,” said Socrates, “that your people, who so far exceed in worth, should reduce you to beggary, while those with Ceramo make him a rich man?”

“Not at all,” replied Aristarchus: “the slaves with him have been brought up to trades; but those I speak of had a liberal education.”

“May we be said to be masters of some trade when we understand how to make things which are useful?”

“No doubt of it.”

“Is flour or bread useful?”

“Certainly.”

“And clothes, whether for men or women, are they useful?”

“Who doubts it?” said Aristarchus.

“But the people with you are altogether ignorant of these things?”

So far from it,” replied Aristarchus, “that I question not their being able to perform any one of them.”

“But of what are you afraid then, Aristarchus. Nausycides with one of these can maintain himself and family; and not only so, but buy flocks and herds, and accommodate the

republic with a round sum on occasion: Cyribes also supports his household in ease and affluence by making bread: Demeas, the Collytensian, his, by making cassocks: Menon, his, by making of cloaks: and the Megarensians theirs, by making of short jackets."

"That is true," interrupted Aristarchus; "for the way with these is to buy Barbarians, whom they can compel to labor: but I can do no such thing with the women who live with me; they are free, they are my relations, Socrates."

"And so, because they are free, and related to you, they are to do nothing but eat and sleep! Do you suppose, Aristarchus, that such as live in this manner are more content than others? or enjoy more happiness than they, who by their labor earn bread for their families? Suppose you that idleness and inattention can gain any useful knowledge, or preserve in the memory what has been already gained? That they can keep the man in health, add strength to his body, and gold to his stores, or give security to what he has already in his possession; and shall labor and industry stand him in no stead? To what purpose, I pray you, did your relations learn anything? Did they resolve at the time to make no use of their knowledge? Or, rather, did they not intend from it some advantage to themselves, or benefit to others? Surely we give small proof of our wisdom when we thus decline all employment. For, which is most reasonable—procuring to ourselves the things that are useful, by exerting the powers which nature has bestowed; or, with arms across, sit listless and musing, considering only the means by which others may provide for us? And verily, if I may speak my mind to you freely, I should suppose, Aristarchus, you cannot have any great love for your guests, in your present situation; nor they for you. You think them a burden; and they perceive you think them so: and it will be well if discontent does not increase daily, till all gratitude and affection are compelled to give way.

But show them once in what manner they may become useful; and you will henceforth regard them with complacency and satisfaction; while they, perceiving it, will hardly be wanting in affection to you. They will be able to look back with pleasure, not pain, on all you have done for them: and the sweet familiarity of friendship, together with all the tender charities arising from the sacred ties of consanguinity, will again be restored to your happy society! Were the employments indeed of that nature as would bring shame along with them, death itself were to be chosen rather than a subsistence so obtained: but such as they are skilled in, are, as I suppose, decent and honorable; to be performed with pleasure, since they can perform them with so much ease. Delay not then, Aristarchus, to propose what may be of so much advantage both to them and you; and doubt not their compliance with what they must perceive to be so very reasonable."

"O heavens! " cried Aristarchus; "what truths have I now heard! But your advice, Socrates, shall be regarded as it ought: hitherto I have been afraid to borrow money of my neighbor, as not knowing, when spent, by what means to repay it; but my scruples are now over: this moment I will buy such materials as may be wanted."

Nor did he at all cool in his resolutions. Wool, with whatever was necessary for the working of it, were sent in by Aristarchus; and each one was employed from morning to night. Melancholy gave way to continual cheerfulness; and mutual confidence took the place of that mutual suspicion, which, till then, had possessed the minds of Aristarchus and his guests. They consider him now as their generous protector; and his love for them increased in proportion to their usefulness.

Sometime afterward, Aristarchus coming to see Socrates, related with much pleasure in what manner they went on:

“But my guests,” said he, “begin now to reproach me, for being, as they say, the only idle person in the whole family.”

“Acquaint them,” answered Socrates, “with the fable of the dog. You must know,” continued he, “that in the days of yore, when brutes could talk, several of the sheep coming to their master, ‘Is it not strange, sir!’ say they to him, ‘that we, who provide you with milk, and wool, and lambs, have nothing at all given us but what we can get off the ground ourselves; while the dog there, who cannot so much as help you to one of them, is pampered and fed with the very bread you eat of?’

‘Peace!’ cries the dog, who overheard their complaint; ‘it is not without reason I am taken most care of; for I secure you from the thief and the wolf; nor would you, wretches! dare to eat at all, if I did not stand sentinel, to watch and defend you.’ The sheep, said the fable, on hearing this, withdrew, convinced that the dog had reason on his side: and do you, Aristarchus, convince your guests that it is by your care they are protected from harm; and enjoy a life of security and pleasure.”

VIII. At another time, Socrates meeting his old friend Eutherus, whom he had not seen for many years, asked him, “Where he came from?”

“From no great distance, at present,” replied Eutherus. “Towards the end of our late destructive war, I returned, indeed, from a long journey: for, being dispossessed of all the estate I had on the frontiers of Attica, and my father dying, and leaving me nothing here, I was obliged to gain a subsistence by my labor wherever I could: and thought it better to do so, than beg of any one; and borrow I could not, as I had nothing to mortgage.”

“And how long,” said Socrates, “do you imagine your labor will supply you with necessaries?”

“Not long.”

“And yet age increases the number of our wants, at the same time that it lessens our power of providing for them?”

“It does so.”

“Would it not then be more advisable, Eutherus, to seek out for some employment, which might enable you to lay up some little for old age? What if you were to go to some wealthy citizen, who may want such a person, to assist him in gathering in his fruits; inspecting his affairs; and overlooking his laborers; whereby you might become a mutual benefit to each other?”

“But slavery, Socrates, is a thing I can ill submit to.”

“Yet magistrates, Eutherus, and those who are employed in public affairs, are so far from being considered as slaves on that account, that, on the contrary, they are held in the highest estimation.”

“It may be so, Socrates, but I never can bear being found fault with.”

“And yet,” said Socrates, “you will be hard set to do any one thing whose every circumstance is secure from blame. For it is difficult so to act, as to commit no error; which yet if we could, I know of no security against the censure of ill judges: and truly I should wonder, Eutherus, if what you are at present employed about could be performed in such a manner as to escape all blame. It seems therefore to me, that all you can do, is only to take care, as far as may be, to keep clear of those people who seem glad to find fault; and seek out such as are more candid. Which done, pursue with steadiness and alacrity whatever you undertake, but beware how you undertake anything beyond your power. Thus will your indigence find relief, without the hazard of much blame to you. Certainty shall take the place of a precarious subsistence, and leave you to the full enjoyment of all the peaceful pleasures of old age!”

IX. I remember one day Crito complaining how difficult it was at Athens for a man who loved quiet to enjoy his fortune in security: “For,” said he, “I have now several lawsuits on my hands, for no other reason, that I can guess at, but because they know I would rather pay my money than involve myself in business and perplexity.”

Socrates asked, “If he kept never a dog, to defend his sheep from the wolves?”

“I keep several,” said Crito, “as you may imagine; and they are of no small use to me.”

“Why then,” said Socrates, “do you not engage some person in your service, whose vigilance and care might prevent others from molesting you?”

“So I would, Socrates, did I not fear that this very man might, at last, turn against me.”

“But wherefore should you fear this? Are you not pretty certain, that it may be more for the interest of people to keep on good terms with you, than have you for an enemy. Believe me, Crito, there is many a man in Athens who would think himself very much honored by your friendship.” Saying this, Archidemus came immediately into their mind; a man able and eloquent, and, withal, well versed in business; but poor, as being one of those few who are not for having whatever they can lay hands on. He loved honest men; though he would often say, nothing was more easy than to grow rich by calumny. To this man, Crito, in consequence of what Socrates had said to him, would send corn, or wool, or wine or oil, or any other produce of his estate, when they brought him those things from the country: and when he sacrificed to the gods, he sent for him to the feast, nor ever omitted any opportunity of showing respect to him. Archidemus seeing this, began to detach himself from all other dependencies, and consider Crito’s house as the place that would shelter him from every

want. He therefore gave himself entirely to him: and discovering that Crito's false accusers were guilty of many crimes, and had made themselves many enemies, he undertook to manage them. He therefore summoned one of them to answer for an offence, which, if proved against him, must subject him at least to a pecuniary mulct, if not to corporal punishment. The man, knowing how little he could defend his malpractices, endeavored by every art to make Archidemus withdraw his prosecution, but to no purpose; for he would never lose sight of him till he had compelled him not only to leave Crito in peace, but purchase his own with no inconsiderable sum of money. Archidemus having conducted this affair, and many others of the same nature, successfully, Crito was thought not a little happy in having his assistance: and as the shepherds often avail themselves of their neighbor's dog, by sending their sheep to pasture near him, Crito's friends would entreat him to lend Archidemus to them. He, on his side, was glad of an opportunity to oblige his benefactor; and it was observed, that not only Crito himself, but all his friends, lived free, for the future, from any molestation. Likewise, when any reproached him with having made his court to Crito for his own interest: "And which," said he, "do you think the most shameful? serving the good who have already served you, and joining with them in their opposition to the wicked; or, confederating with the bad, assist them the more effectually to oppress the virtuous, and thereby make every honest man your enemy?" From this time Archidemus lived in the strictest intimacy with Crito; nor did Crito's friends less honor and esteem him.

X. I remember Socrates once saying to Diodorus, "Suppose, Diodorus, one of your slaves ran away from you, would you be at any pains to recover him?"

"Yes, certainly," said the other; "and I would even go so far as to publish a reward for whoever would bring him to me."

“And if any of them were sick, you would take care of them, I imagine, and send for a physician to try to save them?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“But what if a friend, something of more worth to you than a thousand slaves, were reduced to want, would it not become you, Diodorus, to relieve him? You know him for a man incapable of ingratitude; no, one who would even blush to lie under an obligation without endeavoring to return it. You know too, that the service of him who serves from inclination—who not only can execute what you command, but of himself find out many things that may be of use to you—who can deliberate, foresee, and assist you with good counsel—is infinitely of more value than many slaves? Now good economists tell us, it is right to purchase when things are most cheap; and we can scarcely recollect the time, at Athens, when a good friend might be had for such a pennyworth.”

“You are in the right,” said Diodorus; therefore you may bid Hermogenes come to me.”

“Not so neither,” returned Socrates; “for, since the benefit will be reciprocal, it seems; just as reasonable that you go to him, as he come to you.”

In consequence of this discourse, Diodorus went himself to Hermogenes, and, for a small consideration, secured a valuable friend, whose principal care was to approve his gratitude, and return the kindness shown him with many real services.

BOOK III.

I. We will now relate in what manner Socrates was useful to such of his friends as aimed at any honorable employment, by stirring them up to the attainment of that knowledge which alone could qualify them for discharging it properly.

Being told that one Dionysidorus was come to Athens, and there made public profession of teaching the military art, Socrates from thence took occasion to address the following discourse to a young man of his acquaintance, whom he knew at that very time soliciting for one of the principal posts in the army:—"Is it not," said he, "a most scandalous thing, for one who aims at commanding the forces of his country, to neglect an opportunity of gaining the instructions necessary for it? And does he not deserve to be more severely treated, than he who undertakes to form a statue without having learnt the statuary's art? In time of war, no less than the safety of the whole community is entrusted to the general: and it is in his power either to procure to it many and great advantages, by a prudent discharge of the duties of his station, or involve his country, through misconduct, in the very deepest distress; and therefore that man must be worthy of no small punishment, who while he is unwearied in his endeavors to obtain this honor, takes little or no thought about qualifying himself properly for executing a trust of such vast importance."

This reasoning wrought so powerfully upon the mind of the young man, that he immediately applied himself to the gaining of instruction.

And coming a little time after where Socrates was standing with others of his friends, Socrates, on his approach, said to them laughing, "You remember, sirs, that Homer, speaking of Agamemnon, styles him venerable. Do you not think our young man here has acquired new dignity, and looks far more

respectable, now he has learnt the art of commanding? For, as he who is a master of music, will be a master of music, though he touches no instrument; and he who has the skill of a physician, will be a physician, though not actually employed in the practice of his art: so, no doubt of it, this young man, now that he has gained the knowledge of a general, is incontestably a general, though he never should be chosen to command the army: whereas it would be to very little purpose for an ignorant pretender to get himself elected, since this could no more make a general of him, than it would make a man a physician, to call him one. But," continued Socrates, turning towards him, "since it may fall out that some of us may command a company, or a cohort under you, inform us, I pray you, with what point your master began his instructions, that we may not be altogether ignorant of the matter?"

"With the very same point with which he ended," replied the other; "the right ordering of an army, whether in marching, fighting, or encamping."

"Surely," answered Socrates, "this is out a small part of the office of a general: for he must likewise take care that none of the necessaries of war be wanting, and that his soldiers are supplied with everything needful, as well for their health as daily subsistence. He should be diligent, patient, fruitful in expedients, quick of apprehension, unwearied in labor, mildness and severity must each have their place in him: equally able to secure his own, and take away that which belongs to another. Open, yet reserved; rapacious, yet profuse; generous, yet avaricious; cautious, yet bold; besides many other talents, both natural and acquired, necessary for him who would discharge properly the duties of a good general. Yet I do not esteem the right disposition of an army a slight thing: on the contrary," said he, "nothing can be of so much importance; since, without order, no advantage can

arise from numbers any more than from stones, and bricks, and tiles, and timber, thrown together at random: but when these are disposed of in their proper places; when the stones and the tiles, as least perishable, are made use of for the foundation and covering; the bricks and timber, each likewise in their order; then we may see a regular edifice arising, which afterward becomes no inconsiderable part of our possessions."

"Your comparison," interrupted the other, "makes me recollect another circumstance, which we were told the general of an army ought to have regard to; and that is, to place the best of his soldiers in the front and in the rear: while those of a doubtful character being placed in the middle, may be animated by the one, and impelled by the other, to the performance of their duty."

"Your master then," said Socrates, "taught you how to know a good soldier from a bad one; otherwise this rule could be of no use: for if he ordered you, in the counting of money, to place the good at each end of the table, and that which was adulterated in the middle, without first instructing you by what means to distinguish them, I see not to what purpose his orders could be."

"I cannot say," replied the other; "but it is very sure my master did no such thing: we must therefore endeavor to find it out ourselves."

"Shall we consider this point then a little further," said Socrates, "that so we may the better avoid any mistake in this matter? Suppose," continued he, "the business was to seize some rich booty; should we not do well to place in the front, those whom we thought the most avaricious?"

"Certainly."

"But where the undertaking is attended with peril, there, surely, we should be careful to employ the most ambitious, the love of glory being sufficient to make men of this stamp

despise all danger: neither shall we be at a loss to find out these people; since they are always forward enough to make themselves known. But this master of yours," continued Socrates, "when he taught you the different ways of ranging your forces, taught you at the same time the different use you were to make of them."

"Not at all, I do assure you."

"And yet a different disposition of the army should be made, according as different occasions require."

"That may be," replied the other; "but he said not a word to me of the matter."

"Then return to him," said Socrates, "and question him concerning it; for if he is not either very ignorant, or very impudent, he mil be ashamed of having taken your money, and sent you away so little instructed."

II. Meeting with one who had been newly elected general, Socrates asked him, "Why has Agamemnon the title of pastor of the people given him by Homer? Must it not be for this reason, think you, that like as a shepherd looks carefully to the health of his flock, and provides them pasture; so he, who has the command of the army, should provide his soldiers with all things necessary; and procure those advantages to them for which they endure the hardships of war, conquest over their enemies, and to themselves more happiness? Why also does the same poet praise Agamemnon for being,

"Great in the war; and great in arts of sway," Pope.

but to show in him, that personal bravery, however remarkable, is not enough to constitute the general, without he animates his whole army with courage, and makes every single soldier brave? Neither," continued he, "can that prince be celebrated for the arts of sway, however successful he may be in regulating his domestic affairs, who does not cause felicity and abundance to be diffused throughout his whole

dominion. For kings are not elected that their cares should afterwards center in their own private prosperity; but to advance the happiness of those who elect them, are they called to the throne. As, therefore, the only motive for submitting to war, is the hope of rendering our future lives more secure and happy; and commanders are chosen for no other purpose, than to lead the way to this desirable end; it is the duty of a general to use his utmost endeavors not to disappoint the people therein: for, as to answer their expectations will bring to him the highest glory; so, to fail through misconduct, must be attended with the greatest shame."

We may here see, from what has been just said, that Socrates designed to give us his idea of a good prince; passing over every other consideration; confines it to him alone, who diligently promotes the happiness of his people.

III. Meeting at another time with a person who had been chosen general of the horse, Socrates said to him, "As I doubt not, my young man, your being able to give a good reason why you desired the command of the cavalry, I should be glad to hear it: for I cannot suppose you asked it only for an opportunity of riding before the rest of the army, as the archers on horseback must go before you: neither could it be, to make yourself the more taken notice of; for madmen will still have the advantage of you there. But your design, I conclude, was to reform the cavalry, in hopes of making them of more service to the republic."

"I did design this, most certainly."

"A noble intention!" replied Socrates, "if you can but accomplish it. But your station obliges you to have an eye to your horses, as well as men."

"Undoubtedly."

“Pray tell us then,” said Socrates, “what method you will take to get good horses?”

“O that,” answered the general, “belongs not to me: the rider himself must look to that particular.”

“Very well,” said Socrates. “But suppose you wanted to lead them on to charge the enemy: and you found some of them lame; and others so weak, from being half-starved, that they could not come up with the rest of the army: while others again were so restive and unruly, as to make it impossible to keep them in their ranks: of what use would such horses be to you? or you to the republic?”

“You are in the right,” said the other; “and I will certainly take care what sort of horses are in my troop.”

“And what sort of men too, I hope,” replied Socrates.

“Certainly.”

“Your first endeavor, I suppose then, will be, to make them mount their horses readily?”

“It shall,” said the other, “to the end they may stand a better chance to escape, if they are thrown off them.”

“You will likewise take care,” said Socrates, “to exercise them often: sometimes in one place, and sometimes in another; particularly there where it seems the most like to that in which you expect to meet the enemy, that your troops may be equally dexterous in all: for you cannot, I suppose, when going to engage, order your enemies to come and fight you on the plain, because there alone you were accustomed to exercise your army? You will likewise instruct them in throwing the dart: and if you would indeed make good soldiers, animate them with the love of glory, and resentment against their enemies: but, above all, be careful to establish your authority; since neither the strength of your horses, nor the dexterity of the riders, can be of much use to you without obedience?”

“I know it, Socrates: but what must I do to bring them to this obedience?”

“Have you not observed,” said Socrates, “that all men willingly submit to those whom they believe the most skillful; in sickness, to the best physician; in a storm, to the best pilot; and in agriculture, to him whom they consider as the best husbandman?”

“I have,” replied the other.

“If so, may we not well conclude, that he who is known to have the most skill in conducting the cavalry, will always find himself the most willingly obeyed?”

“But need I do no more than convince them of my superior abilities?”

“Yes; you must likewise convince them that both their glory and safety depend on their obedience.”

“But how shall I be able to convince them of this?

“With less trouble,” replied Socrates, “than you can prove to them it is better and more for their advantage to be vicious than virtuous.”

“But, at this rate, it will be necessary for a general to add the study of the art of speaking to all his other cares.”

“And do you imagine,” said Socrates, “he can discharge his office without speaking? It is by the medium of speech the laws are made known to us for the regulation of our conduct; and whatsoever is useful in any science, we become acquainted with it by the same means; the best method of instruction being in the way, of conversation: and he who is perfectly master of his subject will always be heard with the greatest applause. But have you never observed,” continued Socrates, “that, throughout all Greece, the Athenian youth bear away the prize in every contention, from those sent by any other republic? Even a chorus of music going from hence to Delos, exceeds, beyond all comparison, whatever appears

from any other places. Now the Athenians have not, naturally, voices more sweet, or bodies more strong, than those of other nations, but they are more ambitious of glory, which always impels to generous deeds and noble undertakings. Why, therefore, may not our cavalry be brought in time to excel any other; whether in the beauty of their horses and arms; whether in their discipline, order, and courage; were they but shown that conquest and glory would almost prove the infallible result of it?"

"I see not why, indeed," answered the other, "if we could but convince them this would be the event.

"Lose no time, then," said Socrates; "but go, excite your soldiers to the performance of their duty; that while you make them of use to you, they may likewise make you of some use to your country."

"I certainly shall make the attempt," replied the general.

IV. Seeing, at another time, Nichomachides return from the assembly of the people, where they had been choosing the magistrates, Socrates asked, whom they had fixed upon to command the army? "Could you have thought it!" said the other, "the Athenians, Socrates, paid no regard to me, who have spent my whole life in the exercise of arms! passed through every degree, from that of common sentinel to colonel of the horse, covered with these scars (showing them on his bosom), my whole strength wasted with fighting in defense of them! while Antisthenes, one who never served among the infantry, nor ever did anything remarkable among the horse, him they have elected, though all his merit seems to consist in being able to get money."

"No bad circumstance," replied Socrates; "we may hope, at least, to have our troops well paid."

“But a merchant can get money as well as Antisthenes; does it follow from thence that a merchant is a fit man to command an army?”

“You overlook, Nichomachides, that Antisthenes is likewise a lover of glory, and seeks to excel in whatever he undertakes;—a quality of some worth in the commander of an army. You know, whenever he led the chorus, he always took care to carry off the prize.”

“But, surely, there is some difference between commanding an army and ordering the chorus?”

“And yet,” replied Socrates, “Antisthenes has no great knowledge himself either in music or the laws of the theatre? but as he had penetration sufficient to find out those who excelled in them, you see how, by their assistance, he came off conqueror.”

“He must have somebody then to fight, and give out his orders, when at the head of his army?”

“Be that as it may,” returned Socrates, “it is certain that he who follows the counsel of such as are best skilled in any art, let it be war or music, or anything else, is pretty sure of surpassing all who are engaged in the same pursuit with him. Neither is it probable that he who so liberally expends his money, when the affair is no more than to amuse the people, and purchase a victory which only brings honor to himself and to his own tribe, will be more sparing when the point is to gain a conquest far more glorious over the enemies of his country, and in which the whole republic are equally concerned.”

“We are to conclude, then,” returned the other, “that he who knows how to preside properly at a public show, knows in like manner how to command an army.”

“It is certain,” said Socrates, “so much may be concluded, that he who has judgment enough to find out what things are best for him, and ability to procure them, can hardly fail of

success, whether his design be to direct the stage or govern the state,—manage his own house or command the army."

"Truly," replied Nichomachides, "I scarcely expected to hear from you, Socrates, that a good economist and a good commander was the same thing."

"Do you think so?" answered Socrates: "Let us inquire then if you please, into the duty of each; and see what agreement we can find between them. Is it not the business of them both to endeavor to make the people who are placed under them tractable and submissive?"

"It is."

"Must they not see that every person be employed in the business he is most proper for? Are they not, each of them, to punish those who do wrong, and reward those who do right? Must they not gain the love of the people who are placed under their authority, and procure to themselves as many friends as may be, to strengthen and stand by them in time of need? Should they not knowhow to secure their own? And, in short, should not each of them be diligent and unwearied in the performance of his duty?"

"So far," replied Nichomachides, "it may be as you say; but surely the comparison can scarcely hold, when the case is to engage an enemy."

"Why so?" said Socrates, "have they not each of them enemies to engage?"

"Certainly."

"And would it not be for the advantage of both, to get the better of these enemies?"

"No doubt of it, Socrates! But I still see not of what use economy can be to a general, when the hour is come for his soldiers to fall on."

“The very time,” said Socrates, “when it will be the most; for, as economy will show him his greatest gain must arise from conquest, his greatest loss from being overcome; he will for that reason be very careful not to take any one step whatsoever which may hazard a defeat; wisely declining an engagement while in want of anything; but equally ready to seize the hour, when, provided with all that is necessary, victory seems to him no longer doubtful. Thus you see of what use economy may be to a general: nor do you, Nichomachides, despise those who practice it, since the conduct of the state, and that of a private family, differ no otherwise than as greater and less; in everything else there is no small similarity. The business is with men in either case: neither do we know of one species of these, whereby to manage the affairs of government, and another for carrying on the common concerns of life; but the prince at the helm, and the head of his family, must serve themselves from the same mass. And, to complete the parallel, be assured, Nichomachides, that whoever has the skill to use these instruments properly, has also the best secret for succeeding in his design; whether his aim be to direct the state, or limit his care to the concerns of his own household; while he who is ignorant of this point must commit many errors, and of course meet with nothing but disappointments.”

V. Being in company with Pericles, son to the great Pericles, Socrates said to him,—”I hope, my young man, when you come to command the forces of the republic, the war may be carried on with more glory and success than we have lately known it.”

“I should be glad if it were so,” replied the other; “but how it is to be done I cannot easily see.”

“Shall we try,” said Socrates, “to get some light into this matter? You know the Bœotians are not more numerous than we.”

“I know they are not.”

“Neither are they stronger or more valiant.”

“They are not.”

“But the Bœotians, it may be, are more united among themselves?”

“So far from it,” said Pericles, “that the Bœotians hate the Thebans on account of their oppression; whereas we can have nothing of this sort in Athens.”

“But then we must own,” said Socrates, “that the Bœotians are not only the most courteous of all mankind, but the most ambitious; and they who are so, the love of glory and of their country, will impel to undertake any thing.”

“But I knew not,” replied Pericles, “that the Athenians are deficient in any of these particulars.”

“It must be acknowledged,” said Socrates, “if we look back to the actions of our forefathers, and consider either the luster or the number of their glorious deeds, no nation can exceed us: and having such examples, taken out too from among ourselves, they cannot but inflame our courage, and stir us up to' a love of valor and of virtue.”

“And yet you see,” answered Pericles, “how much the glory of the Athenian name is tarnished since the fatal defeat of Lubea, wherein Tolmides lost more than a thousand men; and that other at Delium, where Hippocrates was slain: for whereas, till then, the Bœotians feared to make head against us, though in defense of their own country; without the assistance of the Lacedæmonians and the rest of Peloponnesus, they now threaten to invade us, and that with their own forces only; while the Athenians, instead of ravaging, as formerly, Bœotia at pleasure, when not defended by foreign troops, are made to tremble in their turn, lest Attica itself should become the scene of slaughter.”

“The case,” said Socrates, “is, I fear, as you have stated it; but for that reason it seems to me, Pericles, the very time wherein to desire the command of our armies. It is of the nature of security to make men careless, effeminate, and ungovernable; while fear, on the contrary, awakens their diligence, renders them obedient, and reduces them to order. We may see this among our seamen. So long as they are under no apprehension of danger, they give themselves over to riot and disorder; but at the sight of a pirate, or the appearance of a storm, become immediately other men: not only diligent in performing whatever is commanded, but even watching, in silence, the master’s eye, ready to execute, as in a well-ordered chorus, whatever part he shall think proper to assign them.”

“Supposing,” replied Pericles, “the people of Athens were at present in such a state as might dispose them to obedience, what way shall we take to rouse them to an imitation of our ancestors, that, with their virtues, we may restore the happiness and the glory of the times they lived in?”

“Was it our desire,” answered Socrates, “to stir up any one to regain an inheritance now in the possession of another, what more should we need than to tell them it was theirs by long descent from their progenitors? If, therefore, Pericles, you wish our Athenians to hold the foremost rank among the virtuous, tell them it is their right, delivered down to them from the earliest ages; and that, so long as they are careful to maintain this pre-eminence in virtue, preeminence in power cannot fail to attend it. You would likewise do well to remind them, how highly the most ancient of their forefathers were esteemed and honored on account of their virtue.”

“You mean when, in the time of Cecrops, the people of Athens were chosen in preference to all others, to arbitrate in the dispute which had arisen among the gods?”

“I do,” said Socrates; “and I would have you go on, and relate to them the birth and the education of Erictheus, the wars in his time with all the neighboring nations; together with that undertaken in favor of the Heraclides against those of Peloponnesus. That also, in the days of Theseus, when our ancestors gained the reputation of surpassing all their contemporaries both in conduct and courage, ought not to be passed over. After which it may not be amiss to recall to their minds what the descendants of these heroes have performed in the ages just before us. Show them the time when, by their own strength alone, they made head against the man who lorded it over all Asia, and whose empire extended even into Europe itself, as far as Macedonia; inheriting from his forefathers a formidable army, as well as wide dominions, that had already made itself famous for many noble undertakings. Tell them at other times of the many victories, both by sea and land, when in league with the Lacedæmonians; men no less famous than themselves on the account of military courage: and, although innumerable have been the revolutions throughout the rest of Greece, whereby many have been compelled to change their habitations, show them the Athenians still in possession of their ancient territories; and not only so, but often made arbiters of the rights of other people, while the oppressed, on every side, have had recourse to them for protection.”

““When I think of these things, Socrates, I marvel by what means our republic has sunk so low.”

“I suppose,” replied Socrates, “the Athenians acted in this respect like men, who, seeing themselves exalted above the fear of a competitor, grow remiss, and neglect discipline, and become thereby more despicable than the people whom they once despised; for, no sooner had our virtue set us above the rest of our contemporaries but we sunk into sloth, which

ended, as you see, in a total degeneracy." But how shall we recover the luster of the ancient virtue?"

"Nothing more easy to point out," replied Socrates; "let but our people call to mind what were the virtues and discipline of their forefathers, and diligently endeavor to follow their example, and the glory of the Athenian name may rise again as high as ever! But, if this is too much for them, let them copy at least the people, whom, at present, they are compelled to consider as far above them: let them apply themselves with the same diligence to perform the same things, and let them not doubt of becoming again their equals: their superiors, if so be they will but surpass them in virtue."

"You speak, Socrates, as if you thought our Athenians at no little distance from it. And, indeed," continued Pericles, "when do we see them, as at Sparta, reverencing old age? Or, rather, do we not see them showing their contempt of it even in the person of a father? Can they be expected to imitate that republic in the exercises which render the body healthful, who make sport of those who do? Will people who even glory in despising their rulers, submit readily to their commands? Or will concord and unanimity subsist among men, who seek not to help, but injure one another, and bear more envy to their fellow-citizens than to any other of mankind? Our assemblies, both public and private, are full of quarrels and contentions, while we harass each other with perpetual suits at law; choosing by that means some trifling advantage, though with the ruin of our neighbor, rather than content ourselves with an honest gain, whereby each party might be equally profited. The magistrate's aim is altogether his own interest, as if the welfare of the community no way concerned him. Hence that eager contention for places and power, that ignorance and mutual hatred among those in the administration, that animosity and intrigue which prevail among private parties.

So that I fear, Socrates, lest the malady should rise to such a height, that Athens itself must, before long, sink under it."

"Be not afraid, Pericles, that the distemper is incurable. You see with what readiness and skill our people conduct themselves in all naval engagements: how regular in obeying those who preside over their exercises, lead the dance, or direct the chorus."

"I am sensible of this," said Pericles: "and hence, Socrates, is the wonder, that, being so complying on all such occasions, our soldiers, who ought to be the choice and flower of this very people, are so frequently disposed to mutiny and disobedience."

"The senate of the Areopagus," said Socrates, "is not this likewise composed of persons of the greatest worth?"

"Most certainly."

"Where else do we see judges who act in such conformity to the laws, and honor to themselves? Who determine with so much uprightness between man and man; or discharge, with such integrity, whatever business is brought before them?"

"I cannot reproach them," said Pericles, "with having failed in anything."

"Therefore, let us not give up our Athenians, Pericles, as a people altogether degenerate."

"Yet in war," replied Pericles, "where decency, order, and obedience, are more especially required, they seem to pay no regard to the command of their superiors."

"Perhaps," returned Socrates, "some part of the blame may belong to those who undertake to command them? You hardly know of any man, I believe, pretending to preside over a chorus, directing the dance, or giving rules to the athletics, while ignorant of the matter. They who take upon them to do any of these things, must tell you where, and by whom they were instructed in the art they now pretend to teach others;

whereas the greater part of our generals learn the first rudiments of war at the head of their armies. But I know, Pericles, you are not of that sort of men; but have made it your employment to study the military art; and have gone through all the exercises so necessary for a soldier. In the memorials of your father, that great man! I doubt not your having remarked, for your own advantage, many of those refined stratagems he made use of; and can show us many more of your own collecting. These you study: and to the end that nothing may be omitted by one who hopes to command our armies, when you find yourself either deficient or doubtful, you are not unwilling to own your ignorance; but seek out for such as you imagine more knowing; while neither courtesy of behavior, nor even gifts, are wanting, whereby to engage them to give you assistance."

"Ah, Socrates!" cried Pericles, interrupting him, "it is not that you think I have done these things, but wish me to do them, that you talk in this manner."

"It may be so," replied Socrates. "But to add a word or two more. You know," continued he, "that Attica is separated from Bœotia by a long chain of mountains, through which the roads are narrow and craggy; so that all access to our country from that side, is both difficult and dangerous."

"I know it," said Pericles.

"It has been told you too, I imagine, how the Mysians and Pisidians, having seized for themselves several considerable places, and a large tract of land, in the territories of the king of Persia, are able, from the advantages of their situation, not Only to secure their own liberty, but with their light-armed horse greatly annoy their enemies, by making perpetual inroads upon them?'

"Yes, I have heard this," replied the other. "Why then may it not be supposed," said Socrates, "that if we secured those

passes on the mountains which divide us from Bœotia, and sent there our youth properly armed for making incursions, we might in our turn give some annoyance to our enemies; while these mountains, as so many ramparts, secured us from their hostilities?"

"I agree with you," said Pericles, "this might turn to our advantage, and that all you have said has been much to the purpose."

"If you think so," replied Socrates, "and that my observations may be of service, you have nothing more to do than to carry them into execution. Should success be the consequence, you, my friend, will have the honor, and the republic much gain. If you fail through want of power, no great mischief can ensue; Athens will not be endangered; nor shall you, Pericles, incur either shame or reproach, for having engaged in such an undertaking."

VI. Glauco, the son of Aristo, was so strongly possessed with the desire of governing the republic, that, although not yet twenty, he was continually making orations to the people: neither was it in the power of his relations, however numerous, to prevent his exposing himself to ridicule; though sometimes they would drag him, by very force, from the tribunal. Socrates, who loved him on the account of Plato and Charmides, had alone the art to succeed with him. For meeting him, he said, "Your design then, Glauco, is to be at the very head of our republic?"

"It is so," replied the other.

"Believe me," said Socrates, "a noble aim! For, this once accomplished, and you become, as it were, absolute; you may then serve your friends, aggrandize your family, extend the limits of your country, and make yourself renowned, not only in Athens, but throughout all Greece; no, it may be, your fame will spread abroad among the most barbarous nations, like

another Themistocles: while admiration and applause attend wherever you go!" Socrates having thus fired the imagination of the young man, and secured himself a favorable hearing, went on: "But if your design is to receive honor from your country, you intend to be of use to it; for nothing but that can secure its applause."

"Undoubtedly," replied Glauco.

"Tell me then, I entreat you, what may be the first service you intend to render the republic?"

Glauco remaining silent, as not knowing what to answer: "I suppose," said Socrates, "you mean to enrich it? for that is generally the method we take, when we intend to aggrandize the family of some friend."

"This is indeed my design," returned the other.

"But the way to do this," said Socrates, "is to increase its revenues."

"It is so."

"Tell me then, I pray you, whence the revenues of the republic arise, and what they annually amount to; since I doubt not of your having diligently inquired into each particular, so as to be able to supply every deficiency; and, when one source fails, can easily have recourse to some other."

"I protest to you," said Glauco, "this is a point I never considered."

"Tell me then only its annual expenses; for I suppose you intend to retrench whatever appears superfluous?"

"I cannot say," replied Glauco, "that I have yet thought of this affair any more than of the other."

"We must postpone then our design of enriching the republic to another time," said Socrates: "for I see not how a

person can exert his endeavors to any purpose so long as he continues ignorant both of its income and expenses."

"Yet a state may be enriched by the spoils of its enemies."

"Assuredly," replied Socrates: "But, in order to this, its strength should be superior, otherwise it may be in danger of losing what it has already. He, therefore, who advises war, ought to be well acquainted not only with the forces of his own country, but those of the enemy; to the end, that if he finds superiority on his side, he may boldly persist in his first opinion, or recede in time, and dissuade the people from the hazardous undertaking."

"It is very true," returned the other.

"I pray you, then, tell me what are our forces by sea and land; and what the enemy's?"

"In truth, Socrates, I cannot pretend to tell you, at once, either one or the other."

"Possibly you may have a list of them in writing? If so, I should attend to your reading it with pleasure."

"No, nor this," replied Glauco, "for I have not yet begun to make any calculation of the matter."

"I perceive then," said Socrates, "we shall not make war in a short time; since an affair of such moment cannot be duly considered at the beginning of your administration. But I take it for granted," continued he, "that you have carefully attended to the guarding our coasts; and know where it is necessary to place garrisons; and what the number of soldiers to be employed for each: that while you are diligent to keep those complete which are of service to us, you may order such to be withdrawn as appear superfluous."

"It is my opinion," replied Glauco, "that every one of them should be taken away, since they only ravage the country they were appointed to defend."

“But what are we to do then,” said Socrates, “if our garrisons are taken away? How shall we prevent the enemy from overrunning Attica at pleasure? And who gave you this intelligence, that our guards discharge their duty in such a manner? Have you been among them?”

“No: but I much suspect it.”

“As soon then,” said Socrates, “as we can be thoroughly informed of the matter, and have not to proceed on conjecture only, we will speak of it to the senate.”

“Perhaps,” replied Glauco, “this may be the best way.”

“I can scarcely suppose,” continued Socrates, “that you have visited our silver mines so frequently, as to assign the cause why they have fallen off so much of late from their once flourishing condition?”

“I have not been at all there,” answered Glauco.

“They say, indeed,” answered Socrates, “that the air of those places is very unhealthy; and this may serve for your excuse, if the affair at any time should be brought under deliberation.”

“You rally me, Socrates, now,” said the other.

“However,” said Socrates, “I question not but you can easily tell us how much corn our country produces; how long it will serve the city; and what more may be wanted to carry us through the year, that so you may be able to give out your orders in time; that scarcity and want may not come upon us unawares.”

“The man,” replied Glauco, “will have no little business on his hands, who pretends to take care of such a variety of things.”

“Yet so it must be, Glauco,” said Socrates: “you see even here, in our own private families, it is impossible for the master to discharge the duties of his station properly, unless

he not only inquires out what is necessary for those who belong to him, but exerts his utmost endeavors to supply whatever is wanted. In the city there are more than ten thousand of these families to provide for; and it is difficult to bestow upon them, at one and the same time, that attention and care which is necessary for each of them. I therefore think you had better have given the first proof of your abilities in restoring the broken fortunes of one in your own family, from whence, if succeeding, you might afterwards have gone on to better those of the whole community; or finding yourself unable to do the one, thought no longer of the other; for surely the absurdity of the man is most apparent, who knowing himself not able to raise fifty pound weight, shall nevertheless attempt the carrying of five thousand."

"But I make no doubt," replied Glauco, "of my having been able to have served my uncle, and that very considerably, if he would have followed my advice."

"Alas!" returned Socrates, "if you could not to this hour prevail on so near a relation as your uncle to follow your counsel, how can you hope that all Athens, this very man too among others, should submit to your direction? Beware then, Glauco; beware lest a too eager desire of glory should terminate in shame. Consider how much they hazard who undertake things, and talk on subjects of which they are ignorant. Call to mind those of your acquaintance who have thus talked and thus done, and see whether the purchase they made for themselves had not more of censure than applause in it; of contempt than admiration. Consider, on the other hand, with what credit they appear, who have made themselves masters of the point in question: and when you have done this, I doubt not your seeing that approbation and glory are alone the attendants of capacity and true merit; while contempt and shame are the sure reward of ignorance and temerity. If, therefore, you desire to be admired and

esteemed by your country beyond all others, you must exceed all others in the knowledge of those things which you are ambitious of undertaking: and thus qualified, I shall not scruple to insure your success, whenever you may think proper to preside over the commonwealth."

VII. On the other hand, having observed that Charmides, the son of Glauco, and uncle to the young man of whom we have been speaking, industriously declined any office in the government, though otherwise a man of sense, and far greater abilities than many who at that time were employed in the administration; Socrates said to him, "I pray you, Charmides, what is your opinion of one, who being able to win the prize at the Olympic games, and thereby gain honor to himself and glory to his country, shall nevertheless, decline to make one among the combatants?"

"I should certainly look upon him," said Charmides, "as a very effeminate and mean-spirited man."

"And suppose there may be one who has it in his power, by the wisdom of his counsels, to augment the grandeur of the republic, and raise at the same time his own name to no common pitch of glory, yet timorously refusing to engage in business; should not this man be deemed a coward?"

"I believe he should," replied Charmides: "but wherefore this question to me?"

"Because," said Socrates, "you seem to be this very man; since, able as you are, you avoid all employment; though, as citizen of Athens, you are certainly a member of the commonwealth, and, consequently, ought to take some share in serving it."

"But on what do you ground your opinion of my ability?"

"I never once doubted it," said Socrates, "since I once saw you in conference with some of our leading men: for, when they imparted any of their designs to you, you not only

counseled what was best to be done, but expostulated freely and judiciously, when you thought they were mistaken."

"But surely there is some difference," said Charmides, "between discoursing in private and pleading your own cause before a full assembly."

"And yet," said Socrates, "a good arithmetician will not calculate with less exactness before a multitude than when alone: and he, who is a master of music, not only excels while in his own chamber, but leads the concert with applause in presence of the full audience."

"But you know, Socrates, the bashfulness and timidity nature has implanted, operates far more powerfully in us when before a large assembly, than in a private conversation."

"And is it possible," said Socrates, "that you, who are under no sort of concern when you speak to men who are in power, and men who have understanding, should stand in awe of such as are possessed of neither? For, after all, Charmides, who are the people you are most afraid of? Is it the masons, the shoemakers, the fullers, the laborers, the retailers? Yet these are the men who compose our assemblies. But to converse thus at your ease, before people who hold the highest rank in the administration, (some of them, perhaps, not holding you in the highest estimation,) and yet suffer yourself to be intimidated by those who know nothing of the business of the state, neither can be supposed at all likely to despise you, is, certainly, no other than if he, who was perfectly well skilled in the art of fencing, should be afraid of one who never handled a file. But you fear their laughing at you?"

"And do they not often laugh at our very best speakers?"

"They do," replied Socrates; "and so do the others—those great men whom you converse with daily. I therefore the rather marvel, Charmides, that you who have spirit and eloquence sufficient to reduce even these last to reason,

should stand in awe of such stingless ridiculers! But endeavor, my friend, to know yourself better; and be not of the number of those who turn all their thoughts to the affairs of others, and are, the meanwhile, utter strangers at home. Be acquainted with your own talents, and lose no occasion of exerting them in the service of your country; and make Athens, if it may be, more flourishing than it is at present. The returns they bring will be glorious! Neither is it the commonwealth alone that shall be advantaged by them; yourself, Charmides, and your best friends, shall share the benefit."

VIII. Aristippus being desirous to retaliate in kind for having been formerly put to silence by Socrates, proposed a question in so artful a manner, as he doubted not would pose him. Socrates, however, was at no loss for an answer; though regardful rather of the improvement of his hearers than the ordering of his speech. The question was, "If he knew anything that was good?"

Now, had it been said of food, money, health, strength, courage, or anything else of the like nature, that they were good, Aristippus could with ease have demonstrated the contrary, and shown that each, and all of them, were often evil: but Socrates was better provided with a reply; for, knowing with what eagerness we wish to be relieved from whatever molests us—"What," said he, "Aristippus, do you ask me if I know anything good for a fever?"

"No, not so," returned the other.

"For an inflammation in the eye?"

"Nor that, Socrates."

"Do you mean anything good against a famine?"

"No, nor against a famine."

"No, then," replied Socrates, "if you ask me concerning a good, which is good for nothing, I know of none such; nor yet

desire it." Aristippus still urging him: "But do you know," said he, "anything beautiful?"

"A great many," returned Socrates.

"Are these all like one another?"

"Far from it, Aristippus: there is a very considerable difference between them."

"But how can beauty differ from beauty?"

"We want not many examples of it," replied Socrates; "for the same disposition of the body which is beautiful in him who runs, is not beautiful in the wrestler; and while the beauty of the shield is to cover him well who wears it, that of the dart is to be swift and piercing."

"But you return," said Aristippus, "the same answer to this question as you did to the former."

"And why not, Aristippus? for do you suppose there can be any difference between beautiful and good? Know you not, that whatever is beautiful, is, for the same reason, good? And we cannot say of anything,—of virtue, for example,—that on this occasion it is good, and on the other, beautiful. Likewise, in describing the virtuous character, say we not of it, "It is fair and good?" Even the bodies of men are said to be fair and good, with respect to the same purposes: and the same we declare of whatever else we meet with, when suited to the use for which it was intended."

"You would, perhaps, then call a dung-cart beautiful?"

"I would," said Socrates, "if made proper for the purpose; as I would call the shield ugly, though made of gold, that answered not the end for which it was designed."

"Possibly you will say too," returned Aristippus, "that the same thing is both handsome and ugly."

"In truth, I will," said Socrates; "and I will go still further, and add, that the same thing may be both good and evil: for I

can easily suppose, that which is good in the case of hunger, may be evil in a fever; since what would prove a cure for the one, will certainly increase the malignity of other; and in the same manner will beauty, in the wrestler, change to deformity in him who runs. For whatsoever, continued he, "is suited to the end intended, with respect to that end it is good and fair; and, contrariwise, must be deemed evil and deformed, when it defeats the purpose it was designed to promote."

Thus, when Socrates said that "beautiful houses were ever the most convenient," he showed us plainly in what manner we ought to build. To this end he would ask, "Does not the man who builds a house intend, principally, the making it useful and pleasant?"

This being granted, Socrates went on: "But to make a house pleasant, it should be cool in summer and warm in winter." This also was acknowledged. "Then," said he, "the building which looks towards the south will best serve this purpose: for the sun, which by that means enters and warms the rooms in winter, will, in summer, pass over its roof. For the same reason, these houses ought to be carried up to a considerable height, the better to admit the winter sun; while those to the north should be left much lower, that they may not be exposed to the bleak winds which blow from that quarter: for in short," continued Socrates, "that house is to be regarded as beautiful, where a man may pass pleasantly every season of the year, and lodge with security whatever belongs to him." As for paintings, and other ornaments, he thought they rather impair than improve our happiness.

With regard to temples and altars, Socrates thought the places best fitted for these were such as lay at some distance from the city, and were open to the view; for, when withheld from them, we should pray with more ardor, while in sight of those sacred edifices; and being sequestered from the resort

of men, holy souls would approach them with more piety and devotion.

IX. Socrates being once asked, “Whether he took courage to be an acquisition of our own, or the gift of Nature?”

“I think,” said he, “that, as in bodies some are more strong, and better able to bear fatigue than others; even so, among minds, may be discerned the same difference; some of these, being by Nature endued with more fortitude, are able to face dangers with greater resolution. For we may observe,” continued he, “that all who live under the same laws, and follow the same customs, are not equally valiant. Nevertheless, I doubt not but education and instruction may give strength to that gift Nature has bestowed on us: for, from hence it is we see the Thracians and the Scythians fearing to meet the Spartans with their long pikes and large bucklers; while, on the contrary, the Spartans are not less afraid of the Scythians with their bows, or of the Thracians with their small shields and short javelins. The same difference is likewise observable in every other instance; and so far as any man exceeds another in natural endowments, so may he, proportionally, by exercise and meditation, make a swifter progress towards perfection. From whence it follows, that not only the man to whom Nature has been less kind, but likewise he whom she has endowed the most liberally, ought constantly to apply himself, with care and assiduity, to whatsoever it may be he wishes to excel in.”

Socrates made no distinction between wisdom and a virtuous temperament; for he judged, that he who so discerned what things were laudable and good, as to choose them, what evil and base, as to avoid them, was both wise and virtuously tempered. And being asked, “Whether those persons who knew their duty but acted contrary to it, were wise and virtuously tempered?” his answer was, “that they ought rather to be ranked among the ignorant and foolish; for

that all men whatever do those particular things, which having first selected out of the various things possible, they imagine to be well for their interest. I am of opinion, therefore," added Socrates, "that those who do not act right, are, for that very reason, neither wise nor virtuously tempered."

Agreeable to this, Socrates would often say, "That justice, together with every other virtue, was wisdom; for that all their actions being fair and good, must be preferred as such by all who were possessed of a right discernment; but ignorance and folly could perform nothing fair and good; because, if attempted, it would miscarry in their hands. Whence it follows, that as whatever is just and fair must be the result of sound wisdom; and as nothing can be fair and just where virtue is wanting; therefore, justice, and every other virtue, is wisdom."

And although Socrates asserted that madness was the very reverse of wisdom, yet did he not account all ignorance madness. But for a man to be ignorant of himself, and erect those things into matters of opinion, belief, or judgment, with which he was totally unacquainted, this he accounted a disorder of the mind bordering on madness. He further said, that "the vulgar never deemed any one mad, for not knowing what was not commonly known; but to be deceived in things wherein no other is deceived, as when he thinks himself too tall to pass upright through the gates of the city, or so strong as to carry the house on his shoulders, in these, and such like cases, they say at once, 'the man is mad;' but pass over, unnoticed, mistakes that are less striking. For, as they only give the name of love to that which is the very excess of the passion, so they confine their idea of madness to the very highest pitch of disorder that can possibly arise in the human mind."

Considering the nature of envy, he said, "It was a grief of mind which did not arise from the prosperity of an enemy, or

the misfortunes of a friend; but it was the happiness of the last the envious man mourned at." And when it seemed strange that any one should grieve at the happiness of his friend, Socrates showed them, "It was no uncommon thing for the mind of man to be so fantastically disposed, as not to be able to bear either the pains or the pleasures of another; but that while it spared for no labor to remove the first, it would sicken and repine on seeing the other: but this," he said, "was only the punishment of minds ill-formed: the generous soul was above such weaknesses."

As to idleness, Socrates said he had observed very few who had not some employment; for the man who spends his time at the dice, or in playing the buffoon to make others laugh, may be said to do something: but, with Socrates, these, and such as these, were in reality no better than idlers, since they might employ themselves so much more usefully. He added, that no one thought himself at leisure to quit a good occupation for one that was otherwise: if he did, he was so much less excusable, as he could not plead the want of employment.

Socrates likewise observed, that a scepter in the hand could not make a king; neither were they rulers in whose favor the lot or the voice of the people had decided, or who by force or fraud had secured their election, unless they understood the art of governing. And although he would readily allow it not less the province of the prince to command, than the subjects to obey, yet he would afterwards demonstrate, that the most skillful pilot would always steer the ship; the master, no less than the mariners, submitting to his direction. "The owner of the farm left the management of it," he said, "to the servant whom he thought better acquainted than himself with the affairs of agriculture. The sick man sought the advice of the physician; and he, who engaged in bodily exercises, the instructions of those who had most experience. And whatever

there may be," continued Socrates, "requiring either skill or industry to perform it, when the man is able, he does it himself; but if not, he has recourse, if prudent, to the assistance of others, since in the management of the distaff a woman may be his instructor: neither will he content himself with what he can have at hand; but inquire out with care for whoever can best serve him."

It being said by some present, "that an arbitrary prince was under no obligation to obey good counsel."

"And why so," replied Socrates; "must not he himself pay the penalty of not doing it? Whoever rejects good counsel commits a crime; and no crime can pass unpunished." It being further said, "That an arbitrary prince was at liberty to rid himself even of his ablest ministers."

"He may," returned Socrates: "but do you suppose it no punishment to lose his best supports? or think you it but a slight one? For, which would this be; to establish him in his power, or the most sure way to hasten his destruction?"

Socrates being asked, "What study was the most eligible and best for man?" answered, "To do well." And being asked by the same person, "If good fortune was the effect of study?"

"So far from it," returned Socrates, "that I look upon good fortune and study as two things entirely opposite to each other: for that is good fortune, to find what we want, without any previous care or inquiry: while the success which is the effect of study, must always be preceded by long searching and much labor, and is what I call doing well: and I think," added Socrates, "that he who diligently applies himself to this study, cannot fail of success; at the same time that he is securing to himself the favor of the gods and the esteem of men. They, likewise, most commonly excel all others in agriculture, medicine, the business of the state, or whatever else they may engage in; whereas they who will take no pains,

neither can know anything perfectly, or do anything well, they please not the gods, and are of no use to man."

X. But all the conversations of Socrates were improving. Even to the artists while engaged in their several employments, he had always somewhat to say which might prove instructive. Being on a time in the shop of Parrhasius the painter, he asked him, "Is not painting, Parrhasius, a representation of what we see? By the help of canvass and a few colors, you can easily set before us hills and caves, light and shade, straight and crooked, rough and plain, and bestow youth and age where and when it best pleases you: and when you would give us perfect beauty, (not being able to find in any one person what answers your idea,) you copy from many what is beautiful in each, in order to produce this perfect form."

"We do so," replied Parrhasius.

"But can you show us, Parrhasius, what is still more charming,—a mind that is gentle, amiable, affable, friendly? Or is this inimitable?'

"And how should it be otherwise than inimitable, Socrates, when it has neither color, proportion, nor any of the qualities of those things you mentioned, whereby it might be brought within the power of the pencil? In short, when it is by no means visible?"

"Are men ever observed to regard each other with looks of kindness or hostility?'

"Nothing more frequently observed," replied Parrhasius.

"The eyes, then, discover to us something?"

"Most undoubtedly."

"And, in the prosperity or adversity of friends, is the countenance of him who is anxiously solicitous, the same with theirs who are indifferent about the matter?

“Far otherwise, Socrates: for he who is solicitous, has a countenance all cheerfulness and joy, on the prosperity of a friend; pensive and dejected, when this friend is in affliction?”

“And can this also be represented?”

“Certainly.”

“Likewise, where there is anything noble and liberal; or illiberal and mean; honest, prudent, modest; bold, insolent, or sordid; are any of these to be discovered in the countenance and demeanor of a man, when he sits, stands, or is in motion?”

“It may.”

“And imitated?”

“Imitated, no doubt of it.”

“And which yields the most pleasure, Parrhasius—the portrait of him on whose countenance the characters of whatever is good, virtuous, and amiable, are impressed; or his, who wears in his face all the marks of a base, evil, and hateful disposition?”

“Truly,” returned Parrhasius, “the difference is too great, Socrates, to admit of any comparison.”

Entering another time into the shop of Clito the statuary, he said to him: “I marvel not, Clito, at your being able to mark out to us even the difference between the racer and the wrestler, the pancratiast and gladiator; but your statues are very men! Tell me, I pray, by what means you effect this?”

Clito hesitating, as at a loss how to reply; Socrates went on: “But, perhaps, you are particularly careful to imitate persons who are living; and that is the reason why your statues are so much alive?”

“It is,” returned Clito.

“Then you have certainly remarked, and that with no little exactness, the natural disposition of all the parts, in all the

different postures of the body: for, while some of these are extended, others remain bent; when that is raised above its natural height, this sinks below it; these are relaxed, and those again contracted, to give the greater force to the meditated blow; and the more these sort of things are attended to, the nearer you approach to human life."

"You are right, Socrates."

"But it undoubtedly gives us the greatest pleasure, when we see the passions of men, as well as their actions, represented?"

"Undoubtedly."

"Then the countenance of the combatant going to engage the enemy, must be menacing and full of fire; that of the conqueror, all complacency and joy?"

"They must."

"Therefore," concluded Socrates, "he will ever be deemed the best sculptor, whose statues best express the inward workings of the mind." Socrates entering the shop of Pistias the armorer, was shown some corslets that were thought well made.

"I cannot but admire," said Socrates, "the contrivance of those things which so well cover that part of the body which most wants defending, and yet leave the hands and arms at liberty. But tell us, Pistias, why you sell your armor so much dearer than any other, when it is neither better tempered, stronger, nor the materials of it more costly?"

"I make it better proportioned," said Pistias; "and therefore I ought to have a better price."

"But how are we to find out this proportion, Pistias? Not by weight or measure: for as you make for different people, the weight and the size must likewise differ, or they will not fit."

“We must make them to fit,” said Pistias; otherwise the armor would be of little use.”

“And are you aware that all bodies are not justly proportioned?”

“I am.”

“How can you make a well-proportioned suit of arms for an ill-proportioned body?”

“I make it fit; and what fits is well-proportioned.”

“Then you are of opinion, that when we declare anything well-proportioned, it must be in reference to the use for which it was intended: at when we say of this shield, or this cloak, it is well-proportioned, for it fits the person for whom it was made? But I think,” added Socrates, “there is still another advantage, and that no small one, in having arms made to fit the wearer.”

“Pray, what is that?”

“Armor which fits,” replied Socrates, “does not load the wearer so much as that which is ill made, although the weight may be the same: for that which does not fit hangs altogether upon the shoulders, or bears hard upon some other part of the body; and becomes, thereby, almost insupportable; whereas the weight of that which is well made, falls equally on all the shoulders, breast, back, loins;—and is worn with ease, not carried as a burden.”

“It is for this very same reason,” said Pistias, “that I set such a value on those I make: nevertheless, Socrates, there are who pay more regard to the gilding and carving of their arms than to any other matter.”

“And yet,” answered Socrates, “these people will make but a bad bargain with all their gilding and various colors, if they buy such arms as do not sit easy. But,” continued Socrates, “since the position of the body is not always the same, being

sometimes stooping and sometimes erect, how can the arms, that are made with such exactness, be at all times easy?"

"Neither can they," replied the other.

"You think then, Pistias, the arms which are well made are not those which are exact, or sit close to the body, but give the least trouble to him who wears them?"

"You think so," said Pistias; "and have certainly taken the matter right."

XI. There was a courtesan at Athens, called Theodota, of great fame on the account of her many lovers. It being mentioned in company that her beauty surpassed all description, that painters came from all parts to draw her picture, and that one was now gone to her lodgings for that very purpose,—"We should do well," said Socrates, "to go ourselves and see this wonder, for we may then speak with more certainty when we speak from our own knowledge, and do not depend on the report of others."

The person who first mentioned this seconding the proposal, they went that instant to the lodgings of Theodota, and found her, as was said, sitting for her picture. The painter being gone, Socrates said to those who came along with him: "What say you, sirs, which of the two ought to think themselves the most obliged: we to Theodota, for the sight of so much beauty; or she to us, for coming to see it? Now, if the advantages of showing herself are found to be altogether on her side, then certainly is she indebted to us for this visit: if otherwise, indeed, we must thank her." The reasonableness of what was said being assented to by the rest, Socrates proceeded—"The praises we bestow at present, ought not even these to be had in some estimation by Theodota? But when we come to blaze abroad the fame of her beauty, what manifold advantages may not arise to her from it! while all our gain from the sight of so many charms can terminate in

nothing but fruitless longing! We take our leave with hearts full of love and anxiety, and are henceforth no other than so many slaves to Theodota, with whom she has no more to do than to show them her pleasure!"

"If this is the case," replied Theodota, "I am to thank you for coming to see me."

Socrates, during this conversation, had observed how sumptuously she was adorned, and that her mother was the same; her attendants, of whom there was no small number expensively clothed, and all the furniture of her apartment elegant and costly: he therefore took occasion from thence to ask her concerning her estate in the country; adding, it must of necessity be very considerable?

Being answered, "she had not any."

"You have houses then," said he, "in the city, and they yield you a good income?"

"No, nor houses, Socrates."

"You have certainly many slaves, then, Theodota, who by the labor of their hands supply you with these riches?"

"So far," replied Theodota, "from having many, that I have not one."

"But whence then," said Socrates, "can all this come?"

"From my friends," returned Theodota.

"A fair possession, truly!" replied Socrates; "and a herd of friends we find to be a far better thing than a flock of sheep or a herd of cattle. But tell me, pray, do you trust fortune to bring these friends home to you, as flies fall by chance into the spider's web, or do you employ some art to draw them in?"

"But where, Socrates, shall I be furnished with this art?"

"You may procure it," said Socrates, "with far greater ease than the spider her web. You see how this little animal, who

lives only upon her prey, hangs her nets in the air, in order to entangle it?"

"You advise me, then, to weave some artificial nets," said Theodota, "in order to catch friends?"

"Not so neither," returned Socrates; "it is necessary to go a little less openly to work in a pursuit of such importance. You see what various arts are employed by men to hunt down hares, which, after all, are of little value. As these are known to feed chiefly in the night, they provide dogs to find them out at that season: and as they lie concealed in the day, the sharp-scented hound is employed to trace them up to their very forms: being swift of foot, the greyhound is let loose upon them, as more swift of foot than they; and, lest all this should not be sufficient for the purpose, they spread nets in the paths to catch and entangle them."

"Very well," replied Theodota; "but what art shall I make use of to catch friends?"

"Instead of the hunter's dog," said Socrates, "you must set somebody to find out those who are rich and well-pleased with beauty, whom afterwards they shall force into your toils."

"And what are my toils?" replied Theodota.

"You are certainly mistress of many," said Socrates, "and those not a little entangling. What think you of that form of yours, Theodota, accompanied as it is with a wit so piercing, as shows you at once what will be most for your advantage? It is this which directs the glance, tunes the tongue, and supplies it with all the shows of courtesy and kindness. It is this which teaches you to receive with transport him who assiduously courts your favor, and scorn such as show you no regard.

If your friend is sick, you spare for no pains in your attendance upon him: you rejoice in all his joy, and give every proof of having bestowed your heart on him who seems to have

given his to you. In short, I make no doubt of your being well versed in all the arts of allurement, and dare venture to say, the friends you have, if true, were not gained by compliments, but substantial proofs of kindness."

"But," said Theodota, "I never practice any of the arts you mention."

"And yet," answered Socrates, "some management is necessary, since a friend is a sort of prey that is neither to be caught nor kept by force; a creature no otherwise to be taken and tamed, but by showing it kindness, and communicating to it pleasure."

"You say right, Socrates; but why will you not help me to gain friends?"

"And so I will," said Socrates, if you can find out how to persuade me to it."

"But what way must I take to persuade you?"

"Do you ask that?" returned Socrates: "You will find out the way, Theodota, if you want my assistance."

"Then come to me often."

Socrates, still joking with her, said laughing:—"But it is not so easy for me to find leisure: I have much business both in public and private, and have my friends too, as well as you, who will not suffer me to be absent night or day, but employ against me the very charms and incantations that I formerly taught them."

"You are then acquainted with those things?"

"Verily!" returned Socrates; "for what else can you suppose, Theodota, engaged Apollodorus and Antisthenes to be always with me? Or Cebes and Simmias to leave Thebes for my company, but the charms I speak of?"

"Communicate these charms to me," said Theodota, "and the first proof of their power shall be upon you."

“But I would not be attracted to you, Theodota; I would rather you should come to me.”

“Give me but a favorable reception,” said Theodota, “and I will certainly come.”

“So I will,” replied Socrates, “provided I have then no one with me whom I love better.”

XII. Socrates having taken notice how very awkward Epigenes, one of his followers, was in all his actions, and that he was moreover of a sickly constitution, both which he attributed to a neglect of those exercises which make so large a part of a liberal education, he reproved him for it, saying, “How unbecoming it was in him to go on in such a manner!” Epigenes only answered, “He was under no obligation to do otherwise.”

“At least as much,” replied Socrates, “as he who has to prepare for Olympia. Or do you suppose it, Epigenes, a thing of less consequence to fight for your life against the enemies of your country, whenever it shall please our Athenians to command your service, than to contend for a prize at the Olympic games? How many do we see, who, through feebleness and want of strength, lose their lives in battle; or, what is still worse, save themselves by some dishonorable means! How many fall alive into the enemy’s hand, endure slavery of the most grievous kind for the remainder of their days, unless redeemed from it by the ruin of their families! While a third procures himself an evil fame; and the charge of cowardice is given to imbecility. But, perhaps, Epigenes, you despise all the ills which attend on bad health, or account them as evils that may easily be borne?”

“Truly,” replied the other, “I think them rather to be chosen, than so much fatigue and labor for the purchase of a little health.”

“It may be, then,” answered Socrates, “you equally contemn all the advantages arising from a contrary complexion; yet, to me, they seem to be many and great; since he who is possessed of a good constitution, is healthful, strong, and hardy, and may acquit himself with honor on every occasion. By the means of this he often escapes all the dangers of war; he can assist his friends, do much service to his country, and is sure of being well received wherever he shall go. His name becomes illustrious: he makes his way to the highest offices; passes the decline of life in tranquility and honor; and leaves to his children the fair inheritance of a good example. Neither ought we to neglect the benefits arising from military exercises, though we may not be called upon to perform them in public, since we shall find ourselves not the less fitted for whatever we may engage in, from having a constitution healthful and vigorous: and as the body must bear its part, it imports us much to have it in good order; for who knows not,” continued Socrates, “that even there—where it seems to have least to do—who knows not how much the mind is retarded in its pursuits after knowledge, through indisposition of the body; so that forgetfulness, melancholy, fretfulness, and even madness itself, shall sometimes be the consequence, so far as to destroy even the very traces of all we have ever learned. But he whose constitution is rightly tempered, need fear none of these evils; and, therefore, he who has a just discernment will choose with pleasure whatever may best secure him from them. Neither does an inconsiderable shame belong to the man who suffers himself to sink into old age, without exerting to the utmost those faculties nature has bestowed on him; and trying how far they will carry him towards that perfection, which laziness and despondence can never attain to; for dexterity and strength are not produced spontaneously.”

XIII. A certain man being angry with another for not returning his salutation, Socrates asked, “Why was he not

enraged when he met one who had less health than himself, since it would not be more ridiculous, than to be angry with one who was less civil?"

Another bemoaning himself because he could not relish his food; "There is an excellent remedy for this complaint," answered Socrates; "fast often. By this means you will not only eat more pleasantly, but likewise better your health, and save your money."

Another complaining that the water which ran by his house was too warm to drink; "You are lucky, however," said Socrates, "in having a bath thus ready prepared for you."

"But it is too cold to bathe in," replied the other.

"Do your domestics complain of it when they drink or bathe?"

"So far from it," answered the man, "that it is often my wonder to see with what pleasure they use it for both these purposes."

"Which do you account," said Socrates, "the warmest; this water you speak of, or that in the temple of Æsclepius?"

"O! that in the temple," replied the other.

"And how is it," said Socrates, "that you do not perceive yourself more froward and harder to please, not only than your own servants, but even people who are sick?"

Socrates seeing one beat his servant immoderately, asked him, "What offence the man had committed?"

"I beat him," replied the other, "because he is not only a drunkard and a glutton, but avaricious and idle."

"You do well," said Socrates; "but judge for yourself which deserves the most stripes, your servant, or you?"

Another dreading the length of the way to Olympia; Socrates asked him, "What he was afraid of? For is it not your custom," said he, "to walk up and down in your own chamber,

almost the whole day? You need therefore but fancy you are taking your usual exercise between breakfast and dinner, and dinner and supper, and you will find yourself, without much fatigue, at the end of your journey; for you certainly walk more in five or six days, than is sufficient to carry you from Athens to Olympia. And as it is pleasanter to have a day to spare, than to want one, delay not, I advise you; but set out in time, and let your haste appear, not at the end, but the beginning of your journey."

A certain person complaining of being tired with travelling, Socrates asked, "If he had carried anything?"

"Nothing but my cloak," replied the other.

"Were you alone?" said Socrates.

"No; my servant went along with me."

"And did he carry anything?"

"Yes, certainly, he carried all I wanted."

"And how did he bear the journey?"

"Much better than I."

"What, if you had carried the burden; how then?"

"I could not have done it," replied the other.

"What a shame," said Socrates, "for a man who has gone through all his exercises not to be able to bear as much fatigue as his servant!"

XIV. It being generally the custom, when they met together, for everyone to bring his own supper; Socrates observed, that while some of them took such care of themselves, as to have more than was sufficient; others were compelled to be content with less. He, therefore, so ordered the matter, that the small portion of him who brought little should be offered about to all the company in such a manner, that no one could, civilly, refuse to partake of it; nor exempt himself from doing the like with what he brought: by which means a greater equality was

preserved among them. There was also this further advantage arising from it the expenses of the table were considerably abridged: for when they saw, that whatever delicacy they brought thither, the whole company would have their share of it, few chose to be at the cost to procure it: and thus luxury was in some degree put a stop to in these entertainments.

Having observed at one of these meetings, a young man who ate his meat without any bread; and the discourse turning at that time on the cause why this or that person had procured to themselves some particular appellation.

"Can you tell me, sirs," said Socrates, "why they call a man a gormandizer, since not one of us here but takes part of whatever is set before him; and therefore we cannot suppose this to be the reason?"

"I suppose it cannot," replied one of the company.

"But," continued Socrates, "when we see any one greedily swallowing down his meat without mixing any bread with it, may we not call this man a gormandizer? For, if otherwise, I know not where we shall meet with one." And being asked by another who was present, What he thought of him who ate a little bread to a great deal of meat? "The same," answered Socrates, "as I did of the other; and while the rest of mankind supplicate the gods to find them plenty of corn, these men must pay for an abundance of the well-mixed ragout."

The young man whom this discourse glanced at, suspecting it was meant for him, thought proper to take a little bread, but, at the same time continued to cram down his meat as formerly; which Socrates observing, called to one who sat near him, to take notice "whether his neighbor ate his meat for the sake of the bread, or his bread for the sake of the meat."

At another time, seeing a person dip a piece of bread into several different sauces, Socrates asked—"Whether it was possible to make a sauce so costly, and at the same time so

little good as this person had made for himself? For, as it consisted of a greater variety, there could be no doubt of its costing more; and as he had mixed such things together as no cook ever once thought of, who could doubt his having spoiled all? Besides," said Socrates, "what folly to be curious in searching after cooks, if a man is to undo at once all they have done for us!" Moreover, he who is accustomed to indulge in variety, will feel dissatisfied when not in his power to procure it; but the man who generally restrains himself to one dish, will rise well satisfied from every table. He used also to say, that the compound verb, which in the Attic dialect signified to feast, or fare well, meant to eat; and that the term well was added to express the eating in such a manner as neither to disorder the body nor oppress the mind; and with such plainness that the food could not be difficult to come at: so that this Attic verb was only applicable to such persons as ate with decency and temperance, and agreeably to the nature of social rational beings.

BOOK IV.

I. In this manner would Socrates make himself useful to all sorts of men, of whatsoever employment. Indeed no one can doubt the advantages arising from his conversation, to those who associated with him while living; since even the remembrance of him, when dead, is still profitable to his friends. Whether serious or gay, whatever he said carried along with it something which was improving. He would frequently assume the character and the language of a lover; but it was easy to perceive it was the charms of the mind, not those of the body, with which he was enamored, as the objects he sought after were always such as he saw naturally inclining towards virtue. Now he thought an aptness to learn, together with a strength of memory to retain what was already learned, accompanied with a busy inquisitiveness into such things as might be of use for the right conduct of life, whether as head only of a single family or governor of the whole state, indicated a mind well fitted for instruction, which, if duly cultivated, would render the youth in whom they were found not only happy in themselves, and their own families, but give them the power of making many others the same; since the benefits arising from thence would be diffused throughout the whole community. His method, however, was not the same with all; but whenever he found any who thought so highly of themselves on the account of their talents as to despise instruction, he would endeavor to convince them, that of all mankind they stood in the greatest want of it: like to the high-bred horse, which having more strength and courage than others, might be made for that very reason of so much the more use, if properly managed; but, neglected while young, becomes thereby the more vicious and unruly. Also those dogs which are of the nobler kind: these, being trained to it, are excellent in' the chase; but, left to themselves, are good for nothing. And it is the same, would he say, with respect to men;

such of them to whom nature has dealt the most liberally, to whom she has given strength of body and firmness of mind, as they can execute with greater readiness and facility whatever they engage in, so they become more useful than others, and rise to nobler heights of virtue, if care is taken , to give them a right turn: but, this not being done, they excel only in vice; and become, by the means of these very talents, more hurtful to society; for, through ignorance of their duty, they engage in a bad cause, and make themselves parties in evil actions; and, being haughty and impetuous, they are with difficulty restrained and brought back to their duty; so that many and great are the evils they occasion.

As to those men who relied upon their riches, and imagined they stood in no need of instruction, as their wealth would be sufficient to supply all their wants, and procure them every honor: these Socrates would endeavor to reduce to reason, by showing how foolish it was to imagine they could of themselves distinguish between things that were useful, and those which were hurtful, without having first been shown the difference. Or, wanting this power of discriminating, still vainly supposed, that because they could purchase the things they had a mind to, they could therefore perform whatever would be to their advantage; or, if not, could yet live safe and easy, and have all things go well with them. “Neither was it,” he said, “less absurd in them to suppose that wealth could supply the want of knowledge, and make the possessor of it pass for a man of abilities; or at least procure for him that esteem which is only acquired by true merit.”

II. But, on the other hand, when he met with any who valued themselves on account of their education, concluding they were qualified for every undertaking; we see the method Socrates took to chastise their vanity, from the manner in which he treated Euthydemus, surnamed the Fair.

This young man having collected many of the writings of the most celebrated poets and sophists, was so much elated by it, as to fancy himself superior to any other of the age, both in knowledge and abilities; and doubted not to see himself the very first man in Athens, whatever the business; whether to manage the affairs of the state, or harangue the people. Being, however, as yet too young to be admitted into the public assemblies, his custom was to go into a bridle-cutter's shop, which stood near to the forum, when he had any business depending: which Socrates observing, he also went in thither, accompanied by some of his friends; and one of them asking, in the way of conversation, "Whether Themistocles had been much advantaged by conversing with philosophers; or, whether it were not chiefly the strength of his own natural talents which had raised him so far above the rest of his fellow-citizens, as made them not fail to turn their eyes towards him whenever the state stood in need of a person of uncommon ability?" Socrates, willing to pique Euthydemus, made answer: "It was monstrous folly for anyone to imagine, that while the knowledge of the very lowest mechanic art was not to be attained without a master; the science of governing the republic, which required for the right discharge of it all that human prudence could perform, was to be had by intuition."

Socrates went no further at that time; but plainly perceiving that Euthydemus cautiously avoided his company, that he might not be taken for one of his followers, he determined to attack him something more openly. To this purpose, when he was next along with him, Socrates, turning to some who were present, "May we not expect," said he, "from the manner in which this young man pursues his studies, that he will not fail to speak his opinion even the very first time he appears in the assembly, should there be any business of importance then in debate? I should suppose, too, that the

proem to his speech, if he begins with letting them know that he has never received any instruction, must have something in it not unpleasant. 'Be it known to you,' will he say, 'O you men of Athens! I never learnt anything of any man: I never associated with persons of parts or experience; never sought out for people who could instruct me: but, on the contrary, have steadily persisted in avoiding all such; as not only holding in abhorrence the being taught by others, but careful to keep clear of every the least suspicion of it: but I am ready, notwithstanding, to give you such advice as chance shall suggest to me.'—Not unlike the man," continued Socrates, "who should tell the people, while soliciting their voices; 'It is true, gentlemen, I never once thought of making physic my study; I never once applied to any one for instruction; and so far was I from desiring to be well versed in this science, I even wished not to have the reputation of it: but, gentlemen, be so kind as to choose me your physician; and I will gain knowledge by making experiments upon you.' "

Every one present laughed at the absurdity of such a preface; and Euthydemus, after this, never avoided the company of Socrates: but still he affected the most profound silence, hoping, by that means, to gain the reputation of a modest man. Socrates, desirous to cure him of his mistake, took an opportunity of saying to some of his friends, Euthydemus being present, "Is it not strange, sirs, that while such as wish to play well on the lute, or mount dexterously on horseback, are not content with practicing in private as often as may be, but look out for masters, and submit willingly to their commands, as the only way to become proficients and gain fame; the man whose aim is to govern the republic, or speak before the people, shall deem himself aptly qualified for either without the trouble of any previous instruction? Yet surely the last must be owned the most difficult; since, out of the many who force themselves into office, so few are seen to

succeed therein; and therefore it should seem, that diligence and study are here the most needful."

By these and the like discourses, Socrates disposed the young man to enter into further conference, and give him a patient hearing. Which having observed, he took an opportunity of going on a time alone into the bridle-cutter's shop, where Euthydemus then was; and sitting down by him—"Is it true," said he, "Euthydemus, that you have collected so many of the writings of those men whom we call wise?"

"Most undoubtedly it is true," replied the other; "neither shall I give over collecting till I have gained as many of them as I well can."

"Truly," said Socrates, "I admire you much for thus endeavoring to accumulate wisdom rather than wealth: for by this, Euthydemus, you plainly discover it to be your opinion, that gold and silver cannot add to our merit; whereas we furnish ourselves with an inexhaustible fund of virtue, when we thus treasure up the writings of these great men."

Euthydemus was not a little pleased with hearing Socrates speak in such a manner; concluding his method of obtaining wisdom had met with approbation; which Socrates perceiving, he continued the discourse.

"But what employment do you intend to excel in Euthydemus, that you collect so many books?"

Euthydemus returning no answer, as at a loss what to say:

"You perhaps intend to study physic," said Socrates; "and no small number of books will be wanting for that purpose."

"Not I, upon my word."

"Architecture, perhaps, then? and for this too you will find no little knowledge necessary."

"No, nor that," replied Euthydemus.

“You wish to be an astrologer, or a skillful geometrician, like Theo?”

“Not at all.”

“Then you possibly intend to become a rhapsodist, and recite verses; for I am told you are in possession of all Homer’s works?”

“By no means,” replied Euthydemus, “will I do this; for however ready these men may be with their verses, it does not prevent their being thought troublesome, wherever they come.”

“Perhaps you are desirous of that knowledge, Euthydemus, which makes the able statesman or good economist? which qualifies for command, and renders a man useful both to himself and others?”

“This, indeed, is what I sigh for, and am in search of,” replied Euthydemus, with no small emotion.

“Verily!” answered Socrates, “a noble pursuit: for this is what we call the royal science, as it belongs in a peculiar manner to kings. But have you considered the matter, Euthydemus, whether it will not be necessary for the man to be just, who hopes to make any proficiency therein?”

“Certainly, Socrates; for I know very well, he who is not just cannot make even a good citizen.”

“Then you are a just man, Euthydemus?”

“I think I am, as much as any other.”

“Pray say, Euthydemus, may one know when a just man is engaged in his proper work, as we can when the artist is employed in his?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“So that—as the architect, for example, can show us what he is doing; so the just man likewise?”

“Assuredly, Socrates; nor should there be any great difficulty in pointing out what is just or unjust, in actions about which we are conversant daily.”

“Suppose, Euthydemus, we should make two marks; an A here, and a D there: under which to set down the things that belong to justice and injustice?”

“You may,” replied Euthydemus, “if you think there wants any such method.”

Socrates having done this, went on.

“Is there any such thing as lying.”

“Most certainly.”

“And to which side shall we place it?”

“To injustice, surely.”

“Does mankind ever deceive each other?”

“Frequently.”

“And where shall we place this?”

“To injustice still.”

“And injury?”

“The same.”

“Selling those into slavery who were born free?”

“Still the same, certainly.”

“But suppose,” said Socrates, “one whom you have elected to command your armies should take a city belonging to your enemies and sell its inhabitants for slaves?—Shall we say of this man he acts unjustly?”

“By no means.”

“May we say he acts justly?”

“We may.”

“And what if, while he is carrying on the war, he deceives the enemy?”

“He will do right by so doing.”

“May he not likewise, when he ravages their country, carry off their corn and their cattle without being guilty of injustice?”

“No doubt, Socrates; and when I seemed to say otherwise, I thought you confined what was spoken to our friends only.”

“So then, whatever we have hitherto placed under “our letter D, may be carried over, and ranged under A?”

“It may.”

“But will it not be necessary to make a further distinction, Euthydemus, and say, that to behave in such a manner to our enemies is just; but, to our friends, unjust: because to these last the utmost simplicity and integrity is due?”

“You are in the right Socrates.”

“But how,” said Socrates, “if this general, on seeing the courage of his troops begin to fail, should make them believe fresh succors are at hand; and by this means remove their fears? To which side shall we assign this falsehood?”

“I suppose to justice.”

“Or if a child refuses the physic he stands in need of, and the father deceives him under the appearance of food—where shall we place the deceit, Euthydemus?”

“With the same, I imagine.”

“And suppose a man in the height of despair should attempt to kill himself; and his friend should come and force away his sword; under what head are we to place this act of violence?”

“I should think, where we did the former.”

“But take care, Euthydemus, since it seems from your answers that we ought not always to treat our friends with candor and integrity, which yet we had before agreed was to be done.”

“It is plain we ought not,” returned Euthydemus; “and I retract my former opinion, if it is allowable for me so to do.”

“Most assuredly,” said Socrates; “for it is far better to change our opinion, than to persist in a wrong one. However,” continued he, “that we may pass over nothing without duly examining it: which of the two, Euthydemus, appears to you the most unjust; he who deceives his friend wittingly, or he who does it without having any such design?”

“Truly,” said Euthydemus, “I am not certain what I should answer, or what I should think; for you have given such a turn to all I have hitherto advanced, as to make it appear very different to what I before thought it: however, I will venture so far as to declare that man the most unjust who deceives his friend designedly.”

“Is it your opinion, Euthydemus, that a man must learn to be just and good, in like manner as he learns to write and read?”

“I believe so.”

“And which,” said Socrates, “do you think the most ignorant, he who writes or reads ill designedly, or he who does it for want of knowing better?”

“The last, certainly,” replied Euthydemus; “since the other can do right whenever he pleases.”

“It then follows that he who reads ill, from design, knows how to read well; but the other does not?”

“It is true.”

“Pray tell me,” continued Socrates, “which of the two knows best what justice is, and what he ought to do; he who offends against the truth and deceives designedly, or he who does it without having any such design?’

“He, no doubt, who deceives designedly,” replied Euthydemus.

“But you said, Euthydemus, that he who understands how to read, is more learned than one who does not?”

“I did so, Socrates; and it is certainly true.”

“Then he who knows wherein justice consists, is more just than he who knows nothing of the matter?’

“So it seems,” said Euthydemus; “and I know not how I came to say otherwise.”

“But what would you think of the man, Euthydemus, who, however willing he might be to tell the truth, never tells you twice together the same thing: but if you ask him about the road, will show you to-day to the east, and to-morrow to the west; and make the very same sum amount sometimes to fifty, and sometimes to a hundred; what would you say to this man, Euthydemus?”

“That it was plain he knew nothing of what he pretended to know.”

Socrates still went on, and said, “Have you never heard people called base and senile?’

“Frequently.”

“And why were they so called? for their ignorance, or knowledge?”

“Not for their knowledge, certainly.”

“What then? for their ignorance in the business of a brazier? building a house? or sweeping a chimney?”

“Nor this, nor that,” replied Euthydemus; “for the men who are the most expert in employments of this nature, are generally the most abject and servile in their minds.”

“It should seem then, Euthydemus, these appellatives only belong to those who are ignorant of what is just and good?”

“So I imagine.”

“Does it not then follow, that we ought to exert our powers to the utmost, to avoid this ignorance, which debases men so low?”

“O Socrates!” cried Euthydemus, with no little emotion, “I will not deny to you that I have hitherto believed I was no stranger to philosophy, but had already gained that knowledge so necessary for the man who aspires after virtue. What then must be my concern to find, after all my labor, I am not able to answer those questions which most imports me to know? And the more, as I see not what method to pursue whereby I may render myself more capable!”

“Have you ever been at Delphos?”

“I have been there twice.”

“Did you observe this inscription somewhere on the front of the temple—Know yourself?”

“Yes, I read it.”

“But it seems scarcely sufficient to have read it, Euthydemus: did you consider it? and, in consequence of the admonition, set yourself diligently to find out what you are?”

“I certainly did not,” said Euthydemus; “for I imagined I must know this sufficiently already: and, indeed, it will be difficult for us to know anything, if we can be supposed at a loss here.”

“But for a man to know himself properly,” said Socrates, “it is scarcely enough that he knows his own name. He who desires to purchase a horse, does not imagine he has made the proper trial of his merit, till by mounting him he has found out whether he is tractable or unruly, strong or weak, fleet or heavy, with everything else, either good or bad, in him: so likewise we should not say, he knows himself as he ought, who is ignorant of his own powers; or those duties which, as man, it is incumbent upon him to perform.”

“It must be confessed,” replied Euthydemus, “that he who knows not his own powers cannot be said to know himself.”

“And yet, who sees not,” continued Socrates, “how great the advantage arising from this knowledge; and what misery must attend our mistakes concerning it! For he who is possessed of it, not only knows himself, but knows what is best for him. He perceives what he can and what he cannot do; he applies himself to the one, he gains what is necessary, and is happy; he attempts not the other, and therefore incurs neither distress nor disappointment. From knowing himself he is able to form a right judgment of others, and turn them to his advantage, either for the procuring some good or preventing some evil. On the contrary, he who is ignorant of himself, and makes a wrong estimate of his own powers, will also mistake those of other men; he knows neither what he wants or undertakes, nor yet the means he makes use of; so that he not only fails of success, but often falls into many misfortunes; while the man who sees his way before him, most commonly obtains the end he aims at; and not only so, but secures to himself renown and honor. His equals gladly attend to his counsel and follow his advice; and they who, by wrong management, have plunged themselves into difficulties, implore his help, and found all their hopes of being restored to their former ease, on the prudence of his administration: while they who blindly engage in business, as they choose ill, so they succeed worse; nor is the damage they then sustain the only misfortune they incur; but they are disgraced forever; all men ridiculing, despising, or blaming them. Neither does it fare anything better with commonwealths themselves,” continued Socrates, “when mistaking their own strength, they engage eagerly in war with their more powerful neighbors, which ends either in the ruin of the state, or the loss of their liberty; compelled to receive their laws from the hand of the conqueror.”

“Be assured,” answered Euthydemus, “that I am now fully convinced of the excellence of the precept which bids us know ourselves: but from what point shall the man set out, Socrates, on so important an inquiry? To inform me of this, is now what I hope from you.”

“You know what things are good, what evil, Euthydemus?”

“Certainly,” replied Euthydemus; “for otherwise I should know less than the very lowest of our slaves.”

“Show me then, I pray you, what you think good; what evil.”

“Most willingly,” answered Euthydemus; “and truly, I think, the task will not be difficult—First, then, I count sound health good; and sickness evil; and whatever conduces to the one, or the other, are to be estimated accordingly; so that the food and exercise which keeps us in health, we may call good; and that which brings on us sickness and disease, evil.”

“But might it not be as well to say, Euthydemus, that health and sickness are both of them good, when they are the cause of good; and evil, when they are the cause of evil?”

“But when do we see,” replied Euthydemus, “that health is the cause of evil; or sickness of good?”

“It is certainly the case,” answered Socrates, “when levies are raising for some unsuccessful expedition; or embarkations made, which afterwards suffer shipwreck: for the healthy and the strong being selected on these occasions, they are unhappily involved in the same common misfortune; while the feeble and the infirm remain in safety.”

“That is true,” replied Euthydemus: “but then, on the other hand, you must own, Socrates, that the healthful and strong have their share, and that to their no small advantage, in more fortunate undertakings; while the sickly and infirm are entirely excluded.”

“These things being so, as indeed they are, sometimes profitable, and sometimes hurtful, we should not do amiss to

set them down," said Socrates, "as being in themselves not more good than evil."

"So indeed it appears," said Euthydemus, "from this way of reasoning: but knowledge, Socrates, must ever remain an indubitable good; since he who has knowledge, whatever the business, may certainly execute it with far greater advantage than he who wants it."

"Have you not heard then," said Socrates, "how it fared with the wretched Dædalus, on the account of his excelling in so many different arts? This man falling into the hands of Minos, was detained by him in Crete: at once torn from his country, and deprived of his freedom: and when afterwards attempting to escape with his son, he was the cause of the loss of the miserable youth. Neither was he able to secure himself; but being seized by the Barbarians, was compelled to return, again to endure all the evil of slavery."

"I have heard this," replied Euthydemus.

"You know too," continued Socrates, "the unhappy fate of Palamedes, whose praises all men celebrated: he fell a sacrifice to the envy of Ulysses; and miserably perished, through the insidious artifices of his rival: and how many are now languishing in perpetual bondage, whom the king of Persia caused to be carried away, and still keeps near him, merely on the account of their superior talents?"

"But granting this to be as you say; yet certainly," replied Euthydemus, "we may esteem happiness an undoubted good?"

"We may," answered Socrates, "provided this happiness arises from such things as are undoubtedly good."

"But how can those things which produce happiness, be otherwise than good?"

“They cannot,” said Socrates, “if you admit not of the number, health, strength, beauty, riches, fame, and such like.”

“But we certainly do admit such things into the number,” replied Euthydemus; “for how are we to be happy without them?”

“Rather, how are we to be happy with them,” returned Socrates, “seeing they are the source of so many evils? For how often, has a beautiful form been the cause of defilement! How often, from a persuasion of their strength, have men been induced to engage in hazardous undertakings which overwhelm them in ruin! How many have sunk into luxury by means of their riches, or fallen into the snares that were insidiously laid for them, by the people whose interest it was to procure their ruin! Even that glory, Euthydemus, which results from our having well served our country, does not seldom prove fatal to the man on whom it is bestowed.”

“If I have then erred in speaking well of happiness,” replied Euthydemus, “I know not what it is for which I can yet supplicate the gods.”

“It may be,” answered Socrates, “you have not duly considered the matter, from thinking you were already sufficiently acquainted with it. But, (changing the subject,) they tell us, Euthydemus, you are preparing to take upon you the administration of our affairs. Now, since it is the people who bear sway in Athens, I doubt not your having thoroughly studied the nature of a popular government?”

“You do right not to doubt it.”

“Pray tell us, may we understand what a popular government is, without knowing who are the people?”

“I should suppose not.”

“And who are the people?” said Socrates.

“I include under that denomination,” replied Euthydemus, “all such citizens as are poor.”

“You know those who are so?”

“Certainly.”

“And who are rich?”

“No doubt of it.”

“Tell me then, I pray you, whom you think rich; whom poor.”

“I consider those as being poor, who have not wherewithal to defray their necessary expenses,” said Euthydemus; “and I esteem those rich who possess more than they want.”

“But have you not observed, Euthydemus, there are people, who, although they have very little, have not only enough for their necessary expenses, but manage in such a manner as to lay up a part; while others are in want, notwithstanding their large possessions?”

“I own it,” said Euthydemus; “and recollect some princes, whose necessities have compelled them to deal injuriously by their subjects; even so far as to deprive them of their possessions.”

“It will follow then, Euthydemus, that we should place these princes among the poor, and the frugal managers of their little fortune among the rich, since these may truly be said to live in affluence.”

“They may,” replied Euthydemus; “for I am not able to support anything against your arguments: and, indeed, I believe silence for the future will best become me, since, after all, I begin to suspect that I know nothing.

On saying this he hastily withdrew, full of confusion and contempt of himself, as beginning to perceive his own insignificancy. But it was not Euthydemus alone to whom Socrates gave that sort of uneasiness: many, who were once

his followers, had forsaken him on that account, whom Socrates estimated accordingly: but it was otherwise with Euthydemus; his attachment to him after this increased daily, and he thought there was no other way to become a man of business than by conversing with Socrates; so that he never left him unless compelled to it by affairs of the greatest moment: carrying his admiration of him so far as to imitate many of his actions: which Socrates perceiving, he carefully avoided saying whatever might appear harsh or disgusting, but conversed with him freely, and instructed him, without reserve, concerning those things which it most imported him to know and practice.

III. Yet was not Socrates ever in haste to make orators, artists, or able statesmen. The first business, as he thought, was to implant in the minds of his followers virtuous principles; since, these wanting, every other talent only added to the capacity of doing greater harm, and more especially to inspire them with piety towards the gods. But seeing many others have already related what they heard him speak upon that subject, I shall content myself with only mentioning in what manner he once discoursed,—I being present with Euthydemus,—concerning a providence; for, turning towards him, he said:

"Have you never reflected, Euthydemus, how wondrously gracious the gods have been to men in providing all things useful for them?"

"I cannot say," replied Euthydemus, "that I ever did."

"And yet," continued Socrates, "you want not to be informed how necessary this light is, or that it is the gods who have bestowed it upon us."

"I do not," replied Euthydemus; "nor yet that our state would be no better than that of the blind, were we deprived of it."

“But because we stand in need of rest after our labor, they have likewise given to us the night, as the more proper time to repose in.”

“They have,” replied Euthydemus; “and we ought to be most thankful.”

“But, as the sun by its light not only renders each object visible, but points out the hours of the day to us; for the stars have been ordained, together with the moon, to mark out the time throughout the darkness of the night season; while the last is still of further use to us in regulating the months, and distinguishing the several parts of them.”

“It is true,” answered Euthydemus.

“And seeing that nourishment is so necessary for the support of man, observe you not, Euthydemus, how the earth has been made to produce it for him? The convenient changes of the seasons, all serving to the same purpose? While such the variety and abundance bestowed upon us, as not only secures from the fear of want, but gives us wherewithal to indulge even to luxury!”

“Undoubtedly,” cried Euthydemus, “this goodness of the gods is a strong proof of their care for man.”

“And what think you,” continued Socrates, “of their having given to us water, so useful and even necessary for all the affairs of life? By the means of it the earth produces its fruits, while the dew's from above carry them on to perfection. It makes of itself a part of our nourishment, and is of use in the dressing and preparing our food; rendering it not only more beneficial but pleasant. And, seeing our wants of it are evidently so many, how bountiful are the gods who have supplied us with it in such profusion!”

“A further proof,” cried Euthydemus, “of their great regard for man.”

“Likewise, what shall we say,” continued Socrates, “to their having provided us with fire, which secures from the cold, dispels the darkness, and is altogether so necessary for carrying on the arts of life, that mankind can produce nothing useful without it. The sun too, Euthydemus; observe you not how, winter being over, it turns towards us; withering those fruits whereof the season is now past, at the same time that it matures others and brings them to perfection? This service once done, it retires again, that its heat may not annoy us; but having reached that point, beyond which it cannot pass without exposing us to the danger of perishing from its absence, it measures back its steps to that part of the heavens in which its influence may be of the most advantage. And because we should be unable to bear the extreme, whether of heat or cold, when coming upon us suddenly, how can it otherwise than excite our admiration, when we consider those almost imperceptible degrees, whereby it advances to, and retires from us; so that we can arrive at the highest point of either, without being, in a manner, at all sensible to the change?”

“Truly,” said Euthydemus, “these things put me in some doubt, whether the gods have any other employment than taking care of man. This, however, perplexes me; I see these gifts bestowed upon him only in common with other animals!”

“And see you not,” replied Socrates, “that even all these themselves are produced and nourished for the service of man? For what animal, except himself, can turn to its use the hog, the goat, the ox, and the horse, together with the rest that everywhere surround him? So that it seems to me, that man is not more indebted to the earth itself, than to these, his fellow-creatures, whether for the conveniences or necessaries of life; since few of us live on the fruits of the earth, but on milk, cheese, and the flesh of other animals; while we break

them for our use, and tame them for our service; and receive assistance from them in war, as well as on other occasions."

"I own it," answered Euthydemus; "for although many of these are much stronger than man, yet he is able to make them so far subservient to him as to perform readily whatever he commands."

"Marvelous, likewise, must we acknowledge the goodness of the gods, and worthy of our consideration; inasmuch, as having given to man an infinite number of things, all good in themselves, yet still differing in their nature, they have therefore bestowed upon him a variety of senses, each peculiarly formed for the enjoyment of its proper object. They have likewise endued him with reason and understanding; by the means of which he examines into those things the senses have discovered to him: he retains them in his memory, and finds out their use; whereby they are made to serve many admirable purposes, both for his ease and security from danger. From the gods likewise it is that we have received the gift of speech, which enables us to give and receive instruction and pleasure, unite into societies, promulgate laws, and govern communities. And, forasmuch as we are not able to foresee what may happen hereafter, or judge of ourselves what may be the best for us to do, they readily incline to such as seek to them for assistance; declaring by their oracles the things that are to come, and instruct us so to act as may be the most for our advantage."

"But," said Euthydemus, interrupting him, "the gods, Socrates, deal still more favorably with you, for they stay not to be consulted, but show of themselves what things you ought or ought not to do."

"But that I spoke not against the truth in so saying, you yourself shall know, if you wait not, Euthydemus, till the gods become visible; but it suffices you to see and adore them in

their works, since it is by these alone they choose to manifest themselves to men. Even among all those deities who so liberally bestow on us good things, not one of them makes himself an object of our sight. And He who raised this whole universe, and still upholds the mighty frame, who perfected every part of it in beauty and in goodness, suffering none of these parts to decay through age, but renewing them daily with unfading vigor, whereby they are able to execute whatever he ordains with that readiness and precision which surpass man's imagination; even he, the supreme God, who performs all these wonders, still holds himself invisible, and it is only in his works that we are capable of admiring him. For consider, Euthydemus, the sun, which seems as it were set forth to the view of all men, yet suffers not itself to be too curiously examined; punishing those with blindness who too rashly venture so to do: and those ministers of the gods, whom they employ to execute their bidding, remain to us invisible: for, though the thunderbolt is shot from on high, and breaks in pieces whatever it finds in its way, yet no one sees it when it falls, when it strikes, or when it retires: neither are the winds discoverable to our sight, though we plainly behold the ravages they everywhere make; and with ease perceive what time they are rising. And if there be any thing in man, Euthydemus, partaking of the divine nature, it must surely be the soul which governs and directs him; yet no one considers this as an object of his sight. Learn, therefore, not to despise those things which you cannot see; judge of the greatness of the power by the effects which are produced, and reverence THE DEITY."

"It is very sure," replied Euthydemus, "I shall never be wanting in my acknowledgments to the gods, and it even troubles me that we cannot make a suitable return for the benefits they have conferred on us."

“Let not this afflict you,” replied Socrates. “You know the answer which is given by the oracle at Delphos to those who inquire what they must do to make their sacrifices acceptable?—Follow, said the god, the custom of your country. Now this is the custom which prevails everywhere, that each one should offer according to his ability: and therefore, Euthydemus, what better can we do to honor the gods, and show our gratitude towards them, than by acting in such a manner as they themselves have commanded? Let us however beware lest we fall short of that ability wherewith the gods have endued us; since this would not be to honor but express our contempt: but, having done all in our power, there is no longer anything left us whereof to be afraid; nothing, indeed, which we may not hope for. For, from whom can we reasonably expect the most good, but from those beings who are possessed of the greatest power? Either what better can we do, to secure it to ourselves, than conciliate their favor—but we best conciliate their favor when we obey their commands.”

In this manner did Socrates instruct his followers in their duty to the gods: and forasmuch as all his precepts were ever accompanied with the practice of the purest devotion, he greatly advanced the piety of his friends.

IV. With regard to justice, no one could doubt what were the sentiments of Socrates concerning it; since all his actions, both public and private, sufficiently declared them. He was always willing to assist whoever wanted his assistance; to observe the laws, and to obey the legal commands of the magistrate; so that, whether in the city or the camp, Socrates distinguished himself above all others, for the readiness and exactness wherewith he executed every order. When it came to his turn to preside in the public assemblies, be would suffer no decree to pass in them which appeared to him contrary to the laws, but stood up alone in defense of them; opposing, on

a time, so violent a tumult of the people, as, I think, none but himself could possibly have withstood; and when the Thirty imposed upon him things which were unjust, he paid no regard to their injunctions, but continued to discourse with the young men as usual, after the time they had ordered him otherwise; neither would obey, when they commanded him and three others to bring a certain person to execution, as knowing he had been condemned by them contrary to all law. And whereas it was common for others, when on their trial, to talk much with their judges; to flatter, and shamefully solicit their favor, which often they procured, in direct opposition to the laws; Socrates would not avail himself of these arts, however easy it was to have brought himself off by any the smallest compliance with the custom; but chose rather, as he himself said to those friends who counseled him otherwise, to die, continuing steadfast to the laws, than save his life by such indirect practices.

Now, though Socrates talked to several on that subject, yet I particularly remember a conversation he once had with Hippias the Elean, concerning justice. This man, after having been a long time absent from Athens, happened, on his return, to come accidentally to a place where Socrates was talking with some friends, and saying, "That if anyone wanted to have a person taught the trade of a carpenter, a smith, or a shoemaker, he need not be at a loss for somebody to instruct him: or, if his horse was to be broke at the bit, or his ox to the yoke, many would be ready enough to undertake them but, if he wanted to learn how he himself might become a good man, or have a son, or any other of his family made so, it was not an easy matter to find out whom to apply to."

Hippias having heard this, said to him jeeringly, "What, Socrates! still saying the same things we heard you say before I left Athens?"

“I am,” replied Socrates; “and, what is still more wonderful, on the same subject; but you, Hippias, being so very learned, may perhaps do otherwise.”

“You are in the right,” said Hippias, “for I always endeavor to say something new.”

“Is it possible!” said Socrates. “But pray,” continued he, “suppose you were asked how many letters there were in my name, and what they were called, would you sometimes say one thing, and sometimes another? And would you not always answer, when asked, that five and five made ten?”

“As to such things,” said Hippias, “I certainly should say the same as you; but we are now talking of justice, or the rule of right and wrong; and I think I have now something to say concerning it, as can hardly be controverted either by you or any other.”

“By the gods,” replied Socrates, “the discovery will be most useful! The standard of right and wrong once fixed, all difference of opinion among the judges, all sedition among the people, all lawsuits between citizens, all wars and contentions among communities, must be at an end! And truly it would grieve me to leave you, Hippias, without knowing what this inestimable secret may be that you say you have discovered.”

“But it is certain,” said Hippias, “you will not know it without first telling us your sentiments concerning justice, or this rule of right: for you content yourself, Socrates, with asking questions, and afterwards confuting the answers that are made you, in order to turn those who make them into ridicule; but never advance anything of your own, that you may not be called upon to support your opinion.”

“How!” said Socrates; “perceive you not that I am continually demonstrating to the world my sentiments concerning justice?”

“And in what manner do you demonstrate them?” said Hippias.

“By my actions,” replied Socrates; “at least as much deserving of credit as words.”

“By Zeus!” said Hippias, “I should fancy somewhat more; for I have heard many declaim loudly in behalf of justice who were all the time very far from being just: but he who is upright in his actions, must necessarily be an upright man.’

“But when have you known me,” said Socrates, “bearing false witness, or slandering any man? Where was it that I sowed dissension between friends? stirred up sedition in the republic? or practiced any other kind of injustice whatsoever?”

“I cannot say,” answered the other.

“And do you not think, that to refrain from injustice, is to be just?”

“Ay, now Socrates,” said Hippias, “you are endeavoring to get off, and care not to give us your opinion freely; for you only tell us what a just man should not do, but not one syllable of what he should.”

“I thought,” replied Socrates, “that a voluntary forbearance of all injustice was sufficient to denominate a person just; but, if it seems not so to you, Hippias, let us see if this will satisfy you better; I say, then, that justice is no other than a due observance of the laws.”

“Do you mean, that to be just, and to live agreeably to the laws, is the same thing?”

“I do.”

“I cannot comprehend you.”

“Know you the laws of the city?”

“Certainly.”

“And what are they?”

“Those things,” said Hippias, “which the people ordain in a public assembly, after having agreed what ought or ought not to be done.”

“Then he, who lives in the republic according to these ordinances, lives according to the laws? and he who does otherwise, must be deemed a transgressor?”

“He must.”

“And is not he, who obeys these ordinances, just? he, who does not obey them, unjust?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“But he, who does that which is just, is just: he, who does that which is unjust, unjust.”

“It cannot be otherwise.”

“Therefore,” said Socrates, “they who observe the laws, are just; they who do not observe them unjust.”

“But,” said Hippias, “what good can there be in obeying the laws; or even in the very laws themselves, when we see those who make them not only continually altering them, but even often abrogating them wholly?”

“Do not cities make war, and then again peace, with one another?

“They do.”

“But may you not as well laugh at your enemies,” said Socrates, “for putting themselves in a posture of defense in time of war, because a time of peace will come; as blame those who observe the laws, because they may afterwards happen to be abrogated? Besides, by so doing, you condemn all those who nobly expose their lives in the service of their country. And, further—can you suppose,” continued he, “that Lycurgus could have brought the republic of Sparta to excel all others, if he had not wrought into the very minds of his citizens a strict observance of his laws? And are not they who

show themselves the most diligent and active to secure this observance, always considered as the best magistrates, seeing it is the certain way to render that city not only the most happy in time of peace, but by far the most formidable in time of war? Neither can you want to be informed," said Socrates, "of the benefits arising to the state from unanimity, since the people are daily exhorted thereto: and, even throughout all Greece, it is everywhere the custom to tender an oath to each person, whereby he engages to live in concord with his fellow-citizens. Now this is not done, as I suppose, for this purpose only, that all should be of the same opinion concerning the choruses; admire the same actor; praise the same poet; and delight in the same pleasures; but obey the same laws, as being what alone can give security, strength, and happiness to any nation: a concord," said he, "of that necessity, that not only states but private families cannot be well governed where it is wanting. For, with regard to our conduct, considered as individuals, what better means can we employ to avoid the incurring public punishment? what better for the procuring public honors and rewards, than a careful and steady observance of all the laws? What so likely to gain a process in our favor, when we have lawsuits depending before any of our tribunals? To whom do we entrust with equal confidence, our wealth, our sons, and our daughters? or even the whole city deem so deserving of their credit? Who is he that so faithfully discharges what he owes to his father, to his mother, to his relations, to his domestics, to his friends, to his fellow-citizens, to foreigners? With whom would our enemies rather leave their hostages during the truce; or more readily depend upon for the punctual performance of the articles of peace; or more desire to join with in strict alliance? Or to whom do our confederates rather entrust the command of their armies, or the government of their fortresses, than to the man who is careful not to infringe the laws? From whom can they, who

bestow favors, be so sure of receiving the proper acknowledgments? And consequently, to whom should we rather choose to show courtesy and kindness, than to him who is ever ready to confess the obligation? In short, who is there we should more earnestly desire for a friend, or less wish for an enemy, than he whom few would willingly offend; while many strive to obtain his favor? Now these, Hippias, are the advantages that accrue to us from a careful and diligent observance of the laws: but, with me, to be an observer of the laws, and to be just, imply the same thing. If it appears otherwise to you, show us, I beseech you, what may be your opinion."

"Truly," answered Hippias, "I do not see that what you have said of justice is at all different to my own notions of it."

"Have you never heard," continued Socrates, "of certain laws that are not written?"

"You mean such as are in force everywhere?"

"True:—Did all mankind concur in making them?"

"Impossible; since all mankind could not assemble in one place; neither would all have spoken the same language."

"Whence then do you suppose we had them?"

"From the gods, I should imagine; for the first command everywhere is, to adore the gods."

"And is it not, likewise, as universally commanded, that parents are to be honored?"

"It is."

"And, that they ought not to marry with their children?"

"But this last," said Hippias, "does not seem to be from the gods."

"And why not?"

"Because," replied Hippias, "I see some who transgress it."

“Neither, perhaps, do they observe the other better; nevertheless,” continued Socrates, “it ought always to be remembered, that no one ever violates the laws of the gods with impunity; the punishment being ever annexed to the commission of the crime; whereas means are often found to elude by fraud, or escape by force, the penalties incurred for the breach of such laws as are only of human institution.”

“But what is this punishment,” said Hippias, “which you say is not to be avoided by those who marry with their own children?”

“The greatest of any: for what can be worse than not to have good children?”

“And from whence do you infer that such must necessarily have bad children; since, if parents are good themselves, what should hinder their having good children?”

“It is not enough,’ said Socrates, “that parents are virtuous; they ought both of them to be in the perfection of their age, if they would have their children such as they wish them. For do you suppose, Hippias, that children produced by parents not yet arrived to a state of maturity, or by such as are already past it, can be compared with the offspring of those who are in the prime of life and perfection of their nature?”

“I suppose they cannot.”

“And which do you take to be the best?”

“Those, no doubt,” said Hippias, “whose parents are in the perfection of their nature.”

“Then children produced by such as are net yet arrived to a state of maturity, or are now far past it, are not good, or such as we desire to have them?”

“So it seems.”

“People, then, who are under either of these circumstances, ought not to have children?’

“They ought not.”

“Those, therefore,” said Socrates, “who indulge themselves in this disorderly manner, what can they else than produce a miserable offspring?”

“They cannot, Socrates; for even in this point I am ready to agree with you.”

“But what think you, Hippias; is not this also an universal law, that we should do good to those who do good to us?”

“Certainly.’

“Yet it is transgressed by many,” said Socrates: “howbeit they go not unpunished any more than the other, since thereby they lose their most valuable friends, and follow those who most hate them: for are not they, Hippias, our most valuable friends from whom we receive the most essential acts of kindness? But he who neglects to acknowledge the kindness of his friends, or returns it with evil, must be hated for his ingratitude; yet because of the advantages he still hopes to receive, he continues to pursue those who shun him, and this with the meanest, most servile assiduity.”

“Assuredly,” said Hippias, “these things are of the gods! For when I consider every breach of these laws, as carrying along with it the punishment of the transgressor, I cannot but allow them to proceed from a more excellent legislator than is to be found among the sons of men.”

“But what think you, Hippias; do the gods make laws that are unjust?”

“So far from it,” said Hippias, “that I believe it almost impossible for any but the gods to make such as are perfectly otherwise.”

“Then certainly,” replied Socrates, “the gods themselves show to us, that to obey the laws, and to be just, is the same thing.”

After this manner would Socrates reason concerning justice-, and his actions being at all times conformable to his words, he daily increased the love of it in the minds of all his followers.

V. I shall next relate the arguments which Socrates employed in order to make his hearers able to practice what was right: and being of opinion that temperance was absolutely necessary for the well performance of anything excellent; and having, in the first place, shown by his manner of living how far he surpassed all others in the exercise of this virtue, he endeavored by his discourses, as well as by his example, to excite his friends to the practice of it. And as all his thoughts were only bent on the improvement of mankind, he never lost an opportunity of introducing into his conversation whatever he supposed might conduce to that end; and it was to this purpose that he once talked, as I remember, to Euthydemus in the following manner:

"Is it your opinion," said he to him, "that liberty is a fair and valuable possession?"

"So valuable," replied Euthydemus, "that I know of nothing more valuable."

"But he who is so far overcome by sensual pleasure, that he is not able to practice what is the best, and consequently the most eligible, do you count this man free, Euthydemus?"

"Far from it," replied the other.

"You think then," said Socrates, "that freedom consists in being able to do what is right;—slavery, in not being able; whatever may be the cause that deprives us of the power?"

"I do, most certainly."

"The debauchee, then, you must suppose is this state of slavery?"

"I do, and with good reason."

“But does intemperance,” Euthydemus, “only withhold from acting right? Or does it not frequently urge us on to the practice of what is evil?”

“I believe it may do both,” said Euthydemus.

“And what should you say to a master, who not only opposes your applying yourself to any one thing commendable, but obliges you to undertake many that must bring on you dishonor?”

“I should esteem him the worst in the world,” replied Euthydemus.

“And what the worst servitude?”

“To serve such a master.”

“Then it should follow,” said Socrates, “that he who is intemperate, is the very lowest of all slaves?”

“I believe it,” said Euthydemus.

“Does not intemperance,” continued Socrates, “rob us of our reason, that chief excellence of man, and drive us on to commit the very greatest disorders? Can he who is immersed in pleasure, find time to turn his thoughts on things that are Useful? But, and if he could, his judgment is so far overborne by his appetites, that, seeing the right path, he deliberately rejects it. Neither,” continued Socrates, “should we expect modesty in such a character; it being most certain, that nothing can well stand at a greater distance from this than the whole life of the voluptuary.”

“That is certain,” replied Euthydemus.

“But what can be so likely to obstruct either the practice or the knowledge of our duty as intemperance? What can we suppose so fatally pernicious to man, as that which deprives him of his understanding; makes him prefer with eagerness the things that are useless; avoid, or reject, whatever is profitable; and act in every respect so unlike a wise man!”

“Nothing, that I know of,” said Euthydemus.

“Must not temperance produce the very contrary, effects?”

“Most assuredly.”

“But whatever produces the contrary effects should be good?”

“No doubt of it.”

“Then temperance must be deemed so?”

“I own it,” said Euthydemus.

“But have you thoroughly considered this point, Euthydemus?”

“What point do you mean?”

“That, however intemperance may promise pleasure, it can never bestow any; for this must be the gift of temperance and sobriety.”

“But why not?” answered Euthydemus.

“Because the intemperate will not endure thirst and hunger; nor submit to any other want of nature; without which, however, no pleasure can arise from any sensual gratification; neither is it possible for that sleep to be sweet, which is not preceded by some degree of watchfulness: therefore, Euthydemus, intemperance must ever be a stranger to the delight which arises from those actions, which are not only necessary, but of daily use; while the temperate man, ever willing to await the call of nature, enjoys them to the full, and tastes pleasures that satiety cannot know.”

“I believe it,” replied Euthydemus.

“Furthermore,” continued Socrates; “it is this virtue alone, Euthydemus, which places both the body and the mind in their utmost degree of perfection; qualifying the man for the study, the knowledge, and the practice of his duty; whereby he is enabled to govern his house prudently, serve his country and his friends usefully; conquer his enemies gloriously.

Neither are they the many benefits arising from such a conduct, that alone recommend it; the consciousness of being thus employed, must yield perpetual complacency and satisfaction: but it is a complacency and satisfaction which belongs not to the voluptuous: indeed, whom do we find at a greater distance from these, than the man whose every faculty is so entirely engaged in the pursuit of present pleasure, as to leave him no liberty for the performance of what is commendable."

"One would suppose," said Euthydemus, from your manner of speaking, that no one virtue can belong to those who suffer themselves to be led away by sensual gratifications."

"And where is the difference," said Socrates, "between him who, staying not to examine what is the best, eagerly rushes to seize what seems pleasant; and the wolf, or the sheep, or any other animal void of reason? But it is the temperate alone, Euthydemus, who are able to inquire into the nature of things, and find out their difference; and carefully consulting both reason and experience, can select what is good; reject what is evil; and become by that means both wise and happy."

Socrates likewise added, that by a constant exercise of this discriminating power, men were taught to reason well: and that the term conference, given to their assemblies, implied, that the very end of their meeting was in order to examine into the nature of things, and class them properly: and he advised his followers to the frequent holding of these conferences; saying, "It would be the best means to mature their judgment; making them thereby truly great, and capable of governing both themselves and others."

VI. I shall next endeavor to explain in what manner Socrates improved his friends in this method of reasoning.

Now, he always held, that whoever had acquired clear ideas himself, might, with equal clearness, explain those ideas: "but

it was no marvel," he said, "if such as were deficient in that particular, should not only be led into error themselves, but mislead others." He therefore was never weary of conferring with his friends, and searching out wherein the peculiar property of all things consisted: but, as it would be difficult to relate the various subjects he endeavored to explain, I shall mention no more than what I think may be sufficient to make his method of reasoning plainly appear: and, in the first place, he thus inquired into the nature of piety:—

"Can you tell us," said he, "Euthydemus, what piety is?"

"A most excellent thing," replied the other.

"And what a pious man?"

"One who serves the gods," answered Euthydemus.

"But, may every one serve them in what manner he pleases?"

"Not so, assuredly," said Euthydemus, "since there are certain laws; and according to these laws we ought to serve them."

"He, then, who observes these laws," said Socrates, "shall know in what manner he ought to serve the gods?"

"So I imagine."

"But he who knows the way of serving them, will he prefer any other to that he knows?"

"I suppose not."

"Will he not rather be careful," said Socrates, "not to serve them, contrary to what he knows?"

"He will."

"The man then," Euthydemus, "who knows the laws that are to regulate his conduct in serving of the gods, will serve them according to these laws?"

"No doubt."

“And he who serves them according to these laws, will serve them as he ought?”

“He will.”

“But he who serves them as he ought, is pious?”

“Assuredly.”

“Then he who knows how he ought to serve the gods, may rightly be defined a pious man?”

“So it seems.”

“But tell me,” added Socrates; “are we at liberty to behave towards each other in what manner we please?”

“Not so,” answered Euthydemus: “there are also certain laws to be observed by us with regard to men.”

“And do they who live together according to these laws, live as they ought to do?”

“One can suppose no other.”

“And he who lives as he ought to live, treats mankind properly?”

“He does.”

“And they who treat mankind properly, execute properly all human affairs?”

“One should suppose so.”

“But do you believe, Euthydemus, there are any who obey the laws, without knowing what the laws enjoin?”

“I do not believe there are any.”

“But when a man knows what he ought to do, will he think he ought to act otherwise?”

“I do not imagine he will.”

“Then such men as know the laws to be observed by mankind in their dealings with each other, will observe them?”

“They will.”

“And they who observe to do what the laws command, do that which is just?”

“They do,” replied Euthydemus.

“But those who act justly, are just?”

“There are no other,” said Euthydemus, “who can be so.”

“May we not be said, then, to make a right definition, when we call them just who know the laws which mankind ought to observe, in their commerce with one another?•’

“It seems so to me,” said Euthydemus.

“And what shall we say of wisdom, Euthydemus? Is it in regard to things they know, or do not know, that men are wise?”

“Certainly on the account of what they do know,” said Euthydemus; “for how can anyone be wise, as to things which he understands not?”

“Then it is on account of their knowledge that men are wise?”

“Most certainly.”

“But wisdom is nothing else but the being wise?”

“It is not.”

“Consequently,” said Socrates, “knowledge is wisdom?”

“I grant it,” said Euthydemus.

“But do you think,” continued Socrates, “that any one man is capable of knowing all things?’ ‘

“No; nor the thousandth part,” returned Euthydemus.

“Then it is impossible for him to be wise in all things?”

“It is.”

“It must follow, then, that no one is wise but in such things as he knows? ‘

“Certainly.”

“But can we, Euthydemus, discover the nature of good, by this our present method of trying and comparing things?”

“What do you mean?” said Euthydemus.

“Is one and the same thing useful for all men, and to every purpose?”

“No, certainly.”

“It may then be useful to one man, and hurtful to another?”

“It may, assuredly.”

“Then, to constitute anything good, it must be found useful?”

“It must.”

“Consequently,” replied Socrates, “that which is useful, is good for him to whom it is useful?”

“I own it.”

“And beautiful, Euthydemus; may we not determine the same concerning this? for we cannot say of a body or vessel, of what kind soever, that it is beautiful with regard to every purpose.”

“We cannot.”

“Perhaps you would say then,” continued Socrates, “that it is beautiful with respect to that particular thing for which it is proper?”‘

“I would.”

“But that which is beautiful on the account of its being well suited to one thing, is it also beautiful with respect to every other?”

“Not at all.”

“Then, whatever is well suited, is beautiful with regard to that thing to which it is well suited?”

“It is so,” said Euthydemus.

“Also, courage, Euthydemus; do you look upon courage as anything excellent?”

“Most excellent,” answered Euthydemus.

“Is it of much use on occasions of little moment?”

“The advantage of it,” said Euthydemus, “is chiefly in things of importance.”

“It is of service to us,” said Socrates, “not to see our danger?”

“I think not.”

“But not to be frightened when we see no danger, is scarcely being valiant?”

“It is not,” said Euthydemus; “for, otherwise, there are madmen, and even cowards, who might be called brave.”

“And what are they,” continued Socrates, “who fear, where there is nothing to be feared?”

“These I should think at a greater distance from courage than the other.”

“They, therefore, who show themselves brave when sensible of their danger, are valiant; those who act otherwise, cowardly?”

“It is true.”

“But do you think, Euthydemus, anyone can behave as he ought, if he knows not in what manner he ought to behave?”

“I should imagine not.”

“And are not they who behave ill, and they who know not how to behave, the same people?”

“I believe they are.”

“Does not every man behave as he thinks he ought to behave?”

“Certainly.”

“Can we say, then, that he who behaves ill, knows in what manner he ought to behave?”

“We cannot.”

“But he who knows how to behave as he ought, does behave as he ought?”

“He is the only man,” said Euthydemus, “who can do it.”

“We will conclude then our discourse, Euthydemus, with saying, That he who knows how to behave properly, in all cases of difficulty and danger, is brave: he who knows it not, a coward.”

“I agree with you entirely,” replied Euthydemus.

Socrates used to say, “That a regal government, and a tyranny, were each of them of that species of dominion which is called monarchical; but differed in this particular,—that the submission of men under a regal government was altogether voluntary, and nothing could be done in it which was not agreeable to the laws; whereas, under a tyranny, the people were compelled to obey; the will of the prince being the sole standard of the laws.” As to the other forms of government, he would say, “That when the chief offices of the commonwealth were lodged in the hands of a small number of the most eminent citizens, it was called an aristocracy; when with the richest, elected on account of their riches, a plutocracy; and when the whole people were admitted indifferently into power, this,” he said, “was a democracy.”

Now, when any one showed himself of a different opinion to Socrates, without producing a sufficient reason for his dissenting; as when, for example, on his commending any one, the preference was given to some other, as more valiant, or better skilled in the affairs of the administration; his custom was, to carry back the argument to the very first proposition; and, from thence, set out in the search of truth; saying to them, “You assert, then, that the man whom you

speak well of, is a far better citizen than he whom I recommend?" And being answered, "It was true:—"We may not do amiss then," said Socrates, "to examine, first of all, what the office of a good citizen is, and what the man should be, who gains to himself the esteem of the republic."

"It is right," answered the other.

"If the affair, then, relates to the management of the treasury, I suppose it must be one who, during his administration, is the most careful of the public money? If to war, then he who renders his country victorious over its enemies will be held in the highest estimation?"

"Undoubtedly."

"When treaties are forming, should not he who, by his address, gains over to the interest of the republic those who before were its enemies, be the most sure of our approbation?"

"He should."

"And, with regard to the business carried on in our public assemblies; to calm sedition, break cabals, and restore concord and unanimity, should best show the good citizen?"

This likewise being granted, and application made of these several particulars to the point in question, the truth shone forth to the acknowledgment of all; even of the very man who before had opposed him. And it was ever his manner, when he intended to examine anything thoroughly, to begin with such propositions as were self-evident, and universally received; and said, that herein consisted the whole strength of reasoning. Nor have I ever yet known any man who could so readily bring others to admit the truth of what he wished to prove, as Socrates: and he thought Homer only gave Ulysses the appellation of the irresistible orator, because he would lead his argument, step by step, through such paths as lay obvious to the eyes of all mankind.

Thus have I, as it seems to me, made it sufficiently appear with what sincerity and openness Socrates conversed with his followers, and showed them his sentiments on every occasion.

VII. Neither must I omit to mention how solicitous Socrates always showed himself to have his friends become capable of performing their own business, that they might not stand in need of others to perform it for them. For this reason, he made it his study, more than any man I ever knew, to find out wherein any of his followers were likely to excel in things not unbecoming a wise and good man; and in such points as he himself could give them any instruction, he did it with the utmost readiness; and where he could not, was always forward to carry them to some more skillful master. Yet was he very careful to fix the bounds in every science; beyond which, he would say, no person properly instructed ought to pass. And, therefore,—in geometry, for example,—he thought it sufficient if so much of it was known as would secure a man from being imposed upon in the buying and selling of land; direct him in the proper distributions of the several portions of an inheritance, and in measuring out the laborer's work: all which, he said, was so easy to be done, that he who applied himself to this science, though almost ever so slightly, might soon find out in what manner to measure the whole earth, and describe its circumference. But to dive deep into such things, and perplex the mind with various uncouth figures, and hard to be understood, although he himself had much knowledge therein, he approved not of it, as seeing no use in these nice inquiries which consume all his time, and engross the whole man, taking off his thoughts from more profitable studies. He also advised his friends to gain such a knowledge of astronomy, as to be able to tell by the stars the hours of the night, the day of the month, and the seasons of the year, that they should not be at a loss when to relieve the sentinel, begin a journey or a voyage, or do any other thing which depends

on this science: all which, he said, was easily to be learnt by conversing with seafaring men, or those whose custom it was to hunt in the night. But to go further, in order to find out what planets were in the same declension, explain their different motions, tell their distances from the earth, their influences, together with the time necessary for the performance of their respective revolutions; these, and things like these he strongly dissuaded his followers from attempting: not as being ignorant of them himself; but he judged of this science as he did of the former, that to examine deeply into the nature of such things, would rob us of all our time, divert our thoughts from useful studies, and, after all, produce nothing that could turn to our advantage. In short, he would not that men should too curiously search into that marvelous art, wherewith the Maker of the universe had disposed the several parts of it, seeing it was a subject incomprehensible to the mind of man; neither yet pleasing to the gods to attempt to discover the things, which they in their wisdom had thought fit to conceal. He also said, "that the understanding, unable to bear these towering speculations, often lost itself in the inquiry; as was the case with Anaxagoras, who gloried not a little in the extent of his knowledge: yet this very man asserted, 'that the sun was the same as fire;' forgetful that the eye can bear the light of the fire, whereas the luster of the sun is too dazzling for it to behold. Neither did he consider that the rays of the sun change the skin black, which the fire does not: as also, that its warmth produces and brings to perfection trees and flowers, and fruits of the earth, while it is the property of the fire to wither and consume them. He said, moreover, 'that the sun was no other than a stone thoroughly inflamed;' not perceiving," added Socrates, "that the stone shines not in the fire; neither can remain there any long time without wasting;

whereas the sun abides still the same,—an inexhaustible source of light and warmth to us."

Socrates also recommended the study of arithmetic to his friends; and assisted them, as was his custom, in tracing out the several parts of it, as far as might be useful: but here, as elsewhere, fixed bounds to their inquiries; never suffering them to run out into vain and trifling disquisitions, which could be of no advantage either to themselves or others.

He always earnestly exhorted his friends to be careful of their health: and, to this end, not only advised them to consult those who were skillful therein, but of themselves to be continually attentive to their diet and exercise; always preferring what would keep them in the best health; since they who did this would seldom, he said, want a better physician. And when he found any who could not satisfy themselves with the knowledge that lay within the reach of human wisdom, Socrates advised that they should diligently apply to the study of divination: asserting, that whoever was acquainted with those mediums which the gods made use of when they communicated anything to man, should never be left destitute of divine counsel.

VIII. And now, if any one should be inclined to conclude that Socrates asserted a falsehood, when he declared himself under the guidance of a good genius, seeing he acted in such a manner as to incur the sentence of death: let such a one, I say, consider that he was now already so far advanced in age, that if he died not then, he must die soon after, and that he only relinquished that part of life which is held the most painful, and when the faculties of the mind are greatly impaired: whereas he now manifested to all the world the strength and vigor of his soul, and gained to himself immortal honor by the manner in which he spoke while before his judges. And, indeed, no man was ever known to plead his own cause with that plainness, firmness, and steady regard to

truth; at the same time that he received his condemnation with that meekness and magnanimity as altogether surpassed the example of former ages; it being on all hands universally acknowledged, that no man ever met death in like manner as Socrates.

After his sentence he was obliged to live thirty days in prison, the laws forbidding any one to be put to death until the return of the sacred vessel: during which time his friends conversed with him daily, and saw no change in his behavior, for he still retained that tranquility of mind, and pleasing turn of humor, which had made him so justly admired by all mankind. Now, who could give greater proofs of fortitude? Either, what death could be attended with more honor? But the death which is the most honorable is likewise the most happy; and that which is the most happy is best pleasing to the gods.

I shall further relate what I heard from Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, concerning Socrates. This man being along with him, after the time that Melitus had accused him, and observing that he rather chose to discourse on any other subject than the business of the trial, asked, "Whether it was not necessary to be preparing for his justification?"

"And what!" answered Socrates, "suppose you, Hermogenes! that I have not, throughout life, been preparing for this very thing?" Hermogenes then desiring him to explain his meaning: "I have," said he, "made it the business of my whole life to examine what things were just or unjust; and have as steadily persisted in practicing the one and refraining from the other; and this I take to be the best way of preparing for my trial."

But know you not," replied Hermogenes, "that here, in Athens, the judges often condemn those to death who have no way deserved it, only because their manner of speaking was

displeasing; while, on the other hand, they not less frequently acquit the guilty?"

"I do know it," answered Socrates; "and be assured, Hermogenes, that I did not neglect to take the matter of my defense under consideration,—but the Genius opposed me."

Hermogenes replying, that he talked marvelously; "But why," said he, "should it be marvelous that God should think this the very best time for me to die? Know you not that hitherto I have granted to no man that he has lived either better, or even more pleasurably, than I; if, as I think it is, to be alone solicitous after the attainment of virtue be living well; and the consciousness of making some proficiency therein pleasant: and that I did make some proficiency therein I well perceived, by comparing myself with others, and from the testimony of my own conscience; my friends also saying the same concerning me. Not for that they love me: since, if so, every friend would think the same of him whom he was a friend to; but because, as it seemed to them, they themselves became better men from having much conversed with me. But if my life should be still prolonged, it can hardly be but the infirmities of old age will likewise come upon me: my sight will fail, my hearing grow heavy, and my understanding much impaired; so that I shall find it more difficult to learn, as less easy to retain what I have learnt already; deprived too of the power of performing many of those things which heretofore I have excelled in. And if, after all, I should become insensible to these decays, still life would not be life, but a wearisome burden. And if otherwise, if I indeed find and feel them, how unpleasant, how afflicting, must a state like this prove! If I die wrongfully, the shame must be theirs who put me wrongfully to death: since, if injustice is shameful, so likewise every act of it: but no disgrace will it bring on me, that others have not seen that I was innocent. The examples drawn from former ages sufficiently show us, that those who commit wrong, and

they who suffer it, stand not alike in the remembrance of men: and I am persuaded, that if I now die, I shall be held in far higher estimation by those who come after me than any of my judges; since posterity will not fail to testify concerning me, that I neither wronged, nor yet, by my discourses, corrupted any man; but, contrariwise, strove throughout life, to the utmost of my power, to make all those who conversed with me happy."

In this manner did Socrates continue to discourse with Hermogenes and others: nor are there any among those who knew him, if lovers of virtue, who do not daily regret the loss of his conversation; convinced how much they might have been advantaged thereby.

As to myself, knowing him of a truth to be such a man as I have described; so pious towards the gods, as never to undertake anything without having first consulted them: so just towards men, as never to do an injury, even the very slightest, to any one; while many and great were the benefits he conferred on all with whom he had any dealings: so temperate and chaste, as not to indulge any appetite, or inclination, at the expense of whatever was modest or becoming: so prudent, as never to err in judging of good and evil; nor wanting the assistance of others to discriminate rightly concerning them: so able to discourse upon, and define with the greatest accuracy, not only those points of which we have been speaking, but likewise of every other; and looking as it were into the minds of men, discover the very moment for reprehending vice, or stimulating to the love of virtue. Experiencing, as I have done, all these excellencies in Socrates, I can never cease considering him as the most virtuous and the most happy of all mankind. But if there is anyone who is disposed to think otherwise, let him go and compare Socrates with any other, and afterwards let him determine.

THE BANQUET OF XENOPHON.

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I. I am of opinion, that as well the sayings as the actions of great men deserve to be recorded, whether they treat of serious subjects with the greatest application of mind, or, giving themselves some respite, unbend their thoughts to diversions worthy of them. You will know by the relation I am going to make, what it was inspired me with this thought, being myself present.

During the festival of Minerva, there was a solemn tournament, whither Callias, who tenderly loved Autolycus, carried him, which was soon after the victory which that youth had obtained at the Olympic games. When the show was over, Callias taking Autolycus and his father with him, went down from the city to his house at the Piræum, with Nicerates the son of Nicias.

But upon the way meeting Socrates, Hermogenes, Critobulus, Antisthenes, and Charmides, discoursing together, he gave orders to one of his people to conduct Autolycus and those of his company to his house; and addressing himself to Socrates, and those who were with him, "I could not," said he, "have met with you more opportunely; I treat today Autolycus and his father; and, if I am not deceived, persons who like you have their souls purified by refined contemplations, would do much more honor to our assembly, than your colonels of horse, captains of foot, and other gentlemen of business, who are full of nothing but their offices and employments."

"You are always upon the banter," said Socrates; "for, since you gave so much money to Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus, to be instructed in wisdom, you make but little

account of us, who have no other assistance but from ourselves to acquire knowledge."

"It is true," said Callias, "hitherto I have concealed from you a thousand fine things I learned in the conversation of those gentlemen; but if you will sup with me this evening, I will teach you all I know, and after that I do not doubt you will say I am a man of consequence."

Socrates and the rest thanked him with the civility that was due to a person of so high a rank, that had invited them in so obliging a manner: and Callias, showing an unwillingness to be refused, they at last accepted the invitation, and went along with him. After they had done bathing and anointing, as was the custom before meals, they all went into the eating-room, where Autolycus was seated by his father's side; and each of the rest took his place according to his age or quality.

The whole company became immediately sensible of the power of beauty, and every one at the same time silently confessed, that by natural right the sovereignty belonged to it, especially when attended with modesty and a virtuous bashfulness. Now Autolycus was one of that kind of beauties; and the effect which the sight of so lovely a person produced was to attract the eyes of the whole company to him, as one would do to flashes of lightning in a dark night. All hearts surrendered to his power, and paid homage to the sweet and noble mien and features of his countenance, and the manly gracefulness of his shape.

It is very certain, that in those who are divinely inspired by some good demon, there appears something which makes them behold with the strictest attention, and a pleasing astonishment: whereas, those who are possessed by some evil genius or power, besides the terror that appears in their looks, they talk in a tone that strikes horror, and have a sort of unbounded vehemence in all they say and do, that comes but

little short of madness. Thence it is, as it was in this case, that those who are touched with a just and well-regulated love, discover in their eyes a charming sweetness, in the tone of the voice a musical softness, and in their whole deportment something that expresses in dumb show the innate virtue of their soul.

At length they sat down to supper, and a profound silence was observed, as though it had been enjoined: when a certain buffoon, named Philip, knocked at the door, and bade the servant that opened it tell the gentlemen he was there, and that he came to sup with them; adding, there was no occasion to deliberate whether he should let him in, for that he was perfectly well furnished with everything that could be necessary towards supping well on free cost, his boy being weary with carrying nothing in his belly, and himself extremely fatigued with running about to see where he could fill his own." Callias understanding the arrival of this new guest, ordered him to be let in, saying, "We must not refuse him his dish;" and at the same time turned his eyes towards Autolycus, to discover, probably, the judgment he made of what had passed in the company with relation to him; but Philip coming into the room, "Gentlemen," said he, "you all know I am a buffoon by profession, and therefore am come of my own accord. I choose rather to come uninvited, than put you to the trouble of a formal invitation, having an aversion to ceremony."

"Very well," said Callias, "take a place then Philip; the gentlemen here are full of serious thoughts, and I fancy they will have occasion for somebody to make them laugh."

While supper lasted, Philip failed not to serve them up, now and then, a dish of his profession; he said a thousand ridiculous things; but not having provoked one smile, he discovered sufficient dissatisfaction. Sometime after he fell to it again, and the company heard him again without being

moved. Thereupon he got up, and throwing his cloak over his head, laid himself down at his full length on his couch, without eating one bit more. “What is the matter,” said Callias; “has any sudden illness taken you?”

“Alas!” cried he, fetching a deep sigh from his heart, “the quickest and most sensible pain that ever I felt in my whole life; for, since there is no more laughing in the world, it is plain my business is at an end, and I have nothing now to do but to make a decent exit. Heretofore I have been called to every jolly entertainment, to divert the company with my buffooneries; but to what purpose should they now invite me? I can as soon become a god as say one serious word; and to imagine anyone will give me a meal in hopes of a return in kind, is a mere jest, for my spit was never yet laid down for supper; such a custom never entered my doors.”

While Philip talked in this manner, he held his handkerchief to his eyes, and personated to admiration a man grievously afflicted. Upon which everyone comforted him, and promised, if he would eat, they would laugh as much as he pleased. The pity which the company showed Philip having made Critobulus almost burst his sides, Philip uncovered his face and fell to his supper again, saying, “Rejoice, my soul, and take courage, this will not be your last good meal; I see you will yet be good for something.”

II. They had now taken away, and made effusion of wine in honor of the gods, when a certain Syracusan entered, leading in a handsome girl, who played on the flute; another, that danced and showed very nimble feats of activity; and a beautiful little boy, who danced and played perfectly well on the guitar. After these had sufficiently diverted the company, Socrates, addressing himself to Callias, “In truth,” says he, “you have treated us very handsomely, and have added to the delicacy of eating, other things delightful to our seeing and hearing.”

“But we want perfumes to make up the treat,” answered Callias: “What say you to that?”

“Not at all,” replied Socrates; “perfumes, like habits, are to be used according to decency; some become men, and others women; but I would not that one man should perfume himself for the sake of another: and for the women, especially such as the wife of Critobulus or Nicerates, they have no occasion for perfumes, their natural sweetness supplying the want of them. But it is otherwise if we talk of the smell of that oil that is used in the Olympic games, or other places of public exercise. This, indeed, is sweeter to the men than perfumes to the women; and when they have been for some time disused to it, they only think on it with a greater desire. If you perfume a slave and a freeman, the difference of their birth produces none in the smell; and the scent is perceived as soon in the one as the other: but the odor of honorable toil, as it is acquired with great pains and application, so it is ever sweet, and worthy of a brave man.”

“This is agreeable to young men,” said Lycon; “but as for you and me, who are past the age of these public exercises, what perfumes ought we to have?”

“That of virtue and honor,” said Socrates.

Lycon. “And where is this sort of perfume to be had?”

Soc. “Not in the shops, I assure you.”

Lycon. “Where then?”

Soc. “Theognis sufficiently discovers where, when he tells us in his poem:

“When virtuous thoughts warn? the celestial mind
With generous heat, each sentiment’s refin’d:
Th’ immortal perfumes breathing from the heart,
With grateful odors sweeten every part.

“But when our vicious passions fire the soul,
The clearest fountains grow corrupt and foul;
The virgin springs, which should untainted flow,
Run thick, and blacken all the stream below.”

“Do you understand this, my son?” said Lycon to Autolycus. “He not only understands it, but will practice it too,” said Socrates, “and I am satisfied, when he comes to contend for that noble prize, he will choose a master to instruct him, such as you shall approve of, who will be capable of giving him rules to attain it.”

Then they began all to reassume what Socrates had said. One affirmed there was no master to be found that was qualified to instruct others in virtue; another said it could not be taught: and a third maintained that if virtue could not be taught nothing else could. “Very well,” said Socrates; “but since we cannot agree at present in our opinions about this matter, let us defer the question to another opportunity, and apply ourselves to what is before us; I see the dancing girl entering at the other end of the hall, and she has brought her cymbals along with her.” At the same time the other girl took her flute; the one played and the other danced to admiration; the dancing girl throwing up and catching again her cymbals, so as to answer exactly the cadency of the music, and that with a surprising dexterity. Socrates, who observed her with pleasure, thought it deserved some reflection: and therefore, said he, “This young girl has confirmed me in the opinion I have had of a long time, that the female sex are nothing inferior to ours, excepting only in strength of body, or perhaps steadiness of judgment. Now you, gentlemen, that have wives amongst us, may take my word for it they are capable of learning anything you are willing they should know to make them more useful to you.”

“If so, sir,” said Antisthenes; “if this be the real sentiment of your heart, how comes it you do not instruct Xantippe, who is, beyond dispute, the most insupportable woman that is, has been, or ever will be?”

“I do with her,” said Socrates, “like those who would learn horsemanship: they do not choose easy tame horses, or such as are manageable at pleasure, but the highest metalled and hardest mouthed; believing, if they can tame the natural heat and impetuosity of these, there can be none too hard for them to manage. I propose to myself very near the same thing; for having designed to converse with all sorts of people, I believed I should find nothing to disturb me in their conversation or manners, being once accustomed to bear the unhappy temper of Xantippe.”

The company relished what Socrates said, and the thought appeared very reasonable. Then a hoop being brought in, with swords fixed all around it, their points upwards, and placed in the middle of the hall, the dancing girl immediately leaped head foremost into it, through the midst of the points, and then out again, with a wonderful agility. This sight gave the company more surprise and fear than pleasure, every one believing she would wound herself; but she received no harm, and performed her feats with all the courage and assurance imaginable.

“The company may say what they please,” said Socrates: “but, if I am not mistaken, nobody will deny but courage may be learned, and that there are masters for this virtue in particular, though they will not allow it in the other virtues we were just now speaking of; since a girl, you see, has the courage to throw herself through the midst of naked swords, which I believe none of us dare venture upon.”

“Truly,” said Antisthenes, to whom Socrates spoke, “the Syracusan may soon make his fortune, if he would but show

this girl in a full theatre, and promise the Athenians that, for a considerable sum of money, he would instruct them to be as little afraid of the Lacedæmonian lances as this girl of her swords."

"Ah!" cries the buffoon, "what pleasure should I take to see Pisander, that grave counselor of state, taking lessons from this girl; he that is like to swoon away at the sight of a lance, and says it is a barbarous cruel custom to go to war and kill men."

After this the little boy danced, which gave occasion to Socrates to say, "You see this child, who appeared beautiful enough before, is yet much more so now, by his gesture and motion, than when he stood still."

"You talk," said Charmides, "as if you were inclinable to esteem the trade of a dancing-master."

"Without doubt," said Socrates, "when I observe the usefulness of that exercise, and how the feet, the legs, the neck, and indeed the whole body, are all in action, I believe whoever would have his body supple, easy, and healthful, should learn to dance. And, in good earnest, I am resolved to take a lesson of the Syracusan whenever he pleases." But it was replied, "When you have learned to do all this little boy does, what advantage can it be to you?"

"I shall then dance," said Socrates. At which all the company burst out a laughing: but Socrates, with a composed and serious countenance, "Methinks you are pleasant," said he. "What is it tickles you? Is it because dancing is not a wholesome exercise? or that after it we do not eat and sleep with more pleasure? You know those who accustom themselves to the long foot-race have generally thick legs and narrow shoulders; and, on the contrary, our gladiators [and wrestlers have broad shoulders and small legs. Now, instead of producing such effects, the exercise of dancing occasions in

us so many various motions, and agitating all the members of the body with so equal a poise, renders the whole of a just proportion, both with regard to strength and beauty. What reason then can you find to laugh, when I tell you I design to dance? I hope you would not think it decent for a man of my age to go into a public school, and unrobe myself before all the company to dance? I need not do that; a parlor, like this we are in, will serve my turn. You may see, by this little boy, that one may sweat as well in a little room as an academy, or a public place; and in winter you may dance in a warm apartment; in summer, if the, heat be excessive, in the shade. When I have told you all this, laugh on, if you please, at my saying I design to dance. Besides, you know I have a belly somewhat larger than I could wish; and are you surprised if I endeavor to bring it down by exercise? Have you not heard that Charmides, the other morning, when he came to visit me, found me dancing?"

"Very true," said Charmides; "and I was extremely surprised, and afraid you had lost your senses: but when you had given me the same reasons you have now, I went back to my house; and, though I cannot dance, I began to move my hands and legs, and practice over some lessons, which I remembered something of when I was young."

"Faith!" said Philip to Socrates, "I believe your thighs and shoulders are exactly of the same weight; so that if you put one into one scale, and the other into the other, as the civil magistrate weighs bread in the market-place, you will not be in danger of being forfeited, for there is not an ounce, no not a grain difference between them."

"Well then," said Callias, "when you have an inclination for a lesson of dancing, Socrates, pray call upon me, that we may learn together."

"With all my heart," answered Socrates.

“And I could wish,” said Philip, “that someone would take the flute, and let Socrates and me dance before this good company; for methinks I have a mighty mind that way.” With that he jumped up, and took two or three frisks round the ball, in imitation of the dancing boy and girl. Upon which everybody took notice, that all those gestures or motions, that were so beautiful and easy in the little boy, appeared awkward and ridiculous in Philip: and when the little girl, bending backwards, touched her heels with her head, and flung herself swiftly round three or four times like a wheel, Philip would needs do the same, but in a manner very different; for, bending himself forward, and endeavoring to turn round, you may imagine with what success he came off. Afterwards, when everyone praised the child for keeping her whole body in the exactest and most regular motion in the dance, Philip bade the music strike up a brisker tune, and began to move his head, his arms, and his heels, all at once, till he could hold out no longer: then throwing himself on the couch, he cried out, “I have exercised myself so thoroughly, that I have already one good effect of it, I am plaguy thirsty; boy: bring the great glass that stands on the sideboard, and fill it up to me, for I must drink.”

“Very well,” said Callias; “the whole company shall drink, if you please, master Philip, for we are thirsty too with laughing at you.”

“It is my opinion too,” said Socrates, “that we drink; wine moistens and tempers the spirits, and lulls the cares of the mind to rest, as opium does the body: on the other hand, it revives our joys, and is oil to the dying flame of life. It is with our bodies as with seeds sown in the earth; when they are over-watered they cannot shoot forth, and are unable to penetrate the surface of the ground: but when they have just so much moisture as is requisite, we may behold them break through the clod with vigor; and pushing boldly upwards,

produce their flowers, and then their fruits. It is much the same thing with us; if we drink too much, the whole man is deluged, his spirits are overwhelmed, and is so far from being able to talk reasonably, or indeed to talk at all, that it is with the utmost pain he draws his breath: but if we drink temperately, and small draughts at a time, the wine distils upon our lungs like sweetest morning dew (to use the words of that noble orator Gorgias). It is then the wine commits no rape upon our reason, but pleasantly invites us to agreeable mirth." Everyone was of his opinion; and Philip said he had something to offer, which was this: "Your servants," said he, "that wait at the sideboard should imitate good coachmen, who are never esteemed such till they can turn dexterously and quick." The advice was immediately put in practice, and the servants went round and filled every man his glass.

III. Then the little boy, tuning his guitar to the flute, sung and played at the same time; which gave mighty satisfaction to all the company. Upon this Charmides spoke: "What Socrates," said he, "just now offered about the effects of wine, may, in my opinion, with little difference, be applied to music and beauty, especially when they are found together: for I begin in good earnest to be sensible that this fine mixture buries sorrow, and is at the same time the parent of love." Whereupon Socrates took occasion to say, "If these people are thus capable of diverting us, I am well assured we are now capable ourselves, and I believe nobody here doubts it. In my judgment, it would be shameful for us, now we are met together, not to endeavor to benefit one another by some agreeable or serious entertainment. What say you, gentlemen?" They generally replied, "Begin then the discourse from which we are to hope so good an effect."

"I hope," said Socrates, "to obtain that favor of Callias, if he would but give us a taste of those fine things he learnt of

Prodicus: you know he promised us this when we came to sup with him."

"With all my heart," said Callias, "I am willing, but on condition that you will all please to contribute to the conversation, and every one tell, in his turn, what it is he values himself most upon."

"Be it so," said Socrates.

"I will tell you then," added Callias, "what I esteem most, and value myself chiefly upon: it is this, that I have it in my power to make men better."

"How so," said Antisthenes; "will you teach them to become rich or honest?"

"Justice is honesty," replied Callias. "You are in the right," said Antisthenes, "I do not dispute it; for though there are some occasions when even courage or wisdom may be hurtful to one's friends or the government, yet justice is ever the same, and can never mix with dishonesty."

"When, therefore, every one of us," says Callias, "has told wherein he chiefly values himself, and is most useful to others, I shall then likewise make no scruple to tell you by what arts I am able to perform what I told you: that is, to make men better."

Soc. "But, Nicerates, what is the thing that you value yourself most upon?"

Nic. "It is that my father, designing to make a virtuous man of me, ordered me to get by heart every verse of Homer; and I believe I can repeat you at this minute the whole Iliad and Odyssey."

"But you know very well," said Antisthenes, "every public rehearser, or ballad-singer, does the same at all the corners of the streets."

“I acknowledge it,” said Nicerates; “nor does a day pass but I go to hear them.”

Ant. “I think them a pack of scandalous wretches: What say you?”

Nic. “I am of your opinion.”

Soc. “It is certain they do not know the sense of one verse they recite: but you, who have given so much money to Hesimbrotus, Anaximander, and other wise men, to instruct you in wisdom, you cannot be ignorant of anything.”

“Now it is your turn, Critobulus,” continued Socrates: “tell us then, if you please, what it is you value yourself most upon?”

“On beauty,” replied he.

“But will you say, Socrates, that yours is such as will help to make us better?’

Soc. “I understand you: but if I do not make that out anon, then blame me. What says Antisthenes? upon what does he value himself?”

Ant. “I think I can value myself upon nothing in this world equal to that of being rich.”

He had scarce done speaking, when Hermogenes took him up, and asked him how much he was worth? “Faith, not one halfpenny,” said Antisthenes.

Her. “But you have a good estate in land?” Ant. “I may perhaps have just as much as may afford dust for Autolycus, the next time he has a mind to wrestle.”

Soc. “Charmides, will you, in few words, acquaint us with what it is you value yourself most upon?”

Car. “Poverty.”

Soc. “Very well; you have made an excellent choice: it is indeed in itself of an admirable nature; nobody will be your

rival; you may preserve it without care, and even negligence is its security. These are not small reasons, you see."

Callias. "But, since you have asked the whole company, may we not inquire of you, Socrates, what it is you value yourself upon?"

When Socrates, putting on a very grave and solemn air, answered coldly, and without hesitation, "I value myself upon procuring." The gravity of the speaker, and the manner of speaking a word so little expected from Socrates, set the whole company a laughing.

"Very well, gentlemen," said he, "I am glad you are pleased; but I am very certain this profession of mine, if I apply myself closely to it, will bring in money enough if I pleased."

When Lycon, pointing to Philip; "Well, what say you?"

"You, I suppose, value yourself upon making men laugh?"

"Yes, certainly," said Philip; "and have I not more reason to be proud of myself for this, than that fine spark, Callipides, who is so fond, you know, of making his audience weep, when he { recites his verses in the theatre?"

"But, Lycon," said Antisthenes, "let us know what it is you value yourself most upon? What gives you greatest content?"

You know very well," answered he, "what I esteem the most, and which gives me the greatest pleasure, it is to be the father of such a son as Autolycus."

"And for your son," said some of the company, "he, no question, values himself most upon carrying the prize the other day at the Olympic games?"

"Not so, I assure you," said Autolycus, blushing. And then the whole company turning their eyes with pleasure towards him, one of them asked him, 'What is it, then, Autolycus, you value yourself most upon?'

“It is,” replied he, “that I am the son of such a father and at the same time turned himself lovingly towards him for a kiss.

Callias, who observed it, said to Lycon, “Don’t you know yourself to be the richest man in the world?”

“I cannot tell that,” replied Lycon.

“And yet it is true,” said Callias, “for you would not change this son of yours for the wealth of Persia.”

Lycon. “Be it so; I am then the richest man in the world; nor will I contradict your opinion.”

Then Nicerates addressing himself to Hermogenes: “What is it,” said he, “that you value yourself most upon?”

“On virtue,” answered he, “and the power of my friends: and that, with these two advantages, I have yet the good fortune to be beloved by these friends.”

Then everyone looking upon him, began to inquire who were his friends?”

“I will satisfy you,” said he, “as you shall see, when it comes to my turn.”

IV. Then Socrates resumed the discourse: “Now you have all,” said he, “declared your opinions, as to what you value yourselves most upon, it remains that you prove it. Let us now then hear every man’s reasons, if you please, for his opinion.”

“Hear me first then,” said Callias: “for though you have all been inquiring what justice is, I alone have found the secret to make men just and honest.”

Soc. “How so?”

Call. “By giving them money.”

At these words, Antisthenes rising up, asked him hastily, “Is justice to be found in the heart or the pocket?”

Call. “In the heart.”

Ant. “And would you then make us believe, that by filling a bag with money, you can make the heart honest or just?”

Call. “Most assuredly.”

Ant. “How?”

Call. “Because when they have all things necessary for life, they will not, for the world, run any hazard by committing evil actions.”

Ant. “But do they repay you again what they receive of you?”

Call. “Not at all.”

Ant. “Nothing but gratitude, I hope; good thanks for good money.”

Call. “Not that neither: for I can tell you something you will hardly believe; I have found some people of so evil a nature, that they love me less for receiving benefits from me.” Then Antisthenes replied briskly,

Ant. “That is wonderful: you make men just and honest to others, and they prove unjust and dishonest only to you?”

Call. “Not so wonderful neither!”

“Have we not architects and masons, who build houses for other men, and live in hired lodgings themselves?”

“Have patience, my master,” said he, (turning to Socrates) “and I will prove this beyond dispute.”

“You need not,” said Socrates; “for, beside what you allege for a proof, there is another that occurs to me: Do you not see there are certain diviners who pretend to foretell everything to other people, and are entirely ignorant of what is to happen to themselves.” Socrates said no more.

“It is now my turn to speak,” said Nicerates: “hear then to what I am going to say, attend to a conversation which will necessarily make you better, and more polite. You all know, or I am much mistaken, there is nothing that relates to human life but Homer has spoken of it. Whoever then would learn economy, eloquence, arms; whoever would be master of every

qualification that is to be found in Achilles, Ajax, Ulysses, or Nestor; let him but apply himself to me, and he shall become perfect in them, for I am entirely master of all that."

"Very well," said Antisthenes, "you have learned likewise the art of being a king; for you may remember Homer praises Agamemnon for that he was

"A noble warrior and a mighty prince."

Nicer. "I learnt too, from Homer, how a coachman ought to turn at the end of his career. He ought to incline his body to the left, and give the word to the horse that is on the right, and make use at the same time of a very loose rein. I have learnt all this from him, and another secret too, which, if you please, we will make trial of immediately: the same Homer says somewhere, that an onion relishes well with a bottle. Now let some of your servants bring an onion, and you will see with what pleasure you will drink."

"I know very well," said Charmides, "what he means; Nicerates, gentlemen, thinks deeper than you imagine. He would willingly go home with the scent of an onion in his mouth, that his wife may not be jealous, or suspect he has been kissing abroad."

"A very good thought," said Socrates; "but perhaps I have one full as whimsical, and worthy of him: it is, that an onion does not only relish wine, but victuals too, and gives a higher seasoning: but if we should eat them now after supper, they would say we had committed a debauch at Calais's."

"No, no," said Callias, "you can never think so: but onions, they say, are very good to prepare people for the day of battle, and inspire courage; you know they feed cocks so against they fight: but our business, at present, I presume, is love, not war; and so much for onions."

Then Critobulus began. "I am now," said he, "to give my reasons why I value myself so much upon my beauty. If I am

not handsome (and I know very well what I think of the matter), you ought all of you to be accounted imposters, for without being obliged to it upon oath, when you were asked what was your opinion of me, you all swore I was handsome, and I thought myself obliged to believe you, being men of honor that scorned a lie. If, then, I am really handsome, and you feel the same pleasure that I do when I behold another beautiful person, I am ready to call all the gods to witness, that were it in my choice either to reign king of Persia, or be that beauty, I would quit the empire to preserve my form. In truth, nothing in this world touches me so agreeably as the sight of Amandra, and I could willingly be blind to all other objects, if I might but always enjoy the sight of her I so tenderly love.

"I curse my slumbers, doubly curse the night,
That hides the lovely maid from my desiring sight;
But, oh! I bless the cheerful god's return,
And welcome with my praise the ruddy morn;
Light with the morn returns, return my fair,
She is the light, the morn restores my dear."

"There is something more in the matter, besides this, to be considered. A person that is vigorous and strong, cannot attain his designs but by his strength and vigor; a brave man by his courage; a scholar by his learning and conversation: but the beautiful person does all this, without any pains, by being only looked at. I know very well how sweet the possession of wealth is, but I would sacrifice all to Amandra: and I should with more pleasure give all my estate to her, than to receive a thousand times more from any other. I would lay my liberty at her feet if she would accept me for her slave: fatigue would be much more agreeable to me than repose, and dangers than ease, if endured in the service of Amandra. If, then, you boast yourself so much, Callias, that you can make

men honester by your wealth, I have much more reason to believe I am able to produce in them all sorts of virtue by the mere force of beauty; for when beauty inspires, it makes its votaries generous and industrious; they thereby acquire a noble thirst after glory, and a contempt of dangers; and all this attended with an humble and respectful modesty, which makes them blush to ask what they wish most to possess. I think the government is stark mad, that they do not choose for generals the most beautiful persons in the state; for my part, I would go through fire to follow such a commander, and I believe you would all do the same for me. Doubt not then, Socrates, but beauty may do much good to mankind; nor does it avail to say beauty does soon fade; for there is one beauty of a child, another of a boy, another of a man. There is likewise a beauty of old age, as in those who carry the consecrated branches at the feast of Minerva; for you know for that ceremony they make choice always of the handsomest old men. Now, if it is desirable to obtain without trouble what one wishes, I am satisfied that, without speaking one word, I should sooner persuade that little girl to kiss me than any of you, with all the arguments you can use; no, not you yourself, Socrates, with all the strength of your extolled eloquence."

"Why, Critobulus, do you give yourself this air of vanity," said Socrates, "as if you were handsomer that me?"

"Doubtless," replied Critobulus, "if I have not the advantage of you in beauty, I must be uglier than the Sileni, as they are painted by the poets." Now Socrates had some resemblance to those figures.

Soc. "Take notice, if you please, that this article of beauty will be soon decided anon, after every one has taken his turn to speak: nor shall we call Paris to make a judgment for us, as he did in the case of the three goddesses about the apple: and this very young girl, who you would make us believe had much rather kiss you than any of us, she shall determine it?"

Crit. “And why may not Amandra be as good as a judge of this matter?”

Soc. “Amandra must needs have a large possession of your heart, seeing, by your good will, you would never name any other name but hers.”

Crit. “True; and yet when I do not speak of her, do you think she lives not in my memory? I assure you, if I were a painter or a statuary, I could draw her picture or statue by the idea of her in my mind, as well as if she were to sit to it.”

Soc. “Since then you have her image in your heart, and that image resembles her so strongly, why is it that you importune me continually to carry you to places where you are sure to meet her?”

Crit. “It is because the sight of Amandra only gives me real joy.

“The idea does no solid pleasure give;

She must within my sight, as well as fancy, live.”

Hermogenes interrupted the discourse; and addressing himself to Socrates, said, “You ought not to abandon Critobulus in the condition he is in, for the violent transport and fury of his passion makes me uneasy for him, and I know not where it may end.”

Soc. “What! do you think he is become thus only since he was acquainted with me? You are mightily deceived; for I can assure you this fire has been kindled ever since they were children. Critobulus’s father having observed it, begged of me that I would take care of his son, and endeavor, if I could, by all means to cure him of it. He is better now; things were worse formerly: for I have seen, when Amandra appeared in company, Critobulus, poor creature, would stand as one struck dead, without motion, and his eyes so fixed upon her, as if he had beheld Medusa’s head; insomuch, that it was impossible almost for me to bring him to himself.

“I remember one day, after certain amorous glances, (this is between ourselves only,) he ran up to her and kissed her; and, Heaven knows, nothing gives more fuel to the fire of love than kisses. For this pleasure is not like others, which either lessen or vanish in the enjoyment: on the contrary, it gathers strength the more it is repeated; and flattering our souls with sweet and favorable hopes, bewitches our minds with a thousand beautiful images. Thence it may be, that to love and to kiss are frequently expressed by the same word in the Greek: and it is for that reason, I think, he that would preserve the liberty of his soul, should abstain from kissing handsome people.”

“What, then,” said Charmides, “must I be afraid of coming near a handsome woman? Nevertheless, I remember very well, and I believe you do so too, Socrates, that being one day in company with Critobulus’s beautiful sister, who resembles him so much, as we were searching together for a passage m some author, you held your head very close to that beautiful virgin; and I thought you seemed to take pleasure in touching her naked shoulder with yours.”

“Good God!” replied Socrates, “I will tell you truly how I was punished for it for five days after: I thought I felt in my shoulder a certain tickling pain, as if I had been bit by gnats, or pricked with nettles: and I must confess too, that during all that time I felt a certain hitherto unknown pain at my heart. But, Critobulus, take notice what I am going to tell you before this good company: it is, that I would not have you come too near me, till you have as many hairs upon your chin as your head, for fear you put me in mind of your handsome sister.”

Thus the conversation between these gentlemen was sometimes serious, sometimes in raillery. After this Callias took up the discourse. “It is your turn now,” said he, “Charmides, to tell us what reasons you have for valuing yourself so much upon poverty.”

“I will,” replied Charmides, “and without delay. Is anything more certain, than that it is better to be brave than a coward; a freeman, than a slave; to be credited, than distrusted; to be inquired after for your conversation, than to court others for theirs? These things, I believe, may be granted me without much difficulty. Now, when I was rich, I was in continual fear of having my house broken open by thieves, and my money stolen, or my throat cut upon the account of it. Besides all this, I was forced to keep in fee with some of these petty-fogging rascals that retain to the law, who swarm all over the town like so many locusts. This I was forced to do, because they were always in a condition to hurt me; and I had no way to retaliate upon them. Then I was obliged to bear public offices at my own charges, and to pay taxes: nor was it permitted me to go abroad for travel, to avoid that expense. But now that my estate, which I had without the frontiers of our republic, is all gone, and my land in Attica brings me in no rent, and all my household goods are exposed to sale, I sleep wonderfully sound, and stretched upon my bed as one altogether fearless of officers. The government is now no more jealous of me, nor I of it; thieves fright me not, and I myself affright others. I travel abroad when I please; and when I please I stay at Athens. What is to be free, if this is not? Besides, rich men pay respect to me; they run from me, to leave me the chair, or to give me the wall. In a word, I am now perfectly a king; I was then perfectly a slave. I have yet another advantage from my poverty; I then paid tribute to the republic; now the republic pays tribute to me; for it maintains me. Then everyone snarled at me, because I was often with Socrates. Now that I am poor, I may converse with him, or any other I please, without any body’s being uneasy at it. I have yet another satisfaction: in the days of my estate, either the government or my ill fortune were continually clipping it: now that is all gone, it is impossible to get anything of me; he that

has nothing, can lose nothing. And I have the continual pleasure of hoping to be worth something again, one time or other."

"Don't you pray heartily against riches?" says Callias. "And if you should happen to dream you were rich, would you not sacrifice to the gods to avert the ill omen:"

"No, no," replied Charmides: "but when any flattering hope presents, I wait patiently for the success." Then Socrates turning to Antisthenes; "And what reason have you," said he, "who have very little or no money, to value yourself upon wealth?"

Ant. "Because I am of opinion, gentlemen, that poverty and wealth are not in the coffers of those we call rich or poor, but in the heart only; for I see numbers of very rich men, who believe themselves poor; nor is there any peril or labor they would not expose themselves to, to acquire more wealth. I knew two brothers, the other day, who shared equally their father's estate. The first had enough, and something to spare; the other wanted everything. I have heard likewise of some princes so greedy of wealth, that they were more notoriously criminal in the search of it than private men: for though the latter may sometimes steal, break houses, and sell free persons to slavery, to support the necessities of life; yet those do much worse: they ravage whole countries, put nations to the sword, enslave free states: and all this for the sake of money, and to fill the coffers of their treasury. The truth is, I have a great deal of compassion for these men, when I consider the distemper that afflicts them Is it not an unhappy condition to have a great deal to eat, to eat a great deal, and yet never be satisfied? For my part, though I confess I have no money at home, yet I want none; because I never eat but just as much as will satisfy my hunger, nor drink but to quench my thirst. I clothe myself in such manner that; am as warm abroad as Callias, with all his great abundance. And when I

am at home, the floor and the wall, without mats or tapestry, make my chamber warm enough for me. And as for my bed, such as it is, I find it more difficult to awake than to fall asleep in it. If at any time a natural necessity requires me to converse with women, I part with them as well satisfied as another. For those to whom I make my addresses, having not much practice elsewhere, are as fond of me as if I were a prince. But don't mistake me, gentlemen, for governing my passion in this as in other things: I am so far from desiring to have more pleasure in the enjoyment, that I wish it less; because, upon due consideration, I find those pleasures that touch us in the most sensible manner deserve not to be esteemed the most worthy of us. But observe the chief advantage I reap from my poverty; it is, that in case the little I have should be taken entirely from me, there is no occupation so poor, no employment in life so barren, but would maintain me without the least uneasiness, and afford me a dinner without any trouble. For if I have an inclination at any time to regale myself and indulge my appetite, I can do it easily; it is but going to market, not to buy dainties (they are too dear,) but my temperance gives that quality to the most common food; and, by that means, the contentedness of my mind supplies me with delicacies, that are wanting in the meat itself. Now, it is not the excessive price of what we eat that gives it a relish, but it is necessity and appetite. Of this I have experience just now, while I am speaking; for this generous wine of Thasos, that I am now drinking, the exquisite flavor of it is the occasion that I drink it now without thirst, and consequently without pleasure. Besides all this, I find it is necessary to live thus, in order to live honestly. For he that is content with What he has, will never covet what is his neighbor's. Further, it is certain the wealth I am speaking of makes men liberal. For, Socrates, from whom I have all mine, never gave it me by number or weight; but, whenever I am willing to receive, he loads me

always with as much as I can carry. I do the same by my friends; I never conceal my plenty. On the contrary, I show them all I have, and at the same time I let them share with me. It is from this, likewise, I am become master of one of the most delightful things in the world; I mean, that soft and charming leisure, that permits me to see everything that is worthy to be seen, and to hear everything that is worthy to be heard. It is, in one word, that which affords me the happiness of hearing Socrates from morning to night; for he having no great veneration for those that can only count vast sums of gold and silver, converses only with them who he finds are agreeable to him, and deserve his company."

"Truly," said Callias, "I admire you, and these your excellent riches, for two reasons: first, that thereby you are no slave to the government; and, secondly, that nobody can take it ill you do not lend them money."

"Pray do not admire him for the last," said Nicerates; "for I am about to borrow of him what he most values, that is, to need nothing; for by reading Homer, and especially that passage where he says,

"Ten golden talents, seven three-legg'd stools,

Just twenty cisterns, and twelve charging steeds;"

I have so accustomed myself, from this passage, to be always upon numbering and weighing, that I begin to fear I shall be taken for a miser." Upon this they all laughed heartily; for there was nobody there but believed Nice-rates spoke what he really thought, and what were his real inclinations.

After this, one spoke to Hermogenes: "It is yours now," said he, "to tell us who are your friends; and make it appear, that if they have much power, they have equal will to serve you with it, and, consequently, that you have reason to value yourself upon them."

Hermog. “There is one thing, gentlemen, universally received among barbarians as well as Greeks; and that is, that the gods know both the present and what is to come: and for that reason they are consulted and applied to by all mankind, with sacrifices, to know of them what they ought to do. This supposes that they have the power to do us good or evil; otherwise, why should we pray to them to be delivered from evils that threaten us, or to grant us the good we stand in need of? Now these very gods, who are both all-seeing and all-powerful, they are so much my friends, and have so peculiar a care of me, that be it night, be it day, whether I go anywhere, or take anything in hand, they have me ever in their view and under their protection, and never lose me out of their sight. They foreknow all the events and all the thoughts and actions of us poor mortals; they forewarn us by some secret prescience impressed on our minds, or by some good angel or dream, what we ought to avoid, and what we ought to do. For my part, I have never had occasion yet to repent these secret impulses given me by the gods, but have been often punished for neglecting them.”

“There is nothing in what you have said,” added Socrates, “that should look incredible: but I would willingly hear by what services you oblige the gods to be so much your friends, and to love and take all this care of you?”

“That is done very cheap, and at little or no expense,” replied Hermogenes, “for the praises I give them cost me nothing. If I sacrifice to them after I have received a blessing from them, that very sacrifice is at their own charge. I return them thanks on all occasions; and if at any time I call them to witness, it is never to a lie, or against my conscience.”

“Truly,” said Socrates, “if such men as you have the gods for their friends, and I am sure they have, it is certain those gods take pleasure in good actions and the practice of virtue.”

Here ended their serious entertainment. What followed was of another kind; for all of them turning to Philip, asked him, "What it was he found so very valuable in his profession?"

"Have I not reason to be proud of my trade," said he, "all the world knowing me to be a buffoon? If any good fortune happens to them, they cheerfully invite me; but when any misfortune comes, they avoid me like the plague, lest I should make them laugh in spite of themselves." Nicerates, interrupting him, "You have reason indeed," said he, "to boast of your profession, for it is quite otherwise with me: when my friends have no occasion for me, they avoid me like the plague; but in misfortunes they are ever about me, and, by a forged genealogy, will needs claim kindred with me, and at the same time carry my family up as high as the gods."

"Very well," said Charmides, "now to the rest of the company."

"Well, Mr. Syracusan, What is it which gives you the greatest satisfaction, or that you value yourself most upon? I suppose it is that pretty little girl of yours?"

"Quite contrary," says he; "I have much more pain than pleasure upon her account: I am in constant apprehension and fear when I see certain people so busy about her, and trying all insinuating ways to ruin her."

"Good God!" said Socrates, "What wrong could they pretend to have received from that poor young creature, to do her a mischief? Would they kill her?"

Syr. "I do not speak of killing her; you do not take me, they would willingly get to bed to her."

Soc. "Suppose it were so, why must the girl be ruined therefore?"

Syr. "Ay, doubtless."

Soc. "Do not you lie in bed with her yourself?"

Syr. “Most certainly, all night long.”

Soc. “By Hera, you are a happy fellow to be the only man in the world that do not ruin those you lie with. Well, then, according to your account, what you are proudest of must be, that you are so wholesome and so harmless a bedfellow?”

Syr. “But you are mistaken; it is not her I value myself for neither.”

Soc. “What then?”

Syr. “That there are so many fools in the world; for it is these kind of gentlemen, who come to see my children dance and sing, that supply me with the necessaries of life, which otherwise I might want.”

“I suppose then,” said Philip, “that was the meaning of your prayer you made the other day before the altar, when you asked the gods that there might be plenty of everything in this world wherever you came, but of judgment and good sense?”

“Immortal beings, grant my humble prayer;

Give Athens all the blessings you can spare;

Let them abound in plenty, peace, and pence,

But never let them want a dearth of sense.”

“All is well hitherto,” said Callias: “But, Socrates, what reason have you to make us believe you are fond of the profession you attributed to yourself just now, for really I take it for a scandalous one?”

Soc. “First, let us understand one another; and know in few words what this artist is properly to do, whose very name has made you so merry: but, to be brief, let us, in short, fix upon some one thing that we may all agree in. Shall it be so?”

“Doubtless,” answered all the company: and during the thread of his discourse they made him no other answer but “doubtless.” Having began so,

“Is it not certainly true,” said Socrates, “that the business of an artist of that kind is to manage so as that the person they introduce be perfectly agreeable to one that employs him?”

“Doubtless,” they replied.

“Is it not certain, too, that a good face and fine clothes do mightily contribute towards the making such a person agreeable?”

“Doubtless.”

“Do you not observe that the eyes of the same person look at some times full of pleasure and kindness, and at other times with an air of aversion and scorn?”

“Doubtless.”

“What, does not the same voice sometimes express itself with modesty and sweetness, and sometimes with anger and fierceness?”

“Doubtless.”

“Are there not some discourses that naturally beget hatred and aversion, and others that conciliate love and affection?”

“Doubtless.”

“If, then, this artist be excellent in his profession, ought he not to instruct those that are under his direction which way to make themselves agreeable to others in all these things I have mentioned?”

“Doubtless.”

“But who is most to be valued; he who renders them agreeable to one person only, or he that renders them agreeable to many? Are you not for the last?” Some of them answered him as before, with “doubtless and the rest said, it was very plain that it was much better to please a great many than a few.”

“That is very well,” said Socrates; “we agree upon every head hitherto: but what if the person we are speaking of can instruct his pupil to gain the hearts of a whole state, will not you say he is excellent in his art?”

This, they all agreed, was clear.

“And if he can raise his scholars to such perfection, has he not reason to be proud of his profession? And deserves he not to receive a handsome reward?”

Every one answered, it was their opinion he did.

“Now,” said Socrates, “if there is such a man to be found in the world, it is Antisthenes, or I am mistaken.”

Ant. “How, Socrates! Will you make me one of your scurvy profession?”

Soc. “Certainly, for I know you are perfectly skilled in what may properly be called an appendix to it.”

Ant. “What is that?”

Soc. “Bringing people together.”

To this Antisthenes, with some concern, replied, “Did you ever know me guilty of a thing of this kind.”

Soc. “Yes, but keep your temper. You procured Callias for Prodicus, finding the one was in love with philosophy, and the other in want of money: you did the same before, in procuring Callias for Hippias, who taught him the art of memory; and he is become such a proficient, that he is more amorous now than ever; for every woman he sees, that is tolerably handsome, he can never forget her, so perfectly has he learnt of Hippias the art of memory. You have done yet more than this, Antisthenes; for lately praising a friend of yours, of Heraclea, to me, it gave me a great desire to be acquainted with him: at the same time you praised me to him, which occasioned his desire to be acquainted with me; for which I am mightily obliged to you, for I find him a very worthy man.

Praising likewise in the same manner Esquilius to me, and me to him, did not your discourse inflame us both with such mutual affection, that we searched every day for one another with the utmost impatience till we came acquainted? Now, having observed you capable of bringing about such desirable things, had not I reason to say you are an excellent bringer of people together? I know very well, that one who is capable of being useful to his friend, in fomenting mutual friendship and love between that friend and another he knows to be worthy of him, is likewise capable of begetting the same disposition between towns and states: he is able to make state-marriages; nor has our republic or our allies a subject that may be more useful to them: and yet you were angry with me, as if I had affronted you, when I said you were master of this art."

Ant. "That is true, Socrates; but my anger is now over; and were I really what you say I am, I must have a soul incomparably rich."

Now you have heard in what manner every one spoke, when Callias began again, and said to Critobulus, "Will you not then venture into the lists with Socrates, and dispute beauty with him?"

Soc. "I believe not; for he knows my art gives me some interest with the judges."

Crit. "Come, I will not refuse to enter the lists for once with you; pray then use all your eloquence, and let us know how you prove yourself to be handsomer than I."

Soc. "That shall be done presently; bring but a light, and the thing is done."

Crit. "But, in order to state the question well, you will give me leave to ask a few questions?"

Soc. "I will."

Crit. "But, on second thoughts, I will give you leave to ask what questions you please first."

Soc. “Agreed. Do you believe beauty is nowhere to be found but in man?”

Crit. “Yes certainly, in other creatures too, whether animate, as a horse or bull, or inanimate things, as we say that is a handsome sword, or a fine shield, etc.”

Soc. “But how comes it then, that things so very different as these should yet all of them be handsome?”

Crit. “Because they are well made, either by art or nature, for the purposes they are employed in.”

Soc. “Do you know the use of eyes?”

Crit. “To see.”

Soc. “Well! it is for that very reason mine are handsomer than yours.”

Crit. “Your reason?”

Soc. “Yours see only in a direct line; but, as for mine, I can look not only directly forward, as you, but sideways too, they being seated on a kind of ridge on my face, and staring out.”

Crit. “At that rate, a crab has the advantage of all other animals in matter of eyes?”

Soc. “Certainly: for theirs are incomparably more solid, and better situated than any other creature’s.”

Crit. “Be it so as to eyes; but as to your nose, would you make me believe that yours is better shaped than mine?”

Soc. “There is no room for doubt, if it be granted that God made the nose for the sense of smelling; for your nostrils are turned downward, but mine are wide and turned up towards heaven, to receive smells that come from every part, whether from above or below.”

Crit. “What! is a short flat nose, then, more beautiful than another?”

Soc. “Certainly; because being such, it never hinders the sight of both eyes at once; whereas a high nose parts the eyes

so much by its rising, that it hinders their seeing both of them in a direct line."

Crit. "As to your mouth, I grant it you; for if God has given us a mouth to eat with, it is certain yours will receive and chew as much at once as mine at thrice."

Soc. "Don't you believe too that my kisses are more luscious and sweet than yours, having my lips so thick and large?"

Crit. "According to your reckoning, then, an ass's lips are more beautiful than mine."

Soc. "And lastly, I must excel you in beauty, for this reason: the Naiades, notwithstanding they are sea-goddesses, are said to have brought forth the Sileni; and sure I am much more like them than you can pretend to be. What say you to that?"

Crit. "I say it is impossible to hold a dispute with you, Socrates; and therefore let us determine this point by balloting; and so we shall know presently who has the best of it, you or I: but pray let it be done in the dark, lest Antisthenes's riches and your eloquence should corrupt the judges."

Whereupon the little dancing boy and girl brought in the balloting box, and Socrates called at the same time for a flambeau to be held before Critobulus, that the judges might not be surprised in their judgment. He desired likewise that the conqueror, instead of garters and ribands, as were usual in such victories, should receive a kiss from every one of the company. After this they went to balloting, and it was carried unanimously for Critobulus. Whereupon Socrates said to him, "Indeed, Critobulus, your money has not the same effect with Callias's, to make men juster; for yours, I see, is able to corrupt a judge upon the bench."

VI. After this, some of the company told Critobulus he ought to demand the kisses due to his victory; and the rest said, it was proper to begin with him who made the

proposition. In short, everyone was pleasant in his way except Hermogenes, who spoke not one word all the time; which obliged Socrates to ask him, "If he knew the meaning of the word *paroinia*?"

Her. "If you ask me what it is precisely, I do not know; but if you ask my opinion of it, perhaps I can tell you what it may be."

Soc. "That is enough."

Her. "I believe, then, that *paroinia* signifies the pain and uneasiness we undergo in the company of people that we are not pleased with."

"Be assured then," said Socrates, "this is what has occasioned that prudent silence of yours all this time."

Her. "How my silence! when you were all speaking?"

Soc. "No, but your silence when we have done speaking and made a full stop."

Her. "Well said, indeed! No sooner one has done but another begins to speak; and I am so far from being able to get in a sentence, that I cannot find room to edge in a syllable."

"Ah, then," said Socrates to Callias, "cannot you assist a man that is thus out of humor?"

"Yes," said Callias; "for I will be bold to say, when the music begins again, everybody will be silent as well as Hermogenes."

Her. "You would have me do then as the poet Nicostratus, who used to recite his grand iambics to the sound of his flute: and it would be certainly very pretty if I should talk to you all the time the music played."

"For God's sake do so," said Socrates; "for as the harmony is the more agreeable that the voice and the instrument go together, so your discourse will be more entertaining for the music that accompanies it; and the more delightful still, if you

give life to your words by your gesture and motion, as the little girl does with her flute."

"But when Antisthenes," said Callias, " is pleased to be angry in company, what flute will be tunable enough to his voice?"

Ant. "I do not know what occasion there will be for flutes tuned to my voice; but I know, that when I am angry with any one in dispute, I am loud enough, and I know my own weak side."

As they were talking thus, the Syracusan observing they took no great notice of anything he could show them, but that they entertained one another on subjects out of his road, was out of all temper with Socrates, who he saw gave occasion at every turn for some new discourse.

"Are you," said he to him, "that Socrates who is surnamed the *Contemplative*?'

Soc. "Yes," said Socrates: "and is it not much more preferable to be called so, than by another name, for some opposite quality?"

Syr. "Let that pass. But they do not only say in general that Socrates is contemplative, but that he contemplates things that are sublime."

Soc. "Know you anything in the world so sublime and elevated as the gods?"

Syr. "No. But I am told your contemplations run not that way. They say they are but trifling; and that, in searching after things above your reach, your inquiries are good for nothing."

Soc. "It is by this, if I deceive not myself, that I attain to the knowledge of the gods: for it is from above that the gods make us sensible of their assistance; it is from above they inspire us with knowledge. But if what I have said appears dry and insipid, you are the cause, for forcing me to answer you."

Syr. “Let us then talk of something else. Tell me then the just measure of the skip of a flea; for I hear you are a subtle geometrician, and understand the mathematics perfectly well.”

But Antisthenes, who was displeased with his discourse, addressing himself to Philip, told him: “You are wonderfully happy, I know, in making comparisons. 2 Pray who is this Syracusan like, Philip? Does he not resemble a man that is apt to give affronts, and say shocking things in company?”

“Faith,” said Philip, “he appears so to me, and I believe to everybody else.”

“Have a care,” said Socrates; “do not affront him, lest you fall under the character yourself that you would give him.”

Phil. “Suppose I compare him to a well-bred person: I hope nobody will say I affront him then?”

Soc. “So much the more,” said Socrates; “such a comparison must needs affront him to some purpose.”

Phil. “Would you then that I compare him to some one that is neither honest nor good?”

Soc. “By no means.”

Phil. “Who must I compare him to then? To “nobody?”

Soc. Nobody.”

Phil. “But it is not proper we should be silent at a feast.”

Soc. “That is true; but it is as true we ought rather be silent than say anything we ought not to say.”

Thus ended the dispute between Socrates and Philip.

VII. However, some of the company were for having Philip make his comparisons; others were against it, as not liking that sort of diversion; so that there was a great noise about it in the room: which Socrates observing, “Very well,” said he, “since you are for speaking all together, it were as well, in my opinion, that we should sing all together and with that he

began to sing himself. When he had done, they brought the dancing girl one of those wheels the potters use, with which she was to divert the company in turning herself round it. Upon which Socrates, turning to the Syracusan: “I believe I shall pass for a contemplative person indeed,” said he, “as you called me just now, for I am now considering how it comes to pass that those two little actors of yours give us pleasure in seeing them perform their tricks, without any pain to themselves, which is what I know you design. I am sensible that for the little girl to jump head foremost into the hoop of swords, with their points upwards, as she has done just now, must be a very dangerous leap; but I am not convinced that such a spectacle is proper for a feast. I confess likewise, it is a surprising sight to see a person writing and reading at the same time that she is carried round with the motion of the wheel, as the girl has done; but yet I must own it gives me no great pleasure. For would it not be much more agreeable to see her in a natural easy posture, than putting her handsome body into an unnatural agitation, merely to imitate the motion of a wheel? Neither is it so rare to meet with surprising and wonderful sights; for here is one before our eyes, if you please to take notice of it. Why does that lamp, whose flame is pure and bright, give all the light to the room, when that looking-glass gives none at all, and yet represents distinctly all objects in its surface? Why does that oil, which is in its own nature wet, augment the flame; and that water, which is wet likewise, extinguish it?

But these questions are not proper at this time. And, indeed, if the two children were to dance to the sound of the flute, dressed in the habits of nymphs, the graces, or the four seasons of the year, as they are commonly painted, they might undergo less pain, and we receive more pleasure.”

“You are in the right, sir,” said the Syracusan to Socrates; “and I am going to represent something of that kind, that

certainly must divert you and at the same time went out to make it ready, when Socrates began a new discourse.

VIII. “What then,” said he, “must we part without saying a word of the attributes of that great demon, or power, who is present here, and equals in age the immortal gods, though, to look at, he resembles but a child? That demon, who by his mighty power is master of all things, and yet is engrafted into the very essence and constitution of the soul of man; I mean Love. We may indeed with reason extol his empire, as having more experience of it than the vulgar, who are not initiated into the mysteries of that great god as we are. Truly, to speak for one, I never remember I was without being in love: I know, too, that Charmides has had a great many lovers, and being much beloved, has loved again. As for Critobulus, he is still of an age to love, and to be beloved; and Nicerates too, who loves so passionately his wife, at least as report goes, is equally beloved by her. And who of us does not know that the object of that noble passion and love of Hermogenes, is virtue and honesty? Consider, pray, the severity of his brows, his piercing and fixed eyes, his discourse so composed and strong, the sweetness of his voice, the gaiety of his manners. And what is yet more wonderful in him, that, so beloved as he is by his friends the gods, he does not disdain us mortals. But for you, Antisthenes, are you the only person in the company that does not love?”

Ant. “No! for in faith I love you, Socrates, with all my heart.”

Then Socrates rallying him, and counterfeiting an angry air, said, “Do not trouble me with it now; you see I have other business upon my hands at present.”

Ant. “I confess you must be an expert master of the trade you valued yourself so much upon a while ago; for sometimes you will not be at the pains to speak to me, and at other times

you pretend your demon will not permit you, or that you have other business."

Soc. "Spare me a little, Antisthenes; I can bear well enough any other troubles that you give me, and I will always bear them as a friend; but I blush to speak of the passion you have for me, since I fear you are not enamored with the beauty of my soul, but with that of my body."

"As for you, Callias, you love, as well as the rest of us: for who is it that is ignorant of your love for Autolycus? It is the town-talk; and foreigners, as well as our citizens, are acquainted with it. The reasons for your loving him, I believe to be, that you are both of you born of illustrious families; and, at the same time, are both possessed of personal qualities that render you yet more illustrious. For me, I always admired the sweetness and evenness of your temper; but much more, when I consider that your passion for Autolycus is placed on a person who has nothing luxurious or affected in him; but in all things shows a vigor and temperance worthy of a virtuous soul; which is a proof, at the same time, that if he is infinitely beloved, he deserves to be so.

"I confess, indeed, I am not firmly persuaded whether there be but one Venus or two, the celestial and the vulgar: and it may be with this goddess, as with Zeus, who has many different names, though there is still but one Zeus. But I know very well that both the Venuses have altogether different altars, temples, and sacrifices. The vulgar Venus is worshipped after a common, negligent manner; whereas the celestial one is adored in purity and sanctity of life. The vulgar inspires mankind with the love of the body only, but the celestial fires the mind with the love of the soul, with friendship, and a generous thirst after noble actions. I hope that it is this last kind of love that has touched the heart of Callias. This I believe, because the person he loves is truly virtuous; and whenever he desires to converse with him, it is

in the presence of his father, which is a proof his love is perfectly honorable."

Upon which Hermogenes began to speak: "I have always admired you, Socrates, on every occasion, but much more now than ever. You are complaisant to Callias, and indulge his passion. And this your complaisance is agreeable to him; so it is wholesome and instructive, teaching him in what manner he ought to love."

"That is true," said Socrates; "and that my advice may please him yet the more, I will endeavor to prove that the love of the soul is incomparably preferable to that of the body. I say then, and we all feel the truth of it, that no company can be truly agreeable to us without friendship; and we generally say, whoever entertains a great value and esteem for the manners and behavior of a man, he must necessarily love him. We know, likewise, that among those who love the body only, they many times disapprove the humor of the person they so love, and hate perhaps at the same time the mind and temper, while they endeavor to possess the body. Yet further, let us suppose a mutual passion between two lovers of this kind; it is very certain that the power of beauty, which gives birth to that love, does soon decay and vanish: and how is it possible that love, built on such a weak foundation, should subsist, when the cause that produced it has ceased? But it is otherwise with the soul; for the more she ripens, and the longer she endures, the more lovely she becomes. Besides, as the constant use of the finest delicacies is attended, in progress of time, with disgust; so the constant enjoyment of the finest beauty palls the appetite at last. But that love that terminates on the bright qualities of the soul, becomes still more and more ardent: and, because it is in its nature altogether pure and chaste, it admits of no satiety. Neither let us think, with some people that this passion, so pure and so chaste, is less charming, or less strong than the other. On the

contrary, those who love in this manner are possessed of all that we ask in that our common prayer to Venus: 'Grant, O goddess! that we may say nothing but what is agreeable, and do nothing but what does please.' Now, I think it is needless to prove, that a person of a noble mien, generous and polite, modest and well-bred, and in a fair way to rise in the state, ought first to be touched with a just esteem for the good qualities of the person he courts, for this will be granted by all. But I am going to prove, in few words, that the person thus addressed to must infallibly return the love of a man that is thus endued with such shining accomplishments. For, is it possible for a woman to hate a man, who she believes has infinite merit, and who makes his addresses to her upon the motive of doing justice to her honor and virtue, rather than from a principle of pleasing his appetite? And how great is the contentment we feel, when we are persuaded that no light faults or errors shall ever disturb the course of a friendship so happily begun, or that the diminution of beauty shall never lessen one's affection? How can it ever happen otherwise, but that persons who love one another thus tenderly, and with all the liberties of a pure and sacred friendship, should take the utmost satisfaction in one another's company, in discoursing together with an entire confidence, in mingling their mutual interests, and rejoicing in their good fortune, and bearing a share in their bad? Such lovers must needs partake of one another's joy or grief, be merry and rejoice with one another in health, and pay the closest and tenderest attendance on one another when sick, and express rather a greater concern for them when absent, than present. Does not Venus and the Graces shower down their blessings on those who love thus? For my part, I take such to be perfectly happy; and a friendship like this must necessarily persevere to the end of their lives, uninterrupted and altogether pure. But I confess I cannot see any reason why one that loves only the exterior

beauty of the person he courts, should be loved again. Is it because he endeavors to obtain something from her, that gives him pleasure, but her shame? Or is it, because in the conduct of their passion they carefully conceal the knowledge of it from their parents or friends? Somebody, perhaps, may object, that we ought to make a different judgment of those who use violence, and of those who endeavor to gain their point by the force of persuasion; but, I say, these last deserve more hatred than the first. The first appear in their proper colors, for wicked persons; and so everyone is on their guard against such open villainy; whereas the last, by sly insinuations, insensibly corrupt and defile the mind of the person they pretend to love. Besides, why should they, who barter their beauty for money, be supposed to have a greater affection for the purchasers, than the trader, who sells his goods in the market-place, has for his chapmen that pays him down the price. Do not be surprised, then, if such lovers as these meet often with the contempt they deserve. There is one thing more in this case worthy of your consideration; we shall never find that the love which terminates in the noble qualities of the mind has ever produced any dismal effects. But there are innumerable examples of tragic consequences, which have attended that love which is fixed only on the beauty of the body. Chiron and Phoenix loved Achilles, but after a virtuous manner, without any other design than to render him a more accomplished person. Achilles likewise loved and honored them in return, and held them both in the highest veneration. And indeed I should wonder, if one that is perfectly accomplished should not entertain the last contempt for those who admire only their personal beauty. Nor is it hard to prove, Callias, that gods and heroes have always had more passion and esteem for the charms of the soul, than those of the body: at least this seems to have been the opinion of our ancient authors. For we may observe in the fables of antiquity, that

Zeus, who loved several mortals upon the account of their personal beauty only, never conferred upon them immortality. Whereas it was otherwise with Hercules, Castor, Pollex, and several others; for having admired and applauded the greatness of their courage, and the beauty of their minds, he enrolled them in the number of the gods. And, whatever some affirm to the contrary of Ganymede, I take it he was carried up to heaven from mount Olympus, not for the beauty of his body, but that of his mind. At least his name seems to confirm my opinion, which in the Greek seems to express as much as, 'to take pleasure in good counsel, and in the practice of wisdom.' When Homer represents Achilles so gloriously revenging the death of Patroclus, it was not properly the passion of love that produced that noble resentment, but that pure friendship and esteem he had for his partner in arms. Why is it, that the memory of Pylades and Orestes, Theseus and Perithous, and other demigods, are to this day so highly celebrated? Was it for the love of the body, think you? No! by no means: it was the particular esteem and friendship they had for one another, and the mutual assistance every one gave to his friend, in those renowned and immortal enterprises, which are to this day the subject of our histories and hymns. And, pray, who are they that performed those glorious actions? Not they that abandoned themselves to pleasure, but they that thirsted after glory; and who, to acquire that glory, underwent the severest toils, and almost insuperable difficulties.

"You are then infinitely obliged to the gods, Callias, who have inspired you with love and friendship for Autolycus, as they have inspired Critobulus with the same for Amandra; for real and pure friendship knows no difference in sexes. It is certain Autolycus has the most ardent passion for glory; since, in order to carry the prize at the Olympic games, and be proclaimed victor by the heralds, with sound of trumpet, as

he lately was, he must needs have undergone numberless hardships and the greatest fatigues: for no less was required towards gaining the victory in so many different exercises. But if he proposes to himself, as I am sure he does, to acquire further glory, to become an ornament to his family, beneficent to his friends, to extend the limits of his country by his valor, and by all honest endeavors to gain the esteem of Barbarians as well as Greeks: do not you believe he will always have the greatest value for one who he believes may be useful and assistant to him in so noble a design? If you would then prove acceptable, Callias, to any one you love, you ought to consider and imitate those methods by which Themistocles rose to the first dignities of the state, and acquired the glorious title of The Deliverer of Greece; the methods by which Pericles acquired that consummate wisdom, which proved so beneficial, and brought immortal honor to his native country. You ought to ponder well how it was, that Solon became the lawgiver to this republic of Athens, and by what honorable means the Lacedæmonians have arrived to such wonderful skill in the art of war: and this last you may easily acquire, by entertaining, as you do, at your house, some of the most accomplished Spartans. When you have sufficiently pondered all these things, and imprinted those noble images upon your mind, doubt not but your country will some time or other court you to accept the reins of government, you having already the advantage of a noble birth, and that important office of high priest, which gives you a greater luster already, than any of your renowned ancestors could ever boast of: and let me add that air of greatness, which shines in your person, and that strength and vigor that is lodged in so handsome a body, capable of the severest toils, and the most difficult enterprises."

Socrates having said all this to Callias, addressed himself to the company, and said: "I know very well this discourse is

too serious for a feast, but you will not be surprised, when you consider that our commonwealth has been always fond of those who, to the goodness of their natural temper, have added an indefatigable search after glory and virtue. And in this fondness of mine for such men, I but imitate the genius of my country."

After this the company began to entertain one another, upon the subject of this last discourse of Socrates: when Callias, with a modest blush in his face, addressed himself to him: "You must then lend me," said he, "the assistance of your art, to which you gave such a surprising name a while ago, to render me acceptable to the commonwealth, and that when it shall please my country to entrust me with the care of its affairs, I may so behave myself as to preserve its good opinion, and never do anything, but what tends to the public good."

"You will certainly succeed; do not doubt it," said Socrates. "You must apply yourself in good earnest to virtue, and not content yourself, as some people do, with the appearance of it only, as if that might suffice. For now, Callias, that false glory can never subsist long. Flattery or dissimulation may for a while varnish over such a rotten structure; but it must tumble down at last. On the contrary, solid glory will always maintain its post; unless God, for some secret reasons, hid from us, think fit to oppose its progress: otherwise, that sublime virtue, which every man of honor should aim at, does naturally reflect back upon him such rays of glory, as grow brighter and brighter every day, in proportion as his virtue rises higher and higher."

IX. The discourse being ended, Autolycus rose to take a walk, and his father following turned towards Socrates, and said, "Socrates, I must declare my opinion, that you are a truly honest man."

After this, there was an elbow chair brought into the middle of the room, and the Syracusan appearing at the same time; “Gentlemen,” said he, “Ariadne is just now entering; and Bacchus, who has made a debauch to day with the gods, is coming down to wait upon her: and I can assure you, they will both divert the company and one another. Immediately Ariadne entered the room, richly dressed, in the habit of a bride, and placed herself in the elbow chair. A little after Bacchus appeared, while at the same time the girl that played on the flute struck up an air that used to be sung at the festival of that god. It was then that the Syracusan was admired for an excellent master in his art: for Ariadne being perfectly well instructed in her part, failed not to show, by her pretty insinuating manner, that she was touched with the air of the music; and that though she rose not from her chair to meet her lover, she yet expressed sufficiently the great desire she had to do it. Bacchus perceiving it, came on dancing toward her, in the most passionate manner, then sat himself down on her lap, and taking her in his arms, kissed her. As for Ariadne, she personated to the life a bride’s modesty; and for a while, looking down to the ground, appeared in the greatest confusion; but at length recovering herself, she threw her arms about her lover’s neck, and returned his kisses. All the company expressed the great satisfaction the performance gave them; and, indeed nothing could be better acted, nor accompanied with more grace in the acting. But when Bacchus rose, and took Ariadne by the hand to lead her out, they were still more pleased; for the pretty couple appeared to embrace and kiss one another after a much more feeling manner than is generally acted on the stage. Then Bacchus addressing himself to Ariadne, said, “Dost you love me, my dearest creature?”

“Yes, yes,” answered she, “let me die if I do not; and will love you to the last moment of my life.” In fine, the

performance was so lively and natural that the company came to be fully convinced of what they never dreamt of before; that the little boy and girl were really in love with one another: which occasioned both the married guests, and some of those that were not, to take horse immediately, and ride back full speed to Athens, with the briskest resolutions imaginable. I know not what happened afterwards; but for Socrates, and some who stayed behind, they went a walking with Lycon, Autolycus, and Callias.

THE SCIENCE OF GOOD HUSBANDRY;

THE ECONOMICS OF XENOPHON.

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I. I remember once to have heard the learned Socrates reasoning with Critobulus, concerning the management of a house, in the following manner:

Soc. "Tell me, Critobulus, whether the ordering of a house is a science, such as that of physic, or the braziers, and of the masons?"

Crit. "My opinion is, that the good management of a house is as great a science as either masonry, or physic, or any other; from whence we may infer there is a distinct business or duty belonging to an economist or housekeeper, as well as to any science whatever: a farmer or a master of a family ought to be a good judge of every particular which relates to the good ordering of his farm or house."

Soc. "But may we not find a trusty steward well skilled in this science, who may take the management of the household upon him, and save the master the trouble? for a master mason employs a deputy under him, who will do his work as well as himself; and for the same reason we may expect that a steward well skilled in the management of a house, may be as serviceable to his master as the mason's deputy."

Crit. "I am of the same opinion, good Socrates."

Soc. "Then the man who is well skilled in this science, though he has no property of his own, may gain a comfortable living by directing another man's house. For the man would be worthy of the master's favor, and a good steward, if in the discharging of his stewardship he could improve his master's house. But what do we mean by the word house, or the economy of it? Is it only the good distribution of the things

that are in the house? or is it the good management and improvement of everything belonging to a house, and the master of it."

Crit. "It is my opinion, that a man's estate, whether it lie in or about the house, or remote from it, yet every branch of that estate may be said to belong to the house; no everything that a man has, except his enemies, which some men have in great numbers, but these are not to be reckoned among his goods or substance. It would be ridiculous if we were to say that the man who had been the occasion of making us more enemies than we had before, should be rewarded with favor or money; but a man's enemies, or anything which he possesses to his hurt or prejudice, must not I suppose, be reckoned among his goods: therefore I conclude, that those things only which contribute to the welfare of a man may be reckoned among his riches, or be properly called his goods."

Soc. "I am of the same mind, that whatever is injurious to a man must not be esteemed a part of his goods; for if a man buy a horse, and for want of skill to manage him, he falls from him and hurts himself, can that horse be reckoned amongst his goods? No, certainly; because those things should be called goods that are beneficial to the master. Neither can those lands be called goods, which by a man's unskillful management put him to more expense than he receives profit by them; nor may those lands be called goods, which do not bring a good farmer such a profit as may give him a good living: so likewise if a man has a flock of sheep, and they come to damage by his unskillful management, he cannot reckon them among his goods."

Crit. "So these may only be called goods which are profitable, and those which are hurtful be deemed the contrary."

Soc. “You distinguish right, that nothing ought to be esteemed goods to any man which he does not receive advantage by; and that those things which bring him disprofit must be esteemed the contrary. A flute, when it is in the hands of a person who can play well upon it, is an advantage, and may be reckoned among his goods; but the same instrument in the possession of one who does not know the use of it, is no better to him than a stone, unless he sells it, and then the price of it may be accounted among his goods; but if he keeps it, when he has no knowledge of its use, it cannot be ranked among them.”

Crit. “I agree with you in this point, that those things only which are profitable may be called goods: the flute, while we keep it unemployed, is no part of our goods, for we have no advantage from it; but if we sell it, it is then profitable to us.”

Soc. “You say right, if a man has wit enough to sell it well: but when it is sold, and the man has not wisdom enough to use the value of it to his advantage, yet whatever price he gets for it cannot be esteemed to be good.”

Crit. “By this you seem to intimate that money itself is not good, if it is in the hands of one who does not know how to use it.”

Soc. “Yes, certainly; for we have already agreed that nothing may be esteemed good but what we can get profit by. If a man bestow the money he gets upon harlots, and by continual conversing with them he impairs his health, and abandons the care of his estate, then his money is no profit to him; but, on the contrary, is an errant poison, which will shortly bring him to destruction: therefore, friend Critobulus, money is good only to those who know how to use it; but to those who know not rightly the value of it, it were better for them to cast it away, to avoid the damage it would do them.”

Crit. “But what say you of friends? If a man knows how to use them, and make them profitable to him, what shall we esteem them to be?”

Soc. “These may truly be called goods; they ought to be preferred before our houses, our land, our cattle, or our flocks; the profit which may arise by them may be superior to all others.”

Crit. “Then by the same rule our enemies may be esteemed goods, if we knowhow to profit ourselves by them.”

Soc. “Undoubtedly they are so; therefore it behooves a master of a house to use his enemies with that discretion that he may make them advantageous to him by any means: for how many instances have we, good Critobulus, of ordinary men, as well as of noblemen and kings, who have increased and amplified their fortunes by law, and warring with their enemies.”

Crit. “You reason well, good Socrates, of these matters. But what think you of those who have good learning, and many other good properties, whereby they have every opportunity of improving their estates, and yet never put their minds to it? We have many instances of men with these qualifications, who never regard the advancement of their fortunes; shall we then reckon their learning, or their other properties, among their goods, seeing they make no advantage of them, or ought we to esteem them the contrary?”

Soc. “I imagine you mean bondmen, or such other vile persons.”

Crit. “No, good Socrates; but the persons I speak of are young gentlemen, who are expert in affairs of war, as well as peace; and yet they abandon their knowledge for trifles; and such as them I esteem in a worse condition than bondmen; for I suppose they do not employ themselves in the sciences

they have been bred to, because they have not masters to direct them or set them to work."

Soc. "How can that be, friend Critobulus, that they are without directors? they have many masters, which, when they would study their felicity and their advantage, lead them away from their virtuous inclinations."

Crit. "These masters then are invisible!"

Soc. "Not so invisible, good Critobulus, but that we may easily discover them to be the most mischievous of any that reign upon earth. What think you of sloth, idleness, negligence, want of public spirit? Where these govern, what can we expect but mischief? But, besides these, there are others which govern under the name of pleasures; as gaming, lewd company, rioting, and such others, which in process of time teach their adherents that pleasures are not without their inconveniences. These rulers keep them so much in servitude, that they do not allow them the least liberty to do anything for their advantage."

Crit. "But there are others, friend Socrates, who have none of these directors to prevent their welfare, but apply themselves assiduously to business, and give their minds entirely to the advancement of their fortunes, and yet waste their estates, ruin their families, and destroy themselves, without hope of redemption."

Soc. "These also are bondmen, and are rather worse slaves than the others, for these have the most severe masters of the two: some are under the tyranny of drunkenness, others slaves to gluttony, and some to vanity and vain-glory; all which keep their subjects in that severity of servitude, that as long as they find them young, lusty, and able to work, they make them bring all that they can get by any means to bestow upon these lusts and pleasures; but as soon as they perceive them to grow so old, that they can labor no longer for them,

they are then turned off to lead the remainder of their days in want and misery, while their quondam masters are contriving to ensnare others in their room. Wherefore, good Critobulus, we ought by all means to resist such invaders of our liberties, even with as much force and resolution as we would oppose an enemy who with sword in hand attempts to bring us into slavery. There are some enemies who have wisdom and goodness enough, when they have brought men into their subjection, to learn them government and moderation, which before were proud and arrogant. But as for the tyrants I have mentioned before, they never cease harassing and tormenting both the bodies and estates of those which fall into their hands, till they have utterly destroyed them."

II. Crit. "You have sufficiently spoken to this point; and, now I examine myself, I verily believe I have conduct and courage enough to resist such deceitful invaders; and I now desire your advice concerning the management of my house, that both myself and fortune may be improved; for I am persuaded I shall not be overcome by those enemies to reason which you have so largely exposed. And therefore, good Socrates, give me your deliberate opinion how I shall act for the good of myself and estate; although perhaps you may think that we are already rich enough."

Soc. "For my own part, if I am one of those you speak of, I want nothing, I have riches enough; but for yourself, Critobulus, I esteem you a very poor man; and, by the faith I owe to the gods, I often pity you."

Crit. "Your discourse makes me laugh! If you are so very rich as you esteem yourself, pray inform me what may be the value of all your estate if it were sold, and what do you imagine is the worth of all my possessions?"

Soc. "Perhaps, if I sell all my possessions at a good market, I may gain five or six pounds for them: but I know very well,

that were your whole estate to be sold, the price would be more than a thousand times as much; and yet though you know this, you are still desirous to increase your estate, and upbraid me with my poverty. What I possess is enough to supply me with necessaries; but to support your grandeur, and draw the respect due to your quality and the post you possess, I am of opinion, that were you master of four times as much as you have already, you would still be in want."

Crit. "I do not conceive how that can be."

Soc. "In the first place, your rank requires you to feast and make entertainments for the people, to gain their good-will, and command their respect. In the next place, you must live hospitably, and receive and entertain all strangers, and gain their esteem. And in the third place, you must continually be doing good offices to your fellow citizens, that upon an emergency you may find friends. Besides, I already observe that the city of Athens begins to put you upon expensive works; viz. to furnish them with horses, to raise public buildings, to muster men, to erect theatres, and to treat the citizens with plays. But if this nation should be once involved in war, I am sure their demand upon you in taxes, and other duties, will be as much as your purse will be able to bear. And when that happens, if you are discovered to conceal any of your riches, or do not answer their demands to your full power, you must undergo the same punishment as if you had robbed the common treasury. And, besides, I find you possessed with the opinion that you have riches enough, and therefore give yourself up to vain and trifling pleasures, which is the effect of your riches. It is for these reasons, good Critobulus, that I grieve for you lest you fall under misfortunes that may end in the greatest poverty without remedy: and for myself, if I should be necessitous, you know very well that many would relieve me; and if I received but a little of every one, I should have more money than would satisfy my wants:

but, as for your friends, though they have more riches in their stations, than you possess in yours, they have yet expectations of preferment from you."

Crit. "I confess I find nothing amiss in your discourse. I so much approve of it, that my greatest desire is, that you will instruct me with such good precepts as may preserve me from the misery you speak of, and that I may never be an object of your compassion, unless it be in a good cause."

Soc. "I suppose then, friend Critobulus, you are not now in the same laughing mind you was in, when I told you I had riches enough; do you now believe I know wherein consists the value of riches? You ridiculed me when you made me confess that I had not by a thousandth part so much as you have, and now you desire my most friendly instructions to keep you from extreme poverty."

Crit. "I perceive, good Socrates, that you have sufficient wisdom to instruct a man how to gain true riches, even in the greatest plenty: and I am persuaded, that the man who knows how to make the most of a little, is no less capable of managing the greatest fortune."

Soc. "You may remember, that towards the beginning of our discourse I told you that horses ought not to be reckoned among the goods of those who know not how to use them, nor land, nor sheep, nor money, or any other thing whatever; and yet every one of these are profitable, when they are used discreetly. As for my own part, I have never had any of these; and how then should I be able to inform you of the use of them? But though a man has neither money nor goods, yet I am persuaded there is such a science as the good ordering of a house. Why then, good Critobulus, should you not be master of this science? For the reason why every man cannot play well upon the flute, is either because he has not a flute of his own, or cannot borrow a flute of another to practice upon. The

same impediment have I in the science of ordering a house; for I was never yet master of the implements belonging to housekeeping, neither goods nor money; nor was there ever any who entrusted me with the management of their house, or estate, although you now desire my directions. But you are sensible, that learners of music in the beginning spoil their instruments: so that were I now to begin my practice upon your estate, I should destroy it."

Crit. "Thus you endeavor to evade the business I desire you to undertake, and would shun taking share with me in the management of my affairs."

Soc. "That is not the case. I am willing to serve you in anything within the bounds of my capacity. But suppose you was in want of fire, and came to me for it, and I had none, but directed you to a place where you might have it: would not that be of the same account? Or if you want water, and I have it not, but direct you where to have it, will not that be as agreeable to you? And if you would be instructed in music, and I directed you to a better judge in music than myself, would not that answer your design? Therefore, since I have no knowledge of myself in the affair you speak of, the best pleasure I can do you, is to recommend you to such persons who are most expert in the business you require; and that, I judge, I am able to do; for I have made it my business to search out the most ingenious of all sorts in every quarter of the city, having observed that among the practicers of the same service, and the same trade, some of the practitioners were hardly capable of subsisting, or getting their bread, while others got estates. This, I confess, made me admire; till at length I discovered that some men ran headlong upon their business without any consideration, and are so rash in their undertakings, that they always come off losers; while, on the other hand, I observed that all those who went about their work deliberately, and advised well upon their business before

they set about it, these men accomplished their affairs with more facility, more dispatch, and to more advantage. Which observation may serve, as a lesson, to instruct you how your fortune may be advanced upon a sure foundation."

III. Crit. "Then I am resolved not to part from you till you have acquainted me with those wise men you speak of, who are capable of informing me of the matters I want."

Soc. "Will it be amiss if I show you some men who have been at vast expenses in building, and set about their work with so little judgment or consideration, that after an immense treasure has been spent by them, they have only raised an unprofitable pile to their discredit? And, on the contrary, there are other men, who with much less charge have erected useful and profitable buildings. Will not this be one step towards the good ordering of a house?"

Crit. "You are surely right."

Soc. "Will it then be improper, if I show you, in the next place, that some men have plenty of rich and useful furniture for their houses, and for all uses; and when any part of it should be used, it is out of the way, and to seek, and it is not known whether it be lost, or laid in safety? This, wherever it happens, discomposes the master of the house, and occasions him to be angry with his servants. But there are others, who have no more goods or furniture, or, perhaps, have not half so much, and yet have everything ready, at hand to answer their occasions."

Crit. "The reason is plain, good Socrates; the first have no order in the distribution of their goods, but let them lie in confusion; the others have a regard that everything should be laid up in its proper place."

Soc. "You are in the right, good Critobulus; but it is not only necessary that everything should be set in its place, but

also, that there should be a proper and convenient place to set it in."

Crit. "This also is necessary towards the good ordering of a house."

Soc. "Suppose I likewise show you, that in some places the slaves and servants are chained and strictly watched, and yet often run away from their masters; while in other places, where they are in freedom, and have their liberty, they work heartily for their masters, and are perpetually striving who shall act most for their advantage. Is not this a point worthy the regard of a housekeeper?"

Crit. "Certainly, it is very worthy the regard of a master."

Soc. "Nor will it be of less use, if I show you that some husbandmen continually complain of want, and are in a starving condition; while others, who practice the same science of husbandry, have everything necessary about them, and live upon the fat of the land."

Crit. "This will surely be of good use. But perhaps the first you speak of bestow their money and goods improperly; or dispose of what they get to the disadvantage of themselves and their families."

Soc. "There are surely some such husbandmen; but I only speak of those who call themselves husbandmen, and yet can hardly find themselves with a sufficiency of meat and drink."

Crit. "What should be the cause of this?"

Soc. "I will bring you among them, that you may learn by their example."

Crit. "That is my desire, good Socrates."

Soc. "But first you must learn how to distinguish between the good and the bad, when you see them. I have known you rise early in the morning, and travel long journeys to see a

comedy, and you have pressed my company with you; but you never invited me to such a sight as this we speak of."

Crit. "Dear Socrates, forbear your banter, and proceed in your good instructions."

Soc. "Suppose I show you some men, who by keeping great stables of horses are reduced to extreme poverty; while others, by the same means, have got great estates, and live splendidly?"

Crit. "I have seen them, and know them both; but I cannot discern what advantage that will be to me."

Soc. "The reason is, that you see them as you do plays, not with a design of becoming a poet, but purely for amusement and recreation; and perhaps you do not amiss in that, if your genius does not lead you to be a poet; but as you are obliged to keep horses, is it not necessary that you should understand what belongs to them, that by your skill you may reap an advantage by them?"

Crit. "You mean that I should breed horses."

Soc. "By no means; for you may have a good servant without the trouble of bringing him up from a child. There are ages both of horses and men wherein they are immediately profitable, and will improve every day upon your hands. Moreover, I can show you some men, who have been so discreet in the management of their wives, that their estates have been greatly advantaged by them; but there are others, and not a few, who by means of their wives have been utterly ruined."

Crit. "But who is to be blamed for this; the husband, or the wife?

Soc. "If a sheep is out of order, we commonly blame the shepherd; and if a horse have not his goings as he should, but is skittish and mischievous, we blame the breaker; and as for a wife, if her husband instruct her well in his affairs, and she

neglect them, she is not wise: but if her husband does not his part, in giving her proper instructions for her government, and she behaves herself disorderly, and unbecoming her sex, or herself as a mistress of a house, is not then the man to blame?"

Crit. "Yes, without doubt; and it is a subject that I should be glad to discourse with you about; and, by the friendship we owe one another, tell me sincerely and freely, Is there any one among all your friends whom you entrust with so great a share of your household affairs as your wife?"

Soc. "It is true, I do not: but tell me likewise, is there one you converse with seldomer upon that subject than you do with your wife?"

Crit. "You judge right; for if there are any, there are very few, who know less of my affairs than my wife."

Soc• "You married her very young, before she had seen or heard much of the world; therefore it would be more to be admired if she acted as she ought to do, than if she did amiss."

Crit. "Then, good Socrates, do you imagine that those, who bear the character of good housewives, have been taught to be so?"

Soc. "I will not dispute that with you at present, but refer you to my wife Aspasia, who will inform you better than I can myself. But, to proceed; I esteem a wife to be a good and necessary companion for the master of a house, and one who ought to bear the next share of government under the master of the house; there is only a little more power in the husband than in the wife: the substance of the estate is generally increased by the industry and labor of the man; but the wife, for the most part, has the care upon her to distribute and order those things that are brought into the house; and if, therefore, the husband and wife agree in their management, the houses and estates improve; but where there is not this

harmony, they must necessarily decay. I could likewise inform you in many other sciences, if the instruction were needful."

Crit. "There is no occasion, good Socrates; for the richest man has not occasion to employ men of all faculties, nor is there any man who has occasion to practice them all. But such sciences as are honorable and becoming my province to understand, those I desire to learn, as well from the persons you may judge most capable of teaching me, as from yourself, whom principally I shall depend upon to give the finishing stroke."

Soc. "You reason well, friend Critobulus; for there are many crafts which are not necessary for you to know: those are called handicraft, and are the least regarded in our city and commonwealth; for they destroy the health of those who practice them, by keeping their bodies in the shade, and confining them to a sedentary habit, or else by employing them all day over the fire, which is yet as unhealthful; and when once the body is tender and feeble, the stomach and spirits must certainly be weak. And besides, men of such occupations can have no time to bend their minds either to do their friends any good, or can have leisure to assist the commonwealth: therefore such people cannot readily serve their friends, if they should happen to be in distress; nor are persons fit to serve their country in time of adversity. For which reason, in some cities and commonwealths, especially such as are deeply engaged in war, a citizen is not suffered to practice any handicraft."

Crit. "What faculties then, good Socrates, would you advise me to use?"

Soc. "The king of Persia, I think, may set us a good example; for we are told that the sciences which are most esteemed by him are war and husbandry; these, of all others, he reckons

the most honorable as well as the most necessary, and accordingly gives them encouragement."

Crit. And can you imagine, good Socrates, that the king of Persia has any regard for husbandry?"

Soc. "I shall endeavor to satisfy you whether he has or not. You will allow with all the world that he delights in war, because of his obligations on the princes under him to furnish him with certain numbers of troops by way of tribute; either to keep his subjects in awe and prevent rebellion, or to guard his country against foreign enemies that may come to invade it. Besides these, he keeps large garrisons in several castles, and appoints a treasurer to pay their wages duly, that they may be kept in good order. His tributary troops are all mustered once in twelve months, that they may be disciplined and ready for an engagement, if any commotion or invasion should happen; but the garrisoned forces and his own guards he reviews himself, and entrusts the inspection of his remoter troops to such a lieutenant as he can best confide in, upon whose report he either rewards or punishes the leaders of the several legions, according as they have acted for his honor in their several stations. Those especially who have their troops in the best order and discipline, he confers on them the greatest honors, and rewards them with such presents as may put them above the world ever after; and for those who have neglected their duty and abused the soldiers under them, he dismisses them from their governments, and loads them with shame. It cannot be doubted but a prince that acts with this conduct must understand war, and is well skilled in the military science.

"On the other hand, he employs great part of his time in riding about his neighboring part of the country, and observing the state of husbandry, whether the lands are tilled as they ought to be; and for the remote parts, he sends such deputies to examine them as are esteemed to be the proper

judges; and when he finds that his governors and deputies have kept their several countries well inhabited, and the ground well cultivated, with such produce as it will best bear, he raises them in honors, loads them with presents, and enlarges their governments; but if he finds the country thin of people, or the ground uncultivated, or that extortions or cruelties have been committed by his governors, he inflicts severe punishments on them, and discharges them from their employments. From these examples, do you believe that the king of Persia has not as great regard to the peopling his country, and the science of husbandry, as he has to keeping an army in such an order as may defend it? But it is to be observed among his high officers, that no one of them has the charge of two commissions at one time; for some are appointed to be overseers of his lands and husbandmen, and to receive his tributes that arise by them, while others are employed to overlook the soldiery and garrisons; so that if the governor of the garrison neglects his duty in keeping good order or defending his country, the lieutenant over the affairs of husbandry accuses him, that his land is not cultivated for want of a sufficient defense against the encroaching parties, which are common enough in those parts. But if the governor of the garrison performs his duty, and keeps the country under his jurisdiction in peace; and the director of affairs of husbandry neglects his business, so that the country is in want of people, and the lands are not ordered as they ought to be, then he is accused by the governor of the garrison; for if the husbandry is neglected, the soldiers must starve, and the king himself must lose his tribute. But in some part of Persia there is a great prince called Satrap, who takes upon him the office both of soldiery and husbandry."

Crit. "If the king acts as you inform me, he seems to take as much delight in husbandry as he does in war."

Soc. “I have not yet done concerning him; for in every country where he resides, or passes a little time, he takes care to have excellent gardens, filled with every kind of flower or plant that can by any means be collected, and in these places are his chief delight.”

Crit. “By your discourse it appears also, that he has a great delight in gardening; for, as you intimate, his gardens are furnished with every tree and plant that the ground is capable of bringing forth.”

Soc. “We are told likewise, that when the king distributes any rewards, he first appoints the principal officers of his soldiery, who have the greatest right to his favor, to appear before him, and then bestows on them presents according to their deserts: for the tilling of ground would be of no effect, unless there were forces well managed to defend it. And after the soldiers he next distributes his honors and preferments among those who have taken good care that his lands were well cultivated and the people kept from idleness; observing at the same time that vigilant soldiers could not subsist without the care of the industrious husbandmen. We are told likewise, that Cyrus, a king famed for his wisdom and warlike disposition, was of the same mind with regard to husbandry; and used to distribute rewards to his most deserving soldiers and husbandmen, telling them at the same time, that he himself had deserved the presents he gave away, because he had taken care of the tillage of his country, and had also taken care to defend it.”

Crit. “If this is true of Cyrus, it is evident enough that he had as much love for husbandry as he had for war.”

Soc. “If Cyrus had lived, he would have proved a very wise prince, for we have many extraordinary proofs of his wisdom and conduct: one passage in particular I may take notice of, which is, when he met his brother in battle to decide the

dispute who should be king, from Cyrus no man deserted, but many thousands deserted from the king to Cyrus; which surely must be the effect of his virtue, for there is no greater argument of a prince's goodness, than the love of the people, and especially when they pay him a voluntary obedience, and stand by him in time of distress; In this great contest, the friends of Cyrus stood fighting about him while he was yet alive, and even after his fall, maintained their post till they were all slain by his side, except Ariaeus, who was posted in the left wing of the army. When Lysander brought presents to Cyrus from the cities of Greece that were his confederates, he received him with the greatest humanity, and among other things showed him his garden, which was called "the Paradise of Sardis which when Lysander beheld, he was struck with admiration of the beauty of the trees, the regularity of their planting, the evenness of their rows, and their making regular angles one to another; or, in a word, the beauty of the quincunx order in which they were planted, and the delightful odors which issued from them. Lysander could no longer refrain from extolling the beauty of their order, but more particularly admired the excellent skill of the hand that had so curiously disposed them; which Cyrus perceiving, answered him: 'All the trees that you here behold are of my own appointment; I it was that contrived, measured, and laid out the ground for planting these trees, and I can even show you some of them that I planted with my own hands.' When Lysander heard this, and saw the richness of his robes, and the splendor of his dress, his chains of gold, and the number and curiosity of the jewels about him, he cried out with astonishment, 'Is it possible, great king, that you could condescend to plant any of these trees with your own hands?—'Do you wonder at that, Lysander?' answered Cyrus. 'I assure you, that whenever I have leisure from war, or am the most at ease, I never dine till I have either done some

exercise in arms, or employed myself in some point of husbandry, till I sweat.' To which Lysander replied: 'You are truly fortunate, great king, in being a wise and good man.'

V. "This, good Critobulus, I thought proper to acquaint you of, that you may know how much the richest and most fortunate among men delight themselves in husbandry: for it is a business of that nature, that at the same time it is delightful and profitable, both to the body and estate, affording such exercise as will increase a man's health and strength, and such advantages as may greatly improve his fortune. By husbandry the ground gives us everything necessary for our food and nourishment, and such things likewise as afford the greatest pleasures. Moreover, it furnishes us with beautiful flowers, and other excellent materials for the ornament and decoration of the temples and altars, affording the richest gayety, and most fragrant odors. So likewise it produces meats for the use of men; some without much trouble, others with more labor; for the keeping of sheep is a branch of husbandry. But though it gives us plenty of all kinds of things, yet it does not allow us to reap them in sloth and idleness, but excites us to health and strength by the labor it appoints us. In the winter, by reason of the cold; and in summer, by reason of heat; and for them who labor with their hands, it makes them robust and mighty; and those who only oversee their works, are quickened and prompted to act like men; for they must rise early in the morning, and must exercise themselves with walking from one place to another. For, both in the fields and in cities, whatever is undertaken to the purpose, must be done in a proper time and season. Again: if a man is inclined to practice horsemanship, and grow expert in that science for the defense of his country, a horse can be nowhere better kept, than in the country; or if a man choose to exercise himself on foot, or in running, husbandry gives him strength of body, and he may

exercise himself in hunting: here is also meat for his dogs, as well as entertainment for wild beasts, and beasts of the game: and the horses and dogs, thus assisted by husbandry, return as good service to the ground; for the horse may carry his master early in the morning to oversee that the workmen and laborers do their duty in the fields, and returns with the master again at night at the latest hour, if his presence should be required till that time; and the dogs are a defense against wild beasts, that they spoil not the fruits of the earth, nor destroy the sheep, and even keep a man safe in a wilderness. Again; the practice of husbandry makes men strong and bold enabling them to defend their country; for in open countries the husbandmen are not without robbers, who would invade their lands, and carry off their crops, if they had not strength and courage enough to resist them. What faculty will sooner encourage a man to leap, to run, or draw a bow, than husbandry? and what science is there that brings a man more advantage for his labor? What science is more agreeable to a studious man? for he finds in it everything he can have occasion for. Where shall a stranger be better received and entertained? or where shall a man live more commodiously in winter, than in the place where he may be accommodated with firing enough and hot baths? Where can we abide with greater pleasure in summer, than near rivers, springs, woods, groves, and fields, where gentle breezes fan the air? Where may a man treat his guests more agreeably or make more triumphant banquets? What place do servants delight in more? Or what other place is more agreeable to the wife? Where do children covet more to be? Or where are friends better received, or better satisfied? There is no science, in my mind, more delightful than this, if a man has a convenient substance to put him to work; nor any business more profitable to a man, if he has skill and industry. Again: the ground may teach men justice, if they have discretion enough to observe it; for it

rewards those very liberally, who take care of it and assist it. But if it should happen that a country, by means of wars, should be obliged to lie uncultivated; yet those who have been bred up to husbandry are hardy and fit for soldiers, and may by that means get their living; and often it is more certain seeking a livelihood with weapons of war, in time of war, than with instruments of husbandry.

"The science of husbandry also brings men to good discipline, and prepares them to go to war when there is occasion. For the ground cannot be tilled without men; and a good husbandman will always provide the strongest, lustiest workmen he can get for that purpose, and such especially as will readily obey his commands, and are tractable in their business; and this is much the same with the business of a general when he is ordering his army: in either case those are rewarded that behave themselves well, or those are punished who are obstinate and neglect their duty. A good husbandman must as often call upon his workmen and encourage them, as a general or leader of an army ought to encourage his soldiers; for bondmen should be no less encouraged and fed with hopes by their masters than freemen; no, rather more, that their inclinations may bind them to their masters, and keep them from running away. He was surely a wise man who said, that husbandry was the mother and nurse of all other sciences; for if husbandry flourish, all other sciences and faculties fare the better; but whenever the ground lies uncultivated, and brings no crop, all other sciences are at a loss both by sea and land."

Crit. "Good Socrates, you reason well of this matter; but you are sensible there are many unforeseen accidents that happen in husbandry, which sometimes will destroy all our hopes of profit, though a husbandman has acted with the greatest skill and diligence; sometimes hail, droughts, mildews, or continual rains, spoil our crops, or vermin will even eat up the seed in the ground; and also sheep, though

they never have so good pasture, are sometimes infected with distempers, which destroy them."

Soc. "I thought, good Critobulus, that you allowed the gods to have the direction of husbandry, as well as the battle. We all know that before our generals lead forth their armies, they make vows, prayers, and offer sacrifices to the gods, to bribe them in favor of their enterprise, and consult the oracles what is best to do. And think you that, in the business of husbandry, we ought not to implore the favor of the gods as much as we do in the affair of war? Be assured, friend Critobulus, that all virtuous men attend the temples with sacrifices, prayers, and oblations for the welfare of all their fruits, their oxen, their sheep, their horses, and of everything else that they possess."

VI. Crit. "I agree with you, good Socrates, that in all our undertakings we ought, before we set about them, to consult and implore the pleasure of the gods, as their power is superior to all others, as well in war as in peace r but our purpose is to consult about the well-ordering of a house; therefore I desire you will resume your discourse, and proceed to the purport of our design: for I confess you have already made such an impression on me with regard to the ordering of a house, and how a man ought to live, that I long for your further instructions."

Soc. "Will it not then be proper to have a respect to our foregoing arguments, and make a recapitulation of those things that we have agreed in, that in the progress of our discourse we may know what has been settled between us?"

Crit. "It will be a great pleasure; for when two men have lent money to one another, there is nothing more agreeable to them both, than to agree in their reckoning; so now in our discourse it will be no less agreeable to know what particulars we have settled between us."

Soc. “We first agreed, that the ordering of a house is the name of a science; and that to act for the increase and welfare of a house, is that science.

“Secondly, we agreed, that by the word house, we mean all a man’s possessions, and such goods as are useful to a man’s life; and we found that everything was profitable to a man that he knew how to use with judgment: wherefore we concluded it was impossible for a man to learn all manner of sciences: and as for the handicrafts, we thought proper to exclude them, as many cities and commonwealths do, because they seem to destroy bodily health; and this particularly where there is danger of enemies invading the country, or where there are wars; for were we on that occasion to set the handicraftsmen on one side, and the husbandmen on the other, and ask them whether they would rather go out against their enemies, or give up their fields and defend the cities; those who had been used to the labor of the field would rather go out to fight and deliver their country, and the artificers would choose rather to sit still in the way they had been brought up, then put themselves into the least danger: we, moreover, recommended husbandry as a good exercise, and a calling of that profit that will bring its master everything that is necessary: besides, it is a business soon learned, and extremely pleasant to them who practice it; it also makes the body robust and strong, gives a bloom to the face, and qualifies a man with a generosity of spirit to assist his friends and his country: besides this, we have also joined in opinion, that the practice of husbandry makes men hardy and courageous, and able to defend their country; because, by the fields lying open and exposed to invaders, they have frequent skirmishes, and therefore know the better how to fight. It is for these reasons that husbandry is esteemed the mother of sciences and the most honorable in all governments; it is healthful, and breeds good men, and

occasions generosity of spirit and good will towards one's friends and country."

Crit. "You have fully persuaded me that husbandry is a most pleasant and profitable occupation; but I remember in your discourse you told me of some husbandmen who get plentiful fortunes by their practice, and that there were others who through mismanagement became beggars by it: I desire you would clear up these two things to me, that when I come to practice this science, I may follow that way which will be the most advantageous, and avoid the contrary."

Soc. "But suppose I should first tell you, good Critobulus, of a discourse I once had with a man who might truly be called good and honest; for it will assist in what you desire."

Crit. "I shall be glad to hear that discourse, which may inform me how to gain the worthy name of a truly good and honest man."

Soc. "That which first led me to consider the value of one man more than of another, was by finding among the artificers, such as builders, painters, and statuaries, those were always esteemed the best and most worthy whose works were the most perfect; so that it was their works that gained them the applause of the people. I had likewise heard that there were those among the people, who had so behaved themselves, that they were esteemed good and honest men: these men, above all others, I coveted to converse with, that I might learn how they gained that character; and because I observed that good and honest were companions in their character, I saluted the first man I met that had a goodly presence, expecting to find the character of good and honest in the most comely personage, rather than any other: but I soon found I was far from my aim, and began to recollect myself that there are many fair faces, and personages of graceful appearance, that possess the most sordid

dispositions, and ungenerous souls; so that now I was sensible the good and honest man was not to be known by the external appearance, but that the surest way to find what I sought for, was to search for one of those that bore the character. In the course of my inquiries I was recommended to one whose name is Ischomachus, a man esteemed by both the sexes, citizens and strangers, as truly worthy the character I sought for; and I soon made it my business to find him out.

VII. “When I first saw him, I found him sitting in a portico of one of the temples alone; and as I concluded he was then at leisure, I placed myself by him, and addressed myself to him in the following manner;—

“Good Ischomachus, I much wonder to see you thus unemployed, whose industry leads you ever to be stirring for the good of someone or other.”

“Nor should you now have found me here, good Socrates,” said Ischomachus, “if I had not appointed some strangers to meet me at this place.”

”And if you had not been here,” said Socrates, “where would you have been? or, I pray you, how would you have employed yourself? for I wish to learn what it is that you do to gain the character from all people of a good and honest man: the good complexion of your features seems to denote, that you do not always confine yourself to home.” At this, Ischomachus, smiling, seemed to express a satisfaction in what I had said, and replied; “I know not that people give me the character of a good and honest man, for when I am obliged to pay money either for taxes, subsidies, or on other occasions, the people call me plainly Ischomachus: and for what you say concerning my not being much at home, you conjecture right, for my wife is capable of ordering such things as belong to the house.”

“But pray tell me,” said Socrates, “did you instruct your wife how to manage your house, or was it her father and mother that gave her sufficient instructions to order a house before she came to you?”

“My wife,” answered Ischomachus, “was but fifteen years old when I married her; and till then she had been so negligently brought up, that she hardly knew anything of worldly affairs.”

“I suppose,” said Socrates, “she could spin, and card, or set her servants to work.”

“As for such things, good Socrates,” replied Ischomachus, “she had her share of knowledge.”

“And did you teach her all the rest,” said Socrates, “which relates to the management of a house?”

“I did,” replied Ischomachus, “but not before I had implored the assistance of the gods, to show me what instructions were necessary for her; and that she might have a heart to learn and practice those instructions to the advantage and profit of us both.”

“But, good Ischomachus, tell me,” said Socrates, “did your wife join with you in your petition to the gods?”

“Yes,” replied Ischomachus, “and I looked upon that to be no bad omen of her disposition to receive such instructions as I should give her.”

“I pray you, good Ischomachus, tell me,” said Socrates, “what was the first thing you began to show her? for to hear that, will be a greater pleasure to me, than if you were to describe the most triumphant feast that had ever been celebrated.”

“To begin then, good Socrates, when we were well enough acquainted, and were so familiar that we began to converse freely with one another, I asked her for what reason she thought I had taken her to be my wife, that it was not purely

to make her a partner of my bed, for that she knew I had women enough already at my command; but the reason why her father and mother had consented she should be mine, was because we concluded her a proper person to be a partner in my house and children: for this end I informed her it was, that I chose her before all other women; and with the same regard her father and mother chose me for her husband: and if we should be so much favored by the gods that she should bring me children, it would be our business jointly to consult about their education, and how to bring them up in the virtues becoming mankind; for then we may expect them to be profitable to us, to defend us, and comfort us in our old age. I further added, that our house was now common to us both, as well as our estates; for all that I had I delivered into her care, and the same she did likewise on her part to me; and likewise that all these goods were to be employed to the advantage of us both, without upbraiding one or the other, which of the two had brought the greatest fortune; but let our study be, who shall contribute most to the improvement of the fortunes we have brought together; and accordingly wear the honor they may gain by their good management.

"To this, good Socrates, my wife replied,

'How can I help you in this? or wherein can the little power I have do you any good? for my mother told me, both my fortune, as well as yours, was wholly at your command, and that it must be my chief care to live virtuously and soberly.'

'This is true, good wife,' answered Ischomachus, 'but it is the part of a sober husband and virtuous wife to join in their care, not only to preserve the fortune they are possessed of, but to contribute equally to improve it.'

'And what do you see in me,' said the wife of Ischomachus, 'that you believe me capable of assisting in the improvement of your fortune?'

‘Use your endeavor, good wife,’ said Ischomachus, ‘to do those things which are acceptable to the gods, and are appointed by the law for you to do.’

‘And what things are those, dear husband?’ said the wife of Ischomachus. ‘They are things,’ replied he, ‘which are of no small concern, unless you think that the bee which remains always in the hive, is unemployed: it is her part to oversee the bees that work in the hive, while the others are abroad to gather wax and honey; and it is,’ in my opinion, a great favor of the gods to give us such lively examples, by such little creatures, of our duty to assist one another in the good ordering of things; for, by the example of the bees, a husband and wife may see the necessity of being concerned together towards the promoting and advancing of their stock: and this union between the man and woman is no less necessary to prevent the decay and loss of mankind, by producing children which may help to comfort and nourish their parents in their old age. It is ordained also for some creatures to live in houses, while it is as necessary for others to be abroad in the fields: wherefore it is convenient for those who have houses and would furnish them with necessary provisions, to provide men to work in their fields, either for tilling the ground, sowing of grain, planting of trees, or grazing of cattle; nor is it less necessary, when the harvest is brought in, to take care in the laying our corn and fruits up properly, and disposing of them discreetly. Little children must be brought up in the house, bread must be made in the house, and all kinds of meats must be dressed in the house; likewise spinning, carding, and weaving, are all works to be done within doors; so that both the things abroad, and those within the house, require the utmost care and diligence; and it appears plainly, by many natural instances, that the woman was born to look after such things as are to be done within the house: for a man naturally is strong of body, and capable of enduring the fatigue of heat

and cold, of travelling and undergoing the harsher exercise; so that it seems as if nature had appointed him to look after the affairs without doors: the woman being also to nurse and bring up children, she is naturally of a more soft and tender nature than the man; and it seems likewise that nature has given the woman a greater share of jealousy and fear than to the man, that she may be more careful and watchful over those things which are entrusted to her care; and it seems likely, that the man is naturally made more hardy and bold than the woman, because his business is abroad in all seasons, and that he may defend himself against all assaults and accidents. But because both the man and the woman are to be together for both their advantages, the man to gather his substance from abroad, and the woman to manage and improve it at home, they are indifferently endowed with memory and diligence. It is natural also to both to refrain from such things as may do them harm, and likewise they are naturally given to improve in everything they study, by practice and experience; but as they are not equally perfect in all things, they have the more occasion of one another's assistance: for when the man and woman are thus united, what the one has occasion for is supplied by the other: therefore, good wife, seeing this is what the gods have ordained for us, let us endeavor, to the utmost of our powers, to behave ourselves in our several stations to the improvement of our fortune: and the law, which brought us together, exhorts us to the same purpose. And also, as it is natural, when we are thus settled, to expect children, the law exhorts us to live together in unity, and to be partakers of one another's benefits: so nature, and the law which is directed by it, ordains that each severally should regard the business that is appointed for them. From whence it appears, that it is more convenient for a woman to be at home and mind her domestic affairs, than to" gad abroad; and it is as shameful for a man

to be at home idling, when his business requires him to be abroad: if any man acts in a different capacity from that he is born to, he breaks through the decrees of nature, and will certainly meet his punishment, either because he neglects the business which is appointed for him, or because he invades the property of another. I think that the mistress bee is an excellent example for the wife.'

'And what is the business of the mistress bee,' said the wife of Ischomachus, 'that I may follow the example of that which you so much recommend to me, for it seems you have not yet fully explained it?'

'The mistress bee,' replied Ischomachus, 'keeps always in the hive, taking care that all the bees, which are in the hive with her, are duly employed in their several occupations; and those whose business lies abroad, she sends out to their several works. These bees, when they bring home their burden, she receives, and appoints them to lay up their harvest, till there is occasion to use it, and in a proper season dispenses it among those of her colony, according to their several offices. The bees who stay at home, she employs in disposing and ordering the combs, with a neatness and regularity becoming the nicest observation and greatest prudence. She takes care likewise of the young bees, that they are well nourished, and educated to the business that belongs to them; and when they are come to such perfection that they are able to go abroad and work for their living, she sends them forth under the direction of a proper leader.'

'And is this my business, dear Ischomachus?' said his wife.

'This example, good wife,' replied Ischomachus, 'is what I give you as a lesson worthy your practice: your case requires your presence at home, to send abroad the servants whose business lies abroad, and to direct those whose business is in the house. You must receive the goods that are brought into

the house, and distribute such a part of them as you think necessary for the use of the family, and see that the rest be laid up till there be occasion for it; and especially avoid the extravagance of using that in a month which is appointed for twelve months' service. When the wool is brought home, observe that it be carded and spun for weaving into cloth; and particularly take care that the corn, which is brought in, be not laid up in such a manner that it grow musty and unfit for use. But, above all, that which will gain you the greatest love and affection from your servants, is to help them when they are visited with sickness, and that to the utmost of your power.' Upon which his wife readily answered, 'That is surely an act of charity, and becoming every mistress of good nature; for, I suppose, we cannot oblige people more than to help them when they are sick: this will surely engage the love of our servants to us, and make them doubly diligent upon every occasion.'—-This answer, Socrates," said Ischomachus, "was to me an argument of a good and honest wife; and I replied to her, 'That by reason of the good care and tenderness of the mistress bee, all the rest of the hive are so affectionate to her, that whenever she is disposed to go abroad, the whole colony belonging to her, accompany, and attend upon her.'—To this the wife replied: 'Dear Ischomachus, tell me sincerely, Is not the business of the mistress bee, you tell me of, rather what you ought to do, than myself; or have you not a share in it? For my keeping at home and directing my servants, will be of little account, unless you send home such provisions as are necessary to employ us.'

'And my providence,' answered Ischomachus, 'would be of little use unless there is one at home who is ready to receive and take care of those goods that I send in. Have you not observed,' said Ischomachus, 'what pity people show to those who are punished by pouring water into sieves till they are

full? The occasion of pity is, because those people labor in vain.'

'I esteem these people,' said the wife of Ischomachus, 'to be truly miserable, who have no benefit from their labors.'

'Suppose, dear wife,' replied Ischomachus, 'you take into your service one who can neither card nor spin, and you teach her to do those works, will it not be an honor to you? Or if you take a servant which is negligent, or does not understand how to do her business, or has been subject to pilfering, and you make her diligent, and instruct her in the manners of a good servant, and teach her honesty, will not you rejoice in your success? and will you not be pleased with your action? So again, when you see your servants sober and discreet, you should encourage them and show them favor; but as for those who are incorrigible and will not follow your directions, or prove larcenaries, you must punish them. Consider, how laudable it will be for you to excel others in the well-ordering your house; be therefore diligent, virtuous, and modest, and give your necessary attendance on me, your children, and your house, and your name shall be honorably esteemed, even after your death; for it is not the beauty of your face and shape, but your virtue and goodness, which will bring you honor and esteem, which will last forever.'—After this manner, good Socrates," cried Ischomachus, "I first discoursed with my wife concerning her duty and care of my house."

VIII. "And did you perceive," said Socrates, "that she improved by what you taught her?"

"Yes," replied Ischomachus, "she was as extremely diligent to learn and practice what was under her care, as one of her tender years could be, who knew nothing of her duty before. Once I saw her under a great concern, because she could not readily find a parcel which I had brought home; but when I perceived her grieved, I bid her take no further thought about

it, for it was time enough to grieve when we wanted a thing which we could not purchase, but this was not our case; and even though what I asked for was then out of the way, it was not her fault, because I had not yet appointed proper places or repositories for the several things that belonged to the house; but that I would take care to do it, that she might put everything in proper order, allotting to every particular thing its place, where it' might be found when there was occasion for it. 'There is nothing, dear wife,' said Ischomachus, 'which is more commendable or profitable to mankind, than to preserve good order in everything.

"'In comedies and other plays, where many people are required to act their parts, if the actors should rashly do or say whatever their fancy led them to, there must of necessity be such confusion as would disgust the audience: but, when every person has his part perfect, and the scenes are regularly performed, it is that order which makes the play agreeable and pleasing to the beholders.

"'So likewise, good wife, an army, when it is once in disorder, is under the greatest confusion and consternation, if the enemy is at hand; for the enemy has little to do to overcome them; their own hurry and confusion will contribute more to their overthrow than the attacks of the adversary. Here you may imagine wagons, footmen, horsemen, chariots, elephants, and baggage, all intermixed and crowded together: obstructing and hindering one another. If one runs, he is stopped by him that would stand the battle; and he that stands is jostled by every messenger that passes him; the chariots overrun the men of arms; and the elephants and horsemen, which in their proper places would be useful, are intermixed among the foot, trampling on them, and in a great measure doing them as much mischief as their enemies would do. And suppose, while an army is in this confusion, they are attacked by their enemy in good order, what can they expect

but destruction? But an army drawn up in good order, how glorious a sight is it to their friends, and how terrible to their enemies! How delightful it is to see the infantry drawn up and exercising in good order, or marching with so much exactness and regularity, that the whole body moves like one man! How agreeable is this to their friends! And to observe an army drawn up in a line of battle, well-disciplined, and advancing in good order, have not their enemies reason to fear them? Or what makes a galley, well-furnished with men, so terrible to the enemy, and so pleasant a sight to their friends, but because of its swift passage upon the waters? And what is the reason that the men within it do not hinder one another, but that they sit in order, make their signs in order, lie down in order, rise up in order, and handle their oars in order.

"'As for confusion and disorder, I can compare it to nothing better, than if a countryman should put together in one heap, oats, wheat, barley, and peas, and when he had occasion to use any one of them, he must be obliged to pick out that sort grain by grain. Wherefore, good wife, by all means avoid confusion as much as possible, and study good order in everything, for it will be both pleasant and profitable to you. Everything then, as you have occasion for it, will be ready at hand to use as you please, and what I may happen to ask for will not be to seek; let us therefore fix upon some proper place where our stores may be laid up, not only in security, but where they may be so disposed, that we may presently know where to look for every particular thing. And when once we have done this in the best order we can, then acquaint the steward of it, that when anything is wanted he may know where to find it; or when anything is brought into the house, he may at once judge of the proper place to lay it in. By this means we shall know what we gain and what we lose; and, in surveying our storehouses, we shall be able to judge what is necessary to be brought in, and what may want repairing, or

what will be impaired by keeping. When we have visited these a few times, we shall grow perfect in the knowledge of all our goods, and readily find what we seek for.'

"I remember, good Socrates," said Ischomachus, "I once went aboard a Phoenician ship, where I observed the best example of good order that I ever met with: and, especially, it was surprising to observe the vast number of implements, which were necessary for the management of such a small vessel.

"What numbers of oars, stretchers, ship-hooks, and spikes, were there for bringing the ship in and out of the harbor! What numbers of shrouds, cables, hawsers, ropes, and other tackling, for the guiding of the ship! With how many engines of war was it armed for its defense! What variety and what numbers of arms, for the men to use in time of battle! What a vast quantity of provisions were there for the sustenance and support of the sailors!. And, besides all these, the loading of the ship was of great bulk, and so rich, that the very freight of it would gain enough to satisfy the captain and his people for their voyage: and all these were stowed so neatly together, that a far larger place would not have contained them, if they had been removed. Here, I took notice, the good order and disposition of everything was so strictly observed, that, notwithstanding the great variety of materials the ship contained, there was not anything on board which the sailors could not find in an instant; nor was the captain himself less acquainted with these particulars than his sailors: he was as ready in them, as a man of learning would be to know the letters that composed the name Socrates, and how they stand in that name. Nor did he only know the proper places for everything on board his ship; but, while he stood upon the deck, he was considering with himself what things might be wanting in his voyage, what things wanted repair, and what length of time his provisions and necessaries would last: for,

as he observed to me, it is no proper time, when a storm comes upon us, to have the necessary implements to seek, or to be out of repair, or to want them on board; for the gods are never favorable to those who are negligent or lazy; and it is their goodness that they do not destroy us when we are diligent. When I had observed the good order which was here practiced, I informed my wife of it; at the same time admonishing her to observe the great difficulty there must needs be to keep up such a regular decorum on board a ship, where there were such numerous varieties of materials, and such little space to lay them in: 'But how much easier, good wife,' said Ischomachus, 'will it be for us, who have large and convenient storehouses for everything to its degree, to keep a good decorum and order, than for those people on board a ship, who yet are bound to remember where, and how, everything is distributed in the midst of a storm at sea? But we have none of these dangers to disturb and distract our thoughts from the care of our business; therefore we should deserve the greatest shame, and be inexcusable, if we were not diligent enough to preserve as good order in our family as they do on board their vessel. But we have already said enough,' continued Ischomachus, 'concerning the necessity and advantage of good order; nor is it less agreeable to see everything belonging to the dress, or wearing apparel, laid carefully up in the wardrobe; the things belonging to the kitchen, let them be there; and so those belonging to the dairy, likewise in the dairy; and, in a word, everything which regards any kind of office belonging to the house, let it be neatly kept and laid up in its proper office. And this is reputable both to the master and mistress of the house; and no one will ridicule such good management, but those who are laughed at for their own ill management. This, good wife,' said Ischomachus, 'you may be sensible of at an easy rate, with little trouble. Nor will it be difficult to find out a steward, who will soon learn from you

the proper places or repositories for everything which belongs to the house; for in the city there is a thousand times more variety of things than ever we shall have occasion for; and yet if we want anything, and send a servant to buy it for us, he will readily go to the place where it is to be had, from the good disposition of things in the several shops which are proper for them, and from the remembrance he will have of observing them in such and such places. There can be no other reason for this, than the disposing everything in the market or city in its proper place, as all kinds of fowls at the poulterers', all sorts of fish at the fishmongers', and the like of other things which have places determined for them; but if we go about to seek a man who at the same time is seeking us, how shall we find one another, unless we have beforehand appointed a meeting place? Then, as for setting our household goods in order, I spoke to her in the following manner."

IX. "But tell me, good Ischomachus," said Socrates, "did your wife understand and practice what you taught her?"

"She promised me," answered Ischomachus, "both by words and by her countenance, that she agreed to what I said, and was delighted that method and good order would take off so great a share of her trouble; she rejoiced to think she should be delivered from the perplexed state she was in before, and desired that I would not delay putting my promise in practice as soon as possible, that she might reap the fruits of it."

"And how did you proceed, good Ischomachus?" said Socrates. "I answered her," said Ischomachus, "in such a manner, that she might learn first what a house was properly designed for; that it was not ordained to be filled with curious paintings or carvings, or such unnecessary decorations; but that the house should be built with due consideration, and for

the convenience of the inhabitants; and as a proper repository for those necessaries which properly belong to a family, and, in some measure, directs us to the proper places wherein every particular ought to be placed the most private and strongest room in the house seems to demand the money, jewels, and those other things that are rich and valuable; the dry places expect the corn; the cooler parts are the most convenient for the wine; and the more lightsome and airy part of the house for such things as require such a situation. I showed her likewise," continued Ischomachus, "which were the most convenient places for parlors and dining-rooms, that they might be cool in summer and warm in winter; and also, that as the front of the house stood to the south, it had the advantage of the winter's sun; and in the summer it rejoiced more in the shade, than it could do in any other situation. Then," said Ischomachus, "I appointed the bed-chambers, and the nursery, and apartments for the women, divided from the men's lodging, that no inconvenience might happen by their meeting without our consent or approbation; for those who behave themselves well, and we allow to come together to have children, they will love us the better for it; but those, who through subtlety will endeavor to gain their ends with any of the women without our consent, will be always contriving and practicing ways to our disadvantage, to compass or carry on their lewd designs. When we were come thus far," proceeded Ischomachus, "we began to set our goods in order. In the first place, we assorted all the materials belonging to sacrifices: after that, my wife's apparel was assigned to their proper places; her richest habits by themselves, and those which were in more common use by themselves. Next to these, we appointed a wardrobe for the master's clothes; one part for his armor and such accoutrements as he used in war, and another for his wearing apparel, to be used upon common occasions: after these, we directed places for the instruments

which belong to spinning, and for the bake-house, the kitchen, and the baths; and took care, in the appointment of all these things, to make a division between those things which are most commonly required to be in use, and such as are only in use now and then: we likewise separated those things which were for a month's service from those which were to serve twelve months; for by this means we might know the better how our stock is employed. When we had done this, we instructed every servant respectively where everything belonging to his office might be found, and directed them carefully to observe, that every implement under their care should be put into the same place where they took it from, when they had done using it; and as for such things as are but seldom required to be used, either upon festivals, or upon the reception of strangers; those we delivered into the care of a discreet woman, whom we instructed in her province; and when we had made an account with her of the goods delivered into her care, and taken it in writing, we directed her to deliver them out to those under her, as she saw proper occasions, and be careful to remember who were the persons to which she delivered every particular; and that upon receiving again the things which she had delivered out, they should be every one laid up in their proper place. In the next place, we chose a discreet, sober, and judicious woman to be our storekeeper or housekeeper, one who had a good memory, and was diligent enough to avoid faults, studying our pleasure and satisfaction in all her business, and endeavoring to gain our esteem, which we always signified by presents, by which means we gained her love and friendship for us; so that, whenever we had occasion to rejoice, we made her partaker of our mirth; or if any accident happened which brought sorrow with it, we made her acquainted with that likewise, and consulted her in it: this made her bend her mind to the advancement of our fortunes. We instructed her to show more esteem for those

servants in the house whom she found were deserving of favor, than the others who neglected their duty; for we took care to observe to her, that those who did well were worthy reward in the world; while those who were deceitful and evil-minded, were rejected of the people. And then, good Socrates," said Ischomachus, "I let my wife know that all this would be of little effect, unless she was careful to observe that everything was preserved in the good order we had placed it: for in cities, and in other governments that are well ordered, it is not enough to make good laws for their conduct, unless there are proper officers appointed to see them put in execution, either to reward those who deserve well, or punish the malefactors.

'This, dear wife, I chiefly recommend to you,' continued Ischomachus, 'that you may look upon yourself as the principal overseer of the laws within our house.' And I informed her also, that it was within her jurisdiction to overlook, at her own pleasure, everything belonging to the house, as a governor of a garrison inspects into the condition of his soldiers, or as the senate of Athens review the men of arms, and the condition of their horses; that she had as great power as a queen in her own house, to distribute rewards to the virtuous and diligent, and punish those servants who deserved it. But I further desired her, not to be displeased, if I entrusted her with more things, and more business, than I had done any of our servants; telling her at the same time, that such as were covenant-servants have no more goods under their care and trust, than are delivered to them for the use of the family; and none of those goods may be employed to their own use, without the master's or mistress's consent: for whoever is master or mistress of the house, has the rule of all that is within it, and has the power of using anything at their pleasure; so that those who have the most profit by goods, have the most loss by them, if they perish or are

destroyed. So it is therefore the interest of them that have possessions, to be diligent in the preservation of them."

"Then," said Socrates, "tell me, good Ischomachus, how did your wife receive this lesson?"

"My wife," replied Ischomachus, "received it like a woman ready to learn and practice what might be for the honor and welfare of us both, and seemed to rejoice at the instructions I gave her." 'It would have been a great grief to me,' said she, 'if, instead of those good rules you instruct me in, for the welfare of our house, you had directed me to have no regard to the possessions I am endowed with; for as it is natural for a good woman to be careful and diligent about her own children, rather than have a disregard for them; so it is no less agreeable and pleasant to a woman, who has any share of sense, to look after the affairs of her family, rather than neglect them.'

X. "When I heard," continued Socrates, "the answer which the wife of Ischomachus gave him, I could not help admiring her wisdom."

"But I shall tell you yet much more of her good understanding," said Ischomachus: "there was not one thing I recommended to her, but she was as ready to practice it, as I was willing she should go about it."

"Go on, I pray you, good Ischomachus," said Socrates, "for it is far more delightful to hear the virtues of a good woman described, than if the famous painter Zeuxis was to show me the portrait of the fairest woman in the 'world."

"Then," continued Ischomachus, "I remember, on a particular day, she had painted her face with a certain cosmetic, attempting to make her skin look fairer than it was; and with another mixture had endeavored to increase the natural bloom of her cheeks; and also had put on higher shoes than ordinary, to make her look taller than she naturally was.

When I perceived this," said Ischomachus, "I saluted her in the following manner: 'Tell me, good wife, which would make me the most acceptable in your eyes, to deal sincerely by you, in delivering into your possession those things which are really my own, without making more of my estate than it is; or for me to deceive you, by producing a thousand falsities which have nothing in them: giving you chains of brass instead of gold, false jewels, false money, and false purple, instead of that which is true and genuine?' To which she presently replied: 'May the gods forbid that you should be such a man! for, should you harbor such deceit in your heart, I should never love you.'

'I tell you then, dear wife,' replied Ischomachus, 'we are come together, to love one another, and to delight in each other's perfections: do you think I should be the more agreeable to you in my person, or should you love me the better, if I was to put a false luster upon myself, that I might appear better complexioned, more fair in body, or more manly than what nature has made me; or that I should paint and anoint my face, when you receive me to your arms, and give you this deceit instead of my natural person?'

'Surely, dear Ischomachus,' replied his wife, 'your own person, in its natural perfections, is preferable to all the paints and ointments you can use to set it off; nor can all the art you might use be comparable to your natural appearance.'

'Believe then, good wife,' said Ischomachus, 'that I have the same abhorrence of false luster that you have: can there be any thing more complete in nature than yourself? or would there be anything less engaging to me than that you should use any means to hide or destroy those perfections in you which I so much admire? The God of nature has appointed beauties in all creatures, as well in the field as among the human race; the magnificence of the male to be admired by the female, and the tender and curious texture of the female

to be admired by the male. It is natural for the creatures in the field to distinguish one another by the purity of their beauties; there is no deceit, there is no corruption: so the men always admire that body which is most pure, or the least deformed by art. Such wiles and deceits may, perhaps, deceive strangers, because they null not have opportunities of discovering and laughing at them; but if such things should be practiced between those who are daily conversant with one another, how soon will the imposition be discovered! how soon will they be ridiculed! For these deceits appear at the rising out of bed, and from that time till the persons have had opportunity of renewing them; as well as when they sweat, when they shed tears, when they wash, and when they bathe themselves.'

"What answer, good Ischomachus," said Socrates, "did your wife give you to this lecture?"

"The best that could be," replied Ischomachus, "for she has never since attempted any of these false glosses, but has constantly appeared in her natural beauties, and repeated her solicitations to me to instruct her, if there was any natural means of assisting them. I then directed her that she should not sit too much, but exercise herself about the house as a mistress, to examine how her several works went forward; sometimes to go among the spinners or weavers, to see that they did their duty, and to instruct those who were ignorant, and encourage the most deserving among them; sometimes to look into the bake-house, to see the neatness and order of the woman that looks after it; and sometimes visit her housekeeper, to account with her for the yarn, or other commodities, that are brought into her charge: and now and then to take a turn about her house, to see that everything is disposed in its proper place. This method, I suppose," said Ischomachus, "would be a means of giving her a healthful exercise, and at the same time of leading her to that business

which would be for her advantage, in benefiting our fortune. I also told her, the exercise of bolting, baking, and looking after the furniture of her house, to brush it and keep it clean, when she wanted something to do, would be commendable, and help to employ her; for I recommended exercise to her as a great benefit: 'for exercise,' said Ischomachus, 'will create you an appetite to your meat, and by that means you will be more healthful, and add, if possible, to the bloom of your beauty: and also the clean appearance of the mistress among the servants, and her readiness to set her hand to work, will encourage them to follow her example; for a good example does more than all the compulsion that can be used. Those who study nothing but their dress, may indeed be esteemed by those who understand nothing else; but the outside appearance is deceitful. And now, good Socrates, I have a wife who lives up to the rules given her."

XI. "Then," said Socrates, "good Ischomachus, you have fully satisfied me concerning the duty of a wife, as well as of your wife's good behavior, and your own management. I beg now you will acquaint me, good Ischomachus," continued Socrates, "what method it is that you have taken on your part towards the management of your fortune, and especially what it is that has gained you the character of a good and honest man; that when I have heard what you have done, I may give my thanks according to your deserts."

"I shall be glad," replied Ischomachus, "to satisfy you in anything within my power, provided you will correct my errors, if I am guilty of any."

"But," answered Socrates, "how can I correct you, when you are already possessed of the character of a good and honest man? and especially when I am the man who is taken for the greatest trifler, and who employs himself in nothing but measuring the air; or, which is a far worse character, that I am a poor man, which is a token of the greatest folly? This,

indeed, might have been a trouble to me, if I had not met the other day a horse belonging to Nicias, with a crowd of people about him, admiring his good qualities, and talking abundance in praise of his strength and spirit: this made me ask the question of the master of the horse, Whether his horse was very rich? but he stared upon me, and laughed at me, as if I had been a madman; and only gave me this short answer;

'How should a horse have any money?' When I heard this, I went my way contented, that it was lawful for a poor horse to be good, on the account only of his free heart and generous spirit; and therefore, I conclude, it is likewise possible for a poor man to be good: for which reason, I beseech you, good Ischomachus, tell me your manner of living, that I may endeavor to learn it, and model my life after your example; for that may well be called a good day, when a man begins to grow good and virtuous."

"Good Socrates, you seem to banter me," said Ischomachus: "however, I will tell you, as well as I can, the whole method of my living, which I design constantly to follow till the day of my death. I perceived, that except a man knew well what was necessary to be done, and diligently applied himself to put his knowledge in practice, the gods would not suffer him to prosper. And I also observed, that those who act with wisdom and diligence, the gods reward them with riches. Therefore, first of all, I paid my adoration to the gods, and implored their assistance in all that I had to do, that they would be pleased to give me health, strength of body, honor in my city, good will of my friends, safety in the day of battle, and that I might return home with an increase of riches and honor."

"When I heard that," said Socrates, "I asked him, are riches then so much worthy your esteem, good Ischomachus; seeing that the more riches you have, the more care and trouble you have to order and preserve them?"

Then Ischomachus replied: “I have no small care to provide me with riches, for I have great pleasure in serving the gods honorably with rich sacrifices; and also to serve my friends, if they happen to want; and likewise to help the city in time of danger or distress.”

“Truly, what you say, good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “is honorable, and becoming a man of power and substance.”

To which Ischomachus answered: “These are my reasons, good Socrates, why I think riches worth my labor; for there are some degrees of men who cannot subsist without the help of others; and there are also some who think themselves rich enough, if they can get what is barely necessary for their support. But those who order their houses and estates with such discretion and good judgment, that they advance their fortunes and increase their riches; and by that means become serviceable and honorable to the city, and are capable of serving their friends; why should not such men be esteemed wise and generous, and deserve power?”

“You are in the right,” replied Socrates; “there are many of us that may well respect such men: but I pray you, good Ischomachus, go on to relate what method you take to support your health and strength of body, and what means you use to return home honorably from the war: and as for the ordering and increasing of the estate, we may hear that by and by.”

“I think,” said Ischomachus, “these things are so chained together, that they cannot well be separated; for when a man has a sufficient store of meat and drink, and uses a convenient share of exercise, his body must of necessity be healthful and strong; and such a body, when it is well exercised in the affairs of war, is most likely to return home from battle with honor. And he who is diligent and industrious in his business, must as surely improve his estate.”

“Good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “all that you have yet said, I grant to be good, that he who uses diligence and exercise will increase his fortune. But tell me, I beseech you, what exercise do you take to maintain your good complexion, and to get strength, and how do you exercise yourself to be expert in war, and what methods do you follow to increase your estate, that enables you to help your friends, and assist the city in honor and strength? These things I desire to learn.”

“To tell you freely, good Socrates,” said Ischomachus, “I rise so early in the morning, that if I have any one to speak with in the city, I am sure to find him at home; or if I have any other business to do in the city, I do it in my morning’s walk: but when I have no matter of importance in the city, my page leads my horse into the fields, and I walk thither, for I esteem the walk into the free air of the country to be more healthful than to walk in the galleries or piazzas of the city; and when I arrive at my ground where my workmen are planting trees, tilling the ground, or sowing, or carrying in of the fruits, I observe how everything is performed, and study whether any of these works may be mended or improved: and when I have diverted myself enough at my villa, I mount my horse, and make him perform the exercise of the academy, such as is serviceable in war; and then ride him through all the difficult paths, waters, through trenches, and over hedges, to make him acquainted with those difficulties as much as possible, without hurting him: and when I have done this, my page takes my horse, and leads him trotting home, and takes along with him to my house, such things out of the country as are wanted, and walk home myself: then I wash my hands, and go to such a dinner as is prepared for me, eating moderately, and never to excess, or too sparingly.”

“Good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “you do your business very pleasantly; and your contrivance is excellent, in performing so many good things at one time, as increase your

health, your strength, your exercise in war, your study for the increase of your estate: all these to be done under one exercise is a great token of your wisdom; and the good effect of this exercise is apparent enough to all that know that you are healthful and strong, and every one allows you to be the best horseman in this country, and one of the richest men in the city."

"Alas! good Socrates," answered Ischomachus; "and yet, though I believe this to be true, I cannot escape detraction. You thought, perhaps, I was going to say, that it was these things which gave me the name of an honest and good man."

"It was my thought," said Socrates; "but I have a mind to ask you, how you guard against detractors, and whether you speak in your own cause, or in such causes as relate to your friends?"

"Do you believe," answered Ischomachus, "that I do not sufficiently do my part against my detractors, if I defend myself by my good deeds, in doing no wrong, and acting as much as I can for many men's good? or do you not think I am in the right if I accuse men who are mischievous, and do injustice in private cases, and to the city?"

"I pray you explain yourself," said Socrates. "I must tell you," said Ischomachus, "I am always exercising myself in rhetoric and eloquence, and in the practice of justice; for if I hear one of my servants complain of another, or justify his own cause, I always endeavor to settle the truth between them; or if I discover any dispute among my friends or acquaintance, I endeavor to make it up, and recover their friendship for one another, by showing them the happiness and profit of friendship, and the distraction and inquietude which attend those who are at variance with one another. I praise and defend those who are accused wrongfully, or are oppressed without a cause; and before the lords of our

government I accuse them who are promoted unworthily; I praise them who set about their business with care and deliberation, and blame such who go rashly about their work. But I am now brought to this dilemma, whether I am to bear with faults, or punish them."

"What is your meaning in that," said Socrates, "and who's the person you mean?"

"It is my wife." said Ischomachus.

"In what manner then are your disputes?" said Socrates.

"We have very little occasion for that," replied Ischomachus, "as yet; nor have we more words in our disputes than, such a thing is not done so carefully as it might have been; and that we may learn by a false step how to guide ourselves for the future: but if she should be unfortunate enough to give her mind to lying and deceit, there is no reforming her." To this Socrates answered: "If she should at any time tell you a lie, you will hardly insist upon the truth of the matter.

XII. "But, perhaps, good Ischomachus, I detain you from your business, and I would by no means hinder a man of your capacity and understanding from proceeding in your affairs."

"You are no hindrance to me," answered Ischomachus, "for I am determined to stay here till the court is up."

"This gives me another token of your justice," said Socrates; "it is an instance of your circumspection, and regard to maintain the noble character the world has given you, of being a good and honest man; for, notwithstanding the many employments you usually engage yourself in, and the delightful method you take in the exercise of them, yet because of your promise to these strangers, to wait for them in this place, you choose to neglect your own business and pleasure, rather than prove worse than your word."

“As for the business you speak of,” said Ischomachus, “I have taken care that nothing shall be neglected; and my greatest pleasure is in being punctual with those that I appoint; for in my farm I have my bailiff or steward of husbandry, and deputies who take care of my businesses.”

“Since we are fallen into this discourse, pray tell me, good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “when you have occasion for a good bailiff or steward for your country affairs, do you use the same method as if you wanted a good builder, to inquire after one who is best skilled in the science? or do you teach and instruct those you hire into your service, in the business you want to employ them in?”

“Good Socrates,” answered Ischomachus, “I endeavor to teach them myself; for he whom I instruct in the management of my affairs, when I am absent, will know the better how to carry on my works agreeable to my liking; rather than if I was to employ one who already had a pretense to knowledge of the business I wanted him for: as I guess I have experience enough to set men to work, and to direct them how they shall go about their business, I therefore suppose I am able to teach a man what I can do myself.”

“Then, surely, your bailiff in husbandry,” replied Socrates, “must be always ready and willing to serve you; for, without he has a love for you, he will never use the utmost of his diligence for the advancement of your affairs, though he be never so expert in his business.”

“You say right,” answered Ischomachus: “but the first of my endeavors is to gain his love and affection to me and my family, by which means he has a regard to my welfare.”

“And what method do you take, good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “to bring the man to love and respect you and your family? Is it by the benefit you do him, by learning him a profitable business?”

“I do not suppose that,” said Ischomachus; “but, whenever the gods are favorable to me in the advancement of my fortune, I always reward my steward.”

“So I suppose,” said Socrates, “that you mean by this, that such people as you assist with money or goods will bear you the best service and respect.”

“Yes, certainly,” said Ischomachus, “for there are no instruments in the world so engaging, or that will prevail so much over mankind, as money or profit.”

“But is it sufficient for him to love you?” replied Socrates; “for we have instances enough that men love themselves before all others; and we have also some examples of those who are lovers of themselves, and yet are so negligent to their own profit, that they never reap those things they wish for.”

Ischomachus answered: “But, good Socrates, before I choose them among my servants that I have brought to love me, to dignify with the places of stewards or deputies, I teach them the good consequence of diligence and industry.”

“Is it possible you can do that?” said Socrates; “for, in my opinion, we can hardly bring men to do another man’s business as punctually as he might do it himself.”

“That I allow,” said Ischomachus: “I mean, that we can never instruct a man to use the same diligence for another that he would do for himself.”

“But,” replied Socrates, “who are those, then, whom you think worthy of employment, or of receiving your instructions?”

To this Ischomachus answered: “Those, in the first place, who cannot avoid drunkenness, are excluded from this care; for drunkenness drowns the memory, and is the occasion of forgetfulness.”

“And is this the only vice,” said Socrates, “which is the occasion of negligence?”

“No,” replied Ischomachus, “for those who indulge themselves in sleep, are incapable of such employments.”

“And are there any more,” said Socrates, “whose vices make them unfit for your service?”

“Yes,” answered Ischomachus; “for I am persuaded those who are addicted to the flesh, bend their minds so much to that thought, that they neglect all other business; for their whole hope and study is upon those they love and if one was to order them to business, it would be the greatest punishment that could be inflicted on them; for there can be no greater pain laid upon any creatures in nature, than to prevent them from the object of their desires. For these reasons, when I find people engaged in such affairs, I set them aside, and never take the pains to instruct them in the matters that relate to my estate.”

“But what say you,” said Socrates, “of those who have a provident thought, and are saving on their own account; do you believe these would not be diligent in the management of your estate “These,” replied Ischomachus, “I choose to employ before all others; for they are sooner brought to be diligent than those who have contrary sentiments; and, besides, it is easy to show them the profit of diligence; and if such a man happens to come in my way, I commend him and reward him.”

“But how do you treat those servants,” said Socrates, “who are ready to obey you in all your commands, and are diligent at your word, and have a moderate share of good order in the management of themselves?”

“These,” said Ischomachus, “I have a great regard for; for I carefully reward those who are diligent, and lay as many hardships as I can upon those who are idle and careless.”

“But tell me, dear Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “is it possible to reform a man who is naturally negligent?”

“No more” answered Ischomachus, “than it would be for a man who is ignorant in music, to teach and instruct another man in that science; for it is impossible to make a good scholar, if the master does not know his business; and, by the same rule, no servant will be diligent when his master sets him the example of neglect. I have heard often enough, that bad masters made bad servants; and I have often seen a small reproof to a servant put him or her upon their duty. However, the best way to make a good servant, is for the master to set him a good example of industry, and be careful and watchful to oversee and regard, that everyone about him is diligent in their respective office, and reward those who are deserving, and punish the negligent. The king of Persia once spoke much to the purpose in a case of this nature. When he was riding upon a fine horse, one of the company asked him what made his horse so fat: his reply was, ‘The eye of his master and we have many beside, good Socrates, who think that everything whatever is improved by the same regard of the master.”

XIII. “But, good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “when you have trained up your steward to be diligent, and to observe your directions, do you esteem him thoroughly qualified to be your steward or bailiff, or has he then anything else to be instructed in?”

“Then,” answered Ischomachus, “there is yet more which is necessary for him to understand; for he must learn the particulars of his business, to know when and how he must dispose of everything; for, without the knowledge of these particulars, a steward is an insignificant person; he is like a physician who has the care of a patient, and is up early and late to attend him, and at last knows nothing of his distemper.”

“But when he has learned all this, good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “is he then perfectly qualified to be your steward, or director of your farm?”

“There is still more required of him,” replied Ischomachus, “for he must learn to rule, as well as direct the workmen.”

“And is it possible,” said Socrates, “that you can teach a man to govern, or know the great science of command?”

“I think,” said Ischomachus, “there is no difficulty in it; though, perhaps, the reasons I may give for it are ridiculous.”

“An affair of this consequence,” said Socrates, “is no laughing matter; for the man who can instruct others how to govern, must himself be a person of great wisdom, and deserve the highest character; for he, who can teach men how to rule, may teach them how to become masters: and he who can raise them to that dignity, may teach them those princely virtues, which will make them worthy the command of kingdoms.”

“Good Socrates,” answered Ischomachus, “let us look into the fields among the beasts for an example of the facility of learning to govern. Those creatures who are restive and stubborn are beaten into obedience; while, on the other hand, those who obey our directions are treated handsomely, and rewarded. Colts, when they are under the management of the breaker or jockey are caressed when they take their lessons kindly; but when they are restive or disobedient, they receive the correction of the lash? and by these means they are brought to make good horses. If we breed spaniels, we treat them in the same manner, to learn them to hunt, to take the water, to fetch and carry, and be watchful; but, as for men, we may persuade them, and bring them to obedience, by setting before them rewards and punishments, and teaching them that it will be for their advantage to obey; but, as for bondmen, or those of the lowest rank, they may be brought to obedience another way; provide well for their bellies and they will do anything; while those, who have noble spirits, are best encouraged by praise, for praise is no less welcome to them, than meat and drink is to those of the meaner sort. And when

I have instructed my steward to govern by my example, I add this, as an instruction to him, that in the bestowing of clothes or apparel among my workmen, he should always give the best to those among them who are most diligent in their business; for industrious men ought always to have better dress, and have the pre-eminence in all things, before the lazy and negligent; for I am of opinion there is nothing more irksome to industrious servants, than to see those who are negligent in their business promoted or encouraged, while they themselves are neglected and overlooked. It discourages them from minding their business for the future; therefore I always take care to keep that difference among my servants. And when I observe that my bailiff shows the same regard for those servants under his care, I praise him for it; but when I perceive he has preferred any one unworthily, by means of flattery or some such deceit, I never suffer his award to pass, but blame him and reprimand him."

XIV. "Then," said Socrates, "tell me, good Ischomachus, when you have thus taught your steward to rule, and discipline the workmen and servants under his care, is he then completely qualified for your service? or is there anything else that you are to instruct him in?" To this Ischomachus replied: "There is yet a very material point, which concerns the business and character of a good steward; and that is, honesty; for if after he has received all my former instructions, he gives his mind to pilfer, and clandestinely to make away with my goods, his diligence in overseeing the management of my lands will be but of little profit to me, or it may be I may happen to be out of pocket by his service, so that I had much better be without the industry of such a man."

"But, good Ischomachus, I pray you tell me," said Socrates, "Are you capable of teaching men justice and honesty?"

"Yes," replied Ischomachus; "but I find that it is not every one I teach or instruct in these ways of truth and equity, who

follow my instructions: but, that I may yet make my servants follow the rules of justice which I teach them, I use those laws of Draco and Solon, which say, that little pilferers must be punished, but the great robbers must be imprisoned and put to death. Whereby it appears, that those, who enrich themselves by indirect methods, and amass to themselves fortunes by thievish practices, those goods shall not be profitable to them. And to these laws I likewise add some of the Persian laws: for those of Draco and Solon only inflict punishments on those who do amiss; but those of the king of Persia do not only punish those who do wrong, but reward those who do right. There are some men, who out of covetousness care not what they do, nor what indiscreet means they take, so that they gather riches together seeing that others can amass great fortunes in an honest way; believing that, so long as riches may be got by honest men, everyone who is rich shall be accounted an honest man: but these have never any pleasure or good advantage in their ill-got goods; or it is very rarely that they preserve them: but those who get their riches by industry and honesty, are always prosperous, and have pleasure in what they have got, especially because they have wronged no man. If among my people I discover any such who have that covetous and deceitful temper, and do not receive benefit by my instructions, I discharge them out of my service. And, on the other hand, those who make honesty their rule and study, behave themselves as true and faithful servants, without having so much regard to profit, as honor and praise from me; if they are bondmen, I give them their liberty; and do not only pro -mote them and advance their fortunes, but take every opportunity of recommending them to the world as good and honest men; for I judge, that the man may be esteemed good and honest, who upon the principle of virtue will employ himself for his master's interest, and will not scruple going

through a little difficulty for his master's service, when there is occasion, without a design of making his advantage of him by deceitful or indiscreet means.

XV. Such a man, when I have once gained his esteem and affection, by instructing him in the science of making a good advantage of the work he is employed in, and have sufficiently instructed him to rule; I am persuaded he will transact everything for his master's advantage, as well as if the master was continually to be present: and, with these qualifications, I think a man sufficiently capable of the business of a steward, and worthy of being employed in that office."

"But, methinks," said Socrates, "the principal part of a steward's business you have not yet explained."

"What is that, good Socrates?" said Ischomachus.

"I remember," said Socrates, "in your discourse, you said, that before all things a steward ought to know every particular of his business, and how to order everything for his master's profit; for, without that, you observed that diligence would be of little use."

"Then, I suppose, good Socrates," answered Ischomachus, "you would have me instruct you in the science of husbandry?"

"That is my desire," said Socrates; "for the science of husbandry is extremely profitable to those who understand it; but it brings the greatest trouble and misery upon those farmers who undertake it without knowledge."

"I shall first of all, good Socrates," said Ischomachus, "acquaint you, that husbandry is an honorable science, and the most pleasant and profitable of any other: it is favored by the gods, and beloved by mankind, and may be learned with ease. Husbandry, therefore, is becoming a gentleman; for if we were to take a view of all creatures upon earth, those only are esteemed, and worthy our regard, which are docile enough to

become profitable to us; while the others, which are wild and fierce in their nature, and are not capable of becoming useful to us, are rejected."

"If I remember right," said Socrates, "you have already instructed me, that a steward or deputy should first love you, then be diligent; in the next place, he should be able to rule, and then be honest; but I am impatient to hear how he must behave himself in the practice of husbandry, with regard to the works, when and how they are to be done; but hitherto you have not explained those particulars, but passed them over as if you imagined I knew as much of the affair as yourself, or understood the business. For my part, I am in the same state, with regard to husbandry, that a man would be who does not understand letters, and you were to show him a writing; he will be never the better for seeing that writing, unless he know the use of the letters that composed it. So I imagine, that it is not enough to be diligent in the science of husbandry, but a man must understand every particular of it. This I suppose you are a master of, but you have not yet acquainted me with the matter. Therefore, if I was now to set about the business of husbandry, I should be like a quack in physic, who went about visiting of sick people, and neither knew their distempers, nor what medicines were proper for them. Therefore, good Ischomachus, I desire you will learn me every particular point of the husbandry you practice."

"Good Soc-rates," replied Ischomachus, "the science of husbandry is not like other sciences, which require length of time to study them, or a great deal of labor to compass them before a man can get his living by them; for husbandry is easily learned, by observing the workmen now and then, and by consulting those who understand it. By these means you may instruct your friends in it. Again, we may observe, that men of other sciences, which are artificers, will always keep some secret of their business to themselves; but the

husbandmen are open and free in their discoveries, that every one may learn from them. The husbandman, who has the greatest knowledge in planting of trees, is proud of being observed, or that any man takes notice of his excellence in that art. And the sower is no less pleased to have any one stop to look upon him. And if you ask him about anything which has been well done in his way, he will be free enough to inform you how it was done. And so, good Socrates, we may see by this, that husbandry teaches men good manners and good nature."

"This," said Socrates, "is a good beginning: and now you have come thus far, I cannot leave you till you have given me every particular relating to husbandry; and especially I insist upon it, because you say it is a science so easy to learn. You will therefore have the less trouble to instruct me; and it will be the greater shame to me, if I do not learn it by your instructions, particularly since it is so profitable a science,"

XVI "I am very willing to answer your desire," said Ischomachus, "and instruct you in every point of husbandry. The principal part, which men dispute about, is the soil. On this account, all the philosophers, who have busied themselves about it, have given us more words than truth; for they throw some occult quality in the way, which leaves us as we were before: and at the best tell us, that he, who designs to be a husbandman, must first know the nature of the soil."

"It is not contrary to my opinion," said Socrates, "that one ought to know the quality of the soil; for those who do not know what the ground will bring forth, how can they appoint either trees, plants, or seeds for it, which are natural to its intent, or are proper for it?'—"Dear Socrates," said Ischomachus, "this is easily discovered, by observing the grounds of other people, where you may see the diversities of plants growing on them, and, by a little observance that way, you will learn what they will produce, and what are contrary

to their nature; and when a man has once made his due observation of this, he will see that it will be unprofitable to resist nature or the will of Providence. For when a man plants or sows those things which he accounts necessary for his use, and the soil does not delight in the nourishment or production of them, or has not a will to bring them forth, his expense and trouble is to no purpose. But if he cannot discover the nature of the grounds next about him, which either through idleness, or any other cause, have been mismanaged or neglected, let him consult other lands remoter from him; and if even they happen not to be cultivated, he may learn by the weeds that grow upon them, what they will produce: for those plants, which grow wild, show best the inclination and disposition of the soil; so that husbandmen may even learn their business by observing what the ground will produce of itself."

"Then," replied Socrates, "I perceive that a man need not abstain from husbandry purely because he does not know how to describe the nature of a soil; for, I remember, I have seen fishermen who have employed themselves continually upon the sea, without inquiring what the water is, or its principles, but pass over it, and when they find anything to their advantage they take it, and leave the rest. The same, I suppose, is the design of the husbandmen; when they look upon soils, it is to observe what they bring forth, that is valuable, and what they mil not.'—"In what point of husbandry would you have me begin,' said Ischomachus, "dear Socrates, for you talk like an adept in that science? Your reasoning is good, and must proceed from understanding."

"All that I mean by my reasoning with you," replied Socrates, "is to know how I shall till the ground, so as to reap the most profitable crops of corn, or other fruits, from it; for it is becoming a philosopher to inquire into those things which are pleasant and profitable."

“I suppose,” said Ischomachus, “you already understand that the stirring or breaking of the ground, which one may call fallowing, is of great advantage.”

“This,” answered Socrates, “I believe.”

“And suppose we were to fallow or plough the ground in winter?” said Ischomachus.

“That I don’t approve of,” said Socrates; “for the earth is then too wet, in my opinion.”

“And what do you think if we were to turn it up in the summer?” said Ischomachus.

“Then, I doubt,” said Socrates, “it would be too dry and hard for the plough.”

“Then let us plough,” said Ischomachus, “in the spring.”

“I think you are much in the right,” said Socrates, “for then the ground is most free and ready to open itself to the plough, and also is most ready to distribute its virtue.”

“It is not only so,” answered Ischomachus, “but then whatever weeds are upon the ground, being turned into the earth, enrich the soil as much as dung. And again, these plants are not grown to such a point of maturity or perfection that their seeds are ripe, and therefore cannot fill the ground with weeds; and besides, I suppose you know that both the fallowing and tilling of ground is always the better as the ground has the fewer weeds in it; for, besides the hindrance the weeds may give to corn, or other profitable herbs, they prevent the ground from receiving the benefit of the sun and free air.”

“This I agree to,” said Socrates.

“Then,” replied Ischomachus, “do not you think that often stirring the ground in summer will be the best way for it to enrich itself by the air and sun, as well as to destroy the weeds?”

“I am very sensible,” said Socrates, “that weeds will wither and dry quickly in the summer; and the ground can never receive more benefit from the sun, than if it is stirred with the plough, or fallowed in the heat of summer: and if a man dig his ground in summer, he will have the same advantage in destroying of weeds, which will then soon die; or else, by turning them in before they seed, they will enrich the ground: and by the turning up of the earth at that season, the sourness and rawness of that, which is turned up, will be corrected by the sun.”

XVII. “So I find,” said Ischomachus, “that we are both of one opinion concerning the stirring and fallowing of the ground.”

“It is true,” said Socrates; “but, to proceed to sowing, do you allow that the old opinion, which is agreed to and followed by the present operators in husbandry, concerning the season of putting the seed into the ground, is agreeable to reason, or are you of another opinion.”

To this Ischomachus replied; “When summer is once past, and September is upon us, all men then wait the pleasure of the gods to send rain to moisten the ground and prepare it for the seed; and, as soon as the rains fall, then everyone employs himself in sowing, as the gods seem to direct.”

“Then,” said Socrates, “it seems that all men in the world have determined, by one assent, that it is not convenient to sow when the ground is dry; and those who act against this rule of nature are sufferers by it, as if they had offended the gods, by practicing against their laws.”

“We agree likewise in this,” said Ischomachus.”

“Then,” Socrates replied, “I perceive that mankind consent to the order of nature, which is the will of the gods; as, for example, everyone thinks it convenient to wear furred gowns

and warm clothes in the winter, and then also to make a good fire, if he can get wood."

"But there are many," said Ischomachus, "who vary in their opinions concerning the time of sowing; some will sow sooner, others later."

"There is good reason for that," replied Socrates, "for the gods do not always give us the same kind of weather one year as another. Therefore it is sometimes best to sow early, and at other times it is better to sow late."

"I allow what you say," said Ischomachus: "but whether is it best to sow much seed, or little?"

"I am of opinion," answered Socrates, "that it is best to allow seed enough, and distribute it truly and equally upon the ground: but one may sow the seed too thick, as well as employ too small a quantity of it."

"I agree with you," said Ischomachus, "in this point."

"I imagine," said Socrates, "there is a great art in sowing."

"It is surely so," replied Ischomachus; "for there are many sorts of grain, and all of them must be cast upon the ground by a man's hand."

"I have seen that," said Socrates.

"But some men," replied Ischomachus, "can cast it even, and distribute it equally upon the ground, and others cannot."

"Then, I suppose," said Socrates, "that the skill in sowing the seeds depends upon the frequent practice and exercise of the hand; as those who play upon the harp, or other instruments of music, must keep their hands continually in practice, that their fingers may readily follow their mind."

"You reason well," said Ischomachus: "but suppose the ground is light and open, or suppose it is stiff and heavy?"

“What would you have me understand by that?” said Socrates: “do you not take the lighter ground to be the weakest, and the heavy ground to be the strongest?”

“I am of that opinion,” said Ischomachus.

“I would then fain know of you,” said Socrates, “whether you would allow the same quantity of seed to one kind of ground as you would to another, or whether you make any difference?”

“You know, good Socrates,” said Ischomachus, “that it is as natural to put the most water to the strongest wines, and the stronger a man is, the greater burden he may carry; so some men are nourished with a very spare diet, while others require a greater share of nourishment: the same ought to be considered in our present case.”

“Will not the ground,” said Socrates, “grow more strong by the more use, as horses and mules are thought to do?”

“This I take as a jest,” said Ischomachus: “but what I think necessary to acquaint you of, is, that you sow your grain when the ground is moist, and has the best advantage of the air; and when the corn is come up, and is high in the blade, if you then turn it into the ground with a plough, it will greatly enrich the land, and give it as much strength as a good dunging would do: and we must also remark, that if we continue to sow for a long space the same sort of grain upon any ground, but upon that especially which is weak or overcharged with seed, it will impoverish the ground, and wear it out of heart. We may compare this to a sow which suckles many pigs, and sustains them till they grow large; the more pigs she suckles, the more will she be weakened.”

“You intimate by this,” said Socrates, “that one ought to sow the smaller quantity of grain upon the weakest soil.”

“It is true,” replied Ischomachus, “and is what we have partly agreed on before, that to overburden ground with seeds or corn, is the ready way to weaken it.”

“But for what reason, good Ischomachus, do you make ditches or furrows in the corn fields?”

“You know very well,” replied Ischomachus, “the winter is subject to wet weather.”

“What mean you by that?” said Socrates.

“When the rains fall in great quantity,” replied Ischomachus, “the wet is apt to do great damage to corn; for sometimes our corn fields are incommoded with waters, and the corn, in some of its parts, smothered with mud; and besides, the roots of the corn in other places will be washed bare; the waters also carry the seeds of weeds to the lower parts of the ground, and by that means fill the corn with weeds.”

“I presume,” said Socrates, “what you say is agreeable to reason.”

“And do you think,” said Ischomachus, “that corn which is subject to these inconveniences ought not to be assisted?”

“Undoubtedly,” answered Socrates.

“Then what shall we do,” said Ischomachus, “to prevent the waters from covering the corn with mud?”

“I find then,” said Socrates, “it is proper to ease the ground from wet to secure the corn.”

“But,” said Ischomachus, “if the roots of the corn should be laid bare, and the earth about them worn away?”

“Then I suppose,” continued he, “the best way to remedy that, is to find some means of covering the roots with earth, that they may be well nourished.”

“But if the weeds, which may come up by this management,” replied Socrates, “should suck up, or destroy

the nourishment which the corn ought to receive, like the drone-bees in a hive, who are of no value in themselves, and yet live upon the industry of the working bees, and destroy the provisions which they have laid up to be manufactured into wax and honey."

"The weeds," replied Socrates, "should then be plucked up, as the drones in a hive are killed and discharged from it."

"Do you think then," said Ischomachus, "that water-furrows, or trenches in the ground to draw off the water, are not good to save corn?"

"I see now the use of similes," said Socrates; "for there is nothing can instruct me so much as similes; for-by them you have learned me to know the disadvantage of weeds among corn, as well as instructed me that drones are not always advantageous to bees.

XVIII. "But now I desire of you, dear Ischomachus, to tell me what is the business of harvest?"

"This," replied Ischomachus, "I shall be ready to do, if you are not already as wise as myself. I suppose," continued he, "you have heard that corn must be reaped?"

"Certainly," said Socrates; "but I am impatient till you proceed to inform me what are your sentiments in the affair of reaping, or getting in the harvest."

"Which do you think, good Socrates, we ought to do;—to stand to reap with the wind, or to reap against it?"

"I suppose," said Socrates, "it would be improper to reap against the wind, for it would increase the labor; it would hurt the eyes, and be likewise more difficult to the hands; for we sometimes meet with corn that is laid or beat down by the wind."

"And then," replied Ischomachus, "how will you cut it? will you cut the tops only? or cut it close to the ground?"

“If the straw is short,” replied Socrates, “I would cut it near the ground, for the advantage of the straw; but if the straw is very long, then I would rather cut it about the middle, for two reasons. In the first place, because the corn will be separated more easily from the straw: and in the next place, the remaining straw, if it is burned, will enrich the ground very much; or if it is afterwards cut and mixed with dung, it will increase it.”

“Good Socrates, your discourse,” said Ischomachus, “shows me plainly, that you understand reaping as well as I do.”

“As you agree with me,” said Socrates, “in what I say concerning reaping, I suppose I am right in my argument; but let me now see if I understand how to separate the corn from the straw.”

“You know, undoubtedly,” said Ischomachus, “that horses do that work.”

“I am sensible,” said Socrates, “that it is not only horses that separate corn from the straw, by treading upon it, but asses and oxen also are used on the same occasion.”

“But how do you think, good Socrates,” said Ischomachus, “that horses, or the other creatures you speak of, can so equally tread the corn as to get it all clear of the straw?”

“The men who have the care of this work,” said Socrates, “take care to stir the corn as they see occasion, that it may be all equally separated from the straw, flinging into the way of the cattle’s feet such corn as they observe to lie still in the straw.”

“I perceive,” said Ischomachus, “that you understand this part of husbandry as well as myself.”

“In the next place,” said Socrates, “let us examine how we ought to clean corn from the husk or chaff.”

“I suppose,” said Ischomachus, “you know that if you begin to winnow your corn on that side of the winnowing place which is next the wind, the chaff will be scattered all over the winnowing floor?”

“It must certainly be so,” said Socrates.

“And it must also fall upon the corn,” said Ischomachus.

“This,” said Socrates, “is certain; but it is the skill of a good husbandman to winnow his corn in such a manner that the chaff may fly from it, and be carried to its proper place.”

“But when you have cleaned the corn,” said Ischomachus, “as far as the middle of the winnowing place, will you rather let it remain there, or carry the clean corn to another place where you design to lodge it?”

“When I have a sufficient quantity of corn clean,” said Socrates, “I would set that by; lest, in cleaning the rest, the corn I have already cleaned, and lies scattered abroad upon the floor, should partake of the chaff from the corn that is cleaning, and then I shall be obliged to do my work twice over.”

“I find, good Socrates,” said Ischomachus, “that you are sufficiently skilled in the management of corn, even to the cleaning of it, for the markets; and I am of opinion, that you are well able to instruct, rather than to be instructed. In my discourse with you on this branch of husbandry, I find that I have yet some remembrance of the management of corn. If there is no more in it than what we have mentioned, I knew as much of it many years ago. And now I recollect that once I could play upon the harp, and the flute, could paint, and carve, and knew many other sciences, and yet I never had a master to teach me any of these sciences, no more than I had one to instruct me in this branch of husbandry; but I have seen men work as well in the sciences I speak of as in husbandry. You are satisfied,” said Ischomachus, “that husbandry is a pleasant science, and that it is easy to learn.”

XIX. “I am persuaded,” said Socrates, “that I now understand, and have long since known, the business of sowing and reaping of corn. But I was not certain in my judgment, till I had the opportunity of conversing with you about it: but I desire you to tell me, whether setting of trees is any part of husbandry?”

“Yes,” replied Ischomachus—”Then,” said Socrates, “though I know something relating to sowing and cleaning of corn, yet I doubt I am ignorant in the business of planting of trees.”

“I guess,” said Ischomachus, “you have as much knowledge in the one as in the other.”

“I must certainly be ignorant,” said Socrates, “in the art of planting trees, because I do not know what sort of earth a tree should be planted in, nor what depth, nor of what size the tree should be: nor yet, when it is planted, what is the best means to make it grow.”

“I am ready to instruct you,” said Ischomachus, “in any thing you are ignorant of. Have you observed, good Socrates, what holes or pits are commonly made to plant trees in?”

“I have observed that very often,” said Socrates. “Have you ever observed these deeper,” said Ischomachus, “than three feet?”

“No,” replied Socrates, “nor yet more than two feet and a half.”

“And the breadth of the trench which is made for planting a tree, did you ever observe that?” said Ischomachus; “for by such inquiries you may guess at the size of the trees which are fit to be transplanted.”

“I never,” said Socrates, “saw any wider than two feet and a half.”

“And have you ever seen any shallower than two feet?” said Ischomachus.

“I have not observed,” said Socrates, “any of those trenches which are dug for planting trees less than two feet and a half deep; for if the trees were to be set shallow, the summer heats would soon make them wither, and scorch the roots.”

“Then I suppose,” said Ischomachus, “that your opinion is, that the trenches or holes, which are to be dug for planting of trees, ought to be no deeper than two feet and a half, and just as much over?”

“I guess,” said Socrates, “they should be so.”

“But do you consider the nature of the ground,” said Ischomachus, “and make the proper differences—which is dry, and which is wet?”

“The ground,” said Socrates, “which lies about Licabectus, I call dry ground; and the ground about Phalericus I call wet ground, for that is a marsh.”

“I then desire to know,” said Ischomachus, “whether you would plant trees deeper, or shallower, in wet than in dry soil?”

“My opinion is,” said Socrates “that in the dry ground we ought to dig the trenches the deeper, for in wet ground we shall soon come to the water, and I do not think it convenient to plant trees deep in such wet places.”

“You argue very rightly,” said Ischomachus; “but do you know, good Socrates,” continued he, “when you have the choice of these grounds, which are those trees which are most proper to plant in them?”

“I think I do,” said Socrates.

“And do you think,” replied Ischomachus, “that when you set a tree to the best advantage, it will be best to plant it in such earth as has been made very fine by working, or in such as has not been made loose and open by culture?”

“It is my opinion,” said Socrates, “that a tree planted in well-loosened earth will prosper much better than in that which has been uncultivated.”

“Do you allow, then,” said Ischomachus, “that the earth ought to be fine and prepared on this occasion?”

“I guess it should be so,” said Socrates.

“But concerning the branch or cutting of a vine, when you plant it,” continued Ischomachus, “will it grow better if you set it upright in the ground, or lay it along in the earth?” — ”Certainly,” said Socrates, “it will grow the stronger if we plant it, or lay it lengthwise in the ground; for the more roots it gains, the greater strength it will have in its shoots.”

“We are both of one opinion,” said Ischomachus. “But when you plant one of these cuttings or branches of vines, would you leave it with the earth loose about it, or tread it hard over the part of the cutting which you bury?”

“I am of the opinion,” said Socrates, “that it is best to tread down the earth very close about it, for else the ground would lie so hollow all round, that the air and moisture would come unequally to it, and rot and spoil the roots; or else the sun’s heat would too soon reach it, and prove of as bad consequence.”

“So far we are of one opinion,” said Ischomachus.

“And must I plant or raise a fig-tree,” answered Socrates, “as I do the vines?”

“I suppose so,” said Ischomachus; “for he who is master of the art of raising vines, may as well raise figs, or most sorts of trees.”

“But is there not,” replied Socrates, “something particular in the propagating of olive-trees?”

“You may observe that,” said Ischomachus, “on every highway side, when we set a large truncheon of an olive-tree,

we dig deep holes, and plant them very deep in the ground, covering the top of the truncheon with clay, and yet we do not find that any other trees or plants are covered in this manner."

"I know this," replied Socrates, "for I have often seen it."

"Surely then," answered Ischomachus, "when you have seen an experiment, you must remember it; and especially in this common case you know that it is not sufficient to put clay over the large top of the olive truncheon, but also to cover the clay close with a shell."

"All that you have said relating to this, I likewise know perfectly," said Socrates: "but when we began to discourse whether I understood the planting of trees, I was not satisfied whether I was sure of the right method: and when you came to the particulars, I gave you my opinion, freely; and it happened to agree with you, who of all men upon the face of the earth are esteemed the most perfect husbandman. I am happy, good Ischomachus,' continued Socrates, "in what you have taught me, which by degrees I brought you to do: you have taught me every particular of good husbandry; and have led me, by your instructions in those things I did not understand, to those that I find I have some knowledge in; and, by your easy way of reasoning, I shall be capable of remembering everything you have laid before me."

"Do you believe," said Ischomachus, "that if I were to discourse with you concerning the goodness and fineness of silver and gold, that you could answer as pertinently as you have done to the affair of husbandry? or if I were to ask you concerning music and painting, do you think that you could reason about them so well as you have done in husbandry?"

"I think so," said Socrates; "for you have satisfied me that I am not ignorant in husbandry, and yet I never had any master to instruct me in it."

“You may remember,” said Ischomachus, “that in this discourse I told you that husbandry was easily learned by a little observation and conversation; for the practice of it teaches us many particulars, which no master can ever teach us, or would ever have thought on. In the first place, the vine will, of its own accord, run up trees, if there are any near it. This natural disposition in the vine shows us, that we ought to sustain the vine with props. Again: we observe that it spreads its leaves abroad the most at that time of the year when its fruit is in its growth; which shows us, that the fruit, during its growth, should be shaded from the too scorching rays of the sun. And again, we may observe, that about the time when grapes ripen, the leaves shrink, and lay the fruit more open to the sun, that they may ripen the better: so it appears that shade is necessary to help the growth of fruit, and a full sun is natural to the good ripening of fruit. And also when we see the vine full of clusters, we find some ripe, and others green; then let the ripe clusters be gathered, for otherwise they would spoil and rot, as it is in the fruit of the fig-tree; gather those which you perceive are completely ripe, lest they drop and are lost.”

XX. “It is surprising to me,” said Socrates, “that seeing husbandry is so easy to learn, we find such a vast difference among the husbandmen: some we may observe to be very rich, while others have hardly bread to eat.”

To this Ischomachus replied: “It is not the want of knowledge which makes the poor husbandman, for both the rich and the poor may have the same knowledge in sowing or planting, or in the virtue of the soil, and what is best to plant upon it, and in the ordering of vines, or that ground is improved by fallowing and by manuring: but that which makes some farmers poor and some rich, is because the first are negligent and lazy, and the latter are industrious and thrifty. The poor farmers often lose the profit of a year by

neglecting to make proper provision either by fallowing, manuring, or sowing; nor has he any wine through his neglect in planting of vines, or taking care to prune and dress those vines he has already: such a man has neither oil, nor figs, for he neglects the care of his tree. It is for these causes, good Socrates, that you find one farmer richer than another; for the knowledge of farming, or anything else, is of no service or advantage, if it is not industriously practiced. And so among generals of armies, it is likely that they all understand their business, but yet we perceive that some of them gain more honor and more riches than others. Their case is like that of the husbandmen; the industrious are always gainers, while the negligent always come off losers. If a general leads an army through an enemy's country, and be discreet and careful, he will march his forces in good order, and be vigilant; so that upon any occasion he is prepared for battle; and yet there are some generals who know these things, and do not act with that care, which ever brings them either honor or profit. All these are convinced that there is a necessity of keeping watches, and sending out scouts to reconnoiter the enemy, or observe their motion; but yet some neglect this business, and lose themselves by it. So likewise we all know that manuring the ground is necessary, but yet some are negligent, and never employ themselves about it, though it may as well be done by turning of cattle into it, as by other means. Some farmers use all their industry to gather together all the sorts of manures they can find; and others, though they might as well enrich their ground by the same means, yet never set their minds about it. The rain falls in hollow places, and remains there to the injury of -the ground; and where this happens, it shows the carelessness of the farmer; the weeds which rise on this occasion are witnesses of his negligence; for the diligent farmer always takes care to lay his ground in good order, and to clear it of weeds; and the very weeds he pulls up reward

him for that work; for if he cast these weeds into a pit of water, and let them rot there, they will produce as good manure as dung itself. For there are no herbs or plants which will rot by lying in water, that will not make good manure for land; nor is there any sort of earth which will not make very rich manure, by being laid a due time in a standing water, till it is fully impregnated with the virtue of the water. We may yet remark further, that if the ground be too wet to sow upon, or too surly or sour to plant in, there is still a remedy for it: if it be wet, we may drain it by ditches or furrows; and if the ground be stiff and sour, mix it with such things as are light and dry, or of a contrary nature to the soil. We find some husbandmen have regard to this, and some have no thought of it, and throw away those things which might prove to their profit. But suppose we were to know nothing of ground, or what it would bring forth, or can see neither tree nor plant upon it; nor have the opportunity of consulting, or learning, from some experienced husbandman, the worth of the ground; may we not satisfy ourselves at a very easy rate, by trying what it will bear or bring forth, in making a few experiments upon it? Is not this more easy than to experience what a horse or a man is? for in all that we can discover by our experiments upon soils, we are sure of the truth of what we see; there is no dissimulation: therefore the ground is the best master or director for the husbandman, in showing him what things are proper for it, and what are the contrary; and it gives us satisfactory proofs who among the farmers are diligent and discerning, and who are not. For the science of husbandry is not like other sciences, or trades or callings; for in them the artificers may excuse themselves by saying they wanted skill in what they wanted to undertake; but husbandry, we know, is within the compass of every man's knowledge; so that whenever we see that the ground is tilled and sown, it will always produce something beneficial, and is the most

pleasant of all others; and therefore I suppose it is that husbandry, above all other sciences, encourages men to practice it: and besides, this is preferable to all others, because every man, who has the least regard to himself, must surely know that no man can live without necessaries: and what does not this produce? We may therefore know, that those who will not learn such sciences as they might get their living by, or do not fall into husbandry, are either downright fools, or else propose to get their living by robbery or by begging. But we will suppose that some of the husbandmen we speak of, are such as employ deputies or bailiffs to look over their workmen; and the overseers of some do right, and the greater part do wrong. Those who do right will take care to see their work done in season; but the negligent steward will not keep his workmen to their business; he will let them leave their business when they think convenient, without regard to his master's profit. And to compare the diligent and careless steward, there will be the difference, that he who sets his people to work regularly, and keeps them employed, gains half as much more as the man who is careless of his laborers: it is like two men who are sent out to travel fifty miles, who are both equally strong and in health; the man who is the most industrious shall perform his day's journey to the utmost of his power, and lose no time; while the other stops at every spring, at every shade, and at every refreshment he can get, and loses so much in his progress, that though they both run and walk alike, the lazy and negligent man makes two days of the same length that the industrious man makes in one day: so, in all sorts of works, there is a great deal of difference between the man who sets himself heartily about his business, and him who is careless and does not regard his work; for when these last happen to weed or clean the vines at such an improper season that the weeds spring again, they rather spoil than mend their vineyards: their absolute neglect

would have been more excusable. Such errors as these are the occasion why many farmers are sufferers. A man who has a large family, and is at great expenses for the maintenance of his house, if he cannot get enough by his rents and by his husbandry to find him and his people with necessaries, must certainly come to poverty. But such as are diligent, and apply themselves to husbandry, will as certainly increase their substance, and may easily grow rich. I remember my father had an excellent rule, which he advised me to follow; that if ever I bought any land, I should by no means purchase that which had been already well improved, but should choose such as had never been tilled; either through the neglect of the owner, or for want of capacity to do it: for he observed, that if I was to purchase improved grounds, I must pay a high price for them, and then I could not propose to advance their value, and must also lose the pleasure of improving them myself, or seeing them thrive better by my endeavors. It was my father's opinion, that both land and cattle, with good management and industry, would doubly improve, and reward the master, and be no less pleasant than profitable to him. There is nothing which brings us a better return for our care and labor, than such ground as has lain a long time without culture; nor is there anything so agreeable and pleasant, as to observe the good use such lands make of the industry and labor we bestow on them. Nothing rewards our labors so much as these; and I assure you," continued Ischomachus, "that I have often brought such land, as had never produced anything of value, to bring such crops as were twice as much worth as the price I gave for the ground. This, I suppose, you will remember, and teach to those who fall into the way of your instructions. I may observe to you also, good Socrates, that my father neither learned this, nor any other branch of husbandry, from any one; his genius led him to study the reason of it, and even to assist in the working part;

for he delighted extremely to see the reward of his own labor and industry, and well knew that he could never expect so great a return from cultivated and improved grounds, as from uncultivated lands, which he took in hand. I believe, good Socrates, that you have heard of my father's excellence in husbandry above all the Athenians, and of his natural bent of fancy towards it."

Then Socrates replied: "Tell me, good Ischomachus, did your father, when he had improved such parcels of land, keep them to himself, or sell them to good advantage?"

"Now and then," replied Ischomachus, "he sold a parcel of land when he could receive a sufficient advantage for his improvements; and immediately bought fresh unimproved land in the room of it, that he might enjoy the pleasure of bringing it to his own mind."

"By what I can understand," said Socrates, "your father was wise and diligent in the science of husbandry, and had no less desire towards it, than the corn merchants have to find out where the best wheat is to be had; not even scrupling to pass the roughest seas, or run any other hazard to gain their intent; and when they have bought up as much corn as they can purchase, they then immediately dispatch it to their own houses; and reserve it in their warehouses till they see a good opportunity of selling it. I suppose then they do not sell it without consideration, or carelessly dispose of it at low markets; but are first assured where they may sell it at the dearest price."

"You seem to banter," replied Ischomachus; "but can we say the mason is in the wrong who builds houses and sells them, and perhaps has afterwards an advantage in repairing or improving them?"

XXI. "I am very well persuaded," said Socrates, "from what you say, that your opinion is, every man ought to study that

thing chiefly which may redound the most to his advantage, with the greatest facility. For, in the discourse we have had, you have insisted that husbandry is the science most easily learnt of any other, and particularly have given proofs of its being the most profitable study a man can pursue: and what you have observed in your discourse relating to it, has convinced me that husbandry is as pleasant and profitable as you represent it."

"It is certain, as I have told you," replied Ischomachus, "that husbandry is a most delightful and beneficial study; and it is as sure that it may be greatly advanced by the application, industry, and good management of the professors of it: we may compare it to a galley upon the sea, which is obliged to make its way as far in a day with oars, as it should with sails. We find that those masters or overseers of the rowers, who keep them encouraged with good words and proper rewards, gain so much upon the good-will of the laborers under their command, that they even outdo themselves, and perform almost as much work as double the number would do of such who are under the discipline of careless or surly masters: for, where such evil masters happen to rule over any sets of people, they never have their work done with a good-will, nor to the purpose: but a generous spirit in a master creates a free, hearty spirit in his servants, which makes them work merrily and heartily, sweating and pressing upon one another who shall excel in his business: so there are likewise some captains, who are of that ill disposition towards their soldiers, and use them with that vile barbarity, that they can never gain their will to perform any thing for their service either in peace or war; and in time of war especially, rather than assist, will expose their captains to the utmost danger. Nor can such leaders ever bring the men under their commission to be ashamed of anything they do, even though they commit the worst actions; for the unmerciful or careless officer hardens

the soldiers, that they have neither a regard for right or wrong: but there are other captains, who have discretion and prudence enough to manage their soldiers with so much good order, and gain so much upon their affections, that if these were to have the command of the same which we have been speaking of, would bring them to duty, and to act as one man in their officers' defense and service, in time of necessity; and instruct them to be ashamed of everything that is base or dishonorable; exciting them to diligence, and to work with good will in such things as are becoming them to do, praising their labors, and rewarding them on all occasions. Such rule and management gains the captain victory and honor; for it is not only the business of the soldier to learn to draw the bow, or throw the javelin, but to know how and when to obey the word of command: and nothing will bring them sooner to this, than to gain their love and affection; for the general or captain who has good sense enough to gain the good esteem of the men under his command, may lead them through the greatest dangers. It is, therefore, such generals as have good generosity and discretion, who, in the management of their soldiers, commonly gain the characters of valiant and expert officers: for, though the number of the soldiers contribute to gain the battle, yet without the commanding officer gives them good instructions, and gains their love and affection to him, they never act to the purpose; nor can their captain gain any reputation by them; so that the great name is rather gained by wisdom and prudence, than by labor and strength of body: and it is no less to be observed in the science of husbandry, or other sciences, that those stewards, who have discretion and generosity enough to gain the goodwill of the men they employ, such will always find their work well done, and increase their riches, But if a master, or his overseer, be careless, and at the same time has the power of rewarding and punishing those under his direction, and, when he views his

workmen, does not make them sensible, either one way or other, of his authority; whenever he comes, or goes, it is the same thing to them; they work or play at their discretion. Such a one is very little worth the regard of any man: but the man who ought to be admired and valued, is he, who, when he comes among his servants, creates in them a pleasant countenance, and makes them rejoice, every one running or striving in their business to serve him, and using all ways to get his praise and love. Such a man as this is worthy the rank of a king. A master of any science, as well as husbandry, who has good sense enough to bring his family to such affection toward him, and good order, he does not possess this by learning only, but he must receive his good nature and wisdom from the gods; he must be born with a generous nature, which must proceed from the gods; for I have never yet found the true gift of government, but it was attended with generosity. Where these excellent qualities appear, all under that direction are willing to obey, and especially if the power of rule be in the hands of those who are endowed with virtue and temperance: but where a master exercises himself in cruelty, or acts in a tyrannical way, against the good-will and reason of mankind, he can never hope for the least ease or comfort."

MEMOIRS OF SOCRATES

For English Readers

By EDWARD LEVIEN, M.A.

1872.

Book I.

Chapter I.

I have often wondered by what arguments the accusers of Socrates could possibly have succeeded in convincing the Athenians that he deserved death at the hands of the state, for the indictment against him ran somewhat thus "Socrates violates the laws, inasmuch as he acknowledges not as gods those whom the state acknowledges, but has introduced other and new divinities. He also violates the laws by corrupting the youth."

Now as to the first count, that "he did not acknowledge as gods those whom the state acknowledges," what kind of evidence did they adduce? For he was frequently seen sacrificing without concealment, both at his own house and on the public altars of the city; and he openly used divination, for it was commonly bruited about how that "Socrates affirmed that the divinity forewarned him." And on this assertion, it was that they seem to me chiefly to have founded the charge of his "introducing new divinities."

But in reality, he introduced nothing more novel than others do who employ divination, and have faith in birds, and voices, and signs, and sacrifices; for such do not suppose that the birds or the people who encounter them know what is best for those who seek their counsel, but only that the gods signify thus much by the instrumentality of such things; and this was also his opinion.

Whereas, however, most people profess that they are diverted from an object, or incited to it, both by birds and by the people they meet, Socrates asserted that which he himself felt; for he declared that it was the divinity who was his forewarner. Accordingly, he encouraged many of his disciples to some actions, and dissuaded them from others; and those who followed his advice were benefited, while those who did

not, repented of not having done so. Yet is there anyone who would not admit that he disliked being regarded either as a fool or a braggart by his friends? both of which Socrates certainly would have been considered, if, after affirming that revelations had been vouchsafed to him by a god, he had then proved a deceiver. It is manifest, therefore, that unless he had believed his predictions true, he would not have uttered them. Who, however, in such matters, would trust in any one rather than in a god I And if Socrates trusted in the gods, how could he think that there were no gods?

Moreover, he acted on similar principles where his friends were concerned, for he counselled them, in matters in which results follow as of necessity, to proceed in such a way as he thought most conducive to their interests; while in those of which the issue was uncertain, he referred them to divination to determine whether they should act or not. He said, too, that those who would found families or cities on a sure footing stood in need of divination; for architecture, or metallurgy, or husbandry, or the governing of men, or the power of criticizing or reasoning upon such subjects, all these he regarded as matters of science, and as fit objects for man's selection according to his individual judgment. But the gods, he affirmed, reserved to themselves that which was most important in all such matters, of which nothing was revealed to mortals. Thus, he who had cropped his land abundantly was by no means sure who should reap the fruits, neither was he 'who had built a fine house certain who should inhabit it. Nor, again, was it clear to the accomplished general whether it would be to his advantage to undertake the command of the army; or to the politician whether he had better become prime minister; or to him who had married a beautiful woman in the hope of happiness whether she might not prove a bane to him; or to him who had powerful political connections whether by their means he might not be sent into banishment. And he

asserted that those who were of opinion that the divinity took no cognizance of such issues, but that they were all matters demanding merely human judgment, must be out of their minds. Those also he declared to be bereft of their senses who had recourse to divination with a view to solving questions upon which the gods had given the power to men to decide for themselves. For instance, as if anyone should inquire whether it were better to engage as a charioteer a man who could drive, or one who could not; or as a pilot a man who could steer, or a man who could not; or in matters which can be estimated by arithmetic, or mensuration, or ponderation. Those who consulted the gods upon questions of this kind he deemed guilty of impiety, and said that whatever the gods had given a man the power of informing himself upon, that he should learn; but in matters which were inscrutable to him the gods should be inquired of through divination, for that they vouchsafed revelations to those whom they regarded favorably.

Moreover, with regard to his own conduct, he always acted without any attempt at concealment, since he was wont early in the morning to attend the public promenades and the gymnasia, and was constantly to be seen in the Forum at the time of high market; while for the rest of the day he went where he was likely to meet the most people, and discoursed as much as possible, so that all those who chose to listen, to him could do so. Neither did anyone ever see or hear of Socrates acting impiously either by deed or word; for he did not argue, as most philosophers do, concerning the nature of all things, speculating upon that which is termed by the Sophists “the universe,” and by what laws each of the heavenly bodies exists; but he maintained that those who devoted their attention to such subjects were fools. And, first, he would ask them whether it was because they considered themselves sufficiently well instructed in all branches of

human knowledge that they proceeded to the contemplation of such matters, or whether they thought it became them to ignore humanity in order to speculate upon divinity? He marveled also that they could not perceive that it was impossible for mortals to penetrate these mysteries, since even those who are the best informed with regard to such topics do not, when discussing them, agree in their opinions, but are affected one towards another as mad people are. For that as with madmen, some are not terrified at things that really are terrible, while others are frightened at that which is by no means frightful; and as some hold it not unseemly to say or do anything before a crowd of people, while others think it wrong even to go into company at all; as some, again, reverence nothing that is sacred, either altar or anything that is consecrated to religion, but worship stones, or chance logs, or wild beasts; so, of those who busy themselves in speculating upon the nature of the universe, some hold that there is only one single existence, while others maintain that the multitude of existences is infinite; some regard all things as being in perpetual motion, while others assert that there is no such thing as motion at all; and while some think that everything is born and perishes, so others argue that nothing ever was born, and that nothing ever perishes.

He would also ask concerning such persons, "Whether, as those who have learned human sciences think that they can employ them when they please for their own service or that of others, so those who seek to dive into matters pertaining to the gods believe, when they have acquainted themselves with the necessary laws of causation respecting each of these things, that they can produce at will either wind or rain, or the changes of the seasons, or any other such phenomena as they choose? or whether, if they have no such expectation as this, the mere knowledge of the means by which each of these is caused satisfies them?"

Such remarks he would make concerning all who busied themselves in these speculations; but he himself was always willing to discuss any topics that might be of human interest, — inquiring into what was pious, what impious; what honorable, what base; what sobriety, what excess; what courage, what cowardice; what a state, what a statesman; what the government of men, what one who was capable of governing them.

And so too on other subjects, the knowledge of which he thought rendered men honorable and good, but ignorance of them fit only to be designated as no better than slaves.

Upon as many points, therefore, as he gave no clear indication of what his opinions were, it is no marvel that his judges should have been led astray; but in regard to facts which were patent to everyone, was it not strange that they took no cognizance of these whatever? For once, when he was a member of the senate, and had taken the customary oath, in the which it was recited that he should u vote in conformity with the laws," he, being President of the people, when they voted, contrary to law, for the death of the nine generals who accompanied Thrasyllus and Erasinides, would not give his suffrage, although they were incensed at him, and many powerful citizens even threatened him, because he considered the observance of his oath more obligatory than the gratification of the people at the expense of right, and than the defense of himself against those who had threatened him. For he held that the gods regarded men, not according to the generally received opinion concerning them — which is, that they are acquainted with some things, but are ignorant of others; but Socrates maintained that the gods were omniscient in regard to everything that men said or did, or meditated in silence; and that they were omnipresent, and vouchsafed revelations to men touching all human affairs.

I wonder, therefore, how the Athenians were ever persuaded that Socrates was not orthodox in his opinions with regard to the gods, since he was a man who never, in any one instance, either spoke or acted irreverently concerning them; but, both in word and deed, talked and behaved in such a way towards them that anyone else whose words and actions had resembled his would have been, and would have been considered to be, exceptionally religious.

Chapter II.

The conviction entertained by some, that “Socrates corrupted the youth,” also seems wonderful to me, inasmuch as, in addition to what has been already said of him, he was, in the first place, the most continent of men in regard to his passions and appetites; in the next, remarkably well constituted to endure both cold and heat, and all kinds of toil; and also so educated as to feel only moderate wants — and as he possessed but very little, so he very easily made that little suffice.

Was he, then, being such a one himself, likely to render others either impious, lawless, luxurious, incontinent, or indisposed to labor? Rather, he caused many to turn from such courses by inducing them to seek after virtue, and encouraging them to believe that if they would take heed to their ways, they would be honorable and good men, not that he himself ever undertook to act as an instructor upon such subjects, but, by its being patent to all 'that such was his own method of life, he caused those who associated with him to hope that they too, if they followed his example, might become such as he was.

Yet was he not by any means neglectful of the body, nor did he approve of those who were so. He did not consider excess either of eating or of labor beneficial, but that such sustenance as could be taken without satiety should be got rid of by a proper degree of exercise; for he said that such a habit was conducive to health, and did not hinder the cultivation of the mind.

Neither was he in any way luxurious or ostentatious, either in his clothes or his shoes, or any of his modes of living. Nor, again, did he make his associates fond of money, while he checked them in other desires; neither from those who sought his advice would he take any fee. He thought that by refusing

payment he could best preserve his independence, and said that those who accepted remuneration, from their disciples were like men who bound themselves to slavery, for that they were obliged to hold discussions with anyone whose money they had taken. He marveled, too, that anyone who was a teacher of virtue should regard it as a matter of payment, instead of reckoning that he had gained most by the acquisition of a firm friend; or should fear that he who had been made an honorable and worthy character by his teacher would not feel the greatest gratitude towards him as his benefactor. Socrates, indeed, never delivered himself to this effect to anyone, but he believed steadfastly that those of his associates who assented to the doctrines which he himself held, would be staunch friends to him and to one another throughout their whole lives.

How, then, could such a man "corrupt the youth," — unless indeed the cultivation of virtue be corruption?

"But most certainly," said his accuser, "Socrates caused his associates to despise the established laws by inveighing against the folly of electing the ministers of state by ballot; for he argued that no one would like to employ a pilot or a builder or a flute-player chosen by ballot, or anyone in any similar capacity, although blunders committed in such matters would occasion far less mischief than errors of statesmanship. By such teaching, therefore, young men were encouraged to contemn the enactments of the state, and to act forcibly in violation of them."

Now, it appears to me that persons who use their intellects, and imagine themselves capable of instructing the citizens as to what is most to their advantage, are the last people likely to commit acts of violence, as being aware that from violence dangers and enmities accrue, and that the same ends are better attained by persuasion, without any hazard, and in an amicable way; for those who are compelled by force, conceive

enmity as though they had been robbed; whereas those who have been persuaded, feel amicably disposed, as though they had received a favor. Acts of violence, then, are not likely to be committed by men who use their intellects, but they are rather to be expected of those who possess sheer strength without judgment. Moreover, he who ventures to use violence must have abettors; but he who prevails through persuasion needs none, for he would consider himself able to carry his point single-handed. And least of all should such persons put any one to death. For who would prefer slaying a man, to preserving his life, and persuading him, and ultimately making him useful?

"But," said the accuser, "Critias and Alcibiades, who became the associates of Socrates, both worked manifold evils in the state; for Critias turned out to be the most grasping and outrageous of the oligarchs, while Alcibiades again was the most intemperate, insolent, and violent of all the democratic party."

Now, for whatever evils either of them may have inflicted upon the state, I shall offer no apology; but with respect to their association with Socrates, I will show how the matter really stood. These two were, in truth, by nature the most ambitious persons among all the Athenians, being desirous of carrying everything before them by their own personal influence, and becoming the most renowned of all men; they knew, too, that Socrates lived very independently on very small means; that he was most abstinent from all pleasures, and that he swayed those who argued with him any way he pleased by his reasonings. Seeing, then, as they did, that such was the case, and being actuated by such motives as they were, will anyone affirm that it was because they were desirous of imitating Socrates in the life he led and the abstinence he practiced, that they sought his company, or that it was not because they thought that by associating with

him, they would be rendered most efficient both in speech and action? I verily am of opinion that if any god had given either of them the choice of passing his whole life as he saw Socrates passing it, or of dying, both of them would have infinitely preferred to die. And this they proved by their conduct; for directly they conceived themselves superior to their contemporaries, they hurried away from Socrates, and busied themselves in politics; that being the very purpose for which they had sought his society.

Now, perhaps, someone might object to this, that Socrates should not have taught his disciples politics before he had taught them discretion — a proposition which I, for one, by no means gainsay. But I perceive that all teachers prove to their disciples by their own examples how far they practice what they preach, and encourage them by their reasonings to follow a similar course. I know, too, that Socrates made it evident to his disciples how honest and good he was, and that he discoursed most admirably concerning virtue, and all human actions. I know, also, that both these men, so long as they associated with Socrates, behaved themselves discreetly, not as being in fear of any penalty or punishment at his hands, but as thinking, at that time, that it was best for their own interests so to act.

But many of those who are called philosophers would perhaps assert that a man who has at one period of his life been just, can never become unjust, nor a humble-minded man insolent; and so, too, in regard to anything that is capable of being learnt, that he who has once learned can never unlearn it. With such sentiments, however, I do not coincide; for I see that, as those who do not train their bodies cannot properly perform the functions of the body, so those who do not exercise their mental faculties cannot perform those of the mind; for they are unable to do those things which they ought to do, or to abstain from that from which they

ought to abstain. And hence it is that fathers keep their sons, however steady they may be, from bad companions, on the ground that intimacy with the good leads to the practice of virtue, whereas the companionship of the wicked destroys it.

And to this one of the poets bears testimony when he says —

> "You shall learn goodness from the good; but those
> Who make companions of the wicked, lose
> Such understanding as they once possessed."

Another observes —

> "Good men are sometimes good and sometimes bad."

And to this I can myself bear witness; for I perceive that as those who are engaged in inditing metrical compositions, if they are not careful as to their diction, forget the art; so those who neglect instructive admonitions become oblivious of them. And when any one forgets moral admonition, he loses the remembrance of those things which the mind desired when it was tolerant of wisdom; and if a man is forgetful of these things, it is not to he wondered at that he becomes oblivious of wisdom also. And I see, too, that those who are given to excess in drinking, or who are carrying on amours, are the less able to apply themselves to their duties, or to abstain from actions which they ought not to commit; for many who could be frugal before they were in love, when they have fallen in love can be so no longer; and when they have exhausted their resources, betake themselves for the sake of gain to courses from which they have previously shrunk as considering them dishonorable.

How is it impossible, then, that one who has formerly been sober-minded may be sober-minded no longer? that he who was once capable of acting justly may become afterwards incapable of executing justice?

It appears to me, therefore, that whatsoever things are honest and good are matters of practice, and not the least of them, sobriety of mind; for the sense of pleasure implanted as it is in the self-same body in which the spirit exists, tempts the latter to pay no regard to sobriety of mind, and leads it but to gratify itself and the body at all hazards.

So, then, both Critias and Alcibiades, as long as they remained intimate with Socrates, were enabled with his aid to subdue their evil propensities; but when they renounced his society, Critias, for his part, flying to Thessaly, there became the associate of men much more addicted to breaking the laws than to keeping them; while Alcibiades, on account of his personal beauty, being solicited by many women, even of high rank, and from the influence which he possessed both in the state and with the allies; being courted, too, by many men, and among them by those who were most able to flatter him; being held in honor by the people, and excelling others without an effort, like those athletes who from easy victories at gymnastic contests afterwards neglect their training — so he neglected himself.

This, then, being the case with each of them, and both of them being proud of their descent, elated with wealth, puffed up with power, petted by many, and thus, rendered thoroughly corrupt, what wonder is it that when they had long been separated from Socrates, they became overbearing in their conduct?

But, granting that they did act wrongfully, pray should the accuser impute the blame to Socrates? and should he argue that if, when they were both young, and therefore most likely to be inconsiderate and ungovernable, Socrates rendered them amenable to reason, he does not therefore deserve any credit for it? At any rate, other matters are not estimated after a similar fashion. For what flautist, or harpist, or teacher of any kind, who has turned out proficient pupils, is blamed, if,

when they go to other teachers, they deteriorate? Or what father, if his son, while he associated with one man, was steady, but afterwards by intimacy with another became vicious, would find fault with the former? and would he not rather, in proportion as his son appeared to be rendered worse by the second, be so much the more inclined to speak well of the first? But even fathers, when they are with their sons, are not held accountable for any faults those sons may commit, provided they themselves are well conducted. And according to the same rules ought Socrates to have been judged. If in any way he acted viciously, he was rightly regarded as a vicious man; but if he was continually engaged in virtuous acts, how was it just to blame him for depravity which he did not exhibit?

Granting, however, that he was himself innocent of any wrong-doing, yet if he commended Critias and Alcibiades when he saw them acting wrongfully, he would be justly liable to censure. But when he saw the former courting Euthydemus, and endeavoring to make use of him just as debauchees do those whom they wish to seduce, he sought to dissuade him from his design, saying, that it was not like a gentleman, or worthy of a man of honor and integrity, to fawn upon a person whom he admires and by whom he wishes to be highly esteemed, beseeching and entreating him, as paupers do, for favors, which after all were for no good purpose. But as Critias heeded not his remonstrances, and was not diverted from his course, Socrates, as the story goes, said in the presence of Euthydemus himself and diverse others, that "Critias appeared to him to be swinishly disposed, for that he sought to rub himself against Euthydemus just as pigs do against stones." Hence it was that Critias bore such a grudge against Socrates, that even when he was one of the Thirty, and was appointed with Charicles to settle the laws, he remembered this circumstance, and inserted a clause

forbidding anyone to teach the art of disputation, expressly to annoy Socrates, and not as having any particular charge on which he could arraign him, but for the purpose of bringing against him the accusation which was commonly brought against philosophers, and lowering his character with the people in general. Not that I myself ever heard this from Socrates, nor did I ever know anyone who said that he had heard it.

Critias, however, himself made it manifest; for when the Thirty were putting to death many of the citizens, some of them being by no means inconsiderable persons, and were encouraging several in their violation of the laws, Socrates casually remarked "that he should think it curious if a man who undertook to tend a herd of cattle, and suffered them to grow thinner and poorer, should deny that he was a bad herdsman; but he thought it still more remarkable that anyone who undertook to act as the head of the state, and suffered the citizens to deteriorate both numerically and morally, should not consider that he was unfit for his position." This observation having been reported to the Thirty, Critias and Charicles summoned Socrates before them, and pointing out the law to him, warned him against holding further discourses with the young. Then Socrates asked them if they would allow him to put a question to them concerning any point of their inhibition which he did not exactly comprehend? Upon their acceding to his request, he said, "I am ready then to obey the law, but in order that I may not violate it unwittingly through ignorance, I wish to ascertain clearly from you whether it is because you think that the art of disputation encourages proper or improper discourse that you prohibit it? If it encourages proper discourse, the inhibition would clearly be against discoursing properly, but if it encourages improper discourse, it is certain that we ought to endeavor to discourse properly." Then Charicles, flying into

a rage with him, exclaimed, “Since, Socrates, you do not understand what we have said, we give you an order which you may comprehend more easily, viz., that you are not to discourse with the young at all.”

“But,” answered Socrates, “that there may be no mistake as to whether I do that which is forbidden or not, define to me at what age I am to consider men young.”

“So long,” said Charicles, “as they are under the senatorial age, as not yet being sufficiently experienced. Do not discourse with anyone who is under thirty years of age.”

“But,” asked Socrates, “suppose I should wish to purchase an article, and a man under thirty should be inclined to sell it, may I not even ask him what is its price?”

“Of course,” answered Charicles, “you may ask such questions as these. But forasmuch as your questions, Socrates, generally bear reference to matters which you know all about, from such questions you must abstain.”

“If, then, a young man asks me such a question as ‘Where does Charicles live?’ or ‘Where is Critias?’ may I not answer him if I know?”

“Yes,” replied Charicles, “such questions as these you may answer.”

“But,” said Critias, “you must abstain from descanting upon shoemakers and builders and braziers, for you talk so unceasingly about them that I should imagine they must be worn threadbare.”

“Must I then abstain from speaking of any quality that may attach to any of such people, as love of justice, or piety, or anything of that sort?”

“Yes, in good sooth, you must,” rejoined Charicles, “and especially beware of ‘herdsmen,’ or if you do not, look out lest you yourself make the herd thinner.” Hence then it was

evident that it was because the anecdote about the cattle had been repeated to them that they were angry with Socrates.

The nature of Critias' intercourse with Socrates, and the relations which existed between them, have now been explained.

Again, I, for my part, should say that no real education could be imparted to a pupil by a teacher whom he disliked. And neither Critias nor Alcibiades were intimate with Socrates because they liked him what time they associated with him, but because, from the very commencement of their intimacy, they were aiming at the headship of the state; for during the whole period of their intercourse with him they affected the conversation of none more eagerly than they did that of persons who were engaged in political life.

Now it is related of Alcibiades, that before he was twenty years of age he held the following conversation with Pericles, who was his guardian, and likewise prime minister of state, respecting the laws: — "Tell me," said he, "Pericles, would you have me taught what law is?"

"By all manner of means," answered Pericles. "Teach me, then, I pray you, by the gods," rejoined Alcibiades; "since, for my part, although I hear some men praised as being obedient to the laws, methinks that they are not deserving of such praise unless they know what law is."

"But, Alcibiades, there is nothing difficult in what you desire," said Pericles, "when you wish to know what law is; for all such measures as the people, approving in full conclave, enacts, declaring what is to be done and what not, are laws."

"And which kind of actions do the laws enjoin — such as are good or such as are bad?"

"The good, my child, of course; but the bad by no means," replied Pericles. "But suppose not the whole people, but, as in

the case of an oligarchy, the few meet together and enact what is to be done, what are such enactments?"

"Everything," answered Pericles, "which the ruling power in the state, after due deliberation, enacts as proper to be done is called the law."

"If a tyrant, then, holding supreme power in the state, enacts for his citizens what they ought to do, is this too law?"

"Even such things as a tyrant at the head of the state enacts," said Pericles, "are called the law."

"In what, then, Pericles, do compulsion and lawlessness consist?" asked Alcibiades; "is it not when the stronger forces the weaker to do that which seems good to him, not by persuasion, but against his will?"

"So, it appears to me," answered Pericles. "Whatever, then, a tyrant by his enactments compels his citizens to do against their own judgment is lawlessness?"

"I think so," said Pericles, "for I retract my assertion that whatever a tyrant enacts without persuading his citizens is law."

"And such measures as the minority enact, not by persuading the majority, but by gaining the mastery over them, should we call these compulsory or not?"

"Everything," replied Pericles, "that one-man forces another to do without persuading him, whether enacted in writing or not, appears to me to be compulsion rather than law."

"Whatever decrees, then, the mass of the people, having obtained the mastery over the wealthier classes, should pass, without having persuaded the latter, would be rather compulsion than law?"

"Certainly, Alcibiades," answered Pericles; "and we, too, when we were of your age, were adepts at arguing as you now argue, for we used to busy ourselves in, and speculate upon,

the same kind of disquisitions as those to which you seem to me now to be paying attention." a I would, then," said Alcibiades, "that I had been intimate with you, Pericles, when you were most of an adept at handling such topics."

So, then, when Critias and Alcibiades considered themselves superior to those who had the direction of the state, they no longer maintained their intimacy with Socrates, for they both disliked him on other grounds, and were also angry if, when they did go to him, he reproved them for any fault that they had committed. Thus, then, they devoted themselves to politics, which was the very reason why they originally sought Socrates.

But Crito was an associate of Socrates, as also were Chaerephon, and Chaerecrates, and Hermocrates, and Simmias, and Cebes, and Phaedonides, and others, who attended him, not with the object of becoming accomplished orators or pleaders, but in order that, by being made good and honorable men, they might do their duty by their families and their domestics, to their relations and friends, to the state and to their fellow-citizens. And not one of these, either in his youth or in his more mature age, ever committed, or was ever accused of committing, any despicable action.

"But Socrates," said his accuser, "taught the young to look contemptuously upon their parents by making his followers believe that he rendered them wiser than their fathers, and alleging that any one might legally confine even his father upon proving mental incapacity against him, — adducing this as an argument that it was lawful for the more ignorant to be put under restraint by the better informed." But Socrates maintained that he who put another under restraint on account of his ignorance would be rightly served by being himself kept in durance by those who happened to understand anything of which he was ignorant. Hence, in reference to this subject, he was often wont to inquire into the

points of difference which exist between ignorance and madness; and while he was of opinion that madmen should be put under restraint, both for their own safety and that of their friends, he also thought that those who were ignorant of such things as they ought to know should by rights be taught by those who did understand them.

"Again," said the accuser, "Socrates caused his followers to look with contempt, not only upon their parents, but upon their kindred generally, by asserting that relations were of no benefit to people when they were suffering illness or involved in a lawsuit, but that the doctors assisted them in the one case and the lawyers in the other." He stated, too, that a Socrates declared, with regard to friends, that their mere good-will was of no avail unless they could also be of some active service; and that those only were deserving of any esteem who knew what would tend to a man's advantage, and could point out the way to it." Accordingly, that "by thus persuading the young to regard him as the wisest of mankind, and the most capable of rendering others wise, he so disposed his disciples towards him that they held every one cheaply in comparison with him."

I know, indeed, that he did express such opinions with regard to parents, and other relatives, and friends; and said, moreover, that when the soul has departed, in which alone intelligence exists, men carry forth the bodies of their most intimate companions, and hide them away from sight as quickly as they can. He remarked, too, that every man of his own accord during his own lifetime, even from his own body, which he cherishes more than he does anything else, removes for himself, or allows others to remove for him, anything that is superfluous or useless. Thus, people rid themselves of their own nails, and their hair, and their callosities, and undergo troublesome and painful cuttings and cauterizations at the hands of surgeons, being even willing to pay them for

performing such operations. Again, men eject the saliva from the mouth as far away from them as they can, because while it remains in the mouth it is of no use to them, but rather the reverse. And he talked in this way, not with a view of inducing anyone to bury his father alive, or to cut him in pieces, but in order to demonstrate the worthlessness of that which is senseless. He exhorted each one to make himself as intelligent and as serviceable as he could, so that if he wished to be highly regarded by a father or a brother, or anyone else, he might not indolently rely solely upon his close relationship with them, but strive to be of use to those whose esteem he was anxious to gain.

Another of the accuser's charges was that he selected the most immoral passages of the most celebrated poets, and used them as arguments to confirm those lessons of villainy and tyranny which he imparted to his disciples. Thus he is said to have quoted the verse of Hesiod —

"Not work, but idleness disgraces men,"

with the intention of fixing on the poet the sentiment that men should not abstain from any kind of work, be it ever so unjust or dishonorable, but should undertake even, such deeds for the sake of profit. Whereas Socrates professed that occupation was advantageous and good for a man, and idleness injurious and bad; and as work was beneficial, and sloth harmful, so he maintained that those only who do good are really occupied and well occupied, while gamblers, or those who are engaged in any evil or pernicious pursuit, he termed idlers; and viewed in this light, the poet's sentiment —

"Not work, but idleness disgraces men," would be correct.

Again, the accuser alleged that he often used to cite that passage in Homer where it is said of Ulysses that —

"Whatever king or chief he chanced to meet,
Him he encouraged with such cheering words:

'Behooves you, sire, not tremble like a coward;
But, brave yourself, to make your comrades brave.'

Or if he heard some low plebeian brawl,
He struck him with his staff, and chid him thus:
'Be quiet, fellow, while thy betters talk;
For you, too weak to argue or to fight,
Art neither good at action or debate.'"

And it was alleged that he brought this forward as an argument that the poet meant to insinuate that plebeians and poor people ought to be beaten. But Socrates never intended any such thing (for in that case he would have been of opinion that he ought to be beaten himself); but he asserted that such people as were of no benefit to others, either by word or deed, and were incapable of serving in the army, or in the ministry, or among the general body of the people, should they ever be called upon to do so, more especially if, in addition to all this incapacity, they were also of an overbearing disposition, that such ought to be restrained by any coercive measures possible, even if they happened to be ever so rich. And he showed that he was even diametrically opposed to the sentiments attributed to him, in that he was undisguisedly well disposed towards the common people, and a friend to men in general; for though he was surrounded by numerous admirers, both native and foreign, he never once exacted any fee from them for their attendance, but ministered of his own stores ungrudgingly to all. And of these treasures some having received a small portion from him without payment, sold them again to others at a great price, and were not, as he was, kind to the common people, inasmuch as they would not hold dissertations with any who had not money to give them in return.

But Socrates, in truth, when compared with other men, rendered his city far more illustrious than even Lichas did that

of the Spartans, renowned as he was on this account; for Lichas certainly entertained at a banquet the strangers who were residing in Sparta on the occasion of the Gymnopaediae; whereas Socrates throughout his whole life spent his own substance in making himself of the greatest possible use to any who were willing to avail themselves of his services, by rendering all who came to him better men before they took leave of him.

On these grounds, then, it appears to me that Socrates, being such a character as he was, deserved honor much rather than death at the hands of the state, and anyone considering the case according to law would find such to be the fact. Thus the law is that if anyone is a known thief, or clothes-snatcher, or cut-purse, or burglar, or kidnapper, or temple-plunderer, the penalty attached to such crimes is death, and of these no man was ever more innocent than was Socrates. Neither, again, did he ever cause the state to engage in any unsuccessful war, or expose it to sedition or treachery, or any other kind of mischief. He never once in his private transactions deprived any man of his property, or brought upon him any misfortune, nor did he ever labor under the imputation of having been guilty of any of the aforesaid crimes.

How, then, could he be obnoxious to the charges of the indictment — he who, instead of not reverencing the gods, as one of the counts had it, was among all other men a most conspicuous servant of the gods? And instead of corrupting the youth, which was another count in the indictment, he confessedly induced such of his followers as displayed vicious inclinations to desist from them, and encouraged them in the cultivation of the purest and highest virtue, by the which both states and families are properly governed. His actions, then, being thus regulated, how was he not deserving of marked distinction at the hands of the state?

Chapter III.

But in what respects he appears to me to have been of service to his followers, partly by the example of his own character, and partly by his conversation, of these I shall set down such reminiscences as occur to me.

Now, with regard to all matters connected with the gods, both his deeds and his words were manifestly in accordance with the answer which the Pythian priestess gives to those who inquire as to the method of performing a sacrifice, worshipping their ancestors, or any rite of a similar kind; for she replies that by acting in conformity with the laws of the realm they will act piously. And Socrates so acted himself, and recommended the same course to others, asserting that the conduct of those who adopted a different plan savored both of supererogation and folly.

Again, he used to pray to the gods simply a that they would grant him good gifts," as believing that they best knew what was good; and those who prayed for gold or silver, or supreme power, or anything of this kind, he regarded as being on a par with those who pray for gambling, or fighting, or any other matter, of which the issue is quite uncertain as to how it will turn out.

When he offered humble sacrifices out of his. small means, he did not consider himself less meritorious than those who, having multifarious and abundant resources, offered up numerous and rich sacrifices; for he said that it would ill become the gods to take pleasure in great rather than in small offerings, since, if they did so, they would often be more pleased with the gifts of the wicked than with those of the good; nor would man's life be worth having if offerings made to the gods by the bad were more acceptable to them than those which were offered by the good. But he thought that the

gods had most pleasure in the offerings of the most pious, and was fond of quoting the verse which says —

"Give to the gods according to thy means."

And he was wont to remark, that the maxim of "according to one's means," was also strongly to be recommended in one's actions towards one's friends and towards strangers, and in every relation of life.

And if he was convinced that he had received some intimation from the gods, he would no more have been persuaded to act contrary to such intimation than anyone could have induced him to take a blind man as a guide on a journey, or one who did not know the road, in preference to one who could see, and was acquainted with it; and he condemned the folly of others who, by disregarding the intimations of the gods, sought to avoid the bad opinion of men. As for himself, he held all human behests as not worth a thought in comparison with the counsel of the gods.

He accustomed his mind and his body to such a mode of life that anyone who should adopt a similar one would, unless some heaven-sent dispensation should prevent it, live cheerfully and securely all his days, without any fear of being in want of the necessary means for meeting his expenses. For he was so frugal that I doubt whether there is any man whose labor would not earn for him as much as satisfied Socrates. He took only such food as he could consume with a relish, and sat down to table prepared to make his appetite for his meal the sauce to season it withal. All kinds of drink were agreeable to him, because he never drank unless he was thirsty.^ And if he ever accepted an invitation to a feast, he accomplished that which most people find extremely difficult, viz., to avoid overloading the stomach, against which danger he very easily guarded himself. And he counselled those who could not do so to abstain from such things as would stimulate them to

eating when they were not hungry, or drinking when they were not thirsty; for he asserted that this was the way to disorder the stomach, the brain, and the mind. And he said, in joke, that it was through a surfeit of such delicacies that Circe changed human beings into swine; but that it was owing to the admonitions of Mercury and his own abstinence in refraining from committing similar excesses, that Ulysses escaped such a transformation.

Thus, would he jest upon such subjects, although, at the same time, he thought very gravely about them. And with regard to love affairs, he counselled strict non-familiarity with handsome people, for he said that it was not easy for anyone who was on terms of intimacy with them to keep their senses. Thus, having once heard that Critobulus, the son of Crito, had kissed the handsome son of Alcibiades, he asked Xenophon, in. the presence of Critobulus, a Tell me, Xenophon, did you not think that Critobulus was a prudent man instead of a rash one, and sensible rather than inconsiderate and adventurous?"

"Certainly, I did," answered Xenophon. "Henceforward regard him, then, as a most headstrong and venturesome person, as one who would even throw himself upon swords or leap into the flames."

"Why, what, I pray you, have you seen him doing to make you judge thus of him?" inquired Xenophon. "Did he not have the boldness to kiss that remarkably handsome youth, the son of Alcibiades?"

"But, in good sooth," said Xenophon, "if you consider this so hazardous a piece of business, I think I could almost have been inclined to have adventured it myself."

"O wretched man!" ejaculated Socrates; "and what do you think are the penalties you incur by kissing a handsome person? Do you not expect forthwith to become a slave rather

than a free agent? to spend a vast deal upon baleful pleasures? to be too much engaged to attend to anything that is useful or honorable? and to become of necessity engrossed in such objects as not even a lunatic would pursue?"

"O Hercules!" cried Xenophon, "what wonderful consequences you attribute to a kiss!"

"Do you marvel at my doing so?" inquired Socrates. "And do you not know," he continued, "that the tarantula, although in size it is not so big as a farthing, yet if its mouth only just comes into contact with a man, it wears him out with pain, and drives him out of his senses?"

"Yes, by Jupiter," answered Xenophon, "for the tarantula injects some sort of poison by its bite."

"And do you not think, O foolish man!" rejoined Socrates, "that handsome people by their kiss, inject some essence that is invisible to you? Are you not aware that the animal which is called 'a blooming beauty' is by far more formidable than the tarantula, inasmuch as the latter by contact, but the former without it, and merely by being looked at, injects something, even from a very great distance, of such potency as to drive people mad? And hence it is, perhaps, that Cupids are called 'archers,' because those who are handsome inflict wounds from afar. But I advise you, Xenophon, to flee as fast as you can whenever you see a handsome person; and you, Critobulus, I advise to go away for a year; for you may perhaps in that time, albeit with some difficulty, be healed of your bite." This he insisted upon as the proper course to be pursued in love affairs by those who were apt to be seduced by them, since if the body did not long dwell upon such desires the soul would never notice them; or if the body did entertain them, they would not gain too much power over it. As for himself, he was manifestly so disciplined with regard to such affections, that he kept himself from the company of the beautiful and

youthful, more easily than others do from those who are most ugly and deformed.

These were his sentiments with regard to all matters connected with eating, drinking, and love. And he considered that he personally derived no less gratification from them by practicing moderation than those do who attach the utmost importance to them; while, at the same time, he thought that they thus caused him infinitely less trouble.

Chapter IV.

But if any should think of Socrates (since some, both in writing and speaking of him, judge him merely from conjecture) as of a man well skilled in encouraging others to virtue, but himself incapable of pioneering them on their way to it, let them consider, not only by what questionings he confuted and exposed those who fancied they knew everything, but the conversations which he held every day with his companions; that so they may determine as to his ability for improving the morals of his disciples.

And, first, I will relate a dialogue which I once heard him hold with Aristodemus, surnamed "the Little," concerning the nature of the Deity. For having been told that the latter neither sacrificed to the gods, nor prayed to them, nor used the divination, but ridiculed those who did so, he said to him — "Tell me, Aristodemus, is there any man whom you admire for his talents?"

"Certainly, there is," replied he. "Mention the name, then, of any that you do admire."

"Well, then," said Aristodemus, "I admire Homer very much, as a writer of epic poetry; Melanippides as a lyrical, and Sophocles as a tragic writer; Polycleitus as a sculptor, and Zeuxis as a painter."

"And which seem to you the more worthy of admiration — those who fashion images unendowed with sense or motion, or those who form living creatures possessing sense and the power of action?"

"Those, of course, by a long way, who form living creatures, since such are produced, not by chance, but deliberate intelligence."

"And as to things concerning which it is not certain for what purpose they exist, and those which are manifestly of some

use or other, which of the two would you judge to be works of chance, and which works of intelligence?"

"Evidently it is those which exist for some use that are works of intelligence."

"Do you not think, then, that He who in the beginning created man, endowed him with perceptive organs for some useful end, — as, for instance, with his eyes to see that which is visible, and his ears to hear that which is audible? Of what use would smells be to us if we had no nostrils? and what power of tasting sweetness and bitterness, or the various flavors that are pleasant to the mouth, should we have had if the tongue had not been formed to distinguish between them? Again, does it not appear to you something like a work of design that, since the organ of sight is so delicate, it should be protected by eyelids as by a door, which, when it is necessary to use the eyes, are thrown open, but are closed in sleep; that the eyelashes are formed like a sieve, to prevent the winds from injuring them, and that the parts above them are furnished with eyebrows as with eaves, that so the perspiration from the head may do the eyes no harm; that the organs of hearing should be capable of taking in every variety of sound, and yet never become choked up; that the front teeth of all animals should be incisors, and the back masticators; that the mouth, through which is transmitted the provender which all living creatures require, should be placed near the eyes and the nostrils; and since what passes from the body is disagreeable, that the channels through which it is discharged should be turned away and removed as far as possible from the other senses? Can you doubt as to whether such arrangements, carried out as they are with so much design, are the result of chance or intelligence?"

"No, by Jupiter," answered Aristodemus; "for to one who regards them in the light that you do, these things appear to

be planned by some skillful artisan, and well-wisher to all living creatures."

"And to have implanted the desire for offspring and maternal love, and a strong attachment to life among the young, and the greatest possible dread of death?"

"Assuredly these instincts seem to denote design on the part of some Being who intended that living creatures should continue to exist."

"And with regard to yourself, do you think that you are an intelligent creature?"

"Put some questions to me upon the point, at any rate, and I will answer you."

"Do you suppose, again, that there is no intelligence existing anywhere but in yourself, and this, as knowing that you have in your own body only a small portion of earth, which is so immense; and an infinitesimal quantity of water, which is so immeasurable; and that only an inconsiderable portion of other vast elements enters into the composition of your members, — can you, I say, being aware of all this, think that you have, by some piece of luck, appropriated to yourself alone that intelligence which is found nowhere else, and that other boundless and innumerable existences are regulated, as you suggest, without any kind of intelligent design?"

"Yes, by Jupiter, that is my opinion; for I do not see anyone who has control over such things in the same way as artificers have over their work here on earth."

"But neither do you see your own soul, which is paramount over your body. Hence, according to this line of argument, you may aver that you accomplish nothing by intelligence, but everything by mere chance."

And Aristodemus replied — "But I do not on that account despise the gods; I merely consider them as of too excellent a nature to demand any service from me."

“For that very reason,” remarked Socrates, “by how much the gods, being so exalted as they are, condescend to be of service to you, by so much the more does it behoove you to honor them.”

“Be well assured,” Aristodemus replied, “that, if I believed that the gods had any regard for men, I would not neglect them.”

“Do you not believe, then, that the gods have any regard for men? — they who, in the first place, created man alone of all animals to stand erect, and so to be capable of seeing farther before him, and contemplate more easily what is above him, and less exposed to injury in those parts where they have placed his eyes and his ears and his mouth; and, in the next place, have given to such other animals as progress by their feet alone, those members as the sole instruments of such progression, but to man have added hands also, wherewith to execute most of those works which make us better off than they are? And that, although other creatures have tongues, they have endowed the human tongue alone, by its touching sometimes one part of the mouth and sometimes another, with the power of modulating the voice and of signifying men’s various wants one to another? And that the desire for sexual intercourse in other animals has been limited to certain seasons of the year, whereas it exists in us constantly till we arrive at old age? It did not, however, satisfy the Deity to take an interest in man’s body only, but, what is the most important point of all, He also implanted in him that most excellent essence — his soul. But in the first place, of what other animal does the mind comprehend the fact of the existence of the gods as the organizers of so stupendous and excellent a system? and what other race except that of men offers service to the gods? or what intelligence exists more adapted than that of man to make provision against cold and heat, or hunger and thirst, or to alleviate disease, or to

practice feats of strength, or to labor for instruction, or more capable of remembering what it may have heard or seen or learned? For is it not clearly manifest to you that men pass their lives like gods as compared with other creatures, and excel them in the nature both of their minds and bodies? For neither could a creature endowed with the body of an ox and the feelings of a man accomplish its wishes; nor do such animals as possess hands, but are devoid of intelligence, obtain any benefit thereby. But do you, who enjoy both these stupendous advantages, think that the gods have no regard for you? How, then, can they do anything that will ever convince you that they do take thought for you?"

"By sending," replied Aristodemus, "(as you affirm that they send to you) counsellors to direct me what I ought and what I ought not to do."

"When, then," asked Socrates, "they communicate with the Athenians upon their consulting them through divination, do you not think that they communicate with you also? Or when they forewarn the Greeks, or the whole human race, by means of portents, do you imagine that they make an exception in your individual case, and put you aside with contempt? Again, do you imagine that the gods would have implanted in men's minds a belief that they were able to dispense blessings or miseries among them unless they really possessed that power? and that men, having been so deluded throughout all ages, should never at any time have once discovered the imposition? Do you not recognize the fact that the oldest and wisest of human communities, both of cities and nations, are the most god-worshipping, and that men, at the most reflective periods of their lives, are most religious? Learn, too, my good friend," he continued, "that your soul, which dwells within your body, orders the latter according to its own will; so that you are bound to believe that the intelligence which subsists in each object directs that object agreeably to itself;

and you must not imagine that while your vision is capable of ranging over a distance of many furlongs, the eye of the Deity is unable to survey the universe at a glance. Nor should you suppose that while your mind can contemplate things that are taking place at home and in Egypt and Sicily, that the Divine Intelligence is insufficient to regard all things simultaneously.

"Moreover, if by showing attention to men you find that they are willing to reciprocate your attentions, and that if you oblige them they are inclined to return the obligation; and as by communication with others you discover who are sensible people, — so, with regard to the gods, you should make the experiment whether, if you cultivate them, they will not vouchsafe to you their guidance in matters which are unrevealed to mankind in general; and you may thus recognize the fact that the nature of the Deity is so stupendously constituted as to be able to see all things at once, and to hear all things, and to be present everywhere, and to take cognizance of everything at the same time."

On the whole, then, by such discourses as these Socrates seems to me to have led his associates to refrain from impious, unjust, or dishonorable conduct, not only as being in the sight of men, but even if they were alone in a desert, as they would be always of opinion that there was no one action that they could commit which would escape the notice of the gods.

Chapter V.

And if self-denial be indeed a good and estimable quality, let us consider whether he did not encourage its practice when he spoke of it in some such way as this: — "If, my friends, we were going to war, and had to choose a leader under whom we should have the best prospect of being ourselves preserved, and overcoming our enemies, pray, should we appoint such an one as we knew to be unable to withstand gluttony, or wine-bibbing, or sensuality, or pain, or drowsiness? And how could we suppose that a man who succumbed to these could bring us off safe and confound our foes? Or if towards the close of our lives we wished to commit our sons to some person to be educated, or our unmarried daughters to be taken care of, or our property not to be squandered, should we think an intemperate man fit to be appointed trustee for such purposes? Should we, again, hand over to an intemperate servant the custody of our herds, our chattels, or the superintendence of our business? Or should we be willing to employ such a servant as an agent or purveyor, even without paying him wages? But if we would not engage even as a servant a man who is intemperate, how incumbent is it upon everyone to guard against this vice in his own person! for, unlike the covetous who, when they despoil others of their property, seek to enrich themselves, the intemperate man, when, he injures his neighbor, does not ameliorate his own condition, but, at the same time that he inflicts evil upon his friends, brings far more evil upon himself; if at least it be conceded that to ruin not only his family, but his own body and soul, is the greatest evil that anyone can commit. And in society, who would like a man whom he knew to take more pleasure in eating and drinking than in his friends, and to prefer the company of harlots to that of his equals? Should not everyone, then, as considering that temperance is the foundation of virtue, cultivate it before all things in his soul?

For who without it can either acquire any good habits, or put them into practice as he ought to do? Or who that is a slave to pleasure, is not ill-conditioned both in his body and mind? I swear, by Juno, that I think a freeman ought to pray that he may never happen to engage a servant who is intemperate, and that any servant who is too much given to sensual pleasures should supplicate the gods that he may meet with morally conducted masters; for by these means only can such a man of such a temperament hope to be saved."

And if his utterances were on this wise, he proved himself still more continent by his actions than by his words, since he had command over himself not only in respect to corporeal pleasures, but also in those which accrue from the acquisition of money; for he was of opinion that anyone who accepted money promiscuously set up a master over himself, and bound himself to a slavery no less degrading than any other in the world.

Chapter VI.

The conversations, too, which Socrates held with Antipho, the Sophist, are so well worth recording that we must not omit them.

On one occasion, Antipho 'wishing to entice Socrates' disciples away from him, walked up to him in their presence, and spoke as follows: — "I thought, Socrates, that those who studied philosophy were invariably rendered happier thereby; but you seem to me to have derived the contrary result from it; at least you appear to live in such a style that not even a slave would continue with his master under similar conditions. Your food and drink are both of a most wretched kind; and you not only dress badly, but you wear the same garments both in summer and winter, and are constantly without your shoes and your coat. Moreover, you even refuse to accept money, the acquisition of which generally gladdens people, and its possession enables them to live more liberally and pleasantly. If, therefore, like instructors in other professions, who teach their pupils to imitate them, you also pursue a similar plan in regard to your followers, you must perforce look upon yourself as a teacher of misery."

And Socrates replied to these observations thus: — "You appear to me, Antipho, to have conceived the idea that my life is so wretched that I am convinced you would rather die than live as I do. Come, then, let us consider those circumstances which you regard as the hardships of my life. Is it a hardship that 'while others who receive money are obliged to perform those tasks for which they are paid, I, on the contrary, as I take no fees, am not bound to discourse with anyone whom I do not like? Do you find fault with my way of living because my food is less wholesome and nourishing than yours? Or is it that my subsistence is more difficult to be obtained than yours, as being more rare and costly? Is it, perhaps, because what you provide for yourself is more agreeable to you than

what I procure is to me? Are you not aware that he whose food is the sweetest needs the less sauce, and that he whose drink is most pleasant, least longs for other beverages than those which he has? You know that those who change their garments do so on account of the variations of the temperature, and that people wear sandals that they may not be hindered from walking for fear of hurting their feet. But when have you ever heard of my preferring to remain in-doors because of the cold, or fighting with any one for the shade because of the heat, or not walking wherever my inclination led me because I dreaded injuring my feet? Are you ignorant of the fact that those who are by nature the weakest grow stronger by training their bodies in those exercises which they practice than those who neglect to do so, and that they bear the fatigue of such exercises more easily? And do you not think that a person who inures his body to whatever may happen to it does not feel hardships less than you who do not so accustom it? And do you imagine that for him who is not a slave to gluttony, or sleep, or sensuality, anything is a greater incentive to his giving the preference to other pursuits than the fact that he finds other objects more capable of affording him pleasure when he needs it, and also of inspiring him with the hope that they will be of constant benefit to him? Of this, at any rate, you are aware, that those who despair of ever becoming proficients in anything are never happy; but those who look upon themselves as progressing either in agriculture or seamanship, or any other occupation that they undertake, are rejoiced at their own success. But do you imagine that the gratification derived from such sources is as great as that which arises from the consciousness that you yourself are becoming better, and gaining more estimable friends? And such is the consciousness that I continually experience.

“But if we should be called upon to render active assistance to our friends or the state, which of the two would have most

leisure to do so — one who lives as I live, or one whose existence is passed in the way that you so much commend? And which would be the best-off in a campaign, the man who could not live without sumptuous fare, or he who was satisfied with whatever came to hand? Which, again, would hold out longest in a beleaguered city, the man who required that which it was very difficult to procure, or he who was content to turn to account such materials as were most easily obtainable? You seem to think, Antipho, that happiness consists in luxury and lavish expenditure, but my opinion is, that like as the gods require nothing, so for a man to be satisfied with as little as possible argues the nearest resemblance to them; and as the divine nature is the most perfect, so the nearest approach to that nature is the closest approach to perfection."

On another occasion Antipho, while conversing with Socrates, said, "Verily, Socrates, I believe you to be a just man, but by no manner of means a wise one. And you yourself appear to me also to regard yourself in this light, for you never ask a fee from those who seek your advice. Yet if you possessed a garment, or a house, or any other; commodity which you considered to be worth money, you would not give it away for nothing, or part with it for less than its value. It is evident, therefore, that if you thought the privilege of attending your discourses at all valuable, you would demand for it no less payment than it was worth. You may therefore be a just man, since you do not cheat people for the purpose of increasing your property, but wise you certainly are not, since your wisdom appears to be worth nothing."

To which remarks Socrates answered thus: "It is the general belief with us, Antipho, that beauty and wisdom can alike be disposed of for virtuous or vicious purposes, and we designate as prostitutes those who are willing to barter their beauty for money; but if anyone attaches himself to an upright

and good person, we consider him as a prudent man. And in like manner we style those who are willing to sell wisdom for money to anyone who will purchase it, 'Sophists,' as if they prostituted their wisdom; but whoever makes a friend of a person whom he knows to be morally disposed, by teaching him all the good he can, him we consider to act as becomes a good and worthy member of the community.

And as for me, Antipho, just as some other men delight in a good horse, or dog, or bird, so do I personally rejoice still more in the possession of estimable friends; and if I know of any good thing, I both impart it to them, and recommend it to any others by whom I think they can be assisted in the pursuit of virtue. The treasures, too, bequeathed to us by the wise men of old in the books they have written, I dip into with my friends, and if, in conning them over in the course of our reading, we come across anything that is good, we make a note of it, and think it great gain if by such studies we become more endeared to one another."

And again, when Antipho, on one occasion, asked him how he could make statesmen of others, while he himself never busied himself with state affairs, if, indeed, he even understood them? "By which means then," inquired Socrates, "do I engage in state affairs to the greatest advantage — by busying myself in them alone, or by taking care that as many as possible may be capable of conducting them?"

Chapter VII.

Let us consider, moreover, whether by discouraging arrogance in his followers, he did not incite them to the cultivation of virtue.

He always insisted that there was no surer road to distinction than that which led a person to excellence in any capacity in which he aimed at enjoying the reputation of a proficient. And in order to establish the truth of his assertion, he taught as follows: — "Let us reflect what a man must do, who, not being a good flute-player, should nevertheless wish to pass as such. Must he not imitate really good flute-players in the externals of the profession? And in the first place, as the latter are handsomely equipped, and go about attended by a large retinue, so also must the former do. In the next place, as a great many people applaud the latter, so the former must get a great many people to applaud him. Yet must he never undertake to perform; for if he did, he would at once be convicted of being a ridiculous pretender, and not a bad flute-player only, but also a vainglorious braggart. Thus, after having incurred great expense without doing himself any good, and, besides all this, having earned a bad character, how would he avoid passing his life otherwise than in discomfort, unprofitableness, and derision?

"So, again, if anyone, not being a skillful general or pilot, should nevertheless wish to appear so, let us consider what would be his disposition. If he desired others to think him capable of performing the duties attaching to such appointments, and yet could not convince them of his fitness for them, would not this be a source of trouble to him? And if he could so convince them, would he not be still more unfortunately placed? For it is evident that he who is appointed to steer a vessel, or to command an army, without understanding his duties, would not only bring destruction

upon those whom he would be very unwilling to destroy, but would himself be dismissed with ignominy and punishment."

In a similar manner he demonstrated the fact that it was useless for a man who was neither wealthy, nor brave, nor strong, to wish to be thought so; for he said that they were required to meet demands which were quite beyond them; and when it was found that they could not comply with such demands as they were deemed capable of complying with, people made no excuses for them whatever.

Him, too, he designated as no mean impostor who, by cozening people into a false estimate of him, robbed them of their money or their goods; but he said that he was the most dangerous deceiver of all who, being possessed of no qualifications that were worth a thought, seduced people into the belief that he was capable of acting as head of the state.

By such discourses as these, then, he appears to me to have endeavored to dissuade his associates from vaingloriousness.

Book II.

Chapter I.

He also appeared to me to encourage his disciples in the practice of self-restraint in their appetites for food, and drink, and sensual gratification, and sleep, and in the endurance of cold, and heat, and fatigue, by similar discourses. And being aware that one of his followers was intemperate in such matters, "Tell me," he said, "Aristippus, if you had to take charge of and educate two young men in such a fashion that one should be rendered an efficient governor of his fellow-men, while the other was not even to aim at governing at all, what method would you pursue with regard to their respective educations? Shall we commence our investigation with their food, as from the first rudiments?" And Aristippus replied — "Food certainly appears to me to be a proper commencement; for no one could exist at all unless lie took nourishment." a Is it not probable, then, that they will both feel a desire for eating when meal-time arrives?"

"No doubt," answered Aristippus. "And which of the two should we accustom to regard prompt attention to business as of greater importance than the gratification of his appetite?"

"Of course, by Jove, the one who was to be educated for government, so that the affairs of state should not be neglected during his administration."

"Therefore" said Socrates, "when they desired to drink, the same task of being able to resist drinking when he is thirsty is to be imposed on the same youth?"

"By all means," answered Aristippus. "And which of the two should we expect to be moderate in sleep, so that he might be able to go to bed late and rise early, and even not to sleep at all if it should be necessary to keep awake?"

"To this also," he said, "we should train the same youth."

“And which,” asked Socrates, “should we bring up to control his sensual appetites, so that by excess in them he might not be hindered in the necessary dispatch of business?”

“The same again,” replied Aristippus. “And which of the two should we require not to shrink from toil, but willingly to undergo it?”

“Once more, him whom we were educating to be a ruler.”

“And what of their being taught such branches of learning as would enable them to get the better of their adversaries? To which of the two would such knowledge more properly belong?”

“Most distinctly to him,” said Aristippus, “whom we were educating to be a ruler; for without this kind of knowledge all other acquirements would be useless.”

“You think, then, that a person who had been thus brought up would be less likely to become a prey to his enemies than other animals are? For of these, forsooth, some are entrapped by their gluttony, and many others, although they are very timid, are enticed by hunger to the bait, and so are captured, while others again are ensnared by thirst.”

“That is certainly true,” said Aristippus.

“And are not others taken through their avidity for sexual intercourse, as, for instance, quails and partridges, who at the voice of the hen are excited by the desire and expectation of enjoyment, and losing all sense of danger, fall into the lure?”

Aristippus admitted that it was so.

“Does it not, then, seem to you disgraceful for a man to yield to the same passions as the most senseless of animals do? As, for example, adulterers enter into forbidden chambers, although they know that the adulterer runs the risk of incurring the penalties of the law, and of being lain in wait for, and insulted if he is caught. And since so much misery and disgrace impends over the adulterer, and there are

so many pursuits to divert him from the quest of sensual gratification, yet that he should, in spite of all these considerations, incur such tremendous risks, — does not this appear to you to be the conduct of a person who is under the absolute influence of some evil genius?"

"It certainly does seem like it to me," said Aristippus.

"And as it is the fact that the most necessary businesses of life are transacted in the open air, such as warfare, husbandry, and not the least important of other kinds of occupations, do you not think that it argues a remarkable degree of carelessness that most people are entirely untrained to withstand cold and heat?"

Aristippus again replied in the affirmative.

"Does it not, then, occur to you that we ought to train him who is destined to become a ruler to bear these unflinchingly?"

"Certainly," answered Aristippus.

"If, therefore, we designate those who can control-themselves in all these points as men capable of ruling, should we not class those who are incapable of so doing among those who have not the slightest claim to be appointed rulers?"

To this also Aristippus assented.

"Well, then, since you know what should be the classification of each of these sets of men, have you ever considered to which of the two classes you would be inclined to remit yourself?"

"I have, indeed," replied Aristippus; "and I should by no means place myself among those who are desirous of ruling; for it appears to me to indicate a great want of sense in a man who finds it a difficult task to procure the mere necessaries of life for himself, not to be satisfied with seeking to supply his own needs, instead of busying himself about providing his fellow-citizens with such things as they require. And is it not

great folly in him who lacks much that he wishes for, to undertake the management of the state, and so to subject himself to penalties if he fails to provide all that the state requires? For the state thinks it right to use its rulers as I use my domestics; and as I consider it the duty of my servants to supply me in abundance with such things as I want, but not to help themselves to them, so, too, bodies politic think it right so to use their rulers that the latter should secure as many benefits as they can for the state, but should not themselves participate in any of them. Those, therefore, who are willing to be constantly engaged in the transaction of business both by themselves and with others, I should esteem, when they have been trained after the manner we have indicated, to be fit to rank among people capable of ruling. Myself I class among those who wish to pass their lives as easily and pleasantly as possible."

Then Socrates said, "Have you any objection to our also considering this question — viz., Which lead the pleasanter life, the governors or the governed?"

"Not the slightest," rejoined Aristippus.

"Well, then, in the first place, of the nations with which we are acquainted, the Persians govern in Asia, while the Syrians and the Phrygians and the Lydians are governed. In Europe, the Scythians govern, and the Maeotians are governed; while in Libya, the Carthaginians are the governors, and the Libyans the governed. Which of these people do you think lives most pleasantly? Or among the Greeks, the nation to which you belong, who seem to lead the most agreeable lives — those who hold the chief power, or those who are subject to it?"

"But," said Aristippus, "I do not regard myself as being in subjection, although I am not one of the governing classes; for there appears to me to be a middle path between the two, which I endeavor to keep, and which leads to happiness by

avoiding supreme power on the one hand, and servitude on the other."

"If indeed," observed Socrates, "this same path of yours, leading neither to supreme authority nor to slavery, kept also clear of all human association, your remarks would be pertinent. But if while you live among men you refuse either to govern or be governed, and object to yield obedience to the ruling powers, I think that you will perceive how that the stronger have the means, by oppressing the weaker both in public and private life, of reducing them to the condition of slaves. Do those escape your observation who, when others have sown and planted, cut down their corn and lop their trees, and who attack their inferiors and those who will not be subservient to them, so ruthlessly on every occasion, that at last they prevail on them to prefer slavery to contending against their superiors? And, again, do you not know that in private life the courageous and the strong, by enslaving the pusillanimous and the weak, reap the fruits of their labors?"

"I do," said Aristippus; "but I do not, on that account, and that I may not experience such treatment, intend to shut myself up in one city, but to travel about everywhere."

Then Socrates said, "Bravo! This determination of yours is forsooth an excellent one, for now that Sinnis and Sceiron and Procrustes are slain, no one any longer attacks travelers. And yet those who are the ministers of state still continue to make laws in their several countries on purpose to prevent injury to themselves, and they employ other friends besides those who are termed 'their partisans' to assist them; and they build fortifications round their cities, and procure arms wherewith to repel those that seek to annoy them; and in addition to these various safeguards, they secure allies from without. And yet, notwithstanding all these precautions, they are attacked. Do you, therefore, having no similar protection, and loitering a consider able time along roads where a great many people

are molested, when you happen to arrive at any city, where you are more powerless than any of the inhabitants, and being in such a position, that those who are inclined to do so would sooner attack you, — do you, I say, suppose that the mere fact of your being a stranger would protect you from injury? Or do you rely for your immunity from danger upon the fact that these cities promise a safe pass to everyone upon his arrival or departure? or because you think that if you were captured you would be unprofitable to your master, on the ground that no one would willingly retain in his house as a servant a man who would not work, and who liked the most expensive diet? Let us consider, too, how masters treat servants of this sort. Do they not restrain their animal propensities by keeping them without food, and hinder them from pilfering by locking up every place from which they can abstract anything? Do they not hinder them from absconding by fettering them, and correct their laziness by the scourge? And how do you yourself act when you hear that any one of your own domestics has been guilty of any such faults?"

"I punish him," replied Aristippus, "until I compel him to do his duty as a servant. But tell me, Socrates, in what do those who are brought up to learn the art of ruling, which you seem to me to regard as happiness, differ from those who undergo privations from necessity, since they suffer hunger and thirst, and cold and want of sleep, and will voluntarily undergo all similar hardships? For my part, I cannot see how it makes any difference to a man, since his skin is the same, whether he is scourged voluntarily or against his will, or, having a body which is in every respect identical, whether his city is besieged with or without his consent, except, indeed, that the charge of folly attaches to him who courts troubles voluntarily."

"What then, Aristippus?" said Socrates; "does not the voluntary endurance of such calamities appear to you to differ

from the involuntary, inasmuch as he who fasts voluntarily can eat when he pleases, and he who is thirsty can drink, and so on in other matters; but he who is compelled to abstain by necessity from such things cannot put an end to his inconvenience at his own pleasure? Besides, those who undergo hardships voluntarily do so in the expectation of some happy issue, as, for instance, the hunters of wild animals toil in the hope of catching them. It is true that such rewards for labor are of little value, but of those who strive to secure valuable friends, or conquer their enemies, or by invigorating their bodies and minds to govern their own households becomingly, and to become benefactors to their country, and serviceable to their friends, how can you be right in supposing that such do not find it pleasant to labor for these ends, or that they do not live happy in their own self-approval, and as the objects of the respect and emulation of others? Moreover, indolence and indulgence in momentary pleasures neither conduce to a healthy state of body, so as to make it active, as the gymnastic trainers define activity, nor do they bring to the mind any knowledge that is worthy to be so called; whereas careful training, combined with patient endurance, makes men capable of following the paths of virtue and rectitude, as good men define them, and as Hesiod somewhere says —

> "'Vice abounds everywhere, and lies not hid.
> 'Tis easy of approach, and dwells at hand;
> But before Virtue's shrine the immortal gods
> Have stationed Toil. The way to it is long,
> Rugged and steep at first; but gain the top,
> Then that which was once rough becomes all smooth.'

"And Epicharmus bears testimony to the same fact in the following line —

> "'The gods dispense all happiness to toil?

"And in another place, he says —

"'Seek not for ease, poor fool, lest pain be thine.'

"Prodicus, too, the Sophist, in his treatise concerning Hercules (which he ostentatiously produces to most of his disciples), makes the same assertion with regard to virtue, saying, as far as my memory serves me, somewhat as follows: — He tells us that Hercules, when he was advancing from boyhood to manhood (at which period youths, becoming their own masters, indicate whether they will enter life by the paths of virtue or those of vice), retired to a quiet spot, and sat down to make up his mind as to the question which of the two tracks he should follow'. That two females of imposing presence seemed to approach him, the one lovely of aspect and lady-like in demeanor, her adornments the natural elegance of her figure, the modesty of her looks, the sobriety of her demeanor, and the purity of her garments. The other pampered to a gross softness, and having her complexion artificially beautified, so that it appeared both whiter and redder than was natural. Her stature, too, appeared heightened and her eyes dilated by art, and she was clad in a robe by means of which her charms were conspicuously displayed; and as she contemplated herself, she seemed to be constantly watching for the admiration of others, and frequently to be glancing back at her own shadow. As these two approached nearer to Hercules, she whom I have first described appeared to advance at the same pace, but the other, being eager to anticipate her, ran up before her, and said, 'I perceive, Hercules, that you are in doubt which road to pursue upon your entrance into life. Now, if you will make me your friend, I will conduct you along the most agreeable and smoothest paths; there is no pleasure of which you shall not taste, and you shall never experience any kind of annoyance. For, in the first place, you shall not cudgel your brains about war or business, but pass your time in considering what eatables and drinkables you find most

agreeable to your palate, what sights and sounds especially delight you, what chiefly pleases your senses of smelling and touching, whose affection gratifies you most, how you may sleep most softly, and how you may obtain all these enjoyments with the least possible trouble. And if at any time the faintest idea of want of the means to procure such pleasures should occur to you, I shall never recommend either bodily toil or mental exertion as being necessary to provide such things, but you shall spend what others have earned, never abstaining from any possible source of money-getting, for I allow my followers to avail themselves of every conceivable plan for benefiting themselves.' Then Hercules, when he had heard this speech, said, 'O lady, what is thy name?' and she replied, 'My friends call me Felicity, but my enemies, libeling me, give me the name of Vice.'

"Then the other female advanced, and said, I also have come to you, Hercules, as being acquainted with your parents, and knowing your natural disposition when you were young. Hence, I entertain the hope that if you follow the path that leads to my abode, you will become the accomplisher of worthy and illustrious exploits, and that I shall appear more honorable and comely through your noble deeds. I will not, however, cajole you with any specious promises of pleasure, but will truthfully lay before you realities as they are ordained by the will of the gods. Now, the gods grant nothing to mankind without labor and diligence; therefore whether you wish them to be propitious to you, you must worship them; or whether you desire the love of your friends, you must make yourself useful to them; or whether you covet honors at the hands of any state, you must benefit it; or whether you seek to be regarded as an object of admiration throughout the whole of Greece on account of your merits, you must endeavor to be of service to the whole of Greece; or whether you wish the earth to yield you abundant crops, you must cultivate it;

or if you intend to make money by cattle-feeding, you must take care of your herds; if you incline to warlike enterprises as a means of advancement and of obtaining freedom for your friends while you confound your enemies, you must both study the arts of war themselves from those who are skilled in them, and must also practice how to employ them advantageously; and if you wish your body to become muscular, you must accustom it to obey your mind, and exercise it with labor and hard training.'

"And Vice interrupting her, said (as Prodicus relates), 'Do you see, Hercules, how rugged and long the road is by which this woman would lead you to enjoyment, contrasted with the smooth and short paths along which I shall conduct you to happiness?'

"'Miserable wretch!' exclaimed Virtue; 'and what blessings do you possess, or with what substantial pleasures are you acquainted, seeing that you are unwilling to exert yourself in any way to obtain them? You who do not even wait for the natural craving for what is agreeable, but fill yourself with all sorts of mixtures, eating before you are hungry, and drinking before you are thirsty, contriving how to keep cooks that you may feed delicately, and buying high-priced wines, and running about seeking for snow in summer. And that you may sleep well, you prepare not only soft beds, but couches and cushions to recline upon; for you desire to sleep not on account of the labor you undergo, but because you have nothing to do. You gratify your passions unseasonably by all sorts of stratagems, and make tools both of men and women; for you train your friends to be debauchees by night, and sluggards during the most useful part of the day. Although you are immortal, you are rejected of the gods, and despised of good men. You never hear that sweetest of sounds, the praise of yourself, neither have you ever once beheld the honest labor of your own hands. Who would believe your

assertions, or who would assist you in your need? Who that had any sense would venture to join the orgies in which you indulge, since those who do so, even when they are young, are impotent in body, and when they grow older, become imbecile in mind? Being brought up in idleness and effeminacy in their youth, they pass their old age in squalid misery, ashamed, on the one hand, of their past deeds, and, on the other, weighed down with what remains for them to complete; so that having exhausted all their means of enjoyment in early life, they lay up for themselves misery for their declining days. But I am the companion of the gods and of good men, and no illustrious action, divine or human, is accomplished without me. I am most honored, too, both among gods and men, by those whom it most concerns to cultivate me. I am regarded with affection by artisans as a help-mate; by householders as a faithful guardian; as a well-disposed champion by servants; as an active sharer in the employments of peace; a firm ally in the operations of war; and a most excellent partner in friendship.

"'Moreover, those who cherish me enjoy both their meat and their drink thoroughly, without attaching undue importance to such matters, for they do not partake of either till they feel the need of them. Moreover, they rest better than the indolent, and are neither vexed at the want of sleep, nor neglect their duties from overindulgence in it. The young delight in the praises of their elders, while the old are pleased at being reverenced by the young. They look back upon their past deeds with satisfaction, and are rejoiced when they succeed by honest means in their present undertakings. Through my inspiration they are beloved by the gods, dear to their friends, and venerated by their country; and when the destined end of life overtakes them, they do not lay them down in oblivion and dishonor, but they flourish in men's memories, being celebrated in song for evermore. By pressing onwards in such a course as this, O Hercules, you son of excellent

parents, you too can secure to yourself the most lasting happiness?

"Somewhat after the above fashion, too, Prodicus would relate how that Hercules was educated by Virtue; but he clothed his narrative in much more ornate language than that which I now employ. It becomes you, therefore, Aristippus, to ponder over this allegory, and to endeavor to take heed as to what conduct you pursue during the remainder of your life."

Chapter II.

Having heard one day that his eldest son, Lamprocles, had been angry with his mother, he said, “Tell me, my son, whether you know that there are certain people who are termed ungrateful?”

“I know it well,” answered the youth.

“And do you understand what it is they do to acquire such a name?”

“I do,” replied Lamprocles; “for men call those ungrateful who, when they have received a kindness, do not return it, albeit they have the means of doing so.”

“They appear to you, then, to class the ungrateful with the unjust?”

“They do,” said the son.

“And have you ever, now, really considered whether, as it is thought an unjust proceeding towards our friends to make slaves of them, but a just one to do so to our enemies, so it is unjust to act ungratefully towards our friends, but just to act in the same manner towards our enemies?”

“By all means,” replied Lamprocles; “and any man who has received a kindness, whether from friend or foe, and does not seek to return it, is, in my opinion, unjust.”

“If, then, this really is so, ingratitude would be manifest injustice?”

The youth assented.

“The greater benefits, then, that a man receives without returning them, the more unjust he would be?”

To this also Lamprocles agreed.

“Whom, then,” returned Socrates, “can we find who receive greater benefits from others than children do from their parents — the former owing their very existence to the latter, as they also do the opportunity of witnessing so many lovely

objects of sight, and partaking of as many blessings as the gods vouchsafe to men; blessings which appear indeed to us so invaluable that we shrink, more than we do from anything else, from relinquishing them; and therefore bodies politic have made death the penalty for the gravest crimes, on the ground that they could not suppress injustice through fear of anything more terrible?

"And you surely do not suppose that men beget children merely for the sake of carnal gratification, since the streets and brothels afford plenty of opportunity for indulging in this? But we evidently consider what kind of women are likely to bring us the finest progeny, and uniting ourselves with them, we procreate children. The man, on the one hand, supports the mother of his family, and provides as abundantly as he can for their offspring everything that he thinks will conduce to their well-being in life. The woman, on her part, conceives the child, and undergoes all the pains and perils of parturition in agony and hazard of her life, imparting the nutriment by which she is herself supported; and having borne the burthen the full time, and brought it forth with many throes, she nourishes and cherishes it, although she has received no previous benefit from it, nor does the infant know who it is that treats it so lovingly, and is incapable of signifying its own wants; but she, judging what will be best for it, and what will please it most, tries to gratify it, and feeds it for a long time, and patiently toils for it day and night, not knowing what return she will receive for all her care. Nor do parents consider it sufficient to provide bodily sustenance only, but when they deem their children fit to learn, they also teach them those lessons which they themselves esteem useful in life; and whatever they think that anyone can teach better than themselves, they send their sons to him at their own expense, and adopt all the means in their power to render them as perfect as possible."

To these remarks the youth replied thus: — “But granted that my mother has done all this, and even much more than this, who can put up with her fierce temper?”

“And which,” asked Socrates, “do you think is most difficult to bear — the fierceness of a wild beast, or that of a mother?”

“That of a mother,” answered Lamprocles; “at least, of such a mother as mine is.”

“Has she, then, either by biting or kicking you, ever inflicted upon you such injuries as many have sustained from wild beasts?”

“No, by Jupiter,” rejoined the son; “but she says things which no one, for all the world, would be willing to listen to.”

“And do you,” said Socrates, “forget how much vexation you have caused her by the peevishness both of your words and deeds ever since the days of your childhood, and how you have kept her employed both by day and night, and what anxieties she suffered when you were ill?”

“But I have never once said or done anything to cause her shame.”

“What, then?” rejoined Socrates; “do you consider it harder to listen to what she says, than it is for actors to bear the dreadful abuse which one heaps upon another in tragedies?”

“But, I suppose,” said Lamprocles, “that actors think little of such abuse, because they reflect that in the dialogue neither the speaker who utters reproaches gives vent to them with any evil intent, nor does he who threatens do so with any view of inflicting injury.”

“And being well aware, as you are, that your mother, whatever she says to you, says it not only without any mischievous design, but as being more anxious for your welfare than she is for that of anyone else, are you offended with her? Or do you imagine that your mother harbors evil thoughts against you?”

“No, in truth,” answered the youth, “I do not entertain such a notion.”

Then Socrates said, “But do you not assert that she, who is so kind to you, and who takes the greatest possible care of you when you are ill, so that your health may be re-established, and that you may want for nothing that is needful for you, and who, moreover, invokes all the blessings of Heaven upon your head, and offers up her prayers for you, is a harsh parent? My opinion, indeed, is, that if you cannot endure such a mother as this, you cannot endure anything that is good. But tell me,” he continued, “whether it is your opinion that you ought not to show attention to anybody, or are you prepared to try and please nobody, and neither to follow nor obey a military commander or any other ruler?”

“No, by Jupiter,” answered Lamprocles, “such are not my sentiments.”

“Would you be willing, then, to make yourself agreeable to your neighbor, so that he might kindle a fire for you, if you wanted one, or help you to benefit yourself; or, if you happened to meet with misfortune, to render you, prompt and hearty assistance?”

“I am willing,” answered the son.

“Again, if you fell in with a fellow-traveler or fellow-voyager, or any other companion, would it make no difference whether he should become your friend or your enemy, and do you think that the good-will of such persons is worth cultivating?”

“I do think so,” said he.

“Are you, then, ready to pay attention to such as these, while you reconcile it to yourself to show no respect to your mother, who loves you more than anyone else? Do you not know, too, that the state neither takes cognizance of, nor legalizes a suit for any species of ingratitude, but overlooks the non-return of favors received; whereas if anyone neglects

to pay due attention to his parents, it imposes a penalty on him, and degrades him by incapacitating him from acting as chief magistrate, on the ground that the holy sacrifices which are offered up on behalf of the state would not be held sacred if he were to officiate, nor any other function performed by him be in accordance with the laws of honor and justice? And, verily, if any one neglects to keep up the tomb of his deceased parents, this, too, the state inquires into in its scrutiny into the qualifications of candidates for the magistracy. You, therefore, my son, if you are wise, will beseech the gods to pardon you if you have in any way neglected your mother, lest they, on their part, should be unwilling to show any favor to you because of your ingratitude. You will also have respect to the opinion of men, lest, if they see that you despise your parents, they should all disregard you, and you should thus be openly deserted by your friends; for if people surmise that you are ungrateful to your parents, no one will give you credit for returning any kindness that he himself may show you."

Chapter III.

And on one occasion, having heard that the brothers Chaerephon and Chaerecrates, both of whom were acquaintances of his, had quarreled, he said to the latter, when he saw him, “Tell, me, Chaerecrates, you surely are not one of those who esteem riches more highly than you do brothers? And this, too, as knowing that wealth is senseless, but a brother endowed with sense, and while the former requires protection, the latter is able to afford it; and, moreover, that there is an abundance of the one, but the other exists individually only. It is also a marvelous circumstance that a man should regard brothers as encumbrances to him because he does not possess their fortunes, while he does not regard his fellow-citizens in the same light, because he possesses not their fortunes. In the latter case, however, he may perhaps argue that it is better for him to live in safety on a mere competency among others, than to live by himself exposed to danger, albeit he shared the possession of all the property of his fellow-citizens; whereas, in the case of brothers, men ignore such considerations. Those, too, who are in a position to do so, engage servants that they may have people to help them in their work, and provide friends, as knowing that they are in need of allies; but they neglect brothers as though they could make friends of their fellow-citizens, but not of their brothers. And yet it conduces greatly to friendship to have been born of the same parents, and to have been brought up together, since even among beasts a certain affection is engendered among those who have been reared together. And, moreover, men pay more respect to those who have brothers than to those who have none, and are less apt to impose upon them.”

And Chaerecrates said, “But if the difference between us were a slight one, it would perhaps be my duty to bear with my brother, and not to avoid him on trifling grounds, for, as

you observe, a brother is a blessing if he behaves as a brother should do. But since my brother is in no respect what he ought to be, but in every point just the reverse, why should a man attempt impossibilities?"

And Socrates answered, "But, Chaerecrates, is Chaerephon unable to please anybody, as he is unable to please you, or are there any whom he really can please?"

"That is the very reason, Socrates, why I think that he deserves my hatred, for whereas he is able to please others, to me, whenever he is present, he is upon all occasions a nuisance rather than an assistance, both by his deeds and words."

"So then," rejoined Socrates, "as a horse is a nuisance to a person who cannot manage him when he tries to do so, in like manner a brother is a nuisance to him who tries to manage him, but cannot succeed in doing so."

"But," asked Chaerecrates, "why should I be ignorant of the proper way to manage a brother, when I know how to speak well of him who speaks well of me, and to act kindly to him who acts kindly by me? To one, however, who endeavors to injure me both by word and deed, I can neither speak nor act kindly, nor shall I ever seek to do so."

Then Socrates answered, "These are curious arguments, Chaerecrates, for suppose you had a dog that was a good sheep-dog, and was fond of your shepherds, but growled when you came near him, you surely would not display anger towards him, but would endeavor to soothe him by kindness; whereas, in the case of your brother, although you profess that he would be a great blessing to you if he conducted himself as he ought to do, and admit that you know how to act and speak well of a person, you do not attempt to contrive a method to induce him to behave in the best possible manner to you."

“I fear, Socrates,” remarked Chaerecrates, “that I do not possess the art of making Chaerephon behave as he ought towards me.”

“And yet,” said Socrates, “you need not, as it appears to me, devise any deep or novel plot against him, for I think that by appliances which are well known to yourself you can bring him to regard you very highly.”

“You must first tell me,” said Chaerecrates, “whether you think that I am acquainted with any love-charm which, although I am in possession of it, has nevertheless escaped my own observation?”

“Tell me now,” said Socrates, “suppose you wished to prevail upon one of your acquaintances to invite you to sup with him when he was about to offer a sacrifice, what would you do?”

“I should begin,” said Chaerecrates, a by first inviting him when I offered my sacrifice.”

“And if you wished to get one of your friends to look after your property while you were away from home, what would you do?”

“I should, of course, undertake to look after his property while he was away.”

“And if you desired to be hospitably entertained by a foreigner when you visited his country, what would you do?”

“I should most assuredly be the first to entertain him when he visited Athens; for if I sought to secure his aid in carrying out for me the objects for which I visited his country, it would certainly behoove me to do the same for him in mine.”

“Then, have you been for a long time unwittingly acquainted with all the love-charms that are efficacious among mankind? or are you afraid to initiate an interchange of good offices with your brother lest you should appear to degrade yourself by so doing? And yet that man is deemed

especially praiseworthy who is foremost to damage his enemies and benefit his friends. Hence, then, if Chaerephon had appeared to me more naturally adapted than you to take the initiative in such a course, I should have essayed to have persuaded him to have been the first to try and make you his friend; but, as it is, you seem to me to be the most likely, by making advances to him, to bring about a reconciliation." And Chaerecrates said, "You speak unreasonably, Socrates, and not at all like yourself, when you recommend me, who am the younger, to make the first advances, since the contrary is certainly the universally established practice among all men, viz., that the elder should take the lead in everything, both in deed and in word."

"How so?" asked Socrates. "Is it not the universally established practice that the younger should yield the path to the elder when they meet in the road; that he should rise up for the other to sit down; that he should honor him with the softest couch, and that he should give place to him in conversation? But however, that may be, do not you, my good friend, hesitate about endeavoring to conciliate this man, and he will very soon listen to you. Can you not perceive how covetous of honor and how liberal-minded he is? Badly-disposed and mean people you cannot affect otherwise than by making them presents, but honorable and good men you can best influence by meeting them in a friendly spirit." And Chaerecrates said, "But suppose I followed your advice, and he should behave no better?"

"Why, then, what do you risk," asked Socrates, "except that you prove your own goodness and brotherly love, and his depravity and unworthiness of affectionate treatment? But I do not think that anything of this kind will happen; for I imagine that he, when he finds you challenging him to such a contest, will be very willing to enter the lists with you, in order that he may gain the victory over you in kindness both of

words and deeds. You are now, however, both of you, in the same condition as if the two hands which Providence has created to assist each other should omit to perform this office, and be employed in hindering each other; or as if the two feet, which were formed by the divine ordinance to co-operate with one another were to neglect to do so, and become a mutual obstruction one to the other. Would it not be great folly and madness to use to our injury those objects that were created for our good? And yet, as it seems to me, the Deity has designed brothers to be of greater help one to another than hands or feet or eyes, or the other members which nature has given to men in pairs. For hands, even if it were necessary for them to act in concert with regard to things more than a cubit asunder, could not do so, neither could feet travel together simultaneously to places at a cubit's length apart; nor eyes, which seem to be able to discern objects at an immense distance, see things that are ever so close to them both in front and behind them at the same moment. But brothers, if united, can, even when they are widely separated in space, both act in concert, and mutually assist one another."

Chapter IV.

And I once heard him utter sentiments upon the subject of friends, which seemed to me capable of being of the greatest advantage both in the acquisition and use of them; for he said that although he heard many people declare that there was no possession so valuable as a wise and good friend, yet he observed that the generality of mankind were devoted to every pursuit rather than to that of gaining friends. He remarked that he noticed their excessive zeal in the acquisition of houses, and lands, and slaves, and cattle, and goods, and their anxiety to retain their own property; but as for a friend, whom they profess to be the greatest of all blessings, he declared that most people, so far as he could perceive, neither took the least pains to acquire one, nor studied how to retain those that they had already gained. Again, when friends and servants were ill, he said that he noticed how some people would both call in doctors for the latter, and use all possible exertions for their recovery, while to the former they paid no regard whatever. And if both died, they grieved for their servants, and considered that they had suffered a loss, but that they thought nothing of being bereaved of their friends. Also, of their other possessions, that there was nothing which they left without their own personal care and supervision, but that when their friends required attention, they utterly neglected them.

In addition to these remarks, he said that most people knew the number of their other goods and chattels, however large it might be; but with regard to their friends, although they had but a few of them, they were not only ignorant of how many they were, but even when they attempted to enumerate them to those who asked them to do so, they omitted some whom they had previously reckoned, so little did they value their friends. Yet to which of their other possessions was not a good friend, upon comparison, preferable? What kind of

horse or team of cattle was so useful as a good friend? What servant was so kindly disposed, or so steadfast? What other acquisition so absolutely advantageous? For a true friend holds himself in readiness to supply all his friend's wants, both of a private and public character; and if the latter desires to render a service to anyone, he furthers his wishes in this respect. And if any cause for alarm disturbs him, his friend comes to his aid, sometimes by sharing his expenses, sometimes by co-operating with him; taking counsel with him in some cases, and in others compelling him to use force; greatly rejoicing at his success, and zealously supporting him when he falls into misfortune. There is no one thing which a man's hands execute for him, or his eyes behold, or his ears hear, or his feet perform, that a serviceable friend fails to accomplish; and frequently a friend does those things for a friend which the latter has not himself done, or perceived, or heard, or acted upon. And yet while some people carefully foster trees on account of their fruit, most men are indolently and stupidly neglectful of their friends.

Chapter V.

Once, too, I heard another of his discourses, which seemed to me to exhort the hearer to examine himself, so as to ascertain of what value he was to his friends; for, seeing one of his disciples neglecting a friend who was sore pressed by poverty, he asked Antisthenes, when the man who had so misbehaved himself and many others were present, “Tell me, Antisthenes, are friends to be had for certain prices, as slaves are? For of slaves, one perhaps is worth two minae, another not even half a mina, another five minae, another as much as ten. Nicias, the son of Niceratus, is said to have given a talent for an overseer for his silver mines. And I am considering,” he continued, “whether, as there are certain ascertained values for slaves, so the same holds good with regard to friends.”

“Without doubt, it does,” said Antisthenes; “at least, I, for my part, should rate one man as a friend at a much higher price than two minae, while another I should hold dear at even half a mina; another I should prefer to ten minae, and another I would purchase as my friend at the cost of all my possessions and resources.”

“Such being the case, then,” said Socrates, “it would be well for every man to examine himself as to how he is estimated by his friends, and to endeavor to be as highly prized by them as possible, so that they may be the less likely to desert him. For,” he continued, “I often hear one man say that his friend has given him up, and another, that such an one whom he believed to be a friend has preferred a mina to him. On all these grounds I am considering whether, as when one sells' a bad slave, and parts with him for anything that he will fetch, so also in the case of a worthless friend, it is advisable to give him up when one can get more for him than his value. But I never see good slaves sold, or good friends given up.”

Chapter VI.

And he appeared to me to inculcate caution in the choice of friends by such conversations as the following: — "Tell me, Critobulus," said he, "if we needed a good friend, on what grounds should we try to select one? Should we not seek for one who could resist gluttony, hard drinking, sensuality, sloth, and idleness; for he who succumbs to these would not be capable of doing his duty either to himself or to his friend?"

"Of course, he would not," replied Critobulus. "Does it not, then, appear to you that we should avoid one who is dominated by such propensities?"

"Certainly," said the other. "Again," asked Socrates, "any man who through his extravagance is no longer independent, but is always seeking assistance from his neighbors, who, when he borrows, cannot repay, and if he cannot borrow, hates him who will not lend, does not such an one appear to you a dangerous friend?"

"Very much so," replied Critobulus. "Should we, then, not avoid him?"

"Assuredly we should," said Critobulus.

"And what of him who, having the means of making money, and desiring to be very rich, on this account becomes churlish, and delights in receiving but grudges paying?"

"Such a character," said Critobulus, "appears to me more detestable than the former."

"What, then, of him who, from his love of accumulating wealth, leaves himself leisure for nothing else but the pursuit of it?"

"He, too, according to my opinion, is to be avoided, since he would be of no use to anyone who required his services."

“And what do you think of him who is of a quarrelsome disposition, and is inclined to set people at variance with their friends?”

“Such an one as this, too, is by all means to be shunned.”

“Suppose a man, however, to have none of these failings, but to be very willing to receive favors, while he is utterly heedless of ever returning them?”

“Neither would such a friend as this be of any service. But what sort of a person, Socrates, should we try to make our friend’?”

“Truly, I think one who, contrariwise to all this, is both self-continent with regard to his bodily pleasures, generally conscientious and fair-dealing, and anxious not to be outdone in benefiting those who have benefited him, so as to be of use to those who are his intimates.”

“But tell me, Socrates, how can we form a judgment on such points before we contract an intimacy with a man?”

“When we pass a judgment with respect to sculptors,” replied Socrates, “we do not ground that judgment upon their words; but when we see that any particular one has executed his previous statues creditably, we conclude that he will be able to turn out his other works in a similar style.”

“You say, then,” asked Critobulus, “that a man who has been known to have behaved kindly to his former friends, is likely to do so towards those whom he has acquired subsequently?”

“Precisely so,” remarked Socrates; “just as I expect that one whom I have previously seen managing horses well will be equally able to manage other horses.”

“Be it so,” said Critobulus. “But when any one appears to us to be worthy of our friendship, what means should we adopt to secure him as a friend?”

“In the first instance,” replied Socrates, “it is necessary to inquire of the gods as to whether they would counsel us to make- him our friend.”

“Can you tell me, then,” asked Critobulus, “how such an one as appears fit for our friendship, and of whom the gods do not disapprove, is to be secured?”

“By Jupiter,” returned Socrates, “he is not to be captured by swiftness of foot, as a hare is, or by the snare, like birds, or by force, like our foes; for it is a difficult task to secure a friend against his will, and it is hard, when you have got him, to keep him bound like a slave, inasmuch as those who are treated in this manner are more apt to become our enemies than our friends.”

“How do they become our friends, then?” Critobulus asked. “It is said that there are certain incantations, by the singing of which to whomsoever they please, such as understand them can secure their hearers as their friends; and that there are charms, which those who are skilled in their use, by administering to any whom they choose, become beloved by them.”

“And whence can we obtain a knowledge of such devices?”

“Have you not heard from Homer the Siren’s song to Ulysses, which commences somehow thus? —

> “‘Come hither, O you prince renowned, great glory of the Greeks!’”

“Did the Sirens, then, Socrates, sins; this same strain to other men, and detain them also, so that they could not tear themselves away from those who sung it?”

“No; but they sung thus to those who loved to be honored on account of their excellence.”

“You mean something of this kind — that we ought to apply such incantations to each individual as to lead him to think, when he hears them, that the man who is praising him is not

doing so to ridicule him; for in that case, he would be rather inimically disposed, and would repel us from him; as, for example, if one were to admire for his beauty and stature and strength a man who was aware that he was undersized and ugly and weak. But," continued Critobulus, "are you acquainted with any other charms?"

"I am not," replied Socrates; "but I have heard that Pericles knew several, by chanting when to the state he made it love him."

"And how did Themistocles gain the affections of the state?"

"Not, by Jupiter, by singing incantations to it, but by attaching to it, as it were, an amulet — some sort of benefit."

"You appear to me, Socrates, to mean, that if we would become possessed of a worthy friend, we should ourselves show our own worthiness both in speech and action?"

"Do you, then," asked Socrates, "think it possible for a bad man to procure good friends?"

"At any rate," replied Critobulus, "I have seen bad rhetoricians friendly with good orators, and incompetent generals on terms of intimacy with men eminently fitted for command."

"But with regard to those points which we were discussing, do you know any who, being themselves useless, are nevertheless able to make useful persons their friends?"

"No, by Jupiter," returned Critobulus; "but if it is impossible for a depraved man to gain for himself good and honest friends, what I am now concerned to know is, whether it is possible for one who is himself honest and good to become, without any difficulty, friendly with men of the same character?"

"What perplexes you, Critobulus, is the fact that you often see honorable men, and such as refrain from any base conduct, acting as enemies rather than as friends to one

another, and treating each other more harshly than those who are altogether worthless."

"And not only private individuals," continued Critobulus, "but even states act in this manner; for, although they carefully cultivate goodness and discourage vice, they are, nevertheless, often hostilely disposed towards one another. When I consider all these circumstances, I quite lose heart about the acquisition of friends. Bad people, I know, cannot live on good terms together, for how can the ungrateful, or the heedless, or the avaricious, or the faithless, or the incontinent, become friends? Indeed, it appears to me that the wicked are naturally enemies rather than friends to each other. But, again, as you remark, the wicked never harmonize with the good in a manner likely to establish mutual friendship. For how can those who commit bad actions be friends with those who abhor them? And if, moreover, those who lead a virtuous life are nevertheless at enmity about pre-eminence in the state, and hate each other through envy, who can be friends, or among what class of men can good-will and faithfulness exist?"

"There are," replied Socrates, "certain distinct feelings which enter into such matters. Hence men are by nature partly disposed to friendliness one with another, as they require one another's aid, and sympathize with each other, and by co-operating together are of mutual assistance; and perceiving that such is the case, they entertain kindly feelings towards one another. On the other hand, they are to a certain extent inimically disposed, for where they regard the same objects as desirable and pleasant, they fight for them, and become opposed to each other through their feelings being at variance. Contention and anger tend to open warfare, the love of self-aggrandizement produces ill-will, and envy engenders hatred. But, nevertheless, friendship, penetrating through all these obstacles, unites together the honorable and the good.

Their virtue leads them to prefer a moderate competency without strife to the possession of unlimited resources acquired by contention. When hungry and thirsty, they can share their meat and drink ungrudgingly, and although they may take pleasure in sensual gratification, they can restrain themselves so as not to annoy people whom they ought not to annoy.

"Moreover, they are able, by refraining from covetousness, not only to divide their property in an equitable spirit, but to assist one another, and to settle their disputes not merely amicably, but in such a way as to produce mutual benefit. They can restrain their anger from going so far as to cause them repentance, and envy they utterly annihilate by giving up their goods to their friends to use as their own, and regarding their friends' property as theirs.

"Why is it improbable, then, that the honorable and good should accept political honors as a means not only of not injuring each other, but even of advancing one another's interests? Those, indeed, who covet distinction and influence in the state for the purposes of embezzlement, oppression, and luxurious living, would be unprincipled, vicious, and unable to adapt themselves to anyone else. But if a man desires to obtain pre-eminence in the state in order that he may both preserve himself from suffering wrong, and may be able to assist his friends in obtaining their rights, and during his terms of office endeavors to confer some boon upon his country, why would such an one be unable to adapt himself to one whose views were similar to his own? Will he be less capable of serving his friends by his association with the upright and the just, or less able to benefit his country by having the honorable and good as his colleagues?

"Now, it is evident that if, at the athletic games, it were allowable for the strongest competitors to band themselves together and enter the lists against the weakest, the former

would be the victors in all the events, and carry off all the prizes. In these contests, therefore, such an arrangement is not permitted, but in political life, in which the honorable and good form the strongest party, there is no rule against any one's benefiting the state in conjunction with whomsoever he pleases. How then is it not a matter of profit that he should have the chief management of the state whose friends are of the best character, and who would have their aid and support, rather than their opposition, in his undertakings? Moreover, it is manifest that if any man commences hostilities against another, he will require coadjutors, and plenty of them too, if he is to take the field against the honorable and good; and those who are willing to serve as his allies must be well treated, so that they may be zealous in his cause. It is, therefore, much more to his advantage to behave well to the good, who are fewer in number, than to the bad, who are more numerous; since the wicked expect many more favors than the good. But cheer up, Critobulus, and endeavor," he said, "to become good yourself, and when you have made yourself so, seek to secure honorable and virtuous men as your friends. And I may perhaps be myself able to assist you in your search after such, on account of the affection I entertain for you; for whenever I conceive a liking for people, I strive anxiously, and with all my power, as I love them, so to be loved again by them in return. I desire that as I regret their absence, so they should regret mine, and that as I miss their company, they also should long for mine. I perceive, too, that your views are of a similar nature, when you seek to form friendships. Do not, therefore, conceal from me who those are with whom you wish to contract an intimacy; for I think that owing to my being always very careful to please those who please me, I am not altogether unskilled in securing men."

And Critobulus said, a I have long been anxious, Socrates, to avail myself of such instructions as you have given,

especially if the knowledge of them will supply me with the means of influencing both those who possess virtuous minds, and those who have handsome persons."

"But, Critobulus, there is nothing in my system which will induce those who are handsome to suffer any one to lay hands upon them; for I am convinced that men fled away from Scylla because she offered to place her hands upon them, while everyone, as the legend goes, lingered and listened with delight to the Sirens, because they never attempted to touch anyone, but sang to people from a distance."

And Critobulus said, "Granting that I refrain from using my hands, teach me any good plan that you may be acquainted with for securing friends."

"But you will never apply your lips," asked Socrates, "to their lips?"

"Depend upon it, Socrates," replied Critobulus, "that I will never suffer my lips to approach those of any other person, except they be beautiful."

"But, Critobulus," remarked Socrates, "you have just uttered a sentiment which militates exactly against what is most to your advantage; for those who are beautiful will not permit such liberties, whereas the ugly submit to them even with pleasure, thinking that they are considered attractive on account of some mental endowment."

And Critobulus said, "Regarding me, then, in the light of one who is inclined to be fond of those who are beautiful, and very fond of those who are good, teach me with confidence the arts necessary to secure friends." And Socrates asked, "When, then, Critobulus, you feel disposed to become friendly with anyone, will you permit me to speak of you to him, and say that you admire him, and wish to become his friend?"

"You may say so," replied Critobulus; "for I never knew any one dislike those who speak well of him."

“But if I add to this, that, because you admire him, you also feel kindly towards him, you will not think that you are being misrepresented by me?”

“By no means,” rejoined Critobulus; “for a kindly feeling is also engendered in my own breast towards those who I think are kindly disposed towards me.”

“I may then say thus much concerning you,” continued Socrates, “to those whom you wish to make your friends; and if, moreover, you empower me to assert concerning you that you are attentive to your friends, and delight in nothing so much as in having good friends, and that you take no less pleasure in your friends’ good actions than you do in your own; that you rejoice at the prosperity of your friends no less than you do at your own; that you are never weary of laboring to promote the welfare of your friends, and that you esteem it a virtue in a man to surpass his friends in doing them good, and his enemies in doing them harm, — I think I shall be an effective coadjutor to yon in your search after worthy friends.”

“But why,” inquired Critobulus, “do you speak to me thus, as if you were not at liberty to say of me whatever you please?”

“No, by Jupiter,” exclaimed Socrates, “I am not at liberty to do so, as I once heard Aspasia say; for she declared that skillful match-makers, in their reports of people’s characters, had great influence in promoting marriages, if the good points that they enumerated were true; but that such as praised people falsely did no good, since those who had been deceived equally hated both each other and the match-maker. And I, being convinced that her sentiments were correct, am of opinion that I ought not to say anything in your praise without I can assert it truthfully.”

“You are then,” exclaimed Critobulus, “a friend of this sort to me, Socrates, that if I myself possess the qualifications necessary to the acquiring of friends, you would assist me in

securing them, but if not, you would not indulge in any fiction to serve me?"

"And whether, Critobulus," rejoined Socrates, "do you think I should be serving you most by praising you undeservedly, or by persuading you to endeavor to become a good man? But if this point is not clear to you, examine it by the light of the following arguments. Suppose, now, that being desirous of making you friendly with the master of a vessel, I should falsely praise you by recommending you as an excellent pilot, and he, relying on my recommendation, should commit the steering of his ship to you, who knew nothing whatever about it, do you at all expect that you would not destroy both yourself and the ship? Or if, by means of false representations, I should induce the state to entrust itself to you in a public capacity, as to a man fitted to discharge important military, judicial, and political functions, what do you think would happen both to yourself and to the state under your guidance? Or if, as a private individual, I should, by false statements, persuade any of the citizens to entrust his property to you as to a skillful and attentive manager, would you not, when your capabilities came to be tested, be evidently found not only to have inflicted loss upon your employer, but to have made yourself thoroughly ridiculous? But the shortest and the safest and the best way, Critobulus, is, in whatever point you wish to excel, to strive to acquire true proficiency in it, for all such things as are called 'excellencies' among mankind you will find upon consideration to be in every case capable of being increased by education and practice. I think, therefore, that we should pursue such a course in the selection of our friends; but if you know any other method impart it to me."

"Rather, Socrates," said Critobulus, "I should blush to gainsay such opinions; for in doing so I should assert that which was neither honorable nor true."

Chapter VII.

And again, with regard to the difficulties of his friends, such of them as arose from ignorance he endeavored to alleviate by his counsel, and those which sprung from poverty, by instructing them to assist one another according to their ability. And in illustration of this, I will relate some anecdotes which I know concerning him.

Upon one occasion, observing Aristarchus looking gloomily — "You seem," he said, "Aristarchus, to be laboring under some burthen, and you ought to impart the cause of your heaviness to your friends, for mayhap we may be able to relieve you of some part of the load."

To this Aristarchus answered — "I am indeed, Socrates, in a great strait, for since the revolution has broken out in the city, and many have fled to the Peiraeus, those of my sisters and nieces and female cousins who have been left behind have come to take shelter with me, in such numbers that there are now fourteen freeborn persons in my house; and we receive nothing from our land, for the enemy holds it; nor from our houses, on account of the scarcity of population that now exists in the city; and no one will buy our furniture, nor is it possible to borrow money anywhere, but it seems to me easier to pick it up in the streets than to obtain a loan of it. Now, it is a sad thing for me to leave my own relations to perish, but it is quite impossible for me to support so many people under such circumstances."

Then Socrates, having heard these words, said, "But how is it that citizen Ceramon, who maintains a great many people, is not only able to provide what is necessary both for himself and them, but adds so much more to his store as even to be rich; while you, on the contrary, having also to support a considerable number, are in fear lest you should all perish for want of even the mere necessaries of life?"

“Because, by Jupiter,” answered Aristarchus, “those who depend upon him for support are slaves, but those who depend upon me are free-born.”

“And which do you regard in the best light, the free-born persons who are with you, or the slaves who are with Ceramon?”

“The free-born who are with me,” replied Aristarchus.

“Is it not then,” asked Socrates, “a shameful thing that he, who is surrounded by an inferior class, should have an abundance, while you, who have about you those who belong to a much higher grade, are in want?”

“Certainly not,” exclaimed Aristarchus, “since his household consists of artisans, mine of persons of a liberal education.”

“Those, then, are artisans who know how to manufacture any useful article?”

“Assuredly,” replied the other.

“Is barley-meal, then, a useful article?”

“Exceedingly useful.”

“And bread?”

“Not less so.”

“What, too, of men’s and women’s clothes, such as coats and cloaks and mantles?”

“These, again, are all extremely useful.”

“Do those, then, who are in your house,” asked Socrates, “understand nothing about the manufacture of such articles?”

“I imagine that they understand the making of all of them.”

“Do you not know, then, that from the manufacture of one of them, viz., barley-meal, Nausicydes supports not only himself and his household, but a great number of pigs and oxen also, and gains so much more besides that he is often able to subsidize the government? Cyrebus, too, maintains his

whole family by the manufacture of bread, and lives in luxury. Demeas of Collyteus subsists upon cloak, and Menon upon tunic making, while most of the Megareans support themselves by the making of mantles."

"No doubt they do," replied Aristarchus, "for they all purchase foreign slaves, whom they keep for the express purpose of compelling them to perform such tasks as they think fit, whereas I am surrounded by free-born persons and relatives."

"Because, then, they are free-born persons and your relatives, you think that they ought to do nothing else but eat and sleep? And do you find that other free persons, who spend their existence thus indolently, live better? gr do you think that they are happier than those do who understand, both theoretically and practically, those arts which are useful to support life? Or do you perceive that laziness and carelessness conduce to make men acquainted with such things as they ought to understand, and to their remembering what they have learned, or to the improvement of their bodily health and strength, or to the acquisition and preservation of what is useful for their support; but that industry and activity are of no profit to them? And with regard to those arts of which, as you say, your relatives have acquired the knowledge, did they learn them without any intention of ever making them available for their support, and of being in any way useful to them; or, on the contrary, with a view to exercising them for their own benefit? By pursuing which course would men show most wisdom, by living in idleness or by occupying themselves in useful pursuits? And would they become more upright by working for, or by indolently pondering over what they require? But, as matters now stand, it appears to me that you cannot have any real love for your female relatives, nor they for you, inasmuch as you regard them as burthensome to you, and they see that you are annoyed at their company. There is

a risk, therefore, that from such a state of feeling dislike will accrue, and the affection that you once had for each other will be impaired. But if you give them directions how to employ themselves, you will feel amiably disposed towards them, seeing that they are of use to you, and they will become attached to you when they are sensible that you are pleased with them; and, remembering with increased gratification the services they have rendered you, you will add to the good-will which has thus sprung up between you, and will conduct yourselves more amicably and sociably towards each other. If, indeed, they had to undertake any work that was disgraceful, death would be preferable to it; but your relations are skilled in those arts which are probably the most honorable and becoming that can be exercised by women, and all people execute such things as they understand most easily, expeditiously, creditably, and pleasurably. Do not hesitate, then," he continued, "to suggest to them a course which will benefit both them and you, and which they, in all probability, will most readily adopt."

"Now, by the gods, Socrates," exclaimed Aristarchus, "your arguments are so forcible, that although I have hitherto shrunk from obtaining a loan, as knowing that when I had spent what I had borrowed, I should not be able to repay the debt, I now think I can bring myself to do so in order to provide means for commencing our tasks."

The result was that all things necessary for the start were procured. Wool was bought, and the women dined as they worked, and supped after they had finished work. Their countenances assumed a cheerful instead of a gloomy expression; instead of shunning each other's looks, they encountered them with pleasure; and they regarded Aristarchus as their protector, while he grew fond of them, as being of use to him. At last, going to Socrates, he related to him with delight all that had happened, and added, that the

women accused him of being the only person in the house who ate the bread of idleness. Then said Socrates, "Why did you not tell them the 'Fable of the Dog?' For the story goes, that when beasts could speak, the sheep said to her master, 'You act strangely, in that to us, who afford you wool and lambs and cheese, you give nothing except what we get from the ground; but with the dog, who supplies you with nothing of the kind, you share the food of which you yourself partake.' And the dog, hearing these words, exclaimed, 'Yes, forsooth, and with justice! since it is I who preserve you yourselves from being stolen by men or carried off by wolves; for if I did not guard you, you would not even be able to graze for fear of being destroyed.' For this reason, it is said, the sheep agreed to grant to the dog precedence in honor. Do you, therefore, tell these women that, like the dog, you are to them a guardian and a protector; and that they by your means, and without suffering any indignity, are passing their time in safe and pleasant occupations."

Chapter VIII.

On one occasion, seeing an old friend after a long interval of time, he said, “Where do you spring from, Eutherus?”

“I have returned, Socrates, from living abroad since the conclusion of the war, and have but lately arrived from thence; for as we were despoiled of all our property beyond the frontier, and my father left me nothing in Attica, I am now compelled to live in the city, so as to procure the necessaries of life by my personal labor; for it seems to me to be better to do this, than to ask favors of anybody, especially as I have no security on which I could raise money.”

“And how long,” asked Socrates, “do you think your body will be sufficiently strong to enable you to earn the necessaries of life by your labor?”

“Not very long, by Jupiter,” answered Eutherus.

“And yet,” said Socrates, “it is certain that when you become older you will require money to spend, although no one will be willing to hire you for your bodily strength.”

“That is very true,” remarked Eutherus.

“It is therefore better for you,” said Socrates, “henceforth to apply yourself to such kinds of occupations as will maintain you when you grow old, and to go to some person who has large possessions, and wants someone to superintend them, whose overseer you could be, and assist him in gathering in his crops and taking care of his estate, so as, by benefiting him, to be yourself benefited in return.”

“I should endure servitude, Socrates,” he said, “with great reluctance.”

“Yet those who preside over states, and have the management of public affairs, are not on this account regarded in the light of slaves, but as freemen.”

“Briefly,” replied Eutherus, “I am not at all inclined to expose myself to be found fault with by anyone.”

“But, assuredly, Eutherus, it is not altogether easy to find any employment in which a person can always avoid cause for blame; for it is difficult to accomplish anything without making some mistake, and difficult, if you do so accomplish it, to meet with a critic who is sensible enough to recognize the fact; and even in those very occupations in which you say you are now engaged, I should much wonder if you were altogether able to escape being found fault with. You must, therefore, beware of captious employers, and look out for such as are indulgent. You must also undertake such duties only as you can carry out, and avoid such as you cannot; and whatever task you do undertake, you must apply yourself to it to the best of your abilities and with the utmost zeal; for, methinks, that by such conduct you will run the least risk of exposing yourself to blame, and be the most likely to obtain help in your difficulties: that you will thus live most easily and securely, and lay up the best provision for old age?’

Chapter IX.

I know, too, that he once heard Crito remark how difficult it was for a man who wished to confine his attention to his own business only, to live in Athens. “For,” said he, “at this very time, actions are being brought against me, not by persons who have suffered any injury at my hands, but because they think that I will give them a sum of money rather than be troubled.”

And Socrates asked, “Tell me, Crito, do you keep dogs for the purpose of guarding your sheep against the wolves?”

“Undoubtedly,” replied Crito; “since it is more to my advantage to keep them than not.”

“Would you not, then, keep a man who would be willing and able to guard you against the attacks of those who are seeking to injure you?”

“Most readily,” answered Crito, “could I be assured that he would not turn against me.”

“But do you not perceive,” asked Socrates, “that it would be much more to a man’s pleasure and profit to ingratiate himself with a person like you, than it would be to incur your enmity? Be assured that there are such men in our city who would esteem it a very great honor to reckon you as a friend.”

The result was that they fixed upon one Archedemus, a very able man, both in speech and action, but poor; for he was not the sort of person who would make money by any means, but, being an admirer of honesty, and naturally possessed of superior qualifications, he was able to make something out of the sycophants. Crito, therefore, whenever he gathered in his com, or oil, or wine, or wool, or any of his agricultural produce which tended to support life, would devote some of it as a present to Archedemus; and when he sacrificed, he would invite him to the feast, and showed him attention in all such matters. And Archedemus, regarding Crito’s house as a place

of refuge to him, was very devoted to him. He quickly discovered many injuries that Crito had suffered at the hands of the sycophants, and that many of them were his enemies; and he summoned one of them to a public trial, at which it would have to be settled what penalty he should pay either in purse or person. Now, the sycophant, being conscious of his many misdemeanors, tried all possible methods to get rid of Archedemus. But he would not be got rid of, until the other left off interfering with Crito, and gave him himself a sum of money besides. And when Archedemus had brought this and other similar transactions to a successful issue, then forthwith, as when any shepherd has a good dog, other shepherds also seek to station their flocks near him, in order to have the benefit of his dog, so many of Crito's friends besought him to lend them Archedemus as a protector of their interests also. To this request of Crito's Archedemus willingly acceded, and thus not only Crito but his friends were no longer molested. And if any of the latter, who owed Archedemus a grudge, taunted him with flattering Crito in return for the kindnesses he had received at his hands, Archedemus would ask, "Pray, is it disgraceful for one who has been served by worthy people, and has served them in return, to make them their friends, and to avoid the wicked? And should they seek to make the honorable and good their enemies by wronging them, while they endeavor by abetting evil-doers to conciliate them, and associate with the latter in preference to the former?" So henceforward Archedemus became one of Crito's intimates, and was highly esteemed by the other friends of Crito.

Chapter X.

I know, also, that he held the following conversation with one of his associates named Diodorus: — "Tell me, Diodorus," said he, "if any of your domestics absconds, do you take any steps to recover him?"

"Yes, by Jupiter," replied Diodorus; "for I call together the others, and proclaim a reward for any of them who will bring him back."

"And if any of them falls ill, do you take care of him, and send for doctors to prevent his dying?"

"Certainly," answered Diodorus.

"And if any one of your acquaintances," continued Socrates, "who is infinitely more valuable than your servants, is in danger of perishing from want, do you not think that you ought to pay attention to him, and endeavor to save his life? Yet you know that Hermogenes is not an ungrateful man, and that he would feel ashamed to receive a kindness from you without requiting you for it. Now, I consider the possession of a well-disposed and earnest assistant, and one who is capable of executing your orders, and not only this, but also of being useful to you in his own person, and of forecasting and forming plans for you, as valuable as many servants. In truth, good economists say that when you have an opportunity of purchasing a high-priced article at a trifling cost, you ought to secure it; and now, circumstances allow of your procuring good friends at a cheap rate?"

To this Diodorus replied, "You say well, Socrates, and therefore bid Hermogenes to come to me."

"Not I, by Jupiter," exclaimed Socrates; "for I do not think it more equitable to send him to you, than that you should go to him, or that a greater benefit will accrue to him from the meeting than to you." So, then Diodorus went to Hermogenes, and at a trifling cost secured a friend who made it his business

to consider how he could best serve and gratify Diodorus either by word or deed.

Book III.

Chapter I.

I now proceed to relate how useful Socrates was to those who were aiming at any post of honor, by making them attentive in pursuing the objects of their desire.

On one occasion, for example, having heard that Dionysodorus had visited the city, and announced that he would give lessons in the art of generalship, he said to one of his own disciples, who was ambitious of gaining public distinction as a general, "It is surely shameful, young man, that he who aspires to take the command of the forces of the state should, when the opportunity offers of learning how to do so, neglect to avail himself of it; and such an one would be much more justly punished by the state than one who should undertake to make statues for it without ever having studied the statuary's profession. For since, in the perils of war, the whole community is entrusted to the commander, the greatest benefits naturally accrue from his successes, and the greatest evils from his mistakes. How, then, would not he who was desirous of occupying such a post, and yet neglected to learn its duties, be deservedly punished?"

By such observations he induced his hearer to go and take lessons. And when, after having attended the lectures, he paid a visit to Socrates, the latter began to jest about him, saying, "Since Homer, my friends, has described Agamemnon as being worthy of respect, so does not this young man appear to be more deserving of our respect now that he has learned to be a general? For as he who has learned to play upon the harp, even if he is not using his instrument, is nevertheless a harpist, and he who has studied the physician's art, even although he does not exercise it, is still a physician, so this youth from henceforth will always be a general, although he should never be appointed to that post; whereas he who lacks

the proper knowledge is neither a general nor a physician, although he should be unanimously elected to act in those capacities. But," he said to him, a in order that, if any one of us should ever have to command a division or a company under you, we may better understand our duties as soldiers, tell us how your teacher commenced his instructions in generalship."

"He commenced," replied the young man, "as he ended; for he taught me tactics, and nothing else."

"And yet," exclaimed Socrates, "what a small branch of the art of generalship that is! for a commander-in-chief must be capable of providing everything that is necessary for war, and for the proper provisioning of his troops. He should be a good mechanic and handicraftsman, careful, patient, quick-witted; kind, and yet severe; simple, yet cunning; anxious to keep his own stores, but ready to seize those of others; lavish, yet rapacious; munificent, but fond of saving; cautious, yet enterprising; and possessed of many other qualifications, both natural and acquired, which he who would make an efficient general must be master of. Doubtless it is of advantage to be a good tactician also; for a well-ordered army differs from a disorderly one, as stones, and bricks, and wood, and tiles, when they are all thrown together in a confused heap, are of no use; but when those materials which will not fall to pieces or decay, such as the stones and the tiles, are put at the bottom and top, while the bricks and the wood are arranged in the middle, as is done in building — then a house, which is a valuable piece of property, is the result."

"Really, Socrates," said the young man, "the analogy which you have instituted is perfect; for in war, we place the best troops in the van and at the rear, and the worst in the main body, so that they may be led on by those in front of them, and urged forward by those behind."

“If,” rejoined Socrates, “your master has taught you how to distinguish the good from the bad, the plan you mention would be an excellent one; but if he has not done so, of what use are his instructions? For example, suppose he were to desire you to arrange some silver coins, so as to place the best examples first and last, and the worst in the middle, without showing you which were the genuine and which the spurious, his orders would be of no use.”

“But,” said the young man, “he certainly did not teach us this, and so we should have to distinguish the good from the bad ourselves.”

“Why, then, should we not consider how we may best avoid making mistakes on this point?”

“I am willing to do so,” replied the young man.

“Well, then,” said Socrates, “if we had to capture a sum of money, should we not be right in placing those men who were most covetous of money in the van?”

“So it appears to me,” answered the young man.

“And what should those do who are about to undertake perilous enterprises? Should they not place those who are most ambitious of honor in the front?”

“These, at any rate,” said the young man, “are such as would most readily incur danger for the sake of glory; neither are they difficult to discover, but being conspicuous everywhere, they are easily to be found.”

“But did your master,” asked Socrates, “merely teach you to draw up an army, or did he also teach you how each division was to be employed?”

“By no means,” he replied.

“And yet there are many circumstances,” said Socrates, “to which neither the same plan of drawing up an army nor of leading it will always apply.”

“But, by Jupiter,” exclaimed the young man, “he never thoroughly explained this.”

“Then, by Jupiter,” said Socrates, “go back to him, and question him upon these points; for if he understands them, and is not altogether shameless, he will blush at having taken your money and sent you away in ignorance of them.”

Chapter II.

Having on a certain occasion met a general elect, Socrates asked him, "Why do you think that Homer styles Agamemnon 'the shepherd of the people?' Is it not, pray, because, as a shepherd ought to care for the safety of his sheep, and to provide what is necessary for them, so that the purpose for which they are kept may be answered, so a general ought to provide for the safety of his soldiers, and for their proper support, so that the object for which they serve may be effected? for they serve to conquer the enemy, and thus improve their own condition. Or if not, for what conceivable purpose has the poet glorified Agamemnon by styling him —

"Both powerful warrior and beloved king?'

Is it not because he would have been a 'powerful warrior,' not if he had been victorious single-handed against the enemy, but because he was the cause of victory to the whole army? And he would have been a 'beloved king,' not if he had merely been careful to render his own individual life pleasant, but because he sought the happiness of all those over whom he ruled. For a man is made a king, not for the purpose of taking good care of himself alone, but that those who elected him may be benefited by his rule; and all men serve as soldiers in order that their lives may be as prosperous as possible, and they appoint generals with this very object, that they may conduct them to that prosperity. The commander of an army, therefore, is bound to carry out the objects for which he was elected. For as it is not easy to discover any course of conduct more honorable than this, so there is none that is more disgraceful than its converse."

And in thus estimating the qualities which constituted the peculiar excellence of a good commander, he omitted all other requirements, and insisted only upon this, viz., that it was

incumbent upon him to render those whom he commanded happy.

Chapter III.

I know that on one occasion he held the following conversation with one who had been elected to the post of a cavalry officer: — "Can you tell me, young man, why you were anxious to command the cavalry? It was not, I presume, that you might ride at the head of the troops; for the horse-archers are appointed to that post of honor, seeing that they ride even before the colonels themselves?"

"That is true," replied the young man. "Neither, I suppose, was it for the sake of being noticed, for even madmen are noticed by everybody."

"Again, you speak the truth," said the young man. "Was it, then, because you think that you can make the cavalry more efficient, and hand it over, when so improved, to the service of the government; and if there should be any need for its employment, that you, as its leader, could confer some benefit upon the state?"

"That certainly is my hope."

"And assuredly," rejoined Socrates, "it will be a most honorable trait in your character if you are able to effect this object. But I suppose the command to which you have been elected has regard both to horses and their riders?"

"It has," replied the young man. "Come, then," continued Socrates, "tell us first how you propose to improve the horses."

"I do not," replied the other, "consider that to be any part of my business; for every man individually should look after his own horse."

"If, then," said Socrates, "they should parade their horses before you, some of them so unsound in the hoofs or legs, or so weak and out of condition that they could not follow you; others theirs so ill-broken that they would not stand where you posted them, and others theirs such kickers that it would be impossible to post them at all, what would be the use of

your cavalry, or how could you, as the commander of such a force, be of any service to the state?"

And the young man answered, "Your remarks are just, and I will henceforth try my utmost to look after the horses."

"How, too, about the riders? Will you not endeavor to improve them?"

"I will," said the other. "You will first of all, then, make them more expert in mounting their horses?"

"I ought to do so," he replied; "for thus any one of them who should fall off would be more capable of recovering himself."

"And if you have to hazard an engagement, will you order your men to draw the opposing forces down to a sandy plain like that on which you have been accustomed to exercise, or will you endeavor to train them so as to act on any sort of ground on which the enemy may be likely to post himself?"

"The latter is the better plan," answered the young man. "And will you take any pains to render as many of your men as possible expert at hurling their javelins from on horseback?"

"This also had better be attended to."

"And have you considered the best way of whetting their courage, and exciting them against the enemy, if you intend to make them more eager to fight?"

"If I have not hitherto done so, I will now commence the experiment."

"And have you considered at all how your men will be induced to obey you most readily? for without obedience neither horses nor troopers will be of any use, be they ever so good and brave."

"You speak the truth, Socrates," replied the young man; "but what is the best method of inducing them to be obedient?"

“You know this, I suppose, that men are most willing to follow those whom they think most capable of leading them? Thus, in sickness, they most readily rely upon him whom they regard as the most skillful physician; those who are passengers on board ship upon him who seems the most experienced pilot; and those who are engaged in agriculture on him whom they consider the best husbandman.”

“Of course, they do,” replied the young man.

“Is it not then probable,” asked Socrates, “that, with regard to horsemanship also, whosoever shall seem most skilled in the art, him men will be most willing to obey?”

“If then, Socrates, I should be manifestly the best horseman among them, will that be sufficient to induce them to obey me?”

“It will; especially if, in addition to this, you show them that it will be more honorable and safer for them to obey you.”

“But how,” demanded the other, “shall I prove this to them?”

“Much more easily, by Jupiter,” replied Socrates, “than if you had to prove to them that evil was better and more profitable than good.”

“You mean to insinuate,” said the young man, “that a cavalry commander, in addition to his other qualifications, should endeavor to acquire the power of speaking?”

“And do you suppose,” asked Socrates, “that you can command cavalry by silence? Or have you never considered that whatever things we have been taught, by force of habit, to be the best for us, and by which we guide our lives, are all of them inculcated by the instrumentality of speech? And that if anyone masters any other valuable branch of science, he acquires it by means of speech? Do not the best instructors make the freest use of speech, and those who comprehend the deepest subjects, discourse upon them in the most suitable

language? Or have you not noticed this, that when a chorus is selected out of this our city (like that which is sent to Delos), no other troupe from elsewhere is able to compete with it, nor can so many handsome men be assembled together in any other city as in this?"

"Again, you speak truly," said the young man.

"Do you not think, then," continued Socrates, "that if anyone addressed himself diligently to the task of improving our cavalry here, we should far surpass others in this, as in other points, both with regard to the equipment and discipline of our men and horses, and in the alacrity with which we encountered the dangers of the field, if we thought that praise and honor would accrue to us thereby?"

"It is probable," replied the other.

"Make no delay, then," said Socrates; "but endeavor to encourage your men to such conduct as will contribute to your own welfare, and also to that of your fellow-citizens through your influence."

"I will by all means make the attempt," said the young man.

Chapter IV.

And one day, seeing Nichomachides returning from an election for heads of public departments, he asked him — "Who have been appointed generals, Nichomachides?"

And Nichomachides answered thus — "Have not the Athenians, Socrates, acted exactly as is their wont? For they have not elected me, pierced through as I have been while borne on the roll of lieutenants and captains, and desperately wounded as I am" (here he drew aside his robe and showed the scars of his wounds); "but they have elected Antisthenes, forsooth, a man who never saw service as an infantry soldier, and did nothing remarkable when in the cavalry, but understands only the accumulation of money."

"And is not this a good recommendation, in that it renders a general capable of providing necessaries for his troops?"

"But merchants," replied Nichomachides, "are capable of accumulating money, but that does not make them fit to head an army"

And Socrates said — "Antisthenes, at any rate, is of an emulous disposition, which is a necessary qualification for a general. Have you not noticed that whenever he has been chorus-master, he has on all occasions carried off the victory with his choruses?"

"But, by Jupiter," exclaimed Nichomachides, "there is no analogy between the leading of a chorus and of an army."

"But yet," continued Socrates, "this Antisthenes, although he himself understood neither singing nor the training of choruses, was nevertheless able to procure the services of those who were most famous for these accomplishments."

"And on the same principle," said Nichomachides, "he will find in his army some to draw up his men, and others to fight for him."

“If, therefore, he is as successful in finding out and putting forward the best man in military as he is in choral affairs, it is probable that he will be as victorious in the former as he was in the latter. And there is every likelihood that he will be more willing to incur expense in order to secure victory in the field with the whole state, than he would be to carry off the prize for a chorus with his single tribe.”

“Do you assert, then, Socrates, that the same man who manages a chorus successfully must also be able to handle an army properly?”

“I certainly maintain,” said Socrates, “that whatever a man presides over, if he knows what is required and is able to provide it, he will be a good president, whether it be over a chorus, or a family, or a state, or an army.”

And Nichomachides exclaimed — “By Jupiter! I should never have expected to have heard you maintain that good domestic managers would also make good generals.”

“Come, then,” said Socrates, “let us investigate their respective duties, that we may ascertain whether they are identical or the reverse.”

“Willingly,” said Nichomachides.”

“Is it not, then, the duty of each to render those whom they govern obedient both to their commands and their wishes?”

“Certainly, it is,” replied the other.

“Again, is it not their duty to appoint to everyone his allotted tasks?”

“That is also their duty,” said Nichomachides.

“And the punishing of the bad and rewarding the good is also, I suppose, the province of each of them?”

“No doubt it is,” replied the other.

“And does it not argue well for both, that those who are under their orders should be well disposed towards them?”

“Unquestionably it does,” said Nichomachides.

“And does the securing of allies and auxiliaries seem to you to be conducive to both their interests or not?”

“As conducive to their interests, of course.”

“Should they not each be careful to guard their resources?”

“By all means,” answered the other.

“Should they not both, then, be diligent and attentive to their respective duties?”

“In these points,” rejoined Nichomachides, “the analogy holds good between them, but they have not both to fight.”

“But, at any rate, I suppose they both have enemies?”

“That, no doubt, they have.”

“Is it not, then, equally their interest to gain the superiority over such?”

“Certainly, it is. But, passing over this question, if it should be necessary to fight, of what use would skill in managing a household be?”

“It would, in such a case,” replied Socrates, “be, as I should imagine, of the greatest possible use; for a good manager of a household, knowing that nothing is so advantageous and valuable as to get the better of your adversaries in a contest, and nothing so unprofitable and injurious as to be worsted by them, will zealously seek out and provide all such things as may most conduce to secure the victory, and will carefully watch and guard against everything that tends to his defeat. He will, likewise, fight with alacrity if he sees that his preparations are such as are adapted to secure the victory, and he will be no less averse from engaging should he find himself insufficiently prepared. Do not, therefore, Nichomachides,” he continued, “despise men who are skilled in the management of a household; for the management of private affairs differs from that of public only in their

magnitude, but in other respects they closely resemble one another. The chief point, however, is, that they are neither of them conducted without men; and private matters are not conducted by one sort of men and public business by another; for those who have the superintendence of public affairs do not select men different in kind from those who are employed by managers of their own private households. And those who understand how to turn such men's services to account are good administrators both in private and public affairs; but those who have not such knowledge perpetrate blunders in both."

Chapter V.

And on one occasion, conversing with Pericles, the son of the famous Pericles, he said — "I entertain the hope, Pericles, that with you as commander-in-chief, our state will flourish and become more renowned in war, and that she will vanquish her enemies."

And Pericles answered — "I could wish, Socrates, that your words might be verified, but I cannot see my way to their accomplishment."

"Are you willing, then," said Socrates, "that we should converse upon the subject, with a view to ascertain how it may be possible to effect this?"

"I am willing," replied Pericles. "Are you aware, then, that the Athenians are as numerous as the Boeotians?"

"I am aware of the fact," replied Pericles. "And from which do you think the largest bodies of fine and efficient men could be selected — the Boeotians or the Athenians?"

"Neither in this respect do the Athenians appear to me to be inferior."

"And which of the two people do you consider to be the most united among themselves?"

"The Athenians, in my opinion at least; for many of the Boeotians, being oppressed by the Thebans, bear a grudge against them, but I never notice similar feelings displayed at Athens."

"But, moreover, the Athenians are, as you will admit, the most covetous of honor and the kindest-hearted of all people; and these are sentiments which act as very strong incentives to men to undergo danger for the sake of glory and their country."

"The Athenians," remarked Pericles, "are certainly not deficient in these qualities."

“Assuredly, too, no people can point to more numerous and nobler exploits performed by their ancestors than the Athenians can, by which consideration many of them are strongly influenced and stimulated to the cultivation of velour and bodily prowess.”

“All your assertions are true, Socrates; but you know that since the defeat of the thousand under Tolmides at Lebadeia, and of Hippocrates and his forces at Delium, the reputation of the Athenians stands lower with the Boeotians, while the courage of the Thebans is rated higher by the Athenians; so much so, indeed, that the Boeotians, who before these events did not dare, even in their own territory, to take the field against the Athenians without the Spartans and other Peloponnesian allies, are now actually threatening to invade Attica single-handed; while the Athenians, who formerly, when the Boeotians were unaided, used to lay waste their country, are at this moment in dread lest the Boeotians should ravage Attica.”

“I know,” said Socrates, “that such is the case, and therefore the state seems to me now all the more inclined to appoint an efficient leader, as recognizing the fact that confidence inspires carelessness, indolence, and insubordination, while fear renders men more attentive, obedient, and orderly. And you may perceive an analogy to this in people’s conduct on board ship; for as long as they are in no fear, they are disorderly above measure: but let them dread a storm or some hostile attack, and they not only implicitly obey orders, but even await the giving of directions most anxiously and in silence, just like dancers.”

“Well, then,” said Pericles, “if the people are now more than usually willing to obey orders, it would seem to be the proper time for inquiring how we can best encourage them to strive to regain their ancient pre-eminence, glory, and happiness.”

“If,” said Socrates, “we wished them to reclaim possessions which other people held, we should most effectually urge them on to this by representing to them that the property had belonged to their ancestors, and was rightfully theirs. Similarly, as we wish them to strive to excel in velour, we must show them how that this is their inheritance from of old, and how, if they take care to practice it, they will gain the mastery over all other people.”

“How, then, can we teach them this?”

“I think, indeed,” said Socrates, “that the best way will be to remind them how that they have heard that the most remote of their ancestors of whom we have any tradition, were the bravest of men.”

“Do you allude to that contest between the gods for pre-eminence which they referred to Cecrops and his companions for arbitration?”

“I do,” replied Socrates, “and also to the education and birth of Erectheus, and to the war which was carried on in his time against the inhabitants of the whole adjoining continent, as well as that which took place between the Heracleidae and the Peloponnesians, and the various conflicts in the reign of Theseus, in the whole of which they proved themselves superior to all their contemporaries. And, if you please, you might point out to them what exploits the descendants of these heroes, men who have lived not long before our own time, have performed, partly in contending single-handed against the dominant nations of all Asia and of Europe, as far as Macedonia, although these latter had themselves inherited great power and wealth from their ancestors, and had achieved most remarkable actions; and partly by gaining victories, in conjunction with the Peloponnesians, by land and sea, and thus have earned the reputation of surpassing all their contemporaries.”

“They certainly do enjoy that credit,” replied Pericles.

“Hence it was, that when constant migrations occurred in Greece, they remained in their own country. And many, when disputing about their respective rights, submitted themselves to their arbitration, and diverse who had suffered injury at the hands of those who were stronger than themselves, fled to them for redress.”

And Pericles said — “I wonder, then, Socrates, how our state ever degenerated.”

“I think,” replied Socrates, “that as other states through their long-continued superiority and power have become indolent, and so deteriorated from their former antecedents; in like manner the Athenians, having reached a great preeminence, have neglected themselves, and so become degenerate.”

“What course should they then now pursue in order to regain their ancient high position?”

“It appears to me by no means doubtful, that if they will ascertain what were the measures adopted by their ancestors, and act in accordance with them, they will be in nowise less excellent than they were. But, if they omit doing this, let them at any rate take example by those who now hold the supremacy of Greece, and by imitating their practices, and employing the same methods as they employ, they will probably become not at all inferior to them, but even, if they take proper care, their superiors.”

“You mean,” said Pericles, “that honor and probity flourish in a locality far distant from our city. For when will the Athenians ever reverence old age as the Spartans do? since the former commence their contemptuous conduct towards their elders even with their parents. Or when will they train their bodies in a similar manner, despising good condition as they do, and turning into ridicule all those who cultivate it?

And when will they obey their rulers as the Spartans obey them, seeing that they now take a delight in setting them at naught? Or when will they act as harmoniously together? they who, instead of co-operating for their mutual interests, intimidate one another, and envy each other more than any other people. More than any other people, too, they wrangle in their public and private assemblies, and go to law oftener one with another, and prefer thus to live upon each other, rather than to unite for their general benefit. They treat public business as if it concerned others rather than them themselves, and not only quarrel over the transaction of it, but actually rejoice in having the power of so doing. From these sources a vast deal of ignorance and misery are engendered in the state, and enmity and hatred of one another prevails extensively among our fellow-citizens. Hence I am in constant dread lest such feelings should produce some terrible national calamity too grievous for the state to bear."

"Do not imagine, Pericles," said Socrates, "that the Athenians suffer from a disorder that is so utterly incurable. Do you not see how orderly they are in naval affairs, what willing obedience they yield to their leaders in the gymnastic contests, and how they submit themselves in a way that is not surpassed by any other people to the directions of their chorus-masters?"

"It is indeed extraordinary," remarked Pericles, "that people engaged in such occupations should so implicitly obey those who are in authority over them; but that the infantry and cavalry, who are supposed to excel the rest of the citizens in worth and velour, should at the same time be the most insubordinate of all classes."

Then said Socrates — "And is not the council of the Areiopagus, Pericles, composed of men of approved character?"

“By all means,” answered Pericles. “And do you,” continued Socrates, “know of any tribunal that acts more honorably, lawfully, solemnly, and equitably, either in the administration of justice or any other business?”

“I find no fault with them in these respects,” replied the other.

“We must not, therefore,” said Socrates, “despair of the Athenians on the ground of their insubordination.”

“And yet, in military matters, where prudence, order, and subordination are of the greatest moment, they utterly disregard them.”

“They do so, perhaps,” rejoined Socrates, “because their leaders in such matters understand but little about them. Do you not notice, in the case of harp-players, choristers, wrestlers, and athletes of any kind, that no one attempts to direct them unless he himself understands their respective arts, but that all who act as instructors in such professions are able to point to the sources from whence they obtained their knowledge of the callings over which they preside; whereas most of our generals act without any previous instruction at all? I do not, however, regard you as one of these; for I take it that you can tell when you began to practice generalship, just as you can when you began to practice wrestling; and I suppose that you have treasured up in your memory many of those principles of warfare which your father inculcated upon you, and that you have collected from various sources all the information you could acquire upon every point that might be useful to you as a general. I conclude, too, that you take all possible care that you may not be unwittingly ignorant of anything that may be serviceable to you in such a capacity, and that if you are personally deficient in such knowledge, you have applied to persons who possess it, sparing neither your pocket nor your influence to learn, from

them such matters as you yourself did not understand, and to earn their valuable co-operation."

And Pericles replied — "You do not, Socrates, deceive me by making me believe that you say these things of me because you think that I have been properly instructed in these matters, but because you design to show me how that a man who is about to act as a general should pay great attention to them all. And with this opinion of yours I thoroughly coincide."

"And have you considered this, Pericles," continued Socrates, "that we have on our frontiers huge mountains, which extend as far as Boeotia, through which narrow and rugged passes lead into our country, and that its center is also girded about by inaccessible mountains?"

"Certainly, I have," answered Pericles.

"And have you not heard that the Mysians and Pisidians, who occupy very strong positions in the country of the great king, and are but lightly armed, are able to make incursions into the king's territory, and while they commit great ravages there, nevertheless maintain their own independence?"

"I hear that such is the case," said Pericles.

"And do you not think," asked Socrates, "that the Athenians, if equipped with even lighter arms, when they are young and active, could, by occupying the mountains which bound our country, inflict great injury upon their enemies, and form a most efficient bulwark for our own countrymen?"

"I think," answered Pericles, "that all such maneuvers would be useful."

"If, then, these plans satisfy you," rejoined Socrates, "be earnest, my good friend, in endeavoring to realize them; for whatever portion of them you carry out will redound to your own credit and to the benefit of the state. But if you fail in any of them through want of support, you will neither injure the state nor bring disgrace upon yourself."

Chapter VI.

And when Glaucon, the son of Ariston, attempted to harangue the people, with a view to obtaining the presidency of the state, although he was not yet twenty years of age, and none of his relations or friends could prevail upon him to refrain from getting himself pulled down from the and making himself ridiculous, Socrates, who felt kindly disposed towards him for Charmides, the son of Glaucon, and for Plato's sake, prevented him from prosecuting his design. For meeting the young man by chance, and wishing to induce him to listen to his advice, he stopped him, and addressed him somewhat in these terms: — "So you have made up your mind, Glaucon, to be the chief governor of our state?"

"I have," replied the other.

"By Jupiter," replied Socrates, "it is as honorable a post as any among men can be; for it is evident that if you succeed in this you will be in a position not only to obtain all the objects of your own ambition, but also be able to serve your friends. You will exalt your father's house and magnify your country. Your name will be celebrated first in our own state, and afterwards throughout Greece; and you will perhaps be regarded as a second Themistocles even among barbarous nations, and an object of admiration wherever you may be."

So Glaucon, being mightily flattered at hearing these words, willingly tarried. And when this had happened, Socrates proceeded to say — "But is it not evident, Glaucon, that if you seek to be honored, the state must be benefited by you?"

"Certainly," replied Glaucon.

"By the gods, then," exclaimed Socrates, "do not conceal from us, but declare at once from what point you intend to start in order to benefit the state."

But when Glaucon continued silent, as considering how he would begin, Socrates said — “Pray now tell me whether, just as if you wished to aggrandize a friend’s household you would endeavor to make him richer, so you would also strive to make the state wealthier?”

“By all means,” replied Glaucon.

“Would it not, then, become wealthier if its revenues were increased?”

“Probably so,” said Glaucon.

“Tell me, then,” said Socrates, “from what sources do our state revenues seem to you to be derived, and what is their extent? For, no doubt, you have considered how, if any one of them falls short, you may make up the deficiency, and how, if any of them fail altogether, you may acquire others.”

“But, by Jupiter,” rejoined Glaucon, “I have never considered anything about this.”

“Well, then,” continued Socrates, “if you have neglected to study these topics, you can at any rate tell roe what our state expenditure is? For you surely intend to cut off all superfluity in this respect?”

“Neither, by Jupiter,” said Glaucon, “have I had leisure to turn my attention to this subject.”

“Let us, then, omit the consideration of how to make our state wealthier; for how can anyone who is ignorant of its expenditure and income exercise control over these matters?”

“But, Socrates,” said Glaucon, “it is also possible to enrich one’s state even at the expense of one’s enemies.”

“Extremely possible, by Jupiter,” rejoined Socrates, “if one is stronger than they; but should one be weaker, one may lose all that one has.”

“You speak the truth,” said Glaucon.

“Therefore,” continued Socrates, “he who is considering what sort of people he purposes to go to war with, ought to be acquainted with the strength both of his own country and of the enemy’s, so that if his own state is the more powerful, he may advise it to undertake the war, but if it be weaker than that of the enemy, he may counsel caution.”

“What you say is correct,” remarked Glaucon.

“In the first place, then,” continued Socrates, “tell us what is the strength of our own country, both in land and sea forces; and, secondly, what is that of our enemies.”

“But, by Jupiter, I cannot tell it you by rote.”

“Well, then,” rejoined Socrates, “if you have a written summary of them, produce it, for I should listen to this with very great pleasure.”

“But neither, by Jupiter,” replied Glaucon, “have I ever even written out such a list.”

“Well, then,” said Socrates, “let us also omit the topic of war as a starting-point for our speculations, since, on account of the magnitude of the considerations involved in it, you have not, perhaps, as you have but lately commenced your administration, as yet thoroughly investigated these points. But I feel sure that you have at any rate turned your attention, to the garrisoning of the country, and you know how many garrisons should be maintained and how many are needless; how many men are required to form them and how many are redundant; and you intend to propose the strengthening of those which are necessary, and the displacing of those which are superfluous.”

“By Jupiter,” exclaimed Glaucon, “as far as I am concerned, I should displace them all, since, from their negligent method of keeping guard, the country is often robbed of its property.”

“And yet, if the garrisons were removed altogether, do you not think that anybody who had the slightest inclination to

plunder us could do so? But," he added, "have you gone personally to examine into this matter, or how do you know that a negligent guard is kept?"

"I conjecture that such is the case," replied the other.

"Well, then," said Socrates, "shall we defer our consideration of this topic also until such time as we rely not upon conjecture, but upon specific information?"

"Perhaps it will be better if we do so," answered Glaucon.

"With regard to the silver mines, then," said Socrates, "I know that you have never visited them, so as to be able to tell us why there is less revenue derived from them now than there formerly was."

"I cannot tell you, because I have never been there."

"No doubt, they are said to be in a very unhealthy situation, so that when it becomes necessary to take this matter into consideration, you can plead that as a sufficient excuse."

"You are bantering me," exclaimed Glaucon.

"But I feel sure," resumed Socrates, "that you have not neglected to calculate how long the corn which is grown in the country will suffice to support the city, and how much is required for the year's consumption, so that any scarcity, in this respect at least, may not escape your notice, but that you will be able, from your own knowledge, to advise with the state upon its necessities, and so to assist and save it."

"You suggest," said Glaucon, "an exceedingly vast field of action, if at least it is requisite to pay attention to these matters also."

"But yet," rejoined Socrates, "no one could ever administer his own household properly without knowing what it stood in need of, and taking care to supply its wants. But since the city consists of more than ten thousand households, and it is difficult to provide for so many at once, how is it that you have

never essayed to cater even for one family — say that of your uncle, as it certainly needs assistance? And if you are able to provide for his establishment, you can then take others in hand. If you cannot be of service to one, how can you be so to a great number? Just as if a man cannot carry a talent, is it not self-evident that he cannot carry a heavier weight, and that it is absurd for him to attempt it?"

"But, Socrates," said Glaucon, "I would be of service to my uncle's household, if he would but be guided by me."

"Well, then," said Socrates, "if you cannot induce your uncle to be guided by you, how do you expect to be able to make all the Athenians, including your uncle, follow your lead? Beware, Glaucon, lest, while you are ambitious of acquiring glory, you do not meet with the reverse of it. Or do you not perceive how hazardous a thing it is for a man to speak upon or to undertake matters in which he has no experience? Reflect upon other men that you know, who are of such a character that they talk about, and. busy themselves in, affairs of which they are ignorant, and. do they seem to you to obtain more praise or blame in reference to them? Regard, again, those who do understand the subjects upon which they converse and act, and you will find, I think, that in every business those are the best thought of, and the most admired, who have the most extensive knowledge of it; and that those who are the most ignorant are the most lightly esteemed and despised. If, therefore, you desire to stand high in the respect and admiration of the state, strive to obtain a thorough knowledge of the business in which you intend to engage. For if, after you have surpassed others in accomplishing this, you then undertake to conduct the affairs of the state, I should not be surprised if you very easily attain the object of your ambition."

Chapter VII.

And perceiving that Charmides, the son of Glaucon, was a man of worth, and of far greater ability than many who were at that time employed in state affairs, but that he, nevertheless, shrank from presenting himself before the people, and accepting a post in the administration — "Tell me, Charmides," said he, "if a man who was capable of winning a crown in the public games, and so acquiring honor for himself and making his birthplace more renowned throughout Greece, and yet should be unwilling to contend for it, what opinion would you entertain of his character?"

"I should certainly consider him as being both effeminate and pusillanimous."

"And if anyone," continued Socrates, "by taking part in the affairs of the state, could at the same time add to its prosperity and his own honor, and yet should shrink from undertaking the task, might he not justly be regarded as a coward?"

"Perhaps so," replied Charmides; "but with what intent have you put these questions to me?"

"Because," replied Socrates, "I think that you, although you have the ability to engage in duties which it becomes you as a citizen to undertake, nevertheless shrink from them."

Then Charmides asked — "And in what transaction have you discovered this ability of mine, as you term it, that you thus condemn me?"

"At the councils," answered Socrates, "at which you meet those who are transacting the business of the state. On those occasions I notice that when they consult you upon any point, you give them very excellent advice, and if they commit any blunder, you deservedly find fault with them."

"But," objected Charmides, "there is a vast difference, Socrates, between a private discussion and haranguing in public."

“And yet,” said Socrates, “a good arithmetician can calculate just as well in a crowd as he can when alone, and those who play the harp best when by themselves, are also the best performers in public.”

“But do you not recognize the fact that bashfulness and timidity are inherent in men’s natures, and affect them far more in crowds than they do in private assemblies?”

“I feel compelled, then,” said Socrates, “to point out to you how that you are not bashful in the presence of the most intelligent, or timid in that of the most powerful people; but yet you are ashamed to speak before the most foolish and weak. Is it to such folks as fullers, or cobblers, or carpenters, or brass-founders, or farmers, or merchants, or chafferers in the market, and those who are forever thinking how they may make a profit by their dealings, that you are bashful about making a speech? And it is of these very classes that a public meeting is composed. In what respects do you think your conduct differs from that of an athlete who, being superior to professional opponents, yet fears to encounter mere amateurs? For do not you, who speak without diffidence before the most talented politicians (some of whom think but lightly of you), and who are far superior to many who are constantly delivering political orations, shrink from addressing those who have never turned their attention at all to politics, and have never shown any contempt for you, for fear that you should be laughed at?”

“And pray,” asked Charmides, “do not those who speak admirably at a public meeting often seem to you to be laughed at?”

“Certainly,” said Socrates, “and so also do the others, and therefore it is that I wonder at your being so ready to encounter one sort of audience, while you fancy that you have not sufficient ability even to present yourself before the other.

Be not ignorant, of yourself, my good friend, and do not make the same mistake which most people do; for men generally, although they are very eager to know all about their neighbors, do not display the same anxiety in reference to themselves. Do not you, therefore, pretermit this task, but strive more and more to apply yourself to such duties as become you. And do not neglect the business of the state if you can in any way improve its institutions; for if these stand on a sound basis, not only the rest of your fellow-citizens, but your own personal friends, and you yourself, will reap the most substantial advantage.

By “the others,” Socrates means those to whom Charmides gave such excellent advice in private, but who laughed at him behind his back, perhaps more than those whom he addressed in public would do.

Chapter VIII.

And when Aristippus attempted, to confute Socrates, as he had himself been previously confuted by him, the latter, wishing his associates to profit by the occasion, answered not as those do who are on their guard lest by any chance their words should be misinterpreted, but, like those who are firmly convinced that they are discharging their duty to the utmost of their power. Aristippus then asked him whether "he knew anything good," so that if he should instance any such thing as meat, or drink, or wealth, or health, or strength, or courage, he might, forsooth, prove that it was sometimes an evil. But Socrates, as knowing that if anything annoys us, we desire some means of putting an end to the annoyance, answered just in the way that it was best to do. "Do you ask me, for instance," said he, "whether I know anything good for fever?"

"Not I," answered Aristippus. "Well, then, for ophthalmia?"

"Nor for that either."

"For hunger, then?"

"No, nor yet for hunger."

"Then," said Socrates, "if in truth you ask me whether I know anything good, that is good for nothing whatever, I neither know it, nor do I require to know it."

And when Aristippus asked him again whether he knew anything beautiful,

"Yes, many things," replied Socrates.

"Do they then all resemble each other?" inquired Aristippus.

"Some of them," replied Socrates, "are as unlike one another as it is possible for them to be."

"How, then, can the beautiful be unlike the beautiful?"

"Because, by Jupiter," said Socrates, "a man who is beautifully formed for running is unlike another who is

beautifully formed for wrestling, and a shield which is beautifully made for resisting blows is very different in every single particular from a javelin which is beautifully made for being hurled forcibly and swiftly."

"You answer me," said Aristippus, "exactly as you did when I asked you whether you knew anything good."

"And do you imagine," asked Socrates, "that the Good is one thing and the Beautiful another? Do you not know that, with reference to the same objects, everything that is beautiful is also good? Thus, for instance, in the first place, virtue is not good with reference to some objects, and beautiful in regard to others. Again, too, in like manner, human beings are designated as beautiful and good in reference to the same objects, and human bodies appear beautiful and good in reference to the same objects. And so all other things which are subservient to men's uses are considered beautiful and good in reference to those points in which they answer their purposes."

"Can, then, a dung-basket be a beautiful thing?" asked Aristippus.

"Yes, by Jupiter, it can," answered Socrates; "and a golden shield may be an ugly thing, if the former be well-made, so as to be adapted for its particular use, and the latter ill-made."

"You maintain, then, that the same things can be both beautiful and ugly?"

"Yes, by Jupiter, I do maintain it, and also that the same things may be good and bad; for frequently that which is good for hunger is bad for a fever, and what is good for a fever is bad for hunger. And often what is beautiful in running is ugly in wrestling, and what is beautiful in wrestling is ugly in running. In a word, whatever is good is also beautiful in reference to those objects to which it is well-adapted, and

whatever is bad is ugly in respect to those objects to which it is ill-adapted."

And when he said, too, that the houses which were beautiful were also useful, he seemed to me at least to teach us what sort of houses we should build. And he speculated on the subject thus: — "Pray, ought not he who cares to have a house built as it should be, contrive so that it should be as pleasant and convenient as possible to live in?"

This being admitted, he proceeded — "Is it not, then, pleasant for it to be cool in summer and warm in winter?"

And when his hearers had assented to this proposition, he continued — "Does not the sun, in such houses as front the south, shine obliquely during the winter-time into the porticos, while in the summer it passes vertically over the roofs, and affords us shade? Is it not well, therefore, if at any rate this position be a good one for a house, to build it in such a way that it shall be highest towards the south, so that the winter sun may not be shut out, and lower towards the north, so that the cold winds may not beat upon it so violently? To speak as concisely as possible, that would be probably the pleasantest and most beautiful dwelling-house to which the owner could most agreeably betake himself at all seasons, and in which he could most safely deposit his goods. Paintings and decorations deprive us of more pleasure than they afford."

And he said that the sites most appropriate for temples and altars were those which were most exposed to view, and yet the least frequented; for that it was pleasant for people to look upon the worshippers while they were praying, and to be able to approach the temple without fear of contamination.

Chapter IX.

And being asked again whether courage could be taught, or whether it was a gift of nature, "I think," said he, "that as one body is formed by nature more capable of enduring labor than another body, so also that one soul by nature meets danger with more fortitude than does another soul; for I perceive that men who are brought up under the very same laws and institutions differ very much from one another in during. I hold, however, that by education and practice all natures are capable of being improved in bravery; for it is evident that the Scythians and Thracians would not dare to take bucklers and spears to fight against the Spartans, and it is plain, too, that the Spartans would not like to engage either the Thracians with small shields and javelins or the Scythians with bows. And I see that men differ from each other equally in their nature with regard to all other matters besides these, and that they improve considerably by practice. Hence it is manifest that those who are the most gifted, and those who by nature are the dullest, should both study and practice those acquirements in which they desire to excel."

He drew no distinction between wisdom and temperance, for he considered a man who knew what was honorable and good, and how to practice it, and who, recognizing what was base, had the power to withstand it, to be both wise and temperate. Being asked, again, whether he esteemed those who, knowing what was their duty, acted in opposition to that knowledge, as wise and continent, he said — "I regard such people merely as foolish and intemperate characters, for I suppose that everyone, in any case in which it is possible for him to do so, chooses that which he thinks will be best for him, and acts accordingly. And my opinion is, that those who do not act rightly are neither wise nor temperate."

He asserted, too, that justice and every kind of virtue was wisdom, for that all just and virtuous deeds were honorable

and good, and that those who could recognize this fact would never prefer any other actions to these; while they who could not perceive this would never perform such actions, but would commit some error even if they undertook them. Hence that the wise acted honorably and well, but that the unwise were not able so to act, or else committed some mistake if they made the attempt. And that since all just deeds, and whatsoever things are honorable and good, are carried out in accordance with virtue, it was manifest that both justice and every other kind of virtue was wisdom.

He asserted that the opposite of wisdom was insanity, but he did not reckon ignorance as insanity, although for a man not to know himself, and to fancy and believe that he knows things of which he is ignorant, he considered as a very near approach to insanity. People in general, he remarked, do not say that those are insane who make mistakes upon points of which the majority of mankind are ignorant, but they call those insane who go wrong in regard to matters with which almost everyone is familiar. Thus, if a man should fancy himself so tall as to stoop when going through the gates of the city wall, or so strong as to attempt to lift up houses, or to address himself to any task which everyone knew to be utterly impracticable, people would say that he was insane; but that those who make trifling mistakes are not usually considered insane, but as people generally designate strong desire "love," so they call great aberration of intellect "insanity."

And when speculating upon the nature of envy, he defined it as being a certain kind of sorrow entertained not on account of the misfortunes of friends, nor resulting from the prosperity of enemies, but he asserted that the envious were never vexed but at the good success of their friends. Hence, when certain persons professed astonishment at any one's feeling grieved at the prosperity of his friends, he reminded them that many men are so disposed towards others that although they would

never neglect them in adversity, but would render them any assistance in their misfortunes, yet they are annoyed at their prosperity. A sensible man, he affirmed, would never entertain these feelings, but the foolish were constantly subject to them.

And when considering what want of occupation was, he said that he found that all men, indeed, were occupied in some way or another, but yet that the majority were unoccupied; for that dice-players and buffoons were employed, but yet, he declared that all such individuals were unoccupied, for that they had it in their power to betake themselves to other avocations better than those. He did not hold that a man was unoccupied by giving up a good employment for a worse, but that anyone who did so, as he had once been well employed, was acting viciously in this respect.

Kings and commanders, he maintained, were not those merely who wielded scepters, or were elected by some haphazard, or chosen by lot, or who had obtained their position by violence or fraud, but those who understood the art of government. For when someone admitted that it devolved upon a governor to issue orders, and upon the governed to obey them, he showed how that on board ship it was the experienced man who took the command, while the steersman and all the crew and passengers obeyed him. In agriculture, too, he argued, that those who were landholders; in sickness, those who were ill; in bodily exercises, those who trained their bodies, and in all other pursuits, those who were engaged in any business requiring care, took the personal superintendence of it if they thought they understood it; but if not, that they were not only willing to listen to any experienced person who might be at hand, but would even send for those who were at a distance, in order that, by acting under their directions, they might do that which was proper. He showed, too, that in woolen-work women dictated to men; for that the former understood how it should be done, while

the latter did not. And if anyone objected to this argument, that a tyrant should not be guided by judicious advisers — "And why," Socrates would reply, "should he not be guided by them, seeing that a penalty attaches to anyone who does not listen to a good adviser? For in whatever matter a person refuses to act upon the advice of a judicious monitor, he will assuredly commit some error; and if he does commit an error, he will pay the penalty?"

And if anyone happened to remark that a tyrant might even put a wise counsellor to death, he said — "And do you think that he who destroys his best allies can escape the penalty of so doing, or that he only runs a chance of incurring misfortunes? And do you imagine that he will by such a course of action be more likely to live in safety, or to bring himself to speedy ruin?"

And when another asked him what he thought the worthiest object of man's pursuit, he replied — "Well doing."

And when he was asked, again, whether he considered good fortune as an object that should be pursued, he answered — "I regard good fortune and action as opposites in every respect; for when a person who requires anything lights upon it by chance, that I hold to be good fortune; but for a person to perform any virtuous action by dint of learning and practice, that I consider to be well-doing. And those who make this the object of their pursuit appear to me to act as they ought to do."

And he maintained that the best men and the dearest to the gods were those who, in agriculture, performed their agricultural tasks well; in medicine, their medical, and in politics, their political duties; but that a man who did nothing well, was neither useful for any purpose, nor dear to the gods.

Chapter X.

But, moreover, whenever he chanced to converse with any who practiced the arts, and employed them as a means of gaining a livelihood, even to such he was of service. Thus, upon one occasion, when visiting Parrhasius, the painter, he said to him, in the course of conversation, "Tell me, Parrhasius, is not painting the art of portraying visible objects? At any rate, you painters imitate concavity and convexity, light and shade, hardness and softness, the rough or the smooth, and old or new substances by representing them through the medium of colors."

"You speak truly," replied Parrhasius.

"When, then, you would represent beautiful forms, since it is not easy to find one human being perfect in every respect, do you, by selecting out of many models that which is best in each, so produce figures which as a whole are faultless?"

"We do so," answered the painter.

"And do you also portray the disposition of the mind according as it may be most persuasively, most agreeably, most amicably, most regretfully, or most lovingly inclined? Or is this inimitable?"

"How can that be imitated, Socrates, which has neither proportion, nor color, nor any of those qualities which you just now indicated, and which is totally invisible?"

"But cannot a man wear an expression either of friendship or of hatred when looking at another?"

"I think he can," answered Parrhasius.

"Cannot that expression, then, be imitated by the expression imparted to the eyes?"

"Certainly," replied the other.

“And do those who take a lively interest in the good or evil fortune of their friends, and those who do not, appear to you to wear the same kind of expression in either case?”

“No, by Jupiter, they do not; for they look cheerful at their successes, and melancholy at their failures.”

“Is it not, then,” asked Socrates, “possible to imitate these looks also?”

“Undoubtedly it is,” answered Parrhasius.

“Surely, then,” said Socrates, “nobility and liberality of disposition, meanness and illiberality, sobriety and good sense, insolence and rusticity, show themselves in the countenances and gestures of men either in their standing or their moving postures.”

“You speak truly,” said Parrhasius.

“Cannot these expressions, then, be imitated?” asked Socrates.

“Certainly,” replied the other.

“Whether do you think, then,” continued Socrates, “that men look with most pleasure on representations of good and honorable and amiable characters, or on those of the base and the depraved and the hateful?”

“There is, by Jupiter,” exclaimed Parrhasius, “a vast difference between them.”

And once while visiting Cleito, the statuary, and conversing with him, he said, “I see and know, Cleito, that you make statues of all kinds, as of runners, and wrestlers, and boxers, and pancratiasts; but how do you impart to your figures that lifelike appearance which so engages men’s minds as they gaze upon them?”

And when Cleito hesitated, and did not give an immediate answer, “Do you,” asked Socrates, “make your statues more lifelike by assimilating your work to living models?”

“Certainly,” replied Cleito.

“Do you not thus make those parts of the body which are apparently drawn up or down, compressed or separated, stretched out or relaxed, more like truth, and reality in their gestures?”

“Undoubtedly,” answered Cleito. “And does not the accurate representation of the bodily feelings of those who are engaged in any action afford a certain degree of pleasure to the spectators?”

“It is probable, at any rate, that it would do so.”

“Must you not, then, copy the menacing looks of the combatants, and must not the joyful expression of the victors be faithfully represented?”

“Certainly,” replied Cleito.

“The sculptor, therefore, should express the workings of the mind by the form.”

Going once to Pistias, the corslet-maker, and Pistias having shown him some well-made corslets, he said, “By Juno, what an excellent invention is this, Pistias, by which you can cover a man’s breast, which is the part that needs protection, while it leaves him at liberty to use his hands. But tell me, Pistias,” he continued, “why, since your corslets are neither stronger nor more costly than those of other makers, do you command a higher price for them than they do?”

“Because, Socrates,” replied Pistias, “I make them better proportioned than others,”

“And is this proportion perceptible in the measure or weight of each corslet, so as to make it evident that it is worth more; for surely you do not make them all alike in size and weight, if they are to fit different persons?”

“But, by Jupiter,” exclaimed Pistias, “I do so make them; for without this, a corslet would be of no use.”

“But are not the bodies of some men well, and of others ill proportioned?” asked Socrates.

“Undoubtedly,” replied Pistias.

“How, then,” continued Socrates, “can you make a well-proportioned corslet suit an ill-proportioned body?”

“By making it fit; for one which fits is well-proportioned.”

“You appear to me,” rejoined Socrates, “to talk of good proportion not as an abstract quality, but simply in relation to the individual, just as you might say of a shield or a cloak that it is well-proportioned to him that wears it; and the same rule seems, according to what you say, to apply to other things also. But perhaps there may be some decided advantage gained by making corslets to fit.”

“Tell me, Socrates,” said Pistias, “if you know any.”

“Those corslets which fit are less oppressive by their weight than those that do not fit, although one is, in reality, as heavy as the other; while those that do not fit, either from their dragging at the shoulders, or pressing too much upon some other part of the body, are galling and inconvenient. But those which fit, by distributing their weight partly over the collar-bone and scapula, partly over the shoulders, partly over the breast, partly over the back, and partly over the stomach, are little felt as a burden to be borne, but seem rather like a natural appendage.”

“You have mentioned the very reason why I consider my corslets to be worth more than others,” said Pistias. “Nevertheless, some people prefer purchasing ornamental and gilded corslets.”

“Yet,” said Socrates, “if, for the sake of such decorations, they forego the question of their fit, they seem to be purchasing an ornamental and gilded nuisance. But,” he continued, “since the body does not always remain in the same posture, but is sometimes stooping, and at other times

upright, how can corslets that are made to fit it exactly, be well adapted for wear?"

"They are not so, by any means," replied Pistias.

"You would imply," said Socrates, "that those corslets which are best adapted for wear are not the most accurately fitting ones, but those that do not gall the wearer."

"The observations you yourself make upon the matter, Socrates, are correct, and you comprehend the subject most clearly."

Chapter XI.

There being at one time in the city a beautiful woman, named Theodota, who was willing to be on intimate terms with anyone who would pay her court, and someone who was in Socrates' company talking of her, and saying that her beauty beggared description, and that all the painters, to whom she displayed her various charms, were anxious that she should sit to them, — "We must go," said Socrates, "to see her, for it is impossible to comprehend by hearsay that which surpasses description."

"You had better, then, lose no time in following me," said he who had broached the subject.

Repairing, therefore, to Theodota's house, and finding her standing to a painter, they inspected her. And when the painter had finished, Socrates said — "Ought we, gentlemen, to express our obligations to Theodota for having exhibited her charms to us, or she to us for our having inspected them? For, if the exhibition is rather to her advantage, does she not owe her acknowledgments to us? but if the balance of pleasure derived from the sight is on our side, ought we not to feel grateful to her?" And when someone remarked that his observations were just, he continued thus: "As matters now stand, then, she obtains present admiration from us, and will gain future profit, when we have mentioned her to others. Whereas we, who at this moment desire to enjoy the charms we have beheld, shall go away disquieted, and when we have gone away shall be tormented by longing regrets: and thus we shall be her slaves, and she will be our mistress."

And Theodota exclaimed — "By Jupiter, if this is really so, I indeed ought to be obliged to you for-coming to see me."

And soon after this, finding her most expensively appareled, with her mother attired and adorned in a manner above the common, and with a large retinue of female

servants, who were both good-looking, and even, although in a menial capacity, not carelessly dressed, and her house luxuriously appointed in every other respect, Socrates said — "Tell me, Theodota, do you possess any landed property?"

"Not I," said she. "But perhaps you have a house that brings you in an income?"

"Neither have I a house," answered she. "Do you not, then, employ workmen?"

"No, I do not," said she. "How, then," asked Socrates, "do you manage to live?"

"If any one of my admirers," replied she, "is generous to me, I live upon him."

"By Juno, Theodota," exclaimed Socrates, "what a fine property is such a man! and it is much better to own a flock of friends, than of sheep, or oxen, or goats. But," he continued, "do you trust to chance for a friend to wing his way to you like a fly, or do you yourself employ some contrivance to attract him?"

"And why should I seek for any contrivance in order to effect this?" asked Theodota.

"Much more appropriately, by Juno," replied he, "than the spiders do; for you know how they procure their sustenance. They weave fine webs, and feed upon whatever falls into them."

"And do you advise me," she asked, "to weave a web to catch something?"

"You do not surely imagine that you will secure friends, that prey which of all others is most worth capturing, without craft? Do you not see what numerous acts hare-hunters have recourse to, although the value of the animal is so trifling? For as hares feed in the night, men provide night-hounds to track them with, and as they slink under cover of a day, they therefore procure other hounds, which, by their scent, trace

out the way they took from their feeding grounds to their forms; and because they are so swift of foot as to get clean out of sight by running, men also employ fleet dogs, so that they may be captured by coursing. And forasmuch as even then some of them escape the dogs, they place nets across the paths by which they flee, so that they may fall into them, and thus become entangled."

"And by what device," asked Theodota, "can I hunt down friends?"

"By employing some individual instead of a dog, by Jupiter, to trace out and discover for you men who are admirers of beauty, and have money, and who, when he has discovered them, will contrive to entangle them in your nets."

"And what sort of nets have I?" asked she. "One you have, at any rate," answered he, a which is eminently well adapted to enfold victims — viz., your person; and within it you possess an instinct which tells you how you may give pleasure by a glance, and by what sort of conversation you can captivate a man, and how you ought to receive affably one that pays you attention, and to reject him who treats you with disdain; how to nurse tenderly a friend who is in ill health, and to sympathize greatly with him in any success that he has achieved, and to show gratitude in your soul to one who cares sincerely for you. The art of loving tenderly I am indeed well assured that you understand, and not only that, but of loving with sincere goodwill; and your friends like you because you conciliate them not by words alone, but by deeds."

"But, by Jupiter," exclaimed Theodota, "I do not plot to bring about any of these results."

"And yet," continued Socrates, "it is of great importance to humor a man's nature and treat him judiciously, for you can neither make nor keep a friend by force, albeit he is an animal

that is easily captured and secured by kind treatment and a sense of gratification."

"You speak truly," said she.

"You must, then," he continued, "in the first place, make upon those who have a regard for you such demands only as will give them the least possible trouble; and, in the next, you must requite them by gratifying them in the same manner, for so they would be most likely to befriend you, and to love you the longest, and do you the most kindnesses. And you will please them most by granting them your favors upon their own solicitation only, for you know that even the most savory viands appear distasteful if one places them before a person when he does not care for them, and that they even disgust those who have eaten to satiety. But if one offers them after having excited a craving for them, they are exceedingly relishable, even although they are of a very indifferent kind."

"But how," asked she, "can I excite such a craving in any one of those who come to me?"

"First, by Jupiter," replied he, "by not obtruding yourself upon those who are already satiated, or even reminding them of yourself, until, having recovered from their satiety, they again feel a desire for your company. In the next place, when they do show such a desire, remind them of yourself by modest familiarity, and by showing your willingness to gratify them, while, at the same time, you hold off until their ardor becomes very demonstrative. For the same gifts become much more enhanced in value when people long for them, than if they are bestowed at a time when no such longing is felt."

And Theodota said — "Why, then, Socrates, do you not become my fellow-hunter in the pursuit of lovers?"

"So I will, by Jupiter," exclaimed he, "if you can persuade me."

"How," returned she, "can I persuade you?"

“You will discover the way to do this, and manage it for yourself, if you find that you have any need of me.”

“Come to me, then,” said she, “very often.” And Socrates, making a joke of his own love of retirement, answered — “But, Theodota, it is not by any means easy for me to find time to do so, inasmuch as my own numerous engagements, both private and public, leave me no leisure. Moreover, I have mistresses who will not suffer me to be absent from them day or night, and who are learning from me the use of love potions and incantations.”

“Is this, too, one of the sciences that you profess, Socrates?” asked she.

“For what other reason, then,” he asked, “do you suppose that Apollodorus here and Antisthenes never leave me, and why else that Cebes and Simmias come to me from Thebes? Be well assured that all this influence was not obtained without many charms and incantations and magical wheels.”

“Send me, then, your wheel,” said she, “that I may set it spinning, to draw you to me before anyone else.”

“But, by Jupiter,” answered he, “I do not wish to be drawn to you, but that you should come to me.”

“Well, then, I will come,” said she, “and be sure you admit me.”

“I certainly will do so,” answered Socrates, “unless I should have with me any mistress whom I prefer to you.”

Chapter XII.

Observing that one of his followers, called Epigenes, although he was young, was nevertheless in a bad state of body, he said — "How unlike to that of a professional athlete you keep your body, Epigenes!"

And he replied — "I am not a professional athlete, Socrates."

"You are no less so," urged Socrates, "than those who are about to contend at the Olympic games. Or do you regard that struggle for life with the enemy which the Athenians will require of you when the occasion arises as an insignificant one? And yet, in the dangers of war, there are not a few who lose their lives from want of bodily strength, or preserve them by dishonorable means. Many, again, from the same cause, are taken alive, and are doomed as prisoners of war, if they meet with such a fate, to the bitterest slavery for the rest of their lives, or undergoing the most dreadful hardships, and sometimes paying for their ransom more than they possess, they drag out the remainder of their days in the want of common necessaries and the endurance of misery of all kinds. Many, too, acquire an infamous name, being regarded as cowards on account of the weakness of their frames. Do you despise such penalties as attach to a bad condition of the body, or do you think that you can bear them without finding them a grievance? It is certainly my opinion that what he has to endure who trains his body so as to have it in sound condition, is far easier and pleasanter to be borne than those inflictions to which I have referred. Or do you consider an unsound condition of body to be generally more healthful and profitable than a good condition? Or do you contemn the advantages which arise from good bodily condition? Yet the consequences of a good state of body are different in every respect from those of a bad state; for those whose bodies are in a good state are healthy and strong, and many, through

this being the case, preserve their lives honorably amid the struggles of war, and also escape all perils. Many, too, succor their friends and benefit their country, and on this account are held worthy of gratitude, acquire great glory, and attain the highest distinction. Hence, they both pass their own lives more pleasantly and honorably, and also leave behind them a better provision for their children. Nor, because the state does not insist upon public drilling for war, should we on that account neglect to train ourselves privately, but should do so no less carefully than if we acted under compulsion. For be well assured that neither in any other contest, nor in any undertaking whatever, will you come worse off for having your body better trained. The body bears a part in every action of men's lives; and in every demand that may be made upon it, it is of great advantage that it should be in the best possible condition; since even in that in which you would suppose there was the least need for bodily exertion, viz., in the power of thinking, who does not know that many fail greatly in this respect on account of their bodies not being in a healthy state; and that forgetfulness, despondency, irritability, and madness, arising from an ill condition of the body, in very many cases attack the intellect so violently as to overthrow the senses? But those who are in good bodily health are generally secure against such mischiefs, and free from any danger of suffering them, in so far, at all events, as they arise from any ill condition of their bodies. But it is more probable that a good condition of body will be serviceable in producing results diametrically opposite to those produced by a bad condition; and in order tb enjoy sensations the reverse of those which we have indicated, what is there which any man in his right mind would not undergo? Moreover, it is disgraceful for a man to grow prematurely old through self-neglect, before proving to himself what he might become if he were in the best and strongest condition of body, and this he

cannot prove if he neglects himself; since such results are not usually arrived at without effort."

Chapter XIII.

On one occasion, when a certain person was indignant because, when he saluted someone else, the latter did not return the compliment, Socrates exclaimed, “How absurd is it that although, if you had met a man in a bad state of bodily health, you would not have been angry — yet you are annoyed because you have encountered one who is somewhat clownishly disposed in mind!”

And when someone else remarked that he did not enjoy what he ate, “Acumenus,” said Socrates, “prescribes an excellent remedy for that disease.” And being asked the nature of it, “To abstain from eating,” rejoined Socrates; “for he says that by abstinence you will live more pleasantly, frugally, and healthfully.”

Again, when another person complained that the drinking-water at his house was warm, “When you want a warm bath, then,” said Socrates, “it will be ready for you.”

“But it is too cold to bathe in,” answered the other. “Do your servants, then,” asked Socrates, “object to drinking and bathing in it?”

“No, by Jupiter,” replied he; “and I have often wondered to see how gladly they use it for both of these purposes.”

“Pray, which is the warmer,” asked Socrates, “your drinking-water, or that at the temple of Æsculapius?”

“That at the temple of Æsculapius,” answered he. “And which is the colder for bathing in, yours or that at the temple of Amphiaraus?”

“That at the temple of Amphiaraus,” he said.

“Consider, then,” rejoined Socrates, “how near you are to being more difficult to please than servants and sick people.”

And when someone was chastising an attendant severely, Socrates asked him why he was so angry with his servant.

“Because,” replied the other, a he is very gluttonous, very stupid, very covetous, and very lazy.”

“And have you ever reflected, then, which deserves the most stripes, you or your servant?” asked Socrates.

Another man feeling nervous at having to travel to Olympia, Socrates asked him, “Why do you dread the journey? Do you not walk about at home almost the whole day? And if you go thither, you will walk and dine, walk, and sup, and then go to rest. Do you not know that if you were to stretch out into one line the walks which you take in five or six days, you would soon get from Athens to Olympia? And it is better for you to start a day too soon than to procrastinate; for it is irksome to be obliged to lengthen your stages beyond a moderate distance; but to take shorter ones, by spending one more day on the journey, is most convenient. Therefore, it is better to start early, than to be hurried on the road?”

Another, saying that he was quite prostrated by the fatigue of a long journey, Socrates asked him whether he had carried any burthen. “Not I, by Jupiter,” answered he, “except only my cloak.”

“And did you travel alone,” continued Socrates, “or had you an attendant with you as well?”

“I had an attendant,” replied he.

“Was he empty-handed,” asked Socrates, “or did he carry something?”

“He carried our bed-clothes, by Jupiter, and the rest of our utensils.”

“And how did he get over the journey?” inquired Socrates.

“Much better than I did, I think,” replied the other.

“But suppose you had been compelled to carry his load, how do you think you would have fared then?”

“Wretchedly, by Jupiter,” exclaimed he; “or rather, I should never have been able to have carried it at all.”

“How, then, does it seem becoming to you that a man who is trained to exercise, should be less able to bear fatigue than a slave?”

Chapter XIV.

And on one occasion, when some people had met to sup together, some of whom had brought very little meat with them, while others had furnished a large supply, Socrates ordered the slave either to place on the table the small quantity for everyone to partake of in common, or else to apportion to each one his share. Then they who had contributed a great deal were ashamed to partake of that which was put on table for general consumption, without having what they had furnished placed upon the table also. This, therefore, was likewise added to the general stock; and so, when they were helped to no more than those who had contributed only a little, they discontinued purchasing provisions at a great cost.

And observing that a certain person at a supper took no bread, but ate his meat entirely without it, a discussion having arisen about names with regard to the reason why any particular epithet should be bestowed, "Can we, gentlemen," asked Socrates, "tell why a man is called a 'meat-eater?' For all people eat meat with their bread when they can get it; but I do not imagine that they are ever designated as 'meat-eaters' on that account."

"I should not suppose they were," said one of the company.

"But," resumed Socrates, "supposing a man to eat his meat without bread, not because he was in training, but simply because he preferred doing so, would he seem to be a 'meat-eater' or not?"

"Scarcely any man could be more so," remarked the other.

And another of the guests asked, "And what of him who eats a great deal of meat with a very little bread?"

"To me," replied Socrates, "it appears that he, too, deserves the name of a 'meat-eater,' and at a time when others would

pray to the gods for an abundance of corn, he very likely would pray for a plentiful supply of meat."

And when Socrates had thus spoken, the young man, thinking that his discourse was directed against him, did not indeed leave off eating meat, but took some bread with it. Then Socrates, seeing that he did so, said, "You that are sitting near this youth, notice whether he takes bread with his meat or meat with his bread"

At another time, noticing that one of the company partook of a great variety of dishes with one small morsel of bread, he said, "Can any cookery be more extravagant, or more apt to spoil the food, than that which he indulges in who partakes of several dishes at the same meal, and impregnates his mouth with all sorts of flavors at the same time? As he mixes up more ingredients than the cooks do, he makes what he eats more expensive, and such things as they abstain from mixing, on the ground that they are incongruous, he, by mingling together, commits a blunder (if at least they are right), and renders their skill of no avail. And how can it be otherwise than absurd for a man to provide the best and most experienced cooks, and then, although he claims for himself no knowledge of their art, to spoil everything that has been prepared by them? Besides this, there is another evil which arises from a man's partaking of many dishes at the same time, viz., that if there is not a great variety upon the table, he thinks that he is stinted, and misses that to which he has been accustomed. But he who uses himself to one dish, with one piece of bread, will be perfectly satisfied with that one when there are not a variety placed before him."

He also remarked, that to "fare well" applied, in the Athenian language, to "eating," and that the "well" was added to indicate such food as neither disagreed with the mind or the body. Hence, he said that those "fared well" who lived temperately.

Book IV.

Chapter I.

Socrates was also so serviceable in every transaction and for every kind of business, that even to anyone who has but a limited understanding, it must be evident that nothing could be more conducive to a man's interest than to have been intimate with him, and to have spent one's time with him upon every opportunity. For even the recollection of him, now that he has passed away from us, is no small advantage to those who were accustomed to associate with him and to listen to him; for he benefited his intimates no less when he was jesting than when he was in earnest. For he would, perhaps, often say that he loved someone, yet it was evident that he did not do so on account of the beauty of their persons, but of their minds, being enamored of those who were by nature well disposed toward virtue. And he judged of the goodness of people's abilities from their quickness in mastering any subject to which they might apply themselves, and recollecting what they had learned, and being anxious to acquire all such branches of knowledge as are available for the well ordering of a household or a state, or to the general good management of men and of human affairs; for he said that such, when they had been duly educated, would not only be happy themselves and good managers of their own households, but that they would make other men and other states happy. He did not, however, approach everyone in the same way; but to those who rated their natural abilities so highly as to despise instruction, he taught that those abilities which were apparently the best the most needed instruction; pointing out to them that of horses, those of the purest breed, being the most spirited and restive, if they are broken in when young, become the most useful and valuable, but if they are not broken in, remain the most unmanageable and worthless; and of the best-bred dogs, which are both hard-working and

fond of attacking wild animals, that those which are highly trained prove the keenest and most serviceable in the chase, whereas, if they are untrained, they are useless, wild, and refractory. In like manner with regard to men. who possessed the best natural abilities and the greatest strength of mind, and who were the most energetic in everything that they undertook, that those who were best educated and instructed in their duties became the most valuable and useful, for they accomplished the most numerous and important good deeds; whereas, if they were uneducated and remained without instruction, they became the vilest and most mischievous characters; for, from not understanding how to discern their duties, they frequently embarked in evil enterprises, and being arrogant and obstinate, were difficult to be restrained or diverted from their purpose. Hence, they worked the most numerous and the most irreparable mischiefs.

And those who prided themselves upon their riches, and fancied that they had no need of instruction, under the impression that their wealth was sufficient for them to carry out all their designs and procure them universal homage, he brought to their senses by saying, that he would be a fool indeed who should suppose that he could distinguish between what was good and what was evil without instruction; and that anyone was an idiot who, though he could not make such a distinction, yet imagined that by means of his wealth he could procure every object of his wishes, and accomplish all that was most advantageous for him. He said, too, that a man must be void of sense who, not being able to accomplish that which was advantageous to him, should suppose that he could be prosperous, and that every condition of his life was either well or sufficiently provided for; and that he was equally void of sense who, being without any understanding, yet thought that, on account of his wealth, he would pass as being

good for something; or that, being evidently good for nothing, he would nevertheless enjoy a good reputation.

Chapter II.

I will now relate how he bore himself towards those who thought that they had attained to the very highest pitch of instruction, and prided themselves upon their acquirements. Hearing, for instance, that Euthydemus, surnamed the "handsome,' had made a large collection of the writings of the most renowned poets and sophists, and fancied that by their means he was already superior to his contemporaries in wisdom, and entertained great hopes of surpassing them all in his ability both as a speaker and a man of action; first having ascertained that he had not yet engaged in any public business on account of his youth, but that if he wished to transact any, he stationed himself at a certain saddler's shop of those that were near the market-place, Socrates also went thither himself, taking with him certain companions. And upon some one's inquiring whether it was from association with some one of the wise men, or from his own natural capacity, that Themistocles so far excelled his fellow-citizens that the whole state looked to him whenever it stood in need of a distinguished man, Socrates, wishing to draw out Euthydemus, said that it was absurd, forsooth, to imagine that men could not become distinguished in arts, that were but of small account without competent instructors, but that the ability to preside over the state, which was a task of the greatest difficulty of any, accrued to men spontaneously.

And when Euthydemus was present on another occasion, seeing him about to leave the company, as if he wished to be on his guard against seeming to admire Socrates on account of his wisdom, the latter remarked: — "When, my friends, our Euthydemus here arrives at the proper age, and any state question is proposed for discussion, it is very evident, from the nature of his studies, that he will not hold himself aloof from its councils, and I fancy that he has already prepared a splendid proem for his public orations, taking precautions

against being supposed to have learned anything from anybody. It is clear, then, that when he commences his harangue, his exordium will be something in this style: — 'O men of Athens! never at any time have I learnt anything from anybody, nor, if I have been informed that there were certain individuals who were clever both in speech and action, have I ever sought their company, nor have I been careful that any of the knowing ones should become my teacher. Nay, I have even pursued the opposite course, for I constantly avoided not only learning anything from anybody, but even the appearance of so doing. Nevertheless, such opinions as suggest themselves to me spontaneously, I will submit to you for your consideration.' So, on the part of those who were seeking to obtain a government medical appointment, it might answer for them to begin a speech thus: — "I, O men of Athens! have never at any time learned the medical art from any one, nor have I been desirous to obtain any medical man as my teacher, for I have constantly avoided not only learning anything from the medical men, but even the appearance of having studied this science. Nevertheless, confer upon me this appointment, for I will endeavor to educate myself by experimentalizing upon you.'" Then all the company laughed at this specimen of an exordium.

And since it was now evident that Euthydemus was paying attention to Socrates' remarks, but yet was himself guarding against making any observations, under the impression that by his silence he would become invested with a reputation for modesty, Socrates, wishing to check any such notion, said — "Surely it is strange to conceive for what reason those who wish to play the lyre or the flute, or to ride, or to become proficients in any similar accomplishments, should endeavor to practice as unremittingly as possible those arts in which they desire to excel, and this not only by themselves, but by the aid of those who are held to be masters in them, doing and

undergoing everything for the sake of never acting without their sanction, as being convinced that they cannot under any other conditions attain celebrity; while of those who desire to become eminent orators or politicians, there are some who fancy that they will become spontaneously, and on the spur of the moment, capable of accomplishing their object. And yet, by how much these latter are more difficult to master than the former, appears plainly from the fact that although a far greater number of people are engaged in them, a much smaller proportion succeed. It is evident, therefore, that those who aim at the one, require more extensive and decided training than those who seek the other."

So then, at first, Socrates would only make such remarks as these, while Euthydemus heard him as if by chance. But when he noticed that the latter stayed more willingly while he was discoursing, and that he listened more attentively, he at last went by himself to the saddler's shop, and as Euthydemus approached and sat down beside him, he said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you really, as I hear you have, made a vast collection of the writings of those men who are reported to have been wise?"

"Yes, by Jupiter, I have," replied the other; "and I am still collecting, until I shall have become possessed of as many as I can possibly procure."

"Then, by Juno," rejoined Socrates, "I admire you, in that you have not preferred the acquisition of the treasures of gold and silver to that of wisdom; for you manifestly hold that silver and gold are unable to make men better, but that the sentiments of the wise enrich their possessors with virtue." And Euthydemus was pleased at hearing these remarks, as thinking that he appeared to Socrates to be seeking after wisdom according to right principles. But Socrates, perceiving that he was gratified with his commendation, asked — "And in what particular branch is it that you wish to excel, that you

collect these writings?" And when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should give, Socrates again asked — "Is it as a physician, for there is a vast collection of the writings of physicians?"

"Not I, by Jupiter," replied Euthydemus.

"Do you wish, then, to become an architect, for a man of sense is needed for that profession also?"

"Not I, indeed," answered the other.

"Would you desire to be a good geometrician, then, like Theodorus?"

"Nor a geometrician either," rejoined Euthydemus. "Would you be an astronomer, then?" asked Socrates.

And when the latter said "No,"

"A rhapsodist, then?" suggested Socrates; "for it is reported that you possess the whole of Homer's poems."

"Not I, indeed," exclaimed Euthydemus; "for I know that the rhapsodists, although they are most accurately acquainted with all the Homeric poems, yet in other things are, as men, excessively foolish."

Then Socrates said, "Perhaps, then, Euthydemus, you aim at acquiring that sort of faculty by which men become good politicians and economists, capable of governing, and useful equally to others as well as to themselves?"

"I ardently desire, Socrates," answered the other, "to become possessed of that faculty."

"Then, by Jupiter," rejoined Socrates, "you aim at the noblest faculty, and at the most exalted science; for this is the very art peculiar to kings, and is designated the 'royal art.' But," he continued, "have you ever considered whether it was possible for an unjust man to excel in it?"

"Certainly I have," replied Euthydemus; "and a man cannot be even a good citizen without a sense of justice."

“Well, then,” said Socrates, “have you acquired this?”

“I think, Socrates,” answered Euthydemus, “that I should appear no less a just man than any other.”

“Are there, then, works of just men as there are of artisans?”

“Decidedly there are,” replied the other.

“As, then, artisans are able to point to their works, so the just would be able to detail theirs.”

“Why should I not be able,” asked Euthydemus, “to detail the works of justice? and, by Jupiter, as I think, those of injustice too? for we may see and hear of no small number of such things every day.”

“Shall we, then,” suggested Socrates, “write on one side a D, and on the other an A, and under the D place whatever seems to us to be a work of justice, and under the A whatever appears to be one of injustice?”

“If you think that we require these letters, make them.”

Then Socrates, having written the letters as he had proposed, said, “Is there such a thing existing among mankind as falsehood?”

“Of course there is,” answered Euthydemus.

“Under which head, then,” asked Socrates, “shall we range this?”

“Evidently,” said Euthydemus, “under that of injustice.”

“And again,” asked Socrates, “is there such a thing as deceit?”

“Unquestionably,” replied the other.

“And under which head shall we place this?”

“No doubt, also under that of injustice,” answered Euthydemus.

“And what about villainy?”

“That is injustice too.”

“And slavery?”

“Again under injustice.”

“Shall we then, Euthydemus, place none of these under the head of justice?”

“It would be a wonderful thing,” replied Euthydemus, “if we did that.”

“How so?” asked Socrates. “Supposing, for instance, that any general had captured an aggressive and hostile state, and reduced its inhabitants to slavery, should we say that he had committed an act of injustice?”

“Certainly not,” replied Euthydemus.

“Nay, should we not rather say that he had acted justly?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“And what if, while he was at war with his enemies, he should deceive them?”

“That, too,” said Euthydemus, “would be just.”

“And if he should abstract and carry off their property, would he not be acting justly?”

“Assuredly he would,” said Euthydemus; “but I supposed at first that you were only putting your questions in reference to our conduct towards our friends.”

“Must we not, then,” continued Socrates, “place also under the head of justice all those things which we have placed under that of injustice?”

“So it seems,” replied the other.

“Are you willing, then, that, after having so placed them, we should make a new distinction, and say that it is just to act thus towards our enemies, but unjust with regard to our friends, and that towards the latter we should conduct ourselves as guilelessly as possible?”

“I consent to such a distinction,” said Euthydemus.

“Well, then,” asked Socrates, “supposing any general, seeing his troops dispirited, should falsely tell them that auxiliaries were at hand, and by this falsehood should put an end to their despondency, under which head are we to place such an act of deceit?”

“In my opinion,” said Euthydemus, “under that of justice.”

“And if any parent whose son required medical treatment, but would not take medicine, should deceive him by giving him his medicine as food, and by this piece of deception should restore him to healthy on which side again are we to place such an act of deceit as this?”

“As it appears to me,” said Euthydemus, “upon the same side.”

“Well, then, supposing a man for fear lest his friend, who was in a state of despondency, should commit suicide, were to steal or convey away his sword, or any other weapon of a similar kind, on which side must this be placed?”

“And this too, by Jupiter,” exclaimed Euthydemus, “must go under the head of justice.”

“You admit, then, that not even towards our friends does it behoove us invariably to act without guile?”

“No, by Jupiter, it does not,” said Euthydemus; “and I retract what I have advanced, if you will allow me to do so.”

“It is much better for me to allow this,” said Socrates, “than that you should be permitted to place actions under their wrong heads. But again, of those who deceive their friends to their injury (so that we may not even omit this point of view from our examination), which of the two men is the more unjust, he who does so wittingly, or he who does it inadvertently?”

“Truly, Socrates, I myself have no longer any faith in my own answers, for everything appears to me now to be totally different to what I lately thought it was. Nevertheless, I should say that he who deceives one wittingly is a more unjust man than he who does so inadvertently.”

“Does it appear to you, then, that there is a method of learning and understanding what is just, as there is of acquiring a knowledge of reading and writing?”

“It does so,” replied Euthydemus.

“And whether of the two should you consider the better grammarian — him who should purposely write or read incorrectly, or him who should do so involuntarily?”

“Certainly him who should do so purposely; for whenever he pleased he could do both correctly.”

“He, therefore, that of set purpose writes or reads incorrectly may be a good grammarian, while he that does so involuntarily is not a grammarian at all?”

“How can it be otherwise?”

“And whether does he who lies and deceives wittingly know what is just, or he who does so inadvertently?”

“Manifestly he who does so wittingly.”

“You assert, then, that a man who understands reading and writing is a better grammarian than one who does not understand them?”

“I do.”

“And that he is a more just man who understands justice, than he who does not?”

“So it appears. But I really seem to myself to be making these admissions I don’t know how.”

“And what, pray, of a man who, although he wished to tell the truth, never gave the same account of the same thing; but, when speaking of the same road, should say at one time that

it led to the east, and at another time towards the west; or when stating the result of a sum, should put it sometimes at a higher and sometimes at a lower total; what would you think of such an one?"

"That he was evidently a man, by Jupiter, who knew nothing of those things that he thought he knew."

"Do you know any persons who are termed 'slave-like?'"

"I do."

"Are they so called on account of their wisdom or their ignorance?"

"Evidently on account of their ignorance."

"Is it, then, on account of their ignorance of the art of brass-founding that they obtain this *sobriquet*?"

"Certainly not."

"Is it, then, because they are ignorant of architecture?"

"No, nor yet on that account."

"Is it, then, because they do not understand shoemaking?"

"Not for any one of these causes," replied Euthydemus; "but rather the reverse; for most of those at least who understand such handicrafts are slave-like."

"Is this, then, an epithet applied to those who do not know what is honorable and good and just?"

"So it appears to me," said the other. "Should we not therefore endeavor as strenuously as possible to avoid being slave-like?"

"But, by the gods, Socrates," exclaimed Euthydemus, "I fully believed that I was pursuing a wise and philosophical course of study, by which I expected to be instructed more efficiently than by any other in all the duties that attach to a man who is earnestly striving after honor and virtue; but now you may imagine how disheartened I feel when I recognize the fact that, notwithstanding all my previous pains, I am not even

able to answer the questions put to me upon subjects which I ought to understand better than any other, and have no path to pursue by taking which I may improve my character."

Then said Socrates — "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever chanced to go to Delphi?"

"Yes, that I have, by Jupiter — twice," answered Euthydemus. "And did you notice the inscription, 'Know Yourself' somewhere on the temple walls?"

"I did."

"And did you give no heed to the legend, or did you attend to it, and endeavor to examine yourself as to what sort of a character you maybe?"

"No, by Jupiter," returned Euthydemus, "I did not do that, for I thought that I knew this at least perfectly well already, since I should scarcely know anything else if I did not know myself."

"And do you think, then, that he knows himself who knows merely his own name, or he who, as people when they are buying horses, do not consider that they have ascertained what they wish to ascertain before they have proved whether the animal is tractable or obstinate, powerful or weak, swift or slow, and how it is with regard to other points which are of advantage or disadvantage to one who wants a horse — so he, having examined himself with regard to the power he has of being serviceable towards the needs of his fellowmen, arrives at a knowledge of his own capabilities?"

"In this case," rejoined Euthydemus, "it certainly appears to me that he who does not know his own capabilities does not know himself."

"But is not this evident," said Socrates, "that by knowing themselves men secure a vast number of blessings; whereas by self-deception they incur an enormous amount of misery? For, in truth, those who know themselves, know what is

adapted to them, and distinguish between what they can and what they cannot effect; and, by acting in accordance with their powers, they both provide such things as are needful for them, and fare prosperously; and, abstaining from undertakings that they do not understand, they live unblamed, and escape adversity. Hence, also, they are enabled to form an estimate of others, and from their intercourse with their fellow-men, they both provide for themselves what is beneficial, and secure themselves against misfortunes. Whereas, those who do not know themselves, but are deceived as to their own capabilities, are in the same position both with regard to other men and other human affairs; for they neither comprehend what they want, nor what they do, nor the characters of those with whom they mix, but, running into error upon all these particulars, they both fail in obtaining what is good, and fall into calamities. But they, on the other hand, who comprehend what they are doing, succeed in their undertakings, and become esteemed and honored. Those who resemble them associate gladly with them, and those who go wrong in their affairs seek their advice respecting them, and covet their protection, and place their hopes of good in them; and on all these accounts they love them better than they do any other men. Those, on the other hand, who have not a clear conception of what they are doing, but who make an unhappy choice in life, and miscarry in their various enterprises, not only suffer pains and penalties personally, but become, on this very account, objects of contempt and ridicule, and lead despised and dishonored lives. So also in the case of states: you see that of such as, from ignorance of their own strength, go to war with those who are more powerful, some are altogether uprooted, while others are reduced from freedom to slavery."

Then said Euthydemus — "Be well assured, Socrates, that on all these grounds I feel convinced that self-knowledge must

be regarded as a quality of the highest importance, but from what source we must seek first to derive it is a matter which I look to you to explain, if you will kindly consent to do so."

"Well, then," said Socrates, "you have, I suppose, a perfect knowledge of the difference between things good and evil?"

"Yes, by Jupiter," replied Euthydemus, "for otherwise I should be inferior to the slaves."

"Come, then," said Socrates, "enumerate some of them to me."

"That, at any rate, is not difficult," answered the other; "for, to begin with, I consider the very fact of one's being in sound health a good, and being out of health an evil. Next, of the things which produce these effects, as drink, food, occupations, such as conduce to health I hold to be good, but those which engender disease as evil."

"Therefore," remarked Socrates, "both health and disease, when they are the causes of good, would be good, but when they are the causes of evil, they would be evil."

"But whenever," asked Euthydemus, "can health be the cause of evil, or disease of good?"

"When, by Jupiter," answered Socrates, "men who, on account of the exuberance of their strength, have taken part in some unsuccessful military expedition by land or damaging voyage by sea, or any similar enterprise, and have perished, while those who on account of their weak health have been left at home have been saved."

"You speak truly," said Euthydemus; "but you also see that, in the case of successful enterprises, such as are endowed with strength share them, while those who are in ill-health are left out of them."

"Are such things, then, as are at one time advantageous and at another injurious to be considered rather as blessings or as evils?"

“One can predicate nothing definite concerning them, by Jupiter, when they are viewed in this light. But wisdom, Socrates, is indisputably a good thing; for what business will not a man transact better for being wise than fox being ignorant?”

“What, then?” asked Socrates, “have you never heard of Daedalus, how that after he had been seized by Minos, he was compelled for his wisdom to serve him as a slave, and was deprived both of his country and his liberty; and how, when he was attempting to make his escape with his son, he lost the boy, and was unable to save himself, but was carried away among the barbarians, and a second time reduced to a servile condition among them?”

“I know, by Jupiter, that there is such a legend.”

“And have you never heard of the woes of Palamedes? For in truth, it is the general song concerning him, that it was on account of his wisdom that he was envied and put to death by Ulysses.”

“This story is also told,” said Euthydemus. “And how many others do you think have been carried off to the king’s territories on account of their wisdom, and been there compelled to serve as slaves?”

“But happiness, Socrates,” said he, “seems to be an undoubted good.”

“Yes, Euthydemus,” observed Socrates, “unless one compounds it of doubtfully good materials.”

“But what, of such things as go to make up happiness, can be a doubtful good?” asked the other.

“Nothing,” replied Socrates, “unless we join to it beauty, or strength, or wealth, or glory, or anything of this sort.”

“But, by Jupiter,” exclaimed Euthydemus, “we must join to it something of the kind, for how could anyone he happy without them?”

“Well, then, by Jupiter,” said Socrates, “we shall join to it one of those accidents which are the cause of diverse troubles to mankind; for many are ruined through their beauty by those who are madly in love with their budding charms, while many, through an excessive estimate of their strength, undertaking enterprises which are beyond their powers, involve themselves in no small calamities. Many, again, who have become enervated through and plotted against for their wealth, have perished; while many, on account of their prominent position and political power, have suffered great misfortunes.”

“Well, then,” said Euthydemus, “if, forsooth, I do not talk correctly even when I commend happiness, I confess that I know not what men ought to ask of the gods.”

“But,” continued Socrates, “it may be that you have not deeply considered these matters, from the belief that you were already sufficiently well acquainted with them; but since you are preparing yourself to be prime minister of a democratic state, no doubt you know, at any rate, what a democracy is?”

“I certainly suppose I do,” said Euthydemus. “Does it, then, appear to you possible that one who does not know what the demos is should know what a democracy is?”

“No, by Jupiter, it does not,” answered the other. “And what, then, do you consider the demos to be?”

“I consider it to be the poorer classes of the citizens.”

“Do you, then, know which are the poor?”

“Why should I not know?”

“You also know, then, which are the rich?”

“Just the same as I know which are the poor.”

“And what sort of people do you define as being rich, and what kind as poor?”

“Those who have not enough wherewith to purchase the necessaries of life I call poor, and those who have more than enough, rich.”

“Have you remarked, then, that to some who have excessively small means, the little they have is not only adequate for their support, but leaves them a surplus, while to others even a very large fortune is not sufficient?”

“Yes, by Jupiter,” replied Euthydemus; “and you are quite right to put me in mind of it; for I have even heard of princes who have been so straitened by their necessities that they have been forced to commit acts of injustice, like the poorest people.”

“If this be so, then,” said Socrates, “we must rank these princes among the demos, and those whose property is but small, if they are good managers, among the rich?” And Euthydemus replied, “It is evident that my own want of skill compels me to admit this also; and I am considering whether it is not best for me to be silent altogether, for I seem to know absolutely nothing.”

He therefore departed in a most dejected frame of mind, esteeming himself very lightly, and regarding himself as being in very truth no better than a slave.

So, then, of those who were handled in the same way by Socrates, many came to him no more, whom also he considered as his more stolid kind of disciples. But Euthydemus conceived that he could adopt no other means of becoming a man of note than by associating with Socrates as much as possible, and he consequently never left him unless on some business of the most urgent necessity, and he even imitated some of his ordinary habits.

So Socrates, finding him thus disposed, no longer puzzled him, but explained to him, in the most simple and lucid manner he could adopt, what he conceived it to be most to his

interest to know, and what was his best method of preparation.

Chapter III.

Socrates was never urgent that his followers should become skilled orators, or men of business, or mechanicians, but preferred that, previously to their acquiring these accomplishments, sober-mindedness should be engendered in them; for he judged that without sobriety of mind, those who were possessed of such capabilities were only the better qualified to commit acts of injustice and mischief.

In the first place, therefore, he endeavored to make his disciples sober-minded with regard to the gods. Thus sundry individuals, who were among his audience when he conversed with various persons upon this topic, have narrated his discourses; and I was myself present when he held a dialogue with Euthydemus somewhat after this fashion: — "Tell me, Euthydemus," said he, "has it ever occurred to you to consider how carefully the gods have provided for all the requirements of men?" And Euthydemus replied,

"No, by Jupiter, it has not."

"But you know, at least," continued Socrates, "that, first of all, we need light; and that the gods give to us?"

"Yes, by Jupiter," rejoined Euthydemus; "for if we had no light, we should, as far as the use of our eyes goes, be in the position of the blind."

"But, moreover, as we stand in need of rest, they afford us night as a most welcome season for repose."

"And this is a boon," exclaimed the other, "that is indeed worthy of our gratitude."

"And forasmuch as the sun, being luminous, reveals to us the hours of the day, and all other objects, while the night, on account of its darkness, renders them less distinct, have they not caused the stars to shine forth at night, to show us the time of night, and enable us to perform many necessary tasks?"

“Such is the case,” said Euthydemus. “And again, the moon indicates to us not only the divisions of the night, but of the month.”

“It certainly does so,” said the other. “And what of the fact that the gads, seeing that we require nourishment, have raised it for us out of the earth, and have appointed seasons suitable for its growth, which supply us in great abundance and variety not only with such things as are needful for us, but with those which contribute to our enjoyment?”

“All these gifts,” replied Euthydemus, “also indicate their love for men.”

“And that they give us water, which is so valuable on account of its both generating and bringing to maturity, in conjunction with the earth and the seasons, all those products which are useful to us, and which aids in nourishing our individual selves also, and by being mixed with all our sustenance, renders it easier of digestion, and more healthful and pleasant; and that since we want such quantities of it, that they should supply it to us without stint?”

“This also,” rejoined Euthydemus, “argues great foresight for us.”

“And that they should give us fire as a protection against cold and darkness, and as an auxiliary in every art and every necessary occupation in which men engage? For, to speak concisely, there is nothing which is of any real importance towards supplying the needs of man’s life that is prepared without the aid of fire.”

“This again,” said Euthydemus, “indicates excessive affection for mankind.”

“And that they diffuse round us the air so liberally, that it not only protects and fosters our lives, but enables us to traverse the seas by means of it, and to procure various necessaries by voyaging hither and thither in different

quarters of the globe, how is not this a benefit beyond all calculation?"

"It is not to be expressed," said Euthydemus.

"That the sun, too, when he inclines towards us in the winter, should approach the earth so as to bring some things to maturity, and to cause others to wither when the season of their prime has passed away? And that when he has accomplished this task, he should come no nearer, but turn back again, for fear lest he should injure us by giving us more heat than we require; and that when, moreover, in his departure, he reaches the point at which it is manifest that if he retired any further we should perish with cold, he should again turn back and approach us, and revolve in that orbit of the heavens in which he is of the greatest service to us?"

"By Jupiter," remarked Euthydemus, "these laws do indeed appear as if they had been established for the sole benefit of man."

"And once more (since it is plain that we could not endure either heat or cold if it came upon us all of a sudden), that the sun should approach us so gradually, and retire from us so gently, that we arrive at extreme heat and extreme cold by degrees which are to us imperceptible?"

"I am indeed considering," rejoined Euthydemus, "whether the gods employ themselves in any other way than administering to men's wants; only one thought alone hinders my coming to this conclusion, viz., that the other animals also participate in these benefits."

"But is it not also evident," asked Socrates, "that these animals exist and are nurtured for man's sake? For what other living creature derives so many advantages from goats, and sheep, and horses, and oxen, and asses, and the various other kinds of beasts, as man does? And to me, indeed, it appears that they are of more value than the vegetable world to him,

or, at any rate, he is nourished and enriched no less by the one than by the other. And many races of mankind do not use the fruits of the earth as a means of subsistence, but support life on the milk and cheese and meat obtained from their herds; and all men, by taming and training the serviceable animals, employ them as useful assistants in war, and for many other purposes."

"In all this I also agree with you," said Euthydemus; "for I observe that of the animals, even those that are much stronger than we are, become so subservient to man that he uses them for whatever end he wishes."

"And again, inasmuch as there exist many beautiful and useful objects which differ one from another, that the gods have conferred upon man perceptions adapted to each of them, through which we are capable of appreciating all their advantages; and that they have implanted in us rationality, by means of which we reason upon what our senses perceive, and, by storing it in our memories, learn how far each object is beneficial, and put into practice many contrivances for the enjoyment of good and the avoidance of evil? And that they should have bestowed upon us the faculty of speech, by means of which we impart all these blessings to others, by communicating a knowledge of them, and ourselves participate in them, and enact laws, and carry on our affairs of state?"

"The gods appear, Socrates, to take great care of man in every way."

"And as we are unable to calculate what will be for our future benefit, that they should aid us also in ascertaining this by revealing coming events to those who consult them, and instruct them as to the best course to pursue?"

"To you, at least, Socrates," replied Euthydemus, "the gods appear to behave in a more friendly way than they do to other

people, if, at least, it is the case that they point out to you beforehand, even without your asking them, what you ought and what you ought not to do."

"At any rate, you will yourself acknowledge that I speak the truth, if you do not expect to behold the gods in their bodily forms, but are satisfied from beholding their works to worship and honor them. Consider, too, that the gods themselves suggest to us that we should do this; for the other deities that vouchsafe blessings to us do not confer them upon us by coming openly into our presence. So, likewise, the deity who regulates and sustains the whole universe, in which exists everything that is lovely and good, and who upholds it unimpaired, well-ordered, and undecaying for the use of his creatures, and swifter than thought to obey his behests without any deviation, is himself revealed to us, indeed, in the execution of his mighty works, but is invisible to us in the performance of them. Reflect, again, how that the sun, although he is conspicuous to all men, does not suffer them to look at him too minutely, but if anyone attempts to gaze steadfastly at him, he deprives them of their eyesight. The agents of the gods you will, in like manner, find invisible; as the thunderbolt, which, although it is manifestly launched from on high, and prevails against every object that stands in its way, is never seen, either in its approach, or its contact, or its departure. Neither are the winds themselves visible, although their effects are evident to us, and we are sensible of their advent. And the soul of man, again, which partakes of the divine nature, if anything human does, manifestly rules within us, but is itself unseen. Meditating upon these things, therefore, it behooves you not to hold the gods in light esteem because they are invisible, but, recognizing their power as displayed in their works, to pay them the honor due to their divine nature."

“I am quite convinced, Socrates,” said Euthydemus, “that I shall never in the slightest degree fail in my reverence for the deity; but I am disheartened at the thought that no man can ever, as it appears to me, sufficiently requite the gods for all their favors.”

“Do not be cast down on that account, Euthydemus,” said Socrates, “for you know that the Delphian deity, when any one consults him as to how he can most acceptably worship the gods, answers — ‘According to the laws of your country;’ and the law, I take it, that prevails universally is, that men should propitiate them with sacred offerings, each one according to his means. How, then, can anyone honor the gods more perfectly or religiously than by acting in accordance with their behests? We must not, however, do less than our means enable us to do; for when a person acts in this way, it is, I conceive, quite clear that he is not then paying due honor to the gods. But it befits him who in no respect fails to honor the gods according to his means, to be of good cheer and to hope for the greatest blessings; for no one can reasonably expect greater benefits from anyone than he can from those who have it in their power to render him the most valuable services, or to secure their favor by any surer way than by pleasing them. And how can he please them better than by obeying them as implicitly as possible?”

By such utterances, and a course of conduct in harmony with them, he rendered his associates both more pious and more sober-minded.

Chapter IV.

Neither, indeed, did Socrates conceal his opinions upon the subject of justice, but displayed them openly in his actions, both by behaving equitably and profitably to all men in his private life, and in his public capacity by obeying the ruling powers in all such matters as were laid down by law, and by conducting himself in such a manner, both as a citizen and a soldier, that he was conspicuous above any other man for his adherence to discipline. And when he presided at the public assemblies, he would not allow the people to pass illegal decrees, but opposed himself to so much violence on the part of the populace as I do not think anyone else could have withstood. And when the Thirty + commanded him to do anything contrary to the law, he refused to obey them. Thus, when they forbade him to discourse with the young, and ordered him to lead away a certain citizen to execution, he alone disregarded their edicts, on the ground that they were illegal. When, again, he was traversing the indictment of Meletus, although others, when pleading, were accustomed to speak so as to gain the favor of the judges, and to flatter them and supplicate them, in direct contravention of the laws, he would not on his trial adopt any of these ordinary illegal devices; but although he might, had he in the slightest degree consented to do so, have easily gained an acquittal from his judges, he nevertheless preferred to die, in conformity with the laws, than to save his life by transgressing them.

And he oftentimes both made this statement to others, and with Hippias of Elis I know that he discoursed somewhat after this fashion. For Hippias, returning to Athens after a long absence, encountered Socrates as he was remarking to some people how surprising it was that, if any one wished to have another instructed in shoemaking, or architecture, or brass-founding, or riding, he was never in any difficulty as to where he should send him to be taught, [and there are some who

maintain that if anyone desired to teach even a horse or an ox to act justly, plenty of masters could be found everywhere for them], while if a man wished either to learn justice himself, or to have it taught to his son or his servant, he would be at a loss to know where he could meet 'with the requisite instruction. Then Hippias, hearing him make these remarks, said, jeering him as it were — “What, Socrates, are you still repeating the very same expressions which I heard you indulging in ever so long ago?”

“Yes, Hippias,” replied Socrates, “and what is more wonderful still, is, that I am not only repeating the very same expressions, but I am discoursing upon the very same topics; but you, perhaps, from your excessive learning, never repeat your observations over again.”

“Assuredly,” rejoined Hippias, “I always endeavor to say something new.”

“In reference to subjects, then, upon which you possess incontrovertible knowledge — as for instance, with regard to the letters of the alphabet — if anyone should inquire of you how many and what letters formed the word “Socrates” would you endeavor to say one thing at one time and another at another? Or to those who questioned you in arithmetic, whether twice five made ten, would you not give the same answer at one time as you did at another?”

“Upon such subjects as these, Socrates,” returned Hippias, “I always repeat what I have said before, just as you do. But with regard to justice, I verily believe that I have something now to advance which neither you nor anyone else can gainsay.”

“Then, by Juno,” cried Socrates, “you claim to have discovered a mighty boon, since our judges will now cease from differing in their decisions, our citizens will abstain from disputing about what is just, and from suing each other at law

and quarrelling, and states will no longer hold conflicting views with regard to what is just, or go to war. And indeed, I scarcely feel as if I could ever part with you until I have had the knowledge of so enormous a blessing communicated to me by its discoverer."

"But, by Jupiter," exclaimed Hippias, "that you shall never have, before you yourself declare what you consider justice to be; for it is quite sufficient that you laugh at others, questioning and puzzling everyone, while you yourself are unwilling to give a definition to anybody, or to state your opinion clearly upon any subject whatever."

"How so, Hippias?" asked Socrates. "Have you not noticed that I never desist from setting forth what I consider justice to be?"

"And what, then, may this your definition of it be?"

"And if I do not define it in words, but illustrate it by my actions, does not practice appear to you to afford a stronger testimony as to my opinions than theory?"

"Yes, by Jupiter," replied the other, "it does; for many who talk justly act unjustly, whereas he who acts justly cannot be an unjust man"

"Have you, then, ever heard of me as a perjurer, or a common informer, or as a person who involves the state in seditions, or commits any other unjust act?"

"I have not," rejoined Hippias.

"And do you not think that to abstain from unjust acts is justice?"

"You are evidently, even now, Socrates," said Hippias, "endeavoring to avoid giving clear utterance to your sentiments as to what you consider justice to be, inasmuch as what you are talking of are not the things that the just do, but those from which they abstain."

“But for my part,” said Socrates, “I thought that the being unwilling to commit acts of injustice was a sufficient proof of justice; but if you do not hold the same opinion, consider whether this is more to your mind — for I hold that whatever is in conformity with the laws is just.”

“Do you then assert, Socrates, that conformity with the laws and justice are identical?”

“I certainly do so,” replied Socrates.

“But I fail to gather from you what sort of an action you define as being in conformity with the laws, and what sort as just.”

“But you know the laws of the state,” said Socrates.

“I do,” replied the other. “And what do you consider them to be?”

“Those enactments which the citizens have passed to inform us what we should do, and what we should avoid doing.”

“Would not that man, then,” asked Socrates, “be a law-abiding person who directed his life as a member of the body politic in conformity with those laws, and a law-breaker if he transgressed them?”

“Assuredly he would,” answered Hippias. “Would not he, then, who obeyed them, be performing just actions and he who disobeyed them, unjust?”

“Certainly.”

“Is not he, then, who performs just actions, just, and he who acts unjustly, unjust?”

“How can it be otherwise.”

“He, therefore, who acts conformably to the laws, is just, and he who violates them, unjust.”

“But, Socrates,” asked Hippias, “how can anyone attach much importance to the laws, or to the abiding by them,

seeing that their very framers themselves often either abrogate or alter them?"

"So, also, states," remarked Socrates, "which have commenced a war, frequently become reconciled again."

"Very frequently," said Hippias.

"What difference do you think you make, then, when you find fault with those who abide by the laws, although they may be repealed, and when you blame those who act prudently in warfare by concluding a peace? Or do you object to those who vigorously support their respective countries in times of war?"

"Not I, by Jupiter," exclaimed Hippias. "And have you not heard it said of the Lacedaemonian, Lycurgus, that he would never have made Sparta at all different from other states, had he not labored above all things to inculcate into her a spirit of obedience to the laws? And of the rulers of states, do you not know that those who are most effectual in enforcing the laws are the best, and that that state in which the members of the community are most obedient to the laws, fares best in peace, and cannot be overthrown in war? Moreover, unanimity appears to be the greatest blessing to a state, and over and over again the senate and leading men exhort the people to cultivate it; and throughout the whole of Greece a law prevails that the members of each state should swear to live in concord, and they everywhere take an oath to that effect. And this, I conceive, is done not with the object of making citizens agree as to the merits of the same choruses, or unanimous in their praises of the same flute-players, or in their approval of the same poets, or that they should take delight in the same recreations, but that they should yield obedience to the laws. For when the members of the community abide by these, bodies politic wax stronger and more prosperous; but without unanimity, neither can a state be well administered, nor a household properly managed. And as a private individual, how

would any man be more likely to avoid state penalties, and gain more respect, than by obeying the laws? And how could he otherwise be exposed to fewer defeats in the law courts, or how could he gain more victories there? And to whose care would anyone think that he could more safely entrust his property, or his sons, or his daughters, and in whom would the whole community place more implicit confidence, than in the man who abides by the laws? From whom, again, would parents, or relatives, or domestics, or friends, or citizens, or strangers be more likely to obtain their rights? And to whom would the enemy more readily entrust the arrangements for truces, treaties, or conventions for establishing peace? Or whose alliance would be more eagerly sought than that of a law-abiding man, and to whose leadership would allies more readily submit themselves or commit the guardianship of their forts or cities? And from whom would anyone who had done him a kindness expect more gratitude than from a man who respects the laws? or whom would one more willingly oblige than a person from Whom one expects to receive gratitude? Whose friendship would any one more desire, or whose enmity more deprecate, than he would that of such a man? Or with whom would one be less inclined to quarrel, and most disposed to be friendly, and least of all at variance? And with whom would most people wish to be on terms of friendship and alliance, and only a very small proportion on those of hatred and antagonism? I therefore, Hippias, declare obedience to the law and justice to be identical; but if you hold a different opinion, state it to me."

"But," said Hippias, "by Jupiter, Socrates, I do not think that my opinions are in any way at variance with yours in respect to justice."

"But do you know, Hippias," asked Socrates, "that there are certain laws which are unwritten?"

“Such as those,” said Hippias, “that are in vogue in every country with reference to the same points.”

“Could you affirm, then,” continued Socrates, “that men enacted them?”

“How could they do so,” inquired Hippias, “inasmuch as they could neither assemble together nor use the same language?”

“By whom, then, do you suppose that such laws were made?”

“I think,” answered Hippias, “that the gods established them for the guidance of mankind, for the worship of the gods is the first law which prevails universally among all men.”

“Is not reverence for parents also a universal law?”

“It is so.”

“Is it not also a law that parents should not intermarry with their children, or children with their parents?”

“But this no longer, Socrates,” remarked Hippias, “appears to me to be one of the laws of the gods.”

“And why not?” asked Socrates. “Because I see,” returned the other, “that there are some who transgress it.”

“And there are many other laws,” said Socrates, “that they transgress; but those who disobey the laws of the gods, incur penalties from which men cannot possibly escape, as they frequently can when they violate human enactments, in some instances by concealment, in others by force?’ “And what sort of penalty is that, Socrates,” asked Hippias, “which parents who intermarry with their children, or children who intermarry with their parents, cannot escape?”

“The heaviest of all penalties, by Jupiter,” answered Socrates; “for what greater misfortune can befall a father than to have bad children?”

“But why,” said Hippias, “should those fathers have bad children who, being good themselves, are not prevented by any circumstance from having families by good wives?”

“Because, by Jupiter,” replied Socrates, “those who procreate children should not only be good, but in full bodily vigor; or does the procreative power appear to you to be the same in those who are in the prime of life as it is in those who have not yet reached, or those that have passed it?”

“No, by Jupiter,” answered the other, “it is not likely that it would be the same.”

“Which of the two, then, is the more perfect?”

“Clearly,” rejoined the other, “that of those who are in the prime of life.”

“That of those, then, that have not yet arrived at their prime is not strong enough?”

“It is not likely, by Jupiter, that it would be,” said the other. “Accordingly, they should not as yet have families?”

“No, they should not.”

“Do not those, therefore, that procreate children under these conditions have them when they ought not?”

“So it appears to me.”

“What other persons, then,” asked Socrates, “are likely to have bad children, if these are not?”

“I agree with you,” returned the other, “upon this point also.”

“Well, then,” continued Socrates, “is it not a universal law that men should recompense those who show kindness to them?”

“It is so,” replied Hippias; “but this, too, is a law that is often broken.”

“And do not those that break it suffer the penalty by being deserted by such of their friends as are worth having, and

being compelled to have recourse to people who hate them? And are not those who do good to such as wish to avail themselves of their services good friends to themselves? And are not those who do not return kindnesses to those who benefit them hated by the latter for their ingratitude, and yet, because it serves their turn to be intimate with such people, do they not pay the greatest court to them?"

"By Jupiter," exclaimed Hippias, "all these results do indeed seem to proceed upon some godlike principle; for that the laws themselves should carry with them punishment for such as transgress them appears to me to indicate some legislator who is wiser than man."

"Whether, then, do you think, Hippias, that the gods enact laws which are in consonance with justice, or in opposition to it?"

"In consonance with it," answered Hippias; "for scarcely would any other being establish just laws if a god did not."

"So, it is certainly agreeable to the will of the gods, Hippias, that what is just and what is in. conformity with the laws should be identical."

By such conversations and such conduct, he rendered his followers more observant of justice.

Chapter V.

I now proceed to set forth the means he adopted to make his associates more practical men of business.

As he considered temperance to be an incalculable advantage to anyone who was about to engage in any important enterprise, he, more than any man, gave evidence to his disciples of practicing it in his own person, and also in his discourses inculcated upon them its observance, as being more necessary than anything else. Accordingly, he was both himself continually mindful of whatever conduced to this virtue, and never ceased directing the attention of all his followers to it; and I know that on one occasion he held a conversation with Euthydemus upon the subject, somewhat to the following effect: —

"Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "whether you regard freedom as a valuable and honorable possession for an individual or a state?"

"I regard it as more so than any other possession," replied the other.

"If a man, then, is under the control of his bodily pleasures to such a degree that he is powerless to act according to his highest instincts, do you consider him to be free?"

"By no means," said Euthydemus. "For, probably acting in the best possible way appears to you to constitute freedom, and the being under the control of influences that prevent one's so acting you regard as an indication of want of freedom?"

"Certainly," replied Euthydemus. "The intemperate, then, appear to you to be, in every respect, as people who are without freedom?"

"Yes, by Jupiter," exclaimed Euthydemus, "and naturally so."

“And do the intemperate seem to you merely to be prevented from acting in the best possible way, or to be forced to do those things that are most disgraceful?”

“They appear to me,” replied he, “to be no less compelled to do the one than they are prevented from doing the other.”

“And what do you think of those masters who prevent men from doing what is best for them, and coerce them into doing that which is most injurious?”

“That they are the worst masters possible.”

“And what sort of slavery do you consider the most grievous?”

“That,” said he, “under the worst masters.”

“And do not the intemperate suffer the most grievous kind of bondage?”

“So, it appears to me,” answered the other.

“And does not intemperance, by repelling men from wisdom, which is their chief good, seem to you to precipitate them into its opposite evil? Does it not, likewise, appear to you in reference to what is useful to them, that it hinders them from acquiring a knowledge of it by seducing them to pleasure, and frequently, by diverting from their duty even those who know the difference between good and evil, lead them to prefer the worse to the better course?”

“That is certainly the case,” replied Euthydemus. “And of whom can it be predicated that he is less under the influence of sobriety of mind than it can of the intemperate man? for, I take it that the actions resulting from sobriety and intemperance are diametrically opposite to each other.”

“I assent to this proposition also,” said Euthydemus.

“And do you consider that there is anything which makes men disregard everything that is decorous more completely than intemperance?”

“I do not, indeed,” replied he.

“And do you think anything can be worse for a man than that which induces him to select such things as are hurtful to him in preference to those which are beneficial, which prompts him to court the one and neglect the other, and which urges him on to a course totally opposite to that which is pursued by the sober-minded?”

“I do not think anything can be worse,” said Euthydemus.

“Is it not probable, therefore,” continued Socrates, “that temperance will produce in men effects just the reverse of those which are produced by intemperance?”

“Certainly,” replied the other.

“Is it not probable, then, that such habits as produce those contrary effects would be most beneficial to a man?”

“It is so, Socrates,” said he.

“And have you ever reflected upon this fact, Euthydemus?”

“Upon what fact?” asked the latter.

“That intemperance does not actually lead men to those pleasures to which it pretends to lead them, whereas temperance produces more real pleasure than anything else.”

“How so?” asked Euthydemus.

“Because intemperance, by its never permitting men to feel the want of food, or drink, or sexual intercourse, or sleep (the longing for which alone causes men really to enjoy eating, drinking, or sexual intercourse, and makes them lie down and sleep tranquilly), prevents their deriving any pleasure, which can properly be so called, even from the most necessary and ordinary acts. Temperance, on the other hand, as she alone renders men capable of resisting excess in such matters as I have mentioned, so also she alone enables them to find any gratification, which is really worthy of the name, in those actions of which we have spoken.”

“Your statements are, in every respect, incontrovertible,” said Euthydemus.

“But, moreover, a man, by learning what is honorable and good, and applying his mind to some branch of knowledge, which enables him to train his own body properly, and to manage his domestic affairs judiciously, and to make himself useful to his friends or to the state, but grievous to his enemies (from which knowledge not only the greatest advantages but the highest pleasures accrue), the temperate derive from such actions a gratification, in which it is impossible for the intemperate to participate. For of whom can we more confidently affirm that he is less in a position to attain to the accomplishment of any of these ends than we can of a man who is always anxious to seize upon any species of pleasure that may be nearest at hand?”

Then said Euthydemus — “You seem to me to maintain, Socrates, that he who is dominated by his love of bodily pleasure cannot be possessed of any virtue whatever?”

“And pray, Euthydemus,” asked Socrates, “in what respects does an intemperate man differ from the most ignorant brute? For if anyone, instead of regarding his highest interests, seeks invariably to avail himself of any pleasure that comes within his reach, what distinction is there between his conduct and that of the most unreasoning beasts? But the temperate alone have the power of weighing what is best in every transaction, and by classifying each particular pursuit, both in their deeds and their words, according to its own proper essence, of selecting such as are good, and rejecting whatever is evil.”

And it was this power, he declared, that rendered men most virtuous and happy, and most capable of reasoning; for he said that the phrase “to reason” was derived from the practice of people’s holding conferences for the purpose of debating on

various matters, and distinguishing between them according to their several natures. Wherefore, he thought that it behooved everyone to render himself an adept in the art of reasoning, and to study it as diligently as possible; for that, by means of it, men became most estimable, best fitted to guide others, arid most skillful in argument.

Chapter VI.

And I will now endeavor to prove that he did render his disciples more skillful in argument. For he held that those who understood the nature of each individual existence would probably be most capable of explaining them to others; but he said of those who did not possess any such knowledge, that it was no wonder that they were both deceived themselves, and also led others into error. Consequently, he never ceased investigating with his associates the nature of every individual existence.

It would, indeed, be an enormous task to set down in detail all his various definitions of the terms employed by him in his various discourses; but so much as I think will serve my purpose, and will show how he conducted his investigations, that will I relate.

First, then, he inquired into the nature of piety somewhat after this fashion: — "Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "what do you conceive piety to be?"

"The chief good of man," replied the other.

"Are you able, then, to define to me what sort of a person you would designate as pious?"

"One, as it seems to me," answered Euthydemus, "who honors the gods."

"And is it permissible for everyone to honor the gods according to his own fancy?"

"No; there are certain laws which define how we are to honor them."

"Would not he, therefore, who is best acquainted with those laws be most likely to honor the gods in a proper manner?"

"I think so," replied the other.

“Accordingly, he who knows how to honor the gods, does not think that he should honor them in any way that is contrary to that knowledge?”

“I suppose not,” said Euthydemus.

“He, then, who knows the decrees of the law respecting the gods, will honor them as the law directs?”

“Certainly, he will.”

“And does not he who honors the gods conformably to law, honor them as he ought?”

“How can it be otherwise?”

“And he who honors them as he ought to do, is a pious man?”

“Of course he is,” replied the other.

“He, therefore, who knows what the law decrees with respect to the gods, may be correctly defined by us as a pious man?”

“So, at least, it appears to me,” said Euthydemus.

“But, with regard to our conduct towards our fellow-men, may everyone behave himself just as he thinks fit?”

“No; but in regard to them also, he who knows what is decreed by the laws, and how to conduct himself towards others, agreeably to those decrees, will act conformably to the law.”

“Do not those, then, whose conduct towards one another proceeds upon this principle, conduct themselves properly?”

“How can it be otherwise?” answered the other.

“And do not those who behave as they ought to do towards others, behave themselves well?”

“Certainly,” said Euthydemus.

“And those who behave well to men, behave well in all transactions as between man and man?”

“Most probably,” answered the other.

“Do not those, then, who obey the laws act justly?”

“Decidedly,” replied Euthydemus.

“And do you know what sort of actions are said to be just?”

“Those which are sanctioned by the law.”

“Those, therefore, who do what is sanctioned by the law, act justly, and as they ought to act?”

“How can it be otherwise?”

“Those, therefore, who act justly, are just?”

“I certainly think so,” said Euthydemus.

“But do you think that anyone is obedient to the laws who does not know what they sanction?”

“Assuredly not,” replied he.

“And if people know what they ought to do, do you think that there are any who suppose that they ought not to do it?”

“I do not think so.”

“Those, therefore, who know what is conformable to the law, with regard to men, act justly?”

“No doubt they do,” remarked the other.

“And are not those who act justly, just people?”

“Who else is, if they are not?” inquired Euthydemus.

“Shall we not be correct, then, in defining just people to be those who know what is conformable to law in respect to mankind?”

“So, it certainly seems to me,” said Euthydemus.

“And how shall we define Wisdom? Tell me, whether do men appear to you to be wise in such matters as they understand, or are there some who are wise upon points that they do not understand?”

“Men are clearly wise upon such matters as they understand,” rejoined Euthydemus; “for how could any be wise upon things that he did not understand?”

“The wise, then, are wise by knowledge?”

“And how otherwise could anyone become wise except through knowledge?”

“Do you regard wisdom, then, as anything else than that by means of which men become wise?”

“I do not”

“Knowledge, therefore, is wisdom?”

“It appears so to me.”

“But do you deem it possible for a man to know everything in the world?”

“No, by Jupiter! but, as it seems to me, only a very inconsiderable portion of them.”

“It is not, therefore, possible for a man to be wise upon every subject?”

“No, by Jupiter, I should think not,” exclaimed the other.

“Each one is wise, then, upon that particular subject which he understands?”

“That is my opinion,” said Euthydemus.

“And shall we adopt the same method, Euthydemus, in our investigations as to what the Good is?”

“How do you mean?” asked Euthydemus.

“Do you think that the same thing is beneficial in every individual case?”

“I do not.”

“So, then, what is beneficial to one person seems to you sometimes to be hurtful to another?”

“Very much so,” replied the other.

“And would you designate as good anything that is not beneficial?”

“I should not,” returned the other.

“Whatsoever then is beneficial is good to him to whom it is beneficial?”

“I think so,” was his answer.

“And can you define the Beautiful, if anything possesses this quality, in any other way than by describing it (be it a person, or a vessel, or any other object) as beautiful in regard to those purposes for which you know that it is so?”

“No, by Jupiter, I cannot,” said Euthydemus.

“For whatever purpose, therefore, each particular object maybe useful, for that purpose it is beautiful to use it?”

“Undoubtedly,” replied the other.

“And is any particular object beautiful for any other purpose than that for which it is beautiful to use it?”

“No, not for any other,” said Euthydemus.

“The useful, then, is beautiful for every purpose for which it is useful?”

“Those are my sentiments,” answered the other.

“And do you regard Courage, Euthydemus, as coming under the category of good qualities?”

“As one of the best,” replied he.

“Do you conceive it to be useful in very small emergencies?”

“No, by Jupiter,” rejoined Euthydemus, “but in the very greatest.”

“Does it then appear to you to be useful with respect to dangerous and formidable undertakings to be ignorant of their nature?”

“By no means,” said the other.

“Those, therefore, who do not fear such enterprises because they are ignorant of their character, are not courageous?”

“No, by Jupiter,” said Euthydemus, “for in that case many madmen and cowards would be courageous.”

“And what about such as are afraid of things that are not terrible?”

“They are still less courageous, by Jupiter, than the others.”

“Those, then, that are good in reference to terrible and dangerous circumstances you would consider as courageous people, and those who are bad as cowards?”

“Certainly,” replied the other.

“But do you regard any as being good in reference to such circumstances, except those who are able to behave well in them?”

“None,” replied the other.

“And those who are not able to behave well in them you regard as bad?”

“Whom else can I consider so?” asked he.

“But does not each class of them think they are behaving as they ought to behave?”

“How can it be otherwise?”

“Do those, then, who cannot behave well in them, know how they ought to behave?”

“I suppose not,” said Euthydemus.

“Those, then, who know how they ought to behave, these have the power of conducting themselves accordingly?”

“They and they alone,” assented Euthydemus.

“So, then, those who do not lose their presence of mind under such circumstances do not behave badly in them?”

“I think not,” said the other.

“But those who behave badly in them have lost their presence of mind?”

“Probably,” answered he. “Those, then, who know how to behave well in difficulties and dangers are courageous, but those who are confounded by them are cowards?”

“So, they seem to me,” said Euthydemus.

Monarchy and tyranny he looked upon as both being forms of government; but he held that they differed one from the other. The government of men with their own consent, and over states in compliance with fixed laws, he regarded as a monarchy; that over men against their will, and over states not in obedience to law, but according to the dictates of the ruler, as a tyranny. And wherever the ruling body was composed of those who acted in compliance with legal enactments, he defined that government as an aristocracy; where it was chosen from men selected on account of their wealth, as a plutocracy; and where it consisted of the whole body of the people, as a democracy.

And if a person should contradict him on any point without having anything definite to say, but should assert independently of all proof that some individual whom he mentioned was better versed in politics, or braver, or superior in any respect, he would bring the whole question to the test by some such reasoning as the following: —

“Do you maintain that the person whom you commend is a better statesman than the one whom I am upholding?”

“I do.”

“Why, then, should we not commence by considering first what are the duties of a good statesman?”

“Let us do so.”

“Would not he, then, be superior in the management of the public funds who increased the revenue of the state?”

“Certainly,” replied his opponent. “And in war, he who rendered it victorious over its enemies?”

“How can it be otherwise?”

“And in diplomacy, he who should convert foes into friends?”

“Naturally?”

“And he who, in haranguing a popular assembly, should quell sedition and induce a spirit of unanimity?”

“It appears so to me.” So when the argument was brought to a conclusion by such a process as this, the truth was made manifest even to his opponents.

And when he wished to sift any subject thoroughly, he proceeded to reason upon it from such premises as are generally admitted — thinking that this was a safe method of conducting the discussion. Hence, he, more than anyone I have ever known, brought his hearers to agree with him; and he said that Homer assigned to Ulysses the character of “a safe rhetorician” on account of his ability to conduct his line of reasoning by means of arguments acknowledged as valid by all mankind.

Chapter VII.

And that Socrates expressed his genuine convictions to those who came to attend his discussions is, I think, evident from my previous statements. I will now, therefore, proceed to show how careful he was to make his disciples complete masters of such kinds of businesses as were suited to them. He, more than any other person with whom I am acquainted, was anxious to discover in what branch of knowledge each of his followers respectively excelled, and such precepts as would conduce to make them good and honorable characters he most readily communicated to them all, in reference to such matters as he himself understood; but with regard to subjects as to which he was personally less instructed, he introduced them to those who were proficients in them.

He taught them, too, how far it behooved a properly educated man to be instructed on each particular branch of knowledge. For instance, he said that he should study geometry up to such a point as would enable him, if ever he should require to do so, to take or hand over land correctly by measurement, or to divide it, or to point out in what proportions it should be worked; and that it was so easy to acquire the science, that anyone who applied his mind to it might discover by mensuration the extent of all the land in the world, and quit his master with a perfect knowledge of how to measure it. On the contrary, he disapproved of the pursuit of geometry up to diagrams, which puzzled the intellect; for he said that he did not see to what practical use it could lead. Albeit he himself was by no means unskilled in such studies, he maintained, nevertheless, that they were enough to wear out a man's life, and to prevent his acquiring a knowledge of many other invaluable branches of instruction.

He advised his followers to make themselves acquainted with astronomy also, but this only up to such a point as would teach them to distinguish the various periods of the night, or

the month, or the year, in travelling by land or sea, or when they were on guard; and whatever occupations are appropriate to any particular time of the month or year, to be able, by recognizing the seasons of the above-mentioned periods, to use them as signs when they ought to apply themselves to their tasks. And thus, much information, he said, was easily acquired from those who hunted by night and pilots, and from many others whose business it was to be acquainted with such matters. But, from pursuing the study up to such a point as to know what bodies do not revolve in the same circle, the various planets, and the unnamed constellations, and from wearying themselves by investigations into their respective distances from the earth, the periods of their appearance, and their causes, he earnestly dissuaded them; for he said that he did not see what was gained by such studies — although he was himself to a certain extent devoted to them — as he maintained that they also wore out men's lives, and kept them from many other useful occupations.

And as to the celestial bodies generally, he dissuaded men from investigating too closely the divine economy of the heavens; for he held that such matters were beyond human ken, nor did he think that anyone who sought to clear up points which the gods themselves did not wish to divulge, was acting acceptably to them. He said, too, that a person who was over-anxious about such matters ran the risk of even going out of his mind, just as Anaxagoras did, who prided himself greatly upon his ability to explain the divine economy. For he, when he asserted that fire and the sun were identical, ignored the fact that men stare into the fire without inconvenience, but cannot even look upon the face of the sun; and that those who are exposed to the sun's rays are tanned by them, but that fire does not produce the same effect. Neither did he perceive that of the productions of the earth none can come to

maturity without sunshine, but that they all wither and perish when exposed to the heat of the fire. And, again, when he asserted that the sun was a fire-heated stone, he forgot this, that a stone neither shines in the fire nor retains its heat for any lengthened period; whereas the sun is, and continues to be, the most luminous of bodies throughout all time.

He also exhorted his disciples to learn the art of reasoning; but in this, as in all other studies, he cautioned them against fruitless labor; although up to such a point as was useful, he took all matters into his consideration, and investigated them with his companions.

He likewise encouraged his associates to take great care of their health, both by learning as much as they could from those who knew what would preserve it, and each person by studying for himself throughout his life what kind of food or drink or what sort of exercise was most adapted to him, and how by the use of them he might continue in the soundest condition; tor that if a person paid thus much attention to himself, it would be a difficult matter to discover a physician who could tell him better what was beneficial to his health than he could himself.

But if a person desired to be helped by wisdom superior to that of man, he advised him to apply him-self to the study of divination, because, he said, anyone who possessed a knowledge of the signs whereby the gods vouchsafe indications to men in reference to human affairs, could never be destitute of divine counsel.

CHAPTER VIII.

Now, if anyone should imagine that, when he was condemned to death by the judges for his assertion that the divinity forewarned him what he should do, and what he should abstain from doing, he was convicted of speaking falsely concerning the divinity, let him consider, in the first place, that he was already of such an advanced age that his life must have come to a close, if not then, yet not very long after. Secondly, that he relinquished only the most burdensome portion of life, in which all men feel their mental faculties impaired; whereas he acquired additional glory by exhibiting the power of his mind in pleading his own cause more truthfully, independently, and fairly than any other individual would have done, and in submitting to his sentence of death with the greatest resignation and fortitude.

It is indeed generally admitted that no one ever met his fate in a nobler manner; for he was compelled to live for thirty days after his condemnation, on account of the sentence having been passed during the month of the Delian festival, and, by law, no one might be publicly executed until the return of the sacred expedition from Delos. During the whole of this period, he was openly seen by all his acquaintances, passing his time in every respect according to his usual wont, although he had always been previously remarkable, above all other men, for the cheerful and easy manner of his life. And how could anybody have died more nobly than this? Or what sort of death can be more noble than that which is suffered most nobly? And what kind of death can be happier than the noblest, or what more dear to the gods than that which is happiest?

And I will also repeat an anecdote that was once related to me concerning him by Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, who said that after Meletus had already laid the indictment against him, when he himself heard him discoursing upon all

manner of topics rather than that of his trial, and told him that he ought to be considering what defense he should make, that his first question was — “But do I not appear to you to have been all my life turning my attention to this point?”

And when Hermogenes asked him how, he said to him, that he had passed all his life in examining what actions were just, and what unjust, and acting in accordance with the former, while he repudiated the latter; and this he conceived to be the most careful mode of preparing his defense.

And the other answered him thus — “Do you not see, Socrates, that the judges at Athens have ere now condemned many an innocent person to death from offence taken at his language, while they have allowed many who were guilty to escape?”

“But, by Jupiter, Hermogenes,” replied he, “while I was already in the very act of beginning to consider what should be the nature of my defense to the judges, the divinity opposed my proceeding.”

And he answered — “You tell a marvelous tale.”

“Do you regard it as marvelous,” asked Socrates, “that the deity thinks it better for me that I should now bring my life to a close? Are you not aware that I refuse to admit that any man has up to this present time spent his existence better or more enjoyably than I have done? For I consider that their lives are the best who study most to become as good as possible, and theirs the most enjoyable who feel that they are constantly progressing in virtue.

“I am conscious that, with regard to myself, such has been the case up to this very moment; and in associating with others, and viewing myself in comparison with others, I have constantly continued to come to the same conclusion respecting myself. And not only I myself, but my friends also steadfastly adhere to the same opinion concerning me, not

because they love me (for those who are in love would naturally thus regard the objects of their affection), but because they consider that their own characters were improved by association with me.

"And if I should live any longer I shall, perhaps, have to bear the penalties of old age, to lose my sight and hearing, to feel my intellects impaired, to become slower at learning and quicker at forgetting, and in such gifts as I once excelled others, to find myself inferior to them. And if, in good truth, I did not, under such circumstances, notice my condition, life would be worthless; but, if I did notice it, how could I continue to live otherwise than less profitably and pleasantly?

"But if I die unjustly, that will reflect disgrace upon those who have killed me unjustly; for, granting that injustice is disgraceful, how is it not a disgrace to commit any unjust action whatever? But what disgrace will it be to me that others were incapable of either deciding or acting justly in my case? And I myself perceive that, with regard to men who have lived before me, the judgment formed by posterity respecting those who have acted wrongfully, and those who have suffered wrong, is by no means similar. Hence, I know that I, too, if I am now to die, shall be regarded by mankind in a very different light from that in which those who have slain me are viewed; for I feel assured that it will always, for all time, be witnessed concerning me, that I have never once wronged any one, or made him a worse character, but that I have ever aimed at the improvement of those who have associated with me." This, then, was the kind of discourse that he held with Hermogenes and sundry others.

And of those who knew Socrates as he really was, all such as are lovers of virtue feel more regret for him than they do for anybody else, even up to the present day, as for one who contributed in the highest degree to their moral progress. And to me, most emphatically (being, as I have described him, so

pious, that he undertook nothing without the counsel of the gods; so just, that he never injured any one — no, not even in the slightest degree — but was of the greatest service to those who associated with him; so temperate, that he never preferred pleasure to virtue; so sensible, that he never erred in distinguishing the better from the worse, without requiring aid from anyone else, but being of himself perfectly competent to discriminate between them; so capable of discoursing upon and defining such matters; and so skilled in estimating the characters of others, and in convincing those that were in error, and persuading them to the pursuit of virtue and all that was honorable and good), he seemed to be such an one as the very best and happiest man could be. But if anyone is not satisfied with my opinion, let him compare the characteristics of others with those of Socrates, and form his judgment accordingly.

THE END.

Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates.

Rev. J. S. Watson, M. A.

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BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

The two charges on which Socrates was condemned to death by the Athenians. The first charge refuted by several arguments: for Socrates used to sacrifice to the gods; he practiced divination, and his daemon was no new god; he recommended that the gods should be consulted by man in perplexing circumstances; he was guilty of no impiety, he avoided vain speculations respecting the gods, and said that the business of philosophy was the study of virtue; his life was in accordance with the precepts of morality.

I have often wondered by what arguments the accusers of Socrates persuaded the Athenians that he deserved death from the state; for the indictment against him was to this effect: Socrates offends against the laws in not paying respect to those gods whom the city respects, and introducing other new deities; he also offends against the laws in corrupting the youth.

In the first place, that he did not respect the gods whom the city respects, what proof did they bring? For he was seen frequently sacrificing at home, and frequently on the public altars of the city; nor was it unknown that he used divination; as it was a common subject of talk, that "Socrates used to say that the divinity instructed him;" and it was from this circumstance, indeed, that they seem chiefly to have derived the charge of introducing new deities.

He however introduced nothing newer than those who, practicing divination, consult auguries, voices, omens, and sacrifices; for they do not imagine that birds, or people who meet them, know what is advantageous for those seeking presages, but that the gods, by their means, signify what will be so; and such was the opinion that Socrates entertained.

Most people say that they are diverted from an object, or prompted to it, by birds, or by the people who meet them; but Socrates spoke as he thought, for he said it was the divinity that was his monitor. He also told many of his friends to do certain things, and not to do others, intimating that the divinity had forewarned him; and advantage attended those who obeyed his suggestions, but repentance, those who disregarded them.

Yet who would not acknowledge that Socrates wished to appear to his friends neither a fool nor a boaster? But he would have seemed to be both, if, after saying that intimations were given him by a god, he had then been proved guilty of falsehood. It is manifest, therefore, that he would have uttered no predictions, if he had not trusted that they would prove true. But who, in such matters, would trust to anyone but a god? And how could he, who trusted the gods, think that there were no gods?

He also acted towards his friends according to his convictions, for he recommended them to perform affairs of necessary consequence in such a manner

as he thought that they would be best managed; but concerning those of which it was doubtful how they would terminate, he sent them to take auguries whether they should be done or not.

Those who would govern families or cities well, he said, had need of divination; for to become skillful in architecture, or working in brass, or agriculture, or in commanding men, or to become a critic in any such arts, or a good reasoner, or a skillful regulator of a household, or a well-qualified general, he considered as wholly matters of learning, and left to the choice of the human understanding; but he said that the gods reserved to themselves the most important particulars attending such matters, of which nothing was apparent to men; for neither was it certain to him who had sown his field well, who should reap the fruit of it; nor certain to him who had built a house well, who should inhabit it; nor certain to him who was skilled in generalship, whether it would be for his advantage to act as a general; nor certain to him who was versed in political affairs, whether it would be for his profit to be at the head of the state; nor certain to him who had married a beautiful wife in hopes of happiness, whether he should not incur misery by her means; nor certain to him who had acquired powerful connections in the state, whether he might not be banished by them: and those who thought that none of these things depended on the gods, but that all were dependent on the human understanding, he pronounced to be insane; as he also pronounced those to be insane who had recourse to omens respecting matters which the gods had granted to men to discover by the exercise of their faculties; as if, for instance, a man should inquire whether it would be better to take for the driver of his chariot, one who knows how to drive, or one who does not know; or whether it would be better to place over his ship one who knows how to steer it, or one who does not know; or if men should ask respecting matters which they may learn by counting, or measuring, or weighing; for those who inquired of the gods concerning such matters he thought guilty of impiety, and said that it was the duty of men to learn whatever the gods had enabled them to do by learning, and to try to ascertain from the gods by augury whatever was obscure to men; as the gods always afford information to those to whom they are rendered propitious.

He was constantly in public, for he went in the morning to the places for walking and the gymnasia; at the time when the market was full he was to be seen there; and the rest of the day he was where he was likely to meet the greatest number of people; he was generally engaged in discourse, and all who pleased were at liberty to hear him; yet no one ever either saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying, anything impious or profane; for he did not dispute about the nature of things as most other philosophers disputed, speculating how that which is called by sophists the world was produced, and by what necessary laws everything in the heavens is effected, but endeavored to show that those who chose such objects of contemplation were foolish; and used in the first place to inquire of them whether they thought that they already knew sufficient of human affairs, and therefore proceeded to such subjects of meditation, or whether, when they neglected human affairs entirely, and speculated on celestial matters, they thought that they were

doing what became them. He wondered, too, that it was not apparent to them that it is impossible for man to satisfy himself on such points, since even those who pride themselves most on discussing them, do not hold the same opinions one with another, but are, compared with each other, like madmen; for of madmen some have no fear of what is to be feared, and others fear what is not to be feared; some think it no shame to say or do anything whatever before men, and others think that they ought not to go among men at all; some pay no respect to temple, or altar, or anything dedicated to the gods, and others worship stones, and common stocks, and beasts: so of those who speculate on the nature of the universe, some imagine that all that exists is one, others that there are worlds infinite in number; some that all things are in perpetual motion, others that nothing is ever moved; some that all things are generated and decay, and others that nothing is either generated or decays.

He would ask, also, concerning such philosophers, whether, as those who have learned arts practiced by men, expect that they will be able to carry into effect what they have learned, either for themselves, or for anyone else whom they may wish, so those who inquire into celestial things, imagine that, when they have discovered by what laws everything is effected, they will be able to produce, whenever they please, wind, rain, changes of the seasons, and whatever else of that sort they may desire, or whether they have no such expectation, but are content merely to know how everything of that nature is generated.

Such were the observations which he made about those who busied themselves in such speculations; but for himself, he would hold discourse, from time to time, on what concerned mankind, considering what was pious, what impious; what was becoming, what unbecoming; what was just, what unjust; what was sanity, what insanity; what was fortitude, what cowardice; what a state was, and what the character of a statesman; what was the nature of government over men, and the qualities of one skilled in governing them; and touching on other subjects, with which he thought that those who were acquainted were men of worth and estimation, but that those who were ignorant of them might justly be deemed no better than slaves.

As to those matters, then, on which Socrates gave no intimation what his sentiments were, it is not at all wonderful that his judges should have decided erroneously concerning him; but is it not wonderful that they should have taken no account of such things as all men knew?

For when he was a member of the senate, and had taken the senator's oath, in which it was expressed that he would vote in accordance with the laws, he, being president in the assembly of the people when they were eager to put to death Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and all the nine generals, by a single vote contrary to the law, refused, though the multitude were enraged at him, and many of those in power uttered threats against him, to put the question to the vote, but considered it of more importance to observe his oath than to gratify the people contrary to

what was right, or to seek safety against those who menaced him; for he thought that the gods paid regard to men, not in the way in which some people suppose, who imagine that the gods know some things and do not know others, but he considered that the gods know all things, both what is said, what is done, and what is meditated in silence, and are present everywhere, and give admonitions to men concerning everything human.

I wonder, therefore, how the Athenians were ever persuaded that Socrates had not right sentiments concerning the gods; a man who never said or did anything impious towards the gods, but spoke and acted in such a manner with respect to them, that any other who had spoken and acted in the same manner, would have been, and have been considered, eminently pious.

CHAPTER II.

Reply to the other charge against Socrates. He did not corrupt the youth, for his whole teaching dissuaded them from vice, and encouraged them to temperance and virtue of every kind. He exhorted them to obey the laws. If Critias and Alcibiades, who listened to his discourses, became corrupt, the fault was not his; he endeavored to reclaim them, till they deserted him; and others, who resigned themselves wholly to his instructions, became virtuous and honorable men,—other frivolous assertions refuted. His benevolence, disinterestedness, and general merits.

It also seems wonderful to me, that any should have been persuaded that Socrates corrupted the youth; Socrates, who, in addition to what has been said of him, was not only the most rigid of all men in the government of his passions and appetites, but also most able to withstand cold, heat, and every kind of labor; and, besides, so inured to frugality, that, though he possessed very little, he very easily made it a sufficiency. How, then, being of such a character himself, could he have rendered others impious, or lawless, or luxurious, or incontinent, or too effeminate to endure labor? On the contrary, he restrained many of them from such vices, leading them to love virtue, and giving them hopes, that if they would take care of themselves, they would become honorable and worthy characters. Not indeed that he ever professed to be an instructor in that way, but, by showing that he was himself such a character, he made those in his society hope that, by imitating him, they would become such as he was.

Of the body he was not neglectful, nor did he commend those who were. He did not approve that a person should eat to excess, and then use immoderate exercise, but recommended that he should work off, by a proper degree of exercise, as much as the appetite received with pleasure; for such a habit, he said, was peculiarly conducive to health, and did not prevent attention to the mind. He was not, however, fine or ostentatious in his clothes or sandals, or in any of his habits of life; yet he did not make those about him lovers of money, for he checked them in this as well as other passions, and asked no remuneration from those who desired his company. By refraining from such demand, he thought that he consulted his liberty, and called those who took money for their discourses their own enslavers, since they must of necessity hold discussions with those from whom they received pay.

He expressed wonder, too, that anyone who professed to teach virtue, should demand money, and not think that he gained the greatest profit in securing a good friend, but fear that he whom he had made an honorable and worthy character would not retain the greatest gratitude towards his greatest benefactor. Socrates, indeed, never expressed so much to anyone; yet he believed that those of his associates who imbibed what he approved, would be always good friends both to himself and to each other. How then could a man of such a character corrupt the young, unless, indeed, the study of virtue be corruption?

“But assuredly,” said the accuser, “he caused those who conversed with him to despise the established laws, by saying how foolish it was to elect the magistrates of a state by beans, when nobody would be willing to take a pilot elected by beans, or an architect, or a flute-player, or a person in any other profession, which, if erroneously exercised, would cause far less harm than errors in the administration of a state;” and declared that “such remarks excited the young to condemn the established form of government, and disposed them to acts of violence.” But I think that young men who exercise their understanding, and expect to become capable of teaching their fellow-citizens what is for their interest, grow by no means addicted to violence, knowing that on violence attend enmity and danger, but that, by persuasion, the same results are attained without peril, and with goodwill; for those who are compelled by us, hate us as if despoiled of something, while those who are persuaded by us, love us as if they had received a favor. It is not the part, therefore, of those who cultivate the intellect to use violence; for to adopt such a course belongs to those who possess brute force without intellect, it. Besides, he who would venture to use force, had need of no small number of allies, but he who can succeed with persuasion, has need of none, for, though left alone, he would think himself still able to persuade; and it by no means belongs to such men to shed blood, for who would wish to put another man to death rather than to have him as a living subject persuaded to obey?

“But,” said the accuser, “Critias and Alcibiades, after having been associates of Socrates, inflicted a great number of evils on the state; for Critias was the most avaricious and violent of all that composed the oligarchy, and Alcibiades was the most intemperate, insolent, and turbulent of all those in the democracy.” For whatever evil they did the state, I shall make no apology; but as to their intimacy with Socrates, I will state how it took place. These two men were by nature the most ambitious of all the Athenians, and wished that everything should be done by their means, and that they themselves should become the most celebrated of all men. But they knew that Socrates lived with the utmost contentment on very small means, that he was most abstinent from every kind of pleasure, and that he swayed those with whom he conversed just as he pleased by his arguments; and, seeing such to be the case, and being such characters as they have just been stated to be, whether will anyone say that they sought his society from a desire to lead such a life as Socrates led, and to practice such temperance as he practiced, or from an expectation that, if they associated with him, they would become eminently able to speak and act? I myself, indeed, am of opinion, that if a god had given them their choice, whether they would live their whole lives as they saw Socrates living, or die, they would have chosen rather to die; and they showed this disposition by what they did; for as soon as they considered themselves superior to their associates, they at once started away from Socrates, and engaged in political life, to qualify themselves for which they had sought the society of Socrates.

Perhaps someone may observe on this point, that Socrates should not have taught his followers politics before he taught them self-control. To this remark I

make no reply at present; but I see that all teachers make themselves examples to their pupils how far they practice what they teach, and stimulate them by precepts; and I know that Socrates made himself an example to those who associated with him as a man of honorable and excellent character, and that he discoursed admirably concerning virtue and other things that concern mankind. I know, too, that those men exercised self-control as long as they conversed with Socrates, not from fear lest they should be fined or beaten by him, but from a persuasion at the time that it was best to observe such conduct.

Perhaps, however, many of those who profess to be philosophers, may say that a man once just, can never become unjust, or once modest, immodest; and that, with regard to any other qualification, (among such as can be taught,) he who has once learned it can never become ignorant of it But regarding such points I am not of that opinion; for I see that as those who do not exercise the body, cannot perform what is proper to the body, so those who do not exercise the mind, cannot perform what is proper to the mind; for they can neither do that which they ought to do, nor refrain from that from which they ought to refrain. For which reason fathers keep their sons, though they be of a virtuous disposition, from the society of bad men, in the belief that association with the good is an exercise of virtue, but that association with the bad is the destruction of it. One of the poets also bears testimony to this truth, who says,

From good men you will learn what is good;
but if you associate with the bad,
you will lose the understanding which is in you.

And another, who observes,

A good man is at one time good,
and at another bad.

I also concur with them; for I see that as people forget metrical compositions when they do not practice the repetition of them, so forgetfulness of precepts of instruction is produced in those who neglect them. But where a person forgets moral admonitions, he forgets also what the mind felt when it had a desire for self-government; and, when he forgets this, it is not at all wonderful that he forgets self-government also.

I see, too, that those who are given up to a fondness for drinking, and those who have fallen in love, are less able to attend to what they ought to do, and to refrain from what they ought not to do; for many, who can be frugal in their expenses before they fall in love, are, after falling in love, unable to continue so; and, when they have exhausted their resources, they no longer abstain from means of gain from which they previously shrunk as thinking them dishonorable.

How is it impossible, then, that he who has once had a control over himself, may afterwards cease to maintain it, and that he who was once able to observe justice, may subsequently become unable? To me everything honorable and good seems to be maintained by exercise, and self-control not the least; for sensual desires, generated in the same body with the soul, are constantly exciting it to abandon self-control, and to gratify themselves and the body as soon as possible.

Critias and Alcibiades, then, as long as they associated with Socrates, were able, with the assistance of his example, to maintain a mastery over their immoral inclinations; but, when they were separated from him, Critias, fleeing to Thessaly, formed connections there with men who practiced dishonesty rather than justice; and Alcibiades also, being sought by many women, even of high rank, for his beauty, and being corrupted by many men, who were well able to seduce him by their flattery, on account of his influence in the city and among the allies, and being also honored by the people, and easily obtaining the pre-eminence among them, became like the wrestlers in the gymnastic games, who, when they are fairly superior to others, neglect their exercise; so he grew neglectful of self-control.

When such was their fortune, and when they were proud of their birth, elated with their wealth, puffed up with their power, corrupted by many associates, demoralized by all these means, and long absent from Socrates, what wonder is it if they became headstrong? And then, if they did anything wrong, does the accuser blame Socrates for it? and does Socrates seem to the accuser deserving of no praise, for having, when they were young, and when it is likely that they were most inconsiderate and intractable, rendered them discreet? Yet other affairs are not judged of in such a way; for what flute-player, or what teacher of the harp, or what other instructor, if he produces competent pupils, and if they, attaching themselves to other masters, become less skillful, is blamed for their deterioration? Or what father, if his son, while he associated with one man, should be virtuous, but afterwards, on uniting himself to some other person, should become vicious, would blame the former of the two? Would he not rather, the more corrupt his son became with the second, bestow the greater praise on the first? Not even parents themselves, when they have their sons in their society, are blamed if their sons do anything wrong, provided they themselves are correct in their conduct.

In the same manner it would be right to judge of Socrates; if he had done anything immoral, he would justly be thought to be a bad man; but if he constantly observed morality, how can he reasonably bear the blame of vice which was not in him?

Or even if he himself did nothing wrong, but commended others when he saw them doing wrong, he would justly be censured. When he perceived, however, that Critias was enamored of Euthydemus, and was seeking to have the enjoyment of his society, like those who abuse the persons of others for licentious purposes, he dissuaded him from his intention, by saying that it was illiberal, and unbecoming

a man of honor and proper feeling, to offer supplications to the object of his affections, with whom he wished to be held in high esteem, beseeching and entreating him, like a beggar, to grant a favor, especially when such favor was for no good end.

But as Critias paid no regard to such remonstrances, and was not diverted from his pursuit, it is said that Socrates, in the presence of many others as well as of Euthydemus, observed that "Critias seemed to him to have some feeling like that of a pig, as he wished to rub against Euthydemus as swine against stones." Critias, in consequence, conceived such a hatred to Socrates, that when he was one of the Thirty Tyrants, and was appointed a law-maker with Charicles, he remembered the circumstance to his disadvantage, and inserted in his laws that "none should teach the art of disputation," intending an insult to Socrates, yet not knowing how to affect him in particular, but laying to his charge what was imputed to the philosophers by the multitude, and calumniating him to the people; at least such is my opinion; for I myself never heard this from Socrates, nor do I remember having known anyone say that he heard it from him.

Bat Critias showed that such was the case; for when the Thirty had put to death many of the citizens, and those not of the inferior class, and had encouraged many to acts of injustice, Socrates happened to observe, that "it seemed surprising to him if a man, becoming herdsman of a number of cattle, and rendering the cattle fewer and in worse condition, should not confess that he was a bad herdsman, and still more surprising if a man, becoming governor of a city, and rendering the people fewer and in worse condition, should not feel ashamed, and be conscious of being a bad governor of the city." This remark being repeated to the Thirty, Critias and Charicles summoned Socrates before them, showed him the law, and forbade him to hold discourse with the youth. Socrates inquired of them, if he might be permitted to ask a question as to any point in the prohibitions that might not be understood by him. They gave him permission. "Then," said he, "I am prepared to obey the laws; but that I may not unconsciously transgress through ignorance, I wish to ascertain exactly from you, ' whether it is because you think that the art of reasoning is an auxiliary to what is rightly spoken, or to what is not rightly spoken, that you give command to abstain from it; for if it be an adjunct to what is rightly spoken, it is plain that we have to abstain from speaking rightly; but if to what is not rightly spoken, it is plain that we ought to endeavor to speak rightly."

Charicles, falling into a passion with him, said, "Since, Socrates, you are ignorant of this particular, we give you an order more easy to be understood, not to discourse at all with the young? "That it may not be doubtful, then," said Socrates, "whether I do anything contrary to what is enjoined, define for me till what age I must consider men to be young."

“As long,” replied Charicles, “as they are not allowed to fill the office of senator, as not being yet come to maturity of understanding; and do not discourse with such as are under thirty years of age.”

“And if I wish to buy anything,” said Socrates, “and a person under thirty years of age has it for sale, may I not ask him at what price he sells it?”

“Yes, such questions as these,” replied Charicles, “but you are accustomed to ask most of your questions about things, when you know very well how they stand; such questions, therefore, do not ask.”

“If then any young man,” said he, “should ask me such a question as ‘where does Charicles live?’ or ‘where is Critias?’ may I not answer him, if I know?”

“Yes, you may answer such questions,” said Charicles.

“But,” added Critias, “it will be necessary for you to abstain from speaking of those shoemakers, and carpenters, and smiths; indeed I think that they must now be worn out, from being so often in your mouth.”

“I must therefore,” said Socrates, “abstain from the illustrations that I attach to the mention of those people, illustrations on justice, piety, and other such subjects.”

“Yes, by Zeus,” retorted Charicles, “and you must abstain from illustrations taken from herdsmen; for, if you do not, take care lest you yourself make the cattle fewer.”

Hence it was evident that they were angry with Socrates on account of his remark about the cattle having been reported to them.

What sort of intercourse Critias had with Socrates, and how they stood towards each other, has now been stated. But I would say that no regular training is derived by anyone from a teacher who does not please him; and Critias and Alcibiades did not associate with Socrates, while their association with him lasted, as being an instructor that pleased them, but they were, from the very first, eager to be at the head of the state, for, while they still attended Socrates, they sought to converse with none more than with those who were most engaged in affairs of government. Alcibiades, it is said, before he was twenty years of age, held the following discourse with Pericles, who was his guardian, and chief ruler of the state, about laws.

“Tell me,” said he, “Pericles, can you teach me what a law is.”

“Certainly,” replied Pericles. “Teach me then, in the name of the gods,” said Alcibiades, “for I, hearing some persons praised as being obedient to the laws, consider that no one can fairly obtain such praise who does not know what a law is.”

“You desire no very difficult matter, Alcibiades,” said Pericles, “when you wish to know what a law is; for all those regulations are laws, which the people, on meeting together and approving them, have enacted, directing what we should do and what we should not do.”

“And whether do they direct that we should do good things, or that we should do bad things?”

“Good, by Zeus, my child,” said he, “but bad by no means.”

“And if it should not be the whole people, but a few, as where there is an oligarchy, that should meet together, and enact what we are to do, what are such enactments?”

“Everything,” replied Pericles, “which the supreme power in the state, on determining what the people ought to do, has enacted, is called a law.”

“And if a tyrant, holding rule over the state, prescribes to the citizens what they must do, is such prescription called a law.”

“Whatever a tyrant in authority prescribes,” returned Pericles, “is also called a law.”

“What then, Pericles,” asked Alcibiades, “is force and lawlessness? Is it not when the stronger obliges the weaker, not by persuasion, but by compulsion, to do what he pleases?”

“So it appears to me,” replied Pericles. “Whatever then a tyrant compels the people to do, by enacting it without gaining their consent, is that an act of lawlessness?”

“Yes,” said Pericles, “it appears to me that it is, for I retract my admission that what a tyrant prescribes to the people without persuading them, is a law.”

“But what the few enact, not from gaining the consent of the many, but from having superior power, should we say that that is force, or that it is not?”

“Everything,” said Pericles, “which one man obliges another to do without gaining his consent, whether he enact it in writing or not, seems to me to be force rather than law.”

“Whatever, then, the whole people, when they are stronger than the wealthier class, enact without their consent, would be an act of force rather than a law?”

“Certainly, Alcibiades,” said Pericles; “and I, when I was of your age, was very acute at such disquisitions; for we used to meditate and argue about such subjects as you now appear to meditate.”

“Would therefore,” said Alcibiades, “that I had conversed with you, Pericles, at the time when you were most acute in discussing such topics!”

When Alcibiades and Critias, therefore, began to think themselves superior to those who were then governing the state, they no longer attended Socrates, (for he was not agreeable to them in other respects, and they were offended, if they went to him at all, at being reproved for any error that they had committed,) but devoted themselves to political employments, with a view to which they had at first associated with Socrates. But Crito was also an attendant on Socrates, as well as Chærephon, Chærecrates, Hermocrates, Simmias, Cebes, and Phædondes, who, with others that attended him, did not seek hi society that they might be fitted for popular orators or forensic pleaders, but that, becoming honorable and good men, they might conduct themselves irreproachably towards their families, connections, dependents, and friends, as well as towards their country and their fellow-citizens;

and no one of all these, whether in youth or at a more advanced age, either was guilty, or was accused, of any crime.

"But Socrates," said the accuser, "taught children to show contempt for their parents, persuading his followers that he rendered them wiser than their fathers, and observing that a son was allowed by the law to confine his father on convicting him of being deranged, using that circumstance as an argument that it was lawful for the more ignorant to be confined by the wiser." But what Socrates said was, that he thought he who confined another for ignorance, might justly be himself confined by those who knew what he did not know; and, with a view to such cases, he used to consider in what respect ignorance differed from madness, and expressed his opinion that madmen might be confined with advantage to themselves and their friends, but that those who did not know what they ought to know, might reasonably learn from those who did know.

"But Socrates," proceeded the accuser, "not only caused parents, but other relations, to be held in contempt by his followers, saying that relatives, as relatives, were of no profit to people who were sick, or to people going to law, but that physicians aided the one, and lawyers the other." The accuser asserted, too, that Socrates said concerning friends that "it was of no profit that they were well-disposed, unless they were able also to assist; and that he insisted that those only were deserving of honor who knew what was for the advantage of others and could make it intelligible to them; and that by thus persuading the young that he himself was the wisest of mankind, and most capable of making others wise, he so disposed his pupils towards him, that other people were of no account with them in comparison with himself." I am aware, indeed, that he did express himself concerning parents and other relatives, and concerning friends, in such a manner as this; and used to say, besides, that when the soul has departed, in which alone intelligence exists, men take away the body of their dearest friend, and put it out of sight as soon as possible. He was accustomed to say, also, that every man, while he is alive, removes of himself from his own body, which he loves most of all things, and allows others to remove from it, everything that is useless and unprofitable; since men themselves take off portions of their nails, and hair, and callous parts, and resign themselves to surgeons to cut and burn them with labor and pain, and think it their duty even to pay them money for their operations; and the saliva from the mouth, he said, men spit away as far as possible, because, while it is in the mouth, it profits them nothing, but is far more likely to harm them. But such observations Socrates uttered, not to teach anyone of his followers to bury his father alive, or to cut himself to pieces, but, by showing that what is senseless is worthless, he exhorted each to study to become as intelligent and useful as possible, so that, whether he wished to be honored by his father, by his brother, or by anyone else, he might not be neglectful of himself through trusting to his relationship, but might endeavor to be serviceable to those by whom he desired to be respected.

The accuser also said that Socrates, selecting the worst passages of the most celebrated poets, and using them as arguments, taught those who kept him company to be unprincipled and tyrannical. The verse of Hesiod, for example,

Work is no disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace,

they say that he used to explain as intimating that the poet bids us abstain from no kind of work, dishonest or dishonorable, but to do such work for the sake of profit. But when Socrates maintained that to be busy was useful and beneficial for a man, and that to be unemployed was noxious and ill for him, that to work was a good, and to be idle an evil, he at the same time observed that those only who do something good really work, and are useful workmen, but those who gamble, or do anything bad and pernicious, he called idle; and in this view the sentiment of the poet will be unobjectionable,

Work is no disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace.

That passage of Homer, too, the accuser stated that he often used to quote, in which it is said that Ulysses,

Whatever king or eminent hero he found,

Stood beside him, and detained him with gentle words:

"Illustrious chief, it is not fit that you should shrink back as a coward;

Sit down yourself, and make the rest of the people sit down." But whatever man of the people he noticed, and found clamoring, He struck him with his staff, and rebuked him with words:

"Worthless fellow, sit down in peace, and hear the exhortations of others,

Who are much better than you; for you are unwarlike and powerless.

Neither to be numbered in the field nor in the council."

And he said that he used to explain it as if the poet recommended that plebeians and poor people should be beaten. Socrates, however, said no such thing, (for he would thus have given an opinion that he himself ought to be beaten,) but what he did say was, that those who benefited others neither by word nor deed, and who were incapable of serving the army, or the state, or the common people, if they should ever be called upon to serve, should, especially if, in addition to their incapacity, they were of an insolent spirit, be curbed in every way, even though they might be ever so rich. But, contrary to the charge of the accuser, Socrates was evidently a friend to the common people, and of a liberal disposition; for though he received numbers of persons desirous to hear him discourse, as well citizens as foreigners, he never required payment for his communications from anyone, but imparted to everyone in abundance from his stores, of which some receiving fragments from him for nothing, sold them at a great price to others, and were not, like him, friends to the common people, for they declined to converse

with such as had not money to give them. But Socrates, in the eyes of other men, conferred glory on the city, far more than Lichas, who was celebrated in this respect, on that of the Lacedaemonians; for Lichas indeed entertained the strangers that visited Lacedaemon at the Gymnopaediae, but Socrates, through the whole course of his life, freely imparted whatever he had to bestow, and thus benefited in the highest degree all who were willing to receive from him, making those who associated with him better before he let them go.

To me, therefore, Socrates, being a man of such a character, appeared to be worthy of honor rather than of death; and anyone, considering his case according to the laws, would find such to be the fact; for, by the laws, death is the punishment for a man if he be found stealing, or stripping people of their clothes, or cutting purses, or housebreaking, or kidnapping, or sacrilege, of which crimes Socrates was the most innocent of all men. Nor was he ever the cause of any war ending unfortunately for the state, or of any sedition or treachery; nor did he ever, in his private transactions, either deprive any man of what was for his good, or involve him in evil; nor did he ever lie under suspicion of any of the crimes which I have mentioned.

How then could he have been guilty of the charges brought against him? a man who, instead of not acknowledging the gods, as was stated in the indictment, evidently paid respect to the gods more than other men; and instead of corrupting the youth, as the accuser laid to his charge, plainly led such of his associates as had vicious inclinations, to cease from indulging them, and exhorted them to cherish a love of that most honorable and excellent virtue, by which men successfully govern states and families. How then, pursuing such a course of conduct, was he not deserving of great honor from the city?

CHAPTER III.

Confirmation of the character of Socrates given in the preceding chapters. He worshipped the gods, and exhorted others to worship them. His notions how the gods were to be supplicated, His judgment as to what was acceptable to them in a sacrifice, his regard for omens, his observance of temperance, and recommendation of it to others.

But to show how he appeared to improve those who associated with him, partly by showing them what his character was, and partly by his conversation, I shall record whatever I can remember of him relating to these points.

As to what had reference to the gods, then, he evidently acted and spoke in conformity with the answer which the priestess of Apollo gives to those who inquire how they ought to proceed with regard to a sacrifice, to the worship of their ancestors, or to any such matter; for the priestess replies that they will act piously, if they act in agreement with the law of their country; and Socrates both acted in this manner himself, and exhorted others to act similarly; and such as acted in any other way he regarded as doing what was not to the purpose, and guilty of folly.

To the gods he simply prayed that they would give him good things, as believing that the gods knew best what things are good; and those who prayed for gold, or silver, or dominion, or anything of that kind, he considered to utter no other sort of requests than if they were to pray that they might play at dice, or fight, or do anything else of which it is quite uncertain what the result will be.

When he offered small sacrifices from his small means, he thought that he was not at all inferior in merit to those who offered numerous and great sacrifices from ample and abundant means; for he said that it would not become the gods to delight in large rather than in small sacrifices; since, if such were the case, the offerings of the bad would oftentimes be more acceptable to them than those of the good; nor would life be of any account in the eyes of men, if oblations from the bad were better received by the gods than oblations from the good; but he thought that the gods had most pleasure in the offerings of the most pious. He also used to quote, with approbation, the verse,

Perform sacrifices to the gods according to your ability,

and used to say that it was a good exhortation to men, with regard to friends, and guests, and all other relations of life, to perform according to their ability.

If anything appeared to be intimated to him from the gods, he could no more have been persuaded to act contrary to such intimation, than anyone could have persuaded him to take for his guide on a journey a blind man, or one who did not know the way, instead of one who could see, and did know it; and he condemned

the folly of others, who act contrary to what is signified by the god, through anxiety to avoid the ill opinion of men. As for himself, he undervalued everything human, in comparison with counsel from the gods.

He disciplined his mind and body by such a course of life, that he who should adopt a similar one, would, if no supernatural influence prevented, live in good spirits and uninterrupted health; nor would he ever be in want of the necessary expenses for it. So frugal was he, that I do not know whether anyone could earn so little by the labor of his hands, as not to procure sufficient to have satisfied Socrates. He took only so much food as he could eat with a keen relish; and, to this end, he came to his meals so disposed that the appetite for his meat was the sauce to it Every kind of drink was agreeable to him, because he never drank unless he was thirsty. If he ever complied with an invitation to go to a feast, he very easily guarded, what is extremely difficult to most men, against loading his stomach to excess. Those who were unable to do so, he advised to be cautious of taking anything that would stimulate them to eat when they were not hungry, and to drink when they were not thirsty; for he said that those were the things that disordered the stomach, the head, and the mind; and he used to say, in jest, that he thought Circe transformed men into swine, by entertaining them with abundance of such luxuries, but that Ulysses, through the admonition of Mercury, and through being himself temperate, and forbearing to partake of such delicacies to excess, was in consequence not changed into a swine.

Such jests he would utter on these subjects, but with an earnest meaning. As to love, his counsel was to abstain rigidly from familiarity with beautiful persons; for he observed that it was not easy to be in communication with such persons, and observe continence. Hearing, on one occasion, that Critobulus, the son of Criton, had kissed the son of Alcibiades, a handsome youth, he asked Xenophon, in the presence of Critobulus, saying, “Tell me, Xenophon, did you not think that Critobulus was one of the modest rather than the forward, one of the thoughtful rather than of the thoughtless and inconsiderate?”

Certainly,” replied Xenophon. “You must now, then, think him extremely headstrong and daring; one who would even spring upon drawn swords, and leap into the fire.”

“And what,” said Xenophon, “have you seen him doing, that you form so unfavorable an opinion of him?”

“Why, has he not dared,” rejoined Socrates, “to kiss the son of Alcibiades, a youth extremely handsome, and in the flower of his age?”

“If such a deed,” returned Xenophon, “is one of daring and peril, I think that even I could undergo such peril.”

“Unhappy man!” exclaimed Socrates, “and what do you think that you incur by kissing a handsome person? Do you not expect to become at once a slave instead of a freeman? To spend much money upon hurtful pleasures? To have too much

occupation to attend to anything honorable and profitable? And to be compelled to pursue what not even a madman would pursue?"

"By Hercules," said Xenophon, "what extraordinary power you represent to be in a kiss!"

"Do you wonder at this?" rejoined Socrates; "are you not aware that the Tarantula, an insect not as large as half an obolus, by just touching a part of the body with its mouth, wears men down with pain, and deprives them of their senses?"

"Yes, indeed," said Xenophon, "but the Tarantula infuses something at the bitten part?"

"And do you not think, foolish man," rejoined Socrates, "that beautiful persons infuse something when they kiss, something which you do not see? Do you not know that the animal, which they call a handsome and beautiful object, is so much more formidable than the Tarantula, as those insects instill something when they touch the body, but this creature, without even touching, but if a person only looks at it, though from a very great distance, instils something of such potency, as to drive people mad? Perhaps indeed Cupid are called archers for no other reason but because the beautiful wound from a distance. But I advise you, Xenophon, whenever you see any handsome person, to flee without looking behind you; and I recommend to you, Critobulus, to absent yourself from hence for a year, for perhaps you may in that time, though hardly indeed, be cured of your wound."

Thus he thought that those should act with regard to objects of love who were not secure against the attractions of such objects; objects of such a nature, that if the body did not at all desire them, the mind would not contemplate them, and which, if the body did desire them, should cause us no trouble. For himself, he was evidently so disciplined with respect to such matters, that he could more easily keep aloof from the fairest and most blooming objects than others from the most deformed and unattractive.

Such was the stale of his feelings in regard to eating, drinking, and amorous gratification; and he believed that he himself, with self-restraint, would have no less pleasure from them, than those who took great trouble to pursue such gratifications, and that he would suffer far less anxiety.

CHAPTER IV.

Socrates not only exhorted men to practice virtue, but led them to the practice of it; his dialogue with Aristodemus. Things formed for a purpose, must be the production, not of chance, but of reason. The human frame is a structure of great excellence, and admirably fitted for its purposes, and we must therefore suppose that man is the object of divine forethought. The order of things throughout the universe shows that it is under the providence of a superior nature. The superiority of man over the inferior animals proves that he is more immediately under the care of the higher powers. The gods also give instruction to man as to his conduct. That they care for man both individually and collectively is evident from various considerations. As the mind governs the body, so the providence of the gods governs the world. If men therefore worship the gods rightly, they may feel persuaded that the gods will be ready to aid them.

But if any suppose that Socrates, as some write and speak of him on conjecture, was excellently qualified to exhort men to virtue, but incapable of leading them forward in it, let them consider not only what he said in refutation, by questioning, of those who thought that they knew everything, (refutations intended to check the progress of those disputants,) but what he used to say in his daily intercourse with his associates, and then form an opinion whether he was capable of making those who conversed with him better. I will first mention what I myself once heard him advance in a dialogue with Aristodemus, surnamed The Little, concerning the gods; for having heard that Aristodemus neither sacrificed to the gods, nor prayed to them, nor attended to auguries, but ridiculed those who regarded such matters, he said to him, “Tell me, Aristodemus, do you admire any men for their genius?”

“I do,” replied he.

“Tell us their names, then,” said Socrates.

“In epic poetry I most admire Homer, in dithyrambic Melanippides, in tragedy Sophocles, in statuary Polycletus, in painting Zeuxis.”

“And whether do those who form images without sense and motion, or those who form animals endowed with sense and vital energy, appear to you the more worthy of admiration?”

“Those who form animals, by Zeus, for they are not produced by chance, but by understanding.”

“And regarding things of which it is uncertain for what purpose they exist, and those evidently existing for some useful purpose, which of the two would you say were the productions of chance, and which of intelligence?”

“Doubtless those which exist for some useful purpose must be the productions of intelligence.”

“Does not he, then,” proceeded Socrates, “who made men at first, appear to you to have given them, for some useful purpose, those parts by which they perceive different objects, the eyes to see what is to be seen, the ears to hear what is to be

heard? What would be the use of smells, if no nostrils had been assigned us? What perception would there have been of sweet and sour, and of all that is pleasant to the mouth, if a tongue had not been formed in it to have a sense of them? In addition to these things, does it not seem to you like the work of forethought, to guard the eye, since it is tender, with eyelids, like doors, which, when it is necessary to use the sight, are set open, but in sleep are closed? To make the eyelashes grow as a screen, that winds may not injure it? To make a coping on the parts above the eyes with the eye-brows, that the perspiration from the head may not annoy them? To provide that the ears may receive all kinds of sounds, yet never be obstructed? and that the front teeth in all animals may be adapted to cut, and the back teeth to receive food from them and grind it? To place the mouth, through which animals take in what they desire, near the eyes and the nose? And since what passes off from the stomach is offensive, to turn the channels of it away, and remove them as far as possible from the senses?—can you doubt whether such a disposition of things, made thus apparently with attention, is the result of chance or of intelligence?"

"No, indeed," replied Aristodemus, "but to one who looks at those matters in this light, they appear like the work of some wise maker who studied the welfare of animals?"

"And to have engendered in them a love of having offspring, and in mothers a desire to rear their progeny, and to have implanted in the young that are reared a desire of life, and the greatest dread of death?"

"Assuredly these appear to be the contrivances of someone who designed that animals should continue to exist."

"And do you think that you yourself have any portion of intelligence?"

"Question me, at least, and I will answer."

"And can you suppose that nothing intelligent exists anywhere else? When you know that you have in your body but a small portion of the earth, which is vast, and a small portion of the water, which is vast, and that your frame is constituted for you to receive only a small portion of each of other things, that are vast, do you think that you have seized for yourself, by some extraordinary good fortune, intelligence alone which exists nowhere else, and that this assemblage of vast bodies, countless in number, is maintained in order by something void of reason?"

"By Zeus, I can hardly suppose that there is any riding intelligence among that assemblage of bodies, for I do not see the directors, as I see the agents of things which are done here."

"Nor do you see your own soul, which is the director of your body; so that, by like reasoning, you may say that you yourself do nothing with understanding, but everything by chance."

"However, Socrates," said Aristodemus, "I do not despise the gods, but consider them as too exalted to need my attention."

“But,” said Socrates, “the more exalted they are, while they deign to attend to you, the more ought you to honor them.”

“Be assured,” replied Aristodemus, “that if I believed the gods took any thought for men, I would not neglect them.”

“Do you not, then, believe that the gods take thought for men? the gods who, in the first place, have made man alone, of all animals, upright, (which uprightness enables him to look forward to a greater distance, and to contemplate better what is above, and renders those parts less liable to injury in which the gods have placed the eyes, and ears, and mouth;) and, in the next place, have given to other animals only feet, which merely give them the capacity of walking, while to men they have added hands, which execute most of those things through which we are better off than they. And though all animals have tongues, they have made that of man alone of such a nature, as, by touching sometimes one part of the mouth, and sometimes another, to express articulate sounds, and to signify everything that we wish to communicate one to another. Do you not see, too, that to other animals they have so given the pleasures of sexual intercourse as to limit them to a certain season of the year, but that they allow them to us uninterruptedly till extreme old age? Nor did it satisfy the gods to take care of the body merely, but, what is most important of all, they implanted in him the soul, his most excellent part. For what other animal has a soul to understand, first of all, that the gods, who have arranged such a vast and noble order of things, exist? What other species of animal, besides man, offers worship to the gods? What other animal has a mind better fitted than that of man, to guard against hunger or thirst, or cold or heat, or to relieve disease, or to acquire strength by exercise, or to labor to attain knowledge; or more capable of remembering whatever it has heard, or seen, or learned? Is it not clearly evident to you, that, in comparison with other animals, men live like gods, excelling them by nature, both in body and mind? For an animal, having the body of an ox, and the understanding of a man, would be unable to execute what it might meditate; and animals which have hands, but are without reason, have no advantage over others; and do you, who share both these excellent endowments, think that the gods take no thought for you? What then must they do, before you will think that they take thought for you?”

“I will think so,” observed Aristodemus, “when they send me, as you say that they send to you, monitors, to show what I ought, and what I ought not, to do.”

“But when they send admonitions to the Athenians, on consulting them by divination, do you not think that they admonish you also? Or when they give warnings to the Greeks by sending portents, or when they give them to the whole human race, do they except you alone from the whole, arid utterly neglect you? Do you suppose, too, that the gods would have engendered a persuasion in men that they are able to benefit or injure them, unless they were really able to do so, and that men, if they had been thus perpetually deluded, would not have become sensible of the delusion? Do you not see that the oldest and wisest of human communities, the oldest and wisest cities and nations, are the most respectful to the gods, and that the wisest age of man is the most observant of their worship? Consider also, my good youth,” continued Socrates, “that your mind, existing

within your body, directs your body as it pleases; and it becomes you therefore to believe that the intelligence pervading all things directs all things as may be agreeable to it, and not to think that while your eye can extend its sight over many furlongs, that of the divinity is unable to see all things at once, or that while your mind can think of things here, or things in Egypt or Sicily, the mind of the deity is incapable of regarding everything at the same time. If, however, as you discover, by paying court to men, those who are willing to pay court to you in return, and, by doing favors to men, those who are willing to return your favors, and as, by asking counsel of men, you discover who are wise, you should, in like manner, make trial of the gods by offering worship to them, whether they will advise you concerning matters hidden from man, you will then find that the divinity is of such power, and of such a nature, as to see all things and hear all things at once, to be present everywhere, and to have a care for all things at the same time."

By delivering such sentiments, Socrates seems to me to have led his associates to refrain from what was impious, or unjust, or dishonorable, not merely when they were seen by men, but when they were in solitude, since they would conceive that nothing that they did would escape the knowledge of the gods.

CHAPTER V.

Temperance and self-control recommended: he that is destitute of temperance can be profitable or agreeable neither to himself nor others. Without temperance nothing can be learned or done with due effect, Socrates not only encouraged to temperance by precepts, but by his example.

If temperance, moreover, be an honorable and valuable quality in a man, let us consider whether he at all promoted its observance by reflections of the following kind concerning it. "If, my friends, when a war was coming upon us, we should wish to choose a man by whose exertions we might ourselves be preserved, and might gain the mastery over our enemies, should we select one whom we knew to be unable to resist gluttony, or wine, or sensuality, or fatigue, or sleep? How could we think that such a man would either serve us, or conquer our adversaries? Or if, being at the close of life, we should wish to commit to anyone the guardianship of our sons, or the care of our unmarried daughters, or the preservation of our property, should we think an intemperate man worthy of confidence for such purposes? Should we entrust to an intemperate slave our herds, our granaries, or the superintendence of our agriculture? Should we be willing to accept such a slave as an agent, or purveyor, even for nothing? But if we would not even accept an intemperate slave, how can it be otherwise than important for every man to take care that he himself does not become such a character? For the intemperate man is not injurious to his neighbor and profitable to himself, (like the avaricious, who, by despoiling others of their property, seem to enrich themselves,) but, while he is mischievous to others, is still more mischievous to himself, for it is, indeed, mischievous in the highest degree, to ruin not only his family, but his body and mind. In society, too, who could find pleasure in the company of such a man, who, he would be aware, felt more delight in eating and drinking than in intercourse with his friends, and preferred the company of harlots to that of his fellows? Is it not the duty of every man to consider that temperance is the foundation of every virtue, and to establish the observance of it in his mind before all things? For who, without it, can either learn anything good, or sufficiently practice it? Who, that is a slave to pleasure, is not in an ill condition both as to his body and his mind? It appears to me, by Hera, that a freeman ought to pray that he may never meet with a slave of such a character, and that he who is a slave to pleasure should pray to the gods that he may find well-disposed masters; for by such means only can a man of that sort be saved."

While such were the remarks that he made, he proved himself more a friend to temperance by his life than by his words; for he was not only superior to all corporeal pleasures, but also to those attendant on the acquisition of money; thinking that he who received money from anyone, set up a master over himself, and submitted to a slavery as disgraceful as any that could be.

CHAPTER VI.

Three dialogues of Socrates with Antipho. Antipho ridicules the poverty and frugality of Socrates, and his forbearance to receive pay for his instructions. Socrates replies that, by not receiving remuneration, he is more at liberty to choose his audience; that there are various advantages attendant on plainness of diet and dress; that the frugal man has the advantage over the man of pleasure in facilities for self-improvement, for doing his duty to his country, and for securing general happiness. Antipho asserts that Socrates might be a just man, but was by no means wise, in accepting no payment; Socrates replies that to sell wisdom is to degrade it, and that more good is gained by the acquisition of friends than of money. Antipho asks Socrates why, when he trained others to manage public affairs, he took no part in public affairs himself; Socrates replies that he was of more service to his country by training many to govern it, than he could have been by giving his single aid in the government of it.

It is due to Socrates, also, not to omit the dialogues which he held with Antipho the sophist. Antipho, on one occasion, wishing to draw away his associates from him, came up to Socrates, when they were present, and said, "I thought, Socrates, that those who studied philosophy were to become happier than other men; but you seem to have reaped from philosophy fruits of an opposite kind; at least you live in a way in which no slave would continue to live with his master; you eat food, and drink beverages, of the worst kind; you wear a dress, not only bad, but the same both summer and winter, and you continue shoeless and coatless. Money, which cheers men when they receive it, and enables those who possess it to live more generously and pleasantly, you do not take; and if, therefore, as teachers in other professions make their pupils imitate themselves, you also shall produce a similar effect on your followers, you must consider yourself but a teacher of wretchedness."

Socrates, in reply to these remarks, said, "You seem to me, Antipho, to have conceived a notion that I live so wretchedly, that I feel persuaded you yourself would rather choose to die than pass your life as I pass mine. Let us then consider what it is that you find disagreeable in my mode of life. Is it that while others, who receive money, must perform the service for which they receive it, while I, who receive none, am under no necessity to discourse with anyone that I do not like? Or do you despise my way of living, on the supposition that I eat less wholesome or less strengthening food than yourself? Or is it that my diet is more difficult to procure than yours, as being more rare and expensive? Or is it that -what you procure for yourself is more agreeable to you than what I provide for myself is to me? Do you not know that he who eats with the most pleasure is he who least requires sauce, and that he who drinks with the greatest pleasure is he who least desires other drink than that which he has? You know that those who change their clothes, change them because of cold and heat, and that men put on sandals that they may not be prevented from walking through annoyances to the feet; but have you ever observed me remaining at home, c« account of cold, more than any other

man, or fighting with anyone for shade because of heat, or not walking wherever I please because my feet suffer? Do you not know that those who are by nature the weakest, become, by exercising their bodies, stronger in those things in which they exercise them, than those who neglect them, and bear the fatigue of exercise with greater ease? And do you not think that I, who am constantly preparing my body by exercise to endure whatever may happen to it, bear everything more easily than you who take no exercise? And to prevent me from being a slave to gluttony, or sleep, or other animal gratifications, can you imagine any cause more efficient than having other objects of attention more attractive than they, which not only afford pleasure in the moment of enjoying them, but give hopes that they will benefit me perpetually? You are aware of this also, that those who think themselves successful in nothing, are far from being cheerful, but that those who regard their agriculture, their seamanship, or whatever other occupation they pursue, as going on favorably for them, are delighted as with present success? But do you think that from ail these gratifications so much pleasure can arise as from the consciousness that you are growing better yourself, and are acquiring more valuable friends? Such is the consciousness, then, which I continue to enjoy.

"But if there should be occasion to assist our friends or our country, which of the two would have most leisure to attend to such objects, he who lives as I live now, or he who lives, as you think, in happiness? Which of the two would most readily seek the field of battle, he who cannot exist without expensive dishes, or he who is content with whatever comes before him? Which of the two would sooner be reduced by a siege, he who requires what is most difficult to be found, or he who is fully content with what is easiest to be met with? You, Antipho, seem to think that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance; but I think that to want nothing is to resemble the gods, and that to want as little as possible is to make the nearest approach to the gods; that the Divine nature is perfection, and that to be nearest to the Divine nature is to be nearest to perfection."

On another occasion, Antipho. in a conversation with Socrates, said, "I consider you indeed to be a just man, Socrates, but by no means a wise one; and you appear to me yourself to be conscious of this; for you ask money from no one for the privilege of associating with you; although, if you considered a garment of yours, or a house, or any other thing that you possess, to be worth money, you would not only not give it to anybody for nothing, but you would not take less than its full value for it. It is evident, therefore, that if you thought your conversation to be worth anything, you would demand for it no less remuneration than it is worth. You may, accordingly, be a just man, because you deceive nobody from covetousness, but wise you cannot be, as you have no knowledge that is of any value."? Socrates, in reply, said, "It is believed among us, Antipho, that it is possible to dispose of beauty, or of wisdom, alike honorably or dishonorably; for if a person sells his beauty for money to anyone that wishes to purchase, men call him a male prostitute; but if anyone makes a friend of a person whom he knows to be an honorable and worthy admirer, we regard him as prudent: and, in like

manner, those who sell their wisdom for money, to any that will buy, men call sophists, or, as it were, prostituters of wisdom; but whoever makes a friend of a person whom he knows to be deserving, by teaching him all the good that he knows, we consider him to act the part which becomes an honorable and good citizen. As any other man, therefore, Antipho, takes delight in a good horse, or dog, or bird, so I, to a still greater degree, take delight in valuable friends; and, if I know anything good, I communicate it to them, and recommend them, also, to any other teachers by whom I conceive that they will be at all advanced in virtue. The treasures, too, of the wise men of old, which they have left written in books, I turn over and peruse in company with my friends, and if we find anything good in them, we remark it, and think it a great gain if we thus become more attached to one another." To me, who heard him utter these sentiments, Socrates appeared to be both happy himself, and to lead those that listened to him to honor and virtue.

Again, when Antipho asked him how he imagined that he could make men skillful statesmen, when he himself took no part in state affairs, if indeed he knew anything of them, "In which of the two ways," said he, "Antipho, should I better promote the management of affairs; if I myself engage in them alone, or if I make it my care that as many as possible may be qualified to engage in them?"

CHAPTER VII.

Dissuasions from ostentation. He that desires to be distinguished, should endeavor to be what he would wish to seem. He that pretends to be what he is not, exposes himself to great inconvenience and ridicule, and may bring disgrace and detriment on his country.

Let us consider also, whether, by dissuading his followers from ostentation, he excited them to pursue virtue. He always used to say that there was no better road to honorable distinction, than that by which a person should become excellent in that in which he wished to appear excellent.

That he said what was just, he used to prove by the following arguments. “Let us consider,” he would say, “what a person must do, if, not being a good flute-player, he should wish to appear so? Must he not imitate good flute-players in the adjuncts of their art? In the first place, as flute-players procure fine dresses, and go about with a great number of attendants, he must act in a similar manner; and as many people applaud them, he must get many to applaud him; yet he must never attempt to play, or he will at once be shown to be ridiculous, and not only a bad flute-player, but a vain boaster. Thus, after having been at great expense without the least benefit, and having, in addition, incurred evil repute, how will he live otherwise than in uneasiness, unprofitableness, and derision?

“In like manner, if anyone should wish to be thought a good general, or a good steersman of a ship, without being so, let us reflect what would be his success. If, when he longed to seem capable of performing the duties of those characters, he should be unable to persuade others of his capability, would not this be a trouble to him? and, if he should persuade them of it, would it not be still more unfortunate for him? For it is evident that lie who is appointed to steer a vessel, or to lead an army, without having the necessary knowledge, would be likely to destroy those whom he would not wish to destroy, and would come off himself with disgrace and suffering.”

By similar examples he showed that it was of no profit for a man to appear rich, or valiant, or strong, without being so; for he said that demands were made upon such persons too great for their ability, and that, not being able to comply with them, when they seemed to be able, they met with no indulgence.

He called him, also, no small impostor, who, obtaining money or furniture from his neighbor by persuasion, should defraud him; but pronounced him the greatest of all impostors, who, possessed of no valuable qualifications, should deceive men by representing himself capable of governing his country. To me he appeared, by discoursing in this manner, to deter his associates from vain boasting.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

Socrates, suspecting that Aristippus, a man of pleasure, was aspiring to a place in the government, admonishes him that temperance is an essential qualification in a statesman. But as Aristippus says that he looked only to a life of leisure and tranquil enjoyment, Socrates introduces the question, whether those who govern, or those who are governed, live the happier life. Aristippus signifies that he wished neither to govern nor to be governed, but to enjoy liberty; and Socrates shows that such liberty as he desired is inconsistent with the nature of human society. Aristippus still adhering to his own views, and declaring his intention not to remain in anyone country, but to visit and sojourn in many, Socrates shows him the dangers of such a mode of life. But as Aristippus proceeds to accuse those of folly who prefer a life of toil in the affairs of government to a life of ease, Socrates shows the difference between those who labor voluntarily, and those who labor from compulsion, and observes that nothing good is given to mortals without labor; in illustration of which remark he relates the fable of Prodicus, The Choice of Hercules.

He appeared also to me, by such discourses as the following, to exhort his hearers to practice temperance in their desires for food, drink, sensual gratification, and sleep, and endurance of cold, heat, and labor. But finding that one of his associates was too intemperately disposed with regard to such matters, he said to him, "Tell me, Aristippus, if it were required of you to lake two of our youths and educate them, the one in such a manner that he would be qualified to govern, and the other in such a manner that he would never seek to govern, how would you train them respectively? Will you allow us to consider the matter by commencing with their food, as with the first principles?"

"Food, indeed," replied Aristippus, "appears to me one of the first principles; for a person could not even live if he were not to take food."

"It will be natural for them both, then," said Socrates, "to desire to partake of food when a certain hour comes."

"It will be natural," said Aristippus. "And which of the two, then," said Socrates, "should we accustom to prefer the discharge of any urgent business to the gratification of his appetite?"

"The one undoubtedly," rejoined Aristippus, "who is trained to rule, that the business of the state may not be neglected during his administration."

"And on the same person," continued Socrates, "we must, when they desire to drink, impose the duty of being able to endure thirst?"

"Assuredly," replied Aristippus.

"And or which of the two should we lay the necessity of being temperate in sleep, so as to be able to go to rest late, to rise early, or to remain awake if it should be necessary?"

"Upon the same, doubtless."

“And on which of the two should we impose the obligation to control his sensual appetites, that he may not be hindered by their influence from discharging whatever duty may be required of him?”

“Upon the same.”

“And on which of the two should we enjoin the duty of not shrinking from labor, but willingly submitting to it?”

“This also is to be enjoined on him who is trained to rule.”

“And to which of the two would it more properly belong to acquire whatever knowledge would assist him to secure the mastery over his rivals?”

“Far more, doubtless, to him who is trained to govern, for without such sort of acquirements there would be no profit in any of his other qualifications.”

“A man, then, who is thus instructed, would appear to you less liable to be surprised by his enemies than other animals, of which some, we know, are caught by their greediness; and others, though very shy, are yet attracted to the bait by their desire to swallow it, and consequently taken; while others also are entrapped by drink.”

“Indisputably,” replied Aristippus. “Are not others, too, caught through their salaciousness, as quails and partridges, which, being attracted to the call of the female by desire and hope of enjoyment, and losing all consideration of danger, fall into traps?” To this Aristippus expressed his assent. “Does it not then,” proceeded Socrates, “appear to you shameful for a man to yield to the same influence as the most senseless of animals; as adulterers, for instance, knowing that the adulterer is in danger of suffering what the law threatens, and of being watched, and disgraced if caught, yet enter into closets; and, though there are such dangers and dishonors hanging over the intriguer, and so many occupations that will free him from the desire of sensual gratification, does it not seem to you the part of one tormented with an evil genius, to run, nevertheless, into imminent peril?”

“It does seem so to me,” said Aristippus.

“And since the greater part of the most necessary employments of life, such as those of war and agriculture, and not a few others, are to be carried on in the open air, does it not appear to you to show great negligence, that the majority of mankind should be wholly unexercised to bear cold and heat?” Aristippus replied in the affirmative. “Does it not then appear to you that we ought to train him who is intended to rule, to bear these inconveniences also without difficulty?”

“Doubtless,” answered Aristippus. “If, therefore, we class those capable of enduring these things among those who are qualified to govern, shall we not class such as are incapable of enduring them among those who will not even aspire to govern?” Aristippus expressed his assent. “In conclusion, then, since you know the position of each of these classes of men, have you ever considered in which of them you can reasonably place yourself?”

“I have indeed,” said Aristippus, “and I by no means place myself in the class of those desiring to rule; for it appears to me that, when it is a task of great difficulty

to procure necessaries for one's self, it is the mark of a very foolish man not to be satisfied with that occupation, but to add to it the labor of procuring for his fellow-countrymen whatever they need. And is it not the greatest folly in him, that while many things which he desires are out of his reach, he should, by setting himself at the head of the state, subject himself, if he does not accomplish all that the people desire, to be punished for his failure? For the people think it right to use their governors as I use my slaves; for I require my slaves to supply me with the necessaries of life in abundance, but to take no part of them themselves; and the people think it the duty of their governors to supply them with as many enjoyments as possible, but themselves to abstain from all of them. Those, therefore, who wish to have much trouble themselves, and to give trouble to others, I would train in this manner, and rank among those qualified to govern; but myself I would number with those who wish to pass their lives in the greatest possible ease and pleasure."

Socrates then said, "Will you allow us to consider this point also, whether the governors or the governed live with the greater pleasure?"

"By all means," said Aristippus. "In the first place, then, of the nations of which we have any knowledge, the Persians bear rule in Asia, and the Syrians, Phrygians, and Lydians are under subjection; the Scythians govern in Europe, and the Maeotians are held in subjection; the Carthaginians rule in Africa, and the Libyans are under subjection. Which of these do you regard as living with the greater pleasure? Or among the Greeks, of whom you yourself are, which of the two appear to you to live more happily, those who rule, or those who are in subjection?"

"Yet, on the other hand," said Aristippus, "I do not consign myself to slavery; but there appears to me to be a certain middle path between the two, in which I endeavor to proceed, and which leads, not through slavery, but through liberty, a path that most surely conducts to happiness."

"If this path of yours, indeed," said Socrates, "as it lie neither through sovereignty nor servitude, did not also lie through human society, what you say would perhaps be worth consideration; but if, while living among mankind, you shall neither think proper to rule nor to be ruled, and shall not willingly pay respect to those in power, I think that you will see that the stronger know how to treat the weaker as slaves, making them to lament both publicly and privately. Do those escape your knowledge who fell and destroy the corn and trees of others that have sown and planted them, and who assail in every way such as are inferior to them, and are unwilling to flatter them, until they prevail on them to prefer slavery to carrying on war against their superiors? In private life, too, do you not see that the spirited and strong enslave the timorous and weak, and enjoy the fruits of their labors?"

"But for my part," answered Aristippus, "in order that I may not suffer such treatment, I shall not shut myself up in anyone state, but shall be a traveler everywhere."

"Doubtless," rejoined Socrates, "this is an admirable plan that you propose; for since Sinnis, and Sciron, and Procrustes were killed, nobody injures travelers. Yet

those who manage the government in their several countries, even now make laws, in order that they may not be injured, and attach to themselves, in addition to such as are called their necessary connections, other supporters; they also surround their cities with ramparts, and procure weapons with which they may repel aggressors, securing, besides all these means of defense, other allies from abroad; and yet those who have provided themselves with all these bulwarks, nevertheless suffer injury; and do you, having no protection of the sort, spending a long time on roads on which a very great number are outraged, weaker than all the inhabitants of whatever city you may arrive at, and being such a character as those who are eager to commit violence most readily attack, think, nevertheless, that you will not be wronged because you are a stranger? Or are you without fear, because these cities proclaim safety to anyone arriving or departing? Or because you think that you would prove a slave of such a character as would profit no master, for who, you perhaps ask yourself, would wish to keep in his house a man not at all disposed to labor, and delighting in the most expensive fare? But let us consider how masters treat slaves of such a sort. Do they not tame down their fondness for dainties by hunger? Do they not hinder them from stealing by excluding them from every place from whence they may take anything? Do they not prevent them from running away by putting fetters on them? Do they not overcome their laziness by stripes? Or how do you yourself act, when you find anyone of your slaves to be of such a disposition?"

"I chastise him," said Aristippus, "with every kind of punishment, until I compel him to serve me? But how do those, Socrates, who are trained to the art of ruling, which you seem to me to consider as happiness, differ from those who undergo hardships from necessity, since they will have (though it be with their own consent) to endure hunger, and thirst, and cold, and want of sleep, and suffer all other inconveniences of the same kind? For I, for my own part, do not know what difference it makes to a man who is scourged on the same skin, whether it be voluntarily or involuntarily, or, in short, to one who suffers with the same body in all such points, whether he suffer with his consent or against it, except that folly is to be attributed to him who endures troubles voluntarily."

"What then, Aristippus," said Socrates, "do not voluntary endurances of this kind seem to you to differ from the involuntary, inasmuch as he who is hungry from choice may eat when lie pleases, and he who is thirsty from choice may drink when he pleases, the same being the case with regard to other voluntary sufferings, while he who endures such hardships from necessity has no liberty to relieve himself from them when he wishes? Besides, he who undergoes trouble willingly, is cheered in undergoing it with some expectation of good, as the hunters of wild animals bear fatigue with pleasure in the hope of capturing them. And such rewards of toil are indeed but of small worth; but as for those who toil that they may acquire valuable friends, or that they may subdue their enemies, or they may, by becoming vigorous in body and mind, manage their own household judiciously, and be of service to their friends and of advantage to their country, how can you think that they labor for such objects otherwise than cheerfully, or that they do not live in happiness, esteeming themselves, and being praised and envied by

others? But indolence, moreover, and pleasures enjoyed at the moment of desire, are neither capable of producing a good constitution of body, as the teachers of gymnastic exercises say, nor do they bring to the mind any knowledge worthy of consideration; but exercises pursued with persevering labor lead men to the attainment of honorable and valuable objects, as worthy men inform us; and Hesiod somewhere says,

> Vice it is possible to find in abundance and with ease; for the way to it is smooth, and lies very near. But before the temple of Virtue the immortal gods have placed labor, and the way to it is long and steep, and at the commencement rough; but when the traveler has arrived at the summit, it then becomes easy, however difficult it was at first.

A sentiment to which Epicharmus gives his testimony in this verse,

> The gods for labor sell us all good things; and in another place he says,
>
> O wretched mortal, desire not what is soft, lest you find what is hard.

Prodicus the sophist, also, in his narrative concerning Hercules, which indeed he declaims to most people as a specimen of his ability, expresses a similar notion respecting virtue, speaking, as far as I remember, to the following effect: For he says that Hercules, when he was advancing from boyhood to manhood, a period at which the young, becoming their own masters, begin to give intimations whether they will enter on life by the path of virtue or that of vice, went forth into a solitary place, and sat down, perplexed as to which of these two paths he should pursue; and that two female figures, of lofty stature, seemed to advance towards him, the one of an engaging and graceful mien, gifted by nature with elegance of form, modesty of look, and sobriety of demeanor, and clad in a white robe; the other fed to plumpness and softness, but assisted by art both in her complexion, so as to seem fairer and rosier than she really was, and in her gesture, so as to seem taller than her natural height; she had her eyes wide open, and a robe through which her beauty would readily show itself; she frequently contemplated her figure, and looked about to see if anyone else was observing her; and she frequently glanced back at her own shadow. As they approached nearer to Hercules, she, whom I first described, came forward at the same pace, but the other, eager to get before her, ran up to Hercules, and exclaimed, “I see that you are hesitating, Hercules, by what path you shall enter upon life; if, then, you make a friend of me, I will conduct you by the most delightful and easy road, and you shall taste of every species of pleasure, and lead a life free from every sort of trouble. In the first place, you shall take no thought of wars or state affairs, but shall pass your time considering what meat or drink you may find to gratify your appetite, what you may delight yourself by seeing or hearing, what you may be pleased with smelling or touching, with what objects of affection you may have most pleasure in associating, how you may sleep most softly, and how you may secure all these enjoyments with the least degree of trouble.

If an apprehension of want of means, by which such delights may be obtained, should ever arise in you, there is no fear that I shall urge you to procure them by toil or suffering either of body or mind; but you shall enjoy what others acquire by

labor, abstaining from nothing by which it may be possible to profit, for I give my followers liberty to benefit themselves from any source whatever."

Hercules, on hearing this address, said, "And what, O woman, is your name?"

"My friends," she replied, "call me Happiness, but those who hate me, give me, to my disparagement, the name of Vice."

In the meantime the other female approached, and said, "I also am come to address you, Hercules, because I know your parents, and have observed your disposition in the training of your childhood, from which I entertain hopes, that if you direct your steps along the path that leads to my dwelling, you will become an excellent performer of whatever is honorable and noble, and that I shall appear more honorable and attractive through your illustrious deeds. I will not deceive you, however, with promises of pleasure, but will set before you things as they really are, and as the gods have appointed them; for of what is valuable and excellent, the gods grant nothing to mankind without labor and care; and if you wish the gods, therefore, to be propitious to you, you must worship the gods; if you seek to be beloved by your friends, you must serve your friends; if you desire to be honored by any city, you must benefit that city; if you long to be admired by all Greece for your merit, you must endeavor to be of advantage to all Greece; if you are anxious that the earth should yield you abundance of fruit, you must cultivate the earth; if you think that you should enrich yourself from herds of cattle, you must bestow care upon herds of cattle; if you are eager to increase your means by war, and to secure freedom to your friends and subdue your enemies, you must learn the arts of war, and learn them from such as understand them, and practice how to use them with advantage; or if you wish to be vigorous in body, you must accustom your body to obey your mind, and exercise it with toil and exertion."

Here Vice, interrupting her speech, said, (as Prodicus relates,) "Do you see, Hercules, by how difficult and tedious a road this woman conducts you to gratification, while I shall lead you, by an easy and short path, to perfect happiness?"

"Wretched being," rejoined Virtue, "of what good are you in possession? Or what real pleasure do you experience, when you are unwilling to do anything for the attainment of it? You, who do not even wait for the natural desire of gratification, but fill yourself with all manner of dainties before you have an appetite for them, eating before you are hungry, drinking before you are thirsty, procuring cooks that you may eat with pleasure, buying costly wines that you may drink with pleasure, and running about seeking for snow in summer; while, in order to sleep with pleasure, you prepare not only soft beds, but couches, and rockers under your couches, for you do not desire sleep in consequence of labor, but in consequence of having nothing to do; you force the sensual inclinations before they require gratification, using every species of contrivance for the purpose,

and abusing male and female; for thus it is that you treat your friends, insulting their modesty at night, and making them sleep away the most useful part of their day. Though you are one of the immortals, you are cast out from the society of the gods, and despised by the good among mankind; the sweetest of all sounds, the praises of yourself, you have never heard, nor have you ever seen the most pleasing of all sights, for you have never beheld one meritorious work of your own hand. Who would believe you when you give your word for anything? Or who would assist you when in need of anything? Or who, that has proper feeling, would venture to join your company of revelers? for while they are young they grow impotent in body, and when they are older they are impotent in mind; they live without labor, and in fatness, through their youth, and pass laboriously, and in wretchedness, through old age; ashamed of what they have done, oppressed with what they have to do, having run through their pleasures in early years, and laid up afflictions for the close of life. But I am the companion of the gods; I associate with virtuous men; no honorable deed, divine or human, is done without me; I am honored, most of all, by the deities, and by those among men to whom it belongs to honor me, being a welcome co-operator with artisans, a faithful household guardian to masters, a benevolent assistant to servants, a benign promoter of the labors of peace, a constant auxiliary to the efforts of war, an excellent sharer in friendship. My friends have a sweet and untroubled enjoyment of meat and drink, for they refrain from them till they feel an appetite. They have also sweeter sleep than the idle; and are neither annoyed if they lose a portion of it, nor neglect to do their duties for the sake of it. The young are pleased with praises from the old; the old are delighted with honors from the young. They remember their former acts with pleasure, and rejoice to perform their present occupations with success; being, through my influence, dear to the gods, beloved by their friends, and honored by their country. And when the destined end of life comes, they do not lie in oblivion and dishonor, but, celebrated with songs of praise, flourish forever in the memory of mankind. By such a course of conduct, O Hercules, son of noble parents, you may secure the most exalted happiness."

Nearly thus it was that Prodicus related the instruction of Hercules by Virtue; adorning the sentiments, however, with far more magnificent language than that in which I now give them. It becomes you, therefore, Aristippus, reflecting on these admonitions, to endeavor to think of what concerns the future period of your life.

CHAPTER II.

A dialogue between Socrates and his son Lamprocles, who had expressed resentment against his mother, on the duty of children to their parents. The ungrateful are to be deemed unjust. The greater benefits a person has received, the more unjust is he if he is ungrateful; and there are no greater benefits than those which children experience from their parents. Hence it follows that a son ought to reverence his mother, though she be severe, when he knows that her severity proceeds from kind motives. How great a crime the neglect of filial duty is, appears from the fact that it is punished by the laws and execrated by mankind.

Having learned, one day, that Lamprocles, the eldest of his sons, had exhibited anger against his mother, "Tell me, my son," said he, "do you know that certain persons are called ungrateful?"

"Certainly," replied the youth. "And do you understand how it is they act that men give them this appellation?"

"I do," said Lamprocles, "for it is those that have received a kindness, and that do not make a return when they are able to make one, whom they call ungrateful."

"They then appear to you to class the ungrateful with the unjust?"

"I think so."

"And have you ever considered whether, as it is thought unjust to make slaves of our friends, but just to make slaves of our enemies, so it is unjust to be ungrateful towards our friends, but just to be so towards our enemies?"

"I certainly have," answered Lamprocles, "and from whomsoever a man receives a favor, whether friend or enemy, and does not endeavor to make a return for it, he is in my opinion unjust."

"If such, then, be the case," pursued Socrates, "ingratitude must be manifest injustice?" Lamprocles expressed his assent. "The greater benefits, therefore, a person has received, and makes no return, the more unjust he must be." He assented to this position also. "Whom, then," asked Socrates, "can we find receiving greater benefits from any persons than children receive from their parents? children whom their parents have brought from non-existence into existence, to view so many beautiful objects, and to share in so many blessings, as the gods grant to men; blessings which appear to us so inestimable, that we shrink, in the highest degree, from relinquishing them; and governments have made death the penalty for the most heinous crimes, in the supposition that they could not suppress injustice by the terror of any greater evil. You do not, surely, suppose that men: beget children merely to gratify their passions, since the streets are full, as well as the brothels, of means to allay desire; but what we evidently consider, is, from what sort of women the finest children may be born to us, and, uniting with them, we beget children. The man maintains her who joins with him to produce offspring, and provides, for the children that are likely to be born to him, whatever he thinks will conduce to their support, in as great abundance as he can;

while the woman receives and bears the burden, oppressed and endangering her life, and imparting a portion of the nutriment with which she herself is supported; and, at length, after bearing it the full time, and bringing it forth with great pain, she suckles and cherishes it, though she has received no previous benefit from it, nor does the infant know by whom it is tended, nor is it able to signify what it wants, but she, conjecturing what will nourish and please it, tries to satisfy its calls, and feeds it for a long time, both night and day, submitting to the trouble and not knowing what return she will receive for it. Nor does it satisfy the parents merely to feed their offspring, but as soon as the children appear capable of learning anything, they teach them whatever they know that may be of use for their conduct in life; and whatever they consider another more capable of communicating than themselves, they send their sons to him at their own expense, and take care to adopt every course that their children may be as much improved as possible."

Upon this the young man said, "But, even if she has done all this, and many times more than this, no one, assuredly, could endure her ill-humor."

"And which do you think," asked Socrates, more difficult to be endured, "the ill-humor of a wild beast, or that of a mother?"

"I think," replied Lamprocles, "that of a mother, at least of such a mother as mine is."

"Has she ever then inflicted any hurt upon you, by biting or kicking you, as many have often suffered from wild beasts?"

"No; but, by Zeus, she says such things as no one would endure to hear for the value of all that he possesses."

"And do you reflect," returned Socrates, "how much grievous trouble you have given her by your peevishness, by voice and by action, in the day and in the night, and how much anxiety you have caused her when you were ill?"

"But I have never said or done anything to her," replied Lamprocles, "at which she could feel ashamed."

"Do you think it, then," inquired Socrates, "a more difficult thing for you to listen to what she says, than for actors to listen when they utter the bitterest reproaches against one another in tragedies?"

"But actors, I imagine, endure such reproaches easily, because they do not think that, of the speakers, the one who utters reproaches, utters them with intent to do harm, or that the one who utters threats, utters them with any evil purpose."

"Yet you are displeased at your mother, although you well know that whatever she says, she not only says nothing with intent to do you harm, but that she wishes you more good than any other human being. Or do you suppose that your mother meditates evil towards you?"

"No indeed," said Lamprocles, "that I do not imagine."

"Do you then say that this mother," rejoined Socrates, "who is so benevolent to you, who, when you are ill, takes care of you, to the utmost of her power, that you

may recover your health, and that you may want nothing that is necessary for you, and who, besides, entreats the gods for many blessings on your head, and pays vows for you, is a harsh mother? For my part, I think that if you cannot endure such a mother, you cannot endure anything that is good? But tell me," continued he, "whether you think that you ought to pay respect to any other human being, or whether you are resolved to try to please nobody, and to follow or obey neither a general nor any other commander?"

"No indeed," replied Lamprocles, "I have formed no such resolution."

"Are you then willing," inquired Socrates, "to cultivate the good-will of your neighbor, that he may kindle a fire for you when you want it, or aid you in obtaining some good, or, if you happen to meet with any misfortune, may assist you with willing and ready help?"

"I am," replied he. "Or would it make no difference," rejoined Socrates, "whether a fellow-traveler, or fellow-voyager, or any other person that you met with, should be your friend or enemy? Or do you think that you ought to cultivate their good-will?"

"I think that I ought," replied Lamprocles. "You are then prepared," returned Socrates, "to pay attention to such persons; and do you think that you ought to pay no respect to your mother, who loves you more than anyone else? Do you not know that the state takes no account of any other species of ingratitude, nor allows any action at law for it, overlooking such as receive a favor and make no return for it, but that if a person does not pay due regard to his parents, it imposes a punishment on him, rejects his services, and does not allow him to hold the archonship, considering that such a person cannot piously perform the sacrifices offered for the country, or discharge any other duty with propriety and justice. Indeed if anyone does not keep up the sepulchers of his dead parents, the state inquires into it in the examinations of candidates for office. You therefore, my son, if you are wise, will entreat the gods to pardon you if you have been wanting in respect towards your mother, lest, regarding you as an ungrateful person, they should be disinclined to do you good; and you will have regard, also, to the opinion of men, lest, observing you to be neglectful of your parents, they should all contemn you, and you should then be found destitute of friends; for if men surmise that you are ungrateful towards your parents, no one will believe that if he does you a kindness he will meet with gratitude in return."

CHAPTER III.

Socrates, hearing that two brothers, Chaerephon and Chaerecrates, had quarreled, recommends brotherly love to Chaerecrates by the following arguments. A brother ought to be regarded as a friend, and esteemed more than wealth; for wealth is an uncertain possession, if the possess or of it is destitute of friends. Fraternal love an appointment of Nature; and men who have brothers are more respected than those who have none, Even though a brother should conceive ill feelings towards us, we should still endeavor to conciliate him. How such conciliation may be effected. The endeavor to conciliate is still more the duty of a younger than of an elder brother, and the more noble the disposition of a brother is, the more easy will it be to conciliate him. Brothers should act in unison with one another, like different members of the same body.

Socrates, having observed that Chaerephon and Chaerecrates, two brothers well known to him, were at variance with each other, and having met with Chaerecrates, said, "Tell me, Chaerecrates, you surely are not one of those men, are you, who think wealth more valuable than brothers, when wealth is but a senseless thing, and a brother endowed with reason, when wealth needs protection, while a brother can afford protection, and when wealth, besides, is plentiful, and a brother but one? It is wonderful, too, that a man should consider brothers to be a detriment to him, because he does not possess his brothers' fortunes, while he does not consider his fellow-citizens to be a detriment, because he does not possess their fortunes; but, in the latter case, he can reason with himself, that it is better for him, living in society with many, to enjoy a competency in security, than, living alone, to possess all the property of his fellow-citizens in fear of danger, while, with regard to brothers, he knows not how to apply such reasoning. Those who are able, too, purchase slaves, that they may have helpers in their work, and procure friends, as being in need of supporters, while they neglect their brothers, as if friends could be made of fellow-citizens, but could not be made of brothers. Yet it surely conduces greatly to friendship to have been born of the same parents, and to have been brought up together, since, even among brutes, a certain affection springs up between those that are reared together. In addition to these considerations, men pay more respect to those who have brothers than to those who have none, and are less forward to commit aggression on them."

To this Chaerecrates made answer, "If, indeed, Socrates, the dissension between us were not great, it might perhaps be my duty to bear with my brother, and not shun his society for slight causes; for a brother, as you say, is a valuable possession, if he be such as he ought to be; but when he is nothing of the sort, and is indeed quite the reverse of what he should be, why should I attempt impossibilities?"

"Whether, then, Chaerecrates," rejoined Socrates, "is Chaerephon unable to please anybody, as he is unable to please you, or are there some whom he certainly can please?"

“Yes,” replied Chaerecrates, “for it is for this very reason that I justly hate him, that he can please others, while to me he is on all occasions, whenever he comes in contact with me, a harm rather than a good, both in word and deed.”

“Is the case then thus,” said Socrates, “that as a horse is a harm to him who knows not how to manage him, and yet tries to do so, so a brother is a harm, when a person tries to manage him without knowing how to do it?”

“But how can I be ignorant,” replied Chaerecrates, “how to manage my brother, when I know how to speak well of him who speaks well of me, and to do well to him who does well to me? As to one, however, who seeks to vex me both by word and deed, I should not be able either to speak well of him, or to act well towards him, nor will I try.”

“You speak strangely, Chaerecrates,” rejoined Socrates, “for if a dog of yours were of service to watch your sheep, and fawned upon your shepherds, but snarled when you approached him, you would forbear to show any ill feeling towards him, but would endeavor to tame him by kindness; but as for your brother, though you admit that he would be a great good to you if he were such as he ought to be, and though you confess that you know how to act and speak well with respect to him, you do not even attempt to make him of such service to you as he might be.”

“I fear, Socrates,” replied Chaerecrates, “that I have not wisdom enough to render Chaerephon such as he ought to be towards me.”

“Yet there is no need to contrive anything artful or novel to act upon him,” said Socrates, “as it appears to me; for I think that he may be gained over by means which you already know, and may conceive a high esteem for you.”

“Tell me first,” said the other, “whether you have observed that I possess any love-charm, which I was not aware that I knew?”

“Answer me this question,” said Socrates: “if you wished to induce anyone of your acquaintance, when he offered sacrifice, to invite you to his feast, what would you do?”

“I should doubtless begin by inviting him when I offered sacrifice.”

“And if you wished to prevail on any of your friends to take care of your property, when you went from home, what would you do?”

“I should certainly first offer to take care of his property, when he went from home.”

“And if you wished to induce an acquaintance in a foreign land to receive you hospitably when you visited his country, what would you do?”

“I should unquestionably be the first to receive him hospitably when he came to Athens; and if I wished him to be desirous to effect for me the objects for which I went thither, it is clear that I must first confer a similar service on him.”

“Have you not long been unawares acquainted, then, with all the love-charms that exist among mankind? Or are you afraid,” continued Socrates, “to make the first advances, lest you should seem to degrade yourself, if you should be the first to propitiate your brother? Yet he is thought to be a man deserving of great praise, who is the first to do harm to the enemy, and to do good to his friends. If, then,

Chaerephon had appeared to me more likely to bring you to this frame of mind, I would have endeavored to persuade him first to try to make you his friend; but, as things stand, you seem more likely, if you take the lead, to effect the desired object."

"You speak unreasonably, Socrates," rejoined Chaerecrates, "and not as might be expected from you, when you desire me, who am the younger, to take the lead; for the established practice among all men is quite the reverse, being that the elder should always be first, both to act and speak."

"How," said Socrates; "is it not the custom everywhere that the younger should yield the path to the elder when he meets him, rise from his seat before him, honor him with the softest couch, and give place to him in conversation? Do not therefore hesitate, my good young friend, but endeavor to conciliate your brother, and he will very soon listen to you. Do you not see how fond of honor, and how liberal-minded, he is? Mean-minded persons you cannot attract more effectually than by giving them something; but honorable and good men you may best gain by treating them in a friendly spirit."

"But what if he should become no kinder," said Chaerecrates, "after I have done what you advise?"

"It will be of no consequence," replied Socrates, "for what other risk will you run but that of showing that you are kind and full of brotherly affection, and that he is mean-spirited and unworthy of any kindness? But I apprehend no such result; for I conceive that when he finds you challenging him to such a contest, he will be extremely emulous to excel you in doing kindnesses both by word and deed. At present, you are in the same case as if the two hands, which the gods have made to assist each other, should neglect this duty, and begin to impede each other; or as if the two feet, formed by divine providence to co-operate with one another, should give up this office, and obstruct one another. Would it not be a great folly and misfortune to use for our hurt what was formed for our benefit? And indeed, as it appears to me, the gods have designed brothers to be of greater mutual service than the hands, or feet, or eyes, or other members which they have made in pairs for men; for the hands, if required to do things, at the same time, at greater distance than a fathom, would be unable to do them; the feet cannot reach two objects, at the same time, that are distant even a fathom; and the eyes, which seem to reach to the greatest distance, cannot, of objects that are much nearer, see at the same time those that are before and behind them; but brothers, if they are in friendship, can, even at the greatest distance, act in concert and for mutual benefit."

CHAPTER IV.

On the value of friendship. Many are more desirous to acquire property than friends. But no species of property is more valuable, lasting, and useful than a good friend: his qualities enumerated.

I heard him, also, on one occasion, holding a discourse concerning friends, by which, as it seems to me, a person might be greatly benefited, both as to the acquisition and use of friends; for he said that he had heard many people observe that a true and honest friend was the most valuable of all possessions, but that he saw the greater part of mankind attending to anything rather than securing friends. He observed them, he added, industriously endeavoring to procure houses and lands, slaves, cattle, and furniture; but as for a friend, whom they called the greatest of blessings, he saw the majority considering neither how to procure one, nor how those whom they had might be retained. Even when friends and slaves were sick, he said that he noticed people calling in physicians to their slaves, and carefully providing other means for their recovery, but paying no attention to their friends; and. that, if both died, they grieved for their slaves, and thought that they had suffered a loss, but considered that they lost nothing in losing friends. Of their other possessions they left nothing untended or unheeded, but when their friends required attention, they utterly neglected them.

In addition to these remarks, he observed that he saw the greater part of mankind acquainted with the number of their other possessions, although they might be very numerous, but of their friends, though but few, they were not only ignorant of the number, but even when they attempted to reckon it to such as asked them, they set aside again some that they had previously counted among their friends; so little did they allow their friends to occupy their thoughts. Yet in comparison with what possession, of all others, would not a good friend appear far more valuable? What sort of horse, or yoke of oxen, is so useful as a truly good friend? What slave is so well-disposed or so attached, or what other acquisition so beneficial? For a good friend is ready to supply whatever is wanting on the part of his friend, whether in his private affairs, or for the public interests; if he is required to do a service to anyone, he assists him with the means; if any apprehension alarms him, he lends him his aid, sometimes sharing expenditure with him, sometimes co-operating with him, sometimes joining with him to persuade others, sometimes using force towards others; frequently cheering him when he is successful, and frequently supporting him when he is in danger of falling. What the hands do, what the eyes foresee, what the ears hear, what the feet accomplish, for each individual, his friend, of all such services, fails to perform no one; and oftentimes, what a person has not effected for himself, or has not seen, or has not heard, or has not accomplished, a friend has succeeded in executing for his friend; and yet, while people try to foster trees for the sake of their fruit, the greater portion of mankind are heedless and neglectful of that most productive possession which is called a friend.

CHAPTER V.

On the different estimation in which different friends are to be held. We ought to examine ourselves, and ascertain at what value we may expect our friends to hold us.

I heard one day another dissertation of his, which seemed to me to exhort the hearer to examine himself, and ascertain of how much value he was to his friends. Finding that one of his followers was neglectful of a friend who was oppressed with poverty, he asked Antisthenes, in the presence of the man that neglected his friend, and of several others, saying, "Are there certain settled values for friends, Antisthenes, as there are for slaves? For, of slaves, one, perhaps, is worth two minae, another not even half a mina, another five minae, another ten. Nicias, the son of Niceratus, is said to have bought an overseer for his silver mines at the price of a whole talent. I am therefore considering whether, as there are certain values for slaves, there are also certain values for friends."

"There are, undoubtedly," replied Antisthenes; "at least I, for my part, should wish one man to be my friend rather than have two minae; another I should not value even at half a mina; another I should prefer to ten minae; and another I would buy for my friend at the sacrifice of all the money and revenues in the world."

"If such be the case, therefore," said Socrates, "it would be well for each of us to examine himself, to consider of what value he is in the estimation of his friends; and to try to be of as much value to them as possible, in order that his friends may be less likely to desert him; for I often hear one man saying that his friend has abandoned him, and another, that a person whom he thought to be his friend has preferred a mina to him. I am considering, accordingly, whether, as one sells a bad slave, and parts with him for whatever he will fetch, so it may be advisable to give up a worthless friend, when there is an opportunity of receiving more than he is worth. Good slaves I do not often see sold at all, or good friends abandoned."

CHAPTER VI.

What sort of persons we should choose for our friends. How we may ascertain the characters of men, before we form a friendship with them. How we may attach men to us as friends. Friendship can exist only between the good and honorable; between whom it will continue to subsist in spite of differences of opinion. Deductions from the preceding remarks.

He appeared to me, also, to make his followers wise in examining what sort of persons it was right to attach to themselves as friends, by such conversations as the following.. "Tell me, Critobulus," said he, "if we were in need of a good friend, how should we proceed to look for one? Should we not, in the first place, seek for a person who can govern his appetite, his inclination to wine or sensuality, and abstain from immoderate sleep and idleness? For one who is overcome by such propensities would be unable to do his duty either to himself or his friend."

"Assuredly he would not," said Critobulus. "It appears then to you that we must avoid one who is at the mercy of such inclinations?"

"Undoubtedly," replied Critobulus. "Besides," continued Socrates, "does not a man who is extravagant and yet unable to support himself, but is always in want of assistance from his neighbor, a man who, when he borrows, cannot pay, and when he cannot borrow, hates him who will not lend, appear to you to be a dangerous friend?"

"Assuredly," replied Critobulus. "We must therefore avoid such a character?"

"We must indeed."

"Again: what sort of friend would he be who has the means of getting money, and covets great wealth, and who, on this account, is a driver of hard bargains, and delights to receive, but is unwilling to pay?"

"Such a person appears to me," said Critobulus, "to be a still worse character than the former."

"What then do you think of him, who, from love of getting money, allows himself no time for thinking of anything else but whence he may obtain it?"

"We must avoid him, as it seems to me; for he would be useless to anyone that should make an associate of him."

"And what do you think of him who is quarrelsome, and likely to raise up many enemies against his friends?"

"We must avoid him also, by Zeus."

"But if a man have none of these bad qualities, but is content to receive obligations, taking no thought of returning them?"

"He also would be useless as a friend. But what sort of person, then, Socrates, should we endeavor to make our friend?"

"A person, I think, who, being the reverse of all this, is proof against the seductions of bodily pleasures, is upright and fair in his dealings, and emulous not

to be outdone in serving those who serve him, so that he is of advantage to those who associate with him."

"How then shall we find proof of these qualities in him, Socrates, before we associate with him?"

"We make proof of statuaries," rejoined Socrates, "not by forming opinions from their words, but, whomsoever we observe to have executed his previous statues skillfully, we trust that he will execute others well."

"You mean, then, that the man who is known to have served his former friends, will doubtless be likely to serve such as maybe his friends hereafter?"

"Yes; for whomsoever I know to have previously managed horses with skill, I expect to manage other horses also with skill."

Be it so," said Critobulus; "but by what means must we make a friend of him who appears to us worthy of our friendship?"

"In the first place," answered Socrates, "we must consult the gods, whether they recommend us to make him our friend."

"Can you tell me, then," said Critobulus, "how he, who appears eligible to us, and whom the gods do not disapprove, is to be secured?"

"Assuredly," returned Socrates, "he is not to be caught by tracking him like the hare, or by wiles, like birds, or by making him prisoner by force, like enemies; for it would be an arduous task to make a man your friend against his will, or to hold him fast if you were to bind him like a slave; for those who suffer such treatment are rendered enemies rather than friends."

"How then are men made friends?" inquired Critobulus. "They say that there are certain incantations, which those who know them, chant to whomsoever they please, and thus make them their friends; and that there are also love-potions, which those who know them, administer to whomsoever they will, and are in consequence beloved by them."

"And how can we discover these charms?"

"You have heard from Homer the song which the Sirens sung to Ulysses, the commencement of which runs thus:

'Come hither, much-extolled Ulysses, great glory of the Greeks.'"

"Did the Sirens then, by singing this same song to other men also, detain them so that they were charmed and could not depart from them?"

"No; but they sang thus to those who were desirous of being honored for virtue."

"You seem to mean that we ought to apply as charms to any person, such commendations as, when he hears them, he will not suspect that his eulogist utters to ridicule him; for, if he conceived such a suspicion, he would rather be rendered an enemy, and would repel men from him; as, for instance, if a person were to praise as beautiful, and tall, and strong, one who is conscious that he is short, and deformed, and weak.

But," added Critobulus, "do you know any other charms?"

"No," said Socrates, "but I have heard that Pericles knew many, which he used to chant to the city, and make it love him."

"And how did Themistocles make the city love him?"

"Not, by Zeus, by uttering charms to it, but by conferring on it some advantage."

"You appear to me to mean, Socrates, that if we would attach to us any good person as a friend, we ourselves should be good both in speaking and acting."

"And did you think it possible," said Socrates, "for a bad person to attach to himself good men as his friends?"

"I have seen," rejoined Critobulus, "bad orators become friends to good orators, and men bad at commanding an army become friends to men eminently good in the military art."

"Do you, then," said Socrates, "regarding the subject of which we are speaking, know any persons, who, being themselves useless, can make useful persons their friends?"

"No, by Zeus," replied Critobulus; "but if it is impossible for a worthless person to attach to himself good and honorable friends, it becomes now an object of consideration with me, whether it is possible for one who is himself honorable and good, to become, with ease, a friend to the honorable and good."

"What perplexes you, Critobulus, is, that you often see men who are honorable in their conduct, and who refrain from everything disgraceful, involved, instead of being friends, in dissensions with one another, and showing more severity towards each other than the worthless part of mankind."

"Nor is it only private persons," rejoined Critobulus, "that act in this manner, but even whole communities, which have the greatest regard for what is honorable, and are least inclined to anything disgraceful, are often hostilely disposed towards one another.

When I reflect on these differences," continued Critobulus, "I am quite in despair about the acquisition of friends; for I see that the bad cannot be friends with one another; for how can the ungrateful, or careless, or avaricious, or faithless, or intemperate, be friends to each other? Indeed the bad appear to me to be altogether disposed by nature to be mutual enemies rather than friends. Again, the bad, as you observe, can never harmonize in friendship with the good; for how can those who commit bad actions be friends with those who abhor such actions? And yet, if those also who practice virtue fall into dissensions with one another about pre-eminence in their respective communities, and even hate each other through envy, who will ever be friends, or among what class of mankind shall affection and attachment be found?"

"But these affections act in various ways," rejoined Socrates, "for men have by nature inclinations to attachment, since they stand in need of each other, and feel compassion for each other, and co-operate for mutual benefit, and, being conscious that such is the case, have a sense of gratitude towards one another;

but they have also propensities to enmity, for such as think the same objects honorable and desirable, engage in contention for them, and, divided in feelings, become enemies. Disputation and anger lead to war; the desire of aggrandizement excites ill-will; and envy is followed by hatred. But, nevertheless, friendship, insinuating itself through all these hindrances, unites together the honorable and good; for such characters, through affection for virtue, prefer the enjoyment of a moderate competency without strife, to the attainment of unlimited power by means of war; they can endure hunger and thirst without discontent, and take only a fair share of meat and drink, and, though delighted with the attractions of youthful beauty, they can control themselves, so as to forbear from offending those whom they ought not to offend. By laying aside all avaricious feelings too, they can not only be satisfied with their lawful share of the common property, but can even assist one another. They can settle their differences, not only without mutual offence, but even to their mutual benefit. They can prevent their anger from going so far as to cause them repentance; and envy they entirely banish, by sharing their own property with their friends, and considering that of their friends as their own.

"How, then, can it be otherwise than natural, that the honorable and good should be sharers in political distinctions, not only without detriment, but even with advantage, to each other? Those indeed who covet honor and power in states, merely that they may be able to embezzle money, to do violence to others, and to live a life of luxury, must be regarded as unprincipled and abandoned characters, and incapable of harmonious union with other men. But when a person wishes to attain honors in a community, in order, not merely that he may not suffer wrong himself, but that he may assist his friends as far as is lawful, and may endeavor, in his term of office, to do some service to his country, why should he not, being of such a character, form a close union with another of similar character? Will he be less able to benefit his friends if he unite himself with the honorable and good, or will he be less able to serve his country if he have the honorable and good for his colleagues? In the public games, indeed, it is plain, that if the strongest were allowed to unite and attack the weaker, they would conquer in all the contests, and carry off all the prizes; and accordingly people do not permit them, in those competitions, to act in such a manner; but since, in political affairs, in which honorable and good men rule, no one hinders another from serving his country in concert with whomsoever lie pleases, how can it be otherwise than profitable for him to conduct affairs with the best men as his friends, having these as colleagues and co-operators, rather than antagonists, in his proceedings? It is evident, too, that if one man commences hostilities against another, he will need allies, and will need a great number of them, if he oppose the honorable and good; and those who consent to be his allies must be well treated by him, that they may be zealous in his interests; and it is much better for him to serve the best characters, who are the fewer, than the inferior, who are more numerous; for the bad require far more favors than the good.

But strive with good courage, Critobulus," he continued, "to be good yourself, and, having become so, endeavor to gain the friendship of men of honor and virtue. Perhaps I myself also may be able to assist you in this pursuit of the honorable and virtuous, from being naturally disposed to love, for, for whatever persons I conceive a liking, I devote myself with ardor, and with my whole mind, to love them, and be loved in return by them, regretting their absence to have mine regretted by them, and longing for their society while they on the other hand long for mine. I know that you also must cultivate such feelings, whenever you desire to form a friendship with any person. Do not conceal from my knowledge, therefore, the persons to whom you may wish to become a friend; for, from my carefulness to please those who please me, I do not think that I am unskilled in the art of gaining men's affections."

"Indeed, Socrates," replied Critobulus, "I have long desired to receive such instructions as yours, especially if the same knowledge will have effect at once on those who are amiable in mind, and handsome in person."

"But, Critobulus," replied Socrates, "there is nothing in the knowledge that I communicate to make those who are handsome in person endure him who lays hands upon them; for I am persuaded that men shrunk from Scylla because she offered to put her hands on them; while everyone, they say, was ready to listen to the Sirens, and were enchanted as they listened, because they laid hands on no one, but sang to all men from a distance."

"On the understanding, then, that I shall lay my hands on no one," said Critobulus, "tell me if you know any effectual means for securing friends."

"But will you never," asked Socrates, "apply your lips to theirs?"

"Be of good courage, Socrates," said Critobulus, "for I will never apply my lips to those of any person, unless that person be beautiful."

"You have now said," rejoined Socrates, "the exact contrary to what will promote your object; for the beautiful will not allow such liberties, though the deformed receive them with pleasure, thinking that they are accounted beautiful for their mental qualities."

"As I shall caress the beautiful, then," said Critobulus, "and caress the good with the utmost ardor, teach me, with confidence, the art of attaching my friends to me."

"When, therefore, Critobulus," said Socrates, "you wish to become a friend to anyone, will you permit me to say to him concerning you, that you admire him, and desire to be his friend?"

"You may say so," answered Critobulus, "for I have never known anyone dislike those who praised him."

"But if I say of you, in addition, that, because you admire him, you feel kindly disposed towards him, will you not think that false information is given of you by me?"

“No: for a kind feeling springs up in myself also towards those whom I regard as kindly disposed towards me.”

“Such information, then,” continued Socrates, “I may communicate regarding you to such as you may wish to make your friends; but if you enable me also to say concerning you, that you are attentive to your friends; that you delight in nothing so much as in the possession of good friends; that you pride yourself on the honorable conduct of your friends not less than on your own; that you rejoice at the good fortune of your friends not less than at your own; that you are never weary of contriving means by which good fortune may come to your friends; and that you think it the great virtue of a man to surpass his friends in doing them good and his enemies in doing them harm, I think that I shall be a very useful assistant to you in gaining the affections of worthy friends.”

“But why,” said Critobulus, “do you say this to me, as if you were not at liberty to say of me anything you please?”

“No, by Zeus,” replied Socrates; “I have no such liberty, according to a remark that I once heard from Aspasia; for she said that skillful matchmakers, by reporting with truth good points of character, had great influence in leading people to form unions, but that those who said what was false, did no good by their praises, for that such as were deceived hated each other and the match-maker alike; and as I am persuaded that this opinion is correct, I think that I ought not to say, when I praise you, anything that I cannot utter with truth.”

“You are, therefore,” returned Critobulus, “a friend of such a kind to me, Socrates, as to assist me, if I have myself any qualities adapted to gain friends; but if not, you would not be willing to invent anything to serve me.”

“And whether, Critobulus,” said Socrates, “should I appear to serve you more by extolling you with false praises, or by persuading you to endeavor to become a truly deserving man? If this point is not clear to you, consider it with the following illustrations: If, wishing to make the owner of a ship your friend, I should praise you falsely to him, pronouncing you a skillful pilot, and he, believing me, should entrust his ship to you to steer when you are incapable of steering it, would you have any expectation that you would not destroy both yourself and the ship? Or if, by false representations, I should persuade the state, publicly, to entrust itself to you as a man skilled in military tactics, in judicial proceedings, or in political affairs, what do you think that yourself and the state would suffer at your hands? Or if, in private intercourse, I should induce any of the citizens, by unfounded statements, to commit their property to your care, as being a good and diligent manager, would you not, when you came to give proof of your abilities, be convicted of dishonesty, and make yourself appear ridiculous? But the shortest, and safest, and best way, Critobulus, is, to strive to be really good in that in which you wish to be thought good. Whatever are called virtues among mankind, you will find, on consideration, capable of being increased by study and exercise. I am of opinion, that it is in accordance with these sentiments, that we ought to endeavor to acquire friends; if you know any other way, make me acquainted with it.”

“I should be indeed ashamed,” replied Critobulus, “to say anything in opposition to such an opinion; for I should say what was neither honorable nor true.”

CHAPTER VII.

Socrates endeavored to alleviate the necessities of his friends by his instructions, and by exhorting them to assist each other. In this chapter it is particularly shown that any person of liberal education may, when oppressed by poverty, honorably use his talents and accomplishments for his support.

Such difficulties of his friends as arose from ignorance, he endeavored to remedy by his counsel; such as sprung from poverty, by admonishing them to assist each other according to their means. With reference to this point, I will relate what I know of him from having been an ear-witness of what he said.

Observing Aristarchus, on one occasion, looking gloomily, "You seem," said he, "Aristarchus, to be taking something to heart; but you ought to impart the cause of your uneasiness to your friends; for perhaps we may by some means lighten it."

"I am indeed, Socrates," replied Aristarchus, "in great perplexity; for since the city has been disturbed, and many of our people have fled to the Piraeus, my surviving sisters, and nieces, and cousins have gathered about me in such numbers, that there are now in my house fourteen freeborn persons. At the same time, we receive no profit from our lands, for the enemy are in possession of them; nor any rent from our houses, for but few inhabitants are left in the city; no one will buy our furniture, nor is it possible to borrow money from any quarter; a person, indeed, as it seems to me, would sooner find money by seeking it on the road, than get it by borrowing. It is a grievous thing to me, therefore, to leave my relations to perish; and it is impossible for me to support such a number under such circumstances." Socrates, on hearing this, replied, "And how is it that Ceramon, yonder, though maintaining a great number of people, is not only able to procure what is necessary for himself and them, but gains so much more, also, as to be positively rich, while you, having many to support, are afraid lest you should all perish for want of necessaries?"

"Because, assuredly," replied Aristarchus, "he maintains slaves, while I have to support free-born persons."

"And which of the two," inquired Socrates, "do you consider to be the better, the freeborn persons that are with you, or the slaves that are with Ceramon?"

"I consider the free persons with me as the better."

"Is it not then a disgrace that he should gain abundance by means of the inferior sort, and that you should be in difficulties while, having with you those of the better class?"

"Such certainly is the case; but it is not at all wonderful; for he supports artisans; hut I, persons of liberal education."

"Artisans, then," asked Socrates, "are persons that know how to make something useful?"

"Unquestionably," replied Aristarchus. "Is barley-meal, then, useful?"

"Very."

"Is bread?"

"Not less so."

"And are men's and women's garments, coats, cloaks, and mantles, useful?"

"They are all extremely useful."

"And do those who are residing with you, then, not know how to make any of these things?"

"They know how to make them all, as I believe."

"And are you not aware that from the manufacture of one of these articles, that of barley-meal, Nausicydes supports not only himself and his household, but a great number of swine and oxen besides, and gains, indeed, so much more than he wants, that he often even assists the government with his money? Are you not aware that Cyrebus, by making bread, maintains his whole household, and lives luxuriously; that Demea, of Collytus, supports himself by making cloaks, Menon by making woolen cloaks, and that most of the Megarians live by making mantles?"

"Certainly they do," said Aristarchus; "for they purchase barbarian slaves and keep them, in order to force them to do what they please; but I have with me free-born persons and relatives."

"Then," added Socrates, "because they are free and related to you, do you think that they ought to do nothing else but eat and sleep? Among other free persons, do you see that those who live thus spend their time more pleasantly, and do you consider them happier, than those who practice the arts which they know, and which are useful to support life? Do you find that idleness and carelessness are serviceable to mankind, either for learning what it becomes them to know, or for remembering what they have learned, or for maintaining the health and strength of their bodies, or for acquiring and preserving what is useful for the support of life, and that industry and diligence are of no service at all? And as to the arts which you say they know, whether did they learn them as being useless to maintain life, and with the intention of never practicing any of them, or, on the contrary, with a view to occupy themselves about them, and to reap profit from them? In which condition will men be more temperate, living in idleness, or attending to useful employments? In which condition will they be more honest, if they work, or if they sit in idleness meditating how to procure necessaries? Under present circumstances, as I should suppose, you neither feel attached to your relatives, nor they to you, for you find them burdensome to you, and they see that you are annoyed with their company. From such feelings there is danger that dislike may grow stronger and stronger, and that previous friendly inclinations may be diminished. But if you take them under your direction, so that they may be employed, you will love them, when you see that they are serviceable to you, and they will grow attached to you, when they find that you feel satisfaction in their society; and remembering past services with greater pleasure, you will increase the friendly feeling resulting from them, and consequently grow more attached and better disposed towards each other. If, indeed, they were going to employ themselves in anything dishonorable, death would be preferable to it; but the

accomplishments which they know, are, as it appears, such as are most honorable and becoming to women; and all people execute what they know with the greatest ease and expedition, and with the utmost credit and pleasure. Do not hesitate, therefore," concluded Socrates, "to recommend to them this line of conduct, which will benefit both you and them; and they, as it is probable, will cheerfully comply with your wishes."

"By the gods," exclaimed Aristarchus, "you seem to me to give such excellent advice, Socrates, that though hitherto I did not like to borrow money, knowing that, when I had spent what I got, I should have no means of repaying it, I now think that I can endure to do so, in order to gain the necessary means for commencing work."

The necessary means were accordingly provided; wool was bought; and the women took their dinners as they continued at work, and supped when they had finished their tasks; they became cheerful instead of gloomy in countenance, and, instead of regarding each other with dislike, met the looks of one another with pleasure; they loved Aristarchus as their protector, and he loved them as being of use to him. At last he came to Socrates, and told him with delight of the state of things in his house; adding that "the women complained of him as being the only person in the house that ate the bread of idleness."

"And do you not tell them," said Socrates, "the fable of the dog? For they say that when beasts had the faculty of speech, the sheep said to her master, ' you act strangely, in granting nothing to us who supply you with wool, and lambs, and cheese, except what we get from the ground; while to the dog, who brings you no such profits, you give a share of the food which you take yourself.' The dog, hearing these remarks, said, 'And not indeed without reason; for I am he that protects even yourselves, so that you are neither stolen by men, nor carried off by wolves; while, if I were not to guard you, you would be unable even to feed, for fear lest you should be destroyed.' In consequence it is said that the sheep agreed that the dog should have superior honor. You, accordingly, tell your relations that you are, in the place of the dog, their guardian and protector, and that, by your means, they work and live in security and pleasure, without suffering injury from anyone."

CHAPTER VIII.

Socrates persuades Eutherus, who was working for hire, to seek some more eligible employment, as his present occupation was not suited for old age, and recommends to him the post of steward to some rich man. An objection on the part of Eutherus, that he should dislike to have to render an account to a master, Socrates opposes with the remark that there is no office in the world free from responsibility.

Seeing an old friend one day, after a considerable interval of time, he said, "Whence do you come, Eutherus?"

"I am returned, Socrates," replied Eutherus, "from my retirement abroad at the conclusion of the war; and I come now from the immediate neighborhood; for since we were robbed of all our possessions beyond the borders, and my father left me nothing in Attica, I am obliged to live in the city and work with my own hands to procure the necessaries of life; but this seems to me better than to ask aid of anybody, especially as I have nothing on which I could borrow."

"And how long," said Socrates, "do you think that your bodily labor will serve to earn what you require?"

"Not very long, by Zeus," replied Eutherus. "Then," said Socrates, "when you grow older, you will doubtless be in want of money, and no one will be willing to give you wages for your bodily labor."

"What you say is true," rejoined Eutherus. "It will be better for you, therefore," continued Socrates, "to apply yourself immediately to some employment which will maintain you when you are old, and, attaching yourself to someone of those that have larger fortunes, (who requires a person to assist him,) and, superintending his works, helping to gather in his fruits, and preserve his property, to benefit him, and to be benefited by him in return."

"I should with great reluctance, Socrates," said he, "submit to slavery."

"Yet those who have the superintendence in states, and who take care of the public interests, are not the more like slaves on that account, but are thought to have more of the freeman."

"In a word, however," rejoined Eutherus, "I am not at all willing to make myself liable to anyone's censure."

"But assuredly, Eutherus," said Socrates, "it is not very easy to find an employment in which a person would not be exposed to censure; for it is difficult to do anything so as to commit no error; and it is difficult, even if you have done it without error, to meet with a considerate judge; for even in the occupation in which you are now engaged I should wonder if it be easy for you to go through it without blame. But you must endeavor to avoid such employers as are given to censure, and seek such as are candid; to undertake such duties as you are able to do, and to decline such as you cannot fulfil; and to execute whatever you take upon you in the best manner and with the utmost zeal; for I think that, by such conduct, you will be least exposed to censure, you will most readily find assistance in time of

need, and you will live with the greatest ease and freedom from danger, and with the best provision for old age.

CHAPTER IX.

Crito, a rich man, complaining that he is harassed by informers, Socrates recommends him to secure the services of Archedemus, a poor man well skilled in the law, to defend him against them; a plan by which both are benefited. Archedemus also assists others, and gains both reputation and emolument.

I know that he also heard Crito once observe, how difficult it was for a man who wished to mind his own business to live at Athens. "For at this very time," added he, "there are people bringing actions against me, not because they have suffered any wrong from me, but because they think that I would rather pay them a sum of money than have the trouble of law proceedings."

"Tell me, Crito," said Socrates, "do you not keep dogs, that they may drive away the wolves from your sheep?"

"Certainly," answered Crito, "for it is more profitable to me to keep them than not."

"Would you not then be inclined to keep a man also, who would be willing and able to drive away from you those that try to molest you?"

"I would with pleasure," returned Crito, "if I were not afraid that he would turn against me."

"But do you not see," said Socrates, "that it would be much more pleasant for him to serve himself by gratifying such a man as you than by incurring your enmity. And be assured that there are such characters here, who would be extremely ambitious to have you for a friend."

In consequence of this conversation, they fixed upon Archedemus, a man of great ability both in speaking and acting, but poor; for he was not of a character to make money by every means, but was a lover of honesty, and a person of superior mind, so that, he could draw money from the informers. Crito, therefore, whenever he gathered in his corn, or oil, or wine, or wool, or anything else that grew on his land, used to select a portion of it, and give it to Archedemus; and used to invite him whenever he sacrificed, and paid him attention in every similar way. Archedemus, accordingly, thinking that Crito's house would be a place of refuge for him, showed him much respect, and quickly discovered, on the part of Crito's accusers, many illegal acts, and many persons who were enemies to those accusers, one of whom he summoned to a public trial, in which it would be settled what he should suffer or pay. This person, being conscious of many crimes, tried every means to get out of the hands of Archedemus; but Archedemus would not let him off, until he ceased to molest Crito, and gave himself a sum of money besides.

When Archedemus had succeeded in this and some other similar proceedings, then, as when any shepherd has a good dog, other shepherds wish to station their flocks near him, in order to have the benefit of his dog, so likewise many of the friends of Crito begged him to lend them the services of Archedemus as a protector.

Archedemus willingly gratified Crito in this respect, and thus not only Crito himself was left at peace, but his friends. And if any of those with whom he was at variance taunted him with receiving favors from Crito, and paying court to him, Archedemus would ask, “whether is it disgraceful to be benefited by honest men, and to make them your friends by serving them in return, and to be at variance with the unprincipled, or to make the honorable and good your enemies by trying to wrong them, and to make the bad your friends by co-operating with them, and associate with the vicious instead of the virtuous?” From this time Archedemus was one of Crito’s friends, and was honored by the other friends of Crito.

CHAPTER X.

Socrates exhorts Diodorus, a rich man, to aid his friend Hermogenes, who is in extreme poverty. A man endeavors to preserve the life of a slave, and ought surely to use greater exertions to save a friend, who will well repay our kindness.

I am aware that he also held a conversation with Diodorus, one of his followers, to the following effect. "Tell me, Diodorus," said he, "if one of your slaves runs away, do you use any care to recover him?"

"Yes, indeed," answered he, "and I call others to my aid, by offering rewards for capturing him."

"And if any of your slaves falls ill," continued Socrates, "do you pay any attention to him, and call in medical men, that he may not die?"

"Certainly," replied the other. "And if anyone of your friends, who is far more valuable to you than all your slaves, is in danger of perishing of want, do you not think that it becomes you to take care of him, that his life may be saved? But you are not ignorant that Hermogenes is not ungrateful, and would be ashamed, if, after being assisted by you, he were not to serve you in return; and indeed to secure such a supporter as he, willing, well-disposed, steady, and not only able to do what he is directed, but capable of being useful of himself, and of taking forethought, and forming plans for you, I consider equivalent to the value of many slaves. Good economists say that you ought to buy, when you can purchase for a little what is worth much; but now, in consequence of the troubled state of affairs, it is possible to obtain good friends at a very easy rate."

"You say well, Socrates," rejoined Diodorus; "and therefore tell Hermogenes to come to me."

"No, by Zeus," said Socrates, "I shall not; for I think it not so honorable for you to send for him as to go yourself to him; nor do I consider it a greater benefit to him than to you that this intercourse should take place." Diodorus accordingly went to Hermogenes, and secured, at no great expense, a friend who made it his business to consider by what words or deeds he could profit or please Diodorus.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

Socrates used to exhort those who aspired to public offices to learn the duties that would be required in them. The duties of a military commander, and his responsibilities. He must know many things besides military tactics.

I will now show that Socrates was of great service to those who aspired to posts of honor, by rendering them attentive to the duties of the offices which they sought.

Having heard that Dionysodorus had arrived at the city, offering to teach the art of a general, he said to one of those who were with him, whom he observed to be desirous of obtaining that honor in the state, "It is indeed unbecoming, young man, that he who wishes to be commander of an army in his country should neglect to learn the duties of that office when he has an opportunity of learning them; and such a person would be far more justly punished by his country than one who should contract to make statues for it, when he had not learned to make them; for as the whole state, in the perils of war, is entrusted to the care of the general, it is likely that great advantages will occur if he act well, and great evils if he fall into error. How, then, would not he, who neglects to learn the duties of the office, while he is eager to be elected to it, be deservedly punished?" By making such observations, he induced the young man to go and learn.

When, after having learned, he returned to Socrates again, he began to joke upon him, saying, "Since Homer, my friends, has represented Agamemnon as dignified, does not this young man, after learning to be a general, seem to you to look more dignified than before? For as he who has learned to play the lyre is a lyrist, though he may not use the instrument, and he who has learned the art of healing is a physician, though he may not practice his art, so this youth will from henceforth be a general, though no one may elect him to command; but he who wants the proper knowledge is neither general nor physician, even though he be chosen to act as such by all the people in the world. But," he continued, "in order that we may have a better knowledge of the military art, in case anyone of us should have to command a troop or company under you, tell us how he began to teach you generalship?"

"He began," replied the youth, "with the same thing with which he ended; for he taught me tactics, and nothing else."

"But," said Socrates, "how small a part of the qualifications of a general is this! For a general must be skillful in preparing what is necessary for war, able in securing provisions for his troops, a man of great contrivance and activity, careful, persevering, and sagacious; kind, and yet severe; open, yet crafty; careful of his own, yet ready to steal from others; profuse, yet rapacious; lavish of presents, yet eager to acquire money; cautious, yet enterprising; and many other qualities there are, both natural and acquired, which he, who would fill the office of general with

ability, must possess. It is good, indeed, to be skilled in tactics; for a well-arranged army is very different from a disorderly one; as stones and bricks, wood and tiles, if thrown together in confusion, are of no use whatever; but when the stone and tiles, materials not likely to rot or decay, are placed at the bottom and the top, and the bricks and wood are arranged in the middle, (as in building,) a house, which is a valuable piece of property, is formed."

"What you have said, Socrates," rejoined the youth, "is an exact illustration of our practice; for in the field of battle we must place the bravest troops in the front and rear, and the cowardly in the middle, that they may be led on by those before them, and pushed forward by those behind."

"If indeed he has taught you to distinguish the brave and cowardly," rejoined Socrates, "that rule may be of use; but if not, what profit is there in what you have learned? for if he ordered you, in arranging a number of coins, to lay the best first and last, and the worst in the middle, and gave you no instructions how to distinguish the good and bad, his orders to you would be to no purpose."

"But indeed," he replied, "he did not teach me this; so that we must distinguish the brave from the cowardly ourselves."

"Why should we not consider then," said Socrates, "how we may avoid mistakes as to that matter?"

"I am willing," returned the young man.

"If then we had to capture a sum of money, and were to place the most covetous men in front, should we not arrange them properly?"

"It appears so to me."

"And what must generals do when entering on a perilous enterprise? Must they not place the most ambitious in front?"

"They at least," said the young man, "are those who are ready to brave danger for the sake of praise; and they are by no means difficult to discover, but will be everywhere conspicuous and easy to be selected."

"But did your instructor," inquired Socrates, "teach you to arrange an army, merely, or did he tell you for what purpose, and in what manner, you must employ each division of your forces?"

"Not at all," replied he. "Yet there are many occasions, on which it is not proper to draw up an army, or to conduct it, in the same way."

"But, by Zeus, he gave me no explanation as to such occasions."

"Go again, then, by all means," said Socrates, "and question him; for if he knows, and is not quite shameless, he will blush, after taking your money, to send you away in ignorance."

CHAPTER II.

A good general ought to take measures for the safety, maintenance, and success of his troops; and not to study his own honor alone, but that of his whole army.

Haying met, on some occasion, a person who had been elected general, Socrates said to him, "Why is it, do you think, that Homer has styled Agamemnon 'Shepherd of the people?' Is it not for this reason, that as a shepherd must be careful that his sheep be safe, and have food, and the object may be effected for which they are kept, so a general must take care that his soldiers be safe, and have provisions, and that the object be effected for which they serve? And they serve, no doubt, that they may increase their gratifications by conquering the enemy. Or why has he praised Agamemnon in the following manner, saying that he was

Both characters, a good king, and an efficient warrior?

Does he not mean that he would not have been "an efficient warrior," if he had fought courageously alone against the enemy, and if he had not been the cause of courage to his whole army; and that he would not have been "a good king," if he had attended to his own subsistence only, and had not been the cause of comfort to those over whom he ruled?

For a man is chosen king, not that he may take good care of himself, but that those who have chosen him may prosper by his means; and all men, when they take the field, take it that their lives may be rendered as happy as possible, and choose generals that they may conduct them to the accomplishment of that object. It is incumbent on the leader of an army, therefore, to carry into execution the views of those who have chosen him their leader. Nor is it easy to find anything more honorable than such exertion, or more disgraceful than an opposite course of conduct."

Thus considering what was the merit of a good leader, he omitted other points in his character, and left only this, that he should render those whom he commanded happy.

CHAPTER III.

The duty of a commander of cavalry is twofold, to improve the condition both of his men and his horses; and not to leave the care of the horses to the troops. How he should train his men, and how he should be himself qualified to do so. He should acquire oratorical power, that he may incite his men to exertion, and fire them with the desire of glory.

I remember that he held a dialogue with a person who had been chosen Hipparch, to the following purport. "Could you tell me, young man," said he, "with what object you desired to be a Hipparch? It certainly was not for the sake of riding first among the cavalry; for the horse-archers are honored with that dignity, as they ride even before the Hipparchs."

"You say the truth," said the youth.

"Nor was it, surely, for the sake of being noticed, for even madmen are noticed by everybody."

"You say the truth in that respect also."

"But was it, then, that you expect to render the cavalry better, and present them in that condition to your country, and that, if there should be need for the services of cavalry, you hope, as their leader, to be the author of some advantage to the state?"

"I do hope so, certainly."

"And it will be truly honorable to you," continued Socrates, "if you are able to effect that object. But the office, to which you have been chosen, takes charge of both the horses and riders?"

"It does so," said the young man.

"Come then, tell me this first of all, how you propose to render the horses better?"

"That," replied the other, "I do not consider to be my business; for I think that each man, individually, must take care of his own horse."

"If, then," said Socrates, "some of the men should present their horses before you so diseased in the feet, so weak in the legs, or so feeble in body, and others theirs so ill-fed, that they could not follow you; others, theirs so unmanageable, that they would not remain where you posted them; others, theirs so vicious that it would not be possible to post them at all; what would be the use of such cavalry to you? Or how would you be able, at the head of them, to be of any service to your country?"

"You admonish me well," said the youth, "and I will try to look to the horses as far as may be in my power."

"And will you not also endeavor," asked Socrates, "to make the riders better?"

"I will," said he.

"You will first of all, then, make them more expert in mounting their horses."

“I ought to do so; for if any of them should fall off, they would thus be better prepared to recover themselves.”

“If, then,” said Socrates, “you should be obliged to hazard an engagement, whether will you order your men to bring the enemy down to the level sand on which you have been accustomed to ride, or will you try to exercise them on such ground as that on which the enemy may show themselves?”

“The latter method will be the better,” said the young man.

“Will you also take any care that the greatest possible number of your men may be able to hurl the dart on horseback?”

“That will be better too,” replied he. “And have you considered how to whet the courage of your cavalry, since you intend to make them more courageous, and animate them against the enemy?”

“If I have not yet considered,” said he, “I will now try to do so.”

“And have you at all considered how your cavalry may be induced to obey you? For without obedience you will have no profit either from horses or horsemen, spirited and valiant as they may be.”

“You say the truth, Socrates,” said he; “but by what means can a leader most effectually induce them to obedience?”

“You are doubtless aware that in all circumstances men most willingly obey those whom they consider most able to direct; for in sickness patients obey him whom they think the best physician; on ship-board, the passengers obey him whom they think the best pilot, and in agriculture, people obey him whom they deem the best husbandman.”

“Unquestionably,” said the young man.

“Is it not then likely,” said Socrates, “that in horsemanship also, others will be most willing to obey him who appears to know best what he ought to do?”

“If, therefore, Socrates, I should myself appear the best horseman among them, will that circumstance be sufficient to induce them to obey me?”

“If you convince them in addition,” said Socrates, “that it is better and safer for them to obey you.”

“How, then, shall I convince them of that?”

“With much more ease,” replied Socrates, “than if you had to convince them that bad things are better and more profitable than good.”

“You mean,” said the young man, “that a commander of cavalry, in addition to his other qualifications, should study to acquire some ability in speaking.”

“And did you think,” asked Socrates, “that you would command cavalry by silence? Have you not reflected, that whatever excellent principles we have learned according to law, principles by which we know how to live, we learned all through the medium of speech; and that whatever other valuable instruction any person acquires, he acquires it by means of speech likewise? Do not those who teach best, use speech most; and those who know the most important truths, discuss them with the greatest eloquence? Or have you not observed, that when a band of

dancers and musicians is formed from this city, as that, for instance, which is sent to Delos, no one from any other quarter can compete with it; and that in no other city is manly grace shown by numbers of people like that which is seen here?"

"What you say is true," said he.

"But it is not so much in sweetness of voice, or in size and strength of body, that the Athenians excel other people, as in ambition, which is the greatest incitement to whatever is honorable and noble."

"This also is true," said he.

"Do you not think, then," said Socrates, "that if anyone should study to improve the cavalry here, the Athenians would excel other people in that department also, (as well in the decoration of their arms and horses as in the good order of the men, and in boldly defying danger to encounter the enemy,) if they thought that by such means they would acquire praise and honor?"

"It is probable," said the young man.

"Do not delay, therefore," added Socrates, "but try to excite your men to those exertions by which you will both be benefited yourself, and your countrymen through your means."

"I will assuredly try," replied he.

CHAPTER IV.

Nicomachides complaining that the Athenians had not chosen him general, though he was experienced in war, but Antisthenes, who had seen no military service, Socrates proceeds to show that Antisthenes, although he had never filled the office of commander, might have qualities to indicate that he would fill it with success.

Seeing Nicomachides, one day, coming from the assembly for the election of magistrates, he asked him, "Who have been chosen generals, Nicomachides?"

"Are not the Athenians the same as ever, Socrates?" he replied; "for they have not chosen me, who am worn out with serving on the list, both as captain and centurion, and with having received so many wounds from the enemy, (he then drew aside his robe, and showed the scars of the wounds,) but have elected Antisthenes, who has never served in the heavy-armed infantry, nor done anything remarkable in the cavalry, and who indeed knows nothing, but how to get money."

"Is it not good, however, to know this," said Socrates, "since he will then be able to get necessaries for the troops?"

"But merchants," replied Nicomachides, "are able to collect money; and yet would not, on that account, be capable of leading an army."

"Antisthenes, however," continued Socrates, "is given to emulation, a quality necessary in a general. Do you not know that whenever he has been chorus-manager he has gained the superiority in all his choruses?"

"But, by Zeus," rejoined Nicomachides, "there is nothing similar in managing a chorus and an army."

"Yet Antisthenes," said Socrates, "though neither skilled in music nor in teaching a chorus, was able to find out the best masters in these departments."

"In the army, accordingly," exclaimed Nicomachides, "he will find others to range his troops for him, and others to fight for him!"

"Well, then," rejoined Socrates, "if he find out and select the best men in military affairs, as he has done in the conduct of his choruses, he will probably attain superiority in this respect also; and it is likely that he will be more willing to spend money for a victory in war on behalf of the whole state, than for a victory with a chorus in behalf of his single tribe."

"Do you say, then, Socrates," said he, "that it is in the power of the same man to manage a chorus well, and to manage an army well?"

"I say," said Socrates, "that over whatever a man may preside, he will, if he knows what he needs, and is able to provide it, be a good president, whether he have the direction of a chorus, a family, a city, or an army."

"By Zeus, Socrates," cried Nicomachides, "I should never have expected to hear from you that good managers of a family would also be good generals."

“Come, then,” proceeded Socrates, “let us consider what are the duties of each of them, that we may understand whether they are the same, or are in any respect different.”

“By all means,” said he. “Is it not, then, the duty of both,” asked Socrates, “to render those under their command obedient and submissive to them?”

“Unquestionably.”

“Is it not also the duty of both to entrust various employments to such as are fitted to execute them?”

“That is also unquestionable.”

“To punish the bad, and to honor the good, too, belongs, I think, to each of them.”

“Undoubtedly.”

“And is it not honorable in both to render those under them well-disposed towards them?”

“That also is certain.”

“And do you think it for the interest of both to gain for themselves allies and auxiliaries or not?”

“It assuredly is for their interest.”

“Is it not proper for both also to be careful of their resources?”

“Assuredly.”

“And is it not proper for both, therefore, to be attentive and industrious in their respective duties?”

“All these particulars,” said Nicomachides, “are common alike to both; but it is not common to both to fight.”

“Yet both have doubtless enemies,” rejoined Socrates. “That is probably the case,” said the other. “Is it not for the interest of both to gain the superiority over those enemies?”

“Certainly; but to say nothing on that point, what, I ask, will skill in managing a household avail, if it be necessary to fight?”

“It will doubtless, in that case, be of the greatest avail,” said Socrates; “for a good manager of a house, knowing that nothing is so advantageous or profitable as to get the better of your enemies when you contend with them, nothing so unprofitable and prejudicial as to be defeated, will zealously seek and provide everything that may conduce to victory, will carefully watch and guard against whatever tends to defeat, will vigorously engage if he sees that his force is likely to conquer, and, what is not the least important point, will cautiously avoid engaging if he find himself insufficiently prepared. Do not therefore, Nicomachides,” he added, “despise men skillful in managing a household; for the conduct of private affairs differs from that of public concerns only in magnitude; in other respects they are similar; but what is most to be observed, is, that neither of them are managed without men, and that private matters are not managed by one species

of men, and public matters by another; for those who conduct public business make use of men not at all differing in nature from those whom the managers of private affairs employ; and those who know how to employ them, conduct either private or public affairs judiciously, while those who do not know, will err in the management of both."

CHAPTER V.

Conversation of Socrates with Pericles the younger on the manner in which the Athenians might be made to recover their ancient spirit and ambition. They ought to be reminded of the deeds of their ancestors; and to be taught that indolence has been the cause of their degeneracy. They ought to revive the institutions of their forefathers, or imitate those of the Lacedaemonians; and to pay great attention to military affairs. How the territory of Attica might be best secured against invasion.

Conversing, on one occasion, with Pericles, the son of the great Pericles, Socrates said, "I have hopes, Pericles, that under your leadership the city will become more eminent and famous in military affairs, and will get the better of her enemies."

"I wish, Socrates," said Pericles, "that what you say may happen; but how such effects are to be produced, I cannot understand."

"Are you willing, then," asked Socrates, "that we should have some conversation on these points, and consider how far there is a possibility of effecting what we desire."

"I am quite willing," replied Pericles.

"Are you aware, then," said Socrates, "that the Athenians are not at all inferior in number to the Boeotians?"

"I am," said Pericles. "

And whether do you think that a greater number of efficient and well-formed men could be selected from the Boeotians, or from the Athenians?"

"The Athenians do not appear to me to be inferior in this respect."

"And which of the two peoples do you consider to be more united among themselves?"

"I think that the Athenians are; for many of the Boeotians, being oppressed by the Thebans, entertain hostile feelings towards them. But at Athens I see nothing of the kind."

"But the Athenians are moreover of all people most eager for honor and most friendly in disposition; qualities which most effectually impel men to face danger in the cause of glory and of their country."

"The Athenians are certainly not to be found fault with in these respects."

"And assuredly there is no people that can boast of greater or more numerous exploits of their ancestors than the Athenians; a circumstance by which many are prompted and stimulated to cultivate manly courage and to become brave."

"All that you say is true, Socrates, but you see that since the slaughter of the thousand occurred at Lebadeia under Tolmides, and that at Delium under Hippocrates, the reputation of the Athenians has suffered as far as regards the Boeotians, and the spirit of the Boeotians has been raised as far as regards the Athenians, so that the Boeotians, indeed, who formerly did not dare, even on their own soil, to meet the Athenians in the field without the aid of the Spartans and

other Peloponnesians, now threaten to invade Attica single-handed; while the Athenians, who formerly, when the Boeotians were unsupported, ravaged Boeotia, are afraid lest the Boeotians should lay waste Attica."

"I perceive, indeed," said Socrates, "that such is the case; but the city seems to me now to be more favorably disposed for any good general; for confidence produces in men carelessness, indolence, and disobedience, but fear renders them more attentive, obedient, and orderly. You may form a notion of this from people in a ship; for as long as they fear nothing, they are all in disorder, but as soon as they begin to dread a storm, or the approach of an enemy, they not only do everything that they are told to do, but are hushed in silence, waiting for the directions to be given, like a band of dancers."

"Well then," said Pericles, "if they would now, assuredly, obey, it would be time for us to discuss how we might incite them to struggle to regain their ancient spirit, glory, and happiness."

"If then," said Socrates, "we wished them to claim property of which others were in possession, we should most effectively urge them to lay claim to it, if we proved that it belonged to their fathers, and was their rightful inheritance; and since we wish that they should strive for pre-eminence in valor, w« must show them that such preeminence was indisputably theirs of old, and that if they now exert themselves to recover it, they will be the most powerful of all people."

"How, then, can we convince them of this?"

"I think that we may do so, if we remind them that they have heard that their most ancient forefathers, of whom we have any knowledge, were the bravest of men."

"Do you allude to the dispute between the gods, of which Cecrops and his assessors had the decision on account of their valor?"

"I do allude to that, and to the education and birth of Erechtheus, and the war which occurred in his time with the people of the whole adjoining continent, as well as that which was waged under the Heracleidae against the Peloponnesians, and all the wars that were carried on under Theseus, in all of which they showed themselves the bravest people of their time; . and also, if you please, to what their descendants have since done, who lived not long before our day, not only contending, with their own unassisted strength, against the lords of all Asia and of Europe, as far as Macedonia, (who inherited vast power and wealth from their ancestors, and who had themselves performed great achievements,) but also distinguishing themselves, in conjunction with the Peloponnesians, both by land and sea. They, doubtless, are celebrated as having far surpassed other men of their time."

"They are so," said Pericles. "In consequence, though many migrations occurred in Greece, they remained in their own country; and many, when contending for their rights, submitted their claims to their arbitration, while many others, also, when persecuted by more powerful people, sought refuge with them."

“I wonder, indeed, Socrates,” said Pericles, “how our city ever degenerated.”

“I imagine,” said Socrates, “that as some other nations have grown indolent through excessive exaltation and power, so likewise the Athenians, after attaining great pre-eminence, grew neglectful of themselves, and consequently became degenerate.”

“By what means, then,” said Pericles, “could they now recover their pristine dignity?”

“It appears to me,” replied Socrates, “not at all difficult to discover; for I think that if they learn what were the practices of their ancestors, and observe them not less diligently than they, they will become not at all inferior to them; but if they do not take that course, yet, if they imitate those who are now at the head of Greece, adhere to their institutions, and attend to the same duties with diligence equal to theirs, they will stand not at all below them, and, if they use greater exertion, even above them.”

“You intimate,” returned Pericles, “that honor and virtue are far away from our city; for when will the Athenians reverence their elders as the Spartans do, when they begin, even by their own fathers, to show disrespect for older men? Or when will they exercise themselves like them, when they not only are regardless of bodily vigor, but deride those who cultivate it. Or when will they obey the magistrates like them, when they make it their pride to set them at naught? Or when will they be of one mind like them, when, instead of acting in concert for their mutual interests, they inflict injuries on one another, and envy one another more than they envy the rest of mankind? More than any other people, too, do they dispute in their private and public meetings; they institute more law-suits against one another, and prefer thus to prey upon one another than to unite for their mutual benefit. They conduct their public affairs as if they were those of a foreign state; they contend about the management of them, and rejoice, above all things, in having power to engage in such contests. From such conduct much ignorance and baseness prevail in the republic, and much envy and mutual hatred are engendered in the breasts of the citizens; on which accounts I am constantly in the greatest fear lest some evil should happen to the state too great for it to bear.”

“Do not by any means suppose, Pericles,” rejoined Socrates, “that the Athenians are thus disordered with an incurable depravity. Do you not see how orderly they are in their naval proceedings, how precisely they obey the presidents in the gymnastic games, and how, in the arrangement of the choruses, they submit to the directions of their teachers in a way inferior to none?”

“This is indeed surprising,” said Pericles, “that men of that class should obey those who are set over them, and that the infantry and cavalry, who are thought to excel the ordinary citizens in worth and valor, should be the least obedient of all the people.”

“The council of the Areopagus, too,” said Socrates, “is it not composed of men of approved character?”

“Undoubtedly,” replied Pericles. “And do you know of any judges who decide causes, and conduct all their business, with more exact conformity to the laws, or with more honor and justice?”

“I find no fault with them,” said Pericles.

“We must not therefore despair,” said Socrates, “as if we thought that the Athenians are not inclined to be lovers of order.”

“Yet in military affairs,” observed Pericles, “in which it is most requisite to act with prudence, and order, and obedience, they pay no regard to such duties.”

“It may be so,” returned Socrates, “for perhaps in military affairs men who are greatly deficient in knowledge have the command of them. Do you not observe that of harp-players, choristers, dancers, wrestlers, or pancratiasts, no one ventures to assume the direction who has not the requisite knowledge for it, but that all, who take the lead in such matters, are able to show from whom they learned the arts in which they are masters; whereas the most of our generals undertake to command without previous study. I do not however imagine you to be one of that sort; for I am sensible that you can tell when you began to learn generalship not less certainly than when you began to learn wrestling. I am sure, too, that you have learned, and keep in mind, many of your father’s principles of warfare, and that you have collected many others from every quarter whence it was possible to acquire anything that would add to your skill as a commander. I have no doubt that you take great care that you may not unawares be ignorant of anything conducive to generalship, and that, if you have ever found yourself deficient in any such matters, you have applied to persons experienced in them, sparing neither presents nor civilities, that you might learn from them what you did not know, and might render them efficient helpers to you.”

“You make me well aware, Socrates,” said Pericles, “that you do not say this from a belief that I have diligently attended to these matters, but from a wish to convince me that he who would be a general must attend to all such studies; and I indeed agree with you in that opinion.”

“Have you considered this also, Pericles,” asked Socrates, “that on the frontier of our territories lie great mountains, extending down to Boeotia, through which there lead into our country narrow and precipitous defiles; and that our country is girded by strong mountains, as it lies in the midst of them?”

“Certainly,” said he.

“Have you heard, too, that the Mysians and Pisidians, who occupy extremely strong positions in the country of the Great King, and who are lightly armed, are able to make descents on the king’s territory, and do it great damage, while they themselves preserve their liberty?”

“This, too, I have heard,” said Pericles.

“And do you not think that the Athenians,” said Socrates, “if equipped with light arms while they are of an age for activity, and occupying the mountains that

fence our country, might do great mischief to our enemies, and form a strong bulwark for the inhabitants of our country?"

"I think, Socrates," said he, "that all these arrangements would be useful."

"If these plans, then," concluded Socrates, "appear satisfactory to you, endeavor, my excellent friend, to act upon them; for whatsoever of them you carry into execution, it will be an honor to yourself and an advantage to the state; and if you fail in the attempt for want of power, you will neither injure the state nor disgrace yourself."

CHAPTER VI.

Socrates, by his usual process of interrogation, leads Glaucon, a young man who was extravagantly desirous of a post in the government, to confess that he was entirely destitute of the knowledge necessary for the office to which he aspired. He then shows that, unless a ruler has acquired an exact knowledge of state affairs, he can do no good to his country or credit to himself.

When Glaucon, the son of Ariston, attempted to harangue the people, from a desire, though he was not yet twenty years of age, to have a share in the government of the state, no one of his relatives, or other friends, could prevent him from getting himself dragged down from the tribunal, and making himself ridiculous; but Socrates, who had a friendly feeling towards him on account of Charmides the son of Glaucon, as well as on account of Plato, succeeded in prevailing on him, by his sole dissuasion, to relinquish his purpose. Meeting him by chance, he first stopped him by addressing him as follows, that he might be willing to listen to him: "Glaucon," said he, "have you formed an intention to govern the state for us?"

"I have, Socrates," replied Glaucon.

"By Zeus," rejoined Socrates, "it is an honorable office, if any other among men be so; for it is certain that, if you attain your object, you will be able yourself to secure whatever you may desire, and will be in a condition to benefit your friends; you will raise your father's house, and increase the power of your country; you will be celebrated, first of all in your own city, and afterwards throughout Greece, and perhaps also," like Themistocles, among the Barbarians; and, wherever you may be, you will be an object of general admiration."

Glaucon, hearing this, was highly elated, and cheerfully stayed to listen. Socrates next proceeded to say, "But it is plain, Glaucon, that if you wish to be honored, you must benefit the state."

"Certainly," answered Glaucon.

"Then, in the name of the gods," said Socrates, "do not hide from us how you intend to act, but inform us with what proceeding you will begin to benefit the state?" But as Glaucon was silent, as if just considering how he should begin, Socrates said, "As, if you wished to aggrandize the family of a friend, you would endeavor to make it richer, tell me whether you will in like manner also endeavor to make the state richer?"

"Assuredly," said he.

"Would it then be richer, if its revenues were increased?"

"That is at least probable," said Glaucon.

"Tell me then," proceeded Socrates, "from what the revenues of the state arise, and what is their amount; for you have doubtless considered, in order that if any of them fall short, you may make up the deficiency, and that if any of them fail, you may procure fresh supplies."

"These matters, by Zeus," replied Glaucon, "I have not considered."

“Well then,” said Socrates, “if you have omitted to consider this point, tell me at least the annual expenditure of the state; for you undoubtedly mean to retrench whatever is superfluous in it.”

“Indeed,” replied Glaucon, “I have not yet had time to turn my attention to that subject.”

“We will therefore,” said Socrates, “put off making our state richer for the present; for how is it possible for him who is ignorant of its expenditure and its income to manage those matters?”

“But, Socrates,” observed Glaucon, “it is possible to enrich the state at the expense of our enemies.”

“Extremely possible indeed,” replied Socrates, “if we be stronger than they; but if we be weaker, we may lose all that we have.”

“What you say is true,” said Glaucon.

“Accordingly,” said Socrates, “he who deliberates with whom he shall go to war, ought to know the force both of his own country and of the enemy, so that, if that of his own country be superior to that of the enemy, he may advise it to enter upon the war, but, if inferior, may persuade it to be cautious of doing so.”

“You say rightly,” said Glaucon.

“In the first place, then,” proceeded Socrates, “tell us the strength of the country by land and sea, and next that of the enemy.”

“But, by Zeus,” exclaimed Glaucon, “I should not be able to tell you on the moment, and at a word.”

“Well, then, if you have it written down,” said Socrates, “bring it, for I should be extremely glad to hear what it is.”

“But to say the truth,” replied Glaucon, “I have not yet written it down.”

“We will therefore put off considering about war for the present,” said Socrates, “for it is very likely that, on account of the magnitude of those subjects, and as you are just commencing your administration, you have not yet examined into them. But to the defense of the country, I am quite sure that you have directed your attention, and that you know how many garrisons are in advantageous positions, and how many not so, what number of men would be sufficient to maintain them, and what number would be insufficient, and that you will advise your countrymen to make the garrisons in advantageous positions stronger, and to remove the useless ones.”

“By Jove,” replied Glaucon, “I shall recommend them to remove them all, as they keep guard so negligently, that the property is secretly carried off out of the country.”

“Yet if we remove the garrisons,” said Socrates, “do you not think that liberty will be given to anybody that pleases to pillage? But,” added he, “have you gone personally, and examined as to this fact, or how do you know that the garrisons conduct themselves with such negligence?”

“I form my conjectures,” said he.

“Well then,” inquired Socrates, “shall we settle about these matters also, when we no longer rest upon conjecture, but have obtained certain knowledge?”

“Perhaps that,” said Glaucon, “will be the better course.”

“To the silver mines, however,” continued Socrates, “I know that you have not gone, so as to have the means of telling us why a smaller revenue is derived from them than came in some time ago.”

“I have not gone thither,” said he.

“Indeed the place,” said Socrates, “is said to be unhealthy, so that, when it is necessary to bring it under consideration, this will be a sufficient excuse for you.”

“You jest with me,” said Glaucon.

“I am sure, however,” proceeded Socrates, “that you have not neglected to consider, but have calculated, how long the corn, which is produced in the country, will suffice to maintain the city, and how much it requires for the year, in order that the city may not suffer from scarcity unknown to you, but that, from your own knowledge, you may be able, by giving your advice concerning the necessaries of life, to support the city, and preserve it.”

“You propose a vast field for me,” observed Glaucon, “if it will be necessary for me to attend to such subjects.”

“Nevertheless,” proceeded Socrates, “a man cannot order his house properly, unless he ascertains all that it requires, and takes care to supply it with everything necessary; but since the city consists of more than ten thousand houses, and since it is difficult to provide for so many at once, how is it that you have not tried to aid one first of all, suppose that of your uncle, for it stands in need of help? If you be able to assist that one, you may proceed to assist more; but if you be unable to benefit one, how will you be able to benefit many? Just as it is plain that, if a man cannot carry the weight of a talent, he need not attempt to carry a greater weight.”

“But I would improve my uncle’s house,” said Glaucon, “if he would but be persuaded by me.”

“And then,” resumed Socrates, “when you cannot persuade your uncle, do you expect to make all the Athenians, together with your uncle, yield to your arguments? Take care, Glaucon, lest, while you are eager to acquire glory, you meet with the reverse of it. Do you not see how dangerous it is for a person to speak of, or undertake, what he does not understand? Contemplate, among other men, such as you know to be characters that plainly talk of, and attempt to do, what they do not know, and consider whether they appear to you, by such conduct, to obtain more applause or censure, whether they seem to be more admired or despised? Contemplate, again, those who have some understanding of what they say and do, and you will find, I think, in all transactions, that such as are praised and admired are of the number of those who have most knowledge, and that those who incur censure and neglect are among those that have least. If therefore you desire to gain esteem and reputation in your country, endeavor to succeed in

gaining a knowledge of what you wish to do; for if, when you excel others in this qualification, you proceed to manage the affairs of the state, I shall not wonder if you very easily obtain what you desire."

CHAPTER VII.

Socrates exhorts Charmides, a man of ability, and acquainted with public affairs, to take part in the government, that he may not be charged with indolence. As Charmides distrusts his abilities for public speaking, Socrates encourages him by various observations.

Observing that Charmides, the son of Glaucon, a man of worth, and of far more ability than those who then ruled the state, hesitated to address the people, or to take part in the government of the city, he said to him, "Tell me, Charmides, if any man, who was able to win the crown in the public games, and, by that means, to gain honor for himself, and make his birth-place more celebrated in Greece, should nevertheless refuse to become a combatant, what sort of person would you consider him to be?"

"I should certainly think him indolent and wanting in spirit," replied Charm ides.

"And if anyone were able," continued Socrates, "by taking part in public affairs, to improve the condition of his country, and thus to attain honor for himself, but should yet shrink from doing so, might not he be justly regarded as wanting in spirit?"

"Perhaps so," said Charmides; "but why do you ask me that question?"

"Because," replied Socrates, "I think that you yourself, though possessed of sufficient ability, yet shrink from engaging even in those affairs in which it is your duty as a citizen to take a share."

"But in what transaction have you discovered my ability," said Charmides, "that you bring this charge against me?"

"In those conferences," answered Socrates, "in which you meet those who are engaged in the government of the state; for when they consult you on any point, I observe that you give them excellent advice, and that, when they are in any way in the wrong, you offer judicious objections."

"But it is not the same thing, Socrates," said he, "to converse with people in private, and to try one's powers at a public assembly."

"Yet," said Socrates, "he that is able to count, can count with no less exactness before a multitude than alone, and those who can play the harp best in solitude are also the best performers on it in company."

"But do you not see," said Charmides, "that bashfulness and timidity are naturally inherent in mankind, and affect us far more before a multitude than in private conversations?"

"But I am prompted to remind you," answered Socrates, "that while you neither feel bashfulness before the most intelligent, nor timid before the most powerful, it is in the presence of the most foolish and weak that you are ashamed to speak. And is it the fullers among them, or the cobblers, or the carpenters, or the copper-

smiths, or the ship-merchants, or those who barter in the market, and meditate what they may buy for little and sell for more, that you are ashamed to address? For it is of all such characters that the assembly is composed.

How then do you think that your conduct differs from that of a wrestler, who, being superior to well-practiced opponents, should yet fear the unpracticed? For is not this the case with you, that though you converse at your ease with those who have attained eminence in state affairs, and of whom some undervalue you, and though you are far superior to many who make it their business to address the people, you yet shrink from uttering your sentiments before men who have never thought of political affairs, and who have shown no disrespect for your talents, from an apprehension that you may be laughed at?"

"And do not the people in the assembly," asked Charmides, "appear to you often to laugh at those who speak with great judgment?"

"Yes," said Socrates, "and so do the other sort of people; and therefore I wonder at you, that you so easily silence one class of persons when they do so, and yet think that you shall not be able to deal with another? Be not ignorant of yourself, my friend, and do not commit the error which the majority of men commit; for most persons, though they are eager to look into the affairs of others, give no thought to the examination of their own. Do not you, then, neglect this duty, but strive more and more to cultivate your own powers; and do not be regardless of the affairs of your country, if any department of them can be improved by your means; for, if they are in a good condition, not only the rest of your countrymen, but your own friends and yourself, will reap the greatest benefit."

CHAPTER VIII.

Socrates meets the captious questions of Aristippus about goodness and beauty in such a manner as to show that nothing is good or bad in itself, but only with reference to some object; and that nothing is beautiful or otherwise in itself, but that the beautiful must be considered with regard to the useful. His remarks on buildings, to the same effect.

When Aristippus attempted to confute Socrates, as he himself had previously been confuted by him, Socrates, wishing to benefit those who were with him, gave his answers, not like those who are on their guard lest their words be perverted, but like those who are persuaded that they ought above all things to do what is right. What Aristippus had asked him, was, 'whether he knew anything good,' in order that if he should say any such thing as food, or drink, or money, or health, or strength, or courage, he might prove that it was sometimes an evil. But Socrates, reflecting that if anything troubles us, we want something to relieve us from it, replied, as it seemed best to do, "Do you ask me whether I know anything good for a fever?"

"I do not."

"Anything good for soreness of the eyes?"

"No."

"For hunger?"

"No, nor for hunger either."

"Well then," concluded Socrates, "if you ask me whether I know anything good that is good for nothing, I neither know anything, nor wish to know."

Aristippus again asking him if he knew anything beautiful, he replied,

"Many things."

"Are they then," inquired Aristippus, "all like each other?"

"Some of them," answered Socrates, "are as unlike one another as it is possible for them to be."

"How then," said he, "can what is beautiful be unlike what is beautiful?"

"Because, assuredly," replied Socrates, "one man, who is beautifully formed for wrestling, is unlike another who is beautifully formed for running; and a shield, which is beautifully formed for defense, is as unlike as possible to a dart, which is beautifully formed for being forcibly and swiftly hurled."

"You answer me," said Aristippus, "in the same manner as when I asked you whether you knew anything good."

"And do you imagine," said Socrates, "that the good is one thing, and the beautiful another? Do you not know that with reference to the same objects all things are both beautiful and good? Virtue, for instance, is not good with regard to some things and beautiful with regard to others; and persons, in the same way,

are called beautiful and good with reference to the same objects; and human bodies, too, with reference to the same objects, appear beautiful and good; and in like manner all other things, whatever men use, are considered beautiful and good with reference to the objects for which they are serviceable."

"Can a dung-basket, then," said Aristippus, "be a beautiful thing?"

"Yes, by Zeus," returned Socrates, "and a golden shield may be an ugly thing, if the one be beautifully formed for its particular uses, and the other ill formed?"

"Do you say, then, that the same things may be both beautiful and ugly?"

"Yes, undoubtedly, and also that they may be good and bad; for oftentimes what is good for hunger is bad for a fever, and what is good for a fever is bad for hunger; oftentimes what is beautiful in regard to running is the reverse in regard to wrestling, and what is beautiful in regard to wrestling is the reverse in regard to running; for whatever is good is also beautiful, in regard to purposes for which it is well adapted, and whatever is bad is the reverse of beautiful, in regard to purposes for which it is ill adapted."

When Socrates said, too, that the same houses that were beautiful were also useful, he appeared to me to instruct us what sort of houses we ought to build. He reasoned on the subject thus, "Should not he, who purposes to have a house such as it ought to be, contrive that it may be most pleasant, and at the same time most useful, to live in?" This being admitted, he said, "Is it not then pleasant to have it cool in summer, and warm in winter?" When his hearers had assented to this, he said, "In houses, then, that look to the south, does not the sun, in the winter, shine into the porticoes, while, in the summer, it passes over our heads, and above the roof, and casts a shade? If it is well, therefore, that houses should thus be made, ought we not to build the parts towards the south higher, that the sun in winter may not be shut out, and the parts toward the north lower, that the cold winds may not fall violently on them? To sum up the matter briefly, that would be the most pleasant and the most beautiful residence, in which the owner, at all seasons, would find the most satisfactory retreat, and deposit what belongs to him with the greatest safety."

Paintings, and colored decorations of the walls, deprive us, he thought, of more pleasure than they give.

The most suitable ground for temples and altars, he said, was such as was most open to view, and least trodden by the public; for that it was pleasant for people to pray as they looked on them, and pleasant to approach them in purity.

CHAPTER IX.

Various definitions of fortitude, prudence and temperance, madness, envy, idleness, command, happiness, given by Socrates. Fortitude is not equal in all men; it may be increased by exercise. Prudence and temperance not distinct from each other, Justice, as well as other virtues, is wisdom, The opposite to prudence is madness; ignorance distinct from madness. Envy is uneasiness of mind at the contemplation of the happiness of others, Idleness is forbearance from useful occupation. Command is exercised, not by those who bear the name, merely, of kings and rulers, but by those who know how to command. The best object of human life is to act well; the difference between acting well and acting fortunately.

Being asked, again, whether Fortitude was a quality acquired by education, or bestowed by nature, "I think," said he, "that as one body is by nature stronger for enduring toil than another body, so one mind may be by nature more courageous in meeting dangers than another mind; for I see that men who are brought up under the same laws and institutions differ greatly from each other in courage. I am of opinion, however, that every natural disposition may be improved, as to fortitude, by training and exercise; for it is evident that the Scythians and Thracians would not dare to take bucklers and spears and fight with the Lacedaemonians; and it is certain that the Lacedaemonians would not like to fight the Thracians with small shields and javelins, or the Scythians with bows. In other things, also, I see that men differ equally from one another by nature, and make great improvements by practice; from which it is evident that it concerns all, as well the naturally ingenious as the naturally dull, to learn and study those arts in which they desire to become worthy of commendation."

Prudence and Temperance he did not distinguish; for he deemed that he who knew what was honorable and good, and how to practice it, and who knew what was dishonorable, and how to avoid it, was both prudent and temperate. Being also asked whether he thought that those who knew what they ought to do, but did the contrary, were prudent and temperate, he replied, "No more than I think the [openly] imprudent and intemperate to be so; for I consider that all [prudent and temperate] persons choose from what is possible what they judge for their interest, and do it; and I therefore deem those who do not act [thus] judiciously to be neither prudent nor temperate."

He said, too, that justice, and every other virtue, was [a part of] prudence, for that everything just, and everything done agreeably to virtue, was honorable and good; that those who could discern those things, would never prefer anything else to them; that those who could not discern them, would never be able to do them, but would even go wrong if they attempted to do them; and that the prudent, accordingly, did what was honorable and good, but that the imprudent could not do it, but went wrong even if they attempted to do it; and that since, therefore, all just actions, and all actions that are honorable and good, are done in agreement

with virtue, it is manifest that justice, and every other virtue, is [comprehended in] prudence.

The opposite to prudence, he said, was Madness; he did not, however, regard ignorance as madness; though for a man to be ignorant of himself, and to fancy and believe that he knew what he did not know, he considered to be something closely bordering on madness. The multitude, he observed, do not say that those are mad who make mistakes in matters of which most people are ignorant, but call those only mad who make mistakes in affairs with which most people are acquainted; for if a man should think himself so tall as to stoop when going through the gates in the city wall, or so strong as to try to lift up houses, or attempt anything else that is plainly impossible to all men, they say that he is mad; but those who make mistakes in small matters are not thought by the multitude to be mad; but just as they call "strong desire" "love," so they call "great disorder of intellect" "madness."

Considering what Envy was, he decided it to be a certain uneasiness, not such as arises, however, at the ill success of friends, nor such as is felt at the good success of enemies, but those only he said were envious who were annoyed at the good success of their friends. When some expressed surprise, that anyone who had a friendly feeling for another should feel uneasy at his good fortune, he reminded them that many are so disposed towards others as to be incapable of neglecting them if they are unfortunate, but would relieve them in ill fortune, though they are uneasy at their good fortune. This feeling, he said, could never arise in the breast of a sensible man, but that the foolish were constantly affected with it.

Considering what Idleness was, he said that he found most men did something; for that dice-players and buffoons did something; but he said that all such persons were idle, for it was in their power to go and do something better; he observed that a man was not idle, however, in passing from a better employment to a worse, but that, if he did so, he, as he [previously] had occupation, acted in that respect viciously.

Kings and Commanders, he said, were not those who held scepters merely, or those elected by the multitude, or those who gained authority by lot, or those who attained it by violence or deceit, but those who knew how to command.

For when someone admitted that it was the part of a commander to enjoin what another should do, and the part of him who was commanded, to obey, he showed that in a ship the skillful man is the commander, and that the owner and all the other people in the ship were obedient to the man of knowledge; that, in agriculture, those who had farms, in sickness, those who were ill, in bodily exercises, those who practiced them, and indeed all other people, who had any

business requiring care, personally took the management of it if they thought that they understood it, but if not, that they were not only ready to obey men of knowledge who were present, but even sent for such as were absent, in order that, by yielding to their directions, they might do what was proper. In spinning, too, he pointed out that women commanded men, as the one knew how to spin, and the other did not know.

But if anyone remarked in reply to these observations, that a tyrant is at liberty not to obey judicious advisers, he would say, "And how is he at liberty not to obey, when a penalty hangs over him that does not obey a wise monitor? for in whatever affair a person does not obey a prudent adviser, he will doubtless err, and, by erring, will incur a penalty." If anyone also observed that a tyrant might put to death a wise counsellor, "And do you think," he would say, "that he who puts to death the best of his allies will go unpunished, or that he will be exposed only to casual punishment? Whether do you suppose that a man who acts thus would live in safety, or would be likely, rather, by such conduct, to bring immediate destruction on himself?"

When someone asked him what object of study he thought best for a man, he replied, "good conduct." When he asked him again whether he thought "good fortune" an object of study, he answered, "'Fortune' and 'Conduct' I think entirely opposed; for, for a person to light on anything that he wants without seeking it, I consider to be 'good fortune,' but to achieve anything successfully by learning and study, I regard as 'good conduct;' and those who make this their object of study appear to me to do well."

The best men, and those most beloved by the gods, he observed, were those who, in agriculture, performed their agricultural duties well, those who, in medicine, performed their medical duties well, and those who, in political offices, performed their public duties well; but he who did nothing well, he said, was neither useful for any purpose, nor acceptable to the gods.

CHAPTER X.

Socrates was desirous to benefit artisans by discoursing with them on the principles of their several arts. Of painting. Of representing perfect beauty. Of expressing the affections of the mind. Of statuary. In what the excellence of a corslet consists.

Whenever he conversed with any of those who were engaged in arts or trades, and who wrought at them for gain, he proved of service to them. Visiting Parrhasius the painter one day, and entering into conversation with him, he said, "Pray, Parrhasius, is not painting the representation of visible objects? At least you represent substances, imitating them by means of color, whether they be concave or convex, dark or light, hard or soft, rough or smooth, fresh or old."

"What you say is true," said Parrhasius. "And when you would represent beautiful figures, do you, since it is not easy to find one person with every part perfect, select, out of many, the most beautiful parts of each, and thus represent figures beautiful in every part?"

"We do so," said he.

"And do you also," said Socrates, "give imitations of the disposition of the mind, as it may be most .persuasive, most agreeable, most friendly, most full of regret, or most amiable? Or is this inimitable?"

"How can that be imitated, Socrates," said he, "which has neither proportion, nor color, nor any of the qualities which you just now mentioned, and is not even a visible object?"

"Is it not often observable in a man that he regards others with a friendly or unfriendly look?"

"I think so," said he. "Is this then possible to be copied in the eyes?"

"Assuredly."

"And at the good or ill fortune of people's friends, do those who are affected at it, and those who are not, appear to you to have the same sort of look?"

"No, indeed; for they look cheerful at their good, and sad at their evil, fortune."

"Is it possible, then, to imitate these looks?"

"Unquestionably."

"Surely, also, nobleness and generosity of disposition, meanness and illiberally, modesty and intelligence, insolence and stupidity, show themselves both in the looks and gestures of men, whether they stand or move."

"What you say is just."

"Can these peculiarities be imitated?"

"Certainly."

"Whether, then," said Socrates, "do you think that people look with more pleasure on paintings in which beautiful, and good, and lovely characters are

exhibited, or those in which the deformed, and evil, and detestable are represented?"

"There is a very great difference indeed, Socrates," replied Parrhasius.

Going once, too, into the workshop of Cleito, the statuary, and beginning to converse with him, he said, "I see and understand, Cleito, that you make figures of various kinds, runners and wrestlers, pugilists and pancratiasts, but how do you put into your statues that which most wins the minds of the beholders through the eye, the life-like appearance?"

As Cleito hesitated, and did not immediately answer, Socrates proceeded to ask, "Do you make your statues appear more life-like by assimilating your work to the figures of the living?"

"Certainly," said he. "Do you not then make your figures appear more like reality, and more striking, by imitating the parts of the body, that are drawn up or drawn down, compressed or spread out, stretched or relaxed, by the gesture?"

"Undoubtedly," said Cleito. "And the representation of the passions of men engaged in any act, does it not excite a certain pleasure in the spectators?"

"It is natural, at least, that it should be so," said he. "Must you not, then, copy the menacing looks of combatants? And must you not imitate the countenance of conquerors, as they look joyful?"

"Assuredly," said he. "A statuary, therefore," concluded Socrates, "must express the workings of the mind by the form."

Entering the shop of Pistias, a corslet-maker, and Pistias having shown him some well-made corslet, Socrates observed, "By Hera, Pistias, this is an excellent invention, that the corslet should cover those parts of a man's body that need protection, and yet should not hinder him from using his hands. But tell me, Pistias," he added, "why do you sell your corslets at a higher price than other makers, though you neither make them stronger nor of more costly materials?"

"Because, Socrates," said he, "I make them better proportioned."

"And do you make this proportion appear in the measure or weight of your corslets, that you set a higher price on them? For I suppose that you do not make them all equal or similar, if you make them to fit different persons." "Indeed," replied he, "I do make them to fit, for there would be no use in a corslet without that quality."

"Are not then," said Socrates, "the bodies of some men well-proportioned, and those of others ill-proportioned?"

"Certainly," said Pistias. "How, then," asked Socrates, "do you make a well-proportioned corslet fit an ill-proportioned body?"

"As I make it fit," answered Pistias; "for one that fits is well-proportioned."

“You seem to me,” said Socrates, “to speak of proportion considered not independently, but with respect to the wearer, as if you should say of a shield, or a cloak, that it is well-proportioned to him whom it suits; and such appears to be the case with regard to other things, according to what you say. But, perhaps, there may be some other considerable advantage attendant on being made to fit.”

“Tell me, Socrates,” said he, “if you know any.”

“Those corslets which fit,” answered Socrates, “are less oppressive by their weight, than those which do not fit, though they be both of equal weight; while those which do not 'fit, are, either from hanging wholly on the shoulders, or from pressing heavily on some other part of the body, inconvenient and uneasy; but those which fit, as they distribute their weight partly over the collar-bone and shoulder, partly over the upper part of the arm, and partly over the breast, back, and stomach, appear almost like, not a burden to be borne, but a natural appendage.”

“You have hit upon the very quality,” said Pistias, “for which I consider my manufacture deserving of the very highest price; some, however, prefer purchasing ornamented and gilded corslets.”

“Yet if on this account,” said Socrates, “they purchase such as do not fit, they appear to me to purchase an ornamented and gilded annoyance. But,” added he, “since the body does not continue always in the same position, but is at one time bent, and at another straight, how can a corslet, which is exactly fitted to it, suit it?”

“It cannot by any means,” said Pistias. “You mean, therefore,” said Socrates, “that it is not those which are exactly fitted to the body that suit, but those that do not gall in the wearing.”

“You say what is clearly the case, Socrates,” replied he, “and exactly comprehend the matter.”

CHAPTER XI.

The visit of Socrates to Theodota, and his discourse with her. He tells her that true friends are not acquired without the manifestation of kind and good feelings. He reminds her that in gratifying the appetites we must guard against satiety. His jests on taking leave of her.

There being at one time a beautiful woman in the city, whose name was Theodota, a woman ready to form a connection with anyone that made advances to her, and somebody in company with Socrates making mention of her, and saying that her beauty was beyond description, and that painters went to her to take her portrait, to whom she showed as much of her person as she could with propriety, "We ought then to go and see her," remarked Socrates, "for it is not possible to comprehend by hearing that which surpasses description."

"You cannot be too quick in following me, then," said he who had mentioned her.

Going, accordingly, to the house of Theodota, and finding her standing to a painter, they contemplated her figure; and when the painter had left off, Socrates said, "My friends, whether ought we to feel obliged to Theodota for having shown us her beauty, or she to us for having viewed it with admiration? If the exhibition be rather of advantage to her, ought not she to feel grateful to us, or if the sight has given rather more pleasure to us, ought not we to feel grateful to her?" Somebody saying that he spoke reasonably, he added, "She, then, for the present, gains praise from us, and, when we have spoken of her to others, will gain profit in addition; but as for us, we now desire to embrace what we have seen, and shall go away excited, and long for her after we are away from her; the natural consequence of which is that we shall be her adorers, and that she will be worshipped as our mistress."

"If this be the case, indeed," said Theodota, "I must feel gratitude to you for coming to see me."

Soon after, Socrates, seeing her most expensively attired, and her mother with her in a dress and adornment above the common, with several handsome female attendants, not unbecomingly appareled, and her house richly furnished in other respects, said to her, "Tell me, Theodota, have you an estate?"

"Not I indeed," replied she. "But perhaps you have a house that brings you an income?"

"Nor a house either," said she. "Have you then any slaves that practice handicrafts?"

"No, nor any slaves."

"How then," said Socrates, "do you procure subsistence?"

“If anyone becomes my friend,” she replied, “and is willing to benefit me, he is my means of subsistence.”

“By Hera, Theodota,” rejoined Socrates, “and he is an excellent acquisition to you; and it is much better to have a flock of friends than of sheep, oxen, and goats. But,” added he, “do you leave it to chance whether a friend, like a fly, shall wing his way to you, or do you use any contrivance to attract them?”

“And how,” said she, “can I find a contrivance for such a purpose?”

“Much more readily,” said he, “than spiders can; for you know how they try to get subsistence; they weave fine nets, and feed upon whatever falls into them.”

“And do you advise me, too,” said she, “to weave a net?”

“Yes,” said he, “for you ought not to think that you will catch friends, the most valuable prey that can be taken, without art. Do you not see how many arts hunters use to catch hares, an animal of but little worth? As the hares feed in the night, they procure dogs for hunting by night, with which they chase them; as they conceal themselves in the day, they provide other dogs, which, perceiving by the smell the way that they have gone from their feeding-place to their forms, trace them out; and as they are swift of foot, so as soon to escape from view by running, they procure also other dogs, of great speed, that they may be caught by pursuit; and because some of them escape even from these dogs, they stretch nets across the paths by which they flee, that they may fall into them and be entangled.”

“By what art of this kind, then,” said she, “can I catch friends?”

“If,” said he, “instead of a dog, you get somebody to track and discover the lovers of beauty, and the wealthy, and who, when he has found them, will contrive to drive them into your nets.”

“And what nets have I?” said she. io. “You have one at least,” he replied, “and one that closely embraces its prey, your person; and in it you have a mind, by which you understand how you may gratify a person by looking at him, and what you may say to cheer him, and learn that you ought to receive with transport him who shows concern for you, and to shut out him who is insolent, to attend carefully on a friend when he is ill, to rejoice greatly with him when he has succeeded in anything honorable, and to cherish affection in your whole soul for the man who sincerely cares for you. To love I am sure that you know, not only tenderly, but with true kindness of heart; and your friends try to please you, I know, because you conciliate them, not with words merely, but by your behavior towards them.”

“Indeed,” replied Theodota, “I use none of these schemes.”

“Yet,” said Socrates, “it is of great importance to deal with a man according to his disposition, and with judgment; for by force you can neither gain nor keep a friend, but by serving and pleasing him the animal is easily taken and attached to you.”

“What you say is true,” said she.

“It becomes you, therefore,” proceeded Socrates, “in the first place, to request of your lovers only such favors as they will perform with least cost to themselves;

and you must then make a return by obliging them in a similar way; for thus they will become most sincerely attached to you, and will love you longest, and benefit you most. But you will please them most, if you grant them favors only when they solicit them; for you see that even the most savory meats, if a person offer them to another before he has an appetite for them, appear to him distasteful; and in the satisfied they excite even loathing; but if one offers food to another after having raised an appetite in him, it seems, though it be of a very ordinary kind, extremely agreeable."

"How then can I," said she, "excite such an appetite in anyone of those that visit me?"

"If, when they are satiated," said he, "you, in the first place, neither offer yourself to them, nor remind them of you, until, coming to an end of their satiety, they again feel a desire for you; and, when they do feel such desire, remind them of your fondness by the most modest address, and by showing yourself willing to gratify them, holding back, at the same time, until they are filled with impatient longing; for it is far better to grant the same favors at such a time, than before they had an appetite for them."

"Why do not you, then, Socrates," said she, "become my helper in securing friends?"

"I will indeed," said he, "if you can persuade me."

"And how then," said she, "can I persuade you?"

"You yourself will seek and find means to do so, if you should at all need me."

"Come often to see me, then," said she. Then Socrates, joking upon his own easy life, said, "But, Theodota, it is not easy for me to find leisure; for my own numerous occupations, private and public, allow > me no rest; and I have friends also, who will not suffer me to leave them day or night, learning from me love-charms and incantations."

"Do you then know such arts, too, Socrates?" said Theodota. "Through what other influence do you suppose that Apollodorus here, and Antisthenes, never leave me? and through what other influence do you suppose that Cebes and Simmias come to me from Thebes? Be assured, that such effects were not produced without many love-charms, incantations, and magic wheels."

"Lend me, then, your magic wheel," said she, "that I may set it a going, first of all, against yourself."

"But, by Zeus," exclaimed Socrates, "I do not wish that I should be drawn to you, but that you should come to me."

"I will come then," said she, "only take care to let me in."

"I will let you in, replied he, "if another more acceptable than you be not within."

CHAPTER XII.

Socrates shows the benefit of gymnastic exercises, as well on the health of the mind as on that of the body. The advantages of health and vigor.

Noticing that Epigenes, one of his followers, was both very young and weak in body, he said to him, "How very unlike an athlete you are in frame, Epigenes!"

"I am not an athlete, Socrates," replied he. "You are not less of an athlete," rejoined Socrates, "than those who are going to contend at the Olympic Games. Does the struggle for life with the enemy, which the Athenians will demand of you when circumstances require, seem to you to be a trifling contest? Yet, in the dangers of war, not a few, through weakness of body, either lose their lives, or save them with dishonor; many, from the same cause, are taken alive, and, as prisoners of war, endure for the rest of their lives, if such should be their fate, the bitterest slavery; or, falling into the most grievous hardships, and paying for their ransom sometimes more than they possess, pass the remainder of their existence in want of necessaries, and in the endurance of affliction; and many, too, incur infamy, being thought to be cowards merely from the imbecility of their bodily frame. Do you think lightly of such penalties attached to weakness of body, or do you expect that you will endure such calamities with ease? I believe that what he must bear who attends to the health of his body, is far lighter and more pleasant than such afflictions. Or do you suppose that an ill condition of body is more salutary and advantageous than a good condition? Or do you despise the benefits secured by a good state of the body? Yet the lot which falls to those who have their bodies in good condition is exactly the reverse of that which falls to those who have them in ill condition; for those who have their bodies in a good state are healthy and strong; and many, from being possessed of this advantage, save themselves with honor amid the struggles of war, and escape every peril; many, also, assist their friends and benefit their country, and, for such services, are thought worthy of favor, acquire great glory, and attain the highest dignities; and, on these accounts, pass the rest of their lives with greater pleasure and honor, and bequeath finer fortunes to their children. Nor, because the city does not require warlike exercises publicly, ought we, on that account, to neglect them privately, but rather to practice them the more; for be well assured that neither in any other contest, nor in any affair whatever, will you at all come off the worse because your body is better trained than that of other men; since the body must bear its part in whatever men do; and in all the services required from the body, it is of the utmost importance to have it in the best possible condition; for even in that in which you think that there is least exercise for the body, namely, thinking, who does not know that many fail greatly from ill-health? and loss of memory, despondency, irritability, and madness, often, from ill-health of body, attack the mind with such force as to drive out all previous knowledge. But to those who have their bodies in good condition, there is the utmost freedom from anxiety, and no danger of suffering any such calamity from weakness of constitution; whilst it is likely, rather, that a healthy state of body will avail to produce consequences the reverse of those which result

from an unhealthy state of it; and, indeed, to secure consequences the reverse of what we have stated, what would a man in his senses not undergo? It is disgraceful, too, for a person to grow old in self-neglect, before he knows what he would become by rendering himself well-formed and vigorous in body; but this a man who neglects himself cannot know; for such advantages are not wont to come spontaneously.

CHAPTER XIII.

Several brief sayings of Socrates. We should not be offended at rudeness of manner more than at personal defects. Fasting the best remedy for loathing of food, We should not be too nice as to food or drink, He that punishes his slave, should consider whether he himself deserves like punishment. Admonitions to travelers, It is disgraceful to him who has been trained in the gymnasium to be outdone by a slave in enduring toil.

A person being angry, because, on saluting another, he was not saluted in return, "It is an odd thing," said Socrates to him, "that if you had met a man ill-conditioned in body, you would not have been angry, but to have met a man rudely disposed in mind provokes you."

Another person saying that he ate without pleasure, "Acumenus," said Socrates, "prescribes an excellent remedy for that disease."

The other asking, "What sort of remedy?"

"To abstain from eating," said Socrates; "for lie says that, after abstaining, you will live with more pleasure, less expense, and better health."

Another saying that the water which he had to drink at his house was warm, "When you wish to bathe in warm water, then," said Socrates, "it will be ready for you."

"But it is too cold to bathe in," said the other.

"Are your slaves, then," asked Socrates, "inconvenienced by drinking or bathing in it?"

"No, by Zeus," replied he; "for I have often wondered how cheerfully they use it for both those purposes."

"And is the water in your house," said Socrates, "or that in the temple of Æsculapius, the warmer for drinking?"

"That at the temple of Æsculapius," replied he.

"And which is the colder for bathing in, that at your house, or that in the temple of Amphiaraus?"

"That in the temple of Amphiaraus," said he.

"Consider, then," said Socrates, "that you seem to be harder to please than your slaves or the sick."

Another person beating his attendant severely, Socrates asked him why he was so angry at the slave. "Because," said he, "he is very gluttonous and very stupid, very covetous and very idle."

"And have you ever reflected," rejoined Socrates, "which of the two deserves the greater number of stripes, you or your slave?"

A person being afraid of the journey to Olympia, “Why,” said Socrates to him, “do you fear the journey? Do you not walk about at home almost all day? And, if you set out thither, you will walk and dine, walk and sup, and go to rest. Do you not know that if you were to extend in a straight line the walks which you take in five or six days, you would easily go from Athens to Olympia? But it will be better for you to start a day too soon than a day too late; for to be obliged to extend your days’ journeys beyond a moderate length is disagreeable; but to spend one day more on the road gives great ease; and it is better, therefore, to hasten to start than to hurry on the way.”

Another saying that he was utterly wearied with a long journey, Socrates asked him whether he carried any burden. “No, by Zeus,” said he, “I did not, except my cloak.”

“And did you travel alone,” said Socrates, “or did an attendant accompany you?”

“An attendant was with me.”

“Was he empty-handed, or did he carry anything?”

“He carried, certainly, the bedding and other utensils.”

“And how did he get over the journey?”

“He appeared to me to come off better than myself.”

“If you, then, had been obliged to carry his burden, how do you imagine that you would have fared?”

“Very ill,” by Zeus; “or rather, I should not have been able to carry it at all.”

“And how can you think that it becomes a man trained to exercise to be so much less able to bear fatigue than a slave?”

CHAPTER XIV.

Table-talk of Socrates in praise of frugality. In contributions to feasts, one guest should not strive to surpass another in the quality or quantity of what he contributes. He may be called flesh-eater, who eats flesh alone, or with very little bread. He that eats of many dishes at once acts foolishly in various ways. He may be truly to banquet, who lives on plain and wholesome food.

When, among a number of persons who had met together to sup, some brought little meat, and others a great quantity, Socrates desired the attendant either to set the smallest dish on the table for common participation, or to distribute a portion of it to each. They, accordingly, who had brought a great deal, were ashamed not to partake of what was put on table for the company in general, and not, at the same time, to put their own on table in return. They therefore offered their own dishes for the participation of the company; and when they had no greater share than those who brought but little, they ceased to buy meat at great cost.

Observing one of those at table with him taking no bread, but eating meat by itself, and a discussion having arisen at the same time about names, for what cause any particular name was given, "Can we tell," said Socrates, "for what cause a man should be called *flesh-eater*. For everybody eats flesh with his bread when he has it; but I do not suppose that people are called *flesh-eater* on that account."

"I should think not," said one of the company. "But," said Socrates, "if a person should eat meat by itself without bread, not for the purpose of training, but of gratifying his appetite, whether would he seem to be a *flesh-eater* or not?"

"Scarcely any other would more justly seem so," said he. "And he that eats a great deal of meat with very little bread," said another of the company, "what should he be called?"

"To me," replied Socrates, "it appears that he would justly be called *flesh-eater*, and when other men pray to the gods for abundance of corn, he may pray for abundance of flesh." When Socrates said this, the young man, thinking that the words were directed at him, did not indeed leave off eating meat, but took some bread with it. Socrates, observing him do so, said, "Notice this young man, you that sit near him, whether he takes bread to his meat, or meat to his bread."

Seeing another of the company taste of several dishes with the same piece of bread, "Can any cookery be more extravagant," said he, "or more adapted to spoil dishes, than that which he practices who eats of several at the same time, putting all manner of sauces into his mouth at once? For as he mixes together more ingredients than the cooks, he makes what he eats more expensive; and as he mixes what they forbear to mix as being incongruous, he, if they do right, is in the wrong, and renders their art ineffectual. And how can it be otherwise than ridiculous," he added, "for a man to provide himself with cooks of the greatest skill,

and then, though he pretends to no knowledge of their art, to undo what has been done by them? But there is another evil attendant on him who is accustomed to eat of several dishes at once; for, if he has not several sorts of meat before him, he thinks himself stinted, missing the variety to which he has been used. But he who is accustomed to make one piece of bread, and one piece of meat, go together, will be able to partake contentedly of one dish when several are just at hand."

He observed also that "to fare well," was in the language of the Athenians called "to eat;" and that the "well," was added to denote that we should eat such food as would disorder neither mind nor body, and such as would not be difficult to be procured; so that he applied "to fare well," to those who fared temperately.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

Socrates liked the society of young men; how he judged of them; his desire that they should be well educated. The more powerful the mind in youth, the more likely it is, if ill trained, to run into vice,, Happiness does not depend on riches, but on knowledge, and on being useful to our fellow-creatures, and gaining their esteem.

So serviceable was Socrates to others, in every kind of transaction, and by every possible means, that to anyone who reflects on his usefulness, (even though he possess but moderate discernment,) it is manifest that nothing was of greater benefit than to associate with Socrates, and to converse with him, on any occasion, or on any subject whatever; since even the remembrance of him, when he is no longer with us, benefits in no small degree those who were accustomed to enjoy his society, and heard him with approbation; for he sought to improve his associates not less in his humorous than in his serious conversation. He would often say that he loved some particular person; but he was evidently enamored, not of those formed by nature to be beautiful, but of those naturally inclined to virtue. He judged of the goodness of people's abilities from their quickness in learning the things to which they gave their attention, from their remembrance of what they learned, and from their desire for all those branches of knowledge by means of which it is possible to manage a family or an estate well, and to govern men and their affairs with success; for he thought that such characters, when instructed, would not only be happy themselves, and regulate their own families judiciously, but would be able to render other men, and other communities besides their own, happy. He did not however make advances to all in the same manner. Those who thought that they had good natural abilities, but despised instruction, he endeavored to convince that minds which show most natural power have most need n£ education, pointing out to them that horses of the best breed, which are high-spirited and obstinate, become, if they are broken in when young, most useful and valuable, but if they are left unbroken, remain quite unmanageable and worthless; and that hounds of the best blood, able to endure toil, and eager to attack beasts, prove, if they are well trained, most serviceable for the chase, and every way excellent, but, if untrained, are useless, rabid, and disobedient. In like manner, he showed that men of the best natural endowments, possessed of the greatest strength of mind, and most energetic in executing what they undertake, became, if well-disciplined and instructed in what they ought to do, most estimable characters, and most beneficent to society, (as they then performed most numerous and important services,) but that, if uninstructed, and left in ignorance, they proved utterly worthless and mischievous; for that, not knowing what line of conduct they ought to pursue, they often entered upon evil courses, and, being haughty and impetuous, were difficult to be restrained or turned from their purpose, and thus occasioned very many and great evils.

But those who prided themselves on their wealth, and thought that they required no education, but imagined that their riches would suffice to effect whatever they desired, and to gain them honor from mankind, he tried to reduce to reason by saying that the man was a fool who thought that he could distinguish the good and the evil in life without instruction; and that he also was a fool, who, though he could not distinguish them, thought that he would procure whatever he wished, and effect whatever was for his interest, by means of his wealth. He also said that the man was void of sense, who, not being qualified to pursue what was for his good, fancied that he would be prosperous in the world, and that everything necessary for his comfort was fully, or at least sufficiently, provided for him; and that he was equally void of sense, who, though he knew nothing, thought that he would seem good for something because of his riches, and, though evidently despicable, would gain esteem through their influence.

CHAPTER II.

No dependence to be placed on natural abilities without education. Socrates proceeds to show Euthydemus, a self-conceited young man, that in every art it is proper to have recourse to instructors. He shows the folly of a man who should pretend to have learned everything of himself. The necessity of instruction in the art of government. By a long series of interrogations Socrates reduces Euthydemus to acknowledge his ignorance and incompetence. The value of self-knowledge. Further instructions given to Euthydemus.

I will now show how Socrates addressed himself to such as thought that they had attained the highest degree of knowledge, and prided themselves on their ability. Hearing that Euthydemus, surnamed the Handsome, had collected many writings of the most celebrated poets and sophists, and imagined that by that means he was outstripping his contemporaries in accomplishments, and had great hopes that he would excel them all in talent for speaking and acting, and finding, by his first inquiries about him, that .he had not yet engaged in public affairs on account of his youth, but that, when he wished to do any business, he usually sat in a bridle-maker's shop near the Forum, he went himself to it, accompanied by some of his hearers; and as somebody asked, first of all, "whether it was from his intercourse with some of the wise men, or from his own natural talents, that Themistocles attained such a pre-eminence above his fellow-citizens, that the republic looked to him whenever it wanted the service of a man of ability," Socrates, wishing to excite the attention of Euthydemus, said that "it was absurd to believe that men could not become skilled in the lowest mechanical arts without competent instructors, and to imagine that ability to govern a state, the most important of all arts, might spring up in men by the unassisted efforts of nature." On another occasion, when Euthydemus was one of the company, and Socrates saw him leaving it, from apprehension lest he should seem to admire him for his wisdom, he observed, "It is evident, my friends, from the studies that he pursues, that Euthydemus here, when he comes of age, and the government give liberty of discussion on any point, will not refrain from offering his counsel; and I imagine that he has already framed an exordium for his public oration, taking precaution that he may not be thought to have learned anything from anybody; and it is pretty certain, therefore, that when he begins to speak, he will make his opening thus: 'I, O men of Athens, have never learned anything from any person, nor, though I heard of some that were skilled in speaking and acting, have I sought to converse with them; nor have I been anxious that anyone of the learned should become my master; but I have done the exact contrary; for I have constantly avoided not only learning anything from anyone, but even the appearance of learning anything; nevertheless I will offer you such advice as may occur to me without premeditation. So it might be proper for a person to commence a speech who desired to obtain a medical appointment from the government: 'I, O men of Athens, have never learned the medical art from anyone, nor have been desirous that any physician should be my instructor; for I have constantly been on my guard, not only against learning anything of the art from anyone, but even against appearing to have learned

anything; nevertheless confer on me this medical appointment; for I will endeavor to learn by making experiments upon you.'" At this mode of opening a speech all who were present burst out into laughter.

As Euthydemus had now evidently begun to attend to what Socrates was saying, but was cautious of speaking himself, as thinking by his silence to clothe himself with reputation for modesty, Socrates, wishing to cure him of that fancy, said, "It is indeed strange, that those who desire to play on the lyre, or on the flute, or to ride, or to become expert in any such accomplishment, should endeavor to practice, as constantly as possible, that in which they desire to excel, and not by themselves merely, but with the aid of such as are considered eminent in those attainments, attempting and undergoing everything, so as to do nothing without their sanction, as supposing that they can, by no other means, attain reputation; but that of those who wish to become able to speak and act in affairs of government, some think that they will be suddenly qualified to achieve their object, without preparation or study, and by their own unassisted efforts. Yet these pursuits are manifestly more difficult of attainment than those, inasmuch as of the very many who attempt them a much smaller number succeed in them; and it is evident, therefore, that those who pursue the one are required to submit to longer and more diligent study than those who pursue the other."

Socrates used at first to make such remarks, while Euthydemus merely listened; but when he observed that he stayed, while he conversed, with more willingness, and hearkened to him with more attention, he at last came to the bridle-maker's shop unattended. As Euthydemus sat down beside him, he said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you really, as I hear, collected many of the writings of men who are said to have been wise."

"I have indeed, Socrates," replied he, "and I am still collecting, intending to persevere till I get as many as I possibly can."

"By Hera," rejoined Socrates, "I feel admiration for you, because you have not preferred acquiring treasures of silver and gold rather than of wisdom; for it is plain you consider that silver and gold are unable to make men better, but that the thoughts of wise men enrich their possessors with virtue."

Euthydemus was delighted to hear this commendation, believing that he was thought by Socrates to have sought wisdom in the right course. Socrates, observing that he was gratified with the praise, said, "And in what particular art do you wish to become skillful, that you collect these writings?"

As Euthydemus continued silent, considering what reply he should make, Socrates again asked, "Do you wish to become a physician? for there are many writings of physicians."

"Not I, by Zeus," replied Euthydemus. "Do you wish to become an architect, then? for a man of knowledge is needed for that art also."

“No, indeed,” answered he. “Do you wish to become a good geometrician, like Theodorus?”

“Nor a geometrician either,” said he.

“Do you wish then to become an astronomer?” said Socrates.

As Euthydemus said “No,” to this, “Do you wish then,” added Socrates, “to become a rhapsodist, for they say that you are in possession of all the poems of Homer.”

“No indeed,” said he, “for I know that the rhapsodists, though eminently knowing in the poems of Homer, are, as men, extremely foolish.”

“You are perhaps desirous then,” proceeded Socrates, “of attaining that talent by which men become skilled in governing states, in managing households, able to command, and qualified to benefit other men as well as themselves.”

“I indeed greatly desire,” said he, “Socrates, to acquire that talent.”

“By Zeus,” returned Socrates, “you aspire to a most honorable accomplishment, and a most exalted art, for it is the art of kings, and is called the royal art. But,” added he, “have you ever considered whether it is possible for a man who is not just to be eminent in that art?”

“I have certainly,” replied he; “and it is not possible for a man to be even a good citizen without justice.”

“Have you yourself, then, made yourself master of that virtue?”

“I think,” said he, “Socrates, that I shall be found not less just than any other man.”

“Are there then works of just men, as there are works of artisans?”

“There are, doubtless,” replied he. “Then,” said Socrates, “as artisans are able to show their works, would not just men be able also to tell their works?”

“And why should not I,” asked Euthydemus, “be able to tell the works of justice; as also indeed those of injustice; for we may see and hear of no small number of them every day?”

“Are you willing then,” said Socrates, “that we should make a delta on this side, and an alpha on that, and then that we should put whatever seems to us to be a work of justice under the delta, and whatever seems to be a work of injustice under the alpha?”

“If you think that we need those letters,” said Euthydemus, “make them.” Socrates, having made the letters as he proposed, asked, “Does falsehood then exist among mankind?”

“It does assuredly,” replied he. “Under which head shall we place it?”

“Under injustice, certainly.”

“Does deceit also exist?”

“Unquestionably.”

“Under which head shall we place that?”

“Evidently under injustice.”

“Does mischievousness exist?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“And the enslaving of men?”

“That, too, prevails.”

“And shall neither of these things be placed by us under justice, Euthydemus?”

“It would be strange if they should be,” said he. “But,” said Socrates, “if a man, being chosen to lead an army, should reduce to slavery an unjust and hostile people, should we say that he committed injustice?”

“No, certainly,” replied he. “Should we not rather say that he acted justly?”

“Indisputably.”

“And if, in the course of the war with them, he should practice deceit?”

“That also would be just,” said he. “And if he should steal and carry off their property, would he not do what was just?”

“Certainly,” said Euthydemus; “but I thought at first that you asked these questions only with reference to our friends.”

“Then,” said Socrates, “all that we have placed under the head of injustice, we must also place under that of justice?”

“It seems so,” replied Euthydemus. “Do you agree, then,” continued Socrates, “that, having so placed them, we should make a new distinction, that it is just to do such things with regard to enemies, but unjust to do them with regard to friends, and that towards his friends our general should be as guileless as possible?”

“By all means,” replied Euthydemus. “Well, then,” said Socrates, “if a general, seeing his army dispirited, should tell them, inventing a falsehood, that auxiliaries were coming, and should, by that invention, check the despondency of his troops, under which head should we place such an act of deceit?”

“It appears to me,” said Euthydemus, “that we must place it under justice.”

“And if a father, when his son requires medicine, and refuses to take it, should deceive him, and give him the medicine as ordinary food, and, by adopting such deception, should restore him to health, under which head must we place such an act of deceit?”

“It appears to me that we must put it under the same head.”

“And if a person, when his friend was in despondency, should, through fear that he might kill himself, steal or take away his sword, or any other weapon, under which head must we place that act?”

“That, assuredly, we must place under justice.”

“You say, then,” said Socrates, “that not even towards our friends must we act on all occasions without deceit?”

“We must not indeed,” said he, “for I retract what I said before, if I may be permitted to do so.”

“It is indeed much better that you should be permitted,” said Socrates, “than that you should not place actions on the right side. But of those who deceive their friends in order to injure them, (that we may not leave even this point unconsidered,) which of the two is the more unjust, he who does so intentionally or he who does so involuntarily?”

“Indeed, Socrates,” said Euthydemus, “I no longer put confidence in the answers which I give; for all that I said before appears to me now to be quite different from what I then thought; however, let me venture to say that he who deceives intentionally is more unjust than he who deceives involuntarily?”

“Does it appear to you, then, that there is a way of learning and knowing what is just, as there is of learning and knowing bow to read and write?”

“I think there is.”

“And which should you consider the better scholar, him who should purposely write or read incorrectly, or him who should do so unawares?”

“Him who should do so purposely, for, whenever he pleased, he would be able to do both correctly.”

“He, therefore, that purposely writes incorrectly may be a good scholar, but he who does so involuntarily is destitute of scholarship?”

“How can it be otherwise?”

“And whether does he who lies and deceives intentionally know what is just, or he who does so unawares?”

“Doubtless he who does so intentionally.”

“You therefore say that he who knows how to write and read is a better scholar than he who does not know?”

“Yes.”

“And that he who knows what is just is more just than he who does not know?”

“I seem to say so; but I appear to myself to say this I know not how.”

“But what would you think of the man, who, wishing to tell the truth, should never give the same account of the same thing, but, in speaking of the same road, should say at one time that it led towards the east, and at another towards the west, and, in stating the result of the same calculation, should sometimes assert it to be greater and sometimes less, what, I say, would you think of such a man?”

“It would be quite clear that he knew nothing of what he thought he knew.”

“Do you know any persons called slave-like?”

“I do.”

“Whether for their knowledge or their ignorance?”

“For their ignorance, certainly.”

“Is it then for their ignorance of working in brass that they receive this appellation?”

“Not at all.”

“Is it for their ignorance of the art of building?”

“Nor for that.”

“Or for their ignorance of shoemaking?”

“Not on anyone of these accounts; for the contrary is the case, as most of those who know such trades are servile.”

“Is this, then, an appellation of those who are ignorant of what is honorable, and good, and just?”

“It appears so to me.”

“It therefore becomes us to exert ourselves in every way to avoid being like slaves.”

“But, by the gods, Socrates,” rejoined Euthydemus, “I firmly believed that I was pursuing that course of study, by which I should, as I expected, be made fully acquainted with all that was proper to be known by a man striving after honor and virtue; but now, how dispirited must you think I feel, when I see that, with all my previous labor, I am not even able to answer a question about what I ought most of all to know, and am acquainted with no other course which I may pursue to become better!”

Socrates then said, “Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever gone to Delphi?”

“Yes, twice,” replied he. “And did you observe what is written somewhere on the temple wall, Know thyself?”

“I did.”

“And did you take no thought of that inscription, or did you attend to it, and try to examine yourself, to ascertain what sort of character you are?”

“I did not indeed try, for I thought that I knew very well already, since I should hardly know anything else if I did not know myself.”

“But whether does he seem to you to know himself, who knows his own name merely, or he who, (like people buying horses, who do not think that they know the horse that they want to know, until they have ascertained whether he is tractable or unruly, whether he is strong or weak, swift or slow, and how he is as to other points which are serviceable or disadvantageous in the use of a horse, so he,) having ascertained with regard to himself how he is adapted for the service of mankind, knows his own abilities?”

“It appears to me, I must confess, that he who does not know his own abilities, does not know himself.”

“But is it not evident,” said Socrates, “that men enjoy a great number of blessings in consequence of knowing themselves, and incur a great number of evils, through being deceived in themselves? For they who know themselves know what is suitable for them, and distinguish between what they can do and what

they cannot; and, by doing what they know how to do, procure for themselves what they need, and are prosperous, and, by abstaining from what they do not know, live blamelessly, and avoid being unfortunate. By this knowledge of themselves, too, they can form an opinion of other men, and, by their experience of the rest of mankind/ obtain for themselves what is good, and guard against what is evil. But they who do not know themselves, but are deceived in their own powers, are in similar case with regard to other men, and other human affairs, and neither understand what they require, nor what they are doing, nor the characters of those with whom they connect themselves, but, being in error as to all these particulars, they fail to obtain what is good, and fall into evil. They, on the other hand, who understand what they take in hand, succeed in what they attempt, and become esteemed and honored; those who resemble them in character willingly form connections with them; those who are unsuccessful in life desire to be assisted with their advice, and to prefer them to themselves; they place in them their hopes of good, and love them, on all these accounts, beyond all other men. But those, again, who do not know what they are doing, who make an unhappy choice in life, and are unsuccessful in what they attempt, not only incur losses and sufferings in their own affairs, but become, in consequence, disreputable and ridiculous, and drag out their lives in contempt and dishonor. Among states, too, you see that such as, from ignorance of their own strength, go to war with others that are more powerful, are, some of them, utterly overthrown, and others reduced from freedom to slavery."

"Be assured, therefore," replied Euthydemus, "that I feel convinced we must consider self-knowledge of the highest value; but as to the way in which we must begin to seek self-knowledge, I look to you for information, if you will kindly impart it to me."

"Well, then," said Socrates, "you doubtless fully understand what sort of things are good, and what sort are evil."

"Yes, by Zeus," replied Euthydemus, "for if I did not understand such things, I should be in a worse condition than slaves are."

"Come then," said Socrates, "tell me what they are."

"That is not difficult," said he, "for, in the first place, health I consider to be a good, and sickness an evil, and, in the next, looking to the causes of each of them, as drink, food, and employments, I esteem such as conduce to health to be good, and such as lead to sickness to be evil."

"Consequently," said Socrates, "health and sickness themselves, when they are the causes of any good, will be good, and when they are the causes of any evil, will be evil."

"But when," exclaimed Euthydemus, "can health be the cause of evil, and sickness of good?"

"When, for example," said Socrates, "some portion of a com-, munity, from being in good health, take part in a disgraceful expedition by land, or a ruinous

voyage by sea, or in any other such matters, which are sufficiently common, and lose their lives, while others, who are left behind from ill-health, are saved."

"What you say is true," said Euthydemus, "but you see that some men share in successful enterprises from being in health, while others, from being in sickness, are left out of them."

"Whether then," said Socrates, "are those things which are sometimes beneficial, and sometimes injurious, goods, rather, or evils?"

"Nothing, by Zeus, is to be settled with regard to them by considering thus. But as to wisdom, Socrates, it is indisputably a good thing; for what business will not one who is wise conduct better than one who is untaught?"

"Have you not heard, then, of Daedalus," said Socrates, "how he was made prisoner by Minos and compelled to serve him as a slave; how he was cut off, at once, from his country and from liberty, and how, when he endeavored to escape with his son, he lost the child, and was unable to save himself, but was carried away among barbarians, and made a second time a slave?"

"Such a story is told, indeed," said Euthydemus. "Have you not heard, too, of the sufferings of Palamedes? For everybody says that it was for his wisdom he was envied and put to death by Ulysses."

"That, too, is said," replied Euthydemus. "And how many other men do you think have been carried off to the king on account of their wisdom, and made slaves there?"

"But as to happiness, Socrates," said Euthydemus, "that at least appears to be an indisputable good."

"Yes, Euthydemus," replied Socrates, "if we make it consist in things that are themselves indisputably good."

"But what," said he, "among things constituting happiness can be a doubtful good?"

"Nothing," answered Socrates, "unless we join with it beauty, or strength, or wealth, or glory, or any other such thing."

"But we must assuredly join them with it," said Euthydemus; "for how can a person be happy without them?"

"We shall then join with it, by Zeus," said Socrates, "things from which many grievous calamities happen to mankind; for many, on account of their beauty, are ruined by those who are maddened with passion for their youthful attractions; many, through confidence in their strength, have entered upon undertakings too great for it, and involved themselves in no small disasters; many, in consequence of their wealth, have become enervated, been plotted against, and destroyed; and many, from the glory and power that they have acquired in their country, have suffered the greatest calamities."

"Well, then," said Euthydemus, "if I do not say what is right when I praise happiness, I confess that I do not know what we ought to pray for to the gods."

“These points, however,” proceeded Socrates, “you have perhaps not sufficiently considered, from too confident a belief that you were already well acquainted with them; but since you intend to be at €he head of a democratic government, you doubtless know what a democracy is.”

“Assuredly,” said he.

“Do you think it possible for a person to know what a democracy is, without knowing what the Demos is?”

“No, indeed.”

“And what do you conceive the Demos to be?”

“I conceive it to be the poorer class of citizens.”

“Do you know, then, which are the poor?”

“How can I help knowing?”

“You know then which are the rich?”

“Just as well as I know which are the poor.”

“Which sort of persons then do you call poor, and which sort rich?”

“Those who have not sufficient means to pay for the necessaries of life, I regard as poor; those who have more than sufficient, I consider rich.”

“Have you ever observed, then, that to some who have very small means, those means are not only sufficient, but that they even save from them, while, to many, very large fortunes are not sufficient?”

“I have indeed,” said Euthydemus, “(for you very properly put me in mind of it,) since I have known some princes, who, from poverty, have been driven to commit injustice like the very poorest people.”

“Then,” said Socrates, “if such be the case, we must rank such princes among the Demos, and those that have but little, we must rank, if they be good managers, among the rich?”

“My own want of knowledge, indeed,” said Euthydemus, “obliges me to admit even this; and I am considering whether it would not be best for me to be silent; for I seem to know absolutely nothing.”

He went away, accordingly, in great dejection, holding himself in contempt, and thinking that he was in reality no better than a slave.

Of those who were thus addressed by Socrates, many came to him no more; and these he regarded as too dull to be improved. But Euthydemus, on the contrary, conceived that he could by no other means become an estimable character, than by associating with Socrates as much as possible; and he in consequence never quitted him, unless some necessary business obliged him to do so. He also imitated many of his habits.

When Socrates saw that he was thus disposed, he no longer puzzled him with questions, but explained to him, in the simplest and clearest manner, what he thought that he ought to know, and what it would be best for him to study.

CHAPTER III.

The necessity of temperance or self-control, and of right notions concerning the gods. The gods have a providential care for mankind. Other animals are formed by the gods for the use of man, In addition to the senses common to man with the inferior animals, the gods have given him reason and speech. Though we do not see the gods, we are convinced of their existence from their works. We ought therefore to pay them honor according to our means.

Socrates was never in haste that his followers should become skillful in speaking, in action, or in invention, but, previous to such accomplishments, he thought it proper that a love of self-control should be instilled into them; for he considered that those who had acquired those qualifications were, if devoid of self-control, only better fitted to commit injustice and to do mischief. In the first place, therefore, he endeavored to impress his associates with right feelings towards the gods Some, who were present with him when he conversed with others on this subject, have given an account of his discourses; but I myself was with him when he held a conversation with Euthydemus to the following effect.

"Tell me," said he, "Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to consider how carefully the gods have provided for men everything that they require?"

"It has indeed never occurred to me," replied he. "You know at least," proceeded Socrates, "that we stand in need, first of all, of light, with which the gods supply us."

"Yes, by Zeus," answered Euthydemus, "for if we had no light, we should be, as to the use of our eyes, like the blind."

"But, as we require rest, they afford us night, the most suitable season for repose."

"That is assuredly," said Euthydemus, "a subject for thankfulness."

"Then because the sun, being luminous, shows us the hours of the day, and everything else, while the night, being dark, prevents us from making such distinctions in it, have they not caused the stars to shine in the night, which show us the night-watches, and under the direction of which we perform many things that we require?"

"So it is," said he. "The moon, too, makes plain to us not only the divisions of the night, but also of the month."

"Assuredly," said he. "But that, since we require food, they should raise it for us from the earth, and appoint suitable seasons for the purpose, which prepare for us, in abundance and every variety, not only things which we need, but also things from which we derive pleasure, what do you think of such gifts?"

"They certainly indicate love for man."

“And that they should supply us with water, an element of such value to us, that it causes to spring up, and unites with the earth and the seasons in bringing to maturity, everything useful for us, and assists also to nourish ourselves, and, being mixed with all our food, renders it easier of digestion, more serviceable, and more pleasant; and that, as we require water in great quantities, they should supply us with it in such profusion, what do you think of such a gift?”

“That also,” said he, “shows thought for us.”

“That they should also give us fire, a protection against cold and darkness, an auxiliary in every art and in everything that men prepare for their use, (for, in a word, men produce nothing, among the various things necessary to life, without the aid of fire,) what do you think of such a gift?”

“That likewise,” said he, “gives eminent proof of regard for man.” [“That they should diffuse the air also around us everywhere in such abundance, as not only to preserve and support life, but to enable us to cross the seas by means of it, and to get provisions by sailing hither and thither among foreign lands, is not this a boon inexpressibly valuable?”

“It is indeed inexpressibly so,” replied he. “That the sun, too, when it turns towards us in the winter, should approach to mature some things, and to dry up others whose season for ripening has passed away; and that, having effected these objects, he should not come nearer to us, but turn back, as if taking care lest he should hurt us by giving us more heat than is necessary; and that when again, in his departure, he arrives at the point at which it becomes evident that, if he were to go beyond it, we should be frozen by the cold, he should again turn towards us, and approach us, and revolve in that precise part of the heaven in which he may be of most advantage to us, what do you think of things so regulated?”

“By Zeus,” replied Euthydemus, “they appear to be appointed solely for the sake of man.”

“Again, that the sun, because it is certain that we could not endure such heat or cold if it should come upon us suddenly, should approach us so gradually, and retire from us so gradually, that we are brought imperceptibly to the greatest extremes of both, what do you think of that appointment?”

“I am reflecting, indeed,” said Euthydemus, “whether the gods can have any other business than to take care of man; only this thought embarrasses me, that other animals partake in these benefits.” “But is not this also evident,” said Socrates, “that these animals are produced and nourished for the sake of man?” For what other animal derives so many benefits from goats, sheep, horses, oxen, asses, and other such creatures, as man? To me it appears that he gains more advantages from them than from the fruits of the earth; at least he is fed and enriched not less from the one than from the other; and a great portion of mankind do not use the productions of the earth for food, but live by herds of cattle, supported by their milk, and cheese, and flesh; and all men tame and train the useful sort of animals, and use their services for war and other purposes.”

“I agree with what you say on that point,” said Euthydemus, “for I see some animals, much stronger than we, rendered so subservient to men that they use them for whatever they please.”

“But that, since there are numberless beautiful and useful objects in the world, greatly differing from one another, the gods should have bestowed on men senses adapted to each of them, by means of which we enjoy every advantage from them; that they should have implanted understanding in us, by means of which we reason about what we perceive by the senses, and, assisted by the memory, learn how far everything is beneficial, and contrive many plans by which we enjoy good and avoid evil; and that they should have given us the faculty of speech, by means of which we convey information to one another, and mutually impart whatever is good, and participate in it, enact laws, and enjoy constitutional government, what think you of such blessings?”

“The gods certainly appear, Socrates, to exercise the greatest care for man in every way.”

“And that, since we are unable to foresee what is for our advantage with regard to the future, they should assist us in that respect, communicating what will happen to those who inquire of them by divination, and instructing them how their actions may be most for their benefit, what thoughts does that produce in you?”

“The gods seem to show you, Socrates,” rejoined he, “more favor than other men, since they indicate to you, without being asked, what you ought to do, and what not to do.”

“And that I speak the truth, you yourself also well know, if you do not expect to see the bodily forms of the gods, but will be content, as you behold their works, to worship and honor them. Reflect, too, that the gods themselves give us this intimation; for the other deities that give us blessings, do not bestow any of them by coming manifestly before our sight; and he that orders and holds together the whole universe, in which are all things beautiful and good, and who preserves it always unimpaired, undisordered, and undecaying, obeying his will swifter than thought and without irregularity, is himself manifested only in the performance of his mighty works, but is invisible to us while he regulates them. Consider also that the sun, which appears manifest to all, does not allow men to contemplate him too curiously, but, if anyone tries to gaze on him steadfastly, deprives him of his sight. The instruments of the deities you will likewise find imperceptible; for the thunder-bolt, for instance, though it is plain that it is sent from above, and works its will with everything with which it comes in contact, is yet never seen either approaching, or striking, or retreating; the winds, too, are themselves invisible, though their effects are evident to us, and we perceive their course. The soul of man, moreover, which partakes of the divine nature if anything else in man does, rules, it is evident, within us, but is itself unseen. Meditating on these facts, therefore, it behooves you not to despise the unseen gods, but, estimating their power from what is done by them, to reverence what is divine.”

“I feel clearly persuaded, Socrates,” said Euthydemus, “that I shall never fail, in the slightest degree, in respect for the divine power, but I am dejected at the thought that no one among mankind, as it seems to me, can ever requite the favors of the gods with due gratitude.”

“Bui be not dejected at that reflection, Euthydemus,” said Socrates, “for you know that the deity at Delphi, whenever anyone consults him how he may propitiate the gods, answers, According to THE LAW of your country; and it is the law, indeed, everywhere, that every man should propitiate the gods with offerings according to his ability; and how, therefore, can any man honor the gods better or more piously, than by acting as they themselves direct? It behooves us, however, not to do less than we are able, for, when anyone acts thus, he plainly shows that he does not honor the gods. But it becomes him who fails, in no respect, to honor the gods according to his means, to be of good courage, and to hope for the greatest blessings; for no one can reasonably hope for greater blessings from others than from those who are able to benefit him most; nor on any other grounds than by propitiating them; and how can he propitiate them better than by obeying them to the utmost of his power?”

By uttering such sentiments, and by acting according to them himself, he rendered those who conversed with him more pious and prudent.

CHAPTER IV.

Socrates inculcated a love of justice into his followers. He gave them an example of adherence to justice in his own life. He commences a conversation with Hippias, a sophist. It is better to be just than merely to talk of justice; it is a part of justice to obey the laws; what a law is; who are the best magistrates in states; a general observance of the laws maintains concord; there are certain unwritten laws, which it is not possible to transgress without incurring punishment; to observe the divine laws is to he just.

Concerning justice, too, he did not conceal what sentiments he entertained, but made them manifest even by his actions, for he conducted himself, in his private capacity, justly and beneficently towards all men, and, as a citizen, he obeyed the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined, both in the city and on military expeditions, so that he was distinguished above other men for his observance of order. When he was president in the public assembly, he would not permit the people to give a vote contrary to law, but opposed himself, in defense of the laws, to such a storm of rage on the part of the populace as I think that no other man could have withstood. When the Thirty Tyrants commanded him to do anything contrary to the laws, he refused to obey them; for both when they forbade him to converse with the young, and when they ordered him, and some others of the citizens, to lead a certain person away to death, he alone did not obey, because the order was given contrary to the laws. When he was accused by Meletus, and others were accustomed, before the tribunal, to speak so as to gain the favor of the judges, and to flatter them, and supplicate them, in violation of the laws, and many persons, by such practices, had often been acquitted by the judges, he refused, on his trial, to comply with any practices opposed to the laws, and though he might easily have been acquitted by his judges, if he had but in a slight degree adopted any of those customs, he chose rather to die abiding by the laws than to save his life by transgressing them.

He held conversations to this effect with others on several occasions, and I know that he once had a dialogue of the following kind, concerning justice, with Hippias of Elis; for Hippias, on his return to Athens after an absence of some time, happened to come in the way of Socrates as he was observing to some people how surprising it was that, if a man wished to have another taught to be a shoemaker, or a carpenter, or a worker in brass, or a rider, he was at no loss whither he should send him to effect his object; [nay, that every place, as some say, was full of persons who would make a horse or an ox observant of right for anyone that desired;] while as to justice, if anyone wished either to learn it himself, or to have his son or his slave taught it, he did not know whither he should go to obtain his desire. Hippias, hearing this remark, said, as if jesting with him, “What! Are you still saying the same things, Socrates, that I heard from you so long ago?”

“Yes,” said Socrates, “and what is more wonderful, I am not only still saying the same things, but am saying them on the same subjects; but you, perhaps, from

being possessed of such variety of knowledge, never say the same things on the same subjects."

"Certainly," replied Hippias, "I do always try to say something new."

"About matters of which you have certain knowledge, then," said Socrates, "as, for instance, about the letters of the alphabet, if anyone were to ask you how many and what letters are in the word 'Socrates' would you try to say sometimes one thing, and sometimes another; or to people who might ask you about numbers, as whether twice five are ten, would you not give the same answer at one time as at another?"

"About such matters, Socrates," replied Hippias, "I, like you, always say the same thing; but concerning justice I think that I have certainly something to say now which neither you nor any other person can refute."

"By Hera," returned Socrates, "it is a great good that you say you have discovered, since the judges will now cease from giving contradictory sentences, the citizens will cease from disputing about what is just, from going to law, and from quarrelling, and communities will cease from contending about their rights and going to war; and I know not how I can part with you till I have learned so important a benefit from its discoverer."

"You shall not hear it, by Zeus," rejoined Hippias, "until you yourself declare what you think justice to be; for it is enough that you laugh at others, questioning and confuting everybody, while you yourself are unwilling to give a reason to anybody, or to declare your opinion on any subject."

"What then, Hippias," said Socrates, "have you not perceived that I never cease declaring my opinion as to what I conceive to be just?"

"And what is this opinion of yours?" said Hippias. "If I make it known to you, not by words merely, but by actions, do not deeds seem to you to be a stronger evidence than words?"

"Much stronger. by Zeus," said Hippias, "For many who say what is just do what is unjust, but a man who does what is just cannot be himself unjust."

"Have you ever then found me bearing false witness, or giving malicious information, or plunging my friends or the state into quarrels, or doing anything else that is unjust?"

"I have not."

"And do you not think it justice to refrain from injustice?"

"You are plainly now," said Hippias, "endeavoring to avoid expressing an opinion as to what you think just; for what you say is, not what the just do, but what they do not do."

"But I thought," rejoined Socrates, "that to be unwilling to do injustice was a sufficient proof of justice. If this, however, does not satisfy you, consider whether what I next say will please you better; for I assert that what is in conformity with the laws is just."

"Do you say, Socrates, that to be conformable to the laws, and to be just, is the same thing?"

“I do indeed.”

“I am puzzled; for I do not understand what you call conformable to law, or what you call just.”

“Do you know the laws of the state?” said Socrates. “I do,” said the other. “And what do you consider them to be?”

“What the citizens in concert have enacted as to what we ought to do, and what we ought to avoid doing.”

“Would not he, therefore,” asked Socrates, “be an observer of the laws, who should conduct himself in the community agreeably to those enactments, and he be a violator of the laws who transgresses them?”

“Undoubtedly,” said Hippias. “Would not he then do what is just who obeys the laws, and he do what is unjust who disobeys them?”

“Certainly.”

“Is not he then just who does what is just, and he unjust who does what is unjust?”

“How can it be otherwise?”

“He therefore that conforms to the laws is just,” added Socrates, “and he who violates the laws, unjust.”

“But,” objected Hippias, “how can anyone imagine the laws, or obedience to them, to be a matter of absolute importance, when the very persons who make them often reject and alter them?”

“That objection is of no consequence,” said Socrates, “for states, which have commenced war, often make peace again.”

“Undoubtedly they do,” said Hippias. “What difference will there be in your conduct, then, think you, if you throw contempt on those who obey the laws, be« cause the laws may be changed, and if you blame those who act properly in war, because peace may be made? Do you condemn those who vigorously support their country in war?”

“I do not indeed,” replied Hippias. “Have you ever heard it said of Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian, then,” said Socrates, “that he would not have made Sparta at all different from other states, if he had not established in it, beyond others, a spirit of obedience to the laws? Do you not know, too, that of magistrates in states, those are thought the best who are most efficient in producing obedience to the laws, and that that state, in which the citizens pay most respect to the laws, is in the best condition in peace, and invincible in war? The greatest blessing to states, moreover, is concord; and the senates and principal men in them often exhort the citizens to unanimity; and everywhere throughout Greece it is a law that the citizens shall take an oath to observe concord, an oath which they everywhere do take; but I conceive that this is done, not that the citizens may approve of the same choruses, or that they may praise the same flute-players, or that they may prefer the same poets, or that they may take delight in the same spectacles, but that they may obey the laws; for while the citizens adhere to these, states will be eminently

powerful and happy; but without such unanimity, no state can be well governed, nor any family well regulated. As an individual citizen, too, how could any person render himself less liable to penalties from the government, or more likely to have honors bestowed upon him, than by being obedient to the laws? How else would he incur fewer defeats in the Courts of justice, or how more certainly obtain sentence in his favor? To whom would anyone believe that he could more safely confide his money, or his sons or daughters? Whom would the whole community deem more trustworthy than him who respects the laws? From whom would parents, or relatives, or domestics, or friends, or citizens, or strangers, more certainly obtain their rights? To whom would the enemy sooner trust in cessations of arms, or in making a truce, or articles of peace? To whom would people more willingly become allies than to the observer of the laws, and to whom would the allies more willingly trust the leadership, or command of a fortress, or of a city? From whom would anyone expect to meet with gratitude, on doing him a kindness, sooner than from the observer of the laws? Or whom would anyone rather serve than him from whom he expects to receive a return? To whom would anyone more desire to be a friend, or less desire to be an enemy, than such a man? With whom would anyone be less inclined to go to war, than with him to whom he would most wish to be a friend, and least of all an enemy, and to whom the greatest part of mankind would wish to be friends and allies, and but a small number to' be antagonists and enemies? I, therefore, Hippias, pronounce that to obey the laws and to be just is the same if you hold an opinion to the contrary, tell me."

"Indeed, Socrates," rejoined Hippias, "I do not know that I entertain any sentiments opposed to what you have said of justice."

"But are you aware, Hippias," continued Socrates, "that there are unwritten laws?"

"You mean those," said Hippias, "that are in force about the same points everywhere."

"Can you affirm, then, that men made those laws?"

"How could they," said Hippias, "when they could not all meet together, and do not all speak the same language?"

"Whom then do you suppose to have made these laws?"

"I believe," said he, "that it was the gods who made these laws for men, for among all men the first law is to venerate the gods."

"Is it not also a law everywhere to honor parents?"

"It is so."

"Is it not a law, too, that parents shall not intermarry with their children, nor children with their parents?"

"This does not as yet, Socrates, appear to me to be a law of the gods?"

"Why?"

"Because I find that some nations transgress it."

“Many others, too, they transgress,” said Socrates; “but those who violate the laws made by the gods incur punishment which it is by no means possible for man to escape, as many transgressors of the laws made by men escape punishment, some by concealment, others by open violence.”

“And what sort of punishment, Socrates,” said he, “cannot parents escape who intermarry with their children, and children who intermarry with their parents?”

“The greatest of all punishments, by Zeus,” replied Socrates, “for what greater penalty can those who beget children incur, than to have bad children?”

“How then,” said Hippias, “do they necessarily have bad children, when nothing hinders but that they may be good themselves, and have children by good partners?”

“Because,” returned Socrates, “it is not only necessary that those who have children by each other should be good, but that they should be in full bodily vigor. Or do you suppose that the seed of those who are at the height of maturity is similar to that of those who have not yet reached maturity, or to that of those who are far past it?”

“By Zeus,” replied Hippias, “it is not at all likely that it should be similar.”

“Which of the two then is the better?”

“Doubtless that of those at full maturity.”

“That of those who are not at full maturity, then, is not sufficiently energetic.”

“Probably not.”

“Accordingly they ought not to have children?”

“No.”

“Do not those, therefore, who have children under such circumstances, have them as they ought not?”

“So it appears to me.”

“What other persons, therefore, will have bad children, if not these?”

“Well,” said Hippias, “I agree with you on this point also.”

“Is it not everywhere a law, also,” said Socrates, “that men should do good to those who do good to them?”

“It is a law,” answered Hippias, “but it is transgressed.”

“Do not those therefore who transgress it incur punishment,” continued Socrates, “by being deprived of good friends, and being compelled to have recourse to those who hate them? Are not such as do service to those who seek it of them good friends to themselves, and are not those who make no return to such as serve them hated by them for their ingratitude; and yet, because it is for their advantage to have their support, do they not pay the greatest court to them?”

“Indeed, Socrates,” replied Hippias, “all these things seem to suit the character of the gods; for that the laws themselves should carry with them punishments for

those who transgress them, appears to me to be the appointment of a lawgiver superior to man."

"Whether, therefore, Hippias," added Socrates, "do you consider that the gods appoint as laws, what is agreeable to justice, or what is at variance with justice?" Not what is at variance with justice, certainly," said Hippias, "for scarcely would any other make laws in conformity with justice, if a god were not to do so."

"It is the pleasure of the gods, therefore, Hippias," concluded Socrates, "that what is in conformity with justice should also be in conformity with the laws."

By uttering such sentiments, and acting in agreement with them, he rendered those who conversed with him more observant of justice.

CHAPTER V.

Socrates rendered his followers better qualified for public life. The necessity of temperance; the evils of intemperance; the benefits arising from temperance: the conduct of the temperate man.

I will now relate how he rendered his followers better qualified for the management of public business. Thinking it expedient that temperance should be observed by him who would succeed in anything honorable, he first made it evident to those who conversed with him, that he practiced this virtue beyond all other men, and then, by his discourse, he exhorted his followers, above everything, to the observance of temperance. He continued always, therefore, to make allusions to whatever was conducive to virtue; and I know that he once held a conversation on temperance with Euthydemus to the following effect: "Tell me," said he, "Euthydemus, do you regard liberty as an excellent and honorable possession for an individual or a community?"

"The most excellent and honorable that can be," replied he. "Do you consider him, then, who is held under control by the pleasures of the body, and is rendered unable, by their influence, to do what is best for him, to be free?"

"By no means," replied Euthydemus. "Perhaps, then, to have the power of doing what is best seems to you to be freedom, but to be under influences which will hinder you from doing it, you consider to be want of freedom?"

"Assuredly," said he. "Do not the intemperate appear to you, then, to be absolutely without freedom?"

"Yes, by Zeus, and naturally so."

"And whether do the intemperate appear to you to be merely prevented from doing what is best, or to be forced, also, to do what is most dishonorable?"

"They appear to me," replied Euthydemus, "to be not less forced to do the one than they are hindered from doing the other."

"And what sort of masters do you consider those to be, who hinder men from doing what is best, and force them to do what is worst?"

"The very worst possible, by Zeus," replied he. "And what sort of slavery do you consider to be the worst?"

"That." said he, "under the worst masters."

"Do not then the intemperate," said Socrates, "endure the very worst of slavery?"

"It appears so to me," answered Euthydemus. "And does not intemperance seem to you, by banishing from men prudence, the greatest good, to drive them into the very opposite evil? Does it not appear to you to hinder them from attending to useful things, and learning them, by drawing them away to pleasure, and frequently, by captivating those who have a perception of good and evil, to make them choose the worse instead of the better?"

“Such is the case,” said he. “And whom can we suppose, Euthydemus, to have less participation in self-control than the intemperate man? for assuredly the acts of self-control and of intemperance are the very opposite to each other.”

“I assent to this also,” said he. “And do you think that anything is a greater hindrance to attention to what is becoming, than intemperance?”

“I do not.”

“And do you imagine that there is any greater evil to man, than that which makes him prefer the noxious to the beneficial, which prompts him to pursue the one and to neglect the other, and which forces him to pursue a contrary course of conduct to that of the wise?”

“There is none,” said Euthydemus.

“Is it not natural, then,” said Socrates, “that temperance should be the cause of producing in men effects contrary to those which intemperance produces?”

“Undoubtedly,” said Euthydemus. “Is it not natural, therefore, also, that what produces those contrary effects should be best for man?”

“It is natural,” said he. “Is it not consequently natural, then, Euthydemus, that temperance should be best for man?”

“It is so, Socrates,” said he. “And have you ever reflected upon this, Euthydemus?”

“What?”

“That even to those pleasures, to which alone intemperance seems to lead men, it cannot lead them, but that temperance produces greater pleasure than anything else?”

“How?” said he. “Because intemperance, by not allowing men to withstand hunger, thirst, or the desire of sensual gratification, or want of sleep, (through which privations alone is it possible for them to eat, and drink, and gratify other natural appetites, and go to rest and sleep with pleasure, waiting and restraining themselves until the inclinations may be most happily indulged,) hinders them from having any due enjoyment in acts most necessary and most habitual; but temperance, which alone enables men to endure the privations which I have mentioned, alone enables them to find delight in the gratifications to which I have alluded.”

“What you say,” observed Euthydemus, “is indisputably true.”

“From learning what is honorable and good, moreover, and from the study of those accomplishments by which a man may ably govern himself, judiciously regulate his household, become useful to his friends and the state, and gain the mastery over his enemies, (from which studies arise not only the greatest advantages, but also the greatest pleasures,) the temperate have enjoyment while they practice them, but the intemperate have no share in any of them; for to whom can we say that it less belongs to participate in such advantages, than to him who has the least power to pursue them, being wholly occupied in attention to present pleasures?”

. “You seem to me, Socrates,” said Euthydemus, “to say that the man who is under the influence of bodily pleasures, has no participation in anyone virtue.”

“For what difference is there, Euthydemus,” said he, “between an intemperate man and the most ignorant brute? How will he, who has no regard to what is best, but seeks only to enjoy what is most seductive by any means in his power, differ from the most senseless cattle? To the temperate alone it belongs to consider what is best in human pursuits, to distinguish those pursuits, according to experience and reason, into their several classes, and then to choose the good and refrain from the evil.”

Thus it was, he said, that men became most virtuous and happy, and most skillful in reasoning; and he observed that the expression “to reason,” had its origin in people’s practice of meeting together to reason on matters, and distinguishing them, to reason, according to their several kinds. It was the duty of everyone, therefore, he thought, to make himself ready in this art, and to study it with the greatest diligence; for that men, by the aid of it, became most accomplished, most able to guide others, and most acute in discussion.

CHAPTER VI.

The value of skill in argument and definition. Definition of piety; of justice; of wisdom; of goodness and beauty; of courage. Some other definitions, Remarks on the Socratic method of argument.

I will now endeavor to show that Socrates rendered those who associated with him more skillful in argument. For he thought that those who knew the nature of things severally, would be able to explain them to others; but as to those who did not know, he said that it was not surprising that they fell into error themselves, and led others into it. He therefore never ceased to reason with his associates about the nature of things. To go through all the terms that he defined, and to show how he defined them, would be a long task; but I will give as many instances as I think will suffice to show the nature of his reasoning.

In the first place, then, he reasoned of piety, in some such way as this. "Tell me," said he, "Euthydemus, what sort of feeling do you consider piety to be?"

"The most noble of all feelings," replied he. "Can you tell me, then, who is a pious man?"

"The man, I think, who honors the gods."

"Is it allowable to pay honor to the gods in any way that one pleases?"

"No; there are certain laws in conformity with which we must pay our honors to them."

"He, then, who knows these laws, will know how he must honor the gods?"

"I think so."

"He therefore who knows how to pay honor to the gods, will not think that he ought to pay it otherwise than as he knows?"

"Doubtless not."

"But does anyone pay honors to the gods otherwise than as he thinks that he ought to pay them?"

"I think not."

"He therefore who knows what is agreeable to the laws with regard to the gods, will honor the gods in agreement with the laws?"

"Certainly."

"Does not he, then, who honors the gods agreeably to the laws honor them as he ought?"

"How can he do otherwise?"

"And he who honors them as he ought, is pious?"

"Certainly."

"He therefore who knows what is agreeable to the laws with regard to the gods, may be justly defined by us as a pious man?"

“So it appears to me,” said Euthydemus.

“But is it allowable for a person to conduct himself towards other men in whatever way he pleases?”

“No; but with respect to men also, he who knows what is in conformity with the laws, and how men ought, according to them, to conduct themselves towards each other, will be an observer of the laws.”

“Do not those, then, who conduct themselves towards each other according to what is in conformity with the laws, conduct themselves towards each other as they ought?”

“How can it be otherwise?”

“Do not those, therefore, who conduct themselves towards each other as they ought, conduct themselves well?”

“Certainly.”

“Do not those, then, that conduct themselves well towards each other, act properly in transactions between man and man?”

“Surely.”

“Do not those, then, who obey the laws, do what is just?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“And do you know what sort of actions are called just?”

“Those which the laws sanction.”

“Those, therefore, who do what the laws sanction, do what is just, and what they ought?”

“How can it be otherwise?”

“Those who do just things, therefore, are just?”

“I think so.”

“Do you think that any persons yield obedience to the laws who do not know what the laws sanction?”

“I do not.”

“'And do you think that any who know what they ought to do, think that they ought not to do it?”

“I do not think so.”

“And do you know any persons that do other things than those which they think they ought to do?”

“I do not.”

“Those, therefore, who know what is agreeable to the laws in regard to men, do what is just?”

“Certainly.”

“And are not those who do what is just, just men?”

“Who else can be so?”

“Shall we not define rightly, therefore,” concluded Socrates, “if we define those to be just who know what is agreeable to the laws in regard to men?”

“It appears so to me,” said Euthydemus.

“And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, whether do men seem to you to be wise, in things which they know, or in things which they do not know?”

“In what they know, certainly; for how can a man be wise in things of which he knows nothing?”

“Those, then, who are wise, are wise by their knowledge?”

“By what else can a man be wise, if not by his knowledge?”

“Do you think wisdom^ then, to be anything else than that by which men are wise?'

“I do not.”

“Is knowledge, then, wisdom?”

“It appears so to me.”

“Does it appear to you, however, that it is possible for a man to know all things that are?”

“No, by Zeus; not even, as I think, a comparatively small portion of them?”

“It is not therefore possible for a man to be wise in all things?”

“No, indeed.”

“Every man is wise, therefore, in that only of which he has a knowledge?”

“So it seems to me.”

“Shall we thus, too, Euthydemus,” said he, “inquire what is good?”

“How?” said Euthydemus. “Does the same thing appear to you to be beneficial to everybody?”

“No.”

“And does not that which is beneficial to one person appear to you to be sometimes hurtful to another?”

“Assuredly.”

“Would you say, then, that anything is good that is not beneficial?”

“I would not.”

“What is beneficial, therefore, is good, to whomsoever it is beneficial?”

“It appears so to me,” said Euthydemus.

“And can we define the beautiful in any other way than if you term whatever is beautiful, whether a person, or a vase, or anything else whatsoever, beautiful for whatever purpose you know that it is beautiful?”

“No, indeed,” said Euthydemus. “For whatever purpose, then, anything may be useful, for that purpose it is beautiful to use it?”

“Certainly.”

“And is anything beautiful for any other purpose than that for which it is beautiful to use it?”

“For no other purpose,” replied he. “What is useful is beautiful, therefore, for that purpose for which it is beautiful?”

“So I think,” said he.

“As to courage, Euthydemus,” said Socrates, “do you think it is to be numbered among excellent things?”

“I think it one of the most excellent,” replied Euthydemus. “But you do not think courage a thing of use for small occasions.”

“No, by Zeus, but for the very greatest.”

“Does it appear to you to be useful, with regard to formidable and dangerous things, to be ignorant of their character?”

“By no means.”

“They, therefore, who do not fear such things, because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?”

“Certainly not; for, in that case, many madmen and even cowards would be courageous.”

“And what do you say of those who fear things that are not formidable?”

“Still less, by Zeus, should they be called courageous.”

“Those, then, that are good, with reference to formidable and dangerous things, you consider to be courageous, and those that are bad, cowardly?”

“Certainly.”

“But do you think that any other persons are good, with reference to terrible and dangerous circumstances, except those who are able to conduct themselves well under them?”

“No, those only,” said he.

“And you think those bad with regard to them, who are of such a character as to conduct themselves badly under them?”

“Whom else can I think so?”

“Do not each, then, conduct themselves under them as they think they ought?”

“How can it be otherwise?”

“Do those, therefore, who do not conduct themselves properly under them, know how they ought to conduct themselves under them?”

“Doubtless not.”

“Those then who know how they ought to conduct themselves under them, can do so?”

“And they alone.”

“Do those, therefore, who do not fail under such circumstances, conduct themselves badly under them?”

“I think not.’ “Those, then, who do conduct themselves badly under them, do fail?”

“It seems so.”

“Those, therefore, who know how to conduct themselves well in terrible and dangerous circumstances are courageous, and those who fail to do so are cowards?”

“They at least appear so to me,” said Euthydemus.

“Monarchy and tyranny he considered to be both form of government, but conceived that they differed greatly from one another; for a government over men with their own con sent, and in conformity with the laws of free states, he regarded as a monarchy; but a government over men against their will, and not according to the law of free states, but just as the ruler pleased, a tyranny; and wherever magistrate were appointed from among those who complied with the injunctions of the laws, he considered the government to be a aristocracy; wherever they were appointed according to the’ wealth, a plutocracy; and wherever they were appointed from among the whole people, a democracy.

Whenever any person contradicted him on any point who had nothing definite to say, and who perhaps asserted, without proof, that some person, whom he mentioned, was wiser, or better skilled in political affairs, or possessed of greater courage, or worthier in some such respect, [than some other whom Socrates had mentioned,] he would recall the whole argument, in some such way as the following, to the primary proposition: “Do you say that he whom you commend, is a better citizen than he whom I commend?”

“I do say so.”

“Why should we not then consider, in the first place, what is the duty of a good citizen?”

“Let us do so.”

“Would not he then be superior in the management of the public money who should make the state richer?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“And he in war who should make it victorious over its enemies?”

“Assuredly.”

“And in an embassy he who should make friends of foes?”

“Doubtless.”

“And he in addressing the people who should check dissension and inspire them with unanimity?”

“I think so.” When the discussion was thus brought back to fundamental principles, the truth was made evident to those who had opposed him.

When he himself went through any subject in argument, he proceeded upon propositions of which the truth was generally acknowledged, thinking that a sure foundation was thus formed for his reasoning. Accordingly, whenever he spoke, he, of all men that I have known, most readily prevailed on his hearers to assent to his arguments; and he used to say that Homer had attributed to Ulysses the character of a sure orator, as being able to form his reasoning on points acknowledged by all mankind.

CHAPTER VII.

How Socrates rendered his followers ingenious and adapted for business; his frankness and sincerity. How far he thought that Geometry should be studied. How far he recommended that Astronomy should be pursued. Vain investigations to be avoided. Regard to be paid to health. Counsel to be asked of the gods.

That Socrates expressed his sentiments with sincerity to those who conversed with him, is, I think, manifest from what I have said. I will now proceed to show how much it was his care that his followers should be competently qualified for employments suited to their powers. Of all men that I have known, he was the most anxious to discover in what occupation each of those who attended him was likely to prove skillful; and of all that it becomes a man of honor and virtue to know, he taught them himself, whatever he knew, with the utmost cheerfulness; and what he had not sufficient knowledge to teach, he took them to those who knew, to learn.

He taught them also how far it was proper that a well-educated man should be versed in any department of knowledge. Geometry, for instance, he said that a man should study until he should be capable, if occasion required, to take or give land correctly by measurement; or to divide it or portion it out for cultivation; and this, he observed, it was so easy to learn, that he who gave any attention at all to mensuration, might find how large the whole earth was, and perfectly understand how it was measured. But of pursuing the study of geometry to diagrams hard to understand, he disapproved; for he said that he could not see of what profit they were, though he himself was by no means unskilled in them; but he remarked that they were enough to consume a man's whole life, and hinder him from attaining many other valuable branches of knowledge.

He recommended his followers to learn astronomy also, but only so far as to be able to know the hour of the night, the month, and the season of the year, with a view to travelling by land or sea, or distinguishing the night-watches; and to be competent, by knowing the divisions of the above-mentioned times, to profit by the signs for whatever other things are done at a certain period of the night, or month, or year. These particulars, he said, were easily learned from men who hunted by night, from pilots, and from many others whose business it was to know them. But to continue the study of astronomy so far as to distinguish the bodies which do not move in the same circle with the heaven, the planets, and the irregular stars, and to weary ourselves in inquiring into their distances from the earth, the periods of their revolutions, and the causes of all these things, was what he greatly discountenanced; for he saw, he said, no profit in these studies either, though he had himself given attention to them; since they also, he remarked, were enough to wear out the life of a man, and prevent him from attending to many profitable pursuits.

Concerning celestial matters in general, he dissuaded every man from becoming a speculator how the divine power contrives to manage them; for he did not think that such points were discoverable by man, nor did he believe that those acted dutifully towards the gods who inquired into things which they did not wish to make known. He observed, too, that a man who was anxious about such investigations, was in danger of losing his senses, not less than Anaxagoras, who prided himself highly on explaining the plans of the gods, lost his. For Anaxagoras, when he said that fire and the sun were of the same nature, did not reflect that people can easily look upon fire, but cannot turn their gaze on the sun, and that men, if exposed to the rays of the sun, have complexions of a darker shade, but not if exposed to fire; he omitted to consider, too, that of the productions of the earth, none can come fairly to maturity without the rays of the sun, while, if warmed by the heat of fire, they all perish; and when he said that the sun was a heated stone, he forgot that a stone placed in the fire does not shine, or last long, but that the sun continues perpetually the most luminous of all bodies.

He advised his followers also to learn computations, but in these, as in other things, he exhorted them to avoid useless labor; as far as it was of any profit, he investigated everything himself, and went through it with his associates.

He earnestly recommended those who conversed with him to take care of their health, both by learning whatever they could respecting it from men of experience, and by attending to it, each for himself, throughout his whole life, studying what food or drink, or what exercise, was most suitable for him, and how he might act in regard to them so as to enjoy the best health; for he said it would be difficult for a person who thus attended to himself to find a physician that would tell better than himself what was conducive to his health.

But if anyone desired to attain to what was beyond human wisdom, he advised him to study divination; for he said that he who knew by what signs the gods give indications to men respecting human affairs, would never fail of obtaining counsel from the gods.

CHAPTER VIII.

Socrates, though condemned to death, was not convicted of falsehood with regard to his Daemon. His resolution to die. His innocence inspires mm with courage. He thinks it good to die and escape the evils of old age. Summary of the arguments of the Memorabilia.

But if anyone thinks that he was convicted of falsehood with regard to his Dæmon, because sentence of death was pronounced on him by the judges although he said that the daemon admonished him what he ought and what he ought not to do, let him consider, in the first place, that he was already so advanced in years, that he must have ended his life, if not then, at least not long after; and, in the next, that he relinquished only the most burdensome part of life, in which all feel their powers of intellect diminished, while, instead of enduring this, he acquired great glory by proving the firmness of his mind, pleading his cause, above all men, with the greatest regard to truth, ingenuousness, and justice, and bearing his sentence at once with the utmost resignation and the utmost fortitude.

It is indeed acknowledged that no man, of all that are remembered, ever endured death with greater glory; for he was obliged to live thirty days after his sentence, because the Delian festival happened in that month, and the law allowed no one to be publicly put to death until the sacred deputation should return from Delos; and during that time he was seen by all his friends living in no other way than at any preceding period; and, let it be observed, throughout all the former part of his life he had been admired beyond all men for the cheerfulness and tranquility with which he lived. How could anyone have died more nobly than thus? Or what death could be more honorable than that which any man might most honorably undergo? Or what death could be happier than the most honorable? Or what death more acceptable to the gods than the most happy?

I will also relate what I heard respecting him from Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, who said that after Meletus had laid the accusation against him, he heard him speaking on any subject rather than that of his trial, and remarked to him that he ought to consider what defense he should make, but that he said at first, “Do I not appear to you to have passed my whole life meditating on that subject?” and then, when he asked him “How so?” he said that “he had gone through life doing nothing but considering what was just and what unjust, doing what was just and abstaining from what was unjust, which he conceived to be the best meditation for his defense.” Hermogenes said again, “Do you not see, Socrates, that the judges at Athens have already put to death many innocent persons, from being offended at their language, and have allowed many that were guilty to escape?”

“But, by Zeus, Hermogenes,” replied he, “when I was proceeding, a while ago, to study my address to the judges, the daemon testified disapprobation.”

“You say what is strange,” rejoined Hermogenes. “And do you think it strange,” inquired Socrates, “that it should seem better to the divinity that I should now close my life? Do you not know, that, down to the present time, I would not admit to any man that he has lived either better or with more pleasure than myself? for I consider that those live best who study best to become as good as possible; and that those live with most pleasure who feel the most assurance that they are daily growing better and better. This assurance I have felt, to the present day, to be the case with respect to myself; and associating with other men, and comparing myself with others I have always retained this opinion respecting myself; and, not only I, but my friends also, maintain a similar feeling with regard to me, not because they love me, (for those who love others may be thus affected towards the objects of their love,) but because they think that while they associated with me they became greatly advanced in virtue. If I shall live a longer period, perhaps I shall be destined to sustain the evils of old age, to find my sight and hearing weakened, to feel my intellect impaired, to become less apt to learn, and more forgetful, and, in fine, to grow inferior to others in all those qualities in which I was once superior to them. If I should be insensible to this deterioration, life would not be worth retaining; and, if I should feel it, how could I live otherwise than with less profit, and with less comfort? If I am to die unjustly, my death will be a disgrace to those who unjustly kill me; for if injustice is a disgrace, must it not be a disgrace to do anything unjustly? But what disgrace will it be to me, that others could not decide or act justly with regard to me? Of the men who have lived before me, I see that the estimation left among posterity with regard to such as have done wrong, and such as have suffered wrong, is by no means similar; and I know that I also, if I now die, shall obtain from mankind far different consideration from that which they will pay to those who take my life; for I know that they will always bear witness to me that I have never wronged any man, or rendered any man less virtuous, but that I have always endeavored to make those better who conversed with me.” Such discourse he held with Hermogenes, and with others.

Of those who knew what sort of man Socrates was, such as were lovers of virtue, continue to regret him above all other men, even to the present day, as having contributed in the highest degree to their advancement in goodness. To me, being such as I have described him, so pious that he did nothing without the sanction of the gods; so just, that he wronged no man even in the most trifling affair, but was of service, in the most important matters, to those who enjoyed his society; so temperate, that he never preferred pleasure to virtue; so wise, that he never erred in distinguishing better from worse, needing no counsel from others, but being sufficient in himself to discriminate between them; so able to explain and settle such questions by argument; and so capable of discerning the character of others, of confuting those who were in error, and of exhorting them to virtue and honor, he seemed to be such as the best and happiest of men would be. But if any

one disapproves of my opinion, let him compare the conduct of others with that of Socrates, and determine accordingly.

THE MEMORABILIA

Recollections of Socrates by Xenophon Translated by H. G. Dakyns

Xenophon the Athenian was born 431 B.C. He was a pupil of Socrates. He marched with the Spartans, and was exiled from Athens. Sparta gave him land and property in Scillus, where he lived for many years before having to move once more, to settle in Corinth. He died in 354 B.C. The Memorabilia is a recollection of Socrates in word and deed, to show his character as the best and happiest of men.

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Recollections of Socrates

BOOK I

I

I have often wondered by what arguments those who indicted Socrates could have persuaded the Athenians that his life was justly forfeit to the state. The indictment was to this effect: “Socrates is guilty of crime in refusing to recognize the gods acknowledged by the state, and importing strange divinities of his own; he is further guilty of corrupting the young.”

In the first place, what evidence did they produce that Socrates refused to recognize the gods acknowledged by the state? Was it that he did not sacrifice? or that he dispensed with divination? On the contrary, he was often to be seen engaged in sacrifice, at home or at the common altars of the state. Nor was his dependence on divination less manifest. Indeed that saying of his, “A divinity gives me a sign,” was on everybody's lips. So much so that, if I am not mistaken, it lay at the root of the imputation that he imported novel divinities; though there was no greater novelty in his case than in that of other believers in oracular help, who commonly rely on omens of all sorts: the flight or cry of birds, the utterances of man, chance meetings, or a victim's entrails. Even according to the popular conception, it is not the mere fowl, it is not the chance individual one meets, who knows what things are profitable for a man, but it is the gods who vouchsafe by such instruments to signify the same. This was also the tenet of Socrates. Only, whereas men ordinarily speak of being turned aside, or urged onwards by birds, or other creatures encountered on the path, Socrates suited his language to his conviction. “The divinity,” said he, “gives me a sign.” Further, he would constantly advise his associates to do this, or beware of doing that, upon the authority of this

same divine voice; and, as a matter of fact, those who listened to his warnings prospered, while he who turned a deaf ear to them repented afterwards. Yet, it will be readily conceded, he would hardly desire to present himself to his everyday companions in the character of either knave or fool. Whereas he would have appeared to be both, supposing the God-given revelations had but revealed his own proneness to deception. It is plain he would not have ventured on forecast at all, but for his belief that the words he spoke would in fact be verified. Then on whom, or what, was the assurance rooted, if not upon God? And if he had faith in the gods, how could he fail to recognize them?

But his mode of dealing with his intimates has another aspect. As regards the ordinary necessities of life, his advice was, "Act as you believe these things may best be done." But in the case of those darker problems, the issues of which are incalculable, he directed his friends to consult the oracle, whether the business should be undertaken or not. "No one," he would say, "who wishes to manage a house or city with success: no one aspiring to guide the helm of state aright, can afford to dispense with aid from above. Doubtless, skill in carpentering, building, smithing, farming, of the art of governing men, together with the theory of these processes, and the sciences of arithmetic, economy, strategy, are affairs of study, and within the grasp of human intelligence. Yet there is a side even of these, and that not the least important, which the gods reserve to themselves, the bearing of which is hidden from mortal vision. Thus, let a man sow a field or plant a farm never so well, yet he cannot foretell who will gather in the fruits: another may build him a house of fairest proportion, yet he knows not who will inhabit it. Neither can a general foresee whether it will profit him to conduct a campaign, nor a politician be certain whether his leadership will turn to evil or good. Nor can the

man who weds a fair wife, looking forward to joy, know whether through her he shall not reap sorrow. Neither can he who has built up a powerful connection in the state know whether he shall not by means of it be cast out of his city. To suppose that all these matters lay within the scope of human judgment, to the exclusion of the preternatural, was preternatural folly. Nor was it less extravagant to go and consult the will of Heaven on any questions which it is given to us to decide by dint of learning. As though a man should inquire, “Am I to choose an expert driver as my coachman, or one who has never handled the reins?” “Shall I appoint a mariner to be skipper of my vessel, or a landsman?” And so with respect to all we may know by numbering, weighing, and measuring. To seek advice from Heaven on such points was a sort of profanity. “Our duty is plain,” he would observe; “where we are permitted to work through our natural faculties, there let us by all means apply them. But in things which are hidden, let us seek to gain knowledge from above, by divination; for the gods,” he added, “grant signs to those to whom they will be gracious.”

Again, Socrates ever lived in the public eye; at early morning he was to be seen betaking himself to one of the promenades, or wrestling-grounds; at noon he would appear with the gathering crowds in the market-place; and as day declined, wherever the largest throng might be encountered, there was he to be found, talking for the most part, while any one who chose might stop and listen. Yet no one ever heard him say, or saw him do anything impious or irreverent. Indeed, in contrast to others he set his face against all discussion of such high matters as the nature of the Universe; how the “kosmos,” as the savants phrase it, came into being; or by what forces the celestial phenomena arise. To trouble one's brain about such matters was, he argued, to play the fool. He would ask first: Did these

investigators feel their knowledge of things human so complete that they betook themselves to these lofty speculations? Or did they maintain that they were playing their proper parts in thus neglecting the affairs of man to speculate on the concerns of God? He was astonished they did not see how far these problems lay beyond mortal ken; since even those who pride themselves most on their discussion of these points differ from each other, as madmen do. For just as some madmen, he said, have no apprehension of what is truly terrible, others fear where no fear is; some are ready to say and do anything in public without the slightest symptom of shame; others think they ought not so much as to set foot among their fellow-men; some honor neither temple, nor altar, nor aught else sacred to the name of God; others bow down to stocks and stones and worship the very beasts:—so is it with those thinkers whose minds are cumbered with cares concerning the Universal Nature. One sect has discovered that Being is one and indivisible. Another that it is infinite in number. If one proclaims that all things are in a continual flux, another replies that nothing can possibly be moved at any time. The theory of the universe as a process of birth and death is met by the counter theory, that nothing ever could be born or ever will die.

But the questioning of Socrates on the merits of these speculators sometimes took another form. The student of human learning expects, he said, to make something of his studies for the benefit of himself or others, as he likes. Do these explorers into the divine operations hope that when they have discovered by what forces the various phenomena occur, they will create winds and waters at will and fruitful seasons? Will they manipulate these and the like to suit their needs? or has no such notion perhaps ever entered their heads, and will they be content simply to know how such

things come into existence? But if this was his mode of describing those who meddle with such matters as these, he himself never wearied of discussing human topics. What is piety? what is impiety? What is the beautiful? what the ugly? What the noble? what the base? What are meant by just and unjust? what by sobriety and madness? what by courage and cowardice? What is a state? what is a statesman? what is a ruler over men? what is a ruling character? and other like problems, the knowledge of which, as he put it, conferred a patent of nobility on the possessor, whereas those who lacked the knowledge might deservedly be stigmatized as slaves.

Now, in so far as the opinions of Socrates were unknown to the world at large, it is not surprising that the court should draw false conclusions respecting them; but that facts patent to all should have been ignored is indeed astonishing.

At one time Socrates was a member of the Council, he had taken the senatorial oath, and sworn "as a member of that house to act in conformity with the laws." It was thus he chanced to be President of the Popular Assembly, when that body was seized with a desire to put the nine generals, Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and the rest, to death by a single inclusive vote. Whereupon, in spite of the bitter resentment of the people, and the menaces of several influential citizens, he refused to put the question, esteeming it of greater importance faithfully to abide by the oath which he had taken, than to gratify the people wrongfully, or to screen himself from the menaces of the mighty. The fact being, that with regard to the care bestowed by the gods upon men, his belief differed widely from that of the multitude. Whereas most people seem to imagine that the gods know in part, and are ignorant in part, Socrates believed firmly that the gods know all things—both the things that are said and the things

that are done, and the things that are counseled in the silent chambers of the heart. Moreover, they are present everywhere, and bestow signs upon man concerning all the things of man.

I can, therefore, but repeat my former words. It is a marvel to me how the Athenians came to be persuaded that Socrates fell short of sober-mindedness as touching the gods. A man who never ventured one impious word or deed against the gods we worship, but whose whole language concerning them, and his every act, closely coincided, word for word, and deed for deed, with all we deem distinctive of most devout piety.

II

No less surprising to my mind is the belief that Socrates corrupted the young. This man, who, beyond what has been already stated, kept his appetites and passions under strict control, who was pre-eminently capable of enduring winter's cold and summer's heat and every kind of toil, who was so schooled to curtail his needs that with the scantiest of means he never lacked sufficiency—is it credible that such a man could have made others irreverent or lawless, or licentious, or effeminate in face of toil? Was he not rather the saving of many through the passion for virtue which he roused in them, and the hope he infused that through careful management of themselves they might grow to be truly beautiful and good—not indeed that he ever undertook to be a teacher of virtue, but being evidently virtuous himself he made those who associated with him hope that by imitating they might at last resemble him.

But let it not be inferred that he was negligent of his own body or approved of those who neglected theirs. If excess of eating, counteracted by excess of toil, was a dietary of which he disapproved, to gratify the natural claim of appetite in

conjunction with moderate exercise was a system he favoured, as tending to a healthy condition of the body without trammeling the cultivation of the spirit. On the other hand, there was nothing dandified or pretentious about him; he indulged in no foppery of shawl or shoes, or other effeminacy of living.

Least of all did he tend to make his companions greedy of money. He would not, while restraining passion generally, make capital out of the one passion which attached others to himself; and by this abstinence, he believed, he was best consulting his own freedom; in so much that he stigmatized those who condescended to take wages for their society as vendors of their own persons, because they were compelled to discuss for the benefits of their paymasters. What surprised him was that any one possessing virtue should deign to ask money as its price instead of simply finding his reward in the acquisition of an honest friend, as if the new-fledged soul of honor could forget her debt of gratitude to her greatest benefactor.

For himself, without making any such profession, he was content to believe that those who accepted his views would play their parts as good and true friends to himself and one another their lives long. Once more then: how should a man of this character corrupt the young? unless the careful cultivation of virtue be corruption.

But, says the accuser, by all that's sacred! did not Socrates cause his associates to despise the established laws when he dwelt on the folly of appointing state officers by ballot? a principle which, he said, no one would care to apply in selecting a pilot or a flute-player or in any similar case, where a mistake would be far less disastrous than in matters political. Words like these, according to the accuser, tended to incite the young to contemn the established constitution, rendering them violent and headstrong. But for myself I

think that those who cultivate wisdom and believe themselves able to instruct their fellow-citizens as to their interests are least likely to become partisans of violence. They are too well aware that to violence attach enmities and dangers, whereas results as good may be obtained by persuasion safely and amicably. For the victim of violence hates with vindictiveness as one from whom something precious has been stolen, while the willing subject of persuasion is ready to kiss the hand which has done him a service. Hence compulsion is not the method of him who makes wisdom his study, but of him who wields power untempered by reflection. Once more: the man who ventures on violence needs the support of many to fight his battles, while he whose strength lies in persuasiveness triumphs single-handed, for he is conscious of a cunning to compel consent unaided. And what has such a one to do with the spilling of blood? since how ridiculous it were to do men to death rather than turn to account the trusty service of the living.

But, the accuser answers, the two men who wrought the greatest evils to the state at any time—to wit, Critias and Alcibiades—were both companions of Socrates—Critias the oligarch, and Alcibiades the democrat. Where would you find a more arrant thief, savage, and murderer than the one? where such a portent of insolence, incontinence, and high-handedness as the other? For my part, in so far as these two wrought evil to the state, I have no desire to appear as the apologist of either. I confine myself to explaining what this intimacy of theirs with Socrates really was.

Never were two more ambitious citizens seen at Athens. Ambition was in their blood. If they were to have their will, all power was to be in their hands; their fame was to eclipse all other. Of Socrates they knew—first that he lived an absolutely independent life on the scantiest means; next

that he was self-disciplined to the last degree in respect of pleasures; lastly that he was so formidable in debate that there was no antagonist he could not twist round his little finger. Such being their views, and such the character of the pair, which is the more probable: that they sought the society of Socrates because they felt the fascination of his life, and were attracted by the bearing of the man? or because they thought, if only we are leagued with him we shall become adepts in statecraft and unrivalled in the arts of speech and action? For my part I believe that if the choice from Heaven had been given them to live such a life as they saw Socrates living to its close, or to die, they would both have chosen death.

Their acts are a conclusive witness to their characters. They no sooner felt themselves to be the masters of those they came in contact with than they sprang aside from Socrates and plunged into that whirl of politics but for which they might never have sought his society.

It may be objected: before giving his companions lessons in politics Socrates had better have taught them sobriety. Without disputing the principle, I would point out that a teacher cannot fail to discover to his pupils his method of carrying out his own precepts, and this along with argumentative encouragement. Now I know that Socrates disclosed himself to his companions as a beautiful and noble being, who would reason and debate with them concerning virtue and other human interests in the noblest manner. And of these two I know that as long as they were companions of Socrates even they were temperate, not assuredly from fear of being fined or beaten by Socrates, but because they were persuaded for the nonce of the excellence of such conduct.

Perhaps some self-styled philosophers may here answer: “Nay, the man truly just can never become unjust, the

temperate man can never become intemperate, the man who has learnt any subject of knowledge can never be as though he had learnt it not." That, however, is not my own conclusion. It is with the workings of the soul as with those of the body; want of exercise of the organ leads to inability of function, here bodily, there spiritual, so that we can neither do the things that we should nor abstain from the things we should not. And that is why fathers keep their sons, however temperate they may be, out of the reach of wicked men, considering that if the society of the good is a training in virtue so also is the society of the bad its dissolution.

To this the poet is a witness, who says:

"From the noble you shall be instructed in nobleness; but, and if you mingle with the base you will destroy what wisdom you have now";

And he who says:

"But the good man has his hour of baseness as well as his hour of virtue"—to whose testimony I would add my own. For I see that it is impossible to remember a long poem without practice and repetition; so is forgetfulness of the words of instruction engendered in the heart that has ceased to value them. With the words of warning fades the recollection of the very condition of mind in which the soul yearned after holiness; and once forgetting this, what wonder that the man should let slip also the memory of virtue itself! Again I see that a man who falls into habits of drunkenness or plunges headlong into licentious love, loses his old power of practicing the right and abstaining from the wrong. Many a man who has found frugality easy while passion was cold, no sooner falls in love than he loses the faculty at once, and in his prodigal expenditure of riches he will no longer withhold his hand from gains which in former

days were too base to invite his touch. Where then is the difficulty of supposing that a man may be temperate to-day, and to-morrow the reverse; or that he who once has had it in his power to act virtuously may not quite lose that power? To myself, at all events, it seems that all beautiful and noble things are the result of constant practice and training; and pre-eminently the virtue of temperance, seeing that in one and the same bodily frame pleasures are planted and spring up side by side with the soul and keep whispering in her ear, "Have done with self-restraint, make haste to gratify us and the body."

But to return to Critias and Alcibiades, I repeat that as long as they lived with Socrates they were able by his support to dominate their ignoble appetites; but being separated from him, Critias had to fly to Thessaly, where he consorted with fellows better versed in lawlessness than justice. And Alcibiades fared no better. His personal beauty on the one hand incited bevies of fine ladies to hunt him down as fair spoil, while on the other hand his influence in the state and among the allies exposed him to the corruption of many an adept in the arts of flattery; honored by the democracy and stepping easily to the front rank he behaved like an athlete who in the games of the Palaestra is so assured of victory that he neglects his training; thus he presently forgot the duty which he owed himself.

Such were the misadventures of these two. Is the sequel extraordinary? Inflated with the pride of ancestry, exalted by their wealth, puffed up by power, sapped to the soul's core by a host of human tempters, separate moreover for many a long day from Socrates—what wonder that they reached the full stature of arrogancy! And for the offences of these two Socrates is to be held responsible! The accuser will have it so. But for the fact that in early days, when they were both young and of an age when dereliction from good feeling and

self-restraint might have been expected, this same Socrates kept them modest and well-behaved, not one word of praise is uttered by the accuser for all this. That is not the measure of justice elsewhere meted. Would a master of the harp or flute, would a teacher of any sort who has turned out proficient pupils, be held to account because one of them goes away to another teacher and turns out to be a failure? Or what father, if he have a son who in the society of a certain friend remains an honest lad, but falling into the company of some other becomes a good-for-nothing, will that father straightway accuse the earlier instructor? Will not he rather, in proportion as the boy deteriorates in the company of the latter, bestow more heartfelt praise upon the former? What father, himself sharing the society of his own children, is held to blame for their transgressions, if only his own goodness be established? Here would have been a fair test to apply to Socrates: Was he guilty of any base conduct himself? If so let him be set down as a knave, but if, on the contrary, he never faltered in sobriety from beginning to end, how in the name of justice is he to be held to account for a baseness which was not in him?

I go further: if, short of being guilty of any wrong himself, he saw the evil doings of others with approval, reason were he should be held blameworthy. Listen then: Socrates was well aware that Critias was attached to Euthydemus, aware too that he was endeavoring to deal by him after the manner of those wantons whose love is carnal of the body. From this Endeavour he tried to deter him, pointing out how illiberal a thing it was, how ill befitting a man of honor to appear as a beggar before him whom he loved, in whose eyes he would fain be precious, ever petitioning for something base to give and base to get.

But when this reasoning fell on deaf ears and Critias refused to be turned aside, Socrates, as the story goes, took

occasion of the presence of a whole company and of Euthydemus to remark that Critias appeared to be suffering from a swinish affection, or else why this desire to rub himself against Euthydemus like a herd of pigs scraping against stones.

The hatred of Critias to Socrates doubtless dates from this incident. He treasured it up against him, and afterwards, when he was one of the Thirty and associated with Charicles as their official lawgiver, he framed the law against teaching the art of words merely from a desire to vilify Socrates. He was at a loss to know how else to lay hold of him except by leveling against him the vulgar charge against philosophers, by which he hoped to prejudice him with the public. It was a charge quite unfounded as regards Socrates, if I may judge from anything I ever heard fall from his lips myself or have learnt about him from others. But the animus of Critias was clear. At the time when the Thirty were putting citizens, highly respectable citizens, to death wholesale, and when they were egging on one man after another to the commission of crime, Socrates let fall an observation: "It would be sufficiently extraordinary if the keeper of a herd of cattle who was continually thinning and impoverishing his cattle did not admit himself to be a sorry sort of herdsman, but that a ruler of the state who was continually thinning and impoverishing the citizens should neither be ashamed nor admit himself to be a sorry sort of ruler was more extraordinary still." The remark being reported to the government, Socrates was summoned by Critias and Charicles, who proceeded to point out the law and forbade him to converse with the young. "Was it open to him," Socrates inquired of the speaker, "in case he failed to understand their commands in any point, to ask for an explanation?"

"Certainly," the two assented.

Then Socrates: I am prepared to obey the laws, but to avoid transgression of the law through ignorance I need instruction: is it on the supposition that the art of words tends to correctness of statement or to incorrectness that you bid us abstain from it? for if the former, it is clear we must abstain from speaking correctly, but if the latter, our Endeavour should be to amend our speech.

To which Charicles, in a fit of temper, retorted: In consideration of your ignorance, Socrates, we will frame the prohibition in language better suited to your intelligence: we forbid you to hold any conversation whatsoever with the young.

Then Socrates: To avoid all ambiguity then, or the possibility of my doing anything else than what you are pleased to command, may I ask you to define up to what age a human being is to be considered young?

For just so long a time (Charicles answered) as he is debarred from sitting as a member of the Council, as not having attained to the maturity of wisdom; accordingly you will not hold converse with any one under the age of thirty.

Soc. In making a purchase even, I am not to ask, what is the price of this? if the vendor is under the age of thirty?

Cha. Tut, things of that sort: but you know, Socrates, that you have a way of asking questions, when all the while you know how the matter stands. Let us have no questions of that sort.

Soc. Nor answers either, I suppose, if the inquiry concerns what I know, as, for instance, where does Charicles live? or where is Critias to be found?

Oh yes, of course, things of that kind (replied Charicles), while Critias added: But at the same time you had better have done with your shoemakers, carpenters, and coppersmiths. These must be pretty well trodden out at heel

by this time, considering the circulation you have given them.

Soc. And am I to hold away from their attendant topics also—the just, the holy, and the like?

Most assuredly (answered Charicles), and from cowherds in particular; or else see that you do not lessen the number of the herd yourself.

Thus the secret was out. The remark of Socrates about the cattle had come to their ears, and they could not forgive the author of it.

Perhaps enough has been said to explain the kind of intimacy which had subsisted between Critias and Socrates, and their relation to one another. But I will venture to maintain that where the teacher is not pleasing to the pupil there is no education. Now it cannot be said of Critias and Alcibiades that they associated with Socrates because they found him pleasing to them. And this is true of the whole period. From the first their eyes were fixed on the headship of the state as their final goal. During the time of their intimacy with Socrates there were no disputants whom they were more eager to encounter than professed politicians.

Thus the story is told of Alcibiades—how before the age of twenty he engaged his own guardian, Pericles, at that time prime minister of the state, in a discussion concerning laws.

Alc. Please, Pericles, can you teach me what a law is?

Per. To be sure I can.

Alc. I should be so much obliged if you would do so. One so often hears the epithet "law-abiding" applied in a complimentary sense; yet, it strikes me, one hardly deserves the compliment, if one does not know what a law is.

Per. Fortunately there is a ready answer to your difficulty. You wish to know what a law is? Well, those are laws which the majority, being met together in conclave, approve and

enact as to what it is right to do, and what it is right to abstain from doing.

Alc. Enact on the hypothesis that it is right to do what is good? or to do what is bad?

Per. What is good, to be sure, young sir, not what is bad.

Alc. Supposing it is not the majority, but, as in the case of an oligarchy, the minority, who meet and enact the rules of conduct, what are these?

Per. Whatever the ruling power of the state after deliberation enacts as our duty to do, goes by the name of laws.

Alc. Then if a tyrant, holding the chief power in the state, enacts rules of conduct for the citizens, are these enactments law?

Per. Yes, anything which a tyrant as head of the state enacts, also goes by the name of law.

Alc. But, Pericles, violence and lawlessness—how do we define them? Is it not when a stronger man forces a weaker to do what seems right to him—not by persuasion but by compulsion?

Per. I should say so.

Alc. It would seem to follow that if a tyrant, without persuading the citizens, drives them by enactment to do certain things—that is lawlessness?

Per. You are right; and I retract the statement that measures passed by a tyrant without persuasion of the citizens are law.

Alc. And what of measures passed by a minority, not by persuasion of the majority, but in the exercise of its power only? Are we, or are we not, to apply the term violence to these?

Per. I think that anything which any one forces another to do without persuasion, whether by enactment or not, is violence rather than law.

Alc. It would seem that everything which the majority, in the exercise of its power over the possessors of wealth, and without persuading them, chooses to enact, is of the nature of violence rather than of law?

To be sure (answered Pericles), adding: At your age we were clever hands at such quibbles ourselves. It was just such subtleties which we used to practice our wits upon; as you do now, if I mistake not.

To which Alcibiades replied: Ah, Pericles, I do wish we could have met in those days when you were at your cleverest in such matters.

Well, then, as soon as the desired superiority over the politicians of the day seemed to be attained, Critias and Alcibiades turned their backs on Socrates. They found his society unattractive, not to speak of the annoyance of being cross-questioned on their own shortcomings. Forthwith they devoted themselves to those affairs of state but for which they would never have come near him at all.

No; if one would seek to see true companions of Socrates, one must look to Crito, and Chaerephon, and Chaerecrates, to Hermogenes, to Simmias and Cebes, to Phaedondes and others, who clung to him not to excel in the rhetoric of the Assembly or the law-courts, but with the nobler ambition of attaining to such beauty and goodliness of soul as would enable them to discharge the various duties of life to house and family, to relatives and friends, to fellow-citizens, and to the state at large. Of these true followers not one in youth or old age was ever guilty, or thought guilty, of committing any evil deed.

“But for all that,” the accuser insists, “Socrates taught sons to pour contumely upon their fathers by persuading his young friends that he could make them wiser than their sires, or by pointing out that the law allowed a son to sue his father for aberration of mind, and to imprison him, which legal ordinance he put in evidence to prove that it might be well for the wiser to imprison the more ignorant.”

Now what Socrates held was, that if a man may with justice incarcerate another for no better cause than a form of folly or ignorance, this same person could not justly complain if he in his turn were kept in bonds by his superiors in knowledge; and to come to the bottom of such questions, to discover the difference between madness and ignorance was a problem which he was perpetually working at. His opinion came to this: If a madman may, as a matter of expediency to himself and his friends, be kept in prison, surely, as a matter of justice, the man who knows not what he ought to know should be content to sit at the feet of those who know, and be taught.

But it was the rest of their kith and kin, not fathers only (according to the accuser), whom Socrates dishonored in the eyes of his circle of followers, when he said that “the sick man or the litigant does not derive assistance from his relatives, but from his doctor in the one case, and his legal adviser in the other.” “Listen further to his language about friends,” says the accuser: “'What is the good of their being kindly disposed, unless they can be of some practical use to you? Mere goodness of disposition is nothing; those only are worthy of honor who combine with the knowledge of what is right the faculty of expounding it;’ and so by bringing the young to look upon himself as a superlatively wise person gifted with an extraordinary capacity for making others wise also, he so worked on the dispositions of those who

consorted with him that in their esteem the rest of the world counted for nothing by comparison with Socrates."

Now I admit the language about fathers and the rest of a man's relations. I can go further, and add some other sayings of his, that "when the soul (which is alone the indwelling centre of intelligence) is gone out of a man, be he our nearest and dearest friend, we carry the body forth and bury it out of sight." "Even in life," he used to say, "each of us is ready to part with any portion of his best possession—to wit, his own body—if it be useless and unprofitable. He will remove it himself, or suffer another to do so in his stead. Thus men cut off their own nails, hair, or corns; they allow surgeons to cut and cauterize them, not without pains and aches, and are so grateful to the doctor for his services that they further give him a fee. Or again, a man ejects the spittle from his mouth as far as possible. Why? Because it is of no use while it stays within the system, but is detrimental rather."

Now by these instances his object was not to inculcate the duty of burying one's father alive or of cutting oneself to bits, but to show that lack of intelligence means lack of worth; and so he called upon his hearers to be as sensible and useful as they could be, so that, be it father or brother or any one else whose esteem he would deserve, a man should not hug himself in careless self-interest, trusting to mere relationship, but strive to be useful to those whose esteem he coveted.

But (pursues the accuser) by carefully culling the most immoral passages of the famous poets, and using them as evidences, he taught his associates to be evildoers and tyrannical: the line of Hesiod for instance—

No work is a disgrace; slackness of work is the disgrace—

“interpreted,” says the accuser, “by Socrates as if the poet enjoined us to abstain from no work wicked or ignoble; do everything for the sake of gain.”

Now while Socrates would have entirely admitted the propositions that “it is a blessing and a benefit to a man to be a worker,” and that “a lazy do-nothing is a pestilent evil,” that “work is good and idleness a curse,” the question arises, whom did he mean by workers? In his vocabulary only those were good workmen who were engaged on good work; dicers and gamblers and others engaged on any other base and ruinous business he stigmatized as the “idle drones”; and from this point of view the quotation from Hesiod is unimpeachable—

No work is a disgrace; only idleness is disgrace.

But there was a passage from Homer for ever on his lips, as the accuser tells us—the passage which says concerning Odysseus,

What prince, or man of name, He found flight-given, he would restrain with words of gentlest blame: “Good sir, it fits you not to fly, or fare as one afraid, You should not only stay yourself, but see the people stayed.” Thus he the best sort used; the worst, whose spirits brake out in noise, He cudgeled with his scepter, chide, and said, “Stay, wretch, be still, And hear your betters; you art base, and both in power and skill Poor and unworthy, without name in counsel or in war.” We must not all be kings.

The accuser informs us that Socrates interpreted these lines as though the poet approved the giving of blows to commoners and poor folk. Now no such remark was ever made by Socrates; which indeed would have been tantamount to maintaining that he ought to be beaten himself. What he did say was, that those who were useful neither in word nor deed, who were incapable of rendering

assistance in time of need to the army or the state or the people itself, be they never so wealthy, ought to be restrained, and especially if to incapacity they added effrontery.

As to Socrates, he was the very opposite of all this—he was plainly a lover of the people, and indeed of all mankind. Though he had many ardent admirers among citizens and strangers alike, he never demanded any fee for his society from any one, but bestowed abundantly upon all alike of the riches of his soul—good things, indeed, of which fragments accepted gratis at his hands were taken and sold at high prices to the rest of the community by some, who were not, as he was, lovers of the people, since with those who had not money to give in return they refused to discourse. But of Socrates be it said that in the eyes of the whole world he reflected more honor on the state and a richer luster than ever Lichas, whose fame is proverbial, shed on Lacedaemon. Lichas feasted and entertained the foreign residents in Lacedaemon at the Gymnopaediae most handsomely. Socrates gave a lifetime to the outpouring of his substance in the shape of the greatest benefits bestowed on all who cared to receive them. In other words, he made those who lived in his society better men, and sent them on their way rejoicing.

To no other conclusion, therefore, can I come but that, being so good a man, Socrates was worthier to have received honor from the state than death. And this I take to be the strictly legal view of the case, for what does the law require? "If a man be proved to be a thief, a filcher of clothes, a cut-purse, a housebreaker, a man-stealer, a robber of temples, the penalty is death." Even so; and of all men Socrates stood most aloof from such crimes.

To the state he was never the cause of any evil—neither disaster in war, nor faction, nor treason, nor any other

mischief whatsoever. And if his public life was free from all offence, so was his private. He never hurt a single soul either by deprivation of good or infliction of evil, nor did he ever lie under the imputation of any of those misdoings. where then is his liability to the indictment to be found? Who, so far from disbelieving in the gods, as set forth in the indictment, was conspicuous beyond all men for service to heaven; so far from corrupting the young—a charge alleged with insistence by the prosecutor—was notorious for the zeal with which he strove not only to stay his associates from evil desires, but to foster in them a passionate desire for that loveliest and queenliest of virtues without which states and families crumble to decay. Such being his conduct, was he not worthy of high honor from the state of Athens?

III

It may serve to illustrate the assertion that he benefited his associates partly by the display of his own virtue and partly by verbal discourse and argument, if I set down my various recollections on these heads. And first with regard to religion and the concerns of heaven. In conduct and language his behavior conformed to the rule laid down by the Pythia in reply to the question, "How shall we act?" as touching a sacrifice or the worship of ancestors, or any similar point. Her answer is: "Act according to the law and custom of your state, and you will act piously." After this pattern Socrates behaved himself, and so he exhorted others to behave, holding them to be but busybodies and vain fellows who acted on any different principle.

His formula or prayer was simple: "Give me that which is best for me," for, said he, the gods know best what good things are—to pray for gold or silver or despotic power were no better than to make some particular throw at dice or stake in battle or any such thing the subject of prayer, of which the future consequences are manifestly uncertain.

If with scant means he offered but small sacrifices he believed that he was in no wise inferior to those who make frequent and large sacrifices from an ampler store. It were ill surely for the very gods themselves, could they take delight in large sacrifices rather than in small, else oftentimes must the offerings of bad men be found acceptable rather than of good; nor from the point of view of men themselves would life be worth living if the offerings of a villain rather than of a righteous man found favour in the sight of Heaven. His belief was that the joy of the gods is greater in proportion to the holiness of the giver, and he was ever an admirer of that line of Hesiod which says,

According to your ability do sacrifice to the immortal gods.

"Yes," he would say, "in our dealings with friends and strangers alike, and in reference to the demands of life in general, there is no better motto for a man than that: 'let a man do according to his ability.'"

Or to take another point. If it appeared to him that a sign from heaven had been given him, nothing would have induced him to go against heavenly warning: he would as soon have been persuaded to accept the guidance of a blind man ignorant of the path to lead him on a journey in place of one who knew the road and could see; and so he denounced the folly of others who do things contrary to the warnings of God in order to avoid some disrepute among men. For himself he despised all human aids by comparison with counsel from above.

The habit and style of living to which he subjected his soul and body was one which under ordinary circumstances would enable any one adopting it to look existence cheerily in the face and to pass his days serenely: it would certainly entail no difficulties as regards expense. So frugal was it that a man must work little indeed who could not earn the

quantum which contented Socrates. Of food he took just enough to make eating a pleasure—the appetite he brought to it was sauce sufficient; while as to drinks, seeing that he only drank when thirsty, any draught refreshed. If he accepted an invitation to dinner, he had no difficulty in avoiding the common snare of over-indulgence, and his advice to people who could not equally control their appetite was to avoid taking what would allure them to eat if not hungry or to drink if not thirsty. Such things are ruinous to the constitution, he said, bad for stomachs, brains, and soul alike; or as he used to put it, with a touch of sarcasm, “It must have been by feasting men on so many dainty dishes that Circe produced her pigs; only Odysseus through his continency and the 'promptings of Hermes' abstained from touching them immoderately, and by the same token did not turn into a swine.” So much for this topic, which he touched thus lightly and yet seriously.

But as to the concerns of Aphrodite, his advice was to hold strongly aloof from the fascination of fair forms: once lay finger on these and it is not easy to keep a sound head and a sober mind. To take a particular case. It was a mere kiss which, as he had heard, Critobulus had some time given to a fair youth, the son of Alcibiades. Accordingly Critobulus being present, Socrates propounded the question.

Soc. Tell me, Xenophon, have you not always believed Critobulus to be a man of sound sense, not wild and self-willed? Should you not have said that he was remarkable for his prudence rather than thoughtless or foolhardy?

Xen. Certainly that is what I should have said of him.

Soc. Then you are now to regard him as quite the reverse—a hot-blooded, reckless libertine: this is the sort of man to throw somersaults into knives, or to leap into the jaws of fire.

Xen. And what have you seen him doing, that you give him so bad a character?

Soc. Doing? Why, has not the fellow dared to steal a kiss from the son of Alcibiades, most fair of youths and in the golden prime?

Xen. Nay, then, if that is the foolhardy adventure, it is a danger which I could well encounter myself.

Soc. Poor soul! and what do you expect your fate to be after that kiss? Let me tell you. On the instant you will lose your freedom, the indenture of your bondage will be signed; it will be yours on compulsion to spend large sums on hurtful pleasures; you will have scarcely a moment's leisure left for any noble study; you will be driven to concern yourself most zealously with things which no man, not even a madman, would choose to make an object of concern.

Xen. O Heracles! how fell a power to reside in a kiss!

Soc. Does it surprise you? Do you not know that the tarantula, which is no bigger than a three-penny bit, has only to touch the mouth and it will afflict its victim with pains and drive him out of his senses.

Xen. Yes, but then the creature injects something with its bite.

Soc. Ah, fool! and do you imagine that these lovely creatures infuse nothing with their kiss, simply because you do not see the poison? Do you not know that this wild beast which men call beauty in its bloom is all the more terrible than the tarantula in that the insect must first touch its victim, but this at a mere glance of the beholder, without even contact, will inject something into him—yards away—which will make him man. And may be that is why the Loves are called “archers,” because these beauties wound so far off. But my advice to you, Xenophon, is, whenever you catch sight of one of these fair forms, to run helter-skelter for bare

life without a glance behind; and to you, Critobulus, I would say, “Go abroad for a year: so long time will it take to heal you of this wound.”

Such (he said), in the affairs of Aphrodite, as in meats and drinks, should be the circumspection of all whose footing is insecure. At least they should confine themselves to such diet as the soul would dispense with, save for some necessity of the body; and which even so ought to set up no disturbance. But for himself, it was clear, he was prepared at all points and invulnerable. He found less difficulty in abstaining from beauty's fairest and fullest bloom than many others from weeds and garbage. To sum up: with regard to eating and drinking and these other temptations of the sense, the equipment of his soul made him independent; he could boast honestly that in his moderate fashion his pleasures were no less than theirs who take such trouble to procure them, and his pains far fewer.

IV

A belief is current, in accordance with views maintained concerning Socrates in speech and writing, and in either case conjecturally, that, however powerful he may have been in stimulating men to virtue as a theorist, he was incapable of acting as their guide himself. It would be well for those who adopt this view to weigh carefully not only what Socrates effected “by way of castigation” in cross-questioning whose who conceived themselves to be possessed of all knowledge, but also his everyday conversation with those who spent their time in close intercourse with himself. Having done this, let them decide whether he was incapable of making his companions better.

So tell me, Aristodemus (he began), are there any human beings who have won your admiration for their wisdom?

Ar. There are.

Soc. Would you mention to us their names?

Ar. In the writings of epic poetry I have the greatest admiration for Homer.... And as a dithyrambic poet for Melanippides. I admire also Sophocles as a tragedian, Polycleitus as a sculptor, and Zeuxis as a painter.

Soc. Which would you consider the more worthy of admiration, a fashioner of senseless images devoid of motion or one who could fashion living creatures endowed with understanding and activity?

Ar. Decidedly the latter, provided his living creatures owed their birth to design and were not the offspring of some chance.

Soc. But now if you had two sorts of things, the one of which presents no clue as to what it is for, and the other is obviously for some useful purpose—which would you judge to be the result of chance, which of design?

Ar. Clearly that which is produced for some useful end is the work of design.

Soc. Does it not strike you then that he who made man from the beginning did for some useful end furnish him with his several senses—giving him eyes to behold the visible word, and ears to catch the intonations of sound? Or again, what good would there be in odors if nostrils had not been bestowed upon us? what perception of sweet things and pungent, and of all the pleasures of the palate, had not a tongue been fashioned in us as an interpreter of the same? And besides all this, do you not think this looks like a matter of foresight, this closing of the delicate orbs of sight with eyelids as with folding doors, which, when there is need to use them for any purpose, can be thrown wide open and firmly closed again in sleep? and, that even the winds of heaven may not visit them too roughly, this planting of the eyelashes as a protecting screen? this coping of the region

above the eyes with cornice-work of eyebrow so that no drop of sweat fall from the head and injure them? again this readiness of the ear to catch all sounds and yet not to be surcharged? this capacity of the front teeth of all animals to cut and of the “grinders” to receive the food and reduce it to pulp? the position of the mouth again, close to the eyes and nostrils as a portal of ingress for all the creature's supplies? and lastly, seeing that matter passing out of the body is unpleasant, this backward direction of the passages, and their removal to a distance from the avenues of sense? I ask you, when you see all these things constructed with such show of foresight can you doubt whether they are products of chance or intelligence?

Ar. To be sure not! Viewed in this light they would seem to be the handiwork of some wise artificer, full of love for all things living.

Soc. What shall we say of this passion implanted in man to beget offspring, this passion in the mother to rear her babe, and in the creature itself, once born, this deep desire of life and fear of death?

Ar. No doubt these do look like the contrivances of some one deliberately planning the existence of living creatures.

Soc. Well, and doubtless you feel to have a spark of wisdom yourself?

Ar. Put your questions, and I will answer.

Soc. And yet you imagine that elsewhere no spark of wisdom is to be found? And that, too, when you know that you have in your body a tiny fragment only of the mighty earth, a little drop of the great waters, and of the other elements, vast in their extent, you got, I presume, a particle of each towards the compacting of your bodily frame? Mind alone, it would seem, which is nowhere to be found, you had the lucky chance to snatch up and make off with, you cannot

tell how. And these things around and about us, enormous in size, infinite in number, owe their orderly arrangement, as you suppose, to some vacuity of wit?

Ar. It may be, for my eyes fail to see the master agents of these, as one sees the fabricators of things produced on earth.

Soc. No more do you see your own soul, which is the master agent of your body; so that, as far as that goes, you may maintain, if you like, that you do nothing with intelligence, but everything by chance.

At this point Aristodemus: I assure you, Socrates, that I do not disdain the Divine power. On the contrary, my belief is that the Divinity is too grand to need any service which I could render.

Soc. But the grander that power is, which deigns to tend and wait upon you, the more you are called upon to honor it.

Ar. Be well assured, if I could believe the gods take thought for all men, I would not neglect them.

Soc. How can you suppose that they do not so take thought? Who, in the first place, gave to man alone of living creatures his erect posture, enabling him to see farther in front of him and to contemplate more freely the height above, and to be less subject to distress than other creatures (endowed like himself with eyes and ears and mouth). Consider next how they gave to the beast of the field feet as a means of progression only, but to man they gave in addition hands—those hands which have achieved so much to raise us in the scale of happiness above all animals. Did they not make the tongue also? which belongs indeed alike to man and beast, but in man they fashioned it so as to play on different parts of the mouth at different times, whereby we can produce articulate speech, and have a code of signals

to express our every want to one another. Or consider the pleasures of the sexual appetite; limited in the rest of the animal kingdom to certain seasons, but in the case of man a series prolonged unbroken to old age. Nor did it content the Godhead merely to watch over the interests of man's body. What is of far higher import, he implanted in man the noblest and most excellent type of soul. For what other creature, to begin with, has a soul to appreciate the existence of the gods who have arranged this grand and beauteous universe? What other tribe of animals save man can render service to the gods? How apt is the spirit of man to take precautions against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to alleviate disease and foster strength! how suited to labor with a view to learning! how capable of garnering in the storehouse of his memory all that he has heard or seen or understood! Is it not most evident to you that by the side of other animals men live and move a race of gods—by nature excellent, in beauty of body and of soul supreme? For, mark you, had a creature of man's wit been encased in the body of an ox, he would have been powerless to carry out his wishes, just as the possession of hands divorced from human wit is profitless. And then you come, you who have obtained these two most precious attributes, and give it as your opinion, that the gods take no thought or care for you. Why, what will you have them to do, that you may believe and be persuaded that you too are in their thoughts?

Ar. When they treat me as you tell us they treat you, and send me counselors to warn me what I am to do and what abstain from doing, I will believe.

Soc. Send you counselors! Come now, what when the people of Athens make inquiry by oracle, and the gods' answer comes? Are you not an Athenian? Think you not that to you also the answer is given? What when they send portents to forewarn the states of Hellas? or to all mankind?

Are you not a man? a Hellene? Are not these intended for you also? Can it be that you alone are excepted as a signal instance of Divine neglect? Again, do you suppose that the gods could have implanted in the heart of man the belief in their capacity to work him weal or woe had they not the power? Would not men have discovered the imposture in all this lapse of time? Do you not perceive that the wisest and most perdurable of human institutions—be they cities or tribes of men—are ever the most God-fearing; and in the individual man the riper his age and judgment, the deeper his religiousness? Ay, my good sir (he broke forth), lay to heart and understand that even as your own mind within you can turn and dispose of your body as it lists, so ought we to think that the wisdom which abides within the universal frame does so dispose of all things as it finds agreeable to itself; for hardly may it be that your eye is able to range over many a league, but that the eye of God is powerless to embrace all things at a glance; or that to your soul it is given to dwell in thought on matters here or far away in Egypt or in Sicily, but that the wisdom and thought of God is not sufficient to include all things at one instant under His care. If only you would copy your own behavior where human beings are concerned. It is by acts of service and of kindness that you discover which of your fellows are willing to requite you in kind. It is by taking another into your counsel that you arrive at the secret of his wisdom. If, on like principle, you will but make trial of the gods by acts of service, whether they will choose to give you counsel in matters obscure to mortal vision, you shall discover the nature and the greatness of Godhead to be such that they are able at once to see all things and to hear all things and to be present everywhere, nor does the least thing escape their watchful care.

To my mind the effect of words like these was to cause those about him to hold aloof from unholiness, baseness, and injustice, not only while they were seen of men, but even in the solitary place, since they must believe that no part of their conduct could escape the eye of Heaven.

V

I suppose it may be taken as admitted that self-control is a noble acquirement for a man. If so, let us turn and consider whether by language like the following he was likely to lead his listeners onwards to the attainment of this virtue. "Sirs," he would say, "if a war came upon us and we wished to choose a man who would best help us to save ourselves and to subdue our enemy, I suppose we should scarcely select one whom we knew to be a slave to his belly, to wine, or lust, and prone to succumb to toil or sleep. Could we expect such an one to save us or to master our foes? Or if one of us were nearing the end of his days, and he wished to discover some one to whom he might entrust his sons for education, his maiden daughters for protection, and his property in general for preservation, would he deem a libertine worthy of such offices? Why, no one would dream of entrusting his flocks and herds, his storehouses and barns, or the superintendence of his works to the tender mercies of an intemperate slave. If a butler or an errand boy with such a character were offered to us we would not take him as a free gift. And if he would not accept an intemperate slave, what pains should the master himself take to avoid that imputation. For with the incontinent man it is not as with the self-seeker and the covetous. These may at any rate be held to enrich themselves in depriving others. But the intemperate man cannot claim in like fashion to be a blessing to himself if a curse to his neighbors; nay, the mischief which he may cause to others is nothing by comparison with that which redounds against himself, since

it is the height of mischief to ruin—I do not say one's own house and property—but one's own body and one's own soul. Or to take an example from social intercourse, no one cares for a guest who evidently takes more pleasure in the wine and the viands than in the friends beside him—who stints his comrades of the affection due to them to dote upon a mistress. Does it not come to this, that every honest man is bound to look upon self-restraint as the very corner-stone of virtue: which he should seek to lay down as the basis and foundation of his soul? Without self-restraint who can lay any good lesson to heart or practice it when learnt in any degree worth speaking of? Or, to put it conversely, what slave of pleasure will not suffer degeneracy of soul and body? By Hera, well may every free man pray to be saved from the service of such a slave; and well too may he who is in bondage to such pleasures supplicate Heaven to send him good masters, seeing that is the one hope of salvation left him."

Well-tempered words: yet his self-restraint shone forth even more in his acts than in his language. Not only was he master over the pleasures which flow from the body, but of those also which are fed by riches, his belief being that he who receives money from this or that chance donor sets up over himself a master, and binds himself to an abominable slavery.

VI

In this context some discussions with Antiphon the sophist deserve record. Antiphon approaches Socrates in hope of drawing away his associates, and in their presence thus accosts him.

Antiphon. Why, Socrates, I always thought it was expected of students of philosophy to grow in happiness daily; but you seem to have reaped other fruits from your

philosophy. At any rate, you exist, I do not say live, in a style such as no slave serving under a master would put up with. Your meat and your drink are of the cheapest sort, and as to clothes, you cling to one wretched cloak which serves you for summer and winter alike; and so you go the whole year round, without shoes to your feet or a shirt to your back. Then again, you are not for taking or making money, the mere seeking of which is a pleasure, even as the possession of it adds to the sweetness and independence of existence. I do not know whether you follow the common rule of teachers, who try to fashion their pupils in imitation of themselves, and propose to mould the characters of your companions; but if you do you ought to dub yourself professor of the art of wretchedness.

Thus challenged, Socrates replied: One thing to me is certain, Antiphon; you have conceived so vivid an idea of my life of misery that for yourself you would choose death sooner than live as I do. Suppose now we turn and consider what it is you find so hard in my life. Is it that he who takes payment must as a matter of contract finish the work for which he is paid, whereas I, who do not take it, lie under no constraint to discourse except with whom I choose? Do you despise my dietary on the ground that the food which I eat is less wholesome and less strengthening than yours, or that the articles of my consumption are so scarce and so much costlier to procure than yours? Or have the fruits of your marketing a flavor denied to mine? Do you not know the sharper the appetite the less the need of sauces, the keener the thirst the less the desire for out-of-the-way drinks? And as to raiment, clothes, you know, are changed on account of cold or else of heat. People only wear boots and shoes in order not to gall their feet and be prevented walking. Now I ask you, have you ever noticed that I keep more within doors than others on account of the cold? Have you ever seen me

battling with any one for shade on account of the heat? Do you not know that even a weakling by nature may, by dint of exercise and practice, come to outdo a giant who neglects his body? He will beat him in the particular point of training, and bear the strain more easily. But you apparently will not have it that I, who am for ever training myself to endure this, that, and the other thing which may befall the body, can brave all hardships more easily than yourself for instance, who perhaps are not so practiced. And to escape slavery to the belly or to sleep or lechery, can you suggest more effective means than the possession of some powerful attraction, some counter-charm which shall gladden not only in the using, but by the hope enkindled of its lasting usefulness? And yet this you do know; joy is not to him who feels that he is doing well in nothing—it belongs to one who is persuaded that things are progressing with him, be it tillage or the working of a vessel, or any of the thousand and one things on which a man may chance to be employed. To him it is given to rejoice as he reflects, “I am doing well.” But is the pleasured derived from all these put together half as joyous as the consciousness of becoming better oneself, of acquiring better and better friends? That, for my part, is the belief I continue to cherish.

Again, if it be a question of helping one's friends or country, which of the two will have the larger leisure to devote to these objects—he who leads the life which I lead to-day, or he who lives in the style which you deem so fortunate? Which of the two will adopt a soldier's life more easily—the man who cannot get on without expensive living, or he to whom whatever comes to hand suffices? Which will be the readier to capitulate and cry “mercy” in a siege—the man of elaborate wants, or he who can get along happily with the readiest things to hand? You, Antiphon, would seem to suggest that happiness consists of luxury and extravagance;

I hold a different creed. To have no wants at all is, to my mind, an attribute of Godhead; to have as few wants as possible the nearest approach to Godhead; and as that which is divine is mightiest, so that is next mightiest which comes closest to the divine.

Returning to the charge at another time, this same Antiphon engaged Socrates in conversation thus.

Ant. Socrates, for my part, I believe you to be a good and upright man; but for your wisdom I cannot say much. I fancy you would hardly dispute the verdict yourself, since, as I remark, you do not ask a money payment for your society; and yet if it were your cloak now, or your house, or any other of your possessions, you would set some value upon it, and never dream, I will not say of parting with it gratis, but of exchanging it for less than its worth. A plain proof, to my mind, that if you thought your society worth anything, you would ask for it not less than its equivalent in gold. Hence the conclusion to which I have come, as already stated: good and upright you may be, since you do not cheat people from pure selfishness; but wise you cannot be, since your knowledge is not worth a cent.

To this onslaught Socrates: Antiphon, it is a tenet which we cling to that beauty and wisdom have this in common, that there is a fair way and a foul way in which to dispose of them. The vendor of beauty purchases an evil name, but supposing the same person has discerned a soul of beauty in his lover and makes that man his friend, we regard his choice as sensible. So is it with wisdom; he who sells it for money to the first bidder we name a sophist, as though one should say a man who prostitutes his wisdom; but if the same man, discerning the noble nature of another, shall teach that other every good thing, and make him his friend, of such a one we say he does that which it is the duty of every good citizen of gentle soul to do. In accordance with

this theory, I too, Antiphon, having my tastes, even as another finds pleasure in his horse and his hounds, and another in his fighting cocks, so I too take my pleasure in good friends; and if I have any good thing myself I teach it them, or I commend them to others by whom I think they will be helped forwards on the path of virtue. The treasures also of the wise of old, written and bequeathed in their books, I unfold and peruse in common with my friends. If our eye light upon any good thing we cull it eagerly, and regard it as great gain if we may but grow in friendship with one another.

As I listened to this talk I could not but reflect that he, the master, was a person to be envied, and that we, his hearers, were being led by him to beauty and nobility of soul.

Again on some occasion the same Antiphon asked Socrates how he expected to make politicians of others when, even if he had the knowledge, he did not engage in politics himself.

Socrates replied: I will put to you a question, Antiphon: Which were the more statesmanlike proceeding, to practice politics myself single-handed, or to devote myself to making as many others as possible fit to engage in that pursuit?

VII

Let us here turn and consider whether by deterring his associates from quackery and false seeming he did not directly stimulate them to the pursuit of virtue. He used often to say there was no better road to renown than the one by which a man became good at that wherein he desired to be reputed good. The truth of the concept he enforced as follows: “Let us reflect on what a man would be driven to do who wanted to be thought a good flute player, without really being so. He would be forced to imitate the good flute player in the externals of his art, would he not? and first or all,

seeing that these artists always have a splendid equipment, and travel about with a long train of attendants, he must have the same; in the next place, they can command the plaudits of a multitude, he therefore must pack a conclave of clackers. But one thing is clear: nothing must induce him to give a performance, or he will be exposed at once, and find himself a laughing-stock not only as a sorry sort of flute player, but as a wretched imposter. And now he has a host of expenses to meet; and not one advantage to be reaped; and worse than all his evil reputation. What is left him but to lead a life stale and unprofitable, the scorn and mockery of men? Let us try another case. Suppose a man wished to be thought a good general or a good pilot, though he were really nothing of the sort, let us picture to our minds how it will fare with him. Of two misfortunes one: either with a strong desire to be thought proficient in these matters, he will fail to get others to agree with him, which will be bad enough; or he will succeed, with worse result; since it stands to reason that anyone appointed to work a vessel or lead an army without the requisite knowledge will speedily ruin a number of people whom he least desires to hurt, and will make but a sorry exit from the stage himself." Thus first by one instance and then another would he demonstrate the unprofitableness of trying to appear rich, or courageous, or strong, without really being the thing pretended. "You are sure sooner or later to have commands laid upon you beyond your power to execute, and failing just where you are credited with capacity, the world will give you no commiseration." "I call that man a cheat, and a great cheat too," he would say, "who gets money or goods out of some one by persuasion, and defrauds him; but of all imposters he surely is the biggest who can delude people into thinking that he is fit to lead the state, when all the while he is a worthless creature."

BOOK II

I

Now, if the effect of such discourses was, as I imagine, to deter his hearers from the paths of quackery and false-seeming, so I am sure that language like the following was calculated to stimulate his followers to practice self-control and endurance: self-control in the matters of eating, drinking, sleeping, and the cravings of lust; endurance of cold and heat and toil and pain. He had noticed the undue license which one of his acquaintances allowed himself in all such matters. Accordingly he thus addressed him:

Tell me, Aristippus (Socrates said), supposing you had two children entrusted to you to educate, one of them must be brought up with an aptitude for government, and the other without the faintest propensity to rule—how would you educate them? What do you say? Shall we begin our inquiry from the beginning, as it were, with the bare elements of food and nutriment?

Ar. Yes, food to begin with, by all means, being a first principle, without which there is no man living but would perish.

Soc. Well, then, we may expect, may we not, that a desire to grasp food at certain seasons will exhibit itself in both the children?

Ar. It is to be expected.

Soc. Which, then, of the two must be trained, of his own free will, to prosecute a pressing business rather than gratify the belly?

Ar. No doubt the one who is being trained to govern, if we would not have affairs of state neglected during his government.

Soc. And the same pupil must be furnished with a power of holding out against thirst also when the craving to quench it comes upon him?

Ar. Certainly he must.

Soc. And on which of the two shall we confer such self-control in regard to sleep as shall enable him to rest late and rise early, or keep vigil, if the need arise?

Ar. To the same one of the two must be given that endurance also.

Soc. Well, and a continence in regard to matters sexual so great that nothing of the sort shall prevent him from doing his duty? Which of them claims that?

Ar. The same one of the pair again.

Soc. Well, and on which of the two shall be bestowed, as a further gift, the voluntary resolution to face toils rather than turn and flee from them?

Ar. This, too, belongs of right to him who is being trained for government.

Soc. Well, and to which of them will it better accord to be taught all knowledge necessary towards the mastery of antagonists?

Ar. To our future ruler certainly, for without these parts of learning all his other capacities will be merely waste.

Soc. Will not a man so educated be less liable to be entrapped by rival powers, and so escape a common fate of living creatures, some of which (as we all know) are hooked through their own greediness, and often even in spite of a native shyness; but through appetite for food they are drawn towards the bait, and are caught; while others are similarly ensnared by drink?

Ar. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And others again are victims of amorous heat, as quails, for instance, or partridges, which, at the cry of the hen-bird, with lust and expectation of such joys grow wild, and lose their power of computing dangers: on they rush, and fall into the snare of the hunter?

Aristippus assented.

Soc. And would it not seem to be a base thing for a man to be affected like the silliest bird or beast? as when the adulterer invades the innermost sanctum of the house, though he is well aware of the risks which his crime involves, the formidable penalties of the law, the danger of being caught in the toils, and then suffering the direst contumely. Considering all the hideous penalties which hang over the adulterer's head, considering also the many means at hand to release him from the thralldom of his passion, that a man should so drive headlong on to the quicksand of perdition—what are we to say of such frenzy? The wretch who can so behave must surely be tormented by an evil spirit?

Ar. So it strikes me.

Soc. And does it not strike you as a sign of strange indifference that, whereas the greater number of the indispensable affairs of men, as for instance, those of war and agriculture, and more than half the rest, need to be conducted under the broad canopy of heaven, yet the majority of men are quite untrained to wrestle with cold and heat?

Aristippus again assented.

Soc. And do you not agree that he who is destined to rule must train himself to bear these things lightly?

Ar. Most certainly.

Soc. And while we rank those who are self-disciplined in all these matters among persons fit to rule, we are bound to

place those incapable of such conduct in the category of persons without any pretension whatsoever to be rulers?

Ar. I assent.

Soc. Well, then, since you know the rank peculiar to either section of mankind, did it ever strike you to consider to which of the two you are best entitled to belong?

Yes I have (replied Aristippus). I do not dream for a moment of ranking myself in the class of those who wish to rule. In fact, considering how serious a business it is to cater for one's own private needs, I look upon it as the mark of a fool not to be content with that, but to further saddle oneself with the duty of providing the rest of the community with whatever they may be pleased to want. That, at the cost of much personal enjoyment, a man should put himself at the head of a state, and then, if he fail to carry through every jot and title of that state's desire, be held to criminal account, does seem to me the very extravagance of folly. Why, bless me! states claim to treat their rulers precisely as I treat my domestic slaves. I expect my attendants to furnish me with an abundance of necessaries, but not to lay a finger on one of them themselves. So these states regard it as the duty of a ruler to provide them with all the good things imaginable, but to keep his own hands off them all the while. So then, for my part, if anybody desires to have a heap of pother himself, and be a nuisance to the rest of the world, I will educate him in the manner suggested, and he shall take his place among those who are fit to rule; but for myself, I beg to be enrolled amongst those who wish to spend their days as easily and pleasantly as possible.

Soc. Shall we then at this point turn and inquire which of the two are likely to lead the pleasanter life, the rulers or the ruled?

Ar. By all means let us do so.

Soc. To begin then with the nations and races known to ourselves. In Asia the Persians are the rulers, while the Syrians, Phrygians, Lydians are ruled; and in Europe we find the Scythians ruling, and the Maeotians being ruled. In Africa the Carthaginians are rulers, the Libyans ruled. Which of these two sets respectively leads the happier life, in your opinion? Or, to come nearer home—you are yourself a Hellene—which among Hellenes enjoy the happier existence, think you, the dominant or the subject states?

Nay, I would have you to understand (exclaimed Aristippus) that I am just as far from placing myself in the ranks of slavery; there is, I take it, a middle path between the two which it is my ambition to tread, avoiding rule and slavery alike; it lies through freedom—the high road which leads to happiness.

Soc. True, if only your path could avoid human beings, as it avoids rule and slavery, there would be something in what you say. But being placed as you are amidst human beings, if you purpose neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not mean to dance attendance, if you can help it, on those who rule, you must surely see that the stronger have an art to seat the weaker on the stool of repentance both in public and in private, and to treat them as slaves. I daresay you have not failed to note this common case: a set of people has sown and planted, whereupon in comes another set and cuts their corn and fells their fruit-trees, and in every way lays siege to them because, though weaker, they refuse to pay them proper court, till at length they are persuaded to accept slavery rather than war against their betters. And in private life also, you will bear me out, the brave and powerful are known to reduce the helpless and cowardly to bondage, and to make no small profit out of their victims.

Ar. Yes, but I must tell you I have a simple remedy against all such misadventures. I do not confine myself to any single civil community. I roam the wide world a foreigner.

Soc. Well, now, that is a masterly stroke, upon my word! Of course, ever since the decease of Sinis, and Sciron, and Procrustes, foreign travelers have had an easy time of it. But still, if I bethink me, even in these modern days the members of free communities do pass laws in their respective countries for self-protection against wrong-doing. Over and above their personal connections, they provide themselves with a host of friends; they gird their cities about with walls and battlements; they collect armaments to ward off evil-doers; and to make security doubly sure, they furnish themselves with allies from foreign states. In spite of all which defensive machinery these same free citizens do occasionally fall victims to injustice. But you, who are without any of these aids; you, who pass half your days on the high roads where iniquity is rife; you, who, into whatever city you enter, are less than the least of its free members, and moreover are just the sort of person whom any one bent on mischief would single out for attack—yet you, with your foreigner's passport, are to be exempt from injury? So you flatter yourself. And why? Will the state authorities cause proclamation to be made on your behalf: “The person of this man Aristippus is secure; let his going out and his coming in be free from danger”? Is that the ground of your confidence? or do you rather rest secure in the consciousness that you would prove such a slave as no master would care to keep? For who would care to have in his house a fellow with so slight a disposition to work and so strong a propensity to extravagance? Suppose we stop and consider that very point: how do masters deal with that sort of domestic? If I am not mistaken, they chastise his wantonness by starvation; they balk his thieving tendencies

by bars and bolts where there is anything to steal; they hinder him from running away by bonds and imprisonment; they drive the sluggishness out of him with the lash. Is it not so? Or how do you proceed when you discover the like tendency in one of your domestics?

Ar. I correct them with all the plagues, till I force them to serve me properly. But, Socrates, to return to your pupil educated in the royal art, which, if I mistake not, you hold to be happiness: how, may I ask, will he be better off than others who lie in evil case, in spite of themselves, simply because they suffer perforce, but in his case the hunger and the thirst, the cold shivers and the lying awake at nights, with all the changes he will ring on pain, are of his own choosing? For my part I cannot see what difference it makes, provided it is one and the same bare back which receives the stripes, whether the whipping be self-appointed or unasked for; nor indeed does it concern my body in general, provided it be my body, whether I am beleaguered by a whole armament of such evils of my own will or against my will—except only for the folly which attaches to self-appointed suffering.

Soc. What, Aristippus, does it not seem to you that, as regards such matters, there is all the difference between voluntary and involuntary suffering, in that he who starves of his own accord can eat when he chooses, and he who thirsts of his own free will can drink, and so for the rest; but he who suffers in these ways perforce cannot desist from the suffering when the humor takes him? Again, he who suffers hardship voluntarily, gaily confronts his troubles, being buoyed on hope—just as a hunter in pursuit of wild beasts, through hope of capturing his quarry, finds toil a pleasure—and these are but prizes of little worth in return for their labors; but what shall we say of their reward who toil to obtain to themselves good friends, or to subdue their

enemies, or that through strength of body and soul they may administer their households well, befriend their friends, and benefit the land which gave them birth? Must we not suppose that these too will take their sorrows lightly, looking to these high ends? Must we not suppose that they too will gaily confront existence, who have to support them not only their conscious virtue, but the praise and admiration of the world? And once more, habits of indolence, along with the fleeting pleasures of the moment, are incapable, as gymnastic trainers say, of setting up a good habit of body, or of implanting in the soul any knowledge worthy of account; whereas by painstaking Endeavour in the pursuit of high and noble deeds, as good men tell us, through endurance we shall in the end attain the goal. So Hesiod somewhere says:

Wickedness may a man take wholesale with ease, smooth is the way and her dwelling-place is very nigh; but in front of virtue the immortal gods have placed toil and sweat, long is the path and steep that leads to her, and rugged at the first, but when the summit of the pass is reached, then for all its roughness the path grows easy.

And again in another passage he exclaims:

Set not your heart on soft things, you knave, lest you light upon the hard.

And that wise man Prodicus delivers himself in a like strain concerning virtue in that composition of his about Heracles, which crowds have listened to. This, as far as I can recollect it, is the substance at least of what he says:

“When Heracles was emerging from boyhood into the bloom of youth, having reached that season in which the young man, now standing upon the verge of independence, shows plainly whether he will enter upon the path of virtue or of vice, he went forth into a quiet place, and sat debating with himself which of those two paths he should pursue; and

as he there sat musing, there appeared to him two women of great stature which drew nigh to him. The one was fair to look upon, frank and free by gift of nature, her limbs adorned with purity and her eyes with bashfulness; sobriety set the rhythm of her gait, and she was clad in white apparel. The other was of a different type; the fleshy softness of her limbs betrayed her nurture, while the complexion of her skin was embellished that she might appear whiter and rosier than she really was, and her figure that she might seem taller than nature made her; she stared with wide-open eyes, and the raiment wherewith she was clad served but to reveal the ripeness of her bloom. With frequent glances she surveyed her person, or looked to see if others noticed her; while ever and anon she fixed her gaze upon the shadow of herself intently.

“Now when these two had drawn near to Heracles, she who was first named advanced at an even pace towards him, but the other, in her eagerness to outstrip her, ran forward to the youth, exclaiming, 'I see you, Heracles, in doubt and difficulty what path of life to choose; make me your friend, and I will lead you to the pleasantest road and easiest. This I promise you: you shall taste all of life's sweets and escape all bitters. In the first place, you shall not trouble your brain with war or business; other topics shall engage your mind; your only speculation, what meat or drink you shall find agreeable to your palate; what delight of ear or eye; what pleasure of smell or touch; what darling lover's intercourse shall most enrapture you; how you shall pillow your limbs in softest slumber; how cull each individual pleasure without alloy of pain; and if ever the suspicion steal upon you that the stream of joys will one day dwindle, trust me I will not lead you where you shall replenish the store by toil of body and trouble of soul. No! others shall labor, but you shall reap the fruit of their labors; you shall withhold your

hand from naught which shall bring you gain. For to all my followers I give authority and power to help themselves freely from every side.'

"Heracles hearing these words made answer: 'What, O lady, is the name you bear?' To which she: 'Know that my friends call be Happiness, but they that hate me have their own nicknames for me, Vice and Naughtiness.'

"But just then the other of those fair women approached and spoke: 'Heracles, I too am come to you, seeing that your parents are well known to me, and in your nurture I have gauged your nature; wherefore I entertain good hope that if you choose the path which leads to me, you shall greatly bestir yourself to be the doer of many a doughty deed of noble emprise; and that I too shall be held in even higher honor for your sake, lit with the luster shed by valorous deeds. I will not cheat you with preluding of pleasure, but I will relate to you the things that are according to the ordinances of God in very truth. Know then that among things that are lovely and of good report, not one have the gods bestowed upon mortal men apart from toil and pains. Would you obtain the favour of the gods, then must you pay these same gods service; would you be loved by your friends, you must benefit these friends; do you desire to be honored by the state, you must give the state your aid; do you claim admiration for your virtue from all Hellas, you must strive to do some good to Hellas; do you wish earth to yield her fruits to you abundantly, to earth must you pay your court; do you seek to amass riches from your flocks and herds, on them must you bestow your labor; or is it your ambition to be potent as a warrior, able to save your friends and to subdue your foes, then must you learn the arts of war from those who have the knowledge, and practice their application in the field when learned; or would you even be powerful of limb

and body, then must you habituate limbs and body to obey the mind, and exercise yourself with toil and sweat.'

"At this point, (as Prodicus relates) Vice broke in exclaiming: 'See you, Heracles, how hard and long the road is by which yonder woman would escort you to her festal joys. But I will guide you by a short and easy road to happiness.'

"Then spoke Virtue: 'Nay, wretched one, what good thing have you? or what sweet thing art you acquainted with—that will stir neither hand nor foot to gain it? You, that may not even await the desire of pleasure, but, or ever that desire springs up, are already satiated; eating before you hunger, and drinking before you thirst; who to eke out an appetite must invent an army of cooks and confectioners; and to whet your thirst must lay down costliest wines, and run up and down in search of ice in summer-time; to help your slumbers soft coverlets suffice not, but couches and feather-beds must be prepared thee and rockers to rock thee to rest; since desire for sleep in your case springs not from toil but from vacuity and nothing in the world to do. Even the natural appetite of love you force prematurely by every means you may devise, confounding the sexes in your service. Thus you educate your friends: with insult in the night season and drowse of slumber during the precious hours of the day. Immortal, you art cast forth from the company of gods, and by good men art dishonored: that sweetest sound of all, the voice of praise, has never thrilled your ears; and the fairest of all fair visions is hidden from your eyes that have never beheld one bounteous deed wrought by your own hand. If you open your lips in speech, who will believe your word? If you have need of aught, none shall satisfy thee. What sane man will venture to join your rabble rout? Ill indeed are your revelers to look upon, young men impotent of body, and old men witless in mind: in the heyday of life they batten in sleek

idleness, and wearily do they drag through an age of wrinkled wretchedness: and why? they blush with shame at the thought of deeds done in the past, and groan for weariness at what is left to do. During their youth they ran riot through their sweet things, and laid up for themselves large store of bitterness against the time of old. But my companionship is with the gods; and with the good among men my conversation; no bounteous deed, divine or human, is wrought without my aid. Therefore am I honored in Heaven pre-eminently, and upon earth among men whose right it is to honor me; as a beloved fellow-worker of all craftsmen; a faithful guardian of house and lands, whom the owners bless; a kindly helpmeet of servants; a brave assistant in the labors of peace; an unflinching ally in the deeds of war; a sharer in all friendships indispensable. To my friends is given an enjoyment of meats and drinks, which is sweet in itself and devoid of trouble, in that they can endure until desire ripens, and sleep more delicious visits them than those who toil not. Yet they are not pained to part with it; nor for the sake of slumber do they let slip the performance of their duties. Among my followers the youth delights in the praises of his elders, and the old man glories in the honor of the young; with joy they call to memory their deeds of old, and in to-day's well-doing are well pleased. For my sake they are dear in the sight of God, beloved of their friends and honored by the country of their birth. When the appointed goal is reached they lie not down in oblivion with dishonor, but bloom afresh—their praise resounded on the lips of men for ever. Toils like these, O son of noble parents, Heracles, it is yours to meet with, and having endured, to enter into the heritage assured you of transcendent happiness.'"

This, Aristippus, in rough sketch is the theme which Prodicus pursues in his "Education of Heracles by Virtue,"

only he decked out his sentiments, I admit, in far more magnificent phrases than I have ventured on. Were it not well, Aristippus, to lay to heart these sayings, and to strive to bethink you somewhat of that which touches the future of our life?

II

At another time, he had noticed the angry temper shown by Lamprocles, the elder of his sons, towards their mother, and thus addressed himself to the lad.

Soc. Pray, my son, did you ever hear of certain people being called ungrateful?

That I have (replied the young man).

Soc. And have you understood what it is they do to get that bad name?

Lamp. Yes, I have: when any one has been kindly treated, and has it in his power to requite the kindness but neglects to do so, men call him ungrateful.

Soc. And you admit that people reckon the ungrateful among wrongdoers?

Lamp. I do.

Soc. And has it ever struck you to inquire whether, as regards the right or wrong of it, ingratitude may not perhaps resemble some such conduct as the enslavement, say, of prisoners, which is accounted wrong towards friends but justifiable towards enemies?

Lamp. Yes, I have put that question to myself. In my opinion, no matter who confers the kindness, friend or foe, the recipient should Endeavour to requite it, failing which he is a wrongdoer.

Soc. Then if that is how the matter stands, ingratitude would be an instance of pure unadulterate wrongdoing?

Lamprocles assented to the proposition.

Soc. It follows, then, that in proportion to the greatness of the benefit conferred, the greater his misdoing who fails to requite the kindness?

Lamprocles again assented.

Socrates continued: And where can we hope to find greater benefits than those which children derive from their parents—their father and mother who brought them out of nothingness into being, who granted them to look upon all these fair sights, and to partake of all those blessings which the gods bestow on man, things so priceless in our eyes that one and all we shudder at the thought of leaving them, and states have made death the penalty for the greatest crimes, because there is no greater evil through fear of which to stay iniquity.

You do not suppose that human beings produce children for the sake of carnal pleasure merely; were this the motive, street and bordello are full of means to quit them of that thrall; whereas nothing is plainer than the pains we take to seek out wives who shall bear us the finest children. With these we wed, and carry on the race. The man has a twofold duty to perform: partly in cherishing her who is to raise up children along with him, and partly towards the children yet unborn in providing them with things that he thinks will contribute to their well-being—and of these as large a store as possible. The woman, conceiving, bears her precious burthen with travail and pain, and at the risk of life itself—sharing with that within her womb the food on which she herself is fed. And when with much labor she has borne to the end and brought forth her offspring, she feeds it and watches over it with tender care—not in return for any good thing previously received, for indeed the babe itself is little conscious of its benefactor and cannot even signify its wants; only she, the mother, making conjecture of what is good for it, and what will please it, essays to satisfy it; and

for many months she feeds it night and day, enduring the toil nor reckoning what return she shall receive for all her trouble. Nor does the care and kindness of parents end with nurture; but when the children seem of an age to learn, they teach them themselves whatever cunning they possess, as a guide to life, or where they feel that another is more competent, to him they send them to be taught at their expense. Thus they watch over their children, doing all in their power to enable them to grow up to be as good as possible.

So be it (the youth answered); but even if she have done all that, and twenty times as much, no soul on earth could endure my mother's cross-grained temper.

Then Socrates: Which, think you, would be harder to bear—a wild beast's savagery or a mother's?

Lamp. To my mind, a mother's—at least if she be such as mine.

Soc. Dear me! And has this mother ever done you any injury—such as people frequently receive from beasts, by bite or kick?

Lamp. If she has not done quite that, she uses words which any one would sooner sell his life than listen to.

Soc. And how many annoyances have you caused your mother, do you suppose, by fretfulness and peevishness in word and deed, night and day, since you were a little boy? How much sorrow and pain, when you were ill?

Lamp. Well, I never said or did anything to bring a blush to her cheeks.

Soc. No, come now! Do you suppose it is harder for you to listen to your mother's speeches than for actor to listen to actor on the tragic stage, when the floodgates of abuse are opened?

Lamp. Yes; for the simple reason that they know it is all talk on their parts. The inquisitor may cross-question, but he will not inflict a fine; the threatener may hurl his menaces, but he will do no mischief—that is why they take it all so easily.

Soc. Then ought you to fly into a passion, who know well enough that, whatever your mother says, she is so far from meaning you mischief that she is actually wishing blessings to descend upon you beyond all others? Or do you believe that your mother is really ill disposed towards you?

Lamp. No, I do not think that.

Soc. Then this mother, who is kindly disposed to you, and takes such tender care of you when you are ill to make you well again, and to see that you want for nothing which may help you; and, more than all, who is perpetually pleading for blessings in your behalf and offering her vows to Heaven—can you say of her that she is cross-grained and harsh? For my part, I think, if you cannot away with such a mother, you cannot away with such blessings either.

But tell me (he proceeded), do you owe service to any living being, think you? or are you prepared to stand alone? Prepared not to please or try to please a single soul? to follow none? To obey neither general nor ruler of any sort? Is that your attitude, or do you admit that you owe allegiance to somebody?

Lamp. Yes; certainly I owe allegiance.

Soc. May I take it that you are willing to please at any rate your neighbor, so that he may kindle a fire for you in your need, may prove himself a ready helpmate in good fortune, or if you chance on evil and are stumbling, may friendlily stand by your side to aid?

Lamp. I am willing.

Soc. Well, and what of that other chance companion—your fellow-traveler by land or sea? what of any others, you may light upon? is it indifferent to you whether these be friends or not, or do you admit that the goodwill of these is worth securing by some pains on your part?

Lamp. I do.

Soc. It stands thus then: you are prepared to pay attention to this, that, and the other stranger, but to your mother who loves you more than all else, you are bound to render no service, no allegiance? Do you not know that while the state does not concern itself with ordinary ingratitude or pass judicial sentence on it; while it overlooks the thanklessness of those who fail to make return for kindly treatment, it reserves its pains and penalties for the special case? If a man render not the service and allegiance due to his parents, on him the finger of the law is laid; his name is struck off the roll; he is forbidden to hold the archonship—which is as much as to say, “Sacrifices in behalf of the state offered by such a man would be no offerings, being tainted with impiety; nor could aught else be 'well and justly' performed of which he is the doer.” Heaven help us! If a man fail to adorn the sepulcher of his dead parents the state takes cognizance of the matter, and inquisition is made in the scrutiny of the magistrates. And as for you, my son, if you are in your sober senses, you will earnestly entreat your mother, lest the very gods take you to be an ungrateful being, and on their side also refuse to do you good; and you will beware of men also, lest they should perceive your neglect of your parents, and with one consent hold you in dishonor; and so you find yourself in a desert devoid of friends. For if once the notion be entertained that here is a man ungrateful to his parents, no one will believe that any kindness shown you would be other than thrown away.

III

At another time the differences between two brothers named Chaerephon and Chaerecrates, both well known to him, had drawn his attention; and on seeing the younger of the two he thus addressed him.

Soc. Tell me, Chaerecrates, you are not, I take it, one of those strange people who believe that goods are better and more precious than a brother; and that too although the former are but senseless chattels which need protection, the latter a sensitive and sensible being who can afford it; and what is more, he is himself alone, while as for them their name is legion. And here again is a marvelous thing: that a man should count his brother a loss, because the goods of his brother are not his; but he does not count his fellow-citizens loss, and yet their possessions are not his; only it seems in their case he has wits to see that to dwell securely with many and have enough is better than to own the whole wealth of a community and to live in dangerous isolation; but this same doctrine as applied to brothers they ignore. Again, if a man have the means, he will purchase domestic slaves, because he wants assistants in his work; he will acquire friends, because he needs their support; but this brother of his—who cares about brothers? It seems a friend may be discovered in an ordinary citizen, but not in a blood relation who is also a brother. And yet it is a great vantage-ground towards friendship to have sprung from the same loins and to have been suckled at the same breasts, since even among beasts a certain natural craving, and sympathy springs up between creatures reared together. Added to which, a man who has brothers commands more respect from the rest of the world than the man who has none, and who must fight his own battles.

Chaer. I daresay, Socrates, where the differences are not profound, reason would a man should bear with his brother, and not avoid him for some mere trifle's sake, for a brother

of the right sort is, as you say, a blessing; but if he be the very antithesis of that, why should a man lay his hand to achieve the impossible?

Soc. Well now, tell me, is there nobody whom Chaerephon can please any more than he can please yourself; or do some people find him agreeable enough?

Chaer. Nay, there you hit it. That is just why I have a right to detest him. He can be pleasing enough to others, but to me, whenever he appears on the scene, he is not a blessing—no! but by every manner of means the reverse.

Soc. May it not happen that just as a horse is no gain to the inexpert rider who essays to handle him, so in like manner, if a man tries to deal with his brother after an ignorant fashion, this same brother will kick?

Chaer. But is it likely now? How should I be ignorant of the art of dealing with my brother if I know the art of repaying kind words and good deeds in kind? But a man who tries all he can to annoy me by word and deed, I can neither bless nor benefit, and, what is more, I will not try.

Soc. Well now, that is a marvelous statement, Chaerecrates. Your dog, the serviceable guardian of your flocks, who will fawn and lick the hand of your shepherd, when you come near him can only growl and show his teeth. Well; you take no notice of the dog's ill-temper, you try to propitiate him by kindness; but your brother? If your brother were what he ought to be, he would be a great blessing to you—that you admit; and, as you further confess, you know the secret of kind acts and words, yet you will not set yourself to apply means to make him your best of friends.

Chaer. I am afraid, Socrates, that I have no wisdom or cunning to make Chaerephon bear himself towards me as he should.

Soc. Yet there is no need to apply any recondite or novel machinery. Only bait your hook in the way best known to yourself, and you will capture him; whereupon he will become your devoted friend.

Chaer. If you are aware that I know some love-charm, Socrates, of which I am the happy but unconscious possessor, pray make haste and enlighten me.

Soc. Answer me then. Suppose you wanted to get some acquaintance to invite you to dinner when he next keeps holy day, what steps would you take?

Chaer. No doubt I should set him a good example by inviting him myself on a like occasion.

Soc. And if you wanted to induce some friend to look after your affairs during your absence abroad, how would you achieve your purpose?

Chaer. No doubt I should present a precedent in undertaking to look after his in like circumstances.

Soc. And if you wished to get some foreign friend to take you under his roof while visiting his country, what would you do?

Chaer. No doubt I should begin by offering him the shelter of my own roof when he came to Athens, in order to enlist his zeal in furthering the objects of my visit; it is plain I should first show my readiness to do as much for him in a like case.

Soc. Why, it seems you are an adept after all in all the potions known to man, only you chose to conceal your knowledge all the while; or is it that you shrink from taking the first step because of the scandal you will cause by kindly advances to your brother? And yet it is commonly held to redound to a man's praise to have outstripped an enemy in mischief or a friend in kindness. Now if it seemed to me that Chaerephon were better fitted to lead the way towards this

friendship, I should have tried to persuade him to take the first step in winning your affection, but now I am persuaded the first move belongs to you, and to you the final victory.

Chaer. A startling announcement, Socrates, from your lips, and most unlike you, to bid me the younger take precedence of my elder brother. Why, it is contrary to the universal custom of mankind, who look to the elder to take the lead in everything, whether as a speaker or an actor.

Soc. How so? Is it not the custom everywhere for the younger to step aside when he meets his elder in the street and to give him place? Is he not expected to get up and offer him his seat, to pay him the honor of a soft couch, to yield him precedence in argument?

My good fellow, do not stand shilly-shallying, but put out your hand caressingly, and you will see the worthy soul will respond at once with alacrity. Do you not note your brother's character, proud and frank and sensitive to honor? He is not a mean and sorry rascal to be caught by a bribe—no better way indeed for such riff-raff. No! gentle natures need a finer treatment. You can best hope to work on them by affection.

Chaer. But suppose I do, and suppose that, for all my attempts, he shows no change for the better?

Soc. At the worst you will have shown yourself to be a good, honest, brotherly man, and he will appear as a sorry creature on whom kindness is wasted. But nothing of the sort is going to happen, as I conjecture. My belief is that as soon as he hears your challenge, he will embrace the contest; pricked on by emulous pride, he will insist upon getting the better of you in kindness of word and deed.

At present you two are in the condition of two hands formed by God to help each other, but which have let go their business and have turned to hindering one another all they can. You are a pair of feet fashioned on the Divine plan to

work together, but which have neglected this in order to trammel each other's gait. Now is it not insensate stupidity to use for injury what was meant for advantage? And yet in fashioning two brothers God intends them, methinks, to be of more benefit to one another than either two hands, or two feet, or two eyes, or any other of those pairs which belong to man from his birth. Consider how powerless these hands of ours if called upon to combine their action at two points more than a single fathom's length apart; and these feet could not stretch asunder even a bare fathom; and these eyes, for all the wide-reaching range we claim for them, are incapable of seeing simultaneously the back and front of an object at even closer quarters. But a pair of brothers, linked in bonds of amity, can work each for the other's good, though seas divide them.

IV

I have at another time heard him discourse on the kindred theme of friendship in language well calculated, as it seemed to me, to help a man to choose and also to use his friends aright.

He (Socrates) had often heard the remark made that of all possessions there is none equal to that of a good and sincere friend; but, in spite of this assertion, the mass of people, as far as he could see, concerned themselves about nothing so little as the acquisition of friends. Houses, and fields, and slaves, and cattle, and furniture of all sorts (he said) they were at pains to acquire, and they strove hard to keep what they had got; but to procure for themselves this greatest of all blessings, as they admitted a friend to be, or to keep the friends whom they already possessed, not one man in a hundred ever gave himself a thought. It was noticeable, in the case of a sickness befalling a man's friend and one of his own household simultaneously, the promptness with which the master would fetch the doctor to his domestic, and take

every precaution necessary for his recovery, with much expenditure of pains; but meanwhile little account would be taken of the friend in like condition, and if both should die, he will show signs of deep annoyance at the death of his domestic, which, as he reflects, is a positive loss to him; but as regards his friend his position is in no wise materially affected, and thus, though he would never dream of leaving his other possessions disregarded and ill cared for, friendship's mute appeal is met with flat indifference.

Or to take (said he) a crowning instance: with regard to ordinary possessions, however multifarious these may be, most people are at least acquainted with their number, but if you ask a man to enumerate his friends, who are not so very many after all perhaps, he cannot; or if, to oblige the inquirer, he essays to make a list, he will presently retract the names of some whom he had previously included. Such is the amount of thought which people bestow upon their friends.

And yet what thing else may a man call his own is comparable to this one best possession! what rather will not serve by contrast to enhance the value of an honest friend! Think of a horse or a yoke of oxen; they have their worth; but who shall gauge the worth of a worthy friend? Kindlier and more constant than the most faithful of slaves—this is that possession best named all-serviceable. Consider what the post is that he assigns himself! to meet and supplement what is lacking to the welfare of his friends, to promote their private and their public interests, is his concern. Is there need of kindly action in any quarter? he will throw in the full weight of his support. Does some terror confound? he is at hand to help and defend by expenditure of money and of energy, by appeals to reason or resort to force. His the privilege alike to gladden the prosperous in the hour of success and to sustain their footing who have well-nigh

slipped. All that the hands of a man may minister, all that the eyes of each are swift to see, the ears to hear, and the feet to compass, he with his helpful arts will not fall short of. Nay, not seldom that which a man has failed to accomplish for himself, has missed seeing or hearing or attaining, a friend acting in behalf of friend will achieve vicariously. And yet, albeit to try and tend a tree for the sake of its fruit is not uncommon, this copious mine of wealth—this friend—attracts only a lazy and listless attention on the part of more than half the world.

V

I remember listening to another argument of his, the effect of which would be to promote self-examination. The listener must needs be brought to ask himself, "Of what worth am I to my friends?" It happened thus. One of those who were with him was neglectful, as he noted, of a friend who was at the pinch of poverty (Antisthenes). Accordingly, in the presence of the negligent person and of several others, he proceeded to question the sufferer.

Soc. What say you, Antisthenes?—have friends their values like domestic slaves? One of these latter may be worth perhaps two minae, another only half a mina, a third five, and a fourth as much as ten; while they do say that Nicias, the son of Niceratus, paid a whole talent for a superintendent of his silver mines. And so I propound the question to myself as follows: "Have friends, like slaves, their market values?"

Not a doubt of it (replied Antisthenes). At any rate, I know that I would rather have such a one as my friend than be paid two minae, and there is such another whose worth I would not estimate at half a mina, and a third with whom I would not part for ten, and then again a fourth whose

friendship would be cheap if it cost me all the wealth and pains in the world to purchase it.

Well then (continued Socrates), if that be so, would it not be well if every one were to examine himself: "What after all may I chance to be worth to my friends?" Should he not try to become as dear as possible, so that his friends will not care to give him up? How often do I hear the complaint: "My friend So-and-so has given me up"; or "Such an one, whom I looked upon as a friend, has sacrificed me for a mina." And every time I hear these remarks, the question arises in my mind: If the vendor of a worthless slave is ready to part with him to a purchaser for what he will fetch—is there not at least a strong temptation to part with a base friend when you have a chance of making something on the exchange? Good slaves, as far as I can see, are not so knocked down to the hammer; no, nor good friends so lightly parted with.

VI

Again, in reference to the test to be applied, if we would gauge the qualifications of a friend worth the winning, the following remarks of Socrates could not fail, I think, to prove instructive.

Tell me (said Socrates, addressing Critobulus), supposing we stood in need of a good friend, how should we set about his discovery? We must, in the first place, I suppose, seek out one who is master of his appetites, not under the dominion, that is, of his belly, not addicted to the wine-cup or to lechery or sleep or idleness, since no one enslaved to such tyrants could hope to do his duty either by himself or by his friends, could he?

Certainly not (Critobulus answered).

Soc. Do you agree, then, that we must hold aloof from every one so dominated?

Cri. Most assuredly.

Well then (proceeded Socrates), what shall we say of the spendthrift who has lost his independence and is for ever begging of his neighbors; if he gets anything out of them he cannot repay, but if he fails to get anything, he hates you for not giving—do you not think that this man too would prove but a disagreeable friend?

Cri. Certainly.

Soc. Then we must keep away from him too?

Cri. That we must.

Soc. Well! and what of the man whose strength lies in monetary transactions? His one craving is to amass money; and for that reason he is an adept at driving a hard bargain—glad enough to take in, but loath to pay out.

Cri. In my opinion he will prove even a worse fellow than the last.

Soc. Well! and what of that other whose passion for money-making is so absorbing that he has no leisure for anything else, save how he may add to his gains?

Cri. Hold aloof from him, say I, since there is no good to be got out of him or his society.

Soc. Well! what of the quarrelsome and factious person whose main object is to saddle his friends with a host of enemies?

Cri. For God's sake let us avoid him also.

Soc. But now we will imagine a man exempt indeed from all the above defects—a man who has no objection to receive kindnesses, but it never enters into his head to do a kindness in return.

Cri. There will be no good in him either. But, Socrates, what kind of man shall we Endeavour to make our friend? what is he like?

Soc. I should say he must be just the converse of the above: he has control over the pleasures of the body, he is kindly disposed, upright in all his dealings, very zealous is he not to be outdone in kindness by his benefactors, if only his friends may derive some profit from his acquaintance.

Cri. But how are we to test these qualities, Socrates, before acquaintance?

Soc. How do we test the merits of a sculptor?—not by inferences drawn from the talk of the artist merely. No, we look to what he has already achieved. These former statues of his were nobly executed, and we trust he will do equally well with the rest.

Cri. You mean that if we find a man whose kindness to older friends is established, we may take it as proved that he will treat his newer friends as amiably?

Soc. Why, certainly, if I see a man who has shown skill in the handling of horses previously, I argue that he will handle others no less skillfully again.

Cri. Good! and when we have discovered a man whose friendship is worth having, how ought we to make him our friend?

Soc. First we ought to ascertain the will of Heaven whether it be advisable to make him our friend.

Cri. Well! and how are we to effect the capture of this friend of our choice, whom the gods approve? will you tell me that?

Not, in good sooth (replied Socrates), by running him down like a hare, nor by decoying him like a bird, or by force like a wild boar. To capture a friend against his will is a toilsome business, and to bind him in fetters like a slave by no means easy. Those who are so treated are apt to become foes instead of friends.

Cri. But how convert them into friends?

Soc. There are certain incantations, we are told, which those who know them have only to utter, and they can make friends of whom they list; and there are certain potions also which those who have the secret of them may administer to whom they like and win their love.

Cri. From what source shall we learn them?

Soc. You need not go farther than Homer to learn that which the Sirens sang to Odysseus, the first words of which run, I think, as follows:

Hither, come hither, you famous man, Odysseus, great glory of the Achaeans!

Cri. And did the magic words of this spell serve for all men alike? Had the Sirens only to utter this one incantation, and was every listener constrained to stay?

Soc. No; this was the incantation reserved for souls athirst for fame, of virtue emulous.

Cri. Which is as much as to say, we must suit the incantation to the listener, so that when he hears the words he shall not think that the enchanter is laughing at him in his sleeve. I cannot certainly conceive a method better calculated to excite hatred and repulsion than to go to some one who knows that he is small and ugly and a weakling, and to breathe in his ears the flattering tale that he is beautiful and tall and stalwart. But do you know any other love-charms, Socrates?

Soc. I cannot say that I do; but I have heard that Pericles was skilled in not a few, which he poured into the ear of our city and won her love.

Cri. And how did Themistocles win our city's love?

Soc. Ah, that was not by incantation at all. What he did was to encircle our city with an amulet of saving virtue.

Cri. You would imply, Socrates, would you not, that if we want to win the love of any good man we need to be good ourselves in speech and action?

And did you imagine (replied Socrates) that it was possible for a bad man to make good friends?

Cri. Why, I could fancy I had seen some sorry speech-monger who was fast friends with a great and noble statesman; or again, some born commander and general who was boon companion with fellows quite incapable of generalship.

Soc. But in reference to the point we were discussing, may I ask whether you know of any one who can attach a useful friend to himself without being of use in return? Can service ally in friendship with disservice?

Cri. In good sooth no. But now, granted it is impossible for a base man to be friends with the beautiful and noble, I am concerned at once to discover if one who is himself of a beautiful and noble character can, with a wave of the hand, as it were, attach himself in friendship to every other beautiful and noble nature.

Soc. What perplexes and confounds you, Critobulus, is the fact that so often men of noble conduct, with souls aloof from baseness, are not friends but rather at strife and discord with one another, and deal more harshly by one another than they would by the most good-for-nothing of mankind.

Cri. Yes, and this holds true not of private persons only, but states, the most eager to pursue a noble policy and to repudiate a base one, are frequently in hostile relation to one another. As I reason on these things my heart fails me, and the question, how friends are to be acquired, fills me with despondency. The bad, as I see, cannot be friends with one another. For how can such people, the ungrateful, or

reckless, or covetous, or faithless, or incontinent, adhere together as friends? Without hesitation I set down the bad as born to be foes not friends, and as bearing the birthmark of internecine hate. But then again, as you suggest, no more can these same people harmonies in friendship with the good. For how should they who do evil be friends with those who hate all evil-doing? And if, last of all, they that cultivate virtue are torn by party strife in their struggle for the headship of the states, envying one another, hating one another, who are left to be friends? where shall goodwill and faithfulness be found among men?

Soc. The fact is there is some subtlety in the texture of these things. Seeds of love are implanted in man by nature. Men have need of one another, feel pity, help each other by united efforts, and in recognition of the fact show mutual gratitude. But there are seeds of war implanted also. The same objects being regarded as beautiful or agreeable by all alike, they do battle for their possession; a spirit of disunion enters, and the parties range themselves in adverse camps. Discord and anger sound a note of war: the passion of more-having, staunchless avarice, threatens hostility; and envy is a hateful fiend.

But nevertheless, through all opposing barriers friendship steals her way and binds together the beautiful and good among mankind. Such is their virtue that they would rather possess scant means painlessly than wield an empire won by war. In spite of hunger and thirst they will share their meat and drink without a pang. Not bloom of lusty youth, nor love's delights can warp their self-control; nor will they be tempted to cause pain where pain should be unknown. It is theirs not merely to eschew all greed of riches, not merely to make a just and lawful distribution of wealth, but to supply what is lacking to the needs of one another. Theirs it is to compose strife and discord not in painless

oblivion simply, but to the general advantage. Theirs also to hinder such extravagance of anger as shall entail remorse hereafter. And as to envy they will make a clean sweep and clearance of it: the good things which a man possesses shall be also the property of his friends, and the goods which they possess are to be looked upon as his. Where then is the improbability that the beautiful and noble should be sharers in the honors of the state not only without injury, but even to their mutual advantage?

They indeed who covet and desire the honors and offices in a state for the sake of the liberty thereby given them to embezzle the public moneys, to deal violently by their fellow-creatures, and to batten in luxury themselves, may well be regarded as unjust and villainous persons incapable of harmony with one another. But if a man desire to obtain these selfsame honors in order that, being himself secure against wrong-doing, he may be able to assist his friends in what is right, and, raised to a high position, may essay to confer some blessing on the land of his fathers, what is there to hinder him from working in harmony with some other of a like spirit? Will he, with the "beautiful and noble" at his side, be less able to aid his friends? or will his power to benefit the community be shortened because the flower of that community are fellow-workers in that work? Why, even in the contests of the games it is obvious that if it were possible for the stoutest combatants to combine against the weakest, the chosen band would come off victors in every bout, and would carry off all the prizes. This indeed is against the rules of the actual arena; but in the field of politics, where the beautiful and good hold empery, and there is naught to hinder any from combining with whomsoever a man may choose to benefit the state, it will be a clear gain, will it not, for any one engaged in state affairs to make the best men his friends, whereby he will find

partners and co-operators in his aims instead of rivals and antagonists? And this at least is obvious: in case of foreign war a man will need allies, but all the more if in the ranks opposed to him should stand the flower of the enemy. Moreover, those who are willing to fight your battles must be kindly dealt with, that goodwill may quicken to enthusiasm; and one good man is better worth your benefiting that a dozen knaves, since a little kindness goes a long way with the good, but with the base the more you give them the more they ask for.

So keep a good heart, Critobulus; only try to become good yourself, and when you have attained, set to your hand to capture the beautiful and good. Perhaps I may be able to give you some help in this quest, being myself an adept in Love's lore. No matter who it is for whom my heart is aflame; in an instant my whole soul is eager to leap forth. With vehemence I speed to the mark. I, who love, demand to be loved again; this desire in me must be met by counter desire in him; this thirst for his society by thirst reciprocal for mine. And these will be your needs also, I foresee, whenever you are seized with longing to contract a friendship. Do not hide from me, therefore, whom you would choose as a friend, since, owing to the pains I take to please him who pleases me, I am not altogether unversed, I fancy, in the art of catching men.

Critobulus replied: Why, these are the very lessons of instruction, Socrates, for which I have been long athirst, and the more particularly if this same love's lore will enable me to capture those who are good of soul and those who are beautiful of person.

Soc. Nay, now I warn you, Critobulus, it is not within the province of my science to make the beautiful endure him who would lay hands upon them. And that is why men fled from Scylla, I am persuaded, because she laid hands upon them; but the Sirens were different—they laid hands on

nobody, but sat afar off and chanted their spells in the ears of all; and therefore, it is said, all men endured to listen, and were charmed.

Cri. I promise I will not lay violent hands on any; therefore, if you have any good device for winning friends, instruct your pupil.

Soc. And if there is to be no laying on of the hands, there must be no application either of the lips; is it agreed?

Cri. No, nor application of the lips to any one—not beautiful.

Soc. See now! you cannot open your mouth without some luckless utterance. Beauty suffers no such liberty, however eagerly the ugly may invite it, making believe some quality of soul must rank them with the beautiful.

Cri. Be of good cheer then; let the compact stand thus: “Kisses for the beautiful, and for the good a rain of kisses.” So now teach us the art of catching friends.

Soc. Well then, when you wish to win some one's affection, you will allow me to lodge information against you to the effect that you admire him and desire to be his friend?

Cri. Lodge the indictment, with all my heart. I never heard of any one who hated his admirers.

Soc. And if I add to the indictment the further charge that through your admiration you are kindly disposed towards him, you will not feel I am taking away your character?

Cri. Why, no; for myself I know a kindly feeling springs up in my heart towards any one whom I conceive to be kindly disposed to me.

Soc. All this I shall feel empowered to say about you to those whose friendship you seek, and I can promise further help; only there is a comprehensive “if” to be considered: if you will further authorize me to say that you are devoted to

your friends; that nothing gives you so much joy as a good friend; that you pride yourself no less on the fine deeds of those you love than on your own; and on their good things equally with your own; that you never weary of plotting and planning to procure them a rich harvest of the same; and lastly, that you have discovered a man's virtue is to excel his friends in kindness and his foes in hostility. If I am authorized thus to report of you, I think you will find me a serviceable fellow-hunter in the quest of friends, which is the conquest of the good.

Cri. Why this appeal to me?—as if you had not free permission to say exactly what you like about me.

Soc. No; that I deny, on the authority of Aspasia. I have it from her own lips. “Good matchmakers,” she said tome, “were clever hands at cementing alliances between people, provided the good qualities they vouched for were truthfully reported; but when it came to their telling lies, for her part she could not compliment them. Their poor deluded dupes ended by hating each other and the go-betweens as well.” Now I myself am so fully persuaded of the truth of this that I feel it is not in my power to say aught in your praise which I cannot say with truth.

Cri. Really, Socrates, you are a wonderfully good friend to me—in so far as I have any merit which will entitle me to win a friend, you will lend me a helping hand, it seems; otherwise you would rather not forge any petty fiction for my benefit.

Soc. But tell me, how shall I assist you best, think you? By praising you falsely or by persuading you to try to be a good man? Or if it is not plain to you thus, look at the matter by the light of some examples. I wish to introduce you to a ship-owner, or to make him your friend: I begin by singing your praises to him falsely thus, “You will find him a good pilot”; he catches at the phrase, and entrusts his ship to you,

who have no notion of guiding a vessel. What can you expect but to make shipwreck of the craft and yourself together? or suppose by similar false assertions I can persuade the state at large to entrust her destinies to you—"a man with a fine genius for command," I say, "a practiced lawyer," "a politician born," and so forth. The odds are, the state and you may come to grief through you. Or to take an instance from everyday life. By my falsehoods I persuade some private person to entrust his affairs to you as "a really careful and business-like person with a head for economy." When put to the test would not your administration prove ruinous, and the figure you cut ridiculous? No, my dear friend, there is but one road, the shortest, safest, best, and it is simply this: In whatsoever you desire to be deemed good, Endeavour to be good. For of all the virtues namable among men, consider, and you will find there is not one but may be increased by learning and practice. For my part then, Critobulus, these are the principles on which we ought to go a-hunting; but if you take a different view, I am all attention, please instruct me.

Then Critobulus: Nay, Socrates, I should be ashamed to gainsay what you have said; if I did, it would neither be a noble statement nor a true.

VII

He had two ways of dealing with the difficulties of his friends: where ignorance was the cause, he tried to meet the trouble by a dose of common sense; or where want and poverty were to blame, by lessoning them that they should assist one another according to their ability; and here I may mention certain incidents which occurred within my own knowledge. How, for instance, he chanced upon Aristarchus wearing the look of one who suffered from a fit of the "depression," and thus accosted him.

Soc. You seem to have some trouble on your mind, Aristarchus; if so, you should share it with your friends. Perhaps together we might lighten the weight of it a little.

Aristarchus answered: Yes, Socrates, I am in sore straits indeed. Ever since the party strife declared itself in the city, what with the rush of people to Piraeus, and the wholesale banishments, I have been fairly at the mercy of my poor deserted female relatives. Sisters, nieces, cousins, they have all come flocking to me for protection. I have fourteen free-born souls, I tell you, under my single roof, and how are we to live? We can get nothing out of the soil—that is in the hands of the enemy; nothing from my house property, for there is scarcely a living soul left in the city; my furniture? no one will buy it; money? there is none to be borrowed—you would have a better chance to find it by looking for it on the road than to borrow it from a banker. Yes, Socrates, to stand by and see one's relatives die of hunger is hard indeed, and yet to feed so many at such a pinch impossible.

After he listened to the story, Socrates asked: How comes it that Ceramon, with so many mouths to feed, not only contrives to furnish himself and them with the necessaries of life, but to realize a handsome surplus, while you being in like plight are afraid you will one and all perish of starvation for want of the necessaries of life?

Ar. Why, bless your soul, do you not see he has only slaves and I have free-born souls to feed?

Soc. And which should you say were the better human beings, the free-born members of your household or Ceramon's slaves?

Ar. The free souls under my roof without a doubt.

Soc. Is it not a shame, then, that he with his baser folk to back him should be in easy circumstances, while you and your far superior household are in difficulties?

Ar. To be sure it is, when he has only a set of handicraftsmen to feed, and I my liberally-educated household.

Soc. What is a handicraftsman? Does not the term apply to all who can make any sort of useful product or commodity?

Ar. Certainly.

Soc. Barley meal is a useful product, is it not?

Ar. Pre-eminently so.

Soc. And loaves of bread?

Ar. No less.

Soc. Well, and what do you say to cloaks for men and for women—tunics, mantles, vests?

Ar. Yes, they are all highly useful commodities.

Soc. Then your household do not know how to make any of these?

Ar. On the contrary, I believe they can make them all.

Soc. Then you are not aware that by means of the manufacture of one of these alone—his barley meal store—Nausicydes not only maintains himself and his domestics, but many pigs and cattle besides, and realizes such large profits that he frequently contributes to the state benevolences; while there is Cyrebus, again, who, out of a bread factory, more than maintains the whole of his establishment, and lives in the lap of luxury; and Demeas of Collytus gets a livelihood out of a cloak business, and Menon as a mantua-maker, and so, again, more than half the Megarians by the making of vests.

Ar. Bless me, yes! They have got a set of barbarian fellows, whom they purchase and keep, to manufacture by forced labor whatever takes their fancy. My kinswomen, I need not tell you, are free-born ladies.

Soc. Then, on the ground that they are free-born and your kinswomen, you think that they ought to do nothing but eat and sleep? Or is it your opinion that people who live in this way—I speak of free-born people in general—lead happier lives, and are more to be congratulated, than those who give their time and attention to such useful arts of life as they are skilled in? Is this what you see in the world, that for the purpose of learning what it is well to know, and of recollecting the lessons taught, or with a view to health and strength of body, or for the sake of acquiring and preserving all that gives life its charm, idleness and inattention are found to be helpful, while work and study are simply a dead loss? Pray, when those relatives of yours were taught what you tell me they know, did they learn it as barren information which they would never turn to practical account, or, on the contrary, as something with which they were to be seriously concerned some day, and from which they were to reap advantage? Do human beings in general attain to well-tempered manhood by a course of idling, or by carefully attending to what will be of use? Which will help a man the more to grow in justice and uprightness, to be up and doing, or to sit with folded hands revolving the ways and means of existence? As things now stand, if I am not mistaken, there is no love lost between you. You cannot help feeling that they are costly to you, and they must see that you find them a burthen? This is a perilous state of affairs, in which hatred and bitterness have every prospect of increasing, while the pre-existing bond of affection is likely to be snapped.

But now, if only you allow them free scope for their energies, when you come to see how useful they can be, you will grow quite fond of them, and they, when they perceive that they can please you, will cling to their benefactor warmly. Thus, with the memory of former kindnesses made

sweeter, you will increase the grace which flows from kindnesses tenfold; you will in consequence be knit in closer bonds of love and domesticity. If, indeed, they were called upon to do any shameful work, let them choose death rather than that; but now they know, it would seem, the very arts and accomplishments which are regarded as the loveliest and the most suitable for women; and the things which we know, any of us, are just those which we can best perform, that is to say, with ease and expedition; it is a joy to do them, and the result is beautiful. Do not hesitate, then, to initiate your friends in what will bring advantage to them and you alike; probably they will gladly respond to your summons.

Well, upon my word (Aristarchus answered), I like so well what you say, Socrates, that though hitherto I have not been disposed to borrow, knowing that when I had spent what I got I should not be in a condition to repay, I think I can now bring myself to do so in order to raise a fund for these works.

Thereupon a capital was provided; wools were purchased; the good man's relatives set to work, and even while they breakfasted they worked, and on and on till work was ended and they supped. Smiles took the place of frowns; they no longer looked askance with suspicion, but full into each other's eyes with happiness. They loved their kinsman for his kindness to them. He became attached to them as helpmates; and the end of it all was, he came to Socrates and told him with delight how matters fared; “and now,” he added, “they tax me with being the only drone in the house, who sit and eat the bread of idleness.”

To which Socrates: Why do not you tell them the fable of the dog? Once on a time, so goes the story, when beasts could speak, the sheep said to her master, “What a marvel is this, master, that to us, your own sheep, who provide you with fleeces and lambs and cheese, you give nothing, save only what we may nibble off earth's bosom; but with this dog

of yours, who provides you with nothing of the sort, you share the very meat out of your mouth." When the dog heard these words, he answered promptly, "Ay, in good sooth, for is it not I who keep you safe and sound, you sheep, so that you are not stolen by man nor harried by wolves; since, if I did not keep watch over you, you would not be able so much as to graze afield, fearing to be destroyed." And so, says the tale, the sheep had to admit that the dog was rightly preferred to themselves in honor. And so do you tell your flock yonder that like the dog in the fable you are their guardian and overseer, and it is thanks to you that they are protected from evil and evildoers, so that they work their work and live their lives in blissful security.

VIII

At another time chancing upon an old friend whom he had not seen for a long while, he greeted him thus.

Soc. What quarter of the world do you hail from, Eutherus?

The other answered: From abroad, just before the close of the war; but at present from the city itself. You see, since we have been denuded of our possessions across the frontier, and my father left me nothing in Attica, I must needs bide at home, and provide myself with the necessaries of life by means of bodily toil, which seems preferable to begging from another, especially as I have no security on which to raise a loan.

Soc. And how long do you expect your body to be equal to providing the necessaries of life for hire?

Euth. Goodness knows, Socrates—not for long.

Soc. And when you find yourself an old man, expenses will not diminish, and yet no one will care to pay you for the labor of your hands.

Euth. That is true.

Soc. Would it not be better then to apply yourself at once to such work as will stand you in good stead when you are old—that is, address yourself to some large proprietor who needs an assistant in managing his estate? By superintending his works, helping to get in his crops, and guarding his property in general, you will be a benefit to the estate and be benefited in return.

I could not endure the yoke of slavery, Socrates! (he exclaimed).

Soc. And yet the heads of departments in a state are not regarded as adopting the badge of slavery because they manage the public property, but as having attained a higher degree of freedom rather.

Euth. In a word, Socrates, the idea of being held to account to another is not at all to my taste.

Soc. And yet, Eutherus, it would be hard to find a work which did not involve some liability to account; in fact it is difficult to do anything without some mistake or other, and no less difficult, if you should succeed in doing it immaculately, to escape all unfriendly criticism. I wonder now whether you find it easy to get through your present occupations entirely without reproach. No? Let me tell you what you should do. You should avoid censorious persons and attach yourself to the considerate and kind-hearted, and in all your affairs accept with a good grace what you can and decline what you feel you cannot do. Whatever it be, do it heart and soul, and make it your finest work. There lies the method at once to silence fault-finders and to minister help to your own difficulties. Life will flow smoothly, risks will be diminished, provision against old age secured.

IX

At another time, as I am aware, he had heard a remark made by Crito that life at Athens was no easy matter for a man who wished to mind his own affairs.

As, for instance, at this moment (Crito proceeded) there are a set of fellows threatening me with lawsuits, not because they have any misdemeanor to allege against me, but simply under the conviction that I will sooner pay a sum of money than be troubled further.

To which Socrates replied: Tell me, Crito, you keep dogs, do you not, to ward off wolves from your flocks?

Cr. Certainly; it pays to do so.

Soc. Then why do you not keep a watchman willing and competent to ward off this pack of people who seek to injure you?

I should not at all mind (he answered), if I were not afraid he might turn again and rend his keeper.

What! (rejoined Socrates), do you not see that to gratify a man like yourself is far pleasanter as a matter of self-interest than to quarrel with you? You may be sure there are plenty of people here who will take the greatest pride in making you their friend.

Accordingly, they sought out Archedemus, a practical man with a clever tongue in his head but poor; the fact being, he was not the sort to make gain by hook or by crook, but a lover of honesty and of too good a nature himself to make his living as a pettifogger. Crito would then take the opportunity of times of harvesting and put aside small presents for Achedemus of corn and oil, or wine, or wool, or any other of the farm produce forming the staple commodities of life, or he would invite him to a sacrificial feast, and otherwise pay him marked attention. Archedemus, feeling that he had in Crito's house a harbor of refuge, could not make too much of his patron, and ere long

he had hunted up a long list of iniquities which could be lodged against Crito's pettifogging persecutors themselves, and not only their numerous crimes but their numerous enemies; and presently he prosecuted one of them in a public suit, where sentence would be given against him "what to suffer or what to pay." The accused, conscious as he was of many rascally deeds, did all he could to be quit of Archedemus, but Archedemus was not to be got rid of. He held on until he had made the informer not only loose his hold of Crito but pay himself a sum of money; and now that Archedemus had achieved this and other similar victories, it is easy to guess what followed. It was just as when some shepherd has got a very good dog, all the other shepherds wish to lodge their flocks in his neighborhood that they too may reap the benefit of him. So a number of Crito's friends came begging him to allow Archedemus to be their guardian also, and Archedemus was overjoyed to do something to gratify Crito, and so it came about that not only Crito abode in peace, but his friends likewise. If any of those people with whom Archedemus was not on the best of terms were disposed to throw it in his teeth that he accepted his patron's benefits and paid in flatteries, he had a ready retort: "Answer me this question—which is the more scandalous, to accept kindnesses from honest folk and to repay them, with the result that I make such people my friends but quarrel with knaves, or to make enemies of honorable gentlemen by attempts to do them wrong, with the off-chance indeed of winning the friendship of some scamps in return for my co-operation, but the certainty of losing in the tone of my acquaintances?"

The net result of the whole proceedings was that Archedemus was now Crito's right hand, and by the rest of Crito's friends he was held in honor.

X

Again I may cite, as known to myself, the following discussion; the arguments were addressed to Diodorus, one of his companions. The master said:

Tell me, Diodorus, if one of your slaves runs away, are you at pains to recover him?

More than that (Diodorus answered), I summon others to my aid and I have a reward cried for his recovery.

Soc. Well, if one of your domestics is sick, do you tend him and call in the doctors to save his life?

Diod. Decidedly I do.

Soc. And if an intimate acquaintance who is far more precious to you than any of your household slaves is about to perish of want, you would think it incumbent on you to take pains to save his life? Well! now you know without my telling you that Hermogenes is not made of wood or stone. If you helped him he would be ashamed not to pay you in kind. And yet—the opportunity of possessing a willing, kindly, and trusty assistant well fitted to do your bidding, and not merely that, but capable of originating useful ideas himself, with a certain forecast of mind and judgment—I say such a man is worth dozens of slaves. Good economists tell us that when a precious article may be got at a low price we ought to buy. And nowadays when times are so bad it is possible to get good friends exceedingly cheap.

Diodorus answered: You are quite right, Socrates; bid Hermogenes come to me.

Soc. Bid Hermogenes come to you!—not I indeed! since for aught I can understand you are no better entitled to summon him that to go to him yourself, nor is the advantage more on his side than your own.

Thus Diodorus went off in a trice to seek Hermogenes, and at no great outlay won to himself a friend—a friend

whose one concern it now was to discover how, by word or deed, he might help and gladden Diodorus.

BOOK III

I

Aspirants to honor and distinction derived similar help from Socrates, who in each case stimulated in them a persevering assiduity towards their several aims, as the following narratives tend to show. He had heard on one occasion of the arrival in Athens of Dionysodorus, who professed to teach the whole duty of a general. Accordingly he remarked to one of those who were with him—a young man whose anxiety to obtain the office of Strategos was no secret to him:

Soc. It would be monstrous on the part of any one who sought to become a general to throw away the slightest opportunity of learning the duties of the office. Such a person, I should say, would deserve to be fined and punished by the state far more than the charlatan who without having learnt the art of a sculptor undertakes a contract to carve a statue. Considering that the whole fortunes of the state are entrusted to the general during a war, with all its incidental peril, it is only reasonable to anticipate that great blessings or great misfortunes will result in proportion to the success or bungling of that officer. I appeal to you, young sir, do you not agree that a candidate who, while taking pains to be elected neglects to learn the duties of the office, would richly deserve to be fined?

With arguments like these he persuaded the young man to go and take lessons. After he had gone through the course he came back, and Socrates proceeded playfully to banter him.

Soc. Behold our young friend, sirs, as Homer says of Agamemnon, of mien majesty, so he; does he not seem to move more majestically, like one who has studied to be a general? Of course, just as a man who has learned to play

the harp is a harper, even if he never touch the instrument, or as one who has studied medicine is a physician, though he does not practice, so our friend here from this time forward is now and ever shall be a general, even though he does not receive a vote at the elections. But the dunce who has not the science is neither general nor doctor, no, not even if the whole world appointed him. But (he proceeded, turning to the youth), in case any of us should ever find ourselves captain or colonel under you, to give us some smattering of the science of war, what did the professor take as the starting-point of his instruction in generalship? Please inform us.

Then the young man: He began where he ended; he taught me tactics—tactics and nothing else.

Yet surely (replied Socrates) that is only an infinitesimal part of generalship. A general must be ready in furnishing the material of war: in providing the commissariat for his troops; quick in devices, he must be full of practical resource; nothing must escape his eye or tax his endurance; he must be shrewd, and ready of wit, a combination at once of clemency and fierceness, of simplicity and of insidious craft; he must play the part of watchman, of robber; now prodigal as a spendthrift, and again close-fisted as a miser, the bounty of his munificence must be equaled by the narrowness of his greed; impregnable in defense, a very dare-devil in attack—these and many other qualities must he possess who is to make a good general and minister of war; they must come to him by gift of nature or through science. No doubt it is a grand thing also to be a tactician, since there is all the difference in the world between an army properly handled in the field and the same in disorder; just as stones and bricks, woodwork and tiles, tumbled together in a heap are of no use at all, but arrange them in a certain order—at bottom and atop materials which will not crumble

or rot, such as stones and earthen tiles, and in the middle between the two put bricks and woodwork, with an eye to architectural principle, and finally you get a valuable possession—to wit, a dwelling-place.

The simile is very apt, Socrates (replied the youth), for in battle, too, the rule is to draw up the best men in front and rear, with those of inferior quality between, where they may be led on by the former and pushed on by the hinder.

Soc. Very good, no doubt, if the professor taught you to distinguish good and bad; but if not, where is the use of your learning? It would scarcely help you, would it, to be told to arrange coins in piles, the best coins at top and bottom and the worst in the middle, unless you were first taught to distinguish real from counterfeit.

The Youth. Well no, upon my word, he did not teach us that, so that the task of distinguishing between good and bad must devolve on ourselves.

Soc. Well, shall we see, then, how we may best avoid making blunders between them?

I am ready (replied the youth).

Soc. Well then! Let us suppose we are marauders, and the task imposed upon us is to carry off some bullion; it will be a right disposition of our forces if we place in the vanguard those who are the greediest of gain?

The Youth. I should think so.

Soc. Then what if there is danger to be faced? Shall the vanguard consist of men who are greediest of honor?

The Youth. It is these, at any rate, who will face danger for the sake of praise and glory. Fortunately such people are not hid away in a corner; they shine forth conspicuous everywhere, and are easy to be discovered.

Soc. But tell me, did he teach you how to draw up troops in general, or specifically where and how to apply each particular kind of tactical arrangement?

The Youth. Nothing of the sort.

Soc. And yet there are and must be innumerable circumstances in which the same ordering of march or battle will be out of place.

The Youth. I assure you he did not draw any of these fine distinctions.

He did not, did not he? (he answered). Bless me! Go back to him again, then, and ply him with questions; if he really has the science, and is not lost to all sense of shame, he will blush to have taken your money and then to have sent you away empty.

II

At another time he fell in with a man who had been chosen general and minister of war, and thus accosted him.

Soc. Why did Homer, think you, designate Agamemnon "shepherd of the peoples"? Was it possibly to show that, even as a shepherd must care for his sheep and see that they are safe and have all things needful, and that the objects of their rearing be secured, so also must a general take care that his soldiers are safe and have their supplies, and attain the objects of their soldiering? Which last is that they may get the mastery of their enemies, and so add to their own good fortune and happiness; or tell me, what made him praise Agamemnon, saying—

He is both a good king and a warrior bold?

Did he mean, perhaps, to imply that he would be a 'warrior bold,' not merely in standing alone and bravely battling against the foe, but as inspiring the whole of his host with like prowess; and by a 'good king,' not merely one who should stand forth gallantly to protect his own life, but who

should be the source of happiness to all over whom he reigns? Since a man is not chosen king in order to take heed to himself, albeit nobly, but that those who chose him may attain to happiness through him. And why do men go soldiering except to ameliorate existence? and to this end they choose their generals that they may find in them guides to the goal in question. He, then, who undertakes that office is bound to procure for those who choose him the thing they seek for. And indeed it were not easy to find any nobler ambition than this, or aught ignobler than its opposite.

After such sort he handled the question, what is the virtue of a good leader? and by shredding off all superficial qualities, laid bare as the kernel of the matter that it is the function of every leader to make those happy whom he may be called upon to lead.

III

The following conversation with a youth who had just been elected hipparch (or commandant of cavalry), I can also vouch for.

Soc. Can you tell us what set you wishing to be a general of cavalry, young sir? What was your object? I suppose it was not simply to ride at the head of the "knights," an honor not denied to the mounted archers, who ride even in front of the generals themselves?

Hipp. You are right.

Soc. No more was it for the sake merely of public notoriety, since a madman might boast of that fatal distinction.

Hipp. You are right again.

Soc. Is this possibly the explanation? you think to improve the cavalry—your aim would be to hand it over to the state in better condition than you find it; and, if the

cavalry chanced to be called out, you at their head would be the cause of some good thing to Athens?

Hipp. Most certainly.

Soc. Well, and a noble ambition too, upon my word—if you can achieve your object. The command to which you are appointed concerns horses and riders, does it not?

Hipp. It does, no doubt.

Soc. Come then, will you explain to us first how you propose to improve the horses.

Hipp. Ah, that will scarcely form part of my business, I fancy. Each trooper is personally responsible for the condition of his horse.

Soc. But suppose, when they present themselves and their horses, you find that some have brought beasts with bad feet or legs or otherwise infirm, and others such ill-fed jades that they cannot keep up on the march; others, again, brutes so ill broken and unmanageable that they will not keep their place in the ranks, and others such desperate plungers that they cannot be got to any place in the ranks at all. What becomes of your cavalry force then? How will you charge at the head of such a troop, and win glory for the state?

Hipp. You are right. I will try to look after the horses to my utmost.

Soc. Well, and will you not lay your hand to improve the men themselves?

Hipp. I will.

Soc. The first thing will be to make them expert in mounting their chargers?

Hipp. That certainly, for if any of them were dismounted he would then have a better chance of saving himself.

Soc. Well, but when it comes to the hazard of engagement, what will you do then? Give orders to draw the enemy down to the sandy ground where you are accustomed to maneuver, or Endeavour beforehand to put your men through their practice on ground resembling a real battlefield?

Hipp. That would be better, no doubt.

Soc. Well, shall you regard it as a part of your duty to see that as many of your men as possible can take aim and shoot on horseback?

(7) Cf. "Hipparch," i. 21.

Hipp. It will be better, certainly.

Soc. And have you thought how to whet the courage of your troopers? to kindle in them rage to meet the enemy?—which things are but stimulants to make stout hearts stouter?

Hipp. If I have not done so hitherto, I will try to make up for lost time now.

Soc. And have you troubled your head at all to consider how you are to secure the obedience of your men? for without that not one particle of good will you get, for all your horses and troopers so brave and so stout.

Hipp. That is a true saying; but how, Socrates, should a man best bring them to this virtue?

Soc. I presume you know that in any business whatever, people are more apt to follow the lead of those whom they look upon as adepts; thus in case of sickness they are readiest to obey him whom they regard as the cleverest physician; and so on a voyage the most skilful pilot; in matters agricultural the best farmer, and so forth.

Hipp. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Then in this matter of cavalry also we may reasonably suppose that he who is looked upon as knowing his business best will command the readiest obedience.

Hipp. If, then, I can prove to my troopers that I am better than all of them, will that suffice to win their obedience?

Soc. Yes, if along with that you can teach them that obedience to you brings greater glory and surer safety to themselves.

Hipp. How am I to teach them that?

Soc. Upon my word! How are you to teach them that? Far more easily, I take it, than if you had to teach them that bad things are better than good, and more advantageous to boot.

Hipp. I suppose you mean that, besides his other qualifications a commandant of cavalry must have command of speech and argument?

Soc. Were you under the impression that the commandant was not to open his mouth? Did it never occur to you that all the noblest things which custom compels us to learn, and to which indeed we owe our knowledge of life, have all been learned by means of speech and reason; and if there be any other noble learning which a man may learn, it is this same reason whereby he learns it; and the best teachers are those who have the freest command of thought and language, and those that have the best knowledge of the most serious things are the most brilliant masters of disputation. Again, have you not observed that whenever this city of ours fits out one of her choruses—such as that, for instance, which is sent to Delos—there is nothing elsewhere from any quarter of the world which can compete with it; nor will you find in any other state collected so fair a flower of manhood as in Athens?

Hipp. You say truly.

Soc. But for all that, it is not in sweetness of voice that the Athenians differ from the rest of the world so much, nor in stature of body or strength of limb, but in ambition and that love of honor which most of all gives a keen edge to the spirit in the pursuit of things lovely and of high esteem.

Hipp. That, too, is a true saying.

Soc. Do you not think, then, that if a man devoted himself to our cavalry also, here in Athens, we should far outstrip the rest of the world, whether in the furnishing of arms and horses, or in orderliness of battle-array, or in eager hazardous encounter with the foe, if only we could persuade ourselves that by so doing we should obtain honor and distinction?

Hipp. It is reasonable to think so.

Soc. Have no hesitation, therefore, but try to guide your men into this path, whence you yourself, and through you your fellow-citizens, will reap advantage.

Yes, in good sooth, I will try (he answered).

IV

At another time, seeing Nicomachides on his way back from the elections (of magistrates), he asked him: Who are elected generals, Nicomachides?

And he: Is it not just like them, these citizens of Athens—just like them, I say—to go and elect, not me, who ever since my name first appeared on the muster-roll have literally worn myself out with military service—now as a captain, now as a colonel—and have received all these wounds from the enemy, look you! (at the same time, and suiting the action to the word, he bared his arms and proceeded to show the scars of ancient wounds)—they elect not me (he went on), but, if you please, Antisthenes! who never served as a hoplite in his life nor in the cavalry ever made a brilliant stroke, that

I ever heard tell of; no! in fact, he has got no science at all, I take it, except to amass stores of wealth.

But still (returned Socrates), surely that is one point in his favour—he ought to be able to provide the troops with supplies.

Nic. Well, for the matter of that, merchants are good hands at collecting stores; but it does not follow that a merchant or trader will be able to command an army.

But (rejoined Socrates) Antisthenes is a man of great pertinacity, who insists on winning, and that is a very necessary quality in a general. Do not you see how each time he has been choragus he has been successful with one chorus after another?

Nic. Bless me! yes; but there is a wide difference between standing at the head of a band of singers and dancers and a troop of soldiers.

Soc. Still, without any practical skill in singing or in the training of a chorus, Antisthenes somehow had the art to select the greatest proficients in both.

Nic. Yes, and by the same reasoning we are to infer that on a campaign he will find proficients, some to marshal the troops for him and others to fight his battles?

Soc. Just so. If in matters military he only exhibits the same skill in selecting the best hands as he has shown in matters of the chorus, it is highly probable he will here also bear away the palm of victory; and we may presume that if he expended so much to win a choric victory with a single tribe, he will be ready to expend more to secure a victory in war with the whole state to back him.

Nic. Do you really mean, Socrates, that it is the function of the same man to provide efficient choruses and to act as commander-in-chief?

Soc. I mean this, that, given a man knows what he needs to provide, and has the skill to do so, no matter what the department of things may be—house or city or army—you will find him a good chief and director of the same.

Then Nicomachides: Upon my word, Socrates, I should never have expected to hear you say that a good housekeeper and steward of an estate would make a good general.

Soc. Come then, suppose we examine their respective duties, and so determine whether they are the same or different.

Nic. Let us do so.

Soc. Well then, is it not a common duty of both to procure the ready obedience of those under them to their orders?

Nic. Certainly.

Soc. And also to assign to those best qualified to perform them their distinctive tasks?

That, too, belongs to both alike (he answered).

Soc. Again, to chastise the bad and reward the good belongs to both alike, methinks?

Nic. Decidedly.

Soc. And to win the kindly feeling of their subordinates must surely be the noble ambition of both?

That too (he answered).

Soc. And do you consider it to the interest of both alike to win the adherence of supporters and allies?

Nic. Without a doubt.

Soc. And does it not closely concern them both to be good guardians of their respective charges?

Nic. Very much so.

Soc. Then it equally concerns them both to be painstaking and prodigal of toil in all their doings?

Nic. Yes, all these duties belong to both alike, but the parallel ends when you come to actual fighting.

Soc. Yet they are both sure to meet with enemies?

Nic. There is no doubt about that.

Soc. Then is it not to the interest of both to get the upper hand of these?

Nic. Certainly; but you omit to tell us what service organization and the art of management will render when it comes to actual fighting.

Soc. Why, it is just then, I presume, it will be of most service, for the good economist knows that nothing is so advantageous or so lucrative as victory in battle, or to put it negatively, nothing so disastrous and expensive as defeat. He will enthusiastically seek out and provide everything conducive to victory, he will painstakingly discover and guard against all that tends to defeat, and when satisfied that all is ready and ripe for victory he will deliver battle energetically, and what is equally important, until the hour of final preparation has arrived, he will be cautious to deliver battle. Do not despise men of economic genius, Nicomachides; the difference between the devotion requisite to private affairs and to affairs of state is merely one of quantity. For the rest the parallel holds strictly, and in this respect pre-eminently, that both are concerned with human instruments: which human beings, moreover, are of one type and temperament, whether we speak of devotion to public affairs or of the administration of private property. To fare well in either case is given to those who know the secret of dealing with humanity, whereas the absence of that knowledge will as certainly imply in either case a fatal note of discord.

V

A conversation held with Pericles the son of the great statesman may here be introduced. Socrates began:

I am looking forward, I must tell you, Pericles, to a great improvement in our military affairs when you are minister of war. The prestige of Athens, I hope, will rise; we shall gain the mastery over our enemies.

Pericles replied: I devoutly wish your words might be fulfilled, but how this happy result is to be obtained, I am at a loss to discover.

Shall we (Socrates continued), shall we balance the arguments for and against, and consider to what extent the possibility does exist?

Pray let us do so (he answered).

Soc. Well then, you know that in point of numbers the Athenians are not inferior to the Boeotians?

Per. Yes, I am aware of that.

Soc. And do you think the Boeotians could furnish a better pick of fine healthy men than the Athenians?

Per. I think we should very well hold our own in that respect.

Soc. And which of the two would you take to be the more united people—the friendlier among themselves?

Per. The Athenians, I should say, for so many sections of the Boeotians, resenting the selfish policy of Thebes, are ill disposed to that power, but at Athens I see nothing of the sort.

Soc. But perhaps you will say that there is no people more jealous of honor or haughtier in spirit. And these feelings are no weak spurs to quicken even a dull spirit to hazard all for glory's sake and fatherland.

Per. Nor is there much fault to find with Athenians in these respects.

Soc. And if we turn to consider the fair deeds of ancestry, to no people besides ourselves belongs so rich a heritage of stimulating memories, whereby so many of us are stirred to pursue virtue with devotion and to show ourselves in our turn also men of velour like our sires.

Per. All that you say, Socrates, is most true, but do you observe that ever since the disaster of the thousand under Tolmides at Lebadeia, coupled with that under Hippocrates at Delium, the prestige of Athens by comparison with the Boeotians has been lowered, while the spirit of Thebes as against Athens had been correspondingly exalted, so that those Boeotians who in old days did not venture to give battle to the Athenians even in their own territory unless they had the Lacedaemonians and the rest of the Peloponnesians to help them, do nowadays threaten to make an incursion into Attica single-handed; and the Athenians, who formerly, if they had to deal with the Boeotians only, made havoc of their territory, are now afraid the Boeotians may some day harry Attica.

To which Socrates: Yes, I perceive that this is so, but it seems to me that the state was never more tractably disposed, never so ripe for a really good leader, as to-day. For if boldness be the parent of carelessness, laxity, and insubordination, it is the part of fear to make people more disposed to application, obedience, and good order. A proof of which you may discover in the behavior of people on ship-board. It is in seasons of calm weather when there is nothing to fear that disorder may be said to reign, but as soon as there is apprehension of a storm, or an enemy in sight, the scene changes; not only is each word of command obeyed, but there is a hush of silent expectation; the mariners wait to catch the next signal like an orchestra with eyes upon the leader.

Per. But indeed, given that now is the opportunity to take obedience at the flood, it is high time also to explain by what means we are to rekindle in the hearts of our countrymen the old fires—the passionate longing for antique velour, for the glory and the wellbeing of the days of old.

Well (proceeded Socrates), supposing we wished them to lay claim to certain material wealth now held by others, we could not better stimulate them to lay hands on the objects coveted than by showing them that these were ancestral possessions to which they had a natural right. But since our object is that they should set their hearts on virtuous pre-eminence, we must prove to them that such headship combined with virtue is an old time-honored heritage which pertains to them beyond all others, and that if they strive earnestly after it they will soon out-top the world.

Por. How are we to inculcate this lesson?

Soc. I think by reminding them of a fact already registered in their minds, that the oldest of our ancestors whose names are known to us were also the bravest of heroes.

Per. I suppose you refer to that judgment of the gods which, for their virtue's sake, Cecrops and his followers were called on to decide?

Soc. Yes, I refer to that and to the birth and rearing of Erectheus, and also to the war which in his days was waged to stay the tide of invasion from the whole adjoining continent; and that other war in the days of the Heraclidae against the men of Peloponnese; and that series of battles fought in the days of Theseus—in all which the virtuous pre-eminence of our ancestry above the men of their own times was made manifest. Or, if you please, we may come down to things of a later date, which their descendants and the heroes of days not so long anterior to our own wrought in the struggle with the lords of Asia, nay of Europe also, as far

as Macedonia: a people possessing a power and means of attack far exceeding any who had gone before—who, moreover, had accomplished the doughtiest deeds. These things the men of Athens wrought partly single-handed, and partly as sharers with the Peloponnesians in laurels won by land and sea. Heroes were these men also, far outshining, as tradition tells us, the peoples of their time.

Per. Yes, so runs the story of their heroism.

Soc. Therefore it is that, amidst the many changes of inhabitants, and the migrations which have, wave after wave, swept over Hellas, these maintained themselves in their own land, unmoved; so that it was a common thing for others to turn to them as to a court of appeal on points of right, or to flee to Athens as a harbor of refuge from the hand of the oppressor.

Then Pericles: And the wonder to me, Socrates, is how our city ever came to decline.

Soc. I think we are victims of our own success. Like some athlete, whose facile preponderance in the arena has betrayed him into laxity until he eventually succumbs to punier antagonists, so we Athenians, in the plenitude of our superiority, have neglected ourselves and are become degenerate.

Per. What then ought we to do now to recover our former virtue?

Soc. There need be no mystery about that, I think. We can rediscover the institutions of our forefathers—applying them to the regulation of our lives with something of their precision, and not improbably with like success; or we can imitate those who stand at the front of affairs to-day, adapting to ourselves their rule of life, in which case, if we live up to the standard of our models, we may hope at least

to rival their excellence, or, by a more conscientious adherence to what they aim at, rise superior.

You would seem to suggest (he answered) that the spirit of beautiful and brave manhood has taken wings and left our city; as, for instance, when will Athenians, like the Lacedaemonians, reverence old age—the Athenian, who takes his own father as a starting-point for the contempt he pours upon grey hairs? When will he pay as strict an attention to the body, who is not content with neglecting a good habit, but laughs to scorn those who are careful in this matter? When shall we Athenians so obey our magistrates—we who take a pride, as it were, in despising authority? When, once more, shall we be united as a people—we who, instead of combining to promote common interests, delight in blackening each other's characters, envying one another more than we envy all the world besides; and—which is our worst failing—who, in private and public intercourse alike, are torn by dissension and are caught in a maze of litigation, and prefer to make capital out of our neighbor's difficulties rather than to render natural assistance? To make our conduct consistent, indeed, we treat our national interests no better than if they were the concerns of some foreign state; we make them bones of contention to wrangle over, and rejoice in nothing so much as in possessing means and ability to indulge these tastes. From this hotbed is engendered in the state a spirit of blind folly and cowardice, and in the hearts of the citizens spreads a tangle of hatred and mutual hostility which, as I often shudder to think, will some day cause some disaster to befall the state greater than it can bear.

Do not (replied Socrates), do not, I pray you, permit yourself to believe that Athenians are smitten with so incurable a depravity. Do you not observe their discipline in all naval matters? Look at their prompt and orderly

obedience to the superintendents at the gymnastic contests, their quite unrivalled subservience to their teachers in the training of our choruses.

Yes (he answered), there's the wonder of it; to think that all those good people should so obey their leaders, but that our hoplites and our cavalry, who may be supposed to rank before the rest of the citizens in excellence of manhood, should be so entirely unamenable to discipline.

Then Socrates: Well, but the council which sits on Areopagos is composed of citizens of approved character, is it not?

Certainly (he answered).

Soc. Then can you name any similar body, judicial or executive, trying cases or transacting other business with greater honor, stricter legality, higher dignity, or more impartial justice?

No, I have no fault to find on that score (he answered).

Soc. Then we ought not to despair as though all sense of orderliness and good discipline had died out of our countrymen.

Still (he answered), if it is not to harp upon one string, I maintain that in military service, where, if anywhere, sobriety and temperance, orderliness and good discipline are needed, none of these essentials receives any attention.

May it not perhaps be (asked Socrates) that in this department they are officered by those who have the least knowledge? Do you not notice, to take the case of harp-players, choric performers, dancers, and the like, that no one would ever dream of leading if he lacked the requisite knowledge? and the same holds of wrestlers or pancratiasts.

Moreover, while in these cases any one in command can tell you where he got the elementary knowledge of what he presides over, most generals are amateurs and improvisers.

I do not at all suppose that you are one of that sort. I believe you could give as clear an account of your schooling in strategy as you could in the matter of wrestling. No doubt you have got at first hand many of your father's “rules for generalship,” which you carefully preserve, besides having collected many others from every quarter whence it was possible to pick up any knowledge which would be of use to a future general. Again, I feel sure you are deeply concerned to escape even unconscious ignorance of anything which will be serviceable to you in so high an office; and if you detect in yourself any ignorance, you turn to those who have knowledge in these matters (sparing neither gifts nor gratitude) to supplement your ignorance by their knowledge and to secure their help.

To which Pericles: I am not so blind, Socrates, as to imagine you say these words under the idea that I am truly so careful in these matters; but rather your object is to teach me that the would-be general must make such things his care. I admit in any case all you say.

Socrates proceeded: Has it ever caught your observation, Pericles, that a high mountain barrier stretches like a bulwark in front of our country down towards Boeotia—cleft, moreover, by narrow and precipitous passes, the only avenues into the heart of Attica, which lies engirdled by a ring of natural fortresses?

Per. Certainly I have.

Soc. Well, and have you ever heard tell of the Mysians and Pisidians living within the territory of the great king, who, inside their mountain fortresses, lightly armed, are able to rush down and inflict much injury on the king's territory by their raids, while preserving their own freedom?

Per. Yes, the circumstance is not new to me.

And do you not think (added Socrates) that a corps of young able-bodied Athenians, accoutered with lighter arms, and holding our natural mountain rampart in possession, would prove at once a thorn in the enemy's side offensively, while defensively they would form a splendid bulwark to protect the country?

To which Pericles: I think, Socrates, these would be all useful measures, decidedly.

If, then (replied Socrates), these suggestions meet your approbation, try, O best of men, to realize them—if you can carry out a portion of them, it will be an honor to yourself and a blessing to the state; while, if you fail in any point, there will be no damage done to the city nor discredit to yourself.

VI

Glaucon, the son of Ariston, had conceived such an ardor to gain the headship of the state that nothing could hinder him but he must deliver a course of public speeches, though he had not yet reached the age of twenty. His friends and relatives tried in vain to stop him making himself ridiculous and being dragged down from the bema. Socrates, who took a kindly interest in the youth for the sake of Charmides the son of Glaucon, and of Plato, alone succeeded in restraining him. It happened thus. He fell in with him, and first of all, to get him to listen, detained him by some such remarks as the following:

Ah, Glaucon (he exclaimed), so you have determined to become prime minister?

Glauc. Yes, Socrates, I have.

Soc. And what a noble aim! if aught human ever deserved to be called noble; since if you succeed in your design, it follows, as the night the day, you will be able not only to gratify your every wish, but you will be in a position to

benefit your friends, you will raise up your father's house, you will exalt your fatherland, you will become a name thrice famous in the city first, and next in Hellas, and lastly even among barbarians perhaps, like Themistocles; but be it here or be it there, wherever you be, you will be the observed of all beholders.

The heart of Glaucon swelled with pride as he drank in the words, and gladly he stayed to listen.

Presently Socrates proceeded: Then this is clear, Glaucon, is it not? that you must needs benefit the city, since you desire to reap her honors?

Glauc. Undoubtedly.

Then, by all that is sacred (Socrates continued), do not keep us in the dark, but tell us in what way do you propose first to benefit the state? what is your starting-point? When Glaucon remained with sealed lips, as if he were now for the first time debating what this starting-point should be, Socrates continued: I presume, if you wished to improve a friend's estate, you would Endeavour to do so by adding to its wealth, would you not? So here, maybe, you will try to add to the wealth of the state?

Most decidedly (he answered).

Soc. And we may take it the state will grow wealthier in proportion as her revenues increase?

Glauc. That seems probable, at any rate.

Soc. Then would you kindly tell us from what sources the revenues of the state are at present derived, and what is their present magnitude? No doubt you have gone carefully into the question, so that if any of these are failing you may make up the deficit, or if neglected for any reason, make some new provision.

Glauc. Nay, to speak the truth, these are matters I have not thoroughly gone into.

Never mind (he said) if you have omitted the point; but you might oblige us by running through the items or heads of expenditure. Obviously you propose to remove all those which are superfluous?

Glauc. Well, no. Upon my word I have not had time to look into that side of the matter either as yet.

Soc. Then we will postpone for the present the problem of making the state wealthier; obviously without knowing the outgoings and the incomings it would be impossible to deal with the matter seriously.

But, Socrates (Glaucon remarked), it is possible to enrich the state out of the pockets of her enemies!

Yes, to be sure, considerably (answered Socrates), in the event of getting the better of them; but in the event of being worsted, it is also possible to lose what we have got.

A true observation (he replied).

And therefore (proceeded Socrates), before he makes up his mind with what enemy to go to war, a statesman should know the relative powers of his own city and the adversary's, so that, in case the superiority be on his own side, he may throw the weight of his advice into the scale of undertaking war; but if the opposite he may plead in favour of exercising caution.

You are right (he answered).

Soc. Then would you for our benefit enumerate the land and naval forces first of Athens and then of our opponents?

Glauc. Pardon me. I could not tell you them off-hand at a moment's notice.

Or (added Socrates), if you have got the figures on paper, you might produce them. I cannot tell how anxious I am to hear your statement.

Glauc. No, I assure you, I have not got them even on paper yet.

Soc. Well then, we will defer tending advice on the topic of peace or war, in a maiden speech at any rate. I can understand that, owing to the magnitude of the questions, in these early days of your ministry you have not yet fully examined them. But come, I am sure that you have studied the defenses of the country, at all events, and you know exactly how many forts and outposts are serviceable and how many are not; you can tell us which garrisons are strong enough and which defective; and you are prepared to throw in the weight of your advice in favour of increasing the serviceable outposts and sweeping away those that are superfluous?

Glauc. Yes, sweep them all away, that's my advice; for any good that is likely to come of them! Defenses indeed! so maintained that the property of the rural districts is simply pilfered.

But suppose you sweep away the outposts (he asked), may not something worse, think you, be the consequence? will not sheer plundering be free to any ruffian who likes?... But may I ask is this judgment the result of personal inspection? have you gone yourself and examined the defenses? or how do you know that they are all maintained as you say?

Glauc. I conjecture that it is so.

Soc. Well then, until we have got beyond the region of conjecture shall we defer giving advice on the matter? (It will be time enough when we know the facts.)

Possibly it would be better to wait till then (replied Glaucon).

Soc. Then there are the mines, but, of course, I am aware that you have not visited them in person, so as to be able to say why they are less productive than formerly.

Well, no; I have never been there myself (he answered).

Soc. No, Heaven help us! an unhealthy district by all accounts; so that, when the moment for advice on that topic arrives, you will have an excuse ready to hand.

I see you are making fun of me (Glaucon answered).

Soc. Well, but here is a point, I am sure, which you have not neglected. No, you will have thoroughly gone into it, and you can tell us. For how long a time could the corn supplies from the country districts support the city? how much is requisite for a single year, so that the city may not run short of this prime necessary, before you are well aware; but on the contrary you with your full knowledge will be in a position to give advice on so vital a question, to the aid or may be the salvation of your country?

It is a colossal business this (Glaucon answered), if I am to be obliged to give attention to all these details.

Soc. On the other hand, a man could not even manage his own house or his estate well, without, in the first place, knowing what he requires, and, in the second place, taking pains, item by item, to supply his wants. But since this city consists of more than ten thousand houses, and it is not easy to pay minute attention to so many all at once, how is it you did not practice yourself by trying to augment the resources of one at any rate of these—I mean your own uncle's? The service would not be thrown away. Then if your strength suffices in the single case you might take in hand a larger number; but if you fail to relieve one, how could you possibly hope to succeed with many? How absurd for a man, if he cannot carry half a hundredweight, to attempt to carry a whole!

Glauc. Nay, for my part, I am willing enough to assist my uncle's house, if my uncle would only be persuaded to listen to my advice.

Soc. Then, when you cannot persuade your uncle, do you imagine you will be able to make the whole Athenian people, uncle and all, obey you? Be careful, Glaucon (he added), lest in your thirst for glory and high repute you come to the opposite. Do you not see how dangerous it is for a man to speak or act beyond the range of his knowledge? To take the cases known to you of people whose conversation or conduct clearly transcends these limits: should you say they gain more praise or more blame on that account? Are they admired the rather or despised? Or, again, consider those who do know what they say and what they do; and you will find, I venture to say, that in every sort of undertaking those who enjoy repute and admiration belong to the class of those endowed with the highest knowledge; while conversely the people of sinister reputation, the mean and the contemptible, emanate from some depth of ignorance and dullness. If therefore what you thirst for is repute and admiration as a statesman, try to make sure of one accomplishment: in other words, the knowledge as far as in you lies of what you wish to do. If, indeed, with this to distinguish you from the rest of the world you venture to concern yourself with state affairs, it would not surprise me but that you might reach the goal of your ambition easily.

VII

Now Charmides, the son of Glaucon, was, as Socrates observed, a man of mark and influence: a much more powerful person in fact than the mass of those devoted to politics at that date, but at the same time he was a man who shrank from approaching the people or busying himself with the concerns of the state. Accordingly Socrates addressed him thus:

Tell me, Charmides, supposing some one competent to win a victory in the arena and to receive a crown, whereby he will gain honor himself and make the land of his fathers more glorious in Hellas, were to refuse to enter the lists—what kind of person should you set him down to be?

Clearly an effeminate and cowardly fellow (he answered).

Soc. And what if another man, who had it in him, by devotion to affairs of state, to exalt his city and win honor himself thereby, were to shrink and hesitate and hang back—would he too not reasonably be regarded as a coward?

Possibly (he answered); but why do you address these questions to me?

Because (replied Socrates) I think that you, who have this power, do hesitate to devote yourself to matters which, as being a citizen, if for no other reason, you are bound to take part in.

Charm. And wherein have you detected in me this power, that you pass so severe a sentence upon me?

Soc. I have detected it plainly enough in those gatherings in which you meet the politicians of the day, when, as I observe, each time they consult you on any point you have always good advice to offer, and when they make a blunder you lay your finger on the weak point immediately.

Charm. To discuss and reason in private is one thing, Socrates, to battle in the throng of the assembly is another.

Soc. And yet a man who can count, counts every bit as well in a crowd as when seated alone by himself; and it is the best performer on the harp in private who carries off the palm of victory in public.

Charm. But do you not see that modesty and timidity are feelings implanted in man's nature? and these are much more powerfully present to us in a crowd than within the circle of our intimates.

Soc. Yes, but what I am bent on teaching you is that while you feel no such bashfulness and timidity before the wisest and strongest of men, you are ashamed of opening your lips in the midst of weaklings and dullards. Is it the fullers among them of whom you stand in awe, or the cobblers, or the carpenters, or the coppersmiths, or the merchants, or the farmers, or the hucksters of the market-place exchanging their wares, and bethinking them how they are to buy this thing cheap, and to sell the other dear—is it before these you are ashamed, for these are the individual atoms out of which the Public Assembly is composed? And what is the difference, pray, between your behavior and that of a man who, being the superior of trained athletes, quails before a set of amateurs? Is it not the case that you who can argue so readily with the foremost statesmen in the city, some of whom affect to look down upon you—you, with your vast superiority over practiced popular debaters—are no sooner confronted with a set of folk who never in their lives gave politics a thought, and into whose heads certainly it never entered to look down upon you—than you are afraid to open your lips in mortal terror of being laughed at?

Well, but you would admit (he answered) that sound argument does frequently bring down the ridicule of the Popular Assembly.

Soc. Which is equally true of the others. And that is just what rouses my astonishment, that you who can cope so easily with these lordly people (when guilty of ridicule) should persuade yourself that you cannot stand up against a set of commoners. My good fellow, do not be ignorant of yourself! do not fall into that commonest of errors—theirs who rush off to investigate the concerns of the rest of the world, and have no time to turn and examine themselves. Yet that is a duty which you must not in cowardly sort draw back from: rather must you brace ourself to give good heed

to your own self; and as to public affairs, if by any manner of means they may be improved through you, do not neglect them. Success in the sphere of politics means that not only the mass of your fellow-citizens, but your personal friends and you yourself last but not least, will profit by your action.

VIII

Once when Aristippus set himself to subject Socrates to a cross-examination, such as he had himself undergone at the hands of Socrates on a former occasion, Socrates, being minded to benefit those who were with him, gave his answers less in the style of a debater guarding against perversions of his argument, than of a man persuaded of the supreme importance of right conduct.

Aristippus asked him "if he knew of anything good," intending in case he assented and named any particular good thing, like food or drink, or wealth, or health, or strength, or courage, to point out that the thing named was sometimes bad. But he, knowing that if a thing troubles us, we immediately want that which will put an end to our trouble, answered precisely as it was best to do.

Soc. Do I understand you to ask me whether I know anything good for fever?

No (he replied), that is not my question.

Soc. Then for inflammation of the eyes?

Aristip. No, nor yet that.

Soc. Well then, for hunger?

Aristip. No, nor yet for hunger.

Well, but (answered Socrates) if you ask me whether I know of any good thing which is good for nothing, I neither know of it nor want to know.

And when Aristippus, returning to the charge, asked him "if he knew of any thing beautiful."

He answered: Yes, many things.

Aristip. Are they all like each other?

Soc. On the contrary, they are often as unlike as possible.

How then (he asked) can that be beautiful which is unlike the beautiful?

Soc. Bless me! for the simple reason that it is possible for a man who is a beautiful runner to be quite unlike another man who is a beautiful boxer, or for a shield, which is a beautiful weapon for the purpose of defense, to be absolutely unlike a javelin, which is a beautiful weapon of swift and sure discharge.

Aristip. Your answers are no better now than when I asked you whether you knew any good thing. They are both of a pattern.

Soc. And so they should be. Do you imagine that one thing is good and another beautiful? Do not you know that relatively to the same standard all things are at once beautiful and good? In the first place, virtue is not a good thing relatively to one standard and a beautiful thing relatively to another standard; and in the next place, human beings, on the same principle and relatively to the same standard, are called "beautiful and good"; and so the bodily frames of men relatively to the same standards are seen to be "beautiful and good," and in general all things capable of being used by man are regarded as at once beautiful and good relatively to the same standard—the standing being in each case what the thing happens to be useful for.

Aristip. Then I presume even a basket for carrying dung is a beautiful thing?

Soc. To be sure, and a spear of gold an ugly thing, if for their respective uses—the former is well and the latter ill adapted.

Aristip. Do you mean to assert that the same things may be beautiful and ugly?

Soc. Yes, to be sure; and by the same showing things may be good and bad: as, for instance, what is good for hunger may be bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; or again, what is beautiful for wrestling is often ugly for running; and in general everything is good and beautiful when well adapted for the end in view, bad and ugly when ill adapted for the same.

Similarly when he spoke about houses, and argued that "the same house must be at once beautiful and useful"—I could not help feeling that he was giving a good lesson on the problem: "how a house ought to be built." He investigated the matter thus:

Soc. "Do you admit that any one purposing to build a perfect house will plan to make it at once as pleasant and as useful to live in as possible?" and that point being admitted, the next question would be:

"It is pleasant to have one's house cool in summer and warm in winter, is it not?" and this proposition also having obtained assent, "Now, supposing a house to have a southern aspect, sunshine during winter will steal in under the verandah, but in summer, when the sun traverses a path right over our heads, the roof will afford an agreeable shade, will it not? If, then, such an arrangement is desirable, the southern side of a house should be built higher to catch the rays of the winter sun, and the northern side lower to prevent the cold winds finding ingress; in a word, it is reasonable to suppose that the pleasantest and most beautiful dwelling place will be one in which the owner can at all seasons of the year find the pleasantest retreat, and stow away his goods with the greatest security."

Paintings and ornamental moldings are apt (he said) to deprive one of more joy than they confer.

The fittest place for a temple or an altar (he maintained) was some site visible from afar, and untrodden by foot of man: since it was a glad thing for the worshipper to lift up his eyes afar off and offer up his orison; glad also to wend his way peaceful to prayer unsullied.

IX

Being again asked by some one: could courage be taught, or did it come by nature? he answered: I imagine that just as one body is by nature stronger than another body to encounter toils, so one soul by nature grows more robust than another soul in face of dangers. Certainly I do note that people brought up under the same condition of laws and customs differ greatly in respect of daring. Still my belief is that by learning and practice the natural aptitude may always be strengthened towards courage. It is clear, for instance, that Scythians or Thracians would not venture to take shield and spear and contend with Lacedaemonians; and it is equally evident that Lacedaemonians would demur to entering the lists of battle against Thracians if limited to their light shields and javelins, or against Scythians without some weapon more familiar than their bows and arrows. And as far as I can see, this principle holds generally: the natural differences of one man from another may be compensated by artificial progress, the result of care and attention. All which proves clearly that whether nature has endowed us with keener or blunter sensibilities, the duty of all alike is to learn and practice those things in which we would fain achieve distinction.

Between wisdom and sobriety of soul (which is temperance) he drew no distinction. Was a man able on the one hand to recognize things beautiful and good sufficiently

to live in them? Had he, on the other hand, knowledge of the "base and foul" so as to beware of them? If so, Socrates judged him to be wise at once and sound of soul (or temperate).

And being further questioned whether "he considered those who have the knowledge of right action, but do not apply it, to be wise and self-controlled?"—"Not a whit more," he answered, "than I consider them to be unwise and intemperate. Every one, I conceive, deliberately chooses what, within the limits open to him, he considers most conducive to his interest, and acts accordingly. I must hold therefore that those who act against rule and crookedly are neither wise nor self-controlled.

He said that justice, moreover, and all other virtue is wisdom. That is to say, things just, and all things else that are done with virtue, are "beautiful and good"; and neither will those who know these things deliberately choose aught else in their stead, nor will he who lacks the special knowledge of them be able to do them, but even if he makes the attempt he will miss the mark and fail. So the wise alone can perform the things which are "beautiful and good"; they that are unwise cannot, but even if they try they fail. Therefore, since all things just, and generally all things "beautiful and good," are wrought with virtue, it is clear that justice and all other virtue is wisdom.

On the other hand, madness (he maintained) was the opposite to wisdom; not that he regarded simple ignorance as madness, but he put it thus: for a man to be ignorant of himself, to imagine and suppose that he knows what he knows not, was (he argued), if not madness itself, yet something very like it. The mass of men no doubt hold a different language: if a man is all abroad on some matter of which the mass of mankind are ignorant, they do not pronounce him "mad"; but a like aberration of mind, if only

it be about matters within the scope of ordinary knowledge, they call madness. For instance, any one who imagined himself too tall to pass under a gateway of the Long Wall without stooping, or so strong as to try to lift a house, or to attempt any other obvious impossibility, is a madman according to them; but in the popular sense he is not mad, if his obliquity is confined to small matters. In fact, just as strong desire goes by the name of passion in popular parlance, so mental obliquity on a grand scale is entitled madness.

In answer to the question: what is envy? he discovered it to be a certain kind of pain; not certainly the sorrow felt at the misfortunes of a friend or the good fortune of an enemy—that is not envy; but, as he said, "envy is felt by those alone who are annoyed at the successes of their friends." And when some one or other expressed astonishment that any one friendlily disposed to another should be pained at his well-doing, he reminded him of a common tendency in people: when any one is faring ill their sympathies are touched, they rush to the aid of the unfortunate; but when fortune smiles on others, they are somehow pained. "I do not say," he added, "this could happen to a thoughtful person; but it is no uncommon condition of a silly mind."

In answer to the question: what is leisure? I discover (he said) that most men do something: for instance, the dice player, the gambler, the buffoon, do something, but these have leisure; they can, if they like, turn and do something better; but nobody has leisure to turn from the better to the worse, and if he does so turn, when he has no leisure, he does but ill in that.

(To pass to another definition.) They are not kings or rulers (he said) who hold the scepter merely, or are chosen by fellows out of the street, or are appointed by lot, or have stepped into office by violence or by fraud; but those who

have the special knowledge how to rule. Thus having won the admission that it is the function of a ruler to enjoin what ought to be done, and of those who are ruled to obey, he proceeded to point out by instances that in a ship the ruler or captain is the man of special knowledge, to whom, as an expert, the ship-owner himself and all the others on board obey. So likewise, in the matter of husbandry, the proprietor of an estate; in that of sickness, the patient; in that of physical training of the body, the youthful athlete going through a course; and, in general, every one directly concerned in any matter needing attention and care will either attend to this matter personally, if he thinks he has the special knowledge; or, if he mistrusts his own science, will be eager to obey any expert on the spot, or will even send and fetch one from a distance. The guidance of this expert he will follow, and do what he has to do at his dictation.

And thus, in the art of spinning wool, he liked to point out that women are the rulers of men—and why? because they have the knowledge of the art, and men have not.

And if any one raised the objection that a tyrant has it in his power not to obey good and correct advice, he would retort: "Pray, how has he the option not to obey, considering the penalty hanging over him who disobeys the words of wisdom? for whatever the matter be in which he disobeys the word of good advice, he will fall into error, I presume, and falling into error, be punished." And to the suggestion that the tyrant could, if he liked, cut off the head of the man of wisdom, his answer was: "Do you think that he who destroys his best ally will go scot free, or suffer a mere slight and passing loss? Is he more likely to secure his salvation that way, think you, or to compass his own swift destruction?"

When some one asked him: "What he regarded as the best pursuit or business for a man?" he answered: "Successful

conduct"; and to a second question: "Did he then regard good fortune as an end to be pursued?"—"On the contrary," he answered, "for myself, I consider fortune and conduct to be diametrically opposed. For instance, to succeed in some desirable course of action without seeking to do so, I hold to be good fortune; but to do a thing well by dint of learning and practice, that according to my creed is successful conduct, and those who make this the serious business of their life seem to me to do well."

They are at once the best and the dearest in the sight of God (he went on to say) who for instance in husbandry do well the things of farming, or in the art of healing all that belongs to healing, or in statecraft the affairs of state; whereas a man who does nothing well—nor well in anything—is (he added) neither good for anything nor dear to God.

X

But indeed, if chance brought him into conversation with any one possessed of an art, and using it for daily purposes of business, he never failed to be useful to this kind of person. For instance, stepping one time into the studio of Parrhasius the painter, and getting into conversation with him—

I suppose, Parrhasius (said he), painting may be defined as "a representation of visible objects," may it not? That is to say, by means of colors and palette you painters represent and reproduce as closely as possible the ups and downs, lights and shadows, hard and soft, rough and smooth surfaces, the freshness of youth and the wrinkles of age, do you not?

You are right (he answered), that is so.

Soc. Further, in portraying ideal types of beauty, seeing it is not easy to light upon any one human being who is

absolutely devoid of blemish, you cull from many models the most beautiful traits of each, and so make your figures appear completely beautiful?

Parrh. Yes, that is how we do.

Well, but stop (Socrates continued); do you also pretend to represent in similar perfection the characteristic moods of the soul, its captivating charm and sweetness, with its deep wells of love, its intensity of yearning, its burning point of passion? or is all this quite incapable of being depicted?

Nay (he answered), how should a mood be other than inimitable, Socrates, when it possesses neither linear proportion nor color, nor any of those qualities which you named just now; when, in a word, it is not even visible?

Soc. Well, but the kindly look of love, the angry glance of hate at any one, do find expression in the human subject, do they not?

Parrh. No doubt they do.

Soc. Then this look, this glance, at any rate may be imitated in the eyes, may it not?

Undoubtedly (he answered).

Soc. And do anxiety and relief of mind occasioned by the good or evil fortune of those we love both wear the same expression?

By no means (he answered); at the thought of good we are radiant, at that of evil a cloud hangs on the brow.

Soc. Then here again are looks with it is possible to represent?

Parrh. Decidedly.

Soc. Furthermore, as through some chink or crevice, there pierces through the countenance of a man, through the very posture of his body as he stands or moves, a glimpse of his nobility and freedom, or again of something in him low

and groveling—the calm of self-restraint, and wisdom, or the swagger of insolence and vulgarity?

You are right (he answered).

Soc. Then these too may be imitated?

No doubt (he said).

Soc. And which is the pleasanter type of face to look at, do you think—one on which is imprinted the characteristics of a beautiful, good, and lovable disposition, or one which bears the impress of what is ugly, and bad, and hateful?

Parrh. Doubtless, Socrates, there is a vast distinction between the two.

At another time he entered the workshop of the sculptor Cleiton, and in course of conversation with him said:

You have a gallery of handsome people here, Cleiton, runners, and wrestlers, and boxers, and pancratiasts—that I see and know; but how do you give the magic touch of life to your creations, which most of all allures the soul of the beholder through his sense of vision?

As Cleiton stood perplexed, and did not answer at once, Socrates added: Is it by closely imitating the forms of living beings that you succeed in giving that touch of life to your statues?

No doubt (he answered).

Soc. It is, is it not, by faithfully copying the various muscular contractions of the body in obedience to the play of gesture and poise, the wrinkling of flesh and the sprawl of limbs, the tensions and the relaxations, that you succeed in making your statues like real beings—make them “breathe” as people say?

Cleit. Without a doubt.

Soc. And does not the faithful imitation of the various affections of the body when engaged in any action impart a particular pleasure to the beholder?

Cleit. I should say so.

Soc. Then the threatening in the eyes of warriors engaged in battle should be carefully copied, or again you should imitate the aspect of a conqueror radiant with success?

Cleit. Above all things.

Soc. It would seem then that the sculptor is called upon to incorporate in his ideal form the workings and energies also of the soul?

Paying a visit to Pistias, the corselet maker, when that artist showed him some exquisite samples of his work, Socrates exclaimed:

By Hera! a pretty invention this, Pistias, by which you contrive that the corselet should cover the parts of the person which need protection, and at the same time leave free play to the arms and hands.... but tell me, Pistias (he added), why do you ask a higher price for these corselets of yours if they are not stouter or made of costlier material than the others?

Because, Socrates (he answered), mine are of much finer proportion.

Soc. Proportion! Then how do you make this quality apparent to the customer so as to justify the higher price—by measure or weight? For I presume you cannot make them all exactly equal and of one pattern—if you make them fit, as of course you do?

Fit indeed! that I most distinctly do (he answered), take my word for it: no use in a corselet without that.

But then are not the wearer's bodies themselves (asked Socrates) some well proportioned and others ill?

Decidedly so (he answered).

Soc. Then how do you manage to make the corselet well proportioned if it is to fit an ill-proportioned body?

Pist. To the same degree exactly as I make it fit. What fits is well proportioned.

Soc. It seems you use the term "well-proportioned" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to the wearer, just as you might describe a shield as well proportioned to the individual it suits; and so of a military cloak, and so of the rest of things, in your terminology? But maybe there is another considerable advantage in this "fitting"?

Pist. Pray instruct me, Socrates, if you have got an idea.

Soc. A corselet which fits is less galling by its weight than one which does not fit, for the latter must either drag from the shoulders with a dead weight or press upon some other part of the body, and so it becomes troublesome and uncomfortable; but that which fits, having its weight distributed partly along the collar-bone and shoulder-blade, partly over the shoulders and chest, and partly the back and belly, feels like another natural integument rather than an extra load to carry.

Pist. You have named the very quality which gives my work its exceptional value, as I consider; still there are customers, I am bound to say, who look for something else in a corselet—they must have them ornamental or inlaid with gold.

For all that (replied Socrates), if they end by purchasing an ill-fitting article, they only become the proprietors of a curiously-wrought and gilded nuisance, as it seems to me. But (he added), as the body is never in one fixed position, but is at one time curved, at another raised erect how can an exactly-modeled corselet fit?

Pist. It cannot fit at all.

You mean (Socrates continued) that it is not the exactly-modeled corselet which fits, but that which does not gall the wearer in the using?

Pist. There, Socrates, you have hit the very point. I see you understand the matter most precisely.

XI

There was once in the city a fair woman named Theodote. She was not only fair, but ready to consort with any suitor who might win her favour. Now it chanced that some one of the company mentioned her, saying that her beauty beggared description. "So fair is she," he added, "that painters flock to draw her portrait, to whom, within the limits of decorum, she displays the marvels of her beauty." "Then there is nothing for it but to go and see her," answered Socrates, "since to comprehend by hearsay what is beyond description is clearly impossible." Then he who had introduced the matter replied: "Be quick then to follow me"; and on this wise they set off to seek Theodote. They found her "posing" to a certain painter; and they took their stand as spectators. Presently the painter had ceased his work; whereupon Socrates:

"Do you think, sirs, that we ought to thank Theodote for displaying her beauty to us, or she us for coming to gaze at her?... It would seem, would it not, that if the exhibition of her charms is the more profitable to her, the debt is on her side; but if the spectacle of her beauty confers the greater benefit on us, then we are her debtors."

Some one answered that "was an equitable statement of the case."

Well then (he continued), as far as she is concerned, the praise we bestow on her is an immediate gain; and presently, when we have spread her fame abroad, she will be further benefited; but for ourselves the immediate effect on us is a

strong desire to touch what we have seen; by and by, too, we shall go away with a sting inside us, and when we are fairly gone we shall be consumed with longing. Consequently it seems that we should do her service and she accept our court.

Whereupon Theodote: Oh dear! if that is how the matter stands, it is I who am your debtor for the spectacle.

At this point, seeing that the lady herself was expensively attired, and that she had with her mother also, whose dress and style of attendance were out of the common, not to speak of the waiting-women—many and fair to look upon, who presented anything but a forlorn appearance; while in every respect the whole house itself was sumptuously furnished—Socrates put a question:

Pray tell me, Theodote, have you an estate in the country?

Theod. Not I indeed.

Soc. Then perhaps you possess a house and large revenues along with it?

Theod. No, nor yet a house.

Soc. You are not an employer of labor on a large scale?

(4) Lit. "You have not (in your employ) a body of handicraftsmen of any sort?"

Theod. No, nor yet an employer of labor.

Soc. From what source, then, do you get your means of subsistence?

Theod. My friends are my life and fortune, when they care to be kind to me.

Soc. By heaven, Theodote, a very fine property indeed, and far better worth possessing than a multitude of sheep or goats or cattle. A flock of friends!... But (he added) do you leave it to fortune whether a friend lights like a fly on your

hand at random, or do you use any artifice yourself to attract him?

Theod. And how might I hit upon any artifice to attract him?

Soc. Bless me! far more naturally than any spider. You know how they capture the creatures on which they live; by weaving webs of gossamer, is it not? and woe betide the fly that tumbles into their toils! They eat him up.

Theod. So then you would counsel me to weave myself some sort of net?

Soc. Why, surely you do not suppose you are going to ensnare that noblest of all game—a lover, to wit—in so artless a fashion? Do you not see (to speak of a much less noble sort of game) what a number of devices are needed to bag a hare? The creatures range for their food at night; therefore the hunter must provide himself with night dogs. At peep of dawn they are off as fast as they can run. He must therefore have another pack of dogs to scent out and discover which way they betake them from their grazing ground to their forms; and as they are so fleet of foot that they run and are out of sight in no time, he must once again be provided with other fleet-footed dogs to follow their tracks and overtake them; and as some of them will give even these the slip, he must, last of all, set up nets on the paths at the points of escape, so that they may fall into the meshes and be caught.

Theod. And by what like contrivance would you have me catch my lovers?

Soc. Well now! what if in place of a dog you can get a man who will hunt up your wealthy lover of beauty and discover his lair, and having found him, will plot and plan to throw him into your meshes?

Theod. Nay, what sort of meshes have I?

Soc. One you have, and a close-folding net it is, I believe; to wit, your own person; and inside it sits a soul that teaches you with what looks to please and with what words to cheer; how, too, with smiles you are to welcome true devotion, but to exclude all wantons from your presence. It tells you, you are to visit your beloved in sickness with solicitude, and when he has wrought some noble deed you are greatly to rejoice with him; and to one who passionately cares for you, you are to make surrender of yourself with heart and soul. The secret of true love I am sure you know: not to love softly merely, but devotedly. And of this too I am sure: you can convince your lovers of your fondness for them not by lip phrases, but by acts of love.

Theod. No, upon my word, I have none of these devices.

Soc. And yet it makes all the difference whether you approach a human being in the natural and true way, since it is not by force certainly that you can either catch or keep a friend. Kindness and pleasure are the only means to capture this fearful wild-fowl man and keep him constant.

Theod. You are right.

Soc. In the first place you must make such demands only of your well-wisher as he can grant without repentance; and in the next place you must make requital, dispensing your favors with a like economy. Thus you will best make friends whose love shall last the longest and their generosity know no stint. And for your favors you will best win your friends if you suit your largess to their penury; for, mark you, the sweetest viands presented to a man before he wants them are apt to prove insipid, or, to one already sated, even nauseous; but create hunger, and even coarser stuff seems honey-sweet.

Theod. How then shall I create this hunger in the heart of my friends?

Soc. In the first place you must not offer or make suggestion of your dainties to jaded appetites until satiety has ceased and starvation cries for alms. Even then shall you make but a faint suggestion to their want, with modest converse—like one who would fain bestow a kindness... and lo! the vision fades and she is gone—until the very pinch of hunger; for the same gifts have then a value unknown before the moment of supreme desire.

Then Theodote: Oh why, Socrates, why are you not by my side (like the huntsman's assistant) to help me catch my friends and lovers?

Soc. That will I be in good sooth if only you can woo and win me.

Theod. How shall I woo and win you?

Soc. Seek and you will find means, if you truly need me.

Theod. Come then in hither and visit me often.

And Socrates, poking sly fun at his own lack of business occupation, answered: Nay, Theodote, leisure is not a commodity in which I largely deal. I have a hundred affairs of my own too, private or public, to occupy me; and then there are my lady-loves, my dear friends, who will not suffer me day or night to leave them, for ever studying to learn love-charms and incantations at my lips.

Theod. Why, are you really versed in those things, Socrates?

Soc. Of course, or else how is it, do you suppose, that Apollodorus here and Antisthenes never leave me; or why have Cebes and Simmias come all the way from Thebes to stay with me? Be assured these things cannot happen without diverse love-charms and incantations and magic wheels.

Theod. I wish you would lend me your magic-wheel, then, and I will set it spinning first of all for you.

Soc. Ah! but I do not wish to be drawn to you. I wish you to come to me.

Theod. Then I will come. Only, will you be “at home” to me?

Soc. Yes, I will welcome you, unless some one still dearer holds me engaged, and I must needs be “not at home.”

XII

Seeing one of those who were with him, a young man, but feeble of body, named Epigenes, he addressed him.

Soc. You have not the athletic appearance of a youth in training, Epigenes.

And he: That may well be, seeing I am an amateur and not in training.

Soc. As little of an amateur, I take it, as any one who ever entered the lists of Olympia, unless you are prepared to make light of that contest for life and death against the public foe which the Athenians will institute when the day comes. And yet they are not a few who, owing to a bad habit of body, either perish outright in the perils of war, or are ignobly saved. Many are they who for the self-same cause are taken prisoners, and being taken must, if it so betide, endure the pains of slavery for the rest of their days; or, after falling into dolorous straits, when they have paid to the uttermost farthing of all, or may be more than the worth of all, that they possess, must drag on a miserable existence in want of the barest necessaries until death release them. Many also are they who gain an evil repute through infirmity of body, being thought to play the coward. Can it be that you despise these penalties affixed to an evil habit? Do you think you could lightly endure them? Far lighter, I imagine, nay, pleasant even by comparison, are the toils which he will undergo who duly cultivates a healthy bodily condition. Or do you maintain that the evil habit is healthier, and in

general more useful than the good? Do you pour contempt upon those blessings which flow from the healthy state? And yet the very opposite of that which befalls the ill attends the sound condition. Does not the very soundness imply at once health and strength? Many a man with no other talisman than this has passed safely through the ordeal of war; stepping, not without dignity, through all its horrors unscathed. Many with no other support than this have come to the rescue of friends, or stood forth as benefactors of their fatherland; whereby they were thought worthy of gratitude, and obtained a great renown and received as a recompense the highest honors of the State; to whom is also reserved a happier and brighter passage through what is left to them of life, and at their death they leave to their children the legacy of a fairer starting-point in the race of life.

Because our city does not practice military training in public, that is no reason for neglecting it in private, but rather a reason for making it a foremost care. For be you assured that there is no contest of any sort, nor any transaction, in which you will be the worse off for being well prepared in body; and in fact there is nothing which men do for which the body is not a help. In every demand, therefore, which can be laid upon the body it is much better that it should be in the best condition; since, even where you might imagine the claims upon the body to be slightest—in the act of reasoning—who does not know the terrible stumbles which are made through being out of health? It suffices to say that forgetfulness, and despondency, and moroseness, and madness take occasion often of ill-health to visit the intellectual faculties so severely as to expel all knowledge from the brain. But he who is in good bodily plight has large security. He runs no risk of incurring any such catastrophe through ill-health at any rate; he has the expectation rather that a good habit must procure consequences the opposite

to those of an evil habit; and surely to this end there is nothing a man in his senses would not undergo.... It is a base thing for a man to wax old in careless self-neglect before he has lifted up his eyes and seen what manner of man he was made to be, in the full perfection of bodily strength and beauty. But these glories are withheld from him who is guilty of self-neglect, for they are not wont to blaze forth unbidden.

XII

Once when some one was in a fury of indignation because he had bidden a passer-by good-day and the salutation was not returned, Socrates said: "It is enough to make one laugh! If you met a man in a wretched condition of body, you would not fall into a rage; but because you stumble upon a poor soul somewhat boorishly disposed, you feel annoyed."

To the remark of another who complained that he did not take his food with pleasure, he said: "Acumenus has a good prescription for that." And when the other asked: "And what may that be?" "To stop eating," he said. "On the score of pleasure, economy, and health, total abstinence has much in its favour."

And when some one else lamented that "the drinking-water in his house was hot," he replied: "Then when you want a warm bath you will not have to wait."

The Other. But for bathing purposes it is cold.

Soc. Do you find that your domestics seem to mind drinking it or washing in it?

The Other. Quite the reverse; it is a constant marvel to me how contentedly they use it for either purpose.

Soc. Which is hotter to the taste—the water in your house or the hot spring in the temple of Asclepius?

The Other. The water in the temple of Asclepius.

Soc. And which is colder for bathing—yours or the cold spring in the cave of Amphiaraus?

The Other. The water in the cave of Amphiaraus.

Soc. Then please to observe: if you do not take care, they will set you down as harder to please than a domestic servant or an invalid.

A man had administered a severe whipping to the slave in attendance on him, and when Socrates asked: “Why he was so wroth with his own serving-man?” excused himself on the ground that “the fellow was a lazy, gourmandizing, good-for-nothing dolt—fonder of money than of work.” To which Socrates: “Did it ever strike you to consider which of the two in that case the more deserves a whipping—the master or the man?”

When some one was apprehending the journey to Olympia, “Why are you afraid of the long distance?” he asked. “Here at home you spend nearly all your day in taking walks. Well, on your road to Olympia you will take a walk and breakfast, and then you will take another walk and dine, and go to bed. Do you not see, if you take and tack together five or six days' length of walks, and stretch them out in one long line, it will soon reach from Athens to Olympia? I would recommend you, however, to set off a day too soon rather than a day too late. To be forced to lengthen the day's journey beyond a reasonable amount may well be a nuisance; but to take one day's journey beyond what is necessary is pure relaxation. Make haste to start, I say, and not while on the road.”

When some one else remarked “he was utterly prostrated after a long journey,” Socrates asked him: “Had he had any baggage to carry?”

“Not I,” replied the complainer; “only my cloak.”

Soc. Were you travelling alone, or was your man-servant with you?

He. Yes, I had my man.

Soc. Empty-handed, or had he something to carry?

He. Of course; carrying my rugs and other baggage.

Soc. And how did he come off on the journey?

He. Better than I did myself, I take it.

Soc. Well, but now suppose you had had to carry his baggage, what would your condition have been like?

He. Sorry enough, I can tell you; or rather, I could not have carried it at all.

Soc. What a confession! Fancy being capable of so much less toil than a poor slave boy! Does that sound like the perfection of athletic training?

XIV

On the occasion of a common dinner-party where some of the company would present themselves with a small, and others with a large supply of viands, Socrates would bid the servants throw the small supplies into the general stock, or else to help each of the party to a share all round. Thus the grand victualers were ashamed in the one case not to share in the common stock, and in the other not to throw in their supplies also. Accordingly in went the grand supplies into the common stock. And now, being no better off than the small contributors, they soon ceased to cater for expensive delicacies.

At a supper-party one member of the company, as Socrates chanced to note, had put aside the plain fare and was devoting himself to certain dainties. A discussion was going on about names and definitions, and the proper applications of terms to things. Whereupon Socrates, appealing to the company: “Can we explain why we call a

man a 'dainty fellow'? What is the particular action to which the term applies?—since every one adds some dainty to his food when he can get it. But we have not quite hit the definition yet, I think. Are we to be called dainty eaters because we like our bread buttered?"

No! hardly! (some member of the company replied).

Soc. Well, but now suppose a man confine himself to eating venison or other dainty without any plain food at all, not as a matter of training, but for the pleasure of it: has such a man earned the title? "The rest of the world would have a poor chance against him," some one answered. "Or," interposed another, "what if the dainty dishes he devours are out of all proportion to the rest of his meal—what of him?"

Soc. He has established a very fair title at any rate to the appellation, and when the rest of the world pray to heaven for a fine harvest: "May our corn and oil increase!" he may reasonably ejaculate, "May my fleshpots multiply!"

At this last sally the young man, feeling that the conversation set somewhat in his direction, did not desist indeed from his savory viands, but helped himself generously to a piece of bread. Socrates was all-observant, and added: Keep an eye on our friend yonder, you others next him, and see fair play between the sop and the sauce.

Another time, seeing one of the company using but one sop of bread to test several savory dishes, he remarked: Could there be a more extravagant style of cookery, or more murderous to the dainty dishes themselves, than this wholesale method of taking so many dishes together?—why, bless me, twenty different sorts of seasoning at one swoop! First of all he mixes up actually more ingredients than the cook himself prescribes, which is extravagant; and secondly, he has the audacity to commingle what the chef holds incongruous, whereby if the cooks are right in their method

he is wrong in his, and consequently the destroyer of their art. Now is it not ridiculous first to procure the greatest virtuosi to cook for us, and then without any claim to their skill to take and alter their procedure? But there is a worse thing in store for the bold man who habituates himself to eat a dozen dishes at once: when there are but few dishes served, out of pure habit he will feel himself half starved, while his neighbor, accustomed to send his sop down by help of a single relish, will feast merrily, be the dishes never so few.

He had a saying that {euokheisthai}, to "make good cheer," was in Attic parlance a synonym for "eating," and the affix {eu} (the attributive "good") connoted the eating of such things as would not trouble soul or body, and were not far to seek or hard to find. So that to "make good cheer" in his vocabulary applied to a modest and well-ordered style of living.

BOOK IV

I

Such was Socrates; so helpful under all circumstances and in every way that no observer, gifted with ordinary sensibility, could fail to appreciate the fact, that to be with Socrates, and to spend long time in his society (no matter where or what the circumstances), was indeed a priceless gain. Even the recollection of him, when he was no longer present, was felt as no small benefit by those who had grown accustomed to be with him, and who accepted him. Nor indeed was he less helpful to his acquaintance in his lighter than in his graver moods.

Let us take as an example that saying of his, so often on his lips: "I am in love with so and so"; and all the while it was obvious the going-forth of his soul was not towards excellence of body in the bloom of beauty, but rather towards faculties of the soul unfolding in virtue. And these "good natures" he detected by certain tokens: a readiness to learn that to which the attention was directed; a power of retaining in the memory the lessons learnt; and a passionate predilection for those studies in particular which serve to good administration of a house or of a state, and in general to the proper handling of man and human affairs. Such beings, he maintained, needed only to be educated to become not only happy themselves and happy administrators of their private households, but to be capable of rendering other human beings as states or individuals happy also.

He had indeed a different way of dealing with different kinds of people. Those who thought they had good natural ability and despised learning he instructed that the most highly-gifted nature stands most in need of training and education; and he would point out how in the case of horses

it is just the spirited and fiery thoroughbred which, if properly broken in as a colt, will develop into a serviceable and superb animal, but if left unbroken will turn out utterly intractable and good for nothing. Or take the case of dogs: a puppy exhibiting that zest for toil and eagerness to attack wild creatures which are the marks of high breeding, will, if well brought up, prove excellent for the chase or for any other useful purpose; but neglect his education and he will turn out a stupid, crazy brute, incapable of obeying the simplest command. It is just the same with human beings; here also the youth of best natural endowments—that is to say, possessing the most robust qualities of spirit and a fixed determination to carry out whatever he has laid his hand to—will, if trained and taught what it is right to do, prove a superlatively good and useful man. He achieves, in fact, what is best upon the grandest scale. But leave him in boorish ignorance untrained, and he will prove not only very bad but very mischievous, and for this reason, that lacking the knowledge to discern what is right to do, he will frequently lay his hand to villainous practices; while the very magnificence and vehemence of his character render it impossible either to rein him in or to turn him aside from his evil courses. Hence in his case also his achievements are on the grandest scale but of the worst.

Or to take the type of person so eaten up with the pride of riches that he conceives himself dispensed from any further need of education—since it is "money makes the man," and his wealth will amply suffice him to carry out his desires and to win honors from admiring humanity. Socrates would bring such people to their senses by pointing out the folly of supposing that without instruction it was possible to draw the line of demarcation between what is gainful and what is hurtful in conduct; and the further folly of supposing that, apart from such discrimination, a man could help

himself by means of wealth alone to whatever he liked or find the path of expediency plain before him; and was it not the most simplicity to suppose that, without the power of laboring profitably, a man can either be doing well or be in any sort of way sufficiently equipped for the battle of life? and again, the most simplicity to suppose that by mere wealth without true knowledge it was possible either to purchase a reputation for some excellence, or without such reputation to gain distinction and celebrity?

II

Or to come to a third kind—the class of people who are persuaded that they have received the best education, and are proud of their wisdom: his manner of dealing with these I will now describe.

Euthydemus “the beautiful” had (Socrates was given to understand) collected a large library, consisting of the most celebrated poets and philosophers, by help of which he already believed himself to be more than a match for his fellows in wisdom, and indeed might presently expect to out-top them all in capacity of speech and action. At first, as Socrates noted, the young man by reason of his youth had not as yet set foot in the agora, but if he had anything to transact, his habit was to seat himself in a saddler's shop hard by. Accordingly to this same saddler's shop Socrates betook himself with some of those who were with him. And first the question was started by some one: “Was it through consorting with the wise, or by his own unaided talent, that Themistocles came so to surpass his fellow-citizens that when the services of a capable man were needed the eyes of the whole community instinctively turned to him?” Socrates, with a view to stirring Euthydemus, answered: There was certainly an ingenuous simplicity in the belief that superiority in arts of comparatively little worth could only be attained by aid of qualified teachers, but that the leadership

of the state, the most important concern of all, was destined to drop into the lap of anybody, no matter whom, like an accidental windfall.

On a subsequent occasion, Euthydemus being present, though, as was plain to see, somewhat disposed to withdraw from the friendly concourse, as if he would choose anything rather than appear to admire Socrates on the score of wisdom, the latter made the following remarks.

Soc. It is clear from his customary pursuits, is it not, sirs, that when our friend Euthydemus here is of full age, and the state propounds some question for solution, he will not abstain from offering the benefit of his advice? One can imagine the pretty exordium to his parliamentary speeches which, in his anxiety not to be thought to have learnt anything from anybody, he has ready for the occasion. Clearly at the outset he will deliver himself thus: "Men of Athens, I have never at any time learnt anything from anybody; nor, if I have ever heard of any one as being an able statesman, well versed in speech and capable of action, have I sought to come across him individually. I have not so much as been at pains to provide myself with a teacher from amongst those who have knowledge; on the contrary, I have persistently avoided, I will not say learning from others, but the very faintest suspicion of so doing. However, anything that occurs to me by the light of nature I shall be glad to place at your disposal."... How appropriate would such a preface sound on the lips of any one seeking, say, the office of state physician, would it not? How advantageously he might begin an address on this wise: "Men of Athens, I have never learnt the art of healing by help of anybody, nor have I sought to provide myself with any teacher among medical men. Indeed, to put it briefly, I have been ever on my guard not only against learning anything from the profession, but against the very notion of having studied medicine at all. If,

however, you will be so good as to confer on me this post, I promise I will do my best to acquire skill by experimenting on your persons." Every one present laughed at the exordium (and there the matter dropped).

Presently, when it became apparent that Euthydemus had got so far that he was disposed to pay attention to what was said, though he was still at pains not to utter a sound himself, as if he hoped by silence to attach to himself some reputation for sagacity, Socrates, wishing to cure him of that defect, proceeded.

Soc. Is it not surprising that people anxious to learn to play the harp or the flute, or to ride, or to become proficient in any like accomplishment, are not content to work unremittingly in private by themselves at whatever it is in which they desire to excel, but they must sit at the feet of the best-esteemed teachers, doing all things and enduring all things for the sake of following the judgment of those teachers in everything, as though they themselves could not otherwise become famous; whereas, among those who aspire to become eminent politically as orators and statesmen, there are some who cannot see why they should not be able to do all that politics demand, at a moment's notice, by inspiration as it were, without any preliminary pains or preparations whatever? And yet it would appear that the latter concerns must be more difficult of achievement than the former, in proportion as there are more competitors in the field but fewer who reach the goal of their ambition, which is as much as to say that a more sustained effort of attention is needed on the part of those who embark upon the sea of politics than is elsewhere called for.

Such were the topics on which Socrates was wont in the early days of their association to dilate in the hearing of Euthydemus; but when the philosopher perceived that the youth not only could tolerate the turns of the discussion

more readily but was now become a somewhat eager listener, he went to the saddler's shop alone, and when Euthydemus was seated by his side the following conversation took place.

Soc. Pray tell me, Euthydemus, is it really true what people tell me, that you have made a large collection of the writings of “the wise,” as they are called?

Euthydemus answered: Quite true, Socrates, and I mean to go on collecting until I possess all the books I can possibly lay hold of.

Soc. By Hera! I admire you for wishing to possess treasures of wisdom rather than of gold and silver, which shows that you do not believe gold and silver to be the means of making men better, but that the thoughts of the wise alone enrich with virtue their possessions.

And Euthydemus was glad when he heard that saying, for, thought he to himself, “In the eyes of Socrates I am on the high road to the acquisition of wisdom.” But the latter, perceiving him to be pleased with the praise, continued.

Soc. And what is it in which you desire to excel, Euthydemus, that you collect books?

And when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should make, Socrates added: Possibly you want to be a great doctor? Why, the prescriptions of the Pharmacopoeia would form a pretty large library by themselves.

No, indeed, not I! (answered Euthydemus).

Soc. Then do you wish to be an architect? That too implies a man of well-stored wit and judgment.

I have no such ambition (he replied).

Soc. Well, do you wish to be a mathematician, like Theodorus?

Euth. No, nor yet a mathematician.

Soc. Then do you wish to be an astronomer? or (as the youth signified dissent) possibly a rhapsodist? (he asked), for I am told you have the entire works of Homer in your possession.

Nay, God forbid! not I! (ejaculated the youth). Rhapsodists have a very exact acquaintance with epic poetry, I know, of course; but they are empty-pated creatures enough themselves.

At last Socrates said: Can it be, Euthydemus, that you are an aspirant to that excellence through which men become statesmen and administrators fit to rule and apt to benefit the rest of the world and themselves?

Yes (replied he), that is the excellence I desire—beyond measure.

Upon my word (said Socrates), then you have indeed selected as the object of your ambition the noblest of virtues and the greatest of the arts, for this is the property of kings, and is entitled "royal"; but (he continued) have you considered whether it is possible to excel in these matters without being just and upright?

Euth. Certainly I have, and I say that without justice and uprightness it is impossible to be a good citizen.

No doubt (replied Socrates) you have accomplished that initial step?

Euth. Well, Socrates, I think I could hold my own against all comers as an upright man.

And have upright men (continued Socrates) their distinctive and appropriate works like those of carpenters or shoe-makers?

Euth. To be sure they have.

Soc. And just as the carpenter is able to exhibit his works and products, the righteous man should be able to expound and set forth his, should he not?

I see (replied Euthydemus) you are afraid I cannot expound the works of righteousness! Why, bless me! of course I can, and the works of unrighteousness into the bargain, since there are not a few of that sort within reach of eye and ear every day.

Shall we then (proceeded Socrates) write the letter R on this side, and on that side the letter W; and then anything that appears to us to be the product of righteousness we will place to the R account, and anything which appears to be the product of wrong-doing and iniquity to the account of W?

By all means do so (he answered), if you think that it assists matters.

Accordingly Socrates drew the letters, as he had suggested, and continued.

Soc. Lying exists among men, does it not?

Euth. Certainly.

To which side of the account then shall we place it? (he asked).

Euth. Clearly on the side of wrong and injustice.

Soc. Deceit too is not uncommon?

Euth. By no means.

Soc. To which side shall we place deceit?

Euth. Deceit clearly on the side of wrong.

Soc. Well, and chicanery or mischief of any sort?

Euth. That too.

Soc. And the enslavement of free-born men?

Euth. That too.

Soc. And we cannot allow any of these to lie on the R side of the account, to the side of right and justice, can we, Euthydemus?

It would be monstrous (he replied).

Soc. Very good. But supposing a man to be elected general, and he succeeds in enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile state, are we to say that he is doing wrong?

Euth. By no means.

Soc. Shall we not admit that he is doing what is right?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. Again, suppose he deceives the foe while at war with them?

Euth. That would be all fair and right also.

Soc. Or steals and pillages their property? would he not be doing what is right?

Euth. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the question to the case of friends.

Soc. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now have to be placed to the credit of Right?

Euth. Apparently.

Soc. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a new definition—that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it is wrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it behooves us to be as straightforward as possible.

I quite assent (replied Euthydemus).

So far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his troops demoralized, were to invent a tale to the effect that reinforcements were coming, and by means of this false statement should revive the courage of his men, to which of the two accounts shall we place that act of fraud?

On the side of right, to my notion (he replied).

Soc. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of medicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by an act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to eat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which account shall we set down this fraud?

Euth. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account.

Soc. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and you are afraid he will make away with himself—accordingly you rob him of his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set the theft?

Euth. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behavior.

Soc. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?

Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind my former statement.

Soc. Allow you! Of course you may—anything rather than make a false entry on our lists.... But there is just another point we ought not to leave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to his detriment: which is the more wrongful—to do so voluntarily or unintentionally?

Euth. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers, for all my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I first supposed them. Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the intentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary.

Soc. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right and Justice just as there is of letters and grammar?

Euth. That is my opinion.

Soc. And which should you say was more a man of letters—he who intentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?

Euth. He who does so intentionally, I should say, because he can spell or read correctly whenever he chooses.

Soc. Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the involuntary offender is an illiterate?

Euth. True, he must be. I do not see how to escape from that conclusion.

Soc. And which of the two knows what is right—he who intentionally lies and deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously?

Euth. Clearly he does.

Euth. The intentional and conscious liar clearly.

Soc. Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who has the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such knowledge?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And he who has the {episteme} of things rightful is more righteous than he who lacks the {episteme}?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And, on the other, he who has the knowledge of what is right is more righteous than he who lacks that knowledge?

Euth. I suppose it is, but for the life of me I cannot make head or tail of my own admission.

Soc. Well (look at it like this). Suppose a man to be anxious to speak the truth, but he is never able to hold the same language about a thing for two minutes together. First he says: “The road is towards the east,” and then he says, “No, it's towards the west”; or, running up a column of figures, now he makes the product this, and again he makes

it that, now more, now less—what do you think of such a man?

Euth. Heaven help us! clearly he does not know what he thought he knew.

Soc. And you know the appellation given to certain people—"slavish," or, "little better than a slave?"

Euth. I do.

Soc. Is it a term suggestive of the wisdom or the ignorance of those to whom it is applied?

Euth. Clearly of their ignorance.

Soc. Ignorance, for instance, of smithing?

Euth. No, certainly not.

Soc. Then possibly ignorance of carpentering?

Euth. No, nor yet ignorance of carpentering.

Soc. Well, ignorance of shoemaking?

Euth. No, nor ignorance of any of these: rather the reverse, for the majority of those who do know just these matters are "little better than slaves."

Soc. You mean it is a title particularly to those who are ignorant of the beautiful, the good, the just?

It is, in my opinion (he replied).

Soc. Then we must in every way strain every nerve to avoid the imputation of being slaves?

Euth. Nay, Socrates, by all that is holy, I did flatter myself that at any rate I was a student of philosophy, and on the right road to be taught everything essential to one who would fain make beauty and goodness his pursuit. So that now you may well imagine my despair when, for all my pains expended, I cannot even answer the questions put to me about what most of all a man should know; and there is no path of progress open to me, no avenue of improvement left.

Thereupon Socrates: Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?

Yes, certainly; twice (said he).

Soc. And did you notice an inscription somewhere on the temple: {GNOMI SEAUTON}—KNOW THYSELF?

Euth. I did.

Soc. Did you, possibly, pay no regard to the inscription? or did you give it heed and try to discover who and what you were?

I can safely say I did not (he answered). That much I made quite sure I knew, at any rate; since if I did not know even myself, what in the world did I know?

Soc. Can a man be said, do you think, to know himself who knows his own name and nothing more? or must he not rather set to work precisely like the would-be purchaser of a horse, who certainly does not think that he has got the knowledge he requires until he has discovered whether the beast is tractable or stubborn, strong or weak, quick or slow, and how it stands with the other points, serviceable or the reverse, in reference to the use and purpose of a horse? So, I say, must a man in like manner interrogate his own nature in reference to a man's requirements, and learn to know his own capacities, must he not?

Euth. Yes, so it strikes me: he who knows not his own ability knows not himself.

Soc. And this too is plain, is it not: that through self-knowledge men meet with countless blessings, and through ignorance of themselves with many evils? Because, the man who knows himself knows what is advantageous to himself; he discerns the limits of his powers, and by doing what he knows, he provides himself with what he needs and so does well; or, conversely, by holding aloof from what he knows not, he avoids mistakes and thereby mishaps. And having

now a test to gauge other human beings he uses their need as a stepping-stone to provide himself with good and to avoid evil. Whereas he who does not know himself, but is mistaken as to his own capacity, is in like predicament to the rest of mankind and all human matters else; he neither knows what he wants, nor what he is doing, nor the people whom he deals with; and being all abroad in these respects, he misses what is good and becomes involved in what is ill.

Again, he that knows what he is doing through the success of his performance attains to fame and honor; his peers and co-mates are glad to make use of him, while his less successful neighbors, failing in their affairs, are anxious to secure his advice, his guidance, his protection; they place their hopes of happiness in him, and for all these causes single him out as the chief object of their affection. He, on the contrary, who knows not what he does, who chooses amiss and fails in what he puts his hands to, not only incurs loss and suffers chastisement through his blunders, but step by step loses reputation and becomes a laughing-stock, and in the end is doomed to a life of dishonor and contempt.

What is true of individuals is true also of communities. That state which in ignorance of its power goes to war with a stronger than itself ends by being uprooted or else reduced to slavery.

Thereupon Euthydemus: Be assured I fully concur in your opinion; the precept KNOW THYSELF cannot be too highly valued; but what is the application? What the starting-point of self-examination? I look to you for an explanation, if you would kindly give one.

Well (replied Socrates), I presume you know quite well the distinction between good and bad things: your knowledge may be relied upon so far?

Why, yes, to be sure (replied the youth); for without that much discernment I should indeed be worse than any slave.

Come then (said he), do you give me an explanation of the things so termed.

That is fortunately not hard (replied the youth). First of all, health in itself I hold to be a good, and disease in itself an evil; and in the next place the sources of either of those aforementioned, meats and drinks, and habits of life, I regard as good or evil according as they contribute either to health or to disease.

Soc. Then health and disease themselves when they prove to be sources of any good are good, but when of any evil, evil?

And when (asked he), can health be a source of evil, or disease a source of good?

Why, bless me! often enough (replied Socrates). In the event, for instance, of some ill-starred expedition or of some disastrous voyage or other incident of the sort, of which veritably there are enough to spare—when those who owing to their health and strength take a part in the affair are lost; while those who were left behind—as hors de combat, on account of ill-health of other feebleness—are saved.

Euth. Yes, you are right; but you will admit that there are advantages to be got from strength and lost through weakness.

Soc. Even so; but ought we to regard those things which at one moment benefit and at another moment injure us in any strict sense good rather than evil?

Euth. No, certainly not, according to that line of argument. But wisdom, Socrates, you must on your side admit, is irrefragably a good; since there is nothing which or in which a wise man would not do better than a fool.

Soc. What say you? Have you never heard of Daedalus, how he was seized by Minos on account of his wisdom, and forced to be his slave, and robbed of fatherland and freedom at one swoop? and how, while endeavoring to make his escape with his son, he caused the boy's death without effecting his own salvation, but was carried off among barbarians and again enslaved?

Yes, I know the old story (he answered).

Soc. Or have you not heard of the “woes of Palamedes,” that commonest theme of song, how for his wisdom's sake Odysseus envied him and slew him?

Euth. That tale also is current.

Soc. And how many others, pray, do you suppose have been seized on account of their wisdom, and dispatched to the great king and at his court enslaved?

Well, prosperity, well-being (he exclaimed), must surely be a blessing, and that the most indisputable, Socrates?

It might be so (replied the philosopher) if it chanced not to be in itself a compound of other questionable blessings.

Euth. And which among the components of happiness and well-being can possibly be questionable?

None (he retorted), unless of course we are to include among these components beauty, or strength, or wealth, or reputation, or anything else of that kind?

Euth. By heaven! of course we are to include these, for what would happiness be without these?

Soc. By heaven! yes; only then we shall be including the commonest sources of mischief which befall mankind. How many are ruined by their fair faces at the hand of admirers driven to distraction by the sight of beauty in its bloom! how many, tempted by their strength to essay deeds beyond their power, are involved in no small evils! how many, rendered

effeminate by reason of their wealth, have been plotted against and destroyed! how many through fame and political power have suffered a world of woe!

Well (the youth replied) if I am not even right in praising happiness, I must confess I know not for what one ought to supplicate the gods in prayer.

Nay, these are matters (proceeded Socrates) which perhaps, through excessive confidence in your knowledge of them, you have failed to examine into; but since the state, which you are preparing yourself to direct, is democratically constituted, of course you know what a democracy is.

Euth. I presume I do, decidedly.

Soc. Well, now, is it possible to know what a popular state is without knowing who the people are?

Euth. Certainly not.

Soc. And whom do you consider to be the people?

Euth. The poor citizens, I should say.

Soc. Then you know who the poor are, of course?

Euth. Of course I do.

Soc. I presume you also know who the rich are?

Euth. As certainly as I know who are the poor.

Soc. Whom do you understand by poor and rich?

Euth. By poor I mean those who have not enough to pay for their necessaries, and by rich those who have more means than sufficient for all their needs.

Soc. Have you noticed that some who possess a mere pittance not only find this sufficient, but actually succeed in getting a surplus out of it; while others do not find a large fortune large enough?

I have, most certainly; and I thank you for the reminder (replied Euthydemus). One has heard of crowned heads and

despotic rulers being driven by want to commit misdeeds like the most paupers.

Then, if that is how matters stand (continued Socrates), we must class these same crowned heads with the commonalty; and some possessors of scant fortunes, provided they are good economists, with the wealthy?

Then Euthydemus: It is the poverty of my own wit which forces me to this admission. I bethink me it is high time to keep silence altogether; a little more, and I shall be proved to know absolutely nothing. And so he went away crestfallen, in an agony of self-contempt, persuaded that he was verily and indeed no better than a slave.

Amongst those who were reduced to a like condition by Socrates, many refused to come near him again, whom he for his part looked upon as dolts and dullards. But Euthydemus had the wit to understand that, in order to become worthy of account, his best plan was to associate as much as possible with Socrates; and from that moment, save for some necessity, he never left him—in some points even imitating him in his habits and pursuits. Socrates, on his side, seeing that this was the young man's disposition, disturbed him as little as possible, but in the simplest and plainest manner initiated him into everything which he held to be needful to know or important to practice.

III

It may be inferred that Socrates was in no hurry for those who were with him to discover capacities for speech and action or as inventive geniuses, without at any rate a well-laid foundation of self-control. For those who possessed such abilities without these same saving virtues would, he believed, only become worse men with greater power for mischief. His first object was to instill into those who were with him a wise spirit in their relation to the gods. That such

was the tenor of his conversation in dealing with men may be seen from the narratives of others who were present on some particular occasion. I confine myself to a particular discussion with Euthydemus at which I was present.

Socrates said: Tell me, Euthydemus, has it ever struck you to observe what tender pains the gods have taken to furnish man with all his needs?

Euth. No indeed, I cannot say that it has ever struck me.

Well (Socrates continued), you do not need to be reminded that, in the first place, we need light, and with light the gods supply us.

Euth. Most true, and if we had not got it we should, as far as our own eyes could help us, be like men born blind.

Soc. And then, again, seeing that we stand in need of rest and relaxation, they bestow upon us “the blessed balm of silent night.”

Yes (he answered), we are much beholden for that boon.

Soc. Then, forasmuch as the sun in his splendor makes manifest to us the hours of the day and bathes all things in brightness, but anon night in her darkness obliterates distinctions, have they not displayed aloft the starry orbs, which inform us of the watches of the night, whereby we can accomplish many of our needs?

It is so (he answered).

Soc. And let us not forget that the moon herself not only makes clear to us the quarters of the night, but of the month also?

Certainly (he answered).

Soc. And what of this: that whereas we need nutriment, this too the heavenly powers yield us? Out of earth's bosom they cause good to spring up for our benefit; and for our benefit provide appropriate seasons to furnish us in turn not

only with the many and diverse objects of need, but with the sources also of our joy and gladness?

Yes (he answered eagerly), these things bear token truly to a love for man.

Soc. Well, and what of another priceless gift, that of water, which conspires with earth and the seasons to give both birth and increase to all things useful to us; nay, which helps to nurture our very selves, and commingling with all that feeds us, renders it more digestible, more wholesome, and more pleasant to the taste; and mark you in proportion to the abundance of our need the superabundance of its supply. What say you concerning such a boon?

Euth. In this again I see a sign of providential care.

Soc. And then the fact that the same heavenly power has provided us with fire—our assistant against cold, our auxiliary in darkness, our fellow-workman in every art and every instrument which for the sake of its utility mortal man may invent or furnish himself withal. What of this, since, to put it compendiously, there is nothing serviceable to the life of man worth speaking of but owes its fabrication to fire?

Euth. Yes, a transcendent instance of benevolent design.

Soc. Again, consider the motions of the Sun, how when he has turned him about in winter he again draws nigh to us, ripening some fruits, and causing others whose time is past to dry up; how when he has fulfilled his work he comes no closer, but turns away as if in fear to scorch us to our hurt unduly; and again, when he has reached a point where if he should prolong his retreat we should plainly be frozen to death with cold, note how he turns him about and resumes his approach, traversing that region of the heavens where he may shed his genial influence best upon us.

Yes, upon my word (he answered), these occurrences bear the impress of being so ordered for the sake of man.

Soc. And then, again, it being manifest that we could not endure either scorching heat or freezing cold if they came suddenly upon us, note how gradually the sun approaches, and how gradually recedes, so that we fail to notice how we come at last to either extreme.

For my part (he replied), the question forces itself upon my mind, whether the gods have any other occupation save only to minister to man; and I am only hindered from saying so, because the rest of animals would seem to share these benefits along with man.

Soc. Why, to be sure; and is it not plain that these animals themselves are born and bred for the sake of man? At any rate, no living creature save man derives so many of his enjoyments from sheep and goats, horses and cattle and asses, and other animals. He is more dependent, I should suppose, on these than even on plants and vegetables. At any rate, equally with these latter they serve him as means of subsistence or articles of commerce; indeed, a large portion of the human family do not use the products of the soil as food at all, but live on the milk and cheese and flesh of their flocks and herds, while all men everywhere tame and domesticate the more useful kinds of animals, and turn them to account as fellow-workers in war and for other purposes.

Yes, I cannot but agree with what you say (he answered), when I see that animals so much stronger than man become so subservient to his hand that he can use them as he lists.

Soc. And as we reflect on the infinite beauty and utility and the variety of nature, what are we to say of the fact that man has been endowed with sensibilities which correspond with this diversity, whereby we take our fill of every blessing; or, again, this implanted faculty of reasoning, which enables us to draw inferences concerning the things which we

perceive, and by aid of memory to understand how each set of things may be turned to our good, and to devise countless contrivances with a view to enjoying the good and repelling the evil; or lastly, when we consider the faculty bestowed upon us of interpretative speech, by which we are enabled to instruct one another, and to participate in all the blessings fore-named: to form societies, to establish laws, and to enter upon a civilized existence—what are we to think?

Euth. Yes, Socrates, decidedly it would appear that the gods do manifest a great regard, nay, a tender care, towards mankind.

Soc. Well, and what do you make of the fact that where we are powerless to take advantageous forethought for our future, at this stage they themselves lend us their co-operation, imparting to the inquirer through divination knowledge of events about to happen, and instructing him by what means they may best be turned to good account?

Euth. Ay, and you, Socrates, they would seem to treat in a more friendly manner still than the rest of men, if, without waiting even to be inquired of by you, they show you by signs beforehand what you must, and what you must not do.

Soc. Yes, and you will discover for yourself the truth of what I say, if, without waiting to behold the outward and visible forms of the gods themselves, you will be content to behold their works; and with these before you, to worship and honor the Divine authors of them. I would have you reflect that the very gods themselves suggest this teaching. Not one of these but gives us freely of his blessings; yet they do not step from behind their veil in order to grant one single boon. And pre-eminently He who orders and holds together the universe, in which are all things beautiful and good; who fashions and refashions it to never-ending use unworn,

keeping it free from sickness or decay, so that swifter than thought it ministers to his will unerringly—this God is seen to perform the mightiest operations, but in the actual administration of the same abides himself invisible to mortal ken. Reflect further, this Sun above our heads, so visible to all—as we suppose—will not suffer man to regard him too narrowly, but should any essay to watch him with a shameless stare he will snatch away their power of vision. And if the gods themselves are thus unseen, so too shall you find their ministers to be hidden also; from the height of heaven above the thunderbolt is plainly hurled, and triumphs over all that it encounters, yet it is all-invisible, no eye may detect its coming or its going at the moment of its swoop. The winds also are themselves unseen, though their works are manifest, and through their approach we are aware of them. And let us not forget, the soul of man himself, which if aught else human shares in the divine—however manifestly enthroned within our bosom, is as wholly as the rest hidden from our gaze. These things you should lay to mind, and not despise the invisible ones, but learn to recognize their power, as revealed in outward things, and to know the divine influence.

Nay, Socrates (replied Euthydemus), there is no danger I shall turn a deaf ear to the divine influence even a little; of that I am not afraid, but I am out of heart to think that no soul of man may ever requite the kindness of the gods with fitting gratitude.

Be not out of heart because of that (he said); you know what answer the god at Delphi makes to each one who comes asking “how shall I return thanks to heaven?”—”According to the law and custom of your city”; and this, I presume, is law and custom everywhere that a man should please the gods with offerings according to the ability which is in him. How then should a man honor the gods with more beautiful

or holier honor than by doing what they bid him? but he must in no wise slacken or fall short of his ability, for when a man so does, it is manifest, I presume, that at the moment he is not honoring the gods. You must then honor the gods, not with shortcoming but according to your ability; and having so done, be of good cheer and hope to receive the greatest blessings. For where else should a man of sober sense look to receive great blessings if not from those who are able to help him most, and how else should he hope to obtain them save by seeking to please his helper, and how may he hope to please his helper better than by yielding him the amplest obedience?

By such words—and conduct corresponding to his words—did Socrates mould and fashion the hearts of his companions, making them at once more devout and more virtuous.

IV

But indeed with respect to justice and uprightness he not only made no secret of the opinion he held, but gave practical demonstration of it, both in private by his law-abiding and helpful behavior to all, and in public by obeying the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined, whether in the life of the city or in military service, so that he was a pattern of loyalty to the rest of the world, and on three several occasions in particular: first, when as president (Epistates) of the assembly he would not suffer the sovereign people to take an unconstitutional vote, but ventured, on the side of the laws, to resist a current of popular feeling strong enough, I think, to have daunted any other man. Again, when the Thirty tried to lay some injunction on him contrary to the laws, he refused to obey, as for instance when they forbade his conversing with the young; or again, when they ordered him and certain other citizens to arrest a man to be put to death, he stood out single-handed on the ground that the

injunctions laid upon him were contrary to the laws. And lastly, when he appeared as defendant in the suit instituted by Meletus, notwithstanding that it was customary for litigants in the law courts to humor the judges in the conduct of their arguments by flattery and supplications contrary to the laws, notwithstanding also that defendants owed their acquittal by the court to the employment of such methods, he refused to do a single thing however habitual in a court of law which was not strictly legal; and though by only a slight deflection from the strict path he might easily have been acquitted by his judges, he preferred to abide by the laws and die rather than transgress them and live.

These views he frequently maintained in conversation, now with one and now with another, and one particular discussion with Hippias of Elis on the topic of justice and uprightness has come to my knowledge.

Hippias had just arrived at Athens after a long absence, and chanced to be present when Socrates was telling some listeners how astonishing it was that if a man wanted to get another taught to be a shoemaker or carpenter or coppersmith or horseman, he would have no doubt where to send him for the purpose: “People say,” he added, “that if a man wants to get his horse or his ox taught in the right way, the world is full of instructors; but if he would learn himself, or have his son or his slave taught in the way of right, he cannot tell where to find such instruction.”

Yes (answered Socrates), and what is still more strange, Hippias, it is not only the same old talk but about the same old subjects. Now you, I daresay, through versatility of knowledge, never say the same thing twice over on the same subject?

To be sure (he answered), my Endeavour is to say something new on all occasions.

What (he asked) about things which you know, as for instance in a case of spelling, if any one asks you, “How many letters in Socrates, and what is their order?” I suppose you try to run off one string of letters to-day and to-morrow another? or to a question of arithmetic, “Does twice five make ten?” your answer to-day will differ from that of yesterday?

Hipp. No; on these topics, Socrates, I do as you do and repeat myself. However, to revert to justice (and uprightness), I flatter myself I can at present furnish you with some remarks which neither you nor any one else will be able to controvert.

By Hera! (he exclaimed), what a blessing to have discovered! Now we shall have no more divisions of opinion on points of right and wrong; judges will vote unanimously; citizens will cease wrangling; there will be no more litigation, no more party faction, states will reconcile their differences, and wars are ended. For my part I do not know how I can tear myself away from you, until I have heard from your own lips all about the grand discovery you have made.

You shall hear all in good time (Hippias answered), but not until you make a plain statement of your own belief. What is justice? We have had enough of your ridiculing all the rest of the world, questioning and cross-examining first one and then the other, but never a bit will you render an account to any one yourself or state a plain opinion upon a single topic.

What, Hippias (Socrates retorted), have you not observed that I am in a chronic condition of proclaiming what I regard as just and upright?

Hipp. And pray what is this theory of yours on the subject? Let us have it in words.

Soc. If I fail to proclaim it in words, at any rate I do so in deed and in fact. Or do you not think that a fact is worth more as evidence than a word?

Worth far more, I should say (Hippias answered), for many a man with justice and right on his lips commits injustice and wrong, but no doer of right ever was a wrong doer or could possibly be.

Soc. I ask then, have you ever heard or seen or otherwise perceived me bearing false witness or lodging malicious information, or stirring up strife among friends or political dissension in the city, or committing any other unjust and wrongful act?

No, I cannot say that I have (he answered).

Soc. And do you not regard it as right and just to abstain from wrong?

Hipp. Now you are caught, Socrates, plainly trying to escape from a plain statement. When asked what you believe justice to be, you keep telling us not what the just man does, but what he does not do.

Why, I thought for my part (answered Socrates) that the refusal to do wrong and injustice was a sufficient warrant in itself of righteousness and justice, but if you do not agree, see if this pleases you better: I assert that what is "lawful" is "just and righteous."

Do you mean to assert (he asked) that lawful and just are synonymous terms?

Soc. I do.

I ask (Hippias added), for I do not perceive what you mean by lawful, nor what you mean by just.

Soc. You understand what is meant by laws of a city or state?

Yes (he answered).

Soc. What do you take them to be?

Hipp. The several enactments drawn up by the citizens or members of a state in agreement as to what things should be done or left undone.

Then I presume (Socrates continued) that a member of a state who regulates his life in accordance with these enactments will be law-abiding, while the transgressor of the same will be law-less?

Certainly (he answered).

Soc. And I presume the law-loving citizen will do what is just and right, while the lawless man will do what is unjust and wrong?

Hipp. Certainly.

Soc. And I presume that he who does what is just is just, and he who does what is unjust is unjust?

Hipp. Of course.

Soc. It would appear, then, that the law-loving man is just, and the lawless unjust?

Then Hippias: Well, but laws, Socrates, how should any one regard as a serious matter either the laws themselves, or obedience to them, which laws the very people who made them are perpetually rejecting and altering?

Which is also true of war (Socrates replied); cities are perpetually undertaking war and then making peace again.

Most true (he answered).

Soc. If so, what is the difference between depreciating obedience to law because laws will be repealed, and depreciating good discipline in war because peace will one day be made? But perhaps you object to enthusiasm displayed in defense of one's home and fatherland in war?

No, indeed I do not! I heartily approve of it (he answered).

Soc. Then have you laid to heart the lesson taught by Lycurgus to the Lacedaemonians, and do you understand that if he succeeded in giving Sparta a distinction above other states, it was only by instilling into her, beyond all else, a spirit of obedience to the laws? And among magistrates and rulers in the different states, you would scarcely refuse the palm of superiority to those who best contribute to make their fellow-citizens obedient to the laws? And you would admit that any particular state in which obedience to the laws is the paramount distinction of the citizens flourishes most in peace time, and in time of war is irresistible? But, indeed, of all the blessings which a state may enjoy, none stands higher than the blessing of unanimity. "Concord among citizens"—that is the constant theme of exhortation emphasized by the councils of elders and by the choice spirits of the community; at all times and everywhere through the length and breadth of all Hellas it is an established law that the citizens be bound together by an oath of concord; everywhere they do actually swear this oath; not of course as implying that citizens shall all vote for the same choruses, or give their plaudits to the same flute-players, or choose the same poets, or limit themselves to the same pleasures, but simply that they shall pay obedience to the laws, since in the end that state will prove most powerful and most prosperous in which the citizens abide by these; but without concord neither can a state be well administered nor a household well organized.

And if we turn to private life, what better protection can a man have than obedience to the laws? This shall be his safeguard against penalties, his guarantee of honors at the hands of the community; it shall be a clue to thread his way through the mazes of the law courts unbewildered, secure against defeat, assured of victory. It is to him, the law-loving citizen, that men will turn in confidence when seeking a

guardian of the most sacred deposits, be it of money or be it their sons or daughters. He, in the eyes of the state collectively, is trustworthy—he and no other; who alone may be depended on to render to all alike their dues—to parents and kinsmen and servants, to friends and fellow-citizens and foreigners. This is he whom the enemy will soonest trust to arrange an armistice, or a truce, or a treaty of peace. They would like to become the allies of this man, and to fight on his side. This is he to whom the allies of his country will most confidently entrust the command of their forces, or of a garrison, or their states themselves. This, again, is he who may be counted on to recompense kindness with gratitude, and who, therefore, is more sure of kindly treatment than another whose sense of gratitude is fuller. The most desirable among friends, the enemy of all others to be avoided, clearly he is not the person whom a foreign state would choose to go to war with; encompassed by a host of friends and exempt from foes, his very character has a charm to compel friendship and alliance, and before him hatred and hostility melt away.

And now, Hippias, I have done my part; that is my proof and demonstration that the "lawful" and "law-observant" are synonymous with the "upright" and the "just"; do you, if you hold a contrary view, instruct us.

Then Hippias: Nay, upon my soul, Socrates, I am not aware of holding any contrary opinion to what you have uttered on the theme of justice.

Soc. But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws?

Yes (he answered), those held in every part of the world, and in the same sense.

Can you then assert (asked Socrates) of these unwritten laws that men made them?

Nay, how (he answered) should that be, for how could they all have come together from the ends of the earth? and even if they had so done, men are not all of one speech?

Soc. Whom then do you believe to have been the makers of these laws.

Hipp. For my part, I think that the gods must have made these laws for men, and I take it as proof that first and foremost it is a law and custom everywhere to worship and reverence the gods.

Soc. And, I presume, to honor parents is also customary everywhere?

Yes, that too (he answered).

Soc. And, I presume, also the prohibition of intermarriage between parents and children?

Hipp. No; at that point I stop, Socrates. That does not seem to me to be a law of God.

Now, why? (he asked).

Because I perceive it is not infrequently transgressed (he answered).

Soc. Well, but there are a good many other things which people do contrary to law; only the penalty, I take it, affixed to the transgression of the divine code is certain; there is no escape for the offender after the manner in which a man may transgress the laws of man with impunity, slipping through the fingers of justice by stealth, or avoiding it by violence.

Hipp. And what is the inevitable penalty paid by those who, being related as parents and children, intermingle in marriage?

Soc. The greatest of all penalties; for what worse calamity can human beings suffer in the production of offspring than to misbeget?

Hipp. But how or why should they breed them ill where nothing hinders them, being of a good stock themselves and producing from stock as good?

Soc. Because, forsooth, in order to produce good children, it is not simply necessary that the parents should be good and of a good stock, but that both should be equally in the prime and vigor of their bodies. Do you suppose that the seed of those who are at their prime is like theirs who either have not yet reached their prime, or whose prime has passed?

Hipp. No, it is reasonable to expect that the seed will differ.

Soc. And for the better—which?

Hipp. Theirs clearly who are at their prime.

Soc. It would seem that the seed of those who are not yet in their prime or have passed their prime is not good?

Hipp. It seems most improbable it should be.

Soc. Then the right way to produce children is not that way?

Hipp. No, that is not the right way.

Soc. Then children who are so produced are produced not as they ought to be?

Hipp. So it appears to me.

What offspring then (he asked) will be ill produced, ill begotten, and ill born, if not these?

I subscribe to that opinion also (replied Hippias).

Soc. Well, it is a custom universally respected, is it not, to return good for good, and kindness with kindness?

Hipp. Yes, a custom, but one which again is apt to be transgressed.

Soc. Then he that so transgresses it pays penalty in finding himself isolated; bereft of friends who are good, and driven to seek after those who love him not. Or is it not so

that he who does me kindness in my intercourse with him is my good friend, but if I requite not this kindness to my benefactor, I am hated by him for my ingratitude, and yet I must needs pursue after him and cling to him because of the great gain to me of his society?

Hipp. Yes, Socrates. In all these cases, I admit, there is an implication of divine authority; that a law should in itself be loaded with the penalty of its transgression does suggest to my mind a higher than human type of legislator.

Soc. And in your opinion, Hippias, is the legislation of the gods just and righteous, or the reverse of what is just and righteous?

Hipp. Not the reverse of what is just and righteous, Socrates, God forbid! for scarcely could any other legislate aright, of not God himself.

Soc. It would seem then, Hippias, the gods themselves are well pleased that "the lawful" and "the just" should be synonymous?

By such language and by such conduct, through example and precept alike, he helped to make those who approached him more upright and more just.

V

And now I propose to show in what way he made those who were with him more vigorous in action. In the first place, as befitted one whose creed was that a basis of self-command is indispensable to any noble performance, he manifested himself to his companions as one who had pre-eminently disciplined himself; and in the next place by conversation and discussion he encouraged them to a like self-restraint beyond all others. Thus it was that he continued ever mindful himself, and was continually reminding all whom he encountered, of matters conducive to virtue; as the following discussion with Euthydemus,

which has come to my knowledge, will serve to illustrate—the topic of the discussion being self-command.

Tell me, Euthydemus (he began), do you believe freedom to be a noble and magnificent acquisition, whether for a man or for a state?

I cannot conceive a nobler or more magnificent (he answered).

Soc. Then do you believe him to be a free man who is ruled by the pleasures of the body, and thereby cannot perform what is best?

Certainly not (he answered).

Soc. No! for possibly to perform what is best appears to you to savor of freedom? And, again, to have some one over you who will prevent you doing the like seems a loss of freedom?

Most decidedly (he answered).

Soc. It would seem you are decidedly of opinion that the incontinent are the reverse of free?

Euth. Upon my word, I much suspect so.

Soc. And does it appear to you that the incontinent man is merely hindered from doing what is noblest, or that further he is impelled to do what is most shameful?

Euth. I think he is as much driven to the one as he is hindered from the other.

Soc. And what sort of lords and masters are those, think you, who at once put a stop to what is best and enforce what is worst?

Euth. Goodness knows, they must be the very worst of masters.

Soc. And what sort of slavery do you take to be the worst?

I should say (he answered) slavery to the worst masters.

It would seem then (pursued Socrates) that the incontinent man is bound over to the worst sort of slavery, would it not?

So it appears to be (the other answered).

Soc. And does it not appear to you that this same beldame incontinence shuts out wisdom, which is the best of all things, from mankind, and plunges them into the opposite? Does it not appear to you that she hinders men from attending to things which will be of use and benefit, and from learning to understand them; that she does so by dragging them away to things which are pleasant; and often though they are well aware of the good and of the evil, she amazes and confounds their wits and makes them choose the worse in place of the better?

Yes, so it comes to pass (he answered).

Soc. And soundness of soul, the spirit of temperate modesty? Who has less claim to this than the incontinent man? The works of the temperate spirit and the works of incontinency are, I take it, diametrically opposed?

That too, I admit (he answered).

Soc. If this then be so concerning these virtues, what with regard to carefulness and devotion to all that ought to occupy us? Can anything more seriously militate against these than this same incontinence?

Nothing that I can think of (he replied).

Soc. And can worse befall a man, think you? Can he be subjected to a more baleful influence than that which induces him to choose what is hurtful in place of what is helpful; which cajoles him to devote himself to the evil and to neglect the good; which forces him, will he nil he, to do what every man in his sober senses would shrink from and avoid?

I can imagine nothing worse (he replied).

Soc. Self-control, it is reasonable to suppose, will be the cause of opposite effects upon mankind to those of its own opposite, the want of self-control?

Euth. It is to be supposed so.

Soc. And this, which is the source of opposite effects to the very worst, will be the very best of things?

Euth. That is the natural inference.

Soc. It looks, does it not, Euthydemus, as if self-control were the best thing a man could have?

It does indeed, Socrates (he answered).

Soc. But now, Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to note one fact?

What fact? (he asked).

Soc. That, after all, incontinency is powerless to bring us to that realm of sweetness which some look upon as her peculiar province; it is not incontinency but self-control alone which has the passport to highest pleasures.

In what way? (he asked). How so?

Why, this way (Socrates answered): since incontinency will not suffer us to resist hunger and thirst, or to hold out against sexual appetite, or want of sleep (which abstinences are the only channels to true pleasure in eating and drinking, to the joys of love, to sweet repose and blissful slumber won by those who will patiently abide and endure till each particular happiness is at the flood)—it comes to this: by incontinency we are cut off from the full fruition of the more obvious and constantly recurring pleasures. To self-control, which alone enables us to endure the pains aforesaid, alone belongs the power to give us any pleasure worth remembering in these common cases.

You speak the words of truth (he answered).

Soc. Furthermore, if there be any joy in learning aught "beautiful and good," or in patient application to such rules as may enable a man to manage his body aright, or to administer his household well, or to prove himself useful to his friends and to the state, or to dominate his enemies—which things are the sources not only of advantage but of deepest satisfaction—to the continent and self-controlled it is given to reap the fruits of them in their performance. It is the incontinent who have neither part nor lot in any one of them. Since we must be right in asserting that he is least concerned with such things who has least ability to do them, being tied down to take an interest in the pleasure which is nearest to hand.

Euthydemus replied: Socrates, you would say, it seems to me, that a man who is mastered by the pleasures of the body has no concern at all with virtue.

And what is the distinction, Euthydemus (he asked), between a man devoid of self-control and the dullest of brute beasts? A man who foregoes all height of aim, who gives up searching for the best and strives only to gratify his sense of pleasure, is he better than the silliest of cattle?... But to the self-controlled alone is it given to discover the hid treasures. These, by word and by deed, they will pick out and make selection of them according to their kinds, choosing deliberately the good and holding aloof from the evil. Thus (he added) it is that a man reaches the zenith, as it were, of goodness and happiness, thus it is that he becomes most capable of reasoning and discussion. The very name discussion ({dialegesthai}) is got from people coming together and deliberating in common by picking out and selecting things ({dialegein}) according to their kinds. A man then is bound to prepare himself as much as possible for this business, and to pursue it beyond all else with earnest resolution; for this is the right road to excellence, this will

make a man fittest to lead his fellows and be a master in debate.

VI

At this point I will Endeavour to explain in what way Socrates fostered this greater “dialectic” capacity among his intimates. He held firmly to the opinion that if a man knew what each reality was, he would be able to explain this knowledge to others; but, failing the possession of that knowledge, it did not surprise him that men should stumble themselves and cause others to stumble also. It was for this reason that he never ceased inquiring with those who were with him into the true nature of things that are. It would be a long business certainly to go through in detail all the definitions at which he arrived; I will therefore content myself with such examples as will serve to show his method of procedure. As a first instance I will take the question of piety. The mode of investigation may be fairly represented as follows.

Tell me (said he), Euthydemus, what sort of thing you take piety to be?

Something most fair and excellent, no doubt (the other answered).

Soc. And can you tell me what sort of person the pious man is?

I should say (he answered) he is a man who honors the gods.

Soc. And is it allowable to honor the gods in any mode or fashion one likes?

Euth. No; there are laws in accordance with which one must do that.

Soc. Then he who knows these laws will know how he must honor the gods?

I think so (he answered).

Soc. And he who knows how he must honor the gods conceives that he ought not to do so except in the manner which accords with his knowledge? Is it not so?

Euth. That is so.

Soc. And does any man honor the gods otherwise than he thinks he ought?

I think not (he answered).

Soc. It comes to this then: he who knows what the law requires in reference to the gods will honor the gods in the lawful way?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. But now, he who honors lawfully honors as he ought?

Euth. I see no alternative.

Soc. And he who honors as he ought is a pious man?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. It would appear that he who knows what the law requires with respect to the gods will correctly be defined as a pious man, and that is our definition?

So it appears to me, at any rate (he replied).

Soc. But now, with regard to human beings; is it allowable to deal with men in any way one pleases?

Euth. No; with regard to men also, he will be a law-observing man who knows what things are lawful as concerning men, in accordance with which our dealings with one another must be conducted.

Soc. Then those who deal with one another in this way, deal with each other as they ought?

Obviously (he answered).

Soc. And they who deal with one another as they ought, deal well and nobly—is it not so?

Certainly (he answered).

Soc. And they who deal well and nobly by mankind are well-doers in respect of human affairs?

That would seem to follow (he replied).

Soc. I presume that those who obey the laws do what is just and right?

Without a doubt, (he answered).

Soc. And by things right and just you know what sort of things are meant?

What the laws ordain (he answered).

Soc. It would seem to follow that they who do what the laws ordain both do what is right and just and what they ought?

Euth. I see no alternative.

Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?

I should say so myself (he answered).

Soc. And should you say that any one obeys the laws without knowing what the laws ordain?

I should not (he answered).

Soc. And do you suppose that any one who knows what things he ought to do supposes that he ought not to do them?

No, I suppose not (he answered).

Soc. And do you know of anybody doing other than what he feels bound to do?

No, I do not (he answered).

Soc. It would seem that he who knows what things are lawful as concerning men does the things that are just and right?

Without a doubt (he answered).

Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?

Who else, if not? (he replied).

Soc. It would seem, then, we shall have got to a right definition if we name as just and upright those who know the things which are lawful as concerning men?

That is my opinion (he answered).

Soc. And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise in what they know, or are there any who are wise in what they know not?

Euth. Clearly they are wise in what they know; for how could a man have wisdom in that which he does not know?

Soc. In fact, then, the wise are wise in knowledge?

Euth. Why, in what else should a man be wise save only in knowledge?

Soc. And is wisdom anything else than that by which a man is wise, think you?

Euth. No; that, and that only, I think.

Soc. It would seem to follow that knowledge and wisdom are the same?

Euth. So it appears to me.

Soc. May I ask, does it seem to you possible for a man to know all the things that are?

Euth. No, indeed! not the hundredth part of them, I should say.

Soc. Then it would seem that it is impossible for a man to be all-wise?

Quite impossible (he answered).

Soc. It would seem the wisdom of each is limited to his knowledge; each is wise only in what he knows?

Euth. That is my opinion.

Soc. Well! come now, Euthydemus, as concerning the good: ought we to search for the good in this way?

What way? (he asked).

Soc. Does it seem to you that the same thing is equally advantageous to all?

No, I should say not (he answered).

Soc. You would say that a thing which is beneficial to one is sometimes hurtful to another?

Decidedly (he replied).

Soc. And is there anything else good except that which is beneficial, should you say?

Nothing else (he answered).

Soc. It would seem to follow that the beneficial is good relatively to him to whom it is beneficial?

That is how it appears to me (he answered).

Soc. And the beautiful: can we speak of a thing as beautiful in any other way than relatively? or can you name any beautiful thing, body, vessel, or whatever it be, which you know of as universally beautiful?

Euth. I confess I do not know of any such myself.

Soc. I presume to turn a thing to its proper use is to apply it beautifully?

Euth. Undoubtedly it is a beautiful appliance.

Soc. And is this, that, and the other thing beautiful for aught else except that to which it may be beautifully applied?

Euth. No single thing else.

Soc. It would seem that the useful is beautiful relatively to that for which it is of use?

So it appears to me (he answered).

Soc. And what of courage, Euthydemus? I presume you rank courage among things beautiful? It is a noble quality?

Nay, one of the most noble (he answered).

Soc. It seems that you regard courage as useful to no mean end?

Euth. Nay, rather the greatest of all ends, God knows.

Soc. Possibly in face of terrors and dangers you would consider it an advantage to be ignorant of them?

Certainly not (he answered).

Soc. It seems that those who have no fear in face of dangers, simply because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?

Most true (he answered); or, by the same showing, a large proportion of madmen and cowards would be courageous.

Soc. Well, and what of those who are in dread of things which are not dreadful, are they—

Euth. Courageous, Socrates?—still less so than the former, goodness knows.

Soc. Possibly, then, you would deem those who are good in the face of terrors and dangers to be courageous, and those who are bad in the face of the same to be cowards?

Certainly I should (he answered).

Soc. And can you suppose any other people to be good in respect of such things except those who are able to cope with them and turn them to noble account?

No; these and these alone (he answered).

Soc. And those people who are of a kind to cope but badly with the same occurrences, it would seem, are bad?

Who else, if not they? (he asked).

Soc. May it be that both one and the other class do use these circumstances as they think they must and should?

Why, how else should they deal with them? (he asked).

Soc. Can it be said that those who are unable to cope well with them or to turn them to noble account know how they must and should deal with them?

I presume not (he answered).

Soc. It would seem to follow that those who have the knowledge how to behave are also those who have the power?

Yes; these, and these alone (he said).

Soc. Well, but now, what of those who have made no egregious blunder (in the matter); can it be they cope ill with the things and circumstances we are discussing?

I think not (he answered).

Soc. It would seem, conversely, that they who cope ill have made some egregious blunder?

Euth. Probably; indeed, it would appear to follow.

Soc. It would seem, then, that those who know how to cope with terrors and dangers well and nobly are courageous, and those who fail utterly of this are cowards?

So I judge them to be (he answered).

A kingdom and a tyranny were, he opined, both of them forms of government, but forms which differed from one another, in his belief; a kingdom was a government over willing men in accordance with civil law, whereas a tyranny implied the government over unwilling subjects not according to law, but so as to suit the whims and wishes of the ruler.

There were, moreover, three forms of citizenship or polity; in the case where the magistrates were appointed from those

who discharged the obligations prescribed by law, he held the polity to be an aristocracy (or rule of the best); where the title to office depended on ratable property, it was a plutocracy (or rule of wealth); and lastly, where all the citizens without distinction held the reins of office, that was a democracy (or rule of the people).

Let me explain his method of reply where the disputant had no clear statement to make, but without attempt at proof chose to contend that such or such a person named by himself was wiser, or more of a statesman, or more courageous, and so forth, than some other person. Socrates had a way of bringing the whole discussion back to the underlying proposition, as thus:

Soc. You state that so and so, whom you admire, is a better citizen that this other whom I admire?

The Disputant. Yes; I repeat the assertion.

Soc. But would it not have been better to inquire first what is the work or function of a good citizen?

The Disputant. Let us do so.

Soc. To begin, then, with the matter of expenditure: his superiority will be shown by his increasing the resources and lightening the expenditure of the state?

Certainly (the disputant would answer).

Soc. And in the event of war, by rendering his state superior to her antagonists?

The Disputant. Clearly.

Soc. Or on an embassy as a diplomatist, I presume, by securing friends in place of enemies?

That I should imagine (replies the disputant).

Soc. Well, and in parliamentary debate, by putting a stop to party strife and fostering civic concord?

The Disputant. That is my opinion.

By this method of bringing back the argument to its true starting-point, even the disputant himself would be affected and the truth become manifest to his mind.

His own—that is, the Socratic—method of conducting a rational discussion was to proceed step by step from one point of general agreement to another: “Herein lay the real security of reasoning,” he would say; and for this reason he was more successful in winning the common assent of his hearers than any one I ever knew. He had a saying that Homer had conferred on Odysseus the title of a safe, unerring orator, because he had the gift to lead the discussion from one commonly accepted opinion to another.

VII

The frankness and simplicity with which Socrates endeavored to declare his own opinions, in dealing with those who conversed with him, is, I think, conclusively proved by the above instances; at the same time, as I hope now to show, he was no less eager to cultivate a spirit of independence in others, which would enable them to stand alone in all transactions suited to their powers.

Of all the men I have ever known, he was most anxious to ascertain in what any of those about him was really versed; and within the range of his own knowledge he showed the greatest zeal in teaching everything which it befits the true gentleman to know; or where he was deficient in knowledge himself, he would introduce his friends to those who knew. He did not fail to teach them also up to what point it was proper for an educated man to acquire empiric knowledge of any particular matter.

To take geometry as an instance: Every one (he would say) ought to be taught geometry so far, at any rate, as to be able, if necessary, to take over or part with a piece of land, or to divide it up or assign a portion of it for cultivation, and in

every case by geometric rule. That amount of geometry was so simple indeed, and easy to learn, that it only needed ordinary application of the mind to the method of mensuration, and the student could at once ascertain the size of the piece of land, and, with the satisfaction of knowing its measurement, depart in peace. But he was unable to approve of the pursuit of geometry up to the point at which it became a study of unintelligible diagrams. What the use of these might be, he failed, he said, to see; and yet he was not unversed in these recondite matters himself. These things, he would say, were enough to wear out a man's life, and to hinder him from many other more useful studies.

Again, a certain practical knowledge of astronomy, a certain skill in the study of the stars, he strongly insisted on. Every one should know enough of the science to be able to discover the hour of the night or the season of the month or year, for the purposes of travel by land or sea—the march, the voyage, and the regulations of the watch; and in general, with regard to all matters connected with the night season, or with the month, or the year, it was well to have such reliable data to go upon as would serve to distinguish the various times and seasons. But these, again, were pieces of knowledge easily learnt from night sportsmen, pilots of vessels, and many others who make it their business to know such things. As to pushing the study of astronomy so far as to include a knowledge of the movements of bodies outside our own orbit, whether planets or stars of eccentric movement, or wearing oneself out endeavoring to discover their distances from the earth, their periods, and their causes, all this he strongly discountenanced; for he saw (he said) no advantage in these any more than in the former studies. And yet he was not unversed in the subtleties of astronomy any more than in those of geometry; only these, again, he insisted, were sufficient to wear out a man's

lifetime, and to keep him away from many more useful pursuits.

And to speak generally, in regard of things celestial he set his face against attempts to excogitate the machinery by which the divine power formed its several operations. Not only were these matters beyond man's faculties to discover, as he believed, but the attempt to search out what the gods had not chosen to reveal could hardly (he supposed) be well pleasing in their sight. Indeed, the man who tortured his brains about such subjects stood a fair chance of losing his wits entirely, just as Anaxagoras, the headiest speculator of them all, in his attempt to explain the divine mechanism, had somewhat lost his head. Anaxagoras took on himself to assert that sun and fire are identical, ignoring the fact that human beings can easily look at fire, but to gaze steadily into the face of the sun is given to no man; or that under the influence of his rays the color of the skin changes, but under the rays of fire not. He forgot that no plant or vegetation springs from earth's bosom with healthy growth without the help of sunlight, while the influence of fire is to parch up everything, and to destroy life; and when he came to speak of the sun as being a “red-hot stone” he ignored another fact, that a stone in fire neither lights up nor lasts, whereas the sun-god abides for ever with the most intense brilliancy undimmed.

Socrates inculcated the study of reasoning processes, but in these, equally with the rest, he bade the student beware of vain and idle over-occupation. Up to the limit set by utility, he was ready to join in any investigation, and to follow out an argument with those who were with him; but there he stopped. He particularly urged those who were with him to pay the utmost attention to health. They would learn all it was possible to learn from adepts, and not only so, but each one individually should take pains to discover, by a lifelong

observation of his own case, what particular regimen, what meat or drink, or what kind of work, best suited him; these he should turn to account with a view to leading the healthiest possible life. It would be no easy matter for any one who would follow this advice, and study his own idiosyncrasy, to find a doctor to improve either on the diagnosis or the treatment requisite.

Where any one came seeking for help which no human wisdom could supply, he would counsel him to give heed to "divination." He who has the secret of the means whereby the gods give signs to men touching their affairs can never surely find himself bereft of heavenly guidance.

VIII

Now if any one should be disposed to set the statement of Socrates touching the divinity which warned him what he ought to do or not to do, against the fact that he was sentenced to death by the board of judges, and argue that thereby Socrates stood convicted of lying and delusion in respect of this "divinity" of his, I would have him to note in the first place that, at the date of his trial, Socrates was already so far advanced in years that had he not died then his life would have reached its natural term soon afterwards; and secondly, as matters went, he escaped life's bitterest load in escaping those years which bring a diminution of intellectual force to all—instead of which he was called upon to exhibit the full robustness of his soul and acquire glory in addition, partly by the style of his defense—felicitous alike in its truthfulness, its freedom, and its rectitude—and partly by the manner in which he bore the sentence of condemnation with infinite gentleness and manliness. Since no one within the memory of man, it is admitted, ever bowed his head to death more nobly. After the sentence he must needs live for thirty days, since it was the month of the "Delia," and the law does not suffer any man to die by the

hand of the public executioner until the sacred embassy return from Delos. During the whole of that period (as his acquaintances without exception can testify) his life proceeded as usual. There was nothing to mark the difference between now and formerly in the even tenor of its courage; and it was a life which at all times had been a marvel of cheerfulness and calm content.

Let us pause and ask how could man die more nobly and more beautifully than in the way described? or put it thus: dying so, then was his death most noble and most beautiful; and being the most beautiful, then was it also the most fortunate and heaven-blest; and being most blessed of heaven, then was it also most precious in the sight of God.

And now I will mention further certain things which I have heard from Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, concerning him. He said that even after Meletus had drawn up the indictment, he himself used to hear Socrates conversing and discussing everything rather than the suit impending, and had ventured to suggest that he ought to be considering the line of his defense, to which, in the first instance, the master answered: "Do I not seem to you to have been practicing that my whole life long?" And upon his asking "How?" added in explanation that he had passed his days in nothing else save in distinguishing between what is just and what is unjust (right and wrong), and in doing what is right and abstaining from what is wrong; "which conduct" (he added) "I hold to be the finest possible practice for my defense"; and when he (Hermogenes), returning to the point again, pleaded with Socrates: "Do you not see, Socrates, how commonly it happens that an Athenian jury, under the influence of argument, condemns innocent people to death and acquits real criminals?"—Socrates replied, "I assure you, Hermogenes, that each time I have essayed to give my thoughts to the defense which I am to make before the court,

the divinity has opposed me." And when he (Hermogenes) exclaimed, "How strange!"—"Do you find it strange" (he continued), "that to the Godhead it should appear better for me to close my life at once? Do you not know that up to the present moment there is no man whom I can admit to have spent a better or happier life than mine. Since theirs I regard as the best of lives who study best to become as good as may be, and theirs the happiest who have the liveliest sense of growth in goodness; and such, hitherto, is the happy fortune which I perceive to have fallen to my lot. To such conclusion I have come, not only in accidental intercourse with others, but by a strict comparison drawn between myself and others, and in this faith I continue to this day; and not I only, but my friends continue in a like persuasion with regard to me, not for the same reason that they are my friends and love me (or else would others have been in like case as regards their friends), but because they are persuaded that by being with me they will attain to their full height of goodness. But, if I am destined to prolong my days, maybe I shall be enforced to pay in full the penalties of old age—to see and hear less keenly, to fail in intellectual force, and to leave school, as it were, more of a dunce than when I came, less learned and more forgetful—in a word, I shall fall from my high estate, and daily grow worse in that wherein aforetime I excelled. But indeed, were it possible to remain unconscious of the change, the life left would scarcely be worth living; but given that there is a consciousness of the change, then must the existence left to live be found by comparison insipid, joyless, a death in life, devoid of life's charm. But indeed, if it is reserved for me to die unjustly, then on those who unjustly slay me lies the shame (since, given injustice is base, how can any unjust action whatsoever fail of baseness?) But for me what disgrace is it that others should fail of a just decision and right acts

concerning me?... I see before me a long line of predecessors on this road, and I mark the reputation also among posterity which they have left. I note how it varies according as they did or suffered wrong, and for myself I know that I too, although I die to-day, shall obtain from mankind a consideration far different from that which will be accorded to those who put me to death. I know that undying witness will be borne me to this effect, that I never at any time did wrong to any man, or made him a worse man, but ever tried to make those better who were with me."

Such are the words which he spoke in conversation with Hermogenes and the rest. But amongst those who knew Socrates and recognized what manner of man he was, all who make virtue and perfection their pursuit still to this day cease not to lament his loss with bitterest regret, as for one who helped them in the pursuit of virtue as none else could.

To me, personally, he was what I have myself endeavored to describe: so pious and devoutly religious that he would take no step apart from the will of heaven; so just and upright that he never did even a trifling injury to any living soul; so self-controlled, so temperate, that he never at any time chose the sweeter in place of the better; so sensible, and wise, and prudent that in distinguishing the better from the worse he never erred; nor had he need of any helper, but for the knowledge of these matters, his judgment was at once infallible and self-sufficing. Capable of reasonably setting forth and defining moral questions, he was also able to test others, and where they erred, to cross-examine and convict them, and so to impel and guide them in the path of virtue and noble manhood. With these characteristics, he seemed to be the very impersonation of human perfection and happiness.

Such is our estimate. If the verdict fail to satisfy I would ask those who disagree with it to place the character of any

other side by side with this delineation, and then pass sentence.

XENOPHON

MEMORABILIA

ŒCONOMICUS

TRANSLATED BY E. C. MARCHANT

SYMPOSIUM

APOLOGY

TRANSLATED BY O. J. TODD

SOURCE: THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

Digital Note: This was originally set forth with Greek and English. I have removed the Greek half of the text, updated some spelling, and do not include all the footnotes, some introductions, what I have retained of those have been moved in with the text. I have decided that the reader should do their part, so any ocr artifacts, or typo's are your fault, buck up, until, if ever, I reedit it.

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XENOPHON

(C.430 to C.354 BC) was a wealthy Athenian and friend of Socrates.

He left Athens in 401 and joined an expedition including ten thousand Greeks led by the Persian governor Cyrus against the Persian king. After the defeat of Cyrus, it fell to Xenophon to lead the Greeks from the gates of Babylon back to the coast through inhospitable lands. Later he wrote the famous vivid account of this 'March Up-Country' (*Anabasis*); but meanwhile he entered service under the Spartans against the Persian king, married happily, and joined the staff of the Spartan king, Agesilaus. But Athens was at war with Sparta in 394 and so exiled Xenophon. The Spartans gave him an estate near Elis where he lived for years writing and hunting and educating his sons. Reconciled to Sparta, Athens restored Xenophon to honor but he preferred to retire to Corinth.

Xenophon's Anabasis is a true story of remarkable adventures. *Hellenica*, a history of Greek affairs from 411 to 362, begins as a continuation of Thucydides' account.

There are four works on Socrates (collected in Volume IV of the Loeb Xenophon edition). In Memorabilia Xenophon adds to Plato's picture of Socrates from a different viewpoint. The *Apology* is an interesting complement to Plato's account of Socrates' defense at his trial Xenophon's *Symposium* portrays a dinner party at which Socrates speaks of love; and *Oeconomicus* has him giving advice on household management and married life. *Cyropaedia*, a historical romance on the education of Cyrus (the Elder), reflects Xenophon's ideas about rulers and government.

We also have his *Hiero*, a dialogue on government; *Agesilaus*, in praise of that king; *Constitution of Lacedaemon* (on the Spartan system); *Ways and Means* (on the finances

of Athens); *Manual for a Cavalry Commander*; a good manual of *Horsemanship*; and a lively *Hunting with Hounds*— mostly hare-hunting. The *Constitution of the Athenians*, though clearly not by Xenophon, is an interesting document on politics at Athens. These eight books are collected in the last of the seven volumes of the Loeb Classical Library edition of Xenophon.

INTRODUCTION

Note on the Titles:

(a) The Memorabilia.

The title, by which this work is familiarly known to us, dates only from 1569, when Johann Lenklau prefixed it to the Latin version that accompanied his great edition of Xenophon's works. Before that time scholars had commonly used the Greek title Apomnemoneumata, i.e. Memoirs, or the awkward description *De factis et dictis Socratis memoratu dignis*. The correct Latin equivalent of the Greek name is *Commentarii*, which, in fact, occurs in the description of the book given by Aulus Gellius (XIV. iii.), viz. libri quos dictornm et factorum Socratis composuit [*Xenophon*).

The Greek title itself is not altogether satisfactory; for in reality the *Memorabilia* consists of four separate parts, which were certainly not all composed at the same time, and to the first of these parts the title does not apply.

(b)The *Oeconomicus*.

"In many respects," writes Cicero in a well-known passage of the de Senectule, Xenophon's works are very useful. How eloquently he praises agriculture in his book entitled *Oeconomicus*, which deals with the care of one's property." Philodemus and Galen refer to the book as the *Oeconomica*. The ancients certainly did not suppose that the title meant the Economist or Householder, but understood it to denote exactly what Cicero's words suggest—*a Discourse on Estate Management*. The same holds good *mutatis mutandis* of the titles Hipparchicus and Cynegeticus.

I

The first part of the *Memorabilia*, which is confined to the first two chapters of the First Book (The absurd division into books and chapters is, of course, not due to Xenophon himself.), is a Defense of Socrates, who had been tried and

condemned to death on a charge of "impiety," in the spring of 399 B.C. At the time of the trial Xenophon was absent in Asia. No speech delivered by any one of the three prosecutors—Anytus, Meletus, and Lycon—had been published, and Xenophon in consequence is only able to give the gist, not the exact form, of the indictment (I. i. 1), which had been drawn by Meletus. His reply to this indictment extends to the eighth section of the second chapter.

At this point a surprise is in store for the reader. For in the next sentence (I. ii. 9) Xenophon suddenly refers to "the prosecutor" in the singular, and proceeds to combat a series of accusations that he had brought. This "prosecutor" had charged against Socrates: (1) that he encouraged his companions to despise the laws (ii. 9); (2) that Critias and Alcibiades, who had done great evil to the state, were his associates (ii. 12); (3) that he taught young men to despise their fathers and their other relations, and to be false to their friends (ii. 49); (4) that he encouraged unscrupulous conduct and an anti-democratic spirit by the use he made of the poets (ii. 56).

Xenophon at first sight appears to be replying here to a speech actually delivered for the prosecution. But, as we have just seen, this cannot be the case. To whom, then, and to what is he replying? The correct solution of this problem was first given by Cobet, and it has been supported by a series of indisputable proofs by several subsequent scholars. The man Socrates had died in 399 B.C., and had left nothing written. But his ardent and gifted disciples—especially Antisthenes, a fanatical admirer, and a little later Plato—very soon began to publish works about Socrates, especially dialogues in which Socrates appeared as the chief interlocutor. One of these earlier Socratic works is, of course, the Apology by Plato. And so it came about that a literary Socrates grew into being—a figure that retained much,

doubtless, of the historical man, but was not identical with him, and might be variously represented by the different authors, and even by the same author in different works.

This cult of Socrates actually provoked opposition. For shortly after the year 393 B.C. a well-known "sophist" named Polycrates published an attack on his memory, throwing his attack into the form of an imaginary speech delivered by one of the three prosecutors, Anytus, at the trial. In after ages a belief not unnaturally grew up that Anytus had actually employed this man, Polycrates, to write his speech for the prosecution. In reality the "Accusation of Socrates" written by Polycrates was nothing more than a literary exercise, based no doubt on reminiscences of the trial, but strongly colored by the writer's own views. Xenophon was now living in exile at Scillus near Olympia; and there he must have read the work of Polycrates. He resolved to compose a reply, traversing the accusation step by step. In after ages another rejoinder was written to Polycrates by Libanius (fourth century A.D.), from whose Defense a good deal more can be learned about the lost Accusation of Polycrates.

The "prosecutor" then, is Polycrates, or rather Polycrates masquerading as Anytus.

Xenophon's Defense of Socrates, therefore (occupying Book 1. i. and ii.), has a double purpose. It is intended, first, to be an answer to the actual indictment, so far as Xenophon was aware of its terms; and, secondly, to refute the attack of Polycrates on the memory of the martyred Socrates. As for the substance of the Defense, we note that although Plato's Apology was certainly written already, Xenophon has not drawn upon it. In fact, throughout these two chapters there are no trustworthy indications that he has laid any of Plato's published work under contribution. At I. ii. 20, indeed, Xenophon quotes in support of his arguments two passages

from the poets that are in the Meno and the Protagoras of Plato, but it would be absurd to suppose that he went to Plato for two commonplace passages that would be familiar to every educated Athenian. In one passage (I. ii.) Xenophon expresses an opinion that is known to have been maintained by Antisthenes; in another (I. ii. 19) he combats that Cynic's doctrine of the permanence of Virtue. In neither place is he professing to report the views of Socrates; and even if it is safe to conclude from these two instances that he had consulted the works of Antisthenes, there is, so far as can be ascertained, no trace in the Defense that he borrowed such knowledge as he shows of Socrates from Antisthenes. The most likely inference from these negative facts is that he incorporated only such knowledge of Socrates as he had gained himself by intercourse with the Master. This knowledge, to be sure, is superficial, and does not point to a close intimacy. On the other hand, since Xenophon is concerned only to rebut the specific charges brought by the prosecutors and by Polycrates, we are scarcely entitled to assume that he has told us all that he really knew about Socrates in these two chapters.

II

The Socratic literature rapidly grew in bulk. Antisthenes, who developed the Cynic system out of the teaching of Socrates, was probably the first to write "Socratic" dialogues. Plato, a much younger man, soon entered the field in sharp opposition to the Cynic. And others tried their hand. It seems that somewhere about the year 385 B.C., Xenophon, who had perhaps now read what Plato had so far published, and had certainly pondered on the works of Antisthenes and assimilated much of his doctrine, decided to compose a series of memoirs and dialogues as illustrations of his "Defense of Socrates." These illustrations cover the remainder of the First (I. iii. onwards) and the whole of the

Second Book of the Memorabilia. “I propose to show,” he says (I. iii. 1), “how Socrates helped his companions both by his deeds and his words: and, in order to do so, I shall relate all that I remember about them.”

Though he makes no reference here to his earlier work, he follows its arrangement closely. He first gives details to prove that Socrates accepted the gods of the state (I. iii. 1-4). Then he insists on the moral tendency of the conduct and teachings of Socrates (5—15); and here he recalls an outspoken conversation between the Master and himself about love. It is the only conversation in the collection in which Xenophon himself takes part. Having proceeded thus far, he suddenly modifies his plan; and writes a new and controversial introduction to a complete series of dialogues, dealing again with the two topics already handled—the piety and the morality of Socrates—before proceeding to illustrate his third topic. He says no more about the actions of Socrates; and the reason presumably is, that he was conscious that he could not add anything new to what he had already said in the *Defense*, little as that was. At any rate, it is noteworthy that, having undertaken to tell all that he remembers about the helpful deeds of Socrates, he has after all told us so very little, but has in the main confined himself to the conversations.

It will be convenient to have a list of the ensuing topics side by side with the corresponding passages of the Defense:

1. I. iv., On *Piety*: I. i. 2—19.

2. I. v.—vi., On Self-discipline: I. ii. 1—5.

3. I. vi. 11—14, On Taking Fees: I. ii. 5—8.

4. I. vi. 15—11. 1., On Obedience to the Laws and Service to the State: I. ii. 9—48.

5. II. ii., On The Duty of Children to Parents: 1. ii. 49—50.

6. II. iii., On The Relations between Brothers: I. ii. 51.

7. II. iv.—vii., On The Treatment of Friends and Relations: I. ii. 52—55.

8. II. viii.-x., On Socrates as Philanthropist: I. ii. 56—61.

Xenophon's statement that he himself "heard" these conversations is a mere literary device. Some of them may quite possibly be based on actual recollection. But others are almost certainly pure invention. Who could suppose, for instance, that Socrates lectured his son on his duty to his mother (II. ii.), or urged Chaerecrates to make up a quarrel with his brother (II. iii.), while a third person, Xenophon, stood by silent, storing up all that good advice in a capacious memory? The supposition of Mr. Dakyns that such conversations were repeated to Xenophon by Lamprocles, Chaerecrates and others is very unlikely, unless we could imagine that Xenophon went about Athens gathering reports of Socrates' conversations before he left for Asia, and when as yet he had no notion that he would ever come to write Socratic memoirs. The opening conversation of the collection, that on Piety (I. iv.), probably owes much to the study of Antisthenes. The chapters on the education of the Ruler (II. i.) and on the proper relations between parents and children, brothers, relatives and friends, contain much that we associate with Xenophon himself rather than with Socrates; and it is difficult to imagine Socrates declaiming to Aristippus a long passage from a work of Prodicus which was often part of its author's own programmes (II. i. 21).

Does Xenophon owe anything to Plato in this part of the Memorabilia? The question hardly admits of a confident answer. The passage about the "Kingly Art" and "Happiness" in II. i. bears a close resemblance to a sentence in the Euthydemus of Plato (p. 291 b). But we know that the

“Kingly Art” was a commonplace with Antisthenes, as may be seen from some words put into his mouth in Xenophon’s Banquet (iv. 6). Again, the opening words of I. vi. strongly suggest a passage in Plato’s Lysis (p. 211 d).

But a similar sentiment is attributed to Socrates by Epictetus (III. v.) and reappears in Dio Chrysostom (III. 128), and as both these authors borrow largely from Cynic sources, the common source of all four passages may possibly be Antisthenes again, though it certainly looks as if Xenophon here had borrowed from Plato, so close is the correspondence.

However that may be, we have here a series of imaginary conversations to which Xenophon’s study of the Socratic literature has contributed not a little. But no doubt many of his reflections are really based on his recollection of Socrates himself. There is no proof in them, however, that Xenophon had really been one of his intimate companions, and indeed he nowhere makes any such claim. These remarks apply equally to the Collections which make up the Third and the Fourth Books.

III

The Third Book of the Memorabilia, which consists of miscellaneous dialogues loosely strung together, and an appendix of aphorisms, clearly forms yet another separate work. The first seven chapters are linked together by a common subject— the civil and military service of the state. But at the eighth chapter the writer passes abruptly to the relation of a dialectical encounter between Socrates and Aristippus the Cyrenaic, on the identity of the Beautiful and the Useful, and appends to it a discourse of Socrates on the same theme. Next we come on a series of definitions.

Then follow other conversations on detached topics. The aphorisms that fill the last two chapters are concerned with

very small things: and they are quite in the Cynic manner. The talk between Socrates and the younger Pericles (c. v.) may really have occurred in the year 411 B.C.; but the ambitions of Thebes are alluded to in a manner that suggests the period of the Theban Supremacy, the years following the battle of Leuctra (fought in 371 B.C.), as the time of composition, and there is a suspiciously Xenophontine ring in the allusions of Pericles to the excellence of the Spartan institutions (v. 15-16).

The fact is, the whole of the subjects dealt with in the first seven chapters of this Third Book are just those in which Xenophon, the old campaigner and worshipper of efficiency, took a special interest. Ten passages in the conversations on the duties and qualifications of commanders are repeated from the Cyropaedia; and here and there the author of the Anabasis and the Hipparchicus reveals himself pretty clearly.

Nevertheless, the spirit of these dialogues, with their insistence on Knowledge as the only sure basis of efficiency, is genuinely Socratic. Nor does the rest of the Third Book, from c. viii. onwards, contain anything inconsistent with the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues. Thus the cross-examination of the artists in the tenth chapter is entirely in keeping with the Platonic Socrates, whose habit it is to appose all sorts and conditions of men respecting their special work. The amusing interview with Theodote, the courtesan, is surprising in its context. The intention of it, apparently, is to show Socrates in a lighter vein, in the mood that we associate with the persiflage of a Banquet. The definitions in the ninth chapter are not alien to Socrates; but it may be that Xenophon drew them from the works of Antisthenes, whose opinions are known to have coincided with those expressed in them.

We may fairly accept as historical the explicit declaration in the Defense (I. ii. 4) that Socrates attached importance to physical culture. In the Dialogues of Plato, so far as I recollect, he does not display much real interest in the physical exercises of the wrestling-ground and the gymnasium; at any rate his chief interest is clearly in other matters when he enters those places. But in the *Republic* Plato on his part fully recognizes the value of "gymnastic" in education, and indeed builds up in his own way a complete theory of the subject. The germs of this theory may very well have come from Socrates himself. If that is true, then just as Plato develops the opinions of Socrates in his way, so Xenophon in the twelfth chapter of this book colors the same opinions with notions of his own, drawn from his experience in Asia, his admiration of Spartan institutions, and very likely, from his study of Antisthenes.

Lastly, what are we to say of the dispute with Aristippus about the Good and the Beautiful (c. viii.)? The truth of the account that Xenophon gives of Socrates' views on this matter must clearly be rejected if we suppose that Plato derived from Socrates himself the theory of eternal, unchanging Ideas or Forms of Goodness and Beauty; for, according to the Socrates of Xenophon nothing is good, beautiful or useful in itself, but only in relation to something. But it is, to say the least, exceedingly doubtful whether Socrates is responsible for the "Theory of Forms or Ideas," which makes no appearance in the early *Dialogues* of Plato. The doctrine of the Xenophontine Socrates is that all things Good and Beautiful must contribute to the advantage or enjoyment of man: nothing is Good but what is Useful for the particular purpose for which it is intended. The very same doctrine is propounded by Socrates in the *Greater Hippias* (rightly or wrongly attributed to Plato), but on examination is rejected by him as untenable. But Plato in

the *Gorgias* makes Socrates declare that a thing is Beautiful because it is pleasant or useful or both; and the doctrine is unchallenged. Lastly, there is a passage of similar import in the *First Alcibiades*. If the *Greater Hippias* was really written by Plato, it must be later in date than the *Gorgias*, but earlier than the Third Book of the *Memorabilia* and Xenophon, assuming that he had read it, has tacitly implied that the views of Socrates are not correctly represented there. Whence did he derive his knowledge? If not from the *Gorgias*, it is very significant that his exposition agrees with what Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates in that Dialogue.

IV

We pass now to the Fourth Book. In the noble and impassioned peroration with which this book concludes, the virtues of Socrates are summed up. Socrates was pious, just, self-controlled and wise: he was masterly in exposition and definition, in refuting error and exhorting to goodness. This concluding sentence is clearly a summary of the contents of this Fourth Book in the form in which it has come down to us; and it is in itself a sufficient refutation of the widely held opinion that large portions of the Fourth Book are spurious. The peroration applies only to this last book; at any rate it contains no reference to many of the topics that have been dealt with in the preceding portions of the collection, whereas it entirely covers the topics of the last. The natural inference is that the Fourth Book is yet another independent work.

This inference gains strong support from the actual contents of the book. The subject throughout is Education. Many topics already treated recur without any indication given that they have already been discussed. The style too differs to some extent from that of the preceding parts, in that it is somewhat fuller and more elaborate. The matter is arranged in an orderly fashion, in striking contrast with the

desultory miscellany that makes up the latter part of the preceding book. Most of the conversations (c. ii., iii., v., vi.) are carried on with Euthydemus, a handsome, bookish and self-confident young man, eager to distinguish himself "in speech and action." The first of these conversations with the youth shows how Socrates convinced young men like Euthydemus that their essential need was to get real education. Next we are introduced to something like a complete system of Socratic education. The first object of Socrates was to make his followers "prudent," i.e. to train the character. Training in power to "speak and act" came after training of character, and it turns out presently that Socrates put speech and action in the inverse order of importance; and, moreover, held that sound action could come only from one who was master of himself. Competence in "speech" depended on power to reason and to define correctly.

We have seen that Euthydemus hoped to excel in "speech and action." Socrates brings him to see that the right way to attain the goal of his ambition is first to learn Prudence, then to realize what is the only sure foundation of right action, and lastly to study the laws of sound reasoning.

We should certainly have expected that throughout the book Socrates would have been represented as addressing himself to Euthydemus, and to none other. But this is, in fact, not the case. The fourth chapter contains an argument on Justice. If we regard the subject with which it deals, it is quite in place where it stands; but it is strange to find the series of hortatory discourses interrupted by an argument addressed to Hippias, the "sophist," on the identity of Law and Justice. Moreover, in the opening sentence of the seventh chapter Xenophon apparently disregards this argument with Hippias; and yet it is clear from the wording of the peroration, which is in exact correspondence with the

topics of the discourses, that he had, when he wrote it, dealt with the topic of Justice.

All the conditions will be satisfied if we suppose that when he had written the fourth chapter down to the point where he was to relate what Socrates said about Justice by means of a dialogue (iv. 5), he incorporated this argument between Socrates and Hippias, which he had composed at some previous time, instead of writing a new dialogue in conformity with the others.

The talk with Hippias is in itself remarkable. For it represents Socrates as identifying Law and Justice. We have read in the Defense of Socrates (I. ii. 9) that Polycrates charged him with "despising the established laws," and we find that Xenophon there really makes no reply to that charge. Socrates, of course, insisted on obedience to the laws and held that "it was just to do what the laws ordain"; but that is a very different thing from saying that he thought the laws to be the embodiment of Justice. This latter opinion runs counter to the whole trend of the Gorgias of Plato, and is indeed not wholly consistent with what Socrates says in other parts of the *Memorabilia*. Plato's work may well have seemed to Xenophon to lend countenance to the very charge that he had failed to rebut in his own earlier work; and because Plato had written so, he may have felt it incumbent on him to come forward with an answer. He found a convenient place for its insertion here. It is really unconvincing as an exposition of Socrates' views on Justice, and the concluding sentence of the chapter does not square with it.

The fifth chapter brings us to that "efficiency in speech and action" coveted by such men as Euthydemus, and it turns out that Socrates put "action" before "speech." The secret and essential condition of efficiency in action was Prudence or Self-control. The curious passage appended to

this conversation, in which "sound reasoning," by a fanciful derivation, is declared to mean "sorting things out, and choosing what is right and rejecting what is wrong in speech and action," looks like a genuine, but rather crude, reminiscence of something actually said by Socrates, who was fond of such word-play.

As for "efficiency in speech," that is arrived at by mastering the art of Reasoning; and the art of Reasoning depends on correct definition of terms. Accordingly, in the sixth chapter we have a series of definitions. Some of these overlap the definitions contained in the ninth chapter of the Third Book; but, as the Fourth Book is independent of the Third, the omission of all reference to the earlier passage need not cause surprise. There is much in this sixth chapter that certainly reflects the opinions of the historical Socrates; but, as usual, the manner in which they are reflected is unmistakably Xenophontine. It is strange that there is nothing about Pleasure and its relation to the Good and Beautiful, seeing that this problem is handled by Plato already in the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*, which dialogues belong to his earlier or "Socratic" stage, and of which Xenophon certainly takes account in his Fourth Book. One cannot but suspect that, in thus ignoring the problem of Pleasure, Xenophon was influenced by the works of Antisthenes. The speculations on Pleasure attributed to Socrates by Plato were, no doubt, much too subtle for Xenophon, and they were, outwardly at least, inconsistent. It was wiser for a plain man to pass them by.

The superficial account of Socratic induction and assumption, or "hypothesis," with which the sixth chapter concludes (§§ 13-15) has raised a sharp dispute as to the sources of Xenophon's information. Is all this derived from Socrates himself, or is it gleaned from the *Phaedo* and, possibly, other dialogues of Plato? The question admits of no

certain answer. But if we assume that the information really comes from certain dialogues of Plato, then it is surely strange that Xenophon selected just this one point, "hypothesis" from them, and ignored other theories—for instance, Knowledge as Recollection and the doctrine of Forms—that Plato in those same dialogues attributes, truly or falsely, to Socrates.

In the seventh chapter we come to mathematics and astronomy, and the views of Socrates thereon. We are told that he recommended the study of them for practical purposes only—just so far as they were "useful." What Xenophon says is not inconsistent with the earlier Socrates of Plato, and can be brought into harmony with the Clouds of Aristophanes and, even with Plato's *Phaedo*. It is, on the other hand, wholly inconsistent with the system of education that Socrates is made to recommend for the "Guardians" in the *Republic* of Plato. The very uncomplimentary reference to Anaxagoras (IV. vii. 6) is thought by some to be based on a famous passage of the Phaedo, in which Socrates expresses disappointment with the Anaxagorean theory of the classification of Matter by Mind. But it is difficult to think that Xenophon could have justified to himself the taunt he attributes to Socrates by the regretful complaint of the Platonic Socrates, or even that he was capable of building this insult on so slender a substructure.

In the sentence that immediately follows this passage about the sciences, Xenophon refers to the importance that Socrates attached to divination (§). Then he argues that the belief in "the divine voice"—the belief that gave rise to the charge of introducing strange gods—was no delusion, and finally launches out into a noble description of the attitude of Socrates towards his trial and condemnation. The total effect of this epilogue is not greatly marred by one serious blemish it exhibits—the series of futile questions, so

characteristic of our author at his worst, in the third section of the last chapter. (Similar questions, in which the obvious is put in the form of a conundrum, are often attributed to Socrates by Xenophon. They are, of course, invariably the product of Xenophon's own mind.)

Although this Fourth Book was written a generation after the death of Socrates, the tone of the peroration is still controversial. The object of Xenophon throughout the book is to prove that the system of education inculcated by Socrates was the best possible; that Socrates was himself the embodiment of that system, and was therefore the pattern of a good and happy man. Clearly there were many still who maintained that the infamous Critias had been trained by Socrates, and that this fact was enough to condemn the system. Nor can it escape notice that the depreciation of the higher mathematics and other sciences in the seventh chapter, and the sharp limitation of scientific studies by Socrates in the training of himself that is implied in the peroration, are argumentative. (The passage in the peroration referring to chapter seven is, "So wise that he was unerring in his judgment of the better and the worse and needed no counselor, but relied on himself for his knowledge of them.") Evidently, even after so long a time, controversy about Socrates had not been silenced, and there was still something to be done for his memory by an ardent believer.

V

The chronological relationship of the *Oeconomicus* to Xenophon's other Socratic writings cannot be established with confidence. Certain linguistic indications point to a date earlier than the *Memorabilia*; but the tone of the work, calm and detached from controversy, strongly suggests that it was at least put into its final shape after the so-called Fourth Book of that work was written. The thoughts and reflections, whether put into the mouth of Socrates or Ischomachus, are

so entirely Xenophon's own that we may wonder why he did not frankly produce a treatise on the management of an estate instead of a Socratic dialogue. And it is evident that he found the dialogue form which he selected inconvenient. Socrates by this time was clearly a ~~literary~~ metaphorical figure, and almost any amount of freedom might be taken with his name. But at least some measure of verisimilitude must be kept up; and to represent Socrates, the wandering philosopher, as a landowner, an authority on household craft, land development and agriculture, devoted to his home, would carry the author too far away from the truth. An ingenious compromise suggested itself. What was impossible in the mouth of Socrates might be put into the mouth of another, and reported by Socrates. But this other person must be a man of standing and of mature years, and therefore could not be Xenophon himself, who had no established position during the life of Socrates. Hence Ischomachus. According to Plutarch this worthy but self-complacent gentleman is a historic personage; but little credence attaches to the kind of story that he tells. Anyhow, Ischomachus, as he appears in this book, is quite clearly Xenophon—Xenophon home from the wars, living happily and prosperously on his own estate at Scillus.

The beginning and end of the *Oeconomicus* are as abrupt as the end of Borrow's *Lavengro* and the beginning of *The Romany Rye*. Even the name of Socrates is not given in the first few sentences: he is referred to as if he had been already mentioned; and there is no epilogue. But of course this does not show, as Galen supposed, that we have here a continuation of the *Memorabilia*, intended to follow on the Fourth Book. The second portion of the *Memorabilia* ends (II. x.) and the third portion opens (III. i.) and ends (III. xiv.) with similar abruptness. We may group the *Oeconomicus* with these miscellaneous dialogues, doubtless not all composed

at the same time, that make up the Third Book of the *Memorabilia*. The plan of the work is curious, for the first six chapters form a lengthy preamble to the reported conversation with Ischomachus. The work must of course not be judged as though it were a complete treatise on Estate Management, indoor and outdoor. That is precisely what Xenophon has not chosen to write. The practical value, therefore, of the teaching is not anything like so great as that of the treatise *On Horsemanship*. But so far as it goes, the teaching is sound—for it is not certain that Xenophon believed that straw added to the manurial value, as well as to the bulk, of our old friends from farmyard and stable.

The abiding interest of the book, however, lies less in the edification it offers and in its literary merit (which is not great), than in the light that it sheds on Xenophon's intimate life, his tastes and pursuits. Readers will differ in their opinion of that paragon "Ischomachus." None will object to his having his boots and his pots and pans neatly set out in rows; but some will mock with the wits at his notion that there was any particular beauty in the spectacle afforded by these homely articles so carefully bestowed. However that may be, one cannot but sympathize with that long-suffering little saint, his wife, the most arresting figure in Xenophon's gallery of women. We glance at Theodote in the *Memorabilia* and Syennesis in the *Anabasis*, and we linger for a time over Panthea in the *Cyropaedia*; but we return again and again to this unnamed heroine of the household.

This unnamed heroine! But Ischomachus is Xenophon, and the little lady is wife of Ischomachus—that is she is Xenophon's wife, Philesia. "My dear, where is it?" asked her methodical husband; and Philesia, not knowing the answer, could only hang her head and blush. So she had to listen to a long homily on the beauty of order in the house, with illustrations drawn from the army and the navy. It is

pleasant to know, that henceforward, at least in one home at Scillus, regimental order reigned among the household paraphernalia, from the boots to the works of art.

And this regimental order in his house is the mirror of Xenophon's mind; for his mind is a series of labeled pigeon-holes, each hole filled with a commonplace thought remorselessly analyzed. These elementary thoughts he produces again and again, for his reader's edification.

The *Oeconomicus* was reviewed and criticized by the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, an elder contemporary of Cicero, in his treatise *On Vices and their Opposite Virtues*, but only a small part of what he had to say has survived, recovered from the ashes of Herculaneum. Further it was translated into Latin by Cicero in the days of his youth: it was familiar to the Roman writers on agriculture, including Virgil, was admired and imitated by the Italians of the Renaissance, and in our own times has found a doughty champion in Ruskin. Xenophon writes with an infectious enthusiasm, and with that easy charm of manner and diction of which he is a great master. But as with his thoughts, so with his words: he too often irritates the reader by incessant repetition of the same pattern of sentence, of the same formula, and even of the same word. How prone Xenophon is to repetition may be judged from the many references added in the translation of both *Memorabilia* and to other works; and of course these references are not exhaustive. His mind moves in a narrow' circle of ideas. But he is master of an extensive and multifarious vocabulary; so that it is strange that he constantly uses the same word over and over again in the compass of a few lines. A translator is often compelled to have recourse to synonyms.

XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA

BOOK I

I. I have often wondered by what arguments those who drew up the indictment against Socrates could persuade the Athenians that his life was forfeit to the state. The indictment against him was to this effect: *Socrates is guilty of rejecting the gods acknowledged by the state and of bringing strange deities: he is also guilty o f corrupting the youth.*

First then, that he rejected the gods acknowledged by the state—what evidence did they produce of that? He offered sacrifices constantly, and made no secret of it, now in his home, now at the altars of the state temples, and he made use of divination with as little secrecy. Indeed it had become notorious that Socrates claimed to be guided by 'the deity': it was out of this claim, I think, that the charge of bringing in strange deities arose. He was no more bringing in anything strange than are other believers in divination, who rely on augury, oracles, coincidences and sacrifices. For these men's belief is not that the birds or the folk met by accident know what profits the inquirer, but that they are the instruments by which the gods make this known; and that was Socrates' belief too. Only, whereas most men say that the birds or the folk they meet dissuade or encourage them, Socrates said what he meant: for he said that the deity gave him a sign. Many of his companions were counseled by him to do this or not to do that in accordance with the warnings of the deity: and those who followed his advice prospered, and those who rejected it had cause for regret. And yet who would not admit that he wished to appear neither a knave nor a fool to his companions? but he would have been thought both, had he proved to be mistaken when he alleged that his counsel was in accordance with divine revelation. Obviously, then, he would not have given the

counsel if he had not been confident that what he said would come true. And who could have inspired him with that confidence but a god? And since he had confidence in the gods, how can he have disbelieved in the existence of the gods? Another way he had of dealing with intimate friends was this: if there was no room for doubt, he advised them to act as they thought best; but if the consequences could not be foreseen, he sent them to the oracle to inquire whether the thing ought to be done. Those who intended to control a house or a city, he said, needed the help of divination. For the craft of carpenter, smith, farmer or ruler, and the theory of such crafts, and arithmetic and economics and generalship might be learned and mastered by the application of human powers; but the deepest secrets of these matters the gods reserved to themselves; they were dark to men. You may plant a field well; but you know not who shall gather the fruits: you may build a house well; but you know not who shall dwell in it: able to command, you cannot know whether it is profitable to command: versed in statecraft, you know not whether it is profitable to guide the state: though, for your delight, you marry a pretty woman, you cannot tell whether she will bring you sorrow: though you form a party among men mighty in the state, you know not whether they will cause you to be driven from the state. If any man thinks that these matters are wholly within the grasp of the human mind and nothing in them is beyond our reason, that man, he said, is irrational. But it is no less irrational to seek the guidance of heaven in matters which men are permitted by the gods to decide for themselves by study: to ask, for instance, Is it better to get an experienced coachman to drive my carriage or a man without experience? Is it better to get an experienced seaman to steer my ship or a man without experience?

So too with what we may know by reckoning, measurement or weighing. To put such questions to the gods seemed to his mind profane. In short, what the gods have granted us to do by help of learning, we must learn; what is hidden from mortals we should try to find out from the gods by divination: for to him that is in their grace the gods grant a sign.

Moreover, Socrates lived ever in the open; for early in the morning he went to the public promenades and training-grounds; in the forenoon he was seen in the market; and the rest of the day he passed just where most people were to be met: he was generally talking, and anyone might listen. Yet none ever knew him to offend against piety and religion in deed or word. He did not even discuss that topic so favored by other talkers, "the Nature of the Universe": and avoided speculation on the so-called "Cosmos" of the Professors, how it works, and on the laws that govern the phenomena of the heavens: indeed he would argue that to trouble one's mind with such problems is sheer folly. In the first place, he would inquire, did these thinkers suppose that their knowledge of human affairs was so complete that they must seek these new fields for the exercise of their brains; or that it was their duty to neglect human affairs and consider only things divine? Moreover, he marveled at their blindness in not seeing that man cannot solve these riddles; since even the most conceited talkers on these problems did not agree in their theories, but behaved to one another like madmen. As some madmen have no fear of danger and others are afraid where there is nothing to be afraid of, as some will do or say anything in a crowd with no sense of shame, while others shrink even from going abroad among men, some respect neither temple nor altar nor any other sacred thing, others worship stocks and stones and beasts, so is it, he held, with those who worry with "Universal Nature." Some hold that

What is, is one, others that it is infinite in number: some that all things are in perpetual motion, others that nothing can ever be moved at any time: some that all life is birth and decay, others that nothing can ever be born or ever die. Nor were those the only questions he asked about such theorists. Students of human nature, he said, think that they will apply their knowledge in due course for the good of themselves and any others they choose. Do those who pry into heavenly phenomena imagine that, once they have discovered the laws by which these are produced, they will create at their will winds, waters, seasons and such things to their need? Or have they no such expectation, and are they satisfied with knowing the causes of these various phenomena?

Such, then, was his criticism of those who meddle with these matters. His own conversation was ever of human things. The problems he discussed were, What is godly, what is ungodly; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just, what is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness; what is courage, what is cowardice; what is a state, what is a statesman; what is government, and what is a governor;—these and others like them, of which the knowledge made a "gentleman," in his estimation, while ignorance should involve the reproach of "slavishness."

So, in pronouncing on opinions of his that were unknown to them it is not surprising that the jury erred: but is it not astonishing that they should have ignored matters of common knowledge? For instance, when he was on the Council and had taken the counselor's oath by which he bound himself to give counsel in accordance with the laws, it fell to his lot to preside in the Assembly when the people wanted to condemn Thrasyllus and Erasinides and their colleagues to death by a single vote. That was illegal, and he refused the motion in spite of popular rancor and the threats

of many powerful persons. It was more to him that he should keep his oath than that he should humor the people in an unjust demand and shield himself from threats. For, like most men, indeed, he believed that the gods are heedful of mankind, but with an important difference; for whereas they do not believe in the omniscience of the gods, Socrates thought that they know all things, our words and deeds and secret purposes; that they are present everywhere, and grant signs to men of all that concerns man.

I wonder, then, how the Athenians can have been persuaded that Socrates was a freethinker, when he never said or did anything contrary to sound religion, and his utterances about the gods and his behavior towards them were the words and actions of a man who is truly religious and deserves to be thought so.

II. No less wonderful is it to me that some believed the charge brought against Socrates of corrupting the youth. In the first place, apart from what I have said, in control of his own passions and appetites he was the strictest of men; further, in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute; and besides, his needs were so schooled to moderation that having very little he was yet very content. Such was his own character: how then can he have led others into impiety, crime, gluttony, lust, or sloth? On the contrary, he cured these vices in many, by putting into them a desire for goodness, and by giving them confidence that self-discipline would make them gentlemen. To be sure he never professed to teach this; but, by letting his own light shine, he led his disciples to hope that they through imitation of him would attain to such excellence. Furthermore, he himself never neglected the body, and reproved such neglect in others. Thus over-eating followed by over-exertion he disapproved. But he approved of taking as much hard exercise as is agreeable to the soul; for the

habit not only insured good health, but did not hamper the care of the soul. On the other hand, he disliked foppery and pretentiousness in the fashion of clothes or shoes or in behavior. Nor, again, did he encourage love of money in his companions. For while he checked their other desires, he would not make money himself out of their desire for his companionship. He held that this self-denying ordinance insured his liberty. Those who charged a fee for their society he denounced for selling themselves into bondage; since they were bound to converse with all from whom they took the fee. He marveled that anyone should make money by the profession of virtue, and should not reflect that his highest reward would be the gain of a good friend; as though he who became a true gentleman could fail to feel deep gratitude for a benefit so great, Socrates indeed never promised any such boon to anyone; but he was confident that those of his companions who adopted his principles of conduct would throughout life be good friends to him and to one another. How, then, should such a man "corrupt the youth"? Unless, perchance, it be corruption to foster virtue.

But, said his accuser, he taught his companions to despise the established laws by insisting on the folly of appointing public officials by lot, when none would choose a pilot or builder or flautist by lot, nor any other craftsman for work in which mistakes are far less disastrous than mistakes in statecraft. Such sayings, he argued, led the young to despise the established constitution and made them violent. But I hold that they who cultivate wisdom and think they will be able to guide the people in prudent policy never lapse into violence: they know that enmities and dangers are inseparable from violence, but persuasion produces the same results safely and amicably. For violence, by making its victims sensible of loss, rouses their hatred: but persuasion, by seeming to confer a favor, wins goodwill.

It is not, then, cultivation of wisdom that leads to violent methods, but the possession of power without prudence. Besides, many supporters are necessary to him who ventures to use force: but he who can persuade needs no confederate, having confidence in his own unaided power of persuasion. And such a man has no occasion to shed blood; for who would rather take a man's life than have a live and willing follower?

But his accuser argued thus. Among the associates of Socrates were Critias and Alcibiades; and none wrought so many evils to the state. For Critias in the days of the oligarchy bore the palm for greed and violence: Alcibiades, for his part, exceeded all in licentiousness and insolence under the democracy. Now I have no intention of excusing the wrong these two men wrought the state; but I will explain how they came to be with Socrates. Ambition was the very life-blood of both: no Athenian was ever like them. They were eager to get control of everything and to outstrip every rival in notoriety. They knew that Socrates was living on very little, and yet was wholly independent; that he was strictly moderate in all his pleasures; and that in argument he could do what he liked with any disputant. Sharing this knowledge and the principles I have indicated, is it to be supposed that these two men wanted to adopt the simple life of Socrates, and with this object in view sought his society? Did they not rather think that by associating with him they would attain the utmost proficiency in speech and action? For my part I believe that, had heaven granted them the choice between the life they saw Socrates leading and death, they would have chosen rather to die. Their conduct betrayed their purpose; for as soon as they thought themselves superior to their fellow-disciples they sprang away from Socrates and took to politics; it was for political ends that they had wanted Socrates.

But it may be answered: Socrates should have taught his companions prudence before politics. I do not deny it; but I find that all teachers show their disciples how they themselves practice what they teach, and lead them on by argument. And I know that it was so with Socrates: he showed his companions that he was a gentleman himself, and talked most excellently of goodness and of all things that concern man. I know further that even those two were prudent so long as they were with Socrates, not from fear of fine or blow, but because at that time they really believed in prudent conduct.

But many self-styled lovers of wisdom may reply: A just man can never become unjust; a prudent man can never become wanton; in fact no one having learned any kind of knowledge can become ignorant of it. I do not hold with this view. I notice that as those who do not train the body cannot perform the functions proper to the body, so those who do not train the soul cannot perform the functions of the soul: for they cannot do what they ought to do nor avoid what they ought not to do.

For this cause fathers try to keep their sons, even if they are prudent lads, out of bad company: for the society of honest men is a training in virtue, but the society of the bad is virtue's undoing. As one of the poets says:

"From the good shalt thou learn good things; but if thou minglest with the bad thou shalt lose even what thou hast of wisdom."

And another says:

"Ah, but a good man is at one time noble, at another base."

My testimony agrees with theirs; for I see that, just as poetry is forgotten unless it is often repeated, so instruction, when no longer heeded, fades from the mind. To forget good

counsel is to forget the experiences that prompted the soul to desire prudence: and when those are forgotten, it is not surprising that prudence itself is forgotten. I see also that men who take to drink or get involved in love intrigues lose the power of caring about right conduct and avoiding evil. For many who are careful with their money no sooner fall in love than they begin to waste it: and when they have spent it all, they no longer shrink from making more by methods which they formerly avoided because they thought them disgraceful. How then can it be impossible for one who was prudent to lose his prudence, for one who was capable of just action to become incapable? To me indeed it seems that whatever is honorable, whatever is good in conduct is the result of training, and that this is especially true of prudence. For in the same body along with the soul are planted the pleasures which call to her: "Abandon prudence, and make haste to gratify us and the body."

And indeed it was thus with Critias and Alcibiades. So long as they were with Socrates, they found in him an ally who gave them strength to conquer their evil passions. But when they parted from him, Critias fled to Thessaly, and got among men who put lawlessness before justice; while Alcibiades, on account of his beauty, was hunted by many great ladies, and because of his influence at Athens and among her allies he was spoilt by many powerful men: and as athletes who gain an easy victory in the games are apt to neglect their training, so the honor in which he was held, the cheap triumph he won with the people, led him to neglect himself. Such was their fortune: and when to pride of birth, confidence in wealth, vainglory and much yielding to temptation were added corruption and long separation from Socrates, what wonder if they grew overbearing? For their wrongdoing, then, is Socrates to be called to account by his accuser? And does he deserve no word of praise for having

controlled them in the days of their youth, when they would naturally be most reckless and licentious? Other cases, at least, are not so judged. For what teacher of flute, lyre, or anything else, after making his pupils proficient, is held to blame if they leave him for another master, and then turn out incompetent? What father, whose son bears a good character so long as he is with one master, but goes wrong after he has attached himself to another, throws the blame on the earlier teacher? Is it not true that the worse the boy turns out with the second, the higher is his father's praise of the first? Nay, fathers themselves, living with their sons, are not held responsible for their boys' wrongdoing if they are themselves prudent men. This is the test which should have been applied to Socrates too. If there was anything base in his own life, he might fairly have been thought vicious. But, if his own conduct was always prudent, how can he be fairly held to blame for the evil that was not in him?

Nevertheless, although he was himself free from vice, if he saw and approved of base conduct in them, he would be open to censure. Well, when he found that Critias loved Euthydemus and wanted to lead him astray, he tried to restrain him by saying that it was mean and unbecoming in a gentleman to sue like a beggar to the object of his affection, whose good opinion he coveted, stooping to ask a favor that it was wrong to grant. As Critias paid no heed whatever to this protest, Socrates, it is said, exclaimed in the presence of Euthydemus and many others, "Critias seems to have the feelings of a pig: he can no more keep away from Euthydemus than pigs can help rubbing themselves against stones." Now Critias bore a grudge against Socrates for this; and when he was one of the Thirty and was drafting laws with Charicles, he bore it in mind. He inserted a clause which made it illegal to teach the art of words." It was a calculated insult to Socrates, whom he saw no means of

attacking, except by imputing to him the practice constantly attributed to philosophers, and so making him unpopular. For myself never heard Socrates indulge in the practice, nor knew of anyone who professed to have heard him do so. The truth came out. When the Thirty were putting to death many citizens of the highest respectability and were encouraging many in crime, Socrates had remarked: "It seems strange enough to me that a herdsman who lets his cattle decrease and go to the bad should not admit that he is a poor cowherd; but stranger still that a statesman when he causes the citizens to decrease and go to the bad, should feel no shame nor think himself a poor statesman." This remark was reported to Critias and Charicles, who sent for Socrates, showed him the law and forbade him to hold conversation with the young.

"May I question you" asked Socrates, "in case I do not understand any point in your orders?"

"You may" said they.

"Well now," said he, "I am ready to obey the laws. But lest I unwittingly transgress through ignorance, I want clear directions from you. Do you think that the art of words from which you bid me abstain is associated with sound or unsound reasoning? For if with sound, then clearly I must abstain from sound reasoning: but if with unsound, clearly I must try to reason soundly."

"Since you are ignorant, Socrates," said Charicles in an angry tone, "we put our order into language easier to understand. You may not hold any converse whatever with the young."

"Well then," said Socrates, "that there may be no question raised about my obedience, please fix the age limit below which a man is to be accounted young."

“So long,” replied Charicles, “as he is not permitted to sit in the Council, because as yet he lacks wisdom. You shall not converse with anyone who is under thirty.”

“Suppose I want to buy something, am I not even then to ask the price if the seller is under thirty?”

“Oh yes,” answered Charicles, “you may in such cases. But the fact is, Socrates, you are in the habit of asking questions to which you know the answer: so that is what you are not to do.”

“Am I to give no answer, then, if a young man asks me something that I know?—for instance, ‘Where does Charicles live?’ or ‘Where is Critias? ’”

“Oh yes,” answered Charicles, “you may, in such cases.”

“But you see, Socrates,” explained Critias, “you will have to avoid your favorite topic,—the cobblers, builders and metal workers; for it is already worn to rags by you in my opinion.”

“Then must I keep off the subjects of which these supply illustrations, Justice, Holiness, and so forth?”

“Indeed yes,” said Charicles, “and cowherds too: else you may find the cattle decrease.”

Thus the truth was out: the remark about the cattle had been repeated to them: and it was this that made them angry with him.

So much, then, for the connexion of Critias with Socrates and their relation to each other. I venture to lay it down that learners get nothing from a teacher with whom they are out of sympathy. Now, all the time that Critias and Alcibiades associated with Socrates they were out of sympathy with him, but from the very first their ambition was political advancement. For while they were still with him, they tried to converse, whenever possible, with prominent politicians. Indeed, there is a story told of Alcibiades, that, when he was

less than twenty years old, he had a talk about laws with Pericles, his guardian, the first citizen in the State.

"Tell me, Pericles," he said, "can you teach me what a law is?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Then pray teach me. For whenever I hear men praised for keeping the laws, it occurs to me that no one can really deserve that praise who does not know what a law is."

"Well, Alcibiades, there is no great difficulty about what you desire. You wish to know what a law is. Laws are all the rules approved and enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and what ought not to be done."

"Do they suppose it is right to do good or evil?"

"Good, of course, young man,—not evil."

"But if, as happens under an oligarchy, not the majority, but a minority meet and enact rules of conduct, what are these?"

"Whatsoever the sovereign power in the State, after deliberation, enacts and directs to be done is known as a law."

"If, then, a despot, being the sovereign power, enacts what the citizens are to do, are his orders also a law?"

"'Yes, whatever a despot as ruler enacts is also known as a law."

"But force, the negation of law, what is that, Pericles? Is it not the action of the stronger when he constrains the weaker to do whatever he chooses, not by persuasion, but by force?"

"That is my opinion."

"Then whatever a despot by enactment constrains the citizens to do without persuasion, is the negation of law?"

“I think so: and I withdraw my answer that whatever a despot enacts without persuasion is a law.”

“And when the minority passes enactments, not by persuading the majority, but through using its power, are we to call that force or not?”

“Everything, I think, that men constrain others to do ‘without persuasion,’ whether by enactment or not, is not law, but force.”

“It follows then, that whatever the assembled majority, through using its power over the owners of property, enacts without persuasion is not law, but force?”

“Alcibiades,” said Pericles, “at your age, I may tell you, we, too, were very clever at this sort of thing. For the puzzles we thought about and exercised our wits on were just such as you seem to think about now.”

“Ah, Pericles,” cried Alcibiades, “if only I had known you intimately when you were at your cleverest in these things!”

So soon, then, as they presumed themselves to be the superiors of the politicians, they no longer came near Socrates. For apart from their general want of sympathy with him, they resented being cross-examined about their errors when they came. Politics had brought them to Socrates, and for politics they left him. But Criton was a true associate of Socrates, as were Chaerophon, Chaerecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas, and others who consorted with him not that they might shine in the courts or the assembly, but that they might become gentlemen, and be able to do their duty by house and household, and relatives and friends, and city and citizens. Of these not one, in his youth or old age, did evil or incurred censure.

“But,” said his accuser, “Socrates taught sons to treat their fathers with contempt: he persuaded them that he made his companions wiser than their fathers: he said that

the law allowed a son to put his father in prison if he convinced a jury that he was insane; and this was a proof that it was lawful for the wiser to keep the more ignorant in jail."

In reality Socrates held that, if you clap fetters on a man for his ignorance, you deserve to he kept in jail yourself by those whose knowledge is greater than your own: and such reasoning led him frequently to consider the difference between Madness and Ignorance. That madmen should be kept in prison was expedient, he thought, both for themselves and for their friends: but those who are ignorant of what they ought to know deserve to learn from those who know it.

"But," said his accuser, "Socrates caused his companions to dishonor not only their fathers, but their other relations as well, by saying that invalids and litigants get benefit not from their relations, but from their doctor or their counsel. Of friends too he said that their goodwill was worthless, unless they could combine with it some power to help one: only those deserved honor who knew what was the right thing to do, and could explain it. Thus by leading the young to think that he excelled in wisdom and in ability to make others wise, he had such an effect on his companions that no one counted for anything in their estimation in comparison with him." Now I know that he did use this language about fathers, relations and friends. And, what is more, he would say that so soon as the soul, the only seat of intelligence, is gone out of a man, even though he be our nearest and dearest, we carry out his body and hide it in the tomb. Moreover, a man's dearest friend is himself: yet, even in his lifetime he removes or lets another remove from his body whatever is useless and unprofitable. He removes his own nails, hair, corns: he lets the surgeon cut and cauterize him, and, aches and pains notwithstanding, feels bound to

thank and fee him for it. He spits out the saliva from his mouth as far away as he can, because to retain it doesn't help him, but harms him rather.

Now in saying all this, he was not giving a lesson on "the duty of burying one's father alive, or making mincemeat of one's body": he meant to show that unreason is unworth, and was urging the necessity of cultivating sound sense and usefulness, in order that he who would fain be valued by father or by brother or by anyone else may not rely on the bond of familiarity and neglect him, but may try to be useful to all those by whom he would be valued.

Again, his accuser alleged that he selected from the most famous poets the most immoral passages, and used them as evidence in teaching his companions to be tyrants and malefactors: for example, Hesiod's line:

"No work is a disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace."

He was charged with explaining this line as an injunction to refrain from no work, dishonest or disgraceful, but to do anything for gain. Now, though Socrates would fully agree that it is a benefit and a blessing to a man to be a worker, and a disadvantage and an evil to be an idler—that work, in fact, is a blessing, idleness an evil—"working," "being a worker," meant to him doing good work; but gambling and any occupation that is immoral and leads to loss he called idling. When thus interpreted there is nothing amiss with the line:

"No work is a disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace."

Again, his accuser said that he often quoted the passage from Homer, showing how Odysseus:

"Whenever he found one that was a captain and a man of mark, stood by his side, and restrained him with gentle words: "Good sir, it is not seemly to affright thee like a coward, but do thou sit thyself and make all thy folk sit

down….' But whatever man of the people he saw and found him shouting, him he drove with his scepter and chid him with loud words: 'Good sir, sit still and hearken to the words of others that are thy betters: but thou art no warrior and a weakling, never reckoned whether in battle or in council.'"

This passage, it was said, he explained to mean that the poet approved of chastising common and poor folk. But Socrates never said that: indeed, on that view he would have thought himself worthy of chastisement. But what he did say was that those who render no service either by word or deed, who cannot help army or city or the people itself in time of need, ought to be stopped, even if they have riches in abundance, above all if they are insolent as well as inefficient. But Socrates, at least, was just the opposite of all that: he showed himself to be one of the people and a friend of mankind. For although he had many eager disciples among citizens and strangers, yet he never exacted a fee for his society from one of them, but of his abundance he gave without stint to all. Some indeed, after getting from him a few trifles for nothing, became vendors of them at a great price to others, and showed none of his sympathy with the people, refusing to talk with those who had no money to give them. But Socrates did far more to win respect for the State in the world at large than Lichas, whose services to Sparta have made his name immortal. For Lichas used to entertain the strangers staying at Sparta during the Feast of the Dancing Boys; but Socrates spent his life in lavishing his gifts and rendering the greatest services to all who cared to receive them. For he always made his associates better men before he parted with them.

Such was the character of Socrates. To me he seemed to deserve honor rather than death at the hands of the State. And a consideration of his case in its legal aspect will confirm my opinion. Under the laws, death is the penalty

inflicted on persons proved to be thieves, highwaymen, cutpurses, kidnappers, robbers of temples; and from such criminals no man was so widely separated as he. Moreover, to the State he was never the cause of disaster in war, or strife or treason or any evil whatever. Again, in private life no man by him was ever deprived of good or involved in ill. None of these crimes was ever so much as imputed to him. How then could he be guilty of the charges? For so far was he from "rejecting the gods," as charged in the indictment, that no man was more conspicuous for his devotion to the service of the gods: so far from "corrupting the youth," as his accuser actually charged against him, that if any among his companions had evil desires, he openly tried to reform them and exhorted them to desire the fairest and noblest virtue, by which men prosper in public life and in their homes. By this conduct did he not deserve high honor from the State?

III. In order to support my opinion that he benefited his companions, alike by actions that revealed his own character and by his conversation, I will set down what I recollect of these.

First, then, for his attitude towards religion; his deeds and words were clearly in harmony with the answer given by the Priestess at Delphi to such questions as "What is my duty about sacrifice?" or about "cult of ancestors." For the answer of the Priestess is, "Follow the custom of the State: that is the way to act piously." And so Socrates acted himself and counseled others to act. To take any other course he considered presumption and folly.

And again, when he prayed he asked simply for good gifts, "for the gods know best what things are good." To pray for gold or silver or sovereignty or any other such thing, was just like praying for a gamble or a fight or anything of which the result is obviously uncertain.

Though his sacrifices were humble, according to his means, he thought himself not a whit inferior to those who made frequent and magnificent sacrifices out of great possessions. The gods (he said) could not well delight more in great offerings than in small—for in that case must the gifts of the wicked often have found more favor in their sight than the gifts of the upright—and man would not find life worth having, if the gifts of the wicked were received with more favor by the gods than the gifts of the upright. No, the greater the piety of the giver, the greater (he thought) was the delight of the gods in the gift. He would quote with approval the line:

"According to thy power render sacrifice to the immortal gods,"

and he would add that in our treatment of friends and strangers, and in all our behavior, it is a noble principle to render according to our power. If ever any warning seemed to be given him from heaven, he would more easily have been persuaded to choose a blind guide who did not know the road in preference to one who could see and knew the way, than to disregard the admonition. All men, in fact, who flouted the warnings of the gods in their anxiety to avoid the censure of men, he denounced for their foolishness. He himself despised all human opinions in comparison with counsel given by the gods.

He schooled his body and soul by following, a system which, in all human calculation, would give him a life of confidence and security, and would make it easy to meet his expenses. For he was so frugal that it is hardly possible to imagine a man doing so little work as not to earn enough to satisfy the needs of Socrates. He ate just sufficient food to make eating a pleasure, and he was so ready for his food that he found appetite the best sauce: and any kind of drink he found pleasant, because he drank only when he was

thirsty. Whenever he accepted an invitation to dinner, he resisted without difficulty the common temptation to exceed the limit of satiety; and he advised those who could not do likewise to avoid appetizers that encouraged them to eat and drink what they did not want: for such trash was the ruin of stomach and brain and soul. “I believe,” he said in jest, “it was by providing a feast of such things that Circe made swine; and it was partly by the prompting of Hermes, partly through his own self-restraint and avoidance of excessive indulgence in such things, that Odysseus was not turned into a pig.” This was how he would talk on the subject, half joking, half in earnest.

Of sensual passion he would say: “Avoid it resolutely: it is not easy to control yourself once you meddle with that sort of thing.” Thus, on hearing that Critobulus had kissed Alcibiades’ pretty boy, he put this question to Xenophon before Critobulus: “Tell me, Xenophon, did you not suppose Critobulus to be a sober person, and by no means rash; prudent, and not thoughtless or adventurous?”

“Certainly,” said Xenophon.

“Then you are to look on him henceforth as utterly hot-headed and reckless: the man would do a somersault into a ring of knives; he would jump into fire.”

“What on earth has he done to make you think so badly of him?” asked Xenophon.

“What has the man done? He dared to kiss Alcibiades’ son, and the boy is very good-looking and attractive.”

“Oh, if that is the sort of adventure you mean, I think I might make that venture myself.”

“Poor fellow! What do you think will happen to you through kissing a pretty face? Won’t you lose your liberty in a trice and become a slave, begin spending large sums on harmful pleasures, have no time to give to anything fit for a

gentleman, be forced to concern yourself with things that no madman even would care about?"

"Heracles! what alarming power in a kiss!" cried Xenophon.

"What? Does that surprise you?" continued Socrates. "Don't you know that the scorpion, though smaller than a farthing, if it but fasten on the tongue, inflicts excruciating and maddening pain?"

"Yes, to be sure; for the scorpion injects something by its bite."

"And do you think, you foolish fellow, that the fair inject nothing when they kiss, just because you don't see it? Don't you know that this creature called 'fair and young' is more dangerous than the scorpion, seeing that it need not even come in contact, like the insect, but at any distance can inject a maddening poison into anyone who only looks at it?

"Maybe, too, the loves are called archers for this reason, that the fair can wound even at a distance.

"Nay, I advise you, Xenophon, as soon as you see a pretty face to take to your heels and fly: and you, Critobulus, I advise to spend a year abroad.

It will certainly take you at least as long as that to recover from the bite."

Thus in the matter of carnal appetite, he held that those whose passions were not under complete control should limit themselves to such indulgence as the soul would reject unless the need of the body were pressing, and such as would do no harm when the need was there. As for his own conduct in this matter, it was evident that he had trained himself to avoid the fairest and most attractive more easily than others avoid the ugliest and most repulsive. Concerning eating and drinking then and carnal indulgence such were his views, and he thought that a due portion of

pleasure would be no more lacking to him than to those who give themselves much to these, and that much less trouble would fall to his lot.

IV. If any hold the opinion expressed in some written and spoken criticisms of Socrates that are based on inference, and think, that though he was consummate in exhorting men to virtue, he was an incompetent guide to it, let them consider not only the searching cross-examination with which he chastised those who thought themselves omniscient, but his daily talks with his familiar friends, and then judge whether he was capable of improving his companions.

I will first state what I once heard him say about the godhead in conversation with Aristodemus the dwarf, as he was called. On learning that he was not known to sacrifice or pray or use divination, and actually made a mock of those who did so, he said: "Tell me, Aristodemus, do you admire any human beings for wisdom?"

"I do," he answered.

"Tell us their names."

"In epic poetry Homer comes first, in my opinion; in dithyramb, Melanippides; in tragedy, Sophocles; in sculpture, Polycleitus; in painting, Zeuxis."

"Which, think you, deserve the greater admiration, the creators of phantoms without sense and motion, or the creators of living, intelligent, and active beings?"

"Oh, of living beings, by far, provided only they are created by design and not mere chance."

"Suppose that it is impossible to guess the purpose of one creature's existence, and obvious that another's serves a useful end, which, in your judgment, is the work of chance, and which of design?"

“Presumably the creature that serves some useful end is the work of design.”

“Do you not think then that he who created man from the beginning had some useful end in view when he endowed him with his several senses, giving eyes to see visible objects, ears to hear sounds? Would odors again be of any use to us had we not been endowed with nostrils? What perception should we have of sweet and bitter and all things pleasant to the palate had we no tongue in our mouth to discriminate between them? Besides these, are there not other contrivances that look like the results of forethought? Thus the eyeballs, being weak, are set behind eyelids, that open like doors when we want to see, and close when we sleep: on the lids grow lashes through which the very winds filter harmlessly: above the eyes is a coping of brows that lets no drop of sweat from the head hurt them. The ears catch all sounds, but are never choked with them. Again, the incisors of all creatures are adapted for cutting, the molars for receiving food from them and grinding it. And again, the mouth, through which the food they want goes in, is set near the eyes and nostrils; but since what goes out is unpleasant, the ducts through which it passes are turned away and removed as far as possible from the organs of sense. With such signs of forethought in these arrangements, can you doubt whether they are the works of chance or design?”

“No, of course not. When I regard them in this light they do look very like the handiwork of a wise and loving creator.”

“What of the natural desire to beget children, the mother’s desire to rear her babe, the child’s strong will to live and strong fear of death?”

“Undoubtedly these, too, look like the contrivances of one who deliberately willed the existence of living creatures.”

“Do you think you have any wisdom yourself?”

“Oh! Ask me a question and judge from my answer.”

“And do you suppose that wisdom is nowhere else to be found, although you know that you have a mere speck of all the earth in your body and a mere drop of all the water, and that of all the other mighty elements you received, I suppose, just a scrap towards the fashioning of your body? But as for mind, which alone, it seems, is without mass, do you think that you snapped it up by a lucky accident, and that the orderly ranks of all these huge masses, infinite in number, are due, forsooth, to a sort of absurdity?”

“Yes; for I don’t see the master hand, whereas I see the makers of things in this world.”

“Neither do you see your own soul, which has the mastery of the body; so that, as far as that goes, you may say that you do nothing by design, but everything by chance.”

Here Aristodemus exclaimed: “Really, Socrates, I don’t despise the godhead. But I think it is too great to need my service.”

“Then the greater the power that deigns to serve you, the more honor it demands of you.”

“I assure you, that if I believed that the gods pay any heed to man, I would not neglect them.”

“Then do you think them unheeding? In the first place, man is the only living creature that they have caused to stand upright; and the upright position gives him a wider range of vision in front and a better view of things above, and exposes him less to injury. Secondly, to groveling creatures they have given feet that afford only the power of moving, whereas they have endowed man with hands, which are the instruments to which we chiefly owe our greater happiness. Again, though all creatures have a tongue, the tongue of man alone has been formed by them to be capable of contact with different parts of the mouth, so as to enable us to articulate

the voice and express all our wants to one another. Once more, for all other creatures they have prescribed a fixed season of sexual indulgence; in our case the only time limit they have set is old age.

"Nor was the deity content to care for man's body. What is of yet higher moment, he has implanted in him the noblest type of soul. For in the first place what other creature's soul has apprehended the existence of gods who set in order the universe, greatest and fairest of things? And what race of living things other than man worships gods? And what soul is more apt than man's to make provision against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to relieve sickness and promote health, to acquire knowledge by toil, and to remember accurately all that is heard, seen, or learned? For is it not obvious to you that, in comparison with the other animals, men live like gods, by nature peerless both in body and in soul? For with a man's reason and the body of an ox we could not carry out our wishes, and the possession of hands without reason is of little worth. Do you, then, having received the two most precious gifts, yet think that the gods take no care of you? What are they to do, to make you believe that they are heedful of you?"

"1 will believe when they send counselors, as you declare they do, saying, f Do this, avoid that.'"

"But when the Athenians inquire of them by divination and they reply, do you not suppose that to you, too, the answer is given? Or when they send portents for warning to the Greeks, or to all the world? Are you their one exception, the only one consigned to neglect? Or do you suppose that the gods would have put into man a belief in their ability to help and harm, if they had not that power; and that man throughout the ages would never have detected the fraud? Do you not see that the wisest and most enduring of human institutions, cities and nations, are most god-fearing, and

that the most thoughtful period of life is the most religious? Be well assured, my good friend, that the mind within you directs your body according to its will; and equally you must think that ***Thought indwelling in the Universal*** disposes all things according to its pleasure. For think not that your eye can travel over many furlongs and yet god's eye cannot see the whole world at once; that your soul can ponder on things in Egypt and in Sicily, and god's thought is not sufficient to pay heed to the whole world at once. Nay, but just as by serving men you find out who is willing to serve you in return, by being kind who will be kind to you in return, and by taking counsel, discover the masters of thought, so *try the gods by serving them*, *and see whether they will vouchsafe to counsel you in matters hidden from man*. Then you will know that such is the greatness and such the nature of the deity that he sees all things and hears all things alike, and is present in all places and heedful of all things."

To me at least it seemed that by these sayings he kept his companions from impiety, injustice, and baseness, and that not only when they were seen by men, but even in solitude; since they ever felt that no deed of theirs could at any time escape the gods.

V. But if Self-control too is a fair and noble possession, let us now consider whether he led men up to that virtue by discourse like the following:

"My friends, if we were at war and wanted to choose a leader most capable of helping us to save ourselves and conquer the enemy, should we choose one whom we knew to be the slave of the belly, or of wine, or lust, or sleep? How could we expect that such an one would either save us or defeat the enemy? Or if at the end of our life we should wish to appoint a guardian to educate our boys or protect our girls

or to take care of our goods, should we think a loose liver a trustworthy man to choose?

Should we entrust live stock or storehouses or the management of works to a vicious slave? Should we be willing to take as a gift a page or an errand-boy with such a character? Surely then, if we should refuse a vicious slave, the master must look to it that he does not grow vicious himself? For whereas the covetous, by robbing other men of their goods, seem to enrich themselves, a vicious man reaps no advantage from the harm he does to others. If he is a worker of mischief to others, he brings much greater mischief on himself, if indeed the greatest mischief of all is to ruin not one's home merely, but the body and the soul. In social intercourse what pleasure could you find in such a man, knowing that he prefers your sauces and your wines to your friends, and likes the women better than the company? Should not every man hold self-control to be the foundation of all virtue, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul? For who without this can learn any good or practice it worthily? Or what man that is the slave of his pleasures is not in an evil plight body and soul alike? From my heart I declare that every free man should pray not to have such a man among his slaves; and every man who is a slave to such pleasures should entreat the gods to give him good masters: thus, and only thus, may he find salvation."

Such were his words; but his own self-control was shown yet more clearly by his deeds than by his words. For he kept in subjection not only the pleasures of the body, but those too that money brings, in the belief that he who takes money from any casual giver puts himself under a master and endures the basest form of slavery,

VI. It is due to him that a conversation he had with Antiphon the Sophist should not go unrecorded. Antiphon came to Socrates with the intention of drawing his

companions away from him, employed to entertain the guests at the banquet and spoke thus in their presence.

"Socrates, I supposed that philosophy must add to one's store of happiness. But the fruits you have reaped from philosophy are apparently very different. For example, you are living a life that would drive even a slave to desert his master. Your meat and drink are of the poorest: the cloak you wear is not only a poor thing, but is never changed summer or winter; and you never wear shoes or tunic. Besides you refuse to take money, the mere getting of which is a joy, while its possession makes one more independent and happier. Now the professors of other subjects try to make their pupils copy their teachers: if you too intend to make your companions do that, you must consider yourself a professor of unhappiness."

To this Socrates replied:

"Antiphon, you seem to have a notion that my life is so miserable, that I feel sure you would choose death in preference to a life like mine. Come then, let us consider together what hardship you have noticed in my life. Is it that those who take money are bound to carry out the work for which they get a fee, while I, because I refuse to take it, am not obliged to talk with anyone against my will? Or do you think my food poor because it is less wholesome than yours or less nourishing? or because my viands are harder to get than yours, being scarcer and more expensive? or because your diet is more enjoyable than mine? Do you not know that the greater the enjoyment of eating the less the need of sauce; the greater the enjoyment of drinking, the less the desire for drinks that are not available? As for cloaks, they are changed, as you know, on account of cold or heat. And shoes are worn as a protection to the feet against pain and inconvenience in walking. Now did you ever know me to stay indoors more than others on account of the cold, or to fight

with any man for the shade because of the heat, or to be prevented from walking anywhere by sore feet? Do you not know that by training, a puny weakling comes to be better at any form of exercise he practices, and gets more staying power, than the muscular prodigy who neglects to train? Seeing then that I am always training my body to answer any and every call on its powers, do you not think that I can stand every strain better than you can without training? For avoiding slavery to the belly or to sleep and incontinence, is there, think you, any more effective specific than the possession of other and greater pleasures, which are delightful not only to enjoy, but also because they arouse hopes of lasting benefit? And again, you surely know that while he who supposes that nothing goes well with him is unhappy, he who believes that he is successful in farming or a shipping concern or any other business he is engaged in is happy in the thought of his prosperity. Do you think then that out of all this thinking there comes anything so pleasant as the thought: 'I am growing in goodness and I am making better friends?' And that, I may say, is my constant thought.

"Further, if help is wanted by friends or city, which of the two has more leisure to supply their needs, he who lives as I am living or he whose life you call happy? Which will find soldiering the easier task, he who cannot exist without expensive food or he who is content with what he can get? Which when besieged will surrender first, he who wants what is very hard to come by or he who can make shift with whatever is at hand?

"You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants is divine; to have as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme."

In another conversation with Socrates Antiphon said:

“Socrates, I for my part believe you to be a just, but by no means a wise man. And I think you realize it yourself. Anyhow, you decline to take money for your society. Yet if you believed your cloak or house or anything you possess to be worth money, you would not part with it for nothing or even for less than its value. Clearly, then, if you set any value on your society, you would insist on getting the proper price for that too. It may well be that you are a just man because you do not cheat people through avarice; but wise you cannot be, since your knowledge is not worth anything.”

To this Socrates replied: “Antiphon, it is common opinion among us in regard to beauty and wisdom that there is an honorable and a shameful way of bestowing them. For to offer one’s beauty for money to all comers is called prostitution; but we think it virtuous to become friendly with a lover who is known to be a man of honor. So is it with wisdom. Those who offer it to all comers for money are known as sophists, prostitutors of wisdom, but we think that he who makes a friend of one whom he knows to be gifted by nature, and teaches him all the good he can, fulfils the duty of a citizen and a gentleman. That is my own view, Antiphon. Others have a fancy for a good horse or dog or bird: my fancy, stronger even than theirs, is for good friends. And I teach them all the good I can, and recommend them to others from whom I think they will get some moral benefit. And the treasures that the wise men of old have left us in their writings I open and explore with my friends. If we come on any good thing, we extract it, and we set much store on being useful to one another.”

For my part, when I heard these words fall from his lips, I judged him to be a happy man himself and to be putting his hearers in the way of being gentlemen.

On yet another occasion Antiphon asked him: “How can you suppose that you make politicians of others, when you yourself avoid politics even if you understand them?”

“How now, Antiphon?” he retorted, should I play a more important part in politics by engaging in them alone or by taking pains to turn out as many competent politicians as possible?”

VII. Let us next consider whether by discouraging imposture he encouraged his companions to cultivate virtue. For he always said that the best road to glory is the way that makes a man as good as he wishes to be thought. And this was how he demonstrated the truth of this saying:

“Suppose a bad flute-player wants to be thought a good one, let us note what he must do. Must he not imitate good players in the accessories of the art? First, as they wear fine clothes and travel with many attendants, he must do the same. Further, seeing that they win the applause of crowds, he must provide himself with a large *claque*. But, of course, he must never accept an engagement, or he will promptly expose himself to ridicule as an incompetent player and an impostor to boot. And so, what with incurring heavy expense and gaining nothing, and bringing disgrace on himself as well, he will make his life burdensome, unprofitable and ridiculous. So too if a man who is not a general or a pilot wanted to be thought a good one, let us imagine what would happen to him. If his efforts to seem proficient in these duties failed to carry conviction, would not his failure be galling to him? if they succeeded, would not his success be still more disastrous? for it is certain that if a man who knew nothing about piloting a ship or commanding an army were appointed to such work, he would lose those whom he least wanted to lose and would bring ruin and disgrace on himself.”

By similar reasoning he would show how unprofitable is a reputation for wealth or courage or strength when it is undeserved. “Tasks beyond their powers,” he would say, “are laid on the incompetent, and no mercy is shown to them when they disappoint the expectation formed of their capability. The man who persuades you to lend him money or goods and then keeps them is without doubt a rogue; but much the greatest rogue of all is the man who has gulled his city into the belief that he is fit to direct it.”

For my part I thought that such talks did discourage imposture among his companions.

BOOK II

I. In other conversations I thought that he exhorted his companions to practice self-control in the matter of eating and drinking, and sexual indulgence, and sleeping, and endurance of cold and heat and toil. Aware that one of his companions was rather intemperate in such matters, he said: "Tell me, Aristippus, if you were required to take charge of two youths and educate them so that the one would be fit to rule and the other would never think of putting himself forward, how would you educate them? Shall we consider it, beginning with the elementary question of food?"

"Oh yes," replied Aristippus, "food does seem to come first; for one can't live without food."

"Well, now, will not a desire for food naturally arise in both at certain times?"

"Yes, naturally."

"Now which of the two should we train in the habit of transacting urgent business before he satisfies his hunger:"

"The one who is being trained to rule, undoubtedly; else State business might be neglected during his tenure."

"And must not the same one be given power to resist thirst when both want to drink?"

"Certainly."

"And to which shall we give the power of limiting his sleep so that he can go late to bed and get up early, and do without sleep if need be?"

"To the same again."

"And the power to control his passions, so that he may not be hindered in doing necessary work?"

"To the same again."

"And to which shall we give the habit of not shirking a task, but undertaking it willingly?"

“That too will go to the one who is being trained to rule.”

“And to which would the knowledge needful for overcoming enemies be more appropriately given?”

“Without doubt to the one who is being trained to rule; for the other lessons would be useless without such knowledge.”

“Don’t you think that with this education he will be less likely to be caught by his enemy than other creatures? Some of them, you know, are so greedy, that in spite of extreme timidity in some cases, they are drawn irresistibly to the bait to get food, and are caught; and others are snared by drink.”

“Yes, certainly.”

“Others again—quails and partridges, for instance—are so amorous, that when they hear the cry of the female, they are carried away by desire and anticipation, throw caution to the winds and blunder into the nets. Is it not so?”

He agreed again.

“Now, don’t yon think it disgraceful that a man should be in the same plight as the silliest of wild creatures? Thus an adulterer enters the women’s quarters, knowing that by committing adultery he is in danger of incurring the penalties threatened by the law, and that he may be trapped, caught and ill-treated. When such misery and disgrace hang over the adulterer’s head, and there are many remedies to relieve him of his carnal desire without risk, is it not sheer lunacy to plunge headlong into danger?”

“Yes, I think it is.”

“And considering that the great majority of essential occupations, warfare, agriculture and very many others, are carried on in the open air, don’t you think it gross negligence that so many men are untrained to withstand cold and heat?”

He agreed again.

“Don’t you think then, that one who is going to rule must adapt himself to bear them lightly?”

“Certainly.”

“If then we classify those who control themselves in all these matters as ‘fit to rule,’ shall we not classify those who cannot behave so as men with no claim to be rulers?”

He agreed again.

“Well now, as you know the category to which each of these species belongs, have you ever considered in which category you ought to put yourself?”

“l have; and I do not for a moment put myself in the category of those who want to be rulers. For considering how hard a matter it is to provide for one’s own needs, I think it absurd not to be content to do that, but to shoulder the burden of supplying the wants of the community as well. That anyone should sacrifice a large part of his own wishes and make himself accountable as head of the state for the least failure to carry out all the wishes of the community is surely the height of folly. For states claim to treat their rulers just as I claim to treat my servants. I expect my men to provide me with necessaries in abundance, but not to touch any of them; and states hold it to be the business of the ruler to supply them with all manner of good things, and to abstain from all of them himself. And so, should anyone want to bring plenty of trouble on himself and others, I would educate him as you propose and number him with ‘those fitted to be rulers ‘: but myself I classify with those who wish for a life of the greatest ease and pleasure that can be had.”

Here Socrates asked: “Shall we then consider whether the rulers or the ruled live the pleasanter life?”

“Certainly,” replied Aristippus.

“To take first the nations known to us. In Asia the rulers are the Persians; the Syrians, Lydians and Phrygians are the ruled. In Europe the Scythians rule, and the Maeotians are ruled. In Africa the Carthaginians rule, and the Libyans are ruled. Which of the two classes, think you, enjoys the pleasanter life? Or take the Greeks, of whom you yourself are one; do you think that the controlling or the controlled communities enjoy the pleasanter life?”

“Nay,” replied Aristippus, “for my part I am no candidate for slavery; but there is, as I hold, a middle path in which I am fain to walk. That way leads neither through rule nor slavery, but through liberty, which is the royal road to happiness.”

“Ah,” said Socrates, “if only that path can avoid the world as well as rule and slavery, there may be something in what you say. But, since you are in the world, if you intend neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not choose to truckle to the rulers—I think you must see that the stronger have a way of making the weaker rue their lot both in public and in private life, and treating them like slaves. You cannot be unaware that where some have sown and planted, others cut their corn and fell their trees, and in all manner of ways harass the weaker if they refuse to bow down, until they are persuaded to accept slavery as an escape from war with the stronger. So, too, in private life do not brave and mighty men enslave and plunder the cowardly and feeble folk?”

“Yes, but my plan for avoiding such treatment is this. I do not shut myself up in the four corners of a community, but am a stranger in every land.”

“A very cunning trick, that!” cried Socrates, “for ever since the death of Sinis and Sceiron and Procrustes, highwaymen slain by Theseus, no one injures strangers! And yet nowadays those who take a hand in the affairs of their

homeland pass laws to protect themselves from injury, get friends to help them over and above those whom nature has given them, encompass their cities with fortresses, get themselves weapons to ward off the workers of mischief; and besides all this seek to make allies in other lands; and in spite of all these precautions, they are still wronged.

But you, with none of these advantages, spend much time on the open road, where so many come to harm; and into whatever city you enter, you rank below all its citizens, and are one of those specially marked down for attack by intending wrongdoers; and yet, because you are a stranger, do you expect to escape injury? What gives you confidence? Is it that the cities by proclamation guarantee your safety in your coming and going? Or is it the thought that no master would find you worth having among his slaves? For who would care to have a man in his house who wants to do no work and has a weakness for high living?

"But now let us see how masters treat such servants. Do they not starve them to keep them from immorality, lock up the stores to stop their stealing, clap fetters on them so that they can't run away, and beat the laziness out of them with whips? What do you do yourself to cure such faults among your servants?"

"I make their lives a burden to them until I reduce them to submission. But how about those who are trained in the art of kingship, Socrates, which you appear to identify with happiness? How are they better off than those whose sufferings are compulsory, if they must bear hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and endure all these tortures willingly? For if the same back gets the flogging whether its owner kicks or consents, or, in short, if the same body, consenting or objecting, is besieged by all these torments, I see no difference, apart from the folly of voluntary suffering."

“What, Aristippus,” exclaimed Socrates, “don’t you think that there is just this difference between these voluntary and involuntary sufferings, that if you bear hunger or thirst willingly, you can eat, drink, or what not, when you choose, whereas compulsory suffering is not to be ended at will? Besides, he who endures willingly enjoys his work because he is comforted by hope; hunters, for instance, toil gladly in hope of game. Rewards like these are indeed of little worth after all the toil; but what of those who toil to win good friends, or to subdue enemies, or to make themselves capable in body and soul of managing their own homes well, of helping their friends and serving their country? Surely these toil gladly for such prizes and live a joyous life, well content with themselves, praised and envied by everyone else? Moreover, indolence and present enjoyment can never bring the body into good condition, as trainers say, neither do they put into the soul knowledge of any value, but strenuous effort leads up to good and noble deeds, as good men say. And so says Hesiod somewhere in Works and Days:

‘Wickedness can be had in abundance easily: smooth is the road and very nigh she dwells. But in front of virtue the gods immortal have put sweat: long and steep is the path to her and rough at first; but when you reach the top, then at length the road is easy, hard though it was.’

“And we have the testimony of Epicharmus too in the line:

‘The gods demand of us toil as the price of all good things.’

“And elsewhere he says:

‘Knave, yearn not for the soft things, lest thou earn the hard.’

“Aye, and Prodicus the wise expresses himself to the like effect concerning Virtue in the essay ‘On Heracles ‘ that he recites to throngs of listeners. This, so far as I remember, is how he puts it:

“When Heracles was passing from boyhood to youth’s estate, wherein the young, now becoming their own masters, show whether they will approach life by the path of virtue or the path of vice, he went out into a quiet place, and sat pondering which road to take. And there appeared two women of great stature making towards him. The one was fair to see and of high bearing; and her limbs were adorned with purity, her eyes with modesty; sober was her figure, and her robe was white. The other was plump and soft, with high feeding. Her face was made up to heighten its natural white and pink, her figure to exaggerate her height. Open-eyed was she; and dressed so as to disclose all her charms. Now she eyed herself; anon looked whether any noticed her; and often stole a glance at her own shadow.

“When they drew nigh to Heracles, the first pursued the even tenor of her way: but the other, all eager to outdo her, ran to meet him, crying: ‘Heracles, I see that you are in doubt which path to take towards life. Make me your friend; follow me, and I will lead you along the pleasantest and easiest road. You shall taste all the sweets of life; and hardship you shall never know. First, of wars and worries you shall not think, but shall ever be considering what choice food or drink you can find, what sight or sound will delight you, what touch or perfume; what tender love can give you most joy, what bed the softest slumbers; and how to come by all these pleasures with least trouble. And should there arise misgiving that lack of means may stint your enjoyments, never fear that I may lead you into winning them by toil and anguish of body and soul. Nay; you shall have the fruits of others’ toil, and refrain from nothing that can bring you gain. For to my companions give authority to pluck advantage where they will.’

“Now when Heracles heard this, he asked, ‘Lady, pray what is your name?’

"'My friends call me Happiness,' she said, 'but among those that hate me I am nicknamed Vice.'

"Meantime the other had drawn near, and she said: 'I, too, am come to you, Heracles: I know your parents and I have taken note of your character during the time of your education. Therefore I hope that, if you take the road that leads to me, you will turn out a right good doer of high and noble deeds, and I shall be yet more highly honored and more illustrious for the blessings I bestow. But I will not deceive you by a pleasant prelude: I will rather tell you truly the things that are, as the gods have ordained them. For of all things good and fair, the gods give nothing to man without toil and effort.

If you want the favor of the gods, you must worship the gods: if you desire the love of friends, you must do good to your friends: if you covet honor from a city, you must aid that city: if you are fain to win the admiration of all Hellas for virtue, you must strive to do good to Hellas: if you want land to yield you fruits in abundance, you must cultivate that land: if you are resolved to get wealth from flocks, you must care for those flocks: if you essay to grow great through war and want power to liberate your friends and subdue your foes, you must learn the arts of war from those who know them and must practice their right use: and if you want your body to be strong, you must accustom your body to be the servant of your mind, and train it with toil and sweat.'

"And Vice, as Prodicus tells, answered and said: 'Heracles, mark you how hard and long is that road to joy, of which this woman tells? but I will lead you by a short and easy road to happiness.'

"And Virtue said: 'What good thing is thine, poor wretch, or what pleasant thing dost thou know, if thou wilt do

naught to win them? Thou dost not even tarry for the desire of pleasant things, but fillest thyself with all things before thou desirest them, eating before thou art hungry, drinking before thou art thirsty, getting thee cooks, to give zest to eating, buying thee costly wines and running to and fro in search of snow in summer, to give zest to drinking; to soothe thy slumbers it is not enough for thee to buy soft coverlets, but thou must have frames for thy beds. For not toil, but the tedium of having nothing to do, makes thee long for sleep. Thou dost rouse lust by many a trick, when there is no need, using men as women: thus thou trainest thy friends, waxing wanton by night, consuming in sleep the best hours of day. Immortal art thou, yet the outcast of the gods, the scorn of good men. Praise, sweetest of all things to hear, thou hearest not: the sweetest of all sights thou beholdest not, for never yet hast thou beheld a good work wrought by thyself. Who will believe what thou dost say? who will grant what thou dost ask? Or what sane man will dare join thy throng? While thy votaries are young their bodies are weak, when they wax old, their souls are without sense; idle and sleek they thrive in youth, withered and weary they journey through old age, and their past deeds bring them shame, their present deeds distress. Pleasure they ran through in their youth: hardship they laid up for their old age. But I company with gods and good men, and no fair deed of god or man is done without my aid. I am first in honor among the gods and among men that are akin to me: to craftsmen a beloved fellow-worker, to masters a faithful guardian of the house, to servants a kindly protector: good helpmate in the toils of peace, staunch ally in the deeds of war, best partner in friendship. To my friends meat and drink bring sweet and simple enjoyment: for they wait till they crave them. And a sweeter sleep falls on them than on idle folk: they are not vexed at awaking from it, nor for its sake do they neglect to do their duties. The young

rejoice to win the praise of the old; the elders are glad to be honored by the young; with joy they recall their deeds past, and their present well-doing is joy to them, for through me they are dear to the gods, lovely to friends, precious to their native land. And when comes the appointed end, they be not forgotten and dishonored, but live on, sung and remembered for all time. O Heracles, thou son of goodly parents, if thou wilt labor earnestly on this wise, thou mayest have for thine own the most blessed happiness.'

"Such, in outline, is Prodicus' story of the training of Heracles by Virtue; only he has clothed the thoughts in even finer phrases than I have done now. But anyhow, Aristippus, it were well that you should think on these things and try to show some regard for the life that lies before you."

II. On noticing that his eldest son, Lamprocles, was out of humor with his mother, he said: "Tell me, my boy, do you know that some men are called ungrateful?"

"Indeed I do," replied the young man.

"Do you realize how they come to have this bad name?"

"I do; the word is used of those who do not show the gratitude that it is in their power to show for benefits received."

"You take it, then, that the ungrateful are reckoned among the unjust?"

"Yes."

"Now, seeing that enslavement is considered a just or an unjust act according as the victims are friends or enemies, have you ever considered whether the case of ingratitude is analogous, ingratitude being unjust towards friends, but just towards enemies?"

"Indeed I have; and I think that it is always unjust not to show gratitude for a favor from whomsoever it is received, be he friend or enemy."

“If that is so, must not ingratitude be injustice pure and simple?”

He assented.

“Therefore the greater the benefits received the greater the injustice of not showing gratitude?”

He agreed again.

“Now what deeper obligation can we find than that of children to their parents? To their parents children owe their being and their portion of all fair sights and all blessings that the gods bestow on men—gifts so highly prized by us that all will sacrifice anything rather than lose them; and the reason why governments have made death the penalty for the greatest crimes is that the fear of it is the strongest deterrent against crime. Of course you don’t suppose that lust provokes men to beget children, when the streets and the stews are full of means to satisfy that? We obviously select for wives the women who will bear us the best children, and then marry them to raise a family. The man supports the woman who is to share with him the duty of parentage and provides for the expected children whatever he thinks will contribute to their benefit in life, and accumulates as much of it as he can. The woman conceives and bears her burden in travail, risking her life, and giving of her own food; and, with much labor, having endured to the end and brought forth her child, she rears and cares for it, although she has not received any good thing, and the babe neither recognizes its benefactress nor can make its wants known to her: still she guesses what is good for it and what it likes, and seeks to supply these things, and rears it for a long season, enduring toil day and night, nothing knowing what return she will get.

“Nor are the parents content just to supply food, but so soon as their children seem capable of learning they teach

them what they can for their good, and if they think that another is more competent to teach them anything, they send them to him at a cost, and strive their utmost that the children may turn out as well as possible."

To this the young man replied: Nay, but even if she has done all this and far more than this, no one could put up with her vile temper."

"Which, think you," asked Socrates, "is the harder to bear, a wild beast's brutality or a mother's?"

"I should say a mother's, when she is like mine."

"Well now, many people get bitten or kicked by wild beasts; has she ever done you an injury of that sort?"

"Oh no, but she says things one wouldn't listen to for anything in the world."

"Well, how much trouble do you think you have given her by your peevish words and froward acts day and night since you were a little child; and how much pain when you were ill?"

"But I have never yet said or done anything to cause her shame."

"Now do you really think it harder for you to listen to what she says than for actors when they abuse one another in a tragedy?"

"But an actor, I suppose, doesn't think that a question put to him will lead to punishment, or that a threat means any harm: and so he makes light of it."

"And why should you be annoyed? You know well that there is no malice in what your mother says to you; on the contrary, she wishes you to be blessed above all other beings—unless, indeed, you suppose that your mother is maliciously set against you?"

"Oh no, I don't think that."

Then Socrates exclaimed: “So this mother of yours is kindly disposed towards you; she nurses you devotedly in sickness and sees that you want for nothing; more than that, she prays the gods to bless you abundantly and pays vows on your behalf; and yet you say she is a trial! It seems to me that, if you can’t endure a mother like her, you can’t endure a good thing. Now tell me, is there any other being whom you feel bound to regard? Or are you set on trying to please nobody, and obeying neither general nor other ruler?”

“Of course not!”

“Do you want to please your neighbor, for instance, so that he may kindle a fire for you at your need, may support you in prosperity, and in case of accident or failure may be ready to hold out a helping hand?”

“Yes, I do.”

“When you find yourself with a travelling companion on land or at sea, or happen to meet anyone, is it a matter of indifference to you whether he prove a friend or an enemy? Or do you think his goodwill worth cultivating?”

“Yes, I do.”

“And yet, when you are resolved to cultivate these, you don’t think courtesy is due to your mother, who loves you more than all? Don’t you know that even the state ignores all other forms of ingratitude and pronounces no judgment on them, caring nothing if the recipient of a favor neglects to thank his benefactor, but inflicts penalties on the man who is discourteous to his parents and rejects him as unworthy of office, holding that it would be a sin for him to offer sacrifices on behalf of the state and that he is unlikely to do anything else honorably and rightly? Aye, and if one fail to honor his parents’ graves, the state inquires into that too, when it examines the candidates for office. Therefore, my boy, if you are prudent, you will pray the gods to pardon your

neglect of your mother, lest they in turn refuse to be kind to you, thinking you an ingrate; and you will beware of men, lest all cast you out, perceiving that you care nothing for your parents, and in the end you are found to be without a friend. For, should men suppose you to be ungrateful to your parents, none would think you would be grateful for any kindness he might show you."

III. On another occasion he found that two brothers, Chaerophon and Chaerecrates, whom he knew well, were quarrelling. On seeing the latter, he cried, "Surely, Chaerecrates, you are not one of those who hold that there is more value in goods and chattels than in a brother, when they are senseless but he is sensible; they are helpless but he is helpful; when, moreover, you have many goods, but only one brother. It is strange too that a man should think he loses by his brothers because he cannot have their possessions as well as his own, and yet should not think that he loses by his fellow-citizens because their possessions are not his; and whereas in this case men can reflect that it is better to belong to a community, secure in the possession of a sufficiency, than to dwell in solitude with a precarious hold on all the property of their fellow-citizens, they fail to see that the same principle applies to brothers. Again, those who have the means buy servants to relieve them of work, and make friends because they feel the need of help; but they care nothing for their brothers, as though friendship can exist between fellow-citizens, but not between brothers! Yet common parentage and common upbringing are strong ties of affection,1 for even brute beasts reared together feel a natural yearning for one another. Besides, our fellow-men respect those of us who have brothers more than those who have none, and are less ready to quarrel with them."

"If only the difference between us were a slight one, Socrates," replied Chaerecrates, "it might perhaps be my

duty to put up with my brother and not allow trifles to separate us. For a brother who behaves like a brother is, as you say, a blessing; but if his conduct is nothing like that, and is, in fact, just the opposite of what it should be, what is the use of attempting impossibilities?"

"Does everyone find Chaerophon as disagreeable as you do, Chaerecrates, or do some people think him very pleasant?"

"Ah, Socrates," replied he, "this is precisely my reason for hating him: he is pleasant enough to other people, but whenever he is near me, he invariably says and does more to hurt than to help me."

"Well now," said Socrates, "if you try to manage a horse without knowing the right way, he hurts you. Is it so with a brother? Does he hurt if you try to deal with him when you don't know the way?

"What," exclaimed Chaerecrates, "don't I know how to deal with a brother, when I know how to requite a kind word and a generous deed? But I can't speak or act kindly to one who tries to annoy me by his words and actions'—and what's more, I won't try."

"Chaerecrates, you astonish me! Had you a sheep dog that was friendly to the shepherds, but growled when you came near him, it would never occur to you to get angry, but you would try to tame him by kindness. You say that, if your brother treated you like a brother, he would be a great blessing, and you confess that you know how to speak and act kindly: yet you don't set yourself to contriving that he shall be the greatest possible blessing to you."

"I fear, Socrates, that I lack the wisdom to make Chaerophon treat me as he should."

“And yet,” said Socrates, “there is no need, so far as I see, of any subtle or strange contriving on your part: I think you know the way to win him and to get his good opinion.”

“If you have observed that I know some spell without being conscious of my knowledge, pray tell me at once.”

“Then tell me, now; if you wanted to get an invitation to dine with an acquaintance when he offers sacrifice, what would you do?”

“Of course I should begin by inviting him myself when I offered sacrifice.”

“And suppose you wanted to encourage one of your friends to look after your affairs during your absence from home, what would you do?”

“Of course I should first undertake to look after his affairs in his absence.”

“And suppose you wanted a stranger to entertain you when you visited his city, what would you do?”

“Obviously I should first entertain him when he came to Athens. Yes, and if I wanted him to show himself eager in forwarding the business on which I had come, it is obvious that I should first have to do the same by him.”

“It seems that you have long concealed a knowledge of all spells that were ever discovered. Or is it that you hesitate to make a beginning, for fear of disgracing yourself by first showing kindness to your brother? Yet it is generally thought worthy of the highest praise to anticipate the malevolence of an enemy and the benevolence of a friend. So if I thought Chaerophon more capable than you of showing the way to this friendship, I would try to persuade him to take the first step towards an understanding with you. But as things are, I think the enterprise more likely to succeed under your direction.”

“Strange sentiments, these, Socrates! It’s quite unlike you to urge me, the junior, to lead the way! And surely all hold the contrary opinion, that the senior, I mean, should always act and speak first?”

“How so?” said Socrates. “Is it not the general opinion that a young man should make way for an older when they meet, offer his seat to him, give him a comfortable bed, let him have the first word?

My good friend, don’t hesitate, but take up the task of pacifying your man, and in no time he will respond to your overtures. Don’t you see how keen and frank he is? Low fellows, it is true, yield most readily to gifts, but kindness is the weapon most likely to prevail with a gentleman.”

“And what,” asked Chaerecrates, “if all my efforts lead to no improvement?”

“Well, in that case, I presume you will have shown that you are honest and brotherly, he that he is base and unworthy of kindness. But I am confident that no such result will follow; for I think that, as soon as he is aware of your challenge to this contest, he will be all eagerness to outdo your kind words and actions. What if a pair of hands refused the office of mutual help for which God made them, and tried to thwart each other; or if a pair of feet neglected the duty of working together, for which they were fashioned, and took to hampering each other? That is how you two are behaving at present. Would it not be utterly senseless and disastrous to use for hindrance instruments that were made for help? And, moreover, a pair of brothers, in my judgment, were made by God to render better service one to the other than a pair of hands and feet and eyes and all the instruments that he meant to be used as fellows. For the hands cannot deal simultaneously with things that are more than six feet or so apart: the feet cannot reach in a single

stride things that are even six feet apart: and the eyes, though they seem to have a longer range, cannot at the same moment see things still nearer than that, if some are in front and some behind. But two brothers, when they are friends, act simultaneously for mutual benefit, however far parted one from the other."

IV. Again, I once heard him give a discourse on friendship that was likely, as I thought, to help greatly in the acquisition and use of friends.

For be said that be often heard it stated that of all possessions the most precious is a good and sincere friend. "And yet," be said, "there is no transaction most men are so careless about as the acquisition of friends. For I find that they are careful about getting houses and lands and slaves and cattle and furniture, and anxious to keep what they have; but though they tell one that a friend is the greatest blessing, I find that most men take no thought how to get new friends or how to keep their old ones. Indeed, if one of their friends and one of their servants fall ill at the same time, I find that some call in the doctor to attend the servant and are careful to provide everything that may contribute to his recovery, whereas they take no heed of the friend. In the event of both dying, they are vexed at losing the servant, but don't feel that the death of the friend matters in the least. And though none of their other possessions is uncared for and unconsidered, they are deaf to their friends' need of attention. And besides all this, I find that most men know the number of their other possessions, however great it may be, yet cannot tell the number of their friends, few as they are; and, if they are asked and try to make a list, they will insert names and presently remove them. So much for the thought they give to their friends! Yet surely there is no other possession that can compare with a good friend. For what horse, what yoke of oxen is so good a servant as the good

friend? What slave so loyal and constant? or what possession so serviceable? The good friend is on the watch to supply whatever his friend wants for building up his private fortune and forwarding his public career.

If generosity is called for, he does his part: if fear harasses, he comes to the rescue, shares expenses, helps to persuade, bears down opposition: he is foremost in delighting him when he is prosperous and raising him up when he falls. Of all that a man can do with his hands, see for himself with his eyes, hear for himself with his ears or accomplish with his feet, in nothing is a friend backward in helping. Nevertheless, while some strive to cultivate a tree for its fruit, most bestow but an idle and listless care on their most fruitful possession, the name of which is friend.'"

V. Again, I once heard him exhort a listener—for so I interpreted his words—to examine himself and to ask how much he was worth to his friends. For he had noticed that one of his companions was neglecting a poverty-stricken friend; so he put a question to Antisthenes in the presence of several others, including the careless friend. "Antisthenes," he said, "have friends like servants their own values? For one servant, I suppose, may be worth two minas, another less than half a mina, another five minas, another no less than ten. Nicias, son of Niceratus, is said to have given a whole talent for a manager of his silver-mine. So I am led to inquire whether friends too may not differ in value."

"Oh yes," replied Antisthenes, "there are men whose friendship I, at any rate, would rather have than two minas: others I should value at less than half a mina: others I would prefer to ten minas: others I would sacrifice any sum and take any trouble to have among my friends."

“Then if that is so,” said Socrates, “were it not well that one should ask himself how much he is really worth to his friends, and try to make himself as precious as possible, in order that his friends may not be tempted to betray him? For my part, I often hear complaints of this sort: ‘A friend betrayed me,’ ‘one whom I regarded as my friend gave me up for the sake of a mina.’ I think over such matters and reflect that, when a man sells a bad slave he takes anything he can get for him; and perhaps it is tempting to sell a bad friend when there is a chance of getting more than he is worth. Good servants, I find, are not offered for sale, nor are good friends betrayed.”

VI. In the following conversation I thought he gave instruction for testing the qualities that make a man’s friendship worth winning.

“Tell me, Critobulus,” he said, “if we wanted a good friend, how should we start on the quest? Should we seek first for one who is no slave to eating and drinking, lust, sleep, idleness? For the thrall of these masters cannot do his duty by himself or his friend.”

“No, of course not.”

“Then you think we should avoid one who is subject to them?”

“I do, certainly.”

“Now what about the spendthrift who is never satisfied, who is always appealing to his neighbors for help, if he receives something, makes no return, if he receives nothing, resents it? Don’t you think he too is a troublesome friend?”

“Certainly.”

“Then we must avoid him too?”

“We must indeed.”

“Again, what about the skilful man of business who is eager to make money, and consequently drives a hard bargain, who likes to receive but is disinclined to repay?”

“So far as I see, he is even worse than the last.”

“And what of the man who is such a keen man of business that he has no leisure for anything but the selfish pursuit of gain?”

“We must avoid him too, I think. There is no profit in knowing him.”

“And what of the quarrelsome person who is willing to provide his friends with plenty of enemies?”

“We must shun him too, of course.”

“Suppose that a man is free from all these faults, but stoops to receive kindness with no thought of returning it?”

“There is no profit in him either. But what are the qualities for which we shall try to win a man’s friendship, Socrates?”

“The opposite of these, I suppose. We shall look for one who controls his indulgence in the pleasures of the body, who is truly hospitable and fair in his dealings and eager to do as much for his benefactors as he receives from them, so that he is worth knowing.”

“Then how can we test these qualities, Socrates, before intimacy begins?”

“What test do we apply to a sculptor? We don’t judge by what he says, but we look at his statues, and if we see that the works he has already produced are beautiful, we feel confident that his future works will be as good.”

“You mean that anyone whose good works wrought upon his old friends are manifest will clearly prove a benefactor to new friends also?”

“Yes; for when find that an owner of horses has been in the habit of treating his beasts well I think that he will treat others equally well.”

“Granted! but when we have found a man who seems worthy of our friendship, how are we to set about making him our friend?”

“First we should seek guidance from the gods, whether they counsel us to make a friend of him.”

“And next? Supposing that we have chosen and the gods approve him, can you say how is he to be hunted?”

“Surely not like a hare by swift pursuit, nor like birds by cunning, nor like enemies by force. It is no light task to capture a friend against his will, and hard to keep him a prisoner like a slave. Hatred, rather than friendship, comes of that treatment.”

“But how does friendship come?”

“There are spells, they say, wherewith those who know charm whom they will and make friends of them, and drugs which those who know give to whom they choose and win their love.”

“How then can we learn them?”

“You have heard from Homer in the Odyssey the spell that the Sirens put on Odysseus. It begins like this:

‘Hither, come hither, renowned Odysseus, great glory of the Achaeans.’

“Then did the Sirens chant in this strain for other folk too, Socrates, so as to keep those who were under the spell from leaving them?”

“No, only for those that yearned for the fame that virtue gives.”

“You mean, I take it, that the spell must be fitted to the listener, so that he may not take the praise for mockery”

“Yes; for to praise one for his beauty, his stature and his strength who is conscious that he is short, ugly and puny, is the way to repel him and make him dislike you more.”

“Do you know any other spells?”

“No, but I have heard that Pericles knew many and put them on the city, and so made her love him.”

“And how did Themistocles make the city love him?”

“Not by spells: no, no; but by hanging some good amulet about her.”

“I think you mean, Socrates, that if we are to win a good man’s friendship, we ourselves must be good in word and deed alike?”

“But you imagined that a bad man could win the friendship of honest men?”

“I did,” answered Critobulus, “for I saw that poor orators have good speakers among their friends, and some who are incapable of commanding an army are intimate with great generals.”

“Coming then to the point under discussion, do you know cases of useless persons making useful friends?”

“Assuredly not; but if it is impossible that the bad should gain the friendship of gentlemen, then I am anxious to know whether it is quite easy for a gentleman as a matter of course to be the friend of gentlemen?”

“Your trouble is, Critobulus, that you often find men who do good and shun evil not on friendly terms, but apt to quarrel and treat one another more harshly than worthless fellows.”

“Yes,” said Critobulus, “and such conduct is not confined to individuals, but even the cities that care most for the right and have least liking for the wrong are often at enmity. These thoughts make me despair about the acquisition of friends.

For I see on the one hand that rogues cannot be friends with one another—for how could the ungrateful, the careless, the selfish, the faithless, the incontinent, form friendships? I feel sure, then, that rogues are by their nature enemies rather than friends. But then, as you point out, neither can rogues ever join in friendship with honest men, for how can wrongdoers become friendly with those who hate their conduct? And if we must add that the votaries of virtue strive with one another for headship in cities, and envy and hate one another, who then will be friends and where shall loyalty and faithfulness be found?"

"Ah, Critobulus, but there is a strange complication in these matters. Some elements in man's nature make for friendship: men need one another, feel pity, work together for their common good, and, conscious of the facts, are grateful to one another. But there are hostile elements in men. For, holding the same things to be honorable and pleasant, they fight for them, fall out and take sides. Strife and anger lead to hostility, covetousness to enmity, jealousy to hatred. Nevertheless through all these barriers friendship slips, and unites the gentle natures. For thanks to their virtue these prize the untroubled security of moderate possessions above sovereignty won by war; despite hunger and thirst, they can share their food and drink without a pang; and although they delight in the charms of beauty they can resist the lure and avoid offending those whom they should respect; they can not only share wealth lawfully and keep from covetousness, but also supply one another's wants; they can compose strife not only without pain, but with advantage to one another, and prevent anger from pursuing its way towards remorse: but jealousy they take away utterly, regarding their own good things as belonging to their friends, and thinking their friend's good things to be their own. Surely, then, it is likely that true gentlemen will

share public honors too not only without harm to one another, but to their common benefit? For those who desire to win honor and to bear rule in their cities that they may have power to embezzle, to treat others with violence, to live in luxury, are bound to be unjust, unscrupulous, incapable of unity. But if a man seeks to be honored in a state that he may not be the victim of injustice himself and may help his friends in a just cause, and when he takes office may try to do some good to his country, why should he be incapable of union with one like himself? Will his connexion with other gentlemen render him less capable of serving his friends? Will he be less able to benefit his city with the help of other gentlemen? Even in the public games it is clear that, if the strongest competitors were allowed to join forces against the weaker, they would win all the events, they would carry off all the prizes. True, that is not permitted in the games; but in politics, where the gentlemen are the strongest, nobody prevents anyone from forming any combination he may choose for the benefit of the state; surely, then, in public life it is a gain to make friends with the best, and to see in them partners and fellow-workers in a common cause, and not rivals. But, again, it is equally clear that anyone who goes to war will need allies, and more of them if he is to fight an army of gentlemen. Moreover, those who are willing to fight at your side must be well treated that they may be willing to exert themselves; and it is a far sounder plan to show kindness to the best, who are fewer in number, than to the worst, who are the greater company; for the bad want many more kindnesses than the good. Courage, Critobulus; try to be good, and when you have achieved that, set about catching your gentleman. Maybe, I myself, as an adept in love, can lend you a hand in the pursuit of gentlemen. For when I want to catch anyone it's surprising how I strain every nerve to have my love returned, my longing

reciprocated by him, in my eagerness that he shall want me as much as I want him. I see that you too will feel this need when you want to form a friendship. So do not hide from me the names of those whom you wish to make your friends; for I am careful to please him who pleases me, and so, I think, I am not without experience in the pursuit of men."

"Well, Socrates," said Critobulus in reply, "these are the lessons I have long wished to learn, especially if the same skill will serve to win a good soul and a fair face."

"Ah no, Critobulus," said Socrates, "it belongs not to my skill to lay hands on the fair and force them to submit. I am convinced that the reason why men fled from Scylla was that she laid hands on them; but the Sirens laid hands on no man; from far away they sang to all, and therefore, we are told, all submitted, and hearing were enchanted." 1

"I am not going to put a hand on anyone," said Critobulus, "so teach me any good plan you know for making friends."

"Then won't you put lip to lip either?"

"Courage!" answered Critobulus, "I won't touch a lip with mine either—unless the owner is fair!"

"That's an unfortunate beginning for you, Critobulus! The fair won't submit to such conduct; but the ugly like it, supposing that they are called fair for the beauty of their souls."

"A kiss for the fair," exclaimed Critobulus, "'and a thousand kisses for the good! That shall be my motto, so take courage, and teach me the art of catching friends."

"Well then, Critobulus," said Socrates, "when you want to make a new friend, will you let me warn him that you admire him and want his friendship?"

"Warn him by all means: no one hates those who praise him, so far as I know."

“Suppose I go on to warn him that your admiration makes you well disposed towards him, you won’t think I am slandering you, will you:”

“Nay; when I guess that anyone feels well disposed towards me, a like goodwill towards him is begotten in me.”

“Then you will permit me to say this about you to those whose friendship you desire. Now if you will give me permission to tell them besides that you are devoted to your friends and nothing gives you so much pleasure as good friends; that you take as much pride in your friends’ fair achievements as in your own, and as much pleasure in your friends’ good as in your own, and never weary of contriving it for your friend’s; and you have made up your mind that a man’s virtue consists in outdoing his friends in kindness and his enemies in mischief; then I think you will find me a useful companion in the quest of good friends.”

“Now why do you say this to me? as if you were not free to say what you choose about me.”

“Not so indeed: I can quote Aspasia against you. She once told me that good matchmakers are successful in making marriages only when the good reports they carry to and fro are true; false reports she would not recommend, for the victims of deception hate one another and the matchmaker too. I am convinced that this is sound, and so I think it is not open to me to say anything in your praise that I can’t say truthfully.”

“It appears, Socrates, that you are the sort of friend to help me if I am in any way qualified to make friends: but if not, you won’t make up a story to help me.”

“How do you think I shall help you best, Critobulus, by false praise, or by urging you to try to be a good man? If you don’t yet see clearly, take the following cases as illustrations. Suppose that I wanted to get a shipmaster to make you his

friend, and as a recommendation told him that you are a good skipper, which is untrue; and suppose that he believed me and put you in charge of his ship in spite of your not knowing how to steer it: have you any reason to hope that you would not lose the ship and your life as well? Or suppose that I falsely represented to the Assembly that you are a born general, jurist and statesman in one, and so persuaded the state to commit her fortunes to you, what do you suppose would happen to the state and to yourself under your guidance? Or again, suppose that I falsely described you to certain citizens in private as a thrifty, careful person, and persuaded them to place their affairs in your hands, wouldn't you do them harm and look ridiculous when you came to the test? Nay, Critobulus, if you want to be thought good at anything, you must try to be so; that is the quickest, the surest, the best way. You will find on reflection that every kind of virtue named among men is increased by study and practice. Such is the view I take of our duty, Critobulus. If you have anything to say against it, tell me."

"Why, Socrates," said Critobulus, "I should be ashamed to contradict you, for I should be saying what is neither honorable nor true."

VII. To pass to another subject. The distresses of his friends that arose from ignorance he tried to cure by advice, those that were due to want by telling them how to help one another according to their power. On this subject too I will state what I know about him.

One day, noticing that Aristarchus looked glum, he said: "Aristarchus, you seem to have a burden on your mind. You should let your friends share it; possibly we may do something to ease you."

"Ah yes, Socrates," replied Aristarchus, "I am in great distress. Since the revolution there has been an exodus to

the Piraeus, and a crowd of my women-folk, being left behind, are come to me,—sisters, nieces and cousins,—so that we are fourteen in the house without counting the slaves. We get nothing from our land, because our enemies have seized it, and nothing from our house property, now there are so few residents in the city. Portable property finds no buyers, and it's quite impossible to borrow money anywhere: I really think a search in the street would have better result than an application for a loan. It's hard, Socrates, to let one's people die, but impossible to keep so many in times like these."

When Socrates heard this, he asked: "How is it that with so many mouths to feed Ceramon not only contrives to provide for the needs of himself and his family, but actually saves enough to make him a rich man, whereas you, with so many mouths to feed, fear you will all be starved to death?"

"The explanation, of course, is this: my dependants are gentlefolk, his are slaves."

"And which do you think are the better, his slaves or your gentlefolk?"

"My gentlefolk, I think."

"Then is it not disgraceful that you with your gentlefolk should be in distress, while he is kept in affluence by his meaner household?"

"Of course his dependants are artisans, while mine have had a liberal education."

"What is an artisan? one who knows how to produce something useful?"

"Certainly."

"Are groats useful?"

"Yes, very."

"And bread?"

“No less so.”

“What about men’s and women’s cloaks, shirts, capes, smocks?”

“Yes, all these things too are very useful.”

“Then don’t the members of your household know how to make any of these?”

“I believe they can make all of them.”

“Don’t you know, then, that by manufacturing one of these commodities, namely groats, Nausicydes keeps not only himself and his family, but large herds of swine and cattle as well, and has so much to spare that he often undertakes costly public duties; that Cyrebus feeds his whole family well and lives in luxury by baking bread, Demeas of Collytus by making capes, Menon by making cloaks; and most of the Megarians make a good living out of smocks?”

“Yes, of course; for they buy foreign slaves and can force them to make what is convenient, but my household is made up of gentlefolk and relations.”

“And so, just because they are gentlefolk and related to you, you think they should do nothing but eat and sleep? Do you find that other gentlefolk who live this sort of life are better off and happier than those who are usefully employed in work that they understand? Or is it your experience that idleness and carelessness help men to learn what they ought to know and remember what they learn, to make themselves healthy and strong, and to get and keep things that are of practical use, but industry and carefulness are useless things? When these women learned the work that you say they understand, did they regard it as of no practical use, and had they no intention of taking it up, or did they mean to occupy themselves in it and obtain some benefit from it? Which makes men more prudent, idleness or useful

employment? Which makes men more just, work or idle discussions about supplies? Besides, at present, I fancy, you don't love these ladies and they don't love you: you think they are a tax on you, and they see that you feel them to be a burden. And the danger in this state of things is that dislike may grow and their former gratitude fade away; but if you exert your authority and make them work, you will love them, when you find that they are profitable to you, and they will be fond of you, when they feel that you are pleased with them. Both you and they will like to recall past kindnesses and will strengthen the feeling of gratitude that these engender; thus you will be better friends and feel more at home. To be sure, if they were going to do something disgraceful, death would be a better fate. But in point of fact the work they understand is, as it appears, the work considered the most honorable and the most suitable for a woman; and the work that is understood is always done with the greatest ease, speed, pride and pleasure. So do not hesitate to offer them work that will yield a return both to you and to them, and probably they will welcome your proposal."

"Well, well," said Aristarchus, "your advice seems so good, Socrates, that I think I shall now bring myself to borrow capital to make a start. Hitherto I have had no inclination to do so, knowing that when I had spent the loan I should not have the wherewithal to repay it."

The consequence was that capital was provided and wool purchased. The women worked during dinner and only stopped at the supper hour. There were happy instead of gloomy faces: suspicious glances were exchanged for pleasant smiles. They loved him as a guardian and he liked them because they were useful. Finally Aristarchus came to Socrates and told him this with delight. "One objection they

have to me," he added: "I am the only member of the household who eats the bread of idleness."

"Then why not tell them the story of the dog?" asked Socrates. "It is said that when beasts could talk, a sheep said to her master: 'It is strange that you give us sheep nothing but what we get from the land, though we supply you with wool and lambs and cheese, and yet you share your own food with your dog, who supplies you with none of these things.' The dog heard this, and said: 'Of course he does. Do not I keep you from being stolen by thieves, and carried off by wolves? Why, but for my protection you couldn't even feed for fear of being killed.' And so, they say, the sheep admitted the dog's claim to preference. Do you then tell these women that you are their watch-dog and keeper, and it is due to you that they live and work in safety and comfort, with none to harm them."

VIII. Again, on meeting an old comrade after long absence he said: "Where do you come from, Eutherus?"

"I came home when the war ended, Socrates, and am now living here," he replied. "Since we have lost our foreign property, and my father left me nothing in Attica, am forced to settle down here now and work for my living with my hands. I think it's better than begging, especially as I have no security to offer for a loan."

"And how long will you have the strength, do you think, to earn your living by your work?"

"Oh, not long, of course."

"But remember, when you get old you will have to spend money, and nobody will be willing to pay you for your labor."

"True."

"Then it would be better to take up some kind of work at once that will assure you a competence when you get old, and to go to somebody who is better off and wants an

assistant, and get a return for your services by acting as his bailiff, helping to get in his crops and looking after his property."

"I shouldn't like to make myself a slave, Socrates."

"But surely those who control their cities and take charge of public affairs are thought more respectable, not more slavish on that account."

"Briefly, Socrates, I have no inclination to expose myself to any man's censure."

"But, you see, Eutherus, it is by no means easy to find a post in which one is not liable to censure. Whatever one does, it is difficult to avoid mistakes, and it is difficult to escape unfair criticism even if one makes no mistakes. I wonder if you find it easy to avoid complaints entirely even from your present employers. You should try, therefore, to have no truck with grumblers and to attach yourself to considerate masters; to undertake such duties as you can perform and beware of any that are too much for you, and, whatever you do, to give of your best and put your heart into the business. In this way, I think, you are most likely to escape censure, find relief from your difficulties, live in ease and security, and obtain an ample competence for old age."

IX. I remember that he once heard Criton say that life at Athens was difficult for a man who wanted to mind his own business. "At this moment," Criton added, "actions are pending against me not because I have done the plaintiffs an injury, but because they think that I would sooner pay than have trouble."

"Tell me, Criton," said Socrates, "do you keep dogs to fend the wolves from your sheep?"

"Certainly," replied Criton, "because it pays me better to keep them."

“Then why not keep a man who may be able and willing to fend off the attempts to injure you?

“I would gladly do so were I not afraid that he might turn on me.”

“What? don’t you see that it is much pleasanter to profit by humoring a man like you than by quarrelling with him? I assure you there are men in this city who would take pride in your friendship.”

Thereupon they sought out Archedemus, an excellent speaker and man of affairs, but poor. For he was not one of those who make money unscrupulously, but an honest man, and he would say that it was easy to take forfeit from false accusers. So whenever Criton was storing corn, oil, wine, wool or other farm produce, he would make a present of a portion to Archedemus, and when he sacrificed, he invited him, and in fact lost no similar opportunity of showing courtesy. Archedemus came to regard Criton’s house as a haven of refuge and constantly paid his respects to him. He soon found out that Criton’s false accusers had much to answer for and many enemies. He brought one of them to trial on a charge involving damages or imprisonment. The defendant, conscious that he was guilty on many counts, did all he could to get quit of Archedemus. But Archedemus refused to let him off until he withdrew the action against Criton and compensated him. Archedemus carried through several other enterprises of a similar kind; and now many of Criton’s friends begged him to make Archedemus their protector, just as when a shepherd has a good dog the other shepherds want to pen their flocks near his, in order to get the use of his dog. Archedemus was glad to humor Criton, and so there was peace not only for Criton but for his friends as well. If anyone whom he had offended reproached Archedemus with flattering Criton because he found him useful, he would answer:

“Which, then, is disgraceful: to have honest men for your friends, by accepting and returning their favors, and to fall out with rogues; or to treat gentlemen as enemies by trying to injure them, and to make friends of rogues by siding with them, and to prefer their intimacy?”

Henceforward Archedemus was respected by Criton’s friends and was himself numbered among them.

X. Again I recall the following conversation between him and his companion Diodorus.

“Tell me, Diodorus,” he said, “if one of your servants runs away, do you take steps to bring him back safe?”

“Yes, of course,” he replied, “and I invite others to help, by offering a reward for the recovery of the man.”

“And further, if one of your servants is ill, do you take care of him and call in doctors to prevent him dying?”

“Indeed I do.”

“Well, suppose that one of your acquaintance, who is much more useful than your servants, is near being ruined by want, don’t you think it worth your while to take steps to save him? Now you know that Hermogenes is a conscientious man and would be ashamed to take a favor from you without making a return. Yet surely it is worth many servants to have a willing, loyal, staunch subordinate, capable of doing what he is told, and not only so, but able to make himself useful unbidden, to think clearly and give advice. Good householders, you know, say that the right time to buy is when a valuable article can be bought at a low price; and in these times the circumstances afford an opportunity of acquiring good friends very cheap.”

“Thank you, Socrates,” said Diodorus, “pray bid Hermogenes call on me.”

“No, indeed I won’t,” said he; “for in my opinion it is at least as good for you to go to him yourself as to invite him to

come to you, and you have quite as much to gain as he by doing so."

The consequence was that Diodorus setoff to visit Hermogenes; and in return for a small sum he acquired a friend who made a point of thinking how he could help and please him either by word or deed.

BOOK III

I. I will now explain how he helped those who were eager to win distinction by making them qualify themselves for the honors they coveted.

He once heard that Dionysodorus had arrived at Athens, and gave out that he was going to teach generalship. Being aware that one of his companions wished to obtain the office of general from the state, he addressed him thus: "Young man, surely it would be disgraceful for one who wishes to be a general in the state to neglect the opportunity of learning the duties, and he would deserve to be punished by the state much more than one who carved statues without having learned to be a sculptor. For in the dangerous times of war the whole state is in the general's hands, and great good may come from his success and great evil from his failure. Therefore anyone who exerts himself to gain the votes, but neglects to learn the business, deserves punishment."

This speech persuaded the man to go and learn. When he had learnt his lesson and returned, Socrates chaffed him. "Don't you think, sirs," he said, "that our friend looks more majestic,' as Homer called Agamemnon, now that he has learnt generalship? For just as he who has learnt to play the harp is a harper even when he doesn't play, and he who has studied medicine is a doctor even though he doesn't practice, so our friend will be a general for ever, even if no one votes for him. But your ignoramus is neither general nor doctor, even if he gets every vote. But," he continued, "in order that any one of us who may happen to command a regiment or platoon under you may have a better knowledge of warfare, tell us the first lesson he gave you in generalship."

"The first was like the last," he replied; "he taught me tactics—nothing else."

“But then that is only a small part of generalship. For a general must also be capable of furnishing military equipment and providing supplies for the men; he must be resourceful, active, careful, hardy and quick-witted; he must be both gentle and brutal, at once straightforward and designing, capable of both caution and surprise, lavish and rapacious, generous and mean, skilful in defense and attack; and there are many other qualifications, some natural, some acquired, that are necessary to one who would succeed as a general. It is well to understand tactics too; for there is a wide difference between right and wrong disposition of the troops, just as stones, bricks, timber and tiles flung together anyhow are useless, whereas when the materials that neither rot nor decay, that is, the stones and tiles, are placed at the bottom and the top, and the bricks and timber are put together in the middle, as in building, the result is something of great value, a house, in fact.”

“Your analogy is perfect, Socrates,” said the youth; “for in war one must put the best men in the van and the rear, and the worst in the centre, that they may be led by the van and driven forward by the rearguard.”

“Well and good, provided that he taught you also to distinguish the good and the bad men. If not, what have you gained by your lessons? No more than you would have gained if he had ordered you to put the best money at the head and tail, and the worst in the middle, without telling you how to distinguish good from base coin.”

“I assure you he didn’t; so we should have to judge for ourselves which are the good men and which are the bad.”

“Then we had better consider how we may avoid mistaking them.”

“I want to do so,” said the youth.

“Well now,” said Socrates, “if we had to lay hands on a sum of money, would not the right arrangement be to put the most covetous men in the front?”

“1 think so.”

“And what should we do with those who are going to face danger? Should our first line consist of the most ambitious? ‘

“Oh yes: they are the men who will face danger for the sake of glory. About these, now, there is no mystery: they are conspicuous everywhere, and so it is easy to find them.”

“But,” said Socrates, “did he teach you only the disposition of an army, or did he include where and how to use each formation?”

“Not at all.”

“And yet there are many situations that call for a modification of tactics and strategy.”

“I assure you he didn’t explain that.”

“Then pray go back and ask him. If he knows and has a conscience, he will be ashamed to send you home ill-taught, after taking your money.”

II. One day when he met a man who had been chosen general, he asked him, “For what reason, think you, is Agamemnon dubbed ‘Shepherd of the people’ by Homer? Is it because a shepherd must see that his sheep are safe and are fed, and that the object for which they are kept is attained, and a general must see that his men are safe and are fed, and that the object for which they fight is attained, or, in other words, that victory over the enemy may add to their happiness? Or what reason can Homer have for praising Agamemnon as ‘both a good king and a doughty warrior too’? Is it that he would be ‘a doughty warrior too’ not if he alone were a good fighter, but if he made all his men like himself; and ‘a good king’ not if he merely ordered his

own life aright, but if he made his subjects happy as well? Because a king is chosen, not to take good care of himself, but for the good of those who have chosen him; and all men fight in order that they may get the best life possible, and choose generals to guide them to it. Therefore it is the duty of a commander to contrive this for those who have chosen him for general. For anything more honorable than that is not easy to find, or anything more disgraceful than its opposite."

By these reflections on what constitutes a good leader he stripped away all other virtues, and left just the power to make his followers happy.

III. Again, when someone had been chosen a leader of cavalry, I remember that Socrates conversed with him in the following manner:

"Young man," he said, "can you tell us why you hankered after a cavalry command? I presume it was not to be first of the cavalry in the charge; for that privilege belongs to the mounted archers; at any rate they ride ahead of their commanders even."

"True."

"Nor was it to get yourself known either. Even madmen are known to everyone."

"True again."

"But perhaps you think you can hand over the cavalry in better condition to the state when you retire, and can do something for the good of the state as a cavalry leader, in case there is any occasion to employ that arm?"

"Yes, certainly," said he.

"Yes," said Socrates, "and no doubt it is a fine thing if you can do that. The command, I presume, for which you have been chosen, is the command of horses and riders."

“Indeed it is.”

“Come then, tell us first how you propose to improve the horses.”

“Oh, but I don’t think that is my business. Every man must look after his own horse.”

“Then if some of your men appear on parade with their horses ailing or suffering from bad feet or sore legs, others with underfed animals that can’t go the pace, others with restive brutes that won’t keep in line, others with such bad kickers that it is impossible to line them up at all, what will you be able to make of your cavalry? how will you be able to do the state any good with a command like that?”

“I am much obliged to you,” he replied, “and I will try to look after the horses carefully.”

“Won’t you also try to improve the men?” said Socrates.

“I will.”

“Then will you first train them to mount better?”

“Oh yes, I must, so that if anyone is thrown he may have a better chance of saving himself.”

“Further, when there is some danger before you, will you order them to draw the enemy into the sandy ground where your maneuvers are held, or will you try to carry out your training in the kind of country that the enemy occupy?”

“Oh yes, that is the better way.”

“And again, will you pay much attention to bringing down as many of the enemy as possible without dismounting?”

“Oh yes, that too is the better way.”

“Have you thought of fostering a keen spirit among the men and hatred of the enemy, so as to make them more gallant in action?”

“Well, at any rate, will try to do so now.”

“And have you considered how to make the men obey you? Because without that horses and men, however good and gallant, are of no use.”

“True, but what is the best way of encouraging them to obey, Socrates?”

“Well, I suppose you know that under all conditions human beings are most willing to obey those whom they believe to be the best. Thus in sickness they most readily obey the doctor, on board ship the pilot, on a farm the farmer, whom they think to be most skilled in his business.”

“Yes, certainly.”

“Then it is likely that in horsemanship too, one who clearly knows best what ought to be done will most easily gain the obedience of the others.”

“If then, Socrates, I am plainly the best horseman among them, will that suffice to gain their obedience?”

“Yes, if you also show them that it will be safer and more honorable for them to obey you.”

“How, then, shall I show that?”

“Well, it’s far easier than if you had to show them that bad is better than good and more profitable.”

“Do you mean that in addition to his other duties a cavalry leader must take care to be a good speaker?”

“Did you suppose that a commander of cavalry should be mum? Did you never reflect that all the best we learned according to custom—the learning,

I mean, that teaches us how to live—we learned by means of *words*, and that every other good lesson to be learned is learned by means of words; that the best teachers rely most on the spoken word and those with the deepest knowledge of the greatest subjects are the best talkers? Did you never reflect that, whenever one chorus is selected from the

citizens of this state—for instance, the chorus that is sent to Delos—no choir from any other place can compare with it, and no state can collect so goodly a company?"

"True."

"And yet the reason is that Athenians excel all others not so much in singing or in stature or in strength, as in love of honor, which is the strongest incentive to deeds of honor and renown."

"True again."

"Then don't you think that if one took the same pains with our cavalry, they too would greatly excel others in arms and horses and discipline and readiness to face the enemy, if they thought that they would win glory and honor by it?"

"I expect so."

"Don't hesitate then, but try to encourage this keenness among the men: both you and your fellow-citizens will benefit by the results of your efforts."

"Most certainly I will try."

IV. Once on seeing Nicomachides returning from the elections, he asked, "Who have been chosen generals, Nicomachides?"

"Isn't it like the Athenians?" replied he; "they haven't chosen me after all the hard work I have done, since I was called up, in the command of company or regiment, though I have been so often wounded in action" (and here he uncovered and showed his scars); "yet they have chosen Antisthenes, who has never served in a marching regiment nor distinguished himself in the cavalry and understands nothing but money-making."

"Isn't that a recommendation," said Socrates, "supposing he proves capable of supplying the men's needs?"

“Why,” retorted Nicomachides, “merchants too are capable of making money, but that doesn’t make them fit to command an army.”

“But,” cried Socrates, “Antisthenes also is eager for victory, and that is a good point in a general. Whenever he has been choragus, you know, his choir has always won.”

“No doubt,” said Nicomachides, “but there is no analogy between the handling of a choir and of an army.”

“But, you see,” said Socrates, “though Antisthenes knows nothing about music or choir training, he showed himself capable of finding the best experts in these.”

“In the army too, then,” said Nicomachides, “he will find others to command for him, and others to do the fighting.”

“And therefore,” said Socrates, “if he finds out and prefers the best men in warfare as in choir training it is likely that he will be victorious in that too; and probably he will be more ready to spend on winning; a battle with the whole state than on winning a choral competition with his tribe.”

“Do you mean to say, Socrates, that the man who succeeds with a chorus will also succeed with an army?”

“I mean that, whatever a man controls, if he knows what he wants and can get it he will be a good controller, whether he control a chorus, an estate, a city or an army.”

“Really, Socrates,” cried Nicomachides, “I should never have thought to hear you say that a good business man would make a good general.”

“Come then, let us review the duties of each that we may know whether they are the same or different.”

“By all means.”

“Is it not the duty of both to make their subordinates willing and obedient?”

“Decidedly.”

“And to put the right man in the right place?”

“That is so.”

“I suppose, moreover, that both should punish the bad and reward the good.”

“Yes, certainly.”

“Of course both will do well to win the goodwill of those under them?”

“That is so.”

“Do you think that it is to the interest of both to attract allies and helpers?”

“Yes, certainly.”

“And should not both be able to keep what they have got?”

“They should indeed.”

“And should not both be strenuous and industrious in their own work?”

“All these are common to both; but fighting is not.”

“But surely both are bound to find enemies?”

“Oh yes, they are.”

“Then is it not important for both to get the better of them?”

“Undoubtedly; but you don’t say how business capacity will help when it comes to fighting.”

“That is just where it will be most helpful. For the good business man, through his knowledge that nothing profits or pays like a victory in the field, and nothing is so utterly unprofitable and entails such heavy loss as a defeat, will be eager to seek and furnish all aids to victory, careful to consider and avoid what leads to defeat, prompt to engage the enemy if he sees he is strong enough to win, and, above all, will avoid an engagement when he is not ready. Don’t look down on business men, Nicomachides. For the

management of private concerns differs only in point of number from that of public affairs. In other respects they are much alike, and particularly in this, that neither can be carried on without men, and the men employed in private and public transactions are the same. For those who take charge of public affairs employ just the same men when they attend to their own; and those who understand how to employ them are successful directors of public and private concerns, and those who do not, fail in both."

V. Once when talking with the son of the great Pericles, he said: "For my part, Pericles, I feel hopeful that, now you have become general, our city will be more efficient and more famous in the art of war, and will defeat our enemies."

"I could wish," answered Pericles, "that it might be as you say, Socrates; but how these changes are to come about cannot see."

"Should you like to discuss them with me, then," said Socrates, "and consider how they can be brought about?"

"1 should."

"Do you know then, that in point of numbers the Athenians are not inferior to the Boeotians?"

"Yes, I know."

"Do you think that the larger number of fine, well-developed men could be selected from among the Boeotians or the Athenians?"

"In that matter too they seem to be at no disadvantage."

"Which do you think are the more united?"

"The Athenians, I should say, for many of the Boeotians resent the selfish behavior of the Thebans. At Athens I see nothing of that sort."

"And again, the Athenians are more ambitious and more high-minded than other peoples; and these qualities are

among the strongest incentives to heroism and patriotic self-sacrifice."

"Yes, in these respects too the Athenians need not fear criticism."

"And besides, none have inherited a past more crowded with great deeds; and many are heartened by such a heritage and encouraged to care for virtue and prove their gallantry."

"All you have said is true, Socrates. But, you see, since the disasters sustained by Tolmides and the Thousand at Lebadea and by Hippocrates at Delium, the relations of the Athenians and Boeotians are changed: the glory of the Athenians is brought low, the pride of the Thebans is exalted; and now the Boeotians, who formerly would not venture, even in their own country, to face the Athenians without help from Sparta and the rest of the Peloponnese, threaten to invade Attica by themselves, and the Athenians, who formerly overran Boeotia, fear that the Boeotians may plunder Attica."

"Ah, I am aware of that," answered Socrates; "but the disposition of our city is now more to a good ruler's liking. For confidence breeds carelessness, slackness, disobedience: fear makes men more attentive, more obedient, more amenable to discipline. The behavior of sailors is a case in point. So long as they have nothing to fear, they are, I believe, an unruly lot, but when they expect a storm or an attack, they not only carry out all orders, but watch in silence for the word of command like choristers."

"Well," exclaimed Pericles, "if they are now in the mood for obedience, it seems time to say how we can revive in them a longing for the old virtue and fame and happiness."

"If then," said Socrates, "we wanted them to claim money that others held, the best way of egging them on to seize it would be to show them that it was their fathers' money and

belongs to them. As we want them to strive for preeminence in virtue, we must show that this belonged to them in old days, and that by striving for it they will surpass all other men."

"How then can we teach this?"

"I think by reminding them that their earliest ancestors of whom we have any account were, as they themselves have been told, the most valiant."

"Do you refer to the judgment of the gods, which Cecrops delivered in his court because of his virtue?"

"Yes, and the care and birth of Erectheus, and the war waged in his day with all the adjacent country, and the war between the sons of Heracles and the Peloponnesians, and all the wars waged in the days of Theseus, in all of which it is manifest that they were champions among the men of their time. You may add the victories of their descendants, who lived not long before our own day: some they gained unaided in their struggle with the lords of all Asia and of Europe as far as Macedonia, the owners of more power and wealth than the world had ever seen, who had wrought deeds that none had equaled; in others they were fellow-champions with the Peloponnesians both on land and sea. These men, like their fathers, are reported to have been far superior to all other men of their time."

"Yes, that is the report of them,"

"Therefore, though there have been many migrations in Greece, these continued to dwell in their own land: many referred to them their rival claims, many found a refuge with them from the brutality of the oppressor."

"Yes, Socrates," cried Pericles, "and I wonder how our city can have become so degenerate."

"My own view," replied Socrates, "is that the Athenians, as a consequence of their great superiority, grew careless of

themselves, and have thus become degenerate, much as athletes who are in a class by themselves and win the championship easily are apt to grow slack and drop below their rivals.

"How, then, can they now recover their old virtue?"

"There is no mystery about it, as I think. If they find out the customs of their ancestors and practice them as well as they did, they will come to be as good as they were; or failing that, they need but to imitate those who now have the pre-eminence and to practice their customs, and if they are equally careful in observing them, they will be as good as they, and, if more careful, even better."

"That means that it is a long march for our city to perfection. For when will Athenians show the Lacedaemonian reverence for age, seeing that they despise all their elders, beginning with their own fathers? When will they adopt the Lacedaemonian system of training, seeing that they not only neglect to make themselves fit, but mock at those who take the trouble to do so? When will they reach that standard of obedience to their rulers, seeing that they make contempt of rulers a point of honor? Or when will they attain that harmony, seeing that, instead of working together for the general good, they are more envious and bitter against one another than against the rest of the world, are the most quarrelsome of men in public and private assemblies, most often go to law with one another, and would rather make profit of one another so than by mutual service, and while regarding public affairs as alien to themselves, yet fight over them too, and find their chief enjoyment in having the means to carry on such strife? So it comes about that mischief and evil grow apace in the city, enmity and mutual hatred spring up among the people, so that I am always dreading that some evil past bearing may befall the city."

“No, no, Pericles, don’t think the wickedness of the Athenians so utterly past remedy. Don’t you see what good discipline they maintain in their fleets, how well they obey the umpires in athletic contests, how they take orders from the choir-trainers as readily as any?”

“Ah yes, and strange indeed it is that such men submit themselves to their masters, and yet the infantry and cavalry, who are supposed to be the pick of the citizens for good character, are the most insubordinate.”

Then Socrates asked, “But what of the Court of the Areopagus, Pericles? Are not its members persons who have won approval?”

“Certainly.”

“Then do you know of any who decide the cases that come before them and perform all their other functions more honorably, more in accordance with law, with more dignity and justice?”

“I am not finding fault with the Areopagus.”

“Then you must not despair of Athenian discipline,

“But, you see, in the army, where good conduct, discipline, submission are most necessary, our people pay no attention to these things.”

“This may be due to the incompetence of the officers. You must have noticed that no one attempts to exercise authority over our harpists, choristers and dancers, if he is incompetent, nor over wrestlers or wrestlers who also box? All who have authority over them can tell where they learned their business; but most of our generals are improvisers. However, I don’t suppose you are one of this sort. I suppose you can say when you began to learn strategy as well as when you began wrestling. Many of the principles, I think, you have inherited from your father, and many others you have gathered from every source from which you could learn

anything useful to a general. I think, too, that you take much trouble that you may not unconsciously lack any knowledge useful to a general; and if you find that you don't know anything, you seek out those who have the knowledge, grudging neither gifts nor thanks, that you may learn what you don't know from them and may have the help of good coaching."

"I can see, Socrates, that in saying this you don't really think I study these things, but you are trying to show me that one who is going to command an army must study all of them; and of course I admit that you are right."

"Have you observed, Pericles, that our frontier is protected by great mountains extending to Boeotia, through which there are steep and narrow passes leading into our land, and that the interior is cut across by rugged mountains?"

"Certainly."

"Further, have you heard that the Mysians and Pisidians, occupying very rugged country in the Great King's territory and lightly armed, contrive to overrun and damage the King's territory and to preserve their own freedom?"

"Yes, I have heard so."

"And don't you think that active young Athenians, more lightly armed and occupying the mountains that protect our country, would prove a thorn in the side of the enemy and a strong bulwark of defense to our people?"

"Socrates," replied Pericles, "I think all these suggestions too have a practical value."

"Then, since you like them, adopt them, my good fellow. Any part of them that you carry out will bring honor to you and good to the state; and should you fail in part, you will neither harm the state nor disgrace yourself."

VI. Ariston's son, Glaucon, was attempting to become an orator and striving for headship in the state, though he was

less than twenty years old; and none of his friends or relations could check him, though he would get himself dragged from the platform and make himself a laughing-stock. Only Socrates, who took an interest in him for the sake of Plato and Glaucon's son Charmides, managed to check him.

For once on meeting him, he stopped him and contrived to engage his attention by saying:

"Glaucon, have you made up your mind to be our chief man in the state?"

"I have, Socrates."

"Well, upon my word there's no more honorable ambition in the world; for obviously, if you gain your object, you will be able to get whatever you want, and you will have the means of helping your friends: you will lift up your father's house and exalt your fatherland; and you will make a name for yourself first at home, later on in Greece, and possibly, like Themistocles, in foreign lands as well; wherever you go, you will be a man of mark."

When Glaucon heard this, he felt proud and gladly lingered.

Next Socrates asked, "Well, Glaucon, as you want to win honor, is it not obvious that you must benefit your city?"

"Most certainly."

"Pray don't be reticent, then; but tell us how you propose to begin your services to the state."

As Glaucon remained dumb, apparently considering for the first time how to begin, Socrates said:

"If you wanted to add to a friend's fortune, you would set about making him richer. Will you try, then, to make your city richer?"

"Certainly."

“Would she not be richer if she had a larger revenue?”

“Oh yes, presumably.”

“Now tell me, from what sources are the city’s revenues at present derived and what is their total? No doubt you have gone into this matter, in order to raise the amount of any that are deficient and supply any that are lacking.”

“Certainly not,” exclaimed Glaucon, “I haven’t gone into that.”

“Well, if you have left that out, tell us the expenditure of the city. No doubt you intend to cut down any items that are excessive.”

“The fact is, I haven’t had time yet for that either.”

“Oh, then we will postpone the business of making the city richer; for how is it possible to look after income and expenditure without knowing what they are?”

“Well, Socrates, one can make our enemies contribute to the city’s wealth.”

“Yes, of course, provided he is stronger than they; but if he be weaker, he may lose what she has got instead.”

“True.”

“Therefore, in order to advise her whom to fight, it is necessary to know the strength of the city and of the enemy, so that, if the city be stronger, one may recommend her to go to war, but if weaker than the enemy, may persuade her to beware.”

“You are right.”

“First, then, tell us the naval and military strength of our city, and then that of her enemies.”

“No, of course I can’t tell you out of my head.”

“Well, if you have made notes, fetch them, for I should greatly like to hear this.”

“But, I tell you, I haven’t yet made any notes either.”

“Then we will postpone offering advice about war too for the present. You are new to power, and perhaps have not had time to investigate such big problems. But the defense of the country, now, I feel sure you have thought about that, and know how many of the garrisons are well placed and how many are not, and how many of the guards are efficient and how many are not; and you will propose to strengthen the well-placed garrisons and to do away with those that are superfluous.”

“No, no; I shall propose to do away with them all, for the only effect of maintaining them is that our crops are stolen.”

“But if you do away with the garrisons, don’t you think that anyone will be at liberty to rob us openly? However, have you been on a tour of inspection, or how do you know that they are badly maintained?”

“By guess-work.”

“Then shall we wait to offer advice on this question too until we really know, instead of merely guessing?”

“Perhaps it would be better.”

“Now for the silver mines. I am sure you have not visited them, and so cannot tell why the amount derived from them has fallen.”

“No, indeed, have not been there.”

“To be sure: the district is considered unhealthy, and so when you have to offer advice on the problem, this excuse will serve.”

“You’re chaffing me.”

“Ah, but there’s one problem I feel sure you haven’t overlooked: ,no doubt you have reckoned how long the corn grown in the country will maintain the population, and how much is needed annually, so that you may not be caught napping, should the city at any time be short, and may come

to the rescue and relieve the city by giving expert advice about food."

"What an overwhelming task, if one has got to include such things as that in one's duties!"

"But, you know, no one will ever manage even his own household successfully unless he knows all its needs and sees that they are all supplied. Seeing that our city contains more than ten thousand houses, and it is difficult to look after so many families at once, you must have tried to make a start by doing something for one, I mean your uncle's? It needs it; and if you succeed with that one, you can set to work on a larger number. But if you can't do anything for one, how are you going to succeed with many? If a man can't carry one talent, it's absurd for him to try to carry more than one, isn't it?"

"Well, I could do something for uncle's household if only he would listen to me."

"What? You can't persuade your uncle, and yet you suppose you will be able to persuade all the Athenians, including your uncle, to listen to you? Pray take care, Glaucon, that your daring ambition doesn't lead to a fall! Don't you see how risky it is to say or do what you don't understand? Think of others whom you know to be the sort of men who say and do what they obviously don't understand.

Do you think they get praise or blame by it? And think of those who understand what they say and what they do. You will find, I take it, that the men who are famous and admired always come from those who have the widest knowledge, and the infamous and despised from the most ignorant. Therefore, if you want to win fame and admiration in public life, try to get a thorough knowledge of what you propose to do. If you enter on a public career with this advantage over

others, I should not be surprised if you gained the object of your ambition quite easily."

VII. Seeing that Glaucon's son, Charmides, was a respectable man and far more capable than the politicians of the day, and nevertheless shrank from speaking in the assembly and taking a part in politics, he said: "Tell me, Charmides, what would you think of a man who was capable of gaining a victory in the great games and consequently of winning honor for himself and adding to his country's fame in the Greek world, and yet refused to compete?"

"I should think him a poltroon and a coward, of course."

"Then if a man were to shrink from state business though capable of discharging it with advantage to the state and honor to himself, wouldn't it be reasonable to think him a coward?"

"Perhaps; but why ask me that?"

"Because I fancy that you shrink from work that is within your powers, work in which it is your duty as a citizen to take a hand."

"What makes you think so? In what sort of work have you discovered my powers?"

"In your intercourse with public men. Whenever they take counsel with you, I find that you give excellent advice, and whenever they make a mistake, your criticism is sound."

"A private conversation is a very different thing from a crowded debate, Socrates."

"But, you know, a man who is good at figures counts as well in a crowd as in solitude; and those who play the harp best in private excel no less in a crowd."

"But surely you see that bashfulness and timidity come natural to a man, and affect him far more powerfully in the presence of a multitude than in private society?"

“Yes, and I mean to give you a lesson. The wisest do not make you bashful, and the strongest do not make you timid; yet you are ashamed to address an audience of mere dunces and weaklings. Who are they that make you ashamed? The fullers or the cobblers or the builders or the smiths or the farmers or the merchants, or the traffickers in the market-place who think of nothing but buying cheap and selling dear? For these are the people who make up the Assembly. You behave like a man who can beat trained athletes and is afraid of amateurs! You are at your ease when you talk with the first men in the state, some of whom despise you, and you are a far better talker than the ordinary run of politicians; and yet you are shy of addressing men who never gave a thought to public affairs and haven’t learnt to despise you—all because you fear ridicule!”

“Well, don’t you think the Assembly often laughs at sound argument?”

“Yes, and so do the others; and that’s why I am surprised that you, who find it easy to manage them when they do it, think you will be quite unable to deal with the Assembly. My good man, don’t be ignorant of yourself: don’t fall into the common error. For so many are in such a hurry to pry into other people’s business that they never turn aside to examine themselves. Don’t refuse to face this duty then: strive more earnestly to pay heed to yourself; and don’t neglect public affairs, if you have the power to improve them. If they go well, not only the people, but your friends and you yourself at least as much as they will profit.”

VIII. When Aristippus attempted to cross-examine Socrates in the same fashion as he had been cross-examined by him in their previous encounter, Socrates, wishing to benefit his companions, answered like a man who is resolved to do what is right, and not like a debater guarding against any distortion of the argument.

Aristippus asked if he knew of anything good, in order that if Socrates mentioned some good thing, such as food, drink, money, health, strength, or daring, he might show that it is sometimes bad. But he, knowing that when anything troubles us we need what will put an end to the trouble, gave the best answer: "Are you asking me," he said, "whether I know of anything good for a fever?"

"No, not that."

"For ophthalmia?"

"No, nor that."

"For hunger?"

"No, not for hunger either."

"Well, but if you are asking me whether I know of anything good in relation to nothing, I neither know nor want to know."

Again Aristippus asked him whether he knew of anything beautiful: "Yes, many things," he replied.

"All like one another?"

"On the contrary, some are as unlike as they can be."

"How then can that which is unlike the beautiful be beautiful?"

"The reason, of course, is that a beautiful wrestler is unlike a beautiful runner, a shield beautiful for defense is utterly unlike a javelin beautiful for swift and powerful hurling."

"That is the same answer as you gave to my question whether you knew of anything good."

"You think, do you, that good is one thing and beautiful another? Don't you know that all things are both beautiful and good in relation to the same things? In the first place, Virtue is not a good thing in relation to some things and a beautiful thing in relation to others. Men, again, are called

'beautiful and good' in the same respect and in relation to the same things: it is in relation to the same things that men's bodies look beautiful and good and that all other things men use are thought beautiful and good, namely, in relation to those things for which they are useful."

"Is a dung basket beautiful then?"

"Of course, and a golden shield is ugly, if the one is well made for its special work and the other badly."

"Do you mean that the same things are both beautiful and ugly?"

"Of course—and both good and bad. For what is good for hunger is often bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; what is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling, and what is beautiful for wrestling ugly for running. For all things are good and beautiful in relation to those purposes for which they are well adapted, bad and ugly in relation to those for which they are ill adapted."

Again his dictum about houses, that the same house is both beautiful and useful, was a lesson in the art of building houses as they ought to be.

He approached the problem thus:

"When one means to have the right sort of house, must he contrive to make it as pleasant to live in and as useful as can be?"

And this being admitted, "Is it pleasant," he asked, "to have it cool in summer and warm in winter?"

And when they agreed with this also, "Now in houses with a south aspect, the sun's rays penetrate into the porticoes in winter, but in summer the path of the sun is right over our heads and above the roof, so that there is shade. If, then, this is the best arrangement, we should build the south side loftier to get the winter sun and the north side lower to keep out the cold winds. To put it shortly, the house in which the

owner can find a pleasant retreat at all seasons and can store his belongings safely is presumably at once the pleasantest and the most beautiful. As for paintings and decorations, they rob one of more delights than they give."

For temples and altars the most suitable position, he said, was a conspicuous site remote from traffic; for it is pleasant to breathe a prayer at the sight of them, and pleasant to approach them filled with holy thoughts.

IX. When asked again whether Courage could be taught or came by nature, he replied: I think that just as one man's body is naturally stronger than another's for labor, so one man's soul is naturally braver than another's in danger. For I notice that men brought up under the same laws and customs differ widely in daring. Nevertheless, I think that every man's nature acquires more courage by learning and practice. Of course Scythians and Thracians would not dare to take bronze shield and spear and fight Lacedaemonians; and of course Lacedaemonians would not be willing to face Thracians with leather shields and javelins, nor Scythians with bows for weapons. And similarly in all other points, I find that human beings naturally differ one from another and greatly improve by application. Hence it is clear that all men, whatever their natural gifts, the talented and the dullards alike, must learn and practice what they want to excel in."

Between Wisdom and Prudence he drew no distinction; but if a man knows and practices what is beautiful and good, knows and avoids what is base,1 that man he judged to be both wise and prudent. When asked further whether he thought that those who know what they ought to do and yet do the opposite are at once wise and vicious, he answered:

"No; not so much that, as both unwise and vicious. For I think that all men have a choice between various courses,

and choose and follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage. Therefore I hold that those who follow the wrong course are neither wise nor prudent."

He said that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. "For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail. Hence the wise do what is beautiful and good, the unwise cannot and fail if they try. Therefore since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom."

Madness, again, according to him, was the opposite of Wisdom. Nevertheless he did not identify Ignorance with Madness; but not to know yourself, and to assume and think that you know what you do not, he put next to Madness. "Most men, however," he declared, "do not call those mad who err in matters that lie outside the knowledge of ordinary people: madness is the name they give to errors in matters of common knowledge. For instance, if a man imagines himself to be so tall as to stoop when he goes through the gateways in the Wall, or so strong as to try to lift houses or to perform any other feat that everybody knows to be impossible, they say he's mad. They don't think a slight error implies madness, but just as they call strong desire love, so they name a great delusion madness."

Considering the nature of Envy, he found it to be a kind of pain, not, however, at a friend's misfortune, nor at an enemy's good fortune, but the envious are those only who are annoyed at their friends' successes. Some expressed surprise that anyone who loves another should be pained at his success, but he reminded them that many stand in this relation towards others, that they cannot disregard them in

time of trouble, but aid them in their misfortune, and yet they are pained to see them prospering. This, however, could not happen to a man of sense, but it is always the case with fools.

Considering the nature of Leisure, he said his conclusion was that almost all men do something. Even draught-players and jesters do something, but all these are at leisure, for they might go and do something better. But nobody has leisure to go from a better to a worse occupation. If anyone does so, he acts wrongly, having no leisure.

Kings and rulers, he said, are not those who hold the scepter, nor those who are chosen by the multitude, nor those on whom the lot falls, nor those who owe their power to force or deception; but those who know how to rule. For once it was granted that it is the business of the ruler to give orders and of the ruled to obey, he went on to show that on a ship the one who knows, rules, and the owner and all the others on board obey the one who knows: in farming the landowners, in illness the patients, in training those who are in training, in fact everybody concerned with anything that needs care, look after it themselves if they think they know how, but, if not, they obey those who know, and not only when such are present, but they even send for them when absent, that they may obey them and do the right thing. In spinning wool, again, he would point out, the women govern the men because they know how to do it and men do not.

If anyone objected that a despot may refuse to obey a good counselor, "How can he refuse," he would ask, "when a penalty waits on disregard of good counsel? All disregard of good counsel is bound surely to result in error, and his error will not go unpunished."

If anyone said that a despot can kill a loyal subject, "Do you think," he retorted, "that he who kills the best of his

allies suffers no loss, or that his loss is trifling? Do you think that this conduct brings him safety, or rather swift destruction?"

When someone asked him what seemed to him the best pursuit for a man, he answered: "Doing well." Questioned further, whether he thought good luck a pursuit, he said: "On the contrary, I think luck and doing are opposite poles. To hit on something right by luck without search I call good luck, to do something well after study and practice I call doing well; and those who pursue this seem to me to do well. And the best men and dearest to the gods," he added, "are those who do their work well: if it is farming, as good farmers; if medicine, as good doctors; if politics, as good politicians. He who does nothing well is neither useful in any way nor dear to the gods."

X. Then again, whenever he talked with artists who followed their art as a business, he was as useful to them as to others.

Thus, on entering the house of Parrhasius the painter one day, he asked in the course of a conversation with him: "Is painting a representation of things seen, Parrhasius? Anyhow, you painters with your colors represent and reproduce figures high and low, in light and in shadow, hard and soft, rough and smooth, young and old."

"True."

"And further, when you copy types of beauty, it is so difficult to find a perfect model that you combine the most beautiful details of several, and thus contrive to make the whole figure look beautiful."

"Yes, we do!" "Well now, do you also reproduce the character of the soul, the character that is in the highest degree captivating, delightful, friendly, fascinating, lovable? Or is it impossible to imitate that?"

“Oh no, Socrates; for how could one imitate that which has neither shape nor color nor any of the qualities you mentioned just now, and is not even visible?”

“Do human beings commonly express the feelings of sympathy and aversion by their looks?”

“I think so.”

“Then cannot thus much be imitated in the eyes?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“Do you think that the joys and sorrows of their friends produce the same expression on men’s faces, whether they really care or not?”

“Oh no, of course not: they look radiant at their joys, downcast at their sorrows.”

“Then is it possible to represent these looks too?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“Moreover, nobility and dignity, self-abasement and servility, prudence and understanding, insolence and vulgarity, are reflected in the face and in the attitudes of the body whether still or in motion.”

“True.”

“Then these, too, can be imitated, can they not?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“Now which do you think the more pleasing sight, one whose features and bearing reflect a beautiful and good and lovable character, or one who is the embodiment of what is ugly and depraved and hateful?”

“No doubt there is a great difference, Socrates.”

On another occasion he visited Cleiton the sculptor, and while conversing with him said:

“Cleiton, that your statues of runners, wrestlers, boxers and fighters are beautiful I see and know. But how do you

produce in them that illusion of life which is their most alluring charm to the beholder?"

As Cleiton was puzzled and did not reply at once, "Is it," he added, "by faithfully representing the form of living beings that you make your statues look as if they lived?"

"Undoubtedly."

"Then is it not by accurately representing the different parts of the body as they are affected by the pose—the flesh wrinkled or tense, the limbs compressed or outstretched, the muscles taut or loose—that you make them look more like real members and more convincing?"

"Yes, certainly."

"Does not the exact imitation of the feelings that affect bodies in action also produce a sense of satisfaction in the spectator?"

"Oh yes, presumably."

"Then must not the threatening look in the eyes of fighters be accurately represented, and the triumphant expression on the face of conquerors be imitated?"

"Most certainly."

"It follows, then, that the sculptor must represent in his figures the activities of the soul."

On visiting Pistias the armorer, who showed him some well-made breastplates, Socrates exclaimed:

"Upon my word, Pistias, it's a beautiful invention, for the breastplate covers the parts that need protection without impeding the use of the hands. But tell me, Pistias," he added, "why do you charge more for your breastplates than any other maker, though they are no stronger and cost no more to make?"

"Because the proportions of mine are better, Socrates."

“And how do you show their proportions when you ask a higher price—by weight or measure? For I presume you don’t make them all of the same weight or the same size, that is, if you make them to fit.”

“Fit? Why, of course! a breastplate is of no use without that!”

“Then are not some human bodies well, others ill proportioned?”

“Certainly.”

“Then if a breastplate is to fit an ill-proportioned body, how do you make it well-proportioned?”

“By making it fit; for if it is a good fit it is well-proportioned.”

“Apparently you mean well-proportioned not absolutely, but in relation to the wearer, as you might call a shield well-proportioned for the man whom it fits, or a military cape—and this seems to apply to everything according to you. And perhaps there is another important advantage in a good fit.”

“Tell it me, if you know, Socrates.”

“The good fit is less heavy to wear than the misfit, though both are of the same weight. For the misfit, hanging entirely from the shoulders, or pressing on some other part of the body, proves uncomfortable and irksome; but the good fit, with its weight distributed over the collar-bone and shoulder-blades, the shoulders, chest, back and belly, may almost be called an accessory rather than an encumbrance.”

“The advantage you speak of is the very one which I think makes my work worth a big price. Some, however, prefer to buy the ornamented and the gold-plated breastplates.”

“Still, if the consequence is that they buy misfits, it seems to me they buy ornamented and gold-plated trash. However,

as the body is not rigid, but now bent, now straight, how can tight breastplates fit?"

"They can't."

"You mean that the good fits are not the tight ones, but those that don't chafe the wearer?"

"That is your own meaning, Socrates, and you have hit the right nail on the head."

XI. At one time there was in Athens a beautiful woman named Theodote, who was ready to keep company with anyone who pleased her. One of the bystanders mentioned her name, declaring that words failed him to describe the lady's beauty, and adding that artists visited her to paint her portrait, and she showed them as much as decency allowed.

"We had better go and see her," cried Socrates; "of course what beggars description can't very well be learned by hearsay."

"Come with me at once," returned his informant. So off they went to Theodote's house, where they found her posing before a painter, and looked on.

When the painter had finished, Socrates said:

"My friends, ought we to be more grateful to Theodote for showing us her beauty, or she to us for looking at it? Does the obligation rest with her, if she profits more by showing it, but with us, if we profit more by looking?"

When someone answered that this was a fair way of putting it, "Well now," he went on, "she already has our praise to her credit, and when we spread the news, she will profit yet more; whereas we already long to touch what we have seen, and we shall go away excited and shall miss her when we are gone. The natural consequence is that we become her adorers, she the adored."

“Then, if that is so,” exclaimed Theodote, “of course I ought to be grateful to you for looking.”

At this point Socrates noticed that she was sumptuously dressed, and that her mother at her side was wearing fine clothes and jewelry; and she had many pretty maids, who also were well cared for, and her house was lavishly furnished.

“Tell me, Theodote,” he said, “have you a farm?”

“Not I,” she answered.

“Or a house, perhaps, that brings in money?”

“No, nor a house.”

“Some craftsmen, possibly?”

“No, none.”

“Then where do you get your supplies from?”

“I live on the generosity of any friend I pick up.”

“A fine property, upon my word, Theodote, and much better than abundance of sheep and goats and oxen. But,” he went on, “do you trust to luck, waiting for friends to settle on you like flies, or have you some contrivance of your own?”

“How could I invent a contrivance for that?”

“Much more conveniently, I assure you, than the spiders. For you know how they hunt for a living: they weave a thin web, I believe, and feed on anything that gets into it.”

“And do you advise me, then, to weave a trap of some sort?”

“Of course not. Don’t suppose you are going to hunt friends, the noblest game in the world, by such crude methods. Don’t you notice that many tricks are employed even for hunting such a poor thing as the hare? Since hares feed by night, hounds specially adapted for night work are provided to hunt them; and since they run away at daybreak, another pack of hounds is obtained for tracking

them by the scent along the run from the feeding ground to the form; and since they are so nimble that once they are oft' they actually escape in the open, yet a third pack of speedy hounds is formed to catch them by hot pursuit; and as some escape even so, nets are set up in the tracks where they escape, that they may be driven into them and stopped dead."

"Then can I adapt this plan to the pursuit of friends?"

"Of course you can, if for the hound you substitute an agent who will track and find rich men with an eye for beauty, and will then contrive to chase them into your nets."

"Nets! What nets have I got?"

"One, surely, that clips close enough—your body! And inside it you have a soul that teaches you what glance will please, what words delight, and tells you that your business is to give a warm welcome to an eager suitor, but to slam the door upon a coxcomb; yes, and when a friend has fallen sick, to show your anxiety by visiting him; and when he has had a stroke of good fortune, to congratulate him eagerly; and if he is eager in his suit, to put yourself at his service heart and soul. As for loving, you know how to do that, I am sure, both tenderly and truly; and that your friends give you satisfaction, you convince them, I know, not by words but by deeds."

"Upon my word," said Theodote, "I don't contrive one of these things."

"Nevertheless," he continued, "it is very important that your behavior to a man should be both natural and correct. For assuredly you can neither catch a friend nor keep him by violence; it is kindness and sweetness that catch the creature and hold him fast."

"True," she said.

“First, then, you must ask such favors of your suitors as they will grant without a moment’s hesitation; and next you must repay their favors in the same coin; for in this way they will prove most sincerely your friends, most constant in their affection and most generous. And they will appreciate your favors most highly if you wait till they ask for them. The sweetest meats, you see, if served before they are wanted, seem sour, and to those who have had enough they are positively nauseating; but even poor fare is very welcome when offered to a hungry man.”

“And how can I make them hunger for my fare?”

“Why, in the first place, you must not offer it to them when they have had enough, nor prompt them until they have thrown off the surfeit and are beginning to want more; then, when they feel the want, you must prompt them by behaving as a model of propriety, by a show of reluctance to yield, and by holding back until they are as keen as can be; for then the same gifts are much more to the recipient than when they are offered before they are desired.”

“Then, Socrates,” exclaimed Theodote, “why don’t you become my partner in the pursuit of friends?”

“By all means—if you persuade me.”

“And how am I to persuade you?”

“That you will find out and contrive for yourself, if you want my help.”

“Come and see me often, then.”

“Ah!” said Socrates, making fun of his own leisurely habits, “it’s not so easy for me to find time.

For I have much business to occupy me, private and public; and I have the dear girls, who won’t leave me day or night; they are studying potions with me and spells.”

“Indeed! do you understand these things too, Socrates?”

“Why, what is the reason that master Apollodorus and Antisthenes never leave me, do you suppose? And why do Cebes and Simmias come to me from Thebes? I assure you these things don’t happen without the help of many potions and spells and magic wheels.”

“Do lend me your wheel, that I may turn it first to draw you.”

“But of course I don’t want to be drawn to you: I want you to come to me.”

“Oh, I’ll come: only mind you welcome me.”

“Oh, you shall be welcome—unless there’s a dearer girl with me!”

XII. On noticing that Epigenes, one of his companions, was in poor condition, for a young man, he said: “You look as if you need exercise, Epigenes.”

“Well,” he replied, “I’m not an athlete, Socrates.”

“Just as much as the competitors entered for Olympia,” he retorted. “Or do you count the life and death struggle with their enemies, upon which, it may be, the Athenians will enter, but a small thing? Why, many, thanks to their bad condition, lose their life in the perils of war or save it disgracefully: many, just for this same cause, are taken prisoners, and then either pass the rest of their days, perhaps, in slavery of the hardest kind, or, after meeting with cruel sufferings and paying, sometimes, more than they have, live on, destitute and in misery. Many, again, by their bodily weakness earn infamy, being thought cowards. Or do you despise these, the rewards of bad condition, and think that you can easily endure such things? And yet I suppose that what has to be borne by anyone who takes care to keep his body in good condition is far lighter and far pleasanter than these things. Or is it that you think bad condition healthier and generally more serviceable than good, or do

you despise the effects of good condition? And yet the results of physical fitness are the direct opposite of those that follow from unfitness. The fit are healthy and strong; and many, as a consequence, save themselves decorously on the battle-field and escape all the dangers of war; many help friends and do good to their country and for this cause earn gratitude; get great glory and gain very high honors, and for this cause live henceforth a pleasanter and better life, and leave to their children better means of winning a livelihood.

"I tell you, because military training is not publicly recognized by the state, you must not make that an excuse for being a whit less careful in attending to it yourself. For you may rest assured that there is no kind of struggle, apart from war, and no undertaking in which you will be worse off by keeping your body in better fettle. For in everything that men do the body is useful; and in all uses of the body it is of great importance to be in as high a state of physical efficiency as possible. Why, even in the process of thinking, in which the use of the body seems to be reduced to a minimum, it is matter of common knowledge that grave mistakes may often be traced to bad health. And because the body is in a bad condition, loss of memory, depression, discontent, insanity often assail the mind so violently as to drive whatever knowledge it contains clean out of it. But a sound and healthy body is a strong protection to a man, and at least there is no danger then of such a calamity happening to him through physical weakness: on the contrary, it is likely that his sound condition will serve to produce effects the opposite of those that arise from bad condition. And surely a man of sense would submit to anything to obtain the effects that are the opposite of those mentioned in my list.

"Besides, it is a disgrace to grow old through sheer carelessness before seeing what manner of man you may

become by developing your bodily strength and beauty to their highest limit. But you cannot see that, if you are careless; for it will not come of its own accord."

XIII. On a man who was angry because his greeting was not returned: "Ridiculous!" he exclaimed; "you would not have been angry if you had met a man in worse health; and yet you are annoyed because you have come across someone with ruder manners!"

On another who declared that he found no pleasure in eating: "Acumenus," he said, "has a good prescription for that ailment." And when asked "What?" he answered, "Stop eating; and you will then find life pleasanter, cheaper, and healthier."

On yet another who complained that the drinking water at home was warm: "Consequently," he said, "when you want warm water to wash in, you will have it at hand."

"But it's too cold for washing," objected the other.

"Then do your servants complain when they use it both for drinking and washing?"

"Oh no: indeed I have often felt surprised that they are content with it for both these purposes."

"Which is the warmer to drink, the water in your house or Epidaurus water?"

"Epidaurus water."

"And which is the colder to wash in, yours or Oropus water?"

"Oropus water."

"Then reflect that you are apparently harder to please than servants and invalids."

When someone punished his footman severely, he asked why he was angry with his man.

“Because he’s a glutton and he’s a fool,” said the other: “he’s rapacious and he’s lazy.”

“Have you ever considered, then, which deserves the more stripes, the master or the man?”

When someone was afraid of the journey to Olympia, he said:

“Why do you fear the distance? When you are at home, don’t you spend most of the day in walking about? on your way there you will take a walk before lunch, and another before dinner, and then take a rest. Don’t you know that if you put together the walks you take in five or six days, you can easily cover the distance from Athens to Olympia? It is more comfortable, too, to start a day early rather than a day late, since to be forced to make the stages of the journey unduly long is unpleasant; but to take a day extra on the way makes easy going. So it is better to hurry over the start than on the road.”

When another said that he was worn out after a long journey, he asked him whether he had carried a load.

“Oh no,” said the man; “only my cloak.”

“Were you alone, or had you a footman with you?”

“I had.”

“Empty-handed or carrying anything?”

“He carried the rugs and the rest of the baggage, of course.”

“And how has he come out of the journey?”

“Better than I, so far as I can tell.”

“Well then, if you had been forced to carry his load, how would you have felt, do you suppose?”

“Bad, of course; or rather, I couldn’t have done it.”

“Indeed! do you think a trained man ought to be so much less capable of work than his slave?”

XIV. Whenever some of the members of a dining-club brought more meat than others, Socrates would tell the waiter either to put the small contribution into the common stock or to portion it out equally among the diners. So the high batteners felt obliged not only to take their share of the pool, but to pool their own supplies in return; and so they put their own supplies also into the common stock. And since they thus got no more than those who brought little with them, they gave up spending much on meat.

He observed on one occasion that one of the company at dinner had ceased to take bread, and ate the meat by itself. *Now the talk was of names and the actions to which they are properly applied.*

"Can we say, my friends," said Socrates, "what is the nature of the action for which a man is called greedy? For all, I presume, eat meat with their bread when they get the chance: but I don't think there is so far any reason for calling them greedy?"

"No, certainly not," said one of the company.

"Well, suppose he eats the meat alone, without the bread, not because he's in training, but to tickle his palate, does he seem a greedy fellow or not?"

"If not, it's hard to say who does," was the reply.

Here another of the company queried, "And he who eats a scrap of bread with a large helping of meat?"

"He too seems to me to deserve the epithet," said Socrates. "Aye, and when others pray for a good wheat harvest, he, presumably, would pray for a good meat supply."

The young man, guessing that these remarks of Socrates applied to him, did not stop eating his meat, but took some bread with it. When Socrates observed this, he cried: "Watch

the fellow, you who are near him, and see whether he treats the bread as his meat or the meat as his bread."

On another occasion he noticed one of the company at dinner tasting several dishes with each bite of bread. "Can you imagine," he asked, "a meal more extravagant and more ruinous to the victuals than his who eats many things together, and crams all sorts of sauces into his mouth at once? At any rate by mixing more ingredients than the cooks, he adds to the cost, and since he mixes ingredients that they regard as unsuitable in a mixture, if they are right, then he is wrong and is ruining their art. Yet it is surely ridiculous for a master to obtain highly skilled cooks, and then, though he claims no knowledge of the art, to alter their confections? There's another drawback, too, attaching to the habit of eating many things together. For if many dishes are not provided, one seems to go short because one misses the usual variety: whereas he who is accustomed to take one kind of meat along with one bit of bread can make the best of one dish when more are not forthcoming."

He used to say too that the term "good feeding" in Attic was a synonym for "eating." The "good" in the compound implied the eating of food that could harm neither body nor soul and was not hard to come by. Thus he attributed even good feeding to sober livers.

BOOK IV

I. Socrates was so useful in all circumstances and in all ways, that any observer gifted with ordinary perception can see that nothing was more useful than the companionship of Socrates, and time spent with him in any place and in any circumstances. The very recollection of him in absence brought no small good to his constant companions and followers; for even in his light moods they gained no less from his society than when he was serious.

Thus he would often say he was "in love"; but clearly his heart was set not on those who were fair to outward view, but on those whose souls excelled in goodness. These excellent beings he recognized by their quickness to learn whatever subject they studied, ability to remember what they learned, and desire for every kind of knowledge on which depend good management of a household and estate and tactful dealing with men and the affairs of men. For education would make such beings not only happy in themselves, and successful in the management of their households, but capable of conferring happiness on their fellow-men and on states alike. His method of approach varied. To those who thought themselves possessed of natural endowments and despised learning, he explained that the greater the natural gifts, the greater is the need of education; pointing out that thoroughbreds by their spirit and mettle develop into serviceable and splendid creatures, if they are broken in as colts, but if unbroken, prove intractable and sorry jades; and high-bred puppies, keen workers and good tacklers of game, make first-rate hounds and useful dogs, if well trained, but, if untrained, turn out stupid, crazy, disobedient brutes. It is the same with human beings. The most highly gifted, the youths of ardent soul, capable of doing whatever they attempt, if educated and taught their duty grow into excellent and useful men; for

manifold and great are their good deeds. But untrained and untaught, these same become utterly evil and mischievous; for without knowledge to discern their duty, they often put their hand to vile deeds, and through the very grandeur and vehemence of their nature, they are uncontrollable and intractable: therefore manifold and great are their evil deeds.

Those who prided themselves on riches and thought they had no need of education, supposing that their wealth would suffice them for gaining the objects of their wishes and winning honor among men, he admonished thus. "Only a fool," he said, "can think it possible to distinguish between things useful and things harmful without learning: only a fool can think that without distinguishing these he will get all he wants by means of his wealth and be able to do what is expedient: only a simpleton can think that without the power to do what is expedient he is doing well and has made good or sufficient provision for his life: only a simpleton can think that by his wealth alone without knowledge he will be reputed good at something, or will enjoy a good reputation without being reputed good at anything in particular.

II. I will now show his method of dealing with those who thought they had received the best education, and prided themselves on wisdom. He was informed that Euthydemus, the handsome, had formed a large collection of the works of celebrated poets and professors, and therefore supposed himself to be a prodigy of wisdom for his age, and was confident of surpassing all competitors in power of speech and action. At present, Socrates observed, he did not enter the Market-place owing to his youth, but when he wanted to get anything done, he would be found sitting in a saddler's shop near the Market. So, to make an opening, Socrates went to this shop with some of his companions.

At the first visit, one of them asked: "Was it by constant intercourse with some wise man or by natural ability that

Themistocles stood out among his fellow-citizens as the man to whom the people naturally looked when they felt the want of a great leader?"

In order to set Euthydemus thinking, Socrates said:

"If in the minor arts great achievement is impossible without competent masters, surely it is absurd to imagine that the art of statesmanship, the greatest of all accomplishments, comes to a man of its own accord."

Some time afterwards, meeting Euthydemus again, he saw that he was reluctant to join the circle and anxious not to betray any admiration for the wisdom of Socrates: "Well, gentlemen," said he, "when our friend Euthydemus has attained his full powers, and some question of policy is before the Assembly, he won't be backward in offering advice: that is obvious from his behavior. I fancy he has prepared a noble exordium to his addresses, with due care not to give the impression that he is indebted to anyone for his knowledge. No doubt he will begin his speech with this introduction:

"'Men of Athens, I have never yet learnt anything from anyone, nor when I have been told of any man's ability in speech and in action, have I sought to meet him, nor have I been at pains to find a teacher among the men who know. On the contrary, I have constantly avoided learning anything of anyone, and even the appearance of it. Nevertheless shall recommend to your consideration anything that comes into my head.'

"This exordium might be adapted so as to suit candidates for the office of public physician. They might begin their speeches in this strain:

"'Men of Athens, I have never yet studied medicine, nor sought to find a teacher among our physicians; for I have constantly avoided learning anything from the physicians,

and even the appearance of having studied their art. Nevertheless I ask you to appoint me to the office of a physician, and I will endeavor to learn by experimenting on you.'"

The exordium set all the company laughing.

Now when it became evident that Socrates had gained the attention of Euthydemus, but that Euthydemus still avoided breaking silence himself, and thought that he assumed an air of prudence by remaining dumb, Socrates wanted to put an end to that affectation. "How strange it is," he said, "that those who want to play the harp or the flute, or to ride or to get skill in any similar accomplishment, work hard at the art they mean to master, and not by themselves but under the tuition of the most eminent professors, doing and bearing anything in their anxiety to do nothing without their teachers' guidance, just because that is the only way to become proficient: and yet, among those who want to shine as speakers in the Assembly and as statesmen, there are some who think that they will be able to do so on a sudden, by instinct, without training or study. Yet surely these arts are much the harder to learn; for many more are interested in them and far fewer succeed. Clearly then these arts demand a longer and more intense application than the others."

For a time, then, Socrates continued to talk in this strain, while Euthydemus listened. But on finding him more tolerant of his conversation and more attentive, Socrates went alone to the saddler's; and when Euthydemus had taken a seat beside him, he said: "Tell me, Euthydemus, am I rightly informed that you have a large collection of books written by the wise men of the past, as they are called?"

"By Zeus, yes, Socrates," answered he, "and I am still adding to it, to make it as complete as possible."

“By Hera,” retorted Socrates, “I do admire you for valuing the treasures of wisdom above gold and silver. For you are evidently of opinion that, while gold and silver cannot make men better, the thoughts of the wise enrich their possessors with virtue.”

Now Euthydemus was glad to hear this, for he guessed that in the opinion of Socrates he was on the road to wisdom. But Socrates, aware that he was pleased with his approbation, went on to say: “Tell me, Euthydemus, what kind of goodness do you want to get by collecting these books?”

And as Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer to give, “Possibly you want to be a doctor?” he guessed: “Medical treatises alone make a large collection.”

“Oh no, not at all.”

“But perhaps you wish to be an architect? One needs a well-stored mind for that too.”

“No, indeed I don’t.”

“Well, perhaps you want to be a good mathematician, like Theodorus?”

“No, not that either.”

“Well, perhaps you want to be an astronomer?” And as he again said no, “Perhaps a rhapsodist, then? They tell me you have a complete copy of Homer.”

“Oh no, not at all; for your rhapsodists, I know, are consummate as reciters, but they are very silly fellows themselves.”

Then Socrates exclaimed: “Surely, Euthydemus, you don’t covet the kind of excellence that makes good statesmen and managers, competent rulers and benefactors of themselves and mankind in general?”

“Yes, I do, Socrates,” answered Euthydemus, “that kind of excellence I greatly desire.”

“Why,” cried Socrates, “it is the noblest kind of excellence, the greatest of arts that you covet, for it belongs to kings and is dubbed ‘kingly.’ However,” he added, “have you reflected whether it be possible to excel in these matters without being a just man?”

“Yes, certainly; and it is, in fact, impossible to be a good citizen without justice.”

“Then tell me, have you got that?”

“Yes, Socrates, I think I can show myself to be as just as any man.”

“And have just men, like carpenters, their works?”

“Yes, they have.”

“And as carpenters can point out their works, should just men be able to rehearse theirs?”

“Do you suppose,” retorted Euthydemus, “that I am unable to rehearse the works of justice? Of course I can,—and the works of injustice too, since there are many opportunities of seeing and hearing of them every day.”

“I propose, then, that we write J in this column and I in that, and then proceed to place under these letters, J and I, what we take to be the works of justice and injustice respectively.”

“Do so, if you think it helps at all”

Having written down the letters as he proposed, Socrates went on: “Lying occurs among men, does it not?”

“Yes, it does.”

“Under which heading, then, are we to put that?”

“Under the heading of injustice, clearly.”

“Deceit, too, is found, is it not?”

“Certainly.”

“Under which heading will that go?”

“Under injustice again, of course.”

“What about doing mischief?”

“That too.”

“Selling into slavery?”

“That too.”

“Then we shall assign none of these things to justice, Euthydemus?”

“No, it would be monstrous to do so.”

“Now suppose a man who has been elected general enslaves an unjust and hostile city, shall we say that he acts unjustly?”

“Oh no!”

“We shall say that his actions are just, shall we not?”

“Certainly.”

“And what if he deceives the enemy when at war?”

“That too is just.”

“And if he steals and plunders their goods, will not his actions be just?”

“Certainly; but at first I assumed that your questions had reference only to friends.”

“Then everything that we assigned to injustice should be assigned to justice also?”

“Apparently.”

“Then I propose to revise our classification, and to say: It is just to do such things to enemies, but it is unjust to do them to friends, towards whom one’s conduct should be scrupulously honest.”

“By all means.”

“Now suppose that a general, seeing that his army is downhearted, tells a lie and says that reinforcements are approaching, and by means of this lie checks discouragement among the men, under which heading shall we put this deception?”

“Under justice, I think.”

“Suppose, again, that a man’s son refuses to take a dose of medicine when he needs it, and the father induces him to take it by pretending that it is food, and cures him by means of this lie, where shall we put this deception?”

“That too goes on the same side, I think.”

“And again, suppose one has a friend suffering from depression, and, for fear that he may make away with himself, one takes away his sword or something of the sort, under which heading shall we put that now?”

“That too goes under justice, of course.”

“You mean, do you, that even with friends straightforward dealing is not invariably right?”

“It isn’t, indeed! I retract what I said before, if you will let me.”

“Why, I’m bound to let you; it’s far better than getting our lists wrong. But now, consider deception practiced on friends to their detriment: we mustn’t overlook that either. Which is the more unjust deception in that case, the intentional or unintentional?”

“Nay, Socrates, I have lost all confidence in my answers; for all the opinions that I expressed before seem now to have taken an entirely different form. Still I venture to say that the intentional deception is more unjust than the unintentional.”

“*Do you think there is a doctrine and science of the just, as there is of letters*?”

“Yes.”

“Which, in your judgment, is the more literate, the man who intentionally blunders in writing and reading, or the man who blunders unintentionally?”

“The one who blunders intentionally, I presume; for he can always be accurate when he chooses.”

“May we not say, then, that the intentional blunderer is literate and the unintentional is illiterate?”

“Indeed we must.”

“And which knows what is just, the intentional liar and deceiver, or the unintentional?”

“The intentional, clearly.”

“You say, then, as I understand, that he who knows letters is more literate than he who is ignorant of them?”

“Yes”

“And he who knows what is just is more just than he who does not know?”

“Apparently; but here again I don’t feel sure of my own meaning.”

“Now come, what do you think of the man who wants to tell the truth, but never sticks to what he says; when he shows you the way, tells you first that the road runs east, then that it runs west; and when he casts up figures, makes the total now larger, now smaller?”

“Why, I think he shows that he doesn’t know what he thought he knew.”

“Are you aware that some people are called slavish?”

“Yes.”

“To what do they owe the name, to knowledge or to ignorance?”

“To ignorance, obviously.”

“To ignorance of the smiths’ trade, shall we say?”

“Certainly not.”

“Ignorance of carpentry perhaps?”

“No, not to that either.”

“Of cobbling?”

“No, to none of these: on the contrary, those who are skilled in such trades are for the most part slavish.”

“Then is this name given to those who are ignorant of the beautiful and good and just?”

“That is my opinion.”

“Then we must strain every nerve to escape being slaves.”

“Upon my word, Socrates, I did feel confident that I was a student of a philosophy that would provide me with the best education in all things needful to one who would be a gentleman. But you can imagine my dismay when I realize that in spite of all my pains I am even incapable of answering a question about things that one is bound to know, and yet find no other way that will lead to my improvement.”

Hereupon Socrates exclaimed: “Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?”

“Yes, certainly; twice.”

“Then did you notice somewhere on the temple the inscription ‘Know thyself’?”

“I did.”

“And did you pay no heed to the inscription, or did you attend to it and try to consider who you were?”

“Indeed I did not; because I felt sure that I knew that already; for I could hardly know anything else if I did not even know myself.”

“And what do you suppose a man must know to know himself, his own name merely? Or must he consider what

sort of a creature he is for human use and get to know his own powers; just as those who buy horses don't think that they know the beast they want to know until they have considered whether he is docile or stubborn, strong or weak, fast or slow, and generally how he stands in all that makes a useful or a useless horse?"

"That leads me to think that he who does not know his own powers is ignorant of himself."

"Is it not clear too that through self-knowledge men come to much good, and through self-deception to much harm? For those who know themselves, know what things are expedient for themselves and discern their own powers and limitations. And by doing what they understand, they get what they want and prosper: by refraining from attempting what they do not understand, they make no mistakes and avoid failure. And consequently through their power of testing other men too, and through their intercourse with others, they get what is good and shun what is bad. Those who do not know and are deceived in their estimate of their own powers, are in the like condition with regard to other men and other human affairs. They know neither what they want, nor what they do, nor those with whom they have intercourse; but mistaken in all these respects, they miss the good and stumble into the bad. Furthermore, those who know what they do win fame and honor by attaining their ends. Their equals are glad to have dealings with them; and those who miss their objects look to them for counsel, look to them for protection, rest on them their hopes of better things, and for all these reasons love them above all other men. But those who know not what they do, choose amiss, fail in what they attempt and, besides incurring direct loss and punishment thereby, they earn contempt through their failures, make themselves ridiculous and live in dishonor and humiliation.

“And the same is true of communities. You find that whenever a state, in ignorance of its own power, goes to war with a stronger people, it is exterminated or loses its liberty.”

“Socrates” answered Euthydemus, “you may rest assured that I fully appreciate the importance of knowing oneself. But where should the process of self-examination begin? I look to you for a statement, please.”

“Well,” said Socrates, “I may assume, I take it, that you know what things are good and what are evil?”

“Of course, for if I don’t know so much as that, I must be worse than a slave.”

“Come then, state them for my benefit.”

“Well, that’s a simple matter. First health in itself is, I suppose, a good, sickness an evil. Next the various causes of these two conditions—meat, drink, habits—are good or evil according as they promote health or sickness.”

“Then health and sickness too must be good when their effect is good, and evil when it is evil.”

“But when can health possibly be the cause of evil, or sickness of good?”

“Why, in many cases; for instance, a disastrous campaign or a fatal voyage: the able-bodied who go are lost, the weaklings who stay behind are saved.”

“True; but you see, in the successful adventures too the able-bodied take part, the weaklings are left behind.”

“Then since these bodily conditions sometimes lead to profit, and sometimes to loss, are they any more good than evil?”

“No, certainly not; at least so it appears from the argument. But wisdom now, Socrates,—that at any rate is indisputably a good thing; for what is there that a wise man would not do better than a fool?”

“Indeed! have you not heard how Daedalus was seized by Minos because of his wisdom, and was forced to be his slave, and was robbed of his country and his liberty, and essaying to escape with his son, lost the boy and could not save himself, but was carried off to the barbarians and again lived as a slave there?”

“That is the story, of course.”

“And have you not heard the story of Palamedes? Surely, for all the poets sing of him, how that he was envied for his wisdom and done to death by Odysseus.”

“Another well-known tale!”

“And how many others, do you suppose, have been kidnapped on account of their wisdom, and haled off to the great King’s court, and live in slavery there?”

“Happiness seems to be unquestionably a good, Socrates.”

“It would be so, Euthydemus, were it not made up of goods that are questionable.”

“But what element in happiness can be called in question?”

“None, provided we don’t include in it beauty or strength or wealth or glory or anything of the sort.”

“But of course we shall do that. For how can anyone be happy without them?”

“Then of course we shall include the sources of much trouble to mankind. For many are ruined by admirers whose heads are turned at the sight of a pretty face; many are led by their strength to attempt tasks too heavy for them, and meet with serious evils: many by their wealth are corrupted, and fall victims to conspiracies; many through glory and political power have suffered great evils.”

“Well now, if I am at fault in praising even happiness, I confess I know not what one should ask for in one’s prayers.”

“But perhaps you never even thought about these things, because you felt so confident that you knew them. However, as the state you are preparing yourself to direct is governed by the people, no doubt you know what popular government is?”

“I think so, certainly.”

“Then do you suppose it possible to know popular government without knowing the people?”

“Indeed I don’t.”

“And do you know, then, what the people consists of?”

“I think so.”

“Of what do you suppose it to consist?”

“The poorer classes, I presume.”

“You know the poor, then?”

“Of course I do.”

“And you know the rich too?”

“Yes, just as well as the poor.”

“What kind of men do you call poor and rich respectively?”

“The poor, I imagine, are those who have not enough to pay for what they want; the rich those who have more than enough.”

“Have you observed, then, that some who have very little not only find it enough, but even manage to save out of it, whereas others cannot live within their means, however large?”

“Yes, certainly—thanks for reminding me—I know, in fact, of some despots even who are driven to crime by poverty, just like paupers.”

“Therefore, if that is so, we will include despots in the people, and men of small means, if they are thrifty, in the rich.”

“1 am forced to agree once more,” cried Euthydemus, “evidently by my stupidity. I am inclined to think I had better hold my tongue, or I shall know nothing at all presently.” And so he went away very dejected, disgusted with himself and convinced that he was indeed a slave.

Now many of those who were brought to this pass by Socrates, never went near him again and were regarded by him as mere blockheads. But Euthydemus guessed that he would never be of much account unless he spent as much time as possible with Socrates. Henceforward, unless obliged to absent himself, he never left him, and even began to adopt some of his practices. Socrates, for his part, seeing how it was with him, avoided worrying him, and began to expound very plainly and clearly the knowledge that he thought most needful and the practices that he held to be most excellent.

III. Skill in speaking and efficiency in affairs, therefore, and ingenuity, were not the qualities that he was eager to foster in his companions. He held that they needed first to acquire prudence. For he believed that those faculties, unless accompanied by prudence, increased in their possessors injustice and power for mischief.

In the first place, then, he tried to make his companions prudent towards the gods. Accordingly he discoursed on this topic at various times, as those who were present used to relate. The following conversation between him and Euthydemus I heard myself.

“Tell me, Euthydemus” he began, “has it ever occurred to you to reflect on the care the gods have taken to furnish man with what he needs?”

“No, indeed it has not,” replied Euthydemus.

“Well, no doubt you know that our first and foremost need is light, which is supplied to us by the gods?”

“Of course; since without light our eyes would be as useless as if we were blind.”

“And again, we need rest; and therefore the gods grant us the welcome respite of night.”

“Yes, for that too we owe them thanks.”

“And since the night by reason of her darkness is dim, whereas the sun by his brightness illuminates the hours of the day and all things else, have they not made stars to shine in the night, that mark the watches of night for us, and do we not thereby satisfy many of our needs?”

“That is so.”

“Moreover, the moon reveals to us not only the divisions of the night, but of the month too.”

“Certainly.”

“Now, seeing that we need food, think how they make the earth to yield it, and provide to that end appropriate seasons which furnish in abundance the diverse things that minister not only to our wants but to our enjoyment.”

“Truly these things too show loving-kindness.”

“Think again of their precious gift of water, that aids the earth and the seasons to give birth and increase to all things useful to us and itself helps to nourish our bodies, and mingling with all that sustains us, makes it more digestible, more wholesome, and more palatable: and how, because we need so much of it, they supply it without stint.”

“That too shows design at work.”

“Think again of the blessing of fire, our defense against cold and against darkness, our helpmate in every art and all that man contrives for his service.

In fact, to put it shortly, nothing of any account that is useful to the life of man is contrived without the aid of fire."

"This too is a signal token of loving-kindness."

"Think again how the sun, when past the winter solstice, approaches, ripening some things and withering others, whose time is over; and having accomplished this, approaches no nearer, but turns away, careful not to harm us by excess of heat; and when once again in his retreat he reaches the point where it is clear to ourselves, that if he goes further away, we shall be frozen with the cold, back he turns once more and draws near and revolves in that region of the heavens where he can best serve us."

"Yes, verily, these things do seem to be done for the sake of mankind."

"And again, since it is evident that we could not endure the heat or the cold if it came suddenly, the sun's approach and retreat are so gradual that we arrive at the one or the other extreme imperceptibly.

"For myself," exclaimed Euthydemus, "I begin to doubt whether after all the gods are occupied in any other work than the service of man. The one difficulty I feel is that the lower animals also enjoy these blessings."

"Yes," replied Socrates, "and is it not evident that they too receive life and food for the sake of man? For what creature reaps so many benefits as man from goats and sheep and horses and oxen and asses and the other animals? He owes more to them, in my opinion, than to the fruits of the earth. At the least they are not less valuable to him for food and commerce; in fact a large portion of mankind does not use the products of the earth for food, but lives on the milk and cheese and flesh they get from live stock. Moreover, all men tame and domesticate the useful kinds of animals, and make

them their fellow-workers in war and many other undertakings."

"There too I agree with you, seeing that animals far stronger than man become so entirely subject to him that he puts them to any use he chooses."

"Think again of the multitude of things beautiful and useful and their infinite variety, and how the gods have endowed man with senses adapted for the perception of every kind, so that there is nothing good that we cannot enjoy; and again, how they have implanted in us the faculty of reasoning, whereby we are able to reason about the objects of our perceptions and to commit them to memory, and so come to know what advantage every kind can yield, and devise many means of enjoying the good and driving away the bad; and think of the power of expression, which enables us to impart to one another all good things by teaching and to take our share of them, to enact laws and to administer states."

"Truly, Socrates, it does appear that the gods devote much care to man."

"Yet again, in so far as we are powerless of ourselves to foresee what is expedient for the future, the gods lend us their aid, revealing the issues by divination to inquirers, and teaching them how to obtain the best results."

"With you, Socrates, they seem to deal even more friendly than with other men, if it is true that, even unasked, they warn you by signs what to do and what not to do."

"Yes, and you will realize the truth of what I say if, instead of waiting for the gods to appear to you in bodily presence, you are content to praise and worship them because you see their works. Mark that the gods themselves give the reason for doing so; for when they bestow on us their good gifts, not one of them ever appears before us gift in hand; and

especially he who co-ordinates and holds together the universe, wherein all things are fair and good, and presents them ever unimpaired and sound and ageless for our use, and quicker than thought to serve us unerringly, is manifest in his supreme works, and yet is unseen by us in the ordering of them. Mark that even the sun, who seems to reveal himself to all, permits not man to behold him closely, but if any attempts to gaze recklessly upon him, blinds their eyes. And the gods' ministers too you will find to be invisible. That the thunderbolt is hurled from heaven, and that he overwhelms all on whom he falls, is evident, but he is seen neither coming nor striking nor going. And the winds are themselves invisible, yet their deeds are manifest to us, and we perceive their approach. Moreover, the soul of man, which more than all else that is human partakes of the divine, reigns manifestly within us, and yet is itself unseen.

"For these reasons it behooves us not to despise the things that are unseen, but, realizing their power in their manifestations, to honor the godhead."

"Socrates," replied Euthydemus, "that I will in no wise be heedless of the godhead I know of a surety. But my heart fails me when I think that no man can ever render due thanks to the gods for their benefits."

"Nay, be not down-hearted, Euthydemus; for you know that to the inquiry, 'How am I to please the gods?' the Delphic god replies, 'Follow the custom of the state'; and everywhere, I suppose, it is the custom that men propitiate the gods with sacrifices according to their power. How then can a man honor the gods more excellently and more devoutly than by doing as they themselves ordain? Only he must fall no whit short of his power. For when he does that, it is surely plain that he is not then honoring the gods. Therefore it is by coming no whit short of his power in honoring the gods that he is to look with confidence for the

greatest blessings. For there are none from whom a man of prudence would hope for greater things than those who can confer the greatest benefits, nor can he show his prudence more clearly than by pleasing them. And how can he please them better than by obeying them strictly?”

Thus by precept and by example alike he strove to increase in his companions Piety and Prudence.

IV. Again, concerning Justice he did not hide his opinion, but proclaimed it by his actions. All his private conduct was lawful and helpful: to public authority he rendered such scrupulous obedience in all that the laws required, both in civil life and in military service, that he was a pattern of good discipline to all. When chairman in the Assemblies he would not permit the people to record an illegal vote, but, upholding the laws, resisted a popular impulse that might even have overborne any but himself. And when the Thirty laid a command on him that was illegal, he refused to obey. Thus he disregarded their repeated injunction not to talk with young men; and when they commanded him and certain other citizens to arrest a man on a capital charge, he alone refused, because the command laid on him was illegal. Again, when he was tried on the charge brought by Meletus, whereas it is the custom of defendants to curry favor with the jury and to indulge in flattery and illegal appeals, and many by such means have been known to gain a verdict of acquittal, he rejected utterly the familiar chicanery of the courts; and though he might easily have gained a favorable verdict by even a moderate indulgence in such stratagems, he chose to die through his loyalty to the laws rather than to live through violating them.

Such views frequently found expression in his conversations with different persons; I recollect the

substance of one that he had with Hippias of Elis concerning Justice. Hippias, who had not been in Athens for a considerable time, found Socrates talking: he was saying that if you want to have a man taught cobbling or building or smithing or riding, you know where to send him to learn the craft: some indeed declare that if you want to train up a horse or an ox in the way he should go, teachers abound. And yet, strangely enough, if you want to learn Justice yourself, or to have your son or servant taught it, you know not where to go for a teacher.

When Hippias heard this, "How now?" he cried in a tone of raillery, "still the same old sentiments, Socrates, that I heard from you so long ago?"

"Yes, Hippias," he replied, "always the same, and—what is more astonishing—on the same topics too! You are so learned that I daresay you never say the same thing on the same subjects."

"I certainly try to say something fresh every time."

"Do you mean, about what you know? For example, in answer to the question, 'How many letters are there in "Socrates" and how do you spell it?' do you try to say something different now from what you said before? Or take figures: suppose you are asked if twice five are ten, don't you give the same answer now as you gave before?"

"About letters and figures, Socrates, I always say the same thing, just like you. As for Justice, I feel confident that I can now say that which neither you nor anyone else can contradict."

"Upon my word, you mean to say that you have made a great discovery, if jurymen are to cease from voting different ways, citizens from disputing and litigation, and wrangling about the justice of their claims, cities from quarrelling about their rights and making war; and for my part, I don't

see how to tear myself away from you till I have heard about your great discovery."

"But I vow you shall not hear unless you first declare your own opinion about the nature of Justice; for it's enough that you mock at others, questioning and examining everybody, and never willing to render an account yourself or to state an opinion about anything."

"Indeed, Hippias! Haven't you noticed that I never cease to declare my notions of what is just?"

"And how can you call that an account?"

"I declare them by my deeds, anyhow, if not by my words. Don't you think that deeds are better evidence than words?"

"Yes, much better, of course; for many say what is just and do what is unjust; but no one who does what is just can be unjust."

"Then have you ever found me dealing in perjury or calumny, or stirring up strife between friends or fellow-citizens, or doing any other unjust act?"

"I have not."

"To abstain from what is unjust is just, don't you think?"

"Even now, Socrates, you are clearly endeavoring to avoid stating what you think Justice to be. You are saying not what the just do, but what they don't do."

"Well, I thought that unwillingness to do injustice was sufficient proof of Justice. But, if you don't think so, see whether you like this better: I say that what is lawful is just."

"Do you mean, Socrates, that lawful and just are the same thing?"

"I do."

"Because I don't see what you mean by lawful or what you mean by just."

“Does the expression ‘laws of a state’ convey a meaning to you?”

“It does.”

“And what do you think they are?”

“Covenants made by the citizens whereby they have enacted what ought to be done and what ought to be avoided.”

“Then would not that citizen who acts in accordance with these act lawfully, and he who transgresses them act unlawfully?”

“Yes, certainly.”

“And would not he who obeys them do what is just, and he who disobeys them do what is unjust?”

“Certainly.”

“Then would not he who does what is just be just, and he who does what is unjust be unjust?”

“Of course.”

“Consequently he who acts lawfully is just, and he who acts unlawfully is unjust.”

“Laws,” said Hippias, “can hardly be thought of much account, Socrates, or observance of them, seeing that the very men who passed them often reject and amend them.”

“Yes,” said Socrates, “and after going to war, cities often make peace again.”

“To be sure.”

“Then is there any difference, do you think, between belittling those who obey the laws on the ground that the laws may be annulled, and blaming those who behave well in the wars on the ground that peace may be made? Or do you really censure those who are eager to help their fatherland in the wars?”

“No, of course not.”

“Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian now—have you realized that he would not have made Sparta to differ from other cities in any respect, had he not established obedience to the laws most securely in her? Among rulers in cities, are you not aware that those who do most to make the citizens obey the laws are the best, and that the city in which the citizens are most obedient to the laws has the best time in peace and is irresistible in war? And again, agreement is deemed the greatest blessing for cities: their senates and their best men constantly exhort the citizens to agree, and everywhere in Greece there is a law that the citizens shall promise under oath to agree, and everywhere they take this oath. The object of this, in my opinion, is not that the citizens may vote for the same choirs, not that they may praise the same flute-players, not that they may select the same poets, not that they may like the same things, but that they may obey the laws. For those cities whose citizens abide by them prove strongest and enjoy most happiness; but without agreement no city can be made a good city, no house can be made a prosperous house. And how is the individual citizen less likely to incur penalties from the state, and more certain to gain honor than by obeying the laws? How less likely to be defeated in the courts or more certain to win? Whom would anyone rather trust as guardian of his money or sons or daughters? Whom would the whole city think more trustworthy than the man of lawful conduct? From whom would parents or kinsfolk or servants or friends or fellow-citizens or strangers more surely get their just rights? Whom would enemies rather trust in the matter of a truce or treaty or terms of peace? Whom would men rather choose for an ally? And to whom would allies rather entrust leadership or command of a garrison, or cities? Whom would anyone more confidently expect to show gratitude for benefits received? Or whom would one rather benefit than him from whom he

thinks he will receive due gratitude? Whose friendship would anyone desire, or whose enmity would he avoid more earnestly? Whom would anyone less willingly make war on than him whose friendship he covets and whose enmity he is fain to avoid, who attracts the most friends and allies, and the fewest opponents and enemies?

"So, Hippias, I declare lawful and just to be the same thing. If you are of the contrary opinion, tell me.

Upon my word, Socrates," answered Hippias, "I don't think my opinion is contrary to what you have said about Justice."

"Do you know what is meant by 'unwritten laws,' Hippias?"

"Yes, those that are uniformly observed in every country."

"Could you say that men made them?"

"Nay, how could that be, seeing that they cannot all meet together and do not speak the same language?"

"Then by whom have these laws been made, do you suppose?"

"I think that the gods made these laws for men. For among all men the first law is to fear the gods."

"Is not the duty of honoring parents another universal law?"

"Yes, that is another."

"And that parents shall not have sexual intercourse with their children nor children with their parents?"

"No, I don't think that is a law of God."

"Why so?"

"Because I notice that some transgress it."

"Yes, and they do many other things contrary to the laws. But surely the transgressors of the laws ordained by the gods pay a penalty that a man can in no wise escape, as

some, when they transgress the laws ordained by man, escape punishment, either by concealment or by violence."

"And pray what sort of penalty is it, Socrates, that may not be avoided by parents and children who have intercourse with one another?"

"The greatest, of course. For what greater penalty can men incur when they beget children than begetting them badly?"

"How do they beget children badly then, if, as may well happen, the fathers are good men and the mothers good women?"

"Surely because it is not enough that the two parents should be good. They must also be in full bodily vigor: unless you suppose that those who are in full vigor are no more efficient as parents than those who have not yet reached that condition or have passed it."

"Of course that is unlikely."

"Which are the better then?"

"Those who are in full vigor, clearly."

"Consequently those who are not in full vigor are not competent to become parents?"

"It is improbable, of course."

"In that case then, they ought not to have children?"

"Certainly not."

"Therefore those who produce children in such circumstances produce them wrongly?"

"I think so."

"Who then will be bad fathers and mothers, if not they?"

"I agree with you there too."

"Again, is not the duty of requiting benefits universally recognized by law?"

“Yes, but this law too is broken.”

“Then does not a man pay forfeit for the breach of that law too, in the gradual loss of good friends and the necessity of hunting those who hate him?

Or is it not true that, whereas those who benefit an acquaintance are good friends to him, he is hated by them for his ingratitude, if he makes no return, and then, because it is most profitable to enjoy the acquaintance of such men, he hunts them most assiduously?”

“Assuredly, Socrates, all this does suggest the work of the gods. For laws that involve in themselves punishment meet for those who break them, must, I think, be framed by a better legislator than man.”

“Then, Hippias, do you think that the gods ordain what is just or what is otherwise?”

“Not what is otherwise—of course not; for if a god ordains not that which is just, surely no other legislator can do so.”

“Consequently, Hippias, the gods too accept the identification of just and lawful.”

By such words and actions he encouraged Justice in those who resorted to his company.

V. He did also try to make his companions efficient in affairs, as I will now show. For holding that it is good for anyone who means to do honorable work to have self-control, he made it clear to his companions, in the first place, that he had been assiduous in self-discipline; moreover, in his conversation he exhorted his companions to cultivate self-control above all things. Thus he bore in mind continually the aids to virtue, and put all his companions in mind of them. I recall in particular the substance of a conversation that he once had with Euthydemus on self-control.

“Tell me, Euthydemus,” he said, “do you think that freedom is a noble and splendid possession both for individuals and for communities?”

“Yes, I think it is, in the highest degree.”

“Then do you think that the man is free who is ruled by bodily pleasures and is unable to do what is best because of them?”

“By no means.”

“Possibly, in fact, to do what is best appears to you to be freedom, and so you think that to have masters who will prevent such activity is bondage?”

“I am sure of it.”

“You feel sure then that the incontinent are bond slaves?”

“Of course, naturally.”

“And do you think that the incontinent are merely prevented from doing what is most honorable, or are also forced to do what is most dishonorable?”

“I think that they are forced to do that just as much as they are prevented from doing the other.”

“What sort of masters are they, in your opinion, who prevent the best and enforce the worst?”

“The worst possible, of course.”

“And what sort of slavery do you believe to be the worst?”

“Slavery to the worst masters, I think.”

“The worst slavery, therefore, is the slavery endured by the incontinent?”

“I think so.”

“As for Wisdom, the greatest blessing, does not incontinence exclude it and drive men to the opposite? Or don’t you think that incontinence prevents them from attending to useful things and understanding them, by

drawing them away to things pleasant, and often so stuns their perception of good and evil that they choose the worse instead of the better?"

"That does happen."

"With Prudence, Euthydemus, who, shall we say, has less to do than the incontinent? For I presume that the actions prompted by prudence and incontinence are exact opposites?"

"I agree with that too."

"To caring for what is right is there any stronger hindrance, do you think, than incontinence?"

"Indeed do not."

"And do you think there can be aught worse for a man than that which causes him to choose the harmful rather than the useful, and persuades him to care for the one and to be careless of the other, and forces him to do the opposite of what prudence dictates?"

"Nothing."

"And is it not likely that self-control causes actions the opposite of those that are due to incontinence?"

"Certainly."

"Then is not the cause of the opposite actions presumably a very great blessing?"

"Yes, presumably."

"Consequently we may presume, Euthydemus, that self-control is a very great blessing to a man?"

"We may presume so, Socrates."

"Has it ever occurred to you, Euthydemus—?"

"What?"

"That though pleasure is the one and only goal to which incontinence is thought to lead men, she herself cannot

bring them to it, whereas nothing produces pleasure so surely as self-control?"

"How so?"

"Incontinence will not let them endure hunger or thirst or desire or lack of sleep, which are the sole causes of pleasure in eating and drinking and sexual indulgence, and in resting and sleeping, after a time of waiting and resistance until the moment comes when these will give the greatest possible satisfaction; and thus she prevents them from experiencing any pleasure worthy to be mentioned in the most elementary and recurrent forms of enjoyment. But self-control alone causes them to endure the sufferings I have named, and therefore she alone causes them to experience any pleasure worth mentioning in such enjoyments."

"What you say is entirely true."

"Moreover, the delights of learning something good and excellent, and of studying some of the means whereby a man knows how to regulate his body well and manage his household successfully, to be useful to his friends and city and to defeat his enemies—knowledge that yields not only very great benefits but very great pleasures—these are the delights of the self-controlled; but the incontinent have no part in them. For who, should we say, has less concern with these than he who has no power of cultivating them because all his serious purposes are centered in the pleasures that lie nearest?"

"Socrates," said Euthydemus, "I think you mean that he who is at the mercy of the bodily pleasures has no concern whatever with virtue in any form."

"Yes, Euthydemus; for how can an incontinent man be any better than the dullest beast? How can he who fails to consider the things that matter most, and strives by every means to do the things that are most pleasant, be better

than the stupidest of creatures? No, only the self-controlled have power to consider the things that matter most, and, sorting them out after their kind, by word and deed alike to prefer the good and reject the evil."

And thus, he said, men become supremely good and happy and skilled in discussion. The very word "discussion," according to him, owes its name to the practice of meeting together for common deliberation, sorting, discussing things after their kind: and therefore one should be ready and prepared for this and be zealous for it; for it makes for excellence, leadership and skill in discussion.

VI. I will try also to show how he encouraged his companions to become skilled in discussion. Socrates held that those who know what any given thing is can also expound it to others; on the other hand, those who do not know are misled themselves and mislead others. For this reason he never gave up considering with his companions what any given thing is.

To go through all his definitions would be an arduous task. I will say only enough to indicate his method of analysis.

His analysis of Piety—to take that first—was more or less as follows:

"Tell me, Euthydemus, what sort of thing is Piety, in your opinion?"

"A very excellent thing, to be sure," he replied.

"Can you say what sort of man is pious?"

"He who worships the gods, I think."

"May a man worship the gods according to his own will and pleasure?"

“No, there are laws to be observed in worshipping the gods!”

“Then will not he who knows these laws know how he must worship the gods?”

“I think so.”

“Then does he who knows how he must worship the gods think that he must do so according to his knowledge, and not otherwise?”

“He does indeed.”

“And does everyone worship the gods as he thinks he ought, and not otherwise?”

“I think so.”

“Then will he who knows what is lawful about the gods worship the gods lawfully?”

“Certainly.”

“Then does not he who worships lawfully worship as he ought?”

“Of course.”

“Yes, but he who worships as he ought is pious?”

“Certainly.”

“Shall we therefore rightly define the pious man as one who knows what is lawful concerning the gods?”

“I at any rate think so.”

“In dealing with men, again, may one do as one chooses?”

“No, in the case of men too there are laws of conduct.”

“Then do not those who observe them in their dealings with one another behave as they ought?”

“Of course.”

“And do not they who behave as they ought behave well?”

“Certainly.”

“And do not they who behave well towards men act well in human affairs?”

“Presumably.”

“And do not those who obey the law’s do what is just?”

“Certainly.”

“Do you know what sort of things are called just?”

“The things that the laws command.”

“Consequently those who do what the laws command do both what is just and what they must do?”

“Of course.”

“And are not they who do what is just, just men?”

“I think so.”

“Do you think then, that any obey the laws without knowing what the law’s command?”

“I do not.”

“And knowing what they must do, do you suppose that any think they must not do it?”

“I don’t think so.”

“Do you know of any who do, not what they think they must do, but something else?”

“I do not.”

“Consequently those who know what is lawful concerning men do what is just?”

“Certainly.”

“But are not they who do what is just, just men?”

“Exactly.”

“At last, then, we may rightly define just men as those who know best what is just concerning men?”

“I think so.”

“And what of Wisdom? How shall we describe it? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise about what they know, or are some wise about what they do not know?”

“About what they know, obviously; for how can a man be wise about the things he doesn’t know?”

“The wise, then, are wise by knowledge?”

“How else can a man be wise if not by knowledge?”

“Do you think that wisdom is anything but that by which men are wise?”

“No.”

“It follows that Wisdom is Knowledge?”

“I think so.”

“Then do you think it possible for a man to know all things?”

“Of course not—nor even a fraction of them.”

“So an all-wise man is an impossibility?”

“Of course, of course.”

“Consequently everyone is wise just in so far as he knows?”

“I think so.”

“Now to seek the Good, Euthydemus: is this the way?”

“What do you mean?”

“Does it seem to you that the same thing is useful to everyone?”

“No.”

“In fact, what is useful to one may sometimes be hurtful to another, don’t you think?”

“Assuredly.”

“Should you call anything good except what is useful?”

“No.”

“Consequently what is useful is good for him to whom it is useful?”

“I think so.”

“Consider the Beautiful: can we define it in any other way? Or is it possible to name a beautiful body, for instance, or vessel, or anything else that you know to be beautiful for all purposes?”

“Of course not.”

“Then does the beauty in using anything consist in using it for just that purpose for which that particular thing is useful?”

“Certainly.”

“And is a tiling beautiful for any other purpose than that for which it is beautiful to use that particular thing?”

“For no other purpose whatever.”

“The useful, then, is beautiful for any purpose for which it is useful?”

“I think so.”

“Next comes Courage, Euthydemus. Do you think it a beautiful thing?”

“I prefer to say very beautiful.”

“So you think Courage useful for no mean purposes?”

“Of course—or rather, for the greatest.”

“Then do you think that in the pressure of terrors and dangers it is useful to be ignorant of them?”

“By no means.”

“So those who feel no fear of such things because they are ignorant of them are not courageous?”

“Of course not, for in that case many madmen and cowards would be courageous.”

“What of those who are afraid when there is no ground for fear?”

“Still less, of course.”

“Then do you think that those who are good in the presence of terrors and dangers are courageous, and those who are bad are cowards?”

“Certainly.”

“And do you think that any are good in the presence of such things, except those who can deal with them well?”

“None but these.”

“And bad, except such as deal badly with them?”

“These and none others.”

“Then do both classes behave as they think they must?”

“How can they behave otherwise?”

“Then do those who cannot behave well know how they must behave?”

“Surely not.”

“So those who know how they must behave are just those who can?”

“Yes, only they.”

“Well now, do those who are not utterly mistaken deal badly with such things?”

“I think not.”

“So those who behave badly are utterly mistaken?”

“Presumably.”

“It follows that those who know how to deal well with terrors and dangers are courageous, and those who utterly mistake the way are cowards?”

“That is my opinion.”

Kingship and despotism, in his judgment, were both forms of government, but he held that they differed. For

government of men with their consent and in accordance with the laws of the state was kingship; while government of unwilling subjects and not controlled by laws, but imposed by the will of the ruler, was despotism. And where the officials are chosen among those who fulfill the requirements of the laws, the constitution is an aristocracy: where ratable property is the qualification for office, you have a plutocracy: where all are eligible, a democracy.

Whenever anyone argued with him on any point without being able to make himself clear, asserting but not proving, that so and so was wiser or an abler politician or braver or what not, he would lead the whole discussion back to the definition required, much in this way:

"Do you say that your man is a better citizen than mine?"

"I do indeed."

"Then why didn't we first consider what is the function of a good citizen?"

"Let us do so."

"In financial administration, then, is not the better man he who makes the city wealthier?"

"Certainly."

"And in war he who makes her stronger than her rivals?"

"Of course."

"And on an embassy he who turns enemies into friends?"

"Presumably."

"And in debate he who puts down strife and produces harmony?"

"I think so."

By this process of leading back the argument even his adversary came to see the truth clearly. Whenever he himself argued out a question, he advanced by steps that gained general assent, holding this to be the only sure method.

Accordingly, whenever he argued, he gained a greater measure of assent from his hearers than any man I have known. He said that Homer gave Odysseus the credit of being “a safe speaker” because he had a way of leading the discussion from one acknowledged truth to another.

VII. I think that I have said enough to show that Socrates stated his own opinion plainly to those who consorted with him: I will now show that he also took pains to make them independent in doing the work that they were fitted for. For I never knew a man who was so careful to discover what each of his companions knew. Whatever it befits a gentleman to know he taught most zealously, so far as his own knowledge extended; if he was not entirely familiar with a subject, he took them to those who knew. He also taught them how far a well-educated man should make himself familiar with any given subject.

For instance, he said that the study of geometry should be pursued until the student was competent to measure a parcel of land accurately in case he wanted to take over, convey or divide it, or to compute the yield; and this knowledge was so easy to acquire, that anyone who gave his mind to mensuration knew the size of the piece and carried away a knowledge of the principles of land measurement. He was against carrying the study of geometry so far as to include the more complicated figures, on the ground that he could not see the use of them. Not that he was himself unfamiliar with them, but he said that they were enough to occupy a lifetime, to the complete exclusion of many other useful studies.

Similarly he recommended them to make themselves familiar with astronomy, but only so far as to be able to find the time of night, month and year, in order to use reliable evidence when planning a journey by land or sea, or setting the watch, and in all other affairs that are done in the night

or month or year, by distinguishing the times and seasons aforesaid. This knowledge, again, was easily to be had from night hunters and pilots and others who made it their business to know such things. But he strongly deprecated studying astronomy so far as to include the knowledge of bodies revolving in different courses, and of planets and comets, and wearing oneself out with the calculation of their distance from the earth, their periods of revolution and the causes of these. Of such researches, again he said that he could not see what useful purpose they served. He had indeed attended lectures on these subjects too; but these again, he said, were enough to occupy a lifetime to the complete exclusion of many useful studies.

In general, with regard to the phenomena of the heavens, he deprecated curiosity to learn how the deity contrives them: he held that their secrets could not be discovered by man, and believed that any attempt to search out what the gods had not chosen to reveal must be displeasing to them. He said that he who meddles with these matters runs the risk of losing his sanity as completely as Anaxagoras, who took an insane pride in his explanation of the divine machinery.

For that sage, in declaring the sun to be fire, ignored the facts than men can look at fire without inconvenience, but cannot gaze steadily at the sun; that their skin is blackened by the sun's rays, but not by fire. Further, he ignored the fact that sunlight is essential to the health of all vegetation, whereas if anything is heated by fire it withers. Again, when he pronounced the sun to be a red-hot stone, he ignored the fact that a stone in fire neither glows nor can resist it long, whereas the sun shines with unequaled brilliance for ever.

He also recommended the study of arithmetic. But in this case as in the others he recommended avoidance of vain application; and invariably, whether theories or ascertained

facts formed the subject of his conversation, he limited it to what was useful.

He also strongly urged his companions to take care of their health. “You should find out all you can,” he said, “from those who know. Everyone should watch himself throughout his life, and notice what sort of meat and drink and what form of exercise suit his constitution, and how he should regulate them in order to enjoy good health. For by such attention to yourselves you can discover better than any doctor what suits your constitution.” When anyone was in need of help that human wisdom was unable to give he advised him to resort to divination; for he who knew the means whereby the gods give guidance to men concerning their affairs never lacked divine counsel.

VIII. As for his claim that he was forewarned by “the deity” what he ought to do and what not to do, some may think that it must have been a delusion because he was condemned to death. But they should remember two facts. First, he had already reached such an age, that had he not died then, death must have come to him soon after. Secondly, he escaped the most irksome stage of life and the inevitable diminution of mental powers, and instead won glory by the moral strength revealed in the wonderful honesty and frankness and probity of his defense, and in the equanimity and manliness with which he bore the sentence of death.

In fact it is admitted that there is no record of death more nobly borne. For he was forced to live for thirty days after the verdict was given, because it was the month of the Delia, and the law did not allow any public execution to take place until the sacred embassy had returned from Delos. During this interval, as all his intimate acquaintances could see, he continued to live exactly as before; and, in truth, before that time he had been admired above all men for his cheerfulness

and serenity. How, then, could man die more nobly? Or what death could be nobler than the death most nobly faced?

What death more blessed than the noblest? Or what dearer to the gods than the most blessed?

I will repeat what Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, told me about him. "When Meletus had actually formulated his indictment," he said, Socrates talked freely in my presence, but made no reference to the case. I told him that he ought to be thinking about his defense. His first remark was, 'Don't you think that I have been preparing for it all my life?' And when I asked him how, he said that he had been constantly occupied in the consideration of right and wrong, and in doing what was right and avoiding what was wrong, which he regarded as the best preparation for a defense. Then I said, 'Don't you see, Socrates, that the juries in our courts are apt to be misled by argument, so that they often put the innocent to death, and acquit the guilty?' 'Ah, yes, Hermogenes,' he answered, 'but when I did try to think out my defense to the jury, the deity at once resisted.' 'Strange words,' said I; and he, 'Do you think it strange, if it seems better to God that I should die now? Don't you see that to this day I never would acknowledge that any man had lived a better or a pleasanter life than I? For they live best, I think, who strive best to become as good as possible: and the pleasantest life is theirs who are conscious that they are growing in goodness. And to this day that has been my experience; and mixing with others and closely comparing myself with them, I have held without ceasing to this opinion of myself. And not I only, but my friends cease not to feel thus towards me, not because of their love for me (for why does not love make others feel thus towards their friends?), but because they think that they too would rise highest in goodness by being with me. But if I am to live on, haply I may be forced to pay the old man's forfeit—to become sand-

blind and deaf and dull of wit, slower to learn, quicker to forget, outstripped now by those who were behind me. Nay, but even were I unconscious of the change, life would be a burden to me; and if I knew, misery and bitterness would surely be my lot.

"'But now, if I am to die unjustly, they who unjustly kill me will bear the shame of it. For if to do injustice is shameful, whatever is unjustly done must surely bring shame. But to me what shame is it that others fail to decide and act justly concerning me? I see that posterity judges differently of the dead according as they did or suffered injustice. I know that men will remember me too, and, if I die now, not as they will remember those who took my life. For I know that they will ever testify of me that I wronged no man at any time, nor corrupted any man, but strove ever to make my companions better.'"

This was the tenor of his conversation with Hermogenes and with the others. All who knew what manner of man Socrates was and who seek after virtue continue to this day to miss him beyond all others, as the chief of helpers in the quest of virtue. For myself, I have described him as he was: so religious that he did nothing without counsel from the gods; so just that he did no injury, however small, to any man, but conferred the greatest benefits on all who dealt with him; so self-controlled that he never chose the pleasanter rather than the better course; so wise that he was unerring in his judgment of the better and the worse, and needed no counselor, but relied on himself for his knowledge of them; masterly in expounding and defining such things; no less masterly in putting others to the test, and convincing them of error and exhorting them to follow virtue and gentleness. To me then he seemed to be all that a truly good and happy man must be. But if there is any doubter, let him

set the character of other men beside these things; then let him judge.

THE OECONOMICUS

A DISCUSSION ON ESTATE MANAGEMENT

I. I once heard him discuss the subject of estate management in the following manner.

"Tell me, Critobulus, is estate management the name of a branch of knowledge, like medicine, smithing and carpentry?"

"I think so," replied Critobulus.

"And can we say what the function of estate management is, just as we can say what is the function of each of these arts?"

"Well, I suppose that the business of a good estate manager is to manage his own estate well."

"Yes, and in case he were put in charge of another man's estate, could he not, if he chose, manage it as well as he manages his own? Anyone who understands carpentry can do for another exactly the same work as he does for himself; and so, I presume, can a good estate manager."

"I think so, Socrates."

"Is it possible, then, for one who understands this art, even if he has no property of his own, to earn money by managing another man's estate, just as he might do by building him a house?"

"Yes, of course; and he would get a good salary if, after taking over an estate, he continued to pay all outgoings, and to increase the estate by showing a balance."

"But what do we mean now by an estate? Is it the same thing as a house, or is all property that one possesses outside the house also part of the estate?"

"Well, I think that even if the property is situated in different cities, everything a man possesses is part of his estate."

“Do not some men possess enemies?”

“Of course; some in fact possess many.”

“Shall we include their enemies in their possessions?”

“It would be ridiculous, surely, if one actually received a salary for increasing the number of a man’s enemies!”

“Because, you know, we supposed a man’s estate to be the same as his property.”

“To be sure—meaning thereby the good things that he possesses. No, of course I don’t call any bad thing that he may possess property.”

“You seem to use the word property of whatever is profitable to its owner.”

“Certainly; but what is harmful I regard as loss rather than wealth.”

“Yes, and consequently if a man buys a horse and doesn’t know how to manage it, and so keeps on getting thrown and injuring himself by trying to ride it, the horse is not wealth to him, I presume?”

“No, if we assume that wealth is a good thing.”

“It follows that land is not wealth either to a man who works it in such a way that his work results in loss.”

“To be sure: even land is not wealth if it makes us starve instead of supporting us.”

“And the same will hold good of sheep, will it not? if a man loses through ignorance of sheep farming, his sheep too will not be wealth to him?”

“I think not.”

“It seems, then, that your view is this: what is profitable is wealth, what is harmful is not wealth.”

“Quite so.”

“That is to say, the same things are wealth and not wealth, according as one understands or does not understand how to use them. A flute, for example, is wealth to one who is competent to play it, but to an incompetent person it is no better than useless stones.”

“True—unless he sells it.”

“We now see that to persons who don’t understand its use, a flute is wealth if they sell it, but not wealth if they keep it instead of selling.”

“Yes, Socrates, and our argument runs consistently, since we have said that what is profitable is wealth.

For a flute, if not put up for sale, is not wealth, because it is useless: if put up for sale it becomes wealth.”

“Yes,” commented Socrates, “provided he knows how to sell; but again, in case he sells it for something he doesn’t know how to use, even then the sale doesn’t convert it into wealth, according to you.”

“You imply, Socrates, that even money isn’t wealth to one who doesn’t know how to use it.”

“And you, I think, agree with me to this extent, that wealth is that from which a man can derive profit. At any rate, if a man uses his money to buy a mistress who makes him worse off in body and soul and estate, how can his money be profitable to him then?”

“By no means, unless we are ready to maintain that the weed called nightshade, which drives you mad if you eat it, is wealth.”

“Then money is to be kept at a distance, Critobulus, if one doesn’t know how to use it, and not to be included in wealth. But how about friends? If one knows how to make use of them so as to profit by them, what are they to be called?”

“Wealth, of course, and much more so than cattle, if it be true that they are more profitable than cattle.”

“Yes, and it follows from what you say that enemies too are wealth to anyone who can derive profit from them.”

“Well, that is my opinion.”

“Consequently it is the business of a good estate manager to know how to deal with enemies so as to derive profit from them too.”

“Most decidedly.”

“In fact, Critobulus, you cannot fail to notice that many private persons have been indebted to war for the increase of their estates, and many princes too.”

“Yes, so far so good, Socrates. But sometimes we come across persons possessed of knowledge and means whereby they can increase their estates if they work, and we find that they are unwilling to do so; and consequently we see that their knowledge profits them nothing. What are we to make of that? In these cases, surely, neither their knowledge nor their property is wealth?”

“Are you trying to raise a discussion about slaves, Critobulus?”

“Oh no, not at all: I am referring to persons of whom some, at any rate, are considered men of the highest lineage. I observe that there are persons skilled in the arts of war or peace, as the case may be, who are unwilling to practice them, and the reason, I think, is just this, that they have no master over them.”

“What, no master over them, when, in spite of their prayers for prosperity and their desire to do what will bring them good, they are thwarted in their intentions by the powers that rule them?”

“And who, pray, may these unseen rulers be?”

“No, not unseen, but open and undisguised, surely! And very vicious rulers they are too, as you yourself must see, if at least you regard idleness and moral cowardice and negligence as vice. Aye, and then there is a set of deceitful mistresses that pretend to be pleasures—such as gambling and consorting with bad companions: even the victims of their deception find as time goes on that these, after all, are really pains concealed beneath a thin veneer of pleasures, and that they are hindering them from all profitable work by their influence over them.”

“But there are other men, Socrates, whose energy is not hindered by these influences, in fact they have an eager desire to work and to make an income: nevertheless they exhaust their estates and are beset with difficulties,”

“Yes, they too are slaves, and hard indeed are their masters: some are in bondage to gluttony, some to lechery, some to drink, and some to foolish and costly ambitions. And so hard is the rule of these passions over every man who falls into their clutches, that so long as they see that he is strong and capable of work, they force him to pay over all the profits of his toil, and to spend it on their own desires; but no sooner do they find that he is too old to work, than they leave him to an old age of misery, and try to fasten the yoke on other shoulders. Ah, Critobulus, we must fight for our freedom against these tyrants as persistently as if they were armed men trying to enslave us. Indeed, open enemies may be gentlemen, and when they enslave us, may, by chastening, purge us of our faults and cause us to live better lives in future. But such mistresses as these never cease to plague men in body and soul and estate all the time that they have dominion over them.”

II. The word was now with Critobulus, who continued thus:

“Well, I think you have told me quite enough about such passions as these, and when I examine myself I find, I think, that I have them fairly well under control; and therefore, if you will advise me what I should do to increase my estate, I don’t think those mistresses, as you call them, are likely to hinder me. So do not hesitate to give me any good advice you can: unless, indeed, you have made up your mind that we are rich enough already, Socrates, and think we have no need of more money?”

“Oh, if you mean to include me, I certainly think I have no need of more money and am rich enough. But you seem to me to be quite poor, Critobulus, and at times, I assure you, I feel quite sorry for you.”

“And how much, pray,” asked Critobulus, laughing, “would your property fetch at a sale, do you suppose, Socrates, and how much would mine?”

“Well, if I found a good buyer, I think the whole of my goods and chattels, including the house, might readily sell for five minae. Yours, I feel sure, would fetch more than a hundred times that sum.”

“And in spite of that estimate, you really think you have no need of money and pity me for my poverty?”

“Yes, because my property is sufficient to satisfy my wants, but I don’t think you would have enough to keep up the style you are living in and to support your reputation, even if your fortune were three times what it is.”

“How can that be?” exclaimed Critobulus.

“Because, in the first place,” explained Socrates,

“I notice that you are bound to offer many large sacrifices; else, I fancy, you would get into trouble with gods and men alike. Secondly, it is your duty to entertain many strangers, on a generous scale too. Thirdly, you have to give dinners and play the benefactor to the citizens, or you lose your

following. Moreover, I observe that already the state is exacting heavy contributions from you: you must needs keep horses, pay for choruses and gymnastic competitions, and accept presidencies; and if war breaks out, I know they will require you to maintain a ship and pay taxes that will nearly crush you. Whenever you seem to fall short of what is expected of you, the Athenians will certainly punish you as though they had caught you robbing them. Besides all this, I notice that you imagine yourself to be a rich man; you are indifferent to money, and yet go courting minions, as though the cost were nothing to you. And that is why I pity you, and fear that you may come to grief and find yourself reduced to penury. Now, if I ran short of money, no doubt you know as well as I do that I should not lack helpers who would need to contribute very little to fill my cup to overflowing. But your friends, though far better supplied with means to support their establishment than you, yet look to receive help from you"

"I cannot dispute this, Socrates," said Critobulus, "but it is time for you to take me in hand, and see that I don't become a real object of pity."

At this Socrates exclaimed, "What, don't you think it strange, Critobulus, that a little while ago, when said I was rich, you laughed at me, as though I did not even know the meaning of riches, and would not cease until you had proved me wrong and made me own that my possessions were less than one-hundredth part of yours, and yet now you bid me take you in hand and see that you don't become in literal truth a poor man?"

"Well, Socrates, I see that you understand one process by which wealth is created—how to create a balance. So a man who saves on a small income can, I suppose, very easily show a large surplus with a large one."

“Then don’t you remember saying just now in our conversation, when you wouldn’t give me leave to utter a syllable, that if a man doesn’t know how to manage horses, his horses are not wealth to him, nor his land, sheep, money or anything else, if he doesn’t know how to manage them? Now these are the sources from which income is derived: and how do you suppose that I can possibly know how to manage any of these things, seeing that I never yet possessed any one of them?”

“Still we held that, even if a man happens to have no wealth, there is such a thing as a science of household management. Then what reason is there why you should not know it?”

“Exactly the same reason, of course, that a man would have for not knowing how to play on the flute if he had never possessed one himself and had never borrowed one to learn on. That is just my case with regard to estate management; for never having possessed wealth myself, I have not had an opportunity of learning on an instrument of my own, and nobody has ever let me handle his, until you made your offer. Beginners, I fancy, are apt to spoil the lyres they learn on; and if I attempted to learn to manage estates by practicing on yours, possibly I might spoil it entirely for you.”

“Ah, Socrates!” rejoined Critobulus, “I see you are eager to avoid giving me any help towards lightening the weight of my troublesome duties.”

“Not at all, not at all,” said Socrates, “I am all eagerness to tell you all I know. Suppose that you had come to me for fire, and I, having none by me, had taken you to some place where you could get it; you would not, I think, have found fault with me: or, if you had asked for water, and I, having none myself, had brought you to some other place for it, I feel sure that you would not have found fault with me for

that either: or, suppose you wanted to learn music with me and I directed you to persons far more skilled in music than I am, who would be grateful to you for taking lessons with them, what fault could you find with me for doing so?"

"None, if I were fair, Socrates."

"Well then, Critobulus, I will direct you to others far more skilled than I in the things you now seek to learn from me. I confess that I have made a point of finding out who are the greatest masters of various sciences to be found in Athens. For observing once that the same pursuits lead in one case to great poverty and in another to great riches, I was filled with amazement, and thought it worth while to consider what this could mean. And on consideration I found that these things happen quite naturally. For I saw that those who follow these pursuits carelessly suffer loss, and I discovered that those who devote themselves earnestly to them accomplish them more quickly, more easily and with more profit. I think that if you would elect to learn from these, you too with God's favor would turn out a clever man of business."

III. "Socrates," exclaimed Critobulus on hearing this, "I don't intend to let you go now, until you have proved to my satisfaction what you have promised in the presence of our friends here to prove."

"Well then" said Socrates, "what if I prove to your satisfaction, Critobulus, to begin with, that some men spend large sums in building houses that are useless, while others build houses perfect in all respects for much less? Will you think that I am putting before you one of the operations that constitute estate management?"

"Yes, certainly."

"And what if I show you next the companion to this—that some possess many costly belongings and cannot use them

at need, and do not even know whether they are safe and sound, and so are continually worried themselves and worrying their servants, whereas others, though they possess not more, but even less, have whatever they want ready for use?"

"What is the reason of this, then, Socrates? Is it not simply this, that the former stow their things away anywhere and the latter have everything neatly arranged in some place?"

"Yes, of course, arranged carefully in the proper place, not just anywhere."

"Your point, I take it, is that this too is an element in estate management."

"Then what if I show you besides that in some households nearly all the servants are in fetters and yet continually try to run away, whereas in others they are under no restraint and are willing to work and to stay at their posts? Won't you think that here too I am pointing out to you a notable effect of estate management?"

"Yes, of course; very much so."

"And that when men farm the same kind of land, some are poverty-stricken and declare that they are ruined by farming, and others do well with the farm and have all they want in abundance?"

"Yes, of course; for maybe some spend money not on necessary purposes only but on what brings harm to the owner and the estate."

"Perhaps there are such people. But I am referring rather to those who haven't the money to meet even the necessary expenses, though professing to be farmers."

"Now what can be the reason of that, Socrates?"

“I will take you to these too; and when you watch them, you will find out, I fancy.”

“Of course; that is, if I can.”

“Then you must watch, and try by experiment whether you are capable of understanding. At present I observe that when a comedy is to be seen, you get up very early and walk a very long way and press me eagerly to go to the play with you. But you have never yet invited me to see a drama of real life like this.”

“You think me ridiculous, don’t you, Socrates?”

“You think yourself far more so, I am sure. And suppose I show you that some have been brought to penury by keeping horses, while others prosper by doing so, and moreover glory in their gain? “

“Well, I too see and know instances of both; I am not one of the gainers for all that.”

“The fact is you watch them just as you watch the actors in tragedy or comedy, not, I suppose, to become a playwright, but for the pleasure of seeing and hearing something. And perhaps there is no harm in that, because you don’t want to write plays; but seeing that you are forced to meddle with horses, don’t you think that common-sense requires you to see that you are not ignorant of the business, the more so as the self-same horses are both good to use and profitable to sell?”

“Would you have me break in colts, Socrates?”

“Of course not, no more than I would have you buy children to train as agricultural laborers; but horses and human beings alike, I think, on reaching a certain age forthwith become useful and go on improving. I can also show you that husbands differ widely in their treatment of their wives, and some succeed in winning their co-operation

and thereby increase their estates, while others bring utter ruin on their houses by their behavior to them."

"And ought one to blame the husband or the wife for that, Socrates?"

"When a sheep is ailing," said Socrates, "we generally blame the shepherd, and when a horse is vicious, we generally find fault with his rider. In the case of a wife, if she receives instruction in the right way from her husband and yet does badly, perhaps she should bear the blame; but if the husband does not instruct his wife in the right way of doing things, and so finds her ignorant, should he not bear the blame himself? Anyhow, Critobulus, you should tell us the truth, for we are all friends here. Is there anyone to whom you commit more affairs of importance than you commit to your wife?"

"There is not."

"Is there anyone with whom you talk less?"

"There are few or none; I confess."

"And you married her when she was a mere child and had seen and heard almost nothing?"

"Certainly."

"Then it would be far more surprising if she understood what she should say or do than if she made mistakes."

"But what of the husbands who, as you say, have good wives, Socrates? Did they train them themselves?"

"There's nothing like investigation. I will introduce Aspasia to you, and she will explain the whole matter to you with more knowledge than I possess. I think that the wife who is a good partner in the household contributes just as much as her husband to its good; because the incomings for the most part are the result of the husband's exertions, but the outgoings are controlled mostly by the wife's

dispensation. If both do their part well, the estate is increased; if they act incompetently, it is diminished. If you think you want to know about other branches of knowledge, I fancy I can show you people who acquit themselves creditably in any one of them."

IV. "Surely, Socrates, there is no need to go through the whole list. For it is not easy to get workmen who are skilled in all the arts, nor is it possible to become an expert in them. Pray select the branches of knowledge that seem the noblest and would be most suitable for me to cultivate: show me these, and those who practice them; and give me from your own knowledge any help you can towards learning them."

"Very good, Critobulus; for, to be sure, the illiberal arts, as they are called, are spoken against, and are, naturally enough, held in utter disdain in our states. For they spoil the bodies of the workmen and the foremen, forcing them to sit still and live indoors, and in some cases to spend the day at the fire. The softening of the body involves a serious weakening of the mind. Moreover, these so-called illiberal arts leave no spare time for attention to one's friends and city, so that those who follow them are reputed bad at dealing with friends and bad defenders of their country. In fact, in some of the states, and especially in those reputed warlike, it is not even lawful for any of the citizens to work at illiberal arts."

"But what arts, pray, do you advise us to follow, Socrates?"

"Need we be ashamed of imitating the king of the Persians? For they say that he pays close attention to husbandry and the art of war, holding that these are two of the noblest and most necessary pursuits."

“And do you really believe, Socrates,” exclaimed Critobulus on hearing this, “that the king of the Persians includes husbandry among his occupations?”

“Perhaps, Critobulus, the following considerations will enable us to discover whether he does so. We allow that he pays close attention to warfare, because he has given a standing order to every governor of the nations from which he receives tribute, to supply maintenance for a specified number of horsemen and archers and slingers and light infantry, that they may be strong enough to control his subjects and to protect the country in the event of an invasion; and, apart from these, he maintains garrisons in the citadels. Maintenance for these is supplied by the governor charged with this duty, and the king annually reviews the mercenaries and all the other troops ordered to be under arms, assembling all but the men in the citadels at the place of muster, as it is called: he personally inspects the men who are near his residence, and sends trusted agents to review those who live far away. The officers, whether commanders of garrisons or of regiments or viceroys, who turn out with a full complement of men and parade them equipped with horses and arms in good condition, he promotes in the scale of honor and enriches with large grants of money; but those officers whom he finds to be neglecting the garrisons or making profit out of them he punishes severely, and appoints others to take their office. These actions, then, seem to us to leave no room for question that he pays attention to warfare.

“As for the country, he personally examines so much of it as he sees in the course of his progress through it; and he receives reports from his trusted agents on the territories that he does not see for himself. To those governors who are able to show him that their country is densely populated and that the land is in cultivation and well stocked with the trees

of the district and with the crops, he assigns more territory and gives presents, and rewards them with seats of honor. Those whose territory he finds uncultivated and thinly populated either through harsh administration or through contempt or through carelessness, he punishes, and appoints others to take their office. By such action, does he seem to provide less for the cultivation of the land by the inhabitants than for its protection by the garrisons? Moreover, each of these duties is entrusted to a separate class of officers; one class governs the residents and the laborers, and collects tribute from them, the other commands the men under arms and the garrisons. If the commander of a garrison affords insufficient protection to the country, the civil governor and controller of agriculture denounces the commander, setting out that the inhabitants are unable to work the farms for want of protection. If, on the other hand, the commander brings peace to the farms, and the governor nevertheless causes the land to be sparsely populated and idle, the commander in turn denounces the governor. For, roughly speaking, where cultivation is inefficient, the garrisons are not maintained and the tribute cannot be paid. Wherever a viceroy is appointed, he attends to both these matters."

At this point Critobulus said: "Well, Socrates, if the Great King docs this, it seems to me that he pays as much attention to husbandry as to warfare."

"Yet further," continued Socrates, "in all the districts he resides in and visits he takes care that there are 'paradises,' as they call them, full of all the good and beautiful things that the soil will produce, and in this he himself spends most of his time, except when the season precludes it."

"Then it is of course necessary, Socrates, to take care that these paradises in which the king spends his time shall

contain a fine stock of trees and all other beautiful things that the soil produces."

"And some say, Critobulus, that when the king makes gifts, he first invites those who have distinguished themselves in war, because it is useless to have broad acres under tillage unless there are men to defend them; and next to them, those who stock and cultivate the land best, saying that even stout-hearted warriors cannot live without the aid of workers. There is a story that Cyrus, lately the most illustrious of princes, once said to the company invited to receive his gifts, 'I myself deserve to receive the gifts awarded in both classes; for I am the best at stocking land and the best at protecting the stock.'"

"Well, if Cyrus said that, Socrates, he took as much pride in cultivating and stocking land as in being a warrior."

"Yes, and, upon my word, if Cyrus had only lived, it seems that he would have proved an excellent ruler. One of the many proofs that he has given of this is the fact that, when he was on his way to fight his brother for the throne, it is said that not a man deserted from Cyrus to the king, whereas tens of thousands deserted from the king to Cyrus. I think you have one clear proof of a ruler's excellence, when men obey him willingly and choose to stand by him in moments of danger. Now his friends all fought at his side and fell at his side to a man, fighting round his body, with the one exception of Ariaeus, whose place in the battle was, in point of fact, on the left wing.

"Further, the story goes that when Lysander came to him bringing the gifts from the allies, this Cyrus showed him various marks of friendliness, as Lysander himself related once to a stranger at Megara, adding besides that Cyrus personally showed him round his paradise at Sardis. Now Lysander admired the beauty of the trees in it, the accuracy

of the spacing, the straightness of the rows, the regularity of the angles and the multitude of the sweet scents that clung round them as they walked; and for wonder of these things he cried, 'Cyrus, I really do admire all these lovely things, but I am far more impressed with your agent's skill in measuring and arranging everything so exactly.' Cyrus was delighted to hear this and said: 'Well, Lysander, the whole of the measurement and arrangement is my own work, and I did some of the planting myself.' 'What, Cyrus?' exclaimed Lysander, looking at him, and marking the beauty and perfume of his robes, and the splendor of the necklaces and bangles and other jewels that he was wearing; 'did you really plant part of this with your own hands?' ' Does that surprise you, Lysander?' asked Cyrus in reply. I swear by the Sun-god that never yet sat down to dinner when in sound health, without first working hard at some task of war or agriculture, or exerting myself somehow.'

"Lysander himself declared, I should add, that on hearing this, he congratulated him in these words: 'I think you deserve your happiness, Cyrus, for you earn it by your virtues.'"

V. "Now I tell you this," continued Socrates, "because even the wealthiest cannot hold aloof from husbandry. For the pursuit of it is in some sense a luxury as well as a means of increasing one's estate and of training the body in all that a free man should be able to do. For, in the first place, the earth yields to cultivators the food by which men live; she yields besides the luxuries they enjoy. Secondly, she supplies all the things with which they decorate altars and statues and themselves, along with most pleasant sights and scents. Thirdly, she produces or feeds the ingredients of many delicate dishes; for the art of breeding stock is closely linked with husbandry; so that men have victims for propitiating the gods with sacrifice and cattle for their own

use. And though she supplies good things in abundance, she suffers them not to be won without toil, but accustoms men to endure winter's cold and summer's heat. She gives increased strength through exercise to the men that labor with their own hands, and hardens the overseers of the work by rousing them early and forcing them to move about briskly. For on a farm no less than in a town the most important operations have their fixed times. Again, if a man wants to serve in the cavalry, farming is his most efficient partner in furnishing keep for his horse; if on foot, it makes his body brisk. And the land helps in some measure to arouse a liking for the toil of hunting, since it affords facilities for keeping hounds and at the same time supplies food for the wild game that preys on the land. And if husbandry benefits horses and hounds, they benefit the farm no less, the horses by carrying the overseer early to the scene of his duties and enabling him to leave it late, the hounds by keeping the wild animals from injuring crops and sheep, and by helping to give safety to solitude. The land also stimulates armed protection of the country on the part of the husbandmen, by nourishing her crops in the open for the strongest to take. And what art produces better runners, throwers and jumpers than husbandry? What art rewards the laborer more generously? What art welcomes her follower more gladly, inviting him to come and take whatever he wants? What art entertains strangers more generously? Where is there greater facility for passing the winter comforted by generous fire and warm baths, than on a farm? Where is it pleasanter to spend the summer enjoying the cool waters and breezes and shade, than in the country? What other art yields more seemly first-fruits for the gods, or gives occasion for more crowded festivals? What art is dearer to servants, or pleasanter to a wife, or more delightful to children, or more agreeable to friends? To me indeed it

seems strange, if any free man has come by a possession pleasanter than this, or has found out an occupation pleasanter than this or more useful for winning a livelihood.

"Yet again, the earth willingly teaches righteousness to those who can learn; for the better she is served, the more good things she gives in return. And if haply those who are occupied in farming, and are receiving a rigorous and manly teaching, are forced at any time to quit their lands by great armies, they, as men well-found in mind and in body, can enter the country of those who hinder them, and take sufficient for their support. Often in time of war it is safer to go armed in search of food than to gather it with farming implements.

"Moreover, husbandry helps to train men for corporate effort. For men are essential to an expedition against an enemy, and the cultivation of the soil demands the aid of men. Therefore nobody can be a good farmer unless he makes his laborers both eager and obedient; and the captain who leads men against an enemy must contrive to secure the same results by rewarding those who act as brave men should act and punishing the disobedient. And it is no less necessary for a farmer to encourage his laborers often, than for a general to encourage his men. And slaves need the stimulus of good hopes no less, nay, even more than free men, to make them steadfast. It has been nobly said that husbandry is the mother and nurse of the other arts.

For when husbandry flourishes, all the other arts are in good fettle; but whenever the land is compelled to lay waste, the other arts of landsmen and mariners alike well-nigh perish."

"Well, Socrates," replied Critobulus to this, "I think you are right so far. But in husbandry a man can rely very little on forecast. For hailstorms and frosts sometimes, and

droughts and rains and blight ruin schemes well planned and well carried out; and sometimes well-bred stock is miserably destroyed by an outbreak of disease."

"Well," said Socrates in reply, "I thought you knew, Critobulus, that the operations of husbandry no less than those of war are in the hands of the gods. And you observe, I suppose, that men engaged in war try to propitiate the gods before taking action; and with sacrifices and omens seek to know what they ought to do and what they ought not to do; and for the business of husbandry do you think it less necessary to ask the blessing of the gods? Know of a surety that right-minded men offer prayer for fruits and crops and cattle and horses and sheep, aye and for all that they possess."

VI. "Well, Socrates, I think you are right when you bid me try to begin every undertaking with the gods' help, since the gods control the works of peace no less than of war. We will try, then, to do so. But now go back to the point where you broke off in your talk about estate management, and try to expound the subject completely step by step, since after hearing what you have said so far, I seem even now to discern rather more clearly than before what I must do to earn my living."

"I suggest then," resumed Socrates, "that we should first recapitulate those points of our discussion on which we have already reached agreement, in order that we may try to agree as thoroughly, if possible, when we go through the remaining steps."

"O yes; when several are jointly interested in money, it is pleasant to have no disagreement in going over the accounts; and it is equally pleasant for us, as the interested parties in a discussion, to agree as we go over the several steps."

“Well now, we thought that estate management is the name of a branch of knowledge, and this knowledge appeared to be that by which men can increase estates, and an estate appeared to be identical with the total of one’s property, and we said that property is that which is useful for supplying a livelihood, and useful things turned out to be all those things that one knows how to use. Now we thought that it is impossible to learn all the sciences, and we agreed with our states in rejecting the so-called illiberal arts, because they seem to spoil the body and unnerve the mind. We said that the clearest proof of this would be forthcoming, if in the course of a hostile invasion the husbandmen and craftsmen were made to sit apart, and each group were asked whether they voted for defending the country or withdrawing from the open and guarding the fortresses. We thought that in these circumstances the men who have to do with the land would give their vote for defending it, the craftsmen for not fighting, but sitting still, as they have been brought up to do, aloof from toil and danger. We came to the conclusion that for a gentleman the best occupation and the best science is husbandry, from which men obtain what is necessary to them. For this occupation seemed to be the easiest to learn and the pleasantest to work at, to give to the body the greatest measure of strength and beauty, and to leave to the mind the greatest amount of spare time for attending to the interests of one’s friends and city. Moreover, since the crops grow and the cattle on a farm graze outside the walls, husbandry seemed to us to help in some measure to make the workers valiant. And so this way of making a living appeared to be held in the highest estimation by our states, because it seems to turn out the best citizens and most loyal to the community.”

“I have already heard enough, I think, Socrates, to convince me that it is in the highest degree honorable, good

and pleasant to get a living by husbandry. But you told me that you have discovered the reasons why some farmers are so successful that husbandry yields them all they need in abundance, and others are so inefficient that they find farming unprofitable. I should like to hear the reasons in each case, in order that we may do what is good and avoid what is harmful."

"Well then, Critobulus, l propose to give you a complete account of an interview I once had with a man whom took to be really one of those who are justly styled 'gentlemen.'"

"I should greatly like to hear it, Socrates, for I long to deserve that title myself."

"Then I will tell you how came to take note of him. For it took me a very little time to visit our good builders, good smiths, good painters, good sculptors, and other people of the kind, and to inspect those of their works that are declared to be beautiful; but I felt a desire to meet one of those who are called by that grand name 'gentleman,' which implies 'beautiful' as well as 'good,' in order to consider what they did to deserve it. And, first, because the epithet 'beautiful' is added to 'good,' I went up to every person I noticed, and tried to discover whether I could anywhere see goodness in combination with beauty. But after all, it was not so: I thought I discovered that some who were beautiful to look at were thoroughly depraved in their minds. So I decided to let good looks alone, and to seek out someone known as 'a gentleman.' Accordingly, since I heard the name applied to Ischomachus by men, women, citizens and strangers alike, I decided to meet him, if I could.

VII. "So, happening one day to see him sitting in the cloister of the temple of Zeus Eleutherius apparently at leisure, I approached, and sitting down at his side, said:

“‘Why sitting still, Ischomachus? You are not much in the habit of doing nothing; for generally when I see you in the market-place you are either busy or at least not wholly idle.’

“‘True, and you would not have seen me so now, Socrates, had I not made an appointment with some strangers here.’

“‘Pray where do you spend your time,’ said I, ‘and what do you do when you are not engaged in some such occupation? For I want very much to learn how you came to be called a gentleman, since you do not pass your time indoors, and your condition does not suggest that you do so.’

“Smiling at my question, ‘How came you to be called a gentleman?’, and apparently well pleased, Ischomachus answered: ‘Well, Socrates, whether certain persons call me so when they talk to you about me, I know not. Assuredly when they challenge me to an exchange of property in order to escape some public burden, fitting a warship or providing a chorus, nobody looks for the “gentleman,” but the challenge refers to me as plain “Ischomachus,” my father’s son. Well now, Socrates, as you ask the question, I certainly do not pass my time indoors; for, you know, my wife is quite capable of looking after the house by herself.’

Ah, Ischomachus,’ said I, that is just what I want to hear from you. Did you yourself train your wife to be of the right sort, or did she know her household duties when you received her from her parents?’

“‘Why, what knowledge could she have had, Socrates, when I took her for my wife? She was not yet fifteen years old when she came to me, and up to that time she had lived in leading-strings, seeing, hearing and saying as little as possible. If when she came she knew no more than how, when given wool, to turn out a cloak, and had seen only how the spinning is given out to the maids, is not that as much as could be expected? For in control of her appetite,

Socrates, she had been excellently trained; and this sort of training is, in my opinion, the most important to man and woman alike.'

"'But in other respects did you train your wife yourself, Ischomachus, so that she should be competent to perform her duties?'

"'Oh no, Socrates; not until I had first offered sacrifice and prayed that I might really teach, and she learn what was best for us both.'

"'Did not your wife join with you in these same sacrifices and prayers? '

"'Oh yes, earnestly promising before heaven to behave as she ought to do; and it was easy to see that she would not neglect the lessons I taught her.'

"'Pray tell me, Ischomachus, what was the first lesson you taught her, since I would sooner hear this from your lips than an account of the noblest athletic event or horse-race?'

"'Well, Socrates, as soon as I found her docile and sufficiently domesticated to carry on conversation, I questioned her to this effect:

""Tell me, dear, have you realized for what reason I took you and your parents gave you to me? For it is obvious to you, I am sure, that we should have had no difficulty in finding someone else to share our beds. But I for myself and your parents for you considered who was the best partner of home and children that we could get. My choice fell on you, and your parents, it appears, chose me as the best they could find. Now if God grants us children, we will then think out how we shall best train them. For one of the blessings in which we shall share is the acquisition of the very best of allies and the very best of support in old age; but at present we share in this our home. For I am paying into the common stock all that I have, and you have put in all that you brought

with you. And we are not to reckon up which of us has actually contributed the greater amount, but we should know of a surety that the one who proves the better partner makes the more valuable contribution."

"'My wife's answer was as follows, Socrates: "How can I possibly help you? What power have I? Nay, all depends on you. My duty, as my mother told me, is to be discreet."

""Yes, of course, dear," I said, "my father said the same to me. But discretion both in a man and a woman, means acting in such a manner that their possessions shall be in the best condition possible, and that as much as possible shall be added to them by fair and honorable means."

""And what do you see that I can possibly do to help in the improvement of our property?" asked my wife.

" "Why," said I, "of course you must try to do as well as possible what the gods made you capable of doing and the law sanctions."

""And pray, what is that?" said she.

""Things of no small moment, I fancy," replied I, "unless, indeed, the tasks over which the queen bee in the hive presides are of small moment.

For it seems to me, dear, that the gods with great discernment have coupled together male and female, as they are called, chiefly in order that they may form a perfect partnership in mutual service. For, in the first place, that the various species of living creatures may not fail, they are joined in wedlock for the production of children. Secondly, offspring to support them in old age is provided by this union, to human beings, at any rate. Thirdly, human beings live not in the open air, like beasts, but obviously need shelter. Nevertheless, those who mean to win store to fill the covered place, have need of someone to work at the open-air occupations; since ploughing, sowing, planting and grazing

are all such open-air employments; and these supply the needful food. Then again, as soon as this is stored in the covered place, then there is need of someone to keep it and to work at the things that must be done under cover. Cover is needed for the nursing of the infants; cover is needed for the making of the corn into bread, and likewise for the manufacture of clothes from the wool. And since both the indoor and the out door tasks demand labor and attention, God from the first adapted the woman's nature, I think, to the indoor and man's to the outdoor tasks and cares.

" "'For he made the man's body and mind more capable of enduring cold and heat, and journeys and campaigns; and therefore imposed on him the outdoor tasks. To the woman, since he has made her body less capable of such endurance, I take it that God has assigned the indoor tasks. And knowing that he had created in the woman and had imposed on her the nourishment of the infants, he meted out to her a larger portion of affection for new-born babes than to the man. And since he imposed on the woman the protection of the stores also, knowing that for protection a fearful disposition is no disadvantage, God meted out a larger share of fear to the woman than to the man; and knowing that he who deals with the outdoor tasks will have to be their defender against any wrong-doer, he meted out to him again a larger share of courage. But because both must give and take, he granted to both impartially memory and attention; and so you could not distinguish whether the male or the female sex has the larger share of these. And God also gave to both impartially the power to practice due self-control, and gave authority to whichever is the better—whether it be the man or the woman—to win a larger portion of the good that comes from it. And just because both have not the same aptitudes, they have the more need of each other, and each

member of the pair is the more useful to the other, the one being competent where the other is deficient.

“ “‘Now since we know, dear, what duties have been assigned to each of us by God, we must endeavor, each of us, to do the duties allotted to us as well as possible. The law, moreover, approves of them, for it joins together man and woman. And as God has made them partners in their children, so the law appoints them partners in the home. And besides, the law declares those tasks to be honorable for each of them wherein God has made the one to excel the other. Thus, to the woman it is more honorable to stay indoors than to abide in the fields, but to the man it is unseemly rather to stay indoors than to attend to the work outside. If a man acts contrary to the nature God has given him, possibly his defiance is detected by the gods and he is punished for neglecting his own work, or meddling with his wife’s. I think that the queen bee is busy about just such other tasks appointed by God.”

““And pray.” said she, “how do the queen bee’s tasks resemble those that I have to do?”

““How? she stays in the hive,” I answered, “and does not suffer the bees to be idle; but those whose duty it is to work outside she sends forth to their work; and whatever each of them brings in, she knows and receives it, and keeps it till it is wanted. And when the time is come to use it, she portions out the just share to each. She likewise presides over the weaving of the combs in the hive, that they may be well and quickly woven, and cares for the brood of little ones, that it be duly reared up. And when the young bees have been duly reared and are fit for work, she sends them forth to found a colony, with a leader to guide the young adventurers.”

““Then shall I too have to do these things?” said my wife.

“Indeed you will,” said I: “your duty will be to remain indoors and send out those servants whose work is outside, and superintend those who are to work indoors, and to receive the incomings, and distribute so much of them as must be spent, and watch over so much as is to be kept in store, and take care that the sum laid by for a year be not spent in a month. And when wool is brought to you, you must see that cloaks are made for those that want them. You must see too that the dry corn is in good condition for making food. One of the duties that fall to you, however, will perhaps seem rather thankless: you will have to see that any servant who is ill is cared for.”

“Oh no,” cried my wife, “it will be delightful, assuming that those who are well cared for are going to feel grateful and be more loyal than before.”

““‘Why, my dear,” cried I, delighted with her answer, “what makes the bees so devoted to their leader in the hive, that when she forsakes it, they all follow her, and not one thinks of staying behind? Is it not the result of some such thoughtful acts on her part?”

“It would surprise me,” answered my wife, “if the leader’s activities did not concern you more than me. For my care of the goods indoors and my management would look rather ridiculous, I fancy, if you did not see that something is gathered in from outside.”

““‘And my ingathering would look ridiculous,” I countered, “if there were not someone to keep what is gathered in. Don’t you see how they who ‘draw water in a leaky jar,’ as the saying goes, are pitied, because they seem to labor in vain?”

““Of course,” she said, “for they are indeed in a miserable plight if they do that.”

““But I assure you, dear, there are other duties peculiar to you that are pleasant to perform. It is delightful to teach

spinning to a maid who had no knowledge of it when you received her, and to double her worth to you: to take in hand a girl who is ignorant of housekeeping and service, and after teaching her and making her trustworthy and serviceable to find her worth any amount: to have the power of rewarding the discreet and useful members of your household, and of punishing anyone who turns out to be a rogue. But the pleasantest experience of all is to prove yourself better than I am, to make me your servant; and, so far from having cause to fear that as you grow older you may be less honored in the household, to feel confident that with advancing years, the better partner you prove to me and the better housewife to our children, the greater will be the honor paid to you in our home. For it is not through outward comeliness that the sum of things good and beautiful is increased in the world, but by the daily practice of the virtues."

"'Such was the tenor of my earliest talks with her, Socrates, so far as I can recall them.'"

VIII. "'And did you find, Ischomachus, that they acted as a stimulus to her diligence?' I asked.

"'Yes, indeed,' answered Ischomachus, 'and I recollect that she was vexed and blushed crimson, because she could not give me something from the stores when I asked for it. And seeing that she was annoyed, I said: "Don't worry, dear, because you cannot give me what I am asking for. For not to be able to use a thing when you want it is poverty unquestionably; but failure to get the thing that you seek is less grievous than not to seek it at all because you know that it does not exist. The fact is, you are not to blame for this, but I, because I handed over the things to you without giving directions where they were to be put, so that you might know where to put them and where to find them. My dear, there is nothing so convenient or so good for human beings as order. Thus, a chorus is a combination of human beings; but when

the members of it do as they choose, it becomes mere confusion, and there is no pleasure in watching it; but when they act and chant in an orderly fashion, then those same men at once seem worth seeing and worth hearing. Again, my dear, an army in disorder is a confused mass, an easy prey to enemies, a disgusting sight to friends and utterly useless,—donkey, trooper, carrier, light-armed, horseman, chariot, huddled together. For how are they to march in such a plight, when they hamper one another, some walking while others run, some running while others halt, chariot colliding with horseman, donkey with chariot, carrier with trooper? If there is fighting to be done, how can they fight in such a state? For the units that must needs run away when attacked are enough to trample underfoot the heavy infantry. But an army in orderly array is a noble sight to friends, and an unwelcome spectacle to the enemy. What friend would not rejoice as he watches a strong body of troopers marching in order, would not admire cavalry riding in squadrons? And what enemy would not fear troopers, horsemen, light-armed, archers, slingers disposed in serried ranks and following their officers in orderly fashion? Nay, even on the march where order is kept, though they number tens of thousands, all move steadily forward as one man; for the line behind is continually filling up the gap. Or, again, why is a man-of-war laden with men terrible to an enemy and a goodly sight to friends, if not for its speed? Why do the men on board not hamper one another?

Is it not just because they are seated in order, swing forward and backward in order, embark and disembark in order? If I want a type of disorder, I think of a farmer who has stored barley, wheat and pulse in one bin; and then when he wants a bannock or a loaf or a pudding, must pick out the grain instead of finding it separate and ready for use.

““And so, my dear, if you do not want this confusion, and wish to know exactly how to manage our goods, and to find with ease whatever is wanted, and to satisfy me by giving me anything I ask for, let us choose the place that each portion should occupy; and, having put the things in their place, let us instruct the maid to take them from it and put them back again. Thus we shall know what is safe and sound and what is not; for the place itself will miss whatever is not in it, and a glance will reveal anything that wants attention, and the knowledge where each thing is will quickly bring it to hand, so that we can use it without trouble.”

“‘Once I had an opportunity of looking over the great Phoenician merchantman, Socrates, and I thought I had never seen tackle so excellently and accurately arranged. For I never saw so many bits of stuff’ packed away separately in so small a receptacle. As you know, a ship needs a great quantity of wooden and corded implements when she comes into port or puts to sea, much rigging, as it is called, when she sails, many contrivances to protect her against enemy vessels; she carries a large supply of arms for the men, and contains a set of household utensils for each mess. In addition to all this, she is laden with cargo which the skipper carries for profit. And all the things mention were contained in a chamber of little more than a hundred square cubits. And I noticed that each kind of thing was so neatly stowed away that there was no confusion, no work for a searcher, nothing out of place, no troublesome untying to cause delay when anything was wanted for immediate use. I found that the steersman’s servant, who is called the mate, knows each particular section so exactly, that he can tell even when away where everything is kept and how much there is of it, just as well as a man who knows how to spell can tell how many letters there are in Socrates and in what order they come. Now I saw this man in his spare time inspecting all

the stores that are wanted, as a matter of course, in the ship. I was surprised to see him looking over them, and asked what he was doing.

"Sir," he answered, "I am looking to see how the ship's tackle is stored, in case of accident, or whether anything is missing or mixed up with other stuff.

For when God sends a storm at sea, there's no time to search about for what you want or to serve it out if it's in a muddle. For God threatens and punishes careless fellows, and you're lucky if he merely refrains from destroying the innocent; and if he saves you when you do your work well, you have much cause to thank heaven."

"'Now after seeing the ship's tackle in such perfect order, I told my wife: "Considering that folk aboard a merchant vessel, even though it be a little one, find room for things and keep order, though tossed violently to and fro, and find what they want to get, though terror-stricken, it would be downright carelessness on our part if we, who have large storerooms in our house to keep everything separate and whose house rests on solid ground, fail to find a good and handy place for everything. Would it not be sheer stupidity on our part?

" "'How good it is to keep one's stock of utensils in order, and how easy to find a suitable place in a house to put each set in, I have already said. And what a beautiful sight is afforded by boots of all sorts and conditions ranged in rows! How beautiful it is to see cloaks of all sorts and conditions kept separate, or blankets, or brazen vessels, or table furniture! Yes, no serious man will smile when I claim that there is beauty in the order even of pots and pans set out in neat array, however much it may move the laughter of a wit. There is nothing, in short, that does not gain in beauty when set out in order. For each set looks like a troop of utensils,

and the space between the sets is beautiful to see, when each set is kept clear of it, just as a troop of dancers about the altar is a beautiful spectacle in itself, and even the free space looks beautiful and unencumbered.

""We can test the truth of what I say, dear, without any inconvenience and with very little trouble. Moreover, my dear, there is no ground for any misgiving that it is hard to find someone who will get to know the various places and remember to put each set in its proper place. For we know, I take it, that the city as a whole has ten thousand times as much of everything as we have; and yet you may order any sort of servant to buy something in the market and to bring it home, and he will be at no loss: every one of them is bound to know where he should go to get each article. Now the only reason for this is that everything is kept in a fixed place. But when you are searching for a person, you often fail to find him, though he may be searching for you himself. And for this again the one reason is that no place of meeting has been fixed."

"'Such is the gist of the conversation I think I remember having with her about the arrangement of utensils and their use.'"

IX. "'And what was the result?' I asked; 'did you think, Ischomachus, that your wife paid any heed to the lessons you tried so earnestly to teach her?'

"'Why, she promised to attend to them, and was evidently pleased beyond measure to feel that she had found a solution of her difficulties, and she begged me to lose no time in arranging things as I had suggested.'

"'And how did you arrange things for her, Ischornachus?' I asked.

"'Why, I decided first to show her the possibilities of our house. For it contains few elaborate decorations, Socrates;

but the rooms are designed simply with the object of providing as convenient receptacles as possible for the things that are to fill them, and thus each room invited just what was suited to it. Thus the store-room by the security of its position called for the most valuable blankets and utensils, the dry covered rooms for the corn, the cool for the wine, the well-lit for those works of art and vessels that need light. I showed her decorated living-rooms for the family that are cool in summer and warm in winter.1 I showed her that the whole house fronts south, so that it was obvious that it is sunny in winter and shady in summer. I showed her the women's quarters too, separated by a bolted door from the men's, so that nothing which ought not to be moved may be taken out, and that the servants may not breed without our leave. For honest servants generally prove more loyal if they have a family; but rogues, if they live in wedlock, become all the more prone to mischief.

"'And now that we had completed the list, we forthwith set about separating the furniture tribe by tribe. We began by collecting together the vessels we use in sacrificing. After that we put together the women's holiday finery, and the men's holiday and war garb, blankets in the women's, blankets in the men's quarters, women's shoes, men's shoes. Another tribe consisted of arms, and three others of implements for spinning, for bread-making and for cooking; others, again, of the things required for washing, at the kneading-trough, and for table use. All these we divided into two sets, things in constant use and things reserved for festivities. We also put by themselves the things consumed month by month, and set apart the supplies calculated to last for a year. For this plan makes it easier to tell how they will last to the end of the time. When we had divided all the portable property tribe by tribe, we arranged everything in its proper place. After that we showed the servants who have

to use them where to keep the utensils they require daily, for baking, cooking, spinning and so forth; handed them over to their care and charged them to see that they were safe and sound. The things that we use only for festivals or entertainments, or on rare occasions, we handed over to the housekeeper, and after showing her their places and counting and making a written list of all the items, we told her to give them out to the right servants, to remember what she gave to each of them, and when receiving them back to put everything in the place from which she took it.

In appointing the housekeeper, we chose the woman whom on consideration we judged to be the most temperate in eating and wine drinking and sleeping and the most modest with men, the one, too, who seemed to have the best memory, to be most careful not to offend us by neglecting her duties, and to think most how she could earn some reward by obliging us. We also taught her to be loyal to us by making her a partner in all our joys and calling on her to share our troubles. Moreover, we trained her to be eager for the improvement of our estate, by making her familiar with it and by allowing her to share in our success. And further, we put justice into her, by giving more honor to the just than to the unjust, and by showing her that the just live in greater wealth and freedom than the unjust; and we placed her in that position of superiority.

"'When all this was done, Socrates, I told my wife that all these measures were futile, unless she saw to it herself that our arrangement was strictly adhered to in every detail. I explained that in well-ordered cities the citizens are not satisfied with passing good laws: they go further, and choose guardians of the laws, who act as overseers, commending the law-abiding and punishing law-breakers.

So I charged my wife to consider herself guardian of the laws to our household. And just as the commander of a

garrison inspects his guards, so must she inspect the chattels whenever she thought it well to do so; as the Council scrutinizes the cavalry and the horses, so she was to make sure that everything was in good condition: like a queen, she must reward the worthy with praise and honor, so far as in her lay, and not spare rebuke and punishment when they were called for.

"'Moreover, I taught her that she should not be vexed that I assigned heavier duties to her than to the servants in respect of our possessions. Servants, I pointed out, carry, tend and guard their master's property, and only in this sense have a share in it; they have no right to use anything except by the owner's leave; but everything belongs to the master, to use it as he will. Therefore, I explained, he who gains most by the preservation of the goods and loses most by their destruction, is the one who is bound to take most care of them.'

"'Well, now, Ischomachus,' said I, 'was your wife inclined to pay heed to your words?'

"'Why, Socrates,' he cried, 'she just told me that I was mistaken if I supposed that I was laying a hard task on her in telling her that she must take care of our things. It would have been harder, she said, had I required her to neglect her own possessions, than to have the duty of attending to her own peculiar blessings. The fact is,' he added, 'just as it naturally comes easier to a good woman to care for her own children than to neglect them, so, I imagine, a good woman finds it pleasanter to look after her own possessions than to neglect them.'"

X. "Now when I heard that his wife had given him this answer, I exclaimed; 'Upon my word, Ischomachus, your wife has a truly masculine mind by your showing!'

“‘Yes,’ said Ischomachus, ‘and I am prepared to give you other examples of high-mindedness on her part, when a word from me was enough to secure her instant obedience.’

“‘Tell me what they are,’ I cried; ‘for if Zeuxis showed me a fair woman’s portrait painted by his own hand, it would not give me half the pleasure I derive from the contemplation of a living woman’s virtues.’

“Thereupon Ischomachus took up his parable. ‘Well, one day, Socrates, I noticed that her face was made up: she had rubbed in white lead in order to look even whiter than she is, and alkanet juice to heighten the rosy color of her cheeks; and she was wearing boots with thick soles to increase her height. So I said to her, “Tell me, my dear, how should I appear more worthy of your love as a partner in our goods, by disclosing to you our belongings just as they are, without boasting of imaginary possessions or concealing any part of what we have, or by trying to trick you with an exaggerated account, showing you bad money and gilt necklaces and describing clothes that will fade as real purple?”

“““Hush!” she broke in immediately, “pray don’t be like that—I could not love you with all my heart if you were like that!”

“““Then, are we not joined together by another bond of union, dear, to be partners in our bodies?”

“““The world says so, at any rate.”

“““How then should I seem more worthy of your love in this partnership of the body—by striving to have my body hale and strong when I present it to you, and so literally to be of a good countenance in your sight, or by smearing my cheeks with red lead and painting myself under the eyes with rouge before I show myself to you and clasp you in my arms, cheating you and offering to your eyes and hands red lead instead of my real flesh?”

“““Oh,” she cried, “I would sooner touch you than red lead, would sooner see your own color than rouge, would sooner see your eyes bright than smeared with grease.”

“““Then please assume, my dear, that I do not prefer white paint and dye of alkanet to your real color; but just as the gods have made horses to delight in horses, cattle in cattle, sheep in sheep, so human beings find the human body undisguised most delightful. Tricks like these may serve to gull outsiders, but people who live together are bound to be found out, if they try to deceive one another. For they are found out while they are dressing in the morning; they perspire and are lost; a tear convicts them; the bath reveals them as they are!

“‘And; pray, what did she say to that?’ I asked.

Nothing,’ he said, ‘only she gave up such practices from that day forward, and tried to let me see her undisguised and as she should be. Still, she did ask whether I could advise her on one point: how she might make herself really beautiful, instead of merely seeming to be so. And this was my advice, Socrates: “Don’t sit about for ever like a slave, but try, God helping you, to behave as a mistress: stand before the loom and be ready to instruct those who know less than you, and to learn from those who know more: look after the baking-maid: stand by the housekeeper when she is serving out stores: go round and see whether everything is in its place.” For I thought that would give her a walk as well as occupation. I also said it was excellent exercise to mix flour and knead dough; and to shake and fold cloaks and bedclothes; such exercise would give her a better appetite, improve her health, and add natural color to her cheeks. Besides, when a wife’s looks outshine a maid’s, and she is fresher and more becomingly dressed, they’re a ravishing sight, especially when the wife is also willing to oblige, whereas the girl’s services are compulsory. But wives

who sit about like fine ladies, expose themselves to comparison with painted and fraudulent hussies. And now, Socrates, you may be sure, my wife's dress and appearance are in accord with my instructions and with my present description.'"

XI. "At this point I said, 'Ischomachus, I think your account of your wife's occupations is sufficient for the present—and very creditable it is to both of you. But now tell me of your own: thus you will have the satisfaction of stating the reasons why you are so highly respected, and I shall be much beholden to you for a complete account of a gentleman's occupations, and if my understanding serves, for a thorough knowledge of them.'

"'Well then, Socrates,' answered Ischomachus, 'it will be a very great pleasure to me to give you an account of my daily occupations, that you may correct me if you think there is anything amiss in my conduct.'

"'As to that,' said I, 'how could I presume to correct a perfect gentleman, I who am supposed to be a mere chatterer with my head in the air, I who am called—the most senseless of all taunts—a poor beggar? I do assure you, Ischomachus, this last imputation would have driven me to despair, were it not that a day or two ago I came upon the horse of Nicias the foreigner. I saw a crowd walking behind the creature and staring, and heard some of them talking volubly about him. Well, I went up to the groom and asked him if the horse had many possessions. The man looked at me as if I must be mad to ask such a question, and asked me how a horse could own property. At that I recovered, for his answer showed that it is possible even for a poor horse to be a good one, if nature has given him a good spirit. Assume, therefore, that it is possible for me to be a good man, and give me a complete account of your occupations, that, so far as my understanding allows me, I may endeavor to follow your

example from to-morrow morning; for that's a good day for entering on a course of virtue.'

You're joking, Socrates,' said Ischomachus; 'nevertheless I will tell you what principles I try my best to follow consistently in life. For I seem to realize that, while the gods have made it impossible for men to prosper without knowing and attending to the things they ought to do, to some of the wise and careful they grant prosperity, and to some deny it; and therefore I begin by worshipping the gods, and try to conduct myself in such a way that I may have health and strength in answer to my prayers, the respect of my fellow-citizens, the affection of my friends, safety with honor in war, and wealth increased by honest means.'

"'What, Ischomachus,' I asked on hearing that, 'do you really want to be rich and to have much, along with much trouble to take care of it?'

"'The answer to your questions,' said he, 'is, Yes, I do indeed. For I would fain honor the gods without counting the cost, Socrates, help friends in need, and look to it that the city lacks no adornment that my means can supply.'

"'Truly noble aspirations, Ischomachus,' I cried, 'and worthy of a man of means, no doubt! Seeing that there are many who cannot live without help from others, and many are content if they can get enough for their own needs, surely those who can maintain their own estate and yet have enough left to adorn the city and relieve their friends may well be thought high and mighty men. However,' I added, 'praise of such men is a commonplace among us. Please return to your first statement, Ischomachus, and tell me how you take care of your health and your strength, how you make it possible to come through war with safety and honor. I shall be content to hear about your money-making afterwards.'

"'Well, Socrates,' replied Ischomachus, 'all these things hang together, so far as I can see. For if a man has plenty to eat, and works off the effects properly, take it that he both insures his health and adds to his strength. By training himself in the arts of war he is more qualified to save himself honorably, and by due diligence and avoidance of loose habits, he is more likely to increase his estate.'

"'So far, Ischomachus, I follow you,' I answered. 'You mean that by working after meals, by diligence and by training, a man is more apt to obtain the good things of life. But now I should like you to give me details. By what kind of work do you endeavor to keep your health and strength? How do you train yourself in the arts of war? What diligence do you use to have a surplus from which to help friends and strengthen the city?'

"'Well now, Socrates,' replied Ischomachus, 'I rise from my bed at an hour when, if I want to call on anyone, I am sure to find him still at home. If I have any business to do in town, I make it an opportunity for getting a walk. If there is nothing pressing to be done in town, my servant leads my horse to the farm, and I make my walk by going to it on foot, with more benefit, perhaps, Socrates, than if I took a turn in the arcade. When I reach the farm, I may find planting, clearing, sowing or harvesting in progress. I superintend all the details of the work, and make any improvements in method that I can suggest. After this, I usually mount my horse and go through exercises, imitating as closely as I can the exercises needed in warfare. I avoid neither slope nor steep incline, ditch nor watercourse, but I use all possible care not to lame my horse when he takes them. After I have finished, the servant gives the horse a roll and leads him home, bringing with him from the farm anything we happen to want in the city. I divide the return home between walking and running. Arrived, I clean myself with a strigil, and then I

have luncheon, Socrates, eating just enough to get through the day neither empty-bellied nor too full.'

"'Upon my word, Ischomachus,' cried I, 'I am delighted with your activities. For you have a pack of appliances for securing health and strength, of exercises for war and specifics for getting rich, and you use them all at the same time! That does seem to me admirable! And in fact you afford convincing proofs that your method in pursuing each of these objects is sound. For we see you generally in the enjoyment of health and strength, thanks to the gods, and we know that you are considered one of our best horsemen and wealthiest citizens.'

"'And what comes of these activities, Socrates? Not, as you perhaps expected to hear, that I am generally dubbed a gentleman, but that I am persistently slandered.'

"'Ah,' said I, 'but I was meaning to ask you, Ischomachus, whether you include in your system ability to conduct a prosecution and defense, in case you have to appear in the courts?'

"'Why, Socrates,' he answered, 'do you not see that this is just what I am constantly practicing—showing my traducers that I wrong no man and do all the good I can to many? And do you not think that I practice myself in accusing, by taking careful note of certain persons who are doing wrong to many individuals and to the state, and are doing no good to anyone?'

"'But tell me one thing more, Ischomachus,' I said; 'do you also practice the art of expounding these matters?'

"'Why, Socrates,' he replied, 'I assiduously practice the art of speaking. For I get one of the servants to act as prosecutor or defendant, and try to confute him; or I praise or blame someone before his friends; or I act as peace-maker between some of my acquaintances by trying to show them that it is

to their interest to be friends rather than enemies. I assist at a court-martial and censure a soldier, or take turns in defending a man who is unjustly blamed, or in accusing one who is unjustly honored. We often sit in counsel and speak in support of the course we want to adopt and against the course we want to avoid. I have often been singled out before now, Socrates, and condemned to suffer punishment or pay damages.'

"'By whom, Ischomachus?' I asked; I am in the dark about that! '

"'By my wife,' was his answer.

"'And, pray, how do you plead?' said I.

"'Pretty well, when it is to my interest to speak the truth. But when lying is called for, Socrates, I can't make the worse cause appear the better—oh no, not at all.'

"'Perhaps, Ischomachus,' I commented, you can't make the falsehood into the truth!'

XII. "'But perhaps I am keeping you, Ischomachus,' I continued, and you want to get away now?'

"'Oh no, Socrates,' he answered; 'I should not think of going before the market empties.'

"'To be sure,' I continued; you take the utmost care not to forfeit your right to be called a gentleman! For I daresay there are many things claiming your attention now; but, as you have made an appointment with those strangers, you are determined not to break it.'

"'But I assure you, Socrates, I am not neglecting the matters you refer to, either; for I keep bailiffs on my farms.'

"'And when you want a bailiff, Ischomachus, do you look out for a man qualified for such a post, and then try to buy him—when you want a builder, I feel sure you inquire for a

qualified man and try to get him—or do you train your bailiffs yourself? ‘

“‘Of course I try to train them myself, Socrates. For the man has to be capable of taking charge in my absence; so why need he know anything but what I know myself? For if I am fit to manage the farm, I presume I can teach another man what I know myself.’

“‘Then the first requirement will be that he should be loyal to you and yours, if he is to represent you in your absence. For if a steward is not loyal, what is the good of any knowledge he may possess? ‘

“‘None, of course; but I may tell you, loyalty to me and to mine is the first lesson I try to teach.’

“‘And how, in heaven’s name, do you teach your man to be loyal to you and yours?’

“‘By rewarding him, of course, whenever the gods bestow some good thing on us in abundance.’

“‘You mean, then, that those who enjoy a share of your good things are loyal to you and want you to prosper?’

“‘Yes, Socrates, find that is the best instrument for producing loyalty.’

“‘But, now, if he is loyal to you, Ischomachus, will that be enough to make him a competent bailiff? Don’t you see that though all men, practically, wish themselves well, yet there are many who won’t take the trouble to get for themselves the good things they want to have?’

“‘Well, when I want to make bailiffs of such men, of course I teach them also to be careful.’

“‘Pray how do you do that? I was under the impression that carefulness is a virtue that can’t possibly be taught,’

“‘True, Socrates, it isn’t possible to teach everyone you come across to be careful.’

“‘Very well; what sort of men can be taught? Point these out to me, at all events.’

“‘In the first place, Socrates, you can’t make careful men of hard drinkers; for drink makes them forget everything they ought to do.’

“‘Then are drunkards the only men who will never become careful, or are there others?’

“‘Of course there are—sluggards must be included; for you can’t do your own business when you are asleep, nor make others do theirs.’

“‘Well then, will these make up the total of persons incapable of learning this lesson, or are there yet others besides? ‘

“‘I should add that in my opinion a man who falls desperately in love is incapable of giving more attention to anything than he gives to the object of his passion. For it isn’t easy to find hope or occupation more delightful than devotion to the darling! aye, and when the thing to be done presses, no harder punishment can easily be thought of than the prevention of intercourse with the beloved! Therefore I shrink from attempting to make a manager of that sort of man too.’

“‘And what about the men who have a passion for lucre? Are they also incapable of being trained to take charge of the work of a farm? ‘

“‘Not at all; of course not. In fact, they very easily qualify for the work. It is merely necessary to point out to them that diligence is profitable.’

“‘And assuming that the others are free from the faults that you condemn and are covetous of gain in a moderate degree, how do you teach them to be careful in the affairs you want them to superintend?’

"'By a very simple plan, Socrates. Whenever I notice that they are careful, I commend them and try to show them honor; but when they appear careless, I try to say and do the sort of things that will sting them.'

"'Turn now, Ischomachus, from the subject of the men in training for the occupation, and tell me about the system: is it possible for anyone to make others careful if he is careless himself?'

"'Of course not: an unmusical person could as soon teach music. For it is hard to learn to do a thing well when the teacher prompts you badly; and when a master prompts a servant to be careless, it is difficult for the man to become a good servant. To put it shortly, I don't think I have discovered a bad master with good servants: I have, however, come across a good master with bad servants—but they suffered for it! If you want to make men fit to take charge, you must supervise their work and examine it, and be ready to reward work well carried through, and not shrink from punishing carelessness as it deserves. I like the answer that is attributed to the Persian. The king, you know, had happened on a good horse, and wanted to fatten him as speedily as possible. So he asked one who was reputed clever with horses what is the quickest way of fattening a horse. "The master's eye" replied the man. I think we may apply the answer generally, Socrates, and say that the master's eye in the main does the good and worthy work.'"

XIII. "'When you have impressed on a man,' I resumed, 'the necessity of careful attention to the duties you assign to him, will he then be competent to act as bailiff, or must he learn something besides, if he is to be efficient?'

"'Of course,' answered Ischomachus, 'he has still to understand what he has to do, and when and how to do it. Otherwise how could a bailiff be of more use than a doctor

who takes care to visit a patient early and late, but has no notion of the right way to treat his illness?'

"'Well, but suppose he has learned how farm-work is to be done, will he want something more yet, or will your man now be a perfect bailiff?'

"'I think he must learn to rule the laborers.'

"'And do you train your bailiffs to be competent to rule too?'

"'Yes, I try, anyhow.'

"'And pray tell me how you train them to be rulers of men.'

"'By a childishly easy method, Socrates. I daresay you'll laugh if I tell you.'

"'Oh, but it is certainly not a laughing matter, Ischomachus. For anyone who can make men fit to rule others can also teach them to be masters of others; and if he can make them fit to be masters, he can make them fit to be kings. So anyone who can do that seems to me to deserve high praise rather than laughter.'

"'Well now, Socrates, other creatures learn obedience in two ways—by being punished when they try to disobey, and by being rewarded when they are eager to serve you. Colts, for example, learn to obey the horse-breaker by getting something they like when they are obedient, and suffering inconvenience when they are disobedient, until they carry out the horse-breaker's intentions. Puppies, again, are much inferior to men in intelligence and power of expression; and yet they learn to run in circles and turn somersaults and do many other tricks in the same way; for when they obey they get something that they want, and when they are careless, they are punished. And men can be made more obedient by word of mouth merely, by being shown that it is good for them to obey. But in dealing with slaves the training thought suitable for wild animals is also a very effective way of

teaching obedience; for you will do much with them by filling their bellies with the food they hanker after. Those of an ambitious disposition are also spurred on by praise, some natures being hungry for praise as others for meat and drink. Now these are precisely the things that I do myself with a view to making men more obedient; but they are not the only lessons I give to those whom I want to appoint my bailiffs. have other ways of helping them on. For the clothes that must provide for my workpeople and the shoes are not all alike. Some are better than others, some worse, in order that I may reward the better servant with the superior articles, and give the inferior things to the less deserving. For I think it is very disheartening to good servants, Socrates, when they see that they do all the work, and others who are not willing to work hard and run risks when need be, get the same as they. For my part, then, I don't choose to put the deserving on a level with the worthless, and when I know that my bailiffs have distributed the best things to the most deserving, I commend them; and if I see that flattery or any other futile service wins special favor, I don't overlook it, but reprove the bailiff, and try to show him, Socrates, that such favoritism is not even in his own interest.'"

XIV. "'Now, Ischomachus,' said I, 'when you find your man so competent to rule that he can make them obedient, do you think him a perfect bailiff', or does he want anything else, even with the qualifications you have mentioned?'

"'Of course, Socrates,' returned Ischomachus, 'he must be honest and not touch his master's property. For if the man who handles the crops dares to make away with them, and doesn't leave enough to give a profit on the undertaking, what good can come of farming under his management?'

"'Then do you take it on yourself to teach this kind of justice too?'

‘Certainly: I don’t find, however, that all readily pay heed to this lesson. Nevertheless I guide the servants into the path of justice with the aid of maxims drawn from the laws of Draco and Solon.

For it seems to me that these famous men enacted many of their laws with an eye on this particular kind of justice. For it is written: “thieves shall be fined for their thefts” and “anyone guilty of attempt shall be imprisoned if taken in the act, and put to death.” The object of these enactments was clearly to make covetousness unprofitable to the offender. By applying some of these clauses and other enactments found in the Persian king’s code, I try to make my servants upright in the matters that pass through their hands. For while those laws only penalize the wrongdoer, the king’s code not only punishes the guilty, but also benefits the upright. Thus, seeing that the honest grow richer than the dishonest, many, despite their love of lucre, are careful to remain free from dishonesty. And if I find any attempting to persist in dishonesty, although they are well treated, I regard them as incorrigibly greedy, and have nothing more to do with them.

On the other hand, if I discover that a man is inclined to be honest not only because he gains by his honesty, but also from a desire to win my approbation, I treat him like a free man by making him rich; and not only so, but I honor him as a gentleman. For I think, Socrates, that the difference between ambition and greed consists in this, that for the sake of praise and honor the ambitious are willing to work properly, to take risks and refrain from dishonest gain.’”

XV. Well, well, I won’t go on to ask whether anything more is wanting to your man, after you have implanted in him a desire for your prosperity and have made him also careful to see that you achieve it, and have obtained for him, besides, the knowledge needful to ensure that every piece of work done shall add to the profits, and, further, have made him

capable of ruling, and when, besides all this, he takes as much delight in producing heavy crops for you in due season as you would take if you did the work yourself. For it seems to me that a man like that would make a very valuable bailiff Nevertheless, Ischomachus, don't leave a gap in that part of the subject to which we have given the most cursory attention.'

"'Which is it?' asked Ischomachus.

"'You said, you know, that the greatest lesson to learn is how things ought to be done; and added that, if a man is ignorant what to do and how to do it, no good can come of his management.'

"Then he said, 'Socrates, are you insisting now that I should teach the whole art and mystery of agriculture? '

"'Yes,' said I; 'for maybe it is just this that makes rich men of those who understand it, and condemns the ignorant to a life of penury, for all their toil.'

"'Well, Socrates, you shall now hear how kindly a thing is this art. Helpful, pleasant, honorable, dear to gods and men in the highest degree, it is also in the highest degree easy to learn. Noble qualities surely! As you know, we call those creatures noble that are beautiful, great and helpful, and yet gentle towards men.'

"'Ah, but I think, Ischomachus, that I quite understand your account of these matters—I mean how to teach a bailiff; for I think I follow your statement that you make him loyal to you, and careful and capable of ruling and honest. But you said that one who is to be successful in the management of a farm must learn what to do and how and when to do it. That is the subject that we have treated, it seems to me, in a rather cursory fashion, as if you said that anyone who is to be capable of writing from dictation and reading what is written must know the alphabet. For had I been told that, I

should have been told, to be sure, that I must know the alphabet, but I don't think that piece of information would help me to know it. So too now; I am easily convinced that a man who is to manage a farm successfully must understand farming, but that knowledge doesn't help me to understand how to farm. Were I to decide this very moment to be a farmer, I think I should be like that doctor who goes round visiting the sick, but has no knowledge of the right way to treat them. Therefore, that I may not be like him, you must teach me the actual operations of farming.'

"'Why, Socrates, farming is not troublesome to learn, like other arts, which the pupil must study till he is worn out before he can earn his keep by his work. Some things you can understand by watching men at work, others by just being told, well enough to teach another if you wish. And I believe that you know a good deal about it yourself, without being aware of the fact. The truth is that, whereas other artists conceal more or less the most important points in their own art, the farmer who plants best is most pleased when he is being watched, so is he who sows best. Question him about any piece of work well done: and he will tell you exactly how he did it. So farming, Socrates, more than any other calling, seems to produce a generous disposition in its followers.'

"'An excellent preamble,' I cried, 'and not of a sort to damp the hearer's curiosity. Come, describe it to me, all the more because it is so simple to learn. For it is no disgrace to you to teach elementary lessons, but far more a disgrace to me not to understand them, especially if they are really useful.'"

XVI. "'First then, Socrates, I want to show you that what is called the most complicated problem in agriculture by the authors who write most accurately on the theory of the subject, but are not practical farmers, is really a simple

matter. For they tell us that to be a successful farmer one must first know the nature of the soil.'

"'Yes, and they are right,' I remarked; 'for if you don't know what the soil is capable of growing, you can't know, I suppose, what to plant or what to sow.'

"'Well then,' said Ischomachus, 'you can tell by looking at the crops and trees on another man's land what the soil can and what it cannot grow. But when you have found out, it is useless to fight against the gods. For you are not likely to get a better yield from the land by sowing and planting what you want instead of the crops and trees that the land prefers. If it happens that the land does not declare its own capabilities because the owners are lazy, you can often gather more correct information from a neighboring plot than from a neighboring proprietor. Yes, and even if the land lays waste, it reveals its nature. For if the wild stuff growing on the land is of fine quality, then by good farming the soil is capable of yielding cultivated crops of fine quality. So the nature of the soil can be ascertained even by the novice who has no experience of farming.'

Well, I think I am now confident, Ischomachus, that need not avoid farming from fear of not knowing the nature of the soil. The fact is, I am reminded that fishermen, though their business is in the sea, and they neither stop the boat to take a look nor slow down, nevertheless, when they see the crops as they scud past the farms, do not hesitate to express an opinion about the land, which is the good and which is the bad sort, now condemning, now praising it. And, what is more, I notice that in their opinion about the good land they generally agree exactly with experienced farmers.'

"'Then, Socrates, let me refresh your memory on the subject of agriculture; but where do you wish me to begin?

For I am aware that I shall tell you very much that you know already about the right method of farming.'

"'First, Ischomachus, I think I should be glad to learn, for this is the philosopher's way, how I am to cultivate the land if I want to get the heaviest crops of wheat and barley out of it.'

"'Well, you know, I take it, that fallow must be prepared for sowing?'

"'Yes, I know.'

"'Suppose, then, we start ploughing in winter?'

"'Why, the land will be a bog!'

"'How about starting in summer?'

"'The land will be hard to plough up.'

"'It seems that spring is the season for beginning this work.'

"'Yes, the land is likely to be more friable if it is broken up then.'

"'Yes, and the grass turned up is long enough at that season to serve as manure, but, not having shed seed, it will not grow. You know also, I presume, that fallow land can't be satisfactory unless it is clear of weeds and thoroughly baked in the sun? '

"'Yes, certainly; that is essential, I think.'

"'Do you think that there is any better way of securing that than by turning the land over as often as possible in summer? '

"'Nay, I know for certain that if you want the weeds to lie on the surface and wither in the heat, and the land to be baked by the sun, the surest way is to plough it up at midday in midsummer.'

"'And if men prepare the fallow by digging, is it not obvious that they too must separate the weeds from the soil?'

"'Yes, and they must throw the weeds on the surface to wither, and turn up the ground so that the lower spit1 may be baked.'"

XVII. "'You see, then, Socrates, that we agree about the fallow.'

"'It does seem so, to be sure.'

"'And now as to the time for sowing, Socrates. Is it not your opinion that the time to sow is that which has been invariably found to be the best by past experience, and is universally approved by present practice? For as soon as autumn ends, all men, I suppose, look anxiously to God, to see when he will send rain on the earth and make them free to sow.'

"'Yes, Ischomachus, all men have made up their minds, of course, not to sow in dry ground if they can help it, those who sowed without waiting to be bidden by God having had to wrestle with many losses.'

"'So far, then,' said Ischomachus, 'all the world is of one mind.'

"'Yes,' said I, 'where God is our teacher we all come to think alike. For example, all agree that it is better to wear warm clothes in winter, if they can, and all agree on the desirability of having a fire, if they have wood.'

"'But,' said Ischomachus, 'when we come to the question whether sowing is best done early or very late or at the mid-season, we find much difference of opinion, Socrates.'

"'And God,' said I, ' does not regulate the year by fixed laws; but in one year it may be advantageous to sow early, in another very late, in another at mid-season.'

"'Then do you think, Socrates, that it is better to select one of these times for sowing, whether you sow much or little, or to begin at the earliest moment and continue sowing to the latest?'

“‘For my part, Ischomachus, I think it is best to sow for succession throughout the season. For in my opinion it is much better to get enough food at all times than too much at one time and not enough at another.’

“‘Here again, then, Socrates, pupil and teacher are of one opinion; and, moreover, you, the pupil, are first in stating this opinion.’

“‘Well now, is casting the seed a complicated problem?’

“‘By all means let us take that also into consideration, Socrates. I presume that you know as well as I that the seed must be cast by the hand?’

“‘Yes, I have seen it.’

“‘Ah,’ he said, ‘but some men can cast evenly, and some cannot.’

“‘Then sowers no less than lyre-players need practice, that the hand may be the servant of the will.’

“‘Certainly. But suppose that some of the land is rather light and some rather heavy? ‘

“‘What do you mean by that? ‘ I interrupted.

‘ By “light” do you mean “weak,” and by “heavy,” “strong”?’

“‘Yes, I do; and I ask you whether you would give the same quantity of seed to both kinds, or to which you would give more? ‘

“‘Well, my principle is this: the stronger the wine, the more water I add; the stronger the bearer, the heavier the burden put on his back; and if it is necessary to feed others, I should require the richest men to feed the greatest number. But tell me whether weak land, like draught animals, becomes stronger when you put more corn into it.’

“‘Ah, you’re joking, Socrates,’ he said, laughing, ‘but allow me to tell you that, if after putting in the seed you plough it in again as soon as the blade appears when the land is

obtaining plenty of nourishment from the sky, it makes food for the soil, and strengthens it like manure. If, on the other hand, you let the seed go on growing on the land until it is boiled, it's hard for weak land to yield much grain in the end. It's hard, you know, for a weak sow to rear a big litter of fine pigs.'

"'Do you mean, Ischomachus, that the weaker the soil the less seed should be put into it? '

"'Yes, of course, Socrates; and you agree when you say that your invariable custom is to make the burden light that is to be borne by the weak.'

"'But the hoers, now, Ischomachus, why do you put them on the corn?'

"'I presume you know that in winter there is a heavy rainfall?'

"'Of course.'

"'Let us assume, then, that part of the corn is waterlogged and covered with mud, and some of the roots are exposed by flooding. And it often happens, you know, that in consequence of rain weeds spring up among the corn and choke it.'

"'All these things are likely to happen.'

"'Then don't you think that in such circumstances the corn needs prompt succor?'

"'Certainly.'

"'What should be done, do you think, to succor the part that is under the mud? '

"'The soil should be lifted.'

"'And the part that has its roots exposed? '

"'It should be earthed up.'

“‘What if weeds are springing up, choking the corn and robbing it of its food, much as useless drones rob bees of the food they have laid in store by their industry?’

“‘The weeds must be cut, of course, just as the drones must be removed from the hive.’

“‘Don’t you think, then, that we have good reason for putting on men to hoe?’

“‘No doubt; but I am reflecting, Ischomachus, on the advantage of bringing in an apt simile. For you roused my wrath against the weeds by mentioning the drones, much more than when you spoke of mere weeds.’”

XVIII. “‘However,’ I continued, ‘after this comes reaping, I fancy. So give me any information you can with regard to that too.’

“‘Yes—unless I find that you know just what I do about that subject too. You know, then, that the corn must be cut.’

“‘I know that, naturally.’

“‘Are you for standing with your back to the wind when you cut corn, or facing it?’

“‘Not facing it, no! I think it is irritating both to the eyes and to the hands to reap with cornstalks and spikes blowing in your face.’

“‘And would you cut near the top or close to the ground? ‘

“‘If the stalk is short, I should cut low down, so that the straw may be more useful; but if it is long, I think it would be right to cut in the middle, in order that the threshers and winnowers may not spend needless trouble on what they don’t want. I imagine that the stubble may be burnt with advantage to the land, or thrown on the manure heap to increase its bulk.’

“‘Do you notice, Socrates, that you stand convicted of knowing just what I know about reaping too?’

“‘Yes, it seems so; and I want to know besides whether I understand threshing as well.’

“‘Then you know this much, that draught animals are used in threshing?’

“‘Yes, of course I do; and that the term draught animals includes oxen, mules and horses.’

“‘Then do you not think that all the beasts know is how to trample on the corn as they are driven?’

“‘Why, what more should draught animals know?’

“‘And who sees that they tread out the right corn, and that the threshing is level, Socrates?’

“‘The threshers, clearly. By continually turning the untrodden corn and throwing it under the animal’s feet they will, of course, keep it level on the floor and take least time over the work.’

“‘So far, then, your knowledge is quite as good as mine.’

“‘Will not our next task be to clean the corn by winnowing, Ischomachus?’

“‘Yes, Socrates; and tell me, do you know that if you start on the windward side of the floor, you will find the husks carried right across the floor? ‘

“‘It must be so.’

“‘Is it not likely, then, that some will fall on the grain? ‘

“‘Yes, it is a long way for the husks to be blown, right over the grain to the empty part of the floor.’

“‘But what if you start winnowing against the wind? ‘

“‘Clearly the chaff will at once fall in the right place.’

“‘And as soon as you have cleaned the corn over one half of the floor, will you at once go on throwing up the rest of the

chaff while the corn lies about just as it is, or will you first sweep the clean corn towards the edge, so as to occupy the smallest space?'

"'Of course I shall first sweep the clean corn up, so that my chaff may be carried across into the empty space, and I may not have to throw up the same chaff twice.'

"'Well, Socrates, it seems you are capable of teaching the quickest way of cleaning corn.'

"'I really wasn't aware that I understood these things; and so I have been thinking for some time whether my knowledge extends to smelting gold, playing the flute, and painting pictures. For I have never been taught these things any more than I have been taught farming; but I have watched men working at these arts, just as I have watched them farming,'

"'And didn't I tell you just now that farming is the noblest art for this among other reasons, because it is the easiest to learn?'

"'Enough, Ischomachus; I know. understood about sowing, it seems, but I wasn't aware that I understood.'"

XIX. However, is the planting of fruit trees another branch of agriculture? 'I continued.

"'It is, indeed,' answered Ischomachus.

"'Then how can I understand all about sowing, and yet know nothing of planting?'

"'What, don't you understand it?'

"'How can I, when I don't know what kind of soil to plant in, nor how deep a hole to dig, nor how broad, nor how much of the plant should be buried, nor how it must be set in the ground to grow best? '

"'Come then, learn whatever you don't know. I am sure you have seen the sort of trenches they dig for plants.'

"'Yes, often enough.'

“‘Did you ever see one more than three feet deep?’

“‘No, of course not—nor more than two and a half.’

“‘Well, did you ever see one more than three feet broad?’

“‘Of course not, nor more than two feet.’

“‘Come then, answer this question too. Did you ever see one less than a foot deep?’

“‘Never less than a foot and a half, of course. For the plants would come out of the ground when it is stirred about them if they were put in so much too shallow.’

“‘Then you know this well enough, Socrates, that the trenches are never more than two and a half feet deep, nor less than a foot and a half.’

“‘A thing so obvious as that can’t escape one’s eyes.’

“‘Again, can you distinguish between dry and wet ground by using your eyes?’

“‘Oh, I should think that the land round Lycabettus and any like it is an example of dry ground, and the low-lying land at Phalerum and any like it of wet.’

“‘In which then would you dig the hole deep for your plant, in the dry or the wet ground? ‘

“‘In the dry, of course; because if you dug deep in the wet, you would come on water, and water would stop your planting.’

“‘I think you are quite right. Now suppose the holes are dug; have you ever noticed how the plants for each kind of soil should be put in? ‘

“‘Oh, yes.’

“‘Then assuming that you want them to grow as quickly as possible, do you think that if you put some prepared soil under them the cuttings will strike sooner through soft earth into the hard stuff, or through unbroken ground?’

“‘Clearly, they will form roots more quickly in prepared soil than in unbroken ground.’

“‘Then soil must be placed below the plant?’

“‘No doubt it must.’

“‘And if you set the whole cutting upright, pointing to the sky, do you think it would take root better, or would you lay part of it slanting under the soil that has been put below, so that it lies like a gamma upside down? ‘

“‘Of course I would; for then there would be more buds underground; and I notice that plants shoot from the buds above ground, so I suppose that the buds under the ground do just the same; and with many shoots forming underground, the plant will make strong and rapid growth, I suppose.’

“‘Then it turns out that on these points too your opinion agrees with mine. But would you merely heap up the earth, or make it firm round the plant?’

“‘I should make it firm, of course; for if it were not firm, I feel sure that the rain would make mud of the loose earth, and the sun would dry it up from top to bottom; so the plants would run the risk of damping off through too much water, or withering from too much heat at the roots.’

“‘About vine planting then, Socrates, your views are again exactly the same as mine.’

“‘Does this method of planting apply to the fig too? ‘ I asked.

“‘Yes, and to all other fruit trees, I think; for in planting other trees why discard anything that gives good results with the vine?’

“‘But the olive—how shall we plant that, Ischomachus?’

“‘You know quite well, and are only trying to draw’ me out again. For I am sure you see that a deeper hole is dug for the

olive (it is constantly being done on the roadside); you see also that all the growing shoots have stumps adhering to them; and you see that all the heads of the plants are coated with clay, and the part of the plant that is above ground is wrapped up.'

"'Yes, I see all this.'

"'You do! Then what is there in it that you don't understand? Is it that you don't know how to put the crocks on the top of the clay, Socrates? '

"'Of course there is nothing in what you have said that I don't know, Ischomachus. But I am again set thinking what can have made me answer 'No' to the question you put to me a while ago, when you asked me briefly, Did I understand planting? For I thought I should have nothing to say about the right method of planting. But now that you have undertaken to question me in particular, my answers, you tell me, agree exactly with the views of a farmer so famous for his skill as yourself! Can it be that questioning is a kind of teaching, Ischomachus? The fact is, I have just discovered the plan of your series of questions! You lead me by paths of knowledge familiar to me, point out things like what I know, and bring me to think that I really know things that I thought I had no knowledge of,'

"'Now suppose I questioned you about money,' said Ischomachus, f whether it is good or bad, could I persuade you that you know how to distinguish good from false by test? And by putting questions about flute-players could convince you that you understand flute-playing; and by means of questions about painters and other artists—'

"'You might, since you have convinced me that understand agriculture, though I know that I have never been taught this art.'

"'No, it isn't so, Socrates. I told you a while ago that agriculture is such a humane, gentle art that you have but to see her and listen to her, and she at once makes you understand her. She herself gives you many lessons in the best way of treating her. For instance, the vine climbs the nearest tree, and so teaches you that she wants support. And when her clusters are yet tender, she spreads her leaves about them, and teaches you to shade the exposed parts from the sun's rays during that period. But when it is now time for her grapes to be sweetened by the sun, she sheds her leaves, teaching you to strip her and ripen her fruit. And thanks to her teeming fertility, she shows some mellow clusters while she carries others yet sour, so saying to you: Pluck my grapes as men pluck figs,—choose the luscious ones as they come.'"

XX. "And now I asked, How is it then, Ischomachus, if the operations of husbandry are so easy to learn and all alike know what must needs be done, that all have not the same fortune? How is it that some farmers live in abundance and have more than they want, while others cannot get the bare necessaries of life, and even run into debt?'

"'Oh, I will tell you, Socrates. It is not knowledge nor want of knowledge on the part of farmers that causes one to thrive while another is needy. You won't hear a story like this running about: The estate has gone to ruin because the sower sowed unevenly, or because he didn't plant the rows straight, or because someone, not knowing the right soil for vines, planted them in barren ground, or because someone didn't know that it is well to prepare the fallow for sowing, or because someone didn't know that it is well to manure the land. No, you are much more likely to hear it said: The man gets no corn from his field because he takes no trouble to see that it is sown or manure. Or, The man has got no wine, for he takes no trouble to plant vines or to make his old stock

bear. Or, The man has neither olives nor figs, because he doesn't take the trouble; he does nothing to get them. It is not the farmers reputed to have made some clever discovery in agriculture who differ in fortune from others: it is things of this sort that make all the difference, Socrates. This is true of generals also: there are some branches of strategy in which one is better or worse than another, not because he differs in intelligence, but in point of carefulness, undoubtedly. For the things that all generals know, and most privates, are done by some commanders and left undone by others. For example, they all know that when marching through an enemy's country, the right w*ay is to march in the formation in which they will fight best, if need be. Well, knowing this, some observe the rule, others break it. All know that it is right to post sentries by day and night before the camp; but this too is a duty that some attend to, while others neglect it. Again, where will you find the man who does not know that, in marching through a defile, it is better to occupy the points of vantage first? Yet this measure of precaution too is duly taken by some and neglected by others. So, too, every one will say that in agriculture there is nothing so good as manure, and their eyes tell them that nature produces it. All know exactly how it is produced, and it is easy to get any amount of it; and yet, while some take care to have it collected, others care nothing about it. Yet the rain is sent from heaven, and all the hollows become pools of water, and the earth yields herbage of every kind which must be cleared off the ground by the sower before sowing; and the rubbish he removes has but to be thrown into water, and time of itself will make what the soil likes. For every kind of vegetation, every kind of soil in stagnant water turns into manure.

"'And again, all the ways of treating the soil when it is too wet for sowing or too salt for planting are familiar to all

men—how the land is drained by ditches, how the salt is corrected by being mixed with saltless substances, liquid or dry. Yet these matters, again, do not always receive attention. Suppose a man to be wholly ignorant as to what the land can produce, and to be unable to see crop or tree on it, or to hear from anyone the truth about it, yet is it not far easier for any man to prove a parcel of land than to test a horse or to test a human being? For the land never plays tricks, but reveals frankly and truthfully what she can and what she cannot do. I think that just because she conceals nothing from our knowledge and understanding, the land is the surest tester of good and bad men. For the slothful cannot plead ignorance, as in other arts: land, as all men know, responds to good treatment. Husbandry is the clear accuser of the recreant soul. For no one persuades himself that man could live without bread; therefore if a man will not dig and knows no other profit-earning trade, he is clearly minded to live by stealing or robbery or begging—or he is an utter fool.

"'Farming,' he added, 'may result in profit or in loss; it makes a great difference to the result, even when many laborers are employed, whether the farmer takes care that the men are working during the working hours or is careless about it. For one man in ten by working all the time may easily make a difference, and another by knocking off before the time; and, of course, if the men are allowed to be slack all the day long, the decrease in the work done may easily amount to one half of the whole. Just as two travelers on the road, both young and in good health, will differ so much in pace that one will cover two hundred furlongs to the other's hundred, because the one does what he set out to do, by going ahead, while the other is all for ease, now resting by a fountain or in the shade, now gazing at the view, now wooing the soft breeze; so in farm work there is a vast difference in

effectiveness between the men who do the job they are put on to do and those who, instead of doing it, invent excuses for not working and are allowed to be slack.

In fact, between good work and dishonest slothfulness there is as "wide a difference as between actual work and actual idleness. Suppose the vines are being hoed to clear the ground of weeds: if the hoeing is so badly done that the weeds grow ranker and more abundant, how can you call that anything but idleness?'

"'These, then, are the evils that crush estates far more than sheer lack of knowledge. For the outgoing expenses of the estate are not a penny less; but the work done is insufficient to show a profit on the expenditure; after that there's no need to wonder if the expected surplus is converted into a loss. On the other hand, to a careful man, who works strenuously at agriculture, no business gives quicker returns than farming. My father taught me that and proved it by his own practice. For he never allowed me to buy a piece of land that was well farmed; but pressed me to buy any that was uncultivated and unplanted owing to the owner's neglect or incapacity. "Well farmed land," he would say, "costs a large sum and can't be improved;" and he held that where there is no room for improvement there is not much pleasure to be got from the land: landed estate and livestock must be continually coming on to give the fullest measure of satisfaction. Now nothing improves more than a farm that is being transformed from a wilderness into fruitful fields. I assure you, Socrates, that we have often added a hundredfold to the value of a farm. There is so much money in this idea, Socrates, and it is so easy to learn, that no sooner have you heard of it from me than you know as much as I do, and can go home and teach it to someone else, if you like. Moreover, my father did not get his knowledge of it at secondhand, nor did he discover it by much thought; but he

would say that, thanks to his love of husbandry and hard work, he had coveted a farm of this sort in order that he might have something to do, and combine profit with pleasure. For I assure you, Socrates, no Athenian, I believe, had such a strong natural love of agriculture as my father.'

"Now on hearing this I asked, 'Did your father keep all the farms that he cultivated, Ischomachus, or did he sell when he could get a good price?'

"'He sold, of course,' answered Ischomachus, 'but, you see, owing to his industrious habits, he would promptly buy another that was out of cultivation.'

"'You mean, Ischomachus, that your father really loved agriculture as intensely as merchants love corn. So deep is their love of corn that on receiving reports that it is abundant anywhere, merchants will voyage in quest of it: they will cross the Aegean, the Euxine, the Sicilian sea; and when they have got as much as possible, they carry it over the sea, and they actually stow it in the very ship in which they sail themselves. And when they want money, they don't throw the corn away anywhere at haphazard, but they carry it to the place where they hear that corn is most valued and the people prize it most highly, and deliver it to them there. Yes, your father's love of agriculture seems to be something like that.'

"'You're joking, Socrates,' rejoined Ischomachus; 'but I hold that a man has a no less genuine love of building who sells his houses as soon as they are finished and proceeds to build others.'

"'Of course; and I declare, Ischomachus, on my oath that I believe you, that all men naturally love whatever they think will bring them profit.'"

XXI. "'But I am pondering over the skill with which you have presented the whole argument in support of your

proposition, Ischomachus. For you stated that husbandry is the easiest of all arts to learn, and after hearing all that you have said, I am quite convinced that this is so.'

"'Of course it is,' cried Ischomachus; 'but I grant you, Socrates, that in respect of aptitude for command, which is common to all forms of business alike—agriculture, politics, estate-management, warfare—in that respect the intelligence shown by different classes of men varies greatly. For example, on a man-of-war, when the ship is on the high seas and the rowers must toil all day to reach port, some boatswains can say and do the right thing to sharpen the men's spirits and make them work with a will, while others are so unintelligent that it takes them more than twice the time to finish the same voyage. Here they land bathed in sweat, with mutual congratulations, boatswain and seamen. There they arrive with a dry skin; they hate their master and he hates them. Generals, too, differ from one another in this respect. For some make their men unwilling to work and to take risks, disinclined and unwilling to obey, except under compulsion, and actually proud of defying their commander: aye, and they cause them to have no sense of dishonor when something disgraceful occurs. Contrast the genius, the brave and scientific leader: let him take over the command of these same troops, or of others if you like. What effect has he on them? They are ashamed to do a disgraceful act, think it better to obey, and take a pride in obedience, working cheerfully, every man and all together, when it is necessary to work. Just as a love of work may spring up in the mind of a private soldier here and there, so a whole army under the influence of a good leader is inspired with love of work and ambition to distinguish itself under the commander's eye. Let this be the feeling of the rank and file for their commander; and I tell you, he is the strong leader, he, and not the sturdiest soldier, not the best with bow and javelin,

not the man who rides the best horse and is foremost in facing danger, not the ideal of knight or targeteer, but he who*can make his soldiers feel that they are bound to follow him through fire and in any adventure. Him you may justly call high-minded who has many followers of like mind; and with reason may he be said to march "with a strong arm" whose will many an arm is ready to serve; and truly great is he who can do great deeds by his will rather than his strength.

"'So too in private industries, the man in authority—bailiff or manager—who can make the workers keen, industrious and persevering—he is the man who gives a lift to the business and swells the surplus. But, Socrates, if the appearance of the master in the field, of the man who has the fullest power to punish the bad and reward the strenuous workmen, makes no striking impression on the men at work, I for one cannot envy him. But if at sight of him they bestir themselves, and a spirit of determination and rivalry and eagerness to excel falls on every workman, then I should say: this man has a touch of the kingly nature in him. And this, in my judgment, is the greatest thing in every operation that makes any demand on the labor of men, and therefore in agriculture. Mind you, I do not go so far as to say that this can be learnt at sight or at a single hearing. On the contrary, to acquire these powers a man needs education; he must be possessed of great natural gifts; above all, he must be a genius. For I reckon this gift is not altogether human, but divine—this power to win willing obedience: it is manifestly a gift of the gods to the true votaries of prudence. Despotic rule over unwilling subjects they give, I fancy, to those whom they judge worthy to live the life of Tantalus, of whom it is said that in hell he spends eternity, dreading a second death.'"

XENOPHON'S BANQUET

I. To my mind it is worth while to relate not only the serious acts of great and good men but also what they do in their lighter moods. I should like to narrate an experience of mine that gives me this conviction.

It was on the occasion of the horse-races at the greater Panathenaic games; Callias, Hipponicus' son, was enamored, as it happened, of the boy Autolycus, and in honor of his victory in the pancratium had brought him to see the spectacle. When the racing was over, Callias proceeded on his way to his house in the Peiraeus with Autolycus and the boy's father; Niceratus also was in his company. But on catching sight of a group comprising Socrates, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Antisthenes, and Charmides, Callias bade one of his servants escort Autolycus and the others, and himself going over to Socrates and his companions, said, "This is an opportune meeting, for I am about to give a dinner in honor of Autolycus and his father; and I think that my entertainment would present a great deal more brilliance if my dining-room were graced with the presence of men like you, whose hearts have undergone philosophy's purification, than it would with generals and cavalry commanders and office-seekers."

"You are always quizzing us," replied Socrates; "for you have yourself paid a good deal of money for wisdom to Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, and many others, while you see that we are what you might call amateurs in philosophy; and so you feel supercilious toward us."

"Yes," said Callias, "so far, I admit, I have been keeping you ignorant of my ability at profound and lengthy discourse; but now, if you will favor me with your company, I will prove to you that I am a person of some consequence."

Now at first Socrates and his companions thanked him for the invitation, as might be expected, but would not promise to attend the banquet; when it became clear, however, that he was taking their refusal very much to heart, they went with him. And so his guests arrived, some having first taken their exercise and their rub-down, others with the addition of a bath. Autolycus took a seat by his father's side; the others, of course, reclined.

A person who took note of the course of events would have come at once to the conclusion that beauty is in its essence something regal, especially when, as in the present case of Autolycus, its possessor joins with it modesty and sobriety. For in the first place, just as the sudden glow of a light at night draws all eyes to itself, so now the beauty of Autolycus compelled every one to look at him. And again, there was not one of the onlookers who did not feel his soul strangely stirred by the boy; some of them grew quieter than before, others even assumed some kind of a pose. Now it is true that all who are under the influence of any of the gods seem well worth gazing at; but whereas those who are possessed of the other gods have a tendency to be sterner of countenance, more terrifying of voice, and more vehement, those who are inspired by chaste Love have a more tender look, subdue their voices to more gentle tones, and assume a supremely noble bearing. Such was the demeanor of Callias at this time under the influence of Love; and therefore he was an object well worth the gaze of those initiated into the worship of this god.

The company, then, were feasting in silence, as though some one in authority had commanded them to do so, when Philip the buffoon knocked at the door and told the porter to announce who he was and that he desired to be admitted; he added that with regard to food he had come all prepared, in all varieties—to dine on some other person's,—and that

his servant was in great distress with the load he carried of—nothing, and with having an empty stomach. Hearing this, Callias said, “Well, gentlemen, we cannot decently begrudge him at the least the shelter of our roof; so let him come in.” With the words he cast a glance at Autolycus, obviously trying to make out what he had thought of the pleasantry. But Philip, standing at the threshold of the men’s hall where the banquet was served, announced: “You all know that I am a jester; and so I have come here with a will, thinking it more of a joke to come to your dinner uninvited than to come by invitation.”

“Well, then,” said Callias, “take a place; for the guests, though well fed, as you observe, on seriousness, are perhaps rather ill supplied with laughter.”

No sooner were they engaged in their dinner than Philip attempted a witticism, with a view to rendering the service that secured him all his dinner engagements; but on finding that he did not excite any laughter, he showed himself, for the time, considerably vexed. A little later, however, he must try another jest; but when they would not laugh at him this time either, he stopped while the dinner was in full swing, covered his head with his cloak, and lay down on his couch. “What does this mean, Philip?” Callias inquired. “Are you seized with a pain?” Philip replied with a groan, “Yes, Callias, by Heaven, with a severe one; for since laughter has perished from the world, my business is ruined. For in times past, the reason why I got invitations to dinner was that I might stir up laughter among the guests and make them merry; but now, what will induce any one to invite me? For I could no more turn serious than could become immortal; and certainly no one will invite me in the hope of a return invitation, as every one knows that there is not a vestige of tradition of bringing dinner into my house.” As he said this, he wiped his nose, and to judge by the sound, he was

evidently weeping. All tried to comfort him with the promise that they would laugh next time, and urged him to eat; and Critobulus actually burst out into a guffaw at his lugubrious moaning. The moment Philip heard the laughter he uncovered his head, and exhorting his spirit to be of good courage, in view of approaching engagements, he fell to eating again.

II. When the tables had been removed and the guests had poured a libation and sung a hymn, there entered a man from Syracuse, to give them an evening's merriment. He had with him a fine flute-girl, a dancing-girl—one of those skilled in acrobatic tricks,—and a very handsome boy, who was expert at playing the cither and at dancing; the Syracusan made money by exhibiting their performances as a spectacle. They now played for the assemblage, the flute-girl on the flute, the boy on the cither; and it was agreed that both furnished capital amusement. Thereupon Socrates remarked: "On my word, Callias, you are giving us a perfect dinner; for not only have you set before us a feast that is above criticism, but you are also offering us very delightful sights and sounds."

"Suppose we go further," said Callias, "and have some one bring us some perfume, so that we may dine in the midst of pleasant odors, also."

"No, indeed!" replied Socrates. "For just as one kind of dress looks well on a woman and another kind on a man, so the odors appropriate to men and to women are diverse. No man, surely, ever uses perfume for a man's sake. And as for the women, particularly if they chance to be young brides, like the wives of Niceratus here and Critobulus, how can they want any additional perfume? For that is what they are redolent of, themselves. The odor of the olive oil, on the other hand, that is used in the gymnasium is more delightful when you have it on your flesh than perfume is to women, and

when you lack it, the want of it is more keenly felt. Indeed, so far as perfume is concerned, when once a man has anointed himself with it, the scent forthwith is all one whether he be slave or free; but the odors that result from the exertions of freemen demand primarily noble pursuits engaged in for many years if they are to be sweet and suggestive of freedom."

"That may do for young fellows," observed Lycon; "but what of us who no longer exercise in the gymnasia? What should be our distinguishing scent?"

"Nobility of soul, surely!" replied Socrates.

"And where may a person get this ointment?"

"Certainly not from the perfumers" said Socrates.

"But where, then?"

"Theognis has said:

'Good men teach good; society with bad

Will but corrupt the good mind that you had.'"

"Do you hear that, my son?" asked Lycon.

"Yes, indeed he does," said Socrates; "and he puts it into practice, too. At any rate, when he desired to become a prize-winner in the pancratium, He availed himself of your help to discover the champions in that sport and associated with them; and so, if he desires to learn the ways of virtue, he will again with your help seek out the man who seems to him most proficient in this way of life and will associate with him."

Thereupon there was a chorus of voices. "Where will he find an instructor in this subject?" said one. Another maintained that it could not be taught at all. A third asserted that this could be learned if anything could.

"Since this is a debatable matter," suggested Socrates, "let us reserve it for another time; for the present let us finish

what we have on hand. For I see that the dancing girl here is standing ready, and that some one is bringing her some hoops."

At that, the other girl began to accompany the dancer on the flute, and a boy at her elbow' handed her up the hoops until he had given her twelve. She took these and as she danced kept throwing them whirling into the air, observing the proper height to throw them so as to catch them in a regular rhythm.

As Socrates looked on he remarked: "This girl's feat, gentlemen, is only one of many proofs that woman's nature is really not a whit inferior to man's, except in its lack of judgment and physical strength. So if any one of you has a wife, let him confidently set about teaching her whatever he would like to have her know."

"If that is your view, Socrates," asked Antisthenes, "how' does it come that you don't practice what you preach by yourself educating Xanthippe, but live with a wife who is the hardest to get along with of all the women there are—yes, or all that ever were, I suspect, or ever will be?"

"Because," he replied, "I observe that men who wish to become expert horsemen do not get the most docile horses but rather those that are high-mettled, believing that if they can manage this kind, they will easily handle any other. My course is similar. Mankind at large is what I wish to deal and associate with; and so I have got her, well assured that if I can endure her, I shall have no difficulty in my relations with all the rest of human kind."

These words, in the judgment of the guests, did not go wide of the mark.

But now there was brought in a hoop set all around with upright swords; over these the dancer turned somersaults into the hoop and out again, to the dismay of the onlookers,

who thought that she might suffer some mishap. She, however, went through this performance fearlessly and safely.

Then Socrates, drawing Antisthenes' attention, said: "Witnesses of this feat, surely, will never again deny, I feel sure, that courage, like other things, admits of being taught, when this girl, in spite of her sex, leaps so boldly in among the swords!"

"Well then," asked Antisthenes, "had this Syracusan not better exhibit his dancer to the city and announce that if the Athenians will pay him for it he will give all the men of Athens the courage to face the spear?"

"Well said!" interjected Philip. "I certainly should like to see Peisander the politician learning to turn somersaults among the knives; for, as it is now, his inability to look spears in the face makes him shrink even from joining the army."

At this point the boy performed a dance, eliciting from Socrates the remark, "Did you notice that, handsome as the boy is, he appears even handsomer in the poses of the dance than when he is at rest?"

"It looks to me," said Charmides, "as if you were puffing the dancing-master."

"Assuredly," replied Socrates; "and I remarked something else, too,—that no part of his body was idle during the dance, but neck, legs, and hands were all active together. And that is the way a person must dance who intends to increase the suppleness of his body. And for myself," he continued, addressing the Syracusan, I should be delighted to learn the figures from you,'*

"What use will you make of them?" the other asked.

"I will dance, forsooth."

This raised a general laugh; but Socrates, with a perfectly grave expression on his face, said: “You are laughing at me, are you? Is it because I want to exercise to better my health? Or because I want to take more pleasure in my food and my sleep? Or is it because I am eager for such exercises as these, not like the long-distance runners, who develop their legs at the expense of their shoulders, nor like the prize-fighters, who develop their shoulders but become thin-legged, but rather with a view to giving my body a symmetrical development by exercising it in every part? Or are you laughing because I shall not need to hunt up a partner to exercise with, or to strip, old as I am, in a crowd, but shall find a moderate-sized room large enough for me (just as but now this room was large enough for the lad here to get up a sweat in), and because in winter I shall exercise under cover, and when it is very hot, in the shade? Or is this what provokes your laughter, that I have an unduly large paunch and wish to reduce it? Don’t you know that just the other day Charmides here caught me dancing early in the morning?”

“Indeed I did,” said Charmides; “and at first I was dumbfounded and feared that you were going stark mad; but when I heard you say much the same tiling as you did just now, I myself went home, and although I did not dance, for had never learned how, practiced shadow-boxing, for I knew how to do that.”

“Undoubtedly,” said Philip; “at any rate, your legs appear so nearly equal in weight to your shoulders that I imagine if you were to go to the market commissioners and put your lower parts in the scale against your upper parts, as if they were loaves of bread, they would let you off without a fine.”

“When you are ready to begin your lessons, Socrates,” said Callias, “pray invite me, so that I may be opposite you in the figures and may learn with you.”

“Come,” said Philip, “let me have some flute music, so that I may dance too.”

So he got up and mimicked in detail the dancing of both the boy and the girl. To begin with, since the company had applauded the way the boy’s natural beauty was increased by the grace of the dancing postures, Philip made a burlesque out of the performance by rendering every part of his body that was in motion more grotesque than it naturally was; and whereas the girl had bent backward until she resembled a hoop, he tried to do the same by bending forward. Finally, since they had given the boy applause for putting every part of his body into play in the dance, he told the flute girl to hit up the time faster, and danced away, flinging out legs, hands, and head all at the same time; and when he was quite exhausted, he exclaimed as he laid himself down: “Here is proof, gentlemen, that my style of dancing, also, gives excellent exercise; it has certainly given me a thirst; so let the servant fill me up the big goblet.”

“Certainly,” replied Callias; “and the same for us, for we are thirsty with laughing at you.”

Here Socrates again interposed. “Well, gentlemen,” said he, “so far as drinking is concerned, you have my hearty approval; for wine does of a truth ‘moisten the soul’ and lull our griefs to sleep just as the mandragora does with men, at the same time awakening kindly feelings as oil quickens a flame. However, I suspect that men’s bodies fare the same as those of plants that grow in the ground. When God gives the plants water in floods to drink, they cannot stand up straight or let the breezes blow through them; but when they drink only as much as they enjoy, they grow up very straight and tall and come to full and abundant fruitage. So it is with us. If we pour ourselves immense draughts, it will be no long time before both our bodies and our minds reel, and we shall not be able even to draw breath, much less to speak

sensibly; but if the servants frequently 'besprinkle' us—if I too may use a Gorgian expression—with small cups, we shall thus not be driven on by the wine to a state of intoxication, but instead shall be brought by its gentle persuasion to a more sportive mood."

This resolution received a unanimous vote, with an amendment added by Philip to the effect that the wine-pourers should emulate skilful charioteers by driving the cups around with ever increasing speed. This the wine-pourers proceeded to do.

III. After this the boy, attuning his lyre to the flute, played and sang, and won the applause of all; and brought from Charmides the remark, "It seems to me, gentlemen, that, as Socrates said of the wine, so this blending of the young people's beauty and of the notes of the music lulls one's griefs to sleep and awakens the goddess of Love."

Then Socrates resumed the conversation. "These people, gentlemen," said he, "show their competence to give us pleasure; and yet we, I am sure, think ourselves considerably superior to them. Will it not be to our shame, therefore, if we do not make even an attempt, while here together, to be of some service or to give some pleasure one to another?"

At that many spoke up: "You lead the way, then, and tell us what to begin talking about to realize most fully what you have in mind."

"For my part," he answered, "I should like to have Callias redeem his promise; for he said, you remember, that if we would take dinner with him, he would give us an exhibition of his profundity."

"Yes," rejoined Callias; "and I will do so, if the rest of you will also lay before us any serviceable knowledge that you severally possess."

“Well,” answered Socrates, “no one objects to telling what he considers the most valuable knowledge in his possession.”

“Very well, then,” said Callias, “I will now tell you what I take greatest pride in. It is that I believe I have the power to make men better.”

“How?” asked Antisthenes. “By teaching them some manual trade, or by teaching nobility of character?”

“The latter, if righteousness is the same thing as nobility.”

“Certainly it is,” replied Antisthenes, “and the least debatable kind, too; for though courage and wisdom appear at times to work injury both to one’s friends and to the state, righteousness and unrighteousness never overlap at a single point.”

“Well, then, when every one of you has named the benefit he can confer, I will not begrudge describing the art that gives me the success that I speak of. And so, Niceratus” he suggested, “it is your turn; tell us what kind of knowledge you take pride in.”

“My father was anxious to see me develop into a good man,” said Niceratus, “and as a means to this end he compelled me to memorize all of Homer; and so even now I can repeat the whole Iliad and the Odyssey by heart.”

“But have you failed to observe,” questioned Antisthenes, “that the rhapsodes, too, all know these poems?”

“How could I,” he replied, “when I listen to their recitations nearly every day?”

“Well, do you know any tribe of men,” went on the other, “more stupid than the rhapsodes?”

“No, indeed,” answered Niceratus; “not I, I am sure.”

“No,” said Socrates; “and the reason is clear: they do not know the inner meaning of the poems. But you have paid a

good deal of money to Stesimbrotus, Anaximander, and many other Homeric critics, so that nothing of their valuable teaching can have escaped your knowledge. But what about you, Critobulus?" he continued. "What do you take greatest pride in?"

"In beauty," he replied.

"What?" exclaimed Socrates. "Are you too going to be able to maintain that you can make us better, and by means of your beauty?"

"Why, otherwise, it is clear enough that I shall cut but an indifferent figure."

"And you, Antisthenes," said Socrates, "what do you take pride in?"

"In wealth," he replied.

Hermogenes asked him whether he had a large amount of money; he swore that he did not have even a penny.

"You own a great deal of land, then?"

"Well, perhaps it might prove big enough," said he, "for Autolycus here to sand himself in." "It looks as if we should have to hear from you, too. And how about you, Charmides?" he continued. "What do you take pride in?"

"My pride," said he, "on the contrary, is in my poverty."

"A charming thing, upon my word!" exclaimed Socrates. "It seldom causes envy or is a bone of contention; and it is kept safe without the necessity of a guard, and grows sturdier by neglect!"

"But what of you, Socrates?" said Callias. "What are you proud of?"

Socrates drew up his face into a very solemn expression, and answered, "The trade of procurer." After the rest had had a laugh at him, "Very well," said he, "you may laugh,

but I know that could make a lot of money if I cared to follow the trade."

"As for you," said Lycon, addressing Philip, "it is obvious that your pride is in your jesting."

"And my pride is better founded, I think," replied Philip, "than that of Callippides, the actor, who is consumed with vanity because he can fill the seats with audiences that weep."

"Will you also not tell us, Lycon," said Antisthenes, "what it is that you take pride in?"

"Don't you all know," he answered, "that it is in my son here?"

"And as for him," said one, "it is plain that he is proud at having taken a prize."

At this Autolycus blushed and said, "No, indeed, not that."

All looked at him, delighted to hear him speak, and one asked, "What is it, then, Autolycus, that you are proud of?" and he answered,

"My father," and with the words nestled close against him.

When Callias saw this, "Do you realize, Lycon," said he, "that you are the richest man in the world?"

"No, indeed," the other replied, "I certainly do not know that."

"Why, are you blind to the fact that you would not part with your son for the wealth of the Great King?"

"I am caught." was the answer, "red-handed; it does look as if I were the richest man in the world."

"What about you, Hermogenes?" said Niceratus. "What do you delight in most?"

“In the goodness and the power of my friends,” he answered, “and in the fact that with all their excellence they have regard for me.”

Thereupon all eyes were turned toward him, and many speaking at once asked him whether he would not discover these friends to them; and he answered that he would not be at all loath to do so.

IV. At this point Socrates said: “I suspect that it remains now for each one of us to prove that what he engaged himself to champion is of real worth.”

“You may hear me first,” said Callias. “While I listen to your philosophical discussions of what righteousness is, I am all the time actually rendering men more righteous.”

“How so, my good friend?” asked Socrates. “Why, by giving them money.”

Then Antisthenes got up and in a very argumentative fashion interrogated him. “Where do you think men harbor their righteousness, Callias, in their souls or in their purses?”

“In their souls,” he replied.

“So you make their souls more righteous by putting money into their purses?”

“I surely do.”

“How?”

“Because they know that they have the wherewithal to buy the necessities of life, and so they are reluctant to expose themselves to the hazards of crime.”

“And do they repay you,” he asked, “the money that they get from you?”

“Heavens, no!” he replied.

“Well, do they substitute thanks for money payment?”

“No, indeed, nor that either,” he said. “On the contrary, some of them have an even greater dislike of me than before they got the money.”

“It is remarkable,” said Antisthenes, looking fixedly at him as though he had him in a corner, “that you can make them righteous toward others but not toward yourself.”

“What is there remarkable about that?” asked Callias. “Do you not see plenty of carpenters, also, and architects that build houses for many another person but cannot do it for themselves, but live in rented houses? Come now, my captious friend, take your medicine and own that you are beaten.”

“By all means,” said Socrates, “let him do so. For even the soothsayers have the reputation, you know, of prophesying the future for others but of not being able to foresee their own fate.”

Here the discussion of this point ended.

Then Niceratus remarked: “You may now hear me tell wherein you will be improved by associating with me. You know, doubtless, that the sage Homer has written about practically everything pertaining to man. Any one of you, therefore, who wishes to acquire the art of the householder, the political leader, or the general, or to become like Achilles or Ajax or Nestor or Odysseus, should seek my favor, for I understand all these things.”

“Ha!” said Antisthenes; “do you understand how to play the king, too, knowing, as you do, that Homer praised Agamemnon for being both goodly king and spearman strong ‘?”

“Yes, indeed!” said he; “and I know also that in driving a chariot one must run close to the goalpost at the turn and

‘Himself lean lightly to the left within

The polished car, the right-hand trace-horse goad,

Urge him with shouts, and let him have the reins.'

And beside this I know something else, which you may test immediately. For Homer says somewhere:

'An onion, too, a relish for the drink.'

Now if some one will bring an onion, you will receive this benefit, at any rate, without delay; for you will get more pleasure out of your drinking."

"Gentlemen," said Charmides, "Niceratus is intent on going home smelling of onions to make his wife believe that no one would even have conceived the thought of kissing him."

"Undoubtedly," said Socrates. "But we run the risk of getting a different sort of reputation, one that will bring us ridicule. For though the onion seems to be in the truest sense a relish, since it adds to our enjoyment not only of food, but also of drink, yet if we eat it not only with our dinner but after it as well, take care that some one does not say of us that on our visit to Callias we were merely indulging our appetites."

"Heaven forbid, Socrates!" was the reply. "I grant that when a man is setting out for battle, it is well for him to nibble an onion, just as some people give their game-cocks a feed of garlic before pitting them together in the ring; as for us, however, our plans perhaps look more to getting a kiss from some one than to fighting."

That was about the way the discussion of this point ended.

Then Critobulus said: "Shall I take my turn now and tell you my grounds for taking pride in my handsomeness?"

"Do," they said.

"Well, then, if I am not handsome, as I think I am, you could fairly be sued for misrepresentation; for though no one

asks you for an oath, you are always swearing that I am handsome. And indeed I believe you; for I consider you to be honorable men. But, on the other hand, if I really am handsome and you have the same feelings toward me that I have toward the one who is handsome in my eyes, I swear by all the gods that I would not take the kingdom of Persia in exchange for the possession of beauty. For as it is, I would rather gaze at Cleinias than at all the other beautiful objects in the world. I would rather be blind to all things else than to Cleinias alone. I chafe at both night and sleep because then I do not see him; I feel the deepest gratitude to day and the sun because they reveal Cleinias to me. We handsome people have a right to be proud of this fact, too, that whereas the strong man must get the good things of his desire by toil, and the brave man by adventure, and the wise man by his eloquence, the handsome person can attain all his ends without doing anything. So far as I, at least, am concerned, although I realize that money is a delightful possession, I should take more delight in giving what I have to Cleinias than in adding to my possessions from another person's; and I should take more delight in being a slave than in being a free man, if Cleinias would deign to be my master. For I should find it easier to toil for him than to rest, and it would be more delightful to risk my life for his sake than to live in safety. And so, Callias, if you are proud of your ability to make people more righteous, I have a better right than you to claim that I can influence men toward every sort of virtue. For since we handsome men exert a certain inspiration upon the amorous, we make them more generous in money matters, more strenuous and heroic amid dangers, yes, and more modest and self-controlled also; for they feel abashed about the very things that they want most. Madness is in those people, too, who do not elect the handsome men as generals; I certainly would go through fire with Cleinias, and

I know that you would, also, with me. Therefore, Socrates, do not puzzle any more over the question whether or not my beauty will be of any benefit to men. But more than that, beauty is not to be contemned on this ground, either, that it soon passes its prime; for just as we recognize beauty in a boy, so we do in a youth, a full-grown man, or an old man. Witness the fact that in selecting garland-bearers for Athena they choose beautiful old men, thus intimating that beauty attends every period of life. Furthermore, if it is pleasurable to attain one's desires with the good will of the giver, I know very well that at this very moment, without uttering a word, could persuade this boy or this girl to give me a kiss sooner than you could, Socrates, no matter how long and profoundly you might argue."

"How now?" exclaimed Socrates. "You boast as though you actually thought yourself a handsomer man than me."

"Of course," was Critobulus's reply; "otherwise I should be the ugliest of all the Satyrs ever on the stage."

Now Socrates, as fortune would have it, really resembled these creatures.

"Come, come," said Socrates; "see that you remember to enter a beauty contest with me when the discussion now under way has gone the rounds. And let our judges be not Alexander, Priam's son, but these very persons whom you consider eager to give you a kiss."

"Would you not entrust the arbitrament to Cleinias, Socrates?"

"Aren't you ever going to get your mind off Cleinias?" was the rejoinder.

"If I refrain from mentioning his name, do you suppose that I shall have him any the less in mind? Do you not know that I have so clear an image of him in my heart that had I ability as a sculptor or a painter I could produce a likeness

of him from this image that would be quite as close as if he were sitting for me in person?"

"Why do you annoy me, then," was Socrates' retort, "and keep taking me about to places where you can see him in person, if you possess so faithful an image of him?"

"Because, Socrates, the sight of him in person has the power to delight one, whereas the sight of the image does not give pleasure, but implants a craving for him."

"For my part, Socrates," said Hermogenes, "I do not regard it as at all like you to countenance such a mad passion of love in Critobulus."

"What? Do you suppose," asked Socrates, "that this condition has arisen since he began associating with me?"

"If not, when did it?"

"Do you not notice that the soft down is just beginning to grow down in front of his ears, while that of Cleinias is already creeping up the nape of his neck? Well, then, this hot flame of his was kindled in the days when they used to go to school together. It was the discovery of this that caused his father to put him into my hands, in the hope that I might do him some good. And without question he is already much improved. For awhile ago he was like those who look at the Gorgons—he would gaze at Cleinias with a fixed and stony stare and would never leave his presence; but now I have seen him actually close his eyes in a wink. But to tell you the truth, gentlemen," he continued, "by Heaven! it does look to me—to speak confidentially—as if he had also kissed Cleinias; and there is nothing more terribly potent than this at kindling the fires of passion. For it is insatiable and holds out seductive hopes. For this reason I maintain that one who intends to possess the power of self-control must refrain from kissing those in the bloom of beauty."

“But why in the world, Socrates,” Charmides now asked, “do you flourish your bogeys so to frighten us, your friends, away from the beauties, when, by Apollo! I have seen you yourself,” he continued, “when the two of you were hunting down something in the same book-roll at the school, sitting head to head, with your nude shoulder pressing against Critobulus’s nude shoulder?”

“Dear me!” exclaimed Socrates. “So that is what affected me like the bite of a wild animal! And for over five days my shoulder smarted and I felt as if I had something like a sting in my heart. But now, Critobulus,” said he, “in the presence of all these witnesses I warn you not to lay a finger on me until you get as much hair on your chin as you have on your head.”

Such was the mingled raillery and seriousness that these indulged in.

But Callias now remarked, “It is your turn, Charmides, to tell us why poverty makes you feel proud.”

“Very well,” said he. “So much, at least, every one admits, that assurance is preferable to fear, freedom to slavery, being the recipient of attention to being the giver of it, the confidence of one’s country to its distrust. Now, as for my situation in our commonwealth, when I was rich, I was, to begin with, in dread of some one’s digging through the wall of my house and not only getting my money but also doing me a mischief personally; in the next place, I knuckled down to the blackmailers, knowing well enough that my abilities lay more in the direction of suffering injury than of inflicting it on them. Then, too, I was for ever being ordered by the government to undergo some expenditure or other, and I never had the opportunity for foreign travel.

Now, however, since I am stripped of my property over the border and get no income from the property in Attica, and

my household effects have been sold, I stretch out and enjoy a sound sleep, I have gained the confidence of the state, I am no longer subjected to threats but do the threatening now myself; and I have the free man's privilege of going abroad or staying here at home as I please. People now actually rise from their seats in deference to me, and rich men obsequiously give me the right of way on the street. Now I am like a despot; then I was clearly a slave. Then I paid a revenue to the body politic; now I live on the tribute that the state pays to me. Moreover, people used to vilify me, when I was wealthy, for consorting with Socrates; but now that I have got poor, no one bothers his head about it any longer. Again, when my property was large, either the government or fate was continually making me throw some of it to the winds; but now, far from throwing anything away (for I possess nothing), I am always in expectation of acquiring something."

"Your prayers, also," said Callias, "are doubtless to the effect that you may never be rich; and if you ever have a fine dream you sacrifice, do you not, to the deities who avert disasters?"

"Oh, no!" was the reply; "I don't go so far as that; I hazard the danger with great heroism if I have any expectation of getting something from some one."

"Come, now, Antisthenes," said Socrates, "take your turn and tell us how it is that with such slender means you base your pride on wealth."

"Because, sirs, I conceive that people's wealth and poverty are to be found not in their real estate but in their hearts. For I see many persons, not in office, who though possessors of large resources, yet look upon themselves as so poor that they bend their backs to any toil, any risk, if only they may increase their holdings; and again I know of brothers, with

equal shares in their inheritance, where one of them has plenty, and more than enough to meet expenses, while the other is in utter want. Again, I am told of certain despots, also, who have such a greedy appetite for riches that they commit much more dreadful crimes than they who are afflicted with the direst poverty. For it is of course their want that makes some people steal, others commit burglary, others follow the slave trade; but there are some despots who destroy whole families, kill men wholesale, oftentimes enslave even entire cities, for the sake of money. As for such men, I pity them deeply for their malignant disease; for in my eyes their malady resembles that of a person who possessed abundance but though continually eating could never be satisfied. For my own part, my possessions are so great that I can hardly find them myself; yet I have enough so that I can eat until I reach a point where I no longer feel hungry and drink until I do not feel thirsty and have enough clothing so that when out of doors I do not feel the cold any more than my superlatively wealthy friend Callias here, and when I get into the house I look on my walls as exceedingly warm tunics and the roofs as exceptionally thick mantles; and the bedding that I own is so satisfactory that it is actually a hard task to get me awake in the morning. If I ever feel a natural desire for converse with women, I am so well satisfied with whatever chance puts in my way that those to whom I make my addresses are more than glad to welcome me because they have no one else who wants to consort with them. In a word, all these items appeal to me as being so conducive to enjoyment that I could not pray for greater pleasure in performing any one of them, but could pray rather for less—so much more pleasurable do I regard some of them than is good for one. But the most valuable parcel of my wealth I reckon to be this, that even though some one were to rob me of what I now possess, I see no occupation so

humble that it would not give me adequate fare. For whenever I feel an inclination to indulge my appetite, I do not buy fancy articles at the market (for they come high), but I draw on the store-house of my soul. And it goes a long way farther toward producing enjoyment when I take food only after awaiting the craving for it than when I partake of one of these fancy dishes, like this fine Thasian wine that fortune has put in my way and am drinking without the promptings of thirst. Yes, and it is natural that those whose eyes are set on frugality should be more honest than those whose eyes are fixed on money-making. For those who are most contented with what they have are least likely to covet what belongs to others. And it is worth noting that wealth of this kind makes people generous, also. My friend Socrates here and I are examples. For Socrates, from whom I acquired this wealth of mine, did not come to my relief with limitation of number and weight, but made over to me all that I could carry. And as for me, I am now niggardly to no one, but both make an open display of my abundance to all my friends and share my spiritual wealth with any one of them that desires it. But—most exquisite possession of all!—you observe that I always have leisure, with the result that I can go and see whatever is worth seeing, and hear whatever is worth hearing and—what I prize highest—pass the whole day, untroubled by business, in Socrates' company. Like me, he does not bestow his admiration on those who count the most gold, but spends his time with those who are congenial to him."

Such was the thesis maintained by Antisthenes. "So help me Hera," commented Callias, "among the numerous reasons I find for congratulating you on your wealth, one is that the government does not lay its commands on you and treat you as a slave, another is that people do not feel resentful at your not making them a loan."

“Do not be congratulating him,” said Niceratus; “because I am about to go and get him to make me a loan—of his contentment with his lot, schooled as I am by Homer to count

‘Sev’n pots unfired, ten talents’ weight of gold,

A score of gleaming cauldrons, chargers twelve,’

weighing and calculating until I am never done with yearning for vast riches; as a result, some people perhaps regard me as just a bit fond of lucre.”

A burst of laughter from the whole company greeted this admission; for they considered that he had told nothing more than the truth.

“Hermogenes, it devolves on you,” some one now remarked, “to mention who your friends are and to demonstrate their great power and their solicitude for you, so that your pride in them may appear justified.”

“Very well; in the first place, it is clear as day that both Greeks and barbarians believe that the gods know everything both present and to come; at any rate, all cities and all races ask the gods, by the diviner’s art, for advice as to what to do and what to avoid. Second, it is likewise manifest that we consider them able to work us good or ill; at all events, every one prays the gods to avert evil and grant blessings. Well, these gods, omniscient and omnipotent, feel so friendly toward me that their watchfulness over me never lets me out of their ken night or day, no matter where I am going or what business I have in view. They know the results also that will follow any act; and so they send me as messengers omens of sounds, dreams, and birds, and thus indicate what ought to do and what I ought not to do. And when I do their bidding, I never regret it; on the other hand, I have before now disregarded them and have been punished for it.”

“None of these statements,” said Socrates, “is incredible. But what I should like very much to know is how you serve them to keep them so friendly.”

“A very economical service it is, I declare!” responded Hermogenes. “I sound their praises,—which costs nothing; I always restore them part of what they give me; I avoid profanity of speech as far as I can; and I never wittingly lie in matters wherein I have invoked them to be my witnesses.”

“Truly,” said Socrates, “if it is conduct like this that gives you their friendship, then the gods also, it would seem, take delight in nobility of soul!” Such was the serious turn given to the discussion of this topic.

When they got around to Philip, they asked him what he saw in the jester’s profession to feel proud of it.

“Have I not a right to be proud,” said he, “when all know that I am a jester, and so whenever they have a bit of good fortune, give me hearty invitations to come and join them, but when they suffer some reverse, run from me with never a glance behind, in dread that they may be forced to laugh in spite of themselves?”

“Your pride is abundantly justified,” said Niceratus. “In my case, on the contrary, those friends who enjoy success keep out of my way, but those that run into some mishap reckon up their kinship to me on the family tree, and I can’t get rid of them.”

“No doubt,” said Charmides; and then, turning to the Syracusan, “What is it that you are proud of? The boy, I suppose?”

“Quite the contrary,” was the reply; “I am instead in extreme apprehension about him. For I understand that there are certain persons plotting his undoing.”

On receiving this information, “Good Heavens!” exclaimed Socrates; “what wrong do they imagine your lad has done them that is grave enough to make them wish to kill him?”

Syr. “It is not killing him that they desire; oh, no! but to persuade him to sleep with them.”

Soc. “Your belief, then, if I mistake not, is that if this happened, he would be undone?”

Syr. “Aye, utterly!”

Soc. “Do you not then sleep in his bed yourself?

Syr. “Most certainly, all night and every night.”

Soc. “Marry, you are in great luck to be formed of such flesh that you are unique in not corrupting those that sleep with you. And so you have a right to be proud of your flesh if of nothing else.”

Syr. “And yet that is not the basis of my pride.”

Soc. “What is, then?”

Syr. “Fools, in faith. They give me a livelihood by coming to view my marionettes.”

“Ah!” ejaculated Philip; “that explains the prayer I heard you uttering the other day, that wherever you were the gods would grant you an abundant harvest of grain but a crop-failure of wits!”

“Good!” said Callias. “And now, Socrates, what can you advance in support of your pride in that disreputable profession that you mentioned?”

“Let us first,” said he, “come to an understanding on the functions that belong to the procurer. Do not hesitate to answer all the questions I ask you, so that we may know our points of agreement. Is that your pleasure?” he asked.

“Certainly,” was their reply; and when they had once started with “certainly,” that was the regular answer they all made to his questions thereafter.

Soc. “Well, then, you consider it the function of a good procurer to render the man or the woman whom he is serving attractive to his or her associates?”

All. “Certainly.”

Soc. “Now, one thing that contributes to rendering a person attractive is a comely arrangement of hair and clothing, is it not?”

All. “Certainly.”

Soc. “This, also, we know, do we not, that it is in a man’s power to use the one pair of eyes to express both friendship and hostility?”

All. “Certainly.”

Soc. “And again, it is possible to speak both modestly and boldly with the same voice?”

All. “Certainly.”

Soc. “Moreover, are there not words that create ill feeling and others that conduce to friendliness?”

All. “Certainly.”

Soc. “Now the good procurer would teach only the words that tend to make one attractive, would he not?”

All. “Certainly.”

Soc. “Which one would be the better?” he continued, “the one who could make people attractive to a single person or the one who could make them attractive to many?”

This question brought a division; some said, “Clearly the one who could make them attractive to a great many”; the others merely repeated,

All. “Certainly.”

Remarking that they were all of one mind on this point as on the others, he went on:

Soc. “If a person could render people attractive to the entire community, would he not satisfy the requirements of the ideal procurer?”

“Indubitably,” they all said.

Soc. “And so, if one could produce men of this type out of his clients, he would be entitled to feel proud of his profession and to receive a high remuneration, would he not?”

All agreeing on this point, too, he added,

Soc. “Antisthenes here seems to me to be a man of just that sort.”

Antisthenes asked, “Are you resigning your profession to me, Socrates?”

“Assuredly,” was the answer. “For I see that you have brought to a high state of perfection the complementary trade.”

“What is that?”

“The profession of go-between,” he said.

Antisthenes was much incensed and asked, “What knowledge can you possibly have of my being guilty of such a thing as that?”

“I know several instances,” he replied. “I know that you acted the part between Callias here and the scholar Prodicus, when you saw that Callias was in love with philosophy and that Prodicus wanted money. I know also that you did the same for Hippias, the Elean, from whom Callias got his memory system; and as a result, Callias has become more amorous than ever, because he finds it impossible to forget any beauty he sees. And just recently, you remember, you introduced the stranger from Heraclea to me, after arousing my keen interest in him by your commendations. For this I am indeed grateful to you; for I

look upon him as endowed with a truly noble nature. And did you not laud Aeschylus the Phleiasian to me and me to him until you brought us to such a pass that in mutual yearning, excited by your words, we went coursing like hounds to find each other? It is the witnessing of your talent at achieving such a result that makes me judge you an excellent go-between. For the man who can recognize those who are fitted to be mutually helpful and can make them desire one another's acquaintance, that man, in my opinion, could also create friendship between cities and arrange suitable marriages, and would be a very valuable acquisition as friend or ally for both states and individuals. But you got indignant, as if you had received an affront, when I said that you were a good go-between."

"But, indeed, that is all over now," he replied; "for with this power mine I shall find my soul chock-full of riches."

And so this round of discourse was brought to a close.

V. Callias now said, "Critobulus, are you going to refuse to enter the lists in the beauty contest with Socrates?"

"Undoubtedly!" said Socrates; "for probably he notices that the procurer stands high in the favor of the judges."

"But yet in spite of that," retorted Critobulus, "I do not shun the contest. So make your plea, if you can produce any profound reason, and prove that you are more handsome than I. Only," he added, "let some one bring the light close to him."

"The first step, then, in my suit," said Socrates, "is to summon you to the preliminary hearing; be so kind as to answer my questions."

"And you proceed to put them."

"Do you hold, then, that beauty is to be found only in man, or is it also in other objects?"

Crit. “In faith, my opinion is that beauty is to be found quite as well in a horse or an ox or in any number of inanimate things. I know, at any rate, that a shield may be beautiful, or a sword, or a spear.”

Soc. “How can it be that all these things are beautiful when they are entirely dissimilar?”

“Why, they are beautiful and fine,” answered Critobulus, “if they are well made for the respective functions for which we obtain them, or if they are naturally well constituted to serve our needs.”

Soc. “Do you know the reason why we need eyes?”

Crit. “Obviously to see with.”

“In that ease, it would appear without further ado that my eyes are finer ones than yours.”

Crit. “How so?”

Soc. “Because, while yours see only straight ahead, mine, by bulging out as they do, see also to the sides.”

Crit. “Do you mean to say that a crab is better equipped visually than any other creature?”

Soc. “Absolutely; for its eyes are also better set to insure strength.”

Crit. “Well, let that pass; but whose nose is finer, yours or mine?”

Soc. “Mine, I consider, granting that Providence made us noses to smell with. For your nostrils look down toward the ground, but mine are wide open and turned outward so that I can catch scents from all about.”

Crit. “But how do you make a snub nose handsomer than a straight one?”

Soc. “For the reason that it does not put a barricade between the eves but allows them unobstructed vision of

whatever they desire to see; whereas a high nose, as if in despite, has walled the eyes off one from the other."

"As for the mouth," said Critobulus, "I concede that point. For if it is created for the purpose of biting off food, you could bite off a far bigger mouthful than I could. And don't you think that your kiss is also the more tender because you have thick lips?"

Soc. "According to your argument, it would seem that I have a mouth more ugly even than an ass's. But do you not reckon it a proof of my superior beauty that the River Nymphs, goddesses as they are, bear as their offspring the Seileni, who resemble me more closely than they do you?"

"I cannot argue any longer with you," answered Critobulus; "let them distribute the ballots, so that I may know without suspense what fine or punishment I must undergo. Only," he continued, "let the balloting be secret, for I am afraid that the 'wealth' you and Antisthenes possess will overmaster me."

So the maiden and the lad turned in the ballots secretly. While this was going on, Socrates saw to it that the light should be brought in front of Critobulus, so that the judges might not be misled, and stipulated that the prize given by the judges to crown the victor should be kisses and not ribbons. When the ballots were turned out of the urn and proved to be a unanimous verdict in favor of Critobulus, "Faugh!" exclaimed Socrates; "your money, Critobulus, does not appear to resemble Callias's. For his makes people more honest, while yours is about the most potent to corrupt men, whether members of a jury or judges of a contest."

VI. At this some of the company urged Critobulus to take his kisses, the reward of victory; others advised him to get the consent of the young people's legal guardian; and others indulged in other badinage. But even then Hermogenes kept

silent. And Socrates, calling him by name, inquired, "Hermogenes, could you define 'convivial unpleasantness' for us?"

"If you ask me what it actually is," he answered, "I do not know; but I am willing to tell you what I think it is."

Soc. "Very well, tell us that."

Herm. "My definition of 'convivial unpleasantness' is the annoying of one's companions at their drink."

Soc. "Well, do you realize that at the present moment you conform to the definition by annoying us with your taciturnity?"

Herm. "What! while you are talking?"

"No, but in the intervals."

"Why, don't you see that a person could not insert even a hair in the interstices of your talk, much less a word?"

"Callias," said Socrates, appealing to him, "could you come to the rescue of a man hard put to it for an answer?"

"Yes, indeed," said he: "we are absolutely quiet every time the flute is played."

Hermogenes retorted, "Is it your wish that I should converse with you to the accompaniment of a flute, the way the actor Nicostratus used to recite tetrameter verses?"

"In Heaven's name, do so, Hermogenes," urged Socrates. "For I believe that precisely as a song is more agreeable when accompanied on the flute, so your discourse would be embellished somewhat by the music, especially if you were to gesticulate and pose, like the flute-girl, to point your words."

"What is the tune to be," asked Callias, "when Antisthenes here gets some one at the banquet cornered in an argument?"

“For the discomfited disputant,” said Antisthenes, “I think the appropriate music would be a hissing.” The Syracusan, seeing that with such conversation going on the banqueters were paying no attention to his show, but were enjoying one another’s company, said spitefully to Socrates, “Socrates, are you the one nick-named the ‘Thinker’?”

“Well, isn’t that preferable,” he rejoined, “to being called the ‘Thoughtless’?”

“Yes, if it were not that you are supposed to be a thinker on celestial subjects.”

“Do you know,” asked Socrates, “anything more celestial than the gods?”

Syr. “No; but that is not what people say you are concerned with, but rather with the most unbeneficial things.”

Soc. “Even granting the expression, it would still be the gods that are my concern; for (1) they cause rain under the heavens and so are beneficial? and (2) they produce light, also under the heavens, and are thus again beneficial. If the pun is strained,” he added, “you have only yourself to blame for it, for annoying me.”

Svr. “Well, let that pass. But tell me the distance between us in flea’s feet; for people say that your geometry includes such measurements as that.”

At this Antisthenes said to Philip: “You are clever at hitting off a person’s likeness; wouldn’t you say that our friend here resembles one with a penchant for abuse?”

“Yes, indeed,” came the answer; “and I see a resemblance in him to many another kind of person, too.”

“Nevertheless,” interposed Socrates, “do not draw the comparison, lest you take on a similar likeness to one stooping to abuse.”

“But suppose I am likening him to all the upright, the very elite; then I should deserve to be compared to a eulogist, rather than to a detractor.”

“Ah, you resemble the latter right now, for you are asserting that every one is better than he.”

“Would you have me compare him to those who excel him in villainy?”

“No, not those, either.”

“What, to no one?”

“No; don’t compare him to any one in any particular.”

“But if I hold my peace, I do not understand how I am going to render services suitable to such a fine dinner.”

“That is easily effected,” said Socrates, “if you will be reticent on matters that should not be talked about.”

Thus was quenched this bit of convivial unpleasantness.

VII. Then some among the rest of the banqueters kept urging Philip to go on with his comparisons, while others opposed. As the clamor rose to some height, Socrates once more interposed, saying: “Since we all want to talk, would this not be a fine time to join in singing?” And with the words he began a song. When they had finished, a potter’s wheel was brought in for the dancing-girl on which she intended performing some feats of jugglery.

This prompted Socrates to observe to the Syracusan: “Sir, it is quite probable that, to use your words, I am indeed a ‘thinker’; at any rate, I am now considering how it might be possible for this lad of yours and this maid to exert as little effort as may be, and at the same time give us the greatest possible amount of pleasure in watching them,— this being your purpose, also, I am sure. Now, turning somersaults in among knives seems to me to be a dangerous exhibition, which is utterly out of place at a banquet. Also, to write or

read aloud on a whirling potter's wheel may perhaps be something of a feat; yet I cannot conceive what pleasure even this can afford. Nor is it any more diverting to watch the young and beautiful going through bodily contortions and imitating hoops than to contemplate them in repose. For it is of course no rare event to meet with marvels, if that is what one's mind is set on. He may marvel at what he finds immediately at hand,—for instance, why the lamp gives light owing to its having a bright flame, while a bronze mirror, likewise bright, does not produce light but instead reflects other things that appear in it; or how it comes about that olive oil, though wet, makes the flame higher, while water, because it is wet, puts the fire out. However, these questions also fail to promote the same object that wine does; but if the young people were to have a flute accompaniment and dance figures depicting the Graces, the Horae, and the Nymphs, I believe that they would be far less wearied themselves and that the charms of the banquet would be greatly enhanced."

"Upon my word, Socrates," replied the Syracusan, "you are quite right; and I will bring in a spectacle that will delight you."

VIII. So the Syracusan withdrew amid applause. Socrates now opened up another new topic for discussion. "Gentlemen," said he, "it is to be expected of us, is it not, when in the presence of a mighty deity that is coeval with the eternal gods, yet youngest of them all in appearance, in magnitude encompassing the universe, but enthroned in the heart of man,— I mean Love,—that we should not be unmindful of him, particularly in view of the fact that we are all of his following? For I cannot name a time when I was not in love with some one, and I know that Charmides here has gained many lovers and has in some instances felt the passion himself; and Critobulus, though even yet the object

of love, is already beginning to feel this passion for others. Nay, Niceratus too, so I am told, is in love with his wife and finds his love reciprocated. And as for Hermogenes, who of us does not know that he is pining away with love for nobility of character, whatever that may be? Do you not observe how serious his brows are, how calm his gaze, how modest his words, how gentle his voice, how genial his demeanor? That though he enjoys the friendship of the most august gods, yet he does not disdain us mortals? Are you the only person, Antisthenes, in love with no one?"

"No, by Heaven!" replied he; "I am madly in love—with you."

And Socrates, banteringly, pretending to be coquettish, said: "Don't pester me just now; I am engaged in other business, as you see."

"How transparent you are, sir procurer of your own charms," Antisthenes rejoined, "in always doing something like this; at one time you refuse me audience on the pretext of your divine sign, at another time because you have some other purpose in mind."

"In Heaven's name, Antisthenes." implored Socrates, "only refrain from beating me; any other manifestation of your bad temper I am wont to endure, and shall continue to do so, in a friendly spirit. But," he went on, "let us keep your love a secret, because it is founded not on my spirit but on my physical beauty. But as for you, Callias, all the city knows that you are in love with Autolycus, and so, I think, do a great many men from abroad. The reason for this is the fact that you are both sons of distinguished fathers and are yourselves in the public eye. Now, I have always felt an admiration for your character, but at the present time I feel a much keener one, for I see that you are in love with a person who is not marked by dainty elegance nor wanton

effeminacy, but shows to the world physical strength and stamina, virile courage and sobriety. Setting one's heart on such traits gives an insight into the lover's character. Now, whether there is one Aphrodite or two, 'Heavenly' and 'Vulgar,' I do not know; for even Zeus, though considered one and the same, yet has many by-names. I do know, however, that in the case of Aphrodite there are separate altars and temples for the two, and also rituals, those of the 'Vulgar' Aphrodite excelling in looseness, those of the 'Heavenly' in chastity. One might conjecture, also, that different types of love come from the different sources, carnal love from the 'Vulgar' Aphrodite, and from the 'Heavenly' spiritual love, love of friendship and of noble conduct. That is the sort of love, Callias, that seems to have you in its grip. I infer this from the noble nature of the one you love and because I see that you include his father in your meetings with him. For the virtuous lover does not make any of these matters a secret from the father of his beloved."

"Marry," said Hermogenes, "you arouse my admiration in numerous ways, Socrates, but now more than ever, because in the very act of flattering Callias you are in fact educating him to conform to the ideal."

"True," he replied; "and to add to his pleasure, I wish to bear testimony to him that spiritual love is far superior to carnal. For we all know that there is no converse worth the mention that does not comprise affection. Now affection on the part of those who feel admiration for character is commonly termed a pleasant and willing constraint; whereas many of those who have a merely physical concupiscence reprehend and detest the ways of those they love. But suppose they are satisfied on both scores; yet the bloom of youth soon passes its prime, and as this disappears, affection also inevitably fades away as fast; but the soul becomes more and more lovable the longer it progresses

toward wisdom. Besides, in the enjoyment of physical beauty there is a point of surfeit, so that one cannot help feeling toward his favorite the same effect that he gets toward food by gratification of the appetite. But affection for the soul, being pure, is also less liable to satiety, though it does not follow, as one might suppose, that it is also less rich in the graces of Aphrodite; on the contrary, our prayer that the goddess will bestow her grace on our words and deeds is manifestly answered. Now, no further argument is necessary to show that a soul verdant with the beauty of freeborn men and with a disposition that is reverent and noble, a soul that from the very first displays its leadership among its own fellows and is kindly withal, feels an admiration and an affection for the object of its love; but I will go on to prove the reasonableness of the position that such a lover will have his affection returned. First, who could feel dislike for one by whom he knew himself to be regarded as the pattern of nobleness, and, in the next place, saw that he made his favorite's honor of more account than his own pleasure, and beside this felt assured that this affection would not be lessened under any circumstances, no matter whether he suffered some reverse or lost his comeliness through the ravages of illness? Moreover, must not those who enjoy a mutual affection unavoidably take pleasure in looking into each other's faces, converse in amity, and trust and be trusted, and not only take thought each for the other but also take a common joy in prosperity and feel a common distress if some ill fortune befall, and live in happiness when their society is attended by sound health, but be much more constantly together if one or the other become ill, and be even more solicitous, each for the other, when absent than when present? Are not all these things marked by Aphrodite's grace? It is by conducting themselves thus that men continue mutually to love friendship and enjoy it clear

down to old age. But what is there to induce a favorite to make a return of affection to a lover who bases his feeling solely on the flesh? Would it be the consideration that the lover allots to himself the joys he desires but gives the favorite only what excites the deepest contempt? Or that he conceals, as best he can, from the favorite's relatives the ends that he is bent on attaining? As for his using entreaty rather than coercion, that is all the stronger reason for detestation. For any one who applies force merely discovers his rascality, but he who uses persuasion corrupts the soul of the one upon whom he prevails. Once more, how will he who traffics in his beauty feel greater affection toward the buyer than he who puts his produce up for sale and disposes of it in the open market? For assuredly he will not be moved to affection because he is a youthful companion to one who is not youthful, or because he is handsome when the other is no longer so, or because he is untouched by passion when the other is in its sway. For a youth does not share in the pleasure of the intercourse as a woman does, but looks on, sober, at another in love's intoxication. Consequently, it need not excite any surprise if contempt for the lover is engendered in him. If one looked into the matter, also, he would descry no ill effect when people are loved for their personality, but that many shocking results have come from companionship lost to shame. I will now go on to show also that the union is servile when one's regard is for the body rather than when it is for the soul. For he who inculcates right speech and conduct would merit the honor given by Achilles to Cheiron and Phoenix;1 but the man who lusts only after the flesh would with good reason be treated like a mendicant; for he is always dogging the footsteps of his favorite, begging and beseeching the favor of one more kiss or some other caress. Do not be surprised at my plain speaking; the wine helps to incite me, and the kind of love

that ever dwells with me spurs me on to say what I think about its opposite. For, to my way of thinking, the man whose attention is attracted only by his beloved's appearance is like one who has rented a farm; his aim is not to increase its value but to gain from it as much of a harvest as he can for himself. On the other hand, the man whose goal is friendship is more like one possessing a farm of his own; at any rate he utilizes all sources to enhance his loved one's worth. Furthermore, the favorite who realizes that he who lavishes physical charms will be the lover's sovereign will in all likelihood be loose in his general conduct; but the one who feels that he cannot keep his lover faithful without nobility of character will more probably give heed to virtue. But the greatest blessing that befalls the man who yearns to render his favorite .a good friend is the necessity of himself making virtue his habitual practice. For one cannot produce goodness in his companion while his own conduct is evil, nor can he himself exhibit shamelessness and incontinence and at the same time render his beloved self-controlled and reverent. My heart is set on showing you, Callias, on the basis of olden tales, also, that not only humankind but also gods and demi-gods set higher value on the friendship of the spirit than on the enjoyment of the body. For in all cases where Zeus became enamored of mortal women for their beauty, though he united with them he suffered them to remain mortal; but all those persons whom he delighted in for their souls' sake he made immortal. Among the latter are Heracles and the Sons of Zeus and tradition includes others also. And I aver that even in the case of Ganymede, it was not his person but his spiritual character that influenced Zeus to carry him up to Olympus. This is confirmed by his very name. Homer, you remember, has the words,

'He joys to hear';

that is to say, 'he rejoices to hear;' and in another place,

'harboring shrewd devices in his heart.'

This, again, means 'harboring wise counsels in his heart.' So the name given Ganymede, compounded of the two foregoing elements, signifies not physically but mentally attractive; hence his honor among the gods. Or again, Niceratus, Homer pictures us Achilles looking upon Patroclus not as the object of his passion but as a comrade, and in this spirit signally avenging his death. So we have songs telling also how Orestes, Pylades, Theseus, Peirithous, and many other illustrious demi-gods wrought glorious deeds of valor side by side, not because they shared a common bed but because of mutual admiration and respect. Moreover, take the splendid feats of the present day; would not a person discover that they are all done for glory's sake by persons willing to endure hardship and jeopardy, rather than by those who are drifting into the habit of preferring pleasure to a good name? Yet Pausanias, the lover of the poet Agathon, has said in his defense of those who wallow in lasciviousness that the most valiant army, even, would be one recruited of lovers and their favorites! For these, he said, would in his opinion be most likely to be prevented by shame from deserting one another,—a strange assertion, indeed, that persons acquiring an habitual indifference to censure and to abandoned conduct toward one another will be most likely to be deterred by shame from any infamous act. But he went further and adduced as evidence in support of his position both the Thebans and the Eleans, alleging that this was their policy; he stated, in fine, that though sharing common beds they nevertheless assigned to their favorites places alongside themselves in the battle-line. But this is a false analogy; for such practices, though normal among them, with us are banned by the severest reprobation. My own view is that those who assign these posts in battle suggest thereby that they are suspicious that the objects of

their love, if left by themselves, will not perform the duties of brave men. In contrast to this, the Lacedaemonians, who hold that if a person so much as feels a carnal concupiscence he will never come to any good end, cause the objects of their love to be so consummately brave that even when arrayed with foreigners and even when not stationed in the same line with their lovers they just as surely feel ashamed to desert their comrades. For the goddess they worship is not Impudence but Modesty. We could all come to one mind, I think, on the point I am trying to make, if we were to consider the question in this way: of two lads, the objects of the different types of love, which one would a person prefer to trust with his money, or his children, or to lay under the obligation of a favor? My own belief is that even the person whose love is founded on the loved one's physical beauty would in all these cases rather put his trust in him whose loveliness is of the spirit. In your case, Callias, I deem it meet that you should thank Heaven for inspiring you with love for Autolycus. For his ardor for glory is manifest, inasmuch as he undergoes many toils and many bodily discomforts to ensure his being proclaimed victor in the pancratium. Now if he were to believe that he is going not merely to shed luster on himself and his father but also to acquire through his manly virtue the ability to serve his friends and to exalt his country by setting up trophies of victory over its enemies, and for these reasons draw the admiring glances of all and be famous among both Greeks and barbarians, do you not suppose that he would esteem and honor highly any one whom he looked upon as the best partner in furthering these designs? If, then, you would be in his good graces, you must try to find out what sort of knowledge it was that made Themistocles able to give Greece liberty; you must try to find out what kind of knowledge it was that gave Pericles the name of being his country's wisest counselor; you must

reflect, further, how it was that Solon by deep meditation established in his city laws of surpassing worth; you must search and find out what kind of practices it is that gives the Lacedaemonians the reputation of being pre-eminent military commanders; for you are their proxenus, and their foremost citizens are always being entertained at your house. You may regard it as certain, therefore, that our city would be quick to entrust itself to your hands, if you so desire. For you possess the highest qualifications for such a trust: you are of aristocratic birth, of Erechtheus' line, a priest serving the gods who under the leadership of Iacchus took the field against the barbarian;3 and in our day you outshine your predecessors in the splendor of your priestly office in the festival;4 and you possess a person more goodly to the eye than any other in the city and one at the same time able to withstand effort and hardship. If what I say appears to you gentlemen to be too grave and earnest for a drinking party, I beg you again not to be surprised. For during practically all my life I have been at one with the commonwealth in loving men who to a nature already good add a zealous desire for virtue."

The rest of the company now engaged in a discussion of the views propounded by Socrates; but Autolycus kept his eyes fixed on Callias. And Callias, addressing Socrates, but looking beyond him and returning the gaze of Autolycus, said: "So you intend acting the procurer, do you, Socrates, to bring me to the attention of the commonwealth, so that may enter politics, and the state may always look upon me with favor?"

"Assuredly," was the reply, "that is, if people see that you set your heart on virtue, not in pretence, but in reality. For false reputation is soon exposed when tried by experience, whereas true manly virtue,—barring the interposition of

Providence,— confers ever more and more brilliant glory when put to the test of actual deeds."

IX. Their conversation ended here. Autolycus got up to go out for a walk (it being now his usual time); and his father Lycon, as he was departing to accompany him, turned back and said: "So help me Hera, Socrates, you seem to me to have a truly noble character."

After he had withdrawn, a chair of state, first of all, was set down in the room, and then the Syracusan came in with the announcement: "Gentlemen, Ariadne will now enter the chamber set apart for her and Dionysus; after that, Dionysus, a little flushed with wine drunk at a banquet of the gods, will come to join her; and then they will disport themselves together."

Then, to start proceedings, in came Ariadne, appareled as a bride, and took her seat in the chair. Dionysus being still invisible, there was heard the Bacchic music played on a flute. Then it was that the assemblage was filled with admiration of the dancing master. For as soon as Ariadne heard the strain, her action was such that every one might have perceived her joy at the sound; and although she did not go to meet Dionysus, nor even rise, yet it was clear that she kept her composure with difficulty. But when Dionysus caught sight of her, he came dancing toward her and in a most loving manner sat himself on her lap, and putting his arms about her gave her a kiss. Her demeanor was all modesty, and yet she returned his embrace with affection. As the banqueters beheld it, they kept clapping and crying "encore!" Then when Dionysus arose and gave his hand to Ariadne to rise also, there was presented the impersonation of lovers kissing and caressing each other. The onlookers viewed a Dionysus truly handsome, an Ariadne truly fair, not presenting a burlesque but offering genuine kisses with their lips; and they were all raised to a high pitch of

enthusiasm as they looked on. For they overheard Dionysus asking her if she loved him, and heard her vowing that she did, so earnestly that not only Dionysus but all the bystanders as well would have taken their oaths in confirmation that the youth and the maid surely felt a mutual affection. For theirs was the appearance not of actors who had been taught their poses but of persons now permitted to satisfy their long-cherished desires. At last, the banqueters, seeing them in each other's embrace and obviously leaving for the bridal couch, those who were unwedded swore that they would take to themselves wives, and those who were already married mounted horse and rode off to their wives that they might enjoy them. As for Socrates and the others who had lingered behind, they went out with Callias to join Lycon and his son in their walk.

So broke up the banquet held that evening.

SOCRATES' DEFENSE TO THE JURY

It seems to me fitting to hand down to memory, furthermore, how Socrates, on being indicted, deliberated on his defense and on his end. It is true that others have written about this, and that all of them have reproduced the loftiness of his words,—a fact which proves that his utterance really was of the character intimated;—but they have not shown clearly that he had now come to the conclusion that for him death was more to be desired than life; and hence his lofty utterance appears rather ill-considered. Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, however, was a companion of his and has given us reports of such a nature as to show that the sublimity of his speech was appropriate to the resolve he had made. For he stated that on seeing Socrates discussing any and every subject rather than the trial, he had said: "Socrates, ought you not to be giving some thought to what defense you are going to make?" That Socrates had at first replied, "Why, do I not seem to you to have spent my whole life in preparing to defend myself?" Then when he asked, "How so?" he had said, "Because all my life I have been guiltless of wrong-doing; and that I consider the finest preparation for a defense." Then when Hermogenes again asked, "Do you not observe that the Athenian courts have often been carried away by an eloquent speech and have condemned innocent men to death, and often on the other hand the guilty have been acquitted either because their plea aroused compassion or because their speech was witty?" "Yes, indeed!" he had answered; "and I have tried twice already to meditate on my defense, but my divine sign interposes." And when Hermogenes observed, "That is a surprising statement," he had replied, "Do you think it surprising that even God holds it better for me to die now? Do you not know that I would refuse to concede that any man has lived a better life than I have up to now? For I

have realized that my whole life has been spent in righteousness toward God and man,—a fact that affords the greatest satisfaction; and so I have felt a deep self-respect and have discovered that my associates hold corresponding sentiments toward me. But now, if my years are prolonged, I know that the frailties of old age will inevitably be realized,—that my vision must be less perfect and my hearing less keen, that I shall be slower to learn and more forgetful of what I have learned. If I perceive my decay and take to complaining, how," he had continued, "could I any longer take pleasure in life? Perhaps," he added, "God in his kindness is taking my part and securing me the opportunity of ending my life not only in season but also in the way that is easiest. For if I am condemned now, it will clearly be my privilege to suffer a death that is adjudged by those who have superintended this matter to be not only the easiest but also the least irksome to one's friends and one that implants in them the deepest feeling of loss for the dead. For when a person leaves behind in the hearts of his companions no remembrance to cause a blush or a pang, but dissolution comes while he still possesses a sound body and a spirit capable of showing kindliness, how could such a one fail to be sorely missed? It was with good reason," Socrates had continued, "that the gods opposed my studying up my speech at the time when we held that by fair means or foul we must find some plea that would effect my acquittal. For if I had achieved this end, it is clear that instead of now passing out of life, I should merely have provided for dying in the throes of illness or vexed by old age, the sink into which all distresses flow, unrelieved by any joy. As Heaven is my witness, Hermogenes," he had gone on, "1 shall never court that fate; but if I am going to offend the jury by declaring all the blessings that I feel gods and men have bestowed on me, as well as my personal opinion of myself, I

shall prefer death to begging meanly for longer life and thus gaining a life far less worthy in exchange for death." Hermosenes stated that with this resolve Socrates came before the jury after his adversaries had charged him with not believing in the gods worshipped by the state and with the introduction of new deities in their stead and with corruption of the young, and replied: "One thing that I marvel at in Meletus, gentlemen, is what may be the basis of his assertion that do not believe in the gods worshipped by the state; for all who have happened to be near at the time, as well as Meletus himself,—if he so desired,— have seen me sacrificing at the communal festivals and on the public altars. As for introducing 'new divinities,' how could I be guilty of that merely in asserting that a voice of God is made manifest to me indicating my duty? Surely those who take their omens from the cries of birds and the utterances of men form their judgments on 'voices.' Will any one dispute either that thunder utters its 'voice,' or that it is an omen of the greatest moment? Does not the very priestess who sits on the tripod at Delphi divulge the god's will through a 'voice'? But more than that, in regard to God's foreknowledge of the future and his forewarning thereof to whomsoever he will, these are the same terms, I assert, that all men use, and this is their belief. The only difference between them and me is that whereas they call the sources of their forewarning 'birds,' 'utterances,' 'chance meetings,' 'prophets,' I call mine a 'divine' thing:1 and think that in using such a term I am speaking with more truth and deeper religious feeling than do those who ascribe the gods' power to birds. Now' that I do not lie against God I have the following proof: I have revealed to many of my friends the counsels which God has given me, and in no instance has the event shown that I was mistaken."

Hermogenes further reported that when the jurors raised a clamor at hearing these words, some of them disbelieving his statements, others showing jealousy at his receiving greater favors even from the gods than they, Socrates resumed: “Hark ye; let me tell you something more, so that those of you who feel so inclined may have still greater disbelief in my being honored of Heaven. Once on a time when Chaerephon made inquiry at the Delphic oracle concerning me, in the presence of many people Apollo answered that no man was more free than I, or more just, or more prudent.”

When the jurors, naturally enough, made a still greater tumult on hearing this statement, he said that Socrates again went on: “And yet, gentlemen, the god uttered in oracles greater things of Lycurgus, the Lacedaemonian law-giver, than he did of me. For there is a legend that, as Lycurgus entered the temple, the god thus addressed him: ‘I am pondering whether to call you god or man,’ Now Apollo did not compare me to a god; he did, however, judge that I far excelled the rest of mankind. However, do not believe the god even in this without due grounds, but examine the god’s utterance in detail. First, who is there in your knowledge that is less a slave to his bodily appetites than I am? Who in the world more free,—for I accept neither gifts nor pay from any one? Whom would you with reason regard as more just than the one so reconciled to his present possessions as to want nothing beside that belongs to another? And would not a person with good reason call me a wise man, who from the time when I began to understand spoken words have never left off seeking after and learning every good thing that I could? And that my labor has not been in vain do you not think is attested by this fact, that many of my fellow-citizens who strive for virtue and many from abroad choose to associate with me above all other men? And what shall we

say is accountable for this fact, that although everybody knows that it is quite impossible for me to repay with money, many people are eager to make me some gift? Or for this, that no demands are made on me by a single person for the repayment of benefits, while many confess that they owe me a debt of gratitude? Or for this, that during the siege,1 while others were commiserating their lot, I got along without feeling the pinch of poverty any worse than when the city's prosperity was at its height? Or for this, that while other men get their delicacies in the markets and pay a high price for them, I devise more pleasurable ones from the resources of my soul, with no expenditure of money? And now, if no one can convict me of misstatement in all that I have said of myself, do I not unquestionably merit praise from both gods and men? But in spite of all, Meletus, do you maintain that I corrupt the young by such practices? And yet surely we know what kinds of corruption affect the young; so you tell us whether you know of any one who under my influence has fallen from piety into impiety, or from sober into wanton conduct, or from moderation in living into extravagance, or from temperate drinking into sottishness, or from strenuousness into effeminacy, or has been overcome of any other base pleasure." "But, by Heaven!" said Meletus: "there is one set of men I know,—those whom you have persuaded to obey you rather than their parents." "I admit it," he reports Socrates as replying, at least so far as education is concerned; for people know that I have taken an interest in that. But in a question of health, men take the advice of physicians rather than that of their parents; and moreover, in the meetings of the legislative assembly all the people of Athens, without question, follow the advice of those whose words are wisest rather than that of their own relatives. Do you not also elect for your generals, in preference to fathers and brothers.,—yes. by Heaven! in preference to your very

selves,—those whom you regard as having the greatest wisdom in military affairs?" "Yes," Meletus had said; for that is both expedient and conventional." "Well, then," Socrates had rejoined, "does it not seem to you an amazing thing that while in other activities those who excel receive honors not merely on a parity with their fellows but even more marked ones, yet I, because I am adjudged by some people supreme in what is man's greatest blessing,— education,— am being prosecuted by you on a capital charge?"

More than this of course was said both by Socrates himself and by the friends who joined in his defense. But I have not made it a point to report the whole trial; rather I am satisfied to make it clear that while Socrates' whole concern was to keep free from any act of impiety toward the sods or any appearance of wrong-doing toward man, he did not think it meet to beseech the jury to let him escape death; instead, he believed that the time had now come for him to die. This conviction of his became more evident than ever after the adverse issue of the trial. For, first of all, when he was bidden to name his penalty, he refused personally and forbade his friends to name one, but said that naming the penalty in itself implied an acknowledgment of guilt. Then, when his companions wished to remove him clandestinely from prison, he would not accompany them, but seemed actually to banter them, asking them whether they knew of any spot outside of Attica that was inaccessible to death.

When the trial was over, Socrates (according to Hermogenes) remarked: "Well, gentlemen, those who instructed the witnesses that they must bear false witness against me, perjuring themselves to do so, and those who were won over to do this must feel in their hearts a guilty consciousness of great impiety and iniquity; but as for me, why should my spirit be any less exalted now than before my condemnation, since I have not been proved guilty of having

done any of the acts mentioned in the indictment? For it has not been shown that I have sacrificed to new deities in the stead of Zeus and Hera and the gods of their company, or that I have invoked in oaths or mentioned other gods. And how could I be corrupting the young by habituating them to fortitude and frugality? Now of all the acts for which the laws have prescribed the death-penalty— temple robbery, burglary, enslavement, treason to the state—not even my adversaries themselves charge me with having committed any of these. And so it seems astonishing to me how you could ever have been convinced that I had committed an act meriting death. But further, my spirit need not be less exalted because I am to be executed unjustly; for the ignominy of that attaches not to me but to those who condemned me. And I get comfort from the case of Palamedes,1 also, who died in circumstances similar to mine; for even yet he affords us far more noble themes for song than does Odysseus, the man who unjustly put him to death. And I know that time to come as well as time past will attest that I, too, far from ever doing any man a wrong or rendering him more wicked, have rather profited those who conversed with me by teaching them, without reward, every good thing that lay in my power."

With these words he departed, blithe in glance, in mien, in gait, as comported well indeed with the words he had just uttered. When he noticed that those who accompanied him were in tears, "What is this?" Hermogenes reports him as asking. "Are you just now beginning to weep? Have you not known all along that from the moment of my birth nature had condemned me to death? Verily, if I am being destroyed before my time while blessings are still pouring in upon me, clearly that should bring grief to me and to my well-wishers; but if I am ending my life when only troubles are in view, my

own opinion is that you ought all to feel cheered, in the assurance that my state is happy."

A man named Apollodorus, who was there with him, a very ardent disciple of Socrates, but otherwise simple, exclaimed, "But, Socrates, what I find it hardest to bear is that I see you being put to death unjustly!" The other, stroking Apollodorus' head, is said to have replied, "My beloved Apollodorus, was it your preference to see me put to death justly?" and smiled as he asked the question.

It is said also that he remarked as he saw Anytus passing by: "There goes a man who is filled with pride at the thought that he has accomplished some great and noble end in putting me to death, because, seeing him honored by the state with the highest offices, I said that he ought not to confine his son's education to hides. What a vicious fellow," he continued, "not to know, apparently, that whichever one of us has wrought the more beneficial and noble deeds for all time, he is the real victor. But," he is reported to have added, "Homer has attributed to some of his heroes at the moment of dissolution the power to foresee the future; and so I too wish to utter a prophecy. At one time I had a brief association with the son of Anytus, and I thought him not lacking in firmness of spirit; and so I predict that he will not continue in the servile occupation that his father has provided for him; but through want of a worthy adviser he will fall into some disgraceful propensity and will surely go far in the career of vice." In saving this he was not mistaken; the young man, delighting in wine, never left off drinking night or day, and at last turned out worth nothing to his city, his friends, or himself. So Anytus, even though dead, still enjoys an evil repute for his son's mischievous education and for his own hard-heartedness. And as for Socrates, by exalting himself before the court, he brought ill-will upon himself and made his conviction by the jury all the more

certain. Now to me he seems to have met a fate that the gods love; for he escaped the hardest part of life and met the easiest sort of death. And he displayed the stalwart nature of his heart; for having once decided that to die was better for him than to live longer, he did not weaken in the presence of death (just as he had never set his face against any other thing, either, that was for his good), but was cheerful not only in the expectation of death but in meeting it.

And so, in contemplating the man's wisdom and nobility of character, I find it beyond my power to forget him or, in remembering him, to refrain from praising him. And if among those who make virtue their aim any one has ever been brought into contact with a person more helpful than Socrates, I count that man worthy to be called most blessed.

Xenophon Memorabilia

Translated and Annotated by AMY L. BONNETTE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

Christopher Bruell

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INTRODUCTION

Xenophon and His Socrates

Christopher Bruell

The following remarks are intended to lend support to the view that Xenophon's account of Socrates deserves more respectful attention from those interested in Socrates than it often receives today. The demonstration of such a proposition is too great a task in this context. But I will try to create a predisposition in its favor (or on behalf of open-minded consideration of it) in two ways: first, by considering in a very general way what might be responsible for the current neglect of Xenophon's account; and, then, by giving a brief summary of the contents of the Memorabilia, the longest of Xenophon's four Socratic writings and the one to which this volume is devoted.

Far more obviously than Plato, Xenophon calls attention in his writings to his own relationship with Socrates. He claims frequently, Plato only once, to have been present at the Socratic conversations he reports. He often comments, in his own name, on Socrates' words and deeds and on his life as a whole, something Plato never does; and he sometimes talks of the impression they made on him in particular. In accord with this, he calls his longest Socratic work "Memorabilia," that is, "Recollections," his recollections of Socrates; there is no parallel to this in the Platonic dialogues. One might add that whereas the dialogues, with the possible exception of the Laws (and the Epinomis), are devoted entirely to Socrates—Plato himself being mentioned only three times, almost in passing—Xenophon's works include not only the Education of Cyrus, devoted to the founder of the Persian empire, but also the Anabasis of Cyrus, whose real hero, the rescuer of almost ten thousand Greeks from extreme peril in the heart of the Persian empire, is Xenophon himself.

All of this would seem to justify an expectation on our part of finding in Xenophon's works an account of his association with Socrates. But this expectation, if not entirely disappointed, is fulfilled in a surprising way. Xenophon recounts only two episodes in what must have been a complex friendship of some duration. The first was a conversation that took place in the presence of Crito's son, Critobulus, a lazy, fun-loving, and spendthrift youth, whom Socrates, despite or perhaps in part because of these qualities, liked to spend time with:

"Tell me, Xenophon," he said, "didn't you hold Critobulus to be one of the moderate rather than the rash human beings, and one of those with forethought rather than senseless and reckless?"

"Certainly," said Xenophon.

"Well, hold now that he is hotheaded and heedless in the extreme. He would even make somersaults into daggers and leap into fire."

"And what did you see him doing," said Xenophon, "that you have formed such judgments about him?"

"Did he not dare to kiss the son of Alcibiades, who is most fair and in his bloom?" he said.

“But if that is the reckless deed,” said Xenophon, “in my opinion, I, too, would endure this risk.”

“You wretch!” Socrates said. “And what do you think you would suffer after kissing someone beautiful? Would you not immediately be a slave rather than free, spend a lot for harmful pleasures, be in great want of leisure for attending to anything noble and good, and be compelled to take seriously what even a madman would not take seriously?”

“Heracles!” said Xenophon. “What a terrible power you ascribe to a kiss.”

“And do you wonder at this?” said Socrates. “Don’t you know that poisonous spiders not even half an obol in size crush human beings with pain and drive them from their senses merely by touching them with their mouths?”

“Yes, by Zeus!” said Xenophon. “For spiders inject something through their sting.”

“You fool!” said Socrates. “Do you think that when those who are beautiful kiss they don’t inject anything, just because you don’t see it? Don’t you know that this beast that they call beautiful and in bloom is so much more terrible than spiders that, while spiders inject something when they touch, it (even when it does not touch, but if one just looks at it) injects even from quite far away something of the sort to drive one mad?… But I counsel you, Xenophon, whenever you see someone beautiful, to flee without looking back.”

Xenophon often comments favorably on the effectiveness of Socratic exhortations. For some reason, he refrained from doing so in this case.

The second episode is recounted not in the Socratic writings proper, but in the Anabasis. Xenophon had received a letter from a friend inviting him to accompany the friend on an expedition being organized by Cyrus, the younger brother of the then Persian king. Xenophon took the letter to Socrates and consulted with him about the trip. Socrates was worried that association with Cyrus might get Xenophon into trouble with Athens, since Cyrus was thought to have given enthusiastic assistance to Sparta in its recent war with Athens. So Socrates advised Xenophon to go to Delphi to consult with the god about the trip. Xenophon went to Delphi, and he put a question to Apollo: to which of the gods should he sacrifice and pray in order to make the journey he intended to make in the noblest and best manner and to come back safely, having acted in a noble manner. When Xenophon returned to Athens with Apollo’s answer, Socrates blamed him for not having asked first whether it was better for him to make the trip or not; instead, Xenophon had made the chief decision himself and had asked only about the means. As a result, Socrates was compelled to advise Xenophon to proceed with the trip in accordance with the god’s instructions.

The account of his association with Socrates that Xenophon conveys through these stories is somewhat surprising in any case. It is all the more surprising for its apparent inconsistency with the impression conveyed by the features of his Socratic works we have mentioned: the stories seem to indicate that Xenophon did not place very great weight on his relationship with Socrates, even that he took it lightly. But perhaps that impression was in need of qualification or correction.

More precisely, what the stories indicate is that Xenophon was not entirely receptive to Socrates' advice. Beyond that, as his life as a whole also serves to suggest, Xenophon did not regard the Socratic life—the philosophic life pure and simple—as a model for him to follow in every respect. It is safe to assume that he expected the same to be true of many of his readers as well.

This consideration may help to explain another feature of Xenophon's Socratic works: the almost total absence from them of philosophic protreptic, exhortations to philosophize of the sort found in abundance in the Platonic dialogues. In their place, we find—in Xenophon's Symposium—a witty and lighthearted but no less telling critique of the Socratic circle, or at least of some of its most conspicuous members. (The very terms "philosophy," "philosophers," "philosophize," occur very infrequently in the Socratic writings.) Xenophon had a precise understanding of what the absence of philosophic protreptic entails. In the fourth book of his Memorabilia, he presents a caricature of such a protreptic. It is a caricature because its object, the boy to be converted to philosophy, is about as unfit for philosophy as a nature can be. Nevertheless, the presentation of this defective case provides some basis for figuring out what a non-defective protreptic might require. An appeal to the potential convert's concern for justice, followed by a thoroughgoing critique of his conscious or unconscious conviction that he knows what justice is, would appear to play a very large role here. Now Xenophon refers rather frequently in his Socratic works to the Socratic examination of justice; but he gives us relatively few examples of it. More generally, he does little to bring the Socratic treatment of justice to life before our eyes and ears: there is no Xenophontic counterpart to Plato's *Republic* or *Gorgias*.

Perhaps with such differences in mind, an admirer of Xenophon from former times distinguished between the sublimity of Plato and the "natural and simple genius" of Xenophon, "comprehended by so few and so little relished by the vulgar." It is tempting to understand this comment in the light of a somewhat mischievous remark of Montesquieu: "Human beings, rogues individually, are en masse very decent people: they love morality; and ... I would say that this is seen admirably well in the theater. One is certain to please the people with the sentiments that morality avows, and one is certain to shock them by those it reproves." But one must think of the higher, the more sublime, rather than the low manifestations of the disposition described by Montesquieu—of Glaucon and Adeimantus rather than Babbitt. If philosophy itself is the true opposite of vulgarity, then prior to falling in love with philosophy in the proper way, the future philosophers themselves cannot be entirely free of vulgar concerns and tastes; a philosophic protreptic would therefore have to appeal to those concerns, if only for the sake of leading its addressees beyond them; and in doing so, it would inevitably partake of the vulgarity it seeks to cure. Xenophon's abstaining, or his having his Socrates abstain, from any serious protreptic effort thus has the perhaps incidental advantage of enabling him to present a Socrates remarkably free of vulgarity of this sort. To put this another way, Xenophon does not bend very much to make the better part of his readers like the Socrates he presents—and, for this very reason, they may, if they come to like him at all, like him all the more.

But Xenophon does make accommodations to a different version of vulgarity, going much farther in this respect than Plato does. In seeking to convince not only the better part but also the vast majority of his readers that Socrates' conviction on a capital charge was absurd, Xenophon uses arguments of a sort that any sufficiently clever lawyer might use if confronted with such a jury. In particular, he goes as far as he can to present Socrates as an ordinary fellow who neither thinks nor does anything out of the ordinary, and as a lover of the demos and his fellow man, and a great benefactor of those who associated with him. That is, Xenophon bids his reader—or accepts the predisposition of many of them—to judge Socrates according to a standard he elsewhere identifies as a vulgar one: "The majority, as it seems, define as good men those who are their benefactors". He goes even farther by having his Socrates, in his ordinariness, profess a number of kindred opinions—for example, the view that certain mercenary relations deserve the name of friendship. Xenophon's Socrates says to an acquaintance on a certain occasion, "On account of the present bad state of affairs, good friends can now be purchased quite cheaply." Xenophon's better readers cannot help noticing such vulgarity; and, remote as we believe we are today from the needs that dictated its use, they cannot help being offended by it. Too refined to tolerate Xenophon's obvious vulgarity, they are not refined enough to observe the quiet evidence of his delicacy and good taste.

The Memorabilia is divided into thirty-nine chapters, which fall into a number of parts. I will go through these sections more or less in order, feeling free, however, to skip around from time to time. In the first two chapters, Xenophon takes up directly, and refutes, the twofold charge on which Socrates was convicted and put to death. The refutation of the impiety charge requires, in Xenophon's view, at least the apparent denial that Socrates was concerned with natural philosophy—that is, with the investigation of the nature of all things, in particular the state of the cosmos and the necessities by which each of the heavenly things comes into being. And while Xenophon gives a number of indications, both in the Memorabilia itself and in his other Socratic writings, that Socrates was indeed engaged in natural philosophy, together with information regarding the manner of his philosophic activity, the bulk of the Memorabilia is silent on this subject. It shows us Socrates not in his philosophic activity proper but in his relations with students, relatives, companions of various sorts, fellow citizens, and others, expressing views on personal as well as economic and political matters. Or it shows us something of what it means to be a philosopher by showing how philosophy affects a number of matters and relations with which we too are concerned. And it was perhaps Xenophon's interest in the question of philosophy as a way of life—as well as his cautious reluctance to say very much about Socrates' philosophic activity proper—that gave his recollections or Memorabilia this form.

The refutation of the corruption charge requires Xenophon to take up not only Socrates' own undoubted law-abidingness but his effect on his young companions. Socrates himself was of the opinion that those of his companions who accepted what he himself approved of would be good friends to him and to each other throughout their lives. Xenophon gives us some evidence, in the Symposium

especially, for doubting whether this was always the case—at least as far as some of those most eager to accept what Socrates approved of were concerned. On the other hand, some partial non-accepters, if Xenophon himself is a representative of this class, might have been quite good friends to Socrates. This question reminds us of Xenophon's other great hero, Cyrus. After conquering all of western Asia and elevating his friends almost to the peak of power, wealth, and honor, Cyrus paused to reflect on his own situation. He thus came to the realization that he had no enemies so dangerous to him as those very friends; and he took precautions commensurate with the danger. But even if Socrates' expectation was always borne out, were those who were good friends to him and to each other always good friends to the city as well? Xenophon admits that Socrates made his companions more attached to him than to their nearest and dearest: would this not have held true also with regard to their attachment to the city? According to another suggestion that Xenophon conveys through his Education of Cyrus, Socrates was put to death for alienating the affections of the young.

Even if we leave this question aside, a problem would still be caused by the facts that the Socratic circle could not have been limited to those fully willing and able to accept what Socrates approved of, and that not every non-accepter or partial accepter could be expected to be a Xenophon. At the minimum, Socrates' companions must have included, at most if not all times, some youths who were still only potential philosophers and who, therefore, could not yet fully accept what they did not yet fully understand. Beyond that, could even Socrates know in advance which among the gifted and well-disposed youths had all that the philosophic life requires?

Do the proper disposition and the necessary intellectual gifts always coincide? Could Socrates always avoid associating even with clearly unpromising cases? Did he always wish to avoid this?

The troubles these questions point to, both individually and taken together, were bound to crop up and did crop up—most conspicuously in the cases of Critias and Alcibiades, notorious political criminals who were, at one time or another, closely associated with Socrates. In his treatment of these cases, Xenophon dutifully tries to follow the line laid down by his Socrates: Critias and Alcibiades became bad only after leaving Socrates' company and even, partially at least, as a result of leaving it; their criminality is bound up entirely with their rejection of Socrates' teaching and example—it is certainly not due to any quasi acceptance of that teaching. Xenophon goes so far as to divide Socrates' companions into two classes: the bad ones like Alcibiades and Critias (only those two names are given in this context) and the good ones like Crito and Hermogenes (seven of these names are given), men who did not abandon Socrates and who, throughout their lives, never did or were even accused of doing anything bad. But this line of argument succeeds a little too well. It makes us wonder why Socrates would ever have wanted to associate with the "baddies" to begin with. That is, it leads us toward raising the questions we have already raised. Xenophon gives, in his Symposium, a beautiful illustration of the problem by contrasting Hermogenes, one of the aforementioned "goodies," with a man named Charmides, who must be classed with the "baddies,"

since he was later to become a quasi-partner in crime of Critias. Both Hermogenes and Charmides were guests at the banquet described in the Symposium, along with Socrates, Critobulus, and others. It will suffice to mention one episode of a more fully drawn characterization and comparison. Sometime after the drinking had commenced, Critobulus was flaunting his extreme infatuation or love for the boy Socrates had criticized him for kissing, in the conversation recounted earlier. Hermogenes took offense and took Socrates to task regarding Critobulus' disgraceful condition: "I think it is out of character, Socrates, for you to overlook the fact that Critobulus has been made so senseless by love." Socrates defended himself by saying that Critobulus' condition predated his own association with him. In fact, Critobulus was already far gone in love when his father, Socrates' companion Crito, turned him over to Socrates to see whether Socrates could help. "And he is already much better: hitherto he stared at the boy stone-like, like those who look at Gorgons, and stone-like, he never left him. But now I have already seen him blink!" Charmides had been listening to this exchange, which concluded with some Socratic remarks about the dangers of kissing. "Why is it, Socrates," he asked, "that you scare us, your friends, away from the beautiful, while you yourself I saw in the grammar school—yes, by Apollo—when you were both searching for something in the same book, head against head, bare shoulder against the bare shoulder of Critobulus?" To which Socrates replied, "So that is why I have felt pain in that shoulder for more than five days and seem to have some sting in my heart, as if bitten by a beast. But now, Critobulus, I declare publicly, before these many witnesses, that you are not to touch me before your beard is as full as the hair on your head." To come back to the Memorabilia, Xenophon indicates there that Socrates had a rather high regard for Charmides. The wish to associate with natures like his would, by itself, account for Socrates' willingness to teach politics, as Xenophon grants, even in the course of his response to the corruption charge, that he did.

The six chapters that follow suggest a reason for the apparent inconsistency noted by Charmides between Socrates' words and deeds: Socrates was exceptionally continent and could therefore safely permit himself temptations others could not. This part of the Memorabilia is devoted to showing how Socrates, through conversation and example, benefited his companions especially with regard to their becoming pious and continent. It features a number of exhortations to continence with respect to bodily pleasures—including the one addressed to Xenophon himself. Moreover, as Xenophon tells us, Socrates showed himself still more continent in his deeds than in his speeches. So impressive, not to say oppressive, is this continence that we are led increasingly to wonder what it is for. To put the problem as one of the exhortations does, continence is the foundation of virtue: it is not virtue itself. Returning for a minute to Xenophon's Symposium, we see that one of the ways in which the guests at that elegant banquet entertained themselves was by stating, each in turn, what he was most proud of and then defending his boast or claim. The occasion, needless to say, did not require that those boasts be entirely serious. Socrates, for example, claimed to be proud of his skill as a pimp. But Antisthenes, one of Socrates' most ardent admirers and an

extremely poor man, claimed to be proud of his wealth. When his turn came to defend this apparently absurd boast, he explained that he meant the wealth he possessed in his soul, wealth he had acquired from Socrates. As his longish statement makes clear, he understood by this "wealth" nothing so much as the extreme Socratic continence. Later in the evening, Socrates found an occasion to chastise Antisthenes playfully. He accused Antisthenes, who claimed to love him, of loving his beautiful body rather than his soul. In the same context, the fact emerged that Socrates did his best, by the use of one pretext or another, to avoid conversing with Antisthenes. In the Memorabilia, Xenophon stresses what Socrates, in the Symposium, called his bodily beauty: his continence and kindred qualities. Nevertheless, in various ways, he allows us glimpses of other things.

For example, Socrates had a number of conversations with a sophist named Antiphon, which Xenophon includes in the section we are discussing. "Do you think," Socrates asked on one of these occasions, "anything is more responsible for my not being enslaved to stomach or sleep or lust, than that I have other things more pleasant than these that delight not only in their use but also by providing hopes that they will benefit always?" And on another he said, "Accordingly, Antiphon, just as another is pleased by a good horse or a dog or a bird, so I myself am even more pleased by good friends, and if I possess something good I teach it, and I introduce them to others from whom, I believe, they will receive some benefit with a view to virtue. And reading in common with my friends, I go through the treasures of the wise men of old which they wrote and left behind in their books; and if we see something good, we pick it out; and we hold that it is a great gain if we become beneficial (or friends) to one another." Hearing this, Xenophon says, he thought Socrates to be blessed.

In the two chapters that follow this section, Socrates gives advice to individuals who have difficult relatives to deal with. In each case, Socrates has a connection with the parties concerned and thus a personal stake in the good behavior he urges. One of the addressees is Socrates' eldest son, Lamprocles, who is angry with his mother and is therefore acting, or in danger of acting, improperly toward her. In order to put his wife's harshness in some perspective, Socrates asks Lamprocles, "Which do you think is more difficult to bear, the ferocity of a beast or of a mother?" "For my part, I think that of a mother, at least one such as this." "Then has she ever yet done you any harm by biting or kicking, such things as many have suffered already from beasts?" "But, by Zeus, she says things that one wouldn't for all one's life wish to hear."… "Do you think it is harsher for you to hear what she says than it is for the actors when they say the most extreme things to one another in the tragedies?" Lamprocles responds that the actors easily bear the harsh words they have to listen to since they know they are spoken with no ill will. "And you, knowing very well that, when your mother speaks to you, she not only intends no harm but also wishes for you more good than for anyone else—knowing this you are angry?" The conversation of which these exchanges are a part is the only example given by Xenophon (or Plato) of an attempt on Socrates' part to educate his own children. In presenting the two chapters containing Socrates' conversations about relatives,

Xenophon abstains from any introductory comments and thus avoids speaking of Socrates' deeds generally as distinguished from his speech.

The next seven chapters concern friendship. According to Xenophon, the Socratic conversations or speeches reported in this section were useful with regard to the acquisition and use of friends, encouraged self-examination as to the amount of one's worth to one's friends, and gave instruction as to what sort of friends are worth acquiring. Socrates also attempted to bring relief to those of his friends who were in some difficulty or other. Where the difficulty was caused by ignorance, he attempted to cure it using his judgment; when it was caused by want, by teaching his friends to assist one another. To give one of the examples Xenophon furnishes of these efforts, a friend of Socrates was being eaten out of house and home because the wars, both civil and foreign, that had severely curtailed his income had also added to his burdens a large number of female relatives to support. Socrates' advice was simple: why don't you put them to work making something that can be sold? But in order to get that advice accepted, he had to relieve his friend of the foolish scruple or notion that free women (society ladies, one can say) ought not to engage in commercial activity. Once Socrates had succeeded in enlightening him, the advice was accepted and acted upon with great success. The ensuing harmony in the friend's home was, as he later reported to Socrates, disturbed only by the ladies' complaint that now the man was the only idle member of the household. Here, too, Socrates was able to be of help: "Then you aren't telling them the speech of the dog. For they say that, when the animals could speak, the ewe said to her master, 'You do an astonishing thing in giving us, who provide you with wool and lambs and cheese, nothing other than what we ourselves get from the earth, while you give the dog, who provides you with nothing of the sort, a share of your very own food.' And that when the dog heard this he said, 'Yes, by Zeus, for I am the one who in fact saves you sheep so that you are neither stolen by human beings nor seized by wolves, since indeed if I were not to guard over you, you would not even be able to graze out of fear that you might perish.'" Thus, according to Socrates, even the sheep acquiesced in the more honorable treatment for the dog. As this chapter reminds us, Xenophon and his Socrates were willing to use the term "friend" rather loosely. It could thus be applied to a number of different sorts of people with whom Socrates had relationships of various kinds. This fact, together with the attention given in the section on friendship to the question of what sort of friends are worth acquiring, makes us wonder what sort of friends Socrates himself thought most worth acquiring. An answer has already been indicated in Socrates' remarks to the sophist Antiphon and elsewhere. A more explicit statement comes later on in the Memorabilia when Xenophon explains what Socrates meant when he said, as he often did, that he was in love with someone: manifestly, he was not longing for those whose bodies were in bloom but those whose souls were naturally fit for acquiring virtue, that is, those who were quick at learning whatever they turned their minds to and remembered what they learned and desired all the sorts of learning relevant to the noble management of household and city and, in general, the good use of human beings and human affairs.

The emphasis in the friendship section as a whole on utilitarian considerations makes us wonder, in turn, about the possible elements of Socratic friendship other than utility, even utility of the sort pointed to in the remarks to Antiphon. The answer to this question is not without its relevance to the answer to the other one: what sort of friends Socrates thought worth acquiring. And in this connection, we might note that after explaining as he does what Socrates meant when he said he was in love with someone, Xenophon seems to go out of his way to show how much time Socrates spent with a certain brainless beauty. (We can also recall here his liking for Critobulus.) In one of the friendship chapters, Socrates distinguishes between friendships acquired through the use of "love charms" and those acquired through conferring benefits. Later on in the Memorabilia, he admits to being a master in the use of such charms. Or, as he says in the chapter in which they are first mentioned, he is erotic and therefore strives mightily, with his whole being, to be loved by those he loves, longed for by those he longs for, and to have those he desires to be with, desire to be with him.

Xenophon gives four examples in the friendship section of Socrates' attempts to relieve the difficulties of his friends. There are indications, as we have to some extent already seen, that some or all of these efforts took place against the background of the awful suffering brought to Athens, to the vast majority of Socrates' fellow citizens, by the latter part of the Peloponnesian War and its aftermath. Xenophon gives us no report of a Socratic attempt to relieve the distress of his city, unless one or more of the conversations reported in the seven chapters he places next constitute such an attempt. Socrates speaks in these conversations to actual or potential or aspiring military and political leaders of the city—in one case giving advice with regard to the current distress, in another urging a capable man not to shrink from playing a (greater) public role. In his general introduction to the conversations in question, however, Xenophon claims no more for them than that they benefited the individuals addressed—individuals whom he characterizes as "those longing for the noble things," that is, for public honors—by making them take the care or make the effort appropriate to such longing. These conversations explore, in an extremely thorough way, what political or military leadership calls for and therefore, in particular, whether what it calls for is of benefit to the leader himself. Socrates seems to indicate that some doubts are in order on that score; surely, he himself never sought political leadership. Yet in a conversation that took place in an earlier section, he had chastised a companion of his who wished to live an entirely unpolitical life—the life of one who is a foreigner in every land—so as to avoid the burdens that come with sharing political responsibility. The companion believed that he was following a path that led to happiness precisely because it avoided both ruling on the one hand and slavery on the other. Socrates said on that occasion, "If the path avoids human beings as well, just as it avoids both ruling and slavery, you might have a point," and he pointed out the dangers to which the weak in general and foreigners in particular are exposed. The only real choices are ruling or being ruled or voluntarily serving the rulers. Or, as Socrates put it when asked on another occasion why he had married the most difficult of all women past, present, and future, "I have acquired her because I want to make use

of and associate with human beings, knowing well that if I can endure her, I will keep company with all other human beings with ease."

The seven chapters that follow the section on politics do not seem to belong to a single group. The most significant are probably the first two, where we are told what Socrates said about certain characteristic themes. For example, Socrates called kings and rulers not those who possess the scepter or those chosen by any chance group or by lot or those who have gotten where they are by force or fraud but those who know how to rule. This remark admits of a number of different interpretations. Left to his own devices, Socrates would enlarge on it in the most innocent way. But if someone objected that it is possible for a tyrant not to obey the knowers, those who speak correctly, Socrates said, "How indeed would it be possible for him not to obey since a penalty is laid down if someone doesn't obey the one who speaks well; for in whatever matter one doesn't obey the one who speaks well, he will no doubt err, and in erring be penalized." If someone persisted in the objection, saying that it is possible for the tyrant to kill the one who thinks well, Socrates said, "But do you think that one who has killed the best of his allies is free from penalty, or that he suffers some chance penalty? For do you think the one who does. this would be preserved, or rather, that he would quickly perish?" And, in general, as Xenophon tells us later on, Socrates treated those who objected to what he said differently from those who listened in silence, "if someone contradicted him on some subject…, he led the whole argument back to its hypothesis… Thus the truth became manifest to the objectors themselves. But whenever he went through an argument on some subject by himself, he kept to the path of the opinions most generally agreed upon, considering that manner of argument to be the safe one."

Seven of the last eight chapters of the Memorabilia are devoted to Socratic education. They show first how Socrates attracted the attention of certain types of potential students and then how he led one student in particular through the successive stages of Socratic instruction. While the demonstration of Socratic instruction undoubtedly tells us much about Socrates as an educator, as well as about his views on various matters, in reading it one must take into account the fact that the individual Xenophon chooses to be the model student in this demonstration is Euthydemus, the brainless beauty referred to earlier. Xenophon begins his treatment of Socratic education by telling us that Socrates did not approach everyone, that is, every type of person, in the same way. And he distinguishes for us a certain number of types. At the top are the good natures, whose characteristics we have already mentioned. In the next place come those of some natural gifts who, on account of these, think they have no need of education and look down on it. Skipping to last place, we find those who believe that they have already received the best education and pride themselves on their wisdom. Euthydemus belongs to this class. To use the distinction mentioned earlier but introduced in the text in the context of the demonstration of Socratic instruction, Euthydemus is the non-objector par excellence. In one of the chapters of this section, he is replaced as Socrates' interlocutor by the world-famous sophist Hippias. Hippias had come upon Socrates when the latter was pointing out to some

people how difficult it is to find a teacher of justice, while teachers of shoemaking, carpentry, smithing, or horsemanship are so ready to hand. Their conversation began in this way. Hippias said, "You are still saying the same things, Socrates, that I heard you saying long ago." And Socrates replied, "What is more terrible than this, Hippias, not only do I always say the same things, but I say them about the same subjects. You, perhaps, due to your great learning, never say the same things about the same subjects." "By all means, I try always to say something new." "Even about the things you understand? For example, if someone asks you how to spell Socrates—how many letters and which ones—do you try to say different things at different times? Or to those who ask regarding numbers whether twice five is ten, don't you give the same answer now as you did before?" As Xenophon shows in this way, the change of interlocutors did not significantly affect the quality of discussion.

The last chapter of the Memorabilia returns to the theme of Socrates' condemnation and death and reports some of Socrates' reflections as those events approached. He was clearly attached to life, which he felt he had lived to the fullest; but, especially given his age, he seemed to feel that it was not a bad time for him to die. We might be disturbed by the manner of his death—by its injustice, which it was after all part of the intention of the Memorabilia to establish. In his Apology of Socrates, where Xenophon takes up again parts of the last chapter of the Memorabilia from a somewhat different point of view, he shows what he and his Socrates would have thought of such a reaction. Among those present at the trial was Apollodorus, whom Xenophon characterizes as "an ardent lover of Socrates and otherwise a naive fellow." After Socrates' condemnation, Apollodorus said to him, "But for me, Socrates, the hardest thing to bear is that I see you dying unjustly." Socrates, stroking Apollodorus' head, said, "Dearest Apollodorus, would you have preferred to see me dying justly?" And, for only the second time in Xenophon's Socratic writings, where he has caused us to laugh more than a few times, Socrates laughed.

Translator's Note

Amy L. Bonnette

In translating Xenophon I have aspired to attain the greatest accuracy and consistency possible in consonance with clear English usage. I admire the sentiments voiced by an older generation of translators who freely expressed their great respect for Xenophon. Edward Spelman's introduction to his translation of Xenophon's Anabasis in offers us a brief account of Xenophon and his works, in that tradition.

> Xenophon was an Athenian; his Father's Name Gryllus. All that we know of him 'till he attended Cyrus in his Expedition, is, that he was a Disciple of Socrates. If, to have been a disciple of that great Man was an Instance of his good Fortune, the Improvement he made of that Education is an Instance of his Merit; and, indeed, nothing less than the happiest Disposition, the best Education, and the greatest Improvement of both, could render Xenophon that universal Man we find him in his Writing: his Cyropaedeia shews him to have possessed, in a sovereign degree, the Art of Government; his Expedition of Cyrus shews him a complete General; his History, an entertaining, an instructive, and a faithful Historian; his Panegyric of Agesilaus, an Orator; and his Treatise of Hunting, a Sportsman; his Apology for Socrates, and his Account of his Manner of conversing, shew that he was both a Friend and a Philosopher; and all of them, that he was a good Man. This appears remarkably in his preserving Byzantium from being plundered by his Soldiers, who, having gained no other Reward of the dangerous Expedition they had been engaged in, but their Preservation, were not only strongly tempted to plunder that Town by the hope of making their Fortunes, but justly provoked to it by the disingenuous Behavior of the Lacedemonian Governor; yet these two lawless Passions, Avarice, and Revenge, the Authority, and Eloquence of Xenophon quite subdued.

Sarah Fielding's introduction to her translation of the Memorabilia, which she entitled the Memoirs of Socrates, gives sound general reasons for approaching Xenophon's work with respect, however odd that work may sometimes appear to us.

> That the memoirs of Socrates, with regard to the greatest part, are held in the highest estimation, is most certain; and if there are some passages which seem obscure; and of which the use doth not so plainly appear to us at this distance of time; and from the dissimilarity of our customs and manners; yet, perhaps, we might not do amiss, in taking Socrates himself for our example in this particular, as well as in many others; who being presented by Euripides, with the writings of Heraclitus, and afterwards asked his opinion of their merit: "What I understand, said he, I find to be excellent; and therefore believe that to be of equal value, which I do not understand." And, certainly . . . this candor is more particularly becoming us in the perusal of the works of ancient authors; of those works which have been preserved in the devastation of cities, and snatched up in the wreck of nations: which have been the delight of ages; and transmitted as the great inheritance of mankind, from one generation to another; and we ought to take it for granted, that there is a justness in the connection, which we cannot trace; and a cogency in the reasoning, which we cannot understand.

Today, translators have an even more compelling reason for treating Xenophon's works with the care that they deserve: we have a renewed access to Xenophon's thought through the writings of Leo Strauss, which look beyond the disarming simplicity of Xenophon's prose in order to reveal how his works can help us to understand life's most important questions, and hence why it is worth the

considerable effort it takes to read them adequately. Reading of this sort requires careful attention to detail, and it was with the reader's need for such attention in mind that I undertook this translation. I have been particularly aware of the need to mark important terms in Socratic philosophy by rendering them consistently with the same English words, or by noting when a deviation from this practice is required. Similarly, I have tried to preserve the order of Xenophon's arguments and his careful wording of lists.

In spite of the care taken, I must repeat the standard translator's warning that for those who wish to make an adequate study, reading this translation is no substitute for reading the original. At best a translation may provide a degree of access for those who cannot avoid such a compromise for now. To begin with, much of Xenophon's great charm is bound to be lost in the transition from ancient Greek to English. Moreover, as readers familiar with ancient Greek will know, a strictly literal translation into English is not really possible. To mention only one difficulty, English depends more heavily on word order to convey meaning, and therefore some sacrifice of Greek sentence structure is a necessity. In spite of the obstacles, the most competent translator would notice every subtlety in the original and then adequately reproduce it. I am aware of instances in which I have failed in this regard, and I suspect that there are many more that have entirely escaped me. In Sarah Fielding's words, "It may perhaps be objected, 'That candor alone is not sufficient for the present occasion;'—to which it can only be answered, That something was to be done;—and, that no pains hath been spared, to do it as well as possible."

B. G. Teubner Press has kindly granted me permission to use Karl Hude's fine reading and compilation of the manuscripts as the basis of this translation. As is the case with most of the ancients, we do not have any single manuscript of the Memorabilia that we know to be perfect. Although many variations are not very important—spelling changes or evident omissions, for example—occasionally differences arise that may significantly alter the meaning of the text. When this occurs or when Hude adopts a later editorial correction of the manuscripts, I inform the reader in a footnote. The endnotes are of a more secondary nature, indicating alternate translations of words or passages, offering historical information, or providing references to other works for comparison.

Only I can be held responsible for the inevitable errors in what follows, but much that is worthwhile in it has been the result of consultation with others. This project was a collaborative effort with Christopher Bruell, who offered extensive guidance throughout and made substantial revisions to the draft. In addition, my work has benefited greatly from attending his seminars. I am also very much indebted to James Nendza for patiently correcting a number of errors, particularly in the early stages of the translation. I thank in addition Wayne Ambler, Robert Bartlett, and In Ha Jang, for suggesting many improvements; Michael Grenke and Joseph Lane for their research on the notes; Sandra MacDonald and Joanne Scibilia for their administrative advice and assistance; and Kay Scheuer and Marian Shotwell for ensuring the manuscript was in shape for publication. I am grateful also to Boston College and its Department of Political Science for

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Finally, I would like to point the reader to works I have found particularly useful in studying this text. Those who know some Greek may be assisted by J. R. Smith's annotated edition of the Memorabilia, C. M. Gloth and M. F. Kellogg's valuable index of words in the Memorabilia, and F. G. Sturz's impressive four-volume Latin lexicon to Xenophon (which may be helpful even to those without much knowledge of Latin for its cross-references to the rest of Xenophon's works). As I indicated above, Leo Strauss is responsible for reviving the study of Xenophon as a philosopher in this century, after a relatively brief period of neglect among scholars. He wrote two books dealing with Xenophon's Socratic writings: Xenophon's Socrates (treating the Memorabilia, Symposium, and Apology of Socrates) and Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An Interpretation of the "Oeconomicus." Since these works themselves can be rather difficult, the assistance offered in Christopher Bruell's review "Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates" is indispensable. It can be of help also to read the books just mentioned in conjunction with Strauss's other work on Xenophon, including On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon's Hiero and "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon," which is a particularly revealing piece on Xenophon's Constitution of the Lacedemonians. Of additional interest-are two posthumously published pieces: an article entitled "Xenophon's Anabasis," which provides valuable information on Xenophon's manner of writing, and a series of lectures on the "problem of Socrates," treating the varying portraits of Socrates found in Aristophanes, Xenophon, and Plato. It is instructive to compare the approach taken in the latter with that of A. E. Taylor in his book Socrates. In addition, I should mention Bruell's chapter introducing Xenophon as a political philosopher in the third edition of Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey's *History of Political Philosophy*. Obviously, this is by no means a comprehensive list of the many fine scholarly works on Xenophon. For an extensive bibliography one may consult Donald R. Morrison's *Bibliography of Editions*, *Translations*, *and Commentary on Xenophon's Socratic Writings*, 1600-*present*. I offer merely what I have found to be a sound path on which to begin to appreciate this marvelous book, and fruitful places to return to along the way.

Xenophon
Memorabilia

BOOK I

Chapter 1

I often wondered by what possible speeches those who indicted Socrates persuaded the Athenians that he deserved death from the city. For the indictment against him was something like the following: Socrates commits an injustice by not believing in the gods in which the city believes and by bringing in new and different divine things; he commits an injustice also by corrupting the young.

To begin with, then, what possible evidence did they use to show that he did not believe in the gods in which the city believed? For he visibly sacrificed often at home and often at the common altars of the city; and it was not difficult to see him using divination. For it had been widely bandied about that Socrates said that the divine thing gave him signs; and, in my opinion, it is especially for this reason that they accused him of bringing in new divine things.

But he brought in nothing newer than others who consult birds of omen, sayings, portents, and sacrificial victims because they believe in divination. For seekers of divination suppose not that the birds or those they meet by chance know what is advantageous for them, but that the gods signal what is advantageous through them; and Socrates held the same.

However, while the majority say that they are both turned back and turned forward by the birds and by those they meet, Socrates spoke just as he judged, for he said that the divine thing gave him signs. And he told many of his companions to do some things and not to do others on the grounds that the divine thing had given a sign. And it was advantageous for those who obeyed him, while those who did not obey regretted it.

And yet who would not agree that he wished to appear to his companions as neither a simpleton nor a boaster? But he would have been held by opinion to be both these things if it had been apparent that in fact he was lying when he told them that things appeared to him as though from a god. It is clear, then, that he would not have foretold these things unless he trusted that he was speaking the truth. But who would trust anyone in these matters other than a god? And trusting in gods, how could he hold that there are no gods?

Moreover, he also did the following with regard to his friends. He advised regarding the necessary things that they also act as he held best. But concerning things whose outcomes were not clear, he sent them to seek divination about whether they should be done.

And he said that those intending to manage households and cities nobly are in need of divination in addition. For, with regard to becoming skillful as a builder, a smith, a farmer, a ruler of human beings, a reviewer of such work, an arithmetician, a household manager, or a general, he held that things of this sort are all matters of learning and attainable by means of human judgment.

But what is most important in these things, he said that the gods reserve for themselves—and none of these things is clear to human beings. For, to the one who has nobly planted a field, it is not clear who will reap from it; nor to the one

who has nobly built a house is it clear who will inhabit it; nor to the skilled general is it clear whether to lead the army is to his advantage; nor to the skilled statesman is it clear whether to preside over the city is to his advantage; nor to the one marrying a beautiful woman in order to be happy is it clear whether he will be grieved because of her; nor to the one who has obtained by marriage relatives who are powerful in the city is it clear whether he will be deprived of his city because of them.

And he said that those who think that there is nothing divine in matters of this sort and that they are wholly within the realm of human judgment are crazy. And he said that those are crazy also who consult divination concerning matters the gods gave to human beings to decide by learning—for example, if one should inquire into whether it is better to take on a chariot someone who understands or does not understand how to drive, or whether better to take on a ship someone who understands or does not understand how to pilot, or into things that can be known by counting, measuring, or weighing. He believed that those who seek to ascertain such things from the gods do what is unlawful. And he said that what the gods permit to be done by those who have learned, one should learn, but that what is not clear to human beings one should try to ascertain from the gods through divination, for the gods give signs to those toward whom they are gracious.

Moreover, he was always visible. For in the early morning he used to go on walks and to the gymnasia, and when the agora was full he was visible there, and for the remainder of the day he was always where he might be with the most people. And he spoke for the majority of the time, and it was possible for anyone who wished to hear him.

But no one ever saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying, anything impious or unholy. For he did not converse about the nature of all things in the way most of the others did—examining what the sophists call the cosmos: how it is, and which necessities are responsible for the coming to be of each of the heavenly things. But he even showed that those who worry about things of this sort are foolish.

First, he examined whether they came to worry about such matters because they held that they already knew the human things sufficiently, or whether they believed that they were acting properly in disregarding the human things and in examining the divine things.

And he wondered whether it was not visible to them that it is impossible for human beings to find these things out, since he thought that even those who most pride themselves on speaking about them do not hold the same opinions as one another but are disposed toward one another like madmen.

For, among madmen, some have no terror even of what is terrible, while others are frightened even by what is not frightening; and some are of the opinion that it is not shameful to do or say anything whatsoever, even in a crowd, while others are of the opinion that one should not even go out among human beings; and some honor neither temple nor altar nor any other divine thing, while others behave piously toward even rocks and chance pieces of wood and beasts; and, among those who are anxious about the nature of all things, some are of the opinion that

being is one thing only, and others that it is an infinite multitude; and some that everything is always moving, and others that nothing ever moves; and some that everything comes to be and perishes, and others that nothing ever comes to be or perishes.

And he examined also the following about them. Just as those who learn human matters believe that they will do what they learn both for themselves and for anyone else they wish, so, too, those who seek out the divine things hold that after they understand the necessities responsible for each thing coming to be they will make winds, rains, seasons, and anything else of the sort they need whenever they wish. Or they do not even hope for such a thing, but it is enough for them merely to understand in what way each of the things of this sort comes to be.

These, then, are the sorts of things he said concerning those who involved themselves in such matters. But he himself was always conversing about human things—examining what is pious, what is impious, what is noble, what is shameful, what is just, what is unjust, what is moderation, what is madness, what is courage, what is cowardice, what is a city, what is a statesman, what is rule over human beings, what is a skilled ruler over human beings, as well as about the other things, knowledge of which he believed makes one a gentleman (noble and good), while those who are ignorant of them would justly be called slavish.

Now, in the sphere of things in which it was not visible how he thought, it is no wonder that the jurors erred in judging him. But isn't it a wonder that they didn't take to heart what everyone knew?

He once presided in the demos, having become a member of the Council and having sworn the councilors' oath, which contains "giving counsel according to the laws." At that time the demos desired to put to death all nine generals—Thrasyllus and Erasinides and those with them—with one vote, contrary to the laws. He did not want to put the question to vote, although the demos grew angry with him and many powerful individuals threatened him as well. But he thought more highly of keeping his oath than of gratifying the demos contrary to what was just and protecting himself against those who threatened him.

For in fact he held that the gods attend to human beings not in the way that the many held. For they think that the gods know some things and do not know others. But Socrates believed that the gods know all things—what is said, what is done, and what is silently deliberated—and that they are present everywhere and give signs to human beings about all human matters.

And so I wonder at how the Athenians were ever persuaded that Socrates was not moderate concerning the gods, since not once did he say or do anything impious concerning the gods, but he said and did regarding the gods the sorts of things that if someone were to say or do them he would be and be held to be most pious.

Chapter 2

It appears to me a wonder also that some were persuaded that Socrates corrupted the young. To begin with, in addition to what has been said, he was the

most continent of all human beings in matters of sex and appetite. Then, he had the greatest endurance with regard to winter, summer, and all labors. Moreover, he had educated himself to have such measured needs that, although he possessed very little, he quite easily had what was enough for him.

How, then, being himself of this sort, would he have made others impious, lawbreaking, gluttonous, incontinent with regard to sex, or soft with regard to labor? Instead, he rid many individuals of these things, after making them desire virtue and providing them with hopes that if they attended to themselves they would be gentlemen (noble and good).

And yet, he never promised at any time to be a teacher of this. But by visibly being so himself, he made those who spent time with him hope that by imitating him they would come to be of the same sort.

Furthermore, he did not himself neglect his body or praise those who did. He disapproved of excessively working out after overeating, but approved of sufficiently working off as much as the soul received with pleasure. For he said that this state was sufficient for health and did not hinder attending to one's soul.

Moreover, he certainly was neither fussy nor boastful, whether about clothing, shoes, or any other way of life. Nor did he make his companions lovers of wealth. For he rid them of the other desires, on the one hand; and on the other, he did not demand wealth from those who desired him.

He held that, in refraining from this, he was attending to his freedom. And he called those who take pay for their association enslavers of themselves, because of its being necessary that they converse with those from whom they took their pay.

He marveled if someone professing to teach virtue would demand money and not hold it the greatest gain to have acquired a good friend, but would be afraid that one who had become a gentleman (noble and good) would not show the greatest gratitude toward one who had done him the greatest good deeds.

Now Socrates never professed to teach anything of the sort to anyone. But he trusted that those of his companions who were receptive to what he himself approved of would be good friends to him and to one another for their whole life. How, then, could such a man corrupt the youth? Unless, that is, attending to virtue is corruption.

"But, by Zeus," the accuser said, "he made his companions look down on the established laws, by saying that it is foolish for the rulers of the city to be established in office by lot, when nobody would want to use a pilot chosen by lot or a builder or a flutist or anyone for any other task of the sort, although far less harm is caused when mistakes are made in them than when they are made concerning the city." He said that speeches of this sort induced the young to have contempt for the established regime and made them violent.

I, for my part, think that those who train themselves in good sense and hold that they will be competent to teach the citizens what is advantageous are least likely to become violent, since they know that enmities and risks attend the use of violence, while through persuasion the same results come about without risk and with friendship. For those treated violently hate as though they have been robbed,

but those persuaded are friendly as though they have been gratified. Violence, accordingly, does not come from those who train themselves in good sense. Instead such practices belong to those who have strength without judgment.

Furthermore, one who dares to use violence would need no few allies, but one who is able to persuade needs no one. For even when alone he would believe himself able to persuade. And it least of all happens that such people resort to murder. For who would wish to kill rather than to deal with someone alive and obedient?

"But," said the accuser, "after they became Socrates' associates, Critias and Alcibiades harmed the city the most. For Critias was the most thievish, violent, and murderous of all in the oligarchy, and Alcibiades the most incontinent, insolent, and violent of all in the democracy."

If those two harmed the city in some way, I, for my part, will not defend them. But I will describe how their companionship with Socrates was.

For these two men were by nature the most honor-loving of all the Athenians. They wished that all affairs might be conducted through themselves and that they might become the most renowned of all. They knew that Socrates lived in a most self-sufficient manner on the least amount of wealth, was most continent in regard to all the pleasures, and in arguments dealt as he wished with all who conversed with him.

Since these two saw these things and were of the sort I mentioned before, would anyone say that they yearned for his association because they desired the life of Socrates and the moderation that he had, or because they held that if they associated with him they would become most competent in speech and action?

For my part, I believe that if a god had offered them either to live their whole life just as they saw Socrates live, or to die, these two would have chosen rather to die. And they made this clear by their actions. For as soon as these two believed themselves superior to their companions, they immediately bolted from Socrates and engaged in political affairs, which was precisely the reason they had yearned for Socrates.

Now perhaps someone might say in response that Socrates should not have taught his companions political affairs before he taught them to be moderate. I, for my part, do not deny this. But I see that all teachers both show themselves to students—how they themselves do what they teach—and convince them by speeches.

I know that Socrates too showed himself to his companions to be a gentleman (noble and good) and that he conversed most nobly about virtue and the other human things. And I know that these two also were moderate as long as they were companions of Socrates—not because they were afraid they would be penalized or beaten by Socrates, but because they thought at the time that this was the superior way to act.

Now perhaps many of those who claim to philosophize would say that one who is just would never become unjust, nor would the moderate one become insolent, nor would anyone who had learned anything else that can be learned ever lose that

knowledge. But I, for my part, do not reach the same judgment about these matters. For I see that, just as those who do not train the body are unable to do bodily work, so also those who do not train the soul are unable to do the work of the soul. For they are able neither to do what they should nor to refrain from what they should.

Indeed this is why fathers, even if their sons are moderate, nevertheless keep them away from wicked human beings, as if association with the good is training in virtue, while association with the wicked is its destruction. There is witness for this also among the poets, one of whom says, "You will learn noble things from those who are noble; but if you mingle with those who are bad, you will utterly destroy even the intelligence that you have," and another says, "Yet a good man is bad sometimes and noble at other times."

I, too, am a witness to these things. For I see that, just as those who do not practice forget verses composed in meter, so also forgetfulness occurs in those neglecting the speeches that teach. And when someone forgets the speeches that admonish, he has forgotten also what the soul experienced when it desired moderation. As he has forgotten this, it is no wonder that he forgets moderation as well.

I see also that those who have been drawn to the love of drink and those who have become involved in love affairs are less able to attend to what they should and to refrain from what they should. For many—even those who are able to be sparing with wealth before they fall in love—are no longer able once they have fallen in love. And once they have lavishly spent their wealth they no longer refrain from gains they used to refrain from because they held them to be shameful.

Why, then, could not one who was previously moderate be again immoderate, and one previously able to do just things be again unable? For in my opinion, at least, all things that are both noble and good are matters of training, and not least of all moderation. For the pleasures growing in the same body together with the soul persuade the soul not to be moderate but instead to gratify themselves and the body as quickly as possible.

Both Critias and Alcibiades, while they kept company with Socrates, were able to overpower their ignoble desires by using him as an ally. But when the two were free of him, Critias, after he went into exile in Thessaly, kept company there with human beings who dealt in lawlessness rather than justice. Alcibiades, in turn—who, because of his beauty, was hunted by many stately women and, because of his power in the city and among the allies, was pampered by many human beings who were able to flatter, as well as honored by the demos, with whom he easily held the first place—neglected himself, just as athletes in gymnastic contests who easily win first place neglect their training.

Things of this sort befell these two, and they were also inflated because of their birth, conceited due to being rich, puffed-up by power, and fussed-over by many human beings; and, having been corrupted by all these things, they were also away from Socrates for a long time. Why is it a wonder if they became arrogant?

If the two of them struck false notes in some way, then, the accuser blames Socrates for this; but does Socrates deserve no praise in the accuser's opinion for the fact that when they were young and likely to be most lacking in judgment and continence he rendered them moderate?

Surely other matters are not decided in this manner. For what master of the flute or master of the cithara or other teacher who has made his students competent is blamed if they appear worse after they have gone to others? And what father, if his son is moderate when he spends time with one person but later becomes wicked when he is in the company of another, blames the first? Does he not rather praise the first all the more insofar as his son appears worse when he is with the second? But fathers themselves are companions of their sons, and they are not blamed when their sons strike false notes if they themselves are moderate.

It would have been just to decide likewise about Socrates too. If he himself were to do something low, he would have been suitably held by opinion to be wicked. But if he himself were continually moderate, how could he justly be blamed for the badness that was not in him?

Moreover, even if he himself were to do nothing wicked but were to praise those whom he saw taking low actions, he would have been justly censured. Now then, when he perceived that Critias was in love with Euthydemus and was attempting to use him the way those do who enjoy bodies for sex, he tried to deter [him] from this by claiming that it is illiberal and unbecoming for a man who is a gentleman (noble and good) to beseech his beloved—to whom he wishes to appear very worthy—in the manner of beggars, acting the suppliant and begging that he grant things that are also not at all good.

Since Critias did not listen to things of this sort and was not deterred, it is said that Socrates said—with many others present as well as Euthydemus—that in his opinion Critias had a swinish passion in desiring to move against Euthydemus like piglets against stones.

As a consequence Critias also hated Socrates, so that he still bore it in mind against him when as a member of the Thirty he became legislator along with Charicles; and he wrote into the laws that one is not to teach an art of speeches, threatening him and not having any way to attack him, but bringing to bear against him what the many censure the philosophers collectively for and slandering him before the many For I myself never heard this from Socrates; nor did I perceive anyone else who claimed that he heard it.

But the matter became clear. For when the Thirty were killing many citizens—and not the worst of them—and turning many to the commission of injustice, Socrates said somewhere that it would be a wonder, in his opinion, if someone who became a herdsman over a herd of cattle and made the cattle fewer and worse didn't agree that he was a bad cattle-tender, and still more a wonder if someone who presided over a city and made the citizens fewer and worse were not ashamed and didn't think himself a bad president over the city.

When this was reported to them, Critias and Charicles called Socrates, showed him the law, and forbade him to converse with the young. Socrates asked the two

of them whether inquiries were permitted if he was in some way ignorant about the orders given. The two of them said that they were.

"Then, for my part," he said, "I am prepared to obey the laws. But so that I don't inadvertently break the law in some way out of ignorance, I wish to learn clearly from you whether, when you bid that one refrain from the art of speeches, you do so holding that this art goes with what is spoken correctly or with what is spoken incorrectly. For if it goes with what is spoken correctly, it is clear that one must refrain from speaking correctly. But if it goes with what is spoken incorrectly, it is clear that one must attempt to speak correctly."

And Charicles, becoming angry with him, said, "Socrates, since you are ignorant, we give you the following orders that are easier to learn: don't converse with the young at all!"

And Socrates said, "Now then, lest there be any ambiguity as to whether I am doing something other than the orders given, define for me up to what age one should hold that human beings are young."

And Charicles said, "For as long as they are not permitted to be members of the Council on the grounds that they are not yet sensible. So don't you converse with those younger than thirty years!"

"If I am buying something," he said, "and the seller is less than thirty, may I not ask how much he is selling it for?"

"Yes, this sort of thing," said Charicles, "but in fact, you, Socrates, are accustomed to ask questions most of whose answers you know. So these you are not to ask."

"And should I also then not answer," he said, "if some youth should ask me whether I know, for example, where Charicles lives, or where Critias is?"

Charicles said, "This sort of thing, yes."

But Critias said, "However, you will have to refrain, Socrates, from the following: from shoemakers, builders, and smiths; indeed I think that they are already worn out from being bandied about by you."

"Then," said Socrates, "should I not also refrain from what follows upon these—both the just and the holy and the other things of this sort?"

"Yes, by Zeus," said Charicles, "and from herdsmen! Or else be on your guard that you, too, do not make the cattle fewer."

And from this it became clear that they were angry with Socrates because his speech about the cattle had been reported to them.

So the sort of companionship Critias had with Socrates and how they were disposed toward each other has thus been told.

For my part, I would say that no one receives any education from someone who does not please him. Critias and Alcibiades did not associate with Socrates—for as long as they did associate with him—because he pleased the two of them. But right from the start the two of them had set out to preside over the city. For even while they were still companions of Socrates they did not attempt to converse with any others more than with those most deeply engaged in political affairs.

For it is said that before Alcibiades was twenty years of age he had the following sort of conversation about laws with Pericles, who was his guardian as well as the one presiding over the city.

"Tell me, Pericles," he said, "would you be able to teach me what law is?"

"By all means," said Pericles.

"By the gods, teach it then," said Alcibiades, "for when I hear certain ones praised as law-abiding men, think that someone who does not know what law is would not justly obtain this praise."

"But you do not desire anything hard, Alcibiades, in wishing to know what law is," said Pericles. "For all things are laws that the assembled multitude has approved and written, pointing out what should and should not be done."

"Do they hold that one should do good things or bad things?"

"The good, by Zeus, lad," he said, "and not the bad."

"What if it is not the multitude, but the assembled few who write what one should do, as is the case wherever there is oligarchy? What is this?"

"Everything," he said, "is called law that the overpowering part of the city, upon deliberation, writes that one should do."

"So even if a tyrant who overpowers the city writes for the citizens what they should do—this too is law?"

"Even what the ruling tyrant writes," he said, "this too is called law."

"But what is violence and lawlessness, Pericles?" he said. "Is it not when one who is stronger compels one who is weaker—not by persuasion but by the use of violence—to do whatever is in his opinion best?"

"In my opinion, at least," said Pericles.

"And whatever the tyrant writes and compels the citizens to do without persuading them—this is lawlessness?"

"In my opinion," said Pericles. "For I take back what I said about what the tyrant writes without persuasion being law."

"And what the few write, without persuading the many but overpowering them, shall we say that this is violence or shall we not say it?"

"Everything, in my opinion," said Pericles, "that one compels someone to do without persuading him, whether he writes it or not, is violence rather than law."

"And whatever the whole multitude writes without persuasion, when it overpowers those having wealth, would be violence rather than law?"

"Alcibiades," said Pericles, "we too were quite clever indeed at things of this sort when we were your age. For we too practiced such things and made precisely the sort of sophisticated arguments that you, in my opinion, are now practicing."

And Alcibiades said, "Would that I could have been your companion at that time, Pericles, when you were at your cleverest."

As soon as they supposed themselves to be superior to the other citizens, they no longer came to Socrates. For he did not please them anyway; and if they did

come to him they were annoyed by being refuted regarding their errors. Rather, they became engaged in the city's affairs, which was why they had in fact come to Socrates.

However, Crito was an associate of Socrates, as were Chairephon, Chairecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaidondas, and others who kept company with him, not in order to become public speakers or lawyers, but in order that, by becoming gentlemen (noble and good), they might be able to deal with their household, domestic servants, relatives, friends, city, and citizens, in a noble manner. And none of these, either when young or old, did anything bad or received blame.

"But," said the accuser, "Socrates taught his companions to abuse their fathers by persuading them that he made them wiser than their fathers, and by claiming that by law someone who has convicted him of insanity is permitted to hold even his father in bonds, using this as evidence that it would be lawful for one who is more ignorant to be held in bonds by one who is wiser."

Socrates thought that someone who holds another in bonds on account of ignorance would also himself justly be held in bonds by those who understand what he himself does not. And for such reasons he often examined how ignorance differs from madness. And as for the mad, he thought that it would be an advantage, both to themselves and to their friends, for them to be held in bonds; and as for those who don't understand what they should, it would be just for them to learn from those who do understand.

"But," said the accuser, "Socrates caused not only fathers but also other relatives to be in dishonor among his companions, saying that it is not relatives who benefit those who are ill or on trial, but the physicians in the one case and those who understand how to plead a case at trial in the other."

The [accuser] said that he said, also regarding friends, that it is of no benefit that they be well intentioned unless they will also be able to benefit; that he claimed the only ones deserving of honor are those who know what they should and are able to explain it; and that, by persuading the young that he himself was the wisest and most competent to make others wise, he so disposed his companions that in their eyes the rest were nothing compared to him.

I, for my part, know that he in fact said these things about fathers and other relatives and friends. In addition, he said that when the soul (the only thing in which good sense comes to be) departs from the body of the human being most closely related to them, they remove and carry the body off as quickly as possible.

And he said that, even while each person is alive, he himself removes and permits another to remove from his own body (which is what he loves most of all) whatever is useless and of no benefit. At least they remove their own nails and hair and calluses. And they permit the physicians to remove these things by cutting and burning accompanied by labor and pain; they even think that they should thank and pay them for it. They also spit saliva from their mouths as far away as they can, because when it is in them it does them no benefit but, much to the contrary, harm.

He said these things, then, not to teach one to bury one's father while still alive or to cut oneself up in pieces. But by displaying that what lacks sense lacks honor, he urged attentiveness to being as sensible and beneficial as possible, so that if someone wished to be honored—whether by a father, brother, or by anyone else—he would not neglect them, in reliance on the fact that he was related to them, but attempt to be beneficial to those by whom he wished to be honored.

The accuser said that he also would pick out the most wicked passages from the poets held in the highest opinion and, using them as witnesses, teach his companions to do be doers of mischief and skilled at tyranny—such as the verse from Hesiod "No work is disgraceful, but idleness is disgraceful." According to the accuser he said that in this the poet bids one to refrain from no work, however unjust or shameful, but to do even these for gain.

But since Socrates thoroughly agreed that being a worker is both beneficial for a human being and good, and that being an idler is harmful and bad, and that working is good and idleness bad, he said that those who do something good both work and are good workers, but those who play dice or do something else wicked and unprofitable he called idlers. Seen in this light, the verse "No work is disgraceful, but idleness is disgraceful" would be correct.

And the accuser said that he often recited the passage from Homer about Odysseus:

> If he should meet with some king and an outstanding man, standing beside him he restrained him with gentle words: "Amazing fellow, it is not fitting for you to be afraid as if you were a coward, but you yourself be seated and seat the rest of the people." But if he saw a man who was one of the demos and found him shouting, he struck him with his scepter and upbraided him by word: "Amazing fellow), sit still and listen to the words of others who are your betters. You are unfit for war and feeble, never of any account either in war or in council."

And the accuser said that he explained these verses as meaning that the poet praised the beating of members of the demos and the poor.

But that is not what Socrates meant: for [if he had] he would have thought also that he himself must be beaten. Instead he said that the ones who should be checked by every means, even if they happen to be very rich, are those who are not beneficial either in speech or in deed, nor competent to bring aid if it should be needed either to army or to city or even to the demos itself—especially if they are even bold in addition.

However, Socrates was visibly the opposite of these things, since he was both well disposed toward the demos and a lover of human beings. For though he had many who desired him, both fellow countrymen and foreigners, he never demanded any pay for his company but ungrudgingly assisted all from what he had. Some of them, after taking a small portion from him for free, sold it to others for a great sum and were not well disposed to the demos as he was, for they did riot want to converse with those who had no wealth to give.

But, as for Socrates, he furnished the city adornment vis-à-vis the rest of human beings far more than Lichas (who is renowned in this regard) did for the city of the Lacedemonians. For while Lichas had dinner parties for strangers who

were staying in Lacedaimonia during the festival of the Gymnopaedia, Socrates throughout all of his life spent his own possessions benefiting all those who wished in the most important matters. For he sent his companions away after rendering them better.

In my opinion, Socrates—since this was the sort he was—deserved honor from the city rather than death. One would find this out by examining the matter also according to the laws. For, according to the laws, the penalty is death if someone is visibly stealing or taking clothes or purse-snatching or breaking into a home or selling free people into slavery or robbing temples. But he above all human beings refrained from these things.

Moreover, he was never the cause of a war ending badly or of civil strife or of treason or of any other bad thing for the city.

Nor, in private life, did he ever deprive any human being of goods or involve anyone in bad things. Rather, no one ever even accused him of the things mentioned.

How, then, could he be subject to the indictment? Instead of not believing in the gods, as was charged in the indictment, he was visibly serving the gods more than the other human beings were. And instead of corrupting the young, as the one who brought the indictment accused him, he was visibly ridding his companions of desires when they had wicked ones, and turning them toward desiring the noblest and most magnificent virtue, that by which both cities and households are well managed. And since this is what he did, how is it that he did not deserve great honor from the city?

Chapter 3

I shall now write down as much as I recall of how in fact, in my opinion, he used to benefit his companions, partly by showing himself in deed as the sort of person he himself was, and partly by conversing also. On the one hand, then, with regard to the gods, he was visible acting and speaking just as the Pythia tells those who ask how they should behave concerning sacrifices or paying service to ancestors or anything else of the sort. For the Pythia replies that they would behave piously by behaving in accordance with the law of the city. And Socrates himself both behaved in this way and so advised the others; and he held that those behaving in some other way were working to no purpose and frivolous.

And he used to pray to the gods that they give him the simply good things, on the grounds that the gods have the noblest knowledge about what sort of things are good. And he held that those who pray for gold or silver or tyranny or anything else of the sort pray no differently than if they should pray for a game of dice, a battle, or any of the other things as to which it is visibly unclear how they will turn out.

He did not believe that, by performing small sacrifices from his small possessions, he fell short of those performing many and large sacrifices from their many and large possessions. For he said that for the gods, too, it would not be noble if they were gratified more by the large sacrifices than by the small ones—for

what gratified them would frequently be what came from the wicked rather than from the good; and life would not be worth living for human beings if what came from the wicked were more gratifying to the gods than what came from the good. Rather, he held that the gods are most gratified by the honors from those who are most pious. And he praised also this verse: "According to one's capacity offer sacrifices to the immortal gods." Also regarding friends and foreigners and one's way of life generally, he said that "to act according to one's capacity" is noble advice.

If he was of the opinion that he received some sign from the gods, he could no more be persuaded to act contrary to the signs than if someone should persuade him to take a blind guide who did not know the way on a trip instead of one who could see and did know the way. And he denounced the folly of others who did something contrary to the signs from the gods because they were on their guard against losing their reputation among human beings. He himself looked down on everything human in comparison to counsel from the gods.

He educated both his soul and his body in a regimen such that one using it would live confidently and securely and would not lack resources regarding the expense it required—unless there were some divine intervention. For he was so frugal that I do not know if anyone could work so little as not to take in what was enough for Socrates. For he used as much food as he could eat with pleasure, and he came to it so prepared that his desire was the relish for his food. And every drink was pleasant to him because he did not drink unless he was thirsty.

And if he ever wanted to go to dinner when he had been invited, he quite easily guarded against what for most takes the most work: guarding against filling oneself beyond satiety. And he advised those unable to do this to be on their guard against things that persuade one to eat when not hungry and drink when not thirsty. For, in fact, he said that these are the things that ruin stomachs, heads, and souls.

He said jokingly that he thought that Circe too made [men into] pigs by entertaining [them] with many such things at dinner; and that Odysseus was spared becoming a pig due to Hermes' warning, as well as to his own continence and his refraining from touching things of this sort when he was satiated.

These were the sorts of things he used to say with a playfulness accompanied by seriousness. On the other hand, he advised that one steadfastly refrain from sex with those who are beautiful. For he said that it is not easy when one touches these sorts to be moderate. In fact, after he perceived once that Critobulus the son of Crito had kissed the beautiful son of Alcibiades, he asked Xenophon in Critobulus' presence:

"Tell me, Xenophon," he said, "didn't you hold Critobulus to be one of the moderate rather than the rash human beings, and one of those with forethought rather than senseless and reckless?"

"Certainly," said Xenophon.

"Well, hold now that he is hotheaded and heedless in the extreme. He would even make somersaults into daggers and leap into fire."

“And what did you see him doing,” said Xenophon, “that you have formed such judgments about him?”

“Did he not dare to kiss the son of Alcibiades, who is most fair and in his bloom?” he said.

“But if that is the reckless deed,” said Xenophon, “in my opinion, I, too, would endure this risk.”

“You wretch!” Socrates said. “And what do you think you would suffer after kissing someone beautiful? Would you not immediately be a slave rather than free, spend a lot for harmful pleasures, be in great want of leisure for attending to anything noble and good, and be compelled to take seriously what even a madman would not take seriously?”

“Heracles!” said Xenophon. “What a terrible power you ascribe to a kiss.”

“And do you wonder at this?” said Socrates. “Don’t you know that poisonous spiders not even half an obol in size crush human beings with pain and drive them from their senses merely by touching them with their mouths?”

“Yes, by Zeus!” said Xenophon. “For spiders inject something through their sting.”

“You fool!” said Socrates. “Do you think that when those who are beautiful kiss they don’t inject anything, just because you don’t see it? Don’t you know that this beast that they call beautiful and in bloom is so much more terrible than spiders that, while spiders inject something when they touch, it (even when it does not touch, but if one just looks at it) injects even from quite far away something of the sort to drive one mad? And perhaps ‘loves’ are called ‘archers’ because those who are beautiful inflict wounds even from afar. But I counsel you, Xenophon, whenever you see someone beautiful, to flee without looking back. And I counsel you, Critobulus, to go into exile for a year. For perhaps in that length of time your sting might just barely heal.”

So indeed he also thought that those who were not out of danger regarding sex ought to have sex with the sort whom the soul would not accept unless the body were in great need, and who would provide no trouble when it was in need. But, with regard to these matters, he himself was visibly so prepared as to refrain more easily from those who are most beautiful and most in bloom than do others from those who are most ugly and most out of bloom.

Concerning, then, meat and drink and sex, he was equipped in this way, and he thought that he would have no less sufficient pleasure and far less pain than those who involved themselves greatly in these matters.

Chapter 4

If any, making a judgment on the basis of what some people write and say about him, hold that Socrates was best at turning human beings toward’ virtue but incompetent to lead them to it, let them test whether he was competent to make his companions better after they examine not only what he asked in refuting

those who thought they knew everything, in order to chasten them, but also what he passed his day saying to those who spent their time with him.

I shall say first what I heard him say once when he was conversing about the divine with Aristodemus, nicknamed “the Small.” Upon observing that the latter neither sacrificed to the gods when he was not engaged in a battle, nor consulted divination, but even ridiculed those who did these things, he said, “Tell me, Aristodemus, are there any human beings you admire for wisdom?”

“Certainly,” he said.

And he said, “Tell us their names.”

“Well, for epic poetry it is Homer whom I especially admire, for dithyrambs, Melanippides, for tragedy, Sophocles, for sculpture, Polycleitus, and for painting, Zeuxis.”

“Who, in your opinion, is more deserving of admiration, makers of senseless and motionless images or makers of animals with sense and activity?”

“Far more, by Zeus, makers of animals, if indeed these come to be not in some chance way, but by design.”

“As between things the purpose of whose existence is obscure and things whose existence is visibly beneficial, which do you decide to be works of chance and which of design?”

“It is fitting that the things whose coming into being is beneficial are works of design.”

“So then, does it seem> to you that the one who made human beings from the beginning included for their benefit the means by which they have each of the perceptions; eyes so that they can see what can be seen, and ears so that they can hear what can be heard. Moreover, of what benefit would smells have been to us unless noses were included? And what perception would there have been of sweet and sharp and all the pleasures of taste, unless the tongue had been put in as a judge of these things?

“In addition to these things, don’t the following also resemble in your opinion works of forethought: that sight, since it is weak, is gated by eyelids, which are thrown open whenever there is any need to use sight but closed shut during sleep; that eyelashes have been implanted as strainers so that winds cause no harm, and that eyebrows jut out like a cornice over the eyes so that sweat from the head does no ill; that our hearing receives all sounds without ever being filled up; that the front teeth of all animals are such as to cut and the molars are such as to grind what is received from the front teeth; that the mouth through which animals bring in what they desire is positioned near the eyes and noses, but, since what is passed off is disagreeable, its paths are diverted, and it is carried away as far as possible from the senses. Are you perplexed as to whether these things, which have been made with such forethought, are works of chance or design?”

“No, by Zeus,” he said, “but when one examines them in this way at least these things very much resemble the contrivance of some wise craftsman who loves animals.”

“And what about implanting an erotic desire for begetting offspring, an erotic desire for rearing them up in the females who bring them forth, and a very great longing for life and a very great fear of death in those who are reared?”

“By all means, these too resemble contrivances of someone who planned that animals exist.”

“And do you, in your own opinion, have some sense?”

“If you ask a question, at any rate, I will answer.”

“Do you think that no sensible being exists anywhere else? And that, even though you know that the composition of your body has grasped a small portion of the great amount of earth that exists, and a little bit of the great amount of water that exists, and that your body no doubt has been composed with you containing a small portion of each of the other great things. Are you, then, of the opinion that intelligence alone exists nowhere and that you by some good chance seized hold of it, while—as you think—those surpassingly large and infinitely numerous things are in such an orderly condition through some senselessness?”

“By Zeus, for I do not see those in authority, as I see the craftsmen of what comes to be here.”

“Nor do you see your own soul, which is in authority over your body: so that, in this way, at least, it is possible for you to say that you do nothing by design but everything by chance.”

And Aristodemus said, “I, for my part, Socrates, do not look down upon the divine, but I believe that it is too magnificent to need my service in addition.”

“Accordingly,” he said, “the more magnificent a thing is that deems it worthwhile to serve you, so much the more should it be honored.”

“Know well,” he said, “that, if I held that gods worried at all about human beings, I would not neglect them.”

“Why then, don’t you think that they do worry? To begin with, of all the animals, it is only human beings that they made stand upright. And upright posture makes one able to see more before one, gaze more at the things above, and suffer less that is bad. And they implanted sight, hearing, and a mouth. And then, while they gave feet to the other animals who walk, these permit them only to travel; on human beings they also included hands, which produce most of those things whereby we are happier than they.

“Moreover, although all animals have a tongue, they made only the tongue of human beings such as to articulate the voice, by touching the mouth now here and now there, and to signal to one another all that we wish. And, in addition, what about their giving sexual pleasures that are limited to a certain time of year for the other animals, while they provide these to us continually up until old age?

“Nor was it enough for the god to attend only to the body, but—and this is the greatest thing—the soul he implanted by nature in human beings was also the best. For, to begin with, what ether animal’s soul perceives the existence of gods, who put in order the greatest and noblest things? What tribe other than human beings serves gods? What sort of soul is more adequate than the human to guard

against hunger or thirst or cold or heat or to aid against sickness or to train so as to increase strength or to labor with a view to learning or more adequate to remember what one hears or sees or learns?

"For is it not very clear to you that human beings live their lives like gods in comparison to the other animals, since by nature they are best both in their body and in their soul? For someone having the body of a cow and the judgment of a human being would not be able to do what he wished. Nor would beings possessing hands but lacking prudence derive any advantage. But you don't think that the gods attend to you, even though you have obtained both of these most valuable things? But what will they have to do, so that you will hold that they worry about you?"

"When they send—as you say that they send to you—counselors regarding what one should and should not do."

"When," he said, "they indicate something to the Athenians who make inquiries through divination, aren't you of the opinion that they are making indications to you as well; or when they give signs by sending marvels to the Greeks, or to all human beings? Or do they select out only you and put you aside in neglect?

"Do you think that the gods would have implanted in human beings the opinion that they are competent to do good and bad, if they were unable to do it; and that human beings, deceived the whole time, would never have perceived this? Don't you see that the most ancient and the wisest of human things—cities and nations—are the most pious toward the gods, and that the most sensible ages in life are the most attentive to the gods?

"My good fellow," he said, "observe that even the intelligence existing in you manages your body as it wishes. You, then, should think also that the sense in everything arranges all the things as is pleasing to itself, and not that your eye is able to reach over many stadia, but that the eye of the god is unable to see everything at the same time; nor that your soul is able to worry both about matters here and about matters in Egypt and in Sicily, but that the good sense of the god isn't competent to attend to all things at the same time.

"If, then, by serving the gods, too, you should try out whether they want to give you some counsel concerning what is not clear to human beings—just as by serving human beings you recognize those who want to serve in return, and by gratifying you recognize those who gratify in return, and by taking counsel you observe those who are sensible—you will recognize that the divine is so great and of such a sort as to see all things at the same time and to hear all things and to be present everywhere, and that they attend to all things at the same time."

In my opinion by saying these things he made his companions refrain from the unholy, unjust, and shameful things, not only when they were seen by human beings, but even when they were in solitude, since they believed that nothing they might do would ever escape the notice of gods.

Chapter 5

Now if surely continence, too, is both a noble and good possession for a man, let us examine whether in saying the following sorts of things he prompted any movement toward it. "Men, if we were at war and wished to elect a man under whom we would be most apt to be saved ourselves and to overpower our enemies, would we elect someone whom we perceived to be not equal to resisting his stomach or wine or sex or labor or sleep? How indeed could we think that such a one would either save us or conquer our enemies?

"And if we wished at the end of life to entrust someone with educating our male children, attentively guarding our maiden daughters, or preserving our wealth, would we believe that the one who is incontinent is trustworthy in these matters? Would we entrust an incontinent slave with cattle, storerooms, or supervision of work? Would we want to accept such a person as a servant or purchaser even if we got him for free?

"Moreover, if we would not accept even a slave who is incontinent, is it not worthwhile to guard against becoming a person of this sort oneself? For in fact the incontinent one is not harmful to others on the one hand and beneficial to himself on the other—as it is opined that the greedy enrich themselves by seizing the wealth of others—but rather he does mischief to others and still worse to himself, if at any rate to ruin not only one's own household but also both body and soul is to do the greatest mischief.

"Who would be pleased to have a person of this sort as a companion, knowing that he enjoys sauce and wine more than friends and cherishes women prostitutes more than comrades? Ought not every man, believing that continence is the foundation of virtue, be equipped with this first in his soul?

"For who, without this, would either learn anything good or train himself in a manner worth mentioning? And who would not be shamefully disposed with regard to both his body and his soul when he is enslaved to pleasures? In my opinion, by Hera, a free man should pray not to obtain a slave of this sort, and one enslaved to such pleasures should beseech the gods to obtain good masters. For only in this way would such a person be saved."

In saying things of this sort he displayed himself to be still more continent in his deeds than in his speeches; for he overpowered not only the pleasures that come through the body but also the pleasure that comes through wealth, holding that the one who accepts wealth from one he meets by chance establishes a master over himself and subjects himself to a slavery as shameful as any.

Chapter 6

It is worthwhile in his regard also not to omit his conversations with Antiphon the sophist. For Antiphon, wishing to draw his close companions away from him, once approached Socrates when they were present and said the following.

"Socrates, I, for my part, thought that those who philosophize should become happier. But you, in my opinion, have reaped from philosophy just the opposite.

You live, at any rate, a way of life such as no slave would abide from a master. You eat and drink the poorest food and drink, you wear a cloak that is not only poor but the same one during summer and winter, and you are continuously without shoes or tunic.

"Moreover, you do not take in wealth—a thing that both delights in its acquisition and makes those who possess it live more freely and pleasantly. If, accordingly, you too dispose your companions as do teachers of other work as well, who show their students to be their imitators, you should hold that you are a teacher of unhappiness." And Socrates replied to this:

"In my opinion, Antiphon, you have supposed me to live so painfully that I am persuaded you would rather die than choose to live as I do. Come now, let us examine what you have perceived to be hard in my life.

"Is it that those who accept money are under necessity to produce what they are paid for, but that by not receiving it I am under no necessity to converse with whomever I do not wish? Or do you deem my way of life poor in the belief that I eat less healthy things than you do, or things that provide less strength? Or is it that my regimen is harder to procure than yours because it is more rare and costly? Or that what you furnish yourself is more pleasant for you than what I furnish myself is for me? Don't you know that the one who eats most pleasantly has the least need of relish, and the one who drinks most pleasantly least desires drink that is not at hand?

"Regarding cloaks, you know that those who change them do so for reasons of cold and heat, and that they put on shoes so that they will not be prevented from walking due to what pains their feet. Now then, have you ever perceived me more than another remaining inside because of the cold, fighting with someone over a spot in the shade because of heat, or not going wherever I wish because of pain in my feet?

"Don't you know that when those whose bodies are naturally weakest practice they become stronger at what they practice and more easily bear it than the strongest who does not practice? And don't you think that, by always practicing patient endurance of the things that chance to befall my body, I bear all things more easily than you who does not practice?

"Do you think that anything is more responsible for my not being enslaved to stomach or sleep or lust than that I have other things more pleasant than these that delight not only in their use but also by providing hopes that they will benefit always? Moreover, this at any rate you know: that those who do not think that they are doing well do not experience delight, but those who believe that they are nobly progressing, either in farming or seafaring or whatever else they chance to be working at, are delighted on the grounds that they are doing well.

"Then, do you think that the pleasure from all these things is as great as that from believing that one is becoming better and acquiring better friends? I, for my part, spend my life holding these things. And if indeed it should be necessary to benefit friends or city, is there more leisure to attend to them in my present way of life or in the one that you deem blessed? And who would go on a campaign more

easily, a person unable to live without a costly way of life, or one for whom what is at hand is enough? And who would surrender more quickly to a siege, the person needing what is hardest to find, or the one who has enough when he makes use of what is easiest to obtain?

"You seem, Antiphon, like one who thinks that happiness is luxury and extravagance. But I, for my part, hold that to need nothing is divine, that to need as little as possible is nearest to the divine, and that what is divine is best, and what is nearest to the divine is nearest to what is best."

Again Antiphon once said to Socrates in a conversation: "Socrates, I, for my part, hold that you are just, but not in any way wise. And in my opinion you even recognize this yourself. At any rate, you demand no money in exchange for associating with you. And yet if you thought that your cloak or your house or any other of your possessions were worth money, you would not only not give it to anyone for free but you wouldn't even take less for it than it is worth.

"Surely it is clear that if you thought as well that associating with you were worth anything, you would exact no less money for this too than it is worth. Just, then, you may be, in that you do not deceive on account of greed, but not wise, since what you understand is worthless."

And Socrates replied to this: "Antiphon, among us it is held that youthful bloom and wisdom are nobly bestowed, or shamefully bestowed, in like fashion. For if someone wishes to sell his youthful bloom for money to whoever wishes it, they call him a prostitute; but if someone makes a friend of one whom he recognizes to be a lover who is both noble and good (a gentleman), we hold that he is moderate. Similarly, those also who sell wisdom for money to whoever wishes it they call sophists just as if they were prostitutes; but we hold that whoever makes a friend by teaching whatever good he possesses to someone he recognizes as having a good nature—this one does what befits a gentlemanly (noble and good) citizen.

"Accordingly, Antiphon, just as another is pleased by a good horse or a dog or a bird, so I myself am even more pleased by good friends, and if I possess something good I teach it, and I introduce them to others from whom, I believe, they will receive some benefit with a view to virtue. And reading collectively with my friends, I go through the treasures of the wise men of old which they wrote and left behind in their books; and if we see something good, we pick it out; and we hold that it is a great gain if we become friends with one another." When heard these things, formed the opinion that he himself was blessed and that he led those who heard him to gentlemanliness (nobility and goodness).

And again Antiphon once questioned him about how he could believe that he made others fit for political affairs, since he himself did not engage in political affairs—if indeed he understood how. He said, "In which case, Antiphon, would I more engage in political affairs, if I engaged in them alone, or if I should attend to there being as many as possible competent to engage in them?"

Chapter 7

Let us examine whether, also by turning his companions away from boasting, he turned them toward being attentive with respect to virtue. For he was always saying that there is no more noble path to a good reputation than by becoming good at the thing for which one wishes to have a good reputation. And he taught in the following way that he was speaking the truth.

'For let us ponder," he said, "what someone should do who wishes to have a reputation as a good flute player when he is not. Should he not imitate the good flute players in the externals of their art? And first, since these both possess beautiful equipment and lead about many followers, he too should do these things. Then, since many people praise them, he too should furnish himself with many who praise him. Moreover, he should never take up the work or he will immediately be proved ridiculous, and not only a bad flute player but also a human being who is a boaster. And indeed, since he has gone to great expense without any benefit at all, and in addition has a bad reputation, will he not live a laborious, profitless, and ridiculous life?

"In like manner, let us reflect on what would happen to someone who is not a good general or pilot but wishes to appear to be one. Would it not be painful if, desiring to be opined as competent to do these things, he was not able to persuade—but would he not be even more wretched if he did persuade? For it is clear that one who does not understand how to be a pilot or a general—if established in the office—would utterly destroy those whom he least wished to destroy and would himself come out of it in a shameful and bad way."

Likewise, he declared it unprofitable to be opined as rich, courageous, and strong when one is not these things in fact. For he said that these people are assigned tasks beyond their power, and if they are opined to be competent, they would not obtain sympathy when they are unable to do them.

And he called no small cheat anyone who would deprive another of money or equipment, taking it by persuasion, but he called by far the greatest cheat the one who, although not worthy, deceives others through persuasion that he is competent to lead the city. And so, in my opinion, he turned his companions away from being boasters by saying things of this sort in conversation.

BOOK II

Chapter 1

In my opinion, also by saying such things, he turned his companions toward training themselves to be continent in their desire for meat and drink, and in regard to lust, sleep, cold, heat, and labor. When he recognized once that one of his companions was too undisciplined in such respects, he said, "Tell me, Aristippus, if you should have to take and educate two youths, one so that he would be competent to rule, and the other so that he would not even lay a claim to rule, how would you educate each? Let us examine it, if you wish, beginning from sustenance, as it were from the elements."

And Aristippus said, "Indeed, in my opinion, sustenance is the beginning. For no one would even be alive unless he were sustained."

"So then, the wish to take food, when the time comes, is likely to be present in both?"

"It is likely," he said.

"So which of them would we accustom to choose doing what is urgent over gratifying his belly?"

"The one being educated for ruling, by Zeus, so that the city's affairs not be left undone in the course of his rule," he said.

"So then," he said, "the ability to endure being thirsty when they wish to drink should also be added to the same one?"

"Certainly," he said.

"And to which would we add continence in regard to sleep, so as to be able to go to bed late or rise early or stay awake all night should there be any need?"

"This too should be added to the same one," he said.

"And what about being continent in regard to sex," he said, "so as not to be prevented on this account from taking action should there be any need?"

"This too should be added to the same one," he said.

"And what about not fleeing from one's labors but willingly enduring them? To which of them should we add this?"

"This too should be added to the one being educated to rule," he said.

"What about learning whatever learning there is that would be serviceable for overpowering one's adversaries? In which would it be more fitting to include this?"

"Far more, by Zeus, in the one educated for rule," he said. "In fact, there is no benefit from the other things without such learning."

"So then, in your opinion, is the one educated in this way less likely to be captured by his adversaries than the rest of the animals? For surely some animals are baited by appetite—some even that are quite shy are nevertheless captured when drawn to the bait by the desire to eat—while others are ensnared by drink."

"Certainly," he said.

“So then, do still others, like quail and partridges, fall into nets due to lust, when they are carried toward the sound of the female by the desire and hope for sex, ceasing to take dangers into account?”

He assented to this as well.

“So then, is it shameful, in your opinion, for a human being to suffer the same things as the most senseless of beasts? As for instance adulterers who enter the women’s quarters, knowing that the adulterer risks both suffering what the law threatens and being ensnared and being dealt with insolently once caught; and even though bad and shameful things of such magnitude hang over the adulterer, and though there are many who would release him from his sexual desire in safety, he is carried nevertheless into risky situations—isn’t this already the mark of someone who is altogether unhappy?”

“In my opinion, at least,” he said.

“And isn’t it a mark of great neglect, in your opinion, that the many are untrained for cold and heat, although the majority of the most necessary activities for human beings take place under the open sky, like those of war and of farming, and not the least important of the others?”

He assented to this as well.

“Then, in your opinion, must the one who is going to rule train himself to bear easily these things too?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“So then, if we put those who are continent in all these things in the order of those fit for rule, shall we put those unable to do these things in the order of those who will not even lay a claim to rule?”

He assented to this as well.

“So, what about this? Since in fact you know the order of the tribe of each of these two individuals, have you before now ever examined in which of these orders you would justly put yourself?”

“Indeed I have,” said Aristippus. “And in no way at all do I put myself in the order of those who wish to rule. In fact, in my opinion, it is quite senseless that it not be enough for a human being to furnish himself with what he needs, although this is a lot of work, but instead to take on the additional task of procuring also for the rest of the citizens what they need. And, while doing without many of the things he wishes for himself, after having presided over the city he undergoes a penalty unless he accomplishes everything the city wishes. How is this not great senselessness?

“For cities in fact think they deserve to deal with their rulers just as I deal with my house servants. For I think I deserve having my servants furnish me with provisions in abundance, while themselves laying hold of none of them; and cities think that their rulers should procure for them as many goods as possible, while themselves refraining from all of them. And so the ones I, for my part, would set among those fit for rule, after educating them in this manner, are those who wish to have many troubles themselves and to provide such troubles to others. I put

myself, however, in the order of those who wish to live as easily and as pleasantly as possible."

And Socrates said, "So do you wish that we examine also this: which live more pleasantly, the rulers or the ruled?"

"Certainly," he said.

"To begin, then, with the tribes we know, in Asia the Persians rule, while the Syrians, Phrygians, and Lydians are ruled; and in Europe the Scythians rule, while the Maiotians are ruled; and in Libya the Carthaginians rule, while the Libyans are ruled. So which of these do you think lives more pleasantly? Or of the Greeks—among whom you belong yourself—which live more pleasantly in your opinion, those who overpower or who are overpowered?"

"But I, for my part, do not put myself in the order of slaves either," said Aristippus. "Rather, in my opinion, there is a certain middle road between these, which I try to travel, neither through rule nor through slavery, but through freedom; and this road especially leads to happiness."

"Well," said Socrates, "if this road that carries you neither through rule nor through slavery doesn't go through human beings either, perhaps you would be saying something. If, however, while you are among human beings you will think you deserve neither to rule nor to be ruled and you won't serve the rulers willingly, I think you see that the stronger both collectively and privately understand how to make the weaker lament and to deal with them as slaves.

"Or are you unaware that the stronger cut down grain and trees after others have sown and planted them; and that they besiege in every way those who are weaker but do not want to serve them, until they persuade them to prefer slavery to being at war with those who are stronger? In addition, don't you know that in private life the courageous and powerful reap profit from those who lack courage and are powerless, whom they enslave?"

"But in order not to suffer these things," he said, "I, for my part, in fact don't confine myself to any regime but am a stranger everywhere."

Socrates said, "Quite a clever trick, what you're saying now! For, ever since Sinis, Sciron, and Procrustes died, is no one any longer unjust to strangers? But now those who live as citizens in their fatherlands even lay down laws so they won't suffer injustice, and acquire other friends to aid them in addition to the so-called necessary ones, and throw up defenses around their cities, and acquire arms to ward off those who are unjust, and, in addition to these things, equip themselves with other allies from outside—and still, those who possess all these things nevertheless suffer injustice.

"But you, who has none of these things and who spends a good deal of time on the highways where people suffer injustice the most and who is weaker than any of the citizens in whatever city you reach and who is the sort of person most attacked by those who wish to do injustice, nevertheless, you think that because you are a stranger, you won't suffer injustice? Or do you take heart because cities announce to you that it is safe to come and go? Or is it also because you think that you would be the sort of slave who is not profitable to any master? For who would

want to have a human being in his household who does not want to labor, while taking delight in a very costly way of life?

"But let us also examine this: how masters deal with household servants who are of this sort. Don't they moderate their lust by hunger, prevent their stealing by shutting them out from wherever there is anything to take, keep them from running away by putting them in bonds, and drive away their laziness with the compulsion of blows? Or what do you do when you observe that one of your household servants is of this sort?"

"I punish him with everything bad," he said, "until I compel him to serve as a slave. But, Socrates, how do those educated in the kingly art—which you, in my opinion, hold to be happiness—differ from those who suffer bad things out of compulsion, at least if they are going to suffer hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and all the other toils willingly? I, for my part, don't know what difference it makes whether the same skin is willingly rather than unwillingly beaten, or, in general, whether the same body is willingly or unwillingly besieged with all things of this sort, except that the one who gladly endures what is painful lacks sense as well."

"What then, Aristippus?" Socrates said. "Isn't it your opinion that the willing sufferings differ from the unwilling ones in ways such as these: someone who is willingly hungry could eat whenever he should wish, and someone who is willingly thirsty could drink, and likewise regarding the other things; but it's not possible for someone suffering these things under compulsion to cease from them whenever he wishes? Secondly, the one who suffers hardship willingly delights in thinking with a view to a good hope, like those who hunt beasts toil with pleasure in hope of a catch.

"And while those sorts of rewards for one's labors are of little worth, what about those who labor so that they may acquire good friends or that they may subdue their enemies, or so that by becoming powerful in their bodies and souls they may manage their own house nobly and treat their friends well and do good deeds for their fatherland? Surely one should know that these both labor for such things with pleasure and take delight in living, since they admire themselves and are praised and emulated by others.

"Moreover, easy and immediate pleasures suffice neither to produce good condition in the body, as the gymnastic trainers say, nor to produce any understanding worth mentioning in the soul; but acts of attention exercised with endurance enable one to attain noble and good works, as the good men say. Hesiod too says somewhere, 'It is easy to choose badness even in abundance; the road is smooth, and it lies very near. But immortal gods have placed sweat before virtue. The path to it is long and steep and rough at first. But if ever one arrives at the peak, then the going is easy, although it was hard.' Epicharmus is a witness, as well, in the following: 'The gods sell us all good things at the price of our labor.' And in another place he says, 'Wicked one, do not yearn for soft things, lest you have hard ones.'

"And Prodicus the wise declares a similar view of virtue in his treatise about Heracles—the very one he displayed most widely—when he says something like the

following, insofar as I recall. For he says that when Heracles was starting to enter adolescence from childhood—when youths, since they are already becoming their own rulers, make clear whether in life they will take the road through virtue or that through vice—going out to a quiet spot, he sat down perplexed as to which of the roads he should take.

"And two tall women appeared to him to be approaching. One of the two was becoming to look at and freeborn in nature. For adornment her body had purity, her eyes modesty, her bearing moderation, and she had white clothing. The other had been fed to the point of being fleshy and soft. She was prettied up so that her complexion seemed to appear whiter and rosier than its reality, and so that her bearing seemed straighter than its nature. Her eyes were wide open, and she was wearing the clothes in which her bloom would be most conspicuous. She looked down at herself frequently, looked around to see if anyone else was looking at her, and frequently looked at her own shadow.

"When they came nearer to Heracles, the one spoken of first went on in the same manner, but the other, who wished to reach Heracles first, ran to him and said, see, Heracles, that you are perplexed as to which road you should take in life. If you befriend me, I will lead you to the most pleasant and easiest road; you will not miss the taste of any delight, and you will live your life without experience of the hard things.

" 'First, you will worry neither about war nor about business. Instead, you will roam about examining what delightful food or drink you might find, what delight you might see or hear, what pleasant things you might smell or touch, which favorites would especially delight you in associating with them, and how you might sleep most comfortably, and how you might obtain all these things with the least trouble.

"'And if ever any suspicion should arise that the sources of these things will be scarce, have no fear that I might lead you to procure these things for yourself by means of labor and hardship of body and soul. Instead, you will use whatever methods others use to accomplish these things and refrain from nothing gainful. For I, for my part, furnish my companions with the license to derive benefit from wherever they may.'

"And Heracles, after hearing these things, said, 'Woman, what is your name?'

"'My friends call me Happiness,' she said, 'but those who hate me nickname me Vice.'

"At this point the other woman approached and said, 'I too have come to you, Heracles, since know those who begot you and that nature of yours, having observed it in your education. Therefore, I have hope: for you, that if you should take the road toward me, you will become an exceedingly good worker of what is noble and august; and, for me, that I will appear still far more honored and more distinguished for good things. I shall not deceive you with preludes about pleasure. But I shall truthfully describe the disposition the gods have made of the things that are.

"'For without labor and attentiveness the gods give humans none of the things that are good and noble. But if you wish the gods to be gracious to you, you must serve the gods; if you want to be cherished by your friends you must do good deeds for your friends; if you desire to be honored by some city, you must benefit the city; if you think you deserve to be admired by all Greece for your virtue you must attempt to be the cause of good for Greece; if you wish the earth to bear you fruit in abundance, you must serve the earth; if you think you must become rich from cattle, you must be attentive to the cattle; if you set out to increase yourself through war and wish to be able to make your friends free and subdue your enemies, you must learn the warlike arts themselves from those who understand them, as well as practice how one must use them. And if you wish to be powerful also in your body, you must accustom your body to serve your judgment, and you must train with labors and sweat.'

"And Vice interrupted her and said—as Prodicus tells it—'Reflect, Heracles, how hard and long is the road to the delights that this woman describes for you. But I shall lead you to an easy and short road to happiness.'

"And Virtue said, 'Wretch! What good thing do you have? Or what pleasant thing do you know, not wanting to do anything for the sake of these things? You do not even await the desire for pleasures but rather fill yourself up with everything before desiring it, eating before you are hungry, drinking before you are thirsty. In fact, in order to eat pleasantly you contrive gourmet cooks; in order to drink pleasantly you furnish yourself with costly wines and in summer run around seeking ice; and in order to sleep pleasantly you furnish yourself not only with soft bedclothes but couches and rockers for your couches. For you desire sleep not because of your labor but because you have nothing to do. And you compel [yourself to have] sex before you are in need, contriving all sorts of things and treating men as women. Insolent at night and asleep during the most useful part of the day, this is the way you educate your friends.

"'Although you are immortal, you have been cast out from among the gods and are dishonored by good human beings. You have not heard the most pleasant of all sounds, praise of yourself. And you have not seen the most pleasant of all sights, for you have never seen any noble work of your own. If you should say anything, who would trust you? If you should need anything, who would supply you? And what person of good sense would dare to be among your worshippers, who are powerless in their bodies when young and senseless in their souls when they become older, who are comfortably sustained^ without labor through youth, and pass a miserable and laborious old age, who are ashamed by what they have done and weighed down by what they are doing, and who run through pleasures in their youth and lay up the hard things for old age.

" 'But I am a companion of the gods, and a companion of good human beings. No noble work, divine or human, comes into being without me. I am honored most of all among gods and among those human beings by whom it is fitting to be honored; for I am a cherished coworker for artisans, a trusted guardian for masters of households, a well-disposed assistant for household servants, a good helper for

the labors of peace, a reliable ally for the works of war, and an excellent partner in friendship.

" 'Among my friends the enjoyment of food and drink is pleasant and trouble free, for they refrain from these until they desire them. More pleasant sleep is available to them than to those who do not toil. And when they lose sleep they are not annoyed, nor on this account are they remiss in taking the actions they should. The young delight in praise from their elders, while the old exult in honors from the young. They recall their former actions with pleasure and are pleased when they do well in present ones, being, because of me, dear to gods, cherished by friends, and honored by fatherlands. And whenever their allotted end comes, they do not lie without honor and forgotten but thrive remembered in hymns sung through all time. When you have worked hard at such things, Heracles, child of good parents, it is possible to possess the most blessed happiness.'

"Prodicus managed the education of Heracles at the hands of Virtue more or less in this way. He, however, decorated his judgments with wording even grander than I used just now. So it's worthwhile for you, Aristippus, with these things in mind, to try to worry somewhat also about the future things of your life."

Chapter 2

When he perceived once that his eldest son, Lamprocles, was angry with his mother, he said, "Tell me, child, do you know any human beings who are called ungrateful?"

"I do indeed," said the youth.

"Have you observed, then, what they do that makes people call them this name?"

"I have," he said, "for they call ungrateful those who have been well treated but do not return the favor when they can."

"So then, are the ungrateful numbered among the unjust in your opinion?"

"Yes, in my opinion," he said.

"Now have you ever yet examined whether, in the same way as opinion holds it to be unjust to enslave friends but just to enslave enemies, it is also unjust to be ungrateful to friends but just to be ungrateful to enemies?"

"Yes, indeed," he said. "And, in my opinion, someone who is well treated, whether by a friend or by an enemy, is unjust if he does not try to return the favor."

"So then, if this is in fact the case, would ingratitude be something purely and simply unjust?"

He agreed.

"Accordingly, the better someone is treated without repaying the favor, the more unjust he would be?"

He assented also to this.

"Now whom," he said, "could we find receiving from any source benefactions greater than children receive from their parents? Their parents cause them to come

from nonbeing to being, so as to see as many noble things and to share in as many good things as the gods provide human beings. And what is more, these things are in our opinion so completely worthwhile that more than anything we all flee from leaving them behind; and cities have fashioned the death penalty against the greatest injustices on the grounds that there is no fear of a greater bad thing to stop the injustice.

"Moreover, surely you don't suppose that human beings beget children on account of sex, since the streets as well as the houses are full of those who will release one from this. And it is visible that we examine also from what sort of women we might get the best offspring, and it is with these we come together to produce offspring.

"And the man in fact sustains the woman who will produce offspring for him, and he provides his future children in advance with all things that he thinks will benefit them for life, and these things in the greatest abundance of which he is capable. While the woman, after she conceives, bears this burden, weighed down, taking risks concerning her life and sharing the sustenance by which she too is sustained; and after she carries it to term with much labor and brings it forth, she sustains and attends to it, even though she has not been previously well treated by it, and even though the newborn does not recognize the one by whom it is well treated; nor can it even signal what it needs, but she by guessing attempts to fill it with what affords both advantage and delight, and she sustains it for a long time, enduring labor both day and night without knowing what gratitude she will receive for these things.

"And it is not enough for them only to sustain the children, but also, when in their opinion their children are competent to learn something, the parents teach them whatever they themselves have that is good for one's life. And they go to expense to send them to someone else when they think that one will be more competent to teach certain things. And they attend to doing everything so that their children might become as good as possible."

The youth said in reply to this, "But even if she has done all these things and very many others besides, no one could endure her harshness."

And Socrates said, "Which do you think is more difficult to bear, the ferocity of a beast or of a mother?"

"For my part," he said, "I think that of a mother, at least one such as this."

"Then has she ever yet given you any harm by biting or kicking, such things as many have suffered from beasts?"

"But, by Zeus," he said, "she says things that no one, upon his whole life, would wish to hear."

"And you," said Socrates, "how many hard-to-endure troubles do you think you provided her, both by your voice and by your deeds from your childhood on, when you were peevish both day and night; and how much grief did you cause when you were sick?"

“But,” he said, “never did I either say or do anything to her that made her ashamed.”

“What then?” he said. “Do you think it is harsher for you to hear what she says than it is for the actors when they say the most extreme things to one another in the tragedies?”

“But I think they bear it easily since in the case of these speakers they do not think that the one who refutes does so in order to inflict a penalty, nor that the one who threatens does so in order to do any harm.”

“And you, knowing very well that, when your mother speaks to you, she not only intends no harm but also wishes good for you more than for anyone else—knowing this, you are angry? Or do you hold that your mother intends you harm?”

“Surely not,” he said. “That I do not think.”

And Socrates said, “And so, though her intention toward you is good and she attends to you as best she can so that you will regain health when you are sick and so that you will lack nothing you need, and, in addition to these things, she prays to the gods for many good things on your behalf and fulfills her vows—you assert that she is harsh. For my part, I think that if you cannot bear such a mother you cannot bear the good things.

“And tell me,” he said, “do you think you should serve anyone else, or are you prepared to try to please no human being, nor to obey either a general or other ruler?”

“By Zeus, for my part, I think one should,” he said.

“And so,” said Socrates, “you wish to please your neighbor too so that he will kindle your fire when you need it and become an accomplice for your good and come to your aid with good intent from close by should you happen to falter?”

“I do, for my part,” he said.

“What about a travel companion, a shipmate, or someone else you might meet? Would it make no difference to you whether he becomes friendly or hostile? Or do you think that one must also be attentive regarding good intent from these?”

“I do, for my part,” he said.

“Then you are prepared to be attentive toward these, but you don’t think you must serve your mother who loves you most of all? Don’t you know that the city, as well, attends to and brings to trial no other form of ingratitude but overlooks those who are well treated and do not return the favor. But if someone does not serve parents, the city sets down a penalty against him and, after deeming him unfit during scrutiny, will not allow him to rule on the grounds that the sacrifices he offers on behalf of the city would not be piously offered, nor would anything else he did be nobly or justly done. And, by Zeus, if someone even fails to decorate the tombs of his parents after they have died, the city reviews this too when it subjects its rulers to scrutiny.

“So you, child, if you are moderate regarding the gods, you will beseech them to forgive you if you have in any way neglected your mother, lest they too not want to treat you well because they hold that you are ungrateful. And regarding human

beings, you will watch out lest when they perceive you neglecting your parents they all dishonor you and then you find yourself bereft of friends. For should they suppose that you are ungrateful to your parents, no one would hold that the favor will be returned him after he has treated you well."

Chapter 3

Once, when he perceived that there was a quarrel between Chairephon and Chairecrates, who were brothers to each other and acquaintances of his, he said upon seeing Chairecrates, "Tell me, Chairecrates, surely you too do not belong to the sort of human beings who hold that wealth is more useful than brothers, even though wealth lacks sense while a brother has it, and wealth is in need of assistance while a brother is able to assist, and, in addition to these things, you possess rather a lot of wealth but only one brother;

"This also is a wonder: if someone should believe that brothers are a loss to him because he does not possess their property too, but not believe that his fellow citizens are losses because he does not have theirs too. But, in the latter case they are able to calculate that it is better for one to hold enough property while dwelling securely with many than to have risky possession of all the property of the citizens while living a solitary way of life. Yet when it comes to their brothers, they are ignorant of this same fact.

"In addition, while those who can buy household servants do so in order to have partners in work, and while they acquire friends on the grounds that they need allies, at the same time they neglect their brothers, as though friends come to be from citizens but not from brothers.

"And yet, to have been born from the same parents is a great foundation for friendship, as is to have been reared together, since even in the beasts a certain longing comes to be for those they were reared with. And, in addition to these things, other human beings also honor those with brothers more than those without, and attack them less."

And Chairecrates said, "Socrates, if the quarrel is not a great one, perhaps one should bear with the brother and not flee from him for the sake of petty matters. For, just as you too say, a brother, who is the sort he should be, is a good thing. When, however, he is deficient in every way and completely the opposite, why should someone attempt the impossible?"

And Socrates said, "Chairecrates, is Chairephon able to please no one, just as he is unable to please you? Or is he in fact quite pleasing to some?"

"It is for this very reason, Socrates," he said, "that he deserves my hatred—that he is able to please others, but, wherever he is in my presence, he is everywhere a loss, rather than a benefit, both by deed and by speech."

"Is it the case, then," said Socrates, "that just as a horse is a loss for someone who lacks understanding but attempts to deal with it, so too a brother is a loss whenever someone without understanding tries to deal with him?"

“But how could I,” said Chairecrates, “lack understanding of how to deal with a brother, since I understand both how to speak well of someone who speaks well of me and how to treat well someone who treats me well? However, I would be able neither to speak well of nor to treat well someone who tries to annoy me in speech and in deed; nor will I even try.”

And Socrates said, “You make wondrous statements indeed, Chairecrates. In the case of a dog, if one were serviceable for your flocks and fond of your shepherds but harsh toward you when you approached him, you would neglect to get angry and try to render him gentle by treating him well; yet, in the case of your brother, you assert that he would be a great good if he were as he should be toward you; and while you agree that you understand how to act and speak well, you do not attempt to contrive a way for him to be as good as possible for you.”

And Chairecrates said, “I am afraid, Socrates, that I do not have great enough wisdom to make Chairephon be as he should toward me.”

“And yet in my opinion,” said Socrates, “one need contrive nothing at all complex or new with regard to him, but with what even you yourself understand I think he could be won over to think highly of you.”

“Hurry up and tell me,” he said, “if you have perceived that I understand some love charm that I am unaware that I know.”

“Tell me,” he said, “if you wished to prevail upon some acquaintance of yours to invite you to dinner whenever he makes sacrifices, what would you do?”

“It is clear that I myself would make a start of the practice by inviting him when make a sacrifice.”

“And if you wished to turn one of your friends toward attending to your property when you go out of the country, what would you do?”

“It is clear that I would attempt to attend to his property first whenever he goes out of the country.”

“And if you wished to have a stranger receive you whenever you go to his country, what would you do?”

“It is clear that I would also receive him first whenever he should come to Athens. And if I wished him to accomplish eagerly for me the business for which I came, it is clear that I myself would have to do this too for him first.”

“Then have you been hiding all along the fact that you understand all the love-charms among human beings?” he said. “Or do you hesitate to make the first move lest you appear shameful if you treat your brother well first? And yet a man is thought, at any rate, to deserve the most praise if he anticipates his enemies in treating them badly and his friends in doing them good deeds. Accordingly, if, in my opinion, Chairephon were more capable than you of leading toward this friendship, I would have tried to persuade him to make the attempt first to make you his friend. But now, in my opinion, it is rather you, if you would take the lead, who would accomplish this.”

And Chairecrates said, “You say something strange and not at all in character, Socrates, when you bid me to lead the way although I am the younger. In fact,

among all human beings the opposite is held, that the elder is to lead in everything, both in speech and in deed."

"How do you mean?" said Socrates. "For isn't it held everywhere that the younger is to stand aside in the street when an elder meets him, and when sitting to stand up, and to honor him with the soft couch, and when speaking to yield? Do not hesitate, my good fellow," he said, "but attempt to make the man gentle and very soon he will listen to you. Don't you see how honor-loving and freeborn he is? For while you would capture wicked human sorts only if you should give them something, you would especially prevail upon noble and good (gentlemanly) human beings by dealing with them in a friendly manner."

And Chairecrates said, "What, then, if he does not become any better when I do these things?"

"What else," said Socrates, "other than that you will risk displaying yourself as a good person who loves his brother, and him as a common person undeserving of good treatment? But I do not think that any of this will come to pass. For I hold that, as soon as he perceives that you are challenging him to enter this contest, he will be very eager to win the victory by surpassing you in good treatment, both in speech and in deed.

"For at present," he said, "you two are disposed just as a pair of hands that the god made for helping each other to grasp, but that give up on this and turn toward hindering each other, or like a pair of feet which have been made by divine dispensation for working with each other but neglect this and get in each other's way.

"Wouldn't it be great ignorance and unhappiness to use for harm things made for benefit? And yet, in my opinion, the god made a pair of brothers to be even more beneficial to one another than a pair of hands, a pair of feet, a pair of eyes, or any of the other things he begot as brethren for human beings. For hands could not do at the same time things that are more than a fathom apart, if they should need to; feet could not go to places even a fathom apart at the same time. And eyes, which are thought to reach over the greatest distance, could not among things still nearer see those in front and behind them at the same time. But when a pair of brothers are friends they can act at the same time for each other's benefit, even though they are separated by a great distance.

Chapter 4

I also heard him once conversing about friends; he said such things as, in my opinion at least, might be especially beneficial to someone regarding the acquisition and treatment of friends. For he said that he heard from many people that a sure and good friend is the best of all possessions. But he said that he saw the many attending to anything rather than the acquisition of friends.

For he said that he saw them attentively acquiring houses, fields, slaves, grazing animals, and furniture, and trying to preserve what they had, but as for a friend—which they say is the greatest good—he said that he saw the many worrying neither about how to acquire nor about how to preserve the ones they had.

But even in the case of illnesses of friends and household servants, he said that he saw some bringing doctors to their household servants and attentively furnishing them with other things for their health, while taking little heed of their friends; and, should both die, he saw them vexed about their household servants and believing their death a loss, while thinking themselves no worse off for the death of their friends; and he saw them allowing none of their other possessions to be left unattended or unguarded, while neglecting their friends who were in need of attention.

Again, in addition to these things, he said that he saw that the many knew the number of their other possessions even when they had very many of them, while, though they had few friends, they were not only ignorant of their number but even when they attempted to count them for those who inquired, they included some among their friends whom they later excluded. This was the extent to which they worried about their friends.

And yet on comparison, which of the other possessions wouldn't a good friend appear far superior to? For what horse or what ox team is as useful as a good friend? What slave is so well intentioned and constant? Or what other possession is so universally useful?

For the good friend orders himself to remedy every deficiency of his friend, both in private equipment and in collective actions: should there be a need to treat someone well, he lends support, and if any fear disturbs him, he comes to his aid—sometimes helping him with expenditures, other times helping him with actions, and sometimes helping him persuade, other times using force, delighting them the most when they do well, and setting them right the most when they falter.

Whatever services the hands do for each, whatever eyes can foresee, whatever the ears hear beforehand, and whatever the feet carry out—a friend falls short of none of these in doing good deeds. And frequently a friend suffices for doing for his friend the things that one could not have done, seen, heard, or carried out for oneself. But nevertheless, while some try to care for trees for the sake of their fruit, most are lazy and remiss in their attention to that possession that bears the most fruit and is called a friend.

Chapter 5

I once heard another speech of his too, which in my opinion turned the listener toward reviewing how much he himself was worth to his friends. For when he saw that one of his companions neglected a friend oppressed by poverty, he questioned Antisthenes in front of the one neglecting him, as well as many others.

"Antisthenes," he said, "are friends worth certain amounts just as household servants are? For I suppose among household servants, one is worth two mina, another not even a half-mina, another five mina, and another even ten. And Nicias the son of Niceratus is said to have purchased an overseer for his silver mines at the cost of a talent. I am examining this," he said, "whether, just as household servants, so friends too have a worth."

“Yes, by Zeus,” said Antisthenes. “I, at any rate, would wish to have a certain person my friend rather than two mina, while another I would not value at even a half-mina, another I would choose before ten mina, and another I would value as my friend above all wealth and labor.”

“So then,” Socrates said, “if indeed these things are so, one would do well to review how much he himself happens to be worth to his friends, and to try to be worth as much as possible in order that his friends will be less likely to betray him. For in fact,” he said, “in the light of what I, for my part, frequently hear—from one that a man who was a friend betrayed him, from another that a man he thought was his friend chose a mina over him—I examine with regard to all such cases whether, just as whenever someone sells a wicked household servant and disposes of him for whatever price he fetches, so also it might be a temptation to dispose of a wicked friend when it is possible to get more than he is worth. Good household servants I don’t much see being sold nor good friends being betrayed,”

Chapter 6

In my opinion he gave instruction also with regard to testing what sort of friends are worth acquiring when he said things of the following sort. “Tell me, Critobulus,” he said, “if we should need a good friend, how would we attempt to conduct our investigation? Should we seek first for one who is the ruler of his appetite as well as of his love of drink, lust, sleep, and laziness? For one overpowered by these couldn’t do what he should either for himself or for a friend.”

“No, by Zeus, he surely couldn’t,” he said.

“So then, should one stay away from one who is ruled by these things, in your opinion?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“What about the one who is a spendthrift and not self-sufficient,” he said, “but always in need of what belongs to his neighbor; and who, if he gets something, cannot pay it back, but when he doesn’t get it, hates the one who does not give? Wouldn’t he, too, be a harsh friend in your opinion?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“So then, one should stay away from him too?”

“One should indeed stay away,” he said.

“What about the one who is able to make wealth but desires a great deal of it, and for this reason drives a hard bargain and is pleased to get, but does not wish to pay back?”

“In my opinion,” he said, “this one is even more wicked than the previous one.”

“What about the one who, because of his erotic desire for making wealth, provides himself with leisure for nothing other than what he can derive some gain from?”

“One should stay away from him, too, in my opinion; for he would be of no benefit to the one dealing with him.”

“What about someone who is factious and wants to provide his friends with many enemies?”

“By Zeus, one should flee from him, too.”

“And if someone has none of these bad qualities but endures being well treated while not worrying at all about doing good deeds in return?”

“This one would be of no benefit either. But, Socrates, what sort shall we attempt to make our friend?”

“Someone, I think, who, as opposed to these, would be continent in the bodily pleasures and, while easy to live with and easy to bargain with, would happen also to be contentious) not to be deficient in the good treatment of those who do him good deeds, so that he is profitable to those who deal with him.”

“So how would we test someone for these qualities, Socrates, before we deal with him?”

“We test sculptors not by making a judgment on the basis of their speeches,” he said, “but he whom we see has done beautiful work on past sculptures we trust to do well also on those in the future.”

“Are you saying,” he said, “that it is also clear that a man who visibly treats his previous friends well would do good deeds for those who become his friends later as well?”

“Yes, for regarding horses, too,” he said, “when I see someone using nobly the ones he had previously, I think that he would use others nobly as well.”

“Well then,” he said, “how should one make oneself a friend of the one who is, in our opinion, worthy of friendship?”

“To begin with,” he said, “one should examine what comes from the gods, whether they advise making him one’s friend.”

“So what about the one whom in our opinion we should make our friend and whom the gods do not oppose?” he said. “Are you able to say how he should be hunted?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “not by following on his heels, as the hare is hunted, nor with deception,, as the birds are, nor with violence, as one’s enemies are. For it is troublesome to capture an unwilling friend, and it is hard to hold him bound down like a slave. Those who are treated in this way become enemies rather than friends.”

“But how are friends hunted?” he said.

“They say that there are certain incantations, which those who understand them chant to make friends for themselves of whomever they wish; and that there are love charms, too, which those who understand them use on whomever they wish to become beloved by them.”

“Where then might we learn these things?” he said.

“You have heard in Homer what the Sirens chanted to Odysseus,

which begins somewhat as follows: ‘Come here, much-praised Odysseus, great glory of the Achaeans.’ “

“Did the Sirens,” he said, “hold fast other human beings too, Socrates, by chanting this incantation with the result that the enchanted didn’t depart from them?”

“No, but they chanted in this manner to those who love the honor accorded to virtue.”

“Are you all but saying that one should chant to each person praises of the sort that he who hears them will not hold that the one praising him is ridiculing him?”

“For one would thus be more hateful and drive human beings away from oneself, if one were to praise a person who knows he is short, ugly, and weak by saying that he is beautiful, tall, and strong.”

“Do you know any other incantations?”

“No, but I have heard that Pericles understood many that he chanted to the city to make it love him.”

“But how did Themistocles make the city love him?”

“Not by chanting incantations, by Zeus, but by attaching some good to it.”

“In my opinion, Socrates, you are saying that if we are going to acquire some good friend, we ourselves must become good at speaking and taking action.”

“Did you think,” said Socrates, “that it is possible even for someone who is wicked to acquire good friends?”

“Well,” said Critobulus, “I have seen poor orators who are friends with good public speakers, and those comrades of men who are masterful generals who are not competent to be generals,”

“Then also, regarding the subject of our conversation,” he said, “do you know any who, while not being beneficial themselves, are able to make those who are beneficial their friends?”

“By Zeus, surely not,” he said. “But if one who is wicked is unable to acquire gentlemanly (noble and good) friends, then I have the following concern: whether one who has become a gentleman can readily become friends with gentlemen.”

“What disturbs you, Critobulus, is that frequently you see men who perform noble actions and refrain from what is shameful, instead of being friends, engaged in factious strife against one another and dealing with one another more harshly than would human beings of no worth.”

“Yes,” said Critobulus, “and not only do private individuals do this but also the cities that are most attentive to the noble things and least admit the shameful are frequently in a state of hostility with one another.

“When I take these things into account I am quite dispirited concerning the acquisition of friends. For I do not see either that the wicked can be friends with one another. For how could ungrateful, neglectful, greedy, untrustworthy, or incontinent human beings become friends? So, in my opinion at any rate, the wicked are by nature complete enemies rather than friends to one another.

“Moreover, as you say, the wicked would never harmonize with the good in friendship: for how could those who do what is wicked become friends with those

who hate such things? And if, in addition, those who train themselves in virtue both engage in factious strife over who will have first place in the cities and hate one another out of envy, who will still be friends? And among what human beings will there be good intentions and trust?"

"But these matters are somewhat complex, Critobulus," said Socrates. "For by nature human beings have, on the one hand, inducements to friendship: for they need one another and have pity and confer benefits as coworkers and, perceiving this, are grateful to one another; and, on the other hand, inducements to hostility: for when they hold the same things to be noble and pleasant, they fight over them, and when they differ in their judgments, they set themselves at variance; and both rivalry and anger are inducements to hostility; and the erotic desire to acquire an excess is ill willed, while envy is hateful.

"Nevertheless, slipping through all these things, friendship unites those who are both noble and good. Because of their virtue, they choose to possess moderate property without labor rather than through war to be lord of all things; and they are able without pain to share their food and drink, though they are hungry and thirsty, and to be continent so as not to pain those it isn't fitting to, though they are pleased by sex with those in bloom.

"In the sphere of wealth as well, not only are they able to share it lawfully, refraining from being greedy, but they also are able to come to one another's assistance. They are able to arrange also their rivalry not only painlessly but even advantageously for one another and to prevent their anger from going so far as to become a source of regret. And envy they remove altogether, since they render their own goods the property of their friends and hold those of their friends to be their own.

"Why, then, isn't it plausible that in the sphere of political honors, as well, the gentlemen (the noble and good) will be partners not only harmless but even beneficial to one another? For those who desire to be honored and to rule in the cities in order to have license to steal wealth, to do violence to human beings, and to experience pleasure would be unjust, wicked, and unable to live in harmony with anyone else.

"But if someone wishes to be honored in a city so that he himself will not be done injustice and can bring just aid to his friends, and so that in ruling he might attempt to do his fatherland some good—on what account would such a one be unable to live in harmony with another of the same sort? Will he be less able to benefit his friends when the gentlemen (noble and good) are with him? Or will he be less able to do good deeds for his city when he has gentlemen as his coworkers?

"But it is clear even in athletic contests that if the best were permitted to make a pact to go against the worse, they would win all the contests and get all the prizes. Now, there they don't allow them to do this; but since in political affairs, where the gentlemen (noble and good) are best, no one prevents one from doing good deeds for the city together with whomever one wishes, how can it be unprofitable to engage in political affairs after acquiring the best friends, using them as partners and coworkers in one's actions rather than as antagonists?

“Furthermore, it is clear that if one is at war with someone else, he will need allies, and more of them if it is gentlemen (noble and good) he is placed against. And yet those who want to be allies must be well treated so that they’ll want to be eager; but it is far better to treat well the best who are fewer in number, than the worse who are more numerous, for the wicked require many more good deeds than the good.

“But take heart and try to become good, Critobulus,” he said, “and when you have become so, attempt to hunt after those who are both noble and good. And, because I am erotic, perhaps even I might be able to assist you in some way in the hunt for those who are both noble and good. For—whatever human beings I desire—loving them, I set out with complete intensity to be loved by them in return, and, longing for them, to be longed for in return, and, desiring to be together with them, to have them desire in return to be together with me.

“I see that you, too, will need these things whenever you desire friendship with certain people. So don’t conceal from me those you wish to become friendly with. For because I am attentive to please whoever pleases me, I think that I am not inexperienced in the hunting of human beings.”

And Critobulus said, “And yet, Socrates, I have long desired to learn these subjects of learning, especially if this same understanding will suffice for me with a view both to those who are good in their souls and to those beautiful in their bodies.”

And Socrates said, “But, Critobulus, it isn’t within the scope of my understanding to make the beautiful endure one who puts his hands on them. I am persuaded as well that it was for this reason that human beings fled from Scylla: because she would put her hands upon them. But because the Sirens put their hands upon no one but chanted to all from afar, people say that all endured them and were enchanted on hearing them.”

And Critobulus said, “If you have something good for the acquisition of friends, teach, on the understanding that I will not put my hands on them.”

“Nor your mouth?” said Socrates. “You will not put it on their mouth?”

“Take heart,” Critobulus said, “for I will not put my mouth on anyone’s mouth, either—unless he is beautiful.”

“There you go, Critobulus,” he said, “saying the exact opposite of what is advantageous. For the beautiful do not endure such things, while the ugly admit them with pleasure even, holding that they are being called beautiful (noble) on account of their soul.”

And Critobulus said, “On the understanding that I shall kiss those who are beautiful, and tenderly kiss those who are good, take heart and teach me what pertains to the hunting of friends.”

And Socrates said, “Whenever, then, you wish to become the friend of someone, Critobulus, will you allow me to give him the following information against you: that you both admire him and desire to be his friend?”

“Accuse me of it,” said Critobulus. “For I know of no one who hates those who praise him.”

‘Then if accuse you in addition,” he said, “of having good intentions as well toward him, because you admire him, you won’t be of the opinion that you’re being slandered by me?”

“To the contrary,” he said, “I myself have good intentions toward those I suppose to have good intentions toward me.”

“These things, then,” Socrates said, “I will be permitted to say about you to those you wish to make your friends. If, in addition, you will give me license to say of you that you are attentive to your friends and take delight in nothing so much as good friends; that you exult in the noble deeds of your friends no less than in your own and that you take delight in the good things that come to your friends no less than in those that come to you, while you do not grow weary of contriving to bring it about that these things will come to your friends; and that you have formed the judgment that the virtue of a man consists in winning the victory over his friends in treating them well and over his enemies in treating them badly—I very much think that I would be serviceable to you as a helper in the hunting of good friends.”

“Why,” Critobulus said, “are you telling this to me, as if it weren’t up to you to say whatever you wish about me?”

“By Zeus, it is not, as I once heard from Aspasia. For she said that good matchmaking women are clever at bringing human beings together into marriages by reporting the good things with truth, but that they do not want- to lie when they praise. For those who have been deceived hate each other and the matchmaker at the same time. Since I have been persuaded that this is in fact correct, I, for my part, believe that in my praise I am not permitted to say of you anything that is not true.”

“So is this the sort of friend you are to me, Socrates,” Critobulus said, “one who would assist me if I myself have something serviceable for acquiring friends; but, if I don’t, you wouldn’t want to say something you fabricated for my benefit?”

“How, in your opinion, Critobulus, would I benefit you more,” Socrates said, “by praising you falsely, or by persuading you to try to become a good man?

“And if the answer is not visible to you in this way, examine it on the basis of the following. If I should praise you falsely by claiming that you are a good pilot because I wish to make you the friend of a ship-owner, and he entrusts his ship to you because he is persuaded by me even though you do not understand how to pilot, do you have any hope that you would not destroy both yourself and the ship? Or if I should falsely persuade the city collectively that it should entrust itself to you on the grounds that you are a master general, juror, and statesman, what do you think you and the city would suffer because of you? Or if privately I should falsely persuade some citizen that he should entrust his belongings to you on the grounds that you really are skilled in managing a household and attentive? If you should be put to the test, wouldn’t you be harmful and appear ridiculous at the same time?

“Instead, the most efficient, safest, and noblest path to being thought to be good at whatever one wishes, Critobulus, is to try to become good at it as well. And when you examine the matter you will find that all those things that are called virtues among human beings are augmented by learning and by practice. I, at any rate, Critobulus, think that we should.” But if you judge the matter in some other way, teach me.”

And Critobulus said, “But I would be ashamed, Socrates, to contradict these things, for I would be speaking neither nobly nor truly.”

Chapter 7

Moreover, he tried to cure the perplexities of his friends—those that were due to ignorance, by his judgment, and those due to want, by teaching them to assist one another according to their capacity. I shall tell what I know of him in these matters as well. For when he saw once that Aristarchus was downcast, he said, “You seem to be burdened by something, Aristarchus. You should share your burden with your friends. For perhaps we might even lighten it somewhat for you.”

And Aristarchus said, “Indeed, Socrates, I am in great perplexity. For, since the city is in civil strife and many have fled to the Piraeus, so many of my abandoned sisters, nieces, and female cousins have come to me that there are fourteen free persons in my house. But we don’t get anything from our land, for the adversary prevails over it, nor from our houses, for there is a scarcity of human beings in the town, and no one is buying furniture. Nor can one borrow money anywhere; but, in my opinion, one is more likely to find it by seeking for it on the street than to get it by borrowing. Now it’s a hard thing, Socrates, to look on as one’s relatives are perishing, but it’s impossible to sustain so many in such circumstances.”

And so, when Socrates heard these things he said, “Why is it that Ceramon, who sustains many, not only is able to provide himself and them with provisions but also makes such a surplus that he is even rich, while you who sustain many fear that you will all perish from want of provisions?”

“Because, by Zeus,” he said, “he sustains slaves, while I sustain those who are free.”

“And which do you think are better,” he said, “the free by your side or the slaves by Ceramon’s?”

“For my part,” he said, “I think the free by my side.”

“So then, isn’t it shameful,” he said, “that he is well-off from those who are worse, while you are in perplexity although you have those who are much better?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “for he sustains artisans, while I sustain those who have been freely educated.”

“Are artisans, then,” he said, “those who understand how to make something useful?”

“Most certainly,” he said.

“And so, is barley meal useful?”

“Exceedingly.”

“And what about loaves of bread?”

“No less so.”

He said, “What about cloaks for men and women, and tunics, and mantles and vests?”

“These are all exceedingly useful as well,” he said.

“Then, do those by your side understand how to make none of these?” he said.

“Surely all of them, I think.”

“Next, don’t you know that from a single one of these things, from making barley meal, Nausicydes sustains not only himself and his household servants but in addition many pigs and cows, and he makes such a surplus that he often performs public services at his own expense for the city as well; by making loaves of bread Cyrebus continually sustains his whole household and lives lavishly; while Demeas of Collytus is continually sustained by the production of mantles, and Menon by the making of wool, and most of the Megarians by the manufacture of vests?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “the human beings they have are barbarians whom they have bought so as to compel them to produce what is appropriate for them to produce. The ones I have are free and my relatives.”

“Then,” he said, “do you think that, because they are free and your relatives, they should do nothing other than eat and sleep? Among others who are free do you see those who live in this manner living better lives, and do you deem them happier than those who are attentive to whatever they understand that is useful for one’s life? Or do you perceive that idleness and inattentiveness are beneficial to human beings for learning what it is fitting to understand, for remembering what they learn, for being healthy and strong in their bodies, and for acquiring and preserving what is useful for their life, while being at work and being attentive are not useful for these?

“And did they learn what you say that they understand, on the assumption that these things are not useful for one’s life and that they would not be making any of them, or, on the opposite assumption, that they would be attentive to these things and derive benefit from them? For how is moderation fostered more in human beings: through their being idle or through their being attentive to the useful things? And how would they be more just: if they are at work, or if they idly deliberate about their provisions?

“But in fact as it is now, I think, you do not love these women, nor do they love you; for you believe that they are causing you a loss, and they see that you are annoyed on their account. From this situation, there is a risk of greater enmity coming into being and their former gratitude diminishing. But if you preside over them so that they are at work, you will love them when you see that they are beneficial to you, and they will cherish you when they perceive that you are delighted with them; and since it will be more pleasing to recall former good deeds,

you [pi.] will augment the gratitude stemming from them and as a result be more friendly and more like a family to one another.

"Now, if they were going to work at something shameful, death would be more choice-worthy than that. But, as it is, they apparently understand how to do what opinion regards as most noble and most becoming for women. And all work most easily, most quickly, most nobly, and most pleasantly at what they understand. So, don't hesitate to introduce to these women what will profit you as well as them," he said, "and, as is suitable, they will heed you with pleasure."

"By the gods," Aristarchus said, "in my opinion you speak so nobly, Socrates, that—although I would not permit myself to borrow before, because I knew I wouldn't be able to pay it back after spending whatever I got—now it is best, in my opinion, to endure doing this in order to raise the capital for the work."

As a consequence of these things, capital was procured, and wool was bought. And the women worked while they ate breakfast and until they ate dinner, and they were merry instead of down-cast. And instead of looking suspiciously at each other, they saw each other with pleasure; the women loved him as a protector, and he cherished them as beneficial. At last, coming to Socrates, he described with delight all these events as well as the fact that they were blaming him for being the only one in the house who ate although he was idle.

And Socrates said, "Then you aren't telling them the speech of the dog. For they say that, when the animals could speak, the ewe said to her master, 'You do an astonishing thing in giving us, who provide you with wool and lambs and cheese, nothing other than what we ourselves get from the earth, while you give the dog, who provides you with nothing of the sort, a share of your very own food.'

"And that when the dog heard this he said, 'Yes, by Zeus, for I am the one who in fact saves you sheep so that you are neither stolen by human beings nor seized by wolves, since indeed if I were not to guard over you, you would not even be able to graze out of fear that you might perish.' It is said that then even the flocks acquiesced in the dog's being preferred in honor. And so you, too, tell these women that you are, in place of a dog, their guardian and attendant, and that it is due to you that, being unjustly treated by no one, they live securely and pleasantly by their work."

Chapter 8

Once he saw another old comrade after not having seen him for some time and said, "Where do you appear from, Eutherus?"

"At the end of the war, Socrates," he said, "I returned from abroad; just now, however, I'm coming from this very place. For, because we were deprived of our possessions abroad and because my father did not leave me anything in Attica, I am now compelled to procure my provisions by the work of my body here at home. And, in my opinion, this is better than to beg for something from human beings, especially since have nothing to borrow against."

“And how long,” he said, “do you think your body will be competent to produce your provisions by its wages?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “not for long.”

“And yet,” he said, “when you become older, it is clear that you will need spending money, but no one will want to pay wages for the work of your body.”

“You speak truly,” he said.

“So then,” he said, “it is better at this point to apply yourself to the sorts of work that will suffice for you also when you are older; and to approach one of those possessing a good deal of wealth who needs someone to help him attend to it; and to be benefited in return when you benefit him by overseeing work and by helping him gather in his harvest, as well as by helping him guard his property.”

“It would be hard, Socrates,” he said, “for me to endure slavery.”

“And yet those who preside in cities and attend to the public property are held not to be more slavish on this account but more

free.”

“Generally, Socrates,” he said, “I don’t much permit myself to be liable to be called to account by anyone.”

“And yet, Eutherus,” he said, “it is not very easy to find work for which one could not be blamed. For it is hard to do anything in such a manner that one makes no error, and it is hard, even if one does something without error, to avoid meeting up with a senseless judge; indeed, even in the work you say you do now, I wonder if it is easy to come through without reproach.

“So you should try to flee those who are fond of blaming and pursue those with good judgment, and to endure doing the sort of business you are able to do, while guarding against doing those you are not able to, and—whatever you are doing—to attend to doing it as nobly and eagerly as possible. For, in this manner, I think you would least be blamed, find the most aid in your perplexity, and live most easily, with the least risk, and in a way most sufficient for your old age.”

Chapter 9

And I know that once he also heard from Crito that life was hard in Athens for a man who wished to mind his own business. “For, as it is,” he said, “people bring me into the law courts, not because they have been done an injustice by me, but because they hold that I would find it more pleasant to pay money than to have trouble.”

And Socrates said, “Tell me, Crito, do you sustain dogs so that they will keep the wolves away from your flocks?”

“Yes, indeed,” he said. “For it profits me more to sustain them than not.”

“Then wouldn’t you sustain a man, too, who would want and be able to keep away from you those attempting to do you injustice?”

“I would do so with pleasure,” he said, “if I did not fear that he might turn against me.”

“But why don’t you see,” he said, “that it is far more pleasant to derive benefit by gratifying a man such as yourself than by making an enemy of you? Know well that there are men of this sort here who would very much love the honor of dealing with you as a friend.”

And after this, they found Archedemus, who was quite competent at speaking and taking action, but impoverished. For he was not the sort who would make a gain from all things, but he loved the good and said that it was very easy* to take from sycophants. So, whenever Crito collected food, oil, wine, wool, or any other farm product useful for one’s life, he took some aside and gave it to him. And whenever he performed sacrifices, he would invite him, and he attended to him in all matters of this sort.

And Archedemus, who held Crito’s household to be a resource for him, treated him with great respect. And immediately he found out many injustices and many enemies of one of the sycophants who were after Crito, and summoned him to a public trial, in which it had to be decided what he should suffer or pay back.

And this one, who was conscious of many wicked deeds, did everything to be rid of Archedemus. But Archedemus did not let him go until he let Crito alone and gave him wealth.

And after Archedemus accomplished this and other things of the sort, then—in the same way as when a shepherd has a good dog, and the other shepherds wish to stand their herds near him so that they can enjoy the benefit of his dog—many of Crito’s friends begged him to provide Archedemus as a guard for them, too.

Archedemus, for his part, was pleased to gratify Crito, and not only was Crito in peace but his friends were as well. And if one of those whom he had made his enemies reproached him that he flattered Crito because he was benefited by him, Archedemus said, “Which, then, is shameful—to receive benefactions from good human beings and to bestow them in return and thus to befriend this sort, while being at variance with the wicked; or rather to make enemies of the gentlemen (noble and good) by trying to do them injustice, while working together with the wicked and trying to befriend them and to deal with them instead of the gentlemen?” As a result of this, Archedemus was one of Crito’s friends and was honored by the other friends of Crito.

Chapter 10

I know that he also had a conversation of the following sort with Diodorus, who was a comrade of his. “Tell me, Diodorus,” he said, “if one of your household servants runs away, do you attend to recovering him?”

“And, by Zeus, I call on others for help,” he said, “proclaiming a reward for his safe return.”

“What about if one of your household servants is sick,” he said, “do you attend to him and call on physicians to help, so that he doesn’t die?”

“Exceedingly so,” he said.

“And if one of your acquaintances who is far more useful than your household servants is at risk of perishing because of need,” he said, “don’t you think that it is worth your while to attend to his coming through safely?

“And yet you know indeed that Hermogenes is not lacking in judgment, and that he would be ashamed not to benefit you in return if he derived benefit from you. And I think it is worth the value of many household servants to have an attendant who is willing and of good intention, constant, competent to do what he is bid, and not only competent to do what he is bid but able to be useful of his own accord and to think and plan ahead.

“The good household managers, moreover, say that one should buy at the time when it is possible to buy for a little something worth a lot. In fact, because of the present state of affairs one can acquire good friends very cheaply.”

And Diodorus said, “You speak nobly indeed, Socrates. And bid Hermogenes to come to me.”

“By Zeus, not I,” he said, “Nor do I hold that it would be nobler for you to invite him than to go to him yourself; nor that it is a greater good for him that these things be done than for yourself.”

Thus indeed Diodorus went to Hermogenes. And without spending much he acquired a friend, who made it his work to examine what he might say or do to benefit and delight Diodorus.

BOOK III

Chapter 1

That he benefited those who yearned for noble things by making them attentive to what they yearned for—this is what I shall now describe. Once, when he heard that Dionysodorus had come to the city professing to teach how to be a general, he said to one of his companions whom he perceived wished to obtain this honor in the city:

"It is surely shameful, young fellow, for one who wishes to be general in the city to neglect learning how to be one, when it's possible for him to do so. Indeed he would be penalized far more justly by the city than someone who takes up the work of making statues when he has not learned how.

"For, since the whole city entrusts itself to the general in the risks of war, it is plausible that if he acts correctly great good things will come to pass, and if he acts incorrectly great bad things will come to pass. Wouldn't someone be justly penalized, then, if he neglected to learn how to be general, while being attentive to being elected one?" By saying such things he persuaded this one to go and learn.

But when he came back after learning, he poked fun at him by saying, "Men, just as Homer said that Agamemnon was majestic, doesn't this fellow too appear more majestic, in your opinion, since he has learned how to be a general? In fact, just as one who has learned how to play the cithara is a cithara player even if he is not playing, and one who has learned how to be a physician, even if he is not practicing, is nevertheless a physician, so too this fellow will continue as a general from this point on, even if no one elects him. But the one who does not understand is neither a general nor a doctor, not even if he has been elected by all human beings.

"But, you," he said, "tell us from what point he began in teaching you generalship, so that, in case even one of us should become a squadron commander or company leader, we would have an improved understanding of what pertains to war."

And he said, "He began from the very same point at which he also ended. For he taught me tactics and nothing else."

"And yet," Socrates said, "this is indeed only one of the many parts of generalship. For the general also should be fit to equip his army for war, fit to procure provisions for his soldiers, fit to contrive, fit to work, attentive, fit to endure, shrewd, both friendly and fierce, both straightforward and devious, both fit to guard and thievish, lavish, rapacious, fond of giving, greedy, cautious, ready to attack, and there are many other things both in his nature and in his understanding that the one who is going to be a good general must have.

"It is noble also to be a tactician. For a well-ordered army far surpasses a poorly ordered one, just as stones, bricks, wood, and clay are not useful when thrown down without being put in order; but when the things that don't rot or wear away, the stones and the clay, are put in order on the top and bottom, with the bricks

and wood in the middle, as they are put together in building, then a possession worth a lot comes into being—a house."

"But," the youth said, "you have said something quite similar, Socrates. For in war, too, one must order the best troops in the front and rear, and the worst in the middle, so that they will be led by the ones and pushed by the others."

"Fine," he said, "if, that is, he taught you also how to distinguish the good from the bad. But if not, how does what you learned benefit you? For if he bade you to order the most noble silver (money) in the front and rear and the worst in the middle, without teaching you how to distinguish the noble from the counterfeit, it would not benefit you."

"But, by Zeus," he said, "he didn't teach this. So we would need to determine for ourselves who is good and bad."

"Why, then, don't we examine how we might avoid erring in these matters?" he said.

"That is my wish," said the youth.

"And so," he said, "if we had to seize some money, would we order correctly if we set those most in love with money in front?"

"In my opinion, at least."

"What about those who are going to be at risk? Shouldn't those most in love with honor be ordered in front?"

"These, at any rate," he said, "are the ones who want to take risks for the sake of praise. Nor indeed is it unclear who they are but, since they are highly visible everywhere, it would be easy to select them."

"But did he teach you tactics only," he said, "or also where' and how one should use each of these orderings?"

"Not much," he said.

"And yet many are the contingencies in which it is fitting neither to put in order nor to speak in the same manner."

"But, by Zeus," he said, "he did not make these things clear."

"By Zeus," he said, "then go back and question him again. For if he has this understanding and is not shameless, he will be ashamed after having taken your money to send you away in such a wanting state."

Chapter 2

And once when he happened to meet someone who had been elected general, he said, "For what purpose do you think Homer addressed Agamemnon as 'shepherd of the people'? Isn't it because, just as shepherds should attend to it that the ewes will be safe and have their provisions and that the purpose for which they are sustained will be achieved, so also the general must attend to it that the soldiers will be safe and have their provisions and that the purpose for which they go on campaign will be achieved? And they go on campaign so that through overpowering their enemies they'll be happier.

"Or why ever did he praise Agamemnon by speaking in this way: 'He is both, a good king and a strong spearman'? Isn't it that he would be a strong spearman, not if he contended well alone against the enemy, but if he were responsible for this for the whole army as well; and a good king, not if he presided nobly over his own life alone, but if he were also responsible for the happiness of those over whom he was king?

"For indeed the king is elected not in order to attend to himself nobly, but so that those also who elected him will do well because of him. And all go on campaign in order to have the best possible life, and for this purpose they elect generals, so that they will be their leaders for this.

"So the one who is general should furnish this to those who elected him general. In fact it's not easy to find anything else more noble than this, or more shameful than its opposite." And by examining in this way what the virtue of a good leader is, he stripped away the rest but left the making of whomever he leads happy.

Chapter 3

I know that he also conversed once in the following way with someone who had been elected to command the cavalry.

"Young fellow," he said, "would you be able to tell us why you desired to be cavalry commander? Surely it was not for the sake of riding first among the horsemen. In fact it is the mounted cavalry's bowmen who are thought to deserve this position. At any rate, they ride in front even of the cavalry commanders."

"You speak truly," he said.

"Moreover, it was not for the sake of being recognized either, since madmen too are recognized by all."

"You speak the truth also about this," he said.

"Was it rather because you think that you would hand the cavalry back to the city having made it better, and if some need for the cavalry should arise you think that in leading them you would be the cause of some good for the city?"

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"It is indeed noble, by Zeus," Socrates said, "if you are able to do these things. The rule to which you have been elected is, I suppose, over both horses and riders?"

"It certainly is," he said.

"Come then, tell us this first, how you intend to make the horses better."

And he said, "But I don't think this is my work. Each, rather, must attend privately to his own horse."

"How, then, will the cavalry be of any benefit to you," said Socrates, "if some provide you with horses that have such bad feet or bad legs or are so weak or so ill sustained that they cannot follow, and others with horses so ill trained that they won't stay where you order them, or who kick so much that it is not possible even to put them in order? How will you be able to do the city any good in leading such horses?"

And he said, “You speak nobly, and I shall try to attend to the horses as far as I am able.”

“What about the horsemen?” he said. “Won’t you attempt to make them better?”

“Indeed I will,” he said.

“Will you first, then, make them more skilled at mounting their horses?”

“One certainly must,” he said, “for in fact should one of them fall off, he would thus more likely be saved.”

“What about if they should have to run some risks somewhere? Will you bid them draw the enemy onto the sand, which is where you are accustomed to ride horses, or will you try to conduct your practices on the sorts of terrain where the wars will take place?”

“That certainly would be better,” he said.

“What about this? Will you pay any attention to their hitting as many as possible from their horses?”

“This too certainly would be better,” he said.

“Did you intend also to sharpen the souls of your horsemen and arouse their anger against the enemy, things that make them more stouthearted?”

“If not, at least now I shall try,” he said.

“Have you worried at all about how to get your horsemen to obey you? For without this neither horses nor good and stouthearted horsemen are any benefit.”

“You speak truly,” he said. “But how would someone most turn them in this direction, Socrates?”

“This you surely know—that in every matter human beings most want to obey those they believe to be best. In fact, when sick they obey most whomever they believe to be most skilled as a physician, and on a ship those who sail obey most whomever they believe most skilled as a pilot, and in farming they obey most whomever they believe to be most skilled in farming.”

“Yes, indeed,” he said.

“It is plausible, then, also in horsemanship,” he said, “that the rest will most want to obey whoever most visibly knows what should be done.”

“So, Socrates,” he said, “if I am clearly the best among them, will this be enough for them to obey me?”

“If, at any rate, in addition to this,” he said, “you teach them that obeying you is both more noble and more conducive to their safety.”

“And how will I teach this?” he said.

“Far more easily, by Zeus,” he said, “than if you had to teach them that bad things are better and more profitable than good things.”

“Are you saying,” he said, “that, in addition to the rest, the cavalry commander must also attend to being able to speak?”

“Did you think,” he said, “that you ought to command the cavalry by silence? Or haven’t you pondered the fact that it is through speech that we learned all the

things that we have learned are most noble according to law, things by means of which we understand how to live; and that if someone learns any other noble thing, he learns it through speech; and that those best at teaching use speech the most; and that those who have the most understanding of the most serious things converse most nobly?

"Or haven't you pondered the following fact, that whenever a single chorus comes from this city, like the one that is sent to Delos, not one from anywhere else is a match for it, nor is there an abundance of good men, similar to that here, gathered in any other city?"

"You speak truly," he said.

"And yet, the Athenians do not surpass others in goodness of voice,, nor in size and strength of body, as much as they surpass them in love of honor, the thing that especially spurs one toward what is noble and honored."

"This also is true," he said.

"Do you think, accordingly," he said, "that if someone should attend also to the cavalry here, that it too would far surpass the others—in equipage of other arms and horses, in orderliness, and in readiness to take risks against the enemy—if the horsemen held that in doing these things they would obtain praise and honor?"

"It is plausible, at least," he said.

"Then, don't hesitate," he said, "but try to turn your men toward the things from which both you yourself, and the other citizens through you, will benefit."

"But, by Zeus, I shall try," he said.

Chapter 4

Once when he saw Nicomachides departing from the elections for offices, he asked, "Who were the generals elected, Nicomachides?"

And he said, "Why Socrates, aren't the Athenians just the sort not to elect me, although I am quite worn out from going on campaign from the service list as well as from serving as company leader and squadron commander, and have so many wounds from the enemy?"—and as he said this he undressed and displayed to him his scars from the wounds—"but instead they elected Antisthenes," he said, "who has never gone on campaign as a hoplite nor done anything admirable among the horsemen, and who understands nothing other than how to gather wealth."

"Well, isn't this a good thing," Socrates said, "if, that is, he is to be competent to procure provisions for the soldiers?"

"Merchants too are competent to gather wealth," Nicomachides said, "but they wouldn't, on this account, have the capacity to be generals as well."

And Socrates said, "But Antisthenes is also a lover of victory, which is a suitable attribute for a general. Don't you see that, as often as he has sponsored choruses, he has won the victory with all of them?"

"By Zeus," said Nicomachides, "there is no similarity between presiding over a chorus and an army."

“And yet,” said Socrates, “although Antisthenes is experienced in the teaching of neither song nor dance, he was nevertheless competent to find those who are best at these things.”

“In the army, too, then,” said Nicomachides, “will he find some who will put it in order instead of him, and others who will fight?”

“If, at any rate,” Socrates said, “in the contests of war, too, he discovers and selects those who are best, as he did in the choral contests, it is plausible that he will bear away the victory in this field as well. And in all likelihood he would want to spend wealth more on victory in contests of war—a victory shared with the whole city—than on a victory in choral contests shared with his tribe.”

“Are you saying, Socrates,” he said, “that it belongs to the same man nobly to sponsor a chorus and to be a general?”

“What I, for my part, am saying,” he said, “is that, whatever someone presides over, if he knows what is needed and is able to procure it, he will be a good presiding officer, whether it is a chorus or a household or a city or an army that he presides over.”

And Nicomachides said, “By Zeus, Socrates, I never thought that I would hear you say that good household managers would be good generals.”

“Come then,” he said, “let’s review the tasks of each of them so that we may know whether they are the same or differ in some respect.”

“By all means,” he said.

“Is it, then,” he said, “the task of both to prepare the ruled to pay heed to them and to obey?”

“Yes, indeed,” he said.

“What about ordering those who are serviceable for doing each thing to do it?”

“This too,” he said.

“Moreover, I think it is fitting for both to punish the bad and to honor the good.”

“Certainly,” he said.

“And as for making their subordinates well disposed—how could this not be noble for both?”

“I think that this too is fitting,” he said.

“And, in your opinion, is it or is it not advantageous to both to bring over to their side allies and those who would give aid?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“But is it not fitting for both to be fit to guard their property?”

“Exceedingly,” he said.

“And so, is it fitting that both be attentive and fond of labor regarding their own tasks?”

“All these things belong similarly to both,” he said, “but fighting is no longer a thing belonging to both.”

“But enemies, at any rate, arise for both?”

"This much is indeed the case," he said.

"Then is it advantageous for both to prevail over them?"

"By all means," he said, "but what you are disregarding is this: if one should have to fight, what benefit would there be from the art of household management?"

"There, no doubt, the benefit would be in fact greatest," he said, "for the good household manager—who knows that nothing is so profitable and gainful as being victorious in fighting the enemy, nor so unprofitable and costly as being defeated—will eagerly seek out and furnish what is advantageous for victory, and attentively examine and guard against what brings defeat; and if he sees that his preparation is such as to bring victory he will fight energetically, and, what is not the least of these things, if he is unprepared he will guard against joining battle.

"Nicomachides," he said, "do not hold in contempt men who are skilled at household management. For attending to private affairs differs only in terms of multitude from attending to public ones. Among other very great similarities the greatest one is that neither takes place without human beings, nor is action taken in private affairs through some human beings, in public affairs through others. For those who attend to public affairs don't deal with any other human beings than those whom they deal with in private affairs when managing their households. And those who understand how to deal with these human beings do well both in private and in public affairs; and those who don't understand strike false notes in both."

Chapter 5

Once, in a conversation with Pericles, the son of the great Pericles, he said, "I, for my part, have hope, Pericles, that with you as general the city will both be better in matters of war and have a better reputation regarding them, and that it will overpower its enemies."

And Pericles said, "I would wish for what you speak of, Socrates. But I am unable to discern how these things might come about."

"Do you wish, then," said Socrates, "that by calculating about them we examine what is possible at present?"

"I do wish it," he said.

"You know, then," he said, "that the Athenians are no worse off in number than the Boeotians?"

"I do know it," he said.

"And do you think that one could select more good and noble bodies from Boeotia than from Athens?"

"In my opinion, they do not fall short in this way either."

"And whom do you hold to be better disposed toward themselves?"

"I, for my part, think the Athenians are. For many of the Boeotians, having been subjected to the Thebans' greed, are ill disposed toward them, but I see nothing of this sort in Athens."

“Moreover, they are surely the most honor-loving as well as the most affectionate* of all—these being not the least of the qualities that spur one to take risks on behalf of both good reputation and fatherland.”

“The Athenians are not blameworthy in these things either.”

“And, as for noble deeds of ancestors—something by which many are exalted and turned toward attending to virtue and becoming stouthearted—no one has more of these or greater ones than Athenians do.”

“What you are saying is all true, Socrates. But you see that ever since the misfortune that befell the thousand with Tolmides in Lebedeia, and that with Hippocrates at Delium, the Athenians’ opinion regarding the Boeotians has been humbled on this account, and the high spirit of the Thebans regarding the Athenians has been exalted. As a result, the Boeotians, who before did not dare to range themselves against the Athenians even in their own land without the Lacedemonians and the other Peloponnesians, now threaten on their own to invade Attica; and the Athenians, who before ravaged Boeotia, when the Boeotians were alone, now fear that the Boeotians will lay waste to Attica.”

And Socrates said, “I perceive that this is the case, but in my opinion the disposition of the city is now more acceptable to a good man who rules it. For confidence implants neglect, easygoingness, and disobedience, while fear makes people more attentive, more obedient, and more orderly.

“And I would make this judgment also on the basis of those who are on ships. For when they fear nothing, they are surely full of disorder. But whenever they are in terror of a storm or enemies, they not only do everything they are bid to do but even keep silent, watching anxiously for further instructions just like members of a chorus.”

“But,” said Pericles, “if indeed they would now most obey, now would be the time to say how we might turn them toward passionately loving again their ancient virtue, fame, and happiness.”

“And so, if we wished them,” said Socrates, “to lay claim to wealth that others had, we would show them that it is their patrimony and belongs to them, and it is in this way especially that we would set them on the path to claiming it; but since it is holding first place together with virtue that we wish them to attend to, we must show them that this, in turn, has from long ago belonged most to them, and that by attending to this they would be best of all.”

“How, then, would we teach this?”

“I think if we would remind them that they have heard that the most ancient ancestors of theirs of whom we hear were most excellent.”

“Are you speaking of the decision about the gods that those around Cecrops made on account of virtue?”

“I am speaking of that and of the rearing and birth of Erechtheus and of the war that came in his time against those from the whole bordering mainland and of the one in the time of the Heracleides against those in the Peloponnese and of all

those fought in the time of Theseus, in all of which they were clearly the most excellent of the human beings of their time.

"And, if you wish, what their descendants did later, those who were born not much before us, on the one hand, contesting on their own against the lords of all Asia and Europe up to Macedonia, they acquired power and resources in amounts surpassing what their ancestors had, and accomplished the greatest deeds; and on the other, together with the Peloponnesians, they excelled both on land and on sea. Surely they are in fact said to have far surpassed human beings of their time."

"They are indeed," he said.

"So, accordingly, when many in Greece were migrating elsewhere, they stayed where they were in their own land; and many who were engaged in disputes about justice put themselves in their hands; and many who were treated insolently by those who were stronger than they were took refuge with them."

And Pericles said, "Indeed I wonder, Socrates, how the city ever took a turn for the worse."

"I, for my part, think," said Socrates, "that, just as some others, who have become easygoing due to their great preeminence and mightiness, fall behind their adversaries, so the Athenians too neglected themselves when they had great preeminence and due to this became worse."

"What, then," he said, "could they do at present to recover their ancient virtue?"

And Socrates said, "It is nothing secret in my opinion, but if they would find out the pursuits of their ancestors and pursue them no worse than they did, they would become no worse than they were; alternatively, by at least imitating those who now have first place, and engaging in the same pursuits as they, if they use the same things similarly, they would be no worse than they are; and if they use them more attentively, they'll be even better."

"You are saying," he said, "that gentlemanliness (nobility and goodness) is somewhere far away from the city. For when will the Athenians, who now have contempt for the old beginning with their fathers, revere their elders in the way the Lacedemonians do? Or when will they, who not only themselves neglect good condition but even ridicule those who attend to it, train their bodies in the same way?

"When will they® obey their rulers, who even exult in their contempt for their rulers? And when will they have the same likeness of mind, who instead of working together to one another's advantage threaten one another abusively and envy one another more than the other human beings; while they disagree most of all in private and public gatherings and prosecute the most cases against one another and choose to gain at one another's expense in this way rather than jointly benefiting one another; and while, using the common property as if it were foreign, they fight in turn over this and take most delight in their abilities in such matters.

"From these things, much mischief' and much badness are putting down roots in the city, and much enmity and hatred of one another are arising among the

citizens, due to which, I am, for my part, always very afraid lest something bad befall the city that is too great for it to be able to bear."

"Don't at all believe, Pericles," Socrates said, "that the wickedness with which the Athenians are sick is so incurable. Don't you see that they are orderly in naval matters, that they obey those in charge in athletic contests in an orderly manner, and that in choruses their subordination to their teachers is inferior to none?"

"This," he said, "is in fact a wonder: that those sorts obey the rule of the ones in charge, while the hoplites and horsemen, who, as opinion has it, are distinguished among the citizens by their gentlemanliness (nobility and goodness), are the most disobedient of all."

And Socrates said, "But isn't the Council of the Areopagus, Pericles, established from among those who have been approved after scrutiny?"

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"Then, do you know any," he said, "who act more nobly, more lawfully, more augustly, or more justly in their judgment of cases and in all other respects?"

"I cast no blame on these," he said.

"You must not, then, be dispirited on the grounds that the Athenians are not orderly," he said.

"And yet," he said, "in what concerns the soldiers—where there is most need to be moderate, orderly, and obedient to rulers—they pay attention to none of this."

"For perhaps," said Socrates, "those who have the least understanding in these matters rule them. Don't you see that no one who lacks understanding attempts to rule cithara players, members of a chorus, and dancers, nor even wrestlers or pancratists, but all who rule over these are able to show where they learned the things they are in charge of. Most of the generals, on the other hand, make things up themselves as they go along.

"However, I, for my part, do not hold you, at least, to be of this sort, but I think that you are no less able to say when you began to learn how to be general than when you began to learn how to wrestle. Indeed I think that you have inherited and preserve many things from your father's store of generalship,-' and that you have collected many things from wherever it was possible to learn something beneficial for generalship.

"I think that you have given to this much anxious thought to avoid being ignorant, unawares, of anything beneficial for generalship, and that if you perceive that you do not know something of this sort, you seek out those who understand these things, sparing neither gifts nor favors in order that you might learn from them what you do not understand and have good helpers in your work."

And Pericles said, "I am not unaware, Socrates, that you say this not because you think that I attend to these things, but because you are attempting to teach me that one who is going to be a general must attend to all of them. Of course, I too agree with you about this."

“Have you observed this, Pericles,” he said, “that large mountains lie before our land and reach down to Boeotia, through which there are narrow and steep paths into our land, and that the middle of our land is girded by mountain strongholds?”

“Yes, indeed,” he said.

“What about this? Have you heard that the Mysians and Pisidians, because they possess extreme strongholds in the King’s land, are able to run down and do great damage to the King’s land and to live freely themselves, though they are lightly armed?”

“I have heard this too,” he said.

“Don’t you think,” he said, “that Athenians of nimble age, who were armed with lighter weapons and held the mountains that lie before our land, would be harmful to the enemy and furnish the citizens with a great bulwark for the land?”

And Pericles said, “I think, Socrates, that all these things too are useful.”

‘Then, if these things please you,” said Socrates, “attempt them, excellent fellow. For whichever of them you may accomplish, it will be both noble for you and good for the city. While, if you are unable to accomplish some one of them, you will neither harm the city nor shame yourself.”

Chapter 6

When Glaucon, the son of Ariston, attempted to make a public address out of a desire to preside over the city although he was not yet twenty years old, none of his other relatives or friends was able to stop him from being dragged from the speaker’s stand and making himself ridiculous. But Socrates, who was well intentioned toward him for the sake of Charmides, the son of Glaucon, and for the sake of Plato, stopped him all by himself.

For, when he happened to meet him, he first detained him by saying the following sorts of things to make him want to listen. “Glaucon,” he said, “do you intend to preside over our city?”

“I do, Socrates,” he said.

“By Zeus,” he said, “if indeed anything else among human beings is noble, this is. For it is clear that, should you accomplish this, you will be able to obtain for yourself whatever you desire and be competent to benefit your friends; you will raise up your paternal household; you will enlarge your fatherland; you will be famous, first in the city, then in Greece, and perhaps, like Themistocles, even among the barbarians. And wherever you are, you will be gazed at from all sides.”

When he heard these things Glaucon was exalted and remained with pleasure. After that, Socrates said, “This, then, is clear, Glaucon, that if you wish to be honored the city must be benefited by you?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“By the gods,” he said, “don’t keep it a secret, then, but tell us where you will begin to do good deeds for the city.”

When Glaucon remained silent, as though examining just then where he would begin, Socrates said, “Just as you would attempt to make a friend richer if you wished to enlarge his household, will you also try to make the city richer?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“Would it be richer, then, if its revenues increased?”

“It’s plausible, at any rate,” he said.

“Tell, then, the sources and amounts of the city’s revenues at present,” he said. “For it is clear that you have examined this so that if any of them are in a deficient state you may bring them to full capacity, and if some are being passed over you may provide them in addition.”

“But, by Zeus,” said Glaucon, “these things I have not examined.”

“But if you have passed over this,” he said, “at least tell us about the city’s expenditures. For it is clear that you also intend to remove those that are superfluous.”

“But, by Zeus,” he said, “I have not yet had leisure for these either.”

“Shall we then,” he said, “postpone making the city richer? For how is it possible, at least for one who doesn’t know its expenditures and the revenues, to attend to these things?”

“But Socrates,” said Glaucon, “it is possible to make the city rich from enemies.”

“Exceedingly, by Zeus,” said Socrates, “if one is stronger than they; but if one is weaker, one would lose in addition even one’s own things.”

“You speak truly,” he said.

“And so,” he said, “the one at least who is going to deliberate regarding whom one should wage war against must know the power both of his city and of its adversaries, so that if that of his city is stronger he may advise it to attempt the war, but if it is weaker than that of the adversaries he may persuade it to be cautious.”

“You speak correctly,” he said.

“To begin with, then,” he said, “tell us the land and sea power of our city, next, that of its adversaries.”

“But, by Zeus,” he said, “I would not be able to tell you like this off the top of my head.”

“But if you have written it down, bring it forth,” he said, “for it would be very pleasant for me to hear this.”

“But, by Zeus,” he said, “I have not yet written it down either.”

“Shall we then,” he said, “hold off giving advice also regarding war, just now, at least? For, perhaps, due to the magnitude of these matters, and since you are just now beginning your presiding, you have not yet reviewed them. But I know that you have already attended at least to the guarding of the land, and that you know how many guard posts are vital and how many not, and how many guards

are sufficient and how many not; and you will advise that the vital guard posts be enlarged, and the superfluous ones removed."

"By Zeus," said Glaucon, "or my part, would remove all of them, because they guard in such a way that what comes from the land is stolen."

"If one were to remove the guard posts," he said, "don't you think that license to rob will be given also to anyone who wishes? But," he said, "have you reviewed this matter by going yourself, or how do you know that they guard badly?"

"I conjecture it," he said.

"Shall we then," he said, "give advice about these matters, too, when we no longer conjecture but already know?"

"Perhaps," said Glaucon, "that would be better."

"I know that you have not got to the silver mines," he said, "so as to be able to say why less revenue proceeds from there now than in the past."

"No, I certainly haven't gone," he said.

"Indeed, by Zeus," Socrates said, "the place is said to be oppressive, so that this will be excuse enough for you whenever you may have to give advice about it."

"I am being made fun of," said Glaucon.

"But this, at least," he said, "I know that you have not neglected, but you have examined for what length of time the food that comes from the land is capable of continually sustaining the city, and how much in addition is needed annually, so that the city may never come to be in need of this with you unawares, but, knowing it, you would be able to come to the city's aid and save it by advising it about its necessities."

"You speak of a huge task," said Glaucon, "if one will have to attend to these sorts of things as well."

"But, indeed," said Socrates, "one would never manage even his own household nobly, unless he knows all its needs and attends to filling them all. But since the city is composed of more than ten thousand households, and it is hard to attend to so many households at the same time, how is it that you haven't first tried to enlarge one, that belonging to your uncle? It needs it. And if you should be able to do this, you will also attempt a larger number. But if you are unable to benefit one, how would you be able to benefit many? Just as if someone were not able to carry one talent, how would it not be visible that he shouldn't even attempt to carry a larger number?"

"But, I for my part, would benefit my uncle's household," said Glaucon, "if he should want to obey me."

"Then," said Socrates, "although you are not able to persuade your uncle, you hold that you would be able to make all the Athenians along with your uncle obey you?"

"Be on your guard, Glaucon," he said, "lest out of a desire to have a good reputation* you come into the opposite. Or don't you see how perilous it is for someone to say or do what he doesn't know? Ponder whether, in the case of others

whom you know to be of the sort visibly to say and do what they don't know, they obtained praise rather than blame for such things, in your opinion, or were admired rather than held in contempt?

"And ponder as well the case of those who know both what they say and what they do. And, as I hold, you will find in every work that those who have good reputations and are admired come from those who have the most understanding, while those who have bad reputations and are held in contempt come from the most ignorant.

"So, if you desire to have a good reputation and to be admired in the city, try to achieve, to the greatest extent, knowledge of what you wish to do. For if, after surpassing the others in this, you should attempt to engage in the city's affairs, I would not wonder if you should very easily obtain what you desire."

Chapter 7

When he saw that Charmides, the son of Glaucon, was a man worthy of note and far more able than those engaged in political affairs at that time, but was hesitant to approach the demos and to attend to the city's affairs, he said, "Tell me, Charmides, if someone should not want to compete in the contests whose prizes are garlands—although he is competent to win the victory in them and, on account of that, be honored himself and enhance the reputation of his fatherland in Greece—what sort would you hold this man to be?"

"That is clear," he said, "soft and cowardly."

"And if someone," he said, "who is able, by attending to the city's affairs, to enlarge his city and on account of that to gain honor for himself, should hesitate to do this, wouldn't he plausibly be held a coward?"

"Perhaps," he said. "But with regard to what are you asking me these questions?"

"The fact," he said, "that I think you hesitate to attend to them, though you are able and they are matters in which it is necessary for you to participate, since you are a citizen."

"In what sort of work have you observed this ability of mine so as to form these judgments about me?" said Charmides.

"In your associations in which you keep company with those who engage in the city's affairs," he said. "For in fact whenever they consult with you on some matter I see you advising them nobly and, whenever they err in something, censuring them correctly."

"It is not the same thing, Socrates," he said, "to converse in private and to compete among the multitude."

"And yet," he said, "he who is able to count, counts no worse among the multitude than when he is alone; and those who play the cithara best when they are alone prevail also among the multitude."

"But don't you see that awe and fear," he said, "have natural roots in human beings and that they come to one far more in crowds than in private company?"

“In fact I have set out to teach you,” he said, “that you, who feel no awe of those who are most prudent and no fear of those who are strongest, are ashamed to speak among those who are both the most senseless and the weakest.

“Is it the fullers among them or the shoemakers or the carpenters or the smiths or the farmers or the merchants or those who barter in the agora and worry about what they can buy for less and sell for more whom you feel shame before? For it is from all of these that the assembly is composed.

“In what, do you think, is what you are doing different from fearing the amateurs even though one prevails over those who are in training? For, although you easily converse with those who have first place in the city (some of whom have contempt for you), and although you far surpass those who attend to conversing with the city, you hesitate to speak among those who have never yet worried about political affairs and who do not have contempt for you, because you are afraid of being ridiculed.”

“What about this?” he said. “Don’t those in the assembly frequently, in your opinion, ridicule those who speak correctly?”

“In fact so do the former,” he said. “Therefore I also wonder if you, who handle those with ease whenever they do this, think that you will be able to find no way to approach the latter.

“Do not be ignorant of yourself, good fellow, and don’t err the way most do: for the many, having set out to examine the affairs of the others, do not turn to taking themselves under review. So don’t be easygoing about this, but rather exert yourself to pay attention to yourself. And don’t neglect the city’s affairs, if due to you they can be in a somewhat better state. For when these things are going well, not only the other citizens but also your friends and, not least, you yourself will benefit.

Chapter 8

Aristippus attempted to refute Socrates, just as he himself had been refuted by him earlier. Wishing to benefit his companions, Socrates answered him, not as those who are on their guard lest their speech somehow become entangled, but as one who has been persuaded that he would thus most be doing what he should.

For he asked him whether he knew anything good, so that if he should say one of the things such as food, drink, wealth, health, strength, or daring, [Aristippus] would then show that the thing mentioned was sometimes bad. But [Socrates], who knew that if something annoys us we are in need of what will stop it, answered after the manner in which it is best also to act.

“Are you,” he said, “asking me if I know something good for fever?”

“No, I am not, for my part,” he said.

“Rather for ophthalmia?”

“Not that either.”

“Rather for hunger?”

“Nor for hunger.”

“And yet,” he said, “if you are asking me at any rate if I know something that is good for nothing, I neither know it,” he said, “nor need it.”

And, again, when Aristippus asked him whether he knew anything noble, he said, “Indeed many things.”

“So,” he said, “are they all like one another?”

“Some are certainly as unlike as possible,” he said.

“Then how,” he said, “could what is unlike the noble be noble?”

“Because, by Zeus,” he said, “a human being noble at wrestling is unlike another who is noble at running. And a shield noble for defense is as unlike as can be to a javelin noble for being violently and swiftly borne.”

“You are answering me no differently,” he said, “than when I asked you if you knew something good.”

“Do you think,” he said, “that one thing is good and another noble? Don’t you know that all things are noble and good for the same things? For, first, virtue is not something good for some things and noble for other things; next, human beings are said to be noble and good in the same respect as well as for the same things; the bodies of human beings, too, appear noble and good for the same things; and all other things that human beings use are held to be noble and good for the same things—whatever they are useful for.”

‘Then,” he said, “is even a dung-carrying basket noble?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “and a gold shield is shameful (ugly), if for their own work one should be nobly made, and the other badly.”

“Are you saying,” he said, “that the same things are both noble and shameful?”

“And, by Zeus, I, for my part, am saying,” he said, “that they are both good and bad. For frequently what is good for hunger is bad for fever, and what is good for fever is bad for hunger. Frequently what is noble for running is shameful for wrestling, and what is noble for wrestling is shameful for running. For all things are good and noble for the things for which they are well suited, and bad and shameful for the things for which they are ill suited.”

And when he said that the same houses are both noble and useful, he was educating, at least in my opinion, as to the sort that should be built. He examined it in the following way: “Ought one who is going to have the sort of house he should, contrive that it will be both most pleasant to live in and most useful?”

And this being agreed to:

“Is it pleasant, then, to have one cool in summer and warm in winter?”

When they would assent to this too:

“Accordingly, in houses looking toward the south, does the sun shine into the inner rooms in winter, while in the summer when it travels over us and the roofs, it provides shade? If then it is noble that these things come to be thus, one should build a house higher on the southern side, so that the winter sun won’t be shut

out, and closer to the ground on the northern side, so that the cold winds won't burst in.

"In sum, the most pleasant and most noble dwelling would plausibly be the one where one would have in every season the most pleasant refuge and where one would make one's belongings most secure. Paintings and embroideries deprive one of more delights than they provide." Moreover the most becoming place for temples and altars he said to be that which, while being most visible, would be most untrodden; for it is pleasant for those who see it to offer prayers, and it is pleasant for those who are undefiled to approach it.

Chapter 9

Again when he was asked whether courage is a thing that is taught or natural, he said, "I think that, just as one body is born stronger than another with regard to its labors, so one soul comes to be by nature more vigorous than another with regard to what is terrible. For I see that those reared in the same laws and customs differ greatly from one another in daring.

"I hold, however, that every nature will be augmented with regard to courage by learning and by practice. For it is clear that Scythians and Thracians would not dare to take up shields and swords to fight against Lacedemonians. And it is visible that Lacedemonians would want to compete neither against Thracians with light shields and javelins nor against Scythians with bows.

"I, for my part, also see that, similarly in all other things, human beings both differ from one another by nature and improve greatly by attentiveness. From this it is clear that everyone—those who are naturally better as well as those whose natures are duller-should both learn and practice those things at which they wish to become worthy of note."

And he did not distinguish between wisdom and moderation but decided that one is both wise and moderate who knows and uses the noble and good things and knows and avoids the shameful ones. And when he was asked in addition whether he held those to be wise and continent who understand what they should do, but do the opposite, he said, "No more than unwise and incontinent;) for I think that all, choosing from among the possibilities the things they think are most to their advantage, do those things; I hold, then, that those who do not act correctly are neither wise nor moderate."

And he said that justice as well as every other virtue is wisdom. For the just things and all the things that are done through virtue are noble and good. And those who know these things would not choose anything else instead of them, nor would those who understand them not be able to do them, but err even if they should try. Thus also as regards what is noble and good, the wise do them and those who are not wise are not able to, but even if they try, they err. Since, then, it is through virtue that the just things and all other noble and good things are done, it is clear that justice as well as every other virtue is wisdom.

He said, moreover, that madness is the opposite of wisdom; however, he did not hold that lack of understanding is madness. He reasoned that to be ignorant

of oneself and—with regard to the things one doesn't know—to opine and think that one in fact knows them is nearest to madness. He said that the many, however, assert that those who are mistaken in matters that most fail to know are not mad, while they call mad those who are mistaken in matters the many know.

For if someone thinks that he is so tall that he bends forward when he goes through the gates of the city wall, or so strong that he attempts to lift up houses, or applies himself to another of the things that are clear to everyone that they are impossible, they assert that this person is mad. But those who make a small mistake are not mad in the opinion of the many, but, just as they call strong desire erotic passion, so they also call great derangement of mind madness.

And when he examined envy, whatever it is, he discovered that it is a certain pain, not indeed that which comes at misfortunes of friends nor that at good fortunes of enemies, but he said only those who are distressed by their friends' doing well feel envy. When some wondered if someone who loved another could be pained by his doing well, he reminded them that many are so disposed to some people that when those people are doing badly they are unable to look the other way but aid them in their misfortune, while they are pained at those people's good fortune. This, however, would not happen to a sensible man, but those who are foolish always experience this passion.

And when he examined leisure, what it is, he said that he discovered that most people are doing something; for even players at checkers and buffoons do something. And he said that these all have leisure, for it is in their power to go to do the things that are better than these. No one, however, has leisure to go from the better things to the worse; and if someone should go, he said lack of leisure afflicts the one who does this, so that he does badly.

He said that kings and rulers are not those who hold the scepters, nor those elected by just anybody, nor those who obtain office by lot, nor those who have used violence, nor those who have used deceit, but those who understand how to rule.

For whenever someone would agree that it belongs to the ruler to command what should be done, and to the ruled to obey, he pointed out that on a ship the one who understands, rules, while the ship-owner together with all others on the ship obey the one who understands; and in farming those who possess fields and in sickness those who are sick and in body training those who are training their bodies and all others to whom there belongs something needing attention, if they themselves believe that they understand how to attend to it, [they do so]; but if not, they not only obey those who understand when they are present but even send for them when they are absent, so that by obeying them they may do what they should. And he pointed out that in the spinning of wool even the women rule the men due to the fact that they know how one should work wool, while the men do not know.

And if someone should say in response to these things that it is possible for the tyrant not to obey those who speak correctly, he said, "How indeed would it be possible for him not to obey, since a penalty is laid down if someone does not obey

the one who speaks well? For in whatever matter someone does not obey the one who speaks well, he will no doubt err, and in erring be penalized."

And if someone should say that it is possible for the tyrant even to kill the one who thinks well, he said, "But do you think that the one who has killed the best of his allies is free from penalty, or that he suffers some chance penalty? For do you think that the one who does this would be preserved, or rather that he would in this way quickly perish?"

When someone asked him what, in his opinion, is the best pursuit for a man, he answered that it is doing well. And when he asked again if he held that good fortune too is a pursuit, he said, "For my part, I believe that fortune and action are complete opposites. For I think it is good fortune for someone who is not seeking it to chance upon something that he needs, but I hold that it is doing well for someone who has learned and practiced something to do it well, and those who pursue this are, in my opinion, doing well."

And he said that the best and the dearest to the gods are, in farming, those who do well in farming affairs and, in medicine, those who do well in medical affairs and, in political life, those who do well in political affairs. And he said that the one who does well in nothing is neither useful nor dear to the gods.

Chapter 10

Furthermore, if he ever conversed with any of those who possessed arts and used them for their trade, he was beneficial to these also. For, once when he visited Parrasius the painter and conversed with him, he said, "Parrasius, does the art of painting consist in making likenesses of what is seen? At any rate, you closely imitate bent, stately, dark, light, hard, soft, rough, smooth, young, and old bodies by making likenesses through colors."

"You speak truly," he said.

"Moreover, in making as likenesses the beautiful forms, you bring together from many what is most beautiful in each, and in this way you make whole bodies appear beautiful, since it is not easy to chance upon a single human being all of whose parts are blameless."

"We do this indeed," he said.

"What about this?" he said. "Do you imitate a most persuasive, pleasing, loving, longed-for, and passionately beloved thing, the soul's character? Or is this not a thing that can be imitated?"

"How could a thing be imitated, Socrates, which has neither proportion nor color nor any of the things you just now mentioned—and which is altogether unseen?" he said.

"Doesn't it come to pass, then," he said, "that a human being looks toward some in a friendly or hostile manner?"

"In my opinion, at least," he said.

"And so, can this much, at least, be imitated in the eyes?"

“Yes, indeed,” he said.

“And, do those who are worried and those who are not, have, in your opinion, similar facial expressions on the occasion of the good things and on that of the bad things that befall their friends?”

“By Zeus, surely not,” he said. “For at the good things they are bright, and at the bad ones they are downcast.”

“And so,” he said, “is it possible to make likenesses of these things too?”

“Yes, indeed,” he said.

“Furthermore, the character that is magnificent and liberal or humble and illiberal, that is moderate and sensible or insolent and inexperienced in the beautiful, shines through the facial expression as well as the postures of human beings—whether they are standing still or in motion.”

“You speak truly,” he said.

“And so, these things, too, can be imitated?”

“Yes, indeed,” he said.

“Which likenesses then,” he said, “do you hold to be more pleasant for human beings to see: those through which the noble and good and cherished characters are visible, or those through which the shameful and wicked and hateful characters are visible?”

“There is a great difference, by Zeus, Socrates,” he said.

When he visited the sculptor Cleiton once and conversed with him, he said, “That the runners, wrestlers, boxers, and pancratists that you make, Cleiton, are beautiful I both see and know. But how do you work into your statues what especially draws the souls of human beings through their sense of sight, namely, the appearance of being alive?”

And when Cleiton, perplexed, did not answer quickly, he said, “Is it by likening what you make to the forms of living beings that you make your statues appear more lifelike?”

“Yes, indeed,” he said.

“Do you, accordingly, by making likenesses of what in bodies is pulled up and down by the postures, and what is squeezed together, pulled apart, stretched tight, and relaxed, make them appear more similar to true bodies and more persuasive?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“And doesn’t the imitation also of the passions” of bodies that are doing something cause a certain joy in those who behold it?”

“It’s plausible, at any rate,” he said.

“Should one, then, make likenesses also of the threatening eyes of those who are fighting, and imitate the look of those delighting in the victory they have won?”

“Exceedingly so,” he said.

“Then the sculptor must make likenesses of the passions” of the soul by means of the form.”

When he visited Pistias, the maker of breastplates, after the latter had displayed to Socrates some well-made breastplates, “By Hera,” he said, “noble indeed, Pistias, is the invention of the breastplate, which protects the parts of a human being in need of protection but does not prevent the use of one’s hands.

“Yet, tell me, Pistias,” he said, “why do you sell your breastplates for more, although you do not make them stronger or costlier than others?”

“Because, Socrates,” he said. “I make them better proportioned.”

“Is it by measure or by weight that you show their proportion in placing more value on them?” he said. “For I certainly do not think that you make them all equal or similar, at least if you make them fit.”

“But, by Zeus, I do make them fit,” he said, “for a breastplate without this is of no benefit.”

“As for bodies, at least, of human beings,” he said, “are some well-proportioned, and others ill proportioned?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“How then,” he said, “do you make a breastplate that fits an ill-proportioned body well proportioned?”

“In just the way in fact that I make it fit,” he said, “for what fits is well proportioned.”

“You are saying, in my opinion,” said Socrates, “that a thing is well proportioned not in itself, but with regard to the one using it, just as if you should say that a shield is well proportioned for whomever it fits, or a mantle—and this is how it seems to be with everything else by your argument.

“And perhaps something else, too, which is no small good, attaches to fittingness.”

“Teach it, Socrates,” he said, “if you have something.”

“Breastplates that fit,” he said, “are less likely to press with their heaviness than those of the same weight that don’t fit. For those that do not fit, either hanging wholly from the shoulders or pressing excessively also some other part of the body, become difficult to bear and harsh. But those that fit, dividing their heaviness so that some of it is supported by the collarbones and the tops of the shoulders where they join the collarbone, some by the shoulders, some by the breast, some by the back, some by the stomach, seem almost not like a thing carried but like an appendage.”

“You have spoken,” he said, “the very thing on account of which I, for my part, hold that those I make are worth the most. Some, however, buy decorated and gold-plated breastplates instead.”

“But yet,” he said, “if, at any rate, on account of these things they buy ones that do not fit, in my opinion they buy what is bad—decorated and gold-plated though it may be.”

“Yet,” he said, “since the body does not remain in one position but sometimes bends and sometimes is straight, how would precisely fitted breastplates fit?”

“There is no way they would,” he said.

“You are saying,” he said, “that it is not the precisely fitted that fit, but those that do not cause pain in their use?”

“You are saying it yourself, Socrates,” he said, “and your grasp of the matter is very correct.”

Chapter 11

There was once a beautiful woman in the city, whose name was Theodote and who was the sort to keep company with whoever persuaded her. When one of those who were present mentioned her and said that the beauty of the woman surpassed speech; and when he had said that painters, to whom she displayed as much of herself as was noble to display, visited her in order to draw her likeness, Socrates said, “We must go to behold her, for surely it is not possible for those who have merely heard to learn what surpasses speech.” And the one who had described her said, “Hurry up and follow.”

Thus they went to Theodote and came upon her standing for a certain painter, and they beheld her. After the painter left off, Socrates said, “Men, should we be more grateful to Theodote for displaying to us her beauty, or she to us because we beheld? If the display is more beneficial to her, is it for her to be grateful to us, while if the beholding is more beneficial to us, for us to be grateful to her?”

And when someone said that what he said was just, he said, “She, then, already gains from our praise and will be the more benefited whenever we should report it to more people; while we already desire to touch what we have beheld and will go away rather excited and will long for what we have left behind. From And Theodote said, “By Zeus, if this is so, then it is I who should be grateful to you for the beholding.”

After this, Socrates—seeing that she herself was adorned in a costly manner and that her mother, who was with her, was dressed and served in no chance manner and that her maidservants were many and good-looking and that not even these were inattentively maintained and that her household was furnished with the other things in abundance—said, “Tell me, Theodote, do you own a farm?”

“Not I,” she said.

“How about a household with revenues?”

“Not a household either,” she said.

“But some artisans perhaps?”

“Not artisans either,” she said.

“Then what source do you have for your provisions?” he said.

“If someone who has become my friend wants to treat me well,” she said, “he is my livelihood.”

“By Hera, Theodote,” he said, “it is a noble possession in-

deed, and far better to possess a herd of friends than a herd of sheep, goats, and cattle. But," he said, "do you entrust it to chance whether some friend will light on you, like a fly, or do you yourself contrive something?"

"How could I find a contrivance for this?" she said.

"It belongs much more, by Zeus, to you to-do this than to spiders," he said. "You know how they hunt things for their livelihood: for, of course, they weave fine webs and use whatever falls into them for sustenance."

"Are you advising me, too," she said, "to weave some hunting net?"

"No, for you surely shouldn't think that you will hunt so artlessly the prey that is worth the most: friends. 'Don't you see that even for rabbits, which are worth very little, hunters craft many artifices?

"For, since they graze at night, they procure for themselves dogs fit for nighttime hunting and hunt them with these. And because they run away when it is day, they acquire other dogs who find the rabbits out by perceiving through scent the path they take from their grazing ground to their lair. And because they are swift-footed enough to escape by running even when they are visible, they furnish themselves with still other dogs, swift ones, so that they may capture them by following on their heels. And because some of them escape even from these, they set nets up on the paths through which they flee, so that when they fall into them they may become enmeshed."

"So with what thing of this sort," she said, "could I hunt friends?"

"By Zeus," he said, "if instead of a dog you acquire someone who will track and find for you those who love beauty and are rich, and who, after finding them, will contrive to throw them into your nets."

"And what sort of nets," she said, "do I have?"

"To be sure, one that is indeed very entangling: your body," he said. "And in it a soul, through which you learn both how you might gratify with a look and delight with what you say; and that you must receive with gladness one who is attentive but shut out one who is spoiled; and that when a friend is sick, at least, to watch over him worriedly, and when he does something noble to be exceedingly pleased by it along with him; and to gratify with your whole soul the one who worries about you exceedingly. I know very well that you understand how to love, at any rate, in a manner not only soft but also well intentioned; and as to the fact that your friends are best for you, I know that you convince not only by speech but by deed."

"By Zeus," said Theodote, "I, for my part, contrive none of these things."

"And yet," he said, "it makes a big difference to approach a human being according to nature and correctly. For to be sure you would neither take nor hold a friend by violence, but this prey is both captured and kept constant by means of benefaction and pleasure."

"You speak truly," she said.

"You must first, then," he said, "require that those who worry about you do the sort of things that they will least regret doing, and then you yourself should make

a return by gratifying them in the same fashion. For this way they would most become friends and love for the longest time and confer the greatest benefactions.

"And you would most gratify them, if you should give of yourself to those who are in need. For you see that even the most pleasant of foods, if someone offers it before there is desire, appears unpleasant and even provokes disgust in those who are satiated; but if someone offers it after inducing hunger, even if it is very common it appears quite pleasant."

"How, then," she said, "would I be able to induce hunger in someone for what I have?"

"By Zeus," he said, "if, first, you neither approach nor offer any reminder to those who are satiated until they stop being full and are in need again. Then, if you offer reminders to those who are in need by means of the most decorous intimacy possible and by visibly wishing to gratify, yet fleeing—until they are most in need. For it makes a big difference to give the same gifts at that point, rather than before they desire them.

And Theodote said, "Why then, Socrates, don't you become my fellow hunter of friends?"

"If, by Zeus," he said, "you persuade me."

"How, then, might I persuade you?" she said.

"You yourself will seek this out and will contrive it," he said, "if you have some need of me."

"Then visit often," she said.

And Socrates, joking about his own lack of busyness, said, "But Theodote, it is not very easy for me to find leisure, for in fact many affairs both private and public deprive me of leisure. And I also have female friends who will not allow me to leave them day or night, since they are learning love charms and incantations from me."

"Do you understand these things, as well, Socrates?" she said.

"Well," he said, "why do you think Apollodorus here and Antisthenes are never absent from me? And why do you think Cebes and Simmias are present from Thebes? Know well that this hasn't happened without many love charms, incantations, and spells."

"Then lend me the spell," she said, "so that I might draw it first against you."

"But, by Zeus," he said, "I myself do not wish to be drawn to you—but that you come to me."

"Then I will go to you," she said. "Only receive me."

"But I will receive you," he said, "unless some female dearer than you is inside."

Chapter 12

When he saw that one of his companions, Epigenes, was both young and maintained his body badly, he said, "How like a private individual you maintain your body, Epigenes."

And he said, “For I am a private individual, Socrates.”

“Not any more in fact than those who are about to compete in the Olympics,” he said. “Or in your opinion is the contest for one’s life against the enemy—a contest the Athenians may at any time chance to establish—a small one?

“And yet, not a few people die amid the risks of war, or are saved in a shameful manner, due to the bad condition of their body. And many, due to this same thing, are captured alive and after being captured either live the rest of their lives as slaves—if they so chance—in the harshest slavery or, having fallen into the most painful necessities and paid sometimes more than they have, they are in want of necessities for the rest of their lives and live in misery. And many acquire a shameful reputation due to the incapacity of their body, because, as opinion has it, they are cowardly.

“Or do you hold in contempt these penalties for bad condition and think that you would easily bear such things? And yet I think that the things that one who attends to the good condition of his body must endure are much easier and more pleasant than those things. Or do you hold that bad condition is healthier and more useful for other things than good condition? Or do you hold in contempt what comes about due to good condition?

“And yet the things that happen to those who maintain their bodies well are all the opposites of the ones that happen to those who maintain them badly. For those who maintain their bodies well are both healthy and strong. And many due to this are saved in a seemly manner in the contests of war and escape all the terrible things; many bring aid to their friends and do good deeds for their fatherland and due to this are deemed worthy of gratitude, acquire a great reputation, and obtain most noble honors and due to these things live the rest of their life in a more pleasant and more noble manner and leave their children with more noble resources for life.

“One should not, just because the city does not train one at the public expense for the things of war, neglect this in private as well, but attend to it no less. For, know well that you will not be worse off in any other contest or in any action from having your body better equipped. The body is useful for all actions that human beings take; and in all the uses of the body it makes a lot of difference to have the body in as good condition as possible.

“Since, even where, in your opinion, there is least use of the body—in thinking—who does not know that, even here, many greatly falter because their body is not healthy? And forgetfulness, dispiritedness, peevishness, and madness frequently attack the thought of many due to the bad condition of their body, so as to drive out even the sciences.

“For those whose bodies are in good condition, there is much security and no risk of suffering something of this sort, at least due to the bad condition of the body; and it is plausible rather that good condition, too, is useful for the opposites of the things that occur due to bad condition. And what would anyone with sense not endure for the sake of the opposites of the things mentioned?

"It is also shameful due to neglect to grow old before seeing oneself in the most beautiful and strongest bodily state one might attain. But it is not possible for one who is neglectful to see these things, for they do not want to come to pass spontaneously."

Chapter 13

Once when someone was angry because, when he addressed someone in greeting, he was not addressed in return, he said, "It is ridiculous that, if you met someone with a worse body you wouldn't be angry, but you are pained because you met by chance someone more boorishly disposed in his soul."

When someone else said that he didn't take pleasure in eating, he said, "Acumenus teaches a good cure for this." And when the other asked him, "Of what sort?" he said, "To stop eating, and to live more pleasantly, more cheaply, and more healthfully after you have stopped."

Again, when someone else said that the drinking water at his house was warm, he said, "Then whenever you wish to take a bath in warm water, it will be ready for you."

"But, it's too cold for bathing," he said.

"Then, are your household servants, too, annoyed when they drink it or bathe in it?" he said.

"By Zeus," he said, "I frequently have wondered, rather, at the pleasure with which they use it for both these purposes."

"Which is warmer to drink," he said, "the water at your house or that in the temple of Æsclepius?"

"That in the temple of Æsclepius," he said.

"And which is colder to bathe in, the water at your house or that in the temple of Amphiaraus?"

"That in the temple of Amphiaraus," he said.

"Ponder, then, on the fact that you run the risk of being more difficult to please than both your household servants and those who are sickly."

When someone was vigorously punishing an attendant, he asked him why he was angry with his servant.

"Because," he said, "although he is most slack, he is a great eater of relishes, and although laziest, a great lover of money."

"Have you ever yet examined, then, which one is more in need of blows, you or your servant?"

When someone was afraid of the trip to Olympia, he said, "Why are you afraid of the trip? Don't you walk about for nearly the whole day even at home? And when you travel there, you will walk until breakfast, walk until dinner, and then rest. Don't you know that, if you would stretch out the walks you take in five or six days you would easily arrive at Olympia from Athens? It is also more delightful to set out early by one day than to arrive late. For to be compelled to prolong the stages

beyond measure is hard, while increasing by one the days of travel provides great ease. It's better, then, to hasten in setting out rather than on the road."

When another said that he was worn out from having traveled a long way, he asked him if he carried a burden as well.

"No, by Zeus, I did not, except for my cloak," he said.

"And did you travel alone," he said, "or did your attendant follow too?"

"He followed," he said.

"Was he empty-handed," he said, "or carrying something?"

"By Zeus, he was carrying the bedding and the other equipment," he said.

"And how," he said, "has he emerged from the journey?"

"In my opinion," he said, "better than I have."

"Then, what if you had to carry his burden?" he said. "How do you think you would have fared?"

"Badly, by Zeus," he said. "Or, rather, I wouldn't even have been able to convey it."

"How, then, in your opinion, has a man trained himself, who is so much less able to labor than his slave boy?"

Chapter 14

Whenever some of his dinner companions brought a small amount of relish and others brought a large amount, Socrates bid the slave boy either to place the small amount at the common disposal or to distribute a portion of it to each. Then those who brought the large amount were ashamed not to join in partaking of what was placed in common and not to place their own in return.

So they too placed their own at the common disposal. And since they had no more than those who brought a small amount, they stopped spending a lot on relishes.

When he observed once that one of his dinner companions had stopped eating bread and was eating the relish itself by itself, the talk being then about names—for what sort of work each name exists—he said, "Would we be able to say, men, with a view to what sort of work a human being is ever called a relish eater? For surely all eat relish on their bread, when it is available. But I think that they are not yet called relish eaters for this."

"Surely not," said one of those present.

"What about this?" he said. "If someone should eat the relish itself without the bread, not because he is in training but for the sake of pleasure, would he be a relish eater according to opinion or not?"

"Scarcely anyone else would be a relish eater," he said.

And someone else of those present said, "And the one who eats a large amount of relish with a small amount of food?"

“In my opinion,” Socrates said, “he too would justly be called a relish eater. And whenever other human beings pray to the gods for a large crop, it is plausible that he would pray for a large amount of relish.”

When Socrates said this, the youth, who held that what had been said was spoken with a view to him, did not stop eating relish but took a loaf as well. And when Socrates observed it, he said, “Those who are near this one should watch closely whether he will use the food as relish or the relish as food.”

When he saw another one of his dinner companions tasting more than one relish with a single morsel of bread, he said, “Could there be a more costly relish making or one more likely to ruin the relish than that practiced by the one who eats many at once and takes a variety of sweets into his mouth at once? In mixing more together than the relish makers do he adds cost; and in mixing things that they do not mix together, on the grounds that they don’t fit, he errs and undoes their art, if, that is, they act correctly.

“And yet how is it not ridiculous to furnish oneself with the relish makers who have the best understanding and then, though one doesn’t even lay a claim to this art, to change around what is done by them? And something else befalls one who has become habituated to eating many foods at once: for, when there are not many relishes present, he has the opinion that he is somehow worse off, since he longs for what is habitual with him. But the one who has become habituated to dispatching one morsel of bread with one relish would be able painlessly to use the one when many should not be available.”

He said also that “to feast” was called eating in the Athenian tongue. He said that the “well” was added with a view to eating those things that pain neither the soul nor the body and are not difficult to find. As a result he attributed feasting, too, to those who live with a decorous way of life.

BOOK IV

Chapter 1

So beneficial was Socrates in every matter and in every manner that it was visible to one who examined with even limited perception that there was nothing more beneficial than being a companion of Socrates and spending time with him anywhere at all and in any matter whatsoever, since even remembering him when he was not present was of no small benefit to those who were accustomed to being in his company and who were receptive to him. In fact when he was joking he was no less profitable to those who spent time with him than when he was serious.

For while he would often say that he was in love with someone, his desire was visibly not for those whose bodies were naturally well formed for youthful bloom but rather for those whose souls were naturally well formed for virtue. And he judged the good natures from their learning quickly what they turned their minds to, remembering what they learned, and desiring all of the subjects of learning through which one can nobly manage a household and a city and, altogether, make good use of human beings and human matters. For he believed that, if they have been educated, those with such a nature would not only be happy themselves and nobly manage their own households but they would also be able to make other human beings as well as cities happy.

He did not approach all in the same manner, but those who thought they were by nature good and who were contemptuous of learning he taught that the natures opinion holds as best are most in need of education—pointing out that the horses with the best natures, who are high-spirited and impetuous, if broken in from a young age become most useful and best, but if unbroken become hardest to restrain and quite common; and that in the case of the dogs with the best natures, who love labor and are ready to attack their prey, those that have been nobly reared become best for the hunts and most useful, while without rearing they become useless and mad and most intractable.

Similarly, he pointed out also that the human beings with the best natures, who are most robust in their souls and most able to accomplish whatever they attempt, if they are educated and learn what they should do, become best and most beneficial (for the good things they accomplish are very many and very great), while without education and learning they become worst and most harmful, for—not understanding how to decide what they should do—they frequently attempt wicked actions, and since they are grand and impetuous they are hard to restrain and hard to turn back, which is why the bad things they do are very many and very great.

And as for those who were proud on account of their riches and held that they had no need of education besides but thought that their riches would suffice for them both in accomplishing whatever they wished and in being honored by human beings, he instructed them by saying that one is foolish if he thinks that without learning he will distinguish which things are beneficial and which harmful; and one is foolish if he thinks that without distinguishing these things, while procuring for himself whatever he wishes due to his riches, he will be able to do what is

advantageous; and one is a simpleton if he thinks that, without being able to do what is advantageous, he does well and is nobly or sufficiently furnished for his life; and one is a simpleton also if he thinks that due to his riches he will, without understanding anything, be thought to be good in anything, or, without being thought good in anything, have a good reputation.

Chapter 2

I shall now describe how he approached those who held that they had obtained the best education and were proud on account of their wisdom. For he learned that Euthydemus the beautiful had collected many writings of the poets and of the sophists who were held in the highest repute, and due to these held himself to be already superior to his contemporaries on account of wisdom and had great hopes of surpassing everyone in being able to speak and take action. To begin with, perceiving that because of his youth he did not yet enter the agora but sat at one of the bridle makers' shops near the agora when he wished to have something done, he too entered this place with some of those with him.

And first—when someone inquired whether it was due to keeping company with one of the wise or by nature that Themistocles was so superior to the citizens that the city looked to him whenever it had need of a serious man—Socrates, who wished to stir Euthydemus, said that it was naive to think, on the one hand, that in the arts hardly worth mentioning human beings don't become serious without competent teachers, but, on the other hand, presiding over a city, which is the greatest work of all, comes to them spontaneously.

And once again when Euthydemus was present—seeing that he retreated from the group seated together and was on his guard lest he seem to admire Socrates for his wisdom—he said, "Men, it is quite clear from his pursuits that when Euthydemus here comes of age he will not refrain from giving advice when the city proposes a discussion about something. And, in my opinion, he prepares for himself a noble opening for his public addresses by guarding against having a reputation for having learned anything from anyone. For it is clear that in beginning to speak he would make the following opening:

'From no one, ever, men of Athens, did I learn anything, nor when I heard that some were competent at speaking and taking action did I seek to meet them; nor did I attend to having one of those who understand become my teacher. Rather, the opposite: I have spent my time fleeing not only from learning anything from anyone but even from seeming to do so. Nevertheless, I shall give you whatever advice spontaneously occurs to me.'

"Opening in this manner would also be fitting for those who wish to get medical work from the city. It would be serviceable for them to begin the speech from this point: 'From no one, ever, men of Athens, did I learn the medical art, nor did I seek that any of the physicians become my teacher. For I have spent my time guarding not only against learning anything from the physicians but even against seeming to have learned this art. Nevertheless, give me the medical work: I shall try to learn,

making my trials on you." Then all who were present laughed at the speech's opening.

When it was visible that Euthydemus was already turning his mind to what Socrates was saying, but still guarding against uttering anything himself and holding that by his silence he clothed himself with a reputation for moderation, Socrates, wishing to stop him from this, then said, "It is to be wondered at why those who wish to play the cithara or the flute or to ride horses or to become competent at anything else of the sort try to do as continuously as possible whatever they wish to have ability in—and not on their own but by the side of those thought to be best, doing and enduring everything in order to do nothing without their judgment, on the assumption that they would not otherwise become worthy of mention—while some of those who wish to become able to speak and to act in political affairs hold that without preparation and attentiveness to them they will spontaneously, all at once, be able to do them.

"And yet, the latter things appear more difficult to accomplish than the former to the extent that those who accomplish them are fewer, although more people involve themselves in them. So it is clear that those desirous of the latter need to give them more and stronger attention than those desirous of the former."

Now, in the beginning, Euthydemus listened when Socrates made such speeches. But when he perceived that he endured it more readily when he conversed, and listened more eagerly, he went alone to the bridle maker's. And when Euthydemus sat down next to him, he said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you really collected, as I hear, many writings of the men said to have been wise?"

And Euthydemus said, "Yes, by Zeus, Socrates. And in fact I am still collecting them, until shall acquire as many as can."

"By Hera, I do admire you," said Socrates, "because you did not choose to possess treasures of silver and gold rather than of wisdom. For you clearly hold that silver and gold make human beings no better, but that the wise men's judgments make those who possess them rich in virtue."

And when he heard this Euthydemus was delighted, holding that he was pursuing wisdom correctly in Socrates' opinion. And the latter, observing that he was pleased at this praise, said, "In what do you wish to become good, Euthydemus, when you gather the writings?"

When Euthydemus remained silent while he examined how he should answer, Socrates again spoke: "It is not as a physician, is it? For indeed there are also many treatises by physicians."

And Euthydemus said, "By Zeus, not I."

"You don't wish to become a master builder either? For this too requires a man of judgment."

"Not I," he said.

"You don't desire to become a good geometrician either, like Theodorus?"

"Not a geometrician, either," he said.

“You don’t wish to become an astronomer either?” he said. As he denied this too, he said, “Nor a rhapsode? For they say that you possess also all the verses of Homer.”

“By Zeus, not I,” he said, “for indeed I know that the rhapsodes are accurate as to the verses, while being themselves quite the simpletons.”

And Socrates said, “Do you not, Euthydemus, desire that virtue through which human beings become fit for political affairs, fit to manage households, competent to rule, and beneficial to other human beings as well as themselves?”

Memorabilia

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And Euthydemus said, “ want this virtue exceedingly.”

“By Zeus,” said Socrates, “you desire the noblest virtue and greatest art, for it belongs to kings and is called kingly. Yet, have you considered,” he said, “whether it is possible to be good at this without being just?”

“Yes, indeed,” he said. “And it is not possible to be a good citizen without justice.”

“So what about this—have you in fact achieved it?” he said.

“I think, at least, Socrates,” he said, “that I would appear no less

just than anyone.”

“Then are there not works belonging to the just,” he said, “as there are works belonging to builders?”

“There are, indeed,” he said.

“Then,” he said, “as builders are able to display their own works, would those who are just be able to explain theirs?”

“Are you afraid,” said Euthydemus, “that I can’t explain the works of justice? By Zeus, for my part, I can explain also those of injustice, since it is possible every day to see and to hear not a few such things.”

“Then do you wish us to write a *J* here, and an *I* here,” said Socrates, “and then to put under *J* whatever is a work of justice, in our opinion, and whatever is a work of injustice under *I*?”

“If, in your opinion, we have some need of this in addition,” he said, “do it.”

And having written as he said, Socrates said, “So then, does lying exist among human beings?”

“It does indeed,” he said.

“Then under which shall we put it?” he said.

“Clearly under injustice,” he said.

“Accordingly, does deceiving, too, exist?” he said.

“Yes, indeed,” he said.

“Then under which shall we put it?”

“Clearly this too goes under injustice.”

“And what about doing mischief?”

“This too,” he said.

“And enslaving?”

“This too.”

“None of these things will be laid by us next to justice, Euthydemus?”

“For that would be terrible,” he said.

“What if someone who has been elected general should enslave an unjust and hostile city? Will we say that he does an injustice?”

“Surely not,” he said.

“Will we not say that he does what is just?”

“Yes, indeed,” he said.

“What if he should use deception when he is at war with them?”

“This too is just,” he said.

“And if he should steal and seize their belongings, will he not do what is just?”

“Yes, indeed,” he said. “But , for my part, supposed at first that you asked about these things with regard to one’s friends alone.”

“And so,” he said, “would one have to put next to justice, too, what we put next to injustice?”

“It seems so,” he said.

‘Then, do you wish,” he said, “after thus putting these things, that we make the additional distinction that while it is just to do such things to enemies, it is unjust to friends, but to these at least one should be as straightforward as possible?”

“Certainly,” said Euthydemus.

“What about this?” said Socrates. “If some general who sees that his army is dispirited should lie and say that allies are approaching and by this lie put an end to the soldiers’ lack of spirit: under which shall we put this deception?”

“Under justice, in my opinion,” he said.

“And if someone, whose son needs medicine but will not allow it near him, should deceive him by giving him the medicine as food and by using the lie in this way to make him healthy: where, again, should one put this deception?”

“In my opinion,” he said, “this too goes in the same place.”

“What about if someone should steal or seize a friend’s sword or anything else of the sort, when the friend is dispirited, out of fear he might destroy himself: again, under which should one put this?”

“This too, by Zeus,” he said, “goes under justice.”

“Are you saying,” he said, “that one should not be straightforward even with one’s friends in all circumstances?”

“By Zeus, surely not,” he said. “Rather I change where I put the things mentioned, if it’s permitted.”

“It must indeed be permitted,” Socrates said, “much more than to put them incorrectly.

“But, so that we do not leave even this unexamined, who is more unjust among those who deceive their friends so as to harm them: the one who does so willingly or unwillingly?”

“But Socrates, I, for my part, no longer trust my answers. In fact all my previous answers are now otherwise in my opinion than as thought then. Nevertheless, let it be said by me that the one who lies willingly is more unjust than the one who does so unwillingly.”

“In your opinion, is there learning and understanding of the just, in the same way as there is of writing?”

“In my opinion, at least.”

“Which do you decide to be more skilled in writing, the one who willingly writes and reads incorrectly, or the one who does so unwillingly?”

“For my part, the one who does so willingly. For he would be able also to do these things correctly whenever he should wish.”

“Would, then, the one who willingly writes incorrectly be skilled in writing and the one who does so unwillingly unskilled?”

“How not?”

“Which knows the just things, the one who willingly lies and deceives, or the one who does so unwillingly?”

“Clearly the one who does so willingly.”

“Are you saying, then, that the one who understands writing is more skilled at writing than the one who doesn’t understand, and that the one who understands the just things is more just than the one who doesn’t understand?”

“I appear to be: in my opinion, I am saying—I don’t know how—these things as well.”

“What about if someone who wishes to speak the truth never says the same things about the same things; but when he points out the same road he at one time points to the east, and at another to the west; and when he declares the same calculation, he declares it at one time as greater, and then at another as less: what is your opinion of such a person?”

“Clearly, by Zeus, he does not know what he thought he knew.”

“Do you know of any people who are called slavish?”

“I do, for my part.”

“Is it due to wisdom or ignorance?”

“It is clear that it is due to ignorance.”

“Now is it due to ignorance in smithing that they obtain this name?”

“Surely not.”

“Rather, then, to ignorance in building?”

“Not due to this either,”

“Rather to ignorance in shoemaking?”

“It is not due to any one of these things,” he said, “but in fact the opposite: most of those who understand how to do such things are slavish.”

“Then is this the name of those who do riot know what the noble and good and just things are?”

“In my opinion, at any rate,” he said.

“Should we, then, exert ourselves in every way to escape being slaves?”

“But, by the gods, Socrates,” he said, “I very much thought that I was pursuing in my philosophizing a philosophy through which, I held, I would be educated to the highest degree in what befits a man yearning for gentlemanliness (nobility and goodness). But now, how dispirited do you think I am at seeing that, for my previous pains, I am unable to answer even what is asked about things one most should know, and that I have no other road that I might travel to become better?”

And Socrates said, “Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever arrived at Delphi?”

“Yes, twice in fact, by Zeus,” he said.

“Surely, you learned, then, what is written on the temple: ‘Know thyself.”

“I did indeed.”

“Was the writing of no concern to you, then, or did you turn your mind to it and attempt to examine yourself regarding who you are?”

“By Zeus, certainly not,” he said. “For indeed I thought that I knew this, at any rate, quite well: I could scarcely know anything else if I did not even know myself.”

“In your opinion, does the one know himself who knows only his own name? Or—just as horse traders don’t think they know the horse they wish to know before they examine whether it is obedient or disobedient and whether strong or weak and whether fast or slow and how it is with regard to the other qualities that make a horse suitable and unsuitable for use—is it the one who has examined himself as to how he is with regard to the use to which human beings are put and who knows his capacity?”

“That is indeed my opinion,” he said, “that the one who doesn’t know his own capacity is ignorant of himself.”

“Is this not visible,” he said, “that human beings experience most good things due to knowing themselves, and most bad ones due to being deceived about themselves? For those who know themselves know what suits them and distinguish between what they are capable of and what they are not; and by doing what they understand how to do, they procure what they need and do well, while by refraining from what they don’t understand, they remain free from error and escape doing badly. Due to this they are able to test other human beings as well, and through the use of the others procure the good things and guard against the bad ones.

“Those, on the other hand, who don’t know but are utterly deceived about their own capacity are similarly disposed regarding the other human beings and the other human matters. And they know neither what they need nor whatever they

are doing nor those they deal with; rather, erring utterly in all these respects, they fail to obtain the good things, and they encounter the bad ones.

"And those who know whatever they are doing, since they succeed in what they do, come to be well reputed and honored. In addition, not only do those who are similar to them deal with them with pleasure, but those who fail in their affairs desire to have them deliberate on their behalf and even to preside over themselves, and place in them their hopes for the good things and due to all of this cherish them most of all.

"Those, on the other hand, who do not know what they are doing, since they choose badly and fail at the things they attempt, are penalized and punished not only in these very matters, but also due to them they are held in low opinion and ridiculed and live in contempt and dishonor. You see among cities, too, that some of those that, out of ignorance of their power, go to war against stronger cities become ruined, while others who were before free are enslaved."

And Euthydemus said, "Know this, Socrates: that it is very much my opinion that one should place a high importance on knowing oneself. But as to where one should begin to examine oneself—for this I am looking to you, if you should want to explain it to me."

"You surely by all means know, then," said Socrates, "what sorts of things are good and what sorts are bad?"

"By Zeus," he said, "for if I did not know even this, I would be more common even than slaves."

"Come, then," he said, "explain this to me, too."

"But it is not hard," he said, "for, first, I hold that being healthy is itself good, being sick bad; then, as to the causes of each of these things—whether drink or food or pursuits—I hold that those are good that are conducive to being healthy, and those are bad that are conducive to being sick."

"So then, wouldn't being healthy and being sick," he said, "both be good whenever they should come to be the cause of something good, and bad when the cause of something bad?"

"When would being healthy ever come to be a cause of something bad or being sick a cause of something good?" he said.

"Whenever, by Zeus, there are shameful campaigns, harmful voyages, and many other things of the sort," he said, "and they perish, those who take part in them due to might, while those left out due to feebleness are saved."

"You speak truly," he said. "But you see that the mighty take part also in the beneficial things, while the feeble are left out."

"These things, then," he said, "that are sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful—are they more good than bad?"

"Not at all, by Zeus, it appears, at least according to this argument. But wisdom at any rate, Socrates, is indisputably good. For in what sort of matter wouldn't someone do better if he were wise than if he were ignorant?"

“What about Daedalus?” he said. “Haven’t you heard that, after he was seized by Minos due to his wisdom, he was compelled to be his slave and was deprived of both his fatherland and his freedom at the same time; and that, when he attempted to escape with his son, he lost the boy and was himself unable to get away safely but was carried back to the barbarians to be a slave there again?”

“So it is said, by Zeus,” he said.

“And have you not heard of the sufferings of Palamedes? For according to what all sing of him in hymns, he was destroyed by Odysseus, who envied him because of wisdom.”

“This too is said,” he said.

“And how many others do you think have been dragged away to the King due to their wisdom to be slaves there?”

“It is probable, Socrates,” he said, “that the least debatable good is being happy.”

“Unless, at least, someone would compose it, Euthydemus, out of debatable goods,” he said.

“Which,” he said, “of the things conducive to happiness would be debatable?”

“None,” he said, “unless we will include among its attributes beauty or strength or riches or reputation or anything else of the sort.”

“But, by Zeus, we will include them,” he said. “For how would someone be happy without these?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “we will include then things from which many hard things befall human beings. For many due to their beauty are corrupted by those who are highly excited by those who are in bloom; and many due to their strength attempt greater works and encounter no small ills; and many due to their riches are destroyed when they are fussed over and plotted against; and many due to reputation and political power suffer great ills.”

“And yet,” he said, “if I do not speak correctly even when I praise being happy, I agree that I do not know even what one should pray to the gods for.”

“Well, these things, perhaps, you didn’t even examine due to your excessive trust that you knew them,” said Socrates. “But since you are preparing to preside over a democratically ruled city, it is clear that you at least know democracy, what it is.”

“By all means, to be sure,” he said.

“Now, in your opinion, is it possible to know democracy without knowing a demos?”

“By Zeus, not in my opinion, at least.”

“Then you know a demos, as well, what it is?”

“I think I do, at least.”

“And what do you hold a demos to be?”

“I, for my part, hold it to be the poor among the citizens.”

"You know, then, the poor, as well?"

"How could I not know?"

"Do you know, then, the rich, as well?"

"No less, at least, than in fact the poor."

"What sorts do you call poor and what rich?"

"Poor, those who do not have what is sufficient to spend for what they need, I think, and rich, those who have more than is sufficient."

"Have you observed, then, that for some the little that they have is not only enough, but they even put savings away from it, while for others a great amount is not sufficient?"

"Yes, by Zeus," said Euthydemus, "you are indeed correct to remind me. For I know even some tyrants who are compelled due to neediness to commit injustice—like those who are most lacking in means."

"Accordingly," said Socrates, "if in fact this is so, we shall include the tyrants in the demos while putting those who possess little, if they are skilled household managers, among the rich?"

And Euthydemus said, "Clearly it is my worthlessness that compels me to agree to these things too. Indeed I worry whether it may not be best for me to remain silent, for I probably know nothing at all."

And he went away very dispirited, having contempt for himself and holding that he was really a slave.

Now many who were put into this state by Socrates no longer approached him, and he held these to be the more slack.

But Euthydemus supposed that he would become in no other way a man worthy of mention than if he were to be in Socrates' company as much as possible. And he no longer left him unless there was some compulsion, and even imitated some of his pursuits. And, for his part, when he recognized that this was his state, he disturbed him as little as possible and explained in the most simple and clear manner what he held he should know and what he held best for him to pursue.

Chapter 3

Now he did not rush his companions to become skilled in speaking and in taking action and in contriving, but he thought that moderation should come to be in them before these things. For he held that those who had these abilities without being moderate are more unjust and more able to do mischief.

First, he tried to make his companions moderate about gods. Now others who were present have given descriptions of him associating in this manner with others. But I was present when he had a conversation with Euthydemus of the following sort.

"Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "has it ever yet occurred to you to ponder this: that the gods attentively furnish human beings with what they need?"

And he said, "By Zeus, it hasn't occurred to me, at least."

“But you surely know,” he said, “that, first, we need light, which the gods provide to us?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “if we did not have this, at least, we would be like those who are blind as far as our eyes are concerned.”

“Furthermore, we need rest as well, and they provide us with night, a most noble resting time.”

“Certainly,” he said, “this too is deserving of gratitude.”

“Accordingly, since also the sun in its shining makes clear to us both the periods of the day and everything else, but night is rather unclear due to its darkness, they have shown forth stars in the night that make visible to us the periods of the night; and on this account we do many of the things we need.”

“These things are so,” he said.

“Moreover, the moon at any rate makes visible to us the parts not only of the night but also of the month.”

“Certainly,” he said.

“And since we need sustenance, what about the giving it forth to us from the earth and the provision of seasons fitting for this, which furnish us with an abundance and variety not only of what we need but also of what we take delight in?”

“These things too,” he said, “are very indicative of a love of human beings.”

“And what about providing us also with water, which is so valuable that it helps the earth and seasons in bringing forth’ and increasing all the things useful to us, helps us also in sustaining ourselves, and, when mixed with all that sustains us, makes these things easier to digest and more beneficial as well as more pleasant; and, since we need this in very great quantity, it is provided to us most ungrudgingly?”

“This too,” he said, “is indicative of forethought.”

“And what about the procuring for us also of fire, an ally against cold, an ally against darkness, a coworker in every art and for all things that human beings equip themselves with for their benefit? For, in sum, without fire, human beings equip themselves with nothing worth mentioning of the things useful for life.”

“This too,” he said, “belongs to a surpassing love of human beings.”*

“And what about the sun’s approaching after it has turned in winter, ripening some things and drying others out when their time has passed; and when it has accomplished these things, it’s not approaching any nearer, but turning away, on its guard lest it do us some harm by heating us beyond what is needful; and when it again goes away and comes to the point when it is clear even to us that if it goes any farther away we will be frozen by the cold, its turning back and approaching again; and its turning to and fro in that region of the heaven where its presence would benefit us most?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “these things too are altogether like things that happen for the sake of human beings.”

“And since this too is visible, that we could endure neither the blazing heat nor the cold if they occurred suddenly, what about the sun’s both approaching so gradually and going away so gradually that we are unaware that we are being brought into each extreme?”

“I, for my part,” said Euthydemus, “am already examining whether the gods have any other work than serving human beings. The only thing holding me back is that the other animals too participate in these things.”

“Is not this, too, visible,” said Socrates, “that even these are born and sustained for the sake of human beings? For what other animal enjoys the benefits of so many good things as human beings do from goats, sheep, cattle, horses, asses, and the other animals? For, in my opinion, they enjoy more benefits from these than from the plants. At any rate, they are sustained and make wealth from the former no less than from the latter; and much of the human race does not use the plants from the earth for sustenance but lives by sustaining itself on milk, cheese, and flesh from grazing animals; and all domesticate and break in the animals that are useful and use them as helpers for war and much other work.”

“I agree with you in this too,” he said. “For I see even those that are much stronger than we who become subservient enough for human beings to make whatever use of them they wish.”

“And since there are many noble and beneficial things, but they differ from each other, what about the addition of perceptions to human beings, which are fit for each of the things and which are the means for our enjoying the benefits of all the good things? And what about the implanting of calculation in us by which, when we calculate and remember the things we perceive, we learn how each of the things is advantageous, and contrive many ways to enjoy the benefit of the good things and ward off the bad ones?

“In addition, what about the gift of explanation, through which, by teaching, we share with one another all the good things, live collectively, establish laws, and partake of political life?”

“The gods seem altogether, Socrates, to be very attentive to human beings.”

“In addition, if we are unable to know in advance what is advantageous for the future, what about their helping us themselves in these matters by pointing out through divination, to those who inquire, how things will turn out, and by teaching the way in which they might best happen?”

“They seem to deal with you, Socrates, in a more friendly manner than the others,” he said, “if, that is, though they are not even asked by you, they signal you in advance what you should and should not do.”

“And that I am speaking the truth, you, too, will know, if you do not wait until you see the shapes of the gods, but if it is enough for you, when you see their works, to revere and honor the gods. Reflect that even the gods themselves intimate so. For when the others give us the good things they do not enter into visibility when they give any of them; and the one who places together and keeps together the whole cosmos, in which all things are noble and good, and who always provides them unravaged, healthy, and ageless for our use, and who does unerring service

more quickly than thought—this one, while seen to be doing the greatest things, is unseen by us as he manages them.

"And reflect that even the sun, which is thought to be visible to everyone, does not permit himself to be seen by human beings precisely, but he takes away the sight of anyone who attempts to behold him shamelessly. You will find that the servants of the gods, too, are invisible. For, that lightning at least is released from above is clear, and also that it overpowers all whom it encounters; but it is seen neither as it approaches nor as it strikes nor as it goes away. And breezes are not, themselves, seen, but what they do is visible to us, and we perceive them as they approach. Furthermore, that a human soul—which shares in the divine if indeed anything else belonging to human beings does—is king in us is visible, but not even it is seen. Knowing these things, one should not have contempt for the things that are unseen, but, learning their power from what comes to pass, one should honor the divine."

"I, for my part, know with certainty, Socrates," said Euthydemus, "that, not even in a small way, shall I neglect the divine. But I am dispirited at this: that in my opinion no single human being could ever repay the gods' benefactions with the gratitude they deserve."

"But don't be dispirited about that, Euthydemus," he said. "For you see that, whenever someone asks him how he would gratify the gods, the god at Delphi answers, 'By law of the city.' And surely it is law everywhere to please gods with sacrifices according to one's capacity. How, then, would one honor gods any more nobly or piously than by doing as they themselves bid? But one should in no way fall short of one's capacity.

"For whenever someone does this, it is surely visible that he is not honoring gods at that point. So one should leave nothing undone in honoring the gods according to his capacity, and take heart and hope for the greatest goods. For it would not be moderate for someone to hope for more from others than from those able to benefit in the most important things, nor would it be moderate to hope for this other than if one would please them. And how would he please them more than if he obeyed them in the highest degree?"

By saying such things and himself doing them he rendered his companions both more pious and more moderate.

Chapter 4

Furthermore, he did not hide the judgment he had concerning justice, at any rate, but showed it even in deed, by dealing with everyone in private in a lawful and beneficial manner; and in public by being so obedient to rulers in what the laws command, both in the city and on campaigns, that it was thoroughly clear that he was orderly beyond the others; and when he presided in the assemblies he did not turn over a vote to the demos contrary to the laws, but together with the laws he opposed an onset of the demos so great that I don't think any other human being would have endured it.

And when the Thirty commanded him to do something contrary to the laws he did not obey. For when they forbade conversing with the young, and when they commanded him and some others to lead away one of the citizens to be put to death, he alone did not obey due to the fact that they were commanding him to do what was contrary to the laws.

And when he was a defendant against the indictment brought by Meletus—although the others are accustomed in the law courts to converse with the jurors in such a way as to gratify them and to flatter them and to beg them contrary to the laws, and although many are often let go by the jurors due to these sorts of things—he for his part wanted to do none of the customary things in the law court contrary to the laws; but, although he would have easily secured his release by the jurors if he had done any of these things even to a limited extent, he chose rather to die abiding by the laws than to live transgressing them.

And while he often spoke in this manner with others too, I know that he once also had a conversation of the following sort about justice with Hippias the Elean. For when Hippias came to Athens after an interval of time, he was present when Socrates was saying to some people that it was a wonder that, while one who wishes to have someone taught shoemaking, building, smithing, or horsemanship is not perplexed as to where he would send him to obtain it—and some say that for one who wishes to have even a horse or cow made just, all places are full of teachers—but if one wishes either oneself to learn justice or to have one's son or household servant taught it, he doesn't know where to go to obtain this.

And after listening to these things, Hippias said, as though making fun of him, "Are you, Socrates, still saying the same things that I myself once heard from you a long time ago?"

And Socrates said, "And what is even more terrible than this, Hippias—I not only say always the same things but even say them about the same things. But you, perhaps, due to your great learning, never say the same things about the same things."

"By all means," he said, "I try always to say something new."

"Even about the things you understand?" he said. "For example, if someone asks you how many and which letters are in 'Socrates,' do you try to say different things now from what you said before? Or to those who ask regarding numbers whether twice five is ten, don't you give the same answer now as you did before?"

"About these things, Socrates," he said, "I too always say the same things, just as you do. About justice, however, I altogether think that I am now able to say something against which neither you nor anyone else would be able to speak."

"By Hera," he said, "great is the good you're saying that you have found, if jurors will cease being divided in their votes; citizens will cease contradicting one another, bringing lawsuits, and forming factions concerning the just things; the cities will cease disagreeing about the just things and going to war. And, for my part, I don't know how I could leave before hearing you, who has found a good of such magnitude."

“But, by Zeus,” he said, “you will not hear—at least, not before you yourself declare what you hold justice to be. For it is enough that you ridicule the others by asking and refuting everyone, while you yourself do not want to render an account to anyone or to declare your judgment about anything.”

“What’s this, Hippias?” he said. “Have you not perceived that I never stop showing what things are just in my opinion?”

“And what sort is this speech of yours?” he said.

“If not by speech,” he said, “I show it rather by deed. Or is it not your opinion that one’s deed is more worthy testimony than one’s speech?”

“Far more, by Zeus,” he said. “For many who say just things do unjust ones, while no one who does just things would be unjust.”

“Have you ever perceived me, then, either bearing false witness or making a false accusation or casting friends or cities into civil faction or doing anything else unjust?”

“No, I have not, for my part,” he said.

“And don’t you believe that refraining from the unjust things is just?”

“It is clear, Socrates,” he said, “that even now you are attempting to escape showing your judgment, whatever you hold justice to be. For you are saying not what the just do, but what they don’t do.”

“But, for my part,” said Socrates, “I thought, that not wanting to do injustice was a sufficient display of justice. But if you don’t have the same opinion, examine whether the following pleases you more. For I say that the lawful is just.”

“Are you saying, Socrates, that the same thing is both lawful and just?”

“I am, for my part,” he said.

“For I do not perceive what sort of thing you are saying is lawful and what sort is just.”

“Do you know laws of a city?” he said.

“I certainly do,” he said.

“And which do you hold these are?”

“What the citizens agreed upon and wrote as to what one must do and refrain from.”

“Would, then,” he said, “one who partakes of political life according to these be lawful, and one who transgresses them be lawless?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“Accordingly, would the one obeying these do just things, and the one disobeying them do unjust ones?”

“Certainly.”

“Then the one who does the just things is just, and the one who does the unjust things is unjust?”

“How could it not be the case?”

“Then the lawful one is just, and the lawless one is unjust.”

And Hippias said, “Socrates, how could anyone believe that laws or the obedience to them are a serious matter, when the very

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people who set them down often change them, having rejected them after scrutiny?”

“War, too,” said Socrates, “the cities have often begun only to make peace again.”

“Yes indeed,” he said.

“Do you think, then, that you behave differently,” he said, “in disparaging those who obey the laws, because the laws might be repealed, than if you would find fault with those who were orderly in wars, because peace might come to pass? Or do you also cast blame on those who eagerly bring aid to their fatherlands in wars?”

“By Zeus, I certainly do not,” he said.

“Have you observed,” said Socrates, “that Lycurgus the Lacedemonian would have made Sparta no different from the other cities, had he not produced in it a special obedience to the laws? And don’t you know that the best rulers in the cities are those who are most responsible for their citizens’ being obedient to the laws, and that a city in which the citizens are especially obedient to the laws lives the best during peace and is the most difficult to withstand in war?

“Furthermore, concord is the greatest good in the cities’ opinion; and both the elder councils of the cities and the best men most often exhort the citizens to live in concord; and everywhere in Greece it is established law that the citizens take an oath that they will live in concord, and everywhere they take this oath. And I, for my part, think that these things come about, not so that the citizens should decide in favor of the same choruses, nor so that they should praise the same flute players, nor so that they should choose the same poets, nor so that they should take pleasure in the same things, but so that they should obey the laws. For when their citizens abide by these, the cities become strongest and happiest; but without concord neither would a city be well governed nor a household nobly managed.

“As for the individual, how would one be less penalized by a city, and how honored more, than if he should obey the laws? And how would one be defeated less in the law courts, or how would one win there more? And whom would someone trust more to keep for him wealth or sons or daughters? And whom would the whole city believe more worthy of trust than one who is lawful? And from whom more than him would parents or relatives or household servants or friends or citizens or strangers obtain the just things? And whom would enemies trust more in armistices or truces or treaties concerning peace? And with whom more than with one who is lawful would people want to become allies? And whom would the allies more entrust with leadership, or with command of garrisons, or with cities? And from whom would someone suppose that he is more likely to receive gratitude when he has done him a good deed than from the one who is lawful? Or for whom is someone more likely to do a good deed than for one from whom he holds that he

will receive gratitude? And with whom would someone wish more to be a friend, or less to be an enemy, than with such a one? And against whom would someone be less likely to wage war than one with whom he most wishes to be a friend, and least an enemy, and with whom very many people wish to be friends and allies and very few enemies and opponents in war?

"For my part, then, Hippias, I show the same thing to be both lawful and just. But if you judge'*' the opposite to be the case, you teach it."

And Hippias said, "But, by Zeus, Socrates, I don't, in my opinion, judge the opposite of what you have said about justice to be the case."

"Do you know any unwritten laws, Hippias?" he said.

"Those, at any rate, held as law in the same way in every land,"

he said.

"Would you be able to say, then," he said, "that human beings set them down?"

"Indeed, how?" he said. "At any rate, they would not all be able to assemble, nor do they speak the same language."

"Who, then, do you hold to have set down these laws?"

"I, for my part," he said, "think that gods set down these laws for human beings. For indeed among all human beings the first thing held as law is to revere gods."

"And so, is honoring one's parents also held everywhere as law?"

"This too," he said.

"Accordingly, also that parents are not to have intercourse with their children, nor children with their parents?"

"This is no longer a god's law, in my opinion, Socrates," he said.

"Why?" he said.

"Because," he said, "I perceive that some transgress it."

"Indeed they break many other laws as well," he said, "but those who transgress the laws laid down by the gods pay a penalty that a human being is unable to escape in any way, as some who transgress the laws laid down by human beings escape paying the penalty, either by going unnoticed or by using violence."

"And what penalty, Socrates," he said, "are parents who have intercourse with their children, and children who do so with their parents, unable to escape?"

"The greatest one, by Zeus," he said. "For what greater penalty might human beings suffer when they beget offspring than to beget badly?"

"How, then, do these beget offspring badly," he said, "when nothing prevents their being good themselves and begetting children with those who are good?"

"Because, by Zeus," he said, "not only should those who beget children with each other be good, but their bodies should also be in their prime; or is it your opinion that the seed of those in their prime is like that of those not yet in their prime or past their prime?"

"But, by Zeus," he said, "it is not plausible that it is."

"Which, then, is better?" he said.

“Clearly,” he said, “the seed of those in their prime.”

“Then the seed of those not in their prime is not sound?”

“It is not plausible, by Zeus,” he said.

“And so, one should not beget children in this manner, at any rate.”

“Certainly not,” he said.

“Accordingly, do those, at least, who beget in this manner beget as they should not?”

“Certainly, in my opinion,” he said.

“Who else, then,” he said, “would beget children badly, if not these at least?”

“I agree with you in this too,” he said.

“What about this? Is it not lawful everywhere to do good in return to those who treat one well?”

“It is lawful,” he said, “but this too is transgressed.”

“Accordingly, do those who transgress this also pay the penalty, since they come to be bereft of good friends and are compelled to pursue those who hate them? Or aren’t good friends the ones who treat well those who deal with them; while those who don’t return favors to these sorts are hated by them due to their ingratitude, yet they pursue them most because it is these sorts whom it profits one most to deal with?”

“By Zeus, Socrates,” he said, “all these things befit gods.’ For, that the laws themselves contain the punishments for those who transgress them comes, in my opinion, from a better than human legislator.”

“Which, then, Hippias, do you believe: that the gods legislate the just things or things other than the just things?”

“Not other things, by Zeus,” he said. “For scarcely anyone else at any rate would legislate the just things, if not a god.”

“Then it pleases the gods too, Hippias, that the same thing is both just and lawful.”

By saying and doing such things he made those who were near him more just.

Chapter 5

I shall now say how he also made his companions more skilled in taking action. For, holding that it is good for continence to be present in one who intends to do anything noble, first he made it visible to his companions that he, most of all human beings, had trained himself; then, when he conversed, he turned his companions most of all toward continence.

He himself, then, always spent his time recalling the things useful for virtue, and reminding all his companions of them. And I know that once with Euthydemus too he had a conversation about continence of the following sort. “Tell me, Euthydemus,” he said, “do you hold that freedom is a noble and grand possession for a man and a city?”

“As noble and grand as can be, in fact,” he said.

“Whoever, then, is ruled by the pleasures that come through the body and is on account of them unable to do what is best—do you hold this one to be free?”

“Least of all,” he said.

“For perhaps it appears to you that it belongs to one who is free to do what is best, and so you hold that to have those who will prevent one from doing this belongs to a person lacking freedom?”

“Altogether so,” he said.

“Then in your opinion the incontinent lack freedom altogether?”

“And suitably so, by Zeus.”

“In your opinion, are the incontinent only prevented from doing what is most noble, or are they also compelled to do what is most shameful?”

“In my opinion,” he said, “they are no less compelled to do the latter things than they are prevented from doing the former.”

“What sort of masters do you believe prevent what is best, and compel what is worst?”

‘The worst possible ones, by Zeus,” he said.

“And what sort of slavery do you hold to be the worst?”

“For my part, that under the worst masters,” he said.

“Then are the incontinent enslaved in the worst slavery?”

“In my opinion, at least,” he said.

“As for wisdom, the greatest good, isn’t it your opinion that, in debarring human beings from it, incontinence casts them into the opposite of wisdom? Or isn’t it your opinion that in dragging toward what is pleasant incontinence prevents turning one’s mind to the beneficial things and learning them; and, often driving the wits from those who perceive what is good and bad, it makes them choose the worse instead of the better?”

“This happens,” he said.

“As for moderation, to whom, Euthydemus, would we say that it belongs less than to the one who is incontinent? For surely the works of moderation and incontinence are the very opposite.”

“I agree with this too,” he said.

“As for being attentive to what it is fitting to attend to, do you think that anything prevents one from this more than incontinence?”

“No, I don’t, for my part,” he said.

“And do you think there is anything worse for a human being than what makes one choose the harmful in place of the beneficial and persuades one to attend to the former, while neglecting the latter, and compels one to do the opposite of what the moderate do?”

“Nothing,” he said.

“Is it plausible, accordingly, that continence is the cause of the opposite of what incontinence causes in human beings?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“And so, is it plausible that what causes the opposite things is best?”

“It is, indeed, plausible,” he said.

“Does it seem, then, Euthydemus,” he said, “that continence is best for a human being?”

“Suitably so, Socrates,” he said.

“But have you ever pondered the following, Euthydemus?” he said.

“What?” he said.

“That incontinence is unable to lead even to those things that are all that opinion supposes it leads human beings to, the pleasures, while it is continence most of all that makes them experience pleasure.”

“How?” he said.

“Incontinence prevents one from experiencing any pleasure worth mentioning from the things that are the most necessary and frequent. For it does not allow one patiently to endure either hunger or thirst or sexual desire or sleeplessness; and it is only in this way that one can pleasurably eat and drink as well as engage in sex or pleasurably rest and sleep—that is, by waiting and bearing up until these things become as pleasant as possible. But continence, the only thing that makes one patiently endure the things mentioned, is also the only thing that makes one experience pleasures worth recalling from the things mentioned.”

“You speak altogether truly,” he said.

“Moreover, as regards learning anything noble and good and attending to any of these sorts of things—things through which one would nobly direct one’s own body and nobly manage one’s own household and become beneficial to friends and city and overpower enemies, and which afford not only benefits but also very great pleasures—those who are continent enjoy the benefits that come from doing these things, while the incontinent have no share in any of them. To whom would we say such things belong less than to the one least permitted to do them, in that he is held fast by his eagerness for the nearest pleasures?”

“In my opinion, Socrates,” he said, “you are saying that no virtue at all belongs to a man who is overcome by the pleasures that come through the body.”

“For how, Euthydemus,” he said, “does an incontinent human being differ from the most ignorant beast? How would one who does not examine what is best, but seeks in every way to do what is most pleasant, differ from the most thoughtless cattle? Rather, it is possible only for the continent to examine the best of the things and, by separating them in speech and deed according to classes, to choose the good things while refraining from the bad.”

And he said that in this manner men become best and happiest as well as most able to converse. And he said also that conversing was named from the collective deliberation of those who come together and separate the things according to class;

and that one should accordingly try to prepare oneself as much as possible to be ready for this and attend to this most; for from this men become best and most fit for leading as well as most skilled in conversing.

Chapter 6

I shall now attempt to tell also how he also made his companions more skilled in conversing. For Socrates held that those who knew what each of the beings is would also be able to explain this to the others. And he said that it was no wonder at all that those who didn't know faltered themselves and made others falter. For these reasons he never ceased examining with' his companions what each of the beings is. It would be a lot of work, then, to go through all things as he defined them. But I will tell some in which I think his manner of examination will be clear.

First, regarding piety, he examined it somewhat as follows. "Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "what sort of thing do you hold piety to be?"

And he said, "The noblest sort, by Zeus,"

"Are you able, then, to say what sort of person the pious one is?"

"In my opinion," he said, "one who honors the gods."

"Is it permitted to honor the gods in whatever manner one wishes?"

"No, but there are laws in accordance with which one should honor the gods."

"And so, would the one who knows these laws know how one should honor the gods?"

"I, at least, think so," he said.

"Now, the one who knows how one should honor the gods does not think that one should do this in any way other than as he knows?"

"Certainly not," he said.

"Does anyone honor gods in a way other than as he thinks one should?"

"I don't think so," he said.

"Then the one who knows what is lawful concerning the gods would honor the gods lawfully?"

"Certainly," he said.

"And so, does the one at least who honors lawfully honor as one should?"

"How would this not be the case?" he said.

"And the one who honors as one should is pious?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Then the one who knows what is lawful concerning the gods would correctly be defined by us as pious?"

"In my opinion, at any rate," he said.

"Then is it permitted to deal with human beings in any manner someone may wish?"

“No, but also regarding these, the one who knows what is lawful—in accordance with which people should deal with one another—would be lawful.”

“And so, do those who deal with one another in accordance with what is lawful, deal with one another as one should?”

“How could this not be the case?” he said.

“Accordingly, do those who deal with human beings as one should, deal with them nobly?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“And so, do those who deal with human beings nobly engage nobly in human affairs?”

“It is plausible,” he said.

“Accordingly, those who are obedient to the laws—these do what is just?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“Do you know what sort of things are called just?” he said.

“The things that the laws bid,” he said.

“Then do those who do what the laws bid, do both what is just and what one should?”

“How could this not be the case?”

“And so, are those just who do what is just?”

“For my part, I think so,” he said.

“Now do you think that any obey the laws without knowing what the laws bid?”

“For my part, I don’t,” he said.

“Do you think, then, that any of those who know what one should do think that they should not do these things?”

“I don’t think so,” he said,

“Do you know any who do other than what they think they should?”

“For my part, I don’t,” he said.

“Then those who know what is lawful concerning human beings—these do what is just?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“And so, are those just who do what is just?”

“Who else?” he said.

“Would we ever define correctly, then, in defining as just those who know what is lawful concerning human beings?”

“In my opinion, at least,” he said.

“As for wisdom, what would we say it is? Tell me, are the wise, in your opinion, wise in what they understand, or are some wise in what they do not understand?”

“Clearly in what they understand,” he said, “for how could one be wise in what he doesn’t understand?”

“Are the wise, then, wise by dint of understanding?”

“For how else would someone be wise,” he said, “if not by dint of understanding?”

“Do you think that wisdom is anything other than that by dint of which people are wise?”

“For my part, I don’t.”

“Then understanding is wisdom?”

“In my opinion, at least,” he said.

“Now in your opinion is a human being able to understand all the beings?”’

“By Zeus, not even a small part of them, in my opinion.”

“It is not possible, then, for a human being to be wise in everything?”

“By Zeus, surely not,” he said.

“What each person understands, then, is that in which he is also wise?”

“In my opinion, at least.”

“Now, Euthydemus, should one seek also in this manner what is good?”

“How?” he said.

“In your opinion, is the same thing beneficial to all?”

“Not in my opinion, at least,” he said.

“What about this? Isn’t it your opinion that what is beneficial to one is sometimes harmful to another?”

“Yes, indeed,” he said.

“Would you say that anything is good other than what is beneficial?”

“For my part, I wouldn’t,” he said.

“Then is the beneficial good to whomever it is beneficial?”

“In my opinion,” he said.

“Would we be able to speak about the noble in any other way? Or is there something you call noble—whether a body or an implement or anything else whatsoever—that you know is noble for everything?”

“By Zeus, for my part, I don’t,” he said.

“Then is it noble to use each thing for what it may be useful for?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“Is each thing noble for anything other than what it is noble to use it for?”

“Not for a single other thing,” he said.

“Then is what is useful noble for whatever it is useful?”

“In my opinion, at least,” he said.

“As for courage, Euthydemus, do you hold that it is among the noble things?”

“For my part, I hold that it is very noble indeed,” he said.

“Then you hold that courage is useful not for the least important things?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “for the most important, certainly.”

“Now, regarding the terrible and risky things, is it useful in your opinion to be ignorant of them?”

“Least of all,” he said.

“Then those who aren’t frightened by such things because they don’t know what they are, aren’t courageous?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “in that way, at any rate, many both of the mad and of the cowardly would be courageous.”

“And what about those who are afraid even of things that are not terrible?”

“Even less, by Zeus,” he said.

“Do you believe, then, that those who are good regarding the terrible and risky things are courageous, while those who are bad are cowardly?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“Do you hold any others to be good regarding such things than those who are able to deal with them nobly?”

“No, rather these,” he said.

“Then you hold as bad the sort who deal with) them badly?”

“Who else?” he said.

“Does each sort, then, deal with them as they think one should?”

“How else?” he said.

“‘Do those, then, who are unable to deal with them nobly know how one should deal with them?”

“Perhaps not,” he said.

“Those who know how one should deal with them—are these, then, also able to?”

“Only these,” he said.

“What about this? Do those who are not mistaken about them deal with things of this sort badly?”

“I don’t think so,” he said.

“Then those who deal with them badly are mistaken about them?”

“It is plausible, at any rate,” he said.

“Those who understand how nobly to deal with the terrible and risky things are courageous, then, and those who are mistaken about this are cowardly?”

“They are, at least in my opinion,” he said.

He believed that kingship and tyranny were both types of rule, but he held that they differed from each other. For he believed that rule over the human beings who are willing and according to laws of the cities, was kingship, while rule over the unwilling and not according to laws, but however the ruler wished, was tyranny. And wherever ruling offices are filled from those who perfect the lawful, he held

that regime to be an aristocracy; and wherever on the basis of property assessments, a plutocracy; and wherever from all, a democracy.

If someone should contradict him about something without having anything clear to say, but claim without showing it that the one he mentioned himself was wiser or more skilled at political affairs or more courageous or anything else of the sort, he would bring the entire argument back to its hypothesis somewhat as follows:

"Do you assert that the one whom you praise is a better citizen than the one I praise?"

"I do indeed assert it."

"Why then didn't we examine first what a good citizen's work is?"

"Let's do this."

"In the management of wealth, accordingly, would he prevail who makes the city better provided with wealth?"

"Certainly."

"And in war indeed the one at any rate who makes it superior to its adversaries?"

"How could this not be the case?"

"And in diplomacy, is it whoever furnishes friends in place of enemies?"

"It is plausible, at any rate."

"And so, in public speaking as well, the one who puts an end to civil faction and produces in it concord?"

"In my opinion, at least."

When the arguments were brought back in this manner the truth became visible even to the contradictors themselves.

But whenever he went through something in argument (logos) by himself, he proceeded via what was most agreed upon, holding this to be safety in argument. Therefore, of those I know, he, when he spoke, produced by far the most agreement in his listeners. And he said that Homer, too, applied to Odysseus the attribute of being a safe orator on the grounds that he was competent to lead his arguments through the opinions of human beings.

Chapter 7

It is clear, then, from what has been said, in my opinion, that Socrates declared his own judgment simply to those who associated with him. I shall now tell how he was attentive also to their being self-sufficient in the activities that were fit for them. For, of all those I know, he was most concerned with knowing what any of his companions had understanding of. And he taught most eagerly of all whatever he himself knew of the things it is fitting for a man who is a gentleman (noble and good) to know. And whatever he himself lacked experience in, he led them to those who understood it.

He taught also how far one who has been correctly educated should be experienced in each matter. For example, he said that one should learn geometry up to the point of being competent, if there should ever be need, to receive or to transfer or to apportion land by correctly measuring it, or to assign work. And he said that this was so easy to learn that the one who turned his mind to measuring would know how much land there was and at the same time go away understanding how it is measured.

But he disapproved of learning geometry as far as the diagrams that are hard to comprehend. For what benefit these might have, he said he did not see (and yet he did not lack experience of them), and he said that they were sufficient to exhaust the life of a human being and to hinder one from many other beneficial studies.

He bid them also to become experienced in studying the stars—in this too, however, up to the point of being able to judge the time of night, month, and year, for the sake of traveling, sailing, and guarding, and as for the other things that are done by night or by month or by year to have marks to use in distinguishing the periods of the things mentioned. And he said that these things were easy to learn from night hunters and ship pilots as well as many others whose concern it is to know them.

But he turned them strongly away from learning astronomy as far as knowing also the beings that do not keep to the same path of revolution, both the planets and the unstable stars, or exhausting themselves by seeking their distances from the earth, their orbits, and the causes of these things. For he said that he did not see any benefit in these things either (and yet even in these he was not uninstructed), and he said that they too were sufficient to exhaust the life of a human being and to hinder one from many beneficial things.

And he turned one away wholly from becoming a worrier about the way in which the god contrives each of the heavenly things. For he held that these things are not discoverable by human beings, and he believed that the one who sought what the gods did not wish to make clear would not gratify them. And he said that the one who was anxious about these things ran the risk of going out of his mind no less than Anaxagoras went out of his mind, he who took the greatest pride in explaining the contrivances of the gods.

For when he said that fire and sun were the same thing he was ignorant of the fact that human beings easily gaze upon the fire but are unable to look directly at the sun; and that those who have the sun shine upon them have darker skin, but not those who have fire shine on them. And he was ignorant also of the fact that none of the things growing from the earth could nobly increase in size without the sun's ray, but that they all perish when heated by fire. And when he asserted that the sun is a glowing stone he was ignorant also of this, that a stone in fire neither shines nor holds out for a long time, while the sun persists through all time while shining most brightly of all.

He bade them also to learn calculations. And in these, similarly to the others, he bade them to be on their guard against vain involvement in the matter, but as

far as what was beneficial, he himself both examined and went through everything with his companions.

He also vehemently turned his companions toward attending to their health by learning from those who know how, as much as was possible, and by each one turning his mind to himself through his whole life, that is, to which food or which drink or what sort of labor was to his advantage and how he might live most healthfully by making use of these things. For he said that someone who turned his mind toward himself in this way would have to work to find a doctor who discerned better than himself what was advantageous for his health.

And if someone wished to be benefited more than in accord with human wisdom, his advice was to attend to divination. For he said that one who knows those things through which the gods give signs to human beings about their affairs would never be bereft of the advice of gods.

Chapter 8

And if someone thinks that he was proven to be lying about the divine thing, since he was condemned to death by the jurors although he claimed that the divine thing signified to him beforehand what he should and should not do, let him reflect first that he was already at the time so far advanced in age that his life would have ended not much later, even if not then; and next, that he left behind both the part of life that is most burdensome and in which everyone diminishes in their power of thought and that, in place of this, he acquired additional fame by displaying the strength of his soul, both by stating his case most truthfully, most freely, and most justly of all human beings and by bearing his condemnation to death most gently and most courageously.

For it is agreed that no human being within memory has borne death more nobly. For it was necessary for him to live thirty days after the judgment—due to the Delian festival being during that month and the law allowing no one to be put to death by the public until the mission returned from Delos—and during this time he was visible to all his acquaintances living in no way other than during the previous time. And yet previously, of all human beings, he was most admired for living in good spirits and contentedly.

And how could someone die more nobly than in this manner? Or what sort of death would be more noble than the death one dies most nobly? What sort of death would be happier than the most noble? Or what sort would be dearer to the gods than the happiest?

I shall tell also what I heard about him from Hermogenes the son of Hipponicus. For he said that after Meletus had already entered the charge against him and he himself heard him conversing about everything other than the trial, he said to him that he should be examining what his defense would be. At first, he said, “Haven’t I been practicing this all my life, in your opinion?” And when he asked him, “How?” he said that he had continuously done nothing other than thoroughly examine what the just and the unjust things are, while doing the just and refraining from the unjust—which he held to be the noblest practice for a defense.

And, once again, he himself said, “Don’t you see, Socrates, that the Athenian jurors, when annoyed by speech, have already put to death many who committed no injustice and released many who did commit injustice?”

“But, by Zeus, Hermogenes,” he said, “I have already attempted to worry about my defense to the jurors, but the divine thing opposed it.”

And he himself said, “You say things to be marveled at.”

He said, “Do you marvel if it is better in the god’s opinion that

I end my life now? Don’t you know that up to this time I, for my part, would not have yielded to any human being that he lived either a better or more pleasant life than mine? For I think that those live best who best attend to becoming as good as possible, and that those live most pleasantly who most perceive that they are becoming better.

“These things I, for my part, perceived up to this time befalling me, and, encountering the other human beings and comparing myself to the others, I have continued in this judgment about myself. And not only I, but my friends also continue to judge likewise about me, not because they love me (for those who love the others could also make the same judgment about their own friends), but for the very reason that they think that by being in my company they themselves, too, would become best.

“But if I should live longer, perhaps it will be necessary to pay the price of old age, both seeing and hearing less, and thinking more poorly, and ending by being less capable of learning and more forgetful, and becoming worse in the things at which I was better before. Moreover, for one who did not perceive these things life would not be worth living, while for one who did perceive them, how could it not be necessary that he live worse and more unpleasantly?

“Moreover, if indeed I will die unjustly, this would be shameful for those who killed me unjustly. For if committing injustice is shameful, how is it not shameful as well to do anything whatsoever unjustly? But, for me, what is shameful in the inability of others to judge or to do what is just concerning me?

“And, for my part, I see also that the opinion held of the human beings who have come before, among those who come after, is not alike for those who have committed injustice and for those who suffered injustice. And know that I shall indeed obtain attentiveness from human beings, even if I die now, which is not the same as there will be for those who kill me. For I know that it will always be witnessed on my behalf that I, for my part, never committed an injustice against any human being, nor made one worse, but that I always tried to make my companions better.”

These were the sort of things he conversed about both with Hermogenes and with the others.

Of those who knew Socrates—what sort he was—all who desired virtue even now still continue to long for him most of all, on the grounds that he was most beneficial with regard to attending to virtue. In my opinion, to be sure, inasmuch as he was such as I have described—so pious as to do nothing without the gods’

judgment; so just as to harm no one, not even a little, and to benefit to the greatest extent those who dealt with him; so continent as never to choose what was more pleasant in place of what was better; so prudent as not to make mistakes in deciding what was better and worse, nor to need another in addition, but to be self-sufficient in his judgment of these matters; and competent also to say and to define such things in speech; and competent as well to test others and to refute them when they made mistakes, and to turn them toward virtue and gentlemanliness (nobility and goodness)—he was such as a most good and happy man would be. And if these things do not please someone, let him decide by comparing the character of others with these things.

XENOPHON

MEMORABILIA • OECONOMICUS

TRANSLATED BY

E. C. MARCHANT

SYMPOSIUM • APOLOGY

TRANSLATED BY

O. J. TODD

REVISED BY JEFFREY HENDERSON

2013

PREFACE

The Loeb edition of Xenophon's Socratic works by E. C. Marchant and O. J. Todd, first published in 1923, has stood up well, but the time has come to modernize its translations — which now seem thoroughly dated not only in style but also in their decorum, unavoidable in that era, as regards frank reference to (homo)sexuality and pederasty — and to update the texts, introductions, and bibliography in light of current scholarship. I hope that this revision will help freshen the appeal of an author still too little read and appreciated as a Socratic.

JJH

January 2013

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

LIFE

Xenophon of Athens lived through a very significant period in history — from the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War ca. 430 to at least 355, when Philip of Macedon had begun to encroach upon Greece — and is one of its most important and versatile witnesses. He is often an original writer, in the fields of war memoir, history (both documentary and romantic), biography, philosophy, and political and military science, and an enlightened and progressive exponent of the important ideas of his era, who could draw upon an exceptionally broad range of interests, experiences, and acquaintances.

The son of Gryllus of the rural deme Erchia, Xenophon was at least well enough off that he could serve in the cavalry from boyhood, and his associations, Athenian and foreign, suggest that he belonged to the highest economic class. Certainly in his life and writings, he exemplified the social and political attitudes characteristic of Athenians from refined landowning families with inherited wealth who eschewed politics and (other) banausic occupations. Although Xenophon may have acquired his evident affection for farming and estate management in boyhood, he must have spent many of his first thirty years in the city as a result of the Spartan investment of the countryside during the years 431-425 and 413-403.

After the war, Xenophon (along with the cavalry as a whole) seems to have supported the oligarchic regime of the so-called Thirty Tyrants (though like Plato he was not uncritical of their excesses) and perhaps even fought against the democratic forces under Thrasybulus and Anytus (one of Socrates' accusers) who restored the democracy in 403; if so, he would have been protected by the amnesty. But still, he could not have felt secure, and in less than two years he had left Athens on the invitation of the Boeotian Proxenus, an "old friend,"

who invited him to join the Persian prince Cyrus in a campaign intended to undermine the new king, Cyrus' brother Artaxerxes. Xenophon reports that Socrates had urged caution on the grounds that "becoming a friend of Cyrus might open him to accusations on the part of the city because Cyrus was thought to have given the Spartans enthusiastic support in the war against Athens". This may indeed have caused Xenophon's exile, declared at some point after his departure, unless the cause was his support of Agesilaus in the defeat of a coalition including Athens at the battle of Coroneia in 394.

Cyrus' plot soon collapsed (at Cunaxa in 401), but in coping with the aftermath Xenophon became a military commander, helping to lead his ten thousand Greeks back to Europe, and thereafter served as a mercenary with the Thracian Seuthes, the Spartan commanders Thibron and Dercylidas, and with King Agesilaus of Sparta, of whom he wrote an idealizing biography. These adventures are recounted in Anabasis and Hellenica Graeca.

For his services Xenophon was appointed Spartan proxenos at Olympia and awarded a home nearby, at Scillous in Triphylia, where he settled in 394, built a fine estate funded by his Asian booty, and raised his twin sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, in the Spartan system (cf. Constitution of the Spartans), living the life of the gentleman farmer described in Oeconomicus and writing; the games provided a convenient venue for meeting and making acquaintances from every part of the Greek world. He stayed on at Scillous until 371, when after the Spartan defeat at Leuctra, Elis recovered Triphylia, forcing Xenophon to flee to Corinth.

According to Diogenes Laertius, Xenophon remained in Corinth for the rest of his life, but it is possible that he returned to Athens or at least visited regularly: after Leuctra, Athens and Sparta were joined by common hostility to Thebes, and both Xenophon's sons fought as cavalrymen with the

Athenians at Mantinea in 362, Gryllus dying a hero's death, which was commemorated by Athens in a painting by Euphranor, still visible in Pausanias' day, located in the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, a popular meeting place in the agora where Xenophon stages Socrates' discussion with Ischomachus in Oeconomicus. To this period belong also the treatises on horsemanship and cavalry command, perhaps written in connection with his sons' service, and (not earlier than 355) Ways and Means (Vectigalia), which offers economic advice to the Athenians along the lines of the policies of the leading Athenian statesman of the time, Eubulus. If Xenophon did return to Athens (with his exile lifted), it may have been around 366, when Athenian relations with Corinth had soured.

SOCRATIC WORKS

From 413 until his departure from Athens in 401, the young Xenophon had ample time to get to know Socrates and other members of Socrates' retinue, including Plato, though Plato never (and Xenophon only once) mentions his own active participation in their conversations. Unlike Plato, who devoted his life to carrying on the master's mission and was first and foremost a philosopher and teacher, Xenophon was a practical man of affairs and a writer with many other interests. Nevertheless, his four Socratic works earned him the reputation in antiquity as second only to Plato as a Socratic, and as more a philosopher than a historian.

Socrates' condemnation in 399 at about seventy years of age was soon followed by literary works, mainly philosophical dialogues based on his life, conversations, and thought, written by those who knew him, not only by the two extant Socratics, Xenophon (the first, according to Diogenes Laertius) and Plato, but also by (among others) Aeschines of Sphettus,

Antisthenes, Lysias, Crito, Phaedo, Aristippus, and perhaps Hermogenes. Because Socrates never committed anything to writing, we depend for our information about his life and thought entirely on what survives of or is traceable to these works, together with the unflattering caricature in Aristophanes' comedy Clouds and other comedies produced during Socrates' lifetime.

These works agree on the sort of basic details whose verisimilitude anyone who had known Socrates would expect and none would dispute, for example his distinctive and unconventional appearance, personality, and mannerisms; his visibility both in the streets and, though poor and threadbare, in the houses of the wealthy; his fondness for conversing with well-to-do young men who sought out his company; and the method of his conversations, which are dialectic, elenctic, and maieutic, employ humor, irony, and paradox, and illustrate the two principal inventions attributed to him by Aristotle (Metaphysics), inductive reasoning and general definition. Beyond such superficial features, however, there are great divergences in the Socratics' recreations of what Socrates said and thought, and these cannot be resolved by trying to determine which witness is more or less accurate, or which alternatives are true or faithful and which false or misunderstood. The Socratics cannot help us recover the "actual" Socrates, because their purposes transcend the merely documentary: they aimed not merely to prove the falseness of the charges brought against Socrates in court, together with the public image that had lent those charges credibility, but also to portray him as intellectually, spiritually, and morally the very best of men and to demonstrate that his associates — even men like Callias, Charmides, Lycon, and Alcibiades — were only improved and never harmed or misguided while in his company. Thus,

Socrates was to be remembered as a good man, a blameless citizen, and a great teacher.

To the latter end both Plato and Xenophon extended the memorializing and apologetic project by adding didactic dimensions (long speeches or demonstrations, passive interlocutors), each developing the implications of his recollections beyond where the master might have taken them. And so while Aristotle views the Socratic dialogues as essentially mimetic and thus as a kind of poetry akin to mimes, they also owed something to the ancient wisdom tradition, in which ethical and-or practical advice or instruction is imparted by an older person or sage to a younger one. Inevitably, each Socratic portrait is built on its creator's own recollections and reflects his own priorities, definitions, and interpretations, sometimes as time went on in response (never explicitly acknowledged) to another Socratic's writings. Nor was their subject static or monolithic: Socrates cannot have remained intellectually uniform throughout a long life lived in an unusually dynamic time and place, nor was he doctrinaire, but rather interrogative, encouraging each of his many and various interlocutors to think and learn for himself.

Thus it is unsurprising that the practical and soldierly Xenophon would develop his portrait along different lines than the unworldly, aloof, and hyper-intellectual Plato. Xenophon's Socrates is down-to-earth, handy, and practical as well as philosophical and comfortable in any society, from gentlemen, the self-designated "good and beautiful" (*kaloi kagathoi*), to intellectuals, working men, and courtesans. Diogenes Laertius recounts that it was Socrates' interest in how men become *kaloi kagathoi* that first attracted Xenophon to him, and although Plato's Socrates denies having any interest in making money or running an estate, Xenophon's Socrates shows both interest and expertise in these subjects. In this

connection it is probably significant that the fragments and titles (e.g., Oeconomicus) of Antisthenes, Socrates' contemporary and longest-term companion, also suggest a Socrates interested in practical matters. No doubt Xenophon, like Plato, at times used Socrates as a vehicle for his own ideas, but we can never know how much in fact they had learned from him.

The dating of Xenophon's Socratic works can be only approximate: we have no precise information about where or how they were published; Xenophon often uses the same material in more than one work and revises or augments earlier work, sometimes over a long period of time; and when there are correspondences with Plato's works (whose dating is far from clear-cut either), priority cannot be established with certainty.

The Text

Marchant and Todd used the text of G. Sauppe (Tauchnitz: Leipzig, 1865-1867) with few modifications, and their text is retained in this revision, though it has been modified on an eclectic basis in light of more recent editions.

MEMORABILIA

INTRODUCTION

Memorabilia is not a complete account of Socrates but rather a collection of reminiscences about and conversations involving him, composed at different times and arranged in four parts. It is not worked into a coherent whole, but has only a general shape, the first book being primarily apologetic, the following books thematically more wide-ranging, the conclusion a recapitulation of Socrates' defense at trial, and an epilogue summarizing his virtues and usefulness.

BOOK 1

Chapters 1 and 2 defend Socrates against charges leveled both at his trial, which Xenophon could have known only by report (religious nonobservance, corrupting the young), and in Polycrates' Accusation, a speech for Anytus against Socrates published sometime, but presumably not long, after 393 (encouraging his companions to despise the laws, teaching Critias and Alcibiades how to subvert the democracy). In 3 the themes are trust in Delphi, frugality, and sexual self-control. In 4 Socrates talks with Aristodemus (who debunks sacrifice and divination) about divine providence in creating mankind. Socrates discourses on self-control in 5, and in 6 he answers the accusations of Antiphon the sophist that, being poor, he can teach only misery, that he is foolish to teach for free, and that his avoidance of politics makes him ineffective in counseling politicians. In 7 Socrates discourages pretensions in his companions.

BOOK 2

In chapter 1 Socrates resumes the topic of self-control, arguing with Aristippus (founder of the Cyrenaic school) for a plainer way of life and telling Prodicus' story of Heracles' Choice. In 2 and 3 Socrates rebukes his son Lamprocles for misbehavior toward his mother and brothers, in 4-6 discusses

the importance of friendship, and in 7-10 advises a series of acquaintances who are down on their luck.

BOOK 3

Socrates discusses leadership in chapters 1-7 with a series of commanders and would-be commanders, including the younger Pericles (general in 406), Glaucon, and Charmides. In 3.8-9 Aristippus reappears and argues about various topics. In 10 Socrates converses with a painter, a sculptor, and an armorer, while in 11 he converses with the courtesan Theodote as she poses for a painter. In 12 Socrates speaks about the importance of physical fitness, in 13 about keeping annoyance appropriate to the situation, and in 14 about etiquette at symposia.

BOOK 4

We are told in chapter 1 that Socrates benefits his companions both when he is earnest and when he is playful; that he was often in love, but with virtuous souls not mere bodies; and that he thought education benefits everyone, even the well-endowed. In 2 Socrates convinces the widely read Euthydemus that he does not know as much as he thinks and wins him as a follower, and in 3 he discusses divine providence with him. Socrates defines justice to Hippias in 4 as being the same as what is lawful, with an appeal (as in Apology 15) to the Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus. In 5-6 Euthydemus returns for instruction in discussion and definition, as examples analyzing several important goods for which knowledge is necessary, as well as in monarchy and despotism. In 7 Socrates claims that geometry, astronomy, and mathematics are worthwhile only insofar as they are useful, which study of the heavens can never be, as exemplified in the sad case of Anaxagoras. He also urges his companions to look after their health. Xenophon recapitulates in 8 (sometimes verbatim) his account of Socrates' defense in

Apology, that Socrates' divine voice did not fail him and that he had reached the proper time to die, and he ends the work with the brief but eloquent epilogue.

TEXT

The most important manuscripts are *Parisini graeci* 1302 (A) and 1740 (B), both late-thirteenth century, which derive from a lost ancient original, A directly and B from an intermediary. Several later manuscripts akin to B and deriving from a different intermediary are useful as a check on B and as a source of emendations from a scholarly revision of the text made in the fourteenth century. A few good readings and words missing from the manuscripts are supplied by testimonial sources and five papyri, the earliest (PHeid. 206) from ca. 280 BC (provenance unknown) and the latest (PCairo inv. 45622) from the fourth century AD (Oxyrhynchus). Detailed information about the tradition may be found in Bandini s Bude edition.

BOOK I

1. I have often wondered by what arguments those who drew up the indictment against Socrates could persuade the Athenians that he deserved to forfeit his life to the state. The indictment against him was to this effect: Socrates does wrong by not worshipping the gods worshipped by the state and of bringing in other novel divinities: he also does wrong by corrupting the young men.

First then, that he did not worship the gods worshipped by the state — what evidence did they produce of that? He often offered sacrifices, and made no secret of it, now in his home, now at the communal altars of the state, and he made use of divination with as little secrecy; indeed it had become notorious that Socrates claimed to be guided by his "divine sign": it was out of this claim, I think, that the charge of bringing in novel deities arose. He was no more bringing in anything novel than are others who practice divination and rely on augury, utterances, coincidences, and sacrifices. For these men's belief is not that the birds or the people met by accident know what profits the inquirer, but that they are the instruments by which the gods make this known; and that was Socrates' belief too. Only whereas most people say that the birds or the people they meet dissuade or encourage them, Socrates said what he meant: for he said that the divine sign was signaling him. Many of his companions were counseled by him to do this or not to do that in accordance with the warnings of the divine sign: and those who followed his advice prospered, and those who rejected it had cause for regret. And yet who would not admit that he wished to appear neither a fool nor a fraud to his companions? but he would have been thought both had he proved to be mistaken when he alleged that his counsel was in accordance with divine revelation. Obviously then, he would not have given the counsel if he had not been confident that what he said would come true. And

who could have inspired him with that confidence but a god? And since he had confidence in the gods, how can he have disbelieved in the existence of the gods? Another way he had of dealing with close friends was this: if there was no room for doubt, he advised them to act as they thought best; but if the consequences could not be foreseen, he sent them to the oracle to inquire whether the thing ought to be done. Those who intended to control estates or states, he said, needed the additional help of divination. For the craft of carpenter, smith, farmer or ruler, and the theory of such crafts, and arithmetic and economics and generalship might be learned and mastered by the application of human intelligence; but the deepest secrets of these matters the gods reserved to themselves; none were clear to men. You may plant a field well; but you know not who will gather the fruits: you may build a house well; but you know not who will dwell in it: able to command, you cannot know whether it is profitable to command: versed in statecraft, you know not whether it is profitable to guide the state: though, for your delight, you marry a pretty woman, you cannot tell whether she will bring you sorrow: though you form a party among men mighty in the state, you know not whether on their account you will be exiled from the state. Those who think that these matters are wholly within the grasp of the human mind and nothing in them is beyond our reason, they, he said, are the irrational ones, just as it is no less irrational to use divination in matters which human beings are permitted by the gods to decide for themselves through knowledge: to ask, for instance, Is it better to get an experienced coachman to drive my carriage or a man without experience? Is it better to get an experienced seaman to steer my ship or a man without experience? So too with what we may know by reckoning, measurement or weighing. To put such questions to the gods was, to his mind, to act improperly. In short, what the gods have granted us to

do by help of learning, we must learn; what is hidden from mortals we should try to find out from the gods by divination: for to those in their favor the gods give signals.

Moreover, Socrates lived ever in the open; for early in the morning he went to the public promenades and training grounds; in the forenoon he was seen in the market; and the rest of the day he passed just where most people were to be met: he was generally talking, and anyone might listen. Yet none ever knew him to offend against piety and religion in deed or word. He did not even discuss that topic so favored by other talkers, "the nature of the universe": and avoided speculation on the so-called Cosmos of the sophists, how it works, and on the laws that govern the phenomena of the heavens: indeed he would demonstrate that to trouble one's mind with such problems is sheer folly. In the first place, he would inquire, did these thinkers suppose that their knowledge of human affairs was so complete that they must seek these new fields for the exercise of their brains; or that it was their duty to neglect human affairs and consider only things divine? Moreover, he marveled at their blindness in not seeing that man cannot solve these riddles; since even the most conceited talkers on these problems did not agree in their theories, but behaved to one another like madmen. As some madmen have no fear of danger and others are afraid where there is nothing to be afraid of, as some will do or say anything in a crowd with no sense of shame, while others shrink even from going abroad among men, some respect neither temple nor altar nor any other sacred thing, others worship stones or pieces of wood or wild animals, so is it, he said, with those who worry about the nature of the universe. Some hold that What is, is one, others that it is infinite in number: some that all things are in perpetual motion, others that nothing can ever be moved at any time: some that all life is birth and decay, others that nothing could ever have been

born or will ever perish. Nor were those the only questions he asked about such theorists. Students of human nature, he said, think that they will apply their knowledge in due course for the good of themselves and any others they choose. Do those who pry into heavenly phenomena imagine that, once they have discovered the laws by which these are produced, they will create at their will winds, waters, seasons, and such things to their need? Or have they no such expectation but are satisfied merely to know the causes of these various phenomena?

Such, then, was his criticism of those who meddle with these matters. His own conversation was ever of human matters, investigating what is pious, what is impious; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just, what is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness; what is courage, what is cowardice; what is a state, what is a statesman; what is government, and what is a governor — these and others like them, knowledge of which made a gentleman, in his opinion, while ignorance could fairly be called slavishness.

So, in pronouncing on opinions of his that were unknown to them it is not surprising that the jury erred: but is it not astonishing that they should have ignored matters of common knowledge? For instance, when he was on the Council and had taken the counselor s oath by which he bound himself to give counsel in accordance with the laws, it fell to his lot to preside in the Assembly when the people wanted to execute nine generals, Thrasyllus and Erasinides and their colleagues, by a single vote. That was illegal, and he refused the motion in spite of popular rancor and the threats of many powerful persons. It was more to him that he should keep his oath than that he should humor the people in an unjust demand and shield himself from threats. For like most people he believed that the gods have a care for humankind, but with an important difference: whereas they think that the gods know

about some things but not others, Socrates thought that they know all things, our words and deeds and secret purposes; that they are present everywhere, and send signals to humans about all that concerns humankind.

So I wonder how the Athenians were ever persuaded that Socrates was a maverick as regards the gods, when he never said or did anything irreverent regarding gods, and his words and behavior regarding gods were the words and behavior of one who is, and is acknowledged to be, truly pious.

2. No less wonderful is it to me that some were convinced that Socrates corrupted the young men. In the first place, apart from what I have said, in control of his lusts and appetite he was the strongest of all men; further, in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute; and besides, his needs were so schooled to moderation that having very little he was yet very content. Such was his own character: how then can he have made others impious, criminal, gluttonous, lustful, or soft? On the contrary, he cured these vices in many, by putting into them a desire for goodness, and by giving them confidence that self-discipline would make them gentlemen. To be sure he never professed to teach this, but by letting his own light shine, he led his disciples to hope that through imitation of him they would develop likewise. Furthermore, he himself never neglected his body and reproved such neglect in others. Thus, overeating followed by overexertion he disapproved, but he approved of taking as much hard exercise as is agreeable to the soul; for the habit not only insured good health, but did not hamper the care of the soul. On the other hand, he disliked foppery and pretentiousness in the fashion of clothes or shoes or in behavior. Nor, again, did he encourage love of money in his associates. For while he checked their other desires, he would not make money himself out of their desire for his companionship. He held that this self-denying ordinance

insured his independence, whereas those who charged a fee for their society he denounced for selling themselves into slavery, since they were bound to converse with all from whom they could take the fee. He marveled that anyone who professed to teach virtue should charge a fee, failing to reflect that his highest reward would be the gain of a good friend and fearing that he who became a true gentleman would not feel deep gratitude for a benefit so great. Socrates indeed never promised any such thing to anyone; but he was confident that those of his associates who adopted his principles of conduct would throughout life be good friends to him and to one another. How, then, should such a man "corrupt the young men? Unless perhaps it is corruption to foster virtue.

But, said his accuser, he taught his companions to despise the established laws by calling it folly to appoint public officials by lot, when none would choose a pilot or builder or piper by lot, nor any other craftsman for work in which mistakes are far less disastrous than mistakes in statecraft. Such talk, he argued, led the young to despise the established constitution and made them violent. But I hold that they who cultivate prudence and think they will be able to guide the people in expedient policy never lapse into violence: they know that enmities and dangers are inseparable from violence, but persuasion produces the same results safely and amicably. For violence, by making its victims sensible of loss, excites their hatred: but persuasion, by seeming to confer a favor, wins goodwill. It is not, then, cultivation of prudence that leads to violent methods, but the possession of power without thought. Besides, many supporters are necessary to him who ventures to use force: but he who can persuade needs no confederate, having confidence in his own unaided power of persuasion. And such a man has no occasion to shed blood; for who would rather take a man's life than have a live and willing follower?

But, his accuser argued, having become associates of Socrates Critias and Alcibiades did a great deal of harm to the state. For Critias, of all involved in the oligarchy, bore the palm for greed and violence, while Alcibiades exceeded all in licentiousness and arrogance under the democracy. Now I have no intention of excusing the wrong these two did the state; but I will explain how they came to be with Socrates. Ambition was the very lifeblood of both: no Athenian was ever like them. They were eager to get control of everything and to outstrip every rival in celebrity. They knew that Socrates was living on very little, and yet was wholly independent; that he was strictly moderate in all his pleasures; and that in argument he could do what he liked with all who conversed with him. Seeing this and being such men as I have indicated, is it to be supposed that these two wanted to adopt the simple life of Socrates, and with this object in view sought his society? Did they not rather think that by associating with him they would attain the utmost proficiency in speech and action? For my part I believe that, had heaven granted them the choice between the life they saw Socrates leading and death, they would rather have died. Their conduct revealed their purpose; for as soon as they thought themselves superior to their fellow disciples they sprang away from Socrates and took to politics; it was for political ends that they had wanted Socrates.

But it may be answered: Socrates should have taught his companions self-control before politics. I do not deny it; but I find that all teachers show their disciples how they themselves practice what they teach, and persuade them by argument. And I know that it was so with Socrates: he showed his companions that he was a gentleman himself, and talked most excellently of goodness and of all things that concern human life. I know further that even those two controlled themselves so long as they were with Socrates, not from fear of fine or

blow, but because at that time they believed it was the best way to behave.

But many self-styled philosophers may reply: A just man can never become unjust; a prudent man can never become wanton; in fact, no one having learned any kind of knowledge can become ignorant of it. I do not hold with this view. I notice that as those who do not train the body cannot perform the functions proper to the body, so those who do not train the soul cannot perform the functions of the soul: for they cannot do what they ought to do nor avoid what they ought not to do. That is why fathers try to keep their sons, even if they are well behaved, out of bad company: for the society of honest men is a training in virtue, but the society of the bad is virtue s undoing. As one of the poets says:

From the good shall you learn good things; but if you mingle with the bad you shall lose even what wisdom you have.

And another says:

Ah, but a good man is at one time noble, at another base.

My testimony agrees with theirs; for I see that, just as poetry is forgotten unless it is often repeated, so instruction, when no longer heeded, fades from the mind. To forget good counsel is to forget the experiences that prompted the soul to desire self-control: and when those words are forgotten, it is not surprising that self-control itself is forgotten. I see also that men who take to drink or get involved in love affairs lose the power of caring about right conduct and avoiding wrong. For many who are careful with their money no sooner fall in love than they begin to waste it: and when they have spent it all, they no longer shrink from making more by methods which they formerly avoided because they thought them disgraceful. How then can it be impossible for one who was self-controlled to lose his self-control, for one who was capable

of just action to become incapable? To me indeed it seems that whatever is honorable, whatever is good in conduct is the result of training, and that this is especially true of self-control. For in the same body along with the soul are planted the pleasures which call to her: “Abandon self-control, and make haste to gratify us and the body.”

And indeed, it was thus with Critias and Alcibiades. So long as they were with Socrates, they found in him an ally who gave them strength to conquer their base passions.

But when they parted from him, Critias fled to Thessaly and began to associate with men who put lawlessness before justice; while Alcibiades, on account of his beauty, was hunted by many great ladies, and because of his influence at Athens and among her allies he was spoiled by many powerful men: and as athletes who gain an easy victory in the games are apt to neglect their training, so the honor in which he was held, the cheap triumph he won with the people, led him to neglect himself. Such was their fortune: and when to pride of birth, confidence in wealth, vainglory and much yielding to temptation were added corruption and long separation from Socrates, what wonder if they grew overbearing? For their wrongdoing, then, is Socrates to be called to account by his accuser? And does he deserve no word of praise for having controlled them in the days of their youth, when they would naturally be most reckless and licentious? Other cases, at least, are not so judged. For what piper or citharist or any other teacher, after making his pupils proficient, is blamed if they leave him for another teacher and then become less proficient? What father, whose son bears a good character so long as he is with one teacher but goes wrong after he has attached himself to another, throws the blame on the earlier teacher? Is it not true that the worse the boy turns out with the second, the higher is his father s praise of the first? Indeed, fathers themselves, living with their sons, are not held

responsible for their boys' wrongdoing if they are themselves well-behaved men. This is the test which should have been applied to Socrates too. If there was anything base in his own life, he might fairly have been thought vicious. But if his own conduct was always proper, how can he be fairly held to blame for the evil that was not in him?

Nevertheless, if he, although himself free of baseness, saw and approved of bad conduct in them, he would be open to censure. Well, when he found that Critias loved Euthydemus and was trying to use him in the way of those who enjoy carnal lust, he tried to restrain him by saying that it was servile and unbecoming in a gentleman to sue like a beggar to the object of his affection, whose good opinion he coveted, stooping to ask an extra favor and a no-good one at that. As Critias paid no heed whatever to this protest, Socrates, it is said, exclaimed in the presence of Euthydemus and many others, "Critias seems to have the feelings of a pig: he can no more keep away from Euthydemus than pigs can help rubbing themselves against stones." Now Critias bore a grudge against Socrates for this; and when he was one of the Thirty and was drafting laws with Charicles, he bore it in mind. He inserted a clause which made it illegal "to teach the art of words." It was a calculated insult to Socrates, whom he saw no means of attacking, except by imputing to him the practice constantly attributed to philosophers, and so making him unpopular. For I myself never heard Socrates indulge in the practice, nor knew of anyone who professed to have heard him do so. He made that clear, for when the Thirty were putting to death many citizens of no small respectability and encouraging many others in crime, Socrates had remarked: "It seems amazing enough to me that a herdsman who lets his cattle decrease and go to the bad should not admit that he is a poor herdsman; but more amazing still that a statesman, when he causes the citizens to decrease and go to the bad, should feel

no shame nor think himself a poor statesman." This remark was reported to Critias and Charicles, who sent for Socrates, showed him the law, and forbade him to hold conversation with young men.

"May I question you," asked Socrates, "in case I do not understand any point in your orders?"

"You may," said they.

"Well now," said he, "I am ready to obey the laws. But in case I may unwittingly transgress through ignorance, I want clear directions from you. Do you think that the art of words from which you bid me abstain is associated with sound or unsound reasoning? For if with sound, then clearly, I must abstain from sound reasoning: but if with unsound, clearly I must try to reason soundly."

"Since you are ignorant, Socrates," said Charicles in an angry tone, "we put our order into language easier to understand. You may not hold any converse whatever with the young."

"Well then," said Socrates, "that there may be no question raised about my obedience, please fix the age limit below which a man is to be accounted young."

"So long," replied Charicles, "as he is not permitted to sit in the Council, because as yet he lacks wisdom. You shall not converse with anyone who is under thirty."

"Suppose I want to buy something, am I not even then to ask the price if the seller is under thirty?"

"Oh yes," answered Charicles, "you may in such cases. But the fact is, Socrates, you are in the habit of asking questions to which you know the answer: so that is what you are not to do."

"Am I to give no answer, then, if a young man asks me something that I know? — for instance, 'Where does Charicles live?' or 'Where is Critias?'"

“Oh yes,” answered Charicles, “you may, in such cases.”

“But you see, Socrates,” explained Critias, “you will have to avoid your favorite topics: cobblers, builders and metal workers; for I think you have already worn them threadbare.”

“Then must I keep off the subjects of which these supply illustrations, Justice, Holiness, and so forth?”

“Indeed yes,” said Charicles, “and herdsmen too: or else you may find the cattle decrease.”

Thus, the truth was out: the remark about the cattle had been repeated to them: and it was this that made them angry with him.

So much, then, for the connection of Critias with Socrates and their attitude toward each other. I venture to assert that learners get nothing from a teacher with whom they are out of sympathy. Now, all the time that Critias and Alcibiades associated with Socrates they were out of sympathy with him, but from the very first their ambition was political advancement. For while they were still with him, they tried to converse, whenever possible, with prominent politicians. Indeed, there is a story told of Alcibiades, that, when he was less than twenty years old, he had a talk about laws with Pericles, his guardian, the first citizen in the State.

“Tell me, Pericles,” he said, “can you teach me what a law is?”

“Certainly,” he replied.

“Then please do teach me. For whenever I hear men praised for keeping the laws, it occurs to me that no one can really deserve that praise who does not know what law is.”

“Well, Alcibiades, there is no great difficulty about what you desire. You wish to know what law is. Laws are all the rules approved and enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and what ought not to be done.”

“Having decided whether to do good or do bad?”

“Good, of course, young man — not bad.”

“But if, as happens under an oligarchy, not the majority, but a minority meet and enact rules of conduct, what are these?”

“Whatsoever the sovereign power in the state enacts, after deliberation about what is to be done, is known as a law.”

“If, then, a tyrant, being the sovereign power, enacts what the citizens are to do, are his orders also law?”

“Yes, whatever a tyrant as ruler enacts is also known as law.”

“But force, the negation of law, what is that, Pericles? Is it not the action of the stronger when he constrains the weaker to do whatever he chooses, not by persuasion but by force?”

“That is my opinion.”

“Then whatever a despot by enactment constrains the citizens to do without persuasion, is the negation of law?”

“I think so: and I withdraw my answer that whatever a despot enacts without persuasion is law.”

“And when the minority passes enactments, not by persuading the majority, but through using its power, are we to call that force or not?”

“Everything, I think, that men constrain others to do “without persuasion,’ whether by enactment or not, is not law but force.”

“It follows then, that whatever the assembled majority, through using its power over the owners of property, enacts without persuasion is not law, but force?”

“Alcibiades,” said Pericles, “at your age, I may tell you, we too were very clever at this sort of thing. For the puzzles we thought about and exercised our wits on were just such as you seem to think about now.”

“Ah, Pericles,” cried Alcibiades, “if only I had known you when you were at your cleverest in these matters!”

So soon, then, as they presumed themselves to be the superiors of the politicians, they no longer came near Socrates. For apart from their general want of sympathy with him, they resented being cross-examined about their errors when they came. Politics had brought them to Socrates, and for politics they left him.

But Crito was a true associate of Socrates, as were Chaerophon, Chaerecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas, and others who kept his company not hoping to shine in the assembly or the courts but to become gentlemen and be able to do their duty by house and household, relatives and friends, city and citizens. Of these not one, in his youth or old age, did evil or incurred censure.

“But,” said his accuser, “Socrates taught sons to treat their fathers with contempt: he persuaded them that he made his companions wiser than their fathers: he said that the law allowed a son to put his father in prison if he convinced a jury that he was insane; and this was a proof that it was lawful for the wiser to keep the more ignorant in jail.” In reality Socrates held that, if you clap fetters on a man for his ignorance, you deserve to be kept in jail yourself by those whose knowledge is greater than your own: and such reasoning led him frequently to consider the difference between madness and ignorance. That madmen should be kept in prison was expedient, he thought, both for themselves and for their friends: but those who are ignorant of what they ought to know deserve to learn from those who know it.

“But,” said his accuser, “Socrates caused his companions to dishonor not only their fathers but their other relations as well, by saying that invalids and litigants get benefit not from their relatives but from their doctors or those who know how

to assist them at law. Of friends too he said that their goodwill was worthless unless they could combine with it some power to help: only those deserved honor who knew what was the right thing to do, and could explain it. Thus, by leading the young to think that he excelled in wisdom and in ability to make others wise, he had such an effect on his companions that no one counted for anything in their estimation in comparison with him." Now I do know that he used this language about fathers, relatives, and friends, and what is more, he would say that as soon as the soul, the only seat of intelligence, has departed, people carry out the body of their nearest and dearest and hide it in the tomb as quickly as they can. Moreover, though a man's dearest friend is himself, even in his lifetime he removes or lets another remove from his body whatever is useless and unprofitable. People remove their own nails, hair, calluses: they let the surgeon amputate and cauterize, and aches and pains notwithstanding, feel bound to thank and pay him for it. They spit out the saliva from their mouths as far away as they can, because to retain it doesn't help but rather harms them.

Now in saying all this, he was not giving a lesson on the duty of burying one's father alive, or making mincemeat of one's own body: he meant to show that unreason is unworth, and was urging the necessity of cultivating sound sense and usefulness, in order that one who wished to be valued by father or by brother or by anyone else would not rely merely on the bond of familiarity and neglect him, but would try to be useful to all those by whom he wished to be valued.

And his accuser alleged that he selected the most immoral passages, even from the most famous poets, and used them as evidence in teaching his companions to be maleficent and tyrannical: for example, Hesiod's line:

No work is a disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace.

He was charged with explaining this line as an injunction to refrain from no work, dishonest or disgraceful, but to do anything for gain. Now, though Socrates would fully agree that it is a benefit and a blessing to a man to be a worker, and a disadvantage and an evil to be an idler — that work, in fact, is a blessing, idleness an evil — "working," ""being a worker," meant to him doing good work; but gambling and any occupation that is immoral and leads to loss he called idling. When thus interpreted there is nothing amiss with the line:

No work is a disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace.

And his accuser said that he often quoted the passage from Homer, showing how Odysseus:

Whenever he found one that was a captain and a man of eminence, he stood by his side and restrained him with gentle words: "Good sir, it is not seemly to be frightened like a coward, but take a seat yourself and sit the others down..." But whatever man of the people he saw and found him shouting, him he drove with his scepter and berated him with loud words: "Good sir, sit still and hearken to the words of others who are your betters: for you are no warrior and a weakling, never reckoned whether in battle or in council."

He allegedly interpreted this passage to mean that the poet approved of chastising ordinary and poor people. But Socrates never said that: indeed, on that view he would have thought himself worthy of chastisement. But what he did say was that those who render no service either by word or deed, who cannot help army or city or the people itself in time of need, ought to be stopped, even if they have riches in abundance, above all if they are insolent as well as inefficient. But Socrates was quite the opposite of all that: he showed himself to be one of the people and a friend of mankind. For although he had many eager disciples among citizens and foreigners, he never exacted a fee for his company from anyone, but of his own

resources he gave unsparingly to everyone. Some indeed, after getting from him a few trifles for nothing, sold them for a high price to others, and showed none of his sympathy with the people, refusing to talk with those who had no money to give them. But Socrates did far more to win respect for the State in the world at large than Lichas, whose services to Sparta have made his name immortal. For Lichas used to entertain the foreigners staying at Sparta during the Gymnopaidiai; but Socrates spent his life in lavishing his gifts and rendering the greatest services to all who cared to receive them. For he always tried to make his associates better men before he sent them on their way.

Such was the character of Socrates. To me he seemed to deserve honor rather than death at the hands of the state, and anyone considering his case in its legal aspect will find likewise. Under the laws, death is the penalty inflicted on persons proved to be thieves, highwaymen, cutpurses, kidnappers, robbers of temples; and from such criminals no one was so widely separated as he was. Furthermore, to the state he was never the cause of disaster in war, or sedition or treason or any harm whatever. Again, in private life he never ever deprived anyone of what was good or involved anyone in what was bad. None of these crimes was ever so much as imputed to him. How then could he be guilty of the charges? For so far was he from rejecting the gods, as charged in the indictment, that no man was more conspicuous for his devotion to the service of the gods: so far from corrupting the youth, as his accuser actually charged against him, that if any among his companions had evil desires, he openly tried to reform them and exhorted them to desire the fairest and noblest virtue, by which men prosper both in public life and in their homes. By this conduct did he not deserve high honor from the state?

3. In order to support my opinion that he benefited his associates alike by actions that revealed his own character and by his conversation, I will set down what I recollect of these.

First, then, for his attitude toward the gods; his deeds and words were clearly consistent with the answer given by the Priestess at Delphi to those who inquire about their duty regarding sacrifice or the cult of ancestors or any other such matters, for the answer of the Priestess is that those who follow the custom of the state would act piously, and that was how Socrates acted himself and counseled others to act, and to take any other course he considered presumption and folly. And again, when he prayed he asked simply for gifts that were good, for the gods know best what things are good, whereas to pray for gold or silver or sovereignty or any other such thing was just like praying for a wager or a fight or anything of which the result is obviously uncertain. Though his sacrifices were humble, according to his means, he thought himself not a whit inferior to those who made frequent and magnificent sacrifices out of great possessions. The gods, he said, could not well delight more in great offerings than in small — for in that case must the gifts of the wicked often have found more favor in their sight than the gifts of the upright — and people would not find life worth living if the gifts of the wicked were received with more favor by the gods than the gifts of the upright. No, the greater the piety of the giver, the greater, he thought, was the delight of the gods in the gift. He would quote with approval the line:

According to your power render sacrifice to the immortal gods and he would add that in our treatment of friends and strangers, and in all our behavior, it is a noble principle to render according to our power. If ever any signal seemed to be given him from the gods, he would more easily have been persuaded to choose a blind guide who did not know the road

in preference to one who could see and knew the way, than to disregard the admonition. All people, in fact, who flouted the warnings of the gods in their anxiety to avoid the censure of others he denounced for foolishness. He himself despised all human opinions in comparison with counsel given by the gods.

He schooled his body and soul by following a regimen which, barring a bolt from the blue, would afford anyone a life of confidence and security and make it easy to meet the required expenses. For he was so frugal that it is hardly possible to imagine a man doing so little work as not to earn enough to satisfy the needs of Socrates. He ate just enough food to make eating a pleasure, and he was so ready for his food that he found appetite the best sauce: and any kind of drink he found pleasant, because he drank only when he was thirsty. Whenever he accepted an invitation to dinner, he resisted without difficulty the common temptation to exceed the limit of satiety; and he advised those who could not do likewise to avoid appetizers that encouraged them to eat and drink what they did not want: for these were the ruin of stomachs, brains, and souls. I believe, he said in jest, that it was by providing a feast of such things that Circe made pigs; and it was partly by the prompting of Hermes, partly through his own self-restraint and avoidance of overindulgence in such things, that Odysseus was not turned into a pig. This was how he would talk on the subject, half joking, half in earnest.

Of sexual relations with beautiful people, he advised resolute avoidance: it is not easy to control yourself once you meddle with that sort of thing.... Moreover, on hearing that Critobulus had kissed Alcibiades' handsome boy, he put this question to Xenophon in Critobulus' presence: "Tell me, Xenophon, did you not consider Critobulus to be a sober person rather than a rash one, and prudent rather than thoughtless and reckless?"

“Certainly,” said Xenophon.

“Then you are to consider him henceforth as utterly hotheaded and reckless: the man would do a somersault into a ring of knives; he would jump into fire.”

“What on earth has he done to make you think so badly of him?” asked Xenophon.

“Hasn’t the man dared to kiss Alcibiades’ boy, who is very good-looking and attractive?”

“Oh, if that sort of behavior is tossing caution to the wind, I think I might run the risk myself.”

“Pitiful! What do you think will happen to you through kissing a handsome face? Won’t you lose your liberty at once and become a slave, begin spending large sums on harmful pleasures, have no time to give to anything fit for a gentleman, be forced to concern yourself with things that not even a lunatic would take seriously?”

“Heracles! what alarming power in a kiss!” cried Xenophon.

“What? Does that surprise you?” continued Socrates. “Don’t you know that poisonous spiders, though smaller than a penny, need only fasten their fangs on people to inflict excruciating pain and drive them out of their minds?”

“I surely do; for spiders inject something by their biting.”

“Simpleton! You don’t think that handsome people inject something when they kiss, just because you don’t see it? Don’t you know that this creature, that they call young and good-looking, is more dangerous than spiders, seeing that it need not even come in contact, like the spiders, but at any distance can inject something maddening into anyone who but looks at it?

[“Maybe, too, the loves are called archers for this reason, that the fair can wound even at a distance.”]

“No, I advise you, Xenophon, as soon as you see a handsome face, to take to your heels and flee: and you, Critobulus, I advise to spend a year abroad. It will certainly take you at least that long to recover from the bite.”

Thus, in the matter of sexual passions he held that those whose passions were not under complete control should limit themselves to such indulgence as the soul would reject unless the need of the body were pressing, and such as would do no harm when the need arose. As for his own conduct in this matter, it was evident that he had trained himself to avoid the handsomest and most attractive youths more easily than others avoid the ugliest and least attractive. Concerning eating and drinking then and carnal indulgence such were his views, and he thought that a due portion of pleasure would be no more lacking to him than to those who give themselves much to these, and that much less trouble would fall to his lot.

4. If any hold the opinion expressed in some written or spoken accounts based on inferences about Socrates, that although he was consummate in exhorting people to virtue, he was an incompetent to guide them to it, let them consider not only the searching cross-examination with which he chastised those who thought themselves omniscient but his daily talks with his familiar friends, and then judge whether he was capable of improving his associates. I will first state what I once heard him say about the divinity in conversation with Aristodemus the dwarf, as he was called. On learning that he was not known to sacrifice to the gods or pray or use divination and actually made fun of those who did so, he said: “Tell me, Aristodemus, do you admire any human beings for wisdom?”

“I do,” he answered.

“Tell us their names.”

“In epic poetry Homer comes first, in my opinion; in dithyramb, Melanippides; in tragedy, Sophocles; in sculpture, Polyclitus; in painting, Zeuxis.”

“Which do you think deserve greater admiration, the creators of likenesses thoughtless and motionless or the creators of living beings endowed with thought and action?”

“Living beings by far, provided only they are created by design and not mere chance.”

“Suppose that it is impossible to guess the purpose of one creature s existence, and obvious that another’s serves a useful end, which, in your judgment, is the work of chance, and which of design?”

“Presumably the creature that serves some useful end is the work of design.”

“Do you not think then that the original creator of mankind had some useful end in view when he endowed us with our several senses, giving eyes to see visible objects and ears to hear sounds? Would odors again be of any use to us had we not been endowed with nostrils? What perception should we have of sweet and bitter and all things pleasant to the palate had we no tongue in our mouth to discriminate between them? Besides these, are there not other contrivances that look like the results of forethought? Thus, the eyeballs, being weak, are set behind eyelids, that open like doors when we want to see, and close when we sleep: on the lids grow lashes through which the very winds filter harmlessly: above the eyes is a coping of brows that lets no drop of sweat from the head hurt them. The ears catch all sounds, but are never choked with them. Again, the incisors of all creatures are adapted for cutting, the molars for receiving food from them and grinding it. And again, the mouth, through which the food they want goes in, is set near the eyes and nostrils; but since what goes out is unpleasant, the ducts through which it passes are

turned away and removed as far as possible from the organs of sense. With such signs of forethought in these arrangements, can you doubt whether they are the works of chance or design?"

"No, of course not. When I regard them in this light they do look very like the handiwork of an ingenious craftsman fond of living creatures."

"What of the natural desire to beget children, the mother's desire to nurture her young, the child's mighty will to live and mighty fear of death?"

"Undoubtedly these, too, look like the contrivances of one who deliberately planned the existence of living creatures."

"And you, do you think you have any wisdom yourself?"

"Well, ask me a question and judge from my answer."

"Do you think that wisdom is nowhere else to be found, although you know that you have a mere speck of all the earth in your body and a mere drop of all the water, and that of all the other presumably mighty elements you received just a scrap toward the fashioning of your body? And do you think that you alone by some lucky accident have caught a mind existing nowhere else, and that the orderly ranks of all these elements, huge in size and infinite in number, are due to a sort of absurdity, as you suppose?"

"Yes, I do; for I don't see these masters, whereas I see the makers of things in this world."

"Neither do you see your own soul, which has mastery of the body; so that, as far as that goes, you may say that you do nothing by design and everything by chance."

Here Aristodemus said, "Really, Socrates, I don't despise the divinity but think it too great to need extra service from me."

“Then the greater the power that deigns to serve you, the more honor it should have.”

“Rest assured, if I believed that the gods give any thought to humankind, I would not neglect them.”

“Then do you really think that they give no thought? In the first place, the human is the only living creature that they have made to stand upright; and the upright position gives him a wider range of vision in front and a better view of things above, and exposes him less to injury. Secondly, to other terrestrial creatures they have given feet that afford only the power of moving, whereas they have endowed humans with hands, which accomplish most of the things that make us more fortunate than the others. Again, though all creatures have a tongue, the tongue of humankind alone has been formed by them to be capable of contact with different parts of the mouth, so as to enable us to articulate the voice and express to one another everything we wish. Once more, for all other creatures they have prescribed a fixed season of sexual pleasures, while for us they provide them continuously until old age.

“What is more, the deity was not content to care for the body but, most important, also implanted in the human being the soul and made it dominant. For what other creature s soul, in the first place, has apprehended the existence of gods who set in order the vastness and great beauty of the universe? And what race of living things other than man worships gods? And what soul is more apt than man s to make provision against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to relieve sickness and promote health, to acquire knowledge by toil, and to remember accurately all that is heard, seen, or learned? For is it not quite obvious soul can ponder on matters here and in Egypt and Sicily, the gods thought is insufficient to take care of the whole world at once. Indeed, just as by serving men you find out who is willing to serve you in return,

by being kind who will be kind to you in return, and by taking counsel discover the masters of thought, so try the gods by serving them, and see whether they will consent to counsel you in matters hidden from mankind. Then you will know that such is the greatness and such the nature of the deity that it sees everything and hears everything alike, and is present in everywhere and takes care of everything."

To me at least it seemed that by these sayings he kept his companions from impiety, injustice, and baseness, not only when they might be seen by people but even in solitude, since they always felt that no deed of theirs could at any time escape divine notice.

5. If indeed self-control too is a fair and noble possession, let us now consider whether he led people closer to it by conversing in the following way:

"Gentlemen, if we were at war and wanted to choose a leader most capable of helping us to save ourselves and conquer the enemy, would we choose one whom we could tell was no match for the belly, for wine, lust, toil, or sleep? How could we expect that such a man would either save us or defeat the enemy? Or if at the end of our life we should wish to entrust someone with educating our boys or protecting our girls or safeguarding our property, would we consider the man lacking self-control trustworthy for these matters? Would we entrust livestock or storehouses or project management to a slave lacking self-control? Would we be willing to accept someone like that as a servant or purveyor even as a free gift? If in fact we would reject even a slave lacking self-control, surely the master should take care that he does become like that himself. For whereas the greedy, by robbing others of their goods, seem to enrich themselves, a man lacking self-control reaps no advantage from the harm he does to others. No, he is a wrongdoer to others but much more so to himself, if indeed the greatest wrong of all is to ruin not only ones home

but also one's body and the soul. In society too, what pleasure could you find in such a man, knowing that he prefers the food and wine to his friends, and likes the whores better than his companions? Should every man not hold self-control to be the foundation of all virtue, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul? For who without this can learn any good or practice it creditably? Or what man that is the slave of his pleasures would not be in a sorry plight body and soul alike? By Hera I declare that every free man should pray not to get such a slave; and every man who is a slave to such pleasures should entreat the gods to give him good masters: thus, and only thus would such a man find salvation."

Such were his words; but his own self-control was shown yet more clearly by his deeds than by his words. For he kept in subjection not only the pleasures of the body, but those too that money brings, in the belief that he who takes money from any casual giver puts himself under a master and endures the basest form of slavery.

6. It is fair to him not to leave unrecorded a conversation he had with Antiphon the Sophist. On one occasion Antiphon, wishing to take Socrates' companions away from him, approached him in their presence and spoke this way:

"Socrates, I supposed that those practicing philosophy ought to grow happier, but the benefits you have derived from philosophy are apparently very different. I mean you are living a life that would drive even a slave to desert his master. Your food and drink are of the poorest, the cloak you wear is not only a poor thing but is never changed summer or winter, and you never wear shoes or a coat. Besides you refuse to take money, the mere getting of which is a joy, while its possession gives one a more independent and pleasant life. So, if you are like the teachers of other occupations, who make their pupils copy them, and intend to make your own companions do so, you must consider yourself a teacher of unhappiness."

To this Socrates replied: “Antiphon, you seem to have a notion that my life is so miserable that I feel sure you would choose death in preference to a life like mine. Come then, let us consider together what hardship you have noticed in my life. Is it that those who take money are bound to carry out the work for which they get a fee, while I, because I refuse to take it, am not obliged to talk with anyone against my will? Or do you think my food poor because it is less wholesome than yours or less nourishing? or because my meals are harder to get than yours, being scarcer and more expensive? or because your diet is more enjoyable than mine? Do you not know that the greater the enjoyment of eating the less the need of condiment; the greater the enjoyment of drinking, the less the desire for drinks that are not available? As for cloaks, they are changed, as you know, on account of cold or heat. And shoes are worn to protect the feet against pain and inconvenience in walking. Now did you ever know me to stay indoors more than others on account of the cold, or to fight with any man for the shade because of the heat, or to be prevented by sore feet from walking anywhere I please? Do you not know that by training, a puny weakling comes to be better at any form of exercise he practices and gets more staying power than the muscular prodigy who neglects to train? Seeing then that I am always training my body to answer any and every call on its powers, do you not think that I can stand every strain better than you can without training? For avoiding slavery to the belly, to sleepiness, and to lustfulness, do you think there is anything more effective than the possession of other and greater pleasures, which are delightful not only to enjoy but also because they arouse hopes of lasting benefit? And again, you surely know that people who think they can do nothing successfully are unhappy, whereas those who consider themselves successful in farming or shipping or any other activity are happy in the thought of their success.

Do you think then that out of all this thinking there comes anything so pleasant as the thought: 'I am growing in goodness and I am making better friends?' And that, I may say, is my constant thought.

"Further, if help is wanted by friends or city, which of the two has more leisure to supply their needs, someone who lives as I am living or someone whose life you call blessed? Which will find soldiering the easier task, the one who cannot exist without expensive food or the one satisfied with what he can get? Which when besieged will surrender first, the one who wants what is very hard to come by or the one who can make do with whatever is at hand?

"You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants is godlike; to have as few as possible comes next to the godlike; and as that which is godlike is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme."

In another conversation with Socrates Antiphon said: "Socrates, I for my part consider you a just but by no means a wise man, and I think you realize it yourself. Anyhow, you decline to take money for your company. Yet if you believed your cloak or house or anything you possess to be worth money, you would not part with it for nothing or even for less than its value. Clearly, then, if you set any value on your company, you would insist on getting the proper price for that too. It may well be that you are a just man because you do not cheat people from avarice; but wise you cannot be, since your knowledge is worthless."

To this Socrates replied: "Antiphon, it is common opinion among us in regard to beauty and wisdom that there is an honorable and a shameful way of bestowing them. For to offer one's beauty for money to all comers is called prostitution, but we consider it virtuous to become friendly with a lover who is

known to be a gentleman. So is it with wisdom: those who offer it to all comers for money are known as sophists, but we think that someone who befriends anyone he finds to be gifted by nature, and teaches him all the good he can, fulfills the duty of a citizen and a gentleman. That is my own view, Antiphon. Others have a yen for a good horse or dog or bird: my yen, stronger even than theirs, is for good friends. And I teach them all the good I can, and recommend them to others from whom I think they will get some moral benefit. And the treasures that the wise men of old have left us in their writings I open and explore with my friends. If we come on anything good, we extract it, and we set much store on being useful to one another."

For my part, when I heard these words of his I judged him to be a happy man himself and to be guiding his hearers toward becoming gentlemen.

On yet another occasion Antiphon asked him how he supposed that he was making politicians of others when he himself avoided politics, if indeed he even understood the subject.

"Well now, Antiphon," he retorted, "could I play a more active role in politics by engaging on my own or by taking pains to turn out as many competent politicians as possible?"

7. Let us next consider whether by discouraging imposture he encouraged his companions to cultivate virtue. For he always said that the best road to good repute is the one where a man can become good in the way he wishes to be thought good. And this was how he demonstrated the truth of his words:

"Suppose a bad pipe player wants to be thought a good one, let us note what he must do. Must he not imitate good players in the accessories of the art? First, as they have fine equipment and travel with many attendants, he must do the

same. Further, seeing that they win the applause of crowds, he must provide himself with a large claque. But, of course, he must never accept an engagement, or he will promptly expose himself to ridicule as an incompetent player and an impostor to boot. And so, what with incurring heavy expense and gaining nothing, and bringing disgrace on himself as well, he will make his life burdensome, unprofitable, and ridiculous. So too if a man who is not a general or a pilot wanted to be thought a good one, let us imagine what would happen to him. If his efforts to seem proficient in these duties failed to carry conviction, would not his failure be galling to him? if they succeeded, would not his success be still more disastrous? for it is certain that if a man who knew nothing about piloting a ship or commanding an army were appointed to such work, he would destroy those whom he least wanted to destroy and would bring ruin and disgrace on himself."

By similar reasoning he would show how unprofitable is a reputation for wealth or courage or strength when it is undeserved. "Tasks beyond their powers," he would say, "are laid on the incompetent, and they are not forgiven when they disappoint the expectation formed of their capability. The man who persuades you to lend him money or goods and then keeps them is without doubt a cheat; but much the greatest cheat of all is the man who, though worthless, has gulled his city into the belief that he is fit to direct it."

For my part I thought that such talks did discourage imposture among his companions.

BOOK II

1. In other conversations I thought that he exhorted his companions to practice self-control as regards eating and drinking, sexual indulgence, sleeping, and endurance of cold and heat and toil. Aware that one of his companions was rather intemperate in such matters, he said: "Tell me, Aristippus, if you were required to take charge of two youths and educate them so that the one would be fit to rule and the other would never think of putting himself forward, how would you educate them? Shall we consider it, beginning with the elementary question of food?"

"Oh yes," replied Aristippus, "food does seem to come first; for one can't live without food."

"Well now, won't a desire for food naturally arise in both at certain times?"

"Yes, naturally."

"So, which of the two should we train in the habit of transacting urgent business before he satisfies his hunger?"

"The one who is being trained to rule, undoubtedly; otherwise, state business might be neglected during his tenure."

"And must not the same one be given power to resist thirst when both want to drink?"

"Certainly."

"And to which shall we give the power of limiting his sleep so that he can go late to bed and get up early, and do without sleep if need be?"

"To the same again."

"And the power to control his sexual passions, so that he may not be hindered in taking action if need be?"

"To the same again."

“And to which shall we give the habit of not shirking a task but undertaking it willingly?”

“That too will go to the one who is being trained to rule.”

“And to which would the knowledge needed for overcoming adversaries be more appropriately given?”

“Without doubt to the one who is being trained to rule; for the other lessons would be useless without such knowledge.”

“Don’t you think that with this education he will be less likely than other creatures to be caught by his adversaries? Some of them, you know, are so greedy that in spite of extreme timidity in some cases, they are drawn irresistibly to the bait to get food and are caught; and others are snared by drink.”

“Yes, certainly.”

“Others again — quails and partridges, for instance — are so lecherous that when they hear the cry of the female they are carried away by desire and anticipation of sex, throw caution to the winds, and blunder into the nets. Is it not so?”

He agreed again.

“Now, don’t you think it disgraceful that a human being should be in the same plight as the silliest of wild creatures? Thus adulterers enter the women’s quarters, knowing that by committing adultery they risk incurring the penalties threatened by the law, and that they may be trapped, caught, and ill-treated. When such misery and disgrace hang over the adulterer’s head, and there are many remedies to relieve him of his sexual desire without risk, is it not sheer lunacy to plunge headlong into danger?”

“Yes, I think it is.”

“And considering that the great majority of essential occupations, warfare, agriculture and not a few others, are carried on in the open air, don’t you think it gross negligence that so many men are untrained to withstand cold and heat?”

He agreed again.

“Don’t you think then, that one who is going to rule must adapt himself to bear them lightly?”

“Certainly.”

“If then we classify those who control themselves in all these matters as ‘fit to rule,’ shall we not classify those who cannot so behave as having no claim to be rulers?”

He agreed again.

“Well now, as you know the category to which each of these species belongs, have you ever considered in which category you ought to put yourself?”

“I have; and I do not for a moment put myself in the category of those who want to be rulers. For considering how hard a job it is to provide for one’s own needs, I think it absurd not to be content to do that, but to shoulder the burden of supplying the wants of the community as well. That anyone should forego many of his own wishes and make himself accountable as head of the state for the least failure to carry out all the wishes of the community is surely the height of folly. For states think fit to treat their rulers just as I do my household staff: just as I expect my servants to provide me with necessaries in abundance but not to touch any of them, so do states think that the ruler should supply them with all manner of good things but abstain from all of them himself. And so, should anyone want to bring plenty of trouble on himself and others, I would educate him as you propose and number him with Those suited to rule’: but myself I classify with those wishing for a life of the greatest possible ease and pleasure.”

Here Socrates asked: “Shall we then consider whether the rulers or the ruled live the pleasanter life?”

“Certainly,” replied Aristippus. “To take first the nations known to us. In Asia the rulers are the Persians; the Syrians,

Lydians and Phrygians are the ruled. In Europe the Scythians rule, and the Maeotians are ruled. In Africa the Carthaginians rule, and the Libyans are ruled. Which of the two classes, think you, enjoys the pleasanter life? Or take the Greeks, of whom you yourself are one; do you think that the controlling or the controlled communities enjoy the pleasanter life?"

"For my part," replied Aristippus, "I am no candidate for slavery; but there is, I think, a middle path in which I try to walk. That way leads neither through rule nor slavery but through liberty, which is the high road to happiness."

"Ah," said Socrates, "if only that path can avoid the world as well as rule and slavery, there may be something in what you say. But, since you are in the world, if you intend neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not choose to truckle to the rulers — I think you must see that the stronger have a way of making the weaker rue their lot both in public and in private life, and treating them like slaves. You cannot be unaware that where some have sown and planted, others cut their com and fell their trees, and in every way harass the weaker if they refuse to bow down, until they convince them to prefer slavery to war with the stronger. So, too, in private life do not brave and mighty men enslave and plunder the cowardly and feeble?"

"Yes, but my plan for avoiding such treatment is this. I do not shut myself up in the four corners of a community, but am a stranger in every land."

"That's an impressive feint!" cried Socrates, "for ever since the death of Sinis and Sceiron and Procrustes no one wrongs strangers! And yet nowadays those who take a hand in the affairs of their homeland pass laws to protect themselves from wrongdoing, get friends to help them over and above those whom nature has given them, encompass their cities with fortresses, get themselves weapons to ward off the

wrongdoers; and besides all this they seek to make allies in other lands; and in spite of all these precautions they are still victimized. But you, with none of these advantages, spend a lot of time on the open road, where so many are victimized; and in whatever city you visit you rank below all its citizens and are one of those specially marked down for attack by intending wrongdoers; and yet, because you are a stranger, do you expect not to be wronged? What makes you confident? Is it that the cities by proclamation guarantee your safety both coming and going? Or is it the thought that no master would find you worth having among his slaves? For who would care to have a man in his house who wants to do no work and has a weakness for high living?

"But now let us see how masters treat such servants. Don't they discipline their randiness by starving them? stop their stealing by locking up whatever they might get their hands on? prevent their escape by chaining them? and beat the laziness out of them with whips? What do you do when you discover a servant like that in your own house?"

"I use every kind of punishment until I force them to serve. But how about those who are trained in the art of kingship, Socrates, which you appear to identify with happiness? How are they better off than those whose sufferings are compulsory, if they must bear hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and endure all these tortures willingly? For if the same back gets the flogging whether its owner objects or consents, or, in short, if the same body, consenting or objecting, is besieged by all these torments, I see no difference, apart from the folly of voluntary suffering."

"What, Aristippus," exclaimed Socrates, "don't you see just this difference between these voluntary and involuntary sufferings, that if you bear hunger or thirst willingly, you can eat, drink, or whatever, as you choose, whereas compulsory suffering cannot be ended at will? Besides, he who endures

willingly enjoys his work because he is comforted by hope; hunters, for instance, toil gladly in hope of game. Rewards like these are indeed of little worth after all the toil; but what of those who toil to win good friends, or to subdue enemies, or to make themselves capable in body and soul of managing their own homes well, of helping their friends and serving their country? Surely these toil gladly for such prizes and live a joyous life, well content with themselves, praised and envied by everyone else? Moreover, indolence and the moment s pleasure can never bring the body into good condition, as trainers say, nor do they create in the soul knowledge of any value, but strenuous effort paves the way to fair and fine deeds, as good men say. And so says Hesiod:

> 'Vice can be had in abundance easily: smooth is the road and very near she dwells. But before Virtue the gods immortal have put sweat: long and steep is the path to her and rough at first; but when you reach the top, then at length the road is easy, hard though it remains.'

"And we have the testimony of Epicharmus too in the line:

> 'The gods demand of us toil as the price of all good things.'

"And elsewhere he says:

> 'Wretch, yearn not for what's soft, lest you earn what's hard.'

"Yes, and Prodicus the wise expresses himself in the same way about Virtue in the essay 'On Heracles' that he recites to throngs of listeners. This, so far as I remember, is how he puts it:

"When Heracles was passing from boyhood to young manhood, where the young, now becoming their own masters, show whether they will approach life by the path of virtue or the path of vice, he went out into a quiet place and sat pondering which road to take. And there appeared two women of great stature coming toward him. The one was fair to see

and of noble stock; her body was adorned with purity, her eyes with modesty; sober was her figure, and her robe was white. The other had grown stout and soft with high feeding. Her skin was made up to heighten its natural white and pink, her figure to exaggerate her height. She had wide-open eyes and clothing that showcased her young beauty. She kept eyeing herself and looking to see whether anyone noticed her; and often stole a glance at her own shadow.

"When they drew closer to Heracles, the first pursued the even tenor of her way, but the other, all eager to outdo her, ran to meet him, crying: 'Heracles, I see that you are in doubt which approach to take toward life. If you make me your friend and follow me, I will lead you along the pleasantest and easiest road, and you will taste all the sweets of life but never know its hardships. First, you will give no thought to wars and business, but will ever be considering what choice food or drink you can discover, what sight or sound will please you, what touch or scent gladden you, the company of which boy love would most delight you, which bed afford the softest slumbers; and how to come by all these pleasures with least trouble.

And should there arise misgiving that lack of means may stint these enjoyments, never fear that I may lead you into winning them by toil and anguish of body and soul. No, you will have the fruits of others' toil and refrain from nothing that can bring you gain. For to my companions, I give authority to pluck advantage wherever they want.'

"Now when Heracles heard this, he asked, 'Lady, what is your name?'

"'My friends call me Happiness,' she said, 'but among those that hate me I am nicknamed Vice.'

"Meanwhile the other had drawn near, and she said; 'I, too, have come to you, Heracles: I know your parents and have

taken note of your character during the time of your education, and so I hope that, if you take the road that leads to me, you will turn out very much a good doer of fine and noble deeds, and I will be yet more highly honored and more illustrious for the blessings I bestow. But I will not deceive you by a pleasant prelude: I will rather tell you truly the way things are, as the gods have ordained them. For of all things good and fair, the gods give nothing to man without toil and effort. If you want the favor of the gods, you must worship the gods: if you desire the love of friends, you must do good to your friends: if you crave honor from a city, you must aid that city: if you expect to win the admiration of all Hellas for virtue, you must strive to do good to Hellas: if you want land to yield you fruits in abundance, you must cultivate that land: if you are determined to get wealth from flocks, you must care for those flocks: if you aim to grow great through war and want power to liberate your friends and subdue your foes, you must learn the arts of war from those who know them and must practice their right use: and if you want your body to be strong, you must accustom your body to be the servant of your mind, and train it with toil and sweat.'

"And Vice, as Prodicus tells it, said in response: 'Heracles, do you see what a hard and long road to joy this woman describes? I will lead you by an easy and short road to happiness.'

"And Virtue said: 'How sad! What good do you have or what pleasure do you know, if you do nothing to get them? You don't even await the desire for pleasant things but fill yourself with all things before you desire them: eating before you're hungry, drinking before you're thirsty; for good eating getting yourself cooks, for good drinking buying expensive wines and running around in the summertime in search of snow; for good sleeping you buy not only soft blankets but bed frames too. For it is not toil but the tedium of having nothing to do

that makes you long for sleep. You force lust when there is no need, by all kinds of tricks and by using men as women: thus you train your own friends, running riot at night and sleeping through the best part of the day. You are immortal yet cast out by the gods and scorned by good men. Praise, sweetest of all things to hear, you never hear, and the sweetest of all sights you never see, for never yet have you beheld a good work of your own doing. Who will believe what you say? who will grant what you request? Or what sane man will dare join your club? While your votaries are young their bodies are weak, when they grow old their souls are mindless; idle and sleek they thrive in youth, withered and weary they journey through old age, and their past deeds bring them shame, their present deeds distress. Pleasure they ran through in their youth, hardship they laid up for their old age. But I keep company with gods and good men, and no fair deed of god or man is done without my aid. I am first in honor among the gods and among men that are akin to me: to craftsmen a cherished fellow worker, to masters a faithful guardian of the house, to servants a kindly protector: a good helpmate in the toils of peace, a staunch ally in the deeds of war, and the best partner in friendship. To my friends food and drink bring sweet and simple enjoyment: for they wait till they desire them. And a sweeter sleep falls on them than on the idle: they are not annoyed at waking from it nor for its sake do they neglect to do their duties. The young rejoice to win the praise of the old; the elders are glad to be honored by the young: with joy they recall their deeds past and are happy that they are doing well in the present, for through me they are dear to the gods, cherished by friends, precious to their native land. And when the appointed end comes, they lie not forgotten and dishonored but live on, sung and remembered for all time. Heracles, son of goodly parents, if you will labor earnestly in

this way, you may have for your own the most blessed happiness.'

"Such, in outline, is Prodicus' story of the training of Heracles by Virtue; only he has clothed the thoughts in even finer phrases than I have done just now. But anyway, Aristippus, you would do well to take all this to heart and try to show some regard for the life that lies before you."

2. On noticing that his eldest son, Lamprocles, was cross with his mother, he said: "Tell me, my boy, do you know that some men are called ingrates?"

"Sure I do," replied the young man.

"Do you realize how they come to have this bad label?"

"I do; those are called ingrates who don't show the gratitude that they are able to show for benefits received."

"You take it, then, that ingrates are reckoned among the unjust?"

"Yes."

"Now, seeing that enslavement is considered a just or an unjust act depending on whether the victims are friends or enemies, have you ever considered whether the case of ingratitude is analogous, ingratitude being unjust toward friends but just toward enemies?"

"Yes, I have; and I think that it is always unjust not to show gratitude for a favor from whomever it is received, be he friend or enemy."

"If that is so, must not ingratitude be injustice pure and simple?"

He agreed.

"Therefore, the greater the benefits received the greater the injustice of not showing gratitude?"

He agreed again.

“Now what deeper obligation can we find than that of children to their parents? To their parents children owe their existence and their portion of all fair sights and all blessings that the gods bestow on humanity — gifts we prize so highly that all will sacrifice anything rather than lose them; and the reason why governments have made death the penalty for the greatest crimes is that the fear of it is the strongest deterrent against crime. Of course, you don’t suppose that lust provokes men to beget children, when the streets and the brothels are full of means to satisfy that? We obviously select for wives the women who will bear us the best children and then marry them to raise a family. The man supports the woman who is to share with him the duty of parentage and provides for the expected children whatever he thinks will contribute to their benefit in life, and accumulates as much of it as he can. The woman conceives and bears her burden in travail, risking her life and giving of her own food; and, with much labor, having endured to the end and brought forth her child, she rears and cares for it, although she has not received any good thing, and the baby neither recognizes its benefactress nor can make its wants known to her: still she guesses what is good for it and what it likes, and seeks to supply these things, and rears it for a long time, putting up with toil day and night, not knowing what return she will get.

“Nor are the parents content just to supply food, but as soon as their children seem capable of learning something they teach them whatever good lessons for life they have, and if they think that someone else is more competent to teach them something, they send them to him at a cost, and do their utmost that the children may turn out as well as possible.”

To this the young man replied: “Yes, but even if she has done all this and far more than this, no one could put up with her vile temper.”

“Which, do you think,” asked Socrates, “is the harder to bear, a wild beast’s ferocity or a mothers?”

“I should say a mothers, when she is like mine.”

“Well now, many people get bitten or kicked by wild beasts; has she ever done you an injury of that sort?”

“Oh no, but she says things you wouldn’t listen to for anything in the world.”

“Well, how much trouble do you think you have given her by your cranky voice and behavior day and night since you were a little child; and how much pain when you were ill?”

“But I have never yet said or done anything to cause her shame.”

“Now do you really think it harder for you to listen to what she says than for actors when they say the worst things to one another in a tragedy?”

“But an actor, I suppose, doesn’t think that a question put to him will lead to punishment, or that a threat means any harm: and so he takes it lightly.”

“And why should you be annoyed? You know well that there is no malice in what your mother says to you; on the contrary, she wants blessings for you above all others — unless you suppose that your mother bears you malice?”

“Oh no, I don’t think that.”

“So this mother of yours,” said Socrates, “is kindly disposed toward you; she nurses you devotedly in sickness and sees that you want for nothing; more than that, she prays the gods to bless you abundantly and pays vows on your behalf; and yet you say she is difficult! It seems to me that, if you can’t endure a mother like her, you can’t endure what’s good. Now tell me, is there any other being whom you feel bound to care for? Or are you set on trying to please nobody, and obeying neither general nor other ruler?”

“Of course not!”

“Do you want to please your neighbor, for instance, so that he will light a fire for you when you need one, will support you in prosperity, and in case of accident or failure will be ready to hold out a helping hand?”

“Yes, I do.”

“When you find yourself with a traveling companion on land or at sea, or happen to meet someone, does it make any difference to you whether he proves a friend or an enemy? Or do you think his goodwill worth cultivating?”

“Yes, I do.”

“And yet, when you are prepared to cultivate them, you don’t think courtesy is due to your mother, who loves you most of all? Don’t you know that even the state ignores all other forms of ingratitude and pronounces no judgment on them, caring nothing if the recipient of a favor neglects to thank his benefactor, but inflicts penalties on the man who is discourteous to his parents and rejects him as unworthy of office, holding that it would be sacrilege for him to offer sacrifices on behalf of the state and that he is unlikely to do anything else honorably and rightly? Yes, and if someone fails to honor his parents’ graves, the state inquires into that too, when it examines the candidates for office. Therefore, my boy, if you are prudent, you will pray the gods to pardon your neglect of your mother, so that they in turn don’t refuse to be kind to you, considering you an ingrate; and you will beware of men, so that all don’t cast you out, perceiving that you care nothing for your parents, and in the end, you are found to be without a friend. For if men suppose you to be ungrateful to your parents, none would think you would be grateful for any favor they might do you.”

3. On another occasion he found that two brothers, Chaerephon and Chaerecrates, whom he knew well, were

quarreling. On seeing the latter, he said, “Surely, Chaerecrates, you are not one of those who believe there is more value in goods and chattels than in a brother, when they are unconscious but he is conscious; they are helpless but he is helpful; when, moreover, you have many goods but only one brother. It is strange too that a man should consider his brothers a liability because he cannot have their possessions as well as his own, and yet should not consider his fellow citizens a liability because their possessions are not his; and although in this case men can reflect that it is better to belong to a community, secure in having enough, than to live alone with a precarious hold on all the property of their fellow citizens, they fail to see that the same principle applies to brothers. Again, those who have the means buy servants to relieve them of work and make friends because they want help, but they neglect their brothers, as though friendship can exist between fellow citizens but not between brothers! Yet common parentage and common upbringing are strong ties of affection, for even wild beasts reared together feel a natural yearning for one another. Besides, our fellow men respect those of us who have brothers more than those who have none, and are less ready to quarrel with them.”

“If only the difference between us were a slight one, Socrates,” replied Chaerecrates, “perhaps I should put up with my brother and not allow trifles to separate us. For a brother who behaves like a brother is, as you say, a good thing; but if his conduct is nothing like that, and is in fact just the opposite of what it should be, what is the use of attempting impossibilities?”

“Does everyone find Chaerephon as disagreeable as you do, Chaerecrates, or do some people find him very pleasant?”

“Ah, Socrates,” replied he, “this is precisely my reason for hating him: he is pleasant enough to other people, but

whenever he is near me he invariably says and does more to hurt than to help me."

"Well now," said Socrates, "if you try to manage a horse without knowing the right way, he hurts you. Is it so with a brother? Is he hurtful if you try to deal with him when you don't know the way?"

"What," exclaimed Chaerecrates, "don't I know how to deal with a brother, when I know how to requite a kind word and a generous deed? But I can't speak or act kindly to one who tries to annoy me by his words and actions — and what's more, I won't try."

"Chaerecrates, you astonish me! Had you a sheep dog that was friendly to the shepherds but growled when you came near him, it would never occur to you to get angry, but you would try to tame him by kindness. You say that, if your brother treated you like a brother, he would be a great blessing, and you confess that you know how to speak and act kindly: yet you don't set yourself to contriving that he will be the greatest possible blessing to you."

"I fear, Socrates, that I lack the wisdom to make Chaerephon treat me as he should."

"And yet," said Socrates, "there is no need, so far as I see, of any subtle or strange contriving on your part: I think you know the way to win him and to get his good opinion."

"If you have observed that I know some spell without being aware of it, please tell me at once."

"Then tell me, now; if you wanted to get an invitation to dine with an acquaintance when he offers sacrifice, what would you do?"

"Of course, I would begin by inviting him myself when I offered sacrifice."

“And suppose you wanted to encourage one of your friends to look after your affairs during your absence from home, what would you do?”

“Of course I should first undertake to look after his affairs in his absence.”

“And suppose you wanted a stranger to entertain you when you visited his city, what would you do?”

“Obviously I should first entertain him when he came to Athens. Yes, and if I wanted him to be eager to carry out the business on which I had come, obviously I would first have to do the same by him.”

“It seems that you have been hiding a knowledge of all spells that were ever discovered. Or is it that you hesitate to make a beginning for fear of disgracing yourself by first showing kindness to your brother? Yet it is generally thought worthy of the highest praise to anticipate the malevolence of an enemy and the benevolence of a friend. So, if I thought Chaerephon more capable than you of showing the way to this friendship, I would try to persuade him to take the first step toward an understanding with you. But as things are, I think the enterprise more likely to succeed under your direction.”

“Strange sentiments, Socrates! It’s quite unlike you to urge me, the younger, to lead the way; and surely all hold the contrary opinion, that the older should always act and speak first.”

“How so?” said Socrates. “Is it not the general opinion that a young man should make way for an older when they meet, offer his seat to him, give him a comfortable bed, let him have the first word? My good friend, don’t hesitate, but take up the task of pacifying your man, and in no time he will respond to your overtures. Don’t you see how eager and frank he is? You will most readily catch the low types, it is true, by giving them

something, but kindness is the weapon most likely to prevail with the gentlemen."

"And what," asked Chaerecrates, "if all my efforts lead to no improvement?"

"Well, in that case, I presume you will have shown that you are honest and brotherly, he that he is base and unworthy of kindness. But I am confident that no such result will follow; for I think that as soon as he is aware of your challenge to this contest, he will be quite eager to outdo your kind words and actions.

"Now what if a pair of hands," he said, "refused the office of mutual help for which the god made them and tried to thwart each other; or if a pair of feet neglected the duty of working together, for which they were fashioned, and took to hampering each other? That is how you two are behaving at present. Would it not be utterly ignorant and disastrous to use for hindrance instruments that were made for help? And, moreover, a pair of brothers, in my judgment, were made by the god to render better service to one another than a pair of hands and feet and eyes and all the instruments that he meant to be used as partners. For the hands cannot deal simultaneously with things that are more than six feet or so apart: the feet cannot reach in a single stride things that are even six feet apart: and the eyes, though they seem to have a longer range, cannot at the same moment see things still nearer than that, if some are in front and some behind. But two brothers, when they are friends, act simultaneously for mutual benefit, however far separate one from the other."

4. Again, I once heard a conversation of his about friendship that I thought likely to be of great help in acquiring and making use of friends.

For he said that he often heard it stated that of all possessions the most precious is a good and sincere friend.

“And yet,” he said, “there is no transaction most men are so careless about as the acquisition of friends. For I find that they are careful about getting houses and lands and slaves and cattle and furniture, and anxious to keep what they have; but though they claim that a friend is the greatest blessing, I find that most men take no thought how to get new friends or keep their old ones. Indeed, if one of their friends and one of their servants get sick at the same time, I find that some call in the doctor to attend the servant and are careful to provide everything that may contribute to his recovery, whereas they pay no attention to the friend. In the event that both die, they are annoyed at losing the servant and consider it a loss, but don’t feel that the death of the friend matters in the least. And though none of their other possessions is uncared for and unconsidered, they neglect their friends’ need of attention. And besides all this, I find that most men know the number of their other possessions, however great it may be, yet cannot tell the number of their friends, few as they are, and if asked to try to make a list they will insert names and presently remove them. So much for the thought they give to their friends! Yet surely there is no other possession that can compare with a good friend. For what horse, what yoke of oxen is so good a servant as the good friend? what slave so loyal and constant? or what possession so serviceable? The good friend is on the watch to supply whatever his friend wants for building up his private fortune and forwarding his public career. If generosity is called for, he does his part: if fear harasses, he comes to the rescue, shares expenses, helps to persuade, bears down opposition: he is foremost in delighting him when he is prosperous and raising him up when he falls. Of all that a man can do with his hands, see for himself with his eyes, hear for himself with his ears or accomplish with his feet, in nothing is a friend backward in helping. Nevertheless, while some strive to cultivate a tree for its fruit, most bestow

but an idle and listless care on their most fruitful possession, the name of which is 'friend.'"

5. Again, I once heard him urge a listener — for so I interpreted his words — to examine himself and to ask how much he was worth to his friends. For he had noticed that one of his companions was neglecting a poverty-stricken friend; so he put a question to Antisthenes in the presence of several others, including the neglectful friend. "Antisthenes," he said, "have friends like servants their own value? For one servant, I suppose, may be worth two minas, another less than half a mina, another five minas, another no less than ten. Nicias, son of Niceratus, is said to have given a whole talent for a manager of his silver mine. So, I'm led to inquire whether friends too may differ in value."

"Oh yes," replied Antisthenes, "there are men whose friendship I for one would rather have than two minas: others I should value at less than half a mina: others I would prefer to ten minas: others I would part with any sum and take any trouble to count among my friends."

"If that's so," said Socrates, "then wouldn't it be well to ask ourselves how much we are really worth to our friends and try to make ourselves as precious as possible, so that our friends won't be tempted to betray us? For my part, I often hear complaints of this sort: 'A friend betrayed me,' one I regarded as my friend gave me up for the sake of a mina.' I ponder all this and reflect that, when a man sells a bad slave he takes anything he can get for him; and perhaps it is tempting to sell a bad friend when there is a chance of getting more than he is worth. Good servants, I find, are not offered for sale, nor are good friends betrayed."

6. In the following conversation I thought he gave instruction for testing the qualities that make a friendship worth acquiring.

“Tell me, Critobulus,” he said, “if we wanted a good friend, how should we start on the search? Should we seek first for one who is no slave to eating and drinking, lust, sleep, idleness? For someone mastered by these cannot do his duty by himself or a friend.”

“No, of course not.”

“Then you think we should avoid one who is subject to them?”

“I do, certainly.”

“Now what about the spendthrift who is never satisfied, is always appealing to his neighbors for help, does not repay what he receives, and is resentful if he receives nothing? Don’t you think he too is a troublesome friend?”

“Certainly.”

“Then we must avoid him too?”

“We must indeed.”

“Again, what about the able businessman who is eager to make money and consequently drives a hard bargain, who likes to receive but is disinclined to repay?”

“So far as I see, he is even worse than the last.”

“And what of the man with such a passion for business that he has no time for anything but the selfish pursuit of gain?”

“We must avoid him too, I think. There is no profit in knowing him.”

“And what of the quarrelsome person who is willing to provide his friends with plenty of enemies?”

“We must shun him too, of course.”

“Suppose that a man is free from all these faults, but stoops to receive kindness with no thought of returning it?”

“There is no profit in him either. But for what qualities will we try to acquire a friend, Socrates?”

“The opposite of these, I suppose. We shall look for one who has control of his bodily pleasures, who is truly hospitable and fair in his dealings and eager to do as much for his benefactors as he receives from them, so that he is worth knowing.”

“Then how can we test these qualities, Socrates, before familiarity begins?”

“What test do we apply to a sculptor? We don’t judge by what he says but we look at his statues, and if we see that the works he has already produced are beautiful, we feel confident that his future works will be as good.”

“You mean that anyone whose good treatment of his old friends is manifest will clearly prove a benefactor to new friends also?”

“Yes, as when I find that someone has habitually treated his horses well, I think that he will treat other horses equally well.”

“Granted! And once we have found a man who seems worthy of our friendship, how are we to set about making him our friend?”

“First we should seek guidance from the gods, whether they counsel us to make a friend of him.”

“And next? Supposing that we have chosen and the gods approve him, can you say how is he to be hunted?”

“Surely not like a hare by swift pursuit, nor like birds by cunning, nor like enemies by force. It’s hard work to capture a friend against his will and difficult to bind him like a slave. Hatred rather than friendship comes of that treatment.”

“But how does friendship happen?”

“There are spells, they say, which those who know them can use to bewitch whomever they want and make them friends, and there are drugs that those who know about them can give to whomever they want and win their love.”

How then can we acquire this knowledge?"

"You have heard from Homer the spell that the Sirens put on Odysseus. It begins like this:

> 'This way, come this way, renowned Odysseus, great glory of the Achaeans.'

"Then did the Sirens chant this spell for other people too, Socrates, so as to keep the spellbound from leaving them?"

"No, only for those who yearned for the fame that virtue gives."

"You mean, I take it, that the spell must be fitted to the listener, so that he won't take the praise for mockery."

"Yes; for to praise for beauty, stature and strength one who is aware that he is short, ugly and puny, is the way to repel him and make him dislike you more."

"Do you know any other spells?"

"No, but I have heard that Pericles knew many and cast them on the city, and so made her love him."

"And how did Themistocles make the city love him?"

"Not by spells: no, no; but by hanging some good amulet about her."

"I think you mean, Socrates, that if we are to win a good man s friendship, we ourselves must be good in word and deed alike?"

"Did you imagine that a bad man could win the friendship of honest men?"

"I did," answered Critobulus, "for I saw that poor orators have good speakers among their friends, and some who are incapable of commanding an army are intimate with great generals."

"Coming then to the point under discussion, do you know cases of useless persons making useful friends?"

“Assuredly not; but if it is impossible that the bad should gain the friendship of gentlemen, then I am anxious to know whether it is quite easy for a gentleman as a matter of course to be the friend of gentlemen?”

“Your trouble, Critobulus, is that you often find men who do good and shun evil not on friendly terms but apt to quarrel and treat one another more harshly than worthless people.”

“Yes,” said Critobulus, “and such conduct is not confined to individuals, but even the states that care most for the right and have least liking for the wrong are often at enmity. These thoughts discourage me about the acquisition of friends. For I see on the one hand that good-for-nothings cannot be friends with one another — for how could the ungrateful, the careless, the selfish, the faithless, the incontinent, form friendships? I feel sure, then, that good-for-nothings are by their nature enemies rather than friends. But then, as you point out, neither can good-for-nothings ever join in friendship with honest men, for how can wrongdoers become friendly with those who hate their conduct? And if we must add that the practitioners of virtue strive with one another for leadership in states, and envy and hate one another, who then will be friends and where will loyalty and faithfulness be found?”

“Wait, Critobulus, there is a subtle complication in all this. Some elements in human nature make for friendship: people need one another, feel pity, work together for their common good, and, conscious of this, are grateful to one another. But other elements are hostile: holding the same things to be honorable and desirable, people fight for them, fall out, and take sides. Strife and anger lead to hostility, covetousness to enmity, jealousy to hatred. Nevertheless through all these barriers friendship slips, and unites the best people: thanks to their excellence they prize the untroubled security of moderate possessions above sovereignty won by war; despite hunger and thirst, they can share their food and drink without

a pang; and although they delight in the charms of beauty they can resist the lure and avoid offending those whom they should respect; they can not only share wealth lawfully and keep from covetousness, but also supply one another's wants; they can settle strife not only without pain, but with advantage to one another, and prevent anger from pursuing its way toward remorse: but jealousy they take away entirely, regarding their own good things as belonging to their friends, and thinking their friend s good things to be their own. Surely, then, it is likely that the best people will share public honors too not only without harm to one another, but to their common benefit? For those who desire to win honor and to rule in their states that they may have power to embezzle, to treat others with violence, to live in luxury, are bound to be unjust, unscrupulous, incapable of unity. But if a man seeks to be honored in a state that he may not be the victim of injustice himself and may help his friends in a just cause, and when he takes office may try to do some good to his country, why should he be unable to join with one like himself? Will his connection with other gentlemen render him less capable of serving his friends? Will he be less able to benefit his state with the help of other gentlemen? Even in the public games it is clear that, if the strongest competitors were allowed to join forces against the weaker, they would win all the events, they would carry off all the prizes. True, that is not permitted in the games; but in politics, where the gentlemen are the strongest, nobody prevents anyone from forming any combination he may choose for the benefit of the state; surely, then, in public life it is a gain to make friends with the best, and to see in them partners and fellow workers in a common cause, and not rivals. But, again, it is equally clear that anyone who goes to war will need allies, and more of them if he is to fight an army of gentlemen. Moreover, those who are willing to fight at your side must be well treated, so that they

will be willing to exert themselves; and it is a far sounder plan to treat the best well, who are fewer in number, than the worst, who are the more numerous; for the bad want many more favors than the good. Take heart, Critobulus; try to be good, and when you have achieved that, set about catching your gentlemen. Perhaps I myself, as an expert in love, can lend you a hand in the pursuit of gentlemen. For when I want to catch anyone it's surprising how I strain every nerve to have my love returned, my longing reciprocated by him, in my eagerness that he will want me as much as I want him. I see that you too will feel this need when you want to form a friendship. So do not hide from me the names of those whom you wish to make your friends; for I am careful to please him who pleases me, and so, I think, I am not without experience in the pursuit of men."

"Well, Socrates," said Critobulus in reply, "these are the lessons I have long wished to learn, especially if the same skill will serve to win those with good souls as well as those with good bodies."

"No, no, Critobulus," said Socrates, "it's not part of my skill to lay hands on the handsome ones and force them to submit. I am convinced that the reason why men fled from Scylla was that she laid hands on them; but the Sirens laid hands on no man; from far away they sang to all, and therefore, we are told, all submitted, and hearing were enchanted."

"I'm not going to put a hand on anyone," said Critobulus, "so teach me any good plan you know for making friends."

"Then won't you put lip to lip either?"

"Don't worry!" answered Critobulus, "I won't touch a lip with mine either — unless the owner is handsome!"

"That's an unfortunate beginning for you, Critobulus! The handsome won't submit to such conduct; but the ugly like it,

supposing that they are called handsome for the beauty of their souls."

"A kiss for the handsome," exclaimed Critobulus, "and a thousand kisses for the good! That will be my motto, so take courage, and teach me the art of catching friends."

"Well then, Critobulus," said Socrates, "when you want to make a new friend, will you let me warn him that you admire him and want his friendship?"

"Warn him by all means: no one hates those who offer praise, so far as I know."

"Suppose I go on to warn him that your admiration makes you well disposed toward him, you won't think I'm slandering you, will you?"

"No; when I guess that someone feels well disposed toward me, similar goodwill toward him arises in me."

"Then you will permit me to say this about you to those whose friendship you desire. Now if you will give me permission to tell them besides that you are devoted to your friends and nothing gives you so much pleasure as good friends; that you take as much pride in your friends' fine achievements as in your own, and as much pleasure in your friends' good as in your own, and never weary of contriving it for your friends'; and you have made up your mind that a man's excellence consists in outdoing his friends in kindness and his enemies in mischief; then I think you will find me a useful companion in the quest for good friends."

"Now why do you say this to me? as if you were not free to say what you like about me."

"But that's not so, as I once heard from Aspasia. She explained that good matchmakers are successful in making marriages only when the good reports that they circulate are true; false reports she would not recommend, for the victims of deception hate one another and the matchmaker too. I am

convinced that this is sound, and so I think it is not open to me to say anything in your praise that I can't say truthfully."

"It appears, Socrates, that you are the sort of friend to help me if I am in any way qualified to make friends, but if not, you won't make up a story to help me."

"How do you think I will help you best, Critobulus, by false praise or by urging you to try to be a good man? If you don't yet see clearly, take the following cases as illustrations. Suppose that I wanted to get a shipmaster to make you his friend, and as a recommendation told him that you are a good skipper, which is untrue; and suppose that he believed me and put you in charge of his ship in spite of your not knowing how to steer it: have you any reason to expect that you would not lose the ship and your life as well? Or suppose that I falsely represented to the Assembly that you are a born general, jurist and statesman in one, and so persuaded the state to commit its fortunes to you, what do you suppose would happen to the state and to yourself under your guidance? Or again, suppose that I falsely described you to certain citizens in private as a thrifty, careful person, and persuaded them to place their affairs in your hands, wouldn't you do them harm and look ridiculous when you came to the test? No, Critobulus, if you want to be thought good at anything you must try to be so; that is the quickest, the surest, the best way. You will find on reflection that every kind of excellence that people recognize is enhanced by study and practice. Such is the view I take of our duty, Critobulus. If you have anything to say against it, tell me."

"Why, Socrates," said Critobulus, "I would be ashamed to contradict you, for I should be saying what is neither honorable nor true."

7. To pass to another subject: the difficulties of his friends that arose from ignorance he tried to cure by advice, those due

to want by telling them how to help one another according to their power. On this subject too I will state what I know about him.

One day, noticing that Aristarchus looked glum, he said: "Aristarchus, you seem to have a burden on your mind. You should let your friends share it; possibly we can do something to relieve you."

"Ah yes, Socrates," replied Aristarchus, "I am in great difficulty. Since the civil unrest there has been an exodus to the Piraeus, and a crowd of my womenfolk, being left behind, have come to me — sisters, nieces and cousins — so that we are fourteen in the house without counting the slaves. We get nothing from our land because our enemies have seized it, and nothing from our house property now that there are so few residents in the city. Portable property finds no buyers, and it's quite impossible to borrow money anywhere: I really think a search in the street would turn out better than an application for a loan. It's hard, Socrates, to let one's people die but impossible to support so many in times like these."

When Socrates heard this, he asked: "How come Ceramon, with so many mouths to feed, not only contrives to provide for the needs of himself and his family but actually saves enough to get rich, whereas you, with so many mouths to feed, fear you will all be starved to death?"

"The explanation, of course, is this: my dependents are free, his are slaves."

"And which do you think are the better, his slaves or your free folk?"

"My free folk, I think."

"Then isn't disgraceful that he does well by his lower types while you with your better types are in difficulty?"

"Of course, his dependents are skilled workers while mine have had a liberal education."

“What is a skilled worker? one who knows how to produce something useful?”

“Certainly”

“Are groats useful?”

“Yes, very.”

“And bread?”

“No less so.”

“What about men’s and women’s coats, shirts, jackets, tunics?”

“Yes, all these things too are very useful.”

“Then don’t the members of your household know how to make any of these?”

“I believe they can make all of them.”

“Then aren’t you aware that by manufacturing one of these commodities, namely groats, Nausicydes supports not only himself and his family but large herds of pigs and cattle as well, and has so much to spare that he often undertakes costly public works; that Cyrebus feeds his whole family well and lives in luxury by baking bread, Demeas of Collytus by making jackets, Menon by making cloaks; and that most of the Megarians make a good living out of tunics?”

“Yes, of course; they buy foreign slaves and can force them to make what does well, but my household is free folk and relatives.”

“And so, just because they are free and related to you, you think they should do nothing but eat and sleep? Do you find that other free folk who live this sort of life are better off and happier than those who are usefully employed in work that they understand? Or is it your experience that idleness and carelessness help people to learn what they ought to know and remember what they learn, to make themselves healthy and strong, and to get and keep things that are of practical use,

but industry and carefulness are useless things? When these women learned what you say they know, did they regard it as of no practical use, and had they no intention of taking it up, or did they mean to occupy themselves in it and obtain some benefit from it? Which makes men more prudent, idleness or useful employment? Which makes people more just, work or idle discussion about supplies? Besides, at present, I imagine, you don't like these women and they don't like you: you think they're a drain on you and they see that you consider them a burden. And the danger in this situation is that dislike may grow and their former gratitude might fade away; but if you exert your authority and make them work, you will like them when you find that they are profitable to you, and they will be fond of you when they feel that you are pleased with them. Both you and they will like to recall past kindnesses and will strengthen the feeling of gratitude that these engender; thus you will be better friends and feel more at home. To be sure, if they were going to do something disgraceful, death would be a better fate. But in fact what they know how to do is what is considered the most honorable and the most suitable for women, it seems to me; and everyone does what they know with the greatest ease, speed, pride and pleasure. So don't hesitate to offer them work that will profit both you and them, and probably they will welcome your proposal."

"Well, I swear, Socrates," said Aristarchus, "your advice seems so good that I think I'll up and borrow capital to make a start in business. Before now I've had no inclination to do so, knowing that when I'd spent the loan, I wouldn't have the wherewithal to repay it."

The consequence was that capital was provided and wool purchased. The women worked during breakfast and stopped at the lunch hour. There were happy instead of gloomy faces; suspicious glances were exchanged for pleasant smiles. They liked him as a guardian and he was fond of them because they

were useful. Finally, Aristarchus came to Socrates and told him this with delight. “Their only complaint about me,” he added, “is that I’m the only member of the household who doesn’t work for his food.”

“Then why not tell them the story of the dog?” asked Socrates. “They say that when animals could talk, a sheep said to her master: ‘It’s strange that you give us sheep nothing but what we get from the land, though we supply you with wool and lambs and cheese, and yet you share your own food with your dog, who supplies you with none of these things.’ The dog heard this and said: ‘Of course he does. Don’t I keep you from being stolen by thieves and carried off by wolves? Why, but for my protection you couldn’t even eat for fear of being killed.’ And so, they say, the sheep admitted the dog’s claim to preference. So, tell these women that you are their watchdog and keeper, and it is due to you that they live and work in safety and comfort, with none to harm them.”

8. Again, on meeting an old comrade after a long time apart he said: “Where have you been, Eutherus?”

“I came home when the war ended, Socrates, and I’m now living here,” he replied. “Since we have lost our foreign property, and my father left me nothing in Attica, I am forced to settle down here now and work for my living with my hands. I think it’s better than begging, especially as I have no security to offer for a loan.”

“And how long will you have the strength, do you think, to earn your living by working?”

“Oh, not long, of course.”

“And remember, when you get old you will have to spend money, and nobody will be willing to pay you for your labor.”

True.

“Then it would be better to take up some kind of work at once that will assure you a living when you get old, and to go

to somebody who is better off and wants an assistant, and get a return for your services by acting as his foreman, helping to get in his crops and looking after his property."

"I wouldn't like to make myself a slave, Socrates."

"But surely those who control their cities and take charge of public affairs are thought more respectable, not more slavish on that account."

"Briefly, Socrates, I have no inclination to expose myself to any man's censure."

"But you see, Eutherus, it is by no means easy to find a job in which one is not liable to censure. Whatever one does, it is difficult to avoid mistakes, and it is difficult to escape unfair criticism even if one makes no mistakes. I wonder if you find it easy to avoid complaints entirely even from your present employers. You should try, therefore, to have no truck with grumblers and to attach yourself to considerate masters; to undertake such duties as you can perform and beware of any that are too much for you, and, whatever you do, to give of your best and put your heart into the job. In this way, I think, you are most likely to escape censure, find relief from your difficulties, live in ease and security, and obtain ample funds for old age."

9. I remember that he once heard Crito say that life at Athens was difficult for a man who wanted to mind his own business. "At this moment," Crito added, "actions are pending against me not because I have done the plaintiffs an injury, but because they think that I would sooner pay than have trouble."

"Tell me, Crito," said Socrates, "do you keep dogs to fend the wolves from your sheep?"

"Certainly," replied Crito, "because it pays me better to keep them."

“Then why not keep a man who may be able and willing to fend off the attempts to injure you?”

“I would gladly do so if I were not afraid that he might turn on me.”

“What? Don’t you see that it is much more pleasant to profit by humoring a man like you than by quarreling with him? I assure you there are men in this city who would take pride in your friendship.”

At that they sought out Archedemus, an excellent speaker and man of affairs, but poor. For he was not one of those who make money unscrupulously but an honest man, and he would say that it was easy to take forfeit from false accusers. So whenever Crito was storing corn, oil, wine, wool or other farm produce, he would make a present of a portion to Archedemus, and when he sacrificed, he invited him, and in fact lost no similar opportunity of showing courtesy. Archedemus came to regard Crito s house as a haven of refuge and constantly paid his respects to him. He soon found out that Crito s false accusers had much to answer for and many enemies. He brought one of them to trial on a charge involving damages or imprisonment. The defendant, conscious that he was guilty on many counts, did all he could to get free of Archedemus. But Archedemus refused to let him off until he withdrew the action against Crito and compensated him. Archedemus carried through several other enterprises of a similar kind; and now many of Crito s friends begged him to make Archedemus their protector, just as when a shepherd has a good dog the other shepherds want to pen their flocks near his, in order to get the benefit of his dog. Archedemus was glad to humor Crito, and so there was peace not only for Crito but for his friends as well. If anyone whom he had offended reproached Archedemus with flattering Crito because he found him useful, he would answer: “Which, then, is disgraceful: to have honest men for your friends, by

accepting and returning their favors, and to fall out with bad people; or to treat gentlemen as enemies by trying to injure them, and to make friends of bad people by siding with them, and to prefer their company?"

Henceforward Archedemus was respected by Crito s friends and was himself counted among them.

10. Again I recall the following conversation between him and his companion Diodorus.

"Tell me, Diodorus," he said, "if one of your servants runs away, do you take steps to bring him back safe?"

"Yes, of course," he replied, "and I invite others to help by offering a reward for his recovery."

"And further, if one of your servants is ill, do you take care of him and call-in doctors to prevent his death?"

"Indeed, I do."

"Well, suppose that one of your acquaintances, who is much more useful than your servants, is near being ruined by want, don't you think it worth your while to take steps to save him? Now you know that Hermogenes is a conscientious man and would be ashamed to take a favor from you without making a return. Yet surely it is worth many servants to have a willing, loyal, staunch subordinate, capable of doing what he is told, and not only so, but able to make himself useful without being told, to think clearly and give advice. Good householders, you know, say that the right time to buy is when a valuable article can be bought at a low price; and in these times the circumstances afford an opportunity of acquiring good friends very cheap."

"Thank you, Socrates," said Diodorus, "and do invite Hermogenes to call on me."

"I will not," he replied; "for in my opinion it is at least as good for you to go to him yourself as to invite him to come to

you, and you have quite as much to gain by doing so as he does."

And so Diodorus took off to visit Hermogenes; and in return for a small sum, he acquired a friend who made a point of thinking how he could help and please him either by word or deed.

BOOK III

1. I will now explain how he helped those who were eager to win distinction by making them qualify themselves for the honors they aimed for. He once heard that Dionysodorus had arrived at Athens and was proclaiming his intention to teach generalship. Aware that one of his companions wished to obtain the office of general from the state, he had a word with him: "Young man, surely it would be disgraceful for one who wishes to be a general in the state to neglect the opportunity of learning the duties, and he would deserve to be punished by the state much more than one who carved statues without having learned to be a sculptor. For in the dangerous times of war the whole state is in the general s hands, and great good may come from his success and great evil from his failure. Therefore, anyone who exerts himself to gain the votes, but neglects to learn the business, deserves punishment."

This speech persuaded the man to go and learn. When he had learned his lesson and returned, Socrates began to tease him. "Gentlemen," he said, "don't you think that our friend looks more 'majestic,' as Homer called Agamemnon, now that he has learned generalship? For just as one who has learned to play the harp is a harper even when he doesn't play, and one who has studied medicine is a doctor even though he doesn't practice, so our friend will be a general forever, even if no one votes for him. But your ignoramus is neither general nor doctor, even if he gets every vote. But," he continued, "in order that any one of us who may happen to command a regiment or platoon under you may have a better knowledge of warfare, tell us the first lesson he gave you in generalship."

"The first was like the last," he replied; "he taught me tactics — nothing else."

"But then that is only a small part of generalship. For a general must also be capable of furnishing military equipment

and providing supplies for the men; he must be resourceful, active, careful, hardy and quick-witted; he must be both gentle and brutal, at once straightforward and designing, capable of both caution and surprise, lavish and rapacious, generous and grasping, skillful in defense and attack; and there are many other qualifications, some natural, some acquired, that are necessary to one who would succeed as a general. It is well to understand tactics too; for there is a wide difference between right and wrong disposition of the troops, just as stones, bricks, timber and tiles flung together any which way are useless, whereas when the materials that neither rot nor decay, that is the stones and tiles, are placed at the bottom and the top, and the bricks and timber are put together in the middle, as in building, the result is something of great value, a house in fact."

"Your analogy is perfect, Socrates," said the youth; "for in war one must put the best men in the van and the rear, and the worst in the center, so that they're led by the van and driven forward by the rearguard."

"Well and good, provided that he taught you also to distinguish the good men and the bad. If not, what have you gained by your lessons? No more than you would have gained if he had ordered you to put the best money at the head and tail, and the worst in the middle, without telling you how to distinguish the good from the counterfeit."

"No, that he didn't teach us: we would have to judge for ourselves which are the good men and which are the bad."

"Then we had better consider how we can avoid mistaking them."

"I agree," said the youth.

"Well now," said Socrates, "if we had to lay hands on a sum of money, would not the right arrangement be to put the greediest men in the front?"

"I think so."

"And what should we do with those who are going to face danger? Should our first line consist of the most ambitious?"

"Oh yes: they are the men who will face danger for the sake of glory. About these, now, there is no mystery: they are conspicuous everywhere, and so it is easy to find them."

"But," said Socrates, "did he teach you only the disposition of an army, or did he include where and how to use each formation?"

"Not at all."

"And yet there are many situations that call for a modification of tactics and strategy."

"I assure you he didn't explain that."

"Then do go back and ask him. If he knows and has a conscience, he will be ashamed to send you home deficient, after taking your money."

2. One day when he met a man who had been chosen general, he asked him, "Why do you think Homer dubs Agamemnon 'shepherd of the people'? Is it because a shepherd should care that his sheep are safe and have what they need, and that the purpose for which they are kept is achieved, and a general should take care that his men are safe and have what they need, and that the purpose for which they fight is achieved? And do they fight so that that victory over the enemy will add to their happiness? Or what reason can Homer have had for praising Agamemnon as 'both a good king and a strong warrior too'? Is it that he would be 'a strong warrior too' not if he alone were a good fighter but if he made all his men like himself; and 'a good king' not if he merely ordered his own life well but if he made his subjects happy as well? Because a king is chosen not to take good care of himself but for the good of those who have chosen him; and all men fight in order that they may get the best life possible, and choose generals to

guide them to it. Therefore, it is the commander s duty to deliver this for those who have chosen him as general. For anything more honorable than that is not easy to find, or anything more disgraceful than its opposite."

By these reflections on what constitutes a good leader he stripped away all other virtues and left just the power to make his followers happy.

3. Again, when someone had been chosen a leader of cavalry, I remember that Socrates conversed with him in the following manner:

"Young man," he said, "can you tell us why you hankered after a cavalry command? I presume it was not to be first of the cavalry in the charge; for that privilege belongs to the mounted archers; at any rate they ride ahead of their commanders even."

True.

"Nor was it to get yourself known either. Even madmen are known to everyone."

"True again."

"But perhaps you think you can hand over the cavalry in better condition to the state when you retire, and can do something for the good of the state as a cavalry leader in case there is any occasion to employ the cavalry?"

"Yes, certainly," said he.

"Yes," said Socrates, "and no doubt it's a fine thing if you can do that. The command, I presume, for which you have been chosen, is the command of horses and riders."

"Indeed it is."

"Come then, tell us first how you propose to improve the horses."

"Oh, but I don't think that is my business. Every man must look after his own horse."

“Then if some of your men appear on parade with their horses sick or suffering from bad feet or sore legs, others with underfed animals that can’t keep the pace, or so disobedient that they won’t stay where you line them up, or such bad kickers that it’s impossible to line them up at all, what use will your cavalry be to you? How will you be able to do the state any good with a command like that?”

“I am much obliged to you,” he replied, “and I will try to look after the horses carefully.”

“Won’t you also try to improve the men?” said Socrates.

“I will.”

“Then will you first train them to mount better?”

“Oh yes, I must, so that if anyone is thrown, he may have a better chance of saving himself.”

“Further, when there is some danger before you, will you order them to draw the enemy into the sandy ground where your maneuvers are held, or will you try to carry out your training in the kind of country that the enemy occupy?”

“Oh yes, that is the better way.”

“And again, will you have a care to bring down as many of the enemy as possible without dismounting?”

“Oh yes, that too is the better way.”

“Have you thought of fostering a keen spirit among the men and hatred of the enemy, so as to make them more gallant in action?”

“Well, I will certainly try to do so now!”

“And have you considered how to make the men obey you? Because without that horses and men, however good and gallant, are of no use.”

“True, but what is the best way of encouraging them to obey, Socrates?”

“Well, I suppose you know that under all conditions human beings are most willing to obey those whom they believe to be the best. Thus in sickness they most readily obey the doctor, on board ship the pilot, on a farm the farmer whom they think to be most capable at farming.”

“Yes, certainly.”

“Then it is likely that in horsemanship too, one who clearly knows best what ought to be done will most easily gain the obedience of the others.”

“If then, Socrates, I am plainly the best horseman among them, will that suffice to gain their obedience?”

“Yes, if you also show them that it will be safer and more honorable for them to obey you.”

“How, then, shall I show that?”

“Well, it’s far easier than if you had to show them that bad is better than good and more profitable.”

“Do you mean that in addition to his other duties a cavalry leader must take care to be a good speaker?”

“Did you suppose that a commander of cavalry should be mum? Did you never reflect that all the best we have learned according to custom — the learning, I mean, that teaches us how to live — we learned by means of words, and that every other good lesson to be learned is learned by means of words; that the best teachers rely most on the spoken word and those with the deepest knowledge of the greatest subjects are the best talkers? Did you never reflect that, whenever one chorus is selected from the citizens of this state — for instance, the chorus that is sent to Delos — none from any other place can compare with it, and no state can collect so impressive a company?”

“True.”

“And yet the reason is that Athenians excel all others not so much in singing or in stature or in strength as in love of honor, which is the strongest incentive to deeds of honor and renown.”

“True again.”

“Then don’t you think that if one took the same pains with our cavalry, they too would greatly excel others in arms and horses and discipline and readiness to face the enemy, if they thought that they would win glory and honor by it?”

“I expect so.”

“Don’t hesitate then, but try to encourage this keenness among the men: both you and your fellow citizens will benefit by the results of your efforts.”

“Most certainly I will try.”

4. Once on seeing Nicomachides returning from the elections, he asked, “Who have been chosen generals, Nicomachides?”

“Isn’t it like the Athenians?” he replied; “they haven’t chosen me after all the hard work I have done since I was called up in the command of company or regiment, though I have been so often wounded in action” (and here he uncovered and showed his scars); “yet they have chosen Antisthenes, who has never served in a marching regiment nor distinguished himself in the cavalry and understands nothing but moneymaking.”

“Isn’t that a recommendation,” said Socrates, “supposing he proves capable of supplying the men’s needs?”

“Well,” said Nicomachides, “merchants too are capable of making money, but that doesn’t make them fit to command an army.”

“But,” said Socrates, “Antisthenes also is eager for victory, and that is a good point in a general. Whenever he serves as chorus master, don’t you know, his chorus always wins.”

“No doubt,” said Nicomachides, “but there is no analogy between the handling of a chorus and of an army.”

“But look,” said Socrates, “though Antisthenes knows nothing about music or chorus training, he showed himself capable of finding the best experts in these.”

“In the army too, then,” said Nicomachides, “he will find others to command for him, and others to do the fighting.”

“And therefore,” said Socrates, “if he searches out and prefers the best men in warfare as in chorus training it is likely that he will be victorious in that too; and probably he will be more ready to spend on winning a battle for the whole state than on winning a choral competition for his tribe.”

“Do you mean to say, Socrates, that the man who succeeds with a chorus will also succeed with an army?”

“I mean that whatever a man controls, if he knows what he wants and can get it he will be a good controller, whether he controls a chorus, an estate, a city, or an army.”

“Really, Socrates,” said Nicomachides, “I would never have expected to hear you say that good business men would make good generals.”

“Come then, let s review the duties of each and find out whether they are the same or different.”

“By all means.”

“Is it not the duty of both to make their subordinates willing and obedient?”

“Decidedly.”

“And to put the right man in the right place?”

“That is so.”

“I suppose, moreover, that both should punish the bad and reward the good.”

“Yes, certainly.”

“Of course, both will do well to win the goodwill of those under them?”

“That is so.”

“Do you think that it is in the interest of both to attract allies and helpers?”

“Yes, certainly.”

“And shouldn’t both be able to keep what they have?”

“They should indeed.”

“And shouldn’t both be careful and industrious in their own work?”

“All these are common to both; but fighting is not.”

“But surely both are bound to find enemies?”

“Oh yes, they are.”

“Then isn’t it important for both to get the better of them?”

“Undoubtedly; but you don’t say how business capacity will help when it comes to fighting.”

“That is just where it will be most helpful. For the good business man, through his knowledge that nothing profits or pays like a victory in the field, and nothing is so utterly unprofitable and entails such heavy loss as a defeat, will be eager to seek and furnish all aids to victory, careful to consider and avoid what leads to defeat, prompt to engage the enemy if he sees they are strong enough to win, and, above all, will avoid an engagement when he is not ready. Don’t look down on business men, Nicomachides. For the management of private concerns differs only in quantity from that of public affairs. In other respects, they are much alike, and particularly in this, that neither can be carried on without people, and the people employed in private and public

transactions are the same: for those who take charge of public affairs employ just the same people when they attend to their own; and those who understand how to employ them are successful directors of public and private concerns, and those who do not fail at both."

5. Once when talking with the son of the great Pericles, he said: "Tor my part, Pericles, now that you have become general I feel hopeful that our city will be more efficient and more famous in the art of war, and will defeat our enemies."

"I could wish," answered Pericles, "that it might be as you say, Socrates; but how these changes are to come about I cannot see."

"Would you like to discuss them with me, then," said Socrates, "and consider how they can be brought about?"

"I would."

"Do you know then, that numerically the Athenians are not inferior to the Boeotians?"

"Yes, I know."

"From which side do you think the larger number of fine, well-developed men could be selected: the Boeotians or the Athenians?"

"In that respect too they seem to be at no disadvantage."

"Which do you think are the more united?"

"The Athenians, I should say, for many of the Boeotians resent the selfish behavior of the Thebans. At Athens I see nothing of that sort."

"And again, the Athenians are more ambitious and more high-minded than other peoples; and these qualities are among the strongest incentives to heroism and patriotic self-sacrifice."

"Yes, in these respects too, the Athenians needn't fear criticism."

“And besides, none have inherited a past more replete with great deeds; and many are heartened by such a heritage and encouraged to care for excellence and prove their gallantry.”

“All you have said is true, Socrates. But you see, since the disasters sustained by Tolmides and the Thousand at Lebadea and by Hippocrates at Delium, the relations of the Athenians and Boeotians are changed: the glory of the Athenians is brought low, the pride of the Thebans is exalted; and now the Boeotians, who formerly would not dare, even in their own country, to face the Athenians without help from Sparta and the rest of the Peloponnese, threaten to invade Attica by themselves, and the Athenians, who formerly overran Boeotia, fear that the Boeotians may plunder Attica.”

“I am quite aware of that,” answered Socrates; “but the disposition of our city is now more to a good ruler s liking. For confidence breeds carelessness, slackness, disobedience: fear makes men more attentive, more obedient, more amenable to discipline. The behavior of sailors is a case in point: so long as they have nothing to fear they are, I believe, an unruly lot, but when they expect a storm or an attack not only do they carry out all orders, but they watch in silence for the word of command like choristers.”

“Well,” said Pericles, “if they are now in the mood for obedience, it seems time to say how we can revive in them a longing for the old excellence and fame and happiness.”

“If then,” said Socrates, “we wanted them to claim money that others held, the best way of egging them on to seize it would be to show them that it was their fathers’ money and belongs to them. As we want them to strive for preeminence in excellence, we must show that this be longed to them in the old days and that by striving for it they will surpass all other men.”

“How then can we teach this?”

“I think by reminding them that their earliest ancestors of whom we have any account were, as they themselves have been told, the most valiant.”

“Do you refer to the judgment of the gods, which Cecrops delivered in his court because of his excellence?”

“Yes, and the care and birth of Erectheus, and the war waged in his day with all the adjacent country, and the war between the sons of Heracles and the Peloponnesians, and all the wars waged in the days of Theseus, in all of which they were manifest champions among the men of their time. You may add the victories of their descendants, who lived not long before our own day: some they gained unaided in their struggle with the lords of all Asia and of Europe as far as Macedonia, the owners of more power and wealth than the world had ever seen, who had wrought deeds that none had equaled; in others they were fellow champions with the Peloponnesians both on land and sea. These men, like their fathers, are reported to have been far superior to all other men of their time.”

“Yes, that is their reputation.”

“Therefore, though there have been many migrations in Greece, they continued to inhabit their own land: many referred to them their rival claims, many found a refuge with them from the brutality of oppressors.”

“Yes, Socrates,” said Pericles, “and I wonder how our city can have declined so badly.”

“My own view,” replied Socrates, “is that as a consequence of their great superiority the Athenians grew careless of themselves and have thus fallen into decline, much as athletes who are in a class by themselves and easily win the championship are apt to grow slack and fall behind their rivals.”

“How, then, can they now recover their old excellence?”

“I see no mystery about it. If they find out the practices of their ancestors and practice them as well as they did, they will come to be as good as they were; or failing that, they need but to imitate those who now hold preeminence and follow their practices, and if they are equally careful in observing them, they will be as good as they, and, if more careful, even better.”

“You’re talking about perfection being a long way off for our city. For when will Athenians show the Spartan reverence for age, seeing that they despise all their elders, beginning with their own fathers? When will they adopt the Spartan system of training, seeing that they not only neglect to make themselves fit, but laugh at those who take the trouble to do so? When will they reach that standard of obedience to their rulers, seeing that they make contempt of rulers a point of honor? Or when will they attain that harmony, seeing that instead of working together for the general good they are more envious and bitter against one another than against the rest of the world, are the most quarrelsome of men in public and private assemblies, most often go to law with one another, and would rather make profit from one another that way than by mutual service, and while regarding public affairs as alien to themselves yet fight over them too, and find their chief enjoyment in having the means to carry on such strife? So it happens that mischief and evil grow abundantly in the city, enmity and mutual hatred spring up among the people, so that I am always dreading that some unbearable evil may befall the city.”

“No no, Pericles, don’t think the wickedness of the Athenians so utterly past remedy. Don’t you see what good discipline they maintain in their fleets, how well they obey the umpires in athletic contests, how they take orders from the chorus trainers as readily as any?”

“Ah yes, and it’s strange indeed that such groups submit themselves to their masters, and yet the infantry and cavalry,

who are supposed to be the pick of the citizens for good character, are the most insubordinate."

Then Socrates asked, "But what of the Court of the Areopagus, Pericles? Aren't its members people who have won approval?"

"Certainly."

"Then do you know of any who decide the cases that come before them and perform all their other functions more honorably, more in accordance with law, with more dignity and justice?"

"I am not finding fault with the Areopagus."

"Then you must not despair of Athenian discipline."

"But look, in the army, where good conduct, discipline, submission are most necessary, our people pay no attention to them."

"This," said Socrates, "maybe due to the incompetence of their officers. You must have noticed that no one attempts to exercise authority over our harpists, choristers, and dancers if he is incompetent, nor over wrestlers or pancratiasts? All who have authority over them can tell where they learned their business; but most of our generals are improvisers. I don't, however, suppose you are one of this sort, and I imagine you're as sure about when you began to learn strategy as when you began wrestling. Many of the principles, I think, you have inherited from your father, and many others you have gathered from every source from which you could learn anything useful to a general. I think, too, that you are very careful not unconsciously to lack any knowledge useful to a general; and if you find that you don't know something you seek out those who do know, grudging neither gifts nor thanks so as to learn from them what you don't know and get the benefit of good coaching."

“I can see, Socrates, that in saying this you don’t really think I study these things but are trying to show me that one who is going to command an army must study all of them; and of course, I admit that you are right.”

“Have you observed, Pericles, that our frontier is protected by great mountains extending to Boeotia, through which there are steep and narrow passes leading into our land, and that the interior is cut across by rugged mountains?”

“Certainly.”

“Further, have you heard that the Mysians and Pisidians, occupying very rugged country in the Great King’s territory and lightly armed, manage to overrun and damage the King’s territory and to preserve their own freedom?”

“Yes, I have heard that.”

“And don’t you think that active young Athenians, more lightly armed and occupying the mountains that protect our country, would prove a thorn in the side of the enemy and a strong bulwark of defense to our people?”

“Socrates,” replied Pericles, “I think all these suggestions too have a practical value.”

“Well, since you like them, adopt them, sir. Any part of them that you carry out will bring honor to you and good to the state; and should you fail in part, you will neither harm the state nor disgrace yourself.”

6. Ariston’s son, Glaucon, was attempting to become an orator and striving for leadership in the state, though he was less than twenty years old; and none of his friends or relations could dissuade him, though he would get himself dragged from the platform and make himself a laughingstock. Only Socrates, who took an interest in him for the sake of Plato and Glaucous son Charmides, managed to dissuade him.

For once on meeting him, he stopped him and managed to engage his attention by saying: “Glaucon, have you made up your mind to be our head of state?”

“I have, Socrates.”

“Well, there’s certainly no more honorable ambition in the world; for obviously, if you succeed you will be able to get whatever you want, and you will have the means of helping your friends: you will lift up your father’s house and exalt your fatherland; and you will make a name for yourself first at home, later on in Greece, and possibly, like Themistocles, in foreign lands as well; wherever you go, you will be a celebrity”

When Glaucon heard this, he felt proud and gladly lingered.

Next Socrates asked, “Well, Glaucon, since you want to win honor, isn’t it obvious that you must benefit your city?”

“Most certainly.”

“Please don’t be reticent then, but tell us how you propose to begin your services to the state.”

When Glaucon remained dumb, apparently considering for the first time how to begin, Socrates said: “If you wanted to add to a friend’s fortune, you would set about making him richer. Will you try, then, to make your city richer?”

“Certainly.”

“Wouldn’t she be richer if she had a larger revenue?”

“She probably would.”

“Now tell me, from what sources are the city’s revenues at present derived and what is their total? No doubt you have gone into this matter in order to raise the amount of any that are deficient and supply any that are lacking.”

“Why, no,” said Glaucon, “I haven’t gone into that.”

“Well, if you have left that out, tell us the expenditures of the city; no doubt you intend to cut back any that are excessive.”

“The fact is, I haven’t had time for that either.”

“Oh, then we’ll postpone the matter of making the city richer; for how is it possible to look after income and expenditure without knowing what they are?”

“Well, Socrates, one can make enemies contribute to the city’s wealth.”

“Yes of course, provided he is stronger than they; but if he be weaker he may lose what the city has got instead.”

“True.”

“Therefore, in order to advise about whom to fight, it is necessary to know the city’s strength and the enemy’s, so that if the city is stronger one may recommend going to war, but if weaker, being cautious.”

“You are right.”

“First then, tell us the naval and military strength of our city, and then that of her enemies.”

“No, of course I can’t tell you out of my head.”

“Well, if you have made notes, fetch them, for I would greatly like to hear this.”

“But, I tell you, I haven’t made any notes either.”

“Then we will postpone offering advice about war too for the present. You are new to power and perhaps haven’t had time to investigate such big problems. But the defense of the country, now, I feel sure you have thought about that, and know how many of the garrisons are well placed and how many are not, and how many of the guards are efficient and how many are not; and you will propose to strengthen the well-placed garrisons and eliminate the superfluous ones.”

“No no; I will propose to eliminate them all, for the only effect of maintaining them is that our crops are stolen.”

“But if you eliminate the garrisons, don’t you think that anyone will be at liberty to rob us openly? However, have you

been on a tour of inspection, or how do you know that they are badly maintained?"

"By guesswork."

"Then will we wait to offer advice on this question too until we really know, instead of merely guessing?"

"Perhaps it would be better."

"Now for the silver mines. I am sure you haven't visited them and so can't say why the amount derived from them has fallen."

"No indeed, I haven't been there."

"Of course not: the district is considered unhealthy, and so when you have to offer advice on the problem this excuse will serve."

"You're teasing me."

"Oh, but there's one problem I feel sure you haven't overlooked: no doubt you have calculated how long the grain grown in the country will maintain the population and how much is needed annually, so that should the city at any time run short you will not be caught napping but come to the rescue and relieve the city by giving expert advice about food."

"You're talking about an overwhelming task, if one must include things like that in one's duties!"

"But you know, no one will ever manage even his own household successfully unless he knows all its needs and sees that they are all supplied. Seeing that our city contains more than ten thousand houses, and it is difficult to look after so many families at once, you must have tried to make a start by doing something for one, I mean your uncle's? It needs it; and if you succeed with that one, you can set to work on a larger number. But if you can't do anything for one, how are you going to succeed with many? If a man can't carry one talent it's absurd for him to try to carry more than one, isn't it?"

“Well, I could do something for uncle’s household if only he would listen to me.”

“What? You can’t persuade your uncle, and yet you suppose you will be able to persuade all the Athenians, including your uncle, to listen to you? Do take care, Glaucon, that your daring ambition doesn’t lead to a fall! Don’t you see how risky it is to say or do what you don’t understand? Think of others whom you know to be the sort of men who say and do what they obviously don’t understand. Do you think they get praise or blame for it? And think of those who understand what they say and what they do. You will find, I think, that the men who are famous and admired are always among those who have the widest knowledge, and the infamous and despised among the most ignorant. Therefore, if you want to win fame and admiration in public life, try to get a thorough knowledge of what you propose to do. If you enter on a public career with this advantage over others, I should not be surprised if you gained the object of your ambition quite easily.”

7. Seeing that Glaucon’s son, Charmides, was a respectable man and far more capable than the politicians of the day but nevertheless shrank from speaking in the assembly and taking a part in politics, he said: “Tell me, Charmides, what would you think of a man who was capable of gaining a victory in the great games and consequently of winning honor for himself and adding to his country’s fame in the Greek world, and yet refused to compete?”

“I should think him a sissy and a coward, of course.”

“Then if a man were to shrink from state business though capable of discharging it with advantage to the state and honor to himself, wouldn’t it be reasonable to think him a coward?”

“Perhaps; but why ask me that?”

“Because I think that you shrink from work that is within your powers, work in which it is your duty as a citizen to take a hand.”

“What makes you think so? In what sort of work have you discovered my powers?”

“In your associations with public men. Whenever they take counsel with you, I find that you give excellent advice, and whenever they make a mistake, your criticism is sound.”

“A private conversation is a very different thing from a crowded debate, Socrates.”

“But look, a man who is good at figures counts as well in a crowd as in solitude; and those who play the harp best in private excel no less in a crowd.”

“But surely you see that bashfulness and timidity come natural to a man and affect him far more powerfully in the presence of a multitude than in private society?”

“Yes, and I mean to give you a lesson. The wisest do not make you bashful and the strongest do not make you timid; yet you are ashamed to address an audience of mere dunces and weaklings. Who are they that make you ashamed? The fullers or the cobblers or the builders or the smiths or the farmers or the merchants, or the traffickers in the marketplace who think of nothing but buying cheap and selling dear? For these are the people who make up the Assembly. You’re no different than a man who can beat trained athletes but fears amateurs! You are at your ease when you talk with the first men in the state, some of whom despise you, and you are a far better talker than the ordinary run of politicians; and yet you are shy of addressing people who never gave a thought to public affairs and haven’t learned to despise you — all because you fear being laughed at!”

“Well, don’t you think those with sound arguments in the Assembly often get laughed at?”

“Yes, and so do the others; and that’s why I am surprised that you, who find it easy to manage them when they do it, think you will be quite unable to deal with the Assembly. My good man, don’t be ignorant of yourself: don’t fall into the common error. For so many are in such a hurry to pry into other people’s business that they never turn aside to examine themselves. Don’t refuse to face this duty then: strive more earnestly to pay heed to yourself; and don’t neglect public affairs, if you have the power to improve them. If they go well, not only the people but your friends and you yourself will profit at least as much as they will.”

8. When Aristippus attempted to cross-examine Socrates in the same fashion as he had been cross-examined by him in their previous encounter, Socrates, wishing to benefit his companions, answered like a man resolved to do what is right and not like a debater guarding against any distortion of the argument.

Aristippus asked if he knew of anything good, so that if Socrates mentioned some good thing, such as food, drink, money, health, strength, or daring, he might show that it is sometimes bad. But Socrates, knowing that when anything troubles us we need what will put an end to the trouble, gave the best answer: “Are you asking me,” he said, “whether I know of anything good for a fever?”

“No, not that.”

“For ophthalmia?”

“Not that either.”

“For hunger?”

“No, not for hunger either.”

“Well, if you are asking me whether I know of anything good in relation to nothing, I don’t know or want to know.”

Again, Aristippus asked him whether he knew of anything beautiful: “Yes, many things,” he replied.

“All like one another?”

“On the contrary, some are as unlike as they can be.”

“How then can that which is unlike the beautiful be beautiful?”

“The reason, of course, is that a beautiful wrestler is unlike a beautiful runner, a shield beautiful for defense is utterly unlike a javelin beautiful for swift and powerful hurling.”

“That is the same answer as you gave to my question whether you knew of anything good.”

“You think, do you, that good is one thing and beautiful another? Don’t you know that all things are both beautiful and good in relation to the same things? In the first place, excellence is not a good thing in relation to some things and a beautiful thing in relation to others. Men, again, are called ‘beautiful and good’ in the same respect and in relation to the same things: it is in relation to the same things that men’s bodies look beautiful and good and that all other things men use are thought beautiful and good, namely, in relation to those things for which they are useful.”

“Is a dung basket beautiful then?”

“Of course, and a golden shield is ugly, if the one is well made for its special work and the other badly.”

“Do you mean that the same things are both beautiful and ugly?”

“Of course — and both good and bad. For what is good for hunger is often bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; what is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling, and what is beautiful for wrestling ugly for running. For all things are good and beautiful in relation to those purposes for which they are well adapted, bad and ugly in relation to those for which they are poorly adapted.”

Again, his dictum about houses, that the same house is both beautiful and useful, was a lesson in the art of building houses as they ought to be.

He approached the problem this way: “When we mean to have the right sort of house, should we arrange to make it as pleasant to live in and as useful as can be?”

And this being admitted, “Is it pleasant,” he asked, “to have it cool in summer and warm in winter?”

And when they agreed with this also, “Now in houses with a southern exposure, the sun s rays penetrate into the porticoes in winter but in summer the path of the sun is right over our heads and above the roof, so that there is shade. If, then, this is the best arrangement, we should build the south side higher to get the winter sun and the north side lower to keep out the cold winds. In brief, the house where the owner can find a pleasant retreat at all seasons and can store his belongings safely is presumably at once the most pleasant and the most beautiful. As for paintings and decorations, they rob us of more delights than they give.”

For temples and altars, the most suitable setting, he said, was a conspicuous site remote from traffic; for it is pleasant to breathe a prayer at the sight of them, and pleasant to approach them in a pure state.

9. When asked again whether courage could be taught or came naturally, he replied: “I think that just as one man’s body is naturally stronger than another’s for labor, so one man’s soul is naturally braver than another’s in danger. For I notice that men brought up under the same laws and customs differ widely in daring. Nevertheless, I think that every man’s nature acquires more courage by learning and practice. Of course, Scythians and Thracians would not dare to take bronze shield and spear and fight Spartans; and of course, Spartans would not be willing to face Thracians with leather

shields and javelins, nor Scythians with bows for weapons. And similarly in all other points, I find that human beings naturally differ one from another and greatly improve by application. Hence it is clear that all men, whatever their natural gifts, the talented and the dullards alike, must learn and practice what they want to excel in."

Between wisdom and prudence, he drew no distinction; but if a man knows and practices what is beautiful and good, knows and avoids what is base, that man he judged to be both wise and prudent. When asked further whether he thought that those who know what they ought to do and yet do the opposite are at once wise and vicious, he answered: "No; not so much that, as both unwise and vicious. For I think that all men have a choice between various courses, and choose and follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage. Therefore, I think that those who follow the wrong course are neither wise nor prudent."

He said that justice and every other form of excellence is wisdom. "For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail. And so the wise do what is beautiful and good, the unwise cannot and fail if they try. Therefore, since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that justice and every other form of excellence is wisdom."

Madness, again, according to him, was the opposite of wisdom. Nevertheless, he did not identify ignorance with madness; but not to know yourself, and to assume and think that you know what you do not, he put next to madness. "Most people, however," he said, "do not call those mad who err in matters that lie outside the knowledge of ordinary people: madness is the name they give to errors in matters of common knowledge. For instance, if a man imagines himself to be so

tall as to stoop when he goes through the gateways in the wall, or so strong as to try to lift houses or to perform any other feat that everybody knows is impossible, they say he's mad. They don't think a slight error implies madness, but just as they call strong desire love, so they name a great delusion madness."

Considering the nature of envy, he found it to be a kind of pain, not, however, at a friend's misfortune nor at an enemy's good fortune, but the envious are those only who are annoyed at their friends' successes. Some expressed surprise that anyone who loves another should be pained at his success, but he reminded them that many stand in this relation toward others, that they cannot disregard them in time of trouble but aid them in their misfortune, and yet they are pained to see them prospering. This, however, could not happen to a man of sense but is always the case with fools.

Considering the nature of leisure, he said his conclusion was that almost all men do something. Even dice players and jesters do something, but all these are at leisure, for they might go and do something better. But nobody has leisure to go from a better to a worse occupation. If anyone does so, he acts wrongly, having no leisure.

Kings and rulers, he said, are not those who hold the scepter, nor those who are chosen by the multitude, nor those on whom the lot falls, nor those who owe their power to force or deception; but those who know how to rule. For once it was granted that it is the business of the ruler to give orders and of the ruled to obey, he went on to show that on a ship the one who knows rules, and the owner and all the others on board obey the one who knows: in farming the landowners, in illness the patients, in training those who are in training, in fact everybody concerned with anything that needs care, look after it themselves if they think they know how, but, if not, they obey those who know, and not only when such are present

but they even send for them when absent, that they may obey them and do the right thing. In spinning wool, again, he would point out, the women govern the men because they know how to do it and men do not.

If anyone objected that a despot may refuse to obey a good counselor, "How can he refuse," he would ask, "when a penalty waits on disregard of good counsel? All disregard of good counsel is bound surely to result in error, and his error will not go unpunished."

If anyone said that a despot can kill a loyal subject, "Do you think," he said, "that he who kills the best of his allies suffers no loss or that his loss is trifling? Do you think that this conduct brings him safety or rather swift destruction?"

When someone asked him what seemed to him the best pursuit for a man, he answered: "Doing well." Questioned further, whether he thought good luck a pursuit, he said: "On the contrary, I think luck and doing are opposite poles. To hit on something right by luck without a search I call good luck, to do something well after study and practice I call doing well; and those who pursue this seem to me to do well. And the best men and dearest to the gods," he added, "are those who do their work well; if it is farming, as good farmers; if medicine, as good doctors; if politics, as good politicians. He who does nothing well is neither useful in any way nor dear to the gods."

10. Then again, whenever he talked with artists who pursued their art as a business, he was as useful to them as to others.

Thus, on entering the house of Parrhasius the painter one day, he asked in the course of a conversation with him: "Is painting a representation of things seen, Parrhasius? Anyhow, you painters with your colors represent and reproduce figures high and low, in light and in shadow, hard and soft, rough and smooth, young and old."

“True.”

“And further, when you copy types of beauty, it is so difficult to find a perfect model that you combine the most beautiful details of several, and thus contrive to make the whole figure look beautiful.”

“Yes, we do!”

“Well now, do you also reproduce the character of the soul, the character that is in the highest degree captivating, delightful, friendly, fascinating, lovable? Or is it impossible to imitate that?”

“Oh no, Socrates; for how could one imitate what lacks shape and color and any of the qualities you mentioned just now, and is not even visible?”

“Do human beings commonly express the feelings of sympathy and aversion by their looks?”

“I think so.”

“Then can’t that much be imitated in the eyes?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“Do you think that the joys and sorrows of their friends produce the same expression on people’s faces, whether they really care or not?”

“Oh no, of course not: they look radiant at their joys, downcast at their sorrows.”

“Then is it possible to represent these looks too?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“And further, nobility and dignity, self-abasement and servility, prudence and understanding, insolence and vulgarity: these are reflected in the face and in the attitudes of the body whether still or in motion.”

“True.”

“Then these too can be imitated, can they not?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“Now which do you think the more pleasing sight, one whose features and bearing reflect a beautiful and good and lovable character, or one who is the embodiment of what is ugly and depraved and hateful?”

“No doubt there is a great difference, Socrates.”

On another occasion he visited Cleiton the sculptor, and while conversing with him said: “Cleiton, that your statues of runners, wrestlers, boxers and fighters are beautiful I see and know. But how do you produce in them that illusion of life which is their most alluring charm to the beholder?”

As Cleiton was puzzled and did not reply at once, “Is it,” he added, “by faithfully representing the form of living beings that you make your statues look as if they are alive?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“Then isn’t it by accurately representing the different parts of the body as they are affected by the pose — the flesh wrinkled or tense, the limbs compressed or outstretched, the muscles taut or loose — that you make them look more like real parts and more convincing?”

“Yes, certainly.”

“Doesn’t the exact imitation of the feelings that affect bodies in action also produce a sense of satisfaction in the spectators?”

“Oh yes, presumably.”

“Then must not the threatening look in the eyes of fighters be accurately represented, and the triumphant expression on the face of victors be imitated?”

“Most certainly”

“It follows, then, that the sculptor must represent in his figures the activities of the soul.”

On visiting Pistias the armorer, who showed him some well-made breastplates, Socrates said: “By Hera, Pistias, it’s a beautiful invention, for the breastplate covers the parts that need protection without impeding the use of the hands. But tell me, Pistias,” he added, “why do you charge more for your breastplates than any other maker, though they are no stronger and cost no more to make?”

“Because the proportions of mine are better, Socrates.”

“And how do you show their proportions when you ask a higher price — by weight or measure? For I presume you don’t make them all the same weight or the same size, that is, if you make them to fit.”

“Fit? Why, of course! A breastplate is useless without that!”

“Then aren’t some human bodies well proportioned, others poorly?”

“Certainly.”

“Then if a breastplate is to fit an ill-proportioned body, how do you make it well proportioned?”

“By making it fit; for if it is a good fit it is well proportioned.”

“Apparently you mean well-proportioned not absolutely but in relation to the wearer, as you might call a shield well-proportioned for the man whom it fits, or a military cape — and this seems to apply to everything according to you. And perhaps there is another important advantage in a good fit.”

“Tell me, if you know one, Socrates.”

“The good fit is less heavy to wear than the misfit, though both weigh the same. For the misfit, hanging entirely from the shoulders or pressing on some other part of the body, proves unwieldy and irritating; but the good fit, with its weight distributed over the collarbone and shoulder blades, the shoulders, chest, back and stomach, may almost be called an accessory rather than an encumbrance.”

“The advantage you speak of is the very one that I think makes my work worth a high price. Some, however, prefer to buy the ornamented and the gold-plated breastplates.”

“Still, if the result is that they buy misfits, it seems to me they buy ornamented and gold-plated trash. Since the body is not rigid, however, but now bent, now straight, how can tight breastplates fit?”

“They can’t.”

“You mean that the good fits are not the tight ones but those that don’t chafe the wearer?”

“That is your own meaning, Socrates, and you have hit the right nail on the head.”

11. At one time there was in Athens a beautiful woman named Theodote, who was ready to keep company with anyone who pleased her. One of the bystanders mentioned her name, declaring that words failed him to describe the lady’s beauty, and adding that artists visited her to paint her portrait, and she showed them as much as decency allowed. “We had better go and see her,” cried Socrates; “of course what beggars description can’t very well be learned by hearsay.”

“Come with me at once,” returned his informant. So off they went to Theodote’s house, where they found her posing before a painter, and looked on.

When the painter had finished, Socrates said: “My friends, ought we to be more grateful to Theodote for showing us her beauty or she to us for looking at it? Does the obligation rest with her if she profits more by showing it, but with us if we profit more by looking?”

When someone answered that this was a fair way of putting it, “Well now,” he went on, “she already has our praise to her credit, and when we spread the news, she’ll profit still more; whereas we already long to touch what we’ve seen and we’ll go

away aroused and will miss her when we're gone. The natural consequence is that we become her adorers, she the adored."

"Then, if that's so," said Theodote, "of course I ought to be grateful to you for looking."

At this point Socrates noticed that she was sumptuously dressed and that her mother at her side was wearing fine clothes and jewelry; and she had many pretty maids, who also were well cared for, and her house was lavishly furnished.

"Tell me, Theodote," he said, "have you a farm?"

"Not I," she answered.

"Or a house, perhaps, that brings in money?"

"No house either."

"Some craftsmen, perhaps?"

"No craftsmen."

"Then how do you afford your things?"

"If one of my boyfriends wants to be generous, that's my livelihood."

"By Hera, Theodote, a flock of friends is a fine property, and much better than a flock of sheep and goats and oxen. But," he went on, "do you trust to luck, waiting for friends to settle on you like flies, or do you have some scheme of your own?"

"How could I invent a scheme for that?"

"Much more conveniently, I assure you, than the spiders. For you know how they hunt for a living: they weave a thin web, I believe, and feed on anything that gets into it."

"So are you advising me to weave a trap of some sort?"

"Of course not. Don't suppose you are going to hunt friends, the noblest game in the world, by such crude methods. Don't you notice that many tricks are employed even for hunting such a poor thing as the hare? Since hares feed by night, hounds specially adapted for night work are provided to hunt them; and since they run away at daybreak, another

pack of hounds is obtained for tracking them by the scent along the run from the feeding ground to the nest; and since they are so nimble that once they are off they actually escape in the open, yet a third pack of speedy hounds is formed to catch them by hot pursuit; and as some escape even so, nets are set up in the tracks where they escape, so they can be driven into them and stopped cold."

"Then can I adapt this plan to the pursuit of friends?"

"Of course, you can, if for the hound you substitute an agent who will track and find rich men with an eye for beauty and will then contrive to drive them into your nets."

"Nets! What nets have I got?"

"One, surely, that entangles quite nicely — your body! And inside it you have a soul that teaches you what glance will please, what words delight, and tells you that you should give a warm welcome to an eager suitor but slam the door on a roughhouser; yes, and when a friend has fallen sick, to show your anxiety by visiting him; and when he has had a stroke of good fortune, to congratulate him eagerly; and if he is eager in his suit, to put yourself at his service heart and soul. As for loving, you know how to do that, I am sure, both tenderly and thoughtfully; and that your friends please you, you convince them, I know, not by words but by deeds."

"No indeed," said Theodote, "I don't contrive any of those things."

"Nevertheless," he continued, "it is very important that your behavior to a man should be both natural and correct. For assuredly you can neither catch a friend nor keep him by force; it is kindness and sweetness that catch the creature and hold him fast."

"True," she said.

"First, then, you must ask such favors of your suitors as they will grant without a moment's hesitation; and next you

must repay their favors in the same coin; for in this way they will prove most sincerely your friends, most constant in their affection and most generous. And they will appreciate your favors most highly if you wait till they ask for them. The most delicious foods, you see, if served before they are wanted, seem unpleasant, and to those who have had enough they are positively nauseating; but even poor fare is very welcome when offered to a hungry man."

"And how can I make them hunger for my fare?"

"First, you shouldn't offer it to them when they've had enough or prompt them until they've stopped feeling full and start to want more; then, when they feel the want, you should prompt them by behaving as a model of propriety, by a show of reluctance to yield, and by holding back until they are as eager as can be; for then the same gifts mean much more to the recipient than when they are offered before they are desired."

"Then, Socrates," said Theodote, "why don't you become my partner in the pursuit of friends?"

"By all means — if you persuade me."

"And how am I to persuade you?"

"You'll figure that out for yourself, if you want my help."

"Come and see me often, then."

"Well, Theodote," said Socrates, making fun of his own leisurely habits, "it's not so easy for me to find time. I have a lot of business to occupy me, private and public; and I have female friends who won't leave me day or night; they are studying potions with me, and spells."

"So, you understand these things too, Socrates?"

"Well, why do you suppose that Apollodorus here and Antisthenes never leave me? And why do Cebes and Simmias come to me from Thebes? I assure you this doesn't happen

without the help of many potions and spells and magic wheels."

"Do lend me your wheel, so I can spin it first to attract you."

"But of course, I don't want to be attracted to you: I want you to come to me."

"Oh, I'll come: only be sure you welcome me."

"Oh, you shall be welcome — unless there's a dearer girl with me!"

12. He noticed that Epigenes, one of his companions, was in poor shape for a young man, and said: "You take amateurish care of your physique, Epigenes."

"In fact," he replied, "I am an amateur, Socrates."

"No more so than the competitors entered at Olympia," he said. "Or do you count but a small thing the life and death struggle with their enemies that the Athenians will enter when the time comes? Not a few, thanks to their bad conditioning, lose their lives in the perils of war or save them disgracefully; and many, for this same reason, are taken prisoner and then either pass the rest of their days perhaps in slavery of the hardest kind, or, after meeting with cruel sufferings and sometimes paying more than they have, live on, destitute and in misery. Many, again, by their bodily weakness earn a bad reputation, being thought cowards. Or do you care little about these rewards of bad conditioning and think that you can easily endure such results? And yet I suppose that what has to be borne by anyone who takes care to keep his body in good condition is far lighter and far more pleasant than all this. Or is it that you think bad conditioning healthier and generally more serviceable than good, or do you care little about the effects of good conditioning? And yet the results of physical fitness are the direct opposite of those that follow from unfitness. The fit are healthy and strong; and consequently many save themselves decorously on the battlefield and

escape all the dangers of war; many help friends and do good for their country and on that account they earn gratitude, get great glory and gain very high honors, and on that account they live henceforth a better and more pleasant life, and leave to their children better means of winning a livelihood.

"Because military training is not publicly supported by the state, you should not make that an excuse for being any the less careful in attending to it yourself. For you may rest assured that there is no kind of struggle, apart from war, and no undertaking in which you will be worse off by keeping your body in better shape. For in everything that men do the body is useful; and in all uses of the body it is very important to keep the body in as optimal condition as possible. Even in the process of thinking, where the use of the body seems minimal, everyone knows that grave mistakes can often be traced to bad health. And because the body is in a bad condition, loss of memory, depression, bad temper, and insanity often assail the mind so violently as to drive whatever knowledge it contains clean out of it. But a sound and healthy body is a strong protection to those who have it, and at least there is no danger then of such a calamity happening to them through physical weakness: on the contrary, it is likely that their sound condition will serve to produce effects the opposite of those that arise from bad condition. And surely a man of sense would submit to anything to obtain the effects that are the opposite of those mentioned in my list.

"Besides, it is a disgrace to grow old through sheer carelessness before seeing what manner of man you may become by developing your bodily strength and beauty to their highest potential. But you cannot see it if you are careless, for it won't come of its own accord."

13. On a man who was angry because his greeting was not returned: "Ridiculous!" he said; "You would not have been angry if you had met a man in worse health; and yet you are

annoyed because you have come across someone with ruder manners!"

On another who declared that he found no pleasure in eating: "Acumenus," he said, "has a good prescription for that ailment." And when asked "What?" he answered, "Stop eating; and you will then find life pleasanter, cheaper, and healthier."

On yet another who complained that the drinking water at home was warm: "Consequently," he said, "when you want warm water to wash in, you will have it at hand."

"But it's too cold for washing," said the other.

"Then do your servants complain when they use it both for drinking and washing?"

"Oh no, and I've often felt surprised that they are content with it for both these purposes."

"Which is the warmer to drink, the water in your house or Epidaurus water?"

"Epidaurus water."

"And which is the colder to wash in, yours or Oropus water?"

"Oropus water."

"Then reflect that you are apparently harder to please than servants and invalids."

When someone punished his footman severely, he asked why he was angry with his servant.

"Because," said the other, "he's surpassingly gluttonous and blockheaded and greedy and lazy."

"Have you ever considered, then, who deserves the bigger beating, the master or the servant?"

When someone was afraid of the journey to Olympia, he said: "Why do you fear the distance? When you're at home, don't you spend most of the day walking about? On your way there you will take a walk before breakfast, and another before

lunch, and then take a rest. Don't you know that if you put together the walks you take in five or six days, you can easily cover the distance from Athens to Olympia? It is more comfortable, too, to start a day early rather than a day late, since to be forced to make the stages of the journey unduly long is unpleasant; but to take a day extra on the way makes easy going. So, it is better to hurry over the start than on the road."

When another said that he was worn out after a long journey, he asked him whether he had carried a load.

"Oh no," said the man; "only my coat."

"Were you alone, or did you have a footman with you?" "I had."

"Empty-handed or carrying anything?"

"He carried the rugs and the rest of the baggage, of course."

"And how has he come out of the journey?"

"Better than I, so far as I can tell."

"Well then, if you had been forced to carry his load, how would you have felt, do you suppose?"

"Bad, of course; or rather, I couldn't have done it."

"Indeed! do you think a trained man ought to be so much less capable of work than his servant?"

14. Whenever some of the members of a dining club brought more appetizers than others, Socrates would tell the waiter either to put the small contribution into the common stock or to portion it out equally among the diners. So, the high contributors felt obliged not only to take their share of the pool, but to pool their own supplies in return; and so they put their own supplies also into the common stock. And since they got no more that way than those who brought little with them, they gave up spending a lot on appetizers.

He observed on one occasion that one of the company at dinner had stopped eating bread and ate only the appetizers. Now the talk was of names and the actions to which they are properly applied. “Can we say, my friends,” said Socrates, 4 what is the nature of the action for which a man is called greedy? For all, I presume, eat appetizers with their bread when they get the chance: but I don’t think there is so far any reason for calling them greedy?”

“No, certainly not,” said one of the company.

“Well, suppose he eats the appetizers alone, without the bread, not because he’s in training but to tickle his palate, does he seem greedy or not?”

“If not, it’s hard to say who does,” was the reply.

Here another of the company asked, “And what about eating a scrap of bread with a large helping of appetizers?”

“I think that one too deserves the label,” said Socrates. “And when others pray for a good wheat harvest, he presumably would pray for a good supply of appetizers.”

The young man, guessing that these remarks of Socrates applied to him, did not stop eating his appetizers but took some bread with them. When Socrates observed this, he said: “Watch that one, you who are near him, and see whether he treats the bread as his appetizer or the appetizer as his bread.”

On another occasion he noticed one of the company at dinner tasting several appetizers with each bite of bread. “Can you imagine,” he asked, “a course more extravagant and more ruinous to the appetizers than the one consumed by a man who eats many things together and crams all sorts of sauces into his mouth at once? At any rate by mixing more ingredients than the cooks, he adds to the cost, and since he mixes ingredients that they regard as unsuitable in a mixture, if they are right, then he is wrong and is ruining their art. Yet it is surely ridiculous for a host to obtain highly skilled cooks,

and then, though he claims no knowledge of the art, to alter their dishes? There's another drawback, too, attaching to the habit of eating many things together. For if many dishes are not provided, one seems to go short because one misses the usual variety: whereas he who is accustomed to take one kind of appetizer along with one bit of bread can make the best of one dish when more are not forthcoming."

He used to say too that the term "good feeding" in Attic was a synonym for "eating." The "good" in the compound implied the eating of food that could harm neither body nor soul and was not hard to come by. Thus, he attributed even good feeding to sober livers.

BOOK IV

1. Socrates was so useful in all circumstances and in all ways that any observer gifted with ordinary perception can see that nothing was more useful than the companionship of Socrates and time spent with him in any place and in any circumstances. The very recollection of him in absence brought no small benefit to his constant companions and followers; for even in his light moods, they gained no less from his society than when he was serious.

Thus he would often say he was "in love" with someone; but his heart was obviously set not on those who were good looking but on those whose souls naturally inclined to excellence. These excellent beings he recognized by their quickness to learn whatever subject they studied, ability to remember what they learned, and desire for every kind of knowledge on which depend good management of a household and state and tactful dealing with people and people's affairs. For education would make such beings not only happy in themselves and successful in the management of their households, but capable of conferring happiness on other people and states alike. His method of approach varied. To those who thought themselves possessed of natural endowments and despised learning he explained that the greater the natural gifts the greater the need of education, pointing out that thoroughbreds by their spirit and mettle develop into serviceable and splendid creatures if they are broken in as colts, but if unbroken they prove intractable and sorry nags; and highbred puppies, keen workers and good tacklers of game, make first-rate hounds and useful dogs if well trained, but if untrained they turn out stupid, crazy, and utterly disobedient. It is the same with human beings. The most highly gifted, the youths of ardent soul, capable of doing whatever they attempt, if educated and taught their duty grow into excellent and useful men; for manifold and great are their

good deeds. But untrained and untaught, they turn out utterly evil and destructive; for without knowledge to discern their duty, they often put their hand to vile deeds, and through the very grandeur and vehemence of their nature they are uncontrollable and intractable; therefore, manifold and great are their evil deeds.

Those who prided themselves on riches and thought they had no need of education, supposing that their wealth would suffice for gaining the objects of their wishes and winning peoples respect, he admonished thus. “Only a fool,” he said, “can think it possible to distinguish between what is useful and what is harmful without learning: only a fool can think that without distinguishing these he will get all he wants by means of his wealth and be able to do what is expedient: only a simpleton can think that without the power to do what is expedient he is doing well and has made good or sufficient provision for his life: only a simpleton can think that by his wealth alone without knowledge he will be reputed good at something or will enjoy a good reputation without being reputed good at anything in particular.

2. I will now describe his method of dealing with those who thought they had received the best education and prided themselves on wisdom. He was informed that Euthydemus, the handsome one, had formed a large collection of the works of celebrated poets and thinkers and therefore supposed himself to be a prodigy of wisdom for his age and was confident of surpassing all competitors in power of speech and action. At present, Socrates observed, he did not enter the marketplace owing to his youth, but when he wanted to get anything done, he would be found sitting in a saddler s shop near the market. So, to make an opening Socrates went to this shop with some of his companions.

At the first visit, one of them asked, “Was it by constantly being with some wise man or by natural ability that

Themistocles stood out among his fellow citizens as the man to whom the city naturally looked when it felt the want of a great leader?"

In order to set Euthydemus thinking, Socrates said: "If in the minor arts great achievement is impossible without competent masters, surely it is absurd to imagine that the art of statesmanship, the greatest of all accomplishments, comes to a man of its own accord."

Some time afterward, meeting Euthydemus again, he saw that he was reluctant to join the circle and anxious not to betray any admiration for the wisdom of Socrates: "Well, gentlemen," he said, "when our friend Euthydemus here has attained majority and some question of policy is before the Assembly, he won't be backward in offering advice: that is obvious from his behavior. I imagine that he has prepared a noble exordium to his addresses, with due care not to give the impression that he is indebted to anyone for his knowledge. No doubt he will begin his speech with this introduction:

"'Gentlemen of Athens, I have never yet learned anything from anyone, nor when I have been told of any man's ability in speech and in action have, I sought to meet him, nor have I taken the trouble to find a teacher among the men who know. On the contrary, I have constantly avoided learning anything from anyone, and even the appearance of it. Nevertheless, I shall recommend to your consideration anything that comes into my head.'

"This exordium might be adapted so as to suit candidates for the office of public physician. They might begin their speeches in this strain:

"'Men of Athens, I have never yet studied medicine, nor sought to find a teacher among our physicians; for I have constantly avoided learning anything from the physicians and even the appearance of having studied their art. Nevertheless,

I ask you to appoint me to the office of physician, and I will endeavor to learn by experimenting on you.'"

The exordium set all the company laughing.

Now when it became evident that Socrates had gained the attention of Euthydemus but that Euthydemus still avoided breaking silence himself, and thought that he assumed an air of prudence by remaining mute, Socrates wanted to put an end to that affectation. "How strange it is," he said, "that those who want to play the harp or the pipes, or to ride or to get skill in any similar accomplishment, work hard at the art they mean to master, and not by themselves but under the tuition of the most eminent practitioners, doing and bearing anything in their anxiety to do nothing without their mentors' guidance, simply because that is the only way to become proficient: and yet, among those who want to shine as speakers in the Assembly and as statesmen, there are some who think that they will be able to do so all of a sudden, by instinct, without training or study. Yet surely these arts are much the harder to learn; for many more are interested in them and far fewer succeed. Clearly then these arts demand a longer and more intense application than the others."

For a time then, Socrates continued to talk in this strain, while Euthydemus listened. But on finding him more tolerant of his conversation and more attentive, Socrates went alone to the saddlers; and when Euthydemus had taken a seat beside him, he said: "Tell me, Euthydemus, am I rightly informed that you have a large collection of books written by the wise men of the past, as they are called?"

"By Zeus yes, Socrates," he said, "and I am still adding to it, to make it as complete as possible."

"By Hera," retorted Socrates, "I do admire you for valuing the treasures of wisdom above gold and silver. For you are evidently of the opinion that, while gold and silver cannot

make men better, the thoughts of the wise enrich their possessors with excellence."

Now Euthydemus was glad to hear this, for he guessed that in Socrates' opinion he was on the road to wisdom. But Socrates, aware that he was pleased with his approbation, went on to say: "Tell me, Euthydemus, what kind of excellence do you want to achieve by collecting these books?"

And as Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer to give, "Possibly you want to be a doctor?" he guessed: "Medical treatises alone make a large collection."

"Oh no, not at all."

"Then perhaps you wish to be an architect? One needs a well-stored mind for that too."

"No, indeed I don't."

"Well, perhaps you want to be a good mathematician, like Theodorus?"

"No, not that either."

"Well, perhaps you want to be an astronomer?"

And as he again said no, "Perhaps a rhapsode, then? They tell me you have the complete works of Homer."

"Oh no, not at all; for your rhapsodes, I know, are consummate as reciters but they are very silly characters themselves."

Then Socrates exclaimed: "Surely, Euthydemus, you don't covet the kind of excellence that makes good statesmen and managers, competent rulers and benefactors of themselves and humanity in general?"

"Yes, I do. Socrates," answered Euthydemus, "that kind of excellence I greatly desire."

"Why," cried Socrates, "it is the noblest kind of excellence, the greatest of arts that you covet, for it belongs to kings and is dubbed 'regal.' Then again," he said, "have you reflected

whether it be possible to excel in these matters without being just?"

"Certainly, I have; and it is in fact impossible to be a good citizen without justice."

"Then tell me, have you accomplished that?"

"Yes, Socrates, I think I can show myself to be as just as anyone."

"And have just people, like carpenters, their works?"

"Yes, they have."

"And as carpenters can point to their works, should just men be able to describe theirs?"

"Do you suppose," said Euthydemus, "that I am unable to describe the works of justice? Of course, I can, and the works of injustice too, since there are many opportunities to see and hear those every day."

"I propose, then, that we write J in this column and I in that, and then proceed to place under these letters, J and I, what we take to be the works of justice and injustice respectively."

"Go ahead, if you think it's of any use."

Having written down the letters as he proposed, Socrates continued: "Lying occurs among people, does it not?"

"Yes, it does."

"Under which heading, then, are we to put that?"

"Under the heading of injustice, clearly."

"Deceit, too, is found, is it not?"

"Certainly."

"Under which heading will that go?"

"Under injustice again, of course."

"What about doing mischief?"

"That too."

“Selling into slavery?”

“That too.”

“Then we will assign none of these things to justice, Euthydemus?”

“No, it would be terrible to do so.”

“Now suppose a man who has been elected general enslaves an unjust and hostile city, will we say that he acts unjustly?”

“Oh no!”

“We will say that his actions are just, will we not?”

“Certainly.”

“And what if he deceives the enemy when at war?”

“That too is just.”

“And if he steals and plunders their goods, will not his actions be just?”

“Certainly; but at first I assumed that your questions had reference only to friends.”

“Then everything that we assigned to injustice should be assigned to justice also?”

“Apparently.”

“Then I propose to revise our classification, and to say: It is just to do such things to enemies but unjust to do them to friends, toward whom ones conduct should be scrupulously honest.”

“By all means.”

“Now suppose that a general, seeing that his army is downhearted, tells a lie and says that reinforcements are coming, and by means of this lie checks discouragement among the men, under which heading will we put this deception?”

“Under justice, I think.”

“Suppose, again, that a man’s son refuses to take a dose of medicine when he needs it, and the father induces him to take it by pretending that it is food and cures him by means of this lie, where will we put this deception?”

“That too goes on the same side, I think.”

“And again, suppose one has a friend suffering from depression and for fear that he may make away with himself he takes away his sword or something of the sort, under which heading will we put that now?”

“That too goes under justice, of course.”

“You mean, do you, that even with friends straightforward dealing is not invariably right?”

“It surely isn’t! I retract what I said before, if you will let me.”

“I have to let you; it’s far better than getting our lists wrong. But now consider deception practiced on friends to their detriment: we mustn’t overlook that either. Which is the more unjust deception in that case, the intentional or unintentional?”

“Socrates, I have lost all confidence in my answers; for all the opinions that I expressed before seem now to have taken an entirely different form. Still, I venture to say that the intentional deception is more unjust than the unintentional.”

“Do you think there is a doctrine and science of the just, as there is of letters?”

“ Yes.”

“Which, in your judgment, is the more literate, the man who intentionally blunders in writing and reading or the man who blunders unintentionally?”

“The one who blunders intentionally, I presume; for he can always be accurate when he chooses.”

“May we not say, then, that the intentional blunderer is literate and the unintentional is illiterate?”

“Indeed, we must.”

“And which knows what is just, the intentional liar and deceiver, or the unintentional?”

“The intentional, clearly.”

“You say then, as I understand, that the one who knows letters is more literate than the one who is ignorant of them?”

“Yes.”

“And the one who knows what is just is more just than the one who does not know?”

“Apparently; but here again I don’t feel sure of my own meaning.”

“Now what do you think of someone who wants to tell the truth but never sticks to what he says; when he shows you the way, tells you first that the road runs east, then that it runs west; and when he adds up figures, makes the total now larger, now smaller?”

“Why, I think he shows that he doesn’t know what he thought he knew.”

“Are you aware that some people are called slavish?” “Yes.”

“To what do they owe the name, to knowledge or to ignorance?”

“To ignorance, obviously.”

“To ignorance of the smiths’ trade, shall we say?”

“Certainly not.”

“Ignorance of carpentry perhaps?”

“No, not to that either.”

“Of cobbling?”

“No, to none of these: on the contrary, those who are skilled in such trades are for the most part slavish.”

“Then is this name given to those who are ignorant of the beautiful and good and just?”

“That is my opinion.”

“Then we must strain every nerve to escape being slaves.”

“I swear, Socrates, I did feel confident that I was a student of a philosophy that would provide me with the best education in all things a would-be gentleman would require. But you can imagine my dismay when I realize that in spite of all my efforts, I am even incapable of answering a question about things that we should especially know and yet find no other way that will lead to my improvement.”

Here Socrates said: “Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?”

“Sure; twice.”

“Then did you notice somewhere on the temple the inscription “Know thyself”?”

“I did.”

“And did you pay no attention to the inscription, or did you attend to it and try to consider who you were?”

“I did not; because I felt sure that I knew that already; I could hardly know anything else if I didn’t even know myself.”

“And what do you suppose a man must know to know himself? Merely his own name? Or must he consider what sort of a creature he is for human use and get to know his own powers; just as those who buy horses don’t think that they know the animal they want to know until they have considered whether he is docile or stubborn, strong or weak, fast or slow, and generally how he stands in all that makes a useful or a useless horse?”

“That leads me to think that someone who does not know his own powers is ignorant of himself.”

“Isn’t it clear too that through self-knowledge men come to much good, and through self-deception to much harm? For those who know themselves know what things are expedient for themselves and discern their own powers and limitations. And by doing what they understand they get what they want and prosper: by refraining from attempting what they do not understand they make no mistakes and avoid failure. And consequently, through their power of testing other men too, and through their dealings with others, they get what is good and shun what is bad. Those who do not know and are deceived in their estimate of their own powers are in the same condition with regard to other men and other human affairs. They know neither what they want nor what they do, nor those with whom they have dealings; but mistaken in all these respects they miss the good and stumble into the bad. Furthermore, those who know what they do win fame and honor by achieving their goals. Their equals are glad to have dealings with them; and those who miss their objectives look to them for counsel, look to them for protection, rest on them their hopes of better times, and for all these reasons cherish them above all others. But those who don’t know what they’re doing choose wrongly, fail in what they attempt and besides thus incurring direct loss and punishment they earn contempt through their failures, make themselves ridiculous and live in dishonor and humiliation.

“And the same is true of communities. You find that whenever a state, in ignorance of its own power, goes to war with a stronger people, it is exterminated or loses its liberty.”

“Socrates,” answered Euthydemus, “please rest assured that I fully appreciate the importance of knowing oneself. But where should the process of self-examination begin? I look to you for a statement, if you will.”

“Well,” said Socrates, “I may assume, I take it, that you know what things are good and what are evil?”

“Of course, for if I don’t know so much as that, I must be worse than a slave.”

“Very well, state them for my benefit.”

“Well, that’s a simple matter. First health in itself is, I suppose, a good, sickness an evil. Next the various causes of these two conditions — meat, drink, habits — are good or evil according as they promote health or sickness.”

“Then health and sickness too must be good when their effect is good, and evil when it is evil.”

“But when can health possibly be the cause of evil, or sickness of good?”

“In many cases. For instance, a disastrous campaign or a fatal voyage: the able-bodied who go are lost, the weaklings who stay behind are saved.”

“True; but you see, in the successful adventures too the able-bodied take part, the weaklings are left behind.”

“Then since these bodily conditions sometimes lead to profit and sometimes to loss, are they any more good than evil?”

“No, certainly not; at least so it appears from the argument. But wisdom now, Socrates — that at any rate is indisputably a good thing; for what is there that a wise man would not do better than a fool?”

“Really! Have you not heard how Daedalus was seized by Minos because of his wisdom and forced to be his slave, and was robbed of his country and his liberty, and in trying to escape with his son lost the boy and could not save himself but was carried off to the barbarians and again lived as a slave there?”

“That is the story, of course.”

“And haven’t you heard the story of Palamedes? Of course, for all the poets sing of him: how he was envied for his wisdom and done in by Odysseus.”

“Another well-known tale!”

“And how many others, do you suppose, have been kidnapped on account of their wisdom and hauled off to the great King’s court and live in slavery there?”

“Happiness seems to be unquestionably a good, Socrates.”

“It would be so, Euthydemus, were it not made up of goods that are questionable.”

“But what element in happiness can be called in question?”

“None, provided we don’t include in it beauty or strength or wealth or glory or anything of the sort.”

“But of course, we will. How can anyone be happy without those?”

“Then of course we will also include the sources of much trouble to mankind. For many are ruined by admirers whose heads are turned at the sight of a pretty face; many are led by their strength to attempt tasks too heavy for them and meet with serious evils; many by their wealth are corrupted and fall victims to conspiracies; many through glory and political power have suffered great evils.”

“Well now, if I am at fault in praising even happiness, I confess I don’t know what we should ask for in our prayers.”

“But perhaps you never even thought about these things because you felt so confident that you knew them. However, as the state you are preparing yourself to direct is governed by the people, no doubt you know what popular government is?”

“I think so, certainly.”

“Then do you suppose it possible to know popular government without knowing the people?”

“Indeed, I don’t.”

“And do you know, then, what the people consists of?” “I think so.”

“Of what do you suppose it to consist?”

“The poorer classes, I presume.”

“You know the poor, then?”

“Of course, I do.”

“And you know the rich too?”

“Yes, just as well as the poor.”

“What kind of men do you call poor and rich respectively?”

“The poor, I imagine, are those who have not enough to pay for what they want; the rich those who have more than enough.”

“Have you observed, then, that some who have very little not only find it enough but even manage to save out of it, whereas others cannot live within their means, however large?”

“Yes, certainly — thanks for reminding me — in fact I even know of some despots who are driven to crime by poverty, just like paupers.”

“Therefore, if that is so, we will group despots among the people and men of small means, if they are thrifty, among the rich.”

“I am forced to agree once more,” said Euthydemus, “evidently by my stupidity. I am inclined to think I had better hold my tongue or I will know nothing at all presently.” And so he went away very dejected, disgusted with himself and convinced that he was indeed a slave.

Now many of those who were brought to this state by Socrates never went near him again and were regarded by him as mere blockheads. But Euthydemus guessed that he would never be of much account unless he spent as much time as

possible with Socrates. Henceforward, unless obliged to absent himself, he never left him and even began to adopt some of his practices. Socrates, for his part, seeing how it was with him, avoided spooking him and began to expound very plainly and clearly the knowledge that he thought most needful and the practices that he held to be most excellent.

3. Skill at speaking, therefore, practical efficiency, and technical ingenuity were not the qualities that he was eager to foster in his companions. He held that they needed first to acquire prudence. For he believed that those faculties, unless accompanied by prudence, increased in their possessors injustice and power for mischief.

In the first place, then, he tried to make his companions prudent toward the gods. Accordingly, he addressed this topic at various times, as those who were present used to relate. The following conversation with Euthydemus I heard myself.

"Tell me, Euthydemus," he began, "has it ever occurred to you to reflect on the care the gods have taken to furnish human beings with what they need?"

"No, it certainly hasn't," replied Euthydemus.

"Well, no doubt you know that our first and foremost need is light, which is supplied to us by the gods?"

"Of course; since without light our eyes would be as useless as if we were blind."

"And again, we need rest; and therefore, the gods grant us the welcome respite of night."

"Yes, for that too we owe them thanks."

"And since the night in her darkness is dim, whereas the sun in his brightness illuminates the hours of the day and everything else, have they not made stars to shine in the night, that mark the watches of night for us, and don't we thereby satisfy many of our needs?"

“That is so.”

“Moreover, the moon reveals to us not only the divisions of the night but of the month too.”

“Certainly.”

“Now, seeing that we need food, think how they make the earth yield it and to that end provide appropriate seasons that furnish in abundance the diverse things that minister not only to our wants but to our enjoyment.”

“Truly these too show affection for humanity.”

“Think again of their precious provision of water, that aids the earth and the seasons to give birth and increase to everything useful to us and itself helps to nourish our bodies, and mingling with all that sustains us makes it more digestible, more wholesome, and more palatable: and how, because we need so much of it, they supply it unstintingly.”

“That too shows design at work.”

“Think again of the blessing of fire, our defense against cold and against darkness, our helpmate in every art and in all that mankind contrives for its benefit. In fact, to sum it up, nothing of any account that is useful to human life is contrived without the aid of fire.”

“This too is a signal token of affection for humanity.”

“Think again how the sun, when past the winter solstice, approaches, ripening some crops and withering others whose time is over; and having accomplished this he approaches no nearer but turns away, careful not to harm us by excess heat; and when once again in his retreat he reaches the point where it is clear to us that if he goes further away we would be frozen with the cold, back he turns once more and draws near and revolves in that region of the heavens where he can best serve us.”

“Yes indeed, all this does seem to be done for the sake of mankind.”

“And again, since it is evident that we could not endure the heat or the cold if it came suddenly, the sun’s approach and retreat are so gradual that we arrive at the one or the other extreme imperceptibly.”

“For myself,” said Euthydemus, “I begin to doubt whether after all the gods are occupied in any other work than the service of humanity. The one difficulty I feel is that the lower animals also enjoy these blessings.”

“Yes,” replied Socrates, “and isn’t it evident that they too receive life and food for the sake of mankind? For what animal reaps so many benefits as the human being from goats and sheep and horses and oxen and asses and the other animals? We owe more to them, in my opinion, than to the fruits of the earth. At the least they are not less valuable to us for food and commerce; in fact a large portion of mankind does not use the products of the earth for food but lives on the milk and cheese and meat they get from livestock. Moreover, all people tame and domesticate the useful kinds of animals and make them their fellow workers in war and many other undertakings.”

“There too I agree with you, seeing that animals far stronger than humans become so entirely subject to us that we put them to any use we choose.”

“Think again of the multitude of things beautiful and useful and their infinite variety, and how the gods have endowed mankind with senses adapted for the perception of every kind, so that there is nothing good that we cannot enjoy; and again, how they have implanted in us the faculty of reasoning, whereby we are able to reason about the objects of our perceptions and commit them to memory, and so come to know what advantage every kind can yield and devise many ways to enjoy the good and drive away the bad; and think of

the power of expression, which enables us to impart to one another all good things by teaching and to take our share of them, to enact laws and to administer states."

"Truly, Socrates, it does appear that the gods devote much care to mankind."

"Yet again, insofar as we are powerless by ourselves to foresee what is expedient for the future, the gods lend us their aid, revealing the issues by divination to inquirers and teaching them how to obtain the best results."

"With you, Socrates, they seem to deal in an even more friendly way than with other men, if it is true that, even unasked, they warn you by signs what to do and what not to do."

"Yes, and you will realize the truth of what I say if instead of waiting for the gods to appear to you in bodily presence you are content to praise and worship them because you see what they do. Note that the gods themselves give the reason for doing so; for when they bestow on us their good gifts not one of them ever appears before us gift in hand; and especially the one who coordinates and holds together the universe, in which all things are fair and good, and presents them ever unimpaired and sound and ageless for our use, and quicker than thought to serve us unerringly, is manifest in his supreme works, and yet is unseen by us in the ordering of them. Note that even the sun, who seems to reveal himself to all, permits no humans to look at him closely, but if anyone attempts to gaze recklessly at him, blinds their eyes. And the gods' ministers too you will find to be invisible. That the thunderbolt is hurled from above and that it overwhelms all on whom it falls is evident, but it is seen neither coming nor striking nor going. And the winds are themselves invisible, yet their effects are manifest to us and we perceive their approach. Moreover, the human soul, which more than all

else human partakes of the divine, reigns manifestly within us and yet is itself unseen.

"Tor these reasons we should not despise things unseen but, realizing their power in their manifestations, honor the divine."

"Socrates," replied Euthydemus, "that I will in no wise be heedless of the divine I am quite sure. But my heart fails me when I think that no man can ever render due thanks to the gods for their benefactions."

"No, don't be downhearted, Euthydemus; for you know that to the inquiry, "How am I to please the gods?' the Delphic god replies, "Follow the custom of the state,' and everywhere, I suppose, it is the custom that people propitiate the gods with sacrifices according to their power.

"How then can anyone honor the gods more excellently and more devoutly than by doing as they themselves ordain? Only he must in no way fall short of his power. For when he does that, it is surely plain that he is not then honoring the gods. Therefore, it is by coming in no way short of his power in honoring the gods that he is to look with confidence for the greatest blessings. For there are none from whom a man of prudence would hope for greater rewards than those who can confer the greatest benefits, nor can he show his prudence more clearly than by pleasing them. And how can he please them better than by strictly obeying them?"

Thus, by precept and by example alike he strove to increase in his companion's piety and prudence.

4. Again, concerning justice he did not hide his opinion but proclaimed it by his actions. All his private conduct was lawful and helpful: to public authority he rendered such scrupulous obedience in all that the laws required, both in civil life and in military service, that he was a pattern of good discipline to all. When chairman in the assemblies he would not permit the

people to record an illegal vote but, upholding the laws, resisted a popular impulse that might even have overborne any but himself. And when the Thirty laid a command on him that was illegal, he refused to obey. Thus, he disregarded their repeated injunction not to talk with young men; and when they commanded him and certain other citizens to arrest a man on a capital charge, he alone refused, because the command laid on him was illegal. Again, when he was tried on the charge brought by Meletus, whereas it is the custom of defendants to curry favor with the jury and to indulge in flattery and illegal appeals, and many by such means have been known to gain a verdict of acquittal, he rejected utterly the familiar chicanery of the courts; and though he might easily have gained a favorable verdict by even a moderate indulgence in such stratagems, he chose to die through his loyalty to the laws rather than to live through violating them.

Such views frequently found expression in his conversations with different people; I recollect the substance of one that he had with Hippias of Elis concerning justice. Hippias, who had not been in Athens for a considerable time, found Socrates talking: he was saying that if you want to have a man taught cobbling or building or smithing or riding, you know where to send him to learn the craft; some indeed declare that if you want to train up a horse or an ox in the way he should go, teachers are everywhere. And yet strangely enough, if you want to learn justice yourself, or to have your son or servant taught it, you don't know where to go for a teacher.

When Hippias heard this, "So" he cried in a tone of raillery, "still voicing the same old views, Socrates, that I heard from you so long ago?"

"Yes, Hippias," he replied, "always the same, and — what is more astonishing — on the same topics too! You are so

learned that I daresay you never express the same views on the same subjects."

"I do try to say something fresh every time."

"Do you mean, about what you know? For example, in answer to the question, 'How many letters are there in "Socrates" and how do you spell it?' do you try to say something different now from what you said before? Or take figures: suppose you are asked if twice five are ten, don't you give the same answer now as you gave before?"

"About letters and figures, Socrates, I always say the same thing, just like you. As for justice, I feel confident that I can now say what neither you nor anyone else can contradict."

"By Hera, you mean to say that you've made a great discovery, if jurymen are to stop voting different ways, citizens from disputing and litigation and wrangling about the justice of their claims, cities from quarreling about their rights and making war; and for my part, I don't see how to tear myself away from you till I have heard about your great discovery."

"But I swear you won't hear unless you first declare your own opinion about the nature of justice; for it's enough that you mock others, questioning and examining everybody, and never willing to render an account yourself or to state an opinion about anything."

"Indeed, Hippias! Haven't you noticed that I never cease to declare my notions of what is just?"

"And how can you call that an account?"

"I declare them by my deeds, anyhow, if not by my words. Don't you think that deeds are better evidence than words?"

"Yes, much better, of course; for many say what is just and do what is unjust; but no one who does what is just can be unjust."

“Then have you ever found me dealing in perjury or extortion, or stirring up strife between friends or fellow citizens, or doing any other unjust act?”

“I have not.”

“To abstain from what is unjust is just, don’t you think?”

“Even now, Socrates, you are clearly trying to avoid stating what you think justice to be. You are saying not what the just do, but what they don’t do.”

“Well, I thought that unwillingness to do injustice was sufficient proof of justice. But if you don’t think so, see whether you like this better: I say that what is lawful is just.”

“Do you mean, Socrates, that lawful and just are the same thing?”

“I do.”

“Because I don’t see what you mean by lawful or what you mean by just.”

“Does the expression ‘laws of a state’ make sense to you?”

“It does.”

“And what do you think they are?”

“Covenants made by the citizens by which they have enacted what ought to be done and what ought to be avoided.”

“Then wouldn’t that citizen who acts in accordance with these act lawfully and the one who transgresses them act unlawfully?”

“Yes, certainly.”

“And wouldn’t the one who obeys them do what is just and the one who disobeys them do what is unjust?”

“Certainly.”

“Then wouldn’t the one who does what is just be just and the one who does what is unjust be unjust?”

“Of course.”

“Consequently, the one who acts lawfully is just and the one who acts unlawfully is unjust.”

“Laws,” said Hippias, “can hardly be thought of much account, Socrates, or observance of them, seeing that the very people who passed them often reject and amend them.”

“Yes,” said Socrates, “and after going to war cities often make peace again.”

To be sure.

“Then is there any difference, do you think, between belittling those who obey the laws on the grounds that the laws may be annulled, and blaming those who behave well in the wars on the ground that peace may be made? Or do you really censure those who are eager to help their fatherland in the wars?”

“No, of course not.”

“Lycurgus the Spartan now — have you realized that he would not have made Sparta differ from other cities in any respect had he not established obedience to the laws most securely there? Among rulers in cities, aren’t you aware that those who do most to make the citizens obey the laws are the best, and that the city in which the citizens are most obedient to the laws has the best time in peace and is irresistible in war? And again, agreement is considered the greatest blessing for cities: their senates and their best men constantly exhort the citizens to agree, and everywhere in Greece there is a law that the citizens must promise under oath to agree, and everywhere they take this oath. The object, in my opinion, is not that the citizens may vote for the same choruses, not that they may praise the same pipers, not that they may select the same poets, not that they may enjoy the same pleasures, but that they may obey the laws. For those cities whose citizens stick with them prove strongest and enjoy most happiness; but without agreement no city can be made a good city, no

house can be made a prosperous house. And how is the individual citizen less likely to incur penalties from the state, and more certain to gain honor than by obeying the laws? How less likely to be defeated in the courts or more certain to win? Whom would anyone rather trust as guardian of his money or sons or daughters? Whom would the whole city think more trustworthy than the man of lawful conduct? From whom would parents or kinsfolk or servants or friends or fellow citizens or strangers more surely get their just rights? Whom would enemies rather trust in the matter of a truce or treaty or terms of peace? Whom would men rather choose for an ally? And to whom would allies rather entrust leadership or command of a garrison, or cities? Whom would anyone more confidently expect to show gratitude for benefits received? Or whom would one rather benefit than him from whom he thinks he will receive due gratitude? Whose friendship would anyone desire, or whose enmity would he avoid more earnestly? Whom would anyone less willingly make war on than him whose friendship he most wants and whose enmity he wants least, who attracts the most friends and allies, and the fewest opponents and enemies?

"So, Hippias, I declare lawful and just to be the same thing. If you are of the contrary opinion, tell me."

"Truly, Socrates," answered Hippias, "I don't think my opinion is contrary to what you have said about justice."

"Do you know what is meant by "unwritten laws,' Hippias?"

""Yes, those that are uniformly observed in every country.

"Could you say that humans made them?"

"And how could that be, seeing that they can't all meet together and don't speak the same language?"

"Then by whom have these laws been made, do you suppose?"

“I think that the gods made these laws for humans. For among all humans the first law is to fear the gods.”

“Isn’t the duty of honoring parents another universal law?”

“Yes, that’s another.”

“And that parents shall not have sexual intercourse with their children nor children with their parents?”

“No, I don’t think that that’s a law of a god.”

“Why so?”

“Because I notice that some break it.”

“Yes, and they do many other things contrary to the laws. But surely the transgressors of the laws ordained by the gods pay a penalty that a human can in no way escape, just as some, when they transgress the laws ordained by humans, escape punishment, either by concealment or by violence.”

“And what sort of penalty is it, Socrates, that may not be avoided by parents and children who have intercourse with one another?”

“The greatest, of course. For what greater penalty can humans incur when they beget children than begetting them badly?”

“How then do they beget children badly if, as may well happen, the fathers are good men and the mothers good women?”

“Surely because it’s not enough that the two parents be good. They must also be at their physical prime, unless you suppose that those who are at their prime are no more fertile as parents than those who have not yet reached their prime or are past it.”

“Of course, that’s unlikely.”

“Which are the better then?”

“Those who are at their prime, clearly.”

“Consequently those who are not at prime aren’t competent to become parents?”

“It is improbable, of course.”

“In that case then, they ought not to have children?”

“Certainly not.”

“Therefore, those who produce children in such circumstances produce them wrongly?”

“I think so.”

“Who then will be bad fathers and mothers, if not they?”

“I agree with you there too.”

“Again, isn’t the duty of requiting benefits universally recognized by law?”

“Yes, but this law too is broken.”

“Then doesn’t a man pay a penalty for the breach of that law too, in the gradual loss of good friends and the necessity of hunting those who hate him? Or isn’t it true that whereas those who benefit an acquaintance are good friends to him, he is hated by them for his ingratitude if he makes no return, and then, because it is most profitable to enjoy the acquaintance of such people, he hunts them most assiduously?”

“Assuredly, Socrates, all this does suggest the work of the gods. For laws that involve in themselves punishment suitable to those who break them, must, I think, be framed by a better than human legislator.”

“Then, Hippias, do you think that the gods ordain what is just or what is otherwise?”

“Not what is otherwise — of course not; for if a god ordains not what is just, surely no other legislator can do so.

“Consequently, Hippias, the gods too accept the identification of just and lawful.”

By such words and actions he encouraged justice in those who resorted to his company.

5. He also tried to make his companions efficient in affairs, as I will now show. For considering it good for anyone who means to do honorable work to have self-control, he made it clear to his companions, in the first place, that in self-control he himself had been the most assiduous of anyone; moreover, in his conversation he exhorted his companions to cultivate self-control above all things. Thus, he bore in mind continually the aids to excellence and reminded all his companions about them. I recall in particular the substance of a conversation he once had with Euthydemus on self-control.

"Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "do you think that freedom is a noble and splendid possession both for individuals and for communities?"

"Yes, in the highest degree."

"Then do you consider free someone who is ruled by bodily pleasures and because of them can't do what is best?"

"By no means."

"Possibly, in fact, to do what is best appears to you to be freedom, and so you think that having masters who will prevent such activity is bondage?"

"I am sure of it."

"You feel sure then that the incontinent are bond slaves?"

"Of course, naturally."

"And do you think that the incontinent are merely prevented from doing what is most honorable, or are they also forced to do what is most dishonorable?"

"I think that they are forced to do that just as much as they are prevented from doing the other."

“What sort of masters are they, in your opinion, who prevent the best and enforce the worst?”

“The worst possible, of course.”

“And what sort of slavery do you believe to be the worst?”

“Slavery to the worst masters, I think.”

“The worst slavery, therefore, is the slavery endured by the incontinent?”

“I think so.”

“As for wisdom, the greatest blessing, does not incontinence exclude it and drive men to the opposite? Or don’t you think that incontinence prevents them from attending to useful things and understanding them by drawing them away to things pleasant, and often so stuns their perception of good and evil that they choose the worse instead of the better?”

“That does happen.”

“With prudence, Euthydemus, who shall we say has less to do than the incontinent? For I presume that the actions prompted by prudence and incontinence are exact opposites?”

“I agree with that too.”

“To caring for what is right is there any stronger hindrance, do you think, than incontinence?”

“Indeed, I don’t.”

“And do you think there can be anything worse for a person than what causes him to choose the harmful rather than the useful, persuades him to care for the one and to be careless of the other, and forces him to do the opposite of what prudence dictates?”

“Nothing.”

“And is it not likely that self-control causes actions the opposite of those that are due to incontinence?”

“Certainly.”

“Then isn’t the cause of the opposite actions presumably a very great blessing?”

“Yes, presumably.”

“Consequently, we may presume, Euthydemus, that self-control is a very great blessing to a man?”

“We may presume so, Socrates.”

“Has it ever occurred to you, Euthydemus — ?”

“What?”

“That though pleasure is the one and only goal to which incontinence is thought to lead men, she herself cannot bring them to it, whereas nothing produces pleasure so surely as self-control?”

“How so?”

“Incontinence will not let them endure hunger or thirst or desire or lack of sleep, which are the sole causes of pleasure in eating and drinking and sexual indulgence, and in resting and sleeping, after a time of waiting and resistance until the moment comes when these will give the greatest possible satisfaction; and thus she prevents them from experiencing any pleasure worthy to be mentioned in the most elementary and recurrent forms of enjoyment. But self-control alone causes them to endure the sufferings I have named, and therefore she alone causes them to experience any pleasure worth mentioning in such enjoyments.”

“What you say is entirely true.”

“What’s more, the delights of learning something good and excellent, and of studying some of the means by which a person knows how to regulate his body well and manage his household successfully, to be useful to his friends and city and to defeat his enemies — knowledge that yields not only very great benefits but very great pleasures — these are the delights of the self-controlled; but the incontinent have no

part in them. For who, should we say, has less concern with these than he who has no power of cultivating them because all his serious purposes are centered in the pleasures that lie nearest?"

"Socrates," said Euthydemus, "I think you mean that he who is at the mercy of the bodily pleasures has no concern whatever with excellence in any form."

"Yes, Euthydemus; for how can an incontinent person be any better than the most ignorant beast? How can a person who fails to consider the things that matter most, and strives by every means to do the things that are most pleasant, be better than the stupidest of creatures? No, only the self-controlled can consider the things that matter most, and sorting them out after their kind, by word and deed alike, choose the good and reject the evil."

And thus, he said, men become supremely good and happy and skilled in discussion. The very word discussion, according to him, owes its name to the practice of meeting together for common deliberation and sorting things after their kind: and therefore we should be especially ready and prepared for this and take special care about it; for it makes for excellence, leadership, and skill in discussion.

6. I will try also to show how he encouraged his companions to become skilled in discussion. Socrates held that those who know what any given thing is can also expound it to others; on the other hand, those who do not know are misled themselves and mislead others. For this reason, he never gave up considering with his companions what any given thing is.

To go through all his definitions would be an arduous task. I will say only enough to indicate his method of analysis.

His analysis of piety — to take that first — was more or less as follows:

“Tell me, Euthydemus, what sort of thing is piety, in your opinion?”

“An excellent thing, to be sure,” he replied.

“Can you say what sort of man is pious?”

“He who worships the gods, I think.”

“May someone worship the gods according to his own will and pleasure?”

“No, there are laws to be observed in worshipping the gods!”

“Then won’t someone who knows these laws know how he must worship the gods?”

“I think so.”

“Then does someone who knows how he must worship the gods think that he must do so according to his knowledge and not otherwise?”

“He does indeed.”

“And does everyone worship the gods as he thinks he ought and not otherwise?”

“I think so.”

“Then will someone who knows what is lawful concerning the gods worship the gods lawfully?”

“Certainly.”

“Then doesn’t someone who worships lawfully worship as he should?”

“Of course.”

“Yes, but someone who worships as he should is pious?”

“Certainly.”

“Shall we therefore rightly define the pious person as one who knows what is lawful concerning the gods?”

“I would think so.”

“In dealing with people, again, may someone do as he chooses?”

“No, in the case of people too there are laws of conduct.”

“Then don’t those who observe them in their dealings with one another behave as they should?”

“Of course.”

“And don’t those who behave as they should behave well?”

“Certainly.”

“And don’t those who behave well toward fellow human beings act well in human affairs?”

“Presumably.”

“And don’t those who obey the laws do what is just?”

“Certainly.”

“Do you know what sort of things are called just?”

“The things that the laws command.”

“Consequently, those who do what the laws command do both what is just and what they must do?”

“Of course.”

“And aren’t those who do what is just, just people?”

“I think so.”

“Do you think, then, that any obey the laws without knowing what the laws command?”

“I do not.”

“And knowing what they must do, do you suppose that any think they must not do it?”

“I don’t think so.”

“Do you know of any who do, not what they think they must do, but something else?”

“I do not.”

“Consequently, those who know what is lawful concerning people do what is just?”

“Certainly.”

“But aren’t they who do what is just, just people?”

“Exactly.”

“At last, then, we may rightly define just people as those who know best what is just concerning people?”

“I think so.”

“And what of wisdom? How shall we describe it? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise about what they know, or are some wise about what they don’t know?”

“About what they know, obviously; for how can someone be wise about the things he doesn’t know?”

“The wise, then, are wise by knowledge?”

“How else can a man be wise if not by knowledge?”

“Do you think that wisdom is anything but that by which men are wise?”

“No.”

“It follows that wisdom is knowledge?”

“I think so.”

“Then do you think it possible for a man to know all things?”

“Of course, not — nor even a fraction of them.”

“So an all-wise man is an impossibility?”

“Of course, of course.”

“Consequently, everyone is wise just in so far as he knows?”

“I think so.”

“Now to seek the good, Euthydemus: is this the way?”

“What do you mean?”

“Does it seem to you that the same thing is useful to everyone?”

“No.”

“In fact, what is useful to one may sometimes be hurtful to another, don’t you think?”

“Assuredly.”

“Should you call anything good except what is useful?”

“No.”

“Consequently, what is useful is good for someone to whom it is useful?”

“I think so.”

“Consider the beautiful: can we define it in any other way? Or is it possible to name a beautiful body, for instance, or vessel, or anything else that you know to be beautiful for all purposes?”

“Of course not.”

“Then does the beauty in using anything consist in using it for just that purpose for which that particular thing is useful?”

“Certainly.”

“And is a thing beautiful for any other purpose than that for which it is beautiful to use that particular thing?”

“For no other purpose whatever.”

“The useful, then, is beautiful for any purpose for which it is useful?”

“I think so.”

“Next comes courage, Euthydemus. Do you think it a beautiful thing?”

“I prefer to say very beautiful.”

“So, you consider courage useful for no mean purposes?”

“Of course — or rather, for the greatest.”

“Then do you think that in the pressure of terrors and dangers it is useful to be ignorant of them?”

“By no means.”

“So those who feel no fear of such things because they are ignorant of them are not courageous?”

“Of course not, for in that case many madmen and cowards would be courageous.”

“What of those who are afraid when there is no ground for fear?”

“Still less, of course.”

“Then do you think that those who are good in the presence of terrors and dangers are courageous, and those who are bad are cowards?”

“Certainly.”

“And do you think that any are good in the presence of such things except those who can deal with them well?”

“None but these.”

“And bad, except such as deal badly with them?”

“These and none others.”

“Then do both classes behave as they think they must?”

“How can they behave otherwise?”

“Then do those who cannot behave well know how they must behave?”

“Surely not.”

“So those who know how they must behave are only those who can?”

“Yes, only they.”

“Well now, do those who are not utterly mistaken deal badly with such things?”

“I think not.”

“So those who behave badly are utterly mistaken?” “Presumably.”

“It follows that those who know how to deal well with terrors and dangers are courageous, and those who utterly mistake the way are cowards?”

“That is my opinion.”

Kingship and despotism, in his judgment, were both forms of government, but he held that they differed. For government of people with their consent and in accordance with the laws of the state was kingship, while government of unwilling subjects and not controlled by laws but imposed by the will of the ruler was despotism. And where the officials are chosen among those who fulfill the requirements of the laws, the constitution is an aristocracy; where ratable property is the qualification for office, you have a plutocracy; where all are eligible, a democracy.

Whenever anyone argued with him on any point without being able to make himself clear, asserting but not proving that so and so was wiser or an abler politician or braver or whatever, he would lead the whole discussion back to the definition required, much in this way:

“Do you say that your man is a better citizen than mine?”

“I do indeed.”

“Then why didn’t we first consider what is the function of a good citizen?”

“Let’s do that.”

“In financial administration then, is not the better man he who makes the city wealthier?”

“Certainly.”

“And in war he who makes her stronger than her rivals?”

“Of course.”

“And on an embassy, he who turns enemies into friends?”

“Presumably.”

“And in debate he who puts down strife and produces harmony?”

“I think so.”

By this process of leading back the argument even his adversary came to see the truth clearly. Whenever he himself argued out a question, he advanced by steps that gained general assent, holding this to be the only sure method. Accordingly, whenever he argued, he gained a greater measure of assent from his hearers than anyone I have known. He said that Homer gave Odysseus the credit of being a “no-risk speaker” because he had a way of leading the discussion from one acknowledged truth to another.

7. I think that I have said enough to show that Socrates stated his own opinion plainly to those who spent time with him: I will now show that he also took pains to make them independent in doing the work that they were fitted for. For I never knew anyone who was so careful to discover what each of his companions knew. Whatever it befits a gentleman to know he taught most spiritedly, so far as his own knowledge extended; if he was not entirely familiar with a subject, he took them to those who knew. He also taught them how far a well-educated person should make himself familiar with any given subject.

For instance, he said that the study of geometry should be pursued until the student was competent to measure a parcel of land accurately in case he wanted to take over, convey or divide it, or to compute the yield; and this knowledge was so easy to acquire that anyone who gave his mind to mensuration knew the size of the piece and carried away a knowledge of the principles of land measurement. He was against taking the study of geometry so far as to include the more complicated figures, on the ground that he could not see the use of them. Not that he was himself unfamiliar with them, but he said that

they were enough to occupy a lifetime, to the complete exclusion of many other useful studies.

Similarly, he recommended that they familiarize themselves with astronomy, but only so far as to be able to find the time of night, month and year, in order to use reliable evidence when planning a journey by land or sea, or setting the watch, and in all other affairs that are done in the night or month or year, by distinguishing the said times and seasons. This knowledge, again, was easily acquired from night hunters and pilots and others who made it their business to know all that. But he strongly deprecated studying astronomy so far as to include the knowledge of bodies revolving in different courses, and of planets and comets, and wearing oneself out with the calculation of their distance from the earth, their periods of revolution and the causes of these. Of such researches again he said that he could not see what useful purpose they served. He had indeed attended lectures on these subjects too; but these again, he said, were enough to occupy a lifetime to the complete exclusion of many useful studies.

In general, with regard to the phenomena of the heavens, he deprecated curiosity to learn how the deity contrives them: he held that their secrets could not be discovered by man, and believed that any attempt to search out what the gods had not chosen to reveal must be displeasing to them. He said that anyone who meddles with these matters runs the risk of losing his sanity as completely as Anaxagoras, who took an insane pride in his explanation of the divine machinery.

For that sage, in declaring the sun to be fire, ignored the facts than men can look at fire without inconvenience but cannot gaze steadily at the sun; that their skin is blackened by the sun's rays but not by fire. Further, he ignored the fact that sunlight is essential to the health of all vegetation, whereas if anything is heated by fire it withers. Again, when

he pronounced the sun to be a red-hot stone, he ignored the fact that a stone in fire neither glows nor can resist it for long, whereas the sun shines with unequaled brilliance forever.

He also recommended the study of arithmetic. But in this case as in the others he recommended avoidance of pointless application; and invariably, whether theories or ascertained facts formed the subject of his conversation, he limited it to what was useful.

He also strongly urged his companions to take care of their health. “You should find out all you can,” he said, “from those who know. Everyone should watch himself throughout his life and notice what sort of meat and drink and what form of exercise suit his constitution, and how he should regulate them in order to enjoy good health. For by such attention to yourselves you can discover better than any doctor what suits your constitution.”

When anyone was in need of help that human wisdom was unable to give, he advised him to resort to divination; for he who knew the means by which the gods give guidance to humanity concerning their affairs never lacked divine counsel.

8. As for his claim that he was forewarned by his divine sign what he ought to do and what not to do, some may think that it must have been a delusion because he was condemned to death. But they should remember two facts. First, he had already reached such an age that had he not died then, death must have come to him soon after. Second, he escaped the most irksome stage of life and the inevitable diminution of mental powers, and instead won glory by the moral strength revealed in the wonderful honesty and frankness and probity of his defense, and in the equanimity and manliness with which he bore the sentence of death. In fact it is admitted that there is no record of death more nobly borne. For he was forced to live for thirty days after the verdict was given,

because it was the month of the Delia festival and the law did not allow any public execution to take place until the sacred embassy had returned from Delos. During this interval, as all his intimate acquaintances could see, he continued to live exactly as before; and in fact before that time he had been admired for his incomparable cheerfulness and serenity. How then could anyone die more nobly? Or what death could be nobler than the death most nobly faced? What death more blessed than the noblest? Or what dearer to the gods than the most blessed?

I will repeat what Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, told me about him. "When Meletus had actually formulated his indictment," he said, "Socrates talked freely in my presence but made no reference to the case. I told him that he ought to be thinking about his defense. His first remark was, "Don't you think that I have been preparing for it all my life?' And when I asked him how, he said that he had been constantly occupied in the consideration of right and wrong and in doing what was right and avoiding what was wrong, which he regarded as the best preparation for a defense. Then I said, 'Don't you see, Socrates, that the juries in our courts are apt to be misled by argument, so that they often put the innocent to death and acquit the guilty?' 'Ah, yes, Hermogenes,' he answered, 'but when I did try to think out my defense to the jury, the deity at once resisted.' 'Strange words,' I said; and he replied, 'Do you think it strange if it seems better to the god that I should die now? Don't you see that to this day I never would acknowledge that anyone had lived a better or more enjoyable life than I? For they live best, I think, who strive best to become as good as possible: and the most enjoyable life is theirs who are conscious that they are growing in goodness. And to this day that has been my experience; and encountering other people and closely comparing myself with other people, I have persisted in this opinion of myself. And

not only I but my friends persist in feeling that way about me, not because of their love for me (for why doesn't love make others feel that way about their friends?) but because they think that they too would rise highest in goodness by keeping my company. But if I am to live on, perhaps I may be forced to pay the old man's penalty — to become dim sighted, hard of hearing and dull witted, slower to learn, quicker to forget, outstripped now by those who were behind me. Even if I were unconscious of the change, life would be a burden to me; and if I knew, misery and bitterness would surely be my lot.'

"'But now, if I am to die unjustly, those who unjustly kill me will bear the shame of it. For if to do injustice is shameful, whatever is unjustly done must surely bring shame. But to me, what shame is it that others fail to decide and act justly concerning me? I see that posterity judges differently of the dead according as they did or suffered injustice. I know that men will remember me too, and if I die now, not as they will remember those who took my life. For I know that they will ever testify of me that I wronged no one at any time nor corrupted anyone, but strove ever to make my companions better.'"

This was the tenor of his conversation with Hermogenes and with the others. All who knew what manner of man Socrates was and who seek after excellence continue to this day to miss him beyond all others, as the chief of helpers in the quest for excellence. For myself, I have described him as he was: so pious that he did nothing without counsel from the gods; so just that he did no injury, however small, to anyone but rather conferred the greatest benefits on all who dealt with him; so self-controlled that he never chose the more agreeable over the better course; so wise that he was unerring in his judgment of the better and the worse and needed no counselor, but relied on himself for his knowledge of them; masterly in expounding and defining such matters; no less

masterly in putting others to the test, convincing them of error, and exhorting them to follow virtue and gentlemanliness. To me then he seemed to be all that a truly good and happy man must be. But if there is any doubter, let him set the character of others beside all this, and then let him judge.

OECONOMICUS

INTRODUCTION

Oeconomicus, a mainly didactic work about the economic, practical, and moral importance of farming and estate management, was evidently written after ca. 385, when Xenophon began to build and manage his own estate at Scillous. It reports a conversation between Socrates and the wealthy young Critobulus that falls into two parts. In the first (1-6) Socrates praises farming as enjoyable, profitable, and physically beneficial, and as a good preparation for war, for just and generous living, and for the occupations. As a worthy model he cites the Persian Cyrus (the Great and the Younger are subtly conflated). In the second part (7-21) Socrates reports his own conversation with the model Greek gentleman Ischomachus, a wealthy landowner who recounts several instructional conversations he had with his new wife upon her arrival in the household, connects the physical and moral fitness acquired on an estate with success, and instructs Socrates on the fine points of farm work and its proper management.

Given the poverty of Socrates' own urban household and the nature of his marriage to Xanthippe, it is easy to understand why he can hardly be cast as the expert Critobulus needs on the subjects of farming and estate management. It is Ischomachus, not Socrates, who is clearly the expert and teacher in the practical part of the dialogue, just as in the first part it is Socrates who searches for definitions and discusses ethical issues, and who had originally sought out Ischomachus, not as an agricultural expert, but as an exemplary gentleman. It may nevertheless be surprising, at least to readers of Plato, that Socrates would be interested in such subjects at all, much less at the level of technical detail explored in Oeconomicus. After all, Socrates

was a lifelong townsman who declares that he had never been interested in moneymaking, estate management, and generalship. Still, he must have taken at least some interest in these subjects, if for no other reason than to have something to talk about with gentlemen like Xenophon. Even in Plato, Socrates notices practical and household business as he does the crafts, though they are never the principal focus of a dialogue, and the workings of the oikos, the central institution of the polis after all, are central to Republic, whose recommendations about management, and especially the fitness of women to participate, overlap to a degree with those of Oeconomicus. It would be interesting to know more about the Oeconomicus by Antisthenes and the dialogue Aspasia by Aeschines of Sphettos, which included a conversation between Xenophon and his wife with Aspasia, also invoked as an expert by our Socrates.

Xenophon elsewhere displays a keen interest in economics (e.g., in Anabasis, Cyropaedeia, and Poroi) and clearly had considerable practical experience. Much of what he says recalls such traditional texts as Hesiod's Works and Days, including the virtues of hard work, expertise, good planning, honest dealing, and the value of a wife who is not an economic liability, but industrious and honest and thus helps increase the profitability of the oikos. As in Semonides, the good wife is like a queen bee in the beehive. But Xenophon's ideas are more advanced and enlightened than this sort of traditional wisdom, especially as regards the role of wives and slaves in estate management. For Xenophon, marriage is not simply for reproduction and labor; it is a complementary partnership in the management both of property (including slaves) and of their children's education. Women are teachable and should be taught, so that a wife, by proving her competence and trustworthiness, can acquire what Socrates calls "masculine intelligence" and earn independence and authority, even over

her husband, something not allowed, for example, by Aristotle, but Plato in *Republic* includes wives in the overall project of making everyone more competent through education and therefore more productive in society. In Symposium Socrates remarks, watching a girl acrobat leap through sword points, that women are obviously capable of learning even bravery.

Was Ischomachus, who at least to some extent must serve as a stand-in for Xenophon himself, fictitious or an actual person? If fictitious, then Xenophon might have chosen a less notorious name, for the Ischomachus who would spring first to the minds of contemporary readers was the man whose wife Chrysilla lived with the wastrel Callias in a menage a trois involving her own daughter, was subsequently involved in a paternity suit, and died ca. 404 with his great estate astonishingly diminished. But it is hard to see why Xenophon, who could not have been unaware of such a long-running scandal in his own social circle, would choose such a person to represent the exemplary gentleman, husband, and estate manager. Irony would be impossible to square with the general tenor and content of the dialogue. The easiest explanation is that Ischomachus is among the people whom Xenophon, like Plato, portrayed at happy (Socratic) times of their lives before their fortunes changed for the worse.

The dramatic date is a time when Critobulus is married (after 422) and Athens is at peace (between 421 and 413). Although the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios in the agora (built in last third of the fifth century) was a popular meeting spot, and both Plato (Theages) and Aeschines Socraticus (Miltiades) had also set Socratic dialogues there, Xenophon may have chosen it as the site of Socrates' conversation with Ischomachus because it contained a painting commemorating the heroic death of his son Gryllus in 362.

TEXT

Of the twenty-three manuscripts studied so far (most recently by Gil), none (including H, according to Gil) is earlier than the thirteenth century or has special authority, and although they can be sorted into two families, contamination is so pervasive that stemmatic considerations do not help in establishing the text. All the manuscripts derive from a single uncial archetype, itself of no great quality, later than Stobaeus, and with a text different than the one reflected in the two papyrus fragments.

Economics

1. I once heard him also discuss the subject of estate management as follows.

"Tell me, Critobulus, is estate management the name of a branch of knowledge, like medicine, smithing, and carpentry?"

"I think so," replied Critobulus.

"And can we say what the function of estate management is, just as we can say what is the function of each of these occupations?"

"Well, I suppose that the business of a good estate manager is to manage his own estate well."

"Yes, and in case he were put in charge of another man's estate, could he not, if he chose, manage it as well as he manages his own? Anyone who understands carpentry can do for another exactly the same work as he does for himself; and so, I presume, can a good estate manager."

"I think so, Socrates."

"Is it possible, then, for one who understands this art, even if he has no property of his own, to earn money by managing another man's estate, just as he might do by building him a house?"

"Yes, of course; and he would get a good salary if, after taking over an estate, he continued to pay all the bills, and to increase the estate by showing a balance."

"But what do we mean now by an estate? Is it the same thing as a house, or is all property that one possesses outside the house also part of the estate?"

"Well, I think that even if the property is situated in different cities, everything a man possesses is part of his estate."

"Do not some men possess enemies?"

“Of course; some in fact possess many.”

“Shall we include their enemies in their possessions?”

“It would be ridiculous, surely, if one actually received a salary for increasing the number of a man’s enemies!”

“Because, you know, we supposed a man’s estate to be the same as his property.”

“That’s true — meaning at least anything good that he possesses; of course I don’t call anything bad that he may possess property.”

“You seem to use the word property of whatever is profitable to its owner.”

“Certainly; but what is harmful I regard as loss rather than wealth.”

“And so, if a man buys a horse and doesn’t know how to manage it, and so keeps on getting thrown and injuring himself by trying to ride it, the horse is not wealth to him, I presume?”

“Not if we assume that wealth is a good thing.”

“It follows that land is not wealth either to a man who works it in such a way that his work results in loss.”

“To be sure: not even land is wealth if it makes us starve instead of supporting us.”

“And won’t the same hold true of sheep? If a man loses through ignorance of sheep farming, his sheep too will not be wealth to him?”

“Not in my opinion.”

“It seems, then, that in your view what is profitable is wealth, what is harmful is not wealth.”

“Quite so.”

“That is to say, the same things are wealth and not wealth according as one understands or does not understand how to use them. A flute, for example, is wealth to one who is

competent to play it, but to an incompetent person it is no better than useless stones."

"True — unless he sells it."

"We now see that to persons who don't understand its use, a flute is wealth if they sell it, but not wealth if they keep it instead of selling."

"Yes, Socrates, and our argument runs consistently, since we have said that what is profitable is wealth. For a flute, if not put up for sale, is not wealth, because it is useless: if put up for sale it becomes wealth."

"Yes," commented Socrates, "provided he knows how to sell; but again, in case he sells it for something he doesn't know how to use, even then the sale doesn't convert it into wealth, according to you."

"You imply, Socrates, that even money isn't wealth to one who doesn't know how to use it."

"And you, I think, agree with me to this extent, that what a man can derive profit from is wealth. At any rate, if a man uses his money to buy, say, a mistress who makes him worse off in body and soul and estate, how can his money be profitable to him then?"

"By no means, unless we are ready to maintain that the weed called nightshade, which drives you mad if you eat it, is wealth."

"Then money is to be kept so far away, Critobulus, if one doesn't know how to use it, that it does not even count as wealth. But how about friends? If one knows how to make use of them so as to profit by them, what are they to be called?"

"Wealth, of course, and much more so than cattle, if it's true that they are more profitable than cattle."

"Yes, and it follows from what you say that enemies too are wealth to anyone who can derive profit from them."

“Well, that is my opinion.”

“Consequently, it is the business of a good estate manager to know how to deal with enemies so as to derive profit from them too.”

“Most decidedly.”

“In fact, Critobulus, you cannot fail to notice that many private persons have been indebted to war for the increase of their estates, and many rulers too.”

“Yes, so far so good, Socrates. But what about the fact that we sometimes come across people who have the knowledge and means for increasing their estates if they work, yet we find that they are unwilling to do so; and consequently we see that their knowledge is without profit for them. What are we to make of that? In these cases, surely, neither their knowledge nor their property is wealth?”

“Are you trying to start a discussion about slaves, Critobulus?”

“Oh no, not at all: I mean even people regarded as men of the highest lineage, of whom I observe that some are skilled in the arts of war, some in the arts of peace, but who are unwilling to practice these arts, and the reason, I think, is precisely because they have no master over them.”

“What, no master over them, when in spite of their prayers for prosperity and their desire to do what will bring them good they are thwarted in their intentions by those who rule them?”

“And who, pray, may these unseen rulers be?”

“No, not unseen, but open and undisguised, surely! And very vicious rulers they are too, as you yourself must see, if at least you regard idleness and moral cowardice and negligence as vices. And then there are some deceitful mistresses that pretend to be pleasures — such as gambling and consorting with bad companions: even the victims of their deception find as time goes on that these, after all, are really pains concealed

beneath a thin veneer of pleasures, and that they are hindering them from all profitable work by their influence over them."

"But there are others, Socrates, whose energy is not hindered by these influences, in fact they have an eager desire to work and to make an income: nevertheless, they exhaust their estates and are beset with difficulties."

"Yes, they too are slaves, and hard indeed are their masters: some are in bondage to gluttony, some to lechery, some to drink, and some to foolish and costly ambitions. And so hard is the rule of these passions over every man who falls into their clutches, that so long as they see that he is strong and capable of work, they force him to pay over all the profits of his toil, and to spend it on their own desires; but no sooner do they find that he is too old to work, than they leave him to an old age of misery, and try to fasten the yoke on other shoulders. No, Critobulus, we must fight for our freedom against all these as persistently as if they were armed men trying to enslave us. In fact, open enemies may be gentlemen, and when they enslave us may, by chastening, purge us of our faults and cause us to live better lives in the future. But such mistresses as these never cease to plague men in body and soul and estate all the time that they have dominion over them."

2. Critobulus continued the conversation in the following fashion: "Well, I think you have told me quite enough about such passions as these, and when I examine myself I find, I think, that I have them fairly well under control; and therefore, if you will advise me what I should do to increase my estate, I don't think those mistresses, as you call them, are likely to hinder me. So don't hesitate to give me any good advice you can. Or have you made up your mind that we are rich enough already, Socrates, and think we have no need of more money?"

“If you mean to include me, I certainly think I have no need of more money and am rich enough. But you seem to me to be quite poor, Critobulus, and at times I really do feel quite sorry for you.”

“And how much, pray tell,” asked Critobulus, laughing, “do you suppose your property would fetch at a sale, Socrates, and how much would mine?”

“Well, if I found a good buyer, I think the whole of my goods and chattels, including the house, might readily sell for five minae. Yours, I feel sure, would fetch more than a hundred times that much.”

“And in spite of that estimate, you really think you need no more money and pity me for my poverty?”

“Yes, because my property is enough to satisfy my wants, but I don’t think you would have enough to keep up your style of life and your reputation, even if your fortune were three times what it is.”

“How can that be?” exclaimed Critobulus.

“Because, in the first place,” explained Socrates, “I notice that you are bound to offer many large sacrifices; otherwise, I suppose, you would get into trouble with gods and men alike. Secondly, it is your duty to entertain many foreign guests, on a generous scale too. Thirdly, you have to give dinners and play the benefactor to the citizens, or you lose your following. Moreover, I observe that already the state is exacting heavy contributions from you: you must keep horses, pay for choruses and gymnastic competitions, and accept presidencies; and if war breaks out, I know they will require you to maintain a ship and pay a level of taxes that you won’t easily afford. Whenever you seem to fall short of what is expected of you, the Athenians will certainly punish you as though they had caught you robbing them. Besides all this, I notice that you imagine yourself to be a rich man; you are

indifferent to money, and yet go courting boys as though the cost were nothing to you. And that is why I pity you, and fear that you may come to grief and find yourself reduced to abject poverty. Whereas if I ran short of money, you know just as well as I do that, I would not lack helpers who would need to contribute very little to fill my cup to overflowing. But your friends, though far better supplied with means to support their style of life than you, nevertheless look to receive help from you."

"I can't deny this, Socrates," said Critobulus, "but it's time for you to take me in hand, and see that I don't really become an object of pity."

At this Socrates exclaimed, "Odd, don't you think, Critobulus, that a little while ago, when I said I was rich, you laughed at me as though I didn't even know the meaning of the word, and wouldn't stop until you had proved me wrong and made me admit that my possessions were worth less than one-hundredth of yours. And yet now you ask me to take you in hand and see that you don't become in all actuality a poor man?"

"Well, Socrates, I see that you understand one process by which wealth is created — how to create a surplus. So, a man who saves on a small income can, I suppose, very easily produce a large surplus from a large income."

"Then don't you remember saying just now in our conversation, when you wouldn't let me get a word in edgewise, that if a man doesn't know how to manage horses, his horses are not wealth to him, nor his land, sheep, money or anything else, if he doesn't know how to manage them? Now these are the sources from which income is derived: so how do you suppose that I can possibly know how to manage any of these, seeing that I never yet owned any of them?"

“Still, we held that, even if a man happens to have no wealth, there is such a thing as a science of household management. So, is there any reason why you shouldn’t know it?”

“Exactly the same reason, of course, that a man would have for not knowing how to play the flute if he had never owned one himself and had never borrowed one to learn on. That’s just my case as regards estate management; for never having possessed wealth myself, I’ve had no opportunity to learn on an instrument of my own, and nobody has ever let me handle his, until you made your offer. Beginners, I imagine, are even apt to damage the lyres they practice on; and if I attempted to learn to manage estates by practicing on yours, I might well totally destroy it for you.”

To that Critobulus rejoined, “How eagerly, Socrates, are you trying to avoid giving me any help toward lightening the weight of my burdensome duties.”

“Not at all, not at all,” said Socrates, “I am all eagerness to tell you all I know. Suppose you came to my house for fire and I hadn’t any but took you to some place where you could get it: I don’t think you would blame me; or if you asked for water and I had none myself but brought you to some other place for it, I feel sure that you would not blame me for that either; or suppose you wanted to learn music with me and I directed you to persons far more skilled in music than I am and who would be grateful to you for taking lessons with them, on what grounds would you blame me for doing that?”

“None if I were fair, Socrates.”

“Well then, Critobulus, I will direct you to others far more skilled than I in the subjects you now seek to learn from me. I confess that I have made a point of finding out who in the city are most knowledgeable in each subject.

For observing once that the same pursuits lead in one case to great poverty and in another to great wealth, I was quite amazed and thought it worthwhile to consider why this is so. And on consideration I found that this happens quite naturally. For I observed that those who follow their pursuits carelessly suffer loss, and I discovered that those who seriously devote themselves accomplish them more quickly, more easily, and more profitably. If you chose to learn from them, I think that, unless some god prevents it, you too would become a formidable businessman."

3. "Socrates," exclaimed Critobulus on hearing this, "I don't intend to let you go now, until you have proved to my satisfaction what you have promised in the presence of our friends here to prove."

"Well then," said Socrates, "what if I prove to your satisfaction, Critobulus, to begin with, that some men spend large sums in building houses that are useless, while others build houses perfect in all respects for much less? Will you think that I am putting before you one of the operations that constitute estate management?"

"Yes, certainly."

"And what if I show you next the companion to this — that some possess many costly belongings and cannot use them when they need them, and do not even know whether they are safe and sound, and so are continually distressing themselves and distressing their slaves, whereas others, though they possess not more but even less, have whatever they want ready for use?"

"Yes, but what is the reason for this, Socrates? Isn't it simply that the former toss their things down anywhere while the latter have everything neatly arranged in its place?"

"Yes, of course, arranged carefully in the proper place, not just anywhere."

“Your point, I take it, is that this too is an element in estate management.”

“Then what if I show you besides that in some households nearly all the slaves are in chains and yet continually try to run away, whereas in others they are under no restraint and are willing to work and to stay at their stations? Won’t you think that here too I am pointing out to you a notable effect of estate management?”

“Yes, of course; very much so.”

“And that when men farm the same kind of land, some are poverty-stricken and declare that they are ruined by farming, while others do well with the farm and have all they need in abundance?”

“Yes, of course; for maybe some spend money not on necessary purposes only but on what brings harm to the owner and the estate.”

“Perhaps there are people like that. But I don’t mean them, rather those who haven’t the money to meet even the necessary expenses though claiming to be farmers.”

“Now what can be the reason for that, Socrates?”

“I will take you to these too; and when you watch them, you will find out, I think.”

“Of course; that is, if I can.”

“Then you must watch and test yourself to see whether you are capable of understanding. At present I observe that when a comedy is to be seen, you get up very early and walk a very long way and press me eagerly to go to the play with you. But you have never yet invited me to see a real-life drama like this.”

“You think me ridiculous, don’t you, Socrates?”

“You think yourself far more so, I’m sure. And suppose I show you that some have been brought to penury by keeping

horses, while others prosper by doing so, and moreover glory in their gain?"

"Well, I see them too and know instances of both, yet I'm not one of the gainers for all that."

"The fact is you watch them just as you watch the actors in tragedy or comedy, not, I suppose, to become a playwright, but for the pleasure of seeing and hearing something. And perhaps there is no harm in that, because you don't want to write plays; but seeing that you are forced to deal with horses, don't you think you would be stupid not to look into how not to be an amateur at the business, the more so as these very horses are both good to use and profitable to sell?"

"Would you have me break in colts, Socrates?"

"Of course not, no more than I would have you buy farmers to train from childhood; but horses and human beings alike, I think, on reaching a certain age suddenly become useful and go on improving. I can also show you that in their treatment of their wives, husbands differ widely, some succeeding in winning their cooperation and thereby increasing their estates, others causing utter wreckage."

"And do we blame the husband or the wife for that, Socrates?"

"When a sheep is ailing," said Socrates, "we generally blame the shepherd, and when a horse is vicious, we generally find fault with the rider. In the case of a wife, if she receives instruction in the right way from her husband and yet does badly, perhaps she should bear the blame; but if the husband does not instruct his wife in the right way of doing things and then finds her ignorant, shouldn't he be the one who bears the blame? Anyhow, Critobulus, you should tell us the truth, for we are all friends here. Is there anyone to whom you commit more matters of importance than to your wife?"

"There is not."

“Is there anyone with whom you talk less?”

“No, or at least not many.”

“And you married her when she was a mere child and had seen and heard almost nothing?”

“Certainly.”

“Then it would be far more surprising if she understood what she should say or do than if she made mistakes.”

“But what of the husbands who you say have good wives, Socrates? Did they train them themselves?”

“There’s nothing like investigation. I will introduce Aspasia to you, and she will explain the whole matter to you with more knowledge than I have. I think that the wife who is a good partner in the household contributes just as much as her husband to its good; because the income for the most part is the result of the husband’s exertions, but the expenses are controlled mostly by the wife’s management. If both do their part well, the estate is increased; if they act incompetently, it is diminished. If you need any further demonstration as regards other branches of knowledge, I think I can show you people who acquit themselves creditably in any one of them.”

4. “Surely, Socrates, there is no need to go through the whole list. For it is not easy to get workmen who are skilled in all the occupations, nor is it possible to become an expert in them all. Please select the branches of knowledge that seem the noblest and would be most suitable for me to cultivate: show me these, and those who practice them; and from your own knowledge give me any help you can toward learning them.”

“Very good, Critobulus; for to be sure, the so-called banausic occupations are scorned and, naturally enough, held in low regard in our states. For they spoil the bodies of the workmen and the foremen, forcing them to sit still and stay indoors, and in some cases to spend the whole day by the

fire. As their bodies become womanish their souls lose strength too. Moreover, these so-called banausic occupations leave no spare time for attention to one's friends and city, so that those who follow them are reputed bad at dealing with friends and bad defenders of their country.

In some states, in fact, and especially in those reputed to be warlike, it is not even lawful for any of the citizens to work in the banausic occupations."

"But what occupations, then, do you advise us to follow, Socrates?"

"Need we be ashamed of imitating the king of the Persians? For they say that he pays close attention to farming and the art of war, holding that these are two of the noblest and most essential pursuits."

"And do you really believe, Socrates," exclaimed Critobulus on hearing this, "that the king of the Persians includes farming among his occupations?"

"Perhaps, Critobulus, the following considerations will enable us to discover whether he does so. We agree that he pays close attention to warfare, because he has given a standing order to every governor of the nations from which he receives tribute, to supply maintenance for a specified number of horsemen and archers and slingers and light infantry, so that they will be strong enough to control his subjects and to protect the country in the event of an invasion; and besides these he maintains garrisons in the citadels, whose maintenance is supplied by the governor charged with this duty, and the king annually reviews the mercenaries and all the other troops ordered to be under arms, assembling all but the men in the citadels at the place of muster, as it is called: he personally inspects the men who are near his residence, and sends trusted agents to review those who live farther away. The officers, whether commanders of garrisons or of

regiments or satraps, who turn out with a full complement of men and parade them equipped with horses and arms in good condition, he promotes in the scale of honors and enriches with valuable gifts; but those officers whom he finds to be neglecting the garrisons or making profit out of them he punishes severely, and appoints others to take their office. These actions, then, seem to us to leave no room for doubt that he pays attention to warfare.

"As for the country, he personally examines as much of it as he sees in the course of his progress through it; and he receives reports from his trusted agents on the territories that he does not see for himself. To those governors who are able to show him that their country is densely populated and that the land is in cultivation and well stocked with the trees of the district and with the crops, he assigns more territory and gives presents, and rewards them with seats of honor. Those whose territory he finds uncultivated and thinly populated either through harsh administration or arrogance or carelessness, he punishes and appoints others to take their office. By such action, does he seem to provide less for the cultivation of the land by the inhabitants than for its protection by the garrisons? And each of these duties is entrusted to a separate class of officers; one class governs the residents and the laborers and collects tribute from them, the other commands the men under arms and the garrisons. If the commander of a garrison inadequately protects the country, the civil governor and controller of agriculture denounces the commander on the grounds that the inhabitants are unable to work the farms for lack of protection. If, on the other hand, the commander brings peace to the farms and the governor nevertheless causes the land to be sparsely populated and idle, the commander in turn denounces the governor. For, roughly speaking, where cultivation is inefficient, the garrisons are not maintained and the tribute cannot be paid.

Wherever a satrap is appointed, he attends to both these matters."

At this point Critobulus said: "Well, Socrates, if the Great King does this, it seems to me that he pays as much attention to farming as to warfare."

"And furthermore," continued Socrates, "in all the districts where he resides and visits, he takes care that there are "paradises," as they call them, full of all the fine and beautiful plants that the soil will produce, and there he himself spends most of his time, except when the season precludes it."

"Then it is of course necessary, Socrates, to take care that these paradises in which the king spends his time will contain a fine stock of trees and all other beautiful plants that the soil produces."

"And some say, Critobulus, that when the king bestows gifts, he first invites those who have distinguished themselves in war, because it is useless to have broad acres under tillage unless there are men to defend them; and next to them, those who best stock and cultivate the land, saying that even stouthearted warriors cannot live without the aid of workers. There is a story that Cyrus, that most illustrious king, once said to the company invited to receive his gifts, T myself deserve to receive the gifts awarded in both classes; for I am the best at stocking land and the best at protecting the stock.'"

"Well, if Cyrus said that, Socrates, he took as much pride in cultivating and stocking land as in being a warrior."

"Yes, and if Cyrus had only lived, it seems that he would surely have proved an excellent ruler. One of the many proofs that he has given of this is the fact that, when he was on his way to fight his brother for the throne, it is said that not a man deserted from Cyrus to the king, whereas tens of thousands deserted from the king to Cyrus. I think you have one clear proof of a ruler s excellence when men obey him

willingly and choose to stand by him in moments of danger. Now his friends all fought at his side while he was alive and after he was killed died at his side, fighting around his body, with the sole exception of Ariaeus, who happened to be posted on the left wing.

"Furthermore, the story goes that when Lysander came to him bringing the gifts from the allies, this Cyrus treated him in friendly fashion, as Lysander himself related once to a stranger at Megara, adding besides that Cyrus personally showed him around his paradise at Sardis. Now Lysander admired the beauty of the trees there, the accuracy of their spacing, the straightness of the rows, the regularity of the angles, and the multitude of sweet scents that clung around them as they walked; and in amazement he exclaimed, 'Cyrus, I really do admire all this loveliness, but I am far more impressed with your agent's skill in measuring and arranging everything so exactly.' Cyrus was delighted to hear this and replied, 'Well, Lysander, the whole of the measurement and arrangement is my own work, and I did some of the planting myself.' 'What did you say, Cyrus?' exclaimed Lysander, looking at him, and noting the beauty and perfume of his robes, and the splendor of the necklaces and bangles and other jewels that he was wearing; 'Did you really plant part of this with your own hands?' 'Does that surprise you, Lysander?' asked Cyrus in reply. 'I swear by Mithras that I never yet sat down to dinner when in sound health, without first working up a sweat at some task of war or agriculture, or exerting myself in some sort of competition.'

"Lysander himself declared, I should add, that on hearing this he congratulated him and said, 'I think you deserve your happiness, Cyrus, for you earn it by your virtue.'"

5. "I'm telling you this," continued Socrates, "because not even the wealthiest can do without farming. For the pursuit of it is in some sense a luxury as well as a means of increasing

one's estate and of training the body in all that a free man should be able to do. In the first place, the earth yields to cultivators the food by which people live; she yields besides the luxuries they enjoy. Secondly, she supplies what they use to decorate altars and statues and themselves, along with most pleasant sights and scents. Thirdly, she produces or feeds the ingredients of many delicate dishes; for the art of breeding stock is closely linked with farming; so that men have victims for propitiating the gods with sacrifice and cattle for their own use. And though she supplies good things in abundance, she does not allow them to be won without work, but she accustoms men to endure winter s cold and summer's heat. She gives increased strength through exercise to those who labor with their own hands, and hardens the overseers of the work by rousing them early and forcing them to move about briskly. For on a farm no less than in the city the most important operations have their fixed times. Again, if a man wants to defend his city by serving in the cavalry, farming is his most efficient partner in furnishing upkeep for his horse; if in the infantry, it energizes his body. And the land helps in some measure to arouse enthusiasm for the labor of hunting, since it affords ready access to nourishment for the hounds and at the same time nourishes the wild game. And if farming benefits horses and hounds, they benefit the farm no less, the horses by carrying the overseer early to the scene of his duties and enabling him to leave it late, the hounds by keeping the wild animals from injuring crops and sheep, and by helping to provide safety in deserted places. The land also stimulates armed protection of the country on the part of the farmers, by nourishing her crops in the open for the strongest to take. And what occupation produces better runners, throwers, and jumpers than farming? What occupation rewards the worker more generously? What occupation welcomes its follower more gladly, inviting him to come and take whatever he

wants? What occupation entertains guests more generously? Where is it more comfortable to pass the winter with a generous fire and warm baths than on a farm? Where is it more pleasant to spend the summer enjoying the cool waters and breezes and shade than in the country? What other occupation yields more seemly first fruits for the gods, or gives occasion for more abundant festivals? What occupation is dearer to slaves, or more pleasant to a wife, or more delightful to children, or more agreeable to friends? To me indeed it would be surprising if any free man has ever come to possess a property more pleasant than a farm, or has discovered an occupation more pleasant than this or more useful for making a living.

"Yet again, because the earth is a goddess she also teaches righteousness to those who can learn; for the better she is served, the greater the benefits she gives in return. So, if at any time those who are occupied in farming and are receiving a rigorous and manly teaching are forced by great armies to quit their lands, because they are men well prepared in mind and body, they can invade the country of those who keep them out of their own and take what they need to support themselves. Often in time of war it is safer to go armed in search of food than to gather it with farm implements.

"Furthermore, farming helps to train men for collaborative effort. For men are essential to an expedition against an enemy, and the cultivation of the soil demands the aid of men. Therefore, nobody can be a good farmer unless he makes his laborers both eager and obedient; and the man who leads men against an enemy must contrive to secure the same results by rewarding those who act as brave men should and punishing the disobedient. And often it is no less necessary for a farmer to encourage his laborers than for a general to encourage his men. Slaves too need the stimulus of good hopes no less, indeed even more than free men, to make them willing to stay.

It has been well said that farming is the mother and nurse of the other arts. For when farming flourishes, all the other arts prosper, but whenever the land is compelled to lie barren, the other arts of landsmen and seamen alike virtually perish."

"Well, Socrates," replied Critobulus, "I think you are right so far. But in farming a man can rely very little on forecasts. Sometimes hailstorms and frosts, droughts, rainstorms, blight, and other factors spoil whatever has been well planned and well accomplished; and sometimes the best raised cattle are miserably destroyed by an outbreak of disease."

"Well," replied Socrates, "I thought you knew, Critobulus, that the operations of farming lie no less in the hands of the gods than those of war . And you have noticed, I suppose, that men engaged in war try to propitiate the gods before taking action, and with sacrifices and omens try to discover what they ought to do and what not to do; and for the business of farming do you think it less necessary to ask the blessing of the gods? You may be sure that sensible people offer prayer for fruits and crops and cattle and horses and sheep, and indeed for all their possessions."

6. "Well, Socrates, I think you're right when you advise me to try to begin every undertaking with the gods' help, since the gods control the works of peace no less than of war. We will try, then, to do so. But please return to the point where you broke off in your discussion of estate management, and try to explain the subject completely step by step, since after hearing what you have said so far I already seem to perceive rather more clearly than before what I must do to earn a living."

"I suggest then," resumed Socrates, "that we should first recapitulate those points of our discussion on which we have already reached agreement, so that we may try to agree as thoroughly when we go through the remaining steps."

“Yes, certainly: just as it is pleasant when business associates have no disagreement when reviewing the accounts, so it is for us, as the interested parties in a discussion, to agree as we go over the several steps.”

“Well now, we thought that estate management is the name of a branch of knowledge, and this knowledge appeared to be that by which men can increase estates, and an estate appeared to be identical with the total of one’s property, and we said that property is that which is useful for supplying a livelihood, and useful things turned out to be all those things that one knows how to use. We thought that it is impossible to learn all the branches of knowledge, and we agreed with our cities in rejecting the so-called banausic occupations because they seem to spoil the body and enervate the mind. We said that the clearest proof of this would be evident if in the course of a hostile invasion the farmers and craftsmen were made to sit apart, and each group were asked whether they voted for defending the land or withdrawing from the open and guarding the city walls. We thought that in these circumstances the men who are occupied with the land would vote to defend it, the craftsmen not to fight but to sit still, as they have been brought up to do, and to avoid exertion and danger. We came to the conclusion that for a gentleman the best occupation and the best branch of knowledge is farming, from which people obtain what is necessary to them. For this occupation seemed to be the easiest to learn and the most pleasant to practice, to afford the body the greatest measure of strength and beauty, and to afford the mind the greatest amount of spare time for attending to the interests of ones friends and city. Since farm crops grow and cattle graze outside the city walls, farming seemed to us to help in some measure to make those who work at it brave. And so, this way of making a living appeared to be held in the highest esteem

by our cities, because it seems to turn out citizens who are the bravest and most loyal to the community."

"I have already heard enough, I think, Socrates, to convince me that farming is the fairest, noblest, and most pleasant way to earn a living. But you told me that you have discovered the reasons why some farmers are so successful that farming yields them all they need in abundance, and others are so inefficient that they find farming unprofitable. I should like to hear the reasons in each case, so that we may do what is good and avoid what is harmful."

"Well then, Critobulus, what if I give you a complete account of an interview, I once had with a man whom I took to be really one of those who are justly styled true gentlemen?"

"I would greatly like to hear it, Socrates, for I long to deserve that title myself."

"Then I will tell you how I came to investigate him. For it took me very little time to visit our good builders, good smiths, good painters, good sculptors, and other people of the kind, and to inspect what were considered their finest works; but my soul very much desired to meet one of those who are called by that grand name 'gentleman,' which implies 'beautiful' as well as 'good,' in order to consider what they did to deserve it. And, first, because the epithet 'beautiful' is added to "good,' I went up to every person I noticed, and tried to discover whether I could anywhere see goodness in combination with beauty. But it was not that way at all: I thought I discovered that some who were beautiful to look at were thoroughly depraved in their souls. So, I decided to let good looks go and to seek out someone known as a gentleman. And since I heard the name applied to Ischomachus by men, women, citizens, and foreigners alike, I decided to try to meet him.

7. So, happening one day to see him sitting in the stoa of the temple of Zeus Eleutherius apparently at leisure, I approached, and sitting down at his side, said:

"Why sitting still, Ischomachus? You are not much in the habit of doing nothing; for generally when I see you in the marketplace you are either busy or at least not completely idle."

"True, and you would not have seen me so now, Socrates, had I not made an appointment with some guests here."

"And where do you spend your time," I asked, "and what do you do when you're not doing something of that sort? For I want very much to learn how you came to be called a gentleman, since you do not pass your time indoors and your condition does not suggest that you do so."

Smiling at my question, How did you come to be called a gentleman? and apparently pleased, Ischomachus answered, "Well, Socrates, I don't know whether people call me that when they talk to you about me. Certainly, when they challenge me to an exchange of property in order to escape an obligation to maintain a warship or train a chorus, nobody goes looking for the gentleman but the challenge refers to me as plain Ischomachus, my father's son. And, Socrates, since you ask the question, I certainly do not pass my time indoors, for my wife is quite capable of managing the household, even by herself."

"Ah, Ischomachus," I said, "that is just what I want to find out from you. Did you yourself train your wife to be of the right sort, or did she know her household duties when you received her from her father and mother?"

"And just what knowledge could she have had, Socrates, when I took her as my wife? She was not yet fifteen when she came to me, and up to that time she had lived under diligent supervision, seeing, hearing, and speaking as little as

possible. If when she came she knew no more than how, when given wool, to turn out a cloak, and had seen only how the spinning tasks are allocated to the slaves, isn't that as much as could be expected? For in control of her appetite, Socrates, she had been excellently trained; and I regard that sort of training to be the most important for man and woman alike."

"But in other respects, Ischomachus, did you train your wife yourself, so that she should be competent to perform her duties?"

"Oh no, Socrates, at least not until I had first offered sacrifice and prayed that I might really teach, and she really learn what was best for us both."

"Didn't your wife join with you in these same sacrifices and prayers?"

"Oh yes, and she earnestly promised and prayed to the gods to behave as she ought to, and it was easy to see that she would not neglect the lessons she had been taught."

"Do tell me, Ischomachus, what was the first lesson you taught her: I would sooner hear this from you than an account of the noblest athletic competition or horse race!"

"Well, Socrates, as soon as I found her sufficiently tamed and domesticated to carry on a conversation, I questioned her along the following lines:

"Tell me, wife, have you thought about my reasons for taking you and your parents' reasons for giving you to me?

For its surely obvious to you that there was no shortage of other potential sleeping partners. But I for myself and your parents for you considered who was the best partner for household and children that we could get. My choice fell on you, and your parents, it appears, chose me as the best they could find. Now if the god grants us children someday, then we will consider how we will best train them. For among the blessings we will share is the acquisition of the very best of

allies and the very best of support in old age; but at present we share in this estate. For I continue paying into the common fund all that I have, and you have put in all that you brought with you. We needn't calculate exactly which of us has contributed more, but we should be well aware that the one who proves the better partner makes the more valuable contribution.'

"My wife's answer was as follows, Socrates: Bow can I possibly help you? What power do I have? Everything depends on you. My duty, as my mother told me, is to practice self-control.'

"'By god, wife,' I said, 'my father said the same to me. But self-control for both husband and wife means acting in such a manner that their possessions will be in the best condition possible, and that as much as possible shall be added to them by fair and honorable means.'

"'And what do you see me possibly doing to help improve our estate?' asked my wife.

"'By god,' I replied 'of course you must try to do as well as possible what the gods made you capable of doing and the law encourages.'

"'And what is that?' she asked.

"'Things of no small importance, I suppose,' I replied, 'unless, of course, the tasks over which the queen bee in the hive presides are of small importance! For it seems to me, wife, that the gods with great discernment have established this kind of yoking of male and female, as they are called, chiefly in order that they may form a perfect partnership in mutual service. In the first place, so that the various species of living creatures may not become extinct, the couple lies down together for the production of children. Secondly, offspring to support them in old age is provided by this union, at any rate to human beings. Thirdly, human beings do not live in the

open air, like cattle, but obviously need shelter. Nevertheless, those who mean to obtain produce to fill the shelter need someone to work at the outdoor occupations, since plowing, sowing, planting, and grazing are all such outdoor jobs; and these supply the necessary provisions. And as soon as all this is stored in the shelter, then someone else is needed to keep it and to work at what must be done indoors. Shelter is needed for the nursing of newborns; shelter is needed for the making of grain into bread, and likewise for the making of clothes from wool. And since both the indoor and the outdoor jobs demand work and care, the god from the first adapted the woman's nature, I think, to the indoor and man's to the outdoor works and cares.'

"'For he made the man's body and mind more capable of enduring cold and heat, and journeys and campaigns, and thus has assigned him the outdoor tasks. To the woman, since he has made her body less capable of such endurance, I take it that the god has assigned the indoor tasks. And knowing that he had created in the woman, and had imposed on her, the nurture of the newborns, he meted out to her a larger portion of affection for newborns than to the man. And since he imposed on the woman the protection of what had been brought in as well, knowing that for protection a fearful disposition is no disadvantage, the god meted out a larger share of fear to the woman than to the man; and knowing that the one who deals with the outdoor tasks will have to be their defender against any wrongdoer, he meted out to him again a larger share of courage. But because both must give and take, he granted to both impartially memory and attention; and so you could not distinguish whether the male or the female sex has the larger share of these. And the god also gave to both impartially the power to practice self-control as needed, and gave the privilege to whichever is the better at this — whether it be the man or the woman — to win a larger portion of the

good that comes from it. And just because they are not equally well endowed with all the same aptitudes, they have the more need of each other, and each member of the pair is the more useful to the other, the one being competent where the other is deficient.'

"'Now, wife, since we know what duties have been assigned to each of us by the god, we must try, each of us, to do the duties allotted to us as well as possible. The law encourages this, for it yokes husband and wife. And as the god has made them partners in their children, so the law appoints them partners in their household. And besides, the law declares those tasks to be seemly for which the god has made the one more naturally capable than the other. Thus, for the woman it is more seemly to stay indoors than to be outside, but to the man it is unseemly rather to stay indoors than to tend to business outside. If a man acts contrary to the nature the god has given him, possibly his defiance is detected by the gods and he is punished for neglecting his own work, or meddling with his wife's. I think that the queen bee is busy with just such other tasks appointed by the god.'

"'And how,' she asked, 'do the queen bee's tasks resemble those that I have to do?'

"'How? she stays in the hive,' I replied, 'and does not allow the bees to be idle; but those who ought to work outside she sends off to their work; and whatever each of them brings in, she knows and receives it, and keeps it till it needs to be used. And when the time comes to use it, she apportions a fair share to each. She likewise presides over the weaving of the combs in the hive, that they may be well and quickly woven, and cares that the brood of little ones be duly reared up. And when the young bees have been duly reared and are fit for work, she sends them off to found a colony, with a leader to guide the new generation.'

"'Then shall I too have to do this?' said my wife.

"'Indeed, you will,' I said; 'your duty will be to stay indoors and dispatch those slaves whose work is outside, and superintend those who are to work indoors, and to receive what comes in and dispense as much of it as must be spent, and watch over as much as is to be kept in reserve, and take care that the amount stored up for a year is not spent in a month. And when wool is brought in to you, you must see that clothing is made for those who need it. You must also see to it that the dry grain is in good condition for making food. One of the duties that fall to you, however, will perhaps seem rather thankless: you will have to see that any slave who falls ill is cared for.'

"'Oh no,' cried my wife, 'it will be charming if those who are well cared for prove to feel grateful and more loyal than before.'

"I was delighted with her answer and replied, 'What makes the bees so devoted to their queen in the hive, wife, that when she abandons it they all follow her and not one thinks of staying behind? Isn't it because of some such thoughtful acts on her part?'

"It would surprise me,' answered my wife, 'if the leader's activities did not apply to you more than me. For my care of the goods indoors and my management would look rather ridiculous, I suppose, if you did not see to it that something is gathered in from outside.'

"'And my ingathering would look ridiculous,' I countered, 'were there not someone to look after what is gathered in. Don't you see how people pity those who draw water in a leaky jar, as the saying goes, because they seem to labor in vain?'

"'Of course,' she said, 'for they are truly in a miserable plight if they do that.'

"'But I assure you, wife, there are other duties particular to you that are pleasant to perform: to teach spinning to a slave

who had no knowledge of it when you received her, and to double her value to you: to take in hand a girl who is ignorant of housekeeping and service, and after teaching her and making her trustworthy and serviceable to end up with someone invaluable: to have the power of rewarding the well-behaved and useful members of your household and of punishing anyone who turns out to be bad. But the most pleasant experience of all is to prove yourself better than I am, to make me your servant; and so far from having reason to fear that as you grow older you may be less honored in the household, to feel confident that with advancing years, the better partner you prove to me and the better guardian of the estate for our children, the greater will be the honor paid to you in the household. For it is not because of youthful charms that the sum of things good and beautiful in human life is increased, but through practice of the virtues.'

"Such was the tenor of my earliest talks with her, Socrates, so far as I can recall them."

8. "And did you find, Ischomachus, that they acted as a stimulus to her diligence?" I asked.

"Yes indeed," answered Ischomachus, "and I recall that she was stung and blushed crimson because she could not give me something from the stores when I asked for it. And seeing that she was annoyed, I said: 'Don't worry, wife, because you can't give me what I happen to ask for. To be unable to use something when you need it is poverty unquestionably; but failure to lay hands on something that you're looking for is less painful than not to seek it at all because you know that it's not there. The fact is, this is not your fault, but mine, because I handed over the household to you without giving directions where anything was to be put, so that you might know where to put things and where to find them. There is nothing, wife, so convenient or so good for human beings as order. For instance, a chorus is a combination of people; but

when its members do as they please, it becomes mere confusion, and there is no pleasure in watching it; but when they move and sing in an orderly fashion, then those same people at once seem worth watching and worth hearing. Again, wife, an army in disorder is a confused mass, an easy prey to enemies, a disgusting sight to allies and utterly useless, — donkey, trooper, carrier, light-armed, horseman, chariot, all jumbled together. How are they to march in such a state, when they hamper one another, some walking while others run, some running while others stand, chariot colliding with horseman, donkey with chariot, carrier with trooper? If there is fighting to be done as well, how can they fight in such a state? For the units that were forced to run away under attack are enough to trample underfoot the heavy infantry. But an army in orderly array is a noble sight to allies, and most unwelcome to the enemy. What ally would not rejoice to watch a strong body of troopers marching in order, would not admire cavalry advancing in squadrons? And what enemy would not quake to see troopers, horsemen, light-armed, archers, slingers disposed in serried ranks and following their officers in orderly fashion? Yes, where order is kept, even on the march, though they number tens of thousands, all move steadily forward as one man; for the line behind is continually filling up the gap. Or again, why is a trireme laden with men frightening to an enemy and worth watching to allies, if not for its speed? Why do the men on board not hamper one another? Is it not precisely because they are seated in order, swing forward and backward in order, embark and disembark in order? If I want a similar example of disorder, I think of a farmer who has stored barley, wheat and beans all in one bin, and then when he wants a barley cake or bread or a side dish, must sort through the pile instead of finding them all carefully grouped and ready for use.’

"'And so, you too, wife, if you don't want such confusion but wish to know exactly how to manage our property, and to find with ease whatever we need to use, and to please me by giving me whatever I ask for, let's choose the appropriate place for each item, and when we have put everything in its place, let's instruct the maid to take it from that place and put it back there again. That way we will know what is safe and sound and what is not; for the place itself will miss whatever is not in it, and a glance will reveal anything that needs attention, and the knowledge where each thing is will quickly bring it to hand, so that we can use it without trouble.'

"Once I had an opportunity to board and look over the great Phoenician merchant ship, Socrates, and I believe I have never seen tackle so excellently and accurately arranged. For I saw a great deal of equipment stowed separately in a very small receptacle. As you know, a ship needs a great many wooden and corded implements when she comes into port or puts to sea, much rigging, as it is called, when she sails, many devices to protect her against enemy vessels; she carries a large supply of weapons for the crew, and contains all the same utensils that people use for each meal together at home. In addition to all this, she is laden with cargo which the skipper carries for profit. And all the things I mention were contained in an area not much bigger than a dining room with eleven couches. And I noticed that each kind of thing was so neatly stowed away that there was no confusion, no work for a searcher, nothing out of place, no troublesome untying to cause delay when anything was needed for immediate use. I found that the pilot's mate, who is called the lookout, knows each particular section so exactly that he can tell even when ashore where everything is kept and how much there is of it, just as well as a man who knows how to spell can tell how many letters there are in Socrates and in what order they come. Now I saw this man in his spare time inspecting

everything that is needed as a matter of course on the ship. I was surprised to see him looking them over and asked what he was doing. 'Sir,' he answered, 'I am looking to see how the ship's equipment is stored, in case of any accident, or whether anything is missing or mixed up with other equipment. For when the god raises a storm at sea, there's no time to look around for what you need or to issue something that's all jumbled. For the god threatens and punishes slackers. You're lucky if he merely refrains from destroying the innocent; and if he also saves you when you do your work well, you have great cause to thank the gods.'

"Now after seeing the ship's tackle in such perfect order, I told my wife: 'Considering that people aboard a merchant vessel, even if it's a little one, find room for things and keep order, though tossed violently to and fro, and find what they want to get, though terror stricken, it would be utter slackness on our part if we, who have large storerooms in our house to keep everything separate and whose house rests on solid ground, fail to find a good and handy place for everything. Would it not be sheer stupidity on our part?'

"'I have already told you how fine it is to keep one's stock of utensils in order, and how easy to find a suitable place in a house for each set. And what a beautiful sight it is when shoes lie in rows, all in their own proper places! How beautiful it is to see clothes sorted, all in their own proper places! and blankets, and bronze ware, or table ware! Although a witty man might find it absolutely hilarious but not a serious man, I claim that even pots and pans look graceful when set out in discriminating fashion. It follows that everything else seems somehow more beautiful when set out in order. For each set looks like a chorus of utensils, and the space between the sets is beautiful to see when each set is kept clear of it, just as a cyclic chorus is not only a beautiful spectacle in itself but the free space looks beautiful and unencumbered.'

“'We can test the truth of what I say, wife, without any inconvenience and with very little trouble. What’s more, wife, there is no reason for any misgiving that it is hard to find someone who will get to know the various places and remember to put each set in its proper place. For surely, we know that the city as a whole has ten thousand times as much of everything as we have, and yet you may order any of the slaves to buy something in the market and bring it home, and none will be at a loss: every one of them is bound to know where to go to get each item. Now the only reason for this is that everything is kept in a specific place. But when you are searching for a person, you often fail to find him, though he may be searching for you himself. And for this again the one reason is that no meeting place has been assigned.’

“That is the gist of the conversation I think I remember having with her about the arrangement of utensils and their use.”

9. “And what was the result?” I asked; “Did you think, Ischomachus, that your wife paid any attention to the lessons you tried so earnestly to teach her?”

“In fact, she promised to attend to them and visibly took deep pleasure in having found a solution of her perplexity, and she begged me to lose no time in arranging things as I had described.”

“And how did you arrange things for her, Ischomachus?” I asked.

“Well, I decided first to show her the possibilities of our house. For it contains few elaborate decorations, Socrates; but the rooms are designed for this very purpose, to provide as convenient receptacles as possible for the things that are to be kept in them, and thus each room invited just what was suited to it. Thus the inner chamber by the security of its position called for the most valuable bedding and furniture,

the dry covered rooms for the grain, the cool for the wine, the well-lit for those works of art and vessels that need light. I showed her decorated living rooms for the family that are cool in summer and warm in winter. I showed her that the whole house fronts south, so that it was obviously sunny in winter and shady in summer. I showed her the women's quarters too, separated by a bolted door from the men's, so that nothing that ought not to be moved may be taken out, and that the slaves may not breed without our permission. For honest slaves generally prove more loyal if they have produced children, while bad ones, if coupled, become all the more prone to mischief.

"And now that we had completed the tour, we set about separating the furniture 'tribe by tribe.' We began by gathering the vessels we use for sacrifices. After that we sorted the women's holiday finery, and the men's holiday and war garb, bedding in the women's, bedding in the men's quarters, women's shoes, men's shoes. Another tribe consisted of weapons, and three others of implements for spinning, for bread making, and for cooking; others again for washing, at the kneading trough, and for table use. All these we divided into two sets, things in constant use and things reserved for festivities. We also set aside the supplies that are consumed within the month and stored separately those calculated to last for a year; that way we are less likely to misjudge how much will be there at the end. When we had divided all the portable property tribe by tribe, we arranged everything in its proper place. After that we showed the slaves who have to use them where to keep the utensils they require daily, for baking, cooking, spinning and so forth; handed them over to their care and charged them to see that they were safe and sound. The things that we use only for festivals or entertaining guests, or on rare occasions, we handed over to the housekeeper, and after showing her their places and counting and making a

written inventory of all the items, we told her to dispense what each slave needed but to remember what she had given to each of them, and when she got it back to put it in the place where she takes items of its kind.

"In appointing the housekeeper, we chose the woman whom on consideration we judged to have the most self-control in eating, wine drinking, sleeping and intercourse with men, the one, too, who seemed to have the best memory, to be most careful not to offend us by neglecting her duties, and to think most how she could earn some reward by obliging us. We also taught her to be loyal to us by making her a partner in all our joys and, if we had any trouble, inviting her to share that too. We trained her to be eager for the improvement of our estate by making her familiar with it and by allowing her to share in our success. And we developed in her a sense of justice by giving more honor to the just than to the unjust, and by showing her that the just live in greater wealth and freedom than the unjust. And so we appointed her to that position.

"When all this was done, Socrates, I told my wife that all these measures were futile unless she saw to it herself that our arrangement was strictly adhered to in every detail. I explained that in well-ordered cities the citizens are not satisfied with passing good laws: they go further and choose guardians of the laws who act as overseers, commending the law-abiding and punishing lawbreakers. So, I charged my wife to consider herself guardian of the laws to our household, and just as the commander of a garrison inspects his guards, so must she inspect the equipment whenever she thought it well to do so, and to determine whether each item is in good condition, just as the Council scrutinizes the cavalry and the horses. And like a queen, she must to the best of her ability praise and honor the deserving and scold and punish the deficient.

“Furthermore, I taught her that she would not be justifiably upset if I assigned heavier duties to her than to the slaves as regarded our possessions. Slaves, I pointed out, carry, tend, and guard their master s property and only in that sense have a share in it; they have no right to use anything except with the owner s permission; but everything belongs to the master to use as he pleases. Therefore, I explained, the one who gains most by the preservation of property and loses most by its destruction is the one who is bound to take most care of it.”

“Well, then, Ischomachus,” I said, “was your wife inclined to pay attention to your words?”

“In fact, Socrates,” he cried, “she told me I was mistaken if I thought I was laying a hard task on her in telling her that she must take care of our things: it would have been harder, she said, had I required her to neglect her own possessions than to have the duty of attending to her own peculiar goods. The fact is, she added, just as it naturally comes easier to a good woman to care for her own children than to neglect them, so, I imagine, a good woman finds it more agreeable to look after her own possessions than to neglect them.”

10. Now when I heard that his wife had given him this answer, I exclaimed, “By Hera, Ischomachus, by your showing, your wife has a truly masculine mind!”

“Yes,” said Ischomachus, “and I am prepared to give you other examples of high-mindedness on her part, when a word from me was enough to secure her instant obedience.”

“Tell me what they are,” I cried; “for if Zeuxis showed me a fair woman’s portrait painted by his own hand, it would not give me half the pleasure I derive from the contemplation of a living woman’s virtues.”

At that, Ischomachus continued, “Well, one day, Socrates, I noticed that her face was made up: she had rubbed in a lot of white lead in order to look even whiter than she is, and

alkanet juice to make her cheeks rosier than they truly were; and she was wearing boots with thick soles to appear taller than she naturally was. So I said to her, 'Tell me, wife, how should I appear more worthy of your love as a partner in our goods, by disclosing to you our belongings just as they are, without boasting of imaginary possessions or concealing any part of what we have, or by trying to trick you with an exaggerated account, showing you counterfeit money and wooden necklaces painted gold and describing clothes dyed purple that would fade?'

"'Hush!' she broke in immediately, 'Don't be like that — I could not love you with all my heart if you were like that!'

"'Then aren't we joined together by another bond of union, wife, to be partners in our bodies?'

"'That's what they say.'

"'How then should I seem more worthy of your love in this partnership of the body — by striving to have my body hale and strong when I present it to you, and so literally to be of a good countenance in your sight, or by smearing my cheeks with red lead and painting myself under the eyes with rouge before I show myself to you and clasp you in my arms, cheating you and offering to your eyes and hands red lead instead of my real flesh?'

"'For my part,' she cried, 'I would sooner touch you than red lead, would sooner see your own color than rouge, would sooner see your eyes bright than smeared with grease.'

"'Then please assume, wife, that I do not prefer white paint and alkanet dye to your real color; but just as the gods have made horses delight in horses, cattle in cattle, sheep in sheep, so human beings find the human body undisguised most delightful. Tricks like these may serve to deceive outsiders, but people who live together are bound to be found out if they try to deceive one another. They're found out when they're just

out of bed and not yet dressed, or they perspire and are lost, or a tear convicts them, or the bath reveals them as they truly are!"'

"My gods, what did she say to that?" I asked.

"Wouldn't you know," he said, "she gave up such practices from that day forward, and tried to let me see her unadorned and as she should be. Still, she did ask whether I could advise her on one point: how she might make herself really beautiful instead of merely seeming to be. And this was my advice, Socrates: 'Don't always be sitting around like a slave but try, with the gods' help, to act like a mistress: stand before the loom and be ready to instruct those who know less than you, and to learn from those who know more: look after the baking maid: stand by the housekeeper when she is measuring out provisions: go round and see whether everything is in its place.' For I thought that would give her a walk as well as something to do. I also said it was excellent exercise to mix flour and knead dough; and to shake and fold clothing and linens; such exercise would give her a better appetite, improve her health, and add natural color to her complexion. Besides, when a wife's looks outshine a slave's, and she is fresher and more becomingly dressed, it's sexy, especially when the wife is also willing to please, whereas a slave girl is forced to do what you want. But wives who sit about like fine ladies open themselves to comparison with painted and fraudulent women. And now, Socrates, you may be sure, my wife's dress and appearance are in accord with my instructions as I have just described."

11. At this point I said, "Ischomachus, I think your account of your wife's activities is sufficient for the present — and very praiseworthy it is to both of you. But now tell me about your own, so that you can have the pleasure of stating the reasons why you are so highly respected, and I will be very grateful to

you for a complete account of a gentleman's activities and, if I'm able, for a thorough knowledge of them."

"Why certainly, Socrates," answered Ischomachus, "it will be a very great pleasure to me to give you an account of my daily activities, that you may correct me if you think there is anything amiss in my conduct."

"As far as that goes," I said, "who am I to rightly remodel a perfect gentleman, and that when I'm taken to be an idle chatterer and measurer of the air, and am called — the most senseless of all charges — a poor beggar? I do assure you, Ischomachus, this last imputation would have depressed me a lot were it not that the other day I came upon the horse of Nicias the foreigner. I saw a crowd walking behind it and staring, and heard some of them talking at length about it. Well, I went up to the groom and asked him if the horse had many possessions. The man looked at me as if I must be crazy to ask such a question, and asked me how a horse could own property. At that I perked up, for his answer showed that it is possible even for a poor horse to be a good one, if nature has given it a good spirit. And thus it is possible also for me to become a good man, so do give me a complete account of your activities, so that, so far as I am able, I may try to follow your example from tomorrow on; for that's a fine day for starting on a course of virtue."

"You're joking, Socrates," said Ischomachus; "but nevertheless I'll tell you what principles I try my best to follow consistently in life. For I seem to have learned that while the gods have made it impossible for people to succeed without knowing their duties and seeing that they are carried out, to some who are thoughtful and careful they grant prosperity, and to some deny it. Therefore I begin by worshipping the gods, and try to conduct myself in such a way that in answer to my prayers I may have health and physical strength, esteem

in the city, the affection of my friends, safety with honor in war, and wealth increased by honest means."

"Ischomachus," I asked on hearing that, "do you really want to be rich and to have lots of possessions when you will also have lots of problems taking care of them?"

"The answer to your questions," he said, is: "Yes, I do indeed. For it is a pleasure to honor the gods in grand fashion, Socrates, to help friends if they need anything, and see to it that the city lacks no adornment that my means can supply."

"And fine principles those are, Ischomachus," I replied, "at least for a very influential man, no doubt about it! For there are many who cannot live without seeking help from others, and many who are content if they can provide enough for their own needs. Surely those who can maintain their own estate and yet have enough left to adorn the city and relieve their friends may well be thought affluent and powerful men. However," I added, "praise of such men is a commonplace among us. Rather please return to your initial statement, Ischomachus, and tell me how you take care of your health, your physical strength, how it's right for you to survive even war honorably. I will be glad to hear about your moneymaking afterward."

"Well, Socrates," replied Ischomachus, "all these things hang together, as far as I can see. For if a man has plenty to eat, and works it off properly, I think he both insures his health and adds to his strength. By training himself in the arts of war he is more apt to survive honorably, and by due diligence and resistance to going soft, he is more likely to increase his estate."

"So far, Ischomachus, I follow you," I answered. "You mean that by working off meals, by due diligence, and by training, a person is more apt to obtain the good things in life. But now I would like you to give me details. By what kind of work do you

go about keeping your health and physical strength? How do you train yourself in the arts of war? What diligence do you use to have a surplus from which to help friends and strengthen the city?"

"Well now, Socrates," replied Ischomachus, "I get out of bed at an hour when, if I need to call on anyone, I am sure to find him still at home. If I have any business to do in town, I make it an opportunity for taking a walk. If there is nothing pressing to be done in town, my slave leads my horse to the farm and I make my walk by going there on foot, with more benefit, perhaps, Socrates, than if I walked around in the arcade. When I reach the farm, I may find planting, clearing, sowing or harvesting in progress. I superintend all the details of each such activity and make any improvements in method that I can suggest. After this, I usually mount my horse and go through exercises, imitating as closely as I can the exercises needed in warfare. I avoid neither slope nor steep incline, ditch nor watercourse, but of course I use all possible care not to lame my horse when he takes them. After I have finished, the slave gives the horse a roll and leads him home, bringing with him from the farm anything we happen to need in the city. I divide the return trip between walking and running. When I've arrived home, I clean myself with a strigil, and then I have lunch, Socrates, eating just enough to get through the day feeling neither empty nor too full."

"By Hera, Ischomachus," I cried, "I'm delighted with your activities. You have a package of methods for securing health and physical strength, of exercises for war, and specifics for getting rich, and you use them all at the same time. That does seem to me totally admirable! And in fact you afford convincing proofs that your method in pursuing each of these goals is sound. For we see you nearly always in good health and physically fit, thanks to the gods, and we know that you

are considered one of our best horsemen and wealthiest citizens."

"And what comes of these activities, Socrates? Not, as you perhaps expected to hear, that I am generally dubbed a gentleman, but instead I am persistently slandered."

"As a matter of fact," I said, "I was meaning to ask you, Ischomachus, whether you include in your system the ability to conduct a prosecution or a defense, in case you have to appear in court?"

"Why, Socrates," he answered, "don't you realize that this is exactly what I am constantly practicing — proving that I wrong no one and do all the good I can to many? And don't you realize that I practice making accusations when I note that certain persons are wronging many individuals and the city but are doing no good to anyone?"

"But tell me one thing more, Ischomachus," I said; "do you also practice the art of expounding these matters?"

"Never, Socrates," he replied, "do I stop practicing the art of speaking. When one of the slaves makes an accusation or denies one, I try to cross-examine him; or I praise or blame someone before his friends; or I act as peacemaker between some of my acquaintances by trying to show them that it is in their interest to be friends rather than enemies. Or we get together and court-martial a general, or take turns defending a man who is unjustly blamed or accusing one who is unjustly honored. We often sit in counsel and speak in support of the course we want to adopt and against the course we want to avoid. I have often been singled out before now, Socrates, and condemned to suffer a punishment or pay damages."

"By whom, Ischomachus?" I asked; "I am in the dark about that!"

"By my wife," was his answer.

"And how does your pleading go?" I said.

“Pretty well, when it’s in my interest to speak the truth. But when lying is called for, Socrates, I can’t make the worse argument appear the better — oh no, not at all!”

“Perhaps, Ischomachus,” I commented, “you can’t turn the lie into the truth!”

12. “But perhaps I’m keeping you, Ischomachus,” I continued, “and you want to get away now?”

“Oh no, Socrates,” he answered; “I shouldn’t think of going before the market clears.”

“You certainly take the utmost care,” I continued, “not to forfeit your right to be called a gentleman! For I’m sure there are many things claiming your attention just now, but since you have made an appointment with those guests you are determined not to break it.”

“But I assure you, Socrates, I’m not neglecting the matters you refer to, either; for I keep foremen on my farms.”

“And when you want a foreman, Ischomachus, do you look out for a man qualified for such a post, and then try to buy him — when you want a builder, I feel sure you inquire for a qualified man and try to get him — or do you train your foremen yourself?”

“Of course, I try to train them myself, Socrates. For the man has to be capable of taking charge in my absence; so why need he know anything but what I know myself? For if I am fit to manage the farm, I presume I can teach another man what I know myself.”

“Then the first requirement will be that he should be loyal to you and yours, if he is to represent you in your absence. For if a foreman is not loyal, what’s the use of any knowledge he may possess?”

“None, of course; but I may tell you, loyalty to me and mine is the first lesson I try to teach.”

“And how, in heaven’s name, do you teach your man to be loyal to you and yours?”

“By rewarding him, of course, whenever the gods bestow some good thing on us in abundance.”

“You mean, then, that those who enjoy a share of your good things are loyal to you and want you to prosper?”

“Yes, Socrates, I find that is the best instrument for producing loyalty.”

“Granted he is loyal to you, Ischomachus, will that be enough to make him a competent foreman? Don’t you see that though virtually all people wish themselves well, still there are many who won’t take the trouble to get for themselves the good things they want to have?”

“Well, when I want to make foremen of such men, of course I teach them also to be attentive.”

“And how on earth do you do that? I was under the impression that attentiveness is a virtue that can’t possibly be taught.”

“True, Socrates, it impossible to teach everyone you come across to be attentive.”

“Then what sort of men can be taught? Point these out to me, at any rate.”

“In the first place, Socrates, you can’t make attentive men of hard drinkers; for drink makes them forget everything they ought to do.”

“Then are drunkards the only men who will never become attentive, or are there others?”

“Of course, there are: sluggards must be included; for you can’t do your own business when you are asleep, nor make others do theirs.”

‘Well then, will these make up the total of persons we will find incapable of learning this lesson, or are there still others besides?”

“I should add that in my opinion those who fall desperately in love are incapable of paying more attention to anything other than that. For it isn’t easy to find hope or occupation more delightful than devotion to the darling boys! And when the thing to be done presses, no harsher punishment can easily be imagined than blocking access to the beloved. So I avoid even trying to make a manager of anyone whom I recognize to be of this sort.”

“And what about those who have a passion for making money? Are they also incapable of being trained to take charge of the work of a farm?”

“Not at all; of course not. In fact, they very easily qualify for the work: it’s merely necessary to point out to them that attentiveness is profitable.”

“And assuming that the others are free from the faults that you condemn and are interested in making a moderate profit, how do you teach them to be attentive to the affairs you want them to superintend?”

“It’s very simple, Socrates: whenever I notice that they are attentive, I commend them and try to show them honor; but when they appear careless, I try to say and do the sort of things that will sting them.”

“Turn now, Ischomachus, from the subject of the men in training for the occupation and tell me about the system: is it possible for anyone to make others attentive if he is careless himself?”

“Of course not: a person untrained in the arts could as soon make others artistic. For it is hard to learn to do something well when the teacher shows you ineptly; and when a master models inattentiveness, it is difficult for the slave to become

attentive. In short, I don't think I've yet found a bad master with good slaves; I have, however, come across a good master with bad slaves — but they suffered for it! If you want to make men fit to take charge, you must supervise their work and examine it, and be ready to reward work well carried out and not shrink from punishing carelessness as it deserves. I like the answer that's attributed to the barbarian when the king, you know, had acquired a good horse, and wanted to fatten him up as quickly as possible. So, he asked one who was considered good with horses what was the quickest way of fattening up a horse. "Its master's eye," replied the man, and I think we may apply the answer generally, Socrates, and say that it's mainly the master's eye that does the fine and worthy work."

13. "When you have impressed on a man," I resumed, "the necessity of careful attention to the duties you assign to him, will he then be competent to act as foreman or must he learn something besides, if he is to be efficient?"

"Of course," answered Ischomachus, "he still has to understand the job and when and how to do it. Otherwise how could a foreman be more useful than a doctor who takes care to visit a patient morning and night but has no idea how to treat his illness?"

"Alright, suppose he's learned how farm work is to be done: will he still need something more, or will your man now be a perfect foreman?"

"I think he must learn to govern the workers."

"And do you train your foremen to be competent to govern too?"

"Yes: I try, anyway."

"And how on earth do you train them to be governors of men?"

“So very easily, Socrates, that maybe you’ll laugh when I tell you.”

“No, it’s certainly no laughing matter, Ischomachus: anyone who can make men fit to govern others can also teach them to be masters of others; and if he can make them fit to be masters, he can make them fit to be kings. Anyone who can do that seems to me to deserve high praise, not laughter.”

“Well now, Socrates, other creatures learn obedience in two ways: by being punished when they try to disobey, and by being rewarded when they are eager to serve you. Colts, for example, learn to obey the horse breaker by getting something they like when they are obedient and getting into trouble when they are disobedient, until they do what the horse breaker wants. Puppies, too, are far inferior to human beings in intelligence and speech, and yet they learn to run in circles and turn somersaults and do many other tricks in the same way; for when they obey, they get something that they want, and when they’re careless they’re punished. And people can be made more obedient merely by talking to them, showing them that it is advantageous for them to obey. But in dealing with slaves the training considered suitable for wild animals is also a very effective way of teaching obedience, for you will get a lot out of them by filling their stomachs with the food they hanker for. Those of an ambitious disposition are also spurred on by praise, some natures being as hungry for praise as others for food and drink. Now these are precisely the things that I do myself with a view to making people more obedient. But they are not the only lessons I give to those whom I want to appoint as my foremen: I have other ways of helping them get on. For the clothes that I must provide for my work force and the shoes are not all alike: some are better than others, some worse, so that I can reward the better workers with the superior articles and give the inferior ones to the less deserving. For I think it is very disheartening to good

workers, Socrates, when they see that they do all the work and others who are not willing to work hard and run risks, when need be, get the same as they do. For my part, then, I don't choose to put the better on a level with the worse, and when I know that my foremen have distributed the best things to the most deserving, I commend them; and if I see that flattery or any other useless service wins special favor, I don't overlook it but reprove the foreman, and try to show him, Socrates, that such favoritism is not even in his own interest."

14. "Now, Ischomachus," I said, "when you find your man so competent to govern that he can make his charges obedient, do you think him a perfect foreman, or does he need anything else, even with the qualifications you have mentioned?"

"Of course, Socrates," Ischomachus replied, "he must keep his hands off his masters property and not steal. For if the man who handles the crops dares to make away with them, and doesn't leave enough to make a profit from the enterprise, what good can come of farming under his management?"

"Then do you take it on yourself to teach this kind of right behavior too?"

"Very much so, though I don't find that all readily pay attention to this lesson. Nevertheless, I guide my slaves onto the path of right behavior with the aid of maxims drawn in part from the laws of Draco, in part from the laws of Solon. For it seems to me that these worthies enacted many of their laws with an eye on this particular kind of right behavior. For it is laid down: 'thieves shall be punished for their thefts and anyone found guilty of theft shall be imprisoned, and if they attempt it shall be put to death.' The object of these enactments was clearly to make greed unprofitable to the offender. By applying some of these statutes and other enactments found in the Persian king's code, I try to make my

slaves upright with the property that passes through their hands. For while the former laws only penalize the wrongdoer, the king's code not only punishes the guilty but also benefits the upright. Thus, seeing that the honest grow richer than the dishonest, many, despite their love of profit, are careful to remain free from dishonesty. And if I notice people who attempt to persist in dishonesty even though they are well treated, I regard them as incorrigibly greedy and have nothing more to do with them. On the other hand, if I notice people who are inclined to be honest not only because they gain by this honesty but also from a desire to win my approbation, I treat them like free men by making them rich; and not only that, I also honor them like gentlemen. For I think, Socrates, that the difference between ambition and greed consists in this, that for the sake of praise and honor the ambitious are willing to work hard, to take risks, and refrain from dishonest gain."

15. "Well, I won't go on to ask whether anything more is needed in your man, after you have implanted in him a desire for your prosperity and have made him also careful to see that you achieve it, and have obtained for him, besides, the knowledge needed to ensure that every piece of work done will add to the profits, and further, have made him capable of governing, and when besides all this, he takes as much delight in producing grand harvests for you in due season as you would take if you did the work yourself. For it seems to me that a man like that would make a very valuable foreman. Nevertheless, Ischomachus, please don't neglect the point that we have merely touched on in our discussion."

"Which point?" asked Ischomachus.

"You said, I believe, that the greatest lesson to learn is how each job ought to be done; and you added that if a man doesn't know what to do and how to do it, no good can come of his management."

Then he said, “Socrates, are you insisting now that I should teach the whole art and mystery of agriculture?”

“Yes,” I said, “for maybe it is just this that makes rich men of those who understand it, and condemns the ignorant to a life of poverty, for all their hard work.”

“Well then, Socrates, you will now hear how kindly is this art toward mankind. Most beneficial, pleasant to work at, fine and dear to gods and men in the highest degree, it is also in the highest degree easy to learn. Noble qualities surely! As you know, we call those creatures noble that are beautiful, large, and beneficial, and yet gentle toward human beings.”

“But I do think, Ischomachus, that I quite understand your account of these matters — I mean how to teach a foreman; for I think I follow your statement that you make him loyal to you, and attentive, and capable of governing, and honest. But you said that one who is to be successful in the management of a farm must learn what to do and how and when to do it. That is the subject that we have treated, it seems to me, in a rather cursory fashion, as if you said that anyone who is to be capable of writing from dictation and reading what is written must know the alphabet. For had I been told that, I should have been told, to be sure, that I must know the alphabet, but I don’t think that piece of information would help me to know it. So too now; I’m easily convinced that a man who is to manage a farm successfully must understand farming, but that knowledge doesn’t help me understand how to farm. Were I to decide this very moment to be a farmer, I think I would be like that doctor who goes round visiting the sick but has no knowledge of the right way to treat them. So you must teach me the actual operations of farming, so I won’t be like him.”

“Well, Socrates, farming is not a lot of trouble to learn, unlike other arts that the student must study till he is worn out before he can earn his keep by his work. Some of the jobs

you can understand by watching men at work, others by just being told, well enough to teach someone else if you wanted. And I believe that you know a good deal about it yourself without being aware of it. The truth is, whereas other artists more or less conceal the most important points in their own art, the farmer who plants best is most pleased when he is being watched, as is the one who sows best. Question him about any piece of work well done and he will tell you exactly how he did it. So farming, Socrates, more than any other calling, seems to produce a very noble disposition in its followers."

"An excellent preamble," I exclaimed, "and not such as to damp the listeners curiosity. Do describe it to me, all the more because it is so simple to learn. For it is no disgrace for you to teach what's simple, but far more a disgrace for me not to understand it, especially if it's really useful."

16. "First then, Socrates, I want to show you that what is called the most complicated problem in agriculture by the authors who write most accurately on the theory of the subject but are not practical farmers, is really a simple matter. For they tell us that to be a successful farmer one must first know the nature of the soil."

"Yes, and they're right," I remarked; "for if you don't know what the soil is capable of growing, I don't suppose you can know what to plant or what to sow."

"Yes," said Ischomachus, "but you can tell simply by looking at the crops and trees on another man's land what the soil can and cannot grow. And when you've found out, it's useless to fight against the gods, for you aren't likely to get a better yield from the land by sowing and planting what you want instead of the crops and trees that the land prefers to grow and nurture. If it happens that the land does not declare its own capabilities because its owners are lazy, you can often

gather more correct information from a neighboring plot than from a neighboring farmer. Even when the land lies barren, it reveals its nature. For if the wild plants growing on the land are of fine quality, then by good farming the soil is capable of yielding cultivated crops of fine quality. That way, the nature of the soil can be ascertained even by the novice who has no experience of farming."

"Well, I think I am now confident, Ischomachus, that I need not avoid farming from fear of not knowing the nature of the soil. The fact is, I am reminded that fishermen, though their business is in the sea, and they neither stop the boat to take a look nor slow down, nevertheless, when they see the crops as they scud past the farms, they don't hesitate to express an opinion about the soil, which is the good kind and which the bad, now condemning, now praising it. And what's more, I notice that in their opinion about the good land they generally agree exactly with experienced farmers."

"Well then, Socrates, let me refresh your memory on the subject of agriculture; but where would you like me to begin? For I'm aware that in you I will be addressing someone who already knows a lot about the right method of farming."

"First, Ischomachus, I think I would be glad to learn, for this is the philosopher's way, how I am to cultivate the land if I want to get the largest crops of wheat and barley out of it."

"Well, you know, I take it, that fallow ground must be prepared for sowing?"

"Yes, I know."

"Suppose, then, we start plowing in winter?"

"But the land will be a bog."

"How about starting in summer?"

"The land will be hard for the oxen to plow up."

“Then it seems that spring is the season for beginning this work.”

“‘Yes, the land is likely to be more friable if it is turned then.”

“Yes, and the grass turned up is long enough at that season to serve as fertilizer but, not having shed seed, it won’t grow again. You know also, I guess, that fallow land can’t be satisfactory unless it is clear of weeds and thoroughly baked in the sun?”

“Yes, certainly; that’s essential, I think.”

“Do you think that there is any better way of accomplishing that than by turning the land over as often as possible in the summer?”

“I know for certain that if you want the weeds to lie on the surface and wither in the heat, and the land to be baked by the sun, the surest way is to plow it up at midday in midsummer.”

“And if people prepare the fallow by digging, isn’t it obvious that they also must separate the weeds from the soil?”

“Yes, and they must throw the weeds on the surface to wither and turn up the soil so that the underside of it can be baked.”

17. “You see, then, Socrates, that we agree about the fallow.”

“It does seem so, to be sure.”

“And now concerning the right time for sowing, Socrates. Don’t you believe that the time to sow is the time that has been invariably found best by past experience and is universally approved by present practice? For as soon as autumn ends all men, I think, look anxiously to the god to see when he will send rain upon the earth and make them free to sow.”

“Yes, Ischomachus, all men have made up their minds, of course, not to sow in dry ground if they can help it, clearly because those who sowed without waiting to be bidden by the god have had to grapple with many losses.”

“So far, then,” said Ischomachus, “all the world is of one mind.”

“Yes,” I said, “where the god is our teacher we all come to think alike. For example, all agree that it is better to wear warm clothing in winter, if they can, and all agree on the desirability of having a fire, if they have wood.”

“But,” said Ischomachus, “when we come to the question whether sowing is best done early or very late or at the midseason, we find much difference of opinion, Socrates.”

“And the god,” I said, “doesn’t regulate the year by fixed laws, but in one year it may be advantageous to sow early, in another very late, in another at midseason.”

“What do you think, then, Socrates? Is it better to select one of these times for sowing, whether you sow a lot or just a little, or to begin sowing at the start of the season and continue to the end?”

“For my part, Ischomachus, I think it’s best to sow for succession throughout the season. For in my opinion, it is much better to get enough food at all times than too much at one time and not enough at another.”

“Here again then, Socrates, student and teacher are of one opinion; and what’s more, you the student stated this opinion before I did.”

“Well now, is scattering the seed a complex skill?”

“By all means let’s take that into consideration too, Socrates. I presume that you know as well as I do that the seed must be scattered by hand?”

“Yes, I have seen it.”

“But some people,” he said, “can scatter it evenly, and some can’t.”

“Then sowers no less than lyre players need practice, so that the hand may be the servant of the will.”

“Certainly. But suppose that some of the soil is rather thin and some rather rich?”

“What do you mean by that?” I interjected. “By ‘thin’ do you mean weak and by ‘rich’ strong?”

“That’s correct; and I’m asking you whether you would give the same quantity of seed to both kinds, or to which you would give more?”

“I for one think that the stronger the wine, the more water should be added, and the stronger the porter, the heavier the load should be put on his back; and if it is necessary to feed others, I would require the richest men to feed the greatest number. But tell me whether weak land, like draft animals, becomes stronger when you put more com into it.”

“Now you’re joking, Socrates,” he said, laughing, “but let me tell you that, if after putting in the seed you plow it in again as soon as green shoots have sprouted, when the land is obtaining plenty of nourishment from the sky, it makes food for the soil and strengthens it like manure. If, on the other hand, you let the seed go on growing on the land until it’s mature, it’s hard for weak land to yield much grain in the end, just as it’s hard for a weak sow to rear a big litter of fine pigs.”

“Do you mean, Ischomachus, that the weaker the soil the less seed should be put into it?”

“Yes I do, Socrates; and you agree when you said just now that your invariable custom is to make the load light that’s to be carried by the weak.”

“But the hoers, now, Ischomachus, why do you put them on the grain?”

“T presume you know that it rains a lot in the wintertime?’

“Of course.”

“Let us assume, then, that part of the grain is waterlogged and covered with mud, and some of the roots are exposed by flooding. And it often happens, you know, that because of flooding weeds spring up amid the grain and choke it.”

“All these things are likely to happen.”

“Then don’t you think that in such circumstances the grain needs some prompt assistance?”

“Certainly.”

“What should be done, do you think, to assist the part that is under the mud?”

“The soil should be lifted.”

“And the part that has its roots exposed?”

“It should have soil piled over it.”

“What if weeds are springing up, choking the grain and robbing it of its nourishment, much as useless drones rob bees of the food they have laid in store by their industry?”

“‘The weeds must be cut, of course, just as the drones must be removed from the hive.”

“Then don’t you think that we have good reason for putting on men to hoe?”

“No doubt; but I am reflecting, Ischomachus, on the advantage of bringing in an apt simile, for you roused my anger against weeds by mentioning drones, much more than when you spoke of mere weeds.

18. “However,” I continued, “after this comes reaping, I guess. So, give me any information you can about that as well.”

“‘Yes, unless I find that you know just what I do about that subject too. You know that the grain must be cut.”

“I know that, naturally.”

“Are you for standing with your back to the wind when you cut corn, or facing it?”

“Not facing it, no! I think it is irritating both to the eyes and to the hands to reap with chaff and stalks blowing in your face.”

“And would you cut near the top or close to the ground?”

“‘If the stalk is short, I would cut low down, so that the straw would be more useful, but if it’s long I think it would be right to cut in the middle, so that the threshers and winnowers won’t spend needless effort on what they don’t want. I imagine that the stubble may be burned with advantage to the land, or thrown on the manure heap to increase its bulk.’

“Do you notice, Socrates, that you stand convicted of knowing just what I know about reaping too?”

“Yes, it seems so; and I want to know besides whether I understand threshing as well.”

“Then you know this much, that draft animals are used in threshing?”

“Yes, of course I do; and that the term draft animals includes oxen, mules, and horses.”

“Do you think that all the beasts know is how to tread on the grain as they’re driven?”

“Why, what more should draft animals know?”

“And who sees that they tread out the right amount of grain, and that the threshing is uniform, Socrates?”

“The threshers, obviously. By continually turning the untrodden grain and throwing it under the animal’s hooves they will of course keep it level on the floor and take the least time over the work.”

“So far, then, your knowledge is quite as good as mine.”

“Won’t our next task be to clean the grain by winnowing, Ischomachus?”

“Yes, Socrates; and tell me, do you know that if you start on the windward side of the floor you’ll find the chaff carried right across the floor?”

“It must be so.”

“Isn’t it likely, then, that some will fall on the grain?”

“Yes, it is a long way for the chaff to be blown, right over the grain to the empty part of the floor.”

“But what if you start winnowing against the wind?”

“Obviously the chaff will at once fall in the right place.”

“And as soon as you’ve cleaned the grain over one half of the floor, will you at once go on winnowing the rest of the chaff while the grain lies about just as it is, or will you first sweep the clean grain toward the pivot in the middle so that it occupies the smallest area?”

“Of course, I’ll first sweep up the clean grain so that my chaff can be carried across into the empty area, and I needn’t winnow the same grain twice.”

“Well, Socrates, it seems you are capable of teaching the quickest way of cleaning grain.”

“I really wasn’t aware that I understood all this; and so I’ve been thinking for some time now whether my knowledge extends to smelting gold, playing the pipes, and painting pictures. For I’ve never been taught these subjects any more than I’ve been taught farming. But I’ve watched people working at these arts, just as I have watched them farming.”

“And didn’t I tell you just now that farming is the noblest art because, among other reasons, it’s the easiest to learn?”

“Enough, Ischomachus; I know that. And I understood about sowing, apparently, though I wasn’t aware that I understood!”

19. “But is the planting of fruit trees another branch of agriculture?” I continued.

“It certainly is,” answered Ischomachus.

“Then how can I know all about sowing and yet know nothing of planting?”

“What? Don’t you know about it?”

“How can I, when I don’t know what kind of soil to plant in, how deep a hole to dig, or how broad, or how much of the plant should be buried, or how it should be set in the ground to grow best?”

“Come then, learn whatever you don’t know. I’m sure you’ve seen the sort of trenches they dig for plants.”

“Yes, often enough.”

“Did you ever see one more than three feet deep?”

“No, of course not — nor more than two and a half.”

“‘Well then, did you ever see one more than three feet wide?”

“‘Of course not, not even more than two feet.”

“Come then, answer this question too. Did you ever see one less than a foot deep?”

“Certainly, never less than a foot and a half: the plants would come out of the ground when it is stirred about them if they were put in so much too shallow.”

“Then you already know this well enough, Socrates, that the trenches are never dug more than two and a half feet deep nor less than a foot and a half.”

“It’s so obvious that I had to notice it.”

“Again, can you distinguish visually between dry and moist ground?”

“Oh, I should think that the land around Lycabettus and any like it is an example of dry ground, and of wet the low-lying land at Phalerum and any like it.”

“In which then would you dig the hole deep for your plant, in the dry or the wet ground?”

“In the dry, of course; because if you dug deep in the wet you would hit water, and water would stop your planting;”

“I think you’re quite right. Now once the holes are dug, have you ever noticed just when the plants for each kind of soil should be put in?”

“Yes I have.”

“Then assuming that you want them to grow as quickly as possible, do you think that if you put some prepared soil under them the cuttings will strike sooner through soft earth into the hard stuff, or through unbroken ground?”

“Clearly they will form roots more quickly in prepared soil than in unbroken ground.”

“Then soil should be placed below the plant?”

“No doubt it should.”

“And if you set the whole cutting upright, pointing to the sky, do you think it would take root better, or would you lay part of it slanting under the soil that has been put below, so that it lies like an upside-down gamma?”

“The latter, of course: then there would be more buds underground; for I notice that plants shoot from the buds above ground, so I suppose that the buds under the ground do just the same; and with many shoots forming underground the plant will make strong and rapid growth, I suppose.”

“Then it turns out that on these points too your opinion agrees with mine. And would you merely heap up the soil or pack around the plant?”

“I would pack it, of course; for if it were not firm, I feel sure that the rain would make mud of the loose earth and the sun would dry it up from top to bottom, so the plants would run the risk of rotting through too much water or withering from too much heat at the roots.”

“About vine planting then, Socrates, your views are again exactly the same as mine.”

“Does this method of planting apply to the fig too?” I asked.

“Yes, and to all other fruit trees, I think; for in planting other trees why discard anything that gives good results with the vine?”

“But the olive: how shall we plant that, Ischomachus?”

“You know quite well and are only trying to draw me out again. For I’m sure you’ve seen that a deeper hole is dug for the olive, since it is constantly being done on the roadside; you’ve seen also that all the growing shoots have stems adhering to them; and you see that all the tips of the plants are coated with clay, and the part of the plant that is above ground is wrapped up.”

“Yes, I’ve seen all this.”

“You have! Then what of all this don’t you understand? Is it that you don’t know how to put the crocks on top of the clay, Socrates?”

“Of course, there’s nothing in what you’ve said that I don’t know, Ischomachus. But I’m again set thinking what can have made me answer No to the question you put to me a while ago, when you asked me generally, Did I understand planting? For I thought I would have nothing to say about the right method of planting. But now that you’ve undertaken to question me in particular, my answers, you tell me, agree exactly with the views of a farmer so famous for his skill as yourself! Can it be that questioning is a kind of teaching, Ischomachus? The fact is, I have just discovered the plan of your series of questions.

You lead me by paths of knowledge familiar to me, point out things similar to what I know, and convince me that I really do know things that I thought I had no knowledge of."

"Now suppose I questioned you about money,' said Ischomachus,' whether it is good or bad, could I persuade you that you know how to distinguish genuine from counterfeit by test? And by putting questions about pipers could I convince you that you understand pipe playing; and by means of questions about painters and other artists —"

"You might, since you've convinced me that I understand farming, though I know that I have never been taught that art."

"No, it isn't possible, Socrates. I told you earlier that agriculture is such a humane and gentle art that you have but to see her and listen to her and she at once makes you understand her. She herself gives you many lessons in the best way of treating her. For instance, the vine climbs the nearest tree, and so teaches you that she needs support. And when her clusters are yet tender, she spreads her leaves about them, and teaches you to shade the exposed parts from the sun's rays during that period. But when it is now time for her grapes to be sweetened by the sun, she sheds her leaves, teaching you to strip her and ripen her fruit. And thanks to her teeming fertility, she shows some ripe clusters while she carries others still sour, so saying to you, Pluck my grapes as men pluck figs; choose the plump ones as they come."

20. And now I asked, "How is it then, Ischomachus, if the principles of farming are so easy to learn and all alike know what to do, that not everyone does equally well? How is it that some farmers live in abundance and have more than they want while others can't get the bare necessaries of life and even fall into debt?"

“I’ll tell you, Socrates. It’s not knowledge or lack of knowledge on the part of farmers that causes one to thrive while another is needy. You won’t hear a story like this going the rounds: The estate has gone to ruin because the sower sowed unevenly, or because he didn’t plant the rows straight, or because someone, not knowing the right soil for vines, planted them in barren ground, or because someone didn’t know that it is good to prepare the fallow for sowing, or because someone didn’t know that it is good to fertilize the soil. No, you are much more likely to hear people say: The man gets no grain from his field because he takes no trouble to see that it is sown or fertilized. Or, The man has got no wine, because he takes no trouble to plant vines or to make his old stock produce. Or, The man has neither olives nor figs, because he doesn’t take the trouble; he does nothing to get them. It’s not the farmers reputed to have introduced some innovation in the business who differ in fortune from others, Socrates, but rather factors of this sort that make all the difference. This is true of generals too: there are branches of military science in which some are better or worse than others not because they differ in intelligence but clearly in degree of attentiveness. For the things that all generals know, and most private citizens, are done by some commanders and left undone by others. For example, they all know that when marching through an enemy’s country the right way is to march in the formation in which they will fight best, if need be. Yet although they know this, some carry it out, others don’t. They all know that it’s right to post sentries day and night before the camp; but this too is a duty that some attend to but others neglect. Again, where will you find someone who doesn’t know that, in marching through narrow passes, it’s better to occupy the points of vantage first? Yet this precaution too is duly taken by some and neglected by others. So too, everyone will say that in agriculture there’s nothing as

good as fertilizer, and they observe that nature produces it. Everyone knows exactly how it's produced, and it's easy to get any amount of it, and yet, while some take care to have it collected, others pay no attention. Yet the god sends rain from above, and all the hollows become pools of water, and the earth yields weeds of every kind which the man who intends to sow must first clear off the ground; and what he removes has but to be thrown into the water and time of itself will produce what the soil likes. For every kind of vegetation, every kind of soil in stagnant water turns into fertilizer.

"And again, all the ways of treating the soil when it is too wet for sowing or too salt for planting are familiar to everyone — how the land is drained by ditches, how the salt is corrected by being mixed with salt-free substances, liquid or dry. Yet these matters, again, do not always receive attention. Suppose a man is wholly ignorant of what the earth can produce, and unable to see crop or plant on it, or to hear from anyone the truth about it, yet isn't it far easier for anyone to prove a parcel of land than to test a horse, and much easier than a human being? For the land makes no deceptive displays but reveals frankly and truthfully what she can and cannot do. Because she conceals nothing from our knowledge and understanding, the land is the surest tester of bad and lazy men. For the slothful cannot plead ignorance, as in other arts: land, as all men know, responds to good treatment. Laziness in farming is a clear indictment of a base soul. For no one persuades himself that a person could live without necessities; if a man will not farm and knows no other profit-making occupation, he clearly intends to live by theft or robbery or begging, or else he is completely irrational.

"Farming," he added, "may result in profit or in loss; it makes a great difference to the result, even when many laborers are employed, whether there is someone who sees to it that the men are working during the working hours or is

careless about it. For one man in ten by working all the time may easily make a difference, and another by knocking off before the time; and of course, if the men are allowed slack off all day long, the decrease in the work done may easily amount to one half of the whole. Just as two travelers on the road, both young and in good health, will differ so much in pace that one will cover two hundred stades to the other's hundred, because the one does what he set out to do, by pressing ahead, while the other is in an easygoing mood, now resting by a fountain or in the shade, now gazing at the view, now looking for soft breezes. So in farm work there is a vast difference in effectiveness between the men who do the job they've been assigned and those who, instead of doing it, invent excuses for not working and are allowed slack off. In fact, between good work and dishonest slothfulness there is as wide a difference as between actual work and actual idleness. Suppose the vines are being hoed to clear the ground of weeds: if the hoeing is so badly done that the weeds grow ranker and more abundant, how can you call that anything but idleness?

"These then are the factors that crush estates more often than sheer lack of knowledge. For the outgoing expenses of the estate are not a penny less, while the work done is insufficient to show a profit on the expenditure; so it's no wonder if the expected surplus is converted into a loss. On the other hand, to an attentive man who works assiduously at farming, no business gives quicker returns. My father taught me that and proved it by his own practice. For he never allowed me to buy a piece of land that was well farmed but encouraged me to buy any that was uncultivated and unplanted owing to the owner's neglect or incapacity. 'Well farmed land,' he would say, 'costs a lot and can't be improved;' and he said that where there is no room for improvement there is not much pleasure to be got from the land: landed estate and livestock must be continually improving to give the fullest

measure of satisfaction. And nothing improves more than a farm that's being transformed from a wilderness into fruitful fields. I assure you, Socrates, that we have often increased the value of a farm many times over. There is so much money in this idea, Socrates, and it is so easy to learn, that no sooner have you heard it from me than you know as much as I do and can go home and teach it to someone else, if you like. What's more, my father didn't get his knowledge secondhand, nor did he have to study hard to discover it; but he would say that, thanks to his love of farming and hard work, he had wanted a farm of this sort in order that he would at the same time have something to do and combine profit with pleasure. For I assure you, Socrates, no Athenian, I believe, had such a strong natural love of farming as my father."

Now on hearing this I asked, "Did your father keep all the farms that he cultivated, Ischomachus, or did he sell when he could get a good price?"

"He sold them, of course," answered Ischomachus, "but, you see, owing to his industrious habits, he would promptly buy another that was out of cultivation."

"You mean, Ischomachus, that your father naturally loved farming as intensely as merchants love grain. So deep is their love of grain that on receiving reports that it is abundant anywhere, merchants will voyage in quest of it: they will cross the Aegean, the Euxine, the Sicilian sea, and when they have got as much as possible, they carry it over the sea and actually stow it in the very ship in which they themselves sail. And when they need money they don't unload the grain just anywhere, but they carry it to the place where they hear that grain is most valued and the people prize it most highly, and deliver it to them there. Yes, your father's love of farming seems to be something like that."

“You’re joking, Socrates,” rejoined Ischomachus; “but I believe a man has no less genuine a love of building if he sells his houses as soon as they are finished and proceeds to build others.”

“Of course; and I swear that I believe you, Ischomachus, that all men naturally love whatever they think will bring them profit.

21. “But I’m pondering how skillfully you’ve presented the whole argument in support of your proposition, Ischomachus. For you stated that farming is the easiest of all occupations to learn, and after hearing all that you’ve said, I’m quite convinced that this is so.”

“Of course, it is,” cried Ischomachus; “but I grant you, Socrates, that in respect of aptitude for governing, which is common to all forms of business alike — farming, politics, estate management, warfare — in that respect the intelligence shown by different classes of men varies greatly. For example, on a trireme, when the ship is on the high seas and the rowers must toil all day to reach port, some coxswains can say and do the right thing to sharpen the men’s spirits and make them work hard, while others are so unintelligent that it takes them more than twice the time to finish the same voyage. Here they land bathed in sweat, with mutual congratulations, coxswain and seamen; there they arrive with dry skin, but hating their master and hated back. Generals, too, differ from one another in this respect. For some make their men unwilling to work hard and to take risks, disinclined and unwilling to obey except under compulsion, and actually proud of defying their commander: yes, and these generals produce men who have no sense of dishonor when something disgraceful occurs. Contrast the inspired, brave, and scientific leader: let him take over the command of these same troops, or of others if you like. What effect does he have on them? They are ashamed to do a disgraceful deed, think it better to obey, and take a pride

in obedience, working cheerfully, every man and all together, when it is necessary to work. Just as a love of work may spring up in the mind of an individual here and there, so too a whole army under the influence of a good leader is inspired with love of work and with an ambition to distinguish itself under the commander s eye. Let this be the feeling of the rank and file for their commander; and I tell you, he is the strong leader, he, and not the sturdiest soldier, not the best with bow and javelin, not the man who rides the best horse and is foremost in facing danger, not the ideal of horseman or marksman, but the leader who can make his soldiers feel that they are bound to follow him through fire and in any risky situation. Those you may justly call high-minded who have many followers of like mind; and with reason may he be said to march 'with a strong arm' whose will many an arm is ready to serve; and truly great is he who can do great deeds by will rather than by strength.

"So too in private enterprises, the man in authority — foreman or manager — who can make the workers eager, industrious, and persevering — he is the man who gives a lift to the business and swells the surplus. But, Socrates, if the appearance of the master in the workplace, of the man who has the fullest power to punish the bad and reward the strenuous workmen, makes no striking impression on the men at work, I for one cannot envy him. But if at the sight of him they stir themselves and a spirit of determination and rivalry and eagerness to excel falls on every workman, then I should say: this man has a touch of the kingly nature in him. And this, in my judgment, is of chief importance in every operation that makes any demand on human labor, and therefore in farming. Mind you, I don't go so far as to say that this can be learned at sight or at a single hearing. On the contrary, to acquire these powers a man needs education; he must be possessed of great natural gifts; above all, he must

be inspired. For I regard this gift as not altogether human but divine — this power to win willing obedience: it is manifestly a gift of the gods to the true votaries of self-control. Despotic rule over unwilling subjects they give, it seems to me, to those who they think deserve to live the life of Tantalus, of whom it is said that in Hades he spends eternity dreading a second death."

SYMPOSIUM

INTRODUCTION

Xenophon's Symposium must have been finished before 371: the reference in to the Theban Sacred Band could have been added at any time after 378, when it was founded, but the claim of its superiority to Spartan warrior pairs could not be made after the battle of Leuctra. Plato's Symposium is datable to between 384 and 378. Though there are clear correspondences, priority is impossible to determine with certainty. Most likely is Thesleff's proposal that Xenophon inspired Plato and then revised his own work, by adding a long speech on homosexual love for Socrates in §8; its unresolved relationship to the following heterosexual mime is perhaps a sign that the revision was incomplete, at least in the version that survives.

Xenophon's symposium is set in 422: the boy Autolycus has won a Great Panathenaic victory in the pankration, and his wealthy admirer Callias throws a celebratory party for him and his father, Lycon. But the main theme, as at Plato's symposium, is the nature and proper management of eros. By upper-class convention, such an occasion allowed an erastes (lover) to introduce his younger eromenos (beloved) to friends in a setting that demonstrated both the honorable intentions of the pair (emphasized by the father s presence) and the proper gentlemanly behavior expected of their associates. As Socrates demonstrates in his speech, pursuit merely of physical gratification is mean and useless, whereas inspiring the beloved's virtue while serving as his worthy role model is noble. For Xenophon this symposium was an opportunity "to relate not only the serious acts of gentlemen but also what they do in their lighter moments". Since Xenophon was only about eight years old at the time and nowhere appears in the ensuing conversation, his further statement, "I should like to

showcase those I was with when I came to this conviction" need not be a claim that he was present (as Athenaeus thought,) but merely that he himself had attended symposia with them, which is both historically possible and likely.

Socrates is the center of attention and the certifier of the gentlemanly codes on display. Callias, the host, was represented by the comic poets Aristophanes and Eupolis and by Plato as an indiscriminate patron of sophists and as a dissipated and spendthrift scion of a very wealthy family that had been prominent at Athens in war, sports, religion, and politics for nearly two centuries. Autolycus was the target and title figure of two plays by Eupolis (420 and 419 or 418) and his father, Lycon, a frequent butt as well. Antisthenes was a sophist and contemporary of Socrates, who lived into the 360s and was considered by some the true founder of the Cynic school of philosophy.

Niceratus was the son of the wealthy landowner and general Nicias (who would perish in the Sicilian expedition nine years later), represented here as newly married to an Athenian girl who, we are told elsewhere, would not survive her husband when he was executed by the Thirty Tyrants: like his father, Niceratus was a democrat. Critobulus was the son of Socrates' faithful friend Crito. Callias' half-brother Hermogenes, an old associate of Socrates and Xenophon's informant for Apology, is mentioned by Plato as having failed to receive his share of the ancestral wealth (he was probably illegitimate). Charmides, a favorite of Socrates, was the uncle of Plato and the cousin of Critias, chief of the Thirty Tyrants; he would be killed fighting the democrats at Munychia in 403. Philip the comedian and the Syracusan impresario are otherwise unknown. Of these participants, Antisthenes, Critobulus, and Hermogenes would be with Socrates at his death.

TEXT

All the manuscripts of Symposium descend from an undatable archetype but cannot be satisfactorily stemmatized, so that an eclectic approach is justified. For details see Olliers edition.

Symposium

1. To my mind it is worthwhile to relate not only the serious acts of gentlemen but also what they do in their lighter moments. I should like to showcase those I was with when I came to this conviction.

It was on the occasion of the horse races at the greater Panathenaic games; Callias, Hipponicus' son, happened to be courting the boy Autolycus, and in honor of his victory in the pancratium had brought him to see the spectacle. When the racing was over, Callias proceeded on his way to his house in the Peiraeus with Autolycus and the boy's father; Niceratus also was in his company. But on catching sight of a group comprising Socrates, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Antisthenes, and Charmides, Callias told one of his servants to escort Autolycus and the others, and then went over to Socrates and his companions and said, "This is an opportune meeting, for I am about to give a dinner party in honor of Autolycus and his father; and I think that my entertainment would shine much brighter if my dining room were graced with the presence of men like you, whose souls have been purified, than it would with generals and cavalry commanders and office seekers."

"You're always mocking us," replied Socrates; "feeling superior because you've paid a lot of money to Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, and many others for practical knowledge, while you view us as some kind of amateurs in philosophy."

"It's true," said Callias, "that so far I've been concealing from you my ability at many a smart discourse; but now, if you will favor me with your company, I'll prove to you that I'm a person worth taking very seriously."

Now at first Socrates and his companions thanked him for the invitation, as might be expected, but would not promise to attend the banquet; when it became clear, however, that he was growing very annoyed at their refusal, they went with him.

And so, his guests arrived, some having first had their exercise and their rubdown, others with the addition of a bath. Autolycus took a seat by his father's side; the others, of course, reclined.

A person who took note of what happened would have come at once to the conclusion that beauty is something naturally regal, especially when, as in the present case of Autolycus, its possessor joins with it modesty and self-control. For in the first place, just as the sudden glow of a light at night draws all eyes to itself, so now the beauty of Autolycus compelled everyone to look at him. And second, there was not one of the onlookers who did not feel his soul stirred by the boy; some of them grew quieter than before, others even assumed some kind of a pose. Now it is true that all who are possessed by any of the gods seem well worth gazing at; but whereas in the case of other gods they have a tendency to look bug-eyed, make terrifying sounds, and behave more vehemently, those who are inspired by chaste Eros have a more affectionate look, make their voices more gentle, and carry themselves in a way most befitting free men. Such was the demeanor of Callias at this time under the influence of Eros; and therefore, he was an object well worth the gaze of those initiated into the worship of this god.

The company, then, were feasting in silence, as though at the command of some greater authority, when Philip the comedian knocked at the door and told the porter to announce who he was and why he desired to be admitted; he declared that with regard to food he had come fully equipped with everything needed to dine at someone else s expense, and that his servant was in great distress at having no load to carry and at having had no lunch. Hearing this, Callias said, "Well, gentlemen, we can't decently begrudge him at the least the shelter of our roof; so, let him come in." At the same time he cast a glance at Autolycus, obviously trying to make out what

he had thought of the joke. But Philip, standing at the threshold of the men's hall where the banquet was served, announced: "You all know that I am a comedian; and so I've come here in the firm belief that it's funnier to come to your dinner uninvited than invited." "Well, then," said Callias, "take a seat; for the guests, though well fed, as you can see, on seriousness, are perhaps rather ill supplied with laughter."

No sooner were they engaged in their dinner than Philip tried making a joke, with a view to rendering the service that secured him a dinner engagement every time; but when he failed to get a laugh he was visibly annoyed. A little later he tried another joke; but when they would not laugh at it this time either, he stopped in the middle of his dinner, covered his head with his cloak, and stretched out on his couch.

"What's the matter, Philip?" Callias asked. "Are you in pain?" Philip replied with a groan, "Zeus yes, Callias, severe pain; for since laughter has perished from the world, my business is ruined. For in times past, the reason I got invitations to dinner was because I might arouse laughter among the guests and put them in a good mood; but why will anyone want to invite me now? For I could no more turn serious than I could become immortal; and certainly no one will invite me in hope of a return invitation, since everyone knows it's simply never been customary at my house even to send out for dinner." As he said this, he wiped his nose, and to judge by the sound, he was evidently weeping. All tried to comfort him with the promise that they would laugh next time, and urged him to eat; and Critobulus actually burst into a guffaw at his display of self-pity. The moment Philip heard the laughter he uncovered his head, and exhorting his spirit to be of good courage — there will be contributions! — he fell to eating again.

2. When the tables had been removed and the guests had poured a libation and sung a hymn, a man from Syracuse

joined them to supply some revelry. He had with him a fine piper girl, a dancing girl — one of those skilled in acrobatic tricks, — and a very handsome boy, who was very good at playing the kithara and at dancing; the Syracusan made money by exhibiting their performance as an amazement. They now played for the company, the piper girl on the pipes, the boy on the kithara; and it was agreed that both furnished satisfactory amusement when Socrates remarked, "I say, Callias, you're entertaining us perfectly: not only have you served a dinner that's above criticism, but you are also offering us very delightful sights and sounds." "Suppose we go further," said Callias, "and have someone bring us perfume, so that we may be entertained amid pleasant scents as well." "Please don't!" replied Socrates. 'Tor just as one kind of clothing looks well on a woman and another kind on a man, so the scents appropriate to men and to women are different. No man, surely, ever puts on perfume for a man's sake. And as for the women, particularly if they happen to be brides, like the wife of Niceratus here and Critobulus' wife, how can they need any additional perfume? They already smell of it. But to women the odor of the olive oil used in the gymnasium is more delightful when you wear it than perfume, and more missed when you don't. In fact, as far as perfume is concerned, as soon as a man puts it on, the scent is the same whether he's a slave or free; but the scents that come from the exertions of free men demand primarily noble pursuits and plenty of time if they are to have the sweet smell of freedom."

"That may do for youngsters," observed Lycon, "but what about those of us who no longer exercise in the gymnasia? What should we smell like?"

"Gentlemanliness, surely!" replied Socrates.

"And where might a person get this particular scent?"

"Certainly not from the perfume market," said Socrates.

“But where, then?”

“Theognis has said:

Good men will teach you good; society with bad Will but corrupt the good mind that you had.

“Do you hear that, son?” asked Lycon.

“Indeed, he does,” said Socrates; “and he puts it into practice, too. At any rate, when he wanted to be a prizewinner in the pancratium, he availed himself of your help to discover the champions in that sport and associate with them; and so, if he desires to learn the ways of excellence, he will again with your help seek out the man who seems to him most proficient in that way of life and will associate with him.”

At that there was a chorus of voices. “Where will he find a teacher in that subject?” someone said. Another said that it couldn’t be taught at all, a third that it could be learned as readily as anything else. “Since this is a debatable matter,” suggested Socrates, “let’s reserve it for another time; for now, let’s finish what we have on hand. For I see that the dancing girl here is standing ready, and that someone is bringing her some hoops.”

At that the other girl began to accompany the dancer on the pipes, and a boy at her elbow handed her up the hoops until he had given her twelve. She took these and as she danced kept tossing them whirling into the air, calculating how high to throw them so as to catch them in a regular rhythm.

As Socrates looked on he remarked: “This girl’s feat, gentlemen, is only one of many proofs that woman’s nature is really not at all inferior to man’s, except in its lack of judgment and physical strength. So, if any one of you has a wife, let him confidently set about teaching her whatever he would like to have her know.”

“If that’s your view, Socrates,” asked Antisthenes, “how does it come that you don’t practice what you preach by yourself educating Xanthippe, but live with a wife who is the hardest to get along with of all the women there are — yes, or all that ever were, I suspect, or ever will be?”

“Because,” he replied, “I observe that people wishing to become expert horsemen do not acquire the most docile horses but rather those that are high-spirited, believing that if they can manage this kind, they will easily handle any other. My course is similar. Humankind at large is what I wish to deal and associate with; and so, I have got her, well assured that if I can endure her, I shall have no difficulty in my relations with all the rest of humankind.”

These words, in the judgment of the guests, did not go wide of the mark.

But now there was brought in a hoop set all around with upright swords; over these the dancer turned somersaults into the hoop and out again, to the dismay of the audience, who thought that she might suffer some mishap. But she went through this performance fearlessly and safely.

Then Socrates, catching Antisthenes’ attention, said: “At least the people watching this will never again deny, I imagine, that courage too is a teachable quality, when this one, in spite of being a female, keeps leaping so boldly in among the swords!”

“Well then,” asked Antisthenes, “wouldn’t it be best for this Syracusan to exhibit his dancer to the city and announce that if the Athenians pay him money he’ll give all the men of Athens the courage to charge the spear points?”

“Well said!” interjected Philip. “I’d certainly like to watch Peisander the popular leader learning to turn somersaults into the knives; for as it is, his inability to look spears in the face makes him shrink even from going on campaign!”

At this point the boy performed a dance, eliciting from Socrates the remark, “Did you notice that, handsome as the boy is, he looks even handsomer in the poses of the dance than when he’s at rest?”

“It looks to me,” said Charmides, “as if you were congratulating the dancing master.”

“That’s right,” replied Socrates; “and I noticed something else, too: that no part of his body was idle during the dance, but neck, legs, and hands were all active together, the way you must dance if you mean to have a suppler body. As for myself,” he continued, addressing the Syracusan, “I would gladly learn the figures from you.”

“What will you do with them?” the other asked.

“I’ll dance, of course.”

This raised a general laugh; but Socrates, with a perfectly grave expression on his face, said: “Laughing at me, are you? Is it because I want to exercise to better my health? Or because I want to take more pleasure in my food and my sleep? Or is it because I am eager for such exercises as these, not like the long-distance runners, who develop their legs at the expense of their shoulders, nor like the prizefighters, who develop their shoulders but become thin-legged, but rather with a view to giving my body a symmetrical development by exercising it in every part? Or are you laughing because I won’t need to hunt up an exercise partner, or to strip, old as I am, in a crowd, but will find a seven-couch room large enough for me, just as this room was large enough for the boy here to work up a sweat just now, and because in winter I’ll exercise indoors, and when it’s very hot, in the shade? Or is this why you’re laughing, that I have an unduly large paunch and wish to reduce it? Don’t you know that just the other day Charmides here caught me dancing early in the morning?”

“That I did,” said Charmides; “and at first I was dumbfounded and feared that you were going mad; but when I heard you say more or less what you said just now, I myself went home, and though I didn’t dance, for I never learned how, I did practice shadowboxing, for I knew how to do that.”

“Oh yes,” said Philip; “at any rate, your legs appear so nearly equal in weight to your shoulders that I imagine if you went to the market commissioners and put your lower parts in the scale against your upper parts, as if they were loaves of bread, they would let you off without a fine.”

“When you’re ready to begin your lessons, Socrates,” said Callias, “please invite me, so that I may line up opposite you and share the lessons.”

“Come on,” said Philip, “let me have some pipe music, so that I may dance too.”

So he got up and mimicked in detail the dancing of both the boy and the girl. To begin with, since the company had applauded the way the boy’s natural beauty was increased by the grace of the dancing postures, Philip made a burlesque out of the performance by rendering every part of his body that was in motion more grotesque than it naturally was; and whereas the girl had bent backward until she resembled a hoop, he tried to do the same by bending forward. Finally, since they had given the boy applause for putting every part of his body into play in the dance, he told the piper girl to quicken the tempo and danced away, flinging out legs, hands, and head all at the same time; and when he was quite exhausted, he exclaimed as he took to his couch: “Here is proof, gentlemen, that my style of dancing also affords excellent exercise; it has certainly made me thirsty; so let the slave fill me up the big goblet.”

“By all means,” replied Callias; “and the same for us, for we’re thirsty from laughing at you.”

Here Socrates again interposed. “Well, gentlemen,” he said, “as far as drinking is concerned, you have my full approval; for wine does in fact ‘moisten the soul’ and lull our pains to sleep just as mandragora lulls people, at the same time awakening kindly feelings just as oil does a flame. I suspect, however, that men’s bodies fare the same as plants that grow in the ground: when the god gives the plants water in floods to drink, they can’t stand up straight or let the breezes blow through them, but when they drink only as much as they enjoy, they grow up very straight and come to full and abundant fruitage. So it is with us. If we pour ourselves immense drafts, it won’t be long before both our bodies and our minds start reeling, and we won’t be able even to draw breath, much less to speak sensibly; but if the slaves frequently ‘besprinkle’ us — if I too may use a Gorgian expression — with small cups, we will reach the merrier state not by the wine’s compulsion to drunkenness but instead by its gentle persuasion.”

This resolution received a unanimous vote, with an amendment added by Philip that the wine waiters should emulate skillful charioteers by driving the cups around with increasing speed. This the wine waiters proceeded to do.

3. After this the boy, attuning his lyre to the pipes, played and sang, and won the applause of all; and Charmides remarked, “It seems to me, gentlemen, that, as Socrates said of the wine, so this blending of the young people’s beauty with the sounds of their music lulls one’s pains to sleep and rouses Aphrodite.”

Then Socrates resumed the conversation. “These people, gentlemen,” he said, “show their competence to give us pleasure, and yet I’m sure we consider ourselves far superior to them. Won’t it be shameful, then, if we don’t even try, while we’re here together, to give one another some benefit or pleasure?”

At that many spoke up: “You lead the way, then, and tell us what topics we should take up in order best to do that.”

“For my part,” he answered, “I would most like to take Callias up on his promise; he said, you remember, that if we had dinner with him he would give us an exhibition of his practical knowledge.”

“Yes,” rejoined Callias; “and I will do so, if the rest of you also ante up any knowledge that each has that’s fine.”

“Well,” answered Socrates, “no one objects to telling what he considers the most valuable knowledge in his possession.”

“Very well, then,” said Callias, “I will now tell you what I take greatest pride in. It is that I believe I have the ability to make people better.”

“How?” asked Antisthenes. “By teaching them some banausic trade, or by teaching gentlemanliness?”

“The latter, if gentlemanliness equals righteousness.”

“Certainly it does,” replied Antisthenes, “and the least debatable kind, too; for though courage and sagacity sometimes seem harmful both to one’s friends and to the city, righteousness and unrighteousness never overlap at a single point.”

“Well, then, when every one of you has named the benefit he can confer, I won’t mind describing the art that gives me the success I speak of. And so, Niceratus,” he suggested, “it’s your turn; tell us what kind of knowledge you take pride in.”

“My father was anxious to see me develop into a good man,” said Niceratus, “so he made me to memorize all of Homer; and so even now I can repeat the whole Iliad and the Odyssey by heart.”

“But have you failed to observe,” questioned Antisthenes, “that the rhapsodes, too, all know these poems?”

“How could I,” he replied, “when I listen to their recitations nearly every day?”

“Well, do you know of any tribe sillier than rhapsodes?”

“No indeed,” answered Niceratus; “not as far as I’m concerned.”

“No,” said Socrates; “and the reason is clear: they don’t know the inner meaning of the poems. But you have paid a lot of money to Stesimbrotus, Anaximander, and many others, so you’ve missed nothing valuable that they’ve got. But what about you, Critobulus? What do you take greatest pride in?”

“Handsomeness,” he replied.

“What?” exclaimed Socrates. “Are you too going to be able to maintain that you can make us better, and by means of your handsomeness?”

“If not, I’m clearly going to seem pretty worthless.”

“And you, Antisthenes,” said Socrates, “what do you take pride in?”

“Wealth,” he replied.

Hermogenes asked him whether he had a lot of money; he swore that he hadn’t even a penny.

“You own a lot of land, then?”

“Maybe enough,” said he, “for Autolycus here to powder himself.”

“It looks as if we’ll have to hear from you too. And how about you, Charmides?” he continued. “What do you take pride in?”

“My pride,” said he, “is rather in my poverty.”

“A charming thing, to be sure!” exclaimed Socrates. “It seldom inspires envy, seldom causes fights; it’s safeguarded without guards, and grows stronger by neglect.”

“But what about you, Socrates?” said Callias. “What are you proud of?”

Socrates made a very solemn face and answered, “Procuring.”

After the rest had laughed at him, he said, “Go ahead and laugh, but I know that I could make a lot of money if I cared to follow that trade.”

“As for you,” said Lycon, addressing Philip, “it is obvious that you pride yourself on getting laughs.”

“And more justifiably,” replied Philip, “than Callipides the actor, who is so very smug because he can get many to sit and cry.”

“Won’t you also tell us, Lycon,” said Antisthenes, “what you take pride in?”

“Don’t you all know,” he answered, “that it’s my son here?”

“And as for him,” said one, “it’s plain that he’s proud of being a winner.”

At this Autolycus blushed and said, “Zeus no, not me.”

Everyone looked his way, delighted to hear him speak, and someone asked, “Well, Autolycus, what are you proud of, then?” and he answered, “My father,” and leaned close to him.

When Callias saw this, “You do realize, Lycon,” said he, “that you’re the richest man in the world?”

“No, indeed,” the other replied, “I certainly don’t know that.”

“Don’t you realize that you wouldn’t part with your son for the wealth of the Great King?”

“I’m caught red-handed!” was the answer, “I do seem to be the richest man in the world.”

“What about you, Hermogenes?” said Niceratus. “What do you delight in most?”

“In the excellence and the power of my friends,” he answered, “and in the fact that such men have regard for me.

Here all eyes turned toward him, and many speaking at once asked him if he would point them out; and he answered that he wouldn't mind at all.

4. At this point Socrates said, "Well, it's up to us now to prove that what each man promised is of real worth."

"You may hear me first," said Callias. "While I listen to you as you wonder what righteousness is, I'm all the time actually making people more righteous."

"Excellent man. How so?" asked Socrates.

"By giving them money, by Zeus."

Then Antisthenes got up and started to interrogate him in a very prosecutorial fashion. "Where do you think men keep their righteousness, Callias, in their souls or in their wallets?"

"In their souls," he replied.

"So, you make their souls more righteous by putting money into their wallets?"

"I surely do."

"How?"

"Because they know that they have the wherewithal to buy what they need, they've no wish to risk committing crimes."

"And do they repay you," he asked, "what they get?"

"Heavens no!" he replied.

"Well, do they give thanks instead of money?"

"No indeed, not that either," he said. "On the contrary, some of them dislike me even more than before they got the money."

"Remarkable," said Antisthenes, staring at him as though he had him cornered, "if you can make them righteous toward others but not toward yourself."

"What's so remarkable about that?" asked Callias. "Don't you see plenty of carpenters and architects too, who build

houses for many people but can't do it for themselves, so instead live in rented places? Come now, Professor Captious, see how it feels to be refuted!"

"By all means," said Socrates, "let him. For even the soothsayers, you know, are said to prophesy the future for others while being unable to foresee what's headed their way."

Here the discussion of that point ended.

Then Niceratus remarked: "You may now hear me explain how you will be improved by associating with me. You no doubt know that the most sage Homer has expressed practically everything pertaining to humanity. So, any one of you who wishes to acquire the art of the estate manager, the political leader, or the general, or to become like Achilles or Ajax or Nestor or Odysseus, should attend to me, for I understand all of this."

"Ha!" said Antisthenes; "do you understand kingship too, knowing, as you do, that Homer praised Agamemnon for being 'a good king and spearman strong'?"

"Yes indeed!" said he; "and I know that he also says that in driving a chariot one must run close to the goalpost at the turn

> 'and lean across a little to the left upon
> his polished chariot, goad the right-hand horse,
> urge him with shouts, and let him have the reins.'

"And I know something else too, which you can test immediately. For Homer says somewhere, 'an onion too is relish for a drink.' Now if someone fetches an onion, you will get that benefit immediately; for you will drink more pleasurably."

"Gentlemen," said Charmides, "Niceratus wants to go home smelling of onions so his wife will believe that no one would even have thought about kissing him."

“Undoubtedly,” said Socrates. “But we run the risk of looking foolish in another way. For while the onion really does seem to be a relish, since it adds to our enjoyment not only of food but also of drink, yet if we nibble it not only with our dinner but after it too, make sure no one says that on our visit to Callias we were merely indulging our appetites.”

“Heaven forbid, Socrates!” he said. “When heading into battle it’s fine to nibble an onion, just as some people feed their roosters garlic before pitting them together in the ring; but our plans perhaps call for kissing someone rather than fighting.”

This was about the way that discussion ended.

Then Critobulus said, “Shall I take my turn now and tell you my reasons for taking pride in my handsomeness?”

“Do,” they said.

“Well then, if I am not handsome, as I think I am, you could fairly be sued for misrepresentation; for though no one puts you under oath, you’re always swearing that I’m handsome. And I believe you, for I consider you to be real gentlemen. But if I really am handsome and you feel about me what I feel about the one I consider handsome, I swear by all the gods that I wouldn’t trade being handsome for the King’s empire. For as it is, I would rather gaze at Cleinias than at everything else the world considers handsome. I would rather be blind to everything else than to Cleinias alone. I’m annoyed by both night and sleep because then I can’t see him; I feel the deepest gratitude to day and the sun because they reveal Cleinias to me. We handsome people have a right to be proud of this fact too: that whereas the strong man must get the good things he wants by toiling, and the brave man by running risks, and the sage man by speaking, the handsome man can have it all without doing anything. I do realize that money is good to have, but I’d be happier giving what I have to Cleinias than

getting more from someone else; and I'd be happier being a slave than being a free man, if Cleinias were willing to be my master. For I should find it easier to work for him than to rest, and I'd be happier to risk my life for him than to live in safety. And so, Callias, if you're proud of your ability to make people more righteous, I have a better right than you to claim that I can influence men toward every sort of excellence. Because of the inspirational effect we handsome ones have on our inamorati, we make them more generous about money, more eager for toil and glory amid dangers, and yes, more modest and self-controlled too, since they feel ashamed about precisely what they most want. People who don't elect the handsome men as generals are crazy: I'd even go through fire with Cleinias, and I know that with me you would also. So puzzle no more, Socrates, over the question whether or not my handsomeness will in any way benefit humanity. What's more, handsomeness is not to be scorned because it soon passes its prime; for just as a boy can be handsome, so can a youth, a grown man, and a senior. Here's proof: in selecting bearers of the olive shoots for Athena they choose handsome old men, thus intimating that handsomeness attends every stage of life. And if it's pleasurable to get people to do what you want willingly, I'm positive that here and now, without uttering a word, I could persuade this boy or the girl to give me a kiss sooner than you could, Socrates, even if you made many clever arguments."

"What do you mean?" exclaimed Socrates. "You boast as if you actually think you're handsomer than me!"

"Absolutely," said Critobulus; "otherwise I'd be the ugliest of all the Silens in the satyr plays."

[Now Socrates, as fortune would have it, really resembled these creatures.]

“Very well, then,” said Socrates; “see that you remember to enter a beauty contest with me when the present discussion has gone the rounds. And let our judges be not Alexander, Priam’s son, but these very persons you think are eager to kiss you.”

“Wouldn’t you entrust the judgment to Cleinias, Socrates?”

“Can’t you get your mind off Cleinias?” was the reply.

“If I stop mentioning him, do you think he’ll be on my mind any the less? Don’t you know that I have so clear an image of him in my soul that if had talent as a sculptor or painter I could produce as good a likeness of him from that image as if I were seeing him in person?”

“Well, if you have such a faithful image of him, why do you put me to all the bother of taking me where you can see him in person?”

“Because, Socrates, the sight of him in person has the power to delight me, whereas the sight of the image affords no pleasure but engenders longing.”

Here Hermogenes commented, “But Socrates, I don’t think it’s at all like you to countenance such lovesickness in Critobulus.”

“What?” asked Socrates, “do you think he’s been like this only since he began associating with me?”

“When else?”

“Don’t you notice that peach fuzz is just beginning to creep down past his ears, while on Cleinias it’s already coming up behind? So he began burning hot in the days when they started going to the same school. His father caught on and put him into my care, hoping I might do him some good. And sure enough he’s already doing much better. Before then he was like people who look at the Gorgons, gazing at Cleinias like a stone and nowhere leaving his presence, but nowadays I’ve actually seen him blink. But to tell you the truth, gentlemen,”

he continued, “by heaven it does seem to me — to speak confidentially — as if he had also kissed Cleinias, and there’s no faster way to fire lust: it’s insatiable and holds out seductive hopes.

That’s why I maintain that anyone who intends to be capable of self-control must refrain from kissing the prime specimens.”

“But why in the world, Socrates,” Charmides now asked, “are you trying to scare your friends away from the beauties, when you yourself — I’ve seen you, by Apollo,” he continued, “when the two of you were hunting down something in the same book at the school, sitting head to head, with your naked shoulder pressing against Critobulus’ naked shoulder?”

“Dear me!” exclaimed Socrates. “So that’s what affected me like the bite of some wild animal! And for over five days my shoulder smarted and I felt as if I had something like a sting in my heart. But now, Critobulus,” he said, “in the presence of all these witnesses I warn you not to lay a finger on me until you get as much hair on your chin as you have on your head.”

Such was their mingled jesting and seriousness.

But Callias now remarked, “It’s your turn, Charmides, to tell us why poverty makes you feel proud.”

“Very well,” he said. “Everyone agrees about this: confidence is preferable to fear, freedom to slavery, getting attention to giving it, the trust of one’s country to its distrust. Now, as for my situation in our city, when I was rich, first of all I dreaded someone tunneling into my house and not only taking my money but also doing me harm; and second, I paid court to the blackmailers, quite aware that I was more liable to suffer injury from them than inflict it. Then too, I was forever being ordered by the government to undertake some expenditure or other, and I could never leave town. Whereas now, since I’m stripped of my property over the border, get no

income from my holdings in Attica, and my household goods have been sold, I stretch out and sleep well, I've gained the trust of the city, I get no more threats — I do the threatening now — and I have the free man's choice of leaving town or staying home. People now actually rise from their seats in deference to me, and rich men get out of my way in the street. Now I am like a despot; then I was clearly a slave. Then I paid tribute to the Sovereign People; now I live on the tribute that the city pays to me. What's more, when I was rich, people used to vilify me for consorting with Socrates, but now that I'm poor no one cares about that at all any more. And when my property was large, I was continually losing some of it either to the city or to bad luck, but now I lose nothing because I have nothing, but I'm always expecting to get something."

"So do you also pray," asked Callias, "never to be rich, and if you have a good dream do you sacrifice to the averters of disaster?"

"Not at all" he replied; "I don't go as far as that; I accept the outcome like a daredevil if I'm hoping to get something from somewhere."

"Come now, Antisthenes," said Socrates, "take your turn and tell us how it is that with such slender means you base your pride on wealth."

"Because, gentlemen, I think that people's wealth and poverty are to be found not in their estates but in their hearts. For I see many private citizens who have plenty of money but consider themselves so poor that they undertake any toil and any risk that might make them more money; and I know of brothers with equal shares in their inheritance where one of them has enough and more than enough to meet expenses, while the other is always short of everything. I know of certain despots, too, who have so great an appetite for money that they commit much more dreadful crimes than the most

destitute: for because of want some steal, others break in, others follow the slave trade, but there are some despots who destroy whole families, carry out mass killings, and often enslave even whole cities for the sake of money. I greatly pity such people their malignant affliction, for I think they have the same problem as the person who has a lot and eats a lot but never feels full. As for me, I've got so much that I can hardly find it all myself, yet I have enough so that I can eat until I reach a point where I no longer feel hungry and drink until I don't feel thirsty and put on enough clothing that I'm no colder outside than my super-rich friend Callias here, and when I get into the house my walls are like cozy shirts and the roof like a thick robe, and the blankets I own are so satisfactory that it's real work to get me up. If I'm feeling a physical urge for lovemaking, what I've got is so adequate that the women I approach are more than glad to welcome me because no one else wants to approach them. In a word, all this seems to me so pleasurable that I wouldn't pray for greater pleasure in doing any of it but rather for less — so much more pleasurable do I regard some of it than is appropriate. But the most valuable asset among my riches I reckon is this, that even if someone robbed me of what I now possess, I see no occupation so humble that it wouldn't provide me an adequate living. For whenever I feel like pampering myself, I don't buy fancy things at the market — they're expensive — but draw from the pantry of my soul. It makes a big difference to my enjoyment whether I partake after waiting until I feel the need or I consume something fancy, like this Thasian wine that I happen to be drinking without being thirsty. In fact the people who are likelier to be honest are those who set their sights on frugality rather than on moneymaking; those who are most contented with what they have are least likely to covet what belongs to others. And it's worth noting that wealth of this kind makes people act

free, too. For example Socrates here, from whom I acquired this wealth, never supplied me by number or weight but kept on handing me however much I could manage to carry; on my side, I now begrudge no one but display my abundance to all my friends and share the wealth of my soul with whomever wants it. But you're always beholding my most exquisite possession: leisure time. I can see what's worth seeing, hear what's worth hearing, and — what I prize highest — pass the whole day, untroubled by business, with Socrates. Like me, he's not impressed by those who count the most gold but spends his time with those congenial to him."

That was the line taken by Antisthenes. "So, help me Hera," commented Callias, "among my reasons for congratulating you on your wealth is that the city doesn't order you around and treat you like a slave, another is that people don't get angry if you don't make them a loan."

"Don't be envying him," said Niceratus; "because I'm about to get him to make me a loan — of his contentment with his lot, schooled as I am by Homer to count

> 'Seven pots unfired, ten talents' weight of gold,
> A score of gleaming cauldrons, chargers twelve,'

weighing and calculating until I'm never done with yearning for as much as possible; maybe that's why people regard me as rather fond of money."

Everyone had a good laugh at this, thinking that he had stated the facts.

"Hermogenes, it's up to you," someone now remarked, "to tell us who your friends are and to demonstrate their great power and their solicitude for you, so that your pride in them may appear justified."

"Very well; in the first place, both Greeks and barbarians quite obviously believe that the gods know everything both present and to come; at any rate, all cities and all races ask

the gods, through the diviner's art, for advice on what to do and what to avoid. Second, it is also clear that we consider them able to do us good or ill; in any event, everyone prays the gods to avert evil and grant blessings. Well, these gods, omniscient and omnipotent, feel so friendly toward me that their watchfulness never lets me out of their sight night or day, wherever my destination or whatever my business. And knowing also the outcome of any act, they send me as messengers, omens of sounds, dreams, and birds, to indicate what I ought to do and what not. And when I pay heed I never regret it, whereas the times I've disregarded them I've been punished."

"None of these statements," said Socrates, "is incredible. But what I'd very much like to know is how you cultivate them to keep them so friendly."

"Very economically, by Zeus!" responded Hermogenes. "I sound their praises, — which costs nothing; I always return to them part of what they give me; I avoid irreverent speech as far as I can; and I never knowingly lie in matters where I have invoked them as witnesses."

"By Zeus," said Socrates, "if it's by conduct like this that you keep their friendship, then the gods also, it seems, take delight in gentlemanliness!"

Such was the serious turn given to the discussion of this topic.

When they got around to Philip, they asked him what he saw in the comedian's profession to feel proud about.

"Why shouldn't I be proud," he said, "when everyone knows that I get laughs, so whenever they have something good they give me a hearty invitation to join them, and whenever they're in some trouble they run from me with never a backward glance, afraid they may be forced to laugh in spite of themselves?"

“Your pride is abundantly justified,” said Niceratus. “My case is the opposite: those friends who enjoy success keep out of my way, but those that run into some mishap reckon up their kinship to me on the family tree, and I can’t get rid of them.”

“No doubt,” said Charmides, and then, “What is it you’re proud of, Syracusan? The boy, I suppose?”

“Quite the contrary,” was the reply; “though I do worry about him very much, because I’m aware that there are people plotting his ruin.”

On hearing this Socrates exclaimed, “Good Heavens! What wrong do they imagine your lad has done them to want to kill him?”

Syracusan. “Oh no, they don’t want to kill him, they want to persuade him to sleep with them.”

Socrates. “So your belief, I suppose, is that if this happened he would be ruined?”

Syracusan. “Yes, utterly!”

Socrates. “Then you don’t sleep with him either?”

Syracusan. “I certainly do, all night and every night.”

Socrates. “By Hera, you’re very lucky to be formed of such flesh that you’re unique in not ruining those who sleep with you. And so you have a right to be proud of your flesh if of nothing else.”

Syracusan. “And yet that’s not my great pride.”

Socrates. “What then?”

Syracusan. “Fools, for sure: they make me my living by coming to watch my marionettes.”

“Aha!” said Philip; “that explains the prayer I heard you making the other day, that wherever you were the gods would grant you an abundant harvest of grain but a dearth of brains!”

“Good!” said Callias. “And now, Socrates, what can you say to justify your pride in that disreputable profession that you mentioned?”

“Let us first come to an agreement,” he said, “on the functions of the procurer. Don’t hesitate to answer all the questions I ask you, so that we may know our points of agreement. Is that acceptable?” he asked.

“Certainly,” was their reply; and when they had once started with “certainly,” that was the answer they all made to each of his questions thereafter.

Socrates. “Well, then, you consider it the function of a good procurer to render the man or the woman whom he is serving attractive to his or her associates?”

All. “Certainly.”

Socrates. “Now, one thing that contributes to rendering a person attractive is a comely arrangement of hair and clothing, isn’t it?”

All. “Certainly.”

“Don’t we also know that it is possible for one pair of eyes to express both friendship and hostility?”

“Certainly.”

“And again, it is possible to speak both modestly and boldly with the same voice?”

“Certainly.”

“And again, aren’t there words that arouse animosity and others conducive to friendliness?”

“Certainly.”

“Now the good procurer would teach only the words that tend to make one attractive, would he not?”

“Certainly.”

“Which one would be the better?” he continued, “the one who could make people attractive to a single person or the one who could make them attractive to many?”

This question brought a division; some said, “Clearly the one who could make them attractive to a great many”; the others merely repeated, “Certainly.”

Declaring that they were agreed on this point too, he continued: “If a person could render people attractive to the entire city, wouldn’t he be hands-down an ideal procurer?”

“Clearly yes,” they all said.

“And so, if someone could turn his clients into that sort of person, he would be entitled to feel proud of his profession and to receive good pay, wouldn’t he?”

All agreeing on this point, too, he added, “Antisthenes here seems to me to be just that sort of man.”

Antisthenes replied, “Are you resigning your profession to me, Socrates?”

“Assuredly,” was the answer. “For I see that you have brought to a high state of perfection the profession that follows it.”

“What is that?”

“The profession of pandering,” he said.

Antisthenes was much incensed and asked,” What knowledge can you possibly have of my doing such a thing?”

“I know,” he said, “that you acted the part between Callias here and the wise Prodicus when you saw that Callias lusted for philosophy and that Prodicus needed money. I also know that you did the same for Hippias the Elean, from whom Callias got his memory system; and ever since then Callias has become more lustful than ever, because he never forgets any beauty he sees. And just recently, you remember, you were commending your visitor from Heraclea to me, and after

arousing my keen interest in him you sat him next to me. And of course, I'm grateful, for he seems a real gentleman. And didn't you commend Aeschylus the Phleiasian to me and me to him until you brought us to such a state that in mutual yearning, excited by your words, we went coursing like hounds to find each other? It is witnessing your ability at accomplishing all this that makes me consider you an ideal panderer. Someone able to recognize people who are equipped to be mutually helpful and can make them desire one another's acquaintance, that man, in my opinion, could also create friendships between cities and arrange suitable marriages, and would be a very valuable acquisition as friend or ally for cities and individuals and allies. But you got indignant, as if you had received an affront, when I said that you were an ideal panderer."

"By Zeus, not any longer," he replied; "for if that's my power I'll find my soul chock-full of riches."

And that round of discussion was thus brought to a close.

5. Callias now said, "Critobulus, are you going to refuse to enter the beauty contest with Socrates?"

"Undoubtedly!" said Socrates; "for probably he notices that the procurer stands high in the favor of the judges."

"In spite of that," said Critobulus, "I'm not shunning the contest. So make your case, if you have some clever proof that you're handsomer than me. Only," he added, "let the lamp be brought close."

"The first step, then, in my suit," said Socrates, "is to summon you to the preliminary hearing; now answer my questions."

"And you proceed to put them."

"Do you believe, then, that beauty is to be found only in man, or also in something else?"

Critobulus. “Certainly, the latter: also in a horse and an ox and in any number of inanimate objects; I know, at any rate, that there’s a beautiful shield, and sword, and spear.”

Socrates. “And how can it be that all these things are beautiful when they are entirely dissimilar?”

“Surely: they’re beautiful if they’re well made for the respective functions for which we obtain them, or if they are naturally well constituted to serve our needs.”

Socrates. “Do you know the reason why we need eyes?”

Critobulus. “Obviously to see with.”

“In that case, and without further ado, my eyes would be more beautiful than yours.”

“How so?”

“Because, while yours see only straight ahead, mine, by bulging out as they do, see also to the sides.”

Critobulus. “Do you mean to say that a crab is better equipped visually than any other creature?”

Socrates. “Absolutely, for its eyes are also best set to ensure strength.”

Critobulus. “Very well. But whose nose is more beautiful, yours or mine?”

Socrates. “Mine, I consider, granting that the gods made us noses to smell with. Your nostrils look down to the ground, while mine are wide open so as to catch scents from all about.”

Critobulus. “But how do you make a snub nose handsomer than a straight one?”

Socrates. “Because it doesn’t put a barricade between the eyes but allows them unobstructed vision of whatever they want to see; whereas a high nose, as if in spite, walls the eyes off from each other.”

“As for the mouth,” said Critobulus, “I concede that point. For if it is created for the purpose of biting off food, you could

bite off a lot more than I could. And don't you think that your kiss is also the more tender because you have thick lips?"

Socrates. "By your argument I apparently have a mouth even uglier than a donkeys. But don't you reckon it a proof of my superior beauty that the Naiads, goddesses as they are, bear as their offspring the Silens, who look more like me than you?"

"I can't counter your arguments any longer," answered Critobulus; "let them distribute the ballots, so that I may know as soon as possible what fine or punishment I must suffer. Only," he said, "let the balloting be secret, for I am afraid that the wealth' you and Antisthenes possess will overmaster me."

So the boy and girl turned in secret ballots. Meanwhile Socrates saw to it that the light should be placed in front of Critobulus so that the judges would not be misled, and stipulated that the prize given by the judges to crown the victor should be kisses and not ribbons. When the ballots were turned out of the urn and proved to be a unanimous for Critobulus, "Bah!" exclaimed Socrates; "your money, Critobulus, does not appear to resemble Callias': his makes people more honest, while yours, like most, has the power to corrupt, whether jurymen or judges."

6. At this some of the company urged Critobulus to take his victory kisses; others advised him to get the consent of the legal guardian; and others made other jokes. But even then Hermogenes kept silent. And Socrates, calling him by name, inquired, "Hermogenes, could you define "wine abuse' for us?"

"If you're asking me what it actually is," he answered, "I don't know; but I can tell you what I think it is."

Socrates. "Very well, tell us that."

Hermogenes. "My definition of "wine abuse' is annoying one's companions because of wine."

Socrates. “Well, do you realize that at the present moment you are annoying us with your silence? “

Hermogenes. “Even while you are all talking?”

“No, but in the intervals.”

“You do see that no one could insert even a hair in the intervals of your talk, much less a word?”

“Callias,” said Socrates, “could you come to the rescue of a man hard pressed for an answer?”

“I can,” he said: “we’re absolutely quiet every time the pipes are played.”

Hermogenes retorted, “Is it your wish that I should converse with you to the accompaniment of the pipes, the way the actor Nicostratus used to recite tetrameter verses?”

“In heaven’s name, do that, Hermogenes!” urged Socrates. “For I believe that precisely as a song is more agreeable when accompanied on the pipes, so your discourse would be embellished somewhat by the music, especially if you were to strike poses, like the piper girl, to point your words.”

“What is the tune to be,” asked Callias, “when Antisthenes here gets someone at the banquet cornered in an argument?”

“For the one refuted,” said Antisthenes, “I think the appropriate music would be hissing.”

The Syracusan, seeing that with such conversation going on the banqueters were paying no attention to his show, but were enjoying one another’s company, said spitefully to Socrates, “Socrates, are you the one nicknamed the ‘Thinker’?”

“Well, isn’t that preferable,” he rejoined, “to being called the ‘Thoughtless’?”

“Yes, if it were not that you’re supposed to be a thinker on celestial subjects.”

“Do you know,” asked Socrates, “anything more celestial than the gods?”

Syracusan. “Zeus no, it’s not the gods that people say you’re interested in, but the most airheaded matters.”

Socrates. “Even granting the expression, I would still be interested in gods: they help us by sending rain through the air overhead and they produce light from the air overhead. If my play on words is strained,” he added, “you have only yourself to blame, for annoying me.”

Syracusan. “Well, let that pass. Tell me instead the distance between us in flea’s feet; for that’s how people say you measure things.”

At this Antisthenes said, “You’re awfully good at making comparisons, Philip; wouldn’t you say that our friend here resembles someone bent on trading insults?”

“Yes, indeed,” came the answer; “and so do many others.

“Nevertheless,” said Socrates, “don’t you draw the comparison, or you might resemble a troublemaker too.”

“But suppose I compare him to all the very best gentlemen; then I would deserve to be compared to a eulogist and not a detractor.”

“You’re like the latter right now, because you’re asserting that everyone is better than him!”

“Do you want me to compare him to those who are viler, then?”

“No, not the viler, either.”

“To no one, then?”

“Don’t compare him to anyone in any way.”

“But if I say nothing, I don’t understand how I can do a job worthy of my dinner.”

“Easily,” said Socrates, “if you say nothing about what you shouldn’t be saying.”

Thus, was quenched this bit of wine abuse.

7. At that point some kept urging Philip to go on with his comparisons, while others tried to stop it. Amid the clamor, Socrates spoke again: “Since we all want to talk, wouldn’t this be a fine time to join in singing?” And with those words he began a song. When they had finished, a potter’s wheel was brought in for the dancing girl, on which she was to put on a show.

This prompted Socrates to observe, “Syracusan, I’m afraid that, to use your words, I really am a ‘thinker’; at any rate, I’m now considering how this boy and girl of yours can exert as little effort as possible while giving us maximum pleasure in watching them, — this being your purpose also, I’m sure. Now turning somersaults into knives strikes me as a dangerous exhibition, and utterly out of place at a banquet. Writing and reading aloud on a whirling potter’s wheel may be something of a feat too, yet I can’t conceive what pleasure even that could afford. Nor is it any more diverting to watch the young and beautiful twisting their bodies about and imitating hoops than in repose. It’s of course no rare event to encounter marvels, if that is what you want; in fact you can marvel at what’s right in front of you now, — for instance, why the lamp gives light by having a bright flame while its bronze reflector, likewise bright, doesn’t produce light but instead reflects other things that appear in it. Or how it is that olive oil, though wet, makes the flame higher, while water, because it is wet, puts the fire out. And yet even these questions fail to promote the same end that wine does. But if the young people were to have a pipe accompaniment and dance figures depicting the Graces, the Seasons, and the Nymphs, I believe that they would have a far easier time of it and that the banquet would be far more delightful.

“You’re absolutely right, Socrates,” replied the Syracusan, “and I’ll bring on a show that you will all enjoy.”

8. So the Syracusan withdrew to applause. Socrates now opened up another new topic for discussion. “Gentlemen,” he said, “it is to be expected of us, is it not, when in the presence of a mighty deity who is coeval with the eternal gods, yet youngest of them in appearance, in magnitude encompassing the universe, yet enthroned in the heart of man — I mean Love — that we should not ignore him, particularly since we are all his followers? I can’t recall a time when I was not in love with someone, and I know that Charmides here has attracted many suitors and has fallen for a few himself; Critobulus too, though still an object of desire, is already beginning to fall for others. Then Niceratus too, so I hear, is in love with his wife and is loved back. As for Hermogenes, who of us doesn’t know that whatever gentlemanliness is, he is melting away with love for it? Don’t you see how serious his brows are, how calm his gaze, how modest his words, how gentle his voice, how genial his demeanor? That although he enjoys the friendship of the most august gods, yet he does not disdain us mortals? Are you the only person, Antisthenes, in love with no one?”

“No, by heaven!” he replied; “I am madly in love — with you!

And Socrates, jokingly pretending to flirt, said: “Don’t pester me just now; I am engaged in other business, as you can see.”

“How transparent you are, you procurer of your own charms,” Antisthenes rejoined, “in always doing something like this; sometimes you refuse to speak with me on the pretext of your divine sign, other times because you have some other purpose in mind.”

“In heaven’s name, Antisthenes” implored Socrates, “just don’t beat me up; I put up with any other manifestation of your bad temper and will continue to do so, in a friendly spirit. But,” he went on, “let’s keep your love a secret, because it’s not for my soul but for my good looks. But as for you, Callias,

all the city knows you're in love with Autolycus and so, I think, do a great many men from abroad. That's because you are both sons of distinguished fathers and are yourselves in the public eye. So, I have always admired your character, but all the more so now, when I see you're in love with someone who doesn't revel in luxury or grow sissified in softness but shows the world physical strength and stamina, virile courage and self-control. Desire for such traits gives an insight into the lover's character. Now, whether there is one Aphrodite or two, Celestial and Popular, I do not know; even Zeus, though considered one and the same, yet has many bynames. I do know, however, that for each Aphrodite there are separate altars, temples, and sacrifices, those of the Popular rather casual, those of the Celestial more holy. You might conjecture also that different types of love come from the different sources, love for bodies from the Popular and from the Celestial love of souls, friendship, and fine deeds. That's the sort of love, Callias, that seems to have you in its grip. I infer this from the gentlemanliness of your beloved and because I see that you include his father in your meetings with him. For the gentlemanly lover does not conceal any of this from his beloved's father."

"By Hera," said Hermogenes, "I admire you in many ways, Socrates, but now more than ever, because in flattering Callias you are in fact teaching him the sort of person he should be."

"True," he replied; "and to add to his pleasure, I wish to bear witness to him that love of the soul is far superior to love of the body. For we all know that no association worth mentioning lacks friendship. Now friendship on the part of those who admire character is termed a pleasant and willing constraint, whereas many of those who are after the body find fault with the behavior of their beloveds and detest it. But suppose they are satisfied on both scores: still the bloom of

youth soon passes its prime, and as this disappears, friendship also inevitably fades away as fast; but the soul becomes more and more worth loving the longer it progresses toward wisdom. Besides, in the enjoyment of physical beauty there is a point of satiety, so that one cannot help feeling for his favorite the same as he feels for food when he's full. But affection for the soul, being pure, is also less liable to satiety, though it does not follow, as one might suppose, that it is also less rich in the graces of Aphrodite; on the contrary, our prayer that the goddess will bestow her grace on our words and deeds is manifestly answered.

"Now no further argument is necessary to show that there is both admiration and affection for the beloved in a soul verdant with the beauty of freeborn men and with a disposition reverent and noble, a soul that from the very first is commanding among its own age-mates and also kind; but I will further show that such a lover will have his love returned. First, who could feel dislike for someone he knows considers him a gentleman, and in the next place saw that he placed more importance on the boys good than his own pleasure, and in addition felt assured that this friendship would not be diminished whether he lost his mind or, through illness, his good looks? When people share friendship, don't they unavoidably enjoy looking at each other, converse in amity, have mutual trust, and not only take thought for each other but also share joy in prosperity and distress if some setback befalls, and live in happiness when their relationship is attended by good health, but be much more constantly together if one or the other falls ill, and be even more solicitous for each other when apart than when together? Aren't all these things marked by Aphrodite's grace? It is by conducting themselves thus that men continue mutually to love their friendship and enjoy it clear down to old age. But what is there to induce reciprocal affection from a boy whose lover is hooked

solely on his body? Because to himself the lover allots what he wants but to the boy only the most contemptible role? Or because he does his best to bar his own relatives from doing what he is bent on getting his favorite to do? As for his using seduction rather than coercion, that makes him all the more detestable: the rapist merely reveals his own rascality, while the seducer corrupts the soul of the seduced. And why will someone who sells his youthfulness for money feel greater affection for the purchaser than the tradesman in the market for the customer? He certainly won't feel affectionate as a youthful companion for someone past it, or handsome for someone no longer handsome, or unimpassioned for someone impassioned. For a boy does not share in the pleasure of intercourse as a woman does, but looks on sober at another intoxicated by love. Consequently, it's no surprise if contempt for the lover develops in him. And research would show that when people love each other for the way they are there's never any difficulty, but from shameless intercourse has come lots of unwholesome behavior.

"I will now show also that the companionship of a man who takes pleasure in the body rather than the soul is servile. The man who inculcates right speech and conduct would merit the honor shown by Achilles to Cheiron and Phoenix, but the man who lusts only for the body would fittingly be treated as a beggar; for he dogs along, always begging and beseeching the favor of a kiss or a grope. Don't be surprised at my plain speaking: the wine incites me and the love that ever dwells with me spurs me on to say frankly what I think about its antagonist. For it seems to me that the man who pays attention only to looks is like a tenant farmer: his concern is not to increase its value but to gain from it the biggest harvest he can. By contrast, the man whose goal is friendship is more like the owner of a farm: he draws from all resources to enhance his beloved's value. So too for beloveds: the one who

realizes that merely by flaunting his looks he can master his lover will predictably become loose in his general conduct; but the one who recognizes that he can't hold on to the friendship without being a gentleman too is bound to have concern for excellence. But the greatest good that comes to the man who strives to make a true friend of his favorite is having to practice excellence himself. He can't produce goodness in his companion while his own conduct is evil, nor can he himself exhibit shamelessness and incontinence and at the same time render his beloved self-controlled and reverent.

"I also want to invoke the myths, Callias, in order to show you that not only humankind but also gods and heroes set higher value on the friendship of the soul than on the enjoyment of the body. For in all cases where Zeus was enamored of mortal women for their beauty, after sex he allowed them to remain mortal, but all those whom he delighted in for their souls' sake he made immortal. Among the latter are Heracles and the Dioscuri, and tradition includes others also. And I declare that Ganymede too was brought up to Olympus by Zeus not for his body but for his soul. This is confirmed by his very name: Homer, you remember, has the words,

'he joys to hear'

that is to say, 'he enjoys hearing;' and in another place,

'harboring dense thoughts in his heart'

This, again, means 'harboring wise counsels in his heart.' So the name given Ganymede, compounded of the two foregoing elements, signifies not physically but mentally attractive; hence his honor among the gods. Or again, Niceratus, Homer makes Achilles view Patroclus not as his favorite but as a comrade, and in this spirit signally avenging his death. So also Orestes, Pylades, Theseus, Peirithous, and many another of the best demigods are celebrated in song for achieving glorious

deeds of valor side by side, not because they slept together but because of mutual admiration and respect.

'Tor that matter, take the splendid feats of the present day: wouldn't you discover that they are all done for glory's sake by people willing to endure hardship and jeopardy rather than by people with a habit of choosing pleasure before glory? Yet Pausanias, the lover of the poet Agathon, said in his defense of those who wallow in lasciviousness that the most valiant army, even, would be one recruited of lovers and their favorites! For these, he said, would in his opinion be most likely to be ashamed to desert one another: a strange assertion indeed if those in the habit of disregarding censure and treating each other with disrespect are the ones most likely to be ashamed of doing something dishonorable. And he even produced as examples both the Thebans and the Eleans, whose policy he said this was; at any rate, though they slept with their favorites, he said, they assigned them places alongside themselves in the battle line. But this is a false analogy: such practices, though normal among them, with us are regarded as reprehensible. My own view is that those who assign these posts in battle betray suspicion that their beloveds, if left by themselves, will not carry out the duties of brave men. In contrast to this, the Spartans, who hold that no one who so much as feels a carnal urge will ever amount to anything outstanding, render their beloveds so consummately brave that even when arrayed with foreigners and even when not stationed in the same line with their lovers they just as surely feel ashamed to desert their comrades. The goddess they worship is not Shamelessness but Shame. We could all agree, I think, on the point I'm trying to make if we considered it this way: of two boys, the objects of the different types of love, which one would a person prefer to trust with his money, or his children, or to lay under the obligation of a favor? My own belief is that even the person whose love is founded on

the beloved's looks would rather entrust each of these to the one lovely of soul.

'Tn your case, Callias, I think the gods deserve your thanks for inspiring you with love for Autolycus. His ardor for glory is obvious, inasmuch as he endures many toils and pains so as to be proclaimed victor in the pancratium. Now if he were to believe that he is going not merely to shed luster on himself and his father but also to acquire through his manly excellence the ability to serve his friends and to exalt his country by setting up trophies of victory over its enemies, and thus to draw the admiring glances of all and be famous among both Greeks and barbarians, don't you suppose that he would esteem and honor highly anyone he considered the best partner in furthering all this? So if you want to be in his good graces, you must try to find out what sort of knowledge it was that enabled Themistocles to liberate Greece; you must try to find out what kind of knowledge it was that got Pericles recognized as his country's best counselor; you must reflect, further, how it was that Solon by deep thought established in his city the best laws; you must search out what kind of practices they are that give the Spartans the reputation of being preeminent military commanders; for you are their proxenos, and their foremost citizens are always being entertained at your house. You may regard it as certain, therefore, that our city would be quick to entrust itself to your hands, if you so desire. You possess the highest qualifications for such a trust: you are of noble birth, of Erechtheus' line, a priest serving the gods who under the leadership of Iacchus took the field against the barbarian; and in today's festival you outshine your predecessors in the splendor of your priestly office, and you possess a physique more impressive to the eye than any other in the city and at the same time able to withstand effort and hardship. If what I say strikes you as too earnest for a drinking party, even so, don't be surprised:

during practically all my life I have shared the city's love for men who add to a nature already good a zealous desire for excellence."

The rest of the company began to discuss what he had propounded, but Autolycus kept his eyes fixed on Callias. And Callias, addressing Socrates but looking beyond him and returning the gaze of Autolycus, said: "So you mean to play the procurer, do you, Socrates, bringing me to the attention of the city, so that I can enter politics and stay in her good graces?"

"Assuredly," was the reply, "if they see that you're cultivating excellence not for show but for real. False reputation is soon exposed when tested, whereas true manly excellence, unless a god spikes it, confers an ever more brilliant glory when put to the test of actual deeds."

9. That conversation ended there. Autolycus got up to go out for a walk, as per his schedule, and his father Lycon left with him but turned around to say, "So help me Hera, Socrates, you seem to me a true gentleman."

After that a chair of state, first of all, was set down in the room, and then the Syracusan came in with the announcement: "Gentlemen, Ariadne will now enter the chamber she shares with Dionysus; then Dionysus, having got tipsy with the gods, will come join her; and then they will play with each other."

With that, in came Ariadne, decked out as a bride, and took her seat in the chair. Before Dionysus was visible, the Bacchic tune was played on the pipes. Then they truly admired the dancing master, for as soon as Ariadne heard the tune, her action was such that everyone would have perceived her joy at the sound; and although she did not go to meet Dionysus or even rise, it was clear that she only just kept her composure. But when Dionysus caught sight of her, he came

dancing toward her and in a most loving manner fell to his knees, put his arms around her, and gave her a kiss. Her demeanor was all modesty, but she returned his embrace with affection. As the banqueters saw it, they kept clapping and crying "encore!" Now Dionysus arose and gave his hand to Ariadne to rise also, and then there were the movements of lovers kissing and caressing each other to watch. The onlookers saw a Dionysus truly handsome, an Ariadne truly fair, not presenting a burlesque but offering genuine kisses with their lips; and all watched with heightened excitement. For they overheard Dionysus asking her if she loved him and heard her vowing that she did, so earnestly that not only Dionysus … but all the bystanders as well would have jointly sworn that the boy and the girl were surely in love with each other. Theirs was the appearance not of performers who had been taught their moves but of people now permitted to satisfy their long-cherished desires. At last, the banqueters, seeing them in each other's arms and obviously heading for the bridal bed, the bachelors swore that they would get married and the married men mounted their horses and rode off to their own wives so that they might enjoy them. As for Socrates and the others who had lingered behind, they went out with Callias to join Lycon and his son on their walk.

So broke up the banquet held that evening.

APOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

In the year 399 BC, Socrates, then about seventy years old, was brought to trial by Anytus, Meletus, and Lycon on an indictment charging subversion of the city's gods and corrupting its young men. The fullest extant account of Socrates at this crisis is to be found in Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. Of these, Apology gives a version of what Socrates said in his own defense at his trial in 399 and is probably accurate in its essentials: Plato was an eyewitness and could not have published his Apology so long after the event that he could get away with significantly falsifying what he reports Socrates as having said, and thus undermining the work's clear purpose. Xenophon's Apology, by contrast, is neither a full nor a firsthand account: Xenophon, who was far from Athens during the trial and for many years thereafter, relies on reports by Socrates' companion Hermogenes in order to answer a fundamental question about Socrates' defense that he thought previously published accounts left open: why did Socrates adopt such a cocky attitude if he expected his defense to be taken seriously? As Xenophon and Hermogenes explain it, Socrates deliberately invited condemnation: his divine sign forbade him to plan a defense, which he interpreted as signifying that the trial offered "the opportunity of ending my life not only at the right juncture but also in the easiest way" (7); that is, before the onset of senility and the burden it would place on his friends.

The first sentence of this composition, like that of Oeconomicus, seems to connect with something preceding, suggesting that it might have been intended to be part of a larger whole, perhaps the Memorabilia, where, in the last chapter, we find practically the same material. Almost equally

indeterminate is the date. It is clear that when our Apology was written, Anytus had been dead several years, and some accounts of the trial had already appeared. If Apology react to Plato's rather lenient portrayal of Anytus in Meno, we would have a date no earlier than the mid-380s.

Hermogenes, the indigent brother of the rich Callias, appears, both from Xenophon's Apology and Symposium and from Plato, to have been an intimate in the Socratic circle. Although he is not mentioned in the doubtless incomplete list given in Plato's Apology of friends and disciples present at the trial, he is named in Plato's Phaedo as one of those who were with Socrates at the time of his execution.

Xenophon includes elements of the defense that also appear in Plato s account, though they often differ in detail or interpretation: Chaerephon's oracle, Socrates' cocky attitude (though shaded toward irony by Plato), his refusal to speak, as was expected of defendants (and the resulting hubbub), his cross-examination of Meletus, his reliance on a divine sign, his hope of communion with great men of the past (in this case, Palamedes), his rejection of a plan to escape. Both omit any mention of Socrates' alleged malign influence on Critias and Alcibiades, which was prominent among the charges and had been stressed in Polycrates' anti-Socratic Accusation, published sometime after 393.

Equally salient are the differences; for example, Xenophon's claim that Socrates' friends spoke on his behalf and that he offered no alternative penalty. In some passages, Socrates is pretty clearly being used as Xenophon's mouthpiece. In contrast to the central claim, that Socrates sought an easy escape from old age, Plato represents him as telling the jury that he can face death calmly because of his confidence in an afterlife (a doctrine elaborated in the Phaedo). Just as Xenophon never mentions this belief either in the Apology or in the Memorabilia, so Plato never mentions fear of

old age as a motive. It is possible that in conversation Socrates had mentioned this commonplace comfort as one reason for his willingness to die, perhaps hoping that here at least was an argument that would appeal to his less metaphysical friends, but either Plato did not hear it or thought it not worth recording beside more spiritual thoughts.

SOCRATES' DEFENSE

[TO THE JURY]

1. I think it worth memorializing also how Socrates, on being summoned to trial, deliberated about his defense and about the end of his life. It is true that others have written about this, and all of them have captured his cockiness — obviously that was the sort of speech Socrates actually made — but what they have not made clear is that he already thought that for him death was preferable to life, so that his cockiness appears rather ill-considered. Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, however, was a companion of his and has divulged such reports as show that the cockiness of his speech suited the decision he had made. For he stated that on seeing Socrates discussing everything but the trial, he asked, "But Socrates, shouldn't you be giving some thought to what defense you're going to make?"

He said that Socrates at first replied, "Why, don't I seem to you to have spent my whole life practicing my defense?"

Then when he asked, "How so?" Socrates said,

"Because I've lived a life without wrongdoing, and that I consider the finest practice for a defense."

Then when Hermogenes again asked, "Don't you observe that the Athenian courts have often been carried away by an eloquent speech and have condemned innocent men to death, and often on the other hand the guilty have been acquitted either because their plea aroused compassion or because their speech was charming?"

"Yes, indeed!" he answered; "and I've tried twice already to look to my defense, but my divine sign opposes me."

And when Hermogenes observed, "That is a surprising statement," he replied,

"Do you really consider it surprising that even the god thinks it better for me to die at this time? Don't you know that

to this day I would never have conceded that any man has lived a better life than I have? For I always knew that my whole life has been lived in piety and justice, a fact that affords the greatest pleasure; and so I have felt a deep self-respect and have discovered that my associates hold corresponding sentiments about me. But now, if my years are prolonged, I know that the frailties of old age will inevitably be realized: that my vision must be less perfect and my hearing less keen, that I shall be slower to learn and more forgetful of what I have learned. If I perceive my decay and start criticizing myself, how," he continued, "could I any longer take pleasure in living? Perhaps," he added, "the god in his kindness is taking my part and securing me the opportunity of ending my life not only at the right juncture but also in the easiest way. For if I'm condemned now, it will clearly be open to me to suffer a death judged by those who have superintended this matter to be the easiest and least troublesome to ones friends, and that implants in them the deepest feeling of loss for those meeting their end. For when a person leaves behind in the hearts of those attending his death nothing unseemly or disagreeable, but dies away while he still possesses a sound body and a spirit capable of showing kindliness, how can he fail to be sorely missed? It was with good reason," Socrates continued, "that the gods opposed my giving thought to my speech at least at that time, when we thought we had to find a plea that would get me acquitted by any means. For had I pulled that off, it's clear that instead of letting go of life at this point, I would have provided for a painful death from disease or old age, the sink into which all distresses flow, unrelieved by any joy. By Zeus no, Hermogenes," he went on, "I'll never court that fate, but if I offend the jury by declaring all the blessings that I feel gods and men have bestowed on me, as well as my personal opinion of myself, I will prefer death to begging,

unlike a free man, for longer life and thus gaining instead of death a far inferior life."

Hermogenes stated that with this resolve Socrates came before the jury after his adversaries had charged him with not believing in the gods worshipped by the city and with the introduction of new deities in their stead and with corruption of the young, and replied: "One thing I marvel at in Meletus, gentlemen, is the basis of his assertion that I do not believe in the gods worshipped by the city, for all have seen me sacrificing at the communal festivals and on the public altars if they happened to be present, including Meletus himself if he so desired. As for introducing new divinities,' how could I be guilty of that merely in asserting that a gods voice is made manifest to me indicating what I should do? Surely those who take their omens from the cries of birds and the utterances of humans form their judgments on voices.' Will anyone dispute either that thunder utters its voice' or that it is an omen of the greatest moment? Does not the very priestess who sits on the tripod at Pytho divulge the god's will through a Voice'? But more than that, in regard to the god's foreknowledge of the future and his forewarning of it to whomever he wishes, these are the same terms, I assert, that all people use and credit. The only difference between them and me is that whereas they call the sources of their forewarning "birds,' 'utterances,' 'chance meetings,' 'prophets,' I call mine a 'divine' thing, and I think that in using such a term I am speaking with greater truth and piety than those who ascribe the gods' power to birds. That I do not lie against the god I have this further proof: I have revealed to many of my friends the counsels which the god has given me, and in no instance has the event shown that I was mistaken."

Hermogenes further reported that when the jurors raised a clamor at hearing this, some of them disbelieving his statements, others jealous at his receiving greater favors even

from the gods than they themselves, Socrates resumed: "Listen, let me tell you something more, so that those of you who feel so inclined may have still greater disbelief in my being honored by divinities. One time when Chaerephon inquired at Delphi about me, in the presence of many people Apollo answered that no man is more free than I, or more just, or more sensible."

When the jurors, naturally enough, made a still greater hubbub on hearing this statement, he said that Socrates continued, "And yet, gentlemen, the god uttered in oracles greater statements about Lycurgus, the Lacedaemonian lawgiver, than he did about me. For there is a legend that, as Lycurgus entered the temple, the god said to him, 'I am pondering whether to call you a god or a man.' Me, Apollo did not compare to a god, though he did judge me far superior to the rest of mankind. Do not, however, believe the god even in this without due grounds, but examine the gods utterance in detail. First, whom do you know less enslaved to his bodily appetites than me? Whom in the world more free, since I accept neither gifts nor pay from anyone? Whom would you reasonably regard as more just than the one so well matched with his present possessions as to need nothing extra from others? And why wouldn't anyone with good reason call me a sage man, who from the time when I began to understand spoken words have never stopped seeking after and learning every good thing that I could? And as proof that my labor has not been in vain do you not credit this fact too, that many of my fellow citizens who strive for virtue and many from abroad choose to associate with me above all others? And what shall we say is the reason for this fact, that although everybody knows I am the least able to repay money, many are eager to make me some gift? Or for this, that no demands are made on me by a single person to repay kindnesses, while many confess that they owe me for favors received? Or for this, that

during the siege, while others were feeling sorry for themselves, I carried on in no greater destitution than when the city's prosperity was at its height? Or for this, that while other men get their delicacies in the market and pay a high price for them, I devise more pleasurable ones from the resources of my soul without cost? And now, if no one can convict me of misstatement in all that I have said of myself, how could I not fairly merit praise from both gods and men? But in spite of that, Meletus, do you maintain that I corrupt the young men by such practices? And yet surely we know what kinds of corruption affect young men; so you tell us whether you know of anyone who under my influence has fallen from piety into impiety, or from self-control into wantonness, or from moderation into extravagance, or from temperate drinking into sottishness, or from strenuousness into effeminacy, or has been overcome by any other base pleasure."

"But, by Heaven!" said Meletus: "there is one set of men I know: those whom you have persuaded to obey you rather than their parents." "I admit it," he reports Socrates as replying, "at least so far as education is concerned; people know that I've taken an interest in that. But on a question of health, men take the advice of physicians rather than their parents, and in Assembly meetings all the Athenians of course follow the advice of those who speak most sensibly rather than that of their own relatives. Don't you also elect as your generals, in preference to fathers and brothers, indeed in preference to yourselves, those whom you regard as most sensible about military affairs?"

"Yes," Meletus said; "for that is both expedient and customary."

"Well, then," Socrates said, "doesn't it strike you as surprising that in other activities those who excel receive not merely equal honor but even superior honor, yet because I am

judged by some to be supreme in humanity's greatest blessing, education, for that I'm being prosecuted by you on a capital charge?"

More than this of course was said both by Socrates himself and by the friends who joined in his defense. But I have not made it a point to report the whole trial; rather I am satisfied to make it clear that while Socrates' whole concern was to keep free from any act of impiety toward the gods or any appearance of wrongdoing toward mankind, he did not think he should beseech the jury to let him escape death; instead, he believed that the time had now come for him to die. This conviction of his became more evident than ever after the verdict had been decided. First of all, when he was invited to name an alternative penalty, he refused personally and forbade his friends to name one, but insisted that naming a penalty was an acknowledgment of guilt. Then, when his companions wished to break him out of prison, he would not accompany them but even seemed to joke about it, asking them whether they knew of any spot outside of Attica that was inaccessible to death.

When the trial was over, Socrates (according to Hermogenes) remarked, "Well, gentlemen, those who instructed the witnesses that they must bear false witness against me, perjuring themselves to do so, and those who were won over to do this must feel in their hearts a consciousness of great impiety and injustice; but as for me, why should my spirits be any lower now than before my condemnation, since I have not been proved guilty of having done any of the acts mentioned in the indictment? For it has not been shown that I have sacrificed to new deities in place of Zeus and Hera and the gods of their company, or that I have sworn by or invoked other gods. And how could I be corrupt the young by habituating them to fortitude and frugality? Now of all the acts for which the laws have prescribed the death penalty — temple

robbery, burglary, enslavement, treason — not even my adversaries themselves charge me with having committed any of these. And so it seems astonishing to me how you could ever have been convinced that I had committed an act meriting death. But further, my spirits need not be lower because Fm to be executed unjustly: that attaches disgrace not to me but to those who condemned me. And I take further comfort from the case of Palamedes, who died in circumstances similar to mine; for even now he affords us a far finer theme for songs than does Odysseus, the man who unjustly caused his death. And I know that time to come as well as time past will attest that I, too, far from ever doing anyone wrong or making him more wicked, I have instead tried to benefit those who conversed with me by teaching them, without charge, every good thing that I could."

With that he departed, blithe of eyes, posture, and step, as was fully consonant with the words he had just spoken. When he noticed that those who accompanied him were in tears, "What is this?" we are told he asked, "Are you just now beginning to weep? Haven't you known all along that from the moment I was born nature had condemned me to death? Now if I'm perishing before my time while blessings are still pouring in, clearly that should bring grief to me and my well-wishers; but if I'm ending my life when only hardships are in view, my own opinion is that you should all be cheerful, in the assurance that I'm doing well."

There with him was man named Apollodorus, a very ardent devotee of Socrates but otherwise simple, who exclaimed, "But Socrates, what I find it hardest to bear is that I see you being put to death unjustly!" Socrates stroked Apollodorus' head and reportedly replied, "My dearest Apollodorus, would you want to see me put to death justly or unjustly?" and smiled as he asked the question.

We are told also that he remarked as he saw Anytus passing by, “There goes a man filled with pride, as having accomplished something great and noble by putting me to death, because, when I saw him honored by the city with the highest offices, I said that he shouldn’t confine his son’s education to hides. What a shoddy fellow,” he continued, “not to know, apparently, that whichever one of us has accomplished what is more beneficial and noble for all time, he is the real victor. But,” he reportedly added, “Homer has attributed to some at the moment of life s dissolution the power to foresee the future, and so I too wish to utter a prophecy. At one time I had a brief association with the son of Anytus, and I thought he had some strength of soul; and so I predict that he will not continue in the servile occupation that his father has arranged for him but through lack of a sound advisor he will fall into some disgraceful propensity and surely go far along the path of vice.” In saying this he was not mistaken: the young man, delighting in wine, never stopped drinking night or day, and at last turned out worth nothing to his city, his friends, or himself. So Anytus, even after his death, still has a bad reputation for his son s vile education and for his own thoughtlessness. And as for Socrates, by magnifying himself in court he brought ill will upon himself and thus made his conviction by the jury all the more certain. Now to me he seems to have met a fate that the gods love: he escaped the hardest part of life and met the easiest sort of death. And he displayed his strength of soul, for having once decided that death was better for him than longer life, he did not weaken in the presence of death, just as he had never set his face against any other thing, either, that was for his good, but was cheerful not only in the expectation of death but in carrying it out.

And so, in contemplating the man s wisdom and nobility of character, I can neither put him out of mind or, when I

remember him, refrain from praise. And if among those who make virtue their aim anyone has ever been brought into contact with someone more helpful than Socrates, I think that man deserves to be called most fortunate.




ΠΛΑΤΩΝ

Halcyon

Translated by Brad Inwood.

Persons of the Dialog

Chaerephon, Socrates

Chaerephon/ Socrates, what was that voice that reached us from way down along the beach, under the headland? It was so sweet to my ears! What creature can it be that makes that sound? Surely creatures that live in the sea are silent.

Socrates/ It's a sort of sea bird, Chaerephon, called the halcyon, much given to lamenting and weeping. There is an ancient account about this bird, which was handed down as a myth by men of old. They say that it was once a woman, the daughter of Aeolus the son of Hellen, who ached with love and lamented the death of her wedded husband, Ceyx of Trachis, the son of Eosphorus the Dawn Star—a handsome son of a handsome father. And then, through some act of divine will, she grew wings like a bird and now flies about the sea searching for him, since she could not find him when she wandered all over the face of the earth.

Chaerephon/ Is it Halcyon that you're referring to? I had never heard the voice before; it really did strike me as something exotic. Anyway, the creature certainly does produce a mournful sound. About how big is it, Socrates?

Socrates/ Not very large. Yet great is the honor she has been given by the gods because of her love for her husband. For it's when the halcyons are nesting that the cosmos brings us what are called the 'halcyon days' in mid-winter, days distinguished for their fair weather—today is an especially good example. Don't you see how bright the sky

above is and how the whole sea is calm and tranquil, like a mirror, so to speak?

Chaerephon/ You're right; today does seem to be a halcyon day, and yesterday was much like it. But by the gods, Socrates! How can we actually believe those ancient tales, that once upon a time birds turned into women or women into birds? All that sort of thing seems utterly impossible.

Socrates/ Ah, my dear Chaerephon, we seem to be utterly short-sighted judges of what is possible or impossible—we make our assessment according to the best of our human ability, which is unknowing, unreliable, and blind. Many things which are feasible seem, to us, not feasible, and many things which are attainable seem unattainable—often because of our inexperience, and often because of the childish folly in our minds. For in fact all human beings, even very old men, really do seem to be as foolish as children, since the span of our lives is small indeed, no longer than childhood when compared with all eternity. My good friend, how could people who know nothing about the powers of the gods and divinities, or of nature as a whole, possibly tell whether something like this is possible or impossible?

Did you notice, Chaerephon, how big a storm we had the day before yesterday? Someone pondering those lightning flashes and thunderbolts and the tremendous force of the winds might well be struck by fear; one might have thought the whole inhabited world was actually going to collapse. But a little later there was an astounding restoration of fair weather which has lasted right up to the present moment. Do you think, then, that it is a greater and more laborious task to conjure up this kind of fair weather out of such an overwhelming storm and disturbance and to bring the entire cosmos into a state of calm, than it is to reshape a woman's form and turn it into a bird's? Even our little children who

know how to model such things out of clay or wax can easily work them into all kinds of shapes, all out of the same material. Since the divinity possesses great power, incomparably greater than ours, perhaps all such things are actually very easy for it. After all, how much greater than yourself would you say that the whole of heaven is?

Chaerephon/ Socrates, who among men could imagine or find words for anything of the sort? Even to say it is beyond human attainment.

Socrates/ When we compare people with each other, do we not see that there are vast differences in their abilities and inabilities? Adult men, when compared to mere infants who are five or ten days old, have an amazing superiority in their ability at virtually all the practical affairs of life, those carried out by means of our sophisticated skills as well as those carried out by means of the body and soul; these things cannot, as I said, even cross the minds of young children. And how immeasurably superior is the physical strength of one man grown to full size, compared to them, for one man could easily vanquish thousands of such children; and it is surely natural that in the initial stages of life men should be utterly helpless and incapable of anything. When one person, as it seems, is so far superior to another, how are we to suppose that the powers of the whole heaven would appear, compared with our powers, to those who are capable of grasping such matters? Perhaps indeed many people will think it plausible that, just as the size of the cosmos surpasses the form of Socrates or Chaerephon, so its power and wisdom and intelligence will to the same degree surpass our condition.

For you and me and many others like us, many things are impossible which are quite easy for others to do. For as long as they lack the knowledge, it is more impossible that people who cannot play the flute should do so or that the illiterate

should read or write, than it is to make women out of birds or birds out of women. Nature virtually tosses into a honeycomb an animal which is footless and wingless; then she gives it feet and wings, adorns it with all kinds of variegated and beautiful colors and so produces a bee, wise producer of heavenly honey; and from mute and lifeless eggs she shapes many species of winged, walking and water-dwelling animals, using (as some say) the sacred arts of the vast aether. We are mortal and utterly trivial, unable to see clearly either great or small matters and in the dark about most of the things which happen to us; so we could not possibly make any reliable claim about the mighty powers of the immortals, whether as regards halcyons or as regards nightingales.

O bird of musical lamentations, I shall pass on to my children the far-famed myth about your songs just as I received it from my ancestors, and I shall sing frequently to my wives, Xanthippe and Myrto, of your piety and loving devotion to your husband, with special emphasis on the honor you received from the gods. Will you too do something like this, Chaerephon?

Chaerephon/ That would certainly be appropriate, Socrates, and what you say is a double exhortation to the bond between husbands and wives.

Socrates/ Well, now it's time to bid farewell to Halcyon, and go on to the city from Cape Phaleron.

Chaerephon/ Certainly; let's do so.

First Alcibiades.

Translated by George Burges, M. A. 1861

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Alcibiades.

Socrates/ You feel some wonder, I think, son of Clinias, that I, who was the first of your admirers, am now, when all the rest have ceased to be so, the only one who has not withdrawn himself; and that, while the others were plaguing you with their conversation, I did for so many years never speak a word to you. For this behavior of mine the reason is to be found not in any obstacle arising from man, but from a dæmon, of whose power you shall hear hereafter. But as it no longer offers any opposition, I have come to you now; and I am in good hopes that for the future likewise it will be no impediment. By reflecting, however, during the interval, I nearly thoroughly understand what is your position with respect to your admirers. For though they were many, and men who thought highly of themselves, yet there is not one, who has not gone away from you, through their being surpassed by you in self-conceit. Now the reason for your thinking so highly of yourself I am desirous of detailing. You assert then, that you are in nothing inferior to any man. For what is your own, beginning from the body and ending in the mind, is so great, as to stand in need of nothing. In the first place, you fancy yourself to be very handsome, and of a great size. And in this it is evident to everyone, who can see, that you are not mistaken. In the next place, you are of a family the most youth-like in your own city, which is the greatest of any in Greece; and that you have friends here, and relations on your father's side, very numerous and very powerful, ready, if need be, to assist you; and those too on your mother's side are neither inferior nor fewer. But greater

than all I have mentioned taken together, is the influence you possess through Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian to yourself and brother; that Pericles who is able to do what he pleases, not only in this city, but through all Greece, and with many and mighty clans of Barbarians. And I will add too, that you are one of the wealthy; although, on this point, you seem to me to value yourself the least. Boasting yourself then highly on all these advantages, you have acted the lord over your admirers; and they, feeling their inferiority, have become your slaves. And of this you are very sensible; and hence I know full well, that you feel a wonder at what I have in my thoughts, in that I do not withdraw myself, and what is the hope I entertain in remaining, when all the rest have gone away.

Alcibiades/ Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that you have anticipated me a little. For I really had it in my mind to come to you previously, and to ask you these very questions—What can you possibly mean, and looking to what hope are you plaguing me, and, wherever I am, are perpetually present yourself? For I do in truth wonder what your business can be with me; and I should very gladly hear.

Socrates/ You will hear me then, as is likely, very readily, if, as you say, you are really desirous of knowing what I have in my thoughts. I speak then as to one who will hear, and stay.

Alcibiades/ Entirely so. Speak then.

Socrates/ But mark, for it will be a thing not of wonder, if, as I begin with difficulty, I should with difficulty likewise make an end.

Alcibiades/ Speak, my good man, for I will listen.

Socrates/ Speak then I must; and though it is a hard task for an admirer to address himself to him, who is not inferior to his admirers, yet I must dare to speak my mind. If,

Alcibiades, I had seen you satisfied with the advantages which I have just now detailed, and that you conceived you ought to pass your life amongst them, I should long since have withdrawn myself from all the love I bear; at least so I persuade myself. But I will now convict you of having other thoughts relating to yourself; and by so doing you will know, how I have continued keeping my attention directed towards you. For you appear to me such that, if any god were to say to you, "Are you willing, Alcibiades, to live possessing what you now do, or to die instantly, unless you are permitted to possess things still greater?" you would prefer to die. But in what kind of hope are you now living? I will unfold. For you conceive that, if you were to come rather quickly before a meeting of the Athenian people—and this will take place within a few days—you will be able to show that you are worthy of being honored in a way that neither Pericles nor anyone else of those, who have ever existed, was worthy; and after you have shown this, that you will possess the greatest power in the state; and that if you are the man of the greatest influence here, you will be so amongst the rest of the Greeks; and not only amongst the Greeks, but amongst the Barbarians likewise, as many as inhabit the same continent with us. And further, if the very same god were to say to you that—It is necessary for you to be the master here in Europe, but that it will not be allowed you to pass over into Asia, nor to concern yourself with affairs there—it appears to me that you would not even on these terms be willing to live, unless you could fill the mouths, so to say, of all men with your name and power; and you would deem, I fancy, that no man ever lived, except Cyrus and Xerxes, worth mentioning. Now, that you do entertain such hopes I know full well, and speak not from conjecture merely. Perhaps, you will say, as being convinced that I am speaking the truth—What has all this to do with the reason, which you said you would tell, why

you have not withdrawn yourself from me? I will tell you then, my dear son of Clinias and Dinomache. That to all these thoughts of yours a finish should be put, is impossible without my help; so great power do, I think, I possess with regard to your affairs and to yourself to boot. Hence I have long ago thought that the god did not permit me to converse with you; for whom I have waited, until he should permit. For as you have a hope of being able to show before the state that you are worth everything to it, and after having shown it, that there is nothing that you will not be able to do forthwith, so do I have a hope that I shall possess the greatest power over you, after having shown that I am worth everything to you; and that neither guardian, nor relation, nor anyone else, is able to procure you the power you desire, except myself, with the assistance, however, of the god. While therefore you were rather young, and before you were filled with these hopes, the god, it seems to me, would not permit me to discourse with you, lest I should converse in vain; but now he has permitted; for now you will hearken to me.

Alcibiades/ Much more unreasonable, Socrates, do you appear to me now, since you have begun to speak, than when you followed me in silence: and yet you were at that time very much a person of such kind to look upon. Whether I have such thoughts, or not, you, it seems, know with certainty; so that were I to deny it, the denial would not avail me to persuade you an atom the more. Let it then be so. But if I have such thoughts ever so much, can you tell me how they will be accomplished through you; but without your help they never can be?

Socrates/ Do you ask me, whether I am able to make a long harangue, such as you are accustomed to hear? For if so, such is not my ability. But yet I should be able, I think,

to show you, that such is the case, if you are willing to do me only one small piece of service.

Alcibiades/ If you mean some service not difficult, I am willing.

Socrates/ Does it seem to you difficult to give answers to questions?

Alcibiades/ Not difficult at all.

Socrates/ Answer then.

Alcibiades/ Ask.

Socrates/ Shall I ask you then as having the thoughts, which I say you are thinking of?

Alcibiades/ Be it so, if you will; in order that I may know what you will say.

Socrates/ Well then. You have it in your mind, as I said, to go and consult with the Athenians within not a long time. If then, when you were just about to mount the platform, I were to lay hold of you, and to say— "Since the Athenians are thinking, Alcibiades, about deliberating upon some matter, are you rising up to give them advice? Is it, since about what you know better than they do?" What answer would you make?

Alcibiades/ I would assuredly answer—About what I know better than they do.

Socrates/ On those subjects, then, which you happen to know, you are a good counselor?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ Do you know those things only, which you have learnt from others, or found out yourself?

Alcibiades/ What other things are there?

Socrates/ Is it then possible that you should ever have learnt, or found out, anything, which you were not willing to learn, or to search out by yourself?

Alcibiades/ It is not.

Socrates/ What then, have you ever been willing to search out or learn what you thought you knew?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ What you now happen to know, was there a time, when you did not think you knew?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, what you have learnt, I know pretty nearly. But if anything has escaped me, do you mention it. To the best of my memory, you have learnt assuredly grammar, and to play on the harp, and to wrestle: for to play on the hautboy, you were not willing to learn. These things are what you know; unless peradventure you have learnt something else secretly. And yet I think that you neither by day or night went out from within.

Alcibiades/ I have never gone to the school of other masters than of these.

Socrates/ When therefore the Athenians are deliberating about grammar, and how they are to write correctly, at that time will you rise up to give them advice?

Alcibiades/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ But when they are debating about striking the strings of the lyre?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ But on the subject of wrestling they are not wont to deliberate in a public assembly.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ When then they are deliberating about what? For assuredly it cannot be, when the subject is about house-building.

Alcibiades/ No, certainly.

Socrates/ For a house-builder would advise them better than you could.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Nor yet is it, when they are deliberating about divination.

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ For a diviner would do so better than you.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that too, whether he be a short man or a tall one; whether handsome or ugly; and whether of a noble or ignoble family.

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ For advice upon each subject belongs, I conceive, to a person who knows it, and not to a man of wealth.

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ And whether the man, who gives advice, be rich or poor, it will make no difference to the Athenians, when they are deliberating about the health of those in the city; but they will seek for a physician to be their counselor.

Alcibiades/ And reasonably so.

Socrates/ When they are inquiring into what subject, will you rise up, and after rising up, give them advice?

Alcibiades/ When they are inquiring, Socrates, into the state of their affairs.

Socrates/ Do you mean about building a fleet? and what kind of vessels it is requisite should be built?

Alcibiades/ No such thing, Socrates.

Socrates/ Because you are ignorant, I think, in the art of ship-building. Is this or anything else the reason?

Alcibiades/ There is no other than this.

Socrates/ But when they are consulting about what affairs of their own do you mean?

Alcibiades/ When they are deliberating, Socrates, about war or peace; or any other affairs of state.

Socrates/ Do you mean when they are deliberating with whom it is requisite to make peace, and against whom to engage in war, and in what way?

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ Now is it not requisite to do so with whom it is better to do so?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And at that time, when it is better?

Alcibiades/ By all means.

Socrates/ And for so long a time, as it is better?

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ If then the Athenians were deliberating with whom it was requisite to wrestle and with whom to come to close quarters, and in what way, would you give better advice than the exercise-master?

Alcibiades/ The exercise-master assuredly.

Socrates/ Can you tell me now, by looking to what would the exercise-master give advice, with whom it is meet to wrestle closely, and with whom it is not? and at what time, and in what manner? I mean something of this kind. Is it meet to wrestle closely with those persons, with whom it is better to do so? or is it not?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Whether to such an extent as it is better?

Alcibiades/ To such an extent.

Socrates/ And at the time too when it is better?

Alcibiades/ By all means.

Socrates/ Moreover, a singer ought sometimes to play the harp, and to move his feet according to the tune.

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ Ought he not to do so at the time when it is better to do so?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And to such an extent as it is better?

Alcibiades/ So I say.

Socrates/ Well then, since you make use of the term better in both cases, namely in playing the harp according to the tune, and in close wrestling, what do you call "the better" in playing the harp, as I call the better in wrestling by the term gymnastical? what do you call that?

Alcibiades/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Try then to imitate me. For I have assuredly answered you, it is that which, under all circumstances, is correct. Now that is correct, which is done according to art. Is it not?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Now is not the art gymnastic?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ And I said, that the better in wrestling is gymnastical.

Alcibiades/ You said so.

Socrates/ And was it not well said?

Alcibiades/ It seems so to me at least.

Socrates/ Come then, and say—for it would surely become you too to discourse correctly—in the first place; What is the art, to which belong the playing on the harp, the singing, and the moving the feet correctly. By what name is the whole of this art called? Are you not able to tell?

Alcibiades/ Indeed I am not.

Socrates/ Try in this way then. Who are the goddesses to whom the art belongs?

Alcibiades/ Mean you, Socrates, the Muses?

Socrates/ I do. Consider now, what appellation has the art derived from their name?

Alcibiades/ You appear to me to mean musical.

Socrates/ Yes, I meant so. What then is that, which is performed rightly according to this art? Just as I told you, that what was performed rightly according to art, was gymnastical. So what do you say is similarly in this case? How is it to be performed?

Alcibiades/ Musically, I think.

Socrates/ You say well. Come then—What do you term the better in the expressions, "the warring better," and "in enjoying peace better?" just as there you made use in each case of the term better, in one as being more musical, in the other as more gymnastical. Try now in these cases likewise to state what is "the better."

Alcibiades/ I cannot tell at all.

Socrates/ But surely it is a disgraceful thing, should anyone, while you were giving advice respecting the kinds of food, and saying, that this is better than that, both as regards the present time and quantity, inquire of you, "What do you mean, Alcibiades, by 'the better?'" that you should, on these subjects, be able to tell him that it was the more wholesome—and this, too, although you do not profess to be a physician—but that on a subject, of which you profess to have a knowledge, and, after rising up, you will give advice, as if you knew it, you are not, when questioned, ashamed, as you seem to be, if you are unable to say anything? Or does this appear to be not disgraceful?

Alcibiades/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Consider now, and be ready to state—To what point tends “the better” in enjoying peace, and in warring with those with whom it is meet?

Alcibiades/ But though I do consider, I am unable to imagine what it is.

Socrates/ Know you not, when we make war, that after accusing each other of some suffering, we proceed to hostilities, and by what calling it we proceed?

Alcibiades/ I do. It is by our being deceived, or treated with violence, or deprived of something.

Socrates/ Hold. How are they suffering in each of these points? Endeavor to state what is the difference, this way or that.

Alcibiades/ By the expression “this way,” do you mean, Socrates, “justly” or “unjustly?”

Socrates/ This very thing.

Alcibiades/ And yet this is a difference wholly and entirely.

Socrates/ Well then, with whom shall you advise the Athenians to war? with those, who do what is unjust, or with those, who do what is just?

Alcibiades/ You are asking a hard question. For even if any man conceives that it is needful to war with such, as do what is right, he would not confess it.

Socrates/ For this, it seems, is not lawful.

Alcibiades/ By no means is it so; nor does it seem to be honorable.

Socrates/ With a view then to these points, and to what is just, you will make your speeches.

Alcibiades/ It is necessary to do so.

Socrates/ Does then the term “better,” about which I asked you just now, relating to the going to war or not, and with whom it is meet to do so, and with whom not, and at what time, and when not, happen to be anything else than the term “more just?” or does it not?

Alcibiades/ It appears to be nothing else.

Socrates/ How then, my dear Alcibiades, does it lie hid from yourself, that you are ignorant of this? or have you lain hid from me, while learning, and frequenting the school of a master, who has taught you to distinguish between what is the more just, and what is the less just? Now who is he? Tell me, in order that you may introduce me too, as a frequenter of his school.

Alcibiades/ You are bantering, Socrates.

Socrates/ Not so, by the guardian-god of friendship to both myself and you, whom I would the least of all invoke as witness to a falsehood? If then you have any master, tell me who he is.

Alcibiades/ But what if I have not? Think you that I could by no other means have a knowledge of what is just, and what is unjust?

Socrates/ I think you would, if you had discovered it yourself.

Alcibiades/ Do you conceive then I could not have discovered it?

Socrates/ You would have done so perfectly, had you sought for it.

Alcibiades/ Think you, then, that I have not sought for it?

Socrates/ I think you would, if you had thought you did not know it.

Alcibiades/ Was there not a time, when I was in that state?

Socrates/ You speak correctly. Can you then mention the time when you did not think you knew what is just, and what is unjust? Come, tell me, were you making the search last year, and did you think then, or did you not, that you knew them? Answer truly now, that our conversation may not be in vain.

Alcibiades/ Nay, I did at that time think I knew.

Socrates/ And did you not think so during the third, fourth, and fifth year preceding?

Alcibiades/ I did.

Socrates/ But previously you were a boy.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And even then, I know full well, that you thought you knew.

Alcibiades/ How do you know it well?

Socrates/ Often have I heard you, when you were a boy at school, and in other places, when you were playing at marbles, or any other game, speaking, as if you had no doubt respecting what is just and unjust, but proclaiming loudly and boldly about any of the boys who happened to be there, that he was a knave, and not just. Say I not what is true?

Alcibiades/ But, Socrates, what else was I to do, when anyone did me an act of injustice?

Socrates/ Right. But if you happened at that time to be ignorant whether you were injured or not, would you have said, What were you to do?

Alcibiades/ But, by Zeus, I was not ignorant; but I clearly knew that I was injured.

Socrates/ You thought then, it seems, when you were a mere boy, that you knew what is just and unjust?

Alcibiades/ I did think so; and knew it too.

Socrates/ At what time did you discover it? for certainly it was not when you merely thought you knew.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not then.

Socrates/ At what time then did you think you did not know? Reflect; for that time you will never find.

Alcibiades/ By Zeus, Socrates, I am not able to tell.

Socrates/ You did not then know by finding it yourself.

Alcibiades/ It seems I did not.

Socrates/ But you stated however just now, that you knew, even without learning. But if you neither discovered it nor learnt it, how or whence did you know it?

Alcibiades/ But perhaps I did not answer you correctly by saying that I knew by discovering it myself. But the case is this. I learnt it, I presume, as others do.

Socrates/ We are now come again to the same point. From whom did you learn it? Tell me.

Alcibiades/ From the people.

Socrates/ In referring it to the people, you fly to no good instructors.

Alcibiades/ Why so? Are not they capable of teaching?

Socrates/ Not even the game of back-gammon correctly or not. And yet I think that these subjects are of less importance than those relating to what is just. Do not you think so too?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Are they then unable to teach somethings of less importance, and somethings of more?

Alcibiades/ I think so; at least they are able to teach many things of more importance than playing at back-gammon.

Socrates/ What things are these?

Alcibiades/ I learnt, for instance, from them to speak the Greek language; nor could I name my teacher on that subject, but I refer to those very persons, who you say are not good teachers.

Socrates/ But, my noble sir, on this subject, indeed, the people are good teachers, and may be justly praised for their power of instructing.

Alcibiades/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because on those subjects they possess what it is necessary for good teachers to possess.

Alcibiades/ What mean you by this?

Socrates/ Know you not, that it is necessary for those who are to teach anything, in the first place to know it themselves? Must they not?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ And must not they, who know it, agree together, and not differ?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But would you say that they know the subjects in which they differ?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Of such things, then, how can they be good teachers?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ Well then, do the people appear to you to differ as to what is stone and wood? And should you inquire of anyone, do they not all agree in the same opinion? and when they wish to take up a stone, or a piece of wood, do they not all rush to the same kind of things? and similarly understand all things of such kind? For I very nearly learn that you mean by this the knowing how to use the Greek language? Is it not so?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ On these subjects, then, as we have said, do not persons individually agree with each other and themselves? and publicly the states of Greece do not have a difference with each other, by some of them meaning one thing, and others a different thing by the same words.

Alcibiades/ They do not.

Socrates/ On these subjects, then, they would reasonably be good teachers.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ If then we wished to cause a person to have a knowledge on these points, we should do right in sending him for such instruction to the people?

Alcibiades/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ But what if we wished that person to know not only of what kind are men and of what are horses, but what kind of horses are fit for the race, and what are not, are the people competent to teach this?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And is this for you a sufficient proof that they do not know and are not correct teachers on these points, because they do not agree with each other on these points?

Alcibiades/ To me at least it is.

Socrates/ And what, if we wished that person to know not only of what kind men are, but what are healthy and unhealthy, would the many be competent teachers for us?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ And it would be a proof to you that they are bad teachers on these points, if you saw them disagreeing.

Alcibiades/ It would.

Socrates/ What then, do the many seem to you to agree, themselves with themselves, or with each other, respecting persons and acts, just and unjust?

Alcibiades/ By Zeus, Socrates, the least of all.

Socrates/ What then, that they differ the most on these points?

Alcibiades/ Very much indeed.

Socrates/ You have never, I suppose, seen or heard of men, differing so violently, about things wholesome and not, as on that account to fight and kill one another?

Alcibiades/ Never.

Socrates/ But upon questions of justice and injustice, how bitterly they differ I know well; and if you have not seen it, you have at least heard from many others, and from Homer; for you have heard of both the Odyssey and the Iliad.

Alcibiades/ Entirely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Are not then those poems concerning a difference as to what is just and unjust?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And did not the battles and the deaths take place amongst the Greeks and the other Trojans, and amongst the wooers of Penelope, and Ulysses, on account of this very difference?

Alcibiades/ You speak what is true.

Socrates/ And I conceive that to the Athenians, Lacedæmonians, and Bœotians who perished at Tanagra, and to those, who afterwards met in arms at Coronea, when Clinias your father ended his career, a difference upon no other question than what relates to justice and injustice, caused the deaths and battles. Is it not so?

Alcibiades/ You are in the right.

Socrates/ Shall we say then that those persons had a knowledge on the question about which they differed with such vehemence, as by their contending with each other to inflict upon themselves the extreme of mischief?

Alcibiades/ It appears not.

Socrates/ Do you not then refer to teachers of such a kind, as you confess yourself to know nothing?

Alcibiades/ I seem to do so.

Socrates/ How then is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust on questions, about which so vague are your ideas, and which you appear to have neither learnt from another, nor to have discovered yourself?

Alcibiades/ From what you say, it is not likely.

Socrates/ See you again this, that you have not spoken, Alcibiades, correctly?

Alcibiades/ What is it?

Socrates/ In that you stated that I said so.

Alcibiades/ What, did not you say that I know nothing of what is just and unjust?

Socrates/ Not I, indeed.

Alcibiades/ But did I say it?

Socrates/ Yes.

Alcibiades/ How so?

Socrates/ You will see it in this way, should I ask you about one and two, which is the greater number, you will say that two is.

Alcibiades/ I shall.

Socrates/ By how much.

Alcibiades/ By one.

Socrates/ Which of us then is the person who says that two is more than one by one?

Alcibiades/ It is I.

Socrates/ Did not I ask the question, and did not you answer it?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ On these points, then, who appears to assert? Is it I who ask, or thou who answerest?

Alcibiades/ I.

Socrates/ What then, were I to ask how many and what are the letters in "Socrates," and you were to state, which of us would be the teller?

Alcibiades/ Myself.

Socrates/ Come then, tell me in one word, whenever a question and answer take place, who is it that asserts? he who asks, or he who answers?

Alcibiades/ He who answers, Socrates, as it seems to me.

Socrates/ Now through the whole of the conversation was not I the party asking?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you the party answering?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, which of us two said what was asserted?

Alcibiades/ From what has been admitted, Socrates, I appear to be the party.

Socrates/ Has it not been said that Alcibiades, the handsome son of Clinias, knew nothing about what is just and unjust, but thought he knew; and that he was about to go to a public meeting to give the Athenians advice upon questions of which he knew nothing? Is it not so?

Alcibiades/ So it appears.

Socrates/ The saying then of Euripides has come to pass, Alcibiades. You seem very nearly to have heard this from yourself, and not from me. For it is not I, who say this, but yourself; and vainly do you lay the blame on me. And indeed you speak correctly. For mad is the endeavor, O best of men, which you have in your thoughts of attempting to teach what you do not know and have neglected to learn.

Alcibiades/ I conceive, Socrates, that the Athenians, and the other Greeks, seldom deliberate whether things are more just or unjust; for these things they think are plain enough. Dismissing then the consideration of such points, they look to what will be most conducive to those who act. For I imagine that justice and interest are not the same things; since to many it has conduced to their interest to have done things very unjust, while to others there has been no advantage in having acted with justice.

Socrates/ Then if justice happens to be a thing ever so much of one kind, and interest of another, do you not surely think you know what is a man's interest, and why it is so?

Alcibiades/ What prevents me, Socrates? unless you ask me again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it myself.

Socrates/ What is this you are doing? If you say anything not correctly, and it happens to be possible to prove it so by the same arguments as before, you fancy forsooth that you ought to hear something fresh, and other arguments; as if the former had been worn out like dresses, and you could no longer put them on, unless one should bring you a proof clear and without a stain. But bidding farewell to the quick sallies of your speech, I will nevertheless ask you from whence have you learnt, and how do you know, what is to a person's interest, and who was your teacher? and all the former points I now put in a single question. For it is evident that you will come to the same point; nor will you be able to

show either that, by having discovered it, you know what is to a person's interest, or that you have learnt it. But since you give yourself airs, and would not pleasantly have a taste of the same argument again, I bid farewell to the question, whether you do or do not know what is for the interest of the Athenians. But whether justice and interest are the same, or different, why have you not shown, by putting, if you wish it, questions to me, as I did to you? or, if you had rather go through the subject in a speech at your discretion.

Alcibiades/ But I know not, Socrates, if I should be able to go through it before you.

Socrates/ But, my good friend, suppose me to be the assembly and people. For there it will be necessary for you to persuade every individual. Is it not so?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does it not belong, then, to the same person to be able to persuade each individual, and many met together, about what he knows? just as a teacher of grammar is wont to persuade one and many on the question of letters.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And will not on the question of numbers the same person persuade both one and many?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And will not he, who knows, be an arithmetician?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are not you likewise able to persuade many on those points, on which you persuade one?

Alcibiades/ It is probable.

Socrates/ But these subjects it is plain are what you know.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does then the person in a meeting like this differ from the orator before the people in anything else, than that the one endeavors to persuade persons collected together, but the other persons taken singly.

Alcibiades/ It appears nearly so.

Socrates/ Come then, since it appears that it belongs to the same person to persuade many and one, practice your skill on myself, and endeavor to prove that what is just is sometimes not to a person's interest.

Alcibiades/ You are very saucy, Socrates.

Socrates/ And I am now from my sauciness about to persuade you the very contrary to what you are unwilling to persuade me.

Alcibiades/ Say on.

Socrates/ Do you only answer the questions asked.

Alcibiades/ Not so; but do you say yourself.

Socrates/ Why so? Do you not wish to be persuaded as much as possible?

Alcibiades/ By all means.

Socrates/ Would you not, if you said that such was the case, be entirely persuaded of it?

Alcibiades/ So it seems to me.

Socrates/ Answer then; and if you do not hear from yourself that what is just is to a person's interest, do not believe anyone else who says so.

Alcibiades/ Not at all. But I must answer. For I do not think I shall come to any hurt.

Socrates/ For you are like a diviner. Tell me then. Say you that of things, that are just, some are to a person's interest, and some not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ What then, that some of them are beautiful, and some not?

Alcibiades/ Why ask you this?

Socrates/ Whether has anyone seemed to you to act basely indeed, but justly?

Alcibiades/ Not to me at least.

Socrates/ But you think that all actions that are just are honorable?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what, as to actions, that are honorable? Whether are all good, or some are so and some not?

Alcibiades/ I indeed, Socrates, conceive that some honorable actions are evil.

Socrates/ And that some base actions are good?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you mean such actions as these? For instance, many men by aiding in battle a friend or relation have received wounds and died; whilst others, by not aiding when they ought, have come off safe and sound.

Alcibiades/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Such aid then you call honorable with respect to their endeavor to save those whom they ought. Now this is fortitude, is it not?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ But you call it evil with respect to the death and wounds.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is not fortitude one thing, and death another?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ To aid a friend then is not honorable and evil in the same respect?

Alcibiades/ It appears it is not.

Socrates/ Consider now, whether it be not good so far as it is honorable, as in the present case. For, with respect to fortitude, you acknowledged that such aid is an honorable act. Consider then this very thing, namely fortitude, whether it be a good or an evil; and consider it in this way. Which would you choose to have, good things or evil?

Alcibiades/ Good things.

Socrates/ And would not you choose the best things the most?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And would you not choose to be deprived of them the least?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ How say you then of fortitude? at what price would you choose to be deprived of it?

Alcibiades/ I would not accept even of life to be a coward.

Socrates/ To you, then, it seems that cowardice is the extreme of evil.

Alcibiades/ It does, at least to me.

Socrates/ On a par, as it seems, with death.

Alcibiades/ So I say.

Socrates/ Are not life and fortitude the most opposite to death and cowardice?

Alcibiades/ They are.

Socrates/ And would you choose to have those the most, and these the least?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it because you deem those the best of things, and these the worst?

Alcibiades/ For this very reason.

Socrates/ To aid, then, our friends in war, in so far as it is honorable, with regard to the working out a good action, namely, that of fortitude, you call an honorable thing.

Alcibiades/ Yes, I appear to do so.

Socrates/ But with regard to the working out an evil action, namely, that of death, you call it an evil thing.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it not then just to denominate every action thus? If, in so far as it works out an evil, you call it evil, ought it not to be called good, in so far as it works out a good?

Alcibiades/ It seems so to me.

Socrates/ In so far, then, as it is good, is it not honorable? but in so far as it is evil, is it not base?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ In saying then that the aiding our friends in a war is honorable indeed, but yet evil, you speak in not a different way than if you called it good indeed, but yet evil.

Alcibiades/ You seem to me, Socrates, to speak the truth.

Socrates/ Nothing then which is honorable, so far as it is honorable, is an evil; nor is anything which is base, so far as it is base, a good.

Alcibiades/ Evidently it is not.

Socrates/ Consider now further in this way. Whoever acts honorably does he not act well too?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are not they, who act well, fortunate?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ And are they not happy through the possession of good things?

Alcibiades/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And they possess these good things by acting well.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ To do well then is a good?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ And is the doing well an honorable thing also?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Therefore the same thing has again been shown to us to be both honorable and good?

Alcibiades/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Whatever then we shall find to be an honorable thing, we shall find it to be a good thing likewise, according to this reasoning at least.

Alcibiades/ It must be so.

Socrates/ What then, do good things conduce to one's interest, or not?

Alcibiades/ They do.

Socrates/ Do you remember now how we agreed about things that are just?

Alcibiades/ I suppose you mean that they, who do what is just, must of necessity do what is honorable.

Socrates/ And that they, who do what is honorable, do what is good?

Alcibiades/ We did.

Socrates/ And that good things conduce to one's interest?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Things then that are just, Alcibiades, conduce to one's interest.

Alcibiades/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Well then, are not you the asserter of this, and I the questioner?

Alcibiades/ I appear so, as it seems.

Socrates/ If then a person rises up to give advice to the people either of Athens or Peparethus, conceiving that he knows what is just and unjust, and should say that what is just is sometimes an evil, would you not laugh at him? since you too happen yourself to be the person asserting, that the same things are both just and conducive to one's interest.

Alcibiades/ Now, by the gods, Socrates, I know not what to say; but I am really like a man in an absurd position. For while you are asking questions, at one time I am of one opinion, and at another time of another.

Socrates/ Are you then ignorant, my friend, what condition you are in?

Alcibiades/ Entirely.

Socrates/ Think you, then, that if a person were to ask you, Have you two eyes or three? and two hands or four? or put any other question of such a kind, you would give one answer at one time, and another at another time? or always the same?

Alcibiades/ I have indeed some fear for myself; but I think I should give the same answer.

Socrates/ Is not the reason, because you know?

Alcibiades/ I think so.

Socrates/ Of matters then, where you give contrary answers unwillingly, it is evident that you know nothing.

Alcibiades/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Do you not say that about things just and unjust, honorable and base, good and evil, to one's interest and not, you waver in your answer? Is it not then evident, that through your not knowing these subjects, you waver respecting them?

Alcibiades/ It is plain to myself at least.

Socrates/ Is not then this the case? When a man does not know a thing, must not his mind waver respecting it?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ Well then, do you know by what means you can mount up to heaven?

Alcibiades/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ Does your opinion waver on this subject?

Alcibiades/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Do you know the reason? Or shall I tell it?

Alcibiades/ Tell it.

Socrates/ It is, my friend, because not knowing, you do not think you know.

Alcibiades/ How say you this?

Socrates/ Do you, in common with me, look at the matter. About the questions, which you do not know, and are convinced you do not know, do you waver? For instance, in preparing sauces, you surely know that you know nothing.

Alcibiades/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ Do you then form any opinion respecting them, how it is necessary to prepare them, and then waver in your opinions? or do you commit them to the person who does know?

Alcibiades/ In this way I act.

Socrates/ And what, if you were sailing in a vessel, would you form any opinion, whether it was necessary to bring the rudder inwards or outwards, and waver as a person knowing nothing? Or would you commit it to the pilot, and keep yourself quiet?

Alcibiades/ I should commit it to the pilot.

Socrates/ In matters then of which you are ignorant, you do not waver, at least if you know that you know nothing.

Alcibiades/ I do not seem to do so.

Socrates/ Do you perceive then, that errors in acting arise through this very ignorance, namely, in a person thinking he knows, when he does not know.

Alcibiades/ How say you this again?

Socrates/ Whenever we think we know what we are doing, then we surely endeavor to do it.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But when persons think they do not know, then they hand over the matters to others.

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ Such then of those, who do not know, live free from mistakes through their committing the management of such matters to others.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Who then are they, who make mistakes? for certainly they are not the knowing.

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ Since then they are neither the knowing, nor those of the ignorant, who know that they are ignorant, are any other persons left than those who are ignorant, but fancy that they are knowing?

Alcibiades/ None other than these.

Socrates/ This very ignorance, then, is the cause of their evils, and an absence of learning worthy of reproach.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ When therefore it relates to things of greatest moment, is it not then the most mischievous and disgraceful?

Alcibiades/ Yes, the most so.

Socrates/ Well then, can you mention things of greater moment than the just, and honorable, and good, and conducing to one's interest?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Do you not say that upon these subjects you waver?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ But if you are wavering, is it not evident from the previous reasoning, that not only you are ignorant of subjects of the greatest moment, but that you think that, although not knowing, you do know them?

Alcibiades/ I seem to be nearly so.

Socrates/ Ho, ho! Alcibiades! In what a state are you suffering! such as I am loth to name; but however, since we are alone, it must be mentioned. You are dwelling, O best of men, in a state of ignorance, the most disgraceful; since the reasoning brings a charge against you, and you are bearing witness against yourself, in that you are rushing to affairs of state, before you have been taught at all. But this not you alone have suffered, but the majority likewise of those, who manage the affairs of the state, except a few, and perhaps your guardian Pericles.

Alcibiades/ He, however, is reported, Socrates, to have become wise, not from himself, but through his intercourse with many wise men, and Pythocleides and Anaxagoras; and even at his time of life he is, on this very account, intimate with Damon.

Socrates/ What then, have you ever seen a person wise in anything, and yet unable to make another person wise in the same things as himself; for instance, he, who taught you grammar, was clever himself, and he has made you so, and whomsoever he wished of other persons likewise. Is it not so?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And will not you too, who have learnt from him, be able to teach another?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And as a harp-master, and a teacher of gymnastic exercises, in like manner?

Alcibiades/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ This then is assuredly a fair proof that they, who know anything whatever, do really know it, when they are able to produce another person knowing it likewise.

Alcibiades/ So it seems to me.

Socrates/ Well then, can you mention anyone whom Pericles has made clever, beginning with his own sons?

Alcibiades/ But what, if the sons of Pericles were silly fellows, Socrates?

Socrates/ Clinias, then, your brother?

Alcibiades/ Why should you mention Clinias, a man out of his senses?

Socrates/ Since then Clinias is a madman, and the sons of Pericles were silly fellows, what reason shall we assign in the case of yourself, for his overlooking you, when you are in such a state?

Alcibiades/ I am, I fancy, myself the cause, by not giving my mind to him.

Socrates/ But of the other Athenians or foreigners, mention either a slave or a freeman, who can show a reason for his having become wiser through his intercourse with Pericles; as I can mention Pythodorus the son of Isolochus, and Callias the son of Calliades through Zeno; to whom each of them paid a hundred minæ, and thus became clever and in high repute.

Alcibiades/ By Zeus, I cannot.

Socrates/ Be it so. What then do you intend respecting yourself? whether to leave yourself as you now are, or to pay some regard to yourself?

Alcibiades/ Let the consultation, Socrates, be common to both.

For I have something in my mind, while you are speaking, and agree to it. For they who manage the affairs of the state, seem, except a few, to be uneducated.

Socrates/ And what then?

Alcibiades/ If they had been educated, it would have been requisite for the person attempting to be their antagonist, to go against them, as 'if they were prize-fighters, after having learnt and practiced the science. But now, since they proceed to state affairs raw and undisciplined, what need is there for a person to exercise himself, and by learning to give himself any trouble? For I well know, that by my natural abilities, I shall be very much their superior.

Socrates/ Ho! ho! thou best of men, what a mighty speech is this thou hast spoken. How unworthy of your personal qualities, and of the other advantages belonging to you!

Alcibiades/ What especially do you mean, Socrates, and why do you say this?

Socrates/ I feel greatly hurt in behalf of yourself, and of the love I bear you.

Alcibiades/ How so?

Socrates/ In that you think there is a fitting contest for yourself against the men here.

Alcibiades/ Against whom then?

Socrates/ This forsooth is a question for him to ask, who fancies himself to be a high-minded man!

Alcibiades/ How say you? Is not my contest with these very persons?

Socrates/ If you had any thought of steering a trireme about to engage in a sea-fight, would it be sufficient for you to be superior to your fellow-sailors in the art of steering? or would you think that this ought to be at hand, and you would look to those in reality your antagonists, but not as you now do to your fellow-combatants? to whom it is assuredly meet for you to be so much the superior, that they ought never to deem themselves fit to contend against you, but, through their being held in little esteem, to contend merely with you against the enemy; if indeed you are thinking of exhibiting any exploit in reality honorable, and worthy of yourself and of your country.

Alcibiades/ Of such an act I am indeed thinking.

Socrates/ Is it then very worthy of you to rest contented, if you are a better man than your fellow-soldiers merely, and not to look to the leaders of your opponents, considering if perchance you shall become somewhat better than they, and exercising yourself in reflecting upon the things relating to them.

Alcibiades/ Who are the persons, of whom you are speaking, Socrates?

Socrates/ Know you not, that the state is constantly at war with the Lacedæmonians, and the great king?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ If then you have it in your mind to be the leader of this state, would you not think rightly in thinking that you will have to contend against the kings of Lacedæmon and Persia?

Alcibiades/ You are very near to speaking the truth?

Socrates/ Nay, but, my good man, must you not look to Midias, the quail-feeder, and others of that kind, who attempt to manage the affairs of the state, and still wear, as the women would say, the slave-like cut of hair in their

souls, through their want of a liberal education; nor having as yet thrown it off, but acting still the part of barbarians, they have come to the city, to fawn upon, and not to rule it. Ought you then to look to these men, of whom I am speaking, and to disregard yourself, and neither to learn what is closely connected with learning, when you are about to enter into a contest so great, nor to practice what requires practice, and, after being furnished with every kind of preparation, to proceed thus to the affairs of state?

Alcibiades/ Indeed, Socrates, you seem to me to say what is true. I fancy, however, that the Lacedæmonian generals and the king of Persia differ in nothing from other persons.

Socrates/ But consider, thou best of men, of what kind is this fancy of yours.

Alcibiades/ With respect to what?

Socrates/ In the first place, whether you fancy you would take the more care of yourself, when feeling a fear, and fancying them to be formidable, or not?

Alcibiades/ It is evident, if I fancied them formidable.

Socrates/ Do you fancy then that you would sustain any injury by taking care of yourself?

Alcibiades/ Not at all; but be benefited even greatly.

Socrates/ This fancy then of yours has this one evil of so great a kind.

Alcibiades/ You say the truth.

Socrates/ Consider then if there be not probably a second, namely, that it is false.

Alcibiades/ How so?

Socrates/ Whether is it probable that the better natures are produced from noble races, or not?

Alcibiades/ It is evident, from the noble.

Socrates/ And is it not probable that the well-born, if they are brought up well, will thus become perfect in virtue?

Alcibiades/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Let us consider then in comparing our condition with theirs, whether the kings of Lacedæmon and of Persia appear to be sprung from inferior races. Now know we not that the former are descendants of Hercules, and the latter of Achæmenes? and that both the family of Hercules, and that of Achæmenes, are carried up to Perseus the son of Zeus?

Alcibiades/ And my family, Socrates, is carried up to Eurysaces; and that of Eurysaces to Zeus.

Socrates/ And mine, my noble Alcibiades, is to Dædalus, and his to Vulcan, the son of Zeus. But in the families of the other parties, beginning from themselves, are kings sprung from kings carried up to Zeus; some of Argos and Lacedæmon, and the others of Persia for ever, and often of all Asia, as they are at present: whereas we and our fathers are only private individuals. If then it were requisite to exhibit your ancestors in the person of Eurysaces, and Salamis as your country, or Ægina as that of the still more remote Æacus, of what ridicule do you fancy you would not have to pay the debt in the presence of Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes? Consider besides, whether we are not inferior both in the pride of birth, and in the rest of our bringing up. Know you not how great are the advantages attendant upon the kings of Lacedæmon? whose wives are watched in public by the Ephori, in order that as far as possible, no king may be secretly begotten except by one of the family of the Heracleidæ; while the Persian king is so greatly our superior, that not a single person has the least suspicion that a king can be born from any other than a king. The consort, therefore, of the king is under no guard but that imposed by

her own fears. Further, when the eldest son is born to him, who is then the ruler, all those in the palace of the king over whom he rules, have a feast, and subsequently at another period the whole of Asia makes a sacrifice and feast, on the birth-day of the king. But when we were born, Alcibiades, "our very neighbors even little knew it," as the comic poet says. After this the child is brought up, not by some nurse at a little price, but by the eunuchs, who are considered the best about the king's person; on whom the duty is imposed of taking care of the royal infant in other matters, and of contriving how he may become as handsome as possible in his person, by molding his limbs, and making them straight; and they who do this well are held in great honor. When the young princes are seven years old, they are placed upon horseback, and frequent the schools of the riding-masters, and commence going a hunting. At fourteen years of age they, who are called the royal preceptors, take the boy under their care. Now these are chosen out from such as are deemed the most excellent of the Persians, men in the prime of life, four in number, excelling severally in wisdom, justice, temperance, and fortitude. The first of these instructs the youth in the learning of the Magi according to Zoroaster, the son of Oromazes, —now by this learning is meant the worship of the gods, —and likewise in the art of kingly government. The person, excelling in justice, teaches him to be true in words and deeds through the whole of life. He who excels in temperance, to be governed by not a single pleasure of any kind, in order that he may acquire the habits of a freeman, and be really a king, by governing first his own appetites, instead of being their slave. But the person who excels in fortitude, makes him fearless and intrepid, since he, who fears, is a slave. But over you, Alcibiades, Pericles appointed as a preceptor, Zopyrus of Thrace, who was, through old age, the most useless of his domestics. I could

recount to you the rest of the bringing up and instruction of your antagonists, if it were not a work of time; and moreover, these are sufficient to show all the rest that follow after them. But of your birth, Alcibiades, and nurture, and instruction, or anything else whatever, there is a care to not one, so to say, of the Athenians; unless there happens to be some admirer of you. But if on the other hand you would turn your eyes to the wealth of the Persian kings, and their luxurious living and apparel, and the trailing of the trains of their dresses, and the anointing of themselves with perfumes, and the multitude of their retinue and servants, and the rest of their delicate living, you would be ashamed of yourself, on perceiving how greatly you fall short of them. And if, on the other hand, you would turn your eyes to the temperance and orderly conduct of the Lacedæmonians, their easy deportment and mildness of disposition, and high-mindedness, and regularity, and manly bearing, and endurance under suffering, and their love of labor, and of contending, and of honor, you would deem yourself a child in all these points. But if you turn your thoughts at all to your wealth, and fancy that on this point you are something, let not this be left unsaid by us, if perchance you are sensible in what rank you stand. If you are willing then to look to the wealth of the Lacedæmonians, you will know that the lands here fall far short of those there. For the land which they possess in their own country, and in Messenia, is such, that not one of those here would contend to be inferior, either in quantity or quality, or in the possession of slaves of other kinds, and of those called Helotes, and of horses, and such other cattle as pasture in Messenia. But to all this I bid a farewell. But as to gold and silver, there is not so much amongst all the Greeks, as there is at Lacedæmon in private hands. For already during many generations the metals have been coming thither from all the Greeks, and often too from

the Barbarians; but there is no going out to any place; but really, according to the fable of Æsop, where the fox speaks to the lion, the impressions of coined money at Lacedæmon, as it enters thither, one may see plainly marked, but no where of its going out; so that it is easy to know well that of all the Grecians the richest in gold and silver are the people there, and of them the richest is their king. For from sources of that kind the largest and most frequent receipts go to the kings; and still further, the royal tribute, which the Lacedæmonians pay to their kings, is not a trifle. But though the wealth of the Lacedæmonians is great, as compared with that of the Greeks, yet as compared with that of the Persians, and their king, it is nothing. For I once heard a person worthy of credit, one of those who went up to the king, who stated that he passed along a large and fertile territory for nearly a day's journey, which the inhabitants called the Queen's Girdle; that there was another called the Queen's Veil; and that many other fair and fruitful countries were appropriated to provide the Queen's apparel; and that each of those countries had its name from the part of the apparel it furnished. So that I think, if any person were to tell Amastris, the mother of the reigning king, and the consort formerly of Xerxes, that the son of Dinomache had in mind to array himself against her son, and that Dinomache's whole attire was worth perhaps fifty minæ, supposing it to be of the most costly kind, and that her son possessed in Ercheia not even three hundred plethra of land, she would wonder to what could Alcibiades be trusting, so as to have in mind to contend with Artaxerxes; and she would, I think, say, it is impossible for this man to make the attempt through trusting to nothing else than his carefulness and wisdom; for these are the only things worth mention amongst the Greeks. Since if she heard, that this same Alcibiades is making so great an attempt, being in the first

place, not yet twenty years of age, and in the next place, that he is utterly uninstructed; and besides this, that when his admirer told him he ought first to acquire knowledge, and to pay attention to himself, and after some practice to go in this way, when he was about to contend with the king, he would not do so, but said that he was all-sufficient as he was, then, she would, I think, be astonished, and ask, What is the thing in which the youth puts his trust? If then we were to say that he trusts to his beauty and size and family and wealth, and to the natural faculties of his mind, she would think us, Alcibiades, out of our senses, when she reflected upon the advantages of such a kind on their side. And I think too that Lampido, the daughter of Leotychidas, and the wife of Archidamus, and the mother of Agis, all of whom became kings, would wonder, when she reflected upon the advantages on their side, that you should have a mind to contend with her son, while you have been brought up so ill. And now do you not think it a shameful thing, that the wives of our enemies should consider more prudently for us, than we do for ourselves, what sort of persons we ought to be to attack them. But do you, O blessed one, be persuaded by me and the inscription at Delphi, "Know thyself;" since such are your antagonists, and not those whom you fancy, and to whom you would never be superior by anything else except application and skill; in which, if you are deficient, you will fail in that renown amongst the Greeks and Barbarians, of which you appear to me to have such a desire as no other person has of anything else.

Alcibiades/ To what then, Socrates, must I apply myself? Can you inform me? for you seem to me to say what is especially correct.

Socrates/ Yes, I can. But let there be a joint consultation respecting the means of our becoming the best. For I do not say that, as regards you, there is a necessity for instruction,

but not as regards myself; for there is no difference between you and me, except in one thing.

Alcibiades/ What is that?

Socrates/ My guardian is better and wiser than Pericles, who is yours.

Alcibiades/ And who is yours, O Socrates?

Socrates/ A deity, Alcibiades, who did not suffer me to converse with you before to-day; and trusting to whom I assert that your favorable appearance in life will arise through no one else than myself.

Alcibiades/ You are in jest, Socrates.

Socrates/ Perhaps so. I am speaking, however, the truth, in saying that we are in need of application, if not more than all men, yet very much so.

Alcibiades/ In saying that I am in need of it, you do not say what is false.

Socrates/ Nor that I myself am so.

Alcibiades/ What then must we do?

Socrates/ We must not hesitate, my friend, nor act a soft part.

Alcibiades/ It is by no means, Socrates, becoming to do so.

Socrates/ Indeed it does not; but we must consider in common. Now tell me. We say that we wish to become as excellent as possible. Do we not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ In what quality?

Alcibiades/ Plainly in what men are good.

Socrates/ Good in what?

Alcibiades/ Evidently in performing acts.

Socrates/ What acts? Of horsemanship?

Alcibiades/ Surely not.

Socrates/ For then we should go to jockeys.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do you then mean naval affairs?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ For then we should go to nautical men.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ What affairs then? and who are the doers?

Alcibiades/ Such as the Athenians do, who are men of honor and goodness.

Socrates/ By men of honor and goodness, do you mean those with mind or without it?

Alcibiades/ With mind.

Socrates/ In whatever, then, each is a man of mind, in that is he good likewise?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But in whatever he is without a mind, in that is he bad likewise?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ Is not a shoemaker a man of mind, as regards the making of shoes?

Alcibiades/ Very much so.

Socrates/ In this respect then is he good?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But as regards the making of garments, is not the shoemaker without mind?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ In this respect then he is bad.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ By this reasoning then the same man is both bad and good.

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Would you say then that the good men are also bad?

Alcibiades/ Surely not.

Socrates/ Whom then do you mean by the good?

Alcibiades/ I mean such as are able to rule in the state.

Socrates/ Not the horses, surely?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But men?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Men, who are sick?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Those on a voyage?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Those harvesting?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Those who are doing nothing? or those who are doing something?

Alcibiades/ I mean, who are doing something?

Socrates/ What? Endeavor to show to me clearly.

Alcibiades/ Those I mean who come in contact with, and make use of each other, as we do, who are living in cities.

Socrates/ You mean then of persons using each other, so as to rule.

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you mean of boatswains, who make use of rowers?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ For this ability to do so belongs to the steersman.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Do you then mean of men able to rule hautboy-players, and by leading the song to men, and making use of ballet-dancers?

Alcibiades/ Not at all.

Socrates/ For this ability belongs to the ballet-master.

Alcibiades/ Very much so.

Socrates/ But of persons making use of what, do you say it is possible for men to rule men?

Alcibiades/ Of those, I mean, who partake in a polity, and come in contact with each other, and are able to rule those in the city.

Socrates/ What then is this art? As if I were to ask you again, what I did just now—What is the art, which enables a person to know how to rule those partaking in a sailing?

Alcibiades/ The art of steering.

Socrates/ And what is the science, that enables a person to rule those, who, as was just now said, partake in a song?

Alcibiades/ The teaching, as you just now said, of ballet-dancing.

Socrates/ Well then, and what do you call the science enabling one to rule those, who partake in a polity?

Alcibiades/ I call it, Socrates, good counsel.

Socrates/ What, then, does the science of steersman seem to you to be a want of counsel?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But good counsel.

Alcibiades/ So it seems to me, at least.

Socrates/ For the preservation of those who are sailing.

Alcibiades/ You speak correctly.

Socrates/ But what you call good counsel, for what is it good?

Alcibiades/ For the better administering the commonwealth, and its being saved.

Socrates/ By the presence or absence of what, is it the better administered to and preserved? As, if you had asked me—By the presence or absence of what is the body the better administered and preserved? I would have said—When health is present, and disease absent. Do not you think thus?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if you had asked me again—By the presence or absence of what, are administered the better and preserved the eyes? I would have answered in like manner—By sight being present, and blindness absent. So likewise the ears, when deafness is absent, and hearing present, are the better, and better taken care of.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What then is the state? By the presence and absence of what does it become better, and is better attended to and administered.

Alcibiades/ It seems to me, Socrates, when friendship exists to them with each other, and hate and dissension are absent.

Socrates/ By friendship do you mean the thinking alike, or not alike?

Alcibiades/ The thinking alike.

Socrates/ Now by what science do states think alike respecting numbers?

Alcibiades/ Through the science of arithmetic.

Socrates/ Well then, and do not individuals too through the same science?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does not each person think alike with himself too?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, through what science does each person think alike with himself about a span and a cubit, which of the two is the greater? Is it not through the science of mensuration?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ And do not individuals with each other, and states likewise?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And about weights? Is it not in like manner?

Alcibiades/ I say so.

Socrates/ But the thinking alike, of which you are speaking, what is it, and about what? and what is the science that furnishes it? And is it the same in the case of a state, and an individual, as regards both himself and another person?

Alcibiades/ Probably it is.

Socrates/ What is it then? Do not be faint-hearted in giving an answer, but be ready to speak out.

Alcibiades/ I suppose I may say that friendship and thinking alike is that, by which a father and a mother think alike, in loving their son, and a brother with his brother, and a man with his wife.

Socrates/ Do you then, Alcibiades, suppose that a man can think alike with his wife on the subject of weaving, he, who does not know, with her, who does?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ Nor ought he either. For this knowledge belongs to women.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What then, can a woman think alike with a man on the subject of shield-warfare, when she has never learnt it?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ For this you would perhaps say belongs to men.

Alcibiades/ I would.

Socrates/ Some kinds of knowledge then belong to women, and some to men, according to your account.

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ On these subjects then there is no thinking alike amongst women and men.

Alcibiades/ There is not.

Socrates/ Neither then is there any friendship, if friendship be a thinking alike.

Alcibiades/ It appears not.

Socrates/ So far then as wives attend to their own business, they are not beloved by their husbands.

Alcibiades/ It is probable.

Socrates/ Neither are husbands beloved by their wives, so far as they attend to their own business.

Alcibiades/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Neither are states well administered in this way, when everyone attends to his own business.

Alcibiades/ I think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ How say you, when friendship is not present, through the existence of which we said that states were well administered, but otherwise not?

Alcibiades/ But friendship seems to me to exist to them on this very account, because everyone attends to his own business.

Socrates/ It did not seem so to you just now. How then do you now state the reverse? Does friendship exist, while a thinking alike does not exist? Or is it possible for a thinking alike to exist on subjects, which some do know and others do not?

Alcibiades/ It is not possible.

Socrates/ Do persons act justly or unjustly, when each attends to his own business?

Alcibiades/ Justly. How not?

Socrates/ When the citizens in a state act justly, is not friendship produced amongst each other?

Alcibiades/ It appears to me necessary, Socrates.

Socrates/ What kind of friendship then, or thinking alike, do you mean, respecting which it is meet for us to be wise and of good counsel, in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn what it is, or in what things it exists. For at one time it seems to exist in the same things, and at another time not, according to your account of it.

Alcibiades/ Now by the gods, Socrates, I do not know myself what I mean; but I am in danger of having been unconsciously for a long time in a shameful state.

Socrates/ But now you ought to take courage. For if you had perceived you were so suffering at the age of fifty, it would have been difficult for you to take care of yourself. But you are now at the very time of life, in which it is meet for you to perceive it.

Alcibiades/ What then must I do, Socrates, now that I perceive it?

Socrates/ Answer to what I ask, Alcibiades. And if you do so, you and I, god willing, will be in a better state, if one may trust to my prophetic powers.

Alcibiades/ Such will be the result, as far as it depends on my answering.

Socrates/ Come then, say, —What is it to take care of oneself? —in order that we may not be unconsciously, as we often are, not taking care of ourselves, although fancying we are—and when does a man do so? When he is taking care of what belongs to him, is he then taking care of himself?

Alcibiades/ To me, at least, it appears so.

Socrates/ What then, when does a man take care of his feet? Is it when he is taking care of the things belonging to his feet?

Alcibiades/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Do you call by a name something belonging to the hand? as, for instance, a ring? Would you say that it belongs to any other part of a man than his finger?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And does not a shoe belong to the foot in like manner?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ When we are taking care of shoes, are we then taking care of feet?

Alcibiades/ I do not, Socrates, very well understand.

Socrates/ Well then, Alcibiades, do you call by any name the taking a correct care of anything whatever?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ When then a person makes anything better, call you that a correct care?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ What then is the art, that makes shoes better?

Alcibiades/ The shoemaker's.

Socrates/ By the shoemaker's art then we take care of shoes.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do we take care of a foot by the shoemaker's art, or by that by which we make the feet better?

Alcibiades/ By this last art.

Socrates/ And we make better the feet not by the art, by which we do the rest of the body?

Alcibiades/ So it seems, at least to me.

Socrates/ And is not this the gymnastic art?

Alcibiades/ Especially so.

Socrates/ By the gymnastic art then we take care of the foot, but by the shoemaker's art that, which belongs to the foot.

Alcibiades/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ And by the gymnastic art we take care of the hands, but by the art of engraving rings, of what belongs to the hand.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And by the gymnastic art we take care of the body, but by the art of the weaver and other arts, what belongs to the body.

Alcibiades/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ By one art then we take care of each thing, but by another what belongs to it.

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ You are not then taking care of yourself, when you are taking care of what belongs to yourself.

Alcibiades/ Not at all.

Socrates/ For the art, it seems, is not the same, by which one takes care of himself, and of what belongs to himself.

Alcibiades/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Now then, by what kind of art can we take care of ourselves?

Alcibiades/ I cannot tell.

Socrates/ So much, however, has been agreed upon, that it is not the art, by which we render better anything whatever belonging to us, but that, by which we render so ourselves.

Alcibiades/ You say what is true.

Socrates/ Could we have ever known what art would make a shoe better, if we knew not what a shoe was?

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Neither what art makes better finger-rings, if ignorant, could we have known what a finger-ring was.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Well then, can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we are ignorant what we are ourselves?

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Does it then happen to be an easy thing to know oneself? and was he a person of mean abilities, who put up that inscription in the temple at Pytho? or is it a difficult thing, and not for everyone to discover?

Alcibiades/ To me indeed, Socrates, it has often seemed to be an easy thing, for everyone to discover, and often too, a thing very difficult.

Socrates/ But, Alcibiades, whether it be easy or not, with respect to us, the case is this. Had we known it, we should perhaps have known to take care of ourselves; but not knowing, we can never do so.

Alcibiades/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ Come then, by what means can a thing be discovered what it is by itself? For so we might thus perhaps find what we are ourselves; but being in ignorance on that point, we are unable to know ourselves.

Alcibiades/ You speak correctly.

Socrates/ Attend now, by Zeus. With whom are you conversing now? Is it not with myself?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And am I not conversing with you?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is Socrates then who is conversing and arguing?

Alcibiades/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And Alcibiades who is listening?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it not by a discourse that Socrates is conversing?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ And is not the same thing to converse and to use a discourse?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But is not the person, who uses a thing, different from the thing, which he uses?

Alcibiades/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ As a shoemaker, for instance, cuts leather with a semicircular knife, and a straight knife, and other tools.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is not then the shoemaker, who cuts and uses tools, one, but the tools, which he uses, another?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ Would not in like manner the instruments on which a harp-player plays, and the harp-player himself, be different?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ This, then, I was lately asking, whether the person, who uses a thing, seems to you always to be different from the thing, which he uses.

Alcibiades/ He seems so.

Socrates/ What then shall we say of the shoemaker? That he cuts with his tools only, or with his hands likewise?

Alcibiades/ With his hands likewise.

Socrates/ He uses them too.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does he not use his eyes too, when he is cutting leather?

Alcibiades/ He does.

Socrates/ Now we are agreed, that the person, who uses, is different from what he uses.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ The shoemaker, then, and the harp-player, are different from the hands and eyes with which they work.

Alcibiades/ It is apparent.

Socrates/ And does not a man use also his whole body.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now the thing using is different from what it uses.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ A man therefore is a being different from his body.

Alcibiades/ It seems so.

Socrates/ What sort of being then is a man?

Alcibiades/ I cannot tell.

Socrates/ But you can tell that it is some being making a use of its body.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does any other being make use of its body but the soul?

Alcibiades/ None other.

Socrates/ And does it not so do by ruling the body?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ I suppose moreover that no man would ever think otherwise than this.

Alcibiades/ Than what?

Socrates/ That the man was one of three things.

Alcibiades/ What things?

Socrates/ Soul, or body, or a whole, itself formed of both.

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ Now have we agreed that the being, which rules the body, is a man.

Alcibiades/ We have agreed.

Socrates/ What being then is a man? Does the body itself govern itself?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ For we said that it was ruled.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ This then cannot be that, of which we are in search.

Alcibiades/ It seems not.

Socrates/ But does the compound being rule the body? and is this a man?

Alcibiades/ Perhaps it is.

Socrates/ Least of all so. For of two parties, one not being a joint-ruler, there are no means for both to rule jointly.

Alcibiades/ Right.

Socrates/ Since then neither the body, nor the compound of both, is a man, it remains, I think, either that the being man is nothing at all, or, if it be anything, it results that the man is nothing else than soul.

Alcibiades/ It is just so.

Socrates/ Needs it then be proved to you still more clearly, that the soul is man?

Alcibiades/ It needs not, by Zeus: for it seems to me to be shown sufficiently.

Socrates/ If it be proved not accurately, yet moderately so, it is sufficient for us. For we shall then perhaps know accurately, when we shall have discovered, what we just now passed by, through its being a matter of much consideration.

Alcibiades/ What is that?

Socrates/ That which was just now spoken of in some such way as this; that we must first consider the self by itself; but now instead of "the self by itself," we have been considering the "each" what it is; and this perhaps will suffice. For we could surely never say that anything is more the master of ourselves, than the soul.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Is it not then well to think thus; that we are having an intercourse with each, by making use of discourses, soul with soul?

Alcibiades/ Very much so.

Socrates/ This then was what we were saying a little before; that Socrates is conversing with Alcibiades, by using speech, not, as it seems, to your person, but by putting reasons to Alcibiades; now this is his soul.

Alcibiades/ So it seems to me at least.

Socrates/ He then who enjoins a person to know himself, orders us to recognize a soul.

Alcibiades/ It is probable.

Socrates/ Whoever then knows only the things belonging to his body, knows the things belonging to himself, but not himself.

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ Not one therefore of the physicians, so far as he is a physician, knows himself; neither does any master of exercises, so far as he is such a master.

Alcibiades/ It is probable.

Socrates/ Husbandmen then, and other workmen, are far from knowing themselves. For these it seems do not consider even what belongs to themselves, but what are still more remote from themselves, according to the arts which they possess. For they know the things belonging to the body, and by which it is taken care of.

Alcibiades/ You say what is true.

Socrates/ If therefore it is temperance to know oneself, none of these is temperate according to their respective arts.

Alcibiades/ I think they are not.

Socrates/ On this account then these arts seem to be those of handicrafts, and not the learning fit for a good man.

Alcibiades/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Again, whoever takes care of his body, takes care of what belongs to him, but not of himself.

Alcibiades/ It is nearly so.

Socrates/ And whoever takes care of his property, takes care neither of himself nor of what belongs to him, but of what are still more remote from what belongs to himself.

Alcibiades/ So it seems to me at least.

Socrates/ The money-making man does then not do his own business.

Alcibiades/ Rightly said.

Socrates/ If then a person has become an admirer of the body of Alcibiades, he is not in love with Alcibiades, but with something which belongs to Alcibiades.

Alcibiades/ You say what is true.

Socrates/ But whoever is in love with you, is in love with your soul.

Alcibiades/ This appears necessary from the reasoning.

Socrates/ And hence he, who admires your body, when it ceases to bloom, goes away.

Alcibiades/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But the admirer of the soul does not go away, so long as it goes on to what is better.

Alcibiades/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Am I not then the person not going away, but remaining, when, the body ceasing to bloom, the rest have departed?

Alcibiades/ And well have you done so, Socrates; and never may you depart.

Socrates/ Be ready then to be the best possible.

Alcibiades/ I will be ready.

Socrates/ For the case is this. There never has been, it seems, an admirer of Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, nor is there now, but one alone, and he worthy to be loved, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phænarete.

Alcibiades/ It is true.

Socrates/ Did you not say that I had been a little beforehand with you when I accosted you; for that you were

about to address me first, being desirous to ask me, why I alone do not go away?

Alcibiades/ It was so.

Socrates/ This then is the reason; for I alone am the admirer of you; but the others of what belong to you. Now what belong to you are ceasing to bloom; but you are beginning to be in flower. If then you are not now spoilt by the Athenian mob, and become ugly, I shall never forsake you. For of this I am most afraid, that you may become a mob-lover, and be spoilt by them. Since many, even virtuous Athenians, have already suffered this fate. For the mob of the magnanimous Erectheus has a fair exterior. But you ought to see it undressed. Make use therefore of the caution, which I give you.

Alcibiades/ What caution?

Socrates/ In the first place, my friend, exercise yourself, and learn what a person ought to learn, who is proceeding to state affairs; but previously not; in order that you may go to them possessing an antidote, and suffer no grievous harm.

Alcibiades/ You seem to me, Socrates, to speak correctly. But endeavor to explain in what way we may take care of ourselves.

Socrates/ Has not so much been gone through by us already? For what we are, has been tolerably well agreed upon. Indeed we feared lest, if mistaken on that point, we should be unconsciously taking care of something else, and not of ourselves.

Alcibiades/ It is so.

Socrates/ And after this we ought to take care of the soul, and look to it.

Alcibiades/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ And that to others should be handed over the care of our bodies and our property.

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ In what way then can we know these things the most clearly? For, after we know this, it seems, we shall know ourselves. Now, by the gods, do we not understand the Delphic inscription we just now mentioned, as saying correctly?

Alcibiades/ What? What are you thinking of, and what do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you what I suspect this inscription means, and what it advises us to do. For it nearly seems that its resemblance does not exist every where, but only with reference to the sight.

Alcibiades/ How say you thus?

Socrates/ Do you likewise consider it. If it had said to our eye, as to a man, by way of advice—"Behold yourself"—how and what should we suppose it was advising? Would it not be to look to that, by looking to which the eye might see itself?

Alcibiades/ It is evident.

Socrates/ Let us then consider, by looking to what of things existing we can see both it and ourselves?

Alcibiades/ It is evident, Socrates, by looking at mirrors, and other things of the like kind.

Socrates/ You say rightly. And in the eye itself, with which we see, is there not something of such a kind?

Alcibiades/ Very much so.

Socrates/ You have observed then, that the face of him, who looks at the eye of another, appears visible to himself in the eye-sight of the person opposite to him, as in a mirror,

which we call the pupil, being the image of the person, who looks in it.

Alcibiades/ You say what is true.

Socrates/ An eye therefore beholding an eye, and looking at that, which is the best part of itself, with which it sees, may thus see itself?

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But if it look at any other part of the man, or at any of things existing, except at that, to which it happens to be like, it will not see itself.

Alcibiades/ You say what is true.

Socrates/ If then an eye would see itself, it must look at an eye, and to that place of the eye where the virtue of the eye is naturally seated; now this is surely the sight.

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ Is it not true then, my dear Alcibiades, that the soul likewise, if it would know itself, must look at soul, and especially at that place of the soul where wisdom, the virtue of the soul, is inherent, and to that other thing, to which it happens to be like?

Alcibiades/ To me at least, Socrates, it seems so.

Socrates/ Can we mention any property of the soul more divine than that, about which knowledge and intelligence are conversant?

Alcibiades/ We cannot.

Socrates/ This therefore in the soul resembles the divine nature. And a person looking at this, and recognizing all that is divine, both god and intelligence, would thus know himself the most.

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And to know oneself, we acknowledge to be wisdom.

Alcibiades/ By all means.

Socrates/ As mirrors then are more clear, and more pure, and more brilliant, than the mirror in the eye, so the deity is more pure and more brilliant than that, which is the best in our soul.

Alcibiades/ It is likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Looking therefore at the deity, we should make use of him, as the most beautiful mirror; but of things belonging to man, to the virtue of the soul; and shall we not thus especially see and know our very selves?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ By not knowing ourselves, and not being wise, can we know what of things belonging to us are good and evil?

Alcibiades/ How could it be, Socrates?

Socrates/ For perhaps it appears impossible for him who knows not Alcibiades himself, to know that what belongs to Alcibiades does so belong to Alcibiades.

Alcibiades/ It is, by Zeus, impossible.

Socrates/ Nor that what are our own, are really our own, unless he knows us.

Alcibiades/ For how should he?

Socrates/ And if not what are ours, then not what belongs to ours.

Alcibiades/ It appears he cannot.

Socrates/ We did not then rightly admit, as we did just now, that there were some, who know not themselves, and yet know what belonged to them, but that others do not know even what belongs to them. For it seems, that it is the province of one person, and of one art, to know himself, and the things which are his, and what belongs to the things that are his.

Alcibiades/ The fact is nearly so.

Socrates/ And whoever is ignorant of what belongs to himself, would surely be ignorant likewise of what belongs to other men.

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ And if he is ignorant of what belongs to other men, will he not be ignorant also of what belongs to states?

Alcibiades/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Such a man therefore cannot be a statesman.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor fit even to manage a family.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor will he know what he is doing.

Alcibiades/ He will not.

Socrates/ And will not he, who knows not what he is doing, act amiss?

Alcibiades/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And acting amiss, will he not do ill, both in private and public capacity?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ And is not he, who does ill, miserable?

Alcibiades/ Yes, very.

Socrates/ And what are those, for whom he is acting?

Alcibiades/ And they too are miserable.

Socrates/ It is not possible then for a person to be happy, unless he be prudent and good.

Alcibiades/ It is not possible.

Socrates/ Bad men then are in a miserable state.

Alcibiades/ Very.

Socrates/ Not even the rich man then is free from a miserable state, but only the prudent one.

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ States then are not in want of walls, or ships, or docks, if they would be happy, nor even of a multitude of people, or of extent of country, without the possession of virtue.

Alcibiades/ Not at all.

Socrates/ If then you would manage the affairs of a state rightly and well, you must impart to the citizens virtue.

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ But how can a person impart what he has not himself?

Alcibiades/ How indeed?

Socrates/ You must therefore, in the first place, acquire virtue yourself, and so must another, who would rule, take care not only of himself and his own private affairs, but of the state, and the affairs of the state.

Alcibiades/ You say true.

Socrates/ You must not therefore procure for yourself or the state the power and dominion to do what you please, but justice and prudence.

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ For by acting justly and prudently both you and the state will act in a manner pleasing to the deity.

Alcibiades/ It is likely.

Socrates/ And by looking, as we said before, at what is divine and bright, ye will do so.

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And, moreover, by looking there, ye will behold and know what is your own good.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And will ye not then act both rightly and well?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And acting thus I will guarantee that you will be happy.

Alcibiades/ For you are a sure guarantee.

Socrates/ But by acting unjustly and looking to that which is godless and dark, ye will, it is likely, commit acts similar to those things, through your being ignorant of yourselves.

Alcibiades/ It is likely.

Socrates/ For to the party, my dear Alcibiades, who has the power of doing what he pleases, and does not possess a mind, what is there likely to happen, either as a private person, or in the case of a state? as in the case of a sick person, having the power to do what he pleased, but not possessing a medical mind, and acting the tyrant, so that nobody would chide him, what would be the consequence? Would it not be in all probability that his body would be destroyed?

Alcibiades/ You say the truth.

Socrates/ And do you see, in the case of a ship, if a person devoid of mind and the talent of a steersman had the power of doing as he thought proper, what would happen both to himself and to his shipmates?

Alcibiades/ I do; that they would all be lost.

Socrates/ Does not, in like manner, in the case of a state, the doing ill follow upon all offices and power deficient in virtue?

Alcibiades/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ It is not meet then, O best of men Alcibiades, to procure a tyrant's power either for yourself, or for the state, if ye would be happy, but virtue.

Alcibiades/ You say true.

Socrates/ And before possessing virtue, it is better for a man, and not a child alone, to be ruled by his better, than to rule.

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Is not the better more beautiful likewise?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not the more beautiful more becoming?

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ It is becoming then for a bad man to be a slave; for it is better.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now vice is a thing becoming only to a slave.

Alcibiades/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But virtue is a thing becoming to a freeman.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Ought we not, friend, to fly from what is becoming to a slave?

Alcibiades/ Most especially, Socrates!

Socrates/ Perceive you then in what state you are? Is it such as becomes a freeman, or not?

Alcibiades/ I think I perceive it very strongly.

Socrates/ Know you then, how you may escape from that, which is now around you? I say this that we may not apply that name to a man of honor?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ How?

Alcibiades/ If you, Socrates, are willing.

Socrates/ You say not well, Alcibiades!

Alcibiades/ But what ought I to say?

Socrates/ This, “if a god is willing.”

Alcibiades/ So I say then. And I will add to those words this too; that we shall be in danger, Socrates, of changing characters, I assuming yours, and you mine. For it is not possible for me from this day forward not to follow you, as if I were your tutor, and you were my pupil.

Socrates/ My love then for you, my noble Alcibiades, differs in nothing from that of the stork; if after having hatched for you a winged love, it shall be administered to in return by this love of yours.

Alcibiades/ And such is the case; and I will begin henceforth to pay all attention to what is just.

Socrates/ I wish you may persevere. But I have a great fear, not indeed through distrusting your natural disposition, but through perceiving the strength of the city, lest it overcome both me and you.

Alcibiades

Translated by D. S. Hutchinson. 1997

Persons of the Dialogue.

Socrates, Alcibiades.

Socrates/ I was the first man to fall in love with you, son of Clinias, and now that the others have stopped pursuing you I suppose you're wondering why I'm the only one who hasn't given up—and also why, when the others pestered you with conversation, I never even spoke to you all these years. Human causes didn't enter into it; I was prevented by some divine being, the effect of which you'll hear about later on. But now it no longer prevents me, so here I am. I'm confident it won't prevent me in future either.

I've been observing you all this time, and I've got a pretty good idea how you treated all those men who pursued you: they held themselves in high esteem, but you were even more arrogant and sent them packing, every single one of them. I'd like to explain the reason why you felt yourself so superior.

You say you don't need anybody for anything, since your own qualities, from your body right up to your soul, are so great there's nothing you lack. In the first place, you fancy yourself the tallest and best-looking man around—and it's quite plain to see you're not wrong about that. Next, you think that yours is the leading family in your city, which is the greatest city in Greece: on your father's side you have plenty of aristocratic friends and relations, who would be of service to you if there was any need; and on your mother's side your connections are no worse and no fewer. And you have Pericles son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as a guardian to you and your brother; you think he's a more powerful ally than all those people I mentioned put together—he can do whatever he

likes, not only in this city, but anywhere in Greece, and also in many important foreign countries. I will also mention your wealth, but I think that's the least of the reasons you hold yourself in high esteem. You bragged about all those things and got the better of your suitors; they didn't measure up and came off the worse. You knew what was going on.

And so I'm sure you're wondering what I could possibly have in mind—why don't I give up on you? The others have all been sent packing, so what do I hope to achieve by persisting?

Alcibiades/ Yes, Socrates, perhaps you don't realize that you've just taken the words out of my mouth. I had already decided to come and ask you that very question: what could you have in mind? What do you hope to achieve by bothering me, always making so sure you're there wherever I am? Yes, I really do wonder what you might be up to, and I'd be very glad to find out.

Socrates/ So then you'll probably be eager to give me your full attention, since, as you say, you're keen to know what I have in mind. I take it that you'll listen carefully?

Alcibiades/ Yes, of course—just tell me.

Socrates/ Watch out—I wouldn't be at all surprised if I found it as hard to stop as it was to start.

Alcibiades/ Tell me, please. I will pay attention.

Socrates/ Speak I must, then. It's not easy to play the role of suitor with a man who doesn't give in to them; nevertheless, I must summon up my courage and say what's on my mind.

Alcibiades, if I saw that you were content with the advantages I just mentioned and thought that this was the condition in which you should live out the rest of your life, I would have given up on you long ago; at least that's what I persuade myself. But I'm going to prove to you in person what very different plans you actually have in mind. Then you'll realize how constantly I've been thinking about you.

Suppose one of the gods asked you, “Alcibiades, would you rather live with what you now have, or would you rather die on the spot if you weren’t permitted to acquire anything greater?” I think you'd choose to die. What then is your real ambition in life? I’ll tell you. You think that as soon as you present yourself before the Athenian people—as indeed you expect to in a very few days—by presenting yourself you’ll show them that you deserve to be honored more than Pericles or anyone else who ever was. Having shown that, you’ll be the most influential man in the city, and if you’re the greatest here, you’ll be the greatest in the rest of Greece, and not only in Greece, but also among the foreigners who live on the same continent as we do.

And if that same god were then to tell you that you should have absolute power in Europe, but that you weren’t permitted to cross over into Asia or get mixed up with affairs over there, I think you'd rather not live with only that to look forward to; you want your reputation and your influence to saturate all mankind, so to speak. I don’t think you regard anybody as ever having been much to speak of, except perhaps Cyrus and Xerxes. I’m not guessing that this is your ambition—I’m sure of it.

Since you know that what I say is true, maybe you’ll say, “Well then, Socrates, what’s this got to do with your point? You said you were going to tell me why you haven’t given up on me.” Yes, I will tell you, my dear son of Clinias and Dinomache. It is impossible to put any of these ideas of yours into effect without me—that’s how much influence I think I have over you and your business. I think this is why the god hasn’t allowed me to talk to you all this time; and I’ve been waiting for the day he allows me.

I’m hoping for the same thing from you as you are from the Athenians: I hope to exert great influence over you by showing you that I’m worth the world to you and that nobody is capable

of providing you with the influence you crave, neither your guardian nor your relatives, nor anybody else except me—with the god's help, of course. When you were younger, before you were full of such ambitions, I think the god didn't let me talk to you because the conversation would have been pointless. But now he's told me to, because now you will listen to me.

Alcibiades/ Really, Socrates, now that you've started talking you seem much more bizarre to me than when you followed me in silence, though you were very bizarre to look at then, too. Well, on the question of whether or not these are my ambitions, you seem to have made up your mind already, and no denial of mine will do anything to convince you otherwise. Fine. But supposing I really do have these ambitions, how will you help me achieve them? What makes you indispensable? Have you got something to say?

Socrates/ Are you asking if I can say some long speech like the ones you're used to hearing? No, that sort of thing's not for me. But I do think I'd be able to show you that what I said is true, if only you were willing to grant me just one little favor.

Alcibiades/ Well, as long as you mean a favor that's not hard to grant, I'm willing.

Socrates/ Do you think it's hard to answer questions?

Alcibiades/ No, I don't.

Socrates/ Then answer me.

Alcibiades/ Ask me.

Socrates/ My question is whether you have in mind what I say you have in mind.

Alcibiades/ Let's say I do, if you like, so I can find out what you're going to say.

Socrates/ Right then; you plan, as I say, to come forward and advise the Athenians sometime soon. Suppose I stopped you as you were about to take the podium and asked,

“Alcibiades, what are the Athenians proposing to discuss? You’re getting up to advise them because it’s something you know better than they do, aren’t you?” What would you reply?

Alcibiades/ Yes, I suppose I would say it was something that I know better than they do.

Socrates/ So it’s on matters you know about that you’re a good adviser.

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now the only things you know are what you’ve learned from others or found out for yourself; isn’t that right?

Alcibiades/ What else could I know?

Socrates/ Could you ever have learned or found out anything without wanting to learn it or work it out for yourself?

Alcibiades/ No, I couldn’t have.

Socrates/ Is that right? Would you have wanted to learn or work out something that you thought you understood?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ So there was a time when you didn’t think you knew what you now understand.

Alcibiades/ There must have been.

Socrates/ But I’ve got a pretty good idea what you’ve learned. Tell me if I’ve missed anything: as far as I remember, you learned writing and lyre-playing and wrestling, but you didn’t want to learn aulos-playing. These are the subjects that you understand—unless perhaps you’ve been learning something while I wasn’t looking; but I don’t think you have been, either by night or by day, on your excursions from home.

Alcibiades/ No, those are the only lessons I took.

Socrates/ Well then, is it when the Athenians are discussing how to spell a word correctly that you’ll stand up to advise them?

Alcibiades/ Good God, I'd never do that!

Socrates/ Then is it when they're discussing the notes on the lyre?

Alcibiades/ No, never.

Socrates/ But surely they're not in the habit of discussing wrestling in the Assembly.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then what will they be discussing? I presume it won't be building.

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Because a builder would give better advice on these matters than you.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor will they be discussing divination, will they?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Because then a diviner would be better at giving advice than you.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Regardless of whether he's tall or short, or handsome or ugly, or even noble or common.

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And when the Athenians are discussing measures for public health, it will make no difference to them if their counselor is rich or poor, but they will make sure that their adviser is a doctor.

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ I suppose that's because advice on any subject is the business not of those who are rich but of those who know it.

Alcibiades/ Quite reasonably so.

Socrates/ Then what will they be considering when you stand up to advise them, assuming you're right to do so?

Alcibiades/ They'll be discussing their own business, Socrates.

Socrates/ You mean their shipbuilding business—what sorts of ships they should be building?

Alcibiades/ No, Socrates, I don't.

Socrates/ I suppose that's because you don't understand shipbuilding. Am I right, or is there some other reason?

Alcibiades/ No, that's it.

Socrates/ So what kind of 'their own business' do you think they'll be discussing?

Alcibiades/ War, Socrates, or peace, or anything else which is the business of the city.

Socrates/ Do you mean they'll be discussing who they should make peace with and who they should go to war with and how?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But shouldn't they do that with the ones with whom it's better to?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when it's better?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And for as long a time as it's better?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now supposing the Athenians were discussing who they should wrestle with and who they should spar with and how, who would be a better adviser, you or the trainer?

Alcibiades/ The trainer, I guess.

Socrates/ And can you tell me what the trainer has in view when he advises you who you should or shouldn't wrestle

with, and when, and how? I mean, for example, that one should wrestle with those with whom it's better to wrestle, isn't that right?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And as much as is better?

Alcibiades/ That's right.

Socrates/ And when it's better, right?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let's take another example: when you're singing, you should sometimes accompany the song with lyre-playing and dancing.

Alcibiades/ Yes, you should.

Socrates/ You should do so when it's better to, right?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And as much as is better.

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Really? Since you used the term 'better' in both cases—in wrestling and in playing the lyre while singing—what do you call what's better in lyre-playing, as I call what's better in wrestling 'athletic'? What do you call that?

Alcibiades/ I don't get it.

Socrates/ Then try to follow my example. My answer was, I think, 'what is correct in every case'—and what is correct, I presume, is what takes place in accordance with the skill, isn't it?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Wasn't the skill athletics?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ I said that what's better in wrestling, was 'athletic'.

Alcibiades/ That's what you said.

Socrates/ Wasn't that well said?

Alcibiades/ I think so, anyway.

Socrates/ Come on then, it's your turn; it's partly up to you, surely, to keep our conversation going well. First of all, tell me what the skill is for singing and dancing and playing the lyre correctly. What is it called as a whole? … Aren't you able to tell me yet?

Alcibiades/ No, I can't.

Socrates/ Well, try it this way. Who are the goddesses to whom the skill belongs?

Alcibiades/ Do you mean the Muses, Socrates?

Socrates/ I do indeed. Don't you see? What's the name of the skill that's named after them?

Alcibiades/ I think you mean music.

Socrates/ Yes, I do. Now what is "correctly" for what takes place in accordance with this skill? In the other case I told you what "correctly" is for what takes place in accordance with the skill, so now it's your turn to say something similar in this case. How does it take place?

Alcibiades/ Musically, I think.

Socrates/ A good answer. Come on now, what do you call what's better in both going to war and keeping the peace? In these last two examples you said that what was better was more musical and more athletic, respectively. Now try to tell me what's better in this case, too.

Alcibiades/ I really can't do it.

Socrates/ But surely it's disgraceful if when you're speaking and giving advice about food—saying that a certain kind is better than another, and better at a certain time and in a certain quantity—and someone should ask you, "What do you mean by 'better', Alcibiades?" you could tell him in that case that 'better' was 'healthier', though you don't even

pretend to be a doctor; and yet in a case where you do pretend to understand and are going to stand up and give advice as though you knew, if you aren't able, as seems likely, to answer the question in this case, won't you be embarrassed? Won't that seem disgraceful?

Alcibiades/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Then think about it, and try to tell me what the better tends towards, in keeping the peace or in waging war with the right people.

Alcibiades/ I'm thinking, but I can't get it.

Socrates/ But suppose we're at war with somebody—surely you know what treatment we accuse each other of when we enter into a war, and what we call it.

Alcibiades/ I do—we say that they're playing some trick on us, or attacking us or taking things away from us.

Socrates/ Hold on—how do we suffer from each of these treatments? Try to tell me how one way differs from another way.

Alcibiades/ When you say 'way', Socrates, do you mean 'justly' or 'unjustly'?

Socrates/ Precisely.

Alcibiades/ But surely that makes all the difference in the world.

Socrates/ Really? Who will you advise the Athenians to wage war on? Those who are treating us unjustly, or those who are treating us justly?

Alcibiades/ That's a hard question you're asking. Even if someone thought it was necessary to wage war on people who were treating us justly, he wouldn't admit it.

Socrates/ Because I think that wouldn't be lawful.

Alcibiades/ It certainly wouldn't.

Socrates/ Nor would it be considered a proper thing to do.

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ So you would also frame your speech in these terms.

Alcibiades/ I'd have to.

Socrates/ Then this 'better' I was just asking you about—when it comes to waging war or not, on whom to wage war and on whom not to, and when and when not to—this 'better' turns out to be the same as 'more just', doesn't it?

Alcibiades/ It certainly seems so.

Socrates/ But how could it, my dear Alcibiades? Don't you realize that this is something you don't understand? Or perhaps, when I wasn't looking, you've been seeing some teacher who taught you how to tell the difference between the more just and the less just. Have you? … Well, who is he? Tell me who he is so that you can sign me up with him as well.

Alcibiades/ Stop teasing me, Socrates.

Socrates/ I'm not—I'll swear by Friendship, yours and mine. I'd never perjure myself by him. So tell me who he is, if you can.

Alcibiades/ And what if I can't? Don't you think I might know about justice and injustice some other way?

Socrates/ Yes, you might—if you found it out.

Alcibiades/ Well, don't you think I might find it out?

Socrates/ Yes, of course—if you investigate the matter.

Alcibiades/ And don't you think I might investigate it?

Socrates/ Yes, I do—if you thought you didn't know.

Alcibiades/ And didn't I once think that?

Socrates/ A fine answer. Can you tell me when this was, when you didn't think you knew about justice and injustice … Well, was it last year that you were looking into it and didn't think you knew? Or did you think you knew? … Answer me truthfully, or else our conversation will be a waste of time.

Alcibiades/ Yes, I thought I knew.

Socrates/ Didn't you think the same thing two years ago, and three years ago, and four?

Alcibiades/ I did.

Socrates/ But surely before that you were a boy, weren't you?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well now, at that point I'm sure you thought you knew.

Alcibiades/ How can you be sure of that?

Socrates/ When you were a boy I often observed you, at school and other places, and sometimes when you were playing knucklebones or some other game, you'd say to one or another of your playmates, very loudly and confidently—not at all like someone who was at a loss about justice and injustice—that he was a lousy cheater and wasn't playing fairly. Isn't that true?

Alcibiades/ But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me like that?

Socrates/ Do you mean, what should you have done if you didn't actually know then whether or not you were being cheated?

Alcibiades/ But I did know, by Zeus! I saw clearly that they were cheating me.

Socrates/ So it seems that even as a child you thought you understood justice and injustice.

Alcibiades/ Yes, and I did understand.

Socrates/ At what point did you find it out? Surely it wasn't when you thought you knew.

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Then when did you think you didn't know? Think about it—you won't find any such time.

Alcibiades/ By Zeus, Socrates, I really can't say.

Socrates/ So it isn't by finding it out that you know it.

Alcibiades/ That's not very likely.

Socrates/ But surely you just finished saying that it wasn't by being taught, either, that you knew it. So if you neither found it out nor were taught it, how and where did you come to know it?

Alcibiades/ Maybe I gave you the wrong answer when I said I knew it by finding it out myself.

Socrates/ Then how did it happen?

Alcibiades/ I suppose I learned it in the same way as other people.

Socrates/ That brings us back to the same argument: from whom? Do tell me.

Alcibiades/ From people in general.

Socrates/ When you give the credit to 'people in general', you're falling back on teachers who are no good.

Alcibiades/ What? Aren't they capable of teaching?

Socrates/ No, they can't even teach you what moves to make or not make in knucklebones. And yet that's a trivial matter, I suppose, compared with justice … What? Don't you agree?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So although they can't teach trivial things, you say they can teach more serious things.

Alcibiades/ I think so; at any rate, they can teach a lot of things that are more important than knucklebones.

Socrates/ Like what?

Alcibiades/ Well, for example, I learned how to speak Greek from them; I couldn't tell you who my teacher was, but I give the credit to the very people you say are no good at teaching.

Socrates/ Yes, my noble friend, people in general are good teachers of that, and it would be only fair to praise them for their teaching.

Alcibiades/ Why?

Socrates/ Because they have what it takes to be good teachers of the subject.

Alcibiades/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ Don't you see that somebody who is going to teach anything must first know it himself? Isn't that right?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And don't people who know something agree with each other, not disagree?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ If people disagree about something, would you say that they know it?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Then how could they be teachers of it?

Alcibiades/ They couldn't possibly.

Socrates/ Well then, do you think that people in general disagree about what wood or stone is? If you ask them, don't they give the same answers? Don't they reach for the same things when they want to get some wood or some stone? And similarly for all other such cases; I suppose this is pretty much what you mean by understanding Greek, isn't it?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So they agree with each other in these cases, as we said, and with themselves when acting privately. But don't they also agree in public? Cities don't disagree with each other and use different words for the same thing, do they?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ So it's likely that they would make good teachers of these things.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So if we wanted somebody to know these things, we'd be right to send him to lessons given by these people in general.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now if we wanted to know not just what men or horses are like, but which of them could and couldn't run, would people in general be able to teach this as well?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Isn't the fact that they disagree with each other about these things enough to show you that they don't understand them, and are not 'four-square teachers' of them?

Alcibiades/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Now if we wanted to know not just what men are like, but what sick and healthy men are like, would people in general be able to teach us?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ And if you saw them disagreeing about it, that would show you that they were bad teachers of it.

Alcibiades/ Yes, it would.

Socrates/ Very well, then—does it seem to you that people in general actually agree among themselves or with each other about just and unjust people and actions?

Alcibiades/ Not in the slightest, Socrates.

Socrates/ Really? Do they disagree a huge amount about these things?

Alcibiades/ Very much so.

Socrates/ I don't suppose you've ever seen or heard people disagreeing so strongly about what is healthy and unhealthy that they fight and kill each other over it, have you?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ But I know you've seen this sort of dispute over questions of justice and injustice; or even if you haven't seen it, at least you've heard about it from many other people—especially Homer, since you've heard the Iliad and the Odyssey, haven't you?

Alcibiades/ I certainly have, of course, Socrates.

Socrates/ Aren't these poems all about disagreements over justice and injustice?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ It was over this sort of disagreement that the Achaeans and the Trojans fought battles and lost their lives, as did Odysseus and the suitors of Penelope.

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ I suppose the same is true of those Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians who died at Tanagra, and later at Coronea, including your own father. The disagreement that caused those battles and those deaths was none other than a disagreement over justice and injustice, wasn't it?

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ Are we to say that people understand something if they disagree so much about it that in their disputes with each other they resort to such extreme measures?

Alcibiades/ Obviously not.

Socrates/ But aren't you giving credit to teachers of this sort who, as you yourself admit, have no knowledge?

Alcibiades/ I guess I am.

Socrates/ Well then, given that your opinion wavers so much, and given that you obviously neither found it out

yourself nor learned it from anyone else, how likely is it that you know about justice and injustice?

Alcibiades/ From what you say anyway, it's not very likely.

Socrates/ See, there you go again, Alcibiades, that's not well said!

Alcibiades/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ You say that I say these things.

Alcibiades/ What? Aren't you saying that I don't understand justice and injustice?

Socrates/ No, not at all.

Alcibiades/ Well, am I?

Socrates/ Yes.

Alcibiades/ How?

Socrates/ Here's how. If I asked you which is more, one or two, would you say two?

Alcibiades/ I would.

Socrates/ By how much?

Alcibiades/ By one.

Socrates/ Then which of us is saying that two is one more than one?

Alcibiades/ I am.

Socrates/ Wasn't I asking and weren't you answering?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Who do you think is saying these things—me, the questioner, or you, the answerer?

Alcibiades/ I am.

Socrates/ And what if I asked you how to spell 'Socrates', and you told me? Which of us would be saying it?

Alcibiades/ I would.

Socrates/ Come then, give me the general principle. When there's a question and an answer, who is the one saying things—the questioner or the answerer?

Alcibiades/ The answerer, I think, Socrates.

Socrates/ Wasn't I the questioner in everything just now?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And weren't you the answerer?

Alcibiades/ I certainly was.

Socrates/ Well then, which of us said what was said?

Alcibiades/ From what we've agreed, Socrates, it seems that I did.

Socrates/ And what was said was that Alcibiades, the handsome son of Clinias, doesn't understand justice and injustice—though he thinks he does—and that he is about to go to the Assembly to advise the Athenians on what he doesn't know anything about. Wasn't that it?

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Then it's just like in Euripides, Alcibiades; 'you heard it from yourself, not from me.' I'm not the one who says these things—you are—don't try to blame me. And furthermore, you're quite right to say so. This scheme you have in mind—teaching what you don't know and haven't bothered to learn—your scheme, my good fellow, is crazy.

Alcibiades/ Actually, Socrates, I think the Athenians and the other Greeks rarely discuss which course is more just or unjust. They think that sort of thing is obvious, so they skip over it and ask which one would be advantageous to do. In fact, though, what's just is not the same, I think, as what's advantageous; many people have profited by committing great injustices, and others, I think, got no advantage from doing the right thing.

Socrates/ So? Even if just and advantageous things happen to be completely different, surely you don't think you know what's advantageous for people, and why, do you?

Alcibiades/ What's to stop me, Socrates? —unless you're going to ask me all over again who I learned it from or how I found it out myself.

Socrates/ What a way of carrying on! If you say something wrong, and if there's a previous argument that can prove that it was wrong, you think you ought to be given some new and different proof, as if the previous one were a worn-out scrap of clothing that you refuse to wear again. No, you want an immaculate, brand-new proof.

I'll pass over your anticipation of my argument and ask you, all the same, 'How did you come to understand what is advantageous? Who was your teacher?', and in my one question ask everything I asked you before. Clearly this will put you in the same position again—you won't be able to prove that you know what is advantageous, either by finding it out or by learning it.

But since you've got a delicate stomach and wouldn't enjoy another taste of the same argument, I'll pass over this question of whether or not you know what is advantageous for the Athenians. But why don't you prove whether the just and the advantageous are the same or different? You can question me, if you like, as I questioned you—or else work it out yourself, in your own argument.

Alcibiades/ No, Socrates, I don't think I'd be able to work it out in front of you.

Socrates/ Well then, my good sir, imagine that I'm the Assembly and the people gathered there; even there, you know, you'll have to persuade them one by one. Isn't that right?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ If somebody knows something, don't you think he can persuade people about it one by one, as well as all together? Take the schoolteacher—don't you think he persuades people about letters individually, as well as collectively?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And won't the same person be able to persuade people about numbers individually, as well as in groups?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ He would be a mathematician, someone who knows about numbers.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So won't you also be able to persuade an individual person about the things you can persuade a group of people about?

Alcibiades/ Probably.

Socrates/ Obviously these are things you know about.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is there any difference between an orator speaking to the people and an orator speaking in this sort of conversation, except insofar as the former persuades them all together while the latter persuades them one by one?

Alcibiades/ I guess not.

Socrates/ Well then, since it's plain that the same person can persuade individuals as well as groups, practice on me, and try to prove that what is just is sometimes not advantageous.

Alcibiades/ Stop pushing me around, Socrates!

Socrates/ No, in fact I'm going to push you around and persuade you of the opposite of what you're not willing to show me.

Alcibiades/ Just try it!

Socrates/ Just answer my questions.

Alcibiades/ No, you do the talking yourself.

Socrates/ What?! Don't you want to be completely convinced?

Alcibiades/ Absolutely, I'm sure.

Socrates/ Wouldn't you be completely convinced if you yourself said, 'Yes, that's how it is'?

Alcibiades/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ Then answer my questions. And if you don't hear yourself say that just things are also advantageous, then don't believe anything else I say.

Alcibiades/ No, I'm sure I won't. But I'd better answer—I don't think I'll come to any harm.

Socrates/ You're quite a prophet. Now tell me—are you saying that some just things are advantageous while others are not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Really? Are some of them admirable and others not admirable?

Alcibiades/ What do you mean by that question?

Socrates/ Have you ever thought that someone was doing something that was both just and contemptible?

Alcibiades/ No, I haven't.

Socrates/ So all just things are admirable.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now what about admirable things? Are they all good, or are some good and others not good?

Alcibiades/ What I think, Socrates, is that some admirable things are bad.

Socrates/ And some contemptible things are good?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are you thinking of this sort of case? Many people get wounded and killed trying to rescue their friends and relatives in battle, while those who don't go to rescue them, as they should, escape safe and sound. Is this what you're referring to?

Alcibiades/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Now you call a rescue of this sort admirable, in that it's an attempt to help the people whom you should help, and this is what courage is; isn't that what you're saying?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But you call it bad, in that it involves wounds and death, don't you?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now courage is one thing, and death is something else, right?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So it's not on the same basis that rescuing your friends is admirable and bad, is it?

Alcibiades/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Now let's see whether, insofar as it's admirable, it's also good, as indeed it is. You agreed that the rescue is admirable, in that it's courageous. Now consider this very thing—courage. Is it good or bad? Look at it like this: which would you rather have, good things or bad things?

Alcibiades/ Good things.

Socrates/ Namely the greatest goods?

Alcibiades/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And wouldn't you be least willing to be deprived of such things?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ What would you say about courage? How much would you have to be offered to be deprived of that?

Alcibiades/ I wouldn't even want to go on living if I were a coward.

Socrates/ So you think that cowardice is the worst thing in the world.

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ On a par with death, it would seem.

Alcibiades/ That's what I say.

Socrates/ Aren't life and courage the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And wouldn't you want the former most and the latter least?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is that because you think that the former are best and the latter are worst?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Would you say that courage ranks among the best things and death among the worst?

Alcibiades/ I would say so.

Socrates/ So you called rescuing your friends in battle admirable, insofar as it is admirable, in that it does something good, being courageous.

Alcibiades/ I think so, anyway.

Socrates/ But you called it bad, in that it does something bad, being fatal.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now since you call this act bad insofar as it produces something bad, wouldn't you also, in all fairness, have to call it good insofar as it produces something good?

Alcibiades/ I think so.

Socrates/ Isn't it also admirable insofar as it's good, and contemptible insofar as it's bad?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then when you say that rescuing one's friends in battle is admirable but bad, you mean exactly the same as if you'd called it good but bad.

Alcibiades/ I suppose you're right, Socrates.

Socrates/ So nothing admirable, to the extent that it's admirable, is bad, and nothing contemptible, to the extent that it's contemptible, is good.

Alcibiades/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Now then, let's take a new approach. People who do what's admirable do things well, don't they?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And don't people who do things well live successful lives?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ Aren't they successful because they've got good things?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And they get good things by acting properly and admirably.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So it is good to act properly.

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And good conduct is admirable.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So we've seen once again that the very thing that is admirable is also good.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So if we find that something is admirable, we'll also find that it's good—according to this argument, at least.

Alcibiades/ We'll have to.

Socrates/ Well then, are good things advantageous, or not?

Alcibiades/ Advantageous.

Socrates/ Do you remember what we agreed about doing just things?

Alcibiades/ I think we agreed that someone who does what's just must also be doing what's admirable.

Socrates/ And didn't we also agree that someone who does what's admirable must also be doing what's good?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that what's good is advantageous?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, Alcibiades, just things are advantageous.

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Well then, am I not the questioner and are you not the answerer?

Alcibiades/ It appears I am.

Socrates/ So if someone who believed that he knew what is just and unjust were to stand up to advise the Athenians, or even the Peparethians, and said that sometimes just things are bad, what could you do but laugh at him? After all, as you yourself say, the same things are just and also advantageous.

Alcibiades/ I swear by the gods, Socrates, I have no idea what I mean—I must be in some absolutely bizarre condition! When you ask me questions, first I think one thing, and then I think something else.

Socrates/ And are you unaware, my dear fellow, of what this feeling is?

Alcibiades/ Completely.

Socrates/ Well, if someone asked you whether you had two eyes or three eyes, or two hands or four hands, or something else like that, do you think you'd give different answers at different times, or would you always give the same answer?

Alcibiades/ I'm quite unsure of myself at this point, but I think I'd give the same answer.

Socrates/ Because you know it—isn't that the reason?

Alcibiades/ I think so.

Socrates/ So if you gave conflicting answers about something, without meaning to, then it would be obvious that you didn't know it.

Alcibiades/ Probably.

Socrates/ Well then, you tell me that you're wavering about what is just and unjust, admirable and contemptible, good and bad, and advantageous and disadvantageous. Isn't it obvious that the reason you waver about them is that you don't know about them?

Alcibiades/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Would you also say that whenever someone doesn't know something, his soul will necessarily waver about it?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ Really? Do you know any way of ascending to the stars?

Alcibiades/ I certainly don't.

Socrates/ Does your opinion waver on this question, too?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Do you know the reason, or shall I tell you?

Alcibiades/ Tell me.

Socrates/ It's because, my friend, you don't understand it and you don't think you understand it.

Alcibiades/ And what do you mean by that?

Socrates/ Let's look at it together. Do you waver about what you realize you don't understand? For example, you know, I think, that you don't know how to prepare a fine meal, right?

Alcibiades/ Quite right.

Socrates/ So do you have your own opinions about how to prepare it, and waver about it; or do you leave it to someone who knows how?

Alcibiades/ The latter.

Socrates/ Well, if you were sailing in a ship, would you be out there wondering whether to put the helm to port or starboard, and wavering because you didn't know? Or would you leave it to the skipper and take it easy?

Alcibiades/ I'd leave it to the skipper.

Socrates/ So you don't waver about what you don't know, if in fact you know that you don't know.

Alcibiades/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Don't you realize that the errors in our conduct are caused by this kind of ignorance, of thinking that we know when we don't know?

Alcibiades/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ Well, we don't set out to do something unless we think we know what we're doing, right?

Alcibiades/ Right.

Socrates/ But when people don't think they know how to do something, they hand it over to somebody else, right?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ So the sort of people who don't think they know how to do things make no mistakes in life, because they leave those things to other people.

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ Well, who are the ones making the mistakes? Surely not the ones who know?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Well, since it's not those who know, and it's not those who don't know and know they don't know, is there anyone left except those who don't know but think they do know?

Alcibiades/ No, they're the only ones left.

Socrates/ So this is the ignorance that causes bad things; this is the most disgraceful sort of stupidity.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And isn't it most harmful and most contemptible when it is ignorance of the most important things?

Alcibiades/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Well, can you name anything more important than what's just and admirable and good and advantageous?

Alcibiades/ No, I really can't.

Socrates/ But aren't those the things you say you're wavering about?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, if you're wavering, it's obvious from what we've said that not only are you ignorant about the most important things, but you also think you know what you don't know.

Alcibiades/ I guess that's right.

Socrates/ Good God, Alcibiades, what a sorry state you're in! I hesitate to call it by its name, but still, since we're alone, it must be said. You are wedded to stupidity, my good fellow, stupidity in the highest degree—our discussion and your own words convict you of it. This is why you're rushing into politics before you've got an education. You're not alone in this sad state—you've got most of our city's politicians for company.

There are only a few exceptions, among them, perhaps, your guardian, Pericles.

Alcibiades/ Yes, Socrates, and people do say that he didn't acquire his expertise all by himself; he kept company with many experts like Pythoclides and Anaxagoras. Even now, despite his advanced age, he consults with Damon for the same purpose.

Socrates/ Really? Have you ever seen any expert who is unable to make others expert in what he knows? The person who taught you how to read and write—he had expertise in his field, and he made you and anybody else he liked expert as well, didn't he?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And will you, having learned from him, be able to teach somebody else?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And isn't it the same with the music teacher and the gymnastics teacher?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I think we can be pretty sure that someone understands something when he can show that he has made someone else understand it.

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well then, can you tell me who Pericles has made into an expert? Shall we start with his sons?

Alcibiades/ But Socrates, both of his sons turned out to be idiots!

Socrates/ What about Clinias, your brother?

Alcibiades/ There's no point talking about him—he's a madman!

Socrates/ Well then, since Clinias is mad and Pericles' sons were idiots, what shall we say is the reason that he allowed you to be in the state you're in?

Alcibiades/ I suppose it's because I didn't really pay attention.

Socrates/ But can you name any other Athenian or any foreigner—slave or free—who became any more of an expert by keeping company with Pericles? After all, I can name Pythodorus, son of Isolochus, and Callias, son of Calliades, who became wise through their association with Zeno; they paid him a hundred minas each and became famous experts.

Alcibiades/ I can't think of anyone, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Very well. What do you propose for yourself? Do you intend to remain in your present condition, or practice some self-cultivation?

Alcibiades/ Let's discuss it together, Socrates. You know, I do see what you're saying and actually I agree—it seems to me that none of our city's politicians has been properly educated, except for a few.

Socrates/ And what does that mean?

Alcibiades/ Well, if they were educated, then anyone who wanted to compete with them would have to get some knowledge and go into training, like an athlete. But as it is, since they entered politics as amateurs, there's no need for me to train and go to the trouble of learning. I'm sure my natural abilities will be far superior to theirs.

Socrates/ Good God, my dear boy, what a thing to say—how unworthy of your good looks and your other advantages!

Alcibiades/ What in the world do you mean, Socrates? What are you getting at?

Socrates/ I'm furious with you and with my infatuation for you!

Alcibiades/ Why?

Socrates/ Because you stoop to compete with these people.

Alcibiades/ Who else have I got to compete with?

Socrates/ That's a fine sort of question, from a man who thinks he holds himself in high esteem!

Alcibiades/ What do you mean? Aren't they my competitors?

Socrates/ Look here, if you were intending to steer a ship into battle, would you be content to be the best sailor at steering? Granted that's necessary, but wouldn't you keep your eye on your real opponents and not on your comrades, as you're doing now? Surely you ought to be so far superior to them that they're happy to be your humble comrades in the struggle, and wouldn't dream of competing with you. I'm assuming that you do really intend to distinguish yourself with some splendid deed worthy of you and your city.

Alcibiades/ Yes, that's certainly what I intend to do.

Socrates/ Dear me, how very proper it is for you to be satisfied with being better than the soldiers—how proper not to keep an eye on the leaders of the opposing camp, so that you can someday become better than them by training and scheming against them!

Alcibiades/ Who are you talking about, Socrates?

Socrates/ Don't you know that our city is at war from time to time with the Spartans and with the Great King of Persia?

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ So since you plan to be leader of this city, wouldn't it be right to think that your struggle is with the kings of Sparta and Persia?

Alcibiades/ That may well be true.

Socrates/ But no sir, you've got to keep an eye on Midias the cock-fighter and such people—people who try to run the

city's affairs with their 'slave-boy hair styles', as the women say, still showing on their boorish minds. They set out to flatter the city with their outlandish talk, not to rule it. These are the people, I'm telling you, you've got to keep your eyes on. So relax, don't bother to learn what needs to be learned for the great struggle to come, don't train yourself for what needs training—go ahead and go into politics with your complete and thorough preparation.

Alcibiades/ No, Socrates, I think you're right. But still I don't think the Spartan generals or the Persian king are any different from anybody else.

Socrates/ But what sort of a notion is that? Think about it.

Alcibiades/ About what?

Socrates/ In the first place, when do you think you'd cultivate yourself: if you feared them and thought they were formidable, or if you didn't?

Alcibiades/ Obviously if I thought they were formidable.

Socrates/ Surely you don't think that cultivating yourself will do you any harm, do you?

Alcibiades/ Not at all. In fact, it would be a big help.

Socrates/ So that's one flaw in this notion of yours, a big flaw, isn't it?

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ Now the second flaw is that it's also false, judging by the probabilities.

Alcibiades/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Is it likely that natural talents will be greatest among noble families, or in other families?

Alcibiades/ In noble families, obviously.

Socrates/ Those who are well born will turn out to be perfectly virtuous, if they're well brought up, won't they?

Alcibiades/ They certainly will.

Socrates/ So let's compare our situation with theirs, and consider, first of all, whether the Spartan and Persian kings are of humbler descent. We know, of course, that the Spartan kings are descended from Heracles, and the Persian kings are descended from Achaemenes, and that the families of Heracles and Achaemenes go right back to Perseus, son of Zeus.

Alcibiades/ Mine too, Socrates—my family goes back to Eurysaces and Eurysaces' goes back to Zeus.

Socrates/ So does mine too, noble Alcibiades, mine goes back to Daedalus and Daedalus' goes back to Hephaestus, son of Zeus. Starting with those kings, though, and tracing backwards, every one of them is a king all the way back to Zeus—kings of Argos and Sparta, and kings of Persia in eternity, and sometimes of Asia, too, as they are now. But you and I are private citizens, as were our fathers. And if you had to show off your ancestors and Salamis, the native land of Eurysaces, to Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes—or Aegina, the native land of Aeacus the ancestor of Eurysaces—don't you realize how much you'd be laughed at? But you think we're the equal of those men in the dignity of our descent, as well as in our upbringing.

Haven't you noticed what a commanding position the Spartan kings enjoy? Their wives are guarded at public expense by the ephors, so as to ensure, as far as possible, that their kings are descended from the family of the Heraclidae alone. And as for the Persian king, his position is so supreme that nobody so much as suspects his heir of being fathered by anybody but him; that's why his queen is left unguarded except by fear. When the eldest son and heir to the throne is born, all the king's subjects have a feast day. Then, in the years that follow, the whole of Asia celebrates that day, the king's birthday, with further sacrifice and feasting. But when

we are born, Alcibiades, “even the neighbors hardly notice it,” as the comic poet says.

Then the boy is brought up—not by some nanny of no account, but by the most highly respected eunuchs in the royal household. They attend to all the needs of the infant child, and are especially concerned to make him as handsome as possible, shaping and straightening his infant limbs; and for this they are held in great esteem. When the boys reach seven years of age they take up horseback riding with their instructors, and begin to hunt wild game.

When he is twice seven years, the boy is entrusted to people called the “royal tutors.” These are four Persians of mature age who have been selected as the best: the wisest, the justest, and most self-controlled, and the bravest. The first of them instructs him in the worship of their gods, the Magian lore of Zoroaster, son of Horomazes, and also in what a king should know. The justest man teaches him to be truthful his whole life long. The most self-controlled man teaches him not to be mastered by even a single pleasure, so that he can get accustomed to being a free man and a real king, whose first duty is to rule himself, not be a slave to himself. The bravest man trains him to be fearless and undaunted, because fear is slavery.

But for you, Alcibiades, Pericles chose from among his household Zopyrus the Thracian, a tutor so old he was perfectly useless. I could tell you about all the rest of the upbringing and education of your competitors, but it would be a long story and, besides, you can probably imagine the later stages from what I’ve told you so far. But, Alcibiades, your birth, your upbringing, and your education—or that of any other Athenian—is of no concern to anybody, to tell the truth—nobody, that is, except perhaps some man who may happen to be in love with you.

Again, if you care to consider the wealth of the Persians, the splendor, the clothes and trailing robes, the anointing with myrrh, the throng of servants-in-waiting, and all their other luxuries, you'd be ashamed of your circumstances, because you'd see how inferior they are to theirs.

Again, if you care to consider the self-control and the decorum of the Spartans, their confidence and their composure, their self-esteem and their discipline, their courage and their fortitude, and their love of hardship, victory, and honor, you'd consider yourself a mere child in all these respects.

Again, we'd better discuss your wealth, Alcibiades, if you're to see where you stand. You may devote yourself to it and think it makes you something, but if you care to look at the wealth of the Spartans you'd realize that it greatly exceeds ours in Athens. They have land of their own and in Messene that not a single one of our estates could compete with—not in size, nor in quality, nor in slaves—especially Helots—nor even in horses, nor in the other livestock grazing in Messene. But I'll pass over all that.

There is more gold and silver in Sparta in private hands than in the rest of Greece put together. It's been coming in to them for many generations, pouring in from all of Greece's cities, and often from foreign cities, too, and it never goes out again. It's just like what the fox says to the lion in Aesop's fable—you can clearly see the tracks of the money going in toward Sparta, but the tracks coming out are nowhere to be seen. So you can be sure that the Spartans are the richest of the Greeks in gold and silver, and that the king is the richest of all the Spartans, because the greatest share of these revenues goes to him. Furthermore, he receives a considerable sum from the Spartans by way of royal tribute.

But great as they are when compared with other Greek cities, the Spartan fortunes are nothing compared with the fortunes of the Persians and their king. I once spoke with a reliable man who travelled over to the Persian court, and he told me that he crossed a very large and rich tract of land, nearly a day's journey across, which the locals called "the Queen's girdle." There's another one called "the Queen's veil," as well as many others, all fine and rich properties, each one named for a part of the Queen's wardrobe, because each one is set aside to pay for the Queen's finery.

Now suppose someone were to say to Amestris, the king's mother and the widow of Xerxes, "The son of Dinomache intends to challenge your son; her wardrobe is worth only fifty minas at best, and her son has less than three hundred acres of land at Erchia." I think she'd be wondering what this Alcibiades had up his sleeve to think of competing against Artaxerxes. I think she'd say, "I don't see what this fellow could be relying on, except diligence and wisdom—the Greeks don't have anything else worth mentioning."

But if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making this attempt is, in the first place, hardly twenty years old yet, and, secondly, entirely uneducated, and furthermore, when his lover tells him to study and cultivate himself and discipline himself so that he can compete with the king, he says he doesn't want to and that he's happy with the way he is—if she heard all that, I think she'd ask in amazement, "What in the world could this youngster be relying on?" Suppose we were to reply, "Good looks, height, birth, wealth, and native intelligence." Then, Alcibiades, considering all that they have of these things as well, she'd conclude that we were stark raving mad. Again, I think that Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides, wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, who were all Spartan kings, would be similarly amazed if you, with your

bad upbringing, proposed to compete with her son, considering all his advantages.

And yet, don't you think it's disgraceful that even our enemies' wives have a better appreciation than we do of what it would take to challenge them? No, my excellent friend, trust in me and in the Delphic inscription and 'know thyself'. These are the people we must defeat, not the ones you think, and we have no hope of defeating them unless we act with both diligence and skill. If you fall short in these, then you will fall short of achieving fame in Greece as well as abroad; and that is what I think you're longing for, more than anyone else ever longed for anything.

Alcibiades/ Well, Socrates, what kind of self-cultivation do I need to practice? Can you show me the way? What you said really sounded true.

Socrates/ Yes—but let's discuss together how we can become as good as possible. You know, what I've said about the need for education applies to me as well as to you—we're in the same condition, except in one respect.

Alcibiades/ What?

Socrates/ My guardian is better and wiser than Pericles, your guardian.

Alcibiades/ Who's that, Socrates?

Socrates/ God, Alcibiades; it was a god who prevented me from talking with you before today. I put my faith in him, and I say that your glory will be entirely my doing.

Alcibiades/ You're teasing me, Socrates.

Socrates/ Maybe; but I'm right in saying that we stand in need of self-cultivation. Actually, every human being needs self-cultivation, but especially the two of us.

Alcibiades/ You're right about me.

Socrates/ And about me.

Alcibiades/ So what should we do?

Socrates/ There must be no giving up, my friend, and no slacking off.

Alcibiades/ No, Socrates, that really wouldn't do.

Socrates/ No it wouldn't. So let's work it out together. Tell me—we say that we want to be as good as possible, don't we?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ In what respect?

Alcibiades/ In what good men do, obviously.

Socrates/ Good at what?

Alcibiades/ Taking care of things, obviously.

Socrates/ What sorts of things? Horses?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ In that case, we'd consult a horse expert.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, do you mean sailing?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ In that case, we'd consult a sailing expert.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, what sorts of things? Whose business is it?

Alcibiades/ The leading citizens of Athens.

Socrates/ By 'leading citizens' do you mean clever men or stupid men?

Alcibiades/ Clever.

Socrates/ But isn't everybody good at what they're clever at?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And bad at what they're not?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And is the shoemaker clever at making shoes?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then he's good at it.

Alcibiades/ That's right.

Socrates/ Well now, isn't the shoemaker stupid at making clothes?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So he's bad at that.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So the same person is both good and bad, at least by this argument.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Do you mean to say that good men are also bad?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ So which ones do you say are good men?

Alcibiades/ I mean those with the ability to rule in the city.

Socrates/ But not, I presume, over horses.

Alcibiades/ No, of course not.

Socrates/ Over people?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ When they're sick?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ When they're at sea?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ When they're harvesting?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ When they're doing nothing? Or when they're doing something?

Alcibiades/ Doing something.

Socrates/ Doing what? Try to make it clear for me.

Alcibiades/ It's when they're helping each other and dealing with each other, as we do in our urban way of life.

Socrates/ So you mean ruling over men who deal with men.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Over the boatswains who deal with rowers?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ That's what the pilot is good at.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you mean ruling over flute-players, who direct the singers and deal with the dancers?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Again, that's what the chorus-master is good at.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So what do you mean by being able to 'rule over men who deal with men'?

Alcibiades/ I mean ruling over the men in the city who take part in citizenship and who make a mutual contribution.

Socrates/ Well, what skill is this? Suppose I asked you the same thing again—what skill makes men understand how to rule over men who take part in sailing?

Alcibiades/ The pilot's.

Socrates/ And what knowledge did we say enables them to rule over those who take part in singing?

Alcibiades/ The chorus-master's, as you just said.

Socrates/ Well now, what do you call the knowledge that enables you to rule over those who take part in citizenship?

Alcibiades/ I call it the knowledge of good advice, Socrates.

Socrates/ But then do you think the pilot's advice is bad advice?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Then is it good advice?

Alcibiades/ I should think so; he has to ensure the safety of his passengers.

Socrates/ You're right. Well then, what's the purpose of this good advice you're talking about?

Alcibiades/ The safety and better management of the city.

Socrates/ But what is present or absent when the city is safe and better managed? If, for example, you asked me, "What is present or absent in the body when it is safe and better managed?" I'd reply, "Health is present and disease is absent." Wouldn't you agree?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if you asked me again, "What is present in our eyes when they are better cared for?" I'd say the same sort of thing—"Sight is present and blindness is absent." Again, with our ears, deafness is absent and hearing is present when they're in better condition and getting better treatment.

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ Well then, what about a city? What is it that's present or absent when it's in a better condition and getting better management and treatment?

Alcibiades/ The way I look at it, Socrates, mutual friendship will be present, and hatred and insurrection will be absent.

Socrates/ When you say 'friendship', do you mean agreement or disagreement?

Alcibiades/ Agreement.

Socrates/ What skill is it that makes cities agree about numbers?

Alcibiades/ Arithmetic.

Socrates/ What about private citizens? Isn't it the same skill?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And doesn't it also make each person agree with himself?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what skill is it that makes each of us agree with himself about whether a hand's-width is larger than an arm's-length? It's measuring, isn't it?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ Doesn't it make both cities and private citizens agree?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And isn't it the same with weighing?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Well, this agreement you're talking about, what is it? What's it about? What skill provides it? Doesn't the same skill make both a city and a private citizen agree, both with themselves and with others?

Alcibiades/ That does seem quite likely.

Socrates/ What is it then? Don't give up … Try your best to tell me.

Alcibiades/ I suppose I mean the sort of friendship and agreement you find when a mother and father agree with a son they love, and when a brother agrees with his brother, and a woman agrees with her husband.

Socrates/ Well, Alcibiades, do you think that a husband is able to agree with his wife about wool-working, when he doesn't understand it and she does?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Nor does he have any need to, because that's for a woman to know about.

Alcibiades/ That's right.

Socrates/ And is a woman able to agree with her husband about military tactics, without having learned about it?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ I suppose you'd say that that's for a man to know about.

Alcibiades/ I would.

Socrates/ So, according to your argument, some subjects are women's subjects and some are men's subjects.

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ So, in these areas at least, there's no agreement between men and women.

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Nor is there any friendship, since friendship was agreement.

Alcibiades/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ So women are not loved by men, insofar as they do their own work.

Alcibiades/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Nor are men loved by women, insofar as they do theirs.

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ So neither are cities well governed when the different groups each do their own work.

Alcibiades/ But I think they are, Socrates.

Socrates/ What do you mean? In that case there's no friendship in cities, but we said friendship was present when cities are well governed, and not otherwise.

Alcibiades/ But I think it's when each person does his own work that mutual friendship results.

Socrates/ You've just changed your mind. What do you mean now? Can there be friendship without agreement? Can

there be any agreement when some know about the matter and others don't?

Alcibiades/ There can't possibly.

Socrates/ But when everyone does his own work, is everyone being just, or unjust?

Alcibiades/ Just, of course.

Socrates/ So when the citizens do what is just in the city, there is no friendship between them.

Alcibiades/ Again, Socrates, I think there must be.

Socrates/ Then what do you mean by this 'friendship' and 'agreement' that we must be wise and good advisers in if we're to be good men? I can't figure out what it is, or who's got it. According to your argument, it seems that sometimes certain people have it and sometimes they don't.

Alcibiades/ Well, Socrates, I swear by the gods that I don't even know what I mean. I think I must have been in an appalling state for a long time, without being aware of it.

Socrates/ But don't lose heart. If you were fifty when you realized it, then it would be hard for you to cultivate yourself, but now you're just the right age to see it.

Alcibiades/ Now that I've seen it, Socrates, what should I do about it?

Socrates/ Answer my questions, Alcibiades. If you do that, then, God willing, —if we are to trust in my divination—you and I will be in a better state.

Alcibiades/ Then we will be, if it depends on my answering.

Socrates/ Well then, what does it mean to cultivate oneself? —I'm afraid we often think we're cultivating ourselves when we're not. When does a man do that? Is he cultivating himself when he cultivates what he has?

Alcibiades/ I think so, anyway.

Socrates/ Really? When does a man cultivate or care for his feet? Is it when he's caring for what belongs to his feet?

Alcibiades/ I don't understand.

Socrates/ Is there anything you'd say belonged to a hand? Take a ring, for example—could it belong anywhere else on a man but on his finger?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Similarly a shoe belongs nowhere but on the feet.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Likewise cloaks and bedclothes belong to the rest of the body.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So when we cultivate or care for our shoes, are we caring for our feet?

Alcibiades/ I don't really understand, Socrates.

Socrates/ Surely, Alcibiades, you talk about taking proper care of one thing or another, don't you?

Alcibiades/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ And when you make something better, you say you're taking proper care of it.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ What skill is it that makes shoes better?

Alcibiades/ Shoemaking.

Socrates/ So shoemaking is the skill by which we take care of shoes.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do we use shoemaking to take care of our feet, too? Or do we use the skill that makes our feet better?

Alcibiades/ The latter.

Socrates/ Isn't the skill that makes the feet better the same as what makes the rest of the body better?

Alcibiades/ I think so.

Socrates/ Isn't this skill athletics?

Alcibiades/ Yes, absolutely.

Socrates/ So while we take care of our feet with athletics, we take care of what belongs to our feet with shoemaking.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And while we take care of our hands with athletics, we take care of what belongs to our hands with ring-making.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And while we cultivate our bodies with athletics, we take care of what belongs to our bodies with weaving and other skills.

Alcibiades/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ So while we cultivate each thing with one skill, we cultivate what belongs to it with another skill.

Alcibiades/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ And so when you're cultivating what belongs to you, you're not cultivating yourself.

Alcibiades/ Not at all.

Socrates/ For it seems that cultivating yourself and cultivating what belongs to you require different skills.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Well then, what sort of skill could we use to cultivate ourselves?

Alcibiades/ I couldn't say.

Socrates/ But we've agreed on this much, at least—it's a skill that won't make anything that belongs to us better, but it will make us better.

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ Now if we didn't know what a shoe was, would we have known what skill makes a shoe better?

Alcibiades/ No, we couldn't have.

Socrates/ Nor would we have known what skill makes a ring better if we didn't know what a ring was.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Well then, could we ever know what skill makes us better if we didn't know what we were?

Alcibiades/ We couldn't.

Socrates/ Is it actually such an easy thing to know oneself? Was it some simpleton who inscribed those words on the temple wall at Delphi? Or is it difficult, and not for everybody?

Alcibiades/ Sometimes I think, Socrates, that anyone can do it, but then sometimes I think it's extremely difficult.

Socrates/ But Alcibiades, whether it's easy or not, nevertheless this is the situation we're in: if we know ourselves, then we might be able to know how to cultivate ourselves, but if we don't know ourselves, we'll never know how.

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Tell me, how can we find out what 'itself' is, in itself? Maybe this is the way to find out what we ourselves might be—maybe it's the only possible way.

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ Hold on, by Zeus—who are you speaking with now? Anybody but me?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ And I'm speaking with you.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is Socrates doing the talking?

Alcibiades/ He certainly is.

Socrates/ And is Alcibiades doing the listening?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And isn't Socrates talking with words?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ I suppose you'd say that talking is the same as using words?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But the thing being used and the person using it—they're different, aren't they?

Alcibiades/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ A shoemaker, for example, cuts with a knife and a scraper, I think, and with other tools.

Alcibiades/ Yes, he does.

Socrates/ So isn't the cutter who uses the tools different from the tools he's cutting with?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And likewise isn't the lyre-player different from what he's playing with?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ This is what I was just asking—doesn't the user of a thing always seem to be different from what he's using?

Alcibiades/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Let's think about the shoemaker again. Does he cut with his tools only, or does he also cut with his hands?

Alcibiades/ With his hands, too.

Socrates/ So he uses his hands, too.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And doesn't he use his eyes, too, in shoemaking?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Didn't we agree that the person who uses something is different from the thing that he uses?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So the shoemaker and the lyre-player are different from the hands and eyes they use in their work.

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Doesn't a man use his whole body, too?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And we agreed that the user is different from the thing being used.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So a man is different from his own body.

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then what is a man?

Alcibiades/ I don't know what to say.

Socrates/ Yes, you do—say that it's what uses the body.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ What else uses it but the soul?

Alcibiades/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ And doesn't the soul rule the body?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now here's something I don't think anybody would disagree with.

Alcibiades/ What?

Socrates/ Man is one of three things.

Alcibiades/ What things?

Socrates/ The body, the soul, or the two of them together, the whole thing.

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ But we agreed that man is that which rules the body.

Alcibiades/ Yes, we did agree to that.

Socrates/ Does the body rule itself?

Alcibiades/ It couldn't.

Socrates/ Because we said it was ruled.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So this can't be what we're looking for.

Alcibiades/ Not likely.

Socrates/ Well then, can the two of them together rule the body? Is this what man is?

Alcibiades/ Yes, maybe that's it.

Socrates/ No, that's the least likely of all. If one of them doesn't take part in ruling, then surely no combination of the two of them could rule.

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ Since a man is neither his body, nor his body and soul together, what remains, I think, is either that he's nothing, or else, if he is something, he's nothing other than his soul.

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Do you need any clearer proof that the soul is the man?

Alcibiades/ No, by Zeus, I think you've given ample proof.

Socrates/ Well, if we've proven it fairly well, although perhaps not rigorously, that will do for us. We'll have a rigorous proof when we find out what we skipped over, because it would have taken quite a lot of study.

Alcibiades/ What was that?

Socrates/ What we mentioned just now, that we should first consider what 'itself' is, in itself. But in fact, we've been

considering what an individual self is, instead of what 'itself' is. Perhaps that was enough for us, for surely nothing about us has more authority than the soul, wouldn't you agree?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So the right way of looking at it is that, when you and I talk to each other, one soul uses words to address another soul.

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ That's just what we were saying a little while ago—that Socrates converses with Alcibiades not by saying words to his face, apparently, but by addressing his words to Alcibiades, in other words, to his soul.

Alcibiades/ I see it now.

Socrates/ So the command that we should know ourselves means that we should know our souls.

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And someone who knows certain things about his body knows about what belongs to him, not himself.

Alcibiades/ That's right.

Socrates/ So no doctor, to the extent he's a doctor, knows himself, and neither does any trainer, to the extent he's a trainer.

Alcibiades/ It seems not.

Socrates/ So farmers and other tradesmen are a long way from knowing themselves. It seems they don't even know what belongs to them; their skills are about what's even further away than what belongs to them. They only know what belongs to the body and how to take care of it.

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ If being self-controlled is knowing yourself, then their skills don't make any of them self-controlled.

Alcibiades/ I don't think so.

Socrates/ That's why we consider these skills to be beneath us, and not suitable for a gentleman to learn.

Alcibiades/ You're quite right.

Socrates/ Furthermore, if someone takes care of his body, then isn't he caring for something that belongs to him, and not for himself?

Alcibiades/ That seems likely.

Socrates/ And isn't someone who takes care of his wealth caring neither for himself nor for what belongs to him, but for something even further away?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ So the money-earner is not, in fact, doing his own work.

Alcibiades/ Right.

Socrates/ Now if there was someone who loved Alcibiades' body, he wouldn't be loving Alcibiades, only something that belonged to Alcibiades.

Alcibiades/ That's right.

Socrates/ But someone who loved you would love your soul.

Alcibiades/ By our argument, I think he'd have to.

Socrates/ Wouldn't someone who loves your body go off and leave you when your beauty is no longer in full bloom?

Alcibiades/ Obviously.

Socrates/ But someone who loves your soul will not leave you, as long as you're making progress.

Alcibiades/ That's probably right.

Socrates/ Well, I'm the one who won't leave you—I'm the one who will stay with you, now that your body has lost its bloom and everyone else has gone away.

Alcibiades/ I'm glad you are, Socrates, and I hope you never leave me.

Socrates/ Then you must try to be as attractive as possible.

Alcibiades/ I'll certainly try.

Socrates/ So this is your situation: you, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, have no lovers and never have had any, it seems, except for one only, and he is your darling Socrates, son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Remember when I first spoke to you? You said that you were just about to say something; you wanted to ask me why I was the only one who hadn't given up on you.

Alcibiades/ That's right.

Socrates/ Well, this is the reason: I was your only lover—the others were only lovers of what you had. While your possessions are passing their prime, you are just beginning to bloom. I shall never forsake you now, never, unless the Athenian people make you corrupt and ugly. And that is my greatest fear, that a love of the common people might corrupt you, for many Athenian gentlemen have suffered that fate already. "The people of great-hearted Erechtheus" might look attractive on the outside, but you need to scrutinize them in their nakedness, so take the precaution I urge.

Alcibiades/ What precaution?

Socrates/ Get in training first, my dear friend, and learn what you need to know before entering politics. That will give you an antidote against the terrible dangers.

Alcibiades/ I think you're right, Socrates. But try to explain how exactly we should cultivate ourselves.

Socrates/ Well, we've made one step forward anyway—we've pretty well agreed what we are; we were afraid that we

might make a mistake about that and unwittingly cultivate something other than ourselves.

Alcibiades/ That's right.

Socrates/ And the next step is that we have to cultivate our soul and look to that.

Alcibiades/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And let others take care of our bodies and our property.

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Now, how can we get the clearest knowledge of our soul? If we knew that, we'd probably know ourselves as well … By the gods—that admirable Delphic inscription we just mentioned—didn't we understand it?

Alcibiades/ What's the point of bringing that up again, Socrates?

Socrates/ I'll tell you what I suspect that inscription means, and what advice it's giving us. There may not be many examples of it, except the case of sight.

Alcibiades/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ You think about it, too. If the inscription took our eyes to be men and advised them, "See thyself," how would we understand such advice? Shouldn't the eye be looking at something in which it could see itself?

Alcibiades/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Then let's think of something that allows us to see both it and ourselves when we look at it.

Alcibiades/ Obviously, Socrates, you mean mirrors and that sort of thing.

Socrates/ Quite right. And isn't there something like that in the eye, which we see with?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I'm sure you've noticed that when a man looks into an eye his face appears in it, like in a mirror. We call this the 'pupil', for it's a sort of miniature of the man who's looking.

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ Then an eye will see itself if it observes an eye and looks at the best part of it, the part with which it can see.

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But it won't see itself if it looks at anything else in a man, or anything else at all, unless it's similar to the eye.

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ So if an eye is to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at that region of it in which the good activity of an eye actually occurs, and this, I presume, is seeing.

Alcibiades/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then if the soul, Alcibiades, is to know itself, it must look at a soul, and especially at that region in which what makes a soul good, wisdom, occurs, and at anything else which is similar to it.

Alcibiades/ I agree with you, Socrates.

Socrates/ Can we say that there is anything about the soul which is more divine than that where knowing and understanding take place?

Alcibiades/ No, we can't.

Socrates/ Then that region in it resembles the divine, and someone who looked at that and grasped everything divine—vision and understanding—would have the best grasp of himself as well.

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But we agreed that knowing oneself was the same as being self-controlled.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So if we didn't know ourselves and weren't self-controlled, would we be able to know which of the things that belong to us were good and which were bad?

Alcibiades/ How could we know that, Socrates?

Socrates/ No; I suppose it would seem impossible to you to know that what belongs to Alcibiades belongs to him, without knowing Alcibiades.

Alcibiades/ Quite impossible, I'm sure.

Socrates/ And similarly we couldn't know that what belongs to us belongs to us, without knowing ourselves.

Alcibiades/ How could we?

Socrates/ And if we didn't even know what belongs to us, how could we possibly know what belongs to our belongings?

Alcibiades/ We couldn't.

Socrates/ Then it wasn't quite right to agree, as we did a few minutes ago, that some people know what belongs to them without knowing themselves, while others know what belongs to their belongings. It seems that it's the job of one man, and one skill, to know all these things: himself, his belongings, and his belongings' belongings.

Alcibiades/ That seems likely.

Socrates/ And it follows that anyone who doesn't know his own belongings probably won't know other people's belongings either.

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And if he doesn't know other people's belongings, nor will he know what belongs to the city.

Alcibiades/ He couldn't.

Socrates/ So such a man couldn't become a statesman.

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Nor could he even manage a household estate.

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Nor indeed will he know what he's doing.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And if he doesn't know what he's doing, won't he make mistakes?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Since he makes mistakes, won't he conduct himself badly, both publicly and privately?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ Since he conducts himself badly, won't he be a failure?

Alcibiades/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ What about the people he's working for?

Alcibiades/ They will be too.

Socrates/ Then it's impossible for anyone to prosper unless he is self-controlled and good.

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ So it's the bad men who are failures.

Alcibiades/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And so the way to avoid being a failure is not by getting rich, but by being self-controlled.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So it's not walls or war-ships or shipyards that cities need, Alcibiades, if they are to prosper, nor is it numbers or size, without virtue.

Alcibiades/ Definitely.

Socrates/ So if you are to manage the city's business properly and well, you must impart virtue to the citizens.

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ Is it possible to impart something you haven't got?

Alcibiades/ How could you?

Socrates/ Then you, or anyone else who is to be ruler and trustee, not only of himself and his private business, but also the city and the city's business, must first acquire virtue himself.

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ So what you need to get for yourself and for the city isn't political power, nor the authority to do what you like; what you need is justice and self-control.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Because my dear Alcibiades, when an individual or a city with no intelligence is at liberty to do what he or it wants, what do you think the likely result will be? For example, if he's sick and has the power to do whatever he likes—without any medical insight but with such a dictator's power that nobody criticizes him—what's going to happen? Isn't it likely his health will be ruined?

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ And in a ship, if someone were free to do what he liked, but was completely lacking in insight and skill in navigation, don't you see what would happen to him and his fellow sailors?

Alcibiades/ I do indeed; they would all die.

Socrates/ Likewise, if a city, or any ruler or administrator, is lacking in virtue, then bad conduct will result.

Alcibiades/ It must.

Socrates/ Well then, my good Alcibiades, if you are to prosper, it isn't supreme power you need to get for yourself or the city, but virtue.

Alcibiades/ You're right.

Socrates/ But before one acquires virtue it's better to be ruled by somebody superior than to rule; this applies to men as well as to boys.

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And isn't what is better also more admirable?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And isn't what is more admirable more appropriate?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ So it's appropriate for a bad man to be a slave, since it's better.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And vice is appropriate for a slave.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And virtue is appropriate for a free man.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, my friend, shouldn't we avoid whatever is appropriate for slaves?

Alcibiades/ Yes, as much as possible, Socrates.

Socrates/ Can you see what condition you're now in? Is it appropriate for a free man or not?

Alcibiades/ I think I see only too clearly.

Socrates/ Then do you know how to escape from your present state? —let's not call a handsome young man by that name.

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ How?

Alcibiades/ It's up to you, Socrates.

Socrates/ That's not well said, Alcibiades.

Alcibiades/ Well, what should I say?

Socrates/ That it's up to God.

Alcibiades/ Then that's what I say. And furthermore I say this as well: we're probably going to change roles, Socrates. I'll be playing yours and you'll be playing mine, for from this day forward I will never fail to attend on you, and you will always have me as your attendant.

Socrates/ Then my love for you, my excellent friend, will be just like a stork: after hatching a winged love in you, it will be cared for by it in return.

Alcibiades/ Yes, that's right. I'll start to cultivate justice in myself right now.

Socrates/ I should like to believe that you will persevere, but I'm afraid—not because I distrust your nature, but because I know how powerful the city is—I'm afraid it might get the better of both me and you.

Alcibiades I.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed. 1892

Persons of the Dialogue.

Alcibiades, Socrates.

Socrates/ I dare say that you may be surprised to find, O son of Cleinias, that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken to you for many years, when the rest of the world were wearying you with their attentions, am the last of your lovers who still speaks to you. The cause of my silence has been that I was hindered by a power more than human, of which I will someday explain to you the nature; this impediment has now been removed; I therefore here present myself before you, and I greatly hope that no similar hindrance will again occur. Meanwhile, I have observed that your pride has been too much for the pride of your admirers; they were numerous and high-spirited, but they have all run away, overpowered by your superior force of character; not one of them remains. And I want you to understand the reason why you have been too much for them. You think that you have no need of them or of any other man, for you have great possessions and lack nothing, beginning with the body, and ending with the soul. In the first place, you say to yourself that you are the fairest and tallest of the citizens, and this everyone who has eyes may see to be true; in the second place, that you are among the noblest of them, highly connected both on the father's and the mother's side, and sprung from one of the most distinguished families in your own state, which is the greatest in Hellas, and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, who can assist you when in need; and there is one potent relative, who is more to you than all the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian of you, and of your brother,

and who can do as he pleases not only in this city, but in all Hellas, and among many and mighty barbarous nations. Moreover, you are rich; but I must say that you value yourself least of all upon your possessions. And all these things have lifted you up; you have overcome your lovers, and they have acknowledged that you were too much for them. Have you not remarked their absence? And now I know that you wonder why I, unlike the rest of them, have not gone away, and what can be my motive in remaining.

Alcibiades/ Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going to ask you the very same question—What do you want? And what is your motive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of coming? I do really wonder what you mean, and should greatly like to know.

Socrates/ Then if, as you say, you desire to know, I suppose that you will be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to an auditor who will remain, and will not run away?

Alcibiades/ Certainly, let me hear.

Socrates/ You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as unwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin.

Alcibiades/ Proceed, my good man, and I will listen.

Socrates/ I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with one who has no feeling of love in him, I will make an effort, and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly like to confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw you loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to pass life in the enjoyment of them.

But I shall reveal other thoughts of yours, which you keep to yourself; whereby you will know that I have always had my eye on you. Suppose that at this moment some God came to you and said: Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in

an instant if you are forbidden to make any further acquisition? —I verily believe that you would choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which you are at present living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you will come before the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that you are more worthy of honor than Pericles, or any other man that ever lived, and having proved this, you will have the greatest power in the state. When you have gained the greatest power among us, you will go on to other Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if the God were then to say to you again: Here in Europe is to be your seat of empire, and you must not cross over into Asia or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I do not believe that you would choose to live upon these terms; but the world, as I may say, must be filled with your power and name—no man less than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you. Such I know to be your hopes—I am not guessing only—and very likely you, who know that I am speaking the truth, will reply, Well, Socrates, but what have my hopes to do with the explanation which you promised of your unwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now going to tell you, sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomache. The explanation is, that all these designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without my help; so great is the power which I believe myself to have over you and your concerns; and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has hitherto forbidden me to converse with you, and I have been long expecting his permission. For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the state, and having proved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I indulge a hope that I shall have the supreme power over you, if I am able to prove my own great value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor kinsman, nor anyone is able to deliver into your hands the power which you desire, but I only, God

being my helper. When you were young and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my time, and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with you; but now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will listen to me.

Alcibiades/ Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I never could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun to speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, is a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if I must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why?

Socrates/ You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however, that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant me one little favor.

Alcibiades/ Yes, if the favor which you mean be not a troublesome one.

Socrates/ Will you be troubled at having questions to answer?

Alcibiades/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Then please to answer.

Alcibiades/ Ask me.

Socrates/ Have you not the intention which I attribute to you?

Alcibiades/ I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what more you have to say.

Socrates/ You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that when you are ascending the

bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians—do you know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they? —How would you answer?

Alcibiades/ I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter which I do know better than they.

Socrates/ Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself?

Alcibiades/ That is all.

Socrates/ And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?

Alcibiades/ I should not.

Socrates/ And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you.

Alcibiades/ Yes, that was the whole of my schooling.

Socrates/ And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give them advice about writing?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Or about the touch of the lyre?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, in the assembly?

Alcibiades/ Hardly.

Socrates/ Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise them? Surely not about building?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ For the builder will advise better than you will about that?

Alcibiades/ He will.

Socrates/ Nor about divination?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ About that again the diviner will advise better than you will?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or ignoble—makes no difference.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has riches, but because he has knowledge?

Alcibiades/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Whether their counselor is rich or poor, is not a matter which will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a physician.

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you will be justified in getting up and advising them?

Alcibiades/ About their own concerns, Socrates.

Socrates/ You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is what sort of ships they ought to build?

Alcibiades/ No, I should not advise them about that.

Socrates/ I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding: —is that the reason?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them?

Alcibiades/ About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other concerns of the state.

Socrates/ You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better to go to war?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when it is better?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And for as long a time as is better?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would you, or the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them?

Alcibiades/ Clearly, the master of gymnastics.

Socrates/ And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how? To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those against whom it is best to wrestle?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And as much as is best?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And at such times as are best?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ When it is well to do so?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And as much as is well?

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would tell me what this latter is; —the excellence of wrestling I call gymnastic, and I want to know what you call the other.

Alcibiades/ I do not understand you.

Socrates/ Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is universally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic?

Alcibiades/ You did.

Socrates/ And I was right?

Alcibiades/ I think that you were.

Socrates/ Well, now, —for you should learn to argue prettily—let me ask you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts, —what is the name of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell.

Alcibiades/ Indeed I cannot.

Socrates/ Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the Goddesses who are the patronesses of art?

Alcibiades/ The Muses do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called after them?

Alcibiades/ I suppose that you mean music.

Socrates/ Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the art of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was gymnastic—what is the excellence of music—to be what?

Alcibiades/ To be musical, I suppose.

Socrates/ Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of war and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more gymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give to the more excellent in war and peace?

Alcibiades/ But I really cannot tell you.

Socrates/ But if you were offering advice to another and said to him—This food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said to you—What do you mean,

Alcibiades, by the word 'better'? you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant 'more wholesome,' although you do not profess to be a physician: and when the subject is one of which you profess to have knowledge, and about which you are ready to get up and advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed, when you are asked, not to be able to answer the question? Is it not disgraceful?

Alcibiades/ Very.

Socrates/ Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of 'better,' in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer?

Alcibiades/ I am thinking, and I cannot tell.

Socrates/ But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we give them?

Alcibiades/ Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been employed, or that we have been defrauded.

Socrates/ And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may be a difference in the manner.

Alcibiades/ Do you mean by 'how,' Socrates, whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly?

Socrates/ Exactly.

Alcibiades/ There can be no greater difference than between just and unjust.

Socrates/ And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust?

Alcibiades/ That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were just.

Socrates/ He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful?

Alcibiades/ Neither lawful nor honorable.

Socrates/ Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war?

Alcibiades/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that you do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust? Who is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him—you shall introduce me.

Alcibiades/ You are mocking, Socrates.

Socrates/ No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists.

Alcibiades/ But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way?

Socrates/ Yes; if you have discovered them.

Alcibiades/ But do you not think that I could discover them?

Socrates/ I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them.

Alcibiades/ And do you not think that I would enquire?

Socrates/ Yes; if you thought that you did not know them.

Alcibiades/ And was there not a time when I did so think?

Socrates/ Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust? What do you say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and enquiry? or did you think that you knew? And please to answer truly, that our discussion may not be in vain.

Alcibiades/ Well, I thought that I knew.

Socrates/ And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you knew all the same?

Alcibiades/ I did.

Socrates/ And more than four years ago you were a child—were you not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew.

Alcibiades/ Why are you so sure?

Socrates/ Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's house, or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very confident—crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a cheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true?

Alcibiades/ But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me?

Socrates/ And how can you say, 'What was I to do'? if at the time you did not know whether you were wronged or not?

Alcibiades/ To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being cheated.

Socrates/ Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the nature of just and unjust?

Alcibiades/ Certainly; and I did know then.

Socrates/ And when did you discover them—not, surely, at the time when you thought that you knew them?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And when did you think that you were ignorant—if you consider, you will find that there never was such a time?

Alcibiades/ Really, Socrates, I cannot say.

Socrates/ Then you did not learn them by discovering them?

Alcibiades/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ But just before you said that you did not know them by learning; now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and whence do you come to know them?

Alcibiades/ I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them through my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in the same way that other people learn.

Socrates/ So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me.

Alcibiades/ Of the many.

Socrates/ Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for your teachers.

Alcibiades/ Why, are they not able to teach?

Socrates/ They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you would acknowledge, would you not, to be a much smaller matter than justice?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse?

Alcibiades/ I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far better things than to play at draughts.

Socrates/ What things?

Alcibiades/ Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I cannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge of Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them.

Socrates/ Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers of Greek, and some of their instructions in that line may be justly praised.

Alcibiades/ Why is that?

Socrates/ Why, because they have the qualities which good teachers ought to have.

Alcibiades/ What qualities?

Socrates/ Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any teacher?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if they know, they must agree together and not differ?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And would you say that they knew the things about which they differ?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Then how can they teach them?

Alcibiades/ They cannot.

Socrates/ Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the nature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what they are? and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a piece of wood or a stone? And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be pretty nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ These, as we were saying, are matters about which they are agreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and states use the same words about them; they do not use some one word and some another.

Alcibiades/ They do not.

Socrates/ Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if we want to instruct anyone in them, we shall be right in sending him to be taught by our friends the many?

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and which are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, would the many still be able to inform us?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these things and are not the best teachers of them, inasmuch as they are never agreed about them?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like, but what healthy or diseased men are like—would the many be able to teach us?

Alcibiades/ They would not.

Socrates/ And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these matters, if you saw them at variance?

Alcibiades/ I should.

Socrates/ Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one another, about the justice or injustice of men and things?

Alcibiades/ Assuredly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ There is no subject about which they are more at variance?

Alcibiades/ None.

Socrates/ I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to war and kill one another for the sake of them?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if you have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people, including Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey?

Alcibiades/ To be sure, Socrates.

Socrates/ A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans and Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel with Odysseus.

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell at Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your father Cleinias met his end, the question was one of justice—this was the sole cause of the battles, and of their deaths.

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ But can they be said to understand that about which they are quarrelling to the death?

Alcibiades/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the teachers to whom you are appealing.

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned them of others nor discovered them yourself?

Alcibiades/ From what you say, I suppose not.

Socrates/ See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades!

Alcibiades/ In what respect?

Socrates/ In saying that I say so.

Alcibiades/ Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and unjust?

Socrates/ No; I did not.

Alcibiades/ Did I, then?

Socrates/ Yes.

Alcibiades/ How was that?

Socrates/ Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater number, two or one; you would reply 'two'?

Alcibiades/ I should.

Socrates/ And by how much greater?

Alcibiades/ By one.

Socrates/ Which of us now says that two is more than one?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Did not I ask, and you answer the question?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or you who answer me?

Alcibiades/ I am.

Socrates/ Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker?

Alcibiades/ I am.

Socrates/ Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question and answer, who is the speaker, —the questioner or the answerer?

Alcibiades/ I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker.

Socrates/ And have I not been the questioner all through?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you the answerer?

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ Which of us, then, was the speaker?

Alcibiades/ The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker.

Socrates/ Did not someone say that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he did understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what he did not know? Was not that said?

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language of Euripides. I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, and not from me'; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear fellow, the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity.

Alcibiades/ But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of the Hellenes do not often advise as to the more

just or unjust; for they see no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider which course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference between justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and profited by their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no good.

Socrates/ Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient for mankind, or why a thing is expedient?

Alcibiades/ Why not, Socrates? —But I am not going to be asked again from whom I learned, or when I made the discovery.

Socrates/ What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different refutation; the old argument is a worn-out garment which you will no longer put on, but someone must produce another which is clean and new. Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over again, —Where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient, and who is your teacher? All this I comprehend in a single question, and now you will manifestly be in the old difficulty, and will not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because you learned or because you discovered it yourself. But, as I perceive that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of a stale argument, I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or different? And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself.

Alcibiades/ But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to discuss the matter with you.

Socrates/ Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men individually.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not the same person able to persuade one individual singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The grammarian, for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And about number, will not the same person persuade one and persuade many?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?

Alcibiades/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can persuade many?

Alcibiades/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you know?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the only difference between one who argues as we are doing, and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one seeks to persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same things.

Alcibiades/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that the just is not always expedient.

Alcibiades/ You take liberties, Socrates.

Socrates/ I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that which you will not prove to me.

Alcibiades/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Answer my questions—that is all.

Alcibiades/ Nay, I should like you to be the speaker.

Socrates/ What, do you not wish to be persuaded?

Alcibiades/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?

Alcibiades/ I think not.

Socrates/ Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that the just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe another man again.

Alcibiades/ I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come to any harm.

Socrates/ A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And sometimes honorable and sometimes not?

Alcibiades/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I am asking if you ever knew anyone who did what was dishonorable and yet just?

Alcibiades/ Never.

Socrates/ All just things are honorable?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are honorable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, or are they always good?

Alcibiades/ I rather think, Socrates, that some honorable things are evil.

Socrates/ And are some dishonorable things good?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ You mean in such a case as the following: —In time of war, men have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in safety?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And to rescue another under such circumstances is honorable, in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is courage?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ But evil in respect of death and wounds?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and the death another?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the rescue of one's friends is honorable in one point of view, but evil in another?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And if honorable, then also good: Will you consider now whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage which is shown in the rescue is honorable? Now is this courage good or evil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or evil?

Alcibiades/ Good.

Socrates/ And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and would least like to be deprived of them?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What would you say of courage? At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage?

Alcibiades/ I would rather die than be a coward.

Socrates/ Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ As bad as death, I suppose?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And they are what you would most desire to have, and their opposites you would least desire?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death and cowardice the worst?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honorable, in as much as courage does a good work?

Alcibiades/ I should.

Socrates/ But evil because of the death which ensues?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Might we not describe their different effects as follows: —You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And they are honorable in so far as they are good, and dishonorable in so far as they are evil?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is honorable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is good and yet evil?

Alcibiades/ I believe that you are right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Nothing honorable, regarded as honorable, is evil; nor anything base, regarded as base, good.

Alcibiades/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts honorably acts well?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who acts well is happy?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And the happy are those who obtain good?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And they obtain good by acting well and honorably?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then acting well is a good?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And happiness is a good?.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the good and the honorable are again identified.

Alcibiades/ Manifestly.

Socrates/ Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honorable we shall also find to be good?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is the good expedient or not?

Alcibiades/ Expedient.

Socrates/ Do you remember our admissions about the just?

Alcibiades/ Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly must also act honorably.

Socrates/ And the honorable is the good?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the good is expedient?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?

Alcibiades/ I should infer so.

Socrates/ And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you answer?

Alcibiades/ I must acknowledge it to be true.

Socrates/ And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the expedient, are you not, let me ask, prepared to ridicule anyone who, pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the just may be the evil?

Alcibiades/ I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants.

Socrates/ And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend?

Alcibiades/ Indeed I am not.

Socrates/ Do you suppose that if someone were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants?

Alcibiades/ I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I should.

Socrates/ You would feel no doubt; and for this reason—because you would know?

Alcibiades/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant?

Alcibiades/ Very likely.

Socrates/ And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. Is not that clear?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?

Alcibiades/ Certainly he is.

Socrates/ And do you know how to ascend into heaven?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?

Alcibiades/ Tell me.

Socrates/ The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but you do not think that you know.

Alcibiades/ There again; what do you mean?

Socrates/ Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the preparation of food.

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food: or do you leave that to someone who understands the art?

Alcibiades/ The latter.

Socrates/ Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing?

Alcibiades/ It would be the concern of the pilot.

Socrates/ Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it?

Alcibiades/ I imagine not.

Socrates/ Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge?

Alcibiades/ Once more, what do you mean?

Socrates/ I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their business to others?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they are ignorant?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of course, be those who know?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they do not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and think that they know.

Alcibiades/ Yes, only those.

Socrates/ Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters?

Alcibiades/ By far.

Socrates/ And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honorable, the good, and the expedient?

Alcibiades/ There cannot be.

Socrates/ And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being ignorant you fancy that you know them?

Alcibiades/ I fear that you are right.

Socrates/ And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good friend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of this you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by your own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated. Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might say the same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps, of your guardian, Pericles.

Alcibiades/ Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of the philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, and now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom.

Socrates/ Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught you letters was not

only wise, but he made you and any others whom he liked wise.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you, whom he taught, can do the same?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And in like manner the harper and gymnastic-master?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, he thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter.

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well, and did Pericles make anyone wise; did he begin by making his sons wise?

Alcibiades/ But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what has that to do with the matter?

Socrates/ Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?

Alcibiades/ Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him.

Socrates/ But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you be as you are?

Alcibiades/ I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him.

Socrates/ But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner, bond or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society of Pericles, —as I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and Callias, the son of Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society of Zeno, for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of a hundred minae to the increase of their wisdom and fame.

Alcibiades/ I certainly never did hear of anyone.

Socrates/ Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself?

Alcibiades/ With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear you speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I agree with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite uneducated.

Socrates/ What is the inference?

Alcibiades/ Why, that if they were educated they would be trained athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge and experience when he attacks them; but now, as they have become politicians without any special training, why should I have the trouble of learning and practicing? For I know well that by the light of nature I shall get the better of them.

Socrates/ My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your noble form and your high estate!

Alcibiades/ What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so?

Socrates/ I am grieved when I think of our mutual love.

Alcibiades/ At what?

Socrates/ At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is with people here.

Alcibiades/ Why, what others are there?

Socrates/ Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?

Alcibiades/ Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?

Socrates/ And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not, while acknowledging that you must

possess this degree of excellence, rather look to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your fellow combatants? You ought to be so far above these latter, that they will not even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as inferiors, will do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kind of superiority which you must establish over them, if you mean to accomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state.

Alcibiades/ That would certainly be my aim.

Socrates/ Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you are better than the soldiers; and you need not, when you are their superior and have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to the generals of the enemy.

Alcibiades/ Of whom are you speaking, Socrates?

Socrates/ Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?

Alcibiades/ True enough.

Socrates/ And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not be right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king were your true rivals?

Alcibiades/ I believe that you are right.

Socrates/ Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others like him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark, you may still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds as well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to flatter us and not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and then you need not trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in such a noble arena: there is no reason why you should either learn what has to be learned, or

practice what has to be practiced, and only when thoroughly prepared enter on a political career.

Alcibiades/ There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really different from anybody else.

Socrates/ But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying.

Alcibiades/ What am I to consider?

Socrates/ In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are not?

Alcibiades/ Clearly, if I have such a fear of them.

Socrates/ And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take care of yourself?

Alcibiades/ No, I shall be greatly benefited.

Socrates/ And this is one very important respect in which that notion of yours is bad.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ In the next place, consider that what you say is probably false.

Alcibiades/ How so?

Socrates/ Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in noble races or not in noble races?

Alcibiades/ Clearly in noble races.

Socrates/ Are not those who are well born and well-bred most likely to be perfect in virtue?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent? Have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the latter from Achaemenes,

and that the race of Heracles and the race of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?

Alcibiades/ Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus!

Socrates/ And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, son of Zeus. But, for all that, we are far inferior to them. For they are descended 'from Zeus' through a line of kings—either kings of Argos and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the descendants of Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at various times sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our fathers were but private persons. How ridiculous would you be thought if you were to make a display of your ancestors and of Salamis the island of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient Aeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes. You should consider how inferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other particulars. Did you never observe how great is the property of the Spartan kings? And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori, who are public officers and watch over them, in order to preserve as far as possible the purity of the Heracleid blood. Still greater is the difference among the Persians; for no one entertains a suspicion that the father of a prince of Persia can be anyone but the king. Such is the awe which invests the person of the queen, that any other guard is needless. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects of the king feast; and the day of his birth is forever afterwards kept as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, when you and I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbors hardly knew of the important event. After the birth of the royal child, he is tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially with the fashioning and

right formation of his limbs, in order that he may be as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are held in great honor. And when the young prince is seven years old he is put upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go out hunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal schoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth the most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster, the son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches him also the duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest, teaches him always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate, forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be accustomed to be a freeman and king indeed, — lord of himself first, and not a slave; the most valiant trains him to be bold and fearless, telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; whereas Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave of his who was past all other work. I might enlarge on the nurture and education of your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I have said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said. I have only to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian, unless he has a lover who looks after him. And if you cast an eye on the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the anointing with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own inferiority; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease and grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil and desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians—in

all these respects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them. Even in the matter of wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must reveal to you how you stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealth of the Lacedaemonians, you will see that our possessions fall far short of theirs. For no one here can compete with them either in the extent and fertility of their own and the Messenian territory, or in the number of their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or of the animals which feed on the Messenian pastures. But I have said enough of this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon than in all the rest of Hellas, for during many generations gold has been always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and often from the barbarian also, and never going out, as in the fable of Aesop the fox said to the lion, 'The prints of the feet of those going in are distinct enough;' but who ever saw the trace of money going out of Lacedaemon? and therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants are the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and that their kings are the richest of them, for they have a larger share of these things, and they have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable. Yet the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of the other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and their kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up to the king [at Susa], that he passed through a large tract of excellent land, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of the country called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several habiliments. Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if someone were to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and say to her, There is a certain

Dinomache, whose whole wardrobe is not worth fifty minae—and that will be more than the value—and she has a son who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he has a mind to go to war with your son—would she not wonder to what this Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? 'He must rely,' she would say to herself, 'upon his training and wisdom—these are the things which Hellenes value.' And if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly uneducated, and when his lover tells him that he ought to get education and training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says that he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask, 'On what, then, does the youth rely?' And if we replied: He relies on his beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you possess with those of her own people. And I believe that even Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present uneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she too would be equally astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should not have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies' wives and mothers have of the qualities which are required in their assailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian inscription, 'Know thyself'—not the men whom you think, but these kings are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill. And if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire more than any other man ever desired anything.

Alcibiades/ I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which are required, Socrates, —can you tell me?

Socrates/ Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning the manner in which both of us may be most improved. For what I am telling you of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you; and there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you.

Alcibiades/ What is that?

Socrates/ I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, Pericles.

Alcibiades/ Who is he, Socrates?

Socrates/ God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially designed to bring you to honor.

Alcibiades/ You are jesting, Socrates.

Socrates/ Perhaps; at any rate, I am right in saying that all men greatly need pains and care, and you and I above all men.

Alcibiades/ You are not far wrong about me.

Socrates/ And certainly not about myself.

Alcibiades/ But what can we do?

Socrates/ There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend.

Alcibiades/ That would not become us, Socrates.

Socrates/ No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we not wish to be as good as possible?

Alcibiades/ We do.

Socrates/ In what sort of virtue?

Alcibiades/ Plainly, in the virtue of good men.

Socrates/ Who are good in what?

Alcibiades/ Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs.

Socrates/ What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well; naval affairs?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then what affairs? And who do them?

Alcibiades/ The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen.

Socrates/ And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the unwise?

Alcibiades/ The wise.

Socrates/ And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making of shoes?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then he is good in that?

Alcibiades/ He is.

Socrates/ But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then in that he is bad?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also bad?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ But would you say that the good are the same as the bad?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then whom do you call the good?

Alcibiades/ I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city.

Socrates/ Not, surely, over horses?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But over men?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ When they are sick?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Or on a voyage?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Or reaping the harvest?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ When they are doing something or nothing?

Alcibiades/ When they are doing something, I should say.

Socrates/ I wish that you would explain to me what this something is.

Alcibiades/ When they are having dealings with one another, and using one another's services, as we citizens do in our daily life.

Socrates/ Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the services of other men?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to the rowers?

Alcibiades/ No; they are not.

Socrates/ That would be the office of the pilot?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, who lead the singers and use the services of the dancers?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use other men?

Alcibiades/ I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of citizenship, and dealings with one another.

Socrates/ And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow-sailors, —how would you answer?

Alcibiades/ The art of the pilot.

Socrates/ And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables them to rule over their fellow-singers?

Alcibiades/ The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just now mentioning.

Socrates/ And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens?

Alcibiades/ I should say, good counsel, Socrates.

Socrates/ And is the art of the pilot evil counsel?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ But good counsel?

Alcibiades/ Yes, that is what I should say, —good counsel, of which the aim is the preservation of the voyagers.

Socrates/ True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which you speak?

Alcibiades/ The aim is the better order and preservation of the city.

Socrates/ And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of disease. You would say the same?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I should reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence of blindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved and were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was present in them.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And what would you say of a state? What is that by the presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered?

Alcibiades/ I should say, Socrates: —the presence of friendship and the absence of hatred and division.

Socrates/ And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement?

Alcibiades/ Agreement.

Socrates/ What art makes cities agree about numbers?

Alcibiades/ Arithmetic.

Socrates/ And private individuals?

Alcibiades/ The same.

Socrates/ And what art makes each individual agree with himself?

Alcibiades/ The same.

Socrates/ And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the comparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of measure?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and states, equally?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same holds of the balance?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about what? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with himself and with another?

Alcibiades/ I should suppose so.

Socrates/ But what is the nature of the agreement? — answer, and faint not.

Alcibiades/ I mean to say that there should be such friendship and agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife.

Socrates/ But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not?

Alcibiades/ No, truly.

Socrates/ Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, which she has never learned?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a male accomplishment?

Alcibiades/ It would.

Socrates/ Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men?

Alcibiades/ There is not.

Socrates/ Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement?

Alcibiades/ Plainly not.

Socrates/ Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work?

Alcibiades/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ Nor men by women when they do their own work?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own work?

Alcibiades/ I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the truth.

Socrates/ What! do you mean to say that states are well administered when friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone secures their good order?

Alcibiades/ But I should say that there is friendship among them, for this very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work.

Socrates/ That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of which the other is in ignorance?

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing what is just or unjust?

Alcibiades/ What is just, certainly.

Socrates/ And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no friendship among them?

Alcibiades/ I suppose that there must be, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the same persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not.

Alcibiades/ But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state.

Socrates/ Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the discovery should be made.

Alcibiades/ And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery?

Socrates/ Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which, by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very improving to both of us.

Alcibiades/ If I can be improved by answering, I will answer.

Socrates/ And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself? and when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him?

Alcibiades/ I should think so.

Socrates/ When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet?

Alcibiades/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong to the finger, and to the finger only?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the shoe in like manner to the foot?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our feet?

Alcibiades/ I do not comprehend, Socrates.

Socrates/ But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a thing is a correct expression?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And taking proper care means improving?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what is the art which improves our shoes?

Alcibiades/ Shoemaking.

Socrates/ Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other art which improves the feet?

Alcibiades/ By some other art.

Socrates/ And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body?

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ Which is gymnastic?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet?

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of graving rings of that which belongs to our hands?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?

Alcibiades/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves?

Alcibiades/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves?

Alcibiades/ I cannot say.

Socrates/ At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe?

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring?

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not know what we are ourselves?

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?

Alcibiades/ At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at other times the task appears to be very difficult.

Socrates/ But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know.

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own existence, which otherwise we can never know.

Alcibiades/ You say truly.

Socrates/ Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing? —with whom but with me?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ As I am, with you?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And Alcibiades is my hearer?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And I in talking use words?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?

Alcibiades/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be distinguished from the harper himself?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands?

Alcibiades/ With his hands as well.

Socrates/ He uses his hands too?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?

Alcibiades/ He does.

Socrates/ And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which he uses?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use?

Alcibiades/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And does not a man use the whole body?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that which uses is different from that which is used?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Then a man is not the same as his own body?

Alcibiades/ That is the inference.

Socrates/ What is he, then?

Alcibiades/ I cannot say.

Socrates/ Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the user of the body is the soul?

Alcibiades/ Yes, the soul.

Socrates/ And the soul rules?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally admitted.

Alcibiades/ What is it?

Socrates/ That man is one of three things.

Alcibiades/ What are they?

Socrates/ Soul, body, or both together forming a whole.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man?

Alcibiades/ Yes, we did.

Socrates/ And does the body rule over itself?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ It is subject, as we were saying?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?

Alcibiades/ It would seem not.

Socrates/ But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man?

Alcibiades/ Very likely.

Socrates/ The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is subject, the two united cannot possibly rule.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient.

Socrates/ And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we shall be satisfied; —more precise proof will be supplied when we have discovered that which we were led to

omit, from a fear that the enquiry would be too much protracted.

Alcibiades/ What was that?

Socrates/ What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be first considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more properly ourselves than the soul?

Alcibiades/ There is nothing.

Socrates/ Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul?

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ And that is just what I was saying before—that I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul?

Alcibiades/ That appears to be true.

Socrates/ He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of a man, and not the man himself?

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?

Alcibiades/ He does not.

Socrates/ The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practice they are even further

removed from self-knowledge, for they only know the belongings of the body, which minister to the body.

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his art none of them is temperate?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practice?

Alcibiades/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what belongs to him?

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And if anyone has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ But he who loves your soul is the true lover?

Alcibiades/ That is the necessary inference.

Socrates/ The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul follows after virtue?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?

Alcibiades/ Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you will remain.

Socrates/ Then you must try to look your best.

Alcibiades/ I will.

Socrates/ The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the son of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other; and he is his darling, —Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechtheus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution which I give you.

Alcibiades/ What caution?

Socrates/ Practice yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics; and then

you will have an antidote which will keep you out of harm's way.

Alcibiades/ Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself.

Socrates/ Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of something which is not ourselves.

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to that?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others?

Alcibiades/ Very good.

Socrates/ But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul? —For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?

Alcibiades/ What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose.

Alcibiades/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Consider; if someone were to say to the eye, 'See thyself' as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself' what is the nature and meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be: —That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself?

Alcibiades/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?

Alcibiades/ Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.

Socrates/ Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort of image of the person looking?

Alcibiades/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself?

Alcibiades/ That is evident.

Socrates/ But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?

Alcibiades/ I agree, Socrates.

Socrates/ And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?

Alcibiades/ There is none.

Socrates/ Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself?

Alcibiades/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil?

Alcibiades/ How can we, Socrates?

Socrates/ You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his?

Alcibiades/ It would be quite impossible.

Socrates/ Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves?

Alcibiades/ How could we?

Socrates/ And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings?

Alcibiades/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art.

Alcibiades/ So much may be supposed.

Socrates/ And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the affairs of states?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then such a man can never be a statesman?

Alcibiades/ He cannot.

Socrates/ Nor an economist?

Alcibiades/ He cannot.

Socrates/ He will not know what he is doing?

Alcibiades/ He will not.

Socrates/ And will not he who is ignorant fall into error?

Alcibiades/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public and private capacity?

Alcibiades/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And failing, will he not be miserable?

Alcibiades/ Very.

Socrates/ And what will become of those for whom he is acting?

Alcibiades/ They will be miserable also.

Socrates/ Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy?

Alcibiades/ He cannot.

Socrates/ The bad, then, are miserable?

Alcibiades/ Yes, very.

Socrates/ And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is delivered from his misery?

Alcibiades/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue?

Alcibiades/ Indeed they do not.

Socrates/ And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer their affairs rightly or nobly?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But can a man give that which he has not?

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Then you or anyone who means to govern and superintend, not only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of the state, must in the first place acquire virtue.

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in order to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but justice and wisdom.

Alcibiades/ Clearly.

Socrates/ You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act according to the will of God?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and divine, and act with a view to them?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own good?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so you will act rightly and well?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ In which case, I will be security for your happiness.

Alcibiades/ I accept the security.

Socrates/ But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark and godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will probably do deeds of darkness.

Alcibiades/ Very possibly.

Socrates/ For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either to him as an individual or to the state—for example, if he be sick and is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician—having moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow-sailors?

Alcibiades/ Yes; I see that they will all perish.

Socrates/ And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like manner, ensue?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue.

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is better for men as well as for children?

Alcibiades/ That is evident.

Socrates/ And that which is better is also nobler?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And what is nobler is more becoming?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Then vice is only suited to a slave?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And virtue to a freeman?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be avoided?

Alcibiades/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know whether you are a freeman or not?

Alcibiades/ I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state.

Socrates/ And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even like to name to my beauty?

Alcibiades/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ How?

Alcibiades/ By your help, Socrates.

Socrates/ That is not well said, Alcibiades.

Alcibiades/ What ought I to have said?

Socrates/ By the help of God.

Alcibiades/ I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely to be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you have followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master.

Socrates/ O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like the stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched.

Alcibiades/ Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think about justice.

Socrates/ And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too much for both of us.

Alcibiades I

[or on the nature of man: “obstetric”]

Translated by Lamb.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Alcibiades

Socrates/ Son of Cleinias, I think it must surprise you that I, the first of all your lovers, am the only one of them who has not given up his suit and thrown you over, and whereas they have all pestered you with their conversation I have not spoken one word to you for so many years. The cause of this has been nothing human, but a certain spiritual opposition, of whose power you shall be informed at some later time. However, it now opposes me no longer, so I have come to you, as you see; and I am in good hopes that it will not oppose me again in the future. Now I have been observing you all this time, and have formed a pretty good notion of your behavior to your lovers: for although they were many and high-spirited, every one of them has found your spirit too strong for him and has run away. Let me explain the reason of your spirit being too much for them. You say you have no need of any man in any matter; for your resources are so great, beginning with the body and ending with the soul, that you lack nothing.

You think, in the first place, that you are foremost in beauty and stature—and you are not mistaken in this, as is plain for all to see—and in the second place, that you are of the most gallant family in your city, the greatest city in Greece, and that there you have, through your father, very many of the best people as your friends and kinsmen, who would assist you in case of need, and other connections also, through your mother, who are not a whit inferior to these,

nor fewer. And you reckon upon a stronger power than all those that I have mentioned, in Pericles, son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian of you and your brother when he died, and who is able to do whatever he likes not only in this city but all over Greece and among many great nations of the barbarians. And I will add besides the wealth of your house: but on this, I observe, you presume least of all. Well, you puff yourself up on all these advantages, and have overcome your lovers, while they in their inferiority have yielded to your might, and all this has not escaped you; so I am very sure that you wonder what on earth I mean by not getting rid of my passion, and what can be my hope in remaining when the rest have fled.

Alcibiades/ Perhaps also, Socrates, you are not aware that you have only just anticipated me. For I, in fact, had the intention of coming and asking you first that very same question—what is your aim and expectation in bothering me by making a particular point of always turning up wherever I may be. For I really do wonder what can be your object, and should be very glad if you would tell me.

Socrates/ Then you will listen to me, presumably, with keen attention if, as you say, you long to know what I mean, and I have in you a listener who will stay to hear me out.

Alcibiades/ Why, to be sure: only speak.

Socrates/ Look to it, then; for it would be no wonder if I should make as much difficulty about stopping as I have made about starting.

Alcibiades/ My good sir, speak; for I will listen.

Socrates/ Speak I must, I suppose. Now, although it is hard for a lover to parley with a man who does not yield to lovers, I must make bold nevertheless to put my meaning into words. For if I saw you, Alcibiades, content with the things I set forth just now, and minded to pass your life in

enjoying them, I should long ago have put away my love, so at least I persuade myself: but as it is, I shall propound to your face quite another set of your thoughts, whereby you will understand that I have had you continually before my mind. For I believe, if some god should ask you: "Alcibiades, do you prefer to live with your present possessions, or to die immediately if you are not to have the chance of acquiring greater things?" I believe you would choose to die. But let me tell you what I imagine must be the present hope of your life. You think that if you come shortly before the Athenian Assembly—which you expect to occur in a very few days—you will stand forth and prove to the people that you are more worthy of honor than either Pericles or anyone else who has ever existed, and that having proved this you will have the greatest power in the state; and that if you are the greatest here, you will be the same among all the other Greeks, and not only Greeks, but all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if that same god should say to you again, that you are to hold sway here in Europe, but are not to be allowed to cross over into Asia and to interfere with the affairs of that region, I believe you would be equally loth to live on those sole conditions either—if you are not to fill, one may say, the whole world with your name and your power; and I fancy that, except Cyrus and Xerxes, you think there has never existed a single man who was of any account. So then that this is your hope, I know well enough; I am not merely guessing. And I daresay you will reply, since you know that what I say is true: "Well, Socrates, and what has that to do with your point?" I am going to tell you, dear son of Cleinias and Deinomache. Without me it is impossible for all those designs of yours to be crowned with achievement; so great is the power I conceive myself to have over your affairs and over you, and it is for this very reason, I believe, that the god has so long prevented me from talking

with you, while I was waiting to see when he would allow me. For as you have hopes of proving yourself in public to be invaluable to the state and, having proved it, of winning forthwith unlimited power, so do I hope to win supreme power over you by proving that I am invaluable to you, and that neither guardian nor kinsman nor anyone else is competent to transmit to you the power that you long for except me, with the god's help, however. In your younger days, to be sure, before you had built such high hopes, the god, as I believe, prevented me from talking with you, in order that I might not waste my words: but now he has set me on; for now you will listen to me.

Alcibiades/ You seem to me far more extraordinary, Socrates, now that you have begun to speak, than before, when you followed me about in silence; though even then you looked strange enough. Well, as to my intending all this or not, you have apparently made your decision, and any denial of mine will not avail me to persuade you. Very good: but supposing I have intended ever so much what you say, how are you the sole means through which I can hope to attain it? Can you tell me?

Socrates/ Are you asking whether I can make a long speech, such as you are used to hearing? No, my gift is not of that sort. But I fancy I could prove to you that the case is so, if you will consent to do me just one little service.

Alcibiades/ Why, if you mean a service that is not troublesome, I consent.

Socrates/ Do you consider it troublesome to answer questions put to you?

Alcibiades/ No, I do not.

Socrates/ Then answer.

Alcibiades/ Ask.

Socrates/ Well, you have the intentions which I say you have, I suppose?

Alcibiades/ Be it so. if you like, in order that I may know what you will say next.

Socrates/ Now then: you intend, as I say, to come forward as adviser to the Athenians in no great space of time; well, suppose I were to take hold of you as you were about to ascend the platform, and were to ask you: “Alcibiades, on what subject do the Athenians propose to take advice, that you should stand up to advise them? Is it something about which you have better knowledge than they?” What would be your reply?

Alcibiades/ I should say, I suppose, it was something about which I knew better than they.

Socrates/ Then you are a good adviser on things about which you actually know.

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And you know only the things you have learnt from others or discovered yourself?

Alcibiades/ What could I know besides?

Socrates/ And can it be that you would ever have learnt or discovered anything without being willing either to learn it or to inquire into it yourself?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Well then, would you have been willing to inquire into or learn what you thought you knew?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ So there was a time when you did not think that you knew what you now actually know.

Alcibiades/ There must have been.

Socrates/ Well, but I know pretty nearly the things that you have learnt: tell me if anything has escaped me. You

learnt, if I recollect, writing and harping and wrestling, as for fluting, you refused to learn it. These are the things that you know, unless perhaps there is something you have been learning unobserved by me; and this you were not, I believe, if you so much as stepped out of doors either by night or by day.

Alcibiades/ No, I have taken no other lessons than those.

Socrates/ Then tell me, will it be when the Athenians are taking advice how they are to do their writing correctly that you are to stand up and advise them?

Alcibiades/ Upon my word, not I.

Socrates/ Well, about strokes on the lyre?

Alcibiades/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Nor in fact are they accustomed to deliberate on throws in wrestling either at the Assembly.

Alcibiades/ No, to be sure.

Socrates/ Then what will be the subject of the advice? For I presume it will not be about building.

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ For a builder will give better advice than you in that matter.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor yet will it be about divination?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ For there again a diviner will serve better than you.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whether he be short or tall, handsome or ugly, nay, noble or ignoble.

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ For on each subject the advice comes from one who knows, not one who has riches.

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And whether their mentor be poor or rich will make no difference to the Athenians when they deliberate for the health of the citizens; all that they require of their counselor is that he be a physician.

Alcibiades/ Naturally.

Socrates/ Then what will they have under consideration if you are to be right in standing up, when you do so, as their counselor?

Alcibiades/ Their own affairs, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you mean with regard to shipbuilding, and the question as to what sort of ships they ought to get built?

Alcibiades/ No, I do not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Because, I imagine, you do not understand shipbuilding. Is that, and that alone, the reason?

Alcibiades/ That is just the reason.

Socrates/ Well, on what sort of affairs of their own do you mean that they will be deliberating?

Alcibiades/ On war, Socrates, or on peace, or on any other of the state's affairs.

Socrates/ Do you mean that they will be deliberating with whom they ought to make peace, and on whom they ought to make war, and in what manner?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And on whom it is better to do so, ought they not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And at such time as it is better?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And for so long as they had better?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now if the Athenians should deliberate with whom they should wrestle close, and with whom only at arm's length, and. in what manner, would you or the wrestling-master be the better adviser?

Alcibiades/ The wrestling-master, I presume.

Socrates/ And can you tell me what the wrestling-master would have in view when he advised as to the. persons with whom they ought or ought not to wrestle close, and when and in what manner? What I mean is something like this: ought they not to wrestle close with those with whom it is better to do so?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so far as is better, too?

Alcibiades/ So far.

Socrates/ And at such time also as is better?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But again, when one sings, one has sometimes to accompany the song with harping and stepping?

Alcibiades/ Yes, one has.

Socrates/ And at such time as is better?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so far as is better?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well now, since you applied the term "better" to the two cases of harping for accompaniment of a song and close wrestling, what do you call the "better" in the case of harping, to correspond with what in the case of wrestling I call gymnastic? What do you call the other?

Alcibiades/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Well, try to copy me: for my answer gave you, I think, what is correct in every instance; and that is correct, I presume, which proceeds by rule of the art, is it not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And was not the art here gymnastic?

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And I said that the better in the case of wrestling was gymnastic.

Alcibiades/ You did.

Socrates/ And I was quite fair?

Alcibiades/ I think so.

Socrates/ Come then, in your turn—for it would befit you also, I fancy, to argue fairly—tell me, first, what is the art which includes harping and singing and treading the measure correctly? What is it called as a whole? You cannot yet tell me?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Well, try another way: who are the goddesses that foster the art?

Alcibiades/ The Muses, you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I do. Now, just think, and say by what name the art is called after them.

Alcibiades/ Music, I suppose you mean.

Socrates/ Yes, I do. And what is that which proceeds correctly by its rule? As in the other case I was correct in mentioning to you gymnastic as that which goes by the art, so I ask you, accordingly, what you say in this case. What manner of proceeding is required?

Alcibiades/ A musical one, I suppose.

Socrates/ You are right. Come then, what is it that you term “better,” in respect of what is better in waging war and

being at peace? Just as in our other instances you said that the “better” implied the more musical and again, in the parallel case, the more gymnastical, try now if you can tell me what is the “better” in this case.

Alcibiades/ But I am quite unable.

Socrates/ But surely that is disgraceful; for if you should speak to somebody as his adviser on food, and say that one sort was better than another, at this time and in this quantity, and he then asked you—What do you mean by the “better,” Alcibiades? —in a matter like that you could tell him you meant the more wholesome, although you do not set up to be a physician; yet in a case where you set up to have knowledge and are ready to stand up and advise as though you knew, are you not ashamed to be unable, as appears, to answer a question upon it? Does it not seem disgraceful?

Alcibiades/ Very.

Socrates/ Then consider and do your best to tell me the connection of “better” in being at peace or at war with those to whom we ought to be so disposed.

Alcibiades/ Well, I am considering, but I fail to perceive it.

Socrates/ But you must know what treatment it is that we allege against each other when we enter upon a war, and what name we give it when we do so?

Alcibiades/ I do: we say we are victims of deceit or violence or spoliation.

Socrates/ Enough: how do we suffer each of these things? Try and tell me what difference there is between one way and another.

Alcibiades/ Do you mean by that, Socrates, whether it is in a just way or an unjust way?

Socrates/ Precisely.

Alcibiades/ Why, there you have all the difference in the world.

Socrates/ Well then, on which sort are you going to advise the Athenians to make war—those who are acting unjustly, or those who are doing what is just?

Alcibiades/ That is a hard question: for even if someone decides that he must go to war with those who are doing what is just, he would not admit that they were doing so.

Socrates/ For that would not be lawful, I suppose?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed; nor is it considered honorable either.

Socrates/ So you too will appeal to these things in making your speeches?

Alcibiades/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Then must not that "better" about which I was asking in reference to making or not making war, on those on whom we ought to or not, and when we ought to or not, be simply and solely the juster?

Alcibiades/ Apparently it is.

Socrates/ How now, friend Alcibiades? Have you overlooked your own ignorance of this matter, or have I overlooked your learning it and taking lessons of a master who taught you to distinguish the more just and the more unjust? And who is he? Inform me in my turn, in order that you may introduce me to him as another pupil.

Alcibiades/ You are joking, Socrates.

Socrates/ No, I swear by our common God of Friendship, whose name I would by no means take in vain. Come, if you can, tell me who the man is.

Alcibiades/ But what if I cannot? Do you think I could not know about what is just and unjust in any other way?

Socrates/ Yes, you might, supposing you discovered it.

Alcibiades/ But do you not think I might discover it?

Socrates/ Yes, quite so, if you inquired.

Alcibiades/ And do you not think I might inquire?

Socrates/ I do, if you thought you did not know.

Alcibiades/ And was there not a time when I held that view?

Socrates/ Well spoken. Then can you tell me at what time it was that you thought you did not know what is just and unjust? Pray, was it a year ago that you were inquiring, and thought you did not know? Or did you think you knew? Please answer truly, that our debates may not be futile.

Alcibiades/ Well, I thought I knew.

Socrates/ And two years, and three years, and four years back, were you not of the same mind?

Alcibiades/ I was.

Socrates/ But, you see, before that time you were a child, were you not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So I know well enough that then you thought you knew.

Alcibiades/ How do you know it so well?

Socrates/ Many a time I heard you, when as a child you were dicing or playing some other game at your teacher's or elsewhere, instead of showing hesitation about what was just and unjust, speak in very loud and confident tones about one or other of your playmates, saying he was a rascal and a cheat who played unfairly. Is not this a true account?

Alcibiades/ But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me?

Socrates/ Yet if you were ignorant then whether you were being unfairly treated or not, how can you ask —"What are you to do?

Alcibiades/ Well, but on my word, I was not ignorant: no, I clearly understood that I was being wronged.

Socrates/ So you thought you knew, even as a child, it seems, what was just and unjust.

Alcibiades/ I did; and I knew too.

Socrates/ At what sort of time did you discover it? For surely it was not while you thought you knew.

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Then when did you think you were ignorant? Consider; I believe you will fail to find such a time.

Alcibiades/ Upon my word, Socrates, I really cannot say.

Socrates/ So you do not know it by discovery.

Alcibiades/ Not at all, apparently.

Socrates/ But you said just now that you did not know it by learning either; and if you neither discovered nor learnt it, how do you come to know it, and whence?

Alcibiades/ Well, perhaps that answer I gave you was not correct, that I knew it by my own discovery.

Socrates/ Then how was it done?

Alcibiades/ I learnt it, I suppose, in the same way as everyone else.

Socrates/ Back we come to the same argument. From whom? Please tell me.

Alcibiades/ From the many.

Socrates/ They are no very serious teachers with whom you take refuge, if you ascribe it to the many!

Alcibiades/ Why, are they not competent to teach?

Socrates/ Not how to play, or not to play, draughts; and yet that, I imagine, is a slight matter compared with justice. What? Do you not think so?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then if they are unable to teach the slighter, can they teach the more serious matter?

Alcibiades/ I think so: at any rate, there are many other things that they are able to teach, more serious than draughts.

Socrates/ What sort of things?

Alcibiades/ For instance, it was from them that I learnt to speak Greek, and I could not say who was my teacher, but can only ascribe it to the same people who, you say, are not serious teachers.

Socrates/ Ah, gallant sir, the many may be good teachers of that, and they can justly be praised for their teaching of such subjects.

Alcibiades/ And why?

Socrates/ Because in those subjects they have the equipment proper to good teachers.

Alcibiades/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ You know that those who are going to teach anything should first know it themselves, do you not?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And that those who know should agree with each other and not differ?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if they differ upon anything, will you say that they know it?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Then how can they be teachers of it?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ Well now, do you find that the many differ about the nature of stone or wood? If you ask one of them, do they not agree on the same answer, and make for the same things when they want to get a piece of stone or wood? It is just the same, too, with everything of the sort: for I am pretty nearly right in understanding you to mean just this by knowing how to speak Greek, am I not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And on these matters, as we stated, they not only agree with each other and with themselves in private, but states also use in public the same terms about them to each other, without any dispute?

Alcibiades/ They do.

Socrates/ Then naturally they will be good teachers of these matters.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if we should wish to provide anyone with knowledge of them, we should be right in sending him to be taught by "the many" that you speak of?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what if we wished to know not only what men were like or what horses were like, but which of them were good runners or not? Would the many still suffice to teach us this?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And you have ample proof that they do not know this, and are not proficient teachers of it, in their not agreeing about it at all with themselves?

Alcibiades/ I have.

Socrates/ And what if we wished to know not only what men were like, but what healthy or diseased men were like? Would the many suffice to teach us?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And you would have proof of their being bad teachers of that, if you saw them differing about it?

Alcibiades/ I should.

Socrates/ Well then, do you now find that the many agree with themselves or each other about just and unjust men or things?

Alcibiades/ Far from it, on my word, Socrates.

Socrates/ In fact, they differ most especially on these points?

Alcibiades/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And I suppose you never yet saw or heard of people differing so sharply on questions of health or the opposite as to fight and kill one another in battle because of them.

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But on questions of justice or injustice I am sure you have; and if you have not seen them, at any rate you have heard of them from many people, especially Homer. For you have heard the Odyssey and the Iliad?

Alcibiades/ I certainly have, of course, Socrates.

Socrates/ And these poems are about a difference of just and unjust?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And from this difference arose the fights and deaths of the Achaeans, and of the Trojans as well, and of the suitors of Penelope in their strife with Odysseus.

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ And I imagine that when the Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians lost their men at Tanagra, and later at Coronea, among whom your own father perished, the difference that caused their deaths and fights was solely on a question of just and unjust, was it not?

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then are we to say that these people understand those questions, on which they differ so sharply that they are led by their mutual disputes to take these extreme measures against each other?

Alcibiades/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ And you refer me to teachers of that sort, whom you admit yourself to be without knowledge?

Alcibiades/ It seems I do.

Socrates/ Then how is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust, when you are so bewildered about these matters and are shown to have neither learnt them from anyone nor discovered them for yourself?

Alcibiades/ By what you say, it is not likely.

Socrates/ There again, Alcibiades, do you see how unfairly you speak?

Alcibiades/ In what?

Socrates/ In stating that I say so.

Alcibiades/ Why, do you not say that I do not know about the just and unjust?

Socrates/ Not at all.

Alcibiades/ Well, do I say it?

Socrates/ Yes.

Alcibiades/ How, pray?

Socrates/ I will show you, in the following way. If I ask you which is the greater number, one or two, you will answer "two"?

Alcibiades/ Yes, I shall.

Socrates/ How much greater?

Alcibiades/ By one.

Socrates/ Then which of us says that two are one more than one?

Alcibiades/ I.

Socrates/ And I was asking, and you were answering?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then is it I, the questioner, or you the answerer, that are found to be speaking about these things?

Alcibiades/ I.

Socrates/ And what if I ask what are the letters in "Socrates" and you tell me? Which will be the speaker?

Alcibiades/ I.

Socrates/ Come then, tell me, as a principle, when we have question and answer, which is the speaker—the questioner, or the answerer?

Alcibiades/ The answerer, I should say, Socrates.

Socrates/ And throughout the argument so far, I was the questioner?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you the answerer?

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Well then, which of us has spoken what has been said?

Alcibiades/ Apparently, Socrates, from what has been admitted, it was I.

Socrates/ And it was said that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, did not know about just and unjust, but thought he did, and intended to go to the Assembly as adviser to the Athenians on what he knows nothing about; is not that so?

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Then, to quote Euripides, the result is, Alcibiades, that you may be said to have "heard it from yourself, not me," and it is not I who say it, but you, and you tax me with it in vain. And indeed what you say is quite true. For it is a mad scheme this, that you meditate, my excellent friend—of teaching things that you do not know, since you have taken no care to learn them.

Alcibiades/ I think, Socrates, that the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks rarely deliberate as to which is the more just or unjust course: for they regard questions of this sort as obvious; and so they pass them over and consider which course will prove more expedient in the result. For the just and the expedient, I take it, are not the same, but many people have profited by great wrongs that they have committed, whilst others, I imagine, have had no advantage from doing what was right.

Socrates/ What then? Granting that the just and the expedient are in fact as different as they can be, you surely do not still suppose you know what is expedient for mankind, and why it is so?

Alcibiades/ Well, what is the obstacle, Socrates, —unless you are going to ask me again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it for myself?

Socrates/ What a way of going on! If your answer is incorrect, and a previous argument can be used to prove it so, you claim to be told something new, and a different line of proof, as though the previous one were like a poor worn-out coat which you refuse to wear any longer; you must be

provided instead with something clean and unsoiled in the way of evidence. But I shall ignore your sallies in debate, and shall none the less ask you once more, where you learnt your knowledge of what is expedient, and who is your teacher, asking in one question all the things I asked before; and now you will clearly find yourself in the same plight, and will be unable to prove that you know the expedient either through discovery or through learning. But as you are dainty, and would dislike a repeated taste of the same argument, I pass over this question of whether you know or do not know what is expedient for the Athenians: but why have you not made it clear whether the just and the expedient are the same or different? If you like, question me as I did you, or if you prefer, argue out the matter in your own way.

Alcibiades/ But I am not sure I should be able, Socrates, to set it forth to you.

Socrates/ Well, my good sir, imagine I am the people in Assembly; even there, you know, you will have to persuade each man singly, will you not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same man may well persuade one person singly, and many together, about things that he knows, just as the schoolmaster, I suppose, persuades either one or many about letters?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And again, will not the same man persuade either one or many about number?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And this will be the man who knows—the arithmetician?

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And you too can persuade a single man about things of which you can persuade many?

Alcibiades/ Presumably.

Socrates/ And these are clearly things that you know.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the only difference between the orator speaking before the people and one who speaks in a conversation like ours is that the former persuades men in a number together of the same things, and the latter persuades them one at a time?

Alcibiades/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ Come now, since we see that the same man may persuade either many or one, try your unpracticed hand on me, and endeavor to show that the just is sometimes not expedient.

Alcibiades/ You are insolent, Socrates!

Socrates/ This time, at any rate, I am going to have the insolence to persuade you of the opposite of that which you decline to prove to me.

Alcibiades/ Speak, then.

Socrates/ Just answer my questions.

Alcibiades/ No, you yourself must be the speaker.

Socrates/ What? Do you not wish above all things to be persuaded?

Alcibiades/ By all means, to be sure.

Socrates/ And you would best be persuaded if you should say “the case is so”?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then answer; and if you do not hear your own self say that the just is expedient, put no trust in the words of anyone again.

Alcibiades/ I will not: but I may as well answer; for I do not think I shall come to any harm.

Socrates/ You are quite a prophet! Now tell me, do you consider some just things to be expedient, and others not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And again, some noble, and some not?

Alcibiades/ What do you mean by that question?

Socrates/ I would ask whether anyone ever seemed to you to be doing what was base and yet just.

Alcibiades/ Never.

Socrates/ Well, are all just things noble?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what of noble things, in their turn? Are they all good, or some only, while others are not?

Alcibiades/ In my opinion, Socrates, some noble things are evil.

Socrates/ And some base things are good?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you mean as in one of the many cases where men have gone to rescue a comrade or kinsman in battle, and have been either wounded or killed, while those who did not go to the rescue, as duty bade, have got off safe and sound?

Alcibiades/ Precisely.

Socrates/ And such a rescue you call noble, in respect of the endeavor to save those whom it was one's duty to save; and this is courage, is it not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But you call it evil, in respect of the deaths and wounds?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not the courage one thing, and the death another?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then it is not in the same respect that rescuing one's friends is noble and evil?

Alcibiades/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Then see if, inasmuch as it is noble, it is also good; for in the present case you were admitting that the rescue was noble in respect of its courage: now consider this very thing, courage, and say whether it is good or bad. Consider it in this way: which would you choose to have, good things or evil?

Alcibiades/ Good.

Socrates/ And most of all, the greatest goods, and of such things you would least allow yourself to be deprived?

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Then what do you say of courage? At what price would you allow yourself to be deprived of it?

Alcibiades/ I would give up life itself if I had to be a coward.

Socrates/ Then you regard cowardice as the uttermost evil.

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ On a par with death, it seems.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you would most desire to have the former, and least the latter?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is that because you think the former best, and the latter worst?

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ So you reckon courage among the best things, and death among the worst.

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Then the rescue of one's friends in battle, inasmuch as it is noble in respect of the working of good by courage, you have termed noble?

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ But evil, in respect of the working of evil by death?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So we may fairly describe each of these workings as follows: as you call either of them evil because of the evil it produces, so you must call it good because of the good it produces.

Alcibiades/ I believe that is so.

Socrates/ And again, are they noble inasmuch as they are good, and base inasmuch as they are evil?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then in saying that the rescue of one's friends in battle is noble and yet evil, you mean just the same as if you called the rescue good, but evil.

Alcibiades/ I believe what you say is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ So nothing noble, in so far as it is noble, is evil, and nothing base, in so far as it is base, is good.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Now then, consider it again in this way: whoever does nobly, does well too, does he not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are not those who do well happy?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And they are happy because of the acquisition of good things?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And they acquire these by doing well and nobly?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So doing well is good?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And welfare is noble?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Hence we have seen again that noble and good are the same thing.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Then whatever we find to be noble we shall find also to be good, by this argument at least.

Alcibiades/ We must.

Socrates/ Well then, are good things expedient or not?

Alcibiades/ Expedient.

Socrates/ And do you remember what our admissions were about just things?

Alcibiades/ I think we said that those who do just things must do noble things.

Socrates/ And that those who do noble things must do good things?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that good things are expedient?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Hence just things, Alcibiades, are expedient.

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Well now, are not you the speaker of all this, and I the questioner?

Alcibiades/ I seem to be, apparently.

Socrates/ So if anyone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians, imagining that he understands what is just and unjust, and says that just things are sometimes evil, could you do other than laugh him to scorn, since you actually say yourself that just and expedient are the same?

Alcibiades/ But by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I am saying, I feel altogether in such a strange state! For from moment to moment I change my view under your questioning.

Socrates/ And are you unaware, my friend, what this feeling is?

Alcibiades/ I am, quite.

Socrates/ Well, do you suppose that if someone should ask you whether you have two eyes or three, two hands or four, or anything else of that sort, you would answer differently from moment to moment, or always the same thing?

Alcibiades/ I begin to have misgivings about myself, but still I think I should make the same answer.

Socrates/ And the reason would be, because you know?

Alcibiades/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then if you involuntarily give contradictory answers, clearly it must be about things of which you are ignorant.

Alcibiades/ Very likely.

Socrates/ And you say you are bewildered in answering about just and unjust, noble and base, evil and good,

expedient and inexpedient? Now, is it not obvious that your bewilderment is caused by your ignorance of these things?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then is it the case that when a man does not know a thing he must needs be bewildered in spirit regarding that thing?

Alcibiades/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ Well now, do you know in what way you can ascend to heaven?

Alcibiades/ On my word, not I.

Socrates/ Is that too a kind of question about which your judgment is bewildered?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Do you know the reason, or shall I state it?

Alcibiades/ State it.

Socrates/ It is, my friend, that while not knowing the matter you do not suppose that you know it.

Alcibiades/ Here again, how do you mean?

Socrates/ Do your share, in seeing for yourself. Are you bewildered about the kind of thing that you do not know and are aware of not knowing? For instance, you know, I suppose, that you do not know about the preparation of a tasty dish?

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then do you think for yourself how you are to prepare it, and get bewildered, or do you entrust it to the person who knows?

Alcibiades/ I do the latter.

Socrates/ And what if you should be on a ship at sea? Would you think whether the tiller should be moved inwards

or outwards, and in your ignorance bewilder yourself, or would you entrust it to the helmsman, and be quiet?

Alcibiades/ I would leave it to him.

Socrates/ So you are not bewildered about what you do not know, so long as you know that you do not know?

Alcibiades/ It seems I am not.

Socrates/ Then do you note that mistakes in action also are due to this ignorance of thinking one knows when one does not?

Alcibiades/ Here again, how do you mean?

Socrates/ We set about acting, I suppose, when we think we know what we are doing?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But when people think they do not know, I suppose they hand it over to others?

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And so that kind of ignorant person makes no mistakes in life, because they entrust such matters to others?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Who then are those who make mistakes? For, I take it, they cannot be those who know.

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But since it is neither those who know, nor those of the ignorant who know that they do not know, the only people left, I think, are those who do not know, but think that they do?

Alcibiades/ Yes, only those.

Socrates/ Then this ignorance is a cause of evils, and is the discreditable sort of stupidity?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when it is about the greatest matters, it is most injurious and base?

Alcibiades/ By far.

Socrates/ Well then, can you mention any greater things than the just, the noble, the good, and the expedient?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And it is about these, you say, that you are bewildered?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if you are bewildered, is it not clear from what has gone before that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do?

Alcibiades/ I am afraid so.

Socrates/ Alack then, Alcibiades, for the plight you are in! I shrink indeed from giving it a name, but still, as we are alone, let me speak out. You are wedded to stupidity, my fine friend, of the vilest kind; you are impeached of this by your own words, out of your own mouth; and this, it seems, is why you dash into politics before you have been educated. And you are not alone in this plight, but you share it with most of those who manage our city's affairs, except just a few, and perhaps your guardian, Pericles.

Alcibiades/ Yes, you know, Socrates, they say he did not get his wisdom independently, but consorted with many wise men, such as Pythocleides and Anaxagoras; and now, old as he is, he still confers with Damon for that very purpose.

Socrates/ Well, but did you ever find a man who was wise in anything and yet unable to make another man wise in the same things as himself? For instance, the man who taught you letters was wise himself, and also made you wise, and anyone else he wished to, did he not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you too, who learnt from him, will be able to make another man wise?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same holds of the harper and the trainer?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For, I presume, it is a fine proof of ones knowing anything that one knows, when one is able to point to another man whom one has made to know it.

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well then, can you tell me whom Pericles made wise? One of his sons, to begin with?

Alcibiades/ But what if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, Socrates?

Socrates/ Well, Cleinias, your brother.

Alcibiades/ But why should you mention Cleinias, a madman?

Socrates/ Well, if Cleinias is mad and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason are we to assign, in your case, for his allowing you to be in your present condition?

Alcibiades/ I believe I am myself to blame for not attending to him.

Socrates/ But tell me of any other Athenian or foreigner, slave or freeman, who is accounted to have become wiser through converse with Pericles; as I can tell you that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, and Callias, son of Calliades, became through that of Zeno; each of them has paid Zeno a hundred minae, and has become both wise and distinguished.

Alcibiades/ Well, upon my word, I cannot.

Socrates/ Very good: then what is your intention regarding yourself? Will you remain as you are, or take some trouble?

Alcibiades/ We must put our heads together, Socrates. And indeed, as soon as you speak, I take the point and agree. For the men who manage the city's affairs, apart from a few, do strike me as uneducated.

Socrates/ Then what does that mean?

Alcibiades/ That if they were educated, I suppose anyone who undertook to contend against them would have to get some knowledge and practice first, as he would for a match with athletes: but now, seeing that these men have gone in for politics as amateurs, what need is there for me to practice and have the trouble of learning? For I am sure that my natural powers alone will give me an easy victory over them.

Socrates/ Ho, ho, my good sir, what a thing to say! How unworthy of your looks and your other advantages!

Alcibiades/ What is your meaning now, Socrates? What is the connection?

Socrates/ I am grieved for you, and for my love.

Alcibiades/ Why, pray?

Socrates/ That you should expect your contest to be with the men we have here.

Alcibiades/ Well, but with whom is it to be?

Socrates/ Is that a worthy question to be asked by a man who considers himself high-spirited?

Alcibiades/ How do you mean? Is not my contest with these men?

Socrates/ Well, suppose you were intending to steer a warship into action, would you be content to be the best hand among the crew at steering or, while regarding this skill as a necessary qualification, would you keep your eye

on your actual opponents in the fight, and not, as now, on your fellow-fighters? These, I conceive, you ought so far to surpass that they would not feel fit to be your opponents, but only to be your despised fellow-fighters against the enemy, if you mean really to make your mark with some noble action that will be worthy both of yourself and of the city.

Alcibiades/ Why, I do mean to.

Socrates/ So you think it quite fitting for you to be satisfied if you are better than the soldiers, but neglect to keep your eye on the enemy's leaders with a view to showing yourself better than they are, or to plan and practice against them!

Alcibiades/ Of whom are you speaking now, Socrates?

Socrates/ Do you not know that our city makes war occasionally on the Spartans and on the Great King?

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ And if you are minded to be the head of our state, you would be right in thinking that your contest is with, the kings of Sparta and of Persia?

Alcibiades/ That sounds like the truth.

Socrates/ No, my good friend; you ought rather to keep your eye on Meidias the quail-filliper and others of his sort—who undertake to manage the city's affairs, while they still have the slavish hair, as the women would say, showing in their minds through their lack of culture, and have not yet got rid of it; who, moreover, have come with their outlandish speech to flatter the state, not to rule it—to these, I tell you, should your eyes be turned; and then you can disregard yourself, and need neither learn what is to be learnt for the great contest in which you are to be engaged, nor practice what requires practice, and so ensure that you are perfectly prepared before entering upon a political career.

Alcibiades/ Why, Socrates, I believe you are right; though I think neither the Spartan generals nor the Persian king are at all different from other people.

Socrates/ But, my excellent friend, consider what this notion of yours means.

Alcibiades/ In regard to what?

Socrates/ First of all, do you think you would take more pains over yourself if you feared them and thought them terrible, or if you did not?

Alcibiades/ Clearly, if I thought them terrible.

Socrates/ And do you think you will come to any harm by taking pains over yourself?

Alcibiades/ By no means; rather that I shall get much benefit.

Socrates/ And on this single count that notion of yours is so much to the bad.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Then, in the second place, observe the probability that it is false.

Alcibiades/ How so?

Socrates/ Is it probable that noble races should produce better natures, or not?

Alcibiades/ Clearly, noble races would.

Socrates/ And will not the well-born, provided they are well brought up, probably be perfected in virtue?

Alcibiades/ That must be so.

Socrates/ Then let us consider, by comparing our lot with theirs, whether the Spartan and Persian kings appear to be of inferior birth. Do we not know that the former are descendants of Hercules and the latter of Achaemenes, and that the line of Hercules and the line of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?

Alcibiades/ Yes, and mine, Socrates, to Eurysaces, and that of Eurysaces to Zeus!

Socrates/ Yes, and mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and Daedalus to Hephaestus, son of Zeus! But take the lines of those people, going back from them: you have a succession of kings reaching to Zeus—on the one hand, kings of Argos and Sparta; on the other, of Persia, which they have always ruled, and frequently Asia also, as at present; whereas we are private persons ourselves, and so were our fathers. And then, suppose that you had to make what show you could of your ancestors, and of Salamis as the native land of Eurysaces, or of Aegina as the home of the yet earlier Aeacus, to impress Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, how you must expect to be laughed at! Why, I am afraid we are quite outdone by those persons in pride of birth and upbringing altogether. Or have you not observed how great are the advantages of the Spartan kings, and how their wives are kept under statutory ward of the ephors, in order that every possible precaution may be taken against the king being born of any but the Heracleidae? And the Persian king is so pre-eminent that no one has a suspicion that an heir could have been born of anybody but the king; and hence the king's wife has nothing to guard her except fear. When the eldest son, the heir to the throne, is born, first of all the king's subjects who are in his palace have a feast, and then forever after on that date the whole of Asia celebrates the king's birthday with sacrifice and feasting: but when we are born, as the comic poet says, "even the neighbors barely notice it," Alcibiades. After that comes the nurture of the child, not at the hands of a woman-nurse of little worth, but of the most highly approved eunuchs in the king's service, who are charged with the whole tendance of the new-born child, and especially with the business of making him as handsome as possible by molding his limbs into a correct

shape; and while doing this they are in high honor. When the boys are seven years old they are given horses and have riding lessons, and they begin to follow the chase. And when the boy reaches fourteen years he is taken over by the royal tutors, as they call them there: these are four men chosen as the most highly esteemed among the Persians of mature age, namely, the wisest one, the justest one, the most temperate one, and the bravest one. The first of these teaches him the magian lore of Zoroaster, son of Horomazes; and that is the worship of the gods: he teaches him also what pertains to a king. The justest teaches him to be truthful all his life long; the most temperate, not to be mastered by even a single pleasure, in order that he may be accustomed to be a free man and a veritable king, who is the master first of all that is in him, not the slave; while the bravest trains him to be fearless and undaunted, telling him that to be daunted is to be enslaved. But you, Alcibiades, had a tutor set over you by Pericles from amongst his servants, who was so old as to be the most useless of them, Zopyrus the Thracian. I might describe to you at length the nurture and education of your competitors, were it not too much of a task; and besides, what I have said suffices to show the rest that follows thereon. But about your birth, Alcibiades, or nurture or education, or about those of any other Athenian, one may say that nobody cares, unless it be some lover whom you chance to have. And again, if you chose to glance at the wealth, the luxury, the robes with sweeping trains, the anointing with myrrh, the attendant troops of menials, and all the other refinements of the Persians, you would be ashamed at your own case, on perceiving its inferiority to theirs.

Should you choose, again, to look at the temperance and orderliness, the forbearance and placidity, the magnanimity and discipline, the courage and endurance, and the toil-

loving, success-loving, honor-loving spirit of the Spartans, you would count yourself but a child in all these things. If again you regard wealth, and think yourself something in that way, I must not keep silence on this point either, if you are to realize where you stand. For in this respect you have only to look at the wealth of the Spartans, and you will perceive that our riches here are far inferior to theirs. Think of all the land that they have both in their own and in the Messenian country: not one of our estates could compete with theirs in extent and excellence, nor again in ownership of slaves, and especially of those of the helot class, nor yet of horses, nor of all the flocks and herds that graze in Messene. However, I pass over all these things: but there is more gold and silver privately held in Lacedaemon than in the whole of Greece; for during many generations treasure has been passing in to them from every part of Greece, and often from the barbarians also, but not passing out to anyone; and just as in the fable of Aesop, where the fox remarked to the lion on the direction of the footmarks, the traces of the money going into Lacedaemon are clear enough, but nowhere are any to be seen of it coming out; so that one can be pretty sure that those people are the richest of the Greeks in gold and silver, and that among themselves the richest is the king; for the largest and most numerous receipts of the kind are those of the kings, and besides there is the levy of the royal tribute in no slight amount, which the Spartans pay to their kings. Now, the Spartan fortunes, though great compared with the wealth of other Greeks, are naught beside that of the Persians and their king. For I myself was once told by a trustworthy person, who had been up to their court, that he traversed a very large tract of excellent land, nearly a day's journey, which the inhabitants called the girdle of the king's wife, and another which was similarly called her veil; and many other fine and fertile

regions reserved for the adornment of the consort; and each of these regions was named after some part of her apparel. So I imagine, if someone should say to the king's mother Amestris, who was wife of Xerxes, "The son of Deinomache intends to challenge your son; the mother's dresses are worth perhaps fifty minae at the outside, while the son has under three hundred acres at Erchiae," she would wonder to what on earth this Alcibiades could be trusting, that he proposed to contend against Artaxerxes; and I expect she would remark—"The only possible things that the man can be trusting to for his enterprise are industry and wisdom; for these are the only things of any account among the Greeks." Whereas if she were informed that this Alcibiades who is actually making such an attempt is, in the first place, as yet barely twenty years old, and secondly, altogether uneducated; and further, that when his lover tells him that he must first learn, and take pains over himself, and practice, before he enters on a contest with the king, he refuses, and says he will do very well as he is; I expect she would ask in surprise, "On what, then, can the youngster rely?" And if we told her, "On beauty, stature, birth, wealth, and mental gifts," she would conclude we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages of her own people in all these respects. And I imagine that even Lampido, daughter of Leotychides and wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, who have all been kings, would wonder in the same way, when she compared her peoples resources, at your intention of having a contest with her son despite your bad upbringing. And yet, does it not strike you as disgraceful that our enemies' wives should have a better idea of the qualities that we need for an attempt against them than we have ourselves? Ah, my remarkable friend, listen to me and the Delphic motto, Know thyself; for these people are our competitors, not those whom you think; and there is

nothing that will give us ascendancy over them save only pains and skill. If you are found wanting in these, you will be found wanting also in achievement of renown among Greeks and barbarians both; and of this I observe you to be more enamored than anyone else ever was of anything.

Alcibiades/ Well then, what are the pains that I must take, Socrates? Can you enlighten me? For I must say your words are remarkably like the truth.

Socrates/ Yes, I can: but we must put our heads together, you know, as to the way in which we can improve ourselves to the utmost. For observe that when I speak of the need of being educated I am not referring only to you, apart from myself; since my case is identical with yours except in one point.

Alcibiades/ What is that?

Socrates/ My guardian is better and wiser than your one, Pericles.

Alcibiades/ Who is he, Socrates?

Socrates/ God, Alcibiades, who until this day would not let me converse with you; and trusting in him I say that through no other man but me will you attain to eminence.

Alcibiades/ You are jesting, Socrates.

Socrates/ Perhaps; I am right, however, in saying that we need to take pains—all men rather badly, but we two very badly indeed.

Alcibiades/ As to me, you are not wrong.

Socrates/ Nor, I fear, as to myself either.

Alcibiades/ Then what can we do?

Socrates/ There must be no crying off or skulking, my good friend.

Alcibiades/ No, for that would indeed be unseemly, Socrates.

Socrates/ It would; so let us consider in common. Now tell me: we say, do we not, that we wish to be as good as possible?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ In what excellence?

Alcibiades/ Clearly that which is the aim of good men.

Socrates/ Good in what?

Alcibiades/ Clearly, good in the management of affairs.

Socrates/ What sort of affairs? Horsemanship?

Alcibiades/ No, no.

Socrates/ Because we should apply to horsemen?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, seamanship, do you mean?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Because we should apply to seamen?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, what sort of thing? The business of what men?

Alcibiades/ Of Athenian gentlemen.

Socrates/ Do you mean by “gentlemen” the intelligent or the unintelligent?

Alcibiades/ The intelligent.

Socrates/ And everyone is good in that wherein he is intelligent?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And bad wherein he is unintelligent?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then is the shoemaker intelligent in the making of foot-gear?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So he is good in that article?

Alcibiades/ Good.

Socrates/ Well now, is not the shoemaker unintelligent in the making of clothes?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So he is bad in that?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, on this showing, the same man is both bad and good.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Well, can you say that good men are also bad?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But whoever do you mean by the good?

Alcibiades/ I mean those who are able to rule in the city.

Socrates/ Not, I presume, over horses?

Alcibiades/ No, no.

Socrates/ But over men?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ When they are sick?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Or at sea?

Alcibiades/ I say, no.

Socrates/ Or harvesting?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Doing nothing, or doing something?

Alcibiades/ Doing something, I say.

Socrates/ Doing what? Try and let me know.

Alcibiades/ Well, men who do business with each other and make use of one another, as is our way of life in our cities.

Socrates/ Then you speak of ruling over men who make use of men?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Over boatswains who make use of rowers?

Alcibiades/ No, no.

Socrates/ Because that is the pilot's distinction?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, do you mean ruling over men who are flute-players, and who lead the singing and make use of dancers?

Alcibiades/ No, no.

Socrates/ Because, again, that is the chorus-teacher's function?

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ But whatever do you mean by being able to rule over men who make use of men?

Alcibiades/ I mean ruling over men in the city who share in it as fellow-citizens, and do business with each other.

Socrates/ Well, what art is this? Suppose I should ask you over again, as I did just now, what art makes men know how to rule over fellow-sailors?

Alcibiades/ The pilot's.

Socrates/ And what knowledge—to repeat what was said a moment ago—makes them rule over their fellow-singers?

Alcibiades/ That which you just mentioned, the chorus-teacher's.

Socrates/ Well now, what do you call the knowledge of one's fellow-citizens?

Alcibiades/ Good counsel, I should say, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, and is the pilot's knowledge evil counsel?

Alcibiades/ No, no.

Socrates/ Rather good counsel?

Alcibiades/ So I should think, for the preservation of his passengers.

Socrates/ Quite right. And now, for what is the good counsel of which you speak?

Alcibiades/ For the better management and preservation of the city.

Socrates/ And what is it that becomes present or absent when we get this better management and preservation? If, for example, you should ask me, "What is it that becomes present or absent when the body is better managed and preserved?"—I should reply, "Health becomes present, and disease absent." Do not you think so too?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if, again, you asked me, "What becomes present in a better condition of the eyes?" —I should answer in just the same way, "Sight becomes present, and blindness absent." So, in the case of the ears, deafness is caused to be absent, and hearing to be present, when they are improved and getting better treatment.

Alcibiades/ Correct.

Socrates/ Well then, what is it that becomes present or absent when a state is improved and has better treatment and management?

Alcibiades/ To my mind, Socrates, friendship with one another will be there, while hatred and faction will be absent.

Socrates/ Now, by friendship do you mean agreement or disagreement?

Alcibiades/ Agreement.

Socrates/ And what art is it that causes states to agree about numbers?

Alcibiades/ Arithmetic.

Socrates/ And what of individuals? Is it not the same art?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And it makes each single person agree with himself?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what art makes each of us agree with himself as to which is the longer, a span or a cubit? Is it not mensuration?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And it makes both individuals and states agree with each other?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what about the balance? Is it not the same here too?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Then what is that agreement of which you speak, and about what? And what art secures it? And is it the same in an individual as in a state, when one agrees with oneself and with another?

Alcibiades/ Most likely.

Socrates/ Well, what is it? Do not flag in your answers, but do your best to tell me.

Alcibiades/ I suppose I mean the friendship and agreement that you find when a father and mother love their son, and between brother and brother, and husband and wife.

Socrates/ Then do you suppose, Alcibiades, that a husband can possibly agree with his wife about wool-work, when he does not understand it, and she does?

Alcibiades/ Oh, no.

Socrates/ Nor has he any need, since that is a woman's accomplishment.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Or again, could a woman agree with a man about soldiering, when she has not learnt it?

Alcibiades/ Oh, no.

Socrates/ Because, I expect you will say again, that is a man's affair.

Alcibiades/ I would.

Socrates/ Then, by your account, there are some accomplishments belonging to women, and some to men?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ So in these, at any rate, there is no agreement between men and women.

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ And hence no friendship either, if, as we said, friendship is agreement.

Alcibiades/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ So women are not loved by men, in so far as they do their own work.

Alcibiades/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Nor are men by women, in so far as they do theirs.

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ And states, therefore, are not well ordered in so far as each person does his own business?

Alcibiades/ I think they are, Socrates.

Socrates/ How can you say that? Without the presence of friendship, which we say must be there if states are well ordered, as otherwise they are not?

Alcibiades/ But it seems to me that friendship arises among them just on that account—that each of the two parties does its own business.

Socrates/ It was not so a moment since: but now, what do you mean this time? Does friendship arise where there is no agreement? And is it possible that agreement should arise where some know about the business, but others do not?

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And are they doing what is just or unjust, when each man does his own business?

Alcibiades/ What is just, of course.

Socrates/ And when the citizens do what is just in the city, does not friendship arise among them?

Alcibiades/ Again I think that must be so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then whatever do you mean by that friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and well-advised in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn either what it is, or in whom; since it appears that the same persons sometimes have it, and sometimes not, by your account.

Alcibiades/ Well, by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I mean myself, and I fear that for some time past I have lived unawares in a very disgraceful condition.

Socrates/ But you must take heart. For had you perceived your plight at fifty, it would be hard for you to take pains with yourself; whereas here you are at the time of life when one ought to perceive it.

Alcibiades/ Then what should one do on perceiving it, Socrates?

Socrates/ Answer the questions asked, Alcibiades: only do that, and with Heaven's favor—if we are to put any trust in my divination—you and I shall both be in better case.

Alcibiades/ That shall be, so far as my answering can avail.

Socrates/ Come then, what is “taking pains over oneself”—for we may perchance be taking, unawares, no pains over ourselves, though we think we are—and when does a man actually do it? Does he take pains over himself at the same time as over his own things?

Alcibiades/ I at least believe so.

Socrates/ Well now, when does a man take pains over his feet? Is it when he takes pains over what belongs to his feet?

Alcibiades/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Is there anything you can name as belonging to the hand? For instance, does a ring belong to any other part of a man but the finger?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And so the shoe also belongs to the foot, in the same way?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And likewise clothes and coverlets belong to the whole body?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now when we take pains over our shoes, we take pains over our feet?

Alcibiades/ I do not quite understand, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, but, Alcibiades, you speak of taking proper pains over this or that matter, do you not?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you call it proper pains when someone makes a thing better?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then what art makes shoes better?

Alcibiades/ Shoe-making.

Socrates/ So by shoe-making we take pains over our shoes?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And over our foot too by shoe-making? Or by that art whereby we make feet better?

Alcibiades/ By that art.

Socrates/ And is it not the same one for making our feet as for making the whole body better?

Alcibiades/ I think so.

Socrates/ And is not that gymnastic?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So by gymnastic we take pains over our foot, but by shoe-making over what belongs to our foot?

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And by gymnastic over our hands, but by ring-engraving over what belongs to the hand?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by gymnastic over the body, but by weaving and the rest over what belongs to the body?

Alcibiades/ Absolutely so.

Socrates/ Then for taking pains over a thing itself and over what belongs to it we use different arts.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So when you take pains over your belongings you are not taking pains over yourself.

Alcibiades/ Not at all.

Socrates/ For the arts, it seems, that one used for taking pains over oneself and over ones belongings would not be the same.

Alcibiades/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Come then, whatever kind of art can we use for taking pains over ourselves?

Alcibiades/ I cannot say.

Socrates/ Well, so much at least has been admitted, that it is not one which would help us to make a single one of our possessions better, but one which would help to make ourselves so?

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ Now, should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we had not known a shoe?

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Nor could we know what art makes rings better, if we had no cognizance of a ring.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Well then, could we ever know what art makes the man himself better, if we were ignorant of what we are ourselves?

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Well, and is it an easy thing to know oneself, and was it a mere scamp who inscribed these words on the temple at Delphi; or is it a hard thing, and not a task for anybody?

Alcibiades/ I have often thought, Socrates, that it was for anybody; but often, too, that it was very hard.

Socrates/ But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, here is the fact for us all the same: if we have that knowledge, we are like to know what pains to take over ourselves; but if we have it not, we never can.

Alcibiades/ That is so.

Socrates/ Come then, in what way can the same-in-itself be discovered? For thus we may discover what we are

ourselves; whereas if we remain in ignorance of it we must surely fail.

Alcibiades/ Rightly spoken.

Socrates/ Steady, then, in Heaven's name! To whom are you talking now? To me, are you not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And I in turn to you?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the talker is Socrates?

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And the hearer, Alcibiades?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And Socrates uses speech in talking?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And you call talking and using speech the same thing, I suppose.

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ But the user and the thing he uses are different, are they not?

Alcibiades/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ For instance, I suppose a shoemaker uses a round tool, and a square one, and others, when he cuts.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the cutter and user is quite different from what he uses in cutting?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And in the same way what the harper uses in harping will be different from the harper himself?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, that is what I was asking just now—whether the user and what he uses are always, in your opinion, two different things.

Alcibiades/ They are.

Socrates/ Then what are we to say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only, or with his hands as well?

Alcibiades/ With his hands as well.

Socrates/ So he uses these also?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does he use his eyes, too, in his shoe-making?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we admit that the user and what he uses are different things?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the shoemaker and the harper are different from the hands and eyes that they use for their work?

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And man uses his whole body too?

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And we said that the user and what he uses are different?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So man is different from his own body?

Alcibiades/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then whatever is man?

Alcibiades/ I cannot say.

Socrates/ Oh, but you can—that he is the user of the body.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the user of it must be the soul?

Alcibiades/ It must.

Socrates/ And ruler?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, here is a remark from which no one, I think, can dissent.

Alcibiades/ What is it?

Socrates/ That man must be one of three things.

Alcibiades/ What things?

Socrates/ Soul, body, or both together as one whole.

Alcibiades/ Very well.

Socrates/ But yet we have admitted that what actually rules the body is man?

Alcibiades/ We have.

Socrates/ And does the body rule itself?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ Because we have said that it is ruled.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then that cannot be what we are seeking.

Alcibiades/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Well then, does the combination of the two rule the body, so that we are to regard this as man?

Alcibiades/ Perhaps it is.

Socrates/ The unlikeliest thing in the world: for if one of the two does not share in the rule, it is quite inconceivable that the combination of the two can be ruling.

Alcibiades/ You are right.

Socrates/ But since neither the body nor the combination of the two is man, we are reduced, I suppose, to this: either

man is nothing at all, or if something, he turns out to be nothing else than soul.

Alcibiades/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Well, do you require some yet clearer proof that the soul is man?

Alcibiades/ No, I assure you: I think it is amply proved.

Socrates/ And if it is tolerably, though not exactly, we are content; exact knowledge will be ours later, when we have discovered the thing that we passed over just now because it would involve much consideration.

Alcibiades/ What is that?

Socrates/ The point suggested in that remark a moment ago, that we should first consider the same-in-itself; but so far, instead of the same, we have been considering what each single thing is in itself. And perhaps we shall be satisfied with that: for surely we cannot say that anything has more absolute possession of ourselves than the soul.

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And it is proper to take the view that you and I are conversing with each other, while we make use of words, by intercourse of soul with soul?

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Well, that is just what we suggested a little while ago—that Socrates, in using words to talk with Alcibiades, is holding speech, not with your face, it would seem, but with Alcibiades—that is, with his soul.

Alcibiades/ I believe so.

Socrates/ Then he who enjoins a knowledge of oneself bids us become acquainted with the soul.

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And anyone who gets to know something belonging to the body knows the things that are his, but not himself.

Alcibiades/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then no physician, in so far as he is a physician, knows himself, nor does any trainer, in so far as he is a trainer.

Alcibiades/ It seems not.

Socrates/ And farmers, and craftsmen generally, are far from knowing themselves. For these people, it would seem, do not even know their own things, but only things still more remote than their own things, in respect of the arts which they follow; since they know but the things of the body, with which it is tended.

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ So if knowing oneself is temperance, none of these people is temperate in respect of his art.

Alcibiades/ None, I agree.

Socrates/ And that is why these arts are held to be sordid, and no acquirements for a good man.

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then once again, whoever tends his body tends his own things, but not himself?

Alcibiades/ It looks rather like it.

Socrates/ But whoever tends his money tends neither himself nor his own things, but only things yet more remote than his own things?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ So that the money-maker has ceased to do his own business.

Alcibiades/ Correct.

Socrates/ And if anyone is found to be a lover of Alcibiades' body, he has fallen in love, not with Alcibiades, but with something belonging to Alcibiades?

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ Your lover is rather he who loves your soul?

Alcibiades/ He must be, apparently, by our argument.

Socrates/ And he who loves your body quits you, and is gone, as soon as its bloom is over?

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Whereas he who loves your soul will not quit you so long as it makes for what is better?

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And I am he who does not quit you, but remains with you when your body's prime is over, and the rest have departed.

Alcibiades/ Yes, and I am glad of it, Socrates, and hope you will not go.

Socrates/ Then you must endeavor to be as handsome as you can.

Alcibiades/ Well, I shall endeavor.

Socrates/ You see how you stand: Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, it seems, neither had nor has any lover except one only, and that a cherished one, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And you said that I only just anticipated you in coming to you, for otherwise you would have come to me first for the purpose of inquiring why I am the only one who does not leave you?

Alcibiades/ Yes, that was so.

Socrates/ Then the reason was that I was the only lover of you, whereas the rest were lovers of what is yours; and that is passing its prime, while you are beginning to bloom. So now, if you are not blighted and deformed by the Athenian people, I shall never forsake you. For my chiefest fear is of your being blighted by becoming a lover of the people, since many a good Athenian has come to that ere now. For fair of face is "the people of great-hearted Erechtheus"; but you should get a view of it stripped: so take the precaution that I recommend.

Alcibiades/ What is it?

Socrates/ Exercise yourself first, my wonderful friend, in learning what you ought to know before entering on politics; you must wait till you have learnt, in order that you may be armed with an antidote and so come to no harm.

Alcibiades/ Your advice seems to me good, Socrates; but try to explain in what way we can take pains over ourselves.

Socrates/ Well, we have made one step in advance; for there is a pretty fair agreement now as to what we are, whereas we were afraid we might fail of this and take pains, without knowing it, over something other than ourselves.

Alcibiades/ That is so.

Socrates/ And the next step, we see, is to take care of the soul, and look to that.

Alcibiades/ Clearly.

Socrates/ While handing over to others the care of our bodies and our coffers.

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then how shall we obtain the most certain knowledge of it? For if we know that, it seems we shall know ourselves also. In Heaven's name, do we fail to comprehend

the wise words of the Delphic inscription, which we mentioned just now?

Alcibiades/ With what intent do you say that, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you what I suspect to be the real advice which that inscription gives us. I rather think there are not many illustrations of it to be found, but only in the case of sight.

Alcibiades/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ Consider in your turn: suppose that, instead of speaking to a man, it said to the eye of one of us, as a piece of advice—"See thyself,"—how should we apprehend the meaning of the admonition? Would it not be, that the eye should look at something in looking at which it would see itself?

Alcibiades/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then let us think what object there is anywhere, by looking at which we can see both it and ourselves.

Alcibiades/ Why, clearly, Socrates, mirrors and things of that sort.

Socrates/ Quite right. And there is also something of that sort in the eye that we see with?

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And have you observed that the face of the person who looks into another's eye is shown in the optic confronting him, as in a mirror, and we call this the pupil, for in a sort it is an image of the person looking?

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then an eye viewing another eye, and looking at the most perfect part of it, the thing wherewith it sees, will thus see itself.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ But if it looks at any other thing in man or at anything in nature but what resembles this, it will not see itself.

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then if an eye is to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at that region of the eye in which the virtue of an eye is found to occur; and this, I presume, is sight.

Alcibiades/ That is so.

Socrates/ And if the soul too, my dear Alcibiades, is to know herself, she must surely look at a soul, and especially at that region of it in which occurs the virtue of a soul—wisdom, and at any other part of a soul which resembles this?

Alcibiades/ I agree, Socrates.

Socrates/ And can we find any part of the soul that we can call more divine than this, which is the seat of knowledge and thought?

Alcibiades/ We cannot.

Socrates/ Then this part of her resembles God, and whoever looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And self-knowledge we admitted to be temperance.

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ So if we have no knowledge of ourselves and no temperance, shall we be able to know our own belongings, good or evil?

Alcibiades/ How can that be, Socrates?

Socrates/ For I expect it seems impossible to you that without knowing Alcibiades you should know that the belongings of Alcibiades are in fact his.

Alcibiades/ Impossible indeed, upon my word.

Socrates/ Nor could we know that our belongings are ours if we did not even know ourselves?

Alcibiades/ How could we?

Socrates/ And so, if we did not so much as know our belongings, we could not know the belongings of our belongings either?

Alcibiades/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Then we were not quite correct in admitting just now that there are people who, without knowing themselves, know their belongings, while others know their belongings' belongings. For it seems to be the function of one man and one art to discern all three—himself, his belongings, and the belongings of his belongings.

Alcibiades/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ And anyone who is ignorant of his belongings will be similarly ignorant, I suppose, of the belongings of others.

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And if ignorant of others' affairs, he will be ignorant also of the affairs of states.

Alcibiades/ He must be.

Socrates/ Then such a man can never be a statesman.

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ No, nor an economist either.

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Nor will he know what he is doing.

Alcibiades/ No, I agree.

Socrates/ And will not he who does not know make mistakes?

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And when he makes mistakes, will he not do ill both in private and in public?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And doing ill he will be wretched?

Alcibiades/ Yes, very.

Socrates/ And what of those for whom he is doing so?

Alcibiades/ They will be wretched also.

Socrates/ Then it is impossible to be happy if one is not temperate and good.

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ So it is the bad men who are wretched.

Alcibiades/ Yes, very.

Socrates/ And hence it is not he who has made himself rich that is relieved of wretchedness, but he who has made himself temperate.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So it is not walls or warships or arsenals that cities need, Alcibiades, if they are to be happy, nor numbers, nor size, without virtue.

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And if you are to manage the city's affairs properly and honorably, you must impart virtue to the citizens.

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ But could one possibly impart a thing that one had not?

Alcibiades/ How, indeed?

Socrates/ Then you or anyone else who is to be governor and curator, not merely of himself and his belongings in private, but of the state and its affairs, must first acquire virtue himself.

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ Hence it is not license or authority for doing what one pleases that you have to secure to yourself or the state, but justice and temperance.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ For you and the state, if you act justly and temperately, will act so as to please God.

Alcibiades/ Naturally.

Socrates/ And, as we were saying in what went before, you will act with your eyes turned on what is divine and bright.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Well, and looking thereon you will behold and know both yourselves and your good.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so you will act aright and well?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well now, if you act in this way, I am ready to warrant that you must be happy.

Alcibiades/ And I can rely on your warranty.

Socrates/ But if you act unjustly, with your eyes on the godless and dark, the probability is that your acts will resemble these through your ignorance of yourselves.

Alcibiades/ That is probable.

Socrates/ For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, is at liberty to do what he pleases, but is lacking in mind, what is the probable result to him personally, or to the state as well? For instance, if he is sick and at liberty to do what he pleases—without a medical mind, but with a despot's power which prevents anyone from even reproving him—what will be the result? Will not his health, in all likelihood, be shattered?

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ Again, in a ship, if a man were at liberty to do what he chose, but were devoid of mind and excellence in navigation, do you perceive what must happen to him and his fellow-sailors?

Alcibiades/ I do: they must all perish.

Socrates/ And in just the same way, if a state, or any office or authority, is lacking in excellence or virtue, it will be overtaken by failure?

Alcibiades/ It must.

Socrates/ Then it is not despotic power, my admirable Alcibiades, that you ought to secure either to yourself or to the state, if you would be happy, but virtue.

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ And before getting virtue, to be governed by a superior is better than to govern, for a man as well as a child.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And the better is also nobler?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the nobler more becoming?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then it becomes a bad man to be a slave, since it is better.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ So vice is a thing that becomes a slave.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And virtue becomes a free man.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we should shun, my good friend, all slavishness?

Alcibiades/ Most certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ And do you now perceive how you stand? Are you on the side of the free, or not?

Alcibiades/ I think I perceive only too clearly.

Socrates/ Then do you know how you may escape from the condition in which you now find yourself? Let us not give it a name, where a handsome person is concerned!

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ How?

Alcibiades/ If it be your wish, Socrates.

Socrates/ That is not well said, Alcibiades.

Alcibiades/ Well, what should I say?

Socrates/ If it be God's will.

Alcibiades/ Then I say it. And yet I say this besides, that we are like to make a change in our parts, Socrates, so that I shall have yours and you mine. For from this day onward it must be the case that I am your attendant, and you have me always in attendance on you.

Socrates/ Ah, generous friend! So my love will be just like a stork; for after hatching a winged love in you it is to be cherished in return by its nestling.

Alcibiades/ Well, that is the position, and I shall begin here and now to take pains over justice.

Socrates/ I should like to think you will continue to do so; yet I am apprehensive, not from any distrust of your nature, but in view of the might of the state, lest it overcome both me and you.

The First Alcibiades.

Translated by Mr. Sydenham.

Persons of the Dialogue*:*

Socrates, Alcibiades.

scene, (most probably) the Lyceum.

Socrates/ SON of Clinias! you wonder, I suppose, that I, who was the earliest of your admirers, now, when all the rest have forsaken you, am the only one who still retains unalterably the same sentiments; and yet, that for so many years I have never spoken so much as a word to you, whilst the others were pressing through crowds of people to converse with you. This reserve and distance in my behavior have been owing to no human regards, but to an impediment thrown in my way by a dæmoniacal nature, the power and force of which you shall by and by be made acquainted with. But now, seeing that this power no longer operates to hinder my approach. I am come thus to accost you; and am in good hopes too, that for the future the dæmon will give no opposition to my desire of conversing with you. All this while, however, being but a spectator, I have been able tolerably well to observe and consider your behavior with regard to your admirers. And I find, that, though they have been numerous, and such persons too as thought highly of themselves, there is not one whom you have not driven away from you by your superior haughtiness and imagined elevation. The reasons of your being exalted so highly in your own opinion, I am desirous of laying before you. They are these; You presume, that in no affair whatever you need assistance from any other party: for that what you have of your own, whether of outward advantages or inward accomplishments, is so great as to be all sufficient. In the first place, you think yourself excelling in the handsomeness

of your person and in the fineness of your figure. And in this opinion it is evident to everyone who has eyes that you are not mistaken. In the next place, you dwell on these thoughts: that you are descended from families the most illustrious in the state to which you belong; that this state is the greatest of any in Greece; that you have friends here, and relations on your father's side, very numerous and very powerful, ready to assist you on every occasion; and that your relations on your mother's side are not inferior to them, either in power or in number. But a greater strength than from all these whom I have mentioned, taken together, you think that you derive from Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian to yourself and to your brother: Pericles, who is able to do what he pleases; and that, not only at Athens, but throughout all Greece, and with many and great families abroad. To all these advantages I shall add the greatness of your estate; though, indeed, on this advantage you seem to value yourself less than you do on any other. Elevated as you are in your own mind on these accounts, you have looked down on your admirers: and they, conscious of their comparative meanness, have bowed their heads, and have retired. This you are very sensible of: and therefore I well know that you wonder what I can have in my thoughts, or what hopes I can entertain, seeing that I quit you not, but continue my attachment to you still, when your other admirers have all forsaken you.

Alcibiades/ This however, Socrates, perhaps you do not know, that you have been a little beforehand with me. For I really had it in my mind to address you first, and to ask you these very questions: What can possibly be your meaning, and with what views or expectations is it, that you continually press on me, and, wherever I am, are assiduous to be there yourself? for I do in truth wonder, what your

business can be with me, and should be very glad to be informed.

Socrates/ You will hear me then, 'tis to be supposed, with willingness and attention, if you really are desirous, as you say you are, of knowing what I have in my thoughts. I speak therefore as to a person disposed to hear, and to stay till he has heard all.

Alcibiades/ I am entirely so disposed: it is your part to speak.

Socrates/ But observe this: you must not wonder, if, as I found it difficult to make a beginning, I should find it no less difficult to make an end.

Alcibiades/ My good man, say all you have to say; for I shall not fail to attend to you.

Socrates/ I must say it then: and though it is a hard talk for any man to address the person whom he loves or admires, if that person be superior to flattery, yet I must adventure boldly to speak my mind. If, Alcibiades, I had observed you satisfied with those advantages of yours, which I just now enumerated; if you had appeared to indulge the fancy of spending your whole life in the enjoyment of them; I persuade myself, that my love and admiration of you would have long since left me. But that you entertain thoughts very different from such as those, I shall now show, and shall lay your own mind open before yourself. By these means you will also plainly perceive, how constantly and closely my mind has attended to you. My opinion of you then is this: That, if any of the gods were to put this question to you, — "Alcibiades!" were he to say, "whether do you choose to live in the possession of all the things which are at present yours; or do you prefer immediate death, if you are not permitted ever to acquire things greater?" in this case, it appears to me that you would make death your option. But

what kind of expectations you live in, I shall now declare. You think, that, if you speedily make your appearance before the Athenian people in assembly, and this you purpose to do within a few days, you shall be able to convince them, that you merit higher honors than were ever bestowed on Pericles, or any other person in any age: and having convinced them of this, you think that you will arrive at the chief power in the state; and if here at home, that you will then have the greatest weight and influence abroad; and not only so with the rest of the Grecian states, but with the barbarian nations too, as many as inhabit the same continent with us. And further: if the deity whom I before spoke of, allowing you larger limits, were to say to you, that "you must be contented with being the master here in Europe; for that 'twill not be permitted you to pass over into Asia, nor to concern yourself with the administration of any affairs there it appears to me, that neither on these terms, thus limited, would you think life eligible; nor on any terms, indeed, that fell short of filling, in a manner, the whole world with your renown, and of being everywhere lord and master. I believe you deem no man that ever lived, excepting Cyrus and Xerxes, worth the speaking of. In fine, that you entertain such hopes as I have mentioned, I know with certainty, and speak not from mere conjecture. Now you, perhaps, conscious of the truth of what I have spoken, might say, What is all this to the account you promised to give me, of the reasons for which your attachment to me still continues? I will tell you then, dear son of Clinias and Dinomache! That all these thoughts of yours should ever come to an end, is impossible without my help, —so great power I think myself to have with regard to your affairs and to yourself too. For this reason, I have long been of opinion, that the god did not as yet permit me to hold any conversation with you; and I waited for the time when he would give me leave. For, as you

entertain hopes of proving to the people, that your value to them is equal to whatever they can give you; and as you expect that, having proved this point, you shall immediately obtain whatever power you desire; in the same manner, do I expect to have the greatest power and influence over you, when I shall have proved that I am valuable to you more than any other thing is; and that neither guardian, nor relation, nor any other person, is able to procure you the power you long for, except myself; with the assistance, however, of the god. So long therefore as you was yet too young, and before you had your mind filled with those swelling hopes, I believe that the god would not permit me to have discourse with you, because you would not have regarded me, and I consequently should have discoursed in vain; but that he has now given me free leave, for that you would now hearken to me.

Alcibiades/ Much more unaccountable and absurd do you appear to me now, Socrates, since you have begun to open yourself, than when you followed me everywhere without speaking to me a word: and yet you had all the appearance of being a man of that sort then. As to what you have said, whether I entertain those thoughts in my mind, or not, you, it seems, know with certainty: so that, were I to say I did not, the denial would not avail me, nor persuade you to believe me. Admitting it then, and supposing that I indulge the hopes you mentioned ever so much, how they may be accomplished by means of you, and that without your help they never can, are you able to prove to me?

Socrates/ Do you ask me, whether I am able to prove it to you in a long harangue, such a one as you are accustomed to hear? I have no abilities in that way. But yet I should be able, as I think, to prove to you, that those pretentions of mine are not vain, if you would be willing but to do me one small piece of service.

Alcibiades/ If that service be not difficult to be done, I am willing.

Socrates/ Do you think it difficult, or not, to make answers to such questions as are proposed to you?

Alcibiades/ Not difficult.

Socrates/ Be ready then to answer.

Alcibiades/ Do you then propose your questions.

Socrates/ May I propose them, with a supposition that you have those thoughts in your mind which I attribute to you?

Alcibiades/ Be it so, if you choose it; that I may know what further you have to say.

Socrates/ Well then. You have it in your mind, as I said, to appear in presence of the Athenians within a short time, with intention to harangue them and give them your advice. If therefore, when you are just ready to mount the rostrum, I were to stop you, and to say thus, "Since the Athenians are here met in assembly, on purpose to deliberate on some of their affairs, what, I pray you, are to be the subjects of their deliberation, now that you rise up to give them your counsel? Must not the subjects be such as you are better acquainted with than they?" what answer would you make me?

Alcibiades/ I certainly should answer, that the subjects were such as I knew better than others who were present.

Socrates/ On those subjects, then, which you happen to have knowledge in you are a good counselor?

Alcibiades/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Have you knowledge in those things only which you have either learnt from others, or found out yourself?

Alcibiades/ What things other than those is it possible that I should have any knowledge in?

Socrates/ And is it possible that ever you should have learnt, or have found out, anything which you was not willing to learn, or to search out by yourself?

Alcibiades/ It is not.

Socrates/ And was you ever at any time willing to learn, or did you ever at any time seek to know, any things in which you imagined yourself to be already knowing?

Alcibiades/ No, certainly.

Socrates/ In those things which you now happen to know, was there once a time when you did not think yourself knowing?

Alcibiades/ That must have been.

Socrates/ Now, what the things are which you have learnt, I tolerably well know. But if you have been taught anything without my knowledge, tell me what. To the best of my memory, you have been taught grammar, the gymnic exercises, and to play on stringed instruments of music: for on wind instruments, besides, you refused to learn. This is the sum total of all your knowledge; unless you have learnt anything else in some place or other, which I have not discovered: and I think, that neither by day nor yet by night did you ever stir out of doors but I was acquainted with all your motions.

Alcibiades/ 'Tis true that I have not gone to any other masters than to such as taught the arts which you have mentioned.

Socrates/ Well then. When the Athenians are consulting together about the grammar of their language, how to write or speak it with propriety, at these times is it that you will rise up to give them your advice?

Alcibiades/ By Jove, not I.

Socrates/ But is it then when they are in debate about striking chords on the lyre?

Alcibiades/ By no means should I make a speech on such a subject.

Socrates/ It cannot be on the subject of wrestling neither: because they never use to deliberate on this subject in their public assemblies.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ On what subject, then, of their consultations is it that you intend the giving them your advice? It cannot be when building is the subject.

Alcibiades/ No, certainly.

Socrates/ Because in this case a builder would give them better advice than you could.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Nor yet is it when they consult together concerning divination.

Alcibiades/ It is not.

Socrates/ For a diviner would, in this case be a better counselor than you.

Alcibiades/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ And that, whether he was a tall or a short man; whether his person was handsome or deformed; and whether his family was noble or ignoble.

Alcibiades/ How should it be otherwise?

Socrates/ For to give good advice in any case whatever, belongs, I suppose, only to a person skilled in the subject, and not to a fine gentleman.

Alcibiades/ Beyond all question.

Socrates/ And whether the man who gives them his advice be rich or poor, it will make no difference to the

Athenians, when they are consulting about the health of the city; but they will always inquire after a physician only to consult with.

Alcibiades/ They will be right in so doing.

Socrates/ Now, on what subject is it, when they are met in consultation together, that you will do right in rising up and giving them your counsel?

Alcibiades/ 'Tis when they are in consultation, Socrates, about their own affairs.

Socrates/ About increasing their navy, do you mean? what sort of vessels they should provide, and in what manner they should have them built?

Alcibiades/ I mean no such thing, Socrates.

Socrates/ Because you are ignorant, I presume, in the art of ship-building, Is not this the reason? Or is there any other, why you would choose in such a consultation to sit silent?

Alcibiades/ That is the only reason.

Socrates/ What affairs of their own then do you mean?

Alcibiades/ I mean, Socrates, when: they are deliberating about the makings war, or the making peace; or concerning any other affairs of state.

Socrates/ Do you mean, when they are deliberating on these points, with whom 'tis proper for them to make peace, and with whom to engage in war, and in what way 'tis proper to carry on that war? Is this what you mean?'

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ And you will agree, that 'tis proper to make peace or war with those people with whom 'tis best so to do?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And at that time when 'tis best?

Alcibiades/ By all means.

Socrates/ And to continue it so long as 'tis best to continue it?

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Now, suppose that the Athenians were deliberating about the exercise of wrestling, with what sort of persons it is proper to come to close quarters, and with whom to engage at arm's length, and in what way, would you give the best counsel in this case, or would a master of the exercises?

Alcibiades/ Such a master, certainly.

Socrates/ Can you tell me now, what end such a master would have, in his view, when he gave his counsel on these points, with whom it is proper to wrestle closely, and with whom not so? at what times it is proper, and in what manner? My meaning is to ask you these questions: Whether is it proper to wrestle closely with those persons with whom it is best so to wrestle, or is it not?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Whether as much also as is best?

Alcibiades/ As much.

Socrates/ Whether at those times too when 'tis best?

Alcibiades/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ But further: Ought not a singer sometimes, in singing, to touch his lute, and to move his feet?

Alcibiades/ He ought.

Socrates/ Ought he not to do so at those times when 'tis best so to do?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And to continue the doing so as long as 'tis best to continue it?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well now. Since you agree with me that there is a best in both these actions, in fingering the lute whilst singing, and in the exercise of close wrestling, by what name call you that which is the best in fingering the lute? As that which is the best in wrestling I call gymnastical, what name now do you give to that which is best done in that other action?

Alcibiades/ I do not apprehend your meaning.

Socrates/ Try to copy after the pattern which I shall now give you. Supposing, then, that I had been asked this question, "In wrestling, how is that performed which is performed best?" I should answer, 'tis performed in every respect rightly. Now, in wrestling, that performance is right which is according to the rules of art. Is it not?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ And the art, in this case, is it not gymnastic?

Alcibiades/ Without dispute.

Socrates/ I said, that that which is the best in wrestling is gymnastical.

Alcibiades/ You did.

Socrates/ And was it not well said?

Alcibiades/ I think it was.

Socrates/ Come then. Do you in like manner (For it would not ill become you likewise to discourse well) say, in the first place, What is the art, to which belong the playing on the harp, the singing, and the moving at the same time, rightly all; the whole of this art, by what name is it called? Are you not yet able to tell?

Alcibiades/ Indeed I am not.

Socrates/ Try in this way then. What goddesses are those who preside over this art?

Alcibiades/ The Muses mean you, Socrates?

Socrates/ I do. Consider now, what name is given to their art—a name derived from them.

Alcibiades/ I suppose you mean music.

Socrates/ The very thing. What then is that which is performed rightly, according to this art? Just as in the other case I told you, that whatever was performed rightly according to the rules of that other art, was gymnastical; in this case now, after the same manner, whatever is performed agreeably to the rules of this art, how do you say it must be performed?

Alcibiades/ Musically, I think.

Socrates/ You say well. Let us now proceed further; and tell me, what name you give to that which is best in making war; and what name to that which is best in making peace: just as, in the former cases, the best in one of them you called the more musical, in the other the more gymnastical. Try now in these cases likewise to name that which is the best.

Alcibiades/ I find myself quite unable to tell what it is.

Socrates/ 'Tis a shame to you that you are so. For, suppose you were speaking and giving your opinion concerning the superiority of one kind of food to another, and should say, that such or such a kind of food was the best at this season, and such or such a quantity of it; and suppose a man should thereupon question you thus, "What do you mean by the best, Alcibiades?" on these subjects you would be able to give him an answer, and to tell him, that by the best you meant the most wholesome; and this you would say, notwithstanding that you do not profess to be a physician. And yet, on a subject: which you profess to have the knowledge of, and rise up to give your judgment and advice on, as if you had this knowledge, are you not ashamed, when you are questioned, as I think you are, on

this very subject, to be unable to give an answer, and to tell what is that which is the best? And must not this inability appear to others shameful in you?

Alcibiades/ Certainly it must.

Socrates/ Consider thoughtfully now, and tell me, What is the end or aim of that which is done best in the making or the continuing of peace, and likewise in the going to war with those with whom it is proper?

Alcibiades/ Well, I do consider; but cannot think of what it is.

Socrates/ Know you not, when we go to war, what it is which both the parties accuse each other of during their military preparations, and what names they give to the causes of their quarrels?

Alcibiades/ I do. They accuse each other of deceiving, or of offering violence, or of taking away some of their possessions.

Socrates/ But observe: How do they say they have been thus treated? Try to tell me what difference there is in the manner of this treatment they give to each other.

Alcibiades/ Do you mean, whether they thus treat each other justly or unjustly?

Socrates/ This is the very difference I mean.

Alcibiades/ These different manners of ill treatment differ totally and entirely.

Socrates/ Well then. With whom would you counsel the Athenians to engage in war? whether with those who treat them ill unjustly, or with those who treat them as they deserve?

Alcibiades/ A question, this, of very serious import. For, if any man should entertain a thought of the propriety of

going to war with such as act uprightly, he would not dare to own it.

Socrates/ Because it is not lawful, I suppose, to engage in such a war.

Alcibiades/ By no means is it so, neither seems it to be beautiful.

Socrates/ With a view therefore to these things, and to what is just, you will make your speeches to the people.

Alcibiades/ There is a necessity for bringing my arguments from these topics.

Socrates/ That best then, concerning which I just now asked you what it was, —the best on these subjects, —whether it is proper to go to war or not, with whom it is proper, and with whom not, —at what times it is proper, and when not, —does the best on these subjects appear to be any other thing than that which is the most agreeable to justice? or does it not?

Alcibiades/ It appears to be no other thing.

Socrates/ How is this, friend Alcibiades? Is it a secret to yourself, that you are ignorant in the science of justice? or else, Is it a secret to me, that you have learnt it, and have gone to some master, who has taught you to distinguish between what is the most agreeable to justice, and what is the most repugnant to it? If this which I last mentioned be the case, who is this master? Tell me; that I too may go and learn of him, through your recommendation.

Alcibiades/ You banter, Socrates.

Socrates/ Not so; by the guardian-god of friendship to both of us, you and me, whose deity I would least of all invoke for witness to a falsehood! If then you have any master who teaches you that science, let me know who he is.

Alcibiades/ And what if I have not? Do you think that I could by no other means have attained the knowledge of what is just, and what is unjust?

Socrates/ I think that you would, if you had discovered it by yourself.

Alcibiades/ Are you then of opinion that I could not have discovered it by myself?

Socrates/ I am entirely of opinion that you might, if ever you had sought for it.

Alcibiades/ Do you presume, then, that I have never sought for it?

Socrates/ I should presume that you had, if ever you had thought yourself ignorant of it.

Alcibiades/ Was there not then a time when I so thought?

Socrates/ Well said. Can you tell me, then, at what time you did not imagine yourself to know what things are just, and what are unjust?' For, come, let me ask you: Was it last year, when you inquired into these subjects, and did not imagine yourself already knowing in them? or did you at that time think that you had such knowledge? Answer truly now, that our argument may come to some conclusion.

Alcibiades/ Well then. I did at that time presume myself to be knowing in those subjects.

Socrates/ And in all the third year back from this present, in all the fourth too, and all the fifth, did you not presume of yourself the same?

Alcibiades/ I did.

Socrates/ And earlier than the time I mentioned last, you was but a boy.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And in your days of boyhood I am well assured that you thought yourself knowing in those subjects.

Alcibiades/ How are you so sure of that?

Socrates/ Often in the schools, when you was a boy, and in other places too whenever you was playing at dice, or was a party in any other play, I have heard you talking about what things were just or unjust—not as if you had any doubts on those subjects, but very strenuously and boldly pronouncing, that such or such a one of your playmates was a wicked boy, and a rogue, and was guilty of a piece of injustice. Is not all this true?

Alcibiades/ Well. But what else was I to do, when any of them injured me?

Socrates/ Right. But if you had happened to be ignorant of this very point, whether you was injured or not, would you say, "What in such a case was I to do?"

Alcibiades/ But, by Jove, I was not ignorant of that point; for I clearly saw that I was injured.

Socrates/ You thought yourself, it seems, therefore, when you was a boy, knowing in the science of what is just and what is unjust?

Alcibiades/ I did so; and knowing in it I was too.

Socrates/ At what time was it that you first discovered it? for certainly it was not at a time when you thought yourself knowing in it.

Alcibiades/ That, 'tis clear, could not be.

Socrates/ At what time then was it that you thought yourself ignorant in it? Consider: but that time you will never find.

Alcibiades/ By Jove, Socrates, I am not able to tell when.

Socrates/ You did not acquire that knowledge, then, by any discovery of your own?

Alcibiades/ That does not at all appear to have been the case.

Socrates/ And besides, you acknowledged but just before, that you did not acquire it by being taught. If then you neither discovered it of yourself, nor was taught it by any other person, how or whence have you this knowledge?

Alcibiades/ Well. But I was wrong in my answers, when I supposed that I had found out that knowledge by myself.

Socrates/ In what way then did you acquire it?

Alcibiades/ I learnt it, I presume, in the same way in which others do.

Socrates/ We are now come round again to the same question as before; From whom did you learn it? Inform me.

Alcibiades/ From the people.

Socrates/ To no good teachers have you recourse for the origin of your knowledge, in referring it to the people.

Alcibiades/ Why so? Are not they capable of teaching?

Socrates/ Not so much as what movements are proper, and what improper, to make in a game at tables. And yet the knowledge of these things is meaner and more inconsiderable, in my opinion, than the knowledge of what things are just, and what are unjust. Do not you think so too?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Incapable, therefore, as they are of teaching meaner things, can they teach things higher and of more importance?

Alcibiades/ I think they can, Nay, it is certain that they are capable of teaching many things of more importance than the movements in a game at tables.

Socrates/ What things do you mean?

Alcibiades/ Such as, for instance, to speak the Greek language: for I myself learnt it from them. Nor could I name any other teacher of that language that I ever had; but must

refer my being able to speak it to those very persons who you say are no good teachers.

Socrates/ Well, my noble sir: in this matter, indeed, the people are good teachers, and as such may justly be recommended.

Alcibiades/ Why particularly in this?

Socrates/ Because in this they possess all the requisites necessary to every good teacher.

Alcibiades/ What requisites do you mean?

Socrates/ Do you not know, that those who are to teach anything must in the first place have the knowledge of it themselves? Must they not?

Alcibiades/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ And must not all those who have the knowledge of anything agree together on that subject, and not differ in their opinions of it?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But where they differ among themselves in their opinions, would you say that they have, all of them, knowledge in those subjects?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Of such things, then, how can they be good teachers?

Alcibiades/ By no means can they.

Socrates/ Well now. Do the people seem to you to differ among themselves about the meaning of the words stone and wood? Ask whom you will, are they not all agreed in the same opinion? And when they are bid to take up a stone, or a piece of wood, do they not all go to the same kind of things? And do they not all apprehend alike, what kind of things every other such word signifies? For I presume this is what you mean by knowledge of the Greek language: is it not?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Now, on these subjects, as we said before, do not the people of our city agree among themselves? And among the several cities of Greece is there any difference of opinion? Do the same words, in different places, signify different things?

Alcibiades/ They do not.

Socrates/ On these subjects, therefore, agreeably to our argument, the people should be good teachers.

Alcibiades/ It is true.

Socrates/ If then we had a mind to have any person instructed in this matter, we should do right in sending him, for such instruction, amongst the multitude of the people?

Alcibiades/ Quite right.

Socrates/ But what if we had a mind to have that person taught, not only to know men from horses by the different words denoting them in the Greek language, but, beside this, to know what horses are fit for the race, and what are unfit? is the multitude able to teach this also?

Alcibiades/ Certainly, not.

Socrates/ And you admit this to be a sufficient proof of their ignorance in this matter, and of their inability to teach, that they agree not in their opinions on this head?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And what if we would have him learn, not only by what word in our language men are distinguished from other things, but, further, to know what men are healthy and who are unhealthy? whether should we deem the multitude to be the proper teachers for him?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ And it would be an evidence to you of their being bad teachers on this subject, if you saw them disagreeing in their opinions?

Alcibiades/ It would.

Socrates/ And how is it now on the subject of justice? Do you find the multitude agreeing one with another, or even the same person always of the same mind, concerning either men or actions, who are the honest, or what is just?

Alcibiades/ Less than on any other subject, by Jove, Socrates, are they agreed with regard to this.

Socrates/ What? do you then think they differ on this subject more than upon any other?

Alcibiades/ By far do they.

Socrates/ You have never, I suppose, seen or heard of men, in any age, who contended for their several opinions concerning the wholesome and the unwholesome in food, with so much zeal as to fight and kill one another on that account?

Alcibiades/ Never.

Socrates/ But concerning just and unjust in actions, that their disputes have carried them to such extremities, I am sure, if you have not seen, you have at least heard from many reports, and particularly from those of Homer; for you have heard both the Odyssey and the Iliad read to you.

Alcibiades/ Thoroughly well, Socrates, am I versed in both.

Socrates/ And is not the subject of both these poems the diversity of opinions with regard to what is just and what is unjust?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ And did not this diversity of opinions produce fighting and slaughter between the Greeks and Trojans, and between Ulysses and the wooers of Penelope?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And I believe that the deaths of those Athenians, Lacedæmonians and Bœotians, who perished at Tanagra, and of those who afterwards died at Coronea, amongst whom was Clinias your father, were not owing to differences on any other subject than this, what was just and what unjust.

Alcibiades/ You are in the right.

Socrates/ Shall we say then that these people had knowledge in that subject on which they differed with so much vehemence, as in support of their different opinions to suffer from each other the utmost effects of hatred?

Alcibiades/ It appears they had not.

Socrates/ Do you not then refer to such a sort of teachers as you yourself acknowledge to be ignorant?

Alcibiades/ I do, it seems.

Socrates/ How therefore is it probable that you should have the knowledge to discern what is just from what is unjust, when your account of them is so vague, and when you appear neither to have been taught that knowledge, by any other person, nor to have found it out yourself?

Alcibiades/ According to what you say, 'tis not probable.

Socrates/ Are you sensible that, what you said last was not said fairly, Alcibiades?

Alcibiades/ What was unfair?

Socrates/ Your assertion that I said those things of you which were said.

Alcibiades/ What? did not you say that I had not the knowledge to discern what was just from what was unjust?

Socrates/ Not I, indeed.

Alcibiades/ Who was it then that said so? was it I myself?!

Socrates/ It was.

Alcibiades/ Make that appear.

Socrates/ You will see it in this way. If I ask you concerning one and two, which is the greater number, you will say that two is.

Alcibiades/ I shall.

Socrates/ How much greater is it?

Alcibiades/ Greater by one.

Socrates/ Now whether of us is it who says that two is a greater number or more than one by one?

Alcibiades/ It is I myself.

Socrates/ Did not I ask the question, and did not you give an answer to it?

Alcibiades/ True: it was so.

Socrates/ On this subject, then, who appears to have made any assertion? Do I, who only asked a question? or do you, who gave the answer?

Alcibiades/ I.

Socrates/ And if I ask you how many letters compose the name of Socrates, and you tell me, which of us is it who declares how many?

Alcibiades/ I.

Socrates/ In a word, whenever any question is asked, and an answer to it is given, say, who is it that makes an assertion, the party that asks the question, or the party that gives the answer?

Alcibiades/ The party that gives the answer, in my opinion, Socrates.

Socrates/ Through the whole of our past discourse was not I the party that asked the questions?

Alcibiades/ You was.

Socrates/ And was not you the party that gave the answers?

Alcibiades/ I was.

Socrates/ Well then. Whether of us two made the assertions?

Alcibiades/ From what I have admitted, Socrates, I myself appear to have been that person.

Socrates/ In those assertions was it not said that Alcibiades, the fine son of Clinias, had not the knowledge to discern what was just and what was unjust, but imagined that he had; and that he was about going into the assembly to give the Athenians his counsel and advice upon subjects which he knew nothing of? Is not this true?

Alcibiades/ It appears so to be.

Socrates/ That which Euripides says may therefore well be applied to the condition you are now in, Alcibiades. You are in danger of being found to have heard all this which has been said of you from yourself, and not from me. For, not I, but you, was the assertor of it; and you lay the blame of it on me without reason.

Alcibiades/ Indeed, Socrates, you are in the right.

Socrates/ Mad therefore is the undertaking, my good sir, which you entertain thoughts of attempting, to teach others what you are ignorant of yourself from your having neglected to learn it.

Alcibiades/ I believe, Socrates, that the Athenians, as well as other Grecian states, seldom deliberate in council about justice or injustice in any affair before them; because these things they presume obvious and plain to all men. Laying

aside therefore the consideration of this point, they consider which way it will be most for their interest to take. For I suppose that justice and interest are not the same thing; seeing that many have found it their interest to have done things the most unjust, and that others have gained no advantage from having acted with honesty.

Socrates/ Well. Suppose interest to be a thing ever so different from justice, do you imagine now that you know what is a man's interest, and why this or that thing is so?

Alcibiades/ What should hinder me, Socrates, from knowing it? unless you will make a doubt of this too, by asking me, from whom I learned this knowledge, or how I discovered it myself.

Socrates/ How strangely you deal with me in this? If you say anything wrong, when 'tis possible to prove it wrong by the same arguments used in confuting what you before said amiss, you would have new matter introduced, and different arguments made use of, to prove you in the wrong again: as if the former proofs were worn out like old clothes, and you could no longer put them on, but one must bring you a fresh proof never used before. But without taking further notice of your evasions, I shall repeat the same question, and ask you from what learning you came to know what was a man's interest, and who taught you this knowledge; and all the other questions asked before I ask you again, summing them up in one. It is evident now, that your answers will amount to the very same as they did before; and that you will not be able to show by what means you attained the knowledge of what is advantageous to a man? or conducive to his good; either how you found it out yourself, or from whom you learned it. However, seeing that you are squeamish, and decline the tasting of the same arguments again, I wave the inquiry into this point, whether you have or not the knowledge of what is the interest of the Athenians. But this

other point, whether the same actions are just and advantageous; or whether what 'tis just to do, differs from what 'tis a man's interest to do; why should not you prove, by putting questions to me, in the same manner as I did to you? or, if you had rather, make a discourse upon that subject wholly by yourself.

Alcibiades/ But I know not if I should be able, Socrates, to make such a discourse to you.

Socrates/ Why, my good friend, suppose me to be the assembly and the people. And, were you addressing your discourse to them, it would be proper for you to persuade every single man of them. Would it not?

Alcibiades/ It would.

Socrates/ Does it not belong, then, to the same person to be able to persuade one single man by himself, and to persuade many men assembled together, in speaking on any subject with which he is well acquainted? as, for instance, a teacher of grammar is equally well able to persuade one man and many men, when letters are the subject of his discourse.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And when numbers are the subject, would not the same person, who persuades many, persuade one as well?

Alcibiades/ He would.

Socrates/ And must not this person be one who is well acquainted with numbers? must he not be an arithmetician?

Alcibiades/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And would not you also, in speaking on any subjects, if you are able to persuade many of the truth of what you say, be able to persuade a single one?

Alcibiades/ 'Tis probable that I should.

Socrates/ But these subjects it is plain must be such as you are well acquainted with.

Alcibiades/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Is there any other difference, then, between a speaker in the assembly of the people and a speaker in such conversation as this of ours, than merely so much as this—the former endeavors to persuade a collection of many men—the latter to persuade men one by one?

Alcibiades/ There appears to be no other.

Socrates/ Come then. Since it apparently belongs to the same person to persuade a multitude and to persuade a single man, practice your skill on me, and undertake to prove to me that in some cases that which is just is not a man's interest.

Alcibiades/ You are very saucy, Socrates.

Socrates/ And I am now going to be so saucy as to convince you of the truth of a position quite contrary to that which you decline the proving of to me.

Alcibiades/ Begin then.

Socrates/ Do you but answer to the questions which I shall put to you.

Alcibiades/ Not so: but do you yourself say plainly what you have to say.

Socrates/ Why so? Would you not choose to be entirely well persuaded of the truth of it, if it be true?

Alcibiades/ By all means, certainly.

Socrates/ And would you not, if you yourself were to assert it, have the most entire persuasion of its truth?

Alcibiades/ I think so.

Socrates/ Answer then to my questions: and if you do not hear from your own mouth, that to act justly is to act for

one's own advantage, believe no other person who asserts that position.

Alcibiades/ I shall not: and I consent to answer your questions. For no harm I think will come to me that way.

Socrates/ You think as if you had the spirit of divination. Tell me, then: Do you say that some just actions are advantageous to the man who performs them, and that some are not so?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you say also, that some just actions are beautiful, and that some are not so?

Alcibiades/ What mean you by this question?

Socrates/ Whether did you ever think that a man acted basely and yet justly at the same time?

Alcibiades/ I never thought so.

Socrates/ You think then that all actions which are just are also beautiful?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ But what, as to actions which are beautiful? Whether do you think that all of these are good to the performer, or that some of them are so, and some not so?

Alcibiades/ For my part, Socrates, I think that some beautiful actions are evil to the performer of them.

Socrates/ And that some base actions are good to the performer?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you mean such actions as these? —Many men by aiding in battle some friend or near relation have been wounded mortally; whilst others, by withholding their aid when they ought to have given it, have come off safe and sound.

Alcibiades/ A just instance of what I mean.

Socrates/ That aid then of theirs you call beautiful with respect to their endeavoring to save those whom they ought to defend. Now such an action proceeds from fortitude, does it not?.

Alcibiades/ It does.

Socrates/ But evil you call it also with respect to the wounds and death which it procured them, do you not?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And are not fortitude and death two different things?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ To aid a friend, therefore, is not both beautiful and evil in the same respect?

Alcibiades/ It appears that 'tis not.

Socrates/ Consider now whether it be not good in the same respect in which it is beautiful; as in this particular which we mentioned. For, with respect to fortitude, you agreed with me that 'twas beautiful and handsome to give such aid. This very thing then, fortitude, consider whether it be a good or an evil. And consider it in this way; —which kind of things would you choose to have your own, whether good things or evil things?

Alcibiades/ Good things.

Socrates/ And would you not choose the best things too?

Alcibiades/ Most of all things.

Socrates/ And would you not choose to part with them least of all?

Alcibiades/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ What say you then of fortitude? at what price would you choose to part with it?

Alcibiades/ I would not accept of life, not I, to live a coward.

Socrates/ You think, then, that cowardice is evil in the utmost degree?

Alcibiades/ That do I.

Socrates/ On a par, as it seems, with death.

Alcibiades/ It is so.

Socrates/ Are not life and fortitude the most of all things opposite to death and cowardice?

Alcibiades/ They are.

Socrates/ And would you choose to have those most of all things, and these least of all things?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it because you deem those the best of all things, and these the worst?

Alcibiades/ For this very reason.

Socrates/ Viewing then the giving of aid in battle to such as are dear to us in that light in which it appears beautiful—viewing it with regard to the practice of that virtue which you acknowledge to be one of the best of things, you gave it the epithet of beautiful?

Alcibiades/ It appears I did so.

Socrates/ But with regard to its operating evil, the evil of death, you gave it the epithet of evil?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Is it not then just and right to denominate every action thus? If, with regard to the evil which it operates, you call it evil, ought it not, with regard to the good which it operates, to be also called good?

Alcibiades/ I think it ought.

Socrates/ In the same respect, then, in which it is good, is it not beautiful? and in the same respect in which it is evil, is it not base?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ In saying, then, that the aiding of our friends in battle is an action beautiful indeed, but that yet 'tis evil, you say exactly the same thing as if you called it an action, good indeed, but yet evil.

Alcibiades/ I think you are in the right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Nothing therefore which is beautiful, so far as it is beautiful, is evil; nor is anything which is base, so far as it is base, good.

Alcibiades/ Evidently it is not.

Socrates/ Further now consider it in this way: —whoever acts beautifully, does he not act well too?

Alcibiades/ He does.

Socrates/ And those who act well, are they not happy?

Alcibiades/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ And are they not happy by being possessed of good things?

Alcibiades/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And are they not possessed of these good things by acting well and beautifully?

Alcibiades/ They are.

Socrates/ To act well, therefore, is in the rank of good things?

Alcibiades/ Beyond a doubt.

Socrates/ And is not acting well a beautiful thing also?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Again therefore we have found, that one and the same thing is both beautiful and good?

Alcibiades/ We have.

Socrates/ Whatever then we should find to be a beautiful thing, we shall find it to be a good thing too, according to this reasoning?

Alcibiades/ It must be so.

Socrates/ And what? are good things advantageous? or are they not?

Alcibiades/ They are.

Socrates/ Do you remember, now, what we agreed in concerning things which are just?

Alcibiades/ I imagine that you mean this, —that those persons who do things which are just must of necessity do things which at the same time are beautiful.

Socrates/ And did we not agree in this too, —that those who do things which are beautiful do things which are also good?

Alcibiades/ We did.

Socrates/ And good things, you say, are advantageous?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Things therefore which are just, O Alcibiades! are things which are advantageous.

Alcibiades/ It seems they are.

Socrates/ Well now; are not you the person who asserts these things? and am not I the questioner concerning them?

Alcibiades/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Whoever then rises up to speak in any council, whether it be of Athenians or Peparethians, imagining that he discerns what is just and what is unjust, if he should say that he knows justice to be sometimes evil and detrimental, would you not laugh at his pretensions to knowledge? since you yourself are found to be the very person who asserts that the same things are both just and advantageous?

Alcibiades/ Now, by the Gods, Socrates, for my part, I know not what to say to it; but am quite like a man distracted. For sometimes I am of one opinion, just while you are putting your questions to me, and presently after am of another.

Socrates/ Are you ignorant now, my friend, what condition you are in?

Alcibiades/ Entirely ignorant.

Socrates/ Do you imagine, then, that if any person were to ask you, how many eyes you had, whether two or three, —or how many hands, whether two or four, —or any other such question, —you would sometimes answer one thing, and at other times another? or would you always give the same answer?

Alcibiades/ I confess that I am now doubtful of myself; but I do believe that I should always give the same answer.

Socrates/ And is not your knowledge of the subject the cause of that consistency there would be in your answers?

Alcibiades/ I believe it is.

Socrates/ When therefore you give contrary answers to one and the same question, without choosing to prevaricate, 'tis evident that you have no knowledge of the subject.

Alcibiades/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Now you say that, to questions concerning things just or unjust, beautiful or base, good or evil, advantageous or otherwise, you should answer sometimes one thing and sometimes another. Is it not then evident, that your ignorance in these subjects is the cause of this inconsistency of yours?

Alcibiades/ It appears so to me myself.

Socrates/ Is not this then the true state of the case? On every subject which a man has not the knowledge of, must not his soul be wavering in her opinions?

Alcibiades/ Most undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Well now. Do you know by what means you may mount up to heaven?

Alcibiades/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ Is your opinion doubtful and wavering on this subject?

Alcibiades/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Do you know the reason why it is not? or shall I tell it you?

Alcibiades/ Do you tell me.

Socrates/ 'Tis this, my friend: it is because you neither know nor imagine that you know the way up to heaven.

Alcibiades/ How is that the reason? Explain yourself.

Socrates/ Let you and I consider it together. Concerning any affairs which you are ignorant of, and are at the same time convinced that you are so, do you waver in your opinions? For instance, in the affair of dressing meats and making sauces, you are, I presume, well acquainted with your ignorance.

Alcibiades/ Perfectly well.

Socrates/ Do you form any opinions then yourself on these affairs of cookery, and waver in those opinions? or do you leave those matters to such as are skilled in them?

Alcibiades/ I do as you mentioned last.

Socrates/ And what if you were in a ship under sail, would you form any opinion, whether the rudder ought to be turned toward the ship or from it, and be unsettled in that opinion for want of knowledge in the affair? or would you leave it to the pilot, and not trouble yourself about it?

Alcibiades/ To the pilot I should leave it.

Socrates/ Concerning affairs then which you are ignorant of, and are no stranger to your own ignorance in those respects, you are not wavering in your opinions?

Alcibiades/ I believe I am not.

Socrates/ Do you perceive that errors, committed in the doing of anything, are all to be ascribed to this kind of ignorance in a man, —his imagining that he knows what he knows not?

Alcibiades/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Whenever we undertake to act in any affair, it is only when we imagine we know what to do.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And such as have no opinion of their own knowledge in the affair resign it up to others to act for them.

Alcibiades/ How should they do otherwise?

Socrates/ Ignorant persons of this kind live therefore without committing errors, because they give up the management of those affairs in which they are ignorant into the hands of others.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ What kind of persons, then, are those who err and act amiss? for certainly they are not such as know how to act.

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ Since then they are neither the knowing, nor those of the ignorant who know that they are ignorant, are any other persons left than of that kind who are ignorant, but imagine themselves knowing?

Alcibiades/ None other than these.

Socrates/ This kind of ignorance, therefore, is the cause of wrong doings, and is the only kind which is culpable.

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ And where it concerns things of greatest moment, is it not in these cases the most of any mischievous and shameful?

Alcibiades/ By far the most so.

Socrates/ Well then. Can you name any things of greater moment than those which are honest, and beautiful, and good, and advantageous?

Alcibiades/ Certainly none.

Socrates/ Is it not on these subjects that you acknowledge yourself to waver in your opinions?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ And, if you are thus wavering, is it not evident from our past conclusions, not only that you are ignorant in subjects of the greatest moment, but that amidst this ignorance you imagine that you know them?

Alcibiades/ I fear it is so.

Socrates/ Fie upon it, Alcibiades! What a condition then are you in! a condition which I am loth to name: but however, since we are alone, it must be spoken out. You are involved, my good sir, in that kind of ignorance which is the most shameful, according to the result of our joint reasoning, and according to your own confession. From this kind of ignorance it is, that you are eager to engage in politics before you have learnt the elements of that science. Indeed, you are not the only person in this sad condition; for in the same state of ignorance are the numerous managers of our civil affairs, all of them, except perhaps Pericles, your guardian, and a few more.

Alcibiades/ And, Socrates, to confirm this opinion of yours, Pericles is said to have become wise, not spontaneously or of himself: on the contrary, 'tis reported of

him that he had had the advantage of enjoying the conversation of many wise men, particularly of Pythoclides and Anaxagoras: and even at this time, old as he is, he is intimate with Damon for this very purpose.

Socrates/ But what? have you ever seen a man who was wise in any art whatever, and yet was unable to make another man wise in the same art? as, for instance, the master who taught you grammar was himself wise in that art; and in the same art he made you wise; as he also made every other person whom he undertook to teach. Did he not?

Alcibiades/ He did.

Socrates/ And you, who have learnt from him that kind of wisdom, would not you be able to teach it to another person?

Alcibiades/ Certainly I should.

Socrates/ And is not the same thing, true of a music-master and of a master in the exercises?

Alcibiades/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ For this undoubtedly is a fair proof of the knowledge of such as are knowing in any subject whatever, their being able to produce their scholars, and to show these to be knowing in the same.

Alcibiades/ I think so too.

Socrates/ Well then. Can you name to me anyone whom Pericles has made a wise man? his own sons has he? to begin with them.

Alcibiades/ But what if the sons of Pericles were silly fellows, Socrates?

Socrates/ Clinias then, your brother?

Alcibiades/ Why should you mention Clinias, a man out of his senses?

Socrates/ Since Clinias then is out of his senses, and since the sons of Pericles were silly fellows, to what defect in your disposition shall we impute, the little care taken by Pericles to improve you?

Alcibiades/ I presume that I myself am in the fault, that of not giving due attention to him.

Socrates/ But name any person else, an Athenian or a foreigner, either a slave or a free man, who is indebted, to the instructions of Pericles for becoming wiser than he was: as I can name to you those, who from the lessons of Zeno have improved in wisdom, —Pythodorus the son of Isolochus, and Callias the son of Calliades; each of whom, at the price of a hundred minæ, paid to Zeno, became eminent for wisdom.

Alcibiades/ Now, by Zeus, I cannot.

Socrates/ Very well. What then do you think of doing about yourself? whether to rest satisfied in the condition which you are now in, or to apply yourself to some means of improvement?

Alcibiades/ Concerning this, Socrates, I would consult with you. For I apprehend what you have said, and admit the truth of it. Those who have the administration of the state, except a few of them, seem indeed to me too not to have had a proper education.

Socrates/ Well; and what conclusion do you draw from thence?

Alcibiades/ This, —that if they, through their education, were well qualified to govern, a man who should undertake to enter the lists in contest with them, ought to come to the engagement duly prepared by discipline and exercise, as in other combats. But now, seeing that such persons as these, raw and undisciplined as they are, have attained to the management of state affairs, what need is there for a man to

exercise himself in such matters, or to give himself the trouble of acquiring knowledge in them? For I well know, that by dint of natural abilities I shall excel them by far, and get above them.

Socrates/ Fie upon it, my fine young gentleman! What a declaration is this which you have made! how unworthy of your personal qualities, and of the other advantages you are possessed of!

Alcibiades/ I should be glad, Socrates, to know why you think it unworthy of me, and in what respect.

Socrates/ You offer an affront, not only to the regard which I have for you, but to the opinion too which you have of yourself.

Alcibiades/ How so?

Socrates/ In that you think of entering the lists to contend with these men here at Athens.

Alcibiades/ Whom then am I to contend with?

Socrates/ Does this question become a man to ask who thinks his mind to be great and elevated?

Alcibiades/ How do you mean? Is it not with these very persons that I am to stand in competition?

Socrates/ Let me ask you this question; —Whether, if you had any thoughts of commanding a ship of war, would you deem it sufficient for you to excel the mariners who were to be under your command, in the skill belonging to a commander? or, presuming yourself qualified with this due præ-excellence. would you direct your eye to those only whom you are in fact to combat against, —and not, as you now do, to such as are to combat together with you? For to these men certainly you ought to be so much superior, that they should never be your associates in competition against any, but your inferior assistants in combating against the

enemy; —if you really think of exhibiting any noble exploits worthy of yourself and of your country.

Alcibiades/ And such a thought I assure you that I entertain.

Socrates/ Is it then at all worthy of you, to be contented with being a better man than your fellow-soldiers, —and not to have your eye directed toward the leaders of those whom you have to struggle with, studying how to become a better man than they, and employing yourself in exercises which are proper with a view to them?

Alcibiades/ What persons do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ Do you not know, that our city is every now and then at war with the Lacedæmonians, and with the Great King?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ If then you have it in your mind to be the leader of this city, would you not think rightly in thinking that you will have the kings of Sparta and of Persia to contend against?

Alcibiades/ I suspect that you are in the right.

Socrates/ And yet you, my good sir, on the contrary, are to fix your view on Midias, a feeder of quails, and on other such persons, who undertake to manage affairs of state, still wearing the badge of slavery, as the women would term it, in their souls, through their ignorance of the Muses; and not having yet thrown it off, but retaining their old sentiments, and manners still barbarian, are come to flatter the people, not to govern them. Ought you now to emulate these men whom I am speaking of, and disregard yourself? Ought you to neglect the acquiring of all such knowledge, as only is acquired through learning, when you have so great a combat to sustain? Or ought you to omit the exercising yourself in all such actions as are well performed only through practice?

Should you not be furnished with all the qualifications requisite for the government of the state before you undertake to govern it?

Alcibiades/ Indeed, Socrates, I believe you are in the right: but however, I imagine the commanders of the Spartan armies, and the Persian monarch, to be just such men as the others whom you have mentioned.

Socrates/ But, my very good sir, consider this imagination of yours, what evils attend on it.

Alcibiades/ In what respects?

Socrates/ In the first place, What opinion concerning your antagonists do you think would engage you to take most care about yourself? whether the opinion of their being formidable, or the contrary?

Alcibiades/ The opinion without doubt of their being formidable.

Socrates/ And do you think it would do you any harm to take care about yourself?

Alcibiades/ None at all; but on the contrary great good.

Socrates/ The want of this great good, then, is one of the evils which attend on that imagination?

Alcibiades/ It is true.

Socrates/ Consider if there be not probably another too; and that is the falsity of it.

Alcibiades/ How do you prove that?

Socrates/ Whether is it probable that persons, the most excellent in their natural dispositions, are to be found amongst those who descend from ancestors the noblest? or is it not?

Alcibiades/ Undoubtedly it is.

Socrates/ And is it not probable that such as have excellent dispositions from nature, if they meet with a suitable education, should become accomplished an virtue?

Alcibiades/ Of necessity they must.

Socrates/ Let us consider now, in comparing their advantages with our own, whether the kings of Sparta and of Persia seem to be descended from meaner ancestors than we are. Know we not that those are descendants of Hercules, and these of Achæmenes? that the begetting of Hercules is attributed to Zeus, and the ancestry of Achæmenes to Perseus the son of Zeus?

Alcibiades/ And the family which I am of, O Socrates! descends from Eurysaces; and the descent of Eurysaces was from Zeus.

Socrates/ And the family which I am of, my noble Alcibiades! descends from Dædalus; and the descent of Dædalus was from Vulcan, the son of Zeus. But the pedigree of those with whom we set ourselves in comparison, beginning from the persons who now reign, exhibits a race of kings, all of them sons of kings, in a direct line quite up to Zeus; those whom I first mentioned, kings of Argos and Lacedæmon; the others, kings of Persia perpetually, and often of all Asia, as they are at present: whereas we are but private men, ourselves and our fathers. If you then were to boast of your ancestors, and pompously say that Salamis was the hereditary dominion of Eurysaces, or, to ascend higher in your ancestry, that Æacus governed in his native country Ægina, can you imagine how ridiculous you would appear in the eyes of Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes? Consider besides, whether we may not be found inferior to those great men, not only in the pride of ancestry, but also in the care taken of our birth and breeding. Are you not sensible of the singular advantages which attend the progeny of the

Spartan kings in this respect, that their wives have a guard of state appointed for them by the Ephori; to the end that no king of theirs may be the issue of stolen embraces, or have for his real father any other man than a descendant of Hercules? And as to the Persian king, so greatly is he our superior with regard to this point, that none of his subjects entertain the least suspicion of his having any other father than the king his predecessor. The consort therefore of the king of Persia is under, no restraint but that of her own dread of the evil consequences, should she dishonor the king's bed. Further, when the king's eldest son, the heir apparent to the crown, is born, all the king's subjects in the city of his residence keep that day an original feast-day: and from thenceforward the anniversary of that day is celebrated with sacrifices and feasts by all Asia. But when we came first into the world, alas, Alcibiades! our very neighbors, as the comic poet says, *little knew what happened*. After this the child is brought up, not by some insignificant nurse, but by the best eunuchs about the king's person. And these have it in their charge to take care of the royal infant in every respect, but especially to contrive the means of his becoming as handsome as possible in his person, by so fashioning his pliant limbs, and giving such a direction to their growth, that they may be straight and for executing this office well they are highly honored. When the young princes have attained the age of seven years, they are provided with horses and with riding-masters, and are initiated in the exercise of hunting. At fourteen years of age they are put into the hands of those who are called the royal preceptors. And these are chosen out from such as are deemed the most excellent of the Persians, men of mature age, four in number; excelling severally in wisdom, justice, temperance, and fortitude. By the first of these they are taught the magic of Zoroaster the son of Oromazes, by which magic is meant the worship of

the Gods: and the same person instructs them likewise in the art of government. He who excels in the science of justice teaches them to follow truth in every part of their conduct throughout life. The person who excels in temperance enures the young prince not to be governed by sensual pleasure of any kind, that he may acquire the habits of a free man, and of a real king; by governing first all his own appetites, instead of being their slave. And the fourth, he who excels in fortitude forms his royal pupil to be fearless and intrepid; for that his mind, under the power of fear, would be a slave. But, Alcibiades, for your preceptor Pericles appointed one of his domestics, too old to be fit for any other service, Zopyrus of Thrace. I would recount to you the other articles of the breeding and instruction given to your antagonists, if the narration would not be too long; and besides this, the articles already mentioned are sufficient indications of those others which they infer and draw along with them. But your birth, Alcibiades, your breeding and institution, or any other circumstances attending you, scarce anyone of the Athenians is at all solicitous about, unless there be some man who happens to have an especial regard for you. Further; if you would consider the treasures of the Persian kings, the sumptuous furniture of their palaces and tables, their wardrobes of apparel, the long trains of their garments, and the fragrance of their unguents, their numerous retinue of attendants, and the rest of their magnificence, in comparing all this with what you have of the same kind yourself, you would evidently perceive how much you fall short of them, and would be ashamed at the comparison. If, on the other hand, you would consider the Lacedæmonians, their sobriety and modesty, how simple their way of living, and how easily they are satisfied, their magnanimity and observance of order, their manly endurance of pain and love of labor, their emulation

to excel, and their love of honor, you would think yourself a child to them in all these excellencies. Besides this, if you make riches any part of your consideration, and in this respect imagine yourself a person of consequence, let us not pass over this point neither unexamined; if by any means you can be made sensible in what rank you stand. If you choose then to consider the Lacedæmonians with regard to wealth, you will find that what we have here in Attica falls far short of theirs. For the lands which they possess in their own country, and in Messenia, are such as that no person here would dispute their superiority in this respect, whether he considers the quantity or the value of those lands, the number of their other slaves, besides such as the Helotes, or the number of their horses, and other cattle in the pasture-grounds of Messenia. But, setting aside all this, you will find that, as to gold and silver, there is not so much amongst all the Grecians as there is amongst the Lacedæmonians in private hands. For gold and silver have now for many generations been flowing into them from all parts of Greece, and often too from foreign countries; but there is no reflux any way. That therefore which the fox said to the lion in a fable of Æsop's, may justly be applied to them; the footsteps of money coming into Lacedæmon are easy to be discovered, as being all turned towards it; but the tracks of money going out of it are nowhere to be discerned. Thus it may easily be conceived, that of all the Grecians the richest in gold and silver are the Lacedæmonians, and that of all the Lacedæmonians the richest is their king. For of such comings-in a larger share, and oftener, is received by kings than by other men. And besides this, the taxes paid, by the Lacedæmonians to their kings bring them in a large revenue. But whatever wealth the Lacedæmonians have, though great if compared with that of any other Grecians, yet in comparison with the riches of the Persians, and especially of

their king, 'tis nothing. For I once heard a man of credit, who had been at the capital city of Persia, say, that in going up to it, he travelled almost a day's journey through a large and fertile territory, which the inhabitants of it called the Queen's Girdle; that there was another extensive tract of land called the Queen's Veil; and that many other fair and fruitful countries were appropriated to provide the rest of the queen's apparel; each of those countries having its name from that part of the apparel which the revenue of it furnished. So that, were any person to tell the queen-mother, Amastris, the consort formerly of Xerxes, that the son of Dinomache had it in his head to lead an army against her son; —and were she told at the same time that Dinomache's whole attire might be worth perhaps fifty minæ; supposing it to be of the most costly kind; and that this son of hers had land in the district of Erchia, containing not so much as three hundred acres; —she I suppose would wonder in what kind of things this Alcibiades could place so much confidence as to think of contending with Artaxerxes. And I imagine that she would say, it is impossible that this man should undertake such an affair with any other confidence than what he places in the prudence and skill which he is master of: for that the Grecians have nothing else worthy of account. Because if she was to hear further, that this same Alcibiades in the first place had not completed the twentieth year of his age; in the next place that he was utterly uninstructed; and besides this, that, when a friend of his advised him first to acquire the knowledge, the prudence, and the habits, necessary for the execution of his designs, before he offered to attack the king, he refused to hearken to this advice, and said, that even in his present condition he was prepared sufficiently; —I believe she would be astonished, and would ask, What kind of a thing it could be then in which the youth put his confidence? Upon this,

were we to tell her, —In his handsome and fine person, in his birth and family, in his riches, and in the natural faculties of his mind, —she would think us, Alcibiades, out of our senses, when she reflected on all the advantages which her son enjoyed of the same kinds. No less do I imagine that Lampido, daughter of Leotychidas, wife of Archidamus, and mother of Agis, who, all of them in their turns, succeeded to the crown of Sparta, she too would wonder, in reflecting on their greatness, were she told, that you had taken it into your head to make war against her son, so ill instructed as you are. And now do you not think it shameful, if the wives of our enemies consider more prudently for us than we do for ourselves, what sort of persons we ought to be before we venture to attack such enemies? Hearken therefore, my good sir, to the advice which I give you, in agreement with the Delphic inscription, Know thyself: since your antagonists are to be, not those whom you imagine, but these whom I have told you of: and these you never can excel in any other point than skill and application; in which articles if you are found deficient, you will fail of that reputation and renown, as well with Grecians as Barbarians, which I think you long for with more ardor than any other man does for whatever is the object of his wishes.

Alcibiades/ Can you teach me then, O Socrates, what sort of application I ought to use? for you seem to be entirely right in all which you have spoken.

Socrates/ Something I have indeed to say upon that subject. But let us enter into a joint consultation, you and I, about the means of becoming, both of us, better men. For when I say, there is a necessity for instruction, I mean it of myself as well as of you: since only one difference there is between you and me.

Alcibiades/ What is that?

Socrates/ He who is my guardian is better and wiser than Pericles, who is yours.

Alcibiades/ And who is yours, O Socrates?

Socrates/ A GOD, O Alcibiades! he who permitted me not before this day to enter into any discourse with you: he it is, on whose dictates to me I rely, when I am bold to say, that you will acquire the renown you long for, by no other means than through me.

Alcibiades/ You are in jest, Socrates.

Socrates/ Perhaps so: but I speak the truth however in good earnest when I say that we stand in need of instruction, or rather, that all men want it; but that you and I have very especial need of it.

Alcibiades/ In saying that I have need of it, you are not mistaken.

Socrates/ Neither am I, in saying that I myself have.

Alcibiades/ What then must we do?

Socrates/ We must not despair, nor give ourselves up to indolence, my friend.

Alcibiades/ By no means, Socrates, does it become us so to do.

Socrates/ Indeed it does not. We must therefore consider of the affair, you and I together. Now then answer to my questions. We profess to be desirous of becoming as excellent as possible: do we not?

Alcibiades/ We do.

Socrates/ In what kind of excellence?

Alcibiades/ In that certainly which belongs to men of merit.

Socrates/ Of merit in what respect?

Alcibiades/ In the management of business and affairs, undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But what business do you mean? The business of a jockey?

Alcibiades/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ For then we should go for instruction to those who understand the management of horses.

Alcibiades/ Certainly we should.

Socrates/ Do you then mean of a mariner?

Alcibiades/ I do not.

Socrates/ For in that case we should apply to those who understand navigation.

Alcibiades/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ But what business or affairs then? and by what sort of men are these affairs managed?

Alcibiades/ I mean such affairs as are managed by men of honor and merit amongst the Athenians.

Socrates/ Men of honor and merit do you call such as have understanding, or such as are void of understanding?

Alcibiades/ Such as have understanding.

Socrates/ In whatever business a man has understanding, in that has he not merit?

Alcibiades/ He has.

Socrates/ And in whatever business be is void of understanding, is he not in that void of merit?

Alcibiades/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Whether hath a shoe-maker understanding in the business of making shoes?

Alcibiades/ He certainly has.

Socrates/ In this respect therefore he has merit.

Alcibiades/ He has.

Socrates/ Well; but is not a shoe-maker void of understanding in the business of making clothes?

Alcibiades/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ In this respect therefore he is void of merit.

Alcibiades/ He is so.

Socrates/ The same man therefore, according to this account, is at the same time void of merit and possessed of merit.

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Would you say, then, that men possessed of merit are at the same time void of merit?

Alcibiades/ That cannot be.

Socrates/ What kind of men then do you mean by the men of merit?

Alcibiades/ I mean such as have abilities to govern at Athens.

Socrates/ Not to govern horses, I presume.

Alcibiades/ No, certainly.

Socrates/ But to govern men.

Alcibiades/ That is my meaning.

Socrates/ But what men do you mean? Men who are sick?

Alcibiades/ I do not mean these.

Socrates/ Men then who are going a voyage?

Alcibiades/ I mean not such men.

Socrates/ Men then who are gathering the harvest?

Alcibiades/ Nor such neither.

Socrates/ But men who do nothing do you mean? or men who do something?

Alcibiades/ Men who do something.

Socrates/ Who do what? try if you can make me sensible of your precise meaning.

Alcibiades/ Well then. I mean men who have commerce one with another, and make use of one another's aid and assistance in that kind of life which we lead in cities.

Socrates/ You speak then of such as have abilities to govern men, who make use of other men to aid and assist them.

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you mean the governing of men who make use of mariners in the rowing of galleys, and give them the proper orders?

Alcibiades/ I mean no such thing.

Socrates/ For ability to govern such men belongs to the commander of a galley.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Do you then mean the governing of men who are musicians, and lead the song to other men, making use of chorus-singers and dancers?

Alcibiades/ I mean not this neither.

Socrates/ For this skill belongs to the master of the whole choir.

Alcibiades/ Right.

Socrates/ In speaking then of ability to govern men who make use of other men, what kind of use do you mean? or in what way?

Alcibiades/ Fellow-citizens, I mean, partakers of the same polity, and engaged in mutual commerce for mutual help and benefit. I speak of ability to govern these.

Socrates/ What art then is that which gives this ability? as if I were to ask you, on the subject: just now mentioned—the knowing how to govern men embarked in the same voyage—What art is it that gives this knowledge?

Alcibiades/ The art of commanding ships.

Socrates/ And what science is that which gives the power of governing those others whom we mentioned, —those who have parts in the same song?

Alcibiades/ That which belongs, as just now you said, to the master of the whole choir.

Socrates/ And by what name do you call that science which gives ability to govern those who partake of the same polity?

Alcibiades/ Prudence I call it for my part, Socrates.

Socrates/ What? do you think then that want of prudence is proper for the commander of a ship?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not so.

Socrates/ But rather that prudence is.

Alcibiades/ I think it is, so far as it regards the safety of those who are sailing in the ship.

Socrates/ It is well said: and that other science, that which you call prudence, what end does that regard?

Alcibiades/ The good government and safety of the commonwealth.

Socrates/ And what is it which the commonwealth enjoys when it is governed best and preserved in safety? and what is it from which it is then preserved? as, if you were to ask me this question, What is it which the body enjoys when it is best taken care of, and preserved in safety? and from what is it then preserved? I would say that then it enjoys health, and is preserved from disease Are not you of the same opinion?

Alcibiades/ I am.

Socrates/ And, if you were to ask me further, What do the eyes enjoy when the best care is taken of them? and from what are they then preserved? I would answer in like manner as before, that they enjoyed their sight, and were preserved

from blindness. So likewise of the ears; when they are preserved from deafness, and have their hearing perfect, they are then in their best condition, and are taken the best care of.

Alcibiades/ Right.

Socrates/ Well, now; what does the commonwealth enjoy, and from what is it preserved, when 'tis in its best condition, has the best care taken of it, and is best preserved?

Alcibiades/ It seems to me, Socrates, that the members of it then enjoy mutual amity, and are preserved from enmity and factions.

Socrates/ By amity do you mean their being of the same mind, or of different minds?

Alcibiades/ Their being of the same mind.

Socrates/ Now through what science is it that different civil states are of the same mind concerning numbers?

Alcibiades/ Through the science of arithmetic.

Socrates/ Well; and is it not through that very science that private persons are of the same mind one with another?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ And that any person too, by himself, continues always in the same mind, is it not through his possessing that science?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ And through what science is it that a single individual is always of the same mind concerning a span and a cubit, whether of the two is the greater measure? is it not through the science of mensuration?

Alcibiades/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ And is it not so too between different private persons and civil states?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ And how concerning weights? does not the same hold true in this case?

Alcibiades/ I agree it does.

Socrates/ But now the sameness of mind which you speak of, what is that? What is the subject-matter of it? and through what science is it procured? I ask you likewise whether the same science which procures it for the public procures it no less for private persons; and whether it operates that effect in a man considered by himself as well as between one man and another.

Alcibiades/ Probably it does.

Socrates/ What science or art then is it? Do not labor for an answer, but speak readily what you think.

Alcibiades/ I think it to be such an amity and sameness of mind, that which we are speaking of, as there is between a father and a mother in loving their child, and as there is between brother and brother, and between man and wife.

Socrates/ Do you then think it possible, Alcibiades, for a man to be of the same mind with his wife on the subject of weaving, when he is ignorant and she is knowing in the art?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ Nor ought he neither. For 'tis a piece of knowledge belonging only to women.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well; and can a woman be of the same mind with her husband on the subject of fighting in battle among the infantry, when she has never learnt the art?

Alcibiades/ Certainly she cannot.

Socrates/ For the knowledge of this you would perhaps say belonged only to men.

Alcibiades/ I should so.

Socrates/ Some pieces of knowledge, therefore, properly belong to women; others to men according to your account.

Alcibiades/ No doubt can be made of it.

Socrates/ On those subjects therefore which are not common to both the sexes there is no sameness of mind, between husbands and their wives.

Alcibiades/ There is not any.

Socrates/ Neither then is there any friendship; if friendship consist in sameness of mind.

Alcibiades/ It appears there is not.

Socrates/ So far therefore as women are attentive to their own business they are not beloved by their husbands.

Alcibiades/ It seems they are not.

Socrates/ Neither are men beloved by their wives, —so far as their minds are engaged in their own business.

Alcibiades/ It seems they are not.

Socrates/ Neither then do citizens live well together in cities, when each of them minds only his own business.

Alcibiades/ Nay, Socrates; for my part I imagine that they do, —so far as they are thus employed.

Socrates/ How say you? What, without friendship between them, by means of which we said that civil states were in a happy condition, and without which we said they could not flourish?

Alcibiades/ But it seems to me that friendship is on this very account produced between them, because everyone gives his whole attention to his own business.

Socrates/ It did not seem so to you just now. But how do you explain at present what you said, —that friendship was produced by sameness of mind? Whether is it possible that fellow-citizens can be all of the same mind on subjects in which some of them are knowing, and others ignorant?

Alcibiades/ It is not possible.

Socrates/ And do they do their duty, and act as they ought, or not, when each of them attends to his own business?

Alcibiades/ As they ought, undoubtedly.

Socrates/ When the citizens then of any city act as they ought, and all of them do their duty, is not friendship produced between them?

Alcibiades/ It must be so I think, Socrates.

Socrates/ What kind of friendship, or sameness of mind, do you then mean, in the procuring of which you say that wisdom and prudence are requisite to make us men of virtue and merit? For I can neither learn from you what it is, nor what objects it regards. But sometimes it seems to regard the same objects, and sometimes not, according to your account of it.

Alcibiades/ Now by the Gods, Socrates, I know not what I mean, myself. But am in danger of appearing to have been, of a long time, in a shameful state of mind, without being sensible of it.

Socrates/ Now therefore you ought to take courage. For if fifty years of your life had elapsed before you had discovered the real state of your mind, an application of it to the care of yourself would have been a difficult task for you. But you are now at the very time of life in which such a discovery should be made, to be of any advantage to you.

Alcibiades/ What then am I to do, Socrates, now that I am made sensible of my condition?

Socrates/ Only to answer to the questions I shall put to you, Alcibiades. And if you will so do, you and I, by the favor of God, if any credit may be given to a prophecy of mine, shall both of us be the better for it.

Alcibiades/ Your prophecy shall be accomplished, as far as the accomplishment depends on my answering to your questions.

Socrates/ Come on then. What is it to take care of oneself? That we may not falsely imagine, as we often do, that we are taking care of ourselves, and know not that all the while we are otherwise employed. And when is it that a man is taking that care? Whether when he is taking care of what appertains to him, is he then taking care of himself?

Alcibiades/ For my part I must own I think so.

Socrates/ And when is it, think you, that a man is taking care of his feet? whether is it then when he is taking care of the things appertaining to his feet?

Socrates/ I do not apprehend your meaning.

Socrates/ Do you acknowledge something to be appertaining to the hand, —a ring, for instance? Or does it appertain to any other part of the human body than a finger?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And does not a shoe appertain to the foot in like manner?

Alcibiades/ It does.

Socrates/ Whether then at the time of our taking care of our shoes are we taking care immediately of our feet?

Alcibiades/ I do not quite apprehend you, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you acknowledge that whatever be the subject of our care, a right care of it may be taken?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ I ask you then, whether you think that a man takes a right care of whatever is the subject of his care, when he improves it and makes it better?

Alcibiades/ I answer yes.

Socrates/ What art now is that by which our shoes are improved and made better?

Alcibiades/ The shoe-maker's art.

Socrates/ By the shoe-maker's art therefore it is that we take a right care of our shoes.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And is it also by the shoe-maker's art that we take a right care of our feet? or is it by that art by which we improve our feet and make them better?

Alcibiades/ It is by this art.

Socrates/ And do we not improve and make better our feet by the same art by which we improve and make better the rest of our body?

Alcibiades/ I believe we do.

Socrates/ And is not this the gymnastic art?

Alcibiades/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ By the gymnastic art therefore we take care of the foot, and by the shoe-maker's art we take care of what is appurtenant to the foot.

Alcibiades/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ And in like manner by the gymnastic art we take care of our hands, and by the art of engraving rings we take care of what is appurtenant to the hand.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ By the gymnastic art also we take care of our bodies; but 'tis by the weaver's art and some others that we take care of things appurtenant to the body.

Alcibiades/ I agree with you entirely.

Socrates/ By one kind of knowledge therefore we take care of things themselves, and by a different kind of

knowledge we take care of things only appurtenant to those things which are the principal.

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ You are not therefore taking care of yourself when you are taking care only of the appurtenances to yourself.

Alcibiades/ At that time 'tis very true I am not.

Socrates/ For one and the same art, it seems, doth not take care of a thing itself, and of the appurtenances to that thing besides.

Alcibiades/ It appears to be not the same art.

Socrates/ Now then, by what kind of art might we take care of ourselves?

Alcibiades/ I have nothing to answer to this question.

Socrates/ So much, however, we are agreed in, that it is not an art by which we improve or better anything which is ours; but an art by which we improve and better our very selves.

Alcibiades/ I acknowledge it.

Socrates/ Could we ever know what art would improve or amend a shoe, if we knew not what a shoe was?

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Neither could we know what art would make better rings for the finger, if ignorant what a ring for the finger was.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Well; and can we ever know what art would improve or make a man's self better, so long as we are ignorant of what we ourselves are?

Alcibiades/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Let me ask you, then, whether it happens to be an easy thing to know oneself; and whether he was some person of mean attainments in knowledge, he who put up this inscription in the temple at Pytho: or is it a piece of knowledge difficult to be attained, and not obvious to everyone?

Alcibiades/ To me, Socrates, it has often seemed easy and obvious to everyone, and often too, at other times, a thing of the greatest difficulty.

Socrates/ But whether in itself it be an easy thing or not, with respect to us, Alcibiades, the state of the case is this; —had we attained to that piece of knowledge, we should perhaps know what it is to take care of ourselves; but never can we know this so long as we remain ignorant of that.

Alcibiades/ These are truths which I acknowledge.

Socrates/ Come then. By what means might it be found what is the very self of everything? for so we might perhaps find what we ourselves are: but so long as we continue in the dark as to that point, it will be no way possible to know ourselves.

Alcibiades/ You are certainly in the right.

Socrates/ Attend now, I conjure you in the name of Zeus: With whom is it that you are at this present time discoursing? Is it not with me?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ And am not I discoursing with you?

Alcibiades/ You are.

Socrates/ It is Socrates then who is discoursing and arguing:

Alcibiades/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And Alcibiades is attentive to his arguments.

Alcibiades/ He is.

Socrates/ Is it not by reason that Socrates thus argues in discourse?

Alcibiades/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And is not to argue in discourse the same thing as to reason?

Alcibiades/ Quite the same.

Socrates/ But is not the person who uses a thing, different from the thing, which he uses?

Alcibiades/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ As a shoe-maker, for instance, cuts his leather with the sheers, and the paring knife, and other tools.

Alcibiades/ Well; he does so.

Socrates/ Is not then the shoe-maker, who cuts the leather and uses those tools in cutting it, different from the tools which he uses?

Alcibiades/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Are not, in like manner, the instruments on which a musician plays, different things from the musician himself?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It was in this sense that just now I asked you whether you thought that, in all cases, the person who used a thing was different from the thing which he used.

Alcibiades/ I think he is.

Socrates/ Now then, to resume the instance of the shoe-maker; what say we? does he cut the leather with his tools only, or also with his hands?

Alcibiades/ With his hands also.

Socrates/ He therefore uses also these.

Alcibiades/ He does.

Socrates/ And does he not use his eyes also when he is cutting the leather?

Alcibiades/ He does.

Socrates/ And we are agreed, that the person who makes use of any things is different from the things which he makes use of.

Alcibiades/ We are.

Socrates/ The shoe-maker then, and the musician, are different from the hands and eyes with which they perform their operations.

Alcibiades/ It is apparent.

Socrates/ And does not a man use also his whole body?

Alcibiades/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Now the user is different from the thing used.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ A man therefore is a being different from his body.

Alcibiades/ It seems so.

Socrates/ What sort of being then is man?

Alcibiades/ I know not.

Socrates/ But you know that man is some being who makes use of the body.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Does any being make use of the body other than the soul?

Alcibiades/ None other.

Socrates/ And does it not so do by governing the body?

Alcibiades/ It does.

Socrates/ Further. I suppose that no man would ever think otherwise than this.

Alcibiades/ Than what?

Socrates/ That a man himself was one of these three things.

Alcibiades/ What three things?

Socrates/ Soul, or body, or a compound of them both, constituting one whole.

Alcibiades/ What besides could be imagined?

Socrates/ Now we agreed that the being which governs the body is the man.

Alcibiades/ We did.

Socrates/ What being then is the man? Doth the body itself govern itself?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ For the body we said was governed.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ The body then cannot be that being which we are in search of.

Alcibiades/ It seems not.

Socrates/ But whether does the compound being govern the body? and whether is this the man?

Alcibiades/ Perhaps it is.

Socrates/ Least of any of the three can this be so. For of two parties, one of which is the party governed, there is no possibility that both of them should govern jointly.

Alcibiades/ Right.

Socrates/ Since then neither the body, nor the compound of soul and body together, is the man, it remains, I think, either that a man's self is nothing at all, or; if it be anything, it must be concluded that the man is no other thing than soul.

Alcibiades/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Needs it then, to be proved to you still more clearly, that the soul is the very man?

Alcibiades/ It needs not, by Zeus: for the proofs already brought seem to me sufficient.

Socrates/ If it be proved tolerably well, though not accurately, 'tis sufficient for us. For we shall then perhaps, and not before, have an accurate knowledge of man's self, when we shall have discovered what we just now passed by as a matter which required much consideration.

Alcibiades/ What is that?

Socrates/ That of which was said some such thing as this, —that in the first place we should consider what is self itself: whereas, instead of this, we have been considering what is the proper self of every man. And this indeed for our purpose will perhaps suffice. For we could by no means ever say that anything was more peculiarly and property oneself, than is the soul.

Alcibiades/ Certainly, we could not.

Socrates/ May we not then fairly thus determine, —that we are conversing one with another, by means of reason, you and I, soul with soul?

Alcibiades/ Quite fairly.

Socrates/ This therefore was our meaning when we said a little before, that Socrates discoursed with Alcibiades, making use of reason: we meant, it seems, that he directed his words and arguments, not to your outward person, but to Alcibiades himself, that is to the soul.

Alcibiades/ It seems so to me too.

Socrates/ He therefore enjoins a man to recognize the soul, he who give him this injunction, —to know himself.

Alcibiades/ That is probably his meaning.

Socrates/ Whoever then has a knowledge only of his body, has indeed attained the knowledge of what is his, but not the knowledge of himself.

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ None therefore of the physicians, so far as he is only a physician, knows himself: neither does any master of the exercises, so far as he is such a master and nothing more.

Alcibiades/ It seems they do not.

Socrates/ Far from knowing themselves then are husbandmen, and other artificers or workmen. For such men as these are ignorant it seems of the things which are theirs, and knowing only in subjects still more remote, the mere appurtenances to those things which are theirs, so far as their several arts lead them. For they are acquainted only with things appurtenant to the body, to the culture and service of which body these things administer.

Alcibiades/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ If therefore wisdom consist in the knowledge of oneself, none of these artificers are wise men by their skill in their respective arts.

Alcibiades/ I think they are not.

Socrates/ On this account it is that these arts seem mechanical and mean, and not the learning fit for a man of a virtuous merit.

Alcibiades/ Entirely true.

Socrates/ To return to our subject: whoever then employs his care in the service of his body, takes care indeed of what is his, but not of himself.

Alcibiades/ There is danger of its being found so.

Socrates/ And whoever is attentive to the improvement of his wealth, is not taking care either of himself or of what is

his, but of things still more remote, the mere appurtenances to what is his.

Alcibiades/ It seems so to me too.

Socrates/ The man therefore, who is intent on getting money, is so far not acting for his own advantage.

Alcibiades/ Rightly concluded.

Socrates/ It follows also, that whoever was an admirer of the outward person of Alcibiades, did not admire Alcibiades, but something which belongs to Alcibiades.

Alcibiades/ You say what is true.

Socrates/ But whoever is your admirer is the admirer of your soul.

Alcibiades/ It appears to follow of necessity from our reasoning.

Socrates/ And hence it is, that the admirer of your outward person, when the flower of it is all fallen, departs and forsakes you.

Alcibiades/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But the admirer of a soul departs not, so long as that soul goes on to improve itself.

Alcibiades/ Probably so.

Socrates/ I am he then who forsakes you not, but abides by you, when, the flower of youth having left you, the rest, of your followers have left you and are gone.

Alcibiades/ It is kindly done of you, Socrates: and never do you forsake me.

Socrates/ Exert all your endeavors then, to be as excellent a man as possible.

Alcibiades/ I will do my best.

Socrates/ For the state of your case is this: —Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, never it seems had any admirer, neither

has he now, besides one only, and therefore to be cherished, this Socrates here, the son of Sophroniscus and Phænarete.

Alcibiades/ 'Tis true.

Socrates/ Did you not say that I had been a little beforehand with you when I accosted you; for that you had it in your mind to address me first; as you wanted to ask me, why of all your admirers I was the only one who forsook you not?

Alcibiades/ I did say so: and that was the very case.

Socrates/ This then was the reason: 'twas because I was the only person who admired you; the others admired that which is yours. That which is yours has already dropt its flower; and the spring-season of it is past: whereas you yourself are but beginning to flourish. If therefore the Athenian populace corrupt you not, and make you less fair, I never shall forsake you. But this is what I chiefly fear, that you may come to admire and court the populace, and be corrupted by them, and we should lose you: since many of the Athenians, men of virtuous merit too, have been thus corrupted before now. For the people of magnanimous Erectheus has an outward person fair and engaging to behold. But we ought to strip it of all its showy dress, and view it naked. Use therefore the caution which I give you.

Alcibiades/ What caution?

Socrates/ In the first place, my friend, exercise yourself; and acquire the knowledge of those things which are necessary to be learnt by every man who engages in political affairs: but engage not in them until you are thus exercised and thus instructed: that you may come to them prepared with an antidote, and suffer no harm from the poison of the populace.

Alcibiades/ What you say, Socrates, to me seems right. But explain, if you can, more clearly, how or in what way we should take care of ourselves.

Socrates/ Is not this then sufficiently clear to us from what has been already said? For what we are, has been tolerably well agreed on. Indeed before that point was settled we feared lest we should mistake it, and imagine that we were taking care of ourselves, when the object of our care all the while was some other thing.

Alcibiades/ This is true.

Socrates/ Upon that it was concluded by both of us that we ought to take care of the soul, and that to this we should direct all our attention and regard.

Alcibiades/ It was evident.

Socrates/ And that the care of our bodies and our possessions should be delivered over to others.

Alcibiades/ We could not doubt it.

Socrates/ In what way then may we attain to know the soul itself with the greatest clearness? For, when we know this, it seems we shall know ourselves. Now, in the name of the Gods, whether are we not ignorant of the right meaning of that Delphic inscription just now mentioned?

Alcibiades/ What meaning? What have you in your thoughts, O Socrates! when you ask this question?

Socrates/ I will tell you what I suspect that this inscription means, and what particular thing it advises us to do. For a just resemblance of it is, I think, not to be found wherever one pleases; but in one only thing, the sight.

Alcibiades/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Consider it jointly now with me. Were a man to address himself to the outward human eye, as if it were some other man; and were he to give it this counsel “See yourself;”

what particular thing should we suppose that he advised the eye to do? Should we not suppose that 'twas to look at such a thing, as that the eye, by looking at it, might see itself?

Alcibiades/ Certainly we should.

Socrates/ What kind of thing then do we think of, by looking at which we see the thing at which we look, and at the same time see ourselves?

Alcibiades/ 'Tis evident, O Socrates, that for this purpose we must look at mirrors, and other things of the like kind.

Socrates/ You are right. And has not the eye itself, with which we see, something of the same kind belonging to it?

Alcibiades/ Most certainly it has.

Socrates/ You have observed, then, that the face of the person who looks in the eye of another person, appears visible to himself in the eye-sight of the person opposite to him, as in a mirror? And we therefore call this the pupil, because it exhibits the image of that person who looks in it.

Alcibiades/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ An eye therefore beholding an eye, and looking in the most excellent part of it, in that with which it sees, may thus see itself?

Alcibiades/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ But if the eye look at any other part of the man, or at anything whatever, except what this part of the eye happens to be like, it will not see itself.

Alcibiades/ It is true.

Socrates/ If therefore the eye would see itself, it must look in an eye, and in that place of the eye, too, where the virtue of the eye is naturally seated; and the virtue of the eye is sight.

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ Whether then is it not true, my friend Alcibiades, that the soul, if she would know herself, must look at soul, and especially at that place in the soul in which wisdom, the virtue of the soul, is ingenerated; and also at whatever else this virtue of the soul resembles?

Alcibiades/ To me, O Socrates, it seems true.

Socrates/ Do we know of any place in the soul more divine than that which is the seat of knowledge and intelligence?

Alcibiades/ We do not.

Socrates/ This therefore in the soul resembles the divine nature. And a man, looking at this, and recognizing all that which is divine, and God and wisdom, would thus gain the most knowledge of himself.

Alcibiades/ It is apparent.

Socrates/ And to know oneself, we acknowledge to be wisdom.

Alcibiades/ By all means.

Socrates/ Shall we not say, therefore, that as mirrors are clearer, purer, and more splendid than that which is analogous to a mirror in the eye, in like manner God is purer and more splendid than that which is best in our soul?

Alcibiades/ It is likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Looking therefore at God, we should make use of him as the most beautiful mirror, and among human concerns we should look at the virtue of the soul; and thus, by so doing, shall we not especially see and know our very selves?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ If then we are not wise, but are ignorant of ourselves, can we know what our good is, and what our evil?

Alcibiades/ How is it possible that we should, Socrates?

Socrates/ For perhaps it appears impossible for a man who knows not Alcibiades himself, to know anything which relates to Alcibiades, as having that relation.

Alcibiades/ Impossible it is, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Neither then can anything which is our own, be known by us to be our own, any other way than through the knowledge of ourselves.

Alcibiades/ How should we?

Socrates/ And if we know not that which is ours, neither can we know any of the appurtenances to what is ours.

Alcibiades/ It appears we cannot.

Socrates/ We therefore were not at all right in admitting, as we did just now, that certain persons there were, who knew not themselves, but who knew what belonged to them, and was theirs. Neither can such as know not themselves know the appurtenances to what is theirs. For it seems, that 'tis the province of one and the same person, and is from one and the same science, to know himself, to know the things which are his, and to know the appurtenances to those things.

Alcibiades/ I believe it will be found so.

Socrates/ And whoever is ignorant of what belongs to himself and is his own, must be like wise ignorant of what belongs to other men and is theirs.

Alcibiades/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And if he is ignorant of what belongs to other men, will he not be ignorant also of what belongs to the public, and to other civil states?

Alcibiades/ He must be so.

Socrates/ Such a man, therefore, cannot be a politician.

Alcibiades/ Certainly he cannot.

Socrates/ Neither will he be fit to manage a family.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor will he have any certain knowledge of anything which he is doing.

Alcibiades/ He will not.

Socrates/ And will not the man who knows not what he is doing, do amiss?

Alcibiades/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ And doing amiss, will he not act ill, both as a private person, and as a member of the public?

Alcibiades/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ And the man who acts ill, is he not in a bad condition?

Alcibiades/ A very bad one.

Socrates/ And in what condition will they be who have an interest in his conduct?

Alcibiades/ In a very bad one they too.

Socrates/ It is not possible therefore that any man, should be happy if he be not wise and good.

Alcibiades/ It is not possible.

Socrates/ Those then who are bad men are in a bad condition.

Alcibiades/ A very bad one indeed.

Socrates/ Not even by riches therefore is a man delivered out of a miserable condition; nor by any other thing than wisdom and virtue.

Alcibiades/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ Fortifications therefore, and shipping, and harbors, will be of no avail to the happiness of any civil states; neither will the multitude of their people, nor the extent of their territories; if they want virtue.

Alcibiades/ Of none at all.

Socrates/ If then you would manage the affairs of the city well and rightly, you must impart virtue to the citizens.

Alcibiades/ Beyond question.

Socrates/ But can a man impart to others that which he has not himself?

Alcibiades/ How should he?

Socrates/ You yourself therefore in the first place should acquire virtue, as should also every other man who has any thoughts of governing, and managing, not himself only, and his own private affairs, but the people also, and the affairs of the public.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Not arbitrary power therefore, nor command, ought you to procure, neither for yourself nor for the city, but justice and prudence.

Alcibiades/ It is evident.

Socrates/ For, if ye act justly and prudently, your own conduct, and that of the city too, will be pleasing unto God.

Alcibiades/ 'Tis highly probable.

Socrates/ And ye will thus act, by looking, as we said before, at that which is divine and splendid.

Alcibiades/ Evidently so.

Socrates/ And, further, by directing your sight hither, ye will behold and know what is your own good.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Will ye not then act both rightly and well?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And acting thus I will insure happiness both to yourself and to the city.

Alcibiades/ You will be a safe insurer.

Socrates/ But acting unjustly, as looking to that which is without God, and dark, 'tis highly probable that ye will perform actions similar to what ye behold, actions dark and atheistical, as being ignorant of yourselves.

Alcibiades/ In all probability that would be the case.

Socrates/ For, O my friend Alcibiades! if a man have the power of doing what he pleases, and at the same time want intellect, what will be the probable consequence of such arbitrary power, to himself, if he is a private person, and to the state also, if he governs it? As in the case of a bodily disease, if the sick person, without having medical knowledge, had the power of doing what he pleased, and if he tyrannized so as that no person would dare to reprove him, what would be the consequence? Would it not be, in all probability, the destruction of his body?

Alcibiades/ It would indeed.

Socrates/ And in the affair of a sea voyage, if a man, void of the knowledge and skill belonging to a sea commander, had the power of acting and directing in the vessel as he thought proper, do you conceive what would be the consequence, both to himself and to the companions of his voyage?

Alcibiades/ I do; that they would all be lost.

Socrates/ Is it otherwise then in the administration of the state, or in any offices of command or power? If virtue be wanting in the persons who are appointed to them, will not the consequence be an evil and destructive conduct?

Alcibiades/ It must.

Socrates/ Arbitrary power, then, my noble Alcibiades! is not the thing which you are to aim at procuring, —neither for yourself, nor yet for the commonwealth; but virtue, if you mean either your own private happiness or that of the public.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And before one acquires virtue, it is better to be under good government than it is to govern, —better not only for a child, but for a man.

Alcibiades/ Evidently so.

Socrates/ Is not that which is better, more beautiful also?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ And is not that which is more beautiful, more becoming?

Alcibiades/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ It becomes a bad man therefore to be a slave: For it is better for him so to be.

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Vice therefore is a thing servile, and becoming only to the condition of a slave.

Alcibiades/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And virtue is a thing liberal, and becoming to a gentleman.

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Ought we not, my friend, to shun everything which is servile, and becoming only to a slave?

Alcibiades/ The most of all things, O Socrates!

Socrates/ Are you sensible of the present state of your own mind? Do you find it liberal, and such as becomes a gentleman, or not?

Alcibiades/ I think I am very fully sensible of what it is.

Socrates/ Do you know then, by what means you may escape from that condition in which you are now, —not to name what it is, when it happens to be the case of a man of honor?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ By what?

Alcibiades/ Through you, Socrates, if you please.

Socrates/ That is not well said, Alcibiades!

Alcibiades/ What ought I then to say?

Socrates/ You ought to say, If God pleases.

Alcibiades/ I adopt those words then for my own. And I shall add to them these further; —that we shall be in danger, Socrates, of changing parts, —I of assuming yours, —and you of bearing mine. For it is not possible for me to avoid the following you everywhere from this day forward, with as much assiduity as if I was your guardian, —and you my pupil.

Socrates/ My friendship then for you, noble Alcibiades! may be compared justly to a stork; if, having hatched in your heart, and there cherished, a winged love, it is afterwards to be by this love, in return, cherished and supported.

Alcibiades/ And this you will find to be the very case: for I shall begin from henceforward to cultivate the science of justice.

Socrates/ I wish you may persevere. But I am terribly afraid for you: not that I in the least distrust the goodness of your disposition; but perceiving the torrent of the times, I fear you may be borne away with it, in spite of your own resistance, and of my endeavors in your aid.

Parmenides.

or

On Idealities.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Cephalus, Adeimantus, Antipho, Glauco,
Pythodorus, Socrates, Zeno, Parmenides.

Cephalus/ When we arrived at Athens from home, from Clazomenæ, we happened to meet with Adeimantus and Glaucon in the place of assembly. And Adeimantus, taking me by the hand, said;

Adeimantus/ Hail, Cephalus; and if you are here in want of anything over which we have any power, mention it to me.

Cephalus/ Nay, I came for this very purpose, to beg of you a favor.

Adeimantus/ Will you then, state your request?

Cephalus/ What was the name of your brother by the same mother? for I do not remember it: for he was a child when I first came here from Clazomenæ; and it is now a long time since then. His father's name was, I think, Pyrilampes.

Adeimantus/ Just so, and his brother's was Antipho. But why do you especially ask?

Cephalus/ These, my fellow-citizens, are much given to philosophy, and have heard that this Antipho had frequently met with one Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno; and that having frequently heard from Pythodorus the conversations which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides held with each other, he had remembered them.

Adeimantus/ You speak the truth.

Cephalus/ These then, we beg to hear.

Adeimantus/ This, is no difficult matter. For, although young, he has exercised himself greatly in them; since he now, after the example of his grandfather, who is his namesake, applies himself much to equestrian affairs. But, if it seems good, we will go to him: for he is just gone home from hence; and dwells hard by, in Melita.

Cephalus/ So saying, we went, and caught him at home, giving orders to a coppersmith to make him a bit. But as soon as he was at liberty, and his brothers told him the cause of our coming, he recognized me through my previous sojourn at this place, and he embraced me; and on our begging him to go through the conversations, he at first shrunk back, for he said it would be a troublesome task; but afterwards, however, he detailed them.

Cephalus/ Antipho then said that Pythodorus had told him that Zeno and Parmenides once came to the great Panathenæa; that Parmenides was then a rather old man, with very hoary locks, but of a handsome and noble aspect, and full sixty-five years of age; but that Zeno was nearly forty years old, very tall and graceful to behold, and was reported to have been the bosom friend of Parmenides; he said, too, that they lodged with Pythodorus, in the Cerameicus, beyond the walls; whither also Socrates came, and many others with him, who were eager to hear the writings of Zeno; for then for the first time they had been brought by the strangers; but that Socrates was at that time very young. That Zeno therefore himself read the writings to them; and Pythodorus further related that Parmenides happened to be gone out; and that of the discourses so read there remained only a very small portion, when he himself entered, and Parmenides with him and Aristotle, who was one of the Thirty Tyrants; and that he heard but a little at that time; but that nevertheless he had often heard the whole discourse previously from Zeno.

He added that Socrates, on hearing the discourses, entreated him to read again the first hypothesis of his first discourse; and that, when it was read, Socrates said—

Socrates/ How do you, Zeno, assert this, that if the things existing are many, the same things must be both similar and dissimilar? But that this is impossible. For neither can things dissimilar be similar, nor things similar be dissimilar. Is not this what you assert?

Zeno/ It is.

Socrates/ If then it is impossible for dissimilars to be similar, and similars dissimilar, it is impossible likewise for many things to exist? For if there were many, they would undergo impossibilities. Is this what your discourses mean? Is it anything else than to contest, contrary to all that is usually asserted, that "the many" does not exist? And do you fancy that each of your discourses is a proof of this very doctrine? so that you conceive you have produced as many proofs as you have written discourses, to show that "the many" does not exist? say you thus, or do I not rightly understand you?

Zeno/ No; but you understand quite well the meaning of the whole work.

Socrates/ I perceive, Parmenides, that Zeno here wishes not only to be familiar with you in other bonds of friendship, but in your writings likewise. For Zeno has, in a certain manner, written the same as yourself; but by some change he endeavors to deceive us, as if asserting something different. For you in your poems assert that the universe is "one;" and you produce beautiful and excellent arguments in support of this opinion. But Zeno says that "the many" does not exist, and he too produces very many and mighty proofs. With regard then to the fact, that you assert that "the one" exists, and he, that "the many" does not exist; and that

each of you speak so as to appear to have said not an atom of the same things, although you both assert nearly the same, it seems to me that what has been said by you is above us the rest.

Zeno/ It is so, Socrates. But you do not perfectly comprehend the truth of my writings; although, like the dogs of Laconia, you excellently pursue and track out what is there asserted. But this in the first place lies hid from you, that this discourse is not in every respect of so solemn a cast, that it was written, as you say, with the set purpose of being concealed from mankind, as if effecting something great; yet you have spoken something of what has happened; and in truth, these writings are a kind of support to the doctrine of Parmenides against those who endeavor to ridicule it, by saying that if "one" exists, it would follow that such an assertion would suffer many things of a laughable kind, and contrary to itself. This writing therefore contradicts those, who assert that "the many" exists; and it gives in return these and many other reasons; as it intends to show that the hypothesis, which asserts the existence of "the many," would suffer things still more laughable than that, which says of if "many" exist, or of "one" existence, should a person go through the question sufficiently. Through some such love of contention was this discourse composed by me, when a youth; but someone stole it after it was written, so that it was out of my power to deliberate whether it should be brought out into the light or not. Hence it lies hid from you, Socrates, that it was written by a young person through the love of contention, and not, as you fancy, by an older one, through the love of renown, since, as I have said, you have not made a bad guess.

Socrates/ I receive the account; and I think the case is as you have stated. But tell me this too. Do you not think there is a certain form of similitude, existing itself by itself? and

that another is contrary to this, which is dissimilar? and that you and me, and other things, which we call many, participate in these two? and that some things, participating in similitude, become similar in that respect and so far as they participate? but that others, which participate in dissimilitude, become dissimilar? and that those which participate in both become both? But if all things participate in both, which are contrary to each other, and that similar and dissimilar to each other exist through participating of both, what is the wonder? For, if anyone should show that similars themselves become dissimilar, or dissimilars similar, I should think it would be a prodigy. But if he shows that such things, as participate in both of these, suffer likewise both these, it does not appear to me, Zeno, that there would be anything absurd in the case; nor again, if anyone should show that all things are one, through their participating in "the one," and that very same things are many, through their participating in multitude. But I should very much wonder if anyone should show that what is one, is itself many, and on the other hand, that what are many is one; and in a similar manner concerning all the rest. It would indeed be worthy of wonder, if he should show that both the genera themselves and the species in them suffered these contrary affections. But what is there wonderful, if anyone should show that I am both one thing and many, by saying, that when he wishes to prove I am many, that the parts on the right hand of me are different from those on the left, the anterior from the posterior, and in like manner the upward from the downward parts—for I think that I participate in multitude—but when he desires to show that I am one, he will say, that, we being seven in number, I am one man, and participate in "the one"? so that he would by this means prove both to be true. If then, anyone should endeavor to show that stones, wood, and all such things, are. both many

and one, we would say that he shows such things as are many and one, but not that “the one” is many, nor “the many” one; and that he does not say anything wonderful, but what we should all confess. But if anyone should, in the first place, distribute the species of things, concerning which I have just been speaking, separating them according to their very selves, such as similitude and dissimilitude, and multitude and the one, and standing and motion, and the rest of this kind, and should afterwards show that these things can in themselves be mixed and separated, I should, Zeno, be marvelously astonished. But it appears to me that you have very manfully made this your business; yet I should be much more astonished if anyone could solve this very same difficulty, which is involved on all sides in species themselves; and, as you have gone through in the case of things sensible to the sight, so should he go through in the case of things comprehended by reason.

Cephalus/ On Socrates saying this, Pythodorus observed that he thought that Parmenides and Zeno were at each remark annoyed; but they gave the greatest attention to him, Socrates, and frequently looking at each other smiled, as wondering at Socrates. Hence on his ceasing to speak, Parmenides said—

Parmenides/ How worthy, Socrates, are you of admiration for your ardor in what relates to reasoning! Tell me then, have you thus separated, as you say, certain species apart by themselves, and likewise those, that participate in them, apart? And does similitude itself appear to you to be separate from that similitude which we possess, and “one” and “many,” and all such other things as you have just now heard of from Zeno?

Socrates/ To me, it does.

Parmenides/ And does it appear to you, that these things too exist, such as a species of justice, itself by itself, and of the beautiful and the good, and all things of such a kind?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ What, is there a species of man separate from us and all the things, such as we are, some species itself of man, or of fire, or water?

Socrates/ I have often been in doubt, Parmenides, on this point; whether it is necessary to speak of these in the same manner as of those, or in a different manner.

Parmenides/ And do you doubt, Socrates, whether it is necessary to say that of each individual thing, as may appear to be ridiculous, such as hair, clay, and filth, or anything else the most worthless and vile, there is a species apart, as being different from those which we take into our hands?

Socrates/ By no means; but I think that things are as we see them: but consider lest it be not very absurd to think that there is a certain form of these? Already it has at some time disturbed me, lest there be something of the same kind in the case of everything. But afterwards, when I have been standing in this way, I rapidly take myself off, fearing lest, falling into an abyss of trifling, I should utterly perish and be lost. But, returning from thence to what we have just now asserted as possessing species, I have passed my time in busying myself about them.

Parmenides/ For, you are as yet but a young man, Socrates, and Philosophy has not yet laid hold of you, as she will yet lay hold of you, according to my thinking, when you shall not despise any of these things: but now, through your juvenile age, you still look to the opinions of men. Tell me then, this; Does it appear to you, as you say, that there are certain species, of which these the rest participating retain their appellations; as, for instance, that such things as

participate in similitude are similars; in greatness, are great; and in beauty and justice, are beautiful and just?

Socrates/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Does not everything which participates, either participate in the whole species, or only in a part of it? Or can there be any other mode of participation besides these?

Socrates/ How can there be?

Parmenides/ Does it then appear to you that the whole species in each individual of many things is one? Or how?

Socrates/ What, prevents it, Parmenides, from being so?

Parmenides/ Being, therefore, one and the same in things many and separate from each other, it will be at the same time whole, and thus it will be separate itself from itself.

Socrates/ It would not be so, if, just as the day, being one and the same, is present in many places at the same time, and yet is not the more separate from itself; in the same manner, if every species may be at once one and the same in all.

Parmenides/ Pleasantly indeed, do you, Socrates, make one and the same thing to be in many places; just as if, covering many men with a sail-cloth, you should say that there is one whole over many; or do you think that you would not assert something of this kind?

Socrates/ Perhaps so.

Parmenides/ Will then the whole sail-cloth be over each person, or one part of it over one person, and another over another?

Socrates/ A part.

Parmenides/ Then, these species, Socrates, are divisible; and that which participates in them, would participate only

in a part of them; and there would no longer be in each a whole, but only a part of each.

Socrates/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ Are you then willing to assert that one species is in truth divided, and that it is still one?

Socrates/ By no means.

Parmenides/ For see, whether, if you should divide magnitude itself, and if each of the many things which are great, should be great by a part of magnitude, less than magnitude itself, it would not appear absurd.

Socrates/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ What then? Will each little thing, by taking a part of the equal, have that, which, to a thing less than the equal itself, will be the thing having equal to something?

Socrates/ It is impossible.

Parmenides/ But some one of us will possess a part of the small; and the small itself will be greater than this, inasmuch as it is a part of itself; and thus the small itself will be greater: but that to which the part taken away shall be added, will become smaller, but not greater than before.

Socrates/ This cannot be.

Parmenides/ After what manner then, Socrates, can the other things participate in species, if they are able to participate neither according to parts, nor according to wholes?

Socrates/ It does not appear to me, by Zeus, to be at all an easy matter to define in a question of this kind.

Parmenides/ What then? How stands the case with you in regard to this?

Socrates/ To what?

Parmenides/ I think that you consider every species as one, on some such account as this. When some things many

in number seem to you to be great, there seems perhaps to be one and the same idea to you, who survey them all; from whence you consider the great to be one.

Socrates/ You speak the truth.

Parmenides/ But what, as regards the great itself, and the other things which are great, if you look upon them all in like manner through the soul, will not, on the other hand, a certain one thing appear to you great, through which all these necessarily seem to be great?

Socrates/ It seems so.

Parmenides/ Another species of magnitude will then become apparent, besides magnitude itself and its participants: and in addition to all these, another species, through which all these become great; each of your species will no longer be one, but infinite in number.

Socrates/ But, have a care, Parmenides, lest each of these species be nothing more than a mental conception, and that it is not meet for it to exist anywhere but in souls. For thus each would be one, nor would the consequences, just now mentioned, occur.

Parmenides/ What then, is each of these mental conceptions one, and is there a mental conception of nothing?

Socrates/ This is impossible.

Parmenides/ It is then of something?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Of a being or of a non-being?

Socrates/ Of a being.

Parmenides/ Is it not of some one thing, which that mental conception understands as being a one certain idea over all things?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Will not then that species, which is understood to be one, be always the same over all things?

Socrates/ This, on the other hand, seems to be necessary.

Parmenides/ But what. Is it not necessary, since you say that the other things participate in species, either that each should seem to you to be from mental conceptions, and that all of them understand, or that being mental conceptions, they understand nothing?

Socrates/ But this, has no reason for it. But this appears, Parmenides, to me to be for the most part the case. That these species stand, as it were, patterns in nature; but that the other things are similar to them, and are their resemblances: and that this participation of species by the other things, is nothing more than an assimilation to them.

Parmenides/ If then anything becomes similar to the species, can it be possible for that species not to be similar to the assimilated, so far as it is rendered similar? Or is there any method by which the similar would not be similar to the similar?

Socrates/ There is not.

Parmenides/ Is there not, therefore, a great necessity for the similar to participate in one and the same form as the similar?

Socrates/ There is a necessity.

Parmenides/ But will not that, through the participation of which the similars become similars, be species itself?

Socrates/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ It is not, therefore, possible for a thing to be similar to the species, nor the species to another. For otherwise another species will always appear by the side of the species; and should this again become similar to another, another would appear; and a new species would

never cease to be continually produced, if the species should be produced similar to its participant.

Socrates/ You speak most truly.

Parmenides/ Hence, then, the other things do not participate in species through similitude; but it is necessary to seek after something else, through which they do participate.

Socrates/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ See you then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty, should anyone define species as existing themselves by themselves?

Socrates/ Very much so.

Parmenides/ Know then well that you do not apprehend at all, so to speak, how great is the difficulty, if, separating each of the things existing, you should lay down one species.

Socrates/ How so?

Parmenides/ There are many and other doubts; but this is the greatest. Should anyone assert that it is not proper for the species to be known, if they are such as we have said they ought to be, a person would not have it in his power to demonstrate to the party asserting this, that he is deceived; unless he who doubts is skilled in many things, and is of a good disposition, and willing to follow the demonstrator, while busied in many proofs, and these far-fetched; while he who holds, as a matter of necessity, that they are not to be known, will be unpersuaded.

Socrates/ In what way, Parmenides?

Parmenides/ Because, Socrates, I think that both you and any other person, who lays down that the essence of each species exists itself by itself, would allow, in the first place, that not one of them exists in us.

Socrates/ For, how could it still exist itself by itself?

Parmenides/ You speak well. But do not such ideas as are, with relation to each other, such as they are, possess also their essence with respect to themselves, and not with reference to things existing among us, whether they are resemblances, or in whatever manner a person may set them down; by the names of each of which, while we participate in them, we are called? but the things existing among us, and which are synonymous to those, exist, on the other hand, with reference to themselves, and not with relation to the species; and belong to themselves, but not to those which receive from them a common appellation.

Socrates/ How say you?

Parmenides/ As if, some one of us should be the master or slave of anyone; for a slave is surely not the slave of a master, who is abstractedly speaking a master, nor is a master the master of a slave, who is abstractedly speaking a slave; but being a man, both these are of a man; but master itself is that, which it is from its relation to slavery itself; and slavery itself is in a similar manner slavery with reference to mastery itself. But what are in us do not possess any power, as regards those, nor those any, as regards us; but they exist, as I say, from themselves, and with relation to themselves; and those by us in a similar manner with relation to themselves. Or do you not understand what I am saying?

Socrates/ I understand, perfectly.

Parmenides/ Would not science itself, which is a thing science, be a science of that itself which is a thing truth.

Socrates/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But would each of the sciences which exists really, be the science of each of the things which exist really, or not?

Socrates/ Yes, it would.

Parmenides/ But would not the science which is among us be the science of the truth which is? And again, would not each science that is among us, turn out to be the science of things existing among us?

Socrates/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But, as you have admitted, we do not possess species themselves, nor is it possible for them to exist among us.

Socrates/ For it is not.

Parmenides/ But each of the genera, which really exist, are surely known by the species itself of its proper science.

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But this species we do not possess.

Socrates/ For we do not.

Parmenides/ No species therefore is known by us, since we do not participate in science itself?

Socrates/ It appears it is not.

Parmenides/ Therefore the beautiful itself, which exists really, and the good itself, and all the things which we have considered as being ideas, are unknown to us?

Socrates/ It nearly seems so.

Parmenides/ Now look at this, which is yet still more dreadful.

Socrates/ What?

Parmenides/ Would you say, or not, that, if there is a certain species itself of science, it would be much more accurate than the science which is among us? and beauty itself, and everything else in the same manner?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ If then, anything else participates in science itself, would you not say that no one possesses the most accurate science more than a god?

Socrates/ It is necessary to say so.

Parmenides/ But will a god, possessing science itself, be able to know the matters among us?

Socrates/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Because, it has been, Socrates, confessed by us, that those species do not possess the power, which they possess, in relation to those among us, nor those among us in relation to them; but that each possess their power in relation to themselves.

Socrates/ It was so confessed.

Parmenides/ If then there is this the most exact mastery with the deity, and this the most exact science, their mastery will not rule over us, nor will their science know us, nor aught of the things among us; and similarly we do not rule over them by our rule, nor do we know aught of things divine by our science. And again, according to the same reasoning, they will neither, though gods, be our masters, nor have any knowledge of human affairs.

Socrates/ But have a care, lest the reasoning be not very wonderful, should it deprive the deity of the power of knowing.

Parmenides/ These, and very many others, Socrates, in addition to these, it is necessary for the species to undergo, if there are these ideas of things existing, and if anyone shall define each species, as being something itself; so that the hearer may be in a difficulty, and, doubting, contend that such species do not exist; or if they do exist ever so much, that there is a great necessity for them to be unknown by human nature; and that he who says so, seems to say something to the purpose; and to be, as we just now stated,

a person wonderfully difficult to be persuaded, and that there is need of a person naturally clever to be able to perceive that there is a certain genus of each thing, and an essence existing itself by itself: but of a person still more wonderful, who shall discover himself, and be able to teach another to distinguish all these in a sufficient manner.

Socrates/ I agree with you, Parmenides, for you speak entirely to my mind.

Parmenides/ But however, if anyone, Socrates, on the contrary, will not admit that there are species of existing things, looking to what has been now said, and to other things of the same kind, nor will define the species of each thing as being something itself, he will not have where to turn his thoughts, while he does not permit the idea of each existing thing to be always the same; and by this means he will entirely destroy the power of speaking logically. Some such thing as this you seem to me to have perceived even more.

Socrates/ You speak the truth.

Parmenides/ What then will you do with respect to philosophy? Where will you turn yourself, if these are unknown?

Socrates/ Indeed I do not seem to myself to see clearly at present.

Parmenides/ Before you exercised yourself, you endeavored, Socrates, betimes to define what is the beautiful, the just, and the good, and each of the other species: for I lately perceived, and I heard you discoursing with this Aristotle here. Beautiful and divine, be assured, is that ardor of yours, by which you rush onwards to rational conversations. But draw yourself out, and exercise yourself still more while you are yet young, on account of the ardor appearing useless to the many, and being called by them a

mere idle talking; for if you do not, the truth will escape you completely.

Socrates/ What then, is the method of the exercise, Parmenides?

Parmenides/ That, which you have heard from Zeno, except this, I admired you while asserting, contrary to Zeno, that you did not permit a person in the things seen by the eye to look into the aberration about them, but about those, which a person could especially lay hold of by reason, and would consider to be species.

Socrates/ For it appears to me that in this way it would be not difficult to prove that the things existing are both similar and dissimilar, and suffering any other state whatever.

Parmenides/ You speak well: but it is necessary for you to do this likewise; not only to make a supposition, whether each thing exists, and to consider the consequences from the supposition, but also, if it does not exist, to suppose this same thing, if you wish to be more exercised in this matter.

Socrates/ How say you?

Parmenides/ As if, you should wish to exercise yourself in the hypothesis which Zeno has laid down, that, "if there are many things," what must happen both to "the many," with respect to themselves, and to "the one;" and to "the one" with respect to itself, and to "the many:" and "if many are not," to consider again what will happen both to "the one" and to "the many," with respect to themselves and to each other: and again, if you made the supposition "if similitude is," or "if it is not," what will on each supposition happen both to the things supposed and to the others, with respect to themselves and to each other; and the same reasoning must be concerning "the dissimilar," and "motion" and "standing," and "generation" and "destruction," and "entity"

and “nonentity;” and, in one word, concerning everything which you suppose either to be or not to be, or suffering any other state whatever, it is necessary to consider what will happen both to itself and to each individual of the other things, which you may select, and towards many, and towards all things in a similar manner; and again, how the other things are related to themselves, and to another, which you may select, whether you suppose that, which is the subject of your supposition, as existing or not existing; if you are about to be exercised in a masterly manner, and to perceive thoroughly the truth.

Socrates/ You are speaking, Parmenides, of an impossible occupation nor do I very well understand you. But why do you not go through a certain supposition yourself, that I may learn the better?

Parmenides/ You enjoin, Socrates, a great task upon a man so old as myself.

Socrates/ But why do not you then, Zeno, go through it for us?

Cephalus/ And then Pythodorus stated that Zeno laughing said—

Zeno/ Let us, Socrates, request Parmenides himself; for see lest it be no trifling matter, as he says; or do you not perceive how great a task you are enjoining? If then we were many it would not be proper to make such a request; for it is unbecoming, especially for a man of such an age, to speak things of this kind before many. For the many are ignorant that, without this discursiveness and wandering through all things, it is impossible for the mind to meet with the truth, and to keep possession of it. I therefore, Parmenides, do, together with Socrates, make the request in order that I too may after a long time hear it.

Cephalus/ On Zeno so saying, Antiphon said that Pythodorus related that he too, and Aristotle, and the rest, entreated Parmenides to declare what he had said, and not to do otherwise.

Parmenides/ There is a necessity then, for me to comply; although I seem to myself to suffer the fate of the horse of Ibycus, to whom as being a competitor and rather old, when about to contend in a chariot race, and fearing through his experience for the event, Ibycus compares himself by saying, "Thus I too, who am so old, am forced to the contests of love to go;" so I, upon recollection, appear to myself to feel a great fear how I, at such an age, must swim through such and so great a sea of words; yet I must gratify you, since, as Zeno says, we are by ourselves. Whence then shall we begin; and what shall we first of all suppose? Or are you willing, since it seems good to play a business-like game, for me to begin from myself, and my own hypothesis, by supposing, with respect to "the one itself," if one "is," or "is not," what must happen?

Zeno/ By all means.

Parmenides/ Who then, will answer me? Will the youngest? For he will have very little trouble; for he will answer what he thinks; and his answer will be at the same time a resting-place for me.

Aristoteles/ I am prepared, in this point, for you, Parmenides; for you mean me, when speaking of the youngest. Ask me then, as one who will answer you.

Parmenides/ Be it so. If "one" is, is it not that "the one" will not be many?

Aristoteles/ For how can it be?

Parmenides/ There must then be of it neither a part nor a whole.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ Is not a part a part of a whole?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But what is a whole? Would not that, to which no part is wanting, be a whole?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ On both sides then “the one” would be composed of parts, as being a whole and having parts?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ And so in both ways “the one” will be many, but not one.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But it must be not many, but one.

Aristoteles/ It must.

Parmenides/ Hence, it will neither be a whole, nor possess parts, if “the one” is one.

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ If then it has no parts, it has neither beginning, nor middle, nor end; for such as these would be its parts?

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But end and beginning are the bounds of each thing?

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ “The one” therefore is infinite, if it has neither beginning nor end?

Aristoteles/ Infinite.

Parmenides/ And therefore without figure; for it neither participates of the round nor the straight.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ For the round figure is that, the extremities of which are on all sides equally distant from the middle.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And the straight is that, the middle of which is situated before both the extremes?

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ Would not then “the one” have parts, and be many, whether it participates in a straight figure or a round?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ It is therefore neither straight nor circular, since it has not parts.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ And being such, it will be nowhere; for it would be neither in another, nor in itself.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ Being in another, it would somehow be surrounded circularly by that, in which it might be, and it would be touched by many things in many places. But it is impossible for “the one,” being without parts, and not participating in a circle, to be touched in a circle in many places.

Aristoteles/ It is impossible.

Parmenides/ But being itself in itself, it would be likewise surrounding itself; since it is no other than itself, if it were in itself: for it is impossible for a thing to be in that, which does not surround it.

Aristoteles/ It is impossible.

Parmenides/ Would not then that, which contains, be one thing, and that which is contained, another? For the same whole cannot at the same time suffer and do both these: and thus “the one” would no longer be one, but two.

Aristoteles/ It certainly would not.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, is not anywhere, being neither in itself nor in another.

Aristoteles/ It is not.

Parmenides/ But consider, whether, being in this state, it is possible for it to stand or be moved.

Aristoteles/ Why can it not?

Parmenides/ Because being moved it would be carried on or be changed; for these alone are the kinds of motion.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But “the one” being changed from itself, it is impossible surely for it to be still one.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ It is not then moved as regards a change.

Aristoteles/ It appears it is not.

Parmenides/ But is it by being carried on?

Aristoteles/ Perhaps so.

Parmenides/ And yet if “the one” is carried on, it would be either carried round in the same circle, or it would change from one place to another.

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ But ought not that, which is carried round in a circle, to stand firm in the middle, and to have the other parts of itself carried about the middle? But what method is there for that, which has neither a middle nor parts, to be carried circularly about the middle?

Aristoteles/ There is none.

Parmenides/ But by changing its position it is sometimes here and other times there, and is moved?

Aristoteles/ If indeed it were moved.

Parmenides/ Has it not appeared to be impossible for “the one” to be in anything?

Aristoteles/ It has.

Parmenides/ Is it not much more impossible for it to be in the act of being in anything?

Aristoteles/ I do not understand how.

Parmenides/ If anything is in the act of being in anything, is it not necessary for it to be not yet in it, since it is in the act of being; nor yet entirely out of it, if it be already in the act of being?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ If then, any other thing suffers this state, that alone would suffer it, which possesses parts; for one part of it would be in that thing, but another out of it; but it will not be possible for that, which has no parts, to be by any means wholly within or without anything.

Aristoteles/ It is true.

Parmenides/ But is it not much more impossible for that, which neither has parts nor happens to be a whole, to be in the act of being in anything; since it can neither exist in the act of being according to parts, nor according to a whole?

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ Hence it does not change its place, neither by going anywhere, nor in the act of being in anything, nor in being carried round in the same, nor in being changed.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear it does.

Parmenides/ “The one” therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion.

Aristoteles/ Immovable.

Parmenides/ But we have likewise asserted that it is impossible for “the one” to be in anything.

Aristoteles/ We have said so.

Parmenides/ It can never therefore be in “the same.”

Aristoteles/ Why so?

Parmenides/ Because it would be already in that, in which it is as if in “the same.”

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But the one itself can neither be in itself nor in another.

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ The one therefore is never in “the same.”

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that is.

Parmenides/ But that which is never in “the same,” is neither at rest nor stands still.

Aristoteles/ For it cannot.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, as it appears, neither stands still nor is it moved.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear indeed.

Parmenides/ Nor will it be the same either with “different,” or with itself; nor again different either from itself or from “different.”

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ Being different from itself, it would surely be different from “one,” and so would not be “one.”

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And if it should be the same with “different,” it would be that “different”, and would not be itself; so that “one” would thus be not what it is, but different from “one.”

Aristoteles/ It would not indeed.

Parmenides/ It will then be not the same with “different” or different from itself?

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ But it will not be different from “different,” while it is “one.” For it does not belong to “one” to be different

from anything, but to be “different” alone, and to nothing else.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ In consequence, then, of its being “one,” it will not be “different;” or do you think it can?

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ But if it is not different through this, neither will it be through itself. But if not different in any way, it will be different from nothing.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ Nor yet will it be the same with itself.

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ The nature of “the one” is surely this of “the same.”

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ Because, when anything becomes the same with anything, it does not become one.

Aristoteles/ But what then?

Parmenides/ That, which becomes the same with many things, must necessarily become many, and not one.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But if “the one” and “the same” differed in no respect, whenever anything became “the same,” it would always become “one,” and whenever it became “the one” it would be “the same.”

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ If then “the one” shall be “the same” to itself, it will not be “one” to itself; and thus “one” will not be “one.”

Aristoteles/ But this indeed is impossible.

Parmenides/ It is impossible, therefore, for “the one” to be either different from “different,” or the same with itself.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ And thus “the one” would be neither different nor the same, either with respect to itself or different.

Aristoteles/ It would not.

Parmenides/ But neither will it be similar to anything, or dissimilar either to itself or to different.

Aristoteles/ Why so?

Parmenides/ Because the “similar” somehow has the accident of “same.”

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But it has been seen that “the same” is naturally separate from “the one.”

Aristoteles/ It has been so seen.

Parmenides/ But if “the one” should suffer anything apart from being “the one,” it would suffer the being more than one; but this is impossible.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ In no respect then can “the one” suffer the being “the same,” either with another or with itself.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear it can.

Parmenides/ Nor can it therefore be similar either to another or to itself.

Aristoteles/ It seems it cannot.

Parmenides/ Nor yet has “the one” suffered the being “different;” for thus it would suffer the being more than one.

Aristoteles/ For it would more.

Parmenides/ But that which suffers the being different either from itself or from another, will be dissimilar either to itself or to another, if that which suffers the being the same is similar.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But “the one,” as it appears, since it in no respect suffers the being “different,” would in no respect be dissimilar either to itself or to another.

Aristoteles/ It would not.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, would be neither similar nor dissimilar, either to another or to itself.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that it would.

Parmenides/ But since it is such, it will neither be equal nor unequal, either to itself or to another.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ Being equal, it would be of the same measure as that to which it is equal.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But being greater or less than the things, with which it is commensurate, it will have more measures than the less quantities, but fewer than the greater.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But of those, with which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one part, it will consist of lesser; and with respect to the other, of greater measures.

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ Is it not therefore impossible for that which does not participate in “the same,” to consist either of the same measures, or of anything else whatever the same?

Aristoteles/ It is impossible.

Parmenides/ It would therefore be equal neither to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of the same measures.

Aristoteles/ It appears not.

Parmenides/ But if it consists of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are measures; and thus again it will no longer be “one,” but as many as there are measures.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But even if it should be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure. But it has been seen to be impossible for one itself to be equal to anything.

Aristoteles/ It has been seen.

Parmenides/ “The one” therefore neither participates in one measure, nor in many, nor in a few, nor in any way participates in “the same,” nor will it ever, as it seems, be equal to itself or to another; nor, on the other hand, greater or less either than itself or “different.”

Aristoteles/ It is in every respect so.

Parmenides/ But what, does “the one” seem to be older or younger than anything, or to be of the same age with anything?

Aristoteles/ Why should it not?

Parmenides/ If it had in any respect the same age, either with itself or with another, it would participate in the similitude and equality of time, in which properties we have asserted “the one” does not participate either similitude or equality.

Aristoteles/ We so asserted.

Parmenides/ And this also we asserted, that it participates neither in dissimilitude nor inequality.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ How then, being such, can it be either older or younger than anything, or of the same age with anything?

Aristoteles/ By no means.

Parmenides/ “The one” therefore will be neither younger, nor older, nor of the same age, either with itself or with another.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear it would.

Parmenides/ Would it not then be impossible for “the one” to exist at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not necessary that, if anything exists in time, it should always become older than itself?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But is not the older always older than the younger?

Aristoteles/ What then?

Parmenides/ That which is in the act of being older than itself, is at the same time in the act of being younger than itself, if it is about to have that through which it is in the act of being older.

Aristoteles/ How say you?

Parmenides/ Thus. It is requisite that nothing should exist in the act of being at variance one with another, when it is already at variance; but that being now at variance, to be so now; and having been, to have been so formerly, and being about to be, to be so hereafter; but being in the act, to neither have been, nor to will be, nor to be at all at variance, but to be in the act, and not otherwise to exist.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But the older is at variance with the younger, and with nothing else.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Hence, that which is in the act of being older than itself, must necessarily at the same time be in the act of being younger than itself.

Aristoteles/ It seems so.

Parmenides/ But likewise to be in the act of being for a time not longer than itself, nor shorter; but for a time equal to itself to be in the act of being, and to be, and to have been, and to be about to be.

Aristoteles/ For these are necessary.

Parmenides/ It is necessary therefore, as it appears, for such things as are in time, and participate in some such thing, to be, each of them, itself the same age with itself, and to be in the act of being both older at the same time and younger than itself.

Aristoteles/ It nearly seems so.

Parmenides/ But in none of these accidents is there any share for "the one."

Aristoteles/ There is no share.

Parmenides/ Neither then has it any share of time, nor does it exist in any time.

Aristoteles/ It does not, indeed, as the reasoning holds.

Parmenides/ What then, do not the terms "was," and "Has been produced," and "was in the act of being," seem to signify a participation in what formerly existed.

Aristoteles/ Very much so.

Parmenides/ And do not the terms "will be," and "will be in the act of being," and "will be generated," signify a participation in time that is about to be hereafter?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And do not the terms "is," and "is in the act of being," signify a participation in time that is now present?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ If then "the one" participates not at all in any time, it never has been, nor has been in the act of being, nor was ever nor has it been now generated, nor is it in the

act of being, nor is, nor will be in the act of being hereafter, nor will be generated, nor will be.

Aristoteles/ It is most true.

Parmenides/ Is it possible then for anything to participate in being, except according to some one of these?

Aristoteles/ It is not.

Parmenides/ In no way then does “the one” participate in being.

Aristoteles/ It appears not.

Parmenides/ “The one” therefore in no way is.

Aristoteles/ It seems not.

Parmenides/ Nor is it then in such a state as to be one; for it would be a being, and participate in being; but, as it seems, the one neither is one, nor is it at all, if one must trust to reasoning of this kind.

Aristoteles/ It seems nearly so.

Parmenides/ But to that which is not, can there be anything either for itself or from itself?

Aristoteles/ How can there?

Parmenides/ Hence there is not for it a name, or discourse, or any science, or perception, or opinion.

Aristoteles/ It appears not.

Parmenides/ Hence it cannot either be named, or spoken of, or conceived by opinion, or known, nor does it perceive anything of those really existing.

Aristoteles/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ Is it possible then for this to be the case respecting “the one?”

Aristoteles/ It seems to me not possible.

Parmenides/ Are you then willing for us to return again from the beginning to our supposition, if by chance anything shall appear to us, on returning, in a different light?

Aristoteles/ I am very willing.

Parmenides/ Did we not say then, that if "one is," whatever may be the consequences from that supposition, we must admit them. Is it not so?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Consider now from the beginning. If "one is," is it possible for it to be, and yet not participate in being?

Aristoteles/ It is not.

Parmenides/ Would not being then be a property of "the one," although not the same as "the one?" for, if it were the same, it would not be the being of it, nor would "the one" participate in being; but it would be all one to say "one is," and "one one." But now our supposition is not, "if one is one," what must be the consequence, but "if one is." Is it not so?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Is it not then that the term "is" means something different from the term "one?"

Aristoteles/ Necessarily.

Parmenides/ If then a person summarily asserts that "one is," would this be no other assertion than that the one participates in being.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Let us say then again, if "one is," what will be the consequence? Consider then, if it is not necessary for this supposition to signify that "one" is existing of such a kind as to possess parts?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ Thus. If the term “it is” is said of “the one being,” and “the one” said of “the being which is one,” and both being and the one are not the same, but belong to that same thing which we have supposed to be “the one,” is it not necessary that the whole being one should be it, but that its parts should be “one” and “being?”

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Whether then should we call each of these parts a part alone? Or must we call a part a part of the whole?

Aristoteles/ Of the whole.

Parmenides/ Whatever then is one, is a whole, and possesses a part.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ What then, of these parts of the one being both “one” and “being,” do either desert each the other, so that “one” is wanting to “being,” and “being” wanting to “one”?

Aristoteles/ It would not be.

Parmenides/ Again, each of the parts contains both “one” and “being;” and the least part is composed of two parts; and thus perpetually by the same reasoning, whatever becomes a part possesses these two parts perpetually; for “one” always contains “being,” and “being, one;” so that, two things being produced, one never is.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Would not then “the one” existing thus become an infinite multitude.

Aristoteles/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ Proceed still further by this road.

Aristoteles/ By what?

Parmenides/ We have said that the one participates in “being,” so far as it is being.

Aristoteles/ We have said so.

Parmenides/ And on this account “one being” appears to be “many.”

Aristoteles/ It does so. What then?

Parmenides/ If one itself, which we say participates in being, we receive mentally, alone by itself, and apart from that in which we say it participates, will it appear to be one alone? Or will this very thing be many?

Aristoteles/ I think it will be one.

Parmenides/ But let us likewise look to another thing. It is necessary for its “being” to be one thing, and itself another, if “the one” itself is not “being;” but as being one it participated in “being.”

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ If then “being” is one thing, and “one” another, neither is “one” by its existence as one different from “being,” nor “being” by its existence as “being” different from “one but they are different from each other through that which is different and another.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ So that “the different” is the same neither with “the one” nor with “the being.”

Aristoteles/ How can it?

Parmenides/ What then, if we should select from them, whether if you will “the being” and “the different,” or “the being” and “the one,” or “the one” and “the different,” should we not, in each selection, select certain two things, which it is proper to denominate both?

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ Thus. It is possible to speak of “being.”

Aristoteles/ It is.

Parmenides/ And again, to speak of “one.”

Aristoteles/ And this likewise.

Parmenides/ Are not then either spoken of?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But what, when I say “being,” and “one,” do I not pronounce both?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ And if I should say “being” and “different,” or “different” and “one,” should I not in each of these pronounce both perfectly?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But can those things which are properly denominated both, be both, and yet not two?

Aristoteles/ They cannot.

Parmenides/ And is there any method for each of things, that are two, not to be one?

Aristoteles/ There is not.

Parmenides/ Of these then, since each two exist together, each would be one.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But if each of them is one, and anyone whatever is placed together with them, by any kind of union whatever, do not they all become three?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But are not three odd, and two even?

Aristoteles/ How should they not be?

Parmenides/ What then, being two, is it not necessary for twice to be? and being three, thrice; since twice one exists in two, and thrice one in three?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But if there are two and twice, is it not necessary that there should be twice two? And if there are three and thrice, that there should be thrice three?

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ But what, if there are three and twice, and there are two and thrice, is it not necessary that there should be twice three and thrice two?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Hence, there would be the evenly even, and the oddly odd; and the oddly even, and the evenly odd.

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ If then this is the case, do you think that any number is left, which is not necessarily there?

Aristoteles/ By no means.

Parmenides/ If then "one" exists, it is necessary for number to exist likewise.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But if number exists, the many would exist, and an infinite multitude of beings; or is there not a number, infinite in multitude, and participating in "being?"

Aristoteles/ There is, by all means.

Parmenides/ If then every number participates in "being," would not each part also of number participate in "being?"

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ "Being" then has been distributed through all things, being many, and stands apart from nothing existing, whether the least or the greatest. Or is it not absurd even to ask this question? For how could "being" stand apart from anything existing?

Aristoteles/ By no means.

Parmenides/ “Being” then is cut up into fractions the smallest possible, and the greatest, and existing in every degree, and is divided the most of all things, and the parts of “being” are infinite.

Aristoteles/ Such is the case.

Parmenides/ Very many, therefore, are its parts.

Aristoteles/ Very many, indeed.

Parmenides/ What then, is there anyone of these, which is a part of “being,” and yet is not one part?

Aristoteles/ But how can this be?

Parmenides/ But if it is, I think there must always be a necessity for it, as long as it exists, to be a certain one thing; but that it cannot possibly be nothing.

Aristoteles/ There is a necessity.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, is present to all and each part of “being,” deficient in neither a less or a greater part, or in anything else.

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ Is then “one” a whole, existing in many places at the same time? Look into this.

Aristoteles/ I do look, and I see it is impossible.

Parmenides/ It is divided then, since it is not a whole; for it will not otherwise than in a divided state, be present to all the parts of “being.”

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But there is a great necessity for that, which is divisible, to be as many as are the parts.

Aristoteles/ There is a necessity.

Parmenides/ We did not then just now say truly, when we said that “being” was distributed into very many parts. For it is not divided into more parts than “one” itself, but into

parts equal to those of “the one:” for neither is “being” wanting to “the one,” nor “the one” to “being;” but being two are always equalized through all things.

Aristoteles/ It appears to be entirely so.

Parmenides/ “One itself,” therefore, having been cut up into fractions by “being,” becomes many and infinite in multitude.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ Not only then is “the being” many, but it is likewise necessary for “the one,” when distributed by “being,” to be many.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Moreover, because the parts are parts of a whole, “the one” will be finite according as it is a whole. Or are not the parts included in the whole?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ But that which includes would be a bound.

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ “The one” therefore is somehow both one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite in multitude.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ As it is bounded then, has it not likewise extremes?

Aristoteles/ Of necessity.

Parmenides/ But what, if it be a whole, would it not have likewise a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if anyone whatever of these be wanting to anything, will that thing be willing to be any longer a whole?

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ “The one” then, as it seems, would possess a beginning, and end, and a middle.

Aristoteles/ It would.

Parmenides/ But the middle is equally distant from the extremes; for it would not otherwise be the middle.

Aristoteles/ It would not.

Parmenides/ And “the one” being such would, as it appears, participate in a certain figure, either straight or round, or mixed up of both.

Aristoteles/ It would so.

Parmenides/ Will it then, being such, not exist itself in itself and in another?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ Each of the parts is surely in the whole, nor is anyone out of the whole.

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ But all the parts are surrounded by the whole.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But “the one” is all the parts of itself; and is neither more nor less than all.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Is not then the one the whole?

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ If then all the parts are in the whole, and all the parts are the one, and the whole itself and all the parts are surrounded by the whole, “the one” would be surrounded by “the one,” and thus “the one” would be already in itself.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But on the other hand, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all, nor in anyone. For, if it were in all,

it would necessarily be in one: for, if it were not in some one, it would not be able to be in all. But if this one is a portion of all the parts, and the whole is not in this, how can it be any longer in all the parts?

Aristoteles/ Not at all.

Parmenides/ Nor yet in any of the parts. For if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the lesser; which is impossible.

Aristoteles/ It is impossible.

Parmenides/ But since the whole is neither in many, nor in one, nor in all the parts, is it not necessary for it to be either in some other, or nowhere?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But if nowhere, will it not be nothing? And if it is a whole, since it is not in itself, is it not necessary for it to be in another?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ So far therefore as “the one” is a whole, it is in another; but so far as all things are its parts, and itself all the parts, it is in itself; and thus “the one” will necessarily be in itself and in another.

Aristoteles/ Necessarily.

Parmenides/ But as “the one” is naturally such, is it not necessary for it to be both moved and to stand still?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ It stands still, if it be in itself. For being in one and not departing from this, it will be in the same, through being in itself.

Aristoteles/ It will.

Parmenides/ But that which is always in the same must somehow necessarily stand still always.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ What then, must not that, on the contrary, which is always in another, necessarily be never in the same? But if it be never in the same, can it ever stand still; and if it does not stand still, must it not be moved?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ It is necessary therefore for “the one,” being always in itself and in another, to be always moved and to stand still.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ It ought moreover to be the same with itself, and different from itself; and, in like manner, the same with and different from others, if it suffers what has been mentioned before.

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ Everything somehow is in this state with relation to everything. It is either the same or different: or if not the same or different, it will be a part of that, to which it is so related, or, it will be with respect to a part a whole.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ Is then “the one” a part of itself?

Aristoteles/ By no means.

Parmenides/ It will not then with respect to a part of itself be a whole, nor with respect to itself a part.

Aristoteles/ For it cannot.

Parmenides/ But is “one” therefore different from “the one?”

Aristoteles/ By no means.

Parmenides/ It will not then be different from itself.

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ If then it is neither different, nor a whole, nor yet a part, with respect to itself, is it not necessary for it to be the same with itself?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ What then, is it not necessary for that, which is elsewhere than itself, while existing in the same with itself, to be different from itself, if indeed it shall be elsewhere?

Aristoteles/ It appears so to me.

Parmenides/ In this state does “the one” appear to be existing at the same time both in itself and in another.

Aristoteles/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ In this way then it appears that “the one” will be different from itself.

Aristoteles/ It does so.

Parmenides/ What then, if anything is different from anything, will it not be different from that which is different?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ But are not all such things, as are not one, different from “the one?” And is not “the one” different from such things as are not one?

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ “The one” therefore will be different from the rest.

Aristoteles/ Different.

Parmenides/ See then, are not “the different” and “the same” contrary to each other.

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ Is the same ever wont to be in the different, or the different in the same?

Aristoteles/ It is not wont.

Parmenides/ If therefore the different is never in the same, there is not one of existing things, in which the different exists for any time; for if it existed in anything during any time whatever, during that time the different would be in the same. Is it not so?

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ But since it is never in the same, the different would never exist in any of existing things.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Neither therefore would the different exist in things which are not one, nor in "the one."

Aristoteles/ It would not.

Parmenides/ Through 'the different" therefore the one will not be different from things which are not one, nor things which are not one be different from "the one."

Aristoteles/ Not indeed.

Parmenides/ Nor through themselves will they be different from each other, since they do not participate in "the different."

Aristoteles/ For how can they?

Parmenides/ But if they are different neither through themselves, nor through "the different," would they not escape entirely from being different from each other?

Aristoteles/ They would escape.

Parmenides/ But neither do things, which are not one, participate in "the one:" for they would be no longer not one, but in some way one.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Nor would things, which are not one, be number; for possessing number, they would thus be altogether not one.

Aristoteles/ They would not.

Parmenides/ But what, can things which are not one be parts of one? Or would not things, which are not one, in this way participate in “the one?”

Aristoteles/ They would participate.

Parmenides/ If then this is entirely “one,” but those not one, “the one” would not be a part of things, which are not one, nor a whole, as if they were a part; nor, on the contrary, would things, which are not one, be parts of “the one,” nor wholes as if the one were a part.

Aristoteles/ They will not.

Parmenides/ But we have said that things, which are neither parts, nor wholes, nor different from each other, will be the same with each other.

Aristoteles/ We have said so.

Parmenides/ Shall we then assert that “the one,” since it is in this state with respect to things which are not one, is the same with them?

Aristoteles/ Let us say so.

Parmenides/ “The one” then, as it appears, is both different from others and itself, and the same with them and with itself.

Aristoteles/ It appears very nearly so, at least from this reasoning.

Parmenides/ But is it also similar and dissimilar to itself and others?

Aristoteles/ Perhaps so.

Parmenides/ Since then it appears to be different from the others, the others likewise will be somehow different from it.

Aristoteles/ But what then?

Parmenides/ Will it not then be different from the others in the same manner as the others from it? And this neither more nor less?

Aristoteles/ For what should it be?

Parmenides/ If then neither more nor less, it will be similarly.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ In the manner then through which “the one” suffers to become different from the others, and the others similarly from it, in that manner would the one be suffering similarly to the others, and the others similarly to the one?

Aristoteles/ How say you?

Parmenides/ Thus. Do not you apply each name to something?

Aristoteles/ I do; what then?

Parmenides/ Could you pronounce the same name often or once?

Aristoteles/ I could.

Parmenides/ When therefore you pronounce a name once, do you speak of the thing, to which the name belongs; but not, if often? Or, is there not a great necessity for you always to speak of the same thing, whether you pronounce the same name once or often?

Aristoteles/ What then?

Parmenides/ Is not “different” a name applied to something?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ When therefore you pronounce it, whether once or often, you do not apply this name to any other thing, but that of which it is the name.

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ When we say then that “the others” are different from “the one,” and “the one” different from “the others,” twice pronouncing the name “different,” we do not at all apply the expression to any other nature but that of which it is the name.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ In the way then that “the one” is different from “the others,” and “the others” from “the one,” according to the very thing which “the different” has, “the one” would suffer nothing else than what the others do, but just the same: but that which somehow suffers the same is similar. Is it not?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But in the way that “the one” suffers so as to be different from the others, according to that very way everything would be similar to everything; for everything is different from everything.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ Moreover the similar is contrary to the dissimilar.

Aristoteles/ It is.

Parmenides/ Is not “the different” too contrary to “the same?”

Aristoteles/ This also.

Parmenides/ Moreover this likewise has been made apparent, that “the one” is the same with and different from “the others.”

Aristoteles/ It has been made apparent.

Parmenides/ But to be the same with “others” is a contrary suffering to the being different from “the others.”

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ As far as it was different, it appeared to be similar.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ So far then as it is the same, it will be dissimilar according to its suffering the contrary to that suffering which produces the similar: but did the different produce the similar?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ The same therefore will render something dissimilar; or it will not be contrary to the different.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ "The one" therefore will be both similar and dissimilar to "the others;" so far as it is different it will be similar; but so far as it is the same, dissimilar.

Aristoteles/ It has, it seems, such reasoning.

Parmenides/ And it has this likewise.

Parmenides/ What?

Parmenides/ So far as it suffers the same, it does not suffer what is of a different kind; and not suffering what is of a different kind, it is not dissimilar; and not being dissimilar, it is similar: but so far as it suffers another thing, it is of a different kind; and being of a different kind, it is dissimilar.

Aristoteles/ You speak the truth.

Parmenides/ Since then "the one" is both the same with and different from "the others," according to both and each of these cases, it will be similar and dissimilar to "the others."

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ And will it not in a similar manner, since it has appeared to be both different from, and the same with,

itself, appear, according to both these, and each, to be similar and dissimilar to itself?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ But consider now how “the one” subsists with respect to touching and not touching itself and “the others.”

Aristoteles/ I consider.

Parmenides/ For “the one” has somehow appeared to be in itself a whole.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But is not “the one” in “the others” likewise?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ So far then as “the one” is in “the others,” it will touch “the others but so far as it is in itself, it will be prevented from touching “the others;” but being in itself it will touch itself.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ And thus, indeed, “the one” will both touch itself and “the others.”

Aristoteles/ It will touch.

Parmenides/ But what will it be in this view? Must not everything, which is about to touch anything, lie close to that, which it is about to touch, and occupy that seat, which may be after that seat, in which that may lie, which it touches?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, if it is about to touch itself, ought to lie close to itself, and occupy the place close to that in which it is.

Aristoteles/ It ought so.

Parmenides/ Would not “the one,” if it were two, do this, and be in two places at once? But as long as it is one, it will not be wont to do so.

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ The same necessity therefore belongs to “the one,” to be neither two nor to touch itself.

Aristoteles/ The same.

Parmenides/ But neither will it touch the others.

Aristoteles/ Why?

Parmenides/ Because we have said, that when anything is about to touch anything, which is separate from it, it ought to be placed close to that which it is about to touch; but that there must be no third in the middle of them.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Two things therefore at the least are requisite, if contact is about to take place.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But if a third is added close upon the two terms, there will now be three, but the contacts two.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And thus one always being added, one contact will be likewise added; and the result is that the contacts will be less by one than the multitude of the numbers. For by how much the two first things exceeded the contacts, so as to be more in number than the contacts, by just so much does all the following number exceed the multitude of the contacts. For already hereafter one is added to the number, and one contact to the contacts.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ As many then as are in number the things existing, by so many, less by one, are the contacts always.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ If then there is only one thing, and not a pair, there can be no contact.

Aristoteles/ How can there?

Parmenides/ Have we not said that the other things, different from “the one,” are neither one nor participate of it, since they are different?

Aristoteles/ We have.

Parmenides/ Number therefore is not in the others, since one is not in them.

Aristoteles/ How can it?

Parmenides/ The Others, therefore, are not one, or two, or anything possessing the name of another number.

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, is one alone, and could not be two.

Aristoteles/ It appears not.

Parmenides/ Contact, therefore, is not, when two are not.

Aristoteles/ It is not.

Parmenides/ “The one” therefore will neither touch “the others,” nor will “the others” touch “the one,” as there is no contact.

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ On all these accounts, therefore, “the one” will both touch and not touch others and itself.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ Is it not therefore equal and unequal to itself and “the others?”

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ If “the one” were greater or less than “the others,” or “the others” greater or less than “the one,” would it not follow that by “the one” being one, and “the others”

different from “the one,” they would be not an atom greater or an atom less than each other, by those very existences? But if, in addition to their being such as they are, each possessed equality, they would be equal to each other. But if “the one” possessed magnitude, and “the others” smallness, or “the one” magnitude, but “the others” smallness, would not that, to whatever species magnitude was present, be the greater; and that, to whatever species smallness was present, be the less.

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ Are there not therefore these two species, magnitude and smallness? For if they had no existence they surely could never be contrary to each other, and be inherent in things existing.

Aristoteles/ How should they?

Parmenides/ If then smallness is inherent in “the one,” it will either be inherent in the whole or in a part of it.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But what if it be inherent in the whole? Will it not either be extended on an equality through the whole of “the one,” or surround “the one?”

Aristoteles/ Plainly so.

Parmenides/ If smallness then is inherent on an equality in “the one,” will it not be equal to “the one;” but if it surrounds “the one,” will it not be greater?

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ Can then smallness be equal to or greater than anything, and produce the effects of magnitude and equality, but not on itself?

Aristoteles/ It is impossible.

Parmenides/ Smallness then will not be inherent in the whole of “the one;” but, if at all, in a part.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Nor yet, on the other hand, in the whole part; for if not, it would produce the same effect as in the case of the whole; for it would either be equal to, or greater than, the part in which it is inherent.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Smallness then will not be in anything existing, being inherent in neither a part nor a whole; nor will there be anything small, except smallness itself.

Aristoteles/ It seems not.

Parmenides/ Neither will magnitude be in it. For there would be some other thing greater, and, besides magnitude itself, that in which magnitude is inherent, and this too, although it being not small, which it ought to exceed, if indeed it be great; but which in this case is impossible, since smallness is not inherent in anything existing.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But magnitude itself is not greater than anything else but smallness itself; nor is smallness less than anything else but magnitude itself.

Aristoteles/ It is not.

Parmenides/ Neither then would “the others” be greater than “the one,” nor less, since they possess neither magnitude nor smallness; nor do these two possess any power either of exceeding or of being exceeded with respect to “the one,” but only with respect to each other; nor, on the contrary, will “the one” be either greater or less than these two, or “the others,” as it possesses neither magnitude nor smallness.

Aristoteles/ So indeed it appears.

Parmenides/ If then “the one” is neither greater nor less than “the others,” is it not necessary for it to neither exceed nor be exceeded by them?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Is there not also a great necessity for that, which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, to be on an equality? and if on an equality, to be equal?

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ “The one” therefore will be in this state with respect to itself. Possessing neither magnitude nor smallness in itself, it would neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself; but being on an equality, it would be equal to itself.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ “The one” therefore will be equal both to itself and “the others.”

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ But being itself in itself, it would also be externally about itself; and surrounding itself, it would be greater than itself; but being surrounded, less than itself; and thus “the one” would be both greater and less than itself.

Aristoteles/ It would so.

Parmenides/ Is not this also necessary, that there is nothing beyond “the one” and “the others?”

Aristoteles/ How should it be otherwise?

Parmenides/ But ought not that, which has a being, to be always somewhere?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And does not that, which exists in another, exist as the less in the greater? For one thing cannot otherwise exist in another.

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ But since there is nothing else apart from “the one” and “the others,” and it is necessary for these to be in something, is it not necessary for them to be in one another, the others in “the one,” and “the one” in the others; or that they should be no where?

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ Because then “the one” is in “the others,” “the others” will be greater than “the one,” through surrounding it; and “the one” will be less than “the others,” by being surrounded. But because “the others” are in “the one,” “the one,” by the same reasoning, would be greater than “the others;” and “the others” less than “the one.”

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, is equal to, greater and less, than both itself and others.

Aristoteles/ It seems so.

Parmenides/ But if it is greater, equal, and less, it will be of equal, more, and fewer measures, both than itself and “the others;” and if of measures, also of the parts.

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ Being, therefore, of equal, more, and fewer measures, it will also in number be more and less than itself and “the others;” and also, for the same reason, equal to itself and “the others.”

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ It would surely be of greater measures than are those things, than which it is greater; and it would be of as many parts as measures; and in the same manner, in the case of those than which it is less; and similarly in the case of those to which it is equal.

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ Since then “the one” is both greater, less, and equal to itself, will it not also contain measures equal to, more, and fewer than itself? And if of measures, will not this also be true of parts?

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ If then it contains equal parts with itself, it will be equal in multitude to itself; but if more, more in multitude, and if fewer, less in multitude, than itself.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But will not “the one” be in a similar state as regards “the others?” Because it appears to be greater in magnitude than them, is it not necessary for it to be more in number than “the others?” and, because less in magnitude, fewer in number? and because equal in magnitude, equal likewise in multitude to “the others?”

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ And thus again, as it seems, “the one” will be equal, more, and less in number, both than itself and “the others.”

Aristoteles/ It will so.

Parmenides/ Does “the one,” then, participate in time? And is it, and does it become, younger and older, itself than itself and “the others?” And again, neither younger nor older than itself and the others, although participating of time?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ “To be” is surely its property, since it “is the one.”

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But what else is “to be” than a participation in “being” in conjunction with the present? Just as “it was” is a participation in “being” in conjunction with the past, and “it will be” with the future?

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ It must participate then in time, if it participates in “being.”

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Must it not therefore participate in time while progressing?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ It is always, therefore, in the act of being older than itself, if it proceeds according to time.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Do we then remember that the older is always becoming older than that which is becoming younger?

Aristoteles/ We remember.

Parmenides/ Would not then “the one,” since it is becoming older than itself, become older than itself, while it is thus becoming younger?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ It becomes then both younger and older than itself.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But is it not then older, when it is in the act of being according to the present time, which is between the “was” and the “will be:” for in proceeding from the “then” to “the hereafter,” it will not pass over “the now?”

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ Will it not then stop in the act of being older, when it arrives at “the now,” and is no longer in the act of being, but is already older? For as it proceeds it will never be laid hold of by “the now.” For that which is proceeding is in such a state as to touch both “the now” and “the hereafter,” leaving hold of “the now,” but laying hold of “the hereafter,”

because it is in the act of being between “the hereafter” and “the now.”

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But if it is necessary for whatever is in the act of being not to pass by “the now,” when it arrives at that point, it always stops in the act of being, and “is” then whatever it may happen to become.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ “The one,” then, when, in becoming older, it arrives at “the now,” stops in the act of being, and then “is” older.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ “Is” it not then older than what it was becoming older? And was it not becoming older than itself?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Now the older is older than the younger.

Aristoteles/ It is.

Parmenides/ “The one” then is younger than itself, when in becoming older, it arrives at “the now.”

Aristoteles/ Of necessity.

Parmenides/ But “the now” is always present with “the one,” through the whole of its being; for it is always “now,” as long as it “is.”

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, always is, and is in the act of being younger and older than itself.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ But “is the one,” or is it in the act of being, for a time longer than or equal to itself?

Aristoteles/ An equal time.

Parmenides/ But that which either is in the act of being, or is for an equal time, has the same age.

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ But that which has the same age is neither older nor younger.

Aristoteles/ It is neither.

Parmenides/ "The one," therefore, since it is in the act of being, and is for a time equal to itself, neither is nor is in the act of being younger or older than itself.

Aristoteles/ It appears to me not.

Parmenides/ But what of "the others?"

Aristoteles/ I have not what to say.

Parmenides/ But this at least you have to say, that "the others," if they are different things from "the one," and not a different thing, are more than "one." For that which is different would be one; but those that are different are more than one, and would possess multitude.

Aristoteles/ They would.

Parmenides/ But being a multitude they would participate in a greater number than "the one?"

Aristoteles/ How not? What then?

Parmenides/ Shall we say that the things more in number are, or have been, generated prior, or the less?

Aristoteles/ The less.

Parmenides/ The least then is the first. Now is not this "the one?"

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ "The one," therefore, was generated the first of all things possessing number: but all "the others" have number, if they are others and not another.

Aristoteles/ They have.

Parmenides/ But that which was first generated was, I think, prior in existence: but the others are posterior. But such as have been generated posterior, are younger than that which was generated prior; and thus “the others” would be younger than “the one,” and “the one” would be older than “the others.”

Aristoteles/ It would.

Parmenides/ But what is this? Could “the one” be generated contrary to its nature? or is this impossible?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ But “the one” has appeared to possess parts; and, if parts, a beginning, an end, and a middle.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Is not then the beginning generated first of all, both of “the one” and of each of “the others;” and after the beginning all “the others,” as far as the end?

Aristoteles/ What then?

Parmenides/ We will say moreover, that all the others are parts of the whole and of one; but that “the one,” together with the end, has been generated one and a whole.

Aristoteles/ We will say so.

Parmenides/ Now the end, I think, is generated the last of all, but “the one” is naturally generated together with this; so that, if it is necessary for “the one” to be generated not contrary to nature, it would, having been generated together with the end, be naturally generated the last of “the others.”

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, is younger than “the others,” but “the others” are older than “the one.” So again it appears to me. But what, must not the beginning or any other part whatever of “the one,” or of anything else, if it is a part, and not parts, be necessarily one, since it is a part?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, would be generated together with the first part, while in the act of being, and together with the second; and is never wanting to anyone of the other parts, while in the act of being, until, arriving at the extremity, it becomes one whole, having been left out neither from the middle, nor from the last, nor the first, nor from any other part whatever in its generation.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, will have the same age with “the others,” so that, if it be not “the one” contrary to its own nature, it would be generated neither prior nor posterior to “the others,” but together with them; and according to this reasoning, “the one” will neither be older nor younger than “the others,” nor “the others” than “the one:” but, according to the former reasoning, “the one” was both older and younger than “the others,” and they in a similar manner than it.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ After this manner, then, “the one” is and has been generated. But what again shall we say of its becoming older and younger than the others, and of the others than “the one;” and again, that it neither becomes older nor younger? As we said respecting its being, shall we say in the same manner respecting its becoming to be? or otherwise?

Aristoteles/ I am not able to say.

Parmenides/ But I am able to say this; that, although one thing is older than another, yet it cannot become still older, than by that difference of age which it possessed as soon as it was produced; nor, on the other hand, can that which is younger become younger. For, equal things being added to unequals, whether they are times or anything else, always

cause them to differ by the same degree as that, by which they were distant at first.

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ “That which is” therefore would never become older or younger than any being, if it is always different by an equal quantity from it in age: but this is and was older, and that younger; but is not becoming so.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ “The one” likewise will never become either older or younger than “the others,” it being so already.

Aristoteles/ Never.

Parmenides/ But see whether in this way they become younger and older.

Aristoteles/ In what way?

Parmenides/ The same as that through which “the one” was made to appear older than “the others,” and “the others” older than “the one.”

Aristoteles/ What then?

Parmenides/ Since “the one” is older than “the others,” it has been generated during a longer time than “the others.”

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Now consider again, if we add an equal time to a longer and shorter time, does the longer differ from the shorter by an equal or by a smaller part?

Aristoteles/ By a smaller.

Parmenides/ Will not then “the one” differ from “the others” by an age as great subsequently as it did at first? but, receiving an equal time with “the others,” it will differ always in age less than before. Will it not be so?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But would not that, which differs less in age, with respect to anything, than it did before, become younger than before, with respect to those, than which it was before older?

Aristoteles/ Younger.

Parmenides/ But if that is younger, will not, on the other hand, “the others” be older with respect to “the one” than before?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ That, therefore, which was generated younger, would be in the act of becoming older, with respect to that which was before generated and is older; but it never is older, but is always in the act of becoming older than it; for the one advances to a younger, but the other to an older, state; and on the other hand, that which is older is in the act of becoming younger in the same manner than the younger. For both tending to that which is contrary to themselves, they are in the act of becoming contrary to each other; the younger becoming older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. But they would not be able to become so. For should they become so, they would no longer be in the act of becoming, but would be now. But now they are in the act of becoming younger and older than each other; and “the one” indeed is in the act of becoming younger than “the others,” because it has been made to appear to be older, and to have had a prior generation: but “the others” have been made to appear to be older than “the one,” because they have had a posterior generation. According to the same reasoning, “the others” likewise are similarly related with respect to “the one,” since they were made to appear to be older and to have had a prior generation.

Aristoteles/ So indeed it appears.

Parmenides/ So far then as neither becomes younger or older than the other, through their differing by an equal number from each other, “the one” will not become older or younger than “the others,” nor the others than “the one.” But so far as it is necessary for the prior to differ by a part ever another from the posterior, and the posterior from the prior, so far it is necessary for them to become older and younger than each other, and “the others” than “the one,” and “the one” than “the others?”

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ On all these accounts then “the one” is, and is in the act of becoming older and younger both than itself and “the others;” and again, it neither is nor is in the act of “becoming” older or younger than itself and “the others.”

Aristoteles/ It is perfectly so.

Parmenides/ But since “the one” participates in time, and in the act of becoming older and younger, is it not necessary for it to participate in “the then,” and “the hereafter,” and “the now,” if it participates in time?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, was, and will be, and is; and has been in the act of becoming, and is in the act of becoming, and will be in the act of becoming.

Aristoteles/ What then?

Parmenides/ And there would be something for it, and of it, and which was, and is, and will be.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Now there would be the knowledge and opinion and perception of it, if we now do all these things relating to it.

Aristoteles/ You speak rightly.

Parmenides/ There is likewise for it a name and a discourse; and it may be named and spoken of: and whatever circumstances of such a kind take place with regard to “the others,” take place with regard likewise to “the one.”

Aristoteles/ Such is entirely the case.

Parmenides/ Let us then speak of the third point. If “the one” is such as we have discussed, is it not necessary, since it is both one and many, and again neither one nor many, and participating in time, that because it is one, it should participate at one time in “being but that because it is not one, it should participate at no time in “being?”

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Will it then be possible for it not to participate, when it does; or to participate, when it does not?

Aristoteles/ It will not be possible.

Parmenides/ It participates then at one time, and does not participate at another; for thus alone can it participate and not participate in the same.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ Is not this then the time when it participates in “being,” and again is freed from it? Or how is it possible for it to possess at one time the same thing, and at another time not, unless at some time it both receives and dismisses it?

Aristoteles/ Not otherwise.

Parmenides/ Do you not call the receiving of “being” by the term to be generated?

Aristoteles/ I do.

Parmenides/ And to be freed from “being” by the term to be destroyed?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ “The one” then, as it seems, by receiving and dismissing “being,” is generated and destroyed.

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ But since it is one and many, and is generated and destroyed, when it becomes one, is not the being many destroyed, and when it becomes many, is not the being one destroyed?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But, when it becomes one and many, must it not be separated and united?

Aristoteles/ It must.

Parmenides/ And when it becomes unlike and like, must it not be made like and unlike?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And when it becomes greater, less, and equal, must it not be increased, and wasted away, and equalized?

Aristoteles/ It must so.

Parmenides/ But when from being moved it stands still, and when from standing still it changes into being moved, it is requisite surely for it to be not in one time.

Aristoteles/ How should it?

Parmenides/ But that which stood still before and is afterwards moved, and that which was moved before and afterwards stands still, cannot be thus affected without a change.

Aristoteles/ For how can it?

Parmenides/ But there is no time, in which anything can at once be neither moved nor stand still.

Aristoteles/ There is not.

Parmenides/ But it cannot change without a change.

Aristoteles/ It is probable not.

Parmenides/ When, therefore, does it change? For it would change, neither while it stands still, nor while it is moved, nor while it is in time.

Aristoteles/ It would not.

Parmenides/ Is there then that strange thing, in which it would be, when it changes?

Aristoteles/ What thing?

Parmenides/ "The sudden." For "the sudden" seems to signify some such thing as changing from it to either. For there is no change from standing, while standing; nor a change from motion, while in motion; but that wonderful nature "the sudden" is situated between motion and standing, and is in no time; and into this and from this that, which is moved, changes for the purpose of standing still; and that which stands, for the purpose of being moved.

Aristoteles/ It nearly appears so.

Parmenides/ "The one," therefore, if it stands still and is moved, must change into either; for thus alone would it produce both these effects. But in changing, it changes suddenly; and when it changes, it would be in no time, and would neither stand still nor be moved.

Aristoteles/ It would not.

Parmenides/ Is then "the one" in this state also with respect to the other changes? and when it changes from being into being destroyed, or from non-being into the act of becoming, does it not then become a medium between certain movements and standings? and then it neither is nor is not, nor is in the act of becoming, nor is destroyed?

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ And by the same reasoning, when it passes from one into many and from many into one, it is neither

one nor many, nor is it separated nor united; and in passing from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, nor is it made like nor unlike; and while it passes from small into great, and into equal and the contraries, it will be neither small nor great, nor unequal, nor increasing, nor wasting away, nor equalized.

Aristoteles/ It appears not.

Parmenides/ But all these accidents "the one" would suffer, if it is.

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ But must we not consider what it is meet for "the others" to suffer, if "one" exists?

Aristoteles/ We must consider.

Parmenides/ Shall we state then, if "one" exists, what "the other" must suffer from "the one?"

Aristoteles/ Let us state.

Parmenides/ Since then "the others" are different from "the one," they are not "the one:" for otherwise they would not be different from "the one?"

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ Nor yet are "the others" entirely deprived of "the one," but somehow participate in it.

Aristoteles/ In what way?

Parmenides/ Because "the others," having parts, are different from "the one:" for if they had not parts, they would be entirely one.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But parts, we have said, belong to that, which is a whole.

Aristoteles/ We said so.

Parmenides/ But it is necessary for a whole to be one composed of many, of which one the parts are parts: for each of the parts must not be a part of many, but of a whole.

Aristoteles/ How is this?

Parmenides/ If anything should be a part of many, amongst which it is itself, it would surely be both a part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others; since it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of one of these, it will be a part of the others, with the exception of this; and thus it will not be a part of each one; and not being a part of each, it will be a part of not one of the many; and being a part of not one of these the many, it is impossible for it to be anything belonging to all those, of not one of which it is either a part, or anything else.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ A part, therefore, is neither a part of the many nor of all; but of some one idea and of some one thing, which we call a whole, having become from all one thing complete. Of this a part would be a part.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ If therefore the others have parts, they too would participate in a whole and one.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ One perfect whole then possessing parts, must necessarily be different from “the one.”

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ There is moreover, the same reasoning respecting each of the parts: for it is necessary that this each part should participate in “the one.” For, if each of these is a part, the very being each signifies surely one thing, separated indeed from others, but existing by itself, if it shall be truly each.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But it would participate in “the one,” as being evidently something else than “the one;” for otherwise it would not have participated, but would have been “the one itself.” But now it is surely impossible for anything to be “the one,” except “the one itself.”

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ But it is necessary for both the whole and the part to participate in “the one.” For the whole will be one thing of which the parts are parts; but on the other hand each part will be a part of the whole, of whatever whole it may be a part.

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ Will not then those things, which participate in “the one,” participate in it as being different from “the one?”

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ But things different from “the one,” will surely be many. For if the things different from “the one” were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.

Aristoteles/ They would.

Parmenides/ But since the things, which participate in the one part and in the one whole, are more than one, is it not necessary for those very things, which participate in “the one,” to be infinite in multitude?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ Let us look at the matter in this way. Being neither one, nor participating in “the one,” do they then not participate in it when they do participate?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Are not multitudes those in which “the one” is not?

Aristoteles/ Multitudes, certainly.

Parmenides/ What then, if we should be willing in imagination to take away from these the least quantity we can, must not this quantity so taken away, be a multitude, and not one, since it does not participate in “the one?”

Aristoteles/ It must.

Parmenides/ To him then, who thus surveys ever the different nature of the species itself by itself, will not as much of it, as we may behold, be infinite in multitude?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ And moreover, since each part becomes one part, the parts have a bound with respect to each other, and to the whole; and the whole with respect to the parts.

Aristoteles/ Perfectly so.

Parmenides/ It results then, to the things different from “the one,” as it seems, that, from “the one” and themselves having a communion, something different is produced in themselves, which furnished them indeed a bound with respect to each other, but their own nature would be with respect to themselves infinity.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ Thus the things different from “the one,” both as wholes and according to parts, are infinite and participate in bound.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Are they not therefore similar and dissimilar, both to each other and to themselves?

Aristoteles/ Why?

Parmenides/ Because, so far as all of them are somehow infinite, according to their own nature, they would all in this way suffer the same.

Aristoteles/ Entirely.

Parmenides/ And so far as they all participate in a bound, they would in this way too suffer the same. But so far as they suffer the being bounded and infinite, they suffer these very accidents, being accidents contrary to each other.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But contrary things are as much as possible dissimilar.

Aristoteles/ What then?

Parmenides/ According to each accident they would be similar to themselves and to each other; but according to both they are on both sides most contrary and dissimilar.

Aristoteles/ It nearly appears so.

Parmenides/ And thus "the others" themselves would be similar and dissimilar to themselves and to each other.

Aristoteles/ They would so.

Parmenides/ And they would be the same to, and different from, each other, and be moved and stand still; and we should, without difficulty find the things different from "the one," suffering all contrary accidents, since they have been shown to suffer these.

Aristoteles/ You speak rightly.

Parmenides/ Shall we not then dismiss these things as evident, and again consider if "the one" is, whether the others different from "the one" are not likewise in this state, or after this manner alone?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Let us then say again as at the beginning, if "the one" is, what must the things different from "the one" suffer.

Aristoteles/ Let us say it.

Parmenides/ Is not then "the one" separate from "the others," and are not "the others" separate from "the one?"

Aristoteles/ Why?

Parmenides/ Because there is nothing else “different” except these, namely, that which is different from “the one,” and that which is “different” from “the others;” for all is said, when “the one” and “the others” are said.

Aristoteles/ All, indeed.

Parmenides/ There is nothing else therefore except these, in which, as being the same, “the one” and “the others” would exist.

Aristoteles/ Nothing.

Parmenides/ “The one” and “the others” are therefore never in the same.

Aristoteles/ They are not.

Parmenides/ Are they then separate?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ We have said moreover that “the truly one” has not any parts.

Aristoteles/ For how can it?

Parmenides/ Neither therefore will the whole of “the one” nor its parts be in “the others,” if it is separate from “the others,” and has no parts.

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ In no way then will “the others” participate in “the one;” since they participate neither according to a certain part, nor according to the whole.

Aristoteles/ It seems not.

Parmenides/ By no means then are “the others” “one,” nor have they anyone in themselves.

Aristoteles/ They have not.

Parmenides/ Neither, then, are “the others” many; for, if they were many, each of them, as being a part of a whole,

would be one; but now the things different from “the one” are neither one nor many, nor a whole nor parts, since they in no respect participate in “the one.”

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ “The others” then are of themselves neither two nor three, nor one in them, because they are entirely deprived of “the one.”

Aristoteles/ So it is.

Parmenides/ “The others,” therefore, are of themselves neither similar nor dissimilar to “the one,” nor are similitude and dissimilitude in them. For if they were similar and dissimilar, or possessed in themselves similitude and dissimilitude, the things different from “the one” would possess in themselves two species contrary to each other.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ But it is impossible for those to participate in any two things, which do not participate even in one.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ “The others” therefore are neither similar nor dissimilar, nor both. For, if they were similar or dissimilar, they would participate in one species of the different; and if they were both, they would participate in two contrary species: but this has been shown to be impossible.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ They are therefore neither same nor different, nor moved, nor standing still, nor generated, nor destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, nor unequal, nor do they suffer anything else of this kind. For, if the others could endure to suffer any such accident, they would participate in one, and two, and three, and in even and odd; in all which it has been shown it is impossible for them to

participate; since they are in every way and entirely deprived of “the one.”

Aristoteles/ Most true.

Parmenides/ Hence, then, if “the one” exists, “the one” is all things and nothing, both as regards itself, and as regards “the others” in like manner.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Be it so. But if “the one” is not, must we not consider after this what ought to happen?

Aristoteles/ We must consider.

Parmenides/ What then would be this supposition, if “one is not?” Does it differ from this, “If that, which is not one, is non-existing?”

Aristoteles/ It does differ.

Parmenides/ Does it differ merely from, or is the saying, “If that which is not one, is non-existing,” entirely contrary to the saying, “If the one is not?”

Aristoteles/ Entirely the contrary.

Parmenides/ But what, should anyone say, if magnitude is not, or if smallness is not, or anything else of this kind, would he not show in each of these cases that he is speaking of that, which is not, as something different?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Would he not therefore now show that he is speaking of that which is not as something different from “the others,” when he says “if the one is not;” and do we understand what he is saying?

Aristoteles/ We do understand.

Parmenides/ In the first place then he speaks of something which may be known; and next of something different from “the others,” when he says “one;” whether he adds to it the term of “being” or “not being;” for that which

is said not to be, is known none the less, and that it is different from “the others:” is it not so?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ Let us then say as at the beginning, “If the one is not,” what ought to occur. In the first place then this, as it seems, ought to occur to it; that either there should be a knowledge of it, or that nothing of what is said can be known, when anyone says, “If one is non-existing.”

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Must not this too happen, either that “the others” are different from it, or that even it cannot be said to be different from “the others?”

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ It has therefore diversity in addition to knowledge. For he does not speak of the diversity of “the others,” when he says that “the one” is different from “the others,” but of the diversity of “the one.”

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ And yet the one which is non-existing, participates in “that,” and “some,” and “this,” and “these,” and everything of this kind. For neither could “the one” be spoken of, nor things different from “the one,” nor would there be anything for it, or belonging to it, nor could it be called anything, if it had no share in something, or in the other things of this kind.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But to be cannot be present to “the one,” if it non-exists; though nothing prevents it from participating in the many; nay, it must participate, if “the one” is that, and not another thing is not existing. If however it will not be either “the one” nor that, but the discourse about something else, it is meet to say nothing. But if “the one” is supposed

as that thing and not as another to non-exist, it is necessary for it to participate in that and many other things.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Dissimilitude, therefore, is present to it with respect to “the others for “the others,” being different from “the one,” will also be foreign from it.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But are not things foreign various?

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ And are not things various dissimilars?

Aristoteles/ Dissimilars.

Parmenides/ If then they are dissimilars to “the one,” it is evident they would be dissimilars to that which is dissimilar.

Aristoteles/ It is evident.

Parmenides/ There would then be present to “the one” a dissimilitude with respect to which “the others” are dissimilar to it.

Aristoteles/ It seems so.

Parmenides/ But if there is to it a dissimilitude from “the others,” must there not be to it a similitude of itself?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ If there be a dissimilitude of “the one” to “the one,” no discourse would take place about a thing of such a kind as “the one;” nor would the supposition be about “the one,” but about something different from “the one.”

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But it ought not.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ There ought, then, to be a similitude of itself to “the one.”

Aristoteles/ There ought.

Parmenides/ But neither is “the one” equal to “the others.” For, if it were equal, it would be according to equality, similar to them; but both these are impossible, if “the one” is not.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ But since it is not equal to “the others,” is it not necessary for “the others” also to be not equal to it?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But are not things which are not equal unequal?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And are not unequals unequal by that which is unequal?

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, participates in the inequality, according to which “the others” are unequal to it.

Aristoteles/ It does participate.

Parmenides/ But magnitude and smallness belong to inequality.

Aristoteles/ They do.

Parmenides/ Do magnitude and smallness then belong to one of this kind?

Aristoteles/ It nearly appears so.

Parmenides/ But magnitude and smallness are always separated from each other.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ There is then always something between them.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Can you mention anything else between these, except equality?

Aristoteles/ Nothing else.

Parmenides/ To whatever thing therefore there is magnitude and smallness, to this there is equality also as a medium between the two.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ To “the one” then which is non-existing, equality, magnitude, and smallness, as it appears, belong.

Aristoteles/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ But it ought likewise to participate in a certain way in “being.”

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ It ought to be in the state which we have mentioned? for, unless it be in that state, we should not speak the truth in saying that “the one” is not; but if we speak the truth, it is evident that we have spoken of things that exist. Is it not so?

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ But since we assert that we speak the truth, it is necessary for us to assert that we are speaking of things which exist.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, which does not exist, as it appears, does exist; for if it should non-exist while non-existing, but remit something of existence with respect to non-existence, it will immediately become existing.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ It ought therefore to have, as the bond of nonexistence, an existence not existing, if it is about to non-exist; just as existence ought to have as a bond of existence a non-existence existing, in order that it may be perfectly to be. For thus especially existence would exist, and non-existence not exist, participating respectively the former in

existence for the sake of “being” existing; but in nonexistence for the sake of “non-being” existing, if it is about to exist completely; the latter participating in non-existence for the sake of “non-being” not existing; but participating in existence for the sake of “being” existing; if non-existence is to non-exist completely.

Aristoteles/ Most truly so.

Parmenides/ Since then both to existence there is a share of non-existence, and to nonexistence a share of existence, is it not necessary for “the one” also, since it does not exist, to participate in existence for the purpose of non-existence?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Existence therefore appears to be “the one,” if it does not exist.

Aristoteles/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ And non-existence, if it does not exist.

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ Can anything then, which is in some state, be not in that state, when it does not change from that state?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ Everything then of such a kind, which is and is not in such a state, indicates some change.

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ Is change motion? or what shall we call it?

Aristoteles/ It is motion.

Parmenides/ But has not “the one” appeared to be both “being” and “not-being?”

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ It appears then to be and not to be in such a state.

Aristoteles/ It seems so.

Parmenides/ “The non-existing one” appears then to be moved, since it has a change from “being” into “not-being.”

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But if it be nowhere among beings, as it is not, since it is a not-being, it cannot change its place from anywhere to anywhere.

Aristoteles/ For it cannot.

Parmenides/ It will not then be moved by changing its place.

Aristoteles/ For it will not.

Parmenides/ Neither will it revolve in “the same;” for it will never touch “the same,” since the same is “being.” But it is impossible for “not-being” to reside in any “being.”

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, “which is not,” cannot revolve in that, in which it is not.

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ Neither will “the one” be altered from itself, either into “being” or “not-being:” for our discourse would no longer be concerning the one, if it were altered from itself, but concerning something else.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But if it is neither altered, nor revolves in the same, nor changes its place, can it still be moved in any way?

Aristoteles/ How can it?

Parmenides/ But it is necessary for that, which is unmoved, to be at rest; and for that, which is at rest, to stand still.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ As it seems, therefore, “the one” which is not, both stands still and is moved.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ And yet if it be moved, there is a great necessity for it to be altered; for, so far as anything is moved, it is no longer in the same state that it was, but in a different one.

Aristoteles/ So it is.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, since it is moved, is also altered.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And yet being moved not at all, it would be not at all altered.

Aristoteles/ It would not.

Parmenides/ So far then as “the one” which is not, is moved, it is altered; but so far as it is not moved, it is not altered.

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, which is not, is both altered and not altered.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But is it not necessary for anything, when it is altered, to be in the act of being different from what it was before, and to die away from its former state; but for a nature, which is not altered, to be neither in the act of being, nor of dying away?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ “The one,” therefore, which is not, by being altered, is in the act of being, and of dying away; but at the same time, from its not being altered, it is not in the act of being or of dying away. And thus “the one,” which is not, is

in the act of being and of dying, and is neither in the act of being nor of dying away.

Aristoteles/ For it is not otherwise.

Parmenides/ But let us again return to the beginning, about to see whether these things will appear to us as they do now, or otherwise.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Have we not already said, "If 'the one is not, what ought to happen concerning it?"

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But when we say "it is not," do we intend anything else than the absence of "being" from that which we say is not?

Aristoteles/ Nothing else.

Parmenides/ Whether therefore, when we say that a thing "is not," do we say that in a certain respect it is not, and that in a certain respect it is? or does the term "is not" simply signify that, what is not, is nowhere at all, and that it does not in any way participate in "being," if it is not?

Aristoteles/ It signifies this most distinctly.

Parmenides/ Neither then can that, which is not, be, nor in any other way participate in "being."

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ But are the terms "to be generated" and "to be destroyed," anything else than for one thing to participate in "being," and for another to lose "being?"

Aristoteles/ It is nothing else.

Parmenides/ The thing therefore to which no atom of "being" is present, can neither receive nor lose it.

Aristoteles/ How can it?

Parmenides/ “The one” therefore, since it is not at all, can neither possess, be freed from, nor participate in “being,” in any manner whatever.

Aristoteles/ This seems reasonable.

Parmenides/ “The one” which is not, is then neither destroyed nor in the act of being, if it participates not at all in being.

Aristoteles/ It appears not.

Parmenides/ Neither therefore is it at all altered; for if it thus suffered it would be in the act of being destroyed.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But if it is not altered, is it not also necessary for it to be not moved?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But that, which in no respect is, we will say cannot stand still; for that which stands still ought to be in some spot ever the same?

Aristoteles/ In the same; for how not?

Parmenides/ Thus then let us say, that “not-being” at no time either stands or is moved.

Aristoteles/ For it does not.

Parmenides/ Moreover not any of things existing is present to it; for participating in any of things existing it would participate in “being.”

Aristoteles/ It is evident.

Parmenides/ It has therefore neither magnitude, nor smallness, nor equality.

Aristoteles/ It has not.

Parmenides/ It has moreover neither similitude nor diversity, either with respect to itself or to others.

Aristoteles/ It appears not.

Parmenides/ What then, is it possible for it to have the other things, if nothing must be present to it?

Aristoteles/ It is not possible.

Parmenides/ To it then there are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor the same nor different.

Aristoteles/ There are not.

Parmenides/ But what, will there be, respecting a thing that is not, the term “at it,” or “to it,” or “of this,” or “to this,” or “of another,” or “to another,” or “formerly,” or “Hereafter,” or “now,” or “knowledge,” or “opinion,” or “perception,” or “discourse,” or “a name,” or anything else belonging to things existing?

Aristoteles/ There will not.

Parmenides/ A not-one then is in this state.

Aristoteles/ What state?

Parmenides/ Not being seems to be in no state.

Aristoteles/ In no state.

Parmenides/ But let us still again say, if “one” is not, what must “the others” suffer.

Aristoteles/ Let us say.

Parmenides/ In a certain way “others” must exist themselves; for, if “others” do not exist, there would be nothing said about “the others.”

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But if there is the discourse about “the others,” “the others” will be different: or do you not apply to the same thing the word “other” and the word “different?”

Aristoteles/ I do.

Parmenides/ But we surely say that the “different” is different from “different,” and “the other” is other than “other?”

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ To “the others,” therefore, if there are about to be “others,” there is something from which they will be “others.”

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But what would this be? For they will not be different from “the one,” since it is not.

Aristoteles/ They will not.

Parmenides/ They are different therefore from each other; for this alone remains to them, or to be different from nothing.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ According to multitudes therefore, each is different from each other; for they cannot be different according to one, since “one” is not. But each mass of them, as it appears, is infinite in multitude; even although one should lay hold of that which appears to be the least, like a dream in sleep, many appear on a sudden, instead of one seeming to be; and instead of the smallest, a quantity very great as compared with the fractions formed out of it.

Aristoteles/ Most right.

Parmenides/ Masses of such kind existing, others will be mutually different from one another, if “others” are, while “one” is not.

Aristoteles/ Completely so.

Parmenides/ Will there not then be many masses, each appearing as one, but not being so, since “one” is not?

Aristoteles/ There will.

Parmenides/ There will likewise appear to be a number of them, if each is one, while there are many.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But the even and odd among them will appear not truly, if “one” shall not exist.

Aristoteles/ They will not.

Parmenides/ But likewise the smallest, as we have said, will seem to be in them. But this the smallest will appear to be many and great, as compared with each of the many and small.

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ And each mass will be imagined to be equal to many and small quantities; for it will not appear to change from a greater to a less quantity, before it seems to arrive at something between them; and this would be a fancied notion of equality.

Aristoteles/ It is likely.

Parmenides/ Will it not also appear to have a bound with respect to another mass, having itself, with respect to itself, neither a beginning, nor a middle, nor an end?

Aristoteles/ In what way?

Parmenides/ Because when a person takes hold by his intellect of some one of these, as being one of these, there will always, prior to the beginning, appear another beginning, and after the end another end will be left behind; but in the middle there will be other things more in the middle than the middle; but smaller, on account of their not being able to take hold of each one of them, since “the one” is not.

Aristoteles/ This is most true.

Parmenides/ But everything which a person can lay hold of by his intellect, must, I think, be broken into small pieces; for a mass would be ever laid hold of mentally without a one.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But is it not necessary for such a mass to appear to him, who beholds it at a distance and with a dull eye, to be one; but to him who surveys it near and with an acute mind, will not each appear to be infinite in multitude, if it is deprived of “the one,” not existing.

Aristoteles/ It is most necessary.

Parmenides/ Thus then each of “the others” ought to appear infinite and bounded, and one and many, if one does not exist, and “the others” besides “the one” do exist.

Aristoteles/ They ought.

Parmenides/ Will they then appear also to be similars and dissimilars?

Aristoteles/ In what way?

Parmenides/ Just as objects in a shaded picture appear all to be one to a person standing at a distance, they will seem to suffer the same accident, and to be similar.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But to him, who approaches nearer, they will appear to be many and different, and different from and dissimilar to themselves, through the fancied notion of diversity.

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ It is therefore necessary for the masses to appear to be similar and dissimilar to themselves and to each other.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ And to be the same with, and different from, each other, and to touch and be apart from themselves, and be moved through all possible movements, and standing still everywhere, and be in the act of being and of destruction, and neither of these, and all of this kind, which it were easy

for us to go through, if, though one does not exist, many do exist?

Aristoteles/ Most true.

Parmenides/ Once more then, returning again to the beginning, let us say, “If one is not,” but the things different from “the one,” what ought to happen.

Aristoteles/ Let us say.

Parmenides/ “The others” then are not one.

Aristoteles/ How should they be?

Parmenides/ Nor yet are they many; for in many there would be one likewise. For if none of these is one, all are nothing; so that there would be not even many.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ One therefore not being in the others, the others are neither many nor one.

Aristoteles/ They are not.

Parmenides/ Nor do they appear to be either one or many.

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Because “the others” have not in any way any communication at all with any of the things which are not, nor is anyone of the non-existing present to “the others;” for there is no part to non-beings.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Neither therefore is there any opinion about that, which is not in “the others,” nor any fancied notion; nor does that “which is not,” become in any way the subject of opinion applicable to “the others.”

Aristoteles/ It does not.

Parmenides/ If therefore one does not exist, not any of “the others” is conceived in opinion to be one or many; for it is impossible to form an opinion of many without one.

Aristoteles/ It is impossible.

Parmenides/ If one therefore does not exist, neither do “the others” exist; nor is one or many conceived by opinion.

Aristoteles/ It seems not.

Parmenides/ Neither therefore do similars or dissimilars exist.

Aristoteles/ They do not.

Parmenides/ Nor the same nor different, nor things touching nor apart, nor such others, as we have already discussed, as appearing themselves; of these there neither is anyone, nor do “the others” appear, if the one does not exist.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ If then we summarily say, that “if one is not, nothing is,” shall we not rightly say?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Let both this then be asserted by us, and this also, as is reasonable, that whether one is or is not, both itself, and the others, are, with respect to themselves and to each other, all things entirely, and are not, and appear to be, and do not appear.

Aristoteles/ It is most true.

Parmenides.

Translated by F. M. Cornford.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Cephalus, Adeimantus, Zeno, Glaucon, Parmenides, Antiphon, Aristoteles, Pythodorus

Cephalus/ After leaving our home at Clazomenae we arrived at Athens and met Adimantus and Glaucon in the market place. Adimantus took my hand.

Glaucon/ Welcome, Cephalus. If there is anything we can do for you here, you must let us know.

Cephalus/ Well, I have come for that very purpose. There is something you and your brother can do for me.

Glaucon/ Please tell us what it is.

Cephalus/ What, was the name of your half-brother on the mother's side? I cannot remember. He was only a child, you know, when I was here before, and that is a long while ago now. His father's name was Pyrilampes, I think.

Glaucon/ Yes, and his own is Antiphon. But why do you ask?

Cephalus/ My companions here, are fellow citizens of mine, deeply interested in philosophy. They have been told that Antiphon has been much in the company of someone called Pythodorus, who was a friend of Zeno's, and that Pythodorus has related to him that conversation which Socrates once had with Zeno and Parmenides. Antiphon is said to have heard it so often that he can repeat it by heart.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Cephalus/ Well, that is what we want—to hear that conversation.

Glaucon/ There is no difficulty about that. Before he was grown up, Antiphon worked hard at getting that conversation by heart, though nowadays he takes after his grandfather of the same name and devotes most of his time to horses. If you like, let us go and see him. He has just gone home from here. His house is close by, in Melite.

Cephalus/ So we set out to walk there. We found Antiphon at home, giving instructions to a smith about making a bit or something of the sort. When he had done with the man, and his brothers began to tell him what we had come for, he recognized me from his memory of my earlier visit and said he was glad to see me. We then asked him to repeat the conversation. At first, he was reluctant.

Antiphon/ It is no easy matter.

Cephalus/ However, he ended by telling us the whole story.

According to Antiphon, then, this was Pythodorus' account.

Pythodorus/ Zeno and Parmenides once came to Athens for the Great Panathenaea. Parmenides was a man of distinguished appearance. By that time, he was well advanced in years, with hair almost white; he may have been sixty-five. Zeno was nearing forty, a tall and attractive figure. It was said that he had been Parmenides' favorite. They were staying with Pythodorus outside the walls in the Ceramicus. Socrates and a few others came there, anxious to hear a reading of Zeno's treatise, which the two visitors had brought for the first time to Athens. Socrates was then quite young. Zeno himself read it to them; Parmenides at the moment had gone out. The reading of the arguments was very nearly over when Pythodorus himself came in, accompanied by Parmenides and Aristoteles, the man who was afterward one of the Thirty; so they heard only a small

part of the treatise. Pythodorus himself, however, had heard it read by Zeno before.

When Zeno had finished, Socrates asked him to read once more the first hypothesis of the first argument. He did so, and Socrates asked;

Socrates/ What does this statement mean, Zeno? 'If things are many,' you say, 'they must be both like and unlike. But that is impossible; unlike things cannot be like, nor like things unlike.' That is what you say, isn't it?

Zeno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so, if unlike things cannot be like or like things unlike, it is also impossible that things should be a plurality; if many things did exist, they would have impossible attributes. Is this the precise purpose of your arguments—to maintain, against everything that is commonly said, that things are not a plurality? Do you regard every one of your arguments as evidence of exactly that conclusion, and so hold that, in each argument in your treatise, you are giving just one more proof that a plurality does not exist? Is that what you mean, or am I understanding you wrongly?

Zeno/ No, you have quite rightly understood the purpose of the whole treatise.

Socrates/ I see, Parmenides, that Zeno's intention is to associate himself with you by means of his treatise no less intimately than by his personal attachment. In a way, his book states the same position as your own; only by varying the form he tries to delude us into thinking that his thesis is a different one. You assert, in your poem, that the all is one, and for this you advance admirable proofs. Zeno, for his part, asserts that it is not a plurality, and he too has many weighty proofs to bring forward. You assert unity; he asserts no plurality; each expresses himself in such a way that your

arguments seem to have nothing in common, though really, they come to very much the same thing. That is why your exposition and his seem to be rather over the heads of outsiders like ourselves.

Zeno/ Yes, Socrates, but you have not quite seen the real character of my book. True, you are as quick as a Spartan hound to pick up the scent and follow the trail of the argument, but there is a point you have missed at the outset. The book makes no pretense of disguising from the public the fact that it was written with the purpose you describe, as if such deception were something to be proud of. What you have pointed out is only incidental; the book is in fact a sort of defense of Parmenides' argument against those who try to make fun of it by showing that his supposition, that there is a one, leads to many absurdities and contradictions. This book, then, is a retort against those who assert a plurality. It pays them back in the same coin with something to spare, and aims at showing that, on a thorough examination, their own supposition that there is a plurality leads to even more absurd consequences than the hypothesis of the one. It was written in that controversial spirit in my young days, and someone copied it surreptitiously, so that I had not even the chance to consider whether it should see the light or not. That is where you are mistaken, Socrates; you imagine it was inspired, not by a youthful eagerness for controversy, but by the more dispassionate aims of an older man, though, as I said, your description of it was not far wrong.

Socrates/ I accept that, and I have no doubt it is as you say. But tell me this. Do you not recognize that there exists, just by itself, a form of likeness and again another contrary form, unlikeness itself, and that of these two forms you and I and all the things we speak of as 'many' come to partake? Also, that things which come to partake of likeness come to

be alike in that respect and just in so far as they do come to partake of it, and those that come to partake of unlikeness come to be unlike, while those which come to partake of both come to be both? Even if all things come to partake of both, contrary as they are, and by having a share in both are at once like and unlike one another, what is there surprising in that? If one could point to things which are simply 'alike' or 'unlike' proving to be unlike or alike, that no doubt would be a portent, but when things which have a share in both are shown to have both characters, I see nothing strange in that, Zeno, nor yet in a proof that all things are one by having a share in unity and at the same time many by sharing in plurality. But if anyone can prove that what is simply unity itself is many or that plurality itself is one, then I shall begin to be surprised.

And so, in all other cases, if the kinds or forms themselves were shown to have these contrary characters among themselves, there would be good ground for astonishment, but what is there surprising in someone pointing out that I am one thing and also many? When he wants to show that I am many things, he can say that my right side is a different thing from my left, my front from my back, my upper parts from my lower, since no doubt I do partake of plurality. When he wants to prove that I am one thing, he will say that I am one person among the seven of us, since I partake also of unity. So both statements are true. Accordingly, if anyone sets out to show about things of this kind—sticks and stones, and so on—that the same thing is many and one, we shall say that what he is proving is that something is many and one, not that unity is many or that plurality is one; he is not telling us anything wonderful, but only what we should all admit. But, as I said just now, if he begins by distinguishing the forms apart just by themselves—likeness, for instance, and unlikeness, plurality and unity, rest and

motion, and all the rest—and then shows that these forms among themselves can be combined with, or separated from, one another, then, Zeno, I should be filled with admiration. I am sure you have dealt with this subject very forcibly, but, as I say, my admiration would be much greater if anyone could show that these same perplexities are everywhere involved in the forms themselves—among the objects we apprehend in reflection, just as you and Parmenides have shown them to be involved in the things we see.

Pythodorus/ While Socrates was speaking, he was expecting every moment that Parmenides and Zeno would be annoyed, but they listened very attentively and kept on exchanging glances and smiles in admiration of Socrates. When he ended, Parmenides expressed this feeling.

Parmenides/ Socrates, your eagerness for discussion is admirable. And now tell me. Have you yourself drawn this distinction you speak of and separated apart on the one side forms themselves and on the other the things that share in them? Do you believe that there is such a thing as likeness itself apart from the likeness that we possess, and so on with unity and plurality and all the terms in Zeno's argument that you have just been listening to?

Socrates/ Certainly I do.

Parmenides/ And also in cases like these, is there, for example, a form of rightness or of beauty or of goodness, and of all such things?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And again, a form of man, apart from ourselves and all other men like us—a form of man as something by itself? Or a form of fire or of water?

Socrates/ I have often been puzzled about those things, Parmenides, whether one should say that the same thing is true in their case or not.

Parmenides/ Are you also puzzled, Socrates, about cases that might be thought absurd, such as hair or mud or dirt or any other trivial and undignified objects? Are you doubtful whether or not to assert that each of these has a separate form distinct from things like those we handle?

Socrates/ Not at all. In these cases, the things are just the things we see; it would surely be too absurd to suppose that they have a form. All the same, I have sometimes been troubled by a doubt whether what is true in one case may not be true in all. Then, when I have reached that point, I am driven to retreat, for fear of tumbling into a bottomless pit of nonsense. Anyhow, I get back to the things which we were just now speaking of as having forms, and occupy my time with thinking about them.

Parmenides/ That is because you are still young, Socrates, and philosophy has not yet taken hold of you so firmly as I believe it will someday. You will not despise any of these objects then, but at present your youth makes you still pay attention to what the world will think. However, that may be, tell me this. You say you hold that there exist certain forms, of which these other things come to partake and so to be called after their names; by coming to partake of likeness or largeness or beauty or justice, they become like or large or beautiful or just?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then each thing that partakes receives as its share either the form as a whole or a part of it? Or can there be any other way of partaking besides this?

Socrates/ No, how could there be?

Parmenides/ Do you hold, then, that the form as a whole, a single thing, is in each of the many, or how?

Socrates/ Why should it not be in each, Parmenides?

Parmenides/ If so, a form which is one and the same will be at the same time, as a whole, in a number of things which are separate, and consequently will be separate from itself.

Socrates/ No, it would not, if it were like one and the same day, which is in many places at the same time and nevertheless is not separate from itself. Suppose any given form is in them all at the same time as one and the same thing in that way.

Parmenides/ I like the way you make out that one and the same thing is in many places at once, Socrates. You might as well spread a sail over a number of people and then say that the one sail as a whole was over them all. Don't you think that is a fair analogy?

Socrates/ Perhaps it is.

Parmenides/ Then would the sail as a whole be over each man, or only a part over one, another part over another?

Socrates/ Only a part.

Parmenides/ In that case, Socrates, the forms themselves must be divisible into parts, and the things which have a share in them will have a part for their share. Only a part of any given form, and no longer the whole of it, will be in each thing.

Socrates/ Evidently, on that showing.

Parmenides/ Are you, then, prepared to assert that we shall find the single form actually being divided? Will it still be one?

Socrates/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ No, for consider this. Suppose it is largeness itself that you are going to divide into parts, and that each of the many large things is to be large by virtue of a part of largeness which is smaller than largeness itself. Will not that seem unreasonable?

Socrates/ It will indeed.

Parmenides/ And again, if it is equality that a thing receives some small part of, will that part, which is less than equality itself, make its possessor equal to something else?

Socrates/ No, that is impossible.

Parmenides/ Well, take smallness. Is one of us to have a portion of smallness, and is smallness to be larger than that portion, which is a part of it? On this supposition again smallness itself will be larger, and anything to which the portion taken is added will be smaller, and not larger, than it was before.

Socrates/ That cannot be so.

Parmenides/ Well then, Socrates, how are the other things going to partake of your forms, if they can partake of them neither in part nor as wholes?

Socrates/ Really, it seems no easy matter to determine in any way.

Parmenides/ Again, there is another question.

Socrates/ What is that?

Parmenides/ How do you feel about this? I imagine your ground for believing in a single form in each case is this. When it seems to you that a number of things are large, there seems, I suppose, to be a certain single character which is the same when you look at them all; hence you think that largeness is a single thing.

Socrates/ True.

Parmenides/ But now take largeness itself and the other things which are large. Suppose you look at all these in the same way in your mind's eye, will not yet another unity make its appearance—a largeness by virtue of which they all appear large?

Socrates/ So it would seem.

Parmenides/ If so, a second form of largeness will present itself, over and above largeness itself and the things that share in it, and again, covering all these, yet another, which will make all of them large. So each of your forms will no longer be one, but an indefinite number.

Socrates/ But, Parmenides, may it not be that each of these forms is a thought, which cannot properly exist anywhere but in a mind. In that way each of them can be one and the statements that have just been made would no longer be true of it.

Parmenides/ Then, is each form one of these thoughts and yet a thought of nothing?

Socrates/ No, that is impossible.

Parmenides/ So it is a thought of something?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Of something that is, or of something that is not?

Socrates/ Of something that is.

Parmenides/ In fact, of some one thing which that thought observes to cover all the cases, as being a certain single character?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then will not this thing that is thought of as being one and always the same in all cases be a form?

Socrates/ That again seems to follow.

Parmenides/ And besides, according to the way in which you assert that the other things have a share in the forms, must you not hold either that each of those things consists of thoughts, so that all things think, or else that they are thoughts which nevertheless do not think?

Socrates/ That too is unreasonable. But, Parmenides, the best I can make of the matter is this—that these forms are

as it were patterns fixed in the nature of things. The other things are made in their image and are likenesses, and this participation they come to have in the forms is nothing but their being made in their image.

Parmenides/ Well, if a thing is made in the image of the form, can that form fail to be like the image of it, in so far as the image was made in its likeness? If a thing is like, must it not be like something that is like it?

Socrates/ It must.

Parmenides/ And must not the thing which is like share with the thing that is like it in one and the same thing?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And will not that in which the like things share, so as to be alike, be just the form itself that you spoke of?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ If so, nothing can be like the form, nor can the form be like anything. Otherwise, a second form will always make its appearance over and above the first form, and if that second form is like anything, yet a third. And there will be no end to this emergence of fresh forms, if the form is to be like the thing that partakes of it.

Socrates/ Quite true.

Parmenides/ It follows that the other things do not partake of forms by being like them; we must look for some other means by which they partake.

Socrates/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ You see then, Socrates, what great difficulties there are in asserting their existence as forms just by themselves?

Socrates/ I do indeed.

Parmenides/ I assure you, then, you have as yet hardly a notion of how great they will be, if you are going to set up a single form for every distinction you make among things.

Socrates/ How so?

Parmenides/ The worst difficulty will be this, though there are plenty more. Suppose someone should say that the forms, if they are such as we are saying they must be, cannot even be known. One could not convince him that he was mistaken in that objection, unless he chanced to be a man of wide experience and natural ability, and were willing to follow one through a long and remote train of argument. Otherwise, there would be no way of convincing a man who maintained that the forms were unknowable.

Socrates/ Why so, Parmenides?

Parmenides/ Because, Socrates, I imagine that you or anyone else who asserts that each of them has a real being 'just by itself,' would admit, to begin with, that no such real being exists in our world.

Socrates/ True, for how could it then be just by itself?

Parmenides/ Very good. And further, those forms which are what they are with reference to one another have their being in such references among themselves, not with reference to those likenesses, or whatever we are to call them, in our world, which we possess and so come to be called by their several names. And, on the other hand, these things in our world which bear the same names as the forms are related among themselves, not to the forms, and all the names of that sort that they bear have reference to one another, not to the forms.

Socrates/ How do you mean?

Parmenides/ Suppose, for instance, one of us is master or slave of another; he is not, of course, the slave of master itself, the essential master, nor, if he is a master, is he

master of slave itself, the essential slave, but, being a man, is master or slave of another man, whereas mastership itself is what it is [mastership] of slavery itself, and slavery itself is slavery to mastership itself. The significance of things in our world is not with reference to things in that other world, nor have these their significance with reference to us, but, as I say, the things in that world are what they are with reference to one another and toward one another, and so likewise are the things in our world. You see what I mean?

Socrates/ Certainly I do.

Parmenides/ And similarly knowledge itself, the essence of knowledge, will be knowledge of that reality itself, the essentially real.

Socrates/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And again, any given branch of knowledge in itself will be knowledge of some department of real things as it is in itself, will it not?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Whereas the knowledge in our world will be knowledge of the reality in our world, and it will follow again that each branch of knowledge in our world must be knowledge of some department of things that exist in our world.

Socrates/ Necessarily.

Parmenides/ But, as you admit, we do not possess the forms themselves, nor can they exist in our world.

Socrates/ No.

Parmenides/ And presumably the forms, just as they are in themselves, are known by the form of knowledge itself?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ The form which we do not possess.

Socrates/ True.

Parmenides/ Then, none of the forms is known by us, since we have no part in knowledge itself.

Socrates/ Apparently not.

Parmenides/ So beauty itself or goodness itself and all the things we take as forms in themselves are unknowable to us.

Socrates/ I am afraid that is so.

Parmenides/ Then here is a still more formidable consequence for you to consider.

Socrates/ What is that?

Parmenides/ You will grant, I suppose, that if there is such a thing as a form, knowledge itself, it is much more perfect than the knowledge in our world, and so with beauty and all the rest.

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And if anything has part in this knowledge itself, you would agree that a god has a better title than anyone else to possess the most perfect knowledge?

Socrates/ Undoubtedly.

Parmenides/ Then will the god, who possesses knowledge itself, be able to know the things in our world?

Socrates/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Because we have agreed that those forms have no significance with reference to things in our world, nor have things in our world any significance with reference to them. Each set has it only among themselves.

Socrates/ Yes, we did.

Parmenides/ Then if this most perfect mastership and most perfect knowledge are in the god's world, the gods' mastership can never be exercised over us, nor their knowledge know us or anything in our world. Just as we do not rule over them by virtue of rule as it exists in our world and we know nothing that is divine by our knowledge, so

they, on the same principle, being gods, are not our masters nor do they know anything of human concerns.

Socrates/ But surely, an argument which would deprive the gods of knowledge would be too strange.

Parmenides/ And yet, Socrates, these difficulties and many more besides are inevitably involved in the forms, if these characters of things really exist and one is going to distinguish each form as a thing just by itself. The result is that the hearer is perplexed and inclined either to question their existence, or to contend that, if they do exist, they must certainly be unknowable by our human nature. Moreover, there seems to be some weight in these objections, and, as we were saying, it is extraordinarily difficult to convert the objector. Only a man of exceptional gifts will be able to see that a form, or essence just by itself, does exist in each case, and it will require someone still more remarkable to discover it and to instruct another who has thoroughly examined all these difficulties.

Socrates/ I admit that, Parmenides. I quite agree with what you are saying.

Parmenides/ But on the other hand, if, in view of all these difficulties and others like them, a man refuses to admit that forms of things exist or to distinguish a definite form in every case, he will have nothing on which to fix his thought, so long as he will not allow that each thing has a character which is always the same, and in so doing he will completely destroy the significance of all discourse. But of that consequence I think you are only too well aware.

Socrates/ True.

Parmenides/ What are you going to do about philosophy, then? Where will you turn while the answers to these questions remain unknown?

Socrates/ I can see no way out at the present moment.

Parmenides/ That is because you are undertaking to define 'beautiful,' 'just,' 'good,' and other particular forms, too soon, before you have had a preliminary training. I noticed that the other day when I heard you talking here with Aristoteles. Believe me, there is something noble and inspired in your passion for argument, but you must make an effort and submit yourself, while you are still young, to a severer training in what the world calls idle talk and condemns as useless. Otherwise, the truth will escape you.

Socrates/ What form, then, should this exercise take, Parmenides?

Parmenides/ The form that Zeno used in the treatise you have been listening to. With this exception—there was one thing you said to him which impressed me very much—you would not allow the survey to be confined to visible things or to range only over that field; it was to extend to those objects which are specially apprehended by discourse and can be regarded as forms.

Socrates/ Yes, because in that other field there seems to be no difficulty about showing that things are both like and unlike and have any other character you please.

Parmenides/ You are right. But there is one thing more you must do. If you want to be thoroughly exercised, you must not merely make the supposition that such and such a thing is and then consider the consequences; you must also take the supposition that that same thing is not.

Socrates/ How do you mean?

Parmenides/ Take, if you like, the supposition that Zeno made-'*If there is a plurality of things*.' You must consider what consequences must follow both for those many things with reference to one another and to the one, and also for the one with reference to itself and to the many. Then again, on the supposition that *there is not a plurality*, you must

consider what will follow both for the one and for the many, with reference to themselves and to each other. Or, once more, if you suppose that 'likeness exists,' or 'does not exist,' what will follow on either supposition both for the terms supposed and for other things, with reference to themselves and to each other. And so again with unlikeness, motion, and rest, coming-to-be and perishing, and being and not-being themselves. In a word, whenever you suppose that anything whatsoever exists or does not exist or has any other character, you ought to consider the consequences with reference to itself and to anyone of the other things that you may select, or several of them, or all of them together, and again you must study these others with reference both to one another and to anyone thing you may select, whether you have assumed the thing to exist or not to exist, if you are really going to make out the truth after a complete course of discipline.

Socrates/ There would be no end to such an undertaking, Parmenides, and I don't altogether understand. Why not enlighten me by illustrating the method on some supposition of your own choice?

Parmenides/ That is a heavy task, Socrates, to lay on a man of my age.

Socrates/ But you, Zeno, why don't you give us the illustration?

Pythodorus/ Zeno laughed and replied;

Zeno/ Let us beg Parmenides himself to do it, Socrates. What he means is no light matter, I am afraid. You must see what a task you are setting. If we were a larger company, it would not be fair to ask him. Such a discourse would be unsuitable before a large audience, particularly in a man of his age, because most people are unaware that you cannot hit upon truth and gain understanding without ranging in

this way over the whole field. So, Parmenides, I join with Socrates in his request, in the hope of sitting at your feet again myself after all these years.

Pythodorus/ After these words from Zeno, I joined with Aristoteles and the rest in begging Parmenides not to disappoint them, but to demonstrate the method he had in mind.

Parmenides/ I cannot refuse, although I feel like the old race horse in Ibycus, who trembles at the start of the chariot race, knowing from long experience what is in store for him. The poet compares his own reluctance on finding himself, so late in life, forced into the lists of love, and my memories too make me frightened of setting out, at my age, to traverse so vast and hazardous a sea. However, I must do as you wish, for after all, as Zeno says, we are all friends here. Where shall we begin, then? What supposition shall we start with? Would you like me, since we are committed to play out this laborious game, to begin with myself and my own original supposition? Shall I take the one itself and consider the consequences of assuming that there is, or is not, a one?

Zeno/ By all means.

Parmenides/ Then who will answer the questions I shall put? Shall it be the youngest? He will be likely to give the least trouble and to be the most ready to say what he thinks, and I shall get a moment's rest while he is answering.

Aristoteles/ The youngest means me, Parmenides, and I am ready. Put your questions and I will answer them.

Parmenides/ Well then, if there is a one, of course the one will not be many. Consequently, it cannot have any parts or be a whole. For a part is a part of a whole, and a whole means that from which no part is missing; so, whether you speak of it as 'a whole' or as 'having parts,' in either case the one would consist of parts and in that way be many and not one.

But it is to be one and not many. Therefore, if the one is to be one, it will not be a whole nor have parts.

And, if it has no parts, it cannot have a beginning or an end or a middle, for such things would be parts of it. Further, the beginning and end of a thing are its limits. Therefore, if the one has neither beginning nor end, it is without limits.

Consequently, the one has no shape; it is not either round or straight. Round is that whose extremity is everywhere equidistant from its center, and straight is that of which the middle is in front of both extremities. So, if the one had either straight or round shape, it would have parts and so be many. Therefore, since it has no parts, it is neither straight nor round.

Further, being such as we have described, it cannot be anywhere, for it cannot be either (*a*) in another, or (*b*) in itself.

(*a*) If it were in another, it would be encompassed all round by that in which it was contained, and would have many contacts with it at many points, but there cannot be contact at many points all round with a thing which is one and has no parts and is not round.

(*b*) On the other hand, if it were in itself, it would have, to encompass it, none other than itself, since it would actually be within itself, and nothing can be within something without being encompassed by that thing. Thus, the encompassing thing would be one thing, the encompassed another, for the same thing cannot as a whole both encompass and be encompassed at the same time, and so, in that case, the one would no longer be one, but two.

Therefore, the one is not anywhere, being neither in itself nor in another.

Next consider whether, such being its condition, it can be (*a*) in motion or (*b*) at rest.

(a) If it were in motion, it would have to be either moving in place or undergoing alteration, for there are no other kinds of motion.

Now, if the one alters, so as to become different from itself, it surely cannot still be one. Therefore, it does not move in the sense of suffering alteration.

Does it, then, move in place? If it does, then it must either turn round in the same place or shift from one place to another. If it turns round, it must rest on a center and have those parts which revolve round the center as different parts of itself. But a thing which a cannot have a center or parts cannot possibly be carried round on its center. If it moves at all, then, it must move by changing its place and coming to be in different places at different times. Now we saw that it could not be anywhere in anything. It is still more impossible that it should *come to be* in anything. If a thing is coming to be in something, it cannot be in that thing so long as it is still coming to be in it, nor yet can it be altogether outside it, since it is already coming to be in it. Accordingly, this can happen only to a thing which has parts, for part of it will be already in the other thing and part of it outside at the same time, and a thing which has no parts surely cannot possibly *be*, at the same time, neither wholly inside nor wholly outside something. It is still more impossible that a thing which has no parts and is not a whole should *come to be* in anything, since it cannot do so either part by part or as a whole. Hence it does not change its place either by traveling anywhere and coming to be in something. or by revolving in the same place, or by changing.

Therefore, the one is immovable in respect of every kind of motion.

(*b*) On the other hand, we also assert that it cannot actually be in anything. Consequently, it can never be in the

same [place or condition], because then it would be in that selfsame [place or condition], and we saw that it could not be either in itself or in anything else. The one, then, is never in the same [place or condition]. But what is never in the same [place or condition] is not at rest or stationary.

It appears, then, that the one is neither at rest nor in motion. Further the one cannot be either the same as another or the same as itself, nor yet other than itself or other than another.

(*a*) Were it other than itself, it would be other than one and so would not be one. (*b*) And if it were the same as another, it would be that other and not be itself, so that, in this case again, it would not be just what it is, one, but other than one.

Therefore the one will not be the same as another or other than itself.

(*c*) Nor can it be other than another, so long as it is one. To be other than something properly belongs, not to 'one,' but only to an 'other-than-another.' Consequently, it will not be other in virtue of its being one, and so not in virtue of being itself, and so not as itself, and if as itself it is not in any sense other, it cannot be other than anything.

(*d*) Nor yet can it be the same as itself. For the character (φύσις) of unity is one thing, the character of sameness another. This is evident because when a thing becomes 'the same' as something, it does not become 'one.' For instance, if it becomes the same as the many, it must become many, not one, whereas if there were no difference whatever between unity and sameness, whenever a thing became 'the same,' it would always become one, and whenever one, the same. So, if the one is to be the same as itself, it will not be one with itself, and thus will be one and not one, and that is

impossible. Consequently, it is equally impossible for the one to be either other than another or the same as itself.

Thus, the one cannot be other than, or the same as, either itself or another.

Nor can the one be (*a*) like or (*b*) unlike anything, whether itself or another.

(*a*) A like thing is a thing which has an identical character. But we have seen that the character 'same' is distinct from the character 'one.' Now if the one has any character distinct from being one, it must have the character of being more things than one, and that is impossible. So, it is quite impossible that the one should be a thing 'having the same character' as either another or itself.

Therefore, the one cannot be like another or like itself.

(*b*) But neither is it true of the one that it is different, for, in that case again, it would be true of it that it was more things than one. But if 'like' means that of which the same thing is true, a thing that is unlike itself or another will be that which can be truly said to be different from itself or another. And the one, it appears, cannot be said to be different in any way. Consequently, the one is in no way unlike either itself or anything else.

Therefore, the one cannot be like or unlike either another or itself. Further, the one, being such as we have described, will not be either (*a*) equal or (*b*) unequal either to itself or to another.

If it is equal, it will have the same number of measures as anything to which it is equal. If greater or less, it will have more or fewer measures than things, less or greater than itself, which are commensurable with it. Or, if they are incommensurable with it, it will have smaller measures in the one case, greater in the other.

(*a*) Now a thing which has no sameness cannot have the same number of measures or of anything else. Therefore, the one, not having the same number of measures, cannot be equal to itself or to another.

(*b*) On the other hand, if it had more or fewer measures, it would have as many parts as measures, and thus, once more, it would be no longer one, but as many as its measures. And if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure, whereas we saw that it could not be equal to anything.

Therefore, since it has neither one measure, nor many, nor few, and has no sameness at all, it appears that it can never be equal to itself or to another, nor yet greater or less than itself or another.

Again, can it be held that the one can be older or younger than anything or of the same age with anything?

If it is of the same age with itself or another, it will have equality of duration and likeness, and we have said that the one has neither likeness nor equality. We also said that it has no unlikeness or inequality. Such a thing cannot, then, be either older or younger than, or of the same age with, anything.

Therefore, the one cannot be younger or older than, or of the same age with, either itself or another.

We may infer that the one, if it is such as we have described, cannot even occupy time at all. Whatever occupies time must always be becoming older than itself, and 'older' always means older than something younger. Consequently, whatever is becoming older than itself, if it is to have something *than* which it is becoming older, must also be at the same time becoming younger than itself. What I mean is this. If one thing is already different from another, there is no question of its becoming different; either they

both are now, or they both have been, or they both will be, different. But if one is in process of becoming different, you cannot say that the other has been, or will be, or as yet is, different; it can only be in process of becoming different. Now the difference signified by 'older' is always a difference from something younger. Consequently, what is becoming older than itself must also at the same time be becoming younger than itself. Now, in the process of becoming it cannot take a longer or shorter time than itself; it must take the same time with itself, whether it is becoming, or is, or has been, or will be. So, it seems, anyone of the things that occupy time and have a temporal character must be of the same age as itself and also be becoming at once both older and a younger than itself. But we saw that none of these characters can attach to the one.

Therefore, the one has nothing to do with time and does not occupy any stretch of time.

Again, the words 'was,' 'has become,' 'was becoming' are understood to mean connection with past time; 'will be,' 'will be becoming,' 'will become,' with future time; 'is' and 'is becoming,' with time now present. Consequently, if the one has nothing to do with any time, it never has become or was becoming or was, nor can you say it has become now or is becoming or is, or that it will be becoming or will become or will be in the future. Now a thing can have being only in one of these ways. There is, accordingly, no way in which the one has being.

Therefore, the one in no sense *is*.

It cannot, then, 'be' even to the extent of 'being' one, for then it would be a thing that is and has being. Rather, if we can trust such an argument as this, it appears that the one neither is one nor is at all.

And if a thing is not, you cannot say that it '*has*' anything or that there is anything '*of*' it. Consequently, it cannot *have* a name or be spoken of, nor can there be any knowledge or perception or opinion of it. It is not named or spoken of, not an object of opinion or of knowledge, not perceived by any creature.

Now can this possibly be the case with the one?

Aristoteles/ I do not think so.

Parmenides/ Shall we, then, go back to our hypothesis and reconsider it from the beginning, in the hope of bringing to light some different result?

'If a one is,' we say, we have to agree what sort of consequences follow concerning it. Start afresh, then, and consider. If a one *is*, it cannot be, and yet not *have* being. So there will also be the being which the one has, and this is not the same thing as the one; otherwise that being would not be *its* being, nor would it, the one, *have* that being, but to say 'a one *is*' would be tantamount to saying 'a one [*is*] *one*.' But in fact the supposition whose consequences we are to consider is not 'if a one [is] *one*,' but 'if a one *is*.' This implies that 'is' and 'one' stand for different things. Thus, the short statement 'a one is' simply means that the one has being.

Let us, then, once more state what will follow, if a one is. Consider whether this supposition does not necessarily imply that the one is such as to have parts. That follows in this way. Since 'is' is asserted to belong to this *one* which is, and 'one' is asserted to belong to this *being* which is one, and since '*being*' and '*one*' are not the same thing, but both belong to the same thing, namely that 'one which is' that we are supposing, it follows that it is 'one being' as a whole, and 'one' and 'being' will be its parts. So, we must speak of each of these parts, not merely as a part, but as part of a whole.

Therefore, any 'one that is' is a whole and also has parts.

Again, take each of these two parts of the one being—its unity and its being. Unity can never be lacking to the part 'being,' nor being to the part 'unity.' Thus, each of the two parts, in its turn, will possess both unity and being; any part proves to consist of at least two parts, and so on forever by the same reasoning. Whatever part we arrive at always possesses these two parts, for a 'one' always has being, and a 'being' always has unity. Hence any part always proves to be two and can never be one.

In this way, then, what is 'one being' must be unlimited in multitude.

We may also proceed in another way, as follows. We are saying that the one has being. That is why it is, and it was for that reason that a 'one which is' was seen to be a plurality. Now take just this 'one' which we are saying has being and conceive it just by itself alone apart from the being which we say it has. Will this 'one' itself be found to be merely one or also a plurality? Consider. The 'one' itself and its being must be *different* things since the one is not being, but, as one, *has* being. If, then, the one and its being are each different from the other, it is not in virtue of being one that the one is different from the being, nor is it in virtue of being 'being' that the being is other than the one; they differ from one another in virtue of being *different* or *other*. Thus [the term] 'different' is not identical with either 'one' or 'being.'

Now suppose we take a selection of these terms, [say] 'being' and 'different,' or 'being' and 'one,' or 'one' and 'different.' In each case we are selecting a pair which may be spoken of as 'both.' I mean, we can speak of 'being,' and again of 'one.' We have thus named each member of a pair. And when I say 'being and one' or 'being and different,' or

'different and one,' and so on in every possible combination, I am in each case speaking of 'both.' And a pair that can properly be called 'both' must be *two*. And if a pair of things are two, each of them must be *one*. This applies to our terms. Since each set forms a couple, each term must be one. And if so, then, when anyone is added to any pair, the sum will be *three*. And three is odd, two even. Now if there are two, there must also be *twice times*, if three, *three times*, since two is twice times one and three is three times one. And if there are two and twice times, three and three times, there must be *twice times two* and *three times three*. And, if there are three which occur twice and two which occur three times, there must be *twice times three* and *three times two*. Thus, there will be even multiples of even sets, odd multiples of odd sets, odd multiples of even sets, and even multiples of odd sets. That being so, there is no number left, which must not necessarily be.

Therefore, if a one is, there must also be number.

Now, if number is, there must be many things, and indeed an unlimited plurality of things, that *are*, for we must admit that number, unlimited in plurality, also proves to have being. And if all number has being, each part of number must have being also. Thus, being is distributed throughout all the members of a plurality of beings, and is lacking to none of these beings from the smallest to the greatest; indeed, it is nonsense to suggest that anything that is should lack being. Thus, being is parceled out among beings of every possible order from smallest to greatest; it is subdivided to the furthest possible point and has an illimitable number of parts. So, its parts form the greatest of multitudes.

Again, among all these parts there cannot be any which *is* part of being and yet not *a* [one] part. If it *is*, then, so long as it is, it must always be someo*ne* part; it cannot be *no* [not one] part. Consequently, unity must belong to every part of

being, and be lacking to none, smaller or greater. And unity, being one, cannot be in many places at once as a whole. And if not as a whole, it must be as divided into parts; only so can it be present to all the parts of being at the same time. Further, that which is divided into parts must be as many as its parts. So, we were wrong to say just now that being was distributed into the 'greatest' multitude of parts. Its parts are not more numerous than those into which unity is distributed, but equal in number, for nothing that *is* lacks unity, and nothing that is *one* lacks being; the two maintain their equality all through. It appears, then, that unity itself is parceled out by being, and is not only many but indefinitely numerous.

Thus, not only is a 'one which is' a plurality, but unity itself is distributed by being and is necessarily many.

Further, since its parts are parts of a whole, the one, in respect of its wholeness, will be limited. For the parts are contained by the whole, and a container must be a limit.

Therefore, a 'one which is' is both one and many, whole and parts, limited as well as indefinitely numerous.

Since it is limited, then, it will have extremities, and if a whole, it will have beginning, middle, and end. A thing cannot be a whole without all these three; if anyone of them is lacking it will no longer be a whole. Thus, the one will have beginning and end and middle. But the middle can only be what is equidistant from the extremities.

So a one, such as we have described, will have some shape, straight or round or a mixture of both.

Then, if it has these properties, it will be both (*a*) in itself and (*b*) in another.

(*a*) Each part is, of course, in the whole; none is outside the whole. And all the parts are contained by the whole. Now, the one is all its own parts, and neither more nor less than

all. And the one is also the whole. Accordingly, since all the parts are in a whole, and the one is both all the parts and the whole, and all the parts are contained in the whole, the one must be contained by the one. In this sense it follows that one must be in itself.

(*b*) On the other hand, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all the parts nor in any part.

If it were in all, it would have to be also in one part, for if there were some one in which it was not, it could not be in all. But if this one part is one among all the parts, and the whole is not in this one, we can no longer say it is in all the parts.

But neither is it in *some* of the parts. If the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be contained in the less, which is impossible.

If, then, the whole is not in several of its parts, nor in one, nor yet in all, it must be either in something else or nowhere at all. But if nowhere at all, it would be nothing, whereas it is a whole and so, since [as a whole] it is not in itself, it must be in something else.

Thus, as a whole the one is in something else; as all the parts it is in itself, and thus the one must be both in itself and in another.

Now, if the one is of this character, it must be both (*a*) at rest and (*b*) in motion.

(a) It is at rest, since it is in itself. For if it is in one thing, and does not shift out of that thing, it will be in the same [place], namely itself, and that which is always in the same [place] must of course always be at rest.

(*b*) On the other hand, what is always in another must never be in the same, and therefore never at rest, and not being at rest, it must be in motion.

Therefore, the one, being always both in itself and in another, must always be both in motion and at rest.

Further, if the one has the foregoing attributes, it must be (*a*) the same with itself and (*b*) different from itself, and similarly both (*c*) different from and (*d*) the same with the others.

(*a*) Anything is related to anything in one of the following ways. Either it is the same or different, or, if neither the same nor different, it must stand as part to whole, or as whole to part. Now the one cannot be part of itself, nor can it stand as whole to itself as part. Again, the one is not different from one, and so not different from itself.

Therefore, since it is not different and does not stand to itself either as whole to part or as part to whole, it follows that it must be the same with itself.

(*b*) Again, if a thing is in a place the same with itself and also in a place other than that self, it must be different from itself; otherwise it could not be in a different place. But we saw that this was true of the one. It was at once in itself and in another.

In this respect, therefore, the one must be different from itself.

(*c*) Again, if something is different from something else, that something else must be different. Now, all the things which are 'not one' must be different from the one, and the one also must be different from them.

Therefore, the one is different from the others.

(*d*) Now consider. Sameness itself and difference are contrary to one another. So sameness will never be in what is different, nor difference in what is the same. And if difference will never be in what is the same, there is nothing that is in which difference is present for any length of time, for if it were in something for any length of time whatsoever,

during that time difference would be in what is the same. And since it is never in what is the same, difference can never be in anything that is, and consequently neither in the 'not-ones' nor in the one. Therefore it is not difference that could make the one different from the 'not-ones,' or the 'not-ones' different from the one. Nor yet will they be different from one another by virtue of being themselves, if they do not possess difference.

Therefore, if neither their own character nor difference can make them different, every possibility of their being different escapes us.

Further, things which are 'not one' do not possess unity either; if they did, they would not be 'not one,' but in a sense one. So things which are 'not one' cannot be a number; if they had number, once more they would not be 'not one' in every sense. Again, the things which are 'not one,' cannot be parts of the one, because once more they would then possess unity. Consequently, if the one is one in every sense, and the things that are 'not one' are not one in every sense, the one cannot stand to the things that are 'not one' either as whole to parts or as part to whole, nor again can the things which are 'not one' be parts of the one or wholes of which the one is part. But we said that things which do not stand to one another either as parts or as wholes, and are not different from one another, must be the same with one another. Therefore, we must say that, since the one stands in this way to the things that are 'not one,' it is the same as they.

It appears, then, that the one is different both from the others and from itself, and also the same both with them and with itself.

Aristoteles/ The argument certainly seems to lead to that conclusion.

Parmenides/ Is the one also both like and unlike itself and the others?

(*a*) Since, as we have seen, the one is different from the others, the others also of course must be different from it. And it differs from them neither more nor less than they differ from it, but just *as* they do, and if neither more nor less, then in a like manner. Accordingly, in so far as it has the character of 'being different' from the others, and the others in just the same way have the character of 'being different' from it, in so far the one and the others will have the same character.

What I mean is this. When you use any word, you use it to stand for something. You can use it once or many times, but in either case you are speaking of the thing whose name it is. However many times you utter the same word, you must always mean the same thing. Now 'different' is a word that stands for something: so when you utter it, whether once or many times, you are using it to stand for, or naming, just that thing whose name it is. Hence when we say 'the others are different from the one' and 'the one is different from the others,' we use the word 'different' twice, but nevertheless we always use it to stand for just that character whose name it is. Consequently in so far as the one is different from the others and the others are different from the one, just in respect of having the character 'different' the one and the others have precisely the same character, and to have the same character is to be alike.

Thus, in so far as the one has the character of being different from the others, just in that respect it and they must be entirely alike, because they are entirely different.

(*b*) On the other hand, 'like' and 'unlike' are contraries, and so also are 'different' and 'same.' Now we have also seen that the one is the same as the others. And 'being the same

as the others' is the contrary character to 'being different from the others.' And it has been shown that, in so far as the one is different, it is like them. Consequently, in so far as it is the same, it will be unlike them, in respect of the character contrary to that which made it like them, namely difference. Sameness, then, will make it unlike; otherwise sameness will not be the contrary of difference.

Therefore the one will be like and unlike the others—like in so far as different, unlike in so far as the same.

Aristoteles/ Yes, it seems possible to argue the case in that way.

Parmenides/ Yes, and it can also be argued as follows. We may say that in so far as the one has the character of being 'the same' [as the others], it has not a diverse character, and so is not unlike, and so is like. And in so far as it has the character of being 'other' [than the others], it has a diverse character, and so is unlike.

Therefore, because the one is the same as the others and because it is different, on both grounds together or on either singly it will be both like and unlike the others.

Similarly, in relation to itself. Since, as we have seen, it is both different from itself and the same with itself, on both grounds together and on either singly it will be both like itself and unlike itself.

Again, there is the question of the one having, or not having, contact with itself and with the others.

We have seen that the one is in itself as a whole. It is also in the others. Accordingly, (*a*) as being in the others, it will have contact with the others, and (*b*) as being in itself, while it will be precluded from contact with the others, it will have contact with itself.

In this way, then, the one will have contact both with itself and with the others.

From another point of view, if anything is to touch something it must be situated next to that thing, occupying the position adjacent to the position of the thing it touches.

(*c*) Accordingly, if the one is to touch itself, it must be situated next to itself, occupying the place adjacent to the place in which itself is. If the one were two, it might do this and be in two places at once, but not so long as it remains one.

Therefore the same necessity which forbids the one to be two forbids it to touch itself.

(*d*) On the other hand, the one will not touch the others either for this reason. We are asserting that, in order to have contact, a thing must be distinct from, but next to, the thing it is to touch, and there must be no third thing between them. So, if there is to be contact, there must be at least two things. And if to the two terms a third be added next to them, the number of terms will be three, the number of contacts two. And so the addition of every fresh term will mean the addition of one fresh contact, with the result that the contacts are always fewer by one than the amount of the numbers. For every subsequent total of terms exceeds the total of contacts by the same amount as the original pair of terms exceeded the contacts, since at every step one term and one contact are added. Thus, however many things there are, their contacts are always fewer by one. And if there is only a one, not a pair of things, there will be no contact.

Now things that are other than one, we say, are not one and have not unity, since they are other. Consequently they do not possess number, because there is no one among them. Thus they are neither one nor two nor any other number you could name. The one, then, is the only thing that is one, and there will be no pair, and consequently no

contact. Therefore, contact being nonexistent, the one does not touch the others, nor the others the one.

Thus the total result of these considerations is that the one both touches, and does not touch, both itself and the others.

We may next inquire whether the one is both equal and unequal, alike to itself and to the others.

If the one is to be greater or less than the others or they are to be greater or less than it, neither will be greater or less than the other merely in virtue of being what they are—the one being one, and the others being other than the one—but if, besides each being such as it is, they should each possess equality, then they would be equal to one another, or if the others possess greatness, the one smallness, or the one possesses greatness, the others smallness, then whichever possesses greatness will be greater, whichever possesses smallness, less.

This pair of characters, then, greatness and smallness, must exist, for surely, if they did not exist, they could not be contrary to one another and come to be in things.

If, then, smallness comes to be in the one, it must be either (*a*) in the one as a whole or (*b*) in a part of it.

(*a*) Suppose it comes to be in the one as a whole. Then it must either stretch throughout the whole extent of the one or contain the one. If it is coextensive with the one, the smallness will be equal to the one; if containing it, greater. But smallness cannot be equal to, or greater than, anything and so discharge, not its own function, but that of greatness or equality. Therefore, smallness cannot be in the one as a whole.

(*b*) Hence, if it is in the one at all, it must be in a part. But not in all that part; otherwise the effect would be the same as in the case of the whole. It would be either equal to, or

larger than, any part in which it might be. Therefore smallness will never be in anything, if it cannot come to be in either a part or the whole, and there will be nothing small except smallness itself.

It follows that greatness will not be in the one either, for then there would be something else, besides greatness itself, that would be 'greater,' namely the thing in which greatness was—and that in spite of the thing's having no smallness, which is required for greatness to surpass, if it is to be great. And there can be no such smallness, since smallness is not in anything anywhere.

Further, the only thing than which greatness itself is greater is smallness itself, and the only thing than which smallness is smaller is greatness itself. Hence, the others, not possessing greatness or smallness, are not greater or smaller than the one; also this pair themselves [greatness and smallness] possess their power of exceeding or being exceeded only with reference to each other, not with reference to the one, and the one in its turn, not possessing either greatness or smallness, cannot be greater or smaller than they or than the others.

It follows that the one, if it is neither greater nor smaller than the others, cannot either exceed them or be exceeded by them, and that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded must be of equal extent, and so equal.

Moreover, the one will also stand in this relation to itself. If it has in itself neither largeness nor smallness, it cannot either exceed or be exceeded by itself, but must be coextensive and so equal to itself.

Therefore the one will be equal both to itself and to the others.

(*c*) Further, if it is in itself, it must also encompass itself on the outside, and as container it will be greater than itself,

and as contained, less. In this way the one will be greater and less than itself.

(*d*) Also, there can be nothing besides the one and the others. Further, anything that is must always be somewhere. And that which is in something will be in it as a less in a greater; only so can one thing be in another.

Now, since there is nothing else besides the others and the one, and they must be in something, it follows at once that they must be in each other—the others in the one and the one in the others—or be nowhere at all. Consequently, since the one is in the others, the others, as containing the one, must be greater than it, and the one, as contained by them, less than they. And since the others are in the one, by the same reasoning the one must be greater than the others, and they less than the one.

Therefore, the one is alike equal to, greater than, and less than, both itself and the others.

Further, the one, if greater, less, and equal, must be of equal measures with itself and with the others, and also of more and fewer, and if of measures, then of parts. And, being of equal, more, and fewer measures, it will also be correspondingly fewer than, more than, and equal to, both itself and the others in number. For if it is greater than anything, it will contain a greater number of measures and so of parts; if less, a smaller number; if equal, the same number.

Hence, the one, being greater and less than itself and also equal, will contain more and fewer and the same number of measures, and hence of parts. So, as having the same number of parts, it will be equal to itself in number, and as having more or fewer, more or less than itself in number.

The one will also stand in the same way to the others. Since it is seen to be greater and smaller and of the same

magnitude as the others, it must also be more, fewer, and equal to them in number.

Thus, once more, it appears that the one will be alike, equal to, and more and fewer than both itself and the others in number.

Next is the question whether the one exists in time, and, as so existing, both is and becomes younger and older than itself and the others, and also neither is nor becomes younger or older than itself or the others.

Since the one *is* one, of course it has being, and to 'be' means precisely having existence in conjunction with time present, as 'was'
or 'will be' means having existence in conjunction with past or future time. So, if the one is, it is in time.

(*a*) Time, moreover, is advancing. Hence since the one moves forward temporally, it is always becoming older than itself. And we remember that what is becoming older becomes older than something that is becoming younger. So, since the one is becoming older than itself, that self must be becoming younger.

Therefore, in this sense, it is becoming both younger and older than itself.

(*b*) Also, it *is* older when, in this process of becoming, it is *at* the present time which lies between 'was' and 'will be,' for of course, as it travels from past to future, it will never overstep the present. So, when it coincides with the present, it stops becoming older; at that time it is not becoming, but already *is*, older. For if it were getting ahead, it could never be caught up by the present, since to get ahead would mean to be in touch with both the present and the future, leaving the present behind and reaching out to the future, and so passing between the two. Whereas, if it is true of anything which is becoming that it can never pass beyond the present,

it constantly stops becoming when it is at the present, and it then *is* whatever it may be that it was becoming.

This applies to the one. When, in becoming older, it coincides with the present, it stops becoming and *is* then older. Moreover, it is older than the thing it was becoming older than, namely itself. And older means older than a younger. Hence the one is also younger than itself at the time when, in becoming older, it coincides with the present. But the present is with the one always throughout all its existence, for at whatever time it is existing, it is existing 'now.'

Therefore, at all times the one both is and is becoming older and younger than itself.

(*c*) Also, in thus being or becoming it cannot take a longer time than itself; it must take the same time. But if it is, or is becoming, for the same length of time, it is of the same age, and so neither older nor younger.

Therefore, the one, which is and is becoming for the same length of time as itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself. Next, is the one similarly related to the others?

(*a*) Things other than the one, being different things and not *a* different thing, are more than one; *a* different thing would be one, but different things must be more than one and have plurality. Hence, they have a number greater than that of the one. And of a number the lesser part comes, or has come, into being before the greater part, and first of all the least, namely the one. Thus, in all things that have number the one comes first, and the others, being others and not another, are always things that have number. And what comes first comes earlier, while the others, coming later, are younger.

In this way the others will he younger than the one, the one older than the others.

Again, the one can have come to be only in a way consistent with its own nature. Now we saw that the one has parts, and hence a beginning, an end, and a middle. And the beginning of anything, whether it be the one itself or anyone of the others, always comes into being first, and after the beginning, all the rest up to the end. Moreover, by 'all the rest' we shall mean parts of the whole or one, and this itself comes to be, as a one or whole, at the same moment as the end. But the end is the last part to come into being, and it is the nature of the one to come into being simultaneously with the last. Hence, if the one a must come to be in a way consistent with its nature, we must say it is the nature of the one, as having come into being at the same time with the end, to come later than all the others.

Therefore, the one is younger than the others, the others older than the one.

(*b*) But again, a beginning or any part whatsoever of the one or of anything else, if it is *a* part and not parts, must be one. So 'one' must come to be along with the first part that comes to be, and again along with the second part, and cannot be lacking to every subsequent part that is added, until, on reaching the last part, a one whole is formed; it cannot be missing at the formation of any part, first, middle, or last. Therefore, the one is of the same age as all the others, so that, if the one is not to contradict its own nature, it will have come to be neither before nor after the others, but at the same time.

Thus, according to this argument, the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, nor they than it, whereas by our former argument it was both older and younger, and so were the others.

So much for what it *is* and *has* become.

Next there is the question whether the one is becoming both older and younger than the others, and they than it, and also not becoming younger or older. Does the case stand with becoming as with being, or not?

(*c*) If one thing actually is older than another, it cannot be becoming older still, nor the younger, younger still, by any more than their original difference in age, for if equals be added to unequals, the difference that results, in time or any other magnitude, will always be the same as the original difference. Consequently, what is older or younger can never be becoming older or younger than what is younger or older, the difference in age being constant at all times. The one is or has become older, the other younger, but neither is becoming so.

Therefore, the one, if it is so, is not becoming, either older or younger than the others which *are* so.

(*d*) From another point of view, both are becoming older and younger. We have seen that (α) the one is older than the others, and (β) they are older than it. (α) When the one is older than the others, it has, of course, been in existence for a longer time than they. Now, if an equal time is added to a greater time and to a less, the greater will exceed the less by a smaller fraction. Hence, the difference in age between the one and the others will not remain into the future what it originally was; the addition of the same time to each will make the difference in age constantly less. And if a thing differs less in age from something than it formerly did, it must be becoming younger than it was relatively to those things in relation to which it was formerly older. And if it is becoming younger, those other things in their turn must be becoming older than they were in relation to it. Hence what has come to be [later and is] younger is becoming older in

relation to what has come to be earlier and is older. It never is older than the other, but it is always becoming so, since that other is progressing toward being younger, while it is progressing toward being older. And the older thing, in its turn, is becoming younger than the younger in the same way. As the two move in contrary directions, they are becoming each other's contrary—the younger becoming older than the older, the older becoming younger than the younger—but they can never finally become so; if they did, they would no longer be becoming, but would be so. As it is, each is becoming older and younger than the other. The one is becoming younger than the others, because, as we saw, it is older and came into existence earlier; the others are becoming older than the one, because they came into existence later. By the same reasoning, (β) the others stand in the same way to the one, since, as we saw, they are older and came into existence earlier.

Thus, from the point of view (*c*) in which there is no question of one thing becoming either older or younger than another, since their distance in age remains always the same, the one will not be becoming older or younger than the others, nor they than it. But from another point of view (*d*) in which the difference between things which come into existence earlier and later must be a constantly diminishing fraction, the one and the others must be becoming both older and younger than each other.

So, the conclusion of all these arguments is that the one both is, and is becoming, older and younger than itself and than the others, and also neither is, nor is becoming, either older or younger than itself or than the others.

Now, since the one is in time and has the property of becoming older and younger, it has a past, a future, and a present. Consequently, the one was and is and will be, and it was becoming, is becoming, and will become.

Also, it can be said to *have* something, and there can be something *of* it, alike in past, present, and future. So, there can be knowledge and opinion and perception of it; in fact we are now exercising all these activities with respect to it. Further, it will have a name and can be spoken of; indeed, it actually is being named and spoken of. And all the other characters which belong to any other things of which the above statements are true belong equally to the one.

To take up the argument yet a third time, if there is a one such as we have described—a one which is both one and many and neither one nor many and is in time—it follows that since it *is* one, it has existence at some time, and again since it *is not* one, at some time it has not existence. And since it cannot both have and not have existence at the same time, it can only have existence at one time and not have existence at another. And there must also be a time when it comes to possess existence and a time when it ceases to possess it; it can possess a thing at one time and not at another only if there are times when it acquires that thing and loses it. Now acquiring existence is called 'coming into existence,' and losing existence is called 'ceasing to exist.'

It appears, then, that the one, when it acquires or loses existence, comes into existence and ceases to exist.

Also, since it is one and many and a thing that comes to be and ceases to be, when it comes to be one, its being many ceases to be, and when it comes to be many, its being one ceases to be. And as coming to be one it must be combined, as coming to be many, separated.

Further, when it becomes like or unlike, it is subject to assimilation or dissimilation.

Also, when it becomes greater or less or equal, it must be increased or diminished or equalized.

But when, being in motion, it comes to a stand, or, being at rest, it changes to being in motion, it cannot itself occupy any time at all for this reason. Suppose it is first at rest and later in motion, or first in motion and later at rest; that cannot happen to it without its changing. But there is no time during which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest. On the other hand it does not change without making a transition. When does it make the transition, then? Not while it is at rest or while it is in motion, or while it is occupying time. Consequently, the time at which it will be when it makes the transition must be that queer thing, the instant. The word 'instant' appears to mean something such that *from it* a thing passes to one or other of the two conditions. There is no transition *from* a state of rest so long as the thing is still at rest, nor *from* motion so long as it is still in motion, but this queer thing, the instant, is situated between the motion and the rest; it occupies no time at all, and the transition of the moving thing to the state of rest, or of the stationary thing to being in motion, takes place *to* and *from* the instant. Accordingly, the one, since it both is at rest and is in motion, must pass from the one condition to the other—only so can it do both things—and when it passes, it makes the transition instantaneously; it occupies no time in making it and at that moment it cannot be either in motion or at rest.

The same holds good of its other transitions. When it passes from being in existence to ceasing to exist or from being nonexistent to coming into existence, it is then between certain motions and states; it is then neither existent nor nonexistent, and it is neither coming into existence nor ceasing to exist. By the same reasoning when it passes from one to many or from many to one, it is not either one or many, and it is not being separated or being combined. Similarly when it passes from like to unlike or

from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, and it is neither becoming like nor becoming unlike. And when it passes from small to great or equal or in the opposite direction, it is not small or great or equal, nor is it being increased or being diminished or being equalized.

All these changes, then, may happen to the one, if it exists.

We have next to consider what will be true of the others, if there is a one. Supposing, then, that there is a one, what must be said of the things other than the one?

Since they are other than the one, they are not the one; if they were, they could not be other than it. Yet the others are not wholly destitute of the one [unity], but partake of it in a way. For things other than the one, are others as having parts; if they had no parts, they would be absolutely one. And parts, we say, are parts of a whole, while a whole must be a one consisting of many, and the parts will be parts of this one whole.

For each part must be part, not of a many, but of a whole, for this reason. If a thing were to be part of a many, among which itself were included, then it would be a part of itself—which is absurd—and also a part of every one of the rest, since it is supposed to be a part of them all. For if there is one of them of which it is not a part, it will be a part of the remainder exclusive of that one, and, if we proceed in that way, it will prove not to be a part of each successive one that we take, and so, not being a part of each one, it will not be a part of anyone of the many. But if a thing is a part, or whatever else you please, of no one of a number of things, it cannot be a part of all those things, of no one of which it is a part. Therefore, a part is part not of many or of all, but of a single entity or 'one' which we call a whole, a complete 'one'

composed of all. Hence if the others have parts, they must also possess wholeness and unity.

Therefore, the things other than the one must be one complete whole having parts.

Further, the same reasoning holds of each part. It is also true of each part that it must have unity. For if each of them is a part, 'each' means that it is one thing, distinct from the rest and having its independent being, if we are to call it 'each.' As having unity, it will plainly be other than unity; otherwise, it would not have unity, but simply be unity itself, whereas nothing but unity itself can be unity. But both the whole and the part must *have* unity, for the whole is *one* whole, of which the parts are parts, while every part that is part of a whole is *one* part of that whole.

Now things that have a share in the one [possess unity] will be different from the one that they share in [the unity they possess]. And things different from the one will naturally be many, for if the things other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.

Moreover, since both things that *have* the unity of a part and things that have the unity of a whole are more than one, it follows that those things which come to *acquire* unity, must, just in themselves, be without limit of multitude. We may see that in this way. Evidently, at the time when they come to acquire unity, they are not one and do not possess unity. So, they are multitudes which do not contain unity. Now if we choose to take in thought from such multitudes the least portion we can conceive, that portion also, if it does not possess unity, must be not one but a multitude. And if we go on in that way considering, just by itself, the nature other than the form, any portion of it that comes into view will he without limit of multitude.

Further, when each single part becomes a part, they now have a limit in relation both to one another and to the whole, and so has the whole in relation to the parts. Thus, the consequence for the things other than the one appears to be that from the combination of unity and themselves there comes to be in them something fresh, which gives them a limit with reference to one another, whereas their own nature gives them, in themselves, unlimitedness.

Thus, the things other than the one, both as wholes and part by part, are unlimited and also have limit.

Moreover, they are also both like and unlike one another and themselves.

In so far as they are all unlimited in respect of their own nature, they have the same character, and also in so far as they all have limit. But in so far as they have both characters, limited and unlimited, they have characters which are contrary to one another, and contraries are as unlike as possible. Thus, in respect of either character singly they are like themselves and one another, but in respect of both characters taken together they are quite contrary and unlike both themselves and one another.

Thus, the others will be both like and unlike themselves and one another.

Also, since we have found this to be true of them, there will be no further difficulty in showing that the things other than the one, are the same as, and different from, one another, and both in motion and at rest, and have all the contrary characters.

Suppose, then, we pass over those further consequences as obvious and consider once more whether, if there is a one, it will not also be true that things other than the one have none of these characters. Let us start again from the

beginning and ask, If there is a one, what must be true of the things other than the one?

The one, then, must be separate from the others and they from it. For there is no further thing distinct from both the one and the others; when we have named the one and the others, we have named all things. So, there is no further thing besides them, in which the one and the others alike might be. Hence, they are never in the same thing, and therefore must be separate.

Also, we cannot admit that what is really and truly one has parts. Therefore, the one cannot be in the others as a whole, nor can parts of it be so, if it is separate from the others and also has no parts.

Consequently, the things other than the one, not possessing unity either in part or as a whole, can have no unity in any way. The others, then, are not one in any sense, and there is no 'one thing' to be found among them.

It follows that the others are not many either. For if they were many, each of them would be one part of the whole, whereas, in fact, not having unity in any sense, they are neither one nor many, neither a whole nor parts.

Nor yet, consequently, are the others two or three, and no two things or three things can be in them, since they are altogether destitute of unity.

It follows that the others are not like the one, nor yet unlike it; there is no likeness and unlikeness in them. If they were like and unlike or had likeness and unlikeness in them, they would then have in them two characters contrary to one another. But, as we saw, it is impossible for things which do not even possess unity to possess any *two* things. Therefore, the others are neither like nor unlike nor both at once, for, if like or unlike, they would have one of two characters; if

both, *two* contrary characters, and that we have seen to be impossible.

Nor yet, accordingly, are they the same, or different, or in motion, or at rest, or coming to be, or ceasing to be, or greater, or less, or equal, nor have they any other characters of that kind. If the others admit any such character, they will also admit of being one, two, three, odd and even, and we have seen that they cannot have those characters, being altogether destitute of unity.

Thus, if there is a one, the one is both all things and nothing whatsoever, alike with reference to itself and to the others.

We have next to consider what follows, if the one is not.

What, then, is the meaning of this supposition, 'if a one [one thing] does not exist'? It differs from the supposition, 'if a not-one [no-thing] does not exist,' and not only differs from it, but is the direct contrary.

Now suppose one says, 'if largeness does not exist,' or 'if smallness does not exist,' or any other statement of that type. Obviously in each case it is a different thing that is spoken of as nonexistent. And so, in the present case, if a man says 'if a one [one thing] does not exist,' it is plain that the thing he is saying does not exist is something different from other things, and we know what he is speaking of. So in speaking of a 'one' [one thing] he is speaking, in the first place, of something knowable, and in the second of something different from other things, no matter whether he attributes existence to it or nonexistence; even if he says it is nonexistent, we nevertheless know what is said not to exist, and that it is distinguishable from other things.

Starting afresh, then, from this supposition, 'if a one [one thing] does not exist,' we are to consider what consequences follow.

First, it seems, this must be true of it, that there is knowledge of it; otherwise, the very meaning of the supposition that 'a one does not exist' would be unknown.

Also, it must be true that other things are different from it; otherwise, it could not be spoken of as different from them. So, besides being knowable, it must have difference in character, for when you speak of the one as different from the others, you are speaking of its difference in character, not of theirs.

And further this nonexistent one has the characters of being 'that' and 'something,' and of being related '*to* this' or '*to* these,' and all other such characters. If it were not 'something' and had not all those other characters, we could not have spoken of '*the* one' or of things different from *the* one, or of anything as belonging *to* it or as being of it, nor could we have spoken of it as 'something.' Thus, although the one cannot have existence, if it does not exist, there is nothing against its having many characters; indeed it must, if it is *this* one, and not another that does not exist. If what is not to exist is neither *the one* nor *this* and the statement is about something else, we ought not so much as to open our lips, but granted that we are supposing the nonexistence of *this one* and not of something else, it must have the character of being *this* and many other characters as well.

It follows that the one possesses unlikeness with respect to the others. For the others, being different, will actually be of different character—that is, of other character—that is, unlike. And if they are unlike the one, unlikes must be unlike an unlike. Therefore, the one also will possess unlikeness, with respect to which the others are unlike it.

Moreover, if it has unlikeness to the others, it must have likeness to itself. For if the one has unlikeness to the one, what we are speaking of will not be such as the one in

character, and our supposition will not be about a one, but about something other than a one. But that is inadmissible.

The one, therefore, must have likeness to itself.

Further, the one is not equal to the others. If it were equal. that would at once imply that it exists and also *is* like them in respect of this equality. But both implications are impossible, if a one does not exist. And since it is not equal to the others, the others must be not equal to it. And things that are not equal are unequal, and unequal things are unequal to an unequal. So, the one has inequality, with reference to which the others are unequal to it.

On the other hand, inequality implies greatness and smallness, and accordingly these must belong to such a one as we are describing. Now greatness and smallness are always kept apart from one another. So there is always something between them, and this can only be equality. Accordingly, anything that has greatness and smallness has also equality between the two.

So, a one which does not exist will, it appears, have equality, greatness, and smallness.

Further, it must in some sense even possess being. For it must be in the state we are ascribing to it; otherwise, we should not be speaking the truth in saying that the one does not exist. If we are speaking the truth, evidently the things we are speaking of must *be*. So, since we do claim to be speaking the truth, we must also assert that we are speaking of things that are. So it appears that the one *is* nonexistent. If it *is not* nonexistent, if it somehow slips away from being so to not being so, it will at once follow that it *is* existent. Accordingly, if it is not to exist, it must have the fact of *being* nonexistent to secure its nonexistence, just as the existent must have the fact of *not being* nonexistent, in order that it may be possible for it completely to exist. The only way to

secure that the existent shall exist, and that the nonexistent shall not exist, is this. The existent must have the 'being' implied in 'being existent' and the 'not-being' implied in 'not being nonexistent,' if it is to have complete existence, and the nonexistent, if it is to have complete nonexistence, must have the 'not-being' implied in 'not being existent' and the 'being' implied in 'being nonexistent.' Thus, since the existent has not-being and the nonexistent has being, the one also, since it does not exist, must have being in order to be nonexistent.

Thus, it appears that the one has being, if it *is* nonexistent, and also, since it *is not* existent, has not-being.

Now a thing which is in a certain condition can not-be in that condition only by passing out of it. So, anything that both is, and is not, in such and such a condition implies transition, and transition is motion. Now we have seen that the one is existent and also is nonexistent, and accordingly is, and is not, in a certain condition. Therefore, the nonexistent one has been shown to be a thing that moves, since it admits transition from being to not-being.

On the other hand, if the one is not anywhere in the world of existence—and it is not, if it does not exist—it cannot shift from one place to another. Therefore, it cannot move by shifting its position. Nor yet can it revolve in the same [place], since it has no point of contact with what is the same, for what is the same is existent, and the nonexistent cannot be in anything that exists. Therefore, the one, if nonexistent, cannot revolve in that in which it is not.

Nor can the one, either when existent or when nonexistent, alter from itself in character; if it did, we should no longer be speaking of the one, but of something other than it.

If, then, it does not alter in character and neither revolves in the same place nor shifts from one place to another, there is no other motion it can have. And the motionless must be at rest, and, if at rest, stationary.

It appears, then, that the nonexistent one is both at rest and in motion.

Further, if it does move, it must become unlike, since in whatever respect a thing moves, to that extent it is no longer in the same condition as before, but in a different condition. So, as moving, the one does become unlike. Also, in so far as it is not moving in any respect, it will not be becoming unlike in any way. Consequently, the nonexistent one, in so far as it moves, becomes unlike, and in those respects in which it has no motion, it does not become unlike.

Therefore, the nonexistent one both becomes, and does not become, unlike.

And a thing that becomes unlike must *come to be* different from what it was, and must *cease to be* in its former condition, while what does not become unlike does not come to be or cease to be. And so, the nonexistent one, as becoming unlike, comes to be and ceases to be, and as not becoming unlike, it does neither.

Thus the nonexistent one both comes to be and ceases to be, and also does not come to be or cease to be.

Once more, then, let us go back to our starting point to see whether we shall reach results different from these. Our question is, If, a one is not, what will follow concerning it?

The words 'is not' mean simply the absence of being from anything that we say is not. We do not mean that the thing in a sense is not, though in another sense it is. The words mean without any qualification that the thing which is not in no sense or manner is, and does not possess being in any

way. So what is not cannot exist or have being in any sense or manner.

And 'coming to be' and 'ceasing to be' mean, as we said, nothing else than acquiring being and losing it. But a thing which has nothing at all to do with being cannot acquire or lose it. So, the one, since it 'is' in no sense whatever, must not possess being or lose or acquire it in any way. Therefore, the one which is not, not possessing being in any sense, neither ceases to be nor comes to be.

Consequently, neither does it change in character in any way, for if it suffered such change, it would be coming to be or ceasing to be.

And if it does not change in character, it cannot be in motion. On the other hand, we cannot speak of what is nowhere at all as being at rest either, for what is at rest must always be in something [some place or condition] that is the same. Thus, that which is not must not be said ever to be in motion or at rest.

Further, nothing that is can belong to it; to have a character that is would imply that it had being. Therefore, it has not greatness or smallness or equality. Nor can it have likeness to, or difference of character from, either itself or the others.

And if nothing can stand in relation to it, the others cannot be anything to it. They cannot be either like it or unlike, the same or different.

Again, we cannot attribute to 'what is not' anything that is; we cannot say it is 'something' or 'this thing,' or that it is so-and-so 'of this' or 'of another' or 'to another,' or that it is at any time, past, present, or future, or that there is anything '*of* it'—any knowledge or opinion, or perception *of* it—or that it *has* anything, even a name, so as to be the subject of discourse.

Thus, a one which is not cannot have any character whatsoever. Let us go on, then, to the question, If there is no one, what must be true of the others?

Obviously, it must be true that they are others; if it were not, we could not be talking about 'the others.' And if we are talking about the others, things that are others must be different; 'other' and 'different' are two names for the same thing. Moreover, we speak of a thing as different from, or other than, something that is different from, or other than, it. So, the others must have something to be 'other than.' What can this something be? Not the one, for there is no one. They must, then, be other than each other; that is the only possibility left, if they are not to be other than nothing.

Accordingly, they must differ from each other as multitudes from multitudes; they cannot differ as one thing from another one, since there is no one [one thing]. Rather, it seems, each mass of them must be without limit of multitude; if you take what seems to be a minimum, suddenly, as might happen in a dream, what you took to be one appears many, and what had seemed to be least appears enormous in comparison with the small change for it. It is, then, as masses of this sort that the others are other than each other, if they are other without there being anyone.

And there will be many such masses, each appearing to be one, but not really being so, if there is to be no one. So, they will seem to have number, since each seems to be one, and they are many. And some among them will appear even, some odd, but falsely, if there is to be no one.

Further, they will seem, as we are saying, to have a smallest in them, but this smallest appears as a 'many.' which is great in comparison with the smallness of each of that many. Also, each mass will be imagined equal to the many smalls, for it could not pass in appearance from larger

to smaller without seeming to reach the intermediate stage, which will be a semblance of equality.

Also, each mass will appear as having a limit in relation to another mass. With respect to itself, it has neither beginning nor end nor middle, since whenever you fix your thought on any part of them and take that as beginning or middle or end, another beginning always appears before the beginning, another end leftover after the end, and within the middle others that are more in the middle and smaller, because you cannot apprehend any of them as a 'one,' since there is no one. So, anything there is, upon which you may fix your thought, must be frittered away in subdivision; anything we may take will always be a mass without a one. To a dim and distant view such a thing must appear one, but to closer and keener inspection each must appear without limit of multitude, being destitute of that one which does not exist.

Thus, if there is no one, but only things other than the one, each of these others must appear both unlimited in multitude and limited, both one and many.

Also, they will appear both like and unlike. As with scene paintings, to the distant spectator all will appear as one thing, and seem to have the same character and so to be alike, but if you approach nearer, they seem many and different and this semblance of difference will make them seem different in character and unlike one another. Thus, these masses must appear both like and unlike themselves and each other.

Moreover, they must appear both the same and different from one another, both in contact and apart from one another, both in every sort of motion and at rest in every respect, both coming to be and ceasing to be and doing neither, and so on with all characters of that sort, which

could easily be enumerated. All this follows, if there are many, but no one.

Now let us go back to the beginning for the last time and ask, If, there is no one, but only things other than one, what must follow?

The others will not be one, but neither will they be many. For if they are to be many, there must be a one among them, since, if none of them is one thing (ἑν), they will all be nothing ((οὐδὲν), and so not many either. But there is no one among them; so, the others are neither one nor many.

Nor do they appear one or many. For the others cannot in any sense or manner have any connection with a nonentity, nor can any element of a nonentity be present to any of them, since a nonentity has no elements. Consequently, neither can any appearance or seeming (δόξα) of that which has no being be found in the others, nor can any notion whatsoever of what has no being be entertained as applied to the others. So, if there is no one, none of the others can be so much as imagined to be one, nor yet to be many, for you cannot imagine many without a one.

Therefore, if there is no one, the others neither are, nor can be imagined to be, one or many.

Nor yet, if there is no one, can the others be or appear like or unlike, or the same or different, or in contact or apart, and so on with all the other characters which we have just been saying they appear to have.

Thus, in sum, we may conclude, If there is no one, there is nothing at all.

To this we may add the conclusion. It seems that, whether there is or is not a one, both that one and the others alike are and are not, and appear and do not appear to be, all manner of things in all manner of ways, with respect to themselves and to one another.

Aristoteles/ Most true.

Parmenides

Translated by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Cephalus, Adeimantus, Zeno, Glaucon, Parmenides, Antiphon, Aristotle, Pythodorus

Cephalus/ When we arrived in Athens from home in Clazomenae, we ran into Adeimantus and Glaucon in the marketplace. Adeimantus took me by the hand and said;

Adeimantus/ "Welcome, Cephalus. If there is anything you want here that we can do for you, please tell us."

Cephalus/ "In fact that's the very reason I'm here to ask a favor of you."

Adeimantus/ "Tell us what you want."

Cephalus/ "Your half-brother on your mother's side—what was his name? I've forgotten. He would have been a child when I came here from Clazomenae to stay before—and that's a long time ago now. I think his father's name was Pyrilampes."

Adeimantus/ "It was, indeed."

Cephalus/ "And his?"

Adeimantus/ "Antiphon. But why do you ask?"

Cephalus/ "These men are fellow citizens of mine, keen philosophers, and they have heard that this Antiphon met many times with a friend of Zeno's called Pythodorus and can recite from memory the discussion that Socrates and Zeno and Parmenides once had, since he heard it often from Pythodorus."

Adeimantus/ 'That's true."

Cephalus/ "Well, we want to hear that discussion."

Adeimantus/ "Nothing hard about that. When Antiphon was a young man, he practiced it to perfection, although these

days, just like the grandfather he's named for, he devotes most of his time to horses. But if that's what's called for, let's go to his house. He left here to go home just a short time ago, but he lives close by in Melite."

Cephalus/ After this exchange, we set off walking and found Antiphon at home engaging a smith to work on a bit of some kind. When he had finished with the smith, and his brothers told him why we were there, he recognized me from my earlier visit and greeted me. We asked him to go through the discussion, and he balked at first—it was, he said, a lot of work. But finally he narrated it in detail.

Cephalus/ Antiphon said that Pythodorus said that Zeno and Parmenides once came to the Great Panathenaea. Parmenides was already quite venerable, very gray but of distinguished appearance, about sixty-five years old. Zeno was at that time close to forty, a tall, handsome man who had been, as rumor had it, the object of Parmenides' affections when he was a boy. Antiphon said that the two of them were staying with Pythodorus, outside the city wall in the Potters' Quarter, and that Socrates had come there, along with a number of others, because they were eager to hear Zeno read his book, which he and Parmenides had just brought to Athens for the first time. Socrates was then quite young.

Zeno was reading to them in person; Parmenides happened to be out. Very little remained to be read when Pythodorus, as he related it, came in, and with him Parmenides and Aristotle—the man who later became one of the Thirty. They listened to a little of the book at the very end. But not Pythodorus himself; he had heard Zeno read it before.

Then Socrates, after he had heard it, asked Zeno to read the first hypothesis of the first argument again; and when he had read it, Socrates said;

Socrates/ “Zeno, what do you mean by this: if things are many, they must then be both like and unlike, but that is impossible, because unlike things can’t be like or like things unlike? That’s what you say, isn’t it?”

Zeno/ “It is.”

Socrates/ “If it’s impossible for unlike things to be like and like things unlike, isn’t it then also impossible for them to be many? Because, if they were many, they would have incompatible properties. Is this the point of your arguments—simply to maintain, in opposition to everything that is commonly said, that things are not many? And do you suppose that each of your arguments is proof for this position, so that you think you give as many proofs that things are not many as your book has arguments? Is that what you’re saying—or do I misunderstand?”

Zeno/ “No. On the contrary, you grasp the general point of the book splendidly.”

Socrates/ “Parmenides, I understand that Zeno wants to be on intimate terms with you not only in friendship but also in his book. He has, in a way, written the same thing as you, but by changing it round he tries to fool us into thinking he is saying something different. You say in your poem that the all is one, and you give splendid and excellent proofs for that; he, for his part, says that it is not many and gives a vast array of very grand proofs of his own. So, with one of you saying ‘one,’ and the other ‘not many,’ and with each of you speaking in a way that suggests that you’ve said nothing the same—although you mean practically the same thing—what you’ve said you appear to have said over the heads of the rest of us.”

Zeno/ “Yes, Socrates. Still, you haven’t completely discerned the truth about my book, even though you chase down its arguments and follow their spoor as keenly as a young Spartan hound. First of all, you have missed this point:

the book doesn't at all preen itself on having been written with the intent you described, while disguising it from people, as if that were some great accomplishment. You have mentioned something that happened accidentally. The truth is that the book comes to the defense of Parmenides' argument against those who try to make fun of it by claiming that, if it is one, many absurdities and self-contradictions result from that argument. Accordingly, my book speaks against those who assert the many and pays them back in kind with something for good measure, since it aims to make clear that their hypothesis, if it is many, would, if someone examined the matter thoroughly, suffer consequences even more absurd than those suffered by the hypothesis of its being one. In that competitive spirit, then, I wrote the book when I was a young man. Someone made an unauthorized copy, so I didn't even have a chance to decide for myself whether or not it should see the light. So in this respect you missed the point, Socrates: you think it was written not out of a young man's competitiveness, but out of a mature man's vainglory. Still, as I said, your portrayal was not bad."

Socrates/ "I take your point, and I believe it was as you say. But tell me this: don't you acknowledge that there is a form, itself by itself, of likeness, and another form, opposite to this, which is what unlike is? Don't you and I and the other things we call 'many' get a share of those two entities? And don't things that get a share of likeness come to be like in that way and to the extent that they get a share, whereas things that get a share of unlikeness come to be unlike, and things that get a share of both come to be both? And even if all things get a share of both, though they are opposites, and by partaking of them are both like and unlike themselves, what's astonishing about that?

"If someone showed that the likes themselves come to be unlike or the unlikes like—that, I think, would be a marvel;

but if he shows that things that partake of both of these have both properties, there seems to me nothing strange about that, Zeno—not even if someone shows that all things are one by partaking of oneness, and that these same things are many by partaking also of multitude. But if he should demonstrate this thing itself, what one is, to be many, or, conversely, the many to be one—at this I'll be astonished.

"And it's the same with all the others: if he could show that the kinds and forms themselves have in themselves these opposite properties, that would call for astonishment. But if someone should demonstrate that I am one thing and many, what's astonishing about that? He will say, when he wants to show that I'm many, that my right side is different from my left, and my front from my back, and likewise with my upper and lower parts—since I take it I do partake of multitude. But when he wants to show that I'm one, he will say I'm one person among the seven of us, because I also partake of oneness. Thus he shows that both are true.

"So if—in the case of stones and sticks and such things—someone tries to show that the same thing is many and one, we'll say that he is demonstrating something to be many and one, not the one to be many or the many one—and we'll say that he is saying nothing astonishing, but just what all of us would agree to. But if someone first distinguishes as separate the forms, themselves by themselves, of the things I was talking about a moment ago—for example, likeness and unlikeness, multitude and oneness, rest and motion, and everything of that sort—and then shows that in themselves they can mix together and separate, I for my part, would be utterly amazed, Zeno. I think these issues have been handled with great vigor in your book; but I would, as I say, be much more impressed if someone were able to display this same difficulty, which you and Parmenides went through in the case of visible things, also similarly entwined in multifarious ways

in the forms themselves—in things that are grasped by reasoning."

Cephalus/ Pythodorus said that, while Socrates was saying all this, he himself kept from moment to moment expecting Parmenides and Zeno to get annoyed; but they both paid close attention to Socrates and often glanced at each other and smiled, as though they admired him. In fact, what Parmenides said when Socrates had finished confirmed this impression.

Parmenides/ "Socrates, you are much to be admired for your keenness for argument! Tell me. Have you yourself distinguished as separate, in the way you mention, certain forms themselves, and also as separate the things that partake of them? And do you think that likeness itself is something, separate from the likeness we have? And one and many and all the things you heard Zeno read about a while ago?"

Socrates/ "I do indeed."

Parmenides/ "And what about these? Is there a form, itself by itself, of just, and beautiful, and good, and everything of that sort?"

Socrates/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ "What about a form of human being, separate from us and all those like us? Is there a form itself of human being, or fire, or water?"

Socrates/ "Parmenides, I've often found myself in doubt whether I should talk about those in the same way as the others or differently."

Parmenides/ "And what about these, Socrates? Things that might seem absurd, like hair and mud and dirt, or anything else totally undignified and worthless? Are you doubtful whether or not you should say that a form is separate for each of these, too, which in turn is other than anything we touch with our hands?"

Socrates/ “Not at all. On the contrary, these things are in fact just what we see. Surely it’s too outlandish to think there is a form for them. Not that the thought that the same thing might hold in all cases hasn’t troubled me from time to time. Then, when I get bogged down in that, I hurry away, afraid that I may fall into some pit of nonsense and come to harm; but when I arrive back in the vicinity of the things we agreed a moment ago have forms, I linger there and occupy myself with them.”

Parmenides/ “That’s because you are still young, Socrates, and philosophy has not yet gripped you as, in my opinion, it will in the future, once you begin to consider none of the cases beneath your notice. Now, though, you still care about what people think, because of your youth.

“But tell me this: is it your view that, as you say, there are certain forms from which these other things, by getting a share of them, derive their names—as, for instance, they come to be like by getting a share of likeness, large by getting a share of largeness, and just and beautiful by getting a share of justice and beauty?”

Socrates/ “It certainly is.”

Parmenides/ “So does each thing that gets a share get as its share the form as a whole or a part of it? Or could there be some other means of getting a share apart from these two?”

Socrates/ “How could there be?”

Parmenides/ “Do you think, then, that the form as a whole—one thing—is in each of the many? Or what do you think?”

Socrates/ “What’s to prevent its being one, Parmenides?”

Parmenides/ “So, being one and the same, it will be at the same time, as a whole, in things that are many and separate; and thus it would be separate from itself.”

Socrates/ “No it wouldn’t. Not if it’s like one and the same day. That is in many places at the same time and is none the less not separate from itself. If it’s like that, each of the forms might be, at the same time, one and the same in all.”

Parmenides/ “Socrates, how neatly you make one and the same thing be in many places at the same time! It’s as if you were to cover many people with a sail, and then say that one thing as a whole is over many. Or isn’t that the sort of thing you mean to say?”

Socrates/ “Perhaps.”

Parmenides/ “In that case would the sail be, as a whole, over each person, or would a part of it be over one person and another part over another?”

Socrates/ “A part.”

Parmenides/ “So the forms themselves are divisible, Socrates, and things that partake of them would partake of a part; no longer would a whole form, but only a part of it, be in each thing.”

Socrates/ “It does appear that way.”

Parmenides/ “Then are you willing to say, Socrates, that our one form is really divided? Will it still be one?”

Socrates/ “Not at all.”

Parmenides/ “No. For suppose you are going to divide largeness itself. If each of the many large things is to be large by a part of largeness smaller than largeness itself, won’t that appear unreasonable?”

Socrates/ “It certainly will.”

Parmenides/ “What about this? Will each thing that has received a small part of the equal have something by which to be equal to anything, when its portion is less than the equal itself?”

Socrates/ “That’s impossible.”

Parmenides/ “Well, suppose one of us is going to have a part of the small. The small will be larger than that part of it, since the part is a part of it: so the small itself will be larger! And that to which the part subtracted is added will be smaller, not larger, than it was before.”

Socrates/ “That surely couldn’t happen.”

Parmenides/ “Socrates, in what way, then, will the other things get a share of your forms, if they can do so neither by getting parts nor by getting wholes?”

Socrates/ “By Zeus! It strikes me that’s not at all easy to determine!”

Parmenides/ “And what do you think about the following?”

Socrates/ “What’s that?”

Parmenides/ “I suppose you think each form is one on the following ground: whenever some number of things seem to you to be large, perhaps there seems to be some one character, the same as you look at them all, and from that you conclude that the large is one.”

Socrates/ “That’s true.”

Parmenides/ “What about the large itself and the other large things? If you look at them all in the same way with the mind’s eye, again won’t some one thing appear large, by which all these appear large?”

Socrates/ “It seems so.”

Parmenides/ “So another form of largeness will make its appearance, which has emerged alongside largeness itself and the things that partake of it, and in turn another over all these, by which all of them will be large. Each of your forms will no longer be one, but unlimited in multitude.”

Socrates/ “But, Parmenides, maybe each of these forms is a thought, and properly occurs only in minds. In this way each

of them might be one and no longer face the difficulties mentioned just now."

Parmenides/ "What do you mean? Is each of the thoughts one, but a thought of nothing?"

Socrates/ "No, that's impossible."

Parmenides/ "Of something, rather?"

Socrates/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ "Of something that is, or of something that is not?"

Socrates/ "Of something that is."

Parmenides/ "Isn't it of some one thing, which that thought thinks is over all the instances, being some one character?"

Socrates/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ "Then won't this thing that is thought to be one, being always the same over all the instances, be a form?"

Socrates/ "That, too, appears necessary."

Parmenides/ "And what about this? Given your claim that other things partake of forms, won't you necessarily think either that each thing is composed of thoughts and all things think, or that, although they are thoughts, they are unthinking?"

Socrates/ "That isn't reasonable either, Parmenides. No, what appears most likely to me is this: these forms are like patterns set in nature, and other things resemble them and are likenesses; and this partaking of the forms is, for the other things, simply being modeled on them."

Parmenides/ "If something resembles the form, can that form not be like what has been modeled on it, to the extent that the thing has been made like it? Or is there any way for something like to be like what is not like it?"

Socrates/ "There is not."

Parmenides/ “And isn’t there a compelling necessity for that which is like to partake of the same one form as what is like it?”

Socrates/ “There is.”

Parmenides/ “But if like things are like by partaking of something, won’t that be the form itself?”

Socrates/ “Undoubtedly.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore nothing can be like the form, nor can the form be like anything else. Otherwise, alongside the form another form will always make its appearance, and if that form is like anything, yet another; and if the form proves to be like what partakes of it, a fresh form will never cease emerging.”

Socrates/ “That’s very true.”

Parmenides/ “So other things don’t get a share of the forms by likeness; we must seek some other means by which they get a share.”

Socrates/ “So it seems.”

Parmenides/ “Then do you see, Socrates, how great the difficulty is if one marks things off as forms, themselves by themselves?”

Socrates/ “Quite clearly.”

Parmenides/ “I assure you, that you do not yet, if I may put it so, have an inkling of how great the difficulty is if you are going to posit one form in each case every time you make a distinction among things.”

Socrates/ “How so?”

Parmenides/ “There are many other reasons, but the main one is this: suppose someone were to say that if the forms are such as we claim they must be, they cannot even be known. If anyone should raise that objection, you wouldn’t be able to show him that he is wrong, unless the objector happened to

be widely experienced and not ungifted, and consented to pay attention while in your effort to show him you dealt with many distant considerations. Otherwise, the person who insists that they are necessarily unknowable would remain unconvinced."

Socrates/ "Why is that, Parmenides?"

Parmenides/ "Because I think that you, Socrates, and anyone else who posits that there is for each thing some being, itself by itself, would agree, to begin with, that none of those beings is in us."

Socrates/ "Yes—how could it still be itself by itself?"

Parmenides/ "Very good. And so all the characters that are what they are in relation to each other have their being in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us. And whether one posits the latter as likenesses or in some other way, it is by partaking of them that we come to be called by their various names. These things that belong to us, although they have the same names as the forms, are in their turn what they are in relation to themselves but not in relation to the forms; and all the things named in this way are of themselves but not of the forms."

Socrates/ "What do you mean?"

Parmenides/ "Take an example. If one of us is somebody's master or somebody's slave, he is surely not a slave of master itself—of what a master is—nor is the master a master of slave itself—of what a slave is. On the contrary, being a human being, he is a master or slave of a human being. Mastery itself, on the other hand, is what it is of slavery itself; and, in the same way, slavery itself is slavery of mastery itself. Things in us do not have their power in relation to forms, nor do they have theirs in relation to us; but, I repeat, forms are what they are of themselves and in relation to themselves, and things that belong to us are, in the same way, what they are in relation to themselves. You do understand what I mean?"

Socrates/ “Certainly, I understand.”

Parmenides/ So too, knowledge itself, what knowledge is, would be knowledge of that truth itself, which is what truth is?”

Socrates/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, each particular knowledge, what it is, would be knowledge of some particular thing, of what that thing is. Isn’t that so?”

Socrates/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “But wouldn’t knowledge that belongs to us be of the truth that belongs to our world? And wouldn’t it follow that each particular knowledge that belongs to us is in turn knowledge of some particular thing in our world?”

Socrates/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “But, as you agree, we neither have the forms themselves nor can they belong to us.”

Socrates/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “And surely the kinds themselves, what each of them is, are known by the form of knowledge itself?”

Socrates/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “The very thing that we don’t have.”

Socrates/ “No, we don’t.”

Parmenides/ “So none of the forms is known by us, because we don’t partake of knowledge itself.”

Socrates/ “It seems not.”

Parmenides/ “Then the beautiful itself, what it is, cannot be known by us, nor can the good, nor, indeed, can any of the things we take to be characters themselves.”

Socrates/ “It looks that way.”

Parmenides/ Here’s something even more shocking than that.”

Socrates/ “What’s that?”

Parmenides/ Surely you would say that if in fact there is knowledge—a kind itself—it is much more precise than is knowledge that belongs to us. And the same goes for beauty and all the others.”

Socrates/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Well, whatever else partakes of knowledge itself, wouldn’t you say that god more than anyone else has this most precise knowledge?”

Socrates/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Tell me, will god, having knowledge itself, then be able to know things that belong to our world?”

Socrates/ “Yes, why not?”

Parmenides/ “Because we have agreed, Socrates, that those forms do not have their power in relation to things in our world, and things in our world do not have theirs in relation to forms, but that things in each group have their power in relation to themselves.”

Socrates/ “Yes, we did agree on that.”

Parmenides/ “Well then, if this most precise mastery and this most precise knowledge belong to the divine, the gods’ mastery could never master us, nor could their knowledge know us or anything that belongs to us. No, just as we do not govern them by our governance and know nothing of the divine by our knowledge, so they in their turn are, for the same reason, neither our masters nor, being gods, do they know human affairs.”

Socrates/ “If god is to be stripped of knowing, our argument may be getting too bizarre.”

Parmenides/ “And yet, Socrates, the forms inevitably involve these objections and a host of others besides—if there are those characters for things, and a person is to mark off

each form as 'something itself.' As a result, whoever hears about them is doubtful and objects that they do not exist, and that, even if they do, they must by strict necessity be unknowable to human nature; and in saying this he seems to have a point; and, as we said, he is extraordinarily hard to win over. Only a very gifted man can come to know that for each thing there is some kind, a being itself by itself; but only a prodigy more remarkable still will discover that and be able to teach someone else who has sifted all these difficulties thoroughly and critically for himself."

Socrates/ "I agree with you, Parmenides. That's very much what I think too."

Parmenides/ "Yet on the other hand, Socrates, if someone, having an eye on all the difficulties we have just brought up and others of the same sort, won't allow that there are forms for things and won't mark off a form for each one, he won't have anywhere to turn his thought, since he doesn't allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the same. In this way he will destroy the power of dialectic entirely. But I think you are only too well aware of that."

Socrates/ "What you say is true."

Parmenides/ "What then will you do about philosophy? Where will you turn, while these difficulties remain unresolved?"

Socrates/ "I don't think I have anything clearly in view, at least not at present."

Parmenides/ "Socrates, that's because you are trying to mark off something beautiful, and just, and good, and each one of the forms, too soon, before you have been properly trained. I noticed that the other day too, as I listened to you conversing with Aristotle here. The impulse you bring to argument is noble and divine, make no mistake about it. But while you are still young, put your back into it and get more

training through something people think useless—what the crowd call idle talk. Otherwise, the truth will escape you."

Socrates/ "What manner of training is that, Parmenides?"

Parmenides/ "The manner is just what you heard from Zeno. Except I was also impressed by something you had to say to him: you didn't allow him to remain among visible things and observe their wandering between opposites. You asked him to observe it instead among those things that one might above all grasp by means of reason and might think to be forms."

Socrates/ "I did that, because I think that here, among visible things, it's not at all hard to show that things are both like and unlike and anything else you please."

Parmenides/ "And you are quite right. But you must do the following in addition to that: if you want to be trained more thoroughly, you must not only hypothesize, if each thing is, and examine the consequences of that hypothesis; you must also hypothesize, if that same thing is not."

Socrates/ "What do you mean?"

Parmenides/ "If you like, take as an example this hypothesis that Zeno entertained: if many are, what must the consequences be both for the many themselves in relation to themselves and in relation to the one, and for the one in relation to itself and in relation to the many? And, in turn, on the hypothesis, if many are not, you must again examine what the consequences will be both for the one and for the many in relation to themselves and in relation to each other. And again, in turn, if you hypothesize, if likeness is or if it is not, you must examine what the consequences will be on each hypothesis, both for the things hypothesized themselves and for the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other. And the same method applies to unlike, to motion, to rest, to generation and destruction, and to being

itself and not-being. And, in a word, concerning whatever you might ever hypothesize as being or as not being or as having any other property, you must examine the consequences for the thing you hypothesize in relation to itself and in relation to each one of the others, whichever you select, and in relation to several of them and to all of them in the same way; and, in turn, you must examine the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to whatever other thing you select on each occasion, whether what you hypothesize you hypothesize as being or as not being. All this you must do if, after completing your training, you are to achieve a full view of the truth."

Socrates/ "Scarcely manageable, Parmenides, this task you describe! And besides, I don't quite understand. To help me understand more fully, why don't you hypothesize something and go through the exercise for me yourself?"

Parmenides/ "For a man my age that's a big assignment, Socrates."

Socrates/ "Well then, you, Zeno—why don't you go through it for us?"

Cephalus/ And Antiphon said that Zeno laughed and said;

Zeno/ "Let's beg Parmenides to do it himself, Socrates. What he's proposing won't be easy, I'm afraid. Or don't you recognize what a big assignment it is? Indeed, if there were more of us here, it wouldn't be right to ask him—it's not fitting, especially for a man his age, to engage in such a discussion in front of a crowd. Ordinary people don't know that without this comprehensive and circuitous treatment we cannot hit upon the truth and gain insight. And so, Parmenides, I join with Socrates in begging you, so that I too may become your pupil again after all this time."

Cephalus/ When Zeno had finished speaking, Antiphon said that Pythodorus said that he too, along with Aristotle and

the others, begged Parmenides not to refuse, but to give a demonstration of what he was recommending. In the end Parmenides said:

Parmenides/ "I am obliged to go along with you. And yet I feel like the horse in the poem of Ibycus. Ibycus compares himself to a horse—a champion but no longer young, on the point of drawing a chariot in a race and trembling at what experience tells him is about to happen -and says that he himself, old man that he is, is being forced against his will to compete in Love's game. I too, when I think back, feel a good deal of anxiety as to how at my age I am to make my way across such a vast and formidable sea of words. Even so, I'll do it, since it is right for me to oblige you; and besides, we are, as Zeno says, by ourselves.

"Well then, at what point shall we start? What shall we hypothesize first? I know: since we have in fact decided to play this strenuous game, is it all right with you if I begin with myself and my own hypothesis? Shall I hypothesize about the one itself and consider what the consequences must be, if it is one or if it is not one?"

Zeno/ "By all means."

Parmenides/ "Then who will answer my questions? The youngest, surely? For he would give the least trouble and would be the most likely to say what he thinks. At the same time his answer would allow me a breathing space."

Aristoteles/ "I'm ready to play this role for you, Parmenides. Because you mean me when you say the youngest. Ask away—you can count on me to answer."

Parmenides/ "Very good. If it is one, the one would not be many, would it?"

Aristoteles/ "No, how could it?"

Parmenides/ "Then there cannot be a part of it nor can it be a whole."

Aristoteles/ “Why?”

Parmenides/ “A part is surely part of a whole.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “But what is the whole? Wouldn’t that from which no part is missing be a whole?”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “In both cases, then, the one would be composed of parts, both if it is a whole and if it has parts.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “So in both cases the one would thus be many rather than one.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “Yet it must be not many but one.”

Aristoteles/ “It must.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, if the one is to be one, it will neither be a whole nor have parts.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it won’t.”

Parmenides/ “Well, then, if it doesn’t have a part, it could have neither a beginning nor an end nor a middle; for those would in fact be parts of it.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s right.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, end and beginning are limits of each thing.”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “So the one is unlimited if it has neither beginning nor end.”

Aristoteles/ “Unlimited.”

Parmenides/ “So it is also without shape; for it partakes of neither round nor straight.”

Aristoteles/ “How so?”

Parmenides/ “Round is surely that whose extremities are equidistant in every direction from the middle.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, straight is that whose middle stands in the way of the two extremities.”

Aristoteles/ “Just so.”

Parmenides/ “So the one would have parts and be many if it partook of either a straight or a curved shape.”

Aristoteles/ “Of course.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore it is neither straight nor curved, since in fact it doesn’t have parts.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s right.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, being like that, it would be nowhere, because it could be neither in another nor in itself.”

Aristoteles/ “How is that?”

Parmenides/ “If it were in another, it would surely be contained all around by the thing it was in and would touch it in many places with many parts; but since it is one and without parts and does not partake of circularity, it cannot possibly touch in many places all around.”

Aristoteles/ “It can’t.”

Parmenides/ “Yet, on the other hand, if it were in itself, its container would be none other than itself, if in fact it were in itself; for a thing can’t be in something that doesn’t contain it.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it can’t.”

Parmenides/ “So the container itself would be one thing, and the thing contained something else, since the same thing will not, as a whole at any rate, undergo and do both at once. And in that case the one would be no longer one but two.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, the one is not anywhere, if it is neither in itself nor in another.”

Aristoteles/ “It isn’t.”

Parmenides/ “Then consider whether, since it is as we have said, it can be at rest or in motion.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, why not?”

Parmenides/ “Because if it moves, it would either move spatially or be altered, since these are the only motions.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “But the one surely can’t be altered from itself and still be one.”

Aristoteles/ “It can’t.”

Parmenides/ “Then it doesn’t move by alteration at least.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently not.”

Parmenides/ “But by moving spatially?”

Aristoteles/ “Perhaps.”

Parmenides/ “And if the one moved spatially, it surely would either spin in a circle in the same location or change from one place to another.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Well then, if it spins in a circle, it must be poised on its middle and have other parts of itself that move round the middle. But how will a thing that has nothing to do with middle or parts manage to be moved in a circle round its middle?”

Aristoteles/ “Not at all.”

Parmenides/ “But by changing places does it come to be here at one time, there at another, and move in this way?”

Aristoteles/ “If in fact it moves at all.”

Parmenides/ “Wasn’t it shown that it cannot be anywhere in anything?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Then is it not even more impossible for it to come to be?”

Aristoteles/ “I don’t see why.”

Parmenides/ “If something comes to be in something, isn’t it necessary that it not yet be in that thing—since it is still coming to be in it—and that it no longer be entirely outside it, if in fact it is already coming to be in it?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “So if anything is to undergo this, only that which has parts could do so, because some of it would already be in that thing, while some, at the same time, would be outside. But a thing that doesn’t have parts will not by any means be able to be, at the same time, neither wholly inside nor wholly outside something.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “But isn’t it much more impossible still for a thing that has no parts and is not a whole to come to be in something somewhere, if it does so neither part by part nor as a whole?”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore it doesn’t change places by going somewhere and coming to be in something, nor does it move by spinning in the same location or by being altered.”

Aristoteles/ “It seems not.”

Parmenides/ “The one, therefore, is unmoved by every sort of motion.”

Aristoteles/ “Unmoved.”

Parmenides/ “Yet, on the other hand, we also say that it cannot be in anything.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, we do.”

Parmenides/ “Then it is also never in the same thing.”

Aristoteles/ “Why?”

Parmenides/ “Because it would then be in that—in that same thing it is in.”

Aristoteles/ “Of course.”

Parmenides/ “But it was impossible for it to be either in itself or in another.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “So the one is never in the same thing.”

Aristoteles/ “It seems not.”

Parmenides/ “But what is never in the same thing neither enjoys repose nor is at rest.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it cannot.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one, as it seems, is neither at rest nor in motion.”

Aristoteles/ “It certainly does appear not.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, it won’t be the same as another thing or itself; nor, again, could it be different from itself or another thing.”

Aristoteles/ “Why is that?”

Parmenides/ “If it were different from itself, it would surely be different from one, and would not be one.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “On the other hand, if it were the same as another, it would be that thing, and not itself. So in this way, too, it would not be just what it is—one—but would be different from one.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, it won’t be the same as another or different from itself.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it won’t.”

Parmenides/ “And it won’t be different from another, as long as it is one; for it is not proper to one to be different from something, but proper to different-from-another alone, and to nothing else.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s right.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore it won’t be different by being one. Or do you think it will?”

Aristoteles/ “No indeed.”

Parmenides/ “Yet if it isn’t different by being one, it will not be so by itself; and if it isn’t so by itself, it will not itself be so. And if it is itself in no way different, it will be different from nothing.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s right.”

Parmenides/ “Nor will it be the same as itself.”

Aristoteles/ “Why not?”

Parmenides/ “The nature of the one is not, of course, also that of the same.”

Aristoteles/ “Why?”

Parmenides/ “Because it is not the case that, whenever a thing comes to be the same as something, it comes to be one.”

Aristoteles/ “But why?”

Parmenides/ “If it comes to be the same as the many, it must come to be many, not one.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “But if the one and the same in no way differ, whenever something came to be the same, it would always come to be one; and whenever it came to be one, it would always come to be the same.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, if the one is to be the same as itself, it won’t be one with itself; and thus it will be one and

not one. But this surely is impossible. Therefore the one can't be either different from another or the same as itself."

Aristoteles/ "It can't."

Parmenides/ "Thus the one could neither be different from nor the same as itself or another."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, you're quite right."

Parmenides/ "Furthermore, it will be neither like nor unlike anything, either itself or another."

Aristoteles/ "Why?"

Parmenides/ "Because whatever has a property the same is surely like."

Aristoteles/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ "But it was shown that the same is separate in its nature from the one."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, it was."

Parmenides/ "But if the one has any property apart from being one, it would be more than one; and that is impossible."

Aristoteles/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ "Therefore, the one can in no way have a property the same as another or itself."

Aristoteles/ "Apparently not."

Parmenides/ "So it cannot be like another or itself either."

Aristoteles/ "It seems not."

Parmenides/ "Nor does the one have the property of being different; for in this way too it would be more than one."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, it would be more."

Parmenides/ "Surely that which has a property different from itself or another would be unlike itself or another, if in fact what has a property the same is like."

Aristoteles/ "That's right."

Parmenides/ “But the one, as it seems, since it in no way has a property different, is in no way unlike itself or another thing.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one could be neither like nor unlike another or itself.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently not.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, being like that, it will be neither equal nor unequal to itself or another.”

Aristoteles/ “How?”

Parmenides/ “If it is equal, it will be of the same measures as that to which it is equal.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “But surely if it is greater or less, it will, in the case of things with which it is commensurate, have more measures than those that are less, and fewer than those that are greater.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “And in the case of things with which it is not commensurate, it will be of smaller measures in the one case, and of larger measures in the other.”

Aristoteles/ “No doubt.”

Parmenides/ “Well, if a thing doesn’t partake of the same, it can’t be of the same measures or of the same anything else at all, can it?”

Aristoteles/ “It can’t.”

Parmenides/ “So it couldn’t be equal to itself or another, if it is not of the same measures.”

Aristoteles/ “It certainly appears not.”

Parmenides/ “Yet if it is, on the other hand, of more measures or fewer, it would have as many parts as measures;

and thus, again, it will be no longer one, but just as many as are its measures."

Aristoteles/ "That's right."

Parmenides/ "And if it were of one measure, it would prove to be equal to its measure; but it was shown that it couldn't be equal to anything."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, it was."

Parmenides/ "Therefore, since it doesn't partake of one measure or many or few, and since it doesn't partake of the same at all, it will, as it seems, never be equal to itself or another; nor again will it be greater or less than itself or another."

Aristoteles/ "That's absolutely so."

Parmenides/ "What about this? Do you think that the one can be older or younger than, or the same age as, anything?"

Aristoteles/ "Yes, why not?"

Parmenides/ "Because if it is the same age as itself or another, it will surely partake of likeness and of equality of time, of which—likeness and equality—we said the one has no share."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, we did say that."

Parmenides/ "And we also said that it does not partake of unlikeness and inequality."

Aristoteles/ "Of course."

Parmenides/ "Then, being like that, how will it be able to be older or younger than, or the same age as, anything?"

Aristoteles/ "In no way."

Parmenides/ "Therefore, the one could not be younger or older than, or the same age as, itself or another."

Aristoteles/ "Apparently not."

Parmenides/ “So if it is like that, the one could not even be in time at all, could it? Or isn’t it necessary, if something is in time, that it always come to be older than itself?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Isn’t the older always older than a younger?”

Aristoteles/ “To be sure.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, that which comes to be older than itself comes to be, at the same time, younger than itself, if in fact it is to have something it comes to be older than.”

Aristoteles/ “What do you mean?”

Parmenides/ “I mean this: there is no need for a thing to come to be different from a thing that is already different; it must, rather, already be different from what is already different, have come to be different from what has come to be different, and be going to be different from what is going to be different; but it must not have come to be, be going to be, or be different from what comes to be different: it must come to be different, and nothing else.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, that’s necessary.”

Parmenides/ “But surely older is a difference from younger and from nothing else.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, it is.”

Parmenides/ “So that which comes to be older than itself must also, at the same time, come to be younger than itself.”

Aristoteles/ “So it seems.”

Parmenides/ “But it must also not come to be for more or less time than itself; it must come to be and be and have come to be and be going to be for a time equal to itself.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, that too is necessary.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore it is necessary, as it seems, that each thing that is in time and partakes of time be the same

age as itself and, at the same time, come to be both older and younger than itself."

Aristoteles/ "It looks that way."

Parmenides/ "But the one surely had no share of any of that."

Aristoteles/ "No, it didn't."

Parmenides/ "Therefore, it has no share of time, nor is it in any time."

Aristoteles/ "It certainly isn't, as the argument proves."

Parmenides/ "Now, don't you think that 'was' and 'has come to be' and 'was coming to be' signify partaking of time past?"

Aristoteles/ "By all means."

Parmenides/ "And again that 'will be' and 'will come to be' and 'will be coming to be' signify partaking of time hereafter?"

Aristoteles/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ "And that 'is' and 'comes to be' signify partaking of time now present?"

Aristoteles/ "Of course."

Parmenides/ "Therefore, if the one partakes of no time at all, it is not the case that it has at one time come to be, was coming to be, or was; or has now come to be, comes to be, or is; or will hereafter come to be, will be coming to be, or will be."

Aristoteles/ "Very true."

Parmenides/ "Could something partake of being except in one of those ways?"

Aristoteles/ "It couldn't."

Parmenides/ "Therefore the one in no way partakes of being."

Aristoteles/ "It seems not."

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one in no way is.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently not.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore neither is it in such a way as to be one, because it would then, by being and partaking of being, be. But, as it seems, the one neither is one nor is, if we are obliged to trust this argument.”

Aristoteles/ “It looks that way.”

Parmenides/ “If something is not, could anything belong to this thing that is not, or be of it?”

Aristoteles/ “How could it?”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, no name belongs to it, nor is there an account or any knowledge or perception or opinion of it.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently not.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore it is not named or spoken of, nor is it the object of opinion or knowledge, nor does anything that is perceive it.”

Aristoteles/ “It seems not.”

Parmenides/ “Is it possible that these things are so for the one?”

Aristoteles/ “I certainly don’t think so.”

Parmenides/ “Do you want to return to the hypothesis from the beginning, in the hope that another kind of result may come to light as we go back over it?”

Aristoteles/ “I do indeed.”

Parmenides/ “If one is, we are saying, aren’t we, that we must agree on the consequences for it, whatever they happen to be?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Consider from the beginning: if one is, can it be, but not partake of being?”

Aristoteles/ “It cannot.”

Parmenides/ “So there would also be the being of the one, and that is not the same as the one. For if it were, it couldn’t be the being of the one, nor could the one partake of it. On the contrary, saying that one is would be like saying that one is one. But this time that is not the hypothesis, namely, what the consequences must be, if one is one, but if one is. Isn’t that so?”

Aristoteles/ “Of course.”

Parmenides/ “Is that because ‘is’ signifies something other than ‘one’?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “So whenever someone, being brief, says ‘one is,’ would this simply mean that the one partakes of being?”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “Let’s again say what the consequences will be, if one is. Consider whether this hypothesis must not signify that the one is such as to have parts.”

Aristoteles/ “How so?”

Parmenides/ “In this way: if we state the ‘is’ of the one that is, and the ‘one’ of that which is one, and if being and oneness are not the same, but both belong to that same thing that we hypothesized, namely, the one that is, must it not itself, since it is one being, be a whole, and the parts of this whole be oneness and being?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Shall we call each of these two parts a part only, or must the part be called part of the whole?”

Aristoteles/ “Of the whole.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore whatever is one both is a whole and has a part.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “Now, what about each of these two parts of the one that is, oneness and being? Is oneness ever absent from the being part or being from the oneness part?”

Aristoteles/ “That couldn’t be.”

Parmenides/ “So again, each of the two parts possesses oneness and being; and the part, in its turn, is composed of at least two parts; and in this way always, for the same reason, whatever part turns up always possesses these two parts, since oneness always possesses being and being always possesses oneness. So, since it always proves to be two, it must never be one.”

Aristoteles/ “Absolutely.”

Parmenides/ “So, in this way, wouldn’t the one that is be unlimited in multitude?”

Aristoteles/ “So it seems.”

Parmenides/ “Come, let’s proceed further in the following way.”

Aristoteles/ “How?”

Parmenides/ “Do we say that the one partakes of being, and hence is?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “And for this reason the one that is was shown to be many.”

Aristoteles/ “Just so.”

Parmenides/ “And what about the one itself, which we say partakes of being? If we grasp it in thought alone by itself, without that of which we say it partakes, will it appear to be only one, or will this same thing also appear to be many?”

Aristoteles/ “One, I should think.”

Parmenides/ “Let’s see. Must not its being be something and it itself something different, if in fact the one is not being but, as one, partakes of being?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “So if being is something and the one is something different, it is not by its being one that the one is different from being, nor by its being, being that being is other than the one. On the contrary, they are different from each other by difference and otherness.”

Aristoteles/ “Of course.”

Parmenides/ “And so difference is not the same as oneness or being.”

Aristoteles/ “Obviously not.”

Parmenides/ “Now, if we select from them, say, being and difference, or being and oneness, or oneness and difference, do we not in each selection choose a certain pair that is correctly called ‘both’?”

Aristoteles/ “How so?”

Parmenides/ “As follows: we can say ‘being’?”

Aristoteles/ “We can.”

Parmenides/ “And, again, we can say ‘one’?”

Aristoteles/ “That too.”

Parmenides/ “So hasn’t each of the pair been mentioned?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “What about when I say ‘being and oneness’? Haven’t both been mentioned?”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “And if I say ‘being and difference’ or ‘difference and oneness,’ and so on—in each case don’t I speak of both?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Can things that are correctly called ‘both’ be both, but not two?”

Aristoteles/ “They cannot.”

Parmenides/ “If there are two things, is there any way for each member of the pair not to be one?”

Aristoteles/ “Not at all.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, since in fact each pair taken together turns out to be two, each member would be one.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “And if each of them is one, when anyone is added to any couple, doesn’t the total prove to be three?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “And isn’t three odd, and two even?”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “What about this? Since there are two, must there not also be twice, and since there are three, thrice, if in fact two is two times one and three is three times one?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Since there are two and twice, must there not be two times two? And since there are three and thrice, must there not be three times three?”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “And again: if there are three and they are two times, and if there are two and they are three times, must there not be two times three and three times two?”

Aristoteles/ “There certainly must.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, there would be even times even, odd times odd, odd times even, and even times odd.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s so.”

Parmenides/ “Then if that is so, do you think there is any number that need not be?”

Aristoteles/ “In no way at all.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, if one is, there must also be number.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. Or doesn’t number, unlimited in multitude, also prove to partake of being?”

Aristoteles/ “It certainly does.”

Parmenides/ “So if all number partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “So has being been distributed to all things, which are many, and is it missing from none of the beings, neither the smallest nor the largest? Or is it unreasonable even to ask that question? How could being be missing from any of the beings?”

Aristoteles/ “In no way.”

Parmenides/ “So being is chopped up into beings of all kinds, from the smallest to the largest possible, and is the most divided thing of all; and the parts of being are countless.”

Aristoteles/ “Quite so.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore its parts are the most numerous of things.”

Aristoteles/ “The most numerous indeed.”

Parmenides/ “Now, is there any of them that is part of being, yet not one part?”

Aristoteles/ “How could that happen?”

Parmenides/ “I take it, on the contrary, that if in fact it is, it must always, as long as it is, be some one thing; it cannot be nothing.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “So oneness is attached to every part of being and is not absent from a smaller or a larger, or any other, part.”

Aristoteles/ “Just so.”

Parmenides/ “So, being one, is it, as a whole, in many places at the same time? Look at this carefully.”

Aristoteles/ “I am—and I see that it’s impossible.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore as divided, if in fact not as a whole; for surely it will be present to all the parts of being at the same time only as divided.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, a divided thing certainly must be as numerous as its parts.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “So we were not speaking truly just now, when we said that being had been distributed into the most numerous parts. It is not distributed into more parts than oneness, but, as it seems, into parts equal to oneness, since neither is being absent from oneness, nor is oneness absent from being. On the contrary, being two, they are always equal throughout all things.”

Aristoteles/ “It appears absolutely so.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, the one itself, chopped up by being, is many and unlimited in multitude.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “So not only is it the case that the one being is many, but also the one itself, completely distributed by being, must be many.”

Aristoteles/ “Absolutely.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, because the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as the whole, would be limited. Or aren’t the parts contained by the whole?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “But surely that which contains would be a limit.”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “So the one that is, is surely both one and many, a whole and parts, and limited and unlimited in multitude.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “So, since in fact it is limited, does it not also have extremities?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “And again: if it is a whole, would it not have a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can anything be a whole without those three? And if anyone of them is missing from something, will it still consent to be a whole?”

Aristoteles/ “It won’t.”

Parmenides/ “The one, as it seems, would indeed have a beginning, an end, and a middle.”

Aristoteles/ “It would.”

Parmenides/ “But the middle is equidistant from the extremities—otherwise, it wouldn’t be a middle.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it wouldn’t.”

Parmenides/ “Since the one is like that, it would partake of some shape, as it seems, either straight or round, or some shape mixed from both.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, it would partake of a shape.”

Parmenides/ “Since it is so, won’t it be both in itself and in another?”

Aristoteles/ “How so?”

Parmenides/ “Each of the parts is surely in the whole, and none outside the whole.”

Aristoteles/ “Just so.”

Parmenides/ “And are all the parts contained by the whole?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, the one is all the parts of itself, and not any more or less than all.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it isn’t.”

Parmenides/ “The one is also the whole, is it not?”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “So if all its parts are actually in a whole, and the one is both all the parts and the whole itself, and all the parts are contained by the whole, the one would be contained by the one; and thus the one itself would, then, be in itself.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “Yet, on the other hand, the whole is not in the parts, either in all or in some one. For if it were in all, it would also have to be in one, because if it were not in some one, it certainly could not be in all. And if this one is among them all, but the whole is not in it, how will the whole still be in all?”

Aristoteles/ “In no way.”

Parmenides/ “Nor is it in some of the parts: for if the whole were in some, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, impossible.”

Parmenides/ “But if the whole is not in some or one or all the parts, must it not be in something different or be nowhere at all?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but since it is a whole, and is not in itself, it must be in another. Isn’t that so?”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “So the one, insofar as it is a whole, is in another; but insofar as it is all the parts, it is in itself. And thus the one must be both in itself and in a different thing.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Since that is the one’s natural state, must it not be both in motion and at rest?”

Aristoteles/ “How?”

Parmenides/ “It is surely at rest, if in fact it is in itself. For being in one thing and not stirring from that, it would be in the same thing, namely, itself.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, it is.”

Parmenides/ “And that which is always in the same thing must, of course, always be at rest.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “What about this? Must not that which is always in a different thing be, on the contrary, never in the same thing? And since it is never in the same thing, also not at rest? And since not at rest, in motion?”

Aristoteles/ “Just so.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one, since it is itself always both in itself and in a different thing, must always be both in motion and at rest.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, it must be the same as itself and different from itself, and, likewise, the same as and different from the others, if in fact it has the aforesaid properties.”

Aristoteles/ “How so?”

Parmenides/ “Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “Is the one itself part of itself?”

Aristoteles/ “In no way.”

Parmenides/ “So neither could it be a whole in relation to itself as part of itself, because then it would be a part in relation to itself.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it could not.”

Parmenides/ “But is the one different from one?”

Aristoteles/ “No indeed.”

Parmenides/ “So it couldn’t be different from itself.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly not.”

Parmenides/ “So if it is neither different nor whole nor part in relation to itself, must it not then be the same as itself?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “What about this? Must not that which is in something different from itself—the self that is in the same thing as itself—be different from itself, if in fact it is also to be in something different?”

Aristoteles/ “It seems so to me.”

Parmenides/ “In fact the one was shown to be so, since it is, at the same time, both in itself and in a different thing.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, it was.”

Parmenides/ “So in this way the one, as it seems, would be different from itself.”

Aristoteles/ “So it seems.”

Parmenides/ “Now, if anything is different from something, won’t it be different from something that is different?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Aren’t all the things that are not-one different from the one, and the one from the things not-one?”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one would be different from the others.”

Aristoteles/ “Different.”

Parmenides/ “Consider this: aren’t the same itself and the different opposite to each other?”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “Then will the same ever consent to be in the different, or the different in the same?”

Aristoteles/ “It won’t.”

Parmenides/ “So if the different is never to be in the same, there is no being that the different is in for any time; for if it were in anything for any time whatsoever, for that time the different would be in the same. Isn’t that so?”

Aristoteles/ “Just so.”

Parmenides/ “But since it is never in the same, the different would never be in any being.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “So the different wouldn’t be in the things not-one or in the one.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “So not by the different would the one be different from the things not-one or they different from it.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it wouldn’t.”

Parmenides/ “Nor by themselves would they be different from each other, if they don’t partake of the different.”

Aristoteles/ “Obviously not.”

Parmenides/ “But if they aren’t different by themselves or by the different, wouldn’t they in fact entirely avoid being different from each other?”

Aristoteles/ “They would.”

Parmenides/ “But neither do the things not-one partake of the one; otherwise they would not be not-one, but somehow one.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “So the things not-one could not be a number either; for in that case, too, they would not be absolutely not-one, since they would at least have number.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “And again: are the things not-one parts of the one? Or would the things not-one in that case, too, partake of the one?”

Aristoteles/ “They would.”

Parmenides/ “So if it is in every way one, and they are in every way not-one, the one would be neither a part of the things not-one nor a whole with them as parts; and, in turn, the things not-one would be neither parts of the one nor wholes in relation to the one as part.”

Aristoteles/ “No, they wouldn’t.”

Parmenides/ “But in fact we said that things that are neither parts nor wholes nor different from each other will be the same as each other.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, we did.”

Parmenides/ “So are we to say that the one, since it is so related to the things not-one, is the same as they are?”

Aristoteles/ “Let’s say so.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one, as it seems, is both different from the others and itself, and the same as the others and itself.”

Aristoteles/ “It certainly looks that way from our argument.”

Parmenides/ “Would the one then also be both like and unlike itself and the others?”

Aristoteles/ “Perhaps.”

Parmenides/ “At any rate, since it was shown to be different from the others, the others would surely also be different from it.”

Aristoteles/ “To be sure.”

Parmenides/ “Wouldn’t it be different from the others just as they are different from it, and neither more nor less?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, why not?”

Parmenides/ “So if neither more nor less, in like degree.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Accordingly, insofar as it has the property of being different from the others and they, likewise, have the property of being different from it, in this way the one would have a property the same as the others, and they would have a property the same as it.”

Aristoteles/ “What do you mean?”

Parmenides/ “As follows: don’t you apply to something each name you use?”

Aristoteles/ “I do.”

Parmenides/ “Now, could you use the same name either more than once or once?”

Aristoteles/ “I could.”

Parmenides/ “So if you use it once, do you call by name that thing whose name it is, but not that thing, if you use it many times? Or whether you utter the same name once or many times, do you quite necessarily always also speak of the same thing?”

Aristoteles/ “To be sure.”

Parmenides/ “Now ‘different’ in particular is a name for something, isn’t it?”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “So when you utter it, whether once or many times, you don’t apply it to another thing or name something other than that thing whose name it is.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Whenever we say ‘the others are different from the one’ and ‘the one is different from the others,’ although we use ‘different’ twice, we don’t apply it to another nature, but always to that nature whose name it is.”

Aristoteles/ “Of course.”

Parmenides/ “So insofar as the one is different from the others, and the others from the one, on the basis of having the property difference itself, the one would have a property not other, but the same as the others. And that which has a property the same is surely like, isn’t it?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Indeed, insofar as the one has the property of being different from the others, owing to that property itself it would be altogether like them all, because it is altogether different from them all.”

Aristoteles/ “So it seems.”

Parmenides/ “Yet, on the other hand, the like is opposite to the unlike.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Isn’t the different also opposite to the same?”

Aristoteles/ “That too.”

Parmenides/ “But this was shown as well: that the one is the same as the others.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, it was.”

Parmenides/ “And being the same as the others is the property opposite to being different from the others.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “Insofar as the one is different, it was shown to be like.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “So insofar as it is the same, it will be unlike, owing to the property opposite to that which makes it like. And surely the different made it like?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “So the same will make it unlike; otherwise it won’t be opposite to the different.”

Aristoteles/ “So it seems.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one will be like and unlike the others—insofar as it is different, like, and insofar as it is the same, unlike.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, it admits of this argument too, as it seems.”

Parmenides/ “It also admits of the following.”

Aristoteles/ “What is that?”

Parmenides/ “Insofar as it has a property the same, it has a property that is not of another kind; and if it has a property that is not of another kind, it is not unlike; and if not unlike, it is like. But insofar as it has a property other, it has a property that is of another kind; and if it has a property that is of another kind, it is unlike.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s true.”

Parmenides/ “So because the one is the same as the others and because it is different, on both grounds and either, it would be both like and unlike the others.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “So, in the same way, it will be like and unlike itself as well. Since in fact it was shown to be both different from itself and the same as itself, on both grounds and either, won’t it be shown to be both like and unlike itself?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “And what about this? Consider the question whether the one touches or does not touch itself and the others.”

Aristoteles/ “Very well.”

Parmenides/ “Surely the one was shown to be in itself as a whole.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s right.”

Parmenides/ “Isn’t the one also in the others?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Then insofar as it is in the others, it would touch the others; but insofar as it is in itself, it would be kept from touching the others, and being in itself, would touch itself.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “Thus the one would touch itself and the others.”

Aristoteles/ “It would.”

Parmenides/ “And again, in this way: must not everything that is to touch something lie next to that which it is to touch, occupying the position adjacent to that occupied by what it touches?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “So, too, the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie directly adjacent to itself, occupying a place next to that in which it itself is.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, it must.”

Parmenides/ “Now if the one were two it could do that and turn out to be in two places at the same time; but won’t it refuse as long as it is one?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “So the same necessity that keeps the one from being two keeps it from touching itself.”

Aristoteles/ “The same.”

Parmenides/ “But it won’t touch the others either.”

Aristoteles/ “Why?”

Parmenides/ “Because, we say, that which is to touch must, while being separate, be next to what it is to touch, and there must be no third thing between them.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “So there must be at least two things if there is to be contact.”

Aristoteles/ “There must.”

Parmenides/ “But if to the two items a third is added in a row, they themselves will be three, their contacts two.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “And thus whenever one item is added, one contact is also added, and it follows that the contacts are always fewer by one than the multitude of the numbers. For in regard to the number being greater than the contacts, every later number exceeds all the contacts by an amount equal to that by which the first two exceeded their contacts, since thereafter one is added to the number and, at the same time, one contact to the contacts.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s right.”

Parmenides/ “So however many the things are in number, the contacts are always fewer than they are by one.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “But if there is only one, and not two, there could not be contact.”

Aristoteles/ “Obviously not.”

Parmenides/ “Certainly the things other than the one, we say, are not one and do not partake of it, if in fact they are other.”

Aristoteles/ “No, they don’t.”

Parmenides/ “So number is not in the others, if one is not in them.”

Aristoteles/ “Obviously not.”

Parmenides/ “So the others are neither one nor two, nor do they have a name of any other number.”

Aristoteles/ “No.”

Parmenides/ “So the one alone is one, and there could not be two.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently not.”

Parmenides/ “So there is no contact, since there aren’t two items.”

Aristoteles/ “There isn’t.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, the one doesn’t touch the others nor do the others touch the one, since in fact there is no contact.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “Thus, to sum up, the one both touches and does not touch the others and itself.”

Aristoteles/ “So it seems.”

Parmenides/ “Is it then both equal and unequal to itself and the others?”

Aristoteles/ “How so?”

Parmenides/ “If the one were greater or less than the others, or they in turn greater or less than it, they wouldn’t be in any way greater or less than each other by the one being one and the others being other than one -that is, by their own being—would they? But if they each had equality in addition

to their own being, they would be equal to each other. And if the others had largeness and the one had smallness, or vice versa, whichever form had largeness attached would be greater, and whichever had smallness attached would be less?"

Aristoteles/ "Necessarily."

Parmenides/ "Then aren't there these two forms, largeness and smallness? For certainly, if there weren't, they couldn't be opposite to each other and couldn't occur in things that are."

Aristoteles/ "No. How could they?"

Parmenides/ "So if smallness occurs in the one, it would be either in the whole of it or in part of it."

Aristoteles/ "Necessarily."

Parmenides/ "What if it were to occur in the whole? Wouldn't it be in the one either by being stretched equally throughout the whole of it, or by containing it?"

Aristoteles/ "Quite clearly."

Parmenides/ "Wouldn't smallness, then, if it were in the one equally throughout, be equal to it, but if it contained the one, be larger?"

Aristoteles/ "Doubtless."

Parmenides/ "So can smallness be equal to or larger than something, and do the jobs of largeness and equality, but not its own?"

Aristoteles/ "It can't."

Parmenides/ "So smallness could not be in the one as a whole; but if in fact it is in the one, it would be in a part."

Aristoteles/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ "But, again, not in all the part. Otherwise, it will do exactly the same thing as it did in relation to the whole: it will be equal to or larger than whatever part it is in."

Aristoteles/ "Necessarily."

Parmenides/ “Therefore smallness will never be in any being, since it occurs neither in a part nor in a whole. Nor will anything be small except smallness itself.”

Aristoteles/ “It seems not.”

Parmenides/ “So largeness won’t be in the one either. For if it were, something else, apart from largeness itself, would be larger than something, namely, that which the largeness is in—and that too, although there is for it no small thing, which it must exceed, if in fact it is large. But this is impossible, since smallness is nowhere in anything.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “But largeness itself is not greater than anything other than smallness itself, nor is smallness less than anything other than largeness itself.”

Aristoteles/ “No, they aren’t.”

Parmenides/ “So the others aren’t greater than the one, nor are they less, because they have neither largeness nor smallness. Nor do these two themselves—largeness and smallness—have, in relation to the one, their power of exceeding and being exceeded; they have it, rather, in relation to each other. Nor could the one, in its turn, be greater or less than these two or the others, since it has neither largeness nor smallness.”

Aristoteles/ “It certainly appears not.”

Parmenides/ “So if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it must neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Now, it is quite necessary that something that neither exceeds nor is exceeded be equally matched, and if equally matched, equal.”

Aristoteles/ “No doubt.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, the one would also itself be so in relation to itself: having neither largeness nor smallness in itself, it would neither be exceeded by nor exceed itself, but, being equally matched, would be equal to itself.”

Aristoteles/ “Of course.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one would be equal to itself and the others.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “And yet, since it is in itself, it would also be around itself on the outside, and as container it would be greater than itself, but as contained it would be less. And thus the one would be greater and less than itself.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, it would be.”

Parmenides/ “Isn’t this necessary too, that there be nothing outside the one and the others?”

Aristoteles/ “No doubt.”

Parmenides/ “But surely what is must always be somewhere.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Then won’t that which is in something be in something greater as something less? For there is no other way that something could be in something else.”

Aristoteles/ “No, there isn’t.”

Parmenides/ “Since there is nothing else apart from the others and the one, and since they must be in something, must they not in fact be in each other—the others in the one and the one in the others—or else be nowhere?”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “So, on the one hand, because the one is in the others, the others would be greater than the one, since they contain it, and the one would be less than the others, since it is contained. On the other hand, because the others

are in the one, by the same argument the one would be greater than the others and they less than it."

Aristoteles/ "So it seems."

Parmenides/ "Therefore the one is both equal to, and greater and less than, itself and the others."

Aristoteles/ "Apparently."

Parmenides/ "And if in fact it is greater and less and equal, it would be of measures equal to, and more and fewer than, itself and the others; and since of measures, also of parts."

Aristoteles/ "Doubtless."

Parmenides/ "So, since it is of equal and more and fewer measures, it would also be fewer and more than itself and the others in number, and, correspondingly, equal to itself and the others."

Aristoteles/ "How so?"

Parmenides/ "It would surely be of more measures than those things it is greater than, and of as many parts as measures; and likewise it would be of fewer measures and parts than those things it is less than; and correspondingly for the things it is equal to."

Aristoteles/ "Just so."

Parmenides/ "Since it is, then, greater and less than, and equal to, itself, would it not be of measures more and fewer than, and equal to, itself? And since of measures, also of parts?"

Aristoteles/ "Doubtless."

Parmenides/ "So, since it is of parts equal to itself, it would be equal to itself in multitude, but since it is of more and fewer parts, it would be more and fewer than itself in number."

Aristoteles/ "Apparently."

Parmenides/ "Now won't the one be related in the same way also to the others? Because it appears larger than they, it

must also be more than they are in number; and because it appears smaller, fewer; and because it appears equal in largeness, it must also be equal to the others in multitude."

Aristoteles/ "Necessarily."

Parmenides/ "Thus, in turn, as it seems, the one will be equal to, and more and fewer than, itself and the others in number."

Aristoteles/ "It will."

Parmenides/ "Does the one also partake of time? And, in partaking of time, is it and does it come to be both younger and older than, and neither younger nor older than, itself and the others?"

Aristoteles/ "How so?"

Parmenides/ "If in fact one is, being surely belongs to it."

Aristoteles/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ "But is to be simply partaking of being with time present, just as was is communion with being together with time past, and, in turn, will be is communion with being together with time future?"

Aristoteles/ "Yes, it is."

Parmenides/ "So the one partakes of time, if in fact it partakes of being."

Aristoteles/ "Certainly."

Parmenides/ "Of time advancing?"

Aristoteles/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ "So the one always comes to be older than itself, if in fact it goes forward in step with time."

Aristoteles/ "Necessarily."

Parmenides/ "Do we recall that the older comes to be older than something that comes to be younger?"

Aristoteles/ "We do."

Parmenides/ “So, since the one comes to be older than itself, wouldn’t it come to be older than a self that comes to be younger?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Thus it indeed comes to be both younger and older than itself.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “But it is older, isn’t it, whenever, in coming to be, it is at the now time, between was and will be? For as it proceeds from the past to the future, it certainly won’t jump over the now.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it won’t.”

Parmenides/ “Doesn’t it stop coming to be older when it encounters the now? It doesn’t come to be, but is then already older, isn’t it? For if it were going forward, it could never be grasped by the now. A thing going forward is able to lay hold of both the now and the later—releasing the now and reaching for the later, while coming to be between the two, the later and the now.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “But if nothing that comes to be can sidestep the now, whenever a thing is at this point, it always stops its coming-to-be and then is whatever it may have come to be.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “So, too, the one: whenever, in coming to be older, it encounters the now, it stops its coming-to-be and is then older.”

Aristoteles/ “Of course.”

Parmenides/ “So it also is older than that very thing it was coming to be older than—and wasn’t it coming to be older than itself?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “And the older is older than a younger?”

Aristoteles/ “It is.”

Parmenides/ “So the one is then also younger than itself, whenever, in its coming-to-be older, it encounters the now.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Yet the now is always present to the one throughout its being; for the one always is now, whenever it is.”

Aristoteles/ “No doubt.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one always both is and comes to be older and younger than itself.”

Aristoteles/ “So it seems.”

Parmenides/ “Is it or does it come to be for more time than itself or an equal time?”

Aristoteles/ “An equal.”

Parmenides/ “But if it comes to be or is for an equal time, it is the same age.”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “And that which is the same age is neither older nor younger.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it isn’t.”

Parmenides/ “So the one, since it comes to be and is for a time equal to itself, neither is nor comes to be younger or older than itself.”

Aristoteles/ “I think not.”

Parmenides/ “And again: what of the others?”

Aristoteles/ “I can’t say.”

Parmenides/ “This much, surely, you can say: things other than the one, if in fact they are different things and not a different thing, are more than one. A different thing would be

one, but different things are more than one and would have multitude."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, they would."

Parmenides/ "And, being a multitude, they would partake of a greater number than the one."

Aristoteles/ "Doubtless."

Parmenides/ "Now, shall we say in connection with number that things that are more or things that are less come to be and have come to be earlier?"

Aristoteles/ "Things that are less."

Parmenides/ "So, the least thing first; and this is the one. Isn't that so?"

Aristoteles/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ "So of all the things that have number the one has come to be first. And the others, too, all have number, if in fact they are others and not an other."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, they do."

Parmenides/ "But that which has come to be first, I take it, has come to be earlier, and the others later; and things that have come to be later are younger than what has come to be earlier. Thus the others would be younger than the one, and the one older than they."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, it would."

Parmenides/ "What about the following? Could the one have come to be in a way contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?"

Aristoteles/ "Impossible."

Parmenides/ "Yet the one was shown to have parts, and if parts, a beginning, an end, and a middle."

Aristoteles/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ “Well, in the case of all things—the one itself and each of the others—doesn’t a beginning come to be first, and after the beginning all the others up to the end?”

Aristoteles/ “To be sure.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, we shall say that all these others are parts of some one whole, but that it itself has come to be one and whole at the same time as the end.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, we shall.”

Parmenides/ “An end, I take it, comes to be last, and the one naturally comes to be at the same time as it. And so if in fact the one itself must not come to be contrary to nature, it would naturally come to be later than the others, since it has come to be at the same time as the end.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one is younger than the others, and the others are older than it.”

Aristoteles/ “That, in turn, appears to me to be so.”

Parmenides/ “But again: must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything else, if in fact it is a part and not parts, be one, since it is a part?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Accordingly, the one would come to be at the same time as the first part that comes to be, and at the same time as the second; and it is absent from none of the others that come to be—no matter what is added to what—until, upon arriving at the last part, it comes to be one whole, having been absent at the coming-to-be of neither the middle nor the first nor the last nor any other part.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one is the same age as all the others. And so, unless the one itself is naturally contrary to nature, it would have come to be neither earlier nor later than

the others, but at the same time. And according to this argument the one would be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others older or younger than it. But according to our previous argument, it was both older and younger than they, and likewise they were both older and younger than it."

Aristoteles/ "Of course."

Parmenides/ "That's how it is and has come to be. But what about its coming-to-be both older and younger, and neither older nor younger, than the others and they than it? Is the case with coming-to-be just as it is with being, or is it different?"

Aristoteles/ "I can't say."

Parmenides/ "But I can say this much, at least: if something is indeed older than another thing, it could not come to be still older by an amount greater than the original difference in age. Nor, in turn, could the younger come to be still younger. For equals added to unequals, in time or anything else at all, always make them differ by an amount equal to that by which they differed at first."

Aristoteles/ "No doubt."

Parmenides/ "So what is older or younger could never come to be older or younger than what is older or younger, if in fact they always differ in age by an equal amount. On the contrary, something is and has come to be older, and something younger, but they do not come to be so."

Aristoteles/ "True."

Parmenides/ "So also the one, since it is older or younger, never comes to be older or younger than the others that are older or younger than it."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, you're quite right."

Parmenides/ “But consider whether it comes to be older and younger in this way.”

Aristoteles/ “In what way?”

Parmenides/ “In the way that the one was shown to be older than the others and they older than it.”

Aristoteles/ “What of that?”

Parmenides/ “When the one is older than the others, it has surely come to be for more time than they.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Go back and consider: if we add an equal time to more and less time, will the more differ from the less by an equal or a smaller fraction?”

Aristoteles/ “A smaller.”

Parmenides/ “So the one’s difference in age in relation to the others will not be in the future just what it was at first. On the contrary, by getting an increment of time equal to the others, it will differ from them in age always less than it did before. Isn’t that so?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Wouldn’t that which differs from anything in age less than before come to be younger than before in relation to those things it was previously older than?”

Aristoteles/ “Younger.”

Parmenides/ “And if the one comes to be younger, don’t those others, in turn, come to be older than before in relation to it?”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “So what is younger comes to be older in relation to what has come to be earlier and is older, but it never is older. On the contrary, it always comes to be older than that thing. For the older advances toward the younger, while the younger advances toward the older. And, in the

same way, the older, in its turn, comes to be younger than the younger. For both, by going toward their opposites, come to be each other's opposite, the younger coming to be older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. But they could not come to be so. For if they came to be, they would no longer come to be, but would be so. But as it is they come to be older and younger than each other. The one comes to be younger than the others, because it was shown to be older and to have come to be earlier, whereas the others come to be older than the one, because they have come to be later.

"And by the same argument the others, too, come to be younger in relation to the one, since in fact they were shown to be older than it and to have come to be earlier."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, it does appear so."

Parmenides/ "Well then, insofar as nothing comes to be older or younger than a different thing, owing to their always differing from each other by an equal number, the one would not come to be older or younger than the others, and they would not come to be older or younger than it. But insofar as things that came to be earlier must differ from things that come to be later by a fraction that is always different, and vice versa, in this way they must come to be older and younger than each other—both the others than the one and the one than the others."

Aristoteles/ "Of course."

Parmenides/ "To sum up all this, the one itself both is and comes to be older and younger than itself and the others, and it neither is nor comes to be older or younger than itself or the others."

Aristoteles/ "Exactly."

Parmenides/ "And since the one partakes of time and of coming to be older and younger, must it not also partake of time past, future, and present—if in fact it partakes of time?"

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, the one was and is and will be, and was coming to be and comes to be and will come to be.”

Aristoteles/ “To be sure.”

Parmenides/ “And something could belong to it and be of it, in the past, present, and future.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “And indeed there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it, if in fact even now we are engaging in all those activities concerning it.”

Aristoteles/ “You’re right.”

Parmenides/ “And a name and an account belong to it, and it is named and spoken of. And all such things as pertain to the others also pertain to the one.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s exactly so.”

Parmenides/ “Let’s speak of it yet a third time. If the one is as we have described it—being both one and many and neither one nor many, and partaking of time—must it not, because it is one, sometimes partake of being, and in turn because it is not, sometimes not partake of being?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “When it partakes, can it at that time not partake, or partake when it doesn’t?”

Aristoteles/ “It cannot.”

Parmenides/ “So it partakes at one time, and doesn’t partake at another; for only in this way could it both partake and not partake of the same thing.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s right.”

Parmenides/ “Isn’t there, then, a definite time when it gets a share of being and when it parts from it? Or how can it at one time have and at another time not have the same thing, if it never gets and releases it?”

Aristoteles/ “In no way.”

Parmenides/ “Don’t you in fact call getting a share of being ‘coming-to-be’?”

Aristoteles/ “I do.”

Parmenides/ “And parting from being ‘ceasing-to-be’?”

Aristoteles/ “Most certainly.”

Parmenides/ “Indeed the one, as it seems, when it gets and releases being, comes to be and ceases to be.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “And since it is one and many and comes to be and ceases to be, doesn’t its being many cease to be whenever it comes to be one, and doesn’t its being one cease to be whenever it comes to be many?”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “Whenever it comes to be one and many, must it not separate and combine?”

Aristoteles/ “It certainly must.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, whenever it comes to be like and unlike, must it not be made like and unlike?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “And whenever it comes to be greater and less and equal, must it not increase and decrease and be made equal?”

Aristoteles/ “Just so.”

Parmenides/ “And whenever, being in motion, it comes to a rest, and whenever, being at rest, it changes to moving, it must itself, presumably, be in no time at all.”

Aristoteles/ “How is that?”

Parmenides/ “It won’t be able to undergo being previously at rest and later in motion or being previously in motion and later at rest without changing.”

Aristoteles/ “Obviously not.”

Parmenides/ “Yet there is no time in which something can, simultaneously, be neither in motion nor at rest.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “Yet surely it also doesn’t change without changing.”

Aristoteles/ “Hardly.”

Parmenides/ “So when does it change? For it does not change while it is at rest or in motion, or while it is in time.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “Is there, then, this queer thing in which it might be, just when it changes?”

Aristoteles/ “What queer thing?”

Parmenides/ “The instant. The instant seems to signify something such that changing occurs from it to each of two states. For a thing doesn’t change from rest while rest continues, or from motion while motion continues. Rather, this queer creature, the instant, lurks between motion and rest—being in no time at all—and to it and from it the moving thing changes to resting and the resting thing changes to moving.”

Aristoteles/ “It looks that way.”

Parmenides/ “And the one, if in fact it both rests and moves, could change to each state—for only in this way could it do both. But in changing, it changes at an instant, and when it changes, it would be in no time at all, and just then it would be neither in motion nor at rest.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it wouldn’t.”

Parmenides/ “Is it so with the other changes too? Whenever the one changes from being to ceasing-to-be, or from not-being to coming-to-be, isn’t it then between certain states of

motion and rest? And then it neither is nor is not, and neither comes to be nor ceases to be?"

Aristoteles/ "It seems so, at any rate."

Parmenides/ "Indeed, according to the same argument, when it goes from one to many and from many to one, it is neither one nor many, and neither separates nor combines. And when it goes from like to unlike and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, nor is it being made like or unlike. And when it goes from small to large and to equal and vice versa, it is neither small nor large nor equal; nor would it be increasing or decreasing or being made equal."

Aristoteles/ "It seems not."

Parmenides/ "The one, if it is, could undergo all that."

Aristoteles/ "Doubtless."

Parmenides/ "Must we not examine what would be proper for the others to undergo, if one is?"

Aristoteles/ "We must."

Parmenides/ "Are we to say, then, what properties things other than the one must have, if one is?"

Aristoteles/ "Let's do."

Parmenides/ "Well then, since in fact they are other than the one, the others are not the one. For if they were, they would not be other than the one."

Aristoteles/ "That's right."

Parmenides/ "And yet the others are not absolutely deprived of the one, but somehow partake of it."

Aristoteles/ "In what way?"

Parmenides/ "In that things other than the one are surely other because they have parts; for if they didn't have parts, they would be altogether one."

Aristoteles/ "That's right."

Parmenides/ “And parts, we say, are parts of that which is a whole.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, we do.”

Parmenides/ “Yet the whole of which the parts are to be parts must be one thing composed of many, because each of the parts must be part, not of many, but of a whole.”

Aristoteles/ “Why is that?”

Parmenides/ “If something were to be part of many, in which it itself is, it will, of course, be both part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if in fact it is part of all of them. For if it is not part of one, it will be part of the others, that one excepted, and thus it will not be part of each one. And if it is not part of each, it will be part of none of the many. But if something is part of none, it cannot be a part, or anything else at all, of all those things of which it is no part of any.”

Aristoteles/ “It certainly appears so.”

Parmenides/ “So the part would not be part of many things or all, but of some one character and of some one thing, which we call a ‘whole,’ since it has come to be one complete thing composed of all. This is what the part would be part of.”

Aristoteles/ “Absolutely.”

Parmenides/ “So if the others have parts, they would also partake of some one whole.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “So things other than the one must be one complete whole with parts.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, the same account applies also to each part, since it too must partake of the one. For if each of them is a part, ‘each,’ of course, signifies that it is one thing,

detached from the others and being by itself, if in fact it is to be each."

Aristoteles/ "That's right."

Parmenides/ "But clearly it would partake of the one, while being something other than one. Otherwise, it wouldn't partake, but would itself be one. But as it is, it is surely impossible for anything except the one itself to be one."

Aristoteles/ "Impossible."

Parmenides/ "But both the whole and the part must partake of the one; for the whole will be one thing of which the parts are parts, and in turn each thing that is part of a whole will be one part of the whole."

Aristoteles/ "Just so."

Parmenides/ "Well, then, won't things that partake of the one partake of it, while being different from it?"

Aristoteles/ "Doubtless."

Parmenides/ "And things different from the one would surely be many; for if things other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, you're quite right."

Parmenides/ "Since both things that partake of the oneness of a part and things that partake of the oneness of a whole are more than one, must not those things themselves that get a share of the one in fact be unlimited in multitude?"

Aristoteles/ "How so?"

Parmenides/ "Let's observe the following: isn't it the case that, at the time when they get a share of the one, they get a share, while not being one and not partaking of the one?"

Aristoteles/ "Quite clearly."

Parmenides/ "While being multitudes, then, in which oneness is not present?"

Aristoteles/ "Certainly, multitudes."

Parmenides/ “Now, if we should be willing to subtract, in thought, the very least we can from these multitudes, must not that which is subtracted, too, be a multitude and not one, if in fact it doesn’t partake of the one?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “So always, as we examine in this way its nature, itself by itself, different from the form, won’t as much of it as we ever see be unlimited in multitude?”

Aristoteles/ “Absolutely.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, whenever each part comes to be one part, the parts then have a limit in relation to each other and in relation to the whole, and the whole has a limit in relation to the parts.”

Aristoteles/ “Quite so.”

Parmenides/ “Accordingly, it follows for things other than the one that from the one and themselves gaining communion with each other, as it seems, something different comes to be in them, which affords a limit for them in relation to each other; but their own nature, by themselves, affords unlimitedness.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “In this way, indeed, things other than the one, taken both as wholes and part by part, both are unlimited and partake of a limit.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “Well, aren’t they both like and unlike each other and themselves?”

Aristoteles/ “In what way?”

Parmenides/ “On the one hand, insofar as they are all unlimited by their own nature, they would in this way have a property the same.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, insofar as they all partake of a limit, in this way, too, they would all have a property the same.”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “On the other hand, insofar as they are both limited and unlimited, they have these properties, which are opposite to each other.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “And opposite properties are as unlike as possible.”

Aristoteles/ “To be sure.”

Parmenides/ “So in respect of either property they would be like themselves and each other, but in respect of both properties they would be utterly opposite and unlike both themselves and each other.”

Aristoteles/ “It looks that way.”

Parmenides/ “Thus the others would be both like and unlike themselves and each other.”

Aristoteles/ “Just so.”

Parmenides/ “And indeed we will have no further trouble in finding that things other than the one are both the same as and different from each other, both in motion and at rest, and have all the opposite properties, since in fact they were shown to have those we mentioned.”

Aristoteles/ “You’re right.”

Parmenides/ “Well, then, suppose we now concede those results as evident and examine again, if one is: Are things other than the one also not so, or only so?”

Aristoteles/ “Of course.”

Parmenides/ “Let’s say from the beginning, what properties things other than the one must have, if one is.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, let’s do.”

Parmenides/ “Must not the one be separate from the others, and the others separate from the one?”

Aristoteles/ “Why?”

Parmenides/ “Because surely there is not something else in addition to them that is both other than the one and other than the others; for all things have been mentioned, once the one and the others are mentioned.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, all things.”

Parmenides/ “So there is no further thing, different from them, in which same thing the one and the others could be.”

Aristoteles/ “No, there isn’t.”

Parmenides/ “So the one and the others are never in the same thing.”

Aristoteles/ “It seems not.”

Parmenides/ “So they are separate?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, we say that what is really one doesn’t have parts.”

Aristoteles/ “Obviously not.”

Parmenides/ “So the one could not be in the others as a whole, nor could parts of it be in them, if it is separate from the others and doesn’t have parts.”

Aristoteles/ “Obviously not.”

Parmenides/ “So the others could in no way partake of the one, if they partake neither by getting some part of it nor by getting it as a whole.”

Aristoteles/ “It seems not.”

Parmenides/ “In no way, then, are the others one, nor do they have any oneness in them.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “So the others aren’t many either; for each of them would be one part of a whole, if they were many. But as it is, things other than the one are neither one nor many nor a whole nor parts, since they in no way partake of the one.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s right.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, the others are not themselves two or three, nor are two or three in them, if in fact they are entirely deprived of the one.”

Aristoteles/ “Just so.”

Parmenides/ “So the others aren’t themselves like and unlike the one, and likeness and unlikeness aren’t in them. For if they were themselves like and unlike, or had likeness and unlikeness in them, things other than the one would surely have in themselves two forms opposite to each other.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “But it was impossible for things that couldn’t partake even of one to partake of any two.”

Aristoteles/ “Impossible.”

Parmenides/ “So the others are neither like nor unlike nor both. If they were like or unlike, they would partake of one of the two forms, and if they were both, they would partake of two opposite forms. But these alternatives were shown to be impossible.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “So they are neither the same nor different, neither in motion nor at rest, neither coming to be nor ceasing to be, neither greater nor less nor equal. Nor do they have any other such properties. For if the others submit to having any such property, they will partake of one and two and three and odd and even, of which it was shown they could not partake, since they are in every way entirely deprived of the one.”

Aristoteles/ “Very true.”

Parmenides/ “Thus if one is, the one is all things and is not even one, both in relation to itself and, likewise, in relation to the others.

Aristoteles/ “Exactly.”

Parmenides/ “So far so good. But must we not next examine what the consequences must be, if the one is not?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, we must.”

Parmenides/ “What, then, would this hypothesis be: ‘if one is not’? Does it differ at all from this hypothesis: ‘if not-one is not’?”

Aristoteles/ “Of course it differs.”

Parmenides/ “Does it merely differ, or is saying ‘if not-one is not’ the complete opposite of saying, ‘if one is not’?”

Aristoteles/ “The complete opposite.”

Parmenides/ “What if someone were to say, ‘if largeness is not’ or ‘if smallness is not’ or anything else like that, would it be clear in each case that what he is saying is not is something different?”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “So now, too, whenever he says, ‘if one is not,’ isn’t it clear that what he says is not is different from the others, and don’t we recognize what he means?”

Aristoteles/ “We do.”

Parmenides/ “So he speaks of something, in the first place, knowable, and in the second, different from the others, whenever he says ‘one,’ whether he attaches being or not-being to it; for we still know what thing is said not to be, and that it is different from the others. Isn’t that so?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Then we must state from the beginning as follows what must be the case, if one is not. First, as it seems, this must be so for it, that there is knowledge of it; otherwise

we don't even know what is meant when someone says, 'if one is not'."

Aristoteles/ "True."

Parmenides/ "And it must be the case that the others are different from it—or else it isn't said to be different from them?"

Aristoteles/ "Certainly."

Parmenides/ "Therefore difference in kind pertains to it in addition to knowledge. For someone doesn't speak of the difference in kind of the others when he says that the one is different from the others, but of that thing's difference in kind."

Aristoteles/ "Apparently."

Parmenides/ "Furthermore, the one that is not partakes of that and of something, this, to this, these, and so on; for the one could not be mentioned, nor could things be different from the one, nor could anything belong to it or be of it, nor could it be said to be anything, unless it had a share of something and the rest."

Aristoteles/ "That's right."

Parmenides/ "The one can't be, if in fact it is not, but nothing prevents it from partaking of many things. Indeed, it's even necessary, if in fact it's that one and not another that is not. If, however, neither the one nor that is not to be, but the account is about something else, we shouldn't even utter a sound. But if that one and not another is posited not to be, it must have a share of that and of many other things."

Aristoteles/ "Quite certainly."

Parmenides/ "So it has unlikeness, too, in relation to the others. For things other than the one, since they are different, would also be different in kind."

Aristoteles/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ “And aren’t things different in kind other in kind?”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “Aren’t things other in kind unlike?”

Aristoteles/ “Unlike, certainly.”

Parmenides/ “Well, then, if in fact they are unlike the one, clearly things unlike would be unlike an unlike.”

Aristoteles/ “Clearly.”

Parmenides/ “So the one would also have unlikeness, in relation to which the others are unlike it.”

Aristoteles/ “So it seems.”

Parmenides/ “But, then, if it has unlikeness to the others, must it not have likeness to itself?”

Aristoteles/ “How so?”

Parmenides/ “If the one has unlikeness to one, the argument would surely not be about something of the same kind as the one, nor would the hypothesis be about one, but about something other than one.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “But it must not be.”

Aristoteles/ “No indeed.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one must have likeness of itself to itself.”

Aristoteles/ “It must.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, it is not equal to the others either; for if it were equal, it would then both be, and be like them in respect of equality. But those are both impossible, if in fact one is not.”

Aristoteles/ “Impossible.”

Parmenides/ “Since it is not equal to the others, must not the others, too, be not equal to it?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Aren’t things that are not equal unequal?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “And aren’t things unequal, unequal to something unequal?”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “So the one partakes also of inequality, in relation to which the others are unequal to it.”

Aristoteles/ “It does.”

Parmenides/ “But largeness and smallness are constitutive of inequality.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, they are.”

Parmenides/ “So do largeness and smallness, too, belong to this one?”

Aristoteles/ “It looks that way.”

Parmenides/ “Yet largeness and smallness always stand apart from each other.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “So there is always something between them.”

Aristoteles/ “There is.”

Parmenides/ “Then can you mention anything between them other than equality?”

Aristoteles/ “No, just that.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore whatever has largeness and smallness also has equality, since it is between them.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “The one, if it is not, would have, as it seems, a share of equality, largeness, and smallness.”

Aristoteles/ “So it seems.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, it must also somehow partake of being.”

Aristoteles/ “How is that?”

Parmenides/ “It must be in the state we describe; for if it is not so, we wouldn’t speak truly when we say that the one is not. But if we do speak truly, it is clear that we say things that are. Isn’t that so?”

Aristoteles/ “It is indeed so.”

Parmenides/ “And since we claim to speak truly, we must claim also to speak of things that are.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, as it seems, the one is a not-being; for if it is not to be a not-being, but is somehow to give up its being in relation to not-being, it will straightway be a being.”

Aristoteles/ “Absolutely.”

Parmenides/ “So if it is not to be, it must have being a not-being as a bond in regard to its not-being, just as, in like manner, what is must have not-being what is not, in order that it, in its turn, may completely be. This is how what is would most of all be and what is not would not be: on the one hand, by what is, if it is completely to be, partaking of being in regard to being a being and of not-being in regard to being a not-being; and, on the other hand, by what is not, if in its turn what is not is completely not to be, partaking of not-being in regard to not-being a not-being and of being in regard to being a not-being.”

Aristoteles/ “Very true.”

Parmenides/ “Accordingly, since in fact what is has a share of not-being and what is not has a share of being, so, too, the one, since it is not, must have a share of being in regard to its not-being.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Then the one, if it is not, appears also to have being.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “And of course not-being, if in fact it is not.”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “Can something that is in some state not be so, without changing from that state?”

Aristoteles/ “It cannot.”

Parmenides/ “So everything of the sort we’ve described, which is both so and not so, signifies a change.”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “And a change is a motion—or what shall we call it?”

Aristoteles/ “A motion.”

Parmenides/ “Now wasn’t the one shown both to be and not to be?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, it appears both to be so and not so.”

Aristoteles/ “So it seems.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one that is not has been shown also to move, since in fact it has been shown to change from being to not-being.”

Aristoteles/ “It looks that way.”

Parmenides/ “Yet, on the other hand, if it is nowhere among the things that are—as it isn’t, if in fact it is not—it couldn’t travel from one place to another.”

Aristoteles/ “Obviously not.”

Parmenides/ “So it couldn’t move by switching place.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it couldn’t.”

Parmenides/ “Nor could it rotate in the same thing, because it nowhere touches the same thing. For that which is

the same is a being, and what is not cannot be in anything that is."

Aristoteles/ "No, it can't."

Parmenides/ "Therefore the one, if it is not, would be unable to rotate in that in which it is not."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, you're quite right."

Parmenides/ "And, surely, the one isn't altered from itself either, whether as something that is or as something that is not. For the argument would no longer be about the one, but about something else, if in fact the one were altered from itself."

Aristoteles/ "That's right."

Parmenides/ "But if it isn't altered and doesn't rotate in the same thing or switch place, could it still move somehow?"

Aristoteles/ "Obviously not."

Parmenides/ "Yet what is unmoved must enjoy repose, and what reposes must be at rest."

Aristoteles/ "Necessarily."

Parmenides/ "Therefore the one, as it seems, since it is not, is both at rest and in motion."

Aristoteles/ "So it seems."

Parmenides/ "Furthermore, if in fact it moves, it certainly must be altered; for however something is moved, by just so much it is no longer in the same state as it was, but in a different state."

Aristoteles/ "Just so."

Parmenides/ "Then because it moves, the one is also altered."

Aristoteles/ "Yes."

Parmenides/ "And yet, because it in no way moves, it could in no way be altered."

Aristoteles/ “No, it couldn’t.”

Parmenides/ “So insofar as the one that is not moves, it is altered, but insofar as it doesn’t move, it is not altered.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it isn’t.

Parmenides/ “Therefore the one, if it is not, is both altered and not altered.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently.”

Parmenides/ “Must not that which is altered come to be different from what it was before, and cease to be in its previous state; and must not that which is not altered neither come to be nor cease to be?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore also the one, if it is not, comes to be and ceases to be, if it is altered, and does not come to be or cease to be, if it is not altered. And thus the one, if it is not, both comes to be and ceases to be, and does not come to be or cease to be.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “Let’s go back again to the beginning to see whether things will appear the same to us as they do now, or different.”

Aristoteles/ “Indeed, we must.”

Parmenides/ “Aren’t we saying, if one is not, what the consequences must be for it?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “When we say ‘is not,’ the words don’t signify anything other than absence of being for whatever we say is not, do they?”

Aristoteles/ “Nothing other.”

Parmenides/ “When we say that something is not, are we saying that in a way it is not, but in a way it is? Or does this

‘is not’ signify without qualification that what is not is in no way at all and does not in any way partake of being?”

Aristoteles/ “Absolutely without qualification.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore what is not could neither be, nor partake of being in any other way at all.”

Aristoteles/ “No, it couldn’t.”

Parmenides/ “Can coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be possibly be anything other than getting a share of being and losing it?”

Aristoteles/ “Nothing other.”

Parmenides/ “But what has no share of being could neither get nor lose it.”

Aristoteles/ “Obviously not.”

Parmenides/ “So the one, since it in no way is, must in no way have, release, or get a share of, being.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s reasonable.”

Parmenides/ “So the one that is not neither ceases to be nor comes to be, since in fact it in no way partakes of being.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently not.”

Parmenides/ “So it also isn’t altered in any way. For if it were to undergo this, it would then come to be and cease to be.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “And if it isn’t altered, it must not move either?”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “And surely we won’t say that what in no way is, is at rest, since what is at rest must always be in some same thing.”

Aristoteles/ “In the same thing, no doubt.”

Parmenides/ “Thus, let’s say that what is not is, in turn, never at rest or in motion.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “But in fact nothing that is belongs to it; for then, by partaking of that, it would partake of being.”

Aristoteles/ “Clearly.”

Parmenides/ “So neither largeness nor smallness nor equality belongs to it.”

Aristoteles/ “No, they don’t.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, it would have neither likeness nor difference in kind in relation to itself or in relation to the others.”

Aristoteles/ “Apparently not.”

Parmenides/ “What about this? Can the others be related to it, if, necessarily, nothing belongs to it?”

Aristoteles/ “They can’t.”

Parmenides/ “So the others are neither like nor unlike it, and they are neither the same as nor different from it.”

Aristoteles/ “No, they aren’t.”

Parmenides/ “And again: will of that, to that, something, this, of this, of another, to another, or time past, hereafter, or now, or knowledge, opinion, perception, an account, a name, or anything else that is be applicable to what is not?”

Aristoteles/ “It will not.”

Parmenides/ “Thus one, since it is not, is not in any state at all.”

Aristoteles/ “At any rate, it certainly seems to be in no state at all.”

Parmenides/ “Let’s go on and say what properties the others must have, if one is not.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, let’s do.”

Parmenides/ “They must surely be other; for if they weren’t even other, we wouldn’t be talking about the others.”

Aristoteles/ “Just so.”

Parmenides/ “But if the argument is about the others, the others are different. Or don’t you apply the names ‘other’ and ‘different’ to the same thing?”

Aristoteles/ “I do.”

Parmenides/ “And surely we say that the different is different from a different thing, and the other is other than another thing?”

Aristoteles/ “Yes.”

Parmenides/ “So the others, too, if they are to be other, have something they will be other than.”

Aristoteles/ “Necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “What would it be then? For they won’t be other than the one, if it is indeed not.”

Aristoteles/ “No, they won’t.”

Parmenides/ “So they are other than each other, since that alternative remains for them, or else to be other than nothing.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s right.”

Parmenides/ “So they each are other than each other as multitudes; for they couldn’t be so as ones, if one is not. But each mass of them, as it seems, is unlimited in multitude, and if you take what seems to be smallest, in an instant, just as in a dream, instead of seeming to be one, it appears many, and instead of very small, immense in relation to the bits chopped from it.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s quite right.”

Parmenides/ “The others would be other than each other as masses of this sort, if they are other, and if one is not.”

Aristoteles/ “Quite so.”

Parmenides/ “Well then, won’t there be many masses, each appearing, but not being, one, if in fact one is not to be?”

Aristoteles/ “Just so.”

Parmenides/ “And there will seem to be a number of them, if in fact each seems to be one, although being many.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “And among them some appear even and some odd, although not really being so, if in fact one is not to be.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, you’re quite right.”

Parmenides/ “Furthermore, a smallest too, we say, will seem to be among them; but this appears many and large in relation to each of its many, because they are small.”

Aristoteles/ “Doubtless.”

Parmenides/ “And each mass will be conceived to be equal to its many small bits. For it could not, in appearance, shift from greater to less, until it seems to come to the state in between, and this would be an appearance of equality.”

Aristoteles/ “That’s reasonable.”

Parmenides/ “Now won’t it appear to have a limit in relation to another mass, but itself to have no beginning, limit, or middle in relation to itself?”

Aristoteles/ “Why is that?”

Parmenides/ “Because whenever you grasp any bit of them in thought as being a beginning, middle, or end, before the beginning another beginning always appears, and after the end a different end is left behind, and in the middle others more in the middle than the middle but smaller, because you can’t grasp each of them as one, since the one is not.”

Aristoteles/ “Very true.”

Parmenides/ “So every being that you grasp in thought must, I take it, be chopped up and dispersed, because surely, without oneness, it would always be grasped as a mass.”

Aristoteles/ “Of course.”

Parmenides/ “So must not such a thing appear one to a person dimly observing from far off; but to a person considering it keenly from up close, must not each one appear unlimited in multitude, if in fact it is deprived of the one, if it is not?”

Aristoteles/ “Indeed, most necessarily.”

Parmenides/ “Thus the others must each appear unlimited and as having a limit, and one and many, if one is not, but things other than the one are.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, they must.”

Parmenides/ “Won’t they also seem to be both like and unlike?”

Aristoteles/ “Why is that?”

Parmenides/ “Just as, to someone standing at a distance, all things in a painting, appearing one, appear to have a property the same and to be like.”

Aristoteles/ “Certainly.”

Parmenides/ “But when the person comes closer, they appear many and different and, by the appearance of the different, different in kind and unlike themselves.”

Aristoteles/ “Just so.”

Parmenides/ “So the masses must also appear both like and unlike themselves and each other.”

Aristoteles/ “Of course.”

Parmenides/ “Accordingly, if one is not and many are, the many must appear both the same as and different from each other, both in contact and separate from themselves, both moving with every motion and in every way at rest, both

coming to be and ceasing to be and neither, and surely everything of that sort, which it would now be easy enough for us to go through."

Aristoteles/ "Very true indeed."

Parmenides/ "Let's go back to the beginning once more and say what must be the case, if one is not, but things other than the one are."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, let's do."

Parmenides/ "Well, the others won't be one."

Aristoteles/ "Obviously not."

Parmenides/ "And surely they won't be many either, since oneness would also be present in things that are many. For if none of them is one, they are all nothing—so they also couldn't be many."

Aristoteles/ "True."

Parmenides/ "If oneness isn't present in the others, the others are neither many nor one."

Aristoteles/ "No, they aren't."

Parmenides/ "Nor even do they appear one or many."

Aristoteles/ "Why?"

Parmenides/ "Because the others have no communion in any way at all with any of the things that are not, and none of the things that are not belongs to any of the others, since things that are not have no part."

Aristoteles/ "True."

Parmenides/ "So no opinion or any appearance of what is not belongs to the others, nor is not-being conceived in any way at all in the case of the others."

Aristoteles/ "Yes, you're quite right."

Parmenides/ “So if one is not, none of the others is conceived to be one or many, since, without oneness, it is impossible to conceive of many.”

Aristoteles/ “Yes, impossible.”

Parmenides/ “Therefore, if one is not, the others neither are nor are conceived to be one or many.”

Aristoteles/ “It seems not.”

Parmenides/ “So they aren’t like or unlike either.”

Aristoteles/ “No, they aren’t.”

Parmenides/ “And indeed, they are neither the same nor different, neither in contact nor separate, nor anything else that they appeared to be in the argument we went through before. The others neither are, nor appear to be any of those things, if one is not.”

Aristoteles/ “True.”

Parmenides/ “Then if we were to say, to sum up, ‘if one is not, nothing is,’ wouldn’t we speak correctly?”

Aristoteles/ “Absolutely.”

Parmenides/ “Let us then say this—and also that, as it seems, whether one is or is not, it and the others both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other.”

Aristoteles/ “Very true.”

Parmenides.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Cephalus, Socrates, Adeimantus, Zeno,
Glaucon, Parmenides, Antiphon, Aristoteles,
Pythodorus.

Cephalus rehearses a dialogue which is supposed to have been narrated in his presence by Antiphon, the half-brother of Adeimantus and Glaucon, to certain Clazomenians.

Cephalus/ We had come from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, and met Adeimantus, who took me by the hand and Glaucon in the Agora.

Adeimantus/ Welcome, Cephalus, is there anything which we can do for you in Athens?

Cephalus/ Yes; that is why I am here; I wish to ask a favor of you.

Adeimantus/ What may that be?

Cephalus/ I want you to tell me the name of your half-brother, which I have forgotten; he was a mere child when I last came hither from Clazomenae, but that was a long time ago; his father's name, if I remember rightly, was Pyrilampes?

Adeimantus/ Yes, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask?

Cephalus/ Let me introduce some countrymen of mine; they are lovers of philosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was intimate with a certain Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno, and remembers a conversation which took place between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides many years ago, Pythodorus having often recited it to him.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Cephalus/ And could we hear it?

Adeimantus/ Nothing easier; when he was a youth he made a careful study of the piece; at present his thoughts run in another direction; like his grandfather Antiphon he is devoted to horses. But, if that is what you want, let us go and look for him; he dwells at Melita, which is quite near, and he has only just left us to go home.

Cephalus/ Accordingly we went to look for him; he was at home, and in the act of giving a bridle to a smith to be fitted. When he had done with the smith, his brothers told him the purpose of our visit; and he saluted me as an acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit, and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very willing, and complained of the trouble, but at length he consented. He told us that Pythodorus had described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they came to Athens, as he said, at the great Panathenaea; the former was, at the time of his visit, about 65 years old, very white with age, but well favored. Zeno was nearly 40 years of age, tall and fair to look upon; in the days of his youth he was reported to have been beloved by Parmenides. He said that they lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus, outside the wall, whither Socrates, then a very young man, came to see them, and many others with him; they wanted to hear the writings of Zeno, which had been brought to Athens for the first time on the occasion of their visit. These Zeno himself read to them in the absence of Parmenides, and had very nearly finished when Pythodorus entered, and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles who was afterwards one of the Thirty, and heard the little that remained of the dialogue. Pythodorus had heard Zeno repeat them before.

When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first thesis of the first argument might be read over again, and this having been done, he said:

Socrates/ What is your meaning, Zeno? Do you maintain that if being is many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like—is that your position?

Zeno/ Just so.

Socrates/ And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then according to you, being could not be many; for this would involve an impossibility. In all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of the many? and is not each division of your treatise intended to furnish a separate proof of this, there being in all as many proofs of the not-being of the many as you have composed arguments? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you?

Zeno/ No; you have correctly understood my general purpose.

Socrates/ I see, Parmenides, that Zeno would like to be not only one with you in friendship but your second self in his writings too; he puts what you say in another way, and would fain make believe that he is telling us something which is new. For you, in your poems, say The All is one, and of this you adduce excellent proofs; and he on the other hand says There is no many; and on behalf of this he offers overwhelming evidence. You affirm unity, he denies plurality. And so you deceive the world into believing that you are saying different things when really you are saying much the same. This is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.

Zeno/ Yes, Socrates. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not fully

apprehend the true motive of the composition, which is not really such an artificial work as you imagine; for what you speak of was an accident; there was no pretense of a great purpose; nor any serious intention of deceiving the world. The truth is, that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who make fun of him and seek to show the many ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose to follow from the affirmation of the one. My answer is addressed to the partisans of the many, whose attack I return with interest by retorting upon them that their hypothesis of the being of many, if carried out, appears to be still more ridiculous than the hypothesis of the being of one. Zeal for my master led me to write the book in the days of my youth, but someone stole the copy; and therefore I had no choice whether it should be published or not; the motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an elder man, but the pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to see, Socrates; though in other respects, as I was saying, your notion is a very just one.

Socrates/ I understand and quite accept your account. But tell me, Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself, and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term many, participate—things which participate in likeness become in that degree and manner like; and so far as they participate in unlikeness become in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation? —Where is the wonder? Now if a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would indeed be a wonder; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that the things

which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience both. Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very astonishing. But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute many one, I should be truly amazed. And so of all the rest: I should be surprised to hear that the natures or ideas themselves had these opposite qualities; but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one. In both instances he proves his case. So again, if a person shows that such things as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows the coexistence of the one and many, but he does not show that the many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a paradox but a truism. If however, as I just now suggested, someone were to abstract simple notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and then to show that these admit of admixture and separation in themselves, I should be very much astonished. This part of the argument appears to be treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner; but, as I was saying, I should be far more amazed if anyone found in the ideas themselves which are apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have shown to exist in visible objects.

Cephalus/ While Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the argument; but still they gave the closest attention, and often looked at one

another, and smiled as if in admiration of him. When he had finished, Parmenides expressed their feelings in the following words: —

Parmenides/ Socrates, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy; tell me now, was this your own distinction between ideas in themselves and the things which partake of them? and do you think that there is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many, and of the other things which Zeno mentioned?

Socrates/ I think that there are such ideas.

Parmenides/ And would you also make absolute ideas of the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?

Socrates/ Yes, I should.

Parmenides/ And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water?

Socrates/ I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or not.

Parmenides/ And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which the mention may provoke a smile? —I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else which is vile and paltry; would you suppose that each of these has an idea distinct from the actual objects with which we come into contact, or not?

Socrates/ Certainly not; visible things like these are such as they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken up this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and so I

return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them.

Parmenides/ Yes, Socrates; that is because you are still young; the time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at your age, you are too much disposed to regard the opinions of men. But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity; and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty?

Socrates/ Yes, certainly, that is my meaning.

Parmenides/ Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea? Can there be any other mode of participation?

Socrates/ There cannot be.

Parmenides/ Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many?

Socrates/ Why not, Parmenides?

Parmenides/ Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation from itself.

Socrates/ Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may be one and the same in all at the same time.

Parmenides/ I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, these would be one whole including many—is not that your meaning?

Socrates/ I think so;

Parmenides/ And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it only, and different parts different men?

Socrates/ The latter.

Parmenides/ Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea existing in each of them?

Socrates/ That seems to follow.

Parmenides/ Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one?

Socrates/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ Suppose that you divide absolute greatness, and that of the many great things, each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness less than absolute greatness—is that conceivable?

Socrates/ No.

Parmenides/ Or will each equal thing, if possessing some small portion of equality less than absolute equality, be equal to some other thing by virtue of that portion only?

Socrates/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a part of the small, and therefore the absolutely small is greater; if the absolutely small be greater, that to which the part of the small is added will be smaller and not greater than before.

Socrates/ How absurd!

Parmenides/ Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?

Socrates/ Indeed, you have asked a question which is not easily answered.

Parmenides/ Well, and what do you say of another question?

Socrates/ What question?

Parmenides/ I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea of each kind is as follows: —You see a number of great objects, and when you look at them there seems to you to be one and the same idea (or nature) in them all; hence you conceive of greatness as one.

Socrates/ Very true.

Parmenides/ And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace in one view the idea of greatness and of great things which are not the idea, and to compare them, will not another greatness arise, which will appear to be the source of all these?

Socrates/ It would seem so.

Parmenides/ Then another idea of greatness now comes into view over and above absolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and then another, over and above all these, by virtue of which they will all be great, and so each idea instead of being one will be infinitely multiplied.

Socrates/ But may not the ideas, be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case each idea may still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication.

Parmenides/ And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?

Socrates/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ The thought must be of something?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Of something which is or which is not?

Socrates/ Of something which is.

Parmenides/ Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as attaching to all, being a single form or nature?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all, be an idea?

Socrates/ From that, again, there is no escape.

Parmenides/ Then, if you say that everything else participates in the ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of thoughts, and that all things think; or that they are thoughts but have no thought?

Socrates/ The latter view is no more rational than the previous one. In my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other things are like them, and resemblances of them—what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.

Parmenides/ But if the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of the idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of like.

Socrates/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?

Socrates/ They must.

Parmenides/ And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the idea itself?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always be coming to light, and if that be like anything else, another; and new ideas will be

always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it?

Socrates/ Quite true.

Parmenides/ The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised?

Socrates/ It would seem so.

Parmenides/ Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the ideas to be absolute?

Socrates/ Yes, indeed.

Parmenides/ And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a single idea, parting it off from other things.

Socrates/ What difficulty?

Parmenides/ There are many, but the greatest of all is this: —If an opponent argues that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, must remain unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who denies their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge, and is willing to follow a long and laborious demonstration; he will remain unconvinced, and still insist that they cannot be known.

Socrates/ What do you mean, Parmenides?

Parmenides/ In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or anyone who maintains the existence of absolute essences, will admit that they cannot exist in us.

Socrates/ No; for then they would be no longer absolute.

Parmenides/ True; and therefore when ideas are what they are in relation to one another, their essence is determined by a relation among themselves, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are

to be termed, which are in our sphere, and from which we receive this or that name when we partake of them. And the things which are within our sphere and have the same names with them, are likewise only relative to one another, and not to the ideas which have the same names with them, but belong to themselves and not to them.

Socrates/ What do you mean?

Parmenides/ I may illustrate my meaning in this way: — A master has a slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them, which is simply a relation of one man to another, But there is also an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the abstract. These natures have nothing to do with us, nor we with them; they are concerned with themselves only, and we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning?

Socrates/ Yes, I quite see your meaning.

Parmenides/ And will not knowledge—I mean absolute knowledge—answer to absolute truth?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have?

Socrates/ No, we cannot.

Parmenides/ And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea of knowledge?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And we have not got the idea of knowledge?

Socrates/ No.

Parmenides/ Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge?

Socrates/ I suppose not.

Parmenides/ Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us?

Socrates/ It would seem so.

Parmenides/ I think that there is a stranger consequence still.

Socrates/ What is it?

Parmenides/ Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the same of beauty and of the rest?

Socrates/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things?

Socrates/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Because, Socrates, we have admitted that the ideas are not valid in relation to human things; nor human things in relation to them; the relations of either are limited to their respective spheres.

Socrates/ Yes, that has been admitted.

Parmenides/ And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human thing; just as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our masters, neither do they know the things of men.

Socrates/ Yet, surely, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.

Parmenides/ These, are a few, and only a few of the difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we determine each one of them to be an absolute unity. He who hears what may be said against them will deny the very existence of them—and even if they do exist, he will say that they must of necessity be unknown to man; and he will seem to have reason on his side, and as we were remarking just now, will be very difficult to convince; a man must be gifted with very considerable ability before he can learn that everything has a class and an absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who discovers all these things for himself, and having thoroughly investigated them is able to teach them to others.

Socrates/ I agree with you, Parmenides; and what you say is very much to my mind.

Parmenides/ And yet, Socrates, if a man, fixing his attention on these and the like difficulties, does away with ideas of things and will not admit that every individual thing has its own determinate idea which is always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning, as you seem to me to have particularly noted.

Socrates/ Very true.

Parmenides/ But, then, what is to become of philosophy? Whither shall we turn, if the ideas are unknown?

Socrates/ I certainly do not see my way at present.

Parmenides/ Yes; and I think that this arises, Socrates, out of your attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas generally, without sufficient previous training. I noticed your deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is assuredly noble and divine; but there is an art which is called by the vulgar idle talking, and which is often imagined to be useless; in that you must train and exercise yourself, now that you are young, or truth will elude your grasp.

Socrates/ And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would recommend?

Parmenides/ That which you heard Zeno practicing; at the same time, I give you credit for saying to him that you did not care to examine the perplexity in reference to visible things, or to consider the question in that way; but only in reference to objects of thought, and to what may be called ideas.

Socrates/ Why, yes, there appears to me to be no difficulty in showing by this method that visible things are like and unlike and may experience anything.

Parmenides/ Quite true; but I think that you should go a step further, and consider not only the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis, but also the consequences which flow from denying the hypothesis; and that will be still better training for you.

Socrates/ What do you mean?

Parmenides/ I mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis of Zeno's about the many, you should inquire not only what will be the consequences to the many

in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself and the many, on the hypothesis of the being of the many, but also what will be the consequences to the one and the many in their relation to themselves and to each other, on the opposite hypothesis. Or, again, if likeness is or is not, what will be the consequences in either of these cases to the subjects of the hypothesis, and to other things, in relation both to themselves and to one another, and so of unlikeness; and the same holds good of motion and rest, of generation and destruction, and even of being and not-being. In a word, when you suppose anything to be or not to be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at the consequences in relation to the thing itself, and to any other things which you choose, —to each of them singly, to more than one, and to all; and so of other things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and to anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would train yourself perfectly and see the real truth.

Socrates/ That, Parmenides, is a tremendous business of which you speak, and I do not quite understand you; will you take some hypothesis and go through the steps? —then I shall apprehend you better.

Parmenides/ That, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a man of my years.

Socrates/ Then will you, Zeno?

Cephalus/ Zeno answered with a smile: —

Zeno/ Let us make our petition to Parmenides himself, who is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the extent of the task which you are imposing on him; and if there were more of us I should not ask him, for these are not subjects which anyone, especially at his age, can well speak of before a large audience; most people are not aware that this roundabout progress through all things is the only way

in which the mind can attain truth and wisdom. And therefore, Parmenides, I join in the request of Socrates, that I may hear the process again which I have not heard for a long time.

Cephalus/ When Zeno had thus spoken, Pythodorus, according to Antiphon's report of him, said, that he himself and Aristoteles and the whole company entreated Parmenides to give an example of the process.

Parmenides/ I cannot refuse; and yet I feel rather like Ibycus, who, when in his old age, against his will, he fell in love, compared himself to an old racehorse, who was about to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the course he knew so well—this was his simile of himself. And I also experience a trembling when I remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at my time of life. But I must indulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we are alone, Where shall I begin? And what shall be our first hypothesis, if I am to attempt this laborious pastime? Shall I begin with myself, and take my own hypothesis of the one? and consider the consequences which follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not-being of one?

Zeno/ By all means.

Parmenides/ And who will answer me? Shall I propose the youngest? He will not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what he thinks; and his answers will give me time to breathe.

Aristoteles/ I am the one whom you mean, Parmenides; for I am the youngest and at your service. Ask, and I will answer.

Cephalus/ Parmenides proceeded:

Parmenides/ If one is, the one cannot be many?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Then the one cannot have parts, and cannot be a whole?

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Because every part is part of a whole; is it not?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And what is a whole? would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as being a whole, and also as having parts?

Aristoteles/ To be sure.

Parmenides/ And in either case, the one would be many, and not one?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But, surely, it ought to be one and not many?

Aristoteles/ It ought.

Parmenides/ Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will not have parts?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ But if it has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle, nor end; for these would of course be parts of it.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of everything?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited?

Aristoteles/ Yes, unlimited.

Parmenides/ And therefore formless; for it cannot partake either of round or straight.

Aristoteles/ But why?

Parmenides/ Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are equidistant from the center?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And the straight is that of which the center intercepts the view of the extremes?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook either of a straight or of a circular form?

Aristoteles/ Assuredly.

Parmenides/ But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ And, being of such a nature, it cannot be in any place, for it cannot be either in another or in itself.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ Because if it were in another, it would be encircled by that in which it was, and would touch it at many places and with many parts; but that which is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a circular nature, cannot be touched all round in many places.

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ But if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also be contained by nothing else but itself; that is to say, if it were really in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ But then, that which contains must be other than that which is contained? for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once; and if so, one will be no longer one, but two?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have either rest or motion.

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Why, because the one, if it were moved, would be either moved in place or changed in nature; for these are the only kinds of motion.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And the one, when it changes and ceases to be itself, cannot be any longer one.

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of nature?

Aristoteles/ Clearly not.

Parmenides/ Then can the motion of the one be in place?

Aristoteles/ Perhaps.

Parmenides/ But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in the same place, or from one place to another?

Aristoteles/ It must.

Parmenides/ And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a center; and that which goes round upon a center must have parts which are different from the center; but that

which has no center and no parts cannot possibly be carried round upon a center?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place?

Aristoteles/ Perhaps so, if it moves at all.

Parmenides/ And have we not already shown that it cannot be in anything?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it not?

Aristoteles/ I do not see why.

Parmenides/ Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, can neither as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor be altogether out of it, if already coming into being in it.

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts, and then one part may be in, and another part out of that other; but that which has no parts can never be at one and the same time neither wholly within nor wholly without anything.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has no parts, and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere, since it cannot come into being either as a part or as a whole?

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ Then it does not change place by revolving in the same spot, nor by going somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by change in itself?

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable?

Aristoteles/ Immoveable.

Parmenides/ But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm?

Aristoteles/ Yes, we said so.

Parmenides/ Then it is never in the same?

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Because if it were in the same it would be in something.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then one is never in the same place?

Aristoteles/ It would seem not.

Parmenides/ But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest?

Aristoteles/ Never.

Parmenides/ One then, as would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion?

Aristoteles/ It certainly appears so.

Parmenides/ Neither will it be the same with itself or other; nor again, other than itself or other.

Aristoteles/ How is that?

Parmenides/ If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be one.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself; so that upon this supposition too, it

would not have the nature of one, but would be other than one?

Aristoteles/ It would.

Parmenides/ Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ Neither will it be other than other, while it remains one; for not one, but only other, can be other than other, and nothing else.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then not by virtue of being one will it be other?

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by virtue of itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will not be other than anything?

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ Neither will one be the same with itself.

Aristoteles/ How not?

Parmenides/ Surely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same.

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ It is not when anything becomes the same with anything that it becomes one.

Aristoteles/ What of that?

Parmenides/ Anything which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes many and not one.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a thing became the same, it would always become one; and when it became one, the same?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And, therefore, if one be the same with itself, it is not one with itself, and will therefore be one and also not one.

Aristoteles/ Surely that is impossible.

Parmenides/ And therefore the one can neither be other than other, nor the same with itself.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in relation to itself or other?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Neither will the one be like anything or unlike itself or other.

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Because likeness is sameness of affections.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?

Aristoteles/ That has been shown.

Parmenides/ But if the one had any other affection than that of being one, it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one; which is impossible.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another or with itself?

Aristoteles/ Clearly not.

Parmenides/ Then it cannot be like another, or like itself?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Nor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one.

Aristoteles/ It would.

Parmenides/ That which is affected otherwise than itself or another, will be unlike itself or another, for sameness of affections is likeness.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never unlike itself or other?

Aristoteles/ Never.

Parmenides/ Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?

Aristoteles/ Plainly not.

Parmenides/ Again, being of this nature, it can neither be equal nor unequal either to itself or to other.

Aristoteles/ How is that?

Parmenides/ Why, because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that to which it is equal.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with it, the one will have more measures than that which is less, and fewer than that which is greater?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And so of things which are not commensurate with it, the one will have greater measures than that which is less and smaller than that which is greater.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same measures or have anything else the same?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ And not having the same measures, the one cannot be equal either with itself or with another?

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But again, whether it have fewer or more measures, it will have as many parts as it has measures; and thus again the one will be no longer one but will have as many parts as measures.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ And if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure; yet it has been shown to be incapable of equality.

Aristoteles/ It has.

Parmenides/ Then it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many, nor of few, nor of the same at all, nor be equal to itself or another; nor be greater or less than itself, or other?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything, or of the same age with it?

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Why, because that which is of the same age with itself or other, must partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that the one did not partake either of equality or of likeness?

Aristoteles/ We did say so.

Parmenides/ And we also said, that it did not partake of inequality or unlikeness.

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger than anything, or have the same age with it?

Aristoteles/ In no way.

Parmenides/ Then one cannot be older or younger, or of the same age, either with itself or with another?

Aristoteles/ Clearly not.

Parmenides/ Then the one, being of this nature, cannot be in time at all; for must not that which is in time, be always growing older than itself?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And that which is older, must always be older than something which is younger?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then, that which becomes older than itself, also becomes at the same time younger than itself, if it is to have something to become older than.

Aristoteles/ What do you mean?

Parmenides/ I mean this: —A thing does not need to become different from another thing which is already different; it is different, and if its different has become, it has become different; if its different will be, it will be different; but of that which is becoming different, there cannot have been, or be about to be, or yet be, a different—the only different possible is one which is becoming.

Aristoteles/ That is inevitable.

Parmenides/ But, surely, the elder is a difference relative to the younger, and to nothing else.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time, become younger than itself?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But again, it is true that it cannot become for a longer or for a shorter time than itself, but it must become, and be, and have become, and be about to be, for the same time with itself?

Aristoteles/ That again is inevitable.

Parmenides/ Then things which are in time, and partake of time, must in every case, I suppose, be of the same age with themselves; and must also become at once older and younger than themselves?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But the one did not partake of those affections?

Aristoteles/ Not at all.

Parmenides/ Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?

Aristoteles/ So the argument shows.

Parmenides/ Well, but do not the expressions 'was,' and 'has become,' and 'was becoming,' signify a participation of past time?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And do not 'will be,' 'will become,' 'will have become,' signify a participation of future time?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And 'is,' or 'becomes,' signifies a participation of present time?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And if the one is absolutely without participation in time, it never had become, or was becoming, or was at any time, or is now become or is becoming, or is, or will become, or will have become, or will be, hereafter.

Aristoteles/ Most true.

Parmenides/ But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these?

Aristoteles/ There are none.

Parmenides/ Then the one cannot possibly partake of being?

Aristoteles/ That is the inference.

Parmenides/ Then the one is not at all?

Aristoteles/ Clearly not.

Parmenides/ Then the one does not exist in such way as to be one; for if it were and partook of being, it would already be; but if the argument is to be trusted, the one neither is nor is one?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?

Aristoteles/ Of course not.

Parmenides/ Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor opinion, nor knowledge of it?

Aristoteles/ Clearly not.

Parmenides/ Then it is neither named, nor expressed, nor opined, nor known, nor does anything that is perceive it.

Aristoteles/ So we must infer.

Parmenides/ But can all this be true about the one?

Aristoteles/ I think not.

Parmenides/ Suppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis; let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question appears.

Aristoteles/ I shall be very happy to do so.

Parmenides/ We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then we will begin at the beginning: —If one is, can one be, and not partake of being?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with the one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one; nor would the one have participated in being, for the proposition that one is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one; but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is: —am I not right?

Aristoteles/ Quite right.

Parmenides/ We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ And when we put them together shortly, and say 'One is,' that is equivalent to saying, 'partakes of being'?

Aristoteles/ Quite true.

Parmenides/ Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts?

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ In this way: —If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the same; and since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And is each of these parts—one and being—to be simply called a part, or must the word 'part' be relative to the word 'whole'?

Aristoteles/ The latter.

Parmenides/ Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Again, of the parts of the one, if it is—I mean being and one—does either fail to imply the other? is the one wanting to being, or being to the one?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Thus, each of the parts also has in turn both one and being, and is at the least made up of two parts; and the same principle goes on forever, and every part whatever has always these two parts; for being always involves one, and one being; so that one is always disappearing, and becoming two.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity?

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ Let us take another direction.

Aristoteles/ What direction?

Parmenides/ We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of being, and try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say, it partakes—will this abstract one be one only or many?

Aristoteles/ One, I think.

Parmenides/ Let us see: —Must not the being of one be other than one? for the one is not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ If being and the one be two different things, it is not because the one is one that it is other than being; nor because being is being that it is other than the one; but they differ from one another in virtue of otherness and difference.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ So that the other is not the same—either with the one or with being?

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and the one, or the one and the other, in every such case we take two things, which may be rightly called both.

Aristoteles/ How so.

Parmenides/ In this way—you may speak of being?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And also of one?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then now we have spoken of either of them?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other, —in any such case do I not speak of both?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?

Aristoteles/ Undoubtedly.

Parmenides/ And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be severally one?

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ And if each of them is one, then by the addition of anyone to any pair, the whole becomes three?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And three are odd, and two are even?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are two and thrice, there is thrice two?

Aristoteles/ Undoubtedly.

Parmenides/ Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken odd times, and even taken odd times, and odd taken even times.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be?

Aristoteles/ None whatever.

Parmenides/ Then if one is, number must also be?

Aristoteles/ It must.

Parmenides/ But if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite multiplicity of being; for number is infinite in multiplicity, and partakes also of being: am I not right?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also participate?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it? And, indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of being?

Aristoteles/ In no way.

Parmenides/ And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into being of all sizes, and is broken up more than all things; the divisions of it have no limit.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then it has the greatest number of parts?

Aristoteles/ Yes, the greatest number.

Parmenides/ Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and cannot be none?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But reflect: —Can one, in its entirety, be in many places at the same time?

Aristoteles/ No; I see the impossibility of that.

Parmenides/ And if not in its entirety, then it is divided; for it cannot be present with all the parts of being, unless divided.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed into the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more than the one, but into parts equal to the one; the one is never wanting to being, or being to the one, but being two they are co-equal and co-extensive.

Aristoteles/ Certainly that is true.

Parmenides/ The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained by the whole?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And that which contains, is a limit?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number?

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ And because having limits, also having extremes?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can anything be a whole without these three? And if anyone of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.

Aristoteles/ It will.

Parmenides/ But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it would not be in the middle?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too.

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And all the parts are contained by the whole?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ And the one is the whole?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and the whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be contained by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.

Aristoteles/ That is true.

Parmenides/ But then, again, the whole is not in the parts—neither in all the parts, nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in one; for if there were anyone in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts; for the part in which it is wanting is one of all, and if the whole is not in this, how can it be in them all?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.

Aristoteles/ Yes, impossible.

Parmenides/ But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and not being in itself, it must be in another.

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as being all its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be itself in itself and also in another.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in motion?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and not passing out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never be in the same; and if never in the same, never at rest, and if not at rest, in motion?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion?

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ And must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also the same with the others, and other than the others; this follows from its previous affections.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ Everything in relation to every other thing, is either the same or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part to a whole, or of a whole to a part.

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ And is the one a part of itself?

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to itself as whole to part?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ But is the one other than one?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ And therefore not other than itself?

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But then, again, a thing which is in another place from 'itself,' if this 'itself' remains in the same place with itself, must be other than 'itself,' for it will be in another place?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than that which is other?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not-one?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ Then the one will be other than the others?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But, consider: —Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?

Aristoteles/ They will not.

Parmenides/ If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small, the other would be in the same. Is not that true?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything that is.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the other will never be either in the not-one, or in the one?

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the not-one other than the one.

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not partaking of the other.

Aristoteles/ How can they be?

Parmenides/ But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another?

Aristoteles/ They will.

Parmenides/ Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have been not-one, but would have been in some way one.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been not-one at all.

Aristoteles/ It would not.

Parmenides/ Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one?

Aristoteles/ It would.

Parmenides/ If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or whole of the one?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another: —so we said?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is the same with it?

Aristoteles/ Let us say so.

Parmenides/ Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself and the others.

Aristoteles/ That appears to be the inference.

Parmenides/ And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?

Aristoteles/ Perhaps.

Parmenides/ Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also be other than the one.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and the others like the one.

Aristoteles/ How do you mean?

Parmenides/ I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a thing?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And you may say the name once or oftener?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? and when more than once, is it something else which you mention? or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once?

Aristoteles/ Of course it is the same.

Parmenides/ And is not 'other' a name given to a thing?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Whenever, then, you use the word 'other' whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other than the others, in repeating the word 'other' we speak of that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?

Aristoteles/ Quite true.

Parmenides/ Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than the one, in that the word 'other' is applied to both, will be in the same condition; and that which is in the same condition is like?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the others, everything will be like everything, for everything is other than everything.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And the other to the same?

Aristoteles/ True again.

Parmenides/ And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And in that it was other it was shown to be like?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite affection to that which made it like; and this was the affection of otherness.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the opposite of the other.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far as it is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same.

Aristoteles/ Yes, that argument may be used.

Parmenides/ And there is another argument.

Aristoteles/ What?

Parmenides/ In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected otherwise, and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not being unlike, is like; but in so far as it is

affected by other it is otherwise, and being otherwise affected is unlike.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the others, on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both like and unlike the others?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And in the same way as being other than itself and the same with itself, on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike itself?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others? —consider.

Aristoteles/ I am considering.

Parmenides/ The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And also in other things?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, but in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching them, and would touch itself only.

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ Then the inference is that it would touch both?

Aristoteles/ It would.

Parmenides/ But what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is to touch another be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy the place nearest to that in which what it touches is situated?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is?

Aristoteles/ It ought.

Parmenides/ And that would require that the one should be two, and be in two places at once, and this, while it is one, will never happen.

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ Neither can it touch others.

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ The reason is, that whatever is to touch another must be in separation from, and next to, that which it is to touch, and no third thing can be between them.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?

Aristoteles/ They are.

Parmenides/ And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will be three, and the contacts two?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it follows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the first two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole number of terms exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in like manner; and for everyone which is afterwards

added to the number of terms, one contact is added to the contacts.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always one less.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact?

Aristoteles/ How can there be?

Parmenides/ And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and have no part in the one?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then they have no number, if they have no one in them?

Aristoteles/ Of course not.

Parmenides/ Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of any number?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist?

Aristoteles/ Clearly not.

Parmenides/ And if there are not two, there is no contact?

Aristoteles/ There is not.

Parmenides/ Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if there is no contact?

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the others?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Further—is the one equal and unequal to itself and others?

Aristoteles/ How do you mean?

Parmenides/ It the one were greater or less than the others, or the others greater or less than the one, they would not be greater or less than each other in virtue of their being the one and the others; but, if in addition to their being what they are they had equality, they would be equal to one another, or if the one had smallness and the others greatness, or the one had greatness and the others smallness—whichever kind had greatness would be greater, and whichever had smallness would be smaller?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness; for if they were not they could not be opposed to each other and be present in that which is.

Aristoteles/ How could they?

Parmenides/ If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the whole or in a part of the whole?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Suppose the first; it will be either co-equal and co-extensive with the whole one, or will contain the one?

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ If it be co-extensive with the one it will be co-equal with the one, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the whole will recur; it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part; nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in anything there will be something greater other and besides greatness itself, namely, that in which greatness is; and this too when the small itself is not there, which the one, if it is great, must exceed; this, however, is impossible, seeing that smallness is wholly absent.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ Then other things are not greater or less than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness; nor have greatness or smallness any power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to one another; nor will the one be greater or less than them or others, if it has neither greatness nor smallness.

Aristoteles/ Clearly not.

Parmenides/ Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot either exceed or be exceeded by them?

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality; and being on an equality, must be equal.

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself; having neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality with and equal to itself.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then the one will be equal both to itself and the others?

Aristoteles/ Clearly so.

Parmenides/ And yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be without itself; and, as containing itself, will be greater than itself; and, as contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be greater and less than itself.

Aristoteles/ It will.

Parmenides/ Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others?

Aristoteles/ Of course not.

Parmenides/ But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it is will be greater; in no other way can one thing be in another.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And since there is nothing other or besides the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the one in the others and the others in the one, if they are to be anywhere?

Aristoteles/ That is clear.

Parmenides/ But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than the others, because it is contained in them; and inasmuch as the others are in the one, the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others?

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ And if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and more and less measures or divisions than itself and the others, and if of measures, also of parts?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will be in number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise equal in number to itself and to the others?

Aristoteles/ How is that?

Parmenides/ It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of as many parts as measures; and so with that to which it is equal, and that than which it is less.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will be of equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than itself; and if of measures then also of parts?

Aristoteles/ It will.

Parmenides/ And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch as it is greater than them, it will be more in number than them; and inasmuch as it is smaller, it will be less in number; and inasmuch as it is equal in size to other things, it will be equal to them in number.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Once more, then, as would appear, the one will be in number both equal to and more and less than both itself and all other things.

Aristoteles/ It will.

Parmenides/ Does the one also partake of time? And is it and does it become older and younger than itself and others, and again, neither younger nor older than itself and others, by virtue of participation in time?

Aristoteles/ How do you mean?

Parmenides/ If one is, being must be predicated of it?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But to be (εἶναι) is only participation of being in present time, and to have been is the participation of being at a past time, and to be about to be is the participation of being at a future time?

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And is not time always moving forward?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves forward in time?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger?

Aristoteles/ I remember.

Parmenides/ Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the same time?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And it is older (is it not?) when in becoming, it gets to the point of time between 'was' and 'will be,' which is 'now': for surely in going from the past to the future, it cannot skip the present?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ And when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming older, and no longer becomes, but is older, for if it went on it would never be reached by the present, for it is the nature of that which goes on, to touch both the present and the future, letting go the present and seizing the future, while in process of becoming between them.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But that which is becoming cannot skip the present; when it reaches the present it ceases to become, and is then whatever it may happen to be becoming.

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ And so the one, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become, and is then older.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And it is older than that than which it was becoming older, and it was becoming older than itself.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And that which is older is older than that which is younger?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But the present is always present with the one during all its being; for whenever it is it is always now.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself?

Aristoteles/ Truly.

Parmenides/ And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with itself?

Aristoteles/ An equal time.

Parmenides/ But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of the same age with itself?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself?

Aristoteles/ I should say not.

Parmenides/ And what are its relations to other things? Is it or does it become older or younger than they?

Aristoteles/ I cannot tell you.

Parmenides/ You can at least tell me that others than the one are more than the one—other would have been one, but the others have multitude, and are more than one?

Aristoteles/ They will have multitude.

Parmenides/ And a multitude implies a number larger than one?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to have come into existence?

Aristoteles/ The lesser.

Parmenides/ Then the least is the first? And that is the one?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then the one of all things that have number is the first to come into being; but all other things have also number, being plural and not singular.

Aristoteles/ They have.

Parmenides/ And since it came into being first it must be supposed to have come into being prior to the others, and the others later; and the things which came into being later, are younger than that which preceded them? And so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ What would you say of another question? Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And a beginning, both of the one itself and of all other things, comes into being first of all; and after the beginning, the others follow, until you reach the end?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?

Aristoteles/ Yes; that is what we shall say.

Parmenides/ But the end comes last, and the one is of such a nature as to come into being with the last; and, since the one cannot come into being except in accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should come into being after the others, simultaneously with the end.

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the one.

Aristoteles/ That also is clear in my judgment.

Parmenides/ Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And will not the one come into being together with each part—together with the first part when that comes into being, and together with the second part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part, which is added to any other part until it has reached the last and become one whole; it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to the first, nor to the last, nor to any of them, while the process of becoming is going on?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be neither prior nor posterior to the others, but simultaneous; and according to this argument the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the

others than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older and younger than the others and the others than the one.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ After this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older nor younger, what shall we say? Shall we say as of being so also of becoming, or otherwise?

Aristoteles/ I cannot answer.

Parmenides/ But I can venture to say, that even if one thing were older or younger than another, it could not become older or younger in a greater degree than it was at first; for equals added to unequals, whether to periods of time or to anything else, leave the difference between them the same as at first.

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than that which is, since the difference of age is always the same; the one is and has become older and the other younger; but they are no longer becoming so.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And the one which is does not therefore become either older or younger than the others which are.

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ But consider whether they may not become older and younger in another way.

Aristoteles/ In what way?

Parmenides/ Just as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than the one.

Aristoteles/ And what of that?

Parmenides/ If the one is older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ But consider again; if we add equal time to a greater and a less time, will the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion than before?

Aristoteles/ By a smaller portion.

Parmenides/ Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if an equal time be added to both of them they will differ less and less in age?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly, from being older will become younger in relation to that other than which it was older?

Aristoteles/ Yes, younger.

Parmenides/ And if the one becomes younger the others aforesaid will become older than they were before, in relation to the one.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then that which had become younger becomes older relatively to that which previously had become and was older; it never really is older, but is always becoming, for the one is always growing on the side of youth and the other on the side of age. And in like manner the older is always in process of becoming younger than the younger; for as they are always going in opposite directions they become in ways the opposite to one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. They cannot, however, have become; for if they had already become they would be and not merely become. But that is impossible; for they are always becoming both older

and younger than one another: the one becomes younger than the others because it was seen to be older and prior, and the others become older than the one because they came into being later; and in the same way the others are in the same relation to the one, because they were seen to be older and prior to the one.

Aristoteles/ That is clear.

Parmenides/ Inasmuch then, as one thing does not become older or younger than another, in that they always differ from each other by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which came into being later must continually differ from each other by a different portion—in this point of view the others must become older and younger than the one, and the one than the others.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger than itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself or the others.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future?

Aristoteles/ Of course it must.

Parmenides/ Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?

Aristoteles/ Quite right.

Parmenides/ Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed, and everything of this kind which appertains to other things appertains to the one.

Aristoteles/ Certainly, that is true.

Parmenides/ Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is both one and many, as we have described, and is neither one nor many, and participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at times partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not partake of being?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of being when partaking of being?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times, for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes being—for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it receives and also gives it up at some time?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?

Aristoteles/ I should.

Parmenides/ And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?

Aristoteles/ I should.

Parmenides/ The one then, as would appear, becomes and is destroyed by taking and giving up being.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience separation and aggregation?

Aristoteles/ Inevitably.

Parmenides/ And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be equalized?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time at all?

Aristoteles/ How can it?

Parmenides/ But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without experiencing change, is impossible.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest?

Aristoteles/ There cannot.

Parmenides/ But neither can it change without changing.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ When then does it change; for it cannot change either when at rest, or when in motion, or when in time?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing really exist?

Aristoteles/ What thing?

Parmenides/ The moment. For the moment seems to imply a something out of which change takes place into either of two states; for the change is not from the state of rest as such, nor from the state of motion as such; but there is this curious nature which we call the moment lying between rest and motion, not being in any time; and into this and out of this what is in motion changes into rest, and what is at rest into motion.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ And the one then, since it is at rest and also in motion, will change to either, for only in this way can it be in both. And in changing it changes in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in no time, and will not then be either in motion or at rest.

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes, when it passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being into becoming—then it passes between certain states of motion and rest, and neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed.

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ And on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and from many to one, the one is neither

one nor many, neither separated nor aggregated; and in the passage from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation nor of dissimilation; and in the passage from small to great and equal and back again, it will be neither small nor great, nor equal, nor in a state of increase, or diminution, or equalization.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ All these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one has being.

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ But if one is, what will happen to the others—is not that also to be considered?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Let us show then, if one is, what will be the affections of the others than the one.

Aristoteles/ Let us do so.

Parmenides/ Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are not the one; for if they were they could not be other than the one.

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ Nor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain way they participate in the one.

Aristoteles/ In what way?

Parmenides/ Because the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have parts; for if they had no parts they would be simply one.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?

Aristoteles/ So we say.

Parmenides/ And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many; and the parts will be parts of the one, for each of the parts is not a part of many, but of a whole.

Aristoteles/ How do you mean?

Parmenides/ If anything were a part of many, being itself one of them, it will surely be a part of itself, which is impossible, and it will be a part of each one of the other parts, if of all; for if not a part of some one, it will be a part of all the others but this one, and thus will not be a part of each one; and if not a part of each one, it will not be a part of anyone of the many; and not being a part of anyone, it cannot be a part or anything else of all those things of none of which it is anything.

Aristoteles/ Clearly not.

Parmenides/ Then the part is not a part of the many, nor of all, but is of a certain single form, which we call a whole, being one perfect unity framed out of all—of this the part will be a part.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ If, then, the others have parts, they will participate in the whole and in the one.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the others than the one must be one perfect whole, having parts.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And the same argument holds of each part, for the part must participate in the one; for if each of the parts is a part, this means, I suppose, that it is one separate from the rest and self-related; otherwise it is not each.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must clearly be other than one; for if not, it

would not merely have participated, but would have been one; whereas only the one itself can be one.

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ Both the whole and the part must participate in the one; for the whole will be one whole, of which the parts will be parts; and each part will be one part of the whole which is the whole of the part.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ And the things which are other than the one will be many; for if the things which are other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But, seeing that the things which participate in the one as a part, and in the one as a whole, are more than one, must not those very things which participate in the one be infinite in number?

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ Let us look at the matter thus: —Is it not a fact that in partaking of the one they are not one, and do not partake of the one at the very time when they are partaking of it?

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present?

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest fraction, must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of the one, be a multitude and not one?

Aristoteles/ It must.

Parmenides/ And if we continue to look at the other side of their nature, regarded simply, and in itself, will not they, as far as we see them, be unlimited in number?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And yet, when each several part becomes a part, then the parts have a limit in relation to the whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to the parts.

Aristoteles/ Just so.

Parmenides/ The result to the others than the one is that the union of themselves and the one appears to create a new element in them which gives to them limitation in relation to one another; whereas in their own nature they have no limit.

Aristoteles/ That is clear.

Parmenides/ Then the others than the one, both as whole and parts, are infinite, and also partake of limit.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves.

Aristoteles/ How is that?

Parmenides/ Inasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature, they are all affected in the same way.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected in the same way.

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ But inasmuch as their state is both limited and unlimited, they are affected in opposite ways.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And opposites are the most unlike of things.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Considered, then, in regard to either one of their affections, they will be like themselves and one another; considered in reference to both of them together, most opposed and most unlike.

Aristoteles/ That appears to be true.

Parmenides/ Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And they are the same and also different from one another, and in motion and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection, as may be proved without difficulty of them, since they have been shown to have experienced the affections aforesaid?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these matters as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the one is, whether the opposite of all this is or is not equally true of the others.

Aristoteles/ By all means.

Parmenides/ Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of the others?

Aristoteles/ Let us ask that question.

Parmenides/ Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one?

Aristoteles/ Why so?

Parmenides/ Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from both of them; for the expression 'one and the others' includes all things.

Aristoteles/ Yes, all things.

Parmenides/ Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in which both the one and the others might exist?

Aristoteles/ There is nothing.

Parmenides/ Then the one and the others are never in the same?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then they are separated from each other?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part?

Aristoteles/ It would seem not.

Parmenides/ Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity?

Aristoteles/ There is not.

Parmenides/ Nor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them would be a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any way of the one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them likeness and

unlikeness, they would have, two natures in them opposite to one another.

Aristoteles/ That is clear.

Parmenides/ But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures, which would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake of opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown to be impossible.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort; for, if they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one.

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other things.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/. Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if the one is not?

Aristoteles/ Yes; we ought.

Parmenides/ What is the meaning of the hypothesis—If the one is not; is there any difference between this and the hypothesis—If the not one is not?

Aristoteles/ There is a difference, certainly.

Parmenides/ Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions—if the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?

Aristoteles/ They are entirely opposed.

Parmenides/ And suppose a person to say: —If greatness is not, if smallness is not, or anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such an expression, that 'what is not' is other than other things?

Aristoteles/ To be sure.

Parmenides/ And so when he says 'If one is not' he clearly means, that what 'is not' is other than all others; we know what he means—do we not?

Aristoteles/ Yes, we do.

Parmenides/ When he says 'one,' he says something which is known; and secondly something which is other than all other things; it makes no difference whether he predicate of one being or not-being, for that which is said 'not to be' is known to be something all the same, and is distinguished from other things.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the consequences? In the first place, as would appear, there is a knowledge of it, or the very meaning of the words, 'if one is not,' would not be known.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as different from the others?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Difference, then, belongs to it as well as knowledge; for in speaking of the one as different from the others, we do not speak of a difference in the others, but in the one.

Aristoteles/ Clearly so.

Parmenides/ Moreover, the one that is not is something and partakes of relation to 'that,' and 'this,' and 'these,' and the like, and is an attribute of 'this'; for the one, or the others than the one, could not have been spoken of, nor could any attribute or relative of the one that is not have been or been spoken of, nor could it have been said to be anything, if it did not partake of 'some,' or of the other relations just now mentioned.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Being, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, since it is not; but the one that is not may or rather must participate in many things, if it and nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor the one that is not is supposed not to be, and we are speaking of something of a different nature, we can predicate nothing of it. But supposing that the one that is not and nothing else is not, then it must participate in the predicate 'that,' and in many others.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others, for the others being different from the one will be of a different kind.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ And are not things other in kind unlike?

Aristoteles/ They are unlike.

Parmenides/ And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will clearly be unlike them?

Aristoteles/ Clearly so.

Parmenides/ Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike it?

Aristoteles/ That would seem to be true.

Parmenides/ And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it must have likeness to itself.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ If the one have unlikeness to one, something else must be meant; nor will the hypothesis relate to one; but it will relate to something other than one?

Aristoteles/ Quite so.

Parmenides/ But that cannot be.

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Then the one must have likeness to itself?

Aristoteles/ It must.

Parmenides/ Again, it is not equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would at once be and be like them in virtue of the equality; but if one has no being, then it can neither be nor be like?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ But since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be equal to it?

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ And things that are not equal are unequal?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And they are unequal to an unequal?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are unequal to it?

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ And inequality implies greatness and smallness?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness?

Aristoteles/ That appears to be true.

Parmenides/ And greatness and smallness always stand apart?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then there is always something between them?

Aristoteles/ There is.

Parmenides/ And can you think of anything else which is between them other than equality?

Aristoteles/ No, it is equality which lies between them.

Parmenides/ Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies between them?

Aristoteles/ That is clear.

Parmenides/ Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and smallness and equality?

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being?

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ It must be so, for if not, then we should not speak the truth in saying that the one is not. But if we speak the truth, clearly we must say what is. Am I not right?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say what is?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then, as would appear, the one, when it is not, is; for if it were not to be when it is not, but were to

relinquish something of being, so as to become not-being, it would at once be.

Aristoteles/ Quite true.

Parmenides/ Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have the being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its own being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the not-being of not-being is when being partakes of the being of being, and not of the being of not-being—that is, the perfection of being; and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of not-being but of the being of not-being—that is the perfection of not-being.

Aristoteles/ Most true.

Parmenides/ Since then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?

Aristoteles/ Clearly.

Parmenides/ And has not-being also, if it is not?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without changing?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And change is motion—we may say that?

Aristoteles/ Yes, motion.

Parmenides/ And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And therefore is and is not in the same state?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it changes from being to not-being?

Aristoteles/ That appears to be true.

Parmenides/ But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not, it cannot change from one place to another?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Then it cannot move by changing place?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the same is, and that which is not cannot be reckoned among things that are?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ Then the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Neither can the one, whether it is or is not, be altered into other than itself, for if it altered and became different from itself, then we could not be still speaking of the one, but of something else?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the same place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest must stand still?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Then the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion?

Aristoteles/ That seems to be true.

Parmenides/ But if it be in motion it must necessarily undergo alteration, for anything which is moved, in so far as it is moved, is no longer in the same state, but in another?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then the one, being moved, is altered?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so far as it is not moved, it is not altered?

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered?

Aristoteles/ That is clear.

Parmenides/ And must not that which is altered become other than it previously was, and lose its former state and be destroyed; but that which is not altered can neither come into being nor be destroyed?

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ And the one that is not, being altered, becomes and is destroyed; and not being altered, neither

becomes nor is destroyed; and so the one that is not becomes and is destroyed, and neither becomes nor is destroyed?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And now, let us go back once more to the beginning, and see whether these or some other consequences will follow.

Aristoteles/ Let us do as you say.

Parmenides/ If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one? That is the question.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Do not the words 'is not' signify absence of being in that to which we apply them?

Aristoteles/ Just so.

Parmenides/ And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way but is in another? or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no sort or way or kind participation of being?

Aristoteles/ Quite absolutely.

Parmenides/ Then, that which is not cannot be, or in any way participate in being?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of being and the loss of being?

Aristoteles/ Nothing else.

Parmenides/ And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose being?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ The one then, since it in no way is, cannot have or lose or assume being in any way?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither perishes nor becomes?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be destroyed?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But if it be not altered it cannot be moved?

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for that which stands must always be in one and the same spot?

Aristoteles/ Of course.

Parmenides/ Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and never moves?

Aristoteles/ Neither.

Parmenides/ Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for if there had been, it would partake of being?

Aristoteles/ That is clear.

Parmenides/ And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be attributed to it?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to others?

Aristoteles/ Clearly not.

Parmenides/ Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be attributed to it?

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or different in relation to it?

Aristoteles/ They cannot.

Parmenides/ Nor can what is not, be anything, or be this thing, or be related to or the attribute of this or that or other, or be past, present, or future. Nor can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression, or name, or any other thing that is, have any concern with it?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind?

Aristoteles/ Such appears to be the conclusion.

Parmenides/ Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others? Let us determine that.

Aristoteles/ Yes; let us determine that.

Parmenides/ The others must surely be; for if they, like the one, were not, we could not be now speaking of them.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But to speak of the others implies difference—the terms 'other' and 'different' are synonymous?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Other means other than other, and different, different from the different?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be other?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And what can that be? —for if the one is not, they will not be other than the one.

Aristoteles/ They will not.

Parmenides/ Then they will be other than each other; for the only remaining alternative is that they are other than nothing.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And they are each other than one another, as being plural and not singular; for if one is not, they cannot be singular, but every particle of them is infinite in number; and even if a person takes that which appears to be the smallest fraction, this, which seemed one, in a moment evanesces into many, as in a dream, and from being the smallest becomes very great, in comparison with the fractions into which it is split up?

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ And in such particles the others will be other than one another, if others are, and the one is not?

Aristoteles/ Exactly.

Parmenides/ And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one, but not being one, if one is not?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them appears to be one, though it is really many?

Aristoteles/ It can.

Parmenides/ And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also have no reality, if one is not?

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And there will appear to be a least among them; and even this will seem large and manifold in comparison with the many small fractions which are contained in it?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And each particle will be imagined to be equal to the many and little; for it could not have appeared to pass from the greater to the less without having appeared to arrive at the middle; and thus would arise the appearance of equality.

Aristoteles/ Yes.

Parmenides/ And having neither beginning, middle, nor end, each separate particle yet appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ Because, when a person conceives of anyone of these as such, prior to the beginning another beginning appears, and there is another end, remaining after the end, and in the middle truer middles within but smaller, because no unity can be conceived of any of them, since the one is not.

Aristoteles/ Very true.

Parmenides/ And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And such being when seen indistinctly and at a distance, appears to be one; but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single thing appears to be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which is not?

Aristoteles/ Nothing more certain.

Parmenides/ Then each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and one and many, if others than the one exist and not the one.

Aristoteles/ They must.

Parmenides/ Then will they not appear to be like and unlike?

Aristoteles/ In what way?

Parmenides/ Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But when you approach them, they appear to be many and different; and because of the appearance of the difference, different in kind from, and unlike, themselves?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And so must the particles appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And must they not be the same and yet different from one another, and in contact with themselves, although they are separated, and having every sort of motion, and every sort of rest, and becoming and being destroyed, and in neither state, and the like, all which things may be easily enumerated, if the one is not and the many are?

Aristoteles/ Most true.

Parmenides/ Once more, let us go back to the beginning, and ask if the one is not, and the others of the one are, what will follow.

Aristoteles/ Let us ask that question.

Parmenides/ In the first place, the others will not be one?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Nor will they be many; for if they were many one would be contained in them. But if no one of them is one, all of them are naught, and therefore they will not be many.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ If there be no one in the others, the others are neither many nor one.

Aristoteles/ They are not.

Parmenides/ Nor do they appear either as one or many.

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Because the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with any sort of not-being, nor can anything which is not, be connected with any of the others; for that which is not has no parts.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of not-being in connection with the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the others.

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Then if one is not, there is no conception of any of the others either as one or many; for you cannot conceive the many without the one.

Aristoteles/ You cannot.

Parmenides/ Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor can be conceived to be either one or many?

Aristoteles/ It would seem not.

Parmenides/ Nor as like or unlike?

Aristoteles/ No.

Parmenides/ Nor as the same or different, nor in contact or separation, nor in any of those states which we enumerated as appearing to be the others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if one is not?

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is not, then nothing is?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Let thus much be said; and further let us affirm what seems to be the truth, that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear to be and appear not to be.

Aristoteles/ Most true.

The Parmenides.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

Cephalus, Pythodorus, Adimantus, Socrates.

Antiphon, Zeno, Glauco, Parmenides.

scene, the Ceramicus.

Cephalus/ When we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, the place of our abode, we fortunately met with Adimantus and Glaucus in the forum: and Adimantus, taking me by the hand;

Adeimantus/ I am glad to see you, Cephalus; and if you are in want of anything here, in which we are able to assist you, I beg you would inform me.

Cephalus/ I came for this very purpose, as being indigent of your assistance.

Adeimantus/ Tell me, then, what you are in want of.

Cephalus/ What was your brother's name? for I do not remember: as he was almost a child when I first came here from Clazomenia; and, since that circumstance took place, a great length of time has intervened. But his father's name was, I think, Pyrilampes.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so, and my brother's name was Antiphon. But what is it you principally inquire after?

Cephalus/ These my Fellow-citizens are very philosophic, and have heard that this Antiphon was frequently present with one Pythodorus, the familiar of Zeno, and that he treasured in his memory the discourses which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides had with each other, and which had frequently been heard by Pythodorus.

Adeimantus/ You speak the truth.

Cephalus/ These discourses, therefore, we are desirous to hear.

Adeimantus/ But this is no difficult matter to accomplish: for the young man has made them the subject of vehement meditation; and now with his grandfather, who bears the same name as himself, very much applies himself to equestrian affairs. But if it is necessary, we will go to him: for he just now went from hence home; and dwells very near, in Melita.

Cephalus/ After we had thus spoke, we proceeded to the house of Antiphon; and found him at home, giving a certain bridle to a coppersmith, to be furnished in a proper manner. But as soon as the smith was gone, and the brothers had told him the cause of our arrival, Antiphon knew me, in consequence of my former journey to this place, and very kindly saluted me: and upon our begging him to relate the discourses, at first he seemed unwilling to comply (for he said it was a very operose undertaking); but afterwards, however, he gratified our request. Antiphon, therefore, said that Pythodorus related that Zeno and Parmenides once came to celebrate the great Panathenæa: that Parmenides was very much advanced in years, extremely hoary, but of a beautiful and venerable aspect, and about sixty-five years of age; but that Zeno was nearly forty years old, was very tall and graceful to the view, and was reported to be the bosom friend of Parmenides.

He likewise said that he met with them, together with Pythodorus, in the Ceramicus, beyond the walls; where also Socrates came, and many others with him, desiring to hear the writings of Zeno, for then for the first time they became acquainted with his writings: but that Socrates at that time was very young. That, in consequence of this, Zeno himself read to them. And Pythodorus further related that it happened Parmenides was gone out; and that but a small

part of the discourse remained unfinished, when he himself entered, together with Parmenides and Aristotle, who was one of the thirty Athenians. That, in consequence of this, he heard but a little at that time; but that he had often before heard the whole discourse from Zeno.

He further added, that Socrates, upon hearing the latter part of Zeno's discourse, entreated him to repeat the first hypothesis of his first discourse; and that, when he had repeated it, Socrates said—

Socrates/ How is it you assert, O Zeno, that if beings are many, it is requisite that the same things should be both similar and dissimilar? But that this is impossible. For neither can things dissimilar be similar, nor things similar be dissimilar. Is not this what you assert?

Zeno/ It is.

Socrates/ If, therefore, it is impossible that dissimilars should be similar, and similars dissimilar, is it not impossible that many things should have a subsistence? For, if there were many, they would suffer impossibilities. Is it not then the sole intention of your discourses to evince, by contesting through all things, that the many has no subsistence? And do you not consider each of your discourses as an argument in support of this opinion; and so think that you have produced as many arguments as you have composed discourses, to show that the many is not? Is not this what you say, or do I not rightly understand you?

Zeno/ You perceive excellently well the meaning of the whole book.

Socrates/ I perceive, O Parmenides, that this Zeno does not only wish to connect himself in the bands of friendship with you, but to agree with you likewise in sentiments concerning the doctrines of the present discourse. For Zeno, in a certain respect, has written the same as yourself;

though, by changing certain particulars, he endeavors to deceive us into an opinion that his assertions are different from yours. For you in your poems assert that the universe is one; and you produce beautiful and excellent arguments in support of this opinion: but Zeno says that the many is not, and delivers many and mighty arguments in defense, of this assertion. As, therefore, you assert that the one is, and he, that the many has no subsistence; and each speaks in such a manner as to disagree totally according to appearance from one another, though you both nearly assert the same; on this account it is that your discourses seem to be above our comprehension.

Zeno/ —Indeed, Socrates, so it is: but you do not perfectly apprehend the truth of my writings; though, like Laconic dogs, you excellently pursue and trace the meaning of the assertions. But this in the first place is concealed from you, that this discourse is not in every respect so venerable, that it was composed, as you say, for the purpose of concealing its real doctrines from men, as if effecting a thing of great importance: yet you have spoken something of that which happens to be the case. But indeed the truth of the matter is this: These writings were composed for the purpose of affording a certain assistance to the doctrine of Parmenides, against those who endeavor to defame it by attempting to show that if the one is many, ridiculous consequences must attend such an opinion; and that things contrary to the assertion must ensue. This writing, therefore, contradicts those who say that the many is, and opposes this and many other opinions; as it is desirous to evince that the hypothesis which defends the subsistence of the many is attended with more ridiculous consequences than that which vindicates the subsistence of the one, if both are sufficiently examined. You are ignorant, therefore, Socrates, that this discourse, which was composed by me when a youth, through the love

of contention, and which was privately taken from me, so that I was not able to consult whether or not it should be issued into the light—you are ignorant, I say, that it was not written through that desire of renown which belongs to a more advanced period of life, but through a juvenile desire of contention: though, as I have said, you do not conjecture amiss.

Socrates/ I admit it; and I think the case is just as you have stated it. But satisfy me in the following particulars. Do you think that there is a certain form of similitude, itself subsisting from itself? And another which is contrary to this, and is that which is dissimilar? But that you and me, and other things which we call many, participate of these two? And that such things as participate of similitude become similar, so far as they participate? But those which participate of dissimilitude become dissimilar? And that those which participate of both become both? But if all things participate of both, which are contrary to each other, and become similar and dissimilar to each other through participating of both, is there anything wonderful in the case? For, if anyone should show that similars themselves become dissimilar, or dissimilars similar, I should think it would be a prodigy: but if he evinces that such things as participate both these suffer likewise both these, it does not appear to me, O Zeno, that there would be anything absurd in the case; nor again, if anyone should evince that all things are one, through their participating of the one, and at the same time many, through their participating multitude. But I should very much wonder if anyone should show that that which is one is many, and that the many is one; and in a similar manner concerning all the rest: for, doubtless, he would produce a proper subject of admiration, who should evince that both genera and species suffer these contrary affections. But what occasion of wonder would there be,

should anyone show that I myself am both one and many? and should prove his assertion by saying, when he wishes to assert that I am many, that the parts on the right hand of me are different from those on the left, the anterior from the posterior, and in like manner the upward from the downward parts (for I think that I participate of multitude): but when he desires to show that I am one, should say, that as we are seven in number, I am one man, and participate of the one? so that he would by this means evince the truth of both these assertions. If anyone, therefore, should endeavor to show that stones, wood, and all such particulars, are both many and one, we should say that he exhibits to our view such things as are many and one, but that he does not assert that the one is many, nor the many one; nor speak of anything wonderful, but asserts that which is confessed by all men. But if anyone should, in the first place, distribute the forms of things, concerning which I have just been speaking, separating them essentially apart from each other, such as similitude and dissimilitude, multitude and the one, and the rest of this kind, and should afterwards show himself able to mingle and separate them in themselves, I should be astonished, O Zeno, in a wonderful manner. But it appears to me that we should strenuously labor in the investigation of these particulars: yet I should be much astonished if anyone could solve this doubt, which is so profoundly involved in species; so as to be able no less clearly to explain this affair in the forms which are apprehended by the reasoning power, than in those belonging to visible objects, and which you have already discussed.

Cephalus/ Pythodorus said, that when Socrates had thus spoken, he thought that Parmenides and Zeno seemed to be indignant at the several particulars of Socrates's discourse; but that they bestowed the greatest attention on what he

said, and frequently looking at each other smiled, as wondering at Socrates: and that, in consequence of his ceasing to speak, Parmenides said—

Parmenides/ How worthy, O Socrates, of admiration is your ardor in the pursuit of liberal disciplines! Tell me, therefore, have you separated, as you say, certain species apart by themselves, and likewise the participants of these species apart? And does there appear to you to be a certain similitude separate from that similitude which we possess, and a certain one and many, and all such other particulars, which you have just now heard mentioned by Zeno?

Socrates/ So it appears to me.

Parmenides/ And does it also appear to you, that there is a certain species or form of *justice*, itself subsisting by itself; likewise of *beauty* and *the good*, and everything of this kind?

Socrates/ It does.

Parmenides/ And likewise of all such things as we are composed from: so that there is a certain form of *man*, or of *fire*, or *water*?

Socrates/ —I have often been in doubt, O Parmenides, concerning these; whether it is necessary to speak of them in the same manner as of the former particulars, or in a different manner.

Parmenides/ And do you doubt, O Socrates, whether it is necessary to say that there is a certain form of every such particular as may appear to be ridiculous, I mean hair, clay, and mud, or anything else which is vile and abject; and that these forms are different from the particulars with which we are conversant?

Socrates/ I do not by any means think that the forms of these can be different from those which are the objects of our inspection: but is it not vehemently absurd to think that there is a certain form of these? For this has formerly

disturbed me, whether or not something of this kind does not take place about everything: but, after having been fixed for some time in this opinion, I have hastily withdrawn myself and fled away; fearing lest, falling into a certain abyss of trifles, I should utterly perish and be lost; but, returning from thence, I have seriously applied myself to consider those particulars, to which, as we have just now asserted, forms belong.

Parmenides/ You are as yet but a young man, O Socrates, and Philosophy has not yet received you into her embraces: for, in my opinion, when you are received by her, you will not despise any of these particulars: but now, on account of your juvenile age, you regard the opinions of men.

Tell me, then, does it appear to you, as you say, that there are certain forms, of which other things participating retain the appellations; as, for instance, that such things as participate of *similitude* are *similars*; of magnitude, great; and that the participants of and justice are beautiful and just?

Socrates/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Does not everything which participates either participate the whole form, or only a part of it? Or can there be any other mode of participation besides these?

Socrates/ How can there be?

Parmenides/ Does it then appear to you that the whole form is one in each individual of many things? Or what other opinion have you on this subject?

Socrates/ What hinders, O Parmenides, but that it should be one?

Parmenides/ As it is, therefore, one and the same in things many and separate from each other, the whole will be at the same time one, and so itself will be separate from itself.

Socrates/ It would not be so: but just as if this form was day, this being one and the same, is collectively present in many places, and yet is not anything the more separate from itself; in the same manner, every form may be at once one and the same in all.

Parmenides/ You have made, O Socrates, one and the same thing to be collectively present in many places, in a very pleasant manner; just as if, covering many men with a veil, you should say that there is one whole, together with the many. Do you not think that you would make an assertion of this kind?

Socrates/ Perhaps so.

Parmenides/ Will, therefore, the whole veil subsist together with each man, or a different part of it with each individual?

Socrates/ A different part only.

Parmenides/ These forms then, O Socrates, are divisible, and their participants participate only parts of them: and hence there will no longer be one whole form in each individual, but only one part of each form.

Socrates/ So indeed it seems.

Parmenides/ Are you then willing to assert that one form is in reality divided, and that nevertheless it is still one?

Socrates/ By no means.

Parmenides/ For see, whether upon dividing magnitude itself, it would not be absurd that each of the many things which are great, should be great by a part of magnitude less than magnitude itself?

Socrates/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But what then? Can that which participates a part of equal itself, be equal to anything by this its part of equality, which is less than equal itself?

Socrates/ It is impossible.

Parmenides/ But some one of us must possess a part of this small quantity; and that which is small itself will be greater than this, this small quantity being a part of *small itself*; and thus *small itself* will be that which is greater: but that to which this part which was taken away is added, will become smaller, and not greater than it was before.

Socrates/ —This cannot take place.

Parmenides/ But after what manner then, O Socrates, can individuals participate of forms, if they are neither able to participate according to parts, nor according to wholes?

Socrates/ It does not appear to me, by Zeus, to be in any respect an easy matter to define a circumstance of this kind.

Parmenides/ But what will you say to this?

Socrates/ To what?

Parmenides/ I think that you consider every form as one, on this account; because, since a certain multitude of particulars seems to you to be great, there may perhaps appear to him who surveys them all to be one idea, from whence you think them to be one great thing.

Socrates/ You speak the truth.

Parmenides/ But what if you consider the *great itself*, and other things which are *great*, in the same manner, with the eye of the soul, will not again a certain something which is *great* appear to you, through which all these necessarily seem to be great?

Socrates/ It seems so.

Parmenides/ Hence, another form of *magnitude* will become apparent, besides *magnitude itself* and its participants: and besides all these another *magnitude*, through which all these become great; so that each of your forms will no longer be one thing, but an infinite multitude.

Socrates/ perhaps, O Parmenides, each of these forms is nothing more than an intellectual *conception*, which ought not to subsist anywhere but in the soul; and if this be the case, each will be one: and the consequences just now mentioned will not ensue.

Parmenides/ What then? is each of these conceptions one, but at the same time a *conception* of nothing?

Socrates/ This is impossible.

Parmenides/ It is a *conception*, therefore, of something?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Of *being* or of *non-being*?

Socrates/ Of *being*.

Parmenides/ Will it not be of one particular thing, which that conception understands as one certain idea in all things?

Socrates/ Undoubtedly.

Parmenides/ But now will not that which is understood to be one, be a form always the same in all things?

Socrates/ This seems to be necessary.

Parmenides/ But what, is it not necessary, since other things participate of forms, that each should be composed from intellectual conceptions; and thus all of them be endued with intellection? Or will you assert that though they are intellectual conceptions, yet they understand nothing?

Socrates/ This is by no means rational. But, O Parmenides, the affair appears to me to take place, in the most eminent degree, as follows: that these forms are established paradigms, as it were, in nature; but that other things are assimilated to these, and are their resemblances: and that the participation of forms by other things, is nothing more than an assimilation to these forms.

Parmenides/ If anything, therefore, becomes similar to a form, can it be possible that the form should not be similar to the assimilated, so far as the assimilated nature is rendered similar to the form? Or can any reason be assigned why similar should not be similar to similar?

Socrates/ There cannot.

Parmenides/ Is there not, therefore, a mighty necessity that the similar to similar should participate of one and the same form?

Socrates/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But will not that through the participation of which similars become similars be form itself?

Socrates/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Nothing, therefore, can be similar to a form, nor a form to any other. For in this case another form will always appear besides some particular form: and if this again should become similar to another, another would be required; and a new form would never cease to take place, as long as any form becomes similar to its participant.

Socrates/ You speak most truly.

Parmenides/ Hence, then, other things do not participate of forms through similitude; but it is necessary to seek after something else through which they participate.

Socrates/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ Do you see, O Socrates, how great a doubt arises, if anyone defines forms as having an essential subsistence by themselves?

Socrates/ I do very much so.

Parmenides/ Know, then, that you do not apprehend what dubious consequences are produced, by placing every individual form of beings separate from its participants.

Socrates/ How do you mean?

Parmenides/ There are many other doubts, indeed, but this is the greatest: if anyone should assert that it is not proper *forms* should be known, if they are such as we have said they ought to be, it is impossible to demonstrate that he who asserts this is deceived, unless he who doubts is skilled in a multitude of particulars, and is naturally of a good disposition. But he should be willing to pursue *him* closely who endeavors to support his opinion by a multitude of farfetched arguments: though, after all, he who contends that forms cannot be known will remain unpersuaded.

Socrates/ In what respect, O Parmenides?

Parmenides/ Because, O Socrates. I think that both you and any other, who establishes the essence of each form as subsisting by itself, must allow, in the first place, that no one of these subsists in us.

Socrates/ How if it did, could it any longer subsist itself by itself?

Parmenides/ You speak well. But will you not admit that such ideas as are, with relation to each other, such as they are, possess also their essence with respect to themselves, and not with reference to things subsisting among us, whether they are resemblances, or in whatever manner you may establish such things; each of which, while we participate, we distinguish by some peculiar appellation? But that the things subsisting among us, and which are synonymous to these, subsist also with reference to each other, and not with relation to forms; and belong to themselves, but not to those which receive with them a common appellation.

Socrates/ How do you mean?

Parmenides/ As if someone of us should be the master or servant of anyone; he who is master is not the *master* of servant, nor is he who is servant, *servant* of master; but he

sustains both these relations, as being a man; while, in the meantime, *dominion itself* is that which it is from its relation to *servitude*; and *servitude*, in a similar manner, is servitude with reference to *dominion*. But the ideas with which we are conversant possess no power over the ideas which subsist by themselves, nor have they any authority over us: but I assert that they subsist from themselves, and with relation to themselves; and ours, in a similar manner, with relation to themselves. Do you understand what I say?

Socrates/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Is not science itself, so far as it is such, the science of truth itself?

Socrates/ Perfectly so.

Parmenides/ But will each of the sciences which is, be the science of each of the things which are?

Socrates/ Certainly it will.

Parmenides/ But will not our science be conversant with the truth which subsists among us? And will not each of our sciences be the science of that being which happens to reside with us?

Socrates/ It is necessary that it should be so.

Parmenides/ But you have granted that we do not possess forms, and that they are not things with which we are conversant?

Socrates/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ Is each genus of beings known to be what it is through the *form itself* of science?

Socrates/ Undoubtedly.

Parmenides/ But this *form* we do not possess?

Socrates/ By no means.

Parmenides/ No form, therefore, is known by us, as we do not participate of science itself?

Socrates/ It does not appear it can.

Parmenides/ The *beautiful itself* therefore, and the *good itself* and all such things which we have considered as being ideas, are unknown to us?

Socrates/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ But survey this, which is yet still more dire.

Socrates/ What?

Parmenides/ You will say, perhaps, that if there is any certain *genus of science*, it is much more accurate than the science which resides with us; and that this is likewise true of beauty, and everything else?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, anyone possesses *science itself* will you not assert that no one possesses the most accurate science more than a God?

Socrates/ It is necessary so to assert.

Parmenides/ But can a God, being such as he is, know our affairs through possessing science itself?

Socrates/ Why should he not?

Parmenides/ Because it has been confessed by us, O Socrates, that neither do those forms possess the power which is peculiar to them, through relation to our concerns, nor ours from relation to theirs; but that the forms in each division are referred to themselves.

Socrates/ It was admitted by us.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, there is the most accurate dominion with Divinity, and the most accurate science, the dominion of the Gods will not rule over us, nor will their science take cognizance of us, or of any of our concerns; and in a similar manner, we shall not rule over them by our dominion, nor know anything divine through the assistance of our science. And again, in consequence of the same

reasoning, they will neither, though Gods, be our governors, nor have any knowledge of human concerns.

Socrates/ But would not the discourse be wonderful in the extreme, which should deprive Divinity of knowledge?

Parmenides/ These, O Socrates, and many other consequences besides these, must necessarily happen to forms, if they are the ideas of things, and if anyone separates each form apart from other things; so that anyone who hears these assertions, may doubt and hesitate whether such forms have any subsistence; or if they do subsist in a most eminent degree, whether it is not abundantly necessary that they should be unknown by the human nature. Hence he who thus speaks may seem to say something to the purpose; and as we just now said, it may be considered as a wonderful thing, on account of the difficulty of being persuaded, and as the province of a man of a very naturally good disposition, to be able to perceive *that there is a certain genus of everything*, *and an essence itself subsisting by itself*: but he will deserve still greater admiration, who, after having made this discovery, shall be able to teach another how to discern and distinguish all these in a becoming manner.

Socrates/ I assent to you, O Parmenides, for you entirely speak agreeably to my opinion.

Parmenides/ But indeed, O Socrates, if anyone on the contrary takes away the forms of things, regarding all that has now been said, and other things of the same kind, he will not find where to turn his dianoëtic part, while he does not permit the idea of everything which exists to be always the same, and by this means entirely destroys the dialectic power of the soul: but you also seem in this respect to perceive perfectly the same with myself.

Socrates/ You speak the truth.

Parmenides/ What then will you do with respect to philosophy? Where will you turn yourself, being ignorant of these?

Socrates/ Indeed I do not seem to myself to know at present.

Parmenides/ Before you exercise yourself in this affair, O Socrates, you should endeavor to define what the beautiful, the just, and the good are, and each of the other forms: for I before perceived the necessity of your accomplishing this, when I heard you discoursing with Aristotle. Indeed that ardor of yours, by which you are impelled to disputation, is both beautiful and divine; but collect yourself together, and while you are young more and more exercise yourself in that science, which appears useless to the many, and is called by them empty loquacity; for if you do not, the truth will elude your pursuit.

Socrates/ What method of exercise is this, O Parmenides?

Parmenides/ It is that which you have heard Zeno employing: but besides this, while you was speaking with Zeno, I admired your asserting that you not only suffered yourself to contemplate the wandering which subsists about the objects of sight, but likewise that which takes place in such things as are especially apprehended by reason, and which someone may consider as having a real subsistence.

Socrates/ For it appears to me, that after this manner it may without difficulty be proved, that there are both similars and dissimilars, or anything else which it is the province of beings to suffer.

Parmenides/ You speak well: but it is necessary that, besides this, you should not only consider if each of the things supposed is, what will be the consequences from the hypothesis, but likewise what will result from supposing that it is not, if you wish to be more exercised in this affair.

Socrates/ How do you mean?

Parmenides/ As if you should wish to exercise yourself in this hypothesis of Zeno, if there are many things, what ought to happen both to the many with reference to themselves, and to the one; and to the one with respect to itself, and to the many: and again, if many are not, to consider what will happen both to the one and to the many, as well to themselves as to each other. And, again, if he should suppose if similitude is, or if it is not, what will happen from each hypothesis, both to the things supposed and to others, and to themselves and to each other; and the same method of proceeding must take place concerning the dissimilar, motion and permanency, generation and corruption, being and non-being: and, in one word, concerning everything which is supposed either to be or nor to be, or influenced in any manner by any other passion, it is necessary to consider the consequences both to itself and to each individual of other things, which you may select for this purpose, and towards many, and towards all things in a similar manner; and again, how other things are related to themselves, and to another which you establish, whether you consider that which is the subject of your hypothesis as having a subsistence or as not subsisting; if, being perfectly exercised, you design through proper media to perceive the truth.

Socrates/ You speak, O Parmenides, of an employment which it is impossible to accomplish, nor do I very much understand what you mean; but why do you not establish a certain hypothesis yourself, and enter on its discussion, that I may be the better instructed in this affair?

Parmenides/ You assign, O Socrates, a mighty labor to a man so old as myself!

Socrates/ Will you, then, O Zeno, discuss something for us?

Cephalus/ And then Pythodorus related that Zeno, laughing, said—

Zeno/ We must request: Parmenides, O Socrates, to engage in this undertaking; for, as he says, it is no trifling matter; or do you not see the prodigious labor of such a discussion? If, therefore, many were present, it would not be proper to make such a request; for it is unbecoming, especially for an old man, to discourse about things of this kind before many witnesses. For the many are ignorant that, without this discursive progression and wandering through all things, it is impossible, by acquiring the truth, to obtain the possession of intellect. I, therefore, O Parmenides, in conjunction with Socrates, beg that you would undertake a discussion, which I have not heard for a long time.

Cephalus/ But Zeno having made this request, Antiphon said that Pythodorus related that he also, and Aristotle, and the rest who were present, entreated Parmenides to exhibit that which he spoke of, and not to deny their request.

Parmenides/ It is necessary to comply with your entreaties, though I should seem to myself to meet with the fate of the Ibycean horse, to whom as a courser, and advanced in years, when about to contend in the chariot races, and fearing through experience for the event, Ibycus comparing himself, said—*Thus also I that am so old, am compelled to return to the subjects of my love*; in like manner, I appear to myself to dread vehemently the present undertaking, when I call to mind the manner in which it is requisite to swim over such, and so great a sea of discourse: but yet it is necessary to comply, especially as it is the request of Zeno, for we are one and the same. Whence then shall we begin; and what shall we first of all suppose? Are

you willing, since it seems we must play a very serious game, that I should begin from myself, and my own hypothesis, supposing concerning the one itself whether the one is, or whether it is not, what ought to be the consequence?

Zeno/ By all means.

Parmenides/ Who then will answer to me? Will the youngest among you do this? For the labor will be very little for him to answer what he thinks; and his answer will at the same time afford me a time for breathing in this arduous investigation.

Aristoteles/ I am prepared to attend you, O Parmenides; for you may call upon me as being the youngest. Ask me, therefore, as one who will answer you.

Parmenides/ Let us then begin. If one is, is it not true that the one will not be many?

Aristoteles/ For how can it be?

Parmenides/ It is necessary, therefore, that there should neither be any part belonging to it, nor that it should be a whole.

Aristoteles/ Why?

Parmenides/ Is not a part a part of a whole?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But what is a whole? Is not that to which no part is wanting a whole?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ From both these consequences, therefore, the one would be composed of parts, being a whole and possessing parts?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary it should be so.

Parmenides/ And so both ways the one will be many, and not one.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But it is necessary that it should not be many, but one.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Hence, it will neither be a whole, nor possess parts, if the one is one.

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, it has no part, it neither possesses beginning, middle, nor end; for such as these would be its parts?

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But end and beginning are the bounds of everything?

Aristoteles/ How should they not?

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, is infinite, if it has neither beginning nor end?

Aristoteles/ Infinite.

Parmenides/ And without figure, therefore, for it neither participates of the round figure nor the straight.

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ For the round figure is that, the extremities of which are equally distant from the middle.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And the straight figure is that, the middle part of which is situated before, or in the view of both the extremes?

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ Will not, therefore, the one consist of parts, and be many, whether it participates of a straight or round figure?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ It is, therefore, neither straight nor circular, since it is without parts.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ And indeed, being such, it will be nowhere; for it will neither be in another, nor in itself.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ For, being in another, it would after a manner be circularly comprehended by that in which it is, and would be touched by it in many places: but it is impossible that the one which is without parts, and which does not participate of a circle, should be touched by a circle in many places.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ But if it were in itself it would also contain itself, since it is no other than itself which subsists in itself: For it is impossible that anything should not be comprehended by that in which it is.

Aristoteles/ It is impossible.

Parmenides/ Would not, therefore, that which contains be one thing, and that which is contained another? For the same whole cannot at the same time suffer and do both these: and thus the one would no longer be one, but two.

Aristoteles/ It certainly would not.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, is not anywhere, since it is neither in itself nor in another.

Aristoteles/ It is not.

Parmenides/ But consider whether thus circumstanced it can either stand or be moved.

Aristoteles/ Why can it not?

Parmenides/ Because whatever is moved is either locally moved, or suffers alteration; for these alone are the genera of motion.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But if the one should be altered from itself, it is impossible that it should remain in any respect the one.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ It will not therefore be moved according to alteration?

Aristoteles/ It appears that it will not.

Parmenides/ But will it be moved locally?

Aristoteles/ Perhaps so.

Parmenides/ But indeed if the one is moved locally, it will either be carried round in the same circle, or it will change one place for another.

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ But ought not that which is carried round in a circle to stand firm in the middle, and to have the other parts of itself rolled about the middle? And can any method be devised by which it is possible that a nature which has neither middle nor parts can be circularly carried about the middle?

Aristoteles/ There cannot be any.

Parmenides/ But if it changes its place, would it not become situated elsewhere, and thus be moved?

Aristoteles/ In this case it would.

Parmenides/ Has it not appeared to be impossible that the one should be in anything?

Aristoteles/ It has.

Parmenides/ Is it not much more impossible that it should *become situated* in anything?

Aristoteles/ I do not understand how you mean.

Parmenides/ If anything is becoming to be in anything, is it not necessary that it should not yet be in it, since it is

becoming to be; nor yet entirely out of it, since it has already become?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ If therefore this can take place in any other thing, it must certainly happen to that which possesses parts; for one part of it will be in this thing, but another out of it: but that which has no parts cannot by any means be wholly within or without anything.

Aristoteles/ It is true.

Parmenides/ But is it not much more impossible that that which neither has parts nor is a whole can be becoming to be in anything; since it can neither subsist in becoming to be according to parts, nor according to a whole?

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ Hence it will neither change its place by going anywhere, nor that it may become situated in anything; nor, through being carried round in that which is the same, will it suffer any alteration.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that it can.

Parmenides/ The one therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion.

Aristoteles/ Immovable.

Parmenides/ But we have likewise asserted that it is impossible for the one to be in anything.

Aristoteles/ We have said so.

Parmenides/ It can never therefore be in same.

Aristoteles/ Why?

Parmenides/ Because it would now be in that in which same is.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But the one can neither be in itself nor in another.

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ The one therefore is never in same.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that it is.

Parmenides/ But as it is never in same, it can neither be at rest nor stand still.

Aristoteles/ In this case it cannot.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, as it appears, neither stands still nor is moved.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that it can.

Parmenides/ Nor will it be the same either with another, or with itself; nor again different either from itself or from another.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ For, if different from itself, it would be different from the one, and so would not be the one.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ And if it should be the same with another, it would be that thing and would not be itself; so that neither could it thus be the one, but it would be something different from the one.

Aristoteles/ It could not indeed.

Parmenides/ But, if it is the same with another, must it not be different from itself?

Aristoteles/ It must.

Parmenides/ But it will not be different from another while it is *the one*. For it does not belong to *the one* to be different from another, but to that alone which is different from another, and; to no other.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ In consequence, therefore, of its being the one, it will not be another; or do you think that it can?

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ But if it is not different from another, neither will it be different from itself. But if not different from itself, it will not be that which is different; and being in no respect that which is different, it will be different from nothing.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ Nor yet will it be the same with itself.

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Is the nature of the one the same with that of same?

Aristoteles/ Why?

Parmenides/ Because, when anything becomes the same with anything, it does not on this account become one.

Aristoteles/ But what then?

Parmenides/ That which becomes the same with many things must, necessarily become many, and not one.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But if the one and same differ in no respect, whenever anything becomes same it will always become the one, and whenever it becomes “the one it will be same.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, the one should be the same with itself, it would be to itself that which is not one; and so that which is one will not be one.

Aristoteles/ But this indeed is impossible.

Parmenides/ It is impossible, therefore, for the one to be either different from another, or the same with itself.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ And thus the one will neither be different nor the same, either with respect to itself or another.

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ But neither will it be similar to anything, or dissimilar either to itself or to another.

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Because the similar is that which in a certain respect suffers *same*.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But it has appeared that same is naturally separate from the one.

Aristoteles/ It has appeared so.

Parmenides/ But if the one should suffer anything except being the one which *is*, it would become more than the one: but this is impossible.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ In no respect, therefore, can *the one* suffer to be the same, either with another or with itself.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that it can.

Parmenides/ It cannot, therefore, be similar either to another or to itself.

Aristoteles/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ Nor yet can the one suffer to be another; for thus it would suffer to be more than the one.

Aristoteles/ More, indeed.

Parmenides/ But that which suffers to be different, either from itself or from another, will be dissimilar either to itself or to another, if that which suffers same is similar.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But *The One*, as it appears, since it in no respect suffers *different*, can in no respect be dissimilar either to itself or to another.

Aristoteles/ It certainly cannot.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, will neither be similar nor dissimilar, either to another or to itself.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that it can.

Parmenides/ But since it is such, it will neither be equal nor unequal, either to itself or to another.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ If it were equal, indeed, it would be of the same measures with that to which it is equal.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But that which is greater or lesser than the things with which it is commensurate, will possess more measures than the lesser quantities, but fewer than the greater.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But to those to which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one part, it will consist of lesser; and with respect to the other, of greater measures.

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ Is it not, therefore, impossible that that which does not participate of same should either be of the same measures, or admit anything in any respect the same?

Aristoteles/ It is impossible.

Parmenides/ It will, therefore, neither be equal to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of the same measures.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that it will.

Parmenides/ But if it consists of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are measures; and so again it will no longer be the one, but as many as there are measures.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But if it should be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure: but it has appeared that the one cannot be equal to anything.

Aristoteles/ It has appeared so.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, neither participates of one measure, nor of many, nor of a few; nor (since it in no respect participates of same) can it ever, as it appears, be equal to itself or to another, nor again greater or lesser either than itself or another.

Aristoteles/ It is in every respect so.

Parmenides/ But what? Does it appear that the one can be either older or younger, or be of the same age?

Aristoteles/ What should hinder?

Parmenides/ If it had in any respect the same age, either with itself or with another, it would participate equally of time and similitude, which we have nevertheless asserted the one does not participate.

Aristoteles/ We have asserted so.

Parmenides/ And this also we have said, that it neither participates of dissimilitude nor inequality.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ How, therefore, being such, can it either be older or younger than anything, or possess the same age with anything?

Aristoteles/ It can in no respect.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, will neither be younger nor older, nor will it be of the same age, either with itself or with another.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that it will.

Parmenides/ Will it not, therefore, be impossible that the one should be at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not necessary that, if anything is in time, it should always become older than itself?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But is not that which is older, always older than the younger?

Aristoteles/ What then?

Parmenides/ That, therefore, which is becoming to be older than itself, is at the same time becoming to be younger than itself, if it is about to have that through which it may become older.

Aristoteles/ How; do you say?

Parmenides/ Thus: It is requisite that nothing should subsist in becoming to be different from another, when it is already different, but that it should *be* now different from that which *is* different, *have been* from that which *was*, and *will be* from that which is *to be hereafter*: but from that which is *becoming to be* different, it ought neither to have been, nor to be here after, nor to be, but to subsist in becoming to be different, and no otherwise.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But the older differs from the younger, and no other.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Hence, that which is becoming to be older than itself, must necessarily at the same time subsist in becoming to be younger than itself.

Aristoteles/ It seems so.

Parmenides/ But likewise it ought not to subsist in becoming to be in a longer time than itself, nor yet in a shorter; but in a time equal to itself it should subsist in becoming to be, should be, have been, and be hereafter.

Aristoteles/ For these are necessary.

Parmenides/ It is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that such things as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, should each one possess the same age with itself, and should subsist in becoming to be both older and younger than itself.

Aristoteles/ It seems so.

Parmenides/ But no one of these passions belongs to the one. None. Neither, therefore, is time present with it, nor does it subsist in any time.

Aristoteles/ It does not, indeed, according to the decisions of reason.

Parmenides/ What then? Do not the terms it was, *it has been*, *it did become*, seem to signify the participation of the time past?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And do not the terms it will be, it may become, and it will be generated, signify that which is about to be hereafter?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But are not the terms *it is*, and *it is becoming to be*, marks of the present time?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ If then the one participates in no respect of any time, it neither ever was, nor has been, nor did become: nor is it now generated, nor is becoming to be, nor is, nor may become hereafter, nor will be generated, nor will be.

Aristoteles/ It is most true.

Parmenides/ Is it possible, therefore, that anything can participate of essence, except according to some one of these?

Aristoteles/ It is not.

Parmenides/ In no respect, therefore, does *the one* participate of essence.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that it can.

Parmenides/ *The one*, therefore, is in no respect.

Aristoteles/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ Hence, it is not in such a manner as to be one, for thus it would be being, and participate of essence: but, as it appears, the one neither is one nor is, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But can anything either belong to, or be affirmed of, that which is not?

Aristoteles/ How can it?

Parmenides/ Neither, therefore, does any name belong to it, nor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that there can.

Parmenides/ Hence, it can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being.

Aristoteles/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ Is it possible, therefore, that these things can thus take place about the one?

Aristoteles/ It does not appear to me that they can.

Parmenides/ Are you therefore willing that we should return again to the hypothesis from the beginning, and see

whether or not by this means anything shall appear to us different from what it did before?

Aristoteles/ I am entirely willing.

Parmenides/ Have we not therefore declared if the one is, what circumstances ought to happen to it? Is it not so?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But consider from the beginning, if the one is, can it be possible that it should be, and yet not participate of *essence*?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ Will not essence therefore be the essence of the one, but not the same with the one? for, if it were the same, it would not be the essence of *the one*, nor would *the one* participate of essence; but it would be all one to say *the one is*, and *one one*. But now our hypothesis is not *if one*, what ought to happen, but *if the one is*—Is it not so?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Does it not signify that the term *is*, is something different from *the one*?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, anyone should summarily assert that *the one is*, this would be no other one than that which participates of essence.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Again, therefore, let us say, if *the one is*, what will happen. Consider then whether it is not necessary that this hypothesis should signify such a *one* as possesses parts?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ Thus. If the term *it is*, is spoken of one being, and the one, of being which is one, and essence is not the same with the one, but each belongs to that same one

being which we have supposed, is it not necessary that the whole of it should be *one being*, but that its parts should be the one and to be?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Whether, therefore, should we call each of these parts a part alone, or a part of the whole?

Aristoteles/ Each should be called a part of the whole.

Parmenides/ That which *is one*, therefore, is a whole, and possesses a part.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ What then? Can each of these parts of one being, viz. the one and being, desert each other, so that the one shall not be a part of being, or being shall not be a part of the one?

Aristoteles/ It cannot be.

Parmenides/ Again, therefore, each of the parts will contain both *one* and being, and each part will at least be composed from two parts; and, on the same account, whatever part takes place will always possess these two parts: for the one will always contain being, and being the one; so that two things will always be produced, and no part will ever be one.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Will not, therefore, one being thus become an infinite multitude?

Aristoteles/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ But proceed, and still further consider this.

Aristoteles/ What?

Parmenides/ We have said that the one participates of essence, so far as it is being.

Aristoteles/ We have said so.

Parmenides/ And on this account one being appears to be many.

Aristoteles/ It does so.

Parmenides/ But what then? If we receive dianoëtically that one which we said participates of essence, and apprehend it alone by itself without that which we have said it participates, will it appear to be one alone? Or will this also be many?

Aristoteles/ I think it will be one.

Parmenides/ But let us consider another certain circumstance. It is necessary that its essence should be one thing, and itself another thing, if the one does not participate of essence; but as essence it participates of the one.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, essence is one thing, and the one another thing, neither is the one, so far as the one, different from essence, nor essence, so far as essence, different from the one; but they are different from each other through that which is different and another.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ So that different is neither the same with the one nor with essence.

Aristoteles/ How can it?

Parmenides/ What, then, if we should select from them, whether if you will essence and different, or essence and the one, or the one and different, should we not, in each assumption, select certain things which might very properly be denominated both these?

Aristoteles/ How do you mean?

Parmenides/ After this manner is there not that which we call *essence*?

Aristoteles/ There is.

Parmenides/ And again, that which we denominate the one?

Aristoteles/ And this also.

Parmenides/ Is not, therefore, each of them denominated?

Aristoteles/ Each.

Parmenides/ But what, when I say essence and the one, do I not pronounce both these?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ And if I should say *essence* and *different*, or *different* and *The One*, should I not perfectly, in each of these, pronounce both?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But can those things which are properly denominated both, be both, and yet not two?

Aristoteles/ They cannot.

Parmenides/ And can any reason be assigned, why of two things each of them should not be one?

Aristoteles/ There cannot.

Parmenides/ As, therefore, these two subsist together, each of them will be one.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But if each of them is one, and the one is placed together with them, by any kind of conjunction, will not all of them become three?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But are not three odd, and two even?

Aristoteles/ How should they not? But what then?

Parmenides/ Being two, is it not necessary that twice should be present? And being three, thrice; since twice one subsists in two, and thrice one in three?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But if there are two and twice, is it not necessary that there should be twice two? And if there are three and thrice, that there should be thrice three?

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ But what, if there are three and twice, and two and thrice, is it not necessary that there should be thrice two and twice three?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Hence, there will be the evenly even, and the oddly odd; and the oddly even, and the evenly odd.

Aristoteles/ It will be so.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, this be the case, do you think that any number will be left which is not necessarily there?

Aristoteles/ By no means.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, the one is, it is also necessary that there should be number.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But if number is, it is necessary that the many should subsist, and an infinite multitude of beings: or do you think that number, infinite in multitude, will also participate of essence?

Aristoteles/ By all means I think so.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, every number participates of essence, will not each part also of number participate of essence?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Essence, therefore, will be distributed through all things which are many, and will not desert any being, whether the least or the greatest: for how can essence be absent from any being?

Aristoteles/ In no respect.

Parmenides/ Essence, therefore, is distributed as much as possible into the least and the greatest, and into all things every way, and is divided the most of all things, and possesses infinite parts.

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ Very many, therefore, are its parts.

Aristoteles/ Very many, indeed.

Parmenides/ But what, is there anyone of these which is a part of essence, and yet is not one part?

Aristoteles/ But how can this be?

Parmenides/ But if it is, I think it must always be necessary, as long as it is, that it should be a certain one; but that it cannot possibly be nothing.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, is present with every part of essence, deserting no part, whether small or great, or in whatever manner it may be affected.

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ Can one being, therefore, be a whole, subsisting in many places at once? Consider this diligently.

Aristoteles/ I do consider it, and I see that it is impossible.

Parmenides/ It is divided, therefore, since it is not a whole; for it can no otherwise be present with all the parts of essence, than in a divided state.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But that which is divisible ought necessarily to be so many as its parts.

Aristoteles/ It ought.

Parmenides/ We did not, therefore, just now speak truly, when we said that essence was distributed into very many

parts; since it is not divided into more parts than the one, but into parts equal to those of the one: for neither does being desert the one, nor the one, being: but these two always subsist, equalized through all things.

Aristoteles/ It appears to be entirely so.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, which is distributed by essence, is many and an infinite multitude.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ One being, therefore, is not only many, but it is likewise necessary that the one which is distributed by essence should be many.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ And, indeed, in consequence of the parts being parts of a whole, the one will be defined according to a whole: or are not the parts comprehended by the whole?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ But that which contains will be a bound.

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ One being, therefore, is in a certain respect both one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite in multitude.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ As it is bounded, therefore, must it not also have extremes?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But what, if it be a whole, must it not also have a beginning, middle, and end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if anyone of these be wanting, can it be willing to be any longer a whole?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, as it appears, will possess a beginning, end, and middle.

Aristoteles/ It will.

Parmenides/ But the middle is equally distant from the extremes; for it could not otherwise be the middle.

Aristoteles/ It could not.

Parmenides/ And, as it appears, the one being such, will participate of a certain figure, whether straight or round, or a certain mixture from both.

Aristoteles/ It will so.

Parmenides/ Will it, therefore, being such, subsist in itself and in another?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ For each of the parts is in the whole, nor is anyone external to the whole.

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ But all the parts are comprehended by the whole.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But the one is all the parts of itself; and is neither more nor less than all.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Is not the one, therefore, a whole?

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ If, therefore, all the parts are in the whole, and all the parts are one, and the one is a whole, but all the parts are comprehended by the whole; hence, the one will be comprehended by the one, and so the one will be in itself.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But again, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all, nor in a certain one. For, if it were in all, it

would necessarily be in one: for, if it were not in some one, it would not be able to be in all. But if this one is a one belonging to all the parts, and the whole is not in this one, how can it any longer be a whole in all the parts?

Aristoteles/ In no respect.

Parmenides/ Nor yet in any of the parts. For if the whole should be in some of the parts, the greater would be in the lesser; which is impossible.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ But since the whole is neither in many, nor in one, nor in all the parts, is it not necessary that it should either be in some other, or that it should be nowhere?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But if it is nowhere, will it not be nothing? And if it is a whole, since it is not in itself, is it not necessary that it should be in another?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ So far, therefore, as the one is a whole, it is in another: but so far as all things are its parts, and itself all the parts, it is in itself: and so the one will necessarily be in itself and in another.

Aristoteles/ Necessarily.

Parmenides/ But as the one is naturally such, is it not necessary that it should both be moved and stand still?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ It must stand still, indeed, if it be in itself. For, being in one, and not departing from this, it will be in same, through being in itself.

Aristoteles/ It will.

Parmenides/ But that which is always in the same must necessarily without doubt always stand still.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But what, must not that, on the contrary, which is always in another, necessarily never be in same? But if it be never in same, can it stand still? And if it does not stand still, must it not be moved?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ It is necessary, therefore, that the one, since it is always in itself and in another, must always be moved and stand still.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But, likewise, it ought to be the same with itself, and different from itself; and, in like manner, the same with, and different from, others, if it suffers what we have related above.

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ Everything, in a certain respect, thus takes place with relation to everything: For it is either the same with it or different: or if it is neither same nor different, it will be a part of this to which it is so related, or with respect to a part it will be a whole.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ Is therefore the one a part of itself?

Aristoteles/ By no means.

Parmenides/ It will not therefore be a whole, with respect to itself, as if itself were a part.

Aristoteles/ For it cannot.

Parmenides/ But is the one, therefore, different from the one?

Aristoteles/ By no means.

Parmenides/ It will not therefore be different from itself.

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, it is neither different nor a whole, nor yet a part with respect to itself, is it not necessary that it should be the same with itself?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But what, that which is elsewhere than itself, subsisting in same in itself, must it not necessarily be different from itself, since it has a subsistence elsewhere?

Aristoteles/ It appears so to me.

Parmenides/ And in this manner the one appears to subsist being at the same time both in itself and in another.

Aristoteles/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ Through this, therefore, it appears that the one is different from itself.

Aristoteles/ It does so.

Parmenides/ But what if anything is different from anything, is it not different from that which is different?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ But are not all such things as are not one different from the one? And is not the one different from such things as are not one?

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ The one therefore will be different from other things.

Aristoteles/ Different.

Parmenides/ But see whether different and same are not contrary to each other.

Aristoteles/ How should they not?

Parmenides/ Do you think, therefore, that same can ever be in different, or different in same?

Aristoteles/ I do not.

Parmenides/ If therefore *different* is never in *same*, there is no being in which for any time different subsists; for, if it subsisted in it during any time whatever, in that time different would be in same. Would it not be so?

Aristoteles/ It would.

Parmenides/ But since it is never in same, different will never subsist in any being.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Neither therefore will different be in things which are not one, nor in the one.

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, will not through different be different from things which are not one, nor things which are not one from the one.

Aristoteles/ Not, indeed.

Parmenides/ Nor likewise will they be different from each other, since they do not participate of different.

Aristoteles/ For how can they?

Parmenides/ But if they are neither different from themselves, nor from different, must they not entirely escape from being different from each other?

Aristoteles/ They must escape.

Parmenides/ But neither will things which are not one participate of the one: for if they did they would no longer be not one, but in a certain respect one.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Hence things which are not one will not be number; for they would not be entirely not one in consequence of possessing number.

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ But what, can things which are not one be parts of one? Or would not things which are not one by this means participate of the one?

Aristoteles/ They would participate.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, this is entirely the one, but those not one, neither will the one be a part of things which are not one, nor a whole with respect to them, as if they were parts; nor, on the contrary, will things which are not one be parts of the one, nor yet wholes, as if the one were a part.

Aristoteles/ They will not.

Parmenides/ But we have said that things which are neither parts nor wholes, nor different from each other, must be the same with each other.

Aristoteles/ We have said so.

Parmenides/ Must we not therefore assert that the one, since it subsists in this manner with respect to things which are not one, is the same with them?

Aristoteles/ We must.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, as it appears, is both different from others and itself, and the same with them and with itself.

Aristoteles/ It appears from this reasoning to be so.

Parmenides/ But is it also similar and dissimilar to itself and others?

Aristoteles/ Perhaps so.

Parmenides/ Since, therefore, it appears to be different from others, others also will be different from it.

Aristoteles/ But what then?

Parmenides/ Will it not be different from others, in the same manner as others from it? And this neither more nor less?

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ If, therefore, neither more nor less, it must be different in a similar manner.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Will not that through which the one becomes different from others, and others in a similar manner from it, be also that through which both the one becomes the same with others, and others with the one?

Aristoteles/ How do you say?

Parmenides/ Thus: Do not you call every name the name of something?

Aristoteles/ I do: but what then?

Parmenides/ Do you pronounce the same name often or once?

Aristoteles/ I pronounce it once.

Parmenides/ When, therefore, you enunciate that name once, do you denominate that thing to which the name belongs: but if often, not the same? Or, whether you pronounce the same name once or often, do you not necessarily always signify the same thing?

Aristoteles/ But what then?

Parmenides/ Does not a different name belong to some certain thing?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ When, therefore, you pronounce this, whether once or often, you do not assign this name to any other, nor do you denominate any other thing than that to which this name belongs.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary it should be so.

Parmenides/ But when we say that other things are different from the one, and that the one is different from others, twice pronouncing the name different, we yet signify

nothing more than the nature of that thing of which this is the name.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ If therefore the one be different from others, and others from the one, in consequence of suffering the same different, the one will not suffer that which is different from others, but the same with others: but is not that which in a certain respect suffers the same similar?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But, in the same manner, as the one becomes different from others, everything becomes similar to everything: for everything is different from all things.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But is the similar contrary to the dissimilar?

Aristoteles/ It is.

Parmenides/ And is not different contrary to *same*?

Aristoteles/ And this also.

Parmenides/ But this likewise is apparent, that the one is both the same with and different from others.

Aristoteles/ It is apparent.

Parmenides/ But to be the same with others is a contrary passion to the being different from others.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But the one appears to be similar, so far as different.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ So far therefore as it is same, it will be dissimilar on account of its suffering a passion contrary to that which produces the similar: or was it not the similar which produced the different?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ It will therefore render that which is dissimilar the same; or it would not be contrary to different.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ The one therefore will be both similar and dissimilar to others: and so far as different it will be similar; but so far as the same dissimilar.

Aristoteles/ The case appears to be so.

Parmenides/ And it is likewise thus affected.

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ So far as it suffers same it does not suffer that which is various; but not suffering that which is various, it cannot be dissimilar; and not being dissimilar, it will be similar: but so far as it suffers different it will be various; and being various it will be dissimilar.

Aristoteles/ You speak the truth.

Parmenides/ Since, therefore, the one is both the same with and different from others, according to both and according to each of these, it will be similar and dissimilar to others.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ And will not this in a similar manner be the case with relation to itself, since it has appeared to be both different from and the same with itself; so that, according to both these, and according to each, it will appear to be similar and dissimilar?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ But consider now how the one subsists with respect to touching itself and others, and not touching.

Aristoteles/ I consider.

Parmenides/ For the one appears in a certain respect to be in the whole of itself.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But is the one also in others?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ So far therefore as the one is in others it will touch others; but so far as it is in itself it will be hindered from touching others, but it will touch itself because it subsists in itself.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ And thus, indeed, the one will both touch itself and others.

Aristoteles/ It will so.

Parmenides/ But what will you say to this? Must not everything which is about to touch anything be situated in a place proximate to and after that which it is about to touch, and in which when situated it touches?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, if it is about to touch itself, ought to be situated immediately after itself, occupying the place proximate to that in which it is.

Aristoteles/ It ought so.

Parmenides/ Would not this be the case with the one if it was two; and would it not be in two places at once? But can this be the case while it is the one?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ The same necessity therefore belongs to the one, neither to be two nor to touch itself.

Aristoteles/ The same.

Parmenides/ But neither will it touch others.

Aristoteles/ Why?

Parmenides/ Because we have said, that when anything is about to touch anything which is separate from it, it ought

to be placed proximate to that which it is about to touch; but that there must be no third in the middle of them.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Two things, therefore, at the least are requisite, if contact is about to take place.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But if a third thing succeeds to the two terms, these will now be three, but the contacts two.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And thus one always being added, one contact will be added, and it will come to pass that the contacts will be less by one than the multitude of the numbers: for by how much the two first numbers surpassed the contacts, so as to be more in number than the contacts, by so much will all the following number surpass the multitude of the contacts. For in that which remains one will be added to the number, and one contact to the contacts.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ The contacts, therefore, less by one will always be as many in number as the things themselves.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ If therefore it is one alone, and not two, there can be no contact.

Aristoteles/ How can there?

Parmenides/ Have we not said that such things as are different from the one are neither one nor participate of it, since they are different?

Aristoteles/ We have.

Parmenides/ The one therefore is not number in others, as the one is not contained in them.

Aristoteles/ How can it?

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, is neither others, nor two, nor anything possessing the name of another number.

Aristoteles/ It is not.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, is one alone, and will not be two.

Aristoteles/ It will not, as it appears.

Parmenides/ There is no contact, therefore, two not subsisting.

Aristoteles/ There is not.

Parmenides/ The one therefore will neither touch other things, nor will other things touch the one, as there is no contact.

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ On all these accounts, therefore, the one will both touch and not touch others and itself.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ Is it therefore equal and unequal to itself and others?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ If the one were greater or lesser than others, or others greater or lesser than the one, would it not follow that neither the one, because one, nor others, because different from the one, would be greater or lesser than each other from their own essences? But if each, besides being such as they are, should possess equality, would they not be equal to each other? But if the one should possess magnitude, and the other parvitude, or the one magnitude but others parvitude, would it not follow, that, with whatever species magnitude was present, that species would be greater; but that the species would be lesser with which parvitude was present?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ Are there not, therefore, two certain species of this kind, magnitude and parvitude? For if they had no subsistence they could never be contrary to each other, and be present with beings.

Aristoteles/ How should they?

Parmenides/ If therefore parvitude becomes inherent in *the one*, it will either be inherent in the whole or in a part of it.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But if it should be inherent in the whole, will it not either be extended equally through the whole of the one or comprehend the one?

Aristoteles/ Plainly so.

Parmenides/ If parvitude, therefore, is equally inherent in the one, will it not be equal to the one; but if it comprehends the one will it not be greater?

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ Can therefore parvitude be equal to or greater than anything, and exhibit the properties of magnitude and equality, and not its own?

Aristoteles/ It is impossible.

Parmenides/ Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in the whole of the one, but if at all, in a part.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Nor yet again in the whole part; as the same consequences would ensue in the whole part of the one, as in the whole of the one: for it would either be equal to or greater than the part in which it is inherent.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in any being, since it can neither be in a part nor in a whole; nor will there be anything small, except smallness itself.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that there will.

Parmenides/ Neither will magnitude therefore be in the one: for there will be some other thing great besides magnitude itself. I mean that in which magnitude is inherent; and this, though parvitude is not, which ought to be surpassed by that which is great; but which in this case is impossible, since parvitude is not inherent in any being.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But, indeed, magnitude itself will not surpass anything else but parvitude itself, nor will parvitude be less than any other than magnitude itself.

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ Neither therefore will other things be greater than the one; nor lesser, since they neither possess magnitude nor parvitude: nor will these two possess any power with respect to the one, either of surpassing or of being surpassed, but this will be the case only with respect to each other: nor, on the contrary, will the one be either greater or lesser than these two, or others, as it neither possesses magnitude nor parvitude.

Aristoteles/ So indeed it appears.

Parmenides/ If the one therefore is neither greater nor lesser than others, is it not necessary that it should neither surpass nor be surpassed by them?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Is it not also abundantly necessary, that that which neither surpasses nor is surpassed should be equally affected? And must it not, if equally affected, be equal?

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ The one therefore will be thus circumstanced with respect to itself: viz. from neither

possessing magnitude nor parvitude in itself, it will neither surpass nor be surpassed by itself; but being equally affected it will be equal to itself.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ The one therefore will be equal both to itself and others.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ But if the one should be in itself, it would also be externally about itself; and so, through comprehending itself, it would be greater than itself; but from being comprehended less than itself: and thus the one would be both greater and lesser than itself.

Aristoteles/ It would so.

Parmenides/ Is not this also necessary, that nothing has any subsistence besides the one and others?

Aristoteles/ How should it be otherwise?

Parmenides/ But ought not whatever has a being to be always somewhere?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And does not that which subsists in another, subsist as the lesser in the greater? For one thing cannot in any other way subsist in another.

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ But since there is nothing else except the one and others, and it is necessary that these should be in something, is it not necessary that they should be in one another, viz. others in the one, and the one in others; or that they should be no where?

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ Because, therefore, the one is in others, others will be greater than the one, through comprehending it; but the one will be less than others, because

comprehended: but if others are inherent in the one, the one on the same account will be greater than others; but others will be less than the one.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, is equal to, greater and lesser, both than itself and others.

Aristoteles/ It seems so.

Parmenides/ But if it is greater, equal, and lesser, it will be of equal, more, and fewer measures, both than itself and others; and if of measures, also of parts.

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ Being, therefore, of equal, more, and fewer measures, it will also be more and less in number, both with respect to itself and others; and also, for the same reason, equal to itself and others.

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ That which is greater possesses more measures than that which is smaller, and contains as many parts as measures; and that which is lesser in the same manner, as also that which is equal.

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ Since the one, therefore, is both greater, lesser, and equal to itself, will it not also contain measures equal to, more and fewer than itself? And if of measures, will not this also be true of parts?

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ If, therefore, it contains equal parts with itself, it will be equal in multitude to itself: but if more, more in multitude, and if fewer, less in multitude, than itself.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But will the one be similarly affected towards others? For, since it appears to be greater than

others, is it not necessary that it should be more in number than others? but, because it is lesser, must it not also be fewer in number? and because equal in magnitude, must it not also be equal in multitude to others?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ And thus again, as it appears, *the one* will be equal, more, and less in number, both than itself and others.

Aristoteles/ It will so.

Parmenides/ Will the one, therefore, participate of time? And is it, and does it subsist in becoming to be younger and older, both than itself and others? And again, neither younger nor older than itself and others, though participating of time?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ To be in a certain respect is present with it, since it is the one.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But what else is to be than a participation of essence with the present time? In the same manner as it was is a communication of essence with the past, and it will be with the future?

Aristoteles/ It is no other.

Parmenides/ It must participate, therefore, of time, if it participates of being.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Must it not, therefore, participate of time in progression?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ It will always, therefore, subsist in becoming to be older than itself, if it proceeds according to time.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Do we, therefore, call to mind that the older is always becoming older, because it is always becoming younger?

Aristoteles/ We do call it to mind.

Parmenides/ Does not the one, therefore, while it is becoming older than itself, subsist in becoming older than itself, while it is becoming younger than itself?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ It will, therefore, become both younger and older than itself.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But is it not then older when it subsists in becoming to be according to the present time, which is between *it was* and *it will be*: for, through proceeding from the past to the future, it will not pass beyond the present now?

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ Will it not, therefore, cease becoming to be older, when it arrives at the now, and is no longer becoming to be, but is now older? For while it proceeds it will never be comprehended by the now. For that which proceeds subsists in such a manner as to touch upon both the now and the future time; departing, indeed, from the now, but apprehending the future, because it subsists in the middle of the future and the now.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But if it be necessary that whatever is becoming to be should not pass by the now or the present time, hence, as soon as it arrives at the now, it will always cease becoming to be, and is then that which it was in pursuit of becoming.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, when in becoming older it arrives at the now, will cease becoming *to be,* and then *is* older.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Is it not, therefore, older than that in respect of which it becomes older? And does it not become older than itself?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And is not the older, older than the younger?

Aristoteles/ It is.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, is younger than itself, when in becoming older it arrives at the now.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But the now is always present with the one, through the whole of its being: For it is always now as long as it is.

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, always is, and is becoming to be younger and older than itself.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ But is the one, or does it subsist in becoming to be, in a time more extended than or equal to itself?

Aristoteles/ In an equal time.

Parmenides/ But that which either is, or subsists in becoming to be, in an equal time possesses the same age.

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ But that which has the same age is neither older nor younger.

Aristoteles/ By no means.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, since it both subsists in becoming to be and is, in a time equal to itself, neither is nor is becoming to be younger nor older than itself.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear to me that it can.

Parmenides/ But how is it affected with respect to others?

Aristoteles/ I know not what to say.

Parmenides/ But this you may say, that things different from the one because they are others, and not another, are more than the one. For that which is another is one; but being others they are more than one, and possess multitude.

Aristoteles/ They do.

Parmenides/ But multitude participates of a greater number than the one? How should it not?

Aristoteles/ What then?

Parmenides/ Do we say that things more in number are generated, or have been generated, before the few?

Aristoteles/ We assert this of the few before the many.

Parmenides/ That which is the fewest, therefore, is first: but is not this the one?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, becomes the first of all things possessing number: but all other things have number, if they are others and not another.

Aristoteles/ They have indeed.

Parmenides/ But that which is first generated has I think a priority of subsistence: but others are posterior to this. But such as have an after generation are younger than that which had a prior generation; and thus others will be younger than the one, but the one will be older than others.

Aristoteles/ It will indeed.

Parmenides/ But what shall we say to this? Can the one be generated contrary to its nature, or is this impossible?

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ But the one appears to consist of parts; and if of parts, it possesses a beginning, end, and middle.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Is not, therefore, the beginning generated first of all, both of the one and of every other thing; and after the beginning all the other parts, as far as to the end?

Aristoteles/ What then?

Parmenides/ And, indeed, we should say that all these are parts of a whole and of one; but that the one, together with the end, is generated one and a whole.

Aristoteles/ We should say so.

Parmenides/ But the end I think must be generated last of all, and the one must be naturally generated together with this; so that the one, since it is necessary that it should not be generated contrary to nature, being produced together with the end, will be naturally generated the last of others. The one, therefore, is younger than others, but others are older than the one.

Aristoteles/ So again it appears to me.

Parmenides/ But what, must not the beginning, or any other part whatever, of the one, or of anything else, if it is a part, and not parts—must it not necessarily be one, since it is a part?

Aristoteles/ Necessarily.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, while becoming to be, together with the first part, will be generated, and together with the second; and it will never desert anyone of the other generated parts, till arriving at the extremity it becomes one

whole; neither excluded from the middle, nor from the last, nor the first, nor from any other whatever in its generation.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, will possess the same age with others, as (if it be not the one contrary to its own nature) it will be generated neither prior nor posterior to others, but together with them; and on this account the one will neither be older nor younger than others, nor others than the one: but, according to the former reasoning, the one was both older and younger than others, and others in a similar manner than it.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ After this manner, therefore, the one subsists and is generated. But what shall we say respecting its becoming older and younger than others, and others than the one; and again, that it neither becomes older nor younger? Shall we say that it subsists in the same manner with respect to the term becoming to be as with respect to the term to bet or otherwise?

Aristoteles/ I am not able to say.

Parmenides/ But I am able to affirm this, that however one thing may be older than another, yet it cannot otherwise subsist in becoming to be older, than by that difference of age which it possessed as soon as it was born: nor, on the contrary, can that which is younger subsist in becoming to be younger, otherwise than by the same difference. For, equal things being added to unequals, whether they are times or anything else, always cause them to differ by the same interval by which they were distant at first.

Aristoteles/ How should it be otherwise?

Parmenides/ That which is, therefore, cannot subsist in becoming to be older or younger than one being, since it is always equally different from it in age: but this is and was

older, but that younger; but by no means subsists in becoming so.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ That which is one, therefore, will never subsist in becoming to be either older or younger than other beings.

Aristoteles/ Never.

Parmenides/ But see whether by this means other things will become younger and older.

Aristoteles/ After what manner?

Parmenides/ The same as that through which the one appeared to be older than others, and others than the one.

Aristoteles/ What then?

Parmenides/ Since the one is older than others, it was for a longer period of time than others.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But again consider, if we add an equal time to a longer and shorter time, does the longer differ from the shorter by an equal or by a smaller part?

Aristoteles/ By a smaller.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, will not differ from others by so great an age afterwards as before; but, receiving an equal time with others, it will always differ by a less age than before. Will it not be so?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But does not that which differs less in age, with respect to anything, than it did before, become younger than before, with respect to those than which it was before older?

Aristoteles/ Younger.

Parmenides/ But if it is younger, will not, on the contrary, others with respect to the one be older than before?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ That, therefore, which was generated younger, will subsist in becoming to be older, with respect to that which was before generated and is older; but it never is older, but always is becoming older than it; the one indeed advancing to a more juvenile state, but the other to one more aged: but that which is older is becoming to be younger than the younger, after the same manner. For both tending to that which is contrary they subsist in becoming contrary to each other; the younger becoming older than the older, and the older younger than the younger: but they are not able to become so. For if they should become they would no longer subsist in becoming, but would now be. But now they are becoming younger and older than each other; and the one indeed becomes younger than others, because it appears to be older, and to have a prior generation: but others are older than the one, because they have a posterior generation; and, from the same reason, other things will be similarly related with respect to the one, since they appear to be more ancient and to have a prior generation.

Aristoteles/ So indeed it appears.

Parmenides/ Does it not follow, that so far as the one does not become younger or older than the other, because they differ by an equal number from each other, that, so far as this, the one will not become older or younger than others, nor others than the one? But that, so far as it is necessary that the prior should always differ from such as are becoming to be posterior, and the posterior from the prior; so far it is necessary that they should become older and younger than each other, both others than the one and the one than others?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ On all these accounts, therefore, the one is, and is becoming to be, older and younger both than itself and others; and again, neither is nor is becoming to be older nor younger than itself and others.

Aristoteles/ It is perfectly so.

Parmenides/ But since the one participates of time, and of becoming to be older and younger, is it not necessary that it should participate of the past, present, and future, since it participates of time?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, was, and is, and will be; and was generated, and is generated, and will be generated.

Aristoteles/ What then?

Parmenides/ And there will also be something belonging to it, and which may be asserted of it, and which was, and is, and will be.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ There will, therefore, be science, opinion, and sense of the one, since we have now treated of all these things about it.

Aristoteles/ You speak rightly.

Parmenides/ A name, therefore, and discourse may subsist about the one, and it may be denominated and spoken of: and whatever particulars of the same kind take place in other things, will also take place about the one.

Aristoteles/ The case is perfectly so.

Parmenides/ In the third place, let us consider, if the one subsists in the manner we have already asserted, is it not necessary, since it is both one and many, and again neither one nor many, and participating of time, that because it is

one it should participate of essence; but that because it is not, it should not at any time participate of essence?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Is it, therefore, possible, that when it participates and becomes such as it is, that then it should not participate; or that it should participate when it does not participate?

Aristoteles/ It cannot be possible.

Parmenides/ It participates, therefore, at one time, and does not participate at another: for thus alone can it participate and not participate of the same.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ Is not that also time, when it receives being and again loses it? Or how can it be possible that, being such as it is, it should at one time possess the same thing, and at another time not, unless it both receives and loses it?

Aristoteles/ No otherwise.

Parmenides/ Do you not denominate the receiving of essence to become?

Aristoteles/ I do.

Parmenides/ And is not to lose essence the same as to perish?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, as it seems, by receiving and losing essence, is generated and perishes.

Aristoteles/ Necessarily so.

Parmenides/ But since it is both one and many, and subsists in becoming to be and perishing, when it becomes one does it cease to be many, and when it becomes many does it cease to be one?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But, in consequence of becoming one and many, must it not be separated and collected?

Aristoteles/ It must.

Parmenides/ And when it becomes dissimilar and similar, must it not be assimilated and dissimilated?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And when it becomes greater, lesser, and equal, must it not be increased, corrupted, and equalized?

Aristoteles/ It must so.

Parmenides/ But when from being moved it stands still, and when from standing still it is changed into being moved, it is requisite that it should not subsist in one time.

Aristoteles/ How should it?

Parmenides/ But that which before stood still and is afterwards moved, and was before moved and afterwards stands still, cannot suffer these affections without mutation.

Aristoteles/ For how can it?

Parmenides/ But there is no time in which anything can neither be moved nor stand still.

Aristoteles/ There is not.

Parmenides/ But it cannot be changed without mutation.

Aristoteles/ It is not probable that it can.

Parmenides/ When, therefore, will it be changed? For neither while it stands still, nor while it is moved, will it be changed: nor while it is in time.

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ Is that any wonderful thing in which it will be when it changes?

Aristoteles/ What thing?

Parmenides/ The sudden, or that which unapparent starts forth to the view. For the sudden seems to signify

some such thing, as that from which it passes into each of these conditions. For while it stands still it will not be changed from standing, nor while in motion will it be changed from motion: but that wonderful nature the sudden is situated between motion and abiding, is in no time, and into this and from this that which is moved passes into standing still, and that which stands still into motion.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, if it stands still and is moved, must be changed into each: for thus alone will it produce both these affections. But, becoming changed, it will be changed suddenly; and when it changes will be in no time: For it will then neither stand still nor be moved.

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ Will the one also be thus affected with respect to other mutations? And when it is changed from being into the loss of being, or from non-being into becoming to be, does it not then become a medium between certain motions and abidings? and then neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor perishes?

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ And in the same manner, when it passes from one into many and from many into one, it is neither one nor many, nor is it separated nor collected. And in passing from similar to dissimilar, and from dissimilar to similar, it is neither similar nor dissimilar, nor is assimilated nor dissimilated. And while it passes from small into great, and into equal or its contrary, it will neither be small nor great, nor unequal, nor increasing, nor perishing, nor equalized.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that it can.

Parmenides/ But all these passions the one will suffer, if it is.

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ But should we not consider what other things ought to suffer if the one is?

Aristoteles/ We should.

Parmenides/ Let us relate, therefore, if the one is, what other things ought to suffer from the one.

Aristoteles/ By all means.

Parmenides/ Does it not follow that because other things are different from the one they are not the one: for otherwise they would not be different from the one?

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ Nor yet are others entirely deprived of the one, but participate it in a certain respect.

Aristoteles/ In what respect?

Parmenides/ Because things different from the one are different, from their having parts: for if they had not parts they would be entirely one.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But parts we have asserted belong to that which is a whole.

Aristoteles/ We have so.

Parmenides/ But it is necessary that a whole should be one composed from many, of which one the many are parts: for each of the parts ought not to be a part of many, but of a whole.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ If anything should be a part of many, among which it subsists itself, it would doubtless be a part of itself (which is impossible), and of each one of the others; since it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of one of these it will be a part of the others, this being excepted; and so it will not be a part of each one: and not being a part of each, it will be a

part of no one of the many: and being a part of no one of the many, it is impossible that it should be anything belonging to all those, of no one of which it is either a part or anything else.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ A part, therefore, is neither a part of many nor of all; but of one certain idea and of one certain thing which we call a whole, and which becomes one perfect thing from all: for a part indeed is a part of this.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, other things have parts, they will also participate of a whole and one.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ One perfect whole, therefore, possessing parts, must necessarily be different from *the one*.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But the same reasoning is true concerning each of the parts: For it is necessary that each of these should participate of the one. For, if each of these is a part, the very being each, in a certain respect, signifies one; since it is distinguished from others, and has a subsistence by itself, if it is that which is called each.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But it participates of the one as it is evidently something different from the one; for otherwise it would not participate, but would be the one itself. But now it is impossible that anything can be the one except the one itself.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ But it is necessary both to a whole and to a part to participate of the one: for a whole is one certain thing

and has parts. But each part whatever, which is a part of the whole, is one part.

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ Must not, therefore, those which participate of the one participate it, as being different from the one?

Aristoteles/ How should they not?

Parmenides/ But things different from the one will in a certain respect be many; for if things different from the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.

Aristoteles/ They would.

Parmenides/ But since the things which participate of one part and one whole are more than one, is it not necessary that these very things which participate of the one should be infinite in multitude?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ Thus: they are different from the one, nor are they participants of the one, then when they have already participated of it.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Are not those multitudes in which the one is not?

Aristoteles/ Multitudes, certainly.

Parmenides/ What then? If we should be willing by cogitation to take away the least quantity from these, would it not he necessary that this quantity which is taken away should be multitude, and not one, since it does not participate of the one?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ By always surveying, therefore, another nature of form, itself subsisting by itself, will not any quantity of it which we may behold be infinite in multitude?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ And since every part becomes one, the parts will have bounds with respect to each other, and to the whole; and the whole with respect to the parts.

Aristoteles/ Perfectly so.

Parmenides/ It will happen, therefore, to things different from the one, as it appears both from the one and from their communicating with each other, that a certain something different will take place in them; which indeed affords to them a bound towards each other, while in the meantime the nature of these causes them to become essentially connected with infinity.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ And thus things different from the one, both as wholes and according to parts, are infinite and participate of bound.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Are they not, therefore, similar and dissimilar, both to each other and to themselves?

Aristoteles/ Why?

Parmenides/ Because, so far as all of them are in a certain respect infinite, according to their own nature, they all of them, in consequence of this, suffer that which is the same.

Aristoteles/ How should they not?

Parmenides/ But so far as they suffer to be bounded and infinite, which are passions contrary to each other, they suffer these passions.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But things contrary, as such, are most dissimilar.

Aristoteles/ What then?

Parmenides/ According to each of these passions, therefore, they are similar to themselves and to each other; but, according to both, they are on both sides most contrary and dissimilar.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ And thus others will be the same with themselves and with each other, and similar and dissimilar.

Aristoteles/ They will so.

Parmenides/ And again, they will be the same and different from each other, will both be moved and stand still; and it will not be difficult to find all kinds of contrary passions suffered by things different from the one, while they appear to be passive, in the manner we have related.

Aristoteles/ You speak rightly.

Parmenides/ Shall we not, therefore, pass by these things as evident, and again consider if the one is, whether things different from the one will subsist not in this manner, or whether in this manner alone?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Let us, therefore, assert again from the beginning, if the one is, what things different from the one ought to suffer.

Aristoteles/ Let us.

Parmenides/ Is, therefore, the one separate from others, and are others separate from the one?

Aristoteles/ Why?

Parmenides/ Because there is no other different besides these, viz. that which is different from the one, and that which is different from others; for all that can be spoken is asserted, when we say the one and others.

Aristoteles/ All, indeed.

Parmenides/ There is nothing else, therefore, besides these in which the one and others can subsist after the same manner.

Aristoteles/ Nothing.

Parmenides/ The one and others, therefore, are never in the same.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that they are.

Parmenides/ Are they separate, therefore?

Aristoteles/ They are.

Parmenides/ We have likewise asserted that the truly one has not any parts.

Aristoteles/ For how can it?

Parmenides/ Neither, therefore, will the whole of the one be in others, nor the parts of if it is separate from others, and has no parts.

Aristoteles/ How should it not be so?

Parmenides/ In no way, therefore, will others participate of the one, since they neither participate according to a certain part of it, nor according to the whole.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that they can.

Parmenides/ By no means, therefore, are others the one, nor have they anyone in themselves.

Aristoteles/ They have not.

Parmenides/ Neither, then, are other things many; for, if they were many, each of them, as being a part of a whole, would be one: but now things different from the one are neither one nor many, nor a whole, nor parts, since they in no respect participate of the one.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ Others, therefore, are neither two nor three, nor is one contained in them, because they are entirely deprived of the one.

Aristoteles/ So it is.

Parmenides/ Others, therefore, are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor the same with the one, nor are similitude and dissimilitude inherent in them. For, if they were similar and dissimilar, so far as they contained in themselves similitude and dissimilitude, so far things different from the one would comprehend in themselves two contrary species.

Aristoteles/ So it appears.

Parmenides/ But it is impossible for those to participate of two certain things which do not participate of one.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ Others, therefore, are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor both. For, if they were things similar or dissimilar, they would participate of one other form; and if they were both, they would participate of two contrary forms: but these things appear to be impossible.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Others, therefore, are neither same nor different, nor are moved nor stand still, nor are generated nor destroyed, nor are greater, or lesser, or equal, nor do they suffer anything else of this kind. For, if others could sustain to suffer any such affection, they would participate of one and two, and of even and odd; all which it appears impossible for them to participate, since they are entirely deprived of the one.

Aristoteles/ All this is most true.

Parmenides/ Hence, then, if the one is, the one is all things and nothing; and is similarly affected towards itself and towards others.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Let this then be admitted. But should we not after this consider what ought to happen if the one is not?

Aristoteles/ We should.

Parmenides/ What then will be the hypothesis if the one is not? Will it differ from the hypothesis if that which is not one is not?

Aristoteles/ It will indeed differ.

Parmenides/ Will it only differ, or is the hypothesis if that which is not one is not, entirely contrary to the hypothesis if the one is not?

Aristoteles/ Entirely contrary.

Parmenides/ But what, if anyone should say, if magnitude is not, or parvitude is not, or anything else of this kind, would he not evince in each of these that he speaks of that which is not as something, different?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Would he not, therefore, now evince that he calls that which is not different from others, when he says if the one is not; and should we understand that which he says?

Aristoteles/ We should understand.

Parmenides/ In the first place, therefore, he speaks of something which may be known; and afterwards of something different from others when he says the one, whether he adds to it *to be* or *not to be*: for that which is said not to be will be not the less known, nor that it is something different from others: is it not so?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary it should.

Parmenides/ Let us, therefore, relate from the beginning, if the one is not, what ought to be the consequence. In the

first place, therefore, this as it appears ought to happen it, that either there should be a science of it, or that nothing of what is pronounced can be known, when anyone says if the one is not.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Must not this also happen, that either other things must be different from it, or that it must be said to be different from others?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Diversity, therefore, besides science, is present with it; for, when anyone says that the one is different from others, he will not speak of the diversity of others, but of the diversity of the one.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ And besides, that which is not, or non-being, will participate of that, and of some certain thing, and of this, and of these, and everything of this kind. For neither could the one be spoken of, nor things different from the one, nor would anything be present with it, nor could it be denominated anything, if it neither participated of some certain thing or things of this kind.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But to be cannot be present with the one if it is not; though nothing hinders but it may participate of the many; but, indeed, it is necessary that it should, if the one is that, and is not something different from that. If, therefore, it is neither the one nor that, neither will it be; but discourse must take place about something else, and it will be necessary to pronounce nothing concerning it. But if the one is established as that and not as another, it is necessary that it should participate of that and of many other things.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Dissimilitude, therefore, is present with it as to other things: for other things being different from the one will also be foreign from it.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But are not things foreign various?

Aristoteles/ How should they not?

Parmenides/ And are not things various dissimilars?

Aristoteles/ Dissimilars.

Parmenides/ If, therefore, they are dissimilars to the one, it is evident they will be dissimilars to that which is dissimilar.

Aristoteles/ It is evident.

Parmenides/ Dissimilitude, therefore, will be present with the one, according to which others will be dissimilars to it.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But if a dissimilitude with respect to other things belongs to it, must not similitude to itself be present with it?

Aristoteles/ How?

Parmenides/ If there be a dissimilitude of the one with respect to the one, discourse would not take place about a thing of this kind as of the one; nor would the hypothesis be about the one, but about something different from the one.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But it ought not.

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ There ought, therefore, to be a similitude of the one with respect to itself.

Aristoteles/ There ought.

Parmenides/ But neither is the one equal to others. For, if it were equal, it would according to equality be similar to them; but both these are impossible, since the one is not.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ But since it is not equal to others, is it not necessary that others also should not be equal to it?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But are not things which are not equal unequal?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ And are not unequals unequal to that which is unequal?

Aristoteles/ How should they not?

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, will participate of inequality, according to which others will be unequal to it.

Aristoteles/ It will participate.

Parmenides/ But magnitude and parvitude belong to inequality.

Aristoteles/ They do.

Parmenides/ Do magnitude and parvitude, therefore, belong to a one of this kind?

Aristoteles/ It appears they do.

Parmenides/ But magnitude and parvitude are always separated from each other.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Something, therefore, always subsists between them.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ Can you assign anything else between these, except equality?

Aristoteles/ Nothing else.

Parmenides/ With whatever, therefore, there is magnitude and parvitude, with this equality also is present, subsisting as a medium between these.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But to the one which is not, equality, magnitude, and parvitude, as it appears, belong.

Aristoteles/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ But it ought likewise, in a certain respect, to participate of essence.

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ Ought it to possess the properties which we have already described? for, unless this is the case, we shall not speak the truth when we say the one is not; but if this is true, it is evident that we have asserted things which have a subsistence: is it not so?

Aristoteles/ It is.

Parmenides/ But since we assert that we speak truly, it is likewise necessary to assert that we speak of things which exist.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, which is not, as it appears, is; for if it is not, while not being, but remits something of being in order to not being, it will immediately become being.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ It ought, therefore, to have, as the bond of not to be, to be that which is not, if it is about not to be: just as being ought to have as a bond not to be that which is not, that it may be perfectly *that which is*. For thus, in a most eminent degree, being will be and non-being will not be: being participating of essence, in order that it may be being; but of non-essence in order that it may obtain to be non-

being, if it is about perfectly to be: but non-being participating of non-essence, in order that it may not be that which is not being; but participating of essence, in order that it may obtain to be non-being, if it is to be perfectly that which is not.

Aristoteles/ Most truly so.

Parmenides/ Since, therefore, non-being is present with being, and being with non-being, is it not necessary that the one also, since it is not, should participate of being, in order that it may *not be*?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ Essence, therefore, will appear with *The One*, if it is not.

Aristoteles/ So it seems.

Parmenides/ And *non-essence*, since it is not.

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ Can anything, therefore, which is affected in a certain manner, be not so affected when not changed from this habit?

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ Everything, therefore, signifies a certain mutation, which is affected and again not affected in some particular manner.

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ Is mutation a motion, or what else do we call it?

Aristoteles/ It is a motion.

Parmenides/ But has not the one appeared to be both *being* and *non-being*?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ It has appeared, therefore, to be thus and not thus affected.

Aristoteles/ It has.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, which is non-being appears to be moved, since it possesses a mutation from being into non-being.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But if it be nowhere among beings, as it is not in consequence of not being, it cannot pass elsewhere.

Aristoteles/ For how can it?

Parmenides/ It will not, therefore, be moved by transition.

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ Neither will it revolve in same: For it will never touch *same*, since *same* is *being*. But it is impossible that *non-being* can reside in *any being*.

Aristoteles/ Impossible.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, which is not, cannot revolve in that in which it is not.

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ Neither will the one be altered from itself, either into being or non-being: for our discourse would no longer be concerning the one, if it was altered from itself, but concerning something different from this one.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ But if it is neither altered, nor revolves in same, nor suffers transition, is there any way in which it can be moved?

Aristoteles/ How should there?

Parmenides/ But that which is immovable must necessarily be at rest; and that which is at rest must abide or stand still.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ The one which is not, therefore, as it appears, both abides and is moved.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But if it be moved, there is a great necessity that it should be altered; for, so far as anything is moved, it is no longer affected in the same manner as before, but differently.

Aristoteles/ There is so.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, since it is moved, is also altered.

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But as again it is in no respect moved, it will be in no respect altered.

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ So far, therefore, as the one which is not is moved, it is altered; but so far as it is not moved it is not altered.

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, which is not, is both altered and not altered.

Aristoteles/ It appears so.

Parmenides/ But is it not necessary that when anything is altered it should become different from what it was before, and should suffer a dissolution of its former habit; but that a nature which is not altered should neither be generated nor dissolved?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, which is not, through being altered, will be generated and dissolved; but at the same time, from its not suffering alteration, will not be subject to either generation or corruption. And thus the one

which is not will be generated and dissolved, and will neither be generated nor dissolved.

Aristoteles/ It will not.

Parmenides/ But let us again return to the beginning, and see whether these things will appear to us in our subsequent discussion as they do now, or otherwise.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary, indeed, so to do.

Parmenides/ Have we not already related, if the one is not, what ought to happen concerning it?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ But when we say it is not, do we signify anything else than the absence of essence from that which we say is not?

Aristoteles/ Nothing else.

Parmenides/ Whether, therefore, when we say that anything is not, do we say that in a certain respect it is not, and, that in a certain respect it is? Or does the term is not simply signify that it is in no respect anywhere, and that it does not any how participate of essence, since it is not?

Aristoteles/ It signifies, indeed, most simply.

Parmenides/ Neither therefore can that which is not be, nor in any other respect participate of essence.

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ But is to be generated and corrupted anything else than for this to receive essence and for that to lose essence?

Aristoteles/ It is nothing else.

Parmenides/ That therefore with which nothing of essence is present, can neither receive nor lose it.

Aristoteles/ How can it?

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, since it in no respect is, can neither possess, nor lose, nor receive essence, in any manner whatever.

Aristoteles/ It is proper it should be so.

Parmenides/ The one which is not, will neither therefore be corrupted nor generated, since it in no respect participates of essence.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that it will.

Parmenides/ Neither, therefore, will it be in any respect altered; for if it suffered this passion it would be generated and corrupted.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But if it is not altered, is it not also necessary that it should not be moved?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But that which in no respect is, we have likewise asserted, cannot stand still; for that which stands ought always to be in a certain same?

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ And thus we must assert that non-being neither at any time stands nor is moved.

Aristoteles/ For indeed it does not.

Parmenides/ But likewise nothing of beings is present with it; for this, through participating of being, would participate of essence.

Aristoteles/ It is evident.

Parmenides/ Neither magnitude, therefore, nor parvitude, nor equality, belongs to it.

Aristoteles/ Certainly not.

Parmenides/ Neither will similitude or diversity, either with respect to itself or others, be present with it.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that they will.

Parmenides/ But what, can other things be in any respect present with it, if nothing ought to be present with it?

Aristoteles/ They cannot.

Parmenides/ Neither, therefore, are similars nor dissimilars, nor same nor different, different from it.

Aristoteles/ They are not.

Parmenides/ But what, can anything be asserted of it, or be with it, or can it be any certain thing, or this, or belong to this, or that, or be with some other thing, or be formerly, or hereafter, or now—or can science, or opinion, or sense, or discourse, or a name, or anything else belonging to beings, subsist about that which is not?

Aristoteles/ There cannot.

Parmenides/ The one therefore which is not, will not in any respect subsist anywhere.

Aristoteles/ So indeed it appears.

Parmenides/ But let us again declare if the one is not, what other things ought to suffer.

Aristoteles/ Let us.

Parmenides/ But in a certain respect others ought to subsist; for, unless others have a being, we cannot discourse concerning them.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ But if discourse is about others, others will be different: or do you not call others and different the same?

Aristoteles/ I do.

Parmenides/ But do we not say that different is different from different, and other is other than another?

Aristoteles/ Certainly.

Parmenides/ With respect to others, therefore, if they are about to be others, there is something than which they will be others.

Aristoteles/ It is necessary.

Parmenides/ But what will this be? For they will not be different from the one, since it is not.

Aristoteles/ They will not.

Parmenides/ They are different therefore from each other; for this alone remains to them, or to be different from nothing.

Aristoteles/ Right.

Parmenides/ According to multitudes, therefore, each is different from each; for they cannot be different according to the one, since the one is not. But each mass of these, as it appears, is infinite in multitude. And though anyone should assume that which appears to be the least, like a dream in sleep, on a sudden, instead of that which seemed to be one, many would rise to the view; and instead of that which is smallest, a quantity perfectly great with respect to the multitude distributed from it.

Aristoteles/ Most right.

Parmenides/ But among these masses or heaps, others will be mutually different from one another, if they are others and the one is not.

Aristoteles/ Eminently so.

Parmenides/ Will there not then be many heaps, each of which will appear to be one, but is not so since the one is not?

Aristoteles/ There will so.

Parmenides/ There will likewise appear to be a number of these, if each of these which are many is one.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But the even and odd which are among them will not have a true appearance, since the one will not have a being.

Aristoteles/ They will not.

Parmenides/ But likewise that which is smallest, as we have said, will appear to be with them; but this minimum will seem to be many things and great, with respect to each of the things which are many and small.

Aristoteles/ How should it not?

Parmenides/ And every small heap will seem in the eye of opinion to be equal to many small heaps: For it will not appear to pass from a greater into a lesser quantity, before it seems to arrive at something between; and this will be a phantasm of equality.

Aristoteles/ It is likely to be so.

Parmenides/ Will it not also appear to be bounded with respect to another heap, itself with respect to itself, at the same time neither having a beginning, nor middle, nor end?

Aristoteles/ How so?

Parmenides/ Because, when anyone apprehends by the dianoëtic power some one of these prior to the beginning, another beginning will always appear, and after the end another end will always be left behind: but in the middle there will always be other things more inward than the middle; and smaller, because each of them cannot receive *one*, *one*, since the one is not.

Aristoteles/ This is most true.

Parmenides/ But everything which anyone may apprehend by the dianoëtic power, must I think be broken to pieces and distributed; for the bulk will in a certain respect be apprehended without the one.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But will not such a heap, to him who beholds it afar off and with a dull eye, necessarily appear to be one: but to him who with an intellectual eye surveys it near and acutely, will not each appear to be infinite in multitude, since it is deprived of the one, because it has no subsistence?

Aristoteles/ It is necessary it should be so in the highest, degree.

Parmenides/ Each, therefore, of other things ought to appear infinite and bounded, and one and many, if the one is not, and other things besides the one have a subsistence.

Aristoteles/ It ought to be so.

Parmenides/ Will they, therefore, appear to be similars and dissimilars?

Aristoteles/ But how?

Parmenides/ Since to him who beholds others at a distance, involved as it were in shadow, they all appear to be one, they will seem to suffer same and to be similar.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ But to him who approaches nearer they will appear to be many and different, and different from and dissimilar to themselves, through the phantasm of *diversity*.

Aristoteles/ It is so.

Parmenides/ The heaps, therefore, will necessarily appear to be similar and dissimilar to themselves, and to each other.

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Will they not also be the same and different from each other, and in contact with, and separate from, themselves, and moved with all possible motions, and every way abiding: likewise generated and corrupted, and neither of these, and all of this kind, which may be easily

enumerated, if, though the one is not, the many have a subsistence?

Aristoteles/ All this is most true.

Parmenides/ Once more, therefore, returning again to the beginning, let us relate what ought to happen to things different from the one, if the one is not.

Aristoteles/ Let us relate.

Parmenides/ Does it not, therefore, follow that others are not the one?

Aristoteles/ How should it not be so?

Parmenides/ Nor yet are they many; for, in the many, the one also would be inherent. For, if none of these is one, all are nothing; so that neither can there be many.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, not being inherent in others, others are neither many nor one.

Aristoteles/ They are not.

Parmenides/ Nor will they appear either to be one or many.

Aristoteles/ Why not?

Parmenides/ Because others cannot in any respect have any communication with things which are not, nor can anything of non-beings be present with others; for no part subsists with non-beings.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ Neither, therefore, is there any opinion of that which is not, inherent in others, nor any phantasm; nor can that which is not become in any respect the subject of opinion to others.

Aristoteles/ It cannot.

Parmenides/ The one, therefore, if it is not, cannot by opinion be conceived to be any certain one of others, nor yet many; for it is impossible to form an opinion of many without the one.

Aristoteles/ It is impossible.

Parmenides/ If the one, therefore, is not, neither have others any subsistence; nor can the one or the many be conceived by opinion.

Aristoteles/ It does not appear that they can.

Parmenides/ Neither, therefore, do similars nor dissimilars subsist.

Aristoteles/ They do not.

Parmenides/ Nor same nor different, nor things in contact, nor such as are separate from each other, nor other things, such as we have already discussed, as appearing to subsist; for no particular of these will have any existence, nor will others appear to be, if the one is not.

Aristoteles/ True.

Parmenides/ If we should, therefore, summarily say, that if the one is not, nothing is, will not our assertion be right?

Aristoteles/ Entirely so.

Parmenides/ Let this then be asserted by us, and this also: that whether the one is or is not, both itself, as it appears, and others, both with respect to themselves and to each other, are entirely all things, and at the same time are not all, and appear to be, and at the same time do not appear.

Aristoteles/ It is most true.

THE END OF THE PARMENIDES.

Theaetetus.

or

On Science.

Translated by Henry Cary.

Persons of the Dialog

First Euclides, and Terpsion,

Then Socrates, Theodorus, and Theætetus.

Euclid/ Are you just now, Terpsion, or long since come from the country?

Terpsion/ A considerable time since, and I have been seeking for you in the forum, and wondered that I could not find you.

Euclid/ I was not in the city.

Terpsion/ Where then?

Euclid/ As I was going down to the port, I met with Theætetus, who was being carried from the camp at Corinth to Athens.

Terpsion/ Alive or dead?

Euclid/ Alive, though scarcely so; for he is in a bad state from several wounds, though he suffers more from the disease that is prevalent in the army.

Terpsion/ Is it dysentery?

Euclid/ Yes.

Terpsion/ What a man you speak of as being in danger!

Euclid/ An honorable and good man, Terpsion, and I just now heard some persons highly extolling his conduct in the battle.

Terpsion/ Nor is that surprising, but it would be much more wonderful if he had not behaved so. But why did he not stop here at Megara?

Euclid/ He was hastening home; although I begged and advised him, yet he would not. And after I had attended him on his journey, on my return hither I recollected, and was filled with admiration of Socrates, who often spoke prophetically about other things, and especially about him. For if I remember rightly, a little before his death, he met with Theætetus who was then a youth, and being in company and discoursing with him, he very much admired his natural disposition. And when I went to Athens, he related to me the conversation he had had with him, which was very well worth hearing, and he said that he must necessarily distinguish himself, if he lived to a mature age.

Terpsion/ And he spoke truly as it seems. But what was the conversation? are you able to relate it?

Euclid/ No, by Zeus, not by heart; but as soon as I returned home, I made notes of it, and afterwards at my leisure calling it to mind I wrote it down, and as often as I came to Athens, I asked Socrates to repeat what I did not remember, and, on my return hither, corrected it; so that I have nearly the whole conversation written out.

Terpsion/ True: I have heard you say so before, and though I always meant to beg you to show it me, I have hitherto delayed doing so. But what should hinder us from now going through it? For I am in great need of rest, having just come from the country.

Euclid/ I too accompanied Theætetus as far as Erinion, so that I should not be at all sorry to rest myself. Let us go, then, and while we rest the boy shall read to us.

Terpsion/ You say well.

Euclid/ This then is the book, Terpsion. But I wrote the conversation thus, not as if Socrates related it to me, as he did, but as if he was conversing with the persons with whom he said he did converse. But these, he said, were Theodorus the geometrician, and Theætetus. In order, then, that phrases interposed in the discourse might not give us trouble in the writing, when Socrates spoke of himself, as "I said," or "Thereupon I replied," and again when he spoke of the person who gave the answer, "He assented," or "He denied," for this reason I have introduced Socrates himself as conversing with them, and have done away with all such expressions.

Terpsion/ And that is not at all improper, Euclides.

Euclid/ Here then, boy, take the book and read.

Socrates/ If I took more interest in the people at Cyrene, Theodorus, I should enquire of you what is going on there, and of the people, whether there are any young men there who devote their attention to geometry, or any other liberal study. But now, for I love them less than these, I am more anxious to know who of our young men promise to become eminent. For I myself examine into this as far as I am able, and enquire of others, with whom I see the young men willingly associating. But no small number attach themselves to you, and justly; for you deserve it, both in other respects, and on account of your geometry. If, therefore, you have met with anyone worth mentioning, I should be glad to be informed of it.

Theodorus/ And indeed, Socrates, it is very well worth while both for me to tell and you to hear, what a youth I have met with among your fellow-citizens. And if he were beautiful, I should be very much afraid to mention him, lest I should appear to anyone to be enamored with him; but

now, and don't be angry with me, he is not handsome, for he resembles you in the flatness of his nose and the prominence of his eyes: but he has these in a less degree than you. You see I speak without reserve. Be assured then, that of all I ever met with, and I have been in company with very many, I never yet knew one of such an admirable disposition. For a man to be apt to learn, as it is at all times difficult, and at the same time remarkably mild, and added to this brave beyond compare, I, for my part, thought could never happen, nor do I see any who are so. But those who are acute, as this one, sagacious, and of a good memory, are for the most part easily roused to anger, and are hurried violently along like ships without ballast, and are naturally rather furious than brave; on the other hand those who are more sedate commonly set about their studies more sluggishly and are forgetful. But he so calmly, steadily, and effectually applies himself to his studies and investigations, with so much gentleness, like oil flowing noiselessly, that one wonders how one at his age can manage to do this.

Socrates/ You bring good news. But whose son is he of our citizens?

Theodorus/ I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However he is the middle one of those who are now approaching. For both he and these who are some of his companions were just now anointing themselves in the outer course; and new they appear to me to be coming here after having anointed themselves. Observe, however, if you know him.

Socrates/ I do know him. He is the son of Euphronius of Sunium, who, my friend, was just such a man as you describe the son to be, and who was otherwise a person of consideration, and besides left behind him a very large fortune.

Theodorus/ Theætetus is his name, Socrates. But I think his guardians have squandered his fortune. However notwithstanding this, he is wonderfully liberal with his money, Socrates.

Socrates/ You describe a noble man. Bid him come here, and sit down by us.

Theodorus/ I will. Theætetus, come hither to Socrates.

Socrates/ By all means come, Theætetus, that I may look at myself, and see what sort of a face I have. For Theodorus says I am like you. But if we had each of us a lyre, and he should say that they were modulated alike, should we believe him at once, or consider first whether he speaks as a musician?

Theaetetus/ We should consider that first.

Socrates/ Should we not, then, on finding that he was so, believe him, but, if he was ignorant of music, disbelieve him?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Now, then, I think, if we care at all about the resemblance of our faces, we should consider whether he speaks as a painter, or not.

Theaetetus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Is Theodorus a painter then?

Theaetetus/ Not that I know of.

Socrates/ And is he not a geometrician either?

Theaetetus/ Most assuredly he is, Socrates.

Socrates/ Is he also an astronomer, a reasoner, and a musician, and acquainted with all such things as are requisite for a good education?

Theaetetus/ He appears so to me.

Socrates/ If, then, he says that we resemble each other in some part of our body, praising or blaming it, it is not very well worthwhile to pay any attention to him.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ But what if he should praise the soul of either of us for virtue or wisdom? would it not be worthwhile for the one who heard him to take pains to examine him that was praised, and for the latter to discover himself willingly?

Theaetetus/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is time then, my dear Theætetus, for you to discover yourself, and for me to examine you; for be assured that Theodorus, though he has ere now praised many both strangers and citizens to me, has never praised anyone so much as he praised you just now.

Theaetetus/ May it be well, Socrates; but beware that he did not speak in jest.

Socrates/ That is not Theodorus's habit. But do not retract what you have granted, under the pretense that he spoke in jest, lest he should be compelled to bear witness. For no one assuredly will accuse him of giving false evidence. Therefore adhere firmly to your agreement.

Theaetetus/ It is proper to do so, if you think fit.

Socrates/ Tell me, then; Do you learn geometry from Theodorus?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ And, likewise, astronomy, and harmony, and reasoning.

Theaetetus/ I endeavor to do so.

Socrates/ I too, my boy, endeavor to learn both from him and from others who I think understand anything of these matters. However, though I am tolerably well informed in other subjects, yet I am in doubt about a trifle which I wish to consider with you, and these here present. Tell me, then, is not to learn to become wiser in that which one learns?

Theaetetus/ How otherwise?

Socrates/ And by wisdom, I think, the wise are wise.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But does this differ at all from science?

Theaetetus/ What?

Socrates/ Wisdom. Are not men wise in things of which they have a scientific knowledge?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Socrates/ Then are wisdom and science the same?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ This, then, is the thing that I doubt about, and I am not able to determine satisfactorily by myself what science is. Can we then explain it? What do you say? Which of us shall speak first? But he that mistakes, and as often as anyone mistakes, shall sit as an ass, as the boys say when they play at ball; but whoever shall get the better without making a mistake shall be our king, and shall order any question he pleases to be answered. Why are you silent? Am I rude at all, Theodorus, from my love of talking, and in my anxiety to bring about a conversation amongst us, and of making us all friends, and sociable with one another?

Theodorus/ Such a thing, Socrates, cannot by any means be rude, but bid one of these young men answer you. For I am unaccustomed to this kind of conversation, and am not of an age to accustom myself to it; whereas it is suitable to them, and they will benefit by it much more; for, in truth, youth can derive benefit from everything. As you begun, therefore, do not let Theætetus off, but question him.

Socrates/ You hear, Theætetus, what Theodorus says, whom, I think, you will neither be willing to disobey, nor is it right for a young man not to submit to a wise man, when he commands him in matters of this kind. Tell me, therefore,

frankly and ingenuously, what does science appear to you to be?

Theaetetus/ I must then, Socrates, since you bid me. And if I make any mistake you will assuredly correct me.

Socrates/ Certainly, if we are able.

Theaetetus/ It appears to me, then, that sciences are such things as one may learn from Theodorus, geometry, and the others which you just now enumerated; and again, the shoemaker's art, and those of other artisans, all and each of these are nothing else but science.

Socrates/ Nobly and munificently, my friend, when asked for one thing you give many, and various things instead of the single one.

Theaetetus/ What mean you by this, Socrates?

Socrates/ Perhaps nothing: but I will tell you what I think. When you speak of the shoemaker's art, do you mean anything else than the science of making shoes?

Theaetetus/ Nothing.

Socrates/ But what of the carpenter's art? Do you mean anything else than the science of making implements in wood?

Theaetetus/ Still nothing else.

Socrates/ In both, then, do you not define that of which each is the science?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the question asked, Theætetus, was not this, of what things there is science, nor how many sciences there are; for we did not enquire, with a view to enumerate them, but to know what science itself is. Do I say nothing to the purpose?

Theaetetus/ You speak very correctly.

Socrates/ Consider this too. If anyone should ask us about any mean and obvious thing, as, for instance, clay, what it is, if we were to answer him, there is the potters' clay, the oven-builders' clay, and the brick-makers' clay, should we not be ridiculous?

Theaetetus/ Probably.

Socrates/ In the first place, we should be ridiculous for thinking that he who asks the question can understand from our answer, when we say Clay, adding, image-makers, or any other artisans whatever. Do you think that anyone can understand the name of a thing when he does not know what that thing is?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Neither does he understand the science of shoes who does not know what science is?

Theaetetus/ He does not.

Socrates/ He then does not understand what is the art of shoemaking, or any other art, who is ignorant of what science is?

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Socrates/ It is, therefore, a ridiculous answer for one to give who is asked what science is, when he answers the name of some art. For he answers, of what there is a science, though this is not what he was asked.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ In the next place, when he might have answered plainly and briefly he goes round an endless way. As for instance to the question about clay, it is a plain and simple answer to give, that clay is earth mixed with moisture, without mentioning what use is made of it.

Theaetetus/ It appears easy now, in this way, Socrates; for you appear to ask just such a question as lately occurred

to me when we were conversing together, I and your namesake here, Socrates.

Socrates/ What was that, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ Theodorus here was describing to us something about powers, with respect to magnitudes of three and five feet, showing that they are not commensurate in length to a magnitude of one foot, and thus proceeding through every number as far as to a magnitude of seventeen feet; at this he stopped. Since then powers appeared to be infinite in multitude, something of the following kind occurred to us, to endeavor to comprehend them in one name, by which we might denominate all these powers.

Socrates/ And did you discover anything of the kind?

Theaetetus/ I think we did. But do you also consider.

Socrates/ Say on.

Theaetetus/ We divided all number into two classes; then comparing that in which the factors are the same to a square figure, we called it square and equilateral.

Socrates/ Very well.

Theaetetus/ But the intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and everyone in which the factors are not the same, but a greater number is multiplied by a less, or a less by a greater, so that a greater and a lesser side always enclose them, we compared to an oblong figure, and called them oblong numbers.

Socrates/ Admirable. But what next?

Theaetetus/ Such lines as square an equilateral and plane number, we defined to be length, and such as square an oblong number, powers, as not being commensurate with them in length, but with the planes which they produce. And the case is the same with solids.

Socrates/ Excellently done, my boys; so that Theodorus appears to me not liable to the charge of having given false testimony.

Theaetetus/ However, Socrates, I shall not be able to answer your question about science, as I did that about length and power; though you appear to me to seek something of the same kind. So that Theodorus again appears to be a false witness.

Socrates/ How so? If, praising you for running, he should say that he never met with any youth who ran so swift, and afterwards you should be defeated in running by a man who is full grown and very swift, do you think he would have praised you with less truth?

Theaetetus/ I do not.

Socrates/ But with respect to science, as I just now spoke of it. do you think it is a trifling matter to find out what it is, and not in every way difficult?

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, I think it difficult in the extreme.

Socrates/ Have confidence, then, in yourself, and think that Theodorus spoke to the purpose, and endeavor by all possible means to comprehend the notion both of other things, and also of science, what it is.

Theaetetus/ As far as endeavor goes, Socrates, it shall be found out.

Socrates/ Come then: for you began very well just now; endeavor, in imitation of your answer about powers, as you comprised those, which are many, under one general idea, so likewise to designate many sciences by one notion.

Theaetetus/ Be assured, Socrates, I have often attempted to examine this, on hearing the questions that are propounded by you; but I can neither persuade myself that I can say anything satisfactory, nor can I hear anyone else

answering in the manner you require, though still I do not desist from the attempt.

Socrates/ You are in labor, my dear Theætetus, not because you are empty, but pregnant.

Theaetetus/ I know not, Socrates; however I tell you how the case stands with me.

Socrates/ What, absurd youth, have you not heard that I am son of the very noble and awful midwife Phænarete?

Theaetetus/ I have heard so.

Socrates/ And have you also heard that I study the same art?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Be assured, however, that it is so: but do not betray me to others. For they are not aware, my friend, that I possess this art? but they, since they are ignorant of it, do not say this of me, but that I am a most absurd man, and make men doubt. Have you not heard this?

Theaetetus/ I have.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you the reason of it?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Consider, then, everything that relates to midwives, and you will more easily understand what I mean. For you doubtless know, that not one of them delivers others, while she herself can conceive and bring forth, but those who can no longer bring forth.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But they say that Diana is the cause of this, because being herself a virgin she has the charge of child-births. Now to barren women she has not given the power of becoming midwives, because human nature is too weak to undertake an art in things of which it has had no experience, but she has imposed that office on those who from their age

are incapable of bearing children, doing honor to the resemblance of herself.

Theaetetus/ That is reasonable.

Socrates/ And is not this also reasonable and necessary, that who are pregnant and who are not should be better known by midwives than by others?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Moreover, midwives by applying drugs and using enchantments, are able both to excite and, if they please, to alleviate the pangs, and to deliver those that bring forth with difficulty, and if the child appears to be abortive, they produce a miscarriage.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Have you not also heard this of them, that they are most skillful match-makers, as being perfectly competent to distinguish what kind of woman ought to be united to what kind of man, in order to produce the finest children?

Theaetetus/ I did not altogether know that.

Socrates/ Be assured, then, that they pride themselves more in this than in cutting the navel-string. For consider; do you think it belongs to the same or a different art to cultivate and gather in the fruits of the earth, and again to know in what soil what plant or seed ought to be sown?

Theaetetus/ No, but to the same art.

Socrates/ But with respect to women, my friend, do you think that there is one art of that kind, and another of gathering in the fruit?

Theaetetus/ It is not reasonable to suppose so.

Socrates/ It is not. But by reason of the illegitimate and ill-assorted unions of men and women, to which the name of pandering has been given, midwives out of regard to their

own dignity avoid match-making also, fearing lest by this they should incur the other imputation, since it doubtless belongs to real midwives only to make marriages properly.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Such then is the office of midwives, but less important than my task. For it does not happen to women, sometimes to bring forth images, and sometimes realities, which cannot be easily discriminated; for, if it did happen, it would be the greatest and noblest work for midwives to distinguish that which is true and that which is not; do you not think so?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ But in my art of midwifery all other things are the same as in theirs; but it differs in this, that it delivers men and not women, and that it attends to their souls bringing forth and not their bodies. But the most important thing in my art is, that it is able to test in every possible way whether the mind of a young man is bringing forth an image and a cheat, or what is genuine and true: for the case is the same with me as with midwives; I am barren of wisdom, and as to what many have reproached me with, that I question others, but give no answer myself on any subject, because I have no wisdom, they reproach me truly. But the cause of this is as follows: the deity compels me to act the part of a midwife, but forbids me to bring forth myself. I am not, therefore, myself at all wise, and I have no such discovery as is the offspring of my own mind; but those who associate with me at first appear, some of them, exceedingly ignorant, but all, as our intimacy continues, to whom the deity grants that privilege, make a wonderful proficiency, as is evident both to themselves and others; and this is clear, that they make this proficiency without ever learning anything from me, but from their own resources finding and becoming

possessed of many beautiful things; of the midwife's office, however, the deity and I are the cause. But it is evident from this: many, from not knowing this, and deeming themselves to be the cause, but despising me, either of themselves or through the persuasion of others, have left me sooner than was proper, and after they have left me have miscarried for the future, in consequence of their depraved associations, and badly nurturing what they have been delivered of through me, they have destroyed it, setting a higher value on cheats and images than on that which is true, they have at last appeared to be ignorant both to themselves and others. One of these was Aristides son of Lysimachus, and many others, with some of whom, when they again come to me, begging to renew their intercourse with me, and doing everything in their power to obtain it, the demon that attends me prevents me from associating, but with others it allows me, and these again make considerable proficiency. And they that associate with me are in this respect affected in the same way as women who bring forth; they suffer pangs, and are filled with anxieties, to a far greater degree than the women are. But their pangs my art is able both to excite and appease. And these are affected in this way. But sometimes, Theætetus, there are some who do not appear to me to be at all pregnant, and I, knowing that they do not need my assistance, very kindly sue others for them, and with the aid of the deity, conjecture well enough, from associating with whom they will derive benefit. Of these I have handed many over to Prodicus, and many to other wise and divine men. I have dwelt long on this, my excellent friend, for this reason, because I suspect, as you also think yourself, that you are in pain from being pregnant with something inwardly. Deal with me, then, as son of a midwife, and as myself skilled in midwifery, and endeavor to answer the questions I put to you to the best of your ability. And if, on examining anything

that you say, I shall consider it to be an image and not true, and should thereupon remove it and throw it away, do not be angry with me, like women who are delivered for the first time are for their children: for many, my admirable friend, have ere this been so affected towards me as to be actually ready to bite me, when I take away any trifle from them, and they do not think that I do this with a good design, in that they are very far from knowing that no deity designs ill to men, and that neither do I do anything of this kind through ill-will, but because it is by no means allowable for me to give way to falsehood and conceal the truth. Again, therefore, from the beginning, Theætetus, endeavor to tell me what science is; but never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills and you strive manfully you will be able.

Theaetetus/ Indeed, Socrates, when you are thus urgent, it would be disgraceful for one not to endeavor to the utmost of one's power to say what one is able. He, then, that knows anything appears to me to perceive what he knows, and, as it now seems, science is nothing else than perception.

Socrates/ Well and nobly said, my boy; for it is right thus to declare one's opinion. But come, let us consider this together, whether it is solid or empty. Science, you say, is perception?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ You appear, indeed, to have given no mean definition of science, but that which Protagoras has given; but he said the same thing in a different manner. For he says that man is the measure of all things, of the existence of those that exist, and of the non-existence of those that do not exist. You have doubtless read this?

Theaetetus/ I have read it, and that often.

Socrates/ Does he not say pretty much, that such as everything appears to me, such it is to me, and as it appears to you, such it is to you, but you and I are men?

Theaetetus/ He does indeed say so.

Socrates/ It is probable however that a wise man does not trifle; let us, therefore, follow him. Does it not sometimes happen that when the same wind blows, one of us is cold, and another not, and one slightly, but another exceedingly?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Whether, then, shall we say, that the wind at that time is in itself cold or not cold? or shall we believe Protagoras, that it is cold to him that is cold, but not to him that is not?

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Does it not, then, appear so to both of them?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But to appear is the same as to be perceived?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ Appearance then and perception are the same in things hot, and everything of that kind; for such as everyone perceives things to be, such also they seem to be to everyone.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Perception, therefore, has always reference to that which really is, and is free from falsehood, as being science.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ By the graces, then, was not Protagoras a very wise man, and did he express himself thus enigmatically to us, the general rabble, but speak the truth to his disciples in secret?

Theaetetus/ What mean you by this, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you, and that no mean account; he asserts, that no one thing exists of itself, nor can you correctly designate anything by any quality, but if you call it great, it will appear small, and if heavy, light, and so with everything else; as if nothing was one thing, or anything, or possessed of any quality: but as if all things which we say exist, become so from impulse, motion, and admixture with each other, thereby designating them incorrectly; for nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And in this all the wise men in succession, except Parmenides, agreed, namely, Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, and of the poets, those who rank highest in each kind of poetry, in comedy Epicharmus, and in tragedy Homer; for in saying that "Oceanus is father of the gods, and Tethys mother," he asserts that all things are produced by flux and motion. Does he not seem to say so?

Theaetetus/ To me he does.

Socrates/ Who then can contend with such an army, with Homer for its leader, and not be ridiculous?

Theaetetus/ It is not easy, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is not, indeed, Theætetus. For this is a strong proof in favor of their argument, that motion gives the appearance of existence and of generation, but repose of non-existence and decay; for heat and fire, which engenders and supports other things, is itself engendered by impulse and friction, but this is motion. Are not these the origin of fire?

Theaetetus/ Surely they are.

Socrates/ And moreover the race of animals springs from the same causes.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Socrates/ But what? Does not the habit of the body perish by rest and inaction, but is it not for the most part preserved by exercise and motion?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But does not the habit of the soul acquire and retain learning and become better by study and practice, which are motions, but by rest, which is want of practice and ignorance, it neither learns anything, and forgets what it has learnt?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Motion, therefore, is good both for the soul and the body; but rest, the contrary.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Shall I add further, with respect to stillness of the air, and calms and things of that kind, that rest corrupts and destroys, but the contrary preserves. And besides this shall I put the finishing stroke to my argument by compelling you to admit, that by the golden chain Homer meant nothing else than the sun, and intimated that as long as the universe and the sun are moved, all things exist, and are preserved, both amongst gods and amongst men; but if they were to stand still, as it were bound, all things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is, turned upside down.

Theaetetus/ He appears to me too, Socrates, to intimate what you say.

Socrates/ Then put the argument thus, my excellent friend: first with respect to the eyes, suppose that what you call white color is not anything different, external to your eyes, nor in your eyes; nor can you assign it any place; for then it would have a fixed position, and would continue, and not be liable to production.

Theaetetus/ But how?

Socrates/ Let us follow our late principle, and lay it down that there is nothing which is of itself one thing; and thus black and white, and every other color, will appear to us to be produced by the application of the eyes to a corresponding movement, and each thing that we say is color, will neither be that which is applied, nor that to which it is applied, but some intermediate production peculiar to each. Would you positively maintain, that what each color appears to you, such it also appears to a dog, and every other animal?

Theaetetus/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But what? Does anything appear similar to another man and to you? are you positive about this, or rather that it does not appear the same even to you, because you are never identical with yourself?

Theaetetus/ The latter seems to me to be the case rather than the former.

Socrates/ If, therefore, that which we measure by comparison, or which we touch, were great, or white, or warm, it would never, by coming in contact with anything else, become different, for it would not be in any respect changed. But if that which measures or touches were some one of these things, it could not, in consequence of something else approaching it or being affected in any way, become anything else, because it would not itself be in any respect affected. For now, my friend, we are in a manner compelled to assert things altogether wonderful and ridiculous, as Protagoras would acknowledge, and everyone who supports his opinions.

Theaetetus/ How and what do you mean?

Socrates/ Take a trifling example, and you will understand all that I wish. Six dice for instance, if you should put four by them, we say are more than the four and

half as many again, but if twelve we say they are fewer, and the half; nor would it be allowable to say otherwise. Would you allow it?

Theaetetus/ Not I, indeed.

Socrates/ What then? If Protagoras or anyone else should ask, "Theætetus, is it possible for anything to become greater or more otherwise than by being increased?" What would you answer?

Theaetetus/ If, Socrates, I should answer what appears to me to be the case with reference to the present question, I should say that it is not possible; but if with reference to the former question, to avoid contradicting myself, I should say that it is possible.

Socrates/ By Hera, well and divinely said, my friend. But, as it seems, if you should answer that it is possible, something like that saying of Euripides will happen; for the tongue will be blameless, but the mind not blameless.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ If, therefore, you and I were skillful and wise, after we had thoroughly examined our minds, we should then, out of mere wantonness, make trial of each other's strength, and engaging in such a contest after the manner of the sophists, should mutually parry argument with argument: but now, as being novices, we shall desire first of all, to examine what the things themselves are which we have in our minds, whether they accord with each other, or not at all.

Theaetetus/ I should certainly desire this.

Socrates/ And so do I. But since this is the case, shall we not quietly, seeing we have abundance of leisure, again consider, not feeling any annoyance, but really examining ourselves, in order to see what those appearances in us are. And on considering them, we shall say in the first place, I

think, that nothing ever becomes greater or less, either in bulk, or number, as long as it continues equal to itself. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And, in the second place, that a thing to which nothing is either added and from which nothing is taken away, will neither be ever increased or diminished, but always be equal.

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Socrates/ And shall we not say, in the third place, that it is impossible for a thing which did not before exist, to exist afterwards, without it has been produced and is produced.

Theaetetus/ It seems so, indeed.

Socrates/ These three admissions, I think, contend with each other in our soul, when we speak about dice, or when we say that I, being of the size I am, having neither increased, nor suffered diminution in the space of a year, am now larger than you, who are a young man, but afterwards less, though in bulk has not been diminished, but yours has been increased. For I am afterwards, what I was not before, without having been made so.

For it is impossible for a thing to have been made, without being made, and having lost nothing of my bulk, I cannot have been made less. And the case is the same with ten thousand other things with reference to ten thousand others, if we admit this. You doubtless follow me, Theætetus; for you appear to me not to be a novice in things of this kind.

Theaetetus/ By the gods, Socrates, I wonder extremely what these things can be, and, truly, sometimes when I look at them, I become dizzy.

Socrates/ Theodorus, my friend, appears not to have formed an erroneous estimate of your disposition; for wonder is very much the affection of a philosopher; for there

is no other beginning of philosophy than this, and he who said that Iris was the daughter of Thaumas, seems not to have described her genealogy badly. But do you understand now, why these things are so, from what we say Protagoras maintains, or not yet?

Theaetetus/ I don't think I do yet.

Socrates/ Shall you not, then, be obliged to me, if I assist you in searching out the true, but concealed opinion of a man, or rather of men of celebrity?

Theaetetus/ How should I not be, and indeed exceedingly obliged to you?

Socrates/ Look round, then, and see that no profane person hears us. But they are so who think that nothing else exists except what they can grasp with their hands, but do not admit that actions, and productions, and whatever is invisible, are to be reckoned in the number of things that exist.

Theaetetus/ Indeed, Socrates, you speak of hard and obstinate men.

Socrates/ For they are very ignorant, my boy. But there are others far more refined than these, whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you. Their principle, on which all the things, that we have just now mentioned, depend, is this: That the universe is motion, and nothing else besides, but that there are two species of motion, each infinite in amount, and that one has an active, the other a passive power. That from the intercourse and friction of these with one another are formed productions infinite in number, but of two kinds, one that is perceivable, the other perception, which always coincides and is engendered together with that which is perceivable. Now to the perceptions we give the following names, seeing, hearing, smelling, cold and heat, and moreover pleasures, pains, desires, and fears are so called,

and there are innumerable others which have no name, and vast multitudes that have been named: again there is a class of perceivable things akin to each of these, all kinds of colors to all kinds of vision, and in like manner voices to hearing, and other perceivable things are produced corresponding to the other perceptions. What then is the meaning of this discourse, Theætetus, in reference to the former? Do you understand what it is?

Theaetetus/ Not very well, Socrates.

Socrates/ But observe if by any means it can be brought to a conclusion. For it means to say that all these things are, as we said, moved, and that there is swiftness and slowness in their motion. Whatever then is slow is moved in the same place and towards things near it, and so produces, and the things which are produced are accordingly slower; and on the contrary, whatever is swift moves towards things at a distance, and so produces, and the things which are produced are accordingly swifter, for they are impelled, and their motion consists in impulse. When, therefore, the eye and any of the things that correspond to it meet together and produce whiteness, and the perception connate to this, which would never have been produced had each of them approached something else, then they being in the meanwhile impelled, *that is to say*, sight from the eyes, and whiteness from that which together with it generates color, the eye becomes filled with vision, and then sees, and becomes not vision, but a seeing eye; but that which together with it generates color is filled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness, but white, whether it is wood or stone, or whatever may happen to be tinted with a color of this kind. And so with the rest, hard and warm, and everything, we must in the same manner conceive that none of these is anything of itself, as we have, observed before that all things and of all kinds are produced by their intercourse with each

other, from motion, for, as they say, we cannot determine positively with regard to anyone thing, that that which is active really exists, nor again that which is passive; for neither is the active anything before it meets with the passive, nor the passive before it meets with the active; and that which, meeting with anything, is active, when it falls upon something else, is found to be passive. So that it results from all this, as we said at the beginning, that nothing is essentially one, but is always being produced by something, and the word "being" must be entirely done away with, although we have already been compelled by custom and ignorance to use it frequently; but, as the sages say, we ought not to allow anything, either of any other, or of me, or this, or that, or any other name which designates permanency, but that according to nature, things ought to be said to be produced and made, to perish and be changed: so, if anyone asserts permanency of anything, he who does so may easily be confuted. Thus then we ought to speak of things individually, and of many collectively, to which collection are given the names of man, stone, animal, and each several species. Do not these things, Theætetus, appear pleasant to you, and have you not found them agreeable to your taste?

Theaetetus/ I don't know, Socrates; for I can't make you out; whether you are giving your own opinions or are trying me.

Socrates/ You do not remember, my friend, that I neither know nor claim as my own any of these things, but that I am barren of them, but I act the midwife towards you, and for this purpose I enchant you, and put before you the opinions of the several wise men, that you may taste them, until I bring your own opinion to light: but when it is brought forth, I will then examine whether it shall prove to be empty or productive. Be therefore confident and bold, and answer in

an honest and manly way, what you think of the questions I put to you.

Theaetetus/ Ask then.

Socrates/ Tell me then again, whether it is your opinion that the good, and the beautiful, and everything that we just now mentioned, have an actual existence or are constantly being produced?

Theaetetus/ To me indeed, when I hear you thus explaining the matter, it is wonderful how far you appear to have reason on your side, and I think that your statements must be admitted.

Socrates/ Let us not, then, omit what remains of it. But it remains that we should speak of dreams, diseases, and, besides other things, of madness; and whatever else is called error of hearing or seeing, or of any other perception. For you know, without doubt, that in all these cases the doctrine which we have just now described, is considered to be completely confuted, since the sensations produced in these instances are utterly false, and so far are the things that appear to each person from existing, that quite contrariwise none of the things that appear have any real existence.

Theaetetus/ You speak most truly, Socrates.

Socrates/ What argument, then, remains for him, who asserts that perception is science, and that things which appear to everyone are to that person what they appear to be?

Theaetetus/ I am afraid to say, Socrates, that I have no answer to give, because you just now blamed me for having said so: but in truth I cannot controvert the fact, that those who are mad or dreaming, form false opinions, since some of the former think they are gods, and the latter that they are winged and fancy that they are flying in their sleep.

Socrates/ Do you not know, then, the controversy that is raised on these points, especially about dreaming and being awake?

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That which I think you have often heard, when people ask, what proof one could give, if anyone should ask us now at the present moment, whether we are asleep, and all our thoughts are dreams, or whether we are awake, and really conversing with each other.

Theaetetus/ And indeed, Socrates, it is difficult to say what proof one ought to give: for in both states all things in a manner correspond with each other. For, with respect to our present conversation, nothing hinders our fancying that we converse with each other in a dream: and when in sleep we fancy we are telling our dreams, the similarity of one with the other is surprising.

Socrates/ You see, then, that it is not difficult to raise a controversy, since it is even controverted whether a state is that of being awake or dreaming; moreover since the time during which we sleep is equal to that when we are awake, in each of these states our soul persists that the opinions that are present for the time are most certainly true, so that for an equal space of time we say that these are real, and for an equal space that those are, and we are equally positive for each of them.

Theaetetus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ May not, then, the same argument be used with respect to diseases and madness, except with regard to time, that it is not equal.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Socrates/ What then? Shall truth be defined by length and brevity of time?

Theaetetus/ That, indeed, would be ridiculous in many ways.

Socrates/ Have you, then, any other clear mark by which you can show which of these opinions is true?

Theaetetus/ I think not.

Socrates/ Hear, therefore, from me, what will be said about these things by those who maintain that appearances are always real to the person to whom they appear. They will question you thus, I think: "Theætetus, can a thing which is totally different from another, have the same power as that other?" And we are not to suppose that the thing we ask about is partly the same, and partly different, but altogether different.

Theaetetus/ It is impossible that it should possess anything the same, either in power, or in any other respect, since it is entirely different.

Socrates/ Must we not, then, necessarily confess, that a thing of this kind is dissimilar?

Theaetetus/ It seems so to me.

Socrates/ If, therefore, anything happens to become similar or dissimilar to anything, whether to itself or to another, so far as it becomes similar we shall say it is the same, but, so far as dissimilar, different.

Theaetetus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Have we not said before, that there are many, and indeed innumerable things, which are active, and likewise passive?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And moreover, that one thing commingled first with one thing and then with another, will produce not the same, but different things.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us speak, then, of you and me and other things in the same manner, of Socrates in health, and again of Socrates ill. Whether shall we say that the latter is similar to the former or dissimilar?

Theaetetus/ By Socrates ill, do you mean the whole of the latter opposed to the whole of the former, Socrates in health?

Socrates/ You understand me perfectly; that is the very thing I mean.

Theaetetus/ Dissimilar, surely.

Socrates/ And is it not different inasmuch as it is dissimilar?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And should you not speak in the same way of Socrates asleep, and in the several states we just now described?

Theaetetus/ I should.

Socrates/ But will not each of those things whose nature it is to make anything something else, when it lights upon Socrates in health, treat me as one thing, and when ill, as a different thing?

Theaetetus/ How should it not?

Socrates/ And shall we not produce different things in each case, both I the patient, and that the agent?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Socrates/ Now when I drink wine, being in health, it appears to me pleasant and sweet.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ For, from what has been already granted, the agent and the patient produce sweetness and perception, both being put in motion together; and the perception proceeding from the patient causes the tongue to perceive, but the sweetness proceeding from the wine and set in

motion about it, causes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to a healthy tongue.

Theaetetus/ Certainly, what was granted before comes to this.

Socrates/ But when it lights on me, being ill, first of all does not a different thing in reality light on one who is not the same person? for it approaches one who is dissimilar.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But Socrates in this state, and the wine drunk, again generate different things, with regard to the tongue a perception of bitterness, and with regard to the wine bitterness produced and set in motion, and that, indeed, not bitterness, but bitter, and me not perception, but perceiving.

Theaetetus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Therefore I shall never become anything else while I perceive thus; for a different perception of a different thing causes the percipient to be changed and different: nor will that, which thus affects me, by coming in contact with another, though it produces the same effect, ever become such as it was to me; for by generating a different thing from a different thing it will become changed.

Theaetetus/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ Neither, then, shall I become such by myself, nor will it become such by itself.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But it is necessary that I, when I become percipient, should become so in relation to something: for it is impossible to become percipient, and yet percipient of nothing: and it is likewise necessary, when anything becomes sweet or bitter, or anything of the kind, that it should become so in relation to someone; for it is impossible for a thing to become sweet, and yet sweet to no one.

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ It remains, I think, that we, if we are, should be, or if we are produced, should be produced, by relation to each other; since necessity unites our existence together, and unites it to no other thing, nor even to ourselves. It remains, therefore, that we are united to each other. So that, if anyone says that anything exists, he must say that it exists for something, or of something, or in relation to something, and in like manner of anything said to be produced: but he must not say, nor must he allow anyone else to say, that anything exists or is produced of itself, as the argument we have deduced clearly proves.

Theaetetus/ Assuredly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Since, then, that which affects me is relative to me and not to another, do not I perceive it, and another not perceive it?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Socrates/ My perception, therefore, is true to me; for it always belongs to my existence. And I, according to Protagoras, am a judge of things that exist in relation to me, that they do exist, and of things that do not so exist, that they do not exist.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ How then, since I am not deceived and do not falter in my mind about things that exist or are produced, can I fail to have a scientific knowledge of things which I perceive?

Theaetetus/ It cannot fail to be so.

Socrates/ It was, therefore, very finely said by you, that science is nothing else than perception; and all come to the same result, the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus and all that tribe, that all things are in motion like streams, and that of the very wise Protagoras, that man is the measure of all

things, and that of Theætetus, that, if this is the case, perception must be science. Is it not so, Theætetus? Shall we say that this is your new-born infant as it were, delivered by my midwifery? How say you?

Theaetetus/ It is necessary to say so, Socrates.

Socrates/ This, then, as it appears, we have with much difficulty produced, whatever it may turn out to be. But after the birth, we must, in truth, perform the ceremony of running round in argument, and consider whether, without our perceiving it, that which is produced is not unworthy of being reared, but empty and false. Do you think that we ought by all means to rear your offspring, and not expose it? and will you endure to see it refuted, and not be very much offended if anyone should take it away from you, as having been delivered for the first time?

Theodorus/ Theætetus will endure this, Socrates, for he is not at all morose. But, by the gods, say whether it is not so.

Socrates/ You are really very fond of discussion, Theodorus, and pleasant, in thinking that I am a sack full of arguments, and that I can easily pick one out and prove that these things are not so. But you do not observe how the case stands, that no argument proceeds from me, but always from the person who is conversing with me, and that I know nothing but a very little, just enough to apprehend and examine moderately well an argument advanced by another who is wise. And now I will endeavor to do this from him, without saying anything of myself.

Theodorus/ You say well, Socrates; then do so.

Socrates/ Do you know, Theodorus, what I wonder at in your friend Protagoras?

Theodorus/ What?

Socrates/ In other respects I thought what he said was very acceptable, that what appears to each person, really exists, but I wondered at the beginning of his essay, that he did not say at the commencement of his book on Truth that a pig or a cynocephalus or some other more monstrous creature that possesses perception, is the measure of all things, in order that he might begin by speaking grandly and very contemptuously to us, showing that we indeed admire him as if he were a god, for his wisdom, whereas with respect to understanding, he is no better than a tadpole, let alone any other man. What are we to say, Theodorus? For if that opinion which is formed from perception will be true to each person, and no one will be able to decide better on the way in which another is affected, nor one more competent to examine the opinion of another, whether it is true or false, but, as we have often said, each person by himself alone will form opinions for himself, and all these are right and true, why in the world, my friend, should Protagoras be so wise as to be thought-justly worthy to teach others for high pay, while we are more ignorant and must have recourse to him, though each person is to himself the measure of his own wisdom? How can we avoid saying that Protagoras speaks thus out of joke? As to myself and my art of midwifery, I say nothing of the ridicule we should be exposed to, and I think, so would the whole study of reasoning; for will it not be great and signal vanity to examine and endeavor to confute the fancies and opinions of others, each person's being true, if the Truth of Protagoras is true, and he has not uttered his oracles in sport from the sanctuary of his book?

Theodorus/ Socrates, he is my friend, as you just now said; I cannot, therefore, allow Protagoras to be confuted by my concessions, nor yet can I oppose you contrary to my own opinion. Again, therefore, take Theætetus; for he

certainly appears to have listened to you just now very attentively.

Socrates/ If you went to Lacedaemon, Theodorus, to the wrestling grounds, and were to see others naked, some of them mean, should you hesitate to strip yourself and show your own form in turn?

Theodorus/ Why do you think I should not, at least if they would permit me and be persuaded by me? as I think I shall now persuade you to allow me to be a spectator, and not drag me to the gymnasium, now that my limbs are stiff, but for you to wrestle with one who is younger and more supple.

Socrates/ But if this is agreeable to you, Theodorus, it is not disagreeable to me, as the vulgar saying goes. I must have recourse again, therefore, to the wise Theætetus. Tell me, then, Theætetus, first of all as to what we just now discussed, do you not wonder with me, that you have so suddenly discovered yourself to be not inferior in wisdom to any man or god? or do you think that the measure of Protagoras has less to do with gods than men?

Theaetetus/ Not I, by Zeus: and I very much wonder at your question. For when we discussed in what manner they said, that what appears to each person is true to him to whom it appears, it seemed to me to be well said, but now the very contrary has speedily occurred to me.

Socrates/ For you are young, my dear boy, and quickly give ear to and are persuaded by plausible speeches. For to these things Protagoras or someone on his behalf would say: “Noble boys and old men, you here sit and converse together, dragging gods into the question, of whom, whether they exist or not, I do not think proper either to speak or write, and what the multitude hear and admit, this you assert, as if it were strange if every man did not excel any beast whatever in wisdom, but you do not adduce any proof, or conclusive

argument, but have recourse to likelihood, which if Theodorus or any other geometrician were to employ in geometry, he would be deemed unworthy of notice." Do you, therefore, and Theodorus, consider, whether on such matters you will admit of arguments deduced from probability and likelihood.

Theaetetus/ But, Socrates, neither would you nor we say that this is right.

Socrates/ We must therefore consider it in another way, as it appears, according to what you and Theodorus says.

Theaetetus/ In another way, certainly.

Socrates/ Let us, then, consider it thus, whether science and perception are the same or different: for to this surely our whole discourse tends, and for the sake of this we have mooted these many absurd points; have we not?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Shall we allow then that whatever we perceive by sight or hearing, this we at the same time know? for instance, before we have learnt the language of barbarians, whether shall we deny that we hear them when they speak, or that we both hear and know what they say? And again, when unacquainted with letters, on looking at them, whether shall we insist that we do not see, or know them, though we do see them?

Theaetetus/ Whichever of them, Socrates, we see and hear, we shall say that we know, for that of the latter we see and know the form and color, and of the former, that we both hear and know the sharpness and flatness of the sounds; but that what grammarians and interpreters teach about them, we neither perceive by sight or hearing, nor know.

Socrates/ Admirable, Theætetus, and it is not worthwhile to dispute with you about these things, in order that you may make a greater proficiency. But observe also this other

difficulty that stands in our way, and consider how we can repel it.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ This: if anyone should ask, whether it is possible for a person who still possesses and retains the memory of a thing which he once knew, at the very time when he remembers it, not to know the very thing that he remembers. But I am becoming prolix, as it seems, through a wish to ask whether a person who has learnt anything and remembers it, does not know it.

Theaetetus/ How should he not, Socrates? for, otherwise, what you say would be a prodigy.

Socrates/ Am I then trifling? Consider. Do you not then say that to see is to perceive, and that sight is perception?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Has not he, then, who sees anything, obtained a scientific knowledge of that which he sees, according to our late argument?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ What then? do you not say that memory is something?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whether of nothing or something?

Theaetetus/ Of something, surely.

Socrates/ Is it not, then, of the things which he learns and perceives, of some such things as these?

Theaetetus/ What else?

Socrates/ And what a person sees, does he not sometimes remember?

Theaetetus/ He does remember.

Socrates/ When he shuts his eyes too? or, when he does this, does he forget?

Theaetetus/ It would be strange to say that, Socrates.

Socrates/ We must say it though, if we would keep to our former argument, otherwise it is gone.

Theaetetus/ And I suspect so, by Zeus, though I do not clearly understand it; but tell me how.

Socrates/ Thus. We say that a person who sees has obtained a scientific knowledge of that which he sees; for sight and perception and science are allowed to be the same.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But he who sees, and has obtained a scientific knowledge of that which he sees, if he shuts his eyes, remembers it indeed, but does not see it. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But to say that he does not see is as much as to say he does not know, since to see is the same thing as to know.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ It follows, therefore, that a person who still remembers a thing of which he had a scientific knowledge, does not know it, because he does not see it; which we have said would be a prodigy, if it happened.

Theaetetus/ You say most truly.

Socrates/ An impossibility, then, appears to result, if anyone should say that science and perception are the same.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Each, then, must be confessed to be different.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ What then is science? must again, as it appears, be enquired from the beginning. What however shall we do, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ About what?

Socrates/ We appear to me, like a dunghill cock, to have jumped from our argument and begun to crow, before we have gained the victory.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ Like disputants we seem to have come to an agreement about the allowed meaning of words, and, having got the better thus far in the discussion, to be content, and though we say we are not wranglers but lovers of wisdom, we do the same as those shrewd men.

Theaetetus/ I do not yet understand what you mean.

Socrates/ But I will endeavor to explain what I mean on this point. We enquired whether a person who has learnt and remembers anything, does not know it, and having shown that a person who has seen a thing and then shut his eyes, remembers it, but does not see it, we proved that he does not know it and remembers it at the same time; but that this is impossible. And so the Protagorean fable is destroyed, and yours at the same time of science and perception, that they are the same.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ It would not be so, my friend, I think, if the father of the other fable were alive, but he would defend it stoutly: but now, as it is an orphan, we have insulted it. For not even the guardians, whom Protagoras left, are willing to assist it, in the number of whom is Theodorus here. We ourselves, however, for justice sake, will venture to assist it.

Theodorus/ It is not I, Socrates, but rather Callias son of Hipponicus who is guardian of his doctrine; for I very quickly

turn aside from mere disputations to geometry. Nevertheless, I shall be obliged to you if you will assist him.

Socrates/ You say well, Theodorus. Observe, then, what assistance I give. For anyone would make more strange admissions than those just now, if he did not attend carefully to the meaning of words, in what way we are generally accustomed to employ them in affirming and denying. Shall I tell you or Theætetus, in what way?

Theodorus/ Tell us both together, but let the younger answer. For if he makes a mistake, it will be less disgraceful.

Socrates/ I am going to propose then a very strange question; it is, I think, something of this kind: Is it possible that he who knows anything should not know the thing that he knows?

Theodorus/ What shall we answer, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ Impossible without doubt, I think.

Socrates/ Not so, if you maintain that to see is to know. For how will you deal with this inexplicable question, as the saying is, you will be caught in a well, if an imperturbable opponent should ask you, closing one of your eyes with his hand, whether you see his dress with the closed eye?

Theaetetus/ I should say, I think, Not with this, but I do with the other.

Socrates/ Would you not, therefore, see, and not see the same thing at the same time?

Theaetetus/ In some respects.

Socrates/ I do not require this, he will say, nor did I ask in what respect, but whether, what you know, this you also do not know. But now what you do not see, you are found to see: and you have already admitted, that to see is to know, and not to see, not to know. Infer then, what conclusion follows from this.

Theaetetus/ I infer the very contrary to what I supposed.

Socrates/ But perhaps, my admirable youth, many things of this kind would happen to you, if anyone should further ask you whether it is possible to know sharply and dully, and near, but not at a distance, intensely and slightly as well, and ten thousand other questions, which a cunning mercenary light-armed combatant would put to you in discussion, when you asserted science and perception to be the same, attacking the hearing, smelling, and such other channels of perception, and he would confute you, keeping you to it and not letting you off, until through admiration of his exquisite wisdom you are completely caught in his toils, from whence, after he had conquered and bound you, he would at length set you free on payment of such a ransom as you and he could agree on. What argument, should you probably say, would Protagoras adduce in support of his own opinions? Shall we endeavor to say?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ He will, then, both say all that we have said in his defense, and besides, I think, he will come to the encounter, despising us and saying; "This fine fellow Socrates, because a boy, when asked by him, whether it were possible for the same person to remember the same thing, and at the same time not to know it, was frightened, and being frightened, answered in the negative, through being unable to look on to results, has made me appear ridiculous by his arguments. But, most stupid Socrates, the case is thus, when you examine any of my opinions by questioning, if he to whom the questions are put gives the same answers that I should give and is proved wrong, I am confuted, but if he gives different answers, then he that is questioned is confuted. For, to the point, do you think that anyone would grant you, that memory is present to anyone, of the things by which he has been affected, as if memory were such an

affection as he then experienced, though now he experiences it no longer? Far from it. Do you think, again, that he would hesitate to allow, that it is possible for the same person to know and not to know the same thing? or if he should be afraid to say this, do you think he would ever grant that a person who has become changed is the same as he was before he was changed? but rather that he is one person, and not several, and those infinite in number, since change is constantly going on, for we must beware of catching at one another's words. But my good sir," he will say, "attack my system in a more generous spirit, confute what I say, if you can, and show that we have not perceptions peculiar to each of us, or that, if they are peculiar, it does not follow that what appears to anyone becomes, or if we must use the word existence, exists to him alone to whom it appears. But when you speak of pigs and cynocephali, you not only act like a pig yourself, but you persuade those that hear you to treat my writings in the same way, herein not doing well. For I affirm that the truth is, as I have written; for that each of us is the measure both of things that do and do not exist; though there is an infinite difference between one man and another, in this very circumstance, that they are and appear different to one person from what they are and do to another. And I am far from denying that there is such a thing as wisdom and a wise man, but I call that man wise, who, changing the aspect of objects to any of us, to whom they appear and are evil, causes them to appear and to be good. But do not, again, follow out my arguments, attending to the words only, but thus in a still clearer manner understand what I mean. For call to mind what was said in a former part of the discussion, that to a sick man what he eats appears and is bitter, but to a man in health it is and appears the contrary. But there is no need to make either of them wiser than the other; for that is not possible; nor must we allege

that the sick man is ignorant, because he is of a different opinion, and that he who is in health is wise, because he thinks differently; but we must endeavor to make him change over to the other side; for the other habit is better. In like manner, in education, we should endeavor to make a man change from one habit to a better. But the physician effects a change by medicines, and the sophist by arguments. For no one ever makes one who entertains false opinions, afterwards entertain true ones; for it is not possible or a man to have an opinion on things that do not exist, or on any others than those by which he is affected, and these are always true. And I think that a man, who from a depraved habit of soul forms opinions corresponding to it, a good habit causes to form different opinions of the same character, but these appearances some people, through ignorance, call true, but I say that some things are better than others, but not at all more true. Moreover, my dear Socrates, I am far from calling the wise, frogs, but as regards bodies, I call them physicians, and as regards plants, husbandmen. For I say that these last produce in plants, when they are at all diseased, instead of depraved perceptions, good and wholesome perceptions and truths, and that wise and good orators cause good instead of depraved things to appear to be just to states. For whatever things appear just and honorable to each city, these are so to that city, so long as it thinks them so; but a wise man, instead of the several depraved things that they have, makes good things to be and to appear. By the same reason a sophist, who is thus able to instruct his pupils, is wise, and deserves large pay from those whom he instructs. And thus some are wiser than others, and yet no one entertains false opinions, and you must admit, whether you will or not, that you are the measure of things; for this principle is maintained throughout, if then you are able to controvert

this from the beginning, do so, by answering it in a consecutive speech, or if you had rather by questioning, do it by questioning; for neither is this to be avoided, but most of all pursued by a man of sense. However do it thus; don't act unfairly in your questions. For it is a great inconsistency for one who pretends to be a lover of virtue, to persevere in doing nothing else but act unfairly in argument. But it is to act unfairly in a matter of this kind, when a man does not make a difference between disputation and discussion, and in the former jests and leads into error as far as he can, but in the latter speaks seriously, and sets the person with whom he is conversing right, pointing out to him those errors only into which he has been led by himself and his former conversations. If, then, you act thus, those who converse with you will have to blame themselves for their own confusion and perplexity, but not you, and they will follow and love you, but hate themselves, and fly from themselves to philosophy, that, becoming different, they may be changed from what they formerly were: but if you act the contrary to this, as most men do, the very contrary will befall you, and you will make those who associate with you, instead of being philosophers, hate this pursuit, when they are more advanced in life. If, then, you will be persuaded by me, as I said before, applying yourself to it not hostilely or pugnaciously, but in a favorable spirit, you will truly consider what I have said, in maintaining that all things are moved, and that whatever appears to everyone, also exists, both to an individual and a city; and from hence you will further consider, whether science and perception are the same or different, and you will not, as just now, depart from the usual meaning of words and names, which most men forcing wherever it suits them, occasion one another all kinds of perplexity." These things, Theodorus, I have advanced by way of assistance to your friend, according to

my ability, trifling from trifling means; but, if he were alive, he would defend his own opinions in a more noble manner.

Theodorus/ You are joking, Socrates: for you have defended the man very vigorously.

Socrates/ You say well, my friend. But tell me: did you observe that Protagoras said just now and reproached us, that in arguing with a boy, we took advantage of the boy's fear to oppose his principles, and giving it the contemptuous name of caviling, and vaunting his measure of all things, he exhorted us to be serious in examining his doctrine?

Theodorus/ How should I not have observed it, Socrates?

Socrates/ What then? Do you require us to obey him?

Theodorus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Do you see, then, that all these, except you, are boys? If then we are to obey him, it is requisite that you and I, questioning and answering each other, should be serious in examining his doctrine, that he may not have this to object to us that we have discussed this question again jesting with youths.

Theodorus/ But what? Would not Theætetus follow this investigation much better than many who have long beards?

Socrates/ But not better than you, Theodorus. Do not, therefore, think that I ought in every way to defend your deceased friend, but you not at all. But come, my good sir, follow me a little, just so far as to enable us to see whether it is right that you should be the measure of diagrams, or whether all men equally with you are sufficient for themselves in astronomy, and the other things in which you have the reputation of excelling.

Theodorus/ It is not easy, Socrates, for one who is sitting by you, to refuse to answer you. But I was just now trifling when I said that you would permit me not to strip myself, and that you would not compel me like the Lacedaemonians.

But you appear to me to resemble Sciron rather. For the Lacedæmonians bid us either depart or strip; but you seem to me to act rather like Anytus, for you do not let anyone go who approaches you until you have compelled him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

Socrates/ You have found out an admirable comparison for my disease, Theodorus, though I am stronger than they were; for an innumerable multitude of Herculeses and Theseuses, who were powerful in argument, have met with me and beaten me heartily, but I do not desist any the more, such a strange passion for this kind of exercise has got possession of me. Do not you, therefore, refuse to have a fall with me, and to benefit yourself and me at the same time.

Theodorus/ I hold out no longer, but lead me wherever you please: I must needs submit to the destiny that you weave for me, and be confuted. However I shall not be able to give myself up to you further than you proposed.

Socrates/ So far will be sufficient. And I beg of you observe this very closely, that we do not, unawares, get into a puerile mode of talking, and so let anyone reproach us again for that.

Theodorus/ I will endeavor, as far as I can.

Socrates/ First of all, then, let us impugn the argument which we did before, and see whether we correctly or incorrectly find fault with and reprobate the assertion, that everyone is sufficient to himself with respect to wisdom. Now Protagoras has conceded to us that some men excel others with respect to better or worse, and those too who are wise: has he not?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ If he then being present in person had agreed to this, and we in assisting him had not made this concession in his behalf, there would be no need to recur to

it in order to confirm it; but now, perhaps, someone may consider us incompetent to assent on his behalf, wherefore it will be better to come to a more clear understanding on this point; for it makes no small difference whether it is so or otherwise.

Theodorus/ You say truly.

Socrates/ Not from others, then, but from his own statements, we may in very few words get his assent.

Theodorus/ How so?

Socrates/ Thus. Does he not say that what appears to each person exists to him to whom it appears?

Theodorus/ He does say so.

Socrates/ Now, Protagoras, we speak the opinions of a man, or rather of all men, and say that there is no one who does not think himself in some respects wiser than others, and in other respects others wiser than himself, and in the greatest dangers, when men are in peril, in wars, or diseases, or storms at sea, they behave towards those who have power in each several case as towards gods, looking up to them as their saviors, though they excel them in nothing else than in knowledge; and the whole world is almost full of men seeking for masters and governors of themselves and other animals and works, and again of men who think themselves competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all these cases what else shall we say, than that men themselves think that there is wisdom and ignorance among themselves?

Theodorus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ Do they not, then, think that wisdom is true opinion, and ignorance false opinion?

Theodorus/ How should they not?

Socrates/ How then, Protagoras, shall we deal with the assertion? Whether shall we say that men always form true opinions, or sometimes true and sometimes false? For in either way the result is that they do not always form true opinions, but both true and false. For consider, Theodorus, whether anyone of the followers of Protagoras, or you yourself, would contend that no one thinks that there is another who is ignorant, and forms false opinions.

Theodorus/ That is incredible, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yet the assertion, that man is the measure of all things, of necessity comes to this?

Theodorus/ How so?

Socrates/ When you have determined anything within yourself, and make known your opinion to me on any point, then, according to his statement, your opinion must be true to you; but may not the rest become judges of your judgment, or must we determine that you always form true opinions? Will not myriads, who form contrary opinions to yours, continually oppose you, deeming that you judge and think falsely?

Theodorus/ By Zeus, Socrates, there are myriads, as Homer says, who give me a vast deal of trouble.

Socrates/ What then? Will you allow us to say that you then form opinions that are true to yourself, but false to innumerable others?

Theodorus/ This seems to me necessary, from the assertion.

Socrates/ But what with respect to Protagoras himself? If neither he thought that man is the measure of all things, nor the multitude, as indeed they do not, does it not necessarily follow that this truth which he has described exists to no one? But if he himself thought so, but the multitude do not agree with him, you must be aware that, in the first place,

by how many more they are to whom it does not appear so, than those to whom it does so appear, by so much the more it is not than it is?

Theodorus/ Necessarily so, since, according to each several opinion, it will be or will not be.

Socrates/ In the next place, this is very pleasant; for he, with respect to his own opinion, admits, that the opinion of those who differ from him, in that they think he is in error, is true, since he allows that all men form opinions of things that exist.

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Must he not, therefore, admit that his own opinion is false, if he allows that the opinion of those who think he is in error is true?

Theodorus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ The others however do not admit that they are in error?

Theodorus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ He however, from what he has written, allows that this opinion also is true.

Theodorus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ It will therefore be controverted by all men, Protagoras not excepted, or rather will be allowed by him, that when he admits to one who differs from him, that he forms a true opinion, then even Protagoras himself will admit that neither a dog, nor any man whatever, is the measure of a thing that he has not learnt. Is it not so?

Theodorus/ It is.

Socrates/ Therefore, since this is controverted by all men, Protagoras's truth will not be true to anyone, neither to anyone else, nor to himself.

Theodorus/ We run down my friend too severely, Socrates.

Socrates/ But, moreover, my friend, it is uncertain whether we have not also exceeded the bounds of propriety. For it is probable that he being older is wiser than we are: and if he should suddenly rise up as far as his neck, having reproved me much for trifling, as is probable, and you for assenting, he would sink down again and hurry away. But it is necessary for us, I think, to make use of our own abilities such as they are, and to say whatever appears to us to be true. Well then, shall we now say that anyone will grant this, that one man is wiser than another, and another also more ignorant?

Theodorus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Shall we say too that our argument holds good as we have laid it down in our endeavors to assist Protagoras, that most things are as they appear to everyone, warm, dry, sweet, and all other things of this kind; but that if in some things he shall admit that one man excels another, he would say with regard to things wholesome and unwholesome, that not every silly woman, boy and brute, is competent to cure itself by knowing what is wholesome for itself, but that here, if anywhere, one excels another?

Theodorus/ So it appears to me.

Socrates/ And with respect to political matters, he will admit that things honorable and base, just and unjust, holy and unholy, as each city thinks right to enact laws for itself, are in truth such to each city, and yet that in these things one individual is not at all wiser than another, nor one city than another; but in enacting what is expedient for itself or not expedient, here again, if anywhere, he will allow that one counselor excels another, and the opinion of one city that of another with regard to truth; nor will he by any means

venture to affirm, that the laws which a city enacts, thinking them to be expedient for itself, must certainly be so. But here in the matter I am speaking about, with respect to what is just and unjust, holy and unholy, men will persist that none of these have by nature an essence of their own, but that what appears to the community to be true, that becomes true at the time when it so appears, and so long as it appears. And those who do not altogether hold the doctrine of Protagoras, deal with philosophy in some such manner as this. But one topic of conversation, Theodorus, springs from another, a greater from a less.

Theodorus/ Have we not leisure, Socrates?

Socrates/ We appear to have. And I have often at other times observed, my excellent friend, and especially now, with what good reason those who have spent much time in philosophical studies, are found to be ridiculous orators when they enter courts of justice.

Theodorus/ What mean you by this?

Socrates/ They that have been from their youth in courts of justice, and places of that kind, when compared with those who have been nurtured in philosophy and such-like studies, appear to have been educated like slaves compared with freemen.

Theodorus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ In this, that these, as you said, have always leisure, and converse in peace at their leisure, just as we now are taking up our third topic in succession, so they too, if any question occurs to them that pleases them better than the one in hand, as is the case with us, are not at all concerned whether they speak at length or briefly, if they can but arrive at the truth. But the others always speak in a hurry, for the running water presses them on, nor are they allowed to speak on whatever subject they wish, but their

opponent stands by them with this instrument of compulsion, and the record which they call the pleadings read aloud, out of which they must not travel; and their speeches are always about a fellow slave before the master who is seated holding the scales of justice in his hand, their contests too, are never unrestrained, but are always to the point before them, and oftentimes it is a race for life. So that, from all these causes they become vehement and keen, knowing how to flatter the master by words, and to conciliate him by actions, being mean and not upright in soul. For slavery from childhood has taken away their growth, and rectitude, and freedom, compelling them to do crooked actions, by exposing their yet tender souls to great dangers and fears, which not being able to bear up against with justice and truth, they immediately have recourse to lying and injuring one another, and become so bent and distorted, that they pass from youth to manhood without having any solidity in their minds, but have become clever and wise, as they think. Such then are these, Theodorus. But are you willing that I should describe the men of our band, or that, passing them by, we should return again to our subject, lest we abuse too much our liberty and powers of digression, which we just now spoke of.

Theodorus/ By no means, Socrates, but describe them. For you observed very well, that we who are members of this band, are not the servants of topics of discussion, but they are our servants as it were, and each of them must wait for its completion until we think proper. For neither does a judge nor a spectator preside over us, to rebuke and keep us in order, as is the case with the poets.

Socrates/ Let us speak then, as we ought, since it is agreeable to you, about the chiefs; for why should anyone speak of those who spend their time in philosophy to but little purpose? These then from early youth do not know the

way to the forum, nor where the law-court, or senate house, or any other public place of assemblage in the city is situated; and they neither see nor hear laws or decrees, proclaimed or written. And canvassing of partisans for magistracies, and meetings, and banquets, and revelry with flute-players, they never think of even in a dream. Whether anyone in a city is well or ill born, or what evil has befallen anyone from his ancestors, whether men or women, is as little known to him as how many measures of water there are in the sea, as the saying is. And he does not know that he is ignorant of all this; for he does not keep aloof from them for vanity's sake, but in reality his body only is situated and dwells in the city, but his mind, considering all these things as trifling and of no consequence, holds them in contempt, and is borne everywhere, according to the expression of Pindar, measuring things beneath the earth and upon its surface, contemplating the stars in heaven above, and searching thoroughly into the entire nature of everything in the universe, and not stooping to anything that is near.

Theodorus/ What mean you by this, Socrates?

Socrates/ Just, Theodorus, as a smart and witty Thracian servant-girl is related to have joked Thales, when, contemplating the stars and looking upwards, he fell into a well, that he was anxious to know what was going on in heaven, but forgot to notice what was before him, and at his feet. The same joke is applicable to all who devote themselves to philosophy; for, in reality, such a one is ignorant about his near neighbor, not only what he is doing but almost whether he is a man or some other animal. But what man is, and what such a nature ought to do or suffer beyond others, he enquires and takes pains to investigate. You understand me surely, Theodorus; do you not?

Theodorus/ I do: and you say truly.

Socrates/ Therefore, my friend, a man of this kind dealing privately with each person, or publicly, as I said at the outset, when he is compelled, in a court of justice or anywhere else, to speak about things at his feet and before his view, affords laughter not only to Thracian damsels, but to the rest of the crowd, by falling into wells and all kinds of perplexities through inexperience, and his strange awkwardness gives him a character of stupidity. For when he is reviled he has nothing personal to retort against anyone, as he does not know any evil of anyone from not having troubled himself about such matters; therefore, not having anything to say, he appears to be ridiculous: and when he hears others praise and boast of themselves, being seen to laugh not feignedly but really he is considered to be a simpleton. For when encomiums are passed on a tyrant or king, he thinks that he hears a herdsman, a swineherd for instance, or a shepherd, or a cow-keeper pronounced happy for milking abundantly: but he thinks that they feed and milk an animal that is more hard to manage and more cunning than the others do; and that such a one must necessarily, from their occupations, be not at all less rustic and uneducated than herdsmen, being shut up within walls as in a mountain pen. But when he hears that anyone who possesses ten thousand acres of land or even more, is possessed of vast property, it appears to him very trifling, as he has been accustomed to survey the whole earth. And when they extol nobility of birth, accounting anyone noble from being able to show seven rich ancestors, he thinks that this praise proceeds from men of dull minds, and who look at trifles, being unable through want of education to look at the succession of ages and compute that every man has had innumerable myriads of grandsires and ancestors, amongst whom there must have been an innumerable multitude of rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks; but

when they pride themselves in a catalogue of five-and-twenty ancestors, and refer their origin to Hercules son of Amphitryon, it appears to him absurd from its littleness; and he laughs at their being unable to compute and so rid themselves of the vaunting of a silly mind, that the five-and-twentieth ancestor from Amphitryon and the fiftieth from him was such as fortune happened to make him. In all these things, therefore, such a man is ridiculed by the multitude, partly from bearing himself haughtily, as it seems, and partly from not knowing what is at his feet, and being on all occasions embarrassed.

Theodorus/ You say exactly what takes place, Socrates.

Socrates/ But when he is able, my friend, to draw anyone upwards, and anyone is willing to leave those questions, of "What injury do I do you?" or "What injury do you do me?" for the consideration of justice and injustice themselves, what each of them is, and in what respect they differ from all other things, or from each other, or the inquiry, Whether a king is happy, and again, he who possesses abundance of gold, for the consideration of royalty and human happiness and misery in general; what they both are, and in what way it is proper for the nature of man to seek the one and shun the other, —when, therefore, it is requisite for that little-minded, sharp, and pettifogging fellow to give an account of all these things, he then shows the opposite side of the picture; becoming dizzy through being suspended aloft and looking so high up, from want of use, and becoming stupefied, and perplexed, and stammering, he does not, indeed, afford laughter to the Thracian damsels or any other uneducated person, for they do not perceive anything, but to all who have been brought up otherwise than as slaves. This, then, is the character of each of them, Theodorus, the one, that of him who is truly brought up in liberty and leisure, whom you call a philosopher, to whom it is no

disgrace to be thought simple and to be good for nothing, when he has to attend to servile offices, for instance, that he does not know how to pack and tie up luggage, or season viands or make flattering speeches; the other, that of him who is able to perform all such offices dexterously and quickly, but knows not how to gather up his cloak with his right hand like a well-bred person, nor perceiving harmony of language to celebrate the life of gods and happy men such as it really is.

Theodorus/ If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of what you say, as you have me, there would be more peace and less evil among men.

Socrates/ But it is not possible, Theodorus, that evil should be destroyed; for it is necessary that there should be always something contrary to good; nor can it be seated among the gods, but of necessity moves round this mortal nature and this region. Wherefore we ought to endeavor to fly hence thither as quickly as possible. But this flight consists in resembling God as much as possible, and this resemblance is the becoming just and holy with wisdom. But, my excellent friend, it is not very easy to persuade men, that not for the reasons for which most men say we ought to flee from vice and pursue virtue, ought we to study the one and not the other, namely, that a man may not seem to be vicious, but may seem to be good; for these are, as the saying is, the driveling of old women, as it appears to me. But let us describe the truth as follows. God is never in any respect unjust, but as just as possible, and there is not anything that resembles him more than the man amongst us who has likewise become as just as possible. And on this depends the true excellence of a man, and his nothingness and worthlessness. For the knowledge of this is wisdom and true virtue, but the not knowing it is manifest ignorance and vice, but all other seeming excellencies and wisdoms, when they

are found in political government, are abject, but in arts sordid. It is therefore by far the best not to allow him who acts unjustly, and who speaks or acts impiously, to excel by reason of his wickedness; for they delight in this reproach, and think they hear that they are not valueless, mere burdens on the earth, but men such as they ought to be who will be safe in a city. The truth, therefore, must be spoken, that they are so much the more what they think they are not, from not thinking that they are such. For they are ignorant of the punishment of injustice, of which they ought to be least of all ignorant: for it does not consist in what they imagine, stripes and death, which they sometimes suffer who do not commit injustice, but in that which it is impossible to avoid.

Theodorus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Since, my friend, there are two models in the nature of things, one divine and most happy, the other ungodly and most miserable, they, not perceiving that this is the case, through stupidity and extreme folly, unknown to themselves become similar to the one by unjust actions, and dissimilar to the other. Wherefore they are punished, by leading a life suited to that to which they are assimilated. But if we should tell them, that unless they abandon this excellence, that place which is free from all evil will not receive them when dead, but here they will always lead a life resembling themselves, and there will associate with evil, these things, as being altogether shrewd and crafty, they will listen to as the extravagances of foolish men.

Theodorus/ Assuredly, Socrates.

Socrates/ I know it, my friend. One thing, however, happens to them; it is, that if they have to give and listen to reasons privately respecting the things that they blame, and if they are willing to persevere manfully for a length of time,

and not fly like cowards, then at length, my excellent friend, they are very absurdly displeased with themselves for what they have said, and that rhetoric of theirs becomes somehow so weak that they appear to be no better than boys. However, let us quit this subject, since what we have been saying was only a digression; if we do not, more topics constantly flowing in will shut out the subject with which we began. Let us, then, return to our former subject, if it is agreeable to you.

Theodorus/ Such things, Socrates, are not at all unpleasing to me to hear; for it is easier for one of my age to follow them; if you please, however, let us return to our subject.

Socrates/ If I mistake not, then, we were at that part of our discussion in which we said that those who maintain motion to be essence, and that whatever appears to each person exists also to him to whom it appears, would in other things persist, and especially with regard to justice, that on every account what a city enacts as appearing just to itself, this also is just to the city that enacts it, so long as it continues in force: but that with respect to what is good, no one is so hardy as to venture to contend that whatever things a city has enacted, thinking that they are advantageous to itself, are also advantageous so long as they continue in force, except one should speak only of the name: but this would be a mere mockery on such a subject as we are speaking on; would it not?

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let him not, then, speak of the name, but of the thing designated by it.

Theodorus/ Just so.

Socrates/ But the thing that the name designates is doubtless that which the city aims at in enacting laws, and

enacts all laws, as far as it thinks and is able, to be as advantageous to itself as possible. Does it look to anything else in enacting laws?

Theodorus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Does it, then, always accomplish its purpose, or is every city often mistaken?

Theodorus/ I think it is often mistaken.

Socrates/ Still more then would everyone allow this very thing, if the question should be asked with reference to the whole genus, to which the advantageous belongs: but surely it regards also the future; for, when we enact laws, we enact them that they may be advantageous for the time to come; and this we should correctly call the future.

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, let us thus question Protagoras, or someone else who holds the same opinions with him, Man, as you say, Protagoras, is the measure of all things, white, heavy, light, and everything of that kind: for, as he contains the criterion of them within himself, in thinking they are such as he feels them to be, he thinks what is true to himself, and really is? Is it not so?

Theodorus/ It is.

Socrates/ Shall we also say, Protagoras, that he contains within himself the criterion of things about to happen, and that such things as he thinks will happen, do become such to him who thinks so? For instance, with regard to heat, when any particular person thinks that he shall catch a fever, and that this kind of heat will happen to him, and another, a physician, thinks differently, according to the opinion of which of the two shall we say will the result prove? or will it be according to the opinion of both of them, and to the physician will he be neither hot nor feverish, but to himself both?

Theodorus/ That, indeed, would be ridiculous.

Socrates/ And I think the opinion of the husbandman, and not that of the harper, respecting the future sweetness or roughness of wine, would prevail.

Theodorus/ How not?

Socrates/ Nor again would a teacher of gymnastics form a better opinion than a musician respecting what will be inharmonious and harmonious, and what will afterwards appear to the teacher of gymnastics himself to be harmonious.

Theodorus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Therefore also, when a banquet is prepared, the judgment of one who, not being skilled in cookery is about to feast on it, is less sound than that of the cook, respecting the pleasure that will ensue. For we are not arguing at all about that which now is or has been pleasant to each person, but about that which will hereafter both appear and be so, whether everyone is the best judge for himself? Could not you, Protagoras, judge beforehand better than any private person what arguments are likely to be available for us in a court of justice?

Theodorus/ Indeed, Socrates, in this he himself professes to excel all men by far.

Socrates/ By Zeus, he does, my friend; otherwise no one would pay him large sums for his instructions, if he had not persuaded his pupils that no prophet or other person would be able to judge better than he could for himself, as to what in future would both be and appear to be.

Theodorus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But do not legislation and the useful regard the future, and would not everyone acknowledge, that a city, in enacting laws, of necessity often misses that which is most useful?

Theodorus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ We have, therefore, rightly urged against your master, that he must needs confess, that one man is wiser than another, and that such a one is the true measure, but that there is no necessity at all for me who am ignorant, to become a measure, as the argument advanced on his behalf just now compelled me to be, whether I would or not.

Theodorus/ In that way, Socrates, his argument appears to me to be effectually refuted, and it was also refuted by this, that he makes the opinions of others sound; and these were found to consider his arguments as by no means to be true.

Socrates/ In many other ways, too, Theodorus, this may be demonstrated, that not every opinion of every man is true. But, with respect to the manner in which each person is affected, whence perceptions and corresponding opinions are produced, it is more difficult to demonstrate that they are not true. But perhaps I should say, it is quite impossible: for probably they cannot be refuted, and those who say that they are certain and sciences, may possibly say the truth, and in that case Theætetus here did not speak amiss in asserting that perception and science are the same. Let us, then, approach nearer to it, as the argument advanced in behalf of Protagoras enjoined us, and examine this essence, that is said to consist in motion, by knocking it, and see whether it sounds whole or cracked. For the contest about it is neither mean nor among a few.

Theodorus/ It is very far from being mean, but is spreading very much throughout Ionia. For the partisans of Heraclitus advocate this doctrine very strenuously.

Socrates/ Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we should the rather examine it from the beginning, as they propound it.

Theodorus/ Assuredly. For, Socrates, with respect to these Heraclitian, or, as you say, Homeric, and even older doctrines, it is no more possible to converse about them with the people of Ephesus who pretend to be acquainted with them, than with persons who are raving mad. For, just as their written doctrines, they are truly in constant motion, but to keep to an argument and a question, and quietly to answer and ask in turn, is less in their power than anything; or rather the power of rest in these men is infinitely less than nothing. But if you ask anyone of them a question, they draw out, as from a quiver, certain dark enigmatical words, and shoot them off, and if you wish to get from him a reason for what he has said, you will be forthwith stricken with another newly coined word, but will never come to any conclusion with anyone of them; nor do they with one another, but they take very good care not to allow anything to be fixed, either in their discourse, or in their souls, thinking, as it appears to me, that this very thing is stationary; and they make constant war upon it, and as far as they are able, expel it from everywhere.

Socrates/ Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen these men contending, but have never been in their company when peaceable, for they are no friends of yours. But I think they say such things when at leisure, to their disciples, whom they wish to render like themselves.

Theodorus/ What disciples, my good friend? Amongst such men, one is not the disciple of another, but they spring up spontaneously, from whatever place each of them happens to be seized with a frenzy, and each thinks that the other knows nothing. From these, therefore, as I was just now saying, you will never get a reason either willingly or unwillingly: but we must take the matter up as if it were a problem and examine it ourselves.

Socrates/ You say right. But have we not received this problem from the ancients, who by the aid of poetry concealed it from the multitude, that Ocean and Tethys, the origin of all things, are streams, and that nothing is at rest, and from the moderns, as being wise, who have declared openly, so that even cobblers on hearing them learn wisdom, and give up their foolish opinion, that some things are at rest and others in motion, and learning that all things are in motion, they pay great respect to their teachers. But I had almost forgotten, Theodorus, that others have declared the very contrary to this, that "that which is called the universe is immoveable," and everything else that the followers of Melissas and Parmenides maintain in opposition to all this, as, that all things are one, and that this is at rest in itself, and has no place in which it can be moved. What then shall we do with all these people, my friend? For advancing by little and little, we have unawares fallen between both of them, and if we do not defend ourselves and escape, we shall be punished like those who in the wrestling grounds play on the line, who, when they are caught by both parties, are dragged in contrary directions. It appears therefore to me, that we should first of all consider those with whom we set out, the advocates of perpetual motion, and, if they shall prove to speak to the purpose, we will join with them, and endeavor to escape from the others; but if those who say that the universe is at rest appear to speak more truly, we will on the other hand fly to them from those who move even things immoveable. And if both shall be found to speak nothing right, we shall be ridiculous for thinking that we, mean as we are, can say anything to the purpose, after we have condemned men of great antiquity and wisdom. Consider therefore, Theodorus, whether it is for our interest to venture on so great a danger.

Theodorus/ It would be unpardonable, Socrates, not thoroughly to examine what each of these men say.

Socrates/ We must examine it, since you are so anxious to do so. It appears to me then, that the first thing to be done in an enquiry about motion, is to find out what they mean by saying that all things are in motion. I mean this: whether they say that there is one species of motion, or, as it appears to me, two. Nor should it appear to me only, but do you also join with me, that we may both fall into the same error, if we must err. Tell me, therefore, do you call it being in motion, when a thing passes from one place to another, or is turned round in the same place?

Theodorus/ I do.

Socrates/ Let this, therefore, be one species. But when it remains in the same place, and grows old, and either becomes black from white or hard from soft, or undergoes any other change, is it not right to say that this is another species of motion?

Theodorus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ It must be so: I say, then, that there are these two species of motion, change and removal.

Theodorus/ You say right.

Socrates/ Having, therefore, made this distinction, let us now address ourselves to those who say that all things are in motion, and ask them: Whether do you say that everything undergoes both kinds of motion, and is both removed and changed, or that one thing is moved both ways, and another only in one way?

Theodorus/ By Zeus, I know not what to answer; but I think they would say, both ways.

Socrates/ Otherwise, my friend, the same things would appear to them to be both in motion and at rest, and it would

not be at all more correct to say that all things are in motion, than that they are at rest.

Theodorus/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, it is necessary that everything should be in motion, and that the absence of motion should be in nothing, all things must always be moved with every kind of motion.

Theodorus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Consider this, then, I beg: did we not say that they explain the generation of heat, or whiteness, or anything else pretty much in this manner, that each of them is impelled, together with perception, between the agent and the patient, and that the patient becomes affected by perception, but is not yet perception itself, and that the agent becomes affected by a certain quality, but is not quality itself? Perhaps, however, quality may appear to you to be a strange word, and you may not understand it when used in this collective sense. Hear me, then, explain it in detail. For the agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot and white, and so with respect to other things. For you surely remember that we said before, that no one thing exists of itself, neither that which is an agent nor that which is a patient, but that, from the meeting together of each with the other, perceptions and objects of perception being produced cause the one to be of a certain quality, and the other percipient.

Theodorus/ I recollect. How should I not.

Socrates/ Let us then dismiss the rest of their system, whether they speak this way or that way; and let us keep to that point alone which concerns our discussion and ask, Are all things in motion and in a state of flux, as you say? Is it not so?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by both those kinds of motion which we have distinguished, removal and change?

Theodorus/ Undoubtedly; if they are to be perfectly moved.

Socrates/ If, therefore, they were only removed, but not changed, we should surely be able to say what kind of things are removed. Must we not say so?

Theodorus/ Just so.

Socrates/ But since not even this continues in the same state, namely, that that which flows continues to flow white, but it changes so that there is also a flux of this very thing, whiteness, and a transition into another color, in order that it may not be found continuing in the same state, will it ever be possible to call anything a color, so as to designate it correctly?

Theodorus/ How is it possible, Socrates? or anything else of the kind, since, while we are speaking about it, it is constantly escaping, as being in a state of flux?

Socrates/ But what shall we say of any kind of perception, for instance of seeing or hearing? Does it ever continue in the state of seeing or hearing?

Theodorus/ It ought not, since all things are in motion.

Socrates/ We must not affirm then, that anyone sees rather than not sees, or has any other perception rather than not, since all things are in constant motion.

Theodorus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ Yet perception is science, as Theætetus and I said.

Theodorus/ That is the case.

Socrates/ On being asked, therefore, what science is, we answered, that it is not at all science rather than not science.

Theodorus/ You appear to have done so.

Socrates/ A fine correction of our answer it would be, if we endeavor to prove that all things are in motion, in order that our former answer may appear correct. But this, as it seems, is the result, if all things are in motion, every answer on whatever subject it may be given, will be equally correct, whether we say that a thing is so or is not so, or, if you will, becomes so, that we may not fix them by a definite expression.

Theodorus/ You say rightly.

Socrates/ Except, Theodorus, that I said "so and not so." But we ought not to use this word "so," for in this way it will no longer be in motion; nor again must we use the expression "not so," for neither does this express motion; but they who maintain this doctrine must find out some other term, since at present they have not words suited to their hypothesis, except perhaps, this, "not in any manner." This would suit them best, as having an indefinite meaning.

Theodorus/ This manner of speaking would indeed be most proper for them.

Socrates/ We have done then with your friend, Theodorus, nor can we by any means concede to him, that any man is the measure of all things, except he is wise: nor can we concede to him that science is perception, at least according to the doctrine that all things are in motion; unless Theætetus here says otherwise.

Theodorus/ You say admirably well, Socrates; for since these things are brought to a conclusion, it is right that I too should have done with answering according to our agreement, now that our discussion about the doctrine of Protagoras has come to end.

Theaetetus/ Not so, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who say that the universe is at rest, as you just now proposed to do.

Theodorus/ Do you who are so young, Theætetus, teach old men to act unjustly, by violating their compacts. But prepare to give account to Socrates of what remains to be discussed.

Theaetetus/ If he wishes it, though I should be very glad to hear you on the subject I mentioned.

Theodorus/ You are challenging riders to a race in challenging Socrates to a discussion. Ask therefore and you will hear.

Socrates/ But I think, Theodorus, I shall not comply with the request of Theætetus.

Theodorus/ Why not comply?

Socrates/ Though I am ashamed of examining with too much freedom Melissus and others, who say that the universe is one and immoveable, yet I am less ashamed to do so with respect to them than Parmenides alone. For Parmenides appears to me, that I may use the words of Homer, "both venerable and formidable." For I was acquainted with him when I was very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me to possess a depth of wisdom altogether extraordinary. I am afraid, therefore, that we should not understand his words, and that we should be much less able to discover the meaning of what he said, and above all, I fear lest with respect to the main subject of our discussion, science, what it is, should be left unconsidered by reason of the digressions that will rush across us, if we listen to them. Besides, the question which we have now raised is of immense extent, and if one should consider it only by the way, it would be treated unworthily, but if as it deserves, the discussion, being extended to too great length, will put out of sight the subject of science. But neither of these things ought to happen; but we ought to endeavor, by

the midwife's art, to deliver Theætetus of his conceptions respecting science.

Theaetetus/ It is proper to do so, if you think well.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, Theætetus, consider this with respect to what has been said. You answered that perception is science; did you not.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ If then anyone should ask you, with what a man sees things white and black, and with what he hears sounds sharp and flat, you would say, I think, with the eyes and ears.

Theaetetus/ I should.

Socrates/ The free use of names and words and without excessive precision, is for the most part not unbecoming a person of education, but rather the contrary to this is illiberal, though sometimes it is necessary; as in the present case it is necessary to find fault with your answer, so far as it is not correct. For consider, which answer is more correct, that it is the eyes with which we see or by which we see, and the ears with which we hear, or by which we hear?

Theaetetus/ By which we receive each perception, it seems to me, Socrates, rather than with which.

Socrates/ For surely it would be strange, my boy, if many senses were seated in us, as in wooden horses, and they did not all tend to one certain form, whether it is soul, or whatever it is proper to call it, with which, by means of these as instruments, we perceive all objects of perception.

Theaetetus/ The case appears to me to be rather in this way than in that.

Socrates/ But why do I require so much accuracy from you on this point? For this reason, that we may discover whether by someone and the same part in us we, by means

of the eyes, attain to things white and black, and again other things by means of the other senses, and whether, when questioned, you will be able to refer all such things to the bodily organs. But perhaps it will be better that you should say this by answering my questions, than that I should take all this trouble for you. Tell me, then; the things by which you perceive things hot and dry, and light and sweet, do you refer each of them to the body, or to anything else?

Theaetetus/ To nothing else.

Socrates/ Are you also willing to allow, that such things as you perceive by means of one faculty it is impossible for you to perceive by means of another, for instance, that what you perceive by means of hearing you cannot perceive by means of sight, and what you perceive by means of sight, you cannot perceive by means of hearing?

Theaetetus/ How should I not be willing to allow it?

Socrates/ If, then, you form a notion of them both together, you cannot receive this perception of both together by means of one organ or the other.

Theaetetus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ Now with respect to sound and color, is not this the very first notion that you have of them both, that they both exist.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ Is it not also, that each is different from the other, and the same with itself?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Socrates/ And that both are two, but each one?

Theaetetus/ And this also.

Socrates/ Are you not also able to consider whether they are like or unlike each other?

Theaetetus/ Probably.

Socrates/ By means of what, then, do you acquire all these notions about them? For it is not possible by means either of hearing or sight to apprehend that which is common between them. Moreover, this too is a proof of what we say. For, if it were possible to examine respecting them both, whether they are salt or not, you know you would be able to say with what you would make this examination, and this proves to be neither sight nor hearing, but something else.

Theaetetus/ How not, and that the faculty of taste by means of the tongue?

Socrates/ You say well. But in what does the faculty consist which shows you that which is common to all things, and to these two, to which you give the name of existence and non-existence, and those other names about which we were just now asking? what organs will you attribute to all these, by means of which our perceptive faculty perceives these several things?

Theaetetus/ You speak of existence and non-existence, similitude and dissimilitude, identity and difference, and moreover of unity and other numbers: and it is evident that you ask about the even and odd and whatever else depends on them, by which of the organs of the body we perceive these things in our soul.

Socrates/ You follow me exceedingly well, and these, Theætetus, are the very things about which I ask.

Theaetetus/ But by Zeus, Socrates, I know not what to say, except that it seems to me that there is no organ at all peculiar to these things as there is to the others, but the soul of itself appears to me to examine that which is common in all things.

Socrates/ You are beautiful, Theætetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus said; for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful

and good. But, besides being beautiful, you have done well in having released me from a very long discussion, if it appears to you that the soul beholds some things by itself, and others by the faculties of the body. For this was the very thing that seemed to me, and I wished it might likewise seem so to you.

Theaetetus/ And indeed it does appear so to me.

Socrates/ To which of the two classes, then, do you refer existence? For this especially attaches to all things.

Theaetetus/ I refer it to those things which the soul of itself reaches after.

Socrates/ Is it the same with similarity and dissimilarity, identity and difference?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ What then? with the beautiful and the ugly, good and evil?

Theaetetus/ It appears to me that the soul especially considers the essence of these in reference to each other, comparing within itself things past and present with the future.

Socrates/ Stay: will it not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft in like manner?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But their essence, both what they are, and their opposition to each other, and the nature of this opposition, the soul itself, examining them repeatedly and comparing them with each other, endeavors to determine for us.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Are not, then, both men and beasts by nature able to perceive as soon as they are born those things that pass by means of the bodily organs to the soul, but

comparisons of these with reference to their essence and use they arrive at with difficulty, and after a long time, by means of much labor and study, if ever they do arrive at it?

Theaetetus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ For is it possible to apprehend the truth of that of which we cannot apprehend the existence?

Theaetetus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ But can anyone possess a scientific knowledge of a thing, of which he cannot apprehend the truth?

Theaetetus/ How can he, Socrates?

Socrates/ There is, therefore, no science in sensations, but in reasoning on them; for in this way, as it seems, it is possible to touch upon essence and truth, but in that way impossible.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Can you, therefore, call that and this the same, when there is so great a difference between them?

Theaetetus/ It would not be right to do so.

Socrates/ What name, then, do you give to that, to sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, being hot, and being cold?

Theaetetus/ Perceiving; for what other name can be given?

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, call the whole of this perception?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ To which, as we said, it does not appertain to touch upon truth, for it does not ever touch upon essence.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor, therefore, upon science?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Perception, therefore, and science, Theætetus, can never be the same?

Theaetetus/ It appears not, Socrates.

Socrates/ And now it has been made perfectly clear that science is something different from perception. But we did not commence this conversation with this view, that we might find out what science is not, but what it is. However, we have advanced so far as not to seek it at all in perception, but in that name, whatever it is, which the soul possesses when it employs itself about things that exist.

Theaetetus/ But this, I think, Socrates, is called, to judge.

Socrates/ You think rightly, my friend. And now consider again from the beginning, having obliterated all that has been said before, if you see at all more clearly, now that you have come to this point. And tell me again what science is.

Theaetetus/ It is impossible, Socrates, to say that it is every judgment, because there is also false judgment. But it appears that true judgment is science, and let this be my answer. For if, as we proceed, it shall not appear to be so, as it does at present, we will endeavor to say something else.

Socrates/ Thus, then, Theætetus, you must speak more promptly, and not, as at first, hesitate to answer. For if we do so, one of two things will happen; we shall either find that which we are in search of, or we shall in a less degree think that we know what we do not know at all; though this would be no despicable reward. Now, then, what do you say? Since there are two species of judgment, one true, and the other false, do you define science to be true judgment?

Theaetetus/ I do; for this at present appears to me to be the case.

Socrates/ Is it, then, worthwhile again to resume the discussion respecting judgment?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Somehow this matter troubles me just now, and has often done so at other times, so that I have had great doubt with respect to myself and others, from not being able to say what this affection in us is, and in what way it is produced.

Theaetetus/ What affection?

Socrates/ This, that anyone forms false judgments; and I even now still consider and am in doubt whether we shall let this alone, or examine it in a different manner than we did just now.

Theaetetus/ How not, Socrates? at least if it appears necessary to be done in some way or other? For you and Theodorus just now remarked, not badly, respecting leisure, that there is no urgency in matters of this kind.

Socrates/ You have reminded me very properly. For perhaps it will not be foreign to our purpose in a manner to retrace our steps. For it is better to finish a little well than much insufficiently.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Socrates/ How then? what do we say? do we not affirm that sometimes judgments are false? or that one of us forms false judgments and another true ones, as if this was naturally the case?

Theaetetus/ We doubtless do affirm this.

Socrates/ Does not this happen to us with regard to things in general and each particular, that we either know it or do not know it? For learning and forgetting, as being between these, I pass by for the present, for now they have nothing to do with our discussion.

Theaetetus/ However, Socrates, there is no other alternative with respect to each particular, except knowing or not knowing it.

Socrates/ Then, is it not necessary, that he who judges should judge either what he does know, or does not know?

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ But that a person who knows should not know the same thing, or that he who does not know it should know it, is impossible.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Socrates/ Does not he, then, who forms a false judgment about what he knows, think that these are not the same, but different from what he knows, and thus while he knows both, he is at the same time ignorant of both?

Theaetetus/ But this is impossible, Socrates.

Socrates/ Does he, then, think that things which he does not know are certain other things that he does not know, and is it possible for one who knows neither Theætetus nor Socrates, to imagine that Socrates is Theætetus, or Theætetus Socrates?

Theaetetus/ How could that be?

Socrates/ Neither, surely, does anyone think that the things which he knows are the same as those that he does not know, nor again that the things which he does not know, are the same as those that he does know.

Theaetetus/ For that would be monstrous.

Socrates/ How then can anyone form false judgments? For it is impossible to form judgments in any other way than this, since we either know or do not know all things, and in these it appears to be by no means possible to form false judgments.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Ought we, then, to consider the object of our enquiry, not by proceeding according to knowing and not knowing, but according to being and not being?

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Whether it is not universally true, that he who thinks things that are not, with respect to anything whatever, must unavoidably form a false judgment, however intelligent he may be in other respects.

Theaetetus/ That s reasonable, Socrates.

Socrates/ How then? what shall we say, Theætetus, if anyone should ask us, “Is it possible for anyone to do what you say, and can any man think that which is not, whether respecting any real object or abstract essence?” And we, it seems, shall say to this, “When he who thinks does not think what is true.” What else can we say?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ Does a thing of this kind happen also in other cases?

Theaetetus/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ If a person sees something, and yet sees nothing.

Theaetetus/ But how can that be?

Socrates/ But if he sees some one thing, he sees something that exists; and do you think that one thing is ever among things that do not exist?

Theaetetus/ I do not.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who sees some one thing sees that which exists.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And, therefore, he who hears something, both hears some one thing, and hears that which exists.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And doubtless he who touches both touches some one thing, and that which exists, since it is one thing?

Theaetetus/ And this too.

Socrates/ Does not he then who judges, judge some one thing?

Theaetetus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And does not he who judges some, one thing, judge something that exists?

Theaetetus/ I grant it.

Socrates/ He therefore who judges what does not exist, judges nothing.

Theaetetus/ It appears not.

Socrates/ But he who judges nothing, does not judge at all.

Theaetetus/ That is evident, as it seems.

Socrates/ It is impossible, therefore, to judge that which is not, either with respect to real objects or abstract essences.

Theaetetus/ It appears not.

Socrates/ To form false judgments, therefore, is different from judging things that do not exist.

Theaetetus/ It seems to be different.

Socrates/ Neither then in this way nor in the way we considered a little before, is false judgment formed in us.

Theaetetus/ On no account.

Socrates/ Do we then give that name to what takes place as follows.

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ We say that a mistaken judgment is a false judgment, when anyone says that any real object is another real object, changing one for the other in his thoughts. For thus he always judges that which exists, but one thing

instead of another, and erring in that which he was considering, he may be justly said to form a false judgment.

Theaetetus/ You now appear to me to have spoken most correctly: for, when anyone forms a judgment that a thing is ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he truly forms a false judgment.

Socrates/ It is evident, Theætetus, that you esteem me lightly and have no fear of me.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ I do not seem to you, I imagine, likely to lay hold of your "truly false," by asking whether it is possible for swift to take place slowly or light heavily, or any other contrary, not according to its own nature, but according to the nature of its contrary, contrariwise to itself. This, however, I dismiss, that your confidence may not be in vain. But are you satisfied, as you say, that to form false judgments is to form mistaken judgments?

Theaetetus/ I am.

Socrates/ It is possible, then, according to your opinion, for one thing to be comprehended in the mind as another, and not as it is.

Theaetetus/ It is possible.

Socrates/ When, therefore, anyone's mind does this, is it not necessary that it should think about both objects, or one of them?

Theaetetus/ Quite necessary.

Socrates/ Either together or in turns?

Theaetetus/ Very well.

Socrates/ But by thinking do you mean the same that I do?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by it?

Socrates/ The discourse which the soul holds with itself about the objects that it considers. I explain this to you as a person who does not know what he says. For the soul, when it thinks, appears to me to do nothing else than discourse with itself, asking itself questions and answering them, affirming and denying; but when it has decided, whether it has come to its decision more slowly or more rapidly, and now asserts and does not doubt, this we call judgment. So that to form a judgment I call to speak, and judgment a sentence spoken, not indeed to another person nor with the voice but in silence to itself. But what do you call it?

Theaetetus/ The same.

Socrates/ When anyone, therefore, forms a judgment that one thing is another, he says to himself, as it seems, that one thing is another.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Socrates/ Recollect, then, whether you have ever said to yourself, that the beautiful is certainly ugly, or the unjust, just, or even, chief of all, consider whether you have ever attempted to persuade yourself, that one thing is certainly another, or, quite contrariwise, whether you have ever ventured even in sleep to say to yourself, that undoubtedly odd is even, or anything else of the kind.

Theaetetus/ You say truly.

Socrates/ But do you think that anyone else in his senses or even mad would venture to say seriously to himself, being himself persuaded, that an ox must needs be a horse, or two one?

Theaetetus/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ If, therefore, to speak to one's-self is to form judgments, no one, who speaks and forms judgments of both objects, and touches upon both with his soul, would say and judge that one is another. You must therefore give up what

you said about the other. For I assert this, that no one thinks that the ugly is beautiful, or anything else of the kind.

Theaetetus/ I give it up then, Socrates, and it appears to me as you say.

Socrates/ It is impossible, then, for one who forms judgments about both, to think that the one is the other.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ He, however, who judges one thing only, but the other in no respect, will never judge that the one is the other.

Theaetetus/ You say truly: for he would be compelled to touch upon that also of which he does not judge.

Socrates/ It is not possible then for a person who judges both or one of the two, to judge that one is the other: so that if anyone should define false judgment to be the judgment of one thing instead of another, he would say nothing to the purpose; for neither in this way, nor in those before mentioned, does it appear that false judgment pertains to us.

Theaetetus/ It seems not.

Socrates/ However, Theætetus, if this should appear not to be so, we shall be compelled to admit many absurdities.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ I will not tell you, until I have endeavored to consider the matter in- every point of view; for I should be ashamed for both of us, if, while we are in the difficulty we are, we should be compelled to admit what I now say. But if we discover the object of our search and become free, then we will speak of others, as subject to this, being ourselves placed beyond the reach of ridicule: but if we shall continue still involved in difficulties, we must humble ourselves, I imagine, and give ourselves up to discussion, like those who

are seasick, to be trampled on and treated as it pleases. Hear, then, how I still find a way out of our enquiry.

Theaetetus/ Only speak.

Socrates/ I shall deny that we made a correct admission, when we admitted that it is impossible for a person to judge that what he knows is what he does not know and be thus deceived; but in some respect it is possible.

Theaetetus/ Do you mean that which I suspected at the time when we said this, might be the case, that sometimes I knowing Socrates, and seeing another person at a distance whom I do not know, have thought it was Socrates, whom I do know? For what you mention happens in a case of this kind.

Socrates/ Are we not, then, driven from that position, because it made us, while we know, not know the things that we do know?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us not, then, make our assumption in this way but as follows; and perhaps it will in some respect succeed for us, and perhaps it will oppose us. For we are in a condition in which it is necessary to examine our whole argument in every point of view. Consider, therefore, whether I say anything to the purpose. Is it possible for a person who did not know something before, afterwards to learn it?

Theaetetus/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ And can he not also learn another thing after another?

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Suppose, then, I beg, for the sake of argument, that we have in our souls a waxen tablet, in one larger, in another smaller, in one of purer wax, in another of impurer,

in some of harder, and in others again of softer, but in some of a moderate quality.

Theaetetus/ I do suppose it.

Socrates/ Let us say, then, that this is a gift of Mnemosyne the mother of the Muses; and that, whatever we wish to remember of things that we have seen, or heard, or have ourselves thought of, we impress in this, by placing it under our perceptions and thoughts, as if we were taking off the impressions from rings: and that whatever is imprinted, this we remember and know, as long as its image remains; but when it is effaced, or can be no longer imprinted, we forget and do not know it.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ When, therefore, a person knows these things and considers any of the things that he sees or hears, consider whether in this way he can judge falsely?

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Socrates/ By thinking with respect to what he knows, that they are at one time the things that he knows, and at another the things that he does not know. For in a former part of our discussion we made an improper admission in admitting that this was impossible.

Theaetetus/ But how do you mean now?

Socrates/ We must speak thus on this subject, defining it from the beginning: It is impossible that he who knows anything, and has a remembrance of it in his soul, but does not actually perceive it, can think that it is some other thing that he knows, of which he has the impression, though he does not perceive it: and again, it is impossible that anyone can think that what he knows is that which he does not know, and of which he has not the seal: or that what he does not know is that which he does not know: or that what he does not know is that which he does know: or think that

what he perceives is some other thing that he perceives: or that what he perceives is something that he does not perceive: or that what he does not perceive is some other thing that he does not perceive: or that what he does not perceive is something that he does perceive.

And again it is still more impossible, if that can be, that a person should think that what he knows and perceives, and of which he has an impression by means of perception, is something else that he knows and perceives, and of which in like manner he has an impression by means of perception. And it is impossible that what he knows and perceives, and of which he has a correct remembrance, he can think is something else that he knows: or that what he knows and perceives, and in like manner retains in his remembrance, is something else that he perceives: or again, that what he neither knows nor perceives is something else that he neither knows nor perceives: or that what he neither knows nor perceives is something else that he does not know; or that what he neither knows nor perceives is something else that he does not perceive. In all these cases it is utterly impossible for anyone to judge falsely. It remains, therefore, that it must take place, if anywhere, in the following cases.

Theaetetus/ In what cases? perhaps I shall understand you better from them; for at present I do not follow you.

Socrates/ In things which a person knows, he may think that they are different from the things that he knows and perceives; or from those which he does not know, but perceives; or that the things which he knows and perceives are some of the things which he likewise knows and perceives.

Theaetetus/ Now I am left much further behind than I was.

Socrates/ Listen again, then, as follows: I, knowing Theodorus, and remembering within myself what kind of a person he is, and in like manner, Theætetus, do I not sometimes see them, and sometimes not, and sometimes touch them, and sometimes not, and hear or perceive them by some other sense, but sometimes have I no perception of you at all, yet nevertheless do I remember you, and know you within myself?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Understand this, then, the first of the things that I wish to prove, that it is possible for a man not to perceive what he knows, and that it is possible for him to perceive it.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And does it not often happen that a man does not perceive what he does not know, and often that he perceives it only?

Theaetetus/ This also is true.

Socrates/ Consider then, whether you can now follow me better. Socrates knows Theodorus and Theætetus, but he sees neither of them, nor has he any other perception respecting them, now he can never form this judgment within himself, that Theætetus is Theodorus? Do I say anything to the purpose or not?

Theaetetus/ Yes, quite true.

Socrates/ This then was the first of the cases that I mentioned.

Theaetetus/ It was.

Socrates/ But the second was this, that I knowing one of you, but not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, should never think that he whom I know is the person whom I do not know.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Socrates/ The third was this, that I neither knowing nor perceiving either of them, should not think that he whom I do not know is some other person of those whom I do not know: and consider that you again hear in succession all the instances before put, in which I shall never form a false judgment respecting you and Theodorus, neither while knowing nor ignorant of you both, nor while knowing one, and not the other; and in the same way with regard to perceptions, if you follow me.

Theaetetus/ I do follow you.

Socrates/ It remains, therefore, that I may form a false judgment in this case, when knowing you and Theodorus, and having the impression of both of you in that waxen tablet made by a seal ring as it were, seeing you both from a distance and not sufficiently distinguishing you, I endeavor, by attributing the peculiar impression of each to his peculiar aspect, applying it so as to adapt it to its own form in order that I may recognize it, then failing in this, and changing them like those that put their shoes on the wrong feet, I fit the aspect of each to the impression of the other, as happens in looking into mirrors, where the sight passes from the right to the left, so I fall into the same error; then mistaken opinion and false judgment take place.

Theaetetus/ What happens with regard to judgment, Socrates, seems wonderfully like what you describe.

Socrates/ Still further, when, knowing both of you, in addition to knowing I perceive one, but not the other, I have a knowledge of the other not according to perception, which I thus described before, but you did not then understand me.

Theaetetus/ I did not.

Socrates/ I said this however, that a person who knows and perceives one and has a knowledge of him according to perception, will never think that he is some other person whom he knows and perceives, and of whom he has a knowledge according to perception. Was not this what I said?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ There remained then the case that was just now mentioned, in which we said that false judgment takes place, when a person knowing you both and seeing you both, or having some other perception of you both, has not the impression of each according to the perception of each, but, like an unskillful archer, shoots beside the mark and misses, this then is called a falsehood.

Theaetetus/ And very properly so.

Socrates/ When, therefore, perception is present to one of the impressions, and not to the other, and the one applies the impression of the absent perception to that which is present, in this case the mind is altogether deceived: and, in a word, with respect to things that a person has neither known nor ever perceived, it is not possible, as it seems, either to be deceived, or to form a false judgment, if there is any soundness in what we now say: but with respect to things that we know and perceive, in these very things judgment is conversant and turns round, becoming both false and true, by collecting together in a direct and straight line the copies and marks proper to each, it is true, but sideways and obliquely, false.

Theaetetus/ Is it not well described, Socrates?

Socrates/ You will say so still more, when you hear what follows. For to judge truly is beautiful, but to be deceived is base.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Socrates/ They say, then, that these things proceed from hence. When the wax in anyone's soul is deep, abundant, smooth, and properly molded, objects entering by means of the perceptions and impressing themselves on this heart of the soul, as Homer calls it, obscurely intimating its resemblance to wax, then pure and sufficiently deep impressions being made in these, become lasting, and such men are first of all easily taught, next have retentive memories, and lastly do not change the impressions of the perceptions, but form true judgments, for, as these impressions are clear, and in a wide space, they quickly distribute to their proper images each of the things that are called beings; and such men are called wise. Does it not appear so to you?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ When, therefore, anyone's heart is covered with hair, which the very wise poet has celebrated, or when it is muddy, and not of pure wax, or very soft, or hard, those in whom it is soft are easily taught, but are forgetful, and those in whom it is hard, the contrary; but those who have it hairy and rough, and stony or full of earth or mixed mud, have indistinct impressions; they are also indistinct in those that are hard, for there is no depth in them; they are likewise indistinct in those that are soft, for by being confused they soon become obscure; but if, in addition to all this, they fall one upon another by reason of narrowness of space, if anyone's soul is little, they are still more indistinct than the others. All these, therefore, are such as form false judgments. For when they see, or hear, or think about anything, not being able at once to attribute each object to its impression, they are slow, and attributing different objects to different impressions, they for the most part see wrongly, and hear wrongly, and think wrongly; and these are said to be deceived in objects and ignorant.

Theaetetus/ You speak as correctly as man can do, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we say, then, that there are false judgments in us?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And true judgments also?

Theaetetus/ And true.

Socrates/ Do we, then, consider it to have been sufficiently established that these two judgments do without doubt exist?

Theaetetus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ A talkative man, Theætetus, appears to be really troublesome and disagreeable.

Theaetetus/ How so? Why do you say this?

Socrates/ Because I am angry at my own ignorance, and, in truth, talkativeness. For what other name can anyone give it when a man drags the conversation upwards and downwards, and cannot be persuaded through his dullness, and is with difficulty torn from each several topic?

Theaetetus/ But why are you angry?

Socrates/ I am not only angry, but I am afraid that I should not know what to answer, if anyone should ask me, "Socrates, have you found that false judgment is neither in the perceptions compared with each other, nor in the thoughts, but in the conjunction of perception with thought?" I think I shall say, I have, priding myself as if we had made a very fine discovery.

Theaetetus/ What has just now been proved appears to me, Socrates, to be by no means despicable.

Socrates/ Do you therefore assert, he will say, that we can never suppose that a man whom we think of only, but do not see, is a horse, which we neither see nor touch, but think of

only, and do not perceive in any other way? I believe I should say, that I do assert this.

Theaetetus/ And rightly.

Socrates/ What then? he will say, according to this mode of reasoning, can the number eleven, which one thinks of only, ever be supposed to be twelve, which also one thinks of only? Come then, do you answer?

Theaetetus/ I should answer, that a person seeing or touching might suppose that eleven are twelve, but that he would never think thus respecting numbers which he embraces only in thought.

Socrates/ What then? do you suppose that anyone has ever proposed to consider within himself of five and seven, I do not mean seven and five men, or anything else of the kind, but the numbers five and seven themselves, which we said were in his soul like impressions in wax, and that it is impossible to judge falsely respecting them, —has any man at any time considered these very things, speaking to himself and asking how many they are, and answered, one that he supposes they are eleven, and another that they are twelve, or do all men say and suppose that they are twelve?

Theaetetus/ No, by Zeus, but many suppose that they are eleven. And if a person considers about a greater number, he is still more mistaken; for I suppose that you rather speak about every number.

Socrates/ You suppose rightly, but consider whether anything else ever happens than this, that he supposes that the number twelve impressed in his soul is eleven?

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Does it not then come back to our former statements? For he who is in this condition supposes that what he knows is something else that he also knows, which we said was impossible, and from which very circumstance

we demonstrated that there is no such thing as false judgment, in order that the same person might not be compelled to know and not to know the same thing at the same time.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Therefore we must show that false judgment is something else than an interchange of mind with perception. For, if this were so, we could never be deceived in the thoughts themselves: but now there is either no such thing as false judgment, or it is possible for a person not to know what he knows: and which of these two do you choose?

Theaetetus/ You offer me a difficult choice, Socrates.

Socrates/ Our argument however appears as if it would not allow both these to take place: though for we must venture on everything, what if we should determine to lay aside all shame?

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ By taking upon ourselves to declare what it is to know.

Theaetetus/ But why would this be shameless?

Socrates/ You do not seem to consider that the whole of our discussion from the beginning has been an investigation respecting science, as if we did not know what it is.

Theaetetus/ I do consider it.

Socrates/ Does it not, then, appear to be a shameless thing, to explain what it is to know, when we are ignorant of what science is? But, Theætetus, our conversation has been all along full of defects. For we have over and over again used the expressions, We know, and We do not know, We have a scientific knowledge, and We have not a scientific knowledge, as if we both of us understood something about it, whereas we are still ignorant of what science is. But if you

please, we will still at the present moment use the terms, to be ignorant, and to understand, as if we could properly use them, though we are destitute of science.

Theaetetus/ But how will you converse, Socrates, if you abstain from the use of these expressions?

Socrates/ Not at all, while I am what I am. If however I were contentious, or if a person of that kind were now present, he would say that I must abstain from them, and would strongly object to what I say. But as we are poor creatures, do you wish I should venture to say what it is to know? For it appears to me that it would be worthwhile to do so.

Theaetetus/ Venture then, by Zeus; for you will be readily pardoned for not abstaining from these expressions.

Socrates/ Have you heard, then, what they now say it is to know?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so; but at present I do not remember.

Socrates/ They say, I believe, that it is to have science.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Let us, then, change it a little, and say that it is to possess science.

Theaetetus/ But in what will you say this differs from that?

Socrates/ Perhaps in nothing: but whether it seems to differ or not, listen and examine with me.

Theaetetus/ I will, if I am able.

Socrates/ To possess, therefore, does not appear to me to be the same as to have: for instance, if anyone having bought a garment, and having it in his power, should not wear it, we should not say that he has it, but that he possesses it.

Theaetetus/ And very properly.

Socrates/ See then whether it is possible thus to possess science without having it: just as if anyone having caught some wild birds, as doves or any others, and having constructed a dovecote at home, should feed them; we should probably say that in some respects he always has them, because he possesses them: should we not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But in another respect we should say that he has none of them, but that he has acquired a power over them, since he has brought them under his control, in an enclosure of his own, so as to take and have them when he pleases, by catching whichever he wishes, and again of letting them go: and this he is at liberty to do as often as he thinks fit.

Theaetetus/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, as in a former part of our discussion we constructed I know not what kind of waxen figment in the soul, so now let us make in each soul a kind of aviary of all sorts of birds, some being in flocks, apart from others, and others few together, and others alone, flying amongst all the rest wherever it may chance.

Theaetetus/ Suppose it to be made: but what next?

Socrates/ While we are children, we must say, that this receptacle is empty, and instead of birds we must understand sciences; whatever science, then, one has become possessed of and shut up in this enclosure, one must say that he has learnt or discovered the thing of which this is the science, and that this is to know.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, when anyone wishes to catch anyone of these sciences, and, when he has taken it, to have it, and again to let it go, consider what words he requires, whether the same as before, when he possessed them, or

different ones. But from what follows you will more clearly understand what I mean. Do you call arithmetic an art?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Suppose this to be a catching of the sciences of every even and odd number.

Theaetetus/ I do suppose it.

Socrates/ By this art, then, I think, he has the sciences of numbers under his control, and, if he pleases, transfers them to others.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we say that he who transfers them teaches, and that he who receives them learns, but that having them, by possessing them in that aviary, he knows them.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Attend now to what follows. Does not he who is a perfect arithmetician know all numbers? for the sciences of all numbers are in his soul.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Socrates/ Does not then such a person sometimes calculate either something within himself, or something else that is external, that is capable of being calculated.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But to calculate we shall say is nothing else than to examine what is the quantity of any number.

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Socrates/ What therefore he knows, be appears to examine, as if he did not know, though we admitted that he knows all number. You surely hear such questions as these.

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ We, therefore, carrying on our comparison with the possession and catching of doves, will say that this catching is of two kinds, one before possessing for the sake of possessing, the other when one has already obtained possession, for the purpose of taking and having in the hands what was already possessed. So with respect to the things of which a person has already acquired the science by learning, and which he knew, he may learn these same things again, and recover and retain the science of each, which he formerly possessed, but had not ready in his mind.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ On this account, I just now asked, what words it is proper to use in speaking of these things, when an arithmetician sets about calculating, or a grammarian reading anything. Shall we say that knowing such a subject he again applies himself to learn from himself what he knows?

Theaetetus/ This would be absurd, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we say, then, that he is going to read or calculate what he does not know, though we have granted him that he knows all letters and all numbers?

Theaetetus/ This too would be unreasonable.

Socrates/ Will you, then, that we say, that we care nothing at all about words, in what way anyone chooses to employ the words knowing and learning, but, since we have settled that it is one thing to possess a science, and another to have it, we maintain that it is impossible for a person not to possess what he does possess, so that it never happens that anyone does not know what he knows, though it is possible for him to form a false judgment respecting it? For it is possible for him not to have the science of this particular thing, but another instead of it, when hunting after some one of the sciences that he possesses as they are flying

about, he may by mistake take one instead of another; accordingly when he thinks that eleven is twelve, he takes the science of eleven instead of that of twelve, as it were taking a pigeon that he possessed instead of a dove.

Theaetetus/ It is reasonable to suppose so.

Socrates/ But when he takes that which he endeavors to take, then he is not deceived, and judges truly: and thus we will say that false and true judgment subsist, and none of the things which occasioned difficulty before will any longer stand in our way. Perhaps you agree with me, or what will you do?

Theaetetus/ Agree with you.

Socrates/ We are freed then, from the dilemma of a man's not knowing what he knows: for it never happens that we do not possess what we do possess, whether we are deceived respecting anything or not. However, another much worse inconvenience appears to me to present itself.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ If the interchange of sciences can ever become false judgment.

Theaetetus/ But how?

Socrates/ In the first place, that having the science of anything one should be ignorant of that thing, not through ignorance, but through the science of the thing itself, and in the next place, that one should judge this thing to be another thing and another thing this, how is it not a great piece of absurdity, that when science is present the soul should know nothing, but be ignorant of all things? For, from this mode of reasoning, nothing hinders but that ignorance when present should make us know something, and blindness should make us see, if science will ever make a man ignorant.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps, Socrates, we have done wrong in making sciences only take the place of the birds, and we ought to have supposed that various kinds of ignorance were flying about in the soul with them, and that the sportsman at one time taking science, and at another time ignorance, with respect to the same thing, judges falsely through ignorance, but truly through science.

Socrates/ It is not by any means easy, Theætetus, to forbear praising you: however, examine again what you have just said. For suppose it to be as you say. He who takes ignorance, will judge falsely you say; is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yet surely he will not think that he judges falsely.

Theaetetus/ How should he?

Socrates/ But truly, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he is deceived.

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ He will therefore judge that by sporting he has taken science, and not ignorance.

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Having therefore made a long circuit, we have come back again to our first doubt. For that critic will laugh at us and say, “Can anyone, my excellent friends, who knows both, science as well as ignorance, think that what he knows is some other thing that he knows? or, knowing neither of them, can judge that what he does not know, is some other thing that he does not know? or, knowing one, and not the other, can he suppose that what he knows is what he does not know, or what he does not know is what he does know? Will you tell me again, that there are sciences of sciences and ignorances, which their possessor having enclosed in some other ridiculous aviaries, or waxen figments, knows as

long as he possesses them, though he has them not ready in his soul? And will you be thus compelled to revolve perpetually round the same circle, without making any progress?" What answer shall we give to this, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, Socrates, I have no notion what ought to be said.

Socrates/ Does not the argument, then, my boy, reprove us very properly, and show that we did wrong in searching for false judgment before science, and neglecting that? But it is impossible to know this until we have sufficiently discovered what science is.

Theaetetus/ It is necessary, Socrates, at present to think as you say.

Socrates/ Again therefore, what shall one say from the beginning about science? For we surely must not give it up yet.

Theaetetus/ By no means, unless you refuse to persevere.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, how can we best speak concerning science so as not to contradict ourselves.

Theaetetus/ As we attempted to do before, Socrates, for I know of no other plan.

Socrates/ What is that?

Theaetetus/ That true judgment is science. For to judge truly is surely free from error, and whatever results from it is beautiful and good.

Socrates/ He who acted as guide in fording a river, Theætetus, said that it would show its own depth; so if we go on in our enquiries, perhaps the impediment that we meet with will show us what we are in search of, but if we stop nothing will be clear.

Theaetetus/ You say well; let us go on then and examine it.

Socrates/ This then requires but a brief examination, for one whole art shows that it is not science.

Theaetetus/ How so? and what art is it?

Socrates/ That which belongs to those who are most renowned for wisdom, whom they call orators and lawyers. For they, in fact, persuade, not by teaching, but by making men form such judgments as they please. Do you think that there are any teachers so clever as, when persons have not been present while others were robbed of their money, or treated with some other violence, to be able, while a little water is running, to teach those persons sufficiently of the truth of what took place?

Theaetetus/ I by no means think so, but that they can persuade.

Socrates/ But do you not say that to persuade is to make a person form a judgment?

Theaetetus/ How otherwise?

Socrates/ When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about things which can only be known by seeing and in no other way, then judging these things from hearsay, do they not, when they form a true opinion, judge without science, being persuaded properly, since they decide correctly?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But, my friend, if true judgment and science are the same, a perfect judge could never form a correct judgment without science; but now each appears to be different from the other.

Theaetetus/ I had forgotten, Socrates, what I heard someone say, but now I remember it: he said that true judgment in conjunction with reason is science, but that without reason it is out of the pale of science, and that things for which a reason cannot be given cannot be known; these

were his very words; and that things for which a reason can be given are known.

Socrates/ You speak admirably well. But how do you distinguish the things that can be known from those that cannot? tell me, for perhaps you and I have heard the same thing.

Theaetetus/ I know not whether I can explain it; but I could follow another person describing it, I think.

Socrates/ Hear, then, a dream for a dream. For I too seem to myself to have heard some people say, that the first elements, as it were, from which we and all other things are composed, cannot be explained by reason; for that each several element by itself can only be named, but that nothing else can be predicated of it, neither that it exists nor does not exist; for that this would be to attribute to it existence or non-existence, whereas nothing ought to be added to it, if one means to speak of the thing itself only; neither must we add to it the term the, or that, or each, or only, or this, or many others of the same kind; for these are constantly varying and are applied to all things, and are different from the things to which they are added. But we ought, if it were possible, to speak of the thing itself, and, if it has a definition peculiar to itself, to speak of it without the addition of anything else. Now, however, it is impossible for any of the first elements to be explained by a definition, for it does not admit of anything else than being named, for it has only a name; but the things that have been composed from these, as they are complex, so their names, when connected together, constitute a definition; for a connection of names is the essence of definition. Thus the elements themselves cannot be defined or known, but only perceived, but things compounded of them can be both known and defined, and apprehended by true judgment. When, therefore, anyone forms a true judgment of anything, without explanation, his

soul indeed perceives the truth respecting it, but does not know it, for he who is not able to give and receive an explanation of a thing must be ignorant of that thing, but when he adds an explanation to it then he is capable of knowing all these things, and may be perfect in science. Is it thus that you have heard the dream, or in some other way?

Theaetetus/ In this way precisely.

Socrates/ Are you willing then that we should settle it thus, that science is true judgment in conjunction with reason?

Theaetetus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Have we, then, Theætetus, thus on this very day discovered what of old so many sages sought for and grew old before they found it?

Theaetetus/ For my part, Socrates, it appears to me that what has been now stated is well said.

Socrates/ And it is reasonable that this very thing should be the case; for what science could there be without reason and right judgment? However one of the things that were stated displeases me.

Theaetetus/ Which is that?

Socrates/ That which seems to be very forcibly said, that the elements are unknown, but that the natures of things compounded of them are known.

Theaetetus/ Is not that right?

Socrates/ We must see. For we have as sureties for this doctrine the examples which he used who said all these things.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The elements of letters and syllables: do you think that he who said what we have mentioned had anything else in view when he said it?

Theaetetus/ No, but these.

Socrates/ Let us, then, apply ourselves to these and examine them, or rather ourselves, whether we learnt letters in this way, or not. First of all then do syllables admit of a definition, but are the elements indefinable?

Theaetetus/ Probably.

Socrates/ It certainly appears so to me, too. If, then, anyone should ask thus respecting the first syllable of the word Socrates, "Theætetus, tell me, what is So?" what would you answer?

Theaetetus/ That it is *S* and *o*.

Socrates/ Have you not, then, this definition of the syllable?

Theaetetus/ I have.

Socrates/ Come then, in the same way give me the definition of the letter *S*.

Theaetetus/ But how can anyone speak of the elements of an element? For *S*, Socrates, is a consonant, only a sound, as of the tongue hissing; again the letter *B* has neither voice nor sound, nor have most of the elements. So that it is very right to say that they are indefinable, since the most distinct among them, to the number of seven, have only a sound, but do not admit of any definition.

Socrates/ Thus far, then, my friend, we have determined rightly with respect to science.

Theaetetus/ We appear to have done so.

Socrates/ What then? have we shown rightly that the element cannot be known, but that the syllable can?

Theaetetus/ It is probable.

Socrates/ Come then, do we say that a syllable is both the elements, and, if there are more than two, all of them, or some one form resulting from their conjunction?

Theaetetus/ All, we appear to me to say.

Socrates/ Observe, then, with respect to the two letters S and o; both of them together form the first syllable of my name, does not then he who knows this syllable know both of them?

Theaetetus/ How should he not?

Socrates/ He knows, therefore, *S* and *o*.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what? is he ignorant of each of them, and knowing neither, does he know both?

Theaetetus/ That would be strange and absurd, Socrates.

Socrates/ However, if it is necessary to know each, in order that he may know both, it is quite necessary for a person who is ever to know a syllable to know the elements first, and thus our former statement will escape us and be off.

Theaetetus/ And very suddenly too.

Socrates/ For we did not guard it well. For, perhaps, we ought to suppose that a syllable does not consist of the elements, but of some one species resulting from them, which has a form peculiar to itself, different from the elements.

Theaetetus/ Certainly; and perhaps the case is rather in this way than in the other.

Socrates/ We must examine it, and not so unmanfully abandon a weighty and venerable statement.

Theaetetus/ We ought not, indeed.

Socrates/ Let it be then as we just now said; let the syllable be one form resulting from the several elements, connected together, as well in letters as in all other things.

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Socrates/ It must, therefore, have no parts.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because where there are parts, the whole must necessarily be the same as all the parts: or do you say that a whole resulting from parts is one certain species different from all the parts?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Whether do you call all and the whole the same, or each different from the other?

Theaetetus/ I cannot say anything for certain, but since you bid me answer boldly, I venture to say that they are different.

Socrates/ Your boldness, Theætetus, is right; but whether your answer is so, must be considered.

Theaetetus/ It must indeed.

Socrates/ Does not the whole, then, differ from all, according to your present statement?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what, is there any difference between all the parts, and the all? for instance when we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or twice three, or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, or five and one, whether in all these cases do we say the same thing, or that which is different?

Theaetetus/ The same thing.

Socrates/ Do we say anything else than six?

Theaetetus/ Nothing.

Socrates/ And in each mode of speaking did we not mention all the parts of six?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, when we say all the parts do we say nothing?

Theaetetus/ We necessarily do say something.

Socrates/ Do we say anything else than six?

Theaetetus/ Nothing.

Socrates/ In all things, then, that consist of number, do we not call the all and all the parts the same thing?

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Thus then let us speak of them; the number of an acre and an acre are the same; is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the number of a stadium in like manner?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And moreover the number of an army, and an army, and in like manner with respect to all other things of the kind? For all number is all that which each of them is.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But is the number of each of them anything else than its parts?

Theaetetus/ Nothing.

Socrates/ Such things, then, as have parts must consist of parts?

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But it is admitted that all the parts are the all, since all number is the all.

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Socrates/ The whole, therefore, does not consist of parts; for it would be all, if it were all the parts.

Theaetetus/ It seems not.

Socrates/ But is a part a part of anything else than a whole?

Theaetetus/ Yes, of the all.

Socrates/ You fight manfully, Theætetus. But is not this very all, the all when nothing is wanting to it?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And will not the whole be this very same thing when nothing is wanting to it? but when anything is wanting, it is neither the whole, nor all, each becoming the same thing from the same cause?

Theaetetus/ It appears to me now, that the whole and the all in no respect differ from each other.

Socrates/ Did we not say, that where there are parts, the whole and the all will be all the parts?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, to return to what I just now attempted to prove, if a syllable is not the elements, does it not necessarily follow that it has not elements as parts of itself, or that, if it is the same with them, it must be equally known with them?

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Socrates/ In order that this might not follow, did we not suppose it to be different from them?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ What then? if the elements are not parts of a syllable, can you mention any other things that are parts of a syllable, and yet not its elements?

Theaetetus/ By no means; for if, Socrates, I should admit that it has parts, it would surely be ridiculous to reject the elements and search for other things.

Socrates/ From what you now say, therefore, Theætetus, a syllable must certainly be some one indivisible form.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Do you remember then, my friend, that we admitted a little before, and thought it was well said, that

there cannot be a definition of first elements, of which other things are composed, because each considered by itself is uncompounded, and neither can the term “being” be correctly attributed to it nor the term “this,” because these things would be said as different and foreign to it, and indeed this very cause makes it indefinable and unknown.

Theaetetus/ I do remember.

Socrates/ Is there any other cause, then, than this of its being simple and indivisible? I for my part see no other.

Theaetetus/ There does not appear to be any.

Socrates/ Does not the syllable, then, fall under the same class as the elements, since it has not parts, and is one form?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ If, therefore, a syllable is many elements, and a whole, and these are its parts, syllables and elements may be equally known and defined, since all the parts have been found to be the same as the whole.

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ But if it is one and indivisible, a syllable equally as an element must be indefinable and unknown; for the same cause will make them alike.

Theaetetus/ I cannot say otherwise.

Socrates/ We must not, therefore, allow this, if anyone should say, that a syllable is known and definable, but an element the contrary.

Theaetetus/ We must not, if we admit this reasoning.

Socrates/ What then? should you pay any more attention to one who should assert the contrary of what you are conscious happened to yourself in learning your letters?

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That in learning you did nothing else than endeavor to distinguish the elements both by sight and hearing, each separated by itself, in order that their position when pronounced or written, might not confuse you.

Theaetetus/ You say most truly.

Socrates/ And at your music-master's was learning perfectly anything else than the being able to follow each note, and distinguish to what chord it belonged, which everyone would allow is called the elements of music.

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ If, therefore, we may conjecture from the elements and syllables in which we are skilled, to others, we shall say that the class of elements are capable of a much more clear and distinct knowledge than that of syllables, in order to our acquiring each study in perfection; and if anyone should say that a syllable is known, but that an element is by nature unknown, we shall think that he is jesting either intentionally or unintentionally.

Theaetetus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Moreover, other proofs of this might still be found, as it appears to me; but let us not lose sight of the question before us by considering them, that is to say, what is meant by the statement, that reason united to true judgment is the most perfect science.

Theaetetus/ This, then, we must consider.

Socrates/ Come then, what is the signification of the word *logos*: for it appears to me to mean one of three things.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The first would be to make one's thought clear by the voice, through the means of verbs and nouns, impressing one's judgment on what flows from the mouth,

as it were on a mirror, or water; does not *logos* appear to you to be something of this kind?

Theaetetus/ It does: and we say that he who does this speaks.

Socrates/ Everyone, therefore, is able to do this more quickly or slowly, that is, can show what he thinks about everything, unless he is altogether dumb or deaf, and thus all who form right judgments on any matter, will be found to do so in conjunction with *logos*, and right judgment will never subsist without science.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ We must not, therefore, too readily condemn him as having spoken nothing to the purpose, who asserted that science is that which we are now examining. For perhaps he who said it did not mean that, but that a person, when asked what each thing is, should be able to give an answer to the questioner by means of each thing's element.

Theaetetus/ For instance, how do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ As Hesiod for instance says of a chariot, that it is made of a hundred pieces of wood, which I, for my part, could not enumerate, neither do I think could you, but we should be contented, if when asked what a chariot is, we could say wheels, axle, frame, rails, and yoke.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But he probably would think us ridiculous, just as if we, when asked concerning your name and having answered syllable by syllable, thereby judging and saying correctly what we do say, should think ourselves grammarians, and that we know and speak grammatically the definition of the name of Theætetus; whereas it is not possible to say anything scientifically, before one has given a complete account of each thing by means of its elements,

together with true judgment, as was observed before, if I mistake not.

Theaetetus/ It was observed.

Socrates/ So, too, we have a correct judgment respecting a chariot, but he who is able to describe its nature by means of those hundred pieces, by adding this, both adds *logos* to true judgment, and instead of forming a mere judgment becomes an artist and knowing in the nature of a chariot, in that he gives a complete account of the whole, by means of its elements.

Theaetetus/ Does not this appear to you, Socrates, to be well said?

Socrates/ If it appears to you, my friend, and you allow that the description of each thing by its element is *logos*, and that that made by syllables, or even larger parts is devoid of *logos*, tell me, that we may examine it.

Theaetetus/ I certainly do allow it.

Socrates/ Whether do you think that anyone has a scientific knowledge of anything, when the same thing appears to him at one time to belong to the same thing and at another to a different thing, or when he forms at one time one judgment and at another a different judgment about the same thing?

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ Have you forgotten then, that in learning your letters at first both you and others did this?

Theaetetus/ Do you mean that we thought that at one time one letter, and at another time another, belonged to the same syllable, and that we placed the same letter at one time to its proper syllable, and at another time to another?

Socrates/ I do mean that.

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, I do not forget, nor do I think that they have knowledge who are in this condition.

Socrates/ What then? when a person at that time of life writing the name Theætetus, thinks that he ought to write and does write *Th* and *e*, and again attempting to write Theodorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write *T* and *e*, shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

Theaetetus/ We have just now admitted, that a person in this condition does not yet know.

Socrates/ Does anything, then, hinder the same person from being in this condition with respect to the second, third, and fourth syllable?

Theaetetus/ Nothing.

Socrates/ Will he not then have the description by means: of the elements, and write Theætetus with correct judgment, when he writes it in its proper order?

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Will he not still be void of science, though he judges correctly, as we said?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And yet he has *logos* together with correct judgment; for he wrote it knowing the order of the elements, which we allowed to be *logos*.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ There is, therefore, my friend, correct judgment accompanied with *logos* which must not yet be called science.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ We have been enriched then, as it appears, in a dream, in thinking that we possess the truest definition of science: or shall we not condemn it yet? For perhaps

someone may not define *logos* in this manner, but may consider it to be the remaining species of the three, one of which we said would be adopted by him who defined science to be correct judgment accompanied with *logos*.

Theaetetus/ You have rightly reminded me; for there is still one left. For the first was an image of the thought as it were expressed by the voice: and that just now mentioned was a proceeding to the whole by means of the elements: but what do you say the third is?

Socrates/ That which most men would say it is, the being able to mention some mark by which the object of enquiry differs from all other things.

Theaetetus/ Can you give me a *logos* of anything by way of example?

Socrates/ For instance, if you please, with respect to the sun, I think it would be sufficient for you to admit, that it is the most luminous of the heavenly bodies that move round the earth.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Observe then why this was said. It is that which we just now mentioned, that when you find the difference of each thing, by which it differs from all others, you will find, as some say, the *logos*; but as long as you lay hold of some common quality, you will have the *logos* of those things to which this common quality belongs.

Theaetetus/ I understand; and it appears to me very proper to call such a thing *logos*.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who together with correct judgment respecting anything whatever can find out its difference from all other things, will have arrived at the knowledge of that of which he before only formed a judgment.

Theaetetus/ We say it certainly is so.

Socrates/ Now, however, Theætetus, since I have come near what has been said, as if it were a picture in perspective, I find that I do not understand it in the least, but while I stood at a distance it appeared to me to have some meaning.

Theaetetus/ How is this?

Socrates/ I will tell you, if I can. If, when I have a correct judgment respecting you, I likewise find your *logos*, then I know you, but if not, I only form a judgment.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But *logos* was the explanation of your difference.

Theaetetus/ It was.

Socrates/ When, therefore, I formed a judgment only, is it not true that I reached by my thought none of those things by which you differ from others?

Theaetetus/ It seems that you did not.

Socrates/ I, therefore, thought of some common qualities, none of which belong to you more than to anyone else.

Theaetetus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Come, then, by Zeus, how in such a case did I form a judgment of you rather than of anyone else? For suppose me to be thinking that this is Theætetus, who is a man, and has nose, eyes, a mouth, and so on with each several member. Will this thought cause me to think of Theætetus rather than of Theodorus, or, as the saying is, the last of the Mysians?

Theaetetus/ How should it?

Socrates/ But if I not only think of one who has nose and eyes, but also of one who has a snub nose and prominent eyes, shall I in that case think of you rather than of myself, or any other persons of that description?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ But I think I shall not form the image of Theætetus in my mind, until his snubbiness shall have impressed on me and left with me some mark different from all other instances of snubbiness that I have seen, and so with respect to the other parts of which you are made up; which, if I should meet you to-morrow, would recall you to my mind, and make me form a correct judgment respecting you.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Right judgment, therefore, respecting each object has to do with difference.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ What then will become of adding *logos* to correct judgment? For if it means that we should moreover form a judgment of the manner in which anything differs from others, the injunction will be very ridiculous.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ It bids us add a right judgment of the manner in which things differ from others, when we have a right judgment of the manner in which they differ from others. And thus the turning round of a scytala, or a pestle, or any other proverb of the kind, would be nothing compared with this injunction, though it might more properly be called the advice of a blind man; for to bid us add those things that we already have, in order that we may learn what we already have formed judgments about, seems remarkably suited to one who is utterly blind.

Theaetetus/ Tell me, then, what did you mean by asking me just now?

Socrates/ If, O boy, in bidding us add *logos* it bids us know, but not form a judgment of the difference, this most beautiful of all the definitions of science would be a

delightful thing: for to know, surely, is to acquire science. Is it not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ When asked, therefore, as it appears, what science is, he will answer, that it is correct judgment with the science of difference. For, according to him, this will be the addition of *logos*.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But it is altogether foolish, when we are searching for science, to say that it is correct judgment with science, either of difference or anything else. Neither perception, therefore, Theætetus, nor true judgment, nor *logos* united with true judgment, can be science.

Theaetetus/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Are we, then, still pregnant and in labor, my friend, with reference to science, or have we brought forth everything?

Theaetetus/ And by Zeus, with your help, I have said more than I had in myself.

Socrates/ Does not, then, our midwife's art pronounce that all these things are empty, and not worth rearing?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ If, therefore, after this you should wish to become pregnant with other things, Theætetus, and if you do become so, you will be full of better things by means of the present discussion; but if you should be empty, you will be less troublesome to your companions, and more meek through modesty, in not thinking that you know what you do not know. For thus much only my art is able to accomplish, but nothing more, nor do I know any of the things which others do who are and have been great and wonderful men. But this midwife's art I and my mother

received from the deity; she about women, and I for young and noble men and such as are beautiful. Now, however, I must go to the king's porch, to answer the indictment which Melitus has preferred against me: to-morrow, Theodorus, let us meet here again.

Theaetetus.

Translated by F. M. Cornford.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus, Euclid, Terpsion

Euclid/ Have you only just come to town, Terpsion?

Terpsion/ No, some time ago. What is more, I was looking for you in the market place and surprised that I could not find you.

Euclid/ I was not in the city.

Terpsion/ Where were you, then?

Euclid/ On my way down to the harbor I met them carrying Theaetetus to Athens from the camp at Corinth.

Terpsion/ Alive or dead?

Euclid/ Only just alive. He is suffering from severe wounds, and still more from having caught the sickness that has broken out in the army.

Terpsion/ The dysentery?

Euclid/ Yes.

Terpsion/ How sad that such a man should be so near death!

Euclid/ An admirable man, Terpsion, and a brave one. Indeed, only just now I was hearing warm praise of his conduct in the battle.

Terpsion/ There is nothing strange in that; it would have been much more surprising if he had behaved otherwise. But why did he not stay here at Megara?

Euclid/ He was eager to get home. I begged him to stay, but he would not listen to my advice. I went some way with him, and then, as I was coming back, I recalled what Socrates had said about him, and was filled with wonder at

this signal instance of his prophetic insight. Socrates must have met him shortly before his own death, when Theaetetus was little more than a boy. They had some talk together, and Socrates was delighted with the promise he showed. When I visited Athens he repeated to me their conversation, which was well worth the hearing, and he added that Theaetetus could not fail to become a remarkable man if he lived.

Terpsion/ And apparently he was right. But what was this conversation? Could you repeat it?

Euclid/ Certainly not, just from memory. But I made some notes at the time, as soon as I got home, and later on I wrote out what I could recall at my leisure. Then, every time I went to Athens, I questioned Socrates upon any point where my memory had failed and made corrections on my return. In this way I have pretty well the whole conversation written down.

Terpsion/ True. I have heard you mention it before, and indeed I have always meant to ask you to show it to me; only I have let the matter slip till this moment. Why should we not go through it now? In any case I am in need of a rest after my walk to town.

Euclid/ For that matter, I should be glad of a rest myself, for I went as far as Erineum with Theaetetus. Let us go indoors, and, while we are resting, my servant shall read to us.

Terpsion/ Very well.

Euclid/ This is the book, Terpsion. You see how I wrote the conversation—not in narrative form, as I heard it from Socrates, but as a dialogue between him and the other persons he told me had taken part. These were Theodorus the geometer and Theaetetus. I wanted to avoid in the written account the tiresome effect of bits of narrative interrupting the dialogue, such as ‘and I said’ or ‘and I

remarked' wherever Socrates was speaking of himself, and 'he assented' or 'he did not agree,' where he reported the answer. So I left out everything of that sort, and wrote it as a direct conversation between the actual speakers.

Terpsion/ That was quite a good notion, Euclides.

Euclid/ Well, boy, take the book and read.

Socrates/ If I took more interest in the affairs of Cyrene, Theodorus, I should ask you for the news from those parts and whether any of the young men there are devoting themselves to geometry or to any other sort of liberal study. But really I care more for our young men here and I am anxious rather to know which of them are thought likely to distinguish themselves. That is what I am always on the lookout for myself, to the best of my powers, and I make inquiries of anyone whose society I see the young men ready to seek. Now you attract a large following, as you deserve for your skill in geometry, not to mention your other merits. So, if you have met with anyone worthy of mention, I should be glad to hear of it.

Theodorus/ Yes, Socrates, I have met with a youth of this city who certainly deserves mention, and you will find it worthwhile to hear me describe him. If he were handsome, I should be afraid to use strong terms, lest I should be suspected of being in love with him. However, he is not handsome, but—forgive my saying so—he resembles you in being snub-nosed and having prominent eyes, though these features are less marked in him. So I can speak without fear. I assure you that, among all the young men I have met with—and I have had to do with a good many—I have never found such admirable gifts. The combination of a rare quickness of intelligence with exceptional gentleness and of an incomparably virile spirit with both, is a thing that I should hardly have believed could exist, and I have never

seen it before. In general, people who have such keen and ready wits and such good memories as he are also quick-tempered and passionate; they dart about like ships without ballast, and their temperament is rather enthusiastic than strong, whereas the steadier sort are somewhat dull when they come to face study, and they forget everything. But his approach to learning and inquiry, with the perfect quietness of its smooth and sure progress, is like the noiseless flow of a stream of oil. It is wonderful how he achieves all this at his age.

Socrates/ That is good news. Who is his father?

Theodorus/ I have heard the name, but I do not remember it. However, there he is, the middle one of those three who are coming toward us. He and these friends of his have been rubbing themselves with oil in the portico outside, and, now they have finished, they seem to be coming this way. See if you recognize him.

Socrates/ Yes, I do; his father was Euphronius of Sunium, just such another as his son is by your account. He was a man of good standing, and I believe he left a considerable fortune. But I don't know the lad's name.

Theodorus/ His name is Theaetetus, Socrates, but I fancy the property has been squandered by trustees. Nonetheless, liberality with his money is another of his admirable traits.

Socrates/ You give him a noble character. Please ask him to come and sit down with us.

Theodorus/ I will. Theaetetus, come this way and sit by Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, do, Theaetetus, so that I may study the character of my own countenance, for Theodorus tells me it is like yours. Now, suppose we each had a lyre, and Theodorus said they were both tuned to the same pitch,

should we take his word at once, or should we try to find out whether he was a musician?

Theaetetus/ We should try to find that out.

Socrates/ And believe him, if we discovered that he was musical, but not otherwise?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And now, if this alleged likeness of our faces is a matter of any interest to us, we must ask whether it is a skilled draftsman who informs us of it.

Theaetetus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well, is Theodorus a painter?

Theaetetus/ Not so far as I know.

Socrates/ Nor an expert in geometry either?

Theaetetus/ Of course he is, Socrates, very much so.

Socrates/ And also in astronomy and calculation and music and in all the liberal arts?

Theaetetus/ I am sure he is.

Socrates/ Then, if, in the way of compliment or otherwise, he tells us of some physical likeness between us, there is no special reason why we should attend to him.

Theaetetus/ Possibly not.

Socrates/ But suppose he should praise the mind of either of us for its virtue and intelligence. Would there not be good reason why the one who heard the other praised should be eager to examine him, and he should be equally eager to show his quality?

Theaetetus/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now is the time, then, my dear Theaetetus, for you to show your qualities and for me to examine them. I can assure you that, often as Theodorus has spoken to me

in praise of citizen or stranger, he has never praised anyone as he was praising you just now.

Theaetetus/ That is good hearing, Socrates. But perhaps he was not speaking seriously.

Socrates/ No, that would not be like Theodorus. Do not try to slip out of your bargain on the pretext that he was not serious. We don't want him to have to give evidence on oath. In any case no one is going to indict him for perjury; so do not be afraid to abide by your agreement.

Theaetetus/ Well, so it shall be, if you wish it.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, you are learning some geometry from Theodorus?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And astronomy and harmonics and arithmetic?

Theaetetus/ I certainly do my best to learn.

Socrates/ So do I, from him and from anyone else who seems to understand these things. I do moderately well in general, but all the same I am puzzled about one small matter which you and our friends must help me to think out. Tell me, is it not true that learning about something means becoming wiser in that matter?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And what makes people wise is wisdom, I suppose.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is that in any way different from knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Is what different?

Socrates/ Wisdom. Are not people wise in the things of which they have knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then knowledge and wisdom are the same thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, that is precisely what I am puzzled about. I cannot make out to my own satisfaction what knowledge is. Can we answer that question? What do you all say? Which of us will speak first? Everyone who misses shall 'sit down and be donkey,' as children say when they are playing at ball; anyone who gets through without missing shall be king and have the right to make us answer any question he likes. Why are you all silent? I hope, Theodorus, that my passion for argument is not making me ill-mannered, in my eagerness to start a conversation and set us all at ease with one another like friends?

Theodorus/ Not at all, Socrates; there is nothing ill-mannered in that. But please ask one of these young people to answer your questions; I am not at home in an abstract discussion of this sort, nor likely to become so at my age. But it is just the thing for them, and they have a far better prospect of improvement; youth, indeed, is capable of improving at anything. So do not let Theaetetus off; go on putting your questions to him.

Socrates/ You hear what Theodorus says, Theaetetus. I do not think you will want to disobey him, and it would be wrong for you not to do what an older and wiser man bids you. So tell me, in a generous spirit, what you think knowledge is.

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, I cannot refuse, since you and Theodorus ask me. Anyhow, if I do make a mistake, you will set me right.

Socrates/ By all means, if we can.

Theaetetus/ Then I think the things one can learn from Theodorus are knowledge—geometry and all the sciences

you mentioned just now, and then there are the crafts of the cobbler and other workmen. Each and all of these are knowledge and nothing else.

Socrates/ You are generous indeed, my dear Theaetetus—so openhanded that, when you are asked for one simple thing, you offer a whole variety.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ There may be nothing in it, but I will explain what my notion is. When you speak of cobbling, you mean by that word precisely a knowledge of shoemaking?

Theaetetus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ And when you speak of carpentry, you mean just a knowledge of how to make wooden furniture?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ In both cases, then, you are defining what the craft is a knowledge of?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the question you were asked, Theaetetus, was not, what are the objects of knowledge, nor yet how many sorts of knowledge there are. We did not want to count them, but to find out what the thing itself—knowledge—is. Is there nothing in that?

Theaetetus/ No, you are quite right.

Socrates/ Take another example. Suppose we were asked about some obvious common thing, for instance, what clay is; it would be absurd to answer: potter's clay, and oven-maker's clay, and brick-maker's clay.

Theaetetus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ To begin with, it is absurd to imagine that our answer conveys any meaning to the questioner, when we use the word 'clay,' no matter whose clay we call it—the doll-maker's or any other craftsman's. You do not suppose a man

can understand the name of a thing, when he does not know what the thing is?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then, if he has no idea of knowledge, 'knowledge about shoes' conveys nothing to him?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ 'Cobblery,' in fact, or the name of any other art has no meaning for anyone who has no conception of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then, when we are asked what knowledge is, it is absurd to reply by giving the name of some art. The answer is 'knowledge of so-and-so,' but that was not what the question called for.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And besides, we are going an interminable way round, when our answer might be quite short and simple. In this question about clay, for instance, the simple and ordinary thing to say is that clay is earth mixed with moisture, never mind whose clay it may be.

Theaetetus/ It appears easy now, Socrates, when you put it like that. The meaning of your question seems to be the same sort of thing as a point that came up when your namesake, Socrates here, and I were talking not long ago.

Socrates/ What was that, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Theodorus here was proving to us something about square roots, namely, that the sides [or roots] of squares representing three square feet and five square feet are not commensurable in length with the line representing one foot, and he went on in this way, taking all the separate cases up to the root of seventeen square feet. There for some reason he stopped. The idea occurred to us, seeing that

these square roots were evidently infinite in number, to try to arrive at a single collective term by which we could designate all these roots.

Socrates/ And did you find one?

Theaetetus/ I think so, but I should like your opinion.

Socrates/ Go on.

Theaetetus/ We divided number in general into two classes. Any number which is the product of a number multiplied by itself we likened to the square figure, and we called such a number 'square' or 'equilateral.'

Socrates/ Well done!

Theaetetus/ Any intermediate number, such as three or five or any number that cannot be obtained by multiplying a number by itself, but has one factor either greater or less than the other, so that the sides containing the corresponding figure are always unequal, we likened to the oblong figure, and we called it an oblong number.

Socrates/ Excellent. And what next?

Theaetetus/ All the lines which form the four equal sides of the plane figure representing the equilateral number we defined as length, while those which form the sides of squares equal in area to the oblongs we called roots [surds], as not being commensurable with the others in length, but only in the plane areas to which their squares are equal. And there is another distinction of the same sort in the case of solids.

Socrates/ Nothing could be better, my young friends; I am sure there will be no prosecuting Theodorus for false witness.

Theaetetus/ But, Socrates, I cannot answer your question about knowledge as we answered the question about the length and the root. And yet you seem to want something of

that kind; so, on the contrary, it does appear that Theodorus was not speaking the truth.

Socrates/ Why, if he had praised your powers of running and declared that he had never met with a young man who was so good a runner, and then you had been beaten in a race by the greatest of runners at the height of his powers, do you think that his praise would have been any the less truthful?

Theaetetus/ No, I don't.

Socrates/ Well, as I said just now, do you fancy it is a small matter to discover the nature of knowledge? Is it not one of the hardest questions?

Theaetetus/ One of the very hardest, I should say.

Socrates/ You may be reassured, then, about Theodorus' account of you, and set your mind on finding a definition of knowledge, as of anything else, with all the zeal at your command.

Theaetetus/ If it depends on my zeal, Socrates, the truth will come to light.

Socrates/ Forward, then, on the way you have just shown so well. Take as a model your answer about the roots. Just as you found a single character to embrace all that multitude, so now try to find a single formula that applies to the many kinds of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ But I assure you, Socrates, I have often set myself to study that problem, when I heard reports of the questions you ask. But I cannot persuade myself that I can give any satisfactory solution or that anyone has ever stated in my hearing the sort of answer you require. And yet I cannot get the question out of my mind.

Socrates/ My dear Theaetetus, that is because your mind is not empty or barren. You are suffering the pains of travail.

Theaetetus/ I don't know about that, Socrates. I am only telling you how I feel.

Socrates/ How absurd of you, never to have heard that I am the son of a midwife, a fine buxom woman called Phaenarete.

Theaetetus/ I have heard that.

Socrates/ Have you also been told that I practice the same art?

Theaetetus/ NO, never.

Socrates/ It is true, though; only don't give away my secret. It is not known that I possess this skill; so the ignorant world describes me in other terms as an eccentric person who reduces people to hopeless perplexity. Have you been told that too?

Theaetetus/ I have.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you the reason?

Theaetetus/ Please do.

Socrates/ Consider, then, how it is with all midwives; that will help you to understand what I mean. I dare say you know that they never attend other women in childbirth so long as they themselves can conceive and bear children, but only when they are too old for that.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ They say that is because Artemis, the patroness of childbirth, is herself childless, and so, while she did not allow barren women to be midwives, because it is beyond the power of human nature to achieve skill without any experience, she assigned the privilege to women who were past childbearing, out of respect to their likeness to herself.

Theaetetus/ That sounds likely.

Socrates/ And it is more than likely, is it not, that no one can tell so well as a midwife whether women are pregnant or not?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Moreover, with the drugs and incantations they administer, midwives can either bring on the pains of travail or allay them at their will, make a difficult labor easy, and at an early stage cause a miscarriage if they so decide.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Have you also observed that they are the cleverest matchmakers, having an unerring skill in selecting a pair whose marriage will produce the best children?

Theaetetus/ I was not aware of that.

Socrates/ Well, you may be sure they pride themselves on that more than on cutting the umbilical cord. Consider the knowledge of the sort of plant or seed that should be sown in any given soil. Does not that go together with skill in tending and harvesting the fruits of the earth? They are not two different arts?

Theaetetus/ No, the same.

Socrates/ And so with a woman; skill in the sowing is not to be separated from skill in the harvesting?

Theaetetus/ Probably not.

Socrates/ No. Only, because there is that wrong and ignorant way of bringing together man and woman which they call pandering, midwives, out of self-respect, are shy even of matchmaking, for fear of falling under the accusation of pandering. Yet the genuine midwife is the only successful matchmaker.

Theaetetus/ That is clear.

Socrates/ All this, then, lies within the midwife's province, but her performance falls short of mine. It is not

the way of women sometimes to bring forth real children, sometimes mere phantoms, such that it is hard to tell the one from the other. If it were so, the highest and noblest task of the midwife would be to discern the real from the unreal, would it not?

Theaetetus/ I agree.

Socrates/ My art of midwifery is in general like theirs; the only difference is that my patients are men, not women, and my concern is not with the body but with the soul that is in travail of birth. And the highest point of my art is the power to prove by every test whether the offspring of a young man's thought is a false phantom or instinct with life and truth. I am so far like the midwife that I cannot myself give birth to wisdom, and the common reproach is true, that, though I question others, I can myself bring nothing to light because there is no wisdom in me. The reason is this. Heaven constrains me to serve as a midwife, but has debarred me from giving birth. So of myself I have no sort of wisdom, nor has any discovery ever been born to me as the child of my soul. Those who frequent my company at first appear, some of them, quite unintelligent, but, as we go further with our discussions, all who are favored by heaven make progress at a rate that seems surprising to others as well as to themselves, although it is clear that they have never learned anything from me. The many admirable truths they bring to birth have been discovered by themselves from within. But the delivery is heaven's work and mine.

The proof of this is that many who have not been conscious of my assistance but have made light of me, thinking it was all their own doing, have left me sooner than they should, whether under others' influence or of their own motion, and thenceforward suffered miscarriage of their thoughts through falling into bad company, and they have lost the children of whom I had delivered them by bringing

them up badly, caring more for false phantoms than for the true. And so at last their lack of understanding has become apparent to themselves and to everyone else. Such a one was Aristides, son of Lysimachus, and there have been many more. When they come back and beg for a renewal of our intercourse with extravagant protestations, sometimes the divine warning that comes to me forbids it; with others it is permitted, and these begin again to make progress. In yet another way those who seek my company have the same experience as a woman with child; they suffer the pains of labor and, by night and day, are full of distress far greater than a woman's, and my art has power to bring on these pangs or to allay them. So it fares with these, but there are some, Theaetetus, whose minds, as I judge, have never conceived at all. I see that they have no need of me and with all good will I seek a match for them. Without boasting unduly, I can guess pretty well whose society will profit them. I have arranged many of these matches with Prodicus, and with other men of inspired sagacity.

And now for the upshot of this long discourse of mine. I suspect that, as you yourself believe, your mind is in labor with some thought it has conceived. Accept, then, the ministration of a midwife's son who himself practices his mother's art, and do the best you can to answer the questions I ask. Perhaps when I examine your statements I may judge one or another of them to be an unreal phantom. If I then take the abortion from you and cast it away, do not be savage with me like a woman robbed of her first child. People have often felt like that toward me and been positively ready to bite me for taking away some foolish notion they have conceived. They do not see that I am doing them a kindness. They have not learned that no divinity is ever ill-disposed toward man, nor is such action on my part due to

unkindness; it is only that I am not permitted to acquiesce in falsehood and suppress the truth.

So, Theaetetus, start again and try to explain what knowledge is. Never say it is beyond your power; it will not be so, if heaven wills and you take courage.

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, with such encouragement from a person like you, it would be a shame not to do one's best to say what one can. It seems to me that one who knows something is perceiving the thing he knows, and, so far as I can see at present, knowledge is nothing but perception.

Socrates/ Good. That is the right spirit in which to express one's opinion. But now suppose we examine your offspring together, and see whether it is a mere wind egg or has some life in it. Perception, you say, is knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The account you give of the nature of knowledge is not, by any means, to be despised. It is the same that was given by Protagoras, though he stated it in a somewhat different way. He says, you will remember, that 'man is the measure of all things—alike of the being of things that are and of the not-being of things that are not.' No doubt you have read that.

Theaetetus/ Yes, often.

Socrates/ He puts it in this sort of way, doesn't he, that any given thing 'is to me such as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to you,' you and I being men?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is how he puts it.

Socrates/ Well, what a wise man says is not likely to be nonsense. So let us follow up his meaning. Sometimes, when the same wind is blowing, one of us feels chilly, the other does not, or one may feel slightly chilly, the other quite cold.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, in that case are we to say that the wind in itself is cold or not cold? Or shall we agree with Protagoras that it is cold to the one who feels chilly, and not to the other?

Theaetetus/ That seems reasonable.

Socrates/ And further that it so 'appears' to each of us?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And 'appears' means that he 'perceives' it so?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ 'Appearing,' then, is the same thing as 'perceiving,' in the case of what is hot or anything of that kind. They are to each man such as he perceives them.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Perception, then, is always of something that is, and, as being knowledge, it is infallible.

Theaetetus/ That is clear.

Socrates/ Can it be, then, that Protagoras was a very ingenious person who threw out this dark saying for the benefit of the common herd like ourselves, and reserved the truth as a secret doctrine to be revealed to his disciples?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by that, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you, and indeed the doctrine is a remarkable one. It declares that nothing is one thing just by itself, nor can you rightly call it by some definite name, nor even say it is of any definite sort. On the contrary, if you call it 'large,' it will be found to be also small, if 'heavy,' to be also light, and so on all through, because nothing is one thing or some thing or of any definite sort. All the things we are pleased to say 'are,' really are in process of becoming, as a result of movement and change and of blending one with another. We are wrong to speak of them as 'being,' for none of them ever is; they are always becoming. In this matter let

us take it that, with the exception of Parmenides, the whole series of philosophers agree—Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles—and among the poets the greatest masters in both kinds, Epicharmus in comedy, Homer in tragedy. When Homer speaks of 'Oceanus, source of the gods, and mother Tethys,' he means that all things are the offspring of a flowing stream of change. Don't you understand him so?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Who, then, could challenge so great an array, with Homer for its captain, and not make himself a laughingstock?

Theaetetus/ That would be no light undertaking, Socrates.

Socrates/ It would not, Theaetetus. Their doctrine that 'being,' so called, and 'becoming' are produced by motion, 'not-being' and perishing by rest, is well supported by such proofs as these. The hot or fire, which generates and controls all other things, is itself generated by movement and friction—both forms of change. These are ways of producing fire, aren't they?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And further, all living things are born by the same processes?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Again, the healthy condition of the body is undermined by inactivity and indolence, and to a great extent preserved by exercise and motion, isn't it?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so with the condition of the soul. The soul acquires knowledge and is kept going and improved by learning and practice, which are of the nature of movements.

By inactivity, dullness, and neglect of exercise, it learns nothing and forgets what it has learned.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ So, of the two, motion is a good thing for both soul arid body, and immobility is bad.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Need I speak further of such things as stagnation in air or water, where stillness causes corruption and decay, when motion would keep things fresh, or, to complete the argument, press into its service that 'golden rope' in Homer, proving that he means by it nothing more nor less than the sun, and signifies that so long as the heavens and the sun continue to move round, all things in heaven and earth are kept going, whereas if they were bound down and brought to a stand, all things would be destroyed and the world, as they say, turned upside down?

Theaetetus/ I agree with your interpretation, Socrates.

Socrates/ Think of it, then, in this way. First, to take the case of the eyes, you must conceive that what you call white color has no being as a distinct thing outside your eyes nor yet inside them, nor must you assign it any fixed place. Otherwise, of course, it would have its being in an assigned place and abide there, instead of arising in a process of becoming.

Theaetetus/ Well, but how am I to think of it?

Socrates/ Let us follow out our recent statement and lay it down that there is no single thing that is in and by itself. On that showing we shall see that black or white or any color you choose is a thing that has arisen out of the meeting of our eyes with the appropriate motion. What we say 'is' this or that color will be neither the eye which encounters the motion nor the motion which is encountered, but something which has arisen between the two and is peculiar to each

several percipient. Or would you be prepared to maintain that every color appears to a dog or any other creature just such as it appears to you?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or to another man? Does anything you please appear to him such as it appears to you? Are you quite sure of that? Are you not much rather sure that it does not even appear the same to yourself, because you never remain in the same condition?

Theaetetus/ I think that is much nearer the mark.

Socrates/ So then, if the thing that we measure ourselves against or the thing we touch really were large or white or hot, it would never become different the moment it encountered a different person, supposing it to undergo no change in itself. And again, if the thing which measures itself against the object or touches it were anyone of these things, [large, white, etc.] then, when a different thing came into contact with it or were somehow modified, it, on its side, if it were not affected in itself, would not become different. For as things are, we are too easily led into making statements which Protagoras and anyone who maintains the same position would call strange and absurd.

Theaetetus/ How so? What statements do you mean?

Socrates/ Take a simple example, which will make my meaning quite clear. When you compare six dice with four, we say that the six are more than the four or half as many again, while if you compare them with twelve, the six are fewer—only half as many—and one cannot say anything else. Or do you think one can?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well then, suppose Protagoras or somebody else asks you, Can anything become larger or more otherwise than by being increased? What will you answer?

Theaetetus/ I should answer no, if I were to speak my mind with reference to this last question, but having regard to your previous one, I might reply yes, to guard against contradicting myself.

Socrates/ An excellent answer; really, you might be inspired. But apparently, if you say yes, it will be like the situation in Euripides; the tongue will be incontrovertible, but not the heart.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Now, if you and I were like those clever persons who have canvassed all the thoughts of the heart, we might allow ourselves the luxury of trying one another's strength in a regular sophistical set-to, with a great clashing of arguments. But being only ordinary people, we shall prefer first to study the notions we have in our own minds and find out what they are and whether, when we compare them, they agree or are altogether inconsistent.

Theaetetus/ I should certainly prefer that.

Socrates/ So do I, and, that being so, suppose we look at the question again in a quiet and leisurely spirit, not with any impatience but genuinely examining ourselves to see what we can make of these apparitions that present themselves to our minds. Looking at the first of them, I suppose we shall assert that nothing can become greater or less, either in size or in number, so long as it remains equal to itself. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And secondly, that a thing to which nothing is added and from which nothing is taken away is neither increased nor diminished, but always remains the same in amount.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And must we not say, thirdly, that a thing which was not at an earlier moment cannot be at a later moment without becoming and being in process of becoming?

Theaetetus/ It certainly seems so.

Socrates/ Now these three admissions, I fancy, fight among themselves in our minds when we make those statements about the dice, or when we say that I, being of the height you see, without gaining or losing in size, may within a year be taller, as I am now, than a youth like you, and later on be shorter, not because I have lost anything in bulk, but because you have grown. For apparently I am later what I was not before, and yet have not become so, for without the process of becoming the result is impossible, and I could not be in process of becoming shorter without losing some of my bulk. I could give you countless other examples, if we are to accept these. For I think you follow me, Theaetetus; I fancy, at any rate, such puzzles are not altogether strange to you.

Theaetetus/ No, indeed it is extraordinary how they set me wondering whatever they can mean. Sometimes I get quite dizzy with thinking of them.

Socrates/ That shows that Theodorus was not wrong in his estimate of your nature. This sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin, and he was a good genealogist who made Iris the daughter of Thaumas.

Do you now begin to see the explanation of all this which follows from the theory we are attributing to Protagoras? Or is it not yet clear?

Theaetetus/ I can't say it is yet.

Socrates/ Then perhaps you will be grateful if I help you to penetrate to the truth concealed in the thoughts of a man—or, I should say, of men—of such distinction.

Theaetetus/ Of course I shall be very grateful.

Socrates/ Then just take a look round and make sure that none of the uninitiate overhears us. I mean by the uninitiate the people who believe that nothing is real save what they can grasp with their hands and do not admit that actions or processes or anything invisible can count as real.

Theaetetus/ They sound like a very hard and repellent sort of people.

Socrates/ It is true, they are remarkably crude. The others, into whose secrets I am going to initiate you, are much more refined and subtle. Their first principle, on which all that we said just now depends, is that the universe really is motion and nothing else. And there are two kinds of motion. Of each kind there are any number of instances, but they differ in that the one kind has the power of acting, the other of being acted upon. From the intercourse and friction of these with one another arise offspring, endless in number, but in pairs of twins. One of each pair is something perceived, the other a perception, whose birth always coincides with that of the thing perceived. Now, for the perceptions we have names like 'seeing, "hearing, "smelling, "feeling cold,' 'feeling hot,' and again pleasures and pains and desires and fears, as they are called, and so on. There are any number that are nameless, though names have been found for a whole multitude. On the other side, the brood of things perceived always comes to birth at the same moment with one or another of these—with instances of seeing, colors of corresponding variety, with instances of hearing, sounds in the same way, and with all the other perceptions, the other things perceived that are akin to them. Now, what light

does this story throw on what has gone before, Theaetetus? Do you see?

Theaetetus/ Not very clearly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, consider whether we can round it off. The point is that all these things are, as we were saying, in motion, but there is a quickness or slowness in their motion. The slow sort has its motion without change of place and with respect to what comes within range of it, and that is how it generates offspring, but the offspring generated are quicker, inasmuch as they move from place to place and their motion consists in change of place. As soon, then, as an eye and something else whose structure is adjusted to the eye come within range and give birth to the whiteness together with its cognate perception—things that would never have come into existence if either of the two had approached anything else—then it is that, as the vision from the eyes and the whiteness from the thing that joins in giving birth to the color pass in the space between, the eye becomes filled with vision and now sees, and becomes, not vision, but a seeing eye, while the other parent of the color is saturated with whiteness and becomes, on its side, not whiteness, but a white thing, be it stock or stone or whatever else may chance to be so colored.

And so, too, we must think in the same way of the rest—'hard,' 'hot,' and all of them—that no one of them has any being just by itself, as indeed we said before, but that it is in their intercourse with one another that all arise in all their variety as a result of their motion, since it is impossible to have any 'firm notion,' as they say, of either what is active or what is passive in them, in any single case, as having any being. For there is no such thing as an agent until it meets with a patient, nor any patient until it meets with its agent. Also what meets with something and behaves as agent, if it

encounters something different at another time, shows itself as patient.

The conclusion from all this is, as we said at the outset, that nothing is one thing just by itself, but is always in process of becoming for someone, and being is to be ruled out altogether, though, needless to say, we have been betrayed by habit and inobservance into using the word more than once only just now. But that was wrong, these wise men tell us, and we must not admit the expressions 'something' or 'somebody's' or 'mine' or 'this' or 'that' or any other word that brings things to a standstill, but rather speak, in accordance with nature, of what is 'becoming,' 'being produced,' 'perishing,' 'changing.' For anyone who talks so as to bring things to a standstill is easily refuted. So we must express ourselves in each individual case and in speaking of an assemblage of many—to which assemblage people give the name of 'man' or 'stone' or of any living creature or kind.

Does all this please you, Theaetetus? Will you accept it as palatable to your taste?

Theaetetus/ Really, I am not sure, Socrates. I cannot even make out about you, whether you are stating this as something you believe or merely putting me to the test.

Socrates/ You forget, my friend, that I know nothing of such matters and cannot claim to be producing any offspring of my own. I am only trying to deliver yours, and to that end uttering charms over you and tempting your appetite with a variety of delicacies from the table of wisdom, until by my aid your own belief shall be brought to light. Once that is done, I shall see whether it proves to have some life in it or not. Meanwhile, have courage and patience, and answer my questions bravely in accordance with your convictions.

Theaetetus/ Go on with your questioning.

Socrates/ Once more, then, tell me whether you like this notion that nothing is, but is always becoming, good or beautiful or any of the other things we mentioned?

Theaetetus/ Well, when I hear you explaining it as you have, it strikes me as extraordinarily reasonable, and to be accepted as you have stated it.

Socrates/ Then let us not leave it incomplete. There remains the question of dreams and disorders, especially madness and all the mistakes madness is said to make in seeing or hearing or otherwise misperceiving. You know, of course, that in all these cases the theory we have just stated is supposed to be admittedly disproved, on the ground that in these conditions we certainly have false perceptions, and that so far from its being true that what appears to any man also is, on the contrary none of these appearances is real.

Theaetetus/ That is quite true, Socrates.

Socrates/ What argument, then, is left for one who maintains that perception is knowledge, and that what appears to each man also 'is' for him to whom it appears?

Theaetetus/ I hesitate to say that I have no reply, Socrates, because just now you rebuked me for saying that. Really, I cannot undertake to deny that madmen and dreamers believe what is false, when madmen imagine they are gods or dreamers think they have wings and are flying in their sleep.

Socrates/ Have you not taken note of another doubt that is raised in these cases, especially about sleeping and waking?

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ The question I imagine you have often heard asked—what evidence could be appealed to, supposing we were asked at this very moment whether we are asleep or

awake, dreaming all that passes through our minds or talking to one another in the waking state?

Theaetetus/ Indeed, Socrates, I do not see by what evidence it is to be proved, for the two conditions correspond in every circumstance like exact counterparts. The conversation we have just had might equally well be one that we merely think we are carrying on in our sleep, and when it comes to thinking in a dream that we are telling other dreams, the two states are extraordinarily alike.

Socrates/ You see, then, that there is plenty of room for doubt, when we even doubt whether we are asleep or awake. And in fact, our time being equally divided between waking and sleeping, in each condition our mind strenuously contends that the convictions of the moment are certainly true, so that for equal times we affirm the reality of the one world and of the other, and are just as confident of both.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the same holds true of disorders and madness, except that the times are not equal.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Well, is the truth to be decided by length or shortness of time?

Theaetetus/ No, that would be absurd in many ways.

Socrates/ Have you any other certain test to show which of these beliefs is true?

Theaetetus/ I don't think I have.

Socrates/ Then let me tell you what sort of account would be given of these cases by those who lay it down that whatever at any time seems to anyone is true to him. I imagine they would ask this question, Tell us, Theaetetus, when one thing is entirely different from another, it cannot be in any respect capable of behaving in the same way as

that other, can it? We are not to understand that the thing we speak of is in some respects the same though different in others, but that it is entirely different.'

Theaetetus/ If so, it can have nothing in common, either in its capabilities of behavior or in any other respect, when it is altogether different.

Socrates/ Must we not admit, then, that such a thing is unlike the other?

Theaetetus/ I agree.

Socrates/ So if it happens that something comes to be like or unlike either itself or something else, we shall say that when it is made like it becomes the same, when unlike, different.

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And we said earlier that there was no limit to the number of things that are active or of things that are acted upon by them.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And further, that when one of these is married to a succession of different partners, the offspring produced will be not the same but different.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now let us take you or me or any other instance to which the principle applies—Socrates in health and Socrates ill. Are we to call one of these like the other or unlike?

Theaetetus/ You mean, is the ill Socrates taken as a whole like Socrates in health taken as a whole?

Socrates/ You understand me perfectly; that is just what I mean.

Theaetetus/ Then of course he is unlike.

Socrates/ And consequently, inasmuch as he is unlike, a different thing?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And you would say the same of Socrates asleep or in any other of the conditions we mentioned?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then anyone of the objects whose nature it is to act upon something will, according as it finds Socrates well or ill, treat me as a different thing?

Theaetetus/ Of course it will.

Socrates/ And consequently the pair of us—I who am acted upon and the thing that acts on me—will have different offspring in the two cases?

Theaetetus/ Naturally.

Socrates/ Now when I am in health and drink wine, it seems pleasant to me and sweet.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Because, in accordance with the account we accepted earlier, agent and patient give birth to sweetness and a sensation, both movements that pass simultaneously. The sensation, on the patient's side, makes the tongue percipient, while, on the side of the wine, the sweetness, moving in the region of the wine, causes it both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

Theaetetus/ Certainly that was what we agreed upon.

Socrates/ But when it finds me in ill-health, to begin with, the person it finds is not really the same, for the one it now meets with is unlike the other.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so this pair—Socrates in this condition and the drinking of the wine—produce a different offspring, in the region of the tongue a sensation of sourness, and in

the region of the wine a sourness that arises as a movement there. The wine becomes, not sourness, but sour, while I become, not a sensation, but sentient.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ It follows, then, that, on my side, I shall never become percipient in just this way of any other thing, for to a different object belongs a different perception, and in acting on its percipient it is acting on a person who is in a different condition and so a different person. Also on its side, the thing which acts on me can never meet with someone else and generate the same offspring and come to be of just this quality, for when it brings to birth another thing from another person, it will itself come to be of another quality.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Further, I shall not come to have this sensation for myself, nor will the object come to be of such a quality for itself.

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Rather, when I become percipient, I must become percipient of something, for I cannot have a perception and have it of nothing, and equally the object, when it becomes sweet or sour and so on, must become so to someone—it cannot become sweet and yet sweet to nobody.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Nothing remains, then, I suppose, but that it and I should be or become—whichever expression we are to use—for each other. Necessity binds together our existence, but binds neither of us to anything else, nor each of us to himself; so we can only be bound to one another. Accordingly, whether we speak of something 'being' or of its 'becoming,' we must speak of it as being or becoming for someone, or of something, or toward something, but we

must not speak, or allow others to speak, of a thing as either being or becoming anything just in and by itself. That is the conclusion to which our argument points.

Theaetetus/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ And so, since what acts upon me is for me and for no one else, I, and no one else, am actually perceiving it.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then my perception is true for me, for its object at any moment is my reality, and I am, as Protagoras says, a judge of what is for me, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ If, then, I am infallible and make no mistake in my state of mind about what is or becomes, how can I fail to have knowledge of the things of which I have perception?

Theaetetus/ You cannot possibly fail.

Socrates/ So you were perfectly right in saying that knowledge is nothing but perception. And it has turned out that these three doctrines coincide—the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus and all their tribe that all things move like flowing streams, the doctrine of Protagoras, wisest of men, that man is the measure of all things, and Theaetetus' conclusion that, on these grounds, it results that perception is knowledge.

Is it not so, Theaetetus? May we say that this is your newborn child which I have brought to birth? What do you say?

Theaetetus/ I can only agree, Socrates.

Socrates/ Here at last, then, after our somewhat painful labor, is the child we have brought to birth, whatever sort of creature it may be. His birth should be followed by the ceremony of carrying him round the hearth; we must look at

our offspring from every angle to make sure we are not taken in by a lifeless phantom not worth the rearing. Or do you think an infant of yours must be reared in any case and not exposed? Will you bear to see him put to the proof, and not be in a passion if your first-born should be taken away?

Theodorus/ Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates; he is thoroughly good-tempered. But do explain what is wrong with the conclusion.

Socrates/ You have an absolute passion for discussion, Theodorus. I like the way you take me for a sort of bag full of arguments, and imagine I can easily pull out a proof to show that our conclusion is wrong. You don't see what is happening. The arguments never come out of me; they always come from the person I am talking with. I am only at a slight advantage in having the skill to get some account of the matter from another's wisdom and entertain it with fair treatment. So now, I shall not give any explanation myself, but try to get it out of our friend.

Theodorus/ That is better, Socrates; do as you say.

Socrates/ Well then, Theodorus, shall I tell you a thing that surprises me in your friend Protagoras?

Theodorus/ What is that?

Socrates/ The opening words of his treatise. In general, I am delighted with his statement that what seems to anyone also is, but I am surprised that he did not begin his Truth with the words, The measure of all things is the pig, or the baboon, or some sentient creature still more uncouth. There would have been something magnificent in so disdainful an opening, telling us that all the time, while we were admiring him for a wisdom more than mortal, he was in fact no wiser than a tadpole, to say nothing of any other human being. What else can we say, Theodorus? If what every man believes as a result of perception is indeed to be true for him; if, just

as no one is to be a better judge of what another experiences, so no one is better entitled to consider whether what another thinks is true or false, and, as we have said more than once, every man is to have his own beliefs for himself alone and they are all right and true—then, my friend, where is the wisdom of Protagoras, to justify his setting up to teach others and to be handsomely paid for it, and where is our comparative ignorance or the need for us to go and sit at his feet, when each of us is himself the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not suppose that Protagoras speaks in this way to flatter the ears of the public? I say nothing of my own case or of the ludicrous predicament to which my art of midwifery is brought, and, for that matter, this whole business of philosophical conversation, for to set about overhauling and testing one another's notions and opinions when those of each and every one are right, is a tedious and monstrous display of folly, if the Truth of Protagoras is really truthful and not amusing herself with oracles delivered from the unapproachable shrine of his book.

Theodorus/ Protagoras was my friend, Socrates, as you were saying, and I would rather he were not refuted by means of any admissions of mine. On the other hand, I cannot resist you against my convictions; so you had better go back to Theaetetus, whose answers have shown, in any case, how well he can follow your meaning.

Socrates/ If you went to a wrestling school at Sparta, Theodorus, would you expect to look on at the naked wrestlers, some of them making a poor show, and not strip so as to let them compare your own figure?

Theodorus/ Why not, if they were likely to listen to me and not insist, just as I believe I shall persuade you to let me look on now? The limbs are stiff at my age, and instead of dragging me into your exercises, you will try a fall with a more supple youth.

Socrates/ Well, Theodorus, as the proverb says, 'What likes you mislikes not me.' So I will have recourse to the wisdom of Theaetetus.

Tell me, then, first, Theaetetus, about the point we have just made. Are not you surprised that you should turn out, all of a sudden, to be every bit as wise as any other man and even as any god? Or would you say that Protagoras' maxim about the measure does not apply to gods just as much as to men?

Theaetetus/ Certainly I think it does, and, to answer your question, I am very much surprised. When we were discussing what they mean by saying that what seems to anyone really is to him who a thinks it so, that appeared to me quite satisfactory, but now, all in a moment, it has taken on a very different complexion.

Socrates/ That, my friend, is because you are young; so you lend a ready ear to claptrap and it convinces you. Protagoras or his representative will have an answer to this. He will say, 'You good people sitting there, boys and old men together, this is all claptrap. You drag in the gods, whose existence or nonexistence I expressly refuse to discuss in my speeches and writings, and you count upon appeals to the vulgar such as this. How strange that any human individual is to be no wiser than the lowest of the brutes! You go entirely by what looks probable, without a word of argument or proof. If a mathematician like Theodorus elected to argue from probability in geometry, he wouldn't be worth an ace. So you and Theodorus might consider whether you are going to allow questions of this importance to be settled by plausible appeals to mere likelihood.'

Theaetetus/ Well, you would not think that right, Socrates, any more than we should.

Socrates/ It seems, then, we must attack the question in another way. That is what you and Theodorus think?

Theaetetus/ Certainly we must.

Socrates/ Let us look at it in this way, then—this question whether knowledge and perception are, after all, the same thing or not. For that, you remember, was the point to which our whole discussion was directed, and it was for its sake that we stirred up all this swarm of queer doctrines, wasn't it?

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Well, are we going to agree that, whenever we perceive something by sight or hearing, we also at the same time know it? Take the case of a foreign language we have not learned. Are we to say that we do not hear the sounds that foreigners utter, or that we both hear and know what they are saying? Or again, when we don't know our letters, are we to maintain that we don't see them when we look at them, or that, since we see them, we do know them?

Theaetetus/ We shall say, Socrates, that we know just so much of them as we do see or hear. The shape and color of the letters we both see and know; we hear and at the same time know the rising and falling accents of the voice. But we neither perceive by sight and hearing nor yet know what a schoolmaster or an interpreter could tell us about them.

Socrates/ Well done, Theaetetus. I had better not raise objections to that, for fear of checking your growth. But look, here is another objection threatening. How are we going to parry it?

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ It is this. Suppose someone to ask, 'Is it possible for a man who has once come to know something and still preserves a memory of it, not to know just that thing that he remembers at the moment when he remembers it?'

This is, perhaps, rather a longwinded way of putting the question. I mean, can a man who has become acquainted with something and remembers it, not know it?

Theaetetus/ Of course not, Socrates, the supposition is monstrous.

Socrates/ Perhaps I am talking nonsense, then. But consider, you call seeing 'perceiving,' and sight 'perception,' don't you?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Then, according to our earlier statement, a man who sees something acquires from that moment knowledge of the thing he sees?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Again, you recognize such a thing as memory?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Memory of nothing, or of something?

Theaetetus/ Of something, surely.

Socrates/ Of what one has become acquainted with and perceived—that sort of thing?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ So a man sometimes remembers what he has seen?

Theaetetus/ He does.

Socrates/ Even when he shuts his eyes? Or does he forget when he shuts them?

Theaetetus/ No, Socrates, that would be a monstrous thing to say.

Socrates/ All the same, we shall have to say it, if we are to save our former statement. Otherwise, it goes by the board.

Theaetetus/ I certainly have a suspicion that you are right, but I don't quite see how. You must tell me.

Socrates/ In this way. One who sees, we say, acquires knowledge of what he sees, because it is agreed that sight or perception and knowledge are the same thing.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But suppose this man who sees and acquires knowledge of what he has seen, shuts his eyes; then he remembers the thing, but does not see it. Isn't that so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But 'does not see it' means 'does not know it,' since 'sees' and 'knows' mean the same.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Then the conclusion is that a man who has come to know a thing and still remembers it does not know it, since he does not see it, and we said that would be a monstrous conclusion.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Apparently, then, if you say that knowledge and perception are the same thing, it leads to an impossibility.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then we shall have to say they are different.

Theaetetus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ What, then, can knowledge be? Apparently we must begin all over again. But wait a moment, Theaetetus. What are we doing?

Theaetetus/ Doing about what?

Socrates/ It seems to me we are behaving toward our theory like an ill-bred gamecock who springs away from his adversary and starts crowing over him before he is beaten.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ It looks as if we were content to have reached an agreement resting on mere verbal consistency and to have got the better of the theory by the methods of a professional controversialist. We profess to be seeking wisdom, not competing for victory, but we are unconsciously behaving just like one of those redoubtable disputants.

Theaetetus/ I Still don't understand what you mean.

Socrates/ Well, I will try to make the point clear, so far as I can see it. We were asking whether one who had become acquainted with something and remembered it could fail to know it. Then we pointed out that a man who shuts his eyes after seeing something, remembers but does not see, and so concluded that at the same moment he both remembers the thing and does not know it. That, we said, was impossible. And so no one was left to tell Protagoras' tale, or yours either, about knowledge and perception being the same thing.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ I fancy it would be very different if the author of the first story were still alive. He would have put up a good fight for his offspring. But he is dead, and here are we trampling on the orphan. Even its appointed guardians, like Theodorus here, will not come to the rescue. However, we will step into the breach ourselves and see that it has fair play.

Theodorus/ In point of fact, Socrates, it is rather Callias, son of Hipponicus, who is Protagoras' trustee. My own inclinations diverted me at rather an early age from abstract discussions to geometry. All the same, I shall be grateful for any succor you can give him.

Socrates/ Very good, Theodorus. You shall see what my help will amount to. For one might commit oneself to even stranger conclusions, if one were as careless in the use of

language as we commonly are in our assertions and denials. Am I to enlarge upon this to you or to Theaetetus?

Theodorus/ To the company in general, but let the younger man answer your questions. It will not be such a disgrace to him to be caught tripping.

Socrates/ Let me put, then, the most formidable poser of all, which I take to be this. Can the same person know something and also not know that which he knows?

Theodorus/ Well, Theaetetus, what are we to answer?

Theaetetus/ That it is impossible, I suppose.

Socrates/ Not if you say that seeing is knowing. How are you going to deal with a question that leaves no loophole, when you are trapped like a beast in a pit and an imperturbable gentleman puts his hand over one of your eyes and asks if you can see his coat with the eye that is covered?

Theaetetus/ I suppose I should say, No, not with that one, but I can with the other.

Socrates/ So you both see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

Theaetetus/ Yes, in a sort of way.

Socrates/ Never mind about the sort of way, he will reply. That was not the question I set you, but whether, when you know a thing, you also do not know it. In this instance you are obviously seeing something you don't see, and you have agreed that seeing is knowing and not-seeing is not-knowing. Now draw your conclusion. What is the consequence?

Theaetetus/ Well, I conclude that the consequence contradicts my thesis.

Socrates/ Yes, and you might have been reduced to the same condition by a number of further questions—whether

knowing can be keen or dim, whether you can know from close at hand what you cannot know from a distance, or know the same thing with more or less intensity. A mercenary skirmisher in the war of words might lie in wait for you armed with a thousand such questions, once you have identified knowledge and perception. He would make his assaults upon hearing and smelling and suchlike senses and put you to confusion, sustaining his attack until your admiration of his in estimable skill betrayed you into his toils, and thereupon, leading you captive and bound, he would hold you to ransom for such a sum as you and he might agree upon.

And now, perhaps, you may wonder what argument Protagoras will find to defend his position. Shall we try to put it into words?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ No doubt, then, Protagoras will make all the points we have put forward in our attempt to defend him, and at the same time will come to close quarters with the assailant, dismissing us with contempt. Your admirable Socrates, he will say, finds a little boy who is scared at being asked whether one and the same person can remember and at the same time not know one and the same thing. When the child is frightened into saying no, because he cannot foresee the consequence, Socrates turns the conversation so as to make a figure of fun of my unfortunate self. You take things much too easily, Socrates. The truth of the matter is this. When you ask someone questions in order to canvass some opinion of mine and he is found tripping, then I am refuted only if his answers are such as I should have given; if they are different, it is he who is refuted, not I. For instance, do you think you will find anyone to admit that one's present memory of a past impression is an impression of the same character as one had during the original

experience, which is now over? It is nothing of the sort. Or again, will anyone shrink from admitting that it is possible for the same person to know and not to know the same thing? Or, if he is frightened of saying that, will he ever allow that a person who is changed is the same as he was before the change occurred, or rather, that he is one person at all, and not several, indeed an infinite succession of persons, provided change goes on happening—if we are really to be on the watch against one another's attempts to catch at words?

No, he will say, show a more generous spirit by attacking what I actually say, and prove, if you can, that we have not, each one of us, his peculiar perceptions, or that, granting them to be peculiar, it would not follow that what appears to each becomes—or is, if we may use the word 'is'—for him alone to whom it appears. With this talk of pigs and baboons, you are behaving like a pig yourself, and, what is more, you tempt your hearers to treat my writings in the same way, which is not fair. For I do indeed assert that the truth is as I have written. Each one of us is a measure of what is and of what is not, but there is all the difference in the world between one man and another just in the very fact that what is and appears to one is different from what is and appears to the other. And as for wisdom and the wise man, I am very far from saying they do not exist. By a wise man I mean precisely a man who can change anyone of us, when what is bad appears and is to him, and make what is good appear and be to him. In this statement, again, don't set off in chase of words, but let me explain still more clearly what I mean. Remember how it was put earlier in the conversation. To the sick man his food appears sour and is so; to the healthy man it is and appears the opposite. Now there is no call to represent either of the two as wiser—that cannot be—nor is the sick man to be pronounced unwise because he thinks as

he does, or the healthy man wise because he thinks differently. What is wanted is a change to the opposite condition, because the other state is better.

And so too in education a change has to be effected from the worse condition to the better; only, whereas the physician produces a change by means of drugs, the Sophist does it by discourse. It is not that a man makes someone who previously thought what is false think what is true, for it is not possible either to think the thing that is not or to think anything but what one experiences, and all experiences are true. Rather, I should say, when someone by reason of a depraved condition of mind has thoughts of a like character, one makes him, by reason of a sound condition, think other and sound thoughts, which some people ignorantly call true, whereas I should say that one set of thoughts is better than the other, but not in any way truer. And as for the wise, my dear Socrates, so far from calling them frogs, I call them, when they have to do with the body, physicians, and when they have to do with plants, husbandmen. For I assert that husbandmen too, when plants are sickly and have depraved sensations, substitute for these sensations that are sound and healthy, and moreover that wise and honest public speakers substitute in the community sound for unsound views of what is right. For I hold that whatever practices seem right and laudable to any particular state are so, for that state, so long as it holds by them. Only, when the practices are, in any particular case, unsound for them, the wise man substitutes others that are and appear sound. On the same principle the Sophist, since he can in the same manner guide his pupils in the way they should go, is wise and worth a considerable fee to them when their education is completed. In this way it is true both that some men are wiser than others and that no one thinks falsely, and you, whether you like it or not,

must put up with being a measure, since by these considerations my doctrine is saved from shipwreck.

Now if you can dispute this doctrine in principle, do so by argument stating the case on the other side, or by asking questions, if you prefer that method, which has no terrors for a man of sense; on the contrary it ought to be specially agreeable to him. Only there is this rule to be observed. Do not conduct your questioning unfairly. It is very unreasonable that one who professes a concern for virtue should be constantly guilty of unfairness in argument. Unfairness here consists in not observing the distinction between a debate and a conversation. A debate need not be taken seriously and one may trip up an opponent to the best of one's power, but a conversation should be taken in earnest; one should help out the other party and bring home to him only those slips and fallacies that are due to himself or to his earlier instructors. If you follow this rule, your associates will lay the blame for their confusions and perplexities on themselves and not on you; they will like you and court your society, and disgusted with themselves, will turn to philosophy, hoping to escape from their former selves and become different men. But if, like so many, you take the opposite course, you will reach the opposite result; instead of turning your companions to philosophy, you will make them hate the whole business when they get older. So, if you will take my advice, you will meet us in the candid spirit I spoke of, without hostility or contentiousness, and honestly consider what we mean when we say that all things are in motion and that what seems also is, to any individual or community. The further question whether knowledge is, or is not, the same thing as perception, you will consider as a consequence of these principles, not, as you did just now, basing your argument on the common use of words and

phrases, which the vulgar twist into any sense they please and so perplex one another in all sorts of ways.

Such, Theodorus, is my contribution to the defense of your friend—the best I can make from my small means. Were he alive to speak for himself, it would be a much more impressive affair.

Theodorus/ You are not serious, Socrates; your defense was most spirited.

Socrates/ Thank you, my friend. And now, did you notice how Protagoras was reproaching us for taking a child to argue with and using the boy's timidity to get the better of his own position in what he called a mere play of wit, in contrast to the solemnity of his measure of all things, and how he exhorted us to be serious about his doctrine?

Theodorus/ Of course I did, Socrates.

Socrates/ What then? Do you think we should do as he says?

Theodorus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Well, the company, as you see, are all children, except yourself. If we are to treat his doctrine seriously, as he enjoins, you and I must question one another. So we shall at any rate escape the charge of making light of it by discussing it with boys.

Theodorus/ Why, surely Theaetetus can follow up such an investigation better than a great many men with long beards.

Socrates/ But not better than you, Theodorus. So don't imagine that you have no duty to your departed friend, but can leave it to me to make the best defense for him. Please come with us a little of the way at any rate—just until we know whether, in the matter of mathematical demonstrations, you cannot help being a measure, or everybody is just as competent as you in geometry and

astronomy and all the other subjects you are supposed to excel in.

Theodorus/ It is no easy matter to escape questioning in your company, Socrates. I was deluded when I said you would leave me in peace and not force me into the ring like the Spartans; you seem to be as unrelenting as Sciron. The Spartans tell you to go away if you will not wrestle, but Antaeus is more in your line; you will let no one who comes near you go until you have stripped him by force for a trial of strength.

Socrates/ Your comparisons exactly fit what is wrong with me, Theodorus, but my capacity for endurance is even greater. I have encountered many heroes in debate, and times without number a Hercules or a Theseus has broken my head, but I have so deep a passion for exercise of this sort that I stick to it all the same. So don't deny me the pleasure of a trial, for your own benefit as well as mine.

Theodorus/ I have no more to say; lead me where you will. You are like Fate. No one can elude the toils of argument you spin for him. But I shall not be able to oblige you beyond the point you have proposed.

Socrates/ Enough, if you will go so far. And please be on the watch for fear we should be betrayed into arguing frivolously and be blamed for that again.

Theodorus/ I will try as well as I can.

Socrates/ Let us begin, then, by coming to grips with the doctrine at the same point as before. Let us see whether or not our discontent was justified, when we criticized it as making every individual self-sufficient in wisdom. Protagoras then conceded that some people were superior in the matter of what is better or worse, and these, he said, were wise. Didn't he?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ If he were here himself to make that admission, instead of our conceding it for him in our defense, there would be no need to reopen the question and make sure of our ground, but, as things are, we might be said to have no authority to make the admission on his behalf. So it will be more satisfactory to come to a more complete and clear agreement on this particular point, for it makes a considerable difference, whether this is so or not.

Theodorus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Let us, then, as briefly as possible, obtain his agreement, not through any third person, but from his own statement.

Theodorus/ How?

Socrates/ In this way. He says, doesn't he, that what seems true to anyone is true for him to whom it seems so?

Theodorus/ He does.

Socrates/ Well now, Protagoras, we are expressing what seems true to a man, or rather to all men, when we say that everyone without exception holds that in some respects he is wiser than his neighbors and in others they are wiser than he. For instance, in moments of great danger and distress, whether in war or in sickness or at sea, men regard as a god anyone who can take control of the situation and look to him as a savior, when his only point of superiority is his knowledge. Indeed, the world is full of people looking for those who can instruct and govern men and animals and direct their doings, and on the other hand of people who think themselves quite competent to undertake the teaching and governing. In all these cases what can we say, if not that men do hold that wisdom and ignorance exist among them?

Theodorus/ We must say that.

Socrates/ And they hold that wisdom lies in thinking truly, and ignorance in false belief?

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ In that case, Protagoras, what are we to make of your doctrine? Are we to say that what men think is always true, or that it is sometimes true and sometimes false? From either supposition it results that their thoughts are not always true, but both true and false. For consider, Theodorus. Are you, or is any Protagorean, prepared to maintain that no one regards anyone else as ignorant or as making false judgments?

Theodorus/ That is incredible, Socrates.

Socrates/ That, however, is the inevitable consequence of the doctrine which makes man the measure of all things.

Theodorus/ How so?

Socrates/ When you have formed a judgment on some matter in your own mind and express an opinion about it to me, let us grant that, as Protagoras' theory says, it is true for you, but are we to understand that it is impossible for us, the rest of the company, to pronounce any judgment upon your judgment, or, if we can, that we always pronounce your opinion to be true? Do you not rather find thousands of opponents who set their opinion against yours on every occasion and hold that your judgment and belief are false?

Theodorus/ I should just think so, Socrates—thousands and tens of thousands, as Homer says, and they give me all the trouble in the world.

Socrates/ And what then? Would you have us say that in such a case the opinion you hold is true for yourself and false for these tens of thousands?

Theodorus/ The doctrine certainly seems to imply that.

Socrates/ And what is the consequence for Protagoras himself? Is it not this? Supposing that not even he believed in man being the measure and the world in general did not believe it either—as in fact it doesn't—then this Truth which

he wrote would not be true for anyone. If, on the other hand, he did believe it, but the mass of mankind does not agree with him, then, you see, it is more false than true by just so much as the unbelievers outnumber the believers.

Theodorus/ That follows, if its truth or falsity varies with each individual opinion.

Socrates/ Yes, and besides that it involves a really exquisite conclusion. Protagoras, for his part, admitting as he does that everybody's opinion is true, must acknowledge the truth of his opponents' belief about his own belief, where they think he is wrong.

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ That is to say, he would acknowledge his own belief to be false, if he admits that the belief of those who think him wrong is true?

Theodorus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ But the others, on their side, do not admit to themselves that they are wrong.

Theodorus/ No.

Socrates/ Whereas Protagoras, once more, according to what he has written, admits that this opinion of theirs is as true as any other.

Theodorus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ On all hands, then, Protagoras included, his opinion will be disputed, or rather Protagoras will join in the general consent—when he admits to an opponent the truth of his contrary opinion, from that moment Protagoras himself will be admitting that a dog or the man in the street is not a measure of anything whatever that he does not understand. Isn't that so?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, since it is disputed by everyone, the Truth of Protagoras is true to nobody—to himself no more than to anyone else.

Theodorus/ We are running my old friend too hard, Socrates.

Socrates/ But it is not clear that we are outrunning the truth, my friend. Of course it is likely that, as an older man, he was wiser than we are, and if at this moment he could pop his head up through the ground there as far as to the neck, very probably he would expose me thoroughly for talking such nonsense and you for agreeing to it, before he sank out of sight and took to his heels. However, we must do our best with such lights as we have and continue to say what we think. Now, for instance, must we not say that everyone would agree at least to this, that one man can be wiser or more ignorant than another?

Theodorus/ I certainly think so.

Socrates/ And further, shall we say that the doctrine would find its firmest footing in the position we traced out in our defense of Protagoras, that most things—hot, dry, sweet, everything of that sort—are to each person as they appear to him? Whereas, if there is any case in which the theory would concede that one man is superior to another, it might consent to admit that, in the matter of good or bad health, not any woman or child—or animal, for that matter—knows what is wholesome for it and is capable of curing itself, but that here, if anywhere, one person is superior to another.

Theodorus/ I should certainly say so.

Socrates/ And again in social matters, the theory will say that, so far as good and bad customs or rights and wrongs or matters of religion are concerned, whatever any state makes up its mind to enact as lawful for itself, really is lawful for it, and in this field no individual or state is wiser than

another. But where it is a question of laying down what is for its advantage or disadvantage, once more there, if anywhere, the theory will admit a difference between two advisers or between the decisions of two different states in respect of truth, and would hardly venture to assert that any enactment which a state supposes to be for its advantage will quite certainly be so.

But, in that field I am speaking of—in right and wrong and matters of religion—people are ready to affirm that none of these things is natural, with a reality of its own, but rather that the public decision becomes true at the moment when it is made and remains true so long as the decision stands, and those who do not argue altogether as Protagoras does carry on their philosophy on these lines.

But one theory after another is coming upon us, Theodorus, and the last is more important than the one before.

Theodorus/ Well, Socrates, we have time at our disposal.

Socrates/ Evidently. And it strikes me now, as often before, how natural it is that men who have spent much time in philosophical studies should look ridiculous when they appear as speakers in a court of law.

Theodorus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ When you compare men who have knocked about from their youth up in law courts and such places with others bred in philosophical pursuits, the one set seem to have been trained as slaves, the others as free men.

Theodorus/ In what way?

Socrates/ In the way you spoke of. The free man always has time at his disposal to converse in peace at his leisure. He will pass, as we are doing now, from one argument to another—we have just reached the third. Like us, he will leave the old for a fresh one which takes his fancy more, and

he does not care how long or short the discussion may be, if only it attains the truth. The orator is always talking against time, hurried on by the clock; there is no space to enlarge upon any subject he chooses, but the adversary stands over him ready to recite a schedule of the points to which he must confine himself. He is a slave disputing about a fellow slave before a master sitting in judgment with some definite plea in his hand, and the issue is never indifferent, but his personal concerns are always at stake, sometimes even his life. Hence he acquires a tense and bitter shrewdness; he knows how to flatter his master and earn his good graces, but his mind is narrow and crooked. An apprenticeship in slavery has dwarfed and twisted his growth and robbed him of his free spirit, driving him into devious ways, threatening him with fears and dangers which the tenderness of youth could not face with truth and honesty; so, turning from the first to lies and the requital of wrong with wrong, warped and stunted, he passes from youth to manhood with no soundness in him and turns out, in the end, a man of formidable intellect—as he imagines.

So much for the orator, Theodorus. Shall I now describe the philosophical choir to which we belong, or would you rather leave that and go back to our discussion? We must not abuse that freedom we claimed of ranging from one subject to another.

Theodorus/ No, Socrates, let us have your description first. As you said quite rightly, we are not the servants of the argument, which must stand and wait for the moment when we choose to pursue this or that topic to a conclusion. We are not in a court under the judge's eye, nor in the theater with an audience to criticize our philosophical evolutions.

Socrates/ Then, if that is your wish, let us speak of the leaders in philosophy, for the weaker members may be neglected. From their youth up they have never known the

way to market place or law court or Council Chamber or any other place of public assembly; they never hear a decree read out or look at the text of a law. To take any interest in the rivalries of political cliques, in meetings, dinners, and merrymakings with flute girls, never occurs to them even in dreams. Whether any fellow citizen is well- or ill-born or has inherited some defect from his ancestors on either side, the philosopher knows no more than how many pints of water there are in the sea. He is not even aware that he knows nothing of all this, for if he holds aloof, it is not for reputation's sake, but because it is really only his body that sojourns in his city, while his thought, disdaining all such things as worthless, takes wings, as Pindar says, 'beyond the sky, beneath the earth,' searching the heavens and measuring the plains, everywhere seeking the true nature of everything as a whole, never sinking to what lies close at hand.

Theodorus/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ The same thing as the story about the Thracian maidservant who exercised her wit at the expense of Thales, when he was looking up to study the stars and tumbled down a well. She scoffed at him for being so eager to know what was happening in the sky that he could not see what lay at his feet. Anyone who gives his life to philosophy is open to such mockery. It is true that he is unaware what his next-door neighbor is doing, hardly knows, indeed, whether the creature is a man at all; he spends all his pains on the question, what man is, and what powers and properties distinguish such a nature from any other. You see what I mean, Theodorus?

Theodorus/ Yes, and it is true.

Socrates/ And so, my friend, as I said at first, on a public occasion or in private company, in a law court or anywhere

else, when he is forced to talk about what lies at his feet or is before his eyes, the whole rabble will join the maidservants in laughing at him, as from inexperience he walks blindly and stumbles into every pitfall. His terrible clumsiness makes him seem so stupid. He cannot engage in an exchange of abuse, for, never having made a study of anyone's peculiar weaknesses, he has no personal scandals to bring up; so in his helplessness he looks a fool. When people vaunt their own or other men's merits, his unaffected laughter makes him conspicuous and they think he is frivolous. When a despot or king is eulogized, he fancies he is hearing some keeper of swine or sheep or cows being congratulated on the quantity of milk he has squeezed out of his flock; only he reflects that the animal that princes tend and milk is more given than sheep or cows to nurse a sullen grievance, and that a herdsman of this sort, penned up in his castle, is doomed by sheer press of work to be as rude and uncultivated as the shepherd in his mountain fold. He hears of the marvelous wealth of some landlord who owns ten thousand acres or more, but that seems a small matter to one accustomed to think of the earth as a whole. When they harp upon birth—some gentleman who can point to seven generations of wealthy ancestors—he thinks that such commendation must come from men of purblind vision, too uneducated to keep their eyes fixed on the whole or to reflect that any man has had countless myriads of ancestors and among them any number of rich men and beggars, kings and slaves, Greeks and barbarians. To pride oneself on a catalogue of twenty-five progenitors going back to Heracles, son of Amphitryon, strikes him as showing a strange pettiness of outlook. He laughs at a man who cannot rid his mind of foolish vanity by reckoning that before Amphitryon there was a twenty-fifth ancestor, and before him a fiftieth, whose fortunes were as luck would have it. But in all these

matters the world has the laugh of the philosopher, partly because he seems arrogant, partly because of his helpless ignorance in matters of daily life.

Theodorus/ Yes, Socrates, that is exactly what happens.

Socrates/ On the other hand, my friend, when the philosopher drags the other upward to a height at which he may consent to drop the question, 'What injustice have I done to you or you to me?' and to think about justice and injustice in themselves, what each is, and how they differ from one another and from anything else, or to stop quoting poetry about the happiness of kings or of men with gold in store and think about the meaning of kingship and the whole question of human happiness and misery, what their nature is, and how humanity can gain the one and escape the other—in all this field, when that small, shrewd, legal mind has to render an account, then the situation is reversed. Now it is he who is dizzy from hanging at such an unaccustomed height and looking down from mid-air. Lost and dismayed and stammering, he will be laughed at, not by maidservants or the uneducated—they will not see what is happening—but by everyone whose breeding has been the antithesis of a slave's.

Such are the two characters, Theodorus. The one is nursed in freedom and leisure, the philosopher, as you call him. He may be excused if he looks foolish or useless when faced with some menial task, if he cannot tie up bedclothes into a neat bundle or flavor a dish with spices and a speech with flattery. The other is smart in the dispatch of all such services, but has not learned to wear his cloak like a gentleman, or caught the accent of discourse that will rightly celebrate the true life of happiness for gods and men.

Theodorus/ If you could convince everyone, Socrates, as you convince me, there would be more peace and fewer evils in the world.

Socrates/ Evils, Theodorus, can never be done away with, for the good must always have its contrary; nor have they any place in the divine world, but they must needs haunt this region of our mortal nature. That is why we should make all speed to take flight from this world to the other, and that means becoming like the divine so far as we can, and that again is to become righteous with the help of wisdom. But it is no such easy matter to convince men that the reasons for avoiding wickedness and seeking after goodness are not those which the world gives. The right motive is not that one should seem innocent and good—that is no better, to my thinking, than an old wives' tale—but let us state the truth in this way. In the divine there is no shadow of unrighteousness, only the perfection of righteousness, and nothing is more like the divine than anyone of us who becomes as righteous as possible. It is here that a man shows his true spirit and power or lack of spirit and nothingness. For to know this is wisdom and excellence of the genuine sort; not to know it is to be manifestly blind and base. All other forms of seeming power and intelligence in the rulers of society are as mean and vulgar as the mechanic's skill in handicraft. If a man's words and deeds are unrighteous and profane, he had best not persuade himself that he is a great man because he sticks at nothing, glorying in his shame as such men do when they fancy that others say of them, They are no fools, no useless burdens to the earth, but men of the right sort to weather the storms of public life.

Let the truth be told. They are what they fancy they are not, all the more for deceiving themselves, for they are ignorant of the very thing it most concerns them to know—

the penalty of injustice. This is not, as they imagine, stripes and death, which do not always fall on the wrongdoer, but a penalty that cannot be escaped.

Theodorus/ What penalty is that?

Socrates/ There are two patterns, my friend, in the unchangeable nature of things, one of divine happiness, the other of godless misery—a truth to which their folly makes them utterly blind, unaware that in doing injustice they are growing less like one of these patterns and more like the other. The penalty they pay is the life they lead, answering to the pattern they resemble. But if we tell them that, unless they rid themselves of their superior cunning, that other region which is free from all evil will not receive them after death, but here on earth they will dwell for all time in some form of life resembling their own and in the society of things as evil as themselves, all this will sound like foolishness to such strong and unscrupulous minds.

Theodorus/ So it will, Socrates.

Socrates/ I have good reason to know it, my friend. But there is one thing about them; when you get them alone and make them explain their objections to philosophy, then, if they are men enough to face a long examination without running away, it is odd how they end by finding their own arguments unsatisfying. Somehow their flow of eloquence runs dry, and they become as speechless as an infant. All this, however, is a digression. We must stop now, and dam the flood of topics that threatens to break in and drown our original argument. With your leave, let us go back to where we were before.

Theodorus/ For my part, I rather prefer listening to your digressions, Socrates; they are easier to follow at my time of life. However, let us go back, if you like.

Socrates/ Very well. I think the point we had reached was this. We were saying that the believers in a perpetually changing reality and in the doctrine that what seems to an individual at any time also is for him would, in most matters, strongly insist upon their principle, and not least in the case of what is right they would maintain that any enactments a state may decide on certainly are right for that state so long as they remain in force. But when it comes to what is good, we said that the boldest would not go to the length of contending that whatever a state may believe and declare to be advantageous for itself is in fact advantageous for so long as it is declared to be so—unless he meant that the name 'advantageous' would continue to be so applied, but that would be turning our subject into a joke.

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We will suppose, then, that he does not mean the name, but has in view the thing that bears it.

Theodorus/ We will.

Socrates/ Whatever name the state may give it, advantage is surely the aim of its legislation, and all its laws, to the full extent of its belief and power, are laid down as being for its own best profit. Or has it any other object in view when it makes laws?

Theodorus/ None.

Socrates/ Then does it also hit the mark every time? Or does every state often miss its aim completely?

Theodorus/ I should say that mistakes are often made.

Socrates/ We may have a still better chance of getting everyone to assent to that, if we start from a question covering the whole class of things which includes the advantageous. It is, I suggest, a thing that has to do with future time. When we legislate, we make our laws with the

idea that they will be advantageous in time to come. We may call this class 'what is going to be.'

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Here, then, is a question for Protagoras or anyone else who agrees with him. According to you and your friends, Protagoras, man is the measure of all things—of white and heavy and light and everything of that sort. He possesses in himself the test of these things, and believing them to be such as he experiences them, he believes what is true and real for him. Is that right?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it also true, Protagoras, we shall continue, that he possesses within himself the test of what is going to be in the future, and that whatever a man believes will be, actually comes to pass for him who believes it? Take heat, for example. When some layman believes that he is going to catch a fever and that this hotness is going to exist, and another, who is a physician, believes the contrary, are we to suppose that the future event will turn out in accordance with one of the two opinions, or in accordance with both opinions, so that to the physician the patient will not be hot or in a fever, while he will be both these things to himself?

Theodorus/ That would be absurd.

Socrates/ And on the question whether a wine is going to be sweet or dry, I imagine the vine-grower's judgment is authoritative, not a flute player's.

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Or again, on the question whether a piece of music is going to be in tune or not, a gymnastic trainer would not have a better opinion than a musician as to what the trainer himself will later judge to be in good tune.

Theodorus/ By no means.

Socrates/ And when a feast is being prepared, the guest who is to be invited, supposing him not to be an expert in cookery, will have a less authoritative opinion than the confectioner upon the pleasure that will result. We will not dispute yet about what already is or has been pleasant to any individual, but about what will in the future seem and be to anyone, is every man the best judge for himself, or would you, Protagoras—at least in the matter of the arguments that anyone of us would find convincing for a court of law—have a better opinion beforehand than any untrained person?

Theodorus/ Certainly, Socrates, in that matter he did emphatically profess to be superior to everybody.

Socrates/ Bless your soul, I should think he did. No one would have paid huge sums to talk with him, if he had not convinced the people who came to him that no one whatever, not even a prophet, could judge better than he what was going to be and appear in the future.

Theodorus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And legislation, too, and the question of advantageousness are matters concerned with the future, and everyone would agree that a state, when it makes its laws, must often fail to hit upon its own greatest advantage?

Theodorus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Then we may quite reasonably put it to your master that he must admit that one man is wiser than another and that the wiser man is the measure, whereas an ignorant person like myself is not in any way bound to be a measure, as our defense of Protagoras tried to make me, whether I liked it or not.

Theodorus/ I think that is the weakest point in the theory, Socrates, though it is also assailable in that it makes other

people's opinions valid when, as it turns out, they hold Protagoras' assertions to be quite untrue.

Socrates/ There are many other ways, Theodorus, of assailing such a position and proving that not every opinion of every person is true. But with regard to what the individual experiences at the moment—the source of his sensations and the judgments in accordance with them—it is harder to assail the truth of these. Perhaps it is wrong to say 'harder' maybe they are unassailable, and those who assert that they are transparently clear and are instances of knowledge may be in the right, and Theaetetus was not beside the mark when he said that perception and knowledge were the same thing.

We must, then, look more closely into the matter, as our defense of Protagoras enjoined, and study this moving reality, ringing its metal to hear if it sounds true or cracked. However that may be, there has been no inconsiderable battle over it, and not a few combatants.

Theodorus/ Anything but inconsiderable; in Ionia, indeed, it is actually growing in violence. The followers of Heraclitus lead the choir of this persuasion with the greatest vigor.

Socrates/ All the more reason, my dear Theodorus, to look into it carefully and to follow their lead by tracing it to its source.

Theodorus/ By all means. For there is no discussing these principles of Heraclitus—or, as you say, of Homer or still more ancient sages—with the Ephesians themselves, who profess to be familiar with them; you might as well talk to a maniac. Faithful to their own treatises they are literally in perpetual motion; their capacity for staying still to attend to an argument or a question or for a quiet interchange of question and answer amounts to less than nothing, or rather

even a minus quantity is too strong an expression for the absence of the least modicum of repose in these gentry. When you put a question, they pluck from their quiver little oracular aphorisms to let fly at you, and if you try to obtain some account of their meaning, you will be instantly transfixed by another, barbed with some newly forged metaphor. You will never get anywhere with any of them; for that matter they cannot get anywhere with one another, but they take very good care to leave nothing settled either in discourse or in their own minds. I suppose they think that would be something stationary—a thing they will fight against to the last and do their utmost to banish from the universe.

Socrates/ Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen these gentlemen in the fray and never met them in their peaceable moments; indeed they are no friends of yours. I dare say they keep such matters to be explained at leisure to their pupils whom they want to make like themselves.

Theodorus/ Pupils indeed! My good friend, there is no such thing as a master or pupil among them; they spring up like mush rooms. Each one gets his inspiration wherever he can, and not one of them thinks that another understands anything. So, as I was going to say, you can never bring them to book, either with or without their consent. We must take over the question ourselves and try to solve it like a problem.

Socrates/ That is a reasonable proposal. As to this problem, then, have we not here a tradition from the ancients, who hid their meaning from the common herd in poetical figures, that Oceanus and Tethys, the source of all things, are flowing streams and nothing is at rest? And do not the moderns, in their superior wisdom, declare the same quite openly, in order that the very cobblers may hear and understand their wisdom and, abandoning their simple faith that some things stand still while others move, may

reverence those who teach them that everything is in motion?

But I had almost forgotten, Theodorus, another school which teaches just the opposite—that reality 'is one, immovable, being is the name of the all,' and much else that men like Melissus and Parmenides maintain in opposition to all those people, telling us that all things are a unity which stays still within itself, having no room to move in. How are we to deal with all these combatants? For, little by little, our advance has brought us, without our knowing it, between the two lines, and, unless we can somehow fend them off and slip through, we shall suffer for it, as in that game they play in the wrestling schools, where the players are caught by both sides and dragged both ways at once across the line. The best plan, I think, will be to begin by taking a look at the party whom we first approached, the men of flux, and if there seems to be anything in what they say, we will help them to pull us over to their side and try to elude the others. But if we find more truth in the partisans of the immovable whole, we will desert to them from these revolutionaries who leave no landmark unremoved. If both sides turn out to be quite unreasonable, we shall merely look foolish if we suppose that nobodies like ourselves can make any contribution after rejecting such paragons of ancient wisdom. Do you think it worthwhile to go further in the teeth of such danger, Theodorus?

Theodorus/ Certainly, Socrates. I could not bear to stop before we have found out what each of the two parties means.

Socrates/ Well, if you feel so strongly about it, we must look into the matter. I think our study of change should begin with the question, What after all do they mean when they say all things are in change? What I mean is this. Do they recognize one kind of change or two? I think there are

two, but I must not be alone in my opinion; you must take your share in the risk, so that we may meet together whatever fate shall befall us. Tell me, do you call it change when something removes from place to place or revolves in the same place?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let that be one kind, then. Now suppose a thing stays in the same place but grows old or turns black instead of white or hard instead of soft or alters in some other way, isn't it proper to call that a different kind of change?

Theodorus/ Yes, it must be.

Socrates/ So I should recognize these as two kinds of change—alteration and local movement.

Theodorus/ And you are right.

Socrates/ Having made that distinction, then, let us now begin our talk with these people who say that everything is in change and ask them, Do you say everything is in both sorts of change—both moving in place and altering—or that part changes in both ways, part in only one of the two?

Theodorus/ I really cannot tell, but I think they would say 'in both ways.'

Socrates/ Yes, my friend; otherwise they will find things at rest as well as things in change, and it will be no more correct to say that everything is changing than to say that everything is at rest.

Theodorus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ So, since they are to be in change and unchangingness must be impossible anywhere, all things are always in every kind of change.

Theodorus/ That follows.

Socrates/ Now consider this point in their theory. The account they gave of the genesis of hotness or whiteness or

whatever it may be, we stated, didn't we, in this sort of way—that anyone of these things is something that moves in place, simultaneously with a perception, between agent and patient, and that the patient becomes perceptive, not a perception, while the agent comes to have a quality, rather than to be a quality? Perhaps this word 'quality' strikes you as queer and uncouth and you don't understand it as a general expression; so let me give particular instances. The agent does not become hotness or whiteness, but hot or white, and so on with all the rest. No doubt you remember how we put this earlier—that nothing has any being as one thing just by itself, no more has the agent or patient, but, as a consequence of their intercourse with one another, in giving birth to the perceptions and the things perceived, the agents come to be of such and such a quality, and the patients come to be percipient.

Theodorus/ I remember, of course.

Socrates/ Very well, then, we will not inquire into other parts of their theory, whether they mean this or that, but keep to the point we have in view and ask them this. All things, by your account, are in a perpetual stream of change. Is that so?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ With both the kinds of change we distinguished—both moving in place and altering?

Theodorus/ Certainly, if they are to be completely in change.

Socrates/ Well now, if they only moved in place without altering in quality, we should be able to say what qualities they have as they move in this stream, shouldn't we?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Since, however, there is nothing constant here either—the flowing thing does not flow white but changes,

so that the very whiteness itself flows and shifts into another color, in order that the thing may escape the charge of constancy in that respect—can we ever give it the name of any color and be sure that we are naming it rightly?

Theodorus/ How can that be done, Socrates? Or how can anything else of the kind you mean be called by its right name, if, while we are speaking, it is all the time slipping away from us in this stream?

Socrates/ And again, what are we to say of a perception of any sort—for instance, the perception of seeing or hearing? Are we to say that it ever abides in its own nature as seeing or hearing?

Theodorus/ It certainly ought not, if all things are in change.

Socrates/ Then it has no right to be called seeing, any more than not-seeing, nor is any other perception entitled to be called perception rather than not-perception, if everything is changing in every kind of way.

Theodorus/ No, it hasn't.

Socrates/ And moreover perception is knowledge, according to Theaetetus and me.

Theodorus/ Yes, you did say so.

Socrates/ In that case, our answer to the question, what knowledge is, did not mean knowledge any more than not-knowledge.

Theodorus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ That would be a pretty result of the improvement we made upon that first answer, when we were so eager to prove it right by showing that everything is in change. Now it seems that what has in fact come to light is that, if all things are in change, any answer that can be given to any question is equally right; you may say it is so and it

is not so—or 'becomes,' if you prefer to avoid any term that would bring these people to a standstill.

Theodorus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Except, Theodorus, that I used the words 'so' and 'not so,' whereas we have no right to use this word 'so'—what is 'so' would cease to be in change—nor yet 'not so'; there is no change in that either. Some new dialect will have to be instituted for the exponents of this theory, since, as it is, they have no phrases to fit their fundamental proposition—unless indeed it were 'not even no-how.' That might be an expression indefinite enough to suit them.

Theodorus/ A most appropriate idiom.

Socrates/ So, Theodorus, we are quit of your old friend, and not yet ready to concede to him that every man is the measure of all things, if he is not a wise man. Also, we shall not admit that knowledge is perception, at least on the basis of the theory that all things are in change, unless Theaetetus has some objection.

Theodorus/ That is excellent, Socrates. For now these questions are disposed of, it was agreed that I should be quit of answering your questions, as soon as the discussion of Protagoras' theory should come to an end.

Theaetetus/ No, Theodorus, you must not be released until you and Socrates, as you proposed just now, have discussed those others who assert that the whole of things is at rest.

Theodorus/ Would you teach your elders, Theaetetus, to dishonor their agreements? No, for what remains you must prepare yourself to carry on the argument with Socrates.

Theaetetus/ Yes, if he wishes, though I would much rather have been a listener while this subject is discussed.

Theodorus/ To invite Socrates to an argument is like inviting cavalry to fight on level ground. You will have something to listen to, if you question him.

Socrates/ Well, but, Theodorus, I think I shall not comply with Theaetetus' request.

Theodorus/ Not comply? What do you mean?

Socrates/ A feeling of respect keeps me from treating in an unworthy spirit Melissus and the others who say the universe is one and at rest, but there is one being whom I respect above all. Parmenides himself is in my eyes, as Homer says, a 'reverend and awful' figure. I met him when I was quite young and he quite elderly, and I thought there was a sort of depth in him that was altogether noble. I am afraid we might not understand his words and still less follow the thought they express. Above all, the original purpose of our discussion—the nature of knowledge—might be thrust out of sight, if we attend to these importunate topics that keep breaking in upon us. In particular, this subject we are raising now is of vast extent. It cannot be fairly treated as a side issue, and an adequate handling would take so long that we should lose sight of our question about knowledge.

Either course would be wrong. My business is rather to try, by means of my midwife's art, to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge.

Theodorus/ Well, do so, if you think that best.

Socrates/ Well then, Theaetetus, here is a point for you to consider. The answer you gave was that knowledge is perception, wasn't it?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now suppose you were asked, When a man sees white or black things or hears high or low tones, what

does he see or hear with? I suppose you would say with eyes and ears.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I should.

Socrates/ To use words and phrases in an easygoing way without scrutinizing them too curiously is not, in general, a mark of ill breeding; on the contrary there is something lowbred in being too precise. But sometimes there is no help for it, and this is a case in which I must take exception to the form of your answer. Consider. Is it more correct to say that we see and hear with our eyes and ears or through them?

Theaetetus/ I should say we always perceive through them, rather than with them.

Socrates/ Yes, it would surely be strange that there should be a number of senses ensconced inside us, like the warriors in the Trojan horse, and all these things should not converge and meet in some single nature—a mind, or whatever it is to be called—with which we perceive all the objects of perception through the senses as instruments.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I think that is a better description.

Socrates/ My object in being so precise is to know whether there is some part of ourselves, the same in all cases, with which we apprehend black or white through the eyes, and objects of other kinds through the other senses. Can you, if the question is put to you, refer all such acts of apprehension to the body? Perhaps, however, it would be better you should speak for yourself in reply to questions, instead of my taking the words out of your mouth. Tell me, all these instruments through which you perceive what is warm or hard or light or sweet are parts of the body, aren't they, not of anything else?

Theaetetus/ Of nothing else.

Socrates/ Now will you also agree that the objects you perceive through one faculty cannot be perceived through another—objects of hearing, for instance, through sight, or objects of sight through hearing?

Theaetetus/ Of course I will.

Socrates/ Then, if you have some thought about both objects at once, you cannot be having a perception including both at once through either the one or the other organ.

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Now take sound and color. Have you not, to begin with, this thought which includes both at once—that they both exist?

Theaetetus/ I have.

Socrates/ And, further, that each of the two is different from the other and the same as itself?

Theaetetus/ Naturally.

Socrates/ And again, that both together are two, and each of them is one?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And also you can ask yourself whether they are unlike each other or alike?

Theaetetus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Then through what organ do you think all this about them both? What is common to them both cannot be apprehended either through hearing or through sight. Besides, here is further evidence for my point. Suppose it were possible to inquire whether sound and color were both brackish or not; no doubt you could tell me what faculty you would use—obviously not sight or hearing, but some other.

Theaetetus/ Of course, the faculty that works through the tongue.

Socrates/ Very good. But now, through what organ does that faculty work, which tells you what is common not only to these objects but to all things—what you mean by the words 'exists' and 'does not exist' and the other terms applied to them in the questions I put a moment ago? What sort of organs can you mention, corresponding to all these terms, through which the perceiving part of us perceives each one of them?

Theaetetus/ You mean existence and nonexistence, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also unity and numbers in general as applied to them, and clearly your question covers 'even' and 'odd' and all that kind of notions. You are asking through what part of the body our mind perceives these?

Socrates/ You follow me most admirably, Theaetetus; that is exactly my question.

Theaetetus/ Really, Socrates, I could not say, except that I think there is no special organ at all for these things, as there is for the others. It is clear to me that the mind in itself is its own instrument for contemplating the common terms that apply to everything.

Socrates/ In fact, Theaetetus, you are handsome, not ugly as Theodorus said you were, for in a discussion handsome is that handsome does. And you have treated me more than handsomely in saving me the trouble of a very long argument, if it is clear to you that the mind contemplates some things through its own instrumentality, others through the bodily faculties. That was indeed what I thought myself, but I wanted you to agree.

Theaetetus/ Well, it is clear to me.

Socrates/ Under which head, then, do you place existence? For that is, above all, a thing that belongs to everything.

Theaetetus/ I should put it among the things that the mind apprehends by itself.

Socrates/ And also likeness and unlikeness and sameness and difference?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And how about 'honorable' and 'dishonorable' and 'good' and 'bad'?

Theaetetus/ Those again seem to me, above all, to be things whose being is considered, one in comparison with another, by the mind, when it reflects within itself upon the past and the present with an eye to the future.

Socrates/ Wait a moment. The hardness of something hard and the softness of something soft will be perceived by the mind through touch, will they not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But their existence and the fact that they both exist, and their contrariety to one another and again the existence of this contrariety are things which the mind itself undertakes to judge for us, when it reflects upon them and compares one with another.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not true, then, that whereas all the impressions which penetrate to the mind through the body are things which men and animals alike are naturally constituted to perceive from the moment of birth, reflections about them with respect to their existence and usefulness only come, if they come at all, with difficulty through a long and troublesome process of education?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Is it possible, then, to reach truth when one cannot reach existence?

Theaetetus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ But if a man cannot reach the truth of a thing, can he possibly know that thing?

Theaetetus/ No, Socrates, how could he?

Socrates/ If that is so, knowledge does not reside in the impressions, but in our reflection upon them. It is there, seemingly, and not in the impressions, that it is possible to grasp existence and truth.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then are you going to give the same name to two things which differ so widely?

Theaetetus/ Surely that would not be right.

Socrates/ Well then, what name do you give to the first one—to seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling cold and feeling warm?

Theaetetus/ Perceiving. What other name is there for it?

Socrates/ Taking it all together, then, you call this perception?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ A thing which, we agree, has no part in apprehending truth, since it has none in apprehending existence.

Theaetetus/ No, it has none.

Socrates/ Nor, consequently, in knowledge either.

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge cannot possibly be the same thing.

Theaetetus/ Evidently not, Socrates. Indeed, it is now perfectly plain that knowledge is something different from perception.

Socrates/ But when we began our talk it was certainly not our object to find out what knowledge is not, but what it is.

Still, we have advanced so far as to see that we must not look for it in sense perception at all, but in what goes on when the mind is occupied with things by itself, whatever name you give to that.

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, the name for that, I imagine, is 'making judgments.'

Socrates/ You are right, my friend. Now begin all over again. Blot out all we have been saying, and see if you can get a clearer view from the position you have now reached. Tell us once more what knowledge is.

Theaetetus/ I cannot say it is judgment as a whole, because there is false judgment, but perhaps true judgment is knowledge. You may take that as my answer. If, as we go further, it turns out to be less convincing than it seems now, I will try to find another.

Socrates/ Good, Theaetetus. This promptness is much better than hanging back as you did at first. If we go on like this, either we shall find what we are after, or we shall be less inclined to imagine we know something of which we know nothing whatever, and that surely is a reward not to be despised. And now, what is this you say—that there are two sorts of judgment, one true, the other false, and you define knowledge as judgment that is true?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is the view I have come to now.

Socrates/ Then, had we better go back to a point that came up about judgment?

Theaetetus/ What point do you mean?

Socrates/ A question that worries me now, as often before, and has much perplexed me in my own mind and also in talking to others. I cannot explain the nature of this experience we have, or how it can arise in our minds.

Theaetetus/ What experience?

Socrates/ Making a false judgment. At this moment I am still in doubt and wondering whether to let that question alone or to follow it further, not as we did a while ago, but in a new way.

Theaetetus/ Why not, Socrates, if it seems to be in the least necessary? Only just now, when you and Theodorus were speaking of leisure, you said very rightly that there is no pressing hurry in a discussion of this sort.

Socrates/ A good reminder, for this may be the right moment to go back upon our track. It is better to carry through a small task well than make a bad job of a big one.

Theaetetus/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ How shall we set about it, then? What is it that we do mean? Do we assert that there is in every case a false judgment, and that one of us thinks what is false, another what is true, such being the nature of things?

Theaetetus/ Certainly we do.

Socrates/ And, in each and all cases, it is possible for us either to know a thing or not to know it? I leave out of account for the moment becoming acquainted with things and forgetting, considered as falling between the two. Our argument is not concerned with them just now.

Theaetetus/ Well then, Socrates, there is no third alternative left in any case, besides knowing and not-knowing.

Socrates/ And it follows at once that when one is thinking he must be thinking either of something he knows or of something he does not know?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And further, if you know a thing, you cannot also not know it, and if you do not know it, you cannot also know it?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then is the man who thinks what is false supposing that things he knows are not those things but other things he knows, so that, while he knows both, he fails to recognize either?

Theaetetus/ No, that is impossible, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, is he supposing that things he does not know are other things he does not know? Is this possible—that a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should take it into his head that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

Theaetetus/ No. How could he?

Socrates/ But surely a man does not imagine that things he does know are things he does not know, or that things he does not know are things he knows?

Theaetetus/ No, that would be a miracle.

Socrates/ What other way is there, then, of judging falsely?

There is, presumably, no possibility of judging outside these alternatives, granted that everything is either known by us or not known, and inside them there seems to be no room for a false judgment.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Perhaps, then, we had better approach what we are looking for by way of another alternative. Instead of 'knowing or not-knowing,' let us take 'being or not-being.'

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ May it not simply be that one who thinks what is not about anything cannot but be thinking what is false, whatever his state of mind may be in other respects?

Theaetetus/ There is some likelihood in that, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then what shall we say, Theaetetus, if we are asked, 'But is what you describe possible for anyone? Can any man think what is not, either about something that is or absolutely?' I suppose we must answer to that, 'Yes, when he believes something and what he believes is not true.' Or what are we to say?

Theaetetus/ We must say that.

Socrates/ Then is the same sort of thing possible in any other case?

Theaetetus/ What sort of thing?

Socrates/ That a man should see something, and yet what he sees should be nothing.

Theaetetus/ No. How could that be?

Socrates/ Yet surely if what he sees is something, it must be a thing that is. Or do you suppose that 'something' can be reckoned among things that have no being at all?

Theaetetus/ No, I don't.

Socrates/ Then, if he sees something, he sees a thing that is.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ And if he hears a thing, he hears something and hears a thing that is.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if he touches a thing, he touches something, and if something, then a thing that is.

Theaetetus/ That also is true.

Socrates/ And if he thinks, he thinks something, doesn't he?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And when he thinks something, he thinks a thing that is?

Theaetetus/ I agree.

Socrates/ So to think what is not is to think nothing.

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But surely to think nothing is the same as not to think at all.

Theaetetus/ That seems plain.

Socrates/ If so, it is impossible to think what is not, either about anything that is, or absolutely.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then thinking falsely must be something different from thinking what is not.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ False judgment, then, is no more possible for us on these lines than on those we were following just now.

Theaetetus/ No, it certainly is not.

Socrates/ Well, does the thing we call false judgment arise in this way?

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ We do recognize the existence of false judgment as a sort of misjudgment that occurs when a person interchanges in his mind two things, both of which are, and asserts that the one is the other. In this way he is always thinking of something which is, but of one thing in place of another, and since he misses the mark he may fairly be said to be judging falsely.

Theaetetus/ I believe you have got it quite right now. When a person thinks 'ugly' in place of 'beautiful' or 'beautiful' in place of 'ugly,' he is really and truly thinking what is false.

Socrates/ I can see that you are no longer in awe of me, Theaetetus, but beginning to despise me.

Theaetetus/ Why, precisely?

Socrates/ I believe you think I shall miss the opening you give me by speaking of 'truly thinking what is false,' and not ask you whether a thing can be slowly quick or heavily light or whether any contrary can desert its own nature and behave like its opposite. However, I will justify your boldness by letting that pass. So you like this notion that false judgment is mistaking.

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ According to you, then, it is possible for the mind to take one thing for another, and not for itself.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ And when the mind does that, must it not be thinking either of both things or of one of the two?

Theaetetus/ Certainly it must, either at the same time or one after the other.

Socrates/ Excellent. And do you accept my description of the process of thinking?

Theaetetus/ How do you describe it?

Socrates/ As a discourse that the mind carries on with itself about any subject it is considering. You must take this explanation as coming from an ignoramus, but I have a notion that, when the mind is thinking, it is simply talking to itself, asking questions and answering them, and saying yes or no. When it reaches a decision—which may come slowly or in a sudden rush—when doubt is over and the two voices affirm the same thing, then we call that its 'judgment.' So I should describe thinking as discourse, and judgment as a statement pronounced, not aloud to someone else, but silently to oneself.

Theaetetus/ I agree.

Socrates/ It seems, then, that when a person thinks of one thing as another, he is affirming to himself that the one is the other.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now search your memory and see if you have ever said to yourself, 'Certainly, what is beautiful is ugly,' or 'What is unjust is just.' To put it generally, consider if you have ever set about convincing yourself that anyone thing is certainly another thing, or whether, on the contrary, you have never, even in a dream, gone so far as to say to yourself that odd numbers must be even, or anything of that sort.

Theaetetus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Do you suppose anyone else, mad or sane, ever goes so far as to talk himself over, in his own mind, into stating seriously that an ox must be a horse or that two must be one?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ So, if making a statement to oneself is the same as judging, then, so long as a man is making a statement or judgment about both things at once and his mind has hold of both, he cannot say or judge that one of them is the other. You, in your turn, must not cavil at my language; I mean it in the sense that no one thinks 'the ugly is beautiful' or anything of that kind.

Theaetetus/ I will not cavil, Socrates. I agree with you.

Socrates/ So long, then, as a person is thinking of both, he cannot think of the one as the other.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ On the other hand, if he is thinking of one only and not of the other at all, he will never think that the one is the other.

Theaetetus/ True, for then he would have to have before his mind the thing he was not thinking of.

Socrates/ It follows, then, that 'mistaking' is impossible, whether he thinks of both things or of one only. So there will be no sense in defining false judgment as 'misjudgment.' It does not appear that false judgment exists in us in this form any more than in those we dismissed earlier.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And yet, Theaetetus, if we cannot show that false judgment does exist, we shall be driven into admitting all sorts of absurdities.

Theaetetus/ For instance?

Socrates/ I will not mention them until I have tried to look at the question from every quarter. So long as we cannot see our way, I should feel some shame at our being forced into such admissions.

But if we find the way out, then, as soon as we are clear, it will be time to speak of others as caught in the ludicrous position we shall have ourselves escaped; though, if we are completely baffled, then, I suppose, we must be humble and let the argument do with us what it will, like a sailor trampling over seasick passengers. So let me tell you where I still see an avenue open for us to follow.

Theaetetus/ Do tell me.

Socrates/ I shall say we were wrong to agree that a man cannot think that things he knows are things he does not know and so be deceived. In a way it is possible.

Theaetetus/ Do you mean something that crossed my mind at the moment when we said that was impossible? It occurred to me that sometimes I, who am acquainted with Socrates, imagine that a stranger whom I see at a distance is the Socrates whom I know. In a case like that a mistake of the kind you describe does occur.

Socrates/ And we were shy of saying that, because it would have made us out as both knowing and not knowing what we know?

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ We must, in fact, put the case in a different way. Perhaps the barrier will yield somewhere, though it may defy our efforts. Anyhow, we are in such straits that we must turn every argument over and put it to the test. Now, is there anything in this? Is it possible to become acquainted with something one did not know before?

Theaetetus/ Surely.

Socrates/ And the process can be repeated with one thing after another?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Imagine, then, for the sake of argument, that our minds contain a block of wax, which in this or that individual may be larger or smaller, and composed of wax that is comparatively pure or muddy, and harder in some, softer in others, and sometimes of just the right consistency.

Theaetetus/ Very well.

Socrates/ Let us call it the gift of the Muses' mother, Memory, and say that whenever we wish to remember something we see or hear or conceive in our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions or ideas and imprint them on it as we might stamp the impression of a seal ring. Whatever is so imprinted we remember and know so long as the image remains; whatever is rubbed out or has not succeeded in leaving an impression we have forgotten and do not know.

Theaetetus/ So be it.

Socrates/ Now take a man who knows things in this way, and is attending to something that he sees or hears. Is there not here a possibility of his making a false judgment?

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ By thinking that things he knows are other things he knows, or sometimes things he does not know. We were wrong when we agreed earlier that this was impossible.

Theaetetus/ What do you think about it now?

Socrates/ Mistake is impossible in the following cases.

No one can think one thing to be another when he does not perceive either of them, but has the memorial or seal of both of them in his mind; nor can any mistaking of one thing for another occur, when he only knows one, and does not know, and has no impression of the other; nor can he think that one thing which he does not know is another thing which he does not know, or that what he does not know is what he knows; nor that one thing which he perceives is another thing which he perceives, or that something which he perceives is something which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something which he perceives; nor again can he think that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense; —this last case, if possible, is still more inconceivable than the others; nor can he think that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the memorial coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows; nor so long as these agree, can he think that a thing which he knows and perceives is another thing which he perceives; or that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive, is the same

as another thing which he does not know and does not perceive; —nor again, can he suppose that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is the same as another thing which he does not know; or that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is another thing which he does not perceive: —All these utterly and absolutely exclude the possibility of false opinion.

There remain, then, the following cases in which, if anywhere, false judgment can occur.

Theaetetus/ What are they? Perhaps they may help me to understand better. At present I cannot follow.

Socrates/ Take things you know. You can suppose them to be other things which you both know and perceive, or to be things you do not know, but do perceive, or you can confuse two things which you both know and perceive.

Theaetetus/ Now I am more in the dark than ever.

Socrates/ Let me start again, then, and put it in this way. I know Theodorus and have a memory in my mind of what he is like, and the same with Theaetetus. At certain moments I see or touch or hear or otherwise perceive them; at other times, though I have no perception of you and Theodorus, I nevertheless remember you both and have you before my mind. Isn't that so?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ That, then, is the first point I want to make clear—that it is possible either to perceive or not to perceive something one is acquainted with.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And it is also possible, when one is not acquainted with a thing, sometimes not to perceive it either, sometimes merely to perceive it and nothing more.

Theaetetus/ That is possible too.

Socrates/ Then see if you can follow me better now. If Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither and has no sort of present perception of them, he can never think in his own mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Is that good sense?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is true.

Socrates/ Well, that was the first of the cases I mentioned.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the second was this. If I know one of you but not the other and perceive neither, once more I could never think that the one I know is the other whom I do not know.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And thirdly, if I neither know nor perceive either of you, I cannot think that one unknown person is another unknown person. And now take it as if I had gone over the whole list of cases again, in which I shall never judge falsely about you and Theodorus, whether I know both or neither or only one of you. And the same applies to perceiving, if you follow me.

Theaetetus/ I follow now.

Socrates/ It remains, then, that false judgment should occur in a case like this—when I, who know you and Theodorus and possess imprints of you both like seal impressions in the waxen block, see you both at a distance indistinctly and am in a hurry to assign the proper imprint of each to the proper visual perception, like fitting a foot into its own footmark to effect a recognition, and then make the mistake of interchanging them, like a man who thrusts his feet into the wrong shoes, and apply the perception of each to the imprint of the other. Or my mistake might be illustrated by the sort of thing that happens in a mirror when

the visual current transposes right to left. In that case mistaking or false judgment does result.

Theaetetus/ I think it does, Socrates. That is an admirable description of what happens to judgment.

Socrates/ Then there is also the case where I know both and perceive only one, and do not get the knowledge I have of that one to correspond with my perception. That is the expression I used before, which you did not understand.

Theaetetus/ No, I did not.

Socrates/ Well, that is what I was saying. If you know one of two people and also perceive him and if you get the knowledge you have to correspond with the perception of him, you will never think he is another person whom you both know and perceive, if your knowledge of him likewise is got to correspond with the perception. That was so, wasn't it?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But there was leftover the case I have been describing now, in which we say false judgment does occur—the possibility that you may know both and see or otherwise perceive both, but not get the two imprints to correspond each with its proper perception. Like a bad archer, you may shoot to one side and miss the mark—which is indeed another phrase we use for error.

Theaetetus/ With good reason.

Socrates/ Also, when a perception is present which belongs to one of the imprints, but none which belongs to the other, and the mind fits to the present perception the imprint belonging to the absent one, in all such cases it is in error. To sum up, in the case of objects one does not know and has never perceived, there is, it seems, no possibility of error or false judgment, if our present account is sound, but it is precisely in the field of objects both known and perceived

that judgment turns and twists about and proves false or true—true when it brings impressions straight to their proper imprints, false when it misdirects them crosswise to the wrong imprint.

Theaetetus/ Surely that is a satisfactory account, isn't it, Socrates?

Socrates/ You will think still better of it when you hear the rest. To judge truly is a fine thing and there is something discreditable in error.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, they say the differences arise in this way. When a man has in his mind a good thick slab of wax, smooth and kneaded to the right consistency, and the impressions that come through the senses are stamped on these tables of the 'heart' —Homer's word hints at the mind's likeness to wax—then the imprints are clear and deep enough to last a long time. Such people are quick to learn and also have good memories, and besides they do not interchange the imprints of their perceptions but think truly. These imprints being distinct and well-spaced are quickly assigned to their several stamps—the 'real things' as they are called—and such men are said to be clever. Do you agree?

Theaetetus/ Most emphatically.

Socrates/ When a person has what the poet's wisdom commends as a 'shaggy heart,' or when the block is muddy or made of impure wax, or over-soft or hard, the people with soft wax are quick to learn, but forgetful, those with hard wax the reverse. Where it is shaggy or rough, a gritty kind of stuff containing a lot of earth or dirt, the impressions obtained are indistinct; so are they too when the stuff is hard, for they have no depth. Impressions in soft wax also are indistinct, because they melt together and soon become

blurred. And if, besides this, they overlap through being crowded together into some wretched little narrow mind, they are still more indistinct. All these types, then, are likely to judge falsely. When they see or hear or think of something, they cannot quickly assign things to their several imprints. Because they are so slow and sort things into the wrong places, they constantly see and hear and think amiss, and we say they are mistaken about things and stupid.

Theaetetus/ Your description could not be better, Socrates.

Socrates/ We are to conclude, then, that false judgments do exist in us?

Theaetetus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And true ones also, I suppose?

Theaetetus/ True ones also.

Socrates/ At last, then, we believe we have reached a satisfactory agreement that both these kinds of judgments certainly exist?

Theaetetus/ Most emphatically.

Socrates/ It really does seem to be true, Theaetetus, that a garrulous person is a strange and disagreeable creature.

Theaetetus/ Why, what makes you say that?

Socrates/ Disgust at my own stupidity. I am indeed garrulous—what else can you call a man who goes on bandying arguments to and fro because he is such a dolt that he cannot make up his mind and is loath to surrender anyone of them?

Theaetetus/ But why are you disgusted with yourself?

Socrates/ I am not merely disgusted but anxious about the answer I shall make if someone asks, So, Socrates, you have made a discovery—that false judgment resides, not in our perceptions among themselves nor yet in our thoughts,

but in the fitting together of perception and thought? I suppose I shall say yes, and plume myself on this brilliant discovery of ours.

Theaetetus/ I don't see anything to be ashamed of in what you have just pointed out, Socrates.

Socrates/ On the other hand, he will continue, you also say that we can never imagine that a man whom we merely think of and do not see is a horse which again we do not see or touch but merely think of without perceiving it in any way? I suppose I shall say yes to that.

Theaetetus/ And rightly.

Socrates/ On that showing, he will say, a man could never imagine that eleven, which he merely thinks of, is twelve, which again he merely thinks of.

Come, you must find the answer now.

Theaetetus/ Well, I shall answer that, if he saw or handled eleven things, he might suppose they were twelve, but he will never make that judgment about the eleven and the twelve he has in his thoughts.

Socrates/ Well now, does a man ever consider in his own mind five and seven—I don't mean five men and seven men or anything of that sort, but just five and seven themselves, which we describe as records in that waxen block of ours, among which there can be no false judgment—does anyone ever take these into consideration and ask himself in his inward conversation how much they amount to, and does one man believe and state that they make eleven, another that they make twelve, or does everybody agree they make twelve?

Theaetetus/ Far from it. Many people say eleven, and if larger numbers are involved, the more room there is for mistakes, for you are speaking generally of any numbers, I suppose.

Socrates/ Yes, that is right. Now consider what happens in this case. Is it not thinking that the twelve itself that is stamped on the waxen block is eleven?

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then haven't we come round again to our first argument? For when this happens to someone, he is thinking that one thing he knows is another thing he knows, and that, we said, was impossible. That was the very ground on which we were led to make out that there could be no such thing as false judgment; it was in order to avoid the conclusion that the same man must at the same time know and not know the same thing.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ If so, we must account for false judgment in some other way than as the misfitting of thought to perception. If it were that, we should never make mistakes among our thoughts themselves. As the case stands now, either there is no such thing as false judgment, or it is possible not to know what one does know. Which alternative do you choose?

Theaetetus/ I see no possible choice, Socrates.

Socrates/ But the argument is not going to allow both alternatives. However, we must stick at nothing; suppose we try being quite shameless.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Socrates/ By making up our minds to describe what knowing is like.

Theaetetus/ How is that shameless?

Socrates/ You seem to be unaware that our whole conversation from the outset has been an inquiry after the nature of knowledge on the supposition that we did not know what it was.

Theaetetus/ No, I am quite aware of that.

Socrates/ Then, doesn't it strike you as shameless to explain what knowing is like, when we don't know what knowledge is? The truth is, Theaetetus, that for some time past there has been a vicious taint in our discussion. Times out of number we have said, 'we know,' 'we do not know,' 'we have knowledge,' 'we have no knowledge,' as if we could understand each other while we still know nothing about knowledge. At this very moment, if you please, we have once more used the words 'know nothing' and 'understand,' as if we had a right to use them while we are still destitute of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Well, but how are you going to carry on a discussion, Socrates, if you keep clear of those words?

Socrates/ I cannot, being the man I am, though I might if I were an expert in debate. If such a person were here now, he would profess to keep clear of them and rebuke us severely for my use of language. As we are such bunglers, then, shall I be so bold as to describe what knowing is like? I think it might help us.

Theaetetus/ Do so, then, by all means. And if you cannot avoid those words, you shall not be blamed.

Socrates/ Well, you have heard what 'knowing' is commonly said to be?

Theaetetus/ Possibly, but I don't remember at the moment.

Socrates/ They say it is 'having knowledge.'

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Let us make a slight amendment and say, 'possessing knowledge.'

Theaetetus/ What difference would you say that makes?

Socrates/ None, perhaps, but let me tell you my idea and you shall help me test it.

Theaetetus/ I will if I can.

Socrates/ 'Having' seems to me different from 'possessing.' If a man has bought a coat and owns it, but is not wearing it, we should say he possesses it without having it about him.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Now consider whether knowledge is a thing you can possess in that way without having it about you, like a man who has caught some wild birds—pigeons or what not—and keeps them in an aviary he has made for them at home. In a sense, of course, we might say he 'has' them all the time inasmuch as he possesses them, mightn't we?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But in another sense he 'has' none of them, though he has got control of them, now that he has made them captive in an enclosure of his own; he can take and have hold of them whenever he likes by catching any bird he chooses, and let them go again, and it is open to him to do that as often as he pleases.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Once more then, just as a while ago we imagined a sort of waxen block in our minds, so now let us suppose that every mind contains a kind of aviary stocked with birds of every sort, some in flocks apart from the rest, some in small groups, and some solitary, flying in any direction among them all.

Theaetetus/ Be it so. What follows?

Socrates/ When we are babies we must suppose this receptacle empty, and take the birds to stand for pieces of knowledge. Whenever a person acquires any piece of

knowledge and shuts it up in his enclosure, we must say he has learned or discovered the thing of which this is the knowledge, and that is what 'knowing' means.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Now think of him hunting once more for any piece of knowledge that he wants, catching and holding it, and letting it go again. In what terms are we to describe that—the same that we used of the original process of acquisition, or different ones? An illustration may help you to see what I mean. There is a science you call 'arithmetic.'

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Conceive that, then, as a chase after pieces of knowledge about all the numbers, odd or even.

Theaetetus/ I will.

Socrates/ That, I take it, is the science in virtue of which a man has in his control pieces of knowledge about numbers and can hand them over to someone else.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when he hands them over, we call it 'teaching,' and when the other takes them from him, that is 'learning,' and when he has them in the sense of possessing them in that aviary of his, that is 'knowing.'

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now observe what follows. The finished arithmetician knows all numbers, doesn't he? There is no number the knowledge of which is not in his mind.

Theaetetus/ Naturally.

Socrates/ And such a person may sometimes count either the numbers themselves in his own head or some set of external things that have a number.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And by counting we shall mean simply trying to find out what some particular number amounts to?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It appears, then, that the man who, as we admitted, knows every number, is trying to find out what he knows as if he had no knowledge of it. No doubt you sometimes hear puzzles of that sort debated.

Theaetetus/ Indeed I do.

Socrates/ Well, our illustration from hunting pigeons and getting possession of them will enable us to explain that the hunting occurs in two ways—first, before you possess your pigeon in order to have possession of it; secondly, after getting possession of it, in order to catch and hold in your hand what you have already possessed for some time. In the same way, if you have long possessed pieces of knowledge about things you have learned and know, it is still possible to get to know the same things again, by the process of recovering the knowledge of some particular thing and getting hold of it. It is knowledge you have possessed for some time, but you had not got it handy in your mind.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ That, then, was the drift of my question—what terms should be used to describe the arithmetician who sets about counting or the literate person who sets about reading—because it seemed as if, in such a case, the man was setting about learning again from himself what he already knew.

Theaetetus/ That sounds odd, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, but can we say he is going to read or count something he does not know, when we have already granted that he knows all the letters or all the numbers?

Theaetetus/ No, that is absurd too.

Socrates/ Shall we say, then, that we care nothing about words, if it amuses anyone to turn and twist the expressions 'knowing' and 'learning'? Having drawn a distinction between possessing knowledge and having it about one, we agree that it is impossible not to possess what one does possess, and so we avoid the result that a man should not know what he does know, but we say that it is possible for him to get hold of a false judgment about it. For he may not have about him the knowledge of that thing, but a different piece of knowledge instead, if it so happens that, in hunting for some particular piece of knowledge, among those that are fluttering about, he misses it and catches hold of a different one. In that case, you see, he mistakes eleven for twelve, because he has caught hold of the knowledge of eleven that is inside him, instead of his knowledge of twelve, as he might catch a dove in place of a pigeon.

Theaetetus/ That seems reasonable.

Socrates/ Whereas, when he catches the piece of knowledge he is trying to catch, he is not mistaken but thinks what is true. In this way both true and false judgments can exist, and the obstacles that were troubling us are removed. You will agree to this, perhaps? Or will you not?

Theaetetus/ I will.

Socrates/ Yes, for now we are rid of the contradiction about people not knowing what they do know. That no longer implies our not possessing what we do possess, whether we are mistaken about something or not. But it strikes me that a still stranger consequence is coming in sight.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That the interchange of pieces of knowledge should ever result in a judgment that is false.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ In the first place, that a man should have knowledge of something and at the same time fail to recognize that very thing, not for want of knowing it but by reason of his own knowledge, and next that he should judge that thing to be something else and vice versa—isn't that very unreasonable, that when a piece of knowledge presents itself, the mind should fail to recognize anything and know nothing? On this showing, the presence of ignorance might just as well make us know something, or the presence of blindness make us see—if knowledge can ever make us fail to know.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps, Socrates, we were wrong in making the birds stand for pieces of knowledge only, and we ought to have imagined pieces of ignorance flying about with them in the mind. Then, in chasing them, our man would lay hold sometimes of a piece of knowledge, sometimes of a piece of ignorance, and the ignorance would make him judge falsely, the knowledge truly, about the same thing.

Socrates/ It is not easy to disapprove of anything you say, Theaetetus, but think again about your suggestion. Suppose it is as you say; then the man who lays hold of the piece of ignorance will judge falsely. Is that right?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But of course he will not think he is judging falsely.

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ No, he will think he is judging truly, and his attitude of mind will be the same as if he knew the thing he is mistaken about.

Theaetetus/ Naturally.

Socrates/ So he will imagine that, as a result of his chase, he has got hold of a piece of knowledge, not a piece of ignorance.

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then we have gone a long way round only to find ourselves confronted once more with our original difficulty. Our destructive critic will laugh at us. You wonderful people, he will say, are we to understand that a man knows both a piece of knowledge and a piece of ignorance, and then supposes that one of these things he knows is the other which he also knows? Or does he know neither, and then judge that one of these unknown things is the other? Or does he know only one, and identify this known thing with the unknown one, or the unknown one with the known? Or are you going to tell me that there are yet further pieces of knowledge about your pieces of knowledge and ignorance, and that their owner keeps these shut up in yet another of your ridiculous aviaries or waxen blocks, knowing them so long as he possesses them, although he may not have them at hand in his mind? On that showing you will find yourselves perpetually driven round in a circle and never getting any further.

What are we to reply to that, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Really, Socrates, I don't know what we are to say.

Socrates/ Maybe, my young friend, we have deserved this rebuke, and the argument shows that we were wrong to leave knowledge on one side and look first for an explanation of false judgment. That cannot be understood until we have a satisfactory account of the nature of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ As things now stand, Socrates, one cannot avoid that conclusion.

Socrates/ To start all over again, then, what is one to say that knowledge is? For surely we are not going to give up yet.

Theaetetus/ Not unless you do so.

Socrates/ Then tell me, what definition can we give with the least risk of contradicting ourselves?

Theaetetus/ The one we tried before, Socrates. I have nothing else to suggest.

Socrates/ What was that?

Theaetetus/ That true belief is knowledge. Surely there can at least be no mistake in believing what is true and the consequences are always satisfactory.

Socrates/ Try, and you will see, Theaetetus, as the man said when he was asked if the river was too deep to ford. So here, if we go forward on our search, we may stumble upon something that will reveal the thing we are looking for. We shall make nothing out, if we stay where we are.

Theaetetus/ True. Let us go forward and see.

Socrates/ Well, we need not go far to see this much. You will find a whole profession to prove that true belief is not knowledge.

Theaetetus/ How so? What profession?

Socrates/ The profession of those paragons of intellect known as orators and lawyers. There you have men who use their skill to produce conviction, not by instruction, but by making people believe whatever they want them to believe. You can hardly imagine teachers so clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the clock, to instruct their hearers thoroughly in the true facts of a case of robbery or other violence which those hearers had not witnessed.

Theaetetus/ No, I cannot imagine that, but they can convince them.

Socrates/ And by convincing you mean making them believe something.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And when a jury is rightly convinced of facts which can be known only by an eyewitness, then, judging by hearsay and accepting a true belief, they are judging without knowledge, although, if they find the right verdict, their conviction is correct?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But if true belief and knowledge were the same thing, the best of jurymen could never have a correct belief without knowledge. It now appears that they must be different things.

Theaetetus/ Yes, Socrates, I have heard someone make the distinction. I had forgotten, but now it comes back to me. He said that a true belief with the addition of an account (λόγος) was knowledge, while belief without an account was outside its range. Where no account could be given of a thing, it was not 'knowable'—that was the word he used—where it could, it was knowable.

Socrates/ A good suggestion. But tell me how he distinguished these knowable things from the unknowable. It may turn out that what you were told tallies with something I have heard said.

Theaetetus/ I am not sure if I can recall that, but I think I should recognize it if I heard it stated.

Socrates/ If you have had a dream, let me tell you mine in return. I seem to have heard some people say that what might be called the first elements of which we and all other things consist are such that no account can be given of them. Each of them just by itself can only be named; we cannot attribute to it anything further or say that it exists or does not exist, for we should at once be attaching to it existence or nonexistence, whereas we ought to add nothing if we are to express just it alone. We ought not even to add 'just' or It' or 'each' or 'alone' or 'this,' or any other of a host

of such terms. These terms, running loose about the place, are attached to everything, and they are distinct from the things to which they are applied. If it were possible for an element to be expressed in any formula exclusively belonging to it, no other terms ought to enter into that expression. But in fact there is no formula in which any element can be expressed; it can only be named, for a name is all there is that belongs to it. But when we come to things composed of these elements, then, just as these things are complex, so the names are combined to make a description (λόγος), a description being precisely a combination of names. Accordingly, elements are inexplicable and unknowable, but they can be perceived, while complexes ('syllables') are knowable and explicable, and you can have a true notion of them. So when a man gets hold of the true notion of something without an account, his mind does think truly of it, but he does not know it, for if one cannot give and receive an account of a thing, one has no knowledge of that thing. But when he has also got hold of an account, all this becomes possible to him and he is fully equipped with knowledge.

Does that version represent the dream as you heard it, or not?

Theaetetus/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ So this dream finds favor and you hold that a true notion with the addition of an account is knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Can it be, Theaetetus, that, all in a moment, we have found out today what so many wise men have grown old in seeking and have not found?

Theaetetus/ I, at any rate, am satisfied with our present statement, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, the statement just in itself may well be satisfactory, for how can there ever be knowledge without an account and right belief? But there is one point in the theory as stated that does not find favor with me.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ What might be considered its most ingenious feature. It says that the elements are unknowable, but whatever is complex ('syllables') can be known.

Theaetetus/ Is not that right?

Socrates/ We must find out. We hold as a sort of hostage for the theory the illustration in terms of which it was stated.

Theaetetus/ Namely?

Socrates/ Letters—the elements of writing—and syllables. That and nothing else was the prototype the author of this theory had in mind, don't you think?

Theaetetus/ Yes, it was.

Socrates/ Let us take up that illustration, then, and put it to the question, or rather put the question to ourselves. Did we learn our letters on that principle or not? To begin with, is it true that an account can be given of syllables, but not of letters?

Theaetetus/ It may be so.

Socrates/ I agree, decidedly. Suppose you are asked about the first syllable of 'Socrates.' Explain, Theaetetus, what is So? How will you answer?

Theaetetus/ S and O.

Socrates/ And you have there an account of the syllable?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Go on, then, give me a similar account of S.

Theaetetus/ But how can one state the elements of an element? The fact is, of course, Socrates, that S is one of the consonants, nothing but a noise, like a hissing of the tongue,

while not only has no articulate sound but is not even a noise, and the same is true of most of the letters. So they may well be said to be inexplicable, when the clearest of them, the seven vowels themselves, have only a sound, and no sort of account can be given of them.

Socrates/ So far, then, we have reached a right conclusion about knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ But now, have we been right in declaring that the letter cannot be known, though the syllable can?

Theaetetus/ That seems all right.

Socrates/ Take the syllable then. Do we mean by that both the two letters or, if there are more than two, all the letters? Or do we mean a single entity that comes into existence from the moment when they are put together?

Theaetetus/ I should say we mean all the letters.

Socrates/ Then take the case of the two letters S and O. The two together are the first syllable of my name. Anyone who knows that syllable knows both the letters, doesn't he?

Theaetetus/ Naturally.

Socrates/ So he knows the S and the O.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But has he, then, no knowledge of each letter, so that he knows both without knowing either?

Theaetetus/ That is a monstrous absurdity, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet, if it is necessary to know each of two things before one can know both, he simply must know the letters first, if he is ever to know the syllable, and so our fine theory will vanish and leave us in the lurch.

Theaetetus/ With a startling suddenness.

Socrates/ Yes, because we are not keeping a good watch upon it. Perhaps we ought to have assumed that the syllable

was not the letters but a single entity that arises out of them with a unitary character of its own and different from the letters.

Theaetetus/ By all means. Indeed, it may well be so rather than the other way.

Socrates/ Let us consider that. We ought not to abandon an imposing theory in this poor-spirited manner.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Suppose, then, it is as we say now. The syllable arises as a single entity from any set of letters which can be combined, and that holds of every complex, not only in the case of letters.

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ In that case, it must have no parts.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Socrates/ Because, if a thing has parts, the whole thing must be the same as all the parts. Or do you say that a whole likewise is a single entity that arises out of the parts and is different from the aggregate of the parts?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Then do you regard the sum (τὸ πᾶν) as the same thing as the whole, or are they different?

Theaetetus/ I am not at all clear, but you tell me to answer boldly, so I will take the risk of saying they are different.

Socrates/ Your boldness, Theaetetus, is right; whether your answer is so, we shall have to consider.

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, the whole will be different from the sum, according to our present view.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well but now, is there any difference between the sum and all the things it includes? For instance, when we say, 'one, two, three, four, five, six,' or 'twice three' or 'three times two' or 'four and two' or 'three and two and one,' are we in all these cases expressing the same thing or different things?

Theaetetus/ The same.

Socrates/ Just six, and nothing else?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ In fact, in each form of expression we have expressed all the six.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But when we express them all, is there no sum that we express?

Theaetetus/ There must be.

Socrates/ And is that sum anything else than 'six'?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Then, at any rate in the case of things that consist

of a number, the words 'sum' and 'all the things' denote the same thing.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Let us put our argument, then, in this way. The number of [square feet in] an acre, and the acre are the same thing, aren't they?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so too with the number of [feet in] a mile?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And again with the number of [soldiers in] an army and the army, and so on, in all cases. The total number is the same as the total thing in each case.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the number of [units in] any collection of things cannot be anything but parts of that collection?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Now, anything that has parts consists of parts.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ But all the parts, we have agreed, are the same as the sum, if the total number is to be the same as the total thing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The whole, then, does not consist of parts, for if it were all the parts it would be a sum.

Theaetetus/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ But can a part be a part of anything but its whole?

Theaetetus/ Yes, of the sum.

Socrates/ You make a gallant fight of it, Theaetetus. But does not 'the sum' mean precisely something from which nothing is missing?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And is not a whole exactly the same thing—that from which nothing whatever is missing? Whereas, when something is removed, the thing becomes neither a whole nor a sum; it changes at the same moment from being both to being neither.

Theaetetus/ I think now that there is no difference between a sum and a whole.

Socrates/ Well, we were saying, were we not, that when a thing has parts, the whole or sum will be the same thing as all the parts?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ To go back, then, to the point I was trying to make just now, if the syllable is not the same thing as the letters, does it not follow that it cannot have the letters as parts of itself; otherwise, being the same thing as the letters, it would be neither more nor less knowable than they are?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And it was to avoid that consequence that we supposed the syllable to be different from the letters.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you name anythings, other than its letters, that are parts of a syllable?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not, Socrates. If I admitted that it had any parts, it would surely be absurd to set aside the letters and look for parts of any other kind.

Socrates/ Then, on the present showing, a syllable will be a thing that is absolutely one and cannot be divided into parts of any sort?

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Do you remember then, my dear Theaetetus, our accepting a short while ago a statement that we thought satisfactory—that no account could be given of the primary things of which other things are composed, because each of them, taken just by itself, was incomposite, and that it was not correct to attribute even 'existence' to it, or to call it 'this,' on the ground that these words expressed different things that were extraneous to it, and this was the ground for making the primary thing inexplicable and unknowable?

Theaetetus/ I remember.

Socrates/ Then is not exactly this, and nothing else, the ground of its being simple in nature and indivisible into parts? I can see no other.

Theaetetus/ Evidently there is no other.

Socrates/ Then has not the syllable now turned out to be a thing of the same sort, if it has no parts and is a unitary thing?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ To conclude, then, if, on the one hand, the syllable is the same thing as a number of letters and is a whole with the letters as its parts, then the letters must be neither more nor less knowable and explicable than syllables, since we made out that all the parts are the same thing as the whole.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ But if, on the other hand, the syllable is a unity without parts, syllable and letter likewise are equally incapable of explanation and unknowable. The same reason will make them so.

Theaetetus/ I see no way out of that.

Socrates/ If so, we must not accept this statement—that the syllable can be known and explained, the letter cannot.

Theaetetus/ No, not if we hold by our argument.

Socrates/ And again, would not your own experience in learning your letters rather incline you to accept the opposite view?

Theaetetus/ What view do you mean?

Socrates/ This—that all the time you were learning you were doing nothing else but trying to distinguish by sight or hearing each letter by itself, so as not to be confused by any arrangement of them in spoken or written words.

Theaetetus/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ And in the music school the height of accomplishment lay precisely in being able to follow each

several note and tell which string it belonged to, and notes, as everyone would agree, are the elements of music.

Theaetetus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Then, if we are to argue from our own experience of elements and complexes to other cases, we shall conclude that elements in general yield knowledge that is much clearer than knowledge of the complex and more effective for a complete grasp of anything we seek to know. If anyone tells us that the complex is by its nature knowable, while the element is unknowable, we shall suppose that, whether he intends it or not, he is playing with us.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Indeed we might, I think, find other arguments to prove that point. But we must not allow them to distract our attention from the question before us, namely, what can really be meant by saying that an account added to true belief yields knowledge in its most perfect form.

Theaetetus/ Yes, we must see what that means.

Socrates/ Well then, what is this term 'account' intended to convey to us? I think it must mean one of three things.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The first will be giving overt expression to one's thought by means of vocal sound with names and verbs, casting an image of one's notion on the stream that flows through the lips, like a reflection in a mirror or in water. Do you agree that expression of that sort is an 'account'?

Theaetetus/ I do. We certainly call that expressing ourselves in speech (λέγειν).

Socrates/ On the other hand, that is a thing that anyone can do more or less readily. If a man is not born deaf or dumb, he can signify what he thinks on any subject. So in this sense anyone whatever who has a correct notion

evidently will have it 'with an account,' and there will be no place left anywhere for a correct notion apart from knowledge.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Then we must not be too ready to charge the author of the definition of knowledge now before us with talking nonsense. Perhaps that is not what he meant. He may have meant being able to reply to the question, what any given thing is, by enumerating its elements.

Theaetetus/ For example, Socrates?

Socrates/ For example, Hesiod says about a wagon, 'In a wagon are a hundred pieces of wood.' I could not name them all; no more, I imagine, could you. If we were asked what a wagon is, we should be content if we could mention wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But I dare say he would think us just as ridiculous as if we replied to the question about your own name by telling the syllables. We might think and express ourselves correctly, but we should be absurd if we fancied ourselves to be grammarians and able to give such an account of the name Theaetetus as a grammarian would offer. He would say it is impossible to give a scientific account of anything, short of adding to your true notion a complete catalogue of the elements, as, I think, was said earlier.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it was.

Socrates/ In the same way, he would say, we may have a correct notion of the wagon, but the man who can give a complete statement of its nature by going through those hundred parts has thereby added an account to his correct notion and, in place of mere belief, has arrived at a technical

knowledge of the wagon's nature, by going through all the elements in the whole.

Theaetetus/ Don't you approve, Socrates?

Socrates/ Tell me if you approve, my friend, and whether you accept the view that the complete enumeration of elements is an account of any given thing, whereas description in terms of syllables or of any larger unit still leaves it unaccounted for. Then we can look into the matter further.

Theaetetus/ Well, I do accept that.

Socrates/ Do you think, then, that anyone has knowledge of whatever it may be, when he thinks that one and the same thing is a part sometimes of one thing, sometimes of a different thing, or again when he believes now one and now another thing to be part of one and the same thing?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Have you forgotten, then, that when you first began learning to read and write, that was what you and your schoolfellows did?

Theaetetus/ Do you mean, when we thought that now one letter and now another was part of the same syllable, and when we put the same letter sometimes into the proper syllable, sometimes into another?

Socrates/ That is what I mean.

Theaetetus/ Then I have certainly not forgotten, and I do not think that one has reached knowledge so long as one is in that condition.

Socrates/ Well then, if at that stage you are writing 'Theaetetus' and you think you ought to write T and H and E and do so, and again when you are trying to write 'Theodorus,' you think you ought to write T and E and do so,

can we say that you know the first syllable of your two names?

Theaetetus/ No, we have just agreed that one has not knowledge so long as one is in that condition.

Socrates/ And there is no reason why a person should not be in the same condition with respect to the second, third, and fourth syllables as well?

Theaetetus/ None whatever.

Socrates/ Can we, then, say that whenever in writing 'Theaetetus' he puts down all the letters in order, then he is in possession of the complete catalogue of elements together with correct belief?

Theaetetus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Being still, as we agree, without knowledge, though his beliefs are correct?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Although he possesses the 'account' in addition to right belief. For when he wrote he was in possession of the catalogue of the elements, which we agreed was the 'account.'

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ So, my friend, there is such a thing as right belief together with an account, which is not yet entitled to be called knowledge.

Theaetetus/ I am afraid so.

Socrates/ Then, apparently, our idea that we had found the perfectly true definition of knowledge was no better than a golden dream. Or shall we not condemn the theory yet? Perhaps the meaning to be given to 'account' is not this, but the remaining one of the three, one of which we said must be intended by anyone who defines knowledge as correct belief together with an account.

Theaetetus/ A good reminder. There is still one meaning left. The first was what might be called the image of thought in spoken sound, and the one we have just discussed was going all through the elements to arrive at the whole. What is the third?

Socrates/ The meaning most people would give—being able to name some mark by which the thing one is asked about differs from everything else.

Theaetetus/ Could you give me an example of such an account of a thing?

Socrates/ Take the sun as an example. I dare say you will be satisfied with the account of it as the brightest of the heavenly bodies that go round the earth.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let me explain the point of this example. It is to illustrate what we were just saying—that if you get hold of the difference distinguishing any given thing from all others, then, so some people say, you will have an 'account' of it, whereas, so long as you fix upon something common to other things, your account will embrace all the things that share it.

Theaetetus/ I understand. I agree that what you describe may fairly be called an 'account.'

Socrates/ And if, besides a right notion about a thing, whatever it may be, you also grasp its difference from all other things, you will have arrived at knowledge of what, till then, you had only a notion of.

Theaetetus/ We do say that, certainly.

Socrates/ Really, Theaetetus, now I come to look at this statement at close quarters, it is like a scene painting. I cannot make it out at all, though, so long as I kept at a distance, there seemed to be some sense in it.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? Why so?

Socrates/ I will explain, if I can. Suppose I have a correct notion about you; if I add to that the account of you, then, we are to understand, I know you. Otherwise I have only a notion.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And 'account' means putting your differentness into words.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, at the time when I had only a notion, my mind did not grasp any of the points in which you differ from others?

Theaetetus/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Then I must have had before my mind one of those common things which belong to another person as much as to you.

Theaetetus/ That follows.

Socrates/ But look here! If that was so, how could I possibly be having a notion of you rather than of anyone else? Suppose I was thinking, Theaetetus is one who is a man and has a nose and eyes and a mouth and so forth, enumerating every part of the body. Will thinking in that way result in my thinking of Theaetetus rather than of Theodorus or, as they say, of the man in the street?

Theaetetus/ How should it?

Socrates/ Well, now suppose I think not merely of a man with a nose and eyes, but of one with a snub nose and prominent eyes. Once more shall I be having a notion of you any more than of myself or anyone else of that description?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ In fact, there will be no notion of Theaetetus in my mind, I suppose, until this particular snubness has

stamped and registered within me a record distinct from all the other cases of snubness that I have seen, and so with every other part of you. Then, if I meet you tomorrow, that trait will revive my memory and give me a correct notion about you.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ If that is so, the correct notion of anything must itself include the differentness of that thing.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then what meaning is left for getting hold of an 'account' in addition to the correct notion? If, on the one hand, it means adding the notion of how a thing differs from other things, such an injunction is simply absurd.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ When we have a correct notion of the way in which certain things differ from other things, it tells us to add a correct notion of the way in which they differ from other things. On this showing, the most vicious of circles would be nothing to this injunction. It might better deserve to be called the sort of direction a blind man might give. To tell us to get hold of something we already have, in order to get to know something we are already thinking of, suggests a state of the most absolute darkness.

Theaetetus/ Whereas, if—? The supposition you made just now implied that you would state some alternative. What was it?

Socrates/ If the direction to add an 'account' means that we are to get to know the differentness, as opposed to merely having a notion of it, this most admirable of all definitions of knowledge will be a pretty business, because 'getting to know' means acquiring knowledge, doesn't it?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, apparently, to the question, 'What is knowledge?' our definition will reply, 'Correct belief together with knowledge of a differentness,' for, according to it, 'adding an account' will come to that.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Yes, and when we are inquiring after the nature of knowledge, nothing could be sillier than to say that it is correct belief together with a knowledge of differentness or of anything whatever.

So, Theaetetus, neither perception, nor true belief, nor the addition of an 'account' to true belief can be knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Are we in labor, then, with any further child, my friend, or have we brought to birth all we have to say about knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Indeed we have, and for my part, I have already, thanks to you, given utterance to more than I had in me.

Socrates/ All of which our midwife's skill pronounces to be mere wind eggs and not worth the rearing?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then supposing you should ever henceforth try to conceive afresh, Theaetetus, if you succeed, your embryo thoughts will be the better as a consequence of today's scrutiny, and if you remain barren, you will be gentler and more agreeable to your companions, having the good sense not to fancy you know what you do not know. For that, and no more, is all that my art can effect; nor have I any of that knowledge possessed by all the great and admirable men of our own day or of the past. But this midwife's art is a gift from heaven; my mother had it for women, and I for young men of a generous spirit and for all in whom beauty dwells.

Now I must go to the portico of the King-Archon to meet the indictment which Meletus has drawn up against me. But tomorrow morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again.

Theaetetus.

[OR ON KNOWLEDGE, TENTATIVE]

Translated by Fowler, Harold North.

Persons of the Dialog:

Eucleides, Terpsion,

Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus.

Euclid/ Just in from the country, Terpsion, or did you come some time ago?

Terpsion/ Quite a while ago; and I was looking for you in the market-place and wondering that I could not find you.

Euclid/ Well, you see, I was not in the city.

Terpsion/ Where then?

Euclid/ As I was going down to the harbor I met Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at Corinth.

Terpsion/ Alive or dead?

Euclid/ Just barely alive; for he is suffering severely from wounds, and, worse than that, he has been taken with the sickness that has broken out in the army.

Terpsion/ You mean the dysentery?

Euclid/ Yes.

Terpsion/ What a man he is who you say is in danger!

Euclid/ A noble man, Terpsion, and indeed just now I heard some people praising him highly for his conduct in the battle.

Terpsion/ That is not at all strange; it would have been much more remarkable if he had not so conducted himself. But why did he not stop here in Megara?

Euclid/ He was in a hurry to get home; for I begged and advised him to stop, but he would not. So I went along with him, and as I was coming back I thought of Socrates and wondered at his prophetic gift, especially in what he said about him. For I think he met him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a mere boy, and as a result of acquaintance and conversation with him, he greatly admired his qualities. When I went to Athens he related to me the conversation he had with him, which was well worth hearing, and he said he would surely become a notable man if he lived.

Terpsion/ And he was right, apparently. But what was the talk? Could you relate it?

Euclid/ No, by Zeus, at least not offhand. But I made notes at the time as soon as I reached home, then afterwards at my leisure, as I recalled things, I wrote them down, and whenever I went to Athens I used to ask Socrates about what I could not remember, and then I came here and made corrections; so that I have pretty much the whole talk written down.

Terpsion/ That is true. I heard you say so before; and really I have been waiting about here all along intending to ask you to show it to me. What hinders us from reading it now? Certainly I need to rest, since I have come from the country.

Euclid/ And I myself went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum, so I also should not be sorry to take a rest. Come, let us go, and while we. are resting, the boy shall read to us.

Terpsion/ Very well.

Euclid/ Here is the book, Terpsion. Now this is the way I wrote the conversation; I did not represent Socrates relating it to me, as he did, but conversing with

those with whom he told me he conversed. And he told me they were the geometrician Theodorus and Theaetetus. Now in order that the explanatory words between the speeches might not be annoying in the written account, such as and I said or and I remarked, whenever Socrates spoke, or he agreed or he did not agree, in the case of the interlocutor, I omitted all that sort of thing and represented Socrates himself as talking with them.

Terpsion/ That is quite fitting, Eucleides.

Euclid/ Come, boy, take the book and read.

Socrates/ If I cared more for Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I should ask you about things there and about the people, whether any of the young men there are devoting themselves to geometry or any other form of philosophy; but as it is, since I care less for those people than for the people here, I am more eager to know which of our own young men are likely to gain reputation. These are the things I myself investigate, so far as I can, and about which I question those others with whom I see that the young men like to associate. Now a great many of them come to you, and rightly, for you deserve it on account of your geometry, not to speak of other reasons. So if you have met with any young man who is worth mentioning, I should like to hear about him.

Theodorus/ Truly, Socrates, it is well worthwhile for me to talk and for you to hear about a splendid young fellow, one of your fellow-citizens, whom I have met. Now if he were handsome, I should be very much afraid to speak, lest someone should think I was in love with him. But the fact is—now don't be angry with me—he is not handsome, but is like you in his snub nose and

protruding eyes, only those features are less marked in him than in you. You see I speak fearlessly. But I assure you that among all the young men I have ever met—and I have had to do with a great many—I never yet found one of such marvelously fine qualities. He is quick to learn, beyond almost anyone else, yet exceptionally gentle, and moreover brave beyond any other; I should not have supposed such a combination existed, and I do not see it elsewhere. On the contrary, those who, like him, have quick, sharp minds and good memories, have usually also quick tempers; they dart off and are swept away, like ships without ballast; they are excitable rather than courageous; those, on the other hand, who are steadier are somewhat dull when brought face to face with learning, and are very forgetful. But this boy advances toward learning and investigation smoothly and surely and successfully, with perfect gentleness, like a stream of oil that flows without a sound, so that one marvels how he accomplishes all this at his age.

Socrates/ That is good news; but which of our citizens is his father?

Theodorus/ I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However, it does not matter, for the youth is the middle one of those who are now coming toward us. He and those friends of his were anointing themselves in the outer course and now they seem to have finished and to be coming here. See if you recognize him.

Socrates/ Yes, I do. He is the son of Euphronius of Suniuni, who is a man of just the sort you describe, and of good repute in other respects; moreover he left a very large property. But the youths name I do not know.

Theodorus/ Theaetetus is his name, Socrates; but I believe the property was squandered by trustees. Nevertheless, Socrates, he is remarkably liberal with his money, too.

Socrates/ It is a noble man that you describe. Now please tell him to come here and sit by us.

Theodorus/ I will. Theaetetus, come here to Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, do so, Theaetetus, that I may look at myself and see what sort of a face I have; for Theodorus says it is like yours. Now if we each had a lyre, and he said we had tuned them to the same key, should we take his word for it without more ado, or should we inquire first whether he who said it was a musician?

Theaetetus/ We should inquire.

Socrates/ Then if we found that he was a musician, we should believe him, but if not, we should refuse to take his word?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But now, if we are concerned about the likeness of our faces, we must consider whether he who speaks is a painter, or not.

Theaetetus/ I think we must.

Socrates/ Well, is Theodorus a painter?

Theaetetus/ Not so far as I know.

Socrates/ Nor a geometrician, either?

Theaetetus/ Oh yes, decidedly, Socrates.

Socrates/ And an astronomer, and an arithmetician, and a musician, and in general an educated man?

Theaetetus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Well then, if he says, either in praise or blame, that we have some physical resemblance, it is not especially worthwhile to pay attention to him.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ But what if he should praise the soul of one of us for virtue and wisdom? Is it not worthwhile for the one who hears to examine eagerly the one who is praised, and for that one to exhibit his qualities with eagerness?

Theaetetus/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, my dear Theaetetus, this is just the time for you to exhibit your qualities and for me to examine them; for I assure you that Theodorus, though he has praised many foreigners and citizens to me, never praised anyone as he praised you just now.

Theaetetus/ A good idea, Socrates; but make sure that he was not speaking in jest.

Socrates/ That is not Theodorus's way. But do not seek to draw back from your agreement on the pretext that he is jesting, or he will be forced to testify under oath; for certainly no one will accuse him of perjury. Come, be courageous and hold to the agreement.

Theaetetus/ I suppose I must, if you say so.

Socrates/ Now tell me; I suppose you learn some geometry from Theodorus?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And astronomy and harmony and arithmetic?

Theaetetus/ I try hard to do so.

Socrates/ And so do I, my boy, from him and from any others who think know anything about these things. But nevertheless, although in other respects I get on fairly well in them, yet I am in doubt about one little matter, which should be investigated with your

help and that of these others. Tell me, is not learning growing wiser about that which one learns?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And the wise, I suppose, are wise by wisdom.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does this differ at all from knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Does what differ?

Socrates/ Wisdom. Or are not people wise in that of which they have knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then knowledge and wisdom are the same thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is. Can we tell that? What do you say? Who of us will speak first? And he who fails, and whoever fails in turn, shall go and sit down and be donkey, as the children say when they play ball; and whoever gets through without failing shall be our king and shall order us to answer any questions he pleases. Why are you silent? I hope, Theodorus, I am not rude, through my love of discussion and my eagerness to make us converse and show ourselves friends and ready to talk to one another.

Theodorus/ That sort of thing would not be at all rude, Socrates; but tell one of the youths to answer your questions; for I am unused to such conversation and, moreover, I am not of an age to accustom myself to it. But that would be fitting for these young men, and they would improve much more than I; for the fact is, youth

admits of improvement in every way. Come, question Theaetetus as you began to do, and do not let him off.

Socrates/ Well, Theaetetus, you hear what Theodorus says, and I think you will not wish to disobey him, nor is it right for a young person to disobey a wise man when he gives instructions about such matters. Come, speak up well and nobly. What do you think knowledge is?

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, I must, since you bid me. For if I make a mistake, you are sure to set me right.

Socrates/ Certainly, if we can.

Theaetetus/ Well then, I think the things one might learn from Theodorus are knowledge—geometry and all the things you spoke of just now—and also cobblery and the other craftsmen's arts; each and all of these are nothing else but knowledge.

Socrates/ You are noble and generous, my friend, for when you are asked for one thing you give many, and a variety of things instead of a simple answer.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Nothing, perhaps; but I will tell you what I think I mean. When you say cobblery you speak of nothing else than the art of making shoes, do you?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ And when you say carpentry? Do you mean anything else than the art of making wooden furnishings?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else by that, either.

Socrates/ Then in both cases you define that to which each form of knowledge belongs?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the question, Theaetetus, was not to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge are; for we did not wish to number them, but to find out what knowledge itself really is. Or is there nothing in what I say?

Theaetetus/ Nay, you are quite right.

Socrates/ Take this example. If anyone should ask us about some common everyday thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should reply that it is the potters clay and the oven-makers clay and the brick-maker's clay, should we not be ridiculous?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Yes; in the first place for assuming that the questioner can understand from our answer what clay is, when we say clay, no matter whether we add the image-makers or any other craftsmen. Or does anyone, do you think, understand the name of anything when he does not know what the thing is?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then he does not understand knowledge of shoes if he does not know knowledge.

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Then he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand cobblery or any other art.

Theaetetus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then it is a ridiculous answer to the question what is knowledge? when we give the name of some art; for we give in our answer something that knowledge belongs to, when that was not what we were asked.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Secondly, when we might have given a short, everyday answer, we go an interminable distance round; for instance, in the question about clay, the everyday, simple thing would be to say “clay is earth mixed with moisture” without regard to whose clay it is.

Theaetetus/ It seems easy just now, Socrates, as you put it; but you are probably asking the kind of thing that came up among us lately when your namesake, Socrates here, and I were talking together.

Socrates/ What kind of thing was that, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Theodorus here was drawing some figures for us in illustration of roots, showing that squares containing three square feet and five square feet are not commensurable in length with the unit of the foot, and so, selecting each one in its turn up to the square containing seventeen square feet; and at that he stopped. Now it occurred to us, since the number of roots appeared to be infinite, to try to collect them under one name, by which we could henceforth call all the roots.

Socrates/ And did you find such a name?

Theaetetus/ I think we did. But see if you agree.

Socrates/ Speak on.

Theaetetus/ We divided all number into two classes. The one, the numbers which can be formed by multiplying equal factors, we represented by the shape of the square and called square or equilateral numbers.

Socrates/ Well done!

Theaetetus/ The numbers between these, such as three and five and all numbers which cannot be formed by multiplying equal factors, but only by multiplying a greater by a less or a less by a greater, and are therefore always contained in unequal sides, we represented by

the shape of the oblong rectangle and called oblong numbers.

Socrates/ Very good; and what next?

Theaetetus/ All the lines which form the four sides of the equilateral or square numbers we called lengths, and those which form the oblong numbers we called surds, because they are not commensurable with the others in length, but only in the areas of the planes which they have the power to form. And similarly in the case of solids.

Socrates/ Most excellent, my boys! I think Theodorus will not be found liable to an action for false witness.

Theaetetus/ But really, Socrates, I cannot answer that question of yours about knowledge, as we answered the question about length and square roots. And yet you seem to me to want something of that kind. So Theodorus appears to be a false witness after all.

Socrates/ Nonsense! If he were praising your running and said he had never met any young man who was so good a runner, and then you were beaten in a race by a full grown man who held the record, do you think his praise would be any less truthful?

Theaetetus/ Why, no.

Socrates/ And do you think that the discovery of knowledge, as I was just now saying, is a small matter and not a task for the very ablest men?

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, I think it is a task for the very ablest.

Socrates/ Then you must have confidence in yourself, and believe that Theodorus is right, and try earnestly in every way to gain an understanding of the nature of knowledge as well as of other things.

Theaetetus/ If it is a question of earnestness, Socrates, the truth will come to light.

Socrates/ Well then—for you pointed out the way admirably just now—take your answer about the roots as a model, and just as you embraced them all in one class, though they were many, try to designate the many forms of knowledge by one definition.

Theaetetus/ But I assure you, Socrates, I have often tried to work that out, when I heard reports of the questions that you asked, but I can neither persuade myself that I have any satisfactory answer, nor can I find anyone else who gives the kind of answer you insist upon; and yet, on the other hand, cannot get rid of a feeling of concern about the matter.

Socrates/ Yes, you are suffering the pangs of labor, Theaetetus, because you are not empty, but pregnant.

Theaetetus/ I do not know, Socrates; I merely tell you what I feel.

Socrates/ Have you then not heard, you absurd boy, that I am the son of a noble and burly midwife, Phaenarete?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I have heard that.

Socrates/ And have you also heard that I practice the same art?

Theaetetus/ No, never.

Socrates/ But I assure you it is true; only do not tell on me to the others; for it is not known that I possess this art. But other people, since they do not know it, do not say this of me, but say that I am a most eccentric person and drive men to distraction. Have you heard that also?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you the reason then?

Theaetetus/ Oh yes, do.

Socrates/ Just take into consideration the whole business of the midwives, and you will understand more easily what I mean. For you know, I suppose, that no one of them attends other women while she is still capable of conceiving and bearing, but only those do so who have become too old to bear.

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ They say the cause of this is Artemis, because she, a childless goddess, has had childbirth allotted to her as her special province. Now it would seem she did not allow barren women to be midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an art which deals with matters of which it has no experience, but she gave the office to those who on account of age were not bearing children, honoring them for their likeness to herself.

Theaetetus/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Is it not, then, also likely and even necessary, that midwives should know better than anyone else who are pregnant and who are not?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And furthermore, the midwives, by means of drugs and incantations, are able to arouse the pangs of labor and, if they wish, to make them milder, and to cause those to bear who have difficulty in bearing; and they cause miscarriages if they think them desirable.

Theaetetus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Well, have you noticed this also about them, that they are the most skillful of matchmakers,

since they are very wise in knowing what union of man and woman will produce the best possible children?

Theaetetus/ I do not know that at all.

Socrates/ But be assured that they are prouder of this than of their skill in cutting the umbilical cord. Just consider. Do you think the knowledge of what soil is best for each plant or seed belongs to the same art as the tending and harvesting of the fruits of the earth, or to another?

Theaetetus/ To the same art.

Socrates/ And in the case of a woman, do you think, my friend, that there is one art for the sowing and another for the harvesting?

Theaetetus/ It is not likely.

Socrates/ No; but because there is a wrongful and unscientific way of bringing men and women together, which is called pandering, the midwives, since they are women of dignity and worth, avoid match-making, through fear of falling under the charge of pandering. And yet the true midwife is the only proper match-maker.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ So great, then, is the importance of midwives; but their function is less important than mine. For women do not, like my patients, bring forth at one time real children and at another mere images which it is difficult to distinguish from the real. For if they did, the greatest and noblest part of the work of the mid wives would be in distinguishing between the real and the false. Do you not think so?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ All that is true of their art of midwifery is true also of mine, but mine differs from theirs in being practiced upon men, not women, and in tending their souls in labor, not their bodies. But the greatest thing about my art is this, that it can test in every way whether the mind of the young man is bringing forth a mere image, an imposture, or a real and genuine offspring. For I have this in common with the midwives; I am sterile in point of wisdom, and the reproach which has often been brought against me, that I question others but make no reply myself about anything, because I have no wisdom in me, is a true reproach; and the reason of it is this; the god compels me to act as midwife, but has never allowed me to bring forth. I am, then, not at all a wise person myself, nor have I any wise invention, the offspring born of my own soul; but those who associate with me, although at first some of them seem very ignorant, yet, as our acquaintance advances, all of them to whom the god is gracious make wonderful progress, not only in their own opinion, but in that of others as well. And it is clear that they do this, not because they have ever learned anything from me, but because they have found in themselves many fair things and have brought them forth. But the delivery is due to the god and me. And the proof of it is this; many before now, being ignorant of this fact and thinking that they were themselves the cause of their success, but despising me, have gone away from me sooner than they ought, whether of their own accord or because others persuaded them to do so. Then, after they have gone away, they have miscarried thenceforth on account of evil companionship, and the offspring which they had brought forth through my assistance they have reared so badly that they have lost it; they have considered

impostures and images of more importance than the truth, and at last it was evident to themselves, as well as to others, that they were ignorant. One of these was Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, and there are very many more. When such men come back and beg me, as they do, with wonderful eagerness to let them join me again, the spiritual monitor that comes to me forbids me to associate with some of them, but allows me to converse with others, and these again make progress. Now those who associate with me are in this matter also like women in childbirth; they are in pain and are full of trouble night and day, much more than are the women; and my art can arouse this pain and cause it to cease. Well, that is what happens to them. But in some cases, Theaetetus, when they do not seem to me to be exactly pregnant, since I see that they have no need of me, I act with perfect goodwill as match-maker and, under God, I guess very successfully with whom they can associate profitably, and I have handed over many of them to Prodicus, and many to other wise and inspired men.

Now I have said all this to you at such length, my dear boy, because I suspect that you, as you yourself believe, are in pain because you are pregnant with something within you. Apply, then, to me, remembering that I am the son of a midwife and have myself a midwifes gifts, and do your best to answer the questions I ask as I ask them. And if, when I have examined any of the things you say, it should prove that I think it is a mere image and not real, and therefore quietly take it from you and throw it away, do not be angry as women are when they are deprived of their first offspring. For many, my dear friend, before this have got into such a state of mind towards me that they are actually ready

to bite me, if I take some foolish notion away from them, and they do not believe that I do this in kindness, since they are far from knowing that no god is unkind to mortals, and that I do nothing of this sort from unkindness, either, and that it is quite out of the question for me to allow an imposture or to destroy the true. And so, Theaetetus, begin again and try to tell us what knowledge is. And never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills it and gives you courage, you will be able.

Theaetetus/ Well then, Socrates, since you are so urgent it would be disgraceful for anyone not to exert himself in every way to say what he can. I think, then, that he who knows anything perceives that which he knows, and, as it appears at present, knowledge is nothing else than perception.

Socrates/ Good! Excellent, my boy! That is the way one ought to speak out. But come now, let us examine your utterance together, and see whether it is a real offspring or a mere wind-egg. Perception, you say, is knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And, indeed, if I may venture to say so, it is not a bad description of knowledge that you have given, but one which Protagoras also used to give. Only, he has said the same thing in a different way For he says somewhere that man is the "measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and the non-existence of the things that are not." You have read that, I suppose?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I have read it often.

Socrates/ Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me such as they appear to me,

and for you in turn such as they appear to you—you and I being man?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is what he says.

Socrates/ It is likely that a wise man is not talking nonsense; so let us follow after him. Is it not true, that sometimes, when the same wind blows, one of us feels cold, and the other does not? or one feels slightly and the other exceedingly cold?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then in that case, shall we say that the wind is in itself cold or not cold; or shall we accept Protagoras's saying that it is cold for him who feels cold and not for him who does not?

Theaetetus/ Apparently we shall accept that.

Socrates/ Then it also seems cold, or not, to each of the two?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But "seems" denotes perceiving?

Theaetetus/ It does.

Socrates/ Then seeming and perception are the same thing in matters of warmth and everything of that sort. For as each person perceives things, such they are to each person.

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Perception, then, is always of that which exists and, since it is knowledge, cannot be false.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ By the Graces! I wonder if Protagoras, who was a very wise man, did not utter this dark saying to the common herd like ourselves, and tell the truth in secret to his pupils.

Theaetetus/ Why, Socrates, what do you mean by that?

Socrates/ I will tell you and it is not a bad description, either, that nothing is one and invariable, and you could not rightly ascribe any quality whatsoever to anything, but if you call it large it will also appear to be small, and light if you call it heavy, and everything else in the same way, since nothing whatever is one, either a particular thing or of a particular quality; but it is out of movement and motion and mixture with one another that all those things become which we wrongly say "are"—wrongly, because nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And on this subject all the philosophers, except Parmenides, may be marshaled in one line—Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles—and the chief poets in the two kinds of poetry, Epicharmus, in comedy, and in tragedy, Homer, who, in the line Oceanus the origin of the gods, and Tethys their mother has said that all things are the offspring of flow and motion; or don't you think he means that?

Theaetetus/ I think he does.

Socrates/ Then who could still contend with such a great host, led by Homer as general, and not make himself ridiculous?

Theaetetus/ It is not easy, Socrates.

Socrates/ No, Theaetetus, it is not. For the doctrine is amply proved by this, namely, that motion is the cause of that which passes for existence, that is, of becoming, whereas rest is the cause of non-existence and destruction; for warmth or fire, which, you know, is the parent and preserver of all other things, is itself

the offspring of movement and friction, and these two are forms of motion. Or are not these the source of fire?

Theaetetus/ Yes, they are.

Socrates/ And furthermore, the animal kingdom is sprung from these same sources.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, then, is not the bodily habit destroyed by rest and idleness, and preserved, generally speaking, by gymnastic exercises and motions?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what of the habit of the soul? Does not the soul acquire information and is it not preserved and made better through learning and practice, which are motions, whereas through rest, which is want of practice and of study, it learns nothing and forgets what it has learned?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the good, both for the soul and for the body, is motion, and rest is the opposite?

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Now shall I go on and mention to you also windless air, calm sea, and all that sort of thing, and say that stillness causes decay and destruction and that the opposite brings preservation? And shall I add to this the all-compelling and crowning argument that Homer by the "golden chain" refers to nothing else than the sun, and means that so long as the heavens and the sun go round everything exists and is preserved, among both gods and men, but if the motion should stop, as if bound fast, everything would be destroyed and would, as the saying is, be turned upside down?

Theaetetus/ Yes, Socrates, I think he means what you say he does.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, you must apply the doctrine in this way; first as concerns vision, the color that you call white is not to be taken as something separate outside of your eyes, nor yet as something inside of them; and you must not assign any place to it, for then it would at once be in a definite position and stationary and would have no part in the process of becoming.

Theaetetus/ But what do you mean?

Socrates/ Let us stick close to the statement we made a moment ago, and assume that nothing exists by itself as invariably one; then it will be apparent that black or white or any other color whatsoever is the result of the impact of the eye upon the appropriate motion, and therefore that which we call color will be in each instance neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something between, which has occurred, peculiar to each individual. Or would you maintain that each color appears to a dog, or any other animal you please, just as it does to you?

Theaetetus/ No, by Zeus, I wouldn't.

Socrates/ Well, does anything whatsoever appear the same to any other man as to you? Are you sure of this? Or are you not much more convinced that nothing appears the same even to you, because you yourself are never exactly the same?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I am much more convinced of the last.

Socrates/ Then, if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I touch, were really large or white or hot, it would never have become different by coming in

contact with something different, without itself changing; and if, on the other hand, that which did the comparing or the touching were really large or white or hot, it would not have become different when something different approached it or was affected in some way by it, without being affected in some way itself. For nowadays, my friend, we find ourselves rather easily forced to make extraordinary and absurd statements, as Protagoras and everyone who undertakes to agree with him would say.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? What statements?

Socrates/ Take a little example and you will know all I have in mind. Given six dice, for instance, if you compare four with them, we say that they are more than the four, half as many again, but if you compare twelve with them, we say they are less, half as many; and any other statement would be inadmissible; or would you admit any other?

Theaetetus/ Not I.

Socrates/ Well then, if Protagoras, or anyone else, ask you, "Theaetetus, can anything become greater or more in any other way than by being increased?" what reply will you make?

Theaetetus/ If I am to say what I think, Socrates, with reference to the present question, I should say "no," but if I consider the earlier question, I should say "yes," for fear of contradicting myself.

Socrates/ Good, by Hera! Excellent, my friend! But apparently, if you answer "yes" it will be in the Euripidean spirit; for our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Well, if you and I were clever and wise and had found out everything about the mind, we should henceforth spend the rest of our time testing each other out of the fullness of our wisdom, rushing together like sophists in a sophistical combat, battering each other's arguments with counter arguments. But, as it is, since we are ordinary people, we shall wish in the first place to look into the real essence of our thoughts and see whether they harmonize with one another or not at all.

Theaetetus/ Certainly that is what I should like.

Socrates/ And so should I. But since this is the case, and we have plenty of time, shall we not quietly, without any impatience, but truly examining ourselves, consider again the nature of these appearances within us? And as we consider them, I shall say, I think, first, that nothing can ever become more or less in size or number, so long as it remains equal to itself. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And secondly, that anything to which nothing is added and from which nothing is subtracted, is neither increased nor diminished, but is always equal.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And should we not say thirdly, that what was not previously could not afterwards be without becoming and having become?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I agree.

Socrates/ These three assumptions contend with one another in our minds when we talk about the dice, or when we say that I, who do not, at my age, either increase in size or diminish, am in the course of a year first larger than you, who are young, and afterwards smaller, when nothing has been taken from my size, but

you have grown. For I am, it seems, afterwards what I was not before, and I have not become so; for it is impossible to have become without becoming, and without losing anything of my size I could not become smaller. And there are countless myriads of such contradictions, if we are to accept these that I have mentioned. You follow me, I take it, Theaetetus, for I think you are not new at such things.

Theaetetus/ By the gods, Socrates, I am lost in wonder when I think of all these things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim.

Socrates/ Theodorus seems to be a pretty good guesser about your nature. For this feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy, and he who said that Iris was the child of Thaumas made a good genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so, according to the doctrine we attribute to Protagoras, or do you not as yet?

Theaetetus/ Not yet, I think.

Socrates/ And will you be grateful to me if I help you to search out the hidden truth of the thought of a famous man or, I should say, of famous men?

Theaetetus/ Of course I shall be grateful, very grateful.

Socrates/ Look round and see that none of the uninitiated is listening. The uninitiated are those who think nothing is except what they can grasp firmly with their hands, and who deny the existence of actions and generation and all that is invisible.

Theaetetus/ Truly, Socrates, those you speak of are very stubborn and perverse mortals.

Socrates/ So they are, my boy, quite without culture. But others are more clever, whose secret doctrines I am going to disclose to you. For them the beginning, upon which all the things we were just now speaking of depend, is the assumption that everything is really motion and that there is nothing besides this, but that there are two kinds of motion, each infinite in the number of its manifestations, and of these kinds one has an active, the other a passive force. From the union and friction of these two are born offspring, infinite in number, but always twins, the object of sense and the sense which is always born rind brought forth together with the object of sense. Now we give the senses names like these; sight and hearing and smell, and the sense of cold and of heat, and pleasures and pains and desires and fears and so forth. Those that have names are very numerous, and those that are unnamed are innumerable. Now the class of objects of sense is akin to each of these; all sorts of colors are akin to all sorts of acts of vision, and in the same way sounds to acts of hearing, and the other objects of sense spring forth akin to the other senses. What does this tale mean for us, Theaetetus, with reference to what was said before? Do you see?

Theaetetus/ Not quite, Socrates.

Socrates/ Just listen; perhaps we can finish the tale. It means, of course, that all these things are, as we were saying, in motion, and their motion has in it either swiftness or slowness. Now the slow element keeps its motion in the same place and directed towards such things as draw near it, and indeed it is in this way that it begets. But the things begotten in this way are quicker; for they move from one place to another, and their motion is naturally from one place to another. Now

when the eye and some appropriate object which approaches beget whiteness and the corresponding perception—which could never have been produced by either of them going to anything else—then, while sight from the eye and whiteness from that which helps to produce the color are moving from one to the other, the eye becomes full of sight and so begins at that moment to see, and becomes, certainly not sight, but a seeing eye, and the object which joined in begetting the color is filled with whiteness and becomes in its turn, not whiteness, but white, whether it be a stick or a stone, or whatever it be the hue of which is so colored. And all the rest—hard and hot and so forth—must be regarded in the same way; we must assume, we said before, that nothing exists in itself, but all things of all sorts arise out of motion by intercourse with each other; for it is, as they say, impossible to form a firm conception of the active or the passive element as being anything separately; for there is no active element until there is a union with the passive element, nor is there a passive element until there is a union with the active; and that which unites with one thing is active and appears again as passive when it comes in contact with something else. And so it results from all this, as we said in the beginning, that nothing exists as invariably one, itself by itself, but everything is always becoming in relation to something, and "being" should be altogether abolished, though we have often—and even just now—been compelled by custom and ignorance to use the word. But we ought not, the wise men say, to permit the use of "something" or "somebody's" or "mine" or "this' or "that" or any other word that implies making things stand still, but in accordance with nature we should speak of things as "becoming" and "being made" and

“being destroyed” and “changing;” for anyone who by his mode of speech makes things stand still is easily refuted. And we must use such expressions in relation both to particular objects and collective designations, among which are “mankind” and “stone” and the names of every animal and class. Do these doctrines seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and do you find their taste agreeable?

Theaetetus/ I don’t know, Socrates; besides, I can’t tell about you, either, whether you are preaching them because you believe them or to test me.

Socrates/ You forget, my friend, that I myself know nothing about such things, and claim none of them as mine, but am incapable of bearing them and am merely acting as a midwife to you, and for that reason am uttering incantations and giving you a taste of each of the philosophical theories, until I may help to bring your own opinion to light. And when it is brought to light, I will examine it and see whether it is a mere wind-egg or a real offspring. So be brave and patient, and in good and manly fashion tell what you think in reply to my questions.

Theaetetus/ Very well; ask them.

Socrates/ Then say once more whether the doctrine pleases you that nothing is, but is always becoming—good or beautiful or any of the other qualities we were just enumerating.

Theaetetus/ Why, when I hear you telling about it as you did, it seems to me that it is wonderfully reasonable and ought to be accepted as you have presented it.

Socrates/ Let us, then, not neglect a point in which it is defective. The defect is found in connection with dreams and diseases, including insanity, and everything else that is said to cause illusions of sight and hearing and the other senses. For of course you know that in all these the doctrine we were just presenting seems admittedly to be refuted, because in them we certainly have false perceptions, and it is by no means true that everything is to each man which appears to him; on the contrary, nothing is which appears.

Theaetetus/ What you say is very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ What argument is left, then, my boy, for the man who says that perception is knowledge and that in each case the things which appear are to the one to whom they appear?

Theaetetus/ I hesitate to say, Socrates, that I have no reply to make, because you scolded me just now when I said that. But really I cannot dispute that those who are insane or dreaming have false opinions, when some of them think they are gods and others fancy in their sleep that they have wings and are flying.

Socrates/ Don't you remember, either, the similar dispute about these errors, especially about sleeping and waking?

Theaetetus/ What dispute?

Socrates/ One which I fancy you have often heard. The question is asked, what proof you could give if anyone should ask us now, at the present moment, whether we are asleep and our thoughts are a dream, or whether we are awake and talking with each other in a waking condition.

Theaetetus/ Really, Socrates, I don't see what proof can be given; for there is an exact correspondence in all particulars, as between the strophe and antistrophe of a choral song. Take, for instance, the conversation we have just had; there is nothing to prevent us from imagining in our sleep also that we are carrying on this conversation with each other, and when in a dream we imagine that we are relating dreams, the likeness between the one talk and the other is remarkable.

Socrates/ So you see it is not hard to dispute the point, since it is even open to dispute whether we are awake or in a dream. Now since the time during which we are asleep is equal to that during which we are awake,. in each state our spirit contends that the semblances that appear to it at any time are certainly true, so that for half the time we say that this is true, and for half the time the other, and we maintain each with equal confidence.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And may not, then, the same be said about insanity and the other diseases, except that the time is not equal?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, then, shall truth be determined by the length or shortness of time?

Theaetetus/ That would be absurd in many ways.

Socrates/ But can you show clearly in any other way which of the two sets of opinions is true?

Theaetetus/ I do not think I can.

Socrates/ Listen, then, while I tell you what would be said about them by those who maintain that what appears at any time is true for him to whom it appears. They begin, I imagine, by asking this question;

“Theaetetus, can that which is wholly other have in any way the same quality as its alternative? And we must not assume that the thing in question is partially the same and partially other, but wholly other.”

Theaetetus/ It is impossible for it to be the same in anything, either in quality or in any other respect whatsoever, when it is wholly other.

Socrates/ Must we not, then, necessarily agree that such a thing is also unlike?

Theaetetus/ It seems so to me.

Socrates/ Then if anything happens to become like or unlike anything—either itself or anything else—we shall say that when it becomes like it becomes the same, and when it becomes unlike it becomes other?

Theaetetus/ We must.

Socrates/ Well, we said before, did we not, that the active elements were many—infinite in fact—and likewise the passive elements?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And furthermore, that any given element, by uniting at different times with different partners, will beget, not the same, but other results?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, let us take me, or you, or anything else at hand, and apply the same principle—say Socrates in health and Socrates in illness. Shall we say the one is like the other, or unlike?

Theaetetus/ When you say “Socrates in illness” do you mean to compare that Socrates as a whole with Socrates in health as a whole?

Socrates/ You understand perfectly; that is just what I mean.

Theaetetus/ Unlike, I imagine.

Socrates/ And therefore other, inasmuch as unlike?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And you would say the same of Socrates asleep or in any of the other states we enumerated just now?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then each of those elements which by the law of their nature act upon something else, will, when it gets hold of Socrates in health, find me one object to act upon, and when it gets hold of me in illness, another?

Theaetetus/ How can it help it?

Socrates/ And so, in the two cases, that active element and I, who am the passive element, shall each produce a different object?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ So, then, when I am in health and drink wine, it seems pleasant and sweet to me?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The reason is, in fact, that according to the principles we accepted a while ago, the active and passive elements produce sweetness and perception, both of which are simultaneously moving from one place to another, and the perception, which comes from the passive element, makes the tongue perceptive, and the sweetness, which comes from the wine and pervades it, passes over and makes the wine both to be and to seem sweet to the tongue that is in health.

Theaetetus/ Certainly, such are the principles we accepted a while ago.

Socrates/ But when it gets hold of me in illness, in the first place, it really doesn't get hold of the same man, does it? For he to whom it comes is certainly unlike.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Therefore the union of the Socrates who is ill and the draught of wine produces other results; in the tongue the sensation or perception of bitterness, and in the wine—a bitterness which is engendered there and passes over into the other; the wine is made, not bitterness, but bitter, and I am made, not perception, but perceptive.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then I shall never have this perception of any other thing; for a perception of another thing is another perception, and makes the percipient different and other; nor can that which acts on me ever by union with another produce the same result or become the same in kind; for by producing another result from another passive element it will become different in kind.

Theaetetus/ That is true.

Socrates/ And neither shall I, furthermore, ever again become the same as I am, nor will that ever become the same as it is.

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ And yet, when I become percipient, I must necessarily become percipient of something, for it is impossible to become percipient and perceive nothing; and that which is perceived must become so to someone, when it becomes sweet or bitter or the like; for to become sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible.

Theaetetus/ Perfectly true.

Socrates/ The result, then, I think, is that we (the active and the passive elements) are or become, whichever is the case, in relation to one another, since we are bound to one another by the inevitable law of our being, but to nothing else, not even to ourselves. The result, then, is that we are bound to one another; and so if a man says anything "is," he must say it is to or of or in relation to something, and similarly if he says it "becomes;" but he must not say it is or becomes absolutely, nor can he accept such a statement from anyone else. That is the meaning of the doctrine we have been describing.

Theaetetus/ Yes, quite so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, since that which acts on me is to me and to me only, it is also the case that I perceive it, and I only?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then to me my perception is true; for in each case it is always part of my being; and I am, as Protagoras says, the judge of the existence of the things that are to me and of the non-existence of those that are not to me.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ How, then, if I am an infallible judge and my mind never stumbles in regard to the things that are or that become, can I fail to know that which I perceive?

Theaetetus/ You cannot possibly fail.

Socrates/ Therefore you were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heracleitus and all their followers—that all things are in motion, like streams—the doctrine of the great philosopher Protagoras that man is the measure

of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, since these things are true, perception is knowledge. Eh, Theaetetus? Shall we say that this is, so to speak, your new-born child and the result of my midwifery? Or what shall we say?

Theaetetus/ We must say that, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, we have at last managed to bring this forth, whatever it turns out to be; and now that it is born, we must in very truth perform the rite of running round with it in a circle—the circle of our argument—and see whether it may not turn out to be after all not worth rearing, but only a wind-egg, an imposture. But, perhaps, you think that any offspring of yours ought to be cared for and not put away; or will you bear to see it examined and not get angry if it is taken away from you, though it is your first-born?

Theodorus/ Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates, for he is not at all ill-tempered. But for heaven's sake, Socrates, tell me, is all this wrong after all?

Socrates/ You are truly fond of argument, Theodorus, and a very good fellow to think that I am a sort of bag full of arguments and can easily pull one out and say that after all the other one was wrong; but you do not understand what is going on; none of the arguments comes from me, but always from him who is talking with me. I myself know nothing, except just a little, enough to extract an argument from another man who is wise and to receive it fairly. And now I will try to extract this thought from Theaetetus, but not to say anything myself.

Theodorus/ That is the better way, Socrates; do as you say.

Socrates/ Do you know, then, Theodorus, what amazes me in your friend Protagoras?

Theodorus/ What is it?

Socrates/ In general I like his doctrine that what appears to each one is to him, but I am amazed by the beginning of his book. I don't see why he does not say in the beginning of his *Truth* that a pig or a dog-faced baboon or some still stranger creature of those that have sensations is the measure of all things. Then he might have begun to speak to us very imposingly and condescendingly, showing that while we were honoring him like a god for his wisdom, he was after all no better in intellect than any other man, or, for that matter, than a tadpole. What alternative is there, Theodorus? For if that opinion is true to each person which he acquires through sensation, and no one man can discern another's condition better than he himself, and one man has no better right to investigate whether another's opinion is true or false than he himself, but, as we have said several times, each man is to form his own opinions by himself, and these opinions are always right and true, why in the world, my friend, was Protagoras wise, so that he could rightly be thought worthy to be the teacher of other men and to be well paid, and why were we ignorant creatures and obliged to go to school to him, if each person is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not believe that Protagoras was "playing to the gallery" in saying this? I say nothing of the ridicule that I and my science of midwifery deserve in that case, — and, I should say, the whole practice of dialectics, too. For would not the investigation of one another's fancies and opinions, and the attempt to refute them, when each mans must be right, be tedious and blatant folly,

if the *Truth* of Protagoras is true and he was not jesting when he uttered his oracles from the shrine of his book?

Theodorus/ Socrates, the man was my friend, as you just remarked. So I should hate to bring about the refutation of Protagoras by agreeing with you, and I should hate also to oppose you contrary to my real convictions. So take Theaetetus again; especially as he seemed just now to follow your suggestions very carefully.

Socrates/ If you went to Sparta, Theodorus, and visited the wrestling-schools, would you think it fair to look on at other people naked, some of whom were of poor physique, without stripping and showing your own form, too?

Theodorus/ Why not, if I could persuade them to allow me to do so? So now I think I shall persuade you to let me be a spectator, and not to drag me into the ring, since I am old and stiff, but to take the younger and nimbler man as your antagonist.

Socrates/ Well, Theodorus, if that pleases you, it does not displease me, as the saying is. So I must attack the wise Theaetetus again. Tell me, Theaetetus, referring to the doctrine we have just expounded, do you not share my amazement at being suddenly exalted to an equality with the wisest man, or even god? Or do you think Protagoras's "measure" applies any less to gods than to men?

Theaetetus/ By no means; and I am amazed that you ask such a question at all; for when we were discussing the meaning of the doctrine that whatever appears to each one really is to him, I thought it was good; but now it has suddenly changed to the opposite.

Socrates/ You are young, my dear boy; so you are quickly moved and swayed by popular oratory. For in reply to what I have said, Protagoras, or someone speaking for him, will say, Excellent boys and old men, there you sit together declaiming to the people, and you bring in the gods, the question of whose existence or non-existence I exclude from oral and written discussion, and you say the sort of thing that the crowd would readily accept—that it is a terrible thing if every man is to be no better than any beast in point of wisdom; but you do not advance any cogent proof whatsoever; you base your statements on probability. If Theodorus, or any other geometrician, should base his geometry on probability, he would be of no account at all. So you and Theodorus had better consider whether you will accept arguments founded on plausibility and probabilities in such important matters.

Theaetetus/ That would not be right, Socrates; neither you nor we would think so.

Socrates/ Apparently, then, you and Theodorus mean we must look at the matter in a different way.

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly in a different way.

Socrates/ Well, then, let us look at it in this way, raising the question whether knowledge is after all the same as perception, or different. For that is the object of all our discussion, and it was to answer that question that we stirred up all these strange doctrines, was it not?

Theaetetus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Shall we then agree that all that we perceive by sight or hearing we know? For instance, shall we say that before having learned the language of foreigners we do not hear them when they speak, or that

we both hear and know what they say? And again, if we do not know the letters, shall we maintain that we do not see them when we look at them or that if we really see them we know them?

Theaetetus/ We shall say, Socrates, that we know just so much of them as we hear or see; in the case of the letters, we both see and know the form and color, and in the spoken language we both hear and at the same time know the higher and lower notes of the voice; but we do not perceive through sight or hearing, and we do not know, what the grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

Socrates/ First-rate, Theaetetus! and it is a pity to dispute that, for I want you to grow. But look out for another trouble that is yonder coming towards us, and see how we can repel it.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Socrates/ It is like this; If anyone should ask, "Is it possible, if a man has ever known a thing and still has and preserves a memory of that thing, that he does not, at the time when he remembers, know that very thing which he remembers?" I seem to be pretty long winded; but I merely want to ask if a man who has learned a thing does not know it when he remembers it.

Theaetetus/ Of course he does, Socrates; for what you suggest would be monstrous.

Socrates/ Am I crazy, then? Look here. Do you not say that seeing is perceiving and that sight is perception?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Then, according to what we have just said, the man who has seen a thing has acquired knowledge of that which he has seen?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, then, do you not admit that there is such a thing as memory?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Memory of nothing or of something?

Theaetetus/ Of something, surely.

Socrates/ Of things he has learned and perceived—that sort of things?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ A man sometimes remembers what he has seen, does he not?

Theaetetus/ He does.

Socrates/ Even when he shuts his eyes, or does he forget if he does that?

Theaetetus/ It would be absurd to say that, Socrates.

Socrates/ We must, though, if we are to maintain our previous argument; otherwise, it is all up with it.

Theaetetus/ I too, by Zeus, have my suspicions, but I don't fully understand you. Tell me how it is.

Socrates/ This is how it is; he who sees has acquired knowledge, we say, of that which he has seen; for it is agreed that sight and perception and knowledge are all the same.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But he who has seen and has acquired knowledge of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers it, but does not see it. Is that right?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But "does not see" is the same as "does not know," if it is true that seeing is knowing.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Then this is our result. When a man has acquired knowledge of a thing and still remembers it, he does not know it, since he does not see it; but we said that would be a monstrous conclusion.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ So, evidently, we reach an impossible result if we say that knowledge and perception are the same.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then we must say they are different.

Theaetetus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Then what can knowledge be? We must, apparently, begin our discussion all over again. And yet, Theaetetus, what are we on the point of doing?

Theaetetus/ About what?

Socrates/ It seems to me that we are behaving like a worthless game-cock; before winning the victory we have leapt away from our argument and begun to crow.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ We seem to be acting like professional debaters; we have based our agreements on the mere similarity of words and are satisfied to have got the better of the argument in such a way, and we do not see that we, who claim to be, not contestants for a prize, but lovers of wisdom, are doing just what those ingenious persons do.

Theaetetus/ I do not yet understand what you mean.

Socrates/ Well, I will try to make my thought clear. We asked, you recollect, whether a man who has learned something and remembers it does not know it. We showed first that the one who has seen and then shuts his eyes remembers, although he does not see,

and then we showed that he does not know, although at the same time he remembers; but this, we said, was impossible. And so the Protagorean tale was brought to naught, and yours also about the identity of knowledge and perception.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ It would not be so, I fancy, my friend, if the father of the first of the two tales were alive; he would have had a good deal to say in its defense. But he is dead, and we are abusing the orphan. Why, even the guardians whom Protagoras left—one of whom is Theodorus here—are unwilling to come to the child's assistance. So it seems that we shall have to do it ourselves, assisting him in the name of justice.

Theodorus/ Do so, for it is not I, Socrates, but rather Callias the son of Hipponicus, who is the guardian of his children. As for me, I turned rather too soon from abstract speculations to geometry. However, I shall be grateful to you if you come to his assistance.

Socrates/ Good, Theodorus! Now see how I shall help him; for a man might find himself involved in still worse inconsistencies than those in which we found ourselves just now, if he did not pay attention to the terms which we generally use in assent and denial. Shall I explain this to you, or only to Theaetetus?

Theodorus/ To both of us, but let the younger answer; for he will be less disgraced if he is discomfited.

Socrates/ Very well; now I am going to ask the most frightfully difficult question of all. It runs, I believe, something like this; Is it possible for a person, if he

knows a thing, at the same time not to know that which he knows?

Theodorus/ Now, then, what shall we answer, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ It is impossible, I should think.

Socrates/ Not if you make seeing and knowing identical.

For what will you do with a question from which there is no escape, by which you are, as the saying is, caught in a pit, when your adversary, unabashed, puts his hand over one of your eyes and asks if you see his cloak with the eye that is covered?

Theaetetus/ I shall say, I think, "Not with that eye, but with the other."

Socrates/ Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

Theaetetus/ After a fashion.

Socrates/ "That," he will reply, "is not at all what I want, and I did not ask about the fashion, but whether you both know and do not know the same thing. Now manifestly you see that which you do not see. But you have agreed that seeing is knowing and not seeing is not knowing. Very well; from all this, reckon out what the result is."

Theaetetus/ Well, I reckon out that the result is the contrary of my hypothesis.

Socrates/ And perhaps, my fine fellow, more troubles of the same sort might have come upon you, if anyone asked you further questions—whether it is possible to know the same thing both sharply and dully, to know close at hand but not at a distance, to know both violently and gently, and countless other questions,

such as a nimble fighter, fighting for pay in the war of words, might have lain in wait and asked you, when you said that knowledge and perception were the same thing; he would have charged down upon hearing and smelling and such senses, and would have argued persistently and unceasingly until you were filled with admiration of his greatly desired wisdom and were taken in his toils, and then, after subduing and binding you he would at once proceed to bargain with you for such ransom as might be agreed upon between you. What argument, then, you might ask, will Protagoras produce to strengthen his forces? Shall we try to carry on the discussion?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ He will, I fancy, say all that we have said in his defense and then will close with us, saying contemptuously, "Our estimable Socrates here frightened a little boy by asking if it was possible for one and the same person to remember and at the same time not to know one and the same thing, and when the child in his fright said 'no,' because he could not foresee what would result, Socrates made poor me a laughing-stock in his talk. But, you slovenly Socrates, the facts stand thus; when you examine any doctrine of mine by the method of questioning, if the person who is questioned makes such replies as I should make and comes to grief, then I am refuted, but if his replies are quite different, then the person questioned is refuted, not I. Take this example. Do you suppose you could get anybody to admit that the memory a man has of a past feeling he no longer feels is anything like the feeling at the time when he was feeling it? Far from it. Or that he would refuse to admit that it is possible for one and the same person to know and not to know one and the same

thing? Or if he were afraid to admit this, would he ever admit that a person who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? In fact, if we are to be on our guard against such verbal entanglements, would he admit that a person is one at all, and not many, who become infinite in number, if the process of becoming different continues? But, my dear fellow," he will say, "attack my real doctrines in a more generous manner, and prove, if you can, that perceptions, when they come, or become, to each of us, are not individual, or that, if they are individual, what appears to each one would not, for all that, become to that one alone—or, if you prefer to say 'be, would not be—to whom it appears. But when you talk of pigs and dog-faced baboons, you not only act like a pig yourself, but you persuade your hearers to act so toward my writings, and that is not right. For I maintain that the truth is as I have written; each one of us is the measure of the things that are and those that are not; but each person differs immeasurably from every other in just this, that to one person some things appear and are, and to another person other things. And I do not by any means say that wisdom and the wise man do not exist; on the contrary, I say that if bad things appear and are to anyone of us, precisely that man is wise who causes a change and makes good things appear and be to him. And, moreover, do not lay too much stress upon the words of my argument, but get a clearer understanding of my meaning from what I am going to say. Recall to your mind what was said before, that his food appears and is bitter to the sick man, but appears and is the opposite of bitter to the man in health. Now neither of these two is to be made wiser than he is—that is not possible—nor should the claim be made that the sick man is

ignorant because his opinions are ignorant, or the healthy man wise because his are different; but a change must be made from the one condition to the other, for the other is better. So, too, in education a change has to be made from a worse to a better condition; but the physician causes the change by means of drugs, and the teacher of wisdom by means of words. And yet, in fact, no one ever made anyone think truly who previously thought falsely, since it is impossible to think that which is not or to think any other things than those which one feels; and these are always true. But I believe that a man who, on account of a bad condition of soul, thinks thoughts akin to that condition, is made by a good condition of soul to think correspondingly good thoughts; and some men, through inexperience, call these appearances true, whereas I call them better than the others, but in no wise truer. And the wise, my dear Socrates, I do not by any means call tadpoles; when they have to do with the human body, I call them physicians, and when they have to do with plants, husbandmen; for I assert that these latter, when plants are sickly, instill into them good and healthy sensations, and true ones instead of bad sensations, and that the wise and good orators make the good, instead of the evil, seem to be right to their states. For I claim that whatever seems right and honorable to a state is really right and honorable to it, so long as it believes it to be so; but the wise man causes the good, instead of that which is evil to them in each instance, to be and seem right and honorable. And on the same principle the teacher who is able to train his pupils in this manner is not only wise but is also entitled to receive high pay from them when their education is finished. And in this sense it is true that some men are

wiser than others, and that no one thinks falsely, and that you, whether you will or no, must endure to be a measure. Upon these positions my doctrine stands firm; and if you can dispute it in principle, dispute it by bringing an opposing doctrine against it; or if you prefer the method of questions, ask questions; for an intelligent person ought not to reject this method, on the contrary, he should choose it before all others. However, let me make a suggestion; do not be unfair in your questioning; it is very inconsistent for a man who asserts that he cares for virtue to be constantly unfair in discussion; and it is unfair in discussion when a man makes no distinction between merely trying to make points and carrying on a real argument. In the former he may jest and try to trip up his opponent as much as he can, but in real argument he must be in earnest and must set his interlocutor on his feet, pointing out to him those slips only which are due to himself and his previous associations. For if you act in this way, those who debate with you will cast the blame for their confusion and perplexity upon themselves, not upon you; they will run after you and love you, and they will hate themselves and run away from themselves, taking refuge in philosophy, that they may escape from their former selves by becoming different. But if you act in the opposite way, as most teachers do, you will produce the opposite result, and instead of making your young associates philosophers, you will make them hate philosophy when they grow older. If, therefore, you will accept the suggestion which I made before, you will avoid a hostile and combative attitude and in a gracious spirit will enter the lists with me and inquire what we really mean when we declare that all things are in motion and that whatever seems is to each individual,

whether man or state. And on the basis of that you will consider the question whether knowledge and perception are the same or different, instead of doing as you did a while ago, using as your basis the ordinary meaning of names and words, which most people pervert in haphazard ways and thereby cause all sorts of perplexity in one another." Such, Theodorus, is the help I have furnished your friend to the best of my ability—not much, for my resources are small; but if he were living himself he would have helped his offspring in a fashion more magnificent.

Theodorus/ You are joking, Socrates, for you have come to the man's assistance with all the velour of youth.

Socrates/ Thank you, my friend. Tell me, did you observe just now that Protagoras reproached us for addressing our words to a boy, and said that we made the boys timidity aid us in our argument against his doctrine, and that he called our procedure a mere display of wit, solemnly insisting upon the importance of "the measure of all things" and urging us to treat his doctrine seriously?

Theodorus/ Of course I observed it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, shall we do as he says?

Theodorus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Now you see that all those present, except you and myself, are boys. So if we are to do as the man asks, you and I must question each other and make reply in order to show our serious attitude towards his doctrine; then he cannot, at any rate, find fault with us on the ground that we examined his doctrine in a spirit of levity with mere boys.

Theodorus/ Why is this? Would not Theaetetus follow an investigation better than many a man with a long beard?

Socrates/ Yes, but not better than you, Theodorus. So you must not imagine that I have to defend your deceased friend by any and every means, while you do nothing at all; but come, my good man, follow the discussion a little way, just until we can see whether, after all, you must be a measure in respect to diagrams, or whether all men are as sufficient unto themselves as you are in astronomy and the other sciences in which you are alleged to be superior.

Theodorus/ It is not easy, Socrates, for anyone to sit beside you and not be forced to give an account of himself and it was foolish of me just now to say you would excuse me and would not oblige me, as the Lacedaemonians do, to strip; you seem to me to take rather after Sciron. For the Lacedaemonians tell people to go away or else strip, but you seem to me to play rather the role of Antaeus; for you do not let anyone go who approaches you until you have forced him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

Socrates/ Your comparison with Sciron and Antaeus pictures my complaint admirably; only I am a more stubborn combatant than they; for many a Heracles and many a Theseus, strong men of words, have fallen in with me and belabored me mightily, but still I do not desist, such a terrible love of this kind of exercise has taken hold on me. So, now that it is your turn, do not refuse to try a bout with me; it will be good for both of us.

Theodorus/ I say no more. Lead on as you like. Most assuredly I must endure whatsoever fate you spin for

me, and submit to interrogation. However, I shall not be able to leave myself in your hands beyond the point you propose.

Socrates/ Even that is enough. And please be especially careful that we do not inadvertently give a playful turn to our argument and somebody reproach us again for it.

Theodorus/ Rest assured that I will try so far as in me lies.

Socrates/ Let us, therefore, first take up the same question as before, and let us see whether we were right or wrong in being displeased and finding fault with the doctrine because it made each individual self-sufficient in wisdom. Protagoras granted that some persons excelled others in respect to the better and the worse, and these he said were wise, did he not?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now if he himself were present and could agree to this, instead of our making the concession for him in our effort to help him, there would be no need of taking up the question again or of reinforcing his argument. But, as it is, perhaps it might be said that we have no authority to make the agreement for him; therefore it is better to make the agreement still clearer on this particular point; for it makes a good deal of difference whether it is so or not.

Theodorus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Let us then get the agreement in as concise a form as possible, not through others, but from his own statement.

Theodorus/ How?

Socrates/ In this way; He says, does he not? “that which appears to each person really is to him to whom it appears.”

Theodorus/ Yes, that is what he says.

Socrates/ Well then, Protagoras, we also utter the opinions of a man, or rather, of all men, and we say that there is no one who does not think himself wiser than others in some respects and others wiser than himself in other respects; for instance, in times of greatest danger, when people are distressed in war or by diseases or at sea, they regard their commanders as gods and expect them to be their saviors, though they excel them in nothing except knowledge. And all the world of men is, I dare say, full of people seeking teachers and rulers for themselves and the animals and for human activities, and, on the other hand, of people who consider themselves qualified to teach and qualified to rule. And in all these instances we must say that men themselves believe that wisdom and ignorance exist in the world of men, must we not?

Theodorus/ Yes, we must.

Socrates/ And therefore they think that wisdom is true thinking and ignorance false opinion, do they not?

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well then, Protagoras, what shall we do about the doctrine? Shall we say that the opinions which men have are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? For the result of either statement is that their opinions are not always true, but may be either true or false. Just think, Theodorus; would any follower of Protagoras, or you yourself, care to contend that no person thinks that another is ignorant and has false opinions?

Theodorus/ No, that is incredible, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet this is the predicament to which the doctrine that man is the measure of all things inevitably leads.

Theodorus/ How so?

Socrates/ When you have come to a decision in your own mind about something, and declare your opinion to me, this opinion is, according to his doctrine, true to you; let us grant that; but may not the rest of us sit in judgment on your decision, or do we always judge that your opinion is true? Do not myriads of men on each occasion oppose their opinions to yours, believing that your judgment and belief are false?

Theodorus/ Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, countless myriads in truth, as Homer says, and they give me all the trouble in the world.

Socrates/ Well then, shall we say that in such a case your opinion is true to you but false to the myriads?

Theodorus/ That seems to be the inevitable deduction.

Socrates/ And what of Protagoras himself? If neither he himself thought, nor people in general think, as indeed they do not, that man is the measure of all things, is it not inevitable that the “truth” which he wrote is true to no one? But if he himself thought it was true, and people in general do not agree with him, in the first place you know that it is just so much more false than true as the number of those who do not believe it is greater than the number of those who do.

Theodorus/ Necessarily, if it is to be true or false according to each individual opinion.

Socrates/ Secondly, it involves this, which is a very pretty result; he concedes about his own opinion the

truth of the opinion of those who disagree with him and think that his opinion is false, since he grants that the opinions of all men are true.

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then would he not be conceding that his own opinion is false, if he grants that the opinion of those who think he is in error is true?

Theodorus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ But the others do not concede that they are in error, do they?

Theodorus/ No, they do not.

Socrates/ And he, in turn, according to his writings, grants that this opinion also is true.

Theodorus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then all men, beginning with Protagoras, will dispute—or rather, he will grant, after he once concedes that the opinion of the man who holds the opposite view is true—even Protagoras himself, I say, will concede that neither a dog nor any casual man is a measure of anything whatsoever that he has not learned. Is not that the case?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then since the "truth" of Protagoras is disputed by all, it would be true to nobody, neither to anyone else nor to him.

Theodorus/ I think, Socrates, we are running my friend too hard.

Socrates/ But, my dear man, I do not see that we are running beyond what is right. Most likely, though, he, being older, is wiser than we, and if, for example, he should emerge from the ground, here at our feet, if only as far as the neck, he would prove abundantly that I

was making a fool of myself by my talk, in all probability, and you by agreeing with me; then he would sink down and be off at a run. But we, I suppose, must depend on ourselves, such as we are, and must say just what we think. And so now must we not say that everybody would agree that some men are wiser and some more ignorant than others?

Theodorus/ Yes I think at least we must.

Socrates/ And do you think his doctrine might stand most firmly in the form in which we sketched it when defending Protagoras, that most things—hot, dry, sweet, and everything of that sort—are to each person as they appear to him, and if Protagoras is to concede that there are cases in which one person excels another, he might be willing to say that in matters of health and disease not every woman or child—or beast, for that matter—knows what is wholesome for it and is able to cure itself, but in this point, if in any, one person excels another?

Theodorus/ Yes, I think that is correct.

Socrates/ And likewise in affairs of state, the honorable and disgraceful, the just and unjust, the pious and its opposite, are in truth to each state such as it thinks they are and as it enacts into law for itself, and in these matters no citizen and no state is wiser than another; but in making laws that are advantageous to the state, or the reverse, Protagoras again will agree that one counselor is better than another, and the opinion of one state better than that of another as regards the truth, and he would by no means dare to affirm that whatsoever laws a state makes in the belief that they will be advantageous to itself are perfectly sure to prove advantageous. But in the other

class of things—I mean just and unjust, pious and impious—they are willing to say with confidence that no one of them possesses by nature an existence of its own; on the contrary, that the common opinion becomes true at the time when it is adopted and remains true as long as it is held; this is substantially the theory of those who do not altogether affirm the doctrine of Protagoras. But, Theodorus, argument after argument, a greater one after a lesser, is overtaking us.

Theodorus/ Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure, have we not?

Socrates/ Apparently we have. And that makes me think, my friend, as I have often done before, how natural it is that those who have spent a long time in the study of philosophy appear ridiculous when they enter the courts of law as speakers.

Theodorus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Those who have knocked about in courts and the like from their youth up seem to me, when compared with those who have been brought up in philosophy and similar pursuits, to be as slaves in breeding compared with freemen.

Theodorus/ In what way is this the case?

Socrates/ In this way; the latter always have that which you just spoke of, leisure, and they talk at their leisure in peace; just as we are now taking up argument after argument, already beginning a third, so can they, if, as in our case, the new one pleases them better than that in which they are engaged; and they do not care at all whether their talk is long or short, if only they attain the truth. But the men of the other sort are always in a hurry—for the water flowing through the water-clock urges them on—and the other party in the suit does not

permit them to talk about anything they please, but stands over them exercising the laws compulsion by reading the brief, from which no deviation is allowed (this is called the affidavit); and their discourse is always about a fellow slave and is addressed to a master who sits there holding some case or other in his hands; and the contests never run an indefinite course, but are always directed to the point at issue, and often the race is for the defendants life. As a result of all this, the speakers become tense and shrewd; they know how to wheedle their master with words and gain his favor by acts; but in their souls they become small and warped. For they have been deprived of growth and straightforwardness and independence by the slavery they have endured from their youth up, for this forces them to do crooked acts by putting a great burden of fears and dangers upon their souls while these are still tender; and since they cannot bear this burden with uprightness and truth, they turn forthwith to deceit and to requiting wrong with wrong, so that they become greatly bent and stunted. Consequently they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness of mind in them, but they think they have become clever and wise. So much for them, Theodorus. Shall we describe those who belong to our band, or shall we let that go and return to the argument, in order to avoid abuse of that freedom and variety of discourse, of which we were speaking just now?

Theodorus/ By all means, Socrates, describe them; for I like your saying that we who belong to this band are not the servants of our arguments, but the arguments are, as it were, our servants, and each of

them must await our pleasure to be finished; for we have neither judge, nor, as the poets have, any spectator set over us to censure and rule us.

Socrates/ Very well, that is quite appropriate, since it is your wish; and let us speak of the leaders; for why should anyone talk about the inferior philosophers? The leaders, in the first place, from their youth up, remain ignorant of the way to the agora, do not even know where the court-room is, or the senate-house, or any other public place of assembly; as for laws and decrees, they neither hear the debates upon them nor see them when they are published; and the strivings of political clubs after public offices, and meetings, and banquets, and retellings with chorus girls—it never occurs to them even in their dreams to indulge in such things. And whether anyone in the city is of high or low birth, or what evil has been inherited by anyone from his ancestors, male or female, are matters to which they pay no more attention than to the number of pints in the sea, as the saying is. And all these things the philosopher does not even know that he does not know; for he does not keep aloof from them for the sake of gaining reputation, but really it is only his body that has its place and home in the city; his mind, considering all these things petty and of no account, disdains them and is borne in all directions, as Pindar says, "both below the earth," and measuring the surface of the earth, and "above the sky," studying the stars, and investigating the universal nature of everything that is, each in its entirety, never lowering itself to anything close at hand.

Theodorus/ What do you mean by this, Socrates?

Socrates/ Why, take the case of Thales, Theodorus. While he was studying the stars and looking upwards, he fell into a pit, and a neat, witty Thracian servant girl

jeered at him, they say, because he was so eager to know the things in the sky that he could not see what was there before him at his very feet. The same jest applies to all who pass their lives in philosophy. For really such a man pays no attention to his next door neighbor; he is not only ignorant of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a human being or some other kind of a creature; but what a human being is and what is proper for such a nature to do or bear different from any other, this he inquires and exerts himself to find out. Do you understand, Theodorus, or not?

Theodorus/ Yes, I do; you are right.

Socrates/ Hence it is, my friend, such a man, both in private, when he meets with individuals, and in public, as I said in the beginning, when he is obliged to speak in court or elsewhere about the things at his feet and before his eyes, is a laughing-stock not only to Thracian girls but to the multitude in general, for he falls into pits and all sorts of perplexities through inexperience, and his awkwardness is terrible, making him seem a fool; for when it comes to abusing people he has no personal abuse to offer against anyone, because he knows no evil of any man, never having cared for such things; so his perplexity makes him appear ridiculous; and as to laudatory speeches and the boastings of others, it becomes manifest that he is laughing at them—not pretending to laugh, but really laughing—and so he is thought to be a fool. When he hears a panegyric of a despot or a king he fancies he is listening to the praises of some herdsman—a swineherd, a shepherd, or a neatherd, for instance—who gets much milk from his beasts; but he thinks that the ruler tends and milks a more perverse and

treacherous creature than the herdsmen, and that he must grow coarse and uncivilized, no less than they, for he has no leisure and lives surrounded by a wall, as the herdsmen live in their mountain pens. And when he hears that someone is amazingly rich, because he owns ten thousand acres of land or more, to him, accustomed as he is to think of the whole earth, this seems very little. And when people sing the praises of lineage and say someone is of noble birth, because he can show seven wealthy ancestors, he thinks that such praises betray an altogether dull and narrow vision on the part of those who utter them; because of lack of education they cannot keep their eyes fixed upon the whole and are unable to calculate that every man has had countless thousands of ancestors and progenitors, among whom have been in any instance rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks. And when people pride themselves on a list of twenty-five ancestors and trace their pedigree back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, the pettiness of their ideas seems absurd to him; he laughs at them because they cannot free their silly minds of vanity by calculating that Amphitryon's twenty-fifth ancestor was such as fortune happened to make him, and the fiftieth for that matter. In all these cases the philosopher is derided by the common herd, partly because he seems to be contemptuous, partly because he is ignorant of common things and is always in perplexity.

Theodorus/ That all happens just as you say, Socrates.

Socrates/ But when, my friend, he draws a man upwards and the other is willing to rise with him above the level of "What wrong have I done you or you me?" to the investigation of abstract right and wrong, to inquire

what each of them is and wherein they differ from each other and from all other things, or above the level of "Is a king happy?" or, on the other hand, "Has he great wealth? to the investigation of royalty and of human happiness and wretchedness in general, to see what the nature of each is and in what way man is naturally fitted to gain the one and escape the other when that man of small and sharp and pettifogging mind is compelled in his turn to give an account of all these things, then the tables are turned; dizzied by the new experience of hanging at such a height, he gazes downward from the air in dismay and perplexity; he stammers and becomes ridiculous, not in the eyes of Thracian girls or other uneducated persons, for they have no perception of it, but in those of all men who have been brought up as free men, not as slaves. Such is the character of each of the two classes, Theodorus, of the man who has truly been brought up in freedom and leisure, whom you call a philosopher—who may without censure appear foolish and good for nothing when he is involved in menial services, if, for instance, he does not know how to pack up his bedding, much less to put the proper sweetening into a sauce or a fawning speech—and of the other, who can perform all such services smartly and quickly, but does not know how to wear his cloak as a freeman should, properly draped, still less to acquire the true harmony of speech and hymn aright the praises of the true life of gods and blessed men.

Theodorus/ If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of the truth of what you say as you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among mankind.

Socrates/ But it is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have

their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth. Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise. But, indeed, my good friend, it is not at all easy to persuade people that the reason generally advanced for the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice—namely, in order that a man may not seem bad and may seem good—is not the reason why the one should be practiced and the other not; that, I think, is merely old wives chatter, as the saying is. Let us give the true reason. God is in no wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly righteous, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in turn becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness. It is herein that the true cleverness of a man is found and also his worthlessness and cowardice; for the knowledge of this is wisdom or true virtue, and ignorance of it is folly or manifest wickedness; and all the other kinds of seeming cleverness and wisdom are paltry when they appear in public affairs and vulgar in the arts. Therefore by far the best thing for the unrighteous man and the man whose words or deeds are impious is not to grant that he is clever through knavery; for such men glory in that reproach, and think it means that they are not triflers, "useless burdens upon the earth," but such as men should be who are to live safely in a state. So we must tell them the truth that just because they do not think they are such as they are, they are so all the more truly; for they do not know the penalty of unrighteousness, which is the thing they most ought to know. For it is not what they think it is—scourgings and death, which they sometimes escape

entirely when they have done wrong—but a penalty which it is impossible to escape.

Theodorus/ What penalty do you mean?

Socrates/ Two patterns, my friend, are set up in the world, the divine, which is most blessed, and the godless, which is most wretched. But these men do not see that this is the case, and their silliness and extreme foolishness blind them to the fact that through their unrighteous acts they are made like the one and unlike the other. They therefore pay the penalty for this by living a life that conforms to the pattern they resemble; and if we tell them that, unless they depart from their "cleverness," the blessed place that is pure of all things evil will not receive them after death, and here on earth they will always live the life like themselves—evil men associating with evil—when they hear this, they will be so confident in their unscrupulous cleverness that they will think our words the talk of fools.

Theodorus/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, I know. However, there is one thing that has happened to them; whenever they have to carry on a personal argument about the doctrines to which they object, if they are willing to stand their ground for a while like men and do not run away like cowards, then, my friend, they at last become strangely dissatisfied with themselves and their arguments; their brilliant rhetoric withers away, so that they seem no better than children. But this is a digression. Let us turn away from these matters—if we do not, they will come on like an ever-rising flood and bury in silt our original argument—and let us, if you please, proceed.

Theodorus/ To me, Socrates, such digressions are quite as agreeable as the argument; for they are easier for a man of my age to follow. However, if you prefer, let us return to our argument.

Socrates/ Very well. We were at about the point in our argument where we said that those who declare that only motion is reality, and that whatever seems to each man really is to him to whom it seems, are willing to maintain their position in regard to other matters and to maintain especially in regard to justice that whatever laws a state makes, because they seem to it just, are just to the state that made them, as long as they remain in force; but as regards the good, that nobody has the courage to go on and contend that whatever laws a state passes thinking them advantageous to it are really advantageous as long as they remain in force, unless what he means is merely the name "advantageous;" and that would be making a joke of our argument. Am I right?

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Yes; for he must not mean merely the name, but the thing named must be the object of his attention.

Theodorus/ True.

Socrates/ But the state, in making laws, aims, of course, at advantage, whatever the name it gives it, and makes all its laws as advantageous as possible to itself, to the extent of its belief and ability; or has it in making laws anything else in view?

Theodorus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And does it always hit the mark, or does every state often miss it?

Theodorus/ I should say they do often miss it!

Socrates/ Continuing, then, and proceeding from this point, everyone would more readily agree to this assertion, if the question were asked concerning the whole class to which the advantageous belongs; and that whole class, it would seem, pertains to the future. For when we make laws, we make them with the idea that they will be advantageous in after time; and this is rightly called the future.

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, on this assumption, let us question Protagoras or someone of those who agree with him. Man is the measure of all things, as your school says, Protagoras, of the white, the heavy, the light, everything of that sort without exception; for he possesses within himself the standard by which to judge them, and when his thoughts about them coincide with his sensations, he thinks what to him is true and really is. Is not that what they say?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does he, then, also, Protagoras, we shall say, possess within himself the standard by which to judge of the things which are yet to be, and do those things which he thinks will be actually come to pass for him who thought them? Take, for instance, heat; if some ordinary man thinks he is going to take a fever, that is to say, that this particular heat will be, and some other man, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion shall we expect the future to prove right? Or perhaps the opinion of both, and the man will become, not hot or feverish to the physician, but to himself both?

Theodorus/ No, that would be ridiculous.

Socrates/ But, I imagine, in regard to the sweetness or dryness which will be in a wine, the opinion of the husbandman, not that of the lyre-player, will be valid.

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And again, in a matter of discord or tunefulness in music that has never been played, a gymnastic teacher could not judge better than a musician what will, when performed, seem tuneful even to a gymnastic teacher himself.

Theodorus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then, too, when a banquet is in preparation the opinion of him who is to be a guest, unless he has training in cookery, is of less value concerning the pleasure that will be derived from the viands than that of the cook. For we need not yet argue about that which already is or has been pleasant to each one; but concerning that which will in the future seem and be pleasant to each one, is he himself the best judge for himself, or would you, Protagoras—at least as regards the arguments which will be persuasive in court to each of us—be able to give an opinion beforehand better than anyone whatsoever who has no especial training?

Theodorus/ Certainly, Socrates, in this, at any rate, he used to declare emphatically that he himself excelled everyone.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, he certainly did; otherwise nobody would have paid him a high fee for his conversations, if he had not made his pupils believe that neither a prophet nor anyone else could judge better than himself what was in the future to be and seem.

Theodorus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Both lawmaking, then, and the advantageous are concerned with the future, and everyone would agree that a state in making laws must often fail to attain the greatest advantage?

Theodorus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Then it will be a fair answer if we say to your master that he is obliged to agree that one man is wiser than another, and that such a wise man is a measure, but that I, who am without knowledge, am not in the least obliged to become a measure, as the argument in his behalf just now tried to oblige me to be, whether I would or no.

Theodorus/ In that respect, Socrates, I think that the argument is most clearly proved to be wrong, and it is proved wrong in this also, in that it declares the opinions of others to be valid, whereas it was shown that they do not consider his arguments true at all.

Socrates/ In many other respects, Theodorus, it could be proved that not every opinion of every person is true, at any rate in matters of that kind; but it is more difficult to prove that opinions are not true in regard to the momentary states of feeling of each person, from which our perceptions and the opinions concerning them arise. But perhaps I am quite wrong; for it may be impossible to prove that they are not true, and those who say that they are manifest and are forms of knowledge may perhaps be right, and Theaetetus here was not far from the mark in saying that perception and knowledge are identical. So we must, as the argument in behalf of Protagoras enjoined upon us, come up closer and examine this doctrine of motion as the fundamental essence, rapping on it to see whether it rings sound or unsound. As you know, a strife has

arisen about it, no mean one, either, and waged by not a few combatants.

Theodorus/ Yes, far from mean, and it is spreading far and wide all over Ionia; for the disciples of Heracleitus are supporting this doctrine very vigorously.

Socrates/ Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we must all the more examine it from the beginning as they themselves present it.

Theodorus/ Certainly we must. For it is no more possible, Socrates, to discuss these doctrines of Heracleitus (or, as you say, of Homer or even earlier sages) with the Ephesians themselves—those, at least, who profess to be familiar with them—than with madmen. For they are, quite in accordance with their text-books, in perpetual motion; but as for keeping to an argument or a question and quietly answering and asking in turn, their power of doing that is less than nothing; or rather the words "nothing at all" fail to express the absence from these fellows of even the slightest particle of rest. But if you ask one of them a question, he pulls out puzzling little phrases, like arrows from a quiver, and shoots them off; and if you try to get hold of an explanation of what he has said, you will be struck with another phrase of novel and distorted wording, and you never make any progress whatsoever with any of them, nor do they themselves with one another, for that matter, but they take very good care to allow nothing to be settled either in an argument or in their own minds, thinking, I suppose, that this is being stationary; but they wage bitter war against the stationary, and, so far as they can, they banish it altogether.

Socrates/ Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen the men when they are fighting, but have not been with them when they are at peace; for they are no friends of yours; but I fancy they utter such peaceful doctrines at leisure to those pupils whom they wish to make like themselves.

Theodorus/ What pupils, my good man? Such people do not become pupils of one another, but they grow up of themselves, each one getting his inspiration from any chance source, and each thinks the other knows nothing. From these people, then, as I was going to say, you would never get an argument either with their will or against it; but we must ourselves take over the question and investigate it as if it were a problem of mathematics.

Socrates/ Yes, what you say is reasonable. Now as for the problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their meaning from the multitude by their poetry, that the origin of all things is Oceanus and Tethys. flowing streams, and that nothing is at rest; and likewise from the moderns, who, since they are wiser, declare their meaning openly, in order that even cobblers may hear and know their wisdom and may cease from the silly belief that some things are at rest and others in motion, and, after learning that everything is in motion, may honor their teachers? But, Theodorus, I almost forgot that others teach the opposite of this;

> So that it is motionless, the name of which is the All.

and all the other doctrines maintained by Melissus and Parmenides and the rest, in opposition to all these; they maintain that everything is one and is stationary within itself, having no place in which to move. What shall we

do with all these people, my friend? For, advancing little by little, we have unwittingly fallen between the two parties, and, unless we protect ourselves and escape somehow, we shall pay the penalty, like those in the palaestra, who in playing on the line are caught by both sides and dragged in opposite directions. I think, then, we had better examine first the one party, those whom we originally set out to join, the flowing ones, and if we find their arguments sound, we will help them to pull us over, trying thus to escape the others; but if we find that the partisans of "the whole" seem to have truer doctrines, we will take refuge with them from those who would move what is motionless. But if we find that neither party has anything reasonable to say, we shall be ridiculous if we think that we, who are of no account, can say anything worthwhile after having rejected the doctrines of very ancient and very wise men. Therefore, Theodorus, see whether it is desirable to go forward into so great a danger.

Theodorus/ Oh, it would be unendurable, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly the doctrines of both parties.

Socrates/ Then they must be examined, since you are so urgent. Now I think the starting-point of our examination of the doctrine of motion is this; Exactly what do they mean, after all, when they say that all things are in motion? What I wish to ask is this; Do they mean to say that there is only one kind of motion or, as I believe, two? But it must not be my belief alone; you must share it also, that if anything happens to us we may suffer it in common. Tell me, do you call it motion when a thing changes its place or turns round in the same place?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let this, then, be one kind of motion. Now when a thing remains in the same place, but grows old, or becomes black instead of white, or hard instead of soft, or undergoes any other kind of alteration, is it not proper to say that this is another kind of motion?

Theodorus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Nay, it must be true. So I say that there are these two kinds of motion; "alteration," and "motion in space."

Theodorus/ And you are right.

Socrates/ Now that we have made this distinction, let us at once converse with those who say that all things are in motion, and let us ask them, "Do you mean that everything moves in both ways, moving in space and undergoing alteration, or one thing in both ways and another in one of the two ways only?"

Theodorus/ By Zeus, I cannot tell! But I think they would say that everything moves in both ways.

Socrates/ Yes; otherwise, my friend, they will find that things in motion are also things at rest, and it will be no more correct to say that all things are in motion than that all things are at rest.

Theodorus/ What you say is very true.

Socrates/ Then since they must be in motion, and since absence of motion must be impossible for anything, all things are always in all kinds of motion.

Theodorus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Then just examine this point of their doctrine. Did we not find that they say that heat or whiteness or anything you please arises in some such

way as this, namely that each of these moves simultaneously with perception between the active and the passive element, and the passive becomes percipient, but not perception, and the active becomes, not a quality, but endowed with a quality? Now perhaps quality seems an extraordinary word, and you do not understand it when used with general application, so let me give particular examples. For the active element becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot or white, and other things in the same way; you probably remember that this was what we said earlier in our discourse, that nothing is in itself unvaryingly one, neither the active nor the passive, but from the union of the two with one another the perceptions and the perceived give birth and the latter become things endowed with some quality while the former become percipient.

Theodorus/ I remember, of course.

Socrates/ Let us then pay no attention to other matters, whether they teach one thing or another; but let us attend strictly to this only, which is the object of our discussion. Let us ask them, “Are all things, according to your doctrine, in motion and flux?” Is that so?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Have they then both kinds of motion which we distinguished? Are they moving in space and also undergoing alteration?

Theodorus/ Of course; that is, if they are to be in perfect motion.

Socrates/ Then if they moved only in space, but did not undergo alteration, we could perhaps say what

qualities belong to those moving things which are in flux, could we not?

Theodorus/ That is right.

Socrates/ But since not even this remains fixed—that the thing in flux flows white, but changes, so that there is a flux of the very whiteness, and a change of color, that it may not in that way be convicted of remaining fixed, is it possible to give any name to a color, and yet to speak accurately?

Theodorus/ How can it be possible, Socrates, or to give a name to anything else of this sort, if while we are speaking it always evades us, being, as it is, in flux?

Socrates/ But what shall we say of any of the perceptions, such as seeing or hearing? Does it perhaps remain fixed in the condition of seeing or hearing?

Theodorus/ It must be impossible, if all things are in motion.

Socrates/ Then we must not speak of seeing more than not-seeing, or of any other perception more than of non-perception, if all things are in all kinds of motion.

Theodorus/ No, we must not.

Socrates/ And yet perception is knowledge, as Theaetetus and I said.

Theodorus/ Yes, you did say that.

Socrates/ Then when we were asked "what is knowledge?" we answered no more what knowledge is than what not-knowledge is.

Theodorus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ This would be a fine result of the correction of our answer, when we were so eager to show that all things are in motion, just for the purpose of making that answer prove to be correct. But this, I

think, did prove to be true, that if all things are in motion, every answer to any question whatsoever is equally correct, and we may say it is thus or not thus—or, if you prefer, "becomes thus," to avoid giving them fixity by using the word "is."

Theodorus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Except, Theodorus, that I said "thus," and "not thus;" but we ought not even to say "thus;" for "thus" would no longer be in motion; nor, again, "not thus." For there is no motion in "this" either; but some other expression must be supplied for those who maintain this doctrine, since now they have, according to their own hypothesis, no words, unless it be perhaps the word "no how." That might be most fitting for them, since it is indefinite.

Theodorus/ At any rate that is the most appropriate form of speech for them.

Socrates/ So, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, arid we do not yet concede to him that every man is a measure of all things, unless he be a sensible man; and we are not going to concede that knowledge is perception, at least not by the theory of universal motion, unless Theaetetus here has something different to say.

Theodorus/ An excellent idea, Socrates; for now that this matter is settled, I too should be rid of the duty of answering your questions according to our agreement, since the argument about Protagoras is ended.

Theaetetus/ No, Theodorus, not until you and Socrates have discussed those who say all things are at rest, as you proposed just now.

Theodorus/ A young man like you, Theaetetus, teaching your elders to do wrong by breaking their

agreements! No; prepare to answer Socrates yourself for the rest of the argument.

Theaetetus/ I will if he wishes it. But I should have liked best to hear about the doctrine I mentioned.

Theodorus/ Calling Socrates to an argument is calling cavalry into an open plain. Just ask him a question and you shall hear.

Socrates/ Still I think, Theodorus, I shall not comply with the request of Theaetetus.

Theodorus/ Why will you not comply with it?

Socrates/ Because I have a reverential fear of examining in a flippant manner Melissus and the others who teach that the universe is one and motionless, and because I reverence still more one man, Parmenides. Parmenides seems to me to be, in Homers words, “one to be venerated” and also “awful.” For I met him when I was very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me to possess an absolutely noble depth of mind. So I am afraid we may not understand his words and may be still farther from understanding what he meant by them; but my chief fear is that the question with which we started, about the nature of knowledge, may fail to be investigated, because of the disorderly crowd of arguments which will burst in upon us if we let them in; especially as the argument we are now proposing is of vast extent, and would not receive its deserts if we treated it as a side issue, and if we treat it as it deserves, it will take so long as to do away with the discussion about knowledge. Neither of these things ought to happen, but we ought to try by the science of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of the thoughts about knowledge with which he is pregnant.

Theodorus/ Yes, if that is your opinion, we ought to do so.

Socrates/ Consider, then, Theaetetus, this further point about what has been said. Now you answered that perception is knowledge, did you not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ If, then, anyone should ask you, “By what does a man see white and black colors and by what does he hear high and low tones?” you would, I fancy, say, “By his eyes and ears.”

Theaetetus/ Yes, I should.

Socrates/ The easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is in general a sign of good breeding; indeed, the opposite is hardly worthy of a gentleman, but sometimes it is necessary, as now it is necessary to object to your answer, in so far as it is incorrect. Just consider; which answer is more correct, that our eyes are that by which we see or that through which we see, and our ears that by which or that through which we hear?

Theaetetus/ I think, Socrates, we perceive through, rather than by them, in each case.

Socrates/ Yes, for it would be strange indeed, my boy, if there are many senses ensconced within us, as if we were so many wooden horses of Troy, and they do not all unite in one power, whether we should call it soul or something else, by which we perceive through these as instruments the objects of perception.

Theaetetus/ I think what you suggest is more likely than the other way.

Socrates/ Now the reason why I am so precise about the matter is this; I want to know whether there is someone and the same power within ourselves by which

we perceive black and white through the eyes, and again other qualities through the other organs, and whether you will be able, if asked, to refer all such activities to the body. But perhaps it is better that you make the statement in answer to a question than that I should take all the trouble for you. So tell me; do you not think that all the organs through which you perceive hot and hard and light and sweet are parts of the body? Or are they parts of something else?

Theaetetus/ Of nothing else.

Socrates/ And will you also be ready to agree that it is impossible to perceive through one sense what you perceive through another; for instance, to perceive through sight what you perceive through hearing, or through hearing what you perceive through sight?

Theaetetus/ Of course I shall.

Socrates/ Then if you have any thought about both of these together, you would not have perception about both together either through one organ or through the other.

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Now in regard to sound and color, you have, in the first place, this thought about both of them, that they both exist?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that each is different from the other and the same as itself?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And that both together are two and each separately is one?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that also.

Socrates/ And are you able also to observe whether they are like or unlike each other?

Theaetetus/ May be.

Socrates/ Now through what organ do you think all this about them? For it is impossible to grasp that which is common to them both either through hearing or through sight. Here is further evidence for the point I am trying to make; if it were possible to investigate the question whether the two, sound and color, are bitter or not, you know that you will be able to tell by what faculty you will investigate it, and that is clearly neither hearing nor sight, but something else.

Theaetetus/ Of course it is, —the faculty exerted through the tongue.

Socrates/ Very good. But through what organ is the faculty exerted which makes known to you that which is common to all things, as well as to these of which we are speaking—that which you call being and not-being, and the other attributes of things, about which we were asking just now? What organs will you assign for all these, through which that part of us which perceives gains perception of each and all of them?

Theaetetus/ You mean being and not-being, and likeness and unlikeness, and identity and difference, and also unity and plurality as applied to them. And you are evidently asking also through what bodily organs we perceive by our soul the odd and the even and everything else that is in the same category.

Socrates/ Bravo, Theaetetus! you follow me exactly; that is just what I mean by my question.

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, Socrates, I cannot answer, except that I think there is no special organ at all for these notions, as there are for those others; but it

appears to me that the soul views by itself directly what all things have in common.

Socrates/ Why, you are beautiful, Theaetetus, and not, as Theodorus said, ugly; for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But besides being beautiful, you have done me a favor by relieving me from a long discussion, if you think that the soul views some things by itself directly and others through the bodily faculties; for that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree.

Theaetetus/ Well, I do think so.

Socrates/ To which class, then, do you assign being; for this, more than anything else, belongs to all things?

Theaetetus/ I assign them to the class of notions which the soul grasps by itself directly.

Socrates/ And also likeness and unlikeness and identity and difference?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And how about beautiful and ugly, and good and bad?

Theaetetus/ I think that these also are among the things the essence of which the soul most certainly views in their relations to one another, reflecting within itself upon the past and present in relation to the future.

Socrates/ Stop there. Does it not perceive the hardness of the hard through touch, and likewise the softness of the soft?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But their essential nature and the fact that they exist, and their opposition to one another, and, in turn, the essential nature of this opposition, the soul

itself tries to determine for us by reverting to them and comparing them with one another.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not true, then, that all sensations which reach the soul through the body, can be perceived by human beings, and also by animals, from the moment of birth; whereas reflections about these, with reference to their being and usefulness, are acquired, if at all, with difficulty and slowly, through many troubles, in other words, through education?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Is it, then, possible for one to attain "truth" who cannot even get as far as "being?"

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ And will a man ever have knowledge of anything the truth of which he fails to attain?

Theaetetus/ How can he, Socrates?

Socrates/ Then knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the process of reasoning about them; for it is possible, apparently, to apprehend being and truth by reasoning, but not by sensation.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then will you call the two by the same name, when there are so great differences between them?

Theaetetus/ No, that would certainly not be right.

Socrates/ What name will you give, then, to the one which includes seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold, and being hot?

Theaetetus/ Perceiving. What other name can I give it?

Socrates/ Collectively you call it, then, perception?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ By which, we say, we are quite unable to apprehend truth, since we cannot apprehend being, either.

Theaetetus/ No; certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor knowledge either, then.

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could never be the same.

Theaetetus/ Evidently not, Socrates; and indeed now at last it has been made perfectly clear that knowledge is something different from perception.

Socrates/ But surely we did not begin our conversation in order to find out what knowledge is not, but what it is. However, we have progressed so far, at least, as not to seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in some function of the soul, whatever name is given to it when it alone and by itself is engaged directly with realities.

Theaetetus/ That, Socrates, is, I suppose, called having opinion.

Socrates/ You suppose rightly, my friend. Now begin again at the beginning. Wipe out all we said before, and see if you have any clearer vision, now that you have advanced to this point. Say once more what knowledge is.

Theaetetus/ To say that all opinion is knowledge is impossible, Socrates, for there is also false opinion; but true opinion probably is knowledge. Let that be my answer. For if it is proved to be wrong as we proceed, I will try to give another, just as I have given this.

Socrates/ That is the right way, Theaetetus. It is better to speak up boldly than to hesitate about answering, as you did at first. For if we act in this way, one of two things will happen; either we shall find what we are after, or we shall be less inclined to think we know what we do not know at all; and surely even that would be a recompense not to be despised. Well, then, what do you say now? Assuming that there are two kinds of opinion, one true and the other false, do you define knowledge as the true opinion?

Theaetetus/ Yes. That now seems to me to be correct.

Socrates/ Is it, then, still worthwhile, in regard to opinion, to take up—again?

Theaetetus/ What point do you refer to?

Socrates/ Somehow I am troubled now and have often been troubled before, so that I have been much perplexed in my own reflections and in talking with others, because I cannot tell what this experience is which we human beings have, and how it comes about.

Theaetetus/ What experience?

Socrates/ That anyone has false opinions. And so I am considering and am still in doubt whether we had better let it go or examine it by another method than the one we followed a while ago.

Theaetetus/ Why not, Socrates, if there seems to be the least need of it? For just now, in talking about leisure, you and Theodorus said very truly that there is no hurry in discussions of this sort.

Socrates/ You are right in reminding me. For perhaps this is a good time to retrace our steps. For it is better to finish a little task well than a great deal imperfectly.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ How, then, shall we set about it? What is it that we do say? Do we say that in every case of opinion there is a false opinion, and one of us has a false, and another a true opinion, because, as we believe, it is in the nature of things that this should be so?

Theaetetus/ Yes, we do.

Socrates/ Then this, at any rate, is possible for us, is it not, regarding all things collectively and each thing separately, either to know or not to know them? For learning and forgetting, as intermediate stages, I leave out of account for the present, for just now they have no bearing upon our argument.

Theaetetus/ Certainly, Socrates, nothing is left in any particular case except knowing or not knowing it.

Socrates/ Then he who forms opinion must form opinion either about what he knows or about what he does not know?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And it is surely impossible that one who knows a thing does not know it, or that one who does not know it knows it.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then does he who forms false opinions think that the things which he knows are not these things, but some others of the things he knows, and so, knowing both, is he ignorant of both?

Theaetetus/ That is impossible, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, does he think that the things he does not know are other things which he does not know—which is as if a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should conceive the idea that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

Theaetetus/ That is impossible.

Socrates/ But surely a man does not think that the things he knows are the things he does not know, or again that the things he does not know are the things he knows.

Theaetetus/ That would be a monstrous absurdity.

Socrates/ Then how could he still form false opinions? For inasmuch as all things are either known or unknown to us, it is impossible, I imagine, to form opinions outside of these alternatives, and within them it is clear that there is no place for false opinion.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Had we, then, better look for what we are seeking, not by this method of knowing and not knowing, but by that of being and not being?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ We may simply assert that he who on any subject holds opinions which are not, will certainly think falsely, no matter what the condition of his mind may be in other respects.

Theaetetus/ That, again, is likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, what shall we say, Theaetetus, if anyone asks us, "Is that which is assumed in common speech possible at all, and can any human being hold an opinion which is not, whether it be concerned with any of the things which are, or be entirely independent of them?" We, I fancy, shall reply, "Yes, when, in thinking, he thinks what is not true," shall we not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is the same sort of thing possible in any other field?

Theaetetus/ What sort of thing?

Socrates/ For instance, that a man sees something, but sees nothing.

Theaetetus/ How can he?

Socrates/ Yet surely if a man sees anyone thing, he sees something that is. Or do you, perhaps, think “one” is among the things that are not?

Theaetetus/ No, I do not.

Socrates/ Then he who sees anyone thing, sees something that is.

Theaetetus/ That is clear.

Socrates/ And therefore he who hears anything, hears some one thing and therefore hears what is.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who touches anything, touches some one thing, which is, since it is one?

Theaetetus/ That also is true.

Socrates/ So, then, does not he who holds an opinion hold an opinion of some one thing?

Theaetetus/ He must do so.

Socrates/ And does not he who holds an opinion of some one thing hold an opinion of something that is?

Theaetetus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then he who holds an opinion of what is not holds an opinion of nothing.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Well then, he who holds an opinion of nothing, holds no opinion at all.

Theaetetus/ That is plain, apparently.

Socrates/ Then it is impossible to hold an opinion of that which is not, either in relation to things that are, or independently of them.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then holding false opinion is something different from holding an opinion of that which is not.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then false opinion is not found to exist in us either by this method or by that which we followed a little while ago.

Theaetetus/ No, it certainly is not.

Socrates/ But does not that which we call by that name arise after the following manner?

Theaetetus/ After what manner?

Socrates/ We say that false opinion is a kind of interchanged opinion, when a person makes an exchange in his mind and says that one thing which exists is another thing which exists. For in this way he always holds an opinion of what exists, but of one thing instead of another; so he misses the object he was aiming at in his thought and might fairly be said to hold a false opinion.

Theaetetus/ Now you seem to me to have said what is perfectly right. For when a man, in forming an opinion, puts ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, he does truly hold a false opinion.

Socrates/ Evidently, Theaetetus, you feel contempt of me, and not fear.

Theaetetus/ Why in the world do you say that?

Socrates/ You think, I fancy, that I would not attack your “truly false” by asking whether it is possible for a thing to become slowly quick or heavily light, or any other opposite, by a process opposite to itself, in accordance, not with its own nature, but with that of its opposite. But I let this pass, that your courage may not

fail. You are satisfied, you say, that false opinion is interchanged opinion?

Theaetetus/ I am.

Socrates/ It is, then, in your opinion, possible for the mind to regard one thing as another and not as what it is.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Now when one's mind does this, does it not necessarily have a thought either of both things together or of one or the other of them?

Theaetetus/ Yes, it must; either of both at the same time or in succession.

Socrates/ Excellent. And do you define thought as I do?

Theaetetus/ How do you define it?

Socrates/ As the talk which the soul has with itself about any subjects which it considers. You must not suppose that I know this that I am declaring to you. But the soul, as the image presents itself to me, when it thinks, is merely conversing with itself, asking itself questions and answering, affirming and denying. When it has arrived at a decision, whether slowly or with a sudden bound, and is at last agreed, and is not in doubt, we call that its opinion; and so I define forming opinion as talking and opinion as talk which has been held, not with someone else, nor yet aloud, but in silence with oneself. How do you define it?

Theaetetus/ In the same way.

Socrates/ Then whenever a man has an opinion that one thing is another, he says to himself, we believe, that the one thing is the other.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now call to mind whether you have ever said to yourself that the beautiful is most assuredly ugly, or the wrong right, or—and this is the sum of the whole matter—consider whether you have ever tried to persuade yourself that one thing is most assuredly another, or whether quite the contrary is the case, and you have never ventured, even in sleep, to say to yourself that the odd is, after all, certainly even, or anything of that sort.

Theaetetus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Do you imagine that anyone else, sane or insane, ever ventured to say to himself seriously and try to persuade himself that the ox must necessarily be a horse, or two one?

Theaetetus/ No, by Zeus, I do not.

Socrates/ Then if forming opinion is talking to oneself, no one who talks and forms opinion of two objects and apprehends them both with his soul, could say and have the opinion that one is the other. But you will also have to give up the expression "one and other." This is what I mean, that nobody holds the opinion that the ugly is beautiful, or anything of that sort.

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, I do give it up; and I agree with you in what you say.

Socrates/ You agree, therefore, that he who holds an opinion of both things cannot hold the opinion that one is the other.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But surely he who holds an opinion of one only, and not of the other at all, will never hold the opinion that one is the other.

Theaetetus/ You are right; for he would be forced to apprehend also that of which he holds no opinion.

Socrates/ Then neither he who holds opinion of both nor he who holds it of one can hold the opinion that a thing is something else. And so anyone who sets out to define false opinion as interchanged opinion would be talking nonsense. Then neither by this method nor by our previous methods is false opinion found to exist in us.

Theaetetus/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ But yet, Theaetetus, if this is found not to exist, we shall be forced to admit many absurdities.

Theaetetus/ What absurdities?

Socrates/ I will not tell you until I have tried to consider the matter in every way. For I should be ashamed of us, if, in our perplexity, we were forced to make such admissions as those to which I refer. But if we find the object of our quest, and are set free from perplexity, then, and not before, we will speak of others as involved in those absurdities, and we ourselves shall stand free from ridicule. But if we find no escape from our perplexity, we shall, I fancy, become low-spirited, like seasick people, and shall allow the argument to trample on us and do to us anything it pleases. Hear, then, by what means I still see a prospect of success for our quest.

Theaetetus/ Do speak.

Socrates/ I shall deny that we were right when we agreed that it is impossible for a man to have opinion that the things he does not know are the things which he knows, and thus to be deceived. But there is a way in which it is possible.

Theaetetus/ Do you mean what I myself suspected when we made the statement to which you refer, that sometimes I, though I know Socrates, saw at a distance

someone whom I did not know, and thought it was Socrates whom I do know? In such a case false opinion does arise.

Socrates/ But did not we reject that, because it resulted in our knowing and not knowing the things which we know?

Theaetetus/ Certainly we did.

Socrates/ Let us, then, not make that assumption, but another; perhaps it will turn out well for us, perhaps the opposite. But we are in such straits that we must turn every argument round and test it from all sides. Now see if this is sensible; Can a man who did not know a thing at one time learn it later?

Theaetetus/ To be sure he can.

Socrates/ Again, then, can he learn one thing after another?

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Please assume, then, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a block of wax, in one case larger, in another smaller, in one case the wax is purer, in another more impure and harder, in some cases softer, and in some of proper quality.

Theaetetus/ I assume all that.

Socrates/ Let us, then, say that this is the gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that whenever we wish to remember anything we see or hear or think of in our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions and thoughts and imprint them upon it, just as we make impressions from seal rings; and whatever is imprinted we remember and know as long as its image lasts, but whatever is rubbed out or cannot be imprinted we forget and do not know.

Theaetetus/ Let us assume that.

Socrates/ Now take a man who knows the things which he sees and hears, and is considering some one of them; observe whether he may not gain a false opinion in the following manner.

Theaetetus/ In what manner?

Socrates/ By thinking that the things which he knows are sometimes things which he knows and sometimes things which he does not know. For we were wrong before in agreeing that this is impossible.

Theaetetus/ What do you say about it now?

Socrates/ We must begin our discussion of the matter by making the following distinctions; It is impossible for anyone to think that one thing which he knows and of which he has received a memorial imprint in his soul, but which he does not perceive, is another thing which he knows and of which also he has an imprint, and which he does not perceive. And, again, he cannot think that what he knows is that which he does not know and of which he has no seal; nor that what he does not know is another thing which he does not know; nor that what he does not know is what he knows; nor can he think that what he perceives is something else which he perceives; nor that what he perceives is something which he does not perceive; nor that what he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; nor that what he does not perceive is something which he perceives. And, again, it is still more impossible, if that can be, to think that a thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords with the perception is another thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords with the perception. And

he cannot think that what he knows and perceives and of which he has a correct memorial imprint is another thing which he knows; nor that a thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has such an imprint is another thing which he perceives; nor again that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he neither knows nor perceives; nor that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not know; nor that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not perceive. In all these cases it is impossible beyond everything for false opinion to arise in the mind of anyone. The possibility that it may arise remains, if anywhere, in the following cases.

Theaetetus/ What cases are they? I hope they may help me to understand better; for now I cannot follow you.

Socrates/ The cases in which he may think that things which he knows are some other things which he knows and perceives; or which he does not know, but perceives; or that things which he knows and perceives are other things which he knows and perceives.

Theaetetus/ Now I am even more out of the running than before.

Socrates/ Then let me repeat it in a different way. I know Theodorus and remember within myself what sort of a person he is, and just so I know Theaetetus, but sometimes I see them, and sometimes I do not, sometimes I touch them, sometimes not, sometimes I hear them or perceive them through some other sense, and sometimes I have no perception of you at all, but I remember you none the less and know you in my own mind. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ This, then, is the first of the points which I wish to make clear. Note that one may perceive or not perceive that which one knows.

Theaetetus/ That is true.

Socrates/ So, too, with that which he does not know he may often not even perceive it, and often he may merely perceive it?

Theaetetus/ That too is possible.

Socrates/ See if you follow me better now. If Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither of them and has no other perception of them, he never could have the opinion within himself that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I right or wrong?

Theaetetus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Now that was the first of the cases of which I spoke.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it was.

Socrates/ The second is this; knowing one of you and not knowing the other, and not perceiving either of you, I never could think that the one whom I know is the one whom I do not know.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Socrates/ And this is the third case; not knowing and not perceiving either of you, I could not think that he whom I do not know is someone else whom I do not know. And imagine that you have heard all the other cases again in succession, in which I could never form false opinions about you and Theodorus, either when I know or do not know both of you, or when I know one and not the other; and the same is true if we say "perceive" instead of "know." Do you follow me?

Theaetetus/ I follow you.

Socrates/ Then the possibility of forming false opinion remains in the following case; when, for example, knowing you and Theodorus, and having on that block of wax the imprint of both of you, as if you were signet-rings, but seeing you both at a distance and indistinctly, I hasten to assign the proper imprint of each of you to the proper vision, and to make it fit, as it were, its own footprint, with the purpose of causing recognition; but I may fail in this by interchanging them, and put the vision of one upon the imprint of the other, as people put a shoe on the wrong foot; or, again, I may be affected as the sight is affected when we use a mirror and the sight as it flows makes a change from right to left, and thus make a mistake; it is in such cases, then, that interchanged opinion occurs and the forming of false opinion arises.

Theaetetus/ I think it does, Socrates. You describe what happens to opinion marvelously well.

Socrates/ There is still the further case, when, knowing both of you, I perceive one in addition to knowing him, but do not perceive the other, and the knowledge which I have of that other is not in accord with my perception. This is the case I described in this way before, and at that time you did not understand me.

Theaetetus/ No, I did not.

Socrates/ This is what I meant, that if anyone knows and perceives one of you, and has knowledge of him which accords with the perception, he will never think that he is someone else whom he knows and perceives and his knowledge of whom accords with the perception. That was the case, was it not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But we omitted, I believe, the case of which I am speaking now—the case in which we say the false opinion arises; when a man knows both and sees both (or has some other perception of them), but fails to hold the two imprints each under its proper perception; like a bad archer he shoots beside the mark and misses it; and it is just this which is called error or deception.

Theaetetus/ And properly so.

Socrates/ Now when perception is present to one of the imprints but not to the other, and the mind applies the imprint of the absent perception to the perception which is present, the mind is deceived in every such instance. In a word, if our present view is sound, false opinion or deception seems to be impossible in relation to things which one does not know and has never perceived; but it is precisely in relation to things which we know and perceive that opinion turns and twists, becoming false and true—true when it puts the proper imprints and seals fairly and squarely upon one another, and false when it applies them sideways and aslant.

Theaetetus/ Well, then, Socrates, is that view not a good one?

Socrates/ After you have heard the rest, you will be still more inclined to say so. For to hold a true opinion is a good thing, but to be deceived is a disgrace.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ They say the cause of these variations is as follows; When the wax in the soul of a man is deep and abundant and smooth and properly kneaded, the images that come through the perceptions are imprinted upon this heart of the soul—as Homer calls it in allusion to its similarity to wax; —when this is the

case, and in such men, the imprints, being clear and of sufficient depth, are also lasting. And men of this kind are in the first place quick to learn, and secondly they have retentive memories, and moreover they do not interchange the imprints of their perceptions, but they have true opinions. For the imprints are clear and have plenty of room, so that such men quickly assign them to their several molds, which are called realities; and these men, then, are called wise. Or do you not agree?

Theaetetus/ Most emphatically.

Socrates/ Now when the heart of anyone is shaggy (a condition which the all-wise poet commends), or when it is unclean or of impure wax, or very soft or hard, those whose wax is soft are quick to learn, but forgetful, and those in whom it is hard are the reverse. But those in whom it is shaggy and rough and stony, infected with earth or dung which is mixed in it, receive indistinct imprints from the molds. So also do those whose wax is hard; for the imprints lack depth. And imprints in soft wax are also indistinct, because they melt together and quickly become blurred; but if besides all this they are crowded upon one another through lack of room, in some mean little soul, they are still more indistinct. So all these men are likely to have false opinions. For when they see or hear or think of anything, they cannot quickly assign things to the right imprints, but are slow about it, and because they assign them wrongly they usually see and hear and think amiss. These men, in turn, are accordingly said to be deceived about realities and ignorant.

Theaetetus/ You are right as right could be, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, say that false opinions exist in us?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And true opinions, no doubt?

Theaetetus/ And true ones also.

Socrates/ Then now at last we think we have reached a valid agreement, that these two kinds of opinion incontestably exist?

Theaetetus/ Most emphatically.

Socrates/ Truly, Theaetetus, a garrulous man is a strange and unpleasant creature!

Theaetetus/ Eh? What makes you say that?

Socrates/ Vexation at my own stupidity and genuine garrulity. For what else could you call it when a man drags his arguments up and down because he is so stupid that he cannot be convinced, and is hardly to be induced to give up any one of them?

Theaetetus/ But you, why are you vexed?

Socrates/ I am not merely vexed, I am actually afraid; for I do not know what answer to make if anyone asks me; "Socrates, have you found out, I wonder, that false opinion exists neither in the relations of the perceptions to one another nor in the thoughts, but in the combination of perception with thought?" I shall say "yes," I suppose, and put on airs, as if we had made a fine discovery.

Theaetetus/ It seems to me, Socrates, that the result we have now brought out is not half bad.

Socrates/ "Do you go on and assert," then, he will say, "that we never could imagine that the man whom

we merely think of, but do not see, is a horse which also we do not see or touch or perceive by any other sense, but merely think of?" I suppose I shall say that I do make that assertion.

Theaetetus/ Yes, and you will be right.

Socrates/ "Then," he will say, "according to that, could we ever imagine that the number eleven which is merely thought of, is the number twelve which also is merely thought of?" Come now, it is for you to answer.

Theaetetus/ Well, my answer will be that a man might imagine the eleven that he sees or touches to be twelve, but that he could never have that opinion concerning the eleven that he has in his mind.

Socrates/ Well, then, do you think that anyone ever considered in his own mind five and seven, —I do not mean by setting before his eyes seven men and five men and considering them, or anything of that sort, but seven and five in the abstract, which we say are imprints in the block of wax, and in regard to which we deny the possibility of forming false opinions—taking these by themselves, do you imagine that anybody in the world has ever considered them, talking to himself and asking himself what their sum is, and that one person has said and thought eleven, and another twelve, or do all say and think that it is twelve?

Theaetetus/ No, by Zeus; many say eleven, and if you take a larger number for consideration, there is greater likelihood of error. For I suppose you are speaking of any number rather than of these only.

Socrates/ You are right in supposing so; and consider whether in that instance the abstract twelve in the block of wax is not itself imagined to be eleven.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Have we not, then, come back again to the beginning of our talk? For the man who is affected in this way imagines that one thing which he knows is another thing which he knows. This we said was impossible, and by this very argument we were forcing false opinion out of existence, that the same man might not be forced to know and not know the same things at the same time.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then we must show that forming false opinion is something or other different from the interchange of thought and perception. For if it were that, we should never be deceived in abstract thoughts. But as the case now stands, either there is no false opinion or it is possible for a man not to know that which he knows. Which alternative will you choose?

Theaetetus/ There is no possible choice, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet the argument is not likely to admit both. But still, since we must not shrink from any risk, what if we should try to do a shameless deed?

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Socrates/ To undertake to tell what it really is to know.

Theaetetus/ And why is that shameless?

Socrates/ You seem not to remember that our whole talk from the beginning has been a search for knowledge, because we did not know what it is.

Theaetetus/ Oh yes, I remember.

Socrates/ Then is it not shameless to proclaim what it is to know, when we are ignorant of knowledge? But really, Theaetetus, our talk has been badly tainted with unclearness all along; for we have said over and over

again “we know” and “we do not know” and “we have knowledge” and “we have no knowledge,” as if we could understand each other, while we were still ignorant of knowledge; and at this very moment, if you please, we have again used the terms “be ignorant” and “understand,” as though we had any right to use them if we are deprived of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ But how will you converse, Socrates, if you refrain from these words?

Socrates/ Not at all, being the man I am; but I might if I were a real reasoner; if such a man were present at this moment he would tell us to refrain from these terms, and would criticize my talk scathingly. But since we are poor creatures, shall I venture to say what the nature of knowing is? For it seems to me that would be of some advantage.

Theaetetus/ Venture it then, by Zeus. You shall have full pardon for not refraining from those terms.

Socrates/ Have you heard what they say nowadays that knowing is?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps; however, I don’t remember just at this moment.

Socrates/ They say it is having knowledge.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Let us make a slight change and say possessing knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Why, how will you claim that the one differs from the other?

Socrates/ Perhaps it doesn’t; but first hear how it seems to me to differ, and then help me to test my view.

Theaetetus/ I will if I can.

Socrates/ Well, then, having does not seem to me the same as possessing. For instance, if a man bought a cloak and had it under his control, but did not wear it, we should certainly say, not that he had it, but that he possessed it.

Theaetetus/ And rightly.

Socrates/ Now see whether it is possible in the same way for one who possesses knowledge not to have it, as, for instance, if a man should catch wild birds—pigeons or the like—and should arrange an aviary at home and keep them in it, we might in a way assert that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And yet in another way that he has none of them, but that he has acquired power over them, since he has brought them under his control in his own enclosure, to take them and hold them whenever he likes, by catching whichever bird he pleases, and to let them go again; and he can do this as often as he sees fit.

Theaetetus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Once more, then, just as a while ago we contrived some sort of a waxen figment in the soul, so now let us make in each soul an aviary stocked with all sorts of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest, others in small groups, and some solitary, flying hither and thither among them all.

Theaetetus/ Consider it done. What next?

Socrates/ We must assume that while we are children this receptacle is empty, and we must understand that the birds represent the varieties of knowledge. And whatsoever kind of knowledge a person acquires and shuts up in the enclosure, we must say

that he has learned or discovered the thing of which this is the knowledge, and that just this is knowing.

Theaetetus/ So be it.

Socrates/ Consider then what expressions are needed for the process of recapturing and taking and holding and letting go again whichever he please of the kinds of knowledge, whether they are the same expressions as those needed for the original acquisition, or others. But you will understand better by an illustration. You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now suppose this to be a hunt after the kinds of knowledge, or sciences, of all odd and even numbers.

Theaetetus/ I do SO.

Socrates/ Now it is by this art, I imagine, that a man has the sciences of numbers under his own control and also that any man who transmits them to another does this.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we say that when anyone transmits them he teaches, and when anyone receives them he learns, and when anyone, by having acquired them, has them in that aviary of ours, he knows them.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now pay attention to what follows from this. Does not the perfect arithmetician understand all numbers; for he has the sciences of all numbers in his mind?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Then would such a man ever count anything—either any abstract numbers in his head, or any such external objects as possess number?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But we shall affirm that counting is the same thing as considering how great any number in question is.

Theaetetus/ We shall.

Socrates/ Then he who by our previous admission knows all number is found to be considering that which he knows as if he did not know it. You have doubtless heard of such ambiguities.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ Continuing, then, our comparison with the acquisition and hunting of the pigeons, we shall say that the hunting is of two kinds, one before the acquisition for the sake of possessing, the other carried on by the possessor for the sake of taking and holding in his hands what he had acquired long before. And just so when a man long since by learning came to possess knowledge of certain things, and knew them, he may have these very things afresh by taking up again the knowledge of each of them separately and holding it—the knowledge which he had acquired long before, but had not at hand in his mind?

Theaetetus/ That is true.

Socrates/ This, then, was my question just now; How should we express ourselves in speaking about them when an arithmetician undertakes to count or a man of letters to read something? In such a case shall we say that although he knows he sets himself to learn again from himself that which he knows?

Theaetetus/ But that is extraordinary, Socrates.

Socrates/ But shall we say that he is going to read or count that which he does not know, when we have granted that he knows all letters and all numbers?

Theaetetus/ But that too is absurd.

Socrates/ Shall we then say that words are nothing to us, if it amuses anyone to drag the expressions "know" and "learn" one way and another, but since we set up the distinction that it is one thing to possess knowledge and another thing to have it, we affirm that it is impossible not to possess what one possesses, so that it never happens that a man does not know that which he knows, but that it is possible to conceive a false opinion about it? For it is possible to have not the knowledge of this thing, but some other knowledge instead, when in hunting for some one kind of knowledge, as the various kinds fly about, he makes a mistake and catches one instead of another; so in one example he thought eleven was twelve, because he caught the knowledge of twelve, which was within him, instead of that of eleven, caught a ringdove, as it were, instead of a pigeon.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is reasonable.

Socrates/ But when he catches the knowledge he intends to catch, he is not deceived and has true opinion, and so true and false opinion exist and none of the things which formerly annoyed us interferes? Perhaps you will agree to this; or what will you do?

Theaetetus/ I will agree.

Socrates/ Yes, for we have got rid of our difficulty about men not knowing that which they know; for we no longer find ourselves not possessing that which we possess, whether we are deceived about anything or

not. However, another more dreadful disaster seems to be coming in sight.

Theaetetus/ What disaster?

Socrates/ If the interchange of kinds of knowledge should ever turn out to be false opinion.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ Is it not the height of absurdity, in the first place for one who has knowledge of something to be ignorant of this very thing, not through ignorance but through his knowledge; secondly, for him to be of opinion that this thing is something else and something else is this thing—for the soul, when knowledge has come to it, to know nothing and be ignorant of all things? For by this argument there is nothing to prevent ignorance from coming to us and making us know something and blindness from making us see, if knowledge is ever to make us ignorant.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps, Socrates, we were not right in making the birds represent kinds of knowledge only, but we ought to have imagined kinds of ignorance also flying about in the soul with the others; then the hunter would catch sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance of the same thing, and through the ignorance he would have false, but through the knowledge true opinion.

Socrates/ It is not easy, Theaetetus, to refrain from praising you. However, examine your suggestion once more. Let it be as you say; the man who catches the ignorance will, you say, have false opinion. Is that it?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But surely he will not also think that he has false opinion.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ No, but true opinion, and will have the attitude of knowing that about which he is deceived.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Hence he will fancy that he has caught, and has, knowledge, not ignorance.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then, after our long wanderings, we have come round again to our first difficulty. For the real reasoner will laugh and say, "Most excellent Sirs, does a man who knows both knowledge and ignorance think that one of them, which he knows, is another thing which he knows; or, knowing neither of them, is he of opinion that one, which he does not know, is another thing which he does not know; or, knowing one and not the other, does he think that the one he does not know is the one he knows; or that the one he knows is the one he does not know? Or will you go on and tell me that there are kinds of knowledge of the kinds of knowledge and of ignorance, and that he who possesses these kinds of knowledge and has enclosed them in some sort of other ridiculous aviaries or waxen figments, knows them, so long as he possesses them, even if he has them not at hand in his soul? And in this fashion are you going to be compelled to trot about endlessly in the same circle without making any progress?" What shall we reply to this, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, Socrates, I don't know what to say.

Socrates/ Then, my boy, is the argument right in rebuking us and in pointing out that we were wrong to abandon knowledge and seek first for false opinion? It is impossible to know the latter until we have adequately comprehended the nature of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ As the case now stands, Socrates, we cannot help thinking as you say.

Socrates/ To begin, then, at the beginning once more, what shall we say knowledge is? For surely we are not going to give it up yet, are we?

Theaetetus/ Not by any means, unless, that is, you give it up.

Socrates/ Tell us, then, what definition will make us contradict ourselves least.

Theaetetus/ The one we tried before, Socrates; at any rate, I have nothing else to offer.

Socrates/ What one?

Theaetetus/ That knowledge is true opinion; for true opinion is surely free from error and all its results are fine and good.

Socrates/ The man who was leading the way through the river, Theaetetus, said; "The result itself will show;" and so in this matter, if we go on with our search, perhaps the thing will turn up in our path and of itself reveal the object of our search; but if we stay still, we shall discover nothing.

Theaetetus/ You are right; let us go on with our investigation.

Socrates/ Well, then, this at least calls for slight investigation; for you have a whole profession which declares that true opinion is not knowledge.

Theaetetus/ How so? What profession is it?

Socrates/ The profession of those who are greatest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers; for they persuade men by the art which they possess, not teaching them, but making them have whatever opinion they like. Or do you think there are any teachers so

clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the water-clock, satisfactorily to teach the judges the truth about what happened to people who have been robbed of their money or have suffered other acts of violence, when there were no eyewitnesses?

Theaetetus/ I certainly do not think so; but I think they can persuade them.

Socrates/ And persuading them is making them have an opinion, is it not?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then when judges are justly persuaded about matters which one can know only by having seen them and in no other way, in such a case, judging of them from hearsay, having acquired a true opinion of them, they have judged without knowledge, though they are rightly persuaded, if the judgment they have passed is correct, have they not?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But, my friend, if true opinion and knowledge were the same thing in law courts, the best of judges could never have true opinion without knowledge; in fact, however, it appears that the two are different.

Theaetetus/ Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by reason, but that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere of knowledge; and matters of which there is not a rational explanation are unknowable—yes, that is what he called them—and those of which there is are knowable.

Socrates/ I am glad you mentioned that. But tell us how he distinguished between the knowable and the

unknowable, that we may see whether the accounts that you and I have heard agree.

Theaetetus/ But I do not know whether I can think it out; but if someone else were to make the statement of it, I think I could follow.

Socrates/ Listen then, while I relate it to you—"a dream for a dream." I in turn used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation; for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not, for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence, whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. Indeed, not even "itself" or "that" or "each" or "alone" or "this" or anything else of the sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be expressed by reason; they can only be named, for they have only a name; but the things composed of these are themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation; for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. Thus the elements are not objects of reason or of knowledge, but only of perception, whereas the combinations of them are objects of knowledge and expression and true opinion. When therefore a man acquires without reasoning the true opinion about anything, his mind has the truth about it, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and

receive a rational explanation of a thing is without knowledge of it; but when he has acquired also a rational explanation he may possibly have become all that I have said and may now be perfect in knowledge. Is that the version of the dream you have heard, or is it different?

Theaetetus/ That was it exactly.

Socrates/ Are you satisfied, then, and do you state it in this way, that true opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Can it be, Theaetetus, that we now, in this casual manner, have found out on this day what many wise men have long been seeking and have grown grey in the search?

Theaetetus/ I, at any rate, Socrates, think our present statement is good.

Socrates/ Probably this particular statement is so; for what knowledge could there still be apart from reason and right opinion? One point, however, in what has been said is unsatisfactory to me.

Theaetetus/ What point?

Socrates/ Just that which seems to be the cleverest; the assertion that the elements are unknowable and the class of combinations is knowable.

Theaetetus/ Is that not right?

Socrates/ We are sure to find out, for we have as hostages the examples which he who said all this used in his argument.

Theaetetus/ What examples?

Socrates/ The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their combinations, the syllables; or do

you think the author of the statements we are discussing had something else in view?

Theaetetus/ No; those are what he had in view.

Socrates/ Let us, then, take them up and examine them, or rather, let us examine ourselves and see whether it was in accordance with this theory, or not, that we learned letters. First then, the syllables have a rational explanation, but the letters have not?

Theaetetus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ I think so, too, decidedly. Now if anyone should ask about the first syllable of Socrates; Theaetetus, tell me, what is SO? What would you reply?

Theaetetus/ I should say S and O.

Socrates/ This, then, is your explanation of the syllable?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Come now, in the same manner give me the explanation of the S.

Theaetetus/ How can one give any elements of an element? For really, Socrates, the S is a voiceless letter, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B again has neither voice nor noise, nor have most of the other letters; and so it is quite right to say that they have no explanation, seeing that the most distinct of them, the seven vowels, have only voice, but no explanation whatsoever.

Socrates/ In this point, then, my friend, it would seem that we have reached a right conclusion about knowledge.

Theaetetus/ I think we have.

Socrates/ But have we been right in laying down the principle that whereas the letter is unknowable, yet the syllable is knowable?

Theaetetus/ Probably.

Socrates/ Well then, shall we say that the syllable is the two letters, or, if there be more than two, all of them, or is it a single concept that has arisen from their combination?

Theaetetus/ I think we mean all the letters it contains.

Socrates/ Now take the case of two, S and O. The two together are the first syllable of my name. He who knows it knows the two letters, does he not?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ He knows, that is, the S and the O.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ How is that? He is ignorant of each, and knowing neither of them he knows them both?

Theaetetus/ That is monstrous and absurd, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet if a knowledge of each letter is necessary before one can know both, he who is ever to know a syllable must certainly know the letters first, and so our fine theory will have run away and vanished!

Theaetetus/ And very suddenly, too.

Socrates/ Yes, for we are not watching it carefully. Perhaps we ought to have said that the syllable is not the letters, but a single concept that has arisen from them, having a single form of its own, different from the letters.

Theaetetus/ Certainly; and perhaps that will be better than the other way.

Socrates/ Let us look into that; we must not give up in such unmanly fashion a great and impressive theory.

Theaetetus/ No, we must not.

Socrates/ Let it be, then, as we say now, that the syllable or combination is a single form arising out of the several conjoined elements, and that it is the same in words and in all other things.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Therefore there must be no parts of it.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ Because if there are parts of anything, the whole must inevitably be all the parts; or do you assert also that the whole that has arisen out of the parts is a single concept different from all the parts?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Do you then say that all and the whole are the same, or that each of the two is different from the other?

Theaetetus/ I am not sure; but you tell me to answer boldly, so I take the risk and say that they are different.

Socrates/ Your boldness, Theaetetus, is right; but whether your answer is so remains to be seen.

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly, we must see about that.

Socrates/ The whole, then, according to our present view, would differ from all?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ How about this? Is there any difference between all in the plural and all in the singular? For instance, if we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we in all these forms speaking of the same or of different numbers?

Theaetetus/ Of the same.

Socrates/ That is, of six?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then in each form of speech we have spoken of all the six?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And again do we not speak of one thing when we speak of them all?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ That is, of six?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then in all things that are made up of number, we apply the same term to all in the plural and all in the singular?

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Here is another way of approaching the matter. The number of the fathom and the fathom are the same, are they not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And of the furlong likewise.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the number of the army is the same as the army, and all such cases are alike? In each of them all the number is all the thing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is the number of each anything but the parts of each?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Everything that has parts, accordingly, consists of parts, does it not?

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ But we are agreed that the all must be all the parts if all the number is to be the all.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the whole does not consist of parts, for if it consisted of all the parts it would be the all.

Theaetetus/ That seems to be true.

Socrates/ But is a part a part of anything in the world but the whole?

Theaetetus/ Yes, of the all.

Socrates/ You are putting up a brave fight, Theaetetus. But is not the all precisely that of which nothing is wanting?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And is not just this same thing, from which nothing whatsoever is lacking, a whole? For that from which anything is lacking is neither a whole nor all, which have become identical simultaneously and for the same reason.

Theaetetus/ I think now that there is no difference between all and whole.

Socrates/ We were saying, were we not, that if there are parts of anything, the whole and all of it will be all the parts?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Once more, then, as I was trying to say just now, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow necessarily that it contains the letters, not as parts of it, or else that being the same as the letters, it is equally knowable with them?

Theaetetus/ It does.

Socrates/ And it was in order to avoid this that we assumed that it was different from them?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you mention any other things which are parts of it, but are not the letters of it?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not. For if I grant that there are parts of the syllable, it would be ridiculous to give up the letters and look for other things as parts.

Socrates/ Without question, then, Theaetetus, the syllable would be, according to our present view, some indivisible concept.

Theaetetus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Do you remember, then, my friend, that we admitted a little while ago, on what we considered good grounds, that there can be no rational explanation of the primary elements of which other things are composed, because each of them, when taken by itself, is not composite, and we could not properly apply to such an element even the expression “be” or “this,” because these terms are different and alien, and for this reason it is irrational and unknowable?

Theaetetus/ I remember.

Socrates/ And is not this the sole reason why it is single in form and indivisible? I can see no other.

Theaetetus/ There is no other to be seen.

Socrates/ Then the syllable falls into the same class with the letter, if it has no parts and is a single form?

Theaetetus/ Yes, unquestionably.

Socrates/ If, then, the syllable is a plurality of letters and is a whole of which the letters are parts, the syllables and the letters are equally knowable and

expressible, if all the parts were found to be the same as the whole.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But if one and indivisible, then syllable and likewise letter are equally irrational and unknowable; for the same cause will make them so.

Theaetetus/ I cannot dispute it.

Socrates/ Then we must not accept the statement of anyone who says that the syllable is knowable and expressible, but the letter is not.

Theaetetus/ No, not if we are convinced by our argument.

Socrates/ But would you not rather accept the opposite belief, judging by your own experience when you were learning to read?

Theaetetus/ What experience?

Socrates/ In learning, you were merely constantly trying to distinguish between the letters both by sight and by hearing, keeping each of them distinct from the rest, that you might not be disturbed by their sequence when they were spoken or written.

Theaetetus/ That is very true.

Socrates/ And in the music school was not perfect attainment the ability to follow each note and tell which string produced it; and everyone would agree that the notes are the elements of music?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is all true.

Socrates/ Then if we are to argue from the elements and combinations in which we ourselves have experience to other things in general, we shall say that the elements as a class admit of a much clearer knowledge than the compounds and of a knowledge

that is much more important for the complete attainment of each branch of learning, and if anyone says that the compound is by its nature knowable and the element unknowable, we shall consider that he is, intentionally or unintentionally, joking.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Still other proofs of this might be brought out, I think; but let us not on that account lose sight of the question before us, which is; What is meant by the doctrine that the most perfect knowledge arises from the addition of rational explanation to true opinion?

Theaetetus/ No, we must not.

Socrates/ Now what are we intended to understand by "rational explanation?" I think it means one of three things.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The first would be making one's own thought clear through speech by means of verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream that flows through the lips, as in a mirror or water. Do you not think the rational explanation is something of that sort?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I do. At any rate, we say that he who does that speaks or explains.

Socrates/ Well, that is a thing that anyone can do sooner or later; he can show what he thinks about anything, unless he is deaf or dumb from the first; and so all who have any right opinion will be found to have it with the addition of rational explanation, and there will henceforth be no possibility of right opinion apart from knowledge.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Let us not, therefore, carelessly accuse him of talking nonsense who gave the definition of knowledge which we are now considering; for perhaps that is not what he meant. He may have meant that each person if asked about anything must be able in reply to give his questioner an account of it in terms of its elements.

Theaetetus/ As for example, Socrates?

Socrates/ As, for example, Hesiod, speaking of a wagon, says, "a hundred pieces of wood in a wagon." Now I could not name the pieces, nor, I fancy, could you; but if we were asked what a wagon is, we should be satisfied if we could say "wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke."

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But he, perhaps, would think we were ridiculous, just as he would if, on being asked about your name, we should reply by telling the syllables, holding a right opinion and expressing correctly what we have to say, but should think we were grammarians and as such both possessed and were expressing as grammarians would the rational explanation of the name Theaetetus. He would say that it is impossible for anyone to give a rational explanation of anything with knowledge, until he gives a complete enumeration of the elements, combined with true opinion. That, I believe, is what was said before.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it was.

Socrates/ So, too, he would say that we have right opinion about a wagon, but that he who can give an account of its essential nature in terms of those one hundred parts has by this addition added rational explanation to true opinion and has acquired technical knowledge of the essential nature of a wagon, in place

of mere opinion, by describing the whole in terms of its elements.

Theaetetus/ Do you agree to that, Socrates?

Socrates/ If you, my friend, agree to it and accept the view that orderly description in terms of its elements is a rational account of anything, but that description in terms of syllables or still larger units is irrational, tell me so, that we may examine the question.

Theaetetus/ Certainly I accept it.

Socrates/ Do you accept it in the belief that anyone has knowledge of anything when he thinks that the same element is a part sometimes of one thing and sometimes of another or when he is of opinion that the same thing has as a part of it sometimes one thing and sometimes another?

Theaetetus/ Not at all, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Then do you forget that when you began to learn to read you and the others did just that?

Theaetetus/ Do you mean when we thought that sometimes one letter and sometimes another belonged to the same syllable, and when we put the same letter sometimes into the proper syllable and sometimes into another?

Socrates/ That is what I mean.

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, I do not forget, nor do think that those have knowledge who are in that condition.

Socrates/ Take an example; When at such a stage in his progress a person in writing “Theaetetus” thinks he ought to write, and actually does write, TH and E, and again in trying to write “Theodorus” thinks he ought to write, and does write, T and E, shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

Theaetetus/ No, we just now agreed that a person in such a condition has not yet gained knowledge.

Socrates/ Then there is nothing to prevent the same person from being in that condition with respect to the second and third and fourth syllables?

Theaetetus/ No, nothing.

Socrates/ Then, in that case, he has in mind the orderly description in terms of letters, and will write "Theaetetus" with right opinion, when he writes the letters in order?

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ But he is still, as we say, without knowledge, though he has right opinion?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yes, but with his opinion he has rational explanation; for he wrote with the method in terms of letters in his mind, and we agreed that that was rational explanation.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ There is, then, my friend, a combination of right opinion with rational explanation, which cannot as yet properly be called knowledge?

Theaetetus/ There is not much doubt about it.

Socrates/ So it seems that the perfectly true definition of knowledge, which we thought we had, was but a golden dream. Or shall we wait a bit before we condemn it? Perhaps the definition to be adopted is not this, but the remaining one of the three possibilities one of which we said must be affirmed by anyone who asserts that knowledge is right opinion combined with rational explanation.

Theaetetus/ I am glad you called that to mind. For there is still one left. The first was a kind of vocal image of the thought, the second the orderly approach to the whole through the elements, which we have just been discussing, and what is the third?

Socrates/ It is just the definition which most people would give, that knowledge is the ability to tell some characteristic by which the object in question differs from all others.

Theaetetus/ As an example of the method, what explanation can you give me, and of what thing?

Socrates/ As an example, if you like, take the sun; I think it is enough for you to be told that it is the brightest of the heavenly bodies that revolve about the earth.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Understand why I say this. It is because, as we were just saying, if you get hold of the distinguishing characteristic by which a given thing differs from the rest, you will, as some say, get hold of the definition or explanation of it; but so long as you cling to some common quality, your explanation will pertain to all those objects to which the common quality belongs.

Theaetetus/ I understand; and it seems to me that it is quite right to call that kind a rational explanation or definition.

Socrates/ Then he who possesses right opinion about anything and adds thereto a comprehension of the difference which distinguishes it from other things will have acquired knowledge of that thing of which he previously had only opinion.

Theaetetus/ That is what we affirm.

Socrates/ Theaetetus, now that I have come closer to our statement, I do not understand it at all. It is like coming close to a scene-painting. While I stood off at a distance, I thought there was something in it.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I will tell you if I can. Assume that I have right opinion about you; if I add the explanation or definition of you, then I have knowledge of you, otherwise I have merely opinion.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But explanation was, we agreed, the interpretation of your difference.

Theaetetus/ It Was.

Socrates/ Then so long as I had merely opinion, I did not grasp in my thought any of the points in which you differ from others?

Theaetetus/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Therefore I was thinking of some one of the common traits which you possess no more than other men.

Theaetetus/ You must have been.

Socrates/ For heaven's sake! How in the world could I in that case have any opinion about you more than about anyone else? Suppose that I thought "That is Theaetetus which is a man and has nose and eyes and mouth" and so forth, mentioning all the parts. Can this thought make me think of Theaetetus any more than of Theodorus or of the meanest of the Mysians, as the saying is?

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ But if I think not only of a man with nose and eyes, but of one with snub nose and protruding

eyes, shall I then have an opinion of you any more than of myself and all others like me?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ No; I fancy Theaetetus will not be the object of opinion in me until this snub-nosedness of yours has stamped and deposited in my mind a memorial different from those of the other examples of snub-nosedness that I have seen, and the other traits that make up your personality have done the like. Then that memorial, if I meet you again tomorrow, will awaken my memory and make me have right opinion about you.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then right opinion also would have to do with differences in any given instance?

Theaetetus/ At any rate, it seems so.

Socrates/ Then what becomes of the addition of reason or explanation to right opinion? For if it is defined as the addition of an opinion of the way in which a given thing differs from the rest, it is an utterly absurd injunction.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ When we have a right opinion of the way in which certain things differ from other things, we are told to acquire a right opinion of the way in which those same things differ from other things! On this plan the twirling of a scytale or a pestle or anything of the sort would be as nothing compared with this injunction. It might more justly be called a blind man's giving directions; for to command us to acquire that which we already have, in order to learn that of which we already have opinion, is very like a man whose sight is mightily darkened.

Theaetetus/ Tell me now, what did you intend to say when you asked the question a while ago?

Socrates/ If, my boy, the command to add reason or explanation means learning to know and not merely getting an opinion about the difference, our splendid definition of knowledge would be a fine affair! For learning to know is acquiring knowledge, is it not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, it seems, if asked, What is knowledge? our leader will reply that it is right opinion with the addition of a knowledge of difference; for that would, according to him, be the addition of reason or explanation.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And it is utterly silly, when we are looking for a definition of knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or of anything else whatsoever. So neither perception, Theaetetus, nor true opinion, nor reason or explanation combined with true opinion could be knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Are we then, my friend, still pregnant and in travail with knowledge, or have we brought forth everything?

Theaetetus/ Yes, we have, and, by Zeus, Socrates, with your help I have already said more than there was in me.

Socrates/ Then does our art of midwifery declare to us that all the offspring that have been born are mere wind-eggs and not worth rearing?

Theaetetus/ It does, decidedly.

Socrates/ If after this you ever undertake to conceive other thoughts, Theaetetus, and do conceive, you will be pregnant with better thoughts than these by reason of the present search, and if you remain barren, you will be less harsh and gentler to your associates, for you will have the wisdom not to think you know that which you do not know. So much and no more my art can accomplish; nor do I know aught of the things that are known by others, the great and wonderful men who are to-day and have been in the past. This art, however, both my mother and I received from God, she for women and I for young and noble men and for all who are fair.

And now I must go to the Porch of the King, to answer to the suit which Meletus has brought against me. But in the morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again.

Theaetetus.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Euclid, Terpsion,

Socrates. Theodorus. Theaetetus.

Euclid and Terpsion meet in front of Euclid's house in Megara; they enter the house, and the dialogue is read to them by a servant.

Euclid/ Have you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion?

Terpsion/ No, I came some time ago: and I have been in the Agora looking for you, and wondering that I could not find you.

Euclid/ But I was not in the city.

Terpsion/ Where then?

Euclid/ As I was going down to the harbor, I met Theaetetus—he was being carried up to Athens from the army at Corinth.

Terpsion/ Was he alive or dead?

Euclid/ He was scarcely alive, for he has been badly wounded; but he was suffering even more from the sickness which has broken out in the army.

Terpsion/ The dysentery, you mean?

Euclid/ Yes.

Terpsion/ Alas! what a loss he will be!

Euclid/ Yes, Terpsion, he is a noble fellow; only to-day I heard some people highly praising his behavior in this very battle.

Terpsion/ No wonder; I should rather be surprised at hearing anything else of him. But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara?

Euclid/ He wanted to get home: although I entreated and advised him to remain, he would not listen to me; so I set him on his way, and turned back, and then I remembered what Socrates had said of him, and thought how remarkably this, like all his predictions, had been fulfilled. I believe that he had seen him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a youth, and he had a memorable conversation with him, which he repeated to me when I came to Athens; he was full of admiration of his genius, and said that he would most certainly be a great man, if he lived.

Terpsion/ The prophecy has certainly been fulfilled; but what was the conversation? can you tell me?

Euclid/ No, indeed, not offhand; but I took notes of it as soon as I got home; these I filled up from memory, writing them out at leisure; and whenever I went to Athens, I asked Socrates about any point which I had forgotten, and on my return I made corrections; thus I have nearly the whole conversation written down.

Terpsion/ I remember—you told me; and I have always been intending to ask you to show me the writing, but have put off doing so; and now, why should we not read it through? —having just come from the country, I should greatly like to rest.

Euclid/ I too shall be very glad of a rest, for I went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum. Let us go in, then, and, while we are reposing, the servant shall read to us.

Terpsion/ Very good.

Euclid/ Here is the roll, Terpsion; I may observe that I have introduced Socrates, not as narrating to me, but as actually conversing with the persons whom he mentioned—

these were, Theodorus the geometrician (of Cyrene), and Theaetetus. I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the interlocutory words 'I said,' 'I remarked,' which he used when he spoke of himself, and again, 'he agreed,' or 'disagreed,' in the answer, lest the repetition of them should be troublesome.

Terpsion/ Quite right, Euclid.

Euclid/ And now, boy, you may take the roll and read.

Euclid's servant reads.

Socrates/ If I cared enough about the Cyrenians, Theodorus, I would ask you whether there are any rising geometricians or philosophers in that part of the world. But I am more interested in our own Athenian youth, and I would rather know who among them are likely to do well. I observe them as far as I can myself, and I enquire of anyone whom they follow, and I see that a great many of them follow you, in which they are quite right, considering your eminence in geometry and in other ways. Tell me then, if you have met with anyone who is good for anything.

Theodorus/ Yes, Socrates, I have become acquainted with one very remarkable Athenian youth, whom I commend to you as well worthy of your attention. If he had been a beauty I should have been afraid to praise him, lest you should suppose that I was in love with him; but he is no beauty, and you must not be offended if I say that he is very like you; for he has a snub nose and projecting eyes, although these features are less marked in him than in you. Seeing, then, that he has no personal attractions, I may freely say, that in all my acquaintance, which is very large, I never knew anyone who was his equal in natural gifts: for he has a quickness of apprehension which is almost unrivalled, and he is exceedingly gentle, and also the most courageous of men; there is a union of qualities in him such as I have never

seen in any other, and should scarcely have thought possible; for those who, like him, have quick and ready and retentive wits, have generally also quick tempers; they are ships without ballast, and go darting about, and are mad rather than courageous; and the steadier sort, when they have to face study, prove stupid and cannot remember. Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in the path of knowledge and enquiry; and he is full of gentleness, flowing on silently like a river of oil; at his age, it is wonderful.

Socrates/ That is good news; whose son is he?

Theodorus/ The name of his father I have forgotten, but the youth himself is the middle one of those who are approaching us; he and his companions have been anointing themselves in the outer court, and now they seem to have finished, and are coming towards us. Look and see whether you know him.

Socrates/ I know the youth, but I do not know his name; he is the son of Euphronius the Sunian, who was himself an eminent man, and such another as his son is, according to your account of him; I believe that he left a considerable fortune.

Theodorus/ Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name; but I rather think that the property disappeared in the hands of trustees; notwithstanding which he is wonderfully liberal.

Socrates/ He must be a fine fellow; tell him to come and sit by me.

Theodorus/ I will. Come hither, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates.

Socrates/ By all means, Theaetetus, in order that I may see the reflection of myself in your face, for Theodorus says that we are alike; and yet if each of us held in his hands a lyre, and he said that they were tuned alike, should we at

once take his word, or should we ask whether he who said so was or was not a musician?

Theaetetus/ We should ask.

Socrates/ And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if not, not?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?

Theaetetus/ Certainly we should.

Socrates/ And is Theodorus a painter?

Theaetetus/ I never heard that he was.

Socrates/ Is he a geometrician?

Theaetetus/ Of course he is, Socrates.

Socrates/ And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man?

Theaetetus/ I think so.

Socrates/ If, then, he remarks on a similarity in our persons, either by way of praise or blame, there is no particular reason why we should attend to him.

Theaetetus/ I should say not.

Socrates/ But if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the mental endowments of either of us, then he who hears the praises will naturally desire to examine him who is praised: and he again should be willing to exhibit himself.

Theaetetus/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for me to examine, and for you to exhibit; since although Theodorus has praised many a citizen and stranger in my hearing, never did I hear him praise anyone as he has been praising you.

Theaetetus/ I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest?

Socrates/ Nay, Theodorus is not given to jesting; and I cannot allow you to retract your consent on any such pretense as that. If you do, he will have to swear to his words; and we are perfectly sure that no one will be found to impugn him. Do not be shy then, but stand to your word.

Theaetetus/ I suppose I must, if you wish it.

Socrates/ In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry, perhaps?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And astronomy and harmony and calculation?

Theaetetus/ I do my best.

Socrates/ Yes, my boy, and so do I; and my desire is to learn of him, or of anybody who seems to understand these things. And I get on pretty well in general; but there is a little difficulty which I want you and the company to aid me in investigating. Will you answer me a question: 'Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?'

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And by wisdom the wise are wise?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is that different in any way from knowledge?

Theaetetus/ What?

Socrates/ Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know?

Theaetetus/ Certainly they are.

Socrates/ Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction—What is knowledge? Can we answer that question? What say you? which of us will speak first? whoever misses shall sit down, as at a game of ball, and shall be donkey, as the boys say; he who lasts out his competitors in the game without missing, shall be our king, and shall have the right of putting to us any questions which he pleases.... Why is there no reply? I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation? I only want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable.

Theodorus/ The reverse of rudeness, Socrates: but I would rather that you would ask one of the young fellows; for the truth is, that I am unused to your game of question and answer, and I am too old to learn; the young will be more suitable, and they will improve more than I shall, for youth is always able to improve. And so having made a beginning with Theaetetus, I would advise you to go on with him and not let him off.

Socrates/ Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says? The philosopher, whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word ought to be a command to a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say what you think that knowledge is.

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me; and if I make a mistake, you will doubtless correct me.

Socrates/ We will, if we can.

Theaetetus/ Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus—geometry, and those which you just now mentioned—are knowledge; and I would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen; these, each and all of them, are knowledge.

Socrates/ Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberality of your nature make you give many and diverse things, when I am asking for one simple thing.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ Perhaps nothing. I will endeavor, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes?

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Socrates/ And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ In both cases you define the subject-matter of each of the two arts?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ But that, Theaetetus, was not the point of my question: we wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right?

Theaetetus/ Perfectly right.

Socrates/ Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing—for example, What is clay? and we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not the answer be ridiculous?

Theaetetus/ Truly.

Socrates/ In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that he who asked the question would understand from our answer the nature of 'clay,' merely because we added 'of the image-makers' or of any other

workers. How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it?

Theaetetus/ He cannot.

Socrates/ Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?

Theaetetus/ None.

Socrates/ Nor of any other science?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous; for the question is, 'What is knowledge?' and he replies, 'A knowledge of this or that.'

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay, he might have said simply, that clay is moistened earth—what sort of clay is not to the point.

Theaetetus/ Yes, Socrates, there is no difficulty as you put the question. You mean, if I am not mistaken, something like what occurred to me and to my friend here, your namesake Socrates, in a recent discussion.

Socrates/ What was that, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Theodorus was writing out for us something about roots, such as the roots of three or five, showing that they are incommensurable by the unit: he selected other examples up to seventeen—there he stopped. Now as there are innumerable roots, the notion occurred to us of attempting to include them all under one name or class.

Socrates/ And did you find such a class?

Theaetetus/ I think that we did; but I should like to have your opinion.

Socrates/ Let me hear.

Theaetetus/ We divided all numbers into two classes: those which are made up of equal factors multiplying into one another, which we compared to square figures and called square or equilateral numbers; —that was one class.

Socrates/ Very good.

Theaetetus/ The intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every other number which is made up of unequal factors, either of a greater multiplied by a less, or of a less multiplied by a greater, and when regarded as a figure, is contained in unequal sides; —all these we compared to oblong figures, and called them oblong numbers.

Socrates/ Capital; and what followed?

Theaetetus/ The lines, or sides, which have for their squares the equilateral plane numbers, were called by us lengths or magnitudes; and the lines which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the oblong numbers, were called powers or roots; the reason of this latter name being, that they are commensurable with the former [i.e. with the so-called lengths or magnitudes] not in linear measurement, but in the value of the superficial content of their squares; and the same about solids.

Socrates/ Excellent, my boys; I think that you fully justify the praises of Theodorus, and that he will not be found guilty of false witness.

Theaetetus/ But I am unable, Socrates, to give you a similar answer about knowledge, which is what you appear to want; and therefore Theodorus is a deceiver after all.

Socrates/ Well, but if someone were to praise you for running, and to say that he never met your equal among boys, and afterwards you were beaten in a race by a grown-up man, who was a great runner—would the praise be any the less true?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter, as I just now said? Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way?

Theaetetus/ By heaven, they should be the top of all perfection!

Socrates/ Well, then, be of good cheer; do not say that Theodorus was mistaken about you, but do your best to ascertain the true nature of knowledge, as well as of other things.

Theaetetus/ I am eager enough, Socrates, if that would bring to light the truth.

Socrates/ Come, you made a good beginning just now; let your own answer about roots be your model, and as you comprehended them all in one class, try and bring the many sorts of knowledge under one definition.

Theaetetus/ I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very often, when the report of questions asked by you was brought to me; but I can neither persuade myself that I have a satisfactory answer to give, nor hear of anyone who answers as you would have him; and I cannot shake off a feeling of anxiety.

Socrates/ These are the pangs of labor, my dear Theaetetus; you have something within you which you are bringing to the birth.

Theaetetus/ I do not know, Socrates; I only say what I feel.

Socrates/ And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ And that I myself practice midwifery?

Theaetetus/ No, never.

Socrates/ Let me tell you that I do though, my friend: but you must not reveal the secret, as the world in general have not found me out; and therefore they only say of me, that I am the strangest of mortals and drive men to their wits' end. Did you ever hear that too?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you the reason?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Bear in mind the whole business of the midwives, and then you will see my meaning better: —No woman, as you are probably aware, who is still able to conceive and bear, attends other women, but only those who are past bearing.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I know.

Socrates/ The reason of this is said to be that Artemis—the goddess of childbirth—is not a mother, and she honors those who are like herself; but she could not allow the barren to be midwives, because human nature cannot know the mystery of an art without experience; and therefore she assigned this office to those who are too old to bear.

Theaetetus/ I dare say.

Socrates/ And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not?

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And by the use of potions and incantations they are able to arouse the pangs and to soothe them at will; they can make those bear who have a difficulty in bearing, and if they think fit they can smother the embryo in the womb.

Theaetetus/ They can.

Socrates/ Did you ever remark that they are also most cunning matchmakers, and have a thorough knowledge of what unions are likely to produce a brave brood?

Theaetetus/ No, never.

Socrates/ Then let me tell you that this is their greatest pride, more than cutting the umbilical cord. And if you reflect, you will see that the same art which cultivates and gathers in the fruits of the earth, will be most likely to know in what soils the several plants or seeds should be deposited.

Theaetetus/ Yes, the same art.

Socrates/ And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise?

Theaetetus/ I should think not.

Socrates/ Certainly not; but midwives are respectable women who have a character to lose, and they avoid this department of their profession, because they are afraid of being called procuresses, which is a name given to those who join together man and woman in an unlawful and unscientific way; and yet the true midwife is also the true and only matchmaker.

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Such are the midwives, whose task is a very important one, but not so important as mine; for women do not bring into the world at one time real children, and at another time counterfeits which are with difficulty distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery—you would think so?

Theaetetus/ Indeed I should.

Socrates/ Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but differs, in that I attend men and not women, and I look after their souls when they are in labor, and not

after their bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And like the midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself, is very just—the reason is, that the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my own soul, but those who converse with me profit. Some of them appear dull enough at first, but afterwards, as our acquaintance ripens, if the god is gracious to them, they all make astonishing progress; and this in the opinion of others as well as in their own. It is quite clear that they never learned anything from me; the many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own making. But to me and the god they owe their delivery. And the proof of my words is, that many of them in their ignorance, either in their self-conceit despising me, or falling under the influence of others, have gone away too soon; and have not only lost the children of whom I had previously delivered them by an ill bringing up, but have stifled whatever else they had in them by evil communications, being fonder of lies and shams than of the truth; and they have at last ended by seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, is one of them, and there are many others. The truants often return to me, and beg that I would consort with them again—they are ready to go to me on their knees—and then, if my familiar allows, which is not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. Dire are the pangs which my art is able to arouse and to allay in those who consort with me, just like the pangs of women in childbirth; night and day they are full of perplexity and travail which is even worse than that of the women. So

much for them. And there are others, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently having nothing in them; and as I know that they have no need of my art, I coax them into marrying someone, and by the grace of God I can generally tell who is likely to do them good. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus, and many to other inspired sages.

I tell you this long story, friend Theaetetus, because I suspect, as indeed you seem to think yourself, that you are in labor—great with some conception. Come then to me, who am a midwife's son and myself a midwife, and do your best to answer the questions which I will ask you. And if I abstract and expose your first-born, because I discover upon inspection that the conception which you have formed is a vain shadow, do not quarrel with me on that account, as the manner of women is when their first children are taken from them. For I have actually known some who were ready to bite me when I deprived them of a darling folly; they did not perceive that I acted from goodwill, not knowing that no god is the enemy of man—that was not within the range of their ideas; neither am I their enemy in all this, but it would be wrong for me to admit falsehood, or to stifle the truth. Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question, 'What is knowledge?'—and do not say that you cannot tell; but quit yourself like a man, and by the help of God you will be able to tell.

Theaetetus/ At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be ashamed of not trying to do my best. Now he who knows perceives what he knows, and, as far as I can see at present, knowledge is perception.

Socrates/ Bravely said, boy; that is the way in which you should express your opinion. And now, let us examine together this conception of yours, and see whether it is a true birth or a mere wind-egg: —You say that knowledge is perception?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing it. Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not: —You have read him?

Theaetetus/ O yes, again and again.

Socrates/ Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?

Theaetetus/ Yes, he says so.

Socrates/ A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to understand him: the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold?

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?

Theaetetus/ I suppose the last.

Socrates/ Then it must appear so to each of them?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he perceives.'

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Then appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ In the name of the Graces, what an almighty wise man Protagoras must have been! He spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but told the truth, 'his Truth', in secret to his own disciples.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I am about to speak of a high argument, in which all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light—there is no single thing or quality, but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which 'becoming' is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming. Summon all philosophers—Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after another, and with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in this. Summon the great masters of either kind of poetry—Epicharmus, the prince of Comedy, and Homer of Tragedy; when the latter sings of

> 'Ocean whence sprang the gods, and mother Tethys,'

does he not mean that all things are the offspring of flux and motion?

Theaetetus/ I think so.

Socrates/ And who could take up arms against such a great army having Homer for its general, and not appear ridiculous?

Theaetetus/ Who indeed, Socrates?

Socrates/ Yes, Theaetetus; and there are plenty of other proofs which will show that motion is the source of what is called being and becoming, and inactivity of not-being and

destruction; for fire and warmth, which are supposed to be the parent and guardian of all other things, are born of movement and of friction, which is a kind of motion; —is not this the origin of fire?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ And the race of animals is generated in the same way?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but preserved for a long time by motion and exercise?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And what of the mental habit? Is not the soul informed, and improved, and preserved by study and attention, which are motions; but when at rest, which in the soul only means want of attention and study, is uninformed, and speedily forgets whatever she has learned?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as to the body?

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ I may add, that breathless calm, stillness and the like waste and impair, while wind and storm preserve; and the palmary argument of all, which I strongly urge, is the golden chain in Homer, by which he means the sun, thereby indicating that so long as the sun and the heavens go round in their orbits, all things human and divine are and are preserved, but if they were chained up and their motions ceased, then all things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is, turned upside down.

Theaetetus/ I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained his meaning.

Socrates/ Then now apply his doctrine to perception, my good friend, and first of all to vision; that which you call white color is not in your eyes, and is not a distinct thing which exists out of them. And you must not assign any place to it: for if it had position it would be, and be at rest, and there would be no process of becoming.

Theaetetus/ Then what is color?

Socrates/ Let us carry out the principle which has just been affirmed, that nothing is self-existent, and then we shall see that white, black, and every other color, arises out of the eye meeting the appropriate motion, and that what we call a color is in each case neither the active nor the passive element, but something which passes between them, and is peculiar to each percipient; are you quite certain that the several colors appear to a dog or to any animal whatever as they appear to you?

Theaetetus/ Far from it.

Socrates/ Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? Are you so profoundly convinced of this? Rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the same?

Theaetetus/ The latter.

Socrates/ And if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I apprehend by touch, were great or white or hot, it could not become different by mere contact with another unless it actually changed; nor again, if the comparing or apprehending subject were great or white or hot, could this, when unchanged from within, become changed by any approximation or affection of any other thing. The fact is that in our ordinary way of speaking we allow ourselves to be driven into most ridiculous and wonderful contradictions, as Protagoras and all who take his line of argument would remark.

Theaetetus/ How? and of what sort do you mean?

Socrates/ A little instance will sufficiently explain my meaning: Here are six dice, which are more by a half when compared with four, and fewer by a half than twelve—they are more and also fewer. How can you or anyone maintain the contrary?

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Well, then, suppose that Protagoras or someone asks whether anything can become greater or more if not by increasing, how would you answer him, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ I should say 'No,' Socrates, if I were to speak my mind in reference to this last question, and if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer.

Socrates/ Capital! excellent! spoken like an oracle, my boy! And if you reply 'Yes,' there will be a case for Euripides; for our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known about the mind, and argue only out of the superfluity of their wits, would have had a regular sparring-match over this, and would have knocked their arguments together finely. But you and I, who have no professional aims, only desire to see what is the mutual relation of these principles, —whether they are consistent with each other or not.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that would be my desire.

Socrates/ And mine too. But since this is our feeling, and there is plenty of time, why should we not calmly and patiently review our own thoughts, and thoroughly examine and see what these appearances in us really are? If I am not mistaken, they will be described by us as follows: —first, equal to that nothing can become greater or less, either in

number or magnitude, while remaining equal to itself—you would agree?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Secondly, that without addition or subtraction there is no increase or diminution of anything, but only equality.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Thirdly, that what was not before cannot be afterwards, without becoming and having become.

Theaetetus/ Yes, truly.

Socrates/ These three axioms, if I am not mistaken, are fighting with one another in our minds in the case of the dice, or, again, in such a case as this—if I were to say that I, who am of a certain height and taller than you, may within a year, without gaining or losing in height, be not so tall—not that I should have lost, but that you would have increased. In such a case, I am afterwards what I once was not, and yet I have not become; for I could not have become without becoming, neither could I have become less without losing somewhat of my height; and I could give you ten thousand examples of similar contradictions, if we admit them at all. I believe that you follow me, Theaetetus; for I suspect that you have thought of these questions before now.

Theaetetus/ Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them; by the Gods I am! and I want to know what on earth they mean; and there are times when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them.

Socrates/ I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. He was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child of

Thaumas (wonder). But do you begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras?

Theaetetus/ Not as yet.

Socrates/ Then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the hidden 'truth' of a famous man or school.

Theaetetus/ To be sure, I shall be very much obliged.

Socrates/ Take a look round, then, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. Now by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in nothing but what they can grasp in their hands, and who will not allow that action or generation or anything invisible can have real existence.

Theaetetus/ Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very hard and impenetrable mortals.

Socrates/ Yes, my boy, outer barbarians. Far more ingenious are the brethren whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you. Their first principle is, that all is motion, and upon this all the affections of which we were just now speaking are supposed to depend: there is nothing but motion, which has two forms, one active and the other passive, both in endless number; and out of the union and friction of them there is generated a progeny endless in number, having two forms, sense and the object of sense, which are ever breaking forth and coming to the birth at the same moment. The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling; there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, and many more which have names, as well as innumerable others which are without them; each has its kindred object, —each variety of color has a corresponding variety of sight, and so with sound and hearing, and with the rest of the senses and the objects akin to them. Do you see, Theaetetus, the bearings of this tale on the preceding argument?

Theaetetus/ Indeed I do not.

Socrates/ Then attend, and I will try to finish the story. The purport is that all these things are in motion, as I was saying, and that this motion is of two kinds, a slower and a quicker; and the slower elements have their motions in the same place and with reference to things near them, and so they beget; but what is begotten is swifter, for it is carried to and fro, and moves from place to place. Apply this to sense: —When the eye and the appropriate object meet together and give birth to whiteness and the sensation connatural with it, which could not have been given by either of them going elsewhere, then, while the sight is flowing from the eye, whiteness proceeds from the object which combines in producing the color; and so the eye is fulfilled with sight, and really sees, and becomes, not sight, but a seeing eye; and the object which combined to form the color is fulfilled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but a white thing, whether wood or stone or whatever the object may be which happens to be colored white. And this is true of all sensible objects, hard, warm, and the like, which are similarly to be regarded, as I was saying before, not as having any absolute existence, but as being all of them of whatever kind generated by motion in their intercourse with one another; for of the agent and patient, as existing in separation, no trustworthy conception, as they say, can be formed, for the agent has no existence until united with the patient, and the patient has no existence until united with the agent; and that which by uniting with something becomes an agent, by meeting with some other thing is converted into a patient. And from all these considerations, as I said at first, there arises a general reflection, that there is no one self-existent thing, but everything is becoming and in relation; and being must be altogether abolished, although from habit and ignorance we are compelled even in this discussion to retain

the use of the term. But great philosophers tell us that we are not to allow either the word 'something,' or 'belonging to something,' or 'to me,' or 'this' or 'that,' or any other detaining name to be used; in the language of nature all things are being created and destroyed, coming into being and passing into new forms; nor can any name fix or detain them; he who attempts to fix them is easily refuted. And this should be the way of speaking, not only of particulars but of aggregates; such aggregates as are expressed in the word 'man,' or 'stone,' or any name of an animal or of a class. O Theaetetus, are not these speculations sweet as honey? And do you not like the taste of them in the mouth?

Theaetetus/ I do not know what to say, Socrates; for, indeed, I cannot make out whether you are giving your own opinion or only wanting to draw me out.

Socrates/ You forget, my friend, that I neither know, nor profess to know, anything of these matters; you are the person who is in labor, I am the barren midwife; and this is why I soothe you, and offer you one good thing after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that I may at last help to bring your own opinion into the light of day: when this has been accomplished, then we will determine whether what you have brought forth is only a wind-egg or a real and genuine birth. Therefore, keep up your spirits, and answer like a man what you think.

Theaetetus/ Ask me.

Socrates/ Then once more: Is it your opinion that nothing is but what becomes? —the good and the noble, as well as all the other things which we were just now mentioning?

Theaetetus/ When I hear you discoursing in this style, I think that there is a great deal in what you say, and I am very ready to assent.

Socrates/ Let us not leave the argument unfinished, then; for there still remains to be considered an objection which may be raised about dreams and diseases, in particular about madness, and the various illusions of hearing and sight, or of other senses. For you know that in all these cases the *esse-percipi* theory appears to be unmistakably refuted, since in dreams and illusions we certainly have false perceptions; and far from saying that everything is which appears, we should rather say that nothing is which appears.

Theaetetus/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ But then, my boy, how can anyone contend that knowledge is perception, or that to every man what appears is?

Theaetetus/ I am afraid to say, Socrates, that I have nothing to answer, because you rebuked me just now for making this excuse; but I certainly cannot undertake to argue that madmen or dreamers think truly, when they imagine, some of them that they are gods, and others that they can fly, and are flying in their sleep.

Socrates/ Do you see another question which can be raised about these phenomena, notably about dreaming and waking?

Theaetetus/ What question?

Socrates/ A question which I think that you must often have heard persons ask: —How can you determine whether at this moment we are sleeping, and all our thoughts are a dream; or whether we are awake, and talking to one another in the waking state?

Theaetetus/ Indeed, Socrates, I do not know how to prove the one any more than the other, for in both cases the facts precisely correspond; and there is no difficulty in supposing that during all this discussion we have been talking to one

another in a dream; and when in a dream we seem to be narrating dreams, the resemblance of the two states is quite astonishing.

Socrates/ You see, then, that a doubt about the reality of sense is easily raised, since there may even be a doubt whether we are awake or in a dream. And as our time is equally divided between sleeping and waking, in either sphere of existence the soul contends that the thoughts which are present to our minds at the time are true; and during one half of our lives we affirm the truth of the one, and, during the other half, of the other; and are equally confident of both.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders? the difference is only that the times are not equal.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time?

Theaetetus/ That would be in many ways ridiculous.

Socrates/ But can you certainly determine by any other means which of these opinions is true?

Theaetetus/ I do not think that I can.

Socrates/ Listen, then, to a statement of the other side of the argument, which is made by the champions of appearance. They would say, as I imagine—Can that which is wholly other than something, have the same quality as that from which it differs? and observe, Theaetetus, that the word 'other' means not 'partially,' but 'wholly other.'

Theaetetus/ Certainly, putting the question as you do, that which is wholly other cannot either potentially or in any other way be the same.

Socrates/ And must therefore be admitted to be unlike?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another, when it becomes like we call it the same—when unlike, other?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And also that different combinations will produce results which are not the same, but different?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us take you and me, or anything as an example: —There is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick—Are they like or unlike?

Theaetetus/ You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and Socrates in sickness as a whole?

Socrates/ Exactly; that is my meaning.

Theaetetus/ I answer, they are unlike.

Socrates/ And if unlike, they are other?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning?

Theaetetus/ I should.

Socrates/ All agents have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as he is well or ill.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient and agent meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes from the patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

Theaetetus/ Certainly; that has been already acknowledged.

Socrates/ But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a different person?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates who is sick, produces quite another result; which is the sensation of bitterness in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness in and about the wine, which becomes not bitterness but something bitter; as I myself become not perception but percipient?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ There is no other object of which I shall ever have the same perception, for another object would give another perception, and would make the percipient other and different; nor can that object which affects me, meeting another subject, produce the same, or become similar, for that too will produce another result from another subject, and become different.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Neither can I by myself, have this sensation, nor the object by itself, this quality.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ When I perceive I must become percipient of something—there can be no such thing as perceiving and perceiving nothing; the object, whether it become sweet, bitter, or of any other quality, must have relation to a percipient; nothing can become sweet which is sweet to no one.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then the inference is, that we [the agent and patient] are or become in relation to one another; there is a law which binds us one to the other, but not to any other existence, nor each of us to himself; and therefore we can only be bound to one another; so that whether a person says that a thing is or becomes, he must say that it is or becomes to or of or in relation to something else; but he must not say or allow anyone else to say that anything is or becomes absolutely: —such is our conclusion.

Theaetetus/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other, I and no other am the percipient of it?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then my perception is true to me, being inseparable from my own being; and, as Protagoras says, to myself I am judge of what is and what is not to me.

Theaetetus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive?

Theaetetus/ You cannot.

Socrates/ Then you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is only perception; and the meaning turns out to be the same, whether with Homer and Heracleitus, and all that company, you say that all is motion and flux, or with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things; or with Theaetetus, that, given these premises, perception is knowledge. Am I not right, Theaetetus, and is not this your new-born child, of which I have delivered you? What say you?

Theaetetus/ I cannot but agree, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then this is the child, however he may turn out, which you and I have with difficulty brought into the world. And now that he is born, we must run round the hearth with him, and see whether he is worth rearing, or is only a wind-egg and a sham. Is he to be reared in any case, and not exposed? or will you bear to see him rejected, and not get into a passion if I take away your first-born?

Theodorus/ Theaetetus will not be angry, for he is very good-natured. But tell me, Socrates, in heaven's name, is this, after all, not the truth?

Socrates/ You, Theodorus, are a lover of theories, and now you innocently fancy that I am a bag full of them, and can easily pull one out which will overthrow its predecessor. But you do not see that in reality none of these theories come from me; they all come from him who talks with me. I only know just enough to extract them from the wisdom of another, and to receive them in a spirit of fairness. And now I shall say nothing myself, but shall endeavor to elicit something from our young friend.

Theodorus/ Do as you say, Socrates; you are quite right.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance Protagoras.

Theodorus/ What is it?

Socrates/ I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other yet stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom he was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his fellow-men—would not this have produced an overpowering effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right to determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why, my friend, should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom? Must he not be talking 'ad captandum' in all this? I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in which my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed; for the attempt to supervise or refute the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; and this must be the case if Protagoras' Truth is the real truth, and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of the shrine of his book.

Theodorus/ He was a friend of mine, Socrates, as you were saying, and therefore I cannot have him refuted by my lips, nor can I oppose you when I agree with you; please, then, to take Theaetetus again; he seemed to answer very nicely.

Socrates/ If you were to go into a Lacedaemonian palestra, Theodorus, would you have a right to look on at the naked wrestlers, some of them making a poor figure, if you

did not strip and give them an opportunity of judging of your own person?

Theodorus/ Why not, Socrates, if they would allow me, as I think you will, in consideration of my age and stiffness; let some more supple youth try a fall with you, and do not drag me into the gymnasium.

Socrates/ Your will is my will, Theodorus, as the proverbial philosophers say, and therefore I will return to the sage Theaetetus: Tell me, Theaetetus, in reference to what I was saying, are you not lost in wonder, like myself, when you find that all of a sudden you are raised to the level of the wisest of men, or indeed of the gods? —for you would assume the measure of Protagoras to apply to the gods as well as men?

Theaetetus/ Certainly I should, and I confess to you that I am lost in wonder. At first hearing, I was quite satisfied with the doctrine, that whatever appears is to each one, but now the face of things has changed.

Socrates/ Why, my dear boy, you are young, and therefore your ear is quickly caught and your mind influenced by popular arguments. Protagoras, or someone speaking on his behalf, will doubtless say in reply, —Good people, young and old, you meet and harangue, and bring in the gods, whose existence or non-existence I banish from writing and speech, or you talk about the reason of man being degraded to the level of the brutes, which is a telling argument with the multitude, but not one word of proof or demonstration do you offer. All is probability with you, and yet surely you and Theodorus had better reflect whether you are disposed to admit of probability and figures of speech in matters of such importance. He or any other mathematician who argued from probabilities and likelihoods in geometry, would not be worth an ace.

Theaetetus/ But neither you nor we, Socrates, would be satisfied with such arguments.

Socrates/ Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must look at the matter in some other way?

Theaetetus/ Yes, in quite another way.

Socrates/ And the way will be to ask whether perception is or is not the same as knowledge; for this was the real point of our argument, and with a view to this we raised (did we not?) those many strange questions.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Shall we say that we know everything which we see and hear? for example, shall we say that not having learned, we do not hear the language of foreigners when they speak to us? or shall we say that we not only hear, but know what they are saying? Or again, if we see letters which we do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them? or shall we aver that, seeing them, we must know them?

Theaetetus/ We shall say, Socrates, that we know what we actually see and hear of them—that is to say, we see and know the figure and color of the letters, and we hear and know the elevation or depression of the sound of them; but we do not perceive by sight and hearing, or know, that which grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

Socrates/ Capital, Theaetetus; and about this there shall be no dispute, because I want you to grow; but there is another difficulty coming, which you will also have to repulse.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Someone will say, Can a man who has ever known anything, and still has and preserves a memory of that which he knows, not know that which he remembers at the time when he remembers? I have, I fear, a tedious way

of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know?

Theaetetus/ Impossible, Socrates; the supposition is monstrous.

Socrates/ Am I talking nonsense, then? Think: is not seeing perceiving, and is not sight perception?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which he has seen?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is memory of something or of nothing?

Theaetetus/ Of something, surely.

Socrates/ Of things learned and perceived, that is?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Often a man remembers that which he has seen?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And if he closed his eyes, would he forget?

Theaetetus/ Who, Socrates, would dare to say so?

Socrates/ But we must say so, if the previous argument is to be maintained.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? I am not quite sure that I understand you, though I have a strong suspicion that you are right.

Socrates/ As thus: he who sees knows, as we say, that which he sees; for perception and sight and knowledge are admitted to be the same.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But he who saw, and has knowledge of that which he saw, remembers, when he closes his eyes, that which he no longer sees.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And seeing is knowing, and therefore not-seeing is not-knowing?

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then the inference is, that a man may have attained the knowledge of something, which he may remember and yet not know, because he does not see; and this has been affirmed by us to be a monstrous supposition.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, involves a manifest impossibility?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then they must be distinguished?

Theaetetus/ I suppose that they must.

Socrates/ Once more we shall have to begin, and ask 'What is knowledge?' and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do?

Theaetetus/ About what?

Socrates/ Like a good-for-nothing cock, without having won the victory, we walk away from the argument and crow.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ After the manner of disputers, we were satisfied with mere verbal consistency, and were well pleased if in this way we could gain an advantage. Although professing not to be mere Eristics, but philosophers, I suspect that we have unconsciously fallen into the error of that ingenious class of persons.

Theaetetus/ I do not as yet understand you.

Socrates/ Then I will try to explain myself: just now we asked the question, whether a man who had learned and remembered could fail to know, and we showed that a person who had seen might remember when he had his eyes shut and could not see, and then he would at the same time remember and not know. But this was an impossibility. And so the Protagorean fable came to naught, and yours also, who maintained that knowledge is the same as perception.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that the result would have been different if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of the two brats, had been alive; he would have had a great deal to say on their behalf. But he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and even the guardians whom he left, and of whom our friend Theodorus is one, are unwilling to give any help, and therefore I suppose that I must take up his cause myself, and see justice done?

Theodorus/ Not I, Socrates, but rather Callias, the son of Hipponicus, is guardian of his orphans. I was too soon diverted from the abstractions of dialectic to geometry. Nevertheless, I shall be grateful to you if you assist him.

Socrates/ Very good, Theodorus; you shall see how I will come to the rescue. If a person does not attend to the meaning of terms as they are commonly used in argument, he may be involved even in greater paradoxes than these. Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus?

Theodorus/ To both of us, and let the younger answer; he will incur less disgrace if he is discomfited.

Socrates/ Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this: —Can a man know and also not know that which he knows?

Theodorus/ How shall we answer, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ He cannot, I should say.

Socrates/ He can, if you maintain that seeing is knowing. When you are imprisoned in a well, as the saying is, and the self-assured adversary closes one of your eyes with his hand, and asks whether you can see his cloak with the eye which he has closed, how will you answer the inevitable man?

Theaetetus/ I should answer, 'Not with that eye but with the other.'

Socrates/ Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time.

Theaetetus/ Yes, in a certain sense.

Socrates/ None of that, he will reply; I do not ask or bid you answer in what sense you know, but only whether you know that which you do not know. You have been proved to see that which you do not see; and you have already admitted that seeing is knowing, and that not-seeing is not-knowing: I leave you to draw the inference.

Theaetetus/ Yes; the inference is the contradictory of my assertion.

Socrates/ Yes, my marvel, and there might have been yet worse things in store for you, if an opponent had gone on to ask whether you can have a sharp and also a dull knowledge, and whether you can know near, but not at a distance, or know the same thing with more or less intensity, and so on without end. Such questions might have been put to you by a light-armed mercenary, who argued for pay. He would have lain in wait for you, and when you took up the position, that sense is knowledge, he would have made an assault upon hearing, smelling, and the other senses; —he would have shown you no mercy; and while you were lost in envy and admiration of his wisdom, he would have got you into his net, out of which you would not have escaped until you had come to an understanding about the sum to be paid

for your release. Well, you ask, and how will Protagoras reinforce his position? Shall I answer for him?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ He will repeat all those things which we have been urging on his behalf, and then he will close with us in disdain, and say: —The worthy Socrates asked a little boy, whether the same man could remember and not know the same thing, and the boy said No, because he was frightened, and could not see what was coming, and then Socrates made fun of poor me. The truth is, O slatternly Socrates, that when you ask questions about any assertion of mine, and the person asked is found tripping, if he has answered as I should have answered, then I am refuted, but if he answers something else, then he is refuted and not I. For do you really suppose that anyone would admit the memory which a man has of an impression which has passed away to be the same with that which he experienced at the time? Assuredly not. Or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing? Or, if he is afraid of making this admission, would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? Or would he admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him? I speak by the card in order to avoid entanglements of words. But, O my good sir, he will say, come to the argument in a more generous spirit; and either show, if you can, that our sensations are not relative and individual, or, if you admit them to be so, prove that this does not involve the consequence that the appearance becomes, or, if you will have the word, is, to the individual only. As to your talk about pigs and baboons, you are yourself behaving like a pig, and you teach your hearers to make sport of my writings in the same ignorant manner; but this is not to your credit. For I declare that the truth is as I have written, and that each of

us is a measure of existence and of non-existence. Yet one man may be a thousand times better than another in proportion as different things are and appear to him. And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the evils which appear and are to a man, into goods which are and appear to him. And I would beg you not to press my words in the letter, but to take the meaning of them as I will explain them. Remember what has been already said, —that to the sick man his food appears to be and is bitter, and to the man in health the opposite of bitter. Now I cannot conceive that one of these men can be or ought to be made wiser than the other: nor can you assert that the sick man because he has one impression is foolish, and the healthy man because he has another is wise; but the one state requires to be changed into the other, the worse into the better. As in education, a change of state has to be effected, and the sophist accomplishes by words the change which the physician works by the aid of drugs. Not that anyone ever made another think truly, who previously thought falsely. For no one can think what is not, or, think anything different from that which he feels; and this is always true. But as the inferior habit of mind has thoughts of a kindred nature, so I conceive that a good mind causes men to have good thoughts; and these which the inexperienced call true, I maintain to be only better, and not truer than others. And, O my dear Socrates, I do not call wise men tadpoles: far from it; I say that they are the physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of plants—for the husbandmen also take away the evil and disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and healthy sensations—aye and true ones; and the wise and good rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil to seem just to states; for whatever appears to a state to be just and fair, so long as it is regarded as such, is

just and fair to it; but the teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the evil, both in appearance and in reality. And in like manner the Sophist who is able to train his pupils in this spirit is a wise man, and deserves to be well paid by them. And so one man is wiser than another; and no one thinks falsely, and you, whether you will or not, must endure to be a measure. On these foundations the argument stands firm, which you, Socrates, may, if you please, overthrow by an opposite argument, or if you like you may put questions to me—a method to which no intelligent person will object, quite the reverse. But I must beg you to put fair questions: for there is great inconsistency in saying that you have a zeal for virtue, and then always behaving unfairly in argument. The unfairness of which I complain is that you do not distinguish between mere disputation and dialectic: the disputer may trip up his opponent as often as he likes, and make fun; but the dialectician will be in earnest, and only correct his adversary when necessary, telling him the errors into which he has fallen through his own fault, or that of the company which he has previously kept. If you do so, your adversary will lay the blame of his own confusion and perplexity on himself, and not on you. He will follow and love you, and will hate himself, and escape from himself into philosophy, in order that he may become different from what he was. But the other mode of arguing, which is practiced by the many, will have just the opposite effect upon him; and as he grows older, instead of turning philosopher, he will come to hate philosophy. I would recommend you, therefore, as I said before, not to encourage yourself in this polemical and controversial temper, but to find out, in a friendly and congenial spirit, what we really mean when we say that all things are in motion, and that to every individual and state what appears, is. In this manner you will consider whether knowledge and sensation are the

same or different, but you will not argue, as you were just now doing, from the customary use of names and words, which the vulgar pervert in all sorts of ways, causing infinite perplexity to one another. Such, Theodorus, is the very slight help which I am able to offer to your old friend; had he been living, he would have helped himself in a far more glorious style.

Theodorus/ You are jesting, Socrates; indeed, your defense of him has been most valorous.

Socrates/ Thank you, friend; and I hope that you observed Protagoras bidding us be serious, as the text, 'Man is the measure of all things' was a solemn one; and he reproached us with making a boy the medium of discourse, and said that the boy's timidity was made to tell against his argument; he also declared that we made a joke of him.

Theodorus/ How could I fail to observe all that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Well, and shall we do as he says?

Theodorus/ By all means.

Socrates/ But if his wishes are to be regarded, you and I must take up the argument, and in all seriousness, and ask and answer one another, for you see that the rest of us are nothing but boys. In no other way can we escape the imputation, that in our fresh analysis of his thesis we are making fun with boys.

Theodorus/ Well, but is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards?

Socrates/ Yes, Theodorus, but not better than you; and therefore please not to imagine that I am to defend by every means in my power your departed friend; and that you are to defend nothing and nobody. At any rate, my good man, do not sheer off until we know whether you are a true measure of diagrams, or whether all men are equally measures and

sufficient for themselves in astronomy and geometry, and the other branches of knowledge in which you are supposed to excel them.

Theodorus/ He who is sitting by you, Socrates, will not easily avoid being drawn into an argument; and when I said just now that you would excuse me, and not, like the Lacedaemonians, compel me to strip and fight, I was talking nonsense—I should rather compare you to Scirrhon, who threw travelers from the rocks; for the Lacedaemonian rule is 'strip or depart,' but you seem to go about your work more after the fashion of Antaeus: you will not allow anyone who approaches you to depart until you have stripped him, and he has been compelled to try a fall with you in argument.

Socrates/ There, Theodorus, you have hit off precisely the nature of my complaint; but I am even more pugnacious than the giants of old, for I have met with no end of heroes; many a Heracles, many a Theseus, mighty in words, has broken my head; nevertheless I am always at this rough exercise, which inspires me like a passion. Please, then, to try a fall with me, whereby you will do yourself good as well as me.

Theodorus/ I consent; lead me whither you will, for I know that you are like destiny; no man can escape from any argument which you may weave for him. But I am not disposed to go further than you suggest.

Socrates/ Once will be enough; and now take particular care that we do not again unwittingly expose ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly.

Theodorus/ I will do my best to avoid that error.

Socrates/ In the first place, let us return to our old objection, and see whether we were right in blaming and taking offence at Protagoras on the ground that he assumed all to be equal and sufficient in wisdom; although he

admitted that there was a better and worse, and that in respect of this, some who as he said were the wise excelled others.

Theodorus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Had Protagoras been living and answered for himself, instead of our answering for him, there would have been no need of our reviewing or reinforcing the argument. But as he is not here, and someone may accuse us of speaking without authority on his behalf, had we not better come to a clearer agreement about his meaning, for a great deal may be at stake?

Theodorus/ True.

Socrates/ Then let us obtain, not through any third person, but from his own statement and in the fewest words possible, the basis of agreement.

Theodorus/ In what way?

Socrates/ In this way: —His words are, 'What seems to a man, is to him.'

Theodorus/ Yes, so he says.

Socrates/ And are not we, Protagoras, uttering the opinion of man, or rather of all mankind, when we say that everyone thinks himself wiser than other men in some things, and their inferior in others? In the hour of danger, when they are in perils of war, or of the sea, or of sickness, do they not look up to their commanders as if they were gods, and expect salvation from them, only because they excel them in knowledge? Is not the world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals? and there are plenty who think that they are able to teach and able to rule. Now, in all this is implied that ignorance and wisdom exist among them, at least in their own opinion.

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And wisdom is assumed by them to be true thought, and ignorance to be false opinion.

Theodorus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument? Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? In either case, the result is the same, and their opinions are not always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false. For tell me, Theodorus, do you suppose that you yourself, or any other follower of Protagoras, would contend that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken in his opinion?

Theodorus/ The thing is incredible, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet that absurdity is necessarily involved in the thesis which declares man to be the measure of all things.

Theodorus/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, suppose that you determine in your own mind something to be true, and declare your opinion to me; let us assume, as he argues, that this is true to you. Now, if so, you must either say that the rest of us are not the judges of this opinion or judgment of yours, or that we judge you always to have a true opinion? But are there not thousands upon thousands who, whenever you form a judgment, take up arms against you and are of an opposite judgment and opinion, deeming that you judge falsely?

Theodorus/ Yes, indeed, Socrates, thousands and tens of thousands, as Homer says, who give me a world of trouble.

Socrates/ Well, but are we to assert that what you think is true to you and false to the ten thousand others?

Theodorus/ No other inference seems to be possible.

Socrates/ And how about Protagoras himself? If neither he nor the multitude thought, as indeed they do not think,

that man is the measure of all things, must it not follow that the truth of which Protagoras wrote would be true to no one? But if you suppose that he himself thought this, and that the multitude does not agree with him, you must begin by allowing that in whatever proportion the many are more than one, in that proportion his truth is more untrue than true.

Theodorus/ That would follow if the truth is supposed to vary with individual opinion.

Socrates/ And the best of the joke is, that he acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his own opinion to be false; for he admits that the opinions of all men are true.

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true?

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely?

Theodorus/ They do not.

Socrates/ And he, as may be inferred from his writings, agrees that this opinion is also true.

Theodorus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then all mankind, beginning with Protagoras, will contend, or rather, I should say that he will allow, when he concedes that his adversary has a true opinion—Protagoras, I say, will himself allow that neither a dog nor any ordinary man is the measure of anything which he has not learned—am I not right?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true neither to himself nor to anyone else?

Theodorus/ I think, Socrates, that we are running my old friend too hard.

Socrates/ But I do not know that we are going beyond the truth. Doubtless, as he is older, he may be expected to be wiser than we are. And if he could only just get his head out of the world below, he would have overthrown both of us again and again, me for talking nonsense and you for assenting to me, and have been off and underground in a trice. But as he is not within call, we must make the best use of our own faculties, such as they are, and speak out what appears to us to be true. And one thing which no one will deny is, that there are great differences in the understandings of men.

Theodorus/ In that opinion I quite agree.

Socrates/ And is there not most likely to be firm ground in the distinction which we were indicating on behalf of Protagoras, viz. that most things, and all immediate sensations, such as hot, dry, sweet, are only such as they appear; if however difference of opinion is to be allowed at all, surely we must allow it in respect of health or disease? for every woman, child, or living creature has not such a knowledge of what conduces to health as to enable them to cure themselves.

Theodorus/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ Or again, in politics, while affirming that just and unjust, honorable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in reality to each state such as the state thinks and makes lawful, and that in determining these matters no individual or state is wiser than another, still the followers of Protagoras will not deny that in determining what is or is not expedient for the community one state is wiser and one counselor better than another—they will scarcely venture to maintain, that what a city enacts in the belief that it is

expedient will always be really expedient. But in the other case, I mean when they speak of justice and injustice, piety and impiety, they are confident that in nature these have no existence or essence of their own—the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of the agreement, and as long as the agreement lasts; and this is the philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with Protagoras. Here arises a new question, Theodorus, which threatens to be more serious than the last.

Theodorus/ Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure.

Socrates/ That is true, and your remark recalls to my mind an observation which I have often made, that those who have passed their days in the pursuit of philosophy are ridiculously at fault when they have to appear and speak in court. How natural is this!

Theodorus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean to say, that those who have been trained in philosophy and liberal pursuits are as unlike those who from their youth upwards have been knocking about in the courts and such places, as a freeman is in breeding unlike a slave.

Theodorus/ In what is the difference seen?

Socrates/ In the leisure spoken of by you, which a freeman can always command: he has his talk out in peace, and, like ourselves, he wanders at will from one subject to another, and from a second to a third, —if the fancy takes him, he begins again, as we are doing now, caring not whether his words are many or few; his only aim is to attain the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the water of the clepsydra driving him on, and not allowing him to expatiate at will: and there is his adversary standing over him, enforcing his rights; the indictment, which in their phraseology is termed the affidavit, is recited at the time:

and from this he must not deviate. He is a servant, and is continually disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his hands; the trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always concerns himself; and often the race is for his life. The consequence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd; he has learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed; but his soul is small and unrighteous. His condition, which has been that of a slave from his youth upwards, has deprived him of growth and uprightness and independence; dangers and fears, which were too much for his truth and honesty, came upon him in early years, when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them, and he has been driven into crooked ways; from the first he has practiced deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness in him; and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument? Do not let us abuse the freedom of digression which we claim.

Theodorus/ Nay, Socrates, not until we have finished what we are about; for you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, and are not the servants of the argument; but the argument is our servant, and must wait our leisure. Who is our judge? Or where is the spectator having any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets?

Socrates/ Then, as this is your wish, I will describe the leaders; for there is no use in talking about the inferior sort. In the first place, the lords of philosophy have never, from their youth upwards, known their way to the Agora, or the dicastery, or the council, or any other political assembly;

they neither see nor hear the laws or decrees, as they are called, of the state written or recited; the eagerness of political societies in the attainment of offices—clubs, and banquets, and revels, and singing-maidens, —do not enter even into their dreams. Whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace may have descended to anyone from his ancestors, male or female, are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell, as they say, how many pints are contained in the ocean. Neither is he conscious of his ignorance. For he does not hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation; but the truth is, that the outer form of him only is in the city: his mind, disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human things, is 'flying all abroad' as Pindar says, measuring earth and heaven and the things which are under and on the earth and above the heaven, interrogating the whole nature of each and all in their entirety, but not condescending to anything which is within reach.

Theodorus/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest which the clever witty Thracian handmaid is said to have made about Thales, when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This is a jest which is equally applicable to all philosophers. For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next-door neighbor; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a man or an animal; he is searching into the essence of man, and busy in enquiring what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer different from any other; —I think that you understand me, Theodorus?

Theodorus/ I do, and what you say is true.

Socrates/ And thus, my friend, on every occasion, private as well as public, as I said at first, when he appears in a law-court, or in any place in which he has to speak of things which are at his feet and before his eyes, he is the jest, not only of Thracian handmaids but of the general herd, tumbling into wells and every sort of disaster through his inexperience. His awkwardness is fearful, and gives the impression of imbecility. When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals of anyone, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being praised and glorified, in the simplicity of his heart he cannot help going into fits of laughter, so that he seems to be a downright idiot. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of cattle—a swineherd, or shepherd, or perhaps a cowherd, who is congratulated on the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them; and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any shepherd—for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed proprietors of ten thousand acres and more, our philosopher deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of family, and say that someone is a gentleman because he can show seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that their sentiments only betray a dull and narrow vision in those who utter them, and who are not educated enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man has had thousands and ten thousands of progenitors, and among them have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and

barbarians, innumerable. And when people pride themselves on having a pedigree of twenty-five ancestors, which goes back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, he cannot understand their poverty of ideas. Why are they unable to calculate that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor, who might have been anybody, and was such as fortune made him, and he had a fiftieth, and so on? He amuses himself with the notion that they cannot count, and thinks that a little arithmetic would have got rid of their senseless vanity. Now, in all these cases our philosopher is derided by the vulgar, partly because he is thought to despise them, and also because he is ignorant of what is before him, and always at a loss.

Theodorus/ That is very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ But, O my friend, when he draws the other into upper air, and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of justice and injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another and from all other things; or from the commonplaces about the happiness of a king or of a rich man to the consideration of government, and of human happiness and misery in general—what they are, and how a man is to attain the one and avoid the other—when that narrow, keen, little legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the philosopher his revenge; for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, whence he looks down into space, which is a strange experience to him, he being dismayed, and lost, and stammering broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the situation, but by every man who has not been brought up a slave. Such are the two characters, Theodorus: the one of the freeman, who has been trained in liberty and leisure, whom you call the philosopher, —him we cannot blame because he appears simple and of no account

when he has to perform some menial task, such as packing up bed-clothes, or flavoring a sauce or fawning speech; the other character is that of the man who is able to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman; still less with the music of discourse can he hymn the true life aright which is lived by immortals or men blessed of heaven.

Theodorus/ If you could only persuade everybody, Socrates, as you do me, of the truth of your words, there would be more peace and fewer evils among men.

Socrates/ Evils, Theodorus, can never pass away; for there must always remain something which is antagonistic to good. Having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity they hover around the mortal nature, and this earthly sphere. Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy, just, and wise. But, O my friend, you cannot easily convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or avoid vice, not merely in order that a man may seem to be good, which is the reason given by the world, and in my judgment is only a repetition of an old wives' fable. Whereas, the truth is that God is never in any way unrighteous—he is perfect righteousness; and he of us who is the most righteous is most like him. Herein is seen the true cleverness of a man, and also his nothingness and want of manhood. For to know this is true wisdom and virtue, and ignorance of this is manifest folly and vice. All other kinds of wisdom or cleverness, which seem only, such as the wisdom of politicians, or the wisdom of the arts, are coarse and vulgar. The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer of unholy things, had far better not be encouraged in the illusion that his roguery is clever; for men glory in their shame—they fancy that they hear others saying of them,

'These are not mere good-for-nothing persons, mere burdens of the earth, but such as men should be who mean to dwell safely in a state.' Let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they do not think they are because they do not know it; for they do not know the penalty of injustice, which above all things they ought to know—not stripes and death, as they suppose, which evil-doers often escape, but a penalty which cannot be escaped.

Theodorus/ What is that?

Socrates/ There are two patterns eternally set before them; the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched: but they do not see them, or perceive that in their utter folly and infatuation they are growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of their evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they are growing like. And if we tell them, that unless they depart from their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death; and that here on earth, they will live ever in the likeness of their own evil selves, and with evil friends—when they hear this they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to the talk of idiots.

Theodorus/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Too true, my friend, as I well know; there is, however, one peculiarity in their case: when they begin to reason in private about their dislike of philosophy, if they have the courage to hear the argument out, and do not run away, they grow at last strangely discontented with themselves; their rhetoric fades away, and they become helpless as children. These however are digressions from which we must now desist, or they will overflow, and drown the original argument; to which, if you please, we will now return.

Theodorus/ For my part, Socrates, I would rather have the digressions, for at my age I find them easier to follow; but if you wish, let us go back to the argument.

Socrates/ Had we not reached the point at which the partisans of the perpetual flux, who say that things are as they seem to each one, were confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded and thought just, were just to the state which imposed them, while they were in force; this was especially asserted of justice; but as to the good, no one had any longer the hardihood to contend of any ordinances which the state thought and enacted to be good that these, while they were in force, were really good; —he who said so would be playing with the name 'good,' and would not touch the real question—it would be a mockery, would it not?

Theodorus/ Certainly it would.

Socrates/ He ought not to speak of the name, but of the thing which is contemplated under the name.

Theodorus/ Right.

Socrates/ Whatever be the term used, the good or expedient is the aim of legislation, and as far as she has an opinion, the state imposes all laws with a view to the greatest expediency; can legislation have any other aim?

Theodorus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But is the aim attained always? do not mistakes often happen?

Theodorus/ Yes, I think that there are mistakes.

Socrates/ The possibility of error will be more distinctly recognized, if we put the question in reference to the whole class under which the good or expedient falls. That whole class has to do with the future, and laws are passed under the idea that they will be useful in after-time; which, in other words, is the future.

Theodorus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Suppose now, that we ask Protagoras, or one of his disciples, a question: —O, Protagoras, we will say to him, Man is, as you declare, the measure of all things—white, heavy, light: of all such things he is the judge; for he has the criterion of them in himself, and when he thinks that things are such as he experiences them to be, he thinks what is and is true to himself. Is it not so?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do you extend your doctrine, Protagoras (as we shall further say), to the future as well as to the present; and has he the criterion not only of what in his opinion is but of what will be, and do things always happen to him as he expected? For example, take the case of heat: —When an ordinary man thinks that he is going to have a fever, and that this kind of heat is coming on, and another person, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion is likely to prove right? Or are they both right? —he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician's judgment?

Theodorus/ How ludicrous!

Socrates/ And the vine-grower, if I am not mistaken, is a better judge of the sweetness or dryness of the vintage which is not yet gathered than the harp-player?

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And in musical composition the musician will know better than the training master what the training master himself will hereafter think harmonious or the reverse?

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And the cook will be a better judge than the guest, who is not a cook, of the pleasure to be derived from the dinner which is in preparation; for of present or past

pleasure we are not as yet arguing; but can we say that everyone will be to himself the best judge of the pleasure which will seem to be and will be to him in the future? — nay, would not you, Protagoras, better guess which arguments in a court would convince anyone of us than the ordinary man?

Theodorus/ Certainly, Socrates, he used to profess in the strongest manner that he was the superior of all men in this respect.

Socrates/ To be sure, friend: who would have paid a large sum for the privilege of talking to him, if he had really persuaded his visitors that neither a prophet nor any other man was better able to judge what will be and seem to be in the future than everyone could for himself?

Theodorus/ Who indeed?

Socrates/ And legislation and expediency are all concerned with the future; and everyone will admit that states, in passing laws, must often fail of their highest interests?

Theodorus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then we may fairly argue against your master, that he must admit one man to be wiser than another, and that the wiser is a measure: but I, who know nothing, am not at all obliged to accept the honor which the advocate of Protagoras was just now forcing upon me, whether I would or not, of being a measure of anything.

Theodorus/ That is the best refutation of him, Socrates; although he is also caught when he ascribes truth to the opinions of others, who give the lie direct to his own opinion.

Socrates/ There are many ways, Theodorus, in which the doctrine that every opinion of every man is true may be refuted; but there is more difficulty in proving that states of feeling, which are present to a man, and out of which arise

sensations and opinions in accordance with them, are also untrue. And very likely I have been talking nonsense about them; for they may be unassailable, and those who say that there is clear evidence of them, and that they are matters of knowledge, may probably be right; in which case our friend Theaetetus was not so far from the mark when he identified perception and knowledge. And therefore let us draw nearer, as the advocate of Protagoras desires, and give the truth of the universal flux a ring: is the theory sound or not? at any rate, no small war is raging about it, and there are combatants not a few.

Theodorus/ No small war, indeed, for in Ionia the sect makes rapid strides; the disciples of Heracleitus are most energetic upholders of the doctrine.

Socrates/ Then we are the more bound, my dear Theodorus, to examine the question from the foundation as it is set forth by themselves.

Theodorus/ Certainly we are. About these speculations of Heracleitus, which, as you say, are as old as Homer, or even older still, the Ephesians themselves, who profess to know them, are downright mad, and you cannot talk with them on the subject. For, in accordance with their text-books, they are always in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or a question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they can no more do so than they can fly; or rather, the determination of these fellows not to have a particle of rest in them is more than the utmost powers of negation can express. If you ask any of them a question, he will produce, as from a quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them at you; and if you enquire the reason of what he has said, you will be hit by some other new-fangled word, and will make no way with any of them, nor they with one another; their great care is, not to allow of any settled principle either in their arguments or in their minds, conceiving, as I imagine,

that any such principle would be stationary; for they are at war with the stationary, and do what they can to drive it out everywhere.

Socrates/ I suppose, Theodorus, that you have only seen them when they were fighting, and have never stayed with them in time of peace, for they are no friends of yours; and their peace doctrines are only communicated by them at leisure, as I imagine, to those disciples of theirs whom they want to make like themselves.

Theodorus/ Disciples! my good sir, they have none; men of their sort are not one another's disciples, but they grow up at their own sweet will, and get their inspiration anywhere, each of them saying of his neighbor that he knows nothing. From these men, then, as I was going to remark, you will never get a reason, whether with their will or without their will; we must take the question out of their hands, and make the analysis ourselves, as if we were doing a geometrical problem.

Socrates/ Quite right too; but as touching the aforesaid problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their wisdom from the many in poetical figures, that Oceanus and Tethys, the origin of all things, are streams, and that nothing is at rest? And now the moderns, in their superior wisdom, have declared the same openly, that the cobbler too may hear and learn of them, and no longer foolishly imagine that some things are at rest and others in motion—having learned that all is motion, he will duly honor his teachers. I had almost forgotten the opposite doctrine, Theodorus;

> 'Alone Being remains unmoved, which is the name for the all.'

This is the language of Parmenides, Melissus, and their followers, who stoutly maintain that all being is one and self-

contained, and has no place in which to move. What shall we do, friend, with all these people; for, advancing step by step, we have imperceptibly got between the combatants, and, unless we can protect our retreat, we shall pay the penalty of our rashness—like the players in the palaestra who are caught upon the line, and are dragged different ways by the two parties. Therefore I think that we had better begin by considering those whom we first accosted, 'the river-gods,' and, if we find any truth in them, we will help them to pull us over, and try to get away from the others. But if the partisans of 'the whole' appear to speak more truly, we will fly off from the party which would move the immovable, to them. And if we find that neither of them have anything reasonable to say, we shall be in a ridiculous position, having so great a conceit of our own poor opinion and rejecting that of ancient and famous men. O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in proceeding when the danger is so great?

Theodorus/ Nay, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly what the two parties have to say would be quite intolerable.

Socrates/ Then examine we must, since you, who were so reluctant to begin, are so eager to proceed. The nature of motion appears to be the question with which we begin. What do they mean when they say that all things are in motion? Is there only one kind of motion, or, as I rather incline to think, two? I should like to have your opinion upon this point in addition to my own, that I may err, if I must err, in your company; tell me, then, when a thing changes from one place to another, or goes round in the same place, is not that what is called motion?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Here then we have one kind of motion. But when a thing, remaining on the same spot, grows old, or

becomes black from being white, or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other change, may not this be properly called motion of another kind?

Theodorus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Say rather that it must be so. Of motion then there are these two kinds, 'change,' and 'motion in place.'

Theodorus/ You are right.

Socrates/ And now, having made this distinction, let us address ourselves to those who say that all is motion, and ask them whether all things according to them have the two kinds of motion, and are changed as well as move in place, or is one thing moved in both ways, and another in one only?

Theodorus/ Indeed, I do not know what to answer; but I think they would say that all things are moved in both ways.

Socrates/ Yes, comrade; for, if not, they would have to say that the same things are in motion and at rest, and there would be no more truth in saying that all things are in motion, than that all things are at rest.

Theodorus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion, all things must always have every sort of motion?

Theodorus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Consider a further point: did we not understand them to explain the generation of heat, whiteness, or anything else, in some such manner as the following: —were they not saying that each of them is moving between the agent and the patient, together with a perception, and that the patient ceases to be a perceiving power and becomes a percipient, and the agent a quale instead of a quality? I suspect that quality may appear a strange and uncouth term to you, and that you do not

understand the abstract expression. Then I will take concrete instances: I mean to say that the producing power or agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot and white, and the like of other things. For I must repeat what I said before, that neither the agent nor patient have any absolute existence, but when they come together and generate sensations and their objects, the one becomes a thing of a certain quality, and the other a percipient. You remember?

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ We may leave the details of their theory unexamined, but we must not forget to ask them the only question with which we are concerned: Are all things in motion and flux?

Theodorus/ Yes, they will reply.

Socrates/ And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished; that is to say, they move in place and are also changed?

Theodorus/ Of course, if the motion is to be perfect.

Socrates/ If they only moved in place and were not changed, we should be able to say what is the nature of the things which are in motion and flux?

Theodorus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ But now, since not even white continues to flow white, and whiteness itself is a flux or change which is passing into another color, and is never to be caught standing still, can the name of any color be rightly used at all?

Theodorus/ How is that possible, Socrates, either in the case of this or of any other quality—if while we are using the word the object is escaping in the flux?

Socrates/ And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and hearing, or any other kind of perception? Is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing?

Theodorus/ Certainly not, if all things are in motion.

Socrates/ Then we must not speak of seeing any more than of not-seeing, nor of any other perception more than of any non-perception, if all things partake of every kind of motion?

Theodorus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Yet perception is knowledge: so at least Theaetetus and I were saying.

Theodorus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge?

Theodorus/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ Here, then, is a fine result: we corrected our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest. But if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right: you may say that a thing is or is not thus; or, if you prefer, 'becomes' thus; and if we say 'becomes,' we shall not then hamper them with words expressive of rest.

Theodorus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Yes, Theodorus, except in saying 'thus' and 'not thus.' But you ought not to use the word 'thus,' for there is no motion in 'thus' or in 'not thus.' The maintainers of the doctrine have as yet no words in which to express themselves, and must get a new language. I know of no word that will suit them, except perhaps 'no how,' which is perfectly indefinite.

Theodorus/ Yes, that is a manner of speaking in which they will be quite at home.

Socrates/ And so, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend without assenting to his doctrine, that every man is the measure of all things—a wise man only is a measure; neither can we allow that knowledge is perception, certainly not on the hypothesis of a perpetual flux, unless perchance our friend Theaetetus is able to convince us that it is.

Theodorus/ Very good, Socrates; and now that the argument about the doctrine of Protagoras has been completed, I am absolved from answering; for this was the agreement.

Theaetetus/ Not, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who say that all things are at rest, as you were proposing.

Theodorus/ You, Theaetetus, who are a young rogue, must not instigate your elders to a breach of faith, but should prepare to answer Socrates in the remainder of the argument.

Theaetetus/ Yes, if he wishes; but I would rather have heard about the doctrine of rest.

Theodorus/ Invite Socrates to an argument—invite horsemen to the open plain; do but ask him, and he will answer.

Socrates/ Nevertheless, Theodorus, I am afraid that I shall not be able to comply with the request of Theaetetus.

Theodorus/ Not comply! for what reason?

Socrates/ My reason is that I have a kind of reverence; not so much for Melissus and the others, who say that 'All is one and at rest,' as for the great leader himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as in Homeric language he may be called; —him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man, and I was a mere youth, and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind. And I am afraid that we may not

understand his words, and may be still further from understanding his meaning; above all I fear that the nature of knowledge, which is the main subject of our discussion, may be thrust out of sight by the unbidden guests who will come pouring in upon our feast of discourse, if we let them in—besides, the question which is now stirring is of immense extent, and will be treated unfairly if only considered by the way; or if treated adequately and at length, will put into the shade the other question of knowledge. Neither the one nor the other can be allowed; but I must try by my art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Very well; do so if you will.

Socrates/ Then now, Theaetetus, take another view of the subject: you answered that knowledge is perception?

Theaetetus/ I did.

Socrates/ And if anyone were to ask you: With what does a man see black and white colors? and with what does he hear high and low sounds? —you would say, if I am not mistaken, 'With the eyes and with the ears.'

Theaetetus/ I should.

Socrates/ The free use of words and phrases, rather than minute precision, is generally characteristic of a liberal education, and the opposite is pedantic; but sometimes precision is necessary, and I believe that the answer which you have just given is open to the charge of incorrectness; for which is more correct, to say that we see or hear with the eyes and with the ears, or through the eyes and through the ears.

Theaetetus/ I should say 'through,' Socrates, rather than 'with.'

Socrates/ Yes, my boy, for no one can suppose that in each of us, as in a sort of Trojan horse, there are perched a

number of unconnected senses, which do not all meet in some one nature, the mind, or whatever we please to call it, of which they are the instruments, and with which through them we perceive objects of sense.

Theaetetus/ I agree with you in that opinion.

Socrates/ The reason why I am thus precise is, because I want to know whether, when we perceive black and white through the eyes, and again, other qualities through other organs, we do not perceive them with one and the same part of ourselves, and, if you were asked, you might refer all such perceptions to the body. Perhaps, however, I had better allow you to answer for yourself and not interfere. Tell me, then, are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the body?

Theaetetus/ Of the body, certainly.

Socrates/ And you would admit that what you perceive through one faculty you cannot perceive through another; the objects of hearing, for example, cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through hearing?

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception cannot come to you, either through the one or the other organ?

Theaetetus/ It cannot.

Socrates/ How about sounds and colors: in the first place you would admit that they both exist?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with itself?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that both are two and each of them one?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one another?

Theaetetus/ I dare say.

Socrates/ But through what do you perceive all this about them? for neither through hearing nor yet through seeing can you apprehend that which they have in common. Let me give you an illustration of the point at issue: —If there were any meaning in asking whether sounds and colors are saline or not, you would be able to tell me what faculty would consider the question. It would not be sight or hearing, but some other.

Theaetetus/ Certainly; the faculty of taste.

Socrates/ Very good; and now tell me what is the power which discerns, not only in sensible objects, but in all things, universal notions, such as those which are called being and not-being, and those others about which we were just asking—what organs will you assign for the perception of these notions?

Theaetetus/ You are thinking of being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also of unity and other numbers which are applied to objects of sense; and you mean to ask, through what bodily organ the soul perceives odd and even numbers and other arithmetical conceptions.

Socrates/ You follow me excellently, Theaetetus; that is precisely what I am asking.

Theaetetus/ Indeed, Socrates, I cannot answer; my only notion is, that these, unlike objects of sense, have no separate organ, but that the mind, by a power of her own, contemplates the universals in all things.

Socrates/ You are a beauty, Theaetetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus was saying; for he who utters the beautiful is himself beautiful and good. And besides being beautiful, you

have done me a kindness in releasing me from a very long discussion, if you are clear that the soul views some things by herself and others through the bodily organs. For that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree with me.

Theaetetus/ I am quite clear.

Socrates/ And to which class would you refer being or essence; for this, of all our notions, is the most universal?

Theaetetus/ I should say, to that class which the soul aspires to know of herself.

Socrates/ And would you say this also of like and unlike, same and other?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good and evil?

Theaetetus/ These I conceive to be notions which are essentially relative, and which the soul also perceives by comparing in herself things past and present with the future.

Socrates/ And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But their essence and what they are, and their opposition to one another, and the essential nature of this opposition, the soul herself endeavors to decide for us by the review and comparison of them?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflections on the being and use of them are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by education and long experience.

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being?

Theaetetus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing?

Theaetetus/ He cannot.

Socrates/ Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being can be attained?

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them?

Theaetetus/ That would certainly not be right.

Socrates/ And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?

Theaetetus/ I should call all of them perceiving—what other name could be given to them?

Socrates/ Perception would be the collective name of them?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And therefore not in science or knowledge?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science?

Theaetetus/ Clearly not, Socrates; and knowledge has now been most distinctly proved to be different from perception.

Socrates/ But the original aim of our discussion was to find out rather what knowledge is than what it is not; at the same time we have made some progress, for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in that other process, however called, in which the mind is alone and engaged with being.

Theaetetus/ You mean, Socrates, if I am not mistaken, what is, called thinking or opining.

Socrates/ You conceive truly. And now, my friend, please to begin again at this point; and having wiped out of your memory all that has preceded, see if you have arrived at any clearer view, and once more say what is knowledge.

Theaetetus/ I cannot say, Socrates, that all opinion is knowledge, because there may be a false opinion; but I will venture to assert, that knowledge is true opinion: let this then be my reply; and if this is hereafter disproved, I must try to find another.

Socrates/ That is the way in which you ought to answer, Theaetetus, and not in your former hesitating strain, for if we are bold we shall gain one of two advantages; either we shall find what we seek, or we shall be less likely to think that we know what we do not know—in either case we shall be richly rewarded. And now, what are you saying? —Are there two sorts of opinion, one true and the other false; and do you define knowledge to be the true?

Theaetetus/ Yes, according to my present view.

Socrates/ Is it still worth our while to resume the discussion touching opinion?

Theaetetus/ To what are you alluding?

Socrates/ There is a point which often troubles me, and is a great perplexity to me, both in regard to myself and others. I cannot make out the nature or origin of the mental experience to which I refer.

Theaetetus/ Pray what is it?

Socrates/ How there can be false opinion—that difficulty still troubles the eye of my mind; and I am uncertain whether I shall leave the question, or begin over again in a new way.

Theaetetus/ Begin again, Socrates, —at least if you think that there is the slightest necessity for doing so. Were not you and Theodorus just now remarking very truly, that in discussions of this kind we may take our own time?

Socrates/ You are quite right, and perhaps there will be no harm in retracing our steps and beginning again. Better a little which is well done, than a great deal imperfectly.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, and what is the difficulty? Do we not speak of false opinion, and say that one man holds a false and another a true opinion, as though there were some natural distinction between them?

Theaetetus/ We certainly say so.

Socrates/ All things and everything are either known or not known. I leave out of view the intermediate conceptions of learning and forgetting, because they have nothing to do with our present question.

Theaetetus/ There can be no doubt, Socrates, if you exclude these, that there is no other alternative but knowing or not knowing a thing.

Socrates/ That point being now determined, must we not say that he who has an opinion, must have an opinion about something which he knows or does not know?

Theaetetus/ He must.

Socrates/ He who knows, cannot but know; and he who does not know, cannot know?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ What shall we say then? When a man has a false opinion does he think that which he knows to be some other thing which he knows, and knowing both, is he at the same time ignorant of both?

Theaetetus/ That, Socrates, is impossible.

Socrates/ But perhaps he thinks of something which he does not know as some other thing which he does not know; for example, he knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates, and yet he fancies that Theaetetus is Socrates, or Socrates Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ How can he?

Socrates/ But surely he cannot suppose what he knows to be what he does not know, or what he does not know to be what he knows?

Theaetetus/ That would be monstrous.

Socrates/ Where, then, is false opinion? For if all things are either known or unknown, there can be no opinion which is not comprehended under this alternative, and so false opinion is excluded.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Suppose that we remove the question out of the sphere of knowing or not knowing, into that of being and not-being.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ May we not suspect the simple truth to be that he who thinks about anything, that which is not, will necessarily think what is false, whatever in other respects may be the state of his mind?

Theaetetus/ That, again, is not unlikely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then suppose someone to say to us, Theaetetus: —Is it possible for any man to think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance or as a predicate of something else? And suppose that we answer, 'Yes, he can, when he thinks what is not true.'—That will be our answer?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But is there any parallel to this?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Can a man see something and yet see nothing?

Theaetetus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ But if he sees anyone thing, he sees something that exists. Do you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non-existing things?

Theaetetus/ I do not.

Socrates/ He then who sees some one thing, sees something which is?

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And he who hears anything, hears some one thing, and hears that which is?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who touches anything, touches something which is one and therefore is?

Theaetetus/ That again is true.

Socrates/ And does not he who thinks, think some one thing?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which is?

Theaetetus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing?

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all?

Theaetetus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Then no one can think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance or as a predicate of something else?

Theaetetus/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is not?

Theaetetus/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere of being or of knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But may not the following be the description of what we express by this name?

Theaetetus/ What?

Socrates/ May we not suppose that false opinion or thought is a sort of heterodoxy; a person may make an exchange in his mind, and say that one real object is another real object. For thus he always thinks that which is, but he puts one thing in place of another, and missing the aim of his thoughts, he may be truly said to have false opinion.

Theaetetus/ Now you appear to me to have spoken the exact truth: when a man puts the base in the place of the noble, or the noble in the place of the base, then he has truly false opinion.

Socrates/ I see, Theaetetus, that your fear has disappeared, and that you are beginning to despise me.

Theaetetus/ What makes you say so?

Socrates/ You think, if I am not mistaken, that your 'truly false' is safe from censure, and that I shall never ask whether there can be a swift which is slow, or a heavy which is light, or any other self-contradictory thing, which works, not according to its own nature, but according to that of its opposite. But I will not insist upon this, for I do not wish needlessly to discourage you. And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, or the thought of something else?

Theaetetus/ I am.

Socrates/ It is possible then upon your view for the mind to conceive of one thing as another?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ But must not the mind, or thinking power, which misplaces them, have a conception either of both objects or of one of them?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Either together or in succession?

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Socrates/ And do you mean by conceiving, the same which I mean?

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ I mean the conversation which the soul holds with herself in considering of anything. I speak of what I scarcely understand; but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken, —I mean, to oneself and in silence, not aloud or to another: What think you?

Theaetetus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then when anyone thinks of one thing as another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But do you ever remember saying to yourself that the noble is certainly base, or the unjust just; or, best of all—have you ever attempted to convince yourself that one thing is another? Nay, not even in sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of the kind?

Theaetetus/ Never.

Socrates/ And do you suppose that any other man, either in his senses or out of them, ever seriously tried to persuade himself that an ox is a horse, or that two are one?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But if thinking is talking to oneself, no one speaking and thinking of two objects, and apprehending them both in his soul, will say and think that the one is the other of them, and I must add, that even you, lover of dispute as you are, had better let the word 'other' alone [i.e. not insist that 'one' and 'other' are the same]. I mean to say, that no one thinks the noble to be base, or anything of the kind.

Theaetetus/ I will give up the word 'other,' Socrates; and I agree to what you say.

Socrates/ If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he cannot think that the one of them is the other?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Neither, if he has one of them only in his mind and not the other, can he think that one is the other?

Theaetetus/ True; for we should have to suppose that he apprehends that which is not in his thoughts at all.

Socrates/ Then no one who has either both or only one of the two objects in his mind can think that the one is the

other. And therefore, he who maintains that false opinion is heterodoxy is talking nonsense; for neither in this, any more than in the previous way, can false opinion exist in us.

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ But if, Theaetetus, this is not admitted, we shall be driven into many absurdities.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ I will not tell you until I have endeavored to consider the matter from every point of view. For I should be ashamed of us if we were driven in our perplexity to admit the absurd consequences of which I speak. But if we find the solution, and get away from them, we may regard them only as the difficulties of others, and the ridicule will not attach to us. On the other hand, if we utterly fail, I suppose that we must be humble, and allow the argument to trample us under foot, as the sea-sick passenger is trampled upon by the sailor, and to do anything to us. Listen, then, while I tell you how I hope to find a way out of our difficulty.

Theaetetus/ Let me hear.

Socrates/ I think that we were wrong in denying that a man could think what he knew to be what he did not know; and that there is a way in which such a deception is possible.

Theaetetus/ You mean to say, as I suspected at the time, that I may know Socrates, and at a distance see someone who is unknown to me, and whom I mistake for him—then the deception will occur?

Socrates/ But has not that position been relinquished by us, because involving the absurdity that we should know and not know the things which we know?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Let us make the assertion in another form, which may or may not have a favorable issue; but as we are

in a great strait, every argument should be turned over and tested. Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know?

Theaetetus/ Certainly you may.

Socrates/ And another and another?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ I would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the mind of man a block of wax, which is of different sizes in different men; harder, moister, and having more or less of purity in one than another, and in some of an intermediate quality.

Theaetetus/ I see.

Socrates/ Let us say that this tablet is a gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses; and that when we wish to remember anything which we have seen, or heard, or thought in our own minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions and thoughts, and in that material receive the impression of them as from the seal of a ring; and that we remember and know what is imprinted as long as the image lasts; but when the image is effaced, or cannot be taken, then we forget and do not know.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Now, when a person has this knowledge, and is considering something which he sees or hears, may not false opinion arise in the following manner?

Theaetetus/ In what manner?

Socrates/ When he thinks what he knows, sometimes to be what he knows, and sometimes to be what he does not know. We were wrong before in denying the possibility of this.

Theaetetus/ And how would you amend the former statement?

Socrates/ I should begin by making a list of the impossible cases which must be excluded. (1) No one can think one thing to be another when he does not perceive either of them, but has the memorial or seal of both of them in his mind; nor can any mistaking of one thing for another occur, when he only knows one, and does not know, and has no impression of the other; nor can he think that one thing which he does not know is another thing which he does not know, or that what he does not know is what he knows; nor (2) that one thing which he perceives is another thing which he perceives, or that something which he perceives is something which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something which he perceives; nor again (3) can he think that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense; —this last case, if possible, is still more inconceivable than the others; nor (4) can he think that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the memorial coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows; nor so long as these agree, can he think that a thing which he knows and perceives is another thing which he perceives; or that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive, is the same as another thing which he does not know and does not perceive; —nor again, can he suppose that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is the same as another thing which he does not know; or that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is another thing which he does not perceive: —All these utterly and absolutely exclude the possibility of false opinion. The only cases, if any, which remain, are the following.

Theaetetus/ What are they? If you tell me, I may perhaps understand you better; but at present I am unable to follow you.

Socrates/ A person may think that some things which he knows, or which he perceives and does not know, are some other things which he knows and perceives; or that some things which he knows and perceives, are other things which he knows and perceives.

Theaetetus/ I understand you less than ever now.

Socrates/ Hear me once more, then: —I, knowing Theodorus, and remembering in my own mind what sort of person he is, and also what sort of person Theaetetus is, at one time see them, and at another time do not see them, and sometimes I touch them, and at another time not, or at one time I may hear them or perceive them in some other way, and at another time not perceive them, but still I remember them, and know them in my own mind.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then, first of all, I want you to understand that a man may or may not perceive sensibly that which he knows.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And that which he does not know will sometimes not be perceived by him and sometimes will be perceived and only perceived?

Theaetetus/ That is also true.

Socrates/ See whether you can follow me better now: Socrates can recognize Theodorus and Theaetetus, but he sees neither of them, nor does he perceive them in any other way; he cannot then by any possibility imagine in his own mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I not right?

Theaetetus/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ Then that was the first case of which I spoke.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The second case was, that I, knowing one of you and not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, can never think him whom I know to be him whom I do not know.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ In the third case, not knowing and not perceiving either of you, I cannot think that one of you whom I do not know is the other whom I do not know. I need not again go over the catalogue of excluded cases, in which I cannot form a false opinion about you and Theodorus, either when I know both or when I am in ignorance of both, or when I know one and not the other. And the same of perceiving: do you understand me?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ The only possibility of erroneous opinion is, when knowing you and Theodorus, and having on the waxen block the impression of both of you given as by a seal, but seeing you imperfectly and at a distance, I try to assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression, and to fit this into its own print: if I succeed, recognition will take place; but if I fail and transpose them, putting the foot into the wrong shoe—that is to say, putting the vision of either of you on to the wrong impression, or if my mind, like the sight in a mirror, which is transferred from right to left, err by reason of some similar affection, then 'heterodoxy' and false opinion ensues.

Theaetetus/ Yes, Socrates, you have described the nature of opinion with wonderful exactness.

Socrates/ Or again, when I know both of you, and perceive as well as know one of you, but not the other, and my knowledge of him does not accord with perception—that

was the case put by me just now which you did not understand.

Theaetetus/ No, I did not.

Socrates/ I meant to say, that when a person knows and perceives one of you, and his knowledge coincides with his perception, he will never think him to be some other person, whom he knows and perceives, and the knowledge of whom coincides with his perception—for that also was a case supposed.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ But there was an omission of the further case, in which, as we now say, false opinion may arise, when knowing both, and seeing, or having some other sensible perception of both, I fail in holding the seal over against the corresponding sensation; like a bad archer, I miss and fall wide of the mark—and this is called falsehood.

Theaetetus/ Yes; it is rightly so called.

Socrates/ When, therefore, perception is present to one of the seals or impressions but not to the other, and the mind fits the seal of the absent perception on the one which is present, in any case of this sort the mind is deceived; in a word, if our view is sound, there can be no error or deception about things which a man does not know and has never perceived, but only in things which are known and perceived; in these alone opinion turns and twists about, and becomes alternately true and false; —true when the seals and impressions of sense meet straight and opposite—false when they go awry and are crooked.

Theaetetus/ And is not that, Socrates, nobly said?

Socrates/ Nobly! yes; but wait a little and hear the explanation, and then you will say so with more reason; for to think truly is noble and to be deceived is base.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And the origin of truth and error is as follows: —When the wax in the soul of anyone is deep and abundant, and smooth and perfectly tempered, then the impressions which pass through the senses and sink into the heart of the soul, as Homer says in a parable, meaning to indicate the likeness of the soul to wax (κῆρ κηρὸς); these, I say, being pure and clear, and having a sufficient depth of wax, are also lasting, and minds, such as these, easily learn and easily retain, and are not liable to confusion, but have true thoughts, for they have plenty of room, and having clear impressions of things, as we term them, quickly distribute them into their proper places on the block. And such men are called wise. Do you agree?

Theaetetus/ Entirely.

Socrates/ But when the heart of anyone is shaggy—a quality which the all-wise poet commends, or muddy and of impure wax, or very soft, or very hard, then there is a corresponding defect in the mind—the soft are good at learning, but apt to forget; and the hard are the reverse; the shaggy and rugged and gritty, or those who have an admixture of earth or dung in their composition, have the impressions indistinct, as also the hard, for there is no depth in them; and the soft too are indistinct, for their impressions are easily confused and effaced. Yet greater is the indistinctness when they are all jostled together in a little soul, which has no room. These are the natures which have false opinion; for when they see or hear or think of anything, they are slow in assigning the right objects to the right impressions—in their stupidity they confuse them, and are apt to see and hear and think amiss—and such men are said to be deceived in their knowledge of objects, and ignorant.

Theaetetus/ No man, Socrates, can say anything truer than that.

Socrates/ Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And of true opinion also?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ We have at length satisfactorily proven that beyond a doubt there are these two sorts of opinion?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Alas, Theaetetus, what a tiresome creature is a man who is fond of talking!

Theaetetus/ What makes you say so?

Socrates/ Because I am disheartened at my own stupidity and tiresome garrulity; for what other term will describe the habit of a man who is always arguing on all sides of a question; whose dullness cannot be convinced, and who will never leave off?

Theaetetus/ But what puts you out of heart?

Socrates/ I am not only out of heart, but in positive despair; for I do not know what to answer if anyone were to ask me: —O Socrates, have you indeed discovered that false opinion arises neither in the comparison of perceptions with one another nor yet in thought, but in the union of thought and perception? Yes, I shall say, with the complacence of one who thinks that he has made a noble discovery.

Theaetetus/ I see no reason why we should be ashamed of our demonstration, Socrates.

Socrates/ He will say: You mean to argue that the man whom we only think of and do not see, cannot be confused with the horse which we do not see or touch, but only think of and do not perceive? That I believe to be my meaning, I shall reply.

Theaetetus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Well, then, he will say, according to that argument, the number eleven, which is only thought, can never be mistaken for twelve, which is only thought: How would you answer him?

Theaetetus/ I should say that a mistake may very likely arise between the eleven or twelve which are seen or handled, but that no similar mistake can arise between the eleven and twelve which are in the mind.

Socrates/ Well, but do you think that no one ever put before his own mind five and seven, —I do not mean five or seven men or horses, but five or seven in the abstract, which, as we say, are recorded on the waxen block, and in which false opinion is held to be impossible; —did no man ever ask himself how many these numbers make when added together, and answer that they are eleven, while another thinks that they are twelve, or would all agree in thinking and saying that they are twelve?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not; many would think that they are eleven, and in the higher numbers the chance of error is greater still; for I assume you to be speaking of numbers in general.

Socrates/ Exactly; and I want you to consider whether this does not imply that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that seems to be the case.

Socrates/ Then do we not come back to the old difficulty? For he who makes such a mistake does think one thing which he knows to be another thing which he knows; but this, as we said, was impossible, and afforded an irresistible proof of the non-existence of false opinion, because otherwise the same person would inevitably know and not know the same thing at the same time.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then false opinion cannot be explained as a confusion of thought and sense, for in that case we could not have been mistaken about pure conceptions of thought; and thus we are obliged to say, either that false opinion does not exist, or that a man may not know that which he knows; —which alternative do you prefer?

Theaetetus/ It is hard to determine, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet the argument will scarcely admit of both. But, as we are at our wits' end, suppose that we do a shameless thing?

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Let us attempt to explain the verb 'to know.'

Theaetetus/ And why should that be shameless?

Socrates/ You seem not to be aware that the whole of our discussion from the very beginning has been a search after knowledge, of which we are assumed not to know the nature.

Theaetetus/ Nay, but I am well aware.

Socrates/ And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the verb 'to know'? The truth is, Theaetetus, that we have long been infected with logical impurity. Thousands of times have we repeated the words 'we know;' and 'do not know,' and 'we have or have not science or knowledge,' as if we could understand what we are saying to one another, so long as we remain ignorant about knowledge; and at this moment we are using the words 'we understand,' 'we are ignorant,' as though we could still employ them when deprived of knowledge or science.

Theaetetus/ But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you ever argue at all?

Socrates/ I could not, being the man I am. The case would be different if I were a true hero of dialectic: and O that such an one were present! for he would have told us to avoid the

use of these terms; at the same time he would not have spared in you and me the faults which I have noted. But, seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say what knowing is? for I think that the attempt may be worth making.

Theaetetus/ Then by all means venture, and no one shall find fault with you for using the forbidden terms.

Socrates/ You have heard the common explanation of the verb 'to know'?

Theaetetus/ I think so, but I do not remember it at the moment.

Socrates/ They explain the word 'to know' as meaning 'to have knowledge.'

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ I should like to make a slight change, and say 'to possess' knowledge.

Theaetetus/ How do the two expressions differ?

Socrates/ Perhaps there may be no difference; but still I should like you to hear my view, that you may help me to test it.

Theaetetus/ I will, if I can.

Socrates/ I should distinguish 'having' from 'possessing': for example, a man may buy and keep under his control a garment which he does not wear; and then we should say, not that he has, but that he possesses the garment.

Theaetetus/ It would be the correct expression.

Socrates/ Well, may not a man 'possess' and yet not 'have' knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking? As you may suppose a man to have caught wild birds—doves or any other birds—and to be keeping them in an aviary which he has constructed at home; we might say of him in one sense,

that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And yet, in another sense, he has none of them; but they are in his power, and he has got them under his hand in an enclosure of his own, and can take and have them whenever he likes; —he can catch any which he likes, and let the bird go again, and he may do so as often as he pleases.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Once more, then, as in what preceded we made a sort of waxen figment in the mind, so let us now suppose that in the mind of each man there is an aviary of all sorts of birds—some flocking together apart from the rest, others in small groups, others solitary, flying anywhere and everywhere.

Theaetetus/ Let us imagine such an aviary—and what is to follow?

Socrates/ We may suppose that the birds are kinds of knowledge, and that when we were children, this receptacle was empty; whenever a man has gotten and detained in the enclosure a kind of knowledge, he may be said to have learned or discovered the thing which is the subject of knowledge: and this is to know.

Theaetetus/ Granted.

Socrates/ And further, when anyone wishes to catch any of these knowledges or sciences, and having taken, to hold it, and again to let them go, how will he express himself? —will he describe the 'catching' of them and the original 'possession' in the same words? I will make my meaning clearer by an example: —You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of odd and even in general.

Theaetetus/ I follow.

Socrates/ Having the use of the art, the arithmetician, if I am not mistaken, has the conceptions of number under his hand, and can transmit them to another.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when transmitting them he may be said to teach them, and when receiving to learn them, and when having them in possession in the aforesaid aviary he may be said to know them.

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about him which are numerable?

Theaetetus/ Of course he can.

Socrates/ And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to?

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And so he appears to be searching into something which he knows, as if he did not know it, for we have already admitted that he knows all numbers; —you have heard these perplexing questions raised?

Theaetetus/ I have.

Socrates/ May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to possession and for the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking and holding in the hands that which is possessed already. And thus, when a man has

learned and known something long ago, he may resume and get hold of the knowledge which he has long possessed, but has not at hand in his mind.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading? Shall we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to learn what he already knows?

Theaetetus/ It would be too absurd, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we say then that he is going to read or number what he does not know, although we have admitted that he knows all letters and all numbers?

Theaetetus/ That, again, would be an absurdity.

Socrates/ Then shall we say that about names we care nothing? —anyone may twist and turn the words 'knowing' and 'learning' in any way which he likes, but since we have determined that the possession of knowledge is not the having or using it, we do assert that a man cannot not possess that which he possesses; and, therefore, in no case can a man not know that which he knows, but he may get a false opinion about it; for he may have the knowledge, not of this particular thing, but of some other; —when the various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about in the aviary, and wishing to capture a certain sort of knowledge out of the general store, he takes the wrong one by mistake, that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the ring-dove which he had in his mind, when he wanted the pigeon.

Theaetetus/ A very rational explanation.

Socrates/ But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not deceived, and has an opinion of what is, and thus false and true opinion may exist, and the difficulties

which were previously raised disappear. I dare say that you agree with me, do you not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man's not knowing what he knows, for we are not driven to the inference that he does not possess what he possesses, whether he be or be not deceived. And yet I fear that a greater difficulty is looking in at the window.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Socrates/ How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance, but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be another thing; —that, having knowledge present with him in his mind, he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things? —you might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making only forms of knowledge our birds: whereas there ought to have been forms of ignorance as well, flying about together in the mind, and then he who sought to take one of them might sometimes catch a form of knowledge, and sometimes a form of ignorance; and thus he would have a false opinion from ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about the same thing.

Socrates/ I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words. Let us grant what

you say—then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion—am I right?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion?

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance?

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And thus, after going a long way round, we are once more face to face with our original difficulty. The hero of dialectic will retort upon us: —'O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know? or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows? or will you tell me that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds, and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or graven on waxen blocks according to your foolish images, and which he may be said to know while he possesses them, even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled to go round and round, and you will make no progress.' What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Indeed, Socrates, I do not know what we are to say.

Socrates/ Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what knowledge is; that must be first ascertained; then, the nature of false opinion?

Theaetetus/ I cannot but agree with you, Socrates, so far as we have yet gone.

Socrates/ Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is? —for we are not going to lose heart as yet.

Theaetetus/ Certainly, I shall not lose heart, if you do not.

Socrates/ What definition will be most consistent with our former views?

Theaetetus/ I cannot think of any but our old one, Socrates.

Socrates/ What was it?

Theaetetus/ Knowledge was said by us to be true opinion; and true opinion is surely unerring, and the results which follow from it are all noble and good.

Socrates/ He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'The experiment will show;' and perhaps if we go forward in the search, we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay where we are, nothing will come to light.

Theaetetus/ Very true; let us go forward and try.

Socrates/ The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is against us.

Theaetetus/ How is that, and what profession do you mean?

Socrates/ The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and make them think whatever they like, but they do not

teach them. Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convince others of the truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which they were not eye-witnesses, while a little water is flowing in the clepsydra?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not, they can only persuade them.

Socrates/ And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged well.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the same.

Theaetetus/ That is a distinction, Socrates, which I have heard made by someone else, but I had forgotten it. He said that true opinion, combined with reason, was knowledge, but that the opinion which had no reason was out of the sphere of knowledge; and that things of which there is no rational account are not knowable—such was the singular expression which he used—and that things which have a reason or explanation are knowable.

Socrates/ Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not 'knowable'? I wish that you would repeat to me what he said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale.

Theaetetus/ I do not know whether I can recall it; but if another person would tell me, I think that I could follow him.

Socrates/ Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream: —Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or explanation; you can only name them, but no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them, for in the one case existence, in the other non-existence is already implied, neither of which must be added, if you mean to speak of this or that thing by itself alone. It should not be called itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like; for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things, but are distinct from them; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had a definition of their own, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is the essence of a definition. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known; but the syllables or combinations of them are known and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, anyone forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that thing; but when he adds rational explanation, then, he is perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you?

Theaetetus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in this casual manner, we have found a truth which in former times many wise men have grown old and have not found?

Theaetetus/ At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the present statement.

Socrates/ Which is probably correct—for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what has been said which does not quite satisfy me.

Theaetetus/ What was it?

Socrates/ What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all: —That the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables known.

Theaetetus/ And was that wrong?

Socrates/ We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances which the author of the argument himself used.

Theaetetus/ What hostages?

Socrates/ The letters, which are the elements; and the syllables, which are the combinations; —he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the alphabet?

Theaetetus/ Yes; he did.

Socrates/ Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves: —What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition?

Theaetetus/ I think so.

Socrates/ I think so too; for, suppose that someone asks you to spell the first syllable of my name: —Theaetetus, he says, what is SO?

Theaetetus/ I should reply S and O.

Socrates/ That is the definition which you would give of the syllable?

Theaetetus/ I should.

Socrates/ I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S.

Theaetetus/ But how can anyone, Socrates, tell the elements of an element? I can only reply, that S is a consonant, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B, and most other letters, again, are neither vowel-sounds nor noises. Thus letters may be most truly said to be undefined; for even the most distinct of them, which are the seven vowels, have a sound only, but no definition at all.

Socrates/ Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Yes; I think that we have.

Socrates/ Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters?

Theaetetus/ I think so.

Socrates/ And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them?

Theaetetus/ I should say that we mean all the letters.

Socrates/ Take the case of the two letters S and O, which form the first syllable of my own name; must not he who knows the syllable, know both of them?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ He knows, that is, the S and O?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together?

Theaetetus/ Such a supposition, Socrates, is monstrous and unmeaning.

Socrates/ But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the fine theory has again taken wings and departed.

Theaetetus/ Yes, with wonderful celerity.

Socrates/ Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single idea framed out of them; having a separate form distinct from them.

Theaetetus/ Very true; and a more likely notion than the other.

Socrates/ Take care; let us not be cowards and betray a great and imposing theory.

Theaetetus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements—of letters or of any other elements.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Socrates/ And it must have no parts.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Socrates/ Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts. Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts?

Theaetetus/ I should.

Socrates/ And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different?

Theaetetus/ I am not certain; but, as you like me to answer at once, I shall hazard the reply, that they are different.

Socrates/ I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time to think whether I equally approve of your answer.

Theaetetus/ Yes; the answer is the point.

Socrates/ According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, but is there any difference between all [in the plural] and the all [in the singular]? Take the case of number: —When we say one, two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of the same or of different numbers?

Theaetetus/ Of the same.

Socrates/ That is of six?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Again, in speaking of all [in the plural], is there not one thing which we express?

Theaetetus/ Of course there is.

Socrates/ And that is six?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then in predicating the word ‘all’ of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural?

Theaetetus/ Clearly we do.

Socrates/ Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And the number of each is the parts of each?

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts?

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts?

Theaetetus/ That is the inference.

Socrates/ But is a part a part of anything but the whole?

Theaetetus/ Yes, of the all.

Socrates/ You make a valiant defense, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all; —if wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature.

Theaetetus/ I now think that there is no difference between a whole and all.

Socrates/ But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, and will therefore be equally known with them?

Theaetetus/ You are right.

Socrates/ And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters?

Theaetetus/ No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of parts in a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for other parts.

Socrates/ Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible therefore form?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded; nor can one

rightly attribute to them the words 'being' or 'this,' because they are alien and inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or elements were indefinable and unknown?

Theaetetus/ I remember.

Socrates/ And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? I can see no other.

Theaetetus/ No other reason can be given.

Socrates/ Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible and expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason?

Theaetetus/ I cannot deny that.

Socrates/ We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not; if we may trust the argument.

Socrates/ Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read?

Theaetetus/ What experience?

Socrates/ Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their position.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as everyone would allow, are the elements or letters of music?

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables, and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject; and if someone says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking nonsense?

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ We must not.

Socrates/ Well, and what is the meaning of the term 'explanation'? I think that we have a choice of three meanings.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one's thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not explanation appear to be of this nature?

Theaetetus/ Certainly; he who so manifests his thought, is said to explain himself.

Socrates/ And everyone who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or later to manifest what he thinks of anything; and if so, all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation; nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he only intended to say, that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything, he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the thing.

Theaetetus/ As for example, Socrates…?

Socrates/ As, for example, when Hesiod says that a wagon is made up of a hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of them individually; but if anyone asked what is a wagon, we should be content to answer, that a wagon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would if we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of the name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters of your name—that would be true opinion, and not knowledge; for knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a wagon; but he who can describe its essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion

has art and knowledge of the nature of a wagon, in that he attains to the whole through the elements.

Theaetetus/ And do you not agree in that view, Socrates?

Socrates/ If you do, my friend; but I want to know first, whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them to be irrational—is this your view?

Theaetetus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of something, or thinks that the same thing is composed of different elements at different times?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly not.

Socrates/ And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read?

Theaetetus/ You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables?

Socrates/ Yes.

Theaetetus/ To be sure; I perfectly remember, and I am very far from supposing that they who are in this condition have knowledge.

Socrates/ When a person at the time of learning writes the name of Theaetetus, and thinks that he ought to write and does write *Th* and *e*; but, again, meaning to write the name of Theodorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write *T* and *e*—can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of your two names?

Theaetetus/ We have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained knowledge.

Socrates/ And in like manner he may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name?

Theaetetus/ He may.

Socrates/ And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion?

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And yet he will have explanation, as well as right opinion, for he knew the order of the letters when he wrote; and this we admit to be explanation.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were there not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with rational explanation? And very likely there may be found someone who will not prefer this but the third.

Theaetetus/ You are quite right; there is still one remaining. The first was the image or expression of the mind in speech; the second, which has just been mentioned, is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements. But what is the third definition?

Socrates/ There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others.

Theaetetus/ Can you give me any example of such a definition?

Socrates/ As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that you would be contented with the statement that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Understand why: —the reason is, as I was just now saying, that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons affirm, you will get at the definition or explanation of it; but while you lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs.

Theaetetus/ I understand you, and your account of definition is in my judgment correct.

Socrates/ But he, who having right opinion about anything, can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other things will know that of which before he had only an opinion.

Theaetetus/ Yes; that is what we are maintaining.

Socrates/ Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself quite disappointed; the picture, which at a distance was not so bad, has now become altogether unintelligible.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I will endeavor to explain: I will suppose myself to have true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, then I have knowledge, but if not, opinion only.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your difference.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ But when I had only opinion, I had no conception of your distinguishing characteristics.

Theaetetus/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ Then I must have conceived of some general or common nature which no more belonged to you than to another.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Tell me, now—How in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of anyone else? Suppose that I imagine Theaetetus to be a man who has nose, eyes, and mouth, and every other member complete; how would that enable me to distinguish Theaetetus from Theodorus, or from some outer barbarian?

Theaetetus/ How could it?

Socrates/ Or if I had further conceived of you, not only as having nose and eyes, but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes, should I have any more notion of you than of myself and others who resemble me?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus until your snub-nosedness has left an impression on my mind different from the snub-nosedness of all others whom I have ever seen, and until your other peculiarities have a like distinctness; and so when I meet you to-morrow the right opinion will be re-called?

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then right opinion implies the perception of differences?

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion? If the meaning is, that we should form an opinion of the way in which something differs from another thing, the proposal is ridiculous.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ We are supposed to acquire a right opinion of the differences which distinguish one thing from another when we have already a right opinion of them, and so we go round and round; —the revolution of the scytal, or pestle, or any other rotatory machine, in the same circles, is as nothing compared with such a requirement; and we may be truly described as the blind directing the blind; for to add those things which we already have, in order that we may learn what we already think, is like a soul utterly benighted.

Theaetetus/ Tell me; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question?

Socrates/ If, my boy, the argument, in speaking of adding the definition, had used the word to 'know,' and not merely 'have an opinion' of the difference, this which is the most promising of all the definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty end, for to know is surely to acquire knowledge.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge? this fair argument will answer 'Right opinion with knowledge,'—knowledge, that is, of difference, for this, as the said argument maintains, is adding the definition.

Theaetetus/ That seems to be true.

Socrates/ But how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything! And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion,

nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion?

Theaetetus/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ And are you still in labor and travail, my dear friend, or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth?

Theaetetus/ I am sure, Socrates, that you have elicited from me a good deal more than ever was in me.

Socrates/ And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up?

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ But if, Theaetetus, you should ever conceive afresh, you will be all the better for the present investigation, and if not, you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, and will be too modest to fancy that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art; I can no further go, nor do I know aught of the things which great and famous men know or have known in this or former ages. The office of a midwife I, like my mother, have received from God; she delivered women, and I deliver men; but they must be young and noble and fair.

And now I have to go to the porch of the King Archon, where I am to meet Meletus and his indictment. To-morrow morning, Theodorus, I shall hope to see you again at this place.

Theaetetus.

Translated by Benjamin Hall Kennedy.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus.

Euclid/ Ha, Terpsion! long in from the country?

Terpsion/ A good while. And you—I was looking for you in the Agora, and wondering that I could not find you.

Euclid/ I was not in the city.

Terpsion/ Where then?

Euclid/ As I was going down to the harbor I met with Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at Corinth.

Terpsion/ Alive or dead?

Euclid/ Alive, but only just. Besides being very ill from wounds, he is more seriously affected by the malady which has broken out in the army.

Terpsion/ You mean the dysentery?

Euclid/ Yes.

Terpsion/ In danger, you say, such a man as that!

Euclid/ Ay, a gallant and good one, Terpsion. It was but just now I heard some people praising him highly for his behavior in the battle.

Terpsion/ Nothing strange in that. It were far more surprising if he had not behaved so. But how came he not to put up here at Megara?

Euclid/ He was in haste to get home. For all my entreaties and advice, he would not stay. So after accompanying him some way, as I went back I bethought me of the marvelous divination shown by Socrates in so many cases, especially in that of Theaetetus. I think it was but a little while before his

own death that he met him, a mere lad at the time, and, after conversing and arguing with him, admired his genius greatly. When I went to Athens, he repeated to me the arguments he had held with him—well worth hearing they were—and said this youth must inevitably become distinguished, if he should reach man's estate.

Terpsion/ He spoke the truth, manifestly. But what were the arguments? Can you repeat them?

Euclid/ No indeed: not from mere recollection. But, having returned home immediately, I jotted down some notes at once, and, afterwards taxing my memory at leisure, I went on writing; and, every time I visited Athens, I used to ask Socrates anything I had not remembered, and to make corrections on my return here. So that I have got nearly the whole conversation in writing.

Terpsion/ True: I heard you say so once before; and I have always been meaning to bid you show it me, but have loitered till this moment. What hinders us from perusing it now? Especially as I am in real want of rest, after coming from the country.

Euclid/ Well, and I too escorted Theaetetus as far as Erineum; so I should not dislike a siesta. Let us go then; and while we repose, the attendant shall read to us.

Terpsion/ A good suggestion.

[They go to Euclid's house.]

Euclid/ Here is the manuscript, Terpsion. I must observe that I wrote out the conversation in my own way: —not in the narrative form as Socrates related it to me, but as a dialogue between him and his fellow-disputants, whom he stated to be Theodorus the geometrician and Theaetetus. And, in order to escape the troublesome notices between the speeches in my manuscript (such as, when Socrates was speaker, 'I spoke,' 'I said,' and, in case of an answerer, 'he

agreed' or 'he disagreed') I wrote as if he were actually talking with them, and got rid of such interpolations.

Terpsion/ Well, no harm in that, Euclid.

Euclid/ Now, boy, take the volume, and read.

[The slave reads aloud all that follows]

Socrates/ If I had a peculiar interest in Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I would ask you about things there, and about its people, whether any of the young men in those parts are studying geometry or other scientific subjects. But I really care for them less than I do for our youth here, and would rather know which of our own young men are expected to become scholars. This therefore I observe for myself as well as I can, and inquire about it from everybody else, with whom I see the young men desirous to converse. Now the largest number of pupils attend your lectures; and justly: for you deserve it on many grounds, but especially for geometry. So I shall be glad to hear if you have met with anyone worth naming.

Theodorus/ Yes, Socrates; among your citizens I have met with a youth, whose character I can cite as well worthy of your attention. If he were handsome, I should be much afraid to mention him, lest anyone should fancy I am in love with him. But in fact (don't be vexed with me) he is not handsome: he has a flat nose and protruding eyes like you: but less marked in his case than in yours. I speak then without scruple. And I can assure you that of all the persons I ever met (and I have associated with a great number) I never found any of a nature so wonderfully excellent. Aptitude for learning such as few attain, combined with a temper singularly mild, and furthermore with unrivalled courage, I could never have expected to find, nor have I ever seen any similar instances. Those who, like him, are quick and ready-witted and gifted with a good memory, are liable

to keen emotions; they rush impetuously like unballasted vessels, and grow up with more of madness in them than of velour: whilst others of more solid temperament usually approach studies in a somewhat sluggish mood, and laden with forgetfulness. But he comes to all his studies and investigations with perfect gentleness, like a current of oil flowing without sound, so smoothly, firmly and successfully, that we marvel to see one of his age perform these things as he does.

Socrates/ Good news indeed. Pray whose son is he?

Theodorus/ I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However, he is the middle one of those who are now approaching us. He and these friends of his were anointing themselves just now in the outer race-course. They have finished, I suppose, and are coming this way. So see if you know him.

Socrates/ I do. He is the son of Sophronius of Sunium, just such a man, my friend, as you describe this one to be, of good repute generally, and, I can tell you, a man who left a considerable property. But I do not know the name of the youth.

Theodorus/ Theaetetus is his name, Socrates: the property I fancy certain trustees have wasted: yet even in money matters he is wonderfully liberal.

Socrates/ A noble character you give him. Bid him come and sit down by me here.

Theodorus/ I will. Theaetetus, come and sit here by Socrates.

Socrates/ Do by all means, Theaetetus, that I may view myself, and see what kind of face I have. Theodorus says it's like yours. Now if each of us held a lyre in his hand, and he said they were tuned to the same pitch, should we believe

him at once, or should we have taken note whether he spoke as a musician?

Theaetetus/ We should have taken note.

Socrates/ And if we found him such, should we not believe him, if ignorant of music, we should disbelieve?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And in the present case, I suppose, if we care at all for resemblance of faces, we must consider whether he speaks with a painter's skill or not.

Theaetetus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Is then Theodorus skilled in portrait-painting?

Theaetetus/ Not to my knowledge.

Socrates/ And is he not skilled in geometry?

Theaetetus/ Without doubt, Socrates.

Socrates/ And in astronomy and calculations and music and every subject of education?

Theaetetus/ I think so.

Socrates/ If then he says, either by way of praise or dispraise, that we are alike in some bodily feature, it is not very well worthwhile to attend to him?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ But how, if he were to praise the soul of one or the other for virtue and wisdom? Would it not be worthwhile for the one who heard the praise to observe him who was praised, and for the other to exhibit himself with alacrity?

Theaetetus/ Quite so, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is time, then, my dear Theaetetus, for you to exhibit and for me to observe. For I must tell you that, although Theodorus has often spoken to me with praise of many persons, both foreigners and citizens, he never gave such praise to anybody as he did to you just now.

Theaetetus/ I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but see to it, that he did not speak in jest.

Socrates/ That is not the way of Theodorus. So do not retract your admissions on the plea that our friend here speaks in jest, lest he be compelled to add an affidavit. I am sure nobody will indict him for perjury. So stand to your confession boldly.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I must, if you think so.

Socrates/ Tell me now: you learn, I suppose, from Theodorus some lessons of geometry?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ And of astronomy and harmony and calculations?

Theaetetus/ I use my best endeavor.

Socrates/ So do I, my boy, both from him and from all others whom I suppose to have any acquaintance with the subjects. Nevertheless, though I am in general pretty well versed in them, I have one little difficulty, which I must examine with your help and that of our friends here. Tell me, does not 'to learn' mean to become wiser in that which one learns?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And by wisdom it is, I suppose, that the wise are wise?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does this differ at all from knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Does what differ?

Socrates/ Wisdom. In things whereof we are knowing, are we not also wise?

Theaetetus/ Can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ Are then wisdom and knowledge the same thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now here is precisely my difficulty, and I cannot adequately comprehend in my own mind what knowledge really is. Are we then able to define it? What say ye? Which of us will speak first? Whoever misses the mark on each trial, shall sit down, as boys playing at ball say, for donkey: and whoever goes through to the end without missing, shall be our king, and shall command us to answer anything he likes to ask. But perhaps, Theodorus, my love of discussion leads me to be rude in trying so hard to make us argue, and become friendly and chatty with one another.

Theodorus/ No, Socrates, such a wish is the reverse of rudeness. But call on one of the youths to answer you. I am unaccustomed to this kind of debate, and too old to acquire the habit. It would suit our young friends, and they would get on much better: for it is a fact that in all things youth has the gift of progress. So, as you had Theaetetus in hand at first, do not let him go, but continue to question him.

Socrates/ You hear then, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says; and you will not, I think, wish to disobey him. In such matters a wise man's injunctions cannot be lawfully disobeyed by his junior. Speak then well and nobly. What do you think that knowledge is?

Theaetetus/ I must, Socrates, since you both require. No doubt, if I make any blunder, you will correct me.

Socrates/ Certainly, if we are able.

Theaetetus/ Well then, I think that all the things one can learn from Theodorus are knowledge; geometry for instance and the others which you enumerated just now: and again leather-dressing, and the trades of the other craftsmen, all and each, I consider nothing else than knowledge.

Socrates/ In a truly noble and bountiful style, my friend, when asked for one thing you give many, and various things instead of a simple one.

Theaetetus/ Why, what is the sense of your words, Socrates?

Socrates/ Perhaps none at all: however, I will explain what I mean. When you name leather-dressing, do you intend anything else than the knowledge of the manufacture of shoes?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ Or when you name carpentry, do you intend anything but the knowledge of the manufacture of wooden implements?

Theaetetus/ No, nothing.

Socrates/ In both cases then, you express that thing of which each is the knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the question put, Theaetetus, was not concerning the various subjects of knowledge, or their number. We did not ask with a wish to count them, but to know what the nature of knowledge itself is. Am I talking nonsense?

Theaetetus/ No, quite correctly.

Socrates/ Consider this also. Should someone ask us any trivial and obvious question, such as, what is clay? if we said in reply, the clay of the potters, and the clay of the stove-makers, and the clay of the brick-makers, should we not deserve to be laughed at?

Theaetetus/ Probably.'

Socrates/ In the first place because we thought the questioner would understand us from our answer, when we introduce the word 'clay,' whether we add that of the doll-

makers, or of any other craftsmen. Does anybody, think you, understand any name of anything, when he does not know its correct meaning?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Then he who is ignorant of 'knowledge,' does not understand 'knowledge of shoes.'

Theaetetus/ He does not.

Socrates/ And he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand leather-dressing or any other art?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Then an answer made to the question—What is knowledge? is ridiculous, when a person gives in his reply the name of some art, For he names 'the knowledge of something,' when that was not the thing asked from him.

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ In the next place, when he might have answered easily and briefly, he goes an infinite way round. For instance, in the question about clay, it was easy and simple to say, that clay is moistened earth, and to abstain from adding whose it is.

Theaetetus/ Yes, Socrates; this method now indeed appears easy. You seem to be asking the same sort of question that occurred sometime since to us in our discussions; —to myself I mean, and your namesake, Socrates here.

Socrates/ What was that, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Theodorus was writing out for us something about 'powers,' proving, as to the 'tripod' and the 'pente-pod,' that in length they are not commensurable with the foot-unit: and so proceeding one by one as far as seventeen: but here he somehow came to a pause. We then bethought us of such a notion as this: since the 'powers' were evidently

infinite in number, to try to comprise them under one term, by which we should entitle all these 'powers.'

Socrates/ Did you find any such term?

Theaetetus/ I think we did. Consider it yourself.

Socrates/ Speak on.

Theaetetus/ We divided number generally into two classes, one, that which is capable of being formed by the multiplication of equal factors into one another, we likened in form to the square, and called it square and equilateral.

Socrates/ Very good.

Theaetetus/ All intervening numbers, to which belong 3 and 5 and everyone that is incapable of being formed by the multiplication of equal factors, but is formed either by a larger number having a smaller—or by a smaller number having a larger—as its multiplier, we likened on the other hand to the oblong figure, which in every instance has greater and lesser sides, and called it oblong number.

Socrates/ Excellent. What next?

Theaetetus/ All lines which being squared form an equilateral plane figure we defined to be 'length'; all which form an oblong, we comprised under the name 'powers' (i.e. irrational roots), as not being commensurable with the others except through the surfaces which they have power to form. And similarly with respect to the solids (cubes).

Socrates/ Nobody in the world could do better, my boys. So I do not think Theodorus will incur the guilt of perjury.

Theaetetus/ But as to your question about knowledge, Socrates, I could not answer it in the same way as that about length and power. Yet you seem to me to be looking for some such answer. So that now Theodorus again appears to be a false speaker.

Socrates/ Well, but if he had praised your running, and said he had never met with any young man so fleet, and then in a racing-match you had been defeated by one in the prime of life, and very fleet, do you think his praise would have been any the less true?

Theaetetus/ I do not.

Socrates/ And, as to knowledge, as I was saying a little while since, do you think it a small thing to discover its nature, and not one of the highest achievements?

Theaetetus/ Nay indeed, Socrates, I do place it among the very highest of all.

Socrates/ Then be at ease about yourself: and consider that Theodorus speaks truly, and show desire in every way to obtain a right definition of knowledge, as of all other things.

Theaetetus/ As for desire, Socrates, it will not be found wanting.

Socrates/ Come then: you made a good suggestion just now. Imitate your answer about the 'powers'. As you comprised their vast number under one term, so also try to describe the many kinds of knowledge by a single definition.

Theaetetus/ I assure you, Socrates, I have often endeavored to gain insight into that matter, while listening to the questions you put. But, though I cannot persuade myself that I have anything important of my own to say, or that I have heard from someone else any such statement as you require, nevertheless I cannot rid myself of the feeling that I am on the point of doing so.

Socrates/ Oh! you are in the throes of labor, dear Theaetetus, through being not empty, but pregnant.

Theaetetus/ I do not know, Socrates. I tell you my feeling, at all events.

Socrates/ Have you not heard then, simpleton, that I am the son of a very famous and solid midwife, Phaenarete?

Theaetetus/ I have heard it before now.

Socrates/ Have you heard too that I practice the same art?

Theaetetus/ Never.

Socrates/ I do really. But don't tell of me to other people. I am not known, my friend, to have this skill. And others, being unaware, do not say this of me, but only that I am a very strange person, and that I perplex people. Have you heard this too?

Theaetetus/ I have.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you the reason?

Theaetetus/ Pray do.

Socrates/ Reflect then upon the general situation of midwives, and you will more easily learn what I mean. You know, I suppose, that none of them practice while they are still conceiving and bearing children, but those alone who are past child-bearing.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ This custom is said to be derived from Artemis, for that she, though a virgin, has the charge of parturition. Accordingly, she did not indeed allow barren women to become midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an art of which it has no experience: but she assigned it to those who are past the age of childbearing, in honor of their resemblance to herself.

Theaetetus/ Naturally.

Socrates/ Is not this also natural, that those who conceive and those who do not are better known by midwives than by others?

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Moreover also midwives, by giving drugs and. chanting incantations, are able to excite the throes and to quell them, if they will, and to make those who have a hard time bring forth: and they produce abortion, if the case require it.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Have you furthermore noted this in them, that they are also very clever match-makers, being well skilled to know what woman uniting with what man must bear the finest children?

Theaetetus/ I was not quite aware of that.

Socrates/ I assure you they pride themselves on this much more than on their special practice. Just consider. Do you think the care and collection of the fruits of the earth belongs to one art, and the knowledge of what soil you must plant or sow to another?

Theaetetus/ No, to the same.

Socrates/ And do you consider it different in the case of a woman?

Theaetetus/ Seemingly not.

Socrates/ No, truly. But on account of the unlawful and unscientific conciliation of man and woman, which is termed 'procuration,' midwives, being a respectable body, shun match-making, fearing lest by this they should incur the other charge. For it is only to genuine midwives, I suppose, that the art of correct match-making belongs.

Theaetetus/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ Thus highly important is the function of midwives; but less so than my procedure. For, it does not happen to women at one time to bear idols, at another true children, so that it shall not be easy to distinguish them. Had they been liable to this, the greatest and noblest task

for midwives would have been to decide between the true child and the untrue. Do you not think so?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ But my art of midwifery, though it has in other respects the same conditions as theirs, differs in these points, that I attend men, not women, and that I inspect the labor of their souls, not of their bodies. The most important skill in our art is, the being able to test in every way whether the young man's mind is bringing forth an idol and an unreality, or a genuine and true progeny. For to me as well as to the midwives belongs the following condition. I am incapable of producing wisdom, and the reproach which many ere now have cast on me, that, while I question others, I myself give no answer about anything, because I have no wisdom in me, is a just reproach. The reason of it is this: the god compels me to act the midwife, but hindered me from engendering. I then am not indeed perfectly wise myself, nor have I brought to birth any discovery of that kind, as the outcome of my own soul. But of those who resort to me, some indeed appear in the outset utterly ignorant, but all, as the intercourse proceeds, and the god gives opportunity, make wonderful progress, in their own opinion and in that of others. And it is evident that they do so not by any learning they have gained from me, but because they have of themselves discovered many excellent things, which they retain. Of that midwifery however I and the god are authors. The proof is this. Many persons ere now, not knowing that fact, and imputing all to themselves while they despised me, quitted me earlier than they ought, either of their own will or by the persuasion of others. After this, they baulked all subsequent conceptions by evil intercourse, and lost by ill nurture the offspring which I had helped them to, valuing unrealities and idols more than truths; and ended by seeming to themselves, as to everybody else, mere

blockheads. One of these, though there are many more, is Aristeides son of Lysimachus. When these truants come back and pray for admission to my society, and move heaven and earth to gain it, with some of them my familiar genius forbids me to consort, with others it allows me: and these latter improve again. And this affection also they that associate with me have in common with women in labor: they feel throes and are full of worry day and night much more than the women. And my art has the power to excite and allay that throe. So much then for them. And sometimes, Theaetetus, when any do not seem to me to be pregnant, perceiving that they do not need me, I very kindly make a match for them, and, with the blessing of heaven, I guess very aptly by whose conversation they will profit. Many I have made over to Prodicus, many to other wise and inspired men. I have spoken at this length to you because I suspect, in conformity with your own opinion, that you are suffering throes from some inward conception. Deal with me then as the son of a midwife, and a practitioner myself, and try to answer my questions as well as you are able. And if, on examining anything you say, I consider it an idol and not a true progeny, and so remove it quietly and put it away, don't be angry as women at their first lying in are about their infants. For many, my good friend, have felt towards me so that they are actually ready to bite me when I take from them any cherished trifle: and they imagine I am not acting kindly; so little are they aware that no god is unkind to men, and that I do nothing of this sort from ill will. But my sense of duty will in no wise allow me to accept falsehood and stifle truth.

So now again, returning to the point, Theaetetus, endeavor to say what knowledge is: and never reply that you are unable: for if the god please and you play the man, you will be able.

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, when you thus exhort, I must own it were disgraceful not to use one's utmost endeavor to state what suggests itself to the mind. It seems to me then that he who knows anything perceives what he knows; and, in my present view, knowledge is nothing else than perception.

Socrates/ Well and nobly said, my boy. It is quite proper to speak with such open frankness. But now let us examine the doctrine in common, to see whether it is a genuine product or a wind-egg. Knowledge, you say, is perception?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ I really think you have given an account of knowledge which is not insignificant, being one which Protagoras also gave. But he has said the same thing in a different way. He says, I fancy, that 'man is the measure of all things;' of things existing, that they do exist; of non-existing things, that they do not exist. Have you perhaps read this?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I have read it often.

Socrates/ He speaks then to this effect, that such as things appear to me, they severally are to me; and such as they appear to you, they severally are to you. The term 'man' includes you and me.

Theaetetus/ He does speak so.

Socrates/ Yes; and it is probable that a wise man is not talking nonsense: so let us follow his track. Does it not sometimes happen that, when the same wind is blowing, one of us is cold, the other not; and one is slightly cold, the other exceedingly?

Theaetetus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Shall we then in that case say the wind in itself is cold or not cold; or shall we assent to Protagoras that to

one who feels it cold it is cold, to one who does not feel it, not?

Theaetetus/ The latter, I should say.

Socrates/ And this is apparent to each?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the term 'is apparent' implies 'perceiving'?

Theaetetus/ It does.

Socrates/ Appearance then and perception concur in things warm and the like generally. For such as each perceives them, they probably are to each.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Perception then is always of that which 'is'; and it is unerring, since it is knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Manifestly.

Socrates/ In the name of the Graces, then, was Protagoras a man of consummate shrewdness, and did he hint this darkly to us of the common herd, while to his disciples he spoke 'the truth in secret confidence?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by this, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will state to you a doctrine of no slight importance: namely, that nothing in itself 'is one,' nor can you rightly call a thing 'some' or 'of some kind,' but, if you style it great, it will turn out also small, and if heavy, light, and so in every case; since nothing 'is' 'one' or 'some,' or 'of some kind': but from vection and motion and mixture with each other all things 'come to be,' of which we say that they 'are,' using a wrong term: for nothing at any time 'is,' but always 'comes to be.' And on this point let all philosophers except Parmenides be compared in their order, Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles: and of the poets those that are consummate in each poetic kind, in the comic, Epicharmus, in the tragic, Homer; for in saying Ocean of

gods progenitor and Tethys mother he has said that all things are born from flux and motion. Does he not seem to say so?

Theaetetus/ I think he does.

Socrates/ After this then, who that disputes with so great a host, and Homer its captain, can avoid making himself ridiculous?

Theaetetus/ It were not easy, Socrates.

Socrates/ No indeed, Theaetetus. Since our statement—that motion produces the semblance 'being,' and the 'coming to be,' while 'non-being' and 'perishing' are produced by rest—has in its favor many competent proofs. The heat of fire, which engenders and protects other things, is itself engendered by vection and attrition. And these are motions. Are not these the parents of fire?

Theaetetus/ They are.

Socrates/ Moreover the race of animals is produced from them?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Again: is not the habit of bodies ruined by rest and laziness, and preserved in general by exercise and motion?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does not the habit of the soul by learning and study, which are motions, acquire doctrines and preserve them and become better, while through rest, which is the absence of study and learning, it both learns nothing, and forgets what it has learnt?

Theaetetus/ Decidedly.

Socrates/ The one then, namely motion, is a good both in soul and body, the other is the reverse.

Theaetetus/ Seemingly.

Socrates/ Must I farther mention to you calms and serenities and such-like things, showing that quietudes rot and destroy, while their opposites preserve? and besides these must I clinch the matter, and evince that by the golden cord Homer means nothing but the sun, and indicates that, as long as the revolution continues, and the sun keeps moving, all things in heaven and earth exist and are preserved; but should this stand still as if fettered, all things would be spoilt, and, as the saying is, turned upside down?

Theaetetus/ In my judgment, Socrates, he does indicate what you say.

Socrates/ Conceive the matter in this way, my good friend. As to vision first: that what you call white color is not in itself something outside your eyes or in your eyes. And do not assign to it any place: for then, being somewhere in position, it would 'be' and remain, and would not by generation 'come to be.'

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ Let us follow the doctrine we were lately stating, that nothing exists as an independent unit; and in that way we shall see that black and white and every other color have 'come to be' from the coincidence of the eyes with the suitable motion; and that what in each case we call color, is neither that which makes nor that which receives the impact, but something between, which is peculiar to each. Or would you insist that what each color appears to you, such it appears also to a dog or any other animal?

Theaetetus/ No indeed, I would not.

Socrates/ Again: does anything appear to another man like what it appears to you? Are-you strongly convinced it does, or are you much rather sure that even to yourself it is not the same, because at no two times are you exactly the same?

Theaetetus/ The latter seems to me truer than the former.

Socrates/ Accordingly, if a thing beside which we measure ourselves, or which we handle, were large or white or hot, it would never have become different by contact with some other, unless it underwent a change in itself, And if again the measuring or handling subject had been any of these, it would not have become different when another approached or suffered any affection, if there were no affection in itself. For now, my friend, we are compelled in a careless sort of way to say marvelous and ridiculous things, as Protagoras would affirm, and everyone who ventures to propound the same that he does.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean? and what kind of things?

Socrates/ Take a small sample, and you will know what I mean. Six dice, if you place four beside them, we say are more in number and half as many again. If you bring twelve, we say the six are fewer in number, and half the second set. To say otherwise were intolerable. Will you tolerate it?

Theaetetus/ No, I will not.

Socrates/ Well: suppose Protagoras or someone else were to ask you: —Theaetetus, is it possible for anything to become greater or more, except by being increased? What answer would you give?

Theaetetus/ If I were to answer what I think in reply to your present question, Socrates, I should say 'no': but if with reference to the former one, to avoid self-contradiction, I should say 'yes.'

Socrates/ Well said, my friend, by Hera, and divinely. But if you answer 'yes,' something will occur like the case in Euripides: our tongue will be unconvicted, but our mind not unconvicted.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ So then, if you and I were clever and wise folk who had intimately studied the whole sphere of mind, and from that time forth amused ourselves with trying one another's powers, we should have engaged in a sophistical conflict of this kind, and be bandying arguments with each other. But now, as we are not professors, we shall wish to look at the statements comparatively, and see what it is we mean; whether they are consistent with each other or inconsistent.

Theaetetus/ Certainly that is what I should wish.

Socrates/ So should I. But, since this is the case, shall we not calmly, as we have plenty of leisure, re-examine (not losing our temper, but really probing ourselves) what these fancies in us are? Looking at the first of them, we shall say, I think, that nothing ever becomes greater or less either in bulk or number, so long as it is equal to itself. Is it not thus?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Secondly, that what suffers neither addition nor subtraction, is never either increased or wasted, but is always equal to itself.

Theaetetus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Is not this also a third proposition, that what was not before, cannot afterwards be without 'having come to be' and 'coming to be'?

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ These three admissions, I think, severally clash with each other in our soul, when we say what was said about the dice, or when we say that I, being of the age I am, without having suffered increase or decrease, within the space of a year begin by being bigger than you, who are young, and afterwards become less, —when nothing has been withdrawn from my size, but yours has increased. For thus 'I am' afterwards what before I was not, without having

‘come to be’ so. Now without ‘coming to be’ it is impossible ‘to have come to be,’ and without losing any size could never ‘come to be’ Smaller. And other like instances there are, myriads upon myriads, if we choose to admit these. I suppose you follow me, Theaetetus: at all events you seem to me not inexperienced in such matters.

Theaetetus/ I do, Socrates; and by all the gods I wonder immensely what these things are, and really sometimes I feel dizzy when I look at them.

Socrates/ Ay, my friend; evidently Theodorus forms no bad estimate of your genius. This affection, I mean of wondering, is quite that of a philosopher; for philosophy has no other origin but this; and he who said that Iris is the child of giant Wonder seems to be no bad genealogist. But do you by this time understand why these things result from the statements we ascribe to Protagoras?

Theaetetus/ Not yet, I think.

Socrates/ You will be thankful to me then, if, when a notable man, or rather when notable men have truth hidden away in the mind, I help you to search it out from them.

Theaetetus/ Thankful indeed I must be in the highest degree.

Socrates/ Look about then, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. These are men who think that nothing ‘is’ but what they are able to grasp with their hands, not accepting actions and generations and all that is invisible as in the category of being.

Theaetetus/ Upon my word, Socrates, stubborn and refractory people are these you tell of.

Socrates/ They are indeed, my boy, a fine set of boors’. Others there are much more refined, whose mysteries I am going to describe to you. Their principle is, and upon it all we were just now saying depends—that the whole universe

is motion, and nothing else but this, and of motions two kinds, each in number infinite, but, in respect of power, the one involving action, the other suffering. From the association and attrition of these with each other are formed products in number infinite, but of two sorts, one perceptible, the other perception, which continually breaks forth and is born with the perceptible objects. Perceptions, we find, have the following names; sight, hearing, smell, feelings of cold and heat, pleasure and pain and desire and fear and others: infinite are those without names; and those with names very numerous. And the objects of perception again are born with each of these, colors of all kinds with all kinds of vision, sounds with hearing similarly, and with the other perceptions other objects of perception are connate and 'come to be.' What meaning has this tale for us, Theaetetus, in reference to the former questions? do you perceive?

Theaetetus/ No, Socrates.

Socrates/ See then if it can be brought to its closing point. It means that all these things, as we say, are in motion, and in their motion are found swiftness and slowness. That which is slow has its motion in the same place and in reference to things near, and so engenders: and the things thus engendered [are slower. But that which is swift has its motion in reference to things at a distance, and so engenders, and the things thus engendered] are swifter, for they are conveyed, and their motion naturally consists in vection. When then the eye and any other of its suitable objects approach and beget whiteness and its kindred perception, which could never have 'come to be' if either of them had gone to something else, then, while the sight on the part of the eyes and the whiteness on the part of that which co-engenders the color are moving in mid space, the eye becomes full of sight, and at length sees and 'comes to

be,' nowise sight, but a seeing eye, and that which co-engendered the color is filled full with whiteness, and 'comes to be' not whiteness but a white thing, whether it be wood or stone or anything else that happens to have been colored with this hue. And other things similarly, hard and warm and all the rest, we must understand in the same manner 'to be' nothing by themselves, as we heretofore said, but in their mutual intercourse 'to become' all and of all kinds from motion: since of agent and patient, as they affirm, taken apart (ἐπὶ ἑνὸς) it is impossible to form any definite notion: for nothing is an agent till it concurs with a patient, nor a patient till it concurs with an agent: and that which concurs with one thing and is an agent, if it lights upon -another, proves to be a patient, so that, as we before said, nothing is 'one by itself,' but always 'comes to be' to some other; and the term 'being' must be removed on all sides, although we are often, even in our present discussion, compelled to use it from habit and ignorance. But it is not proper, as the wise lay down, to allow the use of the word 'some,' or 'of some' or 'me' or 'this' or 'that' or any other term which 'fixes,' but in accordance with nature to speak of things as 'coming to be' and 'being created' and 'perishing' and 'taking new forms.' Since if anyone fixes anything in speech, he who does so is easily confuted. And we ought to speak in this way both of individuals and of many in the aggregate, by which aggregation we determine 'man' and 'stone' and each class of animals. Do these views seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and will you find a taste of them agreeable?

Theaetetus/ I don't know, Socrates; for about you too I cannot discern, whether you are speaking these as your own opinions, or trying me.

Socrates/ Do you not remember, my friend, that I indeed neither know nor adopt any of such things as mine? but I am barren, and act as midwife to you, and on that account

I charm, and offer you, to be tasted, wise things of various sorts, until I can help to bring to light your opinion; and when it is brought forth, then and not before I will examine if it shall prove a wind-egg or a genuine offspring. So then with courage and patience answer well and manfully whatsoever appears to you to be right concerning my several questions.

Theaetetus/ Ask then.

Socrates/ Say then again, whether you are satisfied that nothing should 'be,' but ever 'come to be,' good and noble and all things which we were lately recounting.

Theaetetus/ Yes; since I have heard this recital of yours, it appears to me marvelously clear that it is reasonable, and that we must accept the principles as you have stated them.

Socrates/ Let us then not abandon what remains of our question. There remains the topic of dreams and diseases, madness especially, and all that is called mis-hearing or mis-seeing or any other wrong perception. For you know, I suppose, that in all these cases the principle we lately explained seems by admission to be confuted, since undoubtedly false perceptions occur to us in them, and things that appear to each are far from 'being,' but, quite contrariwise, none of the things that appear 'are.'

Theaetetus/ You speak most truly, Socrates.

Socrates/ What reason then is left, my boy, to him who lays down that perception is knowledge' and that things which appear to each 'are' in every such case?

Theaetetus/ For my own part, Socrates, I shrink from answering that I have nothing to urge, because just now you rebuked me for saying so. Yet in very truth I cannot contend that maniacs or dreamers do not imagine falsities, when some of them think they are gods, and others suppose they are fowls, and imagine they are flying in their sleep.

Socrates/ Have you not in mind then a certain difficulty raised about them, especially as to the sleeping and waking vision?

Theaetetus/ What difficulty?

Socrates/ A question which I think you have often heard people ask, what proof one would have to give, if somebody were to ask at this moment, whether we are sleeping and dreaming all that we imagine, or are awake and talking to one another in that state.

Theaetetus/ Indeed, Socrates, it is a perplexing thing to say by what proof we could establish it: for all the facts succeed one another as counterparts. Even the whole discussion we have now held there is nothing to prevent our seeming to have held in a dream. And when in a dream we seem to be relating dreams, the similarity between the cases is marvelous.

Socrates/ You see then that it is not difficult to raise a question, since it can be questioned even whether we are waking or dreaming. And as the time during which we are asleep is equal to that in which we are awake, our soul in each state contends that the fancies which from time to time occur are true, so that for half the time we say that the one are existent, for half the other, and we are equally confident in regard to each.

Theaetetus/ Yes, unquestionably.

Socrates/ And is not the same true of diseases and madness, except that the times are not equal?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, shall truth be determined by length or shortness of time?

Theaetetus/ That were ridiculous on many grounds.

Socrates/ Have you then any other clear sign to show which of these fancies are true?

Theaetetus/ I think not.

Socrates/ Hear then from me what they will say on this point, who lay it down that what from time to time 'seems,' 'is' true for him who so beholds it. Their opinion, I think, is expressed by this question: 'O Theaetetus, of two things which are totally different, can the one and the other have any identical powers?' We must not assume that the things in question are in one respect the same, in another different, but that they are wholly different.

Theaetetus/ It is impossible that they should have anything the same, either in power or in aught else, when they are wholly different.

Socrates/ Must we not also perforce confess the two things to be unlike?

Theaetetus/ I think so.

Socrates/ If, then, anything happens 'to become' like, either to itself or to another, shall we say that when made like it 'becomes' the same; when it gets unlike, different?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Were we not previously saying that agents are many and infinite, and patients likewise?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And also that a thing combining first with one, then with another, will not produce the same things, but different?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us now specify myself, or you, or anything else, in the same relations. Say Socrates in health and Socrates out of health. Shall we say the latter is like the former, or unlike?

Theaetetus/ Socrates out of health, you say; do you compare this as a whole with the former as a whole, with Socrates in health?

Socrates/ Very well put: that is my meaning.

Theaetetus/ Unlike, of course.

Socrates/ And different, as being unlike?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And you will say the same of Socrates sleeping, and in all the states we cited?

Theaetetus/ I would.

Socrates/ And will not each of the things which have an active nature, when they find Socrates in health, deal with me as one thing; when out of health, as a different one?

Theaetetus/ They must.

Socrates/ And I, the patient, and that agent, will in each case produce different things?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ When I drink wine in health, does it appear to me agreeable and sweet?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ True; for, by our admissions, the agent and the patient produced sweetness and perception, both of them in motion together; and perception on the side of the patient sweetness on the part of the wine, moving about it, made the wine to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

Theaetetus/ Such certainly were our previous admissions.

Socrates/ But when it finds me out of health, does it not in the first place find one who is not the same? It comes to an unlike object.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Such a Socrates, then, and the draught of wine, produce different things; in regard to the tongue a perception of bitterness, in regard to the wine a bitterness beginning to be and moving; and the wine it makes not bitterness, but bitter, and me not perception, but one that perceives.

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ I then shall never become percipient of anything else in the same way; for perception of another is another thing, and makes the percipient different and another; nor will that which acts on me, if it concur with another, ever engender the same and become similar: for from another it will engender another and become different.

Theaetetus/ That is true.

Socrates/ I then shall never become similar to my former self; nor will the object become similar to its former self.

Theaetetus/ No, surely not.

Socrates/ When I perceive, I must needs become percipient of something: for to become percipient, yet percipient of nothing, is impossible; and the object, when it becomes sweet or bitter, or anything of the kind, must become so to someone: for to become sweet, yet sweet to no one, is impossible.

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Then, I think, the inference remains, that to each other we 'are,' if we are, or we 'come to be,' if we come to be: since necessity binds our essence indeed, but binds it to nothing else, nor yet to ourselves individually; it remains then that we are bound to one another. So that if a person says that anything 'is' or 'becomes,' he must say that it 'is' or 'becomes' 'to something,' or 'of something,' or 'in relation to something'; but, if we have come to a right conclusion, he must not say or allow of anyone else saying, that anything 'is' or 'comes to be' absolutely.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly, Socrates.

Socrates/ And so, when that which acts on me is to myself and not to another, I perceive it, and no one else does.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then my perception is true to me: for it belongs always to my being; and, according to Protagoras, I am judge of things which are to me, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ How then, being infallible and unerring in mind as regards things which 'are' and 'come to be,' can I be unknowing of things whereof I am percipient?

Theaetetus/ In no sort of way.

Socrates/ Therefore you have said very well that knowledge is nothing else than perception; and it turns out to be one and the same thing, that (as Homer and Heracleitus, and their whole tribe, affirm) all things move like streams, and that (after the opinion of the consummately wise Protagoras) man is the measure of all things, and that (as Theaetetus infers from these premises) perception is proved to be knowledge. Is it so, Theaetetus? Must we say. that this, as it were, is your newborn child, and the product of my midwifery? What say you?

Theaetetus/ It must be so, Socrates.

Socrates/ This then, seemingly, we have with much difficulty brought to birth, whatever it prove to be. And now, after its birth, we must, in good sooth, run round the hearth with it in our discourse, not failing to observe whether the child be worth nurture, and not a wind-egg and an unreality. Or do you deem it absolutely necessary to rear your offspring, and not to put it away? Can you bear to see it confuted, and not be greatly out of temper if someone should filch from you your firstborn?

Theodorus/ Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates. He is not the least ill-tempered. But in heaven's name tell me, is not this then true?

Socrates/ You are a very gourmand of discussion, Theodorus, and a good creature, in that you take me to be a sack of arguments, and think I can pull out another, and aver that what we have said is untrue. But you do not note what is taking place: that none of the arguments proceed from myself, but from him who is conversing with me at the time; and that I know nothing more than this little feat, how to obtain an argument from another wise person and to treat it fairly. And I will now try to obtain one from our friend, and not to say something of my own.

Theodorus/ You put the thing well, Socrates: so be it.

Socrates/ Do you know then, Theodorus, what surprises me in your friend Protagoras?

Theodorus/ What is that?

Socrates/ I am much pleased with everything else he has said, how what 'seems' to each 'is' to each. But the commencement of his treatise does surprise me. I wonder that in the outset of his 'Truth' he did not say that a pig, or a dog-faced baboon, or any other more monstrous specimen of things that have perception, is the measure of all things, that so he might have spoken to us at once in a magnificent and very disdainful style, ostentatiously showing that, while we were marveling at his wisdom, as if he were a god, he was all the while not a whit superior in judgment to a tadpole, not to say, to any of his fellow-men. Or how are we to put the case, Theodorus? For if that opinion shall be true to each man which he gets by perception, and nobody's affection shall be better determined by another person, nor one be more entitled than another to review opinion, and to say whether it be true or false, but, as has been often said, each

person singly shall form his own opinions, and all these shall be right and true—why in the world, my friend, is Protagoras so wise as to be justly deemed a worthy teacher with high fees, and we dunces in comparison, who must go to school to him, though each of us is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not say that Protagoras speaks thus to amuse the vulgar? while as to my case, and that of my art of midwifery, I forbear to say what ridicule we incur: so indeed does the whole practice of dialectic. For, as to reviewing and criticizing each other's fancies and opinions, when each man's are right, is it not a tedious and monstrous folly, if the 'Truth' of Protagoras is true, and he did not proclaim it in jest from the shrine of his book?

Theodorus/ He was my friend, Socrates, as you said just now. I cannot therefore allow Protagoras to be confuted by my admissions, nor yet resist you contrary to my opinion. So take in hand Theaetetus again. For certainly he appeared some time back to follow your lead very prettily.

Socrates/ If you went to the wrestling-courts at Lacedaemon, Theodorus, and there beheld naked people, some your inferiors, would you refuse to strip yourself beside them, and exhibit your own form competitively?

Theodorus/ Why do you think I would not refuse, Socrates, with their permission and consent? So now I shall try to persuade you to let me look on, rather than be dragged to the play-ground in my present stiff condition, and to wrestle it out yourself with one who is younger and more supple.

Socrates/ If such is your will, Theodorus, I don't say 'nil],' as proverbialists have it. So I must turn again to the wise Theaetetus. Tell me then, Theaetetus, first of all, as to our late discussions; do you not share my surprise if thus all of a sudden you shall turn out to be no wise inferior in wisdom

to any man or even any god? Or do you suppose that the 'measure' of Protagoras is less applicable to gods than to men?

Theaetetus/ Upon my word I do not. And as to your question, I am much surprised. For when we were engaged in showing how that which 'seemed' to each 'was' also to him who thought it, the statement appeared to me very good; but now another view has taken its place all of a sudden.

Socrates/ You are young, my dear boy: you quickly succumb to popular declamation, and become a convert. For Protagoras, or someone on his part, will say in reply: My fine gentlemen, young and old, ye sit together and declaim, bringing gods into question, whom I, after speaking and writing about them, as to their existence or non-existence, set aside: and you say just what the populace would hear with approval, that it is too bad for mankind not to differ in wisdom from every kind of beast: but you offer no convincing proof whatever; you resort to probability, which if Theodorus or any other geometrician sought to use in geometry, he would be good for nothing. Just consider then, you and Theodorus, if on such important subjects you will accept arguments relying on mere persuasion and probability.

Theaetetus/ No, Socrates, we should not any more than yourself affirm that to be just.

Socrates/ We must view it then in some other way, as you and Theodorus suggest.

Theaetetus/ In some other way certainly.

Socrates/ In this way then let us consider it: whether knowledge and perception are the same or different. For to this point, I ween, our whole argument tended; and for this purpose we stirred all these many strange questions. Did we not?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Shall we then admit that all the things which we perceive by sight and hearing we at the same time know? For instance, before we have learnt the language of the barbarians, shall we say that we do not hear them when they speak, or that we both hear and understand what they say? And again, if we do not know letters, shall we, when we look at them, say we do not see them, or shall we insist that we know, since we see them?

Theaetetus/ So much of them, Socrates, as we see and hear, we shall say we know; we shall say we both see and know the figure and the color, and that we both hear and know the sharp and flat sound: but what grammarians and interpreters teach concerning them we shall say we neither perceive by sight and hearing, nor know.

Socrates/ Excellent, Theaetetus. And it is not worthwhile to dispute these positions of yours, that you may grow. But look at this other question also which approaches, and consider how we shall repel it.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ This. If anyone shall ask—'Suppose a man has become cognizant of anything, is it possible that, having and preserving memory of this thing, at the time when he remembers he should not know the very thing which he remembers?' But I am verbose, apparently, when I wish to ask if a man remembering anything he has learnt does not know it.

Theaetetus/ How could that be, Socrates? The thing you suggest would be a miracle.

Socrates/ Perhaps then I am trifling: but consider. Do you not call seeing perceiving, and sight perception?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Has not then one who has seen something become cognizant of the thing he saw according to your last statement?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well: do you not grant there is such a thing as memory?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Memory of something or of nothing?

Theaetetus/ Of something, certainly.

Socrates/ Of what one has learnt then, and of what one has perceived; of such things, is it not?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ What a man has seen, he remembers at times, I suppose?

Theaetetus/ He does.

Socrates/ Even when he has shut his eyes? or on doing so has he forgotten?

Theaetetus/ It were monstrous to suppose that, Socrates.

Socrates/ We must, I can tell you, if we are to maintain our former argument. If not, there is an end of it.

Theaetetus/ I really suspect so myself; but I cannot quite make up my mind. Tell me how.

Socrates/ In this way. One who sees becomes, we say, cognizant of what he sees. For sight and perception and knowledge are admitted to be the same.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And he who saw and became cognizant of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers, but does not see the thing. Is it so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And not seeing means not knowing, if seeing means knowing.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ The inference then is, that, while a man remembers something of which he has become cognizant, yet, since he does not see, he does not know it: and this we said would be a miracle.

Theaetetus/ All quite true.

Socrates/ If then anybody says that knowledge and perception are the same, there results an evident impossibility.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Therefore we must distinguish one from the other.

Theaetetus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ What then will knowledge be? We must begin our statement over again, it seems. Yet what are we going to do, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ About what?

Socrates/ We seem to me, like an ignoble cock, to hop away from the argument and crow, before we have gained the victory.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ Like rhetorical disputants we seem to be content that we have come to a mutual agreement as to the admitted uses of words, and by some such method mastered the question. And though we say we are not Eristics but philosophers, we unconsciously imitate the practice of those clever fellows.

Theaetetus/ I do not yet understand your meaning.

Socrates/ Well then, I will try to explain my view of the matter. We were asking whether a man who has learnt and

remembers something does not know it; and taking the case of one who had seen, and after shutting his eyes remembered though he did not see, we showed that he did not know at the same time that he remembered; and this, we said, was impossible. And so the Protagorean fable came to ruin, and yours with it, as to knowledge and perception being the same.

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ But it would not, my friend, if the father of the former fable had been alive. He would have made a strong defense for it: but now that it is an orphan, we insult it. For even those trustees, whom Protagoras appointed, one of whom was Theodorus here, do not come to the rescue. Well, in the interest of justice, I will run the risk of helping him myself.

Theodorus/ No, Socrates, I was not his children's trustee, but rather Callias son of Hipponicus. I diverged somewhat earlier from abstract studies to geometry. But we shall be much obliged to you if you will succor him.

Socrates/ Well said, Theodorus. Have an eye then to my succor. For a man would have to make stranger admissions than we lately made, if he did not attend to the terms in which we are generally wont to affirm and deny. Shall I explain how to you or to Theaetetus?

Theodorus/ To the company generally, but let the younger one answer. For he will incur less disgrace by defeat.

Socrates/ I put now the most startling question. To this effect, I think Is it possible for the same man knowing a thing not to know what he knows?

Theodorus/ What answer shall we give, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Impossible, in my opinion.

Socrates/ Not if you lay it down that seeing is knowing. For how will you deal with that inevitable question, when, as they say, you are caught in a well, and an unabashed man claps his hand to one of your eyes and asks, whether with the closed eye you see your cloak.

Theaetetus/ Not with that one, I suppose I shall say, but with the other.

Socrates/ Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

Theaetetus/ In a sort of way.

Socrates/ I do not, he will say, define anything, nor did I ask how, but only whether you know that which you do not know. And now you are shown to see what you do not see; and you have admitted that seeing is knowing and not seeing not knowing. Consider the inference from these premises.

Theaetetus/ I consider that it directly contradicts my former assertion.

Socrates/ Probably, my fine gentleman, you would have had more such experiences, if somebody had further asked you whether it is possible to know keenly or to know bluntly, and to know near and not at a distance, and to know the same thing intensely or moderately, and other questions, countless in number, which a light-armed mercenary ambushed in the arguments might have asked, when you laid it down that knowledge and perception are the same; and attacking your senses of hearing and smelling and the like he might have worried you with incessant confutation, until, admiring his accursed wisdom, you were entangled by him so far, that after mastering and binding you tight he might then have ransomed you for what sum you and he agreed on. Now what argument, perhaps you may say, will Protagoras advance in aid of his doctrine? Must we not try to state it?

Theaetetus/ Certainly we must.

Socrates/ Besides all this that we urge in his defense, he will also, methinks, come to close quarters, contemning us, and saying: Here's this good creature Socrates, who—when a lad got frightened on being asked whether it is possible for the same person at once to remember some particular thing and not know it, and in his fright said 'no,' because he could not see before him, —made a laughing-stock of me in the course of his arguments. But the fact, my easy-going Socrates, stands thus: when you examine any of my doctrines by the method of interrogation, if the person questioned give such answers as I should, and be defeated, I am confuted; but if they differ from mine, then the person questioned is confuted. For instance, if mutual word-catching is the thing to guard against, do you think anybody will concede to you that the memory of a past feeling is anything like what the feeling itself was at the time when it was experienced? Far from it. Or again, that he will shrink from admitting that it is possible for the same person to know and not to know the same thing? Or, if he dread this—that he will grant an altered person to be the same he was before he was altered? Or rather—that anybody can be called 'one' and not 'many'—infinitely multiplied, if alteration goes on. But, O my good sir, he will say, encounter my main doctrine more generously, if you can, and prove against it that individual perceptions do not come-to-be' to each of us, or that, supposing they do, it does not follow that the appearance will come-to-be' (or be,' if that is the proper term) to that person alone, unto whom it appears. When you talk of swine and dog-headed baboons, you are not merely swinish yourself, but you likewise induce your hearers to act as such towards my treatises without any decency. For I say that the Truth is as I have written: that each of us is a measure of things that are and are not: but that,

nevertheless, one man differs vastly from another in this very respect, that to one man some things are and appear, to another other things. And I am far from denying that wisdom and a wise man exist, but the man I call wise is he who, by working changes, makes things to appear and to be good to anyone of us, to whom they appear and are evil. And again, do not press my argument literally; but understand from the following explanation more clearly what I mean. Recollect how it was formerly said, that to a sick man his food appears to be and is bitter, but to a man in health the opposite is the fact and appears so. Neither of these persons ought we to make wiser than the other; that is impossible: nor may we declare that the sick man is ignorant for holding such an opinion, or the man in health is wise for holding another. We must effect a change to the opposite state: for the one habit is better than the other. So also in education we must cause a change from the one habit to the better. Now the physician changes by medicines; the wise teacher by arguments. Never indeed did anybody make one who had false opinions afterwards to hold true ones. For it is not possible either to think what is not, or anything but what one feels; and this is always true. But, I suppose, when through a bad habit of mind a man has corresponding opinions, a good habit makes him hold opinions resembling it; phantasms which some persons from inexperience call true: but I call some better than others, not truer. And wise men, dear Socrates, I am far from calling frogs: but in relation to bodies I call them physicians, in relation to plants husbandmen. For I say that these last also produce in plants, instead of evil sensations when any of them are sickly, good and healthy sensations and truths, while wise and good rhetoricians make good things instead of evil seem just to states. Since whatever things seem just and good to each state, are such to it, as long as it deems them lawful;

but the wise man, in the place of those things which are severally evil to each, makes the good both to be and to seem right. And on the same principle the sophist also, who is able to instruct his pupils thus, is both wise and worthy of high fees at their hands. And thus some are wiser than others, and nobody thinks falsities; and you, whether you will or not, must submit to be a measure. For on these grounds this doctrine is maintained. And, if you wish to revive your dispute with it, dispute by counter-arguing at full; or if you prefer the method of questioning, adopt it; for no person of sense will avoid this method, but will pursue it most willingly. Mind this however; you must not question unfairly. For it is most unreasonable in one who professes esteem for virtue to be constantly pursuing an unfair method of argument. Now unfairness is shown, when a man fails to conduct his arguments diversely; in one way as a combatant, in another as a dialectician: in the former case rallying and tripping up as much as he can, in the latter being serious, and correcting his respondent, showing him only those errors into which he was led by his own fault or in consequence of former discussions. If you act thus, your fellow-debaters will impute to themselves the fault of their own confusion and perplexity, not to you; and they will follow and love you, and fly from themselves to philosophy, that they may become different, and get rid of their former selves. But if you take the contrary course, as most do, you will find an opposite result, and your pupils instead of philosophers will turn out haters of philosophy, when they grow older. If then you will follow my advice, as was before said, you will, in no hostile or contentious spirit, but with a really mild and condescending temper, consider what we mean, when we declare that all things are in motion, and that what seems 'is' also to each, individual as well as state. From these considerations you will discern whether

knowledge and perception are the same: but not, as you lately sought, from the use of words and names, which most people pervert in every sort of way, causing each other all kinds of perplexity. Such, Theodorus, is the slight assistance which, from slight resources, I have supplied, as I best could, to your old friend. Had he been alive, he would have helped his own cause in grander language.

Theodorus/ You are joking, Socrates: for you have helped him most valiantly.

Socrates/ You are very obliging, my friend. Allow me one word. You noticed probably that Protagoras in what he said reproached us for holding our discussions with a boy, and using that boy's alarm as a weapon of contention against his propositions: and while he represented this as mere amusement, he called 'the measure of all things' a grave topic, and urged us to deal seriously with his argument.

Theodorus/ Of course I noticed it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well: do you bid us take his advice?

Theodorus/ Very earnestly.

Socrates/ Do you see that all here are boys except you? If then we are to take his advice, you and I must deal seriously with his doctrine by mutual questions and answers, that he may not have to reproach us with considering this subject in a jocular manner with lads.

Theodorus/ Nay, but would not Theaetetus follow the investigation of a doctrine better than many who have great beards?

Socrates/ Not better than you, Theodorus. Do not suppose that I am bound to defend your deceased friend in every manner, and that you are bound in no manner. But come, good sir, follow the argument a little way, till such time as we know whether you are to be the measure of diagrams, or if all are competent in themselves, equally with

you, to treat of astronomy and the other subjects wherein you are reported to excel.

Theodorus/ When one sits beside you, Socrates, it is not easy to decline discussion. Indeed I spoke nonsense just now when I said you would allow me not to strip, and that you would not compel me as the Lacedaemonians do: you seem rather to tend in Sciron's direction. The Lacedaemonians indeed bid one depart or strip, but you seem to me to act your part like Antaeus: you will not let one who comes to you go away before you have forced him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

Socrates/ You have found very good precedents for my malady, Theodorus: but I am more robust than they were. Many a Hercules and Theseus strong in argument have ere now met and thumped me very hard; but I do not flinch for all that: with such a wonderful love of this kind of exercise am I possessed. Do not then refuse to benefit yourself as well as me by trying a fall with me.

Theodorus/ Be it as you will: I refuse no longer. I must inevitably endure by cross-examination whatever destiny you spin for me in this discussion. I shall not however be able to put myself in your hands beyond the limit which you have proposed.

Socrates/ That limit is sufficient. And pray help me to be careful of this, that we do not unawares carry on any childish kind of argument, and incur reproach again for doing so.

Theodorus/ Very well, I'll try my best.

Socrates/ Let us first revert to the objection we took before, and see whether we were right or wrong in being out of humor and censuring the doctrine, in that it made everyone competent in wisdom; and whether Protagoras

rightly conceded to us, that, in respect of better and worse, some do surpass, and they are wise. Is it not so?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now if he had himself been present and made this admission, instead of our making it in his defense, we need not have strengthened ourselves by recurring to the subject: but now perhaps someone may allege that we are incompetent to make the confession on his part. It is better to come to a clearer mutual understanding on this special point. For whether it is so or not makes a great difference.

Theodorus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Let us obtain the admission not through others, but from his statement, as briefly as we can.

Theodorus/ How?

Socrates/ In this way. He says, does he not, that what seems to everyone 'is' also to him unto whom it seems?

Theodorus/ Yes, he does.

Socrates/ Do not we also, Protagoras, state a man's opinion, or rather the opinions of all men, when we say that there is nobody who does not deem himself wiser than others in some respects, and others wiser than himself in other respects; and, moreover, that in the greatest perils, when they are distressed in war or disease or at sea, men regard their rulers on such occasions as gods, expecting them to be their saviors, though they differ from them in nothing but knowledge? And all human life teems with people who are seeking teachers and rulers of themselves and of other living creatures and of the various trades; and teems, again, with other people who deem themselves competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all these cases what else can we say than that men themselves think there exists among them wisdom and ignorance?

Theodorus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ Do they not deem wisdom to be true thought, and ignorance false opinion?

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, how shall we deal with the argument, Protagoras? Must we say that men always have true opinions, or sometimes true, sometimes false? From both views it results that they do not always think true things, but at times true things, at times false. For consider, Theodorus, whether any Protagorean, or you yourself, would wish to contend that no one person considers any other to be unlearned and to have false opinions.

Theodorus/ That is incredible, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet the doctrine which says that man is the measure of all things is brought to this unavoidable conclusion.

Theodorus/ How so?

Socrates/ When you, after forming some judgment in your own mind on any point, declare to me your opinion, be it granted according to his doctrine that this is true to you: but is it not allowed to the rest of us to become judges respecting your judgment? must we always judge that you have true opinions? do not a countless number in each instance contend against you with contrary opinions, believing that you judge and think falsities?

Theodorus/ Yes verily, Socrates, countless myriads indeed, as Homer says, who give me all the trouble in the world.

Socrates/ Well? would you have us say that in that case you have opinions true to yourself but false to the countless myriads?

Theodorus/ Such seems to be the necessary inference from the statement.

Socrates/ And how as to Protagoras himself? Supposing he did not think man a measure, and the public did not think so, (as indeed they do not), would it not necessarily follow that what he delivered in writing as Truth, is Truth to nobody? or if he thought so, and the public does not agree with him, do you see that in proportion as those who deny are more numerous than those who affirm, so much more decidedly it is or is not so?

Theodorus/ Of necessity, if according to each individual opinion it will be or will not be so.

Socrates/ In the next place it involves this very queer result, that he on his side, by confessing that all men hold true opinions, admits that the opinion of the opposite party about his opinion (which they deem false) is a true one.

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Will he not admit that his own is false, if he confesses that the opinion of those who suppose him to think falsely is true?

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But the others on their side do not admit that they think falsely.

Theodorus/ No, they do not.

Socrates/ And he again confesses also this opinion to be true according to his written doctrines.

Theodorus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ By all parties then it will be contended, including Protagoras (by him it will rather be confessed, for when he grants to a gainsayer that the latter thinks what is true, then does Protagoras himself confess), that no dog or man he meets with is a measure concerning anything which he has not learnt. Is it not so?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Since this is the contention of all, to nobody will the Truth of Protagoras be true, neither to himself nor to anyone else.

Theodorus/ We run down my friend very hard, Socrates.

Socrates/ But it is doubtful, my friend, if we are outrunning the fact. It is likely that he being older is wiser than we: and if he could at once pop up his head where we are, he would not sink down and run away again, until, probably, he had convicted me of talking much nonsense, and you of agreeing to it. As it is, we must needs, I think, make the best of ourselves, such as we are, and state our real opinions for the time being. And must we not now say that everybody will confess this—that one man is wiser, one more ignorant, than another?

Theodorus/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ Must we not also say that our argument is most stably conducted on the lines we prescribed in our defense of Protagoras, averring that most things are as they seem to each, hot, dry, sweet, all such-like? but that, if he will grant that one excels another in anything, he will be ready to say so in judgments upon health and disease: not every woman or child or beast, he will admit, knows what is wholesome in its own case, and is competent to cure itself: here, if anywhere, one excels another.

Theodorus/ I think so.

Socrates/ In politics, too, will he not say, that of things honorable and dishonorable, just and unjust, holy and unholy, whatsoever each state shall deem and enact to be lawful for itself are also lawful in truth for each, and that in these no individual or state is wiser than another? but in enacting things expedient or inexpedient, here, if anywhere, he will confess that counselor differs from counselor and the opinion of one city from that of another in respect of truth,

and he will certainly not venture to affirm, that whatever a state shall deem and enact to be expedient for itself will most assuredly be expedient. But of the former things I named, justice and injustice, holiness and unholiness, they (the Protagoreans) are ready to insist that none has any essential nature, but that whatever has seemed good by public consent is true when it has seemed good, and as long as it seems good. And those who do not altogether echo the doctrine of Protagoras, take some such philosophic view. But now, Theodorus, we have question growing out of question, greater out of less.

Theodorus/ Are we not at leisure, Socrates?

Socrates/ We appear to be. On many occasions, my good sir, I have noticed, but especially on this, how natural it is for those who have spent much time on philosophy, when they go into the law-courts, to show themselves absurd orators.

Theodorus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ People who from their youth have been knocking about in law-courts and such like scenes, as compared with those who have been reared in philosophic and literary society, seem to have had a breeding like that of slaves compared with freemen.

Theodorus/ In what respects?

Socrates/ In that (referring to your last observation) philosophers have leisure at all times, and hold their discussions peacefully and with leisurely ease, and as we have now been pursuing three arguments in succession, so do they also, if one which follows pleases them better than the preceding; nor do they care whether they speak briefly or at length, if only they can attain truth. The other class always speak in haste; for the flow of water quickens them, and they are not allowed to make their speeches on anything

they desire; and the opponent stands over them holding compulsion in the shape of a prescribing document read in the ear, beyond the limits of which they must not speak, yclept an affidavit: and the arguments are always about a fellow-slave addressed to a master on the bench, who holds justice between his finger and thumb; and the contests are never away from the point, but to the point of self-interest; and often too the race is for life. So that on all these grounds they become keen and shrewd, knowing how to wheedle the master by word and gratify him by deed, being stunted and crooked in soul. For their slavery from childhood has robbed them of growth and uprightness and freedom, compelling them to act tortuously, setting before their yet tender souls great perils and fears. And as they cannot bear up against these with the help of justice and truth, they have recourse at once to falsehood and mutual injury, and twist themselves in many ways, and become warped; and so they pass from youth to manhood without any mental soundness, becoming, as they imagine, clever and wise. Such is this class of men, Theodorus. Would you wish us now to describe those of our circle, or to pass them by and return to our argument, that we may not, as we just now said, abuse too far our freedom in the change of topics?

Theodorus/ Not so, Socrates; finish the description. For you have said with great truth that we who form a circle like this are not servants of our discussions: our discussions are, as it were, our servants, and each of them waits to be completed when we think fit. For amongst us there is no presiding authority; neither dicast to rule, nor spectator, as in the case of poets, to censure.

Socrates/ We must speak then, seemingly, since you think proper, concerning the leaders of such a circle; for why need one mention the inferior students of philosophy? This class from their youth, in the first place, do not know the

way to the agora, nor where a law-court is or a council-hall or any other political meeting-room: laws and decrees spoken or written they neither see nor hear. Societies agitating for office and clubs and dinners and wine-bouts with flute-girls—these are practices which even in dreams do not occur to them. Whether anyone in the city is well or ill born, whether a person has inherited any disgrace from ancestors on the male or female side, he knows no more than he does of the proverbial 'gallons in the sea.' He does not even know that he is ignorant of all these things; for it is not for credit's sake that he stands aloof from them, but in point of fact it is only his body that reposes and resides in the city, while his mind, deeming all these things petty and Insignificant, moves in every direction, as Pindar says, measuring things beneath the earth and on its surface, and star-gazing above the heaven, and searching out everywhere the nature of each class of existing things, condescending to none of those which are near it.

Theodorus/ How do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ Compare the case of Thales, O Theodorus. While he was astronomising and gazing upward he fell into a well; and a clever and witty Thracian maidservant is said to have taunted him with desiring to know what was in heaven, but not seeing what was before him and at his feet. The same taunt is good for all who are devoted to philosophy. For in fact such a student is not only unaware of what his next neighbor is doing, but does not even know whether he is a man or some other creature. But what man is, and what it belongs to such a nature to do or to suffer differently from all others, this he inquires, and takes pains to search out. You understand, I hope, Theodorus, do you not?

Theodorus/ I do, and your words are true.

Socrates/ Therefore, my friend, a man like this, in his associations private and public, as I said at first, when in a law-court or elsewhere he is compelled to discourse of things at his feet and before his eyes, becomes a laughingstock not only to Thracian maids, but to the general public, falling into wells and perplexities of every kind from inexperience; and his awkwardness is marvelous, raising a suspicion of imbecility. For when personal reviling is the order of the day, he has no scandalous charge to bring, knowing no evil of anybody, because he has never taken the trouble. So he gets laughed at for his helplessness. And when eulogies and glorification of others are the theme, he is seen to laugh in right earnest without any affectation; and so he seems to be silly. When a tyrant or a king is extolled, he thinks he hears one of the herdsmen, swineherd or shepherd or cowherd, congratulated for his large milking: but he considers that the royal proprietors in their tending and milking have to deal with a more untoward and insidious animal than the others have, and that anyone of them must, for want of leisure, perforce prove quite as rude and uninstructed as the real herdsmen, having his fortification built round him like a stall upon the mountain. When he hears it said that somebody, who has got ten thousand acres of land or more, has a wonderfully large estate, he thinks the quantity named a very small one, from being in the habit of contemplating the whole earth. And when they extol birth, and say that someone is a gentleman for being able to show seven rich ancestors, this he regards as praise emanating from very dull and short-sighted persons, who through want of education can never take a comprehensive view, so as to see that every man has had countless myriads of forefathers, among whom in every case are found many rich and poor, kings and slaves, both Greeks and barbarians, recurring again and again. He is amazed at the manifestly narrow

conception of those who pride themselves on a list of twenty-five ancestors, carried back to Heracles, son of Amphitryon; and he laughs at men who cannot bear in mind that the twenty-fifth ancestor, counting back from Amphitryon, and again the fiftieth before him, were just whatever they might happen to be—and by such reflection get rid of their foolish vanity. On all these occasions such a man is scorned by the multitude, partly, it would seem, on the charge of arrogance, partly for not knowing what stares him in the face, and for helplessness in general.

Theodorus/ It certainly does happen as you say, Socrates.

Socrates/ But when he himself, my friend, leads any man to take a higher view, and that man consents to quit his 'How do I wrong you or you me,' for the consideration of justice and injustice—what each is in itself, and wherein they differ from all other things or from each other, —or to turn from the maxim 'Happy the king, happy the possessor of much gold,' to the consideration of kingship itself and human happiness and misery generally—what they are and how it befits human nature to attain the one and escape the other—on all these subjects, I say, when that petty narrow-minded legal personage is required to render reason, he presents a counterpart of the philosopher. Stationed upon a height and gazing down from his elevated position, he turns dizzy from inexperience, and, uneasy perplexed and stuttering, he is a laughing-stock, not to Thracian girls or any uneducated person, for they do not see the absurdity, but to all whose training has not been that of slaves. Such are their several characters, Theodorus. One is that of the man really bred in freedom and leisure, whom you call philosopher; who may without reproach seem simple and be incompetent when he is engaged in menial services; when he does not, for instance, know how to pack a trunk of linen, or to season a dish or a flattering speech. The other is that of him who can

perform all such services thoroughly and briskly, but who does not know how to don his cloak like a gentleman, or, by acquiring harmony of language, to sing well the true life of gods and blessed men.

Theodorus/ If you could bring home what you say to all men, Socrates, as you do-to me, there would be more peace and less evil in the world.

Socrates/ Nay, Theodorus, evil cannot, on the one hand, perish altogether, for something opposite to good there must ever be; nor, on the other, can it find a seat in heaven: but our mortal nature and this lower region it haunts perforce. Wherefore we must endeavor to fly from this world to the other as soon as we can. Now that flight means the becoming like to God as much as possible; and the way to be like God is to become just and holy and wise. But indeed, my excellent friend, it is by no means an easy task to convince the world that the reasons on which most people found the duty of shunning vice and pursuing virtue are not the just motives for practicing the latter and avoiding the former: in order, to wit, that a man may not seem to be wicked, and that he may seem to be good. These views, in my clear opinion, are what is called an old woman's fable: the real truth we may state as follows. God is in no way and in no degree unjust, but just in the highest extreme; and nothing is more like to him than one of us who in his own sphere shall become as just as possible. Hereby is shown a man's veritable power, in the one case; in the other, his worthless and unmanly character. For the cognition of this truth is genuine wisdom and virtue, while the ignorance of it is manifest unintelligence and viciousness. Everything else which is taken for mental power and wisdom is in political government vulgar, in art ignoble. It is by far the best way then not to allow for a moment that one who acts unjustly and speaks or practices impiety is a man of powerful mind

because he is a rogue. Such people pride themselves on the reproach, and suppose it to mean that they are no whipsters, no mere loungers about the streets, but the sort of men they ought to be to hold their own in the state. They must be told the truth therefore; namely—that their belief of not being what they are makes them what they are so much the more. For they do not know the penalty of injustice, a thing of all others which it is most proper to know. It is not what they suppose, stripes and capital punishments, which men sometimes do not incur when they act unjustly, but one from which it is impossible to escape.

Theodorus/ What do you refer to?

Socrates/ There are, my friend, established in the world two types; of supreme happiness in the godly nature, of supreme misery in the ungodly: and these men, not seeing this truth, in their weakness and utter folly do by their unjust deeds insensibly become like the latter nature, unlike the former. The punishment they suffer is that of living a life correspondent with that nature to which they become like. And if we tell them that, unless they get rid of their wondrous wisdom, when they are dead, yon place pure from evil will not receive them, and they will ever continue to live in this world a life resembling themselves—evil amidst evil associations—such language they will undoubtedly hear as clever and cunning rogues listening to a pack of fools.

Theodorus/ To be sure they will, Socrates.

Socrates/ I know it well, my friend. There is however one thing that befalls them. If in private they are required to give a reasonable account of their censures, though for a long time they are willing to abide the brunt manfully and not to flee like cowards, at last, my good sir, they are strangely dissatisfied with their own reasoning; and that rhetoric of theirs dies out, somehow or other, so that they seem no

better than children. As to these people, however, since the topic is a mere digression, let us drop the conversation: or else further considerations will continue to stream in and stifle our original argument. Let us return to the previous question, with your leave.

Theodorus/ For my own part, Socrates, I lend an ear to such digressions with quite as much pleasure, as they are easier for a man of my age to follow. But, if you prefer it, let us return to our subject.

Socrates/ We had, I think, reached this point in our argument. Speaking of those who teach the notion of moving essence, and who aver that what at any time seems to each is for him to whom it seems, we said that—while on other points, and specially with respect to justice, such men would insist strongly, that what a state enacts as its pleasure, is just for the enacting state as long as it remains enacted—yet with respect to good, none are so bold as to contend that what a state enacts considering it useful, is useful so long as it remains enacted, unless one choose to lay stress on the mere term; and that would be quibbling as to our real question. Would it not?

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ He should not dwell on the term, but on the thing which under that term is considered.

Theodorus/ True.

Socrates/ Whatever term the state give to it, that which the state aims at in its legislation is, I suppose, this: all its laws, so far as its opinion and power extend, are framed in order to be as useful to itself as possible. Does it legislate with any other view?

Theodorus/ None.

Socrates/ Does it always succeed? or do all states err in many cases?

Theodorus/ I think they sometimes err.

Socrates/ Ay, and one may be led to this same admission more readily, by putting the question as to the whole class, of which the useful is a part. I suppose it relates to future time as well as to present. When we legislate, we enact our laws as intended to be useful for the time that is to follow. This we should rightly term 'future'?

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then: let us ask Protagoras, or any of those who adopt his doctrine, this question. Man is the measure of all things, as ye say, O Protagoras; of things white, heavy, light, all such-like. For, having the test in himself, thinking what he feels, he thinks what is, and what is to himself true. Is it not so?

Theodorus/ It is.

Socrates/ And of things which are hereafter to be, we shall say, O Protagoras, has he the test in himself, and do they turn out to him such as he thinks they will be? Heat, for instance: when an unskilled person thinks that he will be seized with fever, and that this state of heat mil occur, and another, who is a medical man, has an opposite opinion, shall we say that the future will turn out according to the opinion of one of the two, or according to that of both, and that to the medical man he will not be hot or feverish, but to himself both these?

Theodorus/ This would be absurd.

Socrates/ And, I suppose, with respect to the future sweetness or harshness of wine, the vine-grower's opinion, not that of the harp-player, will prevail?

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Again, as to good and bad music, a gymnast cannot judge beforehand so well as a musician, even of that

which, after he has heard it, the gymnast himself will deem to be good music.

Theodorus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ The judgment also of one who, without culinary skill, is preparing to feast, will, while the banquet is in preparation, be less valid concerning the future pleasure than the judgment of the cook. We must not in our present argument inquire as to that which now is or which has been pleasant to each, but as to that which is about to seem and to be pleasant, —whether each individual is the best judge for himself. For example, would not you, Protagoras, form beforehand a better opinion than an untutored person of the arguments which each of us would find persuasive in a court of law?

Theodorus/ The very point, Socrates, in which he used to declare strongly that he had no rival.

Socrates/ To be sure he did, my dear friend; and nobody would have paid large sums of money to converse with him, if he had tried to persuade his pupils that no person, prophet, or other, is a better judge of what in the future will be, and seem to be, than a man's own self.

Theodorus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Are not legislation and expediency concerned 'with the future, and will not everyone confess that a state, when legislating, must of necessity often fail to attain that which is most useful?

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then it will be a fair thing to say to your master, —he must perforce confess that one man is wiser than another, and that such a man is indeed a measure: while for me, who am unknowing, there is no kind of necessity to become a measure, compelled though I was just now to be one, whether I would or not, by my argument in his defense.

Theodorus/ In my judgment, Socrates, that is the best way of confuting his doctrine, though it is also confuted by this consideration, that it makes other people's opinions valid, and by these opinions (as was shown) his statements are deemed to be anything but true.

Socrates/ In many other ways, also, Theodorus, a doctrine such as this, that every opinion of every person is true, can be confuted. But, in respect to momentary affections, from which arise perception and correspondent opinion, it is more difficult to convict these of untruth. I am very likely wrong, however: possibly they are irrefragable; and those who assert them to be clear, and to be cognitions, may perhaps tell the truth, and our friend Theaetetus may not have missed the mark in laying down that perception and knowledge are the same. We must come closer then and examine this moving essence, by tapping it to see whether it sounds whole or cracked. No slight war is waged about this between combatants not a few.

Theodorus/ Far indeed from being a slight one; in Ionia the doctrine makes great strides. The followers of Heracleitus support it very vigorously.

Socrates/ On that account, dear Theodorus, we must examine it more fundamentally, as they suggest.

Theodorus/ Decidedly. For indeed, Socrates, as to these followers of Heracleitus, or, as you say, of Homer, and of others still more ancient, if we take their leading men about Ephesus, who pretend to be learned in the doctrines, there is no possibility of holding an argument with them any more than with lunatics. They are always in motion after the manner of their writings, and as to pausing on one subject, and inquiring and answering quietly in turn, their power of doing this is below zero. An infinite minus quantity goes nearer to expressing that these men have not in them the

least particle of quietness. If you ask them any question, they pluck as it were out of their quiver a little riddling phrase or two and shoot them at you, and if you try to get any account from the man of what he has said, you will be smitten with another under some novel change of name, and so you will never reach a conclusion with anyone of them. Nor indeed will they themselves do so in their mutual discussions. They carefully guard themselves from allowing any certainty to appear either in an argument or in their own souls, deeming this, I suppose, a stable principle. Any such they are at war with and repel, as much as they can, on every side.

Socrates/ Probably, Theodorus, you have seen these men in battle, and never met with them in a pacific state, as they are no companions of yours. But, I suppose, they do teach certain principles at leisure to their scholars, whom they wish to make like themselves.

Theodorus/ What do you mean by scholars, my good sir? These folk are not scholars one of another; they arise by spontaneous growth, each from some casual inspiration, and there is not one of them that supposes another to know anything. From these men, as I was going to say, you can never get a reason with or against their will. We must ourselves receive their doctrine, and examine it like a mathematical problem.

Socrates/ Very fairly suggested. We have however received the problem in another shape, from the ancients first, who hide it from the multitude in poetry, how that Oceanus and Tethys, the progenitors of all things, are streams, and that nothing stands still: from later writers secondly, who, being wiser, proclaim their views openly, that even a cobbler may hear and learn their wisdom, and cease to suppose some existences stand still while others are moving, and so, having been taught that all things move,

may honor his teachers. I almost forgot, Theodorus, that others again put forth the doctrine opposite to this: for instance;

'Unmoved is that they call the universe,'

and other dogmas, which, in opposition to all the preceding, such men as Melissus and Parmenides insist upon, how that all things are one, and that this one stands self-supported, having no region wherein it moves. How shall we deal with all these, my friend? for we have gone on little by little till we find ourselves unexpectedly thrown midway between them, and if we do not struggle to find an escape, we shall be punished like those who play across a line in wrestling-grounds, when they are seized by both parties and dragged in opposite directions. So I think we must begin by considering the one party, to whom we first addressed ourselves, the fluent gentlemen. And if they appear to have good reasons, we will help them to drag us over, and try to escape from their opponents; but if the standard-bearers of 'the Whole' seem to give the true account, to them will we fly from those who move even the immoveable. If we find that neither of them have any satisfactory account to give, we shall get laughed at for supposing that poor creatures like us have anything of weight to say, and for disavowing men of the highest antiquity and wisdom. Consider, Theodorus, whether it is our interest to incur so great a risk.

Theodorus/ Nay, Socrates, it cannot be endured that we should refuse to consider what each of these parties has to say.

Socrates/ We must consider them, as you urge it so strongly. I think the first step in our consideration is concerning motion, to see what they intend by saying that all things move. What I mean to say is this. Do they speak of one kind of motion, or, as I think evident, two? But let it. not

be my sole opinion; share it with me yourself, that we may abide in common any result. Do you say a thing is moved when it changes from place to place, or revolves in the same place?

Theodorus/ I do.

Socrates/ Let this be one kind. Now, when it stays in the same place, but grows old, or becomes black from being white, or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other variation, is it not proper to say this is another kind of motion?

Theodorus/ I think so.

Socrates/ You cannot help it. These then I name are two kinds of motion, variation one, revolution another.

Theodorus/ You name them rightly.

Socrates/ Having made this division, let us now argue with those who say that all things move, and put to them this question: do you say that all things move in both ways, by local movement and by variation, or that one thing moves in both ways, another in one of the two?

Theodorus/ Nay, upon my word I cannot pronounce. I think they would say all things move in both ways.

Socrates/ Yes; for if not, my friend, they will evidently make them to be both in motion and at rest, and it will be no more right to say that all things move than that they stand still.

Theodorus/ Most truly stated.

Socrates/ Accordingly, since they must move, and it is impossible for anything not to be moving, all things are always moving with every kind of motion.

Theodorus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Now consider this point in their statements.) Did we not say that they state the generation of heat or

whiteness or any other perception in some such way as this—that each of these things at the moment of perception moves between the agent and the patient, and that the patient comes to be a percipient but not perception, and the agent a qualified thing but not a quality? Perhaps however quality seems to you to be a strange term, and you do not understand it when named in the general. Hear it then in particulars. The agent comes to be neither heat nor whiteness, but a hot thing and a white thing, and so with everything else. You remember, I suppose, that in our former statements we laid it down thus; that nothing 'is' one by itself, so also neither agent nor patient; but that from both 'coming to be' together in mutual relation, sensations and sensible things are engendered, and the one comes to be of some quality and the other percipient.

Theodorus/ I remember, of course.

Socrates/ Let us now spare ourselves the pains of considering their other various propositions, and, noting the one which is the subject of our discussion, let us put to them this question: 'All things, you say, move and are in flux.' Is this right?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do they then move with both kinds of motion which we distinguished, locomotion and variation?

Theodorus/ Of course they do, if they are to move completely.

Socrates/ If they moved only, and were not changed, I suppose we should be able to say what kinds of things they are that move in flux. Should we not?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Since it is not even an abiding fact, that what is in flux flows white, but it changes, and so there is a flux of this very thing, whiteness, and a change to another color,

that it may not be convicted of abiding in this one—is it ever possible to name any color so as to give a correct name?

Theodorus/ What possibility can there be, Socrates, in this or any other such thing, if it always slips away as one is speaking, being in constant flux?

Socrates/ And what shall we say of any kind of perception, such as sight or hearing? Shall we say that it ever abides in the act of seeing or hearing?.

Theodorus/ Certainly it must not, seeing that all things are moving.

Socrates/ We cannot therefore aver that we see a thing more than that we do not see it, or that we have any perception more than that we have it not, since all things are in every way moving?

Theodorus/ We cannot indeed.

Socrates/ And yet knowledge is perception, as I and Theaetetus settled it.

Theodorus/ So it was.

Socrates/ Accordingly, when asked what knowledge is,. in our reply we no more stated what it is than what it is not.

Theodorus/ Seemingly not.

Socrates/ A fine issue to the supplement of our answer, when we were so eager to show that all things move: —for the purpose, forsooth, of proving that answer right. Now the thing proved seems to be, that, if all things move, every answer on every possible subject is equally right—to say it is' so and it 'is' not so, or if you prefer the term, 'comes to be,' that our terminology may not make them stationary.

Theodorus/ You say rightly.

Socrates/ Except, Theodorus, that I said 'So' and 'Not so.' I ought not to use this word 'So,' for no motion would be expressed by it; nor yet 'Not so,' for here again is no motion.

But we must supply some other language to those who state this doctrine; since now in fact they have no words to convey their own hypothesis, except perhaps 'Nowise.' This might suit them best, being an indefinite expression.

Theodorus/ Yes, that style of speech would be most natural to them.

Socrates/ Thus, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, and do not yet concede to him that every man is the measure of everything, if he be not a wise man; nor yet will we concede that knowledge is perception, at least on the supposition of all things moving.

Theodorus/ A good hearing, Socrates: for, as this topic is concluded, I must be rid of the task of answering you, as by our compact I was to be, when the question about the doctrine of Protagoras should come to an end.

Theaetetus/ Nay, Theodorus, not before you and Socrates have discussed, as you just now proposed, the doctrine of those who on the other hand affirm that the universe is at rest.

Theodorus/ What? you, Theaetetus, a mere youth, teaching your elders to commit the sin of violating compacts! Come, gird yourself up to debate with Socrates that which remains.

Theaetetus/ Oh, certainly, if he wishes. But I should have been delighted to hear the other topic discussed.

Theodorus/ You challenge cavalry to the plain when you challenge Socrates to argument. Ask him, and you will hear his answer.

Socrates/ Ay, Theodorus; but I do not think I shall obey the call which Theaetetus makes.

Theodorus/ Why not obey it?

Socrates/ As to Melissus and the others who represent the universe as one and at rest, I respect them too much to treat their views cursorily; but in still greater respect do I hold the single name of Parmenides. He appears to me to meet Homer's definition, 'venerable and likewise awful,' I was brought into contact with him when I was very young and he very old, and he struck me as possessing a depth of character pre-eminently noble. I fear that we may not understand his language, still more that we may fail to achieve his meaning: above all, I am afraid that our original question, the definition of knowledge, may cease to be considered, if a fresh crowd of arguments rushes in, and gains our attention. In particular, this hopelessly large argument which we are awakening, if considered as a digression, would be unworthily treated; or, if pursued adequately at full length, it will swamp the question of knowledge. We should do neither one nor the other, but endeavor by our art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge.

Theodorus/ Very well; we must, if you please.

Socrates/ Once more then, Theaetetus, consider this part of our previous discourse. You said in reply to me that knowledge is perception. Did you not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ If anybody were to ask you the question, with what a man sees white things and black, and with what he hears sharp things and flat, you would say, I suppose, with the eyes and with the ears.

Theaetetus/ I should.

Socrates/ The easy acceptance of names and terms, and the non-exaction of strict accuracy, is indeed generally not out of place in a well-bred man; we may rather say the reverse is vulgar, yet is it occasionally necessary. And so in

the present instance I must perforce take exception to the answer which you give, in so far as it is wrong. Consider which answer is more correct, that the eyes are that with which, or that through which we see, and the ears that with which, or that through which we hear.

Theaetetus/ 'Through' which in each case, I think, Socrates, rather than 'with' which.

Socrates/ Yes, my boy; it is strange, I ween, if in us, as though we were 'wooden horses,' many independent senses are seated, instead of all these tending in common to some center, whether we call it soul or anything else, whereby, through these senses as instruments, we perceive all things perceptible.

Theaetetus/ I think this latter view the truer one.

Socrates/ Why am I putting these minute questions to you? If with someone and the same part of ourselves we through the eyes apprehend things white and black, and through the other organs other things, and you will be able, on being asked, to refer all such perceptions at once to the body…perhaps however it is better you should specify them in answer to me than that I should save you that trouble. Now tell me. The organs through which you perceive hot things and hard and light and sweet—do you not state them to belong severally to the body, or do they belong to anything else?

Theaetetus/ To nothing else.

Socrates/ Will you also be ready to admit, that what you perceive through anyone organ, you cannot possibly perceive through another; for instance, what you perceive by hearing, you cannot perceive by sight, or the converse?

Theaetetus/ I most readily admit it.

Socrates/ If you have any common notion about both, you would not acquire it from the one organ or from the other concerning both?

Theaetetus/ I should not.

Socrates/ As to sound and color, in the first place, have you this same notion respecting both, that both 'are?

Theaetetus/ I have.

Socrates/ You suppose also, that each is different from each, and the same with itself?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And that both are twain, but each is one?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are you not also able to observe whether they are like one another or unlike?

Theaetetus/ Probably.

Socrates/ Through what do you form all these notions concerning both? For neither through hearing nor through sight is it possible to obtain a common notion of them. Here again is another instance in point. If it were possible to examine, whether both are briny or not, you know that you will be able to say with what you will examine, and this is evidently neither sight nor hearing, but something else.

Theaetetus/ No doubt it is; namely, the power exercised through the tongue.

Socrates/ Well said. Now, through what does the power act which makes manifest to you what all things generally have in common with these particularly—what you mean, to wit, in saying 'is,' 'is not,' and all else comprised in our late questions? What organs will you assign as those through which our percipient faculty perceives all these severally?

Theaetetus/ You mean being and non-being, and likeness and unlikeness, and sameness and difference, and moreover

unity and any other number applicable to things perceived? Evidently too your question includes the even and the odd, and all other such notions; asking through what bodily organ we perceive them with the soul.

Socrates/ You follow me admirably, Theaetetus, and these are the very questions I ask.

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, I really can give no other answer than this, that in my opinion these have originally no organ peculiar to them, such as the sensible objects have, but the soul through its own individual power appears to me to observe the common properties of all.

Socrates/ Yes, Theaetetus, you are a beauty, and not, as Theodorus said, ugly: for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. And besides your beauty, I am much obliged to you for releasing me from a world of talk, if the soul appears to you to observe some things through itself, and other things through the bodily organs. This was my own opinion, and was wishing it to be yours.

Theaetetus/ Yes: to me it is apparent.

Socrates/ To which of the two classes do you assign 'being'? For this is the notion most universally present.

Theaetetus/ I assign it to that class which the soul attains to by itself.

Socrates/ Do you say the same of likeness and unlikeness, of sameness and difference?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And again of nobleness and baseness, good and evil?

Theaetetus/ Yes: these are things the essence of which, above all others, I believe that the soul observes in their mutual relativity, comparing within itself the past and the present with the future.

Socrates/ Wait a moment. Will it not perceive the hardness of a hard object through the touch, and so again the softness of a soft one?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But their being, and what they are, and their mutual opposition, and again the being of that opposition, the soul itself, by reflecting and by comparing them with each other, endeavors to determine for us?

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Men and beasts then, as soon as they are born, are able by nature to perceive some things, those affections I mean which reach through the body to the soul. But the reflections concerning these in regard to essence and use are acquired, by those who do acquire them, painfully and gradually through the troublesome process of education.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Can anyone attain truth, who does not attain being?

Theaetetus/ He cannot.

Socrates/ And if he fail to attain the truth of a thing, will he ever have knowledge of it?

Theaetetus/ Impossible, Socrates.

Socrates/ Knowledge, then, does not lie in the affections of sense, but in the reasoning concerning them: for in this it seems possible to grasp essence and truth, and not in the affections?

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Do you call two things the same which are in so many respects different?

Theaetetus/ There were no justice in doing so.

Socrates/ What name do you give to the one class—seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and hot?

Theaetetus/ ‘Perceiving’ I would certainly call them.

Socrates/ Their common notion then you would call perception?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And this, we say, has no share in the attainment of truth, having none in the attainment of being.

Theaetetus/ It has none.

Socrates/ Nor yet in the attainment of knowledge?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge will not be the same?

Theaetetus/ Evidently not, Socrates. Now especially has knowledge been very clearly proved to be a different thing from perception.

Socrates/ But it was not by any means with this view that we began our argument, to find what knowledge is not, but to find what it is. Nevertheless we have so far advanced as not to seek it in perception at all, but in that name which, whatever it be, is applicable to the soul’s action when by itself it deals with existing things.

Theaetetus/ This, I imagine, Socrates, is called ‘opining’ (forming opinion).

Socrates/ You imagine rightly, my friend. Now go back again and, erasing all that went before, see if you have any clearer view, after having advanced to this point. Tell me once more what knowledge is.

Theaetetus/ To say that it is opinion generally, Socrates, is impossible, since there is false opinion. But true opinion probably is knowledge: so let this be my answer. If it shall be disproved while we proceed, as in the last case, we will try some other statement.

Socrates/ Your present forwardness to speak, Theaetetus, is more to the purpose than your original reluctance to answer. For in this way, we shall secure one of two advantages: we shall either find what we are in quest of, or our conceit of knowing what we do not know will be diminished. And this will be no despicable reward. Now let us see what it is you say. There being two kinds of opinion, the true and the false, do you make true opinion the definition of knowledge?

Theaetetus/ I do, according to my present view.

Socrates/ Is it worthwhile to resume the question of opinion?

Theaetetus/ Which do you mean?

Socrates/ I am somewhat disturbed now, as often before, and have found myself sorely perplexed in my own mind and in conversation, from my inability to say what this condition is in us, and in what way engendered.

Theaetetus/ What condition?

Socrates/ The holding of false opinion. Now again I am still considering and doubting whether we should leave it, or review it in a way different from that we took some little time ago.

Theaetetus/ Why not review it, Socrates, if there is any clear gain in doing so? For, as to leisure, you and Theodorus said very justly, that there is nothing to hurry us in such cases.

Socrates/ Well reminded. And perhaps it is not unreasonable to return upon our tracks. It is better, you'll allow, to achieve a little well than much inadequately.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well then? What do we in fact affirm? do we say that there is in each case false opinion, and that some one

of us opines falsely, another again truly, as if such were the natural rule?

Theaetetus/ Yes, we do.

Socrates/ Does not this occur to us in respect of all things generally, and of each particularly—either knowing or not-knowing? for learning and forgetting, which lie between these, I set aside for the moment, as having no relation to our present argument.

Theaetetus/ In fact, Socrates, nothing else remains in each case but knowing and not-knowing.

Socrates/ Is it not a necessary consequence that he who opines must opine about one of the things which he knows, or one of those which he does not know?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ And it is impossible, if he knows a thing, not to know it, or, if he knows it not, to know it?

Theaetetus/ Quite impossible.

Socrates/ Does then he who holds a false opinion think that things which he knows are not what they are, but some other things within his knowledge, and knowing both, is he ignorant of both?

Theaetetus/ It cannot be so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Or does he suppose things which he does not know to be some other things outside of his knowledge? Does it happen to one who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates to imagine that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

Theaetetus/ How can that be?

Socrates/ But surely a man does not think that what he knows is what he does not know, or that what he does not know is what he knows.

Theaetetus/ That were a miracle.

Socrates/ In what other way then can anyone hold false opinions? Except under the conditions stated it is impossible, I suppose, to have opinion. In every case we either know or do not know, and so situated, it is manifestly impossible for us ever to have false opinions.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Perhaps we ought to examine our question with reference not to knowing and not-knowing, but to being and not-being.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Consider if it be not a simple truth that one who thinks concerning anything that which is not, will inevitably think what is false, whatever the condition of his mind in other respects.

Theaetetus/ This again is probable, Socrates.

Socrates/ How then? What shall we reply, Theaetetus, if anyone examine us: 'Is what you say possible for anyone, and will any human being think what is not, either about some existing thing, or in the abstract?' Seemingly we shall say in reply: 'Yes, when he thinks, and does not think what is true.' Or how are we to speak?

Theaetetus/ As you say.

Socrates/ Does the like happen in any other case?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ That a person sees something, yet sees nothing.

Theaetetus/ How can that be?

Socrates/ If he sees some one thing, that 'something' is among things that are. Or do you think 'the one' is ever among the things that are not?

Theaetetus/ Not I.

Socrates/ He then, who sees some one thing, sees something that is.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ And he who hears something hears some one thing, and a thing that is.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who touches, I suppose, touches some one thing, and a thing that is, since it is one.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does not he who opines form opinion of some one thing?

Theaetetus/ He must.

Socrates/ And does not he who forms opinion of some one thing form it of something that is?

Theaetetus/ I grant this.

Socrates/ He then who opines what is not opines nothing.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Well, but he who opines nothing does not opine at all.

Theaetetus/ That seems clear.

Socrates/ Therefore it is not possible to think what is not, either about things that arc, or in the abstract.

Theaetetus/ Manifestly not.

Socrates/ Thinking falsities is therefore different from thinking what is not.

Theaetetus/ It seems different.

Socrates/ And thus neither from our present consideration (of being and not-being), nor from our previous one (of knowing and not knowing), do we find false opinion to exist in us.

Theaetetus/ No, we do not.

Socrates/ But can we not speak of it as happening in this way?

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ We can say that an opinion which may be called an 'allodoxy' is false when anybody says that someone existing thing is another existing thing, exchanging them in his mind. For thus he always thinks of what exists, but of one thing instead of another, and, as missing that which he had in view, he may be said to have false opinion.

Theaetetus/ Your present statement seems to me very correct. For when anyone opines that a thing is ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he very truly has false opinion.

Socrates/ Evidently, Theaetetus, you speak in contempt of me, and without fear.

Theaetetus/ Pray why?

Socrates/ You do not expect, I fancy, that I shall lay hold of your term 'truly false', and ask if it is possible for the swift to 'come-to-be' slowly, or the light heavily, or for any other opposite to come-to-be—not according to its own nature, but according to the nature of its opposite—in a manner opposed to itself. This however—that your confidence may not be fruitless—I pass over. You say you are pleased with the notion that opining falsities is allodoxy.

Theaetetus/ I am.

Socrates/ Then in your opinion it is possible to determine in your mind that one thing is another, and not itself.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ When therefore the mind does this, must it not perforce think either of both things, or of one of the two?

Theaetetus/ Yes, it must.

Socrates/ At the same time, or else by turns.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Do you employ the term 'thinking' in the same sense that I do?

Theaetetus/ How do you define it?

Socrates/ A discourse which the soul holds with itself about what it considers. I am representing this to you not as a fact that I know. In the exercise of thought, the soul, as I fancy it, is simply engaged in conversation, questioning itself and answering, affirming and denying. And when, having reached a definition, whether slowly or by a more rapid impulse, it at length agrees and affirms undoubtedly, we state this to be its opinion. So that I call opining the soul's speaking, and opinion its spoken word, not addressed to another or uttered by the voice, but silently to itself.

Theaetetus/ So do I.

Socrates/ Therefore, when anyone opines that one thing is another, he says to himself, it would seem, that one thing is another.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Try to remember whether you ever said to yourself, 'Assuredly the noble is base,' or, 'The unjust is just.' Or, to sum up, consider if you ever attempted to convince yourself that assuredly one thing was another: or if, on the contrary, you never even in sleep ventured to say to yourself, Undoubtedly the odd is even, or any such thing?

Theaetetus/ You say the truth.

Socrates/ Do you think anybody in or out of his senses ever ventured seriously to say to himself, trying to make himself believe, that an ox must needs be a horse, or two things one?

Theaetetus/ No indeed, not I.

Socrates/ If then to speak to oneself is to opine, nobody who speaks and thinks of both things, and apprehends both with his soul, can say and think that one is the other. But you must avoid the terms 'one and other.' I'll state the point in this way: Nobody thinks that the noble is base, or anything of the sort.

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, I give up the terms, and I agree with you.

Socrates/ That one who thinks of both cannot possibly opine that one is the other?

Theaetetus/ Seemingly not.

Socrates/ Again, if he thinks of the one alone, and of the other not at all, he will never opine that one is the other.

Theaetetus/ True: for so he would be forced to apprehend that of which he has no thought.

Socrates/ Accordingly allodoxy is inadmissible for anyone who thinks either of both or of one. So that whoever shall define false opinion to be heterodoxy will talk nonsense: for it is shown by this method as well as by the former that false opinion cannot exist in us.

Theaetetus/ Seemingly not.

Socrates/ And yet, Theaetetus, if this shall be proved impossible, we shall be compelled to admit many absurd consequences.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ I will not say till I have tried every point of view. For I should blush for us if, in a moment of perplexity, we were forced to admit such things as I allude to. But if we find a way to get free, then and not before we will speak of others as thus perplexed, standing clear of ridicule ourselves. But, if we find ourselves posed on every side, then, in a humble frame, I suppose, like sea-sick men, we shall allow the

argument to trample on us and treat us as it will. Listen, while I tell you how I may still find a way of escape from our inquiry.

Theaetetus/ Pray tell me.

Socrates/ I will say we were wrong in admitting that it is impossible to opine that what one knows is what one does not know, and so to be deceived: for it is in a certain way possible.

Theaetetus/ Do you mean what I myself suspected at the time we made the assertion—a case occurring sometimes like this, that I, knowing Socrates, and seeing at a distance another whom I do not know, think it is the Socrates whom I know? For in such a case something like what you say comes to pass.

Socrates/ Did we not abandon that view, because it made us, while knowing, not to know what we do know?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Suppose we do not state it thus, but in the following manner. Perhaps it will give way to us, perhaps resist. But indeed we are in such a strait, that we must perforce turn about and examine every argument. See if I ask a rational question. Is it not possible to learn something which you formerly did not know?

Theaetetus/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ And one thing after another?

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a waxen block, in one soul larger, in another smaller, of purer wax in one, in another of less pure, harder in some, moister in others; in some of medium quality.

Theaetetus/ Well.

Socrates/ Let us say it is a gift of Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses, and that on this we strike off, as if we were impressing ring-seals, anything we wish to remember among those we see or hear or imagine, submitting the block to our senses and imaginations; and that whatever is impressed, we remember and know as long as its image subsists; but that, when it is obliterated or fails to be impressed, we have forgotten and do not know.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ See then if he who knows things, and considers anything he sees or hears, may have false opinions in some such way as the following:

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Socrates/ By thinking sometimes that what he knows is what he does know, sometimes what he does not know. In our previous statements we were wrong in denying this to be possible.

Theaetetus/ How do you state it now?

Socrates/ Our statement on the subject must be this. We first determine, that what a person knows, having a record of it in his soul, but without perceiving it, he cannot possibly think to be some other thing which he knows, having an image of this also, but not perceiving it. And again it is impossible to think that what he knows is what he knows not and has no seal of: and that what he knows not is [something else] which he knows not: and that what he knows not is what he knows: and to think what he perceives is some other thing which he perceives; and what he perceives, a thing which he does not perceive; and what he does not perceive to be another thing which he does not perceive; and what he does not perceive to be a thing which he perceives. And again to think that a thing which he knows and perceives, having the seal of it according to perception,

is some other thing which he knows and perceives having its seal also according to perception—this is, if it can be, still more impossible than the preceding suppositions. And what one knows and perceives, having its record correctly, it is impossible to think [something else] which one knows: and what one knows and perceives under similar conditions, to be [something else] which one perceives: and what one neither knows nor perceives to be [something else] which one neither knows nor perceives: and what one neither knows nor perceives, to be [something else] which one does not know; and what one neither knows nor perceives, to be [something else] which one does not perceive. All these things involve the very utmost impossibility of having any false opinion about them. There remain the following cases, in which, if anywhere, such a thing may happen.

Theaetetus/ What are they? perhaps they may help me to understand. At present I do not follow you.

Socrates/ In the case of things which a person knows, to think that they are some other things which he knows and perceives; or some other things which he does not know, but perceives: or that [some things] which he knows and perceives are [some others] which he also knows and perceives.

Theaetetus/ I am more in the dark now than before.

Socrates/ Listen to this restatement. Do not I, knowing Theodorus and remembering in my mind what sort of man he is, and Theaetetus similarly, sometimes see them, sometimes not, and sometimes touch them, at other times not, and hear them or have some other perception of them, and again have no perception of you, but not the less remember you and know you in my mind?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ This is the first lesson which I wish to make known to you, that a man may not perceive, or may perceive, things which he knows.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Things too which he does not know, a man may often not perceive, often perceive merely?

Theaetetus/ This too is possible.

Socrates/ Now see if you follow me more easily. Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither, and has no other present perception about them. He could never form an opinion in his mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus? Do I speak sense or not?

Theaetetus/ All quite true.

Socrates/ This was the first of the cases spoken of.

Theaetetus/ It was.

Socrates/ The second was, that knowing one of you, and not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, I can never suppose the one I know to be the one I do not know.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Socrates/ Thirdly, knowing and perceiving neither, I cannot suppose one whom I do not know to be some other whom I do not know. And as to all my former suppositions, imagine that you have heard them stated again in order, wherein I can never have false opinions about you and Theodorus, either if I know or if I do not know both, or if I know one, but not the other. And similarly with regard to perceptions, if you follow me.

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ False opinion remains possible in a case like this: when, knowing you and Theodorus, and having in that waxen block the seals of both of you as from rings, then, seeing both at a distance and indistinctly, I strive to assign

the proper seal of each to its proper visage, and to introduce and adapt this to its own mold, in order that recognition may take place: but if, failing in the attempt, and interchanging, like those who put on the wrong shoes, I apply the visage of each to the other's seal; or again, if I go wrong by an affection like that of sight in mirrors, when it flows from right to left: —then heterodoxy and false opinion occur.

Theaetetus/ You describe with marvelous truth, Socrates, the conditions to which opinion is liable.

Socrates/ Moreover [false opinion happens] when, knowing both, I perceive one, as well as know him, but not the other, and so my knowledge of the second of the two is not according to perception—a case put in my former statement, which you did not then understand.

Theaetetus/ I did not.

Socrates/ Well, I meant to say that a person knowing and perceiving the one, and having his knowledge according to perception, will never think that he is some other whom he knows and perceives, and of whom his knowledge is also according to perception. Was it so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ There remained, I think, the case we now deal with, in which we say that false opinion happens when a person knowing and seeing both, or having any other perception of both, does not keep each of the seals in accordance with his perception, but like a bad archer shoots beside the mark and so errs; and such error is called a falsity.

Theaetetus/ And reasonably.

Socrates/ And so, when to one of the seals perception is present, but not to the other, and the mind adapts the seal which is without perception to the perception present, in every such case it is deceived. In one word, about things

which a person knows not and never perceived, error and false opinion seem out of the question, if there is any soundness in our present argument: but in those things about which we have knowledge and perception, opinion turns and twists about, becoming true or false; true, when it brings the proper impressions and forms to meet oppositely and straightly; false, when it brings them crosswise and crookedly.

Theaetetus/ Is not this a noble statement, Socrates?

Socrates/ You will say so with more assurance after hearing what I have further to state: for to think the truth is noble, to be deceived is base.

Theaetetus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ These things are said to happen as follows. When the wax in any person's soul is deep and abundant and smooth and nicely wrought, the impressions become durable which pass through the senses and are sealed on this (waxen) heart of the soul, as Homer called it in allusion to the resemblance of wax; for then, and in all such cases, they are formed in it pure, and have depth enough. And such persons are in the first place quick to learn, in the next retentive, and finally they do not interchange the seals of the perceptions, but form true opinions. For as their impressions are distinct and have ample room, they rapidly distribute them to their several niches; and such impressions are called 'real:' and these persons are termed 'wise.' Do you not think so?

Theaetetus/ With entire conviction.

Socrates/ When any person's heart is shaggy, as that all-wise poet sang, or when it is miry and of impure wax, or exceedingly soft or hard—they whose heart is soft, are quick to learn, but forgetful; they whose heart is hard, the opposite: and they who have a shaggy and rough and gritty

heart, or one defiled with a mixture of earth or mire, have their impressions indistinct. In those who have hard hearts, they are indistinct too, for depth is wanting: likewise in those who have soft hearts, for through confusion they soon become faint. And if besides all these faults they are furthermore crushed one upon another for want of room, when a man's soul is small, they are still more indistinct than in the former cases. All these people are capable of having false opinions. For when they see or hear or imagine anything, being unable to assign each thing quickly to its proper impression, they go tardily to work, and, assorting erroneously, they see and hear and conceive most things wrongly. And of these persons again we say, that they have false notions of things, and are ignorant.

Theaetetus/ Never was a truer statement, Socrates.

Socrates/ May we say then that false opinions exist in us?

Theaetetus/ Decidedly.

Socrates/ And true?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now we think it sufficiently agreed that both these kinds of opinion certainly exist?

Socrates/ What a truly terrible and disagreeable creature, Theaetetus, a chattering man appears to be.

Theaetetus/ How so? What do you say this for?

Socrates/ Because I am so annoyed by my own dullness and manifest garrulity. For what else can one call the conduct of a man, who wears every argument threadbare, and cannot be made to quit it, because he is too stupid to be convinced?

Theaetetus/ What vexes you?

Socrates/ I am not only vexed, but at a loss how to answer, should anyone question me and say: 'Have you now,

Socrates, discovered that false opinion lies neither in the mutual relation of perceptions, nor in that of thoughts, but in the union of perception with thought?' I shall say, 'Yes,' I suppose, with a triumphant air, as if we had made some beautiful discovery.

Theaetetus/ I see nothing the reverse, Socrates, in what has now been proved.

Socrates/ Do you mean, he will say, that we can never suppose the man, whom we think of but do not see, to be a horse, which again we neither see nor touch but only think of, and in no way perceive? I suppose I shall say that I do mean it.

Theaetetus/ Yes, and rightly.

Socrates/ Well, he will say, as to the number eleven, which is an object of thought only, must it not follow from this statement that nobody could ever suppose it to be twelve, which is also an object of thought only? Come now, reply yourself.

Theaetetus/ I shall reply that anyone who saw and touched them might think eleven to be twelve, but so far as he had them in thought, he could never conceive such an opinion regarding them.

Socrates/ Well, take the case of one who set before himself and regarded in his own mind five and seven. I don't mean seven and five men or anything of the sort, but the notions of five and seven, of which we say that they are recorded there on the waxen block, and that as to them it is impossible to have false opinion. Of these things I ask if it never chanced, that while people were considering them, and conversing with themselves, and inquiring how many they come to—one person would think and say they were eleven, another twelve: —or would all say and think that they make twelve?

Theaetetus/ No, indeed, not all; many will say, eleven. And if a person has higher figures under consideration, he is still more liable to error. I suppose you are speaking of number generally.

Socrates/ Your supposition is right. Consider whether anything happens in such a case but imagining the number twelve, in the block, to be eleven.

Theaetetus/ Nothing else, seemingly.

Socrates/ We are thus carried back to our former discussion. The person in such a case supposes a thing which he knows to be another thing which he knows. This we said was impossible; and on this very ground we forced the conclusion that false opinion does not exist, in order that the same person might not be compelled to know and not know the same things at the same time.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Therefore we must declare that holding false opinion is something else than a discrepancy between thought and sensation. For, if it were this, we could never be deceived in our mental concepts themselves. But now either there is no false opinion, or it is possible for a person not to know what he knows. Which alternative do you choose?

Theaetetus/ You offer an impossible choice, Socrates.

Socrates/ Ay, but the argument will hardly allow both. Nevertheless, as we must risk the utmost, suppose we venture to be shameless?

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ By making up our minds to say what 'to know' means.

Theaetetus/ Why is this a shameless act?

Socrates/ You seem not to bear in mind that all our discussion from the first has been a quest of knowledge, assuming that we do not know what it is.

Theaetetus/ I do bear this in mind.

Socrates/ Is it not then shameless, if we do not know knowledge, to proclaim what knowing means? But in fact, Theaetetus, we have been long infected with an impure method of discussion. Over and over again we have used the terms 'we know,' and 'we do not know,' 'we have knowledge' and 'we have not knowledge,' as if we could understand one another, while we are yet ignorant of knowledge. If you remark, at this very moment we have again used the terms ignorance and understanding, as though it were fit for us to use them, if we are destitute of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ But in what way will you argue, Socrates, if you abstain from these terms?

Socrates/ In no way, while I am the man I am: but I could if I were a votary of contention. Were a man of that school now present, he would-profess to abstain from such terms, and would rebuke us sternly for our conduct. Since however we are such poor creatures, will you let me venture to say what 'knowing' is? For I am clear that it will be of some help to us.

Theaetetus/ Oh yes pray venture. You will have great excuse for not abandoning these terms.

Socrates/ You have heard then what people now mean by 'knowing?'

Theaetetus/ Possibly: but I do not remember at the moment.

Socrates/ They say it is a having of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Let us make a slight change and say, possession of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ What will you say is the difference between them?

Socrates/ Perhaps none: but you may as well hear, and help me to test my opinion.

Theaetetus/ I will if I can.

Socrates/ 'Having' does not appear to me the same thing as 'possessing.' For instance, if anyone bought a coat, and being master of it did not wear it, we should not say he had, but possessed it.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Socrates/ Now see if it is possible in the same manner to possess knowledge without having it. Suppose a person had caught wild birds, doves or any other sort, and built a dove-cage in his dwelling and fed them. In a certain way we should say he always has them, because he possesses them. Should we not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ In another sense we should say he has none of them, but he has got a power over them, since he has made them subject to him in a domestic enclosure of his own.

He can take and hold them when he likes, catching anyone he wishes, and he can let it go again. And it is free to him to do this as often as he thinks proper?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ So then, even as in the previous part of our discourse we framed in human souls a strange sort of waxen figment, let us again make in every soul a certain cage of various kinds of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest; others in small groups; others alone, flying among all wherever they may chance.

Theaetetus/ Suppose it made. What next?

Socrates/ While we are children (we must say) this structure is empty: and we must think of sciences instead of birds: and whatever science anyone has acquired and shut up in his enclosure, we must say that he has learnt or discovered the thing of which it is the science: and this is 'knowing.'

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Again, as to catching anyone of the sciences a person chooses, and taking and holding it, and letting it go again, —consider by what terms these acts should be described, whether by the same as when he was first acquiring the sciences, or by others. You will learn what I mean more clearly from the following illustration. There is an art you call arithmetic?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Suppose this to be a pursuit of the knowledge of odd and even.

Theaetetus/ Well, I do.

Socrates/ By this art, I imagine, a person both has the cognitions of all numbers in his power, and transmits them to another.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we say that one who transmits teaches, and one who receives learns, and one who has them by possessing in that cage 'knows?'

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Attend and see what next follows. Does not a perfect arithmetician know all numbers? For he has in his soul the science of all numbers.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Could not such a person count any sum mentally, or any outward objects capable of numeration?

Theaetetus/ No doubt he could.

Socrates/ And shall we say that counting means anything but considering how great any number is?

Theaetetus/ Such is its meaning.

Socrates/ Then what a person 'knows,' he is shown to consider as if he did not know, though we have allowed that he knows all number. You have heard, I suppose, of these vexed questions?

Theaetetus/ I have.

Socrates/ We then, following the similitude of the possession and chase of doves, will say that the chase was double; one before acquirement, with a view to possession: the other after possession, in order to take and hold in hand what the owner had long ago acquired. So even those same things of which a person had the knowledge long since by learning, and which he then knew, he may again thoroughly learn by resuming and holding the knowledge of each, which he had indeed long ago acquired, but had not within his mental grasp.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ I was just now asking what terms we must use to speak of such cases, as when the arithmetician proceeds to count or the grammarian to read. Does he in this case, although he knows, come to learn from himself what he knows?

Theaetetus/ That were absurd, Socrates.

Socrates/ But must we say that he will read and count what he does not know, after allowing him to know all letters and all number?

Theaetetus/ This again is unreasonable.

Socrates/ Would you have us state that, as to terms, we do not care at all in what way anybody likes to twist the words 'knowing' and 'learning;' but that since we defined 'possessing' knowledge to be one thing, 'having' it another, we say it is impossible for anyone not to possess what he has acquired; so that it never happens that anyone does not know what he knows, but it is possible to get hold of a false opinion concerning it: for it is possible not to have the knowledge of this one, but of another in its stead, when chasing any of the sciences which flit from him, he mistakes and lays hold on one instead of another, as in the case when he thought eleven to be twelve, getting hold of the knowledge of eleven, instead of that of twelve, the ring-dove as it were within him instead of the pigeon?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is reasonable.

Socrates/ But when he gets hold of that which he tries to take, shall we say, that then he is free from error and opines realities, and that in this way there is true and false opinion, and that none of the difficulties which we found in our foregoing arguments come in our way? Perhaps you will endorse my statement. Will you?

Theaetetus/ I will.

Socrates/ Then so far we are rid of the notion that people do not know what they know: for it no longer happens in any case not to possess what we do possess, whether deceived about it or not. And yet there seems to glance sideways on me a trouble still more formidable.

Theaetetus/ Of what nature?

Socrates/ Whether the interchange of cognitions will ever come to be false opinion.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ First, as to the notion of anybody's having knowledge of a thing, and at the same time being ignorant

of it, not by inacquaintance, but by his own knowledge: next, as to opining this to be one thing, and the other thing to be this—is it not the height of unreason, that, when knowledge is present the soul should recognize nothing, and be ignorant of everything? for on this principle there is nothing to prevent ignorance being present and causing one to know something, and blindness causing to see, if knowledge shall ever cause anyone to be ignorant.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps, Socrates, we did not arrange the birds well in placing sciences only, but we ought to have placed also nesciences flying about with them in the soul; and the chaser, at one time getting hold of a science, at another of a nescience, has about the same thing opinions false by nescience, true by science.

Socrates/ It is not easy, Theaetetus, to avoid praising you. But review your proposition. Suppose it as you state. He who lays hold on nescience, you say, will have false opinions. Is it so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ He will not, I suppose, think he has false opinions?

Theaetetus/ How can he?

Socrates/ He will think he has true ones then, and as to things in which he is deceived, he will be in the same condition as if he knew them?

Theaetetus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ He will think that he has chased and got science, not nescience?

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Accordingly, after a long circuit we have reached our original perplexity. Our critic will again laugh and say: 'My right worthy friends, will one who knows them

both, science and nescience, suppose that which he knows to be the other which he knows? or knowing neither of them, does he imagine what he knows not to be the other which he knows not: or, knowing one but not the other, does he suppose the one he knows to be the one he knows not, or the one he knows not to be the one he knows? Or will you tell me again that there are also sciences of sciences and of nesciences, which he who possesses has shut up in some other ridiculous dove-cage or waxen figment, and knows as long as he possesses them, even if he have them not ready to hand in his soul? and so will you be compelled to run round and round to the same point without gaining anything by it?' What answer shall we give to these questions, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Really, Socrates, I do not know what we ought to say.

Socrates/ Does not the argument, my boy, rebuke us justly, and show that we are wrong in leaving the question of knowledge, and investigating false opinion first? It is impossible to know this latter, before we have adequately settled what knowledge is.

Theaetetus/ At this point, Socrates, I must accept your view.

Socrates/ Returning to the original question, what is one to say that knowledge is? For we shall not give in yet, I suppose.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not, if you do not set the example.

Socrates/ Say then how we must define it in order to escape best from self-contradiction.

Theaetetus/ As we proposed in our foregoing discussion, Socrates. I have no other suggestion to make.

Socrates/ What was the definition?

Theaetetus/ That true opinion is knowledge. True opinion is, I suppose, free from error, and its results are all noble and good.

Socrates/ The man who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'the trial will prove;' and if we search for this as we go, perhaps the fact will stop us and exhibit what we are looking for. If we stand still, we shall see nothing.

Theaetetus/ Right. Let us proceed and look out.

Socrates/ This look-out of ours will be a brief one: for a whole profession indicates that true opinion is not knowledge.

Theaetetus/ How so? What is that profession?

Socrates/ The profession of the mightiest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers. These men in their art persuade, not by teaching, but by making men opine whatever they will. Do you suppose there are any teachers clever enough, within the flowing of a little water, to teach adequately the truth of facts to certain persons, who were not present when they were robbed of money, or when they received some other violence?

Theaetetus/ I do not suppose they could; but they would persuade.

Socrates/ By persuading you mean, 'causing to form an opinion?'

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ When therefore dicasts are justly persuaded about things which can be known by seeing only, not otherwise, in that case, judging the things by what they hear, they judged without knowledge, though persuaded rightly, if their verdict was good?

Theaetetus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ If, my friend, true opinion and knowledge were the same, a perfect dicast would never form a right opinion without knowledge. But now it seems they are not one ¦ and the same.

Theaetetus/ As to this I had forgotten, Socrates, a thing which I once heard somebody say: but I now recollect it. He said that true opinion accompanied with rational explanation was knowledge, but unexplained opinion out of the sphere of knowledge: things of which there is no explanation are, he said, not knowable, using that very term; but those which have explanation are knowable.

Socrates/ Well said. But what distinction did he draw between these knowable and unknowable things? Tell me, that I may see whether you and I have heard the same version or not.

Theaetetus/ I am not sure that I can recall it: but, if another told it, I think I could follow him.

Socrates/ Hear then dream for dream. Methought I heard some say that the primal elements, as it were, of which we and all other things are compounded, have no reason: for it is only possible to name each by itself, not to predicate anything else of it, either that it is or is not, as in such case 'being' or 'not-being' is attached: while it is wrong to ascribe either, if one is to speak of the thing itself alone. We must not, they say, ascribe the term 'self' or 'that' or 'each' or 'single' or 'this,' or many other like expressions: for these run about and are applied to all things, being different from the things to which they are attached. If the primal element were capable of being described, and had a proper description of its own, the fitting course would be, that it should be described apart from all others. Since, however, it is impossible for anyone of the first rudiments to be defined in words, there is nothing for it except to be named only: name

is all it has. But, as to the things compounded of these, as they are themselves complex, so also their names being combined constitute definition: for a complex of names is the essence of definition. Thus I dreamed that the elements are undescribed and unknown, but perceptible; while their combinations are known and expressed and conceived by true opinion. Whenever anyone gains the true opinion of anything without definition, his soul is truthful with regard to it, but does not know it, for one who cannot give and receive a spoken account of anything is incognisant of it. But after adding such an account, he is capable of becoming all this, and is perfect in knowledge. Have you heard the dream thus or otherwise?

Theaetetus/ Exactly thus.

Socrates/ Are you content with it, and do you lay it down that true opinion combined with explanation is knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Have we to-day, Theaetetus, in this manner found at last what from ancient time so many wise men have grown old without finding?

Theaetetus/ At all events, Socrates, I think our present statement a good one.

Socrates/ It may naturally seem so. For what can be called knowledge apart from definition and right opinion? Yet I am displeased with one of the things we said.

Theaetetus/ What was that?

Socrates/ One that seems to be stated very neatly, how that the elements are unknown, but the class of combinations known.

Theaetetus/ Is not that true?

Socrates/ We must see. For we have as hostages all the examples which he used in saying what he did.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ Letters and syllables. Do you think the speaker had anything but these in view when he said what we cite?

Theaetetus/ No: he thought of these.

Socrates/ Let us then take and test them; or, rather test ourselves, whether we learnt letters on this principle or any other. To begin: can syllables be defined, but letters not?

Theaetetus/ Probably.

Socrates/ I take the same view. If someone asked about the first syllable of Socrates for instance and said, 'Tell me, Theaetetus, what So is: how would you answer?

Theaetetus/ Sigma and Omega.

Socrates/ This then you hold to be the definition of the syllable?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Well now, tell me similarly the definition of Sigma.

Theaetetus/ How can one tell the elements of an element? For indeed, Socrates, Sigma is one of the consonants, a sort of noise only, as when the tongue hisses; Beta again has neither sound nor noise: nor have most of the letters. So they may very well be called undefined, as the clearest of them have sound alone, but no definition at all.

Socrates/ So much then, my friend, we have rightly determined concerning knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Well now? Have we rightly admitted that the letter is not known, but only the syllable?

Theaetetus/ Seemingly.

Socrates/ Do we now say that the syllable is both letters, or if there be more than two, all these, or some one idea arising from their combination?

Theaetetus/ I think we should say, all of them.

Socrates/ Take the case of two, Sigma and Omega. These two form the first syllable of my name. Does not one who knows the syllable know both?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ He knows Sigma and Omega?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ How then? is he ignorant of each, and, knowing neither, does he know both?

Theaetetus/ That were strange and unreasonable, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet, if a person must perforce know each, in order to know both, it is absolutely necessary for one who is ever to know a syllable, to know the letters first. And thus our beautiful argument will have run clear away from us.

Theaetetus/ Ay, and in a very sudden way.

Socrates/ We do not keep a good watch on it. Perhaps we ought to have laid it down that a syllable is not the letters themselves, but some notion arising from them, having one form belonging to itself, while another belongs to the separate letters.

Theaetetus/ Quite so. And perhaps this statement may be truer than the other.

Socrates/ We must consider the point, and not abandon in this cowardly way a great and dignified theory.

Theaetetus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ Suppose it be as we now say. The syllable is one general form arising from the harmonious adaptation of the several elements; both in grammar and everywhere else.

Theaetetus/ Very well.

Socrates/ Then there must be no parts of it.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Socrates/ Because, if a thing has parts, the whole must necessarily be all the parts. Or do you say that a whole formed of parts is a notion distinct from all its parts?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Do you call the all and the whole the same or different?

Theaetetus/ I have no clear view: but as you bid me answer readily, I take the risk of saying they are different.

Socrates/ Your readiness, Theaetetus, is right. Whether the answer is so too, we must consider.

Theaetetus/ We must.

Socrates/ Will not the whole differ from the all, according to your present argument?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well now, is there any difference between all (plural) and the all (singular)? For instance, when we say, one, two, three, four, five, six, and if we say twice three or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, do we in all these cases speak of the same or something different?

Theaetetus/ Of the same.

Socrates/ That is, six; is it not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ In each form of speech we have spoken of all the six?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Again, when we speak of all, do we not speak of one thing?

Theaetetus/ We must.

Socrates/ Is it not of the six?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do we predicate the same unity of all things consisting of number, whether under the term πᾶν or τὰ πάντα (in singular or plural form)?

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Let us now state the question as follows: The number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so of the furlong?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Again, the number of the camp and the camp, and all such things similarly? For the whole number is the essential whole in each case?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not the number of each the parts of each?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And all things which have parts will consist of parts?

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ And all the parts have been admitted to be the all, if the entire number is to be the all.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Then the whole does not consist of parts. For it would be the all, being all the parts?

Theaetetus/ Seemingly not.

Socrates/ But can anything which is a part, be a part of anything except of a whole?

Theaetetus/ Yes, of the all.

Socrates/ You show fight manfully, Theaetetus. But is it not in the very case when nothing is absent that the all is all?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And will not the whole be the very same thing—that from which nothing is anywhere absent? For that from which anything is absent, is neither a whole nor an all, each of these being equally constituted by the same combination of parts.

Theaetetus/ I now think there is no difference between an all and a whole.

Socrates/ Did we not say, that whenever a thing has parts, the whole and all will mean all the parts?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Again: to resume my late essay, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow that it has not the letters for its parts, or if it be the same with them, it must be known equally with them?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Was it not to obviate this result that we defined it to be different from them?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, if the letters are not parts of a syllable, have you any other things to name, which are parts of a syllable, besides its letters?

Theaetetus/ By no means. For if I allowed it to have parts, it would be ridiculous to abandon the letters, and seek anything else.

Socrates/ Decidedly, Theaetetus, according to the present view a syllable must be a single generality without parts.

Theaetetus/ Seemingly.

Socrates/ Do you remember, my friend, that a short time back we accepted the statement, deeming it a good one, that of the primal elements, of which all things are composed, there is no definition, because each by itself is

uncompounded, and that it is not right to apply to it the term 'is,' nor yet 'this,' which are alien and foreign to it; and this cause makes such element indefinable and unknown?

Theaetetus/ I remember.

Socrates/ Is there any other cause than this of its being simple and indivisible? I see no other.

Theaetetus/ Apparently none.

Socrates/ Accordingly, the syllable is shown to belong to the same class as the element, if it has no parts, and is one general notion?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ If then the syllable has many letters, and is a certain whole, and they are its parts, syllables and letters are alike knowable and utterable, since 'all the parts' were shown to be the same with the whole?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But if it is one and indivisible, both syllable and letter are equally indefinable and unknowable: for the same cause will make them both so?

Theaetetus/ I cannot contradict you.

Socrates/ Let us not accept this statement from anybody, that a syllable can be known and expressed, but not a letter.

Theaetetus/ We must not, if we concur with the argument.

Socrates/ Yet further: would you not rather accept the opposite view, from knowing what happened to yourself when you learnt to read?

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That all you went on doing in the course of learning was, to try to distinguish each individual letter as you saw and heard it, that their order might not confuse you when they were spoken and written.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And did not a complete instruction at your music-master's mean the being able to follow each note, and say what string answered to it? These everybody would own to be properly called the elements of music.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So far then as we have experience of letters and syllables, if from these cases we may draw inferences as to others, we shall say that the class of elements admits of a knowledge much clearer than the syllable, and more important for the perfect mastery of each study; and, if anyone shall say that the syllable is naturally known, but the element unknown, we shall think he is joking or talking nonsense?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Other proofs of this fact might be shown, I think; but let us not for their sake forget to keep in view the proposed topic, namely, what is meant by saying that true opinion combined with rational explanation is the most perfect knowledge.

Theaetetus/ We must keep it in view.

Socrates/ Well now, what does the term explanation indicate to us? I think it means one of three things.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The first will be—making one's meaning clear through the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging opinion in the stream through the voice as in a mirror or in water. Do you not consider explanation to be something of this sort?

Theaetetus/ I do. We say therefore that one who does so explains.

Socrates/ This however is not everybody able to do sooner or later, —to show what he thinks about anything—if he is

not born deaf or dumb? and so all those who have any right opinion, will appear to have with it the faculty of explanation, and right opinion will thus nowhere be formed without knowledge.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Let us not however lightly pronounce sentence on him who defined knowledge in the way we are now considering—that he is guilty of talking nonsense. Perhaps he did not mean to say this, but rather the being able, when asked what anything is, to make answer to the questioner in terms of its elements.

Theaetetus/ Instance what you mean, Socrates.

Socrates/ As Hesiod speaking of a wagon says, 'A wagon consists of a hundred planks.' I cannot describe them, probably you cannot. If we were asked what a wagon is, we should be content if we could say, wheels, axle, body, seat, yoke.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ The questioner might perhaps think us ridiculous, as he would if being asked your name and making answer by syllables, —while all we thought and said was right—we deemed that as skillful grammarians we had in mind and stated grammatically the definition of the name Theaetetus; though the fact is that nobody can define anything with knowledge, until he fully describe it in its elements with true opinion; as was before, I think, laid down.

Theaetetus/ It was.

Socrates/ So too he might consider, with respect to a wagon, that we have right opinion indeed, but' that one who was able to detail its nature by those hundred planks, had, through this addition, joined explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion had got technical knowledge about

the nature of a wagon, having fully described the whole in its elements.

Theaetetus/ Do you not think his opinion good, Socrates?

Socrates/ If you think so, my friend, and accept this view, that the full description of everything by its elements is explanation, but the description by syllables or anything more comprehensive is failure of explanation, tell me so, that we may criticize it.

Theaetetus/ I quite accept that view.

Socrates/ Do you accept it under the belief that a person is cognizant of anything when he thinks that the same thing sometimes belongs to the same, sometimes to another, or when he thinks that to the same thing at one time one thing belongs, at another time another?

Theaetetus/ I believe nothing of the sort.

Socrates/ Do you forget that, when you learnt your letters at first, you and the other scholars did such things?

Theaetetus/ Do you mean that we thought first one letter, then another, belonged to the same syllable, and that we assigned the same letter sometimes to its proper syllable, sometimes to another?

Socrates/ That is what I mean.

Theaetetus/ No, I do not forget; nor do I consider that they who are in this condition have yet acquired knowledge.

Socrates/ Well, when a child of that age writing 'Theaetetus,' thinks he ought to write, and does write 'theta' and 'epsilon,' and again attempting to write Theodorus thinks he ought to write and does write 'tau' and 'epsilon,' shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

Theaetetus/ It has been just allowed that such an one does not yet know.

Socrates/ Is there anything to hinder the same child from making a similar error in respect of the second, third, and fourth syllables?

Theaetetus/ Nothing at all.

Socrates/ Will one who has in mind the description by elements write 'Theaetetus with true opinion, whensoever he writes it in just order?

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Being still without knowledge, though having right opinion, do we say?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And yet he unites explanation with right opinion: for he wrote that description by elements which we admitted to be rational explanation?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ And thus, my friend, there is a right opinion with explanation, which we cannot yet call knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So we seem only to have dreamt we were rich in thinking we had the truest explanation of knowledge. Or must we suspend this charge? Somebody, perhaps, will not define 'explanation' thus: but rather as the remaining form of those three, one or other of which we said would be taken as 'explanation,' by one who defined knowledge to be 'true opinion with explanation.'

Theaetetus/ You justly remind me. There was one form left. The first was the image, as it were, of thought in utterance: the second, now discussed, was the road to the whole through the elements. What do you call the third?

Socrates/ That which most people would define as being able to mention some sign by which the thing in question differs from all others.

Theaetetus/ Can you give me an instance of any such explanation of anything?

Socrates/ Yes, one which, if you like, I think you may competently accept concerning the sun, that it is the brightest of the bodies which travel in the heaven round the earth.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now learn why this is said. The fact is, as we were lately saying, that, if you take the difference between each individual and all others, you will get a definition, as some say: but, as long as you lay hold of some common feature only, your account will be about those things which have that community.

Theaetetus/ I understand. And I think it right to call such a process definition.

Socrates/ But whosoever with right opinion about anything learns furthermore its difference from others, will have gained knowledge of that of which before he had opinion.

Theaetetus/ Yes, we state it so.

Socrates/ Now then most decidedly, Theaetetus, since I have come near to our proposition, as it were to a drawing, I do not understand it in the least. As long as I stood at a distance from it, there appeared to be some sense in it.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by this?

Socrates/ I will tell you, if I can. Having a right opinion of you, if I add to this your definition, I know you; if not, I have opinion of you only.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the definition was the interpretation of your distinction.

Theaetetus/ Even so.

Socrates/ When I was opining only, was it not the case that I did not grasp with my mind any of the points in which you differ from others?

Theaetetus/ Seemingly.

Socrates/ Then I was taking note of some of the common features, which belong no more to you than to other people?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now do pray tell me: in such a case how will you more than anybody else have been conceived by me? Suppose me to imagine that this is Theaetetus, whoever is a man, and has a nose and eyes and mouth, and any other individual member. Will this imagination cause me to conceive Theaetetus more than Theodorus, or, proverbially speaking, any rapscallion whatever?

Theaetetus/ How can it?

Socrates/ Or, if I imagine him having not only nose and eyes, but also as the one who has a flat nose and prominent eyes, shall I have a notion of you more than of myself, or of any other with these features?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Theaetetus, I fancy, will not be conceived in my mind until this flatness of nose shall have stamped and deposited in my heart some memorial different from all other snubnesses of nose seen by me (I might say the same of all your other features), which shall bring you to my mind, if I meet you to-morrow, and make me to have right opinion about you.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Right opinion then in each case will be concerned with differentiation.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ What then will be c the adding explanation to right opinion?' For if it means, to add an opinion of the manner in which one thing differs from all others, this direction becomes utterly ridiculous.

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ Of things whereof we have a right opinion as to the nature of their difference from others, it bids us add a right opinion of the nature of their difference from others. And thus the proverbial twirl of the scytal or the pestle or anything else would be a mere trifle compared with this direction: nay it might more fairly be called a blind man's direction: for to bid us add what we have got already, that we may learn what we think already, is a splendid illustration of a man groping in the dark.

Theaetetus/ Tell me now what answer you meant to give to your last question.

Socrates/ If bidding us to add explanation is bidding us to know distinction, —not to have an opinion of distinction— the finest of our definitions of knowledge will turn out to be a nice sort of thing. For to know is, I suppose, to get knowledge. Is it not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, if asked, it seems, what knowledge is, a person will reply that it is right opinion with a knowledge of difference: for the addition of explanation will mean this in his view.

Theaetetus/ Seemingly.

Socrates/ Yet it is utterly silly, when we are seeking knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge whether of difference or of anything else. So, Theaetetus, neither sensible perception, nor true opinion, nor explanation accompanying true opinion will be knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Seemingly not.

Socrates/ Do we still conceive anything and feel throes, my friend, about knowledge, or have we given birth to everything?

Theaetetus/ By all that's sacred, Socrates, with your help I have said more than I had in my own mind.

Socrates/ And does not our art declare that all these products have turned out to be wind, and not worth rearing?

Theaetetus/ Decidedly so.

Socrates/ Well, Theaetetus, if you seek to become, and do become, pregnant with other thoughts hereafter, the present enquiry will have improved your conceptions; and, if you do not, you will be less severe to your associates, more mild and temperate, not supposing that you know what you do not know. So much only as this my art can do, no more. Nor do I know any of the things which others do, who are—and have made themselves—great and wondrous men. This midwifery I and my mother received as our function from God, she to practice it on women, I on young, noble and beautiful men.

Now, however, I. must encounter Melitus and his indictment against me at the Porch of the King. In the morning, Theodorus, let us meet again here.

Theaetetus

Translated by M. J. Levett, rev. Myles Burnyeat.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus,

Euclides, Terpsion

Euclid/ Are you only just in from the country, Terpsion? Or have you been here some time?

Terpsion/ I've been here a good while. In fact, I have been looking for you in the market-place and wondering that I couldn't find you.

Euclid/ Well, you couldn't, because I was not in the city.

Terpsion/ Where have you been, then?

Euclid/ I went down to the harbor; and as I was going, I met Theaetetus, being taken to Athens from the camp at Corinth.

Terpsion/ Alive or dead?

Euclid/ Alive; but that's about all one could say. Badly wounded for one thing; but the real trouble is this sickness that has broken out in the army.

Terpsion/ Dysentery?

Euclid/ Yes.

Terpsion/ What a man to lose!

Euclid/ Yes. A fine man, Terpsion. Only just now I was listening to some people singing his praises for the way he behaved in the battle.

Terpsion/ Well, there's nothing extraordinary about that. Much more to be wondered at if he hadn't distinguished himself. But why didn't he put up here at Megara?

Euclid/ He was in a hurry to get home. I kept asking him myself, and advising him; but he wouldn't. So I saw him on

his way. And as I was coming back, I thought of Socrates and what a remarkably good prophet he was—as usual—about Theaetetus. It was not long before his death, if I remember rightly, that he came across Theaetetus, who was a boy at the time. Socrates met him and had a talk with him, and was very much struck with his natural ability; and when I went to Athens, he repeated to me the discussion they had had, which was well worth listening to. And he said to me then that we should inevitably hear more of Theaetetus, if he lived to grow up.

Terpsion/ Well, he appears to have been right enough. — But what was this discussion? Could you tell it to me?

Euclid/ Good Lord, no. Not from memory, anyway. But I made some notes of it at the time, as soon as I got home; then afterwards I recalled it at my leisure and wrote it out, and whenever I went to Athens, I used to ask Socrates about the points I couldn't remember, and correct my version when I got home. The result is that I have got pretty well the whole discussion in writing.

Terpsion/ Yes, of course. I have heard you say that before, and I have always been meaning to ask you to show it to me, though I have been so long about it. But is there any reason why we shouldn't go through it now? I want a rest, in any case, after my journey in from the country.

Euclid/ Well, I shouldn't mind sitting down either. I saw Theaetetus as far as Erineum. Come along. We will get the slave to read it to us while we rest.

Terpsion/ Right.

Euclid/ This is the book, Terpsion. You see, I have written it out like this: I have not made Socrates relate the conversation as he related it to me, but I represent him as speaking directly to the persons with whom he said he had this conversation. (These were, he told me, Theodorus the

geometer and Theaetetus.) I wanted, in the written version, to avoid the bother of having the bits of narrative in between the speeches—I mean, when Socrates, whenever he mentions his own part in the discussion, says 'And I maintained' or 'I said,' or, of the person answering, 'He agreed' or 'He would not admit this.' That is why I have made him talk directly to them and have left out these formulae.

Terpsion/ Well, that's quite in order, Euclides.

Euclid/ Now, boy, let us have it.

Socrates/ If Cyrene were first in my affections, Theodorus, I should be asking you how things are there, and whether any of your young people are taking up geometry or any other branch of philosophy. But, as it is, I love Athens better than Cyrene, and so I'm more anxious to know which of our young men show signs of turning out well. That, of course, is what I am always trying to find out myself, as best I can; and I keep asking other people too—anyone round whom I see the young men are inclined to gather. Now you, of course, are very much sought after, and with good reason; your geometry alone entitles you to it, and that is not your only claim. So if you have come across anyone worth mentioning, I should be glad to hear.

Theodorus/ Well, Socrates, I think you ought to be told, and I think I ought to tell you, about a remarkable boy I have met here, one of your fellow countrymen. And if he were beautiful, I should be extremely nervous of speaking of him with enthusiasm, for fear I might be suspected of being in love with him. But as a matter of fact—if you'll excuse my saying such a thing—he is not beautiful at all, but is rather like you, snub-nosed, with eyes that stick out; though these features are not quite so pronounced in him. I speak without any qualms; and I assure you that among all the people I have ever met—and I have got to know a good many in my time—I have

never yet seen anyone so amazingly gifted. Along with a quickness beyond the capacity of most people, he has an unusually gentle temper; and, to crown it all, he is as manly a boy as any of his fellows. I never thought such a combination could exist; I don't see it arising elsewhere. People as acute and keen and retentive as he is are apt to be very unbalanced. They get swept along with a rush, like ships without ballast; what stands for courage in their makeup is a kind of mad excitement; while, on the other hand, the steadier sort of people are apt to come to their studies with minds that are sluggish, somehow—freighted with a bad memory. But this boy approaches his studies in a smooth, sure, effective way, and with great good temper; it reminds one of the quiet flow of a stream of oil. The result is that it is astonishing to see how he gets through his work, at his age.

Socrates/ That is good news. And he is an Athenian—whose son is he?

Theodorus/ I have heard the name, but I don't remember it. But he is the middle one of this group coming toward us. He and his companions were greasing themselves outside just now; it looks as if they have finished and are coming in here. But look and see if you recognize him.

Socrates/ Yes, I know him. He's the son of Euphronius of Sunium—very much the kind of person, my friend, that you tell me his son is. A distinguished man in many ways; he left a considerable property too. But I don't know the boy's name.

Theodorus/ His name, Socrates, is Theaetetus. As for the property, that, I think, has been made away with by trustees. All the same, he is wonderfully open-handed about money, Socrates.

Socrates/ A thoroughbred, evidently. I wish you would ask him to come and sit with us over here.

Theodorus/ All right. Theaetetus, come here beside Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, come along, Theaetetus. I want to see for myself what sort of a face I have. Theodorus says I am like you. But look. If you and I had each had a lyre, and Theodorus had told us that they were both similarly tuned, should we have taken his word for it straightaway? Or should we have tried to find out if he was speaking with any expert knowledge of music?

Theaetetus/ Oh, we should have inquired into that.

Socrates/ And if we had found that he was a musician, we should have believed what he said; but if we found he had no such qualification, we should have put no faith in him.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that's true.

Socrates/ And now, I suppose, if we are interested in this question of our faces being alike, we ought to consider whether he is speaking with any knowledge of drawing or not?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I should think so.

Socrates/ Then is Theodorus an artist?

Theaetetus/ No, not so far as I know.

Socrates/ Nor a geometer, either?

Theaetetus/ Oh, there's no doubt about his being that, Socrates.

Socrates/ And isn't he also a master of astronomy and arithmetic and music—of all that an educated man should know?

Theaetetus/ Well, he seems to me to be.

Socrates/ Then if he asserts that there is some physical resemblance between us—whether complimenting us or the reverse—one ought not to pay much attention to him?

Theaetetus/ No, perhaps not.

Socrates/ But supposing it were the soul of one of us that he was praising? Suppose he said one of us was good and wise? Oughtn't the one who heard that to be very anxious to examine the object of such praise? And oughtn't the other to be very willing to show himself off?

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, my dear Theaetetus, now is the time for you to show yourself and for me to examine you. For although Theodorus often gives me flattering testimonials for people, both Athenians and foreigners, I assure you I have never before heard him praise anybody in the way he has just praised you.

Theaetetus/ That's all very well, Socrates; but take care he wasn't saying that for a joke.

Socrates/ That is not Theodorus' way. Now don't you try to get out of what we have agreed upon with the pretense that our friend is joking, or you may make it necessary for him to give his evidence—since no charge of perjury is ever likely to be brought against him. So have the pluck to stand by your agreement.

Theaetetus/ All right, I must, then, if that's what you've decided.

Socrates/ Tell me now. You are learning some geometry from Theodorus, I expect?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I am.

Socrates/ And some astronomy and music and arithmetic?

Theaetetus/ Well, I'm very anxious to, anyway.

Socrates/ And so am I, my son—from Theodorus or from anyone who seems to me to know about these things. But although I get on with them pretty well in most ways, I have a small difficulty, which I think ought to be investigated, with your help and that of the rest of the company. —Now isn't it

true that to learn is to become wiser about the thing one is learning?

Theaetetus/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ And what makes men wise, I take it, is wisdom?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is this in any way different from knowledge?

Theaetetus/ What?

Socrates/ Wisdom. Isn't it the things which they know that men are wise about?

Theaetetus/ Well, yes.

Socrates/ So knowledge and wisdom will be the same thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now this is just where my difficulty comes in. I can't get a proper grasp of what on earth knowledge really is. Could we manage to put it into words? What do all of you say? Who'll speak first? Anyone who makes a mistake shall sit down and be Donkey, as the children say when they are playing ball; and anyone who comes through without a miss shall be King and make us answer any question he likes. — Well, why this silence? Theodorus, I hope my love of argument is not making me forget my manners—just because I'm so anxious to start a discussion and get us all friendly and talkative together?

Theodorus/ No, no, Socrates—that's the last thing one could call forgetting your manners. But do make one of the young people answer you. I am not used to this kind of discussion, and I'm too old to get into the way of it. But it would be suitable enough for them and they would profit more by it. For youth can always profit, that's true enough. So do go on; don't let Theaetetus off but ask him some more questions.

Socrates/ Well, Theaetetus, you hear what Theodorus says. You won't want to disobey him, I'm sure; and certainly a wise man shouldn't be disobeyed by his juniors in matters of this kind—it wouldn't be at all the proper thing. Now give me a good frank answer. What do you think knowledge is?

Theaetetus/ Well, I ought to answer, Socrates, as you and Theodorus tell me to. In any case, you and he will put me right, if I make a mistake.

Socrates/ We certainly will, if we can.

Theaetetus/ Then I think that the things Theodorus teaches are knowledge—I mean geometry and the subjects you enumerated just now. Then again there are the crafts such as cobbling, whether you take them together or separately. They must be knowledge, surely.

Socrates/ That is certainly a frank and indeed a generous answer, my dear lad. I asked you for one thing and you have given me many; I wanted something simple, and I have got a variety.

Theaetetus/ And what does that mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ Nothing, I dare say. But I'll tell you what I think. When you talk about cobbling, you mean just knowledge of the making of shoes?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that's all I mean by it.

Socrates/ And when you talk about carpentering, you mean simply the knowledge of the making of wooden furniture?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that's all I mean, again.

Socrates/ And in both cases you are putting into your definition what the knowledge is of?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But that is not what you were asked, Theaetetus. You were not asked to say what one may have knowledge of,

or how many branches of knowledge there are. It was not with any idea of counting these up that the question was asked; we wanted to know what knowledge itself is. —Or am I talking nonsense?

Theaetetus/ No, you are perfectly right.

Socrates/ Now think about this too. Supposing we were asked about some commonplace, everyday thing; for example, what is clay? And supposing we were to answer, 'clay of the potters' and 'clay of the stove-makers' and 'clay of the brick-makers', wouldn't that be absurd of us?

Theaetetus/ Well, perhaps it would.

Socrates/ Absurd to begin with, I suppose, to imagine that the person who asked the question would understand anything from our answer when we say 'clay', whether we add that it is doll-makers' clay or any other craftsman's. Or do you think that anyone can understand the name of a thing when he doesn't know what the thing is?

Theaetetus/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ And so a man who does not know what knowledge is will not understand 'knowledge of shoes' either?

Theaetetus/ No, he won't.

Socrates/ Then a man who is ignorant of what knowledge is will not understand what cobbling is, or any other craft?

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ So when the question raised is 'What is knowledge?', to reply by naming one of the crafts is an absurd answer; because it points out something that knowledge is of when this is not what the question was about.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Again, it goes no end of a long way round, in a case where, I take it, a short and commonplace answer is possible. In the question about clay, for example, it would

presumably be possible to make the simple, commonplace statement that it is earth mixed with liquid, and let the question of whose clay it is take care of itself.

Theaetetus/ That seems easier, Socrates, now you put it like that. But I believe you're asking just the sort of question that occurred to your namesake Socrates here and myself, when we were having a discussion a little while ago.

Socrates/ And what was that, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Theodorus here was demonstrating to us with the aid of diagrams a point about powers. He was showing us that the power of three square feet and the power of five square feet are not commensurable in length with the power of one square foot; and he went on in this way, taking each case in turn till he came to the power of seventeen square feet; there for some reason he stopped. So the idea occurred to us that, since the powers were turning out to be unlimited in number, we might try to collect the powers in question under one term, which would apply to them all.

Socrates/ And did you find the kind of thing you wanted?

Theaetetus/ I think we did. But I'd like you to see if it's all right.

Socrates/ Go on, then.

Theaetetus/ We divided all numbers into two classes. Any number which can be produced by the multiplication of two equal numbers, we compared to a square in shape, and we called this a square or equilateral number.

Socrates/ Good, so far.

Theaetetus/ Then we took the intermediate numbers, such as three and five and any number which can't be produced by multiplication of two equals but only by multiplying together a greater and a less; a number such that it is always contained by a greater and a less side. A number of this kind we compared to an oblong figure, and called it an oblong number.

Socrates/ That's excellent. But how did you go on?

Theaetetus/ We defined under the term 'length' any line which produces in square an equilateral plane number; while any line which produces in square an oblong number we defined under the term 'power', for the reason that although it is incommensurable with the former in length, it is commensurable in the plane figures which they respectively have the power to produce. And there is another distinction of the same sort with regard to solids.

Socrates/ Excellent, my boys. I don't think Theodorus is likely to be had up for false witness.

Theaetetus/ And yet, Socrates, I shouldn't be able to answer your question about knowledge in the same way that I answered the one about lengths and powers—though you seem to me to be looking for something of the same sort. So Theodorus turns out a false witness after all.

Socrates/ Well, but suppose now it was your running he had praised; suppose he had said that he had never met anyone among the young people who was such a runner as you. And then suppose you were beaten by the champion runner in his prime—would you think Theodorus' praise had lost any of its truth?

Theaetetus/ No, I shouldn't.

Socrates/ But do you think the discovery of what knowledge is, is really what I was saying just now—a small thing? Don't you think that's a problem for the people at the top?

Theaetetus/ Yes, rather, I do; and the very topmost of them.

Socrates/ Then do have confidence in yourself and try to believe that Theodorus knew what he was talking about. You must put your whole heart into what we are doing—in

particular into this matter of getting a statement of what knowledge really is.

Theaetetus/ If putting one's heart into it is all that is required, Socrates, the answer will come to light.

Socrates/ Go on, then. You gave us a good lead just now. Try to imitate your answer about the powers. There you brought together the many powers within a single form; now I want you in the same way to give one single account of the many branches of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ But I assure you, Socrates, I have often tried to think this out, when I have heard reports of the questions you ask. But I can never persuade myself that anything I say will really do; and I never hear anyone else state the matter in the way that you require. And yet, again, you know, I can't even stop worrying about it.

Socrates/ Yes; those are the pains of labor, dear Theaetetus. It is because you are not barren but pregnant.

Theaetetus/ I don't know about that, Socrates. I'm only telling you what's happened to me.

Socrates/ Then do you mean to say you've never heard about my being the son of a good hefty midwife, Phaenarete?

Theaetetus/ Oh, yes, I've heard that before.

Socrates/ And haven't you ever been told that I practice the same art myself?

Theaetetus/ No, I certainly haven't.

Socrates/ But I do, believe me. Only don't give me away to the rest of the world, will you? You see, my friend, it is a secret that I have this art. That is not one of the things you hear people saying about me, because they don't know; but they do say that I am a very odd sort of person, always causing people to get into difficulties. You must have heard that, surely?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ And shall I tell you what is the explanation of that?

Theaetetus/ Yes, please do.

Socrates/ Well, if you will just think of the general facts about the business of midwifery, you will see more easily what I mean. You know, I suppose, that women never practice as midwives while they are still conceiving and bearing children themselves. It is only those who are past child-bearing who take this up.

Theaetetus/ Oh, yes.

Socrates/ They say it was Artemis who was responsible for this custom; it was because she, who undertook the patronage of childbirth, was herself childless. She didn't, it's true, entrust the duties of midwifery to barren women, because human nature is too weak to acquire skill where it has no experience. But she assigned the task to those who have become incapable of child-bearing through age—honoring their likeness to herself.

Theaetetus/ Yes, naturally.

Socrates/ And this too is very natural, isn't it? —or perhaps necessary? I mean that it is the midwives who can tell better than anyone else whether women are pregnant or not.

Theaetetus/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ And then it is the midwives who have the power to bring on the pains, and also, if they think fit, to relieve them; they do it by the use of simple drugs, and by singing incantations. In difficult cases, too, they can bring about the birth; or, if they consider it advisable, they can promote a miscarriage.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is so.

Socrates/ There's another thing too. Have you noticed this about them, that they are the cleverest of match-makers,

because they are marvelously knowing about the kind of couples whose marriage will produce the best children?

Theaetetus/ No, that is not at all familiar to me.

Socrates/ But they are far prouder of this, believe me, than of cutting the umbilical cord. Think now. There's an art which is concerned with the cultivation and harvesting of the crops. Now is it the same art which prescribes the best soil for planting or sowing a given crop? Or is it a different one?

Theaetetus/ No, it is all the same art.

Socrates/ Then applying this to midwifery, will there be one art of the sowing and another of the harvesting?

Theaetetus/ That doesn't seem likely, certainly.

Socrates/ No, it doesn't. But there is also an unlawful and unscientific practice of bringing men and women together, which we call procuring; and because of that the midwives—a most august body of women—are very reluctant to undertake even lawful matchmaking. They are afraid that if they practice this, they may be suspected of the other. And yet, I suppose, reliable matchmaking is a matter for no one but the true midwife.

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So the work of the midwives is a highly important one; but it is not so important as my own performance. And for this reason, that there is not in midwifery the further complication, that the patients are sometimes delivered of phantoms and sometimes of realities, and that the two are hard to distinguish. If there were, then the midwife's greatest and noblest function would be to distinguish the true from the false offspring—don't you agree?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Now my art of midwifery is just like theirs in most respects. The difference is that I attend men and not women,

and that I watch over the labor of their souls, not of their bodies. And the most important thing about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine whether the young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth. For one thing which I have in common with the ordinary midwives is that I myself am barren of wisdom. The common reproach against me is that I am always asking questions of other people but never express my own views about anything, because there is no wisdom in me; and that is true enough. And the reason of it is this, that God compels me to attend the travail of others, but has forbidden me to procreate. So that I am not in any sense a wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any discovery worth the name of wisdom. But with those who associate with me it is different. At first some of them may give the impression of being ignorant and stupid; but as time goes on and our association continues, all whom God permits are seen to make progress—a progress which is amazing both to other people and to themselves. And yet it is clear that this is not due to anything they have learned from me; it is that they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the light. But it is I, with God's help, who deliver them of this offspring. And a proof of this may be seen in the many cases where people who did not realize this fact took all the credit to themselves and thought that I was no good. They have then proceeded to leave me sooner than they should, either of their own accord or through the influence of others. And after they have gone away from me they have resorted to harmful company, with the result that what remained within them has miscarried; while they have neglected the children I helped them to bring forth, and lost them, because they set more value upon lies and phantoms than upon the truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant fools, both by themselves and by everybody else. One

of these people was Aristides the son of Lysimachus; and there have been very many others. Sometimes they come back, wanting my company again, and ready to move heaven and earth to get it. When that happens, in some cases the divine sign that visits me forbids me to associate with them; in others, it permits me, and then they begin again to make progress.

There is another point also in which those who associate with me are like women in child-birth. They suffer the pains of labor, and are filled day and night with distress; indeed they suffer far more than women. And this pain my art is able to bring on, and also to allay.

Well, that's what happens to them; but at times, Theaetetus, I come across people who do not seem to me somehow to be pregnant. Then I realize that they have no need of me, and with the best will in the world I undertake the business of match-making; and I think I am good enough—God willing—at guessing with whom they might profitably keep company. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus; and a great number also to other wise and inspired persons.

Well, my dear lad, this has been a long yarn; but the reason was that I have a suspicion that you (as you think yourself) are pregnant and in labor. So I want you to come to me as to one who is both the son of a midwife and himself skilled in the art; and try to answer the questions I shall ask you as well as you can. And when I examine what you say, I may perhaps think it is a phantom and not truth, and proceed to take it quietly from you and abandon it. Now if this happens, you mustn't get savage with me, like a mother over her first-born child. Do you know, people have often before now got into such a state with me as to be literally ready to bite when I take away some nonsense or other from them. They never believe that I am doing this in all goodwill; they are so far from realizing that no God can wish evil to man, and that even I

don't do this kind of thing out of malice, but because it is not permitted to me to accept a lie and put away truth.

So begin again, Theaetetus, and try to say what knowledge is. And don't on any account tell me that you can't. For if God is willing, and you play the man, you can.

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, after such encouragement from you, it would hardly be decent for anyone not to try his hardest to say what he has in him. Very well then. It seems to me that a man who knows something perceives what he knows, and the way it appears at present, at any rate, is that knowledge is simply perception.

Socrates/ There's a good straight answer, my son. That's the way to speak one's mind. But come now, let us look at this thing together, and see whether what we have here is really fertile or a mere wind-egg. You hold that knowledge is perception?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But look here, this is no ordinary account of knowledge you've come out with: it's what Protagoras used to maintain. He said the very same thing, only he put it in rather a different way. For he says, you know, that 'Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.' You have read this, of course?

Theaetetus/ Yes, often.

Socrates/ Then you know that he puts it something like this, that as each thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you—you and I each being a man?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is what he says.

Socrates/ Well, it is not likely that a wise man would talk nonsense. So let us follow him up. Now doesn't it sometimes happen that when the same wind is blowing, one of us feels

cold and the other not? Or that one of us feels rather cold and the other very cold?

Theaetetus/ That certainly does happen.

Socrates/ Well then, in that case are we going to say that the wind itself, by itself, is cold or not cold? Or shall we listen to Protagoras, and say it is cold for the one who feels cold, and for the other, not cold?

Theaetetus/ It looks as if we must say that.

Socrates/ And this is how it appears to each of us?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But this expression 'it appears' means 'he perceives it'?

Theaetetus/ Yes, it does.

Socrates/ The appearing of things, then, is the same as perception, in the case of hot and things like that. So it results, apparently, that things are for the individual such as he perceives them.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that seems all right.

Socrates/ Perception, then, is always of what is, and unerring—as befits knowledge.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But, I say, look here. Was Protagoras one of those omniscient people? Did he perhaps put this out as a riddle for the common crowd of us, while he revealed the Truth as a secret doctrine to his own pupils?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by that, Socrates?

Socrates/ I'll tell you; and this, now, is certainly no ordinary theory—I mean the theory that there is nothing which in itself is just one thing: nothing which you could rightly call anything or any kind of thing. If you call a thing large, it will reveal itself as small, and if you call it heavy, it is liable to appear as light, and so on with everything, because

nothing is one or anything or any kind of thing. What is really true, is this: the things of which we naturally say that they 'are', are in process of coming to be, as the result of movement and change and blending with one another. We are wrong when we say they 'are', since nothing ever is, but everything is coming to be.

And as regards this point of view, let us take it as a fact that all the wise men of the past, with the exception of Parmenides, stand together. Let us take it that we find on this side Protagoras and Heraclitus and Empedocles; and also the masters of the two kinds of poetry, Epicharmus in comedy and Homer in tragedy. For when Homer talked about 'Ocean, begetter of gods, and Tethys their mother', he made all things the offspring of flux and motion. —Or don't you think he meant that?

Theaetetus/ Oh, I think he did.

Socrates/ And if anyone proceeded to dispute the field with an army like that—an army led by Homer—he could hardly help making a fool of himself, could he?

Theaetetus/ It would not be an easy matter, Socrates.

Socrates/ It would not, Theaetetus. You see, there is good enough evidence for this theory that being (what passes for such) and becoming are a product of motion, while not-being and passing-away result from a state of rest. There is evidence for it in the fact that heat or fire, which presumably generates and controls everything else, is itself generated out of movement and friction—these being motions. —Or am I wrong in saying these are the original sources of fire?

Theaetetus/ Oh no, they certainly are.

Socrates/ Moreover, the growth of living creatures depends upon these same sources?

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And isn't it also true that bodily condition deteriorates with rest and idleness? While by exertion and motion it can be preserved for a long time?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what about the condition of the soul? Isn't it by learning and study, which are motions, that the soul gains knowledge and is preserved and becomes a better thing? Whereas in a state of rest, that is, when it will not study or learn, it not only fails to acquire knowledge but forgets what it has already learned?

Theaetetus/ That certainly is so.

Socrates/ And so we may say that the one thing, that is, motion, is beneficial to both body and soul, while the other has the opposite effect?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that's what it looks like.

Socrates/ Yes, and I might go on to point out to you the effect of such conditions as still weather on land and calms on the sea. I might show you how these conditions rot and destroy things, while the opposite conditions make for preservation. And finally, to put the crown on my argument, I might bring in Homer's golden cord, and maintain that he means by this simply the sun; and is here explaining that so long as the revolution continues and the sun is in motion, all things are and are preserved, both in heaven and in earth, but that if all this should be 'bound fast', as it were, and come to a standstill, all things would be destroyed and, as the saying goes, the world would be turned upside down. Do you agree with this?

Theaetetus/ Yes, Socrates, I think that is the meaning of the passage.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, you must understand our theory in this way. In the sphere of vision, to begin with, what you would naturally call a white color is not itself a distinct

entity, either outside your eyes or in your eyes. You must not assign it any particular place; for then, of course it would be standing at its post; it wouldn't be in process of becoming.

Theaetetus/ But what do you mean?

Socrates/ Let us follow what we stated a moment ago, and posit that there is nothing which is, in itself, one thing. According to this theory, black or white or any other color will turn out to have come into being through the impact of the eye upon the appropriate motion; and what we naturally call a particular color is neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something which has come into being between the two, and which is private to the individual percipient. —Or would you be prepared to insist that every color appears to a dog, or to any other animal, the same as it appears to you?

Theaetetus/ No, I most certainly shouldn't.

Socrates/ Well, and do you even feel sure that anything appears to another human being like it appears to you? Wouldn't you be much more disposed to hold that it doesn't appear the same even to yourself because you never remain like yourself?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that seems to me nearer the truth than the other.

Socrates/ Well now, supposing such things as size or warmth or whiteness really belonged to the object we measure ourselves against or touch, it would never be found that this object had become different simply by coming into contact with another thing and without any change in itself. On the other hand, if you suppose them to belong to what is measuring or touching, this again could never become different simply because something else had come into its neighborhood, or because something had happened to the first thing—nothing having happened to itself. As it is, you

see, we may easily find ourselves forced into saying the most astonishing and ridiculous things, as Protagoras would point out or anyone who undertook to expound the same views.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? What sort of ridiculous things?

Socrates/ Let me give you a simple example of what I mean, and you will see the rest for yourself. Here are six dice. Put four beside them, and they are more, we say, than the four, that is, half as many again; but put twelve beside them, and we say they are less, that is, half the number. And there is no getting out of that—or do you think there is?

Theaetetus/ No, I don't.

Socrates/ Well now, supposing Protagoras or anyone else were to ask you this question: 'Is it possible, Theaetetus, for anything to become bigger or more in number in any other way than by being increased?' What is your answer to that?

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, if I answer what seems true in relation to the present question, I shall say 'No, it is not possible'; but if I consider it in relation to the question that went before, then in order to avoid contradicting myself, I say 'Yes, it is.'

Socrates/ That's a good answer, my friend, by Jove it is; you are inspired. But, I think, if you answer 'Yes', it will be like that episode in Euripides—the tongue will be safe from refutation but the mind will not.

Theaetetus/ That's true.

Socrates/ Now if you and I were professional savants, who had already analyzed all the contents of our minds, we should now spend our superfluous time trying each other out; we should start a regular Sophists' set-to, with a great clashing of argument on argument. But, as it is, we are only plain men; and so our first aim will be to look at our thoughts themselves in relation to themselves, and see what they are—whether, in

our opinion, they agree with one another or are entirely at variance.

Theaetetus/ That would certainly be my aim, anyway.

Socrates/ And mine. That being so, as we are not in any way pressed for time, don't you think the thing to do is to reconsider this matter quietly and patiently, in all seriousness 'analyzing' ourselves, and asking what are these apparitions within us? —And when we come to review them, I suppose we may begin with the statement that nothing can possibly have become either greater or less, in bulk or in number, so long as it is equal to itself. Isn't that so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Secondly, we should say that a thing to which nothing is added and from which nothing is taken away neither increases nor diminishes but remains equal.

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Thirdly, that it is impossible that a thing should ever be what it was not before without having become and without any process of becoming?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ Now it seems to me that these three statements that we have admitted are fighting one another in our souls when we speak of the example of the dice; or when we say that, within the space of a year, I (a full-grown man) without having been either increased or diminished, am now bigger than you (who are only a boy) and, later on, smaller—though I have lost nothing and it is only that you have grown. For this means that I am, at a later stage, what I was not before, and that, too, without having become—for without becoming it is not possible to have become, and without suffering any loss in size I could never become less. And there are innumerable other examples of the same thing if once we admit these. You

follow me, I take it, Theaetetus—I think you must be familiar with this kind of puzzle.

Theaetetus/ Oh yes, indeed, Socrates, I often wonder like mad what these things can mean; sometimes when I'm looking at them I begin to feel quite giddy.

Socrates/ I dare say you do, my dear boy. It seems that Theodorus was not far from the truth when he guessed what kind of person you are. For this is an experience which is characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering: this is where philosophy begins and nowhere else. And the man who made Iris the child of Thaumas was perhaps no bad genealogist—But aren't you beginning to see now what is the explanation of these puzzles, according to the theory which we are attributing to Protagoras?

Theaetetus/ I don't think I am, yet.

Socrates/ Then I dare say you will be grateful to me if I help you to discover the veiled truth in the thought of a great man—or perhaps I should say, of great men?

Theaetetus/ Of course I shall be, Socrates, very grateful.

Socrates/ Then you have a look round, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening to us—I mean the people who think that nothing exists but what they can grasp with both hands; people who refuse to admit that actions and processes and the invisible world in general have any place in reality.

Theaetetus/ They must be tough, hard fellows, Socrates.

Socrates/ They are, my son—very crude people. But these others, whose mysteries I am going to tell you, are a much more subtle type. These mysteries begin from the principle on which all that we have just been saying also depends, namely, that everything is really motion, and there is nothing but motion. Motion has two forms, each an infinite multitude, but distinguished by their powers, the one being active and the other passive. And through the intercourse and mutual

friction of these two there comes to be an offspring infinite in multitude but always twin births, on the one hand what is perceived, on the other, the perception of it, the perception in every case being generated together with what is perceived and emerging along with it. For the perceptions we have such names as sight, hearing, smelling, feeling cold and feeling hot; also what are called pleasures and pains, desires and fears; and there are others besides, a great number which have names, an infinite number which have not. And on the other side there is the race of things perceived, for each of these perceptions perceived things born of the same parentage, for all kinds of visions all kinds of colors, for all kinds of hearings all kinds of sounds; and so on, for the other perceptions the other things perceived, that come to be in kinship with them.

Now what does this tale really mean, from our point of view, Theaetetus? How does it bear on what we were saying before? Do you see?

Theaetetus/ Not really, Socrates.

Socrates/ Look here, then, let us see if we can somehow round it off. What it is trying to express, presumably, is this. All these things are in motion, just as we say; and their motion is distinguished by its swiftness or slowness. What is slow has its motion in one and the same place, and in relation to the things in the immediate neighborhood; in this way it generates and the offspring are swifter, as they move through space, and their motion takes the form of spatial movement.

Thus the eye and some other thing—one of the things commensurate with the eye—which has come into its neighborhood, generate both whiteness and the perception which is by nature united with it (things which would never have come to be if it had been anything else that eye or object approached). In this event, motions arise in the intervening

space, sight from the side of the eye and whiteness from the side of that which cooperates in the production of the color. The eye is filled with sight; at that moment it sees, and becomes not indeed sight, but a seeing eye; while its partner in the process of producing color is filled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but white, a white stick or stone or whatever it is that happens to be colored this sort of color.

This account of course may be generally applied; it applies to all that we perceive, hard or hot or anything else. Of these we must understand in the same way—as indeed we were saying before—that no one of them is anything in itself; all things, of all kinds whatsoever, are coming to be through association with one another, as the result of motion. For even in the case of the active and passive motions it is impossible, as they say, for thought, taking them singly, to pin them down to being anything. There is no passive till it meets the active, no active except in conjunction with the passive; and what, in conjunction with one thing, is active, reveals itself as passive when it falls in with something else.

And so, wherever you turn, there is nothing, as we said at the outset, which in itself is just one thing; all things become relatively to something.

The verb 'to be' must be totally abolished—though indeed we have been led by habit and ignorance into using it ourselves more than once, even in what we have just been saying. That is wrong, these wise men tell us, nor should we allow the use of such words as 'something', 'of something', or 'mine', 'this' or 'that', or any other name that makes things stand still. We ought, rather, to speak according to nature and refer to things as 'becoming', 'being produced', 'passing away', 'changing'; for if you speak in such a way as to make things stand still, you will easily be refuted. And this applies in speaking both of the individual case and of many aggregated together—such an aggregate, I mean, as people call 'man' or

‘stone’, or to which they give the names of the different animals and sorts of thing.

—Well, Theaetetus, does this look to you a tempting meal and could you take a bite of the delicious stuff?

Theaetetus/ I really don’t know, Socrates. I can’t even quite see what you’re getting at—whether the things you are saying are what you think yourself, or whether you are just trying me out.

Socrates/ You are forgetting, my friend. I don’t know anything about this kind of thing myself, and I don’t claim any of it as my own. I am barren of theories; my business is to attend you in your labor. So I chant incantations over you and offer you little tidbits from each of the wise till I succeed in assisting you to bring your own belief forth into the light. When it has been born, I shall consider whether it is fertile or a wind-egg. But you must have courage and patience; answer like a man whatever appears to you about the things I ask you.

Theaetetus/ All right, go on with the questions.

Socrates/ Tell me again, then, whether you like the suggestion that good and beautiful and all the things we were just speaking of cannot be said to ‘be’ anything, but are always ‘coming to be’.

Theaetetus/ Well, as far as I’m concerned, while I’m listening to your exposition of it, it seems to me an extraordinarily reasonable view; and I feel that the way you have set out the matter has got to be accepted.

Socrates/ In that case, we had better not pass over any point where our theory is still incomplete. What we have not yet discussed is the question of dreams, and of insanity and other diseases; also what is called mishearing or misseeing or other cases of misperceiving. You realize, I suppose, that it would be generally agreed that all these cases appear to

provide a refutation of the theory we have just expounded. For in these conditions, we surely have false perceptions. Here it is far from being true that all things which appear to the individual also are. On the contrary, no one of the things which appear to him really is.

Theaetetus/ That is perfectly true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, my lad, what argument is left for the person who maintains that knowledge is perception and that what appears to any individual also is, for him to whom it appears to be?

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, I hardly like to tell you that I don't know what to say, seeing I've just got into trouble with you for that. But I really shouldn't know how to dispute the suggestion that a madman believes what is false when he thinks he is a god; or a dreamer when he imagines he has wings and is flying in his sleep.

Socrates/ But there's a point here which is a matter of dispute, especially as regards dreams and real life—don't you see?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ There's a question you must often have heard people ask—the question what evidence we could offer if we were asked whether in the present instance, at this moment, we are asleep and dreaming all our thoughts, or awake and talking to each other in real life.

Theaetetus/ Yes, Socrates, it certainly is difficult to find the proof we want here. The two states seem to correspond in all their characteristics. There is nothing to prevent us from thinking when we are asleep that we are having the very same discussion that we have just had. And when we dream that we are telling the story of a dream, there is an extraordinary likeness between the two experiences.

Socrates/ You see, then, it is not difficult to find matter for dispute, when it is disputed even whether this is real life or a dream. Indeed we may say that, as our periods of sleeping and waking are of equal length, and as in each period the soul contends that the beliefs of the moment are preeminently true, the result is that for half our lives we assert the reality of the one set of objects, and for half that of the other set. And we make our assertions with equal conviction in both cases.

Theaetetus/ That certainly is so.

Socrates/ And doesn't the same argument apply in the cases of disease and madness, except that the periods of time are not equal?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is so.

Socrates/ Well now, are we going to fix the limits of truth by the clock?

Theaetetus/ That would be a very funny thing to do.

Socrates/ But can you produce some other clear indication to show which of these beliefs are true?

Theaetetus/ I don't think I can.

Socrates/ Then you listen to me and I'll tell you the kind of thing that might be said by those people who propose it as a rule that whatever a man thinks at any time is the truth for him. I can imagine them putting their position by asking you this question: 'Now, Theaetetus, suppose you have something which is an entirely different thing from something else. Can it have in any respect the same powers as the other thing?' And observe, we are not to understand the question to refer to something which is the same in some respects while it is different in others, but to that which is wholly different.

Theaetetus/ In that case, then, it is impossible that it should have anything the same, either as regards its powers or in any other respect, if it is a completely different thing.

Socrates/ And aren't we obliged to admit that such a thing is also unlike the other?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ Now supposing a thing is coming to be like or unlike to something, whether to itself or to something else; are we to say that when it is growing like it is coming to be the same, and when it is growing unlike it is coming to be a different thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that must be so.

Socrates/ Now weren't we saying, at an earlier stage, that there is a number—indeed an infinite number—of both active and passive factors?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Also this, that when a thing mixes now with one thing and now with another, it will not generate the same things each time but different things?

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Well, now let us apply this same statement to you and me and things in general. Take, for example, Socrates ill and Socrates well. Shall we say Socrates in health is like or unlike Socrates in sickness?

Theaetetus/ You mean the ill Socrates as a whole compared with the well Socrates as a whole?

Socrates/ You get my point excellently; that is just what I mean.

Theaetetus/ Unlike, then, I suppose.

Socrates/ And different also, in so far as he is unlike?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that follows.

Socrates/ Similarly, you would say, when he is asleep or in any of the conditions we enumerated just now?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I should.

Socrates/ Then it must surely be true that, when anyone of the naturally active factors finds Socrates well, it will be dealing with one me, and when it finds Socrates ill, with a different me?

Theaetetus/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ Then in these two events the combination of myself as passive and it as the active factor will generate different things?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now if I drink wine when I am well, it appears to me pleasant and sweet?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Going by what we earlier agreed, that is so because the active and passive factors, moving simultaneously, generate both sweetness and a perception; on the passive side, the perception makes the tongue percipient, while on the side of the wine, sweetness moving about it makes it both be and appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

Theaetetus/ That's certainly the sense of what we agreed to before.

Socrates/ But when the active factor finds Socrates ill, then, to begin with, it is not in strict truth the same man that it gets hold of, is it? Because here, as we saw, it has come upon an unlike.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then this pair, Socrates ill and the draft of wine, generates, presumably, different things again: a perception of bitterness in the region of the tongue, and bitterness coming to be and moving in the region of the wine. And then the wine becomes, not bitterness, but bitter; and I become, not perception, but percipient.

Theaetetus/ Yes, quite.

Socrates/ And I shall never again become thus percipient of anything else. A perception of something else is another perception, and makes another and a changed percipient. Nor again, in the case of that which acts on me, will it ever, in conjunction with something else, generate the same thing and itself become such as it now is. From something else it will generate something else, and itself become a changed thing.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Nor will I become such for myself or it such for itself.

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ But I must necessarily become percipient of something when I become percipient; it is impossible to become percipient, yet percipient of nothing. And it again, when it becomes sweet or bitter or anything of that kind, must become so for somebody, because it is impossible to become sweet and yet sweet for no one.

Theaetetus/ Quite impossible.

Socrates/ It remains, then, that I and it, whether we are or whether we become, are or become for each other. For our being is, by Necessity's decree, tied to a partner; yet we are tied neither to any other thing in the world nor to our respective selves. It remains, then, that we are tied to each other. Hence, whether you apply the term 'being' to a thing or the term 'becoming', you must always use the words 'for somebody' or 'of something' or 'relatively to something'. You must not speak of anything as in itself either being or becoming nor let anyone else use such expressions. That is the meaning of the theory we have been expounding.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that's certainly true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then since that which acts on me is for me, and not for anyone else, it is I who perceive it too, and nobody else?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then my perception is true for me—because it is always a perception of that being which is peculiarly mine; and I am judge, as Protagoras said, of things that are, that they are, for me; and of things that are not, that they are not.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ How then, if I am thus unerring and never stumble in my thought about what is—or what is coming to be—how can I fail to be a knower of the things of which I am perceiver?

Theaetetus/ There is no way you could fail.

Socrates/ Then that was a grand idea of yours when you told us that knowledge is nothing more or less than perception. So we find the various theories have converged to the same thing: that of Homer and Heraclitus and all their tribe, that all things flow like streams; of Protagoras, wisest of men, that man is the measure of all things; and of Theaetetus that, these things being so, knowledge proves to be perception. What about it, Theaetetus? Shall we say we have here your first-born child, the result of my midwifery? Or what would you say?

Theaetetus/ Oh, there's no denying it, Socrates.

Socrates/ This, then, it appears, is what our efforts have at last brought forth—whatever it really is. And now that it has been born, we must perform the rite of running round the hearth with it; we must make it in good earnest go the round of discussion. For we must take care that we don't overlook some defect in this thing that is entering into life; it may be something not worth bringing up, a wind-egg, a falsehood. What do you say? Is it your opinion that your child ought in any case to be brought up and not exposed to die? Can you bear to see it found fault with, and not get into a rage if your first-born is stolen away from you?

Theodorus/ Theaetetus will put up with it, Socrates. He is not at all one to lose his temper. But tell me, in Heaven's name, in what way is it not as it should be?

Socrates/ You are the complete lover of discussion, Theodorus, and it is too good of you to think that I am a sort of bag of arguments, and can easily pick one out which will show you that this theory is wrong. But you don't realize what is happening. The arguments never come from me; they always come from the person I am talking to. All that I know, such as it is, is how to take an argument from someone else—someone who is wise—and give it a fair reception. So, now, I propose to try to get our answer out of Theaetetus, not to make any contribution of my own.

Theodorus/ That's a better way of putting it, Socrates; do as you say.

Socrates/ Well then, Theodorus, do you know what astonishes me about your friend Protagoras?

Theodorus/ No—what is it?

Socrates/ Well, I was delighted with his general statement of the theory that a thing is for any individual what it seems to him to be; but I was astonished at the way he began. I was astonished that he did not state at the beginning of the Truth that 'Pig is the measure of all things' or 'Baboon' or some yet more out-of-the-way creature with the power of perception. That would have made a most imposing and disdainful opening. It would have made it clear to us at once that, while we were standing astounded at his wisdom as though he were God, he was in reality no better authority than a tadpole—let alone any other man.

Or what are we to say, Theodorus? If whatever the individual judges by means of perception is true for him; if no man can assess another's experience better than he, or can claim authority to examine another man's judgment and see

if it be right or wrong; if, as we have repeatedly said, only the individual himself can judge of his own world, and what he judges is always true and correct: how could it ever be, my friend, that Protagoras was a wise man, so wise as to think himself fit to be the teacher of other men and worth large fees; while we, in comparison with him the ignorant ones, needed to go and sit at his feet—we who are ourselves each the measure of his own wisdom? Can we avoid the conclusion that Protagoras was just playing to the crowd when he said this? I say nothing about my own case and my art of midwifery and how silly we look. So too, I think, does the whole business of philosophical discussion. To examine and try to refute each other's appearances and judgments, when each person's are correct—this is surely an extremely tiresome piece of nonsense, if the Truth of Protagoras is true, and not merely an oracle speaking in jest from the impenetrable sanctuary of the book.

Theodorus/ Protagoras was my friend, Socrates, as you have just remarked. I could not consent to have him refuted through my admissions; and yet I should not be prepared to resist you against my own judgment. So take on Theaetetus again. He seemed to be following you very sympathetically just now.

Socrates/ Now, Theodorus, supposing you went to Sparta and were visiting the wrestling-schools. Would you think it right to sit and watch other men exercising naked—some of them not much to look at—and refuse to strip yourself alongside of them, and take your turn of letting people see what you look like?

Theodorus/ Why not, if I could persuade them to leave the choice to me? Similarly I am hoping to persuade you to allow me to be a spectator and not drag me into the arena now that I am grown stiff; but to take on someone who is younger and more supple.

Socrates/ Well, Theodorus, what you like I'll not dislike, as the saying goes. So we must again resort to our wise Theaetetus. Come, Theaetetus. Think, to begin with, of what we have just been saying, and tell me if you are not yourself astonished at suddenly finding that you are the equal in wisdom of any man or even a god? —Or do you think the Protagorean measure isn't meant to be applied to gods as much as to men?

Theaetetus/ I most certainly don't. And, to answer your question, yes, I am very much astonished. When we were working out the meaning of the principle that a thing is for each man what it seems to him to be, it appeared to me a very sound one. But now, all in a minute, it is quite the other way round.

Socrates/ Yes, because you are young, dear lad; and so you lend a ready ear to mob-oratory and let it convince you. For Protagoras, or anyone speaking on his behalf, will answer us like this: 'My good people, young and old,' he will say, 'you sit here orating; you drag in gods, whose existence or nonexistence I exclude from all discussion, written or spoken; you keep on saying whatever is likely to be acceptable to the mob, telling them that it would be a shocking thing if no man were wiser than any cow in a field; but of proof or necessity not a word. You just rely on plausibility; though if Theodorus or any other geometer were to do that in his branch of science, it's a good-for-nothing geometer he would be'. So you and Theodorus had better consider whether, in matters of such importance, you are going to accept arguments which are merely persuasive or plausible.

Theaetetus/ You wouldn't say we had any business to do that, Socrates; and neither should we.

Socrates/ Then, it seems, you and Theodorus say our criticism should take a different line?

Theaetetus/ Yes, it certainly should.

Socrates/ Here, then, is another way in which we might consider whether knowledge and perception are the same or different things—for that is the question which our argument has held in view throughout, isn't it? And it was for its sake that we have unearthed all this extraordinary stuff?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Well, now, are we going to agree that when we perceive things by seeing or hearing them, we always at the same time know them? Take, for example, the case of hearing people speaking a foreign language which we have not yet learned. Are we going to say that we do not hear the sound of their voices when they speak? Or that we both hear it and know what they are saying? Again, supposing we do not know our letters, are we going to insist that we do not see them when we look at them? Or shall we maintain that, if we see them, we know them?

Theaetetus/ We shall say, Socrates, that we know just that in them which we see and hear. We both see and know the shape and the color of the letters; and with the spoken words we both hear and know the rise and fall of the voice. But what schoolmasters and interpreters tell us about them, we don't perceive by seeing or hearing, and we don't know, either.

Socrates/ Very good indeed, Theaetetus; and it would not be right for me to stand in the way of your progress by raising objections to what you say. But look, there is another difficulty coming upon us. You must think now how we are going to fend it off.

Theaetetus/ What kind of difficulty?

Socrates/ I mean something like this. Supposing you were asked, 'If a man has once come to know a certain thing, and continues to preserve the memory of it, is it possible that, at the moment when he remembers it, he doesn't know this thing

that he is remembering?' But I am being long-winded, I'm afraid. What I am trying to ask is, 'Can a man who has learned something not know it when he is remembering it?'

Theaetetus/ How could that happen, Socrates? That would be a most extraordinary thing.

Socrates/ Then am I perhaps talking nonsense? But think now. You say that seeing is perceiving and sight is perception?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then a man who has seen something has come to know that which he saw, according to the statement you made just now?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But you do say—don't you? —that there is such a thing as memory?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Memory of nothing? Or of something?

Theaetetus/ Of something, surely.

Socrates/ That is to say, of things which one has learned, that is, perceived—that kind of 'something'?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And what a man has once seen, he recalls, I take it, from time to time?

Theaetetus/ He does.

Socrates/ Even if he shuts his eyes? Or does he forget it if he does this?

Theaetetus/ That would be a strange thing to say, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yet it is what we must say, if we are to save our previous statement. Otherwise, it's all up with it.

Theaetetus/ Yes, by Jove, I begin to have my suspicions too; but I don't quite see it yet. You explain.

Socrates/ This is why. According to us, the man who sees has acquired knowledge of what he sees, as sight, perception and knowledge are agreed to be the same thing.

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ But the man who sees and has acquired knowledge of the thing he saw, if he shuts his eyes remembers but does not see it. Isn't that so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But to say 'He doesn't see' is to say 'He doesn't know', if 'sees' is 'knows'?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Then we have this result, that a man who has come to know something and still remembers it doesn't know it because he doesn't see it? And that's what we said would be a most extraordinary thing to happen.

Theaetetus/ That's perfectly true.

Socrates/ Then apparently we get an impossible result when knowledge and perception are identified?

Theaetetus/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ Then we have got to say that perception is one thing and knowledge another?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I'm afraid so.

Socrates/ Then what is knowledge? We shall have to begin again at the beginning, it seems. And yet—whatever are we thinking about, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ We appear to be behaving like a base-born fighting-cock, jumping away off the theory, and crowing before we have the victory over it.

Theaetetus/ How are we doing that?

Socrates/ We seem to have been adopting the methods of professional controversialists: we've made an agreement aimed at getting words to agree consistently; and we feel complacent now that we have defeated the theory by the use of a method of this kind. We profess to be philosophers, not champion controversialists; and we don't realize that we are doing just what those clever fellows do.

Theaetetus/ I still don't quite see what you mean.

Socrates/ Well, I will try to explain what I have in mind here. We were enquiring into the possibility that a man should not know something that he has learned and remembers. And we showed that a man who has seen something, and then shuts his eyes, remembers but does not see it; and that showed that he does not know the thing at the very time that he remembers it. We said that this was impossible. And so the tale of Protagoras comes to an untimely end; yours too, your tale about the identity of knowledge and perception.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But I don't think this would have happened, my friend, if the father of the other tale were alive. He would find plenty of means of defending it. As things are, it is an orphan we are trampling in the mud. Not even the people Protagoras appointed its guardians are prepared to come to its rescue; for instance, Theodorus here. In the interests of justice, it seems that we shall have to come to the rescue ourselves.

Theodorus/ I think you must. It is not I, you know, Socrates, but Callias, the son of Hipponicus, who is the guardian of Protagoras' relicts. As it happened, I very soon inclined away from abstract discussion to geometry. But I shall be very grateful if you can rescue the orphan.

Socrates/ Good, Theodorus. Now will you give your mind to this rescue work of mine—what little I can do? Because one might be driven into making even more alarming admissions

than we have just made, if one paid as little attention to the words in which we express our assertions and denials as we are for the most part accustomed to doing. Shall I tell you how this might happen? Or shall I tell Theaetetus?

Theodorus/ Tell us both, Socrates; but the younger had better answer. It will not be so undignified for him to get tripped up.

Socrates/ Well, then, here is the most alarming poser of all. It goes something like this, I think: 'Is it possible for a man who knows something not to know this thing which he knows?'

Theodorus/ What are we going to answer now, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ That it is impossible, I should think.

Socrates/ But it is not, if you are going to premise that seeing is knowing. For what are you going to do when some intrepid fellow has you 'trapped in the well-shaft', as they say, with a question that leaves you no way out: clapping his hand over one of your eyes, he asks you whether you see his cloak with the eye that is covered—how will you cope with that?

Theaetetus/ I shall say that I don't see it with this one, but I do with the other.

Socrates/ So you both see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

Theaetetus/ Well, yes, in that sort of way I do.

Socrates/ 'That's not the question I'm setting you,' he will say, 'I was not asking you in what way it happened. I was asking you "Does it happen that you don't know what you know?" You now appear to be seeing what you don't see; and you have actually admitted that seeing is knowing, and not to see is not to know. I leave you to draw your conclusion.'

Theaetetus/ Well, I draw a conclusion that contradicts my original suppositions.

Socrates/ And that is the kind of thing that might have happened to you more than once, you wonderful fellow. It might have happened if someone had gone on asking you whether it was possible to know sometimes clearly and sometimes dimly; or to know near at hand and not from a distance; or to know the same thing both intensely and slightly. And there are a million other questions with which one of the mercenary skirmishers of debate might ambush you, once you had proposed that knowledge and perception are the same thing. He would lay into hearing and smelling and other perceptions of that kind; and would keep on refuting you and not let you go till you had been struck with wonder at his wisdom—that 'answer to many prayers'—and had got yourself thoroughly tied up by him. Then, when he had you tamed and bound, he would set you free for a ransom—whatever price seemed appropriate to the two of you.

But perhaps you'll ask, what argument would Protagoras himself bring to the help of his offspring. Shall we try to state it?

Theaetetus/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ Well, he will say all the things that we are saying in our attempt to defend him; and then, I imagine, he will come to grips with us, and in no respectful spirit either. I imagine him saying: 'This good Socrates here—what he did was to frighten a small boy by asking him if it were possible that the same man should at once remember and not know the same thing; and when the boy in his fright answered "No," because he couldn't see what was coming, then, according to Socrates, the laugh was against me in the argument. You are too easy-going, Socrates. The true position is this. When you are examining any doctrine of mine by the method of question and answer, if the person being questioned answers as I myself would answer, and gets caught, then it is I who am refuted;

but if his answers are other than I should give, then it is he who is put in the wrong.

'Now, to begin with, do you expect someone to grant you that a man's present memory of something which he has experienced in the past but is no longer experiencing is the same sort of experience as he then had? That is very far from being true. Again, do you suppose he will hesitate to admit that it is possible for the same man to know and not know the same thing? Or—if he has misgivings about this—do you expect him to concede to you that the man, who is in process of becoming unlike, is the same as he was before the process began? Do you expect him even to speak of "the man" rather than of "the men," indeed of an infinite number of these men coming to be in succession, assuming this process of becoming unlike? Not if we really must take every precaution against each other's verbal traps. Show a little more spirit, my good man,' he will say, 'and attack my actual statement itself, and refute it, if you can, by showing that each man's perceptions are not his own private events; or that, if they are his own private events, it does not follow that the thing which appears "becomes" or, if we may speak of being, "is" only for the man to whom it appears. You keep talking about pigs and baboons; you show the mentality of a pig yourself, in the way you deal with my writings, and you persuade your audience to follow your example. That is not the way to behave.

'I take my stand on the truth being as I have written it. Each one of us is the measure both of what is and of what is not; but there are countless differences between men for just this very reason, that different things both are and appear to be to different subjects. I certainly do not deny the existence of both wisdom and wise men: far from it. But the man whom I call wise is the man who can change the appearances—the man who in any case where bad things both appear and are

for one of us, works a change and makes good things appear and be for him.

'And I must beg you, this time, not to confine your attack to the letter of my doctrine. I am now going to make its meaning clearer to you. For instance, I would remind you of what we were saying before, namely, that to the sick man the things he eats both appear and are bitter, while to the healthy man they both appear and are the opposite. Now what we have to do is not to make one of these two wiser than the other—that is not even a possibility—nor is it our business to make accusations, calling the sick man ignorant for judging as he does, and the healthy man wise, because he judges differently. What we have to do is to make a change from the one to the other, because the other state is better. In education, too, what we have to do is to change a worse state into a better state; only whereas the doctor brings about the change by the use of drugs, the professional teacher does it by the use of words. What never happens is that a man who judges what is false is made to judge what is true. For it is impossible to judge what is not, or to judge anything other than what one is immediately experiencing; and what one is immediately experiencing is always true. This, in my opinion, is what really happens: when a man's soul is in a pernicious state, he judges things akin to it, but giving him a sound state of the soul causes him to think different things, things that are good. In the latter event, the things which appear to him are what some people, who are still at a primitive stage, call "true"; my position, however, is that the one kind are better than the others, but in no way truer.

'Nor, my dear Socrates, should I dream of suggesting that we might look for wisdom among frogs. I look for wisdom, as regards animal bodies, in doctors; as regards plant-life, in gardeners—for I am quite prepared to maintain that gardeners too, when they find a plant sickly, proceed by causing it to

have good and healthy, that is, “true” perceptions, instead of bad ones. Similarly, the wise and efficient politician is the man who makes wholesome things seem just to a city instead of pernicious ones. Whatever in any city is regarded as just and admirable is just and admirable, in that city and for so long as that convention maintains itself; but the wise man replaces each pernicious convention by a wholesome one, making this both be and seem just. Similarly the professional teacher who is able to educate his pupils on these lines is a wise man, and is worth his large fees to them.

‘In this way we are enabled to hold both that some men are wiser than others, and also that no man judges what is false. And you, too, whether you like it or not, must put up with being a “measure.” For this is the line we must take if we are to save the theory.

‘If you feel prepared to go back to the beginning, and make a case against this theory, let us hear your objections set out in a connected argument. Or, if you prefer the method of question and answer, do it that way; there is no reason to try to evade that method either, indeed an intelligent person might well prefer it to any other. Only I beg that you will observe this condition: do not be unjust in your questions. It is the height of unreasonableness that a person who professes to care for moral goodness should be consistently unjust in discussion. I mean by injustice, in this connection, the behavior of a man who does not take care to keep controversy distinct from discussion; a man who forgets that in controversy he may play about and trip up his opponent as often as he can, but that in discussion he must be serious, he must keep on helping his opponent to his feet again, and point out to him only those of his slips which are due to himself or to the intellectual society which he has previously frequented. If you observe this distinction, those who associate with you will blame themselves for their confusion and their difficulties,

not you. They will seek your company, and think of you as their friend; but they will loathe themselves, and seek refuge from themselves in philosophy, in the hope that they may thereby become different people and be rid forever of the men that they once were. But if you follow the common practice and do the opposite, you will get the opposite results. Instead of philosophers, you will make your companions grow up to be the enemies of philosophy.

'So, if you take my advice, as I said before, you will sit down with us without ill will or hostility, in a kindly spirit. You will genuinely try to find out what our meaning is when we maintain (a) that all things are in motion and (b) that for each person and each city, things are what they seem to them to be. And upon this basis you will inquire whether knowledge and perception are the same thing or different things. But you will not proceed as you did just now. You will not base your argument upon the use and wont of language; you will not follow the practice of most men, who drag words this way and that at their pleasure, so making every imaginable difficulty for one another.'

Well, Theodorus, here is my contribution to the rescue of your friend—the best I can do, with my resources, and little enough that is. If he were alive himself, he would have come to the rescue of his offspring in a grander style.

Theodorus/ That must be a joke, Socrates. It was a very spirited rescue.

Socrates/ You are kind, my friend. Tell me now, did you notice that Protagoras was complaining of us, in the speech that we have just heard, for addressing our arguments to a small boy and making the child's nervousness a weapon against his ideas? And how he disparaged our method of arguments as merely an amusing game, and how solemnly he

upheld his ‘measure of all things’ and commanded us to be serious when we dealt with his theory?

Theodorus/ Yes, of course I noticed that, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then do you think we should obey his commands?

Theodorus/ Most certainly I do.

Socrates/ Look at the company then. They are all children but you. So if we are to obey Protagoras, it is you and I who have got to be serious about his theory. It is you and I who must question and answer one another. Then he will not have this against us, at any rate, that we turned the criticism of his philosophy into sport with boys.

Theodorus/ Well, isn’t our Theaetetus better able to follow the investigation of a theory than many an old fellow with a long beard?

Socrates/ But not better than you, Theodorus. Do not go on imagining that it is my business to be straining every nerve to defend your dead friend while you do nothing. Come now, my very good Theodorus, come a little way with me. Come with me at any rate until we see whether in questions of geometrical proofs it is really you who should be the measure or whether all men are as sufficient to themselves as you are in astronomy and all the other sciences in which you have made your name.

Theodorus/ Socrates, it is not easy for a man who has sat down beside you to refuse to talk. That was all nonsense just now when I was pretending that you were going to allow me to keep my coat on, and not use compulsion like the Spartans. So far from that, you seem to me to have leanings towards the methods of Sciron. The Spartans tell one either to strip or to go away; but you seem rather to be playing the part of Antaeus. You don’t let any comer go till you have stripped him and made him wrestle with you in an argument.

Socrates/ That, Theodorus, is an excellent simile to describe what is the matter with me. But I am more of a fiend for exercise than Sciron and Antaeus. I have met with many and many a Heracles and Theseus in my time, mighty men of words; and they have well battered me. But for all that I don't retire from the field, so terrible a lust has come upon me for these exercises. You must not grudge me this, either; try a fall with me and we shall both be the better.

Theodorus/ All right. I resign myself; take me with you where you like. In any case, I see, I have got to put up with the fate you spin for me, and submit to your inquisition. But not further than the limits you have laid down; beyond that I shall not be able to offer myself.

Socrates/ It will do if you will go with me so far. Now there is one kind of mistake I want you to be specially on your guard against, namely, that we do not unconsciously slip into some childish form of argument. We don't want to get into disgrace for this again.

Theodorus/ I will do my best, I promise you.

Socrates/ The first thing, then, is to tackle the same point that we were dealing with before. We were making a complaint. Now let us see whether we were right or wrong in holding it to be a defect in this theory that it made every man self-sufficient in wisdom; and whether we were right or wrong when we made Protagoras concede that some men are superior to others in questions of better and worse, these being 'the wise'. Do you agree?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It would be a different matter if Protagoras were here in person and agreed with us, instead of our having made this concession on his behalf in our attempt to help him. In that case, there would be no need to take this question up again and make sure about it. In the circumstances, however,

it might be decided that we had no authority on his behalf, and so it is desirable that we should come to a clearer agreement on this point; for it makes no small difference whether this is so or not.

Theodorus/ True.

Socrates/ Then don't let us obtain this concession through anybody else. Let us take the shortest way, an appeal to his own statement.

Theodorus/ How?

Socrates/ In this way. He says, does he not, that things are for every man what they seem to him to be?

Theodorus/ Yes, that is what he says.

Socrates/ Well, then, Protagoras, we too are expressing the judgments of a man—I might say, of all men—when we say that there is no one in the world who doesn't believe that in some matters he is wiser than other men; while in other matters, they are wiser than he. In emergencies—if at no other time—you see this belief. When they are in distress, on the battlefield, or in sickness or in a storm at sea, all men turn to their leaders in each sphere as to God, and look to them for salvation because they are superior in precisely this one thing—knowledge. And wherever human life and work goes on, you find everywhere men seeking teachers and masters, for themselves and for other living creatures and for the direction of all human works. You find also men who believe that they are able to teach and to take the lead. In all these cases, what else can we say but that men do believe in the existence of both wisdom and ignorance among themselves?

Theodorus/ There can be no other conclusion.

Socrates/ And they believe that wisdom is true thinking? While ignorance is a matter of false judgment?

Theodorus/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ What then, Protagoras, are we to make of your argument? Are we to say that all men, on every occasion, judge what is true? Or that they judge sometimes truly and sometimes falsely? Whichever we say, it comes to the same thing, namely, that men do not always judge what is true; that human judgments are both true and false. For think, Theodorus. Would you, would anyone of the school of Protagoras be prepared to contend that no one ever thinks his neighbor is ignorant or judging falsely?

Theodorus/ No, that's not a thing one could believe, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet it is to this that our theory has been driven—this theory that man is the measure of all things.

Theodorus/ How is that?

Socrates/ Well, suppose you come to a decision in your own mind and then express a judgment about something to me. Let us assume with Protagoras that your judgment is true for you. But isn't it possible that the rest of us may criticize your verdict? Do we always agree that your judgment is true? Or does there rise up against you, every time, a vast army of persons who think the opposite, who hold that your decisions and your thoughts are false?

Theodorus/ Heaven knows they do, Socrates, in their 'thousands and tens of thousands', as Homer says, and give me all the trouble that is humanly possible.

Socrates/ Then do you want us to say that you are then judging what is true for yourself, but false for the tens of thousands?

Theodorus/ It looks as if that is what we must say, according to the theory, at any rate.

Socrates/ And what of Protagoras himself? Must he not say this, that supposing he himself did not believe that man is the

measure, any more than the majority of people (who indeed do not believe it), then this Truth which he wrote is true for no one? On the other hand, suppose he believed it himself, but the majority of men do not agree with him; then you see—to begin with—the more those to whom it does not seem to be the truth outnumber those to whom it does, so much the more it isn't than it is?

Theodorus/ That must be so, if it is going to be or not be according to the individual judgment.

Socrates/ Secondly, it has this most exquisite feature: Protagoras admits, I presume, that the contrary opinion about his own opinion (namely, that it is false) must be true, seeing he agrees that all men judge what is.

Theodorus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And in conceding the truth of the opinion of those who think him wrong, he is really admitting the falsity of his own opinion?

Theodorus/ Yes, inevitably.

Socrates/ But for their part the others do not admit that they are wrong?

Theodorus/ No.

Socrates/ But Protagoras again admits this judgment to be true, according to his written doctrine?

Theodorus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ It will be disputed, then, by everyone, beginning with Protagoras—or rather, it will be admitted by him, when he grants to the person who contradicts him that he judges truly—when he does that, even Protagoras himself will be granting that neither a dog nor the 'man in the street' is the measure of anything at all which he has not learned. Isn't that so?

Theodorus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Then since it is disputed by everyone, the Truth of Protagoras is not true for anyone at all, not even for himself?

Theodorus/ Socrates, we are running my friend too hard.

Socrates/ But it is not at all clear, my dear Theodorus, that we are running off the right track. Hence it is likely that Protagoras, being older than we are, really is wiser as well; and if he were to stick up his head from below as far as the neck just here where we are, he would in all likelihood convict me twenty times over of talking nonsense, and show you up too for agreeing with me, before he ducked down to rush off again. But we have got to take ourselves as we are, I suppose, and go on saying the things which seem to us to be. At the moment, then, mustn't we maintain that any man would admit at least this, that some men are wiser than their fellows and others more ignorant?

Theodorus/ So it seems to me, at any rate.

Socrates/ We may also suggest that the theory would stand firm most successfully in the position which we sketched out for it in our attempt to bring help to Protagoras. I mean the position that most things are for the individual what they seem to him to be; for instance, warm, dry, sweet and all this type of thing. But if the theory is going to admit that there is any sphere in which one man is superior to another, it might perhaps be prepared to grant it in questions of what is good or bad for one's health. Here it might well be admitted that it is not true that every creature—woman or child or even animal—is competent to recognize what is good for it and to heal its own sickness; that here, if anywhere, one person is better than another. Do you agree?

Theodorus/ Yes, that seems so to me.

Socrates/ Then consider political questions. Some of these are questions of what may or may not fittingly be done, of just and unjust, of what is sanctioned by religion and what is not;

and here the theory may be prepared to maintain that whatever view a city takes on these matters and establishes as its law or convention, is truth and fact for that city. In such matters neither any individual nor any city can claim superior wisdom. But when it is a question of laying down what is to the interest of the state and what is not, the matter is different. The theory will again admit that here, if anywhere, one counselor is better than another; here the decision of one city may be more in conformity with the truth than that of another. It would certainly not have the hardihood to affirm that when a city decides that a certain thing is to its own interest, that thing will undoubtedly turn out to be to its interest. It is in those other questions I am talking about—just and unjust, religious and irreligious—that men are ready to insist that no one of these things has by nature any being of its own; in respect of these, they say, what seems to people collectively to be so is true, at the time when it seems that way and for just as long as it so seems. And even those who are not prepared to go all the way with Protagoras take some such view of wisdom. But I see, Theodorus, that we are becoming involved in a greater discussion emerging from the lesser one.

Theodorus/ Well, we have plenty of time, haven't we, Socrates?

Socrates/ We appear to … That remark of yours, my friend, reminds me of an idea that has often occurred to me before—how natural it is that men who have spent a great part of their lives in philosophical studies make such fools of themselves when they appear as speakers in the law courts.

Theodorus/ How do you mean now?

Socrates/ Well, look at the man who has been knocking about in law courts and such places ever since he was a boy; and compare him with the man brought up in philosophy, in

the life of a student. It is surely like comparing the upbringing of a slave with that of a free man.

Theodorus/ How is that, now?

Socrates/ Because the one man always has what you mentioned just now—plenty of time. When he talks, he talks in peace and quiet, and his time is his own. It is so with us now: here we are beginning on our third new discussion; and he can do the same, if he is like us, and prefers the newcomer to the question in hand. It does not matter to such men whether they talk for a day or a year, if only they may hit upon that which is. But the other—the man of the law courts—is always in a hurry when he is talking; he has to speak with one eye on the clock. Besides, he can't make his speeches on any subject he likes; he has his adversary standing over him, armed with compulsory powers and with the sworn statement, which is read out point by point as he proceeds, and must be kept to by the speaker. The talk is always about a fellow-slave, and is addressed to a master, who sits there holding some suit or other in his hand. And the struggle is never a matter of indifference; it always directly concerns the speaker, and sometimes life itself is at stake.

Such conditions make him keen and highly strung, skilled in flattering the master and working his way into favor; but cause his soul to be small and warped. His early servitude prevents him from making a free, straight growth; it forces him into doing crooked things by imposing dangers and alarms upon a soul that is still tender. He cannot meet these by just and honest practice, and so resorts to lies and to the policy of repaying one wrong with another; thus he is constantly being bent and distorted, and in the end grows up to manhood with a mind that has no health in it, having now become—in his own eyes—a man of ability and wisdom.

There is your practical man, Theodorus. What about our own set? Would you like us to have a review of them, or shall we let them be, and return to the argument? We don't want to abuse this freedom to change our subject of which we were speaking just now.

Theodorus/ No, no, Socrates. Let us review the philosophers. What you said just now was quite right; we who move in such circles are not the servants but the masters of our discussions. Our arguments are our own, like slaves; each one must wait about for us, to be finished whenever we think fit. We have no jury, and no audience (as the dramatic poets have), sitting in control over us, ready to criticize and give orders.

Socrates/ Very well, then; we must review them, it seems, since you have made up your mind. But let us confine ourselves to the leaders; why bother about the second-rate specimens? To begin with, then, the philosopher grows up without knowing the way to the market-place, or the whereabouts of the law courts or the council chambers or any other place of public assembly. Laws and decrees, published orally or in writing, are things he never sees or hears. The scrambling of political cliques for office; social functions, dinners, parties with flute-girls—such doings never enter his head even in a dream. So with questions of birth—he has no more idea whether a fellow citizen is high-born or humble, or whether he has inherited some taint from his forebears, male or female, than he has of the number of pints in the sea, as they say. And in all these matters, he knows not even that he knows not; for he does not hold himself aloof from them in order to get a reputation, but because it is in reality only his body that lives and sleeps in the city. His mind, having come to the conclusion that all these things are of little or no account, spurns them and pursues its winged way, as Pindar says, throughout the universe, 'in the deeps below the earth'

and 'in the heights above the heaven'; geometrizing upon earth, measuring its surfaces, astronomizing in the heavens; tracking down by every path the entire nature of each whole among the things that are, and never condescending to what lies near at hand.

Theodorus/ What do you mean by that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Well, here's an instance: they say Thales was studying the stars, Theodorus, and gazing aloft, when he fell into a well; and a witty and amusing Thracian servant-girl made fun of him because, she said, he was wild to know about what was up in the sky but failed to see what was in front of him and under his feet. The same joke applies to all who spend their lives in philosophy. It really is true that the philosopher fails to see his next-door neighbor; he not only doesn't notice what he is doing; he scarcely knows whether he is a man or some other kind of creature. The question he asks is, What is Man? What actions and passions properly belong to human nature and distinguish it from all other beings? This is what he wants to know and concerns himself to investigate. You see what I mean, Theodorus, don't you?

Theodorus/ Yes, and what you say is true.

Socrates/ This accounts, my friend, for the behavior of such a man when he comes into contact with his fellows, either privately with individuals or in public life, as I was saying at the beginning. Whenever he is obliged, in a law court or elsewhere, to discuss the things that lie at his feet and before his eyes, he causes entertainment not only to Thracian servant-girls but to all the common herd, by tumbling into wells and every sort of difficulty through his lack of experience. His clumsiness is awful and gets him a reputation for fatuousness. On occasions when personal scandal is the topic of conversation, he never has anything at all of his own to contribute; he knows nothing to the detriment of anyone,

never having paid any attention to this subject—a lack of resource which makes him look very comic. And again, when compliments are in order, and self-laudation, his evident amusement—which is by no means a pose but perfectly genuine—is regarded as idiotic. When he hears the praises of a despot or a king being sung, it sounds to his ears as if some stock-breeder were being congratulated—some keeper of pigs or sheep, or cows that are giving him plenty of milk; only he thinks that the rulers have a more difficult and treacherous animal to rear and milk, and that such a man, having no spare time, is bound to become quite as coarse and uncultivated as the stock-farmer; for the castle of the one is as much a prison as the mountain fold of the other. When he hears talk of land—that so-and-so has a property of ten thousand acres or more, and what a vast property that is, it sounds to him like a tiny plot, used as he is to envisage the whole earth. When his companions become lyric on the subject of great families, and exclaim at the noble blood of one who can point to seven wealthy ancestors, he thinks that such praise comes of a dim and limited vision, an inability, through lack of education, to take a steady view of the whole, and to calculate that every single man has countless hosts of ancestors, near and remote, among whom are to be found, in every instance, rich men and beggars, kings and slaves, Greeks and foreigners, by the thousand. When men pride themselves upon a pedigree of twenty-five ancestors, and trace their descent back to Heracles the son of Amphitryon, they seem to him to be taking a curious interest in trifles. As for the twenty-fifth ancestor of Amphitryon, what he may have been is merely a matter of luck, and similarly with the fiftieth before him again. How ridiculous, he thinks, not to be able to work that out, and get rid of the gaping vanity of a silly mind.

On all these occasions, you see, the philosopher is the object of general derision, partly for what men take to be his

superior manner, and partly for his constant ignorance and lack of resource in dealing with the obvious.

Theodorus/ What you say exactly describes what does happen, Socrates.

Socrates/ But consider what happens, my friend, when he in his turn draws someone to a higher level, and induces him to abandon questions of 'My injustice towards you, or yours towards me' for an examination of justice and injustice themselves—what they are, and how they differ from everything else and from each other; or again, when he gets him to leave such questions as Ts a king happy?' or 'a man of property?' for an inquiry into kingship, and into human happiness and misery in general—what these two things are, and what, for a human being, is the proper method by which the one can be obtained and the other avoided. When it is an account of matters like all these that is demanded of our friend with the small, sharp, legal mind, the situation is reversed; his head swims as, suspended at such a height, he gazes down from his place among the clouds; disconcerted by the unusual experience, he knows not what to do next, and can only stammer when he speaks. And that causes great entertainment, not to Thracian servant-girls or any other uneducated persons—they do not see what is going on—but to all men who have not been brought up like slaves.

These are the two types, Theodorus. There is the one who has been brought up in true freedom and leisure, the man you call a philosopher; a man to whom it is no disgrace to appear simple and good-for-nothing when he is confronted with menial tasks, when, for instance, he doesn't know how to make a bed, or how to sweeten a sauce or a flattering speech. Then you have the other, the man who is keen and smart at doing all these jobs, but does not know how to strike up a song in his turn like a free man, or how to tune the strings of

common speech to the fitting praise of the life of gods and of the happy among men.

Theodorus/ Socrates, if your words convinced everyone as they do me, there would be more peace and less evil on earth.

Socrates/ But it is not possible, Theodorus, that evil should be destroyed—for there must always be something opposed to the good; nor is it possible that it should have its seat in heaven. But it must inevitably haunt human life, and prowl about this earth. That is why a man should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven; and escape means becoming as like God as possible; and a man becomes like God when he becomes just and pure, with understanding. But it is not at all an easy matter, my good friend, to persuade men that it is not for the reasons commonly alleged that one should try to escape from wickedness and pursue virtue. It is not in order to avoid a bad reputation and obtain a good one that virtue should be practiced and not vice; that, it seems to me, is only what men call 'old wives' talk'.

Let us try to put the truth in this way. In God there is no sort of wrong whatsoever; he is supremely just, and the thing most like him is the man who has become as just as it lies in human nature to be. And it is here that we see whether a man is truly able, or truly a weakling and a nonentity; for it is the realization of this that is genuine wisdom and goodness, while the failure to realize it is manifest folly and wickedness. Everything else that passes for ability and wisdom has a sort of commonness—in those who wield political power a poor cheap show, in the manual workers a matter of mechanical routine. If, therefore, one meets a man who practices injustice and is blasphemous in his talk or in his life, the best thing for him by far is that one should never grant that there is any sort of ability about his unscrupulousness; such men are ready enough to glory in the reproach, and think that it means not that they are mere rubbish, cumbering the ground to no

purpose, but that they have the kind of qualities that are necessary for survival in the community. We must therefore tell them the truth—that their very ignorance of their true state fixes them the more firmly therein. For they do not know what is the penalty of injustice, which is the last thing of which a man should be ignorant. It is not what they suppose—scourging and death—things which they may entirely evade in spite of their wrongdoing. It is a penalty from which there is no escape.

Theodorus/ And what is that?

Socrates/ My friend, there are two patterns set up in the world. One is divine and supremely happy; the other has nothing of God in it, and is the pattern of the deepest unhappiness. This truth the evildoer does not see; blinded by folly and utter lack of understanding, he fails to perceive that the effect of his unjust practices is to make him grow more and more like the one, and less and less like the other. For this he pays the penalty of living the life that corresponds to the pattern he is coming to resemble. And if we tell him that, unless he is delivered from this 'ability' of his, when he dies the place that is pure of all evil will not receive him; that he will forever go on living in this world a life after his own likeness—a bad man tied to bad company: he will but think, This is the way fools talk to a clever rascal like me.'

Theodorus/ Oh, yes, Socrates, sure enough.

Socrates/ I know it, my friend. But there is one accident to which the unjust man is liable. When it comes to giving and taking an account in a private discussion of the things he disparages; when he is willing to stand his ground like a man for long enough, instead of running away like a coward, then, my friend, an odd thing happens. In the end the things he says do not satisfy even himself; that famous eloquence of his

somehow dries up, and he is left looking nothing more than a child.

But we had better leave it there; all this is really a digression; and if we go on, a flood of new subjects will pour in and overwhelm our original argument. So, if you don't mind, we will go back to what we were saying before.

Theodorus/ As a matter of fact, Socrates, I like listening to this kind of talk; it is easier for a man of my years to follow. Still, if you like, let us go back to the argument.

Socrates/ Well, then, we were at somewhere about this point in the argument, weren't we? We were speaking of the people who assert a being that is in motion, and who hold that for every individual things always are whatever they seem to him to be; and we said that they were prepared to stand upon their principle in almost every case—not least in questions of what is just and right. Here they are perfectly ready to maintain that whatever any community decides to be just and right, and establishes as such, actually is what is just and right for that community and for as long as it remains so established. On the other hand, when it is a question of what things are good, we no longer find anyone so heroic that he will venture to contend that whatever a community thinks useful, and establishes, really is useful, so long as it is the established order—unless, of course, he means that it is called 'useful'; but that would be making a game of our argument, wouldn't it?

Theodorus/ It would indeed.

Socrates/ Let us suppose, then, that he is not talking about the name 'useful' but has in view the thing to which it is applied.

Theodorus/ Agreed.

Socrates/ It is surely this that a government aims at when it legislates, whatever name it calls it. A community always

makes such laws as are most useful to it—so far as the limits of its judgment and capacity permit. —Or do you think legislation may have some other object in view?

Theodorus/ Oh no, not at all.

Socrates/ And does a community always achieve this object? Or are there always a number of failures?

Theodorus/ It seems to me that there are failures.

Socrates/ Now we might put this matter in a rather different way and be still more likely to get people generally to agree with our conclusions. I mean, one might put a question about the whole class of things to which 'what is useful' belongs. These things are concerned, I take it, with future time; thus when we legislate, we make laws that are going to be useful in the time to come. This kind of thing we may properly call 'future'.

Theodorus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, let's put a question to Protagoras (or to anyone who professes the same views): 'Now, Protagoras, "Man is the measure of all things" as you people say—of white and heavy and light and all that kind of thing without exception. He has the criterion of these things within himself; so when he thinks that they are as he experiences them, he thinks what is true and what really is for him.' Isn't that so?

Theodorus/ It is.

Socrates/ 'Then, Protagoras,' we shall say, 'what about things that are going to be in the future? Has a man the criterion of these within himself? When he thinks certain things will be, do they actually happen, for him, as he thought they would? Take heat, for example. Suppose the ordinary man thinks he is going to take a fever, and that his temperature will go up to fever point; while another man, this time a doctor, thinks the opposite. Do we hold that the future will confirm either the one judgment or the other? Or are we

to say that it will confirm both; that is, that for the doctor the man will not have a temperature or be suffering from fever, while for himself he will?'

Theodorus/ That would be absurd.

Socrates/ But, when there is a question of the sweetness and dryness of the next vintage, I presume it would always be the grower's judgment that would carry authority, rather than that of a musician?

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Nor again, in any question of what will be in tune or out of tune, would the judgment of a teacher of gymnastic be superior to that of a musician—even about what is going to seem to be in tune to the gymnastic master himself?

Theodorus/ No, never.

Socrates/ Or suppose a dinner is being prepared. Even the guest who is going to eat it, if he has no knowledge of cooking, will not be able to pronounce so authoritative a verdict as the professional cook on how nice it is going to be. I say 'going to be', because we had better not at this stage press our point as regards what is now pleasant to any individual, or what has been in the past. Our question for the moment is, whether the individual himself is the best judge, for himself, of what is going to seem and be for him in the future. 'Or,' we will ask, 'would not you, Protagoras, predict better than any layman about the persuasive effect that speeches in a law court will have upon anyone of us?'

Theodorus/ And in fact, Socrates, this at any rate is a point on which Protagoras used to make strong claims to superiority over other people.

Socrates/ Of course he did, my dear good fellow. No one would have paid large fees for the privilege of talking with him if he had not been in the habit of persuading his pupils that

he was a better judge than any fortune-teller—or anyone else—about what was going to be and seem to be in the future.

Theodorus/ That's true enough.

Socrates/ Legislation also and 'what is useful' is concerned with the future; and it would be generally admitted to be inevitable that a city when it legislates often fails to achieve what is the most useful.

Theodorus/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ Then we shall be giving your master fair measure if we tell him that he has now got to admit that one man is wiser than another, and that it is such a man who is 'the measure'; but that I, the man with no special knowledge, have not by any means got to be a measure—a part which the recent speech in his defense was trying to force upon me, whether I liked it or not.

Theodorus/ Now that, Socrates, seems to me to be the chief point on which the theory is convicted of error—though it stands convicted also when it makes other men's judgments carry authority and these turn out to involve thinking that Protagoras' statements are completely untrue.

Socrates/ There is more than one point besides these, Theodorus, on which a conviction might be secured—at least so far as it is a matter of proving that not every man's judgment is true. But so long as we keep within the limits of that immediate present experience of the individual which gives rise to perceptions and to perceptual judgments, it is more difficult to convict these latter of being untrue—but perhaps I'm talking nonsense. Perhaps it is not possible to convict them at all; perhaps those who profess that they are perfectly evident and are always knowledge may be saying what really is. And it may be that our Theaetetus was not far from the mark with his proposition that knowledge and perception are the same thing. We shall have to come to closer

grips with the theory, as the speech on behalf of Protagoras required us to do. We shall have to consider and test this moving Being, and find whether it rings true or sounds as if it had some flaw in it. There is no small fight going on about it, anyway—and no shortage of fighting men.

Theodorus/ No, indeed; but in Ionia it seems to be even growing, and assuming vast dimensions. On the side of this theory, the Heraclitean party is conducting a most vigorous campaign.

Socrates/ The more reason, then, my dear Theodorus, why we should examine it by going back to its first principle, which is the way they present it themselves.

Theodorus/ I quite agree. You know, Socrates, these Heraclitean doctrines (or, as you say, Homeric or still more ancient)—you can't discuss them in person with any of the people at Ephesus who profess to be adepts, any more than you could with a maniac. They are just like the things they say in their books—always on the move. As for abiding by what is said, or sticking to a question, or quietly answering and asking questions in turn, there is less than nothing of that in their capacity. That's an exaggeration, no doubt. I mean there isn't so much as a tiny bit of repose in these people. If you ask anyone of them a question, he will pull out some little enigmatic phrase from his quiver and shoot it off at you; and if you try to make him give an account of what he has said, you will only get hit by another, full of strange turns of language. You will never reach any conclusion with any of them, ever; indeed they never reach any conclusion with each other, they are so very careful not to allow anything to be stable, either in an argument or in their own souls. I suppose they think that if they did it would be something that stands still—this being what they are totally at war with, and what they are determined to banish from the universe, if they can.

Socrates/ I dare say, Theodorus, you have seen these men only on the field of battle, and never been with them in times of peace—as you don't belong to their set. I expect they keep such matters to be explained at leisure to their pupils whom they want to make like themselves.

Theodorus/ Pupils, my good man? There are no pupils and teachers among these people. They just spring up on their own, one here, one there, wherever they happen to catch their inspiration; and no one of them will credit another with knowing anything. As I was just going to say, you will never get these men to give an account of themselves, willingly or unwillingly. What we must do is to take their doctrine out of their hands and consider it for ourselves, as we should a problem in geometry.

Socrates/ What you say is very reasonable. This problem now, we have inherited it, have we not, from the ancients? They used poetical forms which concealed from the majority of men their real meaning, namely, that Ocean and Tethys, the origin of all things, are actually flowing streams, and nothing stands still. In more modern times, the problem is presented to us by men who, being more accomplished in these matters, plainly demonstrate their meaning so that even shoemakers may hear and assimilate their wisdom, and give up the silly idea that some things in this world stand still while others move, learn that all things are in motion, and recognize the greatness of their instructors.

But I was almost forgetting, Theodorus, that there are other thinkers who have announced the opposite view; who tell us that 'Unmoved is the Universe', and other similar statements which we hear from a Melissus or a Parmenides as against the whole party of Heracliteans. These philosophers insist that all things are One, and that this One stands still, itself within itself, having no place in which to move.

What are we to do with all these people, my friend? We have been gradually advancing till, without realizing it, we have got ourselves in between the two parties; and if we don't in some way manage to put up a fight and make our escape, we shall pay for it, like the people who play that game on the line in the wrestling schools, and get caught by both parties and pulled in opposite directions.

Now I think we ought to begin by examining the other party, the fluent fellows we started to pursue. If they appear to us to be talking sense, we will help them to drag us over to their side, and try to escape the others. But if those who make their stand for the whole appear to be nearer the truth, we will take refuge with them from the men who 'move what should not be moved'. And if it appears that neither party has a reasonable theory, then we shall be very absurd if we think that insignificant people like ourselves can have anything to say, after we have rejected the views of men who lived so long ago and possessed all wisdom. Think now, Theodorus, is it of any use for us to go forward upon such a dangerous venture?

Theodorus/ We can't refuse to examine the doctrines of these two schools, Socrates; that couldn't be allowed.

Socrates/ Then we must examine them, if you feel so strongly about it. Now it seems to me that the proper starting point of our criticism is the nature of motion; what is this thing that they are talking about when they say that all things are in motion? I mean, for example, are they referring to one form of motion only, or, as I think, to two—but don't let this be only what I think. You commit yourself as well, so that we may come to grief together, if need be. Tell me, do you call it 'motion' when a thing changes from one place to another or turns round in the same place?

Theodorus/ I do, yes.

Socrates/ Here then is one form of motion. Then supposing a thing remains in the same place, but grows old, or becomes black instead of white, or hard instead of soft, or undergoes any other alteration; isn't it right to say that here we have motion in another form?

Theodorus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Then I now have two forms of motion, alteration and spatial movement.

Theodorus/ Yes; and that's quite correct.

Socrates/ Then now that we have made this distinction, let us have a talk with the people who allege that all things are in motion. Let us ask them, 'Do you hold that everything is in motion in both ways, that is, that it both moves through space and undergoes alteration? Or do you suggest that some things are in motion in both ways, and some only in one or the other?'

Theodorus/ Heaven knows, I can't answer that. I suppose they would say, in both ways.

Socrates/ Yes; otherwise, my friend, it will turn out that, in their view, things are both moving and standing still; and it will be no more correct to say that all things are in motion than to say that all things stand still.

Theodorus/ That's perfectly true.

Socrates/ Then since they must be in motion, and there is no such thing anywhere as absence of motion, it follows that all things are always in every kind of motion.

Theodorus/ Yes, that must be so.

Socrates/ Then I want you to consider this point in their theory. As we were saying, they hold that the genesis of things such as warmth and whiteness occurs when each of them is moving, together with a perception, in the space between the active and passive factors: the passive factor thereby becoming percipient, but not a perception, while the active

factor becomes such or such, but not a quality—isn't that so? But perhaps 'quality' seems a strange word to you; perhaps you don't quite understand it as a general expression. So I will talk about particular cases. What I mean is that the active factor becomes not warmth or whiteness, but warm and white; and so on. You will remember, perhaps, that we said in the earlier stages of the argument that there is nothing which in itself is just one thing; and that this applies also to the active and passive factors. It is by the association of the two with one another that they generate perceptions and the things perceived; and in so doing, the active factor becomes such and such, while the passive factor becomes percipient.

Theodorus/ Yes, I remember that, of course.

Socrates/ Then we need not concern ourselves about other points in their doctrine, whether they mean what we say or something else. We must keep our eyes simply upon the object of our discussion. We must ask them this question: 'According to you, all things move and flow; isn't that so?'

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And they have both the motions that we distinguished, that is to say, they both move and alter?

Theodorus/ That must be so, if they are to be wholly and completely in motion.

Socrates/ Now if they were only moving through space and not altering, we should presumably be able to say what the moving things flow? Or how do we express it?

Theodorus/ That's all right.

Socrates/ But since not even this abides, that what flows, flows white, but rather it is in process of change, so that there is flux of this very thing also, the whiteness, and it is passing over into another color, lest it be convicted of standing still in this respect—since that is so, is it possible to give any name to a color which will properly apply to it?

Theodorus/ I don't see how one could, Socrates; nor yet surely to anything else of that kind, if, being in flux, it is always quietly slipping away as you speak?

Socrates/ And what about any particular kind of perception; for example, seeing or hearing? Does it ever abide, and remain seeing or hearing?

Theodorus/ It ought not to, certainly, if all things are in motion.

Socrates/ Then we may not call anything seeing rather than not-seeing; nor indeed may we call it any other perception rather than not—if it be admitted that all things are in motion in every way?

Theodorus/ No, we may not.

Socrates/ Yet Theaetetus and I said that knowledge was perception?

Theodorus/ You did.

Socrates/ And so our answer to the question, 'What is knowledge?' gave something which is no more knowledge than not.

Theodorus/ It seems as if it did.

Socrates/ A fine way this turns out to be of making our answer right. We were most anxious to prove that all things are in motion, in order to make that answer come out correct; but what has really emerged is that, if all things are in motion, every answer, on whatever subject, is equally correct, both 'it is thus' and 'it is not thus'—or if you like 'becomes', as we don't want to use any expressions which will bring our friends to a standstill.

Theodorus/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ Well, yes, Theodorus, except that I said 'thus' and 'not thus'. One must not use even the word 'thus'; for this 'thus' would no longer be in motion; nor yet 'not thus' for here

again there is no motion. The exponents of this theory need to establish some other language; as it is, they have no words that are consistent with their hypothesis—unless it would perhaps suit them best to use 'not at all thus' in a quite indefinite sense.

Theodorus/ That would at least be an idiom most appropriate to them.

Socrates/ Then we are set free from your friend, Theodorus. We do not yet concede to him that every man is the measure of all things, if he be not a man of understanding. And we are not going to grant that knowledge is perception, not at any rate on the line of inquiry which supposes that all things are in motion; we are not going to grant it unless Theaetetus here has some other way of stating it.

Theodorus/ That's very good hearing, Socrates, for when these matters were concluded I was to be set free from my task of answering you, according to our agreement, which specified the end of the discussion of Protagoras' theory.

Theaetetus/ Oh, no, indeed, Theodorus! Not till you and Socrates have done what you proposed just now, and dealt with the other side, the people who say that the Universe stands still.

Theodorus/ What's this, Theaetetus? You at your age teaching your elders to be unjust and break their agreements? What you have got to do is to prepare to render account to Socrates yourself for the rest of the discussion.

Theaetetus/ All right, if he likes. But I would rather have listened to a discussion of these views.

Theodorus/ Well, challenging Socrates to an argument is like inviting 'cavalry into the plain'. So ask your questions and you shall hear.

Socrates/ But I don't think, Theodorus, that I am going to be persuaded by Theaetetus to do what he demands.

Theodorus/ But what is it makes you unwilling?

Socrates/ Shame. I am afraid our criticism might be a very cheap affair. And if I feel like this before the many who have made the universe one and unmoved, Melissus and the rest of them, I feel it still more in the face of the One—Parmenides. Parmenides seems to me, in the words of Homer, to be 'reverend' and 'awful'. I met him when I was very young and he was a very old man; and he seemed to me to have a wholly noble depth. So I am afraid we might not understand even what he says; still less should we attain to his real thought. Above all, I am afraid that the very object of our discussion, the nature of knowledge, might be left unexamined amid the crowd of theories that will rush in upon us if we admit them; especially as the theory we have now brought up is one which involves unmanageably vast issues. To treat it as a sideshow would be insult and injury; while if it is adequately discussed, it is likely to spread out until it completely eclipses the problems of knowledge. We must not do either. What we must do is to make use of our midwife's art to deliver Theaetetus of the thoughts which he has conceived about the nature of knowledge.

Theodorus/ Well, if that is what you think proper, it must be done.

Socrates/ Now, Theaetetus, I want you to think about one point in what has been said. Your answer was that knowledge is perception, wasn't it?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now supposing you were asked: 'With what does a man see white and black, and with what does he hear high and low notes?' You would reply, I imagine, 'With his eyes and ears.'

Theaetetus/ I should, yes.

Socrates/ Now as a rule it is no sign of ill-breeding to be easy in the use of language and take no particular care in one's choice of words; it is rather the opposite that gives a man away. But such exactness is sometimes necessary; and it is necessary here, for example, to fasten upon something in your answer that is not correct. Think now. Is it more correct to say that the eyes are that with which we see, or that through which we see? Do we hear with the ears or through the ears?

Theaetetus/ Well, I should think, Socrates, that it is 'through which' we perceive in each case, rather than 'with which.'

Socrates/ Yes, my son. It would be a very strange thing, I must say, if there were a number of perceptions sitting inside us as if we were Wooden Horses, and there were not some single form, soul or whatever one ought to call it, to which all these converge—something with which, through the senses, as if they were instruments, we perceive all that is perceptible.

Theaetetus/ That sounds to me better than the other way of putting it.

Socrates/ Now the reason why I am being so precise with you is this. I want to know if it is with one and the same part of ourselves that we reach, through our eyes to white and black, and through the other means to yet further things; and whether, if asked, you will be able to refer all these to the body. But perhaps it would be better if you stated the answers yourself, rather than that I should busy myself on your behalf. Tell me: the instruments through which you perceive hot, hard, light, sweet—do you consider that they all belong to the body? Or can they be referred elsewhere?

Theaetetus/ No, they all belong to the body.

Socrates/ And are you also willing to admit that what you perceive through one power, you can't perceive through another? For instance, what you perceive through hearing,

you couldn't perceive through sight, and similarly what you perceive through sight you couldn't perceive through hearing?

Theaetetus/ I could hardly refuse to grant that.

Socrates/ Then suppose you think something about both; you can't possibly be having a perception about both, either through one of these instruments or through the other?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Now take a sound and a color. First of all, don't you think this same thing about both of them, namely, that they both are?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Also that each of them is different from the other and the same as itself?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And that both together are two, and each of them is one?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I think that too.

Socrates/ Are you also able to consider whether they are like or unlike each other?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I may be.

Socrates/ Now what is it through which you think all these things about them? It is not possible, you see, to grasp what is common to both either through sight or through hearing. Let us consider another thing which will show the truth of what we are saying. Suppose it were possible to inquire whether both are salty or not. You can tell me, of course, with what you would examine them. It would clearly be neither sight nor hearing, but something else.

Theaetetus/ Yes, of course; the power which functions through the tongue.

Socrates/ Good. Now through what does that power function which reveals to you what is common in the case both of all things and of these two—I mean that which you express by the words 'is' and 'is not' and the other terms used in our questions about them just now? What kind of instruments will you assign for all these? Through what does that which is percipient in us perceive all of them?

Theaetetus/ You mean being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, same and different; also one, and any other number applied to them. And obviously too your question is about odd and even, and all that is involved with these attributes; and you want to know through what bodily instruments we perceive all these with the soul.

Socrates/ You follow me exceedingly well, Theaetetus. These are just the things I am asking about.

Theaetetus/ But I couldn't possibly say. All I can tell you is that it doesn't seem to me that for these things there is any special instrument at all, as there is for the others. It seems to me that in investigating the common features of everything the soul functions through itself.

Socrates/ Yes, Theaetetus, you would say that, because you are handsome and not ugly as Theodorus would have it. For handsome is as handsome says. And besides being handsome, you have done me a good turn; you have saved me a vast amount of talk if it seems to you that, while the soul considers some things through the bodily powers, there are others which it considers alone and through itself. This was what I thought myself, but I wanted you to think it too.

Theaetetus/ Well, it does seem to me to be so.

Socrates/ Now in which class do you put being? For that, above all, is something that accompanies everything.

Theaetetus/ I should put it among the things which the soul itself reaches out after by itself.

Socrates/ Also like and unlike, same and different?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ What about beautiful and ugly, good and bad?

Theaetetus/ Yes, these too; in these, above all, I think the soul examines their being in comparison with one another. Here it seems to be making a calculation within itself of past and present in relation to future.

Socrates/ Not so fast, now. Wouldn't you say that it is through touch that the soul perceives the hardness of what is hard, and similarly the softness of what is soft?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But as regards their being—the fact that they are—their opposition to one another, and the being, again, of this opposition, the matter is different. Here the soul itself attempts to reach a decision for us by rising to compare them with one another.

Theaetetus/ Yes, undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And thus there are some things which all creatures, men and animals alike, are naturally able to perceive as soon as they are born; I mean, the experiences which reach the soul through the body. But calculations regarding their being and their advantageousness come, when they do, only as the result of a long and arduous development, involving a good deal of trouble and education.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that certainly is so.

Socrates/ Now is it possible for someone who does not even get at being to get at truth?

Theaetetus/ No; it's impossible.

Socrates/ And if a man fails to get at the truth of a thing, will he ever be a person who knows that thing?

Theaetetus/ I don't see how, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then knowledge is to be found not in the experiences but in the process of reasoning about them; it is here, seemingly, not in the experiences, that it is possible to grasp being and truth.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Then in the face of such differences, would you call both by the same name?

Theaetetus/ One would certainly have no right to.

Socrates/ Now what name do you give to the former—seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling cold or warm?

Theaetetus/ I call that perceiving—what else could I call it?

Socrates/ So the whole lot taken together you call perception?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Which, we say, has no share in the grasping of truth, since it has none in the grasping of being.

Theaetetus/ No, it has none.

Socrates/ So it has no share in knowledge either.

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could never be the same thing.

Theaetetus/ No, apparently not, Socrates; we have now got the clearest possible proof that knowledge is something different from perception.

Socrates/ But our object in beginning this discussion was not to find out what knowledge is not, but to find out what it is. However, we have made a little progress. We shall not now look for knowledge in sense-perception at all, but in whatever we call that activity of the soul when it is busy by itself about the things which are.

Theaetetus/ Well, the name, Socrates, I suppose is judgment.

Socrates/ Your opinion, my dear lad, is correct. Now look back to the beginning. Wipe out all that we have said hitherto, and see if you can see any better from where you have now progressed to. Tell me again, what is knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, one can't say that it is judgment in general, because there is also false judgment—but true judgment may well be knowledge. So let that be my answer. If the same thing happens again, and we find, as we go on, that it turns out not to be so, we'll try something else.

Socrates/ And even so, Theaetetus, you have answered me in the way one ought—with a good will, and not reluctantly, as you did at first. If we continue like this, one of two things will happen. Either we shall find what we are going out after; or we shall be less inclined to think we know things which we don't know at all—and even that would be a reward we could not fairly be dissatisfied with. Now what is this that you say? There are two forms of judgment, true and false; and your definition is that true judgment is knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Yes. That is how it looks to me now.

Socrates/ Now I wonder if it's worthwhile, at this stage, to go back to an old point about judgment—

Theaetetus/ What point do you mean?

Socrates/ I have something on my mind which has often bothered me before, and got me into great difficulty, both in my own thought and in discussion with other people—I mean, I can't say what it is, this experience we have, and how it arises in us.

Theaetetus/ What experience?

Socrates/ Judging what is false. Even now, you know, I'm still considering; I'm in two minds whether to let it go or whether to look into it in a different manner from a short while ago.

Theaetetus/ Why not, Socrates, if this appears for any reason to be the right thing to do? As you and Theodorus were saying just now, and quite rightly, when you were talking about leisure, we are not pressed for time in talk of this kind.

Socrates/ A very proper reminder. Perhaps it would not be a bad moment to go back upon our tracks. It is better to accomplish a little well than a great deal unsatisfactorily.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it certainly is.

Socrates/ Now how are we to proceed? And actually what is it that we are saying? We claim, don't we, that false judgment repeatedly occurs and one of us judges falsely, the other truly, as if it was in the nature of things for this to happen?

Theaetetus/ That is what we claim.

Socrates/ Now isn't it true about all things, together or individually, that we must either know them or not know them? I am ignoring for the moment the intermediate conditions of learning and forgetting, as they don't affect the argument here.

Theaetetus/ Of course, Socrates, in that case there is no alternative. With each thing we either know it or we do not.

Socrates/ Then when a man judges, the objects of his judgment are necessarily either things which he knows or things which he doesn't know?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that must be so.

Socrates/ Yet if he knows a thing, it is impossible that he should not know it; or if he does not know it, he cannot know it.

Theaetetus/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ Now take the man who judges what is false. Is he thinking that things which he knows are not these things

but some other things which he knows—so that knowing both he is ignorant of both?

Theaetetus/ But that would be impossible, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then is he imagining that things which he doesn't know are other things which he doesn't know? Is it possible that a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should take it into his head that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

Theaetetus/ I don't see how that could happen.

Socrates/ But a man certainly doesn't think that things he knows are things he does not know, or again that things he doesn't know are things he knows.

Theaetetus/ No, that would be a very odd thing.

Socrates/ Then in what way is false judgment still possible? There is evidently no possibility of judgment outside the cases we have mentioned, since everything is either a thing we know or a thing we don't know; and within these limits there appears to be no place for false judgment to be possible.

Theaetetus/ That's perfectly true.

Socrates/ Then perhaps we had better take up a different line of inquiry; perhaps we should proceed not by way of knowing and not-knowing, but by way of being and not-being?

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Perhaps the simple fact is this: it is when a man judges about anything things which are not, that he is inevitably judging falsely, no matter what may be the nature of his thought in other respects.

Theaetetus/ That again is very plausible, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now how will that be? What are we going to say, Theaetetus, if somebody sets about examining us, and we are asked, 'Is what these words express possible for anyone? Can

a man judge what is not, either about one of the things which are, or just by itself?' I suppose we shall reply, 'Yes, when he is thinking, but thinking what is not true.' Or how shall we answer?

Theaetetus/ That's our answer.

Socrates/ Now does this kind of thing happen elsewhere?

Theaetetus/ What kind of thing?

Socrates/ Well, for instance, that a man sees something, yet sees nothing.

Theaetetus/ How could he?

Socrates/ On the contrary, in fact, if he is seeing anyone thing, he must be seeing a thing which is. Or do you think that a 'one' can be found among the things which are not?

Theaetetus/ I certainly don't.

Socrates/ Then a man who is seeing anyone thing is seeing something which is?

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ It also follows that a man who is hearing anything is hearing some one thing and something which is.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And a man who is touching anything is touching some one thing, and a thing which is, if it is one?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that also follows.

Socrates/ And a man who is judging is judging some one thing, is he not?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And a man who is judging some one thing is judging something which is?

Theaetetus/ I grant that.

Socrates/ Then that means that a man who is judging something which is not is judging nothing?

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But a man who is judging nothing is not judging at all.

Theaetetus/ That seems clear.

Socrates/ And so it is not possible to judge what is not, either about the things which are or just by itself.

Theaetetus/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ False judgment, then, is something different from judging things which are not?

Theaetetus/ It looks as if it were.

Socrates/ Then neither on this approach nor on the one we followed just now does false judgment exist in us.

Theaetetus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Then is it in this way that the thing we call by that name arises?

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ We say that there is false judgment, a kind of 'other-judging', when a man, in place of one of the things that are, has substituted in his thought another of the things that are and asserts that it is in this way, he is always judging something which is, but judges one thing in place of another; and having missed the thing which was the object of his consideration, he might fairly be called one who judges falsely.

Theaetetus/ Now you seem to me to have got it quite right. When a man judges 'ugly' instead of 'beautiful', or 'beautiful' instead of 'ugly', then he is truly judging what is false.

Socrates/ Evidently, Theaetetus, you have not much opinion of me; you don't find me at all alarming.

Theaetetus/ What in particular makes you say that?

Socrates/ Well, I suppose you don't think me capable of taking up your 'truly false', and asking you whether it is possible that a thing should be slowly swift, or heavily light,

or whether anything else can possibly occur in a way not in accordance with its own nature but in accordance with that of its opposite and contrary to itself. But let that pass; I don't want your boldness to go unrewarded. You like the suggestion, you say, that false judgment is 'other-judging'?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Then, according to your judgment, it is possible to set down a thing in one's thought as another thing and not itself?

Theaetetus/ Surely it is.

Socrates/ Now when a man's thought is accomplishing this, isn't it essential that he should be thinking of either one or both of these two things?

Theaetetus/ It is essential; either both together, or each in turn.

Socrates/ Very good. Now by 'thinking' do you mean the same as I do?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by it?

Socrates/ A talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. Of course, I'm only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have of it. It seems to me that the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call this its judgment. So, in my view, to judge is to make a statement, and a judgment is a statement which is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself. And what do you think?

Theaetetus/ I agree with that.

Socrates/ So that when a man judges one thing to be another, what he is doing, apparently, is to say to himself that the one thing is the other.

Theaetetus/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ Now try to think if you have ever said to yourself 'Surely the beautiful is ugly', or 'The unjust is certainly just'. Or—to put it in the most general terms—have you ever tried to persuade yourself that 'Surely one thing is another'? Wouldn't the very opposite of this be the truth? Wouldn't the truth be that not even in your sleep have you ever gone so far as to say to yourself 'No doubt the odd is even', or anything of that kind?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that's so.

Socrates/ And do you think that anyone else, in his right mind or out of it, ever ventured seriously to tell himself, with the hope of winning his own assent, that 'A cow must be a horse' or 'Two must be one'?

Theaetetus/ No, indeed I don't.

Socrates/ Well, then, if to make a statement to oneself is to judge, no one who makes a statement, that is, a judgment, about both things, getting hold of both with his soul, can state, or judge, that one is the other. And you, in your turn, must let this form of words pass. What I mean by it is this: no one judges 'The ugly is beautiful' or makes any other such judgment.

Theaetetus/ All right, Socrates, I pass it; and I think you're right.

Socrates/ Thus a man who has both things before his mind when he judges cannot possibly judge that one is the other.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But if he has only one of them before his mind in judging, and the other is not present to him at all, he will never judge that one is the other.

Theaetetus/ That's true. For he would have to have hold also of the one that is not present to his judgment.

Socrates/ Then 'other-judging' is not possible for anyone either when he has both things present to him in judgment or when he has one only. So, if anyone is going to define false judgment as 'heterodoxy', he will be saying nothing. The existence of false judgment in us cannot be shown in this way any more than by our previous approaches.

Theaetetus/ It seems not.

Socrates/ And yet, Theaetetus, if it is not shown to exist, we shall be driven into admitting a number of absurdities.

Theaetetus/ And what would they be?

Socrates/ I am not going to tell you until I have tried every possible way of looking at this matter. I should be ashamed to see us forced into making the kind of admissions I mean while we are still in difficulties. If we find what we're after, and become free men, then we will turn round and talk about how these things happen to other people—having secured our own persons against ridicule. While if we can't find any way of extricating ourselves, then I suppose we shall be laid low, like seasick passengers, and give ourselves into the hands of the argument and let it trample all over us and do what it likes with us. And now let me tell you where I see a way still open to this inquiry.

Theaetetus/ Yes, do tell me.

Socrates/ I am going to maintain that we were wrong to agree that it is impossible for a man to be in error through judging that things he knows are things he doesn't know. In a way, it is possible.

Theaetetus/ Now I wonder if you mean the same thing as I too suspected at the time when we suggested it was like that—I mean, that sometimes I, who know Socrates, have seen someone else in the distance whom I don't know and thought it to be Socrates whom I do know. In a case like that, the sort of thing you are referring to does happen.

Socrates/ But didn't we recoil from this suggestion because it made us not know, when we do know, things which we know?

Theaetetus/ Yes, we certainly did.

Socrates/ Then don't let us put the case in that way; let's try another way. It may prove amenable or it may be obstinate; but the fact is we are in such an extremity that we need to turn every argument over and over and test it from all sides. Now see if there is anything in this. Is it possible to learn something you didn't know before?

Theaetetus/ Surely it is.

Socrates/ And again another and yet another thing?

Theaetetus/ Well, why not?

Socrates/ Now I want you to suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we have in our souls a block of wax, larger in one person, smaller in another, and of purer wax in one case, dirtier in another; in some men rather hard, in others rather soft, while in some it is of the proper consistency.

Theaetetus/ All right, I'm supposing that.

Socrates/ We may look upon it, then, as a gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses. We make impressions upon this of everything we wish to remember among the things we have seen or heard or thought of ourselves; we hold the wax under our perceptions and thoughts and take a stamp from them, in the way in which we take the imprints of signet rings. Whatever is impressed upon the wax we remember and know so long as the image remains in the wax; whatever is

obliterated or cannot be impressed, we forget and do not know.

Theaetetus/ Let that be our supposition.

Socrates/ Then take the case of a man who knows these things, but is also considering something he is seeing or hearing; and see if he might judge falsely in this way.

Theaetetus/ In what kind of way?

Socrates/ In thinking, of things which he knows, sometimes that they are things which he knows and sometimes that they are things which he doesn't know—these cases being what at an earlier stage we wrongly admitted to be impossible.

Theaetetus/ And what do you say now?

Socrates/ We must begin this discussion by making certain distinctions. We must make it clear that it is impossible to think () that a thing you know, because you possess the record of it in your soul, but which you are not perceiving, is another thing which you know—you have its imprint too—but are not perceiving, () that a thing you know is something you do not know and do not have the seal of, () that a thing you don't know is another thing you don't know, () that a thing you don't know is a thing you know.

Again, it is impossible to think () that a thing you are perceiving is another thing that you are perceiving, () that a thing you are perceiving is a thing which you are not perceiving, () that a thing you are not perceiving is another thing you are not perceiving, () that a thing you are not perceiving is a thing you are perceiving.

Yet again, it is impossible to think () that a thing you both know and are perceiving, when you are holding its imprint in line with your perception of it, is another thing which you know and are perceiving, and whose imprint you keep in line with the perception (this indeed is even more impossible than

the former cases, if that can be), () that a thing which you both know and are perceiving, and the record of which you are keeping in its true line, is another thing you know, () that a thing you both know and are perceiving and of which you have the record correctly in line as before, is another thing you are perceiving, () that a thing you neither know nor are perceiving is another thing you neither know nor perceive, () that a thing you neither know nor perceive is another thing you don't know, () that a thing you neither know nor perceive is another thing you are not perceiving.

In all these cases, it is a sheer impossibility that there should be false judgment. It remains that it arises, if anywhere, in the cases I am just going to tell you.

Theaetetus/ What are they? Perhaps I may understand a little better from them; at present, I don't follow.

Socrates/ In these cases of things you know: when you think () that they are other things you know and are perceiving, () that they are things you don't know but are perceiving, () that things you both know and are perceiving are other things you both know and are perceiving.

Theaetetus/ Well, now you have left me further behind than ever.

Socrates/ I'll go over it again in another way. I know Theodorus and remember within myself what he is like; and in the same way I know Theaetetus. But sometimes I am seeing them and sometimes not; sometimes I am touching them, and sometimes not; or I may hear them or perceive them through some other sense, while at other times I have no perception about you two at all, but remember you none the less, and know you within myself—isn't that so?

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Now please take this first point that I want to make clear to you—that we sometimes perceive and sometimes do not perceive the things that we know.

Theaetetus/ That's true.

Socrates/ Then as regards the things we don't know, we often don't perceive them either, but often we only perceive them.

Theaetetus/ That is so, also.

Socrates/ Now see if you can follow me a little better. Supposing Socrates knows both Theodorus and Theaetetus, but is not seeing either of them, or having any other perception about them: he could never in that case judge within himself that Theaetetus was Theodorus. Is that sense or not?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that's quite true.

Socrates/ This, then, was the first of the cases I was speaking of.

Theaetetus/ It was.

Socrates/ Secondly then. Supposing I am acquainted with one of you and not the other, and am perceiving neither of you: in that case, I could never think the one I do know to be the one I don't know.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Thirdly, supposing I am not acquainted with either of you, and am not perceiving either of you: I could not possibly think that one of you, whom I don't know, is another of you whom I don't know. Now will you please take it that you have heard all over again in succession the other cases described before—the cases in which I shall never judge falsely about you and Theodorus, either when I am familiar or when I am unfamiliar with both of you; or when I know one

and not the other. And similarly with perceptions, you follow me.

Theaetetus/ I follow.

Socrates/ So there remains the possibility of false judgment in this case, I know both you and Theodorus; I have your signs upon that block of wax, like the imprints of rings. Then I see you both in the distance, but cannot see you well enough; but I am in a hurry to refer the proper sign to the proper visual perception, and so get this fitted into the trace of itself, that recognition may take place. This I fail to do; I get them out of line, applying the visual perception of the one to the sign of the other. It is like people putting their shoes on the wrong feet, or like what happens when we look at things in mirrors, when left and right change places. It is then that 'heterodoxy' or false judgment arises.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that seems very likely, Socrates; it is an awfully good description of what happens to the judgment.

Socrates/ Then, again, supposing I know both of you, and am also perceiving one of you, and not the other, but am not keeping my knowledge of the former in line with my perception—that's the expression I used before and you didn't understand me then.

Theaetetus/ No, I certainly didn't.

Socrates/ Well, I was saying that if you know one man and perceive him as well, and keep your knowledge of him in line with your perception, you will never take him for some other person whom you know and are perceiving, and the knowledge of whom you are holding straight with the perception. Wasn't that so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ There remained, I take it, the case we have just mentioned where false judgment arises in the following manner: you know both men and you are looking at both, or

having some other perception of them; and you don't hold the two signs each in line with its own perception, but like a bad archer you shoot beside the mark and miss—which is precisely what we call falsehood.

Theaetetus/ Naturally so.

Socrates/ And when for one of the signs there is also a present perception but there is not for the other, and you try to fit to the present perception the sign belonging to the absent perception, in all such cases thought is in error.

We may sum up thus: it seems that in the case of things we do not know and have never perceived, there is no possibility of error or of false judgment, if what we are saying is at all sound; it is in cases where we both know things and are perceiving them that judgment is erratic and varies between truth and falsity. When it brings together the proper stamps and records directly and in straight lines, it is true; when it does so obliquely and crosswise, it is false.

Theaetetus/ Well, isn't that beautiful, Socrates?

Socrates/ Ah, when you've heard what is coming next, you will say so all the more. For true judgment is beautiful, right enough, and error is ugly.

Theaetetus/ No doubt about that.

Socrates/ Well, this, then, they say, is why the two things occur. In some men, the wax in the soul is deep and abundant, smooth and worked to the proper consistency; and when the things that come through the senses are imprinted upon this 'heart' of the soul—as Homer calls it, hinting at the likeness to the wax—the signs that are made in it are lasting, because they are clear and have sufficient depth. Men with such souls learn easily and remember what they learn; they do not get the signs out of line with the perceptions, but judge truly. As the signs are distinct and there is plenty of room for them, they quickly assign each thing to its own impress in the

wax—the things in question being, of course, what we call the things that are and these people being the ones we call wise.

Or do you feel any doubts about this?

Theaetetus/ No, I find it extraordinarily convincing.

Socrates/ But it is a different matter when a man's 'heart' is 'shaggy' (the kind of heart our marvelously knowing poet praises), or when it is dirty and of impure wax; or when it is very soft or hard. Persons in whom the wax is soft are quick to learn but quick to forget; when the wax is hard, the opposite happens. Those in whom it is 'shaggy' and rugged, a stony thing with earth or filth mixed all through it, have indistinct impressions. So too if the wax is hard, for then the impressions have no depth; similarly they are indistinct if the wax is soft, because they quickly run together and are blurred. If, in addition to all this, the impresses in the wax are crowded upon each other for lack of space, because it is only some little scrap of a soul, they are even more indistinct. All such people are liable to false judgment. When they see or hear or think of anything, they can't quickly allot each thing to each impress; they are slow and allot things to impresses which do not belong to them, misseeing, mishearing and misthinking most of them—and these in turn are the ones we describe as in error about the things that are and ignorant.

Theaetetus/ That's exactly it, Socrates; no man could improve on your account.

Socrates/ Then are we to say that false judgments do exist in us?

Theaetetus/ Yes, most emphatically.

Socrates/ And true ones, of course?

Theaetetus/ And true ones.

Socrates/ And we think we have now reached a satisfactory agreement, when we say that these two kinds of judgment certainly exist?

Theaetetus/ There's no earthly doubt about it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Theaetetus, I'm afraid a garrulous man is really an awful nuisance.

Theaetetus/ Why, what are you talking about?

Socrates/ I'm annoyed at my own stupidity—my own true garrulousness. What else could you call it when a man will keep dragging arguments up and down, because he is too slow-witted to reach any conviction, and will not be pulled off any of them?

Theaetetus/ But why should you be annoyed?

Socrates/ I am not only annoyed; I am alarmed. I am afraid of what I may say if someone asks me: 'So, Socrates, you've discovered false judgment, have you? You have found that it arises not in the relation of perceptions to one another, or of thoughts to one another, but in the connecting of perception with thought?' I believe I am very likely to say 'Yes', with an air of flattering myself upon our having made some beautiful discovery.

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, what you have just shown us looks to me quite a presentable thing anyway.

Socrates/ 'You mean', he goes on, 'that we would never suppose that a man we are merely thinking of but not seeing is a horse which again we are not seeing or touching, but just thinking of and not perceiving anything else about it?' I suppose I shall agree that we do mean this.

Theaetetus/ Yes, and quite rightly.

Socrates/ 'Well then,' he goes on, 'doesn't it follow from this theory that a man couldn't possibly suppose that eleven, which he is merely thinking about, is twelve, which again he is merely thinking about?' Come now, you answer.

Theaetetus/ Well, my answer will be that someone who is seeing or touching them could suppose that eleven are twelve,

but not with those that he has in his thought: he would never judge this in that way about them.

Socrates/ Well, now, take the case where a man is considering five and seven within himself—I don't mean seven men and five men, or anything of that sort, but five and seven themselves; the records, as we allege, in that waxen block, things among which it is not possible that there should be false judgment. Suppose he is talking to himself about them, and asking himself how many they are. Do you think that in such a case it has ever happened that one man thought they were eleven and said so, while another thought and said that they were twelve? Or do all men say and all men think that they are twelve?

Theaetetus/ Oh, good Heavens, no; lots of people would make them eleven. And with larger numbers they go wrong still more often—for I suppose what you say is intended to apply to all numbers.

Socrates/ Quite right. And I want you to consider whether what happens here is not just this, that a man thinks that twelve itself, the one on the waxen block, is eleven.

Theaetetus/ It certainly looks as if he does.

Socrates/ Then haven't we come back to the things we were saying at the outset? You see, anyone to whom this happens is thinking that one thing he knows is another thing he knows. And this we said was impossible; in fact, it was just this consideration which led us to exclude the possibility of false judgment, because, if admitted, it would mean that the same man must, at one and the same time, both know and not know the same objects.

Theaetetus/ That's perfectly true.

Socrates/ Then we shall have to say that false judgment is something other than a misapplication of thought to perception; because if this were so, we could never be in error

so long as we remained within our thoughts themselves. But as the matter now stands, either there is no such thing as false judgment; or a man may not know what he knows. Which do you choose?

Theaetetus/ You are offering me an impossible choice, Socrates.

Socrates/ But I'm afraid the argument will not permit both. Still—we must stop at nothing; supposing now we were to set about being quite shameless?

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ By consenting to say what knowing is like.

Theaetetus/ And why should that be shameless?

Socrates/ You don't seem to realize that our whole discussion from the beginning has been an inquiry about knowledge, on the assumption that we do not yet know what it is.

Theaetetus/ Oh but I do.

Socrates/ Well, then, don't you think it is a shameless thing that we, who don't know what knowledge is, should pronounce on what knowing is like? But as a matter of fact, Theaetetus, for some time past our whole method of discussion has been tainted. Time and again we have said 'we are acquainted with' and 'we are not acquainted with', 'we know' and 'we do not know', as if we could to some extent understand one another while we are still ignorant of what knowledge is. Or here's another example, if you like: at this very moment, we have again used the words 'to be ignorant of, and 'to understand', as if these were quite proper expressions for us when we are deprived of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ But how are you going to carry on the discussion at all, Socrates, if you keep off these words?

Socrates/ Quite impossible, for a man like me; but if I were one of the experts in contradiction, I might be able to. If one of those gentlemen were present, he would have commanded us to refrain from them, and would keep coming down upon us heavily for the faults I'm referring to. But since we are no good anyway, why don't I make bold to tell you what knowing is like? It seems to me that this might be of some help.

Theaetetus/ Then do be bold, please. And if you don't keep from using these words, we'll forgive you all right.

Socrates/ Well, then, have you heard what people are saying nowadays that knowing is?

Theaetetus/ I dare say I have; but I don't remember it at the moment.

Socrates/ Well, they say, of course, that it is 'the having of knowledge'.

Theaetetus/ Oh, yes, that's true.

Socrates/ Let us make a slight change; let us say 'the possession of knowledge'.

Theaetetus/ And how would you say that was different from the first way of putting it?

Socrates/ Perhaps it isn't at all; but I will tell you what I think the difference is, and then you must help me to examine it.

Theaetetus/ All right—if I can.

Socrates/ Well, then, to 'possess' doesn't seem to me to be the same as to 'have'. For instance, suppose a man has bought a coat and it is at his disposal but he is not wearing it; we would not say that he 'has' it on, but we would say he 'possesses' it.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that would be correct.

Socrates/ Now look here: is it possible in this way to possess knowledge and not 'have' it? Suppose a man were to

hunt wild birds, pigeons or something, and make an aviary for them at his house and look after them there; then, in a sense, I suppose, we might say he 'has' them all the time, because of course he possesses them. Isn't that so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But in another sense he 'has' none of them; it is only that he has acquired a certain power in respect of them, because he has got them under his control in an enclosure of his own. That is to say, he has the power to hunt for anyone he likes at any time, and take and 'have' it whenever he chooses, and let it go again; and this he can do as often as he likes.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Well a little while ago we were equipping souls with I don't know what sort of a waxen device. Now let us make in each soul a sort of aviary of all kinds of birds; some in flocks separate from the others, some in small groups, and others flying about singly here and there among all the rest.

Theaetetus/ All right, let us suppose it made. What then?

Socrates/ Then we must say that when we are children this receptacle is empty; and by the birds we must understand pieces of knowledge. When anyone takes possession of a piece of knowledge and shuts it up in the pen, we should say that he has learned or has found out the thing of which this is the knowledge; and knowing, we should say, is this.

Theaetetus/ That's given, then.

Socrates/ Now think: when he hunts again for anyone of the pieces of knowledge that he chooses, and takes it and 'has' it, then lets it go again, what words are appropriate here? The same as before, when he took possession of the knowledge, or different ones? —You will see my point more clearly in this way. There is an art you call arithmetic, isn't there?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now I want you to think of this as a hunt for pieces of knowledge concerning everything odd and even.

Theaetetus/ All right, I will.

Socrates/ It is by virtue of this art, I suppose, that a man both has under his control pieces of knowledge concerning numbers and also hands them over to others?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we call it 'teaching' when a man hands them over to others, and 'learning' when he gets them handed over to him; and when he 'has' them through possessing them in this aviary of ours, we call that 'knowing'.

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Now you must give your attention to what is coming next. It must surely be true that a man who has completely mastered arithmetic knows all numbers? Because there are pieces of knowledge covering all numbers in his soul.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And a man so trained may proceed to do some counting, either counting to himself the numbers themselves, or counting something else, one of the external things which have number?

Theaetetus/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ And counting we shall take to be simply a matter of considering how large a number actually is?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then it looks as if this man were considering something which he knows as if he did not know it (for we have granted that he knows all numbers). I've no doubt you've had such puzzles put to you.

Theaetetus/ I have, yes.

Socrates/ Then using our image of possessing and hunting for the pigeons, we shall say that there are two phases of hunting; one before you have possession in order to get possession, and another when you already possess in order to catch and have in your hands what you previously acquired. And in this way even with things you learned and got the knowledge of long ago and have known ever since, it is possible to learn them—these same things—all over again. You can take up again and 'have' that knowledge of each of them which you acquired long ago but had not ready to hand in your thought, can't you?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Now this is what I meant by my question a moment ago. What terms ought we to use about them when we speak of what the arithmetician does when he proceeds to count, or the scholar when he proceeds to read something? Here, it seems, a man who knows something is setting out to learn again from himself things which he already knows.

Theaetetus/ But that would be a very odd thing, Socrates.

Socrates/ But are we to say that it is things which he does not know that such a man is going to read and count—remembering that we have granted him knowledge of all letters and all numbers?

Theaetetus/ That wouldn't be reasonable, either.

Socrates/ Then would you like us to take this line? Suppose we say we do not mind at all about the names; let people drag around the terms 'knowing' and 'learning' to their heart's content. We have determined that to 'possess' knowledge is one thing and to 'have' it is another; accordingly we maintain that it is impossible for anyone not to possess that which he has possession of, and thus, it never happens that he does not know something he knows. But he may yet make a false judgment about it. This is because it is possible

for him to 'have', not the knowledge of this thing, but another piece of knowledge instead. When he is hunting for one piece of knowledge, it may happen, as they fly about, that he makes a mistake and gets hold of one instead of another. It was this that happened when he thought eleven was twelve. He got hold of the knowledge of eleven that was in him, instead of the knowledge of twelve, as you might catch a ring-dove instead of a pigeon.

Theaetetus/ Yes; that is reasonable, now.

Socrates/ But when he gets hold of the one he is trying to get hold of, then he is free from error; when he does that, he is judging what is. In this way, both true and false judgment exist; and the things that worried us before no longer stand in our way. I daresay you'll agree with me? Or, if not, what line will you take?

Theaetetus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Yes; we have now got rid of this 'not knowing what one knows'. For we now find that at no point does it happen that we do not possess what we possess, whether we are in error about anything or not. But it looks to me as if something else more alarming is by way of coming upon us.

Theaetetus/ What's that?

Socrates/ I mean, what is involved if false judgment is going to become a matter of an interchange of pieces of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ To begin with, it follows that a man who has knowledge of something is ignorant of this very thing not through want of knowledge but actually in virtue of his knowledge. Secondly, he judges that this is something else and that the other thing is it. Now surely this is utterly unreasonable; it means that the soul, when knowledge becomes present to it, knows nothing and is wholly ignorant.

According to this argument, there is no reason why an accession of ignorance should not make one know something, or of blindness make one see something, if knowledge is ever going to make a man ignorant.

Theaetetus/ Well, perhaps, Socrates, it wasn't a happy thought to make the birds only pieces of knowledge. Perhaps we ought to have supposed that there are pieces of ignorance also flying about in the soul along with them, and what happens is that the hunter sometimes catches a piece of knowledge and sometimes a piece of ignorance concerning the same thing; and the ignorance makes him judge falsely, while the knowledge makes him judge truly.

Socrates/ I can hardly refrain from expressing my admiration of you, Theaetetus; but do think again about that. Let us suppose it is as you say: then, you maintain, the man who catches a piece of ignorance will judge falsely. Is that it?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But presumably he will not think he is judging falsely?

Theaetetus/ No, of course he won't.

Socrates/ He will think he is judging what is true; and his attitude towards the things about which he is in error will be as if he knew them.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ He will think he has hunted down and 'has' a piece of knowledge and not a piece of ignorance.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that's clear.

Socrates/ So, after going a long way round, we are back at our original difficulty. Our friend the expert in refutation will laugh. 'My very good people,' he will say, 'do you mean that a man who knows both knowledge and ignorance is thinking that one of them which he knows is the other which he knows?

Or is it that he knows neither, and judges the one he doesn't know to be the other which he doesn't know? Or is it that he knows one and not the other, and judges that the one he knows is the one he doesn't know? Or does he think that the one he doesn't know is the one he does? Or are you going to start all over again and tell me that there's another set of pieces of knowledge concerning pieces of knowledge and ignorance, which a man may possess shut up in some other ridiculous aviaries or waxen devices, which he knows so long as he possesses them though he may not have them ready to hand in his soul—and in this way end up forced to come running round to the same place over and over again and never get any further?' What are we going to say to that, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Oh, dear me, Socrates, I don't know what one ought to say.

Socrates/ Then don't you think, my boy, that the argument is perhaps dealing out a little proper chastisement, and showing us that we were wrong to leave the question about knowledge and proceed to inquire into false judgment first? While as a matter of fact it's impossible to know this until we have an adequate grasp of what knowledge is.

Theaetetus/ Well, at the moment, Socrates, I feel bound to believe you.

Socrates/ Then, to go back to the beginning, what are we going to say knowledge is? —We are not, I suppose, going to give up yet?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not, unless you give up yourself.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, how could we define it with the least risk of contradicting ourselves?

Theaetetus/ In the way we were attempting before, Socrates; I can't think of any other.

Socrates/ In what way do you mean?

Theaetetus/ By saying that knowledge is true judgment. Judging truly is at least something free of mistakes, I take it, and everything that results from it is admirable and good.

Socrates/ Well, Theaetetus, as the man who was leading the way across the river said, 'It will show you.' If we go on and track this down, perhaps we may stumble on what we are looking for; if we stay where we are, nothing will come clear.

Theaetetus/ You're right; let's go on and consider it.

Socrates/ Well, this won't take long to consider, anyway; there is a whole art indicating to you that knowledge is not what you say.

Theaetetus/ How's that? What art do you mean?

Socrates/ The art of the greatest representatives of wisdom—the men called orators and lawyers. These men, I take it, use their art to produce conviction not by teaching people, but by making them judge whatever they themselves choose. Or do you think there are any teachers so clever that within the short time allowed by the clock they can teach adequately to people who were not eye-witnesses the truth of what happened to people who have been robbed or assaulted, in a case where there were no eye-witnesses?

Theaetetus/ No, I don't think they possibly could; but they might be able to persuade them.

Socrates/ And by 'persuading them,' you mean 'causing them to judge,' don't you?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then suppose a jury has been justly persuaded of some matter which only an eye-witness could know, and which cannot otherwise be known; suppose they come to their decision upon hearsay, forming a true judgment: then they have decided the case without knowledge, but, granted they did their job well, being correctly persuaded?

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ But, my dear lad, they couldn't have done that if true judgment is the same thing as knowledge; in that case the best juryman in the world couldn't form a correct judgment without knowledge. So it seems they must be different things.

Theaetetus/ Oh, yes, Socrates, that's just what I once heard a man say;

I had forgotten, but now it's coming back to me. He said that it is true judgment with an account that is knowledge; true judgment without an account falls outside of knowledge. And he said that the things of which there is no account are not knowable (yes, he actually called them that), while those which have an account are knowable.

Socrates/ Very good indeed. Now tell me, how did he distinguish these knowables and unknowables? I want to see if you and I have heard the same version.

Theaetetus/ I don't know if I can find that out; but I think I could follow if someone explained it.

Socrates/ Listen then to a dream in return for a dream. In my dream, too, I thought I was listening to people saying that the primary elements, as it were, of which we and everything else are composed, have no account.

Each of them, in itself, can only be named; it is not possible to say anything else of it, either that it is or that it is not. That would mean that we were adding being or not-being to it; whereas we must not attach anything, if we are to speak of that thing itself alone. Indeed we ought not to apply to it even such words as 'itself' or 'that', 'each', 'alone', or 'this', or any other of the many words of this kind; for these go the round and are applied to all things alike, being other than the things to which they are added, whereas if it were possible to express the element itself and it had its own proprietary account, it

would have to be expressed without any other thing. As it is, however, it is impossible that any of the primaries should be expressed in an account; it can only be named, for a name is all that it has. But with the things composed of these, it is another matter.

Here, just in the same way as the elements themselves are woven together, so their names may be woven together and become an account of something—an account being essentially a complex of names. Thus the elements are unaccountable and unknowable, but they are perceivable, whereas the complexes are both knowable and expressible and can be the objects of true judgment.

Now when a man gets a true judgment about something without an account, his soul is in a state of truth as regards that thing, but he does not know it; for someone who cannot give and take an account of a thing is ignorant about it. But when he has also got an account of it, he is capable of all this and is made perfect in knowledge. Was the dream you heard the same as this or a different one?

Theaetetus/ No, it was the same in every respect.

Socrates/ Do you like this then, and do you suggest that knowledge is true judgment with an account?

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Theaetetus, can it be that all in a moment, you and I have today laid hands upon something which many a wise man has searched for in the past—and gone gray before he found it?

Theaetetus/ Well, it does seem to me anyway, Socrates, that what has just been said puts the matter very well.

Socrates/ And it seems likely enough that the matter is really so; for what knowledge could there be apart from an account and correct judgment? But there is one of the things said which I don't like.

Theaetetus/ And what's that?

Socrates/ What looks like the subtlest point of all—that the elements are unknowable and the complexes knowable.

Theaetetus/ And won't that do?

Socrates/ We must make sure; because, you see, we do have as hostages for this theory the original models that were used when all these statements were made.

Theaetetus/ What models?

Socrates/ Letters—the elements of language—and syllables. It must have been these, mustn't it, that the author of our theory had in view—it couldn't have been anything else?

Theaetetus/ No, he must have been thinking of letters and syllables.

Socrates/ Let's take and examine them then. Or rather let us examine ourselves, and ask ourselves whether we really learned our letters in this way or not. Now, to begin with, one can give an account of the syllables but not of the letters—is that it?

Theaetetus/ Well, perhaps.

Socrates/ It most certainly looks like that to me. At any rate, supposing you were asked about the first syllable of 'Socrates': 'Tell me, Theaetetus, what is SO?' What would you answer to that?

Theaetetus/ That it's S and O.

Socrates/ And there you have an account of the syllable?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Come along then, and let us have the account of S in the same way.

Theaetetus/ How can anyone give the letters of a letter? S is just one of the voiceless letters, Socrates, a mere sound like a hissing of the tongue. B again has neither voice nor sound, and that's true of most letters. So the statement that they

themselves are unaccountable holds perfectly good. Even the seven clearest have only voice; no sort of account whatever can be given of them.

Socrates/ So here, my friend, we have established a point about knowledge.

Theaetetus/ We do appear to have done so.

Socrates/ Well then: we have shown that the syllable is knowable but not the letter—is that all right?

Theaetetus/ It seems the natural conclusion, anyway.

Socrates/ Look here, what do we mean by 'the syllable'? The two letters (or if there are more, all the letters)? Or do we mean some single form produced by their combination?

Theaetetus/ I think we mean all the letters.

Socrates/ Then take the case of the two letters, S and O; these two are the first syllable of my name. If a man knows the syllable, he must know both the letters?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ So he knows S and O.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But can it be that he is ignorant of each one, and knows the two of them without knowing either?

Theaetetus/ That would be a strange and unaccountable thing, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet, supposing it is necessary to know each in order to know both, then it is absolutely necessary that anyone who is ever to know a syllable must first get to know the letters. And in admitting this, we shall find that our beautiful theory has taken to its heels and got clean away from us.

Theaetetus/ And very suddenly too.

Socrates/ Yes; we are not keeping a proper watch on it. Perhaps we ought not to have supposed the syllable to be the

letters; perhaps we ought to have made it some single form produced out of them, having its own single nature—something different from the letters.

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly; that might be more like it.

Socrates/ We must look into the matter; we have no right to betray a great and imposing theory in this faint-hearted manner.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then let it be as we are now suggesting. Let the complex be a single form resulting from the combination of the several elements when they fit together; and let this hold both of language and of things in general.

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Then it must have no parts.

Theaetetus/ Why is that, now?

Socrates/ Because when a thing has parts, the whole is necessarily all the parts. Or do you mean by 'the whole' also a single form arising out of the parts, yet different from all the parts?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Now do you call 'sum' and 'whole' the same thing or different things?

Theaetetus/ I don't feel at all certain; but as you keep telling me to answer up with a good will, I will take a risk and say they are different.

Socrates/ Your good will, Theaetetus, is all that it should be. Now we must see if your answer is too.

Theaetetus/ We must, of course.

Socrates/ As the argument stands at present, the whole will be different from the sum?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well now, is there any difference between all the things and the sum? For instance, when we say 'one, two, three, four, five, six'; or, 'twice three', or 'three times two', 'four and two', 'three and two and one'; are we speaking of the same thing in all these cases or different things?

Theaetetus/ The same thing.

Socrates/ That is, six?

Theaetetus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Then with each expression have we not spoken of all the six?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when we speak of them all, aren't we speaking of a sum?

Theaetetus/ We must be.

Socrates/ That is, six?

Theaetetus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Then in all things made up of number, at any rate, by 'the sum' and 'all of them' we mean the same thing?

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Now let us talk about them in this way. The number of an acre is the same thing as an acre, isn't it?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Similarly with a mile.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the number of an army is the same as the army? And so always with things of this sort; their total number is the sum that each of them is.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But is the number of each anything other than its parts?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Now things which have parts consist of parts?

Theaetetus/ That seems true.

Socrates/ And it is agreed that all the parts are the sum, seeing that the total number is to be the sum.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then the whole does not consist of parts. For if it did, it would be all the parts and so would be a sum.

Theaetetus/ It looks as if it doesn't.

Socrates/ But can a part, as such, be a part of anything but the whole?

Theaetetus/ Yes; of the sum.

Socrates/ You are putting up a good fight anyway, Theaetetus. But this sum now—isn't it just when there is nothing lacking that it is a sum?

Theaetetus/ Yes, necessarily.

Socrates/ And won't this very same thing—that from which nothing anywhere is lacking—be a whole? While a thing from which something is absent is neither a whole nor a sum—the same consequence having followed from the same condition in both cases at once?

Theaetetus/ Well, it doesn't seem to me now that there can be any difference between whole and sum.

Socrates/ Very well. Now were we not saying that in the case of a thing that has parts, both the whole and the sum will be all the parts?

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Now come back to the thing I was trying to get at just now. Supposing the syllable is not just its letters, doesn't it follow that it cannot contain the letters as parts of itself? Alternatively, if it is the same as the letters, it must be equally knowable with them?

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Well, wasn't it just in order to avoid this result that we supposed it different from the letters?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you tell me of any other things, not its letters, which are?

Theaetetus/ No, indeed. If I were to admit that it had component parts, Socrates, it would be ridiculous, of course, to set aside the letters and look for other components.

Socrates/ Then, Theaetetus, according to our present argument, a syllable is an absolutely single form, indivisible into parts.

Theaetetus/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ Now, my friend, a little while ago, if you remember, we were inclined to accept a certain proposition which we thought put the matter very well—I mean the statement that no account can be given of the primaries of which other things are constituted, because each of them is in itself incomposite; and that it would be incorrect to apply even the term 'being' to it when we spoke of it or the term 'this', because these terms signify different and alien things; and that is the reason why a primary is an unaccountable and unknowable thing. Do you remember?

Theaetetus/ I remember.

Socrates/ And is that the reason also why it is single in form and indivisible into parts or is there some other reason for that? I can see no other myself.

Theaetetus/ No, there really doesn't seem to be any other.

Socrates/ And hasn't the complex now fallen into the same class as the primary, seeing it has no parts and is a single form?

Theaetetus/ Yes, it certainly has.

Socrates/ Well now, if the complex is both many elements and a whole, with them as its parts, then both complexes and elements are equally capable of being known and expressed, since all the parts turned out to be the same thing as the whole.

Theaetetus/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ But if, on the other hand, the complex is single and without parts, then complexes and elements are equally unaccountable and unknowable—both of them for the same reason.

Theaetetus/ I can't dispute that.

Socrates/ Then if anyone tries to tell us that the complex can be known and expressed, while the contrary is true of the element, we had better not listen to him.

Theaetetus/ No, we'd better not, if we go along with the argument.

Socrates/ And, more than this, wouldn't you more easily believe somebody who made the contrary statement, because of what you know of your own experience in learning to read and write?

Theaetetus/ What kind of thing do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that when you were learning you spent your time just precisely in trying to distinguish, by both eye and ear, each individual letter in itself so that you might not be bewildered by their different positions in written and spoken words.

Theaetetus/ That's perfectly true.

Socrates/ And at the music-teacher's, wasn't the finished pupil the one who would follow each note and tell to which string it belonged—the notes being generally admitted to be the elements in music?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that's just what it amounted to.

Socrates/ Then if the proper procedure is to take such elements and complexes as we ourselves have experience of, and make an inference from them to the rest, we shall say that the elements are much more clearly known, and the knowledge of them is more decisive for the mastery of any branch of study than knowledge of the complex. And if anyone maintains that the complex is by nature knowable, and the element unknowable, we shall regard this as tomfoolery, whether it is intended to be or not.

Theaetetus/ Oh, quite.

Socrates/ I think that might be proved in other ways too. But we mustn't let them distract us from the problem before us. We wanted to see what can be meant by the proposition that it is in the addition of an account to a true judgment that knowledge is perfected.

Theaetetus/ Well yes, we must try to see that.

Socrates/ Come then, what are we intended to understand by an 'account'? I think it must be one of three meanings.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The first would be, making one's thought apparent vocally by means of words and verbal expressions—when a man impresses an image of his judgment upon the stream of speech, like reflections upon water or in a mirror. Don't you think this kind of thing is an account?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I do. At least, a man who does this is said to be giving an account.

Socrates/ But isn't that a thing that everyone is able to do more or less readily—I mean, indicate what he thinks about a thing, if he is not deaf or dumb to begin with? And that being so, anyone at all who makes a correct judgment will turn out to have it 'together with an account'; correct judgment without knowledge will no longer be found anywhere.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Well then, we mustn't be too ready to condemn the author of the definition of knowledge now before us for talking nonsense. Perhaps he didn't mean this; perhaps he meant being able, when questioned about what a thing is, to give an answer by reference to its elements.

Theaetetus/ As for example, Socrates?

Socrates/ As for example, what Hesiod is doing when he says, 'One hundred are the timbers of a wagon.' Now I couldn't say what they are; and I don't suppose you could either. If you and I were asked what a wagon is, we should be satisfied if we could answer, 'Wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke.'

Theaetetus/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ But he might think us ridiculous, just as he would if we were asked what your name is, and replied by giving the syllables. In that case, he would think us ridiculous because although we might be correct in our judgment and our expression of it, we should be fancying ourselves as scholars, thinking we knew and were expressing a scholar's account of Theaetetus' name. Whereas in fact no one gives an account of a thing with knowledge till, in addition to his true judgment, he goes right through the thing element by element—as I think we said before.

Theaetetus/ We did, yes.

Socrates/ In the same way, in the example of the wagon, he would say that we have indeed correct judgment; but it is the man who can explore its being by going through those hundred items who has made the addition which adds an account to his true judgment. It is this man who has passed from mere judgment to expert knowledge of the being of a wagon; and he has done so in virtue of having gone over the whole by means of the elements.

Theaetetus/ And doesn't that seem sound to you, Socrates?

Socrates/ Well, tell me if it seems sound to you, my friend. Tell me if you are prepared to accept the view that an account is a matter of going through a thing element by element, while going through it by 'syllables' or larger divisions falls short of being an account. Then we shall be able to discuss it.

Theaetetus/ I'm certainly prepared to accept that.

Socrates/ And do you at the same time think that a man has knowledge of anything when he believes the same thing now to be part of one thing and now part of something else? Or when he judges that now one thing and now something different belongs to one and the same object?

Theaetetus/ No, indeed I don't.

Socrates/ Then have you forgotten that at first when you were learning to read and write that is just what you and the other boys used to do?

Theaetetus/ You mean we used to think that sometimes one letter and sometimes another belonged to the same syllable, and used to put the same letter sometimes into its proper syllable and sometimes into another?

Socrates/ Yes, that is what I mean.

Theaetetus/ Well, I certainly haven't forgotten; and I don't think people at that stage can be said to have knowledge yet.

Socrates/ Well, suppose now that someone who is at this sort of stage is writing the name 'Theaetetus'; he thinks he ought to write THE and does so. Then suppose another time he is trying to write 'Theodorus', and this time he thinks he should write TE and proceeds to do so. Are we going to say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

Theaetetus/ No. We've admitted that anyone who is at that stage has not yet knowledge.

Socrates/ And is there anything to prevent the same person being in that situation as regards the second and third and fourth syllables?

Theaetetus/ No, nothing.

Socrates/ Now at the time when he does this, he will be writing Theaetetus' not only with correct judgment, but with command of the way through its letters; that must be so whenever he writes them out one after another in their order.

Theaetetus/ Yes, clearly.

Socrates/ And still without knowledge though with correct judgment—isn't that our view?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yet possessing an account of it along with his correct judgment. He was writing it, you see, with command of the way through its letters; and we agreed that that is an account.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ So here, my friend, we have correct judgment together with an account, which we are not yet entitled to call knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I'm afraid that's so.

Socrates/ So it was only the poor man's dream of gold that we had when we thought we had got the truest account of knowledge. Or is it early days to be harsh? Perhaps this is not the way in which one is to define 'account'. We said that the man who defines knowledge as correct judgment together with an account would choose one of three meanings for 'account'. Perhaps the last is the one to define it by.

Theaetetus/ Yes, you're right to remind me; there is one possibility still left. The first was, a kind of vocal image of thought; the one we have just discussed was the way to the

whole through the elements. Now what's your third suggestion?

Socrates/ What the majority of people would say—namely, being able to tell some mark by which the object you are asked about differs from all other things.

Theaetetus/ Can you give me an example of such an 'account' of something?

Socrates/ Well, take the sun, if you like. You would be satisfied, I imagine, with the answer that it is the brightest of the bodies that move round the earth in the heavens.

Theaetetus/ Oh yes, quite.

Socrates/ Now I want you to get hold of the principle that this illustrates. It is what we were just saying—that if you get hold of the difference that distinguishes a thing from everything else, then, so some people say, you will have got an account of it. On the other hand, so long as it is some common feature that you grasp, your account will be about all those things which have this in common.

Theaetetus/ I see; I think it's very good to call this kind of thing an account.

Socrates/ Then if a man with correct judgment about anyone of the things that are grasps in addition its difference from the rest, he has become a knower of the thing he was a judger of before.

Theaetetus/ That's our present position, anyway.

Socrates/ Well, at this point, Theaetetus, as regards what we are saying, I'm for all the world like a man looking at a shadow-painting; when I'm close up to it I can't take it in in the least, though when I stood well back from it, it appeared to me to have some meaning.

Theaetetus/ How's that?

Socrates/ I'll see if I can explain. Suppose I have formed a correct judgment about you; if I can grasp your account in addition, I know you, but if not, I am merely judging you.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And an account was to be a matter of expounding your differentness?

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then when I was merely judging, my thought failed to grasp any point of difference between you and the rest of mankind?

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ What I had in mind, it seems, was some common characteristic—something that belongs no more to you than to anybody else.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that must be so.

Socrates/ Then tell me, in Heaven's name how, if that was so, did it come about that you were the object of my judgment and nobody else? Suppose my thought is that 'This is Theaetetus—one who is a human being, and has a nose and eyes and mouth', and so on through the whole list of limbs. Will this thought cause me to be thinking of Theaetetus rather than of Theodorus, or of the proverbial 'remotest Mysian'?

Theaetetus/ No, how could it?

Socrates/ But suppose I think not merely of 'the one with nose and eyes', but of 'the one with a snub nose and prominent eyes'. Shall I even then be judging you any more than myself or anyone who is like that?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ It will not, I take it, be Theaetetus who is judged in my mind until this snub-nosedness of yours has left imprinted and established in me a record that is different in some way from the other snub-nosednesses I have seen; and

so with the other details of your makeup. And this will remind me, if I meet you tomorrow, and make me judge correctly about you.

Theaetetus/ That's perfectly true.

Socrates/ Then correct judgment also must be concerned with the differentness of what it is about?

Theaetetus/ So it seems, anyway.

Socrates/ Then what more might this 'adding an account to correct judgment' be? If, on the one hand, it means that we must make another judgment about the way in which a thing differs from the rest of things, we are being required to do something very absurd.

Theaetetus/ How's that?

Socrates/ Because we already have a correct judgment about the way a thing differs from other things; and we are then directed to add a correct judgment about the way it differs from other things. At that rate, the way a roller goes round or a pestle or anything else proverbial would be nothing compared with such directions; they might be more justly called a matter of 'the blind leading the blind'. To tell us to add what we already have, in order to come to know what we are judging about, bears a generous resemblance to the behavior of a man benighted.

Theaetetus/ Whereas if, on the other hand, ...? What else were you going to suggest when you started this inquiry just now?

Socrates/ Well, if 'adding an account' means that we are required to get to know the differentness, not merely judge it, this most splendid of our accounts of knowledge turns out to be a very amusing affair. For getting to know of course is acquiring knowledge, isn't it?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, it seems, the answer to the question 'What is knowledge?' will be 'Correct judgment accompanied by knowledge of the differentness'—for this is what we are asked to understand by the 'addition of an account.'

Theaetetus/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ And it is surely just silly to tell us, when we are trying to discover what knowledge is, that it is correct judgment accompanied by knowledge, whether of differentness or of anything else? And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither perception nor true judgment, nor an account added to true judgment.

Theaetetus/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Well now, dear lad, are we still pregnant, still in labor with any thoughts about knowledge? Or have we been delivered of them all?

Theaetetus/ As far as I'm concerned, Socrates, you've made me say far more than ever was in me, Heaven knows.

Socrates/ Well then, our art of midwifery tells us that all of these offspring are wind-eggs and not worth bringing up?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And so, Theaetetus, if ever in the future you should attempt to conceive or should succeed in conceiving other theories, they will be better ones as the result of this inquiry. And if you remain barren, your companions will find you gentler and less tiresome; you will be modest and not think you know what you don't know. This is all my art can achieve—nothing more. I do not know any of the things that other men know—the great and inspired men of today and yesterday. But this art of midwifery my mother and I had allotted to us by God; she to deliver women, I to deliver men that are young and generous of spirit, all that have any beauty. And now I must go to the King's Porch to meet the

indictment that Meletus has brought against me; but let us meet here again in the morning, Theodorus.

Theaetetus.

Translated by F. A. Payley.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus.

Euclides and Terpsio.

(Scene, at Megara.)

Euclid/ Have you only just come from the country, Terpsio, or have you been here some time?

Terpsion/ A considerable time; and what is more, I have been looking for you in the agora, and began to wonder that I could not find you.

Euclid/ No wonder at all; the fact is, I was not in town.

Terpsion/ Where were you, then?

Euclid/ I was going down to the harbor when I fell in with Theætetus as they were carrying him from the camp at Corinth towards Athens.

Terpsion/ Alive, or dead?

Euclid/ Alive, and that is all: for he is in a very sad state from some wounds he has received; but worse than that, the disorder that has broken out in the camp has been gradually getting hold of him.

Terpsion/ The dysentery, you mean?

Euclid/ Exactly.

Terpsion/ What a hero we seem likely to lose if what you say is true!

Euclid/ A fine lad and a brave one, Terpsio. Indeed, it was but just now that I heard some persons praising him warmly for his conduct in the fight.

Terpsion/ There is nothing strange in that: it would be much more surprising if he were not what they describe. But how is it that he did not stop here at Megara?

Euclid/ He was anxious to get home; of course, I begged and advised him to stay; but he would not consent. So I went part of the way with him, and on returning I bethought myself of Socrates with feelings of wonder, for having spoken so like a prophet on many subjects, and especially about our young friend. If I mistake not, it was shortly before his death that he met Theætetus, then a mere stripling; and after an interview and a conversation with him he expressed great admiration for his genius. When I came to Athens, he told me the subjects he had talked to him about, and well worth hearing they were. He also made the remark, 'That boy will surely someday be distinguished, if he lives to be a man.'

Terpsion/ And he spoke truly, as the result seems to show. But what was the subject of the conversation? Could you give me a full account of it?

Euclid/ No, certainly not, at least verbally, at the present moment. No! I made some notes of it for myself at the time on returning home, and afterwards recalled it to mind at leisure: and wrote it out. If there was any point I could not remember, I used to ask Socrates when I went to Athens, and then when I got back to Megara I made corrections; so that I now have pretty nearly the whole conversation written out.

Terpsion/ True; I heard you say so before. Indeed, I intended always to ask you to let me see it, but up to this time I have delayed doing so. But what prevents us from going through it now? Anyhow, I want a rest, having come all the way from the country.

Euclid/ For my own part, too, I may say that as I went with Theætetus as far as the Fig-tree, I should not be sorry

to rest. Let us therefore go to my house, and the boy shall read to us while we are taking our ease.

Terpsion/ By all means.

[They enter Euclides' house.]

Euclid/ Well then, Terpsio, here is the book I spoke of. I wrote the dialogue, you will understand, in this way: I did not make Socrates describe to me how he held the conversation, but I made him actually converse with the parties he named, —that is to say, with Theodore the geometer and our friend Theætetus. In order therefore that in the writing of it I might be spared the trouble of saying anything about the persons between the speeches, —as about Socrates, whenever he spoke, such as Then I said, or Then I remarked, or again, about the respondent, as He agreed, or He dissented from this, —to avoid these interruptions, I say, in my written account Socrates himself is made to talk to the company, and I have cut out such clauses as these.

Terpsion/ And not without good precedent, Euclides.

Euclid/ Now, boy, take the book and read on.

[Socrates is supposed to speak; the scene is at Athens.]

Socrates/ If, my Theodore, I cared more for Cyrene and the state of affairs there, I should ask about them and the people, if you have any young men in your town who are interested in geometry or any other branch of learning. But I will not; I have a great regard for them, but more for those here, and therefore I am the more anxious to know what young men we have who are expected to make a figure. To this subject then I not only direct my own attention, as far as I can, but I make inquiry of others whenever I see our youths willing to attend their instructions. Now you attract to yourself more pupils than anyone else, and with good reason, for you are held in esteem on other grounds beside

your skill in geometry. So now, if you have met with anyone worthy of special mention, it would give me pleasure to hear it.

Theodorus/ Then, Socrates, it will be as much worth my while to tell you as yours to hear what a promising young fellow I have met with among your citizens. If, indeed, he were good-looking, I should feel some scruple at giving al description of him, lest a certain person should suspect I am an admirer of his; but as it is, —and you will pardon what I am going to say, —he is not handsome, but rather like you in his broad flat nose and the external contour of the eyes; only he has these features less strongly marked than you have. So I have no fear in speaking of his other merits; for I assure: you that, of all I ever met with, —and I have conversed with very many, —I never found anyone so favored by nature and of so good a disposition. Indeed, he is surprisingly so; for that one who is quick at learning, to a degree that is seldom equaled, should also be peculiarly gentle, and beside those qualities, as brave as anyone, —I should not have supposed was a thing possible; nor do I observe such results of education in any young men. No; your quick pupils, like our friend, who have their wits about them, and good memories, are usually hasty in their tempers; they are carried along in an unsteady course like boats without ballast, and grow up impulsive rather than of a manly decision. While your dullards, on the other hand, come reluctantly to their lessons, and with nothing in their heads but forgetfulness. But our young friend comes so smoothly and without the least hitch, with such success too, to his books and problems, and with the greatest gentleness, like oil that makes no sound as it runs, that one feels surprised that one so young can perform his duties in so pleasing a way.

Socrates/ You give a promising account; but tell me further, who of our citizens is his father?

Theodorus/ I have heard his name, but don't recollect it. However, here he is between two friends coming this way. It seems that he and some of his companions have just been getting rubbed with oil in the outer portico; and now, I suppose, they have been anointed and are coming this way. See now, if you recognize him.

Socrates/ I know him. 'Tis the son of Euphronius of Sunium, a character much as you describe your friend, and of general good repute. If I mistake not, he left a very large property; but the name of the youth I don't know.

Theodorus/ His name, Socrates, is Theætetus. As for his fortune, I am afraid certain guardians of his have not improved it; yet even in liberality in money matters one can't help admiring him, Socrates.

Socrates/ 'Tis a generous fellow that you describe. Do oblige me by asking him to take a seat here by me.

Theodorus/ That shall be done. —Theætetus! come here and speak to Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, pray do, Theætetus, if only that I may get a good sight of my own likeness; for Theodore tells me I have a face like yours. Now suppose each of us had a lute, and he said they were both tuned to the same pitch; should we at once believe him, or should we have considered whether the man who says so skilled in music?

Theaetetus/ We should have considered.

Socrates/ And if we found that he was, we should believe him; or, if ignorant of music, we should put no faith in him.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ So now, I suppose, if we care at all about our faces being alike, we must consider whether the person who says so is conversant with lines, or not.

Theaetetus/ I think he is that.

Socrates/ Has then Theodore any skill as a portrait painter?

Theaetetus/ Not that I know of.

Socrates/ What! do you mean to say he is not even a geometer?

Theaetetus/ He is that, of course, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, is he also versed in astronomy, and abstract calculation, and music, and such other kinds of knowledge as belong to general education?

Theaetetus/ He appears to me to be so.

Socrates/ Then if he says we are like in any part of our bodies, either in praise or disparagement, we are by no means bound to listen to him.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ But what if he were to praise the mind of either of us, in respect of virtue and wisdom? Would it not be worthwhile for the party who heard the remark to take a little trouble to examine the person praised, and for him to exhibit himself freely and readily?

Theaetetus/ Certainly it would, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, my dear Theætetus, it is high time for you to exhibit and for me to observe. For I assure you, though Theodore has spoken favorably to me of very many, both strangers and citizens, he never praised any of them as he praised you.

Theaetetus/ It might be right then to do as you say; only I am afraid he was not in earnest when he spoke of me thus.

Socrates/ That is not Theodore's way; no, don't try to evade your promise by pretending that our friend here was only joking, or we may have to produce him in court as a witness. Whatever he says of you, no one will indict such a man for perjury. So take courage and abide by your agreement.

Theaetetus/ Well, I suppose I must do so, if you think it right.

Socrates/ Then tell me; you learn from Theodore, I presume, something about geometry?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ And also something of astronomy, music, and figures?

Theaetetus/ I endeavor to do so, certainly.

Socrates/ Well, and so do I, my child, from him at all events, if not from others, whom I may suppose to have any knowledge of these subjects. Still, though I have a fair acquaintance with them, there is one little matter which I am in doubt about, and which I should like to consider with you and the present company. And now tell me; is not learning the becoming wiser in what one learns?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And it is in wisdom that the wise are wise.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, is there any difference between this and science?

Theaetetus/ Of what do you speak?

Socrates/ Wisdom. If we have accurate knowledge on any subjects, are we not also wise in them?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then science and wisdom are the same.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ This then is precisely the point that I am perplexed about, and unable to realize as I should wish in my own mind, —what 'accurate knowledge' is. Possibly now we may describe it. What say you? Which of you will be the first to speak? He who gives a wrong answer, and gets wrong always, shall be Donkey (as the boys say who play at ball), and have to sit down; while he who gets through the examination without a mistake, shall be King over us, and impose on us any subject on which he may choose that we should give answers. Why are you silent? I hope, Theodore, it is not I that am acting the churl from fondness of discussion, and in my eagerness to make you converse, and so become friends and have a chat with each other!

Theodorus/ That, Socrates, would be anything but churlish; but desire one of these young men to give you a reply; for I am not much used to this sort of conversation, and I am not of an age either to become used to it. But it will just suit our young friends here, and they will greatly improve; for it is quite true that youth has a capacity for improving in anything. So, as you began, put the question to Theætetus, and don't let him off.

Socrates/ You hear, Theætetus, what Theodore says, and I suppose you will not care to disobey him, as, indeed, it is not permitted for a younger man to do when a man learned in such matters gives his commands. So let us have a good clear answer without stint: what does 'Science' seem to you to be?

Theaetetus/ Well, I suppose I must reply, Socrates, since you and the rest desire me. For of course, if I do make some mistake, you will set me right.

Socrates/ Oh certainly, —that is, if we are able.

Theaetetus/ Well, then, I think that what one can learn from Theodore may be called sciences, —geometry and those

you just named; and again, shoe-making and the trades of the other craftsmen, all and each of them, are nothing else than knowledge.

Socrates/ Like a generous and free-handed man, my friend, when asked for one you offer many, and various for simple.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by that, Socrates?

Socrates/ It has no meaning, perhaps; but what I think I intended to say, I will explain. When you speak of a cobbler's art, do you mean by it anything else than the science of the manufacture of shoes?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ Well, when you speak of carpentry, is it of anything but the science of manufacturing wooden implements?

Theaetetus/ My reply is the same in this case too.

Socrates/ Then in both you confine your answer to that, of which each art is the science?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But, my Theætetus, the question asked was not this, of what things 'Knowledge' is the science, nor how many sciences there are. For it was not with any wish to count them that we asked, but to get a clear knowledge about science, what it is in the abstract. Or is there nothing at all in what I say?

Theaetetus/ Indeed, you say very rightly.

Socrates/ Now then consider well what I am going further to remark. Supposing a person should ask us about some commonplace and obvious thing, for instance, What is clay? should we not appear ridiculous if we answered him, 'Clay is the clay of the potters, and also of the porcelain-makers, and of the brick-makers likewise'?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps we should.

Socrates/ In the first place, I presume, in supposing that the questioner would understand what clay was from our answer, 'Clay is clay,'—adding either 'such as the image-makers use,' or any other artists you please. Or do you believe that a man understands the name of a thing, if he does not know what the thing itself is?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then one who does not know what science means, cannot understand either the 'science of shoes.'

Theaetetus/ He cannot.

Socrates/ And again, whoever is ignorant what science is, does not comprehend the knowledge of leather, or any other trade.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then the answer is absurd, when a man is asked 'What is knowledge?' if he gives in reply the name of some trade. For his answer is confined to the knowledge of some particular subject; but he was not asked that.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Thus then, when he might, I suppose, have answered in a common way, and in brief, he goes a roundabout way that has no end to it. For instance, in the question about clay, it was obvious, surely, and simple to reply, that 'earth mixed up with any fluid would be clay'; and you need not concern yourself as to whose clay it is.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it appears easy enough now, Socrates, when you put it thus. But your question seems like one which lately presented itself to us when we were talking, —I and your namesake here, Socrates.

Socrates/ What was that, now, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ Theodore here was writing down for us some facts about the powers of numbers, and showing us that a rectangle composed of a three-foot and a five-foot line (3 × 5) is not geometrically commensurable by the one-foot line; and so he went on taking examples one by one up to the seventeen-foot line; and at that he stopped. The idea then occurred to us, that as these powers seemed indefinitely numerous, we should try to comprehend them under some one general term by which we might describe all those of this kind.

Socrates/ Did you then find such a term?

Theaetetus/ I think we did; but consider it also yourself.

Socrates/ Tell me then.

Theaetetus/ We divided all number into two kinds. That which could be resolved into an equal number of factors we compared to a figure square in form, and called it both quadrangular and equal-sided.

Socrates/ And very appropriately too.

Theaetetus/ Well, the intervening numbers, such as three and five, and all such as cannot be resolved into equal factors, but can only become either more taken fewer times, or less taken more times, and so, do as you will, must ever be enclosed by one side that is greater than another side, — this kind of numbers we compared to the oblong form, and called it 'Long number.

Socrates/ Very good indeed. But what next?

Theaetetus/ All the lines which make up an equilateral rectangular superficial area, we distinguished as 'regular,' and all that include a parallelogram, as 'powers,' on the ground that in linear figure they were not commensurable with those other lines, but only with the superficial squares they were equivalent to. And similarly with cube numbers.

Socrates/ None could possibly have done better, my dear boys; so that Theodore, as it seems to be, will not be held liable to the penalties of perjury.

Theaetetus/ But, Socrates, your question about knowledge I am not likely to answer as readily as that about the geometrical extension and the power of number, though it seems to me that you require some such a reply. I am afraid therefore that if Theodore was right in the other matter, he is wrong in this.

Socrates/ What! Suppose that, in praising you for running, he had said, 'I never met with any young man so good a runner,' and then, in running a race, you had been beaten by one who was in the very prime of his strength, and had no superior in speed; do you think our friend would have praised you the less truly for that?

Theaetetus/ No, I do not.

Socrates/ But now about this knowledge, —as I was saying just now, —do you-suppose it is a small matter to find out what it is, and not rather the part of very close thinkers?

Theaetetus/ Indeed, I think it is a task of quite first-rate men.

Socrates/ Then have confidence about yourself, and believe there is something in what Theodore says, and endeavor by every means in your power to get information about knowledge, among other things, and the true nature of it.

Theaetetus/ As far as painstaking is concerned, Socrates, it shall be found out.

Socrates/ Come, then, as you have just given a good example of your skill, so try to imitate the answer you gave about the powers of numbers, and as you comprehended them, numerous though they were, under one head, so also

endeavor to call the various kinds of knowledge by some one term.

Theaetetus/ I assure you, Socrates, I have many, many times undertaken the consideration of this question, on hearing the answers that were brought away from you; but alas! I am neither able to convince myself that I give any satisfactory account of it, nor to hear anyone else giving it in the way that you recommend; and yet, on the other hand, I cannot altogether resign my interest in the subject.

Socrates/ The fact is, my dear Theætetus, you are in travail; you are not empty-pated, but have conceived something in that brain of yours.

Theaetetus/ I don't know, Socrates. I only describe what I feel.

Socrates/ And do you mean to say, you ridiculous fellow, you have never heard that I am the son of a cross-faced old lady, Phaenarete?

Theaetetus/ Well, I have heard that before now.

Socrates/ And have you heard also that I practice the same art?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But I can assure you I do; but don't tell of me to the other professors, for they are not aware that I have this faculty. And so, in their ignorance, they do not say this of me, but only that I am the strangest of men, and drive people into perplexities. Have you heard that about me?

Theaetetus/ I certainly have.

Socrates/ Must I tell you the reason, then?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Consider now the whole case of these midwives, and you will more easily perceive my meaning. You are aware, of course, that none of them while she is herself

having a family, acts as midwife to others, but only those who are now too old to have offspring.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the reason of this, as men say, is that Artemis, without being a mother herself, has the office of bringing children into the world. Wow she does not permit women who have never borne children to act as midwives to others, because human nature is too weak to undertake the practice of anything of which it has had no experience. Therefore she assigned this duty only to those who are too old to have children, paying this compliment to her own likeness to them.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps that is so.

Socrates/ Then is not this not only probable, but a matter of course, —that women who are pregnant or not pregnant are more surely known by mid wives than by any others?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And these same midwives by giving drugs and using charms are able to bring on the birth-pains, or, if they choose, to make them more endurable; also to cause those who are in difficult labor to give the child birth, or, if it should be agreed to procure abortion of the fetus, then they can effect that.

Theaetetus/ All that is true.

Socrates/ Have you ever noticed this other office of theirs, —that they are matchmakers of the greatest skill, as being very clever at forming an opinion what kind of man and woman must consort together to produce the finest children?

Theaetetus/ I certainly am not aware of that at all.

Socrates/ Then let me tell you that they pique themselves more on this than on the surgical operation. For observe:

would you say it belonged to the same, or to a different art, to grow and gather in the fruits of the earth, and also to know on what soil what trees and what seeds must be planted?

Theaetetus/ Not to a different, but to the same art.

Socrates/ Do you suppose then that in the case of a woman the judgment in question is one art, and the bringing of the child into the world is another?

Theaetetus/ Why it does not seem likely.

Socrates/ Of course not. But the fact is, it is through that dishonest traffic, which requires no skill at all, of procuring a meeting between a man and a woman, (which, as we all know, is called the trade of the procuress,) that your midwives, as having a proper pride, shun the practice of giving advice about marriages, fearing lest through this latter profession they should incur the odium of practicing the former. For, of course, none but real midwives are entitled to give a sound opinion on such subjects.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ What the midwives do, then, I have said; but it is less than the part that I play. For it is not in the nature of women to bring forth sometimes mere semblances, at other times genuine offspring, and that without any means of distinguishing them. If it were so, there would be no greater or more honorable duty for midwives than to separate the true and the false. Do you not think so?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Well, my art of midwifery has all the duties attached to it which theirs has, but it differs in this, that I deliver men and not women, and look to their minds when there is anything to come from them, and not to their bodies. But the chief boast of our art is this, that it can put to the test in every way and ascertain whether it is a mere sham and a delusion that the ideas of the young man are giving

birth to, or a true and genuine sentiment. This peculiarity, I grant, belongs to me as well as to midwives; —I have never given birth to any wisdom; and the taunt that many have before now uttered against me is quite true, —that I put questions to others, but never give an answer myself on any subject from having nothing clever to say. "Well, the reason of this I will explain. The god constrains me to play the part of midwife to others, but does not allow me to have a family myself. I am then on my own part anything but wise, for I have no such great results to show as any offspring of my genius that has seen the light. But, although those who converse with me seem at first to be, in some cases, even wholly ignorant, yet all, as our intercourse goes on, —that is, to whom the god permits it, —show a marvelous improvement, as both they and others imagine; and it is also evident, that this improvement is not due to anything they have ever learnt from me, but comes from the many fine ideas they have hit upon and retained in their own imaginations. But then the safe delivery of these conceptions is due to me and the god. And this is how we know it: many ‘ere now have not been aware of our part in the matter, but have thought it was all due to themselves; and so, despising me in their own hearts, or induced by others to do so, they have left me sooner than they ought, and thus, from keeping bad company, have not only brought to an untimely birth the other notions they had conceived, but have lost, from bad nursing, those which I had assisted them in bringing into the world, and that because they valued mere shams and semblances more than the truth. Thus in the end they seem both to themselves and to others to be utterly illiterate. One of these is Aristides, the son of Lysimachus; and there are very many more. Now, when such persons come back to me, wanting me to converse with them, and having recourse to all sorts of strange expedients, the Familiar that ever

attends me prevents me from having any more to say to some of these, while it allows me to keep company with others: and then they again begin to improve of themselves. There is another point in which my pupils resemble women in labor: they are in travail and are filled with restless longings by night and by day even more than those of the other sex; and these labor-pains my skill can bring on or alleviate. So much then for these. But some there are, my Theætetus, who seem to me not to have an idea in them; and well knowing that they do not require my aid, I act the part of a friend in making other matches for them; and (to speak under favor of the god) I can make a pretty good guess at the sort of teachers by whose conversation they will be benefited. Many of them I have made over to Prodicus, and many to other wise and inspired teachers. —If I have made a long story, my good friend, it was on this account; I suspected that you, —as indeed you imagine yourself, —were in travail with some notion that you had conceived in your mind. Now, therefore, behave towards me as to the son of a midwife who himself knows something of the art; and do your best to answer such questions as I may put to you. If, on examining what you say, I shall consider it a mere sham and not a reality, and so try to remove and reject it, do not be savage with me as women are about their first offspring. For I can tell you that many have shown such a temper towards me as to be quite ready to bite me when I propose to rid them of some nonsensical idea. They fancy that I am not acting kindly in doing this; they are yet very far from understanding that, as no god bears any ill will to man, so I do nothing of this sort from unkindness; it is because it is not permitted me to concede falsehood or to put out of sight the truth.

Try, therefore, Theætetus, to begin again and say what you consider knowledge to be. And don't tell me that you

can't; if the god wills, and you play the man, you will find yourself able.

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, when you so encourage me to try, it would be a shame not to do one's very best to say what one has to say. I think, then, that if a man knows anything, he has a perception of it; and so—according to my present view, —knowledge is nothing else than perception.

Socrates/ Well said, and right nobly, my boy! That is just as one ought to speak who wishes to say without any reserve what he really thinks. But come, now, let us consider the matter in common, to see if our egg has a chick in it, or is a mere wind-egg. Perception, you say, is knowledge?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Indeed, you seem to have delivered an opinion about knowledge that is by no means common-place: for it is one that Protagoras also gave, though it was in a somewhat different way that he expressed the same meaning. If I mistake not, he says that 'Man is the measure of all things,'—of things that are, that they are so, and of non-existing things that they are not. You have read it, I think?

Theaetetus/ I have read it many times.

Socrates/ Does he not then say, in effect, that as things appear severally to me, such they are to me, and as they seem to you, to you they are: and both of us, I suppose, are human beings.

Theaetetus/ Well, he does say so.

Socrates/ And we may be sure that a wise man is not in the habit of talking nonsense. Let us therefore follow him in his argument. Does it not happen sometimes, when the wind blows, that one of us feels cold, another does not? And one feels it but slightly, another very much?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Must we then on that particular occasion say that the wind is cold of itself, or not cold? Or must we accept the view of Protagoras, that to the man who shivers it is cold, but him who does not, it is not cold?

Theaetetus/ That is probable.

Socrates/ Then it also seems so to each of them?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And this words 'seems' is perceiving.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Then fancy and perception are the same, at least in feelings of heat and all sensations of that kind. For just as each person feels them, such, as it seems, they are to each.

Theaetetus/ Likely enough.

Socrates/ Then perception must always be of something that exists; and it cannot be mistaken, since it is exact science.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then, in the name of all that is elegant and refined, was not Protagoras a truly wise man when he gave us, who are but the rabble multitude, a mere hint of this beautiful doctrine, but told his disciples the whole truth under the seal of secrecy?

Theaetetus/ In what sense do you say this, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you a doctrine of no common-place kind. Nothing exists singly and by itself, and you cannot rightly call anything of itself by any name; but if you speak of it as great, it will seem under other conditions to be small; if heavy, also light; and so with everything else, on the ground of there being no single existence either as a thing or as a quality. The things we now speak of as existing, using thereby an incorrect expression, are really produced from

change of position and motion and union of one with another; for nothing ever is; it is ever being produced. On this point all philosophers ranged together, Parmenides excepted, agree; Protagoras following Heraclitus, and Empedocles; —as well as the great composers of each kind of poetry, Epicharmus of comedy, Homer of tragedy. For Homer, in saying—

> 'Ocean, from whom the gods were created, and Tethys their mother,'

has in effect declared that all things are produced from flux and movement. Does he not seem to you to mean this?

Theaetetus/ He does.

Socrates/ Then no one surely, in joining issue with so numerous a host with Homer for their leader, can hope to escape ridicule.

Theaetetus/ It would not be easy, Socrates.

Socrates/ No; indeed, Theætetus. For the following facts are sufficient proofs of the proposition, that what seems to exist, but is really production, is caused by motion, and non-existence or dissolution by rest; —heat and fire, which, as we all know, both generates and rears everything else, is itself produced from motion and friction, and this is a kind of movement. Are not these the processes by which fire is kindled?

Theaetetus/ Certainly they are.

Socrates/ But surely also animals of all kinds are generated by the same processes?

Theaetetus/ Of course they are.

Socrates/ Well, is not the condition of all living bodies impaired by quietness and inactivity, but kept up for long by exercises and movements?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And surely it is by learning and practice, which are stirrings of the mind, that the habit formed in the soul both acquires new information and retains it and becomes improved, while by lying by, which is non-practice and non-learning, it not only does not learn anything, but even forgets what it has learnt?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly so.

Socrates/ Then the one of these, motion, is a good in respect to both soul and body, and the other is the contrary?

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Need I then further speak of lulls and calms and things of that kind, and say that states of rest sap and destroy, while the contrary conditions preserve? and beside these, as the final argument, shall I leave you no escape in bringing you over to my view, but assert that Homer means nothing else by his 'golden chain' than the sun, —in a word, that he means to show that so long as the revolving motion of the heaven is kept up, and the sun, all things are maintained in their existence both among gods and men; whereas, if this were to come to a stand, as if bound fast, all things would come to ruin, and there would ensue what is described by the proverb, 'all topsy-turvy.'

Theaetetus/ To me, Socrates, Homer does seem to express just what you say.

Socrates/ Then, my excellent friend, view the matter in this light: —first, with respect to sight, that which you call white does not exist per se as something external to your eyes, nor is it in your eyes. Do not therefore assign any place to it at all; for it would at once be in existence, if it were somewhere in position; and it would be permanent, and not always in course of being produced.

Theaetetus/ Then how should I speak of it?

Socrates/ Let us follow our late argument, and assume that nothing exists as a one by itself. Thus black and white and any other color you please will be found to be produced by the eye being directed to the object with the kind of motion that suits that organ; and thus what we call color of any kind will not be the object that strikes nor the eye that is struck, but an intermediate effect brought into existence for the particular person at the time. Or would you insist that what seems any color to you, is also the same to a dog or to any creature?

Theaetetus/ Indeed I would not.

Socrates/ Well, does anything seem the same to another man as it does to you? Are you quite sure of this, or is it not much rather the case that it does not seem the same even to yourself, through your never being in precisely the same bodily condition?

Theaetetus/ This seems to me to be the case rather than that.

Socrates/ Then if any object by which we compare our own stature, or which we lay hold of, were really great, or really hot, it would not, by comparison with another thing, become different, —that is, of course, so long as it admitted no change in itself. And again, if that which measures itself or which touches something else had possessed any of these qualities absolutely, it never would have become different if another object had been brought to it or in some way altered, while the original object remained unchanged. As we now use terms, my friends, we are compelled in a careless easy way to say what is not only surprising, but ridiculous, as Protagoras would assert, and anyone who essays to use the same course of reasoning that he does.

Theaetetus/ How? What reasoning, do you mean?

Socrates/ Take a small matter as an example, and you will understand my meaning fully. Suppose you place four dice near to six others. Then, of course, we say six are more than four, and half as many again. But if you put twelve dice, then six are fewer and only half the number. And we are obliged to use this language. Would you for a moment allow any other?

Theaetetus/ Not I, indeed.

Socrates/ Well, now, if Protagoras should ask you, or anyone else, Can a thing, Theætetus, possibly become greater or more in any other way than by increase, what answer will you give?

Theaetetus/ Why, Socrates, if I answer what I think in reference to the question just put, I should say it is not possible; but if in reference to the former question about the dice, then, guarding my reply against contradiction, I should say it is possible.

Socrates/ By Hera, a clever and oracular answer, my friend! But it seems to me that if you say it is possible, a case will occur like that in the play of Euripides, —your language will be consistent, but your mind will still be open to conviction.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Then if you and I were clever and wise, and had investigated all the phenomena in psychology, we might now, and for the rest of the argument, by way of pastime try each other's prowess, by engaging like sophists in a contest of this kind, and parry statement by statement. But, as we are not sophists, but ordinary men, we will endeavor first to get a clear view of the facts themselves, and what meaning we attach to them, —whether we find they can be reconciled with one another, or not at all.

Theaetetus/ Indeed, that is precisely what I should myself desire.

Socrates/ And so should I. And this being the case, shall we not now quite at our leisure, as having plenty of time at our disposal, again reconsider the matter, not in a spirit of peevishness, but really to put our own convictions to the test, and find out what these visionary notions in us are. In looking at the first, we shall say, I suppose that 'Nothing can ever become greater or less, either in bulk or in number, so long as it retains its own size.' Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ The second proposition is, 'What has nothing added to it and nothing taken away, neither increases nor diminishes, but is always the same in size.'

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Is there not then yet one more case; What was not before, but afterwards is, must have become so, and undergone a process of becoming.'

Theaetetus/ I should think that is true.

Socrates/ Well, now, these three propositions, as accepted by us, are at variance with each other in our minds, when we bring forward the case of the dice, or when we say that I, who am of a certain stature, without having grown or become less, in one year am first taller than you who are young, and then shorter, without my proper height having had anything taken off it, but simply because you have grown. For 'I am afterwards what before I was not, without having become so.' For without becoming it is impossible to have become; and if I lost nothing of my bulk, I never could have gone through the process of becoming less. There are countless other cases of the same kind, if, I suppose, we are to accept these views. You follow me, I think, Theætetus?

You seem, indeed, to me to be very well versed in such inquiries.

Theaetetus/ I protest, Socrates, I am filled with exceeding wonder at these conclusions, and sometimes, when I look steadily at them, I seem to reel, as if darkness were coming over my sight.

Socrates/ Ah! Theodore, my friend, seems to have made a fair guess at your disposition. This feeling of wonder is very characteristic of your philosopher: indeed, that and nothing but that is the source of all philosophy, and the poet who said that Iris was the daughter of Thaumas seems to have been an adept in genealogy. But do you now begin to see why these things are so, from the doctrines we attribute to Protagoras, or are you still in doubt?

Theaetetus/ I don't quite see it as yet.

Socrates/ Will you thank me then if I help you to investigate the true meaning, concealed as it is from the many, of the views held by a man, or rather by men, of note?

Theaetetus/ Of course I shall thank you, and very heartily too.

Socrates/ Then look round you in every direction, lest some of the uninitiated should overhear us. These are the people who do not believe in the existence of anything but what they can clutch in their hands, and do not admit in the category of Being natural operations or creations or any unseen agency.

Theaetetus/ In truth, Socrates, they are a hard and unimpressible set that you speak of.

Socrates/ They are, indeed, my son, an illiterate lot. But there are others much more subtle in language, whose mystical doctrines I am about to describe. And the leading principle, on which all the theories we have just mentioned depend, is this, —that Motion is everything, and beside that

nothing else is. Of this motion there are two kinds, each infinite in its manifestations, the one having the faculty of acting, the other of being acted on. Well, from the union and close contact of these with each other offspring is produced, also infinite in its number of forms, but again of two kinds, —one the sensible, the other sense, —that is, a power of perception which always is produced along with the object of sense, and is born at the same instant with it. Now the senses we express by such terms as these: we call them acts of seeing, hearing, smelling, besides feelings of cold or heat, even the emotions of pleasure and pain, or desire and fear; and though there are endless varieties of these which have no names at all, yet those which have names are very numerous. Now the class of phenomena which we speak of as objects of sense are produced simultaneously with each of the senses, —colors of all kinds for different sorts of eye-sight, and in the same way sounds for hearing, and the other sensuous effects that are produced by a simultaneous birth with the other senses. Now, what has this story to do with our former inquiries? Do you understand?

Theaetetus/ I can't say that I do, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then attend, and we will see if we can arrive at a conclusion. The import of the argument is this: that all things with which we are conversant have motion, but in that motion there is sometimes speed and sometimes slowness. Now the slow kind of movement takes place without change of position, and produces its results in this way; [that which has speed,] has a real motion towards the sentient faculties which will admit of a union, and the results so produced are quicker; for they have motion in space, and their movement is naturally one of change in position. Thus, when the eye, and any other object suited to the nature of that organ, unite and produce whiteness, and a perception of whiteness coincident and congenial with it,

—which never could have resulted, had each of them gone to any other, —then, at the moment when the sight from the eyes, and the whiteness from the object which, in contact with the eyes, produces the color, meet in mid-course, the eye becomes filled with sight, and then begins to see, and the result is, not sight, but a seeing eye; while the object which, together with the eye, gave birth to the appearance of the color, is invested with whiteness, and thus here, too, the effect produced is, not whiteness, but a white stick or stone or whatever object it may be, the surface of which happens to be colored with such a color. And so it is with all other qualities, —we must take the same view of hard and hot and everything else, viz. that, as we before said, nothing has an absolute existence by itself, but that all effects are produced by a relation and intercourse between patient and agent, and varied in their results according to the kind of movement. For to conceive of both an agent and also a patient in anyone thing singly, so as to deny motion, is, they tell us, an impossibility. There can be no agent, till it has come into contact with a patient, nor a patient, unless it has an agent. And that which, by being in contact with one thing, is an agent, becomes in turn a patient combined with some other thing. So that from all these considerations we must conceive, as I said at first, that no one quality can exist singly and by itself; it only becomes so-and-so to the particular person who perceives it; and absolute existence must be taken away from everything, even though we, partly from familiarity and partly from want of skill, have been compelled to use it for many purposes in oar late discussion. We ought not, however, as the philosophers tell us, to concede the existence of anything belonging to me or to anybody else; nor 'this' nor 'that,' nor any other term that tends to fix a thing as constant. We should speak of them according to the true nature of the phenomena, as 'brought

into being,' or 'created,' or 'perishing,' or 'being altered,' For if one adopts any term that fixes existence, he is easily proved to be in the wrong; we ought to use the above expressions both of things severally and of an aggregate of many, —such generalizations as they convey by the terms 'man,' or 'stone,' or any particular creature or kind of things. Well, Theætetus, do these doctrines seem nice? Would you like a further taste of them, as of food that you relish?

Theaetetus/ I don't know, Socrates; indeed, I cannot make up my mind even about you, whether you are stating what you really think, or are making an experiment on me.

Socrates/ Do you forget, my friend, that I myself neither know anything of these matters nor claim them as my own. I am not the parent; I only act as man-mid wife to you, and that is why I employ charms and set by you these clever things for you to take a taste of them severally, till at last I help you to bring your own views to light. When that has been done, I will then examine whether it shall prove of empty air or a product of real genius. Take heart then, and don't give in, but bravely and like a man answer what you really think about the questions I may put.

Theaetetus/ Ask me then.

Socrates/ Then tell me once more, whether you accept the doctrine, that nothing really is, but becomes always right and good, as well as such other qualities as we lately spoke of.

Theaetetus/ Well, Socrates, now that I hear you arguing in this way, it does seem to me in the highest degree reasonable, and that we should view the matter as you have put it.

Socrates/ Then don't let us leave off while any part of the argument is incomplete. We have yet to discuss the subject of dreams, and of madness among other diseases, and such

fancies as result from wrong hearing, or wrong seeing, or any other false perception. For you are aware, of course, that in all such cases as these the argument we maintained is allowed to be proved false, since in these states and conditions there assuredly are such things as false perceptions'; and so far from each man's fancies being true for himself, absolutely nothing of what seems, really is so to him.

Theaetetus/ Nothing can be more true than what you say, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then what reply to these facts remains for one who takes as his axiom that 'Perception is Knowledge', and that what each man fancies is so to him who fancies it?

Theaetetus/ For my own part, Socrates, I hesitate to say I have no reply to give, because just now you blamed me for saying so. For in truth I cannot dispute, that people who are mad or dreaming do imagine what is false, when some of them fancy they are gods, and others that they have wings, and conceive themselves in their sleep to be flying.

Socrates/ Here is another difficulty about them, which I think you will understand, and especially about the question of such imaginings being mere dreams or sober realities.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ What I dare say you have often heard people asking, what proof a man can show, if anyone should ask him as at the present moment, whether we are asleep, and dreaming of all that is now in our thoughts, or awake, and talking to each other in sober earnest.

Theaetetus/ Well, certainly, Socrates, it is hard to say by what proof we could demonstrate it. For all the details are the same in both, and go together like counterparts. For instance, in the conversation we have just held, we might, for aught there is to prevent it, fancy we had been talking to

each other in a dream; and conversely, when in a dream we fancy we are talking to each other, the latter case is strangely like the former.

Socrates/ You see then that to raise the doubt is at least not difficult, when it is called in question whether we are really talking or only dreaming. Nay, I go further, and say that if we are half of our lives asleep, and the other half awake, in each of these periods our minds are convinced that whatever opinions present themselves to us, these are really and certainly true; so that for the same general duration we say these are realities to us as much as those; and we insist on the truth of both alike.

Theaetetus/ Certainly we do.

Socrates/ Is not the very same to be said about diseases and mad-fits, except that the time is not in this case the same?

Theaetetus/ Rightly remarked.

Socrates/ What then? Is truth to be determined by the length or shortness of time?

Theaetetus/ That would indeed be absurd in many respects.

Socrates/ Can you then show any other clear proof which of these opinions are true?

Theaetetus/ I don't think I can.

Socrates/ Then let me tell you the course of reasoning that would be pursued by those who make it an axiom that Whatever seems, that is so to him who fancies it.' And if I mistake not, their argument is conveyed by a question, as thus: —"If, Theætetus, a thing is entirely different, has it any property the same as another thing?" Now mind, we are not to conceive the subject of the question to be partly the same as and partly different from the other, but as wholly and entirely different.

Theaetetus/ I say then that it is impossible for a thing to have any quality that is the same, either in its property or in any other respect, when it is quite different.

Socrates/ Must we not then allow that a thing of this sort is also unlike the other?

Theaetetus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Then if it happens that a thing is getting like or unlike something, viz. either to itself or to something else, we shall say that while it is thus assimilating itself it is becoming the same, and while it is varying from it, different.

Theaetetus/ That cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ And we said before, I think, that the agents in nature were infinite in number, and so also the patients.

Theaetetus/ We did.

Socrates/ And also that one thing in union with another will produce not the same, but different results from what it would in combination with something else?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly so.

Socrates/ Now then let us speak of myself and yourself and of the agents that affect us, according to the same reasoning, and talk about Socrates in health and Socrates out of health. Are we to say the one case is like or unlike to the other?

Theaetetus/ Do you mean by 'Socrates out of health' Socrates as a whole compared with him also as a whole when in health?

Socrates/ You are quite right in your surmise: that is just what I mean.

Theaetetus/ Then, of course, I say unlike.

Socrates/ Then he is also another Socrates, in precisely the same way as he is unlike?

Theaetetus/ We must allow that.

Socrates/ And you will say the same, of course, of Socrates asleep, and in any of the states we just before mentioned?

Theaetetus/ I shall.

Socrates/ Will not now anyone of those things that are in their nature agents, when it gets hold of Socrates in good health, deal with him as one person, and when out of health, as another?

Theaetetus/ Of course that will be so.

Socrates/ Then in such case I, as the patient, and it as the agent, will produce between us different results?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then when I drink wine, being in good health, it seems to me both fragrant and sweet to the taste.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ We assume that it produced, in accordance with what we have before stated, —that is to say, the agent and the patient together, and in mutual motion and relation with each other, —both sweetness and a sensation of it. This sensation on the part of the patient made his tongue to be sentient; and the sweetness from the wine, having a motion of its own in respect of the patient, made the wine sweet to the healthy tongue, in reality as well as in appearance.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly our former admissions were to this effect.

Socrates/ But when the wine finds me out of health, in the first place it finds me really and truly not the same person; for it came to me before when I was unlike my present self.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then Socrates in this, the unhealthy, condition, and the drinking of the wine, together produce on

the tongue a sense of sourness, and in the wine a sourness which comes into being for him; and they make the wine not indeed sourness, but sour, and me not the sense of it, but sentient.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then I, under these circumstances, shall always have the same perception, —for the sense of the other is itself different, and makes the person perceiving it different both in character and in identity, —and the thing which acts on me as an agent, if it were in contact with another, would never produce the same results and so become the same. For by producing a different result from a different patient it will itself become of a different character.

Theaetetus/ All that is true.

Socrates/ And I shall not become sentient of this or that for myself, nor will it be of this particular quality for itself.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But of course I must become sentient of something, when I become sentient at all, —for one can't become sentient and yet sentient of nothing, you know, —and the agent must become something to somebody, when it becomes sweet or sour or anything of that kind. For to become sweet, yet sweet to nobody, is an impossibility.

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ There is nothing left for it then but that this 'being or becoming' must be mutual; for, as we said, the being of both is necessarily coupled together. But it is not coupled to any other than what we are, nor to ourselves; it remains therefore for us only to be coupled to each other. So that, whether one uses the term 'is', he must say it is to somebody, or it is of something, or in relation to something, or the term 'becomes'; but he must not himself speak of anything either 'being' or 'becoming' singly of itself, nor

allow another to use such expressions. This is the conclusion which the foregoing argument indicates.

Theaetetus/ It certainly does so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then when anything which affects me is an agent to me and not to another, I also have perception of it, but another has not.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ It follows that my sense is a true sense to me; for it belongs to a union of which I am an essential member. Thus I am a judge, as Protagoras affirms, of whatever is, and I can fairly say that it is so to me; or of what is not, that it is not.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ I want to know then how, if I am infallible and cannot be mistaken in my own views about what is or becomes, I can fail to have an accurate knowledge in whatever I have perception.

Theaetetus/ That would be impossible.

Socrates/ Then you put it very well when you said that Knowledge is nothing else than Perception. So it comes to the same thing whether, according to Homer and Heraclitus and all that school, all things are ever in motion, like currents; or, according to Protagoras, that wisest of men, man is the measure of all things; or, according to Theætetus, these facts being assumed, that Perception comes to be Knowledge. Is it not so, Theætetus? Must we say this doctrine is a newly-born brat of yours, and that I have been concerned only in the delivery of it? Or how say you?

Theaetetus/ So it must be, Socrates.

Socrates/ This child of ours then, as it seems, —whatever it be worth, —we have at last brought into the world. And now that it has been born, the next step will be to perform

the ceremony (in good earnest, too,) of going round by reasoning on it, taking good heed that the thing born does not turn out unworthy of being brought up, —a mere creature of air and a sham. Or do you think that, as the doctrine is yours, we are bound to rear and not to discard it? Or will you patiently see it put to the test of inquiry, and not be very full of wrath if someone should try to take it from you, like a first child from a mother?

Theodorus/ Theætetus will stand it, Socrates; he is not ill-natured. But tell me, in Heaven's name, is it not, on the other hand, just the other way?

Socrates/ You are quite an enthusiast in argument, and a worthy good man, Theodore, if you think I am a sort of bag of words, and can easily take out of it and deliver a speech to prove that all this is again not so! You don't comprehend what comes of these discussions, that none of these arguments proceeds from me, but always from the party who converses with me, and that I myself know nothing more, except just this trifling matter, how to get a subject from some other clever person, and to give it a fairly good reception. And so I will endeavor now to get this from our young friend here, and not to say it myself.

Theodorus/ What you propose, Socrates, is better, and therefore act accordingly.

Socrates/ Do you know, then, Theodore, what it is that I am surprised at in your companion Protagoras?

Theodorus/ What is that?

Socrates/ The general account of his views he has given charmingly, —how that what seems to each man is so to him. But I wonder at the beginning of his treatise, and that he did not commence his 'Essay on Truth' with these words, 'The measure of all things is a Pig'—or a baboon, or some other still more outlandish specimen of such creatures as

are endowed with the faculty for feeling. For then he would have begun his address to us in grand style, and indeed with no little contempt for us, by showing that while we have been looking up to him, as to a god, for his wisdom, he all the time was no better in respect of intelligence than the tadpole of a frog, not to say, than any other human being. For if that is to be true and real to each man, which he forms an opinion of through perception, and if one man is not to give a decision on the state and the condition of another any better than himself, nor to have any better right to form a judgment about the opinion of another, as to its truth or falsehood, but if (I repeat) each man is to have his own views peculiar to himself, and in all these cases they are right and true views, —then why in the world, my friend, is Protagoras so very wise as justly to be thought worthy of being the teacher of others with large fees, while we are less intelligent, and have to go to school to him, when every man is in fact the measure of his own wisdom? Surely we must say that Protagoras is talking mere clap-trap in all this! As for my own poor services, and my obstetric art, I say nothing about the ridicule that we incur, and indeed, the whole profession and business of dialectic. For of course our examination of and our attempt to refute each other's fancies and opinions, if every man's are equally right, must be a long and dreary waste of breath, if Protagoras' 'Truth' is true, and did not give its oracular utterances from the depths of the book in mere joke.

Theodorus/ Socrates, the man is a friend of mine, as you yourself just now said. Therefore I don't wish to have Protagoras proved to be in the wrong through any admissions of mine, nor on the other hand to insist that my views are right against your convictions. Do therefore once more take Theætetus, who certainly seemed just now to respond very readily to your appeal.

Socrates/ Supposing, Theodore, you were to go to Sparta, to visit the wrestling-schools; would you expect to look at others stripped, some of them but poor figures, without having to display against theirs your own form by taking off your clothes to compare it?

Theodorus/ Do you think I would not, if I thought they were likely to allow me, and to comply with my request? Just so I hope now to persuade you to let me remain a mere spectator, and not to drag me to the wrestling-ground, old and stiff as I am, but to try a throw with one who is younger and more pliant in limb.

Socrates/ Well, Theodore, if that is what pleases you, it does not displease me, as they say in the proverb. Once more then we must go to our clever friend Theætetus. Come, now, Theætetus, to take first the views we have discussed, —do you not share in our surprise that you will thereby prove all at once not inferior in wisdom to any man, or even any god? For you don't suppose that Protagoras' 'Measure' is said at all less in reference to gods than to men?

Theaetetus/ Indeed I don't. And, to reply to your question, I am very much surprised; for when we were discussing in what way they meant to say 'That which seems to each man, is so to him,' it seemed to me very well said; but now it has suddenly turned out quite otherwise.

Socrates/ Ah! you are young, my friend, and therefore your ears and your mind are readily open to the lecture you have heard. (But don't be alarmed); for in reply to this, Protagoras, or someone in his behalf, will say, 'My fine fellows, men and boys, here you are sitting together and talking fine, and bringing forward the gods, though I expressly exempt them both in speaking and in my writings, and decline to say whether there are or are not such beings. You only say what the mass of mankind would accept if they

heard it, —that it is strange if human beings, each and severally, shall have no superiority in respect of wisdom over any animal; but as for proof or cogent argument, you adduce none whatever; you adopt a view that is a mere probability, albeit, if Theodore or any other geometer chose to employ it, he would be worth simply nothing. Consider therefore, both you and Theodore, if you are prepared to accept statements made on such weighty matters by mere probabilities and plausible talk.

Theaetetus/ Why, Socrates, neither you nor we should say that was right.

Socrates/ Then we must view the matter in a different light, as it appears from what you and Theodore say.

Theaetetus/ Differently, by all means.

Socrates/ Then let us proceed thus to the inquiry, whether, in truth, Knowledge and Perception are the same or something different. For it was to this that the whole of our argument was directed, and for this that we mooted all those strange outlandish theories, was it not?

Theaetetus/ It was, without doubt.

Socrates/ Shall we then allow, that when we perceive things by the faculties of seeing or hearing, we at the same time also know every particular about them? For instance, if we have not learned the dialect of foreigners, are we to say that we don't hear them, when they speak, or that we don't hear them with understanding? So again, if we don't know letters, when we look at them are we to say that we don't see them, or to insist that, of course, if we see them, we understand them?

Theaetetus/ Only just this part of them, Socrates, that we actually see and hear, we shall say we understand; that is to say, that we both see and know the shape and color of the letters, and hear and apprehend the shrill or the deep tones

of the voices; but such explanations of the meaning of both as writing-masters or interpreters give, we shall allow that we do not know, as we do not realize them by seeing or hearing.

Socrates/ Bravo, Theætetus! To encourage you, I shall not care to raise any objection to your answer. But see, there is another difficulty coming upon us; and it is for you to consider how we can get clear of it.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ A question of this kind, which might be put: — Is it possible, if a man once became acquainted with something, that while he yet has a recollection of it and retains it, he should not know the very fact that he remembers?' But perhaps I am using more words than I need; I merely wish to ask, if a man who has learnt something does not know it when he remembers it?

Theaetetus/ How can that be, Socrates? What you say would be a miracle.

Socrates/ Perhaps the fault is mine for talking nonsense. But consider: you call seeing perceiving, do you not, and sight perception?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ It follows then that a man who has seen something has 'become acquainted' with what he saw, according to our late axiom?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well! I suppose you allow there is such a faculty as Memory?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it of nothing or of something?

Theaetetus/ Of something, of course.

Socrates/ Therefore of something or other that one learnt and had a perception of?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, now, if a man saw an object, I suppose he remembers it sometimes?

Theaetetus/ He does.

Socrates/ When he shuts his eyes? Or does he forget it when he does that?

Theaetetus/ Why, it would be rather bold to assert that!

Socrates/ But we must assert it, if we are to maintain our axiom as before. Otherwise, it is gone.

Theaetetus/ Upon my word, I suspect as much; but I have not a sufficiently clear apprehension. Say therefore how.

Socrates/ Why, in this way: he who sees, we say, has become acquainted with that which he saw; for sight and sense and knowledge are allowed to be all one.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Well, but one who by sight became acquainted with what he saw, if he shuts his eyes remembers it and yet does not see it. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But this 'doesn't see it' means doesn't know it', if, as we say, 'he sees' means 'he knows'.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ It follows then, that, if a man became acquainted with something, though he still remembers it, he does not know it, since he does not actually see it! But we said that would be a miracle, if it really happened.

Theaetetus/ What you say is very true.

Socrates/ It seems then that something which is impossible does occur, if one maintains that Knowledge and Perception are identical.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then we must assert that each of these is distinct.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ What then can Knowledge be? We must discuss it again, as it seems, from the beginning. Yet what are you going to do, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ About what?

Socrates/ Like some dunghill cock, we seem to me to have suddenly left the argument and to crow before we gained the victory.

Theaetetus/ How can that be?

Socrates/ It appears to me that we are acting like mere controversialists; we form our premises with regard to the common acceptation of words, and we are content by such means to get the better in the argument. Thus, while we profess to be philosophers and not mere wranglers, we are unconsciously doing the very same as those learned and skillful disputants.

Theaetetus/ At present I don't see your meaning.

Socrates/ Well, then, I will try to make what I mean to say clear to you on this subject. We asked, you know, if a man who has learnt something, and has it in mind, can be said not to know it. And by taking the case of one who has seen an object, and afterwards, with his eyes shut, remembers it though he does not see it, we said that he did not know it and yet had it in memory; which was impossible. And so this fine story of Protagoras' came to an end, and with it yours, of the identity of Knowledge and Perception.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But it would not, I suspect, my friend, had the author of that other saying been alive, but he would have brought effective aid to it. At present, we are abusing it when it has none to befriend it. Indeed, it seems that even the guardians whom Protagoras left behind him, —our friend Theodore here is one, —don't care to interfere in its behalf. Well, then, we will make the venture ourselves, and come to its aid for the sake of fair play.

Theodorus/ Nay, Socrates, it is Callias, the son of Hipponicus, who is the guardian, rather than I. Somehow or other, we took to geometry, and got away from the science of bare words. However, we shall feel obliged to you, if you undertake the defense of him.

Socrates/ Very good: then observe, Theodore, the kind of aid I am going to bring. For a man might have to make admissions still more damaging than those we have just made, if he did not carefully attend to the lax use of phrases, —how we are in the habit of saying 'yes' and 'no' in our ordinary answers. Must I tell you how that is, or Theætetus?

Theodorus/ Rather tell us all in common, only let the younger be the respondent; for if he gets a throw he will be in a less awkward plight.

Socrates/ I tell you then what is the most formidable question of all. It is to this effect: Can a man at once know something, and yet not know what he knows?

Theodorus/ What answer now are we to give, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ That it is impossible, in my opinion.

Socrates/ Not at all, —if you intend to maintain that seeing is knowing. For how will you deal with a question that cannot be evaded, —caught, as the saying is, in a tank, —when some undaunted man asks, as he covers one of your

eyes with his hand, 'Whether you see his mantle with that covered one?'

Theaetetus/ I suppose I shall say that I don't with that, but I do with the other.

Socrates/ Then you at once see and don't see the same object?

Theaetetus/ Under those circumstances—yes.

Socrates/ I don't put that reservation (he will reply), nor did I ask you about the how; but simply whether, what you know, you also don't know. It now appears that you see what you don't see; and you have already allowed that seeing is knowing and not seeing is not knowing. Consider then what results from these premises.

Theaetetus/ Well, I see on reflection that it is just the contrary of what I said before.

Socrates/ And perhaps, my estimable friend, more difficulties of the same kind would have occurred to you, if anyone put further questions to you; 'Can a man have a keen or a dull knowledge? Can he know close by, but not far off? Can he know the same thing loudly and gently?' There are countless questions of the like kind, by asking which in the course of his argument a light-armed fighting-man serving for hire might entrap you, when you had defined Knowledge to be the same as Perception. Then, making a direct assault on seeing and smelling and senses of that sort, he would show your definition to be wrong, pressing you hard and allowing you no rest, till at last, in your admiration of that much-to-be-coveted wisdom of his, you had allowed yourself to be bound hand and foot by him; and then, having got you fairly in his power, and tied you to a string of other captives, he would at last consent to ransom you for whatever sum you could agree on between you. What defense then, you

may perhaps ask, would Protagoras make in aid of his own doctrine? Must we essay to state it?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Well, then, he will say all that we say in his behalf, and more than that, will make a direct attack on us, expressing his contempt for us in these terms: —'So then this worthy, this Socrates, because a mere lad, when asked by him if it were possible for one and the same man at once to remember and yet not to know the same thing, was timid, and in his timidity said 'no', through having no faculty of foresight, —has held up my illustrious self to ridicule in his reasonings! Whereas, in fact, you most heedless of disputants, Socrates, the case stands thus: when you are examining any views of mine, and to this end propose a question about them, if the party questioned gives such a reply as I should give, and is beaten, then I am proved to be in the wrong; but if his answer is of a different sort, then the person himself to whom it was put. For instance, —do you imagine anyone will concede to you that, if the memory abides in anyone of something that he underwent, it is a feeling of the same kind as it was when he underwent it, viz. now that he no longer feels it? Or again, do you suppose he will hesitate to admit that thus it is possible for the same man to know and not to know the same thing? Or, should he fear such an admission as that, do you suppose he will allow you to maintain that a person who is undergoing some change is identical with what he was before he began to undergo it? In other words, that a man is the particular person always, and not several, and that by a process of becoming this or that in endless variety, if a becoming unlike should take place in him? —for I suppose we must be careful not to catch up each other's words. No! my very fine fellow, he will say, do come to the precise point of my assertion, and prove it wrong if you can. Show that our perceptions are not

special and peculiar to each of us, or that, if they are such, not at all the more for that what seems to anyone becomes so to him, and to him only (or say, 'is so to him', if we may use the verb 'to be') to whom it seems. But in talking of swine and baboons, you not only act swinishly yourself, but you persuade your hearers to do the same towards my writings; which is not fair play. For I insist that the truth is as I have stated in my book; that each of us is a measure of what is and what is not; though I allow that there is an enormous difference between one man and another in this very respect, that to one man this seems to be and therefore is, to another that. In this sense I am far from denying that there is such a thing as wisdom or a wise man. On the contrary, I even affirm that this very man is wise, who, by producing a change in another, to whom certain things seem and are bad, makes them seem and be good. Now don't carp at my statement again, from the way in which I have expressed it, but take this illustration that you may know my meaning still more clearly. Recall to mind what we said before, that if a man is out of health, what he takes both seems and is nauseous to him, albeit it seems and is just the contrary to one in health. Now, it is not for us to make either of these wiser on the subject, for indeed that is not possible; nor are we to find fault with him, and assure him that the sick man is a stupid fellow for thinking so-and-so, but the healthy man is wise for thinking something quite different. No! we must change him so as to take the other view; for this other disposition is a better one. Just so in educating him, we must alter him from the bad mental habit to the better; only, while your physician effects this by drugs, your professor does it by argument. For we cannot say that a person had false opinions once, but somebody made him hold the truth afterwards; he cannot think what to him is not, nor anything else than what he feels; but this must always be true to him.

In fact, the case is this: when through a vicious condition of mind, men hold vicious opinions, a right condition causes them to hold right opinions. These views some people through want of practice in reasoning call 'true views'; all I say is, that the one sort of views is letter than the other sort, but not at all truer. And, my dear Socrates, I am very far from calling wise men frogs. As far as they deal with men's bodies, I call them physicians; as far as with plants, husbandmen. For I affirm that even these, if any of their plants are out of health, produce in them good and healthy sensations, and such as are true to it, instead of vicious ones; just as your wise and good speakers cause that what is good instead of what is bad should appear to states to be right. For I lay it down as an axiom, that 'Whatever each state considers just and right, that is so to it, so long as it holds them to be so.' Only your wise man makes what is good to seem and therefore to be good, instead of what is bad being true to them in any particular case. In the same way your professor also, if he can train his pupils after this method, is wise, and deserves large sums of money from those instructed by him. According to this view, then, some persons are wiser than others, and yet no one holds false views. No! whether you like it or not, you must submit to be 'a measure'. For by considerations of the above kind the statement we are discussing is shown to be consistent. If you can call it in question by denying its premises, do so by arguing against it in a discourse, or, if you prefer that method, by questions: for even this is not to be shunned by a man of sense. Act, however, in this way; don't be unfair in your questions; for it is most unreasonable that one who professes to care about uprightness and truth should do nothing but cheat all through his discourse. And I call it cheating, in circumstances like the present, when a man does not observe the just distinction between arguing and

conversing, —in the former saying what he does not really mean, and trying to throw his adversary by every means in his power, in the latter speaking always in earnest and setting up the other on his legs again, by pointing out to him only those failures and slips in which he had been led into error by himself or by a course of bad teaching before. For if you act thus towards them, those who converse with you will blame themselves for their own confusion and perplexity, and not you; rather, they will run after you and love you, and dislike themselves. They will find a refuge from their own ignorance in philosophy, in order that they may become what they were not, and be rid of their former selves. If, however, you take the contrary course, as most do, then the contrary will be the result: you will make those who associate with you to hate learning instead of loving it, when they get old. So, if you will take my advice, as I said before, you will not dispute in a surly and captious spirit, but bring yourself down to our level with sentiments of kindness, and consider in good earnest what we mean when we lay it down as a plain truth that 'all things are in motion,' and that 'whatever seems to each, that is so to a state or to an individual alike.' From a right view of these doctrines you will further consider whether Knowledge and Perception are the same or different, and not, as you did just now, from the familiar use of phrases and words, which the many drag and distort to bear any sense they please, and so cause each other every kind of perplexity. Such, Theodor us, is the aid I have rendered by way of taking your friend's part, to the best of my poor abilities, —a small contribution from a small store. Had he been himself alive, he would have defended his own views in more effective language.

Theodorus/ You are joking, Socrates: you have come to the good man's aid with real spirit and courage.

Socrates/ I am glad you think so, my friend. And now tell me; did you notice Protagoras' saying just now, with reproach to us, that by holding our conversation with a boy we made use of a boy's natural timidity to argue against his doctrines; and how, scolding us for what he called our pleasantry, and magnifying his own doctrine of "Measure", he bade us be serious in dealing with his argument?

Theodorus/ Of course I noticed that, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, do you advise us to do as he tells us?

Theodorus/ I do, by all means.

Socrates/ Do you observe then that all the present company except yourself are mere boys? If therefore we are to comply with our friend's wishes, you and I, by questioning and answering each other, must give our serious attention to his argument, that he may not have this to complain of in us, that we have for the second time discussed the matter in joke by addressing ourselves to striplings.

Theodorus/ Well, is not Theætetus likely to follow an argument through all its mazes better than many who wear long beards?

Socrates/ Yes, but not better than you, Theodore. So don't suppose that it is my duty to take the part of your friend, now that he is no more, by every means in my power, while you are not bound to help him at all. Come, my friend, go with just me so far, —'tis but a little way, —till we ascertain whether you have a special claim to be an authority about diagrams, or all are as competent as you, for their own purposes, in astronomy and those other sciences in which, you know, you are considered to excel.

Theodorus/ It is not easy, Socrates, when one sits by you, to avoid giving one's views on any subject. I am afraid my joke was little to the purpose, when I said you would excuse me from stripping to show myself, as they do at Lacedaemon.

No, you seem rather to incline to the practice of Seiron. At Lacedaemon they tell you either to strip or to go; but you seem rather to act like Antaeus, for when anyone meets you in company you don't let him go till you have made him strip and compelled him to try a throw with you in the argument.

Socrates/ You have admirably, Theodore, expressed my weakness by your simile. I, however, am stouter than those you speak of; for 'ere now many and many a Hercules and a Theseus, on meeting me, —men strong in talk, —have pounded me right well; but I don't give it up for all that, so strong a desire has taken possession of my soul for exercises of this kind. Do not therefore on your part refuse to anoint yourself for a bout with me, and so to benefit both yourself and me.

Theodorus/ I have not another word to say against it, so take any course you please. Come of it what may, I must endure the fate, whatever it may be, of which you have woven the thread, and submit to be questioned on these subjects, —not, however, further than the limits you propose shall I allow myself to be examined by you.

Socrates/ Well, even so far will do. And I pray you, be very careful about this, —don't let us inadvertently make our discussion after the puerile fashion, lest someone should again reproach us with it.

Theodorus/ Be quite sure I shall make every effort in my power.

Socrates/ Let us then in the first instance once more get a grip of the same difficulty as before; let us see whether we rightly or wrongly took offence at and found fault with the statement, because it made every man to be wise enough in himself; and whether Protagoras was right or wrong in granting that, in respect of better or worse, some people were

superior to others; and that such really were wise. Was it not so?

Theodorus/ It was.

Socrates/ Well, now, if he had been here in person to make that admission, instead of our making it for him as supporters of his cause, there would have been no need to take up the subject again and try to get it settled in this way. As it is, perhaps someone may say that we have no authority to make the admission on his behalf; and therefore it is the more proper course to come to an agreement between ourselves on this very question; for it makes a material difference in the argument whether it is as Protagoras says, or the other way.

Theodorus/ What you say is quite true.

Socrates/ Then let us arrive at this agreement as briefly as possible, and from no other premises than those supplied by his own reasoning.

Theodorus/ How?

Socrates/ In this way. He says, I think, that 'what seems to each man, that is so to him who thinks it so'?

Theodorus/ He does say that.

Socrates/ Then, Protagoras, we also on our parts state the view of a human being, or rather, the views of all human beings, when we affirm that everybody in the world thinks himself wiser than others in some things, and others wiser than himself in other things; nay more, that when people are in danger in military service or in times of pestilence or in a storm at sea, they behave towards those who hold the command in any such cases as they would towards divine powers, expecting to be saved by them, though in fact their only superiority over others consists in their knowledge. In fact, human life is full of such instances; men seek others to teach and to direct both themselves and their domestic

animals and even their trades; or they think themselves competent to teach and competent to direct. Now, in all these cases what are we to say, but that the men themselves believe that wisdom or want of information resides with themselves?

Theodorus/ That is the only conclusion we can come to.

Socrates/ They think, then, that wisdom means a true view, and ignorance means a false opinion.

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then how, Protagoras, are we to deal with your proposition? Must we 'say that these men always think truly, or sometimes truly and sometimes falsely? For, if they do both, it follows of course that they do not always think the truth, but sometimes truth and sometimes falsehood. For consider, Theodore, whether anyone is likely, either of Protagoras' party or yourself, to contend, that no man thinks another man is ignorant and holds false views?

Theodorus/ Why, that is incredible, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet that is the strait into which the argument is brought, that affirms man to be the measure of all things.

Theodorus/ How is that?

Socrates/ When you, after making up your own mind on some point, express to me your own opinion upon it; granted that this opinion, according to his statement, is true to you; yet may not we, the rest of the world, become judges of your judgment, or do we conclude that your views are invariably right? Is it not rather the case, that multitudes set their opinion in opposition to yours, believing that your judgment and your opinion are alike wrong?

Theodorus/ Yes, by heaven, Socrates, a mighty host indeed, as Homer says, who are ever causing me a world of trouble.

Socrates/ What then? Shall we say, that in such cases you hold opinions that are true to you, but are false to the vast majority?

Theodorus/ That inference seems inevitable, if we are to follow the argument.

Socrates/ And what must Protagoras himself infer? Surely he must grant either that neither he nor the majority really believe (as we know they do not) man is a measure, — in which case the truth he has written about is truth to no one at all; or that he thinks so, but the majority do not; and then you are aware that, in the first place, the more there are who don't think so, compared with those who do, in the same degree it is truth more than it is not truth.

Theodorus/ That must be so, if the opinion of each is to be the test of truth.

Socrates/ In the second place, his doctrine brings us to this sublime conclusion: in allowing that all hold opinions that are real to them, he of course concedes that the views of those who hold the contrary to his, and by which they consider his views are false, are true to them.

Theodorus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then he would be granting that his own opinion was untrue, in allowing that theirs is true, who think him in the wrong.

Theodorus/ It certainly is so.

Socrates/ But the others, I presume, do not allow that they are mistaken.

Theodorus/ Indeed, they do not.

Socrates/ And he allows that such a conviction in them also is true, —to judge from what he has written.

Socrates/ Then by all without exception, and by Protagoras himself among the first, this 'truth' of his is called

in question, —or rather let us say, by him at all events it will be conceded, when he allows that the person who speaks against his, Protagoras', views, hold a true opinion, —then, I say, Protagoras himself must admit, that neither a dog nor your ordinary man is a measure of anything about which he is uninformed. Is it not so?

Theodorus/ It is.

Socrates/ Since then his doctrine is called in question by all, Protagoras' Truth will be true to nobody, —neither to himself nor to anyone else.

Theodorus/ We are running down my friend too hardly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Nay, my good sir, I am not quite sure that we are not outrunning the truth. Certainly, it must be presumed that he, being older, is wiser than we. Suppose now he were at this very moment to raise his head and shoulders up from the floor, he would very likely scold us roundly, me for talking nonsense and you for assenting to it, and then suddenly disappear and be off before we could stop him. As that cannot be, however, I suppose we must make use of ourselves as measures, to find out what we are, and to say always what we think. Thus, we may surely now affirm that anyone will allow this, —that one man is wiser, or is less well-informed, than another.

Theodorus/ I think we may.

Socrates/ Shall we also say that the argument will stand best by the guiding-line we drew when we were advocating Protagoras' doctrine, —viz. that things generally are as they seem to be to each person, —hot, or dry, or sweet, or of any other quality of the like kind; but that, if anywhere and in any instances he shall grant that one man is superior to another, he must be content to say, that not any woman or boy or even any creature is competent to undertake its own

cure, by its knowledge of what is wholesome for it, but that here, if anywhere, one is superior to another.

Theodorus/ That is my opinion.

Socrates/ Then in politics also he must admit that in respect of what is honorable and dishonorable, just and unjust, lawful or not lawful, whatever code of morality a city lays down for itself, believing it to be right, these things are so to it in reality. In these matters one citizen is not wiser than another, nor one state than another state. But in enacting laws that are for or against its own interest, he will allow that the opinion of one state, or of one adviser of the state, is superior in respect of truth to that of another; for he will hardly venture to affirm, that whatever laws a state may have enacted with the full belief that they are to its own advantage, they will also in the end prove to be such. But in the case of which I am speaking, —in matters of justice or injustice, lawful and unlawful, men are prepared to insist that none of these has an inherent quality of its own by nature; they will not allow more, than that what has been accepted! by the state in common becomes true so soon as it shall have been so accepted, and so long as it may remain on the statutes. And even those who do not accept Protagoras' doctrine of 'measure', take the above view of wisdom. —But argument after argument seems coming upon us, Theodore, and a greater after a less.

Theodorus/ Well, Socrates, we have leisure for it, I suppose.

Socrates/ It seems so. Indeed, I have often, my good sir, observed on other occasions not less than now, how very naturally those who have spent much time in philosophic inquiries, when they come into law-courts appear ridiculous as orators.

Theodorus/ In what sense do you say this?

Socrates/ It appears to me that those who have been conversant from their youth with law-courts and assemblies of that kind, compared with those who have been educated in philosophy and kindred pursuits, have been brought up like slaves compared with free men.

Theodorus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ In so far as the latter, just as you remarked, always have leisure, and hold their conversations at their own convenience and in peace. As we are now taking up one subject after another for the third time, so do your philosophers, if the new theme should please them better than the one proposed, as it has done in our case. Nor does it now concern them at all whether they speak in brief or at length, if they do but get hold of the truth. Whereas your lawyers always speak under pressure of time, —for the water as it keeps running does not allow them to loiter, —and it is not in their power to make their addresses on any subject they may please, for the counsel on the other side stands there exercising a constraint over them in the shape of a brief which he reads as they speak, and beyond the limits of which they must not digress. His speeches are always about one who is as much a slave as himself, and are addressed to one seated there as lord and master, who holds justice in his hand; nor do the pleadings ever digress into any other topic, but are confined always strictly to the legal question, albeit it is often a race for dear life. So that from all these causes your lawyers become shrewd and sharp, well knowing how to flatter their master in word as well as how to gratify him in act, yet small and warped in their minds; for their growth in goodness, with their straightforwardness and freedom of character, has been taken from them by their having been slaves from their boyhood, which has constrained them to be always engaged in some crooked business or other, by burdening their yet tender minds with heavy loads of

dangers and fears. Now, as they cannot bear such a load supported by justice and truth, they turn in quite early life to falsehood and to wronging each other, and thus in many respects become warped and stunted, and so turn out men from mere striplings without any sound principles in their minds, and very clever and wise they have become, —in their own opinions. So much then for the lawyers, Theodore; and now for those of our set, —do you propose that we should describe them fully, or dismiss them for the present and resume our former subject, that we may not, as we said just now, make too free a use of our independence and our privilege of taking up one topic in place of another?

Theodorus/ Not so, Socrates, on any account; let us rather discuss their character in full. For, as you very well observed, it is not that we, the acting party on these occasions, are the slaves of our subjects, but rather our subjects are, as it were, domestics, and each of them awaits our convenience for being brought to a conclusion, whenever it may seem good to us. For we have not in our company either any juryman, or, as the poets have, any spectator, standing by us to find fault or to call us to order.

Socrates/ Let us proceed then to our description, as it seems we must, and as such is your pleasure, taking the best specimens of the class; for why should one mention such as spend their time in philosophy to little or no purpose? Well, then, your best men, I suppose, in the first place do not so much as know their way into the agora at all, nor the site of any law-court or of the council-hall, or any other meeting-place in the city; and as for laws and decrees of the people, they neither see them written nor hear them read. Much less do they know of the secret intrigues of political parties for securing to themselves state-offices, and treasonable meetings and dinners, and serenades with your dameuses, —they don't even dream of doing such things.

Then whether any citizen is well-born or ill-born, or what harm attaches to anyone by hereditary descent, either from the male or the female line, they know no more than (as the proverb is,) how many quarts there are of sea-water. Nay, he doesn't even know that he doesn't know all this; for 'tis not to be supposed that he keeps out of the way of such things for the sake of credit, but in real truth his body alone is there in the city and in town', while his mind and thoughts, regarding all such concernments as trifling and mere nothings, despise them and soar all abroad, 'measuring,' as Pindar says, 'the regions below the earth and those upon it, star-gazing in heaven's heights,' and investigating fully the true nature of the phenomena of each and every part of the universe, never bringing themselves down to the level of any of the objects that are near.

Theodorus/ In what sense do you say this, Socrates?

Socrates/ Just as Thales, Theodore, when he was star-gazing and had his eyes on the sky, contrived to tumble into a pit, and so incurred the ridicule of a smart and pretty Thracian slave-girl, for being so eager to know what was in heaven above him, while he failed to notice what lay before him at his very feet, —so the same banter holds good against all who devote their time to philosophy. It is simply true that persons of that profession know nothing about other people, even their own neighbors, —not only as to their occupations, but almost whether they are human beings at all, or some other kind of creature. No! what man is, and what better objects and destinies such a nature has than the lower animals, —that is what he not only inquires, but takes pains thoroughly to understand. You see what I mean, Theodore, don't you?

Theodorus/ I do; what you say is quite true.

Socrates/ And the consequence is, my friend, that your philosopher both in his private dealings and intercourse, and in his public appearance on any occasion, —when he is obliged to talk either in a law-court or elsewhere about matters before his feet and in his sight, makes himself ridiculous, not merely to Thracian slave-girls, but to the people generally, by tumbling into pits and into every sort of puzzle through want of practice; and his awkwardness is something terrible to see, and suggests the notion that he must be a downright fool. For in the attacks on people's characters he has nothing personal to say against anyone, as knowing no harm of anybody from the want of practice; and thus from being at a loss he appears ridiculous. So, too, in the praises and high-flown eulogies of others, by letting people see that he laughs not affectedly but in all sincerity, he is regarded as a silly giggler. For when he hears an encomium on a tyrant or a king, he imagines that he hears one of your stock-keepers, —a swineherd, for instance, or a shepherd, or a neat-herd—called happy for draining a great deal of milk; only he thinks that kings feed and suck an animal more discontented and more fond of laying plots than the herdsmen do. He thinks, moreover, that such a potentate must of necessity be quite as churlish and uninformed as the herdsmen are, from his want of leisure, seated as he is in his castle on a hill like a shepherd in the midst of his fold. And when he is told that someone who owns ten thousand or more plethra of land possesses an astonishing quantity, he imagines that what he hears is but a very small amount, accustomed as he is to look at the whole world. And when they speak in praise of men's pedigrees, and tell you that so-and-so is of high birth because he can show seven rich ancestors, he regards such a commendation as coming from people who see dimly and only a few years back, and who from defect of education

cannot have their eyes always on the universe, nor consider that every individual has had countless myriads of ancestors, in which rich and poor, kings and slaves, foreign and Greek have been born into the world in millions for everyone, be he who he may; but when men pride themselves on a list of five-and twenty forefathers, and carry back a pedigree to Hercules the son of Amphitryon, it does seem to him surprising that they should make these trumpery reckonings; and he laughs at them for not being able to see that the twenty-fifth from Amphitryon still further back was just what fortune happened to make him, and so to get rid of the conceit of a senseless mind. In all such cases then as the above, a character of this kind is ridiculed by the many, partly for being proud, as he is thought, partly for not knowing the most obvious facts and being at a loss on every occasion.

Theodorus/ You describe, Socrates, exactly what happens in the world.

Socrates/ But when, my friend, he the philosopher, has drawn some of these men of law above the level of their courts, —in other words, when someone has consented at his request to exceed the narrow limits of 'What harm do I do to you, or you to me?' and to rise to the contemplation of justice and injustice in its true nature, —what each of them is, and how they differ from each other and from everything else, —and to leave such questions as 'Whether a king is happy because he owns much gold', for inquiries about the nature of sovereignty, and of human happiness and misery in general, —what these two things really are, and in what way it is the duty of one who is by birth human to attain the one and to escape the other, —when it comes to the turn of that small-minded but shrewd man of law to give his views on all these subjects, then he plays the counterpart of the philosopher in the courts; he is giddy from being suspended

aloft, and looking upwards from his height he loses heart from being so unused to it. Then he gets perplexed, and by his unintelligible talk he makes himself laughed at, not indeed by Thracian slave-girls, nor by anyone else who is uneducated, —for they are not intelligent enough, —but by all who have had an education of the contrary kind to slaves. Such, Theodore, is the character of each; the one, that of a person brought up in reality with the ideas of a gentleman and with leisure at his disposal, —the philosopher, in fact, as you call him, —who may be excused for seeming a simpleton and a mere nobody when he is suddenly required to do the services of a slave, —for instance, if he does not know how to pack a portmanteau or to flavor a relishing dish, or words of flattery. The other is the character of one who knows how to perform all these services thoroughly and promptly when called upon, but does not know how to throw his mantle over his right shoulder like a freeborn gentleman, much less has acquired the fitting language for rightly praising the true life of the gods and of happy men.

Theodorus/ Ah! Socrates, if you could persuade all men to think so, as you do me, there would be more peace and less evils in this world of ours.

Socrates/ But it is impossible, Theodore, either that evils should be abolished, —for there must ever be some principle antagonistic to good, —or that they should take up their abode among the gods. No! they must range this mortal nature and this, world of ours, and there is no help for it. And this is just the reason why we should try to flee away from this to the other life with all possible speed. Now by this flight I mean the making oneself as like to God as is possible for man; and this likeness consists in becoming just and holy with the highest intelligence. But alas! my friend, His by no means easy to persuade people that, after all, it is not for the sake of that, for which most men tell us we ought to

shun vice and to pursue virtue, that we are bound to practice the one and not the other, —that is, merely that one may be thought not bad, or to be positively good, —for all this is what they call old wives' gossip, as it seems to me. No! let us state the truth thus: —God is in no way and in none of his dealings unjust; on the contrary, he is as just as it is possible to conceive, and there is nothing so like to him, as anyone of us who on his own part has learnt to be as just as he can be. On this point turns the question whether a man is really clever, or good for nothing and a man only in name. Yes! it is the knowledge of this which is wisdom and true virtue, while ignorance of it shows a want of instruction and a baseness than cannot be mistaken. All the other kinds of cleverness and wisdom, as they are commonly thought to be, in places of political influence are simply vulgar, and in the arts are tradesman-like. If, therefore, any of these men act unjustly, or say or do what is unholy, far the best course to take with them is not to allow that they can be clever by wrong-doing. For as it is, they glory in their shame, and they flatter themselves they are being told they are no fools, no mere encumbrances of earth, but men, such as those should be who have any hope of coming off safely in the turmoil of politics. We should therefore tell them the plain truth; that they are what they think they are not, all the more because they think they are not. For they do not know the penalty of injustice, which of all things they ought least to be ignorant of. It is not what they suppose, stripes or capital punishment, nothing of which in many cases has to be borne by the unrighteous; no! it is a penalty from which there is no escape.

Theodorus/ Of what then do you speak?

Socrates/ My dear friend, there are two examples set before us in the order of things; that of the godlike, which is most blessed, that of the godless, which is most miserable.

Now those who from stupidity and utter want of intelligence do not see that this is so, are unconscious that they get more and more like the one through their unrighteous acts, and more and more unlike the other. And the penalty of this ignorance they pay by living the life, the example of which they are bringing themselves to resemble. And if we tell them, that if they don't cease from that cleverness of theirs, in the other life they will never find entrance into that blessed abode that is free from all evil, but will pass a groveling existence in this lower world, like to their present sojourn upon it, bad in company with bad, —if we tell them this, they will more than ever regard themselves as clever fellows, who are up to anything, being lectured by a parcel of fools.

Theodorus/ That is true indeed, Socrates.

Socrates/ Indeed it is. There is one result, however, from which they cannot escape: if they hold a private conversation, giving and hearing reasons on the course of life they so disparage, and consent like men to stand their ground without running like cowards for some considerable time, then, my good sir, they get strangely out of temper with themselves at the end of the argument, and all that fine eloquence of theirs fades away, so that they seem no better than boys. However, on these subjects, as the discussion of them at present is out of place, let us say no more, or our first argument will be overwhelmed by the flood of ideas that will pour in upon us. Let us then, if you please, return to our former inquiries.

Theodorus/ I confess that to me, Socrates, these extra subjects are fully as pleasant to hear about: for they are easier for one of my age to follow up. However, as you wish it, let us go back again to our former subject.

Socrates/ Well, then, I think we were about that point of the argument where we affirmed that those who take for their axiom that Being is but Movement, and that 'what seems to each is so to him to whom it seems', are ready to insist, that in things in general, and especially in questions of justice, whatever views a city may have adopted as such, as the expression of her opinion on the subject, to her they are just, so long as they are in force. But when the question turns on what is her real interest, we maintained that no man was presumptuous enough in this case to venture on the assertion, that what a state has enacted believing it to be beneficial to itself, that also is so for as long a time as the enactment remains; unless, indeed, we are talking about what is beneficial in name only; which, of course, would be a mere satire on the subject of our conversation.

Theodorus/ It would indeed.

Socrates/ Then don't let him talk of the mere name, but the reality of that which, under the name of 'beneficial,' is the subject of our inquiry.

Theodorus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then whatever she means by the name, that, of course, she aims at in her legislation, and all the laws, to the best of her belief and her power, she enacts with a view to her own interest especially. Is there any other end she has in view in making laws?

Theodorus/ Assuredly not.

Socrates/ Does then a state always succeed in this aim, or does every government make occasional mistakes?

Theodorus/ I think that it is often mistaken.

Socrates/ Perhaps from the following consideration anyone might be yet more likely to form the same conclusion; I mean, if he were to put the question respecting the entire class of things which includes the useful: that, of

course, is one that in its very nature extends also to the future. For, whenever we legislate, we enact our laws with the hope and belief that they will be beneficial for times yet to come, that is, to speak correctly, 'for the future'.

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Come then, let us ask Protagoras, or some of those who maintain his opinions, this question: —'You say, gentlemen, that man is the measure of all things, —of white, heavy, light, all qualities and conditions of that kind whatsoever. For, as he has in himself the criterion of them, whatever he feels, believing it to be such, is so to him, and constitutes a true belief. Now, is this not so?'

Theodorus/ It is so.

Socrates/ But has he also in himself, Protagoras, (we shall say,) a criterion of what will be? Do things happen exactly as one thinks they will happen, when one has formed a certain opinion about them? For instance, in the feeling of heat, when some person ignorant of medicine has conceived the idea that a fever will seize him, and there will be in him a certain feverishness, but another, a physician, forms a contrary opinion, according to the opinion of which are we to say that the result will be? Or will it be according to both opinions, —will the patient not feel hot and feverish to the physician, but feel both to himself?

Theodorus/ That would be absurd, indeed.

Socrates/ Yet, I suppose, on the sweetness or sourness that is yet to be in wine, the opinion of the cultivator alone, and not that of the harp-player, is of authority.

Theodorus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Nor, again, would a trainer in boys' exercises be likely to judge better than a musician whether a piece of music when played will be in good or bad tune, though

afterwards, when it is played, the trainer may have ear enough to think it is correct.

Theodorus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ 'Well, the judgment of one to whom a dinner is to be given, —he being no adept at cookery—while the banquet is in preparation, will be of less weight than that of the cook respecting the pleasure that is in store for him. For observe, we are not at present to insist in our argument on the pleasure that each one now feels, or has felt, but simply on the question, whether, in what will seem and therefore be pleasant to each, every man is the best judge for himself. Would you, Protagoras, be a better judge before-hand than any of the unlearned of what would be likely to carry conviction to each of us if you went into court?

Theodorus/ Why, Socrates, that is just the point in which Protagoras specially professed that he himself surpassed all others.

Socrates/ Of course, my good sir, he did. If he had not, no one would have conversed with him on payment of a large fee, —I mean, if he had not tried to persuade his pupils that no seer, and indeed nobody else in the world, was likely to judge better not only what was, but what would seem and be convincing, than each man for himself.

Theodorus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then both legislations and their utility are concerned with the future; and all will readily grant that of necessity a state must, in enacting laws often fail in securing its highest and truest interests.

Theodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then we shall give a fair reply to your master, if we tell him he is bound to allow that one man is wiser than another; and that, although such a person is a measure of truth, yet I, who have no such knowledge, am in no way

bound to become a measure; —a conclusion very different from that of the argument lately undertaken in his behalf, which insisted that I was a measure, whether I wished it or not.

Theodorus/ It seems to me, Socrates, that the proposition is best refuted by that consideration (though, indeed, it is also refuted by this), viz. that it makes the opinions of others to be of authority, and those opinions have been shown to regard his statements as altogether untrue.

Socrates/ There are many others ways, Theodore, in which such a proposition as this might be refuted, that 'every opinion of every man must be true.' But it is more difficult to prove that, in such feelings as each one has at the time, which are the sources of our impressions and of the opinions founded on them, such opinions are not true. Perhaps, indeed, it is not enough to say this: they may even be, and perhaps are, irrefragable; and those who affirm that they are plain and clear, and therefore sure grounds of knowledge, may possibly assert what is really the case. And thus our friend Theætetus is not far from the mark in saying that Perception and Knowledge are the same thing. We must therefore look at our work of art a little closer, as the argument in defense of Protagoras told us to do, and we must examine this doctrine of 'Being is only motion' by ringing it to hear if it sounds cracked or whole. At all events, no small contest about it has arisen, and that with a numerous school.

Theodorus/ Small! I should say not. Why, in Ionia it is even gaining ground rapidly. The fact is, the followers of Heraclitus support this doctrine very heartily.

Socrates/ And therefore, friend Theodore, the more carefully we must look into it, and from the very beginning, according to the line they themselves take.

Theodorus/ By all means. For indeed, Socrates, apropos of these Heracliteans, or as you say, these followers of Homer or others yet earlier—one can no more converse with the disciples themselves of the school of Ephesus, who profess to be well up in the doctrines, than one could with maniacs. For, just like their own teachings, they are ever in motion; and as for staying on one subject or question, or quietly replying or putting a question in their turn, this is no more in them than anything; or rather, what is not even a naught is greater compared with the utter absence of rest in these men. No! if you ask any of them anything, they drag forth as if from a quiver certain ambiguous wordlets and shoot them off; and if you try to get some account of this, and to know what it really means, you will be hit by another term used in a newfangled sense, and so will never come to any conclusion in conversing with any of them. Indeed, they do not themselves do any better with each other, but they very carefully observe their own law of never letting anything stable remain either in the argument or in their own minds, thinking, I suppose, that 'stable is 'stationary'; and with that, you know, they are openly at war, and even, as far as they can, try to get rid of it altogether.

Socrates/ Perhaps, Theodore, you have only seen these men disputing, and have never had an interview with them in their moments of peace; for they are no friends of yours. That kind of language, I suppose, they use to such disciples of theirs as they wish to make like themselves, when they have a little more leisure.

Theodorus/ Disciples, indeed, my good sir! Why, with philosophers of that kind no one is a disciple of another. They spring up like mushrooms, from whatever source any of them may chance to have drawn his inspirations; and each one believes that the other knows nothing. From these men, then, as I was going on to say, you will never get any

explanation if they can avoid giving it, or even by a stroke of luck. You must take the men themselves and consider them as a problem.

Socrates/ Indeed, you speak quite reasonably. But have we not received this very problem in two ways and from two sources? —from the ancients, who used poetry to conceal their real meaning from the multitude, and who taught that the creation of all things, —expressed by 'Ocean' and 'Tethys', —is perpetual motion, and that nothing stands; and from the later philosophers, who, as being more advanced, openly explained their doctrines to all, in order that the very cobblers may understand their wise sayings when they hear them, and may leave off stupidly thinking that some things stand and other things move, and, on being told that everything moves, may hold them in due honor. —But I had almost forgot that there are others who openly maintain the very contrary doctrine to these; as for example, that the so-called universe is unmovable; and other propositions which are affirmed by more than one Melissus or Parmenides, in opposition to all these of the Ionian school. Such are, 'that the universe is one,' and that it is 'self-contained and stands still,' because 'it has no place to move in.' Now, my friend, how are we to deal with all these conflicting doctrines? For in our gradual advance, we have fallen between the two without knowing it, and if we don't defeat them and get clear off, we shall be punished as boys are in the wrestling-schools when they play at the game of the line, when they are seized by both sides and dragged to the camp of the enemy. It appears to me, therefore, that we ought to examine first the other side, against whom we first made a movement, the 'fluent' school. And, if we should think there is something in what they say, we will join them in dragging our own selves to their side, in our efforts to get away from the others: or if, on the other hand, the party who make the universe stand

still should seem to speak more truly, we will run off to them and leave these people who would move even the immoveable. And again, should we be of opinion that neither side has anything reasonable to say, we shall be ridiculous in supposing that we second-rate inquirers talk sense, and in expressing disapprobation of very old and very learned men. Consider then, Theodore, if it is worth our while to advance in the face of such a danger.

Theodorus/ I should rather say, Socrates, it is not to be endured that we should not fully consider what each of the contending parties have to say.

Socrates/ Consider then we must, as you show such zeal in the cause. It seems to me that our discussion about universal motion should begin with the inquiry, What do they mean in saying that 'all things move'? What I intend to express may be put thus: Do they affirm that there is one kind of motion, or, as I rather think, that there are two? However, don't let this be my opinion alone, but do you share in it, that we may suffer in common, if it must be. And now tell me: Do you call it motion when something changes from one place to another, or even when it turns as on its own axis?

Theodorus/ I do.

Socrates/ Let this then be taken for one kind. But when there is no local movement, but a thing is growing old, or becoming black from being white, or hard from soft, or undergoing any alteration of that kind, are we not justified in describing this as another kind of motion?

Theodorus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Nay, you cannot avoid it. I reckon therefore two kinds of movement: alteration, and motion in space.

Theodorus/ And rightly.

Socrates/ Then, after making this distinction, let us proceed to r argue with those who say that everything has motion; and let us put to them this question: Do you mean that everything moves in both ways, that is, both by motion and by alteration, or that some things have both kinds of motion, some only one?

Theodorus/ Well, really, I don't know what to reply. I suppose they would say, in both ways.

Socrates/ Why, if they do not, my friend, they will find that things both move and stand still, and the answer that 'all things are in motion' will be just as incorrect as that 'they stand still'.

Theodorus/ That is very true.

Socrates/ Then, since they must be in motion, and non-motion cannot exist in any of them, it follows that all things move always with all the kinds of movement.

Theodorus/ It cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ Now then mark well this conclusion of theirs. We said, I think, that they explain the origin of heat, or whiteness, or any other manifestation, in this way: each of these is produced from motion simultaneously with the sensation of it, and intermediately between the agent and the patient. The patient thus becomes sensitive, but not sensation, and the agent becomes of a certain quality, but not the quality itself. Perhaps then this word quality seems to you an outlandish term, and you do not understand it in its general sense. Well, then, hear about it in its several departments. The agent in such effect is not heat nor whiteness: it is only that a thing *becomes* hot, or white, and so on. For you remember, of course, that in our former discussion of this subject we stated the case thus: —that there is no self-existent one, nor any agent or patient taken alone, but that from both, united by a mutual relation, and

so producing the perceptions and the perceptible effects, the one kind of things become of a certain quality, and the other become sentient of it.

Theodorus/ I remember that, of course.

Socrates/ Then let us dismiss all other considerations, and the inquiries whether things are so or not so, and keep strictly to the point which is the subject of our conversation, and put to them this question: You say, do you not, that all things have motion and flux?

Theodorus/ Just so.

Socrates/ And with both kinds of motion that we have distinguished, viz. motion in space, and alteration?

Theodorus/ Of course, —if they are to have a complete or perfect motion.

Socrates/ Well, now, if some things had only the former kind of motion, but not that of alteration, we should be able to say, I presume, what those things are that have the motion of flux.

Theodorus/ That is so.

Socrates/ But as not even this is permanent, that what has flux should flow white, but it is ever changing, so that there is also a flux of this very quality, the whiteness, and a change to some other color (that it may not be found stationary in this respect), is it possible at any given time to describe anything as of a particular color, so as to give it a right name?

Theodorus/ How can that be, Socrates, or anything else of the like kind, if it is always passing away while one names it, as being in a state of flux?

Socrates/ What then are we to say about perception of any kind, as that of seeing or hearing? Does it ever remain in the precise act of seeing or hearing?

Theodorus/ I suppose it ought not, as everything is in a state of motion.

Socrates/ Then we must not say that we see a thing any more than that we don't see it; nor that we have any other perception rather than not, if, as we affirm, all things move in all ways.

Theodorus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But perception is knowledge, as both I and Theætetus contended.

Theodorus/ It was so.

Socrates/ Then our answer to the question, What is knowledge? amounted to this; that it is non-knowledge just as much as it is knowledge.

Theodorus/ That seems to be the answer you gave.

Socrates/ Then our attempt to improve on the answer will prove not very successful, when we try to demonstrate that all things are in motion, in order that that reply may seem a correct one. For on the contrary it has been shown that, on the theory of all things in motion, every answer, on whatever subject one may give it, is equally right whether it says it is so or it is not so, —or, if you please, becomes so, that we may not make them the advocates of 'fixedness' by using the term 'is.'

Theodorus/ You say rightly.

Socrates/ Except indeed, Theodore, that I said 'so' and 'not so'; for when we apply either term to anything, it ceases to be in motion, since not even it is not so' allows of motion. No! we must establish some other kind of language for those who assert this doctrine, since at present they have no phrases in accordance with their own hypothesis, unless indeed 'not at all'; such a phrase might suit them best, being quite indefinite in its meaning.

Theodorus/ Certainly this sort of talk is most suited to them.

Socrates/ Then now, Theodore, we have got rid of your friend Protagoras, and at present we refuse to concede to him that every man is the measure of everything, unless he be intelligent. We shall not allow that knowledge is perception, at least on the theory of universal motion; unless Theætetus here has anything to say on the other side.

Theodorus/ You have spoken very well, Socrates; for now that we have come to these conclusions, I also ought to be let off from replying to you, according to the agreements we made when the argument about Protagoras' doctrine should have come to an end.

Theaetetus/ No, Theodore, no! not till you and Socrates have fully discussed the views of those who maintain on the other hand that the universe stands still. For this, you know, you lately agreed to do.

Theodorus/ What, Theætetus! You, a young man, teach your seniors to be dishonest by breaking their promises! No; make up your mind to give Socrates your views on the subject that still remains.

Theaetetus/ I will, if he wishes it: but I should have liked best to hear rather than to reply about the subject I speak of.

Theodorus/ You challenge cavalry into the open field, Theætetus, in challenging Socrates to a conversation. Do you therefore put your questions to him and you shall hear him.

Socrates/ But I don't think, Theodore, that I shall do as Theætetus bids me in the matter he proposes to question me about.

Theodorus/ Why shall you not do so?

Socrates/ Because I feel a sort of awe of Melissus and those others who assert that the universe stands still, and a fear lest we should consider their doctrine in an undignified way. And yet I fear them less than I do Parmenides, though they are many and he is one. But to me Parmenides appears (to quote the words of Homer) at once to be respected and feared as an adversary. For I had an interview with that man, you must know, when I was very young and he was far advanced in life; and he appeared to me to display a depth that showed true genius. I am afraid therefore that we may fail to understand his statements, and even yet more fail to perceive his real meaning in making them. Nay more, and what is most important, I fear that the subject which the argument has undertaken to discuss, —the question, what is knowledge, —will never be fully examined if so many topics keep pouring in upon us, and we comply with their demands upon our time. Besides, in addition to other considerations, the subject we are now mooting is endless in its bearings and aspects; and if one is to treat it as of secondary importance, it would hardly meet with its deserts, while, if pursued fully, it must be protracted so as to put the primary question about knowledge quite out of sight. Now neither of these alternatives is right; we must rather try if we can deliver Theætetus, by our obstetric art, of the sentiments he entertains respecting knowledge.

Theodorus/ "Well, if such is your pleasure, we will take that course.

Socrates/ Then give your attention once more, Theætetus, to this point, in the subject we have discussed. You said in your answer that Perception was Knowledge. "Was it not so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ If then anyone should put this question to you: By what does a person see black and white, and by what does he hear sounds of high or low pitch? you would reply, I suppose, By his eyes and his ears.

Theaetetus/ I should.

Socrates/ "Well, this off-hand use of words and phrases, when not put to the test of accuracy, is, in general, rather a mark of good breeding, as the contrary is pedantic. Nevertheless, it is sometimes necessary, just as now we are compelled to take hold of the answer you give, in so far as it is not correct. For consider: which is the more correct answer, that the organ by which we see is the eye, or through which we see? And similarly with the ear, —do we hear by or through it?

Theaetetus/ It seems to me, Socrates, that our senses are rather the means than the instruments of perception.

Socrates/ Why, I should say it would be rather strange, my dear boy, if many distinct senses reside in us, as if we were so many wooden horses, instead of all these sensations centering in some one faculty, whether it be soul, or whatever we are to call it, by which we perceive whatever is perceptible, through these senses as through instruments.

Theaetetus/ Well, I think it is in this way rather than in that other.

Socrates/ Now why do I give you this accurate distinction? It is to inquire whether there be not some one and the same principle in us all by which we realize black or white through the medium of the eyes, and other sensations through other organs; and whether, if asked, you will be able to refer all such impressions to the body alone? And perhaps it is better for you to give your views about them by way of answer, than that I should be so very particular in your behoove. And now tell me: Do you not assign to the body all

the several faculties by which you perceive hot, or hard, or light, or sweet things; or do you think they belong to something else?

Theaetetus/ To nothing else.

Socrates/ Will you also be willing to admit, that what you perceive through one faculty it is impossible to perceive through another, —for instance, through seeing you cannot get the impressions you do from hearing, or through hearing, those of seeing?

Theaetetus/ Of course I shall allow that.

Socrates/ Then, if you have any mental conception about both, you would not be said to have a sensible perception of that through either organ, any more than you would have of both through only one.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well, now, on the subject of voice and color, in the first place you have this idea about both, that they have being.

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Also that each is different from each, but the same as itself?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And that both make two, and each is one?

Theaetetus/ That also is true.

Socrates/ Well, are you not also able to make up your mind whether they are alike or unlike to each other?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Then through what faculty do you entertain all these notions about them? For it is not possible to realize any common property respecting them either by hearing or by sight. And there is this further proof of what we assert: if the question could reasonably be asked about both, Have

they any salt in them or not? you are aware that you would be able to state with what faculty you would put this to the test; and that proves to be neither sight nor hearing, but something different.

Theaetetus/ Why, of course it is, being the faculty we have through the tongue.

Socrates/ Well said. But through what comes the faculty that makes known to you the common property of all and the special property of each, —what you call the Being or the non-Being, and the other properties of them that we just now inquired about? What organs or instruments will you assign to all these, as the means by which our sentient faculty has perception of them severally?

Theaetetus/ You mean their Being or non-Being, likeness and unlikeness, their identity or difference, their oneness or any other number they may possess. It is plain, too, that your question refers to oddness or evenness, and other conditions of that kind; —you want to know through which of the bodily faculties we obtain a mental conception of these things.

Socrates/ You follow my meaning admirably, Theætetus; what I ask is precisely this.

Theaetetus/ Upon my word, then, Socrates, I couldn't tell you; but this I can say, that there does not seem to me to be any special organ at all of this nature, as there is to those other sensible impressions. It appears to me that the soul by its own efforts takes into consideration the common properties in all these cases.

Socrates/ Indeed, Theætetus, you are a good looking fellow, and not, as Theodore said of you, plain-featured. For one who says well is well-mannered and well born and bred. And besides your good replies you have done me good by ridding me of a great deal of talk, if you say that the soul

examines some points by itself, and others through means of the bodily faculties. That was the very opinion I held myself; but I wanted you to hold it too.

Theaetetus/ Well, that certainly is my idea of the matter.

Socrates/ To which of these faculties then do you refer the Being of the objects of our impressions? For this is the first and chief consideration in them all.

Theaetetus/ For my part, I refer it to those conceptions which the soul by itself tries to attain to.

Socrates/ Do you refer to the same, the likeness or unlikeness, the identity or difference of them?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ What are we say of their fairness or foulness, their goodness or badness?

Theaetetus/ It appears to me that these are matters of which the soul in an especial manner considers the Being in their mutual relations, by drawing analogies in itself between the past, the present, and the future.

Socrates/ Stay, now. Is it not through the touch that the soul must get a perception of the hardness of what is hard, and likewise of the softness of what is soft?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ But the existence of such qualities as hardness or softness, their nature, and their antagonism to each other, and again, the existence of such antagonism, the soul endeavors to determine for us without any external aid, by gradually attaining these notions and by comparing the one with the other.

Theaetetus/ Certainly it does.

Socrates/ Some of these effects then, I mean those which reach the soul through the medium of the body, are felt at their very birth, by the instinct of nature, by both man and

animals; but the reasonings about them, in respect of their existence and their use, come only by time and through much trouble and instruction, to such as do attain to them at all.

Theaetetus/ That is undoubtedly the case.

Socrates/ Is it possible then for anyone to get to the truth, if he has not realized the fact of existence?

Theaetetus/ It is not.

Socrates/ And if one misses the true view of anything, will he ever have a correct knowledge of it?

Theaetetus/ Of course not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then it is not in the feelings produced that real knowledge consists, but in the reasoning about them. For in this, as it appears, it is possible to realize Being and Truth, whereas in mere perception it is impossible.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Do you then call conception the same as perception, when there are such differences between the two?

Theaetetus/ Not in fairness, at least.

Socrates/ "What name then do you assign to the latter, — I mean the seeing, hearing, smelling, or the feeling of getting warm or cold?

Theaetetus/ I call it the having a sense of such effects: what' other name can I give it?

Socrates/ Then you call it by the general term sensation?

Theaetetus/ I have no better term for it.

Socrates/ But that, we say, is unable to get at truth, since it cannot realize Being?

Theaetetus/ It cannot.

Socrates/ And therefore not knowledge either?

Theaetetus/ No.

Socrates/ Then, Theætetus, perception and exact knowledge never can be the same.

Theaetetus/ It appears not, Socrates; and by this argument more plainly than by any other it has become manifest that knowledge is something different from sensation.

Socrates/ Yes; but surely it was not for this that we began our conversation, that we might discover what knowledge is not, but that we might know what it is. However, we have made so much progress, as no longer to look for it in sensation at all, but in that property of the soul, whatever name it may have, when by its own reasonings it concerns itself with the nature of things that exist.

Theaetetus/ But surely, Socrates, that is called, if I mistake not, 'forming an opinion.'

Socrates/ You think rightly, my friend; and now consider again from the beginning, after wiping clean from your mind all previous impressions, whether you get any clearer view now that you have advanced to this point. And first tell me again, what knowledge is.

Theaetetus/ To call it opinion generally, Socrates, is impossible, since there is such a thing as false opinion. But it seems likely that true opinion is knowledge; and let that be my answer for the present. For if it should appear not to be so, as we go on, as it now does appear, we will then try to give some other definition.

Socrates/ That is the right way to speak, Theætetus, with a hearty earnestness, rather than with the timidity you showed at first in replying. For if we do this, we shall gain one of two things, —either we shall get hold of what we are going after, or we shall be less disposed to think that we know what we don't know: and such a return as that for our

trouble is not to be thought lightly of. And so now what say you? There being two kinds of opinion, one that is true and the other that is false, do you define knowledge to be true opinion?

Theaetetus/ I do; that is the view I now incline to.

Socrates/ Is it not then worth our while to take up again and discuss the question of opinion?

Theaetetus/ What particular question do you allude to?

Socrates/ One which some how or other gives me anxiety now, as it has done often before; so that I have been in great perplexity in considering it not only with myself, but with others, from not being able to define what this feeling is, and how it is produced in us.

Theaetetus/ What feeling?

Socrates/ One's having a false opinion. Hence I am even now in doubt whether we should let it pass, or consider it in some other way than we did shortly before.

Theaetetus/ Of course we should, Socrates, if there seems even the smallest need for doing so. Only just now you and Theodore said well about leisure, that in matters of this kind there is nothing to hurry us.

Socrates/ You are right in reminding me. Perhaps it will not be out of place to pursue the question as one would hunt on a track. For, of course, it is better to get through a small matter well than a great subject insufficiently.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, what have we to say about it? Do we affirm that an opinion may sometimes be false, and that some of us hold false, others true views, such being our natures respectively?

Theaetetus/ We do maintain that.

Socrates/ Is there not then this alternative for us in all subjects and severally in each, that we either know or do not know it? For of learning and forgetting, as intermediate between knowing and not knowing, I say nothing at present, since it has nothing to do with the subject now.

Theaetetus/ Well, then, Socrates, there is nothing left for it but either to know or not to know on every subject.

Socrates/ It becomes necessary then that a man who forms an opinion should form it on something which he either does or does not know.

Theaetetus/ It must be so.

Socrates/ But surely it is alike impossible for one who knows something not to know it, and for one who does not know to know it.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then, this being granted, does he who holds false opinions think that what he knows is not this, but something else of what he knows, and thus, while he knows both, is he also in ignorance about both?

Theaetetus/ Why, that would be impossible, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then does he imagine what he does not know to be some other of the things he does not know? That would be, for one who does not know either Socrates or Theætetus by sight, to take it into his head that either Socrates is Theætetus, or Theætetus Socrates.

Theaetetus/ How can that possibly be?

Socrates/ Well, surely, a man does not think that what he knows is what he does not know, nor, on the other hand, that what he does not know is what he knows.

Theaetetus/ That would be marvelous, indeed.

Socrates/ Then what way remains in which one can have a false opinion? For beyond the limits I have mentioned it is

impossible to have an opinion at all, since there can be nothing that we do not either know or not know; and it has been shown that in none of these is it possible to have false opinions.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Perhaps then, in considering the question before us, we must not pursue the track of knowledge and non-knowledge, but that of Being and non-Being.

Theaetetus/ How is that?

Socrates/ We must consider whether it be not simply true, that one who thinks that something possesses qualities that it has not, must of necessity have a false opinion, however correct his general views may be.

Theaetetus/ Why, that again appears likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ What then? What are we to say, Theætetus, if someone should put this question: Is what we are speaking of possible to anyone, —that is, can any human being ever conceive what is not, either abstractedly or about any existing thing? Well, we, I suppose, shall reply to this, 'Yes, when, in holding an opinion he holds what is not true.' Or how must we state the case?

Theaetetus/ As you have.

Socrates/ Is then such a thing as this possible in other faculties beside thought?

Theaetetus/ As what?

Socrates/ As this, I mean, if a man sees something and yet sees nothing.

Theaetetus/ Of course it is not.

Socrates/ Yet, surely, if he sees some one object, he sees something of things that exist. Or do you think that this 'one' is sometimes among things non-existent?

Theaetetus/ No, I do not.

Socrates/ Then he who sees one object sees a thing that does exist.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And so a person who hears must hear someone sound, and therefore an effect that is real.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who touches something touches someone object, and by consequence some object that actually exists.

Theaetetus/ That too may be granted.

Socrates/ But does not he who forms an opinion form it about something?

Theaetetus/ He must do so.

Socrates/ And if about one thing, then about an existing thing?

Theaetetus/ I grant that.

Socrates/ Then a man who thinks that which is not, thinks nothing.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But surely one who 'thinks nothing' does not think at all!

Theaetetus/ That must be so, as it seems.

Socrates/ It is not possible then to think what is not, either about existing things, or in the abstract.

Theaetetus/ It appears not.

Socrates/ Then holding false opinions is something different from believing what is not.

Theaetetus/ It does seem different.

Socrates/ Then neither according to this view nor according to the line of argument we just before pursued, is there any such thing as false opinion in us.

Theaetetus/ I quite see that there is not.

Socrates/ Then must we call it 'false opinion' as taking place in some such way as this?

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ Must we say that false opinion is an 'allodoxy'; by which I mean, when a man affirms that something of what really exists is something else of what really exists, mistaking in his mind the one for the other? For, according to this view, he does always think what is, only one thing in place of another; and thus, being wrong in the subject of his inquiry, he might properly be said to hold a false opinion.

Theaetetus/ Now you seem to me to have spoken most correctly. For when, for instance, a man thinks something is bad instead of good, or good instead of bad, then he truly thinks what is false.

Socrates/ It is evident, Theætetus, that you have a contempt for me, and hold me in no fear.

Theaetetus/ Why in the world do you say that?

Socrates/ I suppose you think I shall not object to that expression 'truly false,' by asking you if it is possible for quick to take place slowly, or light heavily, or any other contrary not according to its own nature, but according to that of its opposite, and so in a way contrary to itself. This little matter, however, I will not dwell upon, that you may have some real ground for encouragement. But you accept, as you say, the view, that to have a false opinion is to think one thing instead of another?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ In your opinion then it is possible 'to take in one's apprehension one thing for another thing, and not for what the former thing really is.'

Theaetetus/ That is just it.

Socrates/ Then whenever one's mind performs this act, must it not also think about both, or at all events about one?

Theaetetus/ That is necessary.

Socrates/ Either at once, or in turn?

Theaetetus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Now do you mean what I do by this work thinking?

Theaetetus/ What do you call it?

Socrates/ I call it 'a reasoning-process, which the soul goes through with itself about the subject it may be considering', —to deliver an opinion to you without full knowledge. That is what it seems to me to do in thinking, —nothing else than to converse, questioning and answering itself, affirming this or denying that; and when at length, after determining it more or less quickly, by taking a survey and applying itself to the task, it says the same about it and no longer doubts, we take this as its opinion. So that I call the forming an opinion a kind of affirming, and an opinion, a discourse spoken, not indeed to another, nor in audible words, but silently to oneself. What say you?

Theaetetus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Whenever then a person thinks one thing is another thing, then he also asserts to himself that this is that.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Recall to mind now whether you ever said to yourself, as in the form of a maxim, that, beyond a doubt, 'Fair is foul', or, 'Wrong is right'; or, (to sum up every such case under one general head,) consider whether you ever tried to persuade yourself that beyond a doubt one thing is some other thing; or, on the contrary, never even in a dream

went so far as to say to yourself that assuredly these odd numbers are even, or anything of that kind.

Theaetetus/ The truth is as you have last put it.

Socrates/ And do you suppose that anyone beside yourself, either in sound health or out of his mind, seriously said to himself, and with the intention of persuading himself, that that ox must be a horse, or these two must be one?

Theaetetus/ I don't think so, upon my word.

Socrates/ Then, if saying to oneself means forming an opinion, no one, in speaking of or thinking of both of two things, and realizing both in his mind, would be likely to say or think that one was the other; indeed, you will have to give up the very phrase 'other', for I put the proposition thus: 'No man thinks that foul is fair', or anything of the like contrary nature.

Theaetetus/ Yes, Socrates, I resign 'other', as you say, and I agree with you.

Socrates/ Then, in having an opinion about both, he cannot think that one is the other.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But surely if he thinks only about one, and not at all about the other, he will never think that the one is the other.

Theaetetus/ That is true; he would then be obliged to realize that which he has no opinion about.

Socrates/ Then one cannot have "allodoxy' in thinking of both any more than in thinking of one of two things. So that, if one shall define false opinion to mean 'thinking this is that', he will hardly say what is much to the purpose, since it has been shown there cannot be such a thing as 'false opinion' according to this, any more than according to the former views.

Theaetetus/ It seems not.

Socrates/ But surely, Theætetus, if it shall appear that there really is no such thing, we shall be compelled to make many strange admissions.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ I won't tell you, till I have considered and tried the question in all its bearings. For I should feel ashamed for us if, while our doubts are yet upon us, we should feel ourselves forced to make such concessions as I speak of. No! when we have found the truth and have become free, we shall then be able to speak of those others as having to bear it, while we ourselves stand clear of ridicule. If, however, we find ourselves perplexed after all our efforts, then, I suppose, we must submit to be humbled, and give ourselves up to the argument, like sea-sick voyagers, to trample on us and treat us as it pleases. Hear therefore the one way that I can find for bringing this inquiry to an end.

Theaetetus/ You have only to say it.

Socrates/ I shall say that we were wrong in allowing some time ago that it is impossible for a man to think, that what he knows is something that he does not know, and so to be mistaken about it: on the contrary, I shall contend that in a certain sense it is possible.

Theaetetus/ Do you mean (what I surmised at the time when you said it) that there may be a mistake of this kind: I, on some occasion, knowing Socrates, and seeing at a distance someone else, whom I do not, fancied that this is the Socrates whom I know'? For certainly in such a case what you speak of does occur.

Socrates/ We gave up the question then because it seemed to make us at once to know what we know and not to know it.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then don't let us put it so, but in the following way: and perhaps it will fall in with our present view, or perhaps it will still hold out in opposition. But the fact is, we are caught in such a strait that it has become necessary to turn every argument and put it to the test. Consider, therefore, whether there is anything in what I say. Is it possible for one who did not know something before, to learn it afterwards?

Theaetetus/ It is, of course.

Socrates/ And also another thing afterwards, and again another?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Assume then, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a waxen tablet for receiving impressions, —in one of us a greater, in another a less; in one, of purer, in another, of unclarified wax; in some harder, in some softer, in others, of medium quality.

Theaetetus/ I assume that.

Socrates/ Let us further say that it was the gift of the mother of the Muses, Memory; and that upon this tablet, whenever we desire to remember something that we have seen or heard or conceived the idea of in our own thoughts, we take off an impression, by holding it under our sensations or thoughts, just as when we take the impression of gems in our rings. Thus, whatever is taken off on the tablet, that we remember and know, so long as the form remains in our minds; but when it has been effaced, or cannot be taken off at all, then we forget and do not know it.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Observe now whether a person who is considering something of what he sees or hears, and therefore with a knowledge of it, can be said to have a false opinion about it in some such way as this.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Socrates/ By thinking that what he knows is at one time what he knows, at another time what he does not. For we were wrong in our former argument when we said this was impossible.

Theaetetus/ Then how do you state the case now?

Socrates/ It should be stated thus in the cases in question, and a new distinction must be made between them. First, 'if a man knows something, and has the remembrance of it in his mind, but not a sensible perception; he cannot possibly think it to be something else of what he knows, while he retains the impression of this latter, but has not at the time a perception of it.' Secondly, it is equally impossible for a man to think that what he knows is something that he does not know and has no impression of at all. Or, that what he does not know is some other thing that he does not know; or, what he does not know is something that he does know; or, to think that what he has a sensible perception of, is some other thing which he also knows by his senses; or, that what he has a sense of is something that he has not a sense of; or, what he has not a sense of is something else that he has not a sense of; or, what he has not a sense of, is something he has a sense of. We may go yet further, and say it is yet more impossible (if that can be) to think that what one both knows and feels, and also has an impression of in accordance with the feeling, is something else that one knows and feels and has an impression of as well as of the other, and according also to one's feeling. It is also impossible, when one knows something and perceives it, and retains a right impression of it, to think it something else that one knows; or, that what one knows and feels also with right impression, is something else that one feels; or, what one neither knows nor feels, is something else of what one neither knows nor feels: or, what

one neither knows nor feels, is what one does not know; or, what one neither knows nor feels, is what one does not feel. All these are cases where it is in the highest degree impossible to have a false opinion in any of them. It remains, therefore, that in such cases as the following, if anywhere, false opinion may occur.

Theaetetus/ And what cases are these? Tell me, if perchance I derive some farther knowledge from them; for at present I don't follow you.

Socrates/ In the cases where a man knows certain things or objects, he may think them some other of what he knows and has a present perception of; or, secondly, of what he does not know but yet has a perception of; or, lastly, where he thinks that what he knows and feels is something else that he knows and feels.

Theaetetus/ Now I am left still further behind you than I was before.

Socrates/ Then hear the case put in the reverse way. I, knowing Theodore, and retaining in my mind the impression of what he is like, and Theætetus also in the same way, sometimes have the opportunity of seeing, touching, hearing, or by some other of my senses being aware of your presence, while sometimes I have not; and yet I remember you none the less, and so know you in my own consciousness. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Understand this then as the first point in what I wish to explain, —that it is possible either to have or not to have a perception through the senses of what one knows.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Is it not also possible that what one does not know one may, if so be, not perceive by sense at all, or one may only so perceive it?

Theaetetus/ That also may happen.

Socrates/ See then if you follow me any better now. Socrates knows at sight both Theodore and Theætetus, but actually sees neither, and has no other perception of either. I say that he is not likely ever to form an opinion in his own thoughts that Theætetus is Theodore. Is there any truth in what I say?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is certainly true.

Socrates/ This then is the first of the cases I put to you just now.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ And the second is, that, knowing one of you and not the other, and having a present sense of neither, again I should hardly think that the one whom I know is the other whom I do not.

Theaetetus/ Rightly said.

Socrates/ The third is, that if I neither know nor perceive either, I am not likely to think that one whom I don't know is another whom I don't know. I need not repeat to you all the cases I mentioned before, in which I affirmed that I can never have a 'false opinion' about you and Theodore; whether I know or do not know you both, or know one and not the other. You must suppose you have heard them all stated again in the same order. And what I say about the senses generally you must understand in the same way, if you follow my meaning.

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ There remains then only this case in which we can have a false opinion. 'I know you and Theodore; I retain in the waxen tablet I spoke of the impressions of you both, as if they had been stamped on it by seals. Well, at some distance, and so not with sufficient clearness, I see you both together; and I make an effort, in assigning the proper mark

of each to the particular sight of him, to put the sense of sight exactly upon its seal-mark, that I may thence obtain a mental recognition. But I fail in my efforts, and, like persons who put a right shoe on the left foot, I take one for the other, and apply my sight of one to my mental impression of the other; or, as happens to objects seen in a mirror, which causes the right sides to pass into the left, have a change taking place in me, and so get wrong as to the identity.' In this case then occurs the 'allodoxy' that we spoke of, and so the having a false opinion.

Theaetetus/ Why, Socrates, what happens to one's opinion is marvelously like what you describe.

Socrates/ Further than this, there may be mistaken opinion when I know both of two persons, and of one, besides the knowledge, have also the perception, but not the perception of the other, and so have knowledge of him not in the way of actual perception. This is a case which I put before, and you did not then seem to understand me.

Theaetetus/ did not.

Socrates/ Well, I meant this: Knowing the one, and also perceiving him, —that is, having a knowledge of him by perception, —one can never think that he is another of those whom he knows and perceives, i.e. if he has a knowledge of him too by perception. Was it not so?

Theaetetus/ It was.

Socrates/ But we then omitted the particular case we now describe, —that false opinion may occur when a man knows and sees both persons, or has any other kind of perception of them both, but has the mental impression of each not agreeing with the actual perception. For then he is like a bad archer who hits a wrong mark in shooting and so misses; which is what we call deception.

Theaetetus/ That is a likely view of the case.

Socrates/ And further, when there is present perception to one of the impressions, but not to the other, and when a person applies the mental impression of the object of which he has not a present sense to that of which he has, in this way the mind is also quite deceived. To put the matter quite briefly: where a man has no knowledge and never had any perception of an object, he cannot, as it seems, be deceived, and there can be no false opinion, —that is, if there is any truth in the views we are now putting forward. It is on objects that we both know and have perception of that opinion turns, and on these alone that it is engaged. And it becomes either false or true opinion accordingly as it is applied. If it brings the seal-mark and the impressions that belong to it right down upon and exactly opposite to the object seen, then it is a true opinion; if aslant and sideways, then it is a false one.

Theaetetus/ And is not this, Socrates, a very fair account of the matter?

Socrates/ You will say so still more when you hear the following considerations; for the holding of truth is a fair, just as being in error is a foul thing.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, now, they tell us that truth and error result from these causes: when the wax in the mind's tablet is deep, and smooth, and there is plenty of it, and it is sufficiently softened, then the ideas that came upon us through the senses, leaving their marks on this heart's core, (as Homer called it, hinting at the resemblance of κέαρ to κηρὸς,)—then these impressions, being made clear and distinct, and deep enough, are lasting, and persons who are so favored by nature are in the first place apt at learning, secondly, they have good memories, and thirdly, they do not misapply the marks left by the sensations, but form true

opinions. For as the marks are clear, and are not crowded, they at once assign each object to its proper place in their memory; and then it is that we say impressions are really true, and men so constituted are wise men. Don't you think so?

Theaetetus/ I do, decidedly.

Socrates/ And when one's heart has hairs in it, (which, you know, that all-wise poet referred to,) or when it is dirty and not of pure wax, or very moist or very hard, then those who have soft tablets learn easily indeed, but are apt to forget, those who have hard, are slow to learn but retentive. Those whose hearts have hairs in, or are rough, or gritty, or full of earth or dirt mixed up with them, have the impressions made on their tablets indistinct, as those also have whose tablets are hard, —for the impressions have no depth—or too soft, for then they become obscure through so soon running one into the other. And if, beside all these faults, the impressions fall upon and interfere with each other through want of space, and a man happens to be small-minded, in this case they are still more indistinct than in the other. All these persons then are likely to have false opinions; for whenever they hear or see or conceive any idea, they are unable at the instant to assign each to each, but being slow and prone to put things in their wrong places, they see wrongly, hear wrongly, think wrongly about almost everything; and such persons we don't call 'wise', but, on the contrary, mistaken as to what really is, and uninformed.

Theaetetus/ No man could possibly give a truer account of the matter, Socrates.

Socrates/ Must we then affirm that there are such things in us as "false opinions?"

Theaetetus/ O, certainly!

Socrates/ And true opinions too?

Theaetetus/ And true.

Socrates/ Do you think then that by this time it has been determined with sufficient certainty that, as a matter of fact, these two kinds of opinion do exist?

Theaetetus/ Most decidedly so.

Socrates/ I am afraid, Theætetus, that a man who is a twaddler runs a good chance of really being a formidable as well as a disagreeable character!

Theaetetus/ Why so? In respect of what do you say this?

Socrates/ From a feeling of vexation at my own dullness and twaddling, in the true sense of the word. For what else can a man call it, when one drags words to and fro, unable, from sheer stupidity, to be convinced, and so finds it hard to get clear away from each subject of discussion?

Theaetetus/ And pray at what do you feel vexed?

Socrates/ I am not only vexed, but even alarmed, when I think what reply I shall give if someone asks me, O Socrates, have you really then discovered that false opinion does not consist in the mutual relations either of the senses or the ideas, but in the right application of the sense to the idea? And I suppose I shall answer, 'Yes, —piquing myself on the conviction that we have really made a clever discovery.

Theaetetus/ I do think, Socrates, that what we have now proved is very creditable to us.

Socrates/ 'You mean, then,' (he will say,) 'that a man, as man, —that is, whom we only conceive, but do not see, —can never be mistaken by us for a horse, which likewise we neither see nor touch, but have only an idea of without any sensible perception of it whatever? —That, I suppose, I shall say is what I mean.

Theaetetus/ And you will rightly reply.

Socrates/ 'What then? he will say. 'Is it not clear, according to your statement, that a man can never imagine the number eleven, which he only thinks of, to be twelve, which again he only thinks of?'—Come, now, do you give an answer.

Theaetetus/ Well, I shall answer, that if one actually saw or touched them, he might possibly think eleven things were twelve; but that, if he only has these figures in his mind, he never can form such opinions about them.

Socrates/ What then? Do you suppose there ever was a man who, after proposing to himself for consideration five and seven, —I do not mean either seven or five men, or any concrete objects of that kind, but the abstract notions of five and seven, which we said were impressed on the waxen tablets of our memories, and that there was no scope for false opinion about them, —I say, was there ever a man who considered these abstract numbers, saying to himself and asking himself, What total do they make? and replied to himself, on conviction, 'They make eleven,' while another, perhaps, said, 'Twelve'? Or do all the world both say and think that 7 + 5 = 12?

Theaetetus/ No, indeed; many fancy they make eleven. And, if one considers the question by taking a larger number, he makes a still greater mistake. For I assume that you are speaking about number generally.

Socrates/ You are right in your surmise. And now consider: does anything else then happen than that you suppose the abstract numbers in your memory, twelve, are eleven?

Theaetetus/ That seems to be so.

Socrates/ Then it comes back to our original statement. When anyone has this happen to him, he thinks that what he knows is something else of what he also knows, which we

said was impossible; and, in fact, by this very argument we tried to force the conviction that there could be no false opinion, that the same man might not be compelled at once to know and not to know the very same things.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then we are bound to show that the having a false opinion is something else than the wrong application of mental conception to the perception of sense. For, if this were so, we never could be mistaken in our mere conceptions. But as it is, either there is no false opinion, or it is possible not to know what one knows. And which of these paradoxes do you choose?

Theaetetus/ 'Tis a perplexing choice that you set before me, Socrates.

Socrates/ But it certainly seems that the argument will not admit of both. However, —for we are bound to make every venture, —what say you if we try to put a brazen face on the matter?

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ By consenting to state what we mean by 'the knowing a thing.'

Theaetetus/ Why, surely there is nothing impudent in that!

Socrates/ You don't seem to perceive that our whole argument from the very first has been an inquiry about knowledge. We professed not to understand the meaning of the term.

Theaetetus/ Nay, I am aware of that.

Socrates/ Don't you think then that it shows rather a want of modesty, while we don't understand what knowledge is, to undertake to give an opinion as to the nature and meaning of 'to know?' The fact is, Theætetus, we have long

been muddled by this unclear kind of talk. We have said a countless number of times 'We know,' and 'We don't know,' 'We are sure,' and 'We are not sure,' as if we could understand a word that passes between us while we remain ignorant what knowledge is! Nay, at this very moment we are using the terms 'ignorant' and 'understand,' as if we had any right in the world to use them if, as we say, we are as yet destitute of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Then in what way do you propose to converse about these subjects, Socrates, if you avoid the use of such terms?

Socrates/ In no way at all, so long as I am what I am; though perhaps I might have done without them if I had been a practiced controversialist. If such an one were now here, he would say, 'Don't use the terms at all'; and he would blame us greatly for saying what I say, that we cannot possibly do without them. Well, then, since we are but poor disputants, would you approve of my making a venture, and stating what we mean by 'to know'? For it seems to me that it will serve our purpose to do so.

Theaetetus/ Make the venture by all means; and if you don't altogether do without the words, I shall make great allowance for you.

Socrates/ Have you heard then what they now-a-days say is the meaning of 'to know'?

Theaetetus/ I may have heard, but I don't at present remember.

Socrates/ If I mistake not, they say it is 'the state or condition of having knowledge.'

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Let us then make a trifling change in the definition, and call it the possession of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ In what respect will you maintain that the one differs from the other?

Socrates/ Perhaps it will be found not to differ at all; however, you shall hear, and then join me in seeing if there is any truth in their apparent difference.

Theaetetus/ I will, if I can.

Socrates/ Then, as it seems to me, the possessing a thing is not the same as the having it; just as a man may have bought a mantle, and have it in his possession, though he does not happen to wear it. We should not then say that he had it, but only that he possessed it.

Theaetetus/ And rightly so.

Socrates/ Consider then if it is possible in the same way for a man to possess knowledge without actually having it. Take the case of a person who has caught some wild birds, rock-pigeons or any other kind, and builds a dove-cot for them, and so keeps them at home. In one sense, no doubt, we should say that he has them always, because he has secured the possession of them.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But in another sense we should say he has not anyone of them; only that he has a present power over them, since he has made them his captives and keeps them in a cage of his own. He can take and hold them whenever he wishes, by catching whichever of them he may please at any time, and let them go again. And this he can do as many times as ever he may choose.

Theaetetus/ All this is quite possible.

Socrates/ Now then, as before we constructed in our souls some sort of waxen apparatus, let us again build in each soul a kind of dove-cot for birds of every species, some of them gregarious, and keeping aloof from the rest, others

that consort in small numbers, some that fly by themselves through all the others, this way or that as it may happen.

Theaetetus/ Well, supposing our dove-cot made, what next?

Socrates/ We must say that while we are children this receptacle is empty; and instead of birds we must conceive that different kinds of knowledge are meant. Whatever piece of knowledge anyone has acquired and shut up in his enclosure, we must say of it, that he has learnt, or has found out, the fact or subject of which this is the knowledge; and that this is 'to know.'

Theaetetus/ Let that be granted.

Socrates/ Now consider what terms are required to express the endeavor to catch a second time whatever of these kinds of knowledge he may wish, and the taking and holding, and the letting it go again. Are they the same terms as we used before, when he was acquiring them, or different? But perhaps you will learn more clearly what I mean from the following example. Arithmetic, I suppose, you call a science?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Conceive then this to be 'the pursuit of certain kinds of knowledge about odd and even numbers generally.'

Theaetetus/ I will suppose that.

Socrates/ It is by this science then, I suppose, that both he himself has the different branches of knowledge of numbers in his service and possession, and in the capacity of teacher communicates them to another?

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Socrates/ As then we call such a person 'a teacher', so we say that he who receives his instruction is 'a learner'; but

when he has got it safe and fast in that dove-cot of his, by possession, then we say that 'he knows it.'

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now attend to what follows next. If a man is a perfect master of arithmetic, he knows all numbers, does he not? For he has in his soul the kinds of knowledge that comprise them all.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ May not such a person then sometimes make a computation, either with himself abstractedly, or of some external objects that are capable of being counted?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And this counting up' we shall set down as nothing more than considering what the sum total is.'

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Then it comes to this: it appears that he is considering what he already knows, as if he did not know it, although we allowed that he did know number generally. I suppose you hear questions of this kind sometimes raised?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Then we, keeping up our simile of the getting our rock-pigeons, and trying to catch them, shall say, that this catching is of two kinds, the one before one possessed them, and with a view to possessing; the other after possessing them, and with a view of taking and holding in the hands what one had some time ago acquired. Just so, after a man has long gained certain branches of sciences by learning, and so has a knowledge of them, he may again learn up the very same subjects by taking up the particular science of each and getting hold of it: for, though he had long ago acquired it, he did not happen to have it at his fingers' ends just when he wanted it.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ This, then, is the point of my late question, how we are to use our store of terms in speaking of these subjects, —that is, when someone skilled in arithmetic proceeds to count, or one acquainted with letters to read. For it seems that on such an occasion he goes to learn again from himself what he already knows!

Theaetetus/ That sounds odd, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, are we to say that he is going to read or to count what he does not know, when we have, already granted him the science of all letters and all number?

Theaetetus/ Why, that too would be unreasonable.

Socrates/ Do you prefer then that we should say, that we care nothing about terms, or how anyone likes to drag this way or that 'knowledge' and 'learning', but that, as we have distinguished possessing knowledge from having it, we should affirm it is impossible not to possess what one possesses? For thus it can never happen that a man does not know what he knows, though he may conceive a false opinion respecting it. For it is possible for him not to have at hand the particular knowledge of the subject, but some other knowledge instead of it. And this may happen whenever, in chasing some one of the bits of knowledge that keep flying away from him, he gets hold of one by mistake instead of the other; as when he fancied the sum of eleven was twelve, and so got hold of his knowledge of eleven instead of his knowledge of twelve, —his ringdove, as it were, instead of his rock-pigeon.

Theaetetus/ That certainly seems reasonable.

Socrates/ But when he has captured the particular one which he wants to take, then we shall say that he is not mistaken, but has a true opinion. Under these circumstances there may be both true and false opinion, and

none of our former difficulties any longer stand in our way. Perhaps now you will agree with me in this: or what course do you propose to take?

Theaetetus/ I agree.

Socrates/ For we have thus got rid of that 'not knowing what people know'; for it no longer comes to this, in any part of our argument, that we don't possess what we do possess, either when we are deceived in something or when we are not. —But there is another still more formidable difficulty looming in the distance, of which I seem to get a glimpse.

Theaetetus/ "What is that?

Socrates/ The possibility that the changing one piece of knowledge for another may sometimes constitute 'false opinion'.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ The difficulty consists first in a man's having a knowledge of something and yet being ignorant of it, not from want of knowledge, but from the very fact of his own knowledge. Secondly, to think A is B or B is A, is surely something that we can hardly account for. For here we have knowledge present in the soul, and yet the soul knows nothing, but is ignorant of everything! "Why, according to this argument, nothing prevents the very presence of ignorance causing us to know, or blindness making a man see, if, as we say, knowledge can ever make one ignorant.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps, Socrates, we were wrong in making our birds only to represent the various kinds of knowledge. We ought to have assumed that there are also divers kinds of unscientific notions flying about with them in the soul; and thus when one gives chase and catches at one time a knowledge, at another a non-knowledge on the same subject, he has a false opinion by the unscientific, a true one by the scientific conception.

Socrates/ One can hardly abstain from praising you, Theætetus. But consider again what you have just said. We will take your view of the matter: the person, you say, who gets hold of the unscientific notion will have a false opinion. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Of course, he will not also think that he has a false opinion?

Theaetetus/ That is not likely.

Socrates/ But a true one: he will consider himself in the position of one who knows, in the very matter about which he is in error.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ He will think, therefore, that he has caught and holds a knowledge and not a non-knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then, after this long round-about, here we find ourselves again at our original difficulty. For our captious friend will say, with a smile at our simplicity, 'Tell me, my good friends, do you mean that a man who knows both science and want of science, thinks that one which he knows is some other of what he knows; or, knowing neither of them, does he come to the conclusion that one which he does not know is another of what he does not know; or, knowing one but not the other, does he think the one he knows is the one he does not know, or conversely, the one he does not know is the one he knows? Or will you tell me that even of the sciences and non-sciences, there are again and in turn other sciences, the possessor of which shuts them up in some other absurd dove-cots or houses built of wax, and thus, so long as he possesses them, knows them, even if he has not got them in his soul ready to hand? Will you thus (he will add) be compelled to go round and round a countless

number of times, and make no progress at all?' What shall we reply to this, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ Upon my word, Socrates, I don't know what we are to say.

Socrates/ Does not the argument then justly find fault with us, and warn us that we are wrong in looking for false opinion before we have found knowledge, and in dismissing that? Whereas it is impossible to understand the former, till one has got a sufficiently clear conception of what exact knowledge is.

Theaetetus/ At present, Socrates, we are compelled to think as you say.

Socrates/ Then let us begin again once more, and see what definition of knowledge any of us will give. For I suppose we shall not give it up yet.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not, unless indeed you are getting tired of it.

Socrates/ Say then what we had best call it so as least to contradict ourselves.

Theaetetus/ What we before proposed to call it, Socrates; for I myself have no other name to give it.

Socrates/ What is that?

Theaetetus/ We will say that 'true opinion' constitutes knowledge. Surely there can be no error in holding right opinions, and all the actions proceeding from it must be sound and right.

Socrates/ The result will show, Theætetus, as the man said who was the first to cross the river. Just so, if we keep sounding this question as we advance, perhaps, by presenting some obstacle to our progress, it will of itself show us what we are looking for; whereas if we stand still nothing will become dear to us.

Theaetetus/ You say well: let us proceed and keep a good look out ahead.

Socrates/ Well, this at least will require no long consideration: there is one whole branch of art that shows you that true opinion is not knowledge.

Theaetetus/ How so? What art do you mean?

Socrates/ That of those distinguished professors of wisdom, your orators and your 'men of law', as they are called. Surely they, in the exercise of their art, persuade people not so much by teaching and informing, as by making them think whatever they choose to tell them. Supposing some persons were robbed of their money, or violently treated in some other way, and no witnesses were by; do you imagine there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to inform the jury, in a limited space of time, of the exact truth of what happened to them?

Theaetetus/ I don't think they could prove it to them; but still they might convince them.

Socrates/ By 'convincing' you mean 'causing them to think', I suppose?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then when the jury are rightly and truly convinced about circumstances which only he who saw them can know to be facts, and no one else; then, deciding about them on hearsay, and by the right conviction they have got, they may be said to decide without knowledge, but because they have been led to take a correct view of the case, —that is, if their verdict is right.

Theaetetus/ Certainly that is so.

Socrates/ But surely, my friend, if true opinion and knowledge were really identical, no juryman, however shrewd, would form a right conclusion without knowledge.

But it now appears that one of these is different from the other.

Theaetetus/ Yes, Socrates, that is just what I once heard someone say, but had forgotten it, though now I think of it. He contended that only the true opinion which was able to give a reason for it, was knowledge, but that which could not give an account of itself was not to be classed with 'knowledge' at all. Thus, things of which you can give no account are 'unknowable' (so he called them), but if you can, they are 'knowable.'

Socrates/ Really, you give a very good definition. How then did he distinguish what we can from what we cannot know? Tell me, for I should like to learn if you and I have been taught the same.

Theaetetus/ I am not sure that I can make it out, though perhaps, if another were to say it, I might follow.

Socrates/ Then hear a dream of mine as a set-off to yours. For I, on the other hand, fancy I heard some persons say, that the first principles, or elements as we may call them, from which we and all visible things are composed, have no account that can be given of them; we can only give each of them a name as an abstraction, but we can predicate nothing else about them, not even Being or non-Being. For if so, there is added to it existence or non-existence; whereas we ought to apply no qualities, if one is to speak of a simple element. Nay, we must not add even 'itself,' or 'that,' nor 'each,' nor 'only,' nor 'this,' nor many other attributes of the like kind. For these terms are applied to all things in a perpetual round, and are in themselves different from the things to which they are applied; but, if a thing can be spoken of per se, and a proper account can be given of it, it ought to be described without any of these accessories. But, as the case really stands, it is impossible that any of the first

principles should be described in terms, since it can only be named at the most. But when we come to consider compounds of them, then as they are themselves combined, so the terms used to describe them are combined so as to become an account or definition of them. For the combination of terms is the very essence of a definition. Thus then the primary elements are indefinable and unknowable, and are merely objects of sensation; but the combinations are knowable and definable and comprehensible by a true and correct view. When then a person has got the true conception of anything without being able to give an account of it, we say that his soul holds the truth about it, though he cannot be said to know it. For one who can neither give nor get an account of a thing, is without any scientific knowledge about that particular thing. But when he has got the further power of defining it, he has become able in all these respects, and is perfect in wisdom. Was this the purport of the dream you heard, or was it different?

Theaetetus/ Nay, it was quite as you describe it.

Socrates/ Then do you accept this view, and put it thus: 'Knowledge is right opinion where you can give a reason for it'?

Theaetetus/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ May we not say, then, Theætetus, that we have thus at last, on this very day, got hold of that which in times past many philosophers have been seeking for, but have grown old before they could find it?

Theaetetus/ To me at all events, Socrates, the definition we have now arrived at appears to be a sound one.

Socrates/ Why, probability is in favor of its being just what we have said. For, apart from right opinion and a rational account of it, what have we left that we can fairly

call knowledge? There is one point, however, in our definition that I cannot quite accept.

Theaetetus/ Well, what is that!

Socrates/ The proposition that seems to be very neatly and cleverly stated, 'The primaries are unknowable, but all that comes under the head of combinations may be known.'

Theaetetus/ Was not that rightly said?

Socrates/ We will inquire; for we hold as it were hostages for the argument? in the examples which our instructor made use of when he told us all this.

Theaetetus/ What examples do you mean?

Socrates/ The single letters and their combinations in the alphabet. You don't suppose that, in making these remarks, the speaker had anything else in view?

Theaetetus/ No, I think he referred to them.

Socrates/ Then let us take up these examples and put them to a severe test, —or rather, let us apply such a test to ourselves, and see whether we learnt our letters on this principle or otherwise. And let me ask first: —is it not the case, that the combinations have a meaning, while the mere letters are meaningless?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps it is.

Socrates/ I quite think so, too. For instance, take the name Socrates, and suppose someone to put the question in this way, 'Theætetus, what is ΣΩ?' what answer will you give?

Theaetetus/ That it is Σ and Ω.

Socrates/ Then that is the account which you have to give of the syllable?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ Now then give me the like account of the Σ.

Theaetetus/ Of course one can't tell the elements that make an element! You know, Socrates, that Σ is one of the consonants, —a mere sound, a sort of hissing, produced by the tongue. But B is a mute, and has no sound of its own at all, like the majority of the letters. So that they are quite rightly called meaningless, when the most distinct of them, the seven vowels, have only vocal sound, but no power of expression whatever.

Socrates/ So far then, my friend, we have set on a right footing the question about knowledge.

Theaetetus/ We seem to have done so.

Socrates/ Well, but wait. Are we sure we have correctly stated our opinion that only the syllable, but not the letter, is the subject of knowledge?

Theaetetus/ There is little doubt of that.

Socrates/ Tell me now; do we mean by this word syllable both letters, (or all of them, if there be more than two,) or some one general form of language produced by the combination of them?

Theaetetus/ All the letters together, I should say.

Socrates/ Consider now in the case of two, Σ and Ω. Together they form the first syllable of my name. Does not one who knows it know both letters?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then he does know the Σ and the Ω.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you mean to say then that he is ignorant of each separately, and while he knows neither yet he knows both?

Theaetetus/ Why that, Socrates, would be strange and unreasonable indeed.

Socrates/ But surely, as one must needs know each, if he is to know both, it is quite inevitable that he must know the letters first, if he is ever to know the combination at all. And thus that clever proposition of ours will run off and leave us in the lurch.

Theaetetus/ And very suddenly too.

Socrates/ The fact is, we don't keep a good guard over it. We ought perhaps to have defined the syllable not to be composed of the letters merely, but as a sort of vocal sound produced from them, having a special character of its own, that of the letters themselves being distinct.

Theaetetus/ I quite think so. Perhaps the matter stands thus rather than as we said before.

Socrates/ We must consider it well, and not give up in such a cowardly way an important and serious discussion.

Theaetetus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Then let us take for granted that a syllable is, as we now say, a class of its own peculiar kind resulting from the union of the several composing elements; and let us assume this not only of letters, but of all combinations without any exception.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then there ought not to be parts in it.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Socrates/ Because, if anything has parts, the whole must of necessity be made up of all the parts. Or do you venture to say that a whole made up of parts has a nature of its own different from all the parts?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you call then 'all' the same as 'whole', or do you think each is different?

Theaetetus/ I have no clear answer to give, but as you tell me to answer promptly, I say at a venture that it is different.

Socrates/ Your readiness, Theætetus, is right; whether your answer also is, we have to consider.

Theaetetus/ Certainly we have.

Socrates/ Then, according to our present statement, the whole will be something different from all of a thing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well now, do all the ciphers of a sum differ from the sum total? For instance, when we count separately, one, two, three, four, five, six, and when we say twice three, or three times two, or 4 + 2, or 3 + 2 + 1, or 5 + 1, do we in all these forms of expression say the same or something different?

Theaetetus/ The same.

Socrates/ And that is nothing more nor less than six?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ In each expression then we mention the whole number six?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But surely in naming all the ciphers we specify the total amount?

Theaetetus/ That must be so.

Socrates/ That is to say, six?

Theaetetus/ We mean nothing else.

Socrates/ Then, in numeration at least, we mean the very same thing by 'all' and 'all the ciphers together.'

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then our expression amounts to this, that the number of square feet in a plethrum is the same as a plethrum? Is it not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so the number of feet in a stadium?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And, of course, the number of men in a camp, means the same as the camp, and so on with all other things of the like kind. For the whole number is the existing aggregate in each case.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Socrates/ But the number contained in each thing constitutes its parts, does it not?

Theaetetus/ It does.

Socrates/ And all things which have parts are made up of parts?

Theaetetus/ I should say so.

Socrates/ And it is admitted that all the parts form the total, if the whole number makes the total?

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Then 'the whole' is not made up of parts; for it would be the sum total, if it were all the parts.

Theaetetus/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Now, is 'a part' a part of anything else than of the whole?

Theaetetus/ Yes, of the sum total.

Socrates/ You fight like a man, Theætetus. And is not 'the sum total' that which we call it, when no part is absent?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And is not 'the whole' the very same thing, —that is to say, from which no part anywhere is removed? For whenever part is wanting, a thing is neither a whole nor 'all there', —if the same result follows at the same time from the same deficiency.

Theaetetus/ It appears to me now that 'all' and whole do not differ.

Socrates/ Well, now, we said, I think, that if a thing has parts, all these parts will constitute the whole and the sum total.

Theaetetus/ Yes, to be sure.

Socrates/ Again then let me ask, in reference to the point I was endeavoring to prove, Is it not a necessary consequence that, if the syllable is not the letters, it does not contain the letters as the parts of it; or, if it is the same as its parts, then it is equally with them a subject of knowledge?

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Socrates/ It was to avoid this conclusion then that we assumed the syllable was different from its parts.

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Well, but if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you tell us any other things that are parts of a syllable without being letters of it?

Theaetetus/ I cannot: for if, Socrates, I were to grant that a syllable had parts, it would be absurd to give up the letters and go in quest of something else.

Socrates/ Then according to the present argument, Theætetus, a syllable will decidedly prove to be one indivisible nature.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Do you remember then, my friend, that a little while ago we accepted the proposition, and thought that it was well put, 'We cannot tell what the primaries are from which compound bodies are made.' For each primary is itself uncompounded, and it would not be correct to predicate of it either 'Being' or any special quality or condition, since these are different from and alien to it; and this is the cause

which makes it both beyond reason and incapable of being known.

Theaetetus/ I remember.

Socrates/ Is not then this, and none but this, the cause of its being uniform and indivisible? For myself, I can see no other.

Theaetetus/ No, indeed, I think there is not.

Socrates/ Does not then the syllable we have been speaking of fall into the same class as the other, if it has no parts, and is one nature?

Theaetetus/ Decidedly so.

Socrates/ Then if the syllable is an aggregate of several letters and a whole, and its component parts are letters, the syllables must be equally capable of being known and defined as the letters themselves are, since it has been shown that all the parts are the same as the whole.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But if it is one and without parts, then both the syllable and the primary element are alike indescribable and unintelligible, as the same cause will make them so.

Theaetetus/ I cannot state the case in any other way.

Socrates/ Then don't let us listen to anyone who says that a syllable may be known and defined, but a letter is something of a contrary kind.

Theaetetus/ No indeed, if we are to follow our argument.

Socrates/ And now let us ask again, —would you not rather accept the statement to the contrary, from what you know of your own experience in learning letters?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ That you went on for a long time learning nothing else but only trying to distinguish at sight and by the ear each and every letter by itself, that you might not be

puzzled by the position of them in spoken or written language.

Theaetetus/ That is very true.

Socrates/ Well, did not complete instruction from your music-master consist solely in your being able to follow each tone, and knowing to what note it belonged? Everyone will allow that this is what we meant by 'the elements of music.'

Theaetetus/ Nothing but that.

Socrates/ If then we are entitled to make inferences from elements and combinations familiar to ourselves in reference to others, we shall contend that the class of primaries in general is capable of being much more clearly known, and the knowledge of them has far greater influence, than the combinations have, in acquiring perfectly each kind of knowledge. So, if anyone says that the combination may be known, but the element by its very nature cannot be known, we shall think that he is joking, either on purpose or without intending it.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Well, this is a point on which further proofs may yet appear, as it seems to me. But let us not forget, through attending to it, to see and understand what we mean by the proposition, 'The most perfect knowledge is Right Opinion where you can also give a reason for it.'

Theaetetus/ Then it is our duty to look into it.

Socrates/ Tell me then, what is the meaning of this phrase, 'Reason shows us?' For to me it appears to say one of three things.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The first perhaps is, the making one's meaning plain by the means of voice with phrases and words, and so as it were taking an impression of it on the current

proceeding from the mouth, as if one were catching a reflection on a mirror or on the surface of water. Does it not appear to you that the word λὸγος is something of this sort?

Theaetetus/ To me it seems so. For instance, we say that he who does this speaks'.

Socrates/ There is one thing then that anyone can do more or less quickly, —I mean the explaining his views on any matter, unless he is deaf or dumb from his birth. And thus all who have a right opinion will be seen to have it together with the power of expressing it; and right opinion will no longer occur apart and distinct from knowledge.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Then don't let us rashly condemn a man for talking nonsense who may have given his opinion that knowledge is that which we are now considering. For perhaps, when someone said so, he did not mean exactly this, but 'the being able, when one is asked what something is, to give one's reply to the question by dealing with the primaries.'

Theaetetus/ Give an example of what you mean, Socrates.

Socrates/ We will take what Hesiod says about a wagon, that it contains 'a hundred pieces of wood.' Now, I could not specify them, nor, I dare say, could you. We should be quite content, if we were asked 'What is a wagon?' to be able to reply, 'Wheels, axle, body, upper rail, yoke'.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But he, perhaps, would think we were making fools of ourselves, —just as if we were asked your name, and gave it in syllables as The-æ-tutus. He might say, 'You both think and speak rightly in giving this reply, but it is absurd in you to suppose that you are learned in language, and that your account of Theætetus' name is given as if you grammatically understood it.' No! he would say it was

impossible to define anything scientifically, unless a man goes into each matter thoroughly, not only having a right opinion about it, but taking into account all the component elements, as we said before.

Theaetetus/ That was what we stated.

Socrates/ In the same way, then, he will think that though we had a correct notion about a wagon, yet that one who could describe its real nature by enumerating all the hundred planks, and had gained that further knowledge respecting it, had acquired the power of giving an account of it over and above the right notion of it; and thus had become a man of art and science in place of a man of mere opinion respecting the mechanism of a wagon, since he could describe it as a whole by specifying its component parts.

Theaetetus/ And do you think, Socrates, all this is rightly said?

Socrates/ If you think so, my friend, and if you accept the method of inquiry by primary parts as the true explanation of everything, but that by groups, or general combinations of a still more general kind, as an irrational procedure, —say so, that we may further consider it.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I fully accept it.

Socrates/ And do you think that anyone knows any subject when he fancies the same element belongs at one time to the same, at another to another thing; or when also he imagines that now one, now another, belongs to the same thing?

Theaetetus/ Upon my word, I don't think that can be so.

Socrates/ Have you forgotten then that in the learning of your letters at first both you and your other schoolfellows did this very thing?

Theaetetus/ You mean, don't you, that we thought first one letter, then another, belonged to the same syllable; and

that we put the same letter now into the proper syllable, now into some other?

Socrates/ That is what I mean.

Theaetetus/ Then certainly I don't forget that; and I think persons in such a mental condition cannot be said as yet to understand.

Socrates/ What then? When, in such a case, a person wanting to write the name 'Theætetus' thinks he ought to write, and actually does write, Θ and E, or, intending to write 'Theodoras', thinks he ought to use and does use T and E, shall we say that he has any real knowledge of the first syllable of your names?

Theaetetus/ We admitted just now that a person with such notions as that was as yet ignorant.

Socrates/ And is there any reason why the same person should not make similar mistakes about the second, third, and fourth syllables?

Theaetetus/ None at all.

Socrates/ Of course then, as now possessing the way of getting through the word by means of its component parts, he will write 'Theætetus' with a correct opinion about it, when he writes the letters and syllables consecutively.

Theaetetus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ But at present without a scientific knowledge, but only a correct opinion, as we affirm?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And yet he has reason for what he does besides his correct opinion. For he knew the way of writing by syllables when he wrote it: and that, you are aware, we called the reasonable account of it.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ It seems then, my friend, that there is a right opinion with a reasonable account, which we are not yet entitled to call 'science'.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ We only dreamed then, I suppose, that we had got rich, when we imagined we were in possession of the truest account of knowledge. Or must we not condemn it as yet? It is just possible that someone will define knowledge not as we have done, but as the remaining notion out of three, one of which, as we said, he who defines knowledge to be 'Right opinion with a reason for it,' must consider 'reason' to be.

Theaetetus/ You are quite right in reminding me; there is one which yet remains. One account we gave of 'the reason of an opinion' was 'the representing, as it were, of one's meaning expressed in voice'; the second, which we have just discussed, was 'the progress towards the Whole through its Parts'. And now what is the third you speak of?

Socrates/ Just that which most people would tell you of, —'the having some characteristic mark to appeal to, by which the thing you are asked about differs from all others'.

Theaetetus/ What subject will you take as an example, and what account will you thus give me of it?

Socrates/ With respect to the sun, for instance, I suppose it is enough if I prove to you that it is the brightest of all the heavenly bodies that move round the earth.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Observe now the point of the remark. It is this, as we said just now: if you realize the difference by which each thing is distinguished from all others, you will realize (according to some) the 'true account' of a thing. But if you fix on some property which is common to other things, your

definition will comprehend those to which the common property extends.

Theaetetus/ I understand you, and I think it is quite fair to call some such rule as this the 'rational account' of a thing.

Socrates/ And whoever, beside a right opinion about any matter, has also learnt its difference from all others, will have become accurately informed on the particular subject on which before he had only an opinion.

Theaetetus/ We say this, certainly.

Socrates/ For myself, then, Theætetus, I can truly say that on coming close to what I shall call the outline or cartoon of our subject, I don't understand it in the least; although, while I stood some way from it, there did seem to me to be something in what we said.

Theaetetus/ In what sense do you say this?

Socrates/ I will explain, if I can. So long as I have a right opinion about you, I have only an opinion; but if I also get an account of you, then I am said to know you.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And this 'account of you' was the way I had of expressing your difference.

Theaetetus/ It was so.

Socrates/ When then I only had my opinion, may we not say, that I did not realize in my mind any of the marks by which you differ from the rest?

Theaetetus/ It seems you did not.

Socrates/ Then I only had my thoughts about some of the common properties, which you do not possess in a greater degree than others.

Theaetetus/ That must be so.

Socrates/ Then answer me, in Heaven's name! How in the world could I, in such a case, have an opinion about you more than about anyone else? Suppose me, for instance, to have an idea that Theætetus means the individual who is human, and has nose, eyes, and mouth', and so on with each of the other limbs. Is there anything in this conception which will cause me to think of Theætetus rather than of Theodore, or (as the proverb is) the lowest of the low?

Theaetetus/ Why indeed should it?

Socrates/ Well, if I think of you not only as the person who has a nose and eyes, but also as the one who has a turned up nose and prominent eyes, shall I, again, think of you more than of myself, or of others who have the like features?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ No; Theætetus, I suppose, will not be presented to my thoughts till the peculiar curve of his nose impresses and leaves on my mind and memory some specific difference from all other upturned noses that I have ever seen; and so with the other characteristics by which I shall know you, and which will remind me of you, should I meet you tomorrow, and make me think correctly about you.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Socrates/ It seems then that correct opinion also will be concerned with the difference in each object.

Theaetetus/ Yes, so it appears.

Socrates/ Then what can be the meaning, after this, of getting an account besides a right opinion?' For, if it means to 'get a further opinion how one thing differs from the rest,' the injunction to do so seems positively absurd.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, it bids us get in addition a right opinion about things, of which we already have a right opinion as to their difference from others! And so the moving round and round of a wooden roller, or a pestle, or anything of the sort, would be nothing at all compared to such a command as that! It would be more properly called an order given by a blind man; for to tell us to get in addition what we already have, in order to understand opinions that we form, does seem like the act of one who is very much in the dark indeed.

Theaetetus/ Come, then, tell me what was it you were just now going to say, when you asked the question?

Socrates/ If, my young friend, 'the getting a true account besides' means that we are to know, and not merely to have an opinion about, the difference; then this, the best of all the accounts about knowledge that have been given, will prove rather a sorry affair; for 'to know' is 'to get exact information,' I suppose. Is it not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then when we inquire of our argument, what knowledge is, it seems it will reply, 'Right opinion with knowledge of difference.' For, according to it, this will be the 'getting an account, over and above the mere opinion.'

Theaetetus/ It does appear so.

Socrates/ And surely it is utterly weak and silly, if, when we are inquiring what knowledge is, to give as a reply, 'Right opinion with knowledge,'—be it 'of difference' or of anything you please. And therefore, Theætetus, knowledge cannot be either perception, or true opinion, or the being able to give an account also with true opinion.

Theaetetus/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Have we then any further ideas to be delivered of, my friend, on this subject of knowledge, or have we now given birth to all oar conceptions?

Theaetetus/ For myself, I protest, I have said (thanks to you) even more than I had in me.

Socrates/ Then our obstetric art tells us that all these ideas that have come forth from our brains are the offspring of empty air, and not worth the bringing up.

Theaetetus/ Assuredly so.

Socrates/ Well, Theætetus, if ever hereafter you should try to breed other theories, or find yourself pregnant with some new conception, you will be filled with better matter through our present investigations. Or if nothing should come of it, you will at least give less trouble to your friends, and be more gentle and tractable, for discreetly believing that you don't know what you don't know. For thus far only does the power of my art reach, and not beyond it: nor have I any knowledge whatever on subjects which those are versed in who are or have in past times become great and much looked up to for their learning. No! this midwife's practice my mother and I got by favor of the god; only she attends on women, while I am engaged with well-born youths, and such of my own sex as are good-looking. At present I must attend at the King's Portico to meet the accusation Meletus has brought against me. In the morning, Theodore, let us meet here again.

The Theaetetus.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

Euclid, Socrates,

Terpsio, Theodorus,

And Theætetus.

Euclid/ Are you just now come, O Terpsio, or is it some time since you came from the country?

Terpsion/ I have left the country for a considerable time, and have been seeking for you about the forum, and wondered that I could not find you.

Euclid/ I was not in the city.

Terpsion/ Where then was you?

Euclid/ As I was going down to the port, I met with Theætetus, who was carried along from the camp at Corinth to Athens.

Terpsion/ Was he alive or dead?

Euclid/ He was living, but could hardly be said to be so: for he was in a very dangerous condition, through certain wounds: and, what is worse, he was afflicted with a disease while in the camp.

Terpsion/ Was it a dysentery?

Euclid/ It was.

Terpsion/ What a man do you speak of as in a dangerous condition!

Euclid/ A worthy and good man, O Terpsion: for I just now heard certain persons paying him very great encomiums for his military conduct.

Terpsion/ Nor is this wonderful: but it would be much more wonderful if this had not been the case. But why was he not carried to Megara?

Euclid/ He hastened home; for I both entreated and advised him to do so: but it was against his will. And besides this, attending him in his journey, when I again left him, I recollected, and was filled with admiration of Socrates, who often spoke in a prophetic manner about other things, and likewise about this. For a little before his death, if I am not mistaken, meeting with Theætetus, who was then a young man, and discoursing with him, he very much admired his disposition. Besides this, when I came to Athens, he related to me his discourses with Theætetus, which very much deserve to be heard; and observed, that he would necessarily be renowned, if he lived to be a man. And it appears indeed that he spoke the truth.

Terpsion/ But can you relate what those discourses were?

Euclid/ Not verbally, by Zeus: but as soon as I returned home, I committed the substance of them to writing, and afterwards at my leisure wrote nearly the whole of them, through the assistance of memory. As often too as I came to Athens, I asked Socrates about such particulars as I could not remember, and, on my return hither, made such emendations as were necessary; so that I have nearly written the whole discourse.

Terpsion/ True. For I have heard you assert the same thing before: and in consequence of always desiring to urge you to relate this discourse I am come hither. But what should hinder this from taking place at present? For I am perfectly in need of rest, as coming from the country.

Euclid/ I likewise accompanied Theætetus as far as Erineus; so that rest will not be unpleasant to me. Let us go, therefore, and while we rest a boy shall read to us.

Terpsion/ You speak well.

Euclid/ This then is the book, O Terpsio. But it was not composed by me, as if Socrates related it to me, as in reality he did, but as if he was discoursing with the persons with whom he said he discoursed. But he said that these were, the geometrician Theodorus, and Theætetus. That we may not, therefore, in the course of the writing, be troubled with the frequent repetition of I say, and He said, He assented, or He denied, I have introduced Socrates himself discoursing with them.

Terpsion/ And this is not at all improper, O Euclid.

Euclid/ Here, boy, then, take the book and read.

Socrates/ If, O Theodorus, I was more attentive to those in Cyrene than to any others, I should inquire of you respecting them if any young men there applied themselves to geometry, or any other philosophic study. But now, as I love those less than these, I am more desirous to know which of our young men are likely to become worthy characters. For such as these I explore myself as far as I am able, and inquire after them of others, with whom I see young men associating. But you have by no means a few followers: and this very justly. For you deserve to be followed, both for other things, and for the sake of geometry. If, therefore, you have met with any young man who deserves to be mentioned, it would give me pleasure to hear some particulars respecting him.

Theodorus/ Indeed, Socrates, it is in every respect fit both that I should relate, and that you should hear, what a youth I have met with from among your citizens. And if he were beautiful, I should be very much afraid to mention him, lest I should appear to be enamored with him. But, now, (do not be indignant with me,) he is not handsome. For he resembles you, having a flat nose, and prominent eyes: but he has

these in a less degree than you. You see I speak freely to you. Know then, that I have never yet met with any young man (though I have associated with many) who naturally possesses a good disposition in such a wonderful degree. For it is difficult to find one who is docile, remarkably mild, and who besides this may compare with anyone for fortitude. Indeed, I do not think there ever were any, nor do I see any with these qualifications. For some are acute indeed, as this one, sagacious, and of a good memory; but they are for the most part prone to anger, and are hurried along precipitately like ships without their ballast, and are rather naturally furious than brave. And again, those whose manners are more sedate are in a certain respect sluggish and full of oblivion, when they apply themselves to disciplines. But the young man I am speaking of applies himself to disciplines and investigations in so easy, blameless, and ready a manner, that it may be compared to the silent flux of oil; so that it is wonderful that such a great genius should accomplish these things in such a manner.

Socrates/ You announce well. But of which of our citizens is he the son?

Theodorus/ I have heard the name, but I do not remember it. But he is in the middle of those who are now approaching to us. For both he, and these who are his companions, were just now anointed beyond the stadium; but now they appear to me, in consequence of having been anointed, to come hither. Consider, however, if you know him.

Socrates/ I do know him. He is the son of Euphronius the Suniensian, who was entirely such a man as you have just related the son to be; and who, besides being a worthy character, left behind him a very large estate.

Theodorus/ His name, O Socrates, is Theætetus. But certain of his guardians appear to me to have dissipated his estate. However, notwithstanding this, he is wonderfully liberal with respect to money, Socrates.

Socrates/ You speak of a generous man: Order him to come to me, and sit with us.

Theodorus/ I will. —Theætetus, come hither to Socrates.

Socrates/ By all means come, Theætetus, that I may behold myself, and see what sort of a face I have. For Theodorus says it resembles yours. But if we had each of us a lyre, and he should say that they were similarly harmonized, ought we immediately to believe him, or should we consider whether he says this as being a musician?

Theaetetus/ We should consider this.

Socrates/ On finding, therefore, this to be the case, should we not be persuaded by him? but, if he was ignorant of music, should we not disbelieve him?

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Now, therefore, I think, if we are at all careful respecting the similitude of our faces, that we should consider if he speaks as being a painter, or not.

Theaetetus/ So it appears to me.

Socrates/ Is, therefore, Theodorus a painter?

Theaetetus/ Not that I know of.

Socrates/ Nor is he a geometrician?

Theaetetus/ He is perfectly so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Is he also skilled in astronomy, logistic, music, and such other disciplines as follow these?

Theaetetus/ He appears to be so to me.

Socrates/ If, therefore, he says that we resemble each other in a certain part of our body, at the same time praising

or blaming this resemblance, it is not altogether worthwhile to pay much attention to him.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Take notice, therefore, O friend Theætetus, it is your business to evince, and mine to consider. For, know, that Theodorus having praised in my hearing many strangers and citizens, has not praised anyone of them so much as just now he did you.

Theaetetus/ It is well, Socrates; but consider whether he did not speak jocosely.

Socrates/ It is not usual for Theodorus to do so. But do not reject what is granted, in consequence of believing that he spoke this in jest, lest he should be compelled to bear witness. For no one can object to what he said. Persist, therefore, confidently in what is granted.

Theaetetus/ It is proper, indeed, to do so, if it seems fit to you.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, —Do you learn any geometry of Theodorus?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you, likewise, learn things pertaining to astronomy, harmony, and computation?

Theaetetus/ I endeavor to do so.

Socrates/ For I also, O boy, both from this man, and from others who appear to me to understand anything of these particulars, endeavor to learn them; but, at the same time, I am but moderately skilled in them. There is, however, a certain trifling thing of which I am in doubt, and which I wish to consider along with you, and these that are present. Tell me, therefore, whether to learn is not to become wiser in that which anyone learns?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But I think that the wise are wise by wisdom.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But does this in any respect differ from science?

Theaetetus/ What?

Socrates/ Wisdom. Or are not those who have a scientific knowledge of anything, also wise in this thing?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Is, therefore, science the same as wisdom?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ This, therefore, is that which I doubt; and I am not able sufficiently to determine by myself what science is. Have we then anything to say to this? What do you say it is? And which of us can first give this information? But he who errs, and is perpetually detected in an error, shall sit as an ass, as the boys say when they play at ball. But he who shall be found to speak without error shall be our king, and shall order whatever he wishes us to answer. Why are you silent? Have I, O Theodorus, behaved in a rustic manner, through my love of conversation, and through my desire to make you discourse and become friends with each other?

Theodorus/ A thing of this kind, O Socrates, is by no means rustic But order some one of these young men to answer you. For I am unaccustomed to this mode of discourse; and my age does not permit me to become accustomed to it now. But a thing of this kind is adapted to these young men, and they will be greatly improved by it. For, in reality, youth is adapted to every kind of improvement. But, as you began with, do not dismiss Theætetus, but interrogate him.

Socrates/ Do you hear, Theætetus, what Theodorus says? whom I am of opinion you will not disobey. For you would

neither be willing to do so, nor is it lawful for a young man to be unpersuaded by a wise man, when he commands in things of this kind. Tell me, therefore, in a proper and ingenuous manner, what science appears to you to be?

Theaetetus/ It is fit to comply, Socrates, since you command me. And if I in any respect err, do you correct me.

Socrates/ We shall by all means do so, if we are able.

Theaetetus/ It appears to me, then, that sciences are such things as anyone may learn of Theodorus, such as geometry, and the other particulars which you just now enumerated. And besides these, the shoe-maker's art, and the arts of other workmen; and that all and each of these are no other than science.

Socrates/ Generously and munificently, O friend, when asked by me concerning one thing, have you given many, and things various, instead of that which is simple.

Theaetetus/ How so? Why do you say this, Socrates?

Socrates/ Perhaps what I say is nothing: but I will tell you what I think. When you speak of the shoe-maker's art, do you speak of anything else than the science of making shoes?

Theaetetus/ Of nothing else.

Socrates/ But what when you speak of the carpenter's art? Do you speak of anything else than the science of operations in wood?

Theaetetus/ Of nothing else than this.

Socrates/ In both therefore you define that of which each is the science.

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ But that which we asked, O Theætetus, was not this, of what thing, there is science, nor how many sciences there are; for we did not inquire, wishing to

enumerate them, but in order to know what science itself is Or do I say nothing?

Theaetetus/ You speak with perfect rectitude.

Socrates/ But consider also this. If anyone should interrogate us respecting any vile and obvious thing, as, for instance, clay, what it is, if we should answer him, that clay is that from which pans, puppets and tiles are made, or certain other artificial substances, should we not be ridiculous?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ In the first place, indeed, what can we think he who asks this question can understand from our answer, when we say that clay is that from which pans, puppets and tiles, or certain other artificial substances are made? Or do you think that anyone can understand the name of a thing, when he does not know what that thing is?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Neither, therefore, will he understand the science of shoes who does not know what science is.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor, again, will he understand the currier's art, nor any other art, who is ignorant of science.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Socrates/ The answer, therefore, is ridiculous, when anyone, being asked what science is, gives for an answer the name of any art. For he answers, that there is a science of a certain thing, when this is not what he was asked.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ And, in the next place, when he might have given a short and simple answer, he wanders immensely. As in the question concerning clay, a short and simple answer might have been given, that clay is earth mingled with

moisture. At the same time, dismissing the consideration of that which is composed of clay.

Theaetetus/ Now, indeed, Socrates, it thus appears to me to be easy. For you seem to ask that which lately came into my mind as I was discoursing with your namesake here, Socrates.

Socrates/ What was that, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ Theodorus here has written a treatise on powers, concerning magnitudes of three and five feet, evincing that they are not commensurable in length to a magnitude of one foot: and thus proceeding through every number as far as to a magnitude of seventeen feet, in this he stops his investigation. A thing of this kind, therefore, occurred to me, since there appear to be an infinite multitude of powers, we should endeavor to comprehend them in one thing, by which we may denominate all these powers.

Socrates/ Is a thing of this kind discovered?

Theaetetus/ It appears so to me. But do you also consider.

Socrates/ Speak then.

Theaetetus/ We give to the whole of number a two-fold division: one, that which may become equally equal, and which we assimilate among figures to a square, calling it quadrangular and equilateral.

Socrates/ And very properly.

Theaetetus/ But that number which subsists between this, such as three and five, and every number which is incapable of becoming evenly even, but which is either more less, or less more, and always contains a greater and a lesser side, we assimilate to an oblong figure, and call it an oblong number.

Socrates/ Most excellent. But what follows?

Theaetetus/ Such lines as square an equilateral and plane number, we define to be length; but such as square an oblong number, powers; as not being commensurate to them in length, but to planes, which are capable of being commensurable. And about solids there is another thing of this kind.

Socrates/ Best of men, O boys: so that Theodorus cannot, as it appears to me, be accused of giving a false account.

Theaetetus/ But, indeed, Socrates, I am not able to answer you concerning science as I am concerning length and power; though you appear to me to inquire after a thing of this kind. So that again Theodorus appears to be false.

Socrates/ But what? If, praising you for running, he should say that he never met with any youth who ran so swift, and afterwards you should be vanquished in running by some adult who is a very rapid runner, do you think he would have less truly praised you?

Theaetetus/ I do not.

Socrates/ But with respect to science, (as I just now said,) do you think it is a trifling thing to find out what it is, and not in every respect arduous?

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, I think it is arduous in the extreme.

Socrates/ Confide, therefore, in yourself, and think what Theodorus said. Endeavor, too, by all possible means to obtain a reason both of other things, and likewise of science, so as to know what it is.

Theaetetus/ It appears we should do so, O Socrates, for the sake of alacrity.

Socrates/ Come then: for you explained just now in a beautiful manner. Endeavor, imitating your answer respecting powers, that just as you comprehended these,

which are many, in one species, so you may comprehend many sciences in one reason or definition.

Theaetetus/ But know, O Socrates, that I have often endeavored to accomplish this, on hearing the questions which are discussed by you. But I can neither persuade myself that I can say anything sufficient on this occasion, nor that I can hear anyone discoursing as you advise; nor yet am I able to desist from investigation.

Socrates/ You are tormented with the pangs of labor, friend Theætetus, not because you are empty, but because you are full.

Theaetetus/ I do not know, Socrates: but I tell you what I suffer.

Socrates/ O ridiculous youth, have you not heard that I am the son of the generous, and at the same time severe, midwife Phænarete?

Theaetetus/ I have heard this.

Socrates/ And have you also heard that I study the same art?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Know, however, that it is so: but do not betray me to others. For they are ignorant, my friend, that I possess this art; and in consequence of being ignorant of this, they do not assert this respecting me, but they say that I am a most absurd man, and that I cause men to doubt. Or have you not heard this?

Theaetetus/ I have.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you the reason of this?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Conceive everything pertaining to midwives, and you will easily understand what I mean. For you know, that none of them deliver others, while they yet conceive and

bring forth themselves, but when they are no longer capable of conceiving.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But they say that Diana is the cause of this; who being herself a virgin takes care of births. She does not, therefore, permit those that are barren to be midwives, because human nature is too imbecile to undertake an art in which it is inexperienced: but she orders those to exercise this profession, who from their age are incapable of bearing children; by this honoring the similitude of herself.

Theaetetus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ And is not this also probable and necessary, that those who are pregnant, or not, should be more known by midwives than by others?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Midwives, likewise, by medicaments and enchantments, are able to excite and alleviate the pangs of parturition, to deliver those that bring forth, with difficulty, and procure a miscarriage when the child appears to be abortive.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Have you not also heard this concerning them, that they are most skillful bride-maids, as being perfectly wise, with respect to knowing what kind of man and woman ought to be united together, in order to produce the most excellent children?

Theaetetus/ I did not altogether know this.

Socrates/ But you know that they glory in this more than in cutting the navel. For do you think it belongs to the same, or to a different art, to take care of and collect the fruits of the earth, and again, to know in what ground any plant or seed ought to be sown?

Theaetetus/ To the same art.

Socrates/ But in women, my friend, do you think the art pertaining to the care of offspring differs from that of collecting them?

Theaetetus/ It is not likely that it does.

Socrates/ It is not. But through the unjust and absurd conjunction of man and woman, which is called bawdry, midwives as being chaste avoid acting in the capacity of bride-maids, fearing lest by this mean they should be branded with the appellation of bawds, since it alone belongs to legitimate midwives to act as bride-maids with rectitude.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Such then is the office of midwives; but it is less arduous than the part which I have to act. For it does not happen to women, that they sometimes bring forth images, and sometimes realities. But this is a thing not easy to discriminate. For, if it did happen, to distinguish what was true from what was false would be to midwives the greatest and the most beautiful of all works. Or do you not think it would?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ But to my art other things belong which pertain to delivery; but it differs in this, that it delivers men and not women, and that it considers their souls as parturient, and not their bodies. But this is the greatest thing in our art, that it is able to explore in every possible way, whether the dianoëtic part of a young man brings forth an image, and that which is false, or something prolific and true. For that which happens to midwives happens also to me: for I am barren of wisdom. And that for which I am reproached by many, that I interrogate others, but that I do not give an answer to anything, is truly objected to me, owing to my possessing nothing of wisdom. But the cause of this is as

follows: Divinity compels me to act as a midwife, but forbids me to generate. I am not, therefore, myself in any respect wise; nor is there any invention of mine of such a kind as to be the offspring of my soul. But of those who converse with me, some at first appear to be entirely void of discipline, but all to whom Divinity is propitious, during the course of the conversation, make a wonderful proficiency, as is evident both to themselves and others. This likewise is clear, that they do not learn anything from me, but that they possess and discover many beautiful things in themselves: Divinity indeed, and I being the cause of the midwife's office. But this is evident from hence: Many, in consequence of not knowing this, but believing themselves to be the cause, and despising me, perhaps through the persuasions of others, have left me sooner than was proper; and after they have left me through associating with depraved characters, have become as to what remains abortive. Likewise, through badly nourishing what they have brought forth through my assistance they have destroyed it, in consequence of preferring things false and images to that which is true. Lastly, they have appeared both to themselves and others to be unlearned. One of these was Aristides the son of Lysimachus, and many others; who when they again came to me, in consequence of wanting my conversation, and being affected in a wonderful manner, some of them my dæmoniacal power restrained me from conversing with, but with others he permitted me to converse, who at length made a considerable proficiency. For those that associate with me suffer this in common with the parturient; they are tormented, and filled with doubt and anxiety, and this in a far greater degree than the parturient. This torment my art is able both to excite and appease. And such is the manner in which they are affected. But sometimes, O Theætetus, I very benignantly unite in marriage with others those who do not appear to me to be

pregnant, as I know that they do not require my assistance; and (as I may say in conjunction with Divinity) I very sufficiently conjecture with whom it will be advantageous to them to be united. And many of these indeed I have delivered to Prodicus, and many others to wise and divine men. For the sake of this, O most excellent youth, I have been thus prolix in relating these things to you. For I suspect, as you also think, that you are tormented in consequence of being pregnant with something internally. Commit yourself therefore to me as being the son of a midwife, and as being myself skilled in what pertains to parturition. Endeavor, too, cheerfully to answer me what I shall ask you, and to the best of your ability. And if in consequence of considering what you say, it shall appear to me that you have conceived an image, and not that which is true, do not be angry with me, like women who are delivered of their first child, if I privately remove and throw it away. For many, O wonderful young man, are so affected towards me, that they are actually ready to bite me, when I throw aside any trifle of theirs, not thinking that I do this with a benevolent design; since they are very far from knowing that no divinity is malevolent to men, and that I do not perform anything of this kind through malevolence. But it is by no means lawful for me to admit that which is false, and destroy that which is true. Again, therefore, from the beginning O Theætetus, endeavor to inform me what science is; but by no means endeavor to speak beyond your ability. For if Divinity is willing and affords you strength, you will be able.

Theaetetus/ Indeed, Socrates, since you thus urge me, it would be base for anyone not to offer what he has to say, with the greatest alacrity. It appears then to me that he who has a scientific knowledge of anything, perceives that which he thus knows; and, as it now seems, science is nothing else than sense.

Socrates/ Well and generously answered, O boy: For it is requisite thus to speak what appears to be the case. But come, let us consider this in common, whether this offspring is anything solid or vain. Do you say that science is sense?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ You appear, indeed, to have given no despicable definition of science, but that which Protagoras has given: though he has said the same thing, in a somewhat different manner. For he says that man is the measure of all things; of beings so far as they have a being, and of non-beings so far as they are not. Have you ever read this?

Theaetetus/ I have read it often.

Socrates/ Does he not, therefore, speak thus: such as particulars appear to me, such are they to me, and such as they appear to you, such are they to you: but you and I are men?

Theaetetus/ He does speak in this manner.

Socrates/ But do you not think it probable that a wise man will not trifle, nor speak like one delirious? Let us, therefore, follow him thus: When the same wind blows, is not sometimes one of us stiff with cold, and another not? And one in a small degree, but another extremely cold?

Theaetetus/ This is very much the case.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, shall we say, that the wind at that time is in itself cold or not cold? Or shall we be persuaded by Protagoras, that to him who is stiff with cold, the wind is cold; but to him who is not, that it is not cold?

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Does it, therefore, appear so to each?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But for a thing to appear, is it the same as to be perceived?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ Fantasy, therefore, and sense are the same in things hot, and everything else of this kind. For such as everyone perceives things to be, such they are and appear to be to everyone.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Sense, therefore, is always of that which has a being, and is without falsehood, as being science.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Whether or no, therefore, by the Graces, was Protagoras a man perfectly wise; and did he obscurely signify this to us who rank among the vulgar, but speak the truth to his disciples in secret?

Theaetetus/ Why, Socrates, do you say this?

Socrates/ I will tell you, and it is by no means a despicable assertion. There is not anything which is itself essentially one thing; nor can you properly denominate anything, as endued with some particular quality. But if you denominate it as great, it will appear to be small; and if heavy, light. And all things subsist in such a manner, as if nothing was one thing, or anything particular, or endued with a certain quality. But from their lation, motion, and mixture with each other, all things become that which we said they were, and are not rightly denominated by us. For there is not anything, which at any time *is*, but it is always in generation, or *becoming to be*. And in this all the wise in succession consent, except Parmenides; viz. Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles: and of the poets, those who rank the highest in each kind of poetry, in comedy, indeed, Epicharmus, and in tragedy, Homer. For when this latter calls Ocean and mother Tethys the origin of the Gods, he asserts that all things are the progeny of flux and motion. Or does he not appear to say this?

Theaetetus/ To me he does.

Socrates/ Who then can contend against such an army, and which has Homer for its leader, without being ridiculous?

Theaetetus/ It is not easy, O Socrates.

Socrates/ It is not indeed, Theætetus. Since this may be a sufficient argument in favor of their assertion, that motion imparts to things the appearance of being, and of becoming to be; but rest of non-being, and perishing. For heat and fire, which generate and govern other things, are themselves generated from lation and friction. But these are motions. Or are not these the origin of fire?

Theaetetus/ They are.

Socrates/ And besides this, the genus of animals originates from the same things.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But what? Is not the habit of the body corrupted by rest and indolence, but for the most part preserved by exercise and motion?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ But does not habit in the soul possess disciplines through learning and meditation, which are motions; and is it not thus preserved and made better? But through rest, which is negligence and a privation of discipline, it does not learn anything, or if it does, it forgets it. Is not this the case?

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Motion, therefore, is good, both with respect to soul and body; but rest is the very contrary.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ I add further, with respect to times of serenity and tranquility, and all such as these, that rest putrefies and

destroys, but that other things preserve. And besides this, I will bring the affair to a conclusion by forcing the golden chain into my service. For Homer intended by this to signify nothing else than the sun; because, as long as the sun and its circulation are moved, all things will be, and will be preserved, both among Gods and men. But if this should stand still, as if it were bound, all things would be dissolved, and that which is proverbially said would take place, viz., all things would be upwards and downwards.

Theaetetus/ But Homer appears to me also, O Socrates, to signify that which you say.

Socrates/ In the first place, therefore, O best of young men, conceive thus respecting the eyes: that which you call a white color is not anything else external to your eyes, nor yet in your eyes; nor can you assign any place to it. For, if you could, it would now have an orderly position, and would abide, and be no longer in generation.

Theaetetus/ But how?

Socrates/ Let us follow what we just now said, establishing nothing as essentially one thing; and thus black and white, and any other color, will appear to us to be generated from the darting forth of the eyes to a convenient lation. And everything which we denominate a color, will neither be that which darts forth, nor that which is darted forth, but something between these, which becomes peculiar to everything. Or do you strenuously contend, that such as every color appears to you, such also it appears to a dog, and every other animal?

Theaetetus/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But what with respect to another man? Will you contend that anything appears to him in a similar manner as to you? Or rather, that a thing does not appear the same to you, because you are never similar to yourself?

Theaetetus/ This appears to me to be the case rather than that.

Socrates/ If, therefore, that which we measure, or that which we touch, was great, or white, or hot, it would never, by falling upon anything else, become a different thing, because it would not be in any respect changed. But if that which is measured or touched by us, was either great, or white, or hot, it would not, in consequence of something else approaching to it, or becoming passive, become itself anything else, as it would not suffer anything. Since now, my friend, we are in a certain respect easily compelled to assert things wonderful and ridiculous, as Protagoras himself would acknowledge, and everyone who assents to his doctrines.

Theaetetus/ How is this, and what things do you speak of?

Socrates/ Take a small example, and you will understand all that I wish. If we compare four to six dice, we say that the six are more than four, and that the two are to earn other in a sesquialter ratio: but if we compare twelve to the six, we say that the six are less than, and are the half of, twelve. Nor is it possible to say otherwise. Or can you endure to say otherwise?

Theaetetus/ Not I, indeed.

Socrates/ What then? If Protagoras, or any other, should say to you, O Theætetus, can anything become greater or more in any other way than by being increased? What would you answer?

Theaetetus/ If, O Socrates, I should answer to the present question, what appears to me to be the case, I should say that it cannot: but if I should reply to the former question, in older that I might not contradict myself, I should say that it might.

Socrates/ Well and divinely said, by Hera, my friend. But, (as it appears) if you should answer that it is so, that saying of Euripides might be adopted: for the tongue would be irreprehensible for us, but not the mind.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ If, therefore, I and you were skillful and wise, after we had examined everything belonging to our minds, we should then make trial of each other from our abundance, and sophistically approaching to this contest, should make our arguments strike against each other. But now, as being rude and unskillful, we wish, in the first place, to contemplate the things themselves in themselves, that we may know what it is which we dianoëtically perceive, and whether we accord with each other, or not.

Theaetetus/ I wish this to be the case by all means.

Socrates/ And so do I. But since we are thus disposed, let us in a quiet manner, as being abundantly at leisure, again consider, not morosely, but examining ourselves in reality, what the nature is of these appearances within us. And, on the first consideration of these, we shall say (as I think) that nothing at any time ever becomes greater or lesser, neither in bulk, nor in number, as long as it is equal to itself. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ And, in the second place, that to which nothing is either added or taken away, will neither at any time ever be increased, or corrupted, but will always be equal.

Theaetetus/ And, indeed, very much so.

Socrates/ And shall we not also say, in the third place, that a thing which was not formerly, but subsists afterwards, cannot exist without making and being made?

Theaetetus/ So, indeed, it seems.

Socrates/ These three things, then, which are acknowledged by us, oppose each other in a hostile manner in our soul, when we speak about dice, as above, or when we say that I, who am so old, am neither increased, nor suffer a contrary passion in myself; while you, who are a young man, are now greater, and afterwards less, since nothing is taken away from my bulk, but yours is increased. For, through a length of time, I am what I was not formerly, being no longer in a state of progressive increase: for without making, it is impossible that a thing can be made. But losing nothing of my bulk, I do not at any time become less. And there are ten thousand other things of this kind, which happen to ten thousand other persons, if we admit these things. Speak, Theaetetus: for you appear to me not to be unskilled in things of this kind.

Theaetetus/ By the Gods, Socrates, I wonder in a transcendent manner what these things are: and, truly, sometimes looking at them, I labor under a dark vertigo.

Socrates/ Theodorus, my friend, appears not to have badly conjectured concerning your disposition; since to wonder is very much the passion of a philosopher. For there is no other beginning of philosophy than this. And he who said that Iris is the daughter of Thaumas, did not genealogize badly. But whether do you understand on what account these things, from which we say Protagoras speaks, are such as they are, or not?

Theaetetus/ I do not yet appear to myself to understand.

Socrates/ Will you not, therefore, thank me, if I unfold to you the concealed truth of the conceptions of this man, or rather, of celebrated men?

Theaetetus/ How is it possible I should not? Indeed, I should thank you exceedingly.

Socrates/ Looking, round, therefore, now see that no profane person hears us. But *those are profane who think there is nothing else than that which they are able to grasp with their hands*; *but do not admit that actions*, *and generations*, *and everything which is invisible*, *are to be considered as belonging to a part of essence*.

Theaetetus/ You speak, Socrates, of hard and refractory men.

Socrates/ They are indeed, O boy, very much destitute of the Muses: but there are many others more elegant than these, whose mysteries I am about to relate to you. But the principle of these men, from which all that we have just now said is suspended, is this: —That this universe is motion, and that besides motion there is nothing. Likewise, that of motion there are two species; each of which is infinite in multitude, but that one species has the power of acting, and the other of suffering. From the congress and mutual friction of these a progeny is produced, infinite in multitude, but two-fold in species: one, indeed, being that which is sensible, but the other sense, which always concurs and subsists together with sensible. And the senses, indeed, are denominated by us as follows, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and the touching things hot and cold. Pleasures and pains, desires and fears, innumerable other passions without a name, and an all-various multitude which are denominated, follow these. But to each of these the sensible genus is allied, viz., all-various colors to all-various sights; and in a similar manner, voices to hearings, and other sensibles are allied to other senses. What then is the intention of this discourse, O Theætetus, with reference to the former? Do you understand what it is?

Theaetetus/ Not very much, Socrates.

Socrates/ But see whether it can in a certain respect be finished. For it wishes to assert that all these things are, as we have said, moved, and that there is swiftness and slowness in their motions. So far, therefore, as their motions are slow, they possess motion in the same, and towards things near, and thus generate. But things thus generated are more slow. And again, so far as their motions are swift, they possess a motion towards things at a distance, and thus generate: but the things thus generated are more swift. For they are borne along, and their motion naturally subsists in lation. When, therefore, the eye and anything commensurate to this generate by approximation, whiteness, and the sense connate to this, which would never have been produced if each of these had been directed to something else, then, in the interim, sight tending to the eyes, and whiteness to that which together with it generates color, the eye becomes filled with vision, and then sees, and becomes not sight, but an eye seeing. But that which in conjunction with it generates color becomes filled with whiteness, and is made not whiteness, but a thing white; whether it is wood or stone, or anything else which may happen to be colored with a color of this kind. And in a similar manner with respect to other things, such as the hot and the hard, &c., we must conceive that no one of these is essentially anything; but, as we have already observed, that all things, and of all-various kinds, are generated in their congress with each other, from motion. Since, as they say, there is no stability in conceiving, that either that which acts, or that which suffers, is anyone thing. For neither is that which acts anything till it meets with that which is passive, nor that which is passive till it meets with that which acts. For that which meets with and produces anything, when it falls upon another, then renders that which is passive apparent. So that from all this, that which

we said in the beginning follows, that there is not anything which is essentially one thing, but that it is always becoming to be something to some particular thing, but is itself entirely exempt from being. Indeed; just now we frequently used the term being, compelled to this by custom and ignorance; but, according to the assertions of the wise, we ought not to predicate anything, either of any other, or of myself, or of this, or that, or call it by any other name which signifies permanency, but we should affirm according to nature, that they are generated and made, corrupted and changed. For, if anyone asserts that they stand still, he may easily be confuted. But it is requisite thus to speak of things separately, and of many things collected together; in which collection, man, a stone, every animal, and species are placed. Do not these things, O Theætetus, appear to you to be pleasant; and are they not agreeable to your taste?

Theaetetus/ I do not know, Socrates: for I cannot understand respecting yourself, whether you assert these things as appearing to be so to you, or in order to try me.

Socrates/ Do you not remember, my friend, that I neither know any of these particulars, nor make any of them my own, but that I am barren of them? Likewise, that I act: the part of a midwife towards you, and that for the sake of this I enchant you, and place before you the doctrines of each of the wise, that you may taste them, till I lead forth your dogma into light? But when I have led it forth, I then examine whether it appears to be vain and empty, or prolific. But boldly and strenuously, in a becoming and manly manner, answer what appears to you to be the truth respecting the things I shall ask you.

Theaetetus/ Ask then.

Socrates/ Tell me then again, whether it is your opinion that nothing has a being, but that the good, and the

beautiful, and everything which we just now enumerated, always subsist in becoming to be?

Theaetetus/ When I hear you discoursing in this manner, the assertion appears to be wonderful, and it seems that what you discuss should be admitted.

Socrates/ Let us, therefore, not omit what remains. But it remains that we should speak concerning dreams, diseases, and, besides other things, of insanity; likewise, concerning whatever is seen or heard, or in any other way perceived perversely. For you know that in all these the doctrine which we just now related, will appear without any dispute to be confuted; since the senses in these are more deceived than in anything else and so far is it from being the case that things are such as they appear to everyone, that, on the contrary, no one of those things which appear to have a being can in reality be said to be.

Theaetetus/ You speak with the greatest truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ What then, O boy, can remain for him to say, who asserts that sense is science, and that things which appear to everyone are to that individual what they appear to be?

Theaetetus/ I am averse to reply, Socrates, since I know not what to say; because just now when I was speaking you terrified me. For, in reality, I cannot hesitate to grant, that those who are in sane, or dreaming, think falsely, since some among the former of these consider themselves as Gods, and those that dream think they fly like birds.

Socrates/ Whether or no, therefore, are you aware of this dubious question concerning these particulars, and especially concerning perceptions in sleep, and when we are awake?

Theaetetus/ What question is this?

Socrates/ That which I think you have often heard, when it is asked, as at present, by what arguments anyone can evince, whether we are asleep, and all our thoughts are dreams, or whether we are in a vigilant state, and in reality discourse with each other.

Theaetetus/ And indeed, Socrates, it is dubious by what arguments anyone can evince this. For all things follow, as it were, reciprocally the same things. For, with respect to our present discourse, nothing hinders but that our appearing to converse with each other may be in a dream: and when in sleep we appear to relate our dreams, there is a wonderful similitude in this case to our conversation when awake.

Socrates/ You see, then, it is not difficult to doubt, since it is dubious whether things are dreams or vigilant perceptions; and especially since the time which we devote to sleep is equal to that which we devote to vigilance: and in each of these our soul anxiously contends, that the present dogmas are the most true. So that in an equal time we say that these things and those are true; and in a similar manner we strenuously contend for their reality in each.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ The same may be said, therefore, respecting disease and insanity, except that in these the time is not equal.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Socrates/ What then? Shall truth be defined by the multitude and paucity of time?

Theaetetus/ But this, indeed, would be very ridiculous.

Socrates/ Have you anything else by which you can clearly show which of these opinions are true?

Theaetetus/ It does not appear to me that I have.

Socrates/ Hear, therefore, from me, what they will say who define appearances to be always true to those to whom they appear. For I think they will say, interrogating you in this manner; O Theætetus, does that which is in every respect different, possess a certain power which is the same with another thing? And must, we not admit, that a thing in every respect different is not partly the same, and partly different, but that it is wholly different?

Theaetetus/ It is impossible, therefore, that it should possess anything the same, either in power, or in anything else, since it is altogether different.

Socrates/ Must we not, therefore, necessarily confess, that a thing of this kind is dissimilar?

Theaetetus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ If, therefore, anything happens to become similar or dissimilar to anything, whether to itself or to another, so far as it is similar must we not say it becomes same, but, so far as dissimilar, different?

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Have we not said before, that there are many, and indeed an infinite number of things which act, and in a similar manner of things which suffer?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And besides this, that when one thing is mingled with another and another, it does not generate things which are the same, but such as are different?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Shall we speak of me and you, and other things after the same manner? As, for instance, shall we say that Socrates when well is similar to Socrates when ill, or dissimilar?

Theaetetus/ Do you mean to ask whether the whole of Socrates when ill is similar or dissimilar to the whole of Socrates when well?

Socrates/ You understand me perfectly well. This is what I mean.

Theaetetus/ I answer, then, that it is dissimilar and different.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, is it so, considered as dissimilar?

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ And would you speak in a similar manner respecting those that are asleep, and all such particulars as we just now discussed?

Theaetetus/ I should.

Socrates/ But does not each of those things which are naturally capable of effecting anything, when it receives Socrates as well, use me as a different man from what it does when it receives me as ill?

Theaetetus/ Is it possible it should not?

Socrates/ And do we not generate from each things that are different, I being the patient, and that thing the agent?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But when I drink wine, being well, it appears to me to be pleasant and sweet.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But, from what has been granted, an agent and a patient generate sweetness and sense, both being borne along together. And sense, indeed, existing from the patient, causes the tongue to perceive; but sweetness, from the wine being borne along about it, causes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to a healthy tongue.

Theaetetus/ The former particulars were entirely allowed by us to subsist in this manner.

Socrates/ But when I drink wine, being diseased, my tongue does not in reality receive it the same as before: For it now approaches to that which is dissimilar.

Theaetetus/ It does.

Socrates/ But Socrates thus affected, and the drinking the wine again generate other things; about the tongue a sensation of bitterness; but about the wine, bitterness generated and borne along. And the wine, indeed, is not bitterness, but bitter; and I am not sense, but that which is sentient.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ I therefore, thus perceiving, do not ever become anything else. For of a different thing there is a different sense, which renders the perceiver various and different. Nor does that which thus affects me become a thing of this kind, by concurring with another thing, and generating the same. For, generating another thing from another, it would become itself various.

Theaetetus/ These things are so.

Socrates/ Nor, indeed, am I such to myself, nor is that thing generated such to itself.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But it is necessary that I should become sentient of something, when I become sentient: For it is impossible that I should be sentient, and yet sentient of nothing. And it is likewise necessary that that thing should become something to someone, when it becomes sweet or bitter, or anything of this kind. For it is impossible that a thing can be sweet, and yet sweet to no one.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ It remains then, I think, that we should mutually be, if we are; and if we are becoming to be, that we should be mutually in generation; since necessity binds our essence. But it does not bind it to any other thing, nor yet to ourselves. It remains, therefore, that we are bound to each other. So that, if anyone says a certain thing is, or is becoming to be, it must be understood that it is, or is becoming to be something, or of something, or to something. But it must, not be said that it is in itself either that which is, or which is becoming to be. Nor must we suffer this to be said, either by the thing itself, or by any other, as the discourse we have already discussed evinces.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Since that which affects me, belongs to me and not to another, do not I also perceive it, and not another?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ My sense, therefore, is true to me. For it always belongs to my essence. And I, according to Protagoras, am a judge of things which have a being pertaining to myself, that they are, and of non-beings, that they are not.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ How then is it possible, since I am not deceived, and do not stagger in my dianoëtic part, either about things which are, or things in generation, that I should not possess scientific knowledge of things which I perceive?

Theaetetus/ There is no reason why you should not.

Socrates/ It was beautifully, therefore, said by you, that science is nothing else than sense. And the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus, and all of this tribe, that all things are moved like streams, accords with that of the most wise Protagoras that man is the measure of all things; and with that of Theætetus, that, things subsisting in this manner, sense is science for do we not, O Theætetus, say, that this is

as it were your offspring recently born, but delivered by me by the midwife's art? Or how do you say?

Theaetetus/ It is necessary to say so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But this, as it appears, we have scarcely been able to generate, whatever it may be. Since however it is delivered, celebrating the usual solemnities on the fifth day after the nativity, let us run through a circle of disputations, considering whether it does not deceive us, and is not worthy of being educated, but is vain and false. Or do you think that you ought by all means to nourish your offspring, and not abandon it? Or could you endure to see it reprobated, and not be very much offended if anyone should take it away from you, as being your first born?

Theodorus/ Theætetus, Socrates, could endure this. For he is not morose. But by the Gods tell me, if this is not the case.

Socrates/ You are sincerely a philologist, and a good man, Theodorus: for you think I am a sack of discourse, out of which I can easily take words, and say that these things are not so. But you do not understand the truth of the case, that no assertions proceed from me, but always from him who discourses with me. Indeed I know nothing, except a small matter, viz., how to receive a reason from another wise man, and apprehend it sufficiently. And now I endeavor to determine this question, by means of Theætetus, and not from myself.

Theodorus/ You speak well, Socrates; and, therefore, do as you say.

Socrates/ Do you know, Theodorus, what it is I admire in your associate Protagoras?

Theodorus/ What is it?

Socrates/ In other respects his assertion, that a thing is that which it appears to anyone, is, I think, a very pleasant

one; but I wonder that at the beginning of his discourse, when he speaks of truth, he did not say, that a swine or a cynocephalus, or any other more unusual thing endued with sense, is the measure of all things, that he might begin to speak to us magnificently, and in a manner perfectly contemptuous; evincing that we should admire him for his wisdom as if he were a God, when at the same time with respect to understanding, he is not at all superior to a little frog, much less to any other man. Or how shall we say, Theodorus? For if that of which each person forms an opinion through sense is true to each, and no other *passion* of anyone judges better than this, and one person is not better qualified to judge whether an opinion is true or false than another, but, as we have often said, everyone is alone able to form an opinion of things pertaining to himself, and all these are right and true, —then why, my friend, is Protagoras so wise, that he is thought to be justly worthy of instructing others, and receiving a mighty reward for so doing, while we are considered as more unlearned, and are advised to become his disciples, though each person is the measure of his own wisdom? Or how is it possible not to say that Protagoras asserts these things in order to seduce the people? I pass over in silence, what laughter both myself and my obstetric art must excite; and besides this, as I think, the whole business of discourse. For will not the consideration and endeavor to confute the fantasies and opinions of others, since each is true, be nothing more than long and mighty trifles, if the truth of Protagoras is true, and he does not in sport speak from the adytum of his book?

Theodorus/ As I am a friend, Socrates, to Protagoras, as you just now said, I cannot suffer, with my consent that he should; be confuted, nor yet am I willing to oppose your opinion. Again, therefore, take to yourself Theætetus; for he appears to have attended to you in a very becoming manner.

Socrates/ If then, Theodorus, you should go to the Palæstræ at Lacedæmon, and should see among those that are naked some of a base form, would you not think it worthwhile to exhibit your own naked figure?

Theodorus/ But what do you think, if, complying with my request, they should permit me, as I hope you will at present, to be a spectator without being drawn to the Gymnasium, my limbs being now stiff, and engaging in wrestling with one who is younger, and whose joints are more supple than mine?

Socrates/ But, if this be the case, Theodorus, and it is friendly to you, then, according to the proverb, it is not hostile to me. Let us, therefore, again go to the wise Theætetus. But answer me, in the first place, Theætetus, to what we just now discussed, Would you not wonder, if on a sudden you should appear to be not inferior in wisdom, either to any man or God? Or do you think that the Protagorean measure pertains less to Gods than to men?

Theaetetus/ I do not by Zeus. And I very much wonder at your question. For when we discussed in what manner it might be said, that what appears to anyone is true to anyone, it appeared to me to be perfectly well said, but now the very contrary has rapidly taken place.

Socrates/ My dear boy, you are as yet a youth, and are therefore easily obedient to and persuaded by conversation. For to these things Protagoras or anyone of his sect would say: O generous boys, and aged men, you here sit together, conversing and calling on the Gods, concerning whom, whether they are or are not, I do not think it proper either to speak or write. Likewise hearing the things which the multitude admit, these you assert: and among others, that it would be a dire thing if every man did not far surpass every brute in wisdom; but you do not adduce any demonstration,

or necessity, that it should be so, but only employ probability. Which if Theodorus, or any other geometrician, should employ when geometrizing, he would be considered as undeserving of notice. Do you, therefore, and Theodorus consider, whether you should admit persuasion and probable arguments, when discoursing about things of such great consequence.

Theaetetus/ But, Socrates, both you and we should say that this would not be just.

Socrates/ Now, however, as it appears from your discourse, and that of Theodorus, another thing is to be considered.

Theaetetus/ Entirely another thing.

Socrates/ Let us, therefore, consider this, whether science is the same with sense, or different from it? For to this in a certain respect the whole of our discourse tends: and for the sake of this we have agitated these particulars, which are both numerous and wonderful. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Do we then acknowledge that all such things as we perceive by seeing and hearing, we at the same time scientifically know? So that for instance, shall we say, that we do not hear the Barbarians, when they speak, before we have learned their language or, that, without this, we both hear them and at the same time know what they say? And again, whether when ignorant of letters, but looking at them, we do not see them, or shall we strenuously contend that we know, if we see them?

Theaetetus/ We should say this, Socrates, that, if we see and hear things, we know them scientifically; and that in the latter of these instances, on perceiving the figure and color we scientifically know the letters; and that in the former instance, we at the same time both hear and know the

sharpness and flatness of the sounds: but that what grammarians and interpreters teach respecting these things, we neither perceive nor scientifically know by seeing or hearing.

Socrates/ Most excellently said, Theætetus. Nor is it worthwhile to oppose you in these things, that you may thence make a greater proficiency. But consider also this other thing which will take place, and see how it may be repelled.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ It is this: If anyone should ask whether it is possible that a person can be ignorant of that which he has a scientific knowledge of, while he yet remembers it, and preserves it, then when he remembers it. But I shall be prolix, as it appears, through desiring to inquire whether anyone does not know that which he has learnt and remembers.

Theaetetus/ But how is it possible he should not, Socrates? For, otherwise, what you say would be a prodigy.

Socrates/ Do I, therefore, rave or not? Consider. Do you not then say that to see is to perceive, and that sight is sense?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Has not, therefore, he who sees anything a scientific knowledge of that which he sees, according to the present discourse?

Theaetetus/ He has.

Socrates/ But what, do you not say that memory is something?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But whether is it of nothing or something?

Theaetetus/ Of something, doubtless.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, of those things which he learns and perceives?

Theaetetus/ It is of such things as these.

Socrates/ But what, does anyone ever remember that which he sees?

Theaetetus/ He does remember it.

Socrates/ Does he likewise when he shuts his eyes? or, when he does this, does he forget?

Theaetetus/ But this, Socrates, would be a dire thing to say.

Socrates/ And yet it is necessary to say so, if we would preserve the former discourse: but if not, it must perish.

Theaetetus/ And I indeed by Zeus suspect so, though I do not sufficiently understand: but tell me in what respect it must be so.

Socrates/ In this. We say that he who sees anything has a scientific knowledge of that which he sees: For it is confessed by us that sight and sense, and science are the same.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But he who sees, and has a scientific knowledge of that which he sees, if he shuts his eyes, he remembers indeed that thing, but does not see it. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ But not to see is not to know scientifically; since to see is to have a scientific knowledge.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ It happens, therefore, that when anyone has a scientific knowledge of anything, and still remembers it, he does not know it scientifically, since he does not see it; which we say would be monstrous, if it should take place.

Theaetetus/ You speak most true.

Socrates/ But it appears that something impossible would happen, if anyone should say that science and sense are the same.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Each, therefore, must be confessed to be different.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ As it appears then, we must again say from the beginning what science is. Though what shall we do, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ About what?

Socrates/ We appear to me, like dunghill cocks, to leap from our disputation, before we have gained the victory, and begin to crow.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ Though we have assented to the established meaning of names, yet we appear to have contradicted this meaning, and to have been delighted in so doing, in our discourse: and though we have confessed ourselves not to be contentious but wise, yet we are ignorant that we do the same as those skillful men.

Theaetetus/ I do not yet understand what you say.

Socrates/ But I will endeavor to explain what I understand about these things. For we inquired whether anyone who has learnt and remembers a thing, has not a scientific knowledge of that thing: and we evinced that he who knows a thing, and with his eyes shut remembers it, but does not see it, at the same time is ignorant of and remembers it. But that this is impossible. And so the Protagorean fable is destroyed, and at the same time yours, which asserts that science and sense are the same.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But this I think, my friend, would not be the case if the father of the other fable were alive, but he would very much defend it. But now, being an orphan, we reproachfully deride it. For the guardians which Protagoras left, and of which Theodorus is one, are unwilling to assist it. But we, for the sake of justice, should venture to give it assistance.

Theodorus/ Indeed, Socrates, I am not one of the guardians of the doctrine of Protagoras, but this ought rather to be said of Callias the son of Hipponicus. For we very rapidly betook ourselves from mere words to geometry. Nevertheless, we shall thank you if you assist this doctrine.

Socrates/ You speak well, Theodorus. Consider, therefore, the assistance which I shall give. For he who does not attend to the power of words, by which, for the most part, we are accustomed to affirm or deny anything, must, assent to things more dire than those we have just mentioned. Shall I tell you in what respect, Theætetus?

Theodorus/ Tell us in common, therefore: but let the younger answer. For, if he errs, it will be less disgraceful.

Socrates/ But I speak of a most dire question; and I think it is this. Is it possible that he who knows anything can be ignorant of this thing which he knows?

Theodorus/ What shall we answer, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ I think it is not possible.

Socrates/ But this is not the case, if you admit that to see is to know scientifically. For what ought you to reply to that inevitable question, which, as it is said, is shut up in a well, if anyone should ask you, O intrepid man, whether, on covering one of your eyes with your hand, you can see your garment with the covered eye?

Theaetetus/ I think I should say, Not with this, but with the other eye.

Socrates/ Would you not, therefore, see, and at the same time not see, the same thing?

Theaetetus/ I should in a certain respect.

Socrates/ But he will say, I neither ordered you to answer thus, nor did I ask in what respect you might be said to see, but whether, if knowing a thing scientifically, you also did not scientifically know it. But now you confess that not seeing, you see: and prior to this you acknowledged, that to see was to have a scientific knowledge, and that not to see, was not to know scientifically. Think what will happen to you from these things.

Theaetetus/ I think the very contrary to what we admitted will take place.

Socrates/ But, perhaps, O wonderful youth, you will suffer many things of this kind, if anyone should ask you whether it is possible to know scientifically, in an acute and dull manner, and near, but not at a distance; vehemently and with remission, and in ten thousand other ways. For an insidious man, armed with a shield, and led to discussion by hire, when you admit science and sense to be the same, will drive you to hearing, smelling, and such like senses, and there detaining, will confute you, and will not dismiss you, till having admired his exquisite wisdom you are bound by him. And being thus brought into captivity and bound, you will be obliged to redeem yourself for a sum of money which is agreed upon by him and you. But you will perhaps say, after what manner can Protagoras defend his opinions? Shall we endeavor to say something else?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Socrates/ But all this which we have said in defense of him, will, I think, be ineffectual. For, despising us, he will

say: That good man, Socrates, when he was asked by a boy, whether anyone could at the same time remember a thing, and be ignorant of it, was frightened, and in his fear denied that anyone could; and, through being unable to look straight forward, made me appear ridiculous in his discourses. But, most sluggish Socrates, the thing is thus; When by inquiry you consider anyone of my assertions, if he whom you interrogate answers in the same manner as I should answer, and is deceived, in this case I am confuted. But if he answers in a different manner, he alone whom you interrogate is deceived. For, in the first place, do you think that anyone would grant you, that memory can be present to him who, no longer suffers a passion of such a kind as he once suffered? It is far from being the case. Or do you think he would hesitate to acknowledge, that the same thing may at the same time be both known and not known? Or, if he should fear to assert this, do you think he would admit that anyone thing is dissimilar to another, before it is itself made dissimilar to that which has a being? Or rather, that this is something, and not those; and that those will become infinite in dissimilitude has a subsistence; admitting that it is requisite to avoid the mutual hunting of words. But, (he will say) O blessed man, approach in a still more generous manner to what I say, and confute, if you are able, my assertion, that peculiar senses do not belong to each of us; or that, if they are peculiar, that which appears will not anything the more belong only to one individual. Or, if it is necessary it should exist, it may be denominated by him to whom it appears. But when you speak of swine and cynocephali, you not only grunt yourself, but you persuade those that hear you to do this at my writings; and in this respect do not act well. For I say, that the truth subsists, as I have written: for each of us is the measure both of beings and non-beings. But one thing differs widely from another,

because they appear to one person different from what they do to another. I am likewise far from asserting, that there is any such thing as wisdom, or a wise man. But I call him a wise man who, changing the condition of him to whom things appear and are evil, causes them to appear and to be good to such a one. Do not, therefore, pursue my discourse in words only, but still in a clearer manner thus learn what I say. And in order to this, recollect what was said before, that to a sick man the things which he tastes appear and are bitter; but that to him who is well they are and appear to be the contrary. But it is not proper to make either of these the wiser on this account: (for this is impossible) nor must it be asserted, that he who is sick is an ignorant person, because he entertains such opinions, and that he who is well is wise, because he thinks differently; but that he is changed into a different habit. For one habit is better than another. In a similar manner, too, in erudition, there is a mutation from one habit to a better. But the physician effects a mutation by medicines, and the sophist by discourses. For no one can cause him who thinks falsely to think afterwards truly. For it is not possible for anyone to have an opinion of things which are not, or of things different from what he suffers. But the things which he suffers are always true. And I think that he, who, through a depraved habit of soul, forms opinions of things allied to himself, may, through a good habit, be made to entertain opinions of different things, which some, through ignorance, denominate true phantasms. But I say that some things are better than others, but that they are by no means more true. Likewise, friend Socrates, I am far from calling the wise frogs. But I call those that are wise in things pertaining to bodies, physicians; and in things pertaining to plants, husbandmen. For I say that these men insert in their plants, when anyone of them is diseased, useful, healthy, and true senses, instead

of such as are depraved: but that wise men and good rhetoricians cause things that are good to appear just to cities, instead of such as are base. For such things as appear to each city to be just and beautiful, these are to that city such as it thinks them to be. But a wise man, instead of such particulars as are noxious to cities, causes them to become and to appear to be advantageous. After the same manner a sophist, when he is thus able to discipline those that are instructed, is a wise man, and deserves a great reward from those he instructs. And thus some are more wise than others, and yet no one entertains false opinions. And this must, be admitted by you, whether you are willing or not, since you are the measure of things. For this assertion is preserved in these; against which, if you have anything else which you can urge from the beginning, urge it, by adducing opposing arguments. But if you are willing to do this by interrogations, begin to interrogate. For neither is this to be avoided, but is to be pursued the most of all things, by him who is endued with intellect. Act, therefore, in this manner, lest you should be injurious in interrogating. For it is very absurd, that he, who, by his own confession, applies himself to the study of virtue, should in discourse accomplish nothing else than injustice. But he acts unjustly in a thing of this kind, who does not exercise himself separately in contending, and separately in discoursing: and who in the former jests and deceives as far as he is able, but in the latter acts seriously, and corrects him with whom he discourses; alone pointing out to him those errors by which he was deceived, both by himself and the former discussions. If, therefore, you act in this manner, those who discourse with you will accuse themselves of their own perturbation and perplexity, but not you. They will likewise follow and love you, but hate themselves, and will fly from themselves to philosophy; that, becoming different from what they were,

they may liberate themselves from their former habits. But if you act in a manner contrary to this, as is the case with the multitude, the very contrary will happen to you; and you will cause those that associate with you, when they become elderly, to hate this pursuit, instead of being philosophers. If, therefore, you will be persuaded by me, then, as was said before, bringing with you a mind neither morose nor hostile, but propitious and mild, you will truly consider our assertion, that all things are moved, and that whatever appears to anyone, whether to an individual or a city, is that very thing which it appears to be. And from hence you will consider, whether science and sense are the same with, or different from, each other; nor will you, as was the case just now, discourse from the established custom of words and names, which drawing the multitude in a casual manner, mutually involve them in all-various doubts. Such, O Theodorus, is the assistance, which to the utmost of my power I have endeavored to give to your associate. These are small things, indeed, from the small. But, if he were alive, he would more magnificently defend his own doctrines.

Theodorus/ You jest, Socrates: for you have very strenuously assisted the man.

Socrates/ You speak well, my friend. But tell me: Do you take notice that Protagoras just now, when he was speaking, reproached us, that when we were discoursing with a boy, we opposed his doctrines with a puerile fear; and besides this, that forbidding us to jest, and venerating moderation in all things, he exhorted us to discuss his doctrines seriously?

Theodorus/ How is it possible, Socrates, I should not take notice of this?

Socrates/ What then? Do you order us to obey him?

Theodorus/ Very much.

Socrates/ Do you see, therefore, that all these, except you, are boys? If then we are persuaded by him, it is requisite that you and I, interrogating and answering each other, should seriously examine his doctrine, that he may not have to accuse us that we have again considered his assertion, jesting, as it were, with young men.

Theodorus/ But what? Will not Theætetus much better follow you in your investigation than many that have long beards?

Socrates/ But not better than you, Theodorus. Do not, therefore, think that I ought by all possible means to assist your deceased associate, but not afford you any assistance. But come, best of men, follow me a little, till we see this, whether you ought to be the measure of diagrams, or whether all men are, like you, sufficient with respect to astronomy, and other things in which you deservedly appear to excel.

Theodorus/ It is not easy for him, O Socrates, who sits with you, to refuse an answer to your questions. But I just now spoke like one delirious, when I said that you would permit me not to divest myself of my garments, and that you would not compel me like the Lacedæmonians. But you appear to me rather to tend to the manners of Sciron. For the Lacedæmonians order us either to strip or depart: but you seem to me rather to act like Antæus, For you do not dismiss him who engages with you, till you have compelled him to wrestle with you in arguments, naked.

Socrates/ You have most excellently, Theodorus, found out a resemblance of my disease. But I am, indeed, more robust than these. For an innumerable multitude of Herculeses and Theseuses, who were very powerful in discourse, have contended with me, and have been very much wearied: but, notwithstanding this, I have not in the

least desisted; with so dire a love of this exercise am I seized. Do not, therefore, through envy, refrain from exercising yourself with me, and benefiting at the same time both me and yourself.

Theodorus/ I shall no longer oppose you. Lead me, therefore, wherever you please. For it is perfectly necessary that he who is confuted should endure this fatal destiny which you have knit; yet I shall not attempt to exert myself beyond what I promised you.

Socrates/ This will be sufficient. But diligently observe this with respect to me, that I do not, through forgetfulness, adopt a puerile mode of discourse so as that we may again be exposed to censure.

Theodorus/ I will endeavor to do this, as far as I am able.

Socrates/ Let us, therefore, again resume this in the first place, which we discussed before, and see whether we properly or improperly reprobate the assertion of Protagoras, that everyone is sufficient to himself with respect to wisdom. For Protagoras has granted us, that even some among the wise differ with respect to better and worse. Has he not?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ If, therefore, he being himself present acknowledges this, and we do not admit it through his assistance, there is no occasion to establish it by resuming the arguments in its favor. But now, since someone may consider us as not sufficient assertors of his doctrine, it will be better, as the case is, to assent to this position in a still clearer manner. For it is of no small consequence whether this takes place or not.

Theodorus/ It is true.

Socrates/ Not from other things, therefore, but from his own assertions, we acquire our mutual assent in the shortest manner possible.

Theodorus/ How so?

Socrates/ Thus. Does he not say that what appears to anyone is that very thing to him to whom it appears?

Theodorus/ He does say so.

Socrates/ Therefore, O Protagoras, we speak the opinions of a man, or rather of all men, and we say, that no one can partly think himself wiser than others, and others partly wiser than himself. But in the greatest dangers, when in armies, or in diseases, or in tempests at sea, do not men look to the governors in each of these as Gods, and consider them as their saviors; these governors at the same time being superior in nothing else than in knowledge? And in all human affairs, do not men seek after such teachers and governors, both of themselves and other animals, as are thought to be sufficient to all the purposes of teaching and governing? And in all these, what else shall we say, than that men are of opinion that there is wisdom and ignorance among themselves?

Theodorus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ Do they not, therefore, think that wisdom is true dianoëtic energy, but ignorance false opinion?

Theodorus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ What then, O Protagoras, shall we assert? Shall we say that men always form true opinions; or that their opinions are sometimes true and sometimes false? For, from both these assertions, it will happen that they do not always form true opinions, but both true and false. For consider, Theodorus, whether anyone of the followers of Protagoras, or you yourself, will contend, that there is no one who thinks that there is not someone who is unlearned, and forms false opinions.

Theodorus/ But this is incredible, Socrates.

Socrates/ But the assertion, that man is the measure of all things, necessarily leads to this.

Theodorus/ How so?

Socrates/ When you judge anything from yourself, and afterwards declare your opinion of that thing to me, then, according to the doctrine of Protagoras, your opinion is true to you; but, with respect to us, may we not become judges of your judgment? Or shall we judge that you always form true opinions? Or shall we not say that an innumerable multitude of men will continually oppose your opinions, and think that you judge and opine falsely?

Theodorus/ By Zeus, Socrates, there is, as Homer says, a very innumerable multitude who will afford me sufficient employment from human affairs.

Socrates/ But what? Are you willing to admit we should say, that you then, form true opinions to yourself, but such as are false to an innumerable multitude of mankind?

Theodorus/ This appears to be necessary, from the assertion of Protagoras.

Socrates/ But what with respect to Protagoras himself? Is it not necessary, that: if neither he should think that man is the measure of all things, nor the multitude, (as, indeed, they do not think this,) that this truth which he has written should not be possessed by anyone? But if he thinks that man is the measure, but the multitude do not accord with him in opinion, do you not know, in the first place, that by how much greater the multitude is to whom this does not appear to be the case, than to whom it does, by so much the more it is not than it is?

Theodorus/ It is necessary; since, according to each opinion, it will be and will not be.

Socrates/ In the next place, this thing will subsist in the most elegant manner. For he, with respect to his own

opinion, will admit, that the opinion of those that dissent from him, and by which they think that he is deceived, is in a certain degree true, while he acknowledges that all men form true opinions.

Theodorus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will he not, therefore, admit that his own opinion is false, if he allows that the judgment of those who think he errs is true?

Theodorus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ But others will never allow themselves to be deceived; or do you think they will?

Theodorus/ They will not.

Socrates/ Protagoras, however, from what he has written, will acknowledge that this opinion is true.

Theodorus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ From all, therefore, that Protagoras has asserted, it may be doubted, or rather will be granted by him, that when he admits that he who contradicts him forms a true opinion, neither a dog, nor any man, is the measure of all things, or of anyone thing, which he has not learned. Is it not so?

Theodorus/ It is.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, this is doubted by all men, the truth of Protagoras will not be true to anyone, neither to any other, nor to himself.

Theodorus/ We attack my associate, Socrates, in a very violent manner.

Socrates/ But it is immanifest, my friend, whether or not we are carried beyond rectitude. For it is likely that he, as being our elder, is wiser than we are. And if suddenly leaping forth he should seize me by the shoulders, it is probable that he would prove me to be delirious in many things, as likewise

you who assent to me, and that afterwards he would immediately vanish. But I think it is necessary that we should make use of ourselves such as we are, and always speak what appears to us to be the truth. And now then shall we say that anyone will grant us another thing, that one man is wiser or more ignorant than another?

Theodorus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Shall we say that our discourse ought especially to persist in this to which we have subscribed, in order to assist Protagoras, —I mean, that many things which are apparent are such as they appear to everyone, viz., things hot, dry, sweet, and all of this kind? And if in some things it should be granted that one person dissents from another, as about things salubrious and noxious, Protagoras would assert, that not every woman, boy, and brute, is sufficient to cure itself by knowing what is salubrious, but that in this case, if in any, one differs from another.

Theodorus/ So it appears to me.

Socrates/ With respect to political concerns, therefore, such as things beautiful and base, just and unjust, holy and unholy, are such opinions respecting these, as each city legally establishes for itself, true opinions to each? And in these, is neither one individual, nor one city wiser than another! But in the establishment of what is advantageous, or the contrary, to a city, Protagoras would doubtless grant that one counselor is better than another, and that the opinion of one city is more true than that of another. Nor will he by any means dare to say, that what a city establishes in consequence of thinking that it is advantageous to itself, is to be preferred before everything. But cities, with respect to what is just and unjust, holy and unholy, are willing strenuously to contend, that none of these have naturally any essence of their own, but that what appears to be true

in common is then true when it appears, and as long as it appears. And those who do not altogether speak the doctrine of Protagoras, after this manner lead forth their wisdom. But with respect to us, Theodorus, one discourse employs us emerging from another, a greater from a less.

Theodorus/ We are not, therefore, idle, Socrates.

Socrates/ We do not appear to be so. And indeed, O blessed man, I have often as well as now taken notice, that those who have for a long time been conversant with philosophy, when they go to courts of justice deservedly appear to be ridiculous rhetoricians.

Theodorus/ Why do you assert this?

Socrates/ Those who from their youth have been rolled like cylinders in courts of justice, and places of this kind, appear, when compared to those who have been nourished in philosophy and such-like pursuits, as slaves educated among the free-born.

Theodorus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ In this, that these latter, always, as you say, abound in leisure, and at leisure peaceably discourse, just as we at present engage in a digressive conversation for the third time. In like manner, they, if any question occurs more pleasing to them than the proposed subject of discussion, are not at all concerned whether they speak with brevity, or prolixity, if they can but be partakers of reality. But the others when they speak are always busily engaged; (for diffluent water urges) nor is it permitted them to discourse about that which is the object of their desire; but their opponent places before them necessity, and the formula of a book, without which nothing is to be said, which they call an oath respecting calumny, on the part of the plaintiff and defendant. Their discourses too are always concerning a fellow slave, against the master, who sits holding the action

in his hand. Their contests likewise never vary, but are always about the same thing: and their course is often respecting life itself. So that, from all these circumstances, they become vehement and sharp, knowing that the master may be flattered by words, and that they shall be rewarded for it in reality; and this because their souls are little and distorted. For slavery from childhood prevents the soul from increasing, and deprives it of rectitude and liberty compelling it to act in a distorted manner, and hurls into tender souls mighty dangers and fears; which not being able to endure with justice and truth, they immediately betake themselves to falsehood and mutual injuries, and become much bent and twisted. So that, their dianoëtic part being in a diseased condition, they pass from youth to manhood, having rendered themselves as they think skillful and wise. And such are men of this description, O Theodorus. But are you willing that I should give you an account of men belonging to our choir, or that, dismissing them, we should again return to our proposed investigation; lest, as we just now said, we should too much digress?

Theodorus/ By no means, Socrates. For you very properly observed, that we, as being in the choir of philosophers, were not subservient to discourse, but discourse to us, and that it should attend our pleasure for its completion. For neither a judge nor a spectator, who reproves and governs, presides over us, as is the case with the poets.

Socrates/ Let us speak then, since it is agreeable to you, about the Coryphæi. For why should anyone speak of those that are conversant with philosophy in a depraved manner? In the first: place then, the Coryphæi, from their youth, neither know the way to the forum, nor where the court of justice or senate house is situated, or any other common place of assembly belonging to the city. They likewise neither hear nor see laws nor decrees, whether promulgated or

written. And as to the ardent endeavors of their companions to obtain magistracies, the associations of these, their banquets, and wanton feastings accompanied with pipers, these they do not even dream of accomplishing. But whether anything in the city has happened well or ill, or what evil has befallen anyone from his progenitors, whether male or female, these are more concealed from such a one than, as it is said, how many measures called choes the sea contains. And besides this, he is even ignorant that he is ignorant of all these particulars. For he does not abstain from them for the sake of renown, but in reality his body only dwells and is conversant in the city; but his dianoëtic part considering all these as trifling, and of no value, he is borne away, according to Pindar, on all sides, geometrizing about things beneath, and upon the earth, astronomizing above the heavens, and perfectly investigating all the nature of the beings which every whole contains, but by no means applying himself to anything which is near.

Theodorus/ How is this, Socrates?

Socrates/ Just, O Theodorus, as a certain elegant and graceful Thracian maid-servant, is reported to have said to Thales, when while astronomizing he fell into a well, that he was very desirous of knowing what the heavens contained, but that he was ignorant of what was before him, and close to his feet. In the same manner all such as are conversant in philosophy may be derided. For, in reality, a character of this kind is not only ignorant of what his neighbor does, but he scarcely knows whether he is a man or some other animal. But what man is, and what a nature of this kind ought principally to do or suffer, this he makes the object of his inquiry, and earnestly investigates. Do you understand, Theodorus, or not?

Theodorus/ I do; and you speak the truth.

Socrates/ For in reality, my friend, when a man of this kind is compelled to speak (as I said before) either privately with anyone, or publicly in a court of justice, or anywhere else, about things before his feet, and in his view, he excites laughter not only in Thracian maid-servants, but in the other vulgar, since through his unskillfulness he falls into wells and every kind of ambiguity. Dire deformity, too, causes him to be considered as a rustic. For when he is in the company of slanderers he has nothing to say reproachful, as he does not know any evil of anyone, because he has not made individuals the objects of his attention. Hence, not having anything to say, he appears to be ridiculous. But when he is in company with those that praise and boast of others, as he is not only silent, but openly laughs, he is considered as delirious. For, when he hears encomiums given to a tyrant, or a king, he thinks he hears some swineherd, or shepherd, or herdsman proclaimed as happy, because he milks abundantly; at the same time, he thinks that they feed and milk the animal under their command in a more morose and insidious manner. And that it is necessary a character of this kind should be no less rustic and undisciplined through his occupation, than shepherds; the one being enclosed in walls, and the other by a sheep-cot on a mountain. But when he hears anyone proclaiming that he possesses ten thousand acres of land, or a still greater number, as if he possessed things wonderful in multitude, it appears to him that he hears of a very trifling thing, in consequence of being accustomed to survey the whole earth. As often, too, as anyone celebrates the nobility of his family, evincing that he has seven wealthy grandfathers, he thinks that this is entirely the praise of a dull mind, and which surveys a thing of a trifling nature; through want of discipline being incapable of always looking to the universe, and of inferring by a reasoning process, that

every man has had innumerable myriads of grandfathers and progenitors, among which there has often been an innumerable multitude of rich and poor, kings and slaves, Barbarians and Grecians. But when anyone celebrating his progenitors enumerates five-and-twenty of them, and refers their origin to Hercules the son of Amphitryon, it appears to him a thing unworthy to be mentioned. For, as it is entirely owing to fortune that anyone is able to enumerate five-and-twenty progenitors from Hercules, he would laugh even if anyone could enumerate fifty from the same origin; considering such as unable to reason, and liberate themselves from the arrogance of an insane soul. But, in everything of this kind, the coryphæus we are describing will be ridiculed by the vulgar, partly because he will be considered by them as arrogant, and partly because he is ignorant of and dubious about things before his feet.

Theodorus/ You entirely, Socrates, speak of things which take place.

Socrates/ But when anyone, my friend, draws him on high, and is willing that he should abandon the consideration of whether I injure you, or you me, for the speculation of justice and injustice, what each of them is, and in what they differ from all other things, or from each other; or that, dismissing the inquiry whether a king is happy who possesses abundance of gold, he should ascend to the contemplation of a kingdom, and universally of human felicity and misery, of what kind they are to anyone, and after what manner it is proper for human nature to acquire this thing and fly from that; —about all these particulars, when that little sharp soul so conversant with law is required to give a reason, then he in his turn is affected worse than the coryphæus. For he becomes giddy, through being suspended from a lofty place of survey, and being unaccustomed to look so high. He is also terrified,

filled with uncertainty, and speaks in a barbaric manner; so that he does not, indeed, excite laughter in the Thracian vulgar, nor in any other undisciplined person (for they do not perceive his condition), but in all those whose education has been contrary to that of *slaves*. And such, O Theodorus, is the condition of each; the one whom we call a philosopher, being in reality nourished in liberty and leisure; and who, though he ought not to be blamed, yet appears to be stupid and of no value, when he engages in servile offices, since he neither knows how to bind together bundles of cover-lids, nor to make sauce for banquets, nor compose flattering speeches. But the other of these characters is able to accomplish all these servile offices with celerity and ease, but knows not how to clothe himself dexterously in a liberal manner; nor how in harmonious language properly to celebrate the true life of the Gods and blessed men.

Theodorus/ If, O Socrates, you could persuade all men to assent to what you say, as you have persuaded me, there would be more peace and less evil among men.

Socrates/ But it is impossible, Theodorus, that evils should be destroyed; (foe it is necessary that there should be always something contrary to good) nor yet can they be established in the Gods; but they necessarily revolve about a mortal nature, and this place of our abode. On this account we ought to endeavor to fly from hence thither, with the utmost celerity. But this flight consists in becoming as much as possible similar to divinity. And this similitude is acquired by becoming just and holy, in conjunction with prudence. But, O best of men, it is not altogether easy to procure persuasion, that vice is not to be avoided, and virtue pursued, for the sake of those things which the vulgar adopt, viz., that we may not seem to be vicious, but may seem to be good: for these are, as it is said, the nugacities of old women, as it appears to me. The truth however is as follows: Divinity

is never in any respect unjust, but is most just. And there is not anything more similar to him, than a man when he becomes most just. About this, the true skill of a man, his nothingness and sloth are conversant. For the knowledge of this is wisdom and true virtue; but the ignorance of it, a privation of discipline, and manifest improbity. Everything else which appears to be skill and wisdom, when it takes place in political dynasties, is troublesome, but when in arts illiberal. It will be by far the best, therefore, not to permit him who acts unjustly, and who speaks or acts impiously, to be skilled in any art, on account of his cunning. For a character of this kind will exult in his disgrace, and will not think that he is a mere trifle, and the burthen of the earth, but he will consider himself to be such a man as ought to be preserved in a city. The truth, therefore, must be spoken, that such men as these are by so much the more that which they think they are not, from their not thinking the truth respecting themselves. For they are ignorant of the punishment of injustice, of which they ought by no means to be ignorant. For this punishment does not consist, as it appears to me, in stripes and death (which those who do not act unjustly sometimes suffer), but in that which it is impossible to avoid.

Theodorus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Since, my friend, there are two paradigms in the order of things, one of a divine nature, which is most happy, the other of that which is destitute of divinity, and which is most miserable, these men, not perceiving that this is the case, through folly and extreme insanity, secretly become similar to one of these paradigms, through unjust actions, and dissimilar to the other. But for such conduct they are punished, while they lead a life correspondent to that to which they are assimilated. If, likewise, we should say that these men, unless they are liberated from their dire

conduct, will not, when they die, be received into that place which is pure from evil, but that after death they will always retain the similitude of the life they have lived upon earth, the evil associating with the evil, —if we should thus speak, these dire and crafty men would say that they were hearing nothing but jargon and reverie.

Theodorus/ And very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ I know they would speak in this manner, my friend. But this one thing happens to them, that if at any time it is requisite for them to give a reason privately respecting the things which they blame; and if they are willing to continue disputing in a manly manner for a long time, without cowardly flying from the subject, then at length, O blessed man, this absurdity ensues, that they are not themselves pleased with their own assertions, and their rhetoric so entirely fails them, that they appear to differ in no respect from boys. Respecting men of this kind, therefore, let thus much suffice, since our discourse for some time has been entirely a digression. For, if we do not stop here, in consequence of more matter always flowing in, the subject which we proposed from the first to discuss will be overwhelmed. Let us, therefore, return to our former inquiry, if it is agreeable to you.

Theodorus/ Things of this kind, Socrates, are not unpleasant to me to hear. For, in consequence of my age, I can easily follow you. But let us, if you please, resume our inquiry.

Socrates/ We were, therefore, arrived at that part of our discourse in which we said, that those who considered essence as subsisting in lation, and that a thing which appeared to anyone is always what it appears to be, to him to whom it appears, were willing strenuously to assert this in other things, and not less so respecting what is just; as

that what any city establishes as appearing just to itself, this more than anything is just, so far as it continues to be established. But, with respect to good, no one is so bold as to contend, that whatever a city establishes, through an opinion of its being useful to itself, will be useful to it as long as it is established, unless anyone should assert this of a mere name. But this would be a scoff with respect to what we are saying. Or would it not?

Theodorus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But does not a city consider the thing named, and not merely the name?

Theodorus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But that which it denominates, that it doubtless regards in the business of legislation, and establishes all the laws, so far as it is able, most useful to itself. Or does it establish laws, looking to anything else?

Theodorus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Does it, therefore, always accomplish its purpose, or is it often deceived in its opinion?

Theodorus/ I think it is often deceived.

Socrates/ If anyone, however, should inquire respecting every species, in what the useful consists, he would still more readily acknowledge this. But the useful in the business of legislation is in a certain respect concerning the future time. For, when we establish laws, we establish them that they may be useful in futurity.

Theodorus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Let us, therefore, thus interrogate Protagoras, or anyone of his votaries. Man, as you say, O Protagoras, is the measure of all things, of things white, heavy, light, and the like. For, as he contains a criterion in himself, and thinks conformably to the manner in which he is acted upon, he

forms an opinion of things true to himself, and which are true in reality. Is it not so?

Theodorus/ It is.

Socrates/ Shall we also say, O Protagoras, that he contains in himself a criterion of things future; and that such things as he thinks will happen, such things do happen to him thinking so? So that, for instance, when any idiot thinks that he shall be attacked with a fever, and that a heat of this kind will take place, but a physician is of a different opinion, which of these opinions shall we say will be verified in futurity? Or shall we say that both will be verified? and that the physician will not be affected either with heat or fever, but that the idiot will suffer both?

Theodorus/ This, indeed, would be ridiculous.

Socrates/ But I think, likewise, that the opinion of the husbandman, and not of the harper, would prevail, respecting the future sweetness or roughness of wine.

Theodorus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Nor would a master of the Gymnasium think better respecting that consonance, or dissonance, which would in future appear to him to be consonant or dissonant, than a musician.

Theodorus/ By no means.

Socrates/ And when a banquet is to be prepared, will not the opinion of a cook respecting its future agreeableness be preferred to that of any other person who is unskilled in seasoning? For we do not oppose the assertion respecting that which is, or was, agreeable; but, respecting that which in future will appear, and will be agreeable to anyone, whether is everyone to himself the best judge, or whether are you, O Protagoras, better able to foresee what will probably take place in doubtful affairs than an idiot?

Theodorus/ I think, Socrates, that Protagoras professes in these greatly to excel all men.

Socrates/ O miserable man! no one, by Zeus, would have followed him, and given him a considerable sum of money, if he had not persuaded his disciples that in future it would happen, and would appear to be the case, that neither any diviner, nor other person, would judge better than himself.

Theodorus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But does not the establishment of laws, and the useful, regard futurity? And does not everyone acknowledge, that a city, though governed by laws, often necessarily wanders from that which is most useful?

Theodorus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ We have, therefore, sufficiently urged against your preceptor, that he must necessarily confess, that one man is wiser than another, and that such a one is a measure; but that there is no necessity that I, who am void of science, should become a measure, as his discourse just now compelled me to be, since, whether I am willing or not, I am so.

Theodorus/ From that, Socrates, it appears to me, that his doctrine is particularly convincing, and from this also, that it makes the opinions of others valid. But cities reprobate his assertions, and by no means think them to be true.

Socrates/ In many other things, Theodorus, it may be inferred, that not every opinion of everyone is true. But, with respect to the passion present to everyone, from which the senses and opinions according to these are produced, it is more difficult to apprehend that they are not true. But, perhaps, I say nothing to the purpose. For, when they occur, they cannot be confuted: and those who say that they are clear and sciences, perhaps say the truth. And Theætetus

here did not assert foreign from the purpose, that sense and science are the same. Let us, therefore, approach nearer, as the doctrine of Protagoras orders us, and consider whether this essence, which is thus borne along, emits an entire or a broken sound. For the contention about it is neither mean nor among a few.

Theodorus/ It is very far, indeed, from being mean, but it is very much circulated about Ionia. For the followers of Heraclitus discourse about it very strenuously.

Socrates/ On this account, friend Theodorus, we should rather consider this affair from the beginning, in the same manner as it is discussed by them.

Theodorus/ By all means, therefore. For, with respect to these Heraclitics, Socrates, or as you say Homerics, and such as are still more ancient than these, about Ephesus, and who wish to be considered as skillful persons, it is no more possible to discourse with them than with men raging mad. For their writings are indeed borne along. But as to waiting patiently in discourse and inquiry, and continuing quiet during questioning and answering, this is present with them less than nothing; or rather, these men are so far from possessing any rest, that their privation of it even transcends that which is less than nothing. But if anyone asks them a question, they immediately draw, as from a quiver, certain dark enigmatical words, and dart them at you. And if you ask the reason of this, they will again strike you with another dark shower of words, but with the names changed. But you will never bring anything to a conclusion with them, nor do they ever conclude anything among themselves. Indeed, they take very good care that there shall not be anything stable, either in their discourse, or in their souls; thinking, as it appears to me, that this very thing itself is stable. But these are the weapons with which they

strenuously fight, and which, as far as they are able, they on all sides hurl forth.

Socrates/ Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen these men fighting, but have never seen them when peaceably disposed. For they are not your associates. But I think they speak such things as these, when at leisure, to their disciples, whom they wish to render similar to themselves.

Theodorus/ What disciples, blessed man? For, among men of this kind, one is not the disciple of another, but they spring up spontaneously, wherever each of them happens to be seized with a fanatic fury; and at the same time each thinks that the other knows nothing. From these, therefore, as I just now said, neither willingly nor unwillingly will you ever receive a reason. But it is necessary that we should consider the affair as if it was a problem.

Socrates/ You speak to the purpose. But, with respect to the problem, we receive one thing from the ancients, (who concealed in verse their meaning from the multitude,) that Ocean and Tethys are the generation of all other things, that all things are streams, and that nothing abides. But from the moderns, as being more wise, the thing is so clearly demonstrated, that even curriers, on hearing them, are able to learn their wisdom, and lay aside their foolish opinion, that some things stand still, and others are moved. And learning that all things are moved, they venerate the authors of this doctrine. But we have almost forgotten, Theodorus, that others evince the very contrary to this opinion; I mean, that the proper name of the universe is the immovable, and such other assertions as the Melisseans and Parmenideans, opposing all these, strenuously defend—as, that all things are one, and that this one abides in itself, not having a place in which it can be moved. What then shall we say to all these, my friend? For, proceeding by small advances, we have secretly fallen into the midst of both of them. And if we fly,

without in any respect resisting, we shall be punished like those in the palæstræ playing in a line, who, when they are caught on both sides, are drawn in contrary directions. It appears therefore to me, that we should first of all consider those with whom we began—I mean the flowing philosophers—and, if they appear to say anything to the purpose, that we should draw ourselves together with them, and endeavor to fly from the others, but if those who consider the universe as stable shall appear to have more truth on their side, we should fly to them from those who move even things immovable. And if it shall appear that neither of them assert anything sufficient, we shall become ridiculous, in consequence of thinking that we, who are men of no importance, can say anything to the purpose, when we only reprobate men very ancient, and perfectly wise. Consider therefore, Theodorus, whether it is expedient to proceed into such a mighty danger.

Theodorus/ Nothing ought to prevent us, Socrates, from considering what each of these men say.

Socrates/ Let us consider their assertions then, since you so earnestly desire it. It appears, therefore, to me, that this speculation should commence from motion, —I mean, what that motion is by which they say all things are moved. But what I wish to say is this: whether they say there is one species of motion, or, as it appears to me, two. Nor do I alone wish to know this myself, but that you also may partake, together with me, of this information, that we may in common be affected in such a manner as is proper. Tell me, therefore, do you say a thing is moved when it changes one place for another, or is turned round in the same place?

Theodorus/ I do.

Socrates/ Let this, therefore, be one species. But when anything abiding in the same place becomes old, or, from

being white, becomes black, or, from being soft, hard, or is changed by any other internal change, may not this be deservedly called another species of motion?

Theodorus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ It is necessary, therefore, that there should be these two species of motion, viz., alliation, or internal change, and lation.

Theodorus/ Rightly said.

Socrates/ Having, therefore, made this division, let us now discourse with those who assert that all things are moved, and thus interrogate them: Whether do you say that everything is moved both ways, viz., according to lation and alliation, or that one thing is moved both ways, and another only in one way?

Theodorus/ By Zeus, I know not what to say, but I think they would reply, that everything is moved both ways.

Socrates/ Otherwise, my friend, things would appear to them to be both moved and stand still, and it would not be in any respect more proper to assert that all things are moved, than that they stand still.

Theodorus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, it is necessary they should be moved, and that no one thing should not be moved, all things will always be moved with every kind of motion.

Theodorus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Consider, likewise, this respecting their assertions, —I mean concerning the generation of heat, or whiteness, or anything else. Do we not say that they assert, that each of these is borne along, together with sense, between the agent and the patient? And that the patient, indeed, is sensible, but not yet become sense: but that the agent is that which effects something, but is not quality?

Perhaps, therefore, quality may appear to you to be an unusual name, and you do not understand me thus speaking collectively. Hear me, then, according to parts. For the agent is neither heat nor whiteness, but becomes hot and white; and so with respect to other things. For do you not recollect that we have observed before, that nothing is anyone thing essentially, neither that which is an agent, nor that which is a patient, but that from the concourse of both with each other, sense, and things sensible, being generated, some things became certain qualities, but others sentient?

Theodorus/ I recollect. For how is it possible I should not?

Socrates/ As to other things, therefore, we shall omit the consideration, whether they speak in this manner concerning them, or not. But let us alone attend to this thing, for the sake of which we are now discoursing; and let us ask them, are all things moved, and do they flow as you say? For Is not this what they say?

Theodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are they not, therefore, moved with both those motions which we enumerated, viz., lation and alliation?

Theodorus/ Undoubtedly; since it is necessary that they should be perfectly moved.

Socrates/ If, therefore, they were only borne along, but were not internally changed, we might be able to say what kind of things flow that are borne along. Or how shall we say?

Theodorus/ Thus.

Socrates/ But since neither a flowing white thing permanently continues to flow, but is changed, so that there is even a flux of its whiteness, and a transition into another color, and we are not able to discover that it abides in this, can we with rectitude pronounce it to be any particular color?

Theodorus/ But how is it possible, Socrates, that we can pronounce this of a thing white, or of anything else of a similar kind, since, while we speak about it, it is always privately departing, because continually flowing?

Socrates/ But what shall we say of anyone of the senses, as of seeing or hearing? Does anything in seeing or hearing ever abide?

Theodorus/ This ought not to be the case, since all things are moved.

Socrates/ We must say, therefore, that neither does anyone see more than not see, or use any other of the senses more than not use them, since all things are in every respect moved.

Theodorus/ We must say so.

Socrates/ But sense is science, as we say, I and Theætetus.

Theodorus/ You do say so.

Socrates/ On being asked, therefore, what science is, we must answer, that it is not more science than not science.

Theodorus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ An emendation, therefore, of the answer will very opportunely present itself to us, when we desire to evince that all things are moved, in order that the answer may appear to be right. But this it seems will appear, that if all things are moved, every answer to every question will be similarly right which says, that a thing subsists and yet does not subsist in a certain particular manner, or, if you will, that it is in generation, that we may not stop them by our discourse.

Theodorus/ Right.

Socrates/ Except in this, Theodorus, that we should say it is so, and yet is not so. But it is requisite not even to speak

in this manner, (for neither will it be any longer moved thus, nor yet not thus,) but another word must be employed by those that speak in this manner, because they have no words by which they can denominate things according to their hypothesis, unless, perhaps, they use the expression not in any particular manner. But this will be particularly adapted to them, when spoken an infinite number of times.

Theodorus/ It will thus, indeed, be accommodated to them in the highest degree.

Socrates/ We have therefore, Theodorus, done with your friend, nor can we grant him, that every man is the measure of all things, or any man, unless he is endued with wisdom. Nor must we admit that science is sense, according to the doctrine that all things are moved; unless Theætetus here says otherwise.

Theodorus/ You speak most excellently, Socrates. For, these things being brought to a conclusion, it is proper that I also should have done with Protagoras, according to our compact.

Theaetetus/ But not so, Theodorus, till you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who assert that the universe is immovable, as you just now mentioned.

Theodorus/ As you are a young man, Theætetus, you teach those that are advanced in years to act unjustly, by transgressing compacts. But prepare yourself to answer Socrates in the remaining part of this inquiry.

Theaetetus/ Doubtless I shall, if he wishes it: yet it would give me great pleasure to hear what I mentioned.

Theodorus/ You incite horses to the plain when you incite Socrates to discourse. Ask, therefore, and hear.

Socrates/ But, O Theodorus, I appear to myself as if I should not comply with Theætetus in his request.

Theodorus/ But why should you not comply?

Socrates/ Though I should be ashamed to speak concerning Melissus and others, who assert that the universe is one and immovable, lest I should appear to revile them in an insolent manner, yet I should be less ashamed with respect to them than with respect to Parmenides. For, that I may use the words of Homer, Parmenides appears to me to be both venerable and skillful. For I was acquainted with him when I was very young and he was very much advanced in years, and he appeared to me to possess a certain profundity perfectly generous. I am afraid, therefore, lest we should neither understand the meaning of his words, and much more, lest we should be deficient in apprehending the conceptions contained in his writings: and what is greatest of all, left with respect to the subject of our present inquiry, what science is, we should leave the consideration of it unfinished, through employing contumelious language. Besides, the question which we have now excited, and which contains in itself an ineffable multitude of particulars, would be unworthily treated, if discussed in a careless manner; and on the other hand, if it is extended to too great a length, it will prevent the discovery of science. But it is proper that neither of these should take place, but that we should endeavor, by the obstetric art, to free from confinement the fetus of Theætetus respecting science.

Theaetetus/ It is proper indeed to do so, if it seems requisite to you.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, Theætetus, in addition to what has been said above, consider this. Do you say that science is sense or not?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ If then anyone should ask you, by what it is that a man sees things white and black, and hears sounds

flat and sharp, you would answer, I think, that it is by the eyes and ears.

Theaetetus/ I should.

Socrates/ But to use nouns and verbs with facility, without entering into an accurate investigation of them, is for the most part a thing not ignoble; but rather the contrary to this is servile. Sometimes, however, this is necessary: as in the present case we are compelled to examine whether your answer is right or not. For, consider whether the answer is more right, that we see by, or that we see through, the eyes; and that we hear by, or that we hear through, the ears?

Theaetetus/ It appears to me, Socrates, that it is more proper to consider the eyes and ears as things through which, rather than as things by which, we perceive.

Socrates/ For it would be a dire thing, O boy, if many senses were seated in us, as in wooden horses, and did not all of them tend to one certain idea, whether this is soul, or whatever else it may be proper to call it; and by which, through the senses as organs, we perceive sensible objects.

Theaetetus/ This appears to me to be the case, rather than that.

Socrates/ On this account I diligently investigate these things with you, that we may discover whether by one certain thing belonging to us we perceive things black and white, through the eyes, but certain other particulars through the other organs of sense; and whether, when interrogated, you are able to refer all such things as these to the body. But perhaps it will be better that you should answer to these inquiries, than that I should be entangled with a multiplicity of questions from you. Tell me, therefore: Do you admit that the things through which you perceive the

hot and the dry, the light and the sweet, belong each of them to the body, or to anything else?

Theaetetus/ To nothing else.

Socrates/ Are you also willing to acknowledge that such things as you perceive through one power it is impossible to perceive through another? As, that what you perceive through hearing you cannot perceive through seeing, and that what you perceive through seeing you cannot perceive through hearing?

Theaetetus/ How is it possible I should not be willing?

Socrates/ If, therefore, you dianoëtically perceive anything about both these, you do not accomplish this through any other organ, nor yet through any other do you perceive respecting both of them.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly not.

Socrates/ But, with respect to sound and color, do you not, in the first place, dianoëtically conceive this concerning both of them, that both have a subsistence?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ And, therefore that the one is different from the other, and the same with itself?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And again that both are two, and each one?

Theaetetus/ And this also.

Socrates/ Are you also able to consider whether they are similar or dissimilar to each other?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ But through what is it that you dianoëtically conceive all these things about them? For you can neither apprehend anything common respecting them through the hearing, nor the sight. Further still, this also is an instance of what we say. For, if it were possible to consider this of

both, whether or not they are salt, you know you would be able to assign that by which you considered this; and this would appear to be neither sight nor hearing, but something else.

Theaetetus/ But what should hinder this power from operating through the tongue?

Socrates/ You speak well. But with respect to that power which through a certain thing shows you that which is common to all things, and that which is common to these, and through which you denominate a thing to be, or not to be, through what instruments does it perceive the several particulars about which we were just now inquiring?

Theaetetus/ You speak of essence and non-being, similitude and dissimilitude, same and different, and the two species of numbers. For it is evident that you inquire through what instrument of the body we perceive by the soul, the even and the odd, and such other things as are consequent to these.

Socrates/ You follow, Theætetus, surpassingly well for these are the very things about which I interrogate.

Theaetetus/ But by Zeus, Socrates, I know not what to say, except that which appeared to me at first, that there is not any peculiar organ to these as there is to sensible particulars, but it appears to me that the soul itself considers by itself such things as are common in all things.

Socrates/ You are beautiful, Theætetus, and not, as Theodorus said, deformed. For he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But, besides being beautiful, you have done well with respect to me. For you have liberated me from a very copious discourse, since it appears to you that the soul considers some things by itself, and others through the powers of the body. For this was what appeared to me to be

the case, and which I wished might likewise appear so to you.

Theaetetus/ It certainly does appear so to me.

Socrates/ Among what things, therefore, do you place essence? For this especially follows in all things.

Theaetetus/ I place it among those things which the soul itself by itself aspires after.

Socrates/ Do you say the same of the similar and the dissimilar, of same and different?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ But what of the beautiful and the base, good and evil?

Theaetetus/ It appears to me that the soul principally considers the essence of these in mutually comparing them with each other, and considering in itself things past and present with reference to such as are future.

Socrates/ Take notice also of this: the soul perceives the hardness of a thing hard, through the touch, and in a similar manner the softness of a thing soft; or does it not?

Theaetetus/ It does.

Socrates/ But the essence of these, what they are, their mutual contrariety, and the essence of this contrariety, the soul endeavors to discriminate by retiring into herself, and comparing them with each other.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But is not a power of perceiving such passions as extend to the soul through the body naturally present both with men and brutes, as soon as they are born? And is not reasoning about the essence and utility of these, generated in those in whom it is generated, with difficulty, in a long course of time, through a variety of particulars, and through discipline?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Can we, therefore, apprehend the truth by that by which we cannot apprehend essence?

Theaetetus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ But can anyone possess science of a thing, when at the same time he does not apprehend the truth of that thing?

Theaetetus/ But how can he, Socrates?

Socrates/ Science, therefore, is not inherent in passions, but is inherent in a reasoning process about them. For by this, as it appears, we may be able to touch upon essence and truth? But this cannot be effected by passions.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Can you, therefore, call passion and science the same thing, when there is such a great difference between them?

Theaetetus/ It would not be just to do so.

Socrates/ But what name do you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, becoming hot, and becoming cold?

Theaetetus/ I should give to all these the name of perception. For what other name can be given to them?

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, call the whole of this sense?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ But we said that this was not capable of touching upon truth, because it could not apprehend the essence of a thing.

Theaetetus/ It certainly cannot.

Socrates/ Neither, therefore, can it touch upon science.

Theaetetus/ It cannot.

Socrates/ Science, therefore, and sense, Theætetus, can never be the same.

Theaetetus/ It appears, Socrates, they cannot.

Socrates/ And now it becomes most eminently apparent, that science is something different from sense. But we did not begin this conversation for the sake of finding out what science is not, but that we might discover what it is. At the same time, we have advanced thus far, as to be convinced that we must not at all seek for it in sense, but in that name which the soul then possesses when it is conversant with beings, itself by itself.

Theaetetus/ But this, Socrates, is I think called to opine.

Socrates/ You suspect rightly, my friend. And now again consider from the beginning, obliterating all that has been already said, whether you can see more clearly, since we have proceeded thus far. And again tell me what science is.

Theaetetus/ It is impossible, Socrates, to say that every opinion is science, because there are false opinions. But it appears that true opinion is science. And this is my answer. But if in the course of the inquiry it shall not appear to be so, as it does at present, I shall endeavor to say something else.

Socrates/ In this manner, Theætetus, it is proper to act—I mean, to speak with alacrity, and not, as you were at first, be averse to answer. For, if we thus conduct ourselves, we shall either find that which is the object of our search, or we may in a less degree think that we know that which we do not by any means know. Nor will a thing of this kind be a despicable gain. And now then what do you say? Since there are two species of opinion, one true, and the other false, do you define science to be true opinion?

Theaetetus/ I do. For this now appears to me to be the case.

Socrates/ Is it, therefore, worthwhile again to resume the discourse about opinion?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I am now disturbed, and often have been, so that I am involved in much doubt, both with respect to myself and others, as I am not able to say what this passion in us is, and after what manner it is generated in the soul.

Theaetetus/ How is this?

Socrates/ I am now speaking of false opinion; and am considering whether we shall omit the discussion of it, or speculate about it in a different manner from what we did a little before.

Theaetetus/ But why should you be dubious in this affair, Socrates, if you see the manner in which it is proper to act? For you and Theodorus said just now not badly, respecting leisure, that nothing urges in inquiries of this kind.

Socrates/ You very properly remind me. For perhaps it will not be foreign from the purpose again to tread in the same steps. For it is better to finish a little well, than much inefficiently.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ What then shall we say? Shall we say that every opinion is false? or that some of us entertain false opinions, and others true—as if this was naturally the case with respect to opinions?

Theaetetus/ We should doubtless speak in this manner.

Socrates/ Does not this happen to u, as well about all things, as about each thing, that we either know or do not know? For at present I omit to speak of learning and forgetting, as subsisting between these, because it contributes nothing to our design.

Theaetetus/ But, Socrates, nothing else remains respecting every particular, except knowing or not knowing it.

Socrates/ Is it not therefore necessary, that he who forms an opinion should either form an opinion of things of which he knows something, or of things of which he knows nothing?

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Is it not likewise impossible, that he who knows a thing should not know it, or that he who does not know it should know it?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Does, therefore, he who opines falsely respecting the things which he knows, opine that these are not the things which he knows, but different from them, but of which he has at the same time a knowledge? And though he knows both, is he ignorant of both?

Theaetetus/ But this, Socrates, is impossible.

Socrates/ Does he, therefore, think that the things of which he is ignorant are certain other things of which likewise he is ignorant? And can he who neither knows Theætetus nor Socrates ever be induced to think that Socrates is Theætetus, or Theætetus Socrates?

Theaetetus/ How is it possible he can?

Socrates/ Nor, again, can anyone think that the things which he knows are the same as those of which he is ignorant; or that the things of which he is ignorant are the same as those which he knows.

Theaetetus/ For this would be monstrous.

Socrates/ How then can anyone entertain false opinions? For it is impossible to opine in ways different from these; since we either know or do not know all things. But in these it by no means appears possible to opine falsely.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, ought we to consider the object of our inquiry, not by proceeding according to knowing and not knowing, but according to being and non-being?

Theaetetus/ How do you say?

Socrates/ It is not a simple thing; because he who, with respect to anything, opines things which are not, must unavoidably opine falsely, in whatever manner the particulars pertaining to his dianoëtic part may subsist.

Theaetetus/ It is proper it should be so, Socrates.

Socrates/ How then shall we answer, Theætetus, if anyone should ask us (but it is possible that what I say may take place), What man can opine that which is not, whether respecting beings themselves, or whether considered itself by itself? To this, as it appears, we should reply, that he can then opine about that which is not, when opining he does not opine the truth. Or how shall we say?

Theaetetus/ In this manner.

Socrates/ Does a thing of this kind, therefore, take place elsewhere?

Theaetetus/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ That some one sees something, and yet sees nothing.

Theaetetus/ But how can he?

Socrates/ But if he sees one certain thing, he sees something which ranks among beings. Or do you think that the one does not rank among beings?

Theaetetus/ I do not.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who sees one certain thing sees a certain being.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And, therefore, he who hears a certain thing hears one certain thing, and a certain being.

Theaetetus/ He does so.

Socrates/ And does not he also who touches a certain thing touch one certain thing, and that which has a being, since it is one thing?

Theaetetus/ And this also.

Socrates/ And does not he who opines opine one certain thing?

Theaetetus/ I grant it.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who opines that which has no being opines nothing.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But he who opines nothing does not opine in any respect.

Theaetetus/ It is evident, as it appears.

Socrates/ It is impossible, therefore, to opine that which is not, either about beings, or itself by itself.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ To opine falsely, therefore, differs from opining things which are not.

Theaetetus/ It appears that it differs.

Socrates/ For neither is false opinion inherent in us in this manner, nor in the manner which we considered a little before.

Theaetetus/ It is not.

Socrates/ Perhaps, therefore, we may denominate this as follows.

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ We say that a certain foreign opinion is a false opinion, when someone, by an alteration in his dianoëtic

energy, says that a certain thing is a different thing. For thus he always opines that which has a being, but he opines one thing instead of another; and, in consequence of erring in that which he considers, he may be justly said to opine falsely.

Theaetetus/ You now appear to me to have spoken with the greatest rectitude, For, when anyone opines that which is deformed instead of that which is beautiful, or that which is beautiful instead of that which is deformed, then he truly opines falsely.

Socrates/ It is evident, Theætetus, that you despise, and do not reverence me.

Theaetetus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ I do not think I appear to you to have apprehended that which is truly false, when asked whether the swift and the slow, the light and the heavy, or any other contraries, do not become contrary to themselves, according to their own nature, but according to the nature of things which are contrary to them. This, therefore, I dismiss, lest you should be confident in vain. But is it agreeable to you, as you say, that to opine falsely is the same as to opine foreign to the purpose?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ It is possible, therefore, according to your opinion, to establish by the dianoëtic power one thing as another, and not as that thing which it is.

Theaetetus/ It is possible.

Socrates/ When, therefore, the dianoëtic power does this, is it not necessary that it should either cogitate about both these, or about one of them?

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ And, therefore, it must either cogitate about them both together, or separately.

Theaetetus/ Most excellent.

Socrates/ But do you call dianoëtic energy the same as I do?

Theaetetus/ What do you call it?

Socrates/ The discourse which the soul itself evolves in itself about the objects of its consideration. I explain the thing to you like an unskillful person. For the soul, when it energizes dianoëtically, appears to me to do nothing else than discourse with itself, by interrogating and answering, affirming and denying. But when, having defined, it asserts without opposition, whether more slowly or more rapidly, then I call this opinion. So that I denominate to opine, to speak, and opinion, a discourse not directed to any other, nor accompanied with voice, but directed to itself. But what do you call it?

Theaetetus/ The same.

Socrates/ When anyone, therefore, opines that one thing is another, he says to himself, as it appears, that one thing is another.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Recollect, whether if at any time you say to yourself, that the beautiful is more than anything base, or that the unjust is just, or, which is the summit of all, whether you ever attempt to persuade yourself, that that which is one thing is more than anything another thing. Or, on the contrary, have you never dared even in sleep to say to yourself, that things even are entirely odd, or anything else of this kind?

Theaetetus/ Certainly never.

Socrates/ Do you think, then, that any other person, whether he is in a sane or an insane condition, will seriously dare to say to himself, and this accompanied with persuasion, that a horse is necessarily an ox, or two things one thing?

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, I do not.

Socrates/ If, therefore, to opine is for a man to speak to himself, no one, while he says and opines both these, and touches upon both with his soul, will say and opine that one of those is the other. But we will dismiss, if you please, this word *the other*. For my meaning is this: that no one will opine that the base is the beautiful, or anything else of this kind.

Theaetetus/ You have my permission, Socrates, to dismiss this word; and the case appears to me to be as you say.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who opines both these cannot opine that one of them is the other.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ And again, he who only opines one of these, but by no means the other, can never opine that one of them is the other.

Theaetetus/ True. For he would be compelled to touch upon that about which he does not opine.

Socrates/ Neither, therefore, can he who opines both, nor he who only opines, one of them, opine foreign to the purpose So that he will say nothing, who defines false opinion to be heterodoxy. For neither will false opinion appear to reside in us in this manner, nor in that which we have already mentioned.

Theaetetus/ It does not appear that it will.

Socrates/ But, Theætetus, if this should not appear to be the case, we should be compelled to confess many things, and of an absurd nature.

Theaetetus/ What are these?

Socrates/ I will not tell you, till I have endeavored to consider the affair in every possible way. For I should be ashamed, with respect to that of which we are in doubt, if we were compelled to confess what I now say. But if we shall discover the object of our search, and become free, then we may speak concerning others, as suffering these things, while we shall be railed beyond the reach of ridicule. But if we should be involved in inextricable doubts, and thus become abject, and filled with nausea, then, I think, we should permit our discourse to trample on us, and use us as it pleases. Hear, then, whether I have found out any passage to the object of our inquiry.

Theaetetus/ Only speak.

Socrates/ I shall not say that we rightly consented, when we acknowledged that it was impossible anyone could opine that the things which he knows are things which he does not know, and thus be deceived: but I say that this is in a certain respect possible.

Theaetetus/ Do you say that which I suspected might be the case when we made this assertion, as that I knowing Socrates, and seeing another person at a distance whom I do not know, might think it was Socrates, whom I do know? For that which you say takes place in a thing of this kind.

Socrates/ Are we not, therefore, driven from the hypothesis which caused us to acknowledge, that, with respect to things which we know, we are ignorant of them, at the same time that we know them?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ We must not, therefore, establish this hypothesis, but the following: and perhaps someone will in a certain respect assent to us, or perhaps will oppose us. But we are now in that situation in which it is necessary to examine the discourse which perverts all things. Consider, therefore, whether I say anything to the purpose. Is it then possible for anyone who formerly was ignorant of something, afterwards to learn that thing?

Theaetetus/ It certainly is possible.

Socrates/ And can he not also learn another and another thing?

Theaetetus/ Why should he not?

Socrates/ Place for me, for the sake of an example, one waxen image in our souls: in this soul a greater image, and in that a lesser: and in this of purer, but in that of impurer and harder wax: and in some again of a moister kind, but in others sufficiently tempered.

Theaetetus/ I place it.

Socrates/ We must say, then, that this is a gift of Mnemosyne the mother of the Muses; and that in this, whatever we wish to remember of things which we have seen, or heard, or understood, is impressed like images made by a seal, by insinuating itself into our senses and conceptions. And further, that we remember and know that which is impressed in this waxen image, as long as the impressed figure remains; but when it is destroyed, or can be no longer impressed, we forget and cease to know.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Consider, therefore, whether he who knows these impressions, and attends to what he either sees or hears, can after this manner opine falsely?

Theaetetus/ After what manner?

Socrates/ With respect to what he knows, at one time opining that he knows, and at another time that he does not know. For we improperly granted above, that it was impossible for this to happen.

Theaetetus/ But how do you now say?

Socrates/ It is requisite thus to speak about these things, defining them from the beginning: That it is impossible that he who knows anything, and has a monument of it in his soul, but does not perceive it, can opine that it is something else which he knows, and the image of which he possesses, but does not perceive. And again, it is impossible that anyone can opine that what he knows is that which he does not know, and of which he does not possess the image: or that what he does not know is that which he knows. It is likewise impossible for anyone to opine that what he perceives is some other sensible object different from what he perceives: or that what he perceives is something which he does not perceive: or that what he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive: or that what he does not perceive is something which he does perceive. Nor, again, can anyone opine that what he knows and perceives, and of which he has a sensible image, is something else which he knows and perceives, and of which he in like manner possesses a sensible image: or that what he knows and perceives, and of which he possesses an image in a proper manner, is the same as that which he simply knows: or that what he knows and perceives, and similarly retains, is that which he perceives: or again, that what he neither knows nor perceives is the same as that which he simply does not know: or that what he neither knows nor perceives is the same as that which he does not perceive. For in all these it is impossible to opine falsely. It remains, therefore, that false opinion must take place in some things of this kind, if it has any subsistence.

Theaetetus/ In what things, therefore? that I may see whether I can learn better from these. For at present I do not follow you.

Socrates/ In those things which anyone knowing, opines that they are certain other things which he knows and perceives; or which he does not know, but perceives; or which both knowing and perceiving, he opines that he knows and perceives.

Theaetetus/ I now leave you behind, at a greater distance than before.

Socrates/ Hear then again as follows: I knowing Theodorus, and remembering in myself what kind of man he is, and in like manner Theætetus, sometimes I see them, and sometimes I do not: and sometimes I touch them, and sometimes not; and hear or perceive them with some other sense: but sometimes I do not apprehend anything respecting you by any sense, yet nevertheless I remember you, and know you in myself.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Learn this, therefore, the first of the things which I wish to evince to you, that it is possible for a man not to perceive that which he knows, and that it is likewise possible for him to perceive it.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ Does it not often happen that a man does not perceive that which, he does not know, and likewise often happen that he perceives it only?

Theaetetus/ This also is true.

Socrates/ See, then, if you can now follow me better. Socrates knows Theodorus and Theætetus, but sees neither of them, nor is any other sense present with him respecting them. Can he ever in this case opine in himself, that Theætetus is Theodorus? Do I say anything, or nothing?

Theaetetus/ You speak pertinently; for he cannot thus opine.

Socrates/ This then was the first of those things which I said.

Theaetetus/ It was.

Socrates/ But the second was this, that while I know one of you, but do not know the other, and perceive neither of you, I can never opine that he whom I know is the man whom I do not know.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Socrates/ But the third was this, that while I neither know nor perceive either of them, I can never opine that he whom I do not know is some other person whom I do not know: and in a similar manner think that you again hear all that was said above, in which I can never opine falsely respecting you and Theodorus, neither while knowing nor while ignorant of both; nor while knowing one, and not knowing other. And the same may be said respecting the senses, if you apprehend me.

Theaetetus/ I do apprehend you.

Socrates/ It remains, therefore, that I must then opine falsely, when knowing you and Theodorus, and preserving in that waxen image, as in a seal ring, the impression of both of you for a long time, and not sufficiently seeing both of you, I endeavor, by attributing the proper impression of each to my particular sight, so to harmonize this impression to the vestige of sight, that a recognizance may take place: but afterwards failing in the attempt, and changing like those that change their shoes, I transfer the vision of each to a foreign impression, and err by being similarly affected to the passions of light in mirrors, where things on the right hand flow back to those on the left hand. For then heterodoxy takes place, and I opine falsely.

Theaetetus/ It appears, Socrates, that the passion of opinion is such as in a wonderful manner you have represented it to be.

Socrates/ Still further, when knowing both of you, I besides this perceive one of you, and not the other, then I have a knowledge of him whom I do not perceive, but not according to sense; which is what I said before, but you did not then understand me.

Theaetetus/ I did not.

Socrates/ This however I said, that he who knows and perceives one of you, and has a knowledge of you according to sense, will never opine that this object of his knowledge and perception is some other person whom he knows and perceives, and of whom he has a knowledge according to sense. Was not this what I said?

Theaetetus/ It was.

Socrates/ But in a certain respect that which I just now said is omitted, —I mean, that false opinion then takes place, when anyone knowing and seeing both of you, or possessing any other sense of both of you, and likewise retaining your images in his soul, has not a proper perception of either of you, but, like an unskillful archer, wanders from and misses the mark, which is therefore denominated a falsehood.

Theaetetus/ And very properly so.

Socrates/ When, therefore, sense is present to one of the impressions, and not to the other, and that which belongs to the absent sense is adapted to the sense then present, in this case the dianoëtic part is entirely deceived. And, in one word, it is not possible, as it appears, either to be deceived, or to have a false opinion, respecting things which a man has neither ever known or perceived, if we now say anything to the purpose. But respecting things which we know and perceive, in these opinion is rolled about and evolved,

becoming both true and false. And when it collects and marks its proper resemblances in an opposite and straight forward direction, then it is true, but when in a transverse and oblique direction, false.

Theaetetus/ These things, therefore, Socrates, are beautifully said.

Socrates/ And you will much more say so, when you hear what follows. For to opine the truth is beautiful, but to lie is base.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ They say, therefore, that hence the following particulars take place. When that waxen image in the soul is profound, abundant, smooth, and sufficiently perfect, then the several particulars which proceed through the senses, being impressed in this heart of the soul, (as Homer calls it, obscurely signifying its similitude to wax,) so as to become pure signatures, and of sufficient profundity, —in this case they become lasting. And, in the first place, men with such impressions as these are docile: in the next place, they are endued with a good memory: and, in the third place, they do not change the impressions of the senses, but opine the truth. For, as these impressions are clear, and situated in an ample region, they swiftly distribute sensible particulars to their proper resemblances, which are called beings; and such men are denominated wise. Or does it not appear so to you?

Theaetetus/ It does in a transcendent degree.

Socrates/ When, therefore, anyone's heart is hairy (which the perfectly wise poet has celebrated), or when it is of a muddy nature, and not of pure wax, or when it is very moist, or hard, then it is in a bad condition. For those in whom it is moist are indeed docile, but become oblivious; and those in whom it is hard are affected in a contrary manner. But

men in whom it is hairy and rough, in consequence of its possessing something of a stony nature, mingled with earth or clay, these contain obscure resemblances. The resemblances too are obscure in those in whom this heart is hard: for in this case it has no profundity. This likewise happens to those in whom it is moist: for, in consequence of the impressions being confounded, they swiftly become obscure. But if, besides all this, they fall on each other, through the narrowness of their receptacle, since it belongs to a little soul, then the resemblances become still more obscure. All such as these, therefore, opine falsely. For when they see, or hear, or think about anything, as they are unable swiftly to attribute things to their resemblances, they judge erroneously; because they see, hear, and understand for the most part perversely. And such as these are called deceivers, and are said to be ignorant of things.

Theaetetus/ You speak with the greatest rectitude of all men, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we say, then, that false opinions reside in us?

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And true opinions likewise?

Theaetetus/ And true opinions.

Socrates/ I think, therefore, it has been sufficiently acknowledged by us, that these two opinions have a subsistence more than anything.

Theaetetus/ It has in a transcendent degree.

Socrates/ A loquacious man, Theætetus, appears in reality to be a dire and unpleasant man.

Theaetetus/ With reference to what do you speak in this manner?

Socrates/ With reference to my own indocility, and real loquacity, at which I am indignant. For what else than a loquacious man can he be called, who through his stupidity draws discourse upwards and downwards, not being able to procure persuasion, and who with difficulty abandons an assertion?

Theaetetus/ But why are you indignant?

Socrates/ I am not only indignant, but I am fearful what I should answer, if anyone should ask me, O Socrates, have you found that false opinion is neither in the mutual energies of the senses, nor in dianoëtic energies, but in the conjunction of sense with the dianoëtic energy? But I think I should say, boasting, as if we had discovered something beautiful, that we had found it to be so.

Theaetetus/ What has been just now evinced appears to me, Socrates, to be no despicable thing.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, he will say, assert that we can never opine, that a man whom we alone dianoëtically conceive, but do not see is a horse, which we neither at present see, nor touch, nor perceive by any other sense, but only dianoëtically conceive? I think I should say that I do assert these things.

Theaetetus/ And very properly.

Socrates/ Will it not, therefore, follow, he will say, according to this reason, that no one will ever think eleven, which he only dianoëtically perceives, to be twelve, which he only dianoëtically perceives? What answer would you give?

Theaetetus/ I should answer, that someone seeing or touching eleven things, might opine them to be twelve; but that he would never opine in this manner respecting the numbers which he possesses in his dianoëtic part.

Socrates/ But what, he will say, do you think that anyone can speculate about five and seven—I do not mean five and

seven men, or anything else of this kind, but five and seven themselves, which we said were in his soul like impressions in wax—so as never to opine falsely respecting them? Or will not some men, when they consider these things by themselves, and inquire about their amount, opine that they are eleven, and others that they are twelve? Or will all men say and opine that they are twelve?

Theaetetus/ By Zeus they will not; but the greater part will opine that they are eleven. And if anyone should ask them the amount of more numbers, their answer would be still more erroneous. For I think that you rather speak about every number.

Socrates/ You think rightly. Consider, therefore, whether this ever happens, that anyone opines that the twelve which are impressed in his soul are eleven?

Theaetetus/ It seems this does happen.

Socrates/ Does not this then revolve to the former assertions? For he who suffers that which he knows, opines that it is some other thing which he also knows, which we said was impossible: and from this very circumstance we are compelled to confess, that there is no such thing as false opinion, lest the same person should be forced to know and at the same time not to know the same things.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Hence it appears that false opinion must be otherwise defined than a mutation of the dianoëtic energy with respect to sense. For, if this was a true definition, we should never be deceived in dianoëtic conceptions themselves. But now there is either no such thing as false opinion, or, if there is, a man may be ignorant of that which at the same time he knows, And: which of these will you choose?

Theaetetus/ You have proposed an ambiguous choice, Socrates.

Socrates/ But it appears that reason will not permit both these to take place. At the same time, however (for all things must be attempted), what if we should endeavor to divert ourselves of shame?

Theaetetus/ How?

Socrates/ By being willing to say what it is to have a scientific knowledge of a thing.

Theaetetus/ But why would this be impudent?

Socrates/ You do not appear to understand that the whole of our discourse from the beginning is an investigation of science, as if we did not know what it is.

Theaetetus/ I understand you.

Socrates/ But does it not appear to be the part of impudent persons, to show what it is to have a scientific knowledge, at the same time that they are ignorant what science is? But, Theætetus, it is now some time since we have not spoken with purity. For we have ten thousand times employed the terms, We know, and We do not know, We have a scientific knowledge, and We have not a scientific knowledge, as if we mutually understood something, in which at the same time we are ignorant what science is But at present, if you are willing, we will use the terms, to be ignorant, and to understand, in such a manner as it is proper to use them, since we are destitute of science.

Theaetetus/ But how in this case, Socrates, shall we be able to discourse?

Socrates/ Not at all while I remain as I am. But I might be able, if I was contentious: and now, if any contentious person was present, he would say that he abstained from such terms, and would very much deter us from what I say. But, as we are bad, man, are you willing I should dare to say

what it is to know scientifically? For it appears to me to be worthwhile.

Theaetetus/ Dare then, by Zeus. For you will greatly deserve to be pardoned for the attempt.

Socrates/ Have you heard what at present they say it is to know scientifically?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so; but at present I do not remember.

Socrates/ They say that it is the habit of science.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ We, therefore, shall make a trifling alteration, and say that it is the possession of science.

Theaetetus/ But in what do you say this differs from that?

Socrates/ Perhaps in nothing. But when you have heard that which appears to me to be the case, examine it together with me.

Theaetetus/ I will, if I can.

Socrates/ To *possess*, therefore, does not appear to me to be the same as to have a thing. Thus, if anyone buys a garment, and, having the power of using it when he pleases, does not wear it, we should not say that he *has* the garment, but that he *possesses* it.

Theaetetus/ And very properly.

Socrates/ See then whether it is possible to possess science in this manner, without having it: just as if someone having caught certain wild doves, or other wild birds, and having constructed an aviary for them at home, should feed and nourish them. For in a certain respect we should say that he always has, because he possess them. Should we not?

Theaetetus/ We should.

Socrates/ But in another respect we should say that he by no means has them, but that he has a power, since he has shut them up for his own use, in an enclosure of his own, of taking and having them when he pleases, and of again dismissing them: and that he can do this as often as it is agreeable to him.

Theaetetus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Again, as before we devised I know not what waxen figment in the soul, so now let us place a certain aviary containing all sorts of birds in the soul; some of which fly in flocks, apart from others; but others again fly in small companies; and some fly alone, wherever they may happen to find a passage.

Theaetetus/ Let it be so: but what follows?

Socrates/ It is requisite to say, that this receptacle is empty in children: but in the place of birds we must understand sciences, and say, that he who possesses science, and confines it in this enclosure, learns or discovers that thing of which he possesses the science; and that this is to have a scientific knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ But again, consider, when anyone is willing to investigate sciences, and receiving to have them, and afterwards dismiss them, by what names all these particulars ought to be expressed. Shall we say by the same names as at first, when sciences were *possessed*, or by other names? But from what follows you will more clearly understand what I say. Do you not call arithmetic an art?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ Suppose this to be the hunting of the sciences of all the even and the odd.

Theaetetus/ I suppose it.

Socrates/ But I think by this art the arithmetician has the sciences of numbers in his power, and delivers them to others.

Theaetetus/ He does so.

Socrates/ And we say that he who delivers these sciences teaches, but that he who receives them learns; and that he who *has* them, in consequence of possessing them in that enclosure which we mentioned, knows scientifically.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But attend to what follows. Does not he who is a perfect arithmetician know scientifically all numbers? For the sciences of all numbers are in his soul.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Does not a man of this kind sometimes enumerate with himself internally, and sometimes externally, such things as have number?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But to number is considered by us as nothing else than the speculation of the quantity of any number.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who has a scientific knowledge, by thus speculating, appears not to know, though we have confessed that he knows every number. Do you hear these ambiguities?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ When, therefore, we assimilated sciences to the possession and fowling of doves, we said that fowling was two-fold; one kind being prior to acquisition, and subsisting for the sake of possession; but the other being posterior to acquisition and possession, and subsisting for the sake of receiving and having in the hands things which were formerly possessed. So these sciences, which anyone had

formerly been endued with by learning, and which he had known before, may again be learnt, by resuming and retaining the science of every particular which he formerly possessed, but which he has not at hand in his dianoëtic part.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ On this account, I just now inquired how names respecting these things were to be used, as when an arithmetician numbers, or a grammarian reads. For, in either case, he who knows again applies himself to know by himself what he already knows.

Theaetetus/ But this is absurd, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we therefore say, that the grammarian reads, or the arithmetician numbers, things of which he is ignorant, though we have granted that the one knows all letters, and the other every number?

Theaetetus/ But this also is irrational.

Socrates/ Are you, therefore, willing we should say, that we are not at all concerned how anyone may employ the names of knowing and learning? But since we have determined that it is one thing to possess, and another to have, science, we must say that it is impossible for anyone not to possess that which he does possess. So that it will never happen that anyone does not know that which he does know; though about this very thing false opinion may be received. For it may happen that we may take the science of one thing for the science of another, when, hunting after some one of our inward sciences, we erroneously receive instead of it some other that flies away. As when anyone opines that eleven things are twelve: for then, receiving the science of eleven things instead of twelve, he takes out of his aviary a pigeon instead of a dove.

Theaetetus/ It is reasonable to suppose so.

Socrates/ But when he receives that which he endeavors to receive, then he is free from falsehood, and opines things which are. And after this manner false and true opinion subsist and thus none of the particulars which disturbed us before will be any longer an impediment to us. Perhaps, therefore, you assent to me: or how will you do?

Theaetetus/ Assent to you.

Socrates/ We are then now freed from the dilemma respecting a man knowing and at the same time not knowing a thing. For it will no longer happen that we shall not possess that which we do possess, whether we judge falsely or not. However, a more dire passion than this appears to me to present itself to the view.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ If the permutation of sciences should ever become false opinion.

Theaetetus/ But how?

Socrates/ In the first place, is it not absurd, that he who has the science of anything should be ignorant of that thing, not through ignorance, but through the science of the thing? And in the next place, that he should opine this thing to be that, and that thing this? And is it not very irrational to suppose, that when science is present the soul should know nothing, but should be ignorant of all things? For, from this assertion, nothing hinders but that ignorance when present may enable a man to know something, and cause blindness to see, if science ever makes a man to be ignorant of anything.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps, Socrates, we have not properly introduced birds, as we alone placed sciences in the soul, but we ought at the same time to have placed the various kinds of ignorance flying in companies; and a man employed in fowling, at one time receiving science, and at another time

ignorance, about the same thing: through ignorance opining what is false, but through science the truth.

Socrates/ It is by no means easy, Theætetus, not to praise you. However, again consider what you have said. For let it be as you say. But he who receives ignorance, you will say, opines things false. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ But yet he will not think that he opines falsely.

Theaetetus/ He will not.

Socrates/ But that he opines truly. And he will be affected with respect to those things in which he errs, like one endued with knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ He will therefore opine that he has by fowling obtained science, and not ignorance.

Theaetetus/ It is evident.

Socrates/ Hence, after having made a long circuit, we have again fallen into the first doubt. For that reprover whom we mentioned before will laughing say to us, O best of men, whether can he who knows both science and ignorance opine that what he knows is some other thing which he also knows? or, knowing neither of these, can he opine that a thing which he does not know is some other thing which he does not know? or, knowing one of these, and not the other, can he opine that what he knows is that which he does not know? or that what he does not know is that which he does know? Or, again, tell me whether there are sciences of sciences, and of the various kinds of ignorance, which he who possesses, and encloses in other certain ridiculous aviaries, or waxen figments, knows so far as he possesses them, though he has them not at hand in his soul? And thus you will be compelled to revolve infinitely about the same

thing, without making any proficiency. What shall we reply to these things, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, Socrates, I do not know what ought to be said.

Socrates/ Does not, therefore, O boy, the discourse of this man very properly reprove us, and evince that we have not done right in investigating false opinion prior to science, and leaving science undiscussed? But it is impossible to know this till we have sufficiently determined what science is.

Theaetetus/ It is necessary, Socrates, to suspect at present, as you say.

Socrates/ What then can anyone again say from the beginning respecting science? For we are not yet weary of speaking.

Theaetetus/ Not in the least, if you do not forbid it.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, in what manner we can so speak concerning science as not to contradict ourselves.

Theaetetus/ In the same manner as we attempted before, Socrates; for I have not anything else to offer.

Socrates/ In what manner do you mean?

Theaetetus/ That true opinion is science. For to opine truly is without error; and everything that proceeds from it is beautiful and good.

Socrates/ He who in fording a river, Theætetus, is the leader of others, if interrogated respecting the depth of the water, will answer that the water will show its own depth. In like manner, if, entering into the present subject, we inquire, the impediment to our passage will, perhaps, present to us the object of our search: but, if we remain where we are, nothing will become manifest.

Theaetetus/ You speak well: but let us proceed and consider.

Socrates/ Is not this, therefore, a thing of brief consideration? For the whole of art, and its professors, evince that art is not science.

Theaetetus/ How so? And who are these professors?

Socrates/ Those that excel all others in wisdom, and who are called orators and lawyers. For these persuade, but do not teach by their art, and cause their hearers to opine whatever they please. Or do you think there are any teachers so skillful, as to be able in cases of robbery? and other violence, to evince sufficiently the truth of the transactions by means of a little water?

Theaetetus/ I by no means think there are: but these men persuade.

Socrates/ But do you not say that to effect persuasion is the same thing as to produce opinion?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded respecting things which he who sees can alone know, but by no means otherwise, is it possible that thus judging by report, and receiving true opinion without science, they can judge rightly respecting things of which they are persuaded, if we admit that they judge well?

Theaetetus/ I entirely think they can.

Socrates/ But, my friend, if true opinion, judgment, and science are the same, that consummate judge can never opine with rectitude without science: but now each appears to be something different.

Theaetetus/ I had forgotten, Socrates, what I heard a certain person say concerning science, but I now remember. But he said that true opinion in conjunction with reason is science, but that without reason it is void of science; and that things cannot be known scientifically of which there is

no reason, but that things may be thus known which have a reason.

Socrates/ How well you speak! But tell me how he divided things which may be scientifically known, and which cannot be so known, that we may see whether you and I similarly understand them.

Theaetetus/ I do not know that I can discover how he divided these; but I can follow another person discoursing.

Socrates/ Hear, then, a dream for a dream. For I also appear to have heard from certain persons that the first elements, as it were, from which we and other things are composed cannot be rationally described. For they say that each of these can alone be denominated by itself, but cannot be called anything else, neither as that which is nor as that which is not; because essence, or non-essence, would thus be assigned to it. But it is requisite to add nothing, if anyone speaks of a thing itself alone. For neither the term this, nor that, nor each, nor alone, nor any other such appellations, should be employed, because these are applied to things in a circular progression, and are different from the things to which they are added. But it is necessary, if possible, to speak of the thing itself, and, if it has a proper definition, to assert something respecting it, without the addition of anything else. Now, however, no one of things first can be made the subject of discourse; for it does not admit of anything else than a denomination. But the things composed from these, as they are themselves woven together, so from the weaving together of their names discourse is produced. For the connection of names is the essence of discourse. Hence, the elements themselves are ineffable and unknown, but at the same time are objects of sense: but syllables are known and effable, and may be apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, anyone receives a true opinion of anything, without reason, then his

soul perceives the truth respecting it, but he does not know the thing; because he who is incapable of giving and receiving a reason concerning a thing must be destitute of science respecting it. But when he receives a reason, then he may be able to know all these, and acquire science in perfection. Have you not, therefore, heard a dream, or is it anything else?

Theaetetus/ It is nothing else.

Socrates/ Is it, therefore, agreeable to you that we should establish science to be true opinion in conjunction with reason?

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Have we, therefore, Theætetus, this very day detected that which formerly many wise men investigating grew old before they discovered?

Theaetetus/ To me, Socrates, what was just now said appears to be well said.

Socrates/ And it is very fit it should: for what science can there be without reason and right opinion? But one of the assertions does not please me.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That which appears to be very elegantly said; that the elements of speech are unknown, but the genus of syllables known.

Theaetetus/ Is not this right?

Socrates/ Take notice. For we have as hostages of discourse those very paradigms, which he employing said all that I have related.

Theaetetus/ What are these paradigms?

Socrates/ The things pertaining to letters, viz., elements and syllables. Or do you think that he who said what we

have related spoke in this manner looking to anything else than these?

Theaetetus/ To nothing else than these.

Socrates/ Let us, therefore, receiving these, examine them, or rather ourselves, whether we learn letters in this manner, or not. In the first place, then, have syllables a definition, but not the elements?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ To me, also, it very much appears to be so. If, therefore, anyone should thus ask respecting the first syllable of the word Socrates, O Theætetus, viz., what is *So*? what would you answer?

Theaetetus/ That it is *S* and *o*.

Socrates/ You have, therefore, this definition of the syllable.

Theaetetus/ I have.

Socrates/ But come, in a similar manner give me a definition of the letter *S*.

Theaetetus/ But how can anyone speak of the elements of an element? For *S*, Socrates, is only a certain sound of mute letters, the tongue, as it were, hissing: but of the letter *B* there is neither voice nor sound, nor of most of the elements. So that it is very well said that they are ineffable, among which the well-known seven vowels are alone vocal, but have not any reason or definition.

Socrates/ This therefore, my friend, we have rightly asserted respecting science.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But have we rightly shown that a syllable is known, but not an element?

Theaetetus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ But with respect to this syllable, whether shall we say that it is both the elements; and, if there are more than two, that it is all those elements? Or shall we say that it is one certain idea produced from the composition of the elements?

Theaetetus/ It appears to me that we should say it is all the elements.

Socrates/ See, then, with respect to the two letters *S* and *o*, which form the first syllable of my name, whether he who knows this syllable knows both these letters?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ He knows, therefore, *S* and *o*.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what, if he knows each, and, knowing neither, knows both?

Theaetetus/ But this would be dire and absurd, Socrates.

Socrates/ But if it is necessary to know each, if anyone knows both, it is necessary that he who in any future time knows a syllable should previously know all the elements: and so that beautiful assertion escaping from us will disappear.

Theaetetus/ And very suddenly too.

Socrates/ For we did not well secure it. For, perhaps, a syllable ought to have been adopted, and not the elements; but one certain species produced from them, and which is different from the elements.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so: and perhaps the thing takes place in this manner rather than in that.

Socrates/ We should consider, therefore, and not in so effeminate a manner betray a great and venerable assertion.

Theaetetus/ We ought not, indeed.

Socrates/ Let a syllable then, as we just now said, be one idea produced from several according elements, as well in letters as in all other things.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ It ought not, therefore, to have any parts.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because the whole of that which has parts must: necessarily be all the parts. Or do you say that a whole which is produced from parts is one certain species different from all the parts?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Socrates/ But with respect to the all, and the whole, whether do you call each of these the same, or different?

Theaetetus/ I have not anything clear to say; yet since you order me to answer with alacrity, I will venture to say that each of these is different.

Socrates/ Your alacrity, Theætetus, is right; but whether your answer is so, we must consider.

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Does not the whole, therefore, differ from the all, according to your present assertion?

Theaetetus/ It does.

Socrates/ But do all things and the all differ in any respect? As when we say one, two, three, four, five, six: or twice three, or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, or five and one; —whether in all these do we say the same thing, or that which is different?

Theaetetus/ The same thing.

Socrates/ Do we say anything else than six?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ According to each mode of speaking, therefore, we find that all are six.

Theaetetus/ We do.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, we do not say anyone thing when we say all things.

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Do we say anything else than six things?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ In things, therefore, which consist from number, we say that the all is the same with all things.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Should we not, therefore, say respecting them, that the number of an acre is the same as an acre?

Theaetetus/ We should.

Socrates/ And in a similar manner that the number of a stadium is a stadium?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so respecting the number of an army, and an army itself, and all other such like particulars? For every number, being an all, is each of these particulars.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ But is the number of each of these anything else than parts?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ Such things, therefore, as have parts consist of parts.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But it is acknowledged that all the parts are the all, since every number is the all.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Socrates/ The whole, therefore, is not from parts: For it would be the all, in consequence of being all the parts.

Theaetetus/ It does not appear that it is.

Socrates/ But does a part belong to anything else than to a whole?

Theaetetus/ It belongs to the all.

Socrates/ You fight strenuously, Theætetus. But is not the all, then this very thing the all, when nothing is wanting to it?

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ And is not, after the same manner, the whole that which it is, when nothing is wanting to it? And is it not true, that that which is in want of anything, in consequence of this deficiency, is neither the whole, nor the all?

Theaetetus/ It now appears to me, that the whole and the all in no respect differ from each other.

Socrates/ Do we not say that the whole and the all are all the parts of that of which they are the parts?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, that we may resume what we attempted before, if a syllable is not elements, must it not necessarily follow that it has not elements as parts of itself? or that, if it is the same with them, it must with them be similarly known?

Theaetetus/ It must.

Socrates/ Lest, therefore, this should take place, We must establish the one to be different from the other.

Theaetetus/ We must.

Socrates/ But if elements are not parts of a syllable, can you assign any other things which are parts of a syllable, and yet are not the elements of it?

Theaetetus/ I should by no means grant, Socrates, that things which are not the elements can be the parts of a syllable. For it is ridiculous, neglecting the elements, to proceed in search of other things.

Socrates/ According to the present reasoning, therefore, Theætetus, a syllable will be in every respect one particular impartible idea.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Do you remember, therefore, my friend, that we admitted a little before, and thought it was well said, that there could be no reason or definition of things first, from which other things are composed, because each thing considered itself by itself is not a composite; and that neither the term 'to be' can with propriety be accommodated to it, nor the term 'this,' because these are asserted as things different and foreign; and that this very circumstance causes a thing to be ineffable and unknown?

Theaetetus/ I do remember.

Socrates/ Is anything else, therefore, than this the cause of anything being uniform and impartible? For I see no other cause.

Theaetetus/ It does not appear that there is any other.

Socrates/ Will not a syllable, therefore, be a species of this kind, since it has no parts, and is one idea?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, a syllable is many elements, and a certain whole, and these elements are its parts, syllables and elements may be similarly known, and are similarly effable, since all the parts appear to be the same with the whole.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Socrates/ But if a syllable is one impartible thing, a syllable and an element are equally ineffable and unknown. For the same cause renders them such.

Theaetetus/ I cannot say otherwise.

Socrates/ We must not, therefore, admit the assertion, that a syllable is a thing known and effable, but an element the contrary.

Theaetetus/ We must not, if we are persuaded by this reasoning.

Socrates/ But what again, if anyone should assert the contrary, would you not rather admit it from those things of which you were conscious when you learnt your letters?

Theaetetus/ What things are those?

Socrates/ As that you endeavored to learn nothing else than how to know the elements by your eyes and ears, each itself by itself, that the position of them, when they were pronounced or written, might not disturb you.

Theaetetus/ You speak most true.

Socrates/ But is the learning to play on the harp in perfection anything else than the ability of knowing what sound belongs to every chord? For this everyone agrees should be called the elements of music.

Theaetetus/ It is nothing else.

Socrates/ As, therefore, we are skilled in elements and syllables, if it was requisite to conjecture from these respecting other things, we should say that the genus of the elements possessed a much clearer and more principal knowledge than that of syllables, with respect to receiving each discipline in perfection. And if anyone should say that a syllable is a thing known, but that an element is naturally unknown, we should think that he jested either voluntarily or involuntarily.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Socrates/ But, as it appears to me, there are yet other demonstrations of this thing. We must not, however, on account of these particulars, forget the thing proposed by us, viz., to investigate the assertion, that reason united with true opinion becomes most perfect science.

Theaetetus/ It is proper, therefore, to consider this.

Socrates/ Come then, inform me what is the signification of the word logos: For it appears to me to signify one of three things.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The first will be to make its own dianoëtic conception apparent, through voice, in conjunction with verbs and nouns; thus impressing opinion in the flux through the mouth, as in a mirror, or in water. Or does not logos appear to you to be a thing of this kind?

Theaetetus/ It does: and we say that he who does this speaks.

Socrates/ Cannot, therefore, everyone do this—I mean, point out with more or less swiftness what appears to him respecting particulars—unless he is either naturally deaf or dumb? And thus it will follow, that whoever opines anything rightly will appear to opine in conjunction with logos; and true opinion will never subsist without science.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ We must not, therefore, easily condemn him who asserts science to be that which we just now mentioned, as if he said nothing. For perhaps this was not his meaning; but, being asked what each particular is, he might be able to answer the interrogator, through the elements.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ The same as Hesiod, when he speaks of a chariot as composed of a hundred pieces of wood; which I am not able to say, nor do I think you are. But we should be contented, if, when asked what a chariot is, we were able to say that it is wheels, an axis, plankings, arches, and a yoke.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But he perhaps would think we are ridiculous, just as if we were asked concerning your name, and should answer by a syllable; considering us indeed in what we say as thinking and speaking properly, but that we are grammarians, and that we possessed and spoke grammatically the definition of the name of Theætetus. He would likewise say, that no one can speak scientifically about anything, till he has brought it to a conclusion through the elements, in conjunction with true opinion, as we observed before.

Theaetetus/ We did so.

Socrates/ After this manner, therefore, he would think we may possess true opinion respecting the chariot; but that he who is able to pervade its essence through those hundred pieces of wood, can also comprehend its logos or definition, in conjunction with true opinion; and, instead of being one that opines, will thus possess art and science, respecting the essence of the chariot, determining the whole of it, through its elements.

Theaetetus/ Does not this appear to you, Socrates, to be well said?

Socrates/ If it appears so to you, my friend, and if you admit that this discursive process through an element respecting everything is logos, or reason, and that this is the case with the process through syllables, or that it is something still greater, void of reason. Tell me what you think, that we may consider it.

Theaetetus/ But I very much admit this.

Socrates/ But do you admit it in such a manner as to think that anyone has a scientific knowledge of anything, when the same thing appears to him at different times to belong to different things; or when he opines different things at different times of the same thing?

Theaetetus/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Have you forgotten that both you and others thought in this manner, when you first learnt your letters?

Theaetetus/ Do you mean to say, that we thought that at one time one letter, and at another time another, belonged to the same syllable; and that the same letter was at one time to be referred to its proper syllable, and at another time to a different syllable?

Socrates/ This is what I mean.

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, I do not forget; nor do I think that those who are thus affected possess a scientific knowledge.

Socrates/ What then, when anyone at that time writing the word Theætetus, opines that he ought to write *Th* and *e*, and accordingly writes these letters; and again attempting to write Theodorus, opines that he ought to write *Th* and *e*, and writes these letters, shall we say that he knows scientifically the first syllable of your names?

Theaetetus/ But we just now acknowledged, that he who is affected in this manner does not yet know.

Socrates/ Does anything, therefore, hinder the same person from being affected in the same manner respecting the second, third, and fourth syllable?

Theaetetus/ Nothing hinders.

Socrates/ Will not such a one, therefore, in consequence of his discursive process through an element, write

Theætetus with true opinion when he write, it in its proper order?

Theaetetus/ It is evident he will.

Socrates/ Will he not, therefore, be still void of science, but opine rightly, as we said?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And will he not possess reason in conjunction with right opinion? For he wrote making a discursive process through an element, which we acknowledge is logos or reason.

Theaetetus/ True.

Socrates/ There is, therefore, my friend, such a thing as right opinion in conjunction with reason, which it is not yet proper to call science.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ We are enriched then, as it appears, with a dream, while we opine that we possess a most true definition of science.

Theaetetus/ Or we ought not yet to blame. For perhaps someone may not define *logos* in this manner, but may choose the remaining species of the three, one of which we said would be adopted by him who defined science to be right opinion in conjunction with reason.

Socrates/ You have very properly reminded me: for one species still remains. For the first species was an image as it were of dianoëtic conception in voice; and the second, that which we just now mentioned, a procession to the whole through an element.

Theaetetus/ But what do you say the third is?

Socrates/ That which the multitude would say it is, to be able to assign a certain mark by which the object of inquiry differs from all other things.

Theaetetus/ Can you give me as an instance a certain logos of this kind respecting anything?

Socrates/ If you are willing, I think it will be sufficient for you to admit respecting the sun, that it is the most splendid of all the natures that revolve in the heavens round the earth.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Take then that for the sake of which this was said. But it is that which we just now mentioned: that when, you receive the difference of anything, by which it differs from other things, you will receive, as some say, the logos or definition: but as long as you touch upon anything common, you will have the definition of those things to which this something common belong?

Theaetetus/ I understand you: and it appears to me very proper to call a thing of this kind logos.

Socrates/ But he who, in conjunction with right opinion, receives the difference by which anything whatever is distinguished from other things, will be endued with science respecting that of which he formerly possessed opinion.

Theaetetus/ We say it is so.

Socrates/ Now therefore, Theætetus, in consequence of approaching nearer to what is said, as to a certain adumbration, I find I do not in the least understand it; but, while I beheld it at a distance, it appeared to me that something was spoken to the purpose.

Theaetetus/ But how is this?

Socrates/ I will tell you, if I can. When I have a right opinion respecting you, if I likewise receive your definition, then I know you; but if not, then I only opine. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ But logos, or definition, was an interpretation of your difference.

Theaetetus/ It was.

Socrates/ When, therefore, I only opine, I do not perceive by the dianoëtic energy anyone of those things by which you differ from others.

Theaetetus/ You do not, as it appears.

Socrates/ I, therefore, only dianoëtically perceive something common, which you possess no less than another.

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ By Zeus, then, inform me how, in a thing of this kind, I rather opine you than any other? For, suppose me thus dianoëtically considering.: This is Theætetus, who is a man, and has nostrils, eyes, and a mouth, and in like manner each of the other members. Does this dianoëtic conception cause me to perceive Theætetus more than Theodorus? or, as it is said, more than the last of the Mysians?

Theaetetus/ How should it?

Socrates/ But if I not only dianoëtically consider that he has nostrils and eyes, but likewise that he has a flat nose and prominent eyes, shall I opine you more than myself, or any other such person?

Theaetetus/ You will not.

Socrates/ But I think I shall not opine in myself, Theætetus, till a certain monument of his flat nose, exhibiting its difference from other flat noses which I perceive, is impressed in me, and in like manner other particulars from which you are composed; which, if I had met with you yesterday, would remind me, and cause me to form a right opinion respecting you.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Right opinion, therefore, respecting everything will be conversant with difference.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ What then will be the consequence if reason is assumed together with right opinion? For it would be ridiculous if anyone should order us to opine in what it is that anything differs from other things.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Socrates/ For, respecting things of which we have a right opinion, so far as they differ from others, he would order us to assume a right opinion of them, so far as they differ from others. And thus, like the circumvolution of a whip, or a pestle, or the like, from this mandate nothing would be said. For it might more justly be called the mandate of one blind; since it would order us to receive things which we possess, that we might learn things which we opine; and thus would be perfectly similar to the mandate of one deprived of sight.

Theaetetus/ Tell me what it is you just now asked.

Socrates/ If someone, O boy, ordering us to receive reason, should at the same time order us to know, but not opine difference, reason would be a pleasant thing, and the most beautiful of all things pertaining to science. For to know is in a certain respect to receive science. Is it not?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Socrates/ When asked, therefore, as it appears, what science is, he would answer, that it is right opinion with the science of difference. For, according to him, this will be the assumption of reason.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But it is in every respect foolish for us, who are investigating science, to say that it is right opinion with

science, either of difference or of anything else. Neither sense therefore, Theætetus, nor true opinion, nor reason in conjunction with true opinion, will be science.

Theaetetus/ It does not appear that they will.

Socrates/ Are we, therefore, pregnant and parturient, my friend, with anything further respecting science, or have we brought forth everything?

Theaetetus/ By Zeus, through you I have already said more than I had in myself.

Socrates/ Does not, therefore, all this show that the obstetric art has brought for us that which is vain, and which does not deserve to be nourished?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, after this you should endeavor to become pregnant with other things, and your endeavor should be successful, you will, through the present discussion, be full of better things. But if you should be empty, you will be less troublesome to your companions, and more moderate and mild; in consequence of not thinking that you know things which you do not know. For thus much my art is able to accomplish, but nothing more. Nor do I know anything of those particulars which are and have been known to great and wonderful men. But this obstetric art I and my mother are allotted from divinity; she about women, and I about ingenuous and beautiful youths. Now, therefore, I must go to the porch of the king, to answer to the accusation of Melitus. But tomorrow, Theodorus, we will again return hither.

The end of the Theætetus.

Euthyphron.

or

On Holiness.

Translated by Henry Cary.

Persons of the Dialog

Euthyphron. Socrates.

Euthyphro/ What new thing has happened, Socrates, that you have left your haunts in the Lyceum, and are now waiting about the king's porch! You surely have not a trial before the king as I have.

Socrates/ The Athenians, Euthyphron, do not call it a trial, but an indictment.

Euthyphro/ What say you! Someone, it seems, has preferred an indictment against you, for I cannot believe that you have indicted anyone else.

Socrates/ Surely not.

Euthyphro/ Has someone else, then, indicted you?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Euthyphro/ Who is he?

Socrates/ I do not myself very well know the man, Euthyphron; for he appears to me to be young and unknown; however they call him Melitus, I think; and he is of the borough of Pithos, if you know any Melitus of Pithos, who has lank hair, a thin beard, and a hook nose.

Euthyphro/ I don't know him, Socrates, but what indictment has he preferred against you?

Socrates/ What? One not unworthy of a high-minded man, as it appears to me; for it is no contemptible matter for one who is so young, to be versed in so weighty a business. For he knows, as he says, how the youth are corrupted, and

who they are that corrupt them. And he appears to be a shrewd man, and, observing my ignorance, he comes before the city, as before a mother, to accuse me of corrupting those of the same age with himself. And he appears to me to be the only one of our statesmen who knows how to govern rightly; for it is right first of all to pay attention to the young, that they may become as virtuous as possible, just as it is proper for a good husbandman first of all to pay attention to the young plants, and afterwards the others: so Melitus probably first purges us who corrupt the blossoms of youth, as he says; then after this it is clear that by paying attention to the older men, he will be the cause of very many and great blessings to the city, as may be expected to happen from one who makes such a beginning.

Euthyphro/ I wish it were so, Socrates; but I dread lest the contrary should happen. For, in reality, he appears to me, in attempting to injure you, to begin by assailing the city from the hearth. But tell me, by doing what does he say that you corrupt the youth?

Socrates/ Absurd even to hear mentioned, my admirable friend: for he says that I am a maker of gods, and, as if I made new gods and did not believe in the ancient ones, he has indicted me on their account, as he says.

Euthyphro/ I understand, Socrates, it is because you say that a demon constantly attends you. As if, then, you introduced innovations in religion he has preferred this indictment against you, and he comes to accuse you before the court, knowing that such charges are readily entertained by the multitude. And me too, when I say anything in the public assembly concerning divine things, and predict to them what is going to happen, they ridicule as mad; and although nothing that I have predicted has not turned out to be true, yet they envy all such men as we are. However we ought not to heed them, but pursue our own course.

Socrates/ But, my dear Euthyphron, to be laughed at is perhaps of no consequence. For the Athenians, as it appears to me, do not care very much whether they think a man is clever, so long as he does not communicate his wisdom; but when they think a man makes others so, they are angry, either through envy, as you say, or from some other cause.

Euthyphro/ With respect to that matter, how they are affected towards me I am not very anxious to try.

Socrates/ For perhaps you seem to show yourself but rarely, and to be unwilling to impart your wisdom; but I am afraid that, from my love of mankind, I appear to them to tell every man too freely whatever I know, not only without pay, but even gladly offering myself, if anyone is willing to listen to me. If then, as I just now said, they were going to laugh at me, as you say they do at you, there would be nothing unpleasant in passing some time in a court of justice, jesting and laughing; but if they are in earnest, how this affair may terminate is unknown, except to you prophets.

Euthyphro/ Perhaps, however, it will be of no consequence, Socrates, but you will conduct your cause to your mind, as I think I shall mine.

Socrates/ Have you too a cause, Euthyphron? Do you defend it, or prosecute?

Euthyphro/ I prosecute.

Socrates/ Whom?

Euthyphro/ One, in prosecuting whom, I seem to be mad.

Socrates/ What then? do you prosecute someone that can fly?

Euthyphro/ He is very far from being able to fly, for he happens to be very old.

Socrates/ Who is he?

Euthyphro/ My father.

Socrates/ Your father, my excellent friend?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what is the charge, and what is the trial about?

Euthyphro/ Murder, Socrates.

Socrates/ By Hercules! Surely, Euthyphron, the generality of men are ignorant how this can ever be right. For I do not think any common person could do this properly, but he must be very far advanced in wisdom.

Euthyphro/ Far indeed, by Zeus, Socrates.

Socrates/ Is it anyone of your relations who has been killed by your father? It must be so; for surely you would not prosecute him for the murder of a stranger.

Euthyphro/ Ridiculous, Socrates, to think that it makes any difference whether the person killed is a stranger or a relation, and that we ought not to consider this only, whether he killed him justly or not, and, if justly, let him go, but if not, prosecute him, even though the murderer should live at the same hearth and the same table with you. For the pollution is equal, if you knowingly associate with such a one, and do not purify both yourself and him by bringing him to justice. However, the deceased was a dependent of ours, and when we were farming at Naxos, he worked there for us, for hire. This man, then, having drunk too much wine and being in a passion with one of our slaves, slew him. My father, therefore, having bound his hands and feet, and thrown him into a pit, sends a man here to enquire of the interpreter of religious matters, what he ought to do with him; and in the meantime he neglected the prisoner, and took no care of him as being a murderer, and as if it was of no consequence if he died; which did happen. For he died from hunger, cold, and the chains, before the messenger returned from the interpreter. For this reason my father and

all my relatives are angry with me, because I, for the sake of a murderer, accuse my father of murder, who, as they say, did not kill him, and even if he had killed him, as the deceased was a murderer, they say that I ought not to concern myself about such a man; for that it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder; little knowing, Socrates, what the divine rule is with respect to holiness and impiety.

Socrates/ But, by Zeus, Euthyphron, do you think you have such an accurate knowledge of divine things, how they are circumstanced, with respect both to things holy and impious, that those things having been done as you say, you are not afraid, in bringing your father to trial, lest you should commit an impious action?

Euthyphro/ I should be a sorry person, Socrates, nor would Euthyphron in any respect excel the generality of men, if I did not know all such things accurately.

Socrates/ Admirable Euthyphron, it will be a most excellent thing for me to become your disciple, and, before Melitus' indictment comes on for hearing, to object this very thing to him, saying, that I hitherto deemed it of the utmost consequence to be acquainted with divine things, and that now, since he says I am guilty of acting rashly, and introducing innovations with respect to divine things, I have become your disciple. If then, I should say, Melitus, you admit that Euthyphron is wise in such matters and thinks rightly, suppose that I do so too, and do not bring me to trial; but if otherwise, call him, the teacher, to account before you do me, as one who corrupts the elders, both me and his father, me by teaching me, and him by admonishing and punishing him: and if he is not persuaded by me and does not let me off the trial, or indict you instead of me, it will be necessary to say these very things in the court, which I have already objected to him.

Euthyphro/ By Zeus, Socrates, if he should attempt to indict me, I should find, I think, his weak side, and we should much sooner have a discussion in the court about him than about me.

Socrates/ And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am anxious to become your disciple, being persuaded that some others and this Melitus do not appear even to see you, though he has so very keenly and easily seen through me, as to indict me for impiety. Now therefore, by Zeus, tell me what you just now asserted you know so well; what do you say is piety and impiety, both with respect to murder and other things? Is not holiness itself the same with itself in every action, and again, is not impiety, which is contrary to all holiness, in every case similar to itself, and has not everything that is impious someone character with respect to impiety?

Euthyphro/ Most assuredly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, what you say holiness is, and what impiety?

Euthyphro/ I say, then, that that is holy which I am now doing, to prosecute anyone who acts unjustly either with respect to murder or sacrilege, or who commits any similar offence, whether he be one's father or mother, or whoever else he may be, but not to prosecute him is impious. For observe, Socrates, what a great proof I will give you that the law is so, as I have also said to others, showing that it is rightly done, when one does not spare one who acts impiously, whoever he may be. For all men believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and yet they admit that he put his own father in chains, because he unjustly swallowed his children, and again, that he mutilated his father for other similar reasons, but they are indignant with me, because I prosecute my father for having acted unjustly,

and thus these men contradict themselves with respect to the gods and me.

Socrates/ Is this the reason then, Euthyphron, for which I am defendant in this indictment, because when anyone says things of this kind respecting the gods, I admit them with difficulty? on which account, as it seems, someone will say that I am guilty. Now, therefore, if these things appear so to you likewise, who are well versed in such matters, we must of necessity, as it seems, agree with you. For what else can we say, who acknowledge that we know nothing about these things? But tell me, by Zeus, who presides over friendship, do you think that these things did really happen so?

Euthyphro/ And things still more wonderful than these, Socrates, which the multitude are unacquainted with.

Socrates/ Do you then think that there is in reality war among the gods one with another, and fierce enmities and battles, and many other things of the kind such as are related by the poets, and with representations of which by good painters both other sacred places have been decorated, and moreover in the great Panathenaic festival a veil full of such representations is carried into the Acropolis. Must we say that these things are true, Euthyphron?

Euthyphro/ Not these only, Socrates; but, as I just now said, I can, if you please, relate to you many other things respecting divine affairs, which I am sure you will be astonished to hear.

Socrates/ I should not wonder; but you shall relate these things to me hereafter, at our leisure. Now, however, endeavor to explain to me more clearly what I just now asked you. For you have not yet, my friend, sufficiently answered my question as to holiness what it is, but you have told me

that what you are now doing is holy, prosecuting your father for murder.

Euthyphro/ And I said the truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ Perhaps so. But, Euthyphron, you may also say that many other things are holy.

Euthyphro/ For such is the case.

Socrates/ Do you remember, then, that I did not beg this of you, to teach me some one or two from among many holy things, but the particular character itself by which all holy things are holy? For you surely said that unholy things are unholy, and holy things holy, from one character: do you not remember?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Teach me, then, this very character, what it is, in order that looking to it, and using it as a model, I may say that such a thing of all that you or anyone else does is holy.

Euthyphro/ But if you wish it, Socrates, I will also tell you this.

Socrates/ I do indeed wish it.

Euthyphro/ That, then, which is pleasing to the gods is holy, and that which is not pleasing to them is impious?

Socrates/ Admirably, Euthyphron, you have answered just as I begged you to answer. Whether truly, however, I do not yet know, but you will doubtless convince me that what you say is true.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, let us consider what we say. A thing that is pleasing to the gods, and a man who is pleasing to the gods, are holy; but a thing that is hateful to the gods, and a man that is hateful to the gods, are impious; but the holy is not the same with the unholy, but most contrary to it: is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And this appears to have been well said.

Euthyphro/ I think so, Socrates; for it has been said.

Socrates/ And that the gods quarrel, Euthyphron, and are at variance with each other, and that there are enmities amongst them one towards another: has not this also been said?

Euthyphro/ It has.

Socrates/ But, my excellent friend, variance about what occasions enmity and anger? Let us consider it thus. If you and I differed about numbers, which of two was the greater, would a difference on this point make us enemies and angry with each other, or having recourse to computation, should we soon be freed from such dissension?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if we differed about the greater and the less, by having recourse to measuring should we not soon put an end to our difference?

Euthyphro/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ And by having recourse to weighing, as I think, we should be able to decide respecting the heavier and the lighter?

Euthyphro/ How not?

Socrates/ About what then disagreeing and in what being unable to come to a decision, do we become enemies to, and angry with, each other? Perhaps you cannot readily answer, but consider when I say whether they are these, the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the base, the good and the evil.

Are not these the things about which disagreeing, and not being able to arrive at a satisfactory decision respecting them, we become enemies to each other when we do become so, both you and I, and all other men?

Euthyphro/ This, indeed, is difference itself, Socrates, and it is about these things.

Socrates/ But what? If the gods, Euthyphron, differ at all, must they not differ about these very things?

Euthyphro/ Most necessarily.

Socrates/ According to your account, then, noble Euthyphron, different gods think different things just, and beautiful and base, and good and evil. For surely they could not quarrel with each other if they did not differ about these things; is it not so?

Euthyphro/ You say rightly.

Socrates/ Do they not severally, then, love the things which they consider beautiful and good and just, and hate their contraries?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And these same things, as you admit, some consider to be just, and others unjust; disputing about which they quarrel and make war on each other; is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Just so.

Socrates/ The same things, therefore, as it seems, are both hated and loved by the gods, and these are both hateful to the gods and pleasing to the gods.

Euthyphro/ It seems so.

Socrates/ From this reasoning also the same things must be holy and unholy, Euthyphron?

Euthyphro/ It appears so.

Socrates/ You have not, therefore, answered my question, my admirable friend: for I did not ask you this, what is at the same time both holy and impious; but what is pleasing to the gods is also hateful to the gods, as it seems. So that, Euthyphron, in punishing your father, as you are now doing, it is not at all wonderful if in doing this you do what is

pleasing to Zeus, but odious to Saturn and Heaven, and what is pleasing to Vulcan, but odious to Hera; and if any other of the gods differs from another on this point, to them also in like manner.

Euthyphro/ But I think, Socrates, that no one of the gods will differ from another about this, and say that he ought not to be punished who has slain anyone unjustly.

Socrates/ But what? Have you ever heard any man doubting, Euthyphron, whether he who has slain another unjustly, or has committed any other injustice, ought to be punished?

Euthyphro/ They never cease doubting about these things, both elsewhere and in courts of justice. For they who commit very many acts of injustice say and do everything in their power to escape punishment.

Socrates/ Do they also confess, Euthyphron, that they have acted unjustly, and confessing, do they nevertheless say that they ought not to be punished?

Euthyphro/ They by no means say this.

Socrates/ They do not, therefore, do and say everything in their power. For I think they dare not say nor doubt this, that if they act unjustly they ought to suffer punishment; but, I think, they deny that they have acted unjustly: is it not so?

Euthyphro/ You say truly.

Socrates/ They do not, therefore, doubt this, whether he who acts unjustly ought to be punished; but this, perhaps, they doubt, who has acted unjustly, and by doing what, and when.

Euthyphro/ You say truly.

Socrates/ Do not, then, the very same things happen to the gods if they quarrel about things just and unjust,

according to your statement, and do not some say that they act unjustly towards each other, and others again deny it? For surely, my admirable friend, no one, either of gods or men, dare maintain this, that he who acts unjustly ought not to suffer punishment.

Euthyphro/ Yes, and what you say is true, Socrates, at least in general.

Socrates/ But they who doubt, Euthyphron, doubt, I think, about each particular that has been done, both men and gods, if the gods do doubt: and when they differ about any action, some say that it has been done justly, and others unjustly: is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, my dear Euthyphron, teach me too, that I may become wiser, what proof you have that all the gods think he died unjustly, who serving for wages and having committed homicide, and being put in chains by the master of the deceased, died in his fetters before he that put him in chains received an answer respecting him from the interpreters, as to what he ought to do; and that for such a cause it is right for a son to prosecute and demand judgment against his father. Come, endeavor to make it clear to me, with respect to this, that all the gods without exception consider this action to be right. And if you make this sufficiently clear, I will never cease extolling you for your wisdom.

Euthyphro/ But perhaps this is no trifling matter, Socrates; though I could prove it to you very plainly.

Socrates/ I understand you; I appear to you to be more dull of apprehension than the judges; for it is evident that you will prove to them that it was unjust, and that all the gods hate such actions.

Euthyphro/ Very plainly, Socrates, if only they will hear what I have to say.

Socrates/ But they will hear you, if only you shall appear to speak well. However, while you were speaking, I made this reflection, and considered within myself: if Euthyphron should certainly convince me that all the gods think such a death to be unjust, what more shall I have learnt from Euthyphron as to what is holy, and what impious? For this action, as it seems, would be hateful to the gods. Yet what was lately defined has not appeared from this, namely what is holy, and what not: for that which is hateful to some gods appeared also to be pleasing to others. So that I grant you this, Euthyphron, and if you please let all the gods think it unjust, and let them all hate it. Shall we, then, make this correction in the definition, and say, that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love is holy; but that what some love, and others hate, is neither, or both? Are you willing that we should give this definition of the holy and the impious?

Euthyphro/ What hinders, Socrates?

Socrates/ Nothing hinders me, Euthyphron; but do you, for your part, consider whether, assuming this, you can thus easily teach me what you promised?

Euthyphro/ But I should say that the holy is that which all the gods love, and the contrary, the impious, that which all the gods hate.

Socrates/ Shall we examine this, then, Euthyphron, whether it is well said? or shall we let it pass, and thus concede both to ourselves and others, that if anyone only says that anything is so, we shall allow that it is? or must we examine what the speaker says?

Euthyphro/ We must examine it: for my part, however, I think that this is now well said.

Socrates/ We shall soon, my good friend, know this more clearly. For consider it in this way: Is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy; or is it holy, because it is loved?

Euthyphro/ I don't understand what you mean, Socrates.

Socrates/ I will endeavor, then, to express myself more clearly. We say that a thing is carried, and carries; that it is led, and leads; that it is seen, and sees: and you understand that all things of this kind are different from each other, and in what they differ?

Euthyphro/ For my part, I seem to understand it.

Socrates/ Is not, then, that which is beloved one thing, and that which loves different from it?

Euthyphro/ How not?

Socrates/ Tell me, then, is that which is carried, carried because one carries it, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ No, but for this.

Socrates/ And that which is led, because one leads it, and that which is seen, because one sees it?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ One does not therefore see a thing because it is seen, but on the contrary it is seen because one sees it: nor does one lead a thing because it is led, but it is led because one leads it: nor does one carry a thing because it is carried, but it is carried because one carries it. Is my meaning clear, then, Euthyphron? I mean this, that if one does anything, or suffers anything, one does it not because it is done; but it is done because one does it; nor does one suffer anything because it is suffered, but it is suffered because one suffers: do you not admit this to be the case?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Is not, then, the being loved, something either done or suffered by someone?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not the case the same with this as with all the former instances; those who love it do not love it because it is loved, but it is loved, because they love it?

Euthyphro/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ What then do we say respecting holiness, Euthyphron? Do not all the gods love it according to your statement?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it for this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ No, but for this.

Socrates/ They love it then because it is holy, but it is not holy because they love it.

Euthyphro/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Therefore because the gods love it, it is beloved, and that which is pleasing to the gods is pleasing to them.

Euthyphro/ How not?

Socrates/ That which is pleasing to the gods, therefore, is not holy, Euthyphron, nor is that holy which is pleasing to the gods, as you say, but one is different from the other.

Euthyphro/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because we agree that what is holy is therefore loved because it is holy, and that it is not holy because they love it is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ But that which is pleasing to the gods because the gods love it, is from the very circumstance of their loving it pleasing to them; but they do not love it because it is pleasing to them.

Euthyphro/ You say truly.

Socrates/ But, my dear Euthyphron, if the being pleasing to the gods and being holy were the same thing, since that which is holy is loved because it is holy, that which is pleasing to the gods would also be loved because it is pleasing to them; and if that which is pleasing to the gods were pleasing to them because they love it, that which is holy would also be holy because they love it. Now, however, you see that they are contrary, as being altogether different from each other. For the one is such as is loved because they love it, but the other is loved because it is of such a character that it ought to be loved. And you appear, Euthyphron, when asked what holiness is, not to have been willing to make known to me its essence, but to have mentioned an affection to which this same holiness is subject, namely the being loved by all the gods; but what it is, you have not yet told me. If therefore it is agreeable to you, do not conceal it from me, but again say from the beginning what holiness is, whether it is loved by the gods, or is subject to any other affection: for we shall not differ about this. But tell me frankly what the holy is and what the impious.

Euthyphro/ But, Socrates, I know not how to tell you what I think. For whatever we put forward somehow constantly moves from its position, and will not remain where we have placed it.

Socrates/ What you have advanced, Euthyphron, appears to resemble the statues of my ancestor Dædalus. And if I had said and laid down these things, you would probably have joked me, for that owing to my relationship to him, my works, by way of discussion, escape, and will not remain where one places them. But now, for the hypotheses are yours, there is need of some other raillery. For they will not remain with you, as you too perceive yourself.

Euthyphro/ But it appears to me, Socrates, that what has been said needs pretty much the same raillery. For I am not

the person who causes them to shift about in this way and not remain in the same place, but you appear to me to be the Dædalus. For as far as I am concerned, they would have remained as they were.

Socrates/ I appear, then, my friend, to have become much more skillful than him in my art, in that he only made his own works moveable, but I besides my own, as it seems, make those of others so. And this, moreover, is the most wonderful thing in my art, that I am skillful against any will. For I should wish that my reasonings should remain and be immovably fixed, rather than have the riches of Tantalus, in addition to the skill of Dædalus. But enough of this. Since, however, you appear to be too nice, I will assist you to show how you may teach me respecting holiness, and not be tired before you have done. For see, whether it does not appear to you to be necessary that everything that is holy should be just.

Euthyphro/ To me it does.

Socrates/ Is, then, everything that is just also holy, or is everything that is holy just, but not everything that is just holy, but partly holy, and partly something else?

Euthyphro/ I do not follow your questions, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet you are younger no less than wiser than I am; but, as I said, you are too delicate through abundance of wisdom. However, my blessed friend, exert yourself; for it is not difficult to understand what I mean. For I mean the contrary to what the poet said, who wrote, “You are unwilling to mention Jove the creator who made this universe: for where fear is there is also shame.” I, however, differ from this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?

Euthyphro/ By all means.

Socrates/ It does not appear to me, that where fear is there is also shame. For there appear to me to be many who

fearing diseases, poverty, and many other things of the kind, fear indeed but are by no means ashamed of what they fear. Does it not appear so to you?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But wherever shame is, there is also fear: for is there anyone who is ashamed of and blushes at anything, that is not afraid of and does not fear the reputation of baseness?

Euthyphro/ Assuredly he does fear it.

Socrates/ It is not right, therefore, to say, that where fear is, there also is shame, but where shame is, there also is fear; not however, wherever there is fear, there is also shame. For I think that fear is more extensive than shame; for shame is a part of fear, as the odd is a part of number, so that it does not follow that wherever number is, there also is the odd, but wherever the odd is, there also is number. Do you follow me now?

Euthyphro/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ I asked you, then, about a thing of this kind above, whether where the just is, there also is the holy, or where the holy is, there also is the just, but wherever the just is, there is not always the holy: for the holy is a part of the just. Shall we say thus, or does it seem to you otherwise?

Euthyphro/ No, but thus. For you appear to me to speak correctly.

Socrates/ Observe then what follows. If the holy is a part of the just, it is necessary, as it seems, that we should find out what part of the just the holy is. If then you were to ask me about some of the things before mentioned, for instance, what part of number the even is, and what number it is, I should say that it is not scalene, but isosceles. Does it not appear so to you?

Euthyphro/ It does.

Socrates/ Do you, then, also endeavor in like manner to teach me what part of the just the holy is, that I may tell Melitus no longer to treat me unjustly nor indict me for impiety, since I have now sufficiently learnt from you what things are pious and holy, and what not.

Euthyphro/ That part of justice then, Socrates, appears to me to be pious and holy, which is concerned about our care for the gods; but that which is concerned about our care for mankind is the remaining part of justice.

Socrates/ You appear to me, Euthyphron, to speak well; but I still require a trifle further. For I do not yet understand what care you mean. For you surely do not mean such care is to be had for the gods as is employed about other things. For we say, for instance, not everyone knows how to take care of horses, but a groom; do we not?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For surely the groom's business is the taking care of horses.

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor does everyone know how to take care of dogs, but a huntsman.

Euthyphro/ Just so.

Socrates/ For the huntsman's business is the taking care of dogs.

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the herdsman's of cattle.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But holiness and piety of the gods, Euthyphron; do you say so?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ All care, therefore, aims at the same thing, that is to say, it is for some good and advantage of that which is

taken care of, as you see that horses, taken care of by one skilled in the groom's business, are benefited and become better: do they not seem so to you?

Euthyphro/ They do.

Socrates/ Dogs also are benefited by one skilled in the huntsman's business, and oxen by that of the herdsman, and all other things in like manner: do you think that the care is employed for the injury of that which is taken care of?

Euthyphro/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But for its advantage?

Euthyphro/ How should it not?

Socrates/ Is holiness, therefore, since it is a care for the gods, an advantage to the gods, and does it make the gods better? And would you admit this, that when you do anything holy, you make some one of the gods better?

Euthyphro/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Nor do I think, Euthyphron, that you mean this; I am far from doing so: but for this reason I asked you what care for the gods you mean, not thinking that you mean such as this.

Euthyphro/ And rightly, Socrates; for I do not mean such as this.

Socrates/ Be it so: but what care for the gods will holiness be?

Euthyphro/ That, Socrates, which slaves take of their masters.

Socrates/ I understand: it will be a kind of service, as it seems, paid to the gods.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Can you then tell me, to the performance of what the service of physicians is subservient? Do you not think it is to health?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ But what? to the performance of what work is the service of shipwrights subservient?

Euthyphro/ Clearly, Socrates, to that of a ship.

Socrates/ And that of architects, to houses?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, my excellent friend; to the performance of what work will the service of the gods be subservient? For it is clear that you know, since you say that you have a knowledge of divine things beyond that of other men.

Euthyphro/ And I say truly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Tell me then, by Zeus, what is that very beautiful work which the gods effect, by employing us as servants.

Euthyphro/ They are many and beautiful, Socrates.

Socrates/ So do generals, my friend; though you could easily tell the principal of them, that they effect victory in war; is it not so?

Euthyphro/ How should I not?

Socrates/ Husbandmen too, I think, effect many and beautiful things; but the principal thing they effect is the production of food from the earth.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What then? of the many and beautiful things which the gods effect, what is the principal?

Euthyphro/ I told you just now, Socrates, that it is a difficult matter to learn all these things accurately; this however I tell you simply, that if anyone knows how to speak

and do things grateful to the gods, by praying and sacrificing, these things are holy, and such things preserve both private houses and the general weal of cities; but the contraries to things acceptable to them are impious, which also subvert and ruin all things.

Socrates/ You might, if you had pleased, Euthyphron, have told me the principal of what I asked in fewer words. But it is clear that you are not willing to teach me. For now when you were just upon the point of doing so, you turned aside; whereas if you had answered, I should by this time have sufficiently learnt from you what holiness is. But now for it is necessary that he who asks questions should follow the person questioned wherever he may lead what again do you say is the holy, and holiness? Do you not say it is a knowledge of sacrificing and praying?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Is not to sacrifice to offer gifts to the gods, and to pray to beg something of the gods?

Euthyphro/ Assuredly, Socrates.

Socrates/ From this statement it follows that holiness must be a knowledge of begging from and giving to the gods.

Euthyphro/ You quite understand what I mean, Socrates.

Socrates/ For I am very anxious, my friend, to obtain your wisdom, and I apply my mind to it: so that what you say will not fall to the ground. But tell me what this service of the gods is? Do you say it is to beg of them and to give to them?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Must we not then, therefore, to beg rightly, beg those things of them which we need from them?

Euthyphro/ What else?

Socrates/ And again to give rightly must we give them in return such things as they stand in need of from us? For

surely it would not be suitable to offer those gifts to anyone which he does not need.

Euthyphro/ You say truly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Holiness, therefore, Euthyphron, will be a kind of traffic between gods and men.

Euthyphro/ A kind of traffic, if it pleases you to call it so.

Socrates/ But it is not at all pleasing to me, unless it happens to be true. Tell me therefore, what advantage the gods derive from the gifts which they receive from us? For the advantage arising from what they give is clear to everyone; for we have no good at all which they do not impart? but how are they benefited by what they receive from us? Do we get so much the advantage over them in this traffic, that we receive all good things from them, but they nothing from us?

Euthyphro/ But do you think, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by what they receive from us?

Socrates/ What is the use then, Euthyphron, of all our gifts to the gods?

Euthyphro/ What else do you think except honor and reverence, and, as I just now mentioned, gratitude?

Socrates/ Holiness then, Euthyphron, is that which is grateful, but not profitable or dear to the gods.

Euthyphro/ I for my part think it is of all things most dear to them.

Socrates/ This then again is, as it seems, holiness, that which is dear to the gods.

Euthyphro/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Can you wonder then, when you say this, that your statements do not remain fixed, but move about, and can you accuse me as being the Dædalus that makes them move about, when you yourself are far more skillful than

Dædalus, and make them go round in a circle? Do you not perceive that our discussion, turning round, comes to the same point? For you surely remember that in a former part of our discussion that which is holy and that which is acceptable to the gods appeared to us not to be the same, but different from each other: do you not remember?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Now, then, do you not perceive that you say that holiness is that which is dear to the gods? But is this anything else than that which is acceptable to the gods? is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Either, therefore, we did not then admit that properly, or, if we did, our present statement is not correct?

Euthyphro/ It seems so.

Socrates/ From the beginning, therefore, we must consider again what holiness is; for I shall not willingly run away like a coward, until I have learnt it. Do not then despise me, but by all means apply your mind earnestly to it and tell me the truth. For you know it, if any man does; and I cannot let you go like Proteus, until you have told me. For if you had not known clearly both what is holy and what is impious, it is not possible that you could ever have attempted, for the sake of a hireling, to prosecute your aged father for murder; but you would have feared both to incur the anger of the gods, in case you should not act rightly in this matter, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure that you think you clearly know both what is holy and what is not. Tell me, therefore, most excellent Euthyphron, and do not conceal from me what you believe it to be?

Euthyphro/ At some other opportunity then, Socrates: for now I am in haste to go somewhere, and it is time for me to depart.

Socrates/ What are you about, my friend? By going away you deprive me of the great hope I entertained that by learning from you what things are holy and what not, I might get rid of Melitus' indictment, by showing him that I had now become skilled in divine things by the aid of Euthyphron, and that I no longer through ignorance speak rashly, or introduce innovations respecting them, and that therefore I should lead a better life for the future.

Euthyphron

Translated by Church, F. J.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Euthyphron.

SCENE. The porch of the King Archon.

Euthyphro/ What in the world are you doing here at the archons porch, Socrates? Why have you left your haunts in the Lyceum? You surely cannot have an action before him, as I have.

Socrates/ Nay, the Athenians, Euthyphron, call it a prosecution, not an action.

Euthyphro/ What? Do you mean that someone is prosecuting you? I cannot believe that you are prosecuting anyone yourself.

Socrates/ Certainly I am not.

Euthyphro/ Then is someone prosecuting you?

Socrates/ Yes.

Euthyphro/ Who is he?

Socrates/ I scarcely know him myself, Euthyphron; I think he must be some unknown young man. His name, however, is Meletus, and his deme Pitthis, if you can call to mind any Meletus of that deme, a hook-nosed man with long hair, and rather a scanty beard.

Euthyphro/ I don't know him, Socrates. But, tell me, what is he prosecuting you for?

Socrates/ What for? Not on trivial grounds, I think. It is no small thing for so young a man to have formed an opinion on such an important matter. For he, he says, knows how the young are corrupted, and who are their corruptors. He

must be a wise man, who, observing my ignorance, is going to accuse me to the city, as his mother, of corrupting his friends. I think that he is the only man who begins at the right point in his political reforms: I mean whose first care is to make the young men as perfect as possible, just as a good farmer will take care of his young plants first, and, after he has done that, of the others. And so Meletus, I suppose, is first clearing us off, who, as he says, corrupt the young men as they grow up; and then, when he has done that, of course he will turn his attention to the older men, and so become a very great public benefactor. Indeed, that is only what you would expect, when he goes to work in this way.

Euthyphro/ I hope it may be so, Socrates, but I have very grave doubts about it. It seems to me that in trying to injure you, he is really setting to work by striking a blow at the heart of the state. But how, tell me, does he say that you corrupt the youth?

Socrates/ In a way which sounds strange at first, my friend. He says that I am a maker of gods; and so he is prosecuting me, he says, for inventing new gods, and for not believing in the old ones.

Euthyphro/ I understand, Socrates. It is because you say that you always have a divine sign. So he is prosecuting you for introducing novelties into religion; and he is going into court knowing that such matters are easily misrepresented to the multitude, and consequently meaning to slander you there. Why, they laugh even me to scorn, as if I were out of my mind, when I talk about divine things in the assembly, and tell them what is going to happen: and yet I have never foretold anything which has not come true. But they are jealous of all people like us. We must not think about them: we must meet them boldly.

Socrates/ My dear Euthyphron, their ridicule is not a very serious matter. The Athenians, it seems to me, may think a man to be clever without paying him much attention, so long as they do not think that he teaches his wisdom to others. But as soon as they think that he makes other people clever, they get angry whether it be from jealousy, as you say, or for some other reason.

Euthyphro/ I am not very anxious to try their disposition towards me in this matter.

Socrates/ No, perhaps they think that you seldom show yourself, and that you are not anxious to teach your wisdom to others; but I fear that they may think that I am; for my love of men makes me talk to everyone whom I meet quite freely and unreservedly, and without payment: indeed, if I could, I would gladly pay people myself to listen to me. If then, as I said just now, they were only going to laugh at me, as you say they do at you, it would not be at all an unpleasant way of spending the day, to spend it in court, jesting and laughing. But if they are going to be in earnest, then only prophets like you can tell where the matter will end.

Euthyphro/ Well, Socrates, I dare say that nothing will come of it. Very likely you will be successful in your trial, and I think that I shall be in mine.

Socrates/ And what is this suit of yours, Euthyphron? Are you suing, or being sued?

Euthyphro/ I am suing.

Socrates/ Whom?

Euthyphro/ A man whom I am thought a maniac to be suing.

Socrates/ What? Has he wings to fly away with?

Euthyphro/ He is far enough from flying; he is a very old man.

Socrates/ Who is he?

Euthyphro/ He is my father.

Socrates/ Your father, my good sir?

Euthyphro/ He is indeed.

Socrates/ What are you prosecuting him for? What is the charge?

Euthyphro/ It is a charge of murder, Socrates.

Socrates/ Good heavens, Euthyphron! Surely the multitude are ignorant of what makes right. I take it that it is not everyone who could rightly do what you are doing; only a man who was already well advanced in wisdom.

Euthyphro/ That is quite true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Was the man whom your father killed a relative of yours? Nay, of course he was: you would never have prosecuted your father for the murder of a stranger?

Euthyphro/ You amuse me, Socrates. What difference does it make whether the murdered man was a relative or a stranger? The only question that you have to ask is, did the slayer slay justly or not? If justly, you must let him alone; if unjustly, you must indict him for murder, even though he share your hearth and sit at your table. The pollution is the same, if you associate with such a man, knowing what he has done, without purifying yourself, and him too, by bringing him to justice. In the present case the murdered man was a poor dependent of mine, who worked for us on our farm in Naxos. In a fit of drunkenness he got in a rage with one of our slaves, and killed him. My father therefore bound the man hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, while he sent to Athens to ask the seer what he should do. While the messenger was gone, he entirely neglected the man, thinking that he was a murderer, and that it would be no great matter, even if he were to die. And that was exactly what happened; hunger and cold and his bonds killed him

before the messenger returned. And now my father and the rest of my family are indignant with me because I am prosecuting my father for the murder of this murderer. They assert that he did not kill the man at all; and they say that, even if he had killed him over and over again, the man himself was a murderer, and that I ought not to concern myself about such a person, because it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder. So little, Socrates, do they know the divine law of holiness and unholiness.

Socrates/ And do you mean to say, Euthyphron, that you think that you understand divine things, and holiness and unholiness, so accurately that, in such a case as you have stated, you can bring your father to justice without fear that you yourself may be doing an unholy deed?

Euthyphro/ If I did not understand all these matters accurately, Socrates, I should be of no use, and Euthyphron would not be any better than other men.

Socrates/ Then, my excellent Euthyphron, I cannot do better than become your pupil, and challenge Meletus on this very point before the trial begins. I should say that I had always thought it very important to have knowledge about divine things; and that now, when he says that I offend by speaking lightly about them, and by introducing novelties in them, I have become your pupil; and I should say, Meletus, if you acknowledge Euthyphron to be wise in these matters, and to hold the true belief, then think the same of me, and do not put me on my trial; but if you do not, then bring a suit, not against me, but against my master for corrupting his elders; namely, me whom he corrupts by his doctrine, and his own father whom he corrupts by admonishing and chastising him. And if I did not succeed in persuading him to release me from the suit, or to indict you in my place, then I could repeat my challenge in court.

Euthyphro/ Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, I think I should find out his weak points, if he were to try to indict me. I should have a good deal to say about him in court long before I spoke about myself.

Socrates/ Yes, my dear friend, and knowing this, I am anxious to become your pupil. I see that Meletus here, and others too, seem not to notice you at all; but he sees through me without difficulty and at once, and prosecutes me for impiety forthwith. Now, therefore, please explain to me what you were so confident just now that you knew. Tell me what are piety and impiety with reference to murder and everything else. I suppose that holiness is the same in all actions; and that unholiness is always the opposite of holiness, and like itself, and that, as unholiness, it always has the same essential nature, which will be found in whatever is unholy.

Euthyphro/ Certainly, Socrates, I suppose so.

Socrates/ Tell me, then; what is holiness, and what is unholiness?

Euthyphro/ Well, then, I say that holiness means prosecuting the wrong doer who has committed murder or sacrilege, or any other such crime, as I am doing now, whether he be your father or your mother or whoever he be; and I say that unholiness means not prosecuting him. And observe, Socrates, I will give you a clear proof, which I have already given to others, that it is so, and that doing right means not suffering the sacrilegious man, whosoever he may be. Men hold Zeus to be the best and the justest of the gods; and they admit that Zeus bound his own father, Cronos, for devouring his children wickedly; and that Cronos in his turn castrated his father for similar reasons. And yet these same men are angry with me because I proceed against my father

for doing wrong. So, you see, they say one thing in the case of the gods and quite another in mine.

Socrates/ Is not that why I am being prosecuted, Euthyphron? I mean, because I am displeased when I hear people say such things about the gods? I expect that I shall be called a sinner, because I doubt those stories. Now if you, who understand all these matters so well, agree in holding all those tales true, then I suppose that I must needs give way. What could I say when I admit myself that I know nothing about them? But tell me, in the name of friendship, do you really believe that these things have actually happened.

Euthyphro/ Yes, and stranger ones too, Socrates, which the multitude do not know of.

Socrates/ Then you really believe that there is war among the gods, and bitter hatreds, and battles, such as the poets tell of, and which the great painters have depicted in our temples, especially in the pictures which cover the robe that is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaic festival. Are we to say that these things are true, Euthyphron?

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, and more besides. As I was saying, I will relate to you many other stories about divine matters, if you like, which I am sure will astonish you when you hear them.

Socrates/ I dare say. You shall relate them to me at your leisure another time. At present please try to give a more definite answer to the question which I asked you just now. What I asked you, my friend, was, What is holiness? and you have not explained it to me, to my satisfaction. You only tell me that what you are doing now, namely prosecuting your father for murder, is a holy act.

Euthyphro/ Well, that is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Very likely. But many other actions are holy, are they not, Euthyphron?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Remember, then, I did not ask you to tell me one or two of all the many holy actions that there are; I want to know what is the essential form of holiness which makes all holy actions holy. You said, I think, that there is one form which makes all holy actions holy, and another form which makes all unholy actions unholy. Do you not remember?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Well, then, explain to me what is this form, that I may have it to turn to, and to use as a standard whereby to judge your actions, and those of other men, and be able to say that whatever action resembles it is holy, and whatever does not, is not holy.

Euthyphro/ Yes, I will tell you that, if you wish it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Certainly I wish it.

Euthyphro/ Well then, what is pleasing to the gods is holy; and what is not pleasing to them is unholy.

Socrates/ Beautiful, Euthyphron. Now you have given me the answer that I wanted. Whether what you say is true, I do not know yet. But of course you will go on to prove the truth of it.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, let us examine our words. The things and the men that are pleasing to the gods are holy; and the things and the men that are displeasing to the gods are unholy. But holiness and unholiness are not the same: they are as opposite as possible; was not that said?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And I think that that was very well said.

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, that was certainly said.

Socrates/ Have we not also said, Euthyphron, that there are factions, and disagreements, and hatreds among the gods?

Euthyphro/ We have.

Socrates/ But what kind of disagreement, my friend, causes hatred and wrath? Let us look at the matter thus. If you and I were to disagree as to whether one number were more than another, would that provoke us to anger, and make us enemies? Should we not settle such dispute at once by counting?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if we were to disagree as to the relative size of two things, we should measure them, and put an end to the disagreement at once, should we not?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And should we not settle a question about the relative weight of two things, by weighing them?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then what is the question which would provoke us to anger, and make us enemies, if we disagreed about it, and could not come to a settlement? Perhaps you have not an answer ready: but listen to me. Is it not the question of right and wrong, of the honorable and the base, of the good and the bad? Is it not questions about these matters which make you and me, and everyone else quarrel, when we do quarrel, if we differ about them, and can reach no satisfactory settlement?

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates; it is disagreements about these matters.

Socrates/ Well, Euthyphron, the gods will quarrel over these things, if they quarrel at all, will they not?

Euthyphro/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Then, my excellent Euthyphron, you say that some of the gods think one thing right, and others another: and that what some of them hold to be honorable or good, others hold to be base or evil. For there would not have been factions among them if they had not disagreed on these points, would there?

Euthyphro/ You are right.

Socrates/ And each of them loves what he thinks honorable, and good, and right, and hates the opposite, does he not?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But you say that the same action is held by some of them to be right, and by others to be wrong; and that then they dispute about it, and so quarrel and fight among themselves. Is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the same thing is hated by the gods and loved by them; and the same thing will be displeasing and pleasing to them.

Euthyphro/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Then, according to your account, the same thing will be holy and unholy.

Euthyphro/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then, my good friend, you have not answered my question. I did not ask you to tell me what action is both holy and unholy; but it seems that whatever is pleasing to the gods is also displeasing to them. And so, Euthyphron, I should not wonder if what you are doing now in chastising your father is a deed well-pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronos and Ouranos, and acceptable to Hephaestus, but

hateful to Hêrê; and if any of the other gods disagree about it, pleasing to some of them and displeasing to others.

Euthyphro/ But on this point, Socrates, I think that there is no difference of opinion among the gods: they all hold that if one man kills another wrongfully, he must be punished.

Socrates/ What, Euthyphron? Among mankind, have you never heard disputes whether a man ought to be punished for killing another man wrongfully, or for doing some other wrong deed?

Euthyphro/ Indeed, they never cease from these disputes, especially in courts of justice. They do all manner of wrong things; and then there is nothing which they will not do and say to avoid punishment.

Socrates/ Do they admit that they have done wrong, and at the same time deny that they ought to be punished, Euthyphron?

Euthyphro/ No, indeed; that they do not.

Socrates/ Then it is not everything that they will do and say. I take it, they do not venture to assert or argue that if they do, do wrong they must not be punished. What they say is that they have not done wrong, is it not?

Euthyphro/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then they do not dispute the proposition, that the wrong doer must be punished. They dispute about the question, who is a wrong doer, and when, and what is a wrong deed, do they not?

Euthyphro/ That is true.

Socrates/ Well, is not exactly the same thing true of the gods, if they quarrel about right and wrong, as you say they do? Do not some of them assert that the others are doing wrong, while the others deny it? No one, I suppose, my dear

friend, whether god or man, ventures to say that a person who has done wrong must not be punished.

Euthyphro/ No, Socrates, that is true, in the main.

Socrates/ I take it, Euthyphron, that the disputants, whether men or gods, if the gods do dispute, dispute about each separate act. When they quarrel about any act, some of them say that it was done rightly, and others that it was done wrongly. Is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Come then, my dear Euthyphron, please enlighten me on this point. What proof have you that all the gods think that a laborer who has been imprisoned for murder by the master of the man whom he has murdered, and who dies from his imprisonment before the master has had time to learn from the seers what he should do, dies by injustice? How do you know that it is right for a son to indict his father, and to prosecute him for the murder of such a man? Come, see if you can make it clear to me that the gods necessarily agree in thinking that this action of yours is right; and if you satisfy me, I will never cease singing your praises for wisdom.

Euthyphro/ I could make that clear enough to you, Socrates; but I am afraid that it would be a long business.

Socrates/ I see you think that I am duller than the judges. To them of course you will make it clear that your father has done wrong, and that all the gods agree in hating such deeds.

Euthyphro/ I will indeed, Socrates, if they will only listen to me.

Socrates/ They will listen, if only they think that you speak well. But while you were speaking, it occurred to me to ask myself this question: suppose that Euthyphron were to prove to me as clearly as possible that all the gods think

such a death unjust; how has he brought me any nearer to understanding what holiness and unholiness are? This particular act, perhaps, may be displeasing to the gods, but then we have just seen that holiness and unholiness cannot be defined in that way: for we have seen that what is displeasing to the gods is also pleasing to them. So I will let you off on this point, Euthyphron; and all the gods shall agree in thinking your fathers deed wrong, and in hating it, if you like. But shall we correct our definition and say that whatever all the gods hate is unholy, and whatever they all love is holy: while whatever some of them love, and others hate, is either both or neither? Do you wish us now to define holiness and unholiness in this manner?

Euthyphro/ Why not, Socrates?

Socrates/ There is no reason why I should not, Euthyphron. It is for you to consider whether that definition will help you to instruct me as you promised.

Euthyphro/ Well, I should say that holiness is what all the gods love, and that unholiness is what they all hate.

Socrates/ Are we to examine this definition, Euthyphron, and see if it is a good one? or are we to be content to accept the bare assertions of other men, or of ourselves, without asking any questions? Or must we examine the assertions?

Euthyphro/ We must examine them. But for my part I think that the definition is right this time.

Socrates/ We shall know that better in a little while, my good friend. Now consider this question. Do the gods love holiness because it is holy, or is it holy because they love it?

Euthyphro/ I do not understand you, Socrates.

Socrates/ I will try to explain myself: we speak of a thing being carried and carrying, and being led and leading, and being seen and seeing; and you understand that all such

expressions mean different things, and what the difference is.

Euthyphro/ Yes, I think I understand.

Socrates/ And we talk of a thing being loved, and, which is different, of a thing loving?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now tell me: is a thing which is being carried in a state of being carried, because it is carried, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ No, because it is carried.

Socrates/ And a thing is in a state of being led, because it is led, and of being seen, because it is seen?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then a thing is not seen because it is in a state of being seen; it is in a state of being seen because it is seen: and a thing is not led because it is in a state of being led; it is in a state of being led because it is led: and a thing is not carried because it is in a state of being carried; it is in a state of being carried because it is carried. Is my meaning clear now, Euthyphron? I mean this: if anything becomes, or is affected, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming; it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; and it is not affected because it is in a state of being affected: it is in a state of being affected because it is affected. Do you not agree?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Is not that which is being loved in a state, either of becoming, or of being affected in some way by something?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the same is true here as in the former cases. A thing is not loved by those who love it because it is

in a state of being loved. It is in a state of being loved because they love it.

Euthyphro/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Well, then, Euthyphron, what do we say about holiness? Is it not loved by all the gods, according to your definition?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ No, because it is holy.

Socrates/ Then it is loved by the gods because it is holy: it is not holy because it is loved by them?

Euthyphro/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But then what is pleasing to the gods is pleasing to them, and is in a state of being loved by them, because they love it?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then holiness is not what is pleasing to the gods, and what is pleasing to the gods is not holy, as you say, Euthyphron. They are different things.

Euthyphro/ And why, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because we are agreed that the gods love holiness because it is holy: and that it is not holy because they love it. Is not this so?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that what is pleasing to the gods because they love it, is pleasing to them by reason of this same love: and that they do not love it because it is pleasing to them.

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ Then, my dear Euthyphron, holiness, and what is pleasing to the gods, are different things. If the gods had loved holiness because it is holy, they would also have loved

what is pleasing to them because it is pleasing to them; but if what is pleasing to them had been pleasing to them because they loved it, then holiness too would have been holiness, because they loved it. But now you see that they are opposite things, and wholly different from each other. For the one is of a sort to be loved because it is loved: while the other is loved, because it is of a sort to be loved. My question, Euthyphron, was, What is holiness? But it turns out that you have not explained to me the essence of holiness; you have been content to mention an attribute which belongs to it, namely, that all the gods love it. You have not yet told me what is its essence. Do not, if you please, keep from me what holiness is; begin again and tell me that. Never mind whether the gods love it, or whether it has other attributes: we shall not differ on that point. Do your best to make clear to me what is holiness and what is unholiness.

Euthyphro/ But, Socrates, I really don't know how to explain to you what is in my mind. Whatever we put forward always somehow moves round in a circle, and will not stay where we place it.

Socrates/ I think that your definitions, Euthyphron, are worthy of my ancestor Daedalus. If they had been mine and I had laid them down, I dare say you would have made fun of me, and said that it was the consequence of my descent from Daedalus that the definitions which I construct run away, as his statues used to, and will not stay where they are placed. But, as it is, the definitions are yours, and the jest would have no point. You yourself see that they will not stay still.

Euthyphro/ Nay, Socrates, I think that the jest is very much in point. It is not my fault that the definition moves round in a circle and will not stay still. But you are the

Daedalus, I think: as far as I am concerned, my definitions would have stayed quiet enough.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, I must be a more skillful artist than Daedalus; he only used to make his own works move; whereas I, you see, can make other people's works move too. And the beauty of it is that I am wise against my will. I would rather that our definitions had remained firm and immovable than have all the wisdom of Daedalus and all the riches of Tantalus to boot. But enough of this. I will do my best to help you to explain to me what holiness is: for I think that you are indolent. Don't give in yet. Tell me; do you not think that all holiness must be just?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Well, then, is all justice holy too? Or, while all holiness is just, is a part only of justice holy, and the rest of it something else?

Euthyphro/ I do not follow you, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yet you have the advantage over me in your youth no less in your wisdom. But, as I say, the wealth of your wisdom makes you indolent. Exert yourself, my good friend: I am not asking you a difficult question. I mean the opposite of what the poet said, when he wrote:

Thou wilt not name Zeus the creator, who made all things: for where there is fear there also is reverence.

Now I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you why?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ I do not think it true to say that where there is fear, there also is reverence. Many people who fear sickness and poverty and other such evils, seem to me to have fear, but no reverence for what they fear. Do you not think so?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ But I think that where there is reverence, there also is fear. Does any man feel reverence and a sense of shame about anything, without at the same time dreading and fearing the character of baseness?

Euthyphro/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ Then, though there is fear wherever there is reverence, it is not correct to say that where there is fear there also is reverence. Reverence does not always accompany fear; for fear, I take it, is wider than reverence. It is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, so that where you have the odd, you must also have number, though where you have number, you do not necessarily have the odd. Now I think you follow me?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Well, then, this is what I meant by the question which I asked you: is there always holiness where there is justice? or, though there is always justice where there is holiness, yet there is not always holiness where there is justice, because holiness is only a part of justice? Shall we say this, or do you differ?

Euthyphro/ No: I agree. I think that you are right.

Socrates/ Now observe the next point. If holiness is a part of justice, we must find out, I suppose, what part of justice it is? Now, if you had asked me just now, for instance, what part of number is the odd, and what number is an odd number, I should have said that whatever number is not even, is an odd number. Is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then see if you can explain to me what part of justice is holiness, that I may tell Meletus that now that I have learnt perfectly from you what actions are pious and holy, and what are not, he must give up prosecuting me unjustly for impiety.

Euthyphro/ Well then, Socrates, I should say that piety and holiness are that part of justice which has to do with the attention which is due to the gods: and that what has to do with the attention which is due to men, is the remaining part of justice.

Socrates/ And I think that your answer is a good one, Euthyphron. But there is one little point, of which I still want to hear more. I do not yet understand what the attention or care which you are speaking of is. I suppose you do not mean that the care which we show to the gods is like the care which we show to other things. We say, for instance, do we not, that not everyone knows how to take care of horses, but only the trainer of horses?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For I suppose that the art that relates to horses means the care of horses.

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And not everyone understands the care of dogs, but only the huntsman.

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ For I suppose that the huntsman's art means the care of dogs.

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the herdsman's art means the care of cattle.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And you say that holiness and piety mean the care of the gods, Euthyphron?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Well, then, has not all care the same object? Is it not for the good and benefit of that on which it is bestowed? for instance, you see that horses are benefited

and improved when they are cared for by the art which is concerned with them. Is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Yes; I think so.

Socrates/ And dogs are benefited and improved by the huntsman's art, and cattle by the herdsman's, are they not? And the same is always true. Or do you think the care is ever meant to hurt that on which it is bestowed?

Euthyphro/ No indeed; certainly not.

Socrates/ But to benefit it?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then is holiness, which is the care which we bestow on the gods, intended to benefit the gods, or to improve them? Should you allow that you make any of the gods better, when you do an holy action?

Euthyphro/ No indeed; certainly not.

Socrates/ No: I am quite sure that that is not your meaning, Euthyphron: it was for that reason that I asked you what you meant by the attention due to the gods. I thought that you did not mean that.

Euthyphro/ You were right, Socrates. I do not mean that.

Socrates/ Good. Then what sort of attention to the gods will holiness be?

Euthyphro/ The attention, Socrates, of slaves to their masters.

Socrates/ I understand: then it is a kind of service to the gods?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Can you tell me what result the art which serves a doctor serves to produce? Is it not health?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what result does the art which serves a shipwright serve to produce?

Euthyphro/ A ship, of course, Socrates.

Socrates/ The result of the art which serves a builder is a house, is it not?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then tell me, my excellent friend: What result will the art which serves the gods serve to produce? You must know, seeing that you say that you know more about divine things than any other man.

Euthyphro/ Well, that is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then tell me, I beseech you, what is that grand result which the gods use our services to produce?

Euthyphro/ The results are many and noble, Socrates.

Socrates/ So are those, my dear sir, which a general produces. Yet it is easy to see that the crowning result of them all is victory in war, is it not?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ And, I take it, the husbandman produces many fine results; yet the crowning result of them all is that he makes the earth produce food.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, what is the crowning one of the many and noble results which the gods produce?

Euthyphro/ I told you just now, Socrates, that it is not so easy to learn the exact truth in all these matters. However, broadly I say this: if any man knows that his words and deeds in prayer and sacrifice are acceptable to the gods, that is what is holy: that preserves the common weal, as it does private households, from evil; but the opposite of what is acceptable to the gods is impious, and this it is that brings ruin and destruction on all things.

Socrates/ Certainly, Euthyphron, if you had wished, you could have answered my main question in far fewer words. But you are evidently not anxious to instruct me: just now, when you were just on the point of telling me what I want to know, you stopped short. If you had gone on then, I should have learnt from you clearly enough by this time what is holiness. But now I am asking you questions, and must follow wherever you lead me; so tell me, what is it that you mean by the holy and holiness? Do you not mean a science of prayer and sacrifice?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ To sacrifice is to give to the gods, and to pray is to ask of them, is it not?

Euthyphro/ It is, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then you say that holiness is the science of asking of the gods, and giving to them?

Euthyphro/ You understand my meaning exactly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, for I am eager to share your wisdom, Euthyphron, and so I am all attention: nothing that you say will fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service of the gods? You say it is to ask of them, and to give to them?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Then, to ask rightly will be to ask of them what we stand in need of from them, will it not?

Euthyphro/ Naturally.

Socrates/ And to give rightly will be to give back to them what they stand in need of from us? It would not be very clever to make a present to a man of something that he has no need of.

Euthyphro/ True, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, holiness, Euthyphron, will be an art of traffic between gods and men?

Euthyphro/ Yes, if you like to call it so.

Socrates/ Nay, I like nothing but what is true. But tell me, how are the gods benefited by the gifts which they receive from us? What they give us is plain enough. Every good thing that we have is their gift. But how are they benefited by what we give them? Have we the advantage over them in this traffic so much that we receive from them all the good things we possess and give them nothing in return?

Euthyphro/ But do you suppose, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by the gifts which they receive from us?

Socrates/ But what are these gifts, Euthyphron, that we give the gods?

Euthyphro/ What do you think but honor, and homage, and, as I have said, what is acceptable to them.

Socrates/ Then holiness, Euthyphron, is acceptable to the gods, but it is not profitable, nor dear to them?

Euthyphro/ I think that nothing is dearer to them.

Socrates/ Then I see that holiness means that which is dear to the gods.

Euthyphro/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ After that, shall you be surprised to find that your definitions move about, instead of staying where you place them? Shall you charge me with being the Daedalus that makes them move, when you yourself are far more skillful than Daedalus was, and make them go round in a circle? Do you not see that our definition has come round to where it was before? Surely you remember that we have already seen that holiness, and what is pleasing to the gods, are quite different things. Do you not remember?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ And now do you not see that you say that what the gods love is holy? But does not what the gods love come to the same thing as what is pleasing to the gods?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then either our former conclusion was wrong, or, if that was right, we are wrong now.

Euthyphro/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then we must begin again, and inquire what is holiness. I do not mean to give in until I have found out. Do not deem me unworthy; give your whole mind to the question, and this time tell me the truth. For if anyone knows it, it is you; and you are a Proteus whom I must not let go until you have told me. It cannot be that you would ever have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for the murder of a laboring man unless you had known exactly what is holiness and unholiness. You would have feared to risk the anger of the gods, in case you should be doing wrong, and you would have been afraid of what men would say. But now I am sure that you think that you know exactly what is holiness and what is not: so tell me, my excellent Euthyphron, and do not conceal from me what you hold it to be.

Euthyphro/ Another time, then, Socrates. I am in a hurry now, and it is time for me to be off.

Socrates/ What are you doing, my friend! Will you go away and destroy all my hopes of learning from you what is holy and what is not, and so of escaping Meletus? I meant to explain to him that now Euthyphron has made me wise about divine things, and that I no longer in my ignorance speak rashly about them or introduce novelties in them; and then I was going to promise him to live a better life for the future.

Euthyphro

Translated by Lane Cooper.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Euthyphron.

Euthyphro/ This, Socrates, is something new? What has taken you from your haunts in the Lyceum, and makes you spend your time at the royal porch? You surely cannot have a case at law, as I have, before the Archon-King.

Socrates/ My business, Euthyphro, is not what is known at Athens as a case at law; it is a criminal prosecution.

Euthyphro/ How is that? You mean that somebody is prosecuting you? I never would believe that you were prosecuting anybody else.

Socrates/ No indeed.

Euthyphro/ Then somebody is prosecuting you?

Socrates/ Most certainly.

Euthyphro/ Who is it?

Socrates/ I am not too clear about the man myself, Euthyphro. He appears to me to be a young man, and unknown. I think, however, that they call him Meletus, and his deme is Pitthos, if you happen to know anyone named Meletus of that deme—a hook-nosed man with long straight hair, and not much beard.

Euthyphro/ I don't recall him, Socrates. But tell me, of what does he accuse you?

Socrates/ His accusation? It is no mean charge. For a man of his age it is no small thing to have settled a question of so much importance. He says, in fact, that he knows the method by which young people are corrupted, and knows who the persons are that do it. He is, quite possibly, a wise

man, and, observing that my ignorance has led me to corrupt his generation, comes like a child to his mother to accuse me to the city. And to me he appears to be the only one who begins his political activity aright, for the right way to begin is to pay attention to the young, and make them just as good as possible—precisely as the able farmer will give his attention to the young plants first, and afterward care for the rest. And so Meletus no doubt begins by clearing us away, the ones who ruin, as he says, the tender shoots of the young. That done, he obviously will care for the older generation, and will thus become the cause, in the highest and widest measure, of benefit to the state. With such a notable beginning, his chances of success look good.

Euthyphro/ I hope so, Socrates, but I'm very much afraid it will go the other way. When he starts to injure you, it simply looks to me like beginning at the hearth to hurt the state. But tell me what he says you do to corrupt the young.

Socrates/ It sounds very queer, my friend, when first you hear it. He says I am a maker of gods; he charges me with making new gods, and not believing in the old ones. These are his grounds for prosecuting me, he says.

Euthyphro/ I see it, Socrates. It is because you say that ever and anon you have the spiritual sign! So he charges you in this indictment with introducing novelties in religion, and that is the reason why he comes to court with this slanderous complaint, well knowing how easily such matters can be misrepresented to the crowd. For my own part, when I speak in the Assembly about matters of religion, and tell them in advance what will occur, they laugh at me as if I were a madman, and yet I never have made a prediction that did not come true. But the truth is, they are jealous of all such people as ourselves. No, we must not worry over them, but go to meet them.

Socrates/ Dear Euthyphro, if we were only laughed at, it would be no serious matter. The Athenians, as it seems to me, are not very much disturbed if they think that so-and-so is clever, so long as he does not impart his knowledge to anybody else. But the moment they suspect that he is giving his ability to others, they get angry, whether out of jealousy, as you say, or, it may be, for some other reason.

Euthyphro/ With regard to that, I am not very eager to test their attitude to me.

Socrates/ Quite possibly you strike them as a man who is chary of himself, and is unwilling to impart his wisdom; as for me, I fear I am so kindly they will think that I pour out all I have to everyone, and not merely without pay—nay, rather, glad to offer something if it would induce someone to hear me. Well then, as I said just now, if they were going to laugh at me, as you say they do at you, it wouldn't be at all unpleasant to spend the time laughing and joking in court. But if they take the matter seriously, then there is no knowing how it will turn out. Only you prophets can tell!

Euthyphro/ Well, Socrates, perhaps no harm will come of it at all, but you will carry your case as you desire, and I think that I shall carry mine.

Socrates/ Your case, Euthyphro? What is it? Are you prosecuting, or defending?

Euthyphro/ Prosecuting.

Socrates/ Whom?

Euthyphro/ One whom I am thought a maniac to be attacking.

Socrates/ How so? Is it someone who has wings to fly away with?

Euthyphro/ He is far from being able to do that; he happens to be old, a very old man.

Socrates/ Who is it, then?

Euthyphro/ It is my father.

Socrates/ Your father, my good friend?

Euthyphro/ Just so.

Socrates/ What is the complaint? Of what do you accuse him?

Euthyphro/ Of murder, Socrates.

Socrates/ Good heavens, Euthyphro! Surely the crowd is ignorant of the way things ought to go. I fancy it is not correct for any ordinary person to do that [to prosecute his father on this charge], but only for a man already far advanced in point of wisdom.

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, by heaven! Far advanced!

Socrates/ And the man your father killed, was he a relative of yours? Of course he was? You never would prosecute your father, would you, for the death of anybody who was not related to you?

Euthyphro/ You amuse me, Socrates. You think it makes a difference whether the victim was a member of the family, or not related, when the only thing to watch is whether it was right or not for the man who did the deed to kill him. If he was justified, then let him go; if not, you have to prosecute him, no matter if the man who killed him shares your hearth, and sits at table with you. The pollution is the same if, knowingly, you associate with such a man, and do not cleanse yourself, and him as well, by bringing him to justice. The victim in this case was a laborer of mine, and when we were cultivating land in Naxos, we employed him on our farm. One day he had been drinking, and became enraged at one of our domestics, and cut his throat; whereupon my father bound him hand and foot, and threw him into a ditch. Then he sent a man to Athens to find out from the seer what ought to be done—meanwhile paying no attention to the man

who had been bound, neglecting him because he was a murderer and it would be no great matter even if he died. And that was just what happened. Hunger, cold, and the shackles finished him before the messenger got back from visiting the seer. That is why my father and my other kin are bitter at me when I prosecute my father as a murderer. They say he did not kill the man, and had he actually done it, the victim was himself a murderer, and for such a man one need have no consideration. They say that for a son to prosecute his father as a murderer is unholy. How ill they know divinity in its relation, Socrates, to what is holy or unholy!

Socrates/ But you, by heaven! Euthyphro, you think that you have such an accurate knowledge of things divine, and what is holy and unholy, that, in circumstances such as you describe, you can accuse your father? You are not afraid that you yourself are doing an unholy deed?

Euthyphro/ Why, Socrates, if I did not have an accurate knowledge of all that, I should be good for nothing, and Euthyphro would be no different from the general run of men.

Socrates/ Well then, admirable Euthyphro, the best thing I can do is to become your pupil, and challenge Meletus before the trial comes on. Let me tell him that in the past I have considered it of great importance to know about things divine, and that now, when he asserts that I erroneously put forward my own notions and inventions on this head, I have become your pupil. I could say, Come, Meletus, if you agree that Euthyphro has wisdom in such matters, you must admit as well that I hold the true belief, and must not prosecute. If you do not, you must lodge your complaint, not against me, but against my aforesaid master; accuse him of corrupting the elder generation, me and his own father—me by his instruction, his father by correcting and chastising him.

And if he would not yield, would neither quit the suit nor yet indict you rather than myself, then I would say the same in court as when I challenged him!

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, by heaven! If he undertook to bring me into court, I guess I would find out his rotten spot, and our talk there would concern him sooner by a long shot than ever it would me!

Socrates/ Yes, my dear friend, that I know, and so I wish to be your pupil. This Meletus, I perceive, along presumably with everybody else, appears to overlook you, but sees into me so easily and keenly that he has attacked me for impiety. So, in the name of heaven, tell me now about the matter you just felt sure you knew quite thoroughly. State what you take piety and impiety to be with reference to murder and all other cases. Is not the holy always one and the same thing in every action, and, again, is not the unholy always opposite to the holy, and like itself? And as unholiness does it not always have its one essential form, which will be found in everything that is unholy?

Euthyphro/ Yes, surely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then tell me. How do you define the holy and the unholy?

Euthyphro/ Well then, I say that the holy is what I am now doing, prosecuting the wrongdoer who commits a murder or a sacrilegious robbery, or sins in any point like that, whether it be your father, or your mother, or whoever it may be. And not to prosecute would be unholy. And, Socrates, observe what a decisive proof I will give you that such is the law. It is one I have already given to others; I tell them that the right procedure must be not to tolerate the impious man, no matter who. Does not mankind believe that Zeus is the most excellent and just among the gods? And these same men admit that Zeus shackled his own father

[Cronus] for swallowing his [other] sons unjustly, and that Cronus in turn had gelded his father [Uranus] for like reasons. But now they are enraged at me when I proceed against my father for wrongdoing, and so they contradict themselves in what they say about the gods and what they say of me.

Socrates/ There, Euthyphro, you have the reason why the charge is brought against me. It is because, whenever people tell such stories about the gods, I am prone to take it ill, and, so it seems, that is why they will maintain that I am sinful. Well, now, if you who are so well versed in matters of the sort entertain the same beliefs, then necessarily, it would seem, I must give in, for what could we urge who admit that, for our own part, we are quite ignorant about these matters? But, in the name of friendship, tell me! Do you actually believe that these things happened so?

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, and things even more amazing, of which the multitude does not know.

Socrates/ And you actually believe that war occurred among the gods, and there were dreadful hatreds, battles, and all sorts of fearful things like that? Such things as the poets tell of, and good artists represent in sacred places; yes, and at the great Panathenaic festival the robe that is carried up to the Acropolis is all inwrought with such embellishments? What is our position, Euthyphro? Do we say that these things are true?

Euthyphro/ Not these things only, Socrates, but, as I just now said, I will, if you wish, relate to you many other stories about the gods, which I am certain will astonish you when you hear them.

Socrates/ I shouldn't wonder. You shall tell me all about them when we have the leisure at some other time. At present try to tell me more clearly what I asked you a little

while ago, for, my friend, you were not explicit enough before when I put the question. What is holiness? You merely said that what you are now doing is a holy deed —namely, prosecuting your father on a charge of murder.

Euthyphro/ And, Socrates, I told the truth.

Socrates/ Possibly. But, Euthyphro, there are many other things that you will say are holy.

Euthyphro/ Because they are.

Socrates/ Well, bear in mind that what I asked of you was not to tell me one or two out of all the numerous actions that are holy; I wanted you to tell me what is the essential form of holiness which makes all holy actions holy. I believe you held that there is one ideal form by which unholy things are all unholy, and by which all holy things are holy. Do you remember that?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Well then, show me what, precisely, this ideal is, so that, with my eye on it, and using it as a standard, I can say that any action done by you or anybody else is holy if it resembles this ideal, or, if it does not, can deny that it is holy.

Euthyphro/ Well, Socrates, if that is what you want, I certainly can tell you.

Socrates/ It is precisely what I want.

Euthyphro/ Well then, what is pleasing to the gods is holy, and what is not pleasing to them is unholy.

Socrates/ Perfect, Euthyphro! Now you give me just the answer that I asked for. Meanwhile, whether it is right I do not know, but obviously you will go on to prove your statement true.

Euthyphro/ Indeed I will.

Socrates/ Come now, let us scrutinize what we are saying. What is pleasing to the gods, and the man that pleases them, are holy; what is hateful to the gods, and the man they hate, unholy. But the holy and unholy are not the same; the holy is directly opposite to the unholy. Isn't it so?

Euthyphro/ It is.

Socrates/ And the matter clearly was well stated.

Euthyphro/ I accept it, Socrates; that was stated.

Socrates/ Was it not also stated, Euthyphro, that the gods revolt and differ with each other, and that hatreds come between them?

Euthyphro/ That was stated.

Socrates/ Hatred and wrath, my friend—what kind of disagreement will produce them? Look at the matter thus. If you and I were to differ about numbers, on the question which of two was the greater, would a disagreement about that make us angry at each other, and make enemies of us? Should we not settle things by calculation, and so come to an agreement quickly on any point like that?

Euthyphro/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And similarly if we differed on a question of greater length or less, we would take a measurement, and quickly put an end to the dispute?

Euthyphro/ Just that.

Socrates/ And so, I fancy, we should have recourse to scales, and settle any question about a heavier or lighter weight?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ What sort of thing, then, is it about which we differ, till, unable to arrive at a decision, we might get angry and be enemies to one another? Perhaps you have no answer ready, but listen to me. See if it is not the following—right

and wrong, the noble and the base, and good and bad. Are not these the things about which we differ, till, unable to arrive at a decision, we grow hostile, when we do grow hostile, to each other, you and I and everybody else?

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, that is where we differ, on these subjects.

Socrates/ What about the gods, then, Euthyphro? If, indeed, they have dissensions, must it not be on these subjects?

Euthyphro/ Quite necessarily.

Socrates/ Accordingly, my noble Euthyphro, by your account some gods take one thing to be right, and others take another, and similarly with the honorable and the base, and good and bad. They would hardly be at variance with each other, if they did not differ on these questions. Would they?

Euthyphro/ You are right.

Socrates/ And what each one of them thinks noble, good, and just, is what he loves, and the opposite is what he hates?

Euthyphro/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ But it is the same things, so you say, that some of them think right, and others wrong, and through disputing about these they are at variance, and make war on one another. Isn't it so?

Euthyphro/ It is.

Socrates/ Accordingly, so it would seem, the same things will be hated by the gods and loved by them; the same things would alike displease and please them.

Euthyphro/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ And so, according to this argument, the same things, Euthyphro, will be holy and unholy.

Euthyphro/ That may be.

Socrates/ In that case, admirable friend, you have not answered what I asked you. I did not ask you to tell me what at once is holy and unholy, but it seems that what is pleasing to the gods is also hateful to them. Thus, Euthyphro, it would not be strange at all if what you now are doing in punishing your father were pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronus and Uranus, and welcome to Hephaestus, but odious to Hera, and if any other of the gods disagree about the matter, satisfactory to some of them, and odious to others.

Euthyphro/ But, Socrates, my notion is that, on this point, there is no difference of opinion among the gods—not one of them but thinks that if a person kills another wrongfully, he ought to pay for it.

Socrates/ And what of men? Have you never heard a man contending that someone who has killed a person wrongfully, or done some other unjust deed, ought not to pay the penalty?

Euthyphro/ Why! There is never any end to their disputes about these matters; it goes on everywhere, above all in the courts. People do all kinds of wrong, and then there is nothing they will not do or say in order to escape the penalty.

Socrates/ Do they admit wrongdoing, Euthyphro, and, while admitting it, deny that they ought to pay the penalty?

Euthyphro/ No, not that, by any means.

Socrates/ Then they will not do and say quite everything. Unless I am mistaken, they dare not say or argue that if they do wrong they should not pay the penalty. No, I think that they deny wrongdoing. How about it?

Euthyphro/ It is true.

Socrates/ Therefore they do not dispute that anybody who does wrong should pay the penalty. No, the thing that

they dispute about is likely to be who is the wrongdoer, what he did, and when.

Euthyphro/ That is true.

Socrates/ Well then, isn't that precisely what goes on among the gods, if they really do have quarrels about right and wrong, as you say they do? One set will hold that some others do wrong, and the other set deny it? For that other thing, my friend, I take it no one, whether god or man, will dare to say—that the wrongdoer should not pay the penalty!

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, what you say is true—in the main.

Socrates/ It is the individual act, I fancy, Euthyphro, that the disputants dispute about, both men and gods, if gods ever do dispute. They differ on a certain act; some hold that it was rightly done, the others that it was wrong. Isn't it so?

Euthyphro/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Then come, dear Euthyphro, teach me as well, and let me grow more wise. What proof have you that all the gods think that your servant died unjustly, your hireling, who, when he had killed a man, was shackled by the master of the victim, and perished, dying because of his shackles before the man who shackled him could learn from the seers what ought to be done with him? What proof have you that for a man like him it is right for a son to prosecute his father, and indict him on a charge of murder? Come on. Try to make it clear to me beyond all doubt that under these conditions the gods must all consider this action to be right. If you can adequately prove it to me, I will never cease from praising you for your wisdom.

Euthyphro/ But, Socrates, that, very likely, would be no small task, although I could indeed make it very clear to you.

Socrates/ I understand. You think that I am duller than the judges; obviously you will demonstrate to them that what

your father did was wrong, and that the gods all hate such deeds.

Euthyphro/ I shall prove it absolutely, Socrates, if they will listen to me.

Socrates/ They are sure to listen if they think that you speak well. But while you were talking, a notion came into my head, and I asked myself, Suppose that Euthyphro proved to me quite clearly that all the gods consider such a death unjust; would I have come one whit the nearer for him to knowing what the holy is, and what is the unholy? The act in question, seemingly, might be displeasing to the gods, but then we have just seen that you cannot define the holy and unholy in that way, for we have seen that a given thing may be displeasing, and also pleasing, to gods. So on this point, Euthyphro, I will let you off; if you like, the gods shall all consider the act unjust, and they all shall hate it. But suppose that we now correct our definition, and say what the gods all hate is unholy, and what they love is holy, whereas what some of them love, and others hate, is either both or neither. Are you willing that we now define the holy and unholy in this way?

Euthyphro/ What is there to prevent us, Socrates?

Socrates/ Nothing to prevent me, Euthyphro. As for you, see whether when you take this definition you can quite readily instruct me, as you promised.

Euthyphro/ Yes, I would indeed affirm that holiness is what the gods all love, and its opposite is what the gods all hate, unholiness.

Socrates/ Are we to examine this position also, Euthyphro, to see if it is sound? Or shall we let it through, and thus accept our own and others' statement, and agree to an assertion simply when somebody says that a thing is so? Must we not look into what the speaker says?

Euthyphro/ We must. And yet, for my part, I regard the present statement as correct.

Socrates/ We shall soon know better about that, my friend. Now think of this. Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?

Euthyphro/ I do not get your meaning.

Socrates/ Well, I will try to make it clearer. We speak of what is carried and the carrier, do we not, of led and leader, of the seen and that which sees? And you understand that in all such cases the things are different, and how they differ?

Euthyphro/ Yes, I think I understand.

Socrates/ In the same way what is loved is one thing, and what loves is another?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Tell me now, is what is carried ‘carried' because something carries it, or is it for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ No, but for that reason.

Socrates/ And what is led, because something leads it? And what is seen, because something sees it?

Euthyphro/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Then it is not because a thing is seen that something sees it, but just the opposite—because something sees it, therefore it is seen. Nor because it is led, that something leads it, but because something leads it, therefore it is led. Nor because it is carried, that something carries it, but because something carries it, therefore it is carried. Do you see what I wish to say, Euthyphro? It is this. Whenever an effect occurs, or something is effected, it is not the thing effected that gives rise to the effect; no, there is a cause, and then comes this effect. Nor is it because a thing is acted on

that there is this effect; no, there is a cause for what it undergoes, and then comes this effect. Don't you agree?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Well then, when a thing is loved, is it not in process of becoming something, or of undergoing something, by some other thing?

Euthyphro/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Then the same is true here as in the previous cases. It is not because a thing is loved that they who love it love it, but it is loved because they love it.

Euthyphro/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Then what are we to say about the holy, Euthyphro? According to your argument, is it not loved by all the gods?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ No, it is for that reason.

Socrates/ And so it is because it is holy that it is loved; it is not holy because it is loved.

Euthyphro/ So it seems.

Socrates/ On the other hand, it is beloved and pleasing to the gods just because they love it?

Euthyphro/ No doubt of that.

Socrates/ So what is pleasing to the gods is not the same as what is holy, Euthyphro, nor, according to your statement, is the holy the same as what is pleasing to the gods. They are two different things.

Euthyphro/ How may that be, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because we are agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy, and is not holy because it is loved. Isn't it so?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whereas what is pleasing to the gods is pleasing to them just because they love it, such being its nature and its cause. It's being loved of the gods is not the reason of its being loved.

Euthyphro/ You are right.

Socrates/ But suppose, dear Euthyphro, that what is pleasing to the gods and what is holy were not two separate things. In that case if holiness were loved because it was holy, then also what was pleasing to the gods would be loved because it pleased them. And, on the other hand, if what was pleasing to them pleased because they loved it, then also the holy would be holy because they loved it. But now you see that it is just the opposite, because the two are absolutely different from each other, for the one [what is pleasing to the gods] is of a sort to be loved because it is loved, whereas the other [what is holy] is loved because it is of a sort to be loved. Consequently, Euthyphro, it looks as if you had not given me my answer—as if when you were asked to tell the nature of the holy, you did not wish to explain the essence of it. You merely tell an attribute of it, namely, that it appertains to holiness to be loved by all the gods. What it is, as yet you have not said. So, if you please, do not conceal this from me. No, begin again. Say what the holy is, and never mind if gods do love it, nor if it has some other attribute; on that we shall not split. Come, speak out. Explain the nature of the holy and unholy.

Euthyphro/ Now, Socrates, I simply don't know how to tell you what I think. Somehow everything that we put forward keeps moving about us in a circle, and nothing will stay where we put it.

Socrates/ Your statements, Euthyphro, look like the work of Daedalus, founder of my line. If I had made them, and

they were my positions, no doubt you would poke fun at me, and say that, being in his line, the figures I construct in words run off, as did his statues, and will not stay where they are put. Meanwhile, since they are your definitions, we need some other jest, for in fact, as you see yourself, they will not stand still.

Euthyphro/ But, Socrates, it seems to me that the jest is quite to the point. This tendency in our statements to go in a circle, and not to stay in one place, it is not I who put it there. To my mind, it is you who are the Daedalus; so far as I am concerned, they would have held their place.

Socrates/ If so, my friend, I must be more expert in his art than he, in that he merely made his own works capable of moving, whereas I give this power not merely to my own, but, seemingly, to the works of other men as well. And the rarest thing about my talent is that I am an unwilling artist, since I would rather see our arguments stand fast and hold their ground than have the art of Daedalus plus all the wealth of Tantalus to boot. But enough of this. And since, to my mind, you are languid, I will myself make bold with you to show how you might teach me about holiness. Do not weaken. See if you do not think that of necessity all that is holy is just.

Euthyphro/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Well then, is all justice holy too? Or, granted that all holiness is just, is justice not all holy, but some part of it is holy, and some part of it is not?

Euthyphro/ I do not follow, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet you surpass me in your wisdom not less than by your youth. I repeat, you are languid through your affluence in wisdom. Come, lucky friend, exert yourself! What I have to say is not so hard to grasp. I mean the very opposite of what the poet wrote.

> Zeus, who brought that all to pass, and made it all to grow,
> You will not name, for where fear is, there too is reverence.

On that I differ from the poet. Shall I tell you why?

Euthyphro/ By all means.

Socrates/ I do not think that 'where fear is, there too is reverence.' For it seems to me that there are many who fear sickness, poverty, and all the like, and so are afraid, but have no reverence whatever for the things they are afraid of. Does it not seem so to you?

Euthyphro/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Where, however, you have reverence, there you have fear as well. Is there anybody who has reverence and a sense of shame about an act, and does not at the same time dread and fear an evil reputation?

Euthyphro/ Yes, he will be afraid of it.

Socrates/ So it is not right to say that 'where fear is, there too is reverence.' No, you may say that where reverence is, there too is fear—not, however, that where fear is, there always you have reverence. Fear, I think, is wider in extent than reverence. Reverence is a part of fear, as the uneven is a part of number; thus you do not have the odd wherever you have number, but where you have the odd you must have number. I take it you are following me now?

Euthyphro/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Well then, what I asked you was like that. I asked you if wherever justice is, there is holiness as well; or, granted that wherever there is holiness, there is justice too, if where justice is, the holy is not always to be found. Thus holiness would be a part of justice. Shall we say so, or have you a different view?

Euthyphro/ No, that is my opinion. I think that you are clearly right.

Socrates/ Then see what follows. If holiness is a part of justice, it seems to me that we must find out what part of justice it is. Suppose, for instance, in our case just now, you had asked me what part of number is the even, and which the even number is. I would have said it is the one that corresponds to the isosceles, and not to the scalene. Does it not seem so to you?

Euthyphro/ It does.

Socrates/ Then try to show me in this way what part of the just is holiness, so that we may tell Meletus to cease from wronging me, and to give up prosecuting me for irreligion, because we have adequately learned from you of piety and holiness, and the reverse.

Euthyphro/ Well then, Socrates, I think that the part of justice which is religious and is holy is the part that has to do with the service of the gods; the remainder is the part of justice that has to do with the service of mankind.

Socrates/ And what you say there, Euthyphro, to me seems excellent. There is one little point, however, on which I need more light. I am not yet quite clear about the thing which you call ‘service.' I suppose you do not mean the sort of care we give to other things. The ‘service' of the gods is not like that—the sort of thing we have in mind when we assert that it is not everybody who knows how to care for horses. It is the horseman that knows, is it not?

Euthyphro/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ I suppose it is the special care that appertains to horses?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ In the same way, it is not everyone who knows about the care of dogs; it is the huntsman.

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ The art of the huntsman is the care of dogs.

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that of the herdsman is the care of cattle.

Euthyphro/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And in the same way, Euthyphro, holiness and piety mean caring for the gods? Do you say so?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ And so the aim of all this care and service is the same? I mean it thus. The care is given for the good and welfare of the object that is served. You see, for instance, how the horses that are cared for by the horseman's art are benefited and made better. Don't you think so?

Euthyphro/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ And so no doubt the dogs by the art of the huntsman, the cattle by that of the herdsman, and in like manner all the rest. Unless, perhaps, you think that the care may tend to injure the object that is cared for?

Euthyphro/ By heaven, not I!

Socrates/ The care aims at its benefit?

Euthyphro/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Then holiness, which is the service of the gods, must likewise aim to benefit the gods and make them better? Are you prepared to say that when you do a holy thing you make some deity better?

Euthyphro/ By heaven, not I!

Socrates/ Nor do I fancy, Euthyphro, that you mean it so—far from it. No, it was on this account that I asked just what you meant by service of the gods, supposing that, in fact, you did not mean that sort of care.

Euthyphro/ And, Socrates, you were right. I do not mean it so.

Socrates/ Good. And now what kind of service of the gods will holiness be?

Euthyphro/ Socrates, it is the kind that slaves give to their masters.

Socrates/ I understand. It seems to be a kind of waiting on the gods.

Euthyphro/ Just that.

Socrates/ See if you can tell me this. The art which serves physicians, what result does it serve to produce? Don't you think that it is health?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Further, what about the art that serves the ship-wrights? What result does it serve to produce?

Euthyphro/ Obviously, Socrates, the making of a ship.

Socrates/ And that which serves the builders serves the building of a house?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now tell me, best of friends, about the service of the gods. What result will this art serve to produce? You obviously know, since you profess to be the best informed among mankind on things divine!

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, I say so, and I tell the truth.

Socrates/ Then tell me, I adjure you, what is that supreme result which the gods produce when they employ our services?

Euthyphro/ They do many things and noble, Socrates.

Socrates/ Just as the generals do, my friend. All the same you would have no trouble in summing up what they produce, by saying it is victory in war. Isn't it so?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ And the farmers too, I take it, produce many fine results, but the net result of their production is the food they get from the earth.

Euthyphro/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ Well now, of the many fine and noble things which the gods produce, what is the sum of their production?

Euthyphro/ Just a little while ago I told you, Socrates, that the task is not a light one to learn precisely how all these matters stand. I will, however, simply tell you this. If anyone knows how to say and do things pleasing to the gods in prayer and sacrifice, that is holiness, and such behavior saves the family in private life together with the common interests of the state. To do the opposite of things pleasing to the gods is impious, and this it is that upsets all and ruins everything.

Socrates/ Surely, Euthyphro, if you had wished, you could have summed up what I asked for much more briefly. But the fact is that you are not eager to instruct me. That is clear. But a moment since, you were on the very point of telling me—and you slipped away. Had you given the answer. I would now have learned from you what holiness is, and would be content. As it is—for perforce the lover must follow the loved one wherever he leads the way—once more, how do you define the holy, and what is holiness? Don't you say that it is a science of sacrifice and prayer?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Well, and is not sacrifice a giving to the gods, and prayer an asking them to give?

Euthyphro/ Precisely, Socrates.

Socrates/ By this reasoning, holiness would be the science of asking from the gods and giving to them.

Euthyphro/ Quite right, Socrates; you have caught my meaning perfectly.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, for I have my heart set on your wisdom, and give my mind to it, so that nothing you say shall be lost. No, tell me, what is this service to the gods? You say it is to ask of them and give to them?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ And hence to ask aright will be to ask them for those things of which we stand in need from them?

Euthyphro/ What else?

Socrates/ And, on the other hand, to give aright will be to give them in return those things which they may need to receive from us? I take it there would be no art in offering anyone a gift of something that he did not need.

Euthyphro/ True, Socrates.

Socrates/ And therefore, Euthyphro, holiness will be a mutual art of commerce between gods and men.

Euthyphro/ An art of commerce, if you like to call it so.

Socrates/ Well, I do not like it if it is not so. But tell me, what advantage could come to the gods from the gifts which they receive from us? Everybody sees what they give us. No good that we possess but is given by them. What advantage can they gain by what they get from us? Have we so much the better of them in this commerce that we get all good things from them, and they get nothing from us?

Euthyphro/ What! Socrates. Do you suppose that the gods gain anything by what they get from us?

Socrates/ If not, then what would be the meaning, Euthyphro, of these gifts to the gods from us?

Euthyphro/ What do you think they ought to mean but worship, honor, and, as I just now said, good will?

Socrates/ So, Euthyphro, the holy is what pleases them, not what is useful to them, nor yet what the gods love?

Euthyphro/ I believe that what gives them pleasure is precisely what they love.

Socrates/ And so once more, apparently the holy is that which the gods love.

Euthyphro/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ After that, will you be amazed to find your statements walking off, and not staying where you put them? And will you accuse me as the Daedalus who makes them move, when you are yourself far more expert than Daedalus, and make them go round in a circle? Don't you see that our argument has come full circle to the point where it began? Surely you have not forgotten how in what was said before we found that holiness and what is pleasing to the gods were not the same, but different from each other. Do you not remember?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ And are you not aware now that you say that what the gods love is holy? But is not what the gods love just the same as what is pleasing to the gods?

Euthyphro/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, either we were wrong in our recent conclusion, or if that was right, our position now is wrong.

Euthyphro/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And so we must go back again, and start from the beginning to find out what the holy is. As for me, I never will give up until I know. Ah! Do not spurn me, but give your mind with all your might now at length to tell me the absolute truth, for if anybody knows, of all mankind, it is you, and one must not let go of you, you Proteus, until you tell. If you did not know precisely what is holy and unholy,

it is unthinkable that for a simple hireling you ever would have moved to prosecute your aged sire on a charge of murder. No, you would have feared to risk the wrath of the gods on the chance that you were not doing right, and would have been afraid of the talk of men. But now I am sure that you think you know exactly what is holy and what is not. So tell me, peerless Euthyphro, and do not hide from me what you judge it to be.

Euthyphro/ Another time, then, Socrates, for I am in a hurry, and must be off this minute.

Socrates/ What are you doing, my friend? Will you leave, and dash me down from the mighty expectation I had of learning from you what is holy and what is not, and so escaping from Meletus' indictment? I counted upon showing him that now I had gained wisdom about things divine from Euthyphro, and no longer out of ignorance made rash assertions and forged innovations with regard to them, but would lead a better life in future.

Euthyphro.

Translated by Fowler, Harold North.

[OR ON HOLINESS, A TENTATIVE DIALOGUE]

Persons of the Dialog

Euthyphro, Socrates.

Euthyphro/ What strange thing has happened, Socrates, that you have left your accustomed haunts in the Lyceum and are now haunting the portico where the king archon sits? For it cannot be that you have an action before the king, as I have.

Socrates/ Our Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action, but an indictment.

Euthyphro/ What? Somebody has, it seems, brought an indictment against you; for I don't accuse you of having brought one against anyone else.

Socrates/ Certainly not.

Euthyphro/ But someone else against you?

Socrates/ Quite so.

Euthyphro/ Who is he?

Socrates/ I don't know the man very well myself, Euthyphro, for he seems to be a young and unknown person. His name, however, is Meletus, I believe. And he is of the deme of Pitthus, if you remember any Pitthian Meletus, with long hair and only a little beard, but with a hooked nose.

Euthyphro/ I don't remember him, Socrates. But what sort of an indictment has he brought against you?

Socrates/ What sort? No mean one, it seems to me; for the fact that, young as he is, he has apprehended so important a matter reflects no small credit upon him.

For he says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who those are who corrupt them. He must be a wise man; who, seeing my lack of wisdom and that I am corrupting his fellows, comes to the State, as a boy runs to his mother, to accuse me. And he seems to me to be the only one of the public men who begins in the right way; for the right way is to take care of the young men first, to make them as good as possible, just as a good husbandman will naturally take care of the young plants first and afterwards of the rest. And so Meletus, perhaps, is first clearing away us who corrupt the young plants, as he says; then after this, when he has turned his attention to the older men, he will bring countless most precious blessings upon the State, at least, that is the natural outcome of the beginning he has made.

Euthyphro/ I hope it may be so, Socrates; but I fear the opposite may result. For it seems to me that he begins by injuring the State at its very heart, when he undertakes to harm you. Now tell me, what does he say you do that corrupts the young?

Socrates/ Absurd things, my friend, at first hearing. For he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods and do not believe in the old ones, he indicted me for the sake of these old ones, as he says.

Euthyphro/ I understand, Socrates; it is because you say the divine monitor keeps coming to you. So he has brought the indictment against you for making innovations in religion, and he is going into court to slander you, knowing that slanders on such subjects are readily accepted by the people. Why, they even laugh at me and say I am crazy when I say anything in the assembly about divine things and foretell the future to them. And yet there is not one of the things I have foretold that is not true; but they are jealous of all such

men as you and I are. However, we must not be disturbed, but must come to close quarters with them.

Socrates/ My dear Euthyphro, their ridicule is perhaps of no consequence. For the Athenians, I fancy, are not much concerned, if they think a man is clever, provided he does not impart his clever notions to others; but when they think he makes others to be like himself, they are angry with him, either through jealousy, as you say, or for some other reason.

Euthyphro/ I don't much desire to test their sentiments toward me in this matter.

Socrates/ No, for perhaps they think that you are reserved and unwilling to impart your wisdom. But I fear that because of my love of men they think that I not only pour myself out copiously to anyone and everyone without payment, but that I would even pay something myself, if anyone would listen to me. Now if, as I was saying just now, they were to laugh at me, as you say they do at you, it would not be at all unpleasant to pass the time in the court with jests and laughter; but if they are in earnest, then only soothsayers like you can tell how this will end.

Euthyphro/ Well, Socrates, perhaps it won't amount to much, and you will bring your case to a satisfactory ending, as I think I shall mine.

Socrates/ What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you defending or prosecuting?

Euthyphro/ Prosecuting.

Socrates/ Whom?

Euthyphro/ Such a man that they think I am insane because I am prosecuting him.

Socrates/ Why? Are you prosecuting one who has wings to fly away with?

Euthyphro/ No flying for him at his ripe old age.

Socrates/ Who is he?

Euthyphro/ My father.

Socrates/ Your father, my dear man?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what is the charge, and what is the suit about?

Euthyphro/ Murder, Socrates.

Socrates/ Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro, most people do not know where the right lies; for I fancy it is not everyone who can rightly do what you are doing, but only one who is already very far advanced in wisdom.

Euthyphro/ Very far, indeed, Socrates, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Is the one who was killed by your father a relative? But of course he was; for you would not bring a charge of murder against him on a strangers account.

Euthyphro/ It is ridiculous, Socrates, that you think it matters whether the man who was killed was a stranger or a relative, and do not see that the only thing to consider is whether the action of the slayer was justified or not, and that if it was justified one ought to let him alone, and if not, one ought to proceed against him, even if he share ones hearth and eat at ones table. For the pollution is the same if you associate knowingly with such a man and do not purify yourself and him by proceeding against him. In this case, the man who was killed was a hired workman of mine, and when we were farming at Naxos, he was working there on our land. Now he got drunk, got angry with one of our house slaves, and butchered him. So my father bound him hand and foot, threw him into a ditch, and sent a man here to Athens to ask the religious adviser what he

ought to do. In the meantime he paid no attention to the man as he lay there bound, and neglected him, thinking that he was a murderer and it did not matter if he were to die. And that is just what happened to him. For he died of hunger and cold and his bonds before the messenger came back from the adviser. Now my father and the rest of my relatives are angry with me, because for the sake of this murderer I am prosecuting my father for murder. For they say he did not kill him, and if he had killed him never so much, yet since the dead man was a murderer, I ought not to trouble myself about such a fellow, because it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder. Which shows how little they know what the divine law is in regard to holiness and unholiness.

Socrates/ But, in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think your knowledge about divine laws and holiness and unholiness is so exact that, when the facts are as you say, you are not afraid of doing something unholy yourself in prosecuting your father for murder?

Euthyphro/ I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would be in no way different from other men, if I did not have exact knowledge about all such things.

Socrates/ Then the best thing for me, my admirable Euthyphro, is to become your pupil and, before the suit with Meletus comes on, to challenge him and say that I always thought it very important before to know about divine matters and that now, since he says I am doing wrong by acting carelessly and making innovations in matters of religion, I have become your pupil. And Meletus, I should say, if you acknowledge that Euthyphro is wise in such matters, then believe that I also hold correct opinions, and do not bring me to trial; and if you do not acknowledge that, then bring a suit

against him, my teacher, rather than against me, and charge him with corrupting the old, namely, his father and me, which he does by teaching me and by correcting and punishing his father. And if he does not do as I ask and does not release me from the indictment or bring it against you in my stead, I could say in the court the same things I said in my challenge to him, could I not?

Euthyphro/ By Zeus, Socrates, if he should undertake to indict me, I fancy I should find his weak spot, and it would be much more a question about him in court than about me.

Socrates/ And I, my dear friend, perceiving this, wish to become your pupil; for I know that neither this fellow Meletus, nor anyone else, seems to notice you at all, but he has seen through me so sharply and so easily that he has indicted me for impiety. Now in the name of Zeus, tell me what you just now asserted that you knew so well. What do you say is the nature of piety and impiety, both in relation to murder and to other things? Is not holiness always the same with itself in every action, and, on the other hand, is not unholiness the opposite of all holiness, always the same with itself and whatever is to be unholy possessing someone characteristic quality?

Euthyphro/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Tell me then, what do you say holiness is, and what unholiness?

Euthyphro/ Well then, I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrongdoer who commits murder or steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father or your mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting him is unholy. And,

Socrates, see what a sure proof I offer you, —a proof I have already given to others, —that this is established and right and that we ought not to let him who acts impiously go unpunished, no matter who he may be. Men believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and they acknowledge that he put his father in bonds because he wickedly devoured his children, and he in turn had mutilated his father for similar reasons; but they are incensed against me because I proceed against my father when he has done wrong, and so they are inconsistent in what they say about the gods and about me.

Socrates/ Is not this, Euthyphro, the reason why I am being prosecuted, because when people tell such stories about the gods I find it hard to accept them? And therefore, probably, people will say I am wrong. Now if you, who know so much about such things, accept these tales, I suppose I too must give way. For what am I to say, who confess frankly that I know nothing about them? But tell me, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, do you really believe these things happened?

Euthyphro/ Yes, and still more wonderful things than these, Socrates, which most people do not know.

Socrates/ And so you believe that there was really war between the gods, and fearful enmities and battles and other things of the sort, such as are told of by the poets and represented in varied designs by the great artists in our sacred places and especially on the robe which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea? for this is covered with such representations. Shall we agree that these things are true, Euthyphro?

Euthyphro/ Not only these things, Socrates; but, as I said just now, I will, if you like, tell you many other things about the gods, which I am sure will amaze you when you hear them.

Socrates/ I dare say. But you can tell me those things at your leisure some other time. At present try to tell more clearly what I asked you just now. For, my friend, you did not give me sufficient information before, when I asked what holiness was, but you told me that this was holy which you are now doing, prosecuting your father for murder.

Euthyphro/ Well, what I said was true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Perhaps. But, Euthyphro, you say that many other things are holy, do you not?

Euthyphro/ Why, so they are.

Socrates/ Now call to mind that this is not what I asked you, to tell me one or two of the many holy acts, but to tell the essential aspect, by which all holy acts are holy; for you said that all unholy acts were unholy and all holy ones holy by one aspect. Or don't you remember?

Euthyphro/ I remember.

Socrates/ Tell me then what this aspect is, that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a model and, if anything you or anyone else does agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy.

Euthyphro/ If you wish me to explain in that way, I will do so.

Socrates/ I do wish it.

Euthyphro/ Well then, what is dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy.

Socrates/ Excellent, Euthyphro; now you have answered as I asked you to answer. However, whether it is true, I am not yet sure; but you will, of course, show that what you say is true.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, let us examine our words. The thing and the person that are dear to the gods are holy, and the thing and the person that are hateful to the gods are unholy; and the two are not the same, but the holy and the unholy are the exact opposites of each other. Is not this what we have said?

Euthyphro/ Yes, just this.

Socrates/ And it seems to be correct?

Euthyphro/ I think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, have we said this also, that the gods, Euthyphro, quarrel and disagree with each other, and that there is enmity between them?

Euthyphro/ Yes, we have said that.

Socrates/ But what things is the disagreement about, which causes enmity and anger? Let us look at it in this way. If you and I were to disagree about number, for instance, which of two numbers were the greater, would the disagreement about these matters make us enemies and make us angry with each other, or should we not quickly settle it by resorting to arithmetic?

Euthyphro/ Of course we should.

Socrates/ Then, too, if we were to disagree about the relative size of things, we should quickly put an end to the disagreement by measuring?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we should, I suppose, come to terms about relative weights by weighing?

Euthyphro/ Of Course.

Socrates/ But about what would a disagreement be, which we could not settle and which would cause us to be enemies and be angry with each other? Perhaps you cannot give an answer offhand; but let me suggest it. Is it not about right and wrong, and noble and disgraceful, and good and bad? Are not these the questions about which you and I and other people become enemies, when we do become enemies, because we differ about them and cannot reach any satisfactory agreement?

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, these are the questions about which we should become enemies.

Socrates/ And how about the gods, Euthyphro? If they disagree, would they not disagree about these questions?

Euthyphro/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Then, my noble Euthyphro, according to what you say, some of the gods too think some things are right or wrong and noble or disgraceful, and good or bad, and others disagree; for they would not quarrel with each other if they did not disagree about these matters. Is that the case?

Euthyphro/ You are right.

Socrates/ Then the gods in each group love the things which they consider good and right and hate the opposites of these things?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But you say that the same things are considered right by some of them and wrong by others; and it is because they disagree about these things that

they quarrel and wage war with each other. Is not this what you said?

Euthyphro/ It IS.

Socrates/ Then, as it seems, the same things are hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be dear and hateful to the gods.

Euthyphro/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And then the same things would be both holy and unholy, Euthyphro, according to this statement.

Euthyphro/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Then you did not answer my question, my friend. For I did not ask you what is at once holy and unholy; but, judging from your reply, what is dear to the gods is also hateful to the gods. And so, Euthyphro, it would not be surprising if, in punishing your father as you are doing, you were performing an act that is pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronus and Uranus, and pleasing to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera, and so forth in respect to the other gods, if any disagree with any other about it.

Euthyphro/ But I think, Socrates, that none of the gods disagrees with any other about this, or holds that he who kills anyone wrongfully ought not to pay the penalty.

Socrates/ Well, Euthyphro, to return to men, did you ever hear anybody arguing that he who had killed anyone wrongfully, or had done anything else whatever wrongfully, ought not to pay the penalty?

Euthyphro/ Why, they are always arguing these points, especially in the law courts. For they do very many wrong things; and then there is nothing they will

not do or say, in defending themselves, to avoid the penalty.

Socrates/ Yes, but do they acknowledge, Euthyphro, that they have done wrong and, although they acknowledge it, nevertheless say that they ought not to pay the penalty?

Euthyphro/ Oh, no, they don't do that.

Socrates/ Then there is something they do not do and say. For they do not, I fancy, dare to say and argue that, if they have really done wrong, they ought not to pay the penalty; but, I think, they say they have not done wrong; do they not?

Euthyphro/ You are right.

Socrates/ Then they do not argue this point, that the wrongdoer must not pay the penalty; but perhaps they argue about this, who is a wrongdoer, and what he did, and when.

Euthyphro/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then is not the same thing true of the gods, if they quarrel about right and wrong, as you say, and some say others have done wrong, and some say they have not? For surely, my friend, no one, either of gods or men, has the face to say that he who does wrong ought not to pay the penalty.

Euthyphro/ Yes, you are right about this, Socrates, in the main.

Socrates/ But I think, Euthyphro, those who dispute, both men and gods, if the gods do dispute, dispute about each separate act. When they differ with one another about any act, some say it was right and others that it was wrong. Is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come now, my dear Euthyphro, inform me, that I may be made wiser, what proof you have that all the gods think that the man lost his life wrongfully, who, when he was a servant, committed a murder, was bound by the master of the man he killed, and died as a result of his bonds before the master who had bound him found out from the advisers what he ought to do with him, and that it is right on account of such a man for a son to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. Come, try to show me clearly about this, that the gods surely believe that this conduct is right; and if you show it to my satisfaction, I will glorify your wisdom as long as I live.

Euthyphro/ But perhaps this is no small task, Socrates; though I could show you quite clearly.

Socrates/ I understand; it is because you think I am slower to understand than the judges; since it is plain that you will show them that such acts are wrong and that all the gods hate them.

Euthyphro/ Quite clearly, Socrates; that is, if they listen to me.

Socrates/ They will listen, if they find that you are a good speaker. But this occurred to me while you were talking, and I said to myself; If Euthyphro should prove to me no matter how clearly that all the gods think such a death is wrongful, what have I learned from Euthyphro about the question, what is holiness and what is unholiness? For this act would, as it seems, be hateful to the gods; but we saw just now that holiness and its opposite are not defined in this way; for we saw that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to them; and so I let you off any discussion of this point,

Euthyphro. If you like, all the gods may think it wrong and may hate it. But shall we now emend our definition and say that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever they all love is holy, and what some love and others hate is neither or both? Do you wish this now to be our definition of holiness and unholiness?

Euthyphro/ What is to hinder, Socrates?

Socrates/ Nothing, so far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, but consider your own position, whether by adopting this definition you will most easily teach me what you promised.

Euthyphro/ Well, I should say that what all the gods love is holy and, on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy.

Socrates/ Then shall we examine this again, Euthyphro, to see if it is correct, or shall we let it go and accept our own statement, and those of others, agreeing that it is so, if anyone merely says that it is? Or ought we to inquire into the correctness of the statement?

Euthyphro/ We ought to inquire. However, I think this is now correct.

Socrates/ We shall soon know more about this, my friend. Just consider this question; —Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

Euthyphro/ I don't know what you mean, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of being carried and of carrying, of being led and of leading, of being seen and of seeing; and you understand—do you not? —that in all such expressions the two parts differ one from the other in meaning, and how they differ.

Euthyphro/ I think I understand.

Socrates/ Then, too, we conceive of a thing being loved and of a thing loving, and the two are different?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now tell me, is a thing which is carried a carried thing because one carries it, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ No, for that reason.

Socrates/ And a thing which is led is led because one leads it, and a thing which is seen is so because one sees it?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then one does not see it because it is a seen thing, but, on the contrary, it is a seen thing because one sees it; and one does not lead it because it is a led thing, but it is a led thing because one leads it; and one does not carry it because it is a carried thing, but it is a carried thing because one carries it. Is it clear, Euthyphro, what I am trying to say? I am trying to say this, that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes, and it does not undergo-because it is a thing which undergoes, but because it undergoes it is a thing which undergoes; or do you not agree to this?

Euthyphro/ I agree.

Socrates/ Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is this case like the former ones; those who love it do not love it because it is a beloved thing, but it is a beloved thing because they love it?

Euthyphro/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Now what do you say about that which is holy, Euthyphro? It is loved by all the gods, is it not, according to what you said?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ For this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ No, for this reason.

Socrates/ It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

Euthyphro/ I think so.

Socrates/ But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them and beloved by them because they love it.

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy are not identical, but differ one from the other.

Euthyphro/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because we are agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy and that it is not holy because it is loved; are we not?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ But we are agreed that what is dear to the gods is dear to them because they love it, that is, by reason of this love, not that they love it because it is dear.

Euthyphro/ Very true.

Socrates/ But if that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy were identical, my dear Euthyphro, then if the holy were loved because it is holy, that which is dear to the gods would be loved because it is dear, and if that which is dear to the gods is dear because it is loved, then that which is holy would be holy because

it is loved; but now you see that the opposite is the case, showing that the two are entirely different from each other. For the one becomes lovable from the fact that it is loved, whereas the other is loved because it is in itself lovable. And, Euthyphro, it seems that when you were asked what holiness is you were unwilling to make plain its essence, but you mentioned something that has happened to this holiness, namely, that it is loved by the gods. But you did not tell as yet what it really is. So, if you please, do not hide it from me, but begin over again and tell me what holiness is, no matter whether it is loved by the gods or anything else happens to it; for we shall not quarrel about that. But tell me frankly, What is holiness, and what is unholiness?

Euthyphro/ But, Socrates, I do not know how to say what I mean. For whatever statement we advance, somehow or other it moves about and won't stay where we put it.

Socrates/ Your statements, Euthyphro, are like works of my ancestor Daedalus, and if I were the one who made or advanced them, you might laugh at me and say that on account of my relationship to him my works in words run away and won't stay where they are put. But now—well, the statements are yours; so some other jest is demanded; for they won't stay fixed, as you yourself see.

Euthyphro/ I think the jest does very well as it is; for I am not the one who makes these statements move about and not stay in the same place, but you are the Daedalus; for they would have stayed, so far as I am concerned.

Socrates/ Apparently then, my friend, I am a more clever artist than Daedalus, inasmuch as he made only

his own works move, whereas I, as it seems, give motion to the works of others as well as to my own. And the most exquisite thing about my art is that I am clever against my will; for I would rather have my words stay fixed and stable than possess the wisdom of Daedalus and the wealth of Tantalus besides. But enough of this. Since you seem to be indolent, I will aid you myself, so that you may instruct me about holiness. And do not give it up beforehand. Just see whether you do not think that everything that is holy is right.

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ But is everything that is right also holy? Or is all which is holy right, and not all which is right holy, but part of it holy and part something else?

Euthyphro/ I can't follow you, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet you are as much younger than I as you are wiser; but, as I said, you are indolent on account of your wealth of wisdom. But exert yourself, my friend; for it is not hard to understand what I mean. What I mean is the opposite of what the poet said, who wrote; Zeus the creator, him who made all things, thou wilt not name; for where fear is, there also is reverence. Now I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you how?

Euthyphro/ By all means.

Socrates/ It does not seem to me true that where fear is, there also is reverence; for many who fear diseases and poverty and other such things seem to me to fear, but not to reverence at all these things which they fear. Don't you think so, too?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But I think that where reverence is, there also is fear; for does not everyone who has a feeling of

reverence and shame about any act also dread and fear the reputation for wickedness?

Euthyphro/ Yes, he does fear.

Socrates/ Then it is not correct to say where fear is, there also is reverence. On the contrary, where reverence is, there also is fear; but reverence is not everywhere where fear is, since, as I think, fear is more comprehensive than reverence; for reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, so that it is not true that where number is, there also is the odd, but that where the odd is, there also is number. Perhaps you follow me now?

Euthyphro/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ It was something of this sort that I meant before, when I asked whether where the right is, there also is holiness, or where holiness is, there also is the right; but holiness is not everywhere where the right is, for holiness is a part of the right. Do we agree to this, or do you dissent?

Euthyphro/ No, I agree; for I think the statement is correct.

Socrates/ Now observe the next point. If holiness is a part of the right, we must, apparently, find out what part of the right holiness is. Now if you asked me about one of the things I just mentioned, as, for example, what part of number the even was, and what kind of a number it was I should say, that which is not indivisible by two, but divisible by two; or don't you agree?

Euthyphro/ I agree.

Socrates/ Now try in your turn to teach me what part of the right holiness is, that I may tell Meletus not to wrong me anymore or bring suits against me for

impiety, since I have now been duly instructed by you about what is, and what is not, pious and holy.

Euthyphro/ This then is my opinion, Socrates, that the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness, and that the remaining part of the right is that which has to do with the service of men.

Socrates/ I think you are correct, Euthyphro; but there is one little point about which I still want information, for I do not yet understand what you mean by attention. I don't suppose you mean the same kind of attention to the gods which is paid to other things. We say, for example, that not everyone knows how to attend to horses, but only he who is skilled in horsemanship, do we not?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And not everyone knows how to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?

Euthyphro/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then the huntsman's art is the art of attending to dogs?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the ox-herds art is that of attending to oxen?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods? Is that what you mean, Euthyphro?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now does attention always aim to accomplish the same end? I mean something like this; It aims at some good or benefit to the one to whom it is given, as you see that horses, when attended to by the horseman's art are benefited and made better; or don't you think so?

Euthyphro/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ And dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art and oxen by the ox-herds and everything else in the same way? Or do you think care and attention are ever meant for the injury of that which is cared for?

Euthyphro/ No, by Zeus, I do not.

Socrates/ But for its benefit?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then holiness, since it is the art of attending to the gods, is a benefit to the gods, and makes them better? And you would agree that when you do a holy or pious act you are making one of the gods better?

Euthyphro/ No, by Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ Nor do I, Euthyphro, think that is what you meant. Far from it. But I asked what you meant by attention to the gods just because I did not think you meant anything like that.

Euthyphro/ You are right, Socrates; that is not what I mean.

Socrates/ Well, what kind of attention to the gods is holiness?

Euthyphro/ The kind, Socrates, that servants pay to their masters.

Socrates/ I understand. It is, you mean, a kind of service to the gods?

Euthyphro/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Now can you tell me what result the art that serves the physician serves to produce? Is it not health?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then; what is it which the art that serves shipbuilders serves to produce?

Euthyphro/ Evidently, Socrates, a ship.

Socrates/ And that which serves house-builders serves to build a house?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then tell me, my friend; what would the art which serves the gods serve to accomplish? For it is evident that you know, since you say you know more than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods.

Euthyphro/ And what I say is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, in the name of Zeus, tell me, what is that glorious result which the gods accomplish by using us as servants?

Euthyphro/ They accomplish many fine results, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, and so do generals, my friend; but nevertheless, you could easily tell the chief of them, namely, that they bring about victory in war. Is that not the case?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ And farmers also, I think, accomplish many fine results; but still the chief result of their work is food from the land?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But how about the many fine results the gods accomplish? What is the chief result of their work?

Euthyphro/ I told you a while ago, Socrates, that it is a long task to learn accurately all about these things. However, I say simply that when one knows how to say and do what is gratifying to the gods, in praying and sacrificing, that is holiness, and such things bring salvation to individual families and to states; and the opposite of what is gratifying to the gods is impious, and that overturns and destroys everything.

Socrates/ You might, if you wished, Euthyphro have answered much more briefly the chief part of my question. But it is plain that you do not care to instruct me. For now, when you were close upon it you turned aside; and if you had answered it, I should already have obtained from you all the instruction I need about holiness. But, as things are, the questioner must follow the one questioned wherever he leads. What do you say the holy, or holiness, is? Do you not say that it is a kind of science of sacrificing and praying?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And sacrificing is making gifts to the gods and praying is asking from them?

Euthyphro/ Exactly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then holiness, according to this definition, would be a science of giving and asking.

Euthyphro/ You understand perfectly what I said, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, for I am eager for your wisdom, and give my mind to it, so that nothing you say shall fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service of the gods? Do you say that it consists in asking from them and giving to them?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Would not the right way of asking be to ask of them what we need from them?

Euthyphro/ What else?

Socrates/ And the right way of giving, to present them with what they need from us? For it would not be scientific giving to give anyone what he does not need.

Euthyphro/ You are right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then holiness would be an art of barter between gods and men?

Euthyphro/ Yes, of barter, if you like to call it so.

Socrates/ I don't like to call it so, if it is not true. But tell me, what advantage accrues to the gods from the gifts they get from us? For everybody knows what they give, since we have nothing good which they do not give. But what advantage do they derive from what they get from us? Or have we so much the better of them in our bartering that we get all good things from them and they nothing from us?

Euthyphro/ Why you don't suppose, Socrates, that the gods gain any advantage from what they get from us, do you?

Socrates/ Well then, what would those gifts of ours to the gods be?

Euthyphro/ What else than honor and praise, and, as I said before, gratitude?

Socrates/ Then, Euthyphro, holiness is grateful to the gods, but not advantageous or precious to the gods?

Euthyphro/ I think it is precious, above all things.

Socrates/ Then again, it seems, holiness is that which is precious to the gods.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then will you be surprised, since you say this, if your words do not remain fixed but walk about, and will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk, when you are yourself much more skillful than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not see that our definition has come round to the point from which it started? For you remember, I suppose, that a while ago we found that holiness and what is dear to the gods were not the same, but different from each other; or do you not remember?

Euthyphro/ Yes, I remember.

Socrates/ Then don't you see that now you say that what is precious to the gods is holy? And is not this what is dear to the gods?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then either our agreement a while ago was wrong, or if that was right, we are wrong now.

Euthyphro/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then we must begin again at the beginning and ask what holiness is. Since I shall not willingly give up until I learn. And do not scorn me, but by all means apply your mind now to the utmost and tell me the truth; for you know, if anyone does, and like Proteus, you must be held until you speak. For if you had not clear knowledge of holiness and unholiness, you would surely not have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder for the sake of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the anger of the gods, in case your conduct should be wrong, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure you think you know what is holy and what is not. So tell me, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal your thought.

Euthyphro/ Some other time, Socrates. Now I am in a hurry and it is time for me to go.

Socrates/ Oh my friend, what are you doing? You go away and leave me cast down from the high hope I had that I should learn from you what is holy, and what is not, and should get rid of Meletus's indictment by showing him that I have been made wise by Euthyphro about divine matters and am no longer through ignorance acting carelessly and making innovations in respect to them, and that I shall live a better life henceforth.

Euthyphro

Translated by G.M.A. Grube.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Euthyphron.

Euthyphro/ What's new, Socrates, to make you leave your usual haunts in the Lyceum and spend your time here by the king-archon's court? Surely you are not prosecuting anyone before the king-archon as I am?

Socrates/ The Athenians do not call this a prosecution but an indictment, Euthyphro.

Euthyphro/ What is this you say? Someone must have indicted you, for you are not going to tell me that you have indicted someone else.

Socrates/ No indeed.

Euthyphro/ But someone else has indicted you?

Socrates/ Quite so.

Euthyphro/ Who is he?

Socrates/ I do not really know him myself, Euthyphro. He is apparently young and unknown. They call him Meletus, I believe. He belongs to the Pitthean deme, if you know anyone from that deme called Meletus, with long hair, not much of a beard, and a rather aquiline nose.

Euthyphro/ I don't know him, Socrates. What charge does he bring against you?

Socrates/ What charge? A not ignoble one I think, for it is no small thing for a young man to have knowledge of such an important subject. He says he knows how our young men are corrupted and who corrupts them. He is likely to be wise, and when he sees my ignorance corrupting his contemporaries, he proceeds to accuse me to the city as to their mother. I think

he is the only one of our public men to start out the right way, for it is right to care first that the young should be as good as possible, just as a good farmer is likely to take care of the young plants first, and of the others later. So, too, Meletus first gets rid of us who corrupt the young shoots, as he says, and then afterwards he will obviously take care of the older ones and become a source of great blessings for the city, as seems likely to happen to one who started out this way.

Euthyphro/ I could wish this were true, Socrates, but I fear the opposite may happen. He seems to me to start out by harming the very heart of the city by attempting to wrong you. Tell me, what does he say you do to corrupt the young?

Socrates/ Strange things, to hear him tell it, for he says that I am a maker of gods, and on the ground that I create new gods while not believing in the old gods, he has indicted me for their sake, as he puts it.

Euthyphro/ I understand, Socrates. This is because you say that the divine sign keeps coming to you. So he has written this indictment against you as one who makes innovations in religious matters, and he comes to court to slander you, knowing that such things are easily misrepresented to the crowd. The same is true in my case. Whenever I speak of divine matters in the assembly and foretell the future, they laugh me down as if I were crazy; and yet I have foretold nothing that did not happen. Nevertheless, they envy all of us who do this. One need not worry about them, but meet them head-on.

Socrates/ My dear Euthyphro, to be laughed at does not matter perhaps, for the Athenians do not mind anyone they think clever, as long as he does not teach his own wisdom, but if they think that he makes others to be like himself they get angry, whether through envy, as you say, or for some other reason.

Euthyphro/ I have certainly no desire to test their feelings towards me in this matter.

Socrates/ Perhaps you seem to make yourself but rarely available, and not be willing to teach your own wisdom, but I'm afraid that my liking for people makes them think that I pour out to anybody anything I have to say, not only without charging a fee but even glad to reward anyone who is willing to listen. If then they were intending to laugh at me, as you say they laugh at you, there would be nothing unpleasant in their spending their time in court laughing and jesting, but if they are going to be serious, the outcome is not clear except to you prophets.

Euthyphro/ Perhaps it will come to nothing, Socrates, and you will fight your case as you think best, as I think I will mine.

Socrates/ What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you the defendant or the prosecutor?

Euthyphro/ The prosecutor.

Socrates/ Whom do you prosecute?

Euthyphro/ One whom I am thought crazy to prosecute.

Socrates/ Are you pursuing someone who will easily escape you?

Euthyphro/ Far from it, for he is quite old.

Socrates/ Who is it?

Euthyphro/ My father.

Socrates/ My dear sir! Your own father?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What is the charge? What is the case about?

Euthyphro/ Murder, Socrates.

Socrates/ Good heavens! Certainly, Euthyphro, most men would not know how they could do this and be right. It is not

the part of anyone to do this, but of one who is far advanced in wisdom.

Euthyphro/ Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, that is so.

Socrates/ Is then the man your father killed one of your relatives? Or is that obvious, for you would not prosecute your father for the murder of a stranger.

Euthyphro/ It is ridiculous, Socrates, for you to think that it makes any difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only watch whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted justly, let him go, but if not, one should prosecute, if, that is to say, the killer shares your hearth and table. The pollution is the same if you knowingly keep company with such a man and do not cleanse yourself and him by bringing him to justice. The victim was a dependent of mine, and when we were farming in Naxos he was a servant of ours. He killed one of our household slaves in drunken anger, so my father bound him hand and foot and threw him in a ditch, then sent a man here to inquire from the priest what should be done. During that time he gave no thought or care to the bound man, as being a killer, and it was no matter if he died, which he did. Hunger and cold and his bonds caused his death before the messenger came back from the seer. Both my father and my other relatives are angry that I am prosecuting my father for murder on behalf of a murderer when he hadn't even killed him, they say, and even if he had, the dead man does not deserve a thought, since he was a killer. For, they say, it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder. But their ideas of the divine attitude to piety and impiety are wrong, Socrates.

Socrates/ Whereas, by Zeus, Euthyphro, you think that your knowledge of the divine, and of piety and impiety, is so accurate that, when those things happened as you say, you

have no fear of having acted impiously in bringing your father to trial?

Euthyphro/ I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would not be superior to the majority of men, if I did not have accurate knowledge of all such things.

Socrates/ It is indeed most important, my admirable Euthyphro, that I should become your pupil, and as regards this indictment challenge Meletus about these very things and say to him: that in the past too I considered knowledge about the divine to be most important, and that now that he says that I am guilty of improvising and innovating about the gods I have become your pupil. I would say to him: "If, Meletus, you agree that Euthyphro is wise in these matters, consider me, too, to have the right beliefs and do not bring me to trial. If you do not think so, then prosecute that teacher of mine, not me, for corrupting the older men, me and his own father, by teaching me and by exhorting and punishing him." If he is not convinced, and does not discharge me or indict you instead of me, I shall repeat the same challenge in court.

Euthyphro/ Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and, if he should try to indict me, I think I would find his weak spots and the talk in court would be about him rather than about me.

Socrates/ It is because I realize this that I am eager to become your pupil, my dear friend. I know that other people as well as this Meletus do not even seem to notice you, whereas he sees me so sharply and clearly that he indicts me for ungodliness. So tell me now, by Zeus, what you just now maintained you clearly knew: what kind of thing do you say that godliness and ungodliness are, both as regards murder and other things; or is the pious not the same and alike in every action, and the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious presents us with one form or appearance in so far as it is impious?

Euthyphro/ Most certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Tell me then, what is the pious, and what the impious, do you say?

Euthyphro/ I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is impious. And observe, Socrates, that I can cite powerful evidence that the law is so. I have already said to others that such actions are right, not to favor the ungodly, whoever they are. These people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, yet they agree that he bound his father because he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that he in turn castrated his father for similar reasons. But they are angry with me because I am prosecuting my father for his wrongdoing. They contradict themselves in what they say about the gods and about me.

Socrates/ Indeed, Euthyphro, this is the reason why I am a defendant in the case, because I find it hard to accept things like that being said about the gods, and it is likely to be the reason why I shall be told I do wrong. Now, however, if you, who have full knowledge of such things, share their opinions, then we must agree with them, too, it would seem. For what are we to say, we who agree that we ourselves have no knowledge of them? Tell me, by the god of friendship, do you really believe these things are true?

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, and so are even more surprising things, of which the majority has no knowledge.

Socrates/ And do you believe that there really is war among the gods, and terrible enmities and battles, and other such things as are told by the poets, and other sacred stories such as are embroidered by good writers and by representations of which the robe of the goddess is adorned when it is carried up

to the Acropolis? Are we to say these things are true, Euthyphro?

Euthyphro/ Not only these, Socrates, but, as I was saying just now, I will, if you wish, relate many other things about the gods which I know will amaze you.

Socrates/ I should not be surprised, but you will tell me these at leisure some other time. For now, try to tell me more clearly what I was asking just now, for, my friend, you did not teach me adequately when I asked you what the pious was, but you told me that what you are doing now, in prosecuting your father for murder, is pious.

Euthyphro/ And I told the truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ Perhaps. You agree, however, that there are many other pious actions.

Euthyphro/ There are.

Socrates/ Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form, or don't you remember?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it, and using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another's that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not.

Euthyphro/ If that is how you want it, Socrates, that is how I will tell you.

Socrates/ That is what I want.

Euthyphro/ Well then, what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious.

Socrates/ Splendid, Euthyphro! You have now answered in the way I wanted. Whether your answer is true I do not know yet, but you will obviously show me that what you say is true.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, let us examine what we mean. An action or a man dear to the gods is pious, but an action or a man hated by the gods is impious. They are not the same, but quite opposite, the pious and the impious. Is that not so?

Euthyphro/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ And that seems to be a good statement?

Euthyphro/ I think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ We have also stated that the gods are in a state of discord, that they are at odds with each other, Euthyphro, and that they are at enmity with each other. Has that, too, been said?

Euthyphro/ It has.

Socrates/ What are the subjects of difference that cause hatred and anger? Let us look at it this way. If you and I were to differ about numbers as to which is the greater, would this difference make us enemies and angry with each other, or would we proceed to count and soon resolve our difference about this?

Euthyphro/ We would certainly do so.

Socrates/ Again, if we differed about the larger and the smaller, we would turn to measurement and soon cease to differ.

Euthyphro/ That is so.

Socrates/ And about the heavier and the lighter, we would resort to weighing and be reconciled.

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ What subject of difference would make us angry and hostile to each other if we were unable to come to a

decision? Perhaps you do not have an answer ready, but examine as I tell you whether these subjects are the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad. Are these not the subjects of difference about which, when we are unable to come to a satisfactory decision, you and I and other men become hostile to each other whenever we do?

Euthyphro/ That is the difference, Socrates, about those subjects.

Socrates/ What about the gods, Euthyphro? If indeed they have differences, will it not be about these same subjects?

Euthyphro/ It certainly must be so.

Socrates/ Then according to your argument, my good Euthyphro, different gods consider different things to be just, beautiful, ugly, good, and bad, for they would not be at odds with one another unless they differed about these subjects, would they?

Euthyphro/ You are right.

Socrates/ And they like what each of them considers beautiful, good, and just, and hate the opposites of these?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But you say that the same things are considered just by some gods and unjust by others, and as they dispute about these things they are at odds and at war with each other. Is that not so?

Euthyphro/ It is.

Socrates/ The same things then are loved by the gods and hated by the gods, and would be both god-loved and god-hated.

Euthyphro/ It seems likely.

Socrates/ And the same things would be both pious and impious, according to this argument?

Euthyphro/ I'm afraid so.

Socrates/ So you did not answer my question, you surprising man. I did not ask you what same thing is both pious and impious, and it appears that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. So it is in no way surprising if your present action, namely punishing your father, may be pleasing to Zeus but displeasing to Cronus and Uranus, pleasing to Hephaestus but displeasing to Hera, and so with any other gods who differ from each other on this subject.

Euthyphro/ I think, Socrates, that on this subject no gods would differ from one another, that whoever has killed anyone unjustly should pay the penalty.

Socrates/ Well now, Euthyphro, have you ever heard any man maintaining that one who has killed or done anything else unjustly should not pay the penalty?

Euthyphro/ They never cease to dispute on this subject, both elsewhere and in the courts, for when they have committed many wrongs they do and say anything to avoid the penalty.

Socrates/ Do they agree they have done wrong, Euthyphro, and in spite of so agreeing do they nevertheless say they should not be punished?

Euthyphro/ No, they do not agree on that point.

Socrates/ So they do not say or do just anything. For they do not venture to say this, or dispute that they must not pay the penalty if they have done wrong, but I think they deny doing wrong. Is that not so?

Euthyphro/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then they do not dispute that the wrongdoer must be punished, but they may disagree as to who the wrongdoer is, what he did and when.

Euthyphro/ You are right.

Socrates/ Do not the gods have the same experience, if indeed they are at odds with each other about the just and the unjust, as your argument maintains? Some assert that they wrong one another, while others deny it, but no one among gods or men ventures to say that the wrongdoer must not be punished.

Euthyphro/ Yes, that is true, Socrates, as to the main point.

Socrates/ And those who disagree, whether men or gods, dispute about each action, if indeed the gods disagree. Some say it is done justly, others unjustly. Is that not so?

Euthyphro/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Come now, my dear Euthyphro, tell me, too, that I may become wiser, what proof you have that all the gods consider that man to have been killed unjustly who became a murderer while in your service, was bound by the master of his victim, and died in his bonds before the one who bound him found out from the seers what was to be done with him, and that it is right for a son to denounce and to prosecute his father on behalf of such a man. Come, try to show me a clear sign that all the gods definitely believe this action to be right. If you can give me adequate proof of this, I shall never cease to extol your wisdom.

Euthyphro/ This is perhaps no light task, Socrates, though I could show you very clearly.

Socrates/ I understand that you think me more dull-witted than the jury, as you will obviously show them that these actions were unjust and that all the gods hate such actions.

Euthyphro/ I will show it to them clearly, Socrates, if only they will listen to me.

Socrates/ They will listen if they think you show them well. But this thought came to me as you were speaking, and I am examining it, saying to myself: “If Euthyphro shows me

conclusively that all the gods consider such a death unjust, to what greater extent have I learned from him the nature of piety and impiety? This action would then, it seems, be hated by the gods, but the pious and the impious were not thereby now defined, for what is hated by the gods has also been shown to be loved by them." So I will not insist on this point; let us assume, if you wish, that all the gods consider this unjust and that they all hate it. However, is this the correction we are making in our discussion, that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they all love is pious, and that what some gods love and others hate is neither or both? Is that how you now wish us to define piety and impiety?

Euthyphro/ What prevents us from doing so, Socrates?

Socrates/ For my part nothing, Euthyphro, but you look whether on your part this proposal will enable you to teach me most easily what you promised.

Euthyphro/ I would certainly say that the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious.

Socrates/ Then let us again examine whether that is a sound statement, or do we let it pass, and if one of us, or someone else, merely says that something is so, do we accept that it is so? Or should we examine what the speaker means?

Euthyphro/ We must examine it, but I certainly think that this is now a fine statement.

Socrates/ We shall soon know better whether it is. Consider this: Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?

Euthyphro/ I don't know what you mean, Socrates.

Socrates/ I shall try to explain more clearly: we speak of something carried and something carrying, of something led and something leading, of something seen and something

seeing, and you understand that these things are all different from one another and how they differ?

Euthyphro/ I think I do.

Socrates/ So there is also something loved and—a different thing—something loving.

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Tell me then whether the thing carried is a carried thing because it is being carried, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ No, that is the reason.

Socrates/ And the thing led is so because it is being led, and the thing seen because it is being seen?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It is not being seen because it is a thing seen but on the contrary it is a thing seen because it is being seen; nor is it because it is something led that it is being led but because it is being led that it is something led; nor is something being carried because it is something carried, but it is something carried because it is being carried. Is what I want to say clear, Euthyphro? I want to say this, namely, that if anything is being changed or is being affected in any way, it is not being changed because it is something changed, but rather it is something changed because it is being changed; nor is it being affected because it is something affected, but it is something affected because it is being affected. Or do you not agree?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Is something loved either something changed or something affected by something?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So it is in the same case as the things just mentioned; it is not being loved by those who love it because

it is something loved, but it is something loved because it is being loved by them?

Euthyphro/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ What then do we say about the pious, Euthyphro? Surely that it is being loved by all the gods, according to what you say?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it being loved because it is pious, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ For no other reason.

Socrates/ It is being loved then because it is pious, but it is not pious because it is being loved?

Euthyphro/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And yet it is something loved and god-loved because it is being loved by the gods?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then the god-loved is not the same as the pious, Euthyphro, nor the pious the same as the god-loved, as you say it is, but one differs from the other.

Euthyphro/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because we agree that the pious is being loved for this reason, that it is pious, but it is not pious because it is being loved. Is that not so?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that the god-loved, on the other hand, is so because it is being loved by the gods, by the very fact of being loved, but it is not being loved because it is god-loved.

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ But if the god-loved and the pious were the same, my dear Euthyphro, then if the pious was being loved because it was pious, the god-loved would also be being loved because

it was god-loved; and if the god-loved was god-loved because it was being loved by the gods, then the pious would also be pious because it was being loved by the gods. But now you see that they are in opposite cases as being altogether different from each other: the one is such as to be loved because it is being loved, the other is being loved because it is such as to be loved. I'm afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is, you did not wish to make its nature clear to me, but you told me an affect or quality of it, that the pious has the quality of being loved by all the gods, but you have not yet told me what the pious is. Now, if you will, do not hide things from me but tell me again from the beginning what piety is, whether being loved by the gods or having some other quality—we shall not quarrel about that—but be keen to tell me what the pious and the impious are.

Euthyphro/ But Socrates, I have no way of telling you what I have in mind, for whatever proposition we put forward goes around and refuses to stay put where we establish it.

Socrates/ Your statements, Euthyphro, seem to belong to my ancestor, Daedalus. If I were stating them and putting them forward, you would perhaps be making fun of me and say that because of my kinship with him my conclusions in discussion run away and will not stay where one puts them. As these propositions are yours, however, we need some other jest, for they will not stay put for you, as you say yourself.

Euthyphro/ I think the same jest will do for our discussion, Socrates, for I am not the one who makes them go round and not remain in the same place; it is you who are the Daedalus; for as far as I am concerned they would remain as they were.

Socrates/ It looks as if I was cleverer than Daedalus in using my skill, my friend, in so far as he could only cause to move the things he made himself, but I can make other people's move as well as my own. And the smartest part of my

skill is that I am clever without wanting to be, for I would rather have your statements to me remain unmoved than possess the wealth of Tantalus as well as the cleverness of Daedalus. But enough of this. Since I think you are making unnecessary difficulties, I am as eager as you are to find a way to teach me about piety, and do not give up before you do. See whether you think all that is pious is of necessity just.

Euthyphro/ I think so.

Socrates/ And is then all that is just pious? Or is all that is pious just, but not all that is just pious, but some of it is and some is not?

Euthyphro/ I do not follow what you are saying, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yet you are younger than I by as much as you are wiser. As I say, you are making difficulties because of your wealth of wisdom. Pull yourself together, my dear sir, what I am saying is not difficult to grasp. I am saying the opposite of what the poet said who wrote:

You do not wish to name Zeus, who had done it, and who made all things grow, for where there is fear there is also shame.

I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you why?

Euthyphro/ Please do.

Socrates/ I do not think that "where there is fear there is also shame," for I think that many people who fear disease and poverty and many other such things feel fear, but are not ashamed of the things they fear. Do you not think so?

Euthyphro/ I do indeed.

Socrates/ But where there is shame there is also fear. For is there anyone who, in feeling shame and embarrassment at anything, does not also at the same time fear and dread a reputation for wickedness?

Euthyphro/ He is certainly afraid.

Socrates/ It is then not right to say “where there is fear there is also shame,” but that where there is shame there is also fear, for fear covers a larger area than shame. Shame is a part of fear just as odd is a part of number, with the result that it is not true that where there is number there is also oddness, but that where there is oddness there is also number. Do you follow me now?

Euthyphro/ Surely.

Socrates/ This is the kind of thing I was asking before, whether where there is piety there is also justice, but where there is justice there is not always piety, for the pious is a part of justice. Shall we say that, or do you think otherwise?

Euthyphro/ No, but like that, for what you say appears to be right.

Socrates/ See what comes next: if the pious is a part of the just, we must, it seems, find out what part of the just it is. Now if you asked me something of what we mentioned just now, such as what part of number is the even, and what number that is, I would say it is the number that is divisible into two equal, not unequal, parts. Or do you not think so?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Try in this way to tell me what part of the just the pious is, in order to tell Meletus not to wrong us any more and not to indict me for ungodliness, since I have learned from you sufficiently what is godly and pious and what is not.

Euthyphro/ I think, Socrates, that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice.

Socrates/ You seem to me to put that very well, but I still need a bit of information. I do not know yet what you mean by care, for you do not mean the care of the gods in the same sense as the care of other things, as, for example, we say, don’t

we, that not everyone knows how to care for horses, but the horse breeder does.

Euthyphro/ Yes, I do mean it that way.

Socrates/ So horse breeding is the care of horses.

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor does everyone know how to care for dogs, but the hunter does.

Socrates/ So hunting is the care of dogs.

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And cattle raising is the care of cattle.

Euthyphro/ Quite so.

Socrates/ While piety and godliness is the care of the gods, Euthyphro. Is that what you mean?

Euthyphro/ It is.

Socrates/ Now care in each case has the same effect; it aims at the good and the benefit of the object cared for, as you can see that horses cared for by horse breeders are benefited and become better. Or do you not think so?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ So dogs are benefited by dog breeding, cattle by cattle raising, and so with all the others. Or do you think that care aims to harm the object of its care?

Euthyphro/ By Zeus, no.

Socrates/ It aims to benefit the object of its care?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Is piety then, which is the care of the gods, also to benefit the gods and make them better? Would you agree that when you do something pious you make some one of the gods better?

Euthyphro/ By Zeus, no.

Socrates/ Nor do I think that this is what you mean—far from it—but that is why I asked you what you meant by the care of gods, because I did not believe you meant this kind of care.

Euthyphro/ Quite right, Socrates, that is not the kind of care I mean.

Socrates/ Very well, but what kind of care of the gods would piety be?

Euthyphro/ The kind of care, Socrates, that slaves take of their masters.

Socrates/ I understand. It is likely to be a kind of service of the gods.

Euthyphro/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Could you tell me to the achievement of what goal service to doctors tends? Is it not, do you think, to achieving health?

Euthyphro/ I think so.

Socrates/ What about service to shipbuilders? To what achievement is it directed?

Euthyphro/ Clearly, Socrates, to the building of a ship.

Socrates/ And service to house-builders to the building of a house?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Tell me then, my good sir, to the achievement of what aim does service to the gods tend? You obviously know since you say that you, of all men, have the best knowledge of the divine.

Euthyphro/ And I am telling the truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ Tell me then, by Zeus, what is that excellent aim that the gods achieve, using us as their servants?

Euthyphro/ Many fine things, Socrates.

Socrates/ So do generals, my friend. Nevertheless you could easily tell me their main concern, which is to achieve victory in war, is it not?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ The farmers too, I think, achieve many fine things, but the main point of their efforts is to produce food from the earth.

Euthyphro/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Well then, how would you sum up the many fine things that the gods achieve?

Euthyphro/ I told you a short while ago, Socrates, that it is a considerable task to acquire any precise knowledge of these things, but, to put it simply, I say that if a man knows how to say and do what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice, those are pious actions such as preserve both private houses and public affairs of state. The opposite of these pleasing actions are impious and overturn and destroy everything.

Socrates/ You could tell me in far fewer words, if you were willing, the sum of what I asked, Euthyphro, but you are not keen to teach me, that is clear. You were on the point of doing so, but you turned away. If you had given that answer, I should now have acquired from you sufficient knowledge of the nature of piety. As it is, the lover of inquiry must follow his beloved wherever it may lead him. Once more then, what do you say that piety and the pious are? Are they a knowledge of how to sacrifice and pray?

Euthyphro/ They are.

Socrates/ To sacrifice is to make a gift to the gods, whereas to pray is to beg from the gods?

Euthyphro/ Definitely, Socrates.

Socrates/ It would follow from this statement that piety would be a knowledge of how to give to, and beg from, the gods.

Euthyphro/ You understood what I said very well, Socrates.

Socrates/ That is because I am so desirous of your wisdom, and I concentrate my mind on it, so that no word of yours may fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service to the gods? You say it is to beg from them and to give to them?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ And to beg correctly would be to ask from them things that we need?

Euthyphro/ What else?

Socrates/ And to give correctly is to give them what they need from us, for it would not be skillful to bring gifts to anyone that are in no way needed.

Euthyphro/ True, Socrates.

Socrates/ Piety would then be a sort of trading skill between gods and men?

Euthyphro/ Trading yes, if you prefer to call it that.

Socrates/ I prefer nothing, unless it is true. But tell me, what benefit do the gods derive from the gifts they receive from us? What they give us is obvious to all. There is for us no good that we do not receive from them, but how are they benefited by what they receive from us? Or do we have such an advantage over them in the trade that we receive all our blessings from them and they receive nothing from us?

Euthyphro/ Do you suppose, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by what they receive from us?

Socrates/ What could those gifts from us to the gods be, Euthyphro?

Euthyphro/ What else, do you think, than honor, reverence, and what I mentioned just now, gratitude?

Socrates/ The pious is then, Euthyphro, pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them?

Euthyphro/ I think it is of all things most dear to them.

Socrates/ So the pious is once again what is dear to the gods.

Euthyphro/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ When you say this, will you be surprised if your arguments seem to move about instead of staying put? And will you accuse me of being Daedalus who makes them move, though you are yourself much more skillful than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not realize that our argument has moved around and come again to the same place? You surely remember that earlier the pious and the god-loved were shown not to be the same but different from each other. Or do you not remember?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you then not realize now that you are saying that what is dear to the gods is the pious? Is this not the same as the god-loved? Or is it not?

Euthyphro/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ Either we were wrong when we agreed before, or, if we were right then, we are wrong now.

Euthyphro/ That seems to be so.

Socrates/ So we must investigate again from the beginning what piety is, as I shall not willingly give up before I learn this. Do not think me unworthy, but concentrate your attention and tell the truth. For you know it, if any man does, and I must not let you go, like Proteus, before you tell me. If you had no clear knowledge of piety and impiety you would never have ventured to prosecute your old father for murder on

behalf of a servant. For fear of the gods you would have been afraid to take the risk lest you should not be acting rightly, and would have been ashamed before men, but now I know well that you believe you have clear knowledge of piety and impiety. So tell me, my good Euthyphro, and do not hide what you think it is.

Euthyphro/ Some other time, Socrates, for I am in a hurry now, and it is time for me to go.

Socrates/ What a thing to do, my friend! By going you have cast me down from a great hope I had, that I would learn from you the nature of the pious and the impious and so escape Meletus' indictment by showing him that I had acquired wisdom in divine matters from Euthyphro, and my ignorance would no longer cause me to be careless and inventive about such things, and that I would be better for the rest of my life.

Euthyphro.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Euthyphro.

Scene: —The Porch of the King Archon.

Euthyphro/ Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you doing in the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit before the King, like myself?

Socrates/ Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the Athenians use.

Euthyphro/ What! I suppose that someone has been prosecuting you, for I cannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another.

Socrates/ Certainly not.

Euthyphro/ Then someone else has been prosecuting you?

Socrates/ Yes.

Euthyphro/ And who is he?

Socrates/ A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know him: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill grown.

Euthyphro/ No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is the charge which he brings against you?

Socrates/ What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is certainly not to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their

corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing that I am the reverse of a wise man, he has found me out, and is going to accuse me of corrupting his young friends. And of this our mother the state is to be the judge. Of all our political men he is the only one who seems to me to begin in the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth; like a good husbandman, he makes the young shoots his first care, and clears away us who are the destroyers of them. This is only the first step; he will afterwards attend to the elder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be a very great public benefactor.

Euthyphro/ I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the opposite will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you he is simply aiming a blow at the foundation of the state. But in what way does he say that you corrupt the young?

Socrates/ He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first hearing excites surprise: he says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and that I invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the ground of his indictment.

Euthyphro/ I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks that you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the court for this. He knows that such a charge is readily received by the world, as I myself know too well; for when I speak in the assembly about divine things, and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me and think me a madman. Yet every word that I say is true. But they are jealous of us all; and we must be brave and go at them.

Socrates/ Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much consequence. For a man may be thought

wise; but the Athenians, I suspect, do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his wisdom to others; and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they are angry.

Euthyphro/ I am never likely to try their temper in this way.

Socrates/ I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behavior, and seldom impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid that the Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as I was saying, they would only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the time might pass gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they may be in earnest, and then what the end will be you soothsayers only can predict.

Euthyphro/ I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and that you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win my own.

Socrates/ And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you the pursuer or the defendant?

Euthyphro/ I am the pursuer.

Socrates/ Of whom?

Euthyphro/ You will think me mad when I tell you.

Socrates/ Why, has the fugitive wings?

Euthyphro/ Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.

Socrates/ Who is he?

Euthyphro/ My father.

Socrates/ Your father! my good man?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And of what is he accused?

Euthyphro/ Of murder, Socrates.

Socrates/ By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common herd know of the nature of right and truth. A man must be an extraordinary man, and have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to bring such an action.

Euthyphro/ Indeed, Socrates, he must.

Socrates/ I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your relatives—clearly he was; for if he had been a stranger you would never have thought of prosecuting him.

Euthyphro/ I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between one who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the pollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding against him. The real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone; but if unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him. Now the man who is dead was a poor dependent of mine who worked for us as a field laborer on our farm in Naxos, and one day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our domestic servants and slew him. My father bound him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him. Meanwhile he never attended to him and took no care about him, for he regarded him as a murderer; and thought that no great harm would be done even if he did die. Now this was just what happened. For such was the effect of cold and hunger and chains upon him, that before the messenger returned from the diviner, he was dead. And my father and family are angry with me for taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father. They say that he did not kill him, and that if he did, the dead man was but a

murderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father. Which shows, Socrates, how little they know what the gods think about piety and impiety.

Socrates/ Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of religion and of things pious and impious so very exact, that, supposing the circumstances to be as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too may be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your father?

Euthyphro/ The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him, Socrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such matters. What should I be good for without it?

Socrates/ Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your disciple. Then before the trial with Meletus comes on I shall challenge him, and say that I have always had a great interest in religious questions, and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion, I have become your disciple. You, Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and sound in his opinions; and if you approve of him you ought to approve of me, and not have me into court; but if you disapprove, you should begin by indicting him who is my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not of the young, but of the old; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs, and of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if Meletus refuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to you, I cannot do better than repeat this challenge in the court.

Euthyphro/ Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great deal more to say to him than to me.

Socrates/ And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming your disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you—not even this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again—is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?

Euthyphro/ To be sure, Socrates.

Socrates/ And what is piety, and what is impiety?

Euthyphro/ Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting anyone who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime—whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be—that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. And please to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others: —of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods? —and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.

Socrates/ May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety—that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well informed about

them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to your superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you really believe that they are true.

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in ignorance.

Socrates/ And do you really believe that the gods fought with one another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are full of them; and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you.

Socrates/ I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is 'piety'? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder.

Euthyphro/ And what I said was true, Socrates.

Socrates/ No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?

Euthyphro/ There are.

Socrates/ Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious?

Euthyphro/ I remember.

Socrates/ Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of anyone else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.

Euthyphro/ I will tell you, if you like.

Socrates/ I should very much like.

Euthyphro/ Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.

Socrates/ Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said?

Euthyphro/ It was.

Socrates/ And well said?

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.

Socrates/ And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?

Euthyphro/ Yes, that was also said.

Socrates/ And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the difference by measuring?

Euthyphro/ Very true.

Socrates/ And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?

Euthyphro/ To be sure.

Socrates/ But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we quarrel is such as you describe.

Socrates/ And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature?

Euthyphro/ Certainly they are.

Socrates/ They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable: there would have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences—would there now?

Euthyphro/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?

Euthyphro/ Very true.

Socrates/ But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust, —about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fighting among them.

Euthyphro/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?

Euthyphro/ So I should suppose.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Herè, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.

Euthyphro/ But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion about that.

Socrates/ Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear anyone arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?

Euthyphro/ I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defense.

Socrates/ But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished?

Euthyphro/ No; they do not.

Socrates/ Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when?

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?

Euthyphro/ That is true, Socrates, in the main.

Socrates/ But they join issue about the particulars—gods and men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that true?

Euthyphro/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that

all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.

Euthyphro/ It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very clear indeed to you.

Socrates/ I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.

Euthyphro/ Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.

Socrates/ But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking; I said to myself: 'Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.' And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?

Euthyphro/ Why not, Socrates?

Socrates/ Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.

Euthyphro/ Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.

Socrates/ Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say?

Euthyphro/ We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry.

Socrates/ We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.

Euthyphro/ I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.

Socrates/ I will endeavor to explain: we speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies?

Euthyphro/ I think that I understand.

Socrates/ And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ No; that is the reason.

Socrates/ And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And

now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ No, that is the reason.

Socrates/ It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different things.

Euthyphro/ How do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one another. For one (θεοφιλὲς) is of a kind to be loved because it is loved, and the other (ὅσιον) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence—the attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel); and what is impiety?

Euthyphro/ I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away from us.

Socrates/ Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that my arguments walk

away and will not remain fixed where they are placed because I am a descendant of his. But now, since these notions are your own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move.

Euthyphro/ Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.

Socrates/ Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only made his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well. And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I will myself endeavor to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labor. Tell me, then, —Is not that which is pious necessarily just?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?

Euthyphro/ I do not understand you, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings—

'Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things,

> You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also reverence.'

Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?

Euthyphro/ By all means.

Socrates/ I should not say that where there is fear there is also reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.

Euthyphro/ Very true.

Socrates/ But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation.

Euthyphro/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is also fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that you follow me now?

Euthyphro/ Quite well.

Socrates/ That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?

Euthyphro/ No, I think that you are quite right.

Socrates/ Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases; for instance, if you had asked

me what is an even number, and what part of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not agree?

Euthyphro/ Yes, I quite agree.

Socrates/ In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.

Euthyphro/ Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods, as there, is the other part of justice which attends to men.

Socrates/ That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point about which I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of 'attention'? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor is everyone qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ As the art of the ox-herd is the art of attending to oxen?

Euthyphro/ Very true.

Socrates/ In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods? —that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved, are they not?

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by the art of the ox-herd, and all other things are tended or attended for their good and not for their hurt?

Euthyphro/ Certainly, not for their hurt.

Socrates/ But for their good?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?

Euthyphro/ No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.

Socrates/ And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you the question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did not.

Euthyphro/ You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of attention which I mean.

Socrates/ Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety?

Euthyphro/ It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.

Socrates/ I understand—a sort of ministration to the gods.

Euthyphro/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in view the attainment of some object—would you not say of health?

Euthyphro/ I should.

Socrates/ Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with a view to the attainment of some result?

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.

Socrates/ As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with a view to the building of a house?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best instructed in religion.

Euthyphro/ And I speak the truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ Tell me then, oh tell me—what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our ministrations?

Euthyphro/ Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.

Socrates/ Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief of them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?

Euthyphro/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one?

Euthyphro/ I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or holiness is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety is the salvation of families and states, just as the impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction.

Socrates/ I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me—clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me I should have truly learned of you by this time the nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?

Euthyphro/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the gods?

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates.

Socrates/ Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving?

Euthyphro/ You understand me capitally, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your science, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?

Euthyphro/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what they want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to anyone that which he does not want.

Euthyphro/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another?

Euthyphro/ That is an expression which you may use, if you like.

Socrates/ But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I wish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; for there is no good thing which they do not give; but how we can give any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have very greatly the advantage of them.

Euthyphro/ And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts?

Socrates/ But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods?

Euthyphro/ What else, but tributes of honor; and, as I was just now saying, what pleases them?

Socrates/ Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them?

Euthyphro/ I should say that nothing could be dearer.

Socrates/ Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same point. Were we not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten?

Euthyphro/ I quite remember.

Socrates/ And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is not this the same as what is dear to them—do you see?

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ Then either we were wrong in our former assertion; or, if we were right then, we are wrong now.

Euthyphro/ One of the two must be true.

Socrates/ Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf, have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have

run such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide your knowledge.

Euthyphro/ Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.

Socrates/ Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety; and then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had given up rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.

The Euthyphro.

Translated by Taylor, Thomas.

Persons of the Dialog,

Euthyphro, Socrates.

Euthyphro/ What novel circumstance has happened, Socrates, that you, leaving the discussions in the Lyceum, are now waiting about the porch of the king? For you have not an action with the king, as I have.

Socrates/ The Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action, but an accusation.

Euthyphro/ What do you say? Someone, as it seems, has accused you. For I should not think that you would accuse another.

Socrates/ I should not, indeed.

Euthyphro/ Has, then, another accused you?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Euthyphro/ Who is he?

Socrates/ I do not, Euthyphro, perfectly know the man: for he appears to me to be young, and of no note. But they call him, I think, Melitus; and he is of the town Pittheus: if you have in your recollection one Melitus, a Pitthean, who has long hair, a thin beard, and an aquiline nose.

Euthyphro/ I do not recollect him, Socrates. But what is his accusation of you?

Socrates/ What is it? Not an ignoble one, as it appears to me. For it is no despicable thing, for one who is a young man, to be knowing in a circumstance of such a magnitude. For he knows, as he says, how the youth are corrupted, and who they are that corrupt them. And he appears to be a certain wise man; and seeing my ignorance, and considering me as

one who corrupts his equals in age, to have accused me to the city, as to a mother. In consequence of this, he only of the citizens seems to me to have begun rightly. For it is right to pay attention to youth, in the first place, that they may become the most excellent characters: just as it is reasonable that a good husbandman should first take care of the young plants, and after this of the others. Thus also Melitus perhaps will first cut us up who corrupt the blossoms of youth, as he says, and afterwards he will certainly pay attention to those of a more advanced age, and thus will be the cause of the most numerous and the greatest goods to the city. This is what may be expected to happen from one who makes such a beginning.

Euthyphro/ I should wish it were so, Socrates; but I tremble, lest the contrary should happen. For, in reality, he appears to me, by trying to injure you, to begin to hurt the city from the Vestal hearth itself. But tell me by what part of your conduct it is that he says you corrupt the youth?

Socrates/ The things of which he accuses me, O wonderful man, must be considered, when they are heard, as absurd. For he says that I am a maker of gods; and, as if I introduced new and did not believe in the ancient gods, has brought this accusation against me.

Euthyphro/ I understand you, Socrates; it is because you say that a dæmoniacal power is everywhere present with you. This accusation, therefore, is brought against you as one that introduces novelties in divine affairs; and as well knowing that the multitude are always disposed to receive such kind of calumnies. For indeed they ridicule me as one insane, when I say anything in a public assembly concerning the gods, and predict to them future events; though I do not predict to them anything which is not true. At the same time, however, they envy all such as we are. But indeed it is not

fit to pay any attention to them; but we should still go on in our own way.

Socrates/ But, dear Euthyphro, to be ridiculed is perhaps a trifling thing. For the Athenians, as it appears to me, are not very much concerned whether or not a man is skillful in anything, so long as he is not a teacher of his wisdom; but they are indignant with him whom they think makes others to be such, whether this is from envy, as you say, or from some other cause.

Euthyphro/ With respect to this circumstance, therefore, how they may be affected towards me I am not very desirous to try.

Socrates/ For perhaps you exhibit yourself but rarely, and are not willing to teach your wisdom; but I fear lest, through philanthropy, I should appear to disclose, with too much freedom, to every man whatever I possess, not only without taking a reward, but even willingly adding one, if any person is willing to hear me. As I therefore just now said, if they were only to ridicule me, as you say they do you, there would be nothing unpleasant in passing the time in a court of justice, jesting and laughing; but if they are in earnest, how this affair may terminate is immanifest, except to you diviners.

Euthyphro/ Perhaps, however, Socrates, the affair will be nothing; but you will plead your cause successfully, and I also think that I shall mine.

Socrates/ But what is the cause, Euthyphro, which you have to plead? Are you defendant or plaintiff?

Euthyphro/ I am plaintiff.

Socrates/ Whom do you prosecute?

Euthyphro/ One whom, by prosecuting, I appear to be insane.

Socrates/ What, then, do you pursue one that flies?

Euthyphro/ He is very far from flying; for he is very much advanced in years.

Socrates/ Who is he?

Euthyphro/ My father.

Socrates/ Your father? O best of men!

Euthyphro/ He is, indeed.

Socrates/ But what is the crime, and of what do you accuse him?

Euthyphro/ Of murder, Socrates.

Socrates/ O Hercules! The multitude, Euthyphro, will be ignorant how this can ever be right. For I do not think it is the province of any casual person to make such an accusation with rectitude, but of one who has made a very great proficiency in wisdom.

Euthyphro/ Very great indeed, by Zeus, Socrates.

Socrates/ Is it anyone of your relations who has been killed by your father? Though it certainly must be so; for you would not prosecute your father for the murder of a stranger.

Euthyphro/ It is ridiculous, Socrates, if you think it makes any difference whether he who is slain is a stranger or a relation, and are not persuaded that this alone ought to be attended to, whether he who committed the murder did it justly or not; and, if justly, that he should be dismissed; but, if unjustly, that he should be prosecuted, even though he should be your domestic, and partake of your table. For you become equally defiled with him, if you, knowingly associate with such a one, and do not expiate both yourself and him, by bringing him to justice. But to apprize you of the fact: The deceased was one of our farmers, who rented a piece of land of us when we dwelt at Naxus. This man, having one day drank too much wine, was so transported with rage against one of our slaves, that he killed him. My father, therefore,

ordered him to be cast into a pit, with his hands and feet bound, and immediately sent hither, to consult one of the interpreters of sacred concerns what he should do with him; and in the meantime neglected this prisoner, and left him without sustenance as an assassin, whose life was of no consequence; so that he died. For hunger, cold, and the weight of chains killed him, before the person my father had sent returned. Hence my father and the rest of my relations are indignant with me, because I, for the sake of a homicide, accuse my father of murder, which, as they say, he has not committed; and if he had, since he who is dead was a homicide, they think I ought not to be concerned for the fate of such a man. For they say it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder; so little do they know the manner in which a divine nature is affected about piety and impiety.

Socrates/ But, by Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think you possess such an accurate knowledge about divine affairs, and how things holy and impious are circumstanced, that these things having taken place as you say, you are not afraid, lest in prosecuting your father you should commit an impious action?

Euthyphro/ My profession, Socrates, would be of no advantage to me, nor would Euthyphro surpass in any respect other men, unless he accurately knew all such particulars.

Socrates/ O wonderful Euthyphro, it will therefore be a most excellent thing for me to become your disciple, and before the determination of my process to let Melitus know that I have hitherto considered the knowledge of divine concerns as a thing of the greatest consequence; and that now, since he says I am guilty of acting in a rash manner, and introducing novelties concerning divine natures, I am become your disciple. If, therefore, I shall say, you

acknowledge, O Melitus, that Euthyphro is wise and thinks rightly in such affairs, think and judge also the same of me; but if you do not entertain this opinion, call him, my preceptor, to account before you call me, as one who corrupts elderly men, viz. me and his father; me by instructing, but him by reproving and punishing. And if he is not persuaded by me, but still continues his prosecution, or accuses me instead of you, it will be necessary to say the very same things on the trial, to which I shall have previously called his attention.

Euthyphro/ It will so, by Zeus, Socrates; and if he attempts to accuse me, I shall find, as I think, his weak side, and he will be called to account in a court of justice long before me.

Socrates/ And I, O my dear associate, knowing these things, desire to become your disciple, as I am persuaded that no one, and not even Melitus himself, dares to look you in the face, though he so acutely, inartificially, and easily sees through me, that he has accused me of impiety. —Now therefore, by Zeus, tell me that which you now strenuously contend you clearly know, viz. what kind of thing you assert holiness to be, and also unholiness, both respecting murder and other things? Or is not holiness the same with itself in every action? And again, is not unholiness, which is perfectly contrary to holiness itself, similar to itself? And does not everything which it will be unholy to do, possess one certain idea according to unholiness?

Euthyphro/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, what you say holiness, and also what unholiness is?

Euthyphro/ I say, therefore, that holiness is that which I now do, viz. to prosecute him who acts unjustly either with respect to murder or sacrilege, or anything else of a similar

nature; whether the offending person be a father or mother, or any other whatever; and that not to prosecute such a one is impious. For see, Socrates, what a great proof I will give you in law that it is so, and which I have also mentioned to others, viz. that it is right not to spare an impious man, whoever he may be. For men are firmly persuaded that Zeus is the best and most just of gods, and yet they acknowledge that he put his father in chains, because he unjustly swallowed his children; and again, that Saturn castrated his father, through other things of a similar nature: but they are indignant with me, because I prosecute my father who has acted unjustly; and thus these men assert things contrary to each other in what they say concerning the gods and concerning me.

Socrates/ Is this the thing then, Euthyphro, on account of which I am brought to the bar, because when anyone asserts things of this kind concerning the gods, I admit them with pain; and through which, as it seems, someone calls me an offender? Now, therefore, if these things thus appear also to you who are well acquainted with such particulars, it is necessary, as it seems, that we also should admit them. For what else can we say, who acknowledge that we know nothing about such things? But tell me, by Zeus, who presides over friendship; do you think that these things thus happened in reality?

Euthyphro/ Yes, and things still more wonderful than these, Socrates, of which the multitude are ignorant.

Socrates/ Do you therefore think that the gods in reality wage war with each other, and that there are among them dire enmities and battles, and many other such like particulars as are related by the poets, with the representation of which by good painters our temples are decorated; and in the great Panathenææ a veil full of such

like variegated ornaments is carried into the Acropolis. Must we say, O Euthyphro, that these things are true?

Euthyphro/ Not these only, O Socrates; but, as I just now said, I can relate to you many other things concerning divine affairs if you are willing, which when you hear I well know that you will be astonished.

Socrates/ I should not wonder; but you may relate these things to me hereafter, when you are at leisure. Now, however, endeavor to tell me more clearly that which I just now asked. For you have not yet, my friend, sufficiently answered my question what holiness is, but you have only told me that this which you are now doing is holy, viz. to prosecute your father for murder.

Euthyphro/ And I spoke the truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ Perhaps so. But, O Euthyphro, do you not also say that many other things are holy?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Recollect, therefore, that I did not request you to teach me one or two from among many holy things, but what that form itself is by which all holy things are holy. For you have said that things unholy are unholy by one idea; and also that things holy are holy by another. Or do you not remember?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Teach me, therefore, what this very idea is, that looking to it, and using it as a paradigm, I may say that whatever thing of this kind you or any other does is holy, and that whatever is not of this kind is unholy.

Euthyphro/ But if you wish it, Socrates, I will also tell you this.

Socrates/ I do wish it.

Euthyphro/ That, therefore, which is dear to the gods is holy, but that which is not dear to them is unholy.

Socrates/ You have now answered, O Euthyphro, most beautifully, and in such a manner as I wished you to answer. Whether truly or not however, this I do not yet know. But you will doubtless in addition to this teach me that what you say is true.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, let us consider what we say. That which is dear to divinity, and the man who is dear to divinity, are holy; but that which is odious to divinity, and the man who is odious to divinity, are unholy. But the holy is not the same with the unholy, but is most contrary to it. Is it not so?

Euthyphro/ It certainly is so.

Socrates/ And these things appear to have been well said.

Euthyphro/ I think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But has it not, O Euthyphro, also been said that there is sedition among the gods, and that they oppose and are enemies to each other?

Euthyphro/ It has been said.

Socrates/ But let us thus consider, excellent man, about what particulars discord produces enmity and wrath. If, therefore, I and you differed in opinion concerning numbers, which of them were more in quantity, would this difference make us enemies, and should we be enraged with each other? Or, betaking ourselves to computation about things of this kind, should we not be quickly liberated from this dissension?

Euthyphro/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Hence also, if we differed concerning the greater and the lesser, should we not, by applying ourselves to measuring, soon bring our disagreement to an end?

Euthyphro/ We should.

Socrates/ And, as I think, by betaking ourselves to weighing, we should be able to judge concerning the heavier and the lighter.

Euthyphro/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ About what then disagreeing, and not being able to recur to a certain criterion, should we become enemies to, and be enraged with, each other? Perhaps you cannot readily inform me; but consider whether they are such as these, viz. the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the base, good and evil. Are not these the things about which disagreeing, and not being able to arrive at a certain judgment of them, we become enemies to each other, when we do so become, you and I, and all other men?

Euthyphro/ This, Socrates, is indeed the dissension, and it is about these things.

Socrates/ But what? Do not the gods, O Euthyphro, if they disagree in any respect, disagree on account of these very things?

Euthyphro/ By an abundant necessity.

Socrates/ Different gods, therefore, O generous Euthyphro, according to your assertion, think different things to be just, beautiful, base, good and evil. For they never would oppose each other unless they disagreed about these things. Or would they?

Euthyphro/ You speak rightly.

Socrates/ Do they not severally, therefore, love those things which they think to be beautiful, good and just, but hate the contraries of these?

Euthyphro/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But with respect to these very things, some of the gods, as you say, think them to be just, and others

unjust; about which also being dubious, they oppose and wage war with each other. Is it not so?

Euthyphro/ It is.

Socrates/ The same things therefore, as it seems, are hated and loved by the gods; and the things odious to and dear to the gods will be the very same.

Euthyphro/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Hence also the same things will be holy and unholy, O Euthyphro, from this reasoning.

Euthyphro/ It seems so.

Socrates/ You have not therefore, O wonderful man, answered my question. For I did not ask you this, to whom the same thing is both holy and unholy: but, as it seems, that which is dear is also odious to divinity. So that, Euthyphro, there is nothing wonderful if in this which you are now doing, viz. punishing your father, you should do that which is pleasing to Zeus, but odious to Saturn and Heaven; and which is pleasing to Vulcan, but odious to Hera: and if any other of the gods differs from another about this very circumstance, you should in like manner do that which is approved by the one and hated by the other.

Euthyphro/ But I think, Socrates, that no one of the gods will differ from another in this affair, and assert that it is not proper for him to suffer punishment who has unjustly slain anyone.

Socrates/ But what? Have you ever heard any man doubting, O Euthyphro, whether he who has unjustly slain another, or has done anything else unjustly, ought to be punished?

Euthyphro/ They never cease doubting about these things, both elsewhere and in courts of justice. For those that act unjustly in a very great degree, say and do everything in order to escape punishment.

Socrates/ Do they also, O Euthyphro, confess that they have acted unjustly? And confessing this, do they at the same time say, that they ought not to be punished.

Euthyphro/ They by no means say this.

Socrates/ They do not, therefore, say and do everything. For I think they dare not say, nor even doubt this, that if they act unjustly punishment must be inflicted on them: but, as it appears to me, they deny that they have acted unjustly. Do they not?

Euthyphro/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ They are not, therefore, dubious about this, whether he who acts unjustly ought to be punished; but they perhaps doubt who he is that acts unjustly, and by what action, and when, his conduct may be considered as unjust.

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ Will not, therefore, the very same things happen to the gods if they oppose each other concerning things just and unjust, according to your assertion; and will not some of them say, that they act unjustly by each other, and others again deny this? Since, O wonderful man, no one, either of gods or men, dares to assert that punishment ought not to be inflicted on him who acts unjustly.

Euthyphro/ They will: and what you now say, Socrates, is summarily true.

Socrates/ But those who are dubious, as well gods as men, will be dubious respecting each of the transactions; if the gods disagree about any action, and some of them say that it is done justly, but others unjustly. Is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come, then, my dear Euthyphro, teach me also that I may become more wise, what proof you have that all the gods think that he unjustly died, who having slain his

fellow-servant, and being put in chains by the master of the deceased, perished before he that bound him received the answer from the interpreters, which was to inform him how he ought to act; and that, on account of such a man, it is right for a son to prosecute his father and accuse him of murder. Come, endeavor to demonstrate to me something clear about these things, and that all the gods consider this action to be right more than anything. And if you demonstrate this to me sufficiently, I will never cease praising you for your wisdom.

Euthyphro/ But perhaps, Socrates, this is no trifling employment, otherwise I could clearly demonstrate it to you.

Socrates/ I understand you: I appear to you to be more dull of apprehension than the judges; since you will evidently prove to them that your father's conduct was unjust, and that all the gods hate such-like actions.

Euthyphro/ I shall demonstrate this very clearly, Socrates, if they will only hear what I have to say.

Socrates/ But they will hear, if you shall appear to speak well. However, while you was just now speaking, I thus thought and considered with myself: If Euthyphro should especially convince me that all the gods think a death of this kind to be unjust, in what respect shall I have the more learned from Euthyphro what the holy is, and also the unholy? For this action, as it appears, will be odious to divinity. It has not, however, yet appeared from this, what is holy, and what not. For that which is odious has also appeared to be dear to divinity. So that I will grant you this, Euthyphro, and if you please let all the gods think it to be unjust, and let them all hate it. Shall we, therefore, now make this correction in the definition, that what all the gods hate is unholy, and what they all love is holy; but that what some of them love, and others hate, is neither, or both? Are

you willing that at present we should thus desire concerning the holy and unholy?

Euthyphro/ What should hinder, Socrates.

Socrates/ Nothing hinders me, Euthyphro; but do you, as to what relates to yourself, consider whether, admitting this, you can so easily teach me what you promised?

Euthyphro/ But I say the holy is that which all the gods love; and its contrary, the unholy, that which all the gods hate.

Socrates/ Shall we not therefore consider, Euthyphro, whether this, is well said? Or shall we dismiss this consideration, and thus grant both to ourselves and others, that if anyone only says that a certain thing is so, we shall admit that it is so? Or shall we consider what he who speaks says?

Euthyphro/ Consider it certainly; though I think that this is now, well said.

Socrates/ Perhaps, O good man, we shall know this more clearly. For consider as follows: Is the holy, because it is holy, beloved by the gods; or because it is beloved by them, is it holy?

Euthyphro/ I do not know what you say, Socrates.

Socrates/ But I will endeavor to speak more clearly. We say that a thing may be carried, and that a thing carries; that a thing may be led, and that a thing leads; that a thing may be seen, and that a thing sees; and everything else of this kind. Do you understand that these are different from each other, and in what they differ?

Euthyphro/ I appear to myself to understand this.

Socrates/ Is therefore that which is beloved a certain thing, and that which loves another different from this?

Euthyphro/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Tell me, therefore, whether that which may be carried, may be carried because it is carried, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ For no other reason but for this.

Socrates/ And is this the case with that which may be led, because it is led; and with that which may be seen, because it is seen?

Euthyphro/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ A thing therefore is not seen because it may be seen; but, on the contrary, because it is seen, on this account it may be seen. Nor because a thing may be led, on this account is it led; but because it is led, on this account it may be led. Nor because a thing may be carried, is it carried; but because it is carried, it may be carried. Is then what I wish to say evident, Euthyphro? But what I wish to say is this: If anything is making, or suffers anything, it is not making because it may be made; but because it is making it may be made. Nor because it may suffer does it suffer; but because it suffers it may suffer. Or do you not admit this to be the case?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Is not this therefore also the case with that which is beloved, or making, or suffering something from someone?

Euthyphro/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ This therefore subsists in the same manner as the things before mentioned: it is not beloved by those by whom it is beloved, because it may be beloved; but because it is beloved, it may be beloved.

Euthyphro/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ What then do we say concerning holiness, O Euthyphro? Is it not this, that it is beloved by all the gods, according to your assertion?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it therefore beloved on this account, because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ For no other reason but on this account.

Socrates/ Because it is holy, therefore, it is beloved; but not because it is beloved, on this account it is holy.

Euthyphro/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Because however it is beloved by the gods, it may be beloved, and be dear to divinity.

Euthyphro/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ That which is dear to divinity, therefore, is not holy, O Euthyphro, nor must holiness be defined to be that which is dear to divinity as you say, but it is something different from this.

Euthyphro/ How is this, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because we have acknowledged that holiness is on this account beloved because it is holy; and not that it is holy because it is beloved. Did we not?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ But that which is dear to divinity, because it is beloved by the gods, from this very circumstance that it is beloved, is dear to divinity; but not because it is dear to divinity, on this account is it beloved.

Euthyphro/ True.

Socrates/ But, my dear Euthyphro, if that which is dear to divinity were the same with that which is holy, if holiness were beloved through its being holiness, that also which is dear to divinity would be beloved through its being dear to divinity. But if that which is dear to divinity were dear to

divinity through being beloved by the gods, that which is holy would also be holy through being beloved. Now, however, you see that they are contrarily affected, as being perfectly different from each other. For the one, viz. what is dear to the gods because it is beloved, is a thing of that kind that it may be beloved; but the other, viz. holiness, because it is a thing which may be beloved, on this account is beloved. And you appear, O Euthyphro, when you was asked what holiness is, to have been unwilling to manifest the essence of it to me, but to have mentioned a certain affection pertaining to it, which this same thing holiness suffers, viz. the being beloved by all the gods; but you have not yet told me what it is. If therefore it is agreeable to you, do not conceal this from me, but again say from the beginning what holiness is, whether it be beloved by the gods, or has any other property whatever pertaining to it. For we shall not differ about this. But tell me readily what the holy, and also what the unholy is?

Euthyphro/ But, Socrates, I cannot tell you what I conceive. For whatever position we adopt, is always somehow or other circumvented, and is not willing to remain where we have established it.

Socrates/ The things which you have asserted, O Euthyphro, appear to be the offspring of our progenitor Dædalus. And if I indeed had said and adopted these things, perhaps you would have derided me, as if my works also, which consist in discourse, through my alliance with him, privately escaped, and were unwilling to remain where they were placed. But now (for they are your hypotheses) the raillery of some other person is necessary. For they are unwilling to abide with you, as it also appears to you yourself.

Euthyphro/ But it appears to me, Socrates, that what is said ought to be exposed to nearly the same ridicule. For I

am not the cause of the circuitous wandering of these assertions, and of their not abiding in the same place; but you appear to me to be the Dædalus. For so far as pertains to me, these things would have remained firm.

Socrates/ I appear therefore, my friend, to have become so much more skillful than that man in this art, in as much as he only made his own productions unstable; but I, besides my own, as it seems, make those of others to be so. And moreover, this is the most elegant circumstance pertaining to my art, that I am unwillingly wise. For I had rather that my reasonings should abide, and be established immoveable, than that the riches of Tantalus, together with the wisdom of Dædalus, should become my possession. But enough of this. —Since, however, you appear to be delicate, I, in conjunction with you, will endeavor to show how you may teach me concerning holiness, and not be weary till this is accomplished. For see whether it does not appear to you to be necessary that everything holy should be just.

Euthyphro/ To me it does.

Socrates/ Is therefore everything just also holy? or is everything holy indeed just; but not everything just holy, but partly holy, and partly something else?

Euthyphro/ I do not comprehend, Socrates, what you say.

Socrates/ And yet you are younger no less than you are wiser than I am; but, as I said, you are delicate through the riches of your wisdom. However, O blessed man, collect yourself: For it is not difficult to understand what I say. For I assert the contrary to the poet, who says;

> You Jove, the source of all, refuse to sing:
> For fear perpetually resides with shame.

I therefore differ from this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?

Euthyphro/ By all means.

Socrates/ It does not appear to me, that wherever there is fear, there also there is shame. For there are many, as it seems to me, who fear diseases, poverty, and many other things of this kind, but who by no means are ashamed of these things which they fear. Does not the same thing also appear to you?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But wherever shame is, there also is fear. For Is there anyone who is ashamed of and blushes at anything, but who does not at the same time fear and dread the opinion of improbity?

Euthyphro/ He will certainly dread this.

Socrates/ It is not therefore right to say, that where there is fear, there also there is shame; but we should say that where there is shame, there also fear resides. For wherever there is fear, there is not also shame. For I think that fear extends further than shame; since shame is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number. So that it does not follow that wherever there is number, there also is the odd but wherever there is the odd, there also there is number. Do you now apprehend me?

Euthyphro/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ Respecting a thing of this kind, therefore, I inquired above, when I asked you whether where the just was, there also the holy was; or whether where the holy was, there also the just was, but the holy was not to be found every wherein conjunction with the just. For the holy is a part of the just. Does it appear to you that we should thus speak, or otherwise?

Euthyphro/ Not otherwise; but thus. For you appear to me to speak rightly.

Socrates/ See then what follows: for, if the holy is a part of the just, it is necessary, as it seems, that we should discover what part of the just the holy will be. If therefore you should ask me some of the things just now mentioned as, for instance, what part of number the even is, and what number it is, I should say that it is not scalene, but isosceles. Or does it not appear so to you?

Euthyphro/ It does.

Socrates/ Do you therefore also endeavor in like manner to teach me what part of the just the holy is, that we may tell Melitus he must no longer act unjustly by us, nor accuse us of impiety, as having now sufficiently learnt from you what things are pious and holy, and what not.

Euthyphro/ This part then, Socrates, of the just, appears to me to be pious and holy, viz. that which is conversant with the culture of the gods; but that which is conversant with the culture of mankind is the remaining part of the just.

Socrates/ And you appear to me, Euthyphro, to speak well. However, I am still in want of a certain trifling particular. For I do not yet understand what culture you mean. For you certainly do not say that such as is the culture about other things, such also is that which pertains to the gods. For instance, we say not everyone knows the culture of horses, but he who is skilled in equestrian affairs. Do we not?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For equestrian skill is the culture of horses.

Euthyphro/ It is.

Socrates/ Nor does everyone know the culture of dogs, but this belongs to the huntsman.

Euthyphro/ It does.

Socrates/ For the art of hunting is the culture of dogs.

Euthyphro/ It is.

Socrates/ But the grazier's art is the culture of oxen.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But holiness and piety are the culture of the gods, O Euthyphro. Do you say so?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ All culture, therefore, effects the same thing, viz. the good and advantage of that which is cultivated. Just as with respect to horses, you see that being cultivated by the equestrian art, they are advantaged by it and become better. Or does it not appear so to you?

Euthyphro/ It does.

Socrates/ Dogs also are benefited by the huntsman's art, and oxen by that of the grazier, and all other things in a similar manner. Or do you think that culture is the injury of that which is cultivated?

Euthyphro/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But the advantage therefore?

Euthyphro/ How should it not?

Socrates/ Is holiness, therefore, since it is a culture of the gods, an advantage to the gods, and does it make the gods better? And do you admit this, that when you perform anything holy, you render some one of the gods better?

Euthyphro/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Nor do I, O Euthyphro, think that you say this: it certainly is far otherwise. And for this reason I asked you what this culture of the gods is, not thinking you would say a thing of this kind.

Euthyphro/ And you thought rightly, Socrates: for I do not say any such thing.

Socrates/ Be it so. But what culture of the gods will holiness be?

Euthyphro/ That culture, Socrates, which slaves pay to their masters.

Socrates/ I understand. It will be a certain subservience as it seems to the gods.

Euthyphro/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Can you then tell me, with respect to the art subservient to physicians, to the accomplishment of what work it is subservient? Do you not think it is subservient to health?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ But what? with respect to the art subservient to shipwrights, to the accomplishment of what work is it subservient?

Euthyphro/ Evidently, Socrates, to that of a ship.

Socrates/ And is not the art subservient to architects, subservient to the building of houses?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, O best of men: with respect to the art subservient to the gods, to the accomplishment of what work will it be subservient? For it is evident that you know, because you say that you have a knowledge of divine concerns beyond that of other men.

Euthyphro/ And I say true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Inform me then, by Zeus, what that all-beautiful work is which the gods effect, employing our subservience.

Euthyphro/ They are many and beautiful, Socrates.

Socrates/ The generals of an army too, my friend, accomplish many and beautiful things, but at the same time you can easily tell what that principal thing is which they effect, viz. victory in battle. Or can you not?

Euthyphro/ How is it possible I should not?

Socrates/ Husbandmen also, I think, accomplish many and beautiful things; but at the same time the principal thing which they produce is aliment from the earth.

Euthyphro/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Of the many and beautiful things then which the gods accomplish, what is the principal?

Euthyphro/ I told you a little before, Socrates, that to learn accurately how all these things subsist is an arduous undertaking; but I now tell you simply this, that if anyone knows how to say and do things acceptable to the gods, praying and sacrificing to them, these things are holy. Things of this kind also preserve both private houses and cities; but the contraries to things acceptable to the gods are impious, and these subvert and destroy all things.

Socrates/ You might, if you had been willing, Euthyphro, have told me the sum of my inquiries in a much shorter manner. But it is evident that you are not readily disposed to instruct me. For now when you drew near for this purpose you receded; though if you had answered, I should before this perhaps have learnt from you what holiness is. But now (for it is necessary that he who interrogates should follow him who is interrogated wherever he may lead) what do you again say the holy, and holiness, is? Do you not say it is a certain science of sacrificing and praying?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Is not to sacrifice to offer gifts to the gods; but to pray to request something of the gods?

Euthyphro/ Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ From this it follows that holiness will be the science of requesting and giving to the gods.

Euthyphro/ You have very well understood, Socrates, what I said.

Socrates/ For I am very desirous, my friend, of your wisdom, and I pay attention to it; so that what you say does not fall to the ground. But tell me what this subservience to the gods is? Do you say it is to request of them and to give to them?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Will it not follow, therefore, that to request rightly, will be to request of them those things of which we are in want?

Euthyphro/ What else can it be?

Socrates/ And again, will not to give rightly consist in giving to them in our turn such things as they are in want of from us? For it would not be conformable to art to bestow upon anyone those things of which he is not in want.

Euthyphro/ You say true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Holiness, therefore, O Euthyphro, will be a certain mercantile art between gods and men.

Euthyphro/ Let it be mercantile, if it pleases you so to call it.

Socrates/ But it is not pleasing to me unless it be true. Tell me therefore what advantage the gods derive from the gifts which they receive from us? For the advantage arising from their gifts is evident to everyone; since we have not any good which they do not impart. But in what respect are they benefited from what they receive from us? Or have we so much the advantage in this merchandise, that we receive every good from them, but they receive nothing from us?

Euthyphro/ But do you think, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by what they receive from us?

Socrates/ What is the use then, Euthyphro, of these our gifts to the gods?

Euthyphro/ What other use do you think except honor and reverence, and, as I just now said, gratitude?

Socrates/ Holiness then, Euthyphro, is that which is acceptable to the gods, but not that which is profitable to, or beloved by them.

Euthyphro/ I think it is the most of all things beloved by them.

Socrates/ This then again is as it seems holiness, viz. that which is dear to the gods.

Euthyphro/ Especially so.

Socrates/ Asserting these things, can you wonder that your discourse does not appear to be fixed, but wandering? And can you accuse me as being the Dædalus that causes them to wander, when you yourself far surpass Dædalus in art, and make your assertions to revolve in a circle? Or do you not perceive that our discourse, revolving again, comes to the same? For you remember that in the former part of our discourse, the holy, and the dear to divinity, did not appear to us to be the same, but different from each other: or do you not remember?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Now, therefore, do you not perceive that you say the holy is that which is beloved by the gods? But is this anything else than that which is dear to divinity?

Euthyphro/ It is nothing else.

Socrates/ Either therefore we did not then conclude well, or, if we did, our present position is not right.

Euthyphro/ It seems so.

Socrates/ From the beginning, therefore, we must again consider what the holy is. For I shall not willingly, before I have learnt this, run timidly away. Do not then despise me, but paying all possible attention, tell me the truth in the

most eminent degree. For you know it, if any man does; and you will not be dismissed like Proteus till you have told me. For if you had not clearly known what the holy, and also the unholy is, you never would have attempted, for the sake of a man who is a hireling, to accuse your father of murder, when he is now advanced in years; but you would have dreaded (lest you should not act rightly in this affair) the danger of incurring the anger of the gods, and the reproach of men. But now I well know that you clearly suspect, that you have a knowledge of what the holy and its contrary are. Tell me, therefore, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal from me what you think it to be?

Euthyphro/ It must be at some other opportunity then, Socrates: for now I am in haste, and it is time for me to leave you.

Socrates/ What do you do, my friend? By your departure you will throw me from the great hope I had entertained of learning from you what things are holy, and what are not so, and of liberating myself from the accusation of Melitus, by showing him that I was become wise through Euthyphro in divine concerns; that I shall no longer speak rashly, nor introduce any novelties respecting them through ignorance; and also that I shall act better during the remainder of my life.

Euthyphro.

Translated and edited by W. D. Woodhead. 1953

Persons of the Dialog,

Euthyphro, Socrates.

Euthyphro/ Why, Socrates, what strange event has led you to abandon your usual haunts at the Lyceum and spend your time here, around the King's Portico? Surely you are not, like me, involved in an action before the King.

Socrates/ The Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action, but a public prosecution.

Euthyphro/ What do you say? Somebody surely must have lodged an indictment against you: for I will never believe it of you, that you are prosecuting another.

Socrates/ No, indeed.

Euthyphro/ Then someone is prosecuting you?

Socrates/ Exactly.

Euthyphro/ Who is it?

Socrates/ I do not really know the man myself, Euthyphro: apparently he is young and unknown: but I believe they call him Meletus. He belongs to the parish of Pitthus—if you recall a Meletus of Pitthus, a straight-haired fellow with a hooked nose and a straggly bit of beard.

Euthyphro/ I do not remember him, Socrates: but what is this indictment that he has brought against you?

Socrates/ The indictment? Something quite fine, it seems to me. For it is no small matter for one so young to have made so important a discovery. He claims to know how our young men are corrupted and who are responsible. Apparently he is a man of wisdom; and seeing my stupidity in corrupting those of his own age, he comes before the State

to accuse me, even as a boy might run to his mother. And in my opinion he is the only man who is making the right beginning in politics: for the right thing is to look after our young first and see that they become as good as possible, just as your good farmer will naturally first pay attention to his young plants and to the rest later. So too Meletus, I suppose, is first of all weeding us out who, according to him, are ruining the tender buds of youth: and thereafter obviously he will attend to the older folk and prove the author of many great blessings to the city. Such at least would be the natural result of so promising a beginning.

Euthyphro/ So I could wish, Socrates: but I am afraid the opposite will happen: for it seems to me that, in setting out to wrong you, he is literally striking at the very heart of the city. And now tell me how he claims you corrupt the young.

Socrates/ By conduct strange enough, my good friend, at first hearing. He says that I am a creator of gods: and it is because I manufacture strange new gods and do not worship the old, that he has now come forward to prosecute me, so he says.

Euthyphro/ I see, Socrates: doubtless it is because you speak of a divine presence as visiting you from time to time. And so it is on the ground that you are the pioneer of a new religion that he prosecutes you: and he is going into court to discredit you, knowing that it is easy to discredit such conduct before the people. Why, they scoff even at me as a madman whenever I speak in the Assembly about religious matters and foretell the future. And yet not one of my prophecies has failed to prove true. But none the less they bear malice against all people of our kind. However, we must not let them worry us, but must boldly go forth to meet them.

Socrates/ My dear Euthyphro, their ridicule is perhaps a matter of no importance. For the Athenians, in my opinion,

feel little concern, if they think a man too clever, so long as they do not think he imparts his cleverness to others. But when they think he is training others to resemble himself, they grow angry, whether through envy, as you suggest, or for any other reason.

Euthyphro/ Well, I have no particular desire to discover by experience their feelings towards me in this matter.

Socrates/ Perhaps they think that you do not make yourself cheap and are not ready to teach your wisdom: but I myself—well, I am afraid they consider that through my love for humanity I pour forth lavishly to one and all everything that is mine, and not only ask no payment but would gladly pay money myself to any who care to listen to me. If, then, as I just now said, they were likely to laugh at me, as you claim they laugh at you, it would not be unpleasant to spend our time laughing and jesting in court: but if they are going to take it seriously, then only you seers can know what the issue will be.

Euthyphro/ Well, perhaps it will prove a trivial affair, Socrates, and you will fight your case to your satisfaction, as I think I shall mine.

Socrates/ And what is your suit, Euthyphro? Are you prosecutor or defendant?

Euthyphro/ I am prosecuting.

Socrates/ And whom are you suing?

Euthyphro/ One whom they think me as mad as ever to sue.

Socrates/ Why? Is it some winged bird?

Euthyphro/ So far from flying on the wing, he is quite an old man.

Socrates/ Who is he?

Euthyphro/ My father.

Socrates/ Your father, my dear man?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But why are you suing him, and what is the charge?

Euthyphro/ Murder, Socrates.

Socrates/ Heavens above! Surely, Euthyphro, the majority of people must be ignorant of what is right! I cannot believe that the ordinary person would act as you do, but only a man already far advanced in wisdom.

Euthyphro/ Far advanced indeed, Socrates, as God is my witness!

Socrates/ Is it one of your own family who was killed by your father? But of course it was: for you would hardly prosecute him for murder on a stranger's behalf.

Euthyphro/ How absurd of you, Socrates, to think it makes any difference whether the dead man be a relative or stranger! There is only one thing to consider, whether the slayer's deed was justified or not: and if it was justified, one should let him be: if not, one should prosecute him—even if the slayer shares one's hearth and board. For the taint of pollution extends equally to you, if with knowledge of his deed you associate with such a man and do not purify yourself and him by bringing him to justice. As a matter of fact, the victim was a laborer of mine, and when we were farming in Naxos he worked there on our estate. And in a fit of drunkenness he flew into a rage with one of our servants and brutally murdered him. And so my father bound him hand and foot, flung him into a ditch, and sent a man to Athens to inquire of the Religious Adviser what was to be done. Meanwhile he paid no attention to the bound man but neglected him as a murderer, considering that it mattered not even if he should die. And this is exactly what the fellow did: he died of hunger and cold and his bonds before the

return of the messenger from the Adviser. Now that is just why my father and my other relations are annoyed with me, because it is on a murderer's behalf that I am prosecuting my father for murder. They insist that he did not kill the man: and even if he were never so responsible for the death, yet, the dead man being a murderer, I should not, they say, concern myself about such a creature, for it is an unholy action for son to prosecute father for murder. Little they know about heaven's attitude to what is holy or unholy.

Socrates/ But, in God's name, Euthyphro, do you actually consider yourself so expert in your knowledge of the divine and of what is or is not holy, that under the circumstances which you mentioned you are not afraid of being yourself guilty of an unholy act in prosecuting your father?

Euthyphro/ I should be a useless fellow, Socrates, if I had not expert knowledge in all these matters: and Euthyphro would in no way be superior to the mass of mankind.

Socrates/ Then, my wonderful friend, the best thing for me to do is to become your pupil and challenge Meletus on these very points before the case comes to trial, insisting that in the past I always considered it of great importance to know about religion and that now, since he accuses me of acting amiss by judging hastily and breaking new ground in these matters, I have become your pupil. And I might add: 'Meletus, if you admit that Euthyphro is wise in these affairs, then you must consider that I too am orthodox and give up the indictment: but if you do not, then pray take action against him, my teacher, rather than against me, on the ground that he is ruining the older men, namely myself by his teaching, and his father by correction and punishment.' And if he refuses to listen to me and does not release me or prosecute you in my stead, then I might repeat in court the points of my challenge to him.

Euthyphro/ Good God, Socrates, if he should venture to prosecute me, I think I should discover where his weakness lies: and he would be under discussion in court long before me.

Socrates/ I too realize that, my dear friend, and I am anxious to become your disciple because I know that this fellow Meletus—along with others too perhaps—seems not even to see you, but for me so quick and keen in his vision that he has charged me with impiety. So now, in heaven's name, expound to me what you just now maintained you know so clearly, just how you define piety and impiety, both with reference to murder and to other matters. Is not holiness consistently the same in every activity, and unholiness invariably its opposite—all that is to prove unholy being self-consistent and, in respect of its unholiness, possessed of one single form?

Euthyphro/ Assuredly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then tell me how you define holiness and unholiness.

Euthyphro/ Well, then, holiness I describe as doing just what I am now doing. It is to prosecute the man who is guilty of acts of murder or sacrilege, or any other such offences, whether it be your father or mother or whoever it may be: and to decline to prosecute is unholy. Why, Socrates, observe what conclusive proof I can offer to you that this is [heaven's] law—a proof which I have already presented to others in evidence that this conduct would be correct—the law that we should never give way to the impious man, no matter who he may be. Men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods, and yet they agree that he bound and imprisoned his own father for wickedly devouring his children, and that that father in turn castrated his own father for similar misdeeds: but. they are angry with me

because I take action against my father for wrong-doing, and so they are self-contradictory in what they say about the gods and about me.

Socrates/ Can this be the reason for my prosecution, Euthyphro, that when people tell such stories about the gods, I listen with repugnance? And therefore people will say, I suppose, that I do wrong. But now, if you who are an expert in such matters share their opinion, I suppose I must give way. For what can I say, when I myself admit my ignorance in these things? But tell me, in Friendship's name, do you really believe that these things so happened?

Euthyphro/ Yes, and others stranger still, Socrates, of which the many know nothing.

Socrates/ And do you think that the gods are really at war with one another and that there are bitter enmities and battles and many other such things as are described by the poets and depicted by our worthy artists in our shrines, and especially in the robe covered with such embroidered scenes which is carried up to the Acropolis at the Great Panathenaea? Are we to say that all this is true, Euthyphro?

Euthyphro/ Yes, and that is not all, Socrates, but as I said just now, I can tell you many other stories, if you like, about things divine, which will astonish you, I am sure, when you hear them.

Socrates/ I should not be surprised. But these you shall tell me at your leisure some other time. But try now to answer more clearly the question I have just asked. For when I asked you, my friend, what holiness is, you did not sufficiently enlighten me, but replied that to proceed against your own father for murder, as you are now doing, is an act of holiness.

Euthyphro/ Well, what I said was true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Perhaps. But there are many other things which you call holy, Euthyphro.

Euthyphro/ There are indeed.

Socrates/ You must remember, then, that I did not ask you to inform me of one or two of those many things, but to define that one essential form which makes holy all that is holy: for you said, I believe, that holy actions are holy and unholy acts unholy by virtue in each case of a single form. Or do you not remember?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Explain to me then just what is this actual form: then by looking to it and using it as a pattern I can accept as holy any action by yourself or another that conforms to it, and reject what does not.

Euthyphro/ Well, if that is what you want, Socrates, I will explain it to you.

Socrates/ That is precisely what I want.

Euthyphro/ Then, what is dear to the gods is holy: what is not, unholy.

Socrates/ Excellent, Euthyphro: now you have answered just as I wanted you to answer. Whether your definition is true, I do not yet know: but obviously you will proceed to prove you are right.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, let us consider what we mean. Things and persons dear to the gods are holy, those hateful to the gods, unholy: and the holy and the unholy are not the same but completely opposite. Is that our meaning?

Euthyphro/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ And the statement seems to be correct?

Euthyphro/ I think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Has it not also been stated, Euthyphro, that there are factions and quarrels and mutual hatreds among the gods?

Euthyphro/ It has.

Socrates/ But in what matters do disagreements provoke enmity and anger, my worthy friend? Let us investigate the question in this way. If you and I were to differ as to which of two numbers is the greater, would our disagreement on this point make us enemies and angry with each other, or would we quickly settle such questions by counting?

Euthyphro/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And if we differed about larger or smaller size, we should quickly end our difference by resorting to measurement?

Euthyphro/ That is so.

Socrates/ And by resorting to weighing, I fancy, we should quickly settle any dispute about the heavier or the lighter.

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then what source of disagreement is there which, through lack of a means of settlement, might provoke us to enmity and anger? Perhaps the answer is not immediately ready to hand: but consider whether I am correct in suggesting that it is questions of right and wrong, noble and base, good and evil. Are not these the subjects which on occasion breed enmity among us when we differ and are unable to reach a satisfactory agreement, you and I and everyone else?

Euthyphro/ Yes, Socrates, such are the disagreements and such the causes.

Socrates/ And what about the gods, Euthyphro? If they quarrel at all, would it not be over such questions?

Euthyphro/ Most necessarily so.

Socrates/ Then according to what you say, my noble Euthyphro, the gods also differ in their opinions of what is right and noble, base and good and evil: for surely they would not engage in factions against each other, if they did not disagree about these things, would they?

Euthyphro/ You are right.

Socrates/ Then whatever each group considers noble and good and righteous, these things they love, and the opposite they hate?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Yes, but the selfsame things, according to you, are considered right by one group and wrong by another and it is because they disagree about these matters that they quarrel and fight with each other. Is it not so?

Euthyphro/ It is.

Socrates/ Then the same things apparently are hated and loved by the gods, and the same things must be hateful and dear to them.

Euthyphro/ So it seems.

Socrates/ By this account then, Euthyphro, the same things will be holy and unholy.

Euthyphro/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ Then, my strange friend, you have not answered my question. For I did not ask about something which, while remaining the same, is at once holy and unholy. But it seems that what is dear to the gods is also hated by the gods. And so it would not be surprising if your present action in punishing your father is welcome to Zeus but hateful to Cronos or Uranus, and pleasing to Hephaestus but hateful to Hera, and similarly pleasing or displeasing to other gods who are at variance with each other on the subject.

Euthyphro/ But surely, Socrates, there can be but one opinion among all the gods regarding the point of view that a man who has wrongfully killed another need not be punished.

Socrates/ What, Euthyphro? Among mankind have you ever heard anyone argue that the man who has wrongfully killed another or who is guilty of any other wrong should not be punished?

Euthyphro/ Indeed, they are never done with such arguments, both in the law-courts and elsewhere: for while men commit many evil deeds, they leave nothing unsaid or undone to escape punishment.

Socrates/ But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet, in spite of their admission, insist that they should not be punished?

Euthyphro/ Oh, no: not that.

Socrates/ Then they do not leave nothing unsaid and undone: for, I fancy, they do not venture to dispute or argue that they should escape punishment if guilty: but, I think, they deny their guilt. Is it not so?

Euthyphro/ You are right.

Socrates/ They do not then dispute the point that the guilty should be punished, but rather perhaps the question who is the wrong-doer, and when, and what his action.

Euthyphro/ That is true.

Socrates/ Is it not exactly the same with the gods if, as you say, they are at variance about right and wrong and one party accuses the other of doing wrong and the other denies it? For surely no one, my strange friend, whether god or man, dares to assert that the guilty ought not to be punished.

Euthyphro/ Yes, you are right, Socrates, in the main.

Socrates/ But it is always about one particular act, I imagine, Euthyphro, that disputes arise among both gods and men, if indeed gods do disagree: it is with regard to some individual action that they differ when one party claims that it is right and the other that it is wrong. Is it not so?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, my dear Euthyphro, instruct me too for my enlightenment. What proof have you that all the gods regard as unjust the death of your man—a laborer guilty of murder, who was bound by his victim's master and died from his bonds before the man who had bound him could learn from the Advisers what action he should take? What proof have you that for such a man a son should denounce and indict his father for murder? Come, try to give me some definite proof in this case that all the gods beyond any question consider this action right: and if you prove this to my satisfaction, I will praise your wisdom forever.

Euthyphro/ Well, perhaps that is no slight task, Socrates, though I could make it quite clear to you.

Socrates/ I understand: it is because you think me slower of comprehension than the judges, since it is obvious you will convince them that such deeds are wrong and detested by all the gods.

Euthyphro/ Quite conclusively, Socrates, if only they will listen to my words.

Socrates/ They will listen, if they consider that you speak well. But while you were speaking, another point occurred to me and I reflected: Suppose that Euthyphro should prove to me beyond all doubt that all the gods consider such a death unjust, I have not learnt any the more definitely from him the meaning of holiness and unholiness. This particular deed may apparently be hateful to the gods. But we have just seen that holiness and its opposite cannot be defined in this

way: for we have discovered that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to them. On this point, then, I will let you off, Euthyphro: if you wish, let us allow that all the gods consider your father's action wrong and all detest it. But what of the amendment we now put forward in our definition—that what all the gods hate is unholy, and what they all love, holy: and what some hate and others love, is neither or both? Is that the definition of holiness and of unholiness you now wish us to accept?

Euthyphro/ What can hinder us, Socrates?

Socrates/ Oh, I offer no objection, Euthyphro: but consider for your part whether by such an assumption you can most easily give me the instruction which you promised?

Euthyphro/ Well then, I should maintain that the holy is what all the gods love, and its opposite—whatever all the gods hate—unholy.

Socrates/ Shall we examine this definition in turn, Euthyphro, and see whether it is correct, or shall we let it pass and without more ado accept statements from ourselves and others, admitting that things are as stated if anyone merely makes an assertion? Or should we inquire into the speaker's meaning?

Euthyphro/ We must inquire: however, I think that our present statement is right.

Socrates/ We shall soon know more certainly, my good friend. Just consider this problem: is holiness loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because loved by the gods?

Euthyphro/ I do not understand what you mean, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then I will attempt to make it more clear. We speak of things being carried and carrying, being led and

leading, being seen and seeing, and you understand that all such pairs differ from each other and how they differ.

Euthyphro/ Yes, I think I understand.

Socrates/ Then there is a thing that is loved and, different from it, a thing that loves.

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Tell me, is a thing carried a carried thing because it is carried, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ No, for that reason.

Socrates/ And a thing led is so called, because it is led: and a thing seen, because it is seen.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ One does not see it, therefore, because it is a thing seen, but on the contrary it is a thing seen because one sees it: nor does one lead it because it is a thing led, but it is a thing led because one leads it: nor does one carry it because it is a thing carried, but it is a thing carried because one carries it. Is what I wish to say clear, Euthyphro? What I mean is this, that, if a thing is produced or affected, it is a thing produced because it is produced; not produced because it is a thing produced: and it is not affected because it is a thing affected; it is a thing affected because it is affected. Do you not agree?

Euthyphro/ I agree.

Socrates/ Now an object loved is either a thing produced or a thing affected by something?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the truth here is the same as in the former instances: a thing is not loved by its lovers because it is a loved object: it is a loved object because it is loved.

Euthyphro/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ What do we say then about the holy, Euthyphro? Is it not, according to your statement, loved by all the gods?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro/ Because it is holy.

Socrates/ It is loved then because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

Euthyphro/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But it is because it is loved by the gods that it is an object loved and dear to them?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then what is dear to the gods is not identical with the holy, nor is holiness identical with what is dear to the gods, as you assert, Euthyphro: they are different from one another.

Euthyphro/ How is that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because we agree that the holy is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved, do we not?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, but we agree also that what is dear to the gods is dear to them because they love it and in virtue of that love, not loved by them because it is dear to them.

Euthyphro/ You are right.

Socrates/ But supposing what is dear to the gods and what is holy were identical, then, my dear Euthyphro, if the holy were loved because it is holy, the gods would love what is dear to them because it was dear to them: and if what was dear to them were dear to them because they loved it, then the holy would be holy because they loved it. But as it is, you can see that the opposite is true of them and that they are entirely different from one another. For the one [what is

dear to the gods] is lovable because it is loved: the other [holiness] is loved because it is lovable. And apparently, Euthyphro, when asked to define the holy, you do not wish to explain its true nature but merely mention an accident or attribute belonging to it, namely that it is loved by all the gods: but what it is, you have not yet told us. If it so please you, then, do not withhold it from me, but begin again and tell me just what this holiness is, regardless of whether it be loved by the gods or of any other attribute—we need not quarrel about that. But do your best to tell me what is holiness and what is unholiness.

Euthyphro/ Well, Socrates, I do not know how to explain to you what I think. Somehow or other whatever we put forward goes round in circles and refuses to stay where we put it.

Socrates/ Your definitions, Euthyphro, resemble the works of my ancestor Daedalus. And if I uttered them and put them forth, you would probably laugh at me and say that owing to that family connection my works of art in discourse run away and will not remain where they are placed. But, as it is, the definitions were proposed by you, and so some other jest is needed: for you yourself realize that they will not stand still.

Euthyphro/ In my opinion the same jest applies pretty well: for if the statements circle around and will not remain still, I am not the one who put this motion into them, but to my thinking it is you, you Daedalus; since, so far as I am concerned, they would have held their ground.

Socrates/ Apparently then, my friend, I am a more skillful artist than my worthy ancestor, to the extent that he made only his own statues move, whereas, it seems, I can make those of others move as well as my own. And the most charming thing about my craft is that I am skillful in my own

despite. I would rather our statements remained firmly fixed than possess the wealth of Tantalus as well as the skill of Daedalus. But enough of this. Now, since you seem to be a spoilt creature, I will to the best of my ability help you to instruct me about the holy. And do not give in too early. Just consider whether you do not think that all holiness is right.

Euthyphro/ It is.

Socrates/ Then is everything that is right also holy? Or is all that is holy right, but not all that is right holy, but part of it holy, part something else?

Euthyphro/ I cannot follow what you are saying, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet you are as superior to me in youth as you are in wisdom. But, as I say, your wealth of wisdom has spoilt you. Come, make a valiant effort, my good friend: it is not difficult to understand what I mean. I am saying the opposite of what the poet said when he wrote: e Even he who originated all this will not revile Zeus who wrought it: for where there is fear, there is also shame.' Now I do not agree with this poet. Shall I tell you why?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I do not think it is true that 'where there is fear, there is also shame': for many who fear sickness and poverty and other such things seem to me to suffer fear but in no way to feel shame about what they fear. Do you not agree?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But where shame is, there fear is also: for surely no one who feels reverence or shame about anything does not at the same time dread and fear a repute for baseness.

Euthyphro/ No, he does fear.

Socrates/ It is not right then to say 'where there is fear, there is shame': where there is shame there is fear also: but there is not in every case shame where there is fear: for fear has a wider application than shame, shame being but a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number: so that where there is number, there is not necessarily the odd: but where the odd is, there also is number. You follow me now, I suppose.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, this is the kind of thing I meant when I asked whether there is holiness wherever the right is; or whether, while there is always right where there is holiness, there is not everywhere holiness where there is right: since the holy is part of the right. Are we to accept this or do you think otherwise?

Euthyphro/ No, I accept it, for I think your statement is correct.

Socrates/ Then consider the next point. If holiness is a part of the right, we must apparently determine what part it is. Now if you had asked me one of the questions just mentioned, for instance, what part of number is the even and what kind of number, I should have defined it as represented by a triangle with two equal, not all unequal, sides. Do you not agree?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Try then in the same way to explain to me what part of the right is holiness: then I can tell Meletus to cease wronging me by his prosecution for impiety, since I have satisfactorily learnt from you what is pious and holy and the reverse.

Euthyphro/ Piety and holiness in my opinion, Socrates, are that part of the right which is concerned with attention

to the gods: and the remaining part of the right has to do with care for men.

Socrates/ An excellent statement too, Euthyphro: but there is one trifling thing I still lack: I do not yet understand of what 'attention' you are speaking.

You cannot, I imagine, mean the same kind of attention to the gods as we bestow elsewhere: for that is the term we use, is it not? We say, for example, that not every man but only the trainer of horses knows how to attend to horses, do we not?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For the art of horsemanship attends to horses?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And not everybody knows how to tend dogs, but only the huntsman?

Euthyphro/ That is so.

Socrates/ For the huntsman's art attends to dogs?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the herdsman's art attends to cattle?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And holiness and piety pay attention to the gods, Euthyphro: is that what you say?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ Now does not every form of attention achieve the same purpose? What I mean to say is, that it exists for some benefit and advantage to the object tended: you see, for example, that horses when tended by the horseman's art are profited and improved. Do you not think so?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ And so too, I suppose, with dogs tended by the huntsman's art, and cattle by the herdsman's, and

everything else: or do you believe that attentive care is for the harm of the object tended?

Euthyphro/ No, indeed, I do not.

Socrates/ But for its benefit?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then holiness also, being attention bestowed on the gods, benefits and improves them? And you would agree that, when you perform a holy action, you are making one of the gods better?

Euthyphro/ No indeed, not I.

Socrates/ I too do not think that is your meaning. Far from it. And that is the reason why I asked what you meant by attention to the gods, because I did not believe you meant this.

Euthyphro/ You are right too, Socrates: that is not the kind of attention I mean.

Socrates/ Well then: what kind of attention to the gods would holiness be?

Euthyphro/ That which slaves, Socrates, render to their masters.

Socrates/ I understand: it would apparently be a kind of service to the gods.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now could you tell me what result the art that serves a doctor is instrumental in producing? Do you not think it is health?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ What of the art which serves a shipwright? What results does it minister to produce?

Euthyphro/ Obviously, Socrates, a ship.

Socrates/ And the builder's art, I suppose, a house?

Euthyphro/ Yes.

Socrates/ Tell me then, my good friend, what result is the art that serves the gods instrumental in producing? For it is obvious that you know, since you claim to know best of all men about things divine.

Euthyphro/ And my claim is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then tell me, in heaven's name, what is this splendid result which the gods achieve by using our services?

Euthyphro/ Many fine things, Socrates.

Socrates/ So do generals, my friend: none the less you could easily name the sum and substance of them, which is victory in war, is it not?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ And farmers too, I think, produce many fine things: but the sum and substance of their production is food from the soil.

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What then of the many fine results achieved by the gods? What is the main result of their accomplishment?

Euthyphro/ I told you, Socrates, a little while ago that it is a considerable task to learn the truth about all this in detail. But this I can say in broad outline. If a man knows how to say and to do what is acceptable to the gods, by prayer and sacrifice, that is holiness. And such conduct brings with it safety to both private households and commonwealths: but the opposite to what is acceptable is impiety, which brings utter ruin and destruction.

Socrates/ You could have given me the sum and substance of your reply to my question far more briefly, Euthyphro, if you had wished: but you are not eager to instruct me, and that is evident. For just now, when you

were on the point of answering me, you turned aside, though if you had answered, I should by now have learnt clearly enough from you the nature of holiness. But as it is, since the lover must follow the object of his love wherever he leads the way, what do you now mean by holiness and the holy? Is it not in your view a science of prayer and sacrifice?

Euthyphro/ It is.

Socrates/ And sacrifice is giving to the gods, and prayer asking of them?

Euthyphro/ Yes indeed, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then according to this statement holiness will be a science of petition and gifts to the gods.

Euthyphro/ You grasp my meaning admirably, Socrates.

Socrates/ Because I am anxious, my friend, to possess your wisdom; and I pay it all attention, so that not a word you utter will fall spent to the ground. But tell me, what is this service to the gods? You say it is to ask of them and to give to them?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ And the right way to ask of them would be to ask what we need?

Euthyphro/ Of course.

Socrates/ And the right way to give would be to give them in return what they need from us. For surely it would not be very scientific to give to anybody presents which he does not need.

Euthyphro/ You are quite right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then holiness will prove to be an art of mutual traffic between gods and men.

Euthyphro/ Call it trafficking, if that is the name you prefer to give it.

Socrates/ I do not prefer it, unless it happens to be true. But tell me, what benefit do the gods derive from the gifts they receive from us? What they themselves give us is plain to everybody: there is not a blessing which is not their gift to us. But how do they profit by what they receive from us? Have we so much the advantage over them in this trafficking that, while we receive all good gifts from them, they gain nothing from us?

Euthyphro/ But do you really imagine, Socrates, that the gods benefit by our gifts to them?

Socrates/ Then just what are these gifts of ours to the gods?

Euthyphro/ What else do you think but respect and honor and, as I said just now, what is agreeable to them?

Socrates/ Holiness, then, Euthyphro, is agreeable, but not profitable or dear to the gods.

Euthyphro/ Indeed, I think it is dear above all things to them.

Socrates/ Once again then holiness, it appears, is what is dear to the gods.

Euthyphro/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Then if you say this, can you wonder that your words do not stay fixed but are on the move; and will you blame me as the Daedalus who makes them walk, when you yourself are much more skillful than Daedalus, and make them travel round in a circle? Do you not realize that our definition has made a circuit and come round to the same place? For you must remember that previously we discovered that holiness and what is dear to the gods are not the same but different: or do you not remember?

Euthyphro/ I do.

Socrates/ But do you not see that you are saying that what the gods love is holy? And is not this just the same as what is dear to the gods?

Euthyphro/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then either we were wrong in our previous agreement or, if it was right, we are wrong now.

Euthyphro/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Let us consider then once more from the beginning what is the meaning of holiness: for I shall not willingly desert my post before I have discovered it. Do not disdain me but put your whole mind to it and now at last reveal to me the truth. For if any man knows it, you do; and I must hold fast to you as if you were Proteus, until you disclose it. If you had not fully known what holiness and unholiness are, you would never have ventured on behalf of a mere hireling to prosecute your aged father for murder. You would have feared the risk of angering the gods in case you were acting wrongly, and you would have been ashamed before your fellow-men. But now I am sure you are confident that you know what is holy and what is not. So tell me, my good Euthyphro, and do not withhold from me what you think it is.

Euthyphro/ Some other time, Socrates: for now I am in a hurry and it is time for me to be off elsewhere.

Socrates/ What a thing to do, my friend! You leave me after dashing the fine hope I had of learning from you what is holy and not, and ridding myself of Meletus' prosecution by pointing out to him that I have learnt wisdom about things divine from Euthyphro, that I am no longer in my ignorance making reckless judgments or innovations in these matters, and that I shall lead a better life in the future.

Apology Of Socrates.

Translated by Henry Cary.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates and Melitus.

Socrates/ I know not, O Athenians, how far you have been influenced by my accusers: for my part, in listening to them I almost forgot myself, so plausible were their arguments: however, so to speak, they have said nothing true. But of the many falsehoods which they uttered I wondered at one of them especially, that in which they said that you ought to be on your guard lest you should be deceived by me, as being eloquent in speech. For that they are not ashamed of being forthwith convicted by me in fact, when I shall show that I am not by any means eloquent, this seemed to me the most shameless thing in them, unless indeed they call him eloquent who speaks the truth. For, if they mean this, then I would allow that I am an orator, but not after their fashion: for they, as I affirm, have said nothing true; but from me you shall hear the whole truth. Not indeed, Athenians, arguments highly wrought, as theirs were, with choice phrases and expressions, nor adorned, but you shall hear a speech uttered without premeditation, in such words as first present themselves. For I am confident that what I say will be just, and let none of you expect otherwise: for surely it would not become my time of life to come before you like a youth with a got up speech. Above all things therefore I beg and implore this of you, O Athenians, if you hear me defending myself in the same language as that in which I am accustomed to speak both in the forum at the counters, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, not to be surprised or disturbed on this account. For the case is this: I now for the first time come before a court of justice, though

more than seventy years old; I am therefore utterly a stranger to the language here. As, then, if I were really a stranger, you would have pardoned me if I spoke in the language and the manner in which I had been educated, so now I ask this of you as an act of justice, as it appears to me, to disregard the manner of my speech, for perhaps it may be somewhat worse, and perhaps better, and to consider this only, and to give your attention to this, whether I speak what is just or not; for this is the virtue of a judge, but of an orator to speak the truth.

First then, O Athenians, I am right in defending myself against the first false accusations alleged against me, and my first accusers, and then against the latest accusations, and the latest accusers. For many have been accusers of me to you, and for many years, who have asserted nothing true, of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his party, although they too are formidable; but those are still more formidable, Athenians, who laying hold of many of you from childhood, have persuaded you, and accused me of what is not true: —"that there is one Socrates, a wise man, who occupies himself about celestial matters, and has explored everything under the earth, and makes the worse appear the better reason." Those, O Athenians, who have spread abroad this report are my formidable accusers: for they who hear them think that such as search into these things do not believe that there are gods. In the next place, these accusers are numerous, and have accused me now for a long time; moreover they said these things to you at that time of life in which you were most credulous, when you were boys and some of you youths, and they accused me altogether in my absence, when there was no one to defend me. But the most unreasonable thing of all is, that it is not possible to learn and mention their names, except that one of them happens to be a comic poet. Such, however, as influenced by envy

and calumny have persuaded you, and those who, being themselves persuaded, have persuaded others, all these are most difficult to deal with; for it is not possible to bring any of them forward here, nor to confute any; but it is altogether necessary, to fight as it were with a shadow, in making my defense, and to convict when there is no one to answer. Consider, therefore, as I have said, that my accusers are twofold, some who have lately accused me, and others long since, whom I have made mention of; and believe that I ought to defend myself against these first; for you heard them accusing me first, and much more than these last.

Well. I must make my defense then, O Athenians, and endeavor in this so short a space of time to remove from your minds the calumny which you have long entertained. I wish, indeed, it might be so, if it were at all better both for you and me, and that in making my defense I could effect something more advantageous still: I think however that it will be difficult, and I am not entirely ignorant what the difficulty is. Nevertheless let this turn out as may be pleasing to God, I must obey the law, and make my defense.

Let us then repeat from the beginning what the accusation is from which the calumny against me has arisen, and relying on which Melitus has preferred this indictment against me. Well. What then do they who charge me say in their charge? For it is necessary to read their deposition as of public accusers. “Socrates acts wickedly, and is criminally curious in searching into things under the earth, and in the heavens, and in making the worse appear the better cause, and in teaching these same things to others.” Such is the accusation: for such things you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes, one Socrates there carried about, saying that he walks in the air, and acting many other buffooneries, of which I understand nothing whatever. Nor do I say this as disparaging such a

science, if there be anyone skilled in such things, only let me not be prosecuted by Melitus on a charge of this kind; but I say it, O Athenians, because I have nothing to do with such matters. And I call upon most of you as witnesses of this, and require you to inform and tell each other, as many of you as have ever heard me conversing; and there are many such among you. Therefore tell each other, if anyone of you has ever heard me conversing little or much on such subjects. And from this you will know that other things also, which the multitude assert of me, are of a similar nature.

However not one of these things is true; nor, if you have heard from anyone that I attempt to teach men, and require payment, is this true. Though this indeed appears to me to be an honorable thing, if one should be able to instruct men, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, and Hippias the Elean. For each of these, O Athenians, is able, by going through the several cities, to persuade the young men, who can attach themselves gratuitously to such of their own fellow citizens as they please, to abandon their fellow citizens and associate with them, giving them money and thanks besides. There is also another wise man here, a Parian, who I hear is staying in the city. For I happened to visit a person who spends more money on the sophists than all others together, I mean Callias, son of Hipponicus. I therefore asked him, for he has two sons, “Callias,” I said, “if your two sons were colts or calves, we should have had to choose a master for them and hire a person who would make them excel in such qualities as belong to their nature: and he would have been a groom or an agricultural laborer. But now, since your sons are men, what master do you intend to choose for them? Who is there skilled in the qualities that become a man and a citizen? For I suppose you must have considered this, since you have sons. Is there anyone,” I said, “or not?” “Certainly,” he answered. “Who is he?” said I, “and whence

does he come? and on what terms does he teach?" He replied, "Evenus the Parian, Socrates, for five minæ." And I deemed Evenus happy, if he really possesses this art, and teaches so admirably. And I too should think highly of myself and be very proud, if I possessed this knowledge; but I possess it not, O Athenians.

Perhaps, one of you may now object: "But, Socrates, what have you done then? Whence have these calumnies against you arisen? For surely if you had not busied yourself more than others, such a report and story would never have got abroad, unless you had done something different from what most men do. Tell us, therefore, what it is, that we may not pass a hasty judgment on you." He who speaks thus appears to me to speak justly, and I will endeavor to show you what it is that has occasioned me this character and imputation. Listen then: to some of you perhaps I shall appear to jest, yet be assured that I shall tell you the whole truth. For I, O Athenians, have acquired this character through nothing else than a certain wisdom. Of what kind, then, is this wisdom? Perhaps it is merely human wisdom. For in this, in truth I appear to be wise. They probably, whom I just now mentioned, possessed a wisdom more than human, otherwise I know not what to say about it; for I am not acquainted with it, and whosoever says I am, speaks falsely and for the purpose of calumniating me. But, O Athenians, do not cry out against me, even though I should seem to you to speak somewhat arrogantly. For the account which I am going to give you, is not my own, but I shall refer to an authority whom you will deem worthy of credit. For I shall adduce to you the god at Delphi as a witness of my wisdom, if I have any, and of what it is. You doubtless know Chærepho: he was my associate from youth, and the associate of most of you; he accompanied you in your late exile and returned with you. You know, then, what kind of a

man Chærepho was, how earnest in whatever he undertook. Having once gone to Delphi, he ventured to make the following inquiry of the oracle, and, as I said, O Athenians, do not cry out, for he asked if there was anyone wiser than me. The Pythian thereupon answered that there was not one wiser: and of this, his brother here will give you proofs, since he himself is dead.

Consider then why I mention these things: it is because I am going to show you whence the calumny against me arose. For when I heard this, I reasoned thus with myself, What does the god mean? What enigma is this? For I am not conscious to myself that I am wise, either much or little. What then does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For assuredly he does not speak falsely: that he cannot do. And for a long time, I was in doubt what he meant; afterwards with considerable difficulty I had recourse to the following method of searching out his meaning. I went to one of those who have the character of being wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should confute the oracle, and show in answer to the response that This man is wiser than I, though you affirmed that I was the wisest. Having then examined this man, for there is no occasion to mention his name, he was however one of our great politicians, in examining whom I felt as I proceed to describe, O Athenians, having fallen into conversation with him, this man appeared to me to be wise in the opinion of most other men, and especially in his own opinion, though in fact he was not so. I thereupon endeavored to show him that he fancied himself to be wise, but really was not. Hence I became odious both to him, and to many others who were present. When I left him, I reasoned thus with myself, I am wiser than this man, for neither of us appear to know anything great and good: but he fancies he knows something, although he knows nothing, whereas I, as I do not know anything, so I do not fancy I do.

In this trifling particular, then, I appear to be wiser than him, because I do not fancy I know what I do not know. After that I went to another who was thought to be wiser than the former, and formed the very same opinion. Hence I became odious to him and to many others.

After this I went to others in turn, perceiving indeed and grieving and alarmed that I was making myself odious; however it appeared necessary to regard the oracle of the god as of the greatest moment, and that in order to discover its meaning, I must go to all who had the reputation of possessing any knowledge. And by the dog, O Athenians, for I must tell you the truth, I came to some such conclusion as this: those who bore the highest reputation appeared to me to be most deficient, in my researches in obedience to the god, and others who were considered inferior, more nearly approaching to the possession of understanding. But I must relate to you my wandering, and the labors which I underwent, in order that the oracle might prove incontrovertible. For after the politicians I went to the poets as well the tragic as the dithyrambic and others, expecting that here I should in very fact find myself more ignorant than them. Taking up, therefore, some of their poems, which appeared to me most elaborately finished, I questioned them as to their meaning, that at the same time I might learn something from them. I am ashamed, O Athenians, to tell you the truth; however it must be told. For, in a word, almost all who were present could have given a better account of them than those by whom they had been composed. I soon discovered this, therefore, with regard to the poets, that they do not effect their object by wisdom, but by a certain natural inspiration and under the influence of enthusiasm like prophets and seers; for these also say many fine things, but they understand nothing that they say. The poets appeared to me to be affected in a similar manner: and at the same

time I perceived that they considered themselves, on account of their poetry, to be the wisest of men in other things, in which they were not. I left them, therefore, under the persuasion that I was superior to them, in the same way that I was to the politicians.

At last, therefore, I went to the artisans. For I was conscious to myself that I knew scarcely anything, but I was sure that I should find them possessed of much beautiful knowledge. And in this I was not deceived; for they knew things which I did not, and in this respect they were wiser than me. But, O Athenians, even the best workmen appeared to me to have fallen into the same error as the poets: for each, because he excelled in the practice of his art, thought that he was very wise in other most important matters, and this mistake of theirs obscured the wisdom that they really possessed. I therefore asked myself in behalf of the oracle, whether I should prefer to continue as I am, possessing none either of their wisdom or their ignorance, or to have both as they have. I answered, therefore, to myself and to the oracle, that it was better for me to continue as I am.

From this investigation, then, O Athenians, many enmities have arisen against me, and those the most grievous and severe, so that many calumnies have sprung from them and amongst them this appellation of being wise. For those who are from time to time present think that I am wise in those things, with respect to which I expose the ignorance of others. The god however, O Athenians, appears to be really wise, and to mean this by his oracle, that human wisdom is worth little or nothing; and it is clear that he did not say this of Socrates, but made use of my name, putting me forward as an example, as if he had said, that man is the wisest among you, who, like Socrates, knows that he is in reality worth nothing with respect to wisdom. Still therefore

I go about and search and inquire into these things, in obedience to the god, both among citizens and strangers, if I think anyone of them is wise; and when he appears to me not to be so, I take the part of the god, and show that he is not wise. And in consequence of this occupation I have no leisure to attend in any considerable degree to the affairs of the state or my own; but I am in the greatest poverty through my devotion to the service of the god.

In addition to this, young men, who have much leisure and belong to the wealthiest families, following me of their own accord, take great delight in hearing men put to the test, and often imitate me, and themselves attempt to put others to the test: and then, I think, they find a great abundance of men who fancy they know something, although they know little or nothing. Hence those who are put to the test by them are angry with me, and not with them, and say that "there is one Socrates, a most pestilent fellow, who corrupts the youth." And when anyone asks them by doing or teaching what, they have nothing to say, for they do not know: but that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say such things as are ready at hand against all philosophers; "that he searches into things in heaven and things under the earth, that he does not believe there are gods, and that he makes the worse appear the better reason." For they would not, I think, be willing to tell the truth, that they have been detected in pretending to possess knowledge, whereas they know nothing. Therefore, I think, being ambitious and vehement and numerous, and speaking systematically and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears, for a long time and diligently calumniating me. From amongst these, Melitus, Anytus, and Lycon, have attacked me; Melitus being angry on account of the poets, Anytus on account of the artisans and politicians, and Lycon on account of the rhetoricians. So that as I said in the beginning, I should

wonder if I were able in so short a time to remove from your minds a calumny that has prevailed so long. This, O Athenians, is the truth; and I speak it without concealing or disguising anything from you, much or little; though I very well know that by so doing I shall expose myself to odium. This however is a proof that I speak the truth, and that this is the nature of the calumny against me, and that these are its causes. And if you will investigate the matter, either now or hereafter, you will find it to be so.

With respect then to the charges which my first accusers have alleged against me, let this be a sufficient apology to you. To Melitus, that good and patriotic man, as he says, and to my later accusers, I will next endeavor to give an answer; and here again, as there are different accusers let us take up their deposition. It is pretty much as follows: "Socrates," it says, "Acts unjustly in corrupting the youth, and in not believing in those gods in whom the city believes, but in other strange divinities." Such is the accusation; let us examine each particular of it. It says that I act unjustly in corrupting the youth. But I, O Athenians, say that Melitus acts unjustly, because he jests on serious subjects, rashly putting men upon trial, under pretense of being zealous and solicitous about things in which he never at any time took any concern. But that this is the case I will endeavor to prove to you.

Come then, Melitus, tell me; do you not consider it of the greatest importance that the youth should be made as virtuous as possible?

Meletus/ I do.

Socrates/ Well now, tell the judges who it is that makes them better, for it is evident that you know, since it concerns you so much: for, having detected me in corrupting them, as you say, you have cited me here and accused me; come then,

say, and inform the judges who it is that makes them better. Do you see, Melitus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say? But does it not appear to you to be disgraceful and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you never took any concern about the matter? But tell me, friend, who makes them better?

Meletus/ The laws.

Socrates/ I do not ask this, most excellent sir, but what man, who surely must first know this very thing, the laws?

Meletus/ These, Socrates, the judges.

Socrates/ How say you, Melitus? Are these able to instruct the youth, and make them better?

Meletus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Whether all, or some of them, and others not?

Meletus/ All.

Socrates/ You say well, by Hera, and have found a great abundance of those that confer benefit. But what further? Can these hearers make them better, or not?

Meletus/ They too can.

Socrates/ And what of the senators?

Meletus/ The senators also.

Socrates/ But, Melitus, do those who attend the public assemblies corrupt the younger men? or do they all make them better?

Meletus/ They too.

Socrates/ All the Athenians therefore, as it seems, make them honorable and good, except me, but I alone corrupt them. Do you say so?

Meletus/ I do assert this very thing.

Socrates/ You charge me with great ill-fortune. But answer me: does it appear to you to be the same with respect

to horses? do all men make them better, and is there only someone that spoils them? or does quite the contrary of this take place? is there some one person who can make them better, or very few, that is the trainers? but if the generality of men should meddle with and make use of horses, do they spoil them? Is not this the case, Melitus, both with respect to horses and all other animals? It certainly is so, whether you and Anytus deny it or not. For it would be a great good-fortune for the youth if only one person corrupted, and the rest benefited them. However, Melitus, you have sufficiently shown that you never bestowed any care upon youth; and you clearly evince your own negligence, in that you have never paid any attention to the things with respect to which you accuse me.

Tell us further, Melitus, in the name of Zeus, whether is it better to dwell with good or bad citizens? Answer, my friend: for I ask you nothing difficult. Do not the bad work some evil to those that are continually near them, but the good some good?

Meletus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is there anyone that wishes to be injured rather than benefited by his associates? Answer, good man: for the law requires you to answer. Is there anyone who wishes to be injured?

Meletus/ No, surely.

Socrates/ Come then, whether do you accuse me here, as one that corrupts the youth, and makes them more depraved, designedly or undesignedly?

Meletus/ Designedly, I say.

Socrates/ What then, Melitus, are you at your time of life so much wiser than me at my time of life, as to know that the evil are always working some evil to those that are most near to them, and the good some good; but I have arrived at

such a pitch of ignorance as not to know, that if I make anyone of my associates depraved, I shall be in danger of receiving some evil from him, and yet I designedly bring about this so great evil, as you say? In this I cannot believe you, Melitus, nor do I think would any other man in the world: but either I do not corrupt the youth, or if I do corrupt them, I do it undesignedly: so that in both cases you speak falsely. But if I corrupt them undesignedly, for such involuntary offences it is not usual to accuse one here, but to take one apart and teach and admonish one. For it is evident that if I am taught, I shall cease doing what I do undesignedly. But you shunned me, and were not willing to associate with and instruct me, but you accuse me here, where it is usual to accuse those who need punishment, and not instruction.

Thus, then, O Athenians, this now is clear that I have said, that Melitus never paid any attention to these matters, much or little. However tell us, Melitus, how you say I corrupt the youth? Is it not evidently, according to the indictment which you have preferred, by teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other strange deities? Do you not say that by teaching these things, I corrupt the youth?

Meletus/ Certainly I do say so.

Socrates/ By those very gods, therefore, Melitus, of whom the discussion now is, speak still more clearly both to me and to these men. For I cannot understand whether you say that I teach them to believe that there are certain gods, and in that case I do believe that there are gods, and am not altogether an atheist, nor in this respect to blame, not however those which the city believes in, but others, and this it is that you accuse me of, that I introduce others; or do you say outright that I do not myself believe that there are gods, and that I teach others the same?

Meletus/ I say this, that you do not believe in any gods at all.

Socrates/ O wonderful Melitus, how come you to say this? Do I not then like the rest of mankind, believe that the sun and moon are gods?

Meletus/ No, by Zeus, O judges: for he says that the sun is a stone, and the moon an earth.

Socrates/ You fancy that you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Melitus, and thus you put a slight on these men, and suppose them to be so illiterate, as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomene are full of such assertions. And the young, moreover, learn these things from me, which they might purchase for a drachma, at most, in the orchestra, and so ridicule Socrates, if he pretended they were his own, especially since they are so absurd? I ask then, by Zeus, do I appear to you to believe that there is no god?

Meletus/ No, by Zeus, none whatever.

Socrates/ You say what is incredible, Melitus, and that, as appears to me, even to yourself. For this man, O Athenians, appears to me to be very insolent and intemperate, and to have preferred this indictment through downright insolence, intemperance and wantonness. For he seems, as it were, to have composed an enigma for the purpose of making an experiment. Whether will Socrates the wise know that I am jesting, and contradict myself, or shall I deceive him and all who hear me? For in my opinion he clearly contradicts himself in the indictment, as if he should say, Socrates is guilty of wrong in not believing that there are gods, and in believing that there are gods. And this, surely, is the act of one who is trifling.

Consider with me now, Athenians, in what respect he appears to me to say so. And do you, Melitus, answer me;

and do ye, as I besought you at the outset, remember not to make an uproar if I speak after my usual manner.

Is there any man, Melitus, who believes that there are human affairs, but does not believe that there are men? Let him answer, judges, and not make so much noise. Is there anyone who does not believe that there are horses, but that there are things pertaining to horses? or who does not believe that there are pipers, but that there are things pertaining to pipes? There is not, O best of men: for since you are not willing to answer, I say it to you and to all here present. But answer to this at least: is there anyone who believes that there are things relating to demons, but does not believe that there are demons?

Meletus/ There is not.

Socrates/ How obliging you are in having hardly answered, though compelled by these judges. You assert then that I do believe and teach things relating to demons, whether they be new or old; therefore, according to your admission, I do believe in things relating to demons, and this you have sworn in the bill of indictment. If then I believe in things relating to demons, there is surely an absolute necessity that I should believe that there are demons. Is it not so? It is. For I suppose you to assent, since you do not answer. But with respect to demons, do we not allow that they are gods, or the children of gods? Do you admit this or not?

Meletus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Since then I allow that there are demons as you admit, if demons are a kind of gods, this is the point in which I say you speak enigmatically and divert yourself in saying that I do not allow there are gods, and again that I do allow there are, since I allow that there are demons? But if demons are the children of gods, spurious ones, either from nymphs

or any others, of whom they are reported to be, what man can think that there are sons of gods, and yet that there are not gods? For it would be just as absurd, as if anyone should think that there are mules the offspring of horses and asses, but should not think there are horses and asses. However, Melitus, it cannot be otherwise than that you have preferred this indictment for the purpose of trying me, or because you were at a loss what real crime to allege against me: for that you should persuade any man who has the smallest degree of sense, that the same person can think that there are things relating to demons and to gods, and yet that there are neither demons, nor gods, nor heroes, is utterly impossible.

That I am not guilty then, O Athenians, according to the indictment of Melitus, appears to me not to require a lengthened defense; but what I have said is sufficient. And as to what I said at the beginning, that there is a great enmity towards me among the multitude, be assured it is true. And this it is which will condemn me, if I am condemned, not Melitus, nor Anytus, but the calumny and envy of the multitude, which have already condemned many others, and those good men, and will I think condemn others also; for there is no danger that it will stop with me.

Perhaps, however, someone may say, “Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have pursued a study, from which you are now in danger of dying?” To such a person I should answer with good reason, You do not say well, friend, if you think that a man, who is even of the least value, ought to take into the account the risk of life or death, and ought not to consider that alone when he performs any action, whether he is acting justly or unjustly, and the part of a good man or bad man. For according to your reasoning, all those demi-gods that died at Troy would be vile characters, as well all the rest as the son of Thetis, who so far despised danger in comparison of submitting to disgrace, that when his mother,

who was a goddess, spoke to him, in his impatience to kill Hector, something to this effect, as I think, “My son, if you revenge the death of your friend Patroclus, and slay Hector, you will yourself die, for,” she said, “death awaits you immediately after Hector.” But he, on hearing this, despised death and danger, and dreading much more to live as a coward, and not avenge his friends said; “May I die immediately, when I have inflicted punishment on the guilty, that I may not stay here an object of ridicule, by the curved ships, a burden to the ground?” Do you think that he cared for death and danger? For thus it is, O Athenians, in truth; wherever anyone has posted himself, either thinking it to be better, or has been posted by his chief, there, as it appears to me, he ought to remain and meet danger, taking no account either of death or anything else in comparison with disgrace.

I then should be acting strangely, O Athenians, if, when the generals whom you chose to command me assigned me my post at Potidæa, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I then remained where they posted me, like any other person, and encountered the danger of death, but when the deity as I thought and believed, assigned it as my duty to pass my life in the study of philosophy, and in examining myself and others, I should on that occasion, through fear of death or anything else whatsoever, desert my post. Strange indeed would it be, and then in truth anyone might justly bring me to trial, and accuse me of not believing in the gods, from disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking myself to be wise when I am not. For to fear death, O Athenians, is nothing else than to appear to be wise, without being so; for it is to appear to know what one does not know. For no one knows but that death is the greatest of all goods to man; but men fear it, as if they well knew that it is the greatest of evils. And how is not this the most reprehensible ignorance, to

think that one knows what one does not know? But I, O Athenians, in this perhaps differ from most men; and if I should say that I am in anything wiser than another, it would be in this, that not having a competent knowledge of the things in Hades, I also think that I have not such knowledge. But to act unjustly, and to disobey my superior, whether God or man, I know is evil and base. I shall never, therefore, fear or shun things which, for aught I know, may be good, before evils which I know to be evils. So that even if you should now dismiss me, not yielding to the instances of Anytus, who said that either I should not appear here at all, or that, if I did appear, it was impossible not to put me to death, telling you that if I escaped, your sons, studying what Socrates teaches, would all be utterly corrupted; if you should address me thus, "Socrates, we shall not now yield to Anytus, but dismiss you, on this condition however, that you no longer persevere in your researches nor study philosophy, and if hereafter you are detected in so doing, you shall die,"—if, as I said, you should dismiss me an these terms, I should say to you:

"O Athenians, I honor and love you: but I shall obey God rather than you; and as long as I breathe and am able, I shall not cease studying philosophy, and exhorting you and warning anyone of you I may happen to meet, saying as I have been accustomed to do: 'O best of men, seeing you are an Athenian, of a city the most powerful and most renowned for wisdom and strength, are you not ashamed of being careful for riches, how you may acquire them in greatest abundance, and for glory and honor, but care not nor take any thought for wisdom and truth, and for your soul, how it may be made most perfect?" And if anyone of you should question my assertion, and affirm that he does care for these things, I shall not at once let him go, nor depart, but I shall question him, sift and prove him. And if he should appear to

me not to possess virtue, but to pretend that he does, I shall reproach him for that he sets the least value on things of the greatest worth, but the highest on things that are worthless. Thus I shall act to all whom I meet, both young and old, stranger and citizen, but rather to you my fellow citizens, because ye are more nearly allied to me. For be well assured, this the deity commands. And I think that no greater good has ever befallen you in the city, than my zeal for the service of the god. For I go about doing nothing else than persuading you, both young and old, to take no care either for the body, or for riches, prior to or so much as for the soul, how it may be made most perfect, telling you that virtue does not spring from riches, but riches and all other human blessings, both private and public, from virtue. If, then, by saying these things, I corrupt the youth, these things must be mischievous; but if anyone says that I speak other things than these, he misleads you. Therefore I must say, O Athenians, either yield to Anytus or do not, either dismiss me or not, since I shall not act otherwise, even though I must die many deaths.

Murmur not, O Athenians, but continue to attend to my request, not to murmur at what I say, but to listen, for as I think, you will derive benefit from listening. For I am going to say other things to you, at which perhaps you will raise a clamor; but on no account do so. Be well assured, then, if you put me to death, being such a man as I say I am, you will not injure me more than yourselves. For neither will Melitus nor Anytus harm me; nor have they the power: for I do not think that it is possible for a better man to be injured by a worse. He may perhaps have me condemned to death, or banished or deprived of civil rights; and he or others may perhaps consider these as mighty evils: I however do not consider them so, but that it is much more so to do what he is now doing, to endeavor to put a man to death unjustly.

Now, therefore, O Athenians, I am far from making a defense on my own behalf, as anyone might think, but I do so on your behalf, lest by condemning me you should offend at all with respect to the gift of the deity to you. For, if you should put me to death, you will not easily find such another, though it may be ridiculous to say so, altogether attached by the deity to this city as to a powerful and generous horse, somewhat sluggish from his size, and requiring to be roused by a gad-fly; so the deity appears to have united me, being such a person as I am, to the city, that I may rouse you. and persuade and reprove every one of you, nor ever cease besetting you throughout the whole day. Such another man, O Athenians, will not easily be found, therefore, if you will take my advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, being irritated, like drowsy persons who are roused from sleep, will strike me, and, yielding to Anytus, will unthinkingly condemn me to death; and then you will pass the rest of your life in sleep, unless the deity, caring for you, should send someone else to you. But that I am a person who has been given by the deity to this city, you may discern from hence; for it is not like the ordinary conduct of men, that I should have neglected all my own affairs and suffered my private interest to be neglected for so many years, and that I should constantly attend to your concerns, addressing myself to each of you separately, like a father, or elder brother, persuading you to the pursuit of virtue. And if I had derived any profit from this course, and had received pay for my exhortations, there would have been some reason for my conduct; but now you see yourselves, that my accusers, who have so shamelessly calumniated me in everything else, have not had the impudence to charge me with this, and to bring witnesses to prove that I ever either exacted or demanded any reward. And I think I produce a sufficient proof that I speak the truth, *namely*, my poverty.

Perhaps, however, it may appear absurd, that I, going about, thus advise you in private and make myself busy, but never venture to present myself in public before your assemblies and give advice to the city. The cause of this is that which you have often and in many places heard me mention: because I am moved by a certain divine and spiritual influence, which also Melitus, through mockery, has set out in the indictment. This began with me from childhood, being a kind of voice which, when present, always diverts me from what I am about to do, but never urges me on. This it is which opposed my meddling in public politics; and it appears to me to have opposed me very properly. For be well assured, O Athenians, if I had long since attempted to intermeddle with politics, I should have perished long ago, and should not have at all benefited you or myself. And be not angry with me for speaking the truth. For it is not possible that any man should be safe, who sincerely opposes either you, or any other multitude, and who prevents many unjust and illegal actions from being committed in a city; but it is necessary that he who in earnest contends for justice, if he will be safe for but a short time, should live privately, and take no part in public affairs.

I will give you strong proofs of this, not words, but, what you value, facts. Hear then what has happened to me, that you may know that I would not yield to anyone contrary to what is just, through fear of death, at the same time that, by not yielding, I must perish. I shall tell you what will be displeasing and wearisome, yet true. For I, O Athenians, never bore any other magisterial office in the city, but have been a senator: and our Antiochean tribe happened to supply the Prytanes when you chose to condemn in a body the ten generals, who had not taken off those that perished in the sea-fight, in violation of the law, as you afterwards all thought. At that time I alone of the Prytanes opposed your

doing anything contrary to the laws, and I voted against you; and when the orators were ready to denounce me, and to carry me before a magistrate, and you urged and cheered them on, I thought I ought rather to meet the danger with law and justice on my side, than through fear of imprisonment or death to take part with you in your unjust designs. And this happened while the city was governed by a democracy. But when it became an oligarchy, the Thirty, having sent for me with four others to the Tholus, ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, that he might be put to death; and they gave many similar orders to many others, wishing to involve as many as they could in guilt. Then however I shewed, not in word but indeed, that I did not care for death, if the expression be not too rude, in the smallest degree, but that all my care was to do nothing unjust or unholy. For that government, strong as it was, did not so overawe me as to make me commit an unjust action; but when we came out from the Tholus, the four went to Salamis, and brought back Leon; but I went away home. And perhaps for this I should have been put to death, if that government had not been speedily broken up. And of this you can have many witnesses.

Do you think, then, that I should have survived so many years, if I had engaged in public affairs, and, acting as becomes a good man, had aided the cause of justice, and, as I ought, had deemed this of the highest importance? Far from it, O Athenians: nor would any other man have done so. But I, through the whole of my life, if I have done anything in public, shall be found to be a man, and the very same in private, who has never made a concession to anyone contrary to justice, neither to any other, nor to anyone of these whom my calumniators say are my disciples. I however was never the preceptor of anyone; but if anyone desired to hear me speaking and to see me busied about my own

mission, whether he were young or old, I never refused him. Nor do I discourse when I receive money, and not when I do not receive any, but I allow both rich and poor alike to question me, and, if anyone wishes it, to answer me and hear what I have to say. And for these, whether anyone proves to be a good man or not, I cannot justly be responsible, because I never either promised them any instruction or taught them at all. But if anyone says that he has ever learnt or heard anything from me in private, which all others have not, be well assured that he does not speak the truth.

But why do some delight to spend so long a time with me? Ye have heard, O Athenians. I have told you the whole truth, that they delight to hear those closely questioned who think that they are wise but are not: for this is by no means disagreeable. But this duty, as I say, has been enjoined me by the deity, by oracles, by dreams, and by every mode by which any other divine decree has ever enjoined anything to man to do. These things, O Athenians, are both true, and easily confuted if not true. For if I am now corrupting some of the youths, and have already corrupted others, it were fitting, surely, that if any of them, having become advanced in life, had discovered that I gave them bad advice when they were young, they should now rise up against me, accuse me, and have me punished; or if they were themselves unwilling to do this, some of their kindred, their fathers, or brothers, or other relatives, if their kinsmen have ever sustained any damage from me, should now call it to mind. Many of them however are here present, whom I see: first, Crito, my contemporary and fellow-burgher, father of this Critobulus; then, Lysanias of Sphettus, father of this Æschines; again, Antiphon of Cephisus, father of Epigenes; there are those others too, whose brothers maintained the same intimacy with me, namely, Nicostratus, son of Theosdotidus, brother of Theodotus—Theodotus indeed is dead, so that he could

not deprecate his brother's proceedings, and Paralus here, son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages; and Adimantus son of Ariston, whose brother is this Plato; and Æantodorus, whose brother is this Apollodorus. I could also mention many others to you, some one of whom certainly Melitus ought to have adduced in his speech as a witness. If however he then forgot to do so, let him now adduce them, I give him leave to do so, and let him say it, if he has anything of the kind to allege. But quite contrary to this, you will find, O Athenians, all ready to assist me, who have corrupted and injured their relatives, as Melitus and Anytus say. For those who have been themselves corrupted might perhaps have some reason for assisting me; but those who have not been corrupted, men now advanced in life, their relatives, what other reason can they have for assisting me, except that right and just one, that they know that Melitus speaks falsely, and that I speak the truth.

Well then, Athenians; these are pretty much the things I have to say in my defense, and others perhaps of the same kind. Perhaps, however, some among you will be indignant on recollecting his own case, if he, when engaged in a cause far less than this, implored and besought the judges with many tears, bringing forward his children in order that he might excite their utmost compassion, and many others of his relatives and friends, whereas I do none of these things, although I may appear to be incurring the extremity of danger. Perhaps, therefore, someone, taking notice of this, may become more determined against me, and, being enraged at this very conduct of mine, may give his vote under the influence of anger. If then anyone of you is thus affected, —I do not however suppose that there is, —but if there should be, I think I may reasonably say to him; "I too, O best of men, have relatives; for to make use of that saying of Homer, I am not sprung from an oak, nor from a rock, but

from men, so that I too, O Athenians, have relatives, and three sons, one now grown up, and two boys: I shall not however bring anyone of them forward and implore you to acquit me. Why then shall I not do this? Not from contumacy, O Athenians, nor disrespect towards you. Whether or not I am undaunted at the prospect of death, is another question, but out of regard to my own character, and yours, and that of the whole city, it does not appear to me to be honorable that I should do anything of this kind at my age, and with the reputation I have, whether true or false. For it is commonly agreed that Socrates in some respects excels the generality of men. If, then, those among you who appear to excel either in wisdom, or fortitude, or any other virtue whatsoever, should act in such a manner as I have often seen some when they have been brought to trial, it would be shameful, who appearing indeed to be something, have conducted themselves in a surprising manner, as thinking they should suffer something dreadful by dying, and as if they would be immortal if you did not put them to death. Such men appear to me to bring disgrace on the city, so that any stranger might suppose that such of the Athenians as excel in virtue, and whom they themselves choose in preference to themselves for magistracies and other honors, are in no respect superior to women. For these things, O Athenians, neither ought we to do who have attained to any height of reputation, nor, should we do them, ought you to suffer us; but you should make this manifest, that you will much rather condemn him who introduces these piteous dramas, and makes the city ridiculous, than him who quietly awaits your decision.

But reputation apart, O Athenians, it does not appear to me to be right to entreat a judge, or to escape by entreaty, but one ought to inform and persuade him. For a judge does not sit for the purpose of administering justice out of favor,

but that he may judge rightly, and he is sworn not to show favor to whom he pleases, but that he will decide according to the laws. It is therefore right that neither should we accustom you, nor should you accustom yourselves to violate your oaths; for in so doing neither of us would act righteously. Think not then, O Athenians, that I ought to adopt such a course towards you as I neither consider honorable, nor just, nor holy, as well, by Zeus, on any other occasion, and now especially when I am accused of impiety by this Melitus. For clearly, if I should persuade you, and by my entreaties should put a constraint on you who are bound by an oath, I should teach you to think that there are no gods, and in reality, while making my defense, should accuse myself of not believing in the gods. This, however, is far from being the case: for I believe, O Athenians, as none of my accusers do, and I leave it to you and to the deity to judge concerning me in such way as will be best both for me and for you.

Socrates here concludes his defense, and the votes being taken, he is declared guilty by a majority of voices. He thereupon resumes his address.

That I should not be grieved, O Athenians, at what has happened, namely, that you have condemned me, as well many other circumstances concur in bringing to pass, and moreover this, that what has happened has not happened contrary to my expectation; but I much rather wonder at the number of votes on either side. For I did not expect that I should be condemned by so small a number, but by a large majority; but now, as it seems, if only three more votes had changed sides, I should have been acquitted. As far as Melitus is concerned, as it appears to me, I have been

already acquitted, and not only have I been acquitted, but it is clear to everyone that had not Anytus and Lycon come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas, for not having obtained a fifth part of the votes.

The man then awards me the penalty of death. Well. But what shall I, on my part, O Athenians, award myself? Is it not clear that it will be such as I deserve? What then is that? do I deserve to suffer or to pay a fine, for that I have purposely during my life not remained quiet, but neglecting what most men seek after, money-making, domestic concerns, military command, popular oratory, and moreover all the magistracies, conspiracies and cabals that are met with in the city, thinking that I was in reality too upright a man to be safe if I took part in such things, I therefore did not apply myself to those pursuits, by attending to which I should have been of no service either to you or to myself; but in order to confer the greatest benefit on each of you privately, as I affirm, I thereupon applied myself to that object, endeavoring to persuade every one of you, not to take any care of his own affairs, before he had taken care of himself, in what way he may become the best and wisest, nor of the affairs of the city before he took care of the city itself; and that he should attend to other things in the same manner. What treatment then do I deserve, seeing I am such a man? Some reward, O Athenians, if at least I am to be estimated according to my real deserts; and moreover such a reward as would be suitable to me. What then is suitable to a poor man, a benefactor, and who has need of leisure in order to give you good advice? There is nothing so suitable, O Athenians, as that such a man should be maintained in the Prytaneum, and this much more than if one of you had been victorious at the Olympic games in a horse race, or in the two or four-horsed chariot race: for such a one makes you appear to be happy, but I, to be so: and he does not need

support, but I do. If, therefore, I must award a sentence according to my just deserts, I award this, maintenance in the Prytaneum.

Perhaps, however, in speaking to you thus, I appear to you to speak in the same presumptuous manner as I did respecting commiseration and entreaties: but such is not the case, O Athenians, it is rather this. I am persuaded that I never designedly injured any man, though I cannot persuade you of this, for we have conversed with each other but for a short time. For if there was the same law with you as with other men, that in capital cases the trial should last not only one day but many, I think you would be persuaded; but it is not easy in a short time to do away with great calumnies. Being persuaded then that I have injured no one, I am far from intending to injure myself, and of pronouncing against myself that I am deserving of punishment, and from awarding myself anything of the kind. Through fear of what? lest I should suffer that which Melitus awards me, of which I say I know not whether it be good or evil? instead of this, shall I choose what I well know to be evil, and award that? Shall I choose imprisonment? And why should I live in prison, a slave to the established magistracy, the Eleven? Shall I choose a fine, and to be imprisoned until I have paid it? But this is the same as that which I just now mentioned, for I have not money to pay it. Shall I then award myself exile? For perhaps you would consent to this award. I should indeed be very fond of life, O Athenians, if I were so devoid of reason as not to be able to reflect that you, who are my fellow citizens, have been unable to endure my manner of life and discourses, but they have become so burdensome and odious to you, that you now seek to be rid of them: others however will easily bear them: far from it, O Athenians. A fine life it would be for me at my age to go out wandering and driven from city to city, and so to live. For I

well know that, wherever I may go, the youth will listen to me when I speak, as they do here. And if I repulse them, they will themselves drive me out, persuading the elders; and if I do not repulse them, their fathers and kindred will banish me on their account.

Perhaps however someone will say, Can you not, Socrates, when you have gone from us, live a silent and quiet life? This is the most difficult thing of all to persuade some of you. For if I say that that would be to disobey the deity, and that therefore it is impossible for me to live quietly, you would not believe me, thinking I spoke ironically. If, on the other hand, I say that this is the greatest good to man, to discourse daily on virtue, and other things which you have heard me discussing, examining both myself and others, but that a life without investigation is not worth living for, still less would you believe me if I said this. Such however is the case, as I affirm, O Athenians, though it is not easy to persuade you. And at the same time I am not accustomed to think myself deserving of any ill. If indeed I were rich, I would amerce myself in such a sum as I should be able to pay; for then I should have suffered no harm, but now—for I cannot, unless you are willing to amerce me in such a sum as I am able to pay. But perhaps I could pay you a mina of silver: in that sum then I amerce myself. But Plato here, O Athenians, and Crito Critobulus, and Apollodorus bid me amerce myself in thirty minæ, and they offer to be sureties. I amerce myself then to you in that sum; and they will be sufficient sureties for the money.

The judges now proceeded to pass the sentence, and condemned Socrates to death; whereupon he continued:

Socrates/ For the sake of no long space of time, O Athenians, you will incur the character and reproach at the hands of those who wish to defame the city, of having put that wise man, Socrates, to death. For those who wish to defame you will assert that I am wise, though I am not. If, then, you had waited for a short time, this would have happened of its own accord; for observe my age, that it is far advanced in life, and near death. But I say this not to you all, but to those only who have condemned me to die. And I say this too to the same persons. Perhaps you think, O Athenians, that I have been convicted through the want of arguments, by which I might have persuaded you, had I thought it right to do and say anything, so that I might escape punishment. Far otherwise: I have been convicted through want indeed, yet not of arguments, but of audacity and impudence, and of the inclination to say such things to you as would have been most agreeable for you to hear, had I lamented and bewailed and done and said many other things unworthy of me, as I affirm, but such as you are accustomed to hear from others. But neither did I then think that I ought, for the sake of avoiding danger, to do anything unworthy of a freeman, nor do I now repent of having so defended myself; but I should much rather choose to die, having so defended myself, than to live in that way. For neither in a trial nor in battle, is it right that I or anyone else should employ every possible means whereby he may avoid death; for in battle it is frequently evident that a man might escape death by laying down his arms, and throwing himself on the mercy of his pursuers. And there are many other devices in every danger, by which to avoid death, if a man dares to do and say everything. But this is not difficult, O Athenians, to escape death, but it is much more difficult to avoid depravity, for it runs swifter than death. And now I, being slow and aged, am overtaken by the slower of the two;

but my accusers, being strong and active, have been overtaken by the swifter, wickedness. And now I depart, condemned by you to death; but they condemned by truth, as guilty of iniquity and injustice: and I abide my sentence and so do they. These things, perhaps, ought so to be, and I think that they are for the best.

In the next place, I desire to predict to you who have condemned me, what will be your fate: for I am now in that condition in which men most frequently prophecy, namely, when they are about to die. I say then to you, O Athenians, who have condemned me to death, that immediately after my death a punishment will overtake you, far more severe, by Zeus, than that which you have inflicted on me. For you have done this, thinking you should be freed from the necessity of giving an account of your life. The very contrary however, as I affirm, will happen to you. Your accusers will be more numerous, whom I have now restrained, though you did not perceive it; and they will be more severe, inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more indignant. For, if you think that by putting men to death you will restrain anyone from upbraiding you because you do not live well, you are much mistaken; for this method of escape is neither possible nor honorable, but that other is most honorable and most easy, not to put a check upon others, but for a man to take heed to himself, how he may be most perfect. Having predicted thus much to those of you who have condemned me, I take my leave of you.

But with you who have voted for my acquittal, I would gladly hold converse on what has now taken place, while the magistrates are busy and I am not yet carried to the place where I must die. Stay with me then, so long, O Athenians, for nothing hinders our conversing with each other, whilst we are permitted to do so; for I wish to make known to you, as being my friends, the meaning of that which has just now

befallen me. To me then, O my judges, —and in calling you judges I call you rightly, —a strange thing has happened. For the wonted prophetic voice of my guardian deity, on every former occasion even in the most trifling affairs opposed me, if I was about to do anything wrong; but now, that has befallen me which ye yourselves behold, and which anyone would think and which is supposed to be the extremity of evil, yet neither when I departed from home in the morning did the warning of the god oppose me, nor when I came up here to the place of trial, nor in my address when I was about to say anything; yet on other occasions it has frequently restrained me in the midst of speaking. But now, it has never throughout this proceeding opposed me, either in what I did or said. What then do I suppose to be the cause of this? I will tell you: what has befallen me appears to be a blessing; and it is impossible that we think rightly who suppose that death is an evil. A great proof of this to me is the fact that it is impossible but that the accustomed signal should have opposed me, unless I had been about to meet with some good.

Moreover we may hence conclude that there is great hope that death is a blessing. For to die is one of two things: for either the dead may be annihilated and have no sensation of anything whatever; or, as it is said, there is a certain change and passage of the soul from one place to another. And if it is a privation of all sensation, as it were a sleep in which the sleeper has no dream, death would be a wonderful gain. For I think that if anyone, having selected a night, in which he slept so soundly as not to have had a dream, and having compared this night with all the other nights and days of his life, should be required on consideration to say how many days and nights he had passed better and more pleasantly than this night throughout his life, I think that not only a private person, but even the great king himself would find

them easy to number in comparison with other days and nights. If, therefore, death is a thing of this kind, I say it is a gain; for thus all futurity appears to be nothing more than one night. But if, on the other hand, death is a removal from hence to another place, and what is said be true, that all the dead are there, what greater blessing can there be than this, my judges? For if, on arriving at Hades, released from these who pretend to be judges, one shall find those who are true judges, and who are said to judge there, Minos and Rhadamanthus, Æacus and Triptolemus, and such others of the demigods as were just during their own life, would this be a sad removal? At what price would you not estimate a conference with Orpheus and Musæus, Hesiod and Homer? I indeed should be willing to die often, if this be true. For to me the sojourn there would be admirable, when I should meet with Palamedes, and Ajax son of Telamon, and any other of the ancients who has died by an unjust sentence. The comparing my sufferings with theirs would, I think, be no unpleasing occupation. But the greatest pleasure would be to spend my time in questioning and examining the people there as I have done those here, and discovering who among them is wise, and who fancies himself to be so but is not. At what price, my judges, would not anyone estimate the opportunity of questioning him who led that mighty army against Troy, or Ulysses, or Sisyphus, or ten thousand others, whom one might mention, both men and women? with whom to converse and associate, and to question them, would be an inconceivable happiness. Surely for that the judges there do not condemn to death; for in other respects those who live there are more happy than those that are here, and are henceforth immortal, if at least what is said be true.

You, therefore, O my judges, ought to entertain good hopes with respect to death, and to meditate on this one

truth, that to a good man nothing is evil, neither while living nor when dead, nor are his concerns neglected by the gods. And what has befallen me is not the effect of chance; but this is clear to me, that now to die, and be freed from my cares, is better for me. On this account the warning in no way turned me aside; and I bear no resentment towards those who condemned me, or against my accusers, although they did not condemn and accuse me with this intention, but thinking to injure me: in this they deserve to be blamed.

Thus much however I beg of them. Punish my sons, when they grow up, O judges, paining them as I have pained you, if they appear to you to care for riches or anything else before virtue, and if they think themselves to be something when they are nothing, reproach them as I have done you, for not attending to what they ought, and for conceiving themselves to be something when they are worth nothing. If ye do this, both I and my sons shall have met with just treatment at your hands.

But it is now time to depart, —for me to die, for you to live. But which of us is going to a better state is unknown to everyone but God.

The Apology

Translated by Church, F. J.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates; Meletus.

SCENE. The Court of Justice.

Socrates/ I cannot tell what impression my accusers have made upon you, Athenians; for my own part, I know that they nearly made me forget who I was, so plausible were they; and yet they have scarcely uttered one single word of truth. But of all their many falsehoods, the one which astonished me most, was when they said that I was a clever speaker, and that you must be careful not to let me mislead you. I thought that it was most impudent of them not to be ashamed to talk in that way; for as soon as I open my mouth the lie will be exposed, and I shall prove that I am not a clever speaker in any way at all; unless, indeed, by a clever speaker they mean a man who speaks the truth. If that is their meaning, I agree with them that I am a much greater orator than they. My accusers, then I repeat, have said little or nothing that is true; but from me you shall hear the whole truth. Certainly you will not hear an elaborate speech, Athenians, drest up, like theirs, with words and phrases. I will say to you what I have to say, without preparation, and in the words which come first, for I believe that my cause is just; so let none of you expect anything else. Indeed, my friends, it would hardly be seemly for me, at my age, to come before you like a young man with his specious falsehoods. But there is one thing, Athenians, which I do most earnestly beg and entreat of you. Do not be surprised and do not interrupt, if in my defense I speak in the same way that I am

accustomed to speak in the market-place, at the tables of the money-changers, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere. The truth is this. I am more than seventy years old, and this is the first time that I have ever come before a Court of Law; so your manner of speech here is quite strange to me. If I had been really a stranger, you would have forgiven me for speaking in the language and the fashion of my native country; and so now I ask you to grant me what I think I have a right to claim. Never mind the style of my speech—it may be better or it may be worse—give your whole attention to the question, Is what I say just, or is it not? That is what makes a good judge, as speaking the truth makes a good advocate.

I have to defend myself, Athenians, first against the old false charges of my old accusers, and then against the later ones of my present accusers. For many men have been accusing me to you, and for very many years, who have not uttered a word of truth; and I fear them more than I fear Anytus and his companions, formidable as they are. But, my friends, those others are still more formidable; for they got hold of most of you when you were children, and they have been more persistent in accusing me with lies, and in trying to persuade you that there is one Socrates, a wise man, who speculates about the heavens, and who examines into all things that are beneath the earth, and who can 'make the worse appear the better reason.' These men, Athenians, who spread abroad this report, are the accusers whom I fear; for their hearers think that persons who pursue such inquiries never believe in the gods. And then they are many, and their attacks have been going on for a long time; and they spoke to you when you were at the age most readily to believe them; for you were all young, and many of you were children; and there was no one to answer them when they attacked me. And the most unreasonable thing of all is that commonly I

do not even know their names; I cannot tell you who they are, except in the case of the comic poets. But all the rest who have been trying to prejudice you against me, from motives of spite and jealousy, and sometimes, it may be, from conviction, are the enemies whom it is hardest to meet. For I cannot call anyone of them forward in Court, to cross-examine him; I have, as it were, simply to fight with shadows in my defense, and to put questions which there is no one to answer. I ask you, therefore, to believe that, as I say, I have been attacked by two classes of accusers—first by Meletus and his friends, and then by those older ones of whom I have spoken. And, with your leave, I will defend myself first against my old enemies; for you heard their accusations first, and they were much more persistent than my present accusers are.

Well, I must make my defense, Athenians, and try in the short time allowed me to remove the prejudice which you have had against me for a long time. I hope that I may manage to do this, if it be good for you and for me, and that my defense may be successful; but I am quite aware of the nature of my task, and I know that it is a difficult one. Be the issue, however, as God wills, I must obey the law, and make my defense.

Let us begin again, then, and see what is the charge which has given rise to the prejudice against me, which was what Meletus relied on when he drew his indictment. What is the calumny which my enemies have been spreading about me? I must assume that they are formally accusing me, and read their indictment. 1 would run somewhat in this fashion; "Socrates is an evil-doer, who meddles with inquiries into things beneath the earth, and in heaven, and who 'makes the worse appear the better reason,' and who teaches others these same things." That is what they say; and in the Comedy of Aristophanes you yourselves saw a man called

Socrates swinging round in a basket, and saying that he walked the air, and talking a great deal of nonsense about matters of which I understand nothing, either more or less. I do not mean to disparage that kind of knowledge, if there is any man who possesses it. I trust Meletus may never be able to prosecute me for that. But, the truth is, Athenians, I have nothing to do with these matters, and almost all of you are yourselves my witnesses of this. I beg all of you who have ever heard me converse, and they are many, to inform your neighbors and tell them if any of you have ever heard me conversing about such matters, either more or less. That will show you that the other common stories about me are as false as this one.

But, the fact is, that not one of these stories is true; and if you have heard that I undertake to educate men, and exact money from them for so doing, that is not true either; though I think that it would be a fine thing to be able to educate men, as Gorgias of Leontini, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis do. For each of them, my friends, can go into any city, and persuade the young men to leave the society of their fellow-citizens, with any of whom they might associate for nothing, and to be only too glad to be allowed to pay money for the privilege of associating with themselves. And I believe that there is another wise man from Paros residing in Athens at this moment. I happened to meet Callias, the son of Hipponicus, a man who has spent more money on the Sophists than everyone else put together. So I said to him—he has two sons—Callias, if your two sons had been foals or calves, we could have hired a trainer for them who would have made them perfect in the excellence which belongs to their nature. He would have been either a groom or a farmer. But whom do you intend to take to train them, seeing that they are men? Who understands the excellence which belongs to men and to citizens? I suppose that you must

have thought of this, because of your sons. Is there such a person, said I, or not? Certainly there is, he replied. Who is he, said I, and where does he come from, and what is his fee? His name is Evenus, Socrates, he replied; he comes from Paros, and his fee is five mints. Then I thought that Evenus was a fortunate person if he really understood this art and could teach so cleverly. If I had possessed knowledge of that kind, I should have given myself airs and prided myself on it. But, Athenians, the truth is that I do not possess it.

Perhaps some of you may reply; But, Socrates, what is this pursuit of yours? Whence come these calumnies against you? You must have been engaged in some pursuit out of the common. All these stories and reports of you would never have gone about, if you had not been in some way different from other men. So tell us what your pursuits are, that we may not give our verdict in the dark. I think that that is a fair question, and I will try to explain to you what it is that has raised these calumnies against me, and given me this name. Listen, then; some of you perhaps will think that I am jesting; but I assure you that I will tell you the whole truth. I have gained this name, Athenians, simply by reason of a certain wisdom. But by what kind of wisdom? It is by just that wisdom which is, I believe, possible to men. In that, it may be, I am really wise. But the men of whom I was speaking just now must be wise in a wisdom which is greater than human wisdom, or in some way which I cannot describe, for certainly I know nothing of it myself, and if any man says that I do, he lies and wants to slander me. Do not interrupt me, Athenians, even if you think that I am speaking arrogantly. What I am going to say is not my own; I will tell you who says it, and he is worthy of your credit. I will bring the god of Delphi to be the witness of the fact of my wisdom and of its nature. You remember Chaerephon. From youth upwards he was my comrade; and he went into

exile with the people, and with the people he returned. And you remember, too, Chaerephon's character; how vehement he was in carrying through whatever he took in hand. Once he went to Delphi and ventured to put this question to the oracle, —I entreat you again, my friends, not to cry out, — he asked if there was any man who was wiser than I; and the priestess answered that there was no man. Chaerephon himself is dead, but his brother here will confirm what I say.

Now see why I tell you this. I am going to explain to you the origin of my unpopularity. When I heard of the oracle I began to reflect; What can God mean by this dark saying? I know very well that I am not wise, even in the smallest degree. Then what can he mean by saying that I am the wisest of men? It cannot be that he is speaking falsely, for he is a god and cannot lie. And for a long time I was at a loss to understand his meaning; then, very reluctantly, I turned to seek for it in this manner. I went to a man who was reputed to be wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should prove the answer wrong, and meaning to point out to the oracle its mistake, and to say, 'You said that I was the wisest of men, but this man is wiser than I am.' So I examined the man—I need not tell you his name, he was a politician—but this was the result, Athenians. When I conversed with him I came to see that, though a great many persons, and most of all he himself, thought that he was wise, yet he was not wise. And then I tried to prove to him that he was not wise, though he fancied that he was; and by so doing I made him, and many of the bystanders, my enemies. So when I went away, I thought to myself, "I am wiser than this man; neither of us probably knows anything that is really good, but he thinks that he has knowledge, when he has not, while I, having no knowledge, do not think that I have. I seem, at any rate, to be a little wiser than he is on this point; I do not think that I know what I do not know." Next I went to another man who

was reputed to be still wiser than the last, with exactly the same result. And there again I made him, and many other men, my enemies.

Then I went on to one man after another, seeing that I was making enemies every day, which caused me much unhappiness and anxiety; still I thought that I must set Gods command above everything. So I had to go to every man who seemed to possess any knowledge, and search for the meaning of the oracle; and, Athenians, I must tell you the truth; verily, by the dog of Egypt, this was the result of the search which I made at Gods bidding. I found that the men, whose reputation for wisdom stood highest, were nearly the most lacking in it; while others, who were looked down on as common people, were much better fitted to learn. Now, I must describe to you the wanderings which I undertook, like a series of Heraclean labors, to make full proof of the oracle. After the politicians, I went to the poets, tragic, dithyrambic, and others, thinking that there I should find myself manifestly more ignorant than they. So I took up the poems on which I thought that they had spent most pains, and asked them what they meant, hoping at the same time to learn something from them. I am ashamed to tell you the truth, my friends, but I must say it. Almost anyone of the bystanders could have talked about the works of these poets better than the poets themselves. So I soon found that it is not by wisdom that the poets create their works, but by a certain natural power and by inspiration, like soothsayers and prophets, who say many fine things, but who understand nothing of what they say. The poets seemed to me to be in a similar case. And at the same time I perceived that, because of their poetry, they thought that they were the wisest of men in other matters too, which they were not. So I went away again, thinking that I had the same advantage over the poets that I had over the politicians.

Finally, I went to the artisans, for I knew very well that I possessed no knowledge at all, worth speaking of, and I was sure that I should find that they knew many fine things. And in that I was not mistaken. They knew what I did not know, and so far they were wiser than I. But, Athenians, it seemed to me that the skilled artisans made the same mistake as the poets. Each of them believed himself to be extremely wise in matters of the greatest importance, because he was skillful in his own art; and this mistake of theirs threw their real wisdom into the shade. So I asked myself, on behalf of the oracle, whether I would choose to remain as I was, without either their wisdom or their ignorance, or to possess both, as they did. And I made answer to myself and to the oracle that it was better for me to remain as I was.

By reason of this examination, Athenians, I have made many enemies of a very fierce and bitter kind, who have spread abroad a great number of calumnies about me, and people say that I am 'a wise man.' For the bystanders always think that I am wise myself in any matter wherein I convict another man of ignorance. But, my friends, I believe that only God is really wise; and that by this oracle he meant that men's wisdom is worth little or nothing. I do not think that he meant that Socrates was wise. He only made use of my name, and took me as an example, as though he would say to men, 'He among you is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that in very truth his wisdom is worth nothing at all.' And therefore I still go about testing and examining every man whom I think wise, whether he be a citizen or a stranger, as God has commanded me; and whenever I find that he is not wise, I point out to him on the part of God that he is not wise. And I am so busy in this pursuit that I have never had leisure to take any part worth mentioning in public matters, or to look after my private affairs. I am in very great poverty by reason of my service to God.

And besides this, the young men who follow me about, who are the sons of wealthy persons and have a great deal of spare time, take a natural pleasure in hearing men cross-examined; and they often imitate me among themselves; then they try their hands at cross-examining other people. And, I imagine, they find a great abundance of men who think that they know a great deal, when in fact they know little or nothing. And then the persons who are cross-examined, get angry with me instead of with themselves, and say that Socrates is an abominable fellow who corrupts young men. And when they are asked, 'Why, what does he do? what does he teach?' they do not know what to say; but, not to seem at a loss, they repeat the stock charges against all philosophers, and allege that he investigates things in the air and under the earth, and that he teaches people to disbelieve in the gods, and 'to make the worse appear the better reason.' For, I fancy, they would not like to confess the truth, which is that they are shown up as ignorant pretenders to knowledge that they do not possess. And so they have been filling your ears with their bitter calumnies for a long time; for they are zealous and numerous and bitter against me; and they are well disciplined and plausible in speech. On these grounds Meletus and Anytus and Lycon have attacked me. Meletus is indignant with me on the part of the poets, and Anytus on the part of the artisans and politicians, and Lycon on the part of the orators.

And so, as I said at the beginning, I shall be surprised if I am able, in the short time allowed me for my defense, to remove from your minds this prejudice which has grown so strong. What I have told you, Athenians, is the truth; I neither conceal, nor do I suppress anything, small or great. And yet I know that it is just this plainness of speech which makes me enemies. But that is only a proof that my words are true, and that the prejudice against me, and the causes

of it, are what I have said. And whether you look for them now or hereafter, you will find that they are so.

What I have said must suffice as my defense against the charges of my first accusers. I will try next to defend myself against that 'good patriot' Meletus, as he calls himself, and my later accusers. Let us assume that they are a new set of accusers, and read their indictment, as we did in the case of the others. It runs thus. He says that Socrates is an evildoer who corrupts the youth, and who does not believe in the gods whom the city believes in, but in other new divinities. Such is the charge. Let us examine each point in it separately. Meletus says that I do wrong by corrupting the youth; but I say, Athenians, that he is doing wrong; for he is playing off a solemn jest by bringing men lightly to trial, and pretending to have a great zeal and interest in matters to which he has never given a moment's thought. And now I will try to prove to you that it is so.

Come here, Meletus. Is it not a fact that you think it very important that the younger men should be as excellent as possible?

Meletus/ It is.

Socrates/ Come then; tell the judges, who is it who improves them? You take so much interest in the matter that of course you know that. You are accusing me, and bringing me to trial, because, as. you say, you have discovered that I am the corrupter of the youth. Come now, reveal to the judges who improves them. You see, Meletus, you have nothing to say; you are silent. But don't you think that this is a scandalous thing? Is not your silence a conclusive proof of what I say, that you have never given a moment's thought to the matter? Come, tell us, my good sir, who makes the young men better citizens?

Meletus/ The laws.

Socrates/ My excellent sir, that is not my question. What man improves the young, who starts with a knowledge of the laws?

Meletus/ The judges here, Socrates.

Socrates/ What do you mean, Meletus? Can they educate the young and improve them?

Meletus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ All of them? or only some of them?

Meletus/ All of them.

Socrates/ By Hêrê that is good news! There is a great abundance of benefactors. And do the listeners here improve them, or not?

Meletus/ They do.

Socrates/ And do the senators?

Meletus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, Meletus; do the members of the Assembly corrupt the younger men? or do they again all improve them?

Meletus/ They too improve them.

Socrates/ Then all the Athenians, apparently, make the young into fine fellows except me, and I alone corrupt them. Is that your meaning?

Meletus/ Most certainly; that is my meaning.

Socrates/ You have discovered me to be a most unfortunate man. Now tell me; do you think that the same holds good in the case of horses? Does one man do them harm and everyone else improve them? On the contrary, is it not one man only, or a very few—namely, those who are skilled in horses—who can improve them; while the majority of men harm them, if they use them, and have to do with them? Is it not so, Meletus, both with horses and with every other animal? Of course it is, whether you and Anytus say

yes or no. And young men would certainly be very fortunate persons if only one man corrupted them, and everyone else did them good. The truth is, Meletus, you prove conclusively that you have never thought about the youth in your life. It is quite clear, on your own showing, that you take no interest at all in the matters about which you are prosecuting me.

Now, be so good as to tell us, Meletus, is it better to live among good citizens or bad ones? Answer, my friend; I am not asking you at all a difficult question. Do not bad citizens do harm to their neighbors and good citizens good?

Meletus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is there any man who would rather be injured than benefited by his companions? Answer, my good sir; you are obliged by the law to answer. Does anyone like to be injured?

Meletus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well then; are you prosecuting me for corrupting the young, and making them worse men, intentionally or unintentionally?

Meletus/ For doing it intentionally.

Socrates/ What, Meletus? Do you mean to say that you, who are so much younger than I, are yet so much wiser than I, that you know that bad citizens always do evil, and that good citizens always do good, to those with whom they come in contact, while I am so extraordinarily stupid as not to know that if I make any of my companions a rogue, he will probably injure me in some way, and as to commit this great crime, as you allege, intentionally? You will not make me believe that, nor anyone else either, I should think. Either I do not corrupt the young at all; or if I do, I do so unintentionally; so that you are a liar in either case. And if I corrupt them unintentionally, the law does not call upon you to prosecute me for a fault like that, which is an involuntary

one; you should take me aside and admonish and instruct me; for of course I shall cease from doing wrong involuntarily, as soon as I know that I have been doing wrong. But you declined to instruct me; you would have nothing to do with me; instead of that, you bring me up before the Court, where the law sends persons, not for instruction, but for punishment.

The truth is, Athenians, as I said, it is quite clear that Meletus has never paid the slightest attention to these matters. However, now tell us, Meletus, how do you say that I corrupt the younger men? Clearly, according to your indictment, by teaching them not to believe in the gods of the city, but in other new divinities instead. You mean that I corrupt young men by that teaching, do you not?

Meletus/ Yes; most certainly; I mean that.

Socrates/ Then in the name of these gods of whom we are speaking, explain yourself a little more clearly to me and to the judges here. I cannot understand what you mean. Do you mean that I teach young men to believe in some gods, but not in the gods of the city? Do you accuse me of teaching them to believe in strange gods? If that is your meaning, I myself believe in some gods, and my crime is not that of absolute atheism. Or do you mean that I do not believe in the gods at all myself, and that I teach other people not to believe in them either?

Meletus/ I mean that you do not believe in the gods in any way whatever.

Socrates/ Wonderful Meletus! Why do you say that? Do you mean that I believe neither the sun nor the moon to be gods, like other men?

Meletus/ I swear he does not, judges; he says that the sun is a stone, and the moon earth.

Socrates/ My dear Meletus, do you think that you are prosecuting Anaxagoras? You must have a very poor opinion of the judges, and think them very unlettered men, if you imagine that they do not know that the works of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of these doctrines. And so young men learn these things from me, when they can often buy places in the theatre for a drachma at most, and laugh Socrates to scorn, were he to pretend that these doctrines, which are very peculiar doctrines too, were his. But please tell me, do you really think that I do not believe in the gods at all?

Meletus/ Most certainly I do. You are a complete atheist.

Socrates/ No one believes that, Meletus, and I think that you know it to be a lie yourself. It seems to me, Athenians, that Meletus is a very insolent and wanton man, and that he is prosecuting me simply in the insolence and wantonness of youth. He is like a man trying an experiment on me, by asking me a riddle that has no answer. 'Will this wise Socrates,' he says to himself, 'see that I am jesting and contradicting myself? or shall I outwit him and everyone else who hears me?' Meletus seems to me to contradict himself in his indictment; it is as if he were to say, 'Socrates is a wicked man who does not believe in the gods, but who believes in the gods.' But that is mere trifling.

Now, my friends, let us see why I think that this is his meaning. Do you answer me, Meletus; and do you, Athenians, remember the request which I made to you at starting, and do not interrupt me if I talk in my usual way.

Is there any man, Meletus, who believes in the existence of things pertaining to men and not in the existence of men? Make him answer the question, my friends, without these absurd interruptions. Is there any man who believes in the existence of horsemanship and not in the existence of horses? or in flute-playing and not in flute-players? There is

not, my excellent sir. If you will not answer, I will tell both you and the judges that. But you must answer my next question. Is there any man who believes in the existence of divine things and not in the existence of divinities?

Meletus/ There is not.

Socrates/ I am very glad that the judges have managed to extract an answer from you. Well then, you say that I believe in divine beings, whether they be old or new ones, and that I teach others to believe in them; at any rate, according to your statement, I believe in divine beings. That you have sworn in your deposition. But if I believe in divine beings, I suppose it follows necessarily that I believe in divinities. Is it not so? It is. I assume that you grant that, as you do not answer. But do we not believe that divinities are either gods themselves or the children of the gods? Do you admit that?

Meletus/ I do.

Socrates/ Then you admit that I believe in divinities; now, if these divinities are gods, then, as I say, you are jesting and asking a riddle, and asserting that I do not believe in the gods, and at the same time that I do, since I believe in divinities. But if these divinities are the illegitimate children of the gods, either by the nymphs or by other mothers, as they are said to be, then, I ask, what man could believe in the existence of the children of the gods, and not in the existence of the gods? That would be as strange as believing in the existence of the offspring of horses and asses, and not in the existence of horses and asses. You must have indicted me in this manner, Meletus, either to test my skill, or because you could not find any crime that you could accuse me of with truth. But you will never contrive to persuade any man, even of the smallest understanding, that a belief in divine things and things of the gods does not necessarily involve a belief in divinities, and in the gods, and in heroes.

But in truth, Athenians, I do not think that I need say very much to prove that I have not committed the crime for which Meletus is prosecuting me. What I have said is enough to prove that. But, I repeat, it is certainly true, as I have already told you, that I have incurred much unpopularity and made many enemies. And that is what will cause my condemnation, if I am condemned; not Meletus, nor Anytus either, but the prejudice and suspicion of the multitude. They have been the destruction of many good men before me, and I think that they will be so again. There is no fear that I shall be their last victim.

Perhaps someone will say; 'Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of following pursuits which are very likely now to cause your death?' I should answer him with justice, and say; 'My friend, if you think that a man of any worth at all ought to reckon the chances of life and death when he acts, or that he ought to think of anything but whether he is acting rightly or wrongly, and as a good or a bad man would act, you are grievously mistaken. According to you, the demigods who died at Troy would be men of no great worth, and among them the son of Thetis, who thought nothing of danger when the alternative was disgrace. For when his mother, a goddess, addressed him, as he was burning to slay Hector, I suppose in this fashion, 'My son, if thou avengest the death of thy comrade Patroclus, and slayest Hector, thou wilt die thyself, for "fate awaits thee straightway after Hectors death;"' he heard what she said, but he scorned danger and death; he feared much more to live a coward, and not to avenge his friend. 'Let me punish the evil-doer and straightway die,' he said, 'that I may not remain here by the beaked ships, a scorn of men, encumbering the earth.' Do you suppose that he thought of danger or of death? For this, Athenians, I believe to be the truth. Wherever a man's post is, whether he has chosen it of his own will, or whether

he has been placed at it by his commander, there it is his duty to remain and face the danger, without thinking of death, or of any other thing, except dishonor.

When the generals whom you chose to command me, Athenians, placed me at my post at Potidaea, and at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I remained where they placed me, and ran the risk of death, like other men; and it would be very strange conduct on my part if I were to desert my post now from fear of death or of any other thing, when God has commanded me, as I am persuaded that he has done, to spend my life in searching for wisdom, and in examining myself and others. That would indeed be a very strange thing; and then certainly I might with justice be brought to trial for not believing in the gods; for I should be disobeying the oracle, and fearing death, and thinking myself wise, when I was not wise. For to fear death, my friends, is only to think ourselves wise, without being wise; for it is to think that we know what we do not know. For anything that men can tell, death may be the greatest good that can happen to them; but they fear it as if they knew quite well that it was the greatest of evils. And what is this but that shameful ignorance of thinking that we know what we do not know? In this matter too, my friends, perhaps I am different from the mass of mankind; and if I were to claim to be at all wiser than others, it would be because I do not think that I have any clear knowledge about the other world, when, in fact, I have none. But I do know very well that it is evil and base to do wrong, and to disobey my superior, whether he be man or god. And I will never do what I know to be evil, and shrink in fear from what, for all that I can tell, may be a good. And so, even if you acquit me now, and do not listen to Anytus argument that, if I am to be acquitted, I ought never to have been brought to trial at all; and that, as it is, you are bound to put me to death, because, as he said, if I escape, all your

children will forthwith be utterly corrupted by practicing what Socrates teaches; if you were therefore to say to me, Socrates, this time we will not listen to Anytus; we will let you go, but on this condition, that you cease from carrying on this search of yours, and from philosophy; if you are found following those pursuits again, you shall die;' I say, if you offered to let me go on these terms, I should reply; — 'Athenians, I hold you in the highest regard and love; but I will obey God rather than you; and as long as I have breath and strength I will not cease from philosophy, and from exhorting you, and declaring the truth to every one of you whom I meet, saying, as I am wont, "My excellent friend, you are a citizen of Athens, a city which is very great and very famous for wisdom and power of mind; are you not ashamed of caring so much for the making of money, and for reputation, and for honor? Will you not think or care about wisdom, and truth, and the perfection of your soul?"' And if he disputes my words, and says that he does care about these things, I shall not forthwith release him and go away; I shall question him and cross-examine him and test him; and if I think that he has not virtue, though he says that he has, I shall reproach him for setting the lower value on the most important things, and a higher value on those that are of less account. This I shall do to everyone whom I meet, young or old, citizen or stranger; but more especially to the citizens, for they are more nearly akin to me. For, know well, God has commanded me to do so. And I think that no better piece of fortune has ever befallen you in Athens than my service to God. For I spend my whole life in going about and persuading you all to give your first and chiefest care to the perfection of your souls, and not till you have done that to think of your bodies, or your wealth; and telling you that virtue does not come from wealth, but that wealth, and every other good thing which men have, whether in public, or in

private, comes from virtue. If then I corrupt the youth by this teaching, the mischief is great; but if any man says that I teach anything else, he speaks falsely. And therefore, Athenians, I say, either listen to Anytus, or do not listen to him; either acquit me, or do not acquit me; but be sure that I shall not alter my way of life; no, not if I have to die for it many times.

Do not interrupt me, Athenians. Remember the request which I made to you, and listen to my words. I think that it will profit you to hear them. I am going to say something more to you, at which you may be inclined to cry out; but do not do that. Be sure that if you put me to death, who am what I have told you that I am, you will do yourselves more harm than me. Meletus and Anytus can do me no harm; that is impossible; for I am sure that God will not allow a good man to be injured by a bad one. They may indeed kill me, or drive me into exile, or deprive me of my civil rights; and perhaps Meletus and others think those things great evils. But I do not think so; I think that it is a much greater evil to do what he is doing now, and to try to put a man to death unjustly. And now, Athenians, I am not arguing in my own defense at all, as you might expect me to do; I am trying to persuade you not to sin against God, by condemning me, and rejecting his gift to you. For if you put me to death, you will not easily find another man to fill my place. God has sent me to attack the city, as if it were a great and noble horse, to use a quaint simile, which was rather sluggish from its size, and which needed to be aroused by a gadfly; and I think that I am the gadfly that God has sent to the city to attack it; for I never cease from settling upon you, as it were, at every point, and rousing, and exhorting, and reproaching each man of you all day long. You will not easily find anyone else, my friends, to fill my place; and if you take my advice, you will spare my life. You are vexed, as drowsy persons are,

when they are awakened, and of course, if you listened to Anytus, you could easily kill me with a single blow, and then sleep on undisturbed for the rest of your lives, unless God were to care for you enough to send another man to arouse you. And you may easily see that it is God who has given me to your city; a mere human impulse would never have led me to neglect all my own interests, or to endure seeing my private affairs neglected now for so many years, while it made me busy myself unceasingly in your interests, and go to each man of you by himself, like a father, or an elder brother, trying to persuade him to care for virtue. There would have been a reason for it, if I had gained any advantage by this conduct, or if I had been paid for my exhortations; but you see yourselves that my accusers, though they accuse me of everything else without blushing, have not had the effrontery to say that I ever either exacted or demanded payment. They could bring no evidence of that. And I think that I have sufficient evidence of the truth of what I say in my poverty. Perhaps it may seem strange to you that, though I am so busy in going about in private with my counsel, yet I do not venture to come forward in the assembly, and take part in the public councils. You have often heard me speak of my reason for this, and in many places; it is that I have a certain divine sign from God, which is the divinity that Meletus has caricatured in his indictment. I have had it from childhood; it is a kind of voice, which whenever I hear it, always turns me back from something which I was going to do, but never urges me to act. It is this which forbids me to take part in politics. And I think that it does well to forbid me. For, Athenians, it is quite certain that if I had attempted to take part in politics, I should have perished at once and long ago, without doing any good either to you or to myself. And do not be vexed with me for telling the truth. There is no man who will preserve

his life for long, either in Athens or elsewhere, if he firmly opposes the wishes of the people, and tries to prevent the commission of much injustice and illegality in the State. He who would really fight for justice, must do so as a private man, not in public, if he means to preserve his life, even for a short time.

I will prove to you that this is so by very strong evidence, not by mere words, but by what you value highly, actions. Listen then to what has happened to me, that you may know that there is no man who could make me consent to do wrong from the fear of death; but that I would perish at once rather than give way. What I am going to tell you may be a commonplace in the Courts of Law; nevertheless it is true. The only office that I ever held in the State, Athenians, was that of Senator. When you wished to try the ten generals, who did not rescue their men after the battle of Arginusae, in a body, which was illegal, as you all came to think afterwards, the tribe Antiochis, to which I belong, held the presidency. On that occasion I alone of all the presidents opposed your illegal action, and gave my vote against you. The speakers were ready to suspend me and arrest me; and you were clamoring against me, and crying out to me to submit. But I thought that I ought to face the danger out in the cause of law and justice, rather than join with you in your unjust proposal, from fear of imprisonment or death. That was before the destruction of the democracy. When the oligarchy came, the Thirty sent for me, with four others, to the Council-Chamber, and ordered us to bring over Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, that they might put him to death. They were in the habit of frequently giving similar orders to many others, wishing to implicate as many men as possible in their crimes. But then I again proved, not by mere words, but by my actions, that, if I may use a vulgar expression, I do not care a straw for death; but that I do care very much

indeed about not doing anything against the laws of God or man.

That government with all its power did not terrify me into doing anything wrong; but when we left the Council-Chamber, the other four went over to Salamis, and brought Leon across to Athens; and I went away home; and if the rule of the Thirty had not been destroyed soon afterwards, I should very likely have been put to death for what I did then. Many of you will be my witnesses in this matter.

Now do you think that I should have remained alive all these years, if I had taken part in public affairs, and had always maintained the cause of justice like an honest man, and had held it a paramount duty, as it is, to do so? Certainly not, Athenians, nor any other man either. But throughout my whole life, both in private, and in public, whenever I have had to take part in public affairs, you will find that I have never yielded a single point in a question of right and wrong to any man; no, not to those whom my enemies falsely assert to have been my pupils. But I was never any man's teacher. I have never withheld myself from anyone, young or old, who was anxious to hear me converse while I was about my mission; neither do I converse for payment, and refuse to converse without payment; I am ready to ask questions of rich and poor alike, and if any man wishes to answer me, and then listen to what I have to say, he may. And I cannot justly be charged with causing these men to turn out good or bad citizens; for I never either taught, or professed to teach any of them any knowledge whatever. And if any man asserts that he ever learnt or heard anything from me in private, which everyone else did not hear as well as he, be sure that he does not speak the truth.

Why is it, then, that people delight in spending so much time in my company? You have heard why, Athenians. I told

you the whole truth when I said that they delight in hearing me examine persons who think that they are wise when they are not wise. It is certainly very amusing to listen to that. And, I say, God has commanded me to examine men in oracles, and in dreams, and in every way in which the divine will was ever declared to man. This is the truth, Athenians, and if it were not the truth, it would be easily refuted. For if it were really the case that I have already corrupted some of the young men, and am now corrupting others, surely some of them, finding as they grew older that I had given them evil counsel in their youth, would have come forward to-day to accuse me and take their revenge. Or if they were unwilling to do so themselves, surely their kinsmen, their fathers, or brothers, or other relatives, would, if I had done them any harm, have remembered it, and taken their revenge. Certainly I see many of them in Court. Here is Crito, of my own deme and of my own age, the father of Critobulus; here is Lysanias of Sphettus, the father of Eschinus; here is also Antiphon of Cephisus, the father of Epigenes. Then here are others, whose brothers have spent their time in my company; Nicostratus, the son of Theozotides, and brother of Theodotus—and Theodotus is dead, so he at least cannot entreat his brother to be silent; here is Paralus, the son of Demodocus, and the brother of Theages; here is Adeimantus, the son of Ariston, whose brother is Plato here; and Eantodorus, whose brother is Aristodorus. And I can name many others to you, some of whom Meletus ought to have called as witnesses in the course of his own speech; but if he forgot to call them then, let him call them now—I will stand aside while he does so—and tell us if he has any such evidence. No, on the contrary, my friends, you will find all these men ready to support me, the corrupter, the injurer of their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call me. Those of them who have been already corrupted might perhaps have some

reason for supporting me; but what reason can their relatives, who are grown up, and who are uncorrupted, have, except the reason of truth and justice, that they know very well that Meletus is a liar, and that I am speaking the truth?

Well, my friends, this, together it may be with other things of the same nature, is pretty much what I have to say in my defense. There may be someone among you who will be vexed when he remembers how, even in a less important trial than this, he prayed and entreated the judges to acquit him with many tears, and brought forward his children and many of his friends and relatives in Court, in order to appeal to your feelings; and then finds that I shall do none of these things, though I am in what he would think the supreme danger. Perhaps he will harden himself against me when he notices this; it may make him angry, and he may give his vote in anger. If it is so with any of you—I do not suppose that it is, but in case it should be so—I think that I should answer him reasonably if I said; 'My friend, I have kinsmen too, for, in the words of Homer, "I am not born of stocks and stones, but of woman;' and so, Athenians, I have kinsmen, and I have three sons, one of them a lad, and the other two still children. Yet I will not bring any of them forward before you, and implore you to acquit me. And why will I do none of these things? It is not from arrogance, Athenians, nor because I hold you cheap; whether or no I can face death bravely is another question; but for my own credit, and for your credit, and for the credit of our city, I do not think it well, at my age, and with my name, to do anything of that kind. Rightly or wrongly, men have made up their minds that in some way Socrates is different from the mass of mankind. And it will be a shameful thing if those of you who are thought to excel in wisdom, or in bravery, or in any other virtue, are going to act in this fashion. I have often seen men with a reputation behaving in a strange way at their trial, as

if they thought it a terrible fate to be killed, and as though they expected to live forever, if you did not put them to death. Such men seem to me to bring discredit on the city; for any stranger would suppose that the best and most eminent Athenians, who are selected by their fellow-citizens to hold office, and for other honors, are no better than women. Those of you, Athenians, who have any reputation at all, ought not to do these things; and you ought not to allow us to do them; you should show that you will be much more merciless to men who make the city ridiculous by these pitiful pieces of acting, than to men who remain quiet.

But apart from the question of credit, my friends, I do not think that it is right to entreat the judge to acquit us, or to escape condemnation in that way. It is our duty to convince his mind by reason. He does not sit to give away justice to his friends, but to pronounce judgment; and he has sworn not to favor any man whom he would like to favor, but to decide questions according to law. And therefore we ought not to teach you to forswear yourselves; and you ought not to allow yourselves to be taught, for then neither you nor we would be acting righteously. Therefore, Athenians, do not require me to do these things, for I believe them to be neither good nor just nor holy; and, more especially do not ask me to do them to-day, when Meletus is prosecuting me for impiety. For were I to be successful, and to prevail on you by my prayers to break your oaths, I should be clearly teaching you to believe that there are no gods; and I should be simply accusing myself by my defense of not believing in them. But, Athenians, that is very far from the truth. I do believe in the gods as no one of my accusers believes in them; and to you and to God I commit my cause to be decided as is best for you and for me.

(He is found guilty by 281 votes to 220.)

Socrates/ I am not vexed at the verdict which you have given, Athenians, for many reasons. I expected that you would find me guilty; and I am not so much surprised at that, as at the numbers of the votes. I, certainly, never thought that the majority against me would have been so narrow. But now it seems that if only thirty votes had changed sides, I should have escaped. So I think that I have escaped Meletus, as it is; and not only have I escaped him; for it is perfectly clear that if Anytus and Lycon had not come forward to accuse me too, he would not have obtained the fifth part of the votes, and would have had to pay a fine of a thousand drachmae.

So he proposes death as the penalty. Be it so. And what counter- penalty shall I propose to you, Athenians? What I deserve, of course, must I not? What then do I deserve to pay or to suffer for having determined not to spend my life in ease? I neglected the things which most men value, such as wealth, and family interests, and military commands, and popular oratory, and all the political appointments, and clubs, and factions, that there are in Athens; for I thought that I was really too conscientious a man to preserve my life if I engaged in these matters. So I did not go where I should have done no good either to you or to myself. I went instead to each one of you by himself, to do him, as I say, the greatest of services, and strove to persuade him not to think of his affairs, until he had thought of himself, and tried to make himself as perfect and wise as possible; nor to think of the affairs of Athens, until he had thought of Athens herself; and in all cases to bestow his thoughts on things in the same manner. Then what do I deserve for such a life? Something good, Athenians, if I am really to propose what I deserve; and something good which it would be suitable to me to receive. Then what is a suitable reward to be given to a poor

benefactor, who requires leisure to exhort you? There is no reward, Athenians, so suitable for him as a public maintenance in the Prytaneum. It is a much more suitable reward for him than for any of you who has won a victory at the Olympic games with his horse or his chariots. Such a man only makes you seem happy, but I make you really happy; and he is not in want, and I am. So if I am to propose the penalty which I really deserve, I propose this, a public maintenance in the Prytaneum. Perhaps you think me stubborn and arrogant in what I am saying now, as in what I said about the entreaties and tears. It is not so, Athenians; it is rather that I am convinced that I never wronged any man intentionally, though I cannot persuade you of that, for we have conversed together only a little time. If there were a law at Athens, as there is elsewhere, not to finish a trial of life and death in a single day, I think that I could have convinced you of it; but now it is not easy in so short a time to clear myself of the gross calumnies of my enemies. But when I am convinced that I have never wronged any man, I shall certainly not wrong myself, or admit that I deserve to suffer any evil, or propose any evil for myself as a penalty. Why should I? Lest I should suffer the penalty which Meletus proposes, when I say that I do not know whether it is a good or an evil? Shall I choose instead of it something which I know to be an evil, and propose that as a penalty? Shall I propose imprisonment? And why should I pass the rest of my days in prison, the slave of successive officials? Or shall I propose a fine, with imprisonment until it is paid? I have told you why I will not do that. I should have to remain in prison for I have no money to pay a fine with. Shall I then propose exile? Perhaps you would agree to that. Life would indeed be very dear to me, if I were unreasonable enough to expect that strangers would cheerfully tolerate my discussions and reasonings, when you who are my fellow-

citizens cannot endure them, and have found them so burdensome and odious to you, that you are seeking now to be released from them. No, indeed, Athenians, that is not likely. A fine life I should lead for an old man, if I were to withdraw from Athens, and pass the rest of my days in wandering from city to city, and continually being expelled. For I know very well that the young men will listen to me, wherever I go, as they do here; and if I drive them away, they will persuade their elders to expel me; and if I do not drive them away, their fathers and kinsmen will expel me for their sakes.

Perhaps someone will say, 'Why cannot you withdraw from Athens, Socrates, and hold your peace?' It is the most difficult thing in the world to make you understand why I cannot do that. If I say that I cannot hold my peace, because that would be to disobey God, you will think that I am not in earnest and will not believe me. And if I tell you that no better thing can happen to a man than to converse every day about virtue and the other matters about which you have heard me conversing and examining myself and others, and that an unexamined life is not worth living, then you will believe me still less. But that is the truth, my friends, though it is not easy to convince you of it. And, what is more, I am not accustomed to think that I deserve any punishment. If I had been rich, I would have proposed as large a fine as I could pay; that would have done me no harm. But I am not rich enough to pay a fine, unless you are willing to fix it at a sum within my means. Perhaps I could pay you a mina; so I propose that. Plato here, Athenians, and Crito, and Critobulus, and Apollodorus bid me propose thirty minas, and they will be sureties for me. So I propose thirty minae. They will be sufficient sureties to you for the money.

(He is condemned to death.)

Socrates/ You have not gained very much time, Athenians, and. as the price of it, you will have an evil name from all who wish to revile the city, and they will cast in your teeth that you put Socrates, a wise man, to death. For they will certainly call me wise, whether I am wise or not, when they want to reproach you. If you would have waited for a little while, your wishes would have been fulfilled in the course of nature; for you see that I am an old man, far advanced in years, and near to death. I am speaking not to all of you, only to those who have voted for my death. And now I am speaking to them still. Perhaps, my friends, you think that I have been defeated because I was wanting in the arguments by which I could have persuaded you to acquit me, if, that is, I had thought it right to do or to say anything to escape punishment. It is not so. I have been defeated because I was wanting, not in arguments, but in over-boldness and effrontery; because I would not plead before you as you would have liked to hear me plead, or appeal to you with weeping and wailing, or say and do many other things, which I maintain are unworthy of me, but which you have been accustomed to from other men. But when I was defending myself, I thought that I ought not to do anything unmanly because of the danger which I ran, and I have not changed my mind now. I would very much rather defend myself as I did, and die, than as you would have had me do, and live. Both in a law suit, and in war, there are some things which neither I nor any other man may do in order to escape from death. In battle a man often sees that he may at least escape from death by throwing down his arms and falling on his knees before the pursuer to beg for his life. And there are many other ways of avoiding death in every danger, if a man will not scruple to say and to do anything. But, my friends, I think that it is a much harder thing to escape from

wickedness than from death; for wickedness is swifter than death. And now I, who am old and slow, have been overtaken by the slower pursuer; and my accusers, who are clever and swift, have been overtaken by the swifter pursuer, which is wickedness. And now I shall go hence, sentenced by you to death; and they will go hence, sentenced by truth to receive the penalty of wickedness and evil. And I abide by this award as well as they. Perhaps it was right for these things to be so; and I think that they are fairly measured.

And now I wish to prophesy to you, Athenians who have condemned me. For I am going to die, and that is the time when men have most prophetic power. And I prophesy to you who have sentenced me to death, that a far severer punishment than you have inflicted on me, will surely overtake you as soon as I am dead. You have done this thing, thinking that you will be relieved from having to give an account of your lives. But I say that the result will be very different from that. There will be more men who will call you to account, whom I have held back, and whom you did not see. And they will be harder masters to you than I have been, for they will be younger, and you will be more angry with them. For if you think that you will restrain men from reproaching you for your evil lives by putting them to death, you are very much mistaken. That way of escape is hardly possible, and it is not a good one. It is much better, and much easier, not to silence reproaches, but to make yourselves as perfect as you can. This is my parting prophecy to you who have condemned me.

With you who have acquitted me I should like to converse touching this thing that has come to pass, while the authorities are busy, and before I go to the place where I have to die. So, I pray you, remain with me until I go hence; there is no reason why we should not converse with each other while it is possible. I wish to explain to you, as my

friends, the meaning of what has befallen me. A wonderful thing has happened to me, judges, —for you I am right in calling judges. The prophetic sign, which I am wont to receive from the divine voice, has been constantly with me all through my life till now, opposing me in quite small matters if I were not going to act rightly. And now you yourselves see what has happened to me; a thing which might be thought, and which is sometimes actually reckoned, the supreme evil. But the sign of God did not withstand me when I was leaving my house in the morning, nor when I was coming up hither to the Court, nor at any point in my speech, when I was going to say anything; though at other times it has often stopped me in the very act of speaking. But now, in this matter, it has never once withstood me, either in my words or my actions. I will tell you what I believe to be the reason of that. This thing that has come upon me must be a good; and those of us who think that death is an evil must needs be mistaken. I have a clear proof that that is so; for my accustomed sign would certainly have opposed me, if I had not been going to fare well.

And if we reflect in another way we shall see that we may well hope that death is a good. For the state of death is one of two things; either the dead man wholly ceases to be, and loses all sensation; or, according to the common belief, it is a change and a migration of the soul unto another place. And if death is the absence of all sensation, and like the sleep of one whose slumbers are unbroken by any dreams, it will be a wonderful gain. For if a man had to select that night in which he slept so soundly that he did not even see any dreams, and had to compare with it all the other nights and days of his life, and then had to say how many days and nights in his life he had spent better and more pleasantly than this night, I think that a private person, nay, even the

great King! himself, would find them easy to count, compared with the others. If that is the nature of death, I for one count it a gain. For then it appears that eternity is nothing more than a single night. But if death is a journey to another place, and the common belief be true, that there are all who have died, what good could be greater than this, my judges? Would a journey not be worth taking, at the end of which, in the other world, we should be released from the self-styled judges who are here, and should find the true judges, who are said to sit in judgment below, such as Minos, and Rhadamanthus, and Eacus, and Triptolemus, and the other demi-gods who were just in their lives? Or what would you not give to converse with Orpheus and Musseus and Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die many times, if this be true. And for my own part I should have a wonderful interest in meeting there Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and the other men of old who have died through an unjust judgment, and in comparing my experiences with theirs. That I think would be no small pleasure. And, above all, I could spend my time in examining those who are there, as I examine men here, and in finding out which of them is wise, and which of them thinks himself wise, when he is not wise. What would we not give, my judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great expedition against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or countless other men and women whom we could name? It would be an infinite happiness to converse with them, and to live with them, and to examine them. Assuredly there they do not put men to death for doing that. For besides the other ways in which they are happier than we are, they are immortal, at least if the common belief be true.

And you too, judges, must face death with a good courage, and believe this as a truth, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life, or after death. His fortunes are not

neglected by the gods; and what has come to me to-day has not come by chance. I am persuaded that it was better for me to die now, and to be released from trouble; and that was the reason why the sign never turned me back. And so I am hardly angry with my accusers, or with those who have condemned me to die. Yet it was not with this mind that they accused me arid condemned me, but meaning to do me an injury. So far I may find fault with them.

Yet I have one request to make of them. When my sons grow up, visit them with punishment, my friends, and vex them in the same way that I have vexed you, if they seem to you to care for riches, or for any other thing, before virtue; and if they think that they are something, when they are nothing at all, reproach them, as I have reproached you, for not caring for what they should, and for thinking that they are great men when in fact they are worthless. And if you will do this, I myself and my sons will have received our deserts at your hands.

But now the time has come, and we must go hence; I to die, and you to live. Whether life or death is better is known to God, and to God only.

The Defense Of Socrates At His Trial

Translated by Fowler.

[ETHICAL]

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates; Meletus.

Socrates/ How you, men of Athens, have been affected by my accusers, I do not know; but I, for my part, almost forgot my own identity, so persuasively did they talk; and yet there is hardly a word of truth in what they have said. But I was most amazed by one of the many lies that they told—when they said that you must be on your guard not to be deceived by me, because I was a clever speaker. For I thought it the most shameless part of their conduct that they are not ashamed because they will immediately be convicted by me of falsehood by the evidence of fact, when I show myself to be not in the least a clever speaker, unless indeed they call him a clever speaker who speaks the truth; for if this is what they mean, I would agree that I am an orator not—after their fashion. Now they, as I say, have said little or nothing true; but you shall hear from me nothing but the truth. Not, however, men of Athens, speeches finely tricked out with words and phrases, as theirs are, nor carefully arranged, but you will hear things said at random with the words that happen to occur to me. For I trust that what I say is just; and let none of you expect anything else.

For surely it would not be fitting for one of my age to come before you like a youngster making up speeches. And, men of Athens, I urgently beg and beseech you if you hear me making my defense with the same words with which I have been accustomed to speak both in the market place at the bankers tables, where many of you have heard me, and

elsewhere, not to be surprised or to make a disturbance on this account. For the fact is that this is the first time I have come before the court, although I am seventy years old; I am therefore an utter foreigner to the manner of speech here. Hence, just as you would, of course, if I were really a foreigner, pardon me if I spoke in that dialect and that manner in which I had been brought up, so now I make this request of you, a fair one, as it seems to me, that you disregard the manner of my speech—for perhaps it might be worse and perhaps better—and observe and pay attention merely to this, whether what I say is just or not; for that is the virtue of a judge, and an orators virtue is to speak the truth.

First then it is right for me to defend myself against the first false accusations brought against me, and the first accusers, and then against the later accusations and the later accusers. For many accusers have risen up against me before you, who have been speaking for a long time, many years already, and saying nothing true; and I fear them more than Anytus and the rest, though these also are dangerous; but those others are more dangerous, gentlemen, who gained your belief, since they got hold of most of you in childhood, and accused me without any truth, saying, "There is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a ponderer over the things in the air and one who has investigated the things beneath the earth and who makes the weaker argument the stronger." These, men of Athens, who have spread abroad this report, are my dangerous enemies. For those who hear them think that men who investigate these matters do not even believe in gods. Besides, these accusers are many and have been making their accusations already for a long time, and moreover they spoke to you at an age at which you would believe them most readily (some of you in youth, most of you in childhood,) and the case they prosecuted went

utterly by default, since nobody appeared in defense. But the most unreasonable thing of all is this, that it is not even possible to know and speak their names, except when one of them happens to be a writer of comedies. And all those who persuaded you by means of envy and slander—and some also persuaded others because they had been themselves persuaded—all these are most difficult to cope with; for it is not even possible to call any of them up here and cross-question him, but I am compelled in making my defense to fight, as it were, absolutely with shadows and to cross question when nobody answers. Be kind enough, then, to bear in mind, as I say, that there are two classes of my accusers—one those who have just brought their accusation, the other those who, as I was just saying, brought it long ago, and consider that I must defend myself first against the latter; for you heard them making their charges first and with much greater force than these who made them later. Well, then, I must make a defense, men of Athens, and must try in so short a time to remove from you this prejudice which you have been for so long a time acquiring. Now I wish that this might turn out so, if it is better for you and for me, and that I might succeed with my defense; but I think it is difficult, and I am not at all deceived about its nature. But nevertheless, let this be as is pleasing to God, the law must be obeyed and I must make a defense.

Now let us take up from the beginning the question, what the accusation is from which the false prejudice against me has arisen, in which Meletus trusted when he brought this suit against me. What did those who aroused the prejudice say to arouse it? I must, as it were, read their sworn statement as if they were plaintiffs; “Socrates is a criminal and a busybody, investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens and making the weaker argument stronger and teaching others these same things.” Something

of that sort it is. For you yourselves saw these things in Aristophanes comedy, a Socrates being carried about there, proclaiming that he was treading on air and uttering a vast deal of other nonsense, about which I know nothing, either much or little. And I say this, not to cast dishonor upon such knowledge, if anyone is wise about such matters (may I never have to defend myself against Meletus on so great a charge as that!)—but I, men of Athens, have nothing to do with these things. And I offer as witnesses most of yourselves, and I ask you to inform one another and to tell, all those of you who ever heard me conversing—and there are many such among you—now tell, if anyone ever heard me talking much or little about such matters. And from this you will perceive that such are also the other things that the multitude say about me.

But in fact none of these things are true, and if you have heard from anyone that I undertake to teach people and that I make money by it, that is not true either. Although this also seems to me to be a fine thing, if one might be able to teach people, as Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis are. For each of these men, gentlemen, is able to go into anyone of the cities and persuade the young men, who can associate for nothing with whomsoever they wish among their own fellow citizens, to give up the association with those men and to associate with them and pay them money and be grateful besides.

And there is also another wise man here, a Parian, who I learned was in town; for I happened to meet a man who has spent more on sophists than all the rest, Callias, the son of Hipponicus; so I asked him—for he has two sons—"Callias," said I, "if your two sons had happened to be two colts or two calves, we should be able to get and hire for them an overseer who would make them excellent in the kind of excellence proper to them; and he would be a horse-trainer or a

husbandman; but now, since they are two human beings, whom have you in mind to get as overseer? Who has knowledge of that kind of excellence, that of a man and a citizen? For I think you have looked into the matter, because you have the sons. Is there anyone," said I, "or not?" "Certainly," said he. "Who," said I, "and where from, and what is his price for his teaching?" "Evenus," he said, "Socrates, from Paros, five minae." And I called Evenus blessed, if he really had this art and taught so reasonably. I myself should be vain and put on airs, if I understood these things; but I do not understand them, men of Athens.

Now perhaps someone might rejoin; "But, Socrates, what is the trouble about you? Whence have these prejudices against you arisen? For certainly this great report and talk has not arisen while you were doing nothing more out of the way than the rest, unless you were doing something other than most people; so tell us what it is, that we may not act unadvisedly in your case." The man who says this seems to me to be right, and I will try to show you what it is that has brought about my reputation and aroused the prejudice against me. So listen. And perhaps I shall seem to some of you to be joking; be assured, however, I shall speak perfect truth to you.

The fact is, men of Athens, that I have acquired this reputation on account of nothing else than a sort of wisdom. What kind of wisdom is this? Just that which is perhaps human wisdom. For perhaps I really am wise in this wisdom; and these men, perhaps, of whom I was just speaking, might be wise in some wisdom greater than human, or I don't know what to say; for I do not understand it, and whoever says I do, is lying and speaking to arouse prejudice against me. And, men of Athens, do not interrupt me with noise, even if I seem to you to be boasting; for the word which I speak is not mine, but the speaker to whom I shall refer it is a person

of weight. For of my wisdom—if it is wisdom at all—and of its nature, I will offer you the god of Delphi as a witness. You know Chaerephon, I fancy. He was my comrade from a youth and the comrade of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you. And you know the kind of man Chaerephon was, how impetuous in whatever he undertook. Well, once he went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; and, gentlemen, don't make a disturbance at what I say; for he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser. And about these things his brother here will bear you witness, since Chaerephon is dead.

But see why I say these things; for I am going to tell you whence the prejudice against me has arisen. For when I heard this, I thought to myself; "What in the world does the god mean, and what riddle is he propounding? For I am conscious that I am not wise either much or little. What then does he mean by declaring that I am the wisest? He certainly cannot be lying, for that is not possible for him." And for a long time I was at a loss as to what he meant; then with great reluctance I proceeded to investigate him somewhat as follows.

I went to one of those who had a reputation for wisdom, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should prove the utterance wrong and should show the oracle "This man is wiser than I, but you said I was wisest." So examining this man—for I need not call him by name, but it was one of the public men with regard to whom I had this kind of experience, men of Athens—and conversing with him, this man seemed to me to seem to be wise to many other people and especially to himself, but not to be so; and then I tried to show him that he thought he was wise, but was not. As a result, I became hateful to him and to many of those present; and so, as I went away, I thought to myself, "I am wiser than

this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either." From him I went to another of those who were reputed to be wiser than he, and these same things seemed to me to be true; and there I became hateful both to him and to many others.

After this then I went on from one to another, perceiving that I was hated, and grieving and fearing, but nevertheless I thought I must consider the gods business of the highest importance. So I had to go, investigating the meaning of the oracle, to all those who were reputed to know anything. And by the Dog, men of Athens—for I must speak the truth to you—this, I do declare, was my experience; those who had the most reputation seemed to me to be almost the most deficient, as I investigated at the gods behest, and others who were of less repute seemed to be superior men in the matter of being sensible. So I must relate to you my wandering as I performed my Herculean labors, so to speak, in order that the oracle might be proved to be irrefutable. For after the public men I went to the poets, those of tragedies, and those of dithyrambs, and the rest, thinking that there I should prove by actual test that I was less learned than they. So, taking up the poems of theirs that seemed to me to have been most carefully elaborated by them, I asked them what they meant, that I might at the same time learn something from them. Now I am ashamed to tell you the truth, gentlemen; but still it must be told. For there was hardly a man present, one might say, who would not speak better than they about the poems they themselves had composed. So again in the case of the poets also I presently recognized this, that what they composed they composed not by

wisdom, but by nature and because they were inspired, like the prophets and givers of oracles; for these also say many fine things, but know none of the things they say; it was evident to me that the poets too had experienced something of this same sort. And at the same time I perceived that they, on account of their poetry, thought that they were the wisest of men in other things as well, in which they were not. So I went away from them also thinking that I was superior to them in the same thing in which I excelled the public men.

Finally then I went to the hand-workers. For I was conscious that I knew practically nothing, but I knew I should find that they knew many fine things. And in this I was not deceived; they did know what I did not, and in this way they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good artisans also seemed to me to have the same failing as the poets; because of practicing his art well, each one thought he was very wise in the other most important matters, and this folly of theirs obscured that wisdom, so that I asked myself in behalf of the oracle whether I should prefer to be as I am, neither wise in their wisdom nor foolish in their folly, or to be in both respects as they are. I replied then to myself and to the oracle that it was better for me to be as I am.

Now from this investigation, men of Athens, many enmities have arisen against me, and such as are most harsh and grievous, so that many prejudices have resulted from them and I am called a wise man. For on each occasion those who are present think I am wise in the matters in which I confute someone else; but the fact is, gentlemen, it is likely that the god is really wise and by his oracle means this; “Human wisdom is of little or no value.” And it appears that he does not really say this of Socrates, but merely uses my name, and makes me an example, as if he were to say; “This one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like

Socrates, recognizes that he is in truth of no account in respect to wisdom."

Therefore I am still even now going about and searching and investigating at the gods behest anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, who I think is wise; and when he does not seem so to me, I give aid to the god and show that he is not wise. And by reason of this occupation I have no leisure to attend to any of the affairs of the state worth mentioning, or of my own, but am in vast poverty on account of my service to the god.

And in addition to these things, the young men who have the most leisure, the sons of the richest men, accompany me of their own accord, find pleasure in hearing people being examined, and often imitate me themselves, and then they undertake to examine others; and then, I fancy, they find a great plenty of people who think they know something, but know little or nothing. As a result, therefore, those who are examined by them are angry with me, instead of being angry with themselves, and say that "Socrates is a most abominable person and is corrupting the youth."

And when anyone asks them "by doing or teaching what?" they have nothing to say, but they do not know, and that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say these things that are handy to say against all the philosophers, "the things in the air and the things beneath the earth" and "not to believe in the gods" and "to make the weaker argument the stronger." For they would not, I fancy, care to say the truth, that it is being made very clear that they pretend to know, but know nothing. Since, then, they are jealous of their honor and energetic and numerous and speak concertedly and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears both long ago and now with vehement slanders.

From among them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus angered on account of the poets, and Anytus on account of the artisans and the public men, and Lycon on account of the orators; so that, as I said in the beginning, I should be surprised if I were able to remove this prejudice from you in so short a time when it has grown so great. There you have the truth, men of Athens, and I speak without hiding anything from you, great or small or prevaricating. And yet I know pretty well that I am making myself hated by just that conduct; which is also a proof that I am speaking the truth and that this is the prejudice against me and these are its causes. And whether you investigate this now or hereafter, you will find that it is so.

Now so far as the accusations are concerned which my first accusers made against me, this is a sufficient defense before you; but against Meletus, the good and patriotic, as he says, and the later ones, I will try to defend myself next. So once more, as if these were another set of accusers, let us take up in turn their sworn statement. It is about as follows; it states that Socrates is a wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings.

Such is the accusation. But let us examine each point of this accusation. He says I am a wrongdoer because I corrupt the youth. But I, men of Athens, say Meletus is a wrongdoer, because he jokes in earnest, lightly involving people in a lawsuit, pretending to be zealous and concerned about things for which he never cared at all. And that this is so I will try to make plain to you also.

Come here, Meletus, tell me; don't you consider it of great importance that the youth be as good as possible?

Meletus/ "I do."

Socrates/ Come now, tell these gentlemen who makes them better? For it is evident that you know, since you care about it. For you have found the one who corrupts them, as you say, and you bring me before these gentlemen and accuse me; and now, come, tell who makes them better and inform them who he is. Do you see, Meletus, that you are silent and cannot tell? And yet does it not seem to you disgraceful and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you have never cared about it? But tell, my good man, who makes them better?

Meletus/ "The laws."

Socrates/ But that is not what I ask, most excellent one, but what man, who knows in the first place just this very thing, the laws.

Meletus/ "These men, Socrates, the judges."

Socrates/ What are you saying, Meletus? Are these gentlemen able to instruct the youth, and do they make them better?

Meletus/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ All, or some of them and others not?

Meletus/ "All."

Socrates/ Well said, by Hera, and this is a great plenty of helpers you speak of. But how about this? Do these listeners make them better, or not?

Meletus/ "These also."

Socrates/ And how about the senators?

Meletus/ "The senators also."

Socrates/ But, Meletus, those in the assembly, the assembly-men, don't corrupt the youth, do they? or do they also all make them better?

Meletus/ "They also."

Socrates/ All the Athenians, then, as it seems, make them excellent, except myself, and I alone corrupt them. Is this what you mean?

Meletus/ “Very decidedly, that is what I mean.”

Socrates/ You have condemned me to great unhappiness! But answer me; does it seem to you to be so in the case of horses, that those who make them better are all mankind, and he who injures them some one person? Or, quite the opposite of this, that he who is able to make them better is some one person, or very few, the horse-trainers, whereas most people, if they have to do with and use horses, injure them? Is it not so, Meletus, both in the case of horses and in that of all other animals? Certainly it is, whether you and Anytus deny it or agree; for it would be a great state of blessedness in the case of the youth if one alone corrupts them, and the others do them good. But, Meletus, you show clearly enough that you never thought about the youth, and you exhibit plainly your own carelessness, that you have not cared at all for the things about which you hale me into court.

But besides, tell us, for heaven’s sake, Meletus, is it better to live among good citizens, or bad? My friend, answer; for I am not asking anything hard. Do not the bad do some evil to those who are with them at any time and the good some good?

Meletus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ Is there then anyone who prefers to be injured by his associates rather than benefited? Answer, my good man; for the law orders you to answer. Is there anyone who prefers to be injured?

Meletus/ “Of course not.”

Socrates/ Come then, do you hale me in here on the ground that I am corrupting the youth and making them worse voluntarily or involuntarily?

Meletus/ “Voluntarily I say.”

Socrates/ What then, Meletus? Are you at your age so much wiser than I at my age, that you have recognized that the evil always do some evil to those nearest them, and the good some good; whereas I have reached such a depth of ignorance that I do not even know this, that if I make anyone of my associates bad I am in danger of getting some harm from him, so that I do this great evil voluntarily, as you say? I don’t believe this, Meletus, nor do I think anyone else in the world does! but either I do not corrupt them, or if I corrupt them, I do it involuntarily, so that you are lying in both events. But if I corrupt them involuntarily, for such involuntary errors the law is not to hale people into court, but to take them and instruct and admonish them in private. For it is clear that if I am told about it, I shall stop doing that which I do involuntarily. But you avoided associating with me and instructing me, and were unwilling to do so, but you hale me in here, where it is the law to hale in those who need punishment, not instruction.

But enough of this, for, men of Athens, this is clear, as I said, that Meletus never cared much or little for these things. But nevertheless, tell us, how do you say, Meletus, that I corrupt the youth? Or is it evident, according to the indictment you brought, that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings? Do you not say that it is by teaching this that I corrupt them?

Meletus/ “Very decidedly that is what I say.”

Socrates/ Then, Meletus, for the sake of these very gods about whom our speech now is, speak still more clearly both

to me and to these gentlemen. For I am unable to understand whether you say that I teach that there are some gods, and myself then believe that there are some gods, and am not altogether godless and am not a wrongdoer in that way, that these, however, are not the gods whom the state believes in, but others, and this is what you accuse me for, that I believe in others; or you say that I do not myself believe in gods at all and that I teach this unbelief to other people.

Meletus/ "That is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all."

Socrates/ You amaze me, Meletus! Why do you say this? Do I not even believe that the sun or yet the moon are gods, as the rest of mankind do?

Meletus/ "No, by Zeus, judges, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth."

Socrates/ Do you think you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus, and do you so despise these gentlemen and think they are so unversed in letters as not to know, that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of such utterances? And forsooth the youth learn these doctrines from me, which they can buy sometimes (if the price is high) for a drachma in the orchestra and laugh at Socrates, if he pretends they are his own, especially when they are so absurd! But for heaven's sake, do you think this of me, that I do not believe there is any god?

Meletus/ "No, by Zeus, you don't, not in the least."

Socrates/ You cannot be believed, Meletus, not even, as it seems to me, by yourself. For this man appears to me, men of Athens, to be very violent and unrestrained, and actually to have brought this indictment in a spirit of violence and unrestraint and rashness. For he seems, as it were, by composing a puzzle to be making a test; Will Socrates, the wise man, recognize that I am joking and contradicting

myself, or shall I deceive him and the others who hear me? For he appears to me to contradict himself in his speech, as if he were to say, Socrates is a wrongdoer, because he does not believe in gods, but does believe in gods. And yet this is the conduct of a jester.

Join me, then, gentlemen, in examining how he appears to me to say this; and do you, Meletus, answer; and you, gentlemen, as I asked you in the beginning, please bear in mind not to make a disturbance if I conduct my argument in my accustomed manner.

Is there any human being who believes that there are things pertaining to human beings, but no human beings? Let him answer, gentlemen, and not make a disturbance in one way or another. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses, but does believe in things pertaining to horses? or who does not believe that flute-players exist, but that things pertaining to flute-players do? There is not, best of men; if you do not wish to answer, I say it to you and these others here. But answer at least the next question. Is there anyone who believes spiritual things exist, but does not believe in spirits?

Meletus/ "There is not."

Socrates/ Thank you for replying reluctantly when forced by these gentlemen. Then you say that I believe in spiritual beings, whether new or old, and teach that belief; but then I believe in spiritual beings at any rate, according to your statement, and you swore to that in your indictment. But if I believe in spiritual beings, it is quite inevitable that I believe also in spirits; is it not so? It is; for I assume that you agree, since you do not answer. But do we not think the spirits are gods or children of gods? Yes, or no?

Meletus/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ Then if I believe in spirits, as you say, if spirits are a kind of gods, that would be the puzzle and joke which I say you are uttering in saying that I, while I do not believe in gods, do believe in gods again, since I believe in spirits; but if, on the other hand, spirits are a kind of bastard children of gods, by nymphs or by any others, whoever their mothers are said to be, what man would believe that there are children of gods, but no gods? It would be just as absurd as if one were to believe that there are children of horses and asses, namely mules, but no horses and asses. But, Meletus, you certainly must have brought this suit either to make a test of us or because you were at a loss as to what true wrongdoing you could accuse me of; but there is no way for you to persuade any man who has even a little sense that it is possible for the same person to believe in spiritual and divine existences and again for the same person not to believe in spirits or gods or heroes.

Well then, men of Athens, that I am not a wrongdoer according to Meletus's indictment, seems to me not to need much of a defense, but what has been said is enough. But you may be assured that what I said before is true, that great hatred has arisen against me and in the minds of many persons. And this it is which will cause my condemnation, if it is to cause it, not Meletus or Anytus, but the prejudice and dislike of the many. This has condemned many other good men, and I think will do so; and there is no danger that it will stop with me. But perhaps someone might say; "Are you then not ashamed, Socrates, of having followed such a pursuit, that you are now in danger of being put to death as a result?" But I should make to him a just reply; "You do not speak well, Sir, if you think a man in whom there is even a little merit ought to consider danger of life or death, and not rather regard this only, when he does things, whether the things he does are right or wrong and the acts of a good or a

bad man. For according to your argument all the demigods would be bad who died at Troy, including the son of Thetis, who so despised danger, in comparison with enduring any disgrace, that when his mother (and she was a goddess) said to him, as he was eager to slay Hector, something like this, I believe, 'My son, if you avenge the death of your friend Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself shall die; "for straightway," she says, "after Hector, is death appointed unto thee;"' he, when he heard this, made light of death and danger, and feared much more to live as a coward and not to avenge his friends, and 'Straightway,' said he, 'may I die, after doing vengeance upon the wrongdoer, that I may not stay here, jeered at beside the curved ships, a burden of the earth.' Do you think he considered death and danger?"

For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth; wherever a man stations himself, thinking it is best to be there, or is stationed by his commander, there he must, as it seems to me, remain and run his risks, considering neither death nor any other thing more than disgrace.

So I should have done a terrible thing, if, when the commanders whom you chose to command me stationed me, both at Potidaea and at Amphipolis and at Delium, I remained where they stationed me, like anybody else, and ran the risk of death, but when the god gave me a station, as I believed and understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy and in examining myself and others, then I were to desert my post through fear of death or anything else whatsoever. It would be a terrible thing, and truly one might then justly hale me into court, on the charge that I do not believe that there are gods, since I disobey the oracle and fear death and think I am wise when I am not. For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else than to think one is wise when one is not; for it is thinking one knows what one does not know. For no one knows whether death be not even the

greatest of all blessings to man, but they fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. And is not this the most reprehensible form of ignorance, that of thinking one knows what one does not know? Perhaps, gentlemen, in this matter also I differ from other men in this way, and if I were to say that I am wiser in anything, it would be in this, that not knowing very much about the other world, I do not think I know. But I do know that it is evil and disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey him who is better than I, whether he be god or man. So I shall never fear or avoid those things concerning which I do not know whether they are good or bad rather than those which I know are bad. And therefore, even if you acquit me now and are not convinced by Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have been brought to trial at all, or since I was brought to trial, I must certainly be put to death, adding that if I were acquitted your sons would all be utterly ruined by practicing what I teach—if you should say to me in reply to this; "Socrates, this time we will not do as Anytus says, but we will let you go, on this condition, however, that you no longer spend your time in this investigation or in philosophy, and if you are caught doing so again you shall die;" if you should let me go on this condition which I have mentioned, I should say to you, Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to anyone of you whom I may meet, saying in my accustomed way; "Most excellent man, are you who are a citizen of Athens, the greatest of cities and the most famous for wisdom and power, not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honor, when you neither care nor take thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your soul?" And if any of you argues the point, and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once,

nor shall I go away, but I shall question and examine and cross-examine him, and if I find that he does not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorning the things that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth. This I shall do to whomever I meet, young and old, foreigner and citizen, but most to the citizens, inasmuch as you are more nearly related to me. For, know that the god commands me to do this, and I believe that no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property more than for the perfection of your souls, or even so much; and I tell you that virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man, both to the individual and to the state. If by saying these things I corrupt the youth, these things must be injurious; but if anyone asserts that I say other things than these, he says what is untrue. Therefore I say to you, men of Athens, either do as Anytus tells you, or not, and either acquit me, or not, knowing that I shall not change my conduct even if I am to die many times over.

Do not make a disturbance, men of Athens; continue to do what I asked of you, not to interrupt my speech by disturbances, but to hear me; and I believe you will profit by hearing. Now I am going to say some things to you at which you will perhaps cry out; but do not do so by any means. For, know that if you kill me, I being such a man as I say I am, you will not injure me so much as yourselves; for neither Meletus nor Anytus could injure me; that would be impossible, for I believe it is not Gods will that a better man be injured by a worse. He might, however, perhaps kill me or banish me or disfranchise me; and perhaps he thinks he would thus inflict great injuries upon me, and others may think so, but I do not; I think he does himself a much greater

injury by doing what he is doing now—killing a man unjustly. And so, men of Athens, I am now making my defense not for my own sake, as one might imagine, but far more for yours, that you may not by condemning me err in your treatment of the gift the God gave you. For if you put me to death, you will not easily find another, who, to use a rather absurd figure, attaches himself to the city as a gadfly to a horse, which, though large and well bred, is sluggish on account of his size and needs to be aroused by stinging. I think the god fastened me upon the city in some such capacity, and I go about arousing, and urging and reproaching each one of you, constantly alighting upon you everywhere the whole day long. Such another is not likely to come to you, gentlemen; but if you take my advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, might be angry, like people awakened from a nap, and might slap me, as Anytus advises, and easily kill me; then you would pass the rest of your lives in slumber, unless God, in his care for you, should send someone else to sting you. And that I am, as I say, a kind of gift from the god, you might understand from this; for I have neglected all my own affairs and have been enduring the neglect of my concerns all these years, but I am always busy in your interest, coming to each one of you individually like a father or an elder brother and urging you to care for virtue; now that is not like human conduct. If I derived any profit from this and received pay for these exhortations, there would be some sense in it; but now you yourselves see that my accusers, though they accuse me of everything else in such a shameless way, have not been able to work themselves up to such a pitch of shamelessness as to produce a witness to testify that I ever exacted or asked pay of anyone. For I think I have a sufficient witness that I speak the truth, namely, my poverty.

Perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and interfere in other people's affairs to give this advice in private, but do not venture to come before your assembly and advise the state. But the reason for this, as you have heard me say at many times and places, is that something divine and spiritual comes to me, the very thing which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment. I have had this from my childhood; it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges me forward. This it is which opposes my engaging in politics. And I think this opposition is a very good thing; for you may be quite sure, men of Athens, that if I had undertaken to go into politics, I should have been put to death long ago and should have done no good to you or to myself. And do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; the fact is that no man will save his life who nobly opposes you or any other populace and prevents many unjust and illegal things from happening in the state. A man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life for even a little while, must be a private citizen, not a public man.

I will give you powerful proofs of this, not mere words, but what you honor more, —actions. And listen to what happened to me, that you may be convinced that I would never yield to anyone, if that was wrong, through fear of death, but would die rather than yield. The tale I am going to tell you is ordinary and commonplace, but true. I, men of Athens, never held any other office in the state, but I was a senator; and it happened that my tribe held the presidency when you wished to judge collectively, not severally, the ten generals who had failed to gather up the slain after the naval battle; this was illegal, as you all agreed afterwards. At that time I was the only one of the prytanes who opposed doing anything contrary to the laws, and although the orators were ready to impeach and arrest me, and though you urged them

with shouts to do so, I thought I must run the risk to the end with law and justice on my side, rather than join with you when your wishes were unjust, through fear of imprisonment or death. That was when the democracy still existed; and after the oligarchy was established, the Thirty sent for me with four others to come to the rotunda and ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis to be put to death. They gave many such orders to others also, because they wished to implicate as many in their crimes as they could. Then I, however, showed again, by action, not in word only, that I did not care a whit for death if that be not too rude an expression, but that I did care with all my might not to do anything unjust or unholy. For that government, with all its power, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust, but when we came out of the rotunda, the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home; and perhaps I should have been put to death for it, if the government had not quickly been put down. Of these facts you can have many witnesses.

Do you believe that I could have lived so many years if I had been in public life and had acted as a good man should act, lending my aid to what is just and considering that of the highest importance? Far from it, men of Athens; nor could any other man. But you will find that through all my life, both in public, if I engaged in any public activity, and in private, I have always been the same as now, and have never yielded to anyone wrongly, whether it were any other person or any of those who are said by my traducers to be my pupils. But I was never anyone's teacher. If anyone, whether young or old, wishes to hear me speaking and pursuing my mission, I have never objected, nor do I converse only when I am paid and not otherwise, but I offer myself alike to rich and poor; I ask questions, and whoever wishes may answer and hear what I say. And whether any of them turns out well

or ill, I should not justly be held responsible, since I never promised or gave any instruction to any of them; but if any man says that he ever learned or heard anything privately from me, which all the others did not, be assured that he is lying.

But why then do some people love to spend much of their time with me? You have heard the reason, men of Athens; for I told you the whole truth; it is because they like to listen when those are examined who think they are wise and are not so; for it is amusing. But, as I believe, I have been commanded to do this by the God through oracles and dreams and in every way in which any man was ever commanded by divine power to do anything whatsoever. This, Athenians, is true and easily tested. For if I am corrupting some of the young men and have corrupted others, surely some of them who have grown older, if they recognize that I ever gave them any bad advice when they were young, ought now to have come forward to accuse me. Or if they did not wish to do it themselves, some of their relatives—fathers or brothers or other kinsfolk—ought now to tell the facts. And there are many of them present, whom I see; first Crito here, who is of my own age and my own deme and father of Critobulus, who is also present; then there is Lysanias the Sphettian, father of Aeschines, who is here; and also Antiphon of Cephisus, father of Epigenes. Then here are others whose brothers joined in my conversations, Nicostratus, son of Theozotides and brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus is dead, so he could not stop him by entreaties,) and Paralus, son of Demodocus; Theages was his brother; and Adimantus, son of Aristo, whose brother is Plato here; and Aeantodorus, whose brother Apollodorus is present. And I can mention to you many others, some one of whom Meletus ought certainly to have produced as a witness in his speech; but if he forgot it then,

let him do so now; I yield the floor to him, and let him say, if he has any such testimony. But you will find that the exact opposite is the case, gentlemen, and that they are all ready to aid me, the man who corrupts and injures their relatives, as Meletus and Anytus say. Now those who are themselves corrupted might have some motive in aiding me; but what reason could their relatives have, who are not corrupted and are already older men, unless it be the right and true reason, that they know that Meletus is lying and I am speaking the truth?

Socrates/ Well, gentlemen, this, and perhaps more like this, is about all I have to say in my defense. Perhaps someone among you may be offended when he remembers his own conduct, if he, even in a case of less importance than this, begged and besought the judges with many tears, and brought forward his children to arouse compassion, and many other friends and relatives; whereas I will do none of these things, though I am, apparently, in the very greatest danger. Perhaps someone with these thoughts in mind may be harshly disposed toward me and may cast his vote in anger. Now if anyone of you is so disposed—I do not believe there is such a person—but if there should be, I think I should be speaking fairly if I said to him, My friend, I too have relatives, for I am, as Homer has it, “not born of an oak or a rock,” but of human parents, so that I have relatives and, men of Athens, I have three sons, one nearly grown up, and two still children; but nevertheless I shall not bring any of them here and beg you to acquit me. And why shall I not do so? Not because I am stubborn, Athenians, or lack respect for you. Whether I fear death or not is another matter, but for the sake of my good name and yours and that of the whole state, I think it is not right for me to do any of these things in view of my age and my reputation, whether

deserved or not; for at any rate the opinion prevails that Socrates is in some way superior to most men. If then those of you who are supposed to be superior either in wisdom or in courage or in any other virtue whatsoever are to behave in such a way, it would be disgraceful. Why, I have often seen men who have some reputation behaving in the strangest manner, when they were on trial, as if they thought they were going to suffer something terrible if they were put to death, just as if they would be immortal if you did not kill them. It seems to me that they are a disgrace to the state and that any stranger might say that those of the Athenians who excel in virtue, men whom they themselves honor with offices and other marks of esteem, are no better than women. Such acts, men of Athens, we who have any reputation at all ought not to commit, and if we commit them you ought not to allow it, but you should make it clear that you will be much more ready to condemn a man who puts before you such pitiable scenes and makes the city ridiculous than one who keeps quiet.

But apart from the question of reputation, gentlemen, I think it is not right to implore the judge or to get acquitted by begging; we ought to inform and convince him. For the judge is not here to grant favors in matters of justice, but to give judgment; and his oath binds him not to do favors according to his pleasure, but to judge according to the laws; therefore, we ought not to get you into the habit of breaking your oaths, nor ought you to fall into that habit; for neither of us would be acting piously. Do not, therefore, men of Athens, demand of me that I act before you in a way which I consider neither honorable nor right nor pious, especially when impiety is the very thing for which Meletus here has brought me to trial. For it is plain that if by persuasion and supplication I forced you to break your oaths I should teach you to disbelieve in the existence of the gods and in making

my defense should accuse myself of not believing in them. But that is far from the truth; for I do believe in them, men of Athens, more than any of my accusers, and I entrust my case to you and to God to decide it as shall be best for me and for you.

I am not grieved, men of Athens, at this vote of condemnation you have cast against me, and that for many reasons, among them the fact that your decision was not a surprise to me. I am much more surprised by the number of votes for and against it; for I did not expect so small a majority, but a large one. Now, it seems, if only thirty votes had been cast the other way, I should have been acquitted. And so, I think, so far as Meletus is concerned, I have even now been acquitted, and not merely acquitted, but anyone can see that, if Anytus and Lycon had not come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a fifth part of the votes.

And so the man proposes the penalty of death. Well, then, what shall I propose as an alternative? Clearly that which I deserve, shall I not? And what do I deserve to suffer or to pay, because in my life I did not keep quiet, but neglecting what most men care for—money-making and property, and military offices, and public speaking, and the various offices and plots and parties that come up in the state—and thinking that I was really too honorable to engage in those activities and live, refrained from those things by which I should have been of no use to you or to myself, and devoted myself to conferring upon each citizen individually what I regard as the greatest benefit? For I tried to persuade each of you to care for himself and his own perfection in goodness and wisdom rather than for any of his belongings, and for the state itself rather than for its interests, and to follow the same method in his care for other things. What, then, does such a man as I deserve? Some good thing, men of Athens,

if I must propose something truly in accordance with my deserts; and the good thing should be such as is fitting for me. Now what is fitting for a poor man who is your benefactor, and who needs leisure to exhort you? There is nothing, men of Athens, so fitting as that such a man be given his meals in the prytaneum. That is much more appropriate for me than for any of you who has won a race at the Olympic games with a pair of horses or a four-in-hand. For he makes you seem to be happy, whereas I make you happy in reality; and he is not at all in need of sustenance, but I am needy. So if I must propose a penalty in accordance with my deserts, I propose maintenance in the prytaneum.

Perhaps some of you think that in saying this, as in what I said about lamenting and imploring, I am speaking in a spirit of bravado; but that is not the case. The truth is rather that I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged anyone; but I cannot convince you of this, for we have conversed with each other only a little while. I believe if you had a law, as some other people have, that capital cases should not be decided in one day, but only after several days, you would be convinced; but now it is not easy to rid you of great prejudices in a short time. Since, then, I am convinced that I never wronged anyone, I am certainly not going to wrong myself, and to say of myself that I deserve anything bad, and to propose any penalty of that sort for myself. Why should I? Through fear of the penalty that Meletus proposes, about which I say that I do not know whether it is a good thing or an evil? Shall I choose instead of that something which I know to be an evil? What penalty shall I propose? Imprisonment? And why should I live in prison a slave to those who may be in authority? Or shall I propose a fine, with imprisonment until it is paid? But that is the same as what I said just now, for I have no money to pay with. Shall I then propose exile as my penalty? Perhaps you would

accept that. I must indeed be possessed by a great love of life if I am so irrational as not to know that if you, who are my fellow citizens, could not endure my conversation and my words, but found them too irksome and disagreeable, so that you are now seeking to be rid of them, others will not be willing to endure them. No, men of Athens, they certainly will not. A fine life I should lead if I went away at my time of life, wandering from city to city and always being driven out! For well I know that wherever I go, the young men will listen to my talk, as they do here; and if I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to drive me out, and if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relatives will drive me out for their sakes.

Perhaps someone might say, "Socrates, can you not go away from us and live quietly, without talking?" Now-this is the hardest thing to make some of you believe. For if I say that such conduct would be disobedience to the god and that therefore I cannot keep quiet, you will think I am jesting and will not believe me; and if again I say that to talk every day about virtue and the other things about which you hear me talking and examining myself and others is the greatest good to man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you will believe me still less. This is as I say, gentlemen, but it is not easy to convince you. Besides, I am not accustomed to think that I deserve anything bad. If I had money, I would have proposed a fine, as large as I could pay; for that would have done me no harm.

But as it is I have no money, unless you are willing to impose a fine which I could pay. I might perhaps pay a mina of silver. So I propose that penalty; but Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito and Critobulus, and Apollodorus tell me to propose a fine of thirty minas, saying that they are sureties for it. So I propose a fine of that amount, and these men, who are amply sufficient, will be my sureties.

It is no long time, men of Athens, which you gain, and for that those who wish to cast a slur upon the state will give you the name and blame of having killed Socrates, a wise man; for, you know, those who wish to revile you will say I am wise, even though I am not. Now if you had waited a little while, what you desire would have come to you of its own accord; for you see how old I am, how far advanced in life and how near death. I say this not to all of you, but to those who voted for my death. And to them also I have something else to say. Perhaps you think, gentlemen, that I have been convicted through lack of such words as would have moved you to acquit me, if I had thought it right to do and say everything to gain an acquittal. Far from it. And yet it is through a lack that I have been convicted, not however a lack of words, but of impudence and shamelessness, and of willingness to say to you such things as you would have liked best to hear. You would have liked to hear me wailing and lamenting and doing and saying many things which are, as I maintain, unworthy of me such things as you are accustomed to hear from others. But I did not think at the time that I ought, on account of the danger I was in, to do anything unworthy of a free man, nor do I now repent of having made my defense as I did, but I much prefer to die after such a defense than to live after a defense of the other sort. For neither in the court nor in war ought I or any other man to plan to escape death by every possible means. In battles it is often plain that a man might avoid death by throwing down his arms and begging mercy of his pursuers; and there are many other means of escaping death in dangers of various kinds if one is willing to do and say anything. But, gentlemen, it is not hard to escape death; it is much harder to escape wickedness, for that runs faster than death. And now I, since I am slow and old, am caught by the slower runner, and my accusers, who are clever and

quick, by the faster, wickedness. And now I shall go away convicted by you and sentenced to death, and they go convicted by truth of villainy and wrong. And I abide by my penalty, and they by theirs. Perhaps these things had to be so, and I think they are well.

And now I wish to prophesy to you, O ye who have condemned me; for I am now at the time when men most do prophesy, the time just before death. And I say to you, ye men who have slain me, that punishment will come upon you straightway after my death, far more grievous in sooth than the punishment of death which you have meted out to me. For now you have done this to me because you hoped that you would be relieved from rendering an account of your lives, but I say that you will find the result far different. Those who will force you to give an account will be more numerous than heretofore; men whom I restrained, though you knew it not; and they will be harsher, inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more annoyed. For if you think that by putting men to death you will prevent anyone from reproaching you because you do not act as you should, you are mistaken. That mode of escape is neither possible at all nor honorable, but the easiest and most honorable escape is not by suppressing others, but by making yourselves as good as possible. So with this prophecy to you who condemned me I take my leave.

But with those who voted for my acquittal I should like to converse about this which has happened, while the authorities are busy and before I go to the place where I must die. Wait with me so long, my friends; for nothing prevents our chatting with each other while there is time. I feel that you are my friends, and I wish to show you the meaning of this which has now happened to me. For, judges—and in calling you judges I give you your right name—a wonderful thing has happened to me. For hitherto the customary

prophetic monitor always spoke to me very frequently and opposed me even in very small matters, if I was going to do anything I should not; but now, as you yourselves see, this thing which might be thought, and is generally considered, the greatest of evils has come upon me; but the divine sign did not oppose me either when I left my home in the morning, or when I came here to the court, or at any point of my speech, when I was going to say anything; and yet on other occasions it stopped me at many points in the midst of a speech; but now, in this affair, it has not opposed me in anything I was doing or saying. What then do I suppose is the reason? I will tell you. This which has happened to me is doubtless a good thing, and those of us who think death is an evil must be mistaken. A convincing proof of this has been given me; for the accustomed sign would surely have opposed me if I had not been going to meet with something good.

Let us consider in another way also how good reason there is to hope that it is a good thing. For the state of death is one of two things; either it is virtually nothingness, so that the dead has no consciousness of anything, or it is, as people say, a change and migration of the soul from this to another place. And if it is unconsciousness, like a sleep in which the sleeper does not even dream, death would be a wonderful gain. For I think if anyone were to pick out that night in which he slept a dreamless sleep and, comparing with it the other nights and days of his life, were to say, after due consideration, how many days and nights in his life had passed more pleasantly than that night, —I believe that not only any private person, but even the great King of Persia himself would find that they were few in comparison with the other days and nights. So if such is the nature of death, I count it a gain; for in that case, all time seems to be no longer than one night. But on the other hand, if death is, as it were,

a change of habitation from here to some other place, and if what we are told is true, that all the dead are there, what greater blessing could there be, judges? For if a man when he reaches the other world, after leaving behind these who claim to be judges, shall find those who are really judges who are said to sit in judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and all the other demigods who were just men in their lives, would the change of habitation be undesirable? Or again, what would any of you give to meet with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die many times over, if these things are true; for I personally should find the life there wonderful, when I met Palamedes or Ajax, the son of Telamon, or any other men of old who lost their lives through an unjust judgment, and compared my experience with theirs. I think that would not be unpleasant. And the greatest pleasure would be to pass my time in examining and investigating the people there, as I do those here, to find out who among them is wise and who thinks he is when he is not. What price would any of you pay, judges, to examine him who led the great army against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or countless others, both men and women, whom I might mention? To converse and associate with them and examine them would be immeasurable happiness. At any rate, the folk there do not kill people for it; since, if what we are told is true, they are immortal for all future time, besides being happier in other respects than men are here.

But you also, judges, must regard death hopefully and must bear in mind this one truth, that no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death, and God does not neglect him. So, too, this which has come to me has not come by chance, but I see plainly that it was better for me to die now and be freed from troubles. That is the reason why the sign never interfered with me, and I am not at all angry

with those who condemned me or with my accusers. And yet it was not with that in view that they condemned and accused me, but because they thought to injure me. They deserve blame for that. However, I make this request of them; when my sons grow up, gentlemen, punish them by troubling them as I have troubled you; if they seem to you to care for money or anything else more than for virtue, and if they think they amount to something when they do not, rebuke them as I have rebuked you because they do not care for what they ought, and think they amount to something when they are worth nothing. If you do this, both I and my sons shall have received just treatment from you.

But now the time has come to go away. I go to die, and you to live; but which of us goes to the better lot, is known to none but God.

Apology

Translated by G.M.A. Grube.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates; Meletus.

Socrates/ I do not know, men of Athens, how my accusers affected you; as for me, I was almost carried away in spite of myself, so persuasively did they speak. And yet, hardly anything of what they said is true. Of the many lies they told, one in particular surprised me, namely that you should be careful not to be deceived by an accomplished speaker like me. That they were not ashamed to be immediately proved wrong by the facts, when I show myself not to be an accomplished speaker at all, that I thought was most shameless on their part—unless indeed they call an accomplished speaker the man who speaks the truth. If they mean that, I would agree that I am an orator, but not after their manner, for indeed, as I say, practically nothing they said was true. From me you will hear the whole truth, though not, by Zeus, gentlemen, expressed in embroidered and stylized phrases like theirs, but things spoken at random and expressed in the first words that come to mind, for I put my trust in the justice of what I say, and let none of you expect anything else. It would not be fitting at my age, as it might be for a young man, to toy with words when I appear before you.

One thing I do ask and beg of you, gentlemen: if you hear me making my defense in the same kind of language as I am accustomed to use in the marketplace by the bankers' tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, do not be surprised or create a disturbance on that account. The position is this: this is my first appearance in a law-court, at the age of seventy; I am therefore simply a stranger to the manner of speaking here. Just as if I were really a stranger,

you would certainly excuse me if I spoke in that dialect and manner in which I had been brought up, so too my present request seems a just one, for you to pay no attention to my manner of speech—be it better or worse—but to concentrate your attention on whether what I say is just or not, for the excellence of a judge lies in this, as that of a speaker lies in telling the truth.

It is right for me, gentlemen, to defend myself first against the first lying accusations made against me and my first accusers, and then against the later accusations and the later accusers. There have been many who have accused me to you for many years now, and none of their accusations are true. These I fear much more than I fear Anytus and his friends, though they too are formidable. These earlier ones, however, are more so, gentlemen; they got hold of most of you from childhood, persuaded you and accused me quite falsely, saying that there is a man called Socrates, a wise man, a student of all things in the sky and below the earth, who makes the worse argument the stronger. Those who spread that rumor, gentlemen, are my dangerous accusers, for their hearers believe that those who study these things do not even believe in the gods. Moreover, these accusers are numerous, and have been at it a long time; also, they spoke to you at an age when you would most readily believe them, some of you being children and adolescents, and they won their case by default, as there was no defense.

What is most absurd in all this is that one cannot even know or mention their names unless one of them is a writer of comedies. Those who maliciously and slanderously persuaded you—who also, when persuaded themselves then persuaded others—all those are most difficult to deal with: one cannot bring one of them into court or refute him; one must simply fight with shadows, as it were, in making one's defense, and cross-examine when no one answers. I want you to realize

too that my accusers are of two kinds: those who have accused me recently, and the old ones I mention; and to think that I must first defend myself against the latter, for you have also heard their accusations first, and to a much greater extent than the more recent.

Very well then. I must surely defend myself and attempt to uproot from your minds in so short a time the slander that has resided there so long. I wish this may happen, if it is in any way better for you and me, and that my defense may be successful, but I think this is very difficult and I am fully aware of how difficult it is. Even so, let the matter proceed as the god may wish, but I must obey the law and make my defense.

Let us then take up the case from its beginning. What is the accusation from which arose the slander in which Meletus trusted when he wrote out the charge against me? What did they say when they slandered me? I must, as if they were my actual prosecutors, read the affidavit they would have sworn. It goes something like this: Socrates is guilty of wrongdoing in that he busies himself studying things in the sky and below the earth; he makes the worse into the stronger argument, and he teaches these same things to others. You have seen this yourself in the comedy of Aristophanes, a Socrates swinging about there, saying he was walking on air and talking a lot of other nonsense about things of which I know nothing at all. I do not speak in contempt of such knowledge, if someone is wise in these things—lest Meletus bring more cases against me—but, gentlemen, I have no part in it, and on this point I call upon the majority of you as witnesses. I think it right that all those of you who have heard me conversing, and many of you have, should tell each other if anyone of you has ever heard me discussing such subjects to any extent at all. From this you will learn that the other things said about me by the majority are of the same kind.

Not one of them is true. And if you have heard from anyone that I undertake to teach people and charge a fee for it, that is not true either. Yet I think it a fine thing to be able to teach people as Gorgias of Leontini does, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis. Each of these men can go to any city and persuade the young, who can keep company with anyone of their own fellow citizens they want without paying, to leave the company of these, to join with themselves, pay them a fee, and be grateful to them besides. Indeed, I learned that there is another wise man from Paros who is visiting us, for I met a man who has spent more money on Sophists than everybody else put together, Callias, the son of Hipponicus. So I asked him—he has two sons—"Callias," I said, "if your sons were colts or calves, we could find and engage a supervisor for them who would make them excel in their proper qualities, some horse breeder or farmer. Now since they are men, whom do you have in mind to supervise them? Who is an expert in this kind of excellence, the human and social kind? I think you must have given thought to this since you have sons. Is there such a person," I asked, "or is there not?" "Certainly there is," he said. "Who is he?" I asked, "What is his name, where is he from? and what is his fee?" "His name, Socrates, is Evenus, he comes from Paros, and his fee is five minas." I thought Evenus a happy man, if he really possesses this art, and teaches for so moderate a fee. Certainly I would pride and preen myself if I had this knowledge, but I do not have it, gentlemen.

One of you might perhaps interrupt me and say: "But Socrates, what is your occupation? From where have these slanders come? For surely if you did not busy yourself with something out of the common, all these rumors and talk would not have arisen unless you did something other than most people. Tell us what it is, that we may not speak inadvisedly about you." Anyone who says that seems to be

right, and I will try to show you what has caused this reputation and slander. Listen then. Perhaps some of you will think I am jesting, but be sure that all that I shall say is true. What has caused my reputation is none other than a certain kind of wisdom. What kind of wisdom? Human wisdom, perhaps. It may be that I really possess this, while those whom I mentioned just now are wise with a wisdom more than human; else I cannot explain it, for I certainly do not possess it, and whoever says I do is lying and speaks to slander me. Do not create a disturbance, gentlemen, even if you think I am boasting, for the story I shall tell does not originate with me, but I will refer you to a trustworthy source. I shall call upon the god at Delphi as witness to the existence and nature of my wisdom, if it be such. You know Chaerephon. He was my friend from youth, and the friend of most of you, as he shared your exile and your return. You surely know the kind of man he was, how impulsive in any course of action. He went to Delphi at one time and ventured to ask the oracle—as I say, gentlemen, do not create a disturbance—he asked if any man was wiser than I, and the Pythian replied that no one was wiser. Chaerephon is dead, but his brother will testify to you about this.

Consider that I tell you this because I would inform you about the origin of the slander. When I heard of this reply I asked myself: "Whatever does the god mean? What is his riddle? I am very conscious that I am not wise at all; what then does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For surely he does not lie; it is not legitimate for him to do so." For a long time I was at a loss as to his meaning; then I very reluctantly turned to some such investigation as this; I went to one of those reputed wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I could refute the oracle and say to it: "This man is wiser than I, but you said I was." Then, when I examined this man—there is no need for me to tell you his name, he was one of our public

men—my experience was something like this: I thought that he appeared wise to many people and especially to himself, but he was not. I then tried to show him that he thought himself wise, but that he was not. As a result he came to dislike me, and so did many of the bystanders. So I withdrew and thought to myself: "I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know." After this I approached another man, one of those thought to be wiser than he, and I thought the same thing, and so I came to be disliked both by him and by many others.

After that I proceeded systematically. I realized, to my sorrow and alarm, that I was getting unpopular, but I thought that I must attach the greatest importance to the god's oracle, so I must go to all those who had any reputation for knowledge to examine its meaning. And by the dog, gentlemen of the jury—for I must tell you the truth—I experienced something like this: in my investigation in the service of the god I found that those who had the highest reputation were nearly the most deficient, while those who were thought to be inferior were more knowledgeable. I must give you an account of my journeyings as if they were labors I had undertaken to prove the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the poets, the writers of tragedies and dithyrambs and the others, intending in their case to catch myself being more ignorant than they. So I took up those poems with which they seemed to have taken most trouble and asked them what they meant, in order that I might at the same time learn something from them. I am ashamed to tell you the truth, gentlemen, but I must. Almost all the bystanders might have explained the poems better than their authors could. I soon realized that poets do not compose their poems with knowledge, but by

some inborn talent and by inspiration, like seers and prophets who also say many fine things without any understanding of what they say. The poets seemed to me to have had a similar experience. At the same time I saw that, because of their poetry, they thought themselves very wise men in other respects, which they were not. So there again I withdrew, thinking that I had the same advantage over them as I had over the politicians.

Finally I went to the craftsmen, for I was conscious of knowing practically nothing, and I knew that I would find that they had knowledge of many fine things. In this I was not mistaken; they knew things I did not know, and to that extent they were wiser than I. But, gentlemen of the jury, the good craftsmen seemed to me to have the same fault as the poets: each of them, because of his success at his craft, thought himself very wise in other most important pursuits, and this error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had, so that I asked myself, on behalf of the oracle, whether I should prefer to be as I am, with neither their wisdom nor their ignorance, or to have both. The answer I gave myself and the oracle was that it was to my advantage to be as I am.

As a result of this investigation, gentlemen of the jury, I acquired much unpopularity, of a kind that is hard to deal with and is a heavy burden; many slanders came from these people and a reputation for wisdom, for in each case the bystanders thought that I myself possessed the wisdom that I proved that my interlocutor did not have. What is probable, gentlemen, is that in fact the god is wise and that his oracular response meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing, and that when he says this man, Socrates, he is using my name as an example, as if he said: 'This man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates, understands that his wisdom is worthless." So even now I continue this investigation as the god bade me—and I go around seeking

out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I do not think he is, I come to the assistance of the god and show him that he is not wise. Because of this occupation, I do not have the leisure to engage in public affairs to any extent, nor indeed to look after my own, but I live in great poverty because of my service to the god.

Furthermore, the young men who follow me around of their own free will, those who have most leisure, the sons of the very rich, take pleasure in hearing people questioned; they themselves often imitate me and try to question others. I think they find an abundance of men who believe they have some knowledge but know little or nothing. The result is that those whom they question are angry, not with themselves but with me. They say: 'That man Socrates is a pestilential fellow who corrupts the young." If one asks them what he does and what he teaches to corrupt them, they are silent, as they do not know, but, so as not to appear at a loss, they mention those accusations that are available against all philosophers, about "things in the sky and things below the earth," about "not believing in the gods" and "making the worse the stronger argument"; they would not want to tell the truth, I'm sure, that they have been proved to lay claim to knowledge when they know nothing. These people are ambitious, violent and numerous; they are continually and convincingly talking about me; they have been filling your ears for a long time with vehement slanders against me. From them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus being vexed on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the craftsmen and the politicians, Lycon on behalf of the orators, so that, as I started out by saying, I should be surprised if I could rid you of so much slander in so short a time. That, gentlemen of the jury, is the truth for you. I have hidden or disguised nothing. I know well enough that this very conduct makes me unpopular, and this is proof that what I say is true, that such is the slander

against me, and that such are its causes. If you look into this either now or later, this is what you will find.

Let this suffice as a defense against the charges of my earlier accusers. After this I shall try to defend myself against Meletus, that good and patriotic man, as he says he is, and my later accusers. As these are a different lot of accusers, let us again take up their sworn deposition. It goes something like this: Socrates is guilty of corrupting the young and of not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other new spiritual things? Such is their charge. Let us examine it point by point.

He says that I am guilty of corrupting the young, but I say that Meletus is guilty of dealing frivolously with serious matters, of irresponsibly bringing people into court, and of professing to be seriously concerned with things about none of which he has ever cared, and I shall try to prove that this is so. Come here and tell me, Meletus. Surely you consider it of the greatest importance that our young men be as good as possible? —

Meletus/ Indeed I do.

Socrates/ Come then, tell the jury who improves them. You obviously know, in view of your concern. You say you have discovered the one who corrupts them, namely me, and you bring me here and accuse me to the jury. Come, inform the jury and tell them who it is. You see, Meletus, that you are silent and know not what to say. Does this not seem shameful to you and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you have not been concerned with any of this? Tell me, my good sir, who improves our young men? —

Meletus/ The laws.

Socrates/ That is not what I am asking, but what person who has knowledge of the laws to begin with? —

Meletus/ These jurymen, Socrates.

Socrates/ How do you mean, Meletus? Are these able to educate the young and improve them? —

Meletus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ All of them, or some but not others? —

Meletus/ All of them.

Socrates/ Very good, by Hera. You mention a great abundance of benefactors. But what about the audience? Do they improve the young or not?

Meletus/ —They do, too.

Socrates/ What about the members of Council? —

Meletus/ The Councilors, also.

Socrates/ But, Meletus, what about the assembly? Do members of the assembly corrupt the young, or do they all improve them? —

Meletus/ They improve them.

Socrates/ All the Athenians, it seems, make the young into fine good men, except me, and I alone corrupt them. Is that what you mean? —

Meletus/ That is most definitely what I mean.

Socrates/ You condemn me to a great misfortune. Tell me: does this also apply to horses do you think? That all men improve them and one individual corrupts them? Or is quite the contrary true, one individual is able to improve them, or very few, namely, the horse breeders, whereas the majority, if they have horses and use them, corrupt them? Is that not the case, Meletus, both with horses and all other animals? Of course it is, whether you and Anytus say so or not. It would be a very happy state of affairs if only one person corrupted our youth, while the others improved them.

You have made it sufficiently obvious, Meletus, that you have never had any concern for our youth; you show your

indifference clearly; that you have given no thought to the subjects about which you bring me to trial.

And by Zeus, Meletus, tell us also whether it is better for a man to live among good or wicked fellow citizens. Answer, my good man, for I am not asking a difficult question. Do not the wicked do some harm to those who are ever closest to them, whereas good people benefit them?

Meletus/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ And does the man exist who would rather be harmed than benefited by his associates? Answer, my good sir, for the law orders you to answer. Is there any man who wants to be harmed? —

Meletus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Come now, do you accuse me here of corrupting the young and making them worse deliberately or unwillingly? —

Meletus/ Deliberately.

Socrates/ What fellows, Meletus? Are you so much wiser at your age than I am at mine that you understand that wicked people always do some harm to their closest neighbors while good people do them good, but I have reached such a pitch of ignorance that I do not realize this, namely that if I make one of my associates wicked I run the risk of being harmed by him so that I do such a great evil deliberately, as you say? I do not believe you, Meletus, and I do not think anyone else will. Either I do not corrupt the young or, if I do, it is unwillingly, and you are lying in either case. Now if I corrupt them unwillingly, the law does not require you to bring people to court for such unwilling wrongdoings, but to get hold of them privately, to instruct them and exhort them; for clearly, if I learn better, I shall cease to do what I am doing unwillingly. You, however, have avoided my company and were unwilling to instruct me, but you bring me here, where the law requires

one to bring those who are in need of punishment, not of instruction.

And so, gentlemen of the jury, what I said is clearly true: Meletus has never been at all concerned with these matters. Nonetheless tell us, Meletus, how you say that I corrupt the young; or is it obvious from your deposition that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the city believes but in other new spiritual things? Is this not what you say I teach and so corrupt them? —

Meletus/ That is most certainly what I do say.

Socrates/ Then by those very gods about whom we are talking, Meletus, make this clearer to me and to the jury: I cannot be sure whether you mean that I teach the belief that there are some gods—and therefore I myself believe that there are gods and am not altogether an atheist, nor am I guilty of that—not, however, the gods in whom the city believes, but others, and that this is the charge against me, that they are others. Or whether you mean that I do not believe in gods at all, and that this is what I teach to others. —

Meletus/ This is what I mean, that you do not believe in gods at all.

Socrates/ You are a strange fellow, Meletus. Why do you say this? Do I not believe, as other men do, that the sun and the moon are gods? —

Meletus/ No, by Zeus, jurymen, for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth.

Socrates/ My dear Meletus, do you think you are prosecuting Anaxagoras? Are you so contemptuous of the jury and think them so ignorant of letters as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of those theories, and further, that the young men learn from me what they can buy from time to time for a drachma, at most, in the bookshops, and ridicule Socrates if he pretends that these

theories are his own, especially as they are so absurd? Is that, by Zeus, what you think of me, Meletus, that I do not believe that there are any gods? —

Meletus/ That is what I say, that you do not believe in the gods at all.

Socrates/ You cannot be believed, Meletus, even, I think, by yourself. The man appears to me, gentlemen of the jury, highly insolent and uncontrolled. He seems to have made this deposition out of insolence, violence and youthful zeal. He is like one who composed a riddle and is trying it out: "Will the wise Socrates realize that I am jesting and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and others?" I think he contradicts himself in the affidavit, as if he said: "Socrates is guilty of not believing in gods but believing in gods," and surely that is the part of a jester!

Examine with me, gentlemen, how he appears to contradict himself, and you, Meletus, answer us. Remember, gentlemen, what I asked you when I began, not to create a disturbance if I proceed in my usual manner.

Does any man, Meletus, believe in human activities who does not believe in humans? Make him answer, and not again and again create a disturbance. Does any man who does not believe in horses believe in horsemen's activities? Or in flute-playing activities but not in flute-players? No, my good sir, no man could. If you are not willing to answer, I will tell you and the jury. Answer the next question, however. Does any man believe in spiritual activities who does not believe in spirits? —

Meletus/ No one.

Socrates/ Thank you for answering, if reluctantly, when the jury made you. Now you say that I believe in spiritual things and teach about them, whether new or old, but at any rate spiritual things according to what you say, and to this

you have sworn in your deposition. But if I believe in spiritual things I must quite inevitably believe in spirits. Is that not so? It is indeed. I shall assume that you agree, as you do not answer. Do we not believe spirits to be either gods or the children of gods? Yes or no? —

Meletus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then since I do believe in spirits, as you admit, if spirits are gods, this is what I mean when I say you speak in riddles and in jest, as you state that I do not believe in gods and then again that I do, since I do believe in spirits. If on the other hand the spirits are children of the gods, bastard children of the gods by nymphs or some other mothers, as they are said to be, what man would believe children of the gods to exist, but not gods? That would be just as absurd as to believe the young of horses and asses, namely mules, to exist, but not to believe in the existence of horses and asses. You must have made this deposition, Meletus, either to test us or because you were at a loss to find any true wrongdoing of which to accuse me. There is no way in which you could persuade anyone of even small intelligence that it is possible for one and the same man to believe in spiritual but not also in divine things, and then again for that same man to believe neither in spirits nor in gods nor in heroes.

I do not think, gentlemen of the jury, that it requires a prolonged defense to prove that I am not guilty of the charges in Meletus' deposition, but this is sufficient. On the other hand, you know that what I said earlier is true, that I am very unpopular with many people. This will be my undoing, if I am undone, not Meletus or Anytus but the slanders and envy of many people. This has destroyed many other good men and will, I think, continue to do so. There is no danger that it will stop at me.

Someone might say: “Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have followed the kind of occupation that has led to your being now in danger of death?” However, I should be right to reply to him: “You are wrong, sir, if you think that a man who is any good at all should take into account the risk of life or death; he should look to this only in his actions, whether what he does is right or wrong, whether he is acting like a good or a bad man.” According to your view, all the heroes who died at Troy were inferior people, especially the son of Thetis who was so contemptuous of danger compared with disgrace. When he was eager to kill Hector, his goddess mother warned him, as I believe, in some such words as these: “My child, if you avenge the death of your comrade, Patroclus, and you kill Hector, you will die yourself, for your death is to follow immediately after Hector’s.” Hearing this, he despised death and danger and was much more afraid to live a coward who did not avenge his friends. “Let me die at once,” he said, “when once I have given the wrongdoer his deserts, rather than remain here, a laughingstock by the curved ships, a burden upon the earth.” Do you think he gave thought to death and danger?

This is the truth of the matter, gentlemen of the jury: wherever a man has taken a position that he believes to be best, or has been placed by his commander, there he must I think remain and face danger, without a thought for death or anything else, rather than disgrace. It would have been a dreadful way to behave, gentlemen of the jury, if, at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium, I had, at the risk of death, like anyone else, remained at my post where those you had elected to command had ordered me, and then, when the god ordered me, as I thought and believed, to live the life of a philosopher, to examine myself and others, I had abandoned my post for fear of death or anything else. That would have been a dreadful thing, and then I might truly have justly been brought here for not believing that there are gods, disobeying

the oracle, fearing death, and thinking I was wise when I was not. To fear death, gentlemen, is no other than to think oneself wise when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know. No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings for a man, yet men fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from the majority of men, and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge of things in the underworld, so I do not think I have. I do know, however, that it is wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey one's superior, be he god or man. I shall never fear or avoid things of which I do not know, whether they may not be good rather than things that I know to be bad. Even if you acquitted me now and did not believe Anytus, who said to you that either I should not have been brought here in the first place, or that now I am here, you cannot avoid executing me, for if I should be acquitted, your sons would practice the teachings of Socrates and all be thoroughly corrupted; if you said to me in this regard: "Socrates, we do not believe Anytus now; we acquit you, but only on condition that you spend no more time on this investigation and do not practice philosophy, and if you are caught doing so you will die;" if, as I say, you were to acquit me on those terms, I would say to you: "Gentlemen of the jury, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my usual way to point out to anyone of you whom I happen to meet: Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation and honors as possible, while you do not

care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?" Then, if one of you disputes this and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once or leave him, but I shall question him, examine him and test him, and if I do not think he has attained the goodness that he says he has, I shall reproach him because he attaches little importance to the most important things and greater importance to inferior things. I shall treat in this way anyone I happen to meet, young and old, citizen and stranger, and more so the citizens because you are more kindred to me. Be sure that this is what the god orders me to do, and I think there is no greater blessing for the city than my service to the god. For I go around doing nothing but persuading both young and old among you not to care for your body or your wealth in preference to or as strongly as for the best possible state of your soul, as I say to you: "Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and everything else good for men, both individually and collectively."

Now if by saying this I corrupt the young, this advice must be harmful, but if anyone says that I give different advice, he is talking nonsense. On this point I would say to you, gentlemen of the jury: "Whether you believe Anytus or not, whether you acquit me or not, do so on the understanding that this is my course of action, even if I am to face death many times." Do not create a disturbance, gentlemen, but abide by my request not to cry out at what I say but to listen, for I think it will be to your advantage to listen, and I am about to say other things at which you will perhaps cry out. By no means do this. Be sure that if you kill the sort of man I say I am, you will not harm me more than yourselves. Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me in any way; he could not harm me, for I do not think it is permitted that a better man be harmed by a worse; certainly he might kill me, or perhaps banish or disfranchise me, which he and maybe others think

to be great harm, but I do not think so. I think he is doing himself much greater harm doing what he is doing now, attempting to have a man executed unjustly. Indeed, gentlemen of the jury, I am far from making a defense now on my own behalf, as might be thought, but on yours, to prevent you from wrongdoing by mistreating the god's gift to you by condemning me; for if you kill me you will not easily find another like me. I was attached to this city by the god—though it seems a ridiculous thing to say—as upon a great and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of its size and needed to be stirred up by a kind of gadfly. It is to fulfill some such function that I believe the god has placed me in the city. I never cease to rouse each and every one of you, to persuade and reproach you all day long and everywhere I find myself in your company.

Another such man will not easily come to be among you, gentlemen, and if you believe me you will spare me. You might easily be annoyed with me as people are when they are aroused from a doze, and strike out at me; if convinced by Anytus you could easily kill me, and then you could sleep on for the rest of your days, unless the god, in his care for you, sent you someone else. That I am the kind of person to be a gift of the god to the city you might realize from the fact that it does not seem like human nature for me to have neglected all my own affairs and to have tolerated this neglect now for so many years while I was always concerned with you, approaching each one of you like a father or an elder brother to persuade you to care for virtue. Now if I profited from this by charging a fee for my advice, there would be some sense to it, but you can see for yourselves that, for all their shameless accusations, my accusers have not been able in their impudence to bring forward a witness to say that I have ever received a fee or ever asked for one. I, on the other hand, have a convincing witness that I speak the truth, my poverty.

It may seem strange that while I go around and give this advice privately and interfere in private affairs, I do not venture to go to the assembly and there advise the city. You have heard me give the reason for this in many places. I have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletus has ridiculed in his deposition. This began when I was a child. It is a voice, and whenever it speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do anything. This is what has prevented me from taking part in public affairs, and I think it was quite right to prevent me. Be sure, gentlemen of the jury, that if I had long ago attempted to take part in politics, I should have died long ago, and benefited neither you nor myself. Do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; no man will survive who genuinely opposes you or any other crowd and prevents the occurrence of many unjust and illegal happenings in the city. A man who really fights for justice must lead a private, not a public, life if he is to survive for even a short time.

I shall give you great proofs of this, not words but what you esteem, deeds. Listen to what happened to me, that you may know that I will not yield to any man contrary to what is right, for fear of death, even if I should die at once for not yielding. The things I shall tell you are commonplace and smack of the law-courts, but they are true. I have never held any other office in the city, but I served as a member of the Council, and our tribe Antiochis was presiding at the time when you wanted to try as a body the ten generals who had failed to pick up the survivors of the naval battle. This was illegal, as you all recognized later. I was the only member of the presiding committee to oppose your doing something contrary to the laws, and I voted against it. The orators were ready to prosecute me and take me away, and your shouts were egging them on, but I thought I should run any risk on the side of

law and justice rather than join you, for fear of prison or death, when you were engaged in an unjust course.

This happened when the city was still a democracy. When the oligarchy was established, the Thirty summoned me to the Hall, along with four others, and ordered us to bring Leon from Salamis, that he might be executed. They gave many such orders to many people, in order to implicate as many as possible in their guilt. Then I showed again, not in words but in action, that, if it were not rather vulgar to say so, death is something I couldn't care less about, but that my whole concern is not to do anything unjust or impious. That government, powerful as it was, did not frighten me into any wrongdoing. When we left the Hall, the other four went to Salamis and brought in Leon, but I went home. I might have been put to death for this, had not the government fallen shortly afterwards. There are many who will witness to these events.

Do you think I would have survived all these years if I were engaged in public affairs and, acting as a good man must, came to the help of justice and considered this the most important thing? Far from it, gentlemen of the jury, nor would any other man. Throughout my life, in any public activity I may have engaged in, I am the same man as I am in private life. I have never come to an agreement with anyone to act unjustly, neither with anyone else nor with anyone of those who they slanderously say are my pupils. I have never been anyone's teacher. If anyone, young or old, desires to listen to me when I am talking and dealing with my own concerns, I have never begrudged this to anyone, but I do not converse when I receive a fee and not when I do not. I am equally ready to question the rich and the poor if anyone is willing to answer my questions and listen to what I say. And I cannot justly be held responsible for the good or bad conduct of these people, as I never promised to teach them anything and have not done

so. If anyone says that he has learned anything from me, or that he heard anything privately that the others did not hear, be assured that he is not telling the truth.

Why then do some people enjoy spending considerable time in my company? You have heard why, gentlemen of the jury, I have told you the whole truth. They enjoy hearing those being questioned who think they are wise, but are not. And this is not unpleasant. To do this has, as I say, been enjoined upon me by the god, by means of oracles and dreams, and in every other way that a divine manifestation has ever ordered a man to do anything. This is true, gentlemen, and can easily be established.

If I corrupt some young men and have corrupted others, then surely some of them who have grown older and realized that I gave them bad advice when they were young should now themselves come up here to accuse me and avenge themselves. If they were unwilling to do so themselves, then some of their kindred, their fathers or brothers or other relations should recall it now if their family had been harmed by me. I see many of these present here, first Crito, my contemporary and fellow demesman, the father of Critobulus here; next Lysanias of Sphettus, the father of Aeschines here; also Antiphon the Cephisian, the father of Epigenes; and others whose brothers spent their time in this way; Nicostratus, the son of Theozotides, brother of Theodotus, and Theodotus has died so he could not influence him; Paralius here, son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages; there is Adeimantus, son of Ariston, brother of Plato here; Acantidorus, brother of Apollodorus here.

I could mention many others, some one of whom surely Meletus should have brought in as witness in his own speech. If he forgot to do so, then let him do it now; I will yield time if he has anything of the kind to say. You will find quite the contrary, gentlemen. These men are all ready to come to the

help of the corruptor, the man who has harmed their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus say. Now those who were corrupted might well have reason to help me, but the uncorrupted, their kindred who are older men, have no reason to help me except the right and proper one, that they know that Meletus is lying and that I am telling the truth.

Very well, gentlemen of the jury. This, and maybe other similar things, is what I have to say in my defense. Perhaps one of you might be angry as he recalls that when he himself stood trial on a less dangerous charge, he begged and implored the jury with many tears, that he brought his children and many of his friends and family into court to arouse as much pity as he could, but that I do none of these things, even though I may seem to be running the ultimate risk. Thinking of this, he might feel resentful toward me and, angry about this, cast his vote in anger. If there is such a one among you—I do not deem there is, but if there is—I think it would be right to say in reply: My good sir, I too have a household and, in Homer's phrase, I am not born "from oak or rock" but from men, so that I have a family, indeed three sons, gentlemen of the jury, of whom one is an adolescent while two are children. Nevertheless, I will not beg you to acquit me by bringing them here. Why do I do none of these things? Not through arrogance, gentlemen, nor through lack of respect for you. Whether I am brave in the face of death is another matter, but with regard to my reputation and yours and that of the whole city, it does not seem right to me to do these things, especially at my age and with my reputation. For it is generally believed, whether it be true or false, that in certain respects Socrates is superior to the majority of men. Now if those of you who are considered superior, be it in wisdom or courage or whatever other virtue makes them so, are seen behaving like that, it would be a disgrace. Yet I have often seen them do this sort of thing when standing trial, men

who are thought to be somebody, doing amazing things as if they thought it a terrible thing to die, and as if they were to be immortal if you did not execute them. I think these men bring shame upon the city so that a stranger, too, would assume that those who are outstanding in virtue among the Athenians, whom they themselves select from themselves to fill offices of state and receive other honors, are in no way better than women. You should not act like that, gentlemen of the jury, those of you who have any reputation at all, and if we do, you should not allow it. You should make it very clear that you will more readily convict a man who performs these pitiful dramatics in court and so makes the city a laughingstock, than a man who keeps quiet.

Quite apart from the question of reputation, gentlemen, I do not think it right to supplicate the jury and to be acquitted because of this, but to teach and persuade them. It is not the purpose of a juryman's office to give justice as a favor to whoever seems good to him, but to judge according to law, and this he has sworn to do. We should not accustom you to perjure yourselves, nor should you make a habit of it. This is irreverent conduct for either of us.

Do not deem it right for me, gentlemen of the jury, that I should act towards you in a way that I do not consider to be good or just or pious, especially, by Zeus, as I am being prosecuted by Meletus here for impiety; clearly, if I convinced you by my supplication to do violence to your oath of office, I would be teaching you not to believe that there are gods, and my defense would convict me of not believing in them. This is far from being the case, gentlemen, for I do believe in them as none of my accusers do. I leave it to you and the god to judge me in the way that will be best for me and for you.

[The jury now gives its verdict of guilty, and Meletus asks for the penalty of death.]

Socrates/ There are many other reasons for my not being angry with you for convicting me, gentlemen of the jury, and what happened was not unexpected. I am much more surprised at the number of votes cast on each side for I did not think the decision would be by so few votes but by a great many. As it is, a switch of only thirty votes would have acquitted me. I think myself that I have been cleared on Meletus' charges, and not only this, but it is clear to all that, if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him in accusing me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a fifth of the votes.

He assesses the penalty at death. So be it. What counter-assessment should I propose to you, gentlemen of the jury? Clearly it should be a penalty I deserve, and what do I deserve to suffer or to pay because I have deliberately not led a quiet life but have neglected what occupies most people: wealth, household affairs, the position of general or public orator or the other offices, the political clubs and factions that exist in the city? I thought myself too honest to survive if I occupied myself with those things. I did not follow that path that would have made me of no use either to you or to myself, but I went to each of you privately and conferred upon him what I say is the greatest benefit, by trying to persuade him not to care for any of his belongings before caring that he himself should be as good and as wise as possible, not to care for the city's possessions more than for the city itself, and to care for other things in the same way. What do I deserve for being such a man? Some good, gentlemen of the jury, if I must truly make an assessment according to my deserts, and something suitable. What is suitable for a poor benefactor who needs leisure to exhort you? Nothing is more suitable, gentlemen,

than for such a man to be fed in the Prytaneum much more suitable for him than for anyone of you who has won a victory at Olympia with a pair or a team of horses. The Olympian victor makes you think yourself happy; I make you be happy. Besides, he does not need food, but I do. So if I must make a just assessment of what I deserve, I assess it as this: free meals in the Prytaneum.

When I say this you may think, as when I spoke of appeals to pity and entreaties, that I speak arrogantly, but that is not the case, gentlemen of the jury; rather it is like this: I am convinced that I never willingly wrong anyone, but I am not convincing you of this, for we have talked together but a short time. If it were the law with us, as it is elsewhere, that a trial for life should not last one but many days, you would be convinced, but now it is not easy to dispel great slanders in a short time. Since I am convinced that I wrong no one, I am not likely to wrong myself, to say that I deserve some evil and to make some such assessment against myself. What should I fear? That I should suffer the penalty Meletus has assessed against me, of which I say I do not know whether it is good or bad? Am I then to choose in preference to this something that I know very well to be an evil and assess the penalty at that? Imprisonment? Why should I live in prison, always subjected to the ruling magistrates, the Eleven? A fine, and imprisonment until I pay it? That would be the same thing for me, as I have no money. Exile? for perhaps you might accept that assessment.

I should have to be inordinately fond of life, gentlemen of the jury, to be so unreasonable as to suppose that other men will easily tolerate my company and conversation when you, my fellow citizens, have been unable to endure them, but found them a burden and resented them so that you are now seeking to get rid of them. Far from it, gentlemen. It would be a fine life at my age to be driven out of one city after another,

for I know very well that wherever I go the young men will listen to my talk as they do here. If I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to drive me out; if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relations will drive me out on their behalf.

Perhaps someone might say: But Socrates, if you leave us will you not be able to live quietly, without talking? Now this is the most difficult point on which to convince some of you. If I say that it is impossible for me to keep quiet because that means disobeying the god, you will not believe me and will think I am being ironical. On the other hand, if I say that it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day and those other things about which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others, for the unexamined life is not worth living for men, you will believe me even less.

What I say is true, gentlemen, but it is not easy to convince you. At the same time, I am not accustomed to think that I deserve any penalty. If I had money, I would assess the penalty at the amount I could pay, for that would not hurt me, but I have none, unless you are willing to set the penalty at the amount I can pay, and perhaps I could pay you one mina of silver. So that is my assessment.

Plato here, gentlemen of the jury, and Crito and Critobulus and Apollodorus bid me put the penalty at thirty minae, and they will stand surety for the money. Well then, that is my assessment, and they will be sufficient guarantee of payment.

[The jury now votes again and sentences Socrates to death.]

Socrates/ It is for the sake of a short time, gentlemen of the jury, that you will acquire the reputation and the guilt, in the eyes of those who want to denigrate the city, of having killed Socrates, a wise man, for they who want to revile you will say

that I am wise even if I am not. If you had waited but a little while, this would have happened of its own accord. You see my age, that I am already advanced in years and close to death. I am saying this not to all of you but to those who condemned me to death, and to these same jurors I say: Perhaps you think that I was convicted for lack of such words as might have convinced you, if I thought I should say or do all I could to avoid my sentence. Far from it. I was convicted because I lacked not words but boldness and shamelessness and the willingness to say to you what you would most gladly have heard from me, lamentations and tears and my saying and doing many things that I say are unworthy of me but that you are accustomed to hear from others. I did not think then that the danger I ran should make me do anything mean, nor do I now regret the nature of my defense. I would much rather die after this kind of defense than live after making the other kind. Neither I nor any other man should, on trial or in war, contrive to avoid death at any cost. Indeed it is often obvious in battle that one could escape death by throwing away one's weapons and by turning to supplicate one's pursuers, and there are many ways to avoid death in every kind of danger if one will venture to do or say anything to avoid it. It is not difficult to avoid death, gentlemen of the jury, it is much more difficult to avoid wickedness, for it runs faster than death. Slow and elderly as I am, I have been caught by the slower pursuer, whereas my accusers, being clever and sharp, have been caught by the quicker, wickedness. I leave you now, condemned to death by you, but they are condemned by truth to wickedness and injustice. So I maintain my assessment, and they maintain theirs. This perhaps had to happen, and I think it is as it should be.

Now I want to prophesy to those who convicted me, for I am at the point when men prophesy most, when they are about to die. I say gentlemen, to those who voted to kill me, that

vengeance will come upon you immediately after my death, a vengeance much harder to bear than that which you took in killing me. You did this in the belief that you would avoid giving an account of your life, but I maintain that quite the opposite will happen to you. There will be more people to test you, whom I now held back, but you did not notice it. They will be more difficult to deal with as they will be younger and you will resent them more. You are wrong if you believe that by killing people you will prevent anyone from reproaching you for not living in the right way. To escape such tests is neither possible nor good, but it is best and easiest not to discredit others but to prepare oneself to be as good as possible. With this prophecy to you who convicted me, I part from you.

I should be glad to discuss what has happened with those who voted for my acquittal during the time that the officers of the court are busy and I do not yet have to depart to my death. So, gentlemen, stay with me awhile, for nothing prevents us from talking to each other while it is allowed. To you, as being my friends, I want to show the meaning of what has occurred. A surprising thing has happened to me, judges—you I would rightly call judges. At all previous times my familiar prophetic power, my spiritual manifestation, frequently opposed me, even in small matters, when I was about to do something wrong, but now that, as you can see for yourselves, I was faced with what one might think, and what is generally thought to be, the worst of evils, my divine sign has not opposed me, either when I left home at dawn, or when I came into court, or at any time that I was about to say something during my speech. Yet in other talks it often held me back in the middle of my speaking, but now it has opposed no word or deed of mine. What do I think is the reason for this? I will tell you. What has happened to me may well be a good thing, and those of us who believe death to be an evil are certainly mistaken. I have convincing proof of this, for it is impossible that my

familiar sign did not oppose me if I was not about to do what was right.

Let us reflect in this way, too, that there is good hope that death is a blessing, for it is one of two things: either the dead are nothing and have no perception of anything, or it is, as we are told, a change and a relocating for the soul from here to another place. If it is complete lack of perception, like a dreamless sleep, then death would be a great advantage. For I think that if one had to pick out that night during which a man slept soundly and did not dream, put beside it the other nights and days of his life, and then see how many days and nights had been better and more pleasant than that night, not only a private person but the great king would find them easy to count compared with the other days and nights. If death is like this I say it is an advantage, for all eternity would then seem to be no more than a single night. If, on the other hand, death is a change from here to another place, and what we are told is true and all who have died are there, what greater blessing could there be, gentlemen of the jury? If anyone arriving in Hades will have escaped from those who call themselves judges here, and will find those true judges who are said to sit in judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus and the other demi-gods who have been upright in their own life, would that be a poor kind of change? Again, what would one of you give to keep company with Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die many times if that is true. It would be a wonderful way for me to spend my time whenever I met Palamedes and Ajax, the son of Telamon, and any other of the men of old who died through an unjust conviction, to compare my experience with theirs. I think it would be pleasant. Most important, I could spend my time testing and examining people there, as I do here, as to who among them is wise, and who thinks he is, but is not.

What would one not give, gentlemen of the jury, for the opportunity to examine the man who led the great expedition against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, and innumerable other men and women one could mention. It would be an extraordinary happiness to talk with them, to keep company with them and examine them. In any case, they would certainly not put one to death for doing so. They are happier there than we are here in other respects, and for the rest of time they are deathless, if indeed what we are told is true.

You too must be of good hope as regards death, gentlemen of the jury, and keep this one truth in mind, that a good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death, and that his affairs are not neglected by the gods. What has happened to me now has not happened of itself, but it is clear to me that it was better for me to die now and to escape from trouble. That is why my divine sign did not oppose me at any point. So I am certainly not angry with those who convicted me, or with my accusers. Of course that was not their purpose when they accused and convicted me, but they thought they were hurting me, and for this they deserve blame. This much I ask from them: when my sons grow up, avenge yourselves by causing them the same kind of grief that I caused you, if you think they care for money or anything else more than they care for virtue, or if they think they are somebody when they are nobody. Reproach them as I reproach you, that they do not care for the right things and think they are worthy when they are not worthy of anything. If you do this, I shall have been justly treated by you, and my sons also.

Now the hour to part has come. I go to die, you go to live. Which of us goes to the better lot is known to no one, except the god.

Apology.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates; Meletus.

Socrates/ How you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accusers, I cannot tell; but I know that they almost made me forget who I was—so persuasively did they speak; and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. But of the many falsehoods told by them, there was one which quite amazed me; —I mean when they said that you should be upon your guard and not allow yourselves to be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To say this, when they were certain to be detected as soon as I opened my lips and proved myself to be anything but a great speaker, did indeed appear to me most shameless—unless by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth; for if such is their meaning, I admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have scarcely spoken the truth at all; but from me you shall hear the whole truth: not, however, delivered after their manner in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No, by heaven! but I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the moment; for I am confident in the justice of my cause: at my time of life I ought not to be appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the character of a juvenile orator—let no one expect it of me. And I must beg of you to grant me a favor: —If I defend myself in my accustomed manner, and you hear me using the words which I have been in the habit of using in the agora, at the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere else, I would ask you not to be surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. For I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first time in a court

of law, I am quite a stranger to the language of the place; and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his country: —Am I making an unfair request of you? Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good; but think only of the truth of my words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak truly and the judge decide justly.

And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers, and then I will go on to the later ones. For of old I have had many accusers, who have accused me falsely to you during many years; and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous, too, in their own way. But far more dangerous are the others, who began when you were children, and took possession of your minds with their falsehoods, telling of one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear the better cause. The disseminators of this tale are the accusers whom I dread; for their hearers are apt to fancy that such enquirers do not believe in the existence of the gods. And they are many, and their charges against me are of ancient date, and they were made by them in the days when you were more impressible than you are now—in childhood, or it may have been in youth—and the cause when heard went by default, for there was none to answer. And hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the names of my accusers; unless in the chance case of a Comic poet. All who from envy and malice have persuaded you—some of them having first convinced themselves—all this class of men are most difficult to deal with; for I cannot have them up here, and cross-examine them, and therefore I must simply fight with shadows in my own defense, and argue when there is no one who answers. I will ask you then to assume with me, as I

was saying, that my opponents are of two kinds; one recent, the other ancient: and I hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the latter first, for these accusations you heard long before the others, and much oftener.

Well, then, I must make my defense, and endeavor to clear away in a short time, a slander which has lasted a long time. May I succeed, if to succeed be for my good and yours, or likely to avail me in my cause! The task is not an easy one; I quite understand the nature of it. And so leaving the event with God, in obedience to the law I will now make my defense.

I will begin at the beginning, and ask what is the accusation which has given rise to the slander of me, and in fact has encouraged Meletus to prefer this charge against me. Well, what do the slanderers say? They shall be my prosecutors, and I will sum up their words in an affidavit: 'Socrates is an evil-doer, and a curious person, who searches into things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse appear the better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others.' Such is the nature of the accusation: it is just what you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes, who has introduced a man whom he calls Socrates, going about and saying that he walks in air, and talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of which I do not pretend to know either much or little—not that I mean to speak disparagingly of anyone who is a student of natural philosophy. I should be very sorry if Meletus could bring so grave a charge against me. But the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do with physical speculations. Very many of those here present are witnesses to the truth of this, and to them I appeal. Speak then, you who have heard me, and tell your neighbors whether any of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or in many upon such matters....You hear their

answer. And from what they say of this part of the charge you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest.

As little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher, and take money; this accusation has no more truth in it than the other. Although, if a man were really able to instruct mankind, to receive money for giving instruction would, in my opinion, be an honor to him. There is Gorgias of Leontium, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, who go the round of the cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leave their own citizens by whom they might be taught for nothing, and come to them whom they not only pay, but are thankful if they may be allowed to pay them. There is at this time a Parian philosopher residing in Athens, of whom I have heard; and I came to hear of him in this way: —I came across a man who has spent a world of money on the Sophists, Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and knowing that he had sons, I asked him: 'Callias,' I said, 'if your two sons were foals or calves, there would be no difficulty in finding someone to put over them; we should hire a trainer of horses, or a farmer probably, who would improve and perfect them in their own proper virtue and excellence; but as they are human beings, whom are you thinking of placing over them? Is there anyone who understands human and political virtue? You must have thought about the matter, for you have sons; is there anyone?' 'There is,' he said. 'Who is he?' said I; 'and of what country? and what does he charge?' 'Evenus the Parian,' he replied; 'he is the man, and his charge is five minae.' Happy is Evenus, I said to myself, if he really has this wisdom, and teaches at such a moderate charge. Had I the same, I should have been very proud and conceited; but the truth is that I have no knowledge of the kind.

I dare say, Athenians, that someone among you will reply, 'Yes, Socrates, but what is the origin of these accusations

which are brought against you; there must have been something strange which you have been doing? All these rumors and this talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, what is the cause of them, for we should be sorry to judge hastily of you.' Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I will endeavor to explain to you the reason why I am called wise and have such an evil fame. Please to attend then. And although some of you may think that I am joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as may perhaps be attained by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom, which I may fail to describe, because I have it not myself; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away my character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit; that witness shall be the God of Delphi—he will tell you about my wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. You must have known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the recent exile of the people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether—as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt—he asked the oracle to tell him whether anyone was wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered, that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of what I am saying.

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; that would be against his nature. After long consideration, I thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, 'Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest.' Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed him—his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination—and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and still wiser by himself; and thereupon I tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is, —for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to another who had still higher pretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the same. Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him.

Then I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity was laid upon me, —the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first. And I said to

myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians, by the dog I swear! —for I must tell you the truth—the result of my mission was just this: I found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish; and that others less esteemed were really wiser and better. I will tell you the tale of my wanderings and of the 'Herculean' labors, as I may call them, which I endured only to find at last the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And there, I said to myself, you will be instantly detected; now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them—thinking that they would teach me something. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them. The poets appeared to me to be much in the same case; and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in other things in which they were not wise. So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to them for the same reason that I was superior to the politicians.

At last I went to the artisans, for I was conscious that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine things; and here I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I observed that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets; —because they were good workmen they thought that they

also knew all sorts of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom; and therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or like them in both; and I made answer to myself and to the oracle that I was better off as I was.

This inquisition has led to my having many enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies. And I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient to the god, and search and make enquiry into the wisdom of anyone, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god.

There is another thing: —young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord; they like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to examine others; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me: This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth! —and then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practice

or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has been detected—which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are drawn up in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. And this is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians; Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such a mass of calumny all in a moment. And this, O men of Athens, is the truth and the whole truth; I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled nothing. And yet, I know that my plainness of speech makes them hate me, and what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth? —Hence has arisen the prejudice against me; and this is the reason of it, as you will find out either in this or in any future enquiry.

I have said enough in my defense against the first class of my accusers; I turn to the second class. They are headed by Meletus, that good man and true lover of his country, as he calls himself. Against these, too, I must try to make a defense: —Let their affidavit be read: it contains something of this kind: It says that Socrates is a doer of evil, who corrupts the youth; and who does not believe in the gods of the state, but has other new divinities of his own. Such is the charge; and now let us examine the particular counts. He says that I am a doer of evil, and corrupt the youth; but I say, O men of Athens, that Meletus is a doer of evil, in that

he pretends to be in earnest when he is only in jest, and is so eager to bring men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about matters in which he really never had the smallest interest. And the truth of this I will endeavor to prove to you.

Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. You think a great deal about the improvement of youth?

Meletus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you have taken the pains to discover their corrupter, and are citing and accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their improver is. — Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter? Speak up, friend, and tell us who their improver is.

Meletus/ The laws.

Socrates/ But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to know who the person is, who, in the first place, knows the laws.

Meletus/ The judges, Socrates, who are present in court.

Socrates/ What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and improve youth?

Meletus/ Certainly they are.

Socrates/ What, all of them, or some only and not others?

Meletus/ All of them.

Socrates/ By the goddess Herè, that is good news! There are plenty of improvers, then. And what do you say of the audience, —do they improve them?

Meletus/ Yes, they do.

Socrates/ And the senators?

Meletus/ Yes, the senators improve them.

Socrates/ But perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them? —or do they too improve them?

Meletus/ They improve them.

Socrates/ Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception of myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what you affirm?

Meletus/ That is what I stoutly affirm.

Socrates/ I am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose I ask you a question: How about horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world good? Is not the exact opposite the truth? One man is able to do them good, or at least not many; —the trainer of horses, that is to say, does them good, and others who have to do with them rather injure them? Is not that true, Meletus, of horses, or of any other animals? Most assuredly it is; whether you and Anytus say yes or no. Happy indeed would be the condition of youth if they had one corrupter only, and all the rest of the world were their improvers. But you, Meletus, have sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the young: your carelessness is seen in your not caring about the very things which you bring against me.

And now, Meletus, I will ask you another question—by Zeus I will: Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer, friend, I say; the question is one which may be easily answered. Do not the good do their neighbors good, and the bad do them evil?

Meletus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with him? Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to answer—does anyone like to be injured?

Meletus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?

Meletus/ Intentionally, I say.

Socrates/ But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbors good, and the evil do them evil. Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet I corrupt him, and intentionally, too—so you say, although neither I nor any other human being is ever likely to be convinced by you. But either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally; and on either view of the case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been better advised, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally—no doubt I should; but you would have nothing to say to me and refused to teach me. And now you bring me up in this court, which is a place not of instruction, but of punishment.

It will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was saying, that Meletus has no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But still I should like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young. I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead. These are the lessons by which I corrupt the youth, as you say.

Meletus/ Yes, that I say emphatically.

Socrates/ Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms,

what you mean! for I do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge some gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods, and am not an entire atheist—this you do not lay to my charge, —but only you say that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes—the charge is that they are different gods. Or, do you mean that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism?

Meletus/ I mean the latter—that you are a complete atheist.

Socrates/ What an extraordinary statement! Why do you think so, Meletus? Do you mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, like other men?

Meletus/ I assure you, judges, that he does not: for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth.

Socrates/ Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras: and you have but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them illiterate to such a degree as not to know that these doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, which are full of them. And so, forsooth, the youth are said to be taught them by Socrates, when there are not unfrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre (price of admission one drachma at the most); and they might pay their money, and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father these extraordinary views. And so, Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any god?

Meletus/ I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all.

Socrates/ Nobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am pretty sure that you do not believe yourself. I cannot help thinking, men of Athens, that Meletus is reckless and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. Has he not

compounded a riddle, thinking to try me? He said to himself: —I shall see whether the wise Socrates will discover my facetious contradiction, or whether I shall be able to deceive him and the rest of them. For he certainly does appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment as much as if he said that Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in them—but this is not like a person who is in earnest.

I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. And I must remind the audience of my request that they would not make a disturbance if I speak in my accustomed manner:

Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not of human beings?...I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, and not be always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing, and not in flute-players? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever did. But now please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in spiritual and divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?

Meletus/ He cannot.

Socrates/ How lucky I am to have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court! But then you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine or spiritual agencies (new or old, no matter for that); at any rate, I believe in spiritual agencies, —so you say and swear in the affidavit; and yet if I believe in divine beings, how can I help believing in spirits or demigods; —must I not? To be sure I must; and therefore I may assume that your silence gives consent. Now

what are spirits or demigods? are they not either gods or the sons of gods?

Meletus/ Certainly they are.

Socrates/ But this is what I call the facetious riddle invented by you: the demigods or spirits are gods, and you say first that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in demigods. For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the nymphs or by any other mothers, of whom they are said to be the sons—what human being will ever believe that there are no gods if they are the sons of gods? You might as well affirm the existence of mules, and deny that of horses and asses. Such nonsense, Meletus, could only have been intended by you to make trial of me. You have put this into the indictment because you had nothing real of which to accuse me. But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever be convinced by you that the same men can believe in divine and superhuman things, and yet not believe that there are gods and demigods and heroes.

I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus: any elaborate defense is unnecessary; but I know only too well how many are the enmities which I have incurred, and this is what will be my destruction if I am destroyed; —not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the world, which has been the death of many good men, and will probably be the death of many more; there is no danger of my being the last of them.

Someone will say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a course of life which is likely to bring you to an untimely end? To him I may fairly answer: There you are mistaken: a man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong—acting the part

of a good man or of a bad. Whereas, upon your view, the heroes who fell at Troy were not good for much, and the son of Thetis above all, who altogether despised danger in comparison with disgrace; and when he was so eager to slay Hector, his goddess mother said to him, that if he avenged his companion Patroclus, and slew Hector, he would die himself—'Fate,' she said, in these or the like words, 'waits for you next after Hector;' he, receiving this warning, utterly despised danger and death, and instead of fearing them, feared rather to live in dishonor, and not to avenge his friend. 'Let me die forthwith,' he replies, 'and be avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here by the beaked ships, a laughing-stock and a burden of the earth.' Had Achilles any thought of death and danger? For wherever a man's place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; he should not think of death or of anything but of disgrace. And this, O men of Athens, is a true saying.

Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, if I who, when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any other man, facing death—if now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfil the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death, fancying that I was wise when I was not wise. For the fear of death is indeed the pretense of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a pretense of knowing the unknown; and no one knows whether death, which men in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest

good. Is not this ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the ignorance which is the conceit that a man knows what he does not know? And in this respect only I believe myself to differ from men in general, and may perhaps claim to be wiser than they are: —that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonorable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. And therefore if you let me go now, and are not convinced by Anytus, who said that since I had been prosecuted I must be put to death; (or if not that I ought never to have been prosecuted at all); and that if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words—if you say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Anytus, and you shall be let off, but upon one condition, that you are not to enquire and speculate in this way anymore, and that if you are caught doing so again you shall die; —if this was the condition on which you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honor and love you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting anyone whom I meet and saying to him after my manner: You, my friend, —a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens, —are you not ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of money and honor and reputation, and caring so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all? And if the person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes, but I do care; then I do not leave him or let him go at once; but I proceed to interrogate and examine and cross-examine him, and if I think that he has no virtue in him, but only says that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less. And I shall repeat the same words to everyone whom I meet,

young and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren. For, know that this is the command of God; and I believe that no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue comes money and every other good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person. But if anyone says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not; but whichever you do, understand that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times.

Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there was an understanding between us that you should hear me to the end: I have something more to say, at which you may be inclined to cry out; but I believe that to hear me will be good for you, and therefore I beg that you will not cry out. I would have you know, that if you kill such an one as I am, you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me. Nothing will injure me, not Meletus nor yet Anytus—they cannot, for a bad man is not permitted to injure a better than himself. I do not deny that Anytus may, perhaps, kill him, or drive him into exile, or deprive him of civil rights; and he may imagine, and others may imagine, that he is inflicting a great injury upon him: but there I do not agree. For the evil of doing as he is doing—the evil of unjustly taking away the life of another—is greater far.

And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin

against the God by condemning me, who am his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by God; and the state is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state, and all day long and in places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, and therefore I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel out of temper (like a person who is suddenly awakened from sleep), and you think that you might easily strike me dead as Anytus advises, and then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless God in his care of you sent you another gadfly. When I say that I am given to you by God, the proof of my mission is this: —if I had been like other men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns or patiently seen the neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours, coming to you individually like a father or elder brother, exhorting you to regard virtue; such conduct, I say, would be unlike human nature. If I had gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in my doing so; but now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of anyone; of that they have no witness. And I have a sufficient witness to the truth of what I say—my poverty.

Someone may wonder why I go about in private giving advice and busying myself with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward in public and advise the state. I will tell you why. You have heard me speak at sundry times and in divers places of an oracle or sign which comes to me, and is the divinity which Meletus ridicules in the

indictment. This sign, which is a kind of voice, first began to come to me when I was a child; it always forbids but never commands me to do anything which I am going to do. This is what deters me from being a politician. And rightly, as I think. For I am certain, O men of Athens, that if I had engaged in politics, I should have perished long ago, and done no good either to you or to myself. And do not be offended at my telling you the truth: for the truth is, that no man who goes to war with you or any other multitude, honestly striving against the many lawless and unrighteous deeds which are done in a state, will save his life; he who will fight for the right, if he would live even for a brief space, must have a private station and not a public one.

I can give you convincing evidence of what I say, not words only, but what you value far more—actions. Let me relate to you a passage of my own life which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to injustice from any fear of death, and that 'as I should have refused to yield' I must have died at once. I will tell you a tale of the courts, not very interesting perhaps, but nevertheless true. The only office of state which I ever held, O men of Athens, was that of senator: the tribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, had the presidency at the trial of the generals who had not taken up the bodies of the slain after the battle of Arginusae; and you proposed to try them in a body, contrary to law, as you all thought afterwards; but at the time I was the only one of the Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my vote against you; and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest me, and you called and shouted, I made up my mind that I would run the risk, having law and justice with me, rather than take part in your injustice because I feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the days of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power, they sent for me and four others into the rotunda,

and bade us bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, as they wanted to put him to death. This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were always giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their crimes; and then I showed, not in word only but in deed, that, if I may be allowed to use such an expression, I cared not a straw for death, and that my great and only care was lest I should do an unrighteous or unholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong; and when we came out of the rotunda the other four went to Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might have lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. And many will witness to my words.

Now do you really imagine that I could have survived all these years, if I had led a public life, supposing that like a good man I had always maintained the right and had made justice, as I ought, the first thing? No indeed, men of Athens, neither I nor any other man. But I have been always the same in all my actions, public as well as private, and never have I yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed my disciples, or to any other. Not that I have any regular disciples. But if anyone likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my mission, whether he be young or old, he is not excluded. Nor do I converse only with those who pay; but anyone, whether he be rich or poor, may ask and answer me and listen to my words; and whether he turns out to be a bad man or a good one, neither result can be justly imputed to me; for I never taught or professed to teach him anything. And if anyone says that he has ever learned or heard anything from me in private which all the world has not heard, let me tell you that he is lying.

But I shall be asked, Why do people delight in continually conversing with you? I have told you already, Athenians, the

whole truth about this matter: they like to hear the cross-examination of the pretenders to wisdom; there is amusement in it. Now this duty of cross-examining other men has been imposed upon me by God; and has been signified to me by oracles, visions, and in every way in which the will of divine power was ever intimated to anyone. This is true, O Athenians; or, if not true, would be soon refuted. If I am or have been corrupting the youth, those of them who are now grown up and have become sensible that I gave them bad advice in the days of their youth should come forward as accusers, and take their revenge; or if they do not like to come themselves, some of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kinsmen, should say what evil their families have suffered at my hands. Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito, who is of the same age and of the same deme with myself, and there is Critobulus his son, whom I also see. Then again there is Lysanias of Sphettus, who is the father of Aeschines—he is present; and also there is Antiphon of Cephisus, who is the father of Epigenes; and there are the brothers of several who have associated with me. There is Nicostratus the son of Theosdotides, and the brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus himself is dead, and therefore he, at any rate, will not seek to stop him); and there is Paralus the son of Demodocus, who had a brother Theages; and Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is present; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I also see. I might mention a great many others, some of whom Meletus should have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech; and let him still produce them, if he has forgotten—I will make way for him. And let him say, if he has any testimony of the sort which he can produce. Nay, Athenians, the very opposite is the truth. For all these are ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter, of the injurer of their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call

me; not the corrupted youth only—there might have been a motive for that—but their uncorrupted elder relatives. Why should they too support me with their testimony? Why, indeed, except for the sake of truth and justice, and because they know that I am speaking the truth, and that Meletus is a liar.

Well, Athenians, this and the like of this is all the defense which I have to offer. Yet a word more. Perhaps there may be someone who is offended at me, when he calls to mind how he himself on a similar, or even a less serious occasion, prayed and entreated the judges with many tears, and how he produced his children in court, which was a moving spectacle, together with a host of relations and friends; whereas I, who am probably in danger of my life, will do none of these things. The contrast may occur to his mind, and he may be set against me, and vote in anger because he is displeased at me on this account. Now if there be such a person among you, —mind, I do not say that there is, —to him I may fairly reply: My friend, I am a man, and like other men, a creature of flesh and blood, and not 'of wood or stone,' as Homer says; and I have a family, yes, and sons, O Athenians, three in number, one almost a man, and two others who are still young; and yet I will not bring any of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why not? Not from any self-assertion or want of respect for you. Whether I am or am not afraid of death is another question, of which I will not now speak. But, having regard to public opinion, I feel that such conduct would be discreditable to myself, and to you, and to the whole state. One who has reached my years, and who has a name for wisdom, ought not to demean himself. Whether this opinion of me be deserved or not, at any rate the world has decided that Socrates is in some way superior to other men. And if those among you who are said to be superior in wisdom and

courage, and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way, how shameful is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation, when they have been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner: they seemed to fancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died, and that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live; and I think that such are a dishonor to the state, and that any stranger coming in would have said of them that the most eminent men of Athens, to whom the Athenians themselves give honor and command, are no better than women. And I say that these things ought not to be done by those of us who have a reputation; and if they are done, you ought not to permit them; you ought rather to show that you are far more disposed to condemn the man who gets up a doleful scene and makes the city ridiculous, than him who holds his peace.

But, setting aside the question of public opinion, there seems to be something wrong in asking a favor of a judge, and thus procuring an acquittal, instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is, not to make a present of justice, but to give judgment; and he has sworn that he will judge according to the laws, and not according to his own good pleasure; and we ought not to encourage you, nor should you allow yourselves to be encouraged, in this habit of perjury—there can be no piety in that. Do not then require me to do what I consider dishonorable and impious and wrong, especially now, when I am being tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and in defending should simply convict myself of the charge of not believing in them. But that is not so—far otherwise. For I do believe that there are gods, and in a sense higher than that in which any of my accusers believe in

them. And to you and to God I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best for you and me.

There are many reasons why I am not grieved, O men of Athens, at the vote of condemnation. I expected it, and am only surprised that the votes are so nearly equal; for I had thought that the majority against me would have been far larger; but now, had thirty votes gone over to the other side, I should have been acquitted. And I may say, I think, that I have escaped Meletus. I may say more; for without the assistance of Anytus and Lycon, anyone may see that he would not have had a fifth part of the votes, as the law requires, in which case he would have incurred a fine of a thousand drachmae.

And so he proposes death as the penalty. And what shall I propose on my part, O men of Athens? Clearly that which is my due. And what is my due? What return shall be made to the man who has never had the wit to be idle during his whole life; but has been careless of what the many care for—wealth, and family interests, and military offices, and speaking in the assembly, and magistracies, and plots, and parties. Reflecting that I was really too honest a man to be a politician and live, I did not go where I could do no good to you or to myself; but where I could do the greatest good privately to every one of you, thither I went, and sought to persuade every man among you that he must look to himself, and seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to his private interests, and look to the state before he looks to the interests of the state; and that this should be the order which he observes in all his actions. What shall be done to such an one? Doubtless some good thing, O men of Athens, if he has his reward; and the good should be of a kind suitable to him. What would be a reward suitable to a poor man who is your benefactor, and who desires leisure that he

may instruct you? There can be no reward so fitting as maintenance in the Prytaneum, O men of Athens, a reward which he deserves far more than the citizen who has won the prize at Olympia in the horse or chariot race, whether the chariots were drawn by two horses or by many. For I am in want, and he has enough; and he only gives you the appearance of happiness, and I give you the reality. And if I am to estimate the penalty fairly, I should say that maintenance in the Prytaneum is the just return.

Perhaps you think that I am braving you in what I am saying now, as in what I said before about the tears and prayers. But this is not so. I speak rather because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged anyone although I cannot convince you—the time has been too short; if there were a law at Athens, as there is in other cities, that a capital cause should not be decided in one day, then I believe that I should have convinced you. But I cannot in a moment refute great slanders; and, as I am convinced that I never wronged another, I will assuredly not wrong myself. I will not say of myself that I deserve any evil, or propose any penalty. Why should I? Because I am afraid of the penalty of death which Meletus proposes? When I do not know whether death is a good or an evil, why should I propose a penalty which would certainly be an evil? Shall I say imprisonment? And why should I live in prison and be the slave of the magistrates of the year—of the Eleven? Or shall the penalty be a fine, and imprisonment until the fine is paid? There is the same objection. I should have to lie in prison, for money I have none, and cannot pay. And if I say exile (and this may possibly be the penalty which you will affix), I must indeed be blinded by the love of life, if I am so irrational as to expect that when you, who are my own citizens, cannot endure my discourses and words, and have found them so grievous and odious that you will have no more of them, others are likely

to endure me. No indeed, men of Athens, that is not very likely. And what a life should I lead, at my age, wandering from city to city, ever changing my place of exile, and always being driven out! For I am quite sure that wherever I go, there, as here, the young men will flock to me; and if I drive them away, their elders will drive me out at their request; and if I let them come, their fathers and friends will drive me out for their sakes.

Someone will say: Yes, Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue, and then you may go into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with you? Now I have great difficulty in making you understand my answer to this. For if I tell you that to do as you say would be a disobedience to the God, and therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, you will not believe that I am serious; and if I say again that daily to discourse about virtue, and of those other things about which you hear me examining myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you are still less likely to believe me. Yet I say what is true, although a thing of which it is hard for me to persuade you. Also, I have never been accustomed to think that I deserve to suffer any harm. Had I money I might have estimated the offence at what I was able to pay, and not have been much the worse. But I have none, and therefore I must ask you to proportion the fine to my means. Well, perhaps I could afford a mina, and therefore I propose that penalty: Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, my friends here, bid me say thirty minae, and they will be the sureties. Let thirty minae be the penalty; for which sum they will be ample security to you.

Not much time will be gained, O Athenians, in return for the evil name which you will get from the detractors of the city, who will say that you killed Socrates, a wise man; for

they will call me wise, even although I am not wise, when they want to reproach you. If you had waited a little while, your desire would have been fulfilled in the course of nature. For I am far advanced in years, as you may perceive, and not far from death. I am speaking now not to all of you, but only to those who have condemned me to death. And I have another thing to say to them: You think that I was convicted because I had no words of the sort which would have procured my acquittal—I mean, if I had thought fit to leave nothing undone or unsaid. Not so; the deficiency which led to my conviction was not of words—certainly not. But I had not the boldness or impudence or inclination to address you as you would have liked me to do, weeping and wailing and lamenting, and saying and doing many things which you have been accustomed to hear from others, and which, as I maintain, are unworthy of me. I thought at the time that I ought not to do anything common or mean when in danger: nor do I now repent of the style of my defense; I would rather die having spoken after my manner, than speak in your manner and live. For neither in war nor yet at law ought I or any man to use every way of escaping death. Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man will throw away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pursuers, he may escape death; and in other dangers there are other ways of escaping death, if a man is willing to say and do anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not to avoid death, but to avoid unrighteousness; for that runs faster than death. I am old and move slowly, and the slower runner has overtaken me, and my accusers are keen and quick, and the faster runner, who is unrighteousness, has overtaken them. And now I depart hence condemned by you to suffer the penalty of death, —they too go their ways condemned by the truth to suffer the penalty of villainy and wrong; and I must abide by my award—let them abide by theirs. I suppose that these

things may be regarded as fated, —and I think that they are well.

And now, O men who have condemned me, I would fain prophesy to you; for I am about to die, and in the hour of death men are gifted with prophetic power. And I prophesy to you who are my murderers, that immediately after my departure punishment far heavier than you have inflicted on me will surely await you. Me you have killed because you wanted to escape the accuser, and not to give an account of your lives. But that will not be as you suppose: far otherwise. For I say that there will be more accusers of you than there are now; accusers whom hitherto I have restrained: and as they are younger they will be more inconsiderate with you, and you will be more offended at them. If you think that by killing men you can prevent someone from censuring your evil lives, you are mistaken; that is not a way of escape which is either possible or honorable; the easiest and the noblest way is not to be disabling others, but to be improving yourselves. This is the prophecy which I utter before my departure to the judges who have condemned me.

Friends, who would have acquitted me, I would like also to talk with you about the thing which has come to pass, while the magistrates are busy, and before I go to the place at which I must die. Stay then a little, for we may as well talk with one another while there is time. You are my friends, and I should like to show you the meaning of this event which has happened to me. O my judges—for you I may truly call judges—I should like to tell you of a wonderful circumstance. Hitherto the divine faculty of which the internal oracle is the source has constantly been in the habit of opposing me even about trifles, if I was going to make a slip or error in any matter; and now as you see there has come upon me that which may be thought, and is generally believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of

opposition, either when I was leaving my house in the morning, or when I was on my way to the court, or while I was speaking, at anything which I was going to say; and yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech, but now in nothing I either said or did touching the matter in hand has the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be the explanation of this silence? I will tell you. It is an intimation that what has happened to me is a good, and that those of us who think that death is an evil are in error. For the customary sign would surely have opposed me had I been going to evil and not to good.

Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to hope that death is a good; for one of two things—either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in which his sleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to compare with this the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more pleasantly than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a private man, but even the great king will not find many such days or nights, when compared with the others. Now if death be of such a nature, I say that to die is gain; for eternity is then only a single night. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead abide, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and

Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. I myself, too, shall have a wonderful interest in there meeting and conversing with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other ancient hero who has suffered death through an unjust judgment; and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall then be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also in the next; and I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions! In another world they do not put a man to death for asking questions: assuredly not. For besides being happier than we are, they will be immortal, if what is said is true.

Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know of a certainty, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that the time had arrived when it was better for me to die and be released from trouble; wherefore the oracle gave no sign. For which reason, also, I am not angry with my condemners, or with my accusers; they have done me no harm, although they did not mean to do me any good; and for this I may gently blame them.

Still I have a favor to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have troubled you,

if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something when they are really nothing, —then reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when they are really nothing. And if you do this, both I and my sons will have received justice at your hands.

The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die, and you to live. Which is better God only knows.

The Judgment Of Socrates.

The Apology.

Translated by Paul Elmer More.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates; Meletus.

Socrates/ How you have felt, O men of Athens, while my accusers were speaking, I cannot tell; as for myself, I almost forgot who I was, so persuasive were their words, although, if I may say it, not a single word they spoke was true. But of all their falsehoods this one amazed me most, that they should dare to bid you be on your guard against me and not be deceived by my skillful pleading; for they must have known that their falsehood would be exposed the moment I opened my mouth and showed myself the owner of no such skill at all. Really this must have been mere wanton insolence on their part, unless indeed they call a man eloquent who simply speaks the truth. If that is their meaning, I might confess myself an orator—only not after the manner of these men, for in their words there was no truth at all, whereas in mine you shall hear the truth and the whole truth. Do not then expect from me, Athenians, an elaborate oration like theirs, decked out and daintily adorned with fine phrases—God forbid. You shall hear whatever language comes uppermost, for I trust that what I am going to say is right and just, and that is sufficient; let no one expect anything else. Neither would it be seemly at my time of life to come before you with cunningly prepared phrases like a young man. But this one thing above all I ask and beg of you, men of Athens: if you hear me defending myself with the same sort of words I have always used about the money-changers' tables in the market-place, where many of you have heard me talk, or anywhere else, do not

be surprised at this and do not interrupt me. The simple fact is, this is the first time I have ever appeared in a law-court, although I am now seventy years old; and consequently I am a complete stranger to the language of the place. You would readily have patience with me if I were really a foreigner and spoke after the language and fashion of the land where I grew up; and now in the same way I may claim the privilege, I think, of asking you to overlook my manner of speech—it might be better and it might be worse—and to mark this and fix your minds on this question alone, whether what I say is justified by the facts or not. For this is the judge's office, as the orator's is to speak the truth.

In the first place, then, it behooves me, O men of Athens, to answer first the old lying charges against me and my earlier accusers, and after that these later ones. For I have had many accusers before you now these many years, whose slanders have gained strength with age, and whom I fear more than Anytus and his accomplices, although these, too, may well fill me with alarm. But those are the more dangerous who began to instill their slanders in your ears when you were children, and taught you that there is one Socrates, a philosopher, who speculates about the heavens above, and pries into the earth beneath, and makes the worse appear the better cause. These men, Athenians, who have scattered abroad rumors like this, are my serious accusers. Their hearers are only too quick to fancy that all speculators of the kind are natural atheists. Besides that, these accusers are many and their charges are of long standing: they began with you in childhood, or in youth, perhaps, when the mind is quick to believe; and the case went against me by default, there being none to answer. And strangest of all, it is impossible to know even their names and tell you who they are—unless it be perhaps some comic poet. And how shall I deal with those who have won your

ears through sheer envy and malignity, and with those, too, who first honestly convinced themselves and then persuaded others? I cannot summon anyone of them here before you and confute him, but I must make my defense as a man fights with shadows, and question when there is none to answer. —Well, as I was saying, you are to understand that I have two sets of accusers, —those who have brought the present indictment against me, and others of older date whom I have just mentioned. You will understand also why I turn to these ancient accusers first, since you heard their charges first and much oftener, too, than the recent charges. Very well, gentlemen, you shall hear my apology. In this brief time allotted me I must endeavor to overcome your long-standing prejudices. Gladly would I prosper in my attempt and come out well from my defense, if it were better for you and for me. The task is not easy, nay, I know too well how hard it is; yet be the issue as God wills, it is mine to obey the law and render my apology.

Let us go back to the beginning and see from what accusation arose the calumnies which now embolden Meletus to bring forward his indictment. How have these backbiters been slandering me? Let us read their affidavit as if they accused me legally: "Socrates is an evil-doer and a busybody who investigates what is beneath the earth and above in the heavens, who makes the worse appear the better cause, and imparts these notions to others."—Such is the accusation; and you yourselves have seen in the comedy of Aristophanes how one Socrates is exhibited swung about in a basket, declaring that he treads the air and uttering a deal of nonsense regarding things of which I have no knowledge at all. I do not mean to speak in contempt of such knowledge, if there be anyone really wise in these matters—may no Meletus, I pray, bring such a charge against me—I merely say, Athenians, that I myself have nothing to do with

them. Most of you who are present here will confirm me in this: many of you are familiar with my mode of talking, and I may call on you to testify for me to your neighbors; tell them now whether anyone of you ever heard me say anything whatsoever, in few words or many, about these matters. From this you may assume that the other stories current about me are of the same fabrication.

And furthermore if you have heard anyone assert that I undertake to give instruction and demand fees, this is equally false. Yet I am ready to admit such a course would be perfectly honorable if one were really able to give instruction, —like Gorgias of Leontini, for instance, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, each of whom travels about from city to city and cunningly persuades the young men to leave their fellow townsmen whose instruction they might have quite freely and without price, and to follow after the new master at considerable cost and with gratitude besides. There is another of these philosophers, a Parian, who, I understand, is in the city at this moment. I heard of him from a man who has probably spent more money on these sophists than anybody else in the world, —I mean Callias, the son of Hipponicus. Happening to fall in with him one day, I began to question him about his two sons: "Callias," said I, "if your two boys were only foals or calves, we should know well enough where to hire a master who would train them so as to bring out their best qualities; some horse-breeder or farmer would serve our purpose. But now, seeing they are men, what master have you in mind for them? Do you know anyone who has made a science of bringing out the qualities necessary to a man and a citizen? No doubt you have looked into the matter on account of these sons of yours. Is there any such master?" "To be sure there is," he replied. "Who," said I, "and whence does he hail, and what is his fee?" "Evenus, the Parian, my Socrates; and

he charges five minae." Happy Evenus, thought I to myself, if he in sooth possesses this art and teaches so reasonably. How I should plume myself, and how conceited I should be, if I had this wisdom. But alas, Athenians, I have it not.

Perhaps someone may retort: But, Socrates, what have you done then? Why have all these calumnies sprung up against you? For unless you had shown yourself a busybody in some way or other and had acted differently from other people, surely all this talk and rumor would never have got about. We do not wish to judge you unadvisedly; tell us the whole story. —Now this seems to me a fair request, and I will try to explain how I came by such an ill-omened name. Hear me out; I mean to tell the whole truth, though to some of you it will sound like a tale told in jest. The fact is, men of Athens, I got this name because of a sort of wisdom in me and for no other reason. What sort of wisdom, you ask? Well, it might be called strictly human wisdom, for really I may claim a share of that. These philosophers I mentioned just now possibly possess some wisdom of a higher sort, something superhuman—I hardly know how to name it, for I myself have no part in it, and who ever says I have lies and utters a slander. I beg you, Athenians, do not cry out if I appear to speak boastfully; the word I shall speak, however it sound, is not of me but of a greater, and he who uttered it is worthy of credence. Of this wisdom of mine, if so be I have any, and of its nature, I offer to you as witness the god who abides at Delphi. Chaerephon you certainly know. He was my friend from youth up; he was a friend of the people, too, following you in the recent exile and returning with you. You know the man, how eager he was in all his ventures. Well, Chaerephon once took upon himself to go to Delphi and inquire of the oracle there—now I beseech you, Athenians, hear me quietly; he inquired of the oracle whether there was anyone wiser than I, and the Pythian priestess declared there was none

wiser. He himself is dead, but his brother is present to-day and will testify to these things.

Perhaps you may wonder why I relate this story: it is because I am going to show you how the calumnies rose against me. For when the oracle was brought to me, I began to ask myself, What does the god mean, and what is the reading of his riddle? Certainly so far as I know myself I am not conscious of being wise in any matter great or small. What, then, does he mean by calling me the wisest? At any rate he does not lie, for that were contrary to his nature. — So for a long while I was in doubt about the oracle, until at length I bethought me of the following method of testing it. I went straight to one of our reputed wise men, thinking that here, if anywhere, I should be able to refute the oracle and say to the god, Look you! this man is wiser than I, and yet you call me wisest. Well, I examined this man (never mind his name, but my first adventure was with one of our politicians) and conversed with him, and it soon became apparent that to many people and most of all to himself he seemed quite wise, whereas in truth he was not so at all. Thereupon I undertook to show him how he was wise in opinion only and not in reality; but I only made myself a nuisance to him and to many of those about him. So I went away reflecting that at least I was wiser than this man. Neither of us apparently knows anything much worthwhile, but he in his ignorance thinks he knows, whereas I neither know nor think I know. Surely I may claim a little more of wisdom than he, in so far as I do not think I know what I do not know. After this I approached one whose character for wisdom was still higher, but with no different result; I only gained the ill will of him and a host of others.

So I went from one to another in succession, perceiving all the while that I was but making enemies, sorrowing and fearing, and yet compelled, as it were, to honor the god above

all things and to prove his oracle by approaching all who were reputed to have any knowledge. And I swear by the dog, O men of Athens—for I must declare the truth—I swear that this was all my profit. Searching by command of the god, I found that those who had the greatest renown for wisdom were in general the most lacking of all, whereas others of no reputation were really the better and wiser men. But let me narrate my wanderings in detail and the labors I endured, like a second Heracles, to confirm the oracle to my own mind. After the politicians I went to the poets, tragic, dithyrambic, and what not, making sure that in comparison with these I should detect myself in the very act of folly. I took their own poems which they had apparently elaborated with the greatest care, and with these in my hand proceeded to ask the authors what they signified, expecting, of course, to pick up some curious information at the same time. I am ashamed to tell you the truth, my friends, and yet it must out. Will you believe me, almost anyone here in this court would speak more intelligently about these works than the authors themselves. I very soon learned of the poets that they compose not by wisdom but by a certain inspiration and gift of nature, like diviners and soothsayers, who in the same way utter many noble sentiments, yet understand nothing of what they say. Such appeared to be the state of the poets; yet I perceived that deluded by their poetic genius they deemed themselves the wisest of men in other matters also, wherein they were nothing. So I gave up the poets too, thinking I surpassed them in the same way as the politicians.

Finally I went to the artisans. Here at least I had no knowledge at all, and I was sure to find these men skilled in many noble crafts. And in this I was not deceived; they knew what I did not know and in so far were wiser than I. Nevertheless these excellent artisans, as I discovered, had

the same weakness as the poets: because they wrought well in their own craft, every one of them deemed himself most wise in other weighty matters; and this error went far to obscure their real wisdom. Come, then, I said to myself, in behalf of the oracle, will you be content with your present lot, being neither wise in the wisdom of these men nor foolish in their folly, or would you choose their dubious state? And immediately I answered to myself and to the oracle that it was better for me as I am.

From this investigation, O men of Athens, many enmities sprang up against me, such as are grievous and dangerous, and such as gave birth to a host of slanders; from thence, too, arose the name I had of being wise. Those who are present always take it for granted that I myself am wise in those things wherein I expose the ignorance of others. But the truth would seem to be, O Athenians, that God alone is really wise, and this he sets forth in the oracle, signifying that human wisdom is worth little or nothing at all. Neither doth he care aught for Socrates, but merely employed my name, using me as an illustration, as if to say: Hear, all ye men! he is wisest among you who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is of nothing worth. —And I even to this day go about seeking as the god wills, and am ever on the scent, if perchance any citizen or stranger may appear to me truly wise. And when he proves other than wise, then, in vindication of the god, I expose the man's ignorance. And by reason of this task laid upon me. I have no leisure for the important affairs of state and home, but live always in utter poverty as a servant of the god.

In addition to this, many young men from our wealthy families, who have nothing else to do, flock after me unbidden and take delight in hearing my cross-questionings. Indeed, they often imitate me, trying their wit at refuting others; and I dare say they find plenty of men

ready at hand who pretend to know, but really know little or nothing at all. Straightway these pretenders, on being exposed, fall into a rage against me, instead of blaming themselves, and call down curses on this Socrates who is corrupting our young men. And when they are asked what this Socrates does and teaches, they are at a loss, having nothing to say; and so they try to cover up their confusion by repeating the old trumpery charges against the whole body of philosophers about things in heaven and beneath the earth, you know, and atheism, and making the worse appear the better cause. They are not likely to confess the truth, that they have been detected in assuming knowledge which they never had. These men are self-important and revengeful and numerous, and so, I think, with their loud and overbearing words they have dinned these ancient and bitter slanders into your ears. No doubt this is why Meletus and Anytus and Lycon have set upon me, —Meletus having a grudge against me on the part of the poets, Anytus of the artisans, and Lycon of the orators. It would be a wonder, then, as I remarked at the beginning, if in the brief time allotted me I should be able to root out of your minds this calumny now grown so huge. This is the very truth, O men of Athens, and I speak before you, nothing concealing, whether great or small, nothing dissimulating. Yet I know well enough that I but increase the hatred towards me by my frankness; and this is a proof, if need be, that my words are true, and a witness to the slander of my life and the causes thereof. Examine the matter now or later at your leisure; you will find it thus.

And now sufficient has been said in regard to those earlier enemies and their charges; I will proceed in my defense against Meletus—that worthy patriot as he calls himself—and my recent accusers. Let us treat them as new plaintiffs and read their affidavit anew. So it runs: Socrates is an evil-

doer and corrupter of the youth, who denies the gods of the city, and introduces strange daemonic powers of his own. Such is the accusation; let us examine it point by point. It asserts that I am an evil-doer and corrupter of the youth; but I, O Athenians, assert that this Meletus is an evil-doer; for see how he jests in so serious an affair, thoughtlessly dragging men into court, and affecting to be serious and solicitous about matters for which he never cared a whit. No, I am not misrepresenting him, as you shall see for yourselves.

Now, Meletus, speak up and answer me. Of course you are highly concerned that our young men shall turn out for the best?

Meletus/ I am.

Socrates/ Very good; now inform these gentlemen who it is improves them. You must certainly know, since you make this your business. Having tracked down their corrupter, as you say, you summon me hither and lodge a complaint. Now, then, speak out and declare to the court who it is improves them. What, Meletus, you are silent and have nothing to say? Yet isn't your silence a little disgraceful now, and even a good proof of my taunt that you do not care a straw for these things? Nay, tell us, my good Sir, who it is improves them.

Meletus/ The laws.

Socrates/ I didn't ask about them, my dear Sir; but first of all, who is the man that knows the laws?

Meletus/ The men before you, Socrates, the judges.

Socrates/ What's this you say, Meletus? Are these men capable of instructing and improving the youth?

Meletus/ So I said.

Socrates/ Do you mean all of them, or only part?

Meletus/ All of them.

Socrates/ Well said, by the goddess Hera, and a mighty abundance of helpers for our youth! And what follows? Do the gentlemen of the audience yonder improve them?

Meletus/ They do.

Socrates/ And the senators, too?

Meletus/ Yes, and the senators.

Socrates/ Well, then, Meletus, perhaps those who sit in the great assembly corrupt the youth; or do all of these, too, improve them?

Meletus/ Yes, these, too.

Socrates/ Why, then, it should seem that all the Athenians train our young men to be good and honorable—except me; I alone spread corruption. Is this your meaning?

Meletus/ It is precisely what I mean.

Socrates/ Alas, you lay a great evil at my door. But tell me: in the case of horses, is it your opinion that all the world can improve them, while only one man injures? On the contrary, isn't it true that one particular man, or perhaps some few men, horse-men by profession, improve them, whereas most people who meddle with horses really spoil them? Isn't this the case, Meletus, with horses and all kinds of creatures? Indeed it is, no matter whether you and Anytus say yes or no. And it would be a great and strange blessing for our youth if only one man spread corruption and all the rest of the world helped them. Really, Meletus, you prove sufficiently well that our young men have never given you a care; and you set forth your own heedlessness in bringing me to court for matters that concern you not at all.

But I am not done with you, Meletus. Tell me whether it is better to live amidst good or wicked citizens. Answer, I say,

for the question is quite simple. Do not wicked citizens do ill to their neighbors, and good citizens good?

Meletus/ Yes, they do.

Socrates/ Would anybody in the world wish to be harmed by his fellow men rather than benefited?

Answer, my friend; indeed, the law requires you to answer. Would anybody wish to be harmed?

Meletus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Well, then, do you summon me hither because I corrupt the youth and make them wicked intentionally or against my will?

Meletus/ Intentionally, I say.

Socrates/ How is this, Meletus? Are you as a young man so much wiser than I in my old age? Have you learned that the evil always do ill to those about them, and the good, good, whereas I am so far gone in folly as not to know that if I make anyone of my fellows a rascal I am likely to receive harm from him? Am I so foolish as to commit this great wrong intentionally, as you say? I cannot accept your statement, Meletus; nor will anyone else, I think. Either I do not corrupt the youth, or, if I do, it is unwittingly; and in either case you are proved a liar. If I corrupt them unwittingly, then for such unintentional errors you have no authority in law to prosecute me here; but rather taking me apart you should instruct and admonish me, for certainly I would turn from unwitting wrong were I shown my error. Yet you have always avoided me, never once trying to enlighten my ignorance, and now you prosecute me before this court where those are properly indicted who require punishment and not enlightenment.

It is now perfectly clear, Athenians, that Meletus, as I said before, has never troubled himself in the least about any of these matters. Yet, tell me, Meletus, how is it you say I

corrupt the youth. Evidently, according to your written indictment, by denying the gods of the city and introducing strange daemonic powers of my own. Do you mean that I corrupt them by spreading such doctrines as this?

Meletus/ So I assert, and boldly.

Socrates/ I conjure you, Meletus, by these very gods who are now in question, make your charge a little more explicit to me and to the court. I do not quite understand. Do you mean that I teach the belief in certain gods, and myself believe that such exist, not being altogether an atheist and evil-doer in this respect, but that my gods are not those of the city?, Is that your charge? Or do you claim that I utterly deny the gods and spread abroad this doctrine of atheism?

Meletus/ I claim that you absolutely deny the existence of the gods.

Socrates/ Extraordinary! Why do you say that, Meletus? Do not I, like other men, believe the sun and the moon to be gods?

Meletus/ Hear him, judges! Does he not call the sun a stone and the moon earth?

Socrates/ Why, my dear Meletus, you must think you are accusing Anaxagoras. Do you so despise these gentlemen, and deem them so illiterate as not to know that the works of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of such notions? And of course the young men come to me to learn these doctrines, when they have plenty of opportunities of hearing them in the theatre for a drachma at most, and so turning the laugh on poor Socrates if he palms them off as his own, —such outlandish doctrines, too. But, in heaven's name, do you really think me such an atheist?

Meletus/ A complete and utter atheist.

Socrates/ Incredible, Meletus; you are lying and you know it. —O Athenians, the man is utterly insolent and

wanton; he has made this indictment in the merest insolence and wantonness and youthful bravado. He seems to have patched together a kind of riddle to try our wits, as if to say, Will the wise Socrates detect my jesting and self-contradictions, or shall I hoodwink him and the whole court? So far as I can make out, he has contradicted himself flatly in his own indictment, which as much as says, Socrates is an evil-doer who does not believe in the gods, yet believes in the gods. —It is the trick of a jester.

And now let us see why I have such an opinion of him. Do you, Meletus, answer my questions; and do you, gentlemen, as I requested at the beginning, remember not to interrupt me if I talk along in my usual manner. —Is there, Meletus, in all the world a man who recognizes human works, but denies that there are men? —The court sees that he won't answer, but tries to make a distraction. —Does anyone believe there is horsemanship, but no horses? or flute-playing, but no flute-players? Of course not, my honest friend; so much I may affirm to you and to the others here, since you are unready to reply. But at least answer me this: Does anyone deny there are daemons, who yet acknowledges their power?

Meletus/ No one.

Socrates/ How delighted I am that at last, compelled by the court, you deign to answer. So, then, as you say, I do believe and teach there are daemonic powers; whether old or new ones of my own invention, no matter, for according to your words I do believe in these powers, and this you have sworn to in your affidavit. But if I believe in daemonic powers, I must needs believe in daemons, must I not? Of course. You see I take your silence for tacit agreement. And do we not regard the daemons as gods or children of the gods? Answer me, yes or no.

Meletus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Since, then, I acknowledge there are daemons, what riddling and jesting is this of yours? For in the one case if the daemons are nothing more than gods, and I believe in these daemons, why, then, with one breath you declare that I do and do not believe in the gods. But if on the other hand these daemons are the illegitimate children of the gods by the nymphs or other mothers, as the stories go, then who in the world would say there are children of the gods, but no gods? Absurd; you might as well say there are mules from horses and asses, and deny the existence of horses and asses. The gist of it all is just this, Meletus: you have brought that indictment against me either to test my wits, or else because you wished to accuse me and could find no real wrong to attack. But there is no art by which you will ever persuade anyone not utterly devoid of reason that the same person can believe in daemonic and divine agencies and at the same time believe neither in daemons nor gods nor half-gods—that is quite impossible.

In truth, men of Athens, there is no need of many words to free myself from the charge of Meletus; and sufficient has been said.

But as I was saying, and as you yourselves know, there are many enemies and a deal of hatred arrayed against me. It is this will condemn me, if I am cast; not Meletus or Anytus, but the envious detraction of the multitude which has condemned many an honest man before me and will do the same hereafter—there is no danger it will stop with me.

Possibly someone will say here: But are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have lived such a life that now you stand in peril of death? I might fairly reply to such an one: You are far from the mark, my friend, if you suppose that a man of any worth in the world ought to reckon on the chances of life and death.

Not so; when he acts he has only this one thing to consider, —whether he acts righteously or unrighteously, and whether as a good or a bad man. Poor creatures indeed your notion would make of the heroes who fell at Troy, and among them Thetis' son, Achilles, who so despised danger, in comparison with dishonor, that he heeded not the warning words of his mother, though she. was a goddess. For so I can imagine her pleading with him in his deadly wrath against Hector, and saying: "O my child, if you avenge the death of your comrade Patroclus and slay Hector, you, too, must die;

> 'Ready thy fate stands against thee after that Hector hath fallen.'"

Still when he heard this, he accounted death and peril as but a little thing, fearing far more to live a coward and leave his friends unavenged. "Let me perish straightway," he said, "and be avenged of mine enemy, that I abide not here by the beaked ships, a laughing-stock and a burden of the earth."—Think you, this man cared for death and peril? Nay, Athenians, the truth is quite otherwise; for wherever a man takes his post, deeming it best for him there, or wherever the leader places him, there let him abide, say I, awaiting danger, taking account of naught, be it death or any other thing, except only dishonor.

Strange indeed would my conduct be, men of Athens, if I, who have stood like many another man at my post and faced death, when the generals chosen by you to command gave me my orders, —strange indeed if, now when the god, as I firmly believe and am convinced, bids me stand forth as one devoted to wisdom, a questioner of myself and all the world, I were to desert my post through fear of death or any other thing. That would be strange indeed, I repeat, and justly then might a man charge me in court with denying the gods if I disobeyed the oracle, and feared death, and in my folly deemed myself wise. For the fear of death, my friends, is only

another form of appearing wise when we are foolish and of seeming to know what we know not. No mortal knoweth of death whether it be not the greatest of all good things to man, yet do men fear it as if knowing it to be the greatest of evils.

And is not this that most culpable ignorance which pretends to know what it knows not? It may be, my friends, that in this I am different from the world; and certainly if I should claim to be wiser than another in anyone thing, it would be herein, that having no certain knowledge of the life beyond, I pretend to none. Yet this knowledge I have, and this I know, that it is an evil and shameful thing to do wrong and to disobey our superior, whether human or divine. Never, then, will I shrink and flee from what may be an unknown blessing rather than from evil known to be such.

And therefore if now you should release me and pay no heed to Anytus, who declares that the trial should never have been admitted at all unless I am to be punished with death, for otherwise all your sons will follow in my steps and be utterly corrupted, —if notwithstanding this you should say to me: Socrates, this time we will let you off in spite of Anytus, but on one condition, that you give up this investigation of yours and this pursuit of wisdom, under penalty of death should you be caught at it again, —if, I repeat, you were to release me on these terms, then I should say to you: Omen of Athens, I do indeed salute you and wish you all happiness, but I obey God rather than you, and while there is breath to me and so far as my strength permits, I will not cease from this pursuit of wisdom, neither will I desist from admonishing you. And whomsoever of you I meet, with him I will argue as my wont is and say to him: My good friend, you who belong to Athens, this city great and glorious for wisdom and power, are you not ashamed that your life is given up to the winning of much money and

reputation and rank, while for wisdom and truth and the good of your own soul you care not and have no concern? And if he disputes and asserts his care for these things, I will not quickly let him go or leave him, but will question and examine him and put him to the proof; and if then he seems to claim a virtue which he does not possess, I will rebuke him because the things of most worth he little esteems, but prizes what is valueless. In this way I shall act toward young and old, whomever I meet, whether stranger or citizen, and especially toward citizens, as they are closer akin to me. For this, I assure you, is the command of the god; and I think no greater blessing has ever befallen you in the city than this my service to the god. For I do nothing else but go about persuading you, young and old, not to take thought first for your bodies and for money, but more diligently to consider the welfare of your own souls; and I say to you always that not from money proceedeth virtue, but from virtue proceed money and all good things that men cherish in public and in private. If by teaching this doctrine I corrupt the youth, the mischief is great; but if anyone asserts that my teaching is other than this, his words are naught. Therefore I say to you, Athenians, yield to Anytus or yield not, acquit me or acquit me not, —never will I alter my ways, though I suffer death many times.

Do not cry out, Athenians; but remember how I besought you to remain quiet and listen, no matter what I said. Indeed, I think you will profit by hearing. Now I am going to say something else at which perhaps you will raise a shout—yet I beg you do not. Be assured, then, that if I am such an one as I said and you put me to death, you will be doing yourselves greater harm than me.

Neither Meletus nor Anytus can injure me a whit; there is no power in them to do that; for it is not decreed above that the better man can be injured by the worse. He may inflict

death, perhaps, or exile, or civil dishonor; and possibly Meletus and his guild reckon these things to be great calamities; but I for my part deem it a far greater calamity to plot unrighteously against a man's life as Meletus is now doing. And therefore, men of Athens, I am not concerned to plead for myself, as one might expect of me, but am rather pleading for you, lest by condemning me in your ignorance you throw away God's gift to you.

For if you kill me, you will not speedily find another like me, sent, as it were, by the hand of God upon the city. You will laugh at my words, but really this people resembles a huge horse, thoroughbred, but sluggish from his very size and needing a gadfly to excite him. So the god seems to have set me upon the city as a gadfly, and without respite I am fastening on you the livelong day, and exciting and urging and reproaching everyone I meet. Such another man is not so readily found, my friends; you had better take my advice and spare me. Now, like a man disturbed in his sleep, you may of course fall into a rage and crush me with a blow, as you would a fly—and so you will please Anytus. After that you may quietly slumber away the rest of your lives, unless God in his mercy sends some other upon you. That I am really such an one given to the city by God, you may understand from my life; for it is not from merely human reasons that I neglect my own affairs and see them going to waste these many years, while un-weariedly I look to your interests and come to you all individually, as if I were a father or an elder brother, with my message and persuasion of virtue. If I reaped any profit from this life or took pay for my exhortations, it would be a simple matter. My accusers have shamelessly brought forward every other possible charge against me; and yet, as you yourselves see, they have not dared to assert, under the testimony of witnesses, that I

ever exacted a fee or asked any man for such. I think, indeed, my poverty is sufficient evidence to the contrary.

It may perhaps seem inconsistent that I go about so busily giving my advice in private, but never venture to come up with you to the assembly and speak out before the whole city. I have a reason for this, as you have often heard me explain and in many places; for there is a certain divine or daemonic witness abides with me, and it is this that Meletus has caricatured in the indictment. From childhood it has been with me, as it were a voice speaking at intervals, always warning me against something I had in hand to do, but never urging me to act. This it is has restrained me from a public life. And wisely has it hindered me; for doubtless, Athenians, if I had busied myself with public affairs, my death would have fallen long before now, and I should have profited neither you nor myself. Do not chafe at hearing the truth. No man will save his own life who boldly opposes you or any other people and checks the wicked and lawless proceedings in his city. He who would preserve his life for a little while to fight the brave fight of justice must seek his ends in private and not in public.

I can offer you convincing evidence of these things, —not in words, but in what you appreciate, deeds. Hear what actually befell me, and you will see that I am not one to yield the right to any man (through fear of death, but would rather die unyielding. My story may sound vulgar and commonplace, but it is at least true. You know I have never held any public office in the city except to sit in the senate. Now it happened that the tribe Antiochis, to which I belong, held the presidency at the time of the battle of Arginusae when the ten generals were charged with neglecting the bodies of the lost. You remember you wished to try them in a body, quite contrary to law, as you yourselves afterwards acknowledged. At that time I alone of the presidents held out

and voted against this illegal proceeding. The demagogues were ready to arrest and impeach me; you were urging them on and shouting out against me; nevertheless I thought it behooved me to take this hazard with law and justice on my side, rather than stand with you against justice through fear of bonds or death. This happened while the people were still in power; but during the Oligarchy the thirty tyrants once summoned me, with four others, to the city hall, and bade us fetch over Leon of Salamis from that island to be executed. Such commands, you know, they were constantly giving in order to implicate as many as possible in their crimes. Then again I proved, not by words but by deeds, that I cared not a straw for death, if I may speak so boldly, but was anxious above all else in the world to shun injustice and impiety. Not even that strong and oppressive tyranny could terrify me into abetting injustice. When we came from the hall the other four went to Salamis and brought back Leon, but I went quietly home. Probably it would have cost me my life, had not the government of the Thirty fallen shortly afterwards. —This is my story and there are many to bear witness to its truth.

Now do you suppose I could have lived through all these years if I had gone into public affairs, and like an honest man had made it my first duty always to support the right? Far from it, O Athenians; neither I nor any other could have done it. Examine my whole life and it will appear that such has been my conduct wherever I have touched on public affairs. And in private I am the same, for never once have I yielded to any man in a question of right and wrong, no, not even to one of those who by these slanderers are called my disciples. I am no master to have disciples. If anyone, young or old, ever cares to listen to me while I talk and go about my business, I do not repulse him; neither do I discourse for money, but to rich and poor alike I offer myself; anybody

may start the question, and, if. ready to answer my queries, may hear whatever I have to say. And I am in no wise accountable if those who listen to me turn out good or bad, for to none of them have I ever promised or given any kind of instruction. Should anyone claim to have heard or learned from me in private what all the world has not heard, the man simply lies.

Do you ask why certain persons take pleasure in my company year after year? That has already been explained to you, Athenians. I told you the whole truth when I said their pleasure was in hearing our pretenders to wisdom detected in folly. There is a certain satisfaction in this; but as for me, my course was pointed out by God himself, whose admonitions came to me in oracles and dreams and signs, in whatsoever way the divine will is at times made manifest to men to guide their actions. My statement, Athenians, is true and easily proved. For if aforetime I corrupted the youth and do still corrupt them, then some of those who have now grown old enough to recognize the evil counsel given them in their youth ought to come forward and avenge themselves by denouncing me. And if they themselves hesitate to do this, then their relatives, their fathers or brothers or others of their kin, ought to bear in mind the dishonor of their family and seek vengeance. A number of these men I see present to-day: yonder is Crito, who is of the same age and deme with me; and there is his son Critobulus; then I see Lysanias of Sphettus, the father of Aeschines yonder; there is Antiphon of Cephisus, the father of Epigenes. Others I see whose brothers have been much about me: Nicostratus, the son of Theozotides, who might speak for his brother Theodotus, now dead and no longer able to command his silence; and Paralus yonder, the son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages; here is Adeimantus, the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is also present; and Aeantodorus, whose

brother Apollodorus I likewise see. I might point out a number of others, among whom Meletus ought certainly to have found someone to produce as a witness during his speech.

Perhaps he forgot while speaking: let him bring forward his witnesses now—I yield the floor—let him say if he has any such testimony. No, Athenians, you will find, on the contrary, they are all ready to witness for me, for me the corrupter and destroyer of their families, if you art to believe Meletus and Anytus. No doubt those whom I actually corrupted may have their ground: for supporting me; but the uncorrupted, these older men, their relatives, what other reason can they have for abetting me but the plain and straightforward reason of justice? They know, forsooth, that Meletus lies and that I speak the truth.

Well, gentlemen, this and the like of this is about all I have to offer as an apology. Yet there may be someone among you who will be indignant when he recalls his own conduct on such an occasion. He may have had less at stake than I, yet with many tears he implored and supplicated the judges, dragging his little children before the court and a swarm of friends and relatives to awaken pity; whereas I will do nothing of the sort, although my danger, it might seem, is the extremest of all. Such an one, observing my conduct, may harden himself against me and suffer anger to influence his vote. If anyone is so disposed—but that is hardly possible—still if there be any such, I might fittingly say to him: My dear friend, I, too, have my family ties; I, too, as Homer says, was born of human parents, and not of a stock or a stone; I have my own kith and kin, and even children, three sons, Athenians, one a grown boy and the other two quite young. But I will drag none of these hither and so beseech you to release me. You ask my reasons for refusing? Not out of willfulness, gentlemen, or because I condemn you;

and whether I hold death lightly or not is another question. The point is that out of regard for myself and for you and for the whole city I deem it degrading to stoop to any such means. For I am now an old man and have, whether rightly or wrongly, acquired a certain name, —yes, the saying has gone abroad that Socrates is different from the rest of the world. It is a shameful thing, if those among you who are held superior for wisdom or courage or some other virtue are willing to act in this way. Indeed, I have more than once seen men of reputation behave in the strangest fashion when on trial; one might suppose they looked on death as a monstrous ill, just as though they were to be immortal if once they escaped your hands. Such men, I say, are an opprobrium to the city; they leave any foreigner to remark of us, that the best of Athenians in virtue, the men chosen by the Athenians for place and honor, are in reality no better than women. O men of Athens, we who have a name among you ought not to behave thus, nor, if we would, ought you to allow it. You ought clearly to show that condemnation inevitably falls, not on the man who keeps his peace, but on those who go through these piteous farces and render the city ridiculous.

And apart from appearances, O Athenians, it does not seem right to appeal to the sympathy of the judges and escape by such means, but rather to inform and convince them. The judge does not sit here to grant justice as a favor, but to decide the truth; he is under oath to give judgment in accordance with the laws and to show partiality to none. Is it your wish that we encourage perjury amongst you? and how, then, shall you and we escape the evil of impiety? Do not therefore require of me, Athenians, to demean myself before you in a manner that I consider neither honorable nor right in the eyes of God and men, and especially now when I am charged by Meletus here with the very crime of impiety.

For clearly were I to persuade you and force you by my supplications to forswear yourselves, clearly, then, I should be teaching you to disbelieve in the gods; and in the very act of my apology I should be accusing myself of atheism. But such disbelief is far from my thoughts, Athenians; I do believe, though my belief is beyond the understanding of my accusers. And now I commit myself to you and to God, to judge as it shall be best for me and for you.

[Socrates is condemned by a majority of 281 to 220. —He now discusses the penalty to be inflicted. According to the custom of the Athenian courts, prosecutor and defendant each proposed a penalty, and it was left to the judges to decide between these two. Meletus has proposed the death-penalty.]

There are many reasons, O men of Athens, why I am not troubled that the verdict has gone against me. Indeed, the result was fully anticipated, and I am only surprised at the evenness of the vote. I thought to be condemned by a large majority, and now it appears that only thirty votes were needed to acquit me. So far as Meletus is concerned, I have, I think, escaped, and more than escaped; for it must be apparent to all that if Anytus and Lycon had not taken part in the accusation he would have fallen below one fifth of the votes and so forfeited the thousand drachmas.

The man has proposed death as the penalty. Very good; and what counter-penalty shall I propose? Evidently what I deserve. And what is that? what do I deserve to suffer or pay? Look at me: never in all my life have I learned to be idle; for a higher end I have neglected all that the world most covets, —wealth, property, military command, public leadership, office, the influence of party and faction in the state, —deeming myself too honest a man to indulge in these pursuits and save my own life. Neither did I see any profit in

these things to you or to myself, and therefore I passed them by and took up a new pursuit.

Going to each of you in private, I conferred on him what I call the highest benefit in the world, by persuading him to think first of the good of his own real self and afterwards of his worldly affairs; to think first of the good of the city itself and afterwards of her interests, and so in all things. You see what man I am; what should be done to me? Some good thing, Athenians, if I am to propose what I really deserve, — and some good thing that shall be suited to me. What, then, is suited to a poor man, your benefactor, who only demands leisure to go on admonishing you? There is no other reward so appropriate as a seat at the tables in the Prytaneum. This he deserves more than any of your victors with horse or chariot at the Olympic games; for these champions give you but the name of fortunate, whereas I render you such in reality. Moreover they need no support, and I do. Therefore if I must propose the proper and just reward, my proposition is a seat at the tables in the Prytaneum.

Possibly I may seem to you now to be speaking with the same arrogance as before in the matter of tears and supplications. That is not the case; rather I am persuaded that never once have I willingly wronged a human being, however I fail to convince you of the fact. A little while only we have talked here with one another; and I think you, too, might be convinced if your custom permitted us to discuss the sentence of death, not for one day only, but for several days, as other states do. Now it is not easy in this brief time to root out deep-seated prejudices. Being persuaded, then, that I have never wronged any man, I am not likely now to wrong myself, or say of myself that I deserve any evil, or pronounce any such sentence upon myself. And why should I? Through fear of the penalty proposed by Meletus? But as I have already stated, I do not know whether death is really

a blessing or an evil. And instead of this shall I name some penalty which I know to be an evil? imprisonment, for example? Why should I pass my life in prison, the slave of each succeeding officer? Shall I propose a fine, with imprisonment until the sum is paid? But in my case that would be confinement for life, as I have no money to pay withal. Or exile, perhaps? It is quite probable you would agree to that. But what a poor spirit mine would be, what blindness of heart, if I supposed that any other people would put up with me when you, my fellow citizens, find my continual discoursing and arguing so intolerably odious that you must needs get rid of me. My blindness is not so great, Athenians. It would be a noble life for me in my old age to go forth an exile and be bandied about from city to city. Well I know that wherever I went the young men would flock to hear my words just as they do here. If I drove them away, they themselves would call upon the elders to banish me; and if I suffered them to follow me, then in fear for them their fathers and kinsmen would banish me.

Does anyone ask, Why can't you withdraw somewhere, Socrates, and live in silence and peace? It seems strangely difficult to enlighten you on this point. If I say I cannot hold my peace because this would be to disobey the god, you will take my words in jest. If on the other hand I say that the one good thing in all the world for a man is to pass his days in converse about virtue and these other matters whereof I am continually talking and questioning myself and others, and that a life unquestioned is no life at all for a man, —if I say this, you will believe me even less. Nevertheless I speak truly, though you are slow to believe. And further I am not accustomed to think of myself as deserving punishment. Had I money, I should propose a fine, the greatest I could pay, and account it no evil. But this cannot be, unless you accept a sum within my scant means. For example, I might

perhaps pay a silver mina; and this fine I will propose. Plato here, O Athenians, and Crito and Critobulus and Apollodorus bid me name thirty minae, and offer themselves as security. This sum, therefore, I finally propose, and these men will be sufficient security to you for the payment.

[He is condemned, to death.]

You have gained but a little, Athenians, and at how great a cost! From those who are prompt to revile our city you will receive the name and opprobrium of killing Socrates, a man of wisdom, —for in their eagerness to blame you they will call me wise whether I am so or not. Could you have waited but a little while, the event would have come of itself.

My age is not hidden; you see that I am far on in life and near to death. I am not speaking now to all, but to those of you who voted my death. And to them I say further: You suppose, gentlemen, that I have lost through lack of words to convince you, even provided I had stooped to say and do anything to escape. Not so. I am cast, not through lack of words, but through lack of impudence and shamelessness, and because I would not speak what you are most pleased to hear, nor weep and wail, nor do and say a thousand other degrading things which others have taught you to expect. At the time it did not seem worthwhile to demean myself as a slave through fear; neither do I now repent of my manner of defense. I choose to defend myself thus and die, rather than as you would have me and live. Neither in war nor in a lawsuit aught a man, neither I nor any other, to accept every means of avoiding death. In battle, for instance, a man often sees that he may save his life by throwing away his arms and falling in supplication before his pursuers; and so in all times of peril there are ways of escape if one will submit to any baseness. Nay, Athenians, it is not so hard to shun death, but hard indeed to shun evil, for it runs more swiftly than death. I, you see, an old man and slow of gait, have

been overtaken by the slower runner; whereas my accusers, who are young and nimble, are caught by the swifter runner, which is wickedness. And now I go away condemned by you to death, but they depart hence condemned by truth herself to injustice and sin. I abide by my award, and they by theirs. Some fate, it may be, has meted out the awards, and I at least am content.

And now a word of prophecy for those who condemned me; for I stand at the threshold of death, when, if ever, men speak with prophetic insight. So I say to you who have slain me that straightway after my death a punishment shall come upon you far more terrible, God knows, than your slaying me. You have committed this crime, thinking to shake off the burden of accounting for your lives; but the result, I tell you now, will be quite the contrary. There are many who. will call you to account, —men whom I have restrained and whom you have never suspected; younger men who will attack you more savagely and cause you still greater annoyance. You are wide of the mark if you hope by executions to silence all censures of your evil conduct. That way of escape is neither very effective nor very honorable. But there is another way easier and far more noble: do not crush others, but look to the bettering of your own lives. I have made my prophecy, and have done with you who condemned me.

And last with those who voted for my acquittal I would talk over this event, while the authorities are busy, and before I go thither where I must die. Remain with me that little while, my friends. There is nothing to hinder our talking together until I go; and I wish to point out to you, as my well-wishers, the significance of what has happened to me. A wonderful thing, O judges, —for you I may rightly call judges, —a wonderful thing has befallen me. Constantly before this the wonted sign, the warning voice of the daemon, has come to me and opposed me in the most trivial affairs if

I chanced to be going wrong. And now you see what has befallen me, this calamity which might be called the greatest of all evils; yet neither this morning when I left my house, nor when I came up here to the court, nor during the whole course of my speech, —not once has the divine warning deterred me. And this is remarkable, for often on other occasions the sign has stopped me short in the very midst of what I was saying. But now through this whole affair it has not once opposed me in what I have done or said. You ask how I interpret this? I will tell you. It indicates that everything has happened for my good, and that those of us who think it an evil to die are quite wrong in our notion.

It must be so; the accustomed sign would have warned me, had I not been in the way of good.

But we have other reasons for hoping confidently that death is a blessing. Consider a moment. To die must be one of two things: either the dead are as nothing and have no perception or feeling whatsoever, or else, as many believe, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. If, now, there is no consciousness in the grave, but deep sleep, as when a man in slumber discerns not even a dream, then will death be a marvelous gain. For consider such a night of slumber when we behold not the shadow of a dream; compare all the other days and nights of our life with such a night, and ask ourselves how many of them could be called happier than this night of deep sleep; we should find them but few in number and easily counted in the course of a long life; and this I believe will hold good, not only of us poor mortals, but of the great King of Persia himself. If death is like this, I at least reckon it a gain, and endless time will seem no more than a single night. But if death is, as it were, a journeying hence to another world, where, as men believe, the departed dead dwell together, — what greater blessing than this could you desire, my judges?

Will not that be a wonderful journey, if, escaping these self-styled judges, we go to that other world and stand there before those true judges, as the saying is, Minos and Rhadamanthys and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and others of the half-gods who lived righteously in this life? Would any of you count it a little thing to meet Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer, and talk with them? I am ready to die many times if this belief is true. That would be a glorious life for me there where I might meet Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and others perhaps who long ago perished by an unrighteous judgment; and how glad I should be to compare my wrongs with theirs. But the greatest joy would be in questioning the inhabitants there as I do here, and examining them to discover who is really wise and who only in his own conceit. What would not a man give, O judges, to examine the leader of the great Trojan armament, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or any of a thousand other men and women whom it would be our infinite joy to meet and question and call our friends. Assuredly they of that world do not put men to death for doing this. They are altogether happier there than we, happier and deathless forever more, if the saying be true.

And ye too, my judges, ought to be of good hope toward death, being persuaded of this one thing at least, that no evil can befall a good man either in life or in death, and that his affairs are all in the hands of God. Neither have these events befallen by chance, but I see clearly it was better for me to die and be released from this labor of life. Therefore not once in my trial was a sign given to turn me aside, and therefore I feel little anger toward those who accused and condemned me. Yet because they did not accuse and condemn me in this mind, but thinking to do me harm, for this they are worthy of blame. And I may make of them this one request: When my sons have grown up, I would ask you, gentlemen, to

worry them as I have worried you, if they seem to care more for money and such things than for virtue, and if they claim to be something when they are naught. Do you rebuke them as I have rebuked you for not caring about what they should, and for thinking themselves something when they are of nothing worth. If you do this, both I and my sons shall have received justice at your hands. —And now it is time to depart hence, I to die and you to live; but which of us goes to the better fate no one knoweth save only God.

The Apology Of Socrates.

Translated by Nevill, D. F.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates; Meletus.

Socrates/ How you, men of Athens, have been influenced by my accusers, I know not; I at any rate even myself almost forgot my own case in listening to them; so persuasively did they speak. And yet not a word, as I may say, of truth have they uttered. But of the many false statements which they made I was particularly amazed at one, —that in which they said that you must take care not to be deceived by me, for I was clever at speaking. For the fact that they were not ashamed that they would at once be refuted practically, when I should appear not in the least clever at speaking, — this seemed to me to be the most shameless thing in them; unless of course they call the man who speaks the truth a clever speaker for if this is what they mean, I indeed would confess that I am an orator, 'but not after their style. Well, as I say, these have uttered little or nothing that is true; but from me you shall hear the whole truth. But, by Zeus, men of Athens, not a speech finely decked oat, as theirs was, with expressions and words nor a prepared speech, but you will hear things spoken at random in the first words that occur; for I believe that what I say is just, and let none of you expect otherwise; indeed it would not, I suppose, be seemly for me at my age to come before you like a lad fabricating a story.

And I must most earnestly, men of Athens, beg and entreat this of you; if you hear me making my defense in the same language as I am wont to use both in the market at the counters, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, not to be surprised nor to interrupt on this account. For the truth is this. This is the first time that I have come before a

court, though I am seventy years of age; I am therefore literally a stranger to your manner of speech here. And so, just as, supposing I happened actually to be a stranger, you would, I presume, forgive my speaking in the language and the fashion in which I had been brought up, so also now I beg this of you as what, in my opinion, is just, that you pass over the manner of my speech, —for it might perhaps be worse or perhaps better, —but consider this point and to this give your attention, whether I say what is just or not; for this is the virtue of a judge, but an orator's virtue is to speak the truth.

First, then, it is right that I should make my defense, men of Athens, against the first [false] charges brought against me and my first accusers, and then against the later charges and the later accusers. For many have arisen accusing me to you even of old, talking now for many years and saying nothing true. And I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his friends, though these too are dangerous. But, men of Athens, still more dangerous are those who taking most of you in hand from your childhood were more successful both in persuading you and in accusing me of nothing true, saying that there is one Socrates, a wise man, one who both speculates about the heavens and who has inquired into everything beneath the earth and who makes the worse appear the better cause. These, men of Athens, who have scattered abroad this rumor, are my dangerous accusers; for their hearers think that those who make these inquiries do not believe in the gods either. And then these accusers are many and have now been accusing me for a long time, and were moreover speaking to you at that time of life at which you would have most readily believed them, when you were children, and some of you too were youths, literally prosecuting a suit given by default, where no one appeared for the defense. But the most unreasonable thing of all is

that one cannot even know and mention the names of any of them, except one who happens to be a writer of comedies. But all who employing spite and slander used to persuade you, some of them persuading others after having also been themselves persuaded, these are all most difficult to deal with; for it is not possible to call one of them here or to cross-examine him, but it is necessary literally, as it were, to fight with shadows, both making my defense and putting my questions whilst no one answers. Do you also then assume that, as I say, my accusers have been of two kinds, firstly those who have recently accused me, and secondly those who accused me long ago, of whom I am speaking. And believe that I ought first to defend myself against those; for you also heard them accusing me earlier and much more often than these later accusers.

Very well; I must indeed make my defense and try to remove from your minds in so short a time this prejudice which you in so long a time conceived. Now I should wish that this might so befall, if it should be in aught better for both you and me, and that I should gain some benefit in making my defense; but I think that my task is difficult, and its nature does not altogether escape me. Nevertheless let the result go as the god wills, but I must obey the law and make my defense.

Let us then resume from the beginning and see what is the charge, out of which the prejudice against me has arisen, on which of course Meletus relied, when he preferred this indictment against me. Well, what did the slanderers really say, when they slandered me?

I must read their deposition as if they were formal accusers. 'Socrates is on evil-doer and is over-busy investigating what is under the earth and what is in heaven and making the worse appear the better cause and teaching others these same things. It is something like that; for you

saw this yourselves in the comedy of Aristophanes, you saw there a man called Socrates swinging about saying that he walked on air and talking a great deal of nonsense besides about matters of which I know nothing either great or small. And I do not speak as disparaging that kind of knowledge, if anyone is wise about such things. May I never be prosecuted by Meletus upon so many charges; but the truth is, men of Athens, I have nothing to do with these matters. And as witnesses I call the majority of you yourselves, and request you to inform and tell one another, all you who have ever yet heard me conversing; and there are many of you who have. Then tell one another if any of you ever yet heard me in anything small or great conversing about such matters; and from this you will learn that all the other things too which people say about me are of this kind.

But as a matter of fact none of this is so, nor yet, if you have heard anyone say that I try to educate men and demand payment, is this true either. Although this too seems to me to be a fine thing, if anyone could educate men, as do both Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis. For each of these, men of Athens, [is able] going to each of the cities to persuade the young, who are at liberty to associate without fee with whomsoever of their own citizens they may wish, —they persuade these to leave the schools of those men and! associate with themselves paying fees, and to feel gratitude besides. For that matter there is also another wise man here, one from Paros, who I heard was staying in the city; for I happened to meet a man who has spent more money on sophists than everyone else put together, I mean 'Callias the son of Hipponicus. So I asked him, —he has two sons, —'Callias,' said I, 'if your sons had been foals or calves, we could have got and hired a trainer for them who might have made them beautiful and good in their proper excellence. And this person would have been

either one of those who understand horses, or of those skilled in farming; but, as it is, since they are men, whom are you minded to get as a trainer for them? Who is skilled in this kind of excellence, that of a man and of a citizen? For I suppose you have thought of this owing to your having sons. Is there anyone,' said I, 'or not?' 'Certainly there is,' he replied. 'Who,' said I, 'and of what country? And for how much does he teach?' 'Evenus of Paros, Socrates,' he said, 'for five minæ.' And I thought Evenus fortunate if in truth he has this art and teaches for so modest a fee. I myself too should give myself both airs and graces, if I understood these things; but, as a matter of fact, men of Athens, I do not understand them.

Perhaps one of you might reply, 'But your own profession, Socrates, what is that? Whence have these slanders against you arisen? For surely all this rumor and talking has not resulted, while you were practicing nothing more extraordinary than the rest of mankind [unless you were doing something of a different kind from most.] Tell us then what it is, in order that we may not pass a hasty judgment on you.' The man who says this appears to me to say what is just, and I will try to explain to you what this can be which has created for me both the name and the prejudice. Listen then. And perhaps I shall seem to some of you to be jesting, but, be well assured, I shall tell you the whole truth. For I, men of Athens, have acquired this name through nothing but a certain wisdom. What kind of wisdom then is this? Perhaps it is such wisdom as is possible to man. For really it is probable that I am wise in this; but these men, of whom I spoke just now, would perhaps be wise in some wisdom too great for man, or I know not what to call it; for I certainly do not understand it myself and whoever says that I do, both lies and speaks with a view to slandering me. And, men of Athens, pray do not interrupt, even if I seem at all to you to

speak arrogantly; for it is not as my own that I shall utter the words which I speak; but I shall refer them to the speaker, —one worthy of your credit. For it is the god of Delphi whom I shall call as a witness to you of my wisdom, whether indeed it exists, and of what sort it is. I suppose you know Chærephon. He was my comrade from youth and was also a comrade to your popular party and he shared the recent exile and returned with you. And you know well what kind of man Chærephon was, how impetuous in whatever he set to work at. For instance, once he went to Delphi and ventured to ask the oracle this question, —and, as I say, men of Athens, do not interrupt; he actually asked if anyone was wiser than I. So the priestess answered that no one was wiser. And since he himself is dead, his brother here will give you evidence of these things.

Now see for what reasons I mention this; I am going to tell you whence the prejudice against me has arisen. When I heard this, I began to reflect as follows, 'What can the god mean, and what can he be hinting at? For certainly I know that I am not wise in any degree either great or small; what then can he mean by asserting that I am the wisest of men? for surely he, at any rate, is not lying; for a god may not do that.' And for a long time I was perplexed as. to what he could mean, then most reluctantly I turned to an investigation of the matter which was something like this. I went to one of those reputed to be wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should refute the oracle and state a proof to this prophecy thus, 'This man is wiser than I, but you said that I was the wisest of men.' do I, examining this man, —I need not mention him by name, but it was one of the public men, in whose case I in my inquiry experienced something of this kind, men of Athens, —and conversing with him, it became clear to me that this man appeared to be wise both to many other men and especially to himself, but that really

he was not. And then I tried to show him that he thought he was wise, but that he was not. So by that I made myself odious both to this man and to many of those who were present; anyhow, when I went away, I thought to myself,' I am wiser than this man; for it is probable that neither of us knows anything really excellent, but he indeed thinks that he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as in reality I do not know, do not think that I know either.' At all events I seem to be in some slight degree wiser than him in just this, that what I do not know I do not think that I know either. Thence I went to another man, one of those who were thought to be wiser than that man and I came to the same conclusion as before; and there I made myself odious to him also and to many others.

So after this I already began going my rounds, perceiving indeed and grieving and fearing that I was making myself odious, but yet it seemed to me that I must set the god's command before everything; so I must go in my quest for the meaning of the oracle to all those who were thought to know anything. And, by the dog, men of Athens, —for I must tell you the truth, —verily I experienced something like this. Those who were especially well esteemed seemed to me, while I inquired according to the god's command, to be almost the most deficient; whereas others, who were thought inferior, seemed to be more promising men as far as wisdom was concerned. Now I must describe to you how I wandered, as if performing certain labors, in order that my oracle might be mode quite irrefutable. After the public men I went to the poets, both the poets of tragedy and those of the dithyramb and the rest, thinking that there I should catch myself in the very act of being more ignorant than they. So taking up those of their poems which seemed to me to have cost them most pains, I would ask them what they meant, in order that at the same time I might also learn something from them. Well,

I am ashamed to tell you the truth, men of Athens; but yet it must be told. In short almost all, I may say, of those who were present would have given a better account than they about that which they had themselves composed. So I soon discovered concerning the poets too this fact, that it is not by wisdom that they make their poetry, but by a kind of instinct and by being in ecstasy, like the diviners and soothsayers. For these say many fine things, but they understand none of the things which they say. The poets also appeared to me to be in some such state as this. And at the same time I perceived that because of their poetry they fancied themselves to be the wisest of men in everything else also, which they were not. So I departed from them too, thinking that I had prevailed over them in the same particular as over the public men.

Then finally I went to the artisans; for I was conscious that I had, I may say, no knowledge, but I knew that I should find that these at any rate had knowledge of many fine things. And in this I was not deceived, for they knew what I did not know, and in this way were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good craftsmen as well seemed to me to have the same defect as the poets; each, because he executed his art well, claimed to be most wise in all other, even the highest, matters, and this failing of theirs threw into the shade that wisdom; so that I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I should choose to be as I am, being neither at all wise in their wisdom nor ignorant in their ignorance, or to have, what they have, both. So I answered myself and the oracle that it was better for me to be as I am.

From this investigation then, men of Athens, have resulted for me many enmities and such as are most harsh and grievous, so that many slanders have sprung from them and I am called by this name, that I am wise. For those who are present always imagine that I am wise myself in that in

which I refute another; whereas the fact probably is, men of Athens, that it is really the god who is wise, and by this oracle means this, that the wisdom of man is worth little or nothing; and he appears not to say this of Socrates, but to have made use of my name, making me an example, as though he would say,' Mortals, that man of you is wisest, who, like Socrates, has discovered that in truth with regard to wisdom he is worth nothing.' As to this then I am still even now going round and searching and examining according to the god's command anyone, be he citizen or stranger, whom I may imagine to be wise; and when he does not appear so to me, I support the god and show that he is not wise. And by this occupation I have been left no time to take any part worth mentioning either in the affairs of the State or my private concerns, but am in extreme poverty through my service to the god.

And in addition to this the young men, who most have leisure, the sons of the most wealthy, following me of their own accord, delight in hearing men being examined and themselves often imitate me and so try to examine others; and then, I fancy, they find a great abundance of men who think they know something, but who know little or nothing. Consequently those who are examined by them are angry not with themselves, but with me, and say that a person called Socrates is most objectionable and corrupts the young. And whenever anyone asks them, by doing what and by teaching what, they have nothing to say, and do not know, but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they utter these stock charges against all who are philosophers, that they investigate the things in the air and the things under the earth and do not believe in gods and make the worse appear the better cause. For, I fancy, they would not care to tell the truth, which is that they are convicted of pretending to know, when they know nothing.

And so inasmuch as they are, I think, ambitious and vehement and numerous and are well drilled and plausible in what they say about me, they have filled your ears, slandering me both long and fiercely. As a result of this also Meletus attacked me and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus being aggrieved for the poets, and Anytus for the craftsmen and the public men, and Lycon for the rhetoricians. So that, as I said at the beginning, I should be surprised if I could in such a short time remove this prejudice from you, so strong has it grown. In this, men of Athens, you have the truth and I speak without concealing from you anything great or small and without dissembling. And yet I know well enough that it is for this same reason that I am disliked. Which is also a proof that I speak the truth and that the prejudice against me is this and that its causes are these. And whether you investigate this now or hereafter, you will find that it is so.

With regard then to the accusations of my first accusers let this be a sufficient defense before you; but against Meletus the good and the patriotic, as he calls himself, and my later accusers, I will try to make my defense next. Again then, as if these were a second set of accusers, let us take up their deposition. It is. something like this; it says that Socrates is an evil-doer, both corrupting the young and not believing in the gods in whom the State believes, but in other new divinities. The indictment then is like that; but let us examine each point of this indictment. It says in fact that I am an evil-doer in corrupting the young. But for my part, men of Athens, I say that Meletus is an evil-doer, because he is jesting in earnest, lightly bringing men to trial, pretending to be in earnest and to care about affairs in which he has never yet taken the slightest interest. And I shall endeavor also to prove to you that this is so.

Come hither then, Meletus, and tell me, Do you not consider it of great importance that the younger men should be as excellent as possible?

Meletus/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ Come then now tell the judges, who improves them? For it is clear that you know, since at any rate you care about it. For having discovered their corrupter, as you call me, you are bringing me here before the judges and accusing me; but come, speak and declare to them who it is that really improves the young. Do you see, Meletus, that you are silent and have nothing to say? And yet does it not seem to you to be disgraceful and a sufficient proof of what I in fact say, that you have not cared about it at all But tell me, my good friend, who improves them?

Meletus/ 'The laws.'

Socrates/ Most excellent sir, that is not what I ask, but what man, who first knows just this very thing, —the laws.

Meletus/ 'These, Socrates, the judges.'

Socrates/ What do you mean, Meletus? Are these able to educate the young and improve them?

Meletus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ All of them, or some of them and others not?

Meletus/ 'All.'

Socrates/ By Hera, you give us good news indeed, and a great abundance of benefactors. But what then? Do these our hearers improve them or not?

Meletus/ 'Yes, they also.'

Socrates/ But what of the senators?

Meletus/ 'The senators too.'

Socrates/ But, Meletus, of course those in the Assembly [the members of the Assembly] do not corrupt the younger men? On the contrary do not all those also improve them?

Meletus/ 'Those also.'

Socrates/ Then, apparently, all the Athenians make them beautiful and good except me, and I alone corrupt them. Is this what you mean?

Meletus/ 'Most decidedly I mean this.'

Socrates/ You have discovered a great misfortune in me. Fray answer me; in the case of horses also do you think this is so, that those who improve them are all mankind, whereas it is some one person only who spoils them? Or is it quite the opposite of this, that only some one person or vary few, I mean the horse-trainers, can improve them, but the majority, if they have anything to do with horses and make use of them, spoil them? Is not this the case, Meletus, both with horses and with every other animal? Of course it is, whether you and Anytus deny it or admit it; for great would be the good-fortune of the young, if indeed only one man corrupts them, and all the rest benefit them. But in fact, Meletus, you give ample proof that you never yet thought of the young, and you clearly exhibit your indifference, in that you have not taken any interest in the matters as to which you are bringing me to trial.

Now once more, do, by Zeus, tell us, Meletus, is it better to live among good citizens or bad ones? Answer, my good friend; for surely I am asking nothing difficult. Do not the wicked do some evil to those who are for the time being nearest to them, whilst the good do some good?

Meletus/ 'Undoubtedly.'

Socrates/ Then is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by his companions? Answer, my good man; and in fact the law requires you to answer. Is there anyone who desires to be injured?

Meletus/ 'Of course not.'

Socrates/ Very well, you are bringing me here as one who corrupts the younger men and makes them more wicked; do you mean intentionally or unintentionally?

Meletus/ 'I mean intentionally.'

Socrates/ What then, Meletus? Are you at your time of life so much wiser than I at mine, that you have discovered that those who are evil always do some evil to those who are nearest to them, but the good do some good; whereas I, it seems, have come to such a pitch of ignorance, that I do not know even this, —that, if I make anyone of my companions wicked, I shall be likely to receive some evil at his hands, so that, according to you, I create so great an evil as this intentionally? In this I do not believe you, Meletus, and I think that no one else will either; but either I do not corrupt them, or, if I corrupt them, I do so unintentionally, so that in both cases you lie. And if I am corrupting them unintentionally, it is not the custom that one should bring a man here for errors of this kind [and unintentional,] but that one should take him privately and teach and instruct him; for it is clear that, if I learn, I shall cease from doing that at any rate which I do unintentionally. But you shrank from and objected to associating with me and teaching me, but you bring me here, whither it is the custom to bring those who need not instruction, but punishment.

But in fact, men of Athens, that which I said is already apparent, that Meletus never yet took any interest either great or small in these matters. But yet, Meletus, do tell us, in what way do you say that I corrupt the younger men? Or rather, is it not clear that according to the indictment, which you preferred, I do so by teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the State believes, but in other new divinities? Do you not mean that I corrupt them by teaching this?

Meletus/ 'Yes, most decidedly I mean that.'

Socrates/ Then, Meletus, by these very gods, of whom the question now is, speak still more clearly both to me and to the judges here.

For I cannot understand whether you mean that I teach men to believe that there are some gods, and therefore myself believe that there are gods and am not altogether an atheist and do not offend in this respect, not however those at any rate in whom the State believes, but others, and that it is this with which you charge me, that I teach belief in others; or whether you say that I both absolutely disbelieve in gods myself and teach this to everyone else.

Meletus/ 'I say this, that you entirely disbelieve in gods?

Socrates/ O wonderful Meletus, wherefore do you say this? Do I not even believe, like everyone else, that the sun and moon are gods?

Meletus/ 'No, by Zeus, judges, for he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth.'

Socrates/ My dear Meletus, do you imagine that you are accusing 'Anaxagoras, and have you such a contempt for the judges, and do you think them so ignorant of letters, as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ are full of these assertions? And what is more the young learn from me those things which they are sometimes at liberty to buy for a drachma, at most, from the orchestra, and then to laugh at Socrates, if he pretends that they are his own, especially as they are so peculiar. But, by Zeus, is this your opinion of me, —that I do not believe in the existence of any god?

Meletus/ 'Indeed, by Zeus, you do not, not in the least.'

Socrates/ You are incredible, Meletus, and that too, as I think, even to yourself. For man appears to me, men of Athens, to be an utterly insolent and wanton person, and literally to have preferred this indictment with a kind of

insolence and wantonness and youthful petulance. He is like one making trial of us, putting together a sort of riddle, 'Will that wise man Socrates find out that I am jesting and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and the rest of my hearers?' For this man appears to me to be contradicting himself in his indictment, as if he were to say, 'Socrates is an evil-doer, who does not believe in gods, but believes in gods.' Yet this is mere trifling.

Help me now to consider, men of Athens, how he appears to me to mean this; but do you, Meletus, answer us. And you, men of Athens, as I requested you at the beginning, pray remember not to interrupt, if I conduct my speech in my customary manner. Is there anyone amongst men, Meletus, who believes that there are human things, but does not believe that there are human beings? He must answer, men of Athens, and not interrupt with first one remark and then another; is there anyone who does not believe in the existence of horses, but believes in that of things pertaining to horses? or who does not believe in flute-players, but believes in flute-playing? There is not, best of men. If you do not wish to give the answer, I tell it to you and everyone else here. But at least answer the next question. Is there anyone who believes in divine things, and does not believe in divinities?

Meletus/ 'There is not.'

Socrates/ How obliging of you to answer at last, on being compelled by the judges. Well then, you say that I believe in and teach the existence of divine things, whether new or old; then at all events I believe in divine things according to your statement; moreover you swore this in your deposition. But if I believe in divine things, I suppose it is an absolute necessity that I should believe in divinities. Is not this so? Of course it is; I set you down as admitting that, as you do not

answer. But do we not consider that divinities are either gods or children of gods? Yes or no?

Meletus/ 'Certainly, yes.'

Socrates/ Well then, if I do believe in divinities as you say I do, if indeed divinities are gods of some kind, this would be that about which I say that you are making riddles and jesting, saying that I, while not believing in the gods, do again on the contrary believe in them, inasmuch as I do at least believe in divinities; but if again divinities are, as it were, illegitimate children of gods, either by nymphs or some other mothers, whose children in fact they are said to be, who amongst men would believe that children of gods exist, but that gods do not? For it would be just as absurd as if anyone were to believe in the offspring of horses or likewise of asses [mules,] but were not to believe in the existence of horses and asses. But, Meletus, you must herein surely have been making trial of me when you brought this indictment, or have been in doubt as to what genuine misdeed you should lay to my charge; but that you should persuade any man who has even the smallest intelligence that it is (not) possible for the same man to believe in both divine things and things of the gods, and on the other hand possible for the same man to believe in neither divinities nor gods nor heroes, is quite inconceivable.

But in truth, men of Athens, to show that I am not indeed guilty according to Meletus' indictment, does not seem to me to require a long defense, but even this is sufficient; but as to that which I said in my foregoing remarks also, that there has arisen against me a great and widespread enmity, be well assured that it is true; and this is what will convict me, if anything does, not Meletus nor Anytus, but the prejudice and spite of the multitude; which have in fact convicted many other good men too, and, I fancy, also will convict them; there is no fear of their stopping short at me.

Well, perhaps someone might say, 'What, Socrates! are you not ashamed of having followed such a pursuit, one from which you are now in danger of death?' But I could give this man a just reply, 'You say not well, my friend, if you think that a man who is worth anything however little ought to take account of chances of life or death, and not to look, when he acts, to this alone, whether he is doing what is just or what is an just, the deeds of a good man or of a bad man. For base indeed, in your esteem at least, would be all those demigods who died at Troy, the son of Thetis above all, who thought so little of danger compared with enduring a disgrace, that when his mother, who was a goddess, spoke to him while he was burning to slay Hector, in some such words as those, I believe, 'My son, if thou shalt avenge the death of thy friend Patroclus and slay Hector, thou thyself wilt die; for in truth straightway after Hector is thy doom ready.' So she spoke; but he, hearing this, made light of death and of danger, and fearing much more to live a coward and not to avenge his friends, replied, 'Straightway may I die, having requited the evil-doer, that I may not remain here laughed to scorn beside the beaked ships, a cumberer of the ground.' Do you suppose that he cared for death and danger? For so, in truth, it is, men of Athens. Wherever a man stations himself [either] believing it to be best or is stationed by a commander, there he ought, as I think, to remain and face the danger, taking no account of anything either of death or anything else before disgrace.

Therefore, men of Athens, I should be one who has done strange things, if, when the commanders whom you chose to command me assigned to me my post both at Potidæa and at Amphipolis and at Delium, I then indeed remained at the post which they assigned like any other man and ran- the risk of death, but when the god assigned to me, as I both believed and understood, the duty of spending my life in

philosophy and in examining myself and everyone else, in that case I were to take fright at death or any other thing whatever and desert my post, Strange indeed would it be, and then in truth anyone might justly bring me into court for not believing in gods, for I should be disobeying the oracle and fearing death and thinking myself to be wise, when I was not. For to fear death, men of Athens, is nothing else than to think one is wise, when one is not, for it is to think one knows what one does not know. For indeed no one knows whether death happens to be even the greatest of all blessings to man, but men fear it as though they knew well that it was the greatest of evils. And this is surely that reprehensible ignorance, that of thinking one knows what one does not know. And in this point, men of Athens, I am here too perhaps better than most men, and if I were really to say that I am wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this, that not having full knowledge about matters in Hades, so also I think that I do not know; but to do wrong and to disobey my superior, be he god or man, I know to be evil and base. Sooner then than the evils which I know to be evils, I will never fear nor shun things as to which I know not whether they may happen to be good. And so, not even if you now acquit me, disbelieving Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have come in here in the first instance, or, as I had come in, it was impossible not to put me to death, telling you that, if I should escape, straightway would your sons, practicing what Socrates teaches, all be utterly corrupted, —if you were to say to me with regard to this, Socrates, this time we will not listen to Anytus, and we acquit you, on this condition however, on condition that you no longer continue in this research nor pursue philosophy; but if you are caught doing this again, you shall die'; if then, as I said, you were to acquit me on these terms, I should say to you, 'Men of Athens, I honor and love you, but I shall obey

the god rather than you, and as long as I breathe and have strength, never will I cease from pursuing philosophy and both exhorting your and demonstrating to whomsoever of you I may At any time meet, saying the kind of things that I am wont to say, “Best of men, you are a citizen of Athens, the greatest and most glorious city in wisdom and power, and are you not ashamed of caring for money, that you shall have as much as possible, and for reputation and honor, whilst for wisdom and truth and the soul, that it shall be as good as possible, you do not care nor take thought?” ‘And if one of you disputes my words and says that he does care, I shall not at once release him nor depart, but I shall question and cross-question and refute him, and if he seems to me not to possess virtue, but to say that he does, I shall reproach him, because he sets least value on that which is worth most, and sets more value on that which is worth less. These things will I do to whomsoever I meet, be he young or old, citizen or stranger, but especially to you citizens, inasmuch as you are nearer to me by birth. For, know well, the god commands this. And I think that no greater blessing yet befell you in the State than my service of the god. For I go about doing naught else than persuading both the younger and older of you to care neither for your bodies nor your money sooner than, or so earnestly as, for the soul, that it may be as excellent as possible, telling you that virtue does not come from money, but that money and all other blessings that men have, both in private and in public, come from virtue. Well, if I corrupt the young by saying this, that would be mischievous indeed. But if anyone declares that I say anything other than this, he is wrong. With regard to this, I would say, ‘Men of Athens, either take Anytus’ advice or do not, and either acquit me or do not acquit me, for I shall not act otherwise, not even if I have to die many times.’

Do not interrupt me, men of Athens, but pray abide by that which I requested of you, not to murmur at what I say, but to listen; indeed you will, as I think, derive benefit from listening; for I am in fact about to tell you certain other things also, at which perhaps you will raise a clamor; but on no account do this. For, be well assured, if you put me to death being such a man as I say I am, you will not be doing so much harm to me as to yourselves. For neither Meletus nor Anytus would do me any harm. In fact he would not have the power; for I do not think that a better man may be harmed by a worse. He might however kill me perhaps or banish me or disgrace me. And he, perhaps, and possibly others, think these things great evils; I however do not think them so, but much more to do what he is now doing, to try to put a man to death unjustly.

Now therefore, men of Athens, I am far from making a defense for my own sake, as one might suppose, but for yours, lest by condemning me you should at all offend with respect to the god's gift to you. For if you put me to death, you will not easily find such another, one who literally, though it may be a somewhat ridiculous thing to say, is attached by the god to the State, as if to a horse which is great indeed and noble, but somewhat sluggish from its size and requiring to be roused by some gadfly; and as such, I think, has the god attached me to the State, being such an one as I am, who, rousing and persuading and reproaching each one of you, never cease settling upon you at every point the whole day long; another such man then will not easily be found for you, men of Athens, but if you take my advice, you will spare me. But you perhaps being vexed, like those who while napping are awakened, might; strike me, and, yielding to Anytus, might thoughtlessly kill me, then you might go to sleep and so continue for the rest of your lives, unless the god, caring for you, should send upon you some

other. But that I happen to be such as to have been given by the god to the State, you might discern from this; it is not like human nature that I have neglected all my own affairs and have now for so many years suffered my private Interests to be neglected, whereas I am always doing your business, going to each man separately and, like a father or an elder brother, persuading him to care for virtue. And certainly, if I had been deriving any profit from this, and had received payment for these exhortations, I should have had some reason for my conduct; but as it is you see of course yourselves, that my accusers, while in all else accusing me so shamelessly, could not at any rate have the effrontery to produce a witness and say that I ever either exacted or requested any payment. For sufficient, I think, is the witness I produce that I speak the truth, —my poverty.

Now perhaps it might appear to be strange that I do indeed give this advice in private, going about and being very busy, whereas I do not venture to come forward in public before your assembly and give advice to the State. But the reason of this is what you have often heard me say in many places, that there comes to me something from the gods and divine [a voice,] which, as you know, Meletus caricatured in his indictment, when he drew it up. But I have had this, beginning from my childhood, a kind of voice coming to me, which when it comes always diverts me from that which I am about to do, but never urges me on; this it is which opposes my taking part in politics; for, be well assured, men of Athens, if I had [long ago] attempted to take part in political affairs, I should [as] long ago have perished and have done no good either to you or to myself. And be not angry with me when I tell you the truth; there is no man who will preserve his life while honestly opposing either you or any other multitude and preventing many unjust and unlawful things being done in the State, but it is necessary that he who will

really fight for what is just, if he is to preserve his life even for a short time, should be a private citizen and not a public man.

And I will give you strong proofs of this, not words, but, what you value, deeds. Listen then to what has happened to me, in order that you may know that I would not through fear of death yield to any man contrary to what is just, but that, if I did not yield at once, I should also at once be likely to perish. What I shall tell you will be commonplace and forensic, yet true. For I, men of Athens, never yet held any office in the State, but once I was a senator; and our tribe [Antiochis] happened to be presiding, when you wished to judge in a body the ten generals who did not rescue their men after the sea-fight, illegally, as afterwards you all came to think. On that occasion I alone of all the presidents opposed [your] doing anything contrary to the laws, [and gave my vote against you;] and when the speakers were ready to denounce and arrest me, and you were urging them on and shouting, I thought I ought rather to face the danger out on the side of the law and justice than through fear of imprisonment or death, to side with you who were meditating on unjust course. And that was while the State was still a democracy. But again when it became an oligarchy, the Thirty, having sent for me and four others to come to the Rotunda, ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, that he might be put to death; and, as you know, they gave many such orders to many others, wishing to contaminate with guilt as many as they could. Then however I again showed not in word, but in deed, that for death indeed, —if the expression be not too rude, —I do not care a jot, but as to doing nothing unjust or unholy, that is all my care. For I was not so terrified by that government, strong as it was, as to commit an unjust action, but when we came out from the Rotunda, the four indeed

went to Salamis and brought Leon, but I departed and went home. And perhaps I should have suffered death for this, if the government had not speedily been overthrown; and of this you will have many witnesses.

Do you then suppose that I should have survived for so many years, if I had taken part in public affairs, and, acting in a manner worthy of a good man, had supported what was just, and had, as I ought, set the highest value on that? Far from it, men of Athens; nor in fact would any other man. But I throughout my life, if I did anything anywhere in public, shall be found to have been a man of this kind, and in private also the same, one who never yet has yielded to any man in anything contrary to what is just either to any other or to one of these, who those who slander me say are my disciples. I however never yet became any man's teacher; but, if anyone desires to hear me speaking and doing my own work, whether he be young or old, I never grudged it to anyone. Neither do I converse only if I receive payment, and not if I receive none, but I offer myself to rich and poor alike to ask me questions and to anyone who wishes to answer and hear what I have to say. And for these, whether anyone turns out a good man or not, I should not justly incur the responsibility, to none of whom I ever yet either promised any instruction or taught them.

And if anyone says that he has ever yet learnt or heard from me in private anything which everyone else did not also hear, be well assured that he is not speaking the truth.

But why really do some delight in spending much time with me? You have heard, men of Athens; I told you the whole truth, that, hearing they take delight in the examination of those who think they are wise, but are not; 'for that is somewhat amusing. And this, as I say, has been assigned to me by the god to do, both by oracles and by dreams and in every way in which any other divine decree

also ever assigned anything whatever to a man to do. This, men of Athens, is both true and easy to prove. For if I am in fact corrupting some of the young, and have corrupted others, they surely ought, if any of them when they grew older had found out that I ever gave them any bad advice when they were young, to have come forward now and accused me and taken their revenge; but if they themselves were unwilling, some of their kinsmen, fathers or brothers or other relatives, if their kinsmen had suffered any evil from me, should have remembered it now [and taken their revenge.] And certainly many of them are present here, whom I see; first, there is Crito, of the same age and dome as myself, father of Critobulus here; then Lysanias of Sphettus, father of Æschines here; again, here in Antiphon of Cephisus, father of Epigenes. Here are those others besides, whose brothers have engaged in this occupation of mine, Nicostratus, the son of Theozotides, brother of Theodotus, —Theodotus indeed is dead, so that he at least could not try to influence him, —and here is Paralus, the son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages. And Adeimantus, the son of Ariston, whose brother is Plato here, and Æantodorus, whose brother is Apollodorus here. And I could mention to you many others, of whom Meletus ought certainly to have called someone as a witness in the course of his own speech; but if he forgot then, let him call one now, —I give him my place, —and let him speak, if he has any such evidence. But quite contrary to this, men of Athens, you will find them all ready to support me, who corrupt, who work evil against their kinsmen, as Meletus and Anytus declare. For those who themselves have been corrupted would perhaps have some reason for supporting me; but those who are uncorrupted, men now advanced in years, the relations of these, what other reason have they for supporting me except the right and just reason, that they

are conscious that Meletus is lying, but that I am speaking the truth?

Very well, men of Athens; the things which I might have to say in my defense are pretty much these and others perhaps of the same kind. But perhaps someone among you might be displeased on remembering his own case, if he indeed, when contesting a suit even less important than this, both implored and besought the judges with many tears, having brought before the court not only his own children, in order that he might be pitied as much as possible, but also many of his relations and friends besides, whereas I, it appears, will do none of these things, and that too when, as it seems, I am in the extremity of danger. Perhaps then someone, having reflected upon this, might become more remorseless towards me, and being angered for these very reasons, might give his vote in anger. Now if anyone among you is in this state of mind, —I do not assume that be is; but if he is, I think that I should say what is reasonable in answer to him, if I said, 'Best of men, I perhaps have some kinsmen too.' In fact, to use that saying of Homer, 'Neither am I born of oak or rock,' but of man; and so I also have kinsmen and I have sons, men of Athens, three sons, one now a youth and two still children. But yet I shall not bring any of them forward here and implore you to acquit me. Now why is it that I shall do none of these things? Not out of obstinacy, men of Athens, nor out of disrespect to you, but whether or not I am undaunted in the face of death, is another question; at any rate both for my own credit and yours and that of the State as a whole, it does not seem to me to be honorable that I should do any of these things, both as being of such an age and as bearing this name, whether it be true or a lie; but at least it has been decided that Socrates is in some respect superior to the multitude. If therefore those of you who are thought to be superior

whether in wisdom or courage or any other virtue whatsoever, shall be men of this kind, it would be disgraceful; the kind, I mean, of which I have often seen some, when they are brought to trial, men considered to be somewhat, but making marvelous efforts, as imagining that they would suffer a terrible thing, it they were put to death, as though they would be immortal, if you did not kill them; and these seem to me to fasten discredit on the State, so that any stranger too might suppose that those of the Athenians who excel in virtue, those whom they themselves select in preference to themselves both in the magistracies and in the other posts of honor, —these are in naught superior to women. For, men of Athens, neither ought we who are thought to be even anything whatever to do these things, nor if we do them, ought you to allow it, but you should show this very thing, that you will much rather condemn the man who introduces these pitiful stage-effects and makes the State ridiculous than him who remains quiet.

But apart from reputation, men of Athens, it does not seem to me to be just either, to entreat a judge nor by entreating to gain acquittal, but to inform and persuade him. For it is not for this that a judge sits, —for dispensing justice by favor, but for giving judgment thereupon; and he has sworn not to favor whomsoever he pleases, but to judge according to the laws. It is therefore neither right that we should accustom you to perjure yourselves nor that you should become accustomed so to do; for neither of us would be acting with piety.

Do not therefore deem it right that I should do towards you such things as I consider neither honorable nor just nor holy, —yes, by Zeus, in all cases and especially now, when I am being accused of impiety by Meletus here. For if I were to persuade you and by entreating were to put constraint upon you when you had taken an oath, I should clearly be

teaching you not to believe that there are gods, and while making my defense, should literally be accusing myself of not believing in gods. But this is far from being the case; for I believe, men of Athens, as none of my accusers do, and I leave it to you and the god to judge concerning me in whatever way is destined to be best both for me and for you.

That I am not vexed, men of Athens, at this which has happened, that you have condemned me, both many other things contribute to bring about, and especially this, —that what has happened has not happened contrary to my expectation, but much more do I wonder at the resulting number of the votes on each side. For I at least did not imagine that it would be by so little, but by much; but as it is, apparently, if only thirty of the votes had changed their side, I should have been acquitted.

As against Meletus indeed, I think, I have even as it is gained an acquittal, and not only have I gained an acquittal, but this at least is clear to everyone, that if Anytus and Lycon had not come forward to accuse me, he would even have been fined a thousand drachma, for not having obtained the fifth part of the votes.

So the man assesses the penalty at death. Very well. But at what would you have me set the counter-assessment, men of Athens? Evidently at my deserts, would you not? 'What then shall I say? What do I deserve to suffer or to pay, because during my life I did not remain quiet, but having neglected what most men care for, money-making and domestic affairs and military appointments and popular oratory and also all the offices and clubs and factions which exist in the State, thinking myself to be in reality too honest to enter upon these and yet preserve my life, so I did not indeed enter on that, by entering on which I was not likely to be of any service either to you or myself, but entering on doing in private to each individual the greatest service, as I

call it, [on that I entered] trying to persuade each of you not to care first either for any of his own affairs before he cared for himself, that he might be as good and wise as possible, nor for any of the affairs of the State before the State itself; and to care for everything else thus in the same manner. What then do I, being a man of this kind, deserve to suffer? Something good, men of Athens, if at least I must in truth assess the penalty according to my deserts; and moreover a good thing of a kind which would be suitable for me. What then is suitable for a poor man, a benefactor, one who requires to be at leisure for the purpose of exhorting you? There is nothing, men of Athens, which is more suitable than that such a man should be maintained in the Prytaneum, much more at least than anyone among you who has won a victory at Olympia with a horse or a pair or a team. For he indeed makes you appear to be happy, but I make you to be so; and he is not in need of support, but I am. If then I must assess the penalty at my deserts according to what is just, I assess it at this, maintenance in the Prytaneum.

Now perhaps in saying this also, I seem to speak in much the same way as about lamentations and entreaty, speaking pre-sumptuously; but the case is not, men of Athens, like that, but rather like this. I am convinced that I never wronged any man intentionally, but I do not convince you of this; for it is but a short time that we have conversed with one another; or else, as I believe, if you had a law, as 'other men have, not to decide a capital case in a single day only, but in many,' you would have been convinced. But, as it is, to clear away gross calumnies in a short time is no easy matter. Convinced then as I am that I have wronged no man, I am far from likely to wrong myself and to declare against myself that I am worthy of any evil and to assess the penalty for myself at something of this kind. Through fear of what? Is it lest I should suffer that which Meletus assesses ¦ for

me, as to which I say I know not either if it is good or if it is evil? Instead of this then am I to choose what I well know are evils, assessing it at this? At imprisonment? And why should I live in a prison, a slave to the 'magistracy appointed from time to time [the Eleven?] Or at a fine and to lie imprisoned until I have paid it? But for me that is the same as what I mentioned just now; for I have no money, from which to pay. Then am I to assess it at exile? For perhaps you would assess it at this for me. A great love of life would indeed possess me, if I were to be so devoid of reason as not to be able to infer, that you indeed being my fellow-citizens became unable to bear my occupations and my discourses, and they have become burdensome and odious to you, so that you are now seeking to be released from them, whereas others of course will bear them cheerfully. Far from it, men of Athens; a fine life indeed would it be for a man of my age, having gone into exile, to live changing from one city to another and being expelled. For I know well that, wherever I go, the young will listen to me discoursing, as they do here; and, if I drive them away, they will themselves expel me, persuading their elders; but if I do not drive them away, their fathers and kinsmen will expel me for their sakes.

Perhaps then someone would say, 'But will you not be able, Socrates, having gone Into exile, to live being silent and remaining quiet?' It is just this, of which it is the hardest of all to convince some of you. For if on the one hand I say that this is to disobey the god and that for this reason it is impossible to remain quiet, you will not believe me, thinking that I am dissembling; or if on the other hand I say that this happens also to be a very great blessing to a man, to discourse each day on virtue and the other matters, about which you hear me conversing and examining myself and others, and that an unexamined life is not worth living, when I say this still less will you believe me. The facts are indeed

as I say, men of Athens, but to convince you is no easy matter. And at the same time I have not been accustomed to deem myself deserving of any evil. If indeed I had money, I should have assessed the penalty at a fine of as much as I was expected to pay; for I should have suffered no harm; but as it is, —for I have none, unless of course you wish to assess it for me at as much as I should be able to pay. And perhaps I should have been able to pay you a mina of silver; at so much then I assess it. But Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito and Critobulus and Apollodorus tell me to assess it at thirty mines, and that they themselves are my sureties; so I assess it at so much. And these will lie trustworthy sureties to you for the money.

It is not for the sake of much time, men of Athens, that you will have the name and the blame from those who wish to defame the State, of having put to death Socrates, a wise man. For they who wish to reproach you will say indeed that I am wise, even although I am not. Now if you had waited for a short time, this would have happened for you of its own accord; for you surely observe my age, that it is already far on in life, and nigh to death. And I say this not to you all, but to those who have condemned me to death. And to these very men I say this also. Perhaps you think, men of Athens, that I have been convicted through deficiency of the kind of argument, by which I should have convinced you, had I thought it right to do and to say anything, so as to be acquitted. Far from it. I have indeed been convicted through deficiency, not however of arguments, but of audacity and impudence and the will to utter before you such things as would have been most pleasant to you to hear, namely me both wailing and lamenting and doing and saying many other things, which, as I say, are unworthy of me; such things in fact as you have been accustomed to hear from other men. But neither then did I think that I ought because

of the danger to do any slavish action, nor now do I repent of having thus made my defense, but much rather do I prefer to have made my defense in this way and to die than to have made it in that way and to live; for neither in a lawsuit nor in war ought I or any other person to contrive this, how by using any means he shall avoid death. And in fact it often becomes evident in battles that a man might escape, At least from death, by laying down his arms and turning to supplication of his pursuers; and there are many devices in every danger so as to escape death, if a man will venture to do and say anything. But this, I think, may not be difficult, men of Athens, to escape death, but it is far more difficult to escape wickedness; for it runs swifter than death. And now I, inasmuch as I am slow and old, have been overtaken by the slower, but my accusers, inasmuch as they are clever and swift, have been overtaken by the swifter, wickedness. And now I indeed shall depart, having been condemned by you to death, but these, having been condemned by truth to depravity and injustice. And I abide by the assessment and so do they. Perhaps it was necessary too that these things should so befall, and I think that they are fair.

In the next place I desire to prophesy to you who have condemned me; for I am in fact now in that case in which men most do prophesy, —when they are about to die. Men of Athens, I tell you, who have put me to death, that straightway after my death a punishment will come upon you far more severe, by Zeus, than that with which you have put me to death; for now you have done this, thinking you would be released from giving an account of your lives. But, I tell you, the case will turn out for you far otherwise. Those who call you to account will be more numerous, whom I have now restrained, though you did not perceive it; and they will be more severe inasmuch as they are younger and you will be more vexed. For if you imagine that by putting men to

death you will stop anyone from reproaching you for not living rightly, you are mistaken; for that method of escape is neither altogether possible nor honorable, but this is both very honorable and very easy, not to suppress other men, but to prepare one's self to be as good as possible. Having then prophesied this to you who have voted against me, I take my leave of you.

But with you who have voted for my acquittal I would gladly converse about this thing which has come to pass, while the magistrates are busy, and while yet I do not go to the place where I must go and die. Stay here with me then, men of Athens, so long. For nothing hinders our talking with one another, while we may. For I wish to explain to you, as being my friends, what may be the meaning of that which has now befallen me. To me, my judges, —for in calling you judges I should call you rightly, —a marvelous thing has happened. For my customary prophetic voice, that of the divinity, in all the former time was on all occasions quite constant, opposing me even in quite trifling matters, if in aught I were not going to act rightly; but now that has happened to me which you yourselves also see, which anyone might surely suppose, and which is considered, to be the extreme of evil. Yet neither when in the morning I was leaving my house did the sign of the god oppose me, nor when I was coming up here [before the court,] nor anywhere in my speech when I was about to say anything; and yet in other discourses it has at many points checked me in the midst of speaking. But now it has nowhere in this matter opposed me either in any deed or word. What then do I conceive to be the reason of this? I will tell you; it is probable that this which has happened has been a good thing for me, and it cannot be that we conceive rightly, as many of us as suppose that to die is an evil. Surely a great proof of this has arisen; for it is not possible that the accustomed sign would

have failed to oppose me, if I had not been about to achieve some good.

And let us consider in this way also, that there is much hope that it is a good thing. For to die is one of two things; either it is such that the dead man is nothing and has no sensation of anything, or, according to what men say, it happens to be a kind of change and migration of the soul from the present abode, into another. And 'if on the one hand there is no sensation, but something like a sleep wherein one sleeping sees not even a dream, death would be a marvelous gain. For I think that if a man had to select that night in which he slept so soundly that he did not even see a dream, and, having compared with this night all the other nights and days of his life, had to reflect and say how many days and nights in bin life he had spent better and more pleasantly than this night, I think that not only a private person, but even the great king himself would find these easy to count compared with the other days and nights. If then death is such as this, I for my part count it a gain. For in fact all time thus appears to be nothing more than a single night. But if on the other hand death is like going a journey from here to another place, and what is said is true, namely that all the dead are there, what greater blessing could there be than this, my judges? For if anyone, having arrived at Hades, delivered from these who profess to be judges, shall find those who truly are judges, who are also said to give judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Æacus and Triptolemus, and such others of the demigods as were just in their lives, would the journey be worthless? Or again, how much would any of you give to associate with Orpheus and Musæus and Hesiod and Homer? I indeed nm willing to die many times, if these things are true; for to myself especially the sojourn there would be admirable, when I should meet with Palamedes and Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other

of the ancients who has died through an unjust judgment, and for me to compare my own sufferings with theirs would, as I think, be not unpleasant; and, the greatest thing of all, to spend my time questioning and making inquiry of those who are there, as of those here, to see which of them is wise and which thinks that he is, but is not. And how much, my judges, would anyone give to question him who led the great army against Troy, or Odysseus or Sisyphus or ten thousand others one might mention, both men and women? To converse with whom and to be with them and question them would be an infinite degree of happiness. There, I suppose, they certainly do not put men to death for this; 'for those that are there are not only happier in all else than those that are here, but are now and forever immortal, if at least what is said is true.

But you also, my judges, ought to be of good cheer with respect to death and to contemplate this one thing as true, that for a good man there is no evil, either while living or when dead, nor are his fortunes neglected by the gods; nor have mine now befallen me by chance, but this is clear to me, that to die now and be rid of trouble was better for me. On this account the sign nowhere turned me aside, and I for my part am hardly angry with my accusers. And yet it was not with this intention that they condemned me or accused me, but thinking to do me harm; for this they deserve blame. Thus much however I beg of them; punish my sons when they grow up, men of Athens, troubling them in the very same way as I have troubled you, if they seem to you to care either for money or for anything else sooner than for virtue; and if they think that they are something, when they are nothing at all, reproach them, as I did you, because they care not for what they ought and think that they are something when they are worth nothing. And if you do this, I shall have received justice at your hands, both myself and

my sons. But now it is time to depart, —for me to die, for you to live. But which of us goes to the better lot, is unknown to everyone but the god.

The Apology.

of

Socrates.

Translated by Taylor, Thomas.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates; Melitus.

Socrates/ I know not, O Athenians, how you may be affected by my accusers: I indeed have through them almost forgotten myself, so persuasively have they spoken; though, as I may say, they have not asserted anything which is true. But among the multitude of their false assertions I am most surprised at this, in which they say that you ought to beware of being deceived by me, as if I were an eloquent speaker. For that they should not be ashamed of asserting that which will be immediately confuted by me in reality, since in the present instance I shall appear to you to be by no means eloquent, —this seems to me to be the consummation of impudence; unless they call him eloquent who speaks the truth. For, if they assert this, I shall indeed acknowledge myself to be a rhetorician, though not according to their conceptions. They have not then, as I said, asserted anything which is true; but from me you will hear all the truth. Not, by Zeus, O Athenians, that you will hear from me a discourse splendidly decorated with nouns and verbs, and adorned in other respects, like the harangues of these men; but you will hear me speaking in such language as may casually present itself. For I am confident that what I say will be just, nor let anyone of you expect it will be otherwise: For it does not become one of my age to come before you like a lad with a studied discourse. And, indeed, I very much request and beseech you, O Athenians, that if you should

hear me apologizing in the same terms and modes of expression which I am accustomed to use in the Forum, on the Exchange and public Banks, and in other places, where many of you have heard me, —that you will neither wonder nor be disturbed on this account; for the case is as follows: —I now for the first time come before this tribunal, though I am more than seventy years old; and consequently I am a stranger to the mode of speaking which is here adopted. As, therefore, if I were in reality a foreigner, you would pardon me for using the language and the manner in which I had been educated, so now I request you, and this justly, as it appears to me, to suffer the mode of my diction, whether it be better or worse, and to attend to this, whether I speak what is just or not: for this is the virtue of a judge, as that of an orator is to speak the truth. In the first place, therefore, O Athenians, it is just that I should answer the first false accusations of me, and my first accusers, and afterwards the latter accusations, and the latter accusers. For many have been accusers of me to you for many years, and who have asserted nothing true, of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his accomplices, though these indeed are powerful in persuading; but those are still more so, who having been conversant with many of you from infancy, have persuaded you, and accused me falsely. For they have said, that there is one Socrates, a wise man, studious of things on high, and exploring everything under the earth, and who also can make the worse to be the better argument. These men, O Athenians, who spread this report are my dire accusers. For those who hear it think that such as investigate these things do not believe that there are Gods. In the next place, these accusers are numerous, and have accused me for a long time. They also said these things to you in that age in which you would most readily believe them, some of you being boys and lads; and they accused

me quietly, no one speaking in my defense. But that which is most irrational of all is this, that neither is it possible to know and tell their names, except some one of them should be a comic poet. Such however as have persuaded you by employing envy and calumny, together with those who being persuaded themselves have persuaded others, —with respect to all these, the method to be adopted is most dubious. For it is not possible to call them to account here before you, nor to confute anyone of them; but it is necessary, as if fighting with shadows, to make my defense and refutation without any to answer me. Consider, therefore, as I have said, that my accusers are two-fold, some having accused me lately, and others formerly; and think that it is necessary I should answer the latter of these first; for you also have heard these my accusers, and much more than you have those by whom I have been recently accused. Be it so. I must defend myself then, O Athenians, and endeavor in this so short a space of time to remove from you the calumny which you have so long entertained. I wish, therefore, that this my defense may effect something better both for you and me, and that it may contribute to some more important end. I think however that it will be attended with difficulty, and I am not entirely ignorant what the difficulty is. At the same time let this terminate as Divinity pleases. It is my business to obey the law, and to make my apology.

Let us repeat, therefore, from the beginning what the accusation was, the source of that calumny in which Melitus confiding brought this charge against me. Be it so. What then do my accusers say? For their accusation must be formally recited as if given upon oath. It is this: SOCRATES ACTS WICKEDLY, AND WITH CRIMINAL CURIOSITY INVESTIGATES THINGS UNDER THE EARTH, AND IN THE HEAVENS. HE ALSO MAKES THE WORSE TO BE THE BETTER ARGUMENT; AND HE TEACHES

THESE THINGS TO OTHERS. Such is the accusation: for things of this kind you also have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes: for there one Socrates is carried about, who affirms that he walks upon the air, and idly asserts many other trifles of this nature; of which things however I neither know much nor little. Nor do I say this as despising such a science, if there be anyone wise about things of this kind, lest Melitus should charge me with this as a new crime; but because, O Athenians, I have no such knowledge. I adduce many of you as witnesses of this, and I call upon such of you as have at any time heard me discoursing, and there are many such among you, to teach and declare to each other, if you have ever heard me speak much or little about things of this kind. And from this you may know that other things also, which the multitude assert of me, are all of them of a similar nature: for no one of them is true. For neither if you have heard anyone assert that I attempt to teach men, and that I make money by so doing, —neither is this true. This indeed appears to me to be a beautiful thing, if someone is able to instruct men, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, and Hippias the Elean. For each of these, in the several cities which he visits, has the power of persuading the young men, who are permitted to apply themselves to such of their own countrymen as they please without any charge, to adhere to them only, and to give them money and thanks besides for their instruction. There is also another wise man, a Parian, who I hear has arrived hither. For it happened that I once met with a man who spends more money on the sophists than all others, —I mean Callias the son of Hipponicus. I therefore asked him, for he has two sons, O Callias, said I, if your two sons were two colts or calves, should we not have someone to take care of them, who would be paid for so doing, and who would make them beautiful, and the possessors of such good qualities as

belong to their nature? But now, since your sons are men, what master do you intend to have for them? Who is there that is scientifically knowing in human and political virtue of this kind? For I think that you have considered this, since you have sons. Is there such a one, said I, or not? There certainly is, he replied. Who is he? said I. And whence is he? And for how much money does he teach? It is Evenus the Parian, said he, Socrates, and he teaches for five minæ. And I indeed have considered Evenus as blessed. if he in reality possesses this art, and so elegantly teaches. I, therefore, should also glory and think highly of myself, if I had a scientific knowledge of these things; but this, O Athenians, is certainly not the case.

Perhaps, however, someone may reply: But, Socrates, what have you done then? Whence have these calumnies against you arisen? For unless you had more curiously employed yourself than others, and had done something different from the multitude, so great a rumor would never have been raised against you. Tell us, therefore, what it is, that we may not pass an unadvised sentence against you. He who says these things appears to me to speak justly, and I will endeavor to show you what that is which has occasioned me this appellation and calumny. Hear, therefore; and though perhaps I shall appear to some of you to jest, yet be well assured that I shall tell you all the truth. For I, O Athenians, have acquired this name through nothing else than a certain wisdom. But of what kind is this wisdom? Perhaps it is human wisdom. For this in reality I appear to possess. Those indeed whom I just now mentioned possessed perhaps more than human wisdom, which I know not how to denominate: for I have no knowledge of it. And whoever says that I have, speaks falsely, and asserts this to calumniate me. But, O Athenians, be not disturbed if I appear to speak somewhat magnificently of myself. For this

which I say is not my own assertion, but I shall refer it to one who is considered by you as worthy of belief. For I shall adduce to you the Delphic Deity himself as a testimony of my wisdom, if I have any, and of the quality it possesses. You certainly then know Chærepho: he was my associate from a youth, was familiar with most of you, and accompanied you in and returned with you from your exile. You know, therefore, what kind of a man Chærepho was, and how eager in all his undertakings. He then, coming to Delphi, had the boldness to consult the oracle about this particular. Be not, as I said, O Athenians, disturbed: for he asked if there was anyone more wise than I am. The Pythian priestess, therefore, answered that there was not anyone more wise. His brother can testify to you the truth of these things; for Chærepho himself is dead.

Consider then on what account I assert these things: for I am going to inform you whence this calumny against me arose. When, therefore, I had heard this answer of the oracle, I thus considered with myself, What does the God say? and what does he obscurely signify? For I am not conscious to myself that I am wise, either in a great or in a small degree. What then does he mean in saying that I am most wise? For he does not lie, since this is not lawful to him. And for a long time, indeed, I was dubious what he could mean. Afterwards with considerable difficulty I betook myself to the following mode of investigating his meaning. I went to one of those who appear to be wise men, that here if any where I might confute the prediction, and evince to the oracle that this man was more wise than I. Surveying, therefore, this man, (for there is no occasion to mention his name, but he was a politician;) while I beheld him and discoursed with him, it so happened, O Athenians, that this man appeared to me to be wise in the opinion of many other men, and especially in his own, but that he was not so. And afterwards I endeavored to

show him that he fancied himself to be wise, but was not. Hence I became odious to him, and also to many others that were present. Departing, therefore, I reasoned with myself that I was wiser than this man. For it appears that neither of us knows anything beautiful or good: but he indeed not knowing, thinks that he knows something; but I, as I do not know anything, neither do I think that I know. Hence in this trifling particular I appear to be wiser than him, because I do not think that I know things which I do not know. After this I went to another of those who appeared to be wiser than him; and of him also I formed the same opinion. Hence also I became odious to him and many others.

Afterwards however I went to others, suspecting and grieving and fearing that I should make enemies. At the same time however it appeared to me to be necessary to pay the greatest attention to the oracle of the God, and that, considering what could be its meaning, I should go to all that appeared to possess any knowledge. And by the dog, O Athenians, (For it is necessary to tell you the truth,) that which happened to me was as follows. Those that were most celebrated for their wisdom appeared to me to be most remote from it; but others who were considered as far inferior to them possessed more of intellect. But it is necessary to relate to you my wandering, and the labors as it were which I endured, that the oracle might become to me unconfuted. For after the politicians I went to the poets both tragic and dithyrambic, and also others, expecting that I should here immediately find myself to be less wise than these. Taking up, therefore, some of their poems which appeared to me to be the most elaborately written, I asked them what was their meaning, that at the same time I might learn something from them. I am ashamed indeed, O Athenians, to tell you the truth; but at the same time it must be told. For, as I may say, all that were present would have

spoken better about the things which they had composed. I discovered this, therefore, in a short time concerning the poets, that they did not effect, by wisdom that which they did, but by a certain genius and from enthusiastic energy, like prophets and those that utter oracles. For these also say many and beautiful things, but they understand nothing of what they say. Poets, therefore, appeared to me to be affected in a similar manner. And at the same time I perceived that they considered themselves, on account of their poetry, to be the wisest of men in other things, in which they were not so. I departed, therefore, also from them, thinking that I surpassed them by the very same thing in which I surpassed the politicians.

In the last place, therefore, I went to the artificers. For I was conscious to myself that I knew nothing, as I may say, but that these men possessed knowledge, because I had found them acquainted with many and beautiful things. And in this indeed I was not deceived; for they knew things which I did not, and in this they were wiser than I. But, O Athenians, good artificers also appeared to me to have the same fault as the poets. For each, in consequence of performing well in his art, thought that he was also most wise in other things, and those the greatest. And this their error obscured that very wisdom which they did possess. I therefore asked myself in behalf of the oracle, whether I would choose to be as I am, possessing no part either of their wisdom or ignorance, or to have both which they possess. I answered, therefore, for myself and for the oracle, that it was advantageous for me to be as I am.

From this my investigation, O Athenians, many enmities were excited against me, and such as were most grievous and weighty, so that many calumnies were produced from them; and hence I obtained the appellation of the wise man. For those that hear me think that I am wise in these things,

the ignorance of which I confute in others. It appears however, O Athenians, that Divinity is wise in reality, and that in this oracle he says this, that human wisdom is but of little, or indeed of no worth; and it seems that he used my name, making me an example, as if he had said, He, O men, is the wisest among you, who, like Socrates, knows that he is in reality of no worth with respect to wisdom. These things, therefore, going about, I even now inquire and explore in obedience to the God, both among citizens and strangers, if anyone of them appears to me to be wise; and when I find he is not, giving assistance to the God, I demonstrate that he is not wise. And in consequence of this employment I have no leisure worth mentioning either for public or private transactions; but I am in great poverty through my religious cultivation of the God.

Besides, the youth that spontaneously follow me, who especially abound in leisure, as being the sons of the most wealthy, rejoice on hearing men confuted by me; and often imitating me, they afterwards endeavor to make trial of others. In which attempt I think they find a numerous multitude of men who fancy that they know something, but who know little or nothing. Hence, therefore, those who are tried by them are angry with me, and not with them, and say that there is one Socrates a most wicked person, and who corrupts the youth. And when someone asks them what he does, and what he teaches, they have nothing to say, but are ignorant. That they may not however appear to be dubious, they assert things which may be readily adduced against all that philosophize, as, that he explores things on high and under the earth, that he does not think there are Gods, and that he makes the worse to be the better reason. For I think they are not willing to speak the truth, that they clearly pretend to be knowing, but know nothing. Hence, as it appears to me, being ambitious and vehement and

numerous, and speaking in an elegant and persuasive manner about me, they fill your ears, both before and now calumniating in the extreme. Among these, Melitus, Anytus, and Lycon, have attacked me; Melitus indeed being my enemy on account of the poets; but Anytus on account of the artificers and politicians; and Lycon on account of the orators. So that, as I said in the beginning, I should wonder if I could remove such an abundant calumny from your minds in so short a time. These things, O Athenians, are true; and I thus speak, neither concealing nor subtracting anything from you, either great or small; though I nearly know that I shall make enemies by what I have said. This however is an argument that I speak the truth, that this is the calumny which is raised against me, and that the causes of it are these. And whether now or hereafter you investigate these things, you will find them to be as I have said. Concerning the particulars, therefore, which my first accusers urged against me, let this be a sufficient apology to you.

In the next place, I shall endeavor to reply to Melitus, that good man and lover of his country, as he says, and also to my latter accusers. For again, as being different from the former accusers, let us take the oath of these men for calumny. The accusation then is as follows: Socrates, it says, acts unjustly, corrupting the youth; and not believing in those Gods in which the city believes, he introduces other novel dæmoniacal natures. Such then is the accusation; of which let us examine every part. It says, therefore, that I act unjustly by corrupting the youth. But I, O Athenians, say that Melitus acts unjustly, because he intentionally trifles, rashly bringing men into danger, and pretending to be studious and solicitous about things which were never the objects of his care. But that this is the case I will endeavor to show you.

Tell me then, O Melitus, whether you consider it as a thing of the greatest consequence, for the youth to become the best of men? —

Meletus/ I do. —

Socrates/ Come, then, do you therefore tell them what will make them better? For it is evident that you know, since it is the object of your care. For, having found me to be a corrupter of youth, as you say, you have brought me hither, and are my accuser; but come, inform me who it is that makes them better, and signify it to this assembly do you see, O Melitus, that you are silent, and have not anything to say? Though, does it not appear to you to be shameful, and a sufficient argument of what I say, that this is not the object of your attention? But tell me, O good man, who it is that makes them better. —

Meletus/ The laws. —

Socrates/ I do not, however, ask this, O best of men, but what man it is that first knows this very thing, the laws. —

Meletus/ These men, Socrates, are the judges. —

Socrates/ How do you say, Melitus? Do they know how to instruct the youth, and to make them better? —

Meletus/ Especially so. —

Socrates/ But whether do all of them know how? or do some of them know, and others not? —

Meletus/ All of them. —

Socrates/ You speak well, by Hera, and adduce a great abundance of those that benefit. But what? Can these auditors also make the youth better, or not? —

Meletus/ These also. —

Socrates/ And what of the senators? —

Meletus/ These senators also can effect this. —

Socrates/ But, O Melitus, do some of those that harangue the people in an assembly corrupt the more juvenile; or do all these make them better? —

Meletus/ All these. —

Socrates/ All the Athenians therefore, as it seems, make them to be worthy and good, except me, but I alone corrupt them. Do you say so? —

Meletus/ These very things I strenuously assert. —

Socrates/ You charge me with a very great infelicity. But answer me: Does this also appear to you to be the case respecting horses, *viz.* that all men can make them better, but that there is only one person that corrupts them? or does the perfect contrary of this take place, so that it is one person who can make them better, or, at least, that those possessed of equestrian skill are very few; but the multitude, if they meddle with and make use of horses, corrupt them? Is not this the case, O Melitus, both with respect to horses and all other animals? It certainly is so, whether you and Anytus say so, or not. For a great felicity would take place concerning youth if only one person corrupted, and the rest benefited them. However, you have sufficiently shown, O Melitus, that you never bestowed any care upon youth; and you clearly evince your negligence, and that you pay no attention to the particulars for which you accuse me.

Further still, tell me, by Zeus, O Melitus, whether it is better to dwell in good or in bad polities? Answer, my friend: for I ask you nothing difficult. Do not the depraved always procure some evil to those that continually reside near them; and do not the good procure some good? —

Meletus/ Entirely so. —

Socrates/ Is there then anyone who wishes to be injured by his associates, rather than to be benefited? Answer, O

good man: for the law orders you to answer. Is there anyone who wishes to be injured? —

Meletus/ There is not. —

Socrates/ Come then, whether do you bring me hither, as one that corrupts the youth, and makes them depraved willingly, or as one who does this unwillingly? —

Meletus/ I say that you do it willingly. —

Socrates/ But what, O Melitus, is it possible that you, who are so much younger than I am, should well know that the depraved always procure some evil to those that are most near to them, and the good some good; but that I should have arrived at such ignorance as not to know that, if I make anyone of my associates depraved, I shall be in danger of receiving some evil from him; and that I, therefore, do this so great an evil willingly, as you say? I cannot be persuaded by you, O Melitus, as to these things, nor do I think that any other man would: but either I do not corrupt the youth, or I corrupt them unwillingly. So that you speak falsely in both assertions. But if I unwillingly corrupt them, the law does not order me to be brought hither for such-like involuntary offences, but that I should be taken and privately taught and admonished. For it is evident that, if I am taught better, I shall cease doing that which I unwillingly do. But you, indeed, have avoided me, and have not been willing to associate with and instruct me; but you have brought me hither, where the law orders those who require punishment, and not discipline, to be brought. Wherefore, O Athenians, this now is manifest which I have said, that Melitus never paid the smallest attention to this affair.

At the same time, however, tell us, O Melitus, how you say I corrupt the youth. Or is it not evident, from your written accusation, that I teach them not to believe in the Gods in which the city believes, but in other new divine

powers? Do you not say that, teaching these things, I corrupt the youth? —

Meletus/ Perfectly so: I strenuously assert these things. —

Socrates/ By those very Gods, therefore, Melitus, of whom we are now speaking, speak in a still clearer manner both to me and to these men. For I cannot learn whether you say that I teach them to think that there are not certain Gods, (though I myself believe that there are Gods, for I am by no means an atheist, nor in this respect do I act unjustly,) not, indeed, such as the city believes in, but others, and that this it is for which you accuse me, that I introduce other Gods; or whether you altogether say that I do not believe there are Gods, and that I teach this doctrine also to others. —

Meletus/ I say this, that you do not believe that there are Gods. —

Socrates/ O wonderful Melitus, why do you thus speak? Do I then think, unlike the rest of mankind, that the sun and moon are not Gods? —

Meletus/ He does not, by Zeus, O judges: for he says that the sun is a stone, and that the moon is earth. —

Socrates/ O friend Melitus, you think that you accuse Anaxagoras; and you so despise these judges, and think them to be so illiterate, as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of these assertions. Besides, would the youth learn those things from me, which they might buy for a drachma at most in the orchestra, and thus might deride Socrates if he pretended they were his own, ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY ARE LIKEWISE SO ABSURD? But, by Zeus, do I then appear to you to think that there is no God? —

Meletus/ None whatever, by Zeus. —

Socrates/ What you say, O Melitus, is incredible, and, as it appears to me, is so even to yourself. Indeed, O Athenians, this man appears to me to be perfectly insolent and intemperate in his speech, and to have in reality written this accusation, impelled by a certain insolence, wantonness, and youthfulness. For he seems, as it were, to have composed an enigma in order to try me, and to have said to himself, Will the wise Socrates know that I am jesting, and speaking contrary to myself? Or shall I deceive him, together with the other hearers? For he appears to me to contradict himself in his accusation, as if he had said, Socrates is impious in not believing that there are Gods, but believing that there are Gods. And this, indeed, must be the assertion of one in jest.

But let us jointly consider, O Athenians, how he appears to me to have asserted these things. And do you, O Melitus, answer us, and, as I requested you at first, be mindful not to disturb me if I discourse after my usual manner. Is there then any man, O Melitus, who thinks that there are human affairs, but does not think that there are men? Pray answer me, and do not make so much noise. And is there anyone who does not think that there are horses, but yet thinks that there are equestrian affairs? or who does not think that there are pipers, but yet that there are things pertaining to pipers? There is not, O best of men. For I will speak for you, since you are not willing to answer yourself. But answer also to this: Is there anyone who thinks that there are dæmoniacal affairs, but yet does not think that there are dæmons? —

Meletus/ There is not. —

Socrates/ How averse you are to speak! so that you scarcely answer, compelled by these things. Do you not, therefore, say that I believe in and teach things dæmoniacal. whether they are new or old? But indeed you acknowledge that I believe in things dæmoniacal, and to this you have

sworn in your accusation. If then I believe in dæmoniacal affairs, there is an abundant necessity that I should also believe in the existence of dæmons, Is it not so? —It is. —For I suppose you to assent, since you do not answer. But with respect to dæmons, do we not think either that they are Gods, or the sons of Gods? Will you acknowledge this or not? —

Meletus/ Entirely so. —

Socrates/ If, therefore, I believe that there are dæmons as you say, if dæmons are certain Gods, will it not be as I say, that you speak enigmatically and in jest, since you assert that I do not think there are Gods, and yet again think that there are, since I believe in dæmons? But if dæmons are certain spurious sons of the Gods, either from Nymphs, or from certain others, of whom they are said to be the offspring, what man can believe that there are sons of the Gods, and yet that there are no Gods? For this would be just as absurd, as if someone should think that there are colts and mules, but should not think that there are horses and asses. However, O Melitus, it cannot be otherwise but that you have written this accusation, either to try me, or because there was not any crime of which you could truly accuse me. For it is impossible that you should persuade any man who has the smallest degree of intellect, that one and the same person can believe that there are dæmoniacal and divine affairs, and yet that there are neither dæmons, nor Gods, nor heroes. That I am not, therefore, impious, O Athenians, according to the accusation of Melitus, does not appear to me to require a long apology; but what I have said is sufficient.

As to what I before observed, that there is a great enmity towards me among the vulgar, you may be well assured that it is true. And this it is which will condemn me, if I should happen to be condemned, viz. the hatred and envy of the

multitude, and not Melitus, nor Anytus; which indeed has also happened to many others, and those good men, and will I think again happen in futurity. For there is no reason to expect that it will terminate in me. Perhaps, however, someone will say, Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have applied yourself to a study, through which you are now in danger of being put to death? To this person I shall justly reply, That you do not speak well, O man, if you think that life or death ought to be regarded by the man who is capable of being useful though but in a small degree; and that he ought not to consider this alone when he acts, whether he acts justly, or unjustly, and like a good or a bad man. For those demigods that died at Troy would, according to your reasoning, be vile characters, as well others as the son of Thetis, who so much despised the danger of death when compared with disgraceful conduct, that when his mother, who was a goddess, on his desiring to kill Hector, thus I think addressed him—My son, if you revenge the slaughter of your friend Patroclus, and kill Hector, you will yourself die, for said she, death awaits you as soon as Hector expires: —Notwithstanding this, he considered the danger of death as a trifle, and much more dreaded living basely, and not revenging his friends. For he says, May I immediately die, when I have inflicted just punishment on him who has acted unjustly, and not stay here an object of ridicule, by the crooked ships, and a burden to the ground? Do you think that he was solicitous about death and danger? For this, O Athenians, is in reality the case: wherever anyone ranks himself, thinking it to be the best for him, or wherever he is ranked by the ruler, there as it appears to me he ought to abide, and encounter danger, neither paying attention to death nor to anything else before that which is base.

I therefore, O Athenians, should have acted in a dire manner, if, when those rulers which you had placed over me

had assigned me a rank at Potidaea, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I should then have remained where they stationed me, like any other person, and should have encountered the danger of death; but that, when Divinity has ordered, as I think and apprehend, that I ought to live philosophizing, and exploring myself and others, I should here through fear of death or any other thing desert my rank. For this would be dire: and then in reality anyone might justly bring me to a court of judicature, and accuse me of not believing in the Gods, in consequence of not obeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking myself to be wise when I am not. For to dread death, O Athenians, is nothing else than to appear to be wise, without being so: since it is for a man to appear to know that which he does not know. For no one knows but that death may be to man the greatest of goods; but they dread it, as if they well knew that it is the greatest of evils. And how is it possible that this should not be a most disgraceful ignorance, I mean for a man to suspect that he has a knowledge of that of which he is ignorant? But I, O Athenians, differ perhaps in this from the multitude of men; and if I should say that I am wiser than someone in anything, it would be in this, that not having a sufficient knowledge of the things in Hades, I also think that I have not this knowledge. But I know that to act unjustly, and to be disobedient to one more excellent, whether God or man, is evil and base. I shall never, therefore, fear and avoid things which for aught I know may be good, before those evils which I know to be evils. So that neither if you should now dismiss me, (being unpersuaded by Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have been brought hither at first, or that, when brought hither, it was impossible not to put me to death, telling you that if I escaped, all your sons studying what Socrates had taught them would be corrupted,) if besides these things you should say to me, O Socrates, we now

indeed shall not be persuaded by Anytus, but we shall dismiss you, though on this condition, that afterwards you no longer busy yourself with this investigation, nor philosophize, and if hereafter you are detected in so doing, you shall die, —if, as I said, you should dismiss me on these terms, I should thus address you: O Athenians, I honor and love you: but I obey Divinity rather than you; and as long as I breathe and am able, I shall not cease to philosophize, and to exhort and indicate to anyone of you I may happen to meet, such things as the following, after my usual manner. O best of men, since you are an Athenian, of a city the greatest. and the most celebrated for wisdom and strength, are you not ashamed of being attentive to the means of acquiring riches, glory and honor, in great abundance, but to bestow no care nor any consideration upon prudence and truth, nor how your soul may subsist in the most excellent condition? And if anyone of you should contend with me, and say that these things are the objects of his care, I should not immediately dismiss him, nor depart, but I should interrogate, explore, and reason with him. And if he should not appear to me to possess virtue, and yet pretend to the possession of it, I should reprove him as one who but little esteems things of the greatest worth, but considers things of a vile and abject nature as of great importance. In this manner I should act by anyone I might happen to meet, whether younger or older, a stranger or a citizen; but rather to citizens, because ye are more allied to me. For be well assured that Divinity commands me thus to act. And I think that a greater good never happened to you in the city, than this my obedience to the will of Divinity. For I go about doing nothing else than persuading both the younger and older among you, neither to pay attention to the body, nor to riches, nor anything else prior to the soul; nor to be so much concerned for anything, as how the soul may subsist in the

most excellent condition. I also say that virtue is not produced from riches, but riches from virtue, as likewise all other human goods, both privately and publicly. If, therefore, asserting these things, I corrupt the youth, these things will be noxious; but if anyone says that I assert other things than these, he says nothing. In addition to this I shall say, O Athenians, that whether you are persuaded by Anytus or not, and whether you dismiss me or not, I shall not act otherwise, even though I should die often.

Be not disturbed, O Athenians, but patiently hear what I shall request of you; for I think it will be advantageous for you to hear. For I am about to mention certain other things to you, at which perhaps you will be clamorous; though let this on no account take place. Be well assured then, if you put me to death, being such a man as I say I am, you will not injure me more than yourselves. For neither Melitus nor Anytus injures me; for neither can they. Indeed, I think it is not lawful for a better to be injured by a worse man. He may indeed perhaps condemn me to death, or exile, or disgrace; and he or some other may consider these as mighty evils. I however do not think so; but, in my opinion, it is much more an evil to act as he now acts, who endeavors to put a man to death unjustly. Now, therefore, O Athenians, it is far from my intention to defend myself, (as someone may think,) but I thus speak for your sake, lest in condemning me you should sin against the gift of Divinity. For, if you should put me to death, you will not easily find such another (though the comparison is ridiculous) whom Divinity has united to this city as to a great and generous horse, but sluggish through his magnitude, and requiring to be excited by a certain fly. In like manner Divinity appears to have united such a one as I am to the city, that I might not cease exciting, persuading and reproving each of you, and everywhere sitting among you through the whole day. Such another

man, therefore, will not easily arise among you. And if you will be persuaded by me, you will spare me. Perhaps, however, you, being indignant, like those who are awakened from sleep, will repulse me, and, being persuaded by Anytus, will inconsiderately put me to death. Should this be the case, you will pass the rest of your time in sleep, unless Divinity should send some other person to take care of you. But that I am such a one as I have said, one imparted to this city by Divinity, you may understand from hence. For my conduct does not appear to be human, in neglecting everything pertaining to myself and my private affairs for so many years, and always attending to your concerns, addressing each of you separately, like a father, or an elder brother, and persuading you to the study of virtue. And if indeed I had obtained any emolument from this conduct, and receiving a recompense had exhorted you to these things, there might be some reason for asserting that I acted like other men; but now behold, even my accusers themselves, who have so shamelessly calumniated me in everything else, have not been so impudent as to charge me with this, or to bring witnesses to prove that I ever either demanded or solicited a reward. And that I speak the truth, my poverty I think affords a sufficient testimony.

Perhaps, therefore, it may appear absurd, that, going about and involving myself in a multiplicity of affairs, I should privately advise these things, but that I should never dare to come to your convention and consult for the city. The cause of this is that which you have often heard me everywhere asserting, viz. because a certain divine and dæmoniacal voice is present with me, which also Melitus in his accusation derided. This voice attended me from a child; and, when it is present, always *dissuades* me from what I intended to do, but never *incites* me. This it is which opposed my engaging in political affairs; and to me its opposition

appears to be all-beautiful. For be well assured, O Athenians, if I had formerly attempted to transact political affairs, I should have perished long before this, and should neither have benefited you in any respect, nor myself, And be not indignant with me for speaking the truth. For it is not possible that any man can be safe, who sincerely opposes either you, or any other multitude, and who prevents many unjust and illegal actions from taking place in the city; but it is necessary that he who in reality contends for the just, if he wishes even but for a little time to be safe, should live privately, and not engage in public affairs.

I will present you with mighty proofs of these things, not words, which you honor, but deeds. Hear then the circumstances which have happened to me, that you may know that I shall not yield to anyone contrary to what is becoming, through dread of death; though at the same time by not yielding I shall perish. For I, O Athenians, never bore the office of magistrate in the city, but I have been a senator: and it happened that our Antiochean tribe governed, when you thought proper to condemn the ten generals collectively, for not taking up the bodies of those that perished in the naval battle; and in so doing acted illegally, as afterwards appeared to all of you. At that time I alone of the Prytaneans opposed you, that you might not act contrary to the laws, and my suffrage was contrary to yours. When the orators also were ready to point me out and condemn me, and you likewise were exhorting and vociferating to the same end, I thought that I ought rather to encounter danger with law and justice, than adhere to you, not establishing what is just, through fear of bonds or death. And these things indeed happened while the city was yet a democracy; but when it became an oligarchy, the Thirty sent for me and four others to the Tholus, and ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, in order to be put to death; for by these orders

they meant to involve many others in guilt. Then indeed I, not in words but in deeds, showed them, if the assertion is not too rustic, that I made no account of death; but that all my attention was directed to this, that I might do nothing unjust or unholy. For that dominion of the Thirty, though so strong, did not terrify me into the perpetration of any unjust action. But when we departed from the Tholus, the four indeed went to Salamis, and brought with them Leon; but I returned home. And perhaps for this I should have been put to death, if that government had not been rapidly dissolved. These things many of you can testify.

Do you think, therefore, that I could have lived for so many years, if I had engaged in public affairs, and had acted in a manner becoming a good man, giving assistance to justice, and doing this in the most eminent degree? Far otherwise, O Athenians: for neither could any other man. But I, through the whole of my life, if I do anything publicly, shall appear to be such a man; and being the same privately, I shall never grant anything to anyone contrary to justice, neither to any other, nor to anyone of these whom my calumniators say are my disciples. I however was never the preceptor of anyone; but I never repulsed either the young or the old that were desirous of hearing me speak after my usual manner. Nor do I discourse when I receive money, but refrain from speaking when I do not receive any; but I similarly offer myself to be interrogated by the rich and the poor: and if anyone is willing to answer, he hears what I have to say. Of these too, whether anyone becomes good or not, I cannot justly be said to be the cause, because I never either promised or taught them any discipline. But if anyone says that he has ever learnt or heard anything from me privately which all others have not, be well assured that he does not speak the truth.

Why therefore some have delighted to associate with me for a long time ye have heard, O Athenians. I have told you all the truth, that men are delighted on hearing those interrogated who think themselves to be wise, but who are not: for this is not unpleasant. But, as I say, I am ordered to do this by Divinity, by oracles, by dreams, and by every mode by which any other divine destiny ever commanded anything to be done by man. These things, O Athenians, are true, and might easily be confuted if they were not. For If, with respect to the youth, I corrupt some, and have corrupted others, it is fit, if any of them have become old, that, knowing I gave them bad advice when they were young, they should now rise up, accuse and take vengeance on me; but if they themselves are unwilling to do this, that their fathers, or brothers, or others of their kindred, should now call to mind and avenge the evil which their relatives suffered from me. But in short many of them are here present, whom I see: — In the first place, Crito, who is of the same age and city that I am, and who is the father of this Critobulus: in the next place, Lysanias the Sphecian, the father of this Æschines; and further still, Antipho the Cephisian, the father of Epigenes. There are also others whose brothers are in this assembly, viz. Nicostratus the son of Zotidas, and the brother of Theodotus. And Theodotus indeed is dead, and so has no occasion for his brother's assistance. Paralus also is here, the son of Demodochus, of whom Theages was the brother; likewise Adimantus the son of Aristo, the brother of whom is this Plato; and Æantidorus, of whom Apollodorus is the brother. I could also mention many others, some one of whom Melitus, especially in his oration, ought to have adduced as a witness. If however he then forgot to do so, let him now produce him, for he has my consent; and if he has anything of this kind to disclose, let him declare it. However, you will find the very contrary of this to be the case, and that

all these are ready to assist me who have corrupted and injured their kindred, as Melitus and Anytus say. It might indeed perhaps be reasonable to suppose that those whom I have corrupted would assist me; but what other reason can the relatives of these have, who are not corrupted, and who are now advanced in age, for giving me assistance, except that which is right and just? For they know that Melitus lies, and that I speak the truth. Be it so then, O Athenians: and these indeed, and perhaps other such-like particulars, are what I have to urge in my defense.

Perhaps, however, someone among you will be indignant on recollecting that he, when engaged in a much less contest than this, suppliantly implored the judges with many tears; that he also brought his children hither, that by these he might especially excite compassion, together with many others of his relatives and friends: but I do none of these things, though, as it may appear, I am brought to extreme danger. Perhaps, therefore, someone thus thinking may become more hostile towards me, and, being enraged with these very particulars, may give his vote with anger. If then anyone of you is thus affected, I do not think it by any means right; but if he should be, I shall appear to myself to speak equitably to such a one by saying that I also, O best of men, have certain relatives. For, as Homer says, I am not sprung from an oak, nor from a rock, but from men. So that I also, O Athenians, have relations, and three sons; one now a lad; but the other two, boys: I have not however brought anyone of them hither, that I might supplicate you on that account to acquit me. Why is it then that I do none of these things? It is not, O Athenians, because I am contumacious, nor is it in contempt of you. And as to my fearing or not fearing death, that is another question. But it does not appear to me to be consistent either with my own glory or yours, or that of the whole city, that I should do anything of this kind at

my age, and with the reputation I have acquired, whether true or false. For it is admitted that Socrates surpasses in something the multitude of mankind. If, therefore, those among you who appear to excel either in wisdom, in fortitude, or any other virtue, should act in such a manner as I have seen some when they have been judged, it would be shameful: for these, appearing indeed to be something, have conducted themselves in a wonderful manner, thinking they should suffer something dreadful by dying, as if they would be immortal if you did not put them to death. These men, as it appears to me, would so disgrace the city, that any stranger might apprehend that such of the Athenians as excel in virtue, and who are promoted to the magistracy and other honors in preference to the rest, do not in any respect surpass women. For these things, O Athenians, ought not to be done by us who have gained some degree of reputation, nor should you suffer us to do them, if we were willing; but you should show that you will much sooner condemn him who introduces these lamentable dramas, and who thus makes the city ridiculous, than him who quietly expects your decision.

But exclusive of glory, O Athenians, neither does it appear to me to be just for a judge to be entreated, or to acquit anyone in consequence of being supplicated; but in my opinion he ought to teach and persuade. For a judge does not sit for the purpose of showing favor, but that he may judge what is just: and he takes an oath that he will not show favor to any, but that he will judge according to the laws. Hence it is neither fit that we should accustom you, nor that you should be accustomed to swear: for in so doing neither of us will act piously. Do not, therefore, think, O Athenians, that I ought to act in such a manner towards you as I should neither conceive to be beautiful, nor just, nor holy; and especially, by Zeus, since I am accused of impiety

by this Melitus. For it clearly follows, that if I should persuade you, and, though you have taken an oath, force you to be favorable, I might then indeed teach that you do not think there are Gods; and in reality, while making my defense, I should accuse myself as not believing in the Gods. This however is far from being the case: *for I believe that there are* GODS *more than anyone of my accusers*; and I refer it to you and to Divinity to judge concerning me such things as will be best both for me and you.

That I should not, therefore, O Athenians, be indignant with you because you have condemned me, there are many reasons, and among others this, that it has not happened to me contrary to my expectation; but I much rather wonder that there should have been so great a number of votes on both sides. For I did not think that I should have wanted such a few additional votes for my acquittal. But now, as it seems, if there had been only three more votes, I should have escaped condemnation. Indeed, as it appears to me, I now have escaped Melitus; and I have not only escaped him, but it is perfectly evident that unless Anytus and Lyco had risen to accuse me, he had lost his thousand drachmas, since he had not the fifth part of the votes on his side.

Melitus then thinks that I deserve death. Be it so. But what punishment, O Athenians, shall I assign to myself? Is it not evident that it will be such a one as I deserve? What then do I deserve to suffer or to pay, for not having during my life concealed what I have learned, but neglected all that the multitude esteem, riches, domestic concerns, military command, authority in public assemblies, and other magistracies? for having avoided the conspiracies and seditions which have happened in the city, thinking that I was in reality a more worthy character than to depend on these things for my safety? I have not, therefore, applied myself to those pursuits, by which I could neither benefit

you nor myself; but my whole endeavor has been to benefit every individual in the greatest degree; striving to persuade each of you, that he should pay no attention to any of his concerns, prior to that care of himself by which he may become a most worthy and wise man; that he should not attend to the affairs of the city prior to the city itself; and that attention should be paid to other things in a similar manner. What then, being such a man, do I deserve to suffer? A certain good, O Athenians, if in reality you honor me according to my desert; and this such a good as it is proper for me to receive. What then is the good which is adapted to a poor man who is a benefactor, and who requires leisure that he may exhort you to virtue? There is not anything more adapted, O Athenians, than that such a man should be supported at the public expense in the Prytaneum; and this much more than if someone of you had been victorious in the Olympic games with horses, or in the two or four-yoked car. For such a one makes you appear to be happy, but I cause you to be so: and he is not in want of support, but I am. If, therefore, it is necessary that I should be honored according to what is justly my desert, I should be honored with this support in the Prytaneum.

Perhaps, therefore, in saying these things, I shall appear to you to speak in the same manner as when I reprobated lamentations and supplications. A thing of this kind, however, O Athenians, is not the case, but rather the following. I am determined not to injure any man willingly; though I shall not persuade you of this, because the time in which we can discourse with each other is but short. For if there was the same law with you as with others, that in cases of death the judicial process should not continue for one day only but for many, I think I should be able to persuade you. But now it is not easy in a short time to dissolve great calumnies. Being however determined to injure no one, I

shall be very far from injuring myself, and of pronouncing against myself that I am worthy of evil and punishment. What then? Fearing lest I should suffer that which Melitus thinks I deserve, which I say I know not whether it is good or evil, that I may avoid this, shall I choose that which I well know to be evil, and think that I deserve this? Whether then shall I choose bonds? But why is it necessary that I should live in prison, in perpetual subjection to the eleven magistrates? Shall I pay a fine then, and remain in bonds till it is discharged? But this is what I just now said: for I have not money to pay it. Shall I then choose exile? For perhaps I shall be thought worthy of this. I should however, O Athenians, be a great lover of life, if I were so absurd as not to be able to infer that if you, being my fellow citizens, could not endure my habits and discourses, which have become to you so burthensome and odious, that you now seek to be liberated from them, it is not likely that others would easily bear them. It is far otherwise, O Athenians. My life would be beautiful indeed were I at this advanced age to live in exile, changing and being driven from one city to another. For I well know that, wherever I may go, the youth will hear me when I discourse, in the same manner as they do here. And if I should repel them, they also would expel me, persuading the more elderly to this effect. But if I should not repel them, the fathers and kindred of these would banish me on account of these very young men themselves.

Perhaps however someone will say, Can you not, Socrates, live in exile silently and quietly? But it is the most difficult of all things to persuade some among you, that this cannot take place. For if I say that in so doing I should disobey Divinity, and that on this account it is impossible for me to live a life of leisure and quiet, you would not believe me, in consequence of supposing that I spoke ironically. And if, again, I should say that this is the greatest good to man,

to discourse every day concerning virtue, and other things which you have heard me discussing, exploring both myself and others; and if I should also assert that an uninvestigating life is to be rejected by man, much less, were I thus to speak, would you believe me. These things however, O Athenians, are as I say; but it is not easy to persuade you that they are so. And at the same time I am not accustomed to think myself deserving of any ill. Indeed, if I were rich, I would amerce myself in such a sum as I might be able to pay; but now I am not in a condition to do this, unless you would allow the fine to be proportioned to what I am able to pay. For thus perhaps I might be able to pay a mina of silver. But Plato here, O Athenians, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, exhort me to pay thirty minæ, for which they will be answerable. I amerce myself, therefore, in thirty minæ; and these will be my securities for the payment.

Now, O Athenians, your impatience and precipitancy will draw upon you a great reproach, and give occasion to those who are so disposed, to revile the city for having put that wise man Socrates to death. For those who are willing to reproach you will call me a wise man, though I am not. If, therefore, you had waited but for a short time, this very thing, my death, would have happened to you spontaneously. For behold my age, that it is far advanced in life, and is near to death. But I do not say this to all of you, but to those only who have condemned me to die. This also I say to them: Perhaps you think, O Athenians, that I was condemned through the want of such language, by which I might have persuaded you, if I had thought it requisite, to say and do anything, so that I might escape punishment. Far otherwise: for I am condemned through want indeed, yet not of words, but of audacity and impudence, and because I was unwilling to say such things to you as you would have been much gratified in hearing, I at the same time weeping

and lamenting, and doing and saying many other things unworthy of me, as I say, but such as you are accustomed to hear and see in others. But neither then did I think it was necessary, for the sake of avoiding danger, to do anything illiberal, nor do I now repent that I have thus defended myself; but I should much rather choose to die, after having made this apology, than to live after that manner. For neither in a judicial process, nor in battle, is it proper that I or any other should devise how he may by any means avoid death; since in battle it is frequently evident that a man might easily avoid death by throwing away his arms, and suppliantly converting himself to his pursuers. There are also many other devices in other dangers, by which he who dares to do and say anything may escape death. To fly from death however, O Athenians, is not difficult, but it is much more difficult to fly from depravity; for it runs swifter than death. And now I indeed, as being slow and old, am caught by the slower; but my accusers, as being skillful and swift, are caught by the swifter of these two, improbity. Now too, I indeed depart, condemned by you to death; but they being condemned by truth, depart to depravity and injustice. And I acquiesce in this decision, and they also. Perhaps, therefore, it is necessary that these things should subsist in this manner, and I think they subsist properly.

In the next place, I desire to predict to you who have condemned me, what will be your fate. For I am now in that situation in which men especially prophesy, viz. when they are about to die. For I say, that you, my murderers, will immediately after my death be punished, by dying in a manner, by Zeus, much more severe than I shall. For now you have done this, thinking you should be liberated from the necessity of giving an account of your life. The very contrary however, as I say, will happen to you: for many will be your accusers, whom I have restrained, though you did

not perceive it. These too will be more troublesome, because they are younger, and will be more indignant against you. For, if you think that by putting men to death you will restrain others from upbraiding you that you do not live well, you are much mistaken; since this mode of liberation is neither sufficiently efficacious nor becoming. But this is the most beautiful and the most easy mode, not to disturb others, but to act in such a manner that you may be most excellent characters. And thus much I prophesy to those of you who condemned me.

But to you who have acquitted me by you decision, I would willingly speak concerning this affair during the time that the magistrates are at leisure, and before I am brought to the place where it is necessary I should die. Attend to me, therefore, O Athenians, during that time. For nothing hinders our conversing with each other, as long as we are permitted so to do; since I wish to demonstrate to you, as friends, the meaning of that which has just now happened to me. To me then, O my judges, (and in calling you judges I rightly denominate you,) a certain wonderful circumstance has happened. For the prophetic voice of the dæmon, which opposed me in the most trifling affairs, if I was about to act in anything improperly, prior to this, I was continually accustomed to hear; but now, though these things have happened to me which you see, and which some one would think to be the extremity of evils, yet neither when I departed from home in the morning was the signal of the God adverse to me, nor when I ascended hither to the place of judgment, nor when I was about to speak, —though at other times it frequently restrained me in the midst of speaking. But now, in this affair, it has never been adverse to me, either in word or deed. I will now, therefore, tell you what I apprehend to be the cause of this. For this thing which has happened appears to me to be good; nor do those of us apprehend

rightly who think death to be an evil; of which this appears to me to be a great argument, that the accustomed signal would have opposed me, unless I had been about to do something good.

After this manner too we may conceive that there is abundant hope that death is good. For to die is one of two things. For it is either to be as it were nothing, and to be deprived of all sensation; or, as it is said, it is a certain mutation and migration of the soul from this to another place. And whether no sensation remains, but death is like sleep when unattended with any dreams, in this case death will be a gain. For, if anyone compares such a night as this, in which he so profoundly sleeps as not even to see a dream, with the other nights and days of his life, and should declare how many he had passed better and more pleasantly than this night, I think that not only a private man, but even the great king himself, would find so small a number that they might be easily counted. If, therefore, death is a thing of this kind, I say it is a gain: for thus the whole of future time appears to be nothing more than one night. But if again death is a migration from hence to another place, and the assertion is true that all the dead are there, what greater good, O my judges, can there be than this? For if someone arriving at Hades, being liberated from these who pretend to be judges, should find those who are true judges, and who are said to judge there, viz. Minos and Rhadamanthus, Æacus and Triptolemus, and such others of the demigods as lived justly, would this be a vile journey? At what rate would you not purchase a conference with Orpheus and Musæus, with Hesiod and Homer? I indeed should be willing to die often, if these things are true. For to me the association will be admirable, when I shall meet with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other of the ancients who died through an unjust decision. The

comparing my case with theirs will, I think, be no unpleasing employment to me. But the greatest pleasure will consist in passing my time there, as I have done here, in interrogating and exploring who among them is wise, and who fancies himself to be but is not so. What, O my judges, would not anyone give for a conference with him who led that mighty army against Troy, or with Ulysses, or Sisyphus, or ten thousand others, both men and women, that might be mentioned? For to converse and associate with these would be an inestimable felicity. For I should not be capitally condemned on this account by those that dwell there; since they are in other respects more happy than those that live here, and are for the rest of time immortal, if the assertions respecting these things are true.

You, therefore, O my judges, ought to entertain good hopes with respect to death, and to be firmly persuaded of this one thing, that to a good man nothing is evil, neither while living nor when dead, and that his concerns are never neglected by the Gods. Nor is my present condition the effect of chance; but this is evident to me, that now to die, and be liberated from the affairs of life, is better for me. On this account the accustomed signal did not in this affair oppose me. Nor am I very indignant with those that accused and condemned me, though their intention in so doing was to injure me; and for this they deserve to be blamed. Thus much however I request of them: That you will punish my sons when they grow up, if they cause you the same molestation that I have; and if they shall appear to you to pay more attention to riches or anything else than to virtue, and shall think themselves to be something when they are nothing, that you will reprobate them as I do you, as neglecting the care of things to which they ought to attend, and conceiving themselves to be of some consequence when they are of no worth. If ye do these things, your conduct both

towards me and my sons will be just. But it is now time to depart hence, —for me indeed to die but for you to live. Which of us however will arrive at a better thing, is perfectly immanifest except to Divinity.

THE END OF THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

Socrates' Defense.

(Apology)

Translated by Hugh Tredennich.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates; Meletus.

Socrates/ I do not know what effect my accusers have had upon you, gentlemen, but for my own part I was almost carried away by them—their arguments were so convincing. On the other hand, scarcely a word of what they said was true. I was especially astonished at one of their many misrepresentations; I mean when they told you that you must be careful not to let me deceive you—the implication being that I am a skillful speaker. I thought that it was peculiarly brazen of them to tell you this without a blush, since they must know that they will soon be effectively confuted, when it becomes obvious that I have not the slightest skill as a speaker—unless, of course, by a skillful speaker they mean one who speaks the truth. If that is what they mean, I would agree that I am an orator, though not after their pattern.

My accusers, then, as I maintain, have said little or nothing that is true, but from me you shall hear the whole truth—not, I can assure you, gentlemen, in flowery language like theirs, decked out with fine words and phrases. No, what you will hear will be a straightforward speech in the first words that occur to me, confident as I am in the justice of my cause, and I do not want any of you to expect anything different. It would hardly be suitable, gentlemen, for a man of my age to address you in the artificial language of a schoolboy orator. One thing, however, I do most earnestly beg and entreat of you. If you hear me defending myself in

the same language which it has been my habit to use, both in the open spaces of this city—where many of you have heard me—and elsewhere, do not be surprised, and do not interrupt. Let me remind you of my position. This is my first appearance in a court of law, at the age of seventy, and so I am a complete stranger to the language of this place. Now if I were really from another country, you would naturally excuse me if I spoke in the manner and dialect in which I had been brought up, and so in the present case I make this request of you, which I think is only reasonable, to disregard the manner of my speech—it may be better or it may be worse—and to consider and concentrate your attention upon this one question, whether my claims are fair or not. That is the first duty of the juryman, just as it is the pleader's duty to speak the truth.

The proper course for me, gentlemen of the jury, is to deal first with the earliest charges that have been falsely brought against me, and with my earliest accusers, and then with the later ones. I make this distinction because I have already been accused in your hearing by a great many people for a great many years, though without a word of truth, and I am more afraid of those people than I am of Anytus and his colleagues, although they are formidable enough. But the others are still more formidable. I mean the people who took hold of so many of you when you were children and tried to fill your minds with untrue accusations against me, saying, There is a wise man called Socrates who has theories about the heavens and has investigated everything below the earth, and can make the weaker argument defeat the stronger.

It is these people, gentlemen, the disseminators of these rumors, who are my dangerous accusers, because those who hear them suppose that anyone who inquires into such matters must be an atheist. Besides, there are a great many of these accusers, and they have been accusing me now for

a great many years. And what is more, they approached you at the most impressionable age, when some of you were children or adolescents, and they literally won their case by default, because there was no one to defend me. And the most fantastic thing of all is that it is impossible for me even to know and tell you their names, unless one of them happens to be a playwright. All these people, who have tried to set you against me out of envy and love of slander—and some too merely passing on what they have been told by others—all these are very difficult to deal with. It is impossible to bring them here for cross-examination; one simply has to conduct one's defense and argue one's case against an invisible opponent, because there is no one to answer. So I ask you to accept my statement that my critics fall into two classes, on the one hand my immediate accusers, and on the other those earlier ones whom I have mentioned, and you must suppose that I have first to defend myself against the latter. After all, you heard them abusing me longer ago and much more violently than these more recent accusers.

Very well, then, I must begin my defense, gentlemen, and I must try, in the short time that I have, to rid your minds of a false impression which is the work of many years. I should like this to be the result, gentlemen, assuming it to be for your advantage and my own; and I should like to be successful in my defense, but I think that it will be difficult, and I am quite aware of the nature of my task. However, let that turn out as God wills. I must obey the law and make my defense.

Let us go back to the beginning and consider what the charge is that has made me so unpopular, and has encouraged Meletus to draw up this indictment. Very well, what did my critics say in attacking my character? I must read out their affidavit, so to speak, as though they were my

legal accusers : Socrates is guilty of criminal meddling, in that he inquires into things below the earth and in the sky, and makes the weaker argument defeat the stronger, and teaches others to follow his example. It runs something like that. You have seen it for yourselves in the play by Aristophanes, where Socrates goes whirling round, proclaiming that he is walking on air, and uttering a great deal of other nonsense about things of which I know nothing whatsoever. I mean no disrespect for such knowledge, if anyone really is versed in it—I do not want any more lawsuits brought against me by Meletus—but the fact is, gentlemen, that I take no interest in it. What is more, I call upon the greater part of you as witnesses to my statement, and I appeal to all of you who have ever listened to me talking—and there are a great many to whom this applies—to clear your neighbors' minds on this point. Tell one another whether anyone of you has ever heard me discuss such questions briefly or at length, and then you will realize that the other popular reports about me are equally unreliable.

The fact is that there is nothing in any of these charges, and if you have heard anyone say that I try to educate people and charge a fee, there is no truth in that either. I wish that there were, because I think that it is a fine thing if a man is qualified to teach, as in the case of Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis. Each one of these is perfectly capable of going into any city and actually persuading the young men to leave the company of their fellow citizens, with any of whom they can associate for nothing, and attach themselves to him, and pay money for the privilege, and be grateful into the bargain.

There is another expert too from Paros who I discovered was here on a visit; I happened to meet a man who has paid more in Sophists' fees than all the rest put together—I mean

Callias, the son of Hipponicus. So I asked him—he has two sons, you see—Callias, I said, if your sons had been colts or calves, we should have had no difficulty in finding and engaging a trainer to perfect their natural qualities, and this trainer would have been some sort of horse dealer or agriculturalist. But seeing that they are human beings, whom do you intend to get as their instructor? Who is the expert in perfecting the human and social qualities? I assume from the fact of your having sons that you must have considered the question. Is there such a person or not?

Certainly, said he.

Who is he, and where does he come from? said I. And what does he charge?

Evenus of Paros, Socrates, said he, and his fee is five minas.

I felt that Evenus was to be congratulated if he really was a master of this art and taught it at such a moderate fee. I should certainly plume myself and give myself airs if I understood these things, but in fact, gentlemen, I do not.

Here perhaps one of you might interrupt me and say, But what is it that you do, Socrates? How is it that you have been misrepresented like this? Surely all this talk and gossip about you would never have arisen if you had confined yourself to ordinary activities, but only if your behavior was abnormal. Tell us the explanation, if you do not want us to invent it for ourselves.

This seems to me to be a reasonable request, and I will try to explain to you what it is that has given me this false notoriety. So please give me your attention. Perhaps some of you will think that I am not being serious, but I assure you that I am going to tell you the whole truth.

I have gained this reputation, gentlemen, from nothing more or less than a kind of wisdom. What kind of wisdom do

I mean? Human wisdom, I suppose. It seems that I really am wise in this limited sense. Presumably the geniuses whom I mentioned just now are wise in a wisdom that is more than human. I do not know how else to account for it. I certainly have no knowledge of such wisdom, and anyone who says that I have is a liar and willful slanderer. Now, gentlemen, please do not interrupt me if I seem to make an extravagant claim, for what I am going to tell you is not my own opinion. I am going to refer you to an unimpeachable authority. I shall call as witness to my wisdom, such as it is, the god at Delphi.

You know Chaerephon, of course. He was a friend of mine from boyhood, and a good democrat who played his part with the rest of you in the recent expulsion and restoration. And you know what he was like, how enthusiastic he was over anything that he had once undertaken. Well, one day he actually went to Delphi and asked this question of the god—as I said before, gentlemen, please do not interrupt—he asked whether there was anyone wiser than myself. The priestess replied that there was no one. As Chaerephon is dead, the evidence for my statement will be supplied by his brother, who is here in court.

Please consider my object in telling you this. I want to explain to you how the attack upon my reputation first started. When I heard about the oracle's answer, I said to myself, What does the god mean? Why does he not use plain language? I am only too conscious that I have no claim to wisdom, great or small. So what can he mean by asserting that I am the wisest man in the world? He cannot be telling a lie; that would not be right for him.

After puzzling about it for some time, I set myself at last with considerable reluctance to check the truth of it in the following way. I went to interview a man with a high reputation for wisdom, because I felt that here if anywhere I

should succeed in disproving the oracle and pointing out to my divine authority, You said that I was the wisest of men, but here is a man who is wiser than I am.

Well, I gave a thorough examination to this person—I need not mention his name, but it was one of our politicians that I was studying when I had this experience—and in conversation with him I formed the impression that although in many people's opinion, and especially in his own, he appeared to be wise, in fact he was not. Then when I began to try to show him that he only thought he was wise and was not really so, my efforts were resented both by him and by many of the other people present. However, I reflected as I walked away, Well, I am certainly wiser than this man. It is only too likely that neither of us has any knowledge to boast of, but he thinks that he knows something which he does not know, whereas I am quite conscious of my ignorance. At any rate it seems that I am wiser than he is to this small extent, that I do not think that I know what I do not know.

After this I went on to interview a man with an even greater reputation for wisdom, and I formed the same impression again, and here too I incurred the resentment of the man himself and a number of others.

From that time on I interviewed one person after another. I realized with distress and alarm that I was making myself unpopular, but I felt compelled to put my religious duty first. Since I was trying to find out the meaning of the oracle, I was bound to interview everyone who had a reputation for knowledge. And by dog, gentlemen, for I must be frank with you, my honest impression was this. It seemed to me, as I pursued my investigation at the god's command, that the people with the greatest reputations were almost entirely deficient, while others who were supposed to be their inferiors were much better qualified in practical intelligence.

I want you to think of my adventures as a sort of pilgrimage undertaken to establish the truth of the oracle once for all. After I had finished with the politicians I turned to the poets, dramatic, lyric, and all the rest, in the belief that here I should expose myself as a comparative ignoramus. I used to pick up what I thought were some of their most perfect works and question them closely about the meaning of what they had written, in the hope of incidentally enlarging my own knowledge. Well, gentlemen, I hesitate to tell you the truth, but it must be told. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that any of the bystanders could have explained those poems better than their actual authors. So I soon made up my mind about the poets too. I decided it was not wisdom that enabled them to write their poetry, but a kind of instinct or inspiration, such as you find in seers and prophets who deliver all their sublime messages without knowing in the least what they mean. It seemed clear to me that the poets were in much the same case, and I also observed that the very fact that they were poets made them think that they had a perfect understanding of all other subjects, of which they were totally ignorant. So I left that line of inquiry too with the same sense of advantage that I had felt in the case of the politicians.

Last of all I turned to the skilled craftsmen. I knew quite well that I had practically no technical qualifications myself, and I was sure that I should find them full of impressive knowledge. In this I was not disappointed. They understood things which I did not, and to that extent they were wiser than I was. But, gentlemen, these professional experts seemed to share the same failing which I had noticed in the poets. I mean that on the strength of their technical proficiency they claimed a perfect understanding of every other subject, however important, and I felt that this error more than outweighed their positive wisdom. So I made

myself spokesman for the oracle, and asked myself whether I would rather be as I was—neither wise with their wisdom nor stupid with their stupidity—or possess both qualities as they did. I replied through myself to the oracle that it was best for me to be as I was.

The effect of these investigations of mine, gentlemen, has been to arouse against me a great deal of hostility, and hostility of a particularly bitter and persistent kind, which has resulted in various malicious suggestions, including the description of me as a professor of wisdom. This is due to the fact that whenever I succeed in disproving another person's claim to wisdom in a given subject, the bystanders assume that I know everything about that subject myself. But the truth of the matter, gentlemen, is pretty certainly this, that real wisdom is the property of God, and this oracle is his way of telling us that human wisdom has little or no value. It seems to me that he is not referring literally to Socrates, but has merely taken my name as an example, as if he would say to us, The wisest of you men is he who has realized, like Socrates, that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless.

That is why I still go about seeking and searching in obedience to the divine command, if I think that anyone is wise, whether citizen or stranger, and when I think that any person is not wise, I try to help the cause of God by proving that he is not. This occupation has kept me too busy to do much either in politics or in my own affairs. In fact, my service to God has reduced me to extreme poverty.

There is another reason for my being unpopular. A number of young men with wealthy fathers and plenty of leisure have deliberately attached themselves to me because they enjoy hearing other people cross-questioned. These often take me as their model, and go on to try to question other persons. Whereupon, I suppose, they find an unlimited

number of people who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing. Consequently their victims become annoyed, not with themselves but with me, and they complain that there is a pestilential busybody called Socrates who fills young people's heads with wrong ideas. If you ask them what he does, and what he teaches that has this effect, they have no answer, not knowing what to say. But as they do not want to admit their confusion, they fall back on the stock charges against any philosopher, that he teaches his pupils about things in the heavens and below the earth, and to disbelieve in gods, and to make the weaker argument defeat the stronger. They would be very loath, I fancy, to admit the truth—which is that they are being convicted of pretending to knowledge when they are entirely ignorant. So, jealous, I suppose, for their own reputation, and also energetic and numerically strong, and provided with a plausible and carefully worked-out case against me, these people have been dinning into your ears for a long time past their violent denunciations of myself.

There you have the causes which led to the attack upon me by Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus being aggrieved on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the professional men and politicians, and Lycon on behalf of the orators. So, as I said at the beginning, I should be surprised if I were able, in the short time that I have, to rid your minds of a misconception so deeply implanted.

There, gentlemen, you have the true facts, which I present to you without any concealment or suppression, great or small. I am fairly certain that this plain speaking of mine is the cause of my unpopularity, and this really goes to prove that my statements are true, and that I have described correctly the nature and the grounds of the calumny which has been brought against me. Whether you inquire into

them now or later, you will find the facts as I have just described them.

So much for my defense against the charges brought by the first group of my accusers. I shall now try to defend myself against Meletus—high-principled and patriotic as he claims to be—and after that against the rest.

Let us first consider their deposition again, as though it represented a fresh prosecution. It runs something like this : Socrates is guilty of corrupting the minds of the young, and of believing in deities of his own invention instead of the gods recognized by the state. Such is the charge. Let us examine its points one by one.

First it says that I am guilty of corrupting the young. But I say, gentlemen, that Meletus is guilty of treating a serious matter with levity, since he summons people to stand their trial on frivolous grounds, and professes concern and keen anxiety in matters about which he has never had the slightest interest. I will try to prove this to your satisfaction.

Come now, Meletus, tell me this. You regard it as supremely important, do you not, that our young people should be exposed to the best possible influence?

Meletus/ I do.

Socrates/ Very well, then, tell these gentlemen who it is that influences the young for the better. Obviously you must know, if you are so much interested. You have discovered the vicious influence, as you say, in myself, and you are now prosecuting me before these gentlemen. Speak up and inform them who it is that has a good influence upon the young—You see, Meletus, that you are tongue-tied and cannot answer. Do you not feel that this is discreditable, and a sufficient proof in itself of what I said, that you have no interest in the subject? Tell me, my friend, who is it that makes the young good?

Meletus/ The laws.

Socrates/ That is not what I mean, my dear sir. I am asking you to name the *person* whose first business it is to know the laws.

Meletus/ These gentlemen here, Socrates, the members of the jury.

Socrates/ Do you mean, Meletus, that they have the ability to educate the young, and to make them better?

Meletus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Does this apply to all jurymen, or only to some?

Meletus/ To all of them.

Socrates/ Excellent! A generous supply of benefactors. Well, then, do these spectators who are present in court have an improving influence, or not?

Meletus/ Yes, they do.

Socrates/ And what about the members of the Council?

Meletus/ Yes, the councilors too.

Socrates/ But surely, Meletus, the members of the Assembly do not corrupt the young? Or do all of them too exert an improving influence?

Meletus/ Yes, they do.

Socrates/ Then it would seem that the whole population of Athens has a refining effect upon the young, except myself, and I alone demoralize them. Is that your meaning?

Meletus/ Most emphatically, yes.

Socrates/ This is certainly a most unfortunate quality that you have detected in me. Well, let me put another question to you. Take the case of horses. Do you believe that those who improve them make up the whole of mankind, and that there is only one person who has a bad effect on them? Or is the truth just the opposite, that the ability to improve them belongs to one person or to very few persons, who are

horse trainers, whereas most people, if they have to do with horses and make use of them, do them harm? Is not this the case, Meletus, both with horses and with all other animals? Of course it is, whether you and Anytus deny it or not. It would be a singular dispensation of fortune for our young people if there is only one person who corrupts them, while all the rest have a beneficial effect. But I need say no more. There is ample proof, Meletus, that you have never bothered your head about the young, and you make it perfectly clear that you have never taken the slightest interest in the cause for the sake of which you are now indicting me.

Here is another point. Tell me seriously, Meletus, is it better to live in a good or in a bad community? Answer my question, like a good fellow; there is nothing difficult about it. Is it not true that wicked people have a bad effect upon those with whom they are in the closest contact, and that good people have a good effect?

Meletus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Is there anyone who prefers to be harmed rather than benefited by his associates? Answer me, my good man; the law commands you to answer. Is there anyone who prefers to be harmed?

Meletus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Well, then, when you summon me before this court for corrupting the young and making their characters worse, do you mean that I do so intentionally or unintentionally?

Meletus/ I mean intentionally.

Socrates/ Why, Meletus, are you at your age so much wiser than I at mine? You have discovered that bad people always have a bad effect, and good people a good effect, upon their nearest neighbors. Am I so hopelessly ignorant as not even to realize that by spoiling the character of one of my

companions I shall run the risk of getting some harm from him? Because nothing else would make me commit this grave offense intentionally. No, I do not believe it, Meletus, and I do not suppose that anyone else does. Either I have not a bad influence, or it is unintentional, so that in either case your accusation is false. And if I unintentionally have a bad influence, the correct procedure in cases of such involuntary misdemeanors is not to summon the culprit before this court, but to take him aside privately for instruction and reproof, because obviously if my eyes are opened, I shall stop doing what I do not intend to do. But you deliberately avoided my company in the past and refused to enlighten me, and now you bring me before this court, which is the place appointed for those who need punishment, not for those who need enlightenment.

It is quite clear by now, gentlemen, that Meletus, as I said before, has never shown any degree of interest in this subject. However, I invite you to tell us, Meletus, in what sense you make out that I corrupt the minds of the young. Surely the terms of your indictment make it clear that you accuse me of teaching them to believe in new deities instead of the gods recognized by the state. Is not that the teaching of mine which you say has this demoralizing effect?

Meletus/ That is precisely what I maintain.

Socrates/ Then I appeal to you, Meletus, in the name of these same gods about whom we are speaking, to explain yourself a little more clearly to myself and to the jury, because I cannot make out what your point is. Is it that I teach people to believe in some gods—which implies that I myself believe in gods, and am not a complete atheist, so that I am not guilty on that score—but in different gods from those recognized by the state, so that your accusation rests upon the fact that they are different? Or do you assert that I believe in no gods at all, and teach others to do the same?

Meletus/ Yes, I say that you disbelieve in gods altogether.

Socrates/ You surprise me, Meletus. What is your object in saying that? Do you suggest that I do not believe that the sun and moon are gods, as is the general belief of all mankind?

Meletus/ He certainly does not, gentlemen of the jury, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon a mass of earth.

Socrates/ Do you imagine that you are prosecuting Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus? Have you so poor an opinion of these gentlemen, and do you assume them to be so illiterate as not to know that the writings of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of theories like these? And do you seriously suggest that it is from me that the young get these ideas, when they can buy them on occasion in the market place for a drachma at most, and so have the laugh on Socrates if he claims them for his own, to say nothing of their being so silly? Tell me honestly, Meletus, is that your opinion of me? Do I believe in no god?

Meletus/ No, none at all, not in the slightest degree.

Socrates/ You are not at all convincing, Meletus—not even to yourself, I suspect. In my opinion, gentlemen, this man is a thoroughly selfish bully, and has brought this action against me out of sheer wanton aggressiveness and self-assertion. He seems to be devising a sort of intelligence test for me, saying to himself, Will the infallible Socrates realize that I am contradicting myself for my own amusement, or shall I succeed in deceiving him and the rest of my audience?

It certainly seems to me that he is contradicting himself in this indictment, which might just as well run : Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, but believing in the gods. And this is pure flippancy.

I ask you to examine with me, gentlemen, the line of reasoning which leads me to this conclusion. You, Meletus, will oblige us by answering my questions. Will you all kindly remember, as I requested at the beginning, not to interrupt if I conduct the discussion in my customary way?

Is there anyone in the world, Meletus, who believes in human activities, and not in human beings? Make him answer, gentlemen, and don't let him keep on making these continual objections. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses, but believes in horses' activities? Or who does not believe in musicians, but believes in musical activities? No, there is not, my worthy friend. If you do not want to answer, I will supply it for you and for these gentlemen too. But the next question you must answer. Is there anyone who believes in supernatural activities and not in supernatural beings?

Meletus/ No.

Socrates/ How good of you to give a bare answer under compulsion by the court! Well, do you assert that I believe and teach others to believe in supernatural activities? It does not matter whether they are new or old. The fact remains that I believe in them according to your statement; indeed you solemnly swore as much in your affidavit. But if I believe in supernatural activities, it follows inevitably that I also believe in supernatural beings. Is not that so? It is. I assume your assent, since you do not answer. Do we not hold that supernatural beings are either gods or the children of gods? Do you agree or not?

Meletus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then if I believe in supernatural beings, as you assert, if these supernatural beings are gods in any sense, we shall reach the conclusion which I mentioned just now when I said that you were testing my intelligence for your

own amusement, by stating first that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do, since I believe in supernatural beings. If on the other hand these supernatural beings are bastard children of the gods by nymphs or other mothers, as they are reputed to be, who in the world would believe in the children of gods and not in the gods themselves? It would be as ridiculous as to believe in the young of horses or donkeys and not in horses and donkeys themselves. No, Meletus, there is no avoiding the conclusion that you brought this charge against me as a test of my wisdom, or else in despair of finding a genuine offense of which to accuse me. As for your prospect of convincing any living person with even a smattering of intelligence that belief in supernatural and divine activities does not imply belief in supernatural and divine beings, and vice versa, it is outside all the bounds of possibility.

As a matter of fact, gentlemen, I do not feel that it requires much defense to clear myself of Meletus' accusation. What I have said already is enough. But you know very well the truth of what I said in an earlier part of my speech, that I have incurred a great deal of bitter hostility, and this is what will bring about my destruction, if anything does—not Meletus nor Anytus, but the slander and jealousy of a very large section of the people. They have been fatal to a great many other innocent men, and I suppose will continue to be so; there is no likelihood that they will stop at me. But perhaps someone will say, Do you feel no compunction, Socrates, at having followed a line of action which puts you in danger of the death penalty?

I might fairly reply to him, You are mistaken, my friend, if you think that a man who is worth anything ought to spend his time weighing up the prospects of life and death. He has only one thing to consider in performing any action—that is, whether he is acting rightly or wrongly, like a good man or a

bad one. On your view the heroes who died at Troy would be poor creatures, especially the son of Thetis. He, if you remember, made light of danger in comparison with incurring dishonor when his goddess mother warned him, eager as he was to kill Hector, in some such words as these, I fancy: My son, if you avenge your comrade Patroclus' death and kill Hector, you will die yourself—'Next after Hector is thy fate prepared.' When he heard this warning, he made light of his death and danger, being much more afraid of an ignoble life and of failing to avenge his friends. 'Let me die forthwith,' said he, 'when I have requited the villain, rather than remain here by the beaked ships to be mocked, a burden on the ground.' Do you suppose that he gave a thought to death and danger?

The truth of the matter is this, gentlemen. Where a man has once taken up his stand, either because it seems best to him or in obedience to his orders, there I believe he is bound to remain and face the danger, taking no account of death or anything else before dishonor.

This being so, it would be shocking inconsistency on my part, gentlemen, if, when the officers whom you chose to command me assigned me my position at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, I remained at my post like anyone else and faced death, and yet afterward, when God appointed me, as I supposed and believed, to the duty of leading the philosophical life, examining myself and others, I were then through fear of death or of any other danger to desert my post. That would indeed be shocking, and then I might really with justice be summoned into court for not believing in the gods, and disobeying the oracle, and being afraid of death, and thinking that I am wise when I am not. For let me tell you, gentlemen, that to be afraid of death is only another form of thinking that one is wise when one is not; it is to think that one knows what one does not know.

No one knows with regard to death whether it is not really the greatest blessing that can happen to a man, but people dread it as though they were certain that it is the greatest evil, and this ignorance, which thinks that it knows what it does not, must surely be ignorance most culpable. This, I take it, gentlemen, is the degree, and this the nature of my advantage over the rest of mankind, and if I were to claim to be wiser than my neighbor in any respect, it would be in this—that not possessing any real knowledge of what comes after death, I am also conscious that I do not possess it. But I do know that to do wrong and to disobey my superior, whether God or man, is wicked and dishonorable, and so I shall never feel more fear or aversion for something which, for all I know, may really be a blessing, than for those evils which I know to be evils.

Suppose, then, that you acquit me, and pay no attention to Anytus, who has said that either I should not have appeared before this court at all, or, since I have appeared here, I must be put to death, because if I once escaped your sons would all immediately become utterly demoralized by putting the teaching of Socrates into practice. Suppose that, in view of this, you said to me, Socrates, on this occasion we shall disregard Anytus and acquit you, but only on one condition, that you give up spending your time on this quest and stop philosophizing. If we catch you going on in the same way, you shall be put to death.

Well, supposing, as I said, that you should offer to acquit me on these terms, I should reply, Gentlemen, I am your very grateful and devoted servant, but I owe a greater obedience to God than to you, and so long as I draw breath and have my faculties, I shall never stop practicing philosophy and exhorting you and elucidating the truth for everyone that I meet. I shall go on saying, in my usual way, My very good friend, you are an Athenian and belong to a city which is the

greatest and most famous in the world for its wisdom and strength. Are you not ashamed that you give your attention to acquiring as much money as possible, and similarly with reputation and honor, and give no attention or thought to truth and understanding and the perfection of your soul?

And if any of you disputes this and professes to care about these things, I shall not at once let him go or leave him. No, I shall question him and examine him and test him; and if it appears that in spite of his profession he has made no real progress toward goodness, I shall reprove him for neglecting what is of supreme importance, and giving his attention to trivialities. I shall do this to everyone that I meet, young or old, foreigner or fellow citizen, but especially to you, my fellow citizens, inasmuch as you are closer to me in kinship. This, I do assure you, is what my God commands, and it is my belief that no greater good has ever befallen you in this city than my service to my God. For I spend all my time going about trying to persuade you, young and old, to make your first and chief concern not for your bodies nor for your possessions, but for the highest welfare of your souls, proclaiming as I go, Wealth does not bring goodness, but goodness brings wealth and every other blessing, both to the individual and to the state.

Now if I corrupt the young by this message, the message would seem to be harmful, but if anyone says that my message is different from this, he is talking nonsense. And so, gentlemen, I would say, You can please yourselves whether you listen to Anytus or not, and whether you acquit me or not. You know that I am not going to alter my conduct, not even if I have to die a hundred deaths.

Order, please, gentlemen (Remember my request to give me a hearing without interruption. Besides, I believe that it will be to your advantage to listen. I am going to tell you something else, which may provoke a storm of protest, but

please restrain yourselves. I assure you that if I am what I claim to be, and you put me to death, you will harm yourselves more than me. Neither Meletus nor Anytus can do me any harm at all; they would not have the power, because I do not believe that the law of God permits a better man to be harmed by a worse. No doubt my accuser might put me to death or have me banished or deprived of civic rights, but even if he thinks—as he probably does, and others too, I dare say—that these are great calamities, I do not think so. I believe that it is far worse to do what he is doing now, trying to put an innocent man to death. For this reason, gentlemen, so far from pleading on my own behalf, as might be supposed, I am really pleading on yours, to save you from misusing the gift of God by condemning me. If you put me to death, you will not easily find anyone to take my place. It is literally true, even if it sounds rather comical, that God has specially appointed me to this city, as though it were a large thoroughbred

horse which because of its great size is inclined to be lazy and needs the stimulation of some stinging fly. It seems to me that God has attached me to this city to perform the office of such a fly, and all day long I never cease to settle here, there, and everywhere, rousing, persuading, reproving every one of you. You will not easily find another like me, gentlemen, and if you take my advice you will spare my life. I suspect, however, that before long you will awake from your drowsing, and in your annoyance you will take Anytus' advice and finish me off with a single slap, and then you will go on sleeping till the end of your days, unless God in his care for you sends someone to take my place.

If you doubt whether I am really the sort of person who would have been sent to this city as a gift from God, you can convince yourselves by looking at it in this way. Does it seem natural that I should have neglected my own affairs and

endured the humiliation of allowing my family to be neglected for all these years, while I busied myself all the time on your behalf, going like a father or an elder brother to see each one of you privately, and urging you to set your thoughts on goodness? If I had got any enjoyment from it, or if I had been paid for my good advice, there would have been some explanation for my conduct, but as it is you can see for yourselves that although my accusers unblushingly charge me with all sorts of other crimes, there is one thing that they have not had the impudence to pretend on any testimony, and that is that I have ever exacted or asked a fee from anyone. The witness that I can offer to prove the truth of my statement is, I think, a convincing one—my poverty.

It may seem curious that I should go round giving advice like this and busying myself in people's private affairs, and yet never venture publicly to address you as a whole and advise on matters of state. The reason for this is what you have often heard me say before on many other occasions—that I am subject to a divine or supernatural experience, which Meletus saw fit to travesty in his indictment. It began in my early childhood—a sort of voice which comes to me, and when it comes it always dissuades me from what I am proposing to do, and never urges me on. It is this that debars me from entering public life, and a very good thing too, in my opinion, because you may be quite sure, gentlemen, that if I had tried long ago to engage in politics, I should long ago have lost my life, without doing any good either to you or to myself. Please do not be offended if I tell you the truth. No man on earth who conscientiously opposes either you or any other organized democracy, and flatly prevents a great many wrongs and illegalities from taking place in the state to which he belongs, can possibly escape with his life. The true champion of justice, if he intends to survive even for a short

time, must necessarily confine himself to private life and leave politics alone.

I will offer you substantial proofs of what I have said—not theories, but what you can appreciate better, facts. Listen while I describe my actual experiences, so that you may know that I would never submit wrongly to any authority through fear of death, but would refuse even at the cost of my life. It will be a commonplace story, such as you often hear in the courts, but it is true.

The only office which I have ever held in our city, gentlemen, was when I was elected to the Council. It so happened that our group was acting as the executive when you decided that the ten commanders who had failed to rescue the men who were lost in the naval engagement should be tried en bloc, which was illegal, as you all recognized later. On this occasion I was the only member of the executive who insisted that you should not act unconstitutionally, and voted against the proposal; and although your leaders were all ready to denounce and arrest me, and you were all urging them on at the top of your voices, I thought that it was my duty to face it out on the side of law and justice rather than support you, through fear of prison or death, in your wrong decision.

This happened while we were still under a democracy. When the oligarchy came into power, the Thirty Commissioners in their turn summoned me and four others to the Round Chamber and instructed us to go and fetch Leon of Salamis from his home for execution. This was of course only one of many instances in which they issued such instructions, their object being to implicate as many people as possible in their wickedness. On this occasion, however, I again made it clear not by my words but by my actions that death did not matter to me at all—if that is not too strong an expression—but that it mattered all the world to

me that I should do nothing wrong or wicked. Powerful as it was, that government did not terrify me into doing a wrong action. When we came out of the Round Chamber, the other four went off to Salamis and arrested Leon, and I went home. I should probably have been put to death for this, if the government had not fallen soon afterward. There are plenty of people who will testify to these statements.

Do you suppose that I should have lived as long as I have if I had moved in the sphere of public life, and conducting myself in that sphere like an honorable man, had always upheld the cause of right, and conscientiously set this end above all other things? Not by a very long way, gentlemen; neither would any other man. You will find that throughout my life I have been consistent in any public duties that I have performed, and the same also in my personal dealings. I have never countenanced any action that was incompatible with justice on the part of any person, including those whom some people maliciously call my pupils. I have never set up as any man's teacher, but if anyone, young or old, is eager to hear me conversing and carrying out my private mission, I never grudge him the opportunity; nor do I charge a fee for talking to him, and refuse to talk without one. I am ready to answer questions for rich and poor alike, and I am equally ready if anyone prefers to listen to me and answer my questions. If any given one of these people becomes a good citizen or a bad one, I cannot fairly be held responsible, since I have never promised or imparted any teaching to anybody, and if anyone asserts that he has ever learned or heard from me privately anything which was not open to everyone else, you may be quite sure that he is not telling the truth.

But how is it that some people enjoy spending a great deal of time in my company? You have heard the reason, gentlemen; I told you quite frankly. It is because they enjoy hearing me examine those who think that they are wise

when they are not—an experience which has its amusing side. This duty I have accepted, as I said, in obedience to God's commands given in oracles and dreams and in every other way that any other divine dispensation has ever impressed a duty upon man. This is a true statement, gentlemen, and easy to verify. If it is a fact that I am in process of corrupting some of the young, and have succeeded already in corrupting others, and if it were a fact that some of the latter, being now grown up, had discovered that I had ever given them bad advice when they were young, surely they ought now to be coming forward to denounce and punish me. And if they did not like to do it themselves, you would expect some of their families—their fathers and brothers and other near relations—to remember it now, if their own flesh and blood had suffered any harm from me. Certainly a great many of them have found their way into this court, as I can see for myself—first Crito over there, my contemporary and near neighbor, the father of this young man Critobulus, and then Lysanias of Sphettus, the father of Aeschines here, and next Antiphon of Cephisus, over there, the father of Epigenes. Then besides there are all those whose brothers have been members of our circle—Nicostratus, the son of Theozotides, the brother of Theodotus, but Theodotus is dead, so he cannot appeal to his brother, and Paralus here, the son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages. And here is Adimantus, the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is over there, and Aeantodorus, whose brother Apollodorus is here on this side. I can name many more besides, some of whom Meletus most certainly ought to have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech. If he forgot to do so then, let him do it now—I am willing to make way for him. Let him state whether he has any such evidence to offer. On the contrary, gentlemen, you will find that they are all prepared to help me—the corrupter

and evil genius of their nearest and dearest relatives, as Meletus and Anytus say. The actual victims of my corrupting influence might perhaps be excused for helping me; but as for the uncorrupted, their relations of mature age, what other reason can they have for helping me except the right and proper one, that they know Meletus is lying and I am telling the truth?

There, gentlemen, that, and perhaps a little more to the same effect, is the substance of what I can say in my defense. It may be that some one of you, remembering his own case, will be annoyed that whereas he, in standing his trial upon a less serious charge than this, made pitiful appeals to the jury with floods of tears, and had his infant children produced in court to excite the maximum of sympathy, and many of his relatives and friends as well, I on the contrary intend to do nothing of the sort, and that, although I am facing, as it might appear, the utmost danger. It may be that one of you, reflecting on these facts, will be prejudiced against me, and being irritated by his reflections, will give his vote in anger. If one of you is so disposed—I do not expect it, but there is the possibility—I think that I should be quite justified in saying to him, My dear sir, of course I have some relatives. To quote the very words of Homer, even I am not sprung 'from an oak or from a rock,' but from human parents, and consequently I have relatives—yes, and sons too, gentlemen, three of them, one almost grown up and the other two only children—but all the same I am not going to produce them here and beseech you to acquit me.

Why do I not intend to do anything of this kind? Not out of perversity, gentlemen, nor out of contempt for you; whether I am brave or not in the face of death has nothing to do with it. The point is that for my own credit and yours and for the credit of the state as a whole, I do not think that it is right for me to use any of these methods at my age and

with my reputation—which may be true or it may be false, but at any rate the view is held that Socrates is different from the common run of mankind. Now if those of you who are supposed to be distinguished for wisdom or courage or any other virtue are to behave in this way, it would be a disgrace. I have often noticed that some people of this type, for all their high standing, go to extraordinary lengths when they come up for trial, which shows that they think it will be a dreadful thing to lose their lives—as though they would be immortal if you did not put them to death! In my opinion these people bring disgrace upon our city. Any of our visitors might be excused for thinking that the finest specimens of Athenian manhood, whom their fellow citizens select on their merits to rule over them and hold other high positions, are no better than women. If you have even the smallest reputation, gentlemen, you ought not to descend to these methods; and if we do so, you must not give us license. On the contrary, you must make it clear that anyone who stages these pathetic scenes and so brings ridicule upon our city is far more likely to be condemned than if he kept perfectly quiet.

But apart from all question of appearances, gentlemen, I do not think that it is right for a man to appeal to the jury or to get himself acquitted by doing so; he ought to inform them of the facts and convince them by argument. The jury does not sit to dispense justice as a favor, but to decide where justice lies, and the oath which they have sworn is not to show favor at their own discretion, but to return a just and lawful verdict. It follows that we must not develop in you, nor you allow to grow in yourselves, the habit of perjury; that would be sinful for us both. Therefore you must not expect me, gentlemen, to behave toward you in a way which I consider neither reputable nor moral nor consistent with my religious duty, and above all you must not expect it when I stand charged with impiety by Meletus

here. Surely it is obvious that if I tried to persuade you and prevail upon you by my entreaties to go against your solemn oath, I should be teaching you contempt for religion, and by my very defense I should be accusing myself of having no religious belief. But that is very far from the truth. I have a more sincere belief, gentlemen, than any of my accusers, and I leave it to you and to God to judge me as it shall be best for me and for yourselves.

There are a great many reasons, gentlemen, why I am not distressed by this result—I mean your condemnation of me—but the chief reason is that the result was not unexpected. What does surprise me is the number of votes cast on the two sides. I should never have believed that it would be such a close thing, but now it seems that if a mere thirty votes had gone the other way, I should have been acquitted. Even as it is, I feel that so far as Meletus' part is concerned I have been acquitted, and not only that, but anyone can see that if Anytus and Lycon had not come forward to accuse me, Meletus would actually have forfeited his one thousand drachmas for not having obtained one fifth of the votes.

However, we must face the fact that he demands the death penalty. Very good. What alternative penalty shall I propose to you, gentlemen? Obviously it must be adequate. Well, what penalty do I deserve to pay or suffer, in view of what I have done?

I have never lived an ordinary quiet life. I did not care for the things that most people care about—making money, having a comfortable home, high military or civil rank, and all the other activities, political appointments, secret societies, party organizations, which go on in our city. I thought that I was really too strict in my principles to survive if I went in for this sort of thing. So instead of taking a course which would have done no good either to you or to me, I set

myself to do you individually in private what I hold to be the greatest possible service. I tried to persuade each one of you not to think more of practical advantages than of his mental and moral well-being, or in general to think more of advantage than of well-being in the case of the state or of anything else. What do I deserve for behaving in this way? Some reward, gentlemen, if I am bound to suggest what I really deserve, and what is more, a reward which would be appropriate for myself. Well, what is appropriate for a poor man who is a public benefactor and who requires leisure for giving you moral encouragement? Nothing could be more appropriate for such a person than free maintenance at the state's expense. He deserves it much more than any victor in the races at Olympia, whether he wins with a single horse or a pair or a team of four. These people give you the semblance of success, but I give you the reality; they do not need maintenance, but I do. So if I am to suggest an appropriate penalty which is strictly in accordance with justice, I suggest free maintenance by the state.

Perhaps when I say this I may give you the impression, as I did in my remarks about exciting sympathy and making passionate appeals. that I am showing a deliberate perversity. That is not so, gentlemen. The real position is this. I am convinced that I never wrong anyone intentionally, but I cannot convince you of this, because we have had so little time for discussion. If it was your practice, as it is with other nations, to give not one day but several to the hearing of capital trials, I believe that you might have been convinced, but under present conditions it is not easy to dispose of grave allegations in a short space of time. So, being convinced that I do no wrong to anybody, I can hardly be expected to wrong myself by asserting that I deserve something bad, or by proposing a corresponding penalty. Why should I? For fear of suffering this penalty proposed by

Meletus, when, as I said, I do not know whether it is a good thing or a bad? Do you expect me to choose something which I know very well is bad by making my counterproposal? Imprisonment? Why should I spend my days in prison, in subjection to the periodically appointed officers of the law? A fine, with imprisonment until it is paid? In my case the effect would be just the same, because I have no money to pay a fine. Or shall I suggest banishment? You would very likely accept the suggestion.

I should have to be desperately in love with life to do that, gentlemen. I am not so blind that I cannot see that you, my fellow citizens, have come to the end of your patience with my discussions and conversations. You have found them too irksome and irritating, and now you are trying to get rid of them. Will any other people find them easy to put up with? That is most unlikely, gentlemen. A fine life I should have if I left this country at my age and spent the rest of my days trying one city after another and being turned out every time! I know very well that wherever I go the young people will listen to my conversation just as they do here, and if I try to keep them off, they will make their elders drive me out, while if I do not, the fathers and other relatives will drive me out of their own accord for the sake of the young.

Perhaps someone may say, But surely, Socrates, after you have left us you can spend the rest of your life in quietly minding your own business.

This is the hardest thing of all to make some of you understand.

If I say that this would be disobedience to God, and that is why I cannot 'mind my own business,' you will not believe that I am serious. If on the other hand I tell you that to let no day pass without discussing goodness and all the other subjects about which you hear me talking and examining

both myself and others is really the very best thing that a man can do, and that life without this sort of examination is not worth living, you will be even less inclined to believe me. Nevertheless that is how it is, gentlemen, as I maintain, though it is not easy to convince you of it. Besides, I am not accustomed to think of myself as deserving punishment. If I had money, I would have suggested a fine that I could afford, because that would not have done me any harm. As it is, I cannot, because I have none, unless of course you like to fix the penalty at what I could pay. I suppose I could probably afford a mina. I suggest a fine of that amount.

One moment, gentlemen. Plato here, and Crito and Critobulus and Apollodorus, want me to propose thirty minas, on their security. Very well, I agree to this sum, and you can rely upon these gentlemen for its payment.

Well, gentlemen, for the sake of a very small gain in time you are going to earn the reputation—and the blame from those who wish to disparage our city—of having put Socrates to death, 'that wise man' —because they will say I am wise even if I am not, these people who want to find fault with you. If you had waited just a little while, you would have had your way in the course of nature. You can see that I am well on in life and near to death. I am saying this not to all of you but to those who voted for my execution, and I have something else to say to them as well.

No doubt you think, gentlemen, that I have been condemned for lack of the arguments which I could have used if I had thought it right to leave nothing unsaid or undone to secure my acquittal. But that is very far from the truth. It is not a lack of arguments that has caused my condemnation, but a lack of effrontery and impudence, and the fact that I have refused to address you in the way which would give you most pleasure. You would have liked to hear me weep and wail, doing and saying all sorts of things which

I regard as unworthy of myself, but which you are used to hearing from other people. But I did not think then that I ought to stoop to servility because I was in danger, and I do not regret now the way in which I pleaded my case. I would much rather die as the result of this defense than live as the result of the other sort. In a court of law; just as in warfare, neither I nor any other ought to use his wits to escape death by any means. In battle it is often obvious that you could escape being killed by giving up your arms and throwing yourself upon the mercy of your pursuers, and in every kind of danger there are plenty of devices for avoiding death if you are unscrupulous enough to stick at nothing. But I suggest, gentlemen, that the difficulty is not so much to escape death; the real difficulty is to escape from doing wrong, which is far more fleet of foot. In this present instance I, the slow old man, have been overtaken by the slower of the two, but my accusers, who are clever and quick, have been overtaken by the faster—by iniquity. When I leave this court I shall go away condemned by you to death, but they will go away convicted by truth herself of depravity and wickedness. And they accept their sentence even as I accept mine. No doubt it was bound to be so, and I think that the result is fair enough.

Having said so much, I feel moved to prophesy to you who have given your vote against me, for I am now at that point where the gift of prophecy comes most readily to men—at the point of death. I tell you, my executioners, that as soon as I am dead, vengeance shall fall upon you with a punishment far more painful than your killing of me. You have brought about my death in the belief that through it you will be delivered from submitting your conduct to criticism, but I say that the result will be just the opposite. You will have more critics, whom up till now I have restrained without your knowing it, and being younger they will be harsher to you and will cause you more annoyance. If you expect to stop

denunciation of your wrong way of life by putting people to death, there is something amiss with your reasoning. This way of escape is neither possible nor creditable. The best and easiest way is not to stop the mouths of others, but to make yourselves as good men as you can. This is my last message to you who voted for my condemnation.

As for you who voted for my acquittal, I should very much like to say a few words to reconcile you to the result, while the officials are busy and I am not yet on my way to the place where I must die. I ask you, gentlemen, to spare me these few moments. There is no reason why we should not exchange fancies while the law permits. I look upon you as my friends, and I want you to understand the right way of regarding my present position.

Gentlemen of the jury—for you deserve to be so called—I have had a remarkable experience. In the past the prophetic voice to which I have become accustomed has always been my constant companion, opposing me even in quite trivial things if I was going to take the wrong course. Now something has happened to me, as you can see, which might be thought and is commonly considered to be a supreme calamity; yet neither when I left home this morning, nor when I was taking my place here in the court, nor at any point in any part of my speech did the divine sign oppose me. In other discussions it has often checked me in the middle of a sentence, but this time it has never opposed me in any part of this business in anything that I have said or done. What do I suppose to be the explanation? I will tell you. I suspect that this thing that has happened to me is a blessing, and we are quite mistaken in supposing death to be an evil. I have good grounds for thinking this, because my accustomed sign could not have failed to oppose me if what I was doing had not been sure to bring some good result.

We should reflect that there is much reason to hope for a good result on other grounds as well. Death is one of two things. Either it is annihilation, and the dead have no consciousness of anything, or, as we are told, it is really a change—a migration of the soul from this place to another. Now if there is no consciousness but only a dreamless sleep, death must be a marvelous gain. I suppose that if anyone were told to pick out the night on which he slept so soundly as not even to dream, and then to compare it with all the other nights and days of his life, and then were told to say, after due consideration, how many better and happier days and nights than this he had spent in the course of his life—well, I think that the Great King himself, to say nothing of any private person, would find these days and nights easy to count in comparison with the rest. If death is like this, then, I call it gain, because the whole of time, if you look at it in this way, can be regarded as no more than one single night. If on the other hand death is a removal from here to some other place, and if what we are told is true, that all the dead are there, what greater blessing could there be than this, gentlemen? If on arrival in the other world, beyond the reach of our so-called justice, one will find there the true judges who are said to preside in those courts, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus and all those other half-divinities who were upright in their earthly life, would that be an unrewarding journey? Put it in this way. How much would one of you give to meet Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die ten times over if this account is true. It would be a specially interesting experience for me to join them there, to meet Palamedes and Ajax, the son of Telamon, and any other heroes of the old days who met their death through an unfair trial, and to compare my fortunes with theirs—it would be rather amusing, I think. And above all I should like to spend my

time there, as here, in examining and searching people's minds, to find out who is really wise among them, and who only thinks that he is. What would one not give, gentlemen, to be able to question the leader of that great host against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or the thousands of other men and women whom one could mention, to talk and mix and argue with whom would be unimaginable happiness? At any rate I presume that they do not put one to death there for such conduct, because apart from the other happiness in which their world surpasses ours, they are now immortal for the rest of time, if what we are told is true.

You too, gentlemen of the jury, must look forward to death with confidence, and fix your minds on this one belief, which is certain —that nothing can harm a good man either in life or after death, and his fortunes are not a matter of indifference to the gods. This present experience of mine has not come about mechanically. I am quite clear that the time had come when it was better for me to die and be released from my distractions. That is why my sign never turned me back. For my own part I bear no grudge at all against those who condemned me and accused me, although it was not with this kind intention that they did so, but because they thought that they were hurting me; and that is culpable of them. However, I ask them to grant me one favor. When my sons grow up, gentlemen, if you think that they are putting money or anything else before goodness, take your revenge by plaguing them as I plagued you; and if they fancy themselves for no reason, you must scold them just as I scolded you, for neglecting the important things and thinking that they are good for something when they are good for nothing. If you do this, I shall have had justice at your hands, both I myself and my children.

Now it is time that we were going, I to die and you to live, but which of us has the happier prospect is unknown to anyone but God.

The Apology Of Socrates.

Translated by Woodhead, W. D. 1953

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates; Meletus.

1

Socrates/ What impression, men of Athens, my accusers have made upon you, I know not: but as for me, they almost made me forget who I am, so persuasively did they speak. And yet there is practically no word of truth in what they have said. But I was particularly astonished at one of their many falsehoods—their statement that I am a clever speaker and that you must beware of being deceived by me. For what seemed to me the most brazen thing about them is this, that they are not ashamed at the prospect of being confuted at once in actual fact, when I prove myself to be in no way a clever speaker—unless, to be sure, they mean by a clever speaker one who tells the truth: if that is what they mean, I should agree that I am an orator on a very different level from them. My accusers, then, as I state, have said little or nothing that is true: but you shall hear from me the whole truth—not, gentlemen, speeches decked out like theirs with words and phrases and finely arranged, but words uttered as they occur to me in the language of every day—for I am confident in the justice of my plea—and let none of you expect otherwise. For surely it would ill become me at my age to appear before you telling stories, like a boy. There is indeed one thing, gentlemen, which I most earnestly beg and entreat of you: if you hear me making my defense in the language that I regularly employ at the counters in the market place, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, not to be surprised nor to interrupt me on that account. For the truth is that this is the first time I have

appeared before a court, though I am seventy years old. I am therefore literally a stranger to the language of the courts. Then just as, if I had really been a stranger, you would assuredly pardon me for speaking in the dialect and the fashion of my motherland, so too now I ask this of you, a fair request, in my opinion: to ignore my manner of speech—it may be bad, it may be good—and to give this one thing your whole attention and consideration, whether or not my plea is just. For that is the virtue of a judge, as an orator's virtue is to speak the truth.

First of all then it is right for me to defend myself, gentlemen, against the first false charge levelled against me and my earlier accusers, and then against the later charges and the present accusers. For many have come forward to accuse me before you, long ago too, in fact for many years already, without uttering a word of truth: and these I fear more than Anytus and his friends, though they too are formidable. But more formidable still are those who took most of you in hand from your childhood and convinced you by their accusations against me, though they were no more true than the present charges, saying that there is one Socrates, a wise man who speculates upon things on high and has investigated all things beneath the earth, and who makes the weaker argument the stronger. These men, who have deluged me with this flood of false statement, are my dangerous accusers: for those who give ear to them believe that men engaged in such pursuits do not worship the gods either. And then these accusers are many in number and have long been attacking me; and further they spoke to you when you were of an age most likely to believe them, being some of you children or in your teens: and so they literally convicted me by default, there being none to defend me. And the most unreasonable thing of all is that I am not even in a position to know and mention their names, except in the

case of the comic poets. But all who sought to convince you by misrepresentation and malice—some too persuading others because they themselves were convinced—all these, I say, are my most baffling accusers: for it is not even possible to call any of them into court or cross-examine them, but I must simply fight with shadows, as it were, in making my defense, and cross-question with none to answer. You too must allow then, as I say, that I have had two classes of accusers, the one group whom you have just heard, the other those earlier attackers of whom I am now talking: and consider that I must first defend myself against the latter: for you heard them attacking me first, and attacking with much more vigor than these later enemies.

Well then, I must offer my defense, gentlemen, and must attempt in the short time at my disposal to eradicate from your minds a prejudice you took many years to acquire. Now I could wish that this might be achieved, if so it be better both for you and for me, and that I might meet with some success in my defense: but I think it is a difficult task, and I am pretty well aware of its nature. However, let this follow the course that is pleasing to God: I must obey the law and make my defense.

Let us go back, then, to the beginning and consider what the charge is that gave rise to this prejudice against me—a prejudice upon which Meletus relied, I suppose, when he brought this indictment against me. What was said then by those who aroused this prejudice, to create it? I must read their sworn statement, as it were, just as if they were accusing me in court. 'Socrates is a busybody and is guilty of investigating things beneath the earth and in the sky above, and of making the weaker argument the stronger, and of teaching others these same things.' It runs somewhat like that. You yourselves saw these things in that comedy of Aristophanes, a certain Socrates swinging about, claiming to

tread the air and talking a deal of other nonsense about matters of which I know nothing either more or less. And I speak not with any disrespect for such knowledge, if anyone is wise in these matters—may Meletus never indict me often enough to induce me to do that—but in fact, gentlemen, I have no concern whatever with such things. And once again I produce the majority of you yourselves as witnesses and entreat you to instruct and inform each other, as many of you as have ever heard me conversing-—and there are many such here present—tell each other, then, whether anyone of you has ever heard me talking either briefly or at length upon such subjects: and from this you will learn that the other stories told about me by most people are equally groundless.

However, none of these things is true; and if you have heard from any source that I undertake to educate men and exact money for it, that also is untrue. Though as a matter of fact it does seem to me a fine thing if anyone could possess the gift of educating men, as is done by Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis. For, gentlemen, each one of them is able to visit any city and win over the young men, who are at liberty to associate free of charge with any fellow-citizens they choose—these young men, I say, they can persuade to abandon such associations and to associate with them instead, and to pay them a fee and feel grateful to them as well. For that matter, there is another wise man, from Paros, who, I discovered, is now in town. I happened to encounter a man who has paid to the Sophists more money that all others put together, Callias, the son of Hipponicus: and so I asked him—he has two sons—'Callias', I said, 'if your two sons had been colts or calves, we should have been able to hire an overseer who would have made them perfect in the appropriate kind of excellence; and this would have been one of the groom or farmer class. But as it is, since they are human beings, whom have you in mind to take as their

overseer? Who is expert in the form of excellence proper to a man and a citizen? I expect that as a father you have considered the matter. Is there anyone I said, 'or not'? 'Certainly', he replied. 'Who', said I, 'and whence, and what his fee?' 'Evenus', he said, 'Socrates, from Paros, five minae'. And I thought Evenus a fortunate man if he really should possess this art and actually teaches it so reasonably. At least I should give myself airs and feel most superior, if I possessed such knowledge. But I do not possess it, gentlemen.

Now perhaps some of you may rejoin: 'But, Socrates, what is this occupation of yours? Whence have these prejudices arisen against you? You must surely have been doing something more unusual than most men for all this gossip and talk to have arisen: you must have been acting differently from others. Tell us what it is, then, that we may not jump to conclusions about you'. That seems to me a reasonable plea, and I will attempt to show you what it is that is responsible for this reputation and this prejudice. Listen then: and perhaps some of you will think I am not serious: but be well assured, I will tell you the whole truth. Gentlemen, I have acquired this reputation of mine through nothing else but a kind of wisdom. What kind of wisdom, you will say. The wisdom which is perhaps attainable by a man: in reality apparently this wisdom is mine. But those of whom I spoke just now must probably be endowed with a superhuman wisdom, or I know not what to call it: for I have no such knowledge, but whoever says that I have is lying and seeking to slander me. Now do not interrupt me, gentlemen, even if you think me guilty of boasting: for the words I am about to speak are not mine, but I shall refer them to a speaker in whom you may place all confidence. Of my wisdom—if indeed it be wisdom, and such as it is—I will produce as witness the god at Delphi. You know Chaerepho,

I am sure. He was my comrade from his youth, and he was a partisan of your democracy and shared its exile and returned with it. And you know what manner of man he was, how impetuous in all that he undertook. Now once he went to Delphi and ventured to put this question to the oracle—and once more I ask you, gentlemen, not to interrupt: he actually asked if there was any man wiser than I: and the Pythian priestess replied there was none. For the truth of this his brother will vouch, since Chaerepho himself is dead.

And now consider why I tell you this: for I am about to explain whence this prejudice against me arose. When I heard the story, I began to ponder: 'What does the god mean, and what is this riddle of his? I am conscious that I have no knowledge of whatever degree. What does he mean, then, by saying I am the wisest? For surely he is not uttering a falsehood: that is not permissible for him'. And for a long time I was at a loss as to his meaning: and then with the utmost reluctance I set out to investigate in the manner I now describe. I went to a man with a reputation for wisdom, thinking that there, if anywhere, I might prove the response mistaken and say to the oracle: This man is wiser than I, but you said I was the wisest of men'. In my examination of him (and I need not mention him by name, but it was a politician with whom I had this experience) and in my conversation with him, I discovered that he was considered to be wise by many people, and above all by himself, but was not. And then I endeavored to prove to him that he thought himself wise, but that he was not. The result was that I made an enemy of him and of many who were present. But as I departed, I reflected to myself: 'I am at least wiser than he is: for in all probability neither of us knows anything good, but he fancies that he does, though he does not, whereas I, even as I have no knowledge, do not think that I have. Apparently then I am his superior in wisdom to this small

extent at least, that what I know not I do not imagine that I know'. I went next to another man, one reputed to be even wiser than he, and I formed the same impression; and there too I made enemies of him and many others.

After this I went around to one after another, perceiving with grief and anxiety that I was making enemies, but none the less I thought it necessary to consider the god's mission of the utmost moment. And so in searching out the oracle's meaning onward I must go to all who enjoyed a name for knowledge. And, by the dog, gentlemen, this is what actually happened—for I must tell you the truth: those whose reputation stood highest seemed to me almost the most deficient, as I investigated at the god's bidding: and others, of inferior repute, seemed to be their superiors in good sense. I must needs describe to you my wanderings, as of one engaged in the labors of Hercules, only to prove after all that the oracle was irrefutable. For after the politicians I approached the poets, tragic, dithyrambic, and others, intending there to prove on the spot my inferiority in knowledge. I took up then those of their poems which seemed to me to have cost them most trouble, and asked them what they meant, hoping at the same time to receive some instruction from them. Now I am ashamed, gentlemen, to tell you the truth: but nevertheless it must out. Practically all present could have given a better account of what the poets had written than the poets themselves. And so with the poets too in their turn I quickly discovered that it was not through wisdom that they composed their works, but by a natural endowment and inspiration, like prophets and givers of oracles: for these say many fine things but understand nothing of what they say. Such seemed also to be the plight of the poets; and at the same time I perceived that on account of their poetry they thought they were the wisest of men in other fields, in which they were not. And so

I left them also, thinking that I was their superior in the same way, in which I surpassed the politicians.

Finally then I approached the craftsmen: for I was aware that I knew practically nothing, but that I should find them possessed of much fine knowledge. And herein I was not disappointed: they knew much that I did not, and in this respect were my superiors in wisdom. But, gentlemen, our worthy craftsmen, it seemed to me, made the same error as the poets. Each one, because of his excellent craftsmanship, claimed to be wisest in other matters of the utmost moment, and this presumption threw their wisdom into the shade. So I asked myself on the oracle's behalf whether I would prefer to be as I am, neither wise with their wisdom nor ignorant with their ignorance, or to possess both these qualities of theirs. And I made reply to myself and to the oracle that it was to my advantage to remain as I am.

As a result of this investigation, gentlemen, I have incurred many enmities of the most bitter and grievous kind, and from them many slanders have arisen, and I am called by the name of 'wise'. For those who are present on each occasion think that I am wise in any matters in which I confute others. Whereas, gentlemen, in actual truth it seems to me that the god only is wise and that in this oracle he says that human wisdom is of little or no worth. And apparently he speaks of Socrates here and takes me as an example by using my name, just as if he should say: 'that man among human beings is most wise who like Socrates has learnt that in reality his wisdom is nothing worth'. So that is why I go around even now searching and examining, at the god's command, any man, whether citizen or stranger, whom I think to be wise: and whenever he does not appear so to me, I come to the god's assistance and point out that the man is not wise. And as a result of this activity I have no leisure to pay any attention worth speaking of either to the city's

affairs or to my own, but am in the depths of poverty owing to my service to the god.

And further, the young men who follow me uninvited—the sons of the wealthy, who have most leisure—enjoy hearing people cross-examined, and they often of their own accord imitate me and attempt to cross-examine others: and then I suppose they find a plentiful abundance of men who think they possess knowledge but know little or nothing. And consequently their victims are angry with me instead of with themselves, and they say that Socrates is a most pestilent fellow who corrupts the youth: and when asked by what action or teaching, they have nothing to say, for they do not know: but to avoid appearing at a loss, they utter the stock charges brought against all philosophers, about 'things in the sky and beneath the earth and 'not worshipping the gods and 'making the weaker argument the stronger'. For, I suppose, they would not be willing to admit the truth, that they are detected pretending to knowledge, when they know nothing. And so, I imagine, because they are zealous and vehement and numerous and speak vigorously and convincingly about me, they have long filled your ears with their violent slanders. It is on the strength of this that Meletus and Anytus and Lycon have attacked me, Meletus the indignant champion of the poets, Anytus of the craftsmen and politicians, Lycon of the orators: and so, as I remarked at the outset, I should be surprised if I could in so short a time rid you of a prejudice which has grown so strong. There, gentlemen, you have the truth, and I speak to you without any concealments or suppressions great or small. And yet I am pretty well aware that it is by these very methods that I make enemies: but this is proof that my words are true and that the prejudice and the causes of it are as I describe them. And whether you investigate the matter now or later, you will find that it is so.

This should be sufficient defense before you against the charges brought by my first accusers. I shall next attempt to offer my defense against Meletus, that true man and patriot, as he styles himself, and the later accusers. Once more then, as if they were a second group of assailants, let us take up their sworn statement in turn. It runs like this: 'Socrates,' it states, 'is guilty of corrupting the youth and of not worshipping the gods recognized by the city but following strange religious practices'.

Such is the charge against me: and now let us examine each element in it.

Meletus says that I am guilty of corrupting the young. But I say, gentlemen, that Meletus is the guilty man, because he jests on a serious matter and light-heartedly brings people to trial, pretending to be zealous and concerned about matters which have never interested him in the least. And that this is so I shall now endeavor to prove to you also.

Come now, Meletus, tell me: do you not consider it of the utmost importance that our young men should be as good as possible?

Meletus/ I do.

Socrates/ Go on then and tell the court who it is that makes them better: for obviously you know, since you are so interested. You have, you say, discovered in me their corrupter and you bring me to court and accuse me: come then, tell these gentlemen who improves them and reveal his name ... You see, Meletus, that you are tongue-tied and unable to tell. And yet do you not think this is disgraceful and sufficient evidence of exactly what I say, namely that you have never felt the slightest concern in the matter?

But tell us, my good sir, who makes them better?

Meletus/ The laws.

Socrates/ That is not what I am asking, my worthy friend, but what man, who of course to begin with must know the laws.

Meletus/ These judges here, Socrates.

Socrates/ What is that, Meletus? Are they able to educate our youth and improve them?

Meletus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ All of them, or can some do so and others not?

Meletus/ All of them.

Socrates/ That is good news indeed—an abundant crop of benefactors. And what about the listeners (in court)? Do they improve the young or not?

Meletus/ They also do.

Socrates/ And the councilors?

Meletus/ The councilors too.

Socrates/ But, Meletus, do the members of the assembly corrupt the young? Or do they too all improve them?

Meletus/ They too.

Socrates/ Then all the Athenians, it seems, make them good except myself: and I alone corrupt them: is that what you mean?

Meletus/ Most emphatically, I do.

Socrates/ It is a great misfortune you lay to my charge. And now answer this: do you hold that the same thing is true with horses, that but one man does them harm, and all others improve them? Or, quite the contrary, that one man or very few can improve them, namely the trainers, but most people injure them if they have anything to do with them or use them? Is it not so, Meletus, in the case of horses and of all other animals? Of course it is, whether you and Anytus accept or deny it: we should have abundant reason to be happy about our young men, if it is really true that one man

alone corrupts them, and all others do them good. However, Meletus, you prove conclusively that you have never given any thought to our youth, and clearly display your own indifference and lack of concern about the matters for which you prosecute me.

But in heaven's name, Meletus, answer this further question: is it better to live among good or evil citizens? Answer, my friend: for it is not a difficult question. Do not evil men do harm to those who at any time are their neighbors, and good men do good?

Meletus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is there any man who prefers to be harmed rather than benefited by his associates? Answer, my good sir: for the law bids you answer. Is there anyone who prefers to be harmed?

Meletus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And now, do you bring me to court for corrupting the young and making them worse men voluntarily or involuntarily?

Meletus/ Voluntarily, I say.

Socrates/ Why, Meletus, are you at your age so much wiser than I at mine, as to have realized that evil men always do evil to those who are closest to them, and the good some good, whereas I am sunk in such a depth of ignorance as to be unaware that, if I make any of my associates a knave, I am likely to suffer some harm from him, and yet, according to you, I commit this evil intentionally? Oh, no, Meletus, you cannot convince me of that nor, I should think, convince any other man either. But either I do not corrupt the young or, if I do, it is unintentional: so that in either event you are lying. And if I corrupt them involuntarily, for such involuntary errors the law does not bid you bring me to court, but rather to take me in private and instruct and admonish me: for

manifestly, if I am instructed, I shall cease to do what in any case I am doing involuntarily. But you avoided my company and refused to instruct me, and you bring me here instead, where the law bids you bring those who need, not instruction, but punishment.

However, gentlemen, what I was saying is now quite evident, that Meletus has never concerned himself to any degree whatever with these matters. Nevertheless, tell us, Meletus, in what way you say that I corrupt the young. Or is it evident, by the terms of the indictment you have brought against me, that it is by teaching them not to acknowledge the gods observed by the city but to practice strange religious rites? Is it not by such teachings that you say I corrupt the youth?

Meletus/ Yes, most emphatically I do say so.

Socrates/ Then in the name of those very gods who are now under discussion, Meletus, explain this still more definitely to me and to the court. For I cannot understand whether you say that I teach men to believe that certain gods exist, not those recognized by the city, but different gods (in which event I myself do believe in the existence of gods and am not an out-and-out atheist and am not guilty in that way) and your charge against me is that they are different; or whether you insist that I do not believe in gods at all and teach this atheism to others.

Meletus/ That is what I mean, that you do not recognize gods at all.

Socrates/ You strange fellow, Meletus, why do you say this? Do I not then believe, like other men, that the sun and moon are gods?

Meletus/ No indeed, judges, he does not: for he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth.

Socrates/ Do you imagine, my dear Meletus, that you are accusing Anaxagoras? And do you so disdain these gentlemen and think them so illiterate as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of these theories? And do the young men actually learn from me doctrines which they may purchase for a drachma at the most at the Orchestra and then laugh Socrates to scorn if he claims them to be his own, especially when they are so outlandish? In heaven's name, is that what you think of me? Do I not believe in any gods?

Meletus/ No indeed, in none whatever.

Socrates/ What you say is unconvincing, Meletus, even to yourself, I believe. It seems to me, gentlemen, that my opponent is thoroughly insolent and uncontrolled, and that he has laid this charge literally in a spirit of insolence and wantonness and youthful bravado. He is like a man trying an experiment by composing a riddle: 'Will Socrates, that paragon of wisdom, detect that I am trifling and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and all who hear me?' Yes, he seems to be contradicting himself in the indictment, as though he should say: 'Socrates is guilty of not recognizing gods, but of recognizing gods'. Yet this is the behavior of a trifler.

And now consider along with me, gentlemen, what makes me think this is his meaning. Do you answer me, Meletus: and, as I entreated you at the outset, remember, gentlemen, not to interrupt if I converse in my usual fashion.

Is there any man, Meletus, who believes in the existence of human affairs but not of human beings? Let him answer, gentlemen, and not engage in one interruption after another. Is there anyone who believes in horsemanship, but not in horses? or in flute-playing, but not in flutists? There is not, my good sir: if you refuse to answer, I will tell you and all

others here. But this next question you must answer. Is there anybody who believes in things divine, but not in divine beings?

Meletus/ There is not.

Socrates/ How obliging of you to answer—though reluctantly and compelled by the court. You assert then that I acknowledge and teach belief in things divine, whether old or new: at any rate, by your account, I recognize things divine, and to this you have sworn in your deposition. But if I recognize things divine, surely there is every necessity that I must recognize divine beings. Is it not so? I take it that you agree, since you do not answer. But do we not consider divine beings to be either gods or the children of gods? Yes or no?

Meletus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If I believe in divine beings, as you say, then, if these divine beings are a kind of gods, that would be the riddling jest of which I accuse you—your assertion that though I do not believe in the gods, yet once more I do believe in them, since I believe in divine beings. But if on the other hand these divine beings are the illegitimate offspring of gods, whether by nymphs or by any other mothers whose children they are said to be—what man is there who would believe that the children of gods exist, but not gods? It would be just as ridiculous as if one believed that the offspring of horses and asses exist, namely mules, but not horses and asses. But beyond all doubt, Meletus, you lodged this indictment against me either as an experiment or because you were at a loss to discover any real guilt wherewith to charge me. There is no means whereby you can persuade anyone with the slightest intelligence that it is not to be expected of the same man that he will believe both in things

divine and in what concerns the gods, and again that the same man will not believe in divinities and gods and heroes.

Well, gentlemen, that I am not guilty of the offences charged by Meletus does not, I think, need much proof, but what I have said is sufficient. But you may be well assured of the truth of what I said before, that many have come to hate me bitterly. And this it is that will convict me, not Meletus nor Anytus, but the prejudice and malice of the many. These things have already convicted many other good men, and are likely to do so again. There is no fear that it will end with me.

Now, perhaps someone may say: 'Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of having engaged in an occupation which now exposes you to the danger of death?' To him I could reply with justice: 'You are mistaken, my friend, if you think that a man of even the slightest merit ought to calculate risks of life and death, but ought not rather in every action to consider whether it is right or wrong, the act of a good man or an evil. For by your account all the demigods who died at Troy would be slight, unmeritable men, the son of Thetis included, who despised death in comparison with dishonor. For when in his thirst to slay Hector, his mother, a goddess, spoke to him in some such words as follow, I believe: "My son, if you insist upon avenging the death of your friend Patroclus and killing Hector, you yourself will die—for", said she, "straightway after Hector's death your fate is ready"—he made light of danger and death when he heard this, and fearing far more to live a coward and fail to avenge his friend, "let me die at once", he said, "when once I have punished the guilty, that I may not remain to be laughed to scorn, e a mere burden on the earth beside the curved ships"'' Do you think that he took any account of death and danger?

The truth is, gentlemen, that wherever a man posts himself, because he thinks it best, or is posted by his

commander, there, in my opinion, he ought to remain and face the danger, taking no account of death or of anything else, except disgrace. When the officers whom you chose to command me, gentlemen, set me at my post at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, I remained at my station like anyone else and faced the risk of death: it would be strange behavior if through fear of death or of any other fate I were to leave my post, when the god, as I thought and understood, assigned me my duty—to live the life of a philosopher examining myself and others. Yes, that would be strange, and then I might in very truth rightly be brought to trial for not believing in the existence of the gods and disobeying the oracle and fearing death and thinking myself wise when I am not. For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else but to think oneself wise when one is not: it is to fancy that we know what we know not. No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings to man, but men fear it as if they knew well that it was the greatest of evils. And yet surely this is ignorance of the most reprehensible kind—that of thinking one knows what one does not. As for me, here too perhaps I differ from the majority of men to this extent, and if I should claim in any respect to be wiser than any other man, it would be in this, that as I have no definite knowledge about the other world, so too I do not think that I know: but I do know that it is shameful and evil to do injury and to disobey one's betters, whether god or man. In preference then to those evils which I recognize as such, I shall never fear or avoid what for all I know may be good. And so, even if you acquit me now and pay no heed to Anytus, who says that either I should never have been brought to trial at all or, since I have, it is impossible to avoid putting me to death, insisting that if I should now escape, your sons will all be utterly ruined by practicing the teachings of Socrates—if you should say in answer to this: 'Socrates, we will not be persuaded by Anytus

this time, we will acquit you, but only on condition that you no longer spend your time in these investigations nor pursue philosophy: if you are caught continuing such practices, you shall die'—if then as I said, you would release me on those terms, I should say to you: 'Men of Athens, I love and esteem you, but I will obey the god rather than you; and as long as I breathe and have the power, I shall never abandon philosophy nor cease to admonish you and reveal the truth to anyone of you I may meet from time to time, saying in my wonted fashion: "My good friend, you are a citizen of Athens, a great city and highly renowned for its power and wisdom: are you not ashamed then of seeking to acquire as much money as you can, and reputation and honor, but caring nothing and taking no thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your soul?"' And if anyone of you should dispute this and say that he does care, I shall not at once release him and go my way, but I shall question him and examine and convict him and if I make up my mind that he does not possess goodness but merely claims to, I shall reproach him for making light of the most important things and treasuring what is of lesser value. This I shall do for the benefit of both young and old, whomsoever I encounter, both citizen and stranger; but more especially for you citizens, inasmuch as you are closer akin to me. For I assure you, this is the god's bidding: and I consider that the city has enjoyed no greater boon than my service to the god. For I go around engaged in the one activity of persuading you, young and old alike, not to care first and foremost for your bodies or for wealth, but rather for the improvement of your souls, saying: 'goodness does not come from money, but it is goodness that makes money and all other things in public or in private good for men.' If then by such discourses I corrupt the young, it must be harmful: but if anyone accuses me of saying anything else than this, he talks nonsense.

‘Now then, gentlemen’, I shall say, ‘you may believe Anytus or not, you may acquit me or not: but I will not behave otherwise, even if I have to die many a death.’

Do not interrupt, gentlemen, but abide by my request not to interrupt but to listen: for I believe you will profit by listening. I am about to say something else at which you will perhaps exclaim aloud but do not by any means do that. You may be assured that if you put to death such a man as I describe myself to be, you will do yourselves more harm than me. Meletus and Anytus will do me no harm—that would be impossible. For it is not permitted, I believe, for a better man to be harmed by a worse. He might be killed or exiled or disfranchised: and Meletus and others perhaps consider these things to be great evils. But I do not: it is a far greater evil, in my opinion, to do what Meletus is now doing, endeavoring unjustly to put a man to death. Now therefore, gentlemen, I am not making this defense on my own behalf, as you might suppose. Far from it. It is on your behalf, that you may make no error about the god’s gift to you by condemning me. For if you put me to death, you will not easily find such another, one who, ridiculous as it may sound, has literally been attached by the god to the city as though to a horse that is thoroughbred and large but owing to its very size somewhat sluggish and constantly needs to be awakened by a gadfly. That is the guise, I think, in which the god has attached me to the city—a kind of creature that never ceases to awaken you and persuade and reproach you, besetting you one and all the whole day long from every quarter. You will not readily find such another, gentlemen, but if you will take my advice, you will spare me. But perhaps in your vexation, like sleepy people suddenly awakened, you will thoughtlessly kill me with a single blow, as Anytus suggests, and then pass the rest of your lives in slumber, unless the god in his care for you should send you

another such visitant. But that I am actually a kind of gift from the god to the city you may realize from this fact: it does not look like mere human behavior that I should have ignored all my own affairs and put up with their neglect for so many years now, ever engaging in your interests, approaching each one of you singly as though I were a father or elder brother and persuading you to care for goodness. And if I reaped any profit from this conduct or received a fee for my exhortations, it would be explicable. But as it is you can see for yourselves that my accusers, shameless though they have been in every other respect, have not had the effrontery to produce witnesses and assert that I ever exacted or asked payment from any man. For I think that my poverty is sufficient evidence that I am telling the truth.

Now perhaps it may seem strange that I go around giving my advice in private and busy myself with the concerns of others, but that I do not venture to appear before your assembly and give advice to the state. The reason for this is something you have often heard me speak about and in many places—something supernatural and divine which visits me—the very thing, of course, at which Meletus poked fun in his indictment. This is something that began with me in childhood, a kind of voice which on each occasion when it comes to me deters me from what I am about to do, but never encourages me to action. This it is that opposes my engaging in politics, and a very good thing it is, in my opinion, that it does oppose. For you may be certain, gentlemen, that if I had long since attempted to enter public life, I should have perished long ago without benefiting you or myself. And do not be angry with me if I speak frankly. There is no man who can save himself alive, if he genuinely opposes you or any other democracy and prevents many evil and lawless actions from taking place in the city: but it is essential that the man who is really to fight the battle for

justice, if he is to remain alive even for a short while, should act in a private, not a public station.

For this I will offer you good evidence, not words, but what you respect more highly, deeds. Listen to what happened to me; then you may realize that so far from yielding to any man whatever to do wrong through fear of death, I would even be ready to meet my death for not yielding. The proofs I shall offer are mere tiresome commonplaces of the law-courts, but none the less true.

I have never held any office in the city, gentlemen, but once I was a member of the Council: and my tribe, Antiochis, happened to be presiding when you passed your resolution to try in a body the ten generals who failed to recover the dead after the sea-battle—an illegal action on your part, as you all afterwards agreed. On that occasion I alone of the presiding committee opposed your taking any action contrary to the laws and voted against you. And though the orators were ready to impeach and arrest me, and though you clamored and hounded them on, I thought it my duty to face the danger to the end on the side of law and justice rather than, through fear of imprisonment or death, to side with you in your unjust decree.

This took place when the state was still a democracy. And when the oligarchy had gained power, the Thirty summoned me with four others to the rotunda and ordered us to bring Leon of Salamis from his home to be put to death. They gave many such orders to others also, being anxious to secure as many accomplices as possible in their guilt. But then once more I proved by action, not by word, that for death, if I may speak somewhat bluntly, I cared not a straw, but that my whole concern was that I should perform no wrongful or impious act. That government, for all its power, did not terrify me into doing anything wrong: but when we left the rotunda, the four departed to Salamis and brought Leon

over, but I took my way home. And perhaps I might have met my death for this, had not that government soon been overthrown. And there are many who will confirm the truth of this to you.

Do you imagine that I could have survived for so many years if I had entered public life and had acted like a good man and true in aiding the cause of justice and, as is right, had considered this of paramount importance? Far from it, gentlemen: no other man would have either. But throughout my life, both in any public action and in private, you will find that I have been immutably the same, one who never made any base submission to any man whatever, and I include those whom they slanderously describe as my disciples. I have never been any man's teacher: but if anyone wished to hear me speaking and engaging in my mission, whether old or young, I grudged nobody: nor is it true that I converse when paid a fee but refuse to otherwise; but I offer myself to rich and poor alike for questioning and if any wish to hear what I have to say in reply. And whether any of these men turn out good or not I cannot rightly be held accountable, since I never promised or gave any of them any instruction. And if anyone says that he has ever heard or learnt from me in private anything that was not open to all others, I assure you that he is not speaking the truth.

But why do certain people enjoy spending much time with me? You have heard already, gentlemen, I have told you the whole truth. It is because they enjoy hearing the cross-examination of those who think themselves wise when they are not: and it really is diverting. But, as I tell you, this task has been enjoined upon me by the god in oracles and dreams and in every way in which a divine dispensation has ever enjoined upon any man any act whatever. That, gentlemen, is the truth, and it may easily be tested. If I have already corrupted some of our youth and am now corrupting others,

then surely some of them, on recognizing as they grow older that I had given them evil advice in their youth, should have made their appearance in court to accuse and punish me: or if they themselves were unwilling, their kinsfolk, fathers, brothers, and other relatives, should now have remembered and punished it, if those near and dear to them had suffered any harm at my hands. In any case many of them I can see here in court, first of all Crito, who is of my own age and parish, the father of Critobulus yonder; and then Lysanias of Sphettus, whose son Aeschines is present, and Antiphon of Cephisus also, the father of Epigenes; and others too, whose brothers spent their time in this manner, Nicostratus, son of Theozotides and brother of Theodotus—and Theodotus is dead and so could not dissuade him—and Paralus, son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages: and yonder is Adeimantus, son of Ariston, whose brother is Plato here, and Aeantodorus, whose brother is Apollodorus yonder. And there are many others I could mention to you, some of whom Meletus ought to have brought forward to give evidence, preferably during his own speech; but if he forgot then, let him do so now—I will stand aside—and let him say if he has any such witness. But, quite on the contrary', you will find, gentlemen, many who are ready to help me, the corrupting influence, the man who harms their relatives according to Meletus and Anytus. It would be reasonable of course to expect the victims of corruption themselves to help me: but those who are not corrupted, their kinsmen who are now older men—what other reason can they have for helping me than the true and just reason, that they know Meletus is lying and I am speaking the truth?

Well, gentlemen, this is pretty much what I have to offer in my defense, this and other similar evidence, I suppose. Now perhaps some one of you may be indignant when he recalls his own case—how, though involved in a far less

critical trial than this, he begged and implored the judges with many a tear, bringing his small children and others of his family and many friends into court, in order to win the utmost sympathy, whereas I, it seems, intend to do none of these things, even though exposed, by all appearances, to the extremes of peril. Perhaps then in taking note of this he may harden his heart against me and being angered at this conduct of mine may give his vote in anger. If anyone of you is so affected—and I do not expect it of you, but if so—I think I should make a reasonable plea if I said to him: 'My good friend, I too have kinsfolk: for, in Homer's words, "I am not sprung from oak-tree or from rock", but from human parents: and so I too have kinsmen, and sons also, gentlemen, three of them, one in his teens and the other two still children. Nevertheless I shall not bring any of them into court and implore you to acquit me.' Why then will I do none of these things? Not through stubborn pride, gentlemen, nor in disrespect towards you. Whether I am confident or not when death is in question is another matter: but where honor is in question, mine and yours and that of the whole city, it does not seem good to me to act in such a way at my age and with my reputation: for whether that reputation be deserved or not, it seems generally believed at any rate that Socrates is in some way distinguished from the majority of men. If then those of you who are considered superior in wisdom or courage or any other virtue are going to behave in such a fashion, it would be a shameful affair. I have often observed the conduct of such men when on trial, men of some reputation too, but conducting themselves in the most extraordinary way, as though they thought they would suffer some terrible fate if put to death, as though indeed they would be exempt from death if you did not remove them. These men, in my opinion, attach discredit to the city, so that even a stranger might conceive that those of the

Athenians who excel in worth, those whom the people select as their magistrates and other officers, are in no way superior to women. Any among you who enjoy any reputation at all should not act in this way, nor should you put up with it if we do: but you should make it plain that you are far more likely to condemn the man who puts on these dismal dramas and makes the city ridiculous, than the man who holds his peace.

And quite apart from reputation, gentlemen, I do not consider it right to implore the judge and secure acquittal by entreaty, but rather to inform and convince him. For the judge does not sit to dispense justice by favor but to render judgment. And he has taken oath, not to favor whomsoever he pleases, but to judge according to the laws. We should not then form in you the habit of perjury, nor should you acquire it: for neither of us would be acting with piety. Do not expect me then, gentlemen, to act towards you in a way which I consider neither honorable nor right nor pious, especially and above all when it is for impiety that Meletus here is prosecuting me. For if I should persuade you and do violence to your oath by entreaties, I should plainly be teaching you not to believe that the gods exist, and my very defense would literally convict me of not fearing the gods. But this is far from being true. I do fear them, gentlemen, as do none of my accusers; and I leave it to you and to the god to come to whatever decision is likely to be best both for me and for you.

2

If I am not vexed, gentlemen, at your verdict of condemnation, there are many factors that contribute to my attitude: and among others, that the event was not unexpected by me. But I am much more surprised at the number of votes on either side. For I did not expect that the margin would be so narrow, but a considerable one. As it is,

apparently, if only thirty votes had been cast the other way, I should have been acquitted. As far as Meletus is concerned, in my opinion I am already acquitted: and not only that, but it is perfectly evident to everybody that if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him in the accusation, he would have suffered a fine of a thousand drachms for not having obtained the fifth part of the votes.

And so, he proposes the penalty of death. Well, what alternative penalty shall I suggest, gentlemen? Plainly what I deserve. And what punishment or fine do I deserve for refusing throughout my life to hold my peace? I neglected what most men love, money-making and the management of property, military commands and political leaderships, and all the factions and cabals that prevail in your city, thinking myself in fact too good a man to be suffered to live if I took that direction. And so I did not follow a road by pursuing which I was likely to be of no use either to you or to myself, but I chose a different path, that of visiting each one of you in private and doing you, so I claim, the greatest of benefits. I strove to persuade each one of you not to concern himself with his external possessions rather than with his self and the perfection of that self in goodness and wisdom; and not to concern himself with the trappings of the state rather than with the state itself, and in all other matters also to display a similar concern. Then what requital do I deserve for such conduct? Something good, gentlemen, if I am to assess my true deserts; and some good thing too that would be appropriate for me. What reward then is appropriate for a poor man and a benefactor, who needs leisure to give you counsel? There is nothing so appropriate, gentlemen, as that such a man should enjoy free maintenance at the Prytaneum—far more so indeed than if one of you has won a victory at the Olympic games with a horse or a pair or a four-horse chariot. For he but gives you the semblance of

happiness, I the reality: and he has no need of maintenance, but I have. If then I must assess the penalty I justly deserve, I propose free maintenance at the Prytaneum.

But perhaps some of you will think that in speaking thus, just as in what I said about prayers and entreaties for pity, I am behaving with stubborn pride. That is not so, gentlemen, but the truth is rather this. I am convinced that I do no intentional harm to any man, but of this I cannot convince you. For we have spoken but a short time together. Whereas, in my opinion, if you had a law such as is found elsewhere, that capital trials should last, not one, but many days, you would have been convinced. But now it is not easy to dispel such deep-rooted prejudices in a short time. Being convinced then that I do wrong to nobody, I am but little likely to wrong myself by stating that I deserve to suffer some evil and naming such a penalty against myself. What fear should so impel me? The fear of suffering this penalty which Meletus suggests, when I tell you that I know not whether it be good or evil? Am I to choose as an alternative and propose for myself something I well know to be evil? Shall it be imprisonment? And why should I live on in prison, a constant slave to your successive magistrates? Shall it be a fine, and imprisonment until it is paid? But that is what I told you just now. I have no money wherewith to pay it. Shall I choose exile then? For perhaps you would accept that choice. I should indeed be devoted to life if I were so irrational as not to be able to reason thus with myself: you, my fellow-citizens, could not endure my words and discourses: they became too tiresome and odious to you, and you now seek to be quit of them: will others then cheerfully put up with them? Most unlikely, gentlemen. A fine life mine would be if I left Athens at my age and lived like a hunted thing, constantly changing from city to city. For I am well aware that, wherever I go, the young men will listen to me as

they do here: and if I repel them, they will of their own accord persuade their elders and drive me forth: and if I do not repel them, their fathers and kinsmen will drive me out for their sakes.

Now perhaps some of you may say: c Can you not leave us, Socrates, and live in peace and quiet abroad'? This is the most difficult thing of all to bring home to you. For if I say that such behavior is disobedience to the god and that for this reason it is impossible for me to keep silent, you will regard me as insincere and will refuse to believe: but you will be still less ready to believe me if I say that the greatest good that can befall a man is to discourse every day about goodness and those other subjects about which you hear me conversing and examining myself and others, and that the life unexamined is not worth living. Yet the truth is as I say, gentlemen, difficult though it be to persuade you. Moreover I am not in the habit of considering myself deserving of any evil. If I had money, I would have proposed a fine such as I had some prospect of paying: for that would not have harmed me. But as it is I have none—unless you are willing to accept as a fine such a sum as I could afford. And perhaps I could afford one mina. That, then, is the sum I propose.... But Plato here, gentlemen, and Crito and Critobulus and Apollodorus bid me propose 30 minae, and offer themselves as surety. That then is the sum I propose: and you will find them sufficient sureties for the money.

3

For lack of but a little patience, gentlemen, you will acquire, from those who wish to malign the city, the evil name of having put to death Socrates, a wise man—for those who wish to reproach you will call me wise, even if I am not. At any rate, if you had waited but a little while, this would have happened in the natural course of events: for you see that I am well stricken in years and near to death. I am now

speaking, not to all of you, but to those who voted for my condemnation. And to these same people I have this further to say. Perhaps, gentlemen, you think that I was convicted through lack of words which might have persuaded you, if I had thought it right to leave nothing unsaid or undone to secure my acquittal: but that is far from true. I have indeed been convicted through a lack, not a lack of words, however, but a lack of effrontery and shamelessness and of readiness to say the kind of thing you would most have delighted to hear from me—weeping and lamentations and many other deeds and words which I claim to be unworthy of me—the kind of thing you are accustomed to hear from others. But neither at the time did I think that I ought to do anything common or mean because of the danger, nor do I now regret having so defended myself: but I would much rather die after such a defense than live on after a defense like theirs. For neither in court nor on the battlefield should I or any other contrive to escape death at any cost. In battle it often becomes evident that death may be avoided if a man flings away his weapons and goes on his knees to his pursuers: and in dangers of every kind there are many means of escaping death, if a man ventures to leave nothing unsaid or undone. But perhaps it is not difficult to escape death, gentlemen, but a far more difficult thing to escape the stain of evil: for it flies faster than fate. And now I who am an old man and slow have been overtaken by the slower, and my accusers, who are quick and clever, by the faster, the taint of evil. And now I depart condemned to death by you, and they, convicted of evil and wrong-doing by Truth herself. And I abide, as they do, by the decision. Perhaps these things had so to happen, and I think it is well.

And now I wish to prophesy to you, all you who have condemned me: for I have reached the time at which men are most gifted with prophecy, the hour when death is near.

And I say to you, my slayers, that immediately after my death a punishment will come upon you far more bitter than this death sentence of yours. You have now done this, thinking you will be released from submitting an account of your lives, but it will turn out completely the reverse, I tell you. Those who cross-examine you will be more numerous—men whom I have held back, though you never knew it: and they will be more troublesome, inasmuch as they are younger: and you will be far more vexed with them. For if you think that by putting men to death you will restrain any from reproaching you for your evil lives, you are quite mistaken. Such a method of escape is scarcely possible nor is it honorable: but the noblest and easiest is, not to repress others, but to see to it that each one of you is as perfect as possible. With this prophecy to those who condemned me, I bid you good-bye.

And now I should be glad to converse about what has happened with those who voted to acquit me, while the officials are busy and before I depart to the scene of my death. Remain with me, my friends, for just so long: for there is nothing to prevent us from talking together while yet we may. You are my friends, and to you I am ready to reveal the meaning of what has now befallen me. A strange thing has happened to me, justices—for I can properly give you that name. The customary divine, prophetic monitor has on all previous occasions been most persistent, opposing me in quite trivial matters if I were going to do something amiss. And now, as you see for yourselves, something has come to pass which might be considered, and actually is considered, the greatest of evils. But this sign from God offered no opposition, either when I left my home this morning or when I made my way to court, or when I was on the point of saying anything in my speech. Yet during other discourses it has often checked me in the very act of speaking. But nowhere

in this present affair has it offered any objection to what I said or did. I will explain to you what I conceive to be the reason for this. The fate that has befallen me must be good, and all who believe that death is an evil must be wrong in their opinion. I have good evidence of this: for beyond question the accustomed sign would have opposed me, if I had not been going in some way to fare well.

Let us reflect in this way too that there is every hope death is a boon. For death is one or other of two things. It is either complete annihilation, when the dead man has no sensation of anything; or, as we are told, a change of life and migration of the soul from one world to another. And if death means complete unconsciousness, like a sleep in which the slumbering man sees not even a dream, then it would be a marvelous gain. For if a man had to choose that night in which he slept so soundly as not even to dream, and after comparing with it all the other nights and days of his life had after due deliberation to say how many days and nights in his life he had spent more pleasantly and happily than this, I think that not only a private person, but even the Great King himself would find such nights easy to count in comparison with the other nights and days. If then death is like this, I count it a gain: for thus reckoned all eternity seems no longer than a single night. But if on the other hand death is like making a journey to another land, and there is truth in the stories that all the dead dwell there, what greater boon could there be, my judges, than this? For if on reaching the other world, released from those who claim to be judges here, a man is to discover the true judges who are said to give sentence there—Minos and Rhadamanthys and Aeacus and Triptolemus and other demi-gods who lived righteously in their life here—would such a journey be a trivial matter? Or again, to associate with Orpheus and Musaeus, and Hesiod and Homer—what would not anyone of you pay for

that? For my part, I am willing to die many deaths if these stories are true. Life there, in my opinion, would be a wonderful thing, when I could meet Palamedes and Ajax son of Telamon and any others of the men of old who were put to death through an unjust verdict, and compare my experiences with theirs—this, I think, would be a real pleasure—and, greatest pleasure of all, to spend my time there, as here, questioning and cross-examining to discover which of them is wise, and which thinks himself wise when he is not. What price, my judges, would not a man pay to examine the leader of the great expedition to Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus or countless others, both men and women, whom one might mention? It would be bliss unspeakable to converse with them and live with them and question them. In any case they do not in that world put men to death for doing this: for not only are the dwellers in that world happier in general than are we, but for all time to come they are immortal, if what we are told is true.

But you too, my judges, must face death with good hope, and remember this one truth, that a good man cannot suffer any evil either in life or after death, and that the gods do not neglect his fortunes. What has happened to me also is not mere chance, but I am sure that it was better for me to die now and be rid of my troubles. That is why the sign nowhere restrained me, and I am not so very vexed with those who accused and condemned me. And yet it was not with this intention that they accused and condemned, but thinking to harm me. For this they deserve to be reproached. But this much I entreat of them. When my sons reach manhood, gentlemen, punish them by vexing them in the same way in which I vexed you, if you think they concern themselves with money or anything else in preference to goodness: and if they consider themselves to be something when they are of no account, reproach them as I reproach you for not caring for

what they should and for thinking they are of some account when they are worthless. And if you do this, both I and my sons will have received just treatment from you. But now the time has come for us to go our different paths, for me to die, for you to live. And which of us is going to the better fate is unknown to all save only to God.

The Sophist.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Theodorus, Socrates, a Guest from Elea, Theaetetus.

Theodorus/ According to our agreement yesterday, both we ourselves are come, Socrates, in due order, and we bring this our guest, an Elean by birth, and a friend of Parmenides and Zeno, and a great philosopher.

Socrates/ Are you not, Theodorus, unconsciously bringing not a guest but some god, according to the language of Homer, who says in behalf of such mortals, as have a portion of due respect, both other gods, and especially the deity who presides over guests, become a follower and survey the insolent and the equitable conduct of men. So that perhaps he, who now follows you, may be one of the better beings about to survey and confute us, when ill-conducting ourselves in a strife of words, through his being a kind of a disproving god.

Theodorus/ Such is not the manner of this stranger, Socrates; but he is more moderate than those that are studious of contention; and the man appears to me, not to be a deity, but divine: for such I denominate all philosophers.

Socrates/ And you do well, my friend. Although I fear this race of philosophers is scarcely more easy to distinguish, I may say, than that of the divinity. For they, who are philosophers, not made up, but in reality, appear, through the ignorance of others, to be of a multiform kind, while they wander about cities, and behold from on high the life of those below them; and to some they seem to be worthy of no honor, but to others of all; and now they appear to be politicians;

and now sophists; and sometimes there are those, to whom they give the idea that they are altogether mad. I would, however, gladly hear from this our guest, if it is agreeable to him, what the people about the place there think of these things, and how they denominate them.

Theodorus/ What things?

Socrates/ the sophist, statesman, and philosopher.

Theodorus/ What, and of what kind, is the doubt about them, respecting which you have it in your mind to make an inquiry?

Socrates/ It is this. Whether they consider all these as one or two? Or as there are three names, whether they distribute them into three kinds likewise, and attach to each singly a name?

Theodorus/ He will not, I think, grudge to go through them. Or how shall we say, guest?

Stranger/ Thus, Theodorus. For I do not grudge, nor is it difficult to say, that they think them three kinds. But to define clearly what each of them is, is not a small nor an easy task.

Theodorus/ You have by accident, Socrates, laid hold of questions similar to those, which we were asking this our guest, before we came hither. But he then made the same pretense to us, as he just now did to you: since he says that he had sufficiently heard, and did not forget.

Socrates/ Do not then, stranger, deny us the first favor we ask. But tell us thus much; whether you are wont more readily to go through by yourself and to state in a long discourse whatever you wish to show forth, or by interrogations? such as I once heard Parmenides employing, and at the same time going through very beautiful arguments, when I was a young man and he very old at that time.

Stranger/ With him who converses by answers, Socrates, without pain, and as it were with a light rain, it is more easy thus with another; but if not, by oneself.

Socrates/ You are at liberty then to select whom you please of those present here: for we shall all of us readily obey you. You will however, if you take my advice, select some of the young men, either Theætetus here, or any of the rest, if such is your mind.

Stranger/ A kind of shame has come upon me, Socrates, in that, conversing with you now for the first time, I have not carried on the intercourse in detail, word for word, but by drawing out a discourse to a great extent, either by myself or to another, I have as it were made a display. For in reality, that which is now said is not such as a person would expect it to be, when interrogated about it; for it requires a very long discussion. But on the other hand, not to gratify you and these, especially since you have spoken as you have spoken, would, as it appears to me, be unlike a guest and boorish; since, from what I have before said, and from what you now urge me, I receive Theætetus here to be the respondent.

Theaetetus/ Will you then, stranger, as Socrates said, gratify us all?

Stranger/ It nearly appears then, Theætetus, that nothing further must be said on this point. And as it seems, the discourse must hereafter be addressed to you. But if, wearied by the length of the discourse, you shall be somewhat annoyed, blame not me, but these your companions, as the cause.

Theaetetus/ But I think I shall not faint in this way for the present. If, however, such a thing should take place, then I will take to myself as an ally Socrates, the namesake of Socrates here, who is of the same age with me, and my

associate in gymnastic exercises, and not unaccustomed to labor in many things with me.

Stranger/ You say well. Deliberate then about these things by yourself, as the discourse proceeds. But now you must consider in common with me, beginning in the first place, as it appears to me, from the Sophist; and searching out and showing forth by a reason, what thing he is. For now both you and I have only the name in common respecting this thing; but as regards the thing by what name we call it, perhaps each of us have one peculiar to ourselves. But it is always requisite respecting everything, to agree rather through reasons as to the thing itself, than to the name alone without a reason. However, with respect to the tribe which we now have it in our mind to investigate, it is not the easiest of all things to comprehend what a sophist is. But whatever things of moment ought to be well and thoroughly labored at, respecting these it has been decreed by all of old that we must practice them first in small and more easy matters, previous to those in the greatest. Now then, Theætetus, I too recommend, since we conceive the genus of a sophist is difficult to hunt out, that we should in like manner practice the method in something more easy; unless you are able to show some other and easier road.

Theaetetus/ But I am not able.

Stranger/ Are you willing then to go after something of little value, and to endeavor to put it as the pattern of a greater?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ What then if we propose a thing well known, and of trifling value, but possessing a subject for discourse not less than things greater? as, for instance, a fisherman. Is not this thing known to everyone, and worthy of not very great and serious thought?

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Stranger/ And I suspect it has a method and reasoning not unsuited for us.

Theaetetus/ It would then answer well.

Stranger/ Come then, let us begin from it thus; and tell me, whether we shall put down a fisherman as skilled in some art, or unskilled in some art, but possessing another power.

Theaetetus/ By no means as unskilled in some art.

Stranger/ But of all arts there are nearly two species.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Agriculture, and the care respecting everything mortal, and that relating to the putting together and molding what we call an utensil, and the imitative power, all these may be justly called by one name.

Theaetetus/ How so? and by what name?

Stranger/ When anyone leads subsequently into existence that which was previously not in existence, then we say that he who leads, makes, and that the thing led, is made.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ But all which we just now mentioned are wont to possess their own power suited to this.

Theaetetus/ They do.

Stranger/ This then let us summarily call the making power.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Stranger/ After this the whole species of discipline and knowledge, and the species relating to money-making, and contending, and hunting, may be said to be clearly a certain acquiring power, through all their details; since not one of these makes anything, but gets hold of some things, which

are and have been, through words and deeds, and does not give up to others who attempt to get hold of them.

Theaetetus/ Truly so; for it would be proper.

Stranger/ Since then all arts consist either in acquiring or in making, in which of these, Theætetus, shall we place the art of fishing?

Theaetetus/ Doubtless in the art of acquiring.

Stranger/ But are there not two species of the art of acquiring? the one being an interchange between those that are willing, through the medium of gifts, wages, and purchase? but the other would be a getting hold, effected entirely either by deeds or words.

Theaetetus/ So it appears from what has been said.

Stranger/ But must not the getting hold likewise receive a two-fold division?

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ The one being openly done, and wholly from a contest; but the other secretly, and consisting wholly in hunting.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ It is likewise irrational not to give hunting a two-fold division.

Theaetetus/ Say how.

Stranger/ By making one relate to a race inanimate, and the other to an animated one.

Theaetetus/ How not? if there are both these.

Stranger/ How should there not be? But we may pass by the hunting of inanimate things as being without a name, except as regards some portions of the art of diving, and other trifling things of this kind; but call the other part, relating to the hunting of an animated race, animal-hunting.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Stranger/ But is it not justly said, that of animal-hunting there is a twofold kind? one being the hunting of walking animals, which is distinguished by many species and names, but the other of swimming animals, and which is hunting in a liquid.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But of the swimming division, we see that one kind is winged and the other aquatic.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But all the hunting of the winged tribe is called bird-catching.

Theaetetus/ It is so called.

Stranger/ But that of nearly all the aquatic, sea-fishing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But shall we not divide this hunting into two chief parts?

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ According as the one makes for itself a catch with nets, the other by a blow.

Theaetetus/ How say you? And how do you divide each?

Stranger/ Whatever by enclosing on all sides restrains anything for the sake of an hindrance, it is reasonable to call a net.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But do you call a net of twigs, of twine, of reeds, and a casting-net, anything else than nets?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Stranger/ We must therefore say that this hunting with nets is a part of fishing, or something of this kind.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But that which takes place with hooks and three-forked harpoons, by a blow, and which is different from the other kind, it will be requisite for us now to call by one word, by-a-blow-hunting. Or what would anyone, Theætetus, say better?

Theaetetus/ Let us disregard the name; for this is sufficient.

Stranger/ Of by-a-blow-hunting then one kind is, I think, at night effected by the light of fire; and it happens to be called the fire-kind by those engaged in the hunting.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But the other kind is by day, and is effected with rods and harpoons, having hooks at their extremities, and is wholly hook-fishing.

Theaetetus/ It is so called.

Stranger/ Of hook-fishing, and by a blow, that which takes place by darting downwards the harpoons from on high, is I think called harpoon-fishing, on account of persons using the harpoons in that way.

Theaetetus/ So some persons say.

Stranger/ There remains then only one kind, so to say.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ That which is with a blow contrary to this, and effected with a hook, but not striking, as it may happen, upon any part of the body of fishes, as in the case of harpoons, but about the head and mouth of the fish caught on each occasion, and drawing it from below to the contrary up by rods and reeds; to which fishing what name, Theætetus, shall we say ought to be given?

Theaetetus/ That of hook-fishing with rods; and we now appear to have arrived at the end of that, which we proposed as being necessary to find out.

Stranger/ Now then, you and I have not only agreed about a name for the fishing art, but we have likewise sufficiently accepted the reason respecting the thing itself. For of the whole art, a half was in the acquiring; and of the acquiring, a half was in the getting hold; and of the getting hold, a half was in the hunting; and of the hunting, a half was in the animal-hunting; and of the animal-hunting, a half was in the hunting in a liquid; and of the hunting in a liquid, the downward division was wholly sea-fishing; and of the sea-fishing, a half was the fishing by a blow; and of the fishing by a blow, a half was by a hook; and of this a half was about the blow drawing from below upwards; and that from the act itself to which the name has been made to resemble the fisherman's art, having been now discovered, is called by that appellation.

Theaetetus/ This, then, has been shown in every respect sufficiently.

Stranger/ Come then, let us endeavor according to this example to discover what a sophist is.

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ Now this was the first search in the pattern just adduced, whether we must put down a fisherman as an untaught individual, or as possessing some art.

Theaetetus/ It was.

Stranger/ And now, Theætetus, shall we put down this person as an untaught individual, or as truly a sophist in all things?

Theaetetus/ By no means as an untaught individual. For I understand what you mean, that he who possesses the name, ought to be such. But we must put him down as possessing some art.

Stranger/ What is then the art? By the gods, are we ignorant that one of these men is a relation of the other?

Theaetetus/ Whom of whom?

Stranger/ The fisherman of the Sophist.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ Both of them appear to me to be hunters.

Theaetetus/ Of what prey is this the hunter? for we have spoken of the other.

Stranger/ We divided the whole of hunting into the swimming and the walking.

Theaetetus/ We did.

Stranger/ And we went through such a portion as related to the swimming part of the aquatic kind? but we left the walking undivided, having said that it was multiform.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Thus far then the Sophist and the fisherman equally proceed from the art of acquiring.

Theaetetus/ They appear so.

Stranger/ But they turn themselves from the animal hunting, one to the sea, and rivers, and lakes, and he catches animals in these.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But another turns himself to the land, and some other rivers, as if they were meadows of wealth and youth without stint, with the view of getting hold of the animals nourished in them.

Theaetetus/ How say you?

Stranger/ Of the hunting on foot, there are two chief parts.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind is each?

Stranger/ One is the hunting of tame animals, and the other of wild.

Theaetetus/ Is there any hunting then of tame animals?

Stranger/ If indeed man is a tame animal. But lay down in whatsoever way you like, either that no animal is tame, or that some other is tame, but that man is a wild one; or you say that man indeed is a tame animal, but you think that there is no hunting of men. Whichever of these suppositions you deem it agreeable to you to be stated, this do you define.

Theaetetus/ I think, stranger, we are a tame animal, and I say that there is a hunting of men.

Stranger/ Let us say then that tame-animal hunting is of two kinds.

Theaetetus/ Speaking according to what manner?

Stranger/ By defining the hunting by robbers, and that which makes slaves, and that by tyrants, to be one and all a hunting by force.

Theaetetus/ Very well.

Stranger/ But by calling that which pertains to law-courts, popular assemblies, and private discourse, one and all a certain single persuasive art.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ Now of this persuasive art let us say there are two kinds.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One is private, and the other public.

Theaetetus/ There are then these two species.

Stranger/ Again, with respect to private hunting, one kind is connected with wages, and the other with gifts.

Theaetetus/ I do not understand.

Stranger/ It seems you have never given your mind to the hunting of lovers.

Theaetetus/ Why say you so?

Stranger/ Because persons bestow even gifts in addition upon the caught.

Theaetetus/ You speak most truly.

Stranger/ Let this then be a kind of the amatory art.

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ But as regards that connected with wages, that part of it which keeps up an intercourse through favor, and has in every way made a bait through pleasure, and bargains for food for itself as its wages, this, I think, we should all of us call adulation, or a certain pleasure-giving art.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But the other part of it, which professes to keep up an intercourse for the sake of virtue, and bargains for coin as its wages, is it not worthy to call by another name?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ But with what name? Try to tell me.

Theaetetus/ It is evident. For we appear to me to have found the Sophist; and thus calling him, I think I should call him by a fitting name.

Stranger/ According to the present reasoning, it seems, Theætetus, the art of a sophist must be called domestic hold-getting, acquiring, hunting, animal-hunting, land-hunting, on land, tame-animal-hunting, man-hunting, by persuasion-hunting, individual-hunting, wages-hunting, coin-selling, and ensnaring rich and noble young men, through a false reputation for erudition, as the present reasoning now goes with us.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Let us consider further still in this way. For the object of our present search does not participate in some contemptible art, but in a very clever one. For from what has

been before stated, an idea presents itself that it is not that kind of art, which we just now said, but some other kind.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Of the art of acquiring, there was a two-fold kind, one consisting in the catching, and the other in the exchanging.

Theaetetus/ There was.

Stranger/ Let us say then, that of the exchanging there are two kinds, the one consisting in giving, and the other in selling.

Theaetetus/ Let it be so said.

Stranger/ And again, we will say that the selling must have a two-fold division.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ He who exposes his own works for sale is called a seller of his own property; but he who sells the works of others, an exchanger.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But is not the exchange, which takes place in the same city, and which is nearly a half of the whole of the trade, called capelic?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And is not that which effects an exchange from one city to another, by buying and selling, called emporic?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ And do we not perceive, in the case of the emporic, that the sale of the articles by which the body and soul are nourished, and which they use respectively, becomes barter by means of coin?

Theaetetus/ How say you this?

Stranger/ Of that part, which relates to the soul, we are perhaps ignorant: but the other we understand.

Theaetetus/ We do.

Stranger/ Let us say then as regards music in general, which is constantly purchased at one place, and, carried from city to city, is sold at another; and as regards painting, wonder-working, and other things pertaining to the soul, which are imported and sold, some for the sake of amusement, others for graver pursuits, that the person, who imports and sells them, would give a handle to be called a merchant no less than by the sale of meats and drinks.

Theaetetus/ You speak most true.

Stranger/ Will you not, then, call by the same name him who goes about from city to city to buy learning for money?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But of this soul-trafficking, would not one part be most justly called an exhibition; but the other part, although no less ridiculous than the former, still as being a selling of learning, there is a necessity to call it by a name the brother to the act.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But in this learning-selling, the trade which relates to other arts must be called by one name, and that which relates to virtue by another.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ For as regards the others, the name “art-seller” would be fitting; but as regards this, do you consider what name to call it.

Theaetetus/ And what other name, except that sought out now for the Sophistic race, could one mention without an error?

Stranger/ No other. Now then let us collect it together, by saying that by a second search, the Sophistic art appeared to consist in the acquiring, exchanging, buying, trafficking, soul-trafficking respecting discourses, and the selling the learning of virtue.

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Stranger/ By a third search, I think that you will call by no other name, than we have done just now, the person who, being settled in a city, partly buys and partly fabricates himself learning respecting these very same subjects, and by selling determines for himself to live by such a plan.

Theaetetus/ Why, indeed, should I not?

Stranger/ And that part, too, of the acquiring art, which consists in exchanging, purchasing, and selling in both ways, either one's own inventions, or those of others, you will ever call, as you seem, a sophistic kind, whatever may be the learning-selling respecting such things.

Theaetetus/ Necessarily so. For it is necessary to be the follower of reason.

Stranger/ Let us still further consider, whether the kind, which has been now pursued, is similar to some such thing as this.

Theaetetus/ To what?

Stranger/ Of the art of acquiring a certain part consisted in contesting.

Theaetetus/ It did.

Stranger/ It will not then be from the purpose to divide it into two.

Theaetetus/ Say into what parts?

Stranger/ By laying down one part as a contest of friends, and the other as the fight of foes.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Stranger/ Of the fighting part then, when a body comes in conflict with a body, it is nearly reasonable and becoming for persons, laying down a name, to pronounce it, as it were, violent.

Theaetetus/ It may.

Stranger/ But in the case of reasons coming in conflict with reasons, what else, Theætetus, would anyone call it but contention?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Stranger/ But as to contentions, we must lay down a twofold division.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ So far as contention takes place through prolix arguments against prolix arguments and about things just and unjust in a public matter it is judicial.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ But when it takes place in a private one, and is broken to minute parts, by questions to answers, are we accustomed to call it anything else than contradiction.

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Stranger/ But of contradiction, that part which respects private contracts is made the subject of dispute, and is carried on carelessly and without art, we must place as a separate kind; since reason distinguishes it as being something different; but it has neither obtained an appellation from any of those of a former period, nor does it deserve to obtain one now from us.

Theaetetus/ True, for it is divided into parts extremely small and very various.

Stranger/ But that which is according to art, and disputes about things just and unjust, in the abstract, and

universally about other matters, we are accustomed to call contentious.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ But of the contentious, one part destroys wealth, and the other makes it.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Let us then endeavor to state by what name it is needful to call each of these.

Theaetetus/ It is proper to do so.

Stranger/ I think then that the neglect of private affairs, which takes place through the delight in the practice of contention, and through the telling to the majority of listeners what is not heard with pleasure, may be called, according to my notion, something not different from babbling.

Theaetetus/ It is indeed called so.

Stranger/ But do you now in your turn endeavor to tell the contrary name of him, who makes money through private quarrels.

Theaetetus/ Would not anyone err, in calling him by any other name than that of the wonderful sophist, who, after being pursued by us, has now come again for the fourth time in our view?

Stranger/ the Sophist then, as it seems, is nothing else but that money-making genus, which is a part of the arts of quarrelling, contradiction, controversy, hostile fighting, friendly contest, and acquisition, as our reasoning has pointed out.

Theaetetus/ He is altogether so.

Stranger/ You see, then, it is truly said, that this wild beast is a various animal, and that, according to the proverb, he is not to be caught with the left hand.

Theaetetus/ It is necessary then to use both hands.

Stranger/ It is necessary; and we must to the utmost of our power do something of this kind, by running after its footmarks. But tell me, have we not words relating to household affairs?

Theaetetus/ Yes, many. But about which of the many are you inquiring?

Stranger/ Such as when we say to pass through a colander, to bolt through a bag, to pass through a sieve, to separate.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ And besides these, we know the words, to card wool, to draw it down, to weave it, and ten thousand others of a like kind existing in the arts. Do we not?

Theaetetus/ What being desirous to point out respecting them, and to bring forward as a pattern, have you made this inquiry in general terms?

Stranger/ All the names that have been mentioned, are in a certain respect divisive.

Theaetetus/ They are.

Stranger/ According to my reasoning then we will think worthy of one name the art, which as regards them is one in them all.

Theaetetus/ What name calling it?

Stranger/ Discriminative.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Stranger/ Consider again, whether we are able to perceive two kinds of it?

Theaetetus/ You are imposing, for a person like me, a rapid consideration.

Stranger/ In the discriminations mentioned above it was our business to separate the worse from the better, and the similar from the similar.

Theaetetus/ It appears that it was nearly so said.

Stranger/ Of the latter discrimination I cannot tell the name; but I can of that which leaves the better and rejects the worse.

Theaetetus/ Inform me what it is.

Stranger/ The whole of this discrimination, as I understand it, is called by all men a certain purification.

Theaetetus/ It is so called.

Stranger/ Would not then everyone see that the purification is in kind twofold?

Theaetetus/ Yes, looking at it at leisure perhaps; but I do not see it at present.

Stranger/ It is proper then to comprehend in one name the many kinds of purifications appertaining to the body.

Theaetetus/ What are they? and by what name do you call them?

Stranger/ Whatever within the bodies of living animals is, after being properly separated by the arts of exercise and of medicine, purified, and whatever the bath-art supplies, relating to things outside the body very vile to mention, and the things relating to inanimate bodies, of which the fuller's art, and the whole art of adorning the body, have the care in trifling matters, possess many and seemingly ridiculous names.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ Entirely so, Theætetus. But the method of reasoning cares not either much or little about the art of wiping with a sponge or the drinking a medicine, whether the one benefits us little and the other much, by a

purification. Since for the sake of the mind possessing something correctly, science endeavors to understand what is allied and what is not allied to all arts, and it honors all equally on this account; and does not consider that some things are more ridiculous than others as regards their similitude; nor has it held that he, who exhibits the hunting art in the character of a general, is at all more respectable than he who does so in that of a louse-catcher, but is for the most part more vain. And now, indeed, which was what you asked, by what name shall we speak of all the powers together which are allotted for the purifying a body either animate or inanimate? But it makes no difference what name may appear to be more becoming. Let it be only separate from the purgation of the soul, and include in itself all such things as purify anything else. For the method of reasoning has just now endeavored to separate the intellect from the rest of things, if we understand what it means.

Theaetetus/ But I do understand, and I grant that there are two species of purification; one species respecting the soul, and separate from that respecting the body.

Stranger/ You speak in the most beautiful manner. Listen then to me in what follows, and endeavor to give a two-fold division to what has been said.

Theaetetus/ Wherever you may lead, I will endeavor to make a division with you.

Stranger/ We say, then, that depravity in the soul is something different from virtue.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ And that to leave the one, and to cast out as far as may be the bad, was a purification.

Theaetetus/ It was so.

Stranger/ Of the soul then, as far as we can discover a taking away of depravity, we shall, in calling it a purification, speak harmoniously.

Theaetetus/ Yes, very much so.

Stranger/ As regards the soul, then, we must speak of two kinds of depravity.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ The one is like a disease in the body, but the other is like an inherent baseness.

Theaetetus/ I do not understand.

Stranger/ Perhaps you have not thought that disease is the same with sedition.

Theaetetus/ Nor, again, have I what I ought to answer to this.

Stranger/ Whether do you think sedition is anything else than the difference from a natural alliance through a certain corruption.

Theaetetus/ It is nothing else.

Stranger/ And is baseness anything else than that kind of dissonance which exists everywhere disagreeable?

Theaetetus/ It is nothing else.

Stranger/ What then, have we not perceived in the soul of those who conduct themselves ill, opinions at variance with desires, anger with pleasures, reason with pain, and all these with each other?

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ And yet all these are necessarily allied to each other.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ In calling then depravity a sedition and disease of the soul, we shall speak correctly.

Theaetetus/ Most correctly.

Stranger/ But when such things as participate of motion, and propose to themselves a certain end, are, in attempting to reach it, carried according to each impulse beside it, and miss it, shall we say that they are affected thus through a congruity towards each other, or, on the contrary, through an incongruity?

Theaetetus/ It is evident through an incongruity.

Stranger/ But we know that every soul is involuntarily ignorant of anything.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ But ignorance is nothing else than a delirium of the soul, which, while it is impelled to truth, is carried away from a correct perception.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ We must consider, therefore, a soul without intelligence as base and incongruous.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Stranger/ It seems then there are these two kinds of evil in the soul; one, which is called by the multitude depravity, and is most evidently its disease—

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ But the other the multitude call ignorance; but they are unwilling to confess that it alone is a vice in the soul.

Theaetetus/ It must be readily granted, what, when you just now spoke of it, I doubted, that there are two kinds of vice in the soul; and that we ought to consider cowardice, intemperance, injustice, all taken together as a disease in us; but we must lay down the accident of ignorance great and of various kinds as a baseness.

Stranger/ In the body then are there not two arts relating to these two accidents?

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ Relating to baseness, the gymnastic; but to disease, the medical.

Theaetetus/ They seem so.

Stranger/ As regards insolence, injustice, and cowardice, is not the chastising justice naturally the most fitting of all arts?

Theaetetus/ It is likely, as I may say, according to human opinion.

Stranger/ But can anyone say that there is a more proper remedy for all ignorance than the teaching art.

Theaetetus/ There is none.

Stranger/ Come then, must we say there is only one kind of the teaching art, or more? But take notice, that there are two greatest kinds of it.

Theaetetus/ I do take notice.

Stranger/ And it appears to me that we shall very quickly discover this.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ By perceiving whether ignorance has a division in the middle of it. For being twofold, it is evident that it compels the teaching art to have two parts, one for each one of its own.

Theaetetus/ What then? Has the thing sought become visible?

Stranger/ I seem to see set apart a great and difficult kind of ignorance, which outweighs all its other parts.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind is it?

Stranger/ When he, who does not know a thing, thinks he knows it; through which it nearly happens that all those things, in which we are deceived by the imagination, take their rise in the case of all persons.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And I think that to this division of ignorance alone the name of non-erudition should be given.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ By what name then is to be mentioned that part of the teaching art which frees a person from this ignorance?

Theaetetus/ I think, Guest, that the other part is called handicraft teaching, but that this is called here through us discipline.

Stranger/ It is so called, Theætetus, by nearly all the Greeks. But this also must be considered by us, whether the whole of this is indivisible, or possesses a certain division worthy a name.

Theaetetus/ It is requisite to consider this.

Stranger/ It appears then to me, that this may in some way be still further divided.

Theaetetus/ In what?

Stranger/ Of the teaching art relating to discourses, one way appears to be more rough, but another part of it more smooth.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind shall we call each of these?

Stranger/ One, the old-fashioned, paternal, which persons formerly adopted, especially towards their children, and many use even now, when children do wrong, partly by severely reproving, and partly by mildly admonishing them. Now the whole of this one may call most correctly admonition.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Stranger/ But the other—since some seem, after giving themselves to reflection, to hold that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one, who thinks himself wise, is willing to learn those things in which he considers himself skilled, and that the admonitory kind of instruction, even with great labor, effects but little.

Theaetetus/ And they think right.

Stranger/ They therefore direct their course to an outlet for their opinion by another mode.

Theaetetus/ By what mode?

Stranger/ They inquire into those matters, about which a man thinks he says something to the purpose, when he is saying nothing. They then easily examine the opinions of persons as if they were in error, and bringing them together by a reasoning process to the same point, they place them by the side of each other; and by so placing, they show that the opinions are at one and the same time contrary to themselves, about the same things, with reference to the same circumstances, and according to the same premises. And they seeing are indignant with themselves, and become milder towards others; and in this way are liberated from strong and harsh opinions; a liberation of all others the most pleasant to hear, and the most firm to the party suffering. For they, my dear boy, who purify these, think as physicians do with respect to the body—that the body cannot enjoy food, which is brought to it, until someone casts out the impediments in it; and in like manner the others think that the soul can derive no advantage from the learning brought to it, until someone, by confuting, places the party confuted in a state of shame, and by taking away the opinions, which are the impediments to learning, exhibits him purified, and thinking that he knows those things alone which he does know, and nothing more.

Theaetetus/ This is the best and the most temperate of habits.

Stranger/ For all these reasons then, Theætetus, we must say, that confutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications; and we must think that he who is not confuted, even though he should be the great king himself, would be unpurified to the greatest degree, and become uninstructed and ugly with respect to those things, in which it is fit that he should be most pure and beautiful, who is to be in reality happy.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But whom shall we say employ this art? For I fear to say the sophists.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ Lest we should place on them a greater honor than is fitting.

Theaetetus/ But yet what has been just now said appears to be suited to some such character.

Stranger/ So does a wolf resemble a dog, a most savage animal one the most mild. But he who wishes to be most of all free from stumbling, ought to keep ever a guard on similitudes; for it is a most slippery race. Let them however stand, for I think there will not be a dispute about trifling definitions, at a time when persons are watching them sufficiently.

Theaetetus/ It is not likely at least.

Stranger/ Let then there be of the separating art one portion, the purifying; of the purifying, let the part relating to the soul be divided off; and of this let a part be the teaching art; and of the teaching art, let instruction be a part; and of instruction, let that confutation, which takes place respecting a vain opinion of wisdom, be called, through

the reason now exhibited, nothing else than the Sophistic art of a noble race.

Theaetetus/ Let it be so called. But in consequence of so many things having just now presented themselves, I am doubtful what, as speaking the truth and urging it strenuously, I ought to say the Sophist really is.

Stranger/ You are very properly in doubt. And indeed one ought to think, that even a sophist himself will now very much doubt by what means he shall slip through the argument. For the proverb rightly says, It is not easy to avoid all traps. Now therefore let us attack him with all our might.

Theaetetus/ You speak well.

Stranger/ But, in the first place, let us stand and as it were take breath; and while stopping let us reason among ourselves. Come then, in how many forms has the Sophist appeared? For I think, he was found at first a hunter for wages of the youthful and rich.

Theaetetus/ He was.

Stranger/ Secondly, a certain trafficker in the learning of the soul.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Thirdly, did he not appear as a Chapman in the very same articles?

Theaetetus/ He did. And fourthly, he was the seller of his own inventions.

Stranger/ You have properly reminded me of this; and of the fifth form I will endeavor to remind you. For he was a combatant in the contests of words, having been so defined from the art of contention.

Theaetetus/ He was so.

Stranger/ The sixth form is indeed ambiguous; but nevertheless we laid it down and conceded to him, that a

sophist is a purifier, as regards the soul, of such opinions as are an impediment to learning.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Do you then perceive, that, when anyone seems to know many things, and is called by the name of one art, this it is not a healthful seeming; but that he, who is thus affected with respect to any art, evidently cannot see that part of it to which all this learning tends? and hence he calls the person possessing them by many names, instead of one.

Theaetetus/ This almost appears to be very natural.

Stranger/ Let us not then suffer the same thing in this search through indolence; but let us in the first place take up again one of the things stated of the Sophist; for one of them appeared to me especially to indicate him.

Theaetetus/ Which of them?

Stranger/ We said that he was in a certain respect a contradictor.

Theaetetus/ We did.

Stranger/ And does he not also become a teacher of this to others?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ Let us then consider about what such persons say they make contradictions. And let our consideration be from the beginning in this way. With respect to divine things, which are non-apparent to the many, do sophists make them able to do this, viz. to contradict?

Theaetetus/ This is indeed asserted of them.

Stranger/ But with respect to the apparent things of earth and heaven, and what pertains to these?

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ In private meetings at least, when anything is asserted of generation and existence in general, we are

conscious that the sophists are powerful in contradicting, and that they make others as powerful as themselves.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But with respect to laws, and all political matters, do they not also promise to make men contentious in these?

Theaetetus/ Not one, as I may say, would discourse with them unless they promised this.

Stranger/ But writings relating to all the arts, and to each art singly, are made public and deposited by him, who wishes to learn what he ought to say against each handicraftsman.

Theaetetus/ You appear to me to speak of the writings of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts.

Stranger/ And to the writings of many others, O blessed man. But does not the art of contradicting seem to be a power sufficient for controversy about all things, to speak summarily?

Theaetetus/ It appears that scarcely not a thing would be wanting.

Stranger/ But by the gods, O boy, do you think this is possible? For perhaps you young men see more acutely, but we more dully, this thing.

Theaetetus/ What thing? and at what are you particularly talking? For I do not understand at all the present question.

Stranger/ Consider, if it be possible for anyone man to know all things.

Theaetetus/ If it were possible our race, O guest, would indeed be blessed.

Stranger/ How then can anyone without knowledge himself be able to urge anything sound against him who possesses knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Stranger/ What then would be the wonder in the Sophistic power?

Theaetetus/ About what?

Stranger/ The manner by which sophists are able to get up an opinion amongst the young, that they are the wisest of all men in all things. For it is evident that, if they neither contradicted rightly, nor appeared to the young to do so, and, when appearing to do so, unless they seemed to be more wise through their contentions, no one would, as far as your business is concerned, even at leisure, give them money, or be willing to become their scholar.

Theaetetus/ Not even at leisure indeed.

Stranger/ But now persons are willing.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ For the sophists appear I think to have a knowledge themselves of that against which they speak.

Theaetetus/ How should they not?

Stranger/ But do they act so in all things? Say we it?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ They appear, then, to their disciples to be wise in all things.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ But not being so in reality; for this appeared to be impossible.

Theaetetus/ For how is it not impossible?

Stranger/ the Sophist, then, has been shown to us to possess a certain kind of a reputation for knowledge about all things, but not according to the truth.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so. And what has been now said respecting sophists seems very nearly to be most rightly said.

Stranger/ Let us therefore take a clearer pattern respecting them.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ This. But endeavor to answer by giving your mind very closely to what I am saying.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind is the pattern?

Stranger/ As if anyone should say, that he knows not the art of asserting and contradicting, but of making and causing all things by one art.

Theaetetus/ How said you all?

Stranger/ Of the commencement of the discourse you are straightway ignorant; for, as it seems, you do not understand the "all."

Theaetetus/ I do not.

Stranger/ I say then that you and I are in the number of all things, and besides us, there are other animals and trees.

Theaetetus/ How say you?

Stranger/ If anyone should assert that he would make you and me, and all the rest of productions—

Theaetetus/ Of what making do you speak? For you are not speaking of a husbandman; because you mentioned him as a maker of animals.

Stranger/ I say, moreover, that he is the maker of the sea, the earth, the heavens, the gods, and all other things; and rapidly making each of these, he sells them for a small sum.

Theaetetus/ You are speaking in jest.

Stranger/ What! must we not consider that as a jest, when a man asserts that he knows all things, and can teach

another all things, for a small sum of money, and in a short time?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But have you any kind of jesting more artificial or agreeable than the imitative?

Theaetetus/ I have not. For you have mentioned a very large kind, and comprehended all things in one, and that one nearly the most varied.

Stranger/ Do we not then know that he who undertakes to be able to make all things by one art, will, by fabricating imitations and homonyms of things, through the art of painting, be able, by showing the pictures at a distance, to lie concealed from the stupid amongst young men and boys, as being a person most competent to do whatever he pleased?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ But as to discourses, do we not expect that there is such another art? or is it not possible to bewitch the young men, and those still standing far off from the truth of things, through words spoken in their ears, and by showing them images, as they are called, of everything, so as to cause them to be said to seem true, and for the speaker to be the wisest of all men in all things?

Theaetetus/ Why should there not be another such art?

Stranger/ Is it not then necessary, Theætetus, that the majority of those, who were then hearing, should, after a sufficient time has passed and they have themselves arrived at manhood, come near to things as they are, and be compelled through accidental circumstances to handle realities clearly, and to change their former opinions, so that things once great appear small, those once difficult, easy, and all the mere appearances produced by discourses, are entirely overthrown through works which occur in practice?

Theaetetus/ It appears so to me, as far as my age is capable of judging; for I think that I too am one of those who are far distant from the truth.

Stranger/ All we then, who are present, will endeavor, and let us now endeavor, free from all accidental circumstances, to bring you as near as possible to the truth. With respect to a sophist then tell me this. Is it clear, that he is one of enchanters, as being an imitator of things? or do we yet doubt, whether in the matters, respecting which he appears able to contradict, he possesses in reality the requisite science?

Theaetetus/ But how, Guest, can we doubt of this? For it is nearly evident from what has been said, that he is one of those who take a part in jesting.

Stranger/ We must put him down then as some enchanter and mimic.

Theaetetus/ How must we not so put him?

Stranger/ Come then, it is now our business not to let go the wild beast, for we have now nearly enclosed the Sophist in a casting net, one of the instruments used in discourses about things of this kind, so that he cannot any longer escape from this.

Theaetetus/ From what?

Stranger/ That he is one of the wonder-workers.

Theaetetus/ This also is my opinion respecting him.

Stranger/ It is decreed then, that we divide as quickly as possible the image-producing art, and, going down against it, seize upon the Sophist, should he forthwith wait for us, according to the royal mandate, and, delivering him up, exhibit our prey to him the king. But if he creeps into the parts of the imitative art, we are to follow him, always dividing the part which receives him, until he is caught. For neither will he, nor any other genus, ever boast to escape the

method of those, who are able to follow thus the points singly and universally.

Theaetetus/ You speak well. And in this manner, therefore, we must act.

Stranger/ According to the preceding method of division, I now seem to see two kinds of the imitative art; but in which of these happens to be the idea of which we are in search, I do not now seem to be able to perceive.

Theaetetus/ But first tell me, and divide the two kinds of which you are speaking.

Stranger/ I see that one is the assimilative art. And this especially takes place, when anyone according to the proportions of the original, in length, breadth, and depth, and moreover by adding fitting colors, works out the production of an imitation.

Theaetetus/ What then, do not all imitators endeavor to do this?

Stranger/ Not such as mold or paint any great work. For, if they would give the true proportion of beautiful things, you know that the upper parts would appear smaller than is fitting, and the lower parts larger, through the former being seen by us at a distance, and the latter close at hand.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Do not then the artists, bidding farewell to truth, now work out not real proportions, but such as will seem to be beautiful in their representations?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Is it not then just, as being at least probable, to call one an image?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And we must call the part of the imitative art, subsequent to this, as we said above, assimilative.

Theaetetus/ We must so call it.

Stranger/ But what shall we call that, which appears indeed similar to the beautiful, through the view taken from a favorable point, but which, when seen by him who has the power to look on such things sufficiently, is not like that to which it professes to be like? Must we not call it an appearance, since it appears to be, but is not like?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Is not this part to be found abundantly in painting, and in the whole of the imitative art?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ But may we not most correctly call that art, which produces an appearance, but not an image, fantastic?

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ Now I have already said that these were the two kinds of the image-producing art, the assimilative and fantastic.

Theaetetus/ Correctly so.

Stranger/ But that of which I doubted then, viz. in which of these kinds we must put the Sophist, I am not at all able even now to see clearly. For the man is truly wonderful; and it is extremely difficult to get a view of him; since even now, very well and cleverly, he has fled into a species, where it is hard to track him out.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Stranger/ Do you then assent to this through understanding it? or has a certain rush of reasoning carried you away to giving a rapid ascent according to custom?

Theaetetus/ How and for what do you say this?

Stranger/ We are, O blessed man, truly engaged in a speculation thoroughly difficult. For that this thing should appear both to seem to be, and yet not be; and that a man

should assert certain things, and yet not true, —all these things were always full of difficulty formerly, and are now. For he, who thus speaks, must either say or think that false things truly exist; and thus speaking, Theætetus, it is extremely difficult for him not to be hampered by a self-contradiction.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ Because such a mode of speaking dares to suggest that a nonentity exists; for otherwise there would not be a falsehood, which exists. And the great Parmenides, O boy, while we were yet boys, did from the first to the last testify to this. For, both in prose and verse, he on every occasion thus speaks, "You must not think," says he, "non-entities exist; but keep thy thoughts when searching from this road." This then is both testified by him, and this discourse will the most of all point it out, if examined with moderation. Let us then, if it makes no difference to you, consider this in the first place.

Theaetetus/ Put my business where you like. But in what way the discourse will best proceed, do you consider yourself, and lead me along in that path.

Stranger/ It will be proper so to do. Tell me, then. Dare we pronounce that which in no respect is?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ If then, not for the sake of contention nor of jesting, but in seriousness, it were necessary for any of the hearers to join with us in considering and stating to what point one ought to carry the word "non-entity," for what thing and of what kind do we think he would be able to use it himself, and to show its use to a person inquiring?

Theaetetus/ You ask a difficult question, and to a person like myself utterly insurmountable.

Stranger/ This however is evident, that to anyone of entities the expression of non-entity cannot be referred.

Theaetetus/ For how could it?

Stranger/ Since then it cannot be referred to an entity, one cannot rightly refer it to anything.

Theaetetus/ How could he?

Stranger/ And this too is evident to us, that we pronounce on each occasion this word “something” respecting an entity. For it is impossible to pronounce it alone, as if it were naked and placed in a desert from all entities.

Theaetetus/ It is impossible.

Stranger/ Thus considering, do you then agree with me, that he who pronounces the word “something,” must necessarily mean some one thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ For you will say, that the word “something” is a sign of one thing, and that “somethings” is a sign of many things.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ But it is most necessary, as it appears, that he who speaks of that, which is not something, must speak entirely of nothing.

Theaetetus/ This is most necessary.

Stranger/ Is not then this to be granted, that such a person speaks indeed, but speaks of nothing? But neither must we say that he speaks, who endeavors to enunciate non-entity?

Theaetetus/ The discourse would have then an end of doubt.

Stranger/ Do not as yet speak any big word. For, O blessed man, the greatest and first of doubts still remain as

regards these things: for it happens to be about the very commencement of it the discourse.

Theaetetus/ How say you? Speak, and do not hesitate.

Stranger/ To that, which is, something else may be added of things that are.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ But to that, which is not, shall we say that something can be added of things that are?

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Now we place number universally among things that are.

Theaetetus/ If indeed anything else is to be placed as a thing that is.

Stranger/ Let us then not attempt to attribute "the many," nor "the one," to a non-entity.

Theaetetus/ We cannot it seems with propriety attempt it, as reason says.

Stranger/ How then can anyone enunciate by the mouth, or comprehend at all by intellect, non-entities, or a non-entity, apart from number?

Theaetetus/ Tell me why not.

Stranger/ When we speak of non-entities, do we not endeavor to add "the many" of number?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ And when we speak of a non-entity, do we not endeavor to adjoin "the one" of number?

Theaetetus/ Yes, most clearly.

Stranger/ And yet we say, that it is neither just nor right to endeavor to add an entity to a non-entity.

Theaetetus/ You speak most truly.

Stranger/ You perceive then, that it is not possible correctly to enunciate, or speak of, or think of, a non-entity itself by itself; but that it is incomprehensible, unspeakable, unpronounceable, and irrational?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Did I, then, just now speak falsely, when I said, that I would tell of the greatest doubt respecting it?

Theaetetus/ What then, can we mention any doubt greater than this?

Stranger/ Do you not see, O wonderful youth, from what has been said, that non-entity leads him, who confutes it, into such a perplexity, that in the very attempt to confute it, he is compelled to contradict himself?

Theaetetus/ How say you? Speak yet clearer.

Stranger/ For me there is no occasion to consider anything clearer. For, when I laid down the proposition, that non-entity ought to participate neither of "the one" nor of "the many," both a little before and now, I said "the one" abstractedly. For I was speaking of a non-entity; you perceived this?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And again, a little before, I said that a non-entity was unspeakable, ineffable, and irrational. Do you follow me?

Theaetetus/ I do follow in a certain way.

Stranger/ When, therefore, I endeavored to fit entity to nonentity, did I not say what is contrary to former assertions?

Theaetetus/ You appear so.

Stranger/ What then, did I not, when attributing this to it, speak to it as to one thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And yet, while calling it irrational, ineffable, and unspeakable, did I not make the assertion as pertaining to one thing?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ For we say, that if anyone correctly speaks of nonentity, he ought to define it neither as one, nor many, nor give it any appellation whatever; for it would be called already one thing, according to this appellation.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ What then will someone say of me? For, both formerly and now, he will find me overthrown respecting the proof of a non-entity. So that, as I have already said, let us not think, in my speaking at least, of logical precision respecting a non-entity. But come, let us now consider this affair in your speaking.

Theaetetus/ How say you?

Stranger/ Come, endeavor in a becoming and noble manner, as being a young man, and exerting yourself with all your might, pronounce something about non-entity, conformable to right reason, without adding to it either existence, or the one or the many of number.

Theaetetus/ The readiness of my attempt would be vastly absurd, were I, after seeing you suffer thus, to make it.

Stranger/ But, if it seems good, let us dismiss both you and myself with a farewell; and until we meet with someone who is able to do this, let us say that the Sophist has, with a knavery greater than all, let himself down into a place from which there is no outlet.

Theaetetus/ So indeed it appears.

Stranger/ If then we should say that he possessed a certain fancy-effecting art, he would, from his use of words, easily lay hold of us, and turn the discourse to the very

contrary point. For when we call him a maker of images, he will immediately ask us, What do we assert an image to be universally. It is meet then, Theætetus, to consider what answer to this question should one give to the young man.

Theaetetus/ It is evident that we shall say that things seen in water and mirrors are images, and moreover such things as are painted and fashioned and the rest of other things of this kind.

Stranger/ It is evident, Theætetus, that you have never seen a sophist.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ He will appear to you to wink, or to have no eyes at all.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ When you give him this answer, should you speak of anything seen in mirrors or moldings, he will laugh at your reasons; when you speak to him as being able to see, he will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors, or water, or of sight at all, but will ask you of that, which depends on reason alone.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ That, which in all those things you have mentioned, you, speaking of as many, think fit to call by one name, pronouncing the word image as being in them all one thing. Speak then and defend yourself, and yield nothing to the man.

Theaetetus/ What then, O guest, can we say an image is, except that it is made to resemble the truth, being another thing the counterpart?

Stranger/ Do you say that such other thing is truly so, or to what do you apply the expression, such other?

Theaetetus/ It is by no means truly a such other, but only seems to be.

Stranger/ Do you then call a truth a real entity?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Stranger/ But is not that, which is not true, contrary to truth?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ You say then that the seeming is not an entity, if you assert that it is not a truth. It is however an entity.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Do you not say then truly?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not, except a likeness in reality.

Stranger/ That then which is not really a non-entity, is really that which we call a likeness.

Theaetetus/ It nearly appears that non-entity is entwined by a certain connection of this kind with entity; and it is very strange.

Stranger/ How is it possible it should not be strange? You now therefore perceive that through this alternation, the many-headed sophist compels us unwillingly to confess that non-entity does somehow exist.

Theaetetus/ I see it, and very much so.

Stranger/ How, then, shall we define his art, and yet be able to be consistent with ourselves?

Theaetetus/ Why do you speak thus, and of what are you afraid?

Stranger/ When we say that he is a deceiver about an appearance, and that his is a certain deceptive art, whether shall we say that our soul then has a false opinion, through his art? or what shall we say?

Theaetetus/ This very thing. For what else can we say?

Stranger/ But will false opinion be fancying things contrary to those that are?

Theaetetus/ Contrary.

Stranger/ You say then that false opinion fancies things that are not.

Theaetetus/ It does so of necessity.

Stranger/ Whether does it fancy that non-entities do not exist, or that non-entities do exist in a certain way?

Theaetetus/ If anyone is ever deceived even a little, he must fancy that non-entities do exist in a certain way.

Stranger/ And will not entities entirely be likewise fancied not to exist at all?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And this too falsely?

Theaetetus/ Yes, this too.

Stranger/ And false reasoning will, I think, be deemed, in the same way, to assert that entities do not exist, and non-entities do exist.

Theaetetus/ For how can it otherwise become such viz. false?

Stranger/ Nearly not at all. But the Sophist will not say so. Or what device is there for anyone of a sound mind to concede; when the things that have been granted before these have been admitted to be unspeakable, ineffable, irrational, and incomprehensible? Do we understand what the Sophist says, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ How is it possible we should not? For he will assert that we are saying things contrary to the present, in having dared to assert that falsehoods exist in opinions and reasons; for that having been often compelled to unite entity to non-entity, we have just now acknowledged, that this is somehow the most impossible of all things.

Stranger/ You have rightly recalled me to the argument. But it is now time to consult about what we ought to do respecting the Sophist. For, if we should attempt to search him out, by placing him in the art of falsehood-workers and enchanters, you see that his counter-graspings will be easy and our difficulties many.

Theaetetus/ Very.

Stranger/ We have then gone through only a small part of them; since they are, as I may say, boundless.

Theaetetus/ If such is the case, it would be impossible, it seems, to catch the Sophist.

Stranger/ What then, shall we now stand cowardly aloof?

Theaetetus/ I say we ought not, if we are able by ever so little to lay hold in some way of the man.

Stranger/ You will then grant me pardon, and, as you just now said, be satisfied, if we can draw by some means even a little for ourselves out of such powerful reasoning.

Theaetetus/ How shall I not?

Stranger/ This too I beg of you still further.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ That you do not think I am become, as it were, a parricide.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ Because it will be necessary for us, in self-defense, to put to the torture the reasoning of my father Parmenides, and to compel a nonentity to exist in some way, and again an entity in some way not to exist.

Theaetetus/ It appears that we must battle in our reasonings for a thing of this kind.

Stranger/ For how should this not be evident, as it is said, even to a blind man? For, while these things are neither confuted nor confessed, anyone will be able to speak at

leisure about false assertions, or opinions respecting resemblances, or images, or imitations, or appearances, or of the arts conversant with these, without being ridiculous through his being compelled to contradict himself.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ Hence we must dare to oppose my father's reasoning, or we must dismiss it altogether, if any sluggishness restrains us from doing so viz. opposing it.

Theaetetus/ But let nothing by any means restrain us.

Stranger/ I will now beg of you still a third and trifling request.

Theaetetus/ Only mention it.

Stranger/ I just now stated that I was always faint-hearted about the confutation of these points, and so I am now.

Theaetetus/ You did say so.

Stranger/ I fear as regards what has been said, lest I seem to you to be insane, through my changing myself on the instant, up and down. For we will throw ourselves on the confutation of the reasoning, for your sake, if indeed we happen to confute it.

Theaetetus/ As you will not then by any means appear to me to act improperly by advancing to the confutation and demonstration, on this account at least advance boldly.

Stranger/ Come then, what beginning shall we make to this very danger-bringing discourse? Now it appears, O boy, to be most necessary for us to turn to this road.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ To consider first those things which now seem to be clear, lest we become flurried about them; and that we without difficulty assent to each other, as if we were in a position to judge correctly.

Theaetetus/ State more clearly what you mean.

Stranger/ Both Parmenides and whoever else has rushed forward to the trial respecting the defining the quantity and quality of entities, seems to me to have discussed the question loosely.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Each seem to me to have told a tale to us, as if we were boys. One of them said that the entities are three; but that some of them at one time are at war with each other in some manner; and at another, becoming friends, are married, bring forth, and furnish food to their offspring. But another said that the entities are only two, the moist and the dry, or the hot and the cold; and these he unites in one house and gives them in marriage to each other. But the Eleatic sect among us, which derives its origin from Xenophanes, and from others still prior to him, details in fables that what is called the all is really one. But the Ionian, and subsequently some Sicilian muses have thought it more safe to connect these with each other, and to say that entity is both many and one, but held together by enmity and friendship. For that, which is separated, always comes together, say the more energetic of the Muses. But the more gentle relax the doctrine by saying that this takes place always as regards the whole, but that the whole is in turn now one, and friendly to itself, through Venus; and now many, and hostile to itself, through a certain strife. But whether anyone has asserted all this truly or not, it is difficult and wrong to bring so great a reproach upon illustrious and ancient men. This, however, I may without envy show forth.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ That they greatly looked down upon, and held in little esteem, us the many. For each of them finish their

own work, without caring at all whether we follow them when speaking, or desert them.

Theaetetus/ How say you?

Stranger/ When anyone of them asserts in his speech that—many, or one or two, exist, or have been, or are in the course of production, and that the hot is mingled with the cold, and elsewhere lays down somehow discretions and concretions, —by the gods, Theætetus, do you understand what they are on each occasion asserting? Indeed, when I was younger, I thought that when anyone spoke of a non-entity I accurately understood that, which is now doubtful; but now you see where we are in a difficulty respecting it.

Theaetetus/ I do see.

Stranger/ Perhaps then, receiving in no less a degree the same feeling in our soul respecting an entity, we say we can easily understand it, when it is enunciated by anyone; but not so, as regards the other, though similarly affected with respect to both.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ And let this very same thing be said by us respecting the other things before mentioned.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ We will speculate then, after this, about the many things, if it seems good; but let us now speculate about the greatest and first leading thing.

Theaetetus/ Of what are you speaking? Or is it plain that you assert that we ought in the first place to search after entity, and see what they, who speak of it, think they show.

Stranger/ You understand me, Theætetus, on the instant. For I say that we ought to adopt the same method, as if we were inquiring of them here present in this way. Come, ye who assert that the hot and the cold, or any two such things,

are the whole, what is it you affirm to subsist in both of these, when you say that both and each exist? What are we to understand by this term of yours “to exist”? Is it a third thing different from those two, and are we to lay down three things as the whole, and no longer two things, according to you? For, while you call one of the two an entity, you cannot surely say that both are similarly an entity. For in both ways there would nearly be one thing, and not two.

Theaetetus/ You speak the truth.

Stranger/ Are you then willing to call both of them an entity?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ But, O friends, we shall say, you would thus most clearly call even the two things one.

Theaetetus/ You speak most correctly.

Stranger/ Since then we are thus in doubt, do you sufficiently explain to us what you wish to signify, when you pronounce the word entity? For it is evident that you are conversant with these things long ago; and we formerly thought we knew them, but now we are in doubt. Instruct us then, first in this very thing, that we may not fancy we understand what is asserted by you, when what is entirely contrary to this is taking place. In speaking in this manner, and making this request, both to these, and to such others as assert that the all is more than one thing, shall we, O boy, do any wrong?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Stranger/ But ought we not to inquire, to the utmost of our power, of those who assert that the all is one, what they call entity?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ To this question then let them answer, Do you assert there is one thing alone? They will say. We do assert it. Will they not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ What then, do you call entity a thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Do you say, it is that which the one is, employing two names respecting the same thing? or how?

Theaetetus/ What answer will they have after this, O stranger?

Stranger/ It is evident, Theætetus, that to him who lays down this hypothesis, it will not be the easiest thing of all to give an answer respecting the present question, or any other whatever.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ To acknowledge that there are two names, while laying down that there is not but one thing, is surely ridiculous.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ And to receive the assertion altogether from him, who says that a name is a thing possessing no value—

Theaetetus/ In what manner?

Stranger/ He who lays down a name as different from a thing, speaks of two certain things.

Theaetetus/ He does.

Stranger/ And yet, if he lays down that the name is the same with the thing, he will be compelled to say, it is the name of nothing; or, if he says it is the name of something, it will result that a name is only the name of a name, but of nothing else.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Stranger/ And the one must be one entity alone of one, and not itself the entity of a name.

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Stranger/ But do they say that the whole is different from the one entity, or the same with it?

Theaetetus/ How will they not say it, and do say it?

Stranger/ If, then, a whole is, as Parmenides says, "Like the bulk of a sphere that is a perfect circle on all sides, and possessing equal powers on every part from the middle; for there must needs be nothing greater or less on this side or on that it is necessary for entity, being of such a kind, to have a middle and extremities; and having these, there is every necessity for it to have parts. Or how shall we say?

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Stranger/ But nothing prevents the divided from having in all its parts the accident of the one; and in this way every entity and a whole would be one.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ But is it not impossible that what suffers such accidents should itself be the very one?

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Surely according to right reason, that, which is truly the one, must be said to be entirely without parts.

Theaetetus/ It must indeed.

Stranger/ But such a thing as consists of many parts would not harmonize with the one.

Theaetetus/ I understand you.

Stranger/ But whether will entity, having the accident of the one, be thus one, and whole? or must we by no means say that entity is a whole?

Theaetetus/ You have proposed a difficult choice.

Stranger/ You speak however most truly. For entity having the accident to be in some way one, it does not appear to be the same as the one; and the all will be more than one. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But yet if entity is not a whole, on account of its being subject to the accident belonging to the whole, and yet is the whole itself, it follows that entity is in want of itself.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ And entity, according to this reasoning, being deprived of itself, will be a non-entity.

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Stranger/ And thus again the all becomes more than one; since both entity and the whole have obtained each their proper nature, apart from the other.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And if the whole has not an existence at all, the very same things will take place with respect to entity; and in addition to its not having an existence, it would at no time have been produced.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ Whatever is produced is always produced as a whole. So that he, who does not place amongst entities the one or the whole, ought to speak neither of existence or production as an entity.

Theaetetus/ It appears that such is wholly the case.

Stranger/ Moreover, that, which is not a whole, must not have the accident of any quantity whatever. For, while it has the accident of quantity, whatever that may be, it must necessarily be a whole.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Each view then will appear to have taken up ten thousand other endless doubts for him, who says that entity is either two or only one.

Theaetetus/ The light which is just now breaking almost shows this. For one thing is linked with another and brings with it a wandering of the mind greater and more dangerous respecting what has been from time to time asserted before.

Stranger/ But we have not yet gone through the whole of those, who have accurately discoursed about entity and nonentity. Let, however, this suffice. And let us consider again those who speak inaccurately on these subjects, that we may perceive from all quarters, that it is in no respect more easy to say what entity is, than what non-entity is.

Theaetetus/ We must therefore march against them.

Stranger/ Now, in truth, there appears to be among them, as it were, a kind of giants' war, through their conflicts with each other respecting existence.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Some of them draw down to earth all things from heaven and the unseen region, unskillfully laying hold for this purpose of rocks and oaks. For through their touching all such things as these, they strenuously contend that that alone exists, which affords impact and touch; and they define body and existence to be the same. But if anyone says that of other things some have not a body, they thoroughly despise the assertion, and are unwilling to hear another word.

Theaetetus/ You have spoken of terrible men. For I also have met with many such.

Stranger/ Wherefore the opponents of these men very carefully defend themselves from on high, from the invisible region, and compel certain intelligible and incorporeal forms to be the true existence; and breaking into small pieces the

bodies of the others, and that, which is called by them truth, they do in their own discourses, instead of existence, talk of some production carried on. But between these, Theætetus, an immense contest has always existed respecting these matters.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Let us now, therefore, receive from both these races an account in detail of the existence which they lay down.

Theaetetus/ But how shall we receive it?

Stranger/ From those that place existence in forms we may easily receive it; for they are more mild; but from those who violently draw all things to body, with more difficulty. And perhaps it will be nearly impossible. It appears to me, however, that we ought to act with respect to them in this way.

Theaetetus/ In what?

Stranger/ Most of all to render them, if possible, better in deed; but if we make no progress in this, let us render them so in word, by supposing them to answer more equitably than at present they would be willing to do. For that, which is assented to by better persons, possesses more authority than that which is assented to by worse. However, we pay no attention to these things, but are seeking out the truth.

Theaetetus/ Most right.

Stranger/ Order therefore those that have become better to answer you, and to interpret what they assert.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Stranger/ Let them say then whether they call a mortal animal a thing?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ And do they not acknowledge that this is an animated body?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Laying down that the soul is one of the things that exist.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust; and one prudent, and another imprudent?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ But does not each soul become such through the habit and presence of justice, and the contrary through the habit and presence of the contraries?

Theaetetus/ Yes; to this likewise they assent.

Stranger/ But will they say that what is able to be present to, and absent from, anything, is something?

Theaetetus/ They say it.

Stranger/ Since then justice and prudence, and the other virtues, and their contraries, together with the soul in which they are implanted, exist, whether will they say that each of these is invisible and tangible, or that all of them are invisible?

Theaetetus/ They will assert that nearly not one of them is visible.

Stranger/ But what? Do they say that anyone of such things has a body?

Theaetetus/ They do not give the same answer to the whole of this question; but that the soul itself appears to them to possess a certain body; but with respect to prudence, and each of the other things about which you just now inquired, they are ashamed to dare either to confess that they are not one of existing things, or to strenuously assert that all of them are bodies.

Stranger/ The men, Theætetus, have clearly become better. For such of them as are seed-sown, or earth-sprung, would not be ashamed to assert one of these points, but would contend that whatever they cannot squeeze together with their hands, is altogether nothing.

Theaetetus/ You state very nearly what they think.

Stranger/ Let us then again ask them. For, if they are willing to grant that even any trifling thing is incorporeal, it is sufficient. For they must say, with respect to these incorporeal and those corporeal, which have a body born with them, what it is they look to, when they assert that both exist.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps, however, they would be in a difficulty.

Stranger/ But if they suffer anything of this kind, consider whether, on our proposing the question, they would be willing to admit and confess that existence is a thing of this kind.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind? Speak, and we shall quickly know.

Stranger/ I say then, that what possesses any power soever, whether of doing anything naturally to another, or of suffering even the least thing from the vilest thing, although only once, —everything of this kind does really exist. For I lay down a definition by defining that existences are nothing else but power.

Theaetetus/ But since they cannot at present say anything better than this, they receive it.

Stranger/ It is well; for perhaps hereafter both to us and them something different will appear. Let this then here remain acknowledged by us on their account.

Theaetetus/ It shall remain.

Stranger/ Let us now proceed to the others, the friends of forms. And do you interpret to us what is said by them.

Theaetetus/ It shall be so.

Stranger/ Do you then say that generation is one thing, and existence another, separating them in some way?

Theaetetus/ We do.

Stranger/ And that by body we communicate with generation, through sensation, but through reason by our soul with real existence, which you say is found forever under the same circumstance in a similar manner, but that generation exists differently at different times?

Theaetetus/ We do.

Stranger/ But, ye best of men, what shall we say you mean by the communion between both? Is it not that which we just now mentioned?

Theaetetus/ What was that?

Stranger/ Passion or action arising from a certain power, from the concurrence of things with each other. Perhaps, Theætetus, you have not heard their answer to this question; but I have, through my familiarity with them.

Theaetetus/ What answer then do they give?

Stranger/ They do not admit with us, what was just now said against the earth-born respecting existence.

Theaetetus/ What was that?

Stranger/ We laid down as a sufficient definition of existence, that it is when the power is present to anything, either of suffering or doing in the smallest point.

Theaetetus/ We did.

Stranger/ To this they say, that a power of doing and suffering has a share with generation; but that neither of these powers is adapted to existence.

Theaetetus/ Do they then not speak to the purpose?

Stranger/ To this we must say that we require to hear from them still more clearly, whether they acknowledge that the soul knows, and that existence is known.

Theaetetus/ They certainly say this.

Stranger/ But do you say that to know, or to be known, is action, or passion, or both? Or that passion is one thing, and action another? Or that neither of these has a share in any respect with the other?

Theaetetus/ It is evident that neither has a share with the other. For, if they admitted this, they would contradict what they before asserted.

Stranger/ I understand this at least, that if to know were to do something, it would necessarily happen that what is known would become passive. And according to this reasoning, existence being known by knowledge, would, as far as it is known, be, through becoming passive, moved; which we say cannot take place about the act of resting.

Theaetetus/ Rightly so.

Stranger/ What then, by Zeus, shall we be easily persuaded that motion, life, soul, and prudence, are not truly present to that which is existing in perfection, and that it neither lives, nor thinks, but stands immovable, not possessing an intellect as an object of respect and holy?

Theaetetus/ It would be a dreadful thing, O guest, to admit this.

Stranger/ Shall we say then that it possesses intellect, but not life?

Theaetetus/ And how?

Stranger/ But say we that both these reside in it, but shall we say that it does not possess these in soul at least?

Theaetetus/ But after what other manner can it possess?

Stranger/ That it possesses then at least intellect, life, and soul; but that, though animated, it abides perfectly immovable?

Theaetetus/ All this appears to me at least to be irrational.

Stranger/ We must therefore grant that both the moved and motion are existences.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ It follows then, Theætetus, that intellect is never on any account in any way present to anyone of things immovable.

Theaetetus/ It follows easily.

Stranger/ And yet, if we grant that all things are borne along and moved, we shall by such an assertion take away this sameness from existences.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Does it appear to you that what exists according to the same, and in a similar manner, and about the same, can ever exist without a standing?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Stranger/ But do you perceive that intellect ever is or would be without these?

Theaetetus/ Least of all.

Stranger/ And truly we should contend with every argument against him, who, causing science, or prudence, or intellect to disappear, strenuously insists in behalf of anything in any way whatever.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ But there is every necessity, as it appears, for the philosopher, and him who honors these things the most on this account, not to listen at all to those, who, asserting that there is either one or many forms, admit that the whole

stands still; nor on the other hand, to those who are putting existence into motion by every means; but to say, according to the prayer of boys, whatever are immovable, and have been moved, are both the being and the all.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ Do we not then appear to have now reasonably in our discourse comprehended existence?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Ho! ho! Theætetus, how do we now seem about to know the difficulty of the inquiry about it.

Theaetetus/ How so? and why do you assert this?

Stranger/ Do you not perceive, O blessed man, that we are at present in the greatest ignorance respecting it? And yet we appear to ourselves to say something about it.

Theaetetus/ To myself at least. But I do not very well understand how we are unconsciously in this state.

Stranger/ Consider more clearly, whether, by assenting to this, we should not be justly asked, as we have asked them, who said that the whole consisted of the hot and the cold.

Theaetetus/ Remind me what these questions were.

Stranger/ By all means: and I will endeavor to do this by asking you this, as I then asked them, that we may make some progress together.

Theaetetus/ Rightly so.

Stranger/ Be it so. Do you not say then, that motion and standing are contrary to each other?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ And you surely say that both and each of them exist equally.

Theaetetus/ I do.

Stranger/ Do you then say that both and each are moved, when you admit that they exist?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Stranger/ But do you mean that they stand, when you say that both exist?

Theaetetus/ How can I?

Stranger/ Placing then existence, as a third thing, alongside these in your soul, and considering it as comprehending under itself standing and motion, and looking to their communion with existence, you have asserted that both of them exist.

Theaetetus/ We seem nearly to prophesy very truly that existence is a certain third thing, when we say that motion and standing exist.

Stranger/ Existence then is not both motion and standing, but something different from them.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Stranger/ Hence existence, according to its own nature, neither stands nor is moved.

Theaetetus/ It is nearly so.

Stranger/ Whither then ought he to turn his thoughts, who wishes to fix in himself any clear conceptions respecting existence?

Theaetetus/ Whither?

Stranger/ To no point do I think it is yet easy for him to turn. For, if existence is not moved, why has it not stood still? Or on the other hand, why is that, which in no respect stands still, not moved? But existence has just now appeared to us to be apart from both of these. Is this, however, possible?

Theaetetus/ It is the most impossible of all things.

Stranger/ In the next place, then, it will be just to call to mind this.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ That being asked what name non-entity ought to bear, we were hampered by the greatest difficulty. Do you remember?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ Are we then in a less difficulty now respecting entity?

Theaetetus/ We appear to be, O guest, if it be impossible to say so, in a greater.

Stranger/ Let then this question of difficulty lie here. But since both entity and non-entity have equally a share of difficulty, there is now a hope that, if one of them shall appear more obscure, or more clear, the other will appear such likewise; and on the other hand, if we should not be able to see either of them, the other also will be in a similar state.

And thus we shall pursue, in the most becoming manner we can, the discourse respecting both of them together.

Theaetetus/ Very well.

Stranger/ Let us state then after what manner we call on each occasion this same thing by many names.

Theaetetus/ Such as what? Give an example.

Stranger/ In speaking of man we give him various appellations, and attribute to him color, figure, magnitude, vices, and virtues; in all which, and ten thousand other particulars, we not only say that he is a man, but that he is good, and an infinity of other things: and in the same manner we lay down other things, each as one, and we again call it many things, and by many names.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Whence, I think, we have prepared a feast to young men, and to those old men who learn late in life. For it is easy for everyone immediately to lay hold of the doctrine, that it is impossible for the many to be one, and the one many. Hence they exult forsooth, not suffering us to say that a man is good, but that the good is a good, and the man a man. For I think, Theætetus, you have often met with those, who seriously apply themselves to things of this kind, and sometimes even with rather elderly persons, who, through the poverty of their possessions with respect to wisdom, admire such things as these, and think they have discovered the very-wise thing itself.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ That our discourse then may extend to all who have ever conversed at all respecting existence, let what will be now said in the way of interrogation, be for those and for the rest with whom we have before conversed.

Theaetetus/ What is this?

Stranger/ Whether we should neither join existence to motion and standing, nor anything else to anything else; but as if things were unmixed, and impossible to take a part with each other, we should place them thus separate in our discourse? Or whether we should bring all things to the same, as if they were able to take a part with each other? Or only some, and some not? Which of these, Theætetus, shall we say they would prefer?

Theaetetus/ I indeed have nothing to answer to this on their behalf. Why do you not, by answering each question, consider what follows from each?

Stranger/ You say well; and let us suppose them, if you please, to say, in the first place, that nothing has any power of communion with anything for anything. Will not then motion and standing in no respect take a part of existence?

Theaetetus/ They will not.

Stranger/ But will either of them exist, not having a communion with existence?

Theaetetus/ It will not.

Stranger/ By this admission, all the doctrines, it seems, have become rapidly subverted, as well of those, who put all things in motion, as of those, who make all things stand like one, and of those, who assert that entities, according to forms, subsist ever under the same circumstances and in a similar manner. For all these join existence at least with their doctrines, some asserting that things are really moved, and others that they really stand.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Moreover, such as at one time unite all things, and at another separate them, whether dividing them into one and from one into infinite, or into finite elements, and composing from these, and whether they consider this as partially, or as always taking place, —in all these cases they will say nothing to the purpose, if there is in no respect a commingling.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ Further still, they will have gone through their discourse the most ridiculously of all men, who permitting nothing to the communion of the accident of "different," have thought proper to use the appellation, "the other."

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ They are compelled somehow to employ about all things, "to be," and "apart," and "others," and "by itself," and ten thousand other expressions, from which being unable to abstain, and not to insert them in their discourses, they do not require others to confute them, but walk about, having, as the saying is, an enemy and an adversary at

home, vociferating within, and always carrying, as it were, the absurd Eurycles with them.

Theaetetus/ You really say what is similar and true.

Stranger/ But what if we permit all things to have the power of alternate communion with each other?

Theaetetus/ This I myself am able to refute.

Stranger/ How?

Theaetetus/ Because motion itself would entirely stand still, and on the other hand, standing itself would be moved, if they were alternately mingled with each other.

Stranger/ But this indeed is impossible from the greatest necessity, for motion to stand still, and standing to be moved.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ The third thing therefore alone remains.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ For one of these things is necessary; either that all things should be commingled, or nothing; or that some things should be willing to be commingled, and others not.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ Now it has been found that two cannot be commingled.

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Stranger/ Everyone therefore who wishes to answer rightly, will adopt that which remains of the three.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ But since some things are willing to do so, be mingled, and others not, they will be affected nearly in the same manner as letters. For some of these do not fit with each other, but others do fit.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ For vowels being pre-eminently the bond, as it were, of the other letters, it has come to pass, that without some one of them, it is impossible for any of the rest to fit one with the other.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ Does then everyone know what letters will unite with what? or is there a need of art to him, who is about to do this sufficiently?

Theaetetus/ Of art.

Stranger/ What kind of art?

Theaetetus/ The grammatical.

Stranger/ What then, with respect to sharp and flat sounds, is not he, who has the art to know the sounds that are combined or not, a musician, but he who does not know, not a musician?

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Stranger/ And in other things of skill, and want of skill, we shall find other circumstances of such a kind.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ Since then we have acknowledged, that the genera of things have a mingling with each other, after the same manner, is it not necessary for him to proceed in his discourse with some science, who is about to show what kind of genera accord with what kind, and what do not receive each other? Likewise, whether these genera so hold together through all things as to be capable of being mutually mingled? And again in their divisions, whether there are other causes of division through wholes?

Theaetetus/ How is there not a need of science, and, perhaps, of nearly the greatest?

Stranger/ What then, Theætetus, shall we call this science? Or, by Zeus, have we ignorantly fallen upon the

science of freemen? And do we nearly appear, while searching after a sophist, to have found previously a philosopher?

Theaetetus/ How say you?

Stranger/ Shall we not say, that to divide according to genera, and neither to think the same species different, nor a different species the same, is the business of the dialectic science?

Theaetetus/ Yes, we will say so.

Stranger/ He then who is able to do this, perceives sufficiently one idea every way extended through many things, of which each one lies apart, and many different from one another, externally comprehended under one; and on the other hand, one idea through many wholes conjoined in one, and many ideas, every way separated from each other. This is to know how to distinguish according to genus, in what point each can have a communion, and where they cannot.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But you will not, I think, assign the dialectic art to any other than one, who philosophizes purely and justly.

Theaetetus/ For how should anyone assign it to any other?

Stranger/ If we seek indeed, we shall find, both now and hereafter, a philosopher in a place of this kind, though difficult to see him clearly; but the difficulty in the case of a sophist and that of a philosopher is of a different kind.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ The one flying into the darkness of non-entity, and by rubbing touching it, is through the obscurity of the place hard to be perceived. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Stranger/ But the philosopher, always lying, through reasoning, near the idea of entity, is, through the splendor of the region, by no means easily discerned. For the eyes of the soul of the many are unable to endure the looking upon what is divine.

Theaetetus/ And this too it is likely is the case, no less than that.

Stranger/ On this point, therefore, we shall shortly reflect more clearly, if it be permitted to us wishing it. But with respect to the Sophist, it is evident that we must not dismiss him, before we have sufficiently surveyed him.

Theaetetus/ You speak well.

Stranger/ Since then it is acknowledged by us, that some genera have a communion with each other, and some have not, and that nothing prevents some from having a communion with a few, others with many, and others through all and with all, —let us, in the next place, follow the reasoning, and in this way speculate, not about all species, lest we be confounded by their multitude, —but, selecting some of those called the greatest, let us first consider the qualities of each, and then what power of communion they possess with each other, in order that, although we may not be able to comprehend entity and non-entity with all clearness, we may at least not want for reasons respecting them, as far as the manner of the present speculation admits, if perchance it be permitted us, when we assert that non-entity is in reality a non-entity, to escape unscathed.

Theaetetus/ So must we do.

Stranger/ Now the greatest of all the genera, which we have now mentioned, are, entity itself, standing, and motion.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ And we have said that the two latter are unmixed with each other.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ But entity is mixed with both; for both do somehow exist.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ These things then become three.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Is not then each of these different from the other two, but the same with itself?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ What then have we now said of sameness and difference? Must we say that, as there are two genera different from the other three, but yet always mingled with them from necessity, we have to consider about five, and not three genera only? Or have we unconsciously denominated the same and the different, as something belonging to them?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ But surely motion and standing are neither the different nor the same?

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ That which we in common call motion and standing can be neither of these.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ Because motion would be standing, and standing be motion. For, with respect to both, either one becoming the other, would compel that other to change into the contrary to its nature, as participating in the contrary.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ But yet both participate of the same and the different.

Theaetetus/ They do.

Stranger/ Let us then not assert that motion is either the same or the different, nor on the other hand assert this, of standing.

Theaetetus/ Let us not.

Stranger/ But must entity and the same be considered by us as one?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ But if entity and the same signify that which is in no respect different, when we again say that motion and standing both exist, we shall thus assert that they are the same, as things existing.

Theaetetus/ But this is surely impossible.

Stranger/ It is impossible then for the same and entity to be one.

Theaetetus/ Nearly so.

Stranger/ We must place then the same as a fourth species, in addition to the former three.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But must we say that the different is a fifth species? Or must we conceive that this and entity are some two names belonging to one genus?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ But I think you will grant, that of existences, some always subsist themselves by themselves, but others in relation to each other.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ But the different is always referred to the different. Is it not?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ But this would not be, unless entity and the different widely differed from each other. But if the different participated of both species, as entity does, there would be something even of the different not different with reference to the different. But now it happens from necessity that, whatever is really different, is so from its relation to that which is different.

Theaetetus/ You say, as the fact is.

Stranger/ We must say then, that the nature of the different must be added as a fifth to the species, of which we have already spoken.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And we will say that it pervades through all these. For each one is different from the others, not through its own nature, but through participating in the idea of the different.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ Let us say thus of the five genera, taking each singly.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ In the first place, that motion is entirely different from standing. Or how shall we say?

Theaetetus/ Thus.

Stranger/ It is not then standing.

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Stranger/ But it exists through its participating in entity.

Theaetetus/ It does.

Stranger/ Again, motion is different from the same.

Theaetetus/ Nearly so.

Stranger/ It is not therefore the same.

Theaetetus/ It is not.

Stranger/ And yet it was the same, through its participating on the other hand in the same.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ It must be confessed then that motion is both the same and not the same; nor must we be indignant at this. For, when we say that it is both the same, and not the same, we do not speak of it in a similar manner; but when we say it is the same, we call it so, through the participation of the same with respect to itself; but when we say it is not the same, we call it so through its communion with the different; through which, being separated from the same, it becomes not the same, but the different; so that it is again rightly said to be not the same.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ If, then, motion itself has in any respect participated in standing, there would be no absurdity in calling it stable.

Theaetetus/ Most truly, if we should acknowledge that some of the genera are willing to be mixed with each other, but others not.

Stranger/ And yet we arrived at the proof of this prior to the present remarks, by showing that it exists in this manner naturally.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ Let us then say again that motion is a thing different from the different, just as it was from the same and standing.

Theaetetus/ It must be so.

Stranger/ It is then, in a certain respect, not different and different, according to the present reasoning.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ What then follows? Shall we say it is different from the three genera, but not from the fourth? acknowledging that there are five, about which, and in which, we propose to speculate?

Theaetetus/ And how so? for it is impossible to grant that the number is less than it now appears.

Stranger/ We may, therefore, fearlessly contend that motion is different from entity.

Theaetetus/ We may most fearlessly.

Stranger/ Clearly then motion is really a non-entity and an entity, since it participates of entity.

Theaetetus/ Most clearly.

Stranger/ It is then of necessity that non-entity exists with respect to motion, and as regards all the genera. For as regards all, the nature of the different, rendering them different from entity, makes each to be a non-entity. Hence we rightly say, that all of them are, as regards the same, non-entities; and again, because they participate in entity, that they exist and are entities.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Stranger/ About each of the species then, the entity is many, but the non-entity is in multitude endless.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Stranger/ Must not then entity itself be said to be different from the others?

Theaetetus/ Of necessity.

Stranger/ Entity then does not exist according to so many in number as the others; for entity, being one itself, is not them; but the others, being infinite in number, are not entity.

Theaetetus/ This is nearly the case.

Stranger/ We ought not then to be indignant at this, since the nature of the genera have a communion with each other. But if someone does not admit this, let him, having persuaded our former reasoning, in like manner persuade the subsequent assertions.

Theaetetus/ You speak most justly.

Stranger/ Let us look at this likewise.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ When we say non-entity, we do not, as it appears, speak of anything contrary to entity, but only as something different from it.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Just as when we say a thing is not great, do we then appear to you to point out by this word what is small rather than what is equal?

Theaetetus/ How could you?

Stranger/ We must therefore admit that the contrary to a thing is not signified, when negation is spoken of; but thus much only, that the prohibitive "not," and the negative "no," when prefixed, signify something relating to the words that follow, or rather to the things, respecting which are placed the words of the negation afterwards enunciated.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ This also let us consider, if it seems good to you.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ The nature of the different appears to me to have been cut into fractional parts, in the same manner as science.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ The nature is one; but the portion of it that is attached to anything does, when separated, possess

individually its peculiar appellation; on which account arts and sciences are said to be many.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Have not then the parts of the nature of the different, which is itself one thing, been affected in the very same way?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so. But let us tell how this takes place.

Stranger/ Is there any part of the different opposed to the beautiful?

Theaetetus/ There is.

Stranger/ Shall we say it is nameless, or that it has some appellation?

Theaetetus/ That it has. For that which we call on each occasion not-beautiful, is not different from anything else but the nature of the beautiful.

Stranger/ Come, then, tell me this.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ When anything is separated from some kind of existences, and is again opposed to some kind of existences, does it happen that thus it is not beautiful?

Theaetetus/ It does.

Stranger/ But the opposition of entity to entity happens, as it seems, to be not-beautiful.

Theaetetus/ Most right.

Stranger/ What then, according to this reasoning does the beautiful belong more to entities, and the non-beautiful, less?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Stranger/ We must say then, that the not-great and the great exist similarly.

Theaetetus/ Similarly.

Stranger/ Hence too we must lay down respecting the just, in the same manner as of the not-just, that the one in no respect exists more than the other.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ And we will speak of other things in this way; since the nature of the different appears to be one of entities; and as it exists, it is necessary for us to lay down the parts of it, as no less existing.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ The opposition then, it seems, of a part of the nature of the different, and of entity opposed to each other, are no less existence, if it be lawful to say so, than existence itself; nor do they signify what is contrary to existence, but only so much, what is different from it.

Theaetetus/ It is most clear.

Stranger/ What then, shall we call it the antithesis?

Theaetetus/ It is evident that non-entity, which we have been seeking on account of the Sophist, is this very thing.

Stranger/ Whether then, as you have said, is it no more deficient of existence than the others? And ought we now boldly to say, that non-entity possesses its own nature firmly, in the same manner as the great was found to be great, and the beautiful, beautiful, and the not-great to be not-great, and the not-beautiful, not-beautiful? and that thus too nonentity was and is non-entity, as being one species numbered amongst the many existing? Or must we still, Theætetus, have with regard to this some want of faith?

Theaetetus/ None at all.

Stranger/ Do you perceive then, how we have been with some prolixity disobedient to the prohibition of Parmenides?

Theaetetus/ In what respect?

Stranger/ We have farther than he ordained us to inquire, exhibited ourselves, still exploring onwards.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ Because he says somewhere, —"Non-beings never and by no means are. And from this path thy searching thought restrain."

Theaetetus/ And so he does say.

Stranger/ But we have not only shown that non-entities exist, but we have demonstrated what kind of thing a non-entity is. For, having proved that the nature of the different has an existence, and that it is cut up into fractions, distributed mutually through all things, we then dared to say, that each part of it, which is opposed to entity, is itself truly a nonentity.

Theaetetus/ And to me, O guest, we appear to have spoken with the greatest truth.

Stranger/ Let no one then say, that we, having proved that non-entity is contrary to entity, dare to assert that it exists. For we some time since did to something, contrary to it, bid a farewell, whether it exists or not, and possesses a certain reason, or is entirely irrational. But, with respect to that which we now call non-entity, either let someone persuade us by showing that we speak not well; or, as long as he is unable to do this, he must also say, as we say, that the genera are mixed with each other, and that entity and the different pervading through all things, and through each other, the different, partaking of entity, does through this participation exist, not being that of which it participates, but something else; and being different from entity, it clearly follows that it is necessarily non-entity. And on the other hand entity, having partaken of the different, will be different from the other genera; but being different from all of them, it is not anyone of them, nor all the others, nor anything

besides itself. So that incontestably entity is not ten thousand things in ten thousand things: and thus the rest taken singly and together exist in many forms, but do not exist in many forms.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Now if anyone either does not believe in these contrarieties, let him reflect and produce something better than has been stated now; or if, perceiving this to be a difficult speculation, he is pleased at drawing out his arguments now on this side and now on that, he is engaged, as our present reasoning shows, in a pursuit not deserving very serious attention. For this is neither a clever thing nor difficult to discover; but that is at one and the same time difficult and honorable.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ That which has been stated before; so that, omitting these as possible, we may be able, by following up what has been said, each by itself, to confute a person, when he says that what is different is same, and what is the same different, in the way and according to the circumstance by which he says either is affected. For, to show that the same is different, and the different same, and the great small, and the similar dissimilar, and to be pleased in thus introducing contrarieties in discourse, is not a true confutation, but one evidently newly born of someone, who has recently laid hold of entities.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ For, my good friend, to endeavor to separate everything from everything, is inelegant in other respects, and the part too of one untaught and unphilosophical.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ To loosen each thing from all things, is the most perfect abolition of all discourse. For discourse subsists through the conjunction of species with each other.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Consider then, how opportunely we have now contended with men of this kind, and compelled them to permit one thing to be mixed with another.

Theaetetus/ With a view to what?

Stranger/ To this, that discourse may be one certain thing belonging to the genera of existences. For, if we are deprived of this, we shall, for the most part, be deprived of philosophy. And farther still, it is requisite at present that we agree about discourse what it is. But if we take it away entirely from us, so as not to exist at all, we can no longer speak about anything. And we should take it away, if we admit that there is no mixing of anything for anything.

Theaetetus/ This is said quite rightly. But I do not understand why we should agree about discourse.

Stranger/ But, perhaps, you will most easily understand by following me in this way.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ Non-entity has appeared to us to be one of the rest of genera, and to be dispersed through all existences.

Theaetetus/ It has so.

Stranger/ After this, therefore, we must consider whether it is mixed with opinion and discourse.

Theaetetus/ On what account?

Stranger/ Because, if it is not mixed with these, it must necessarily follow that all things are true; but, if it is mixed with these, false opinion and false discourse is produced. For to fancy or speak of non-entities, is a falsehood existing in the mind and in discourse.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Stranger/ But, being falsehood, it is deception.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ And deception existing, all things must necessarily be full of resemblances, images, and fancies.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ But we have said that the sophist flew to and stayed in this place, while he denies that there is any such thing as falsehood; for he says that no one can either think or speak of a non-entity; because it in no respect partakes of existence.

Theaetetus/ It was so said.

Stranger/ But now it has appeared to partake of entity; so that in this respect perhaps he will no longer oppose us. Perhaps, however, he will say, that of species some partake of non-entity, and others not; and that discourse and opinion are amongst those things that do not partake of it. So that he will again contend with us, that the image-making and fancy-producing art, in which we have said he is concealed, exists not at all; since opinion and discourse have no communion with non-entity; for that falsehood does not exist at all, if this communion of things takes place nowhere. Hence we must search out discourse, opinion, and fancy, what they are, in order that we may perceive after their appearance their communion with non-entity; and having perceived this, we may prove that falsehood exists; and having proved this, we may put the Sophist into bonds, if he is guilty; or, setting him free, search for him in some other genus.

Theaetetus/ What was said, O guest, at first about the Sophist, appears to be very true—that he is a genus difficult to hunt out. For he appears to be full of fences; of which when he throws up one, it is necessary to take it by storm,

before you can reach him himself. And even now we have scarcely passed over the obstacle he had raised, that a nonentity does not exist, when he immediately throws up another. Hence it is requisite to show that falsehood does exist, both in discourse and opinion; and after this perhaps something else, and another thing after that; and, as it seems, no end will ever appear.

Stranger/ He, Theætetus, should be bold, who is able to proceed, though only a little, continually onwards. For what will he be able to do in other things who is faint-hearted in these, and is either effecting nothing in these, or is driven back again? Such a person will scarcely, according to the proverb, ever take a city. But now, O good man, since this, as you say, has been passed through, the greatest wall will have been taken by us, and the rest will be more easy and of small account.

Theaetetus/ You say well.

Stranger/ Let us then now in the first place take up, as we said, discourse and opinion, that we may more clearly calculate, whether non-being touches upon these, or whether both these are in every respect true, and neither of them at any time false.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ Come then, let us again speculate about nouns, in the same manner as we did about species and letters. For the present inquiry appears somehow to lie in this road.

Theaetetus/ What then is to be heard forsooth about nouns?

Stranger/ Whether all of them fit together, or not; or some are wont to do so, but others not.

Theaetetus/ This is evident, that some are wont and others not.

Stranger/ Perhaps you mean some such thing as this; that some being spoken in order and signifying something, do fit together; but that such as in continuity signify nothing, do not fit together.

Theaetetus/ Why, and how say you this?

Stranger/ What I thought you would understand and acknowledge. For there is a twofold kind of significations by the voice respecting existence.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ One called nouns, and the other verbs.

Theaetetus/ Speak of each.

Stranger/ That which has a signification in the case of actions, is called a verb.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ But a sign of the voice, applied to the doers themselves of those actions, we call a noun.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ From nouns then alone, spoken in succession, there is not a discourse; nor, on the other hand, from verbs spoken without nouns.

Theaetetus/ I have not learned this.

Stranger/ Yet it is plain that you just now acknowledged this, when looking to something else. For this very thing I meant to say, that when these are spoken in succession, there is not a discourse.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ As for instance, should anyone say in succession “walks,” “runs,” “sleeps,” and such other words as signify actions, he would not form a discourse at all.

Theaetetus/ For how could he?

Stranger/ Again then, when anyone says, “lion,” “stag,” “horse,” and such other nouns, as are named after those doing acts, no discourse is composed by such a continuity. For the words spoken do not, either in this way or that, signify action, or non-action, or the existence of a thing which is or is not, until one mixes verbs with nouns; and then they fit with each other, and a discourse is produced immediately, and their first connection is nearly the first and shortest discourse.

Theaetetus/ How say you this?

Stranger/ When anyone says, “Man learns,” would you not say that this is the shortest and first discourse?

Theaetetus/ I should.

Stranger/ For he then points out something respecting things which exist, or are in the course of existing, or have been, or will be; nor does he name a thing merely, but completes something by connecting verbs with nouns. Hence we say that he speaks, and does not merely name a thing; and through this connection we pronounce the noun “discourse.”

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ Thus too in the case of things, some did fit with each other, and others did not; so likewise with respect to the signs of the voice, some do not fit, but others of them by fitting produce discourse.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ There is still this trifling thing.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ It is necessary for a discourse, when it takes place, to be a discourse about something; for it is impossible to be about nothing.

Theaetetus/ It must.

Stranger/ Ought it not then to be of some particular kind?

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ Let us then pay attention to ourselves.

Theaetetus/ For it is requisite.

Stranger/ I will then pronounce you a discourse, having united a thing with an action, through a noun and a verb; and do you tell me of what it is the discourse.

Theaetetus/ This shall be as far as I am able.

Stranger/ Theætetus sits. —This is not a long discourse.

Theaetetus/ No; a moderate one.

Stranger/ It is now your business to say about whom is the discourse, and whose it is.

Theaetetus/ It is evident that it is about me and mine.

Stranger/ But what again is this?

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ Theætetus, with whom I am now conversing, flies.

Theaetetus/ Respecting this also, no one can say but that it is mine, and of me.

Stranger/ But we said it was necessary that every sentence should be of some particular kind.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But of what kind must each of the sentences just now mentioned be?

Theaetetus/ One must be false and the other true.

Stranger/ But of them the one which is true asserts things respecting you, as they are.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ But the one which is false asserts things respecting you, different from what they are.

Theaetetus/ It does.

Stranger/ It speaks then of things which are not, as if they were.

Theaetetus/ Nearly so.

Stranger/ And it speaks of things about you different from the existing. For we said that about each thing there are many things which exist, and many which do not.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ The discourse then which I last spoke about you, should, from what we have defined a discourse to be, of necessity be, in the first place, one of the shortest.

Theaetetus/ This we have just now acknowledged.

Stranger/ In the next place, it is a discourse of someone.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Stranger/ But if it is not yours, it is not of anyone else.

Theaetetus/ For how should it?

Stranger/ And if it is not about something, it cannot be a discourse at all. For we have shown that it is one of things impossible, for a discourse to exist about nothing.

Theaetetus/ Most correctly.

Stranger/ When therefore the different is asserted of you as if it were the same, and things not existing as if existing, such an arrangement of verbs and nouns altogether becomes, as it appears, a really and truly false discourse.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ But what, is it not now evident, that all these genera, both false and true, such as thought, opinion, and fancy, are produced in our souls?

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ You will more easily understand it thus, if you first take, what each of them is, and in what they differ each from the other.

Theaetetus/ Only give.

Stranger/ Are not then thought and discourse the same, except that the former being within the soul a voiceless dialogue with itself, is called by us by the name of thought?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But the stream of thought passing through the mouth with a sound is called discourse.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ We know of this too in discourse.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ Affirmation and negation.

Theaetetus/ We do.

Stranger/ When therefore this is generated in the soul according to thought, accompanied with silence, can you call it anything else than opinion?

Theaetetus/ How can I?

Stranger/ But when, again, some circumstance of this kind is present to anyone, not according to itself, but through sensation, is it possible to call it correctly anything else than fancy?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Stranger/ Since then discourse is both true and false, and it appears that thought is a dialogue of the soul with itself, but opinion the termination of thought, and what we mean by “it appears” is the mixture of sensation and opinion, it is necessary, that of these, being allied to discourse, some should be false and sometimes.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ Do you perceive then, that opinion and discourse have been previously found to be false more easily, than according to our expectation? For just now we were

afraid, lest by searching into this matter we should throw ourselves upon a work perfectly impracticable.

Theaetetus/ I do perceive.

Stranger/ Let us not then be faint-hearted as to what remains. For since these have been made to appear, let us recall to our memory the previous divisions according to species.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind were they?

Stranger/ We divided image-making into two species; the one assimilative, and the other fanciful.

Theaetetus/ We did.

Stranger/ And we said we were dubious in which of these we should place the Sophist.

Theaetetus/ It was so said.

Stranger/ And while we were doubting of this, a still greater dizziness was shed around us, through the assertion appearing a matter of doubt to all men, that there cannot be at all either a resemblance, or an image, or fancy; because no falsehood exists by any means at any time or in any place.

Theaetetus/ You speak the truth.

Stranger/ But now since discourse has made its appearance, and false opinion likewise, it is conceded that there are imitations of things existing; and that from this disposition of things the art of deceiving is produced.

Theaetetus/ It is agreed.

Stranger/ And yet was it not also acknowledged by us above, that the sophist is one of these?

Theaetetus/ It was.

Stranger/ Let us then again endeavor, by always bisecting the proposed genus, to proceed along the right hand of the section, and attend to its communion with the sophist, until, having cut off all his common properties, we leave the nature

peculiar to himself, and exhibit it to ourselves especially, and afterwards to those also, who are naturally the nearest of kin to this method.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ Did we not then begin by dividing the making art and the acquiring art?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the acquiring art presented itself to us in hunting, contests, traffic, and in some such-like species.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But now, since the imitative art comprehends the Sophist, it is evident that the making art must first receive a twofold division. For imitation is a certain kind of making. We said, indeed, it was the making of images, and not of each themselves. Did we not?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But, in the first place, let there be two parts of the making art.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One divine, the other human.

Theaetetus/ I do not understand you.

Stranger/ The making art, if we remember what was said at first, we asserted to be every power, which might be the cause of things being produced subsequently, that did not previously exist.

Theaetetus/ We do remember.

Stranger/ But, with respect to all living animals, and plants, which are produced in the earth from seeds and roots, together with such inanimate bodies as subsist on the earth, able to be liquefied or not, can we say that not existing previously they were subsequently produced by any other

than some fabricating god? Or making use of the opinion and assertion of the many—

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ That nature generates these from some self-acting fortuitous cause, and without a generating intellect; or is it with reason and divine science, originating from a god?

Theaetetus/ I, perhaps, through my age, am often changing my opinions to both sides. But at present looking to you, and apprehending that you think these things are produced according to the will of a deity, I think so too.

Stranger/ It is well, Theætetus. And if we thought that you would be one of those, who at a future time would think differently, we should now endeavor to make you acknowledge this by the force of reason, in conjunction with the persuasion of necessity. But since I know your nature to be such, that, without any arguments from us, it will of itself arrive at that conclusion to which you say you are now drawn, I will leave the subject; for the time would be superfluous. But I will lay this down, that the things, which are said to be made by nature, are made by divine art; but that the things, which are composed from these by men, are produced by human art: and that, according to this assertion, there are two kinds of the making art, one human, and the other divine.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ But, since there are two kinds, bisect each of them.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ Just as the whole of the making art was then divided, according to breadth, so now divide it according to length.

Theaetetus/ Let it be so divided.

Stranger/ And thus all its parts will become four; two of which, with reference to us, will be human; and two again, with reference to the gods, divine.

Theaetetus/ They will.

Stranger/ But with respect to these, as being again divided in a different manner, one part of each division is self-making, but the remaining parts may be nearly called image-making; and in this way again, the making art is divided into two parts.

Theaetetus/ Tell me again how each is to be divided.

Stranger/ With respect to ourselves and other animals, and the things from which they naturally consist, fire and water, and the sisters of these, we know that all these productions are individually the offspring of a deity. Or how?

Theaetetus/ Thus.

Stranger/ And that the images of each of these, and not the things themselves, follow, and these too produced by the artifice of some dæmon-like power.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind are these?

Stranger/ Fancies, which occur in dreams, and such as appear in the day, are called self-produced; as, for instance, a shadow, when darkness is generated in fire: but this is twofold, when its own and foreign light meeting in one about shining and smooth bodies, effects by these means a species, producing a sensation of seeing contrary to accustomed vision.

Theaetetus/ These works then of divine making are two, the things themselves, and the image which follows each.

Stranger/ But what of our art? Shall we not say that it does, by the art of house-building, make a dwelling, and has made by painting another dwelling, which is, as it were, a dream made by man to persons awake?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ In this way then are the rest. Divided into two parts are the works of our making power; that which relates to the thing itself we call thing-itself-making, but that which relates to the image, image-making.

Theaetetus/ I now understand you better; and I lay down in two parts two kinds of the making art, the divine and human, according to one section; and, according to the other, one a production from themselves, and the other of certain resemblances.

Stranger/ Let us then recollect, that of the image-producing art we said, one kind was about to be a likeness-producing, and the other a fancy-producing, if it should appear that falsehood is in reality a falsehood, and one of things existing.

Theaetetus/ It was so.

Stranger/ There have then appeared, and we shall on this account enumerate ourselves, incontestably two species.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let us then again divide into two the fancy-producing species.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ One produced through instruments, but the other, when he, who causes the fancied appearance, exhibits himself as the instrument of the thing.

Theaetetus/ How say you?

Stranger/ I think, when anyone employing his own body, causes your figure to appear similar to his own, or voice to voice, this is especially called an imitation belonging to the fancy-producing species.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ Calling this then imitative, we will divide it; but let us, now reduced to a jelly, dismiss all the rest, and we will permit some other person to collect the facts into one, and to give them a proper appellation.

Theaetetus/ Let one then be divided, and the other dismissed.

Stranger/ And yet, Theætetus, it is fit to think that this also is twofold; but take notice on what account.

Theaetetus/ Say on.

Stranger/ Of those who imitate, some knowing what they imitate, do this, but others not knowing. And yet what division can we make greater than that of ignorance and knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Not one.

Stranger/ Will not then that, which was just now mentioned, be an imitation by those, that are endued with knowledge? For a man by knowing you, would imitate your figure likewise.

Theaetetus/ How not?

Stranger/ But what shall we say respecting the figure of justice, and, in short, of the whole of virtue? Do not many, though ignorant, yet fancying they know it, vehemently endeavor to make it appear that, what seems to be justice in them, is inherent in them, and that they are particularly desirous of it, by imitating it in deeds and words.

Theaetetus/ Very many indeed.

Stranger/ Do not then all fail in seeming to be just, by their not being just at all? Or does the contrary of this take place wholly?

Theaetetus/ Wholly.

Stranger/ I think then we must say that the imitator, who is ignorant, is different from the other who knows.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Whence, then, can anyone of them obtain a name adapted to each? Or is it evident that it is difficult; because a certain ancient cause of the division of genera into species was unknown to our ancestors, so that none of them attempted even to divide; and on this account there was a necessity for them not to be very ready at names. But at the same time, although it may be rather bold to be asserted, for the sake of distinction, let us call the imitation which subsists with opinion, the "opinion-mimicking," but that which subsists in conjunction with science, a certain scientific imitation.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Stranger/ We must therefore make use of the other: for a sophist was not among the scientific but the imitators.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ Let us then look into this opinion-mimic, as if he were a piece of iron, and see whether he is sound and whole, or contains in himself some layer doubled over.

Theaetetus/ Let us consider.

Stranger/ He has it indeed very thick. For, of sophists, one is a simpleton, and thinks he knows what he merely fancies. But the figure of another, through his tossing about in his discourse, carries with it much of suspicion and fear, that he is ignorant of what before others he pretends to know.

Theaetetus/ There are both these kinds of sophists, of whom you have spoken.

Stranger/ We will therefore place one as a simple imitator, but the other as an ironical one.

Theaetetus/ It is proper to do so.

Stranger/ And again, shall we say that the genus of this is one or two?

Theaetetus/ Do you look to it.

Stranger/ I do consider; and some two imitators appear before me. One I behold able to employ irony in public, and in lengthened speeches before the masses; but the other in private, and in short discourses, compelling the person who converses with him to contradict himself.

Theaetetus/ You speak most correctly.

Stranger/ What then may we show the imitator to be, who employs lengthened discourses? A statesman, or a mob-orator?

Theaetetus/ A mob-orator.

Stranger/ But what shall we call the other? a wise man, or wise-man-like?

Theaetetus/ To call him a wise man is impossible, since we have placed him as one who is ignorant; but as he is an imitator of a wise man, it is plain he must receive some similar appellation; and I now nearly understand, that we ought truly to call this person the perfectly real sophist.

Stranger/ Shall we not then bind together his name, as we did before, connecting everything from the end to the beginning?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ He, then, who is a portion of the art that makes a discourse to contradict itself, and a part of the ironic species, and of the opinion-mimicking, and of the fancy-producing, and of that proceeding from the image-making, and separated from the making, not as a god but man, and in discourses is the wonder-working portion, whoever shall say that he is “of this race and blood” a real sophist, such a person will, as it appears, speak with the greatest truth.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Sophist.

Translated by F. M. Cornford.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Stranger, Theodorus, Theaetetus

Theodorus/ Here we are, Socrates, faithful to our appointment of yesterday, and, what is more, we have brought a guest with us. Our friend here is a native of Elea; he belongs to the school of Parmenides and Zeno, and is devoted to philosophy.

Socrates/ Perhaps, Theodorus, it is no ordinary guest but some god that you have brought us unawares. Homer tells us that gods attend upon the goings of men of mercy and justice, and not least among them the god of strangers comes to mark the orderly or lawless doings of mankind. Your companion may be one of those higher powers, who intends to observe and expose our weakness in philosophical discourse, like a very spirit of refutation.

Theodorus/ That is not our friend's way, Socrates; he is more reasonable than the devotees of verbal dispute. I should not call him a god by any means, but there is something divine about him. I would say that of any philosopher.

Socrates/ And rightly, my friend, but one might almost say that the type you mention is hardly easier to discern than the god. Such men—the genuine, not the sham philosophers—as they go from city to city surveying from a height the life beneath them, appear, owing to the world's blindness, to wear all sorts of shapes. To some they seem of no account, to others above all worth; now they wear the guise of statesmen, now of Sophists, and sometimes they may give the impression of simply being mad. But if our

guest will allow me, I should like to ask him what his countrymen thought and how they used these names.

Theodorus/ What names?

Socrates/ Sophist, statesman, philosopher.

Theodorus/ What is your question exactly? What sort of difficulty about these names have you in mind?

Socrates/ This. Did they think of all these as a single type, or as two, or did they distinguish three types and attach one of the three corresponding names to each?

Theodorus/ I imagine you are quite welcome to the information. Is not that so, sir?

Stranger/ Yes, Theodorus, perfectly welcome, and the answer is not difficult. They thought of them as three different types, but it is not so short and easy a task to define each one of them clearly.

Theodorus/ As luck would have it, Socrates, you have hit upon a subject closely allied to one on which we were pressing him with questions before we came here. He tried to put us off with the same excuse he has just made to you, though he admits he has been thoroughly instructed and has not forgotten what he heard.

Socrates/ Do not deny us, then, the first favor we ask. Tell us this much. Which do you commonly prefer—to discourse at length by yourself on any matter you wish to make clear, or to use the method of asking questions, as Parmenides himself did on one occasion in developing some magnificent arguments in my presence, when I was young and he quite an elderly man?

Stranger/ When the other party to the conversation is tractable and gives no trouble, to address him is the easier course; otherwise, to speak by oneself.

Socrates/ Then you may choose any of the company you will; they will all follow you and respond amenably. But if you take my advice, you will choose one of the younger men—Theaetetus here or any other you may prefer.

Stranger/ I feel some shyness, Socrates, at the notion that, at my first meeting with you and your friends, instead of exchanging our ideas in the give-and-take of ordinary conversation, I should spin out a long discourse by myself or even address it to another, as if I were giving a display of eloquence. For indeed the question you have just raised is not so easy a matter as one might suppose, on hearing it so simply put, but it calls for a very long discussion. On the other hand, to refuse you and your friends a request, especially one put to me in such terms as you have used, strikes me as a breach of civility in a guest. That Theaetetus should be the other party to our conversation is a proposal which my earlier talk with him, as well as your recommendation, makes exceedingly welcome.

Theaetetus/ Then do as you say, sir; you will, as Socrates said, be conferring a favor on us all.

Stranger/ On that point, Theaetetus, no more need be said; the discussion from now onward must, it seems, be carried on with you. But if the long task should after all weigh heavy on you, your friends here, not I, must bear the blame.

Theaetetus/ I do not feel at this moment as if I should sink under it, but should something of that sort happen, we will call in Socrates' namesake here, who is of my own age and shares my pursuits. He is quite used to working out most questions with me.

Stranger/ A good suggestion. That shall be for you to consider as our conversation goes forward. What now concerns us both is our joint inquiry. We had better, I think,

begin by studying the Sophist and try to bring his nature to light in a clear formula. At present, you see, all that you and I possess in common is the name. The thing to which each of us gives that name we may perhaps have privately before our minds, but it is always desirable to have reached an agreement about the thing itself by means of explicit statements, rather than be content to use the same word without formulating what it means. It is not so easy to comprehend this group we intend to examine or to say what it means to be a Sophist. However, when some great task is to be properly carried through, everyone has long since found it a good rule to take something comparatively small and easy and practice on that, before attempting the big thing itself. That is the course I recommend for us now, Theaetetus. Judging the Sophist to be a very troublesome sort of creature to hunt down, let us first practice the method of tracking him on some easier quarry—unless you have some readier means to suggest?

Theaetetus/ No, I have none.

Stranger/ Then suppose that we work out some lesser example, which will be a pattern of the greater?

Theaetetus/ Good.

Stranger/ What is there which is well known and not great, and is yet as susceptible of definition as any larger thing? Shall I say an angler? He is familiar to all of us, and not a very interesting or important person.

Theaetetus/ He is not.

Stranger/ Yet I suspect that he will furnish us with the sort of definition and line of inquiry which we want.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Let us begin by asking whether he is a man having art or not having art, but some other power.

Theaetetus/ He is clearly a man of art.

Stranger/ And of arts there are two kinds?

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ There is agriculture, and the tending of mortal creatures, and the art of constructing or molding vessels, and there is the art of imitation—all these may be appropriately called by a single name.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? And what is the name?

Stranger/ He who brings into existence something that did not exist before is said to be a producer, and that which is brought into existence is said to be produced.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And all the arts which were just now mentioned are characterized by this power of producing?

Theaetetus/ They are.

Stranger/ Then let us sum them up under the name of productive or creative art.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Next follows the whole class of learning and cognition; then comes trade, fighting, hunting. And since none of these produces anything, but is only engaged in conquering by word or deed, or in preventing others from conquering, things which exist and have been already produced—in each and all of these branches there appears to be an art which may be called acquisitive.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is the proper name.

Stranger/ Seeing, then, that all arts are either acquisitive or creative, in which class shall we place the art of the angler?

Theaetetus/ Clearly in the acquisitive class.

Stranger/ And the acquisitive may be subdivided into two parts. There is exchange, which is voluntary and is effected by gifts, hire, purchase, and the other part of acquisitive,

which takes by force of word or deed, may be termed conquest?

Theaetetus/ That is implied in what has been said.

Stranger/ And may not conquest be again subdivided?

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ Open force may be called fighting, and secret force may have the general name of hunting?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And there is no reason why the art of hunting should not be further divided.

Theaetetus/ How would you make the division?

Stranger/ Into the hunting of living and of lifeless prey.

Theaetetus/ Yes, if both kinds exist.

Stranger/ Of course they exist, but the hunting after lifeless things having no special name, except some sorts of diving, and other small matters, may be omitted; the hunting after living things may be called animal hunting.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And animal hunting may be truly said to have two divisions, land animal hunting, which has many kinds and names, and water animal hunting, or the hunting after animals who swim?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And of swimming animals, one class lives on the wing and the other in the water?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Fowling is the general term under which the hunting of all birds is included.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ The hunting of animals who live in the water has the general name of fishing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And this sort of hunting may be further divided also into two principal kinds?

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ There is one kind which takes them in nets, another which takes them by a blow.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?

Stranger/ As to the first kind—all that surrounds and encloses anything to prevent egress, may be rightly called an enclosure.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ For which reason twig baskets, casting nets, nooses, creels, and the like may all be termed ‘enclosures'?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And therefore this first kind of capture may be called by us capture with enclosures, or something of that sort?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ The other kind, which is practiced by a blow with hooks and three-pronged spears, when summed up under one name, may be called striking, unless you, Theaetetus, can find some better name?

Theaetetus/ Never mind the name—what you suggest will do very well.

Stranger/ There is one mode of striking, which is done at night, and by the light of a fire, and is by the hunters themselves called firing, or spearing by firelight.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And the fishing by day is called by the general name of barbing, because the spears, too, are barbed at the point.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is the term.

Stranger/ Of this barb fishing, that which strikes the fish who is below from above is called spearing, because this is the way in which the three-pronged spears are mostly used.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it is often called so.

Stranger/ Then now there is only one kind remaining.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ When a hook is used, and the fish is not struck in any chance part of his body, as he is with the spear, but only about the head and mouth, and is then drawn out from below upward with reeds and rods—what is the right name of that mode of fishing, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ I suspect that we have now discovered the object of our search.

Stranger/ Then now you and I have come to an understanding not only about the name of the angler's art, but about the definition of the thing itself. One half of all art was acquisitive—half of the acquisitive art was conquest or taking by force, half of this was hunting, and half of hunting was hunting animals; half of this was hunting water animals; of this again, the under half was fishing; half of fishing was striking; a part of striking was fishing with a barb, and one half of this again, being the kind which strikes

with a hook and draws the fish from below upward, is the art which we have been seeking, and which from the nature of the operation is denoted angling or drawing up (ἁσπαλιευτική), ἀνασπάσθαι).

Theaetetus/ The result has been quite satisfactorily brought out.

Stranger/ And now, following this pattern, let us endeavor to find out what a Sophist is.

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ The first question about the angler was, whether he was a skilled artist or unskilled?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And shall we call our new friend unskilled, or a thorough master of his craft?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not unskilled, for his name, as, indeed, you imply, must surely express his nature.

Stranger/ Then he must be supposed to have some art.

Theaetetus/ What art?

Stranger/ By heaven, they are cousins! It never occurred to us.

Theaetetus/ Who are cousins?

Stranger/ The angler and the Sophist.

Theaetetus/ In what way are they related?

Stranger/ They both appear to me to be hunters.

Theaetetus/ How the Sophist? Of the other we have spoken.

Stranger/ You remember our division of hunting, into hunting after swimming animals and land animals?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And you remember that we subdivided the swimming and left the land animals, saying that there were many kinds of them?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Thus far, then, the Sophist and the angler, starting from the art of acquiring, take the same road?

Theaetetus/ So it would appear.

Stranger/ Their paths diverge when they reach the art of animal hunting—the one going to the seashore, and to the rivers, and to the lakes, and angling for the animals which are in them.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ While the other goes to land and water of another sort—rivers of wealth and broad meadowlands of generous youth, and he also is intending to take the animals which are in them.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Of hunting on land there are two principal divisions.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One is the hunting of tame, and the other of wild animals.

Theaetetus/ But are tame animals ever hunted?

Stranger/ Yes, if you include man under tame animals. But if you like you may say that there are no tame animals, or that, if there are, man is not among them, or you may say that man is a tame animal but is not hunted—you shall decide which of these alternatives you prefer.

Theaetetus/ I should say, Stranger, that man is a tame animal, and I admit that he is hunted.

Stranger/ Then let us divide the hunting of tame animals into two parts.

Theaetetus/ How shall we make the division?

Stranger/ Let us define piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, the whole military art, by one name, as hunting with violence.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ But the art of the lawyer, of the popular orator and the art of conversation may be called in one word the art of persuasion.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And of persuasion, there may be said to be two kinds?

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One is private, and the other public.

Theaetetus/ Yes, each of them forms a class.

Stranger/ And of private hunting, one sort receives hire, and the other brings gifts.

Theaetetus/ I do not understand you.

Stranger/ You seem never to have observed the manner in which lovers hunt.

Theaetetus/ To what do you refer?

Stranger/ I mean that they lavish gifts on those whom they hunt in addition to other inducements.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ Let us admit this, then, to be the amatory art.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But that sort of hireling whose conversation is pleasing and who baits his hook only with pleasure and exacts nothing but his maintenance in return, we should all, if I am not mistaken, describe as possessing flattery or an art of making things pleasant.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And that sort, which professes to form acquaintances only for the sake of virtue, and demands a reward in the shape of money, may be fairly called by another name?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ And what is the name? Will you tell me?

Theaetetus/ It is obvious enough, for I believe that we have discovered the Sophist—which is, as I conceive, the proper name for the class described.

Stranger/ Then now, Theaetetus, his art may be traced as a branch of the appropriative, acquisitive family—which hunts animals, living, land, tame animals—which hunts man, privately, for hire, taking money in exchange, having the semblance of education—and this is termed Sophistry, and is a hunt after young men of wealth and rank—such is the conclusion.

Theaetetus/ Just So.

Stranger/ Let us take another branch of his genealogy, for he is a professor of a great and many-sided art. And if we look back at what has preceded we see that he presents another aspect, besides that of which we are speaking.

Theaetetus/ In what respect?

Stranger/ There were two sorts of acquisitive art—the one concerned with hunting, the other with exchange.

Theaetetus/ There were.

Stranger/ And of the art of exchange there are two divisions, the one of giving, and the other of selling.

Theaetetus/ Let us assume that.

Stranger/ Next, we will suppose the art of selling to be divided into two parts.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ There is one part which is distinguished as the sale of a man's own productions; another, which is the exchange of the works of others.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And is not that part of exchange which takes place in the city, being about half of the whole, termed retailing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And that which exchanges the goods of one city for those of another by selling and buying is the exchange of the merchant?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ And you are aware that this exchange of the merchant is of two kinds; it is partly concerned with food for the use of the body, and partly with the food of the soul which is bartered and received in exchange for money.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ You want to know what is the meaning of food for the soul; the other kind you surely understand.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Take music in general, and painting and marionette playing, and many other things, which are purchased in one city, and carried away and sold in another—wares of the soul which are hawked about either for the sake of instruction or amusement. May not he who takes them about and sells them be quite as truly called a merchant as he who sells meats and drinks?

Theaetetus/ To be sure he may.

Stranger/ And would you not call by the same name him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?

Theaetetus/ Certainly I should.

Stranger/ Of this merchandise of the soul, may not one part be fairly termed the art of display? And there is another part which is certainly not less ridiculous, but being a trade in learning must be called by some name germane to the matter?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ The latter should have two names—one descriptive of the sale of the knowledge of virtue, and the other of the sale of other kinds of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ The name of art seller corresponds well enough to the latter, but you must try and tell me the name of the other.

Theaetetus/ He must be the Sophist, whom we are seeking; no other name can possibly be right.

Stranger/ No other, and so this trader in virtue again turns out to be our friend the Sophist, whose art may now be traced from the art of acquisition through exchange, trade, merchandise, to a merchandise of the soul which is concerned with speech and the knowledge of virtue.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ And there may be a third reappearance of him—for he may have settled down in a city, and may fabricate as well as buy these same wares, intending to live by selling them, and he would still be called a Sophist?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then that part of acquisitive art which exchanges, and of exchange which either sells a man's own productions or retails those of others, as the case may be, and in either way sells the knowledge of virtue, you would again term Sophistry?

Theaetetus/ I must, if I am to keep pace with the argument.

Stranger/ Let us consider once more whether there may not be yet another aspect of Sophistry.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ In the acquisitive there was a subdivision of the combative or fighting art.

Theaetetus/ There was.

Stranger/ Perhaps we had better divide it.

Theaetetus/ What shall be the divisions?

Stranger/ There shall be one division of the competitive, and another of the pugnacious.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ That part of the pugnacious which is a contest of bodily strength may be properly called by some such name as violent.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And when the war is one of words, it may be termed controversy?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And controversy may be of two kinds?

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ When long speeches are answered by long speeches, and there is public discussion about the just and unjust, that is forensic controversy.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And there is a private sort of controversy, which is cut up into questions and answers, and this is commonly called disputation?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is the name.

Stranger/ And of disputation, that sort which is only a discussion about contracts, and is carried on at random, and without rules of art, is recognized by the reasoning faculty to be a distinct class, but has hitherto had no distinctive name, and does not deserve to receive one from us.

Theaetetus/ No, for the different sorts of it are too minute and heterogeneous.

Stranger/ But that which proceeds by rules of art to dispute about justice and injustice in their own nature, and about things in general, we have been accustomed to call argumentation [eristic]?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And of argumentation, one sort wastes money, and the other makes money.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Suppose we try and give to each of these two classes a name.

Theaetetus/ Let us do so.

Stranger/ I should say that the habit which leads a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of conversation, of which the style is far from being agreeable to the majority of his hearers, may be fairly termed loquacity. Such is my opinion.

Theaetetus/ That is the common name for it.

Stranger/ But now who the other is, who makes money out of private disputation, it is your turn to say.

Theaetetus/ There is only one true answer. He is the wonderful Sophist, of whom we are in pursuit, and who reappears again for the fourth time.

Stranger/ Yes, and with a fresh pedigree, for he is the moneymaking species of the eristic, disputatious, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive family, the argument has already proved.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ How true was the observation that he was a many-sided animal, and not to be caught with one hand, as they say!

Theaetetus/ Then you must catch him with two.

Stranger/ Yes, we must, if we can. And therefore let us try another track in our pursuit of him. You are aware that there are certain menial occupations which have names among servants?

Theaetetus/ Yes, there are many such. Which of them do you mean?

Stranger/ I mean such as sifting, straining, winnowing, threshing.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And besides these there are a great many more, such as carding, spinning, adjusting the warp and the woof, and thousands of similar expressions are used in the arts.

Theaetetus/ Of what are they to be patterns, and what are we going to do with them all?

Stranger/ I think that in all of these there is implied a notion of division.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then if, as I was saying, there is one art which includes all of them, ought not that art to have one name?

Theaetetus/ And what is the name of the art?

Stranger/ The art of discerning or discriminating.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Think whether you cannot divide this.

Theaetetus/ I should have to think a long while.

Stranger/ In all the previously named processes either like has been separated from like or the better from the worse.

Theaetetus/ I see now what you mean.

Stranger/ There is no name for the first kind of separation; of the second, which throws away the worse and preserves the better, I do know a name.

Theaetetus/ What Is it?

Stranger/ Every discernment or discrimination of that kind, as I have observed, is called a purification.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is the usual expression.

Stranger/ And anyone may see that purification is of two kinds.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so, if he were allowed time to think, but I do not see at this moment.

Stranger/ There are many purifications of bodies which may with propriety be comprehended under a single name.

Theaetetus/ What are they, and what is their name?

Stranger/ There is the purification of living bodies in their inward and in their outward parts, of which the former is duly effected by medicine and gymnastics, the latter by the not very dignified art of the bathman, and there is the purification of inanimate substances—to this the arts of fulling and furbishing in general attend in a number of minute particulars, having a variety of names which are thought ridiculous.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ There can be no doubt that they are thought ridiculous, Theaetetus, but then the dialectic art never considers whether the benefit to be derived from the purge

is greater or less than that to be derived from the sponge, and has not more interest in the one than in the other. Her endeavor is to know what is and is not kindred in all arts, with a view to the acquisition of intelligence, and having this in view, she honors them all alike. And when she makes comparisons, she counts one of them not a whit more ridiculous than another, nor does she esteem him who adduces as his example of hunting, the general's art, at all more decorous than another who cites that of the vermin destroyer, but only as the greater pretender of the two. And as to your question concerning the name which was to comprehend all these arts of purification, whether of animate or inanimate bodies, the art of dialectic is in no wise particular about fine words, if she may be only allowed to have a general name for all other purifications, binding them up together and separating them off from the purification of the soul or intellect. For this is the purification at which she wants to arrive, and this we should understand to be her aim.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I understand, and I agree that there are two sorts of purification, and that one of them is concerned with the soul, and that there is another which is concerned with the body.

Stranger/ Excellent, and now listen to what I am going to say, and try to divide further the first of the two.

Theaetetus/ Whatever line of division you suggest, I will endeavor to assist you.

Stranger/ Do we admit that virtue is distinct from vice in the soul?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And purification was to leave the good and to cast out whatever is bad?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Then any taking away of evil from the soul may be properly called purification?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And in the soul there are two kinds of evil.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ The one may be compared to disease in the body, the other to deformity.

Theaetetus/ I do not understand.

Stranger/ Perhaps you have never reflected that disease and discord are the same.

Theaetetus/ To this, again, I know not what I should reply.

Stranger/ Do you not conceive discord to be a dissolution of kindred elements, originating in some disagreement?

Theaetetus/ Just that.

Stranger/ And is deformity anything but the want of measure, which is always unsightly?

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ And do we not see that opinion is opposed to desire, pleasure to anger, reason to pain, and that all these elements are opposed to one another in the souls of bad men?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And yet they must all be akin?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and disease of the soul?

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ And when things having motion, and aiming at an appointed mark, continually miss their aim and glance

aside, shall we say that this is the effect of symmetry among them, or of the want of symmetry?

Theaetetus/ Clearly of the want of symmetry.

Stranger/ But surely we know that no soul is voluntarily ignorant of anything?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ And what is ignorance but the aberration of a mind which is bent on truth, and in which the process of understanding is perverted?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Then we are to regard an unintelligent soul as deformed and devoid of symmetry?

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Then there are these two kinds of evil in the soul—the one which is generally called vice, and is obviously a disease of the soul...

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And there is the other, which they call ignorance, and which, because existing only in the soul, they will not allow to be vice.

Theaetetus/ I certainly admit what I at first disputed—that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that we ought to consider cowardice, intemperance, and injustice to be all alike forms of disease in the soul, and ignorance, of which there are all sorts of varieties, to be deformity.

Stranger/ And in the case of the body are there not two arts which have to do with the two bodily states?

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ There is gymnastics, which has to do with deformity, and medicine, which has to do with disease.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And where there are insolence and injustice and cowardice, is not the chastisement the art that is most required?

Theaetetus/ That certainly appears to be the opinion of mankind.

Stranger/ Again, of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction be rightly said to be the remedy?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And of the art of instruction, shall we say that there is one or many kinds? At any rate there are two principal ones. Think.

Theaetetus/ I Will.

Stranger/ I believe that I can see how we shall soonest arrive at the answer to this question.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ If we can discover a line which divides ignorance into two halves. For a division of ignorance into two parts will certainly imply that the art of instruction is also twofold, answering to the two divisions of ignorance.

Theaetetus/ Well, and do you see what you are looking for?

Stranger/ I do seem to myself to see one very large and bad sort of ignorance which is quite separate, and may be weighed in the scale against all other sorts of ignorance put together.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ When a person supposes that he knows, and does not know; this appears to be the great source of all the errors of the intellect.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And this, if I am not mistaken, is the kind of ignorance which specially earns the title of stupidity.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ What name, then, shall be given to the sort of instruction which gets rid of this?

Theaetetus/ The instruction which you mean, Stranger, is, I should imagine, not the teaching of handicraft arts, but what, thanks to us, has been termed education in this part of the world.

Stranger/ Yes, Theaetetus, and by nearly all Hellenes. But we have still to consider whether education admits of any further division deserving a name.

Theaetetus/ We have.

Stranger/ I think that there is a point at which such a division is possible.

Theaetetus/ Where?

Stranger/ Of education, one method appears to be rougher, and another smoother.

Theaetetus/ How are we to distinguish the two?

Stranger/ There is the time-honored mode which our fathers commonly practiced toward their sons, and which is still adopted by many—either of roughly reproving their errors, or of gently advising them—which varieties may be correctly included under the general term of admonition.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ But whereas some appear to have arrived at the conclusion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those things in which he is conscious of his own cleverness, and that the admonitory sort of education gives much trouble and does little good—

Theaetetus/ There they are quite right.

Stranger/ Accordingly, they set to work to eradicate the spirit of conceit in another way.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ They cross-examine a man's words, when he thinks that he is saying something and is really saying nothing, and easily convict him of inconsistencies in his opinions; these they then collect by the dialectic process, and placing them side by side, show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same respect. He, seeing this, is angry with himself, and grows gentle toward others, and thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which is most amusing to the hearer, and produces the most lasting good effect on the person who is the subject of the operation. For as the physician considers that the body will receive no benefit from taking food until the internal obstacles have been removed, so the purifier of the soul is conscious that his patient will receive no benefit from the application of knowledge until he is refuted, and from refutation learns modesty; he must be purged of his prejudices first and made to think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.

Theaetetus/ That is certainly the best and wisest state of mind.

Stranger/ For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must admit that refutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications, and he who has not been refuted, though he be the Great King himself, is in an awful state of impurity; he is uninstructed and deformed in those things in which he who would be truly blessed ought to be fairest and purest.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Well, what name shall we give to the practitioners of this art? For my part I shrink from calling them Sophists.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ For fear of ascribing to them too high a function.

Theaetetus/ And yet your description has some resemblance to that type [the Sophist].

Stranger/ So has the dog to the wolf—the fiercest of animals to the tamest. But a cautious man should above all be on his guard against resemblances; they are a very slippery sort of thing. However, be it so [i.e., let them pass for Sophists], for should they ever set up an adequate defense of their confines, the boundary in dispute will be of no small importance.

Theaetetus/ That is likely enough.

Stranger/ Let us take it, then, that under the art of separation there is a method of purification, that we have distinguished that kind of purification which is concerned with the soul, and under that, instruction, and under that again, education. Within the art of education, the examination which confutes the vain conceit of wisdom we will allow to pass, in the argument which has now come in by a side wind, by no other name than the sophistry that is of noble lineage (ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική).

Theaetetus/ Let it pass by that name. But by this time the Sophist has appeared in so many guises that for my part I am puzzled to see what description one is to maintain as truly expressing his real nature.

Stranger/ You may well be puzzled. But we may suppose that by now the Sophist too is very much puzzled to see how he is once more to slip through the meshes of our argument, for it is a true saying that you cannot easily evade all the wrestler's grips. So now is the moment of all others to set upon him.

Theaetetus/ Well and good.

Stranger/ First, then, let us stand and take breath, and while a we are resting let us reckon up between ourselves in how many guises the Sophist has appeared. First, I think, he was found as the hired hunter of rich young men.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And secondly as a sort of merchant of learning as nourishment for the soul.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Thirdly, he showed himself as a retail dealer in the same wares, did he not?

Theaetetus/ Yes, and fourthly as selling the products of his own manufacture.

Stranger/ Your memory serves you well. His fifth appearance I will myself try to recall. He was an athlete in debate, appropriating that subdivision of contention which consists in the art of eristic.

Theaetetus/ He was.

Stranger/ His sixth appearance was open to doubt; however, we conceded his claim to be described as a purifier of the soul from conceits that block the way to understanding.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Stranger/ Now does it strike you that when one who is known by the name of a single art appears to be master of many, there is something wrong with this appearance? If one has that impression of any art, plainly it is because one cannot see clearly that feature of it in which all these forms of skill converge, and so one calls their possessor by many names instead of one.

Theaetetus/ I dare say that is the gist of the situation.

Stranger/ If so, we must not be so lazy as to let that happen to us in our inquiry. Let us begin by going back to

one among the characteristics we attributed to the Sophist. There was one that struck me particularly as revealing his character.

Theaetetus/ What was that?

Stranger/ We said, I believe, that he was a controversialist.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And further that he figures as an instructor of others in controversy.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Let us consider, then, in what field these people profess to turn out controversialists. Let us go to the root of the matter and set about it in this way. Tell me, does their pupils' competence extend to divine things that are hidden from common eyes?

Theaetetus/ So it is said of them, at any rate.

Stranger/ And also to all that is visible in sky and earth and everything of that sort.

Theaetetus/ Surely.

Stranger/ And in private circles, whenever any general statement is made about becoming or reality, we are aware how cleverly they can controvert it and make others able to do the same.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And then again where laws are in question or any political matter, do they not promise to produce debaters?

Theaetetus/ If they did not hold out that promise, hardly anyone would take part in their discussions.

Stranger/ And about the crafts in general and each particular craft, the arguments to be used in controversy with any actual craftsman have been published broadcast for all who choose to learn.

Theaetetus/ I take it you mean what Protagoras wrote on wrestling and the other arts.

Stranger/ Yes, and on many other things. In fact, the pretensions of this art of controversy amount, it seems, to a capacity for disputation on any subject whatsoever.

Theaetetus/ It certainly seems that nothing worth speaking of is beyond its scope.

Stranger/ Do you, then, my young friend, really think that possible? You young people may perhaps see more clearly; my eyes are too dim.

Theaetetus/ Is what possible? What am I meant to see? I don't clearly understand what you are asking me.

Stranger/ Whether it is possible for any human being to know everything.

Theaetetus/ Mankind would indeed be happy, if it were so.

Stranger/ Then if a man who has no knowledge controverts one who does know, how can there be any sound sense in what he says?

Theaetetus/ There cannot be.

Stranger/ Then what can be the secret of this magical power of sophistry?

Theaetetus/ In what respect?

Stranger/ I mean, how they can ever create a belief in the minds of young men that they are the wisest of men on all subjects? For clearly if they were not in the right in their controversies or did not appear to be so in the young men's eyes, and if that appearance did not enhance the belief that they are wise because they can dispute, then, to quote your own remark, it is hard to see why anyone should want to pay their fees and be taught this art of disputation.

Theaetetus/ Hard indeed.

Stranger/ But in actual fact there is a demand.

Theaetetus/ Quite a brisk one.

Stranger/ No doubt because the Sophists are believed to possess a knowledge of their own in the subjects they dispute about.

Theaetetus/ No doubt.

Stranger/ And, we say, there is no subject they do not dispute about.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So they appear to their pupils to be wise on all subjects.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Although they are not really wise, for that, we saw, is impossible.

Theaetetus/ It must be impossible.

Stranger/ The upshot is, then, that the Sophist possesses a sort of reputed and apparent knowledge on all subjects, but not the reality.

Theaetetus/ I quite agree, and perhaps this is the truest thing that has yet been said about them.

Stranger/ Let us, then, take an analogy that will throw more light on their position.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ It is this. Try to give me your closest attention in answering.

Theaetetus/ What is your question?

Stranger/ Suppose a man professed to know, not how to speak or dispute about everything, but how to produce all things in actual fact by a single form of skill.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by ‘all things'?

Stranger/ My meaning is beyond your comprehension at the very outset. It seems you do not understand what is meant by ‘all things.'

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ Well, ‘all things' is meant to include you and me and, besides ourselves, all other animals and plants.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ Suppose a man should undertake to produce you and me and all creatures.

Theaetetus/ What sort of production do you mean? You cannot mean some sort of farmer, for you spoke of him as producing animals as well.

Stranger/ Yes, and besides that, sea and sky and earth and gods and everything else there is. What is more, after producing anyone of them with a turn of the hand he sells them for quite a moderate sum.

Theaetetus/ You mean in some kind of play?

Stranger/ Well, a man who says he knows everything and could teach it to another for a small fee in a short time can hardly be taken in earnest.

Theaetetus/ Assuredly not.

Stranger/ And of all forms of play, could you think of any more skillful and amusing than imitation?

Theaetetus/ No. When you take that one form with all that it embraces, it covers a very large variety.

Stranger/ Well, we know this about the man who professes to be able, by a single form of skill, to produce all things, that when he creates with his pencil representations bearing the same name as real things, he will be able to deceive the innocent minds of children, if he shows them his drawings at a distance, into thinking that he is capable of creating, in full reality, anything he chooses to make.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then must we not expect to find a corresponding form of skill in the region of discourse, making it possible to impose upon the young who are still far removed from the reality of things, by means of words that cheat the ear, exhibiting images of all things in a

shadow play of discourse, so as to make them believe that they are hearing the truth and that the speaker is in all matters the wisest of men?

Theaetetus/ There may well be such an art as you describe.

Stranger/ And is it not inevitable that, after a long enough time, as these young hearers advance in age and, coming into closer touch with realities, are forced by experience to apprehend things clearly as they are, most of them should abandon those former beliefs, so that what seemed important will now appear trifling and what seemed easy, difficult, and all the illusions created in discourse will be completely overturned by the realities which encounter them in the actual conduct of life?

Theaetetus/ Yes, so far as I can judge at my age, but I suppose I am one of those who are still at a distance.

Stranger/ That is why all of us here must try, as we are in fact trying, to bring you as close as possible to the realities and spare you the experience.

But about the Sophist, tell me, is it now clear that he is a sort of wizard, an imitator of real things—or are we still uncertain whether he may not possess genuine knowledge of all the things he seems capable of disputing about?

Theaetetus/ He cannot, sir. It is clear enough from what has been said that he is one of those whose province is play.

Stranger/ Then we may class him as a wizard and an imitator of some sort.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Come then, it is now for us to see that we do not again relax the pursuit of our quarry. We may say that we have him enveloped in such a net as argument provides for hunting of this sort. He cannot shuffle out of this.

Theaetetus/ Out of what?

Stranger/ Out of being somewhere within the class of illusionists.

Theaetetus/ So far I quite agree with you.

Stranger/ Agreed then that we should at once quarter the ground by dividing the art of image making, and if, as soon as we descend into that enclosure, we meet with the Sophist at bay, we should arrest him on the royal warrant of reason, report the capture, and hand him over to the sovereign. But if he should find some lurking place among the subdivisions of this art of imitation, we must follow hard upon him, constantly dividing the part that gives him shelter, until he is caught. In any event there is no fear that he or any other kind shall ever boast of having eluded a process of investigation so minute and so comprehensive.

Theaetetus/ Good, that is the way to go to work.

Stranger/ Following, then, the same method of division as before, I seem once more to make out two forms of imitation, but as yet I do not feel able to discover in which of the two the type we are seeking is to be found.

Theaetetus/ Make your division first, at any rate, and tell us what two forms you mean.

Stranger/ One art that I see contained in it is the making of likenesses (εἰκαστική). The perfect example of this consists in creating a copy that conforms to the proportions of the original in all three dimensions and giving moreover the proper color to every part.

Theaetetus/ Why, is not that what all imitators try to do?

Stranger/ Not those sculptors or painters whose works are of colossal size. If they were to reproduce the true proportions of a well-made figure, as you know, the upper parts would look too small, and the lower too large, because we see the one at a distance, the other close at hand.

Theaetetus/ That is true.

Stranger/ So artists, leaving the truth to take care of itself, do in fact put into the images they make, not the real proportions, but those that will appear beautiful.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Stranger/ The first kind of image, then, being like the original, may fairly be called a likeness (εἰκόν).

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the corresponding subdivision of the art of imitation may be called by the name we used just now—likeness making.

Theaetetus/ It May.

Stranger/ Now, what are we to call the kind which only appears to be a likeness of a well-made figure because it is not seen from a satisfactory point of view, but to a spectator with eyes that could fully take in so large an object would not be even like the original it professes to resemble? Since it seems to be a likeness, but is not really so, may we not call it a semblance (φάντασμα)?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ And this is a very extensive class, in painting and in imitation of all sorts.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ So the best name for the art which creates, not a likeness, but a semblance will be semblance making (φάνταστική).

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Stranger/ These, then, are the two forms of image making I meant—the making of likenesses and the making of semblances.

Theaetetus/ Good.

Stranger/ Yes, but even now I cannot see clearly how to settle the doubt I then expressed—under which of the two arts [likeness making and semblance making] we must place the Sophist. It is really surprising how hard it is to get a clear view of the man. At this very moment he has, with admirable cleverness, taken refuge in a class which baffles investigation.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Stranger/ You assent, but do you recognize the class I mean, or has the current of the argument carried you along to agree so readily from force of habit?

Theaetetus/ How? What are you referring to?

Stranger/ The truth is, my friend, that we are faced with an extremely difficult question. This ‘appearing' or ‘seeming' without really ‘being,' and the saying of something which yet is not true—all these expressions have always been and still are deeply involved in perplexity. It is extremely hard, Theaetetus, to find correct terms in which one may say or think that falsehoods have a real existence, without being caught in a contradiction by the mere utterance of such words.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ The audacity of the statement lies in its implication that 'what is not' has being, for in no other way could a falsehood come to have being. But, my young friend, when we were of your age the great Parmenides from beginning to end testified against this, constantly telling us what he also says in his poem, 'Never shall this be proved—that things that are not are, but do thou, in thy inquiry, hold back thy thought from this way.'

So we have the great man's testimony, and the best way to obtain a confession of the truth may be to put the statement itself to a mild degree of torture. So, if it makes no difference to you, let us begin by studying it on its own merits.

Theaetetus/ I am at your disposal. As for the argument, you must consider the way that will best lead to a conclusion, and take me with you along it.

Stranger/ It shall be done. Now tell me, we do not hesitate to utter the phrase 'that which has no sort of being'?

Theaetetus/ Surely not.

Stranger/ Then setting aside disputation for its own sake and playing with words, suppose one of this company were seriously required to concentrate his mind and tell us to what this name can be applied—'that which is not.' Of what thing or of what sort of thing should we expect him to use it himself, and what would he indicate by it to the inquirer?

Theaetetus/ That is a hard question. It is scarcely for a person like me to find an answer at all.

Stranger/ Well, this much is clear at any rate, that the term 'what is not' must not be applied to anything that exists.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ And since it cannot be applied to what exists, neither can it properly be applied to ‘something.'

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Surely we can see that this expression ‘something' is always used of a thing that exists. We cannot use it just by itself in naked isolation from everything that exists, can we?

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ Is your assent due to the reflection that to speak of ‘something' is to speak of ‘some *one* thing'?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Because you will admit that ‘something' stands for one thing, as ‘some things' stands for two or more.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ So it seems to follow necessarily that to speak of what is not ‘something' is to speak of nothing at all.

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Stranger/ Must we not even refuse to allow that in such a case a person is *saying* something, though he may be speaking of nothing? Must we not assert that he is not even saying anything when he sets about uttering the sounds ‘a thing that is not'?

Theaetetus/ That would certainly end our bewilderment.

Stranger/ ‘No time for boasting yet.' There is more to come, in fact the chief of all the difficulties and the first, for it goes to the very root of the matter.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean? Do not hesitate to state it.

Stranger/ When a thing exists, I suppose something else that exists may be attributed to it.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But can we say it is possible for something that exists to be attributed to what has no existence?

Theaetetus/ How could it be?

Stranger/ Well, among things that exist we include number in general.

Theaetetus/ Yes, number must exist, if anything does.

Stranger/ We must not, then, so much as attempt to attach either plurality or unity in number to the nonexistent.

Theaetetus/ That would certainly seem to be wrong, according to our argument.

Stranger/ How then can anyone utter the words 'things which are not,' or 'that which is not,' or even conceive such things in his mind at all, apart from number?

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ When we speak of *'things* that are not,' are we not undertaking to attribute plurality to them?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And unity, when we speak of *'that* which is not'?

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Stranger/ And yet we admit that it is not justifiable or correct to set about attaching something that exists to the nonexistent.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ You see the inference then. One cannot legitimately utter the words, or speak or think of that which just simply is not : it is unthinkable, not to be spoken of or uttered or expressed.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ Perhaps then I was mistaken in saying just now that I was going to state the greatest difficulty it presents, whereas there is a worse one still that we can formulate.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ I am surprised you do not see from the very phrases I have just used that the nonexistent reduces even one who is refuting its claims to such straits that, as soon as he sets about doing so, he is forced to contradict himself.

Theaetetus/ How? Explain more clearly.

Stranger/ You must not look to me for illumination. I who laid it down that the nonexistent could have neither unity nor plurality, have not only just now but at this very moment spoken of it as one thing, for I am saying *'the* nonexistent.' You see what I mean?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And again a little while ago I was speaking of its *being* a thing not to be uttered or spoken of or expressed. Do you follow?

Theaetetus/ Yes, of course.

Stranger/ Well, then, in trying to apply that term 'being' to it, was I not contradicting what I said before?

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Stranger/ And again in applying the term 'the,' was I not addressing it as singular?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And again in speaking of it as 'a thing not to be expressed or spoken of or uttered,' I was using language as if referring to a single thing.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Whereas we are admitting that, if we are to speak strictly, we ought not to specify it as either one thing

or many or even to call it ‘it' at all, for even that appellation means ascribing to it the character of singleness.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Stranger/ In that case there is nothing to be said for me. I shall be found to have had the worst of it, now and all along, in my criticism of the nonexistent. Accordingly, as I said, we must not look to anything I have to say for the correct way of describing the nonexistent; we must turn to you for that. Come along now.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Come, you are young; show your spirit and make the best effort you can. Try, without attributing being or unity or plurality to the nonexistent, to find some form of words describing it correctly.

Theaetetus/ I should need an extraordinary zeal for such an enterprise in face of what has happened to you.

Stranger/ Well, if you agree, we will leave ourselves out of account, and until we meet with someone who can perform this feat, let us say that the Sophist with extreme cunning has found an impenetrable lurking place.

Theaetetus/ It certainly seems so.

Stranger/ Accordingly, if we are going to say he possesses an art of creating ‘semblances,' he will readily take advantage of our handling our arguments in this way to grapple with us and turn them against ourselves. When we call him a maker of images, he will ask what on earth we mean in speaking of an ‘image' at all. So we must consider, Theaetetus, how this truculent person's question is to be answered.

Theaetetus/ Clearly we shall say we mean images in water or in mirrors, and again images made by the draftsman or the sculptor, and any other things of that sort.

Stranger/ It is plain, Theaetetus, that you have never seen a Sophist.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ He will make as though his eyes were shut or he had no eyes at all.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ When you offer him your answer in such terms, if you speak of something to be found in mirrors or in sculpture, he will laugh at your words, as implying that he can see. He will profess to know nothing about mirrors or water or even eyesight, and will confine his question to what can be gathered from discourse.

Theaetetus/ Namely?

Stranger/ The common character in all these things you mentioned and thought fit to call by a single name when you used the expression ‘image' as one term covering them all. State it, then, and hold your ground against the man without yielding an inch.

Theaetetus/ Well, sir, what could we say an image was, if not another thing of the same sort, copied from the real thing?

Stranger/ ‘Of the same sort'? Do you mean another real thing, or what does ‘of the same sort' signify?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not real, but like it.

Stranger/ Meaning by ‘real' a thing that really exists.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And by ‘not real' the opposite of real?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then by what is ‘like' you mean what has not real existence, if you are going to call it ‘not real.'

Theaetetus/ But it has some sort of existence.

Stranger/ Only not real existence, according to you.

Theaetetus/ No, except that it is really a likeness.

Stranger/ So, not having real existence, it really is what we call a likeness?

Theaetetus/ Real and unreal do seem to be combined in that perplexing way, and very queer it is.

Stranger/ Queer indeed. You see that now again by dovetailing them together in this way our Hydra-headed Sophist has forced us against our will to admit that 'what is not' has some sort of being.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I do.

Stranger/ And what now? How can we define his art without contradicting ourselves?

Theaetetus/ How do you mean? What sort of contradiction do you fear?

Stranger/ When we say that he deceives with that semblance we spoke of and that his art is a practice of deception, shall we be saying that, as the effect of his art, our mind thinks what is false, or what shall we mean?

Theaetetus/ Just that. What else could we mean?

Stranger/ And false thinking, again, will be thinking things contrary to the things that are?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ You mean, then, by false thinking, thinking things that are not?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Stranger/ Does that mean thinking that things that are not, are not, or that things that are not in any way, in some way are?

Theaetetus/ It must at least mean thinking that things that are not, are in some way, if anyone is ever to be in error even to the smallest extent.

Stranger/ And also surely thinking that things which certainly are, are not in any way at all?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ That also is error?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that also.

Stranger/ And a false statement, I suppose, is to be regarded in the same light, as stating that things that are, are not, and that things that are not, are.

Theaetetus/ Yes. How else could it be false?

Stranger/ Hardly in any other way. But the Sophist will deny that. How could a sensible man agree, when the admissions we made earlier are set beside this one? We understand, Theaetetus, what he is referring to?

Theaetetus/ Of course we understand. He will say that we are contradicting what was said just now, when we have the face to say that falsehoods exist in thoughts and in statements, for we are constantly being obliged to attribute what has being to what is not, after agreeing just now that this was altogether impossible.

Stranger/ Your recollection is correct. But you must now consider what we are to do about the Sophist, for if we pursue our search for him by ranking him under the art of the illusionists and creators of error, you see what an easy opening we offer to many perplexities and counterattacks.

Theaetetus/ I do.

Stranger/ They are almost without number and we have stated only a small fraction of them.

Theaetetus/ If that is so, it looks as if it were impossible to catch the Sophist.

Stranger/ What then? Are we to lose heart and give up now?

Theaetetus/ I don't think we ought to, if we have the least chance of being able to lay hands on him somehow.

Stranger/ Then I may count on your indulgence, and, as you now say, you will be content if we can by some twist free ourselves, even to the least extent, from the grip of so powerful an argument?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ Then I have another still more pressing request.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ That you will not think I am turning into a sort of parricide.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ We shall find it necessary in self-defense to put to the question that pronouncement of father Parmenides, and establish by main force that what is not, in some respect has being, and conversely that what is, in a way is not.

Theaetetus/ It is plain that the course of the argument requires us to maintain that at all costs.

Stranger/ Plain enough for the blind to see, as they say. Unless these propositions are either refuted or accepted, anyone who talks of false statements or false judgment as being images or likenesses or copies or semblances, or of any of the arts concerned with such things, can hardly escape becoming a laughingstock by being forced to contradict himself.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ That is why we must now dare to lay unfilial hands on that pronouncement, or else, if some scruple holds us back, drop the matter entirely.

Theaetetus/ As for that, we must let no scruple hinder us.

Stranger/ In that case, for the third time, I have a small favor to ask.

Theaetetus/ You have only to mention it.

Stranger/ I believe I confessed just now that on this point the task of refutation has always proved too much for my powers, and still does so.

Theaetetus/ You did say that.

Stranger/ Well, that confession, I am afraid, may make you think me scatterbrained when at every turn I shift my position to and fro. It is for your satisfaction that we shall attempt to refute the pronouncement, if we can refute it.

Theaetetus/ Then you may take it that I shall never think you are overstepping the limits by entering on your refutation and proof. So far as that goes, you may proceed with an easy mind.

Stranger/ Come then, where is one to make a start on so hazardous a theme? I think I see the path we must inevitably follow.

Theaetetus/ And that is?

Stranger/ To take first things that are now supposed to be quite clear and see whether we are not in some confusion about them and too easily reaching conclusions on the assumption that we understand them well enough.

Theaetetus/ Tell me more plainly what you mean.

Stranger/ It strikes me that Parmenides and everyone else who has set out to determine how many real things there are and what they are like, have discoursed to us in rather an offhand fashion.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ They each and all seem to treat us as children to whom they are telling a story. According to one there are three real things, some of which now carry on a sort of warfare with one another, and then make friends and set about marrying and begetting and bringing up their children. Another tells us that there are two—moist and dry, or hot and cold—whom he marries off, and makes them set up house together. In our part of the world the Eleatic set, who hark back to Xenophanes or even earlier, unfold their tale on the assumption that what we call 'all things' are only one thing. Later, certain muses in Ionia and Sicily perceived that safety lay rather in combining both accounts and saying that the real is both many and one and is held together by enmity and friendship. 'In parting asunder it is always being drawn together' say the stricter of these muses. The milder relax the rule that this should always be so and tell us of alternate states, in which the universe is now one and at peace through the power of love, and now many and at war with itself owing to some sort of strife.

In all this, whether anyone of them has told the truth or not is a hard question, and it is in bad taste to find fault so grossly with men of long-established fame. But one observation may be made without offense.

Theaetetus/ And that is?

Stranger/ That they have shown too little consideration for ordinary people like ourselves in talking over our heads. Each school pursues its own argument to the conclusion without caring whether we follow what they say or get left behind.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ When one or another of them in his discourse uses these expressions ‘there really are' or ‘have come to be' or ‘are coming to be' ‘many things' or ‘one thing' or ‘two,' or again another speaks of ‘hot being mixed with cold,' assuming ‘combinations' and ‘separations,' do you, Theaetetus, understand a single word he says? Speaking for myself, when I was younger I thought I understood quite clearly when someone spoke of this thing that is now puzzling us—'the unreal.' But now you see how completely perplexed we are about that.

Theaetetus/ I do.

Stranger/ Possibly, then, our minds are in the same state of confusion about reality. We profess to be quite at our ease about the real and to understand the word when it is spoken, though we may not understand the unreal, when perhaps we are equally in the dark about both.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps.

Stranger/ And we may take it that the same is true of the other expressions I have just mentioned.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ The general run of these expressions we will consider later, if we so decide. We must begin now with the chief and most important of them all.

Theaetetus/ Which is that? Of course you mean we ought to begin by studying ‘reality' and finding out what those who use the word think it stands for.

Stranger/ You have hit my meaning precisely, Theaetetus; I do mean that we must take this line. Imagine them here before us, and let us put this question, ‘You who say that hot and cold or some such pair *really are* all things, what exactly does this expression convey that you apply to both when you say that they both are “real” or each of them is “real”? How are we to understand this “reality” you speak of? Are we to suppose it is a third thing alongside the other two and that the all is no longer, as you say, two things, but three? For surely you do not give the name “reality” to one of the two and then say that both alike are real, for then there will be only one thing, whichever of the two it may be, and not two.'

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ ‘Well then, do you intend to give the name “reality” to the pair of them?'

Theaetetus/ Perhaps.

Stranger/ But that again,' we shall object, ‘will clearly be speaking of your two things as one.'

Theaetetus/ You are quite right.

Stranger/ ‘We are completely puzzled, then, and you must clear up the question for us, what you do intend to signify when you use the word “real.” Obviously you must be quite familiar with what you mean, whereas we, who formerly imagined we knew, are now at a loss. First, then, enlighten us on just this point, so that we may not fancy we understand what you have to tell us, when in fact we are as far as possible from understanding.'

If we put our case in that way to these people and to any others who say that the all is more than one thing, will there be anything unwarrantable in our request?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Stranger/ Again, there are those who say that the all is one thing. Must we not do our best to find out what they mean by 'reality'?

Theaetetus/ Surely.

Stranger/ Let them answer this question, then, 'You say, we understand, that there is only one thing?' 'We do,' they will reply, won't they?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ 'And there is something to which you give the name *real?'*

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ 'Is it the same thing as that to which you give the name *one?* Are you applying two names to the same thing, or what do you mean?'

Theaetetus/ What will their next answer be?

Stranger/ Obviously, Theaetetus, it is not so very easy for one who has laid down their fundamental assertion to answer this question or any other.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ In the first place, it is surely absurd for him to admit the existence of *two* names, when he has laid down that there is no more than one thing.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And further, it is equally absurd to allow anyone to assert that a name can have any existence, when that would be inexplicable.

Theaetetus/ How is it inexplicable?

Stranger/ If, on the one hand, he assumes that the name is different from the thing, he is surely speaking of *two* things.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Whereas, if he assumes that the name is the same as the thing, either he will have to say it is not the name of anything, or if he says it is the name of something, it will follow that the name is merely a name of a name and of nothing else whatsoever.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Stranger/ —

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Stranger/ And what of 'the whole'? Will they say that this is other than their 'one real thing' or the same?

Theaetetus/ Certainly that it is the same. In fact they do say so.

Stranger/ Then if it is a whole—as indeed Parmenides says, 'Every way like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, evenly balanced from the midst in every direction, for there must not be something more nor something less here than there'—if the real is like that, it has a middle and extremities, and consequently it must have parts, must it not?

Theaetetus/ It must.

Stranger/ Well. if a thing is divided into parts, there is nothing against its having the property of unity as applied to the aggregate of all the parts and being in that way one, as being a sum or whole.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ On the other hand, the thing which has these properties cannot be just unity itself, can it?

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ Surely unity in the true sense and rightly defined must be altogether without parts.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it must.

Stranger/ Whereas a thing such as we described, consisting of several parts, will not answer to that definition.

Theaetetus/ I see.

Stranger/ Then, (*a*) is the real one and a whole in the sense that it has the property of unity, or (*b*) are we to say that the real is not a whole at all?

Theaetetus/ That is a hard choice.

Stranger/ Quite true. For if (*a*) the real has the property of being in a sense one, it will evidently not be the same thing as unity, and so all things will be more than one.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And again (*b*) if the real is not a whole by virtue of having this property of unity, while (*a*) at the same time wholeness itself is real, it follows that the real falls short of itself.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ So, on this line of argument too, the real will be deprived of reality and will not be a thing that is.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And further, once more all things will be more than one, since reality on the one side and wholeness on the other have now each a distinct nature.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But if, (β) on the other hand, there is no such thing as wholeness at all, not only are the same things true of the real, but also that, besides not being a thing that really is, it could never even become such.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ Whenever a thing comes into being. at that moment it has come to be as a whole; accordingly, if you do not reckon unity or wholeness among real things, you have no right to speak of either being or coming-into-being as having any existence.

Theaetetus/ That seems perfectly true.

Stranger: And further, what is not a whole cannot have any definite number either, for if a thing has a definite number, it must amount to that number, whatever it may be, as a whole.

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Stranger/ And countless other difficulties, each involved in measureless perplexity, will arise, if you say that the real is either two things or only one.

Theaetetus/ That is plain enough from those we have had a glimpse of now. One leads to another, and each carries us further into a wilderness of doubt about every theory as it is mentioned.

Stranger/ So much, then, for those who give an exact account of what is real or unreal. We have not gone through them all, but let this suffice. Now we must turn to look at those who put the matter in a different way, so that, from a complete review of all, we may see that reality is just as hard to define as unreality.

Theaetetus/ We had better go on, then, to their position.

Stranger/ What we shall see is something like a battle of gods and giants going on between them over their quarrel about reality.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ One party is trying to drag everything down to earth out of heaven and the unseen, literally grasping rocks and trees in their hands, for they lay hold upon every stock

and stone and strenuously affirm that real existence belongs only to that which can be handled and offers resistance to the touch. They define reality as the same thing as body, and as soon as one of the opposite party asserts that anything without a body is real, they are utterly contemptuous and will not listen to another word.

Theaetetus/ The people you describe are certainly a formidable crew. I have met quite a number of them before now.

Stranger/ Yes, and accordingly their adversaries are very wary in defending their position somewhere in the heights of the unseen, maintaining with all their force that true reality consists in certain intelligible and bodiless forms. In the clash of argument they shatter and pulverize those bodies which their opponents wield, and what those others allege to be true reality they call, not real being, but a sort of moving process of becoming. On this issue an interminable battle is always going on between the two camps.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Suppose, then, we challenge each party in turn to render an account of the reality they assert.

Theaetetus/ How shall we do so?

Stranger/ It will be easier to obtain from those who place reality in forms, because they are more civilized—harder, from those whose violence would drag everything down to the level of body perhaps, all but impossible. However, I think I see the right way to deal with them.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ Best of all, if it were anyhow possible, would be to bring about a real change of heart, but if that is beyond our power, to imagine them reformed and assume them willing to moderate their present lawlessness in answering our questions. The better a man's character is, the more

force there will be in any agreement you make with him. However, we are not concerned with them so much as with our search for the truth.

Theaetetus/ You are quite right.

Stranger/ Well then, call upon these reformed characters to oblige you with an answer, and you shall act as their spokesman.

Theaetetus/ I will.

Stranger/ Let them tell us, then, whether they admit that there is such a thing as a mortal living creature.

Theaetetus/ Of course they do.

Stranger/ And they will agree that it is a body animated by a soul?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Taking a soul to be something real?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Again, they allow that one soul may be just, another unjust, or one wise, another foolish?

Theaetetus/ Naturally.

Stranger/ And that any soul comes to be just or the reverse by possessing justice or the reverse, which is present in it?

Theaetetus/ Yes, they agree to that too.

Stranger/ But surely they will admit that whatever can come to be present in a thing or absent from it is certainly a real thing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Granted, then, that justice or wisdom or any other sort of goodness or badness is real, and moreover that a soul in which they come to exist is real, do they maintain

that anyone of these things is visible and tangible, or are they all invisible?

Theaetetus/ They can hardly say that anyone of them is visible.

Stranger/ And do they really assert that something that is not visible has a body?

Theaetetus/ That question they do not answer as a whole without a distinction. The soul itself, they think, does possess a sort of body, but when it comes to wisdom or any of the other things you asked about, they have not the face either to accept the inference that they have no place among real things or to persist in maintaining that they are all bodies.

Stranger/ That shows, Theaetetus, that they are genuinely reformed characters. The giants among them, of the true earthborn breed, would not stick at any point; they would hold out to the end, that whatever they cannot squeeze between their hands is just nothing at all.

Theaetetus/ I dare say that describes their state of mind.

Stranger/ Let us question them further, then, for it is quite enough for our purpose if they consent to admit that even a small part of reality is bodiless. They must now tell us this. When they say that these bodiless things and the other things which have body are alike 'real,' what common character that emerges as covering both sets of things have they in view? It is possible they may be at a loss for an answer. If that is their state of mind, you must consider whether they would accept at our suggestion a description of the real and agree to it.

Theaetetus/ What description? Perhaps we can tell, if you will state it.

Stranger/ I suggest that anything has real being that is so constituted as to possess any sort of power either to affect anything else or to be affected, in however small a degree, by the most insignificant agent, though it be only once. I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing but power.

Theaetetus/ Well, they accept that, having for the moment no better suggestion of their own to offer.

Stranger/ That will do, for later on both they and we perhaps may change our minds. For the present, then, let us take it that this agreement stands between us and the one party.

Theaetetus/ It does.

Stranger/ Let us turn, then, to the opposite party, the friends of forms. Once more you shall act as their spokesman.

Theaetetus/ I will.

Stranger/ We understand that you make a distinction between ‘becoming' and ‘real being' and speak of them as separate. Is that so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And you say that we have intercourse with becoming by means of the body through sense, whereas we have intercourse with real being by means of the soul through reflection. And real being, you say, is always in the same unchanging state, whereas becoming is variable.

Theaetetus/ We do.

Stranger/ Admirable. But now what are we to take you as meaning by this expression ‘intercourse' which you apply to both? Don't you mean what we described a moment ago?

Theaetetus/ What was that?

Stranger/ The experiencing an effect or the production of one, arising, as the result of some power, from things that encounter one another. Perhaps, Theaetetus, you may not be able to catch their answer to this, but I, who am familiar with them, may be more successful.

Theaetetus/ What have they to say, then?

Stranger/ They do not agree to the proposition we put just now to the earthborn giants about reality.

Theaetetus/ You mean—?

Stranger/ We proposed as a sufficient mark of real things the presence in a thing of the power of being acted upon or of acting in relation to however insignificant a thing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well, to that they reply that a power of acting and being acted upon belongs to becoming, but neither of these powers is compatible with real being.

Theaetetus/ And there is something in that answer?

Stranger/ Something to which we must reply by a request for more enlightenment. Do they acknowledge further that the soul knows and real being is known?

Theaetetus/ Certainly they agree to that.

Stranger/ Well, do you agree that knowing or being known is an action, or is it experiencing an effect, or both? Or is one of them experiencing an effect, the other an action? Or does neither of them come under either of these heads at all?

Theaetetus/ Evidently neither; otherwise our friends would be contradicting what they said earlier.

Stranger/ I see what you mean. They would have to say this. If knowing is to be acting on something, it follows that what is known must be acted upon by it, and so, on this showing, reality when it is being known by the act of knowledge must, in so far as it is known, be changed owing to being so acted upon—and that, we say, cannot happen to the changeless.

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ But tell me, in heaven's name, are we really to be so easily convinced that change, life, soul, understanding have no place in that which is perfectly real—that it has neither life nor thought, but stands immutable in solemn aloofness, devoid of intelligence?

Theaetetus/ That, sir, would be a strange doctrine to accept.

Stranger/ But can we say it has intelligence without having life?

Theaetetus/ Surely not.

Stranger/ But if we say it contains both, can we deny that it has soul in which they reside?

Theaetetus/ How else could it possess them?

Stranger/ But then. if it has intelligence, life, and soul, can we say that a living thing remains at rest in complete changelessness?

Theaetetus/ All that seems to me unreasonable.

Stranger/ In that case we must admit that what changes and change itself are real things.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ From this, however, it follows, Theaetetus, first, that if all things are unchangeable, no intelligence can really exist anywhere in anything with regard to any object.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Stranger/ And, on the other hand, if we allow that all things are moving and changing, on that view equally we shall be excluding intelligence from the class of real things.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Do you think that, without rest, there could ever be anything that abides constant in the same condition and in the same respects?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ And without such objects can you make out that intelligence exists or could ever exist anywhere?

Theaetetus/ It would be quite impossible.

Stranger/ Well then, all the force of reasoning must be enlisted to oppose anyone who tries to maintain any assertion about anything at the same time that he suppresses knowledge or understanding or intelligence.

Theaetetus/ Most certainly.

Stranger/ On these grounds, then, it seems that only one course is open to the philosopher who values knowledge and the rest above all else. He must refuse to accept from the champions either of the one or of the many forms the doctrine that all reality is changeless, and he must turn a deaf ear to the other party who represent reality as everywhere changing. Like a child begging for 'both,' he must declare that reality or the sum of things is both at once—all that is unchangeable and all that is in change.

Theaetetus/ Perfectly true.

Stranger/ Well then, does it not look now as if we had fairly caught reality within the compass of our description?

Theaetetus/ Certainly it does.

Stranger/ And yet—oh dear, Theaetetus, what if I say after all that I think it is just at this point that we shall come to see how baffling this question of reality is?

Theaetetus/ How so? Why do you say that?

Stranger/ My good friend, don't you see that now we are wholly in the dark about it, though we fancy we are talking good sense?

Theaetetus/ I certainly thought so, and I don't at all understand how we can be deceived about our condition.

Stranger/ Then consider these last conclusions of ours more carefully, and whether, when we agree to them, we might not fairly be posed with the same question we put earlier to those who said that the sum of things 'really is' hot and cold.

Theaetetus/ You must remind me what that question was.

Stranger/ By all means, and I will try to do it by questioning you in the same way as I questioned them, so that we may get a little further at the same time.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Come along then. When you speak of movement and rest, these are things completely opposed to one another, aren't they?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ At the same time you say of both and of each severally, that they are real?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Stranger/ And when you admit that they are real, do you mean that either or both are in movement?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ Then, perhaps, by saying both are real you mean they are both at rest?

Theaetetus/ No, how could I?

Stranger/ So, then, you conceive of reality [realness] as a third thing over and above these two, and when you speak of both as being real, you mean that you are taking both movement and rest together as embraced by reality and fixing your attention on their common association with reality?

Theaetetus/ It does seem as if we discerned reality as a third thing, when we say that movement and rest are real.

Stranger/ So reality is not motion and rest 'both at once,' but something distinct from them.

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Stranger/ In virtue of its own nature, then, reality is neither at rest nor in movement.

Theaetetus/ I suppose so.

Stranger/ If so, where is the mind to turn for help if one wants to reach any clear and certain conclusion about reality?

Theaetetus/ Where indeed?

Stranger/ It seems hard to find help in any quarter. If a thing is not in movement, how can it not be at rest? Or how can what is not in any way at rest fail to be in movement? Yet reality is now revealed to us as outside both alternatives. Is that possible?

Theaetetus/ As impossible as anything could be.

Stranger/ Then there is one thing that ought to be remembered at this point.

Theaetetus/ And that is?

Stranger/ That we were completely puzzled when we were asked to what the name 'unreal' should be applied. You remember?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And now we are in no less perplexity about reality?

Theaetetus/ In even greater, I should say, sir, if that be possible.

Stranger/ Let us take it, then, that our difficulty is now completely stated. But since reality and unreality are equally puzzling, there is henceforward some hope that any light, whether dim or bright, thrown upon the one will illuminate the other to an equal degree, and if, on the other hand, we cannot get sight of either, at any rate we will make the best we can of it under these conditions and force a passage through the argument with both elbows at once.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Let us explain, then, how it is that we call the same thing—whatever is in question at the moment—by several names.

Theaetetus/ For instance? Give me an example.

Stranger/ Well, when we speak of a man we give him many additional names—we attribute to him colors and shapes and sizes and defects and good qualities, and in all these and countless other statements we say he is not merely a ‘man' but also ‘good' and any number of other things. And so with everything else. We take any given thing as one and yet speak of it as many and by many names.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And thereby, I fancy, we have provided a magnificent entertainment for the young and for some of their elders who have taken to learning late in life. Anyone can take a hand in the game and at once object that many things cannot be one, nor one thing many; indeed, they delight in forbidding us to speak of a man as ‘good'—we must only speak of a good as good, and of the man as man. I imagine, Theaetetus, you often meet with these enthusiasts, sometimes elderly men who, being poorly endowed with intelligence, gape with wonder at these discoveries and fancy they have lighted here on the very treasure of complete wisdom.

Theaetetus/ I have indeed.

Stranger/ Well then, we want our argument to be addressed to all alike who have ever had anything to say about existence; so let us take it that the questions we shall put now are intended not only for these people but for all those others whom we have been conversing with earlier.

Theaetetus/ And what are the questions?

Stranger/ Are we not to attach existence to motion and rest, nor anything else to anything else, but rather to treat

them in our discourse as incapable of any blending or participation in one another? Or are we to lump them all together as capable of association with one another? Or shall we say that this is true of some and not of others? Which of these possibilities shall we say they prefer, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ I am not prepared to answer that on their behalf.

Stranger/ Then why not answer the questions one at a time and see what are the consequences in each case?

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ And first, if you like, let us suppose them to say that nothing has any capacity for combination with anything else for any purpose. Then movement and rest will have no part in existence.

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ Well then, will either of them exist, if it has no association with existence?

Theaetetus/ No, it will not exist.

Stranger/ That admission seems to make short work of all theories; it upsets at one blow those who have a universe in motion, and those who make it a motionless unity, and all who say their realities exist in forms that are always the same in all respects, for they all attribute existence to things, some saying they really *are* in movement, some that they really *are* at rest.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Stranger/ And further, those who make all things come together at one time and separate at another, whether they bring innumerable things into a unity and out of a unity, or divide things into and combine them out of a limited set of elements—no matter whether they suppose this to happen in alternation or to be going on all the time—however it may

be, all this would be meaningless if there is no blending at all.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Moreover, the greatest absurdity of all results from pursuing the theory of those very people who will not allow one thing to share in the quality of another and so be called by its name.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Why, in referring to anything they cannot help using the words 'being' and 'apart' and 'from the others' and 'by itself' and any number more. They cannot refrain from these expressions or from connecting them in their statements, and so need not wait for others to refute them; the foe is in their own household, as the saying goes, and, like that queer fellow Eurycles, they carry about with them wherever they go a voice in their own bellies to contradict them.

Theaetetus/ True, your comparison is very much to the purpose.

Stranger/ Well, suppose we allow that all are capable of combining with one another.

Theaetetus/ Even I can dispose of that suggestion.

Stranger/ How?

Theaetetus/ Because then movement itself would come to a complete standstill, and again rest itself would be in movement, if each were to supervene upon the other.

Stranger/ And that is to the last degree impossible—that movement should come to be at rest and rest be in motion?

Theaetetus/ Surely.

Stranger/ Then only the third choice is left.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And observe that one of these alternatives must be true—either all will blend, or none, or some will and some will not.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And two of the three have been found impossible.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Whoever, then, wishes to give a right answer will assert the remaining one.

Theaetetus/ Quite So.

Stranger/ Then since some will blend, some not, they might be said to be in the same case with the letters of the alphabet. Some of these cannot be conjoined; others will fit together.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And the vowels are specially good at combination—a sort of bond pervading them all, so that without a vowel the others cannot be fitted together.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Stranger/ And does everyone know which can combine with which, or does one need an art to do it rightly?

Theaetetus/ It needs art.

Stranger/ And that art is?

Theaetetus/ Grammar.

Stranger/ Again, is it not the same with sounds of high or low pitch? To possess the art of recognizing the sounds that can or cannot be blended is to be a musician; if one doesn't understand that, one is unmusical.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And we shall find differences of the same sort between competence and incompetence in any other art.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Well, now that we have agreed that the kinds stand toward one another in the same way as regards blending, is not some science needed as a guide on the voyage of discourse, if one is to succeed in pointing out which kinds are consonant, and which are incompatible with one another—also, whether there are certain kinds that pervade them all and connect them so that they can blend, and again, where there are divisions [separations], whether there are certain others that traverse wholes and are responsible for the division?

Theaetetus/ Surely some science is needed—perhaps the most important of all.

Stranger/ And what name shall we give to this science? Or—good gracious, Theaetetus, have we stumbled unawares upon the free man's knowledge and, in seeking for the Sophist, chanced to find the philosopher first?

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ Dividing according to kinds, not taking the same form for a different one or a different one for the same—is not that the business of the science of dialectic?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the man who can do that discerns clearly *one* form everywhere extended throughout many, where each one lies apart, and *many* forms, different from one another, embraced from without by one form, and again *one* form connected in a unity through many wholes, and *many* forms, entirely marked off apart. That means knowing how to distinguish, kind by kind, in what ways the several kinds can or cannot combine.

Theaetetus/ Most certainly.

Stranger/ And the only person, I imagine, to whom you would allow this mastery of dialectic is the pure and rightful lover of wisdom.

Theaetetus/ To whom else could it be allowed?

Stranger/ It is, then, in some such region as this that we shall find the philosopher now or later, if we should look for him. He too may be difficult to see clearly, but the difficulty in his case is not the same as in the Sophist's.

Theaetetus/ What is the difference?

Stranger/ The Sophist takes refuge in the darkness of not-being, where he is at home and has the knack of feeling his way, and it is the darkness of the place that makes him so hard to perceive.

Theaetetus/ That may well be.

Stranger/ Whereas the philosopher, whose thoughts constantly dwell upon the nature of reality, is difficult to see because his region is so bright, for the eye of the vulgar soul cannot endure to keep its gaze fixed on the divine.

Theaetetus/ That may well be no less true.

Stranger/ Then we will look more closely at the philosopher presently, if we are still in the mind to do so; meanwhile clearly we must not loosen our grip on the Sophist until we have studied him thoroughly.

Theaetetus/ I entirely agree.

Stranger/ Now that we are agreed, then, that some of the kinds will combine with one another and some will not, and that some combine to a small extent, others with a large number, while some pervade all and there is nothing against their being combined with everything, let us next follow up the argument in this way. We will not take all the forms, for fear of getting confused in such a multitude, but choose out some of those that are recognized as most [*or* very]

important, and consider first their several natures and then how they stand in respect of being capable of combination with one another. In this way, though we may not be able to conceive being and not-being with perfect clearness, we may at least give as satisfactory an account of them as we can under the conditions of our present inquiry, and see if there is any opening allowing us to assert that what is not, *really is* what is not, and to escape unscathed.

Theaetetus/ Yes, we had better do that.

Stranger/ Now, among the kinds, those we were just now discussing—existence itself and rest and motion—are very important.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Stranger/ And observe, we say that two of the three will not blend with one another.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Whereas existence can be blended with both, for surely they both exist.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ So they make three in all. And each one of them [existence, motion, rest] is *different* from the other two, and the *same* as itself.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Stranger/ But what do we mean by these words we have just used—'same' and 'different'? Are they a pair of kinds distinct from those three, though always necessarily blending with them, so that we must consider the forms as five in all, not three? Or, when we say 'same' or 'different,' are we unconsciously using a name that belongs to one or another of those three kinds?

Theaetetus/ Possibly.

Stranger/ Well, motion and rest at any rate cannot be [identical with] difference or sameness.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ Neither motion nor rest can be [identical with] anything that we say of both of them in common.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ Because motion would then be at rest, and rest in motion, for whichever of the two [motion or rest] becomes applicable to both [by being identified with either sameness or difference, which *are* applicable to both] will force the other [rest or motion] to change to the contrary of its own nature, as thus coming to partake of its contrary.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Stranger/ But both do partake of sameness and difference.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then we must not say that sameness or difference is [identical with] motion, nor yet with rest.

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ Are we, however, to think of existence and sameness as a single thing?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps.

Stranger/ But if ‘existence' and ‘sameness' have no difference in meaning, once more, when we say that motion and rest both ‘exist,' we shall thereby be speaking of them as being ‘the same.'

Theaetetus/ But that is impossible.

Stranger/ Then sameness and existence cannot be one thing.

Theaetetus/ Hardly.

Stranger/ We may, then, set down sameness as a fourth form, additional to our three.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And are we to call difference a fifth? Or must we think of difference and existence as two names for a single kind?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps.

Stranger/ But I suppose you admit that, among things that exist., some are always spoken of as being what they are just in themselves, others as being what they are with reference to other things.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And what is different is always so called with reference to another thing, isn't it?

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Stranger/ It would not be so, if existence and difference were not very different things. If difference partook of both characters as existence does, there would sometimes be, within the class of different things, something that was different not with reference to another thing. But in fact we undoubtedly find that whatever is different, as a necessary consequence, is what it is with reference to another.

Theaetetus/ It is as you say.

Stranger/ Then we must call the nature of difference a fifth among the forms we are singling out.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And moreover we shall say that this nature pervades all the forms, for each one is different from the rest, not by virtue of its own nature, but because it partakes of the character of difference.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Stranger/ Now, then, taking our five kinds one by one, let us make some statements about them.

Theaetetus/ What statements?

Stranger/ First about motion, let us say that motion is altogether different from rest. Or is that not so?

Theaetetus/ It is SO.

Stranger/ So motion is not rest.

Theaetetus/ Not in any sense.

Stranger/ But motion *is* [exists], by virtue of partaking of existence.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And once more motion is different from the same [sameness].

Theaetetus/ No doubt.

Stranger/ So motion is not the same [sameness].

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ But on the other hand, motion, we said, is the same as itself, because everything partakes of the same [sameness].

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Motion, then, is both the same and not the same; we must admit that without boggling at it. For when we say it is 'the same' and 'not the same' we are not using the expression in the same sense; we call it 'the same' on account of its participation in the same with reference to itself, but we call it 'not the same' because of its combination with difference, a combination that separates it off from the same [sameness] and makes it not the same but different, so that we have the right to say this time that it is 'not the same.'

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ So too, supposing motion itself did in any way participate in rest, there would be nothing outrageous in speaking of it as stationary. But it does not in fact participate in rest at all.

Theaetetus/ No, it does not.

Stranger/ Whereas it does participate both in sameness and in difference, so that it is correct to speak of it as both the same and not the same.

Theaetetus/ Perfectly correct, provided that we are to agree that some of the kinds will blend with one another, some will not.

Stranger/ Well, that is a conclusion we proved at an earlier stage, when we showed that such was indeed their nature.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ To go back to our statements, then, is motion different from different [difference], just as it was other than the same [sameness] and other than rest?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Stranger/ Motion, then, in a sense is not different, and also is different, in accordance with the argument we stated just now.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ What, then, of the next point? Are we to say that motion is different from three of the four, but not from the fourth, when we have agreed that there were five kinds in the field we set before us for examination?

Theaetetus/ How can we? We cannot allow that their number is less than it was shown to be.

Stranger/ So we may fearlessly contend that motion is different from existence.

Theaetetus/ Without the smallest fear.

Stranger/ In fact, it is clear that motion really is a thing that is not [existence] and a thing that is, since it partakes of existence.

Theaetetus/ Perfectly clear.

Stranger/ It must, then, be possible for 'that which is not' [i.e., is different from existence] to be [to exist], not only in the case of motion but of all the other kinds. For in the case of them all the nature of difference makes each one of them different from existence and so makes it a thing that 'is not,' and hence we shall be right to speak of them all on the same principle as things that in this sense *'are not,'* and again, because they partake of existence, to say that they *'are'* [exist] and call them things that have being [existence].

Theaetetus/ No doubt.

Stranger/ So, in the case of every one of the forms there is much that it *is* and an indefinite number of things that it *is not.*

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Stranger/ And, moreover, existence itself must be called different from the rest.

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Stranger/ We find, then, that existence likewise 'is not' in as many respects as there are other things, for, not being those others, while it *is* its single self, it *is not* all that indefinite number of other things.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Stranger/ Then we must not boggle even at that conclusion, granted that kinds are of a nature to admit combination with one another. If anyone denies that, he must win over our earlier arguments to his side before he tries to win over their consequences.

Theaetetus/ That is a fair demand.

Stranger/ Now let us mark this.

Theaetetus/ Yes?

Stranger/ When we speak of ‘that which is not,' it seems that we do not mean something contrary to what exists but only something that is different.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ In the same way that when, for example, we speak of something as ‘not tall,' we may just as well mean by that phrase ‘what is equal' as ‘what is short,' mayn't we?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ So, when it is asserted that a negative signifies a contrary, we shall not agree, but admit no more than this—that the prefix ‘not' indicates something different from the words that follow, or rather from the things designated by the words pronounced after the negative.

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ And here, if you agree, is a point for us to consider.

Theaetetus/ Namely?

Stranger/ The nature of the different [difference] appears to be parceled out, in the same way as knowledge.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Knowledge also is surely one, but each part of it that commands a certain field is marked off and given a special name proper to itself. Hence language recognizes many arts and forms of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And the same thing is true of the parts of the single nature of the different.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps, but shall we explain how?

Stranger/ There exists a part of the different that is set in contrast to the beautiful?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Are we to say it is nameless, or has it a special name?

Theaetetus/ It has. Whenever we use the expression 'not beautiful,' the thing we mean is precisely that which is different from the nature of the beautiful.

Stranger/ Then tell me this.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ May we not say that the *existence* of the not-beautiful is constituted by its being marked off from a single definite kind among existing things and again set in contrast with something that exists?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So it appears that the not-beautiful is an instance of something that exists being set in contrast to something that exists.

Theaetetus/ Perfectly.

Stranger/ What then? On this showing has the not-beautiful any less claim than the beautiful to be a thing that exists?

Theaetetus/ None whatever.

Stranger/ And so the not-tall must be said to exist just as much as the tall itself.

Theaetetus/ Just as much.

Stranger/ And we must also put the not-just on the same footing as the just with respect to the fact that the one exists no less than the other.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And we shall say the same of all the rest, since we have seen that the nature of the different is to be ranked among things that exist, and, once it exists, its parts also must be considered as existing just as much as anything else.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ So, it seems, when a part of the nature of the different and a part of the nature of the existent [existence] are set in contrast to one another, the contrast is, if it be permissible to say so, as much a reality as existence itself : it does not mean what is contrary to 'existent,' but only what is different from that existent.

Theaetetus/ That is quite clear.

Stranger/ What name are we to give it, then?

Theaetetus/ Obviously this is just that 'what-is-not' which we were seeking for the sake of the Sophist.

Stranger/ Has it then, as you say, an existence inferior to none of the rest in reality? May we now be bold to say that 'that is not' unquestionably *is* a thing that has a nature of its own—just as the tall was tall and the beautiful was beautiful, so too with the not-tall and the not-beautiful—and in that sense 'that which is not' also, on the same principle, both was and *is* 'what is not,' a single form to be reckoned among the many realities? Or have we any further doubts with regard to it, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ None at all.

Stranger/ You see, then, that in our disobedience to Parmenides we have trespassed far beyond the limits of his prohibition.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ In pushing forward on our quest, we have shown him results in a field which he forbade us even to explore.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ He says, you remember, 'Never shall this be proved, that things that are not, are, but keep back thy thought from this way of inquiry.'

Theaetetus/ Yes, he does say that.

Stranger/ Whereas we have not merely shown that things that are not, are, but we have brought to light the real character of 'not-being.' We have shown that the nature of the different has existence and is parceled out over the whole field of existent things with reference to one another, and of every part of it that is set in contrast to 'that which is' we have dared to say that precisely that *is really* 'that which is not.'

Theaetetus/ Yes, sir, and I think what we have said is perfectly true.

Stranger/ Then let no one say that it is the contrary of the existent that we mean by 'what is not,' when we make bold to say that 'what is not' exists. So far as any contrary of the existent is concerned, we have long ago said good-by to the question whether there is such a thing or not and whether any account can be given of it or none whatsoever.

But with respect to the 'what-is-not' that we have now asserted to exist, an opponent must either convince us that our account is wrong by refuting it, or, so long as he proves unable to do that, he must accept our statements (*a*) that the kinds blend with one another, (*b*) that existence and difference pervade them all, and pervade one another, (*c*) that difference [*or* the different], by partaking of existence, *is* by virtue of that participation, but on the other hand *is not* that existence of which it partakes, but is different, and since

it is different from existence [*or* an existent], quite clearly it must be possible that it should *be* a thing that *is not,* (*d*) and again, existence, having a part in difference, will be different from all the rest of the kinds, and, because it is different from them all, it *is not* anyone of them nor yet all the others put together, but is only itself, with the consequence, again indisputable, that existence *is not* myriads upon myriads of things, and that all the other kinds in the same way, whether taken severally or all together, in many respects *are* and in many respects *are not.*

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And if anyone mistrusts these apparent contradictions, he should study the question and produce some better explanation than we have now given, whereas if he imagines he has discovered an embarrassing puzzle and takes delight in reducing argument to a tug of war, he is wasting his pains on a triviality, as our present argument declares. There is nothing clever in such a discovery, nor is it hard to make; what is hard and at the same time worth the pains is something different.

Theaetetus/ And that is?

Stranger/ What I said before—leaving such quibbling alone as leading nowhere, to be able to follow our statements step by step and, in criticizing the assertion that a different thing is the same or the same thing is different in a certain sense, to take account of the precise sense and the precise respect in which they are said to be one or the other. Merely to show that in some unspecified way the same is different or the different is the same, the tall short, the like unlike, and to take pleasure in perpetually parading such contradictions in argument—that is not genuine criticism, but may be recognized as the callow offspring of a too recent contact with reality.

Theaetetus/ I quite agree.

Stranger/ Yes, my friend, and the attempt to separate everything from every other thing not only strikes a discordant note but amounts to a crude defiance of the philosophical Muse.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ This isolation of everything from everything else means a complete abolition of all discourse, for any discourse we can have owes its existence to the weaving together of forms.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Observe, then, how opportune was our struggle with those separatists, when we forced them to allow one form to blend with another.

Theaetetus/ In what respect?

Stranger/ In respect of securing the position of discourse as one of the kinds of things that exist. To rob us of discourse would be to rob us of philosophy. That would be the most serious consequence, but, besides that, we need at the present moment to come to an agreement about the nature of discourse, and if its very existence had been taken from us, we should naturally not be able to discourse any further. And that would have happened, if we had yielded the point that there is no blending of anyone form with another.

Theaetetus/ That is certainly true. But I do not understand why we need an agreement about discourse at the present moment.

Stranger/ I may be able to suggest a line of thought that will help you to understand.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ We saw that ‘not-being' is a single kind among the rest, dispersed over the whole field of realities.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ We have next to consider whether it blends with thinking and discourse.

Theaetetus/ Why that?

Stranger/ If it does not blend with them, everything must be true, but if it does, we shall have false thinking and discourse, for thinking or saying 'what is not' comes, I suppose, to the same thing as falsity in thought and speech.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And if falsity exists, deception is possible.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And once deception exists, images and likenesses and appearance will be everywhere rampant.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And the Sophist, we said, had taken refuge some-where in that region, but then he had denied the very existence of falsity; no one could either think or say 'what is not,' because what is not never has any sort of being.

Theaetetus/ So he said.

Stranger/ But now that 'what is not' has been found to have its share in existence, perhaps he will not fight with us further on that point.

On the other hand, he may perhaps say that some things partake of not-being, some do not, and that speech and thinking are among those that do not, and so once more he might contend that the art of creating images and semblances, where we say he is to be found, has no existence at all, since thought and speech have no share in not-being, and without that combination there is no such thing as falsity. That is why we must begin by investigating the nature of discourse and thinking and appearance, in order that we may then make out their combination with not-being

and so prove that falsity exists, and by that proof pin down the Sophist there, if he is amenable to capture, or else let him go and pursue our search in some other kind.

Theaetetus/ Certainly, sir, what we said at the outset about the Sophist seems true—that he is a hard sort of beast to hunt down. Evidently he possesses a whole armory of problems, and every time that he puts one forward to shield him, we have to fight our way through it before we can get at him. So now, hardly have we got the better of his defense that 'what is not' cannot exist, when another obstacle is raised in our path. We must, it seems, prove that falsity exists both in speech and thought, and after that perhaps something else, and so on. It looks as if the end would never be in sight.

Stranger/ A man should be of good courage, Theaetetus, if he can make only a little headway at each step. If he loses heart then, what will he do in another case where he cannot advance at all or even perhaps loses ground? No city, as they say, will surrender to so faint a summons. And now that we have surmounted the barrier you speak of, we may have already taken the highest wall and the rest may be easier to capture.

Theaetetus/ That is encouraging.

Stranger/ Then, as I said, let us take first statement and judgment, so as to establish clearly whether not-being has any point of contact with them, or both are altogether true and there is never falsity in either.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Now, remembering what we said about forms and letters, let us consider words in the same way. The solution of our present problem promises to lie in that quarter.

Theaetetus/ What are you going to ask me about words?

Stranger/ Whether they all fit together, or none of them, or some will and some will not.

Theaetetus/ That is plain enough. Some will, some will not.

Stranger/ You mean perhaps something like this. Words which, when spoken in succession, signify something, do fit together, while those which mean nothing when they are strung together, do not.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ What I supposed you had in your mind when you gave your assent. The signs we use in speech to signify being are surely of two kinds.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ One kind called ‘names,' the other ‘verbs.'

Theaetetus/ Give me a description of each.

Stranger/ By ‘verb' we mean an expression which is applied to actions.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And by a ‘name' the spoken sign applied to what performs these actions.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Stranger/ Now a statement never consists solely of names spoken in succession, nor yet of verbs apart from names.

Theaetetus/ I don't follow that.

Stranger/ Evidently you had something else in mind when you agreed with me just now, because what I meant was just this—that these words spoken in a string in this way do not make a statement.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ For example, ‘walks runs sleeps,' and so on with all the other verbs signifying actions—you may utter

them all one after another, but that does not make a statement.

Theaetetus/ Naturally.

Stranger/ And again, if you say ‘lion stag horse' and any other names given to things that perform actions, such a string never makes up a statement. Neither in this example nor in the other do the sounds uttered signify any action performed or not performed or nature of anything that exists or does not exist, until you combine verbs with names. The moment you do that, they fit together and the simplest combination becomes a statement of what might be called the simplest and briefest kind.

Theaetetus/ Then how do you make a statement of that kind?

Stranger/ When one says, ‘A man understands,' do you agree that this is a statement of the simplest and shortest possible kind?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Because now it gives information about facts or events in the present or past or future; it does not merely name something but gets you somewhere by weaving together verbs with names. Hence we say it ‘states' something, not merely ‘names' something, and in fact it is this complex that we mean by the word ‘statement.'

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And so, just as some things fit together, some do not, so with the signs of speech; some do not fit, but those that do fit make a statement.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Stranger: Now another small point.

Theaetetus/ Yes?

Stranger/ Whenever there is a statement, it must be about something; it cannot be about nothing.

Theaetetus/ That is so.

Stranger/ And must it not have a certain character?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Now let us fix our attention on ourselves.

Theaetetus/ We will.

Stranger/ I will make a statement to you, then, putting together a thing with an action by means of a name and a verb. You are to tell me what the statement is about.

Theaetetus/ I will do my best.

Stranger/ 'Theaetetus sits'—not a lengthy statement, is it?

Theaetetus/ No, of very modest length.

Stranger/ Now it is for you to say what it is about—to whom it belongs.

Theaetetus/ Clearly about me. It belongs to me.

Stranger/ Now take another.

Theaetetus/ Namely?

Stranger/ Theaetetus, whom I am talking to at this moment, flies.'

Theaetetus/ That too can only be described as belonging to me and about me.

Stranger/ And moreover we agree that any statement must have a certain character.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then what sort of character can we assign to each of these?

Theaetetus/ One is false, the other true.

Stranger/ And the true one states about you the things that are [or the facts] as they are.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Whereas the false statement states about you things *different* from the things that are.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And accordingly states *things that are not* as being.

Theaetetus/ No doubt.

Stranger/ Yes, but things that *exist*, different from things that *exist* in your case. For we said that in the case of everything there are many things that are and also many that are not.

Theaetetus/ Quite so.

Stranger/ So the second statement I made about you, in the first place, according to our definition of the nature of a statement, must itself necessarily be one of the shortest possible.

Theaetetus/ So we agreed just now.

Stranger/ And secondly it must be about something.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And if it is not about you, it is not about anything else.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And if it were about nothing, it would not be a statement at all, for we pointed out that there could not be a statement that was a statement about nothing.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ So what is stated about you, but so that what is different is stated as the same or what is not as what is—a combination of verbs and names answering to that description finally seems to be really and truly a false statement.

Theaetetus/ Perfectly true.

Stranger/ And next, what of thinking and judgment and appearing? Is it not now clear that all these things occur in our minds both as false and as true?

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ You will see more easily if you begin by letting me give you an account of their nature and how each differs from the others.

Theaetetus/ Let me have it.

Stranger/ Well, thinking and discourse are the same thing, except that what we call thinking is, precisely, the inward dialogue carried on by the mind with itself without spoken sound.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Whereas the stream which flows from the mind through the lips with sound is called discourse.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And further there is a thing which we know occurs in discourse.

Theaetetus/ Namely?

Stranger/ Assertion and denial.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then when this occurs in the mind in the course of silent thinking, can you call it anything but judgment?

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ And suppose judgment occurs, not independently, but by means of perception; the only right name for such a state of mind is ‘appearing.'

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well then, since we have seen that there is true and false statement, and of these mental processes we have found thinking to be a dialogue of the mind with itself, and judgment to be the conclusion of thinking, and what we mean by 'it appears' a blend of perception and judgment, it follows that these also, being of the same nature as statement, must be, some of them and on some occasions, false.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ You see, then, that we have discovered the nature of false judgment and false statement sooner than we expected just now when we feared there would be no end to the task we were setting ourselves in the search for them.

Theaetetus/ I do.

Stranger/ Then let us not lose courage for what remains to be done. Now that these matters are cleared up, let us recall our earlier divisions by forms.

Theaetetus/ Which do you mean?

Stranger/ We distinguished two forms of image making—the making of likenesses and the making of semblances.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And we said we were puzzled to tell under which of these two we should place the Sophist.

Theaetetus/ We did.

Stranger/ And to increase our perplexity we were plunged in a whirl of confusion by the apparition of an argument that called in question all these terms and disputed the very existence of any copy or image or semblance, on the ground that falsity never has any sort of existence anywhere.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ But now that we have brought to light the existence of false statement and of false judgment, it is

possible that there should be imitations of real things and that this condition of mind [false judgment] should account for the existence of an art of deception.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it is.

Stranger/ And we agreed earlier that the Sophist does come under one or other of the two kinds mentioned.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Now, then, let us set to work again and, as we divide the kind proposed in two, keep to the right-hand section at each stage. Holding fast to the characters of which the Sophist partakes until we have stripped off all that he has in common with others and left only the nature that is peculiar to him, let us so make that nature plain, in the first place to ourselves, and secondly to others whose temperament finds a procedure of this sort congenial.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Well, we began by dividing art into productive and acquisitive.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And under the head of the acquisitive we had glimpses of the Sophist in the arts of hunting, contention, trafficking, and other kinds of that sort.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But now that he has been included under an art of imitation, clearly we must start by dividing into two the productive branch of art. For imitation is surely a kind of production, though it be only a production of images, as we say, not of originals of every sort. Is that not so?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Stranger/ Let us begin, then, by recognizing two kinds of production.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ The one divine, the other human.

Theaetetus/ I don't understand yet.

Stranger/ Production—to recall what we said at the outset—we defined as any power that can bring into existence what did not exist before.

Theaetetus/ I remember.

Stranger/ Now take all mortal animals and also all things that grow—plants that grow above the earth from seeds and roots, and lifeless bodies compacted beneath the earth, whether fusible or not fusible. Must we not attribute the coming-into-being of these things out of not-being to divine craftsmanship and nothing else? Or are we to fall in with the belief that is commonly expressed?

Theaetetus/ What belief do you mean?

Stranger/ That nature gives birth to them as a result of some spontaneous cause that generates without intelligence. Or shall we say that they come from a cause which, working with reason and art, is divine and proceeds from divinity?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps because I am young, I often shift from one belief to the other, but at this moment, looking at your face and believing you to hold that these things have a divine origin, I too am convinced.

Stranger/ Well said, Theaetetus. If I thought you were the sort of person that might believe otherwise in the future, I should now try by force of persuasion to make you accept that account. But I can see clearly that, without any arguments of mine, your nature will come of itself to the conclusion which you tell me attracts you at this moment. So I will let that pass; I should be wasting time. I will only lay it down that the products of nature, as they are called, are works of divine art, as things made out of them by man

are works of human art. Accordingly there will be two kinds of production, one human, the other divine.

Theaetetus/ Good.

Stranger/ Once more, then, divide each of these two into two parts.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ As you have just divided the whole extent of production horizontally, now divide it vertically.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Stranger/ The result is four parts in all—two on our side, human, two on the side of the gods, divine.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And taking the divisions made in the first way [horizontally, divine and human], one section of each part will be the production of originals, and the remaining two sections will be best described as production of images. So we have a second division of production on that principle [originals and images].

Theaetetus/ Explain once more how each of the two parts [divine and human] is divided.

Stranger/ Ourselves, I take it, and all other living creatures and the elements of natural things—fire, water, and their kindred—are all originals, the offspring, as we are well assured, of divine workmanship. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And every one of these products is attended by images which are not the actual thing, and which also owe their existence to divine contrivance.

Theaetetus/ You mean—?

Stranger/ Dream images, and in daylight all those naturally produced semblances which we call ‘shadow' when dark patches interrupt the light, or a ‘reflection' when the

light belonging to the eye meets and coalesces with light belonging to something else on a bright and smooth surface and produces a form yielding a perception that is the reverse of the ordinary direct view.

Theaetetus/ There are, indeed, these two products of divine workmanship—the original and the image that in every case accompanies it.

Stranger/ And what of our human art? Must we not say that in building it produces an actual house, and in painting a house of a different sort, as it were a man-made dream for waking eyes?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And so in all cases, we find once more twin products of our own productive activity in pairs—one an actual thing, the other an image.

Theaetetus/ I understand better now, and I recognize two forms of production, each of them twofold—divine and human according to one division, and according to the other a production of actual things and of some sort of likenesses.

Stranger/ Let us remind ourselves, then, that of this production of images there were to be two kinds, one producing likenesses, the other semblances, provided that falsity should be shown to be a thing that really is false and of such a nature as to have a place among existing things.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it was to be so.

Stranger/ And that has now been shown; so on that ground shall we now reckon the distinction of these two forms as beyond dispute?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Once more, then, let us divide in two the kind that produces semblances.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ There is the semblance produced by means of tools, and another sort where the producer of the semblance takes his own person as an instrument.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ When someone uses his own person or voice to counterfeit your traits or speech, the proper name for creating such a semblance is, I take it, mimicry.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let us reserve that section, then, under the name of mimicry, and indulge ourselves so far as to leave all the rest for someone else to collect into a unity and give it an appropriate name.

Theaetetus/ So be it.

Stranger/ But there is still ground for thinking that mimicry is of two sorts. Let me put it before you.

Theaetetus/ Do.

Stranger/ Some mimics know the thing they are impersonating; others do not. And could we find a more important distinction than that of knowing from not knowing?

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ And the mimicry we have just mentioned goes with knowledge, for to impersonate you, one must be acquainted with you and your traits.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And what of the traits of justice and of virtue generally? Are there not many who, having no knowledge of virtue but only some sort of opinion about it, zealously set about making it appear that they embody virtue as they conceive it, mimicking it as effectively as they can in their words and actions?

Theaetetus/ Only too many.

Stranger/ And are they always unsuccessful in appearing to be virtuous when they are not really virtuous at all? Do they not rather succeed perfectly?

Theaetetus/ They do.

Stranger/ We must, then, distinguish the ignorant mimic from the other, who has knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Where, then, must we look for a suitable name for each? No doubt it is hard to find one, because the ancients, it would seem, suffered from a certain laziness and lack of discrimination with regard to the division of kinds by forms, and not one of them even tried to make such divisions, with the result that there is a serious shortage of names. However, though the expression may seem daring, for purposes of distinction let us call mimicry guided by opinion 'conceit mimicry,' and the sort that is guided by knowledge 'mimicry by acquaintance.'

Theaetetus/ So be it.

Stranger/ It is the former, then, that concerns us, for the Sophist was not among those who have knowledge, but he has a place among mimics.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then let us take this conceit mimic and see if his metal rings sound or there is still a crack in it somewhere.

Theaetetus/ Let us do so.

Stranger/ Well, there is a gaping crack. There is the simple-minded type who imagines that what he believes is knowledge, and an opposite type who is versed in discussion, so that his attitude betrays no little misgiving and suspicion that the knowledge he has the air of possessing in the eyes of the world is really ignorance.

Theaetetus/ Certainly both the types you describe exist.

Stranger/ We may, then, set down one of these mimics as sincere, the other as insincere.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Stranger/ And the insincere—is he of two kinds or only one?

Theaetetus/ That is for you to consider.

Stranger/ I will, and I can clearly make out a pair of them. I see one who can keep up his dissimulation publicly in long speeches to a large assembly. The other uses short arguments in private and forces others to contradict themselves in conversation.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ And with whom shall we identify the more longwinded type—with the statesman or with the demagogue?

Theaetetus/ The demagogue.

Stranger/ And what shall we call the other—wise man or Sophist?

Theaetetus/ We cannot surely call him wise, because we set him down as ignorant, but as a mimic of the wise man he will clearly assume a title derived from his, and I now see that here at last is the man who must be truly described as the real and genuine Sophist.

Stranger/ Shall we, then, as before collect all the elements of his description, from the end to the beginning, and draw our threads together in a knot?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ The art of contradiction making, descended from an insincere kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from image making, distinguished as a portion, not divine but human, of

production, that presents a shadow play of words—such are the blood and lineage which can, with perfect truth, be assigned to the authentic Sophist.

Theaetetus/ I entirely agree.

The Sophist.

[OR ON BEING; LOGICAL]

Translated by Fowler, Harold North.

Persons of the Dialog.

Theodorus, Socrates,

An Elean Stranger,

Theaetetus.

Theodorus/ According to our yesterday's agreement, Socrates, we have come ourselves, as we were bound to do, and we bring also this man with us; he is a stranger from Elea, one of the followers of Parmenides and Zeno, and a real philosopher.

Socrates/ Are you not unwittingly bringing, as Homer says, some god, and no mere stranger, Theodorus? He says that the gods, and especially the god of strangers, enter into companionship with men who have a share of due reverence and that they behold the deeds, both violent and righteous, of mankind. So perhaps this companion of yours may be one of the higher powers, who comes to watch over and refute us because we are worthless in argument a kind of god of refutation.

Theodorus/ No, Socrates, that is not the strangers character; he is more reasonable than those who devote themselves to disputation. And though I do not think he is a god at all, I certainly do think he is divine, for I give that epithet to all philosophers.

Socrates/ And rightly, my friend. However, I fancy it is not much easier, if I may say so, to recognize this class, than that of the gods. For these men I mean those who are not feignedly but really philosophers appear

disguised in all sorts of shapes, thanks to the ignorance of the rest of mankind, and visit the cities, beholding from above the life of those below, and they seem to some to be of no worth and to others to be worth everything. And sometimes they appear disguised as statesmen and sometimes as sophists, and sometimes they may give some people the impression that they are altogether mad. But I should like to ask our stranger here, if agreeable to him, what people in his country thought about these matters, and what names they used.

Theodorus/ What matters do you mean?

Socrates/ Sophist, statesman, philosopher.

Theodorus/ What particular difficulty and what kind of difficulty in regard to them is it about which you had in mind to ask?

Socrates/ It is this; Did they consider all these one, or two, or, as there are three names, did they divide them into three classes and ascribe to each a class, corresponding to a single name?

Theodorus/ I think he has no objection to talking about them. What do you say, stranger?

Stranger/ Just what you did, Theodorus; for I have no objection, and it is not difficult to say that they considered them three. But it is no small or easy task to define clearly the nature of each.

Theodorus/ The fact is, Socrates, that by chance you have hit upon a question very like what we happened to be asking him before we came here; and he made excuses to us then, as he does now to you; though he admits that he has heard it thoroughly discussed and remembers what he heard.

Socrates/ In that case, stranger, do not refuse us the first favor we have asked; but just tell us this; Do you generally prefer to expound in a long uninterrupted speech of your own whatever you wish to explain to anyone, or do you prefer the method of questions? I was present once when Parmenides employed the latter method and carried on a splendid discussion. I was a young man then, and he was very old.

Stranger/ The method of dialogue, Socrates, is easier with an interlocutor who is tractable and gives no trouble; but otherwise I prefer the continuous speech by one person.

Socrates/ Well, you may choose whomever you please of those present; they will all respond pleasantly to you; but if you take my advice you will choose one of the young fellows, Theaetetus here, or any of the others who suits you.

Stranger/ Socrates, this is the first time I have come among you, and I am somewhat ashamed, instead of carrying on the discussion by merely giving brief replies to your questions, to deliver an extended, long drawn out speech, either as an address of my own or in reply to another, as if I were giving an exhibition; but I must, for really the present subject is not what one might expect from the form of the question, but is a matter for very long speech. On the other hand it seems unfriendly and discourteous to refuse a favor to you and these gentlemen, especially when you have spoken as you did. As for Theaetetus I accept him most willingly as interlocutor in view of my previous conversation with him and of your present recommendation.

Theaetetus/ But, stranger, by taking this course and following Socrates's suggestion will you please the others too?

Stranger/ I am afraid there is nothing more to be said about that, Theaetetus; but from now on, my talk will, I fancy, be addressed to you. And if you get tired and are bored by the length of the talk, do not blame me, but these friends of yours.

Theaetetus/ Oh, no, I do not think I shall get tired of it so easily, but if such a thing does happen, we will call in this Socrates, the namesake of the other Socrates; he is of my own age and my companion in the gymnasium, and is in the habit of working with me in almost everything.

Stranger/ Very well; you will follow your own devices about that as the discussion proceeds; but now you and I must investigate in common, beginning first, as it seems to me, with the sophist, and must search out and make plain by argument what he is. For as yet you and I have nothing in common about him but the name; but as to the thing to which we give the name, we may perhaps each have a conception of it in our own minds; however, we ought always in every instance to come to agreement about the thing itself by argument rather than about the mere name without argument. But the tribe which we now intend to search for, the sophist, is not the easiest thing in the world to catch and define, and everyone has agreed long ago that if investigations of great matters are to be properly worked out we ought to practice them on small and easier matters before attacking the very greatest. So now, Theaetetus, this is my advice to ourselves, since we think the family of sophists is troublesome and hard to catch, that we first

practice the method of hunting in something easier, unless you perhaps have some simpler way to suggest.

Theaetetus/ I have not.

Stranger/ Then shall we take some lesser thing and try to use it as a pattern for the greater?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well, then, what example can we set before us which is well known and small, but no less capable of definition than any of the greater things? Say an angler; is he not known to all and unworthy of any great interest?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But I hope he offers us a method and is capable of a definition not unsuitable to our purpose.

Theaetetus/ That would be good.

Stranger/ Come now; let us begin with him in this way; Tell me, shall we say that he is a man with an art, or one without an art, but having some other power?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not one without an art.

Stranger/ But of all arts there are, speaking generally, two kinds?

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Agriculture and all kinds of care of any living beings, and that which has to do with things which are put together or molded (utensils we call them), and the art of imitation all these might properly be called by one name.

Theaetetus/ How so, and what is the name?

Stranger/ When anyone brings into being something which did not previously exist, we say that he who brings it into being produces it and that which is brought into being is produced.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Now all the arts which we have just mentioned direct their energy to production.

Theaetetus/ Yes, they do.

Stranger/ Let us, then, call these collectively the productive art.

Theaetetus/ Agreed.

Stranger/ And after this comes the whole class of learning and that of acquiring knowledge, and money making, and fighting, and hunting. None of these is creative, but they are all engaged in coercing, by deeds or words, things which already exist and have been produced, or in preventing others from coercing them; therefore all these divisions together might very properly be called acquisitive art.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that would be proper.

Stranger/ Then since acquisitive and productive art comprise all the arts, in which, Theaetetus, shall we place the art of angling?

Theaetetus/ In acquisitive art, clearly.

Stranger/ And are there not two classes of acquisitive art one the class of exchange between voluntary agents by means of gifts and wages and purchases, and the other, which comprises all the rest of acquisitive art, and, since it coerces either by word or deed, might be called coercive?

Theaetetus/ It appears so, at any rate, from what you have said.

Stranger/ Well then, shall we not divide coercive art into two parts?

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ By calling all the open part of it fighting and all the secret part hunting.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But it would be unreasonable not to divide hunting into two parts.

Theaetetus/ Say how it can be done.

Stranger/ By dividing it into the hunting of the lifeless and of the living.

Theaetetus/ Certainly, if both exist.

Stranger/ Of course they exist. And we must pass over the hunting of lifeless things, which has no name, with the exception of some kinds of diving and the like, which are of little importance; but the hunting of living things we will call animal-hunting.

Theaetetus/ Very well.

Stranger/ And two classes of animal-hunting might properly be made, one (and this is divided under many classes and names) the hunting of creatures that go on their feet, land-animal hunting, and the other that of swimming creatures, to be called, as a whole, water-animal hunting?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And of swimming creatures we see that one tribe is winged and the other is in the water?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And the hunting of winged creatures is called, as a whole, fowling.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ And the hunting of water creatures goes by the general name of fishing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And might I not divide this kind of hunting into two principal divisions?

Theaetetus/ What divisions?

Stranger/ The one carries on the hunt by means of enclosures merely, the other by a blow.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean, and how do you distinguish the two?

Stranger/ As regards the first, because whatever surrounds anything and encloses it so as to constrain it is properly called an enclosure.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ May not, then, wicker baskets and seines and snares and nets and the like be called enclosures?

Theaetetus/ Assuredly.

Stranger/ Then we will call this division hunting by enclosures, or something of that sort.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the other, which is done with a blow, by means of hooks and three pronged spears, we must now to name it with a single word call striking; or could a better name be found, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Never mind the name; that will do well enough.

Stranger/ Then the kind of striking which takes place at night by the light of a fire is, I suppose, called by the hunters themselves fire-hunting.

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ And that which belongs to the daytime is, as a whole, barb-hunting, since the spears, as well as the hooks, are tipped with barbs.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it is so called.

Stranger/ Then of striking which belongs to barb-hunting that part which proceeds downward from above, is called, because tridents are chiefly used in it, tridentry, I suppose.

Theaetetus/ Yes, some people, at any rate, call it so.

Stranger/ Then there still remains, I may say, only one further kind.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ The kind that is characterized by the opposite sort of blow, which is practiced with a hook and strikes, not any chance part of the body of the fishes, as tridents do, but only the head and mouth of the fish caught, and proceeds from below upwards, being pulled up by twigs and rods. By what name, Theaetetus, shall we say this ought to be called?

Theaetetus/ I think our search is now ended and we have found the very thing we set before us a while ago as necessary to find.

Stranger/ Now, then, you and I are not only agreed about the name of angling, but we have acquired also a satisfactory definition of the thing itself. For of art as a whole, half was acquisitive, and of the acquisitive, half was coercive, and of the coercive, half was hunting, and of hunting, half was animal hunting, and of animal hunting, half was water hunting, and, taken as a whole, of water hunting the lower part was fishing, and of fishing, half was striking, and of striking, half was barb-hunting, and of this the part in which the blow is pulled from below upwards at an angle has a name in the very likeness of the act and is called angling, which was the object of our present search.

Theaetetus/ That at all events has been made perfectly clear.

Stranger/ Come, then, let us use this as a pattern and try to find out what a sophist is.

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ Well, then, the first question we asked was whether we must assume that the angler was just a man or was a man with an art.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Now take this man of ours, Theaetetus. Shall we assume that he is just a man, or by all means really a man of wisdom?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not just a man; for I catch your meaning that he is very far from being wise, although his name implies wisdom.

Stranger/ But we must, it seems, assume that he has an art of some kind.

Theaetetus/ Well, then, what in the world is this art that he has?

Stranger/ Good gracious! Have we failed to notice that the man is akin to the other man?

Theaetetus/ Who is akin to whom?

Stranger/ The angler to the sophist.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ They both seem clearly to me to be a sort of hunters.

Theaetetus/ What is the hunting of the second? We have spoken about the first.

Stranger/ We just now divided hunting as a whole into two classes, and made one division that of swimming creatures and the other that of land-hunting.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the one we discussed, so far as the swimming creatures that live in the water are concerned; but we left the land-hunting undivided, merely remarking that it has many forms.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Now up to that point the sophist and the angler proceed together from the starting-point of acquisitive art.

Theaetetus/ I think they do.

Stranger/ But they separate at the point of animal-hunting, where the one turns to the sea and rivers and lakes to hunt the animals in those.

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ But the other turns toward the land and to rivers of a different kind rivers of wealth and youth, bounteous meadows, as it were and he intends to coerce the creatures in them.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Of land-hunting there are two chief divisions.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One is the hunting of tame, the other of wild creatures.

Theaetetus/ Is there, then, a hunting of tame creatures?

Stranger/ Yes, if man is a tame animal; but make any assumption you like, that there is no tame animal, or that some other tame animal exists but man is a wild one or that man is tame but there is no hunting of man. For the purpose of our definition choose whichever of these statements you think is satisfactory to you.

Theaetetus/ Why, Stranger, I think we are a tame animal, and I agree that there is a hunting of man.

Stranger/ Let us, then, say that the hunting of tame animals is also of two kinds.

Theaetetus/ How do we justify that assertion?

Stranger/ By defining piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, and the whole art of war all collectively as hunting by force.

Theaetetus/ Excellent.

Stranger/ And by giving the art of the law courts, of the public platform, and of conversation also a single name and calling them all collectively an art of persuasion.

Theaetetus/ Correct.

Stranger/ Now let us say that there are two kinds of persuasion.

Theaetetus/ What kinds?

Stranger/ The one has to do with private persons, the other with the community.

Theaetetus/ Granted; each of them does form a class.

Stranger/ Then again of the hunting of private persons one kind receives pay, and the other brings gifts, does it not?

Theaetetus/ I do not understand.

Stranger/ Apparently you have never yet paid attention to the lovers method of hunting.

Theaetetus/ In what respect?

Stranger/ That in addition to their other efforts they give presents to those whom they hunt.

Theaetetus/ You are quite right.

Stranger/ Let us, then, call this the amatory art.

Theaetetus/ Agreed.

Stranger/ But that part of the paid kind which converses to furnish gratification and makes pleasure exclusively its bait and demands as its pay only maintenance, we might all agree, if I am not mistaken, to call the art of flattery or of making things pleasant.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But the class which proposes to carry on its conversations for the sake of virtue and demands its pay in cash does not this deserve to be called by another name?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And what is that name? Try to tell.

Theaetetus/ It is obvious; for I think we have discovered the sophist. And therefore by uttering that word I think I should give him the right name.

Stranger/ Then, as it seems, according to our present reasoning, Theaetetus, the part of appropriative, coercive, hunting art which hunts animals, land animals, tame animals, man, privately, for pay, is paid in cash, claims to give education, and is a hunt after rich and promising youths, must so our present argument concludes be called sophistry.

Theaetetus/ Most assuredly.

Stranger/ But let us look at it in still another way; for the class we are now examining partakes of no mean art, but of a very many-sided one. And we must indeed do so, for in our previous talk it presents an appearance of being, not what we now say it is, but another class.

Theaetetus/ HOW SO?

Stranger/ The acquisitive art was of two sorts, the one the division of hunting, the other that of exchange.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it was.

Stranger/ Now shall we say that there are two sorts of exchange, the one by gift, the other by sale?

Theaetetus/ So be it.

Stranger/ And we shall say further that exchange by sale is divided into two parts.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ We make this distinction calling the part which sells a man's own productions the selling of one's own, and the other, which exchanges the works of others, exchange.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Well, then, that part of exchange which is carried on in the city, amounting to about half of it, is called retailing, is it not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And that which exchanges goods from city to city by purchase and sale is called merchandising?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And have we not observed that one part of merchandising sells and exchanges for cash whatever serves the body for its support and needs, and the other whatever serves the soul?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by that?

Stranger/ Perhaps we do not know about the part that has to do with the soul; though I fancy we do understand the other division.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Take, therefore, the liberal arts in general that constantly go about from city to city, bought in one place and carried to another and sold painting, and conjuring, and the many other things that affect the soul, which are imported and sold partly for its entertainment and partly for its serious needs; we cannot deny that he who carries these about and sells them constitutes a merchant properly so called, no less than he whose business is the sale of food and drink.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Then will you give the same name to him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ One part of this soul-merchandising might very properly be called the art of display, might it not? But since the other part, though no less ridiculous than the first, is nevertheless a traffic in knowledge, must we not call it by some name akin to its business?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Now of this merchandising in knowledge the part which has to do with the knowledge of the other arts should be called by one name, and that which has to do with virtue by another.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ The name of art-merchant would fit the one who trades in the other arts, and now do you be so good as to tell the name of him who trades in virtue.

Theaetetus/ And what other name could one give, without making a mistake, than that which is the object of our present investigation the sophist?

Stranger/ No other. Come then, let us now summarize the matter by saying that sophistry has appeared a second time as that part of acquisitive art, art of exchange, of trafficking, of merchandising, of soul merchandising which deals in words and knowledge, and trades in virtue.

Theaetetus/ Very well.

Stranger/ But there is a third case; If a man settled down here in town and proposed to make his living by selling these same wares of knowledge, buying some of them and making others himself, you would, I fancy, not call him by any other name than that which you used a moment ago.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ Then also that part of acquisitive art which proceeds by exchange, and by sale, whether as mere retail trade or the sale of one's own productions, no matter which, so long as it is of the class of merchandising in knowledge, you will always, apparently, call sophistry.

Theaetetus/ I must do so, for I have to follow where the argument leads.

Stranger/ Let us examine further and see if the class we are now pursuing has still another aspect, of similar nature.

Theaetetus/ Of what nature?

Stranger/ We agreed that fighting was a division of acquisitive art.

Theaetetus/ Yes, we did.

Stranger/ Then it is quite fitting to divide it into two parts.

Theaetetus/ Tell what the parts are.

Stranger/ Let us call one part of it the competitive and the other the pugnacious.

Theaetetus/ Agreed.

Stranger/ Then it is reasonable and fitting to give to that part of the pugnacious which consists of bodily contests some such name as violent.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And what other name than controversy shall we give to the contests of words?

Theaetetus/ No other.

Stranger/ But controversy must be divided into two kinds.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ Whenever long speeches are opposed by long speeches on questions of justice and injustice in public, that is forensic controversy.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But that which is carried on among private persons and is cut up into little bits by means of questions and their answers, we are accustomed to call argumentation, are we not?

Theaetetus/ We are.

Stranger/ And that part of argumentation which deals with business contracts, in which there is controversy, to be sure, but it is carried on informally and without rules of art all that must be considered a distinct class, now that our argument has recognized it as different from the rest, but it received no name from our predecessors, nor does it now deserve to receive one from us.

Theaetetus/ True; for the divisions into which it falls are too small and too miscellaneous.

Stranger/ But that which possesses rules of art and carries on controversy about abstract justice and injustice and the rest in general terms, we are accustomed to call disputation, are we not?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Well, of disputation, one sort wastes money, the other makes money.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then let us try to tell the name by which we must call each of these.

Theaetetus/ Yes, we must do so.

Stranger/ Presumably the kind which causes a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of engaging in it, but the style of which causes no pleasure to most of his hearers, is, in my opinion, called by no other name than garrulity.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is about what it is called.

Stranger/ Then the opposite of this, the kind which makes money from private disputes try now, for it is your turn, to give its name.

Theaetetus/ What other answer could one give without making a mistake, than that now again for the fourth time that wonderful being whom we have so long been pursuing has turned up the sophist!

Stranger/ Yes, and the sophist is nothing else, apparently, than the money-making class of the disputatious, argumentative, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive art, as our argument has now again stated.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Do you see the truth of the statement that this creature is many-sided and, as the saying is, not to be caught with one hand?

Theaetetus/ Then we must catch him with both.

Stranger/ Yes, we must, and must go at it with all our might, by following another track of his in this way. Tell me; of the expressions connected with menial occupations some are in common use, are they not?

Theaetetus/ Yes, many. But to which of the many does your question refer?

Stranger/ To such as these; we say sift and strain and winnow and separate.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And besides these there are card and comb and beat the web and countless other technical terms which we know. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Why do you use these as examples and ask about them all? What do you wish to show in regard to them?

Stranger/ All those that I have mentioned imply a notion of division.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then since there is, according to my reckoning, one art involved in all of these operations, let us give it one name.

Theaetetus/ What shall we call it?

Stranger/ The art of discrimination.

Theaetetus/ Very well.

Stranger/ Now see if we can discover two divisions of this.

Theaetetus/ You demand quick thinking, for a boy like me.

Stranger/ And yet, in the instance of discrimination just mentioned there was, first, the separation of worse from better, and, secondly, of like from like.

Theaetetus/ Yes, as you now express it, that is pretty clear.

Stranger/ Now I know no common name for the second kind of discrimination; but I do know the name of the kind which retains the better and throws away the worse.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ Every such discrimination, as I think, is universally called a sort of purification.

Theaetetus/ Yes, so it is.

Stranger/ And could not anyone see that purification is of two kinds?

Theaetetus/ Yes, perhaps, in time; but still I do not see it now.

Stranger/ Still there are many kinds of purifications of bodies, and they may all properly be included under one name.

Theaetetus/ What are they and what is the name?

Stranger/ The purification of living creatures, having to do with impurities within the body, such as are successfully discriminated by gymnastics and medicine, and with those outside of the body, not nice to speak of, such as are attended to by the bath-keepers art; and the purification of inanimate bodies, which is the special care of the fullers art and in general of the art of exterior decoration; this, with its petty subdivisions, has taken on many names which seem ridiculous.

Theaetetus/ Very.

Stranger/ Certainly they do, Theaetetus. However, the method of argument is neither more nor less concerned with the art of medicine than with that of sponging, but is indifferent if the one benefits us little, the other greatly by its purifying. It endeavors to understand what is related and what is not related in all arts, for the purpose of acquiring intelligence; and therefore it honors them all equally and does not in making comparisons think one more ridiculous than another, and does not consider him who employs, as his example of hunting, the art of generalship, any more dignified than him who employs the art of louse-catching, but only, for the most part, as more pretentious. And now as to your question, what name we shall give to all the activities whose function it is to purify the body, whether animate or inanimate, it will not matter at all to our method what name sounds finest; it cares only to unite under one name all purifications of everything else and to keep them separate from the purification of the soul. For it has in our present discussion been trying to separate this purification definitely from the rest, if we understand its desire.

Theaetetus/ But I do understand and I agree that there are two kinds of purification and that one kind is the purification of the soul, which is separate from that of the body.

Stranger/ Most excellent. Now pay attention to the next point and try again to divide the term.

Theaetetus/ In whatever way you suggest, I will try to help you in making the division.

Stranger/ Do we say that wickedness is distinct from virtue in the soul?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And purification was retaining the one and throwing out whatever is bad anywhere?

Theaetetus/ Yes, it was.

Stranger/ Hence whenever we find any removal of evil from the soul, we shall be speaking properly if we call that a purification.

Theaetetus/ Very properly.

Stranger/ We must say that there are two kinds of evil in the soul.

Theaetetus/ What kinds?

Stranger/ The one is comparable to a disease in the body, the other to a deformity.

Theaetetus/ I do not understand.

Stranger/ Perhaps you have not considered that disease and discord are the same thing?

Theaetetus/ I do not know what reply I ought to make to this, either.

Stranger/ Is that because you think discord is anything else than the disagreement of the naturally related, brought about by some corruption?

Theaetetus/ No; I think it is nothing else.

Stranger/ But is deformity anything else than the presence of the quality of disproportion, which is always ugly?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else at all.

Stranger/ Well then; do we not see that in the souls of worthless men opinions are opposed to desires, anger to pleasures, reason to pain, and all such things to one another?

Theaetetus/ Yes, they are, decidedly.

Stranger/ Yet they must all be naturally related.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then we shall be right if we say that wickedness is a discord and disease of the soul.

Theaetetus/ Yes, quite right.

Stranger/ But if things which partake of motion and aim at some particular mark pass beside the mark and miss it on every occasion when they try to hit it, shall we say that this happens to them through right proportion to one another or, on the contrary, through disproportion?

Theaetetus/ Evidently through disproportion.

Stranger/ But yet we know that every soul, if ignorant of anything, is ignorant against its will.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ Now being ignorant is nothing else than the aberration of a soul that aims at truth, when the understanding passes beside the mark.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Then we must regard a foolish soul as deformed and ill-proportioned.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Stranger/ Then there are, it appears, these two kinds of evils in the soul, one, which people call wickedness, which is very clearly a disease.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the other they call ignorance, but they are not willing to acknowledge that it is vice, when it arises only in the soul.

Theaetetus/ It must certainly be admitted, though I disputed it when you said it just now, that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that cowardice,

intemperance, and injustice must all alike be considered a disease in us, and the widespread and various condition of ignorance must be regarded as a deformity.

Stranger/ In the case of the body there are two arts which have to do with these two evil conditions, are there not?

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ For deformity there is gymnastics, and for disease medicine.

Theaetetus/ That is clear.

Stranger/ Hence for insolence and injustice and cowardice is not the corrective art the one of all arts most closely related to Justice?

Theaetetus/ Probably it is, at least according to the judgment of mankind.

Stranger/ And for all sorts of ignorance is there any art it would be more correct to suggest than that of instruction?

Theaetetus/ No, none.

Stranger/ Come now, think. Shall we say that there is only one kind of instruction, or that there are more and that two are the most important?

Theaetetus/ I am thinking.

Stranger/ I think we can find out most quickly in this way.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ By seeing whether ignorance admits of being cut in two in the middle; for if ignorance turns out to be twofold, it is clear that instruction must also consist of two parts, one for each part of ignorance.

Theaetetus/ Well, can you see what you are now looking for?

Stranger/ I at any rate think I do see one large and grievous kind of ignorance, separate from the rest, and as weighty as all the other parts put together.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ Thinking that one knows a thing when one does not know it. Through this, I believe, all the mistakes of the mind are caused in all of us.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And furthermore to this kind of ignorance alone the name of stupidity is given.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Now what name is to be given to that part of instruction which gets rid of this?

Theaetetus/ I think, Stranger, that the other part is called instruction in handicraft, and that this part is here at Athens through our influence called education.

Stranger/ And so it is, Theaetetus, among nearly all the Hellenes. But we must examine further and see whether it is one and indivisible or still admits of division important enough to have a name.

Theaetetus/ Yes, we must see about that.

Stranger/ I think there is still a way in which this also may be divided.

Theaetetus/ On what principle?

Stranger/ Of instruction in arguments one method seems to be rougher, and the other section smoother.

Theaetetus/ What shall we call each of these?

Stranger/ The venerable method of our fathers, which they generally employed towards their sons, and which many still employ, of sometimes showing anger

at their errors and sometimes more gently exhorting them that would most properly be called as a whole admonition.

Theaetetus/ That is true.

Stranger/ On the other hand, some appear to have convinced themselves that all ignorance is involuntary, and that he who thinks himself wise would never be willing to learn any of those things in which he believes he is clever, and that the admonitory kind of education takes a deal of trouble and accomplishes little.

Theaetetus/ They are quite right.

Stranger/ So they set themselves to cast out the conceit of cleverness in another way.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ They question a man about the things about which he thinks he is talking sense when he is talking nonsense; then they easily discover that his opinions are like those of men who wander, and in their discussions they collect those opinions and compare them with one another, and by the comparison they show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things and in respect to the same things. But those who see this grow angry with themselves and gentle towards others, and this is the way in which they are freed from their high and obstinate opinions about themselves. The process of freeing them, moreover, affords the greatest pleasure to the listeners and the most lasting benefit to him who is subjected to it. For just as physicians who care for the body believe that the body cannot get benefit from any food offered to it until all obstructions are removed, so, my boy, those who purge the soul believe that the soul can receive no benefit from any teachings offered to it

until someone by cross-questioning reduces him who is cross-questioned to an attitude of modesty, by removing the opinions that obstruct the teachings, and thus purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.

Theaetetus/ That is surely the best and most reasonable state of mind.

Stranger/ For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must assert that cross-questioning is the greatest and most efficacious of all purifications, and that he who is not cross-questioned, even though he be the Great King, has not been purified of the greatest taints, and is therefore uneducated and deformed in those things in which he who is to be truly happy ought to be most pure and beautiful.

Theaetetus/ Perfectly true.

Stranger/ Well then, who are those who practice this art? I am afraid to say the sophists.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ Lest we grant them too high a meed of honor.

Theaetetus/ But the description you have just given is very like someone of that sort.

Stranger/ Yes, and a wolf is very like a dog, the wildest like the tamest of animals. But the cautious man must be especially on his guard in the matter of resemblances, for they are very slippery things. However, let us agree that they are the sophists; for I think the strife will not be about petty discriminations when people are sufficiently on their guard.

Theaetetus/ No, probably not.

Stranger/ Then let it be agreed that part of the discriminating art is purification, and as part of purification let that which is concerned with the soul be separated off, and as part of this, instruction, and as part of instruction, education; and let us agree that the cross-questioning of empty conceit of wisdom, which has come to light in our present discussion, is nothing else than the true-born art of sophistry.

Theaetetus/ Let us agree to all that; but the sophist has by this time appeared to be so many things that I am at a loss to know what in the world to say he really is, with any assurance that I am speaking the truth.

Stranger/ No wonder you are at a loss. But it is fair to suppose that by this time he is still more at a loss to know how he can any longer elude our argument; for the proverb is right which says it is not easy to escape all the wrestlers grips. So now we must attack him with redoubled vigor.

Theaetetus/ You are right.

Stranger/ First, then, let us stop to take breath and while we are resting let us count up the number of forms in which the sophist has appeared to us. First, I believe, he was found to be a paid hunter after the young and wealthy.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And secondly a kind of merchant in articles of knowledge for the soul.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And thirdly did he not turn up as a retailer of these same articles of knowledge?

Theaetetus/ Yes, and fourthly we found he was a seller of his own productions of knowledge.

Stranger/ Your memory is good; but I will try to recall the fifth case myself. He was an athlete in contests of words, who had taken for his own the art of disputation.

Theaetetus/ Yes, he was.

Stranger/ The sixth case was doubtful, but nevertheless we agreed to consider him a purger of souls, who removes opinions that obstruct learning.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Then do you see that when a man appears to know many things, but is called by the name of a single art, there is something wrong about this impression, and that, in fact, the person who labors under this impression in connection with any art is clearly unable to see the common principle of the art, to which all these kinds of knowledge pertain, so that he calls him who possesses them by many names instead of one?

Theaetetus/ Something like that is very likely to be the case.

Stranger/ We must not let that happen to us in our search through lack of diligence. So let us first take up again one of our statements about the sophist. For there is one of them which seemed to me to designate him most plainly.

Theaetetus/ Which was it?

Stranger/ I think we said he was a disputer.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And did we not also say that he taught this same art of disputing to others?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Now let us examine and see what the subjects are about which such men say they make their pupils able to dispute. Let us begin our examination at the beginning with this question; Is it about divine things which are invisible to others that they make people able to dispute?

Theaetetus/ That is their reputation, at any rate.

Stranger/ And how about the visible things of earth and heaven and the like?

Theaetetus/ Those are included, of course.

Stranger/ And furthermore in private conversations, when the talk is about generation and being in general, we know (do we not?) that they are clever disputants themselves and impart equal ability to others.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And how about laws and public affairs in genera]? Do they not promise to make men able to argue about those?

Theaetetus/ Yes, for nobody, to speak broadly, would attend their classes if they did not make that promise.

Stranger/ However in all arts jointly and severally what the professional ought to answer to every opponent is written down somewhere and published that he who will may learn.

Theaetetus/ You seem to refer to the text-books of Protagoras on wrestling and the other arts.

Stranger/ Yes, my friend, and to those of many other authors. But is not the art of disputation, in a word, a trained ability for arguing about all things?

Theaetetus/ Well, at any rate, it does not seem to leave much out.

Stranger/ For heaven's sake, my boy, do you think that is possible? For perhaps you young people may look at the matter with sharper vision than our duller sight.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean and just what do you refer to? I do not yet understand your question.

Stranger/ I ask whether it is possible for a man to know all things.

Theaetetus/ If that were possible, Stranger, ours would indeed be a blessed race.

Stranger/ How, then, can one who is himself ignorant say anything worthwhile in arguing with one who knows?

Theaetetus/ He cannot at all.

Stranger/ Then what in the world can the magical power of the sophistical art be?

Theaetetus/ Magical power in what respect?

Stranger/ In the way in which they are able to make young men think that they themselves are in all matters the wisest of men. For it is clear that if they neither disputed correctly nor seemed to the young men to do so, or again if they did seem to dispute rightly but were not considered wiser on that account, nobody, to quote from you, would care to pay them money to become their pupil in these subjects.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ But now people do care to do so?

Theaetetus/ Very much.

Stranger/ Yes, for they are supposed, I fancy, to have knowledge themselves of the things about which they dispute.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And they do that about all things, do they not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then they appear to their pupils to be wise in all things.

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ Though they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.

Theaetetus/ Of course it is impossible.

Stranger/ Then it is a sort of knowledge based upon mere opinion that the sophist has been shown to possess about all things, not true knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Certainly; and I shouldn't be surprised if that were the most accurate statement we have made about him so far.

Stranger/ Let us then take a clearer example to explain this.

Theaetetus/ What sort of an example?

Stranger/ This one; and try to pay attention and to give a very careful answer to my question.

Theaetetus/ What is the question?

Stranger/ If anyone should say that by virtue of a single art he knew how, not to assert or dispute, but to do and make all things.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by all things?

Stranger/ You fail to grasp the very beginning of what I said; for apparently you do not understand the word all.

Theaetetus/ No, I do not.

Stranger/ I mean you and me among the all, and the other animals besides, and the trees.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ If one should say that he would make you and me and all other created beings.

Theaetetus/ What would he mean by making? Evidently you will not say that he means a husbandman; for you said he was a maker of animals also.

Stranger/ Yes, and of sea and earth and heaven and gods and everything else besides; and, moreover, he makes them all quickly and sells them for very little.

Theaetetus/ This is some joke of yours.

Stranger/ Yes? And when a man says that he knows all things and can teach them to another for a small price in a little time, must we not consider that a joke?

Theaetetus/ Surely we must.

Stranger/ And is there any more artistic or charming kind of joke than the imitative kind?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not; for it is of very frequent occurrence and, if I may say so, most diverse. Your expression is very comprehensive.

Stranger/ And so we recognize that he who professes to be able by virtue of a single art to make all things will be able by virtue of the painters art, to make imitations which have the same names as the real things, and by showing the pictures at a distance will be able to deceive the duller ones among young children into the belief that he is perfectly able to accomplish in fact whatever he wishes to do.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Well then, may we not expect to find that there is another art which has to do with words, by virtue of which it is possible to bewitch the young

through their ears with words while they are still standing at a distance from the realities of truth, by exhibiting to them spoken images of all things, so as to make it seem that they are true and that the speaker is the wisest of all men in all things?

Theaetetus/ Why should there not be such another art?

Stranger/ Now most of the hearers, Theaetetus, when they have lived longer and grown older, will perforce come closer to realities and will be forced by sad experience openly to lay hold on realities; they will have to change the opinions which they had at first accepted, so that what was great will appear small and what was easy, difficult, and all the apparent truths in arguments will be turned topsy-turvy by the facts that have come upon them in real life. Is not this true?

Theaetetus/ Yes, at least so far as one of my age can judge. But I imagine I am one of those who are still standing at a distance.

Stranger/ Therefore all of us elders here will try, and are now trying, to bring you as near as possible without the sad experience. So answer this question about the sophist; Is this now clear, that he is a kind of a juggler, an imitator of realities, or are we still uncertain whether he may not truly possess the knowledge of all the things about which he seems to be able to argue?

Theaetetus/ How could that be, my dear sir? Surely it is pretty clear by this time from what has been said that he is one of those whose business is entertainment.

Stranger/ That is to say, he must be classed as a juggler and imitator.

Theaetetus/ Of course he must.

Stranger/ Look sharp, then; it is now our business not to let the beast get away again, for we have almost got him into a kind of encircling net of the devices we employ in arguments about such subjects, so that he will not now escape the next thing.

Theaetetus/ What next thing?

Stranger/ The conclusion that he belongs to the class of conjurers.

Theaetetus/ I agree to that opinion of him, too.

Stranger/ It is decided, then, that we will as quickly as possible divide the image-making art and go down into it, and if the sophist stands his ground against us at first, we will seize him by the orders of reason, our king, then deliver him up to the king and display his capture. But if he tries to take cover in any of the various sections of the imitative art, we must follow him, always dividing the section into which he has retreated, until he is caught. For assuredly neither he nor any other creature will ever boast of having escaped from pursuers who are able to follow up the pursuit in detail and everywhere in this methodical way.

Theaetetus/ You are right. That is what we must do.

Stranger/ To return, then, to our previous method of division, I think I see this time also two classes of imitation, but I do not yet seem to be able to make out in which of them the form we are seeking is to be found.

Theaetetus/ Please first make the division and tell us what two classes you mean.

Stranger/ I see the likeness-making art as one part of imitation. This is met with, as a rule, whenever anyone produces the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and

depth, and giving, besides, the appropriate colors to each part.

Theaetetus/ Yes, but do not all imitators try to do this?

Stranger/ Not those who produce some large work of sculpture or painting. For if they reproduced the true proportions of beautiful forms, the upper parts, you know, would seem smaller and the lower parts larger than they ought, because we see the former from a distance, the latter from near at hand.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ So the artists abandon the truth and give their figures not the actual proportions but those which seem to be beautiful, do they not?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ That, then, which is other, but like, we may fairly call a likeness, may we not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the part of imitation which is concerned with such things, is to be called, as we called it before, likeness-making?

Theaetetus/ It is to be so called.

Stranger/ Now then, what shall we call that which appears, because it is seen from an unfavorable position, to be like the beautiful, but which would not even be likely to resemble that which it claims to be like, if a person were able to see such large works adequately? Shall we not call it, since it appears, but is not like, an appearance?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And this is very common in painting and in all imitation?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And to the art which produces appearance, but not likeness, the most correct name we could give would be fantastic art, would it not?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ These, then, are the two forms of the image-making art that I meant, the likeness-making and the fantastic.

Theaetetus/ You are right.

Stranger/ But I was uncertain before in which of the two the sophist should be placed, and even now I cannot see clearly. The fellow is really wonderful and very difficult to keep in sight, for once more, in the very cleverest manner he has withdrawn into a baffling classification where it is hard to track him.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Stranger/ Do you assent because you recognize the fact, or did the force of habit hurry you along to a speedy assent?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean, and why did you say that?

Stranger/ We are really, my dear friend, engaged in a very difficult investigation; for the matter of appearing and seeming, but not being, and of saying things, but not true ones all this is now and always has been very perplexing. You see, Theaetetus, it is extremely difficult to understand how a man is to say or think that falsehood really exists and in saying this not be involved in contradiction.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ This statement involves the bold assumption that not-being exists, for otherwise

falsehood could not come into existence. But the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we were children to the end of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse;

> Never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is;
>
> But keep your mind from this way of investigation.

So that is his testimony, and a reasonable examination of the statement itself would make it most absolutely clear. Let us then consider this matter first, if its all the same to you.

Theaetetus/ Assume my consent to anything you wish. Consider only the argument, how it may best be pursued; follow your own course, and take me along with you.

Stranger/ Very well, then. Now tell me; do we venture to use the phrase absolute not-being?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ If, then, not merely for the sake of discussion or as a joke, but seriously, one of his pupils were asked to consider and answer the question To what is the designation not-being to be applied? how do we think he would reply to his questioner, and how would he apply the term, for what purpose, and to what object?

Theaetetus/ That is a difficult question; I may say that for a fellow like me it is unanswerable.

Stranger/ But this is clear, anyhow, that the term not-being cannot be applied to any being.

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Stranger/ And if not to being, then it could not properly be applied to something, either.

Theaetetus/ How could it?

Stranger/ And this is plain to us, that we always use the word something of some being, for to speak of something in the abstract, naked, as it were, and disconnected from all beings is impossible, is it not?

Theaetetus/ Yes, it is.

Stranger/ You assent because you recognize that he who says something must say some one thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And you will agree that something or some in the singular is the sign of one, in the dual of two, and in the plural of many.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And he who says not something, must quite necessarily say absolutely nothing.

Theaetetus/ Quite necessarily.

Stranger/ Then we cannot even concede that such a person speaks, but says nothing? We must even declare that he who undertakes to say not-being does not speak at all?

Theaetetus/ The argument could go no further in perplexity.

Stranger/ Boast not too soon! For there still remains, my friend, the first and greatest of perplexities. It affects the very beginning of the matter.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? Do not hesitate to speak.

Stranger/ To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ Now we assume that all number is among the things which are.

Theaetetus/ Yes, if anything can be assumed to be.

Stranger/ Then let us not even undertake to attribute either the singular or the plural of number to not-being.

Theaetetus/ We should, apparently, not be right in undertaking that, as our argument shows.

Stranger/ How then could a man either utter in speech or even so much as conceive in his mind things which are not, or not-being, apart from number?

Theaetetus/ Tell me how number is involved in such conceptions.

Stranger/ When we say things which are not, do we not attribute plurality to them?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And in saying a thing which is not do we not equally attribute the singular number?

Theaetetus/ Obviously.

Stranger/ And yet we assert that it is neither right nor fair to undertake to attribute being to not-being.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Do you see, then, that it is impossible rightly to utter or to say or to think of not-being without any attribute, but it is a thing inconceivable, inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational?

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Then was I mistaken just now in saying that the difficulty I was going to speak of was the greatest in our subject?

Theaetetus/ But is there a still greater one that we can mention?

Stranger/ Why, my dear fellow, don't you see, by the very arguments we have used, that not-being reduces him who would refute it to such difficulties that when he attempts to refute it he is forced to contradict himself?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? Speak still more clearly.

Stranger/ You must not look for more clearness in me; for although I maintained that not-being could have nothing to do with either the singular or the plural number, I spoke of it just now, and am still speaking of it, as one; for I say that which is not. You understand surely?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And again a little while ago I said it was inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational. Do you follow me?

Theaetetus/ Yes, of course.

Stranger/ Then when I undertook to attach the verb to be to not-being I was contradicting what I said before.

Theaetetus/ Evidently.

Stranger/ Well, then; when I attached this verb to it, did I not address it in the singular?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And when I called it irrational, inexpressible, and unspeakable, I addressed my speech to it as singular.

Theaetetus/ Of course you did.

Stranger/ But we say that, if one is to speak correctly, one must not define it as either singular or plural, and must not even call it, it at all; for even by this manner of referring to it one would be giving it the form of the singular.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But poor me, what can anyone say of me any longer? For you would find me now, as always before, defeated in the refutation of not-being. So, as I said before, we must not look to me for correctness of speech about not-being. But come now, let us look to you for it.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Come, I beg of you, make a sturdy effort, young man as you are, and try with might and main to say something correctly about not-being, without attributing to it either existence or unity or plurality.

Theaetetus/ But I should be possessed of great and absurd eagerness for the attempt, if I were to undertake it with your experience before my eyes.

Stranger/ Well, if you like, let us say no more of you and me; but until we find someone who can accomplish this, let us confess that the sophist has in most rascally fashion hidden himself in a place we cannot explore.

Theaetetus/ That seems to be decidedly the case.

Stranger/ And so, if we say he has an art, as it were, of making appearances, he will easily take advantage of our poverty of terms to make a counter attack, twisting our words to the opposite meaning; when we call him an image-maker, he will ask us what we mean by image, exactly. So, Theaetetus, we must see what reply is to be made to the young man's question.

Theaetetus/ Obviously we shall reply that we mean the images in water and in mirrors, and those in paintings, too, and sculptures, and all the other things of the same sort.

Stranger/ It is evident, Theaetetus, that you never saw a sophist.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ He will make you think his eyes are shut or he has none at all.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ When you give this answer, if you speak of something in mirrors or works of art, he will laugh at your words, when you talk to him as if he could see. He will feign ignorance of mirrors and water and of sight altogether, and will question you only about that which is deduced from your words.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ That which exists throughout all these things which you say are many but which you saw fit to call by one name, when you said image of them all, as if they were all one thing. So speak and defend yourself. Do not give way to the man at all.

Theaetetus/ Why, Stranger, what can we say an image is, except another such thing fashioned in the likeness of the true one?

Stranger/ Do you mean another such true one, or in what sense did you say such?

Theaetetus/ Not a true one by any means, but only one like the true.

Stranger/ And by the true you mean that which really is?

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ And the not true is the opposite of the true?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ That which is like, then, you say does not really exist, if you say it is not true.

Theaetetus/ But it does exist, in a way.

Stranger/ But not truly, you mean.

Theaetetus/ No, except that it is really a likeness.

Stranger/ Then what we call a likeness, though not really existing, really does exist?

Theaetetus/ Not-being does seem to have got into some such entanglement with being, and it is very absurd.

Stranger/ Of course it is absurd. You see, at any rate, how by this interchange of words the many-headed sophist has once more forced us against our will to admit that not-being exists in a way.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I see that very well.

Stranger/ Well then, how can we define his art without contradicting ourselves?

Theaetetus/ Why do you say that? What are you afraid of?

Stranger/ When, in talking about appearance, we say that he deceives and that his art is an art of deception, shall we say that our mind is misled by his art to hold a false opinion, or what shall we say?

Theaetetus/ We shall say that. What else could we say?

Stranger/ But, again, false opinion will be that which thinks the opposite of reality, will it not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ You mean, then, that false opinion thinks things which are not?

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Stranger/ Does it think that things which are not, are not, or that things which are not at all, in some sense are?

Theaetetus/ It must think that things which are not in some sense are that is, if anyone is ever to think falsely at all, even in a slight degree.

Stranger/ And does it not also think that things which certainly are, are not at all?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And this too is falsehood?

Theaetetus/ Yes, it is.

Stranger/ And therefore a statement will likewise be considered false, if it declares that things which are, are not, or that things which are not, are.

Theaetetus/ In what other way could a statement be made false?

Stranger/ Virtually in no other way; but the sophist will not assent to this. Or how can any reasonable man assent to it, when the expressions we just agreed upon were previously agreed to be inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational, and inconceivable? Do we understand his meaning, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Of course we understand that he will say we are contradicting our recent statements, since we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words; for he will say that we are thus forced repeatedly to attribute being to not-being, although we agreed a while ago that nothing could be more impossible than that.

Stranger/ You are quite right to remind me. But I think it is high time to consider what ought to be done about the sophist; for you see how easily and repeatedly he can raise objections and difficulties, if we conduct our search by putting him in the guild of false-workers and jugglers.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Yes, we have gone through only a small part of them, and they are, if I may say so, infinite.

Theaetetus/ It would, apparently, be impossible to catch the sophist, if that is the case.

Stranger/ Well, then, shall we weaken and give up the struggle now?

Theaetetus/ No, I say; we must not do that, if we can in any way get the slightest hold of the fellow.

Stranger/ Will you then pardon me, and, as your words imply, be content if I somehow withdraw just for a short distance from this strong argument of his?

Theaetetus/ Of course I will.

Stranger/ I have another still more urgent request to make of you.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ Do not assume that I am becoming a sort of parricide.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not.

Theaetetus/ It is plain that some such contention is necessary.

Stranger/ Yes, plain even to a blind man, as they say; for unless these statements are either disproved or accepted, no one who speaks about false words, or false opinion whether images or likenesses or imitations or appearances or about the arts which have to do with them, can ever help being forced to contradict himself and make himself ridiculous.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ And so we must take courage and attack our fathers theory here and now, or else, if any scruples prevent us from doing this, we must give the whole thing up.

Theaetetus/ But nothing in the world must prevent us.

Stranger/ Then I have a third little request to make of you.

Theaetetus/ You have only to utter it.

Stranger/ I said a while ago that I always have been too faint-hearted for the refutation of this theory, and so I am now.

Theaetetus/ Yes, so you did.

Stranger/ I am afraid that on account of what I have said you will think I am mad because I have at once reversed my position. You see it is for your sake that I am going to undertake the refutation, if I succeed in it.

Theaetetus/ I certainly shall not think you are doing anything improper if you proceed to your refutation and proof; so go ahead boldly, so far as that is concerned.

Stranger/ Well, what would be a good beginning of a perilous argument? Ah, my boy, I believe the way we certainly must take is this.

Theaetetus/ What way?

Stranger/ We must first examine the points which now seem clear, lest we may have fallen into some confusion about them and may therefore carelessly agree with one another, thinking that we are judging correctly.

Theaetetus/ Express your meaning more clearly.

Stranger/ It seems to me that Parmenides and all who ever undertook a critical definition of the number and nature of realities have talked to us rather carelessly.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Every one of them seems to tell us a story, as if we were children. One says there are three principles, that some of them are sometimes waging a sort of war with each other, and sometimes become friends and marry and have children and bring them up; and another says there are two, wet and dry or hot and cold, which he settles together and unites in marriage. And the Eleatic sect in our region, beginning with Xenophanes and even earlier, have their story that all things, as they are called, are really one. Then some Ionian and later some Sicilian Muses reflected that it was safest to combine the two tales and to say that being is many and one, and is (or are) held together by enmity and friendship. For the more strenuous Muses say it is always simultaneously coming together and separating; but the gentler ones relaxed the strictness of the doctrine of perpetual strife; they say that the all is sometimes one and friendly, under the influence of Aphrodite, and sometimes many and at variance with itself by reason of some sort of strife. Now whether any of them spoke the truth in all this, or not, it is harsh and improper to impute to famous men of old such a

great wrong as falsehood. But one assertion can be made without offence.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ That they paid too little attention and consideration to the mass of people like ourselves. For they go on to the end, each in his own way, without caring whether their arguments carry us along with them, or whether we are left behind.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ When one of them says in his talk that many, or one, or two are, or have become, or are becoming, and again speaks of hot mingling with cold, and in some other part of his discourse suggests separations and combinations, for heaven's sake, Theaetetus, do you ever understand what they mean by any of these things? I used to think, when I was younger, that I understood perfectly whenever anyone used this term not-being, which now perplexes us. But you see what a slew of perplexity we are in about it now.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I see.

Stranger/ And perhaps our minds are in this same condition as regards being also; we may think that it is plain sailing and that we understand when the word is used, though we are in difficulties about not-being, whereas really we understand equally little of both.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps.

Stranger/ And we may say the same of all the subjects about which we have been speaking.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ We will consider most of them later, if you please, but now the greatest and foremost chief of them must be considered.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? Or, obviously, do you mean that we must first investigate the term being, and see what those who use it think it signifies?

Stranger/ You have caught ray meaning at once, Theaetetus. For I certainly do mean that this is the best method for us to use, by questioning them directly, as if they were present in person; so here goes; Come now, all you who say that hot and cold or any two such principles are the universe, what is this that you attribute to both of them when you say that both and each are? What are we to understand by this being (or are) of yours? Is this a third principle besides those two others, and shall we suppose that the universe is three, and not two any longer, according to your doctrine? For surely when you call one only of the two being you do not mean that both of them equally are; for in both cases they would pretty certainly be one and not two.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Well, then, do you wish to call both of them together being?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps.

Stranger/ But, friends, we will say, even in that way you would very clearly be saying that the two are one.

Theaetetus/ You are perfectly right.

Stranger/ Then since we are in perplexity, do you tell us plainly what you wish to designate when you say being. For it is clear that you have known this all along, whereas we formerly thought we knew, but are now perplexed. So first give us this information, that we may not think we understand what you say, when the exact opposite is the case. If we speak in this way and make this request of them and of all who say that the universe

is more than one, shall we, my boy, be doing anything improper?

Theaetetus/ Not in the least.

Stranger/ Well then, must we not, so far as we can, try to learn from those who say that the universe is one what they mean when they say being?

Theaetetus/ Of course we must.

Stranger/ Then let them answer this question; Do you say that one only is? We do, they will say; will they not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well then, do you give the name of being to anything?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Is it what you call one, using two names for the same thing, or how is this?

Theaetetus/ What is their next answer, Stranger?

Stranger/ It is plain, Theaetetus, that he who maintains their theory will not find it the easiest thing in the world to reply to our present question or to any other.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ It is rather ridiculous to assert that two names exist when you assert that nothing exists but unity.

Theaetetus/ Of course it is.

Stranger/ And in general there would be no sense in accepting the statement that a name has any existence.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And further, if he asserts that the name is the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name.

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Stranger/ And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it?

Theaetetus/ Of course they will and do say it is the same.

Stranger/ If then the whole is, as Parmenides says;

> On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere,
> equally weighted in every direction from the middle;
> for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that;

then being, being such as he describes it, has a center and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ But is it not impossible for that which is in this condition to be itself absolute unity?

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ Why surely that which is really one must, according to right reason, be affirmed to be absolutely without parts.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it must.

Stranger/ But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize with reason.

Theaetetus/ I understand.

Stranger/ Then shall we agree that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we deny that being is a whole at all?

Theaetetus/ It is a hard choice that you offer me.

Stranger/ That is very true; for being, having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as unity, and the all will be more than one.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And further, if being is not a whole through having had the attribute of unity imposed upon it, and the absolute whole exists, then it turns out that being lacks something of being.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And so, by this reasoning, since being is deprived of being, it will be not-being.

Theaetetus/ So it Will.

Stranger/ And again the all becomes more than the one, since being and the whole have acquired each its own nature.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But if the whole does not exist at all, being is involved in the same difficulties as before, and besides not existing it could not even have ever come into existence.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ That which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole. Therefore no one who does not reckon the whole among things that are can speak of existence or generation as being.

Theaetetus/ That certainly seems to be true.

Stranger/ And moreover, that which is not a whole cannot have any quantity at all; for if it has any quantity, whatever that quantity may be, it must necessarily be of that quantity as a whole.

Theaetetus/ Precisely.

Stranger/ And so countless other problems, each one involving infinite difficulties, will confront him who says that being is, whether it be two or only one.

Theaetetus/ The problems now in sight make that pretty clear; for each leads up to another which brings greater and more grievous wandering in connection with whatever has previously been said.

Stranger/ Now we have not discussed all those who treat accurately of being and not-being; however, let this suffice. But we must turn our eyes to those whose doctrines are less precise, that we may know from all sources that it is no easier to define the nature of being than that of not-being.

Theaetetus/ Very well, then, we must proceed towards those others also.

Stranger/ And indeed there seems to be a battle like that of the gods and the giants going on among them, because of their disagreement about existence.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Some of them drag down everything from heaven and the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and trees with their hands; for they lay their

hands on all such things and maintain stoutly that that alone exists which can be touched and handled; for they define existence and body, or matter, as identical, and if anyone says that anything else, which has no body, exists, they despise him utterly, and will not listen to any other theory than their own.

Theaetetus/ Terrible men they are of whom you speak. I myself have met with many of them.

Stranger/ Therefore those who contend against them defend themselves very cautiously with weapons derived from the invisible world above, maintaining forcibly that real existence consists of certain ideas which are only conceived by the mind and have no body. But the bodies of their opponents, and that which is called by them truth, they break up into small fragments in their arguments, calling them, not existence, but a kind of generation combined with motion. There is always, Theaetetus, a tremendous battle being fought about these questions between the two parties.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Let us, therefore, get from each party in turn a statement in defense of that which they regard as being.

Theaetetus/ How shall we get it?

Stranger/ It is comparatively easy to get it from those who say that it consists in ideas, for they are peaceful folk; but from those who violently drag down everything into matter, it is more difficult, perhaps even almost impossible, to get it. However, this is the way I think we must deal with them.

Theaetetus/ What way?

Stranger/ Our first duty would be to make them really better, if it were in any way possible; but if this cannot be done, let us pretend that they are better, by assuming that they would be willing to answer more in accordance with the rules of dialectic than they actually are. For the acknowledgement of anything by better men is more valid than if made by worse men. But it is not these men that we care about; we merely seek the truth.

Theaetetus/ Quite right.

Stranger/ Now tell them, assuming that they have become better, to answer you, and do you interpret what they say.

Theaetetus/ I will do so.

Stranger/ Let them tell whether they say there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

Theaetetus/ Of course they do.

Stranger/ And they agree that this is a body with a soul in it, do they not?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Giving to soul a place among things which exist?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well then, do they not say that one soul is just and another unjust, one wise and another foolish?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And do they not say that each soul becomes just by the possession and presence of justice, and the opposite by the possession and presence of the opposite?

Theaetetus/ Yes, they agree to this also.

Stranger/ But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists.

Theaetetus/ Yes, they say that.

Stranger/ Granting, then, that justice and wisdom and virtue in general and their opposites exist, and also, of course, the soul in which they become present, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible, or that they are all invisible?

Theaetetus/ That none of them is visible, or pretty nearly that.

Stranger/ Now here are some other questions. Do they say they possess anybody?

Theaetetus/ They no longer answer the whole of that question in the same way. They say they believe the soul itself has a sort of body, but as to wisdom and the other several qualities about which you ask, they have not the face either to confess that they have no existence or to assert that they are all bodies.

Stranger/ It is clear, Theaetetus, that our men have grown better; for the aboriginal sons of the dragon's teeth 1 among them would not shrink from any such utterance; they would maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all.

Theaetetus/ That is pretty nearly what they believe.

Stranger/ Then let us question them further; for if they are willing to admit that any existence, no matter how small, is incorporeal, that is enough. They will then have to tell what that is which is inherent in the incorporeal and the corporeal alike, and which they have in mind when they say that both exist. Perhaps they would be at a loss for an answer; and if they are in that condition, consider whether they might not accept

a suggestion if we offered it, and might not agree that the nature of being is as follows.

Theaetetus/ What is it? Speak, and we shall soon know.

Stranger/ I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else than power.

Theaetetus/ Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this.

Stranger/ Good; for perhaps later something else may occur both to them and to us. As between them and us, then, let us assume that this is for the present agreed upon and settled.

Theaetetus/ It is settled.

Stranger/ Then let us go to the others, the friends of ideas; and do you interpret for us their doctrines also.

Theaetetus/ I will.

Stranger/ You distinguish in your speech between generation and being, do you not?

Theaetetus/ Yes, we do.

Stranger/ And you say that with the body, by means of perception, we participate in generation, and with the soul, by means of thought, we participate in real being, which last is always unchanged and the same, whereas generation is different at different times.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is what we say.

Stranger/ But, most excellent men, how shall we define this participation which you attribute to both? Is it not that of which we were just speaking?

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ A passive or active condition arising out of some power which is derived from a combination of elements. Possibly, Theaetetus, you do not hear their reply to this, but I hear it, perhaps, because I am used to them.

Theaetetus/ What is it, then, that they say?

Stranger/ They do not concede to us what we said just now to the aboriginal giants about being.

Theaetetus/ What was it?

Stranger/ We set up as a satisfactory sort of definition of being, the presence of the power to act or be acted upon in even the slightest degree.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ It is in reply to this that they say generation participates in the power of acting and of being acted upon, but that neither power is connected with being.

Theaetetus/ And is there not something in that?

Stranger/ Yes, something to which we must reply that we still need to learn more clearly from them whether they agree that the soul knows and that being is known.

Theaetetus/ They certainly assent to that.

Stranger/ Well then, do you say that knowing or being known is an active or passive condition, or both? Or that one is passive and the other active?

Or that neither has any share at all in either of the two?

Theaetetus/ Clearly they would say that neither has any share in either; for otherwise they would be contradicting themselves.

Stranger/ I understand; this at least is true, that if to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive. Now being, since it is, according to this theory, known by the intelligence, in so far as it is known, is moved, since it is acted upon, which we say cannot be the case with that which is in a state of rest.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ But for heaven's sake, shall we let ourselves easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and mind are really not present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, but awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?

Theaetetus/ That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.

Stranger/ But shall we say that it has mind, but not life?

Theaetetus/ How can we?

Stranger/ But do we say that both of these exist in it, and yet go on to say that it does not possess them in a soul?

Theaetetus/ But how else can it possess them?

Stranger/ Then shall we say that it has mind and life and soul, but, although endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable?

Theaetetus/ All those things seem to me absurd.

Stranger/ And it must be conceded that motion and that which is moved exist.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then the result is, Theaetetus, that if there is no motion, there is no mind in anyone about anything anywhere.

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ And on the other hand, if we admit that all things are in flux and motion, we shall remove mind itself from the number of existing things by this theory also.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Do you think that sameness of quality or nature or relations could ever come into existence without the state of rest?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Stranger/ What then? Without these can you see how mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Stranger/ And yet we certainly must contend by every argument against him who does away with knowledge or reason or mind and then makes any dogmatic assertion about anything.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then the philosopher, who pays the highest honor to these things, must necessarily, as it seems, because of them refuse to accept the theory of those who say the universe is at rest, whether as a unity or in many forms, and must also refuse utterly to listen to those who say that being is universal motion; he must quote the children's prayer, “all things immovable and in motion,” and must say that being and the universe consist of both.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Do we not, then, seem to have attained at last a pretty good definition of being?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But dear me, Theaetetus! I think we are now going to discover the difficulty of the inquiry about being.

Theaetetus/ What is this again? What do you mean?

Stranger/ My dear fellow, don't you see that we are now densely ignorant about it, but think that we are saying something worthwhile?

Theaetetus/ I think so, at any rate, and I do not at all understand what hidden error we have fallen into.

Stranger/ Then watch more closely and see whether, if we make these admissions, we may not justly be asked the same questions we asked a while ago of those who said the universe was hot and cold.

Theaetetus/ What questions? Remind me.

Stranger/ Certainly; and I will try to do this by questioning you, as we questioned them at the time. I hope we shall at the same time make a little progress.

Theaetetus/ That is right.

Stranger/ Very well, then; you say that motion and rest are most directly opposed to each other, do you not?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And yet you say that both and each of them equally exist?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I do.

Stranger/ And in granting that they exist, do you mean to say that both and each are in motion?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Stranger/ But do you mean that they are at rest, when you say that both exist?

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Stranger/ Being, then, you consider to be something else in the soul, a third in addition to these two, inasmuch as you think rest and motion are embraced by it; and since you comprehend and observe that they participate in existence, you therefore said that they are. Eh?

Theaetetus/ We really do seem to have a vague vision of being as some third thing, when we say that motion and rest are.

Stranger/ Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them.

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Stranger/ According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion.

Theaetetus/ You are about right.

Stranger/ What is there left, then, to which a man can still turn his mind who wishes to establish within himself any clear conception of being?

Theaetetus/ What indeed?

Stranger/ There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. For if a thing is not in motion, it must surely be at rest; and again, what is not at rest, must surely be in motion. But now we find that being has emerged outside of both these classes. Is that possible, then?

Theaetetus/ No, nothing could be more impossible.

Stranger/ Then there is this further thing which we ought to remember.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ That when we were asked to what the appellation of not-being should be applied, we were in the greatest perplexity. Do you remember?

Theaetetus/ Of course I do.

Stranger/ Well, then, are we now in any less perplexity about being?

Theaetetus/ It seems to me, stranger, that we are, if possible, in even greater.

Stranger/ This point, then, let us put down definitely as one of complete perplexity. But since being and not-being participate equally in the perplexity, there is now at last some hope that as either of them emerges more dimly or more clearly, so also will the other emerge. If, however, we are able to see neither of them, we will at any rate push our discussion through between both of them at once as creditably as we can.

Theaetetus/ Good.

Stranger/ Let us, then, explain how we come to be constantly calling this same thing by many names.

Theaetetus/ What, for instance? Please give an example.

Stranger/ We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional designations; we attribute to him colors and forms and sizes and vices and virtues, and in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is man, but we say he is good and numberless other things. So in the same way every single thing which we supposed to be one, we treat as many and call by many names.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And it is in this way, I fancy, that we have provided a fine feast for youngsters and for old men whose learning has come to them late in life; for example, it is easy enough for anyone to grasp the notion that the many cannot possibly be one, nor the one many, and so, apparently, they take pleasure in

saying that we must not call a man good, but must call the good, good, and a man, man. I fancy, Theaetetus, you often run across people who take such matters seriously; sometimes they are elderly men whose poverty of intellect makes them admire such quibbles, and who think this is a perfect mine of wisdom they have discovered.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then, to include in our discussion all those who have ever engaged in any talk whatsoever about being, let us address our present arguments to these men as well as to all those with whom we were conversing before, and let us employ the form of questions.

Theaetetus/ What are the arguments?

Stranger/ Shall we attribute neither being to rest and motion, nor any attribute to anything, but shall we in our discussions assume that they do not mingle and cannot participate in one another? Or shall we gather all things together, believing that they are capable of combining with one another? Or are some capable of it and others not? Which of these alternatives, Theaetetus, should we say is their choice?

Theaetetus/ I cannot answer these questions for them.

Stranger/ Then why did you not answer each separately and see what the result was in each case?

Theaetetus/ A good suggestion.

Stranger/ And let us, if you please, assume that they say first that nothing has any power to combine with anything else. Then motion and rest will have no share in being, will they?

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ Well, then, will either of them be, if it has no share in being?

Theaetetus/ It will not.

Stranger/ See how by this admission everything is overturned at once, as it seems the doctrine of those who advocate universal motion, that of the partisans of unity and rest, and that of the men who teach that all existing things are distributed into invariable and everlasting kinds. For all of these make use of being as an attribute. One party says that the universe "is" in motion, another that it "is" at rest.

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ And further, all who teach that things combine at one time and separate at another, whether infinite elements combine in unity and are derived from unity or finite elements separate and then unite, regardless of whether they say that these changes take place successively or without interruption, would be talking nonsense in all these doctrines, if there is no intermingling.

Theaetetus/ Quite right.

Stranger/ Then, too, the very men who forbid us to call anything by another name because it participates in the effect produced by another, would be made most especially ridiculous by this doctrine.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Because they are obliged in speaking of anything to use the expressions "to be," "apart," "from the rest," "by itself," and countless others; they are powerless to keep away from them or avoid working them into their discourse; and therefore there is no need of others to refute them, but, as the saying goes, their enemy and future opponent is of their own household

whom they always carry about with them as they go, giving forth speech from within them, like the wonderful Eurycles.

Theaetetus/ That is a remarkably accurate illustration.

Stranger/ But what if we ascribe to all things the power of participation in one another?

Theaetetus/ Even I can dispose of that assumption.

Stranger/ How?

Theaetetus/ Because motion itself would be wholly at rest, and rest in turn would itself be in motion, if these two could be joined with one another.

Stranger/ But surely this at least is most absolutely impossible, that motion be at rest and rest be in motion?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then only the third possibility is left.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And certainly one of these three must be true; either all things will mingle with one another, or none will do so, or some will and others will not.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And certainly the first two were found to be impossible.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then everybody who wishes to answer correctly will adopt the remaining one of the three possibilities.

Theaetetus/ Precisely.

Stranger/ Now since some things will commingle and others will not, they are in much the same condition as

the letters of the alphabet; for some of these do not fit each other, and others do.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And the vowels, to a greater degree than the others, run through them all as a bond, so that without one of the vowels the other letters cannot be joined one to another.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Now does everybody know which letters can join with which others? Or does he who is to join them properly have need of art?

Theaetetus/ He has need of art.

Stranger/ What art?

Theaetetus/ The art of grammar.

Stranger/ And is not the same true in connection with high and low sounds? Is not he who has the art to know the sounds which mingle and those which do not, musical, and he who does not know unmusical?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And we shall find similar conditions, then, in all the other arts and processes which are devoid of art?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Now since we have agreed that the classes or genera also commingle with one another, or do not commingle, in the same way, must not he possess some science and proceed by the processes of reason who is to show correctly which of the classes harmonize with which, and which reject one another, and also if he is to show whether there are some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can

mingle, and again, when they separate, whether there are other universal causes of separation?

Theaetetus/ Certainly he needs science, and perhaps even the greatest of sciences.

Stranger/ Then, Theaetetus, what name shall we give to this science? Or, by Zeus, have we unwittingly stumbled upon the science that belongs to free men and perhaps found the philosopher while we were looking for the sophist?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Shall we not say that the division of things by classes and the avoidance of the belief that the same class is another, or another the same, belongs to the science of dialectic?

Theaetetus/ Yes, we shall.

Stranger/ Then he who is able to do this has a clear perception of one form or idea extending entirely through many individuals each of which lies apart, and of many forms differing from one another but included in one greater form, and again of one form evolved by the union of many wholes, and of many forms entirely apart and separate. This is the knowledge and ability to distinguish by classes how individual things can or cannot be associated with one another.

Theaetetus/ Certainly it is.

Stranger/ But you surely, I suppose, will not grant the art of dialectic to any but the man who pursues philosophy in purity and righteousness.

Theaetetus/ How could it be granted to anyone else?

Stranger/ Then it is in some region like this that we shall always, both now and hereafter, discover the philosopher, if we look for him; he also is hard to see

clearly, but the difficulty is not the same in his case and that of the sophist.

Theaetetus/ How do they differ?

Stranger/ The sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, feeling his way in it by practice, and is hard to discern on account of the darkness of the place. Don't you think so?

Theaetetus/ It seems likely.

Stranger/ But the philosopher, always devoting himself through reason to the idea of being, is also very difficult to see on account of the brilliant light of the place; for the eyes of the soul of the multitude are not strong enough to endure the sight of the divine.

Theaetetus/ This also seems no less true than what you said about the sophist.

Stranger/ Now we will make more accurate investigations about the philosopher hereafter, if we still care to do so; but as to the sophist, it is clear that we must not relax our efforts until we have a satisfactory view of him.

Theaetetus/ You are right.

Stranger/ Since, therefore, we are agreed that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not, and some will mingle with few and others with many, and that there is nothing to hinder some from mingling universally with all, let us next proceed with our discussion by investigating, not all the forms or ideas, lest we become confused among so many, but some only, selecting them from those that are considered the most important; let us first consider their several natures, then what their power of mingling with one another is, and so, if we cannot grasp being and not-being with perfect clearness, we shall at any

rate not fail to reason fully about them, so far as the method of our present inquiry permits. Let us in this way see whether it is, after all, permitted us to say that not-being really is, although not being, and yet come off unscathed.

Theaetetus/ Yes; that is the proper thing for us to do.

Stranger/ The most important, surely, of the classes or genera are those which we just mentioned; being itself and rest and motion.

Theaetetus/ Yes, by far.

Stranger/ And further, two of them, we say, cannot mingle with each other.

Theaetetus/ Decidedly not.

Stranger/ But being can mingle with both of them, for they both are.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then these prove to be three.

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ Each of them is, then, other than the remaining two, but the same as itself.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But what do we mean by these words, the same and other which we have just used? Are they two new classes, different from the other three, but always of necessity mingled with them, and must we conduct our inquiry on the assumption that there are five classes, not three, or are we unconsciously speaking of one of those three when we say the same or other?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps.

Stranger/ But certainly motion and rest are neither other nor the same.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Whatever term we apply to rest and motion in common cannot be either of those two.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ Because motion would be at rest and rest would be in motion; in respect of both, for whichever of the two became other would force the other to change its nature into that of its opposite, since it would participate in its opposite.

Theaetetus/ Exactly so.

Stranger/ Both certainly partake of the same and the other.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then we must not say that motion, or rest either, is the same or other.

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ But should we conceive of being and the same as one?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps.

Stranger/ But if being and the same have no difference of meaning, then when we go on and say that both rest and motion are, we shall be saying that they are both the same, since they are.

Theaetetus/ But surely that is impossible.

Stranger/ Then it is impossible for being and the same to be one.

Theaetetus/ Pretty nearly.

Stranger/ So we shall consider the same a fourth class in addition to the other three?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then shall we call the other a fifth class? Or must we conceive of this and being as two names for one class?

Theaetetus/ May be.

Stranger/ But I fancy you admit that among the entities some are always conceived as absolute, and some as relative.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And other is always relative to other, is it not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ It would not be so, if being and the other were not utterly different. If the other, like being, partook of both absolute and relative existence, there would be also among the others that exist another not in relation to any other; but as it is, we find that whatever is other is just what it is through compulsion of some other.

Theaetetus/ The facts are as you say.

Stranger/ Then we must place the nature of the other as a fifth among the classes in which we select our examples.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And we shall say that it permeates them all; for each of them is other than the rest, not by reason of its own nature, but because it partakes of the idea of the other.

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ Let us now state our conclusions, taking up the five classes one at a time.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ Take motion first; we say that it is entirely other than rest, do we not?

Theaetetus/ We do.

Stranger/ Then it is not rest.

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Stranger/ But it exists, by reason of its participation in being.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it exists.

Stranger/ Now motion again is other than the same.

Theaetetus/ You're about right.

Stranger/ Therefore it is not the same.

Theaetetus/ No, it is not.

Stranger/ But yet we found it was the same, because all things partake of the same.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then we must admit that motion is the same and is not the same, and we must not be disturbed thereby; for when we say it is the same and not the same, we do not use the words alike. When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes of the same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the same, we do so on account of its participation in the other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same.

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Stranger/ Then even if absolute motion partook in any way of rest, it would not be absurd to say it was at rest?

Theaetetus/ It would be perfectly right, if we are to admit that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not.

Stranger/ And surely we demonstrated that before we took up our present points; we proved that it was according to nature.

Theaetetus/ Yes, of course.

Stranger/ Then let us recapitulate; Motion is other than the other, just as we found it to be other than the same and than rest. Is that true?

Theaetetus/ Inevitably.

Stranger/ Then it is in a sense not other and also other, according to our present reasoning.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Now how about the next point? Shall we say next that motion is other than the three, but not other than the fourth, that is, if we have agreed that the classes about which and within which we undertook to carry on our inquiry are five in number?

Theaetetus/ How can we say that? For we cannot admit that the number is less than was shown just now.

Stranger/ Then we may fearlessly persist in contending that motion is other than being?

Theaetetus/ Yes, most fearlessly.

Stranger/ It is clear, then, that motion really is not, and also that it is, since it partakes of being?

Theaetetus/ That is perfectly clear.

Stranger/ In relation to motion, then, not-being is That is inevitable. And this extends to all the classes; for in all of them the nature of other so operates as to make each one other than being, and therefore not-being. So we may, from this point of view, rightly say of all of them alike that they are not; and again, since they partake of being, that they are and have being.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I suppose so.

Stranger/ And so, in relation to each of the classes, being is many, and not-being is infinite in number.

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Stranger/ Then being itself must also be said to be other than all other things.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it must.

Stranger/ And we conclude that whatever the number of other things is, just that is the number of the things in relation to which being is not; for not being those things, it is itself one, and again, those other things are not unlimited in number.

Theaetetus/ That is not far from the truth.

Stranger/ Then we must not be disturbed by this either, since by their nature the classes have participation in one another. But if anyone refuses to accept our present results, let him reckon with our previous arguments and then proceed to reckon with the next step.

Theaetetus/ That is very fair.

Stranger/ Then here is a point to consider.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ When we say not-being, we speak, I think, not of something that is the opposite of being, but only of something different.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ For instance, when we speak of a thing as not great, do we seem to you to mean by the expression what is small any more than what is of middle size?

Theaetetus/ No, of course not.

Stranger/ Then when we are told that the negative signifies the opposite, we shall not admit it; we shall admit only that the particle not indicates something

different from the words to which it is prefixed, or rather from the things denoted by the words that follow the negative.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Let us consider another point and see if you agree with me.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ It seems to me that the nature of the other is all cut up into little bits, like knowledge.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Knowledge, like other, is one, but each separate part of it which applies to some particular subject has a name of its own; hence there are many arts, as they are called, and kinds of knowledge, or sciences.

Theaetetus/ Yes, certainly.

Stranger/ And the same is true, by their nature, of the parts of the other, though it also is one concept.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps; but let us discuss the matter and see how it comes about.

Stranger/ Is there a part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

Theaetetus/ There is.

Stranger/ Shall we say that this is nameless or that it has a name?

Theaetetus/ That it has one; for that which in each case we call not-beautiful is surely the other of the nature of the beautiful and of nothing else.

Stranger/ Now, then, tell me something more.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ Does it not result from this that the not-beautiful is a distinct part of some one class of being and also, again, opposed to some class of being?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then, apparently, it follows that the not-beautiful is a contrast of being with being.

Theaetetus/ Quite right.

Stranger/ Can we, then, in that case, say that the beautiful is more and the not-beautiful less a part of being?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Stranger/ Hence the not-great must be said to be no less truly than the great?

Theaetetus/ No less truly.

Stranger/ And so we must recognize the same relation between the just and the not-just, in so far as neither has any more being than the other?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And we shall, then, say the same of other things, since the nature of the other is proved to possess real being; and if it has being, we must necessarily ascribe being in no less degree to its parts also.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then, as it seems, the opposition of the nature of a part of the other, and of the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is no less truly existence than is being itself, if it is not wrong for me to say so, for it signifies not the opposite of being, but only the other of being, and nothing more.

Theaetetus/ That is perfectly clear.

Stranger/ Then what shall we call this?

Theaetetus/ Evidently this is precisely not-being, which we were looking for because of the sophist.

Stranger/ And is this, as you were saying, as fully endowed with being as anything else, and shall we henceforth say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence and a nature of its own? Just as we found that the great was great and the beautiful was beautiful, the not-great was not-great and the not-beautiful was not-beautiful, shall we in the same way say that not-being was and is not-being, to be counted as one class among the many classes of being? Or have we, Theaetetus, any remaining distrust about the matter?

Theaetetus/ None whatever.

Stranger/ Do you observe, then, that we have gone farther in our distrust of Parmenides than the limit set by his prohibition?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ We have proceeded farther in our investigation and have shown him more than that which he forbade us to examine.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Because he says somewhere;

> Never shall this thought prevail, that not-being is;
> Nay, keep your mind from this path of investigation.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is what he says.

Stranger/ But we have not only pointed out that things which are not exist, but we have even shown what the form or class of not-being is; for we have pointed out that the nature of the other exists and is distributed in small bits throughout all existing things in their relations to one another, and we have ventured

to say that each part of the other which is contrasted with being, really is exactly not-being.

Theaetetus/ And certainly, Stranger, I think that what we have said is perfectly true.

Stranger/ Then let not anyone assert that we declare that not-being is the opposite of being, and hence are so rash as to say that not-being exists. For we long ago gave up speaking of any opposite of being, whether it exists or not and is capable or totally incapable of definition. But as for our present definition of not-being, a man must either refute us and show that we are wrong, or, so long as he cannot do that, he too must say, as we do, that the classes mingle with one another, and being and the other permeate all things, including each other, and the other, since it participates in being, is, by reason of this participation, yet is not that in which it participates, but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably be not-being. But being, in turn, participates in the other and is therefore other than the rest of the classes, and since it is other than all of them, it is not each one of them or all the rest, but only itself; there is therefore no doubt that there are thousands and thousands of things which being is not, and just so all other things, both individually and collectively, in many relations are, and in many are not.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And if any man has doubts about these oppositions, he must make investigations and advance better doctrines than these of ours; or if he finds pleasure in dragging words about and applying them to different things at different times, with the notion that he has invented something difficult to explain, our present argument asserts that he has taken up

seriously matters which are not worth serious attention; for this process is neither clever nor difficult, whereas here now is something both difficult and beautiful.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ What I have spoken of before the ability to let those quibbles go as of no account and to follow and refute in detail the arguments of a man who says that other is in a sense the same, or that the same is other, and to do this from that point of view and with regard for those relations which he presupposes for either of these conditions. But to show that in some sort of fashion the same is the other, and the other the same, and the great small, and the like unlike, and to take pleasure in thus always bringing forward opposites in the argument, all that is no true refutation, but is plainly the newborn offspring of some brain that has just begun to lay hold upon the problem of realities.

Theaetetus/ Exactly so.

Stranger/ For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate everything from everything else is not only not in good taste but also shows that a man is utterly uncultivated and unphilosophical.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ The complete separation of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse. For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Observe, then, that we have now been just in time in carrying our point against the supporters of such doctrine, and in forcing them to admit that one thing mingles with another.

Theaetetus/ What was our object?

Stranger/ Our object was to establish discourse as one of our classes of being. For if we were deprived of this, we should be deprived of philosophy, which would be the greatest calamity; moreover, we must at the present moment come to an agreement about the nature of discourse, and if we were robbed of it by its absolute non-existence, we could no longer discourse; and we should be robbed of it if we agreed that there is no mixture of anything with anything.

Theaetetus/ That is true enough; but I do not understand why we must come to an agreement about discourse just now.

Stranger/ Perhaps the easiest way for you to understand is by following this line of argument.

Theaetetus/ What line?

Stranger/ We found that not-being was one of the classes of being, permeating all being.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So the next thing is to inquire whether it mingles with opinion and speech.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ If it does not mingle with them, the necessary result is that all things are true, but if it does, then false opinion and false discourse come into being; for to think or say what is not that is, I suppose, falsehood arising in mind or in words.

Theaetetus/ So it is.

Stranger/ But if falsehood exists, deceit exists.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And if deceit exists, all things must be henceforth full of images and likenesses and fancies.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But we said that the sophist had taken refuge in this region and had absolutely denied the existence of falsehood; for he said that not-being could be neither conceived nor uttered, since not-being did not in any way participate in being.

Theaetetus/ Yes, so it was.

Stranger/ But now not-being has been found to partake of being, and so, perhaps, he would no longer keep up the fight in this direction; but he might say that some ideas partake of not-being and some do not, and that speech and opinion are among those which do not; and he would therefore again contend that the image-making and fantastic art, in which we placed him, has absolutely no existence, since opinion and speech have no participation in not-being; for falsehood cannot possibly exist unless such participation takes place. For this reason we must first inquire into the nature of speech and opinion and fancy, in order that when they are made clear we may perceive that they participate in not-being, and when we have perceived that, may prove the existence of falsehood, and after proving that, may imprison the sophist therein, if he can be held on that charge, and if not, may set him free and seek him in another class.

Theaetetus/ It certainly seems, Stranger, that what you said at first about the sophist that he was a hard kind of creature to catch is true; for he seems to have no end of defenses, and when he throws one of them up, his opponent has first to fight through it before he can reach the man himself; for now, you see, we have barely passed through the non-existence of being, which was his first prepared line of defense, when we find another line ready; and so we must prove that falsehood exists in relation to opinion and to speech; and after this,

perhaps, there will be another line, and still another after that; and it seems no end will ever appear.

Stranger/ No one should be discouraged, Theaetetus, who can make constant progress, even though it be slow. For if a man is discouraged under these conditions, what would he do under others if he did not get ahead at all or were even pressed back? It would be a long time, as the saying is, before such a man would ever take a city. But now, my friend, since we have passed the line you speak of, the main defenses would surely be in our hands, and the rest will now be smaller and easier to take.

Theaetetus/ Good.

Stranger/ First, then, let us take up speech and opinion, as I said just now, in order to come to a clearer understanding whether not-being touches them, or they are both entirely true, and neither is ever false.

Theaetetus/ Very well.

Stranger/ Then let us now investigate names, just as we spoke a while ago about ideas and letters; for in that direction the object of our present search is coming in sight.

Theaetetus/ What do we need to understand about names?

Stranger/ Whether they all unite with one another, or none of them, or some will and some will not.

Theaetetus/ Evidently the last; some will and some will not.

Stranger/ This, perhaps, is what you mean, that those which are spoken in order and mean something

do unite, but those that mean nothing in their sequence do not unite.

Theaetetus/ How so, and what do you mean by that?

Stranger/ What I supposed you had in mind when you assented; for we have two kinds of vocal indications of being.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ One called nouns, the other verbs.

Theaetetus/ Define each of them.

Stranger/ The indication which relates to action we may call a verb.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions in question we call a noun.

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ Hence discourse is never composed of nouns alone spoken in succession, nor of verbs spoken without nouns.

Theaetetus/ I do not understand that.

Stranger/ I see; you evidently had something else in mind when you assented just now; for what I wished to say was just this, that verbs and nouns do not make discourse if spoken successively in this way.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ For instance, walks, runs, sleeps and the other verbs which denote actions, even if you utter all there are of them in succession, do not make discourse for all that.

Theaetetus/ No, of course not.

Stranger/ And again, when lion, stag, horse, and all other names of those who perform these actions are

uttered, such a succession of words does not yet make discourse; for in neither case do the words uttered indicate action or inaction or existence of anything that exists or does not exist, until the verbs are mingled with the nouns; then the words fit, and their first combination is a sentence, about the first and shortest form of discourse.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by that?

Stranger/ When one says a man learns, you agree that this is the least and first of sentences, do you not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ For when he says that, he makes a statement about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be; he does not merely give names, but he reaches a conclusion by combining verbs with nouns. That is why we said that he discourses and does not merely give names, and therefore we gave to this combination the name of discourse.

Theaetetus/ That was right.

Stranger/ So, then, just as of things some fit each other and some do not, so too some vocal signs do not fit, but some of them do fit and form discourse.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Now there is another little point.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ A sentence, if it is to be a sentence, must have a subject; without a subject it is impossible.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And it must also be of some quality, must it not?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Now let us pay attention to each other.

Theaetetus/ Yes, at any rate we ought to do so.

Stranger/ Now, then, I will speak a sentence to you in which an action and the result of action are combined by means of a noun and a verb, and whatever the subject of the sentence is do you tell me.

Theaetetus/ I will, to the best of my ability.

Stranger/ Theaetetus sits. It isn't a long sentence, is it?

Theaetetus/ No, it is fairly short.

Stranger/ Now it is for you to say what it is about and what its subject is.

Theaetetus/ Clearly it is about me, and I am its subject.

Stranger/ And how about this sentence?

Theaetetus/ What one?

Stranger/ Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies.

Theaetetus/ Everyone would agree that this also is about me and I am its subject.

Stranger/ But we agree that every sentence must have some quality.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences?

Theaetetus/ One is false, I suppose, the other true.

Stranger/ The true one states facts as they are about you.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And the false one states things that are other than the facts.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ In other words, it speaks of things that are not as if they were.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is pretty much what it does.

Stranger/ And states with reference to you that things are which are other than things which actually are; for we said, you know, that in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not.

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ Now the second of my sentences about you is in the first place by sheer necessity one of the shortest which conform to our definition of sentence.

Theaetetus/ At any rate we just now agreed on that point.

Stranger/ And secondly it has a subject.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And if you are not the subject, there is none.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible.

Theaetetus/ Quite right.

Stranger/ Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse.

Theaetetus/ Yes, very truly.

Stranger/ Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true?

Theaetetus/ How is it plain?

Stranger/ You will understand more easily if you first grasp their natures and the several differences between them.

Theaetetus/ Give me an opportunity.

Stranger/ Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And in speech we know there is just—

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ Affirmation and negation.

Theaetetus/ Yes, we know that.

Stranger/ Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give it any other name than opinion?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ And when such a condition is brought about in anyone, not independently, but through sensation, can it properly be called anything but seeming, or fancy?

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ Then since speech, as we found, is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought, and what we mean when we say it seems is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that,

since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Do you see, then, that false opinion and false discourse were found sooner than we expected when we feared a few moments ago that in looking for them we were undertaking an endless task?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I see.

Stranger/ Then let us not be discouraged about the rest of our search, either; for now that these points are settled, we have only to revert to our previous divisions into classes.

Theaetetus/ What divisions?

Stranger/ We made two classes of image-making, the likeness-making and the fantastic.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And we said that we did not know to which of the two the sophist should be assigned.

Theaetetus/ You are right.

Stranger/ And in the midst of our perplexity about that, we were overwhelmed by a still greater dizziness when the doctrine appeared which challenges everybody and asserts that neither likeness nor image nor appearance exists at all, because falsehood never exists anywhere in any way.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ But now, since the existence of false speech and false opinion has been proved, it is possible for imitations of realities to exist and for an art of deception to arise from this condition of mind.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it is possible.

Stranger/ And we decided some time ago that the sophist was in one of those two divisions of the image-making class.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then let us try again; let us divide in two the class we have taken up for discussion, and proceed always by way of the right-hand part of the thing divided, clinging close to the company to which the sophist belongs, until, having stripped him of all common properties and left him only his own peculiar nature, we shall show him plainly first to ourselves and secondly to those who are most closely akin to the dialectic method.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ We began by making two divisions of art, the productive and the acquisitive, did we not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the sophist showed himself to us in the arts of hunting, contests, commerce, and the like, which were subdivisions of acquisitive art?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But now, since imitative art has taken him over, it is clear that our first step must be the division of productive art into two parts; for imitative art is a kind of production of images, however, we say, not of real things in each case. Do you agree?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ Then let us first assume two parts of productive art.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ The divine and the human.

Theaetetus/ I don't yet understand.

Stranger/ We said, if we remember the beginning of our conversation, that every power is productive which causes things to come into being which did not exist before.

Theaetetus/ Yes, we remember.

Stranger/ There are all the animals, and all the plants that grow out of the earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless substances, fusible and infusible, that are formed within the earth. Shall we say that they came into being, not having been before, in any other way than through Gods workmanship? Or, accepting the commonly expressed belief?

Theaetetus/ What belief?

Stranger/ That nature brings them forth from some self-acting cause, without creative intelligence. Or shall we say that they are created by reason and by divine knowledge that comes from God?

Theaetetus/ I, perhaps because I am young, often change from one opinion to the other; but now, looking at you and considering that you think they are created by God, I also adopt that view.

Stranger/ Well said, Theaetetus; and if I thought you were one of those who would think differently by and by, I should try now, by argument and urgent persuasion, to make you agree with my opinion; but since I understand your nature and see that it of itself inclines, without any words of mine, towards that to which you say you are at present attracted, I will let that go; for it would be a waste of time. But I will assume that things which people call natural are made by divine art, and things put together by man out of those as materials are made by human art, and that there are

accordingly two kinds of art, the one human and the other divine.

Theaetetus/ Quite right.

Stranger/ Now that there are two, divide each of them again.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ You divided all productive art width wise, as it were, before; now divide it lengthwise.

Theaetetus/ Assume that it is done.

Stranger/ In that way we now get four parts in all; two belong to us and are human, and two belong to the gods and are divine.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And again, when the section is made the other way, one part of each half has to do with the making of real things, and the two remaining parts may very well be called image-making; and so productive art is again divided into two parts.

Theaetetus/ Tell me again how each part is distinguished.

Stranger/ We know that we and all the other animals, and fire, water, and their kindred elements, out of which natural objects are formed, are one and all the very offspring and creations of God, do we not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And corresponding to each and all of these there are images, not the things themselves, which are also made by superhuman skill.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ The appearances in dreams, and those that arise by day and are said to be spontaneous a shadow when a dark object interrupts the firelight, or

when twofold light, from the objects themselves and from outside, meets on smooth and bright surfaces and causes upon our senses an effect the reverse of our ordinary sight, thus producing an image.

Theaetetus/ Yes, these are two works of divine creation, the thing itself and the corresponding image in each case.

Stranger/ And how about our own art? Shall we not say that we make a house by the art of building, and by the art of painting make another house, a sort of man-made dream produced for those who are awake?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And in the same way, we say, all the other works of our creative activity also are twofold and go in pairs the thing itself, produced by the art that creates real things, and the image, produced by the image-making art.

Theaetetus/ I understand better now; and I agree that there are two kinds of production, each of them twofold the divine and the human by one method of bisection, and by the other real things and the product that consists of a sort of likenesses.

Stranger/ We must remember that there were to be two parts of the image-making class, the likeness-making and the fantastic, if we should find that falsehood really existed and was in the class of real being.

Theaetetus/ Yes, there were.

Stranger/ But we found that falsehood does exist, and therefore we shall now, without any doubts, number the kinds of image-making art as two, shall we not?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let us, then, again bisect the fantastic art.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ One kind is that produced by instruments, the other that in which the producer of the appearance offers himself as the instrument.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ When anyone, by employing his own person as his instrument, makes his own figure or voice seem similar to yours, that kind of fantastic art is called mimetic.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let us, then, classify this part under the name of mimetic art; but as for all the rest, let us be so self-indulgent as to let it go and leave it for someone else to unify and name appropriately.

Theaetetus/ Very well, let us adopt that classification and let the other part go.

Stranger/ But it is surely worthwhile to consider, Theaetetus, that the mimetic art also has two parts; and I will tell you why.

Theaetetus/ Please do.

Stranger/ Some who imitate do so with knowledge of that which they imitate, and others without such knowledge. And yet what division can we imagine more complete than that which separates knowledge and ignorance?

Theaetetus/ None.

Stranger/ The example I just gave was of imitation by those who know, was it not? For a man who imitates you would know you and your figure.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But what of the figure of justice and, in a word, of virtue in general? Are there not many who have no knowledge of it, but only a sort of opinion, and who try with the greatest eagerness to make this which they themselves think is virtue seem to exist within them, by imitating it in acts and words to the best of their ability?

Theaetetus/ Yes, there are very many such people.

Stranger/ Do all of them, then, fail in the attempt to seem to be just when they are not so at all? Or is quite the opposite the case?

Theaetetus/ Quite the opposite.

Stranger/ Then I think we must say that such an imitator is quite distinct from the other, the one who does not know from the one who knows.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Where, then, can the fitting name for each of the two be found? Clearly it is not an easy task, because there was, it seems, among the earlier thinkers a long established and careless indolence in respect to the division of classes or genera into forms or species, so that nobody even tried to make such divisions; therefore there cannot be a great abundance of names. However, even though the innovation in language be a trifle bold, let us, for the sake of making a distinction, call the imitation which is based on opinion, opinion-imitation, and that which is founded on knowledge, a sort of scientific imitation.

Theaetetus/ Agreed.

Stranger/ We must therefore apply ourselves to the former, for we found that the sophist was among those who imitate but was not among those who know.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Then let us examine the opinion-imitator as if he were a piece of iron, and see whether he is sound or there is still some seam in him.

Theaetetus/ Let us do so.

Stranger/ Well, there is a very marked seam. For some of these imitators are simple-minded and think they know that about which they have only opinion, but the other kind because of their experience in the rough and tumble of arguments, strongly suspect and fear that they are ignorant of the things which they pretend before the public to know.

Theaetetus/ Certainly the two classes you mention both exist.

Stranger/ Then shall we call one the simple imitator and the other the dissembling imitator?

Theaetetus/ That is reasonable, at any rate.

Stranger/ And shall we say that the latter forms one class or two again?

Theaetetus/ That is your affair.

Stranger/ I am considering, and I think I can see two classes. I see one who can dissemble in long speeches in public before a multitude, and the other who does it in private in short speeches and forces the person who converses with him to contradict himself.

Theaetetus/ You are quite right.

Stranger/ And what name shall we give to him who makes the longer speeches? Statesman or popular orator?

Theaetetus/ Popular orator.

Stranger/ And what shall we call the other? Philosopher or sophist?

Theaetetus/ We cannot very well call him philosopher, since by our hypothesis he is ignorant; but since he is an imitator of the philosopher, he will evidently have a name derived from his, and I think I am sure at last that we must truly call him the absolutely real and actual sophist.

Stranger/ Shall we then bind up his name as we did before, winding it up from the end to the beginning?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ The imitative kind of the dissembling part of the art of opinion which is part of the art of contradiction and belongs to the fantastic class of the image-making art, and is not divine, but human, and has been defined in arguments as the juggling part of productive activity he who says that the true sophist is of this descent and blood will, in my opinion, speak the exact truth.

Theaetetus/ Yes, he certainly will.

Sophist.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.
Theodorus, Theaetetus, Socrates.
An Eleatic Stranger, whom
Theodorus and Theaetetus bring with them.
The younger Socrates, who is a silent auditor.

Theodorus/ Here we are, Socrates, true to our agreement of yesterday; and we bring with us a stranger from Elea, who is a disciple of Parmenides and Zeno, and a true philosopher.

Socrates/ Is he not rather a god, Theodorus, who comes to us in the disguise of a stranger? For Homer says that all the gods, and especially the god of strangers, are companions of the meek and just, and visit the good and evil among men. And may not your companion be one of those higher powers, a cross-examining deity, who has come to spy out our weakness in argument, and to cross-examine us?

Theodorus/ Nay, Socrates, he is not one of the disputatious sort—he is too good for that. And, in my opinion, he is not a god at all; but divine he certainly is, for this is a title which I should give to all philosophers.

Socrates/ Capital, my friend! and I may add that they are almost as hard to be discerned as the gods. For the true philosophers, and such as are not merely made up for the occasion, appear in various forms unrecognized by the ignorance of men, and they 'hover about cities,' as Homer declares, looking from above upon human life; and some think nothing of them, and others can never think enough; and sometimes they appear as statesmen, and sometimes as sophists; and then, again, to many they seem to be no better than madmen. I should like to ask our Eleatic friend, if he

would tell us, what is thought about them in Italy, and to whom the terms are applied.

Theodorus/ What terms?

Socrates/ Sophist, statesman, philosopher.

Theodorus/ What is your difficulty about them, and what made you ask?

Socrates/ I want to know whether by his countrymen they are regarded as one or two; or do they, as the names are three, distinguish also three kinds, and assign one to each name?

Theodorus/ I dare say that the Stranger will not object to discuss the question. What do you say, Stranger?

Stranger/ I am far from objecting, Theodorus, nor have I any difficulty in replying that by us they are regarded as three. But to define precisely the nature of each of them is by no means a slight or easy task.

Theodorus/ You have happened to light, Socrates, almost on the very question which we were asking our friend before we came hither, and he excused himself to us, as he does now to you; although he admitted that the matter had been fully discussed, and that he remembered the answer.

Socrates/ Then do not, Stranger, deny us the first favor which we ask of you: I am sure that you will not, and therefore I shall only beg of you to say whether you like and are accustomed to make a long oration on a subject which you want to explain to another, or to proceed by the method of question and answer. I remember hearing a very noble discussion in which Parmenides employed the latter of the two methods, when I was a young man, and he was far advanced in years.

Stranger/ I prefer to talk with another when he responds pleasantly, and is light in hand; if not, I would rather have my own say.

Socrates/ Anyone of the present company will respond kindly to you, and you can choose whom you like of them; I should recommend you to take a young person—Theaetetus, for example—unless you have a preference for someone else.

Stranger/ I feel ashamed, Socrates, being a new-comer into your society, instead of talking a little and hearing others talk, to be spinning out a long soliloquy or address, as if I wanted to show off. For the true answer will certainly be a very long one, a great deal longer than might be expected from such a short and simple question. At the same time, I fear that I may seem rude and ungracious if I refuse your courteous request, especially after what you have said. For I certainly cannot object to your proposal, that Theaetetus should respond, having already conversed with him myself, and being recommended by you to take him.

Theaetetus/ But are you sure, Stranger, that this will be quite so acceptable to the rest of the company as Socrates imagines?

Stranger/ You hear them applauding, Theaetetus; after that, there is nothing more to be said. Well then, I am to argue with you, and if you tire of the argument, you may complain of your friends and not of me.

Theaetetus/ I do not think that I shall tire, and if I do, I shall get my friend here, young Socrates, the namesake of the elder Socrates, to help; he is about my own age, and my partner at the gymnasium, and is constantly accustomed to work with me.

Stranger/ Very good; you can decide about that for yourself as we proceed. Meanwhile you and I will begin together and enquire into the nature of the Sophist, first of the three: I should like you to make out what he is and bring him to light in a discussion; for at present we are only agreed about the name, but of the thing to which we both apply the

name possibly you have one notion and I another; whereas we ought always to come to an understanding about the thing itself in terms of a definition, and not merely about the name minus the definition. Now the tribe of Sophists which we are investigating is not easily caught or defined; and the world has long ago agreed, that if great subjects are to be adequately treated, they must be studied in the lesser and easier instances of them before we proceed to the greatest of all. And as I know that the tribe of Sophists is troublesome and hard to be caught, I should recommend that we practice beforehand the method which is to be applied to him on some simple and smaller thing, unless you can suggest a better way.

Theaetetus/ Indeed I cannot.

Stranger/ Then suppose that we work out some lesser example which will be a pattern of the greater?

Theaetetus/ Good.

Stranger/ What is there which is well known and not great, and is yet as susceptible of definition as any larger thing? Shall I say an angler? He is familiar to all of us, and not a very interesting or important person.

Theaetetus/ He is not.

Stranger/ Yet I suspect that he will furnish us with the sort of definition and line of enquiry which we want.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Let us begin by asking whether he is a man having art or not having art, but some other power.

Theaetetus/ He is clearly a man of art.

Stranger/ And of arts there are two kinds?

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ There is agriculture, and the tending of mortal creatures, and the art of constructing or molding vessels,

and there is the art of imitation—all these may be appropriately called by a single name.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? And what is the name?

Stranger/ He who brings into existence something that did not exist before is said to be a producer, and that which is brought into existence is said to be produced.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And all the arts which were just now mentioned are characterized by this power of producing?

Theaetetus/ They are.

Stranger/ Then let us sum them up under the name of productive or creative art.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Next follows the whole class of learning and cognition; then comes trade, fighting, hunting. And since none of these produces anything, but is only engaged in conquering by word or deed, or in preventing others from conquering, things which exist and have been already produced—in each and all of these branches there appears to be an art which may be called acquisitive.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is the proper name.

Stranger/ Seeing, then, that all arts are either acquisitive or creative, in which class shall we place the art of the angler?

Theaetetus/ Clearly in the acquisitive class.

Stranger/ And the acquisitive may be subdivided into two parts: there is exchange, which is voluntary and is effected by gifts, hire, purchase; and the other part of acquisitive, which takes by force of word or deed, may be termed conquest?

Theaetetus/ That is implied in what has been said.

Stranger/ And may not conquest be again subdivided?

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ Open force may be called fighting, and secret force may have the general name of hunting?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And there is no reason why the art of hunting should not be further divided.

Theaetetus/ How would you make the division?

Stranger/ Into the hunting of living and of lifeless prey.

Theaetetus/ Yes, if both kinds exist.

Stranger/ Of course they exist; but the hunting after lifeless things having no special name, except some sorts of diving, and other small matters, may be omitted; the hunting after living things may be called animal hunting.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And animal hunting may be truly said to have two divisions, land-animal hunting, which has many kinds and names, and water-animal hunting, or the hunting after animals who swim?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And of swimming animals, one class lives on the wing and the other in the water?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Fowling is the general term under which the hunting of all birds is included.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ The hunting of animals who live in the water has the general name of fishing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And this sort of hunting may be further divided also into two principal kinds?

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ There is one kind which takes them in nets, another which takes them by a blow.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?

Stranger/ As to the first kind—all that surrounds and encloses anything to prevent egress, may be rightly called an enclosure.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ For which reason twig baskets, casting-nets, nooses, creels, and the like may all be termed 'enclosures'?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And therefore this first kind of capture may be called by us capture with enclosures, or something of that sort?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ The other kind, which is practiced by a blow with hooks and three-pronged spears, when summed up under one name, may be called striking, unless you, Theaetetus, can find some better name?

Theaetetus/ Never mind the name—what you suggest will do very well.

Stranger/ There is one mode of striking, which is done at night, and by the light of a fire, and is by the hunters themselves called firing, or spearing by firelight.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And the fishing by day is called by the general name of barbing, because the spears, too, are barbed at the point.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is the term.

Stranger/ Of this barb-fishing, that which strikes the fish who is below from above is called spearing, because this is the way in which the three-pronged spears are mostly used.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it is often called so.

Stranger/ Then now there is only one kind remaining.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ When a hook is used, and the fish is not struck in any chance part of his body, as he is with the spear, but only about the head and mouth, and is then drawn out from below upwards with reeds and rods: —What is the right name of that mode of fishing, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ I suspect that we have now discovered the object of our search.

Stranger/ Then now you and I have come to an understanding not only about the name of the anglers art, but about the definition of the thing itself. One half of all art was acquisitive—half of the acquisitive art was conquest or taking by force, half of this was hunting, and half of hunting was hunting animals, half of this was hunting water animals—of this again, the under half was fishing, half of fishing was striking; a part of striking was fishing with a barb, and one half of this again, being the kind which strikes with a hook and draws the fish from below upwards, is the art which we have been seeking, and which from the nature of the operation is denoted angling or drawing up (ἀσπαλιευτικὴ, ἀνασπᾶσθαι).

Theaetetus/ The result has been quite satisfactorily brought out.

Stranger/ And now, following this pattern, let us endeavor to find out what a Sophist is.

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ The first question about the angler was, whether he was a skilled artist or unskilled?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And shall we call our new friend unskilled, or a thorough master of his craft?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not unskilled, for his name, as, indeed, you imply, must surely express his nature.

Stranger/ Then he must be supposed to have some art.

Theaetetus/ What art?

Stranger/ By heaven, they are cousins! it never occurred to us.

Theaetetus/ Who are cousins?

Stranger/ The angler and the Sophist.

Theaetetus/ In what way are they related?

Stranger/ They both appear to me to be hunters.

Theaetetus/ How the Sophist? Of the other we have spoken.

Stranger/ You remember our division of hunting, into hunting after swimming animals and land animals?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And you remember that we subdivided the swimming and left the land animals, saying that there were many kinds of them?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Thus far, then, the Sophist and the angler, starting from the art of acquiring, take the same road?

Theaetetus/ So it would appear.

Stranger/ Their paths diverge when they reach the art of animal hunting; the one going to the sea-shore, and to the rivers and to the lakes, and angling for the animals which are in them.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ While the other goes to land and water of another sort—rivers of wealth and broad meadow-lands of

generous youth; and he also is intending to take the animals which are in them.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Of hunting on land there are two principal divisions.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One is the hunting of tame, and the other of wild animals.

Theaetetus/ But are tame animals ever hunted?

Stranger/ Yes, if you include man under tame animals. But if you like you may say that there are no tame animals, or that, if there are, man is not among them; or you may say that man is a tame animal but is not hunted—you shall decide which of these alternatives you prefer.

Theaetetus/ I should say, Stranger, that man is a tame animal, and I admit that he is hunted.

Stranger/ Then let us divide the hunting of tame animals into two parts.

Theaetetus/ How shall we make the division?

Stranger/ Let us define piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, the whole military art, by one name, as hunting with violence.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ But the art of the lawyer, of the popular orator, and the art of conversation may be called in one word the art of persuasion.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And of persuasion, there may be said to be two kinds?

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One is private, and the other public.

Theaetetus/ Yes; each of them forms a class.

Stranger/ And of private hunting, one sort receives hire, and the other brings gifts.

Theaetetus/ I do not understand you.

Stranger/ You seem never to have observed the manner in which lovers hunt.

Theaetetus/ To what do you refer?

Stranger/ I mean that they lavish gifts on those whom they hunt in addition to other inducements.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ Let us admit this, then, to be the amatory art.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But that sort of hireling whose conversation is pleasing and who baits his hook only with pleasure and exacts nothing but his maintenance in return, we should all, if I am not mistaken, describe as possessing flattery or an art of making things pleasant.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And that sort, which professes to form acquaintances only for the sake of virtue, and demands a reward in the shape of money, may be fairly called by another name?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ And what is the name? Will you tell me?

Theaetetus/ It is obvious enough; for I believe that we have discovered the *Sophist*: which is, as I conceive, the proper name for the class described.

Stranger/ Then now, Theaetetus, his art may be traced as a branch of the appropriative, acquisitive family—which hunts animals, —living—land—tame animals; which hunts man, —privately—for hire, —taking money in exchange—having the semblance of education; and this is termed

Sophistry, and is a hunt after young men of wealth and rank—such is the conclusion.

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Stranger/ Let us take another branch of his genealogy; for he is a professor of a great and many-sided art; and if we look back at what has preceded we see that he presents another aspect, besides that of which we are speaking.

Theaetetus/ In what respect?

Stranger/ There were two sorts of acquisitive art; the one concerned with hunting, the other with exchange.

Theaetetus/ There were.

Stranger/ And of the art of exchange there are two divisions, the one of giving, and the other of selling.

Theaetetus/ Let us assume that.

Stranger/ Next, we will suppose the art of selling to be divided into two parts.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ There is one part which is distinguished as the sale of a man's own productions; another, which is the exchange of the works of others.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And is not that part of exchange which takes place in the city, being about half of the whole, termed retailing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And that which exchanges the goods of one city for those of another by selling and buying is the exchange of the merchant?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ And you are aware that this exchange of the merchant is of two kinds: it is partly concerned with food for

the use of the body, and partly with the food of the soul which is bartered and received in exchange for money.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ You want to know what is the meaning of food for the soul; the other kind you surely understand.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Take music in general and painting and marionette playing and many other things, which are purchased in one city, and carried away and sold in another—wares of the soul which are hawked about either for the sake of instruction or amusement; —may not he who takes them about and sells them be quite as truly called a merchant as he who sells meats and drinks?

Theaetetus/ To be sure he may.

Stranger/ And would you not call by the same name him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?

Theaetetus/ Certainly I should.

Stranger/ Of this merchandise of the soul, may not one part be fairly termed the art of display? And there is another part which is certainly not less ridiculous, but being a trade in learning must be called by some name germane to the matter?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ The latter should have two names, —one descriptive of the sale of the knowledge of virtue, and the other of the sale of other kinds of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ The name of art-seller corresponds well enough to the latter; but you must try and tell me the name of the other.

Theaetetus/ He must be the Sophist, whom we are seeking; no other name can possibly be right.

Stranger/ No other; and so this trader in virtue again turns out to be our friend the Sophist, whose art may now be traced from the art of acquisition through exchange, trade, merchandise, to a merchandise of the soul which is concerned with speech and the knowledge of virtue.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ And there may be a third reappearance of him; —for he may have settled down in a city, and may fabricate as well as buy these same wares, intending to live by selling them, and he would still be called a Sophist?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then that part of the acquisitive art which exchanges, and of exchange which either sells a man's own productions or retails those of others, as the case may be, and in either way sells the knowledge of virtue, you would again term Sophistry?

Theaetetus/ I must, if I am to keep pace with the argument.

Stranger/ Let us consider once more whether there may not be yet another aspect of sophistry.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ In the acquisitive there was a subdivision of the combative or fighting art.

Theaetetus/ There was.

Stranger/ Perhaps we had better divide it.

Theaetetus/ What shall be the divisions?

Stranger/ There shall be one division of the competitive, and another of the pugnacious.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ That part of the pugnacious which is a contest of bodily strength may be properly called by some such name as violent.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And when the war is one of words, it may be termed controversy?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And controversy may be of two kinds.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ When long speeches are answered by long speeches, and there is public discussion about the just and unjust, that is forensic controversy.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And there is a private sort of controversy, which is cut up into questions and answers, and this is commonly called disputation?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is the name.

Stranger/ And of disputation, that sort which is only a discussion about contracts, and is carried on at random, and without rules of art, is recognized by the reasoning faculty to be a distinct class, but has hitherto had no distinctive name, and does not deserve to receive one from us.

Theaetetus/ No; for the different sorts of it are too minute and heterogeneous.

Stranger/ But that which proceeds by rules of art to dispute about justice and injustice in their own nature, and about things in general, we have been accustomed to call argumentation (Eristic)?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And of argumentation, one sort wastes money, and the other makes money.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Suppose we try and give to each of these two classes a name.

Theaetetus/ Let us do so.

Stranger/ I should say that the habit which leads a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of conversation, of which the style is far from being agreeable to the majority of his hearers, may be fairly termed loquacity: such is my opinion.

Theaetetus/ That is the common name for it.

Stranger/ But now who the other is, who makes money out of private disputation, it is your turn to say.

Theaetetus/ There is only one true answer: he is the wonderful Sophist, of whom we are in pursuit, and who reappears again for the fourth time.

Stranger/ Yes, and with a fresh pedigree, for he is the moneymaking species of the Eristic, disputatious, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive family, as the argument has already proven.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ How true was the observation that he was a many-sided animal, and not to be caught with one hand, as they say!

Theaetetus/ Then you must catch him with two.

Stranger/ Yes, we must, if we can. And therefore let us try another track in our pursuit of him: You are aware that there are certain menial occupations which have names among servants?

Theaetetus/ Yes, there are many such; which of them do you mean?

Stranger/ I mean such as sifting, straining, winnowing, threshing.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And besides these there are a great many more, such as carding, spinning, adjusting the warp and the woof; and thousands of similar expressions are used in the arts.

Theaetetus/ Of what are they to be patterns, and what are we going to do with them all?

Stranger/ I think that in all of these there is implied a notion of division.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then if, as I was saying, there is one art which includes all of them, ought not that art to have one name?

Theaetetus/ And what is the name of the art?

Stranger/ The art of discerning or discriminating.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Think whether you cannot divide this.

Theaetetus/ I should have to think a long while.

Stranger/ In all the previously named processes either like has been separated from like or the better from the worse.

Theaetetus/ I see now what you mean.

Stranger/ There is no name for the first kind of separation; of the second, which throws away the worse and preserves the better, I do know a name.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ Every discernment or discrimination of that kind, as I have observed, is called a purification.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is the usual expression.

Stranger/ And anyone may see that purification is of two kinds.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so, if he were allowed time to think; but I do not see at this moment.

Stranger/ There are many purifications of bodies which may with propriety be comprehended under a single name.

Theaetetus/ What are they, and what is their name?

Stranger/ There is the purification of living bodies in their inward and in their outward parts, of which the former is duly effected by medicine and gymnastic, the latter by the not very dignified art of the bath-man; and there is the purification of inanimate substances—to this the arts of fulling and of furbishing in general attend in a number of minute particulars, having a variety of names which are thought ridiculous.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ There can be no doubt that they are thought ridiculous, Theaetetus; but then the dialectical art never considers whether the benefit to be derived from the purge is greater or less than that to be derived from the sponge, and has not more interest in the one than in the other; her endeavor is to know what is and is not kindred in all arts, with a view to the acquisition of intelligence; and having this in view, she honors them all alike, and when she makes comparisons, she counts one of them not a whit more ridiculous than another; nor does she esteem him who adduces as his example of hunting, the general's art, at all more decorous than another who cites that of the vermin-destroyer, but only as the greater pretender of the two. And as to your question concerning the name which was to comprehend all these arts of purification, whether of animate or inanimate bodies, the art of dialectic is in no wise particular about fine words, if she may be only allowed to have a general name for all other purifications, binding them up together and separating them off from the purification of the soul or intellect. For this is the purification at which she

wants to arrive, and this we should understand to be her aim.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I understand; and I agree that there are two sorts of purification, and that one of them is concerned with the soul, and that there is another which is concerned with the body.

Stranger/ Excellent; and now listen to what I am going to say, and try to divide further the first of the two.

Theaetetus/ Whatever line of division you suggest, I will endeavor to assist you.

Stranger/ Do we admit that virtue is distinct from vice in the soul?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And purification was to leave the good and to cast out whatever is bad?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Then any taking away of evil from the soul may be properly called purification?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And in the soul there are two kinds of evil.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ The one may be compared to disease in the body, the other to deformity.

Theaetetus/ I do not understand.

Stranger/ Perhaps you have never reflected that disease and discord are the same.

Theaetetus/ To this, again, I know not what I should reply.

Stranger/ Do you not conceive discord to be a dissolution of kindred elements, originating in some disagreement?

Theaetetus/ Just that.

Stranger/ And is deformity anything but the want of measure, which is always unsightly?

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ And do we not see that opinion is opposed to desire, pleasure to anger, reason to pain, and that all these elements are opposed to one another in the souls of bad men?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And yet they must all be akin?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and disease of the soul?

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ And when things having motion, and aiming at an appointed mark, continually miss their aim and glance aside, shall we say that this is the effect of symmetry among them, or of the want of symmetry?

Theaetetus/ Clearly of the want of symmetry.

Stranger/ But surely we know that no soul is voluntarily ignorant of anything?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ And what is ignorance but the aberration of a mind which is bent on truth, and in which the process of understanding is perverted?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Then we are to regard an unintelligent soul as deformed and devoid of symmetry?

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Then there are these two kinds of evil in the soul—the one which is generally called vice, and is obviously a disease of the soul…

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And there is the other, which they call ignorance, and which, because existing only in the soul, they will not allow to be vice.

Theaetetus/ I certainly admit what I at first disputed—that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that we ought to consider cowardice, intemperance, and injustice to be all alike forms of disease in the soul, and ignorance, of which there are all sorts of varieties, to be deformity.

Stranger/ And in the case of the body are there not two arts which have to do with the two bodily states?

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ There is gymnastic, which has to do with deformity, and medicine, which has to do with disease.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And where there is insolence and injustice and cowardice, is not chastisement the art which is most required?

Theaetetus/ That certainly appears to be the opinion of mankind.

Stranger/ Again, of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction be rightly said to be the remedy?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And of the art of instruction, shall we say that there is one or many kinds? At any rate there are two principal ones. Think.

Theaetetus/ I will.

Stranger/ I believe that I can see how we shall soonest arrive at the answer to this question.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ If we can discover a line which divides ignorance into two halves. For a division of ignorance into

two parts will certainly imply that the art of instruction is also twofold, answering to the two divisions of ignorance.

Theaetetus/ Well, and do you see what you are looking for?

Stranger/ I do seem to myself to see one very large and bad sort of ignorance which is quite separate, and may be weighed in the scale against all other sorts of ignorance put together.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ When a person supposes that he knows, and does not know; this appears to be the great source of all the errors of the intellect.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And this, if I am not mistaken, is the kind of ignorance which specially earns the title of stupidity.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ What name, then, shall be given to the sort of instruction which gets rid of this?

Theaetetus/ The instruction which you mean, Stranger, is, I should imagine, not the teaching of handicraft arts, but what, thanks to us, has been termed education in this part of the world.

Stranger/ Yes, Theaetetus, and by nearly all Hellenes. But we have still to consider whether education admits of any further division.

Theaetetus/ We have.

Stranger/ I think that there is a point at which such a division is possible.

Theaetetus/ Where?

Stranger/ Of education, one method appears to be rougher, and another smoother.

Theaetetus/ How are we to distinguish the two?

Stranger/ There is the time-honored mode which our fathers commonly practiced towards their sons, and which is still adopted by many—either of roughly reproving their errors, or of gently advising them; which varieties may be correctly included under the general term of admonition.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ But whereas some appear to have arrived at the conclusion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those things in which he is conscious of his own cleverness, and that the admonitory sort of instruction gives much trouble and does little good——

Theaetetus/ There they are quite right.

Stranger/ Accordingly, they set to work to eradicate the spirit of conceit in another way.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ They cross-examine a man's words, when he thinks that he is saying something and is really saying nothing, and easily convict him of inconsistencies in his opinions; these they then collect by the dialectical process, and placing them side by side, show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same respect. He, seeing this, is angry with himself, and grows gentle towards others, and thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which is most amusing to the hearer, and produces the most lasting good effect on the person who is the subject of the operation. For as the physician considers that the body will receive no benefit from taking food until the internal obstacles have been removed, so the purifier of the soul is conscious that his patient will receive no benefit from the application of knowledge until he is refuted, and from refutation learns modesty; he must be purged of his

prejudices first and made to think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.

Theaetetus/ That is certainly the best and wisest state of mind.

Stranger/ For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must admit that refutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications, and he who has not been refuted, though he be the Great King himself, is in an awful state of impurity; he is uninstructed and deformed in those things in which he who would be truly blessed ought to be fairest and purest.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ And who are the ministers of this art? I am afraid to say the Sophists.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ Lest we should assign to them too high a prerogative.

Theaetetus/ Yet the Sophist has a certain likeness to our minister of purification.

Stranger/ Yes, the same sort of likeness which a wolf, who is the fiercest of animals, has to a dog, who is the gentlest. But he who would not be found tripping, ought to be very careful in this matter of comparisons, for they are most slippery things. Nevertheless, let us assume that the Sophists are the men. I say this provisionally, for I think that the line which divides them will be marked enough if proper care is taken.

Theaetetus/ Likely enough.

Stranger/ Let us grant, then, that from the discerning art comes purification, and from purification let there be separated off a part which is concerned with the soul; of this mental purification instruction is a portion, and of instruction education, and of education, that refutation of

vain conceit which has been discovered in the present argument; and let this be called by you and me the nobly-descended art of Sophistry.

Theaetetus/ Very well; and yet, considering the number of forms in which he has presented himself, I begin to doubt how I can with any truth or confidence describe the real nature of the Sophist.

Stranger/ You naturally feel perplexed; and yet I think that he must be still more perplexed in his attempt to escape us, for as the proverb says, when every way is blocked, there is no escape; now, then, is the time of all others to set upon him.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ First let us wait a moment and recover breath, and while we are resting, we may reckon up in how many forms he has appeared. In the first place, he was discovered to be a paid hunter after wealth and youth.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ In the second place, he was a merchant in the goods of the soul.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ In the third place, he has turned out to be a retailer of the same sort of wares.

Theaetetus/ Yes; and in the fourth place, he himself manufactured the learned wares which he sold.

Stranger/ Quite right; I will try and remember the fifth myself.

He belonged to the fighting class, and was further distinguished as a hero of debate, who professed the eristic art.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ The sixth point was doubtful, and yet we at last agreed that he was a purger of souls, who cleared away notions obstructive to knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Do you not see that when the professor of any art has one name and many kinds of knowledge, there must be something wrong? The multiplicity of names which is applied to him shows that the common principle to which all these branches of knowledge are tending, is not understood.

Theaetetus/ I should imagine this to be the case.

Stranger/ At any rate we will understand him, and no indolence shall prevent us. Let us begin again, then, and re-examine some of our statements concerning the Sophist; there was one thing which appeared to me especially characteristic of him.

Theaetetus/ To what are you referring?

Stranger/ We were saying of him, if I am not mistaken, that he was a disputer?

Theaetetus/ We were.

Stranger/ And does he not also teach others the art of disputation?

Theaetetus/ Certainly he does.

Stranger/ And about what does he profess that he teaches men to dispute? To begin at the beginning—Does he make them able to dispute about divine things, which are invisible to men in general?

Theaetetus/ At any rate, he is said to do so.

Stranger/ And what do you say of the visible things in heaven and earth, and the like?

Theaetetus/ Certainly he disputes, and teaches to dispute about them.

Stranger/ Then, again, in private conversation, when any universal assertion is made about generation and essence, we know that such persons are tremendous argufiers, and are able to impart their own skill to others.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ And do they not profess to make men able to dispute about law and about politics in general?

Theaetetus/ Why, no one would have anything to say to them, if they did not make these professions.

Stranger/ In all and every art, what the craftsman ought to say in answer to any question is written down in a popular form, and he who likes may learn.

Theaetetus/ I suppose that you are referring to the precepts of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts?

Stranger/ Yes, my friend, and about a good many other things. In a word, is not the art of disputation a power of disputing about all things?

Theaetetus/ Certainly; there does not seem to be much which is left out.

Stranger/ But oh! my dear youth, do you suppose this possible? for perhaps your young eyes may see things which to our duller sight do not appear.

Theaetetus/ To what are you alluding? I do not think that I understand your present question.

Stranger/ I ask whether anybody can understand all things.

Theaetetus/ Happy would mankind be if such a thing were possible!

Stranger/ But how can anyone who is ignorant dispute in a rational manner against him who knows?

Theaetetus/ He cannot.

Stranger/ Then why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power?

Theaetetus/ To what do you refer?

Stranger/ How do the Sophists make young men believe in their supreme and universal wisdom? For if they neither disputed nor were thought to dispute rightly, or being thought to do so were deemed no wiser for their controversial skill, then, to quote your own observation, no one would give them money or be willing to learn their art.

Theaetetus/ They certainly would not.

Stranger/ But they are willing.

Theaetetus/ Yes, they are.

Stranger/ Yes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And they dispute about all things?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And therefore, to their disciples, they appear to be all-wise?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.

Theaetetus/ Impossible, of course.

Stranger/ Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth?

Theaetetus/ Exactly; no better description of him could be given.

Stranger/ Let us now take an illustration, which will still more clearly explain his nature.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ I will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very closest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that he could speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all things, by a single art.

Theaetetus/ All things?

Stranger/ I see that you do not understand the first word that I utter, for you do not understand the meaning of 'all.'

Theaetetus/ No, I do not.

Stranger/ Under all things, I include you and me, and also animals and trees.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all creatures.

Theaetetus/ What would he mean by 'making'? He cannot be a husbandman; —for you said that he is a maker of animals.

Stranger/ Yes; and I say that he is also the maker of the sea, and the earth, and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things; and, further, that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few pence.

Theaetetus/ That must be a jest.

Stranger/ And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a jest?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than imitation?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not; and imitation is a very comprehensive term, which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things.

Stranger/ We know, of course, that he who professes by one art to make all things is really a painter, and by the painter's art makes resemblances of real things which have the same name with them; and he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom he shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he has the absolute power of making whatever he likes.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of reasoning? Is it not possible to enchant the hearts of young men by words poured through their ears, when they are still at a distance from the truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments, and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of men in all things?

Theaetetus/ Yes; why should there not be another such art ?

Stranger/ But as time goes on, and their hearers advance in years, and come into closer contact with realities, and have learnt by sad experience to see and feel the truth of things, are not the greater part of them compelled to change many opinions which they formerly entertained, so that the great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts of life?

Theaetetus/ That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.

Stranger/ And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can without the sad reality. And now I should like you to tell me, whether the Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being; or are we still disposed to think that

he may have a true knowledge of the various matters about which he disputes?

Theaetetus/ But how can he, Stranger? Is there any doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of children's play?

Stranger/ Then we must place him in the class of magicians and mimics.

Theaetetus/ Certainly we must.

Stranger/ And now our business is not to let the animal out, for we have got him in a sort of dialectical net, and there is one thing which he decidedly will not escape.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ The inference that he is a juggler.

Theaetetus/ Precisely my own opinion of him.

Stranger/ Then, clearly, we ought as soon as possible to divide the image-making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Sophist does not run away from us, to seize him according to orders and deliver him over to reason, who is the lord of the hunt, and proclaim the capture of him; and if he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and secretes himself in one of them, to divide again and follow him up until in some subsection of imitation he is caught. For our method of tackling each and all is one which neither he nor any other creature will ever escape in triumph.

Theaetetus/ Well said; and let us do as you propose.

Stranger/ Well, then, pursuing the same analytic method as before, I think that I can discern two divisions of the imitative art, but I am not as yet able to see in which of them the desired form is to be found.

Theaetetus/ Will you tell me first what are the two divisions of which you are speaking?

Stranger/ One is the art of likeness-making; —generally a likeness of anything is made by producing a copy which is executed according to the proportions of the original, similar in length and breadth and depth, each thing receiving also its appropriate color.

Theaetetus/ Is not this always the aim of imitation?

Stranger/ Not always; in works either of sculpture or of painting, which are of any magnitude, there is a certain degree of deception; for if artists were to give the true proportions of their fair works, the upper part, which is farther off, would appear to be out of proportion in comparison with the lower, which is nearer; and so they give up the truth in their images and make only the proportions which appear to be beautiful, disregarding the real ones.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ And that which being other is also like, may we not fairly call a likeness or image?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And may we not, as I did just now, call that part of the imitative art which is concerned with making such images the art of likeness-making?

Theaetetus/ Let that be the name.

Stranger/ And what shall we call those resemblances of the beautiful, which appear such owing to the unfavorable position of the spectator, whereas if a person had the power of getting a correct view of works of such magnitude, they would appear not even like that to which they profess to be like? May we not call these 'appearances,' since they appear only and are not really like?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ There is a great deal of this kind of thing in painting, and in all imitation.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And may we not fairly call the sort of art, which produces an appearance and not an image, fantastic art?

Theaetetus/ Most fairly.

Stranger/ These then are the two kinds of image-making—the art of making likenesses, and fantastic or the art of making appearances?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ I was doubtful before in which of them I should place the Sophist, nor am I even now able to see clearly; verily he is a wonderful and inscrutable creature. And now in the cleverest manner he has got into an impossible place.

Theaetetus/ Yes, he has.

Stranger/ Do you speak advisedly, or are you carried away at the moment by the habit of assenting into giving a hasty answer?

Theaetetus/ May I ask to what you are referring?

Stranger/ My dear friend, we are engaged in a very difficult speculation—there can be no doubt of that; for how a thing can appear and seem, and not be, or how a man can say a thing which is not true, has always been and still remains a very perplexing question. Can anyone say or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid being caught in a contradiction? Indeed, Theaetetus, the task is a difficult one.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ He who says that falsehood exists has the audacity to assert the being of not-being; for this is implied in the possibility of falsehood. But, my boy, in the days when I was a boy, the great Parmenides protested against this doctrine, and to the end of his life he continued to inculcate the same lesson—always repeating both in verse and out of verse:

> ‘Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that not-being is.’

Such is his testimony, which is confirmed by the very expression when sifted a little. Would you object to begin with the consideration of the words themselves?

Theaetetus/ Never mind about me; I am only desirous that you should carry on the argument in the best way, and that you should take me with you.

Stranger/ Very good; and now say, do we venture to utter the forbidden word ‘not-being’?

Theaetetus/ Certainly we do.

Stranger/ Let us be serious then, and consider the question neither in strife nor play: suppose that one of the hearers of Parmenides was asked, ‘To what is the term “not-being" to be applied?’—do you know what sort of object he would single out in reply, and what answer he would make to the enquirer?

Theaetetus/ That is a difficult question, and one not to be answered at all by a person like myself.

Stranger/ There is at any rate no difficulty in seeing that the predicate ‘not-being’ is not applicable to any being.

Theaetetus/ None, certainly.

Stranger/ And if not to being, then not to something.

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Stranger/ It is also plain, that in speaking of something we speak of being, for to speak of an abstract something naked and isolated from all being is impossible.

Theaetetus/ Impossible.

Stranger/ You mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must say some one thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Some in the singular (τὶ) you would say is the sign of one, some in the dual (τινὲ) of two, some in the plural (τινὲς) of many?

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ Then he who says 'not something' must say absolutely nothing.

Theaetetus/ Most assuredly.

Stranger/ And as we cannot admit that a man speaks and says nothing, he who says 'not-being' does not speak at all.

Theaetetus/ The difficulty of the argument can no further go.

Stranger/ Not yet, my friend, is the time for such a word; for there still remains of all perplexities the first and greatest, touching the very foundation of the matter.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? Do not be afraid to speak.

Stranger/ To that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But can anything which is, be attributed to that which is not?

Theaetetus/ Impossible.

Stranger/ And all number is to be reckoned among things which are?

Theaetetus/ Yes, surely number, if anything, has a real existence.

Stranger/ Then we must not attempt to attribute to not-being number either in the singular or plural?

Theaetetus/ The argument implies that we should be wrong in doing so.

Stranger/ But how can a man either express in words or even conceive in thought things which are not or a thing which is not without number?

Theaetetus/ How indeed?

Stranger/ When we speak of things which are not, are we not attributing plurality to not-being?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But, on the other hand, when we say 'what is not,' do we not attribute unity?

Theaetetus/ Manifestly.

Stranger/ Nevertheless, we maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to not-being?

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ Do you see, then, that not-being in itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable?

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ But, if so, I was wrong in telling you just now that the difficulty which was coming is the greatest of all.

Theaetetus/ What! is there a greater still behind?

Stranger/ Well, I am surprised, after what has been said already, that you do not see the difficulty in which he who would refute the notion of not-being is involved. For he is compelled to contradict himself as soon as he makes the attempt.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? Speak more clearly.

Stranger/ Do not expect clearness from me. For I, who maintain that not-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and am still speaking of not-being as one; for I say 'not-being.' Do you understand?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And a little while ago I said that not-being is unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable: do you follow?

Theaetetus/ I do after a fashion.

Stranger/ When I introduced the word 'is,' did I not contradict what I said before?

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Stranger/ And in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not-being as one?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And when I spoke of not-being as indescribable and unspeakable and unutterable, in using each of these words in the singular, did I not refer to not-being as one?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And yet we say that, strictly speaking, it should not be defined either as one or many, and should not even be called 'it,' for the use of the word 'it' would imply a form of unity.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ How, then, can anyone put any faith in me? For now, as always, I am unequal to the refutation of not-being.

And therefore, as I was saying, do not look to me for the right way of speaking about not-being; but come, let us try the experiment with you.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Make a noble effort, as becomes youth, and endeavor with all your might to speak of not-being in a right manner, without introducing into it either existence or unity or plurality.

Theaetetus/ It would be a strange boldness in me which would attempt the task when I see you thus discomfited.

Stranger/ Say no more of ourselves; but until we find someone or other who can speak of not-being without

number, we must acknowledge that the Sophist is a clever rogue who will not be got out of his hole.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ And if we say to him that he professes an art of making appearances, he will grapple with us and retort our argument upon ourselves; and when we call him an image-maker he will say, 'Pray what do you mean at all by an image?'—and I should like to know, Theaetetus, how we can possibly answer the younker's question?

Theaetetus/ We shall doubtless tell him of the images which are reflected in water or in mirrors; also of sculptures, pictures, and other duplicates.

Stranger/ I see, Theaetetus, that you have never made the acquaintance of the Sophist.

Theaetetus/ Why do you think so?

Stranger/ He will make believe to have his eyes shut, or to have none.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ When you tell him of something existing in a mirror, or in sculpture, and address him as though he had eyes, he will laugh you to scorn, and will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors and streams, or of sight at all; he will say that he is asking about an idea.

Theaetetus/ What can he mean?

Stranger/ The common notion pervading all these objects, which you speak of as many, and yet call by the single name of image, as though it were the unity under which they were all included. How will you maintain your ground against him?

Theaetetus/ How, Stranger, can I describe an image except as something fashioned in the likeness of the true?

Stranger/ And do you mean this something to be some other true thing, or what do you mean?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not another true thing, but only a resemblance.

Stranger/ And you mean by true that which really is?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the not true is that which is the opposite of the true?

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ A resemblance, then, is not really real, if, as you say, not true?

Theaetetus/ Nay, but it is in a certain sense.

Stranger/ You mean to say, not in a true sense?

Theaetetus/ Yes; it is in reality only an image.

Stranger/ Then what we call an image is in reality really unreal.

Theaetetus/ In what a strange complication of being and not-being we are involved!

Stranger/ Strange! I should think so. See how, by his reciprocation of opposites, the many-headed Sophist has compelled us, quite against our will, to admit the existence of not-being. not-being.

Theaetetus/ Yes, indeed, I see.

Stranger/ The difficulty is how to define his art without falling into a contradiction.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean? And where does the danger lie?

Stranger/ When we say that he deceives us with an illusion, and that his art is illusory, do we mean that our soul is led by his art to think falsely, or what do we mean?

Theaetetus/ There is nothing else to be said.

Stranger/ Again, false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the opposite of the truth: —You would assent?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ You mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Does false opinion think that things which are not are not, or that in a certain sense they are?

Theaetetus/ Things that are not must be imagined to exist in a certain sense, if any degree of falsehood is to be possible.

Stranger/ And does not false opinion also think that things which most certainly exist do not exist at all?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And here, again, is falsehood?

Theaetetus/ Falsehood—yes.

Stranger/ And in like manner, a false proposition will be deemed to be one which asserts the non-existence of things which are, and the existence of things which are not.

Theaetetus/ There is no other way in which a false proposition can arise.

Stranger/ There is not; but the Sophist will deny these statements. And indeed how can any rational man assent to them, when the very expressions which we have just used were before acknowledged by us to be unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable, unthinkable? Do you see his point, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ Of course he will say that we are contradicting ourselves when we hazard the assertion, that falsehood exists in opinion and in words; for in maintaining this, we are compelled over and over again to assert being of

not-being, which we admitted just now to be an utter impossibility.

Stranger/ How well you remember! And now it is high time to hold a consultation as to what we ought to do about the Sophist; for if we persist in looking for him in the class of false workers and magicians, you see that the handles for objection and the difficulties which will arise are very numerous and obvious.

Theaetetus/ They are indeed.

Stranger/ We have gone through but a very small portion of them, and they are really infinite.

Theaetetus/ If that is the case, we cannot possibly catch the Sophist.

Stranger/ Shall we then be so faint-hearted as to give him up?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not, I should say, if we can get the slightest hold upon him.

Stranger/ Will you then forgive me, and, as your words imply, not be altogether displeased if I flinch a little from the grasp of such a sturdy argument?

Theaetetus/ To be sure I will.

Stranger/ I have a yet more urgent request to make.

Theaetetus/ Which is—?

Stranger/ That you will promise not to regard me as a parricide.

Theaetetus/ And why?

Stranger/ Because, in self-defense, I must test the philosophy of my father Parmenides, and try to prove by main force that in a certain sense not-being is, and that being, on the other hand, is not.

Theaetetus/ Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed.

Stranger/ Yes, a blind man, as they say, might see that, and, unless these questions are decided in one way or another, no one when he speaks of false words, or false opinion, or idols, or images, or imitations, or appearances, or about the arts which are concerned with them, can avoid falling into ridiculous contradictions.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ And therefore I must venture to lay hands on my father's argument; for if I am to be over-scrupulous, I shall have to give the matter up.

Theaetetus/ Nothing in the world should ever induce us to do so.

Stranger/ I have a third little request which I wish to make.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ You heard me say what I have always felt and still feel—that I have no heart for this argument?

Theaetetus/ I did.

Stranger/ I tremble at the thought of what I have said, and expect that you will deem me mad, when you hear of my sudden changes and shiftings; let me therefore observe, that I am examining the question entirely out of regard for you.

Theaetetus/ There is no reason for you to fear that I shall impute any impropriety to you, if you attempt this refutation and proof; take heart, therefore, and proceed.

Stranger/ And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise? I think that the road which I must take is—

Theaetetus/ Which? —Let me hear.

Stranger/ I think that we had better, first of all, consider the points which at present are regarded as self-evident, lest we may have fallen into some confusion, and be too ready to

assent to one another, fancying that we are quite clear about them.

Theaetetus/ Say more distinctly what you mean.

Stranger/ I think that Parmenides, and all who ever yet undertook to determine the number and nature of existences, talked to us in rather a light and easy strain.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ As if we had been children, to whom they repeated each his own mythos or story; —one said that there were three principles, and that at one time there was war between certain of them; and then again there was peace, and they were married and begat children, and brought them up; and another spoke of two principles, —a moist and a dry, or a hot and a cold, and made them marry and cohabit. The Eleatics, however, in our part of the world, say that all things are many in name, but in nature one; this is their mythos, which goes back to Xenophanes, and is even older. Then there are Ionian, and in more recent times Sicilian muses, who have arrived at the conclusion that to unite the two principles is safer, and to say that being is one and many, and that these are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting, as the severer Muses assert, while the gentler ones do not insist on the perpetual strife and peace, but admit a relaxation and alternation of them; peace and unity sometimes prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again plurality and war, by reason of a principle of strife. Whether any of them spoke the truth in all this is hard to determine; besides, antiquity and famous men should have reverence, and not be liable to accusations so serious. Yet one thing may be said of them without offence—

Theaetetus/ What thing?

Stranger/ That they went on their several ways disdaining to notice people like ourselves; they did not care whether they took us with them, or left us behind them.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ I mean to say, that when they talk of one, two, or more elements, which are or have become or are becoming, or again of heat mingling with cold, assuming in some other part of their works separations and mixtures, — tell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean by these expressions? When I was a younger man, I used to fancy that I understood quite well what was meant by the term 'not-being,' which is our present subject of dispute; and now you see in what a fix we are about it.

Theaetetus/ I see.

Stranger/ And very likely we have been getting into the same perplexity about 'being,' and yet may fancy that when anybody utters the word, we understand him quite easily, although we do not know about not-being. But we may be equally ignorant of both.

Theaetetus/ I dare say.

Stranger/ And the same may be said of all the terms just mentioned.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ The consideration of most of them may be deferred; but we had better now discuss the chief captain and leader of them.

Theaetetus/ Of what are you speaking? You clearly think that we must first investigate what people mean by the word 'being.'

Stranger/ You follow close at my heels, Theaetetus. For the right method, I conceive, will be to call into our presence the dualistic philosophers and to interrogate them. 'Come,'

we will say, 'Ye, who affirm that hot and cold or any other two principles are the universe, what is this term which you apply to both of them, and what do you mean when you say that both and each of them "are"? How are we to understand the word "are"? Upon your view, are we to suppose that there is a third principle over and above the other two, —three in all, and not two? For clearly you cannot say that one of the two principles is being, and yet attribute being equally to both of them; for, if you did, whichever of the two is identified with being, will comprehend the other; and so they will be one and not two.'

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ But perhaps you mean to give the name of 'being' to both of them together?

Theaetetus/ Quite likely.

Stranger/ 'Then, friends,' we shall reply to them, 'the answer is plainly that the two will still be resolved into one.'

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ 'Since, then, we are in a difficulty, please to tell us what you mean, when you speak of being; for there can be no doubt that you always from the first understood your own meaning, whereas we once thought that we understood you, but now we are in a great strait. Please to begin by explaining this matter to us, and let us no longer fancy that we understand you, when we entirely misunderstand you.' There will be no impropriety in our demanding an answer to this question, either of the dualists or of the pluralists?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ And what about the assertors of the oneness of the all—must we not endeavor to ascertain from them what they mean by 'being'?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ Then let them answer this question: One, you say, alone is? 'Yes' they will reply.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And there is something which you call 'being'?

Theaetetus/ 'Yes'

Stranger/ And is being the same as one, and do you apply two names to the same thing?

Theaetetus/ What will be their answer, Stranger?

Stranger/ It is clear, Theaetetus, that he who asserts the unity of being will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing but unity, is surely ridiculous?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And equally irrational to admit that a name is anything?

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ To distinguish the name from the thing, implies duality.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will be compelled to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says that it is the name of something, even then the name will only be the name of a name, and of nothing else.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And the one will turn out to be only one of one, and being absolute unity, will represent a mere name.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And would they say that the whole is other than the one that is, or the same with it?

Theaetetus/ To be sure they would, and they actually say so.

Stranger/ If being is a whole, as Parmenides sings, —

> 'Every way like unto the fullness of a well-rounded sphere,
> Evenly balanced from the center on every side,
> And must needs be neither greater nor less in any way,
> Neither on this side nor on that—'

then being has a center and extremes, and, having these, must also have parts.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of unity in all the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute unity?

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ Because, according to right reason, that which is truly one must be affirmed to be absolutely indivisible.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But this indivisible, if made up of many parts, will contradict reason.

Theaetetus/ I understand.

Stranger/ Shall we say that being is one and a whole, because it has the attribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all?

Theaetetus/ That is a hard alternative to offer.

Stranger/ Most true; for being, having in a certain sense the attribute of one, is yet proved not to be the same as one, and the all is therefore more than one.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And yet if being be not a whole, through having the attribute of unity, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, being lacks something of its own nature?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will become not-being?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And, again, the all becomes more than one, for being and the whole will each have their separate nature.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But if the whole does not exist at all, all the previous difficulties remain the same, and there will be the further difficulty, that besides having no being, being can never have come into being.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ Because that which comes into being always comes into being as a whole, so that he who does not give whole a place among beings, cannot speak either of essence or generation as existing.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that certainly appears to be true.

Stranger/ Again; how can that which is not a whole have any quantity? For that which is of a certain quantity must necessarily be the whole of that quantity.

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ And there will be innumerable other points, each of them causing infinite trouble to him who says that being is either one or two.

Theaetetus/ The difficulties which are dawning upon us prove this; for one objection connects with another, and they are always involving what has preceded in a greater and worse perplexity.

Stranger/ We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all, that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of not-being.

Theaetetus/ Then now we will go to the others.

Stranger/ There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on amongst them; they are fighting with one another about the nature of essence.

Theaetetus/ How is that?

Stranger/ Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to earth, and they literally grasp in their hands rocks and oaks; of these they lay hold, and obstinately maintain, that the things only which can be touched or handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if anyone else says that what is not a body exists they altogether despise him, and will hear of nothing but body.

Theaetetus/ I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they are.

Stranger/ And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the bodies of the materialists, which by them are maintained to be the very truth, they break up into little bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be, not essence, but generation and motion. Between the two armies, Theaetetus, there is always an endless conflict raging concerning these matters.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Let us ask each party in turn, to give an account of that which they call essence.

Theaetetus/ How shall we get it out of them?

Stranger/ With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be less difficulty, for they are civil people enough; but there will be very great difficulty, or rather an absolute impossibility, in getting an opinion out of those who drag everything down to matter. Shall I tell you what we must do?

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not possible, let us imagine them to be better than they are, and more willing to answer in accordance with the rules of argument, and then their opinion will be more worth having; for that which better men acknowledge has more weight than that which is acknowledged by inferior men. Moreover we are no respecters of persons, but seekers after truth.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Then now, on the supposition that they are improved, let us ask them to state their views, and do you interpret them.

Theaetetus/ Agreed.

Stranger/ Let them say whether they would admit that there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

Theaetetus/ Of course they would.

Stranger/ And do they not acknowledge this to be a body having a soul?

Theaetetus/ Certainly they do.

Stranger/ Meaning to say that the soul is something which exists?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust, and that one soul is wise, and another foolish?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And that the just and wise soul becomes just and wise by the possession of justice and wisdom, and the opposite under opposite circumstances?

Theaetetus/ Yes, they do.

Stranger/ But surely that which may be present or may be absent will be admitted by them to exist?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And, allowing that justice, wisdom, the other virtues, and their opposites exist, as well as a soul in which they inhere, do they affirm any of them to be visible and tangible, or are they all invisible?

Theaetetus/ They would say that hardly any of them are visible.

Stranger/ And would they say that they are corporeal?

Theaetetus/ They would distinguish: the soul would be said by them to have a body; but as to the other qualities of justice, wisdom, and the like, about which you asked, they would not venture either to deny their existence, or to maintain that they were all corporeal.

Stranger/ Verily, Theaetetus, I perceive a great improvement in them; the real aborigines, children of the dragon's teeth, would have been deterred by no shame at all, but would have obstinately asserted that nothing is which they are not able to squeeze in their hands.

Theaetetus/ That is pretty much their notion.

Stranger/ Let us push the question; for if they will admit that any, even the smallest particle of being, is incorporeal, it is enough; they must then say what that nature is which is common to both the corporeal and incorporeal, and which they have in their mind's eye when they say of both of them that they 'are.' Perhaps they may be in a difficulty; and if this

is the case, there is a possibility that they may accept a notion of ours respecting the nature of being, having nothing of their own to offer.

Theaetetus/ What is the notion? Tell me, and we shall soon see.

Stranger/ My notion would be, that anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another, if only for a single moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the effect, has real existence; and I hold that the definition of being is simply power.

Theaetetus/ They accept your suggestion, having nothing better of their own to offer.

Stranger/ Very good; perhaps we, as well as they, may one day change our minds; but, for the present, this may be regarded as the understanding which is established with them.

Theaetetus/ Agreed.

Stranger/ Let us now go to the friends of ideas; of their opinions, too, you shall be the interpreter.

Theaetetus/ I will.

Stranger/ To them we say—You would distinguish essence from generation?

Theaetetus/ 'Yes,' they reply.

Stranger/ And you would allow that we participate in generation with the body, and through perception, but we participate with the soul through thought in true essence; and essence you would affirm to be always the same and immutable, whereas generation or becoming varies?

Theaetetus/ Yes; that is what we should affirm.

Stranger/ Well, fair sirs, we say to them, what is this participation, which you assert of both? Do you agree with our recent definition?

Theaetetus/ What definition?

Stranger/ We said that being was an active or passive energy, arising out of a certain power which proceeds from elements meeting with one another. Perhaps your ears, Theaetetus, may fail to catch their answer, which I recognize because I have been accustomed to hear it.

Theaetetus/ And what is their answer?

Stranger/ They deny the truth of what we were just now saying to the aborigines about existence.

Theaetetus/ What was that?

Stranger/ Any power of doing or suffering in a degree however slight was held by us to be a sufficient definition of being?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ They deny this, and say that the power of doing or suffering is confined to becoming, and that neither power is applicable to being.

Theaetetus/ And is there not some truth in what they say?

Stranger/ Yes; but our reply will be, that we want to ascertain from them more distinctly, whether they further admit that the soul knows, and that being or essence is known.

Theaetetus/ There can be no doubt that they say so.

Stranger/ And is knowing and being known doing or suffering, or both, or is the one doing and the other suffering, or has neither any share in either?

Theaetetus/ Clearly, neither has any share in either; for if they say anything else, they will contradict themselves.

Stranger/ I understand; but they will allow that if to know is active, then, of course, to be known is passive. And on this view being, in so far as it is known, is acted upon by knowledge, and is therefore in motion; for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon, as we affirm.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being? Can we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture?

Theaetetus/ That would be a dreadful thing to admit, Stranger.

Stranger/ But shall we say that being has mind and not life?

Theaetetus/ How is that possible?

Stranger/ Or shall we say that both inhere in perfect being, but that it has no soul which contains them?

Theaetetus/ And in what other way can it contain them?

Stranger/ Or that being has mind and life and soul, but although endowed with soul remains absolutely unmoved?

Theaetetus/ All three suppositions appear to me to be irrational.

Stranger/ Under being, then, we must include motion, and that which is moved.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then, Theaetetus, our inference is, that if there is no motion, neither is there any mind anywhere, or about anything or belonging to anyone.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ And yet this equally follows, if we grant that all things are in motion—upon this view too mind has no existence.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Do you think that sameness of condition and mode and subject could ever exist without a principle of rest?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ Can you see how without them mind could exist, or come into existence anywhere?

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ And surely contend we must in every possible way against him who would annihilate knowledge and reason and mind, and yet ventures to speak confidently about anything.

Theaetetus/ Yes, with all our might.

Stranger/ Then the philosopher, who has the truest reverence for these qualities, cannot possibly accept the notion of those who say that the whole is at rest, either as unity or in many forms: and he will be utterly deaf to those who assert universal motion. As children say entreatingly 'Give us both' so he will include both the moveable and immoveable in his definition of being and all.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ And now, do we not seem to have gained a fair notion of being?

Theaetetus/ Yes truly.

Stranger/ Alas, Theaetetus, methinks that we are now only beginning to see the real difficulty of the enquiry into the nature of it.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ O my friend, do you not see that nothing can exceed our ignorance, and yet we fancy that we are saying something good?

Theaetetus/ I certainly thought that we were; and I do not at all understand how we never found out our desperate case.

Stranger/ Reflect: after having made these admissions, may we not be justly asked the same questions which we ourselves were asking of those who said that all was hot and cold?

Theaetetus/ What were they? Will you recall them to my mind?

Stranger/ To be sure I will, and I will remind you of them, by putting the same questions to you which I did to them, and then we shall get on.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire opposition to one another?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And yet you would say that both and either of them equally are?

Theaetetus/ I should.

Stranger/ And when you admit that both or either of them are, do you mean to say that both or either of them are in motion?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest, when you say that they are?

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Stranger/ Then you conceive of being as some third and distinct nature, under which rest and motion are alike

included; and, observing that they both participate in being, you declare that they are.

Theaetetus/ Truly we seem to have an intimation that being is some third thing, when we say that rest and motion are.

Stranger/ Then being is not the combination of rest and motion, but something different from them.

Theaetetus/ So it would appear.

Stranger/ Being, then, according to its own nature, is neither in motion nor at rest.

Theaetetus/ That is very much the truth.

Stranger/ Where, then, is a man to look for help who would have any clear or fixed notion of being in his mind?

Theaetetus/ Where, indeed?

Stranger/ I scarcely think that he can look anywhere; for that which is not in motion must be at rest, and again, that which is not at rest must be in motion; but being is placed outside of both these classes. Is this possible?

Theaetetus/ Utterly impossible.

Stranger/ Here, then, is another thing which we ought to bear in mind.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ When we were asked to what we were to assign the appellation of not-being, we were in the greatest difficulty: —do you remember?

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ And are we not now in as great a difficulty about being?

Theaetetus/ I should say, Stranger, that we are in one which is, if possible, even greater.

Stranger/ Then let us acknowledge the difficulty; and as being and not-being are involved in the same perplexity, there is hope that when the one appears more or less distinctly, the other will equally appear; and if we are able to see neither, there may still be a chance of steering our way in between them, without any great discredit.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Let us enquire, then, how we come to predicate many names of the same thing.

Theaetetus/ Give an example.

Stranger/ I mean that we speak of man, for example, under many names—that we attribute to him colors and forms and magnitudes and virtues and vices, in all of which instances and in ten thousand others we not only speak of him as a man, but also as good, and having numberless other attributes; and in the same way anything else which we originally supposed to be one is described by us as many, and under many names.

Theaetetus/ That is true.

Stranger/ And thus we provide a rich feast for tyros, whether young or old; for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot be many, or the many one; and great is their delight in denying that a man is good; for man, they insist, is man and good is good. I dare say that you have met with persons who take an interest in such matters—they are often elderly men, whose meager sense is thrown into amazement by these discoveries of theirs, which they believe to be the height of wisdom.

Theaetetus/ Certainly, I have.

Stranger/ Then, not to exclude anyone who has ever speculated at all upon the nature of being, let us put our questions to them as well as to our former friends.

Theaetetus/ What questions?

Stranger/ Shall we refuse to attribute being to motion and rest, or anything to anything, and assume that they do not mingle, and are incapable of participating in one another? Or shall we gather all into one class of things communicable with one another? Or are some things communicable and others not? —Which of these alternatives, Theaetetus, will they prefer?

Theaetetus/ I have nothing to answer on their behalf. Suppose that you take all these hypotheses in turn, and see what are the consequences which follow from each of them.

Stranger/ Very good, and first let us assume them to say that nothing is capable of participating in anything else in any respect; in that case rest and motion cannot participate in being at all.

Theaetetus/ They cannot.

Stranger/ But would either of them be if not participating in being?

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ Then by this admission everything is instantly overturned, as well the doctrine of universal motion as of universal rest, and also the doctrine of those who distribute being into immutable and everlasting kinds; for all these add on a notion of being, some affirming that things 'are' truly in motion, and others that they 'are' truly at rest.

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Stranger/ Again, those who would at one time compound, and at another resolve all things, whether making them into one and out of one creating infinity, or dividing them into finite elements, and forming compounds out of these; whether they suppose the processes of creation to be successive or continuous, would be talking nonsense in all this if there were no admixture.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Most ridiculous of all will the men themselves be who want to carry out the argument and yet forbid us to call anything, because participating in some affection from another, by the name of that other.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ Why, because they are compelled to use the words 'to be,' 'apart,' 'from others,' 'in itself,' and ten thousand more, which they cannot give up, but must make the connecting links of discourse; and therefore they do not require to be refuted by others, but their enemy, as the saying is, inhabits the same house with them; they are always carrying about with them an adversary, like the wonderful ventriloquist, Eurycles, who out of their own bellies audibly contradicts them.

Theaetetus/ Precisely so; a very true and exact illustration.

Stranger/ And now, if we suppose that all things have the power of communion with one another—what will follow?

Theaetetus/ Even I can solve that riddle.

Stranger/ How?

Theaetetus/ Why, because motion itself would be at rest, and rest again in motion, if they could be attributed to one another.

Stranger/ But this is utterly impossible.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then only the third hypothesis remains.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ For, surely, either all things have communion with all; or nothing with any other thing; or some things communicate with some things and others not.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And two out of these three suppositions have been found to be impossible.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Everyone then, who desires to answer truly, will adopt the third and remaining hypothesis of the communion of some with some.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ This communion of some with some may be illustrated by the case of letters; for some letters do not fit each other, while others do.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And the vowels, especially, are a sort of bond which pervades all the other letters, so that without a vowel one consonant cannot be joined to another.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ But does everyone know what letters will unite with what? Or is art required in order to do so?

Theaetetus/ Art is required.

Stranger/ What art?

Theaetetus/ The art of grammar.

Stranger/ And is not this also true of sounds high and low? —Is not he who has the art to know what sounds mingle, a musician, and he who is ignorant, not a musician?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And we shall find this to be generally true of art or the absence of art.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And as classes are admitted by us in like manner to be some of them capable and others incapable of intermixture, must not he who would rightly show what kinds will unite and what will not, proceed by the help of

science in the path of argument? And will he not ask if the connecting links are universal, and so capable of intermixture with all things; and again, in divisions, whether there are not other universal classes, which make them possible?

Theaetetus/ To be sure he will require science, and, if I am not mistaken, the very greatest of all sciences.

Stranger/ How are we to call it? By Zeus, have we not lighted unwittingly upon our free and noble science, and in looking for the Sophist have we not entertained the philosopher unawares?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Should we not say that the division according to classes, which neither makes the same other, nor makes other the same, is the business of the dialectical science?

Theaetetus/ That is what we should say.

Stranger/ Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many different forms contained under one higher form; and again, one form knit together into a single whole and pervading many such wholes, and many forms, existing only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which determines where they can have communion with one another and where not.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to the philosopher pure and true?

Theaetetus/ Who but he can be worthy?

Stranger/ In this region we shall always discover the philosopher, if we look for him; like the Sophist, he is not easily discovered, but for a different reason.

Theaetetus/ For what reason?

Stranger/ Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered because of the darkness of the place. Is not that true?

Theaetetus/ It seems to be so.

Stranger/ And the philosopher, always holding converse through reason with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light; for the souls of the many have no eye which can endure the vision of the divine.

Theaetetus/ Yes; that seems to be quite as true as the other.

Stranger/ Well, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully considered by us, if we are disposed; but the Sophist must clearly not be allowed to escape until we have had a good look at him.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ Since, then, we are agreed that some classes have a communion with one another, and others not, and some have communion with a few and others with many, and that there is no reason why some should not have universal communion with all, let us now pursue the enquiry, as the argument suggests, not in relation to all ideas, lest the multitude of them should confuse us, but let us select a few of those which are reckoned to be the principal ones, and consider their several natures and their capacity of communion with one another, in order that if we are not able to apprehend with perfect clearness the notions of being and not-being, we may at least not fall short in the consideration of them, so far as they come within the scope of the present enquiry, if peradventure we may be allowed to assert the reality of not-being, and yet escape unscathed.

Theaetetus/ We must do so.

Stranger/ The most important of all the genera are those which we were just now mentioning—being and rest and motion.

Theaetetus/ Yes, by far.

Stranger/ And two of these are, as we affirm, incapable of communion with one another.

Theaetetus/ Quite incapable.

Stranger/ Whereas being surely has communion with both of them, for both of them are?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ That makes up three of them.

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ And each of them is other than the remaining two, but the same with itself.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ But then, what is the meaning of these two words, 'same' and 'other'? Are they two new kinds other than the three, and yet always of necessity intermingling with them, and are we to have five kinds instead of three; or when we speak of the same and other, are we unconsciously speaking of one of the three first kinds?

Theaetetus/ Very likely we are.

Stranger/ But, surely, motion and rest are neither the other nor the same.

Theaetetus/ How is that?

Stranger/ Whatever we attribute to motion and rest in common, cannot be either of them.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ Because motion would be at rest and rest in motion, for either of them, being predicated of both, will

compel the other to change into the opposite of its own nature, because partaking of its opposite.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ Yet they surely both partake of the same and of the other?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then we must not assert that motion, any more than rest, is either the same or the other.

Theaetetus/ No; we must not.

Stranger/ But are we to conceive that being and the same are identical?

Theaetetus/ Possibly.

Stranger/ But if they are identical, then again in saying that motion and rest have being, we should also be saying that they are the same.

Theaetetus/ Which surely cannot be.

Stranger/ Then being and the same cannot be one.

Theaetetus/ Scarcely.

Stranger/ Then we may suppose the same to be a fourth class, which is now to be added to the three others.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ And shall we call the other a fifth class? Or should we consider being and other to be two names of the same class?

Theaetetus/ Very likely.

Stranger/ But you would agree, if I am not mistaken, that existences are relative as well as absolute?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And the other is always relative to other?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ But this would not be the case unless being and the other entirely differed; for, if the other, like being, were absolute as well as relative, then there would have been a kind of other which was not other than other. And now we find that what is other must of necessity be what it is in relation to some other.

Theaetetus/ That is the true state of the case.

Stranger/ Then we must admit the other as the fifth of our selected classes.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the fifth class pervades all classes, for they all differ from one another, not by reason of their own nature, but because they partake of the idea of the other.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ Then let us now put the case with reference to each of the five.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ First there is motion, which we affirm to be absolutely 'other' than rest: what else can we say?

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Stranger/ And therefore is not rest.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ And yet is, because partaking of being.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Again, motion is other than the same?

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Stranger/ And is therefore not the same.

Theaetetus/ It is not.

Stranger/ Yet, surely, motion is the same, because all things partake of the same.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Then we must admit, and not object to say, that motion is the same and is not the same, for we do not apply the terms 'same' and 'not the same,' in the same sense; but we call it the 'same,' in relation to itself, because partaking of the same; and not the same, because having communion with the other, it is thereby severed from the same, and has become not that but other, and is therefore rightly spoken of as 'not the same.'

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ And if absolute motion in any point of view partook of rest, there would be no absurdity in calling motion stationary.

Theaetetus/ Quite right, —that is, on the supposition that some classes mingle with one another, and others not.

Stranger/ That such a communion of kinds is according to nature, we had already proved before we arrived at this part of our discussion.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Let us proceed, then. May we not say that motion is other than the other, having been also proved by us to be other than the same and other than rest?

Theaetetus/ That is certain.

Stranger/ Then, according to this view, motion is other and also not other?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ What is the next step? Shall we say that motion is other than the three and not other than the fourth, —for we agreed that there are five classes about and in the sphere of which we proposed to make enquiry?

Theaetetus/ Surely we cannot admit that the number is less than it appeared to be just now.

Stranger/ Then we may without fear contend that motion is other than being?

Theaetetus/ Without the least fear.

Stranger/ The plain result is that motion, since it partakes of being, really is and also is not?

Theaetetus/ Nothing can be plainer.

Stranger/ Then not-being necessarily exists in the case of motion and of every class; for the nature of the other entering into them all, makes each of them other than being, and so non-existent; and therefore of all of them, in like manner, we may truly say that they are not; and again, inasmuch as they partake of being, that they are and are existent.

Theaetetus/ So we may assume.

Stranger/ Every class, then, has plurality of being and infinity of not-being.

Theaetetus/ So we must infer.

Stranger/ And being itself may be said to be other than the other kinds.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then we may infer that being is not, in respect of as many other things as there are; for not being these it is itself one, and is not the other things, which are infinite in number.

Theaetetus/ That is not far from the truth.

Stranger/ And we must not quarrel with this result, since it is of the nature of classes to have communion with one another; and if anyone denies our present statement [viz. that being is not, etc.], let him first argue with our former conclusion [i.e. respecting the communion of ideas], and then he may proceed to argue with what follows.

Theaetetus/ Nothing can be fairer.

Stranger/ Let me ask you to consider a further question.

Theaetetus/ What question?

Stranger/ When we speak of not-being, we speak, I suppose, not of something opposed to being, but only different.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ When we speak of something as not great, does the expression seem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal?

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ The negative particles, οὐ and μὴ when prefixed to words, do not imply opposition, but only difference from the words, or more correctly from the things represented by the words, which follow them.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ There is another point to be considered, if you do not object.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ The nature of the other appears to me to be divided into fractions like knowledge.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Knowledge, like the other, is one; and yet the various parts of knowledge have each of them their own particular name, and hence there are many arts and kinds of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ And is not the case the same with the parts of the other, which is also one?

Theaetetus/ Very likely; but will you tell me how?

Stranger/ There is some part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

Theaetetus/ There is.

Stranger/ Shall we say that this has or has not a name?

Theaetetus/ It has; for whatever we call not-beautiful is other than the beautiful, not than something else.

Stranger/ And now tell me another thing.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ Is the not-beautiful anything but this—an existence parted off from a certain kind of existence, and again from another point of view opposed to an existing something?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Then the not-beautiful turns out to be the opposition of being to being?

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ But upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the not-beautiful a less real existence?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Stranger/ And the not-great may be said to exist, equally with the great?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And, in the same way, the just must be placed in the same category with the not-just—the one cannot be said to have any more existence than the other.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ The same may be said of other things; seeing that the nature of the other has a real existence, the parts of this nature must equally be supposed to exist.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then, as would appear, the opposition of a part of the other, and of a part of being, to one another, is, if I may venture to say so, as truly essence as being itself, and

implies not the opposite of being, but only what is other than being.

Theaetetus/ Beyond question.

Stranger/ What then shall we call it?

Theaetetus/ Clearly, not-being; and this is the very nature for which the Sophist compelled us to search.

Stranger/ And has not this, as you were saying, as real an existence as any other class? May I not say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence, and a nature of its own? Just as the great was found to be great and the beautiful, beautiful, and the not-great, not-great, and the not-beautiful, not-beautiful, in the same manner not-being has been found to be and is not-being, and is to be reckoned one among the many classes of being. Do you, Theaetetus, still feel any doubt of this?

Theaetetus/ None whatever.

Stranger/ Do you observe that our skepticism has carried us beyond the range of Parmenides' prohibition?

Theaetetus/ In what?

Stranger/ We have advanced to a further point, and shown him more than he forbad us to investigate.

Theaetetus/ How is that?

Stranger/ Why, because he says—

> 'Not-being never is, and do thou keep thy thoughts from this way of enquiry.'

Theaetetus/ Yes, he says so.

Stranger/ Whereas, we have not only proved that things which are not are, but we have shown what form of being not-being is; for we have shown that the nature of the other is, and is distributed over all things in their relations to one another, and whatever part of the other is contrasted with

being, this is precisely what we have ventured to call not-being.

Theaetetus/ And surely, Stranger, we were quite right.

Stranger/ Let not anyone say, then, that while affirming the opposition of not-being to being, we still assert the being of not-being; for as to whether there is an opposite of being, to that enquiry we have long said good-bye—it may or may not be, and may or may not be capable of definition. But as touching our present account of not-being, let a man either convince us of error, or, so long as he cannot, he too must say, as we are saying, that there is a communion of classes, and that being, and difference or other, traverse all things and mutually interpenetrate, so that the other partakes of being, and by reason of this participation is, and yet is not that of which it partakes, but other, and being other than being, it is clearly a necessity that not-being should be. And again, being, through partaking of the other, becomes a class other than the remaining classes, and being other than all of them, is not each one of them, and is not all the rest, so that undoubtedly there are thousands upon thousands of cases in which being is not, and all other things, whether regarded individually or collectively, in many respects are, and in many respects are not.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And he who is skeptical of this contradiction, must think how he can find something better to say; or if he sees a puzzle, and his pleasure is to drag words this way and that, the argument will prove to him, that he is not making a worthy use of his faculties; for there is no charm in such puzzles, and there is no difficulty in detecting them; but we can tell him of something else the pursuit of which is noble and also difficult.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ A thing of which I have already spoken; — letting alone these puzzles as involving no difficulty, he should be able to follow and criticize in detail every argument, and when a man says that the same is in a manner other, or that other is the same, to understand and refute him from his own point of view, and in the same respect in which he asserts either of these affections. But to show that somehow and in some sense the same is other, or the other same, or the great small, or the like unlike; and to delight in always bringing forward such contradictions, is no real refutation, but is clearly the new-born babe of someone who is only beginning to approach the problem of being.

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate all existences from one another is a barbarism and utterly unworthy of an educated or philosophical mind.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ The attempt at universal separation is the final annihilation of all reasoning; for only by the union of conceptions with one another do we attain to discourse of reason.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And, observe that we were only just in time in making a resistance to such separatists, and compelling them to admit that one thing mingles with another.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ Why, that we might be able to assert discourse to be a kind of being; for if we could not, the worst of all consequences would follow; we should have no philosophy. Moreover, the necessity for determining the nature of discourse presses upon us at this moment; if utterly deprived of it, we could no more hold discourse; and

deprived of it we should be if we admitted that there was no admixture of natures at all.

Theaetetus/ Very true. But I do not understand why at this moment we must determine the nature of discourse.

Stranger/ Perhaps you will see more clearly by the help of the following explanation.

Theaetetus/ What explanation?

Stranger/ Not-being has been acknowledged by us to be one among many classes diffused over all being.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And thence arises the question, whether not-being mingles with opinion and language.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ If not-being has no part in the proposition, then all things must be true; but if not-being has a part, then false opinion and false speech are possible, for to think or to say what is not—is falsehood, which thus arises in the region of thought and in speech.

Theaetetus/ That is quite true.

Stranger/ And where there is falsehood surely there must be deceit.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And if there is deceit, then all things must be full of idols and images and fancies.

Theaetetus/ To be sure.

Stranger/ Into that region the Sophist, as we said, made his escape, and, when he had got there, denied the very possibility of falsehood; no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered falsehood, inasmuch as not-being did not in any way partake of being.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And now, not-being has been shown to partake of being, and therefore he will not continue fighting in this direction, but he will probably say that some ideas partake of not-being, and some not, and that language and opinion are of the non-partaking class; and he will still fight to the death against the existence of the image-making and fantastic art, in which we have placed him, because, as he will say, opinion and language do not partake of not-being, and unless this participation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And, with the view of meeting this evasion, we must begin by enquiring into the nature of language, opinion, and imagination, in order that when we find them we may find also that they have communion with not-being, and, having made out the connection of them, may thus prove that falsehood exists; and therein we will imprison the Sophist, if he deserves it, or, if not, we will let him go again and look for him in another class.

Theaetetus/ Certainly, Stranger, there appears to be truth in what was said about the Sophist at first, that he was of a class not easily caught, for he seems to have abundance of defenses, which he throws up, and which must every one of them be stormed before we can reach the man himself. And even now, we have with difficulty got through his first defense, which is the not-being of not-being, and lo! here is another; for we have still to show that falsehood exists in the sphere of language and opinion, and there will be another and another line of defense without end.

Stranger/ Anyone, Theaetetus, who is able to advance even a little ought to be of good cheer, for what would he who is dispirited at a little progress do, if he were making none at all, or even undergoing a repulse? Such a faint heart, as the proverb says, will never take a city: but now that we have succeeded thus far, the citadel is ours, and what remains is easier.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Then, as I was saying, let us first of all obtain a conception of language and opinion, in order that we may have clearer grounds for determining, whether not-being has any concern with them, or whether they are both always true, and neither of them ever false.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Then, now, let us speak of names, as before we were speaking of ideas and letters; for that is the direction in which the answer may be expected.

Theaetetus/ And what is the question at issue about names?

Stranger/ The question at issue is whether all names may be connected with one another, or none, or only some of them.

Theaetetus/ Clearly the last is true.

Stranger/ I understand you to say that words which have a meaning when in sequence may be connected, but that words which have no meaning when in sequence cannot be connected?

Theaetetus/ What are you saying?

Stranger/ What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent; for there are two sorts of intimation of being which are given by the voice.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One of them is called nouns, and the other verbs.

Theaetetus/ Describe them.

Stranger/ That which denotes action we call a verb.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do the actions, we call a noun.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ A succession of nouns only is not a sentence, any more than of verbs without nouns.

Theaetetus/ I do not understand you.

Stranger/ I see that when you gave your assent you had something else in your mind. But what I intended to say was, that a mere succession of nouns or of verbs is not discourse.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ I mean that words like 'walks,' 'runs,' 'sleeps,' or any other words which denote action, however many of them you string together, do not make discourse.

Theaetetus/ How can they?

Stranger/ Or, again, when you say 'lion,' 'stag,' 'horse,' or any other words which denote agents—neither in this way of stringing words together do you attain to discourse; for there is no expression of action or inaction, or of the existence of existence or non-existence indicated by the sounds, until verbs are mingled with nouns; then the words fit, and the smallest combination of them forms language, and is the simplest and least form of discourse.

Theaetetus/ Again I ask, What do you mean?

Stranger/ When anyone says 'A man learns,' should you not call this the simplest and least of sentences?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Yes, for he now arrives at the point of giving an intimation about something which is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be. And he not only names, but he does something, by connecting verbs with nouns; and therefore we say that he discourses, and to this connection of words we give the name of discourse.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And as there are some things which fit one another, and other things which do not fit, so there are some vocal signs which do, and others which do not, combine and form discourse.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ There is another small matter.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ A sentence must and cannot help having a subject.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And must be of a certain quality.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And now let us mind what we are about.

Theaetetus/ We must do so.

Stranger/ I will repeat a sentence to you in which a thing and an action are combined, by the help of a noun and a verb; and you shall tell me of whom the sentence speaks.

Theaetetus/ I will, to the best of my power.

Stranger/ 'Theaetetus sits'—not a very long sentence.

Theaetetus/ Not very.

Stranger/ Of whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject? that is what you have to tell.

Theaetetus/ Of me; I am the subject.

Stranger/ Or this sentence, again—

Theaetetus/ What sentence?

Stranger/ 'Theaetetus, with whom I am now speaking, is flying'

Theaetetus/ That also is a sentence which will be admitted by everyone to speak of me, and to apply to me.

Stranger/ We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain quality.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And what is the quality of each of these two sentences?

Theaetetus/ The one, as I imagine, is false, and the other true.

Stranger/ The true says what is true about you?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the false says what is other than true?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And says that things are real of you which are not; for, as we were saying, in regard to each thing or person, there is much that is and much that is not.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ The second of the two sentences which related to you was first of all an example of the shortest form consistent with our definition.

Theaetetus/ Yes, this was implied in our recent admission.

Stranger/ And, in the second place, it related to a subject?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Who must be you, and can be nobody else?

Theaetetus/ Unquestionably.

Stranger/ And it would be no sentence at all if there were no subject, for, as we proved, a sentence which has no subject is impossible.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ When other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and not-being as being, such a combination of nouns and verbs is really and truly false discourse.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ And therefore thought, opinion, and imagination are now proved to exist in our minds both as true and false.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ You will know better if you first gain a knowledge of what they are, and in what they severally differ from one another.

Theaetetus/ Give me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain.

Stranger/ Are not thought and speech the same, with this exception, that what is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with herself?

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is audible is called speech?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And we know that there exists in speech…

Theaetetus/ What exists?

Stranger/ Affirmation.

Theaetetus/ Yes, we know it.

Stranger/ When the affirmation or denial takes place in silence and in the mind only, have you any other name by which to call it but opinion?

Theaetetus/ There can be no other name.

Stranger/ And when opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of sense, would you not call it imagination?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And seeing that language is true and false, and that thought is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion is the end of thinking, and imagination or fantasy is the union of sense and opinion, the inference is that some of them, since they are akin to language, should have an element of falsehood as well as of truth?

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Do you perceive, then, that false opinion and speech have been discovered sooner than we expected? — For just now we seemed to be undertaking a task which would never be accomplished.

Theaetetus/ I perceive.

Stranger/ Then let us not be discouraged about the future; but now having made this discovery, let us go back to our previous classification.

Theaetetus/ What classification?

Stranger/ We divided image-making into two sorts; the one making likeness-making, the other imaginative or fantastic.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And we said that we were uncertain in which we should place the Sophist.

Theaetetus/ We did say so.

Stranger/ And our heads began to go round more and more when it was asserted that there is no such thing as an image or idol or appearance, because in no manner or time or place can there ever be such a thing as falsehood.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And now, since there has been shown to be false speech and false opinion, there may be imitations of real existences, and out of this condition of the mind an art of deception may arise.

Theaetetus/ Quite possible.

Stranger/ And we have already admitted, in what preceded, that the Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness-making art?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let us, then, renew the attempt, and in dividing any class, always take the part to the right, holding fast to that which holds the Sophist, until we have stripped him of all his common properties, and reached his difference or peculiar. Then we may exhibit him in his true nature, first to ourselves and then to kindred dialectical spirits.

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ You may remember that all art was originally divided by us into creative and acquisitive.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the Sophist was flitting before us in the acquisitive class, in the subdivisions of hunting, contests, merchandize, and the like.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ But now that the imitative art has enclosed him, it is clear that we must begin by dividing the art of creation; for imitation is a kind of creation—of images, however, as we affirm, and not of real things.

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ In the first place, there are two kinds of creation.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One of them is human and the other divine.

Theaetetus/ I do not follow.

Stranger/ Every power, as you may remember our saying originally, which causes things to exist, not previously existing, was defined by us as creative.

Theaetetus/ I remember.

Stranger/ Looking, now, at the world and all the animals and plants, at things which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots, as well as at inanimate substances which are formed within the earth, fusile or non-fusile, shall we say that they come into existence—not having existed previously—by the creation of God, or shall we agree with vulgar opinion about them?

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ The opinion that nature brings them into being from some spontaneous and unintelligent cause. Or shall we say that they are created by a divine reason and a knowledge which comes from God?

Theaetetus/ I dare say that, owing to my youth, I may often waver in my view, but now when I look at you and see that you incline to refer them to God, I defer to your authority.

Stranger/ Nobly said, Theaetetus, and if I thought that you were one of those who would hereafter change your mind, I would have gently argued with you, and forced you to assent; but as I perceive that you will come of yourself and without any argument of mine, to that belief which, as you say, attracts you, I will not forestall the work of time. Let me suppose, then, that things which are said to be made by nature are the work of divine art, and that things which are made by man out of these are works of human art. And so there are two kinds of making and production, the one human and the other divine.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Then, now, subdivide each of the two sections which we have already.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ I mean to say that you should make a vertical division of production or invention, as you have already made a lateral one.

Theaetetus/ I have done so.

Stranger/ Then, now, there are in all four parts or segments—two of them have reference to us and are human, and two of them have reference to the gods and are divine.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And, again, in the division which was supposed to be made in the other way, one part in each subdivision is the making of the things themselves, but the two remaining parts may be called the making of likenesses; and so the productive art is again divided into two parts.

Theaetetus/ Tell me the divisions once more.

Stranger/ I suppose that we, and the other animals, and the elements out of which things are made—fire, water, and the like—are known by us to be each and all the creation and work of God.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And there are images of them, which are not them, but which correspond to them; and these are also the creation of a wonderful skill.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by day, such as a shadow when darkness arises in a fire, or the reflection which is produced when the light in bright and smooth objects meets on their surface with an external light, and creates a perception the opposite of our ordinary sight.

Theaetetus/ Yes; and the images as well as the creation are equally the work of a divine hand.

Stranger/ And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one house by the art of building, and another by the art of drawing, which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake?

Theaetetus/ Quite true.

Stranger/ And other products of human creation are also twofold and go in pairs; there is the thing, with which the art of making the thing is concerned, and the image, with which imitation is concerned.

Theaetetus/ Now I begin to understand, and am ready to acknowledge that there are two kinds of production, and each of them twofold; in the lateral division there is both a divine and a human production; in the vertical there are realities and a creation of a kind of similitudes.

Stranger/ And let us not forget that of the imitative class the one part was to have been likeness-making, and the other fantastic, if it could be shown that falsehood is a reality and belongs to the class of real being.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And this appeared to be the case; and therefore now, without hesitation, we shall number the different kinds as two.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Then, now, let us again divide the fantastic art.

Theaetetus/ Where shall we make the division?

Stranger/ There is one kind which is produced by an instrument, and another in which the creator of the appearance is himself the instrument.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ When anyone makes himself appear like another in his figure or his voice, imitation is the name for this part of the fantastic art.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let this, then, be named the art of mimicry, and this the province assigned to it; as for the other division, we are weary and will give that up, leaving to someone else the duty of making the class and giving it a suitable name.

Theaetetus/ Let us do as you say—assign a sphere to the one and leave the other.

Stranger/ There is a further distinction, Theaetetus, which is worthy of our consideration, and for a reason which I will tell you.

Theaetetus/ Let me hear.

Stranger/ There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?

Theaetetus/ There can be no greater.

Stranger/ Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely know you and your figure?

Theaetetus/ Naturally.

Stranger/ And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge of either, but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they can, in word and deed?

Theaetetus/ Yes, that is very common.

Stranger/ And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just, when they are not? Or is not the very opposite true?

Theaetetus/ The very opposite.

Stranger/ Such a one, then, should be described as an imitator—to be distinguished from the other, as he who is ignorant is distinguished from him who knows?

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Can we find a suitable name for each of them? This is clearly not an easy task; for among the ancients there was some confusion of ideas, which prevented them from attempting to divide genera into species; wherefore there is no great abundance of names. Yet, for the sake of distinctness, I will make bold to call the imitation which coexists with opinion, the imitation of appearance—that which coexists with science, a scientific or learned imitation.

Theaetetus/ Granted.

Stranger/ The former is our present concern, for the Sophist was classed with imitators indeed, but not among those who have knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Let us, then, examine our imitator of appearance, and see whether he is sound, like a piece of iron, or whether there is still some crack in him.

Theaetetus/ Let us examine him.

Stranger/ Indeed there is a very considerable crack; for if you look, you find that one of the two classes of imitators is a simple creature, who thinks that he knows that which he only fancies; the other sort has knocked about among arguments, until he suspects and fears that he is ignorant of that which to the many he pretends to know.

Theaetetus/ There are certainly the two kinds which you describe.

Stranger/ Shall we regard one as the simple imitator—the other as the dissembling or ironical imitator?

Theaetetus/ Very good.

Stranger/ And shall we further speak of this latter class as having one or two divisions?

Theaetetus/ Answer yourself.

Stranger/ Upon consideration, then, there appear to me to be two; there is the dissembler, who harangues a multitude in public in a long speech, and the dissembler, who in private and in short speeches compels the person who is conversing with him to contradict himself.

Theaetetus/ What you say is most true.

Stranger/ And who is the maker of the longer speeches? Is he the statesman or the popular orator?

Theaetetus/ The latter.

Stranger/ And what shall we call the other? Is he the philosopher or the Sophist?

Theaetetus/ The philosopher he cannot be, for upon our view he is ignorant; but since he is an imitator of the wise he will have a name which is formed by an adaptation of the word σοφός. What shall we name him? I am pretty sure that I cannot be mistaken in terming him the true and very Sophist.

Stranger/ Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a chain from one end of his genealogy to the other?

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows—who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of the art of causing self-contradiction, is an imitator of appearance, and is separated from the class of fantastic which is a branch of image-making into that further division of creation, the juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine—anyone who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage will say the very truth.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

The Sophistes Of Plato.

A DIALOGUE OF TRUE AND FALSE TEACHING.

Translated by E. W. Mackay, M. A., 1868.

Persons of the Dialog

Theodorus, Socrates, An Elean Stranger, Theaetetus.

Theodorus/ —Conformably to our yesterday's agreement, Socrates, we have come ourselves and have brought with us this stranger, by birth an Elean, one of the followers of Parmenides and Zeno, and a great philosopher.

Socrates/ —Possibly, Theodorus, you have unconsciously brought with you not a mere mortal visitor, but a God; since Homer tells how Gods—the God of strangers especially—are wont, in company with just and conscientious persons, to come inspecting the iniquities and righteousness of men. So perhaps this stranger is some higher being who has followed you in order to inspect and impeach the imperfections of our reasonings, being, in truth, some cross-examining God.

Theodorus/ —Not so, Socrates; our friends argumentative method is, comparatively speaking, more moderate than that of ordinary Eristic cavilers; and though the man, in my opinion, is no God, he has nevertheless something divine about him; for such, indeed, I hold to be the case with all true philosophers.

Socrates/ —You do well, my friend; although I fear that this kind of man is not much easier to distinguish than that of the Gods. For these, —I mean the true, not fictitious, philosophers, assume all sorts of fictitious semblances through others ignorance, and in the course of their peregrinations and inspection of the life of those below them, appear to some nothing worth, while surpassingly excellent in the esteem of others. Sometimes they take the form of

statesmen, sometimes of (teachers or) sophists, while to some they seem as if altogether insane. However, I would gladly learn from this our guest, if not displeasing to him, what opinion his countrymen entertain, and what name they give to these several characters.

Theodorus/ —What characters?

Socrates/ —Those of the Sophist, the politician, and the philosopher.

Theodorus/ —What specific doubt respecting them prompts your inquiry?

Socrates/ —I wish to know whether they esteem them as one, or as two, or as three, assigning each of the three names to a separate genus.

Theodorus/ —There can, I presume, be no objection to answer the question; —how say you, Stranger?

Stranger/ —None in the least, Theodorus; there is neither scruple nor difficulty in saying that they consider them to be three; at the same time, to define each of them accurately is no small or easy task.

Theodorus/ —You have accidentally, Socrates, touched on matters which we happened to be questioning him about before coming here, and he then made,, the same answer to us as now to you, saying he has heard and recollects all about it.

Socrates/ —Do not then, Stranger, refuse the favor already asked. Tell us first, however, this—whether you prefer to reply in the form of a continuous discourse, or rather in that of answers to a series of questions, the form in which once, when young, I remember hearing Parmenides deliver some very beautiful arguments, he being very old at the time?

Stranger/ —The colloquial form is certainly better, if it be used fluently and easily; if not, the form of monologue were preferable.

Socrates/ —Choose, then, among those present one with whom to converse, for all will readily follow you. But if you take my advice you will select one of the younger men—Theaetetus here, for instance, or any other you like.

Stranger/ —I feel ashamed, Socrates, at having in this, our first interview, to hold a lengthened discourse, either alone or with another, as if to make a display; for, in truth, the subject proposed is not to be comprised in a simple answer to a question as one might think, but is a matter requiring long discussion. Yet not to comply with your and their wishes were rude and unfriendly, especially after what you have said; and I accept Theaetetus as my fellow dialogist the more readily because I was already conversing with him in anticipation of your recommendation.

Theaetetus/ —Pray do then, Stranger, consent to gratify us all?

Stranger/ —Say no more, Theaetetus; I shall now address myself to you; and if hereafter you should feel fatigue through the prolixity of what you undertake, you must not blame me, but your own friends here.

Theaetetus/ —I don't fear defeat this time; but, in case of accident, I will take this younger Socrates, a crony of my own age, as an ally one who is not unaccustomed to share my exercises.

Stranger/ —Well! settle this between yourselves as the discourse proceeds. We will begin, then, our mutual enquiry with the Sophist; considering and explaining what he is. At present you and I have only the name in common; each of us probably entertains a different idea as to the thing. But in

every matter it is far more important to be agreed as to the thing by means of rational explanations, than to repeat the name without explanation. Now, it is not easy to determine the class or kind in which the Sophist is to be placed. But since, in order to deal effectually with great and important matters, universal experience shows it to be better to approach the investigation by means of simple and easy examples, I propose that we should do so in the present case, and study the obscure nature of the Sophist and his mode of action in some familiar instance; unless you, Theaetetus, can point out a. better way.

Theaetetus/ —I can think of none better.

Stranger/ —Suppose then we take something common and trivial, using it as a pattern or illustration of a greater thing.

Theaetetus/ —Well!

Stranger/ —Let us take something easily manageable and familiar, yet admitting rational exposition as much as a greater, a fisherman, for instance; this is a well-known and common thing.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —I think it may suggest a method and an explanation not inapposite to our purpose.

Theaetetus/ —Then will it answer well.

Stranger/ —Come, then, let us begin thus; shall we call the fisherman an artist; or inartistic, but possessing some other faculty.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly not inartistic!

Stranger/ —But all art falls under two kinds.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —Agriculture and all manipulations of material body, the putting together and forming of utensils, and the imitative art, all these may be called by one name.

Theaetetus/ —What name?

Stranger/ —When one brings into existence that which before had no existence, then we say that he who does so makes, and that the thing so brought into being is made or created.

Theaetetus/ —Right.

Stranger/ —But all the above-recited arts have a power of effecting this.

Theaetetus/ —They have.

Stranger/ —Summing them altogether in one, we may call them creative art (ποιητική).

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —On the other hand, all the operations of science and knowledge, of money-making, gymnastics, hunting, etc., —these, as creating nothing new, but only taking hold of things existing already, in the way of apprehending them by acts or words, or preventing others doing so, may be called acquisitive art (κτητική).

Theaetetus/ —Just so.

Stranger/ —All art, then, being either creative or acquisitive, in which class shall we place the art of fishing?

Theaetetus/ —Doubtless in the acquisitive class.

Stranger/ —But is not the acquisitive art itself of two kinds; one carried on by voluntary interchanges of gifts, wages, and values; the other, a seizure by means of acts or words altogether forcibly?

Theaetetus/ —So it appears.

Stranger/ —But is not the forcibly acquisitive art too susceptible of two-fold division?

Theaetetus/ —How?

Stranger/ —One kind consisting in open competition, the other in secret hunting.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —But the art of hunting too we must needs in reason divide.

Theaetetus/ —Say how.

Stranger/ —Into hunting the inanimate, and hunting the animate.

Theaetetus/ —Of course, if there are both these.

Stranger/ —Of course there must be; and we must leave alone the hunting of the inanimate, which, for the most part, is nameless, unless it be the art of diving and such like; on the other hand, we will call the art of hunting the animate animal hunting.

Theaetetus/ —Be it so.

Stranger/ —Of animal hunting again there may be said to be two sorts; one hunting on dry land, of which there are several kinds and names; another, the hunting of sailing and floating animals, or liquid hunting.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Of the floating animals, some are in air, some in water.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —The hunting of the feathered tribe is called fowling.

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —And the aquatic hunting is almost wholly fishing.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —But say, shall we not divide this sort of hunting also into two chief parts?

Theaetetus/ —What parts?

Stranger/ —One sort carried on with nets or gins, the other with blows.

Theaetetus/ —How do you distinguish each?

Stranger/ —One, because everything enclosing and constraining another may be called a barrier or net.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Such contrivances, whether formed of wicker or twine, or nooses of reeds or drags, are they not all snares or nets?

Theaetetus/ —Doubtless.

Stranger/ —This sort of hunting then we may term net hunting, or something of the sort.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —But the hunting with hooks and spears or by a blow, we may call hunting by striking, or can you suggest a better name?

Theaetetus/ —Never mind the name; this is quite good enough.

Stranger/ —But of the hunting by blows some is carried on by night with torches, so that the fishing is called torch fishing.

Theaetetus/ —So it is.

Stranger/ —But that by day may be all called hook fishing, since the spears too which are used in it are barbed or hooked.

Theaetetus/ —So they say.

Stranger/ —But of the hunting by blows of hooks one sort is practiced from above, downwards, and is called spearing or harpooning.

Theaetetus/ —So indeed they call it.

Stranger/ —And there remains one kind only, in which the hook, unlike the harpoon, does not strike any part of the body at random, but always some part of the mouth or head, and by means of a reed or rod draws the fish from below upwards. Now what name, Theaetetus, shall we give to this operation?

Theaetetus/ —I think we have now solved the problem which it was proposed to unravel.

Stranger/ —You and I, then, are now agreed not only as to the name of the art of angling, but as to the thing. For of all art one-half was acquisitive, the half of this seizing, half of this hunting, half of this animal hunting, half of this hunting in a fluid, —the lower division of which was the fisherman's art; of fishing half was fishing by blows, half again of this hook fishing; and the half of this which draws from below upwards is the anglers art, which has obtained a name in analogy with the action practiced.

Theaetetus/ —This is certainly very sufficiently explained.

Stranger/ —Come now, let us endeavor to find out according to this example what a Sophist is.

Theaetetus/ —Very well.

Stranger/ —In conformity with our plan we had to enquire first, whether the angler be an ignoramus or possessor of art?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And now in regard to the Sophist; shall we assume him to be an ignoramus, or one really and truly a Sophist?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly not an ignoramus; I understand your meaning, namely, that one having the name of “Sophist” should possess the thing to which the name applies; but what particular art are we to suppose him to possess?

Stranger/ —What art? has it then escaped us that the two men we have been talking of have affinity with one another?

Theaetetus/ —Which men?

Stranger/ —Why the angler and the Sophist.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —Both appear to me to be hunters.

Theaetetus/ —What then is the game of the Sophist? of the other enough has been said.

Stranger/ —Did we not just now divide hunting into fluid hunting and land hunting?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And that portion of the whole which has to do with floating in water we have already explained; the land hunting we left undivided, remarking only that it comprehends many kinds.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —So far then the Sophist and angler both proceed from a common art of acquiring.

Theaetetus/ —So it appears.

Stranger/ —But in their animal hunting they separate, one turning to the sea, the rivers and lakes, the other to the land, and to certain other rivers, inexhaustible pastures as it were of wealth and youth, in order to get hold of the animals there nourished.

Theaetetus/ —How mean you?

Stranger/ —Of the land hunting there were two great divisions.

Theaetetus/ —Which?

Stranger/ —One the hunting of tame, the other of wild animals.

Theaetetus/ —Are tame animals then hunted?

Stranger/ —Yes; if man be a tame animal. But make what supposition you like; either that there is no tame animal, or that some other animal is tame and man wild; or will you suppose man to be tame, but not an object of chase. Tell me which supposition you prefer.

Theaetetus/ —I think, my friend, that we are tame animals, and that man is an object of chase.

Stranger/ —Let us then say that tame animal hunting is of two kinds.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —All robbery, enslavement, tyranny, and warfare we place under one head of hunting with violence; but judgment, oratory, affability, we may also include in one term as popular conciliation or persuasion.

Theaetetus/ —Very well.

Stranger/ —But of persuasion we may say that there are two sorts; one private, the other public. Of the former again, one kind seeks pay, the other confers gifts.

Theaetetus/ —I don't follow this.

Stranger/ —It seems you have not yet paid attention to the chase carried on by lovers?

Theaetetus/ —In what respect?

Stranger/ —Inasmuch as they confer gifts on the beloved objects.

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —Let this then be set apart as the form of the lovers art. But of the mercenary or pay-seeking subdivision, that kind which courts popular favor, and using pleasure as a bait, seeks only sustenance for self, all men would, I suppose, call the art of pleasing or adulation.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —But the other kind, professing to court association for the sake of cultivating virtue, yet receiving reward in the shape of pay, does not this deserve a different appellation?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly it does.

Stranger/ —But what name? Try and tell us.

Theaetetus/ —It is evident. We seem now to have discovered the Sophist; this, I think, is the fitting name for him.

Stranger/ —So then, according to our present course of reasoning, Theaetetus, the Sophistical art is a sort of acquisitive land-animal-hunting, a chase of individual men for money reward, a hunting of rich and noble young men by seeming educators.

Theaetetus/ —Such it certainly appears.

Stranger/ —But let us also consider it thus; for the object of our present enquiry is no trivial thing, but a very various and complicated one; it would seem indeed from what was before said not to be of the kind now stated, but something quite different.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —We divided, I think, the acquisitive art into hunting, and another kind carried on by way of exchange?

Theaetetus/ —It was so.

Stranger/ —But of exchanges there are two sorts, one by way of gift, the other of purchase.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And shall we also divide purchase into two kinds?

Theaetetus/ —How?

Stranger/ —By distinguishing those exchanging their own productions from those exchanging the productions of others.

Theaetetus/ —Very well.

Stranger/ —But of all exchange, is not that which takes place within the same city, constituting nearly half of the whole, called retail traffic?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And that which occurs in the way of purchase and sale between city and city is called wholesale or mercantile?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —And observe, one kind of trade exchanges for money things for the use and nourishment of the body, another things for the use of the soul.

Theaetetus/ —How mean you?

Stranger/ —That which concerns the soul escapes us, perhaps; the other kind we understand well enough.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Well then, may we not say that he who imports and furnishes the different kinds of ornamental culture, the arts of music, painting, wonder-working, and other aids of the soul, destined either for its amusement or instruction, deserves the name of trader or merchant, quite as much, as the purveyor of meat and drink.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —And does not the same name belong also to him who buys knowledge and sells it again from city to city?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —But of this traffic in commodities for the soul may not one part be justly styled display; while the other, though no less ridiculous than the former, must nevertheless, as a selling of learning, be called by some analogous name?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Of this traffic in knowledge and learning, then, that part which concerns the arts generally must be called by one name, that which concerns virtue by another.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —Dealing in arts and accomplishments is a sufficient designation of the one; for the other do you yourself devise a name.

Theaetetus/ —What other name can we well give it but that of the Sophistical art which we are now seeking?

Stranger/ —No other, certainly! Now then let us recapitulate the heads of our second description of it, having the characteristics of acquisition, acquisition by exchange, commercially exchanging, trading, trading in commodities concerning the soul, namely, in reasonings and knowledge, and trafficking in virtue.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —Again, thirdly, if anyone coming to establish himself in the city should propose to get his living by selling such stores of learning, partly purchased and partly fabricated by himself, you would give him no other name.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —That acquisitive art, then, which is carried on by traffic and exchange, whether the commodities sold are bought or self-produced, must in both cases, if dealing with commodities of learning, be termed Sophistical.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly; such is the necessary inference.

Stranger/ —Let us also consider whether what we are now seeking is not allied to something like the following; Of the acquisitive art one part, you may recollect, we denned as contentious or competitive.

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —We may then, as usual, divide it into two sorts the struggle of rivals, and the fight of foes.

Theaetetus/ —Well.

Stranger/ —Of fighting, that kind which is carried on bodily between man and man may be termed violent; whereas strife carried on in words against words is controversy.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —But controversies are of two sorts; those publicly held in continuous discourses on questions of just and unjust are legal pleadings; those privately conducted in the form of question and answer are called disputations.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —But disputation, so far as it concerns business contracts, and is carried on carelessly and unartificially, though recognizable as a separate kind, has not obtained a distinct name in former time, nor shall it now from us.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly; for it concerns only a variety of small trivialities.

Stranger/ —But the artificial kind, which embarks in general and systematic controversies on the essential nature

of justice, injustice, and all other things, do we not usually call this the “eristic” or wrangling art?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —But of wrangling one sort destroys wealth, the other increases it.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —Let us now try to find a suitable name for each.

Theaetetus/ —We must do so.

Stranger/ —That which occurs to the neglect of our private affairs, to gratify the idle garrulity of the speaker, and often to the disgust of the hearers, may, I think, be called prosing or babbling.

Theaetetus/ —So it may, indeed.

Stranger/ —And the kind opposed to this, which makes money out of private disputations, what would you term it?

Theaetetus/ —What answer can be given to such a question except that we have here a fourth characteristic of the wonderful being we are in search of, namely the Sophist?

Stranger/ —It doubtless is that acquisitive race which, practicing the general art of wrangling and controversy, is specially distinguished by the private character of its contentions and their lucrative results.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —You see, then, how true it is that this is a various and very questionable animal one not to be caught with the left hand, as the saying is.

Theaetetus/ —Nay; we must use both hands.

Stranger/ —True; and let us do our best to do so, following up its footmarks, for instance, as follows; say, do we not sometimes employ household terms?

Theaetetus/ —To which do you allude?

Stranger/ —Expressions such as straining, filtering, sifting, sorting?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —Moreover, carding, weaving, combing, and many other expressions used in the arts.

Theaetetus/ —For what particular purpose of explanation do you select these instances?

Stranger/ —All these instances denote division and separation.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Since, then, one operation pervades them all, we may apply one name to all.

Theaetetus/ —What name?

Stranger/ —The discriminative art (Diacritike).

Theaetetus/ —Be it so.

Stranger/ —Consider, now, if there be two sorts of this.

Theaetetus/ —You are rather too quick for me.

Stranger/ —Of the divisions alluded to, some are of better from worse, some of like from like.

Theaetetus/ —So, indeed, it seems.

Stranger/ —For one of these I have no name; but for that which leaves the good and rejects the bad, I have one.

Theaetetus/ —What is it?

Stranger/ —All separation of this nature is called, I think, purification.

Theaetetus/ —So it is.

Stranger/ —And are there not two sorts of purification?

Theaetetus/ —Yes, perhaps, if one had time to consider; but I don't at present see it.

Stranger/ —The various kinds of bodily purification may be comprehended under one name.

Theaetetus/ —What are they,?

Stranger/ —In regard to animal bodies, the legitimate inward purifications of exercise and medicine; in regard to the outside, all that is effected by bathing; in the inanimate, all that is done by the fullers art and by cosmetics, suggesting many minute specialties and ridiculous terms.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Yes, Theaetetus; but our method of enquiry cares little for differences of quality or utility in the particular kinds of purification cited as examples. For its aim is clear and definite ideas; for this it endeavors to distinguish in all arts that which is similar or dissimilar, treating all for its own particular purpose as being on the same footing in regard to dignity—none of them, indeed, as more despicable than another if only it can supply a useful analogy. For instance, it does not esteem the hunting pursued in a military campaign more really important than the hunting of vermin, but only a more ostentatious and pretentious sort of it. In reference to your question, it matters not by what name we denominate the various purifications of animate or inanimate bodies; only it should be one comprehending all, purifications of the soul excepted. Our sole object, at present, is to separate mental from other sorts of purification.

Theaetetus/ —I understand, and admit two sorts; one relating to the body, the other to the soul.

Stranger/ —Very well. Now listen; try to divide the kind just alluded to into two parts.

Theaetetus/ —Lead, and I will try to follow you in the division.

Stranger/ —Do we not reckon vice as differing from virtue in the soul?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —And purification was found to consist in leaving the one and expelling what is evil?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —Any expulsion of depravity from the soul then may properly be termed purification?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —We may, I think, distinguish two kinds of mental depravity, —one analogous to bodily sickness, the other to bodily deformity.

Theaetetus/ —I don't follow.

Stranger/ —Are not sickness and sedition identical things?

Theaetetus/ —I don't quite see.

Stranger/ —Is not sedition a corruption of something naturally allied, in consequence of some discord?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And is deformity anything but the repulsive appearance arising wherever harmony is absent?

Theaetetus/ —Nothing else.

Stranger/ —Well then, —do we not see in the souls of the ill-conditioned, opinion at issue with desire, fortitude with pleasure, reason with pain, and indeed discord of all kinds?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Nevertheless all these elements are naturally allied?

Theaetetus/ —Of course they are.

Stranger/ —We may therefore aptly call vice a sedition and disease of the soul.

Theaetetus/ —Very truly so.

Stranger/ —But when things having motion and a certain end in view, fail in their efforts to reach it by being carried hither and thither by particular impulses, shall we say that the failure arises from internal harmony and congruity, or from incongruity?

Theaetetus/ —Evidently through incongruity.

Stranger/ —But we are certain that all ignorance is contrary to the instincts of the soul.

Theaetetus/ —Quite so.

Stranger/ —Ignorance, however, is only the error of a soul aiming at truth, but swerving from its course.

Theaetetus/ —Assuredly.

Stranger/ —An ignorant soul must therefore be considered deformed and inharmonious?

Theaetetus/ —So it appears.

Stranger/ —There are then two kinds of evil besetting it; one called by the many vice or depravity, and being most certainly a disease in it; the other ignorance; but this they will not allow to be the special vice of the soul.

Theaetetus/ —I must admit the truth of what I just now doubted, namely what you said about there being two kinds of vice in the soul; cowardice, intemperance, injustice, and faults of this description, must be allowed to be diseases; but the state of ignorance in its various phases is deformity.

Stranger/ —But now, so far as the body is concerned, are there not two arts dealing with these two evils respectively?

Theaetetus/ —What are they?

Stranger/ —Gymnastics for deformity, medicine for disease.

Theaetetus/ —Tis so indeed.

Stranger/ —To repress insolence, injustice, cowardice, etc., is not the best preservative that which punishes, namely law or justice?

Theaetetus/ —So it appears, to human estimation at least.

Stranger/ —But for ignorance generally what remedy is there except instruction?

Theaetetus/ —None.

Stranger/ —But now, consider; is there one kind of instruction only or several; and of many are not two of supreme importance? Reflect!

Theaetetus/ —Well. I am reflecting.

Stranger/ —It seems to me that we shall best get an answer by considering whether ignorance does not admit a two-fold division, for so each of its divisions will ask its own special remedy.

Theaetetus/ —Do you see the way to a solution?

Stranger/ —Yes. I do think I see a great and very dangerous kind of ignorance, which alone may well be considered equivalent to all its other forms.

Theaetetus/ —Which is it?

Stranger/ —The fancying we know when we are in fact ignorant; out of which mistake almost all our intellectual errors arise.

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —I think it is this sort of ignorance which has specially earned the name stupidity (αμαθια).

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —Which kind of instruction then shall we propose as a remedy for this?

Theaetetus/ —All other teaching may, I think, be called handicraft teaching; l the kind here particularly required is among us at Athens called education.

Stranger/ —So it is, Theaetetus, by nearly all the Greeks; but let us consider whether education be entirely homogeneous, or something admitting division.

Theaetetus/ —We must consider this.

Stranger/ —It seems to me then to be susceptible of division, of the teaching by means of discourse one way appears to me difficult, the other easier.

Theaetetus/ —Tell me which they are.

Stranger/ —One is the respectable hereditary practice used of old, and even now, when a fault is committed, either in the way of angry reprimand or mild reproval; all this may pass by the name of admonition.

Theaetetus/ —So it is.

Stranger/ —But the other kind, —since some seem, after mature reflection, to have come to the conclusion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one esteeming himself wise would wish to learn the things which he thinks he already knows, and under any circumstances would benefit but little from the admonitory method—

Theaetetus/ —And they are right.

Stranger/ —So they address themselves in another way to eradicate this opinion.

Theaetetus/ —How?

Stranger/ —They question a man as to things about which he thinks he can speak when in reality he cannot. They expose the vacillating uncertainty of his opinions, placing the latter as summarized from the discourse side by side in clear contrast, so as to show their essential weakness and inconsistency. Seeing this, their authors get angry with themselves and at the same time more tolerant towards others; and in this way they become emancipated from strongly self-complacent and inveterate prejudices, an emancipation very pleasant to listen to and very salutary to the patient himself.

For as physicians consider that the body cannot properly profit by the nourishment given if, until obstructions have been removed, so these purifiers of the soul believe that it cannot make proper use of instruction until obstructive opinions have been expelled, and the patient, shamed by refutation, becomes intellectually pure and clear, thinking he knows what he really knows, and nothing more.

Theaetetus/ —This is a most excellent and wise proceeding.

Stranger/ —For all these reasons, Theaetetus, the Elenchus (criticism or argumentative refutation), appears to me the greatest and most effectual of all purifications, and that he who has not passed through this ordeal, even were he the great king himself, is impure, ignorant, and uncomely in the important matters most concerning his real happiness.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —But now, what shall we call those using this art; for I fear to call them Sophists.

Theaetetus/ —Why so?

Stranger/ —Lest we ascribe to them a higher honor than they deserve.

Theaetetus/ —Yet the description just given resembles something of the sort.

Stranger/ —So does a wolf a dog, the wildest animal the tamest. But a prudent man will be cautious in making comparisons, for this is a very slippery and hazardous kind. Nevertheless let them pass as such; for, if we are sufficiently on our guard, there will, I apprehend, be no dispute about small differences.

Theaetetus/ —No, it is not likely.

Stranger/ —Of the discriminative or reparative art then, let us take the purifying; of purification generally the purification of the soul;. of this instruction, of instruction generally, education; and of education generally let that part which consists in refuting the false semblance of wisdom be called, for the reason now given, the noble art of the genuine or generic Sophist.

Theaetetus/ —So be it. But I am at a loss now, in consequence of so much having been brought forward, what we are to say with confidence that the Sophist really is.

Stranger/ —You may well be puzzled; yet even the Sophist himself will now probably feel not a little puzzled how to escape our analysis; since as the proverb says, it is not easy to escape all traps; let us then attack him now with all our might.

Theaetetus/ —Well.

Stranger/ —Let us, however, first breathe awhile, considering with ourselves, while resting, the many various forms under which the Sophist has presented himself to us; first, I think, he was found to be a mercenary hunter of the young and rich?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Secondly, a kind of trafficker in instruction of the soul.

Theaetetus/ —Just so.

Stranger/ —Thirdly, a retailer of these same commodities.

Theaetetus/ —Yes, and, fourthly, a seller of wares of this nature of his own manufacture.

Stranger/ —Correctly recapitulated. I will now try to recall a fifth characteristic; in the department of contention he was defined as a wrestler with words, a professor of the art of wrangling.

Theaetetus/ —He was.

Stranger/ —A sixth characteristic was left in some uncertainty; yet we allowed, though with some slight misgiving, that the Sophist purifies the soul from prejudices obstructive to real knowledge.

Theaetetus/ —So we did.

Stranger/ —But do you not perceive that when a person appears conversant with a variety of things, while nominally professing only a single art, this appearance is not wholesome, the spectator not being able to see the common kind referred to by the various accomplishments of such artist, whence he is induced to give their possessor many names instead of one?

Theaetetus/ —So it indeed seems.

Stranger/ —Let us not then through indolence undergo the same sort of misconception in our enquiry, but let us recall to mind the various predicates assigned to the Sophist; one particular trait seemed to me especially to mark him.

Theaetetus/ —Which?

Stranger/ —Did we not describe him as a disputer or wrangler?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And also a teacher of this qualification to others?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —Let us then consider about what things such persons undertake to qualify others to dispute. and suppose we begin our inquiry thus: —say, do they profess to do this in relation to divine things, which are non-apparent to the many?

Theaetetus/ —They are certainly said to do so.

Stranger/ —And what of the conspicuous phenomena of earth and sky and things pertaining to these?

Theaetetus/ —The answer must be the same.

Stranger/ —When in private conversation questions arise about generation and existence generally, do we not find them powerful in reply and able to make others equally so?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —But again in regard to the laws and political affairs, do they not undertake to give ability to argue about these also?

Theaetetus/ —Assuredly no one would converse with them if they did not promise this.

Stranger/ —In regard to the arts, all and singular, is it not published and laid down in writings, what replies are to be made to the professors of such arts?

Theaetetus/ —You seem to allude to the writings of Protagoras having to do with wrestling and other arts.

Stranger/ —And many other similar writings also, my good friend; may we not then say in a word that the art of wrangling implies ability to argue about everything?

Theaetetus/ —It, indeed, seems to omit nothing.

Stranger/ —But, in the name of heaven, boy, do you think this possible? Perhaps you youngsters see this matter more clearly than us old folks.

Theaetetus/ —What mean you? I don't quite understand the question.

Stranger/ —Whether it be possible for one man to understand all things?

Theaetetus/ —Happy, indeed, should we be if it were so!

Stranger/ —How, then, can one who is unskilled say anything to the purpose in arguing with the skilled?

Theaetetus/ —He cannot.

Stranger/ —In what, then, consists the marvel of the sophistical art?

Theaetetus/ —How shown?

Stranger/ —In the power they possess of making young people think that they themselves are wisest of all and on all subjects. For it is clear that if they neither answered correctly, nor seemed to their hearers to do so, or did not leave the discussion with increased reputation for cleverness, what you just now suggested hypothetically would be realized—none would choose to pay them or learn from them.

Theaetetus/ —Scarcely, indeed!

Stranger/ —But as it is, they do choose to do so.

Theaetetus/ —Yes; very eagerly.

Stranger/ —I presume, then, it is because they appear to be intelligently conversant with the matters upon which they dispute.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —And they dispute on all subjects?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —They appear, then, wise in the eyes of their disciples on all subjects?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —But not as being really so; for this was found to be impossible?

Theaetetus/ —Clearly.

Stranger/ —So, then, the Sophist is found to profess a seeming universal wisdom, not a real?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly; and this appears to describe him exactly.

Stranger/ —Suppose we take a still more evident illustration.

Theaetetus/ —What is it?

Stranger/ —This and consider well before answering.

Theaetetus/ —Well; say what.

Stranger/ —Suppose anyone were to profess to be able not merely to speak and to reply, but to make and do all things by one art.

Theaetetus/ —How all?

Stranger/ —You forthwith forget the prime point of the question; you don't understand, it seems, what I mean by all?

Theaetetus/ —No.

Stranger/ —I mean by all that which comprehends you and me, and, moreover, other things, both animal and vegetable.

Theaetetus/ —How say you?

Stranger/ —Suppose one were to profess to be able to make you and me and all natural products?

Theaetetus/ —What kind of making mean you by this? Not that of a husbandman, I suppose; for the maker you spoke of was a maker of animals.

Stranger/ —Yes; maker also of sea and land, of the heaven, of the gods, and of all things; one who, having made these things, disposes of each of them for a very small amount.

Theaetetus/ —You are jesting.

Stranger/ —And pray, then, shall we not esteem it a jest that anyone should profess to know all things, and to teach all for a small sum in a short space of time?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly we must.

Stranger/ —Of jesting or sporting, now, is there any more agreeable or ingenious kind than imitation?

Theaetetus/ —None. In that one word you sum up a very large and most multifarious genus.

Stranger/ —He, then, who should profess to be able to make all things by one art, might, by forming homonymous imitations of things, for instance, by the art of painting, and by showing such painted images to silly little children at a distance, cheat them into a belief of his being able to make any of the things he chose.

Theaetetus/ —Very likely.

Stranger/ —Well, then, in the case of word imitations by the art of language, is it not the same? Is it not possible, by means of discourses, so to impose on the ears of young people, who are still far from the truth of things, by exhibiting all sorts of wordy imagery to them, to make them believe that the things spoken are true, and that the speaker is universally wise and wisest of men?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly, there may be such an art.

Stranger/ —And is it not inevitable, Theaetetus, that the majority of such hearers, when, with advancing time and age they become more closely intimate with realities, and compelled by experience to see things as they are, should change their previous opinions, so that what appeared great before should now seem little, and that which was easy, difficult—in short, that all the fantastic notions so engendered by discourses should be entirely upset by being brought into contact with practical facts?

Theaetetus/ —Yes, so far as I can judge. But I must admit myself to be of the number of those who are still far remote from truth.

Stranger/ —We, then, who are here present, will endeavor to bring you as near to it as possible without the painful teaching of experience. But now tell me about the Sophist; —is it agreed that he is a juggler or impostor, as being an imitator of reality, or do you really suppose he really possesses scientific knowledge of the things about which he professes to dispute?

Theaetetus/ —How can he? Surely it is clear from what has been said, that he is one of those occupied with child's play.

Stranger/ —One must then call him a mimic and a mountebank.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Now, then, we must be careful not to let the quarry again give us the slip; for we have now pretty nearly enclosed him in a network of argument, from which he cannot escape.

Theaetetus/ —What network?

Stranger/ —We have convicted him of being a certain kind of juggler.

Theaetetus/ —So it seems to me, too.

Stranger/ —We must then at once search carefully the image-making art, and, invading its confines, seize the Sophist, if he await our coming, so as to deliver him up captive to the king whose servants we are; or if he try to escape by any bye-path of the mimetic art, we must follow him up, continually dividing the department containing him, until he be caught; for neither he nor any other shall ever boast of being able to escape the method of those who can thus follow up the game both severally and generally.

Theaetetus/ —Well said, so let us do.

Stranger/ —Following our former plan of subdivision I think I now see two kinds of imitative art; but am not yet able to discern in which of them the species now sought is to be found.

Theaetetus/ —Tell us first what two kinds you mean.

Stranger/ —One is the assimilative art. This is when anyone produces an imitation according to the true dimensions or proportions of the original in length, breadth, and thickness, adding colors suitable to the respective objects.

Theaetetus/ —But do not all imitators do the like?

Stranger/ —Not those who paint or mold any great work. For you know that if they were to give the true and exact proportions of the beautiful, the upper portions would necessarily seem smaller, the lower larger, on account of their respective distance or nearness to the eye. So that here the artist, abandoning literal copying, tries to give not the real but the seeming and most agreeable proportions to his imitative work.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —May we not then call the one, as being copied, a faithful image or copy?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And the department of the imitative art concerned with this is called, as we have said, assimilative.

Theaetetus/ —It is so.

Stranger/ —But what shall we term that which appears indeed from a fitting point of view to resemble the beautiful, but which, when seen by one able to form a just estimate of such matters, is not really like the thing it professes to be like? Must we not call it an appearance or phantasm, since it appears to be like, but is not?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —And is not this sort very common in painting and all imitative art?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —The art, then, which produces a phantasm, but not a true image or copy, we may term fantastic?

Theaetetus/ —And rightly.

Stranger/ —But I before doubted in which of the two kinds I should place the Sophist, and this doubt still continues; for lie is truly a marvelous being, very difficult to understand thoroughly. You see how very adroitly and cleverly he has at this moment hid himself in a genus in which it is very hard to find him out.

Theaetetus/ —So it seems.

Stranger/ —Does your assent proceed from knowledge and conviction, or has a certain rush of words hurried you into hasty assent through the mere habit of assenting?

Theaetetus/ —What mean you by the question?

Stranger/ —Most certainly, my friend, we are engaged in a very arduous investigation. For that a thing should appear

and be thought to be, yet not be, or that a man should assert certain things, yet not true things, all this is now, as it ever was, full of difficulty. It is indeed very difficult to see how a man can be said to affirm or suppose falsehood really to exist without being involved in a contradiction.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —Because this would be equivalent to affirming non-entity to exist; since, otherwise it were impossible for falsehood to exist. The great Parmenides, my son, was always conjuring us both in prose and verse to this effect—

> Never affirm that non-entities exist;
> But carefully guard your mind from this way of thinking.

Such was his testimony, and a little consideration of the subject will clearly prove its correctness. Suppose, then, we examine it a little?

Theaetetus/ —I am quite at your disposal, and pray conduct the argument as may be most suitable; lead the way and I will follow.

Stranger/ —So be it then. And now tell me; do we ever venture to speak that which in no respect is?

Theaetetus/ —Why not?

Stranger/ —Suppose that, not jestingly or for contentions sake, but in sober earnest, one had to answer as to how and in reference to what the phrase “non-entity” should be used, what think you would be the reply?

Theaetetus/ —You ask a difficult and to me altogether insoluble question.

Stranger/ —But this, at least, is clear that nonentity cannot be ascribed to any entity.

Theaetetus/ —How can it?

Stranger/ —If, then, not to be ascribed to an entity, it cannot be ascribed to anything.

Theaetetus/ —No, indeed.

Stranger/ —But it is evident that the word “something” is always applied to some entity; we cannot pronounce “something” nakedly as it were, and as wholly destitute of reality; is it not so?

Theaetetus/ —Impossible.

Stranger/ —And do you admit that when we speak of something we necessarily mean some one thing?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —You admit that “something” means one thing, “somethings” many?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —And does it not follow that he who speaks of that which is not something necessarily speaks of nothing?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Must it not further be allowed that one undertaking to speak of non-entity not only speaks of nothing, but does not even speak at all?

Theaetetus/ —This seemingly ends the difficulty.

Stranger/ —Don’t exult too soon, my good friend, for the difficulty is before us still, and, indeed, the primary and greatest difficulty of all, since it concerns the very essence of our argument.

Theaetetus/ —How? Explain yourself.

Stranger/ —To any existing thing another thing may, you will allow, be added?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —But can anything which is be added to that which is not?

Theaetetus/ —Impossible.

Stranger/ —But the general attribute of number, does not this belong to (the category of) existing things?

Theaetetus/ —Yes, if indeed any other thing can be said to be.

Stranger/ —We must not, then, attempt to ascribe number, either as plurality or unity to the non-existent.

Theaetetus/ —It would certainly be improper to do so, as the argument shows.

Stranger/ —But how can anyone speak or think of the non-existent, either as one or as many, apart from number?

Theaetetus/ —How, indeed!

Stranger/ —When we speak of "non-existent things" do we not predicate number?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —And is not speaking of "the nonexistent" the speaking of unity?

Theaetetus/ —Clearly.

Stranger/ —And yet we just now denied it to be just or right to add the existent to the nonexistent.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —You see, then, that it is impossible rightly to speak or think of the non-existent alone and by itself, it being unthinkable, unspeakable, unpronounceable, and irrational.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Was I then wrong just now in saying I had still to state its greatest difficulty?

Theaetetus/ —How indeed can there be a greater difficulty than this?

Stranger/ —Do you not perceive, my good friend, from what has been said, that he who undertakes to refute the non-existent is obliged, by the very nature of his subject, to contradict himself?

Theaetetus/ —How say you? explain more clearly.

Stranger/ —It is vain to look to me for a clearer explanation. I before showed that neither unity nor plurality could be ascribed to the non-existent; now I speak of it as one; I say "the non-existent." Do you understand?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And yet just before I said it was unutterable, unpronounceable, irrational; —do you follow me?

Theaetetus/ —To a certain extent—yes.

Stranger/ —Do I not contradict myself in trying to combine being with non-being?

Theaetetus/ —So it seems.

Stranger/ —Did I not in fact attempt to make this combination when speaking of non-entity as a unity?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And while declaring it irrational and ineffable, I spoke of this ineffable non-entity as one?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —But I am assuming that in strictness we ought to speak of it neither as one, nor as many, nor indeed to name it at all; since by so doing we necessarily mention it as one.

Theaetetus/ —Assuredly.

Stranger/ —Why then continue the exposition as from myself, being proved both before and now to be at fault and

defeated in this question about nonentity; suppose, then, instead of looking for a solution of the problem from my answers, we pursue the enquiry through the medium of yours.

Theaetetus/ —How?

Stranger/ —Come now, try with all the generous enthusiasm of youth, exerting yourself to the utmost, to say something correctly about non-entity, adding to it neither the predicate of existence nor that of number.

Theaetetus/ —Such an attempt would be very absurd in me, after witnessing your failure.

Stranger/ —If so we must both give it up and finally dismiss the argument; and until we chance upon someone able to do what we cannot, we must conclude that the Sophist has with unequalled knavery undertaken to pass where there is positively no outlet.

Theaetetus/ —So it clearly appears.

Stranger/ —If then we say he possesses a certain fantastic art, he will easily take advantage of that use of language to contradict us by asking what we mean by image when calling him an image-maker? We must therefore consider, Theaetetus, what answer should be given to the fellow.

Theaetetus/ —We should of course advert to images reflected in water and in mirrors, also to painted, sculptured, and other similar imagery.

Stranger/ —It is evident, Theaetetus, that you never saw a Sophist.

Theaetetus/ —Why?

Stranger/ —Because, if you had, you would have found him to be blind or blinking.

Theaetetus/ —How?

Stranger/ —If you made him your proposed answer about mirrors and sculpture, he would laugh in your face for talking to him as to one possessing eyes; he would ignore water, mirrors, and eye-sight generally, and restrict his interrogations to the logical inferences of your own admissions.

Theaetetus/ —How should he do this?

Stranger/ —He would require you to define an image, the one common idea running through the many particulars you have named. Speak then, and maintain your ground manfully.

Theaetetus/ —What, stranger, should an image be but a sort of imitative other or counterpart of the true?

Stranger/ —Do you mean by "other" another true thing or repetition, or how another?

Theaetetus/ —Not a true thing, but a resemblance.

Stranger/ —Meaning by "true" that which really exists?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —But that which is contrary to the true is, I suppose, the false?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —When then you speak of a resemblance as not true, you mean, I presume, that it is nonexistent?

Theaetetus/ —No; it does exist in a certain way.

Stranger/ —But not truly, you say?

Theaetetus/ —No, only as a resemblance of the true.

Stranger/ —The image of the real is then a really existing unreal thing?

Theaetetus/ —There indeed seems to be some such sort of combination of non-entity with entity, and very strange it is.

Stranger/ —Of course it is; see now, how, in consequence of this ambiguity, our many-headed Sophist has forced us unwillingly to admit that the nonexistent does in a certain way exist.

Theaetetus/ —I see it well enough.

Stranger/ —What now shall we define his art to be without ourselves falling into a self-contradiction?

Theaetetus/ —How mean you? What fear you?

Stranger/ —If we say that he deals in phantasms and exercises a deceptive art, must we not infer that our souls, misled by his art, form false conceptions?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly; how can it be otherwise?

Stranger/ —But a false conception is one formed in contrariety to that which exists, is it not?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —You mean then that a false conception is a conception of the non-existent?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —Does the falsehood consist in supposing that non-entities exist not, or that they somehow exist?

Theaetetus/ —In the latter supposition certainly, namely that non-entity somehow exists; there is no other room for falsehood.

Stranger/ —But is it not possible to conceive that that which truly exists, exists not?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And this too is false?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —It will then be equally false to say that the existing exists not, and that the non-existent exists?

Theaetetus/ —Assuredly, and I don't see how there can be any other kind of falsehood.

Stranger/ —Scarcely; but this the Sophist will not admit. For how can anyone of sound understanding be brought to admit that things just before allowed and granted are unspeakable, irrational, and incomprehensible? Do you fully enter, Theaetetus, into the Sophists meaning?

Theaetetus/ —Yes; he will tell us we contradict ourselves, when venturing to speak of falsehoods as existing, either in opinion or discourse; that we are constantly obliged to unite entity to non-entity, after having just before admitted this to be of all things the most impossible.

Stranger/ —Correctly recapitulated. But it is high time to consider what to do with the Sophist. For you see how many ready contradictions and difficulties suggest themselves as soon as we try to track him out in that art of mountebank imposture in which we have placed him.

Theaetetus/ —Yes, indeed.

Stranger/ —We have gone through only a few of them; but they are, in fact, infinite.

Theaetetus/ —If so, it must be impossible to catch and refute him.

Stranger/ —What, then, shall we yield to fatigue and give it up?

Theaetetus/ —I am for continuing the pursuit, even if we only catch the fellow by the skirt of his coat.

Stranger/ —You must, then, excuse shortcomings, and be satisfied if we drag him ever so little out of the strong fences of argument in which he entrenches himself?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —And may I further make this request of you namely, not to take me for a kind of parricide?

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —It will be necessary for our defense to criticize the doctrine of father Parmenides to prove that non-entity may have a relative existence, and entity be said, in a certain sense, not to exist.

Theaetetus/ —Such, indeed, appears to be the task before us.

Stranger/ —It is evident even to the blind, as the saying is; for how, while these matters are neither admitted nor refuted, can anyone speak about false reasonings or opinions, whether as appearances, images, resemblances, or phantasms, or about any of the arts relating to them, without ridiculously contradicting himself?

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —Therefore we must now venture to attack our fathers reasoning, or, if reluctant to do this, give up the matter altogether.

Theaetetus/ —By no means let any false delicacy stay us.

Stranger/ —Well then, allow me to make one trifling request more. I just now said I felt considerable difficulty and misgiving as to the coming enquiry, and such indeed is my present feeling about it.

Theaetetus/ —You did so.

Stranger/ —I fear too I may appear to you half insane, through the many turns and changes inevitably occurring in the course of the argument; for your sake, however, I will attempt it to the best of my ability.

Theaetetus/ —Be assured, so far as I am concerned, there is no risk of your appearing to act improperly in advancing boldly to this task of negative demonstration.

Stranger/ —Come, then, how shall we begin this perilous argument? We must needs methinks take this course; first, let us examine that which seems already familiar, that we may not hereafter feel confused by making inconsiderate concessions.

Theaetetus/ —Explain.

Stranger/ —Parmenides seems to me to have taken it very easily in his discourses, and the same may be said of all who have hitherto attempted to define the nature of things in regard to quantity and quality.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —They all appear to be, as it were, telling stories to children; one saying that there are three elements or kinds of being, some of them at war with the others, or again in amity with them, marrying, bringing forth, and nourishing their progeny. Another, speaking of two elements, as moist and dry, or warm and cold, brings them together and marries them; our school alone, namely that of Elea, commencing with Xenophanes and even earlier, speaks in its poetical lucubration of all things as one. Other votaries of the Muse, Ionian or Sicilian, thought it safer to combine the two theories; to say that all things are both one and many, held together by love and hate. Of these the more firmly modulated strain taught how the separated elements are continually reunited; while the softer, admitting this to be true in the universal, contended that in particulars the all is alternately one under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again many and at issue with itself. Whether in all this they or any of them spoke truly it were difficult, perhaps invidious under the circumstances, to question; yet thus much at least may be said, that they who

so curtly wound up their several theories evinced little regard for us their ordinary readers, caring little whether we follow them or not.

Theaetetus/ —What particular difficulty do you allude to?

Stranger/ —By heaven, Theaetetus, when they talk about two or many, or the one as being or becoming, or speak of the combinations and separations of warm and cold, are you able to understand them? When as a young man I first heard our present problem about non-entity discussed, I fancied I understood it thoroughly; but you see now how completely we are in the dark about it.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —It is quite possible too that the case may be exactly similar in regard to entity; that while fancying we understand it perfectly we may be really as much at fault respecting it as about non-entity; in short, that we are equally ignorant of both.

Theaetetus/ —Very likely.

Stranger/ —And the same may also be said as to the other things mentioned above.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —We will then, if you please, adjourn our consideration of the other things, and now concentrate our attention on the main and most important part of our subject.

Theaetetus/ —You doubtless allude to the problem of entity or being; we must first enquire what is meant by those who speak of it.

Stranger/ —Rightly apprehended, Theaetetus; yet we must pursue the enquiry as if in presence of those whom we thus interrogate Ho! ye who assert the All to consist of hot and cold, or any two elements of this nature, what is it you mean when

you affirm both of these severally and conjointly, to *exist*; what are we to understand by this predicate "existence?" is it a third element to be added to the other two? for in assigning to both the attribute of being you surely do not mean that both are or exist in the same manner? for in that case they would not be two, but one.

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —But still you call both entities?

Theaetetus/ —Perhaps.

Stranger/ —Yet even so, my friend, we must say that the two are clearly one.

Theaetetus/ —Most true.

Stranger/ —Since then we find ourselves at a loss, do you yourselves explain what it is you mean when speaking of being. For you evidently understood the matter long ago; we, on the contrary, before thought we understood, but now find a difficulty. Instruct us then first in this very thing, that we may not fancy we understand you, and afterwards find ourselves mistaken. In making this request of these and all others who assert the All to be more than one, say, boy, are we asking any more than is fair and reasonable?

Theaetetus/ —Not at all.

Stranger/ —Again, as to those who affirm all to be one, must we not try as far may be to find out what they too mean by being?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Let them, then, answer this; you say only the one is or exists; yes, they reply; I rejoin, do you call being anything?

Theaetetus/ —Of course it is.

Stranger/ —Is it, then, the same as the one, or another name for it, or how?

Theaetetus/ —What, O, Stranger, will be their answer to this?

Stranger/ —Clearly, Theaetetus, it will not be very easy for those holding this hypothesis (i.e. of the identity of the two) to reply to the question now proposed, or, indeed, to any other.

Theaetetus/ —Why so?

Stranger/ —Because it seems absurd to admit two names after having said there is only one thing.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —Absurd too to admit that a name may exist by itself without a corresponding thing.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —He who proposes a name differing from a thing, speaks, in fact, of two things.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Even if he propose the name as one with the thing, he must admit it either to be the name of nothing, or else only the name of another name, not of another thing.

Theaetetus/ —It is so.

Stranger/ —And the one, too, is the entity of unity only, not that of a mere name?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —Once more: —will they call the whole something different from the one existing, or the same with it?

Theaetetus/ —Of course they must mean it to be the same.

Stranger/ —If, then, it be a whole, as described in the verse of Parmenides—

> "Like the bulk of a perfect sphere,

> Equally balanced everywhere from the center,
> Having no greater size or weight on one side than the other"—

it follows that such an entity must have a middle and extremities, and consequently parts; is it not so?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Now, certainly, a thing having parts may have the affection of unity, or share in all its several parts the quality of unity; in this sense an aggregate existence or whole may, doubtless, be one.

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —But it is impossible for that which has this secondary kind of unity to be itself the very one.

Theaetetus/ —Why so?

Stranger/ —Because reason demands that that which is truly one should be absolutely and entirely without parts.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —But the divisible whole in question, being compounded of parts, does not agree with this.

Theaetetus/ —I see.

Stranger/ —Is, then, being or the existent a whole and one in the secondary sense, as suffering or sharing the character of unity and entirety; or is it not to be called a whole at all?

Theaetetus/ —A perplexing alternative this!

Stranger/ —Right! for the existent, as partaking in a secondary sense of unity, is not the same as the one, and the all must be more than one.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And if the existent be not a whole in the aforesaid sense of partaking of unity, but be itself the very whole, it will turn out to be less than itself.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —And being minus itself, will not be existent?

Theaetetus/ —Just so.

Stranger/ —The all, again, seems more than the one, the existent and the whole having each obtained their proper nature apart from the other.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —But if the whole exist not at all, the same inference must be made as to existence or entity; and moreover, not only it could not be, it could never have been produced.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —That which is produced is ever produced as a whole; so that it is impossible to speak of existence or generation unless the whole be placed among entities.

Theaetetus/ —Such, appears to be the case.

Stranger/ —Moreover, the non-whole could have no magnitude; for whatever it be, it must be the quantity of its being which constitutes it a whole.

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —A thousand other similar insoluble difficulties will be found to beset the path of him who maintains being to be two or only one.

Theaetetus/ —So it appears from what has been advanced; each point is linked with another, entailing ever more and more obscurity on all that had gone before.

Stranger/ —We are far from having gone through all the current philosophic subtleties about being and non-being; but let this suffice; and now let us advert to those treating the subject on a different footing, that it may be on all hands evident that being is no easier to define than non-being.

Theaetetus/ —Yes, let us address ourselves to these too.

Stranger/ —There really seems to be a sort of battle of giants among them in regard to the problem of being.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —Some of them are for dragging everything down from heaven and the unseen world to earth, rudely clutching with their fingers trees and stones; laying their hands on these and the like, they stoutly maintain that alone to exist which can be pressed or touched, defining being as identical with body; and if anyone talks of the existence of the incorporeal, they frown and refuse to have anything more to say to him.

Theaetetus/ —These are terrible fellows indeed; I have met with such ere now.

Stranger/ —Their opponents very adroitly defend themselves out of the resources of the supernal invisible world, insisting that certain incorporeal forms (ἔιδη) cognizable by intellect are the true existences; and breaking up or analyzing what the others held to be body and truth in their discourses, they call it generation or becoming instead of being. Between these two parties, Theaetetus, there has ever raged the fiercest antagonism.

Theaetetus/ —Surely.

Stranger/ —We will then reckon with each party separately about existence.

Theaetetus/ —How is it to be managed?

Stranger/ —With those who attribute existence to “ideas” or forms the task is easy; for they are of milder temper; those on the other hand who drag all things down to the corporeal, it is difficult, almost impossible to manage. The only way of treating them is, I think, this; we must in the first place try, if possible, to make them really and indeed better; failing in this we must make them so hypothetically in word and discourse, assuming their willingness to answer more fairly than is their wont. For that which is assented to by the good carries more weight with it than the opinions of inferior persons; however, it is not of them that we have to think so much as about truth.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Summon then our hypothetically reformed respondents to the bar, and do you interpret their answers.

Theaetetus/ —So be it.

Stranger/ —Let them say if they admit a mortal animal to be an existing thing.

Theaetetus/ —Of course they must.

Stranger/ —And do they not admit this animal to consist of body and soul?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Do they reckon the soul among existing things?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —But do not souls differ? are there not just and unjust, wise and unwise souls?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —And do not these differences arise in each instance from the possession and presence of each of these different qualities?

Theaetetus/ —Yes, they allow this too.

Stranger/ —Since then justice, and prudence, and the other virtues with their contraries exist, as also the souls in which they exist, do they consider them as visible and tangible, or as all of them invisible?

Theaetetus/ —As nearly all invisible.

Stranger/ —But have such things a body?

Theaetetus/ —To this question they do not give one uniform answer; the soul they suppose to have a certain body; but as to prudence and the other matters enquired about, they would neither venture to deny their belonging to the number of existing things, nor to say that they are bodies.

Stranger/ —Clearly, Theaetetus, these men are mending; for the genuine original and earth-born (materialist) would not shrink from either assertion, but would insist that whatever he cannot clutch and press with his fingers has no existence whatever.

Theaetetus/ —You express very nearly their real meaning.

Stranger/ —We will, then, once more question them, since if they will but allow anything, however small and unimportant, to possess existence independently of body it suffices. Let them, then, explain what it is they mean by the word existence used in both instances, what they intend it to designate as naturally given both in the incorporeal, and also in that which has a body. They may perhaps feel at a loss here; if so, try and find out whether they are disposed to receive and approve the proposition we are about to make as to the nature of being.

Theaetetus/ —State your proposition and we shall see.

Stranger/ —It is this; I say that that which possesses power of any kind, either in the way of acting on some other thing or of being acted on by it, although it be ever so little and for the

shortest time, all this really exists; in short, I define existence to be nothing else than power or force.

Theaetetus/ —Having themselves nothing better to propose at the moment, I may say that our respondents accept this.

Stranger/ —Very well; let a possible alteration of opinion be reserved on both sides; for the present, so far as concerns these parties, let this be understood as mutually agreed.

Theaetetus/ —Well.

Stranger/ —Proceed we now to the others—namely, the friends of forms, and be you interpreter of their pretensions. Say, therefore, in your capacity of expositor, do you not distinguish (becoming or) generation as something differing and apart from being or existence?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Do you not also say that, by means of our bodies, we have communion with the nature of becoming, the object contemplated by the senses; and by means of our souls with that of true and real being, the object contemplated by reason; —that which you hold to be ever unique and changeless, whereas generated being is ever changing?

Theaetetus/ —Such is the doctrine held by us.

Stranger/ —But what mean you, my dear friends, by the phrase "having communion" in these two cases; is it not identical with the active and passive influence just now alluded to as exercised by power or force? Perhaps, Theaetetus, you may not exactly comprehend the answers given to this, while I, being more accustomed to them, apprehend it better.

Theaetetus/ —What, then, do they say?

Stranger/ —They don't agree with what we just now said in reference to being when dealing with the earth-born fellows; I

mean, when considering it sufficient to define it as consisting in power to act or suffer, even to the smallest extent.

Theaetetus/ —Indeed!

Stranger/ —They rejoin that generation partakes of the power to act and suffer, but that neither of these powers agree with the nature of being.

Theaetetus/ —Is the objection well founded?

Stranger/ —We reply, we desire further to learn from them whether they allow that the soul knows, and that being is known?

Theaetetus/ —They do agree to this?

Stranger/ —Well, then, are not knowing and being known a sort of acting and suffering, or both; or is one an act, the other a suffering; or are we to suppose that neither has anything to do with either?

Theaetetus/ —Evidently, neither with either; were it otherwise, they should be contradicting what they just before admitted.

Stranger/ —Yet, assuredly, if to know be a certain act, to be known must imply passivity or suffering, and then being, so far as it is a subject of knowledge, becomes also subject to passivity and movement, which had before been said to be impossible.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —But more than this; surely we shall not easily allow ourselves to be persuaded that movement, life, soul, understanding, do not appertain to (perfect or) absolute existence; that it is lifeless and unconscious, a motionless stability, destitute of the sublime attributes of mind?

Theaetetus/ —This were, indeed, O Stranger, a miserable concession to make?

Stranger/ —Yet if it have mind, it must have life, surely?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —And if it possess both these, does it not possess them by virtue of a soul?

Theaetetus/ —How can it be otherwise?

Stranger/ —And if it have mind and life and soul, can we imagine this living existence to stand for ever motionless?

Theaetetus/ —The supposition appears the extremist absurdity.

Stranger/ —The moved and motion itself then must be allowed to share the nature of existence?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —It follows then, Theaetetus, that were being entirely motionless, no one could have any intelligence of anything.

Theaetetus/ —Evidently.

Stranger/ —And yet, were we to concede everything to be borne about and moved, we should be forced in consistency to draw the same inference?

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —Can you conceive the unique, identical, and immutable to be without stability.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly not.

Stranger/ —But is any mental cognition or understanding of anything possible without these characteristics?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly, all knowledge implies them.

Stranger/ —And assuredly we ought to contend with all our might against anyone who, while obliterating belief in science, understanding, and reason, pretends to speak with assured certainty about anything whatever?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Consequently no philosopher or friend of truth ought to accept the doctrine of the absolute immobility of the All, whether viewed as one or as many; nor, on the other hand, listen to those representing it as wholly in motion; but should rather, as children do when asked to choose, decide for both, combining immobility with stability, whenever dealing with being and the All.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —Well, then, have we not satisfactorily explained the problem of existence?

Theaetetus/ —Quite so.

Stranger/ —Pooh, pooh, Theaetetus! it seems to me that we are but just beginning to comprehend the difficulty of the enquiry.

Theaetetus/ —What mean you by this?

Stranger/ —Do you not see, my dear friend, that we are in the greatest ignorance respecting it, while fancying we are giving a satisfactory account?

Theaetetus/ —To me it appeared satisfactory, and I don't see how we are unconsciously so wide of the mark.

Stranger/ —Consider well whether our present inferences would not justly leave us exposed to the same questions as those we lately addressed to the maintainers of "hot and cold."

Theaetetus/ —Which questions? Do me the favor to recall them.

Stranger/ —Certainly; and I will endeavor to do so by interrogating you as I before did those others, so as to make some progress.

Theaetetus/ —Right!

Stranger/ —Well, then, are not motion and rest contradictories?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —Yet you maintain that both and each alike exist?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Admitting both and each to be moved when you say they exist?

Theaetetus/ —No.

Stranger/ —You mean then that both exist in a state of rest?

Theaetetus/ —How can that be?

Stranger/ —You must then be assuming some third condition of being comprehending both rest and motion, and so viewing them as partaking of the common property of being you say that "they are."

Theaetetus/ —We seem, in very truth, to be divining a third kind of being when asserting both rest and motion to be.

Stranger/ —Rest and motion then combined do not constitute being; it must be something distinct from these.

Theaetetus/ —So it seems.

Stranger/ —Consequently being in its own essential nature is neither at rest nor in motion.

Theaetetus/ —You almost hit it.

Stranger/ —Which way then can we turn our thought in order to arrive at a certain inference in regard to being? Its assuredly no easy problem! If not moved, how can it be otherwise than still? If not still, how other than in motion? But being has just now appeared to us to repel or stand apart from both; is this possible?

Theaetetus/ —Quite impossible.

Stranger/ —And we should, moreover, remember this, that when interrogated as to what the name of non-being should be referred to, we were utterly bewildered and at fault. Do you recollect?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —And now are we not in equal perplexity about being?

Theaetetus/ —Nay, in more, if possible, in my opinion.

Stranger/ —Let the problem then rest here awhile unsolved; and since being and non-being seem both of them to involve equal difficulty, we may hope that, in proportion as the one becomes darker or clearer, so too will the other; and should we fail in comprehending either, we shall thus be most appropriately pursuing our enquiry as best we may in regard to both.

Theaetetus/ —Very well.

Stranger/ —Suppose, then, we explain how one and the same thing comes to be called by many names.

Theaetetus/ —As how? Give an example.

Stranger/ —To man, for instance, we assign various appellations derived from color, magnitude, form, vices and virtues; in all which cases and many others we say not only that man exists, but that a good man exists, and so forth; and so too in the case of other things, we suppose a single thing, and then assign many names (or predicates) to it.

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —Here methinks we have prepared a welcome treat for the young and also for late learners among the old; for anyone can readily cavil at the proposition that the many are one and the one many, exultingly proclaiming that it is

absurd to talk of a good man, good being solely good, and man, man. You often, I think, Theaetetus, fall in with men addicting themselves to this kind of quibbling, sometimes even grave and elderly persons, who through the poverty of their intellectual stock-in-trade make much of such like things, and even esteem them to be the perfection of wise discovery.

Theaetetus/ —That is quite true.

Stranger/ —Therefore, in order that our argument may meet all who have ever reasoned about existence, let the questions we are now about to put be supposed to be addressed to them as well as to our former respondents.

Theaetetus/ —What questions?

Stranger/ —I will make three alternative propositions, and ask which of them you accept. First, is it impossible to conjoin being or other things with rest and motion and other things on the ground of their unmixed singleness and incapacity to share each other's nature; or secondly, are all things alike indiscriminately susceptible of intercommunion with all others; or finally, susceptible of some but not of all; which of these answers, Theaetetus, are we to suppose they would adopt?

Theaetetus/ —I feel incompetent. to answer on their behalf; pray be good enough yourself to consider what would follow from their answers in the several cases stated.

Stranger/ —Very well; suppose first that there is no capacity in anything to associate or share the nature of anything else, have motion and rest no share in existence.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly not.

Stranger/ —How? Can either of them be, if they have no share of being?

Theaetetus/ —No.

Stranger/ —The admission then seems at once to overthrow the first supposition, both in the case of those who assert universal movement and those asserting universal rest; nay, all who consider things as maintaining a constant uniformity according to forms or ideas; for all these conjoin existence when affirming the real existence of movement and rest.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Likewise, all those who at one time unite all things, at another separate them, whether uniting infinite elements in one, or dividing one into many finite or infinite elements and again recomposing them, whether alternately or continuously, —all these affirmations would mean nothing were there no conjunction.

Theaetetus/ —Right.

Stranger/ —Besides, they would be most absurd reasoners if they allow nothing to be called different (i.e. to vary in its nature) through participation in something else.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —They have continually to employ the category of being, as well as that of division, differentiation, isolation, and others innumerable, which being absolutely obliged to use in connecting their discourses, they need no adversary for their refutation, since they bear about with them a domestic adversary, like the strange voice of the ventriloquist Eurycles, internally thwarting them and recording their own refutation.

Theaetetus/ —A very apt and true parallel!

Stranger/ —But what of the second supposition? Are we to allow to all things the capacity of combining alike with all?

Theaetetus/ —This even I can refute.

Stranger/ —How?

Theaetetus/ —Because on this supposition motion itself might be at rest, and rest in motion, if they communicated with each other.

Stranger/ —It is certainly quite impossible that movement should stand still and rest be moved.

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —There remains then only the third supposition, for we had but these three alternatives, —either that all may join, or none, or that some may and some not.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Well, the two first suppositions being dismissed, the third must in fairness be accepted.

Theaetetus/ —Evidently.

Stranger/ —Some things being thus susceptible of association, others not, the case resembles that of letters, some of which fit together, others not.

Theaetetus/ —Just so.

Stranger/ —The vowels especially are as a chain passing throughout, so that without one or other of them it is impossible to join any letters together.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —How, then, is it known which letters fit with others? Does it not require the dexterity of art to join them correctly?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —What art?

Theaetetus/ —That of grammar.

Stranger/ —And is it not the same in the case of low notes and high ones; the person possessing the art of discriminating

notes capable of blending being a musician, whereas he who has it not is unmusical; and so of other arts?

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —But since it has been agreed that genera or kinds are susceptible of similar combinations, does it not follow that some sort of science must be needed in order effectually to demonstrate what kinds agree with others, and the reverse; also whether the combinations are universally continuous, so as to be susceptible of intermingling, and again, in cases of severance, whether there are kinds universally causing separation?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly there is need of science—indeed, the highest science.

Stranger/ —What name then shall we give to this science? Can it be that we have unsuspectingly stumbled against the science of the free, and while seeking the Sophist have found the true philosopher?

Theaetetus/ —How mean you?

Stranger/ —Is not the separating according to kinds, taking care not to combine or distinguish inaccurately, either by confounding the different or severing the identical, that which is meant by the art of dialectics?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —He then who can do this will perceive clearly how one kind or idea pervades many several individual things, and also how many diverse ideas are externally comprehended in one how, again, the one extending throughout the aggregated many is internally knit together, and how many ideas are sundered and entirely inconsistent with one another. This is what is meant by knowing how to distinguish scientifically between kinds, —between those, I mean, which are capable of combination and those not so.

Theaetetus/ —Exactly.

Stranger/ —But surely you will not attribute the true art of dialectics to any except to the true and genuine philosopher?

Theaetetus/ —How, indeed, assign it to any other?

Stranger/ —Certainly we shall always find the philosopher conspicuous in this department; yet it is difficult to identify him exactly; and the difficulty in his case and that of the Sophist is of a different sort.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —The difficulty in the case of the Sophist consists in his ever running off into the darkness of non-entity, the subject of his habitual concern and occupation, —and so eluding observation through the surrounding obscurity.

Theaetetus/ —So it seems.

Stranger/ —But the philosopher, ever intently studying the idea of true existence by means of reason, becomes difficult to follow through the brightness of the region inhabited by him; for the mental eye of the many is unable to endure continuously the effulgence of the divine.

Theaetetus/ —The explanation here is correct as before.

Stranger/ —Respecting the philosopher, we will, if agreeable, treat more accurately hereafter; as to the Sophist, it seems impossible to stop until we get a clear view of him.

Theaetetus/ —Well said.

Stranger/ —Since then it is acknowledged that some genera are disposed to communion with each other, others not, and that some may have communion with a few, others with many, while others again are free to combine universally with all, —I propose we follow up our course of reasoning by enquiring, not about all genera, lest we be confounded by their

number, but selecting some of the most important, —first, what are the specific qualities of each, then what capacity they have of mutual intercommunion; —in order that, though we may not be able to comprehend thoroughly the nature of entity and non-entity, we may, at least, not be without some comprehension of them, so far as permitted by the plan of our present argument, if, indeed, we may in any way venture unscathed to say that non-entity exists.

Theaetetus/ —Such, indeed, must be our plan.

Stranger/ —The most important forms or genera are those just mentioned—namely, existence itself, and rest and movement.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —And yet we agreed that two of these are mutually incongruous?

Theaetetus/ —No doubt.

Stranger/ —But existence mingles with both; for both rest and movement exists.

Theaetetus/ —How not?

Stranger/ —These, then, are three?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Each different from the two others, but identical with itself!

Theaetetus/ —It is so.

Stranger/ —But what is it we are now saying about difference and identity? Are these also two ideas or kinds, differing from the others, although necessarily ever mingling with them, so that we have now five existences before us for consideration instead of three? or do we unconsciously mean by “different” and “identical” one or other of the former?

Theaetetus/ —Perhaps we do.

Stranger/ —But motion and rest are not the same as diversity and identity.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —That which we affirm of, or assign as an attribute to, both rest and motion indifferently cannot possibly be itself either rest or motion.

Theaetetus/ —Why?

Stranger/ —Because if it were, motion would be rest, and rest motion; for in both cases the happening of one or other to either of the two will force the other to change its nature, as participating in its contrary.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —For both rest and motion partake the nature of identity and diversity.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Let us not then call motion and diversity one, nor rest one with identity.

Theaetetus/ —No.

Stranger/ —And are we to conceive existence and identity as one?

Theaetetus/ —Possibly.

Stranger/ —But if existence and identity are the same, we shall again find ourselves compelled to identify rest and motion, since both rest and motion exist.

Theaetetus/ —But this is impossible.

Stranger/ —Then it is impossible that existence and identity should be one.

Theaetetus/ —So it seems.

Stranger/ —We must then consider identity as a fourth kind or “form” along with the others.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —And must we not make diversity a fifth? or shall we take both this and existence to be merely two names for one thing?

Theaetetus/ —Possibly we may.

Stranger/ —Yet I think you will admit that of existences some are spoken of as absolute, some relative.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And is not diversity always relative?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Not so unless existence and diversity be thoroughly distinct; if diversity could be participant of both these, like being or existence, then there might be a kind of diversity which is not relative; but we have just seen that whatever is diverse must always be so relatively to something else.

Theaetetus/ —So it is.

Stranger/ —Diversity then must be reckoned as a fifth in the list of our selected forms.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And we may say of it that it pervades all the others, for each differs from the other not through its own nature, but through participating the form of diversity.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —We may then thus recapitulate the nature of our five forms: —motion differs wholly from rest—it is not rest, yet partakes of being as existing; motion, again, differs from identity—it is not identity, yet still it is in one sense identical inasmuch as all things partake of identity; and this equivalency and non-equivalency of motion and identity must

not be taken amiss; for in asserting both propositions we do not mean to assert them in the same sense; in the first case, we mean the sharing identity in regard to itself; in the second, we think of the same things participation in diversity, through which, parted from identity, it becomes not that but another, so as again to be rightly styled non-identical.

Theaetetus/ —Very well!

Stranger/ —And if in any respect motion should partake of the nature of rest, it would not be absurd to speak of it as resting.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly, since we agree that of kinds or forms some have a tendency to mingle with one another, others not.

Stranger/ —Indeed, we came to the demonstration of this before, showing it to be naturally thus.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Let us repeat then—motion differs from diversity, as it also differed from identity and from rest?

Theaetetus/ —Necessarily.

Stranger/ —Yet in a certain sense it is not different, though different according to our present meaning?

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —Well, then, having divided it from three of our forms, shall we confound it with the fourth, after having agreed upon five several forms as subjects of enquiry?

Theaetetus/ —How can the number possibly be less than that before shown?

Stranger/ —We may then boldly assert motion to differ from being?

Theaetetus/ —Most certainly.

Stranger/ —Is not motion, then, actually an instance of non-being, although at the same time being, inasmuch as participating being?

Theaetetus/ —Clearly.

Stranger/ —Of necessity, then, non-entity must exist both in regard to motion and all forms, since throughout all of them the nature of diversity distorts and suppresses their being, making each of them in a sense not to be; so that in this way we may correctly speak of all as not being, although at the same time being—namely, as partaking of being.

Theaetetus/ —So it appears.

Stranger/ —In each of the forms, then, there is abundance of being, also an infinite quantity of nonbeing.

Theaetetus/ —So, indeed, it seems.

Stranger/ —Must we, then, not speak of being itself as differing from the other forms?

Theaetetus/ —Necessarily.

Stranger/ —Being, too, then may be said relatively not to be in as many cases as there are other forms; for though considered as excluding each of these, it is in itself individual and one, its negations (or diversities) relatively to other forms of being are infinite.

Theaetetus/ —Almost, indeed.

Stranger/ —These positions, then, should not be thought extravagant, since genera tend by their very nature to mutual communion; if anyone disallow them, let him show that we are wrong in the former steps of the argument, and so proceed to dispute what follows.

Theaetetus/ —Your claim is just.

Stranger/ —Let us also consider this, that when we speak of non-being, we do not predicate the contrary of being, but only diversity.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —When, for example, we speak of a thing as not great, do we seem to mean the small rather than the unequal (or the relatively small)?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly not.

Stranger/ —Therefore when negation is said to imply contradiction, we shall not concede this, but only that the negative sign implies some diversity or exclusion of the after accompanying properties or predicates.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —Let us also, if you please, attend to this, that the nature of the diverse appears to me to be liable to subdivision to the same extent as science itself.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —Science, too, is one, yet each of its several provinces has its own specific name. Hence the usual enumeration of many arts and sciences.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —And is not this equally the case with subdivisions of the diverse?

Theaetetus/ —Perhaps so; but say how.

Stranger/ —Has not the beautiful a certain diversity opposed to it?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Has this diversity a name, or is it nameless?

Theaetetus/ —It has a name; for what we call not beautiful is that which is diverse from the nature of the beautiful, and from that only.

Stranger/ —But tell me, is not the not beautiful to be considered as existing, as being severed from, and also opposed to, a certain class of existences?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —The existence of the non-beautiful is then an antithesis of being to being?

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —And according to our present reasoning has the beautiful more claim to be reckoned among existences than the non-beautiful?

Theaetetus/ —No.

Stranger/ —Similarly we must say that the non-great exists equally with the great?

Theaetetus/ —Quite so.

Stranger/ —The unjust too must in this view be placed on an equal footing with the just, inasmuch as one exists no less than the other?

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —It will also follow in other cases, that since the diverse has appeared to be among the number of existing natures, its several parts or subdivisions must likewise exist?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —It seems, then, that the opposition between a particular segment of the diverse and a segment of the existent—is no less existent if we may so say—than the existent itself; not in the sense of contradiction between the two, but only of diversity.

Theaetetus/ —Clearly so.

Stranger/ —How shall we then name it?

Theaetetus/ —Evidently, it is the non-existent or non-entity which we have been looking for on the Sophists account.

Stranger/ —Non-entity then is no more deficient in regard to existence than other kinds of being, and we may now declare confidently that it possesses a nature of its own, like the great and the not great, the beautiful and not beautiful; so, too, non-being exists as non-being, a specific kind or form among the many kinds of being. Is there any reason, Theaetetus, for distrusting this inference?

Theaetetus/ —None whatever.

Stranger/ —Do you see, then, how we have done more than disobey the immediate prohibition of Parmenides?

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —Because we have not only not abstained from enquiry as he directed, but have arrived at a positive result.

Theaetetus/ —How?

Stranger/ —Parmenides says;

> "Never venture to assert non-entity to exist,
> But carefully withdraw your mind from this enquiry"—

whereas we have not only shown that non-entity exists, but also how it exists—namely, its kind or form; for we have explained how the diverse exists and is distributed through all forms of correlated being; and have ventured to call that portion of it which is severally antithetical to each segment of being as constituting in the aggregate the true essence of non-entity.

Theaetetus/ —Your inferences, Stranger, appear to me altogether unexceptionable.

Stranger/ —Let not, then, anyone assert that we venture to speak of non-entity as existing in the sense of the contrary of entity; since long ago we gave up asserting the existence or rationality of any such contrary. But in regard to what has just been advanced as to the nature of non-entity, let it either be distinctly proved that we are wrong, or else let our adversaries agree that the kinds of being and of diversity intermingle throughout, —that the diverse, by participating being, is or exists through such participation, yet not as identical with that in which it participates, but as something different, and being so different from being, is so far clearly non-being; on the other hand, that being, by participating diversity, becomes differentiated from all other kinds or forms; and as such is neither one of them in particular, nor all together, nor any except itself; so that incontestably being appears in a thousand ways as non-being; and all other forms, both individually and collectively, in many respects may be said to be, in many not to be.

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —And if anyone disputes these antitheses, let him reflect and produce something better; or if, seeing the difficulty, he amuses himself by caviling this way and that, let him be assured that he only wastes his time, as our present arguments show. For this last alternative is neither clever nor difficult; whereas the former is not only difficult but glorious.

Theaetetus/ —Which former?

Stranger/ —I mean that before stated, that allowing the possibility of these (inferences or antitheses) he should be able intelligently to follow each step in argument, and, whenever the diverse is alleged to be in a sense identical, or the identical diverse, to discriminate the special manner and relation predicated of each kind; while, on the other hand, arbitrarily to confound the several kinds, indiscriminately calling the

identical different, the great small, the similar dissimilar, etc., and moreover to exult in making this confusion, this is no genuine mode of argument, but only the rash venture of one newly attempting the problem of being.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —And moreover, my good friend, a constant effort to sever everything from everything is inharmonious and rude, the part of one quite untutored and unphilosophical.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —Because the complete severance of everything from everything else amounts to complete suppression of all rational discourse; for it is through the mutual interlacement of ideas or forms that discourse becomes possible.

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —Consider now how opportunely we have fought the matter out with these men, and compelled them to admit that one kind mingles with another.

Theaetetus/ —To what end?

Stranger/ —In order to make it appear how discourse forms one of our existing genera. Were we deprived of it, first and foremost, we should be bereft of all philosophy; moreover, it is especially needful to come to an understanding about it at the present moment, since if compelled to relinquish it as an existing reality we could not utter a word more. And this, indeed, we should be, were it admitted that there can be no union of anything with anything.

Theaetetus/ —In this you are right; but I don't see why we should at this particular moment have to come to an agreement as to the nature of discourse.

Stranger/ —You will, perhaps, best learn by thus following the course of the argument. Non-being or non-entity was

found to be one of the other forms or genera, spreading through all existence. Was it not?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —We have then to enquire further whether it mingles with opinion and discourse.

Theaetetus/ —How so?

Stranger/ —Because if it mingle not with these all language and opinion must be true; if on the contrary it can and does mingle, false opinion and false reasoning become possible; falsehood, in thought and speech, being, in fact, nothing more than thinking or saying the thing which is not.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —And from falsehood follows deception.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And deception implies the prevalence of visionary and fantastic images.

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —But this was precisely the hiding-place to which we before traced the Sophist—he all the time utterly denying even the possible existence of falsehood; for lie said that no one could either think or speak non-entity, non-entity no way possessing any share of being.

Theaetetus/ —It was so.

Stranger/ —But the contrary of this has been made evident, and will probably no longer be disputed; but perhaps it may be pretended that some forms or genera, partake of non-entity, others not, and that opinion and discourse are of the latter class. Hence the Sophist may say that the fantastic and image-making art do not exist at all; since if there be no union of opinion and discourse with non-entity, there can be no falsehood. Therefore we will consider the nature of

discourse, opinion, and fantasy, in order, in the first place, to show their communion with non-entity; and, on the basis of this showing, prove the existence of falsehood, and having proved the falsehood, bind the Sophist to it, if he be guilty; or else release and seek him in some other kind.

Theaetetus/ —Most true, O Stranger, appears to be what you said at the beginning, that the Sophist is a species difficult to hunt out. For he seems to be inexhaustible in resources of defense, and we have to fight our way through each of these fences before getting at himself. Scarcely had we got through the pretense that non-entity exists not, when we had to face another, and to show that falsehood exists both in opinions and discourses; after this we shall, perhaps, find another, and another after that, and so on endlessly.

Stranger/ —He, Theaetetus, who is able to make even a small advance, must be of good courage. For what would he, who in these circumstances desponds, do in another case in which he should make no advance or be driven back? Scarcely would such an one take the city, as the saying is. But now, since the obstacle you speak of is passed, the main fortress may be considered to be won—the rest is easier and less important.

Theaetetus/ —Very well.

Stranger/ —First, then, let us consider opinion and discourse, in order to ascertain whether non-entity reaches them, or whether they are universally true and exempt from falsehood.

Theaetetus/ —Very well.

Stranger/ —Well, then, let us now consider words, as we before dealt with ideas and letters; for this way seems to lie the object of our search.

Theaetetus/ —What, then, is to be said respecting words?

Stranger/ —Whether all words agree together or none; or whether some do and some not.

Theaetetus/ —Clearly the latter alternative is the truth.

Stranger/ —You mean possibly that those which follow each other in a sentence or proposition agree, and that such as are unmeaning when placed consecutively disagree?

Theaetetus/ —Why so?

Stranger/ —I allude to what I presume to be your meaning in your last given assent; for in fact there are two distinct sorts of words used in declarations about existence.

Theaetetus/ —Which are they?

Stranger/ —Some called names, others predicates or verbs.

Theaetetus/ —Describe them.

Stranger/ —Declarations about actions are called verbs.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And the vocal signs affixed to the agents (or subjects) of those actions are names.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —Names alone uttered consecutively do not form a-discourse, neither do verbs spoken alone without names.

Theaetetus/ —I don't see this.

Stranger/ —Clearly, then, you were thinking of something else when you just now assented to what, in effect, I am now saying, —namely, that such words alone spoken together do not make a discourse.

Theaetetus/ —As how?

Stranger/ —For instance, "walks, runs, sleeps," and so of other words denoting actions; no amount of these strung together would make a discourse.

Theaetetus/ —How indeed should it?

Stranger/ —Again, if you say “lion, stag, horse,”—and so forth, no such series of words amounts to a discourse; for in neither case do the words say anything, by attributing action or inaction to being or non-being; this occurs only when verbs are joined with names; each then fits the other, and discourse is produced in its first and simplest form.

Theaetetus/ —How mean you this?

Stranger/ —As when one says—man learns—here is an instance of the shortest and most elementary speech.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —For, then, by connecting verbs with nouns, he asserts something about the existing or becoming things which are or are about to be; not merely recounting names, but also transactions; hence we said that he not only names but speaks, and called the tissue of such connected speech discourse.

Theaetetus/ —Right.

Stranger/ —Thus, then, as among things some fit together, others not, so too among vocal signs or words some disagree, while to those agreeing together we give the title of discourse.

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —Add also this trifling circumstance—that discourse, in order really to be, must be about something, not about nothing.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Hence it must have a certain quality.

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —Now, then, let us look to ourselves and our own doings; I will frame a discourse, connecting a thing with

an act by means of a noun and verb; do you tell me what the discourse is about.

Theaetetus/ —To the best of my power I will do so.

Stranger/ —"Theaetetus sits"—this discourse is no long one.

Theaetetus/ —Short enough!

Stranger/ —You are now to say what it is about, and whom.

Theaetetus/ —About me and my act.

Stranger/ —But how is it with the following—"Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies."

Theaetetus/ —This too can scarcely be said to be other than of and about me.

Stranger/ —But we said that all discourse must have a certain quality?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Then what is the quality of each of the two foregoing propositions?

Theaetetus/ —One is false, the other true.

Stranger/ —The true one affirms that which is respecting you, the false something other than what is?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Stating the non-existent as if it existed?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —An existence different from that truly existing about you; for we said before that much is about every individual, and that much is not?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Now the last uttered discourse about you must, according to the definition given, be necessarily one of the shortest?

Theaetetus/ —Such was our conclusion.

Stranger/ —Also about something?

Theaetetus/ —So it is.

Stranger/ —And if not about you it is about no one nothing.

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —But if about nothing it is not discourse at all; since we showed that it is impossible for discourse to be about nothing?

Theaetetus/ —Very true.

Stranger/ —When, then, in speaking of you the different is stated as identical and the nonexistent as existent, it appears that such a tissue of nouns and verbs is really and truly a false discourse?

Theaetetus/ —Most certainly it is.

Stranger/ —But how about thought, opinion, and appearance? Is it not clear that all these kinds are formed falsely as well as truly in our souls?

Theaetetus/ —How?

Stranger/ —You will understand better by considering separately the specific nature of each; —are not thought and discourse the same, save that the former, being the souls silent discourse (dialogos) within itself, has hence been called "Dianoia?"

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —And its outpour thence through the lips in sound is called (λογος) speech or discourse?

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —And this so expressed in words we know to be either affirmation or denial?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —But when occurring silently within the soul in the form of thought, what name can you give it save that of opinion?

Theaetetus/ —None.

Stranger/ —And when such a condition occurs not independently in the soul, but as a consequence of sensation, what name can you give it save that of fantasy or appearance?

Theaetetus/ —None other.

Stranger/ —Since then discourse was shown to be of two qualities, namely, true or false, and since thought is the internal discourse of the soul terminating in opinion, while fantasy is a compound of sensation and opinion, it follows that of these correlatives of discourse some are sometimes false.

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —See now how false opinion and discourse have been far more easily and quickly discovered than we lately anticipated.

Theaetetus/ —I perceive.

Stranger/ —Let us then not despond as to what remains, and having so far pursued our discoveries let us recall our former several kinds and divisions.

Theaetetus/ —Which divisions?

Stranger/ —We distinguished two kinds of the imitative art, the assimilative and the fantastic.

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And we then professed to be at a loss in which to place the Sophist.

Theaetetus/ —So it was.

Stranger/ —And while thus doubting we became involved in still deeper obscurity in consequence of the all-controverting suggestion, that there can be no unveracious image, similitude, or phantasm whatever, falsehood being everywhere and always impossible.

Theaetetus/ —True.

Stranger/ —But now, since it has been made evident that there may be both false discourse and false opinion, it follows that false imitations of real being may exist, and that hence a deceptive art may be produced.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Also it was before agreed that the Sophist must belong to one or other of those two kinds?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Let us, then, again proceed to divide the given genus, and so adhering to the right hand segment continually follow the characteristics of the Sophist, until, having divested him of all that he has in common with others, we exhibit him in his proper and peculiar nature, —for our own edification in the first instance, and next for the benefit of those who by nature are most nearly allied to his mode of arguing.

Theaetetus/ —Very well.

Stranger/ —Did we not at the outset distinguish the formative and acquisitive arts?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And under the head of acquisitive he appeared to be among hunters, wrestlers, traffickers, and others of the sort?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —But now, since the imitative art has caught him, it is clear that we must first make a twofold division also of the formative or creative; for imitation is a sort of forming, that is, of images, not of things themselves; is it not so?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Of the formative art, then, let there be two kinds, the divine and human.

Theaetetus/ —I don't quite see this.

Stranger/ —The formative or creative art was, according to our former definitions, any force or agency causing things not existing before to exist afterwards.

Theaetetus/ —I remember.

Stranger/ —Well, then, shall we say of animals and plants, and all things growing from seeds or roots, or formed within the earth of a fusible or infusible nature, that these were brought from nonbeing into being by any other than a creating God? —or, borrowing the words and notions of the many, shall we suppose them to be casual spontaneous products of unreasoning nature, rather than of a divine cause acting with reason and divine science?

Theaetetus/ —It is inexperience, probably, which makes me hesitate between two opinions; looking, however, at the present moment to you, and supposing you to be so minded, I now hold them to originate from God.

Stranger/ —Very well, Theaetetus; if I thought that hereafter you would be one among differently minded persons, I would even now endeavor to persuade you to the contrary by cogent reasons; but, knowing your disposition and that you are of yourself, without any argument of mine, already tending the way to which you now incline, I omit this as taking up too much time; assuming, meanwhile, that the so-called products of nature are creations of divine art, as those formed by man

out of these are of human, so that there will be two kinds of formative art, one human, one divine.

Theaetetus/ —Well.

Stranger/ —Divide now each of these again into two, so that the whole of formative art may appear in four segments, two dependent on us, or human, two on the gods, or divine.

Theaetetus/ —Very well.

Stranger/ —And since they are again divided transversely, let one segment of each of the former divisions be called "freely creative," of the other two "image creative."

Theaetetus/ —Pray describe them.

Stranger/ —Ourselves and other animals, and the elements, as fire, water, etc., out of which things arise, each of these products we recognize as the very work of God, do we not?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —And the accompanying images of these, not their very selves, these too are formations of divine art, are they not?

Theaetetus/ —What are you alluding to?

Stranger/ —All sleeping and waking images that are called natural, such as dreams, shadows produced by intercepted light, also the images reflected from smooth bright surfaces, where a confluence of original and derived light exhibits the ordinary appearance reversed.

Theaetetus/ —These two, then, are products of divine art, the thing itself, and its accompanying image or shadow.

Stranger/ —But what of human art? Shall we not say that it too has a double function, one producing things, e.g. a house by the builders art, the other, the painters art for instance, producing a sort of waking dream?

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —So that of these two products of human formative art the one may be called freely creative or auto-poetic, the other imitative or image creative.

Theaetetus/ —I see now, and assume two kinds of formative art under two separate heads; human and divine according to one division, according to the other true existence and fictitious or simulative.

Stranger/ —It should be also remembered that of the image-making art there were to be two kinds, the assimilative and fantastic, at least if it turned out that falsehood really is, as one among things existing.

Theaetetus/ —So it was agreed.

Stranger/ —Well, such having proved to be the case, we may now assume these two, and then again divide the fantastic art into two kinds.

Theaetetus/ —How?

Stranger/ —The one produced by means of instruments, the other where the appearance-producing artist is himself the instrument of his work.

Theaetetus/ —What mean you?

Stranger/ —When anyone in his own person counterfeits your person or voice, this aspect of fantastic art may, I presume, be called mimicry?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Let this name, then, be awarded to it as a distinctive appellation; the remaining portion it were more easy and agreeable to omit, leaving it to someone else to summaries and find a fitting name for it.

Theaetetus/ —So be it.

Stranger/ —But mimicry too, Theaetetus, should be treated as twofold; some mimics practice their art knowingly, others not; and what difference can be greater than that of knowledge and ignorance?

Theaetetus/ —None.

Stranger/ —The instance just adduced was one of knowing mimicry; for only one knowing you and your appearance could imitate it.

Theaetetus/ —Of course.

Stranger/ —But how of the form of justice and of virtue generally, do not many, destitute of knowledge and having only seeming or opinion, strive with all their might to counterfeit the semblances of virtue, imitating it as much as possible in act and word?

Theaetetus/ —Very many indeed.

Stranger/ —Do they fail in their efforts to appear what they are not?

Theaetetus/ —Quite the contrary.

Stranger/ —Such ignorant mimics, I presume, must be held to be quite different from the others, who know what they imitate?

Theaetetus/ —Yes.

Stranger/ —Whence, then, shall we get a suitable name for each? Evidently it is difficult, because former thinkers entertained a groundless prejudice against special and generic distinctions, so that none attempted to make them; and hence a dearth of appropriate names. Nevertheless, however rash the attempt, we will venture to call the mimicry or imitation resting on opinion only—"doxomimetic,"—that based on science "scientific."

Theaetetus/ —Very well.

Stranger/ —One of these will suffice for our present purpose; for the Sophist is an imitator or mimic, but not with knowledge.

Theaetetus/ —Certainly.

Stranger/ —Let us, then, test the doxomimic like steel, whether he be sound or have a flaw in him.

Theaetetus/ —Apply your test.

Stranger/ —A flaw he certainly has, and that a large one. One among the number of such is simple, fancying he knows what really he only opines; but the other sort by his elaborate logical evolutions creates infinite terror and suspicion in the minds of his hearers, lest he prove to be ignorant of what he pretends before the multitude to know.

Theaetetus/ —There are indeed these two sorts.

Stranger/ —Suppose, then, we call one the simple mimic, the other the insincere or ironical?

Theaetetus/ —Very well.

Stranger/ —And of this last is there one kind or two?

Theaetetus/ —That is for you to consider.

Stranger/ —I do, and seem to see two sorts; one able to play the ironical mimic publicly before a numerous audience in long winded harangues, another who in short private conversations drives the interlocutor to a self-contradiction.

Theaetetus/ —Most true.

Stranger/ —What, then, shall we term the lengthy speaker, a statesman or a mob-orator?

Theaetetus/ —A mob-orator.

Stranger/ —And what the other; a wise man or a Sophist?

Theaetetus/ —A wise man (or true philosopher) we cannot call him, having already supposed him to be ignorant; but as

an imitator of the wise (sophos) it is fit that he should have some analogous designation; and now methinks I see pretty plainly that it is he whom we must address as the real and genuine Sophist.

Stranger/ —Shall we, then, as before, summaries the constituent elements comprehended under this title, recapitulating the whole backwards from the end up to the beginning?

Theaetetus/ —Agreed.

Stranger/ —Whoever, singling out that portion of the doxomimetic art, or art of fictitious imitation founded on mere opinion, which with ironical insincerity drives interlocutors to a self-contradiction, derived from the race of fantastic human image-makers playing the charlatan with words, —whoever, I say, shall speak of the genuine Sophist as coming of this blood and lineage, will, in my opinion, most truly describe him.

The Sophista.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

Theodorus, An Elean Guest, or Stranger,

Socrates, And Theætetus.

Theodorus/ We are come, Socrates, according to our agreement yesterday, as good manners require, and have brought with us this guest, who is an Elean by birth, but very different from the associates of Parmenides and Zeno: he is however a great philosopher.

Socrates/ Perhaps, therefore, Theodorus, according to the assertion of Homer, you are conducting a certain God, and not a stranger. For he says, that both other Gods, and especially the hospitable deity, are conversant with men who participate of just shame, and that they inspect the insolent and the equitable conduct of men. So that perhaps he who now follows you, is one of the natures superior to man, who attends you in order to behold and confute us who dispute badly, as being himself a certain reprehending God.

Theodorus/ This is not the manner of this guest, Socrates, but he is more modest than those that are studious of contention. And he appears to me, as being a man, not to be a God, but to be divine: for so I denominate all philosophers.

Socrates/ And you do well in calling them so, my friend. But indeed the genus of philosophers is not much more easily distinguished, as I may say, than that of divinity. For those who are not fictitiously but truly philosophers, appear through the ignorance of others to be of an all-various nature, while they wander about cities, and behold from on high the life of inferior natures. And to some they appear to

deserve no honor, but by others they are considered as worthy of all honor. And sometimes they appear to be politicians, but at other times Sophists; and sometimes, in the opinion of certain persons, they are considered to be perfectly in sane. I would gladly, therefore, inquire of this our guest, if agreeable to him, what his familiars the Eleans think of these things, and how they denominate them.

Theodorus/ What things do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ The sophist, politician, and philosopher.

Theodorus/ What, and of what kind, is the doubt about these, which you would wish to have dissolved?

Socrates/ This: Whether they denominate all these, one or two. Or as there are three names, whether they also make a distribution into three genera, and ascribe the respective names to the respective genera.

Theodorus/ But I think that he will not enviously refuse to discuss these things. Or how shall we say, guest?

Stranger/ In this manner, Theodorus. For I shall not enviously refuse, nor is it difficult to inform you, that they think these are three genera: but to define clearly what each of them is, is not a small nor an easy work.

Theodorus/ You have perhaps, Socrates, fallen upon questions similar to those which we were asking this our guest before we came hither. But he then gave us the same answers as he just now gave you: for he said, that he had sufficiently heard, and did not forget them.

Socrates/ You ought, therefore, to gratify us, O guest, with respect to our first question: But tell us thus much, whether you are accustomed to discuss by yourself in a long discourse, that which you wish to evince, or by interrogations, which I once heard Parmenides employing, and at the same time delivering all-beautiful arguments, I being then a young and he a very elderly man.

Stranger/ If anyone answers, Socrates, without difficulty, and in a placid manner, it is more easy to discourse with such a one by interrogating; but if not, it is better to discourse by oneself.

Socrates/ You are at liberty, therefore, to choose whichever of these you please: for we shall all of us obey you without reluctance. But I would advise you to choose some young man for this purpose, either Theætetus here, or any other that you may think proper.

Stranger/ I am ashamed, Socrates, that, conversing with you now for the first time, I have not given word for word, but, making a long discourse either by myself or to another, I have acted as if I had been framing a demonstration. For in reality no one should expect that the present question can be solved with the greatest facility: For it requires a very long discussion. On the contrary, not to gratify you, and those that are now assembled, especially since you have asked in so modest a manner; would, as it appears to me, be inhospitable and rustic; since, from what I have before said, and from what you have now urged me to do, I shall have Theætetus here as my associate in the discussion.

Theaetetus/ By thus acting indeed, O guest, as Socrates says, you will gratify all of us.

Stranger/ It appears then, Theætetus, that nothing further must be said against these things. And as it seems, after this, I must address myself to you. But if being weary through the length of the discourse you should become indignant, do not blame me, but these your companions, as the cause of this.

Theaetetus/ I am far from thinking that this will be the case: but if a thing of this kind should take place, then we can call upon the namesake of Socrates here, who is of the same age with me, and is my associate in gymnastic

exercises, and who is not unaccustomed to accomplish many laborious things in conjunction with me.

Stranger/ You speak well. Deliberate, therefore, about these things by yourself, in the course of the disputation: but now consider in common with me, beginning in the first place (as it appears to me) from the sophist; and let us evince by our discourse what he is. For now both you and I have only the name in common respecting this thing: but perhaps each of us thinks differently as to the thing denominated. But it is always requisite respecting everything, rather to consent through reasons to the thing itself, than to the name alone without reason. However, with respect to the tribe which we now take upon us to investigate, it is by no means easy to apprehend what a sophist is. It appears however to all men, and is an ancient opinion, that whoever wishes to labor through great things well, should exercise himself in such as are small and more easy, before he attempts such as are the greatest. Now, therefore, as we are of opinion that the genus of a sophist is difficult to investigate, I would advise, Theætetus, that we should first of all consider the method of this investigation, in something more easy: unless you are able to show a more expeditious way.

Theaetetus/ But I am not able.

Stranger/ Are you willing, therefore, that, adducing a vile thing, we should establish it as a paradigm of a greater thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But what if we propose a thing well known, and of a trifling nature, but which will contribute as well as anything to the apprehension of greater things? as for instance a fisherman. Is he not known to everyone? and is it not likewise certain, that he does not deserve much serious consideration?

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Stranger/ Yet I suspect he will furnish us with a method, and reasoning process, not unadapted to our design.

Theaetetus/ In this case, therefore, it will be well.

Stranger/ Come then, let us begin from this: and inform me, whether we should consider a fisherman, as one endued with art, or as without art, but possessing another power.

Theaetetus/ We must by no means consider him as without art.

Stranger/ But there are nearly two species of all arts.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Agriculture, and the care respecting every mortal body, together with that pertaining to everything composite and plastic, which we denominate an utensil, and in conjunction with these the imitative power, all which may be justly called by one name.

Theaetetus/ How so? and by what name?

Stranger/ When anyone afterwards leads into existence that which was not before, then we say that he who leads makes, and that the thing led is made.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ But all the particulars which we just now mentioned possess a power adapted to this.

Theaetetus/ They do.

Stranger/ In a summary way, therefore, we shall denominate them effective.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Stranger/ But after this, the whole species of discipline and knowledge, together with the species of gain, contest and hunting, may be called a certain art of acquiring, since no one of these fabricates anything, but procures things which are and have been, partly subjecting them to its power

by words and actions, and partly conceding them to those by whom they are received.

Theaetetus/ They may be so called: For it is proper.

Stranger/ Since all arts, therefore, consist either in acquiring or in effecting, in which of these, Theætetus, shall we place the art of fishing?

Theaetetus/ Doubtless in the art of acquiring.

Stranger/ But are there not two species of the art of acquiring? the one being a commutation between those that are willing, through gifts, buying, and wages? But the other will be a mancipation, effected either by deeds or words.

Theaetetus/ It appears this must be the case, from what has been said.

Stranger/ But what? Must not mancipation also receive a two-fold division?

Theaetetus/ After what manner?

Stranger/ The one being apparent, and wholly agonistic; but the other being occult, and wholly consisting in hunting.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ It is likewise absurd, not to give hunting a two-fold division.

Theaetetus/ Inform me how.

Stranger/ One member of the division consists of the inanimate, and the other of the animated kind.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly: for there are both these.

Stranger/ How, indeed, is it possible there should not? And it is requisite that we should leave the hunting of inanimate things without a name, and that we should likewise dismiss the consideration of certain parts of the art of swimming, and other trifling things of this kind; and denominate the other part, which is the hunting of animated natures, the hunting of animals.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Stranger/ But is it not justly said, that there is a two-fold species of the hunting of animals? one being the hunting of the pedestrian kind, which is distinguished by many species and names, but the other of every swimming animal, and which is denominated hunting in water?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But of the swimming division, we see that one kind cuts the air with wings, and that the, other is aquatic.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But all the hunting of the winged tribe is called fowling.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Stranger/ But nearly that of all the aquatic tribe, fishing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But what? Must we not divide this hunting into two greatest parts?

Theaetetus/ What are these parts?

Stranger/ According to which we either fish with nets, or by percussion.

Theaetetus/ How do you say? And how do you divide each?

Stranger/ That everything which on all sides enclosing restrains anything for the sake of impediment, is fitly denominated a net.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But do you call a bow-net, dictuon, a snare, and a calling-net, anything else than nets?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Stranger/ We must say, therefore, that this hunting with nets is a part of fishing, or something of this kind.

Theaetetus/ We must.

Stranger/ But that which is accomplished with hooks and darts, by percussion, and which is different from the other kind of fishing, it will be proper that we should now call by one word, percussion-hunting, unless you, Theætetus, have anything better to say.

Theaetetus/ Let us pay no attention to the name: for this is sufficient.

Stranger/ Of percussion-hunting, therefore, one kind is I think nocturnal, being effected by the light of fire; and on this account it happens to be called igniferous.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But the other kind is diurnal, and is effected with tridents hooked on the extremities of rods; the whole of this being aduncous fishing.

Theaetetus/ It is indeed so called.

Stranger/ Of aduncous-percussion-fishing, therefore, that kind which is effected by darting the tridents into the water from on high, is I think called by some trident fishing.

Theaetetus/ So certain persons say.

Stranger/ Only one species then, as I may say, remains.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ A percussion contrary to this, effected indeed with a hook, but not casually striking any part of the body, as in fishing with tridents, but piercing only the head and mouth of the fish, and drawing it upwards with rods and reeds. By what name, Theætetus, shall we say this ought to be called?

Theaetetus/ By that of aduncous fishing with rods: and we now appear to have accomplished that which we proposed to discuss.

Stranger/ Now, therefore, you and I have not only accorded in giving a name to fishing, but we have likewise sufficiently explained the manner in which it is conducted. For, of the whole art, one half we said consisted in acquiring; and the half of this in manual subjugation; and again the half of this in hunting. Likewise that the half of hunting consisted in the capture of animals; and that the half of the capture of animals was hunting in water. That again, of hunting in water, the downward division of the whole was fishing; that the half of fishing was percussion; that the half of percussion fishing was performed with a hook: and lastly, that the half of this consisted in drawing that which is downwards upwards; and that, thence deriving its name, it is called aduncous fishing with rods.

Theaetetus/ This, therefore, has been in every respect sufficiently shown.

Stranger/ Come then, let us endeavor according to this paradigm to discover what a sophist is.

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ And this indeed was the first object of inquiry in the example just adduced, whether a fisherman is to be considered as a rude character, or as one endued with a certain art.

Theaetetus/ It was.

Stranger/ And now, Theætetus, shall we call a sophist a rude character, or one in every respect skillful?

Theaetetus/ We must by no means call him a rude character. For I understand what you say, that he who is so called ought not to be unskillful, but endued with a certain art.

Stranger/ But with what art ought we to consider him endued?

Theaetetus/ I ask you the same question.

Stranger/ By the Gods, then, are we ignorant that one of these men is allied to the other?

Theaetetus/ Which men?

Stranger/ The fisherman and the sophist.

Theaetetus/ In what respect are they allied?

Stranger/ Both of them appear to me to be hunters.

Theaetetus/ Of what is this latter character a hunter? for we have spoken of the other.

Stranger/ We divided the whole of hunting into the swimming and the pedestrian.

Theaetetus/ We did.

Stranger/ And we discussed, indeed, the particulars respecting the swimming part of aquatic natures; but we omitted the pedestrian division, and said that it was multiform.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Thus far, therefore, the sophist and the fisherman equally proceed from the art of acquiring.

Theaetetus/ They appear so indeed.

Stranger/ Some however, abandoning the hunting of land animals, betake themselves to the sea, to rivers and lakes, and hunt animals in these.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But some subjugate animals on the earth, and in rivers, as in meadows abounding with riches and youthfulness.

Theaetetus/ How do you say?

Stranger/ Of pedestrian hunting there are two greatest parts.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind is each of these parts?

Stranger/ One is the hunting of tame, and the other of savage animals.

Theaetetus/ Is there any hunting then of tame animals?

Stranger/ Either man is a tame animal, (adopt what I say as you please,) or no animal is tame; or some other animal is tame, but man is a savage animal: or you may say that man indeed is a tame animal, but you may think that there is no hunting of men. Adopt whichever of these divisions is most agreeable to you.

Theaetetus/ But I think, O guest, that we are a tame animal, and I say that there is a hunting of men.

Stranger/ We must say then that there is also a two-fold hunting of tame animals.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ By defining predatory hunting, that which reduces into bondage, and tyrannic hunting, to be all of them violent hunting.

Theaetetus/ Well defined.

Stranger/ But that which pertains to judicial cases, popular harangues, and discourse, may summarily be called a certain art of persuasion.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ But of this art of persuasion we say there are two kinds.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One of them is private, and the other public.

Theaetetus/ There are these two species.

Stranger/ Again, with respect to the hunting of private persuasion, one kind is effected by wages, and another by gifts.

Theaetetus/ I do not understand you.

Stranger/ It seems you have never attended to the hunting of lovers.

Theaetetus/ In what respect?

Stranger/ In this, that besides other things they bestow gifts on those they have caught.

Theaetetus/ You speak most true.

Stranger/ Let this then be a species of the amatory art.

Theaetetus/ By all means.

Stranger/ But with respect to that species of the hunting of persuasion which is effected by wages, that part of it which converses with others through favor, and entirely procures enchantments through pleasure, that it may thence alone receive aliment as its reward, this I think we all of us call adulation, or a certain art administering to pleasure.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But another part of it professes to converse for the sake of virtue, and requires money For its reward. Ought not this part, therefore, to be called by another name?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Endeavor to tell me this name.

Theaetetus/ It is evident. For we appear to me to have found a sophist; and I think this name is adapted to this other part of the object of our investigation.

Stranger/ According to the present reasoning, as it seems, Theætetus, the profession of a sophist must be called an art, servile, subjugating, and venatic; hunting pedestrian, terrestrial, and tame animals; or, in other words, privately bringing men into captivity for pecuniary rewards, and ensnaring rich and noble young men, through an opinion of erudition.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Further still, let us consider as follows: —For the object of our present investigation does not participate of a certain vile art, but of one various in the extreme. For, from what has been before said, we may conjecture that it does not belong to that kind of art which we just now mentioned, but to another kind.

Theaetetus/ What is that kind?

Stranger/ There were in a certain respect two species of the art of acquiring, the one consisting in hunting, and the other flowing from contracts.

Theaetetus/ There were.

Stranger/ We say, therefore, that there are two species of contracts, the one consisting in bestowing, and the other in buying and selling.

Theaetetus/ There are so.

Stranger/ And again, we say that the species of contracts which consists in buying and selling, must receive a two-fold division.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ He who exposes his own works to sale may be called a seller of his own property; but he who sells the works of others, an exchanger.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But what? Is not that exchange which takes place in the same city, and which is nearly the half of the whole of exchange, denominated cauponary?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And is not the other half that which takes place by buying and selling in different cities, and which we call emporic?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ And do we not perceive, that of emporic exchange, one part pertains to the nutriment of the body, and the other to the discipline of the soul, exchanging erudition for money?

Theaetetus/ How do you say?

Stranger/ That part which pertains to the soul we are, perhaps, unacquainted with: for the other part we understand.

Theaetetus/ We do.

Stranger/ But we say that he who buys music in one city by learning, and sells it in another by teaching, and who acts in a similar manner with respect to painting, enchantment, and many other things pertaining to the soul, as well serious as jocose, —we say that such a one traffics no less than he who sells meats and drinks.

Theaetetus/ You speak most true.

Stranger/ Will you not, therefore, similarly denominate him who wanders about different cities in order to exchange disciplines for money?

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ But of this merchandize pertaining to the soul, may not one part be most justly called demonstrative; and may not the other part, though ridiculous, yet, since it is no less the selling of disciplines than the former, be called by a name which is the brother to that of selling?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But in this traffic of disciplines, he who sells the disciplines of other arts must be called by a name different from him who sells the disciplines of virtue.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ For he who sells the disciplines of other arts may be aptly called a seller of arts; but consider by what name he should be called who sells the disciplines of virtue.

Theaetetus/ By what other name can he be called without error, except that which is the object of our investigation at present, a sophist?

Stranger/ By no other. We may, therefore, now collect as follows: that, by a second investigation, a sophist has appeared to us to be an exchanger, a buyer and seller, a merchant respecting discourses, and one who sells the, disciplines of virtue.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ In the third place, I think that you in like manner will call him, a sophist, who being settled in a city, partly buys and partly himself fabricates disciplines, which he sells in order to procure the necessaries of life.

Theaetetus/ Why, indeed, should I not?

Stranger/ You will, therefore, call him a sophist who is conversant in acquiring, who traffics, and sells either his own inventions, or those of others, about the disciplines of virtue.

Theaetetus/ Necessarily so. For it is requisite to assent to reason.

Stranger/ Let us still further consider, whether the genus which we are at present investigating is similar to a certain thing of this kind.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind?

Stranger/ Of the art of acquiring, a certain part appeared to us to be; agonistic.

Theaetetus/ It did.

Stranger/ It will not, therefore, be improper to give it a two-fold division.

Theaetetus/ Inform me how you divide it.

Stranger/ One part is defensive, and the other offensive.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Stranger/ Of the offensive part, therefore, that which takes place when bodies fight against bodies may be fitly called violence.

Theaetetus/ It may.

Stranger/ But what else, Theætetus, can that which takes place when arguments oppose arguments be called, except contention?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Stranger/ But as to contentions, there must be a two-fold division.

Theaetetus/ In what respect?

Stranger/ For, so far as contention takes place through employing prolix arguments against prolix arguments in public concerning things just and unjust, it is judicial.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ But when it takes place in private, by a distribution into minute parts, through question and answer, are we accustomed to call it anything else than contradiction?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Stranger/ But of contradiction, that part which is employed about contracts, and which subsists casually, and without art, is to be placed as a separate species, since reason distinguishes it from other kinds of contradiction; but it has neither been assigned a name by any of the ancients, nor does it deserve to be denominated by us at present.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ For it is divided into parts extremely small and all-various. But that which proceeds according to art, and disputes about things just and unjust, and universally about other particulars, we are accustomed to call contentious.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But of the contentious division, one part dissipates possessions, and the other accumulates wealth.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ We should, therefore, endeavor to discover by what name each of these ought to be called.

Theaetetus/ It is proper to do so.

Stranger/ It appears then to me, that he who, through delighting in the study of contention, neglects his affairs, and is always hunting after trifling questions, cannot be called anything else than a man of words.

Theaetetus/ He may, indeed, be called so.

Stranger/ But do you now, in your turn, endeavor to inform me how he is to be denominated who endeavors to acquire wealth from private contention.

Theaetetus/ Can anyone with rectitude call him anything else than that wonderful character the sophist, which we investigate, and who now again for the fourth time presents himself to our view?

Stranger/ As reason, therefore, again shows us, a sophist is nothing else than that pecuniary genus which is conversant with the art of contention, with contradiction, controversy, hostile opposition, and with the agonistic art, and that of acquiring.

Theaetetus/ He is altogether so.

Stranger/ Do you not perceive, therefore, that it is truly said, this wild beast is a various animal, and that, according to the proverb, he is not to be caught with the other hand?

Theaetetus/ It will, therefore, be proper to use both hands.

Stranger/ It will be proper, and we must do so to the utmost of our power. But inform me, whether we have any servile names?

Theaetetus/ We have many. But respecting which of the many do you ask me?

Stranger/ Such as when we say to wash, to distribute, to boil, and to separate.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ And besides these, to card wool, to draw down, to comb, and ten thousand other such-like words which we meet with in the arts. Or do we not?

Theaetetus/ Which among these do you wish to serve throughout, as an instance of what you mean to evince?

Stranger/ All the names that have been mentioned are in a certain respect divisive.

Theaetetus/ They are.

Stranger/ According to my reasoning, therefore, since there is one art in all these, we should call them by one name.

Theaetetus/ By what name?

Stranger/ Segregative.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Stranger/ Consider, again, whether we are able to perceive two species of this?

Theaetetus/ You seem to urge me to a rapid consideration.

Stranger/ And, indeed, in all these segregations, the worse was separated from the better, and the similar from the similar.

Theaetetus/ It appears that it was nearly so said.

Stranger/ Of the latter of these segregations, therefore, I cannot tell the name; but I can of that which leaves the better and rejects the worse.

Theaetetus/ Inform me what it is.

Stranger/ The whole of this separation (as I conjecture) is called by all men a certain purification.

Theaetetus/ It is so called.

Stranger/ Does not, therefore, everyone see that the cathartic species is two-fold?

Theaetetus/ Yes. If anyone, perhaps, thinks about it at leisure; for I do not see it at present.

Stranger/ And, indeed, it is proper to comprehend in one name the many species of purgations pertaining to the body.

Theaetetus/ What kind of purgations do you mean? and by what name ought they to be called?

Stranger/ The inward purgations of the bodies of animals, by gymnastic and medicine, which purify by rightly separating; and those which operate externally, and which it is vile to mention, viz. such as baths afford; and likewise the purgations of inanimate bodies, by means of the fuller's art, and the whole art of adorning the body, which occasions attention to things of a trifling nature, —all these appear to be allotted many and ridiculous names.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ Entirely so, indeed, Theætetus. But the order of reasoning cares neither more nor less, whether wiping with a sponge purifies in a small degree, but the drinking a medicine is more advantageous to us, by the purification it

affords. For, that it may understand all arts, by endeavoring to apprehend what is allied, and what not, it equally honors the several arts, and is of opinion that some are not more ridiculous than others according to similitude. It likewise considers hunting, effected through military discipline, as in no respect more venerable than searching after vermin, but for the most part more futile. And now, indeed, which was what you asked, we have comprehended in one name all the powers which are allotted the purification either of an animated or inanimate body; but it is of no consequence to the present disputation what name may appear to be more becoming, if it be only placed separate from the purgations of the soul, and include in itself all such things as purify the body. For the order of reasoning now endeavors to separate the purification of the dianoëtic part from other purgations, if we understand what it wishes to accomplish.

Theaetetus/ But I do understand, and I grant that there are two species of purification; one species respecting the soul, and the other, which is separate from this, respecting the body.

Stranger/ You speak in the most beautiful manner. Attend to me, therefore, in what follows, and endeavor to give a two-fold division to what has been said.

Theaetetus/ Wherever you may lead, I will endeavor to distribute in conjunction with you.

Stranger/ Do we not say, then, that depravity in the soul is something different from virtue?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ And we likewise said, that purification consists in rejecting what is depraved, and preserving what remains.

Theaetetus/ We did say so.

Stranger/ So far, therefore, as we shall discover an ablation of depravity in the soul, we ought to call it purgation.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ Two species of depravity in the soul must be established.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ The one is like disease in the body, but the other resembles inherent baseness.

Theaetetus/ I do not understand you.

Stranger/ Perhaps you do not think that disease is the same with sedition.

Theaetetus/ Again, I am not able to answer this question.

Stranger/ Whether do you think sedition is anything else than the corruption of natural alliance through a certain discord?

Theaetetus/ It is nothing else.

Stranger/ And is baseness anything else than entire deformity, arising from the immoderation of things of one kind?

Theaetetus/ It is nothing else.

Stranger/ What then, do we not see in the soul of the depraved that opinions differ from desires, anger from pleasures, reason from pain, and all these from each other?

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ But all these are necessarily allied to each other.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ We shall speak rightly, therefore, in calling depravity the sedition and disease of the soul.

Theaetetus/ We shall speak most rightly.

Stranger/ But what, when we see such things as participate of motion, and propose to themselves a certain end, wander from and miss the mark according to every impulse, do we say that they are affected in this manner through symmetry to each other, or, on the contrary, through a privation of symmetry?

Theaetetus/ It is evident that this, happens through a privation of symmetry.

Stranger/ But we know that every soul is involuntarily ignorant of anything.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ But ignorance is nothing else than a delirium of the soul, which, while it is impelled to truth, wanders in its apprehension of things.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ We must consider, therefore, a soul involved in ignorance as base and deformed.

Theaetetus/ So it appears.

Stranger/ It seems, therefore, that there are these two genera of evils in the soul; one of which is called by the multitude depravity, and is most evidently a disease.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ But the other the multitude call ignorance, but they are unwilling to acknowledge that this is a vice in the soul.

Theaetetus/ It must by all means be granted, though when you just now spoke I was doubtful of it, that there are two genera of vice or depravity in the soul; and that we ought to consider timidity, intemperance, injustice, and everything else of this kind, as a disease in us; but the passion of abundant and all-various ignorance as baseness.

Stranger/ In the body, therefore, are there not two certain arts about these two passions?

Theaetetus/ What are these arts?

Stranger/ About baseness, gymnastic; but about disease, medicine.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Stranger/ About insolence, therefore, injustice, and timidity, is not chastising justice naturally the most adapted of all arts?

Theaetetus/ It is likely, as I may say, according to human opinion.

Stranger/ But, can anyone say that there is a more proper remedy for all ignorance than erudition?

Theaetetus/ No one can.

Stranger/ Must we say, therefore, that there is only one kind of erudition, or that there are more kinds than one? But take notice, that there are two greatest genera of it.

Theaetetus/ I do take notice.

Stranger/ And it appears to me that we shall very rapidly discover this.

Theaetetus/ In what manner?

Stranger/ By perceiving that ignorance has a certain two-fold division. For, being two-fold, it is evident that it necessarily requires a two-fold mode of instruction, corresponding to the members of its division.

Theaetetus/ What then? Is that apparent which is the object of your present investigation?

Stranger/ I perceive, indeed, a great and ponderous species of ignorance, which outweighs all its other parts.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind is it?

Stranger/ When he who is ignorant of a thing appears to himself to know it. For it appears that through this all the deceptions in our dianoëtic part take place.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And I think that to this species of ignorance alone the name of rusticity should be given.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ How, therefore, do you think that part of erudition should be called which liberates from this species of ignorance?

Theaetetus/ I think, indeed, O guest, that the other part is denominated demiurgic erudition, but that this is called by us discipline.

Stranger/ It is nearly so denominated, Theætetus, by all the Greeks. But this also must be considered by us, whether the whole of this is indivisible, or possesses a certain division which deserves to be named.

Theaetetus/ It is requisite to consider this.

Stranger/ It appears, therefore, to me, that this may be still further divided.

Theaetetus/ According to what?

Stranger/ Of the erudition which is effected by discourse, one way appears to be more rough, and another part of it more smooth.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind do we call each of these?

Stranger/ The one ancient and paternal, which men formerly adopted towards their children, and many use at present, viz. as often as children do wrong, partly severely reproving) and partly mildly admonishing them. But the whole of this may be called with the utmost propriety admonition.

Theaetetus/ It may so.

Stranger/ But some are of opinion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn those things in which he considers himself as skilled; but that the admonitory species of discipline makes very small advances with great labor.

Theaetetus/ And they think right.

Stranger/ They likewise adopt another mode in order to disclose this opinion.

Theaetetus/ What mode?

Stranger/ By inquiring into those particulars about which a man thinks he says something to the purpose, when at the same time this is far from being the case. In the next place, they easily explore the opinions of those that err, and, collecting them together by a reasoning process, render them the same with each other: and after this they evince that these opinions are contrary to themselves, respecting the same things, with reference to the same, and according to the same. But those whose opinions are thus explored, on seeing this, are indignant with themselves, and become milder to others; and after this manner are liberated from mighty and rigid opinions; which liberation is of all others the most pleasant to hear, and the most firm to him who is the subject of it. For, O beloved youth, those that purify these think in the same manner as physicians with respect to bodies. For physicians are of opinion, that the body cannot enjoy salubrious food till someone removes the impediments it contains. In like manner, these mental purifiers think that the soul can derive no advantage from disciplines accommodated to its nature, till he who is confuted is ashamed of his error, and, the impediments of disciplines being expelled, viz. false opinions, he becomes pure, and alone thinks that he knows the things which he does know, and not more than he knows.

Theaetetus/ This is the best and the most modest of habits.

Stranger/ Hence, Theætetus, we must say, that confutation is the greatest and the chief of all purifications; and that he who is not confuted, even though he should be the great king himself, since he would be unpurified in things of the greatest consequence, will be rude and base with respect to those things in which it is fit he should be most pure and beautiful, who wishes to become truly happy.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But by whom shall we say this art is employed? For I am afraid to say it is used by the sophists.

Theaetetus/ On what account?

Stranger/ Lest we should honor them more than is fit.

Theaetetus/ But yet what has been just now said appears to be adapted to a certain character of this kind.

Stranger/ So likewise a wolf resembles a dog, a most savage a most mild animal. But he who wishes to be free from deception ought to guard against similitude above all things: For it is a genus of the greatest lubricity. But, at the same time, let these things be admitted; for I think it is not proper to dispute about small terms, at a time when these ought to be carefully avoided.

Theaetetus/ It is not proper.

Stranger/ Let, therefore, a species of the separating art be cathartic: and let a part of the cathartic species be limited to the soul. But of this let a part be doctrinal; and of the doctrinal let discipline be a part. But of discipline, that confutation which takes place about a vain opinion of wisdom should be called, as it appears from our present discourse, nothing else than that sophistic art which is of a noble race.

Theaetetus/ It should be so called. But I am dubious, what, out of many things which present themselves, it is fit truly and strenuously to call a sophist.

Stranger/ You are very properly dubious. But indeed it is proper to think, that even a sophist himself will now very much doubt, by what means he may escape our arguments. For the proverb rightly says, It is not easy to avoid all things. Now, therefore, let us attack him with all our might.

Theaetetus/ You speak well.

Stranger/ But, in the first place, let us stop as it were to take breath, and reason among ourselves, at the same time mutually resting when we are weary. Let us consider, then, how many forms the sophist assumes. For we appear from our first investigation to have discovered, that he is a mercenary hunter of the youthful and rich.

Theaetetus/ We do so.

Stranger/ But from our second investigation it appears, that he is a certain merchant in the disciplines of the soul.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ And did he not, in the third place, appear to be a huckster about these same things?

Theaetetus/ He did. And did we not, in the fourth place, find him to be one who sells us his own inventions?

Stranger/ You properly remind me. But I will endeavor to remember the fifth particular. For, in the next place, we found him to be one who strives in the agonistic exercise about discourses, and who is defined from the art of contention.

Theaetetus/ We did so.

Stranger/ The sixth form is indeed ambiguous; but at the same time we must admit it, and grant that a sophist is a

purifier of such opinions as are an impediment to disciplines respecting the soul.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Do you therefore perceive, that, when anyone appears to possess a scientific knowledge of many things, and is called by the name of one art, this is not a sound phantasm? It is indeed evident, that he who is thus affected with respect to any art cannot behold that particular thing to which all these disciplines look. Hence he who possesses a multitude of disciplines should be called by many names, instead of one name.

Theaetetus/ This appears to be in the highest degree natural.

Stranger/ Lest, therefore, the same thing should happen to us through indolence in this investigation, let us repeat, in the first place, one of the things which we said respecting the sophist: for one of these appears to me especially to indicate him.

Theaetetus/ Which of them?

Stranger/ We said that he was in a certain respect a contradictor.

Theaetetus/ We did.

Stranger/ And does he not also become a teacher of this to others?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Let us now, therefore, consider, about what it is that sophists say they make others contradictors. But let our consideration from the beginning be as follows. With respect to divine things which are unapparent to the many, do sophists sufficiently impart the power of contradiction?

Theaetetus/ This is indeed asserted of them.

Stranger/ But what with respect to things apparent, such as earth and heaven, and the particulars pertaining to these?

Theaetetus/ What of them?

Stranger/ For, in private conversations, when anything is asserted in general respecting generation and essence, we say that the sophists are skilled in contradicting, and that they are able to render others like themselves.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But what, with respect to laws, and all political concerns, do they not also promise to make men contentious in these?

Theaetetus/ No one, as I may say, would discourse with them unless they promised this.

Stranger/ But writings containing such contradictions as ought to be urged against the professors of the several arts, may everywhere be procured by him who wishes to learn the art of contradiction.

Theaetetus/ You appear to me to allude to the writings of Protagoras respecting wrestling and the other arts.

Stranger/ And to the writings of many others, O blessed man. But is not the art of contradicting, summarily a certain power, sufficient to bring all things into controversy?

Theaetetus/ It appears, therefore, that nearly nothing is omitted.

Stranger/ But by the Gods, O boy, do you think this is possible? For perhaps you young men behold this more acutely, but we more dully.

Theaetetus/ In what respect? and why do you particularly assert this? For I do not understand your present question.

Stranger/ I asked, if it were possible for anyone man to know all things.

Theaetetus/ If it were possible, our race, O guest, would be blessed.

Stranger/ How, therefore, can anyone destitute of science be able, by contradicting, to urge anything sound against him who is endued with science?

Theaetetus/ He cannot in any respect.

Stranger/ What then is it which will be wonderful in the sophistic power?

Theaetetus/ About what?

Stranger/ The manner by which sophists are able to produce an opinion in young men, that they are the wisest of all men in all things? For it is evident that, unless they contradicted rightly, or at least appeared to do so to young men, and, when appearing to do so, unless they were considered to be more wise through their contentions, they would be without employment, and, as you said, no one would give them money to become their disciple.

Theaetetus/ Doubtless no one would.

Stranger/ But now men are willing to do this.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ For I think the sophists appear to have a scientific knowledge of those particulars about which they employ contradiction.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But do they employ contradiction in all things? Shall we say so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ They appear, therefore, to their disciples to be wise in all things.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But yet they are not: for this seems to be impossible.

Theaetetus/ It does.

Stranger/ A sophist, therefore, appears to us to possess doxastic, and not true science, about all things.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so. And what has been now said, respecting sophists, seems to be most rightly said.

Stranger/ Let us, therefore, assume a clearer paradigm respecting them.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ This. But endeavor to attend to what I say, and answer me in the best manner you are able.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind is the paradigm?

Stranger/ Just as if anyone should assert that he neither says anything, nor contradicts, but that he makes and causes all things to be known by one art.

Theaetetus/ What is your meaning in all this?

Stranger/ You are obviously ignorant of the beginning of what is said: for, as it seems, you do not understand the word all.

Theaetetus/ I do not.

Stranger/ I say then that you and I are in the number of all things, and besides us, other animals and trees.

Theaetetus/ How do you say?

Stranger/ If anyone should assert that he would make you and me, and all other living things.

Theaetetus/ Of what making do you speak? For you do not mean a husbandman, because the artificer you mention is a maker of animals.

Stranger/ I do say so. And besides this, he is the maker of the sea, the earth, the heavens, the Gods, and all other things. And as he rapidly makes each of these, so he fills each for a small price.

Theaetetus/ You speak in jest.

Stranger/ What then? May not he also be said to jest, who asserts that he knows all things, and professes himself able to teach another all things, for a small sum of money, and in a short time?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But have you any species of jesting more artificial and agreeable than the imitative?

Theaetetus/ I have not. For you have mentioned a very ample species. which comprehends all things in one, and is nearly most various.

Stranger/ Do we not, therefore, know that he who professes himself able to make all things by one art, in consequence of fabricating imitations and homonyms of things, by the art of painting, is able to deceive stupid young men and boys, by showing them his pictures at a distance, and induce them to believe that he is sufficient to effect whatever he pleases?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But what as to discourses, will it not appear to us that there is another certain art respecting these, by which seducers, as if employing certain incantations, are able to draw young men far away from the truth, by bewitching their ears with their discourses, and exhibiting to them images of everything, instead of realities; so as to cause themselves to appear to speak the truth, and to be the wisest of all men in all things?

Theaetetus/ Why should there not be another certain art of this kind?

Stranger/ Is it not, therefore, necessary, Theætetus, that many of those who then hear these things, after through the course of time they have arrived at the perfection of manhood, and consider the things themselves nigh at hand,

and are compelled through passions clearly to handle realities, will then abandon their former opinions, and be induced to consider those things as small, which once appeared to them to be great, those things difficult which they once considered easy, and thus at length entirely subvert all the phantasms produced by discourse, through the works which take place in actions?

Theaetetus/ It appears so to me, as far as my age is capable of judging. For I am of opinion, that as yet I rank among those who are far distant from the truth.

Stranger/ All we, therefore, who are present will endeavor to assist you. And now we shall endeavor, free from passion, to approach as near as possible to the truth. With respect to a sophist, then, inform me whether this is clear, that he ranks among enchanters, being an imitator of things? or must we yet doubt whether he possesses in reality the sciences of those things respecting which he appears able to contradict?

Theaetetus/ But how can we doubt this, O guest? For it is nearly evident from what has been said that he is one of those who participate parts of erudition.

Stranger/ He must be considered, therefore, as a certain enchanter and mimic.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Come then: for we must now no longer drop our prey; as we have now nearly enclosed the sophist in a certain not of reasoning; so that he cannot hereafter escape from this.

Theaetetus/ From what?

Stranger/ That he is one of those who work miracles.

Theaetetus/ This also is my opinion respecting him.

Stranger/ It seems, therefore, that we should divide with the utmost celerity the image producing art; and that, entering into it, if the sophist evidently waits for us, we should apprehend him conformably to the royal mandate, and, delivering him up, exhibit our prey to the king: but that, if he enters into the parts of the imitative art, we should follow him, always dividing the part which receives him, till we apprehend him. For neither will he, nor any other genus, ever be able to fly from him who can pursue every particular through all things according to method.

Theaetetus/ You speak well. And in this manner, therefore, we must act.

Stranger/ According to the superior mode of division, I now appear to myself to see two species of the imitative art; but in which of these we should place the idea which is the object of our investigation, it does not yet appear, to me possible to know.

Theaetetus/ But first of all inform me by division what these two species are.

Stranger/ I see that one indeed is the assimilative art. But this especially takes place, when anyone according to the commensurations of a paradigm, in length, depth, and breadth, and besides this by the addition of convenient colors, gives birth to a resemblance.

Theaetetus/ What then, do not all those that imitate anything endeavor to do this?

Stranger/ Not such as fashion or paint any great work. For, if they should impart the true symmetry of things beautiful, you know that the upper parts would appear smaller than is fit, and the lower parts greater, in consequence of the former being seen by us at a distance, and the latter nigh at hand.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Do not therefore artists, bidding farewell to truth, neglect real symmetry, and accommodate to images such commensurations as are only apparently beautiful?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Is it not, therefore, just to call the one species, since it is a likeness, an image?

Theaetetus/ Perfectly so.

Stranger/ And is it not just to call the other species assimilative?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ We must, therefore, call the other part of the imitative art, as we said above, assimilative.

Theaetetus/ We must so call it.

Stranger/ But what shall we call that which appears indeed similar to the beautiful, but, when inspected by him who is endued with a power sufficient for the purpose, is found not to resemble that to which it appears to be similar? Must we not call it a phantasm, since it appears to be but is not similar?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Is not this part abundantly to be found in painting, and in the whole of the imitative art?

Theaetetus/ It is impossible it should not.

Stranger/ But may we not with the greatest rectitude call that art which produces a phantasm, and not an image, fantastic?

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ I have already, therefore, said that these were two species of the image-producing art, viz. the assimilative and fantastic.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ But neither am I able now to see clearly, that of which I was then dubious, viz. in which of these species the sophist is to be placed. For this is truly a wonderful man; and it is extremely difficult to discern him; since even now, in a very excellent and elegant manner, he has fled into a species which it is almost impossible to investigate.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Stranger/ Do you then assent to this in consequence of understanding it? or does a certain usual impetus arising from discourse induce you to a rapid coincidence of sentiment?

Theaetetus/ How, and with a view to what, do you say this?

Stranger/ O blessed man, we are truly engaged in a speculation perfectly difficult. For that this thing should appear and seem to be, and yet is not; and that a man should assert certain things, and yet not such as are true, —all these things have always been subjects of the greatest doubt in former times, and are so at present. For it follows, that he who speaks in this manner must either speak falsely, or be of opinion that such things truly are; and thus speaking, Theætetus, it is extremely difficult for him not to contradict himself.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ Because such a mode of speaking dares to admit that non-being is: for otherwise it would not be false, which it is. But the great Parmenides, O boy, while we were yet boys, both from the first and to the end, rejected this mode of speaking. For, both in prose and verse, he everywhere speaks as follows: “Non-beings can never, nor by any means, be. But do thou, when inquiring, restrain thy conceptions from this path.” The truth of this, therefore, is testified by him, and this assertion will the most of all things

become evident, if moderately discussed. Let us, therefore, if it is not disagreeable to you, consider this in the first place.

Theaetetus/ You may do as you please with respect to me. But do you consider what it is best to investigate, and in this path lead me.

Stranger/ It will be proper so to do. Tell me, then: Dare we to pronounce that which in no respect is?

Theaetetus/ How is it possible we should not?

Stranger/ Not for the sake of contention, therefore, nor jesting, but seriously, everyone who hears us ought to join with us in considering the import of this word non-being. But can we think that he who is asked this question would know where to turn himself, or how to show what non-being is?

Theaetetus/ You ask a difficult question, and to me, as I may say, entirely impervious.

Stranger/ This, however, is evident, that non-being cannot be attributed to anything which ranks among beings.

Theaetetus/ For how could it?

Stranger/ Since, therefore, it cannot be attributed to being, neither can anyone rightly attribute it to anything.

Theaetetus/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ This also is evident to us, that this word something is everywhere predicated of a certain being. For it is impossible to speak of it alone, as if it were naked and solitary with respect to all beings.

Theaetetus/ It is impossible.

Stranger/ Thus considering, therefore, must you not agree with me, that he who speaks of something must necessarily speak of one certain thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ For you would say, that the word something is a sign of one thing, and that certain things is a sign of many things.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But it is most necessary, as it appears, that he who speaks of that which is not something must entirely speak of nothing.

Theaetetus/ This is most necessary.

Stranger/ Must it not therefore follow, that neither this is to be granted, that he who speaks of something speaks of that which is not even one thing, or nothing? But neither must we say that he speaks who endeavors to enunciate non-being.

Theaetetus/ The doubts, therefore, in which our discourse is involved should come to an end.

Stranger/ You do not as yet speak of something great. For, O blessed man, the greatest and first of doubts still remains about these things: For it is a doubt which takes place about the principle of non-being.

Theaetetus/ Tell me how, and do not be remiss.

Stranger/ To that which is, something else belonging to beings may happen.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But shall we say, that anything belonging to beings can ever be present to that which is not?

Theaetetus/ How can we?

Stranger/ But do we not rank the whole of number among beings?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly, if we rank anything else among beings.

Stranger/ We should, therefore, neither attempt to attribute the multitude of number, nor the one, to non-being.

Theaetetus/ Reason shows that we cannot with propriety.

Stranger/ How, therefore, can anyone enunciate by the mouth, or altogether comprehend by the dianoëtic power, non-beings, or non-being separate from number?

Theaetetus/ Tell me why not.

Stranger/ When we say nonbeings, do we not endeavor to adjoin the multitude of number?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ And when we say non-being, do we not endeavor to adjoin the one?

Theaetetus/ Most clearly so.

Stranger/ And besides this we say, that it is neither just nor right to endeavor to adapt being to non-being.

Theaetetus/ You speak most truly.

Stranger/ Do you not, therefore, perceive, that non-being can neither be rightly enunciated, nor spoken, nor yet be cogitated, itself by itself, but that it is incomprehensible by thought, ineffable, non-vocal, and irrational?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Did I, therefore, just now speak falsely when I said, that I could produce the greatest doubt respecting it?

Theaetetus/ What then, can we mention any doubt greater than this?

Stranger/ Do you not see, O wonderful youth, from what has been said, that non-being leads him who confutes it into such perplexity, that in the very attempt to confute it he is compelled to contradict himself?

Theaetetus/ How do you say? Speak yet clearer.

Stranger/ There is no occasion to consider anything clearer in me. For, when I adopted the position, that non-being ought to participate neither of the one, nor of many, both a little before, and now, I employed the term the one. For I enunciated non-being. Do you perceive this?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And again, a little before, I said that non-being was non-vocal, ineffable, and irrational. Do you apprehend me?

Theaetetus/ I do. For how is it possible I should not?

Stranger/ When, therefore, I endeavored to adapt being to non-being, did I not assert things contrary to what I had before advanced?

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Stranger/ And in consequence of attributing this to it, did I not speak of it as one thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And besides this, while I called it irrational, ineffable, and non-vocal, did we not make these assertions as pertaining to one thing?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ For we have said, that he who speaks of non-being in a proper manner, ought neither to define it as one, nor many, nor give it any appellation whatever: For it is impossible to denominate it, without at the same time calling it one thing.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ What then will someone say of me? For, both formerly and now, he will find me vanquished in this contention respecting non-being. So that, as I have already said, you must not expect me to speak properly on this subject. But come, let us now consider this affair in you.

Theaetetus/ How do you say?

Stranger/ endeavor in a becoming and generous manner, as being a young man, and with all your might, to assert something about non-being, conformable to right reason, without adding to it either essence, or the one, or the multitude of number.

Theaetetus/ It certainly would be great rashness in me to engage in a contest in which you have been vanquished.

Stranger/ But, if it is agreeable to you, we will dismiss you and me; and till we meet with someone who is able to accomplish this, we will say that a sophist more than any other person conceals himself in an impervious place.

Theaetetus/ Very much so, indeed.

Stranger/ If, therefore, we should say that he possessed a certain fantastic art from this use of words, he Would easily attack us, and turn the discourse to the very contrary of what is asserted. For, while we call him a maker of images, he will immediately ask us what we assert an image to be. Consider therefore, Theætetus, what answer we should give to this question of the sophist.

Theaetetus/ It is evident we should say that images are such things as are seen in water and mirrors, and besides this, such things as are painted and carved, and everything else of this kind.

Stranger/ It seems, Theætetus, that you have never seen a sophist.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ He would appear to you to wink, or to be entirely deprived of eyes.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ He would laugh at you for answering him by appearances in mirrors, and by pictures and carvings, when

you speak to him as being yourself endued with sight; and he will pretend that he knows nothing about mirrors, or water, or even sight itself, but that he alone interrogates you about this one thing.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ That which in all the particulars you have mentioned you think fit to call by one name, pronouncing the word image in all of them, as being one thing. Speak, therefore, and give assistance, and do not yield to the man.

Theaetetus/ But what, O guest, can we say an image is, except that which, being itself something different, approaches to a true similitude to another thing?

Stranger/ When you say an image is something different, do you mean that it is truly different, or do you assert this of something else?

Theaetetus/ It is by no means truly different, but only appears to be so, or is similar.

Stranger/ Do you, therefore, call real being that which is true?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Stranger/ But is not that which is not true contrary to the true?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ When, therefore, you say that which is similar is at the same time not true, you assert that it is not. It has however a being.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ You say that it truly is not.

Theaetetus/ It certainly is not; but it is truly an image.

Stranger/ That, therefore, which we called an image of being, is not truly being, and that which is not truly being, truly is.

Theaetetus/ Non-being appears to possess a certain connection of this kind with being, and that in a very wonderful manner.

Stranger/ How is it possible it should not appear wonderful? You now, therefore, perceive that the many-headed sophist, through this alternation, compels us unwillingly to confess that non-being in a certain respect is.

Theaetetus/ I see it, and very much so.

Stranger/ How, then, shall we define this art, so that we may be confident with ourselves?

Theaetetus/ What is it you are afraid of, that you speak in this manner?

Stranger/ When we said that he was a deceiver about a phantasm, and that his art was a certain deception, whether shall we say that our soul then opined falsely, through his art; or what shall we say?

Theaetetus/ This very thing. For what else can we say?

Stranger/ But is false opinion that which opines things contrary to things which are?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ You say, therefore, that false opinion opines things which are not.

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Stranger/ Whether does it opine that non-beings are not, or that things which have no subsistence whatever, in a certain respect are?

Theaetetus/ If anyone is ever deceived, and in the smallest degree, it is necessary he should opine that non-beings in a certain respect are.

Stranger/ And will he not also opine, that things which entirely are, in no respect are?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And this also falsely?

Theaetetus/ And this too.

Stranger/ And false speech, in my opinion, will think after the same manner, asserting that beings are not, and that non-beings are.

Theaetetus/ For how can it otherwise become false?

Stranger/ Nearly, no otherwise. But the sophist will not say so. For by what possible device can anyone of a sound mind admit the things which have been previously granted, since they are non-vocal, ineffable, irrational, and incomprehensible by the dianoëtic power? Do we understand what the sophist says, Theætetus?

Theaetetus/ How is it possible we should not? For he says that our former assertions are contrary to the present, since we have falsely dared to assert that non-being subsists in opinion and discourse. He likewise adds, that we have often been compelled to adapt being to non-being, though we have just now acknowledged, that this is in a certain respect the most impossible of all things.

Stranger/ You rightly recollect. But we should now consult what we ought to do respecting the sophist. For, if we should attempt to investigate him, by placing him in the art of deceivers and enchanters, you see that many doubts will arise.

Theaetetus/ Many, indeed.

Stranger/ We have, therefore, only discussed a small part of them, since they are, as I may say, innumerable.

Theaetetus/ But if this is the case, it appears to be impossible to apprehend a sophist.

Stranger/ What then, shall we thus effeminately desist from our undertaking?

Theaetetus/ I say we ought not, if there is the least possibility of apprehending this man.

Stranger/ You will, therefore, pardon, and, as you just now said, be satisfied, if we make but a small proficiency in so arduous an affair.

Theaetetus/ How is it possible I should not?

Stranger/ I, therefore, in a still greater degree request this of you.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ That you do not think I am become, as it were, a certain parricide.

Theaetetus/ Why do you request this?

Stranger/ Because it will be necessary for us to examine with our opponents the discourse of our father Parmenides, and. to compel non-being in a certain respect to be, and again being, in a certain respect not to be.

Theaetetus/ It appears that a thing of this kind must be contended for in our discourse.

Stranger/ For how is it possible this should not appear, and, as it is said, even to a blind man? For, while these things are neither confuted, nor assented to, no one can speak either about false assertions, or about opinion, whether respecting resemblances, or images, or imitations, or phantasms, or of the arts conversant with these, without being ridiculous in consequence of being compelled to contradict himself.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ Hence, we must dare to oppose the paternal discourse; or we must entirely dismiss it, if a certain sluggishness restrains us from opposing it.

Theaetetus/ But nothing will in any respect hinder us from opposing it.

Stranger/ I still, therefore, request a third, and a trifling thing of you.

Theaetetus/ Only say what it is.

Stranger/ I just now said that I was always wearied in the confutation of things of this kind, and that I am so at present.

Theaetetus/ You did say so.

Stranger/ I am afraid lest I should appear to you to be insane, in consequence of what I have said, and from immediately transferring myself upwards and downwards. For we shall enter on the confutation of the paternal discourse, for your sake, if we happen to confute it.

Theaetetus/ As you will not, therefore, by any means be considered by me as acting in a disorderly manner by entering on this confutation, and demonstration, on this account engage boldly in this affair.

Stranger/ Come then, whence shall we begin this very dangerous discourse? For it appears, O boy, to be most necessary for us to proceed in the following path.

Theaetetus/ What is that path?

Stranger/ That we should first of all consider those things which now appear to be clear, lest we immediately desist from our undertaking, deterred by its difficulty; and that we should proceed in an easy manner, by mutually assenting to each other, as if we were engaged in a subject which may be easily discussed.

Theaetetus/ Speak more clearly.

Stranger/ Parmenides appears to me to have spoken with ease, and whoever else has attempted to determine the number and quality of beings.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ It seems to me that each of them has related a fable to us, as being boys. One of them, by asserting that the things which have a subsistence are three; but that some of them sometimes oppose each other in a hostile manner; and at other times becoming friends, unite in marriage, bring forth, and administer aliment to their offspring. But another of these says that beings are only two, viz. the moist and the dry, or the hot and the cold; and these he associates with each other. But the Eleatic sect among us, which derives its origin from Zenophanes, and from others still prior to him, by denominating all things one, discusses its doctrines in fables. But the Iades, and certain Sicilian Muses posterior to these, have thought it more safe to connect these with each other, and to say that being is both many and one, but is held together by strife and friendship. For that which is discordant always unites with something else, as the more vehement Muses assert. But the more effeminate Muses always loosen the many from the one; and assert that the universe is alternately one, and in friendship with itself, through Venus; and many, and hostile to itself, through a certain strife. But with respect to all these assertions, whether they are true or false, to oppose such illustrious and ancient men is difficult and rash. This, however, may be asserted without envy.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ That they very much despised us who rank among the multitude. For each of them finishes his own work, without being at all concerned whether we can follow them in what they assert.

Theaetetus/ How do you say?

Stranger/ When anyone of them asserts that the many is, or was, or is generated, or that this is the case with two or one, and that the hot is mingled with the cold, externally

adducing for this purpose separations and concretions, —by the Gods, Theætetus, do you understand what they mean by each of these assertions? Indeed, when I was younger, I was confident that I accurately understood that of which we are now dubious, when anyone spoke of non-being; but now you see in what difficulties we are involved through doubting about it.

Theaetetus/ I do see.

Stranger/ Perhaps, therefore, receiving in no less a degree the same passion in our soul respecting being, we say that it is easy to understand it when it is enunciated by anyone, but that this cannot be asserted of non-beings though we are similarly affected with respect to both.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ And this very same thing has been said by us respecting the other particulars which we mentioned before.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ We will consider, therefore, after this respecting many things, if it is agreeable to you; but let us now first speculate about that which is the greatest and principal thing.

Theaetetus/ Of what are you speaking? Or do you say that we ought in the first place to investigate being, and consider what they assert who are thought to evince something about it?

Stranger/ You clearly apprehend me, Theætetus. For I say that we ought to proceed in the same manner as if those I just now mentioned were present, and to interrogate them as follows: Ye who assert that the hot and the cold, or any two such things, are all things, what is it you affirm to subsist in both these, when you say that both are, and that each is? What are we to understand by this term of yours to be? Is it a third thing different from those two, and are we to

establish three things as constituting the all, and no longer two things, according to your hypothesis? For, while you call either of the two being, you cannot say that both similarly are. For each would nearly be one thing, and not two.

Theaetetus/ You speak the truth.

Stranger/ Are you, therefore, willing to call both of them being?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ But, O friends, we shall say, thus also you will most clearly call two things one.

Theaetetus/ You speak with the utmost rectitude.

Stranger/ Since, therefore, we are thus involved in doubt, will you sufficiently unfold to us what you wish to signify when you pronounce being? For it is evident that you have had a knowledge of these things for some time past: but we, indeed, at first thought we knew them, but now we are dubious. Instruct us, therefore, first of all in this, that we may not think we learn the things asserted by you, when the very contrary to this takes place, By speaking in this manner, and making this request, both to these, and to such others as assert that the all is more than one thing, shall we, O boy, err?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Stranger/ But what with respect to those who assert that the all is one, ought we not to inquire of them, to the utmost of our power, what they call being?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ To this question, therefore, they may answer: Do you say there is one thing alone? We do say so. Or will they not speak in this manner?

Theaetetus/ They will.

Stranger/ What then, do you call being anything?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Do you call it the one, employing two names respecting the same thing? Or how do you say?

Theaetetus/ What answer will they give to these things, O guest?

Stranger/ It is evident, Theætetus, that he who says down this hypothesis will not be able with perfect ease to answer the present question, or any other whatever.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ To acknowledge that there are two names, while establishing nothing but one thing, is ridiculous.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ And this also is ridiculous, to assent in every respect to him who asserts that there is a name to a thing of which no account can be given.

Theaetetus/ In what manner?

Stranger/ He who establishes a name different from a thing, speaks of two certain things.

Theaetetus/ He does.

Stranger/ And besides this, if he asserts that a name is the same with a thing, he is either compelled to say that it is the name of nothing; or, if he says it is the name of something, it must happen that a name is alone the name of a name, but of nothing else.

Theaetetus/ It must so.

Stranger/ And the one must be the one being alone of one, and this must be the one being of a name.

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Stranger/ But what, do they say that which is a whole is different from, one being, or the same with it?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly, they will and do say so.

Stranger/ If, therefore, a whole is, as Parmenides says, “that which is everywhere similar to the bulk of a perfect sphere, entirely possessing equal powers from the middle; for nothing is greater or more stable than this:”—if this be the case, it is necessary that being should have a middle and an extremity. And having these, it must unavoidably have parts. Or how shall we say?

Theaetetus/ Just so.

Stranger/ But, indeed, nothing hinders but that, when it is divided, it should have the passion of the one, in all its parts, and that thus the one should be every being, and a whole.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But is it not impossible that that which suffers these things should be the one?

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ Because, according to right reason, that which is truly one should be said to be entirely without parts.

Theaetetus/ It must indeed necessarily be so.

Stranger/ But such a thing as we have just now mentioned, in consequence of consisting of many parts, would not harmonize with the one.

Theaetetus/ I understand you.

Stranger/ But whether will the whole having the passion of the one, be thus one, and a whole, or must we by no means say that the one is a whole?

Theaetetus/ You propose a difficult choice.

Stranger/ You speak most true. *For, since in a certain respect being is passive to the one*, it does not appear to be the same with the one, and all things will be more than one. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But likewise if being is a non-whole on account of its becoming passive to whole, but yet is whole itself, being in this case will happen to be indigent of itself.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ And being, according to this reasoning, since it is deprived of itself, will be non-being.

Theaetetus/ It will so.

Stranger/ And thus again all things will be more than one, since being and the whole are allotted their proper nature, each separate from the other.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And if the whole has in no respect a subsistence, these same things will take place with respect to being; and besides, being not having a subsistence, neither will it at any time have been generated.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ Whatever is generated is always generated a whole. So that he who does not place in the rank of beings, the one or the whole, ought neither to denominate essence, nor generation, as that which has a being.

Theaetetus/ It appears that this is entirely the case.

Stranger/ Likewise, that which is not a whole ought not to be any quantum whatever. For, being a certain quantum, so far as it is so, it must necessarily be a whole.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ It appears, therefore, that everyone will be involved in ten thousand other insoluble doubts, who says that being is alone either two or one.

Theaetetus/ This is nearly evident by the things which have just now been shown. For greater and more difficult doubts will always follow each other in a connected series, respecting what has been above asserted.

Stranger/ But we have not yet discussed the assertions of those who accurately discourse about being and non-being. At the same time, what we have already said is sufficient. But let us again consider those who speak inaccurately about these, that we may perceive from all things, that it is in no respect more easy to say what being is, than what *non-being* is.

Theaetetus/ It will be, therefore, requisite to consider those.

Stranger/ Indeed, there appears to be among these a certain gigantic war as it were, through the doubts in which they are mutually involved respecting essence.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Some of these draw down all things from heaven and the invisible region to earth, seizing in reality, for this purpose, rocks and oaks. For, in consequence of touching all such things as these, they strenuously contend that that alone has a being which can be seen and handled, and this they define to be body and essence. But if anyone says that there are other things which are without a body, they perfectly despise the assertion, and are unwilling to hear of anything that is not corporeal.

Theaetetus/ You speak of dire men: but I also have frequently met with such.

Stranger/ On the contrary, the opponents of these men very religiously contend supernally from the invisible region, and compel certain intelligible and incorporeal species to be true essence: but by their arguments they break into small pieces the bodies of the others, and that which is denominated by them truth, at the same time calling it flowing generation instead of essence. But between these, Theætetus, an immense contest always subsisted.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Let us now, therefore, receive from each a particular account of the essence established by each.

Theaetetus/ But how can we receive it?

Stranger/ From those that place essence in forms we may easily receive it: for they are more mild. But from those who violently draw all things to body we shall receive it more difficultly. And perhaps it will be nearly impossible to do so. It appears to me, however, that we should act in the following manner with respect to them.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ It will be best, if possible, to make them in reality better: but if this is impossible, we must be content with making them so in our discourse, and suppose them to answer more equitably than at present they would be willing to do. For that which is assented to by better men possesses more authority than that which is assented to by worse men. However, we pay no attention to these things, but explore the truth.

Theaetetus/ Most right.

Stranger/ Order them, therefore, as being made better to answer you, and to unfold the meaning of that which they assert.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Stranger/ Do they, therefore, say, that what they call a mortal animal is anything?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly they do.

Stranger/ And do they not acknowledge that this is an animated body?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ And, admitting this, do they also acknowledge that soul is something?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Do they likewise assert that one soul is just, and another unjust; and that one is wise, and another unwise?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But does not every soul become such through the habit and presence of justice, and the contrary, through the habit and presence of the contraries to these?

Theaetetus/ These things also they will assent to.

Stranger/ But will they say that that is altogether anything, which is able to be present to and absent from anything?

Theaetetus/ They will.

Stranger/ Since, therefore, justice is something, and likewise prudence, and every other virtue, and the contraries to the virtues, together with soul in which these subsist, whether will they say that each of these is visible and tangible, or that all of them are invisible?

Theaetetus/ They will nearly assert that no one of these is visible.

Stranger/ But what? Will they say that anyone of things of this kind has a body?

Theaetetus/ They will not give the same answer to the whole of this question: but soul itself will appear to them to possess a certain body; but with respect to prudence, and the other things about which you just now inquired, they will be restrained by shame from daring strenuously to assert, that they are either nothing, or that all of them are bodies.

Stranger/ The men, Theætetus, are clearly become better. For such of them as are Spartans or natives would not be ashamed to assert this, but would contend that whatever cannot be grasped by the hands is altogether nothing.

Theaetetus/ You nearly speak their conceptions.

Stranger/ Let us, therefore, again ask them. For, if they are willing to grant that even any trifling thing is incorporeal, it is sufficient. For we ask them respecting that which is connate with incorporeal, and at the same time with corporeal natures, what it is they look to, when they say that both of them have a being.

Theaetetus/ Perhaps they would not be able to give an answer, if they should suffer anything of this kind.

Stranger/ Consider whether, in consequence of our proposing this question, they will be willing to admit and acknowledge that being is a thing of this kind.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind? Speak, and perhaps we shall understand.

Stranger/ I say then that whatever possesses any power, whether of doing anything naturally, or of suffering though in the least degree from the vilest thing, and though this takes place but once, —everything of this kind truly is. For I define being to be nothing else than power.

Theaetetus/ But since they cannot at present say anything better than this, they must admit it.

Stranger/ It is well said: for perhaps afterwards both we and they may think differently. Let this then now remain acknowledged by them.

Theaetetus/ Let it remain.

Stranger/ Let us now proceed to the others, the friends of forms. And do you unfold to us their sentiments.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Stranger/ Do you then say that generation is one thing, and essence another, separating them from each other?

Theaetetus/ We do.

Stranger/ And do you admit that by our body we communicate with generation, through sense, but that by our soul we communicate with true essence, through the reasoning power? Do you likewise say, that true essence always subsists similarly according to the same, but that generation subsists differently at different times?

Theaetetus/ We do.

Stranger/ But, O best of men, what do you call the communion which subsists between these two? Is it that which we just now mentioned?

Theaetetus/ What was that?

Stranger/ Passion or action arising from a certain power, from the concurrence of things with each other. Perhaps you, Theætetus, do not know what answer they would give to this question; but perhaps I do, through my familiarity with them.

Theaetetus/ What answer then would they give?

Stranger/ They would not grant us that which was just now said to the earth-born men respecting essence.

Theaetetus/ What was that?

Stranger/ We established this to be a sufficient definition of beings, viz. when a power though the smallest is present to anything, either of acting or suffering.

Theaetetus/ We did.

Stranger/ To this they will say, that a power of acting and suffering is present with generation, but that no power of this kind is adapted to essence.

Theaetetus/ They will, therefore, speak to the purpose.

Stranger/ To this, however, we must say, that we require to hear from them still more clearly, whether they acknowledge that the soul knows, and that essence is known.

Theaetetus/ They certainly say so.

Stranger/ But what? Do you say that to know, or to be known, is action, or passion, or both? Or do you say that action is one thing, and passion another? Or that neither of these participates in no respect of the other? It is evident, indeed, that neither participates of the other. For, if they admitted this, they would contradict what they asserted above.

Theaetetus/ I understand you.

Stranger/ For if to know was to do something, it would necessarily happen that what is known would suffer, or become passive. And thus, according to this reasoning, essence being known by knowledge, would, so far as it is known, be moved, through becoming passive; which we say cannot take place about a thing at rest.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ What then, by Zeus, shall we be easily persuaded that true motion, life, soul, and prudence, are not present to that which is perfectly being, and that it neither lives, nor is wise, but abides immovable, not possessing a venerable and holy intellect?

Theaetetus/ But it would be a dire thing, O guest, to admit this.

Stranger/ Shall we say then that it possesses intellect, but not life?

Theaetetus/ And how?

Stranger/ Or shall we say that both these reside in it, but that it does not possess these in soul?

Theaetetus/ But after what other manner can it possess these?

Stranger/ Shall we then say that it possesses intellect, life, and soul, but that, though animated, it abides perfectly immovable?

Theaetetus/ All these things appear to me to be irrational.

Stranger/ We must therefore grant, that both that which is moved, and motion, are beings.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ It follows therefore, Theætetus, that intellect will never in any respect be present to anything immovable.

Theaetetus/ It does follow.

Stranger/ But, indeed, if we grant that all things are borne along and moved, we shall by such an assertion take away sameness from beings.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Does it appear to you that that which subsists according to the same, and in a similar manner, and about the same, can ever subsist without *permanency*?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Stranger/ But do you perceive that intellect, ever was, or is, without these?

Theaetetus/ In the smallest degree.

Stranger/ But besides this, we should oppose, by every possible argument, him who entirely taking away science, or prudence, or intellect, strenuously endeavors to introduce anything else.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ But it is perfectly necessary, as it appears, that the philosopher, and he who honors these things in the highest degree, should not assent to those who, asserting that there is either one, or many species of things, consider the universe as standing still: nor yet should he by any means hear those who affirm that being is everywhere

moved; but, according to the opinion even of boys, he should call things immovable, and things moved, considered as subsisting together, being, and the all.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ Do we not, then, now appear to have equitably comprehended being in our discourse?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Now therefore, Theætetus, as it appears to me, we are strangely involved in doubt.

Theaetetus/ How so? and why do you assert this?

Stranger/ Do you not perceive, O blessed man, that we are at present in the greatest ignorance respecting being, and yet we have appeared to ourselves to say something about it?

Theaetetus/ I do perceive it; but I do not altogether understand in what respect we have deceived ourselves.

Stranger/ Consider more clearly, whether, in consequence of assenting to these things, anyone may justly interrogate us, in the same manner as we interrogated those who said that the whole of things consisted of the hot and the cold.

Theaetetus/ Remind me what these interrogations were.

Stranger/ By all means: and I will endeavor to do this by asking you the same question as I then asked them, that we may at the same time make some advance in our inquiry.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ Do you not then say, that motion and permanency are contrary to each other?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ And do you not likewise say, that both and each of them similarly are?

Theaetetus/ I do.

Stranger/ Do you, therefore, say, that both and each are moved, when you admit that they are?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Stranger/ But do you signify that they stand still, when you say that both are?

Theaetetus/ But how can I?

Stranger/ You may, therefore, place in your soul being, as a third thing different from these, considering it as comprehending under itself permanency and motion; and looking to the communion of these with essence, you may thus assert that both of them are.

Theaetetus/ We seem to prophesy that being is a certain third thing, when we say that there are motion and permanency.

Stranger/ Being, therefore, is not both motion and permanency, but something different from these.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Stranger/ Hence being, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is moved.

Theaetetus/ It is nearly so.

Stranger/ Where then ought he to turn his thoughts, who wishes to establish in himself any clear conceptions respecting being?

Theaetetus/ Where?

Stranger/ I do not think it is yet easy for him to turn his thoughts anywhere. For, if being is not moved, why does it not stand still? Or how is it possible, if it in no respect stands still, that it should not be moved? But being has now appeared to us without both these. Is this, however, possible?

Theaetetus/ It is the most impossible of all things.

Stranger/ In the next place, therefore, it will be just to call to mind this.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ That being asked respecting the name of non-being, we were involved in the greatest doubt respecting what it ought to be. Do you remember?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Are we, therefore, now involved in less doubt respecting being?

Theaetetus/ If it be possible to say so, O guest, we appear to be involved in greater doubt.

Stranger/ Let this ambiguity then rest here. But since both being and non-being equally participate of doubt, we may now hope, that if one of them shall appear to be more obscure, or more clear, the other likewise will appear to be the same: and again, that if we should not be able to perceive one of them, the other will also be invisible to us. And thus we shall pursue the discourse respecting both of them in the most becoming manner we are able.

Theaetetus/ It is well said.

Stranger/ Let us relate, then, after what manner we denominate this same thing by many names.

Theaetetus/ Adduce for this purpose a certain paradigm.

Stranger/ In speaking of man, we give him various appellations, and attribute to him color, figure, magnitude, virtue, and vice; in all which, and ten thousand other particulars, we not only say that man is, but that he is good, and an infinity of other things: and we act in a similar manner with respect to other particulars; for, considering each as one thing, we again call it many things, and by many names.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Whence, I think, we have given a feast to young men, and to those who study in old-age. For it is easy for everyone immediately to object, that it is impossible for the many to be one, and the one many. Hence, they will exult, not suffering us to say that a man is good, but that good is good, and man, man. For I think, Theætetus, that you have often met with young men who seriously apply themselves to things of this kind, and sometimes with men advanced in years, who, through the poverty of their possessions with respect to wisdom, admire such things as these, and who think themselves all-wise for having discovered this.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ That our discourse, therefore, may extend to all who have ever asserted anything respecting essence, let what we shall now say in the way of interrogation be understood as addressed as well to these as to those others whom we have above mentioned.

Theaetetus/ What is it you are now going to say?

Stranger/ Whether we should neither conjoin essence with motion and permanency, nor anything else with anything else, but, as if things were unmingled, and it were impossible for them to communicate with each other, we should consider them as separate in our discourse? Or whether we should collect, all things into the same, as if they were able to communicate with each other? Or consider this as the case with some things, but not with others? Which of these, Theætetus, shall we say is to be preferred?

Theaetetus/ I indeed have nothing to answer to these things. Why, therefore, do you not, by answering to each particular, consider what follows from each?

Stranger/ You speak well. We will suppose them, therefore, if you please, to say, in the first place, that nothing has any power of communicating with anything, in any

respect. Will it not, therefore, follow, that motion and permanency in no respect participate of essence?

Theaetetus/ They certainly will not.

Stranger/ But what? Will anyone of them be, and at the same time have no communication with essence?

Theaetetus/ It will not.

Stranger/ From consenting to this, all things, as it seems, will become rapidly subverted, as well the doctrine of those who contend that all things are moved, as of those who contend that all things stand still, together with the dogmas of those who assert that such things as subsist according to forms or species subsist similarly according to the same. For all these conjoin being with their doctrines, some asserting that things are truly moved, and others that they truly stand still.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Such, likewise, as at one time unite all things, and at another time separate them, whether dividing from one thing into things infinite, or into things which have finite elements, and composing from these, and whether they consider this as partially, or as always taking place, —in all these cases they will say nothing to the purpose, if there is in no respect a mixture of things.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ Further still, we ourselves shall have discoursed the most ridiculously of all men, who permitting nothing pertaining to the communion of the passion of different, have yet used the appellation the other.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ They are in a certain respect compelled to employ the term to be, about all things, likewise the terms separate, others, and by itself, and ten thousand others,

from which being unable to abstain, and finding it necessary to insert these expressions in their discourses, they do not require any other confutation, but, as it is said, they have an enemy and an adversary at home, vociferating within, and always walk as if carrying about with them the absurd Eurycles.

Theaetetus/ You very much speak of that which is like and true.

Stranger/ But what if we should permit all things to have the power of communicating with each other? This, indeed, I myself am able to dissolve.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ Because motion itself would entirely stand still, and again, permanency itself would be moved, if they were mingled with each other. But this indeed is impossible from the greatest necessity, that motion should stand still, and permanency be moved.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ The third thing, therefore, alone remains.

Theaetetus/ It does.

Stranger/ For one of these things is necessary, either that all things should be mingled together, or nothing; or that some things should be willing to be mingled with each other, and that other things should be unwilling.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ And two of the members of this division cannot be found.

Theaetetus/ They cannot.

Stranger/ Everyone, therefore, who wishes to answer rightly should adopt that which remains of the three.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ But since some things are willing to be mingled, and others not, they will nearly be affected in the same manner as letters. For some of these are incongruous with respect to each other, but others mutually harmonize.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ For vowels being in a particular manner the bond, as it were, of the other letters, pervade through all of them, so that without some one of these it is impossible for any two of the others to accord with each other.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ Does everyone, therefore, know what letters will communicate with each other? or is art requisite in order to accomplish this sufficiently?

Theaetetus/ Art is requisite.

Stranger/ What kind of art?

Theaetetus/ The grammatical.

Stranger/ And is not this the case with respect to sharp and flat sounds? I mean, Is not he who knows by art what sounds are consonant or dissonant; a musician, but he who is ignorant of this not so?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ And in other arts, and the privation of arts, we shall find other such circumstances take place.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Since then we have acknowledged, that the genera of being are mixed with each other, after the same manner, ought not he necessarily to proceed in his discourse scientifically, who is about to show what genera mutually accord, and what do not admit each other? Likewise, whether these genera so hold together through all things as to be capable of being mutually mingled? And again in their

divisions, if there is another cause of division through wholes?

Theaetetus/ How is it possible science should not be requisite for this purpose, and nearly, perhaps, the greatest of all sciences?

Stranger/ What then, again, Theætetus, shall we call this science? Or, by Zeus, have we ignorantly fallen upon the science of the liberal? And do we appear, while investigating a sophist, to have first found a philosopher?

Theaetetus/ How do you say?

Stranger/ Do we not say, that to divide according to genera, and neither to think the same species different, nor a different species the same, is the business of the dialectic science?

Theaetetus/ We do say so.

Stranger/ He, therefore, who is able to do this, sufficiently perceives one idea every way extended through many things, the individuals of which are placed apart from each other, and many ideas different from each other externally comprehended under one, and one idea through many wholes conjoined in one; and lastly, many ideas, every way divided apart from each other. This is to know scientifically, how to distinguish according to genus, in what respect particulars communicate, and how far they do not communicate with each other.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But I think you do not give dialectic to any other than one who philosophizes purely and justly.

Theaetetus/ For how is it possible to give it to any other?

Stranger/ If we seek, indeed, we shall find a philosopher in a place, of this kind, both now and hereafter, though it is also difficult to see this character clearly; but the difficulty

of perceiving a sophist is of a different kind from that with which the perceiving a philosopher is attended.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ The former flying into the darkness of non-being, and by use becoming adapted to it, is with difficulty perceived through the obscurity of the place. Is it not so?

Theaetetus/ So it seems.

Stranger/ But the philosopher through reasoning, being always situated near the idea of being, is by no means easily discerned, on account of the splendor of the region. For the eyes of vulgar souls are unable to support the view of that which is divine.

Theaetetus/ It is likely that these things subsist in this manner, no less than those.

Stranger/ About this particular, therefore, we shall perhaps at another time consider more clearly, if it be permitted us. But, with respect to the sophist, it is evident that we should not dismiss him till we have sufficiently surveyed him.

Theaetetus/ You speak well.

Stranger/ Since then it is acknowledged by us, that some of the genera of being communicate with each other, and that some do not, and that some communicate with a few, and others with many things, and others again are not hindered from communicating through all things with all things; —this being the case, let us, in the next place, following the order of course, speculate not about all species, lest we should be confounded by their multitude, —but, choosing certain of those which are called the greatest, let us, in the first place, consider the qualities of each, and, in the next place, what communion of power they possess with each other, that we may not in any respect be indigent of discourse about being and non-being (though we may not be

able to comprehend them with perfect perspicuity), as far as the condition of the present speculation admits. If, therefore, while we are assimilating non-being, we should say that it is truly non-being, we should be exculpated.

Theaetetus/ It would indeed be proper that we should.

Stranger/ But the greatest of all the genera which we have now mentioned are, being itself, permanency, and motion.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ And we have said that the two latter are unmingled with each other.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ But being is mingled with both: for both after a manner are.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ These things then become three.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Is not, therefore, each of these different from the other two, but the same with itself?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ What then shall we now say respecting sameness and difference? Shall we say that they are two certain genera, different from the other three, but yet always mingled with them from necessity? And thus are we to consider about five, and not three genera only? Or are we ignorant that we have denominated this sameness and difference, as something belonging to the other three?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ But, indeed, motion and permanency are neither different nor same.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ That which we in common call motion and permanency can be neither of these.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ Because motion would be permanent, and permanency be moved. For, with respect to both, the one becoming the other, would compel that other to change into the contrary to its nature, as participating of the contrary.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ But yet both participate of same and different.

Theaetetus/ They do.

Stranger/ We must not, therefore, say that motion is either same or different, nor yet must we assert this of permanency.

Theaetetus/ We must not.

Stranger/ Are, therefore, being and sameness to be considered by us as one certain thing?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ But if being and sameness signify that which is in no respect different, when we again assert of motion and permanency, that both are, we thus denominate both of them the same, as things which have a being.

Theaetetus/ But, indeed, this is impossible.

Stranger/ It is impossible, therefore, that sameness and being should be one thing.

Theaetetus/ Nearly so.

Stranger/ We must place sameness, therefore, as a fourth species, in addition to the former three.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But what? Must we not say that difference is a fifth species? Or is it proper to think that this, and being, are two names belonging to one genus?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ But I think you will grant, that of beings, some always subsist themselves by themselves, but others in relation to other things.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But different is always referred to different. Is it not?

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ But this would not be the case unless being and difference widely differed from each other. But if difference participated of both species, as is the case with being, there would be someone among things different, which would be no longer different with reference to that which is different. But now it happens from necessity. that whatever is different is so from its relation to that which is different.

Theaetetus/ It is as you say.

Stranger/ We must say, then, that the nature of different must be added as a fifth to the species of which we have already spoken.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And we must likewise say that it pervades through all these. For each one of the others is different, not through its own nature, but through participating the idea of difference.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ But we may thus speak respecting each of the five genera.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ In the first place, that motion is entirely different from permanency. Or how shall we say?

Theaetetus/ That it is so.

Stranger/ It is not, therefore, permanency.

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Stranger/ But it is, through participating of being.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ Again, motion is different from sameness.

Theaetetus/ Nearly so.

Stranger/ It is not, therefore, sameness.

Theaetetus/ It is not.

Stranger/ And yet it is same, in consequence of all things participating of sameness.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ It must be confessed, therefore, that motion is both same, and not same, nor must we be indignant that it is so. For, when we say that it is both same, and not same, we do not speak of it in a similar manner; but when we say it is same, we call it so, through the participation of sameness with respect to itself; and when we say it is not same, we call it so through its communion with different, through which, separating it from same, it becomes not same, but different. So that it is again rightly said to be not same.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ If, therefore, motion itself should in any respect participate of permanency, there would be no absurdity in calling it stable.

Theaetetus/ Most right, since we have acknowledged that some of the genera are willing to be mingled with each other, and others not.

Stranger/ And, indeed, we arrived at the demonstration of this prior to what we have evinced at present, by proving that the thing subsists after this manner.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But we may again say that motion is different from different, just as it is different from sameness and permanency.

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Stranger/ It is, therefore, in a certain respect, not different and different, according to this reasoning.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ What then follows? Shall we say it is different from three of the genera, but not from the fourth? acknowledging that the genera are five, about which, and in which, we propose to speculate?

Theaetetus/ And how?

Stranger/ For it is impossible to grant that they are fewer in number than they now appear to be. We may, therefore, safely contend, that motion is different from being.

Theaetetus/ We may, most safely.

Stranger/ It clearly follows, therefore, that motion is truly non-being, and at the same time being, since it participates of being.

Theaetetus/ Most clearly.

Stranger/ Non-being, therefore, is necessarily in motion, and in all the genera. For, in all of them, the nature of different rendering them different from being, makes each to be non-being. Hence, we rightly say that all of them are non-beings; and again, because they participate of Being, that they are, and are beings.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Stranger/ About each of the species, therefore, there is much of being, but there is also non-being infinite in multitude.

Theaetetus/ It appears so.

Stranger/ Must not, therefore, being itself be said to be different from the others?

Theaetetus/ It is necessary.

Stranger/ Being, therefore, is not so many in number as the others; for not being them, it is itself one, but is not other things, which are infinite in number.

Theaetetus/ This is nearly the case.

Stranger/ We ought not, therefore, to be indignant at these things, since the genera have naturally a mutual communion. But if someone does not admit these things, yet, as we have been persuaded by the former assertions. in like manner we ought to be persuaded by these.

Theaetetus/ You speak most justly.

Stranger/ We may also see this.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ When we say non-being, we do not, as it appears, say anything contrary to being, but only that which is different.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ Just as when we say a thing is not great, do we then appear to you to evince by this word that which is small rather than that which is equal?

Theaetetus/ How is it possible we should?

Stranger/ We must not, therefore, admit that the contrary to a thing is signified, when negation is spoken of; but thus much only must be asserted, that the terms not, and neither, signify something of other things, when placed before names, or rather before things, about which the names of the negations afterwards enunciated are distributed.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ This also we may consider by a dianoëtic energy, if it is agreeable to you.

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ The nature of different appears to me to be cut into small parts, in the same manner as science.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ This nature itself is one; but a part of it residing in anything and being individually defined, possesses a private appellation of its own; on which account there are said to be many arts and sciences.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Do not, therefore, the parts of the nature of different, which is itself one thing, suffer this very same thing?

Theaetetus/ Perhaps so. But we must show how this takes place.

Stranger/ Is there any part of different opposite to the beautiful?

Theaetetus/ There is.

Stranger/ Must we say that this part is nameless, or that it has a certain name?

Theaetetus/ That it has a name. For everything which we say is not beautiful, is not different from anything else than the nature of the beautiful.

Stranger/ Come, then, answer me the following question.

Theaetetus/ What question?

Stranger/ When anything is defined as belonging to one particular genus, and is again opposed to a certain essence, does it happen that thus it is not beautiful?

Theaetetus/ It does.

Stranger/ But the opposition of being to being happens, as it seems, to be not beautiful.

Theaetetus/ Most right.

Stranger/ What then? Does it follow from this reasoning that the beautiful belongs more to beings, and the non-beautiful less?

Theaetetus/ It does not.

Stranger/ We must say, therefore, that the non-great and the great similarly are.

Theaetetus/ Similarly.

Stranger/ Hence, too, we must assert of the just and the non-just, that the one in no respect is more than the other.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ And the same must be said of other things, since the nature of different appears to rank among beings. But difference having a subsistence, it is necessary to place the parts of it as no less having subsistence.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ As it appears, therefore, the opposition of a part of the nature of different, and of the parts of being, are no less essence, if it be lawful so to speak, than being itself; nor do they signify that which is contrary to being, but only something different from it.

Theaetetus/ It is most clear.

Stranger/ What then shall we call it?

Theaetetus/ It is evident that non-being, which we have sought after on account of a sophist, is this very thing.

Stranger/ Whether, therefore, as you say, is it no more deficient of essence than the others? And ought we now boldly to say, that non-being possesses its own nature firmly, in the same manner as the great was found to be great, and the beautiful, beautiful, and the non-great to be

non-great, and the non-beautiful, non-beautiful? Shall we in like manner say, that non-being was and is non-being, as one species which must be numbered among many beings? Or must we still, Theætetus, be diffident about this?

Theaetetus/ By no means.

Stranger/ Do you perceive, therefore, how disobedient we have been to the prohibition of Parmenides?

Theaetetus/ In what respect?

Stranger/ We have wandered beyond the limits he appointed us, by thus continuing still further to explore and evince.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ Because he says, "Non-beings never, and by no means are; but do you, while investigating, restrain your conceptions from this path."

Theaetetus/ He does speak in this manner.

Stranger/ But we have not only shown that non-beings are, but we have demonstrated what the form of non-being is. For, having evinced that the nature of different has a subsistence, and that it is divided into small parts, which are mutually distributed through all things, we then dared to say, that the part of it which is opposed to the being of everything, is itself truly non-being.

Theaetetus/ And to me, O guest, we appear to have spoken with the greatest truth.

Stranger/ Let no one, therefore, say, that we, having evinced that non-being is contrary to being, dare to assert that it is For we some time since bade farewell to him who asks whether that which is contrary to anything has a subsistence, and possesses a certain reason, or is entirely irrational. But, with respect to that which we now call non-being, either someone who is not persuaded by our

arguments should confute us, as not having spoken well; or, if he cannot do this, he must also say as we say, that the genera are mingled with each other, and that being and different pervading through all things, and through each other, different participating of being, is through this participation, not being that of which it participates, but something else. But, being different from being, it clearly follows that it is necessarily non-being. And again, being, in consequence of participating of difference, will be different from the other genera: but being different from all of them, it is not anyone of them, nor all the others, nor anything besides itself. So that, without doubt, being is not ten thousand things in ten thousand things: and, in like manner, each and all of the other genera are multifariously distributed, but are not themselves multifarious.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And if anyone does not believe in these contrarieties, he should consider, and assert something better than has been now said. Or if someone, in consequence of finding this to be a difficult speculation, rejoices, drawing the arguments from one side to another, such a one, as our present reasoning asserts, is not engaged in a pursuit which deserves much serious attention. For this neither possesses anything elegant, nor is difficult to discover; but that is difficult, and at the same time beautiful.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ That of which we have spoken above; I mean that, omitting these particulars, we may be able to confute anyone who asserts that different is same, or same different. For, to show that same is different, and different same, that the great is small, and the similar dissimilar, and to rejoice in thus introducing contraries in discourse, is not a true

confutation, but is evidently the province of one who has but a slight apprehension of the thing, and is recently born.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ For, O excellent young man, to endeavor to separate everything from everything, is both inelegant, and the province of one rude and destitute of philosophy.

Theaetetus/ Why so?

Stranger/ To dissolve each thing from all things, is the most perfect abolition of all discourse. For discourse subsists through the conjunction of species with each other.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Consider, therefore, how opportunely we have now contended with men of this kind, and compelled them to permit one thing to be mingled with another.

Theaetetus/ With a view to what?

Stranger/ To this, that discourse may be one certain thing belonging to the genera of being. For, if we are deprived of this, we shall, for the most part, be deprived of philosophy. And further still, it is requisite at present that we should mutually consent to determine what discourse is. But, if it is entirely taken away from us, we can no longer speak about anything. And it will be taken away, if we admit that things are not in any respect mingled with each other.

Theaetetus/ Right. But I do not understand why we should now mutually consent to determine what discourse is.

Stranger/ But, perhaps, you will easily understand by attending to this.

Theaetetus/ To what?

Stranger/ Non-being has appeared to us to be one of the other genera, and to be dispersed through all beings.

Theaetetus/ It has so.

Stranger/ After this, therefore, we should consider whether it is mingled with opinion and discourse.

Theaetetus/ On what account?

Stranger/ Because, if it is not mingled with these, it must necessarily follow that all things are true: but, if it is mingled with these, false opinion and false discourse must be produced. For to opine, or speak of non-beings, is itself falsehood subsisting in the dianoëtic part and discourse.

Theaetetus/ It is so.

Stranger/ But, being falsehood, it is deception.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ And deception subsisting, all things must necessarily be full of resemblances, images, and fantasy.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But we have said that the sophist flies into this place, while he denies that there is any such thing as falsehood. For he asserts that no one can either think or speak of non-being; because it in no respect participates of essence.

Theaetetus/ These things were said by us.

Stranger/ But now it has appeared that non-being participates of being. So that in this respect perhaps he will no longer oppose us. Perhaps however he will say, that of species, some participate of non-being, and others not; and that discourse and opinion rank among those things which do not participate it. So that he will again contend with us, that the image-making; and fantastic art, in which we have said he is concealed, has no subsistence; since opinion and discourse have no communion with non-being. He will likewise assert that falsehood has not any kind of subsistence, since this communion of things is nowhere to be found. Hence we must investigate the nature of discourse,

opinion, and fantasy, that, these becoming apparent, we may perceive their communion with non-being; and, perceiving this, may evince that there is such a thing as falsehood; and, having evinced this, may bind the sophist in it, if he is found to be guilty; or, liberating him, investigate in some other genus.

Theaetetus/ That, O guest, which we said at first about the sophist, appears to be very true—I mean, that he is a genus difficult to apprehend. For he appears to be full of problems; nor can anyone arrive at his retreats, till he has first vanquished the obstacle which he throws in the way. For now we have scarcely overcome the obstacle which he hurled forth, I mean that non-being is not, and he immediately throws in our way another. Hence it is requisite to show that there is falsehood, both in discourse and opinion, and after this perhaps something else, and another thing after that, and so on, as it appears, without end.

Stranger/ He, O Theætetus, who is able to make advances continually, though in a small degree, ought to proceed boldly in this affair. For what will he be able to accomplish in other things, who is without ardor in these? For he who either effects nothing in these, or is repelled backwards, will scarcely (according to the proverb) ever take the city. But now, O good man, since as you say this is accomplished, we shall have captured the greatest wall, and the rest will be easy and trifling.

Theaetetus/ You speak well.

Stranger/ Let us then now, in the first place, as we said, consider discourse and opinion, that we may more clearly show, whether non-being touches upon these, or whether both these are in every respect true, and neither of them at any time false.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ Come then, let us again speculate about nouns, in the same manner as we did about species and letters. For that which is the object of our present investigation appears in a certain respect to have a similar subsistence.

Theaetetus/ What is it you wish to be conceived respecting nouns?

Stranger/ Whether all of them harmonize with each other; or some accord, but others do not.

Theaetetus/ It is evident that some accord, and others do not.

Stranger/ Perhaps your meaning is this, that such nouns as in an orderly succession assert and evince something, mutually accord; but that such as signify nothing by continuity, do not mutually accord.

Theaetetus/ How do you mean? and what is it you say?

Stranger/ What I thought you would both understand and assent to. For there is a two-fold genus of vocal declarations respecting essence.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ One, which is called nouns, and the other verbs.

Theaetetus/ Speak of each.

Stranger/ That which is a declaration in actions, we call a verb.

Theaetetus/ We do.

Stranger/ But a mark or sign of voice imposed on the agents themselves, we call a noun.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ From nouns, therefore, alone, enunciated in continued succession, a sentence is never produced; nor yet again from verbs enunciated without nouns.

Theaetetus/ These things I have not learned.

Stranger/ But it is evident that you just now acknowledged this, when looking to something else. For this is what I wished to say, that when these are enunciated in continued succession, a sentence is not produced.

Theaetetus/ How so?

Stranger/ As, for instance, walks, runs, sleeps, and such other words as signify actions, all which when anyone enunciates in continued succession, he will not by this means produce a sentence.

Theaetetus/ For how can he?

Stranger/ Again, therefore, when anyone says, a lion, a stag, a horse, and such other nouns as signify agents themselves, a sentence will not yet be produced by this continuity. For the things enunciated do not evince action, or a privation of action, or the essence of a thing which is, or which is not, till verbs are mingled with nouns. But when they are harmonized, a sentence is immediately produced, and the first connection of these is nearly the first sentence, though it should be the shortest possible.

Theaetetus/ How is this?

Stranger/ When anyone says, A man learns, would you not say that this is the shortest and first sentence?

Theaetetus/ I should.

Stranger/ For he then evinces something respecting things which actually are, or are rising into being, or have been, or will be. Nor does he denominate only, but he finishes something connecting verbs and nouns. Hence we say that he speaks, and does not alone denominate, and to this connection we give the name of discourse.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ And thus as we said respecting things, that some harmonized with each other, and that others did not, so likewise with respect to the signs of voice, some do not harmonize, but others do, and produce discourse.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Further still, attend to this trifling thing.

Theaetetus/ To what?

Stranger/ That discourse when it takes place must necessarily be a discourse about something: For it is impossible that it can be about nothing.

Theaetetus/ It must.

Stranger/ Ought it not, therefore, to be of some particular kind?

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Let us then give diligent attention.

Theaetetus/ For it is requisite.

Stranger/ I will, therefore, enunciate to you a sentence, in which a thing is conjoined with action, through a noun and a verb: but do you inform me of what it is a sentence.

Theaetetus/ I will, as far as I am able.

Stranger/ Theætetus sits: —is this a long sentence?

Theaetetus/ It is not; but a moderate one.

Stranger/ It is now your business to say what it is about, and of whom it is a sentence.

Theaetetus/ It is evident that it is about me, and of me.

Stranger/ But what again with respect to this?

Theaetetus/ To what?

Stranger/ Theætetus, with whom I now discourse, flies.

Theaetetus/ Respecting this also, no one can say but that it is about me, and of me.

Stranger/ But we said it was necessary that every sentence should be of some particular kind.

Theaetetus/ We did.

Stranger/ But of what kind must each of the sentences just now mentioned be?

Theaetetus/ One must be false, and the other true.

Stranger/ But that which is true asserts things respecting you as they are.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But that which is false asserts things respecting you different from what they are.

Theaetetus/ It does.

Stranger/ It speaks, therefore, of things which are not, as if they were.

Theaetetus/ Nearly so.

Stranger/ And it speaks of things which have a subsistence, but which do not belong to you. For we say, that about everything there are many things which have a subsistence, and many things which have no subsistence.

Theaetetus/ Very much so.

Stranger/ In the first place, therefore, it is most necessary, that the latter sentence which I enunciated respecting you should be one of the shortest, according to the definition we have given of a sentence.

Theaetetus/ This must now be acknowledged by us.

Stranger/ In the next place, it must be confessed that it is a sentence of something.

Theaetetus/ It must.

Stranger/ But if it is not of you, it is not of anything else.

Theaetetus/ For how should it?

Stranger/ But if it is not of anything, it cannot in any respect be a sentence. For we have shown that it belongs to things impossible, that discourse should exist, and yet be a discourse of nothing.

Theaetetus/ Most right.

Stranger/ When, therefore, other things are asserted of you, as if they were the same, and things which are not, as things which are, such a composition of verbs and nouns becomes altogether, as it appears, a really and truly false discourse.

Theaetetus/ Most true.

Stranger/ But what with respect to the dianoëtic energy, opinion, and fantasy, is it not now evident that all these genera, as well the false as the true, are produced in our souls?

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ You will easily understand, if you first of all apprehend what each of them is, and in what they differ from each other.

Theaetetus/ Only inform me.

Stranger/ Are not, therefore, the dianoëtic energy and discourse the same, except that the former is an inward dialogue without voice, of soul with itself?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But the fluxion from the dianoëtic energy through the mouth, proceeding with sound, is called discourse.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ We perceive this also in discourse.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ Affirmation and negation.

Theaetetus/ We do.

Stranger/ When, therefore, this takes place in the soul according to the dianoëtic energy, accompanied with silence, can you call it anything else than opinion?

Theaetetus/ How can I?

Stranger/ But, when again, a certain passion of this kind is present, not according to the dianoëtic energy, but through sense, can it be rightly denominated anything else than fantasy?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Stranger/ Since, then, discourse is both true and false, and it appears that the dianoëtic energy is a dialogue of the soul with itself, but opinion the conclusion of the dianoëtic energy, and fantasy the mixture of sense and opinion with each other, it is necessary, since these are allied to discourse, that some of them should be sometimes true, and sometimes false.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Do you perceive, therefore, that we have found more easily than we expected, that opinion and discourse are sometimes false? For just now we were afraid, lest by investigating this matter we should attempt a work which it is perfectly impossible to accomplish.

Theaetetus/ I do perceive.

Stranger/ Let us not, therefore, despair as to what remains; but, since these things are rendered apparent, let us recall into our memory those divisions according to species which we mentioned before.

Theaetetus/ Of what kind were they?

Stranger/ We divided image-making into two species; the one assimilative, and the other fantastic.

Theaetetus/ We did.

Stranger/ And we said we were dubious in which of these we should place the sophist.

Theaetetus/ These things were said by us.

Stranger/ And while we were doubting about this, we were oppressed with a still darker vertigo, in consequence of that assertion which is dubious to all men, that there can be no such thing as either a resemblance, or an image, because that which is false has never in any respect any subsistence whatever.

Theaetetus/ You speak the truth.

Stranger/ But now since discourse has become apparent, and likewise false opinion, it is possible there may be imitations of things, and that from this disposition the art of deceiving may be produced.

Theaetetus/ It is possible.

Stranger/ And was it not also acknowledged by us above, that the sophist is conversant with these?

Theaetetus/ It was.

Stranger/ Let us, therefore, again endeavor, by always bisecting the proposed genus, to proceed to the right hand part of the section, attending to its communion with the sophist, till, having taken away all his common properties, and leaving the nature peculiar to him, we may be able especially to exhibit this to ourselves, and afterwards to those who are naturally most proximate to the genus of this method.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ Did we not, therefore, begin dividing the effective art, and the art of acquiring?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the art of acquiring presented itself to us in hunting, contests, merchandize, and such-like species.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But now, since the imitative art comprehends the sophist, it is evident that the effective art must first receive a two-fold division. For Imitation is a certain making. We said, indeed, it was the making of images, and not of things themselves. Did we not?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But, in the first place, let there be two parts of the effective art.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ The one is divine, the other human.

Theaetetus/ I do not yet understand you.

Stranger/ If we remember what was said at first we asserted that the whole of the effective art was a power causing things to exist afterwards which were not before.

Theaetetus/ We do remember.

Stranger/ But, with respect to all mortal animals, and plants which are produced in the earth from seeds and roots, together with such inanimate natures as subsist on the earth, whether they are bodies which can be liquefied, or not, can we say that they were afterwards generated, when before they were not, by any other than a certain fabricating God? Or shall we employ the dogma and assertion of many?

Theaetetus/ What is that?

Stranger/ That nature generates these from a certain fortuitous cause, and which operates without thought. Or shall we say that they are produced in conjunction with reason and divine science, originating from Deity itself?

Theaetetus/ I, perhaps, through my age, often change my opinion. However, at present looking to you, and apprehending that you think these things were produced by Divinity, I think so too.

Stranger/ It is well, Theætetus. And if we thought that in some future time you would be of a different opinion, we should now endeavor to make you acknowledge this by the force of reason, in conjunction with necessary persuasion; but since I know your nature to be such, that, without any arguments from us, you would of yourself arrive at that conclusion to which I have drawn you, I shall dismiss the attempt; for it would be superfluous. But I adopt this position, that things which are said to subsist from nature are produced by a divine art: but that the things which are composed from these by men, are produced by human art: and that, according to this position, there are two genera of the effective art, one of which is human, and the other divine.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ But, since there are two genera, bisect each of them.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ Just as the whole of the effective art was then divided according to breadth, so now let it be divided according to length.

Theaetetus/ Let it be so divided.

Stranger/ And thus all its parts will become four; two of which indeed, with reference to us, will be human; and two again, with reference to the Gods, divine.

Theaetetus/ They will.

Stranger/ But with respect to these, as being again divided in a different manner, one part of each division is effective, but the remaining parts may be nearly called representative. And hence, again, the effective art receives a two-fold division.

Theaetetus/ Inform me again how each is to be divided.

Stranger/ With respect to ourselves and other animals, and the things from which they naturally consist, viz. fire and water, and the sisters of these, we know that each of these productions is the offspring of Divinity. Do we not?

Theaetetus/ We do.

Stranger/ After these the images of each, and not the things themselves, follow; and these are produced by a dæmoniacal artifice.

Theaetetus/ What kind of images are these?

Stranger/ Phantasms which occur in sleep, and such as appearing in the day are called spontaneous; as, for instance, shadow, when darkness is generated in fire: but this is two-fold, when domestic and foreign light concurring in one about splendid and smooth bodies, and producing a sensation of seeing contrary to accustomed vision, effect by these means a species.

Theaetetus/ These works, therefore, of divine making are two, viz. the things themselves, and the image which follows each.

Stranger/ But what? Shall we not say that our art, by architecture, makes a house, but by painting, that other thing, the image of the house, which is, as it were, a human dream effected by men awake?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Hence, by giving a two-fold division after this manner to other things, we shall again find two-fold works of our effective action, and we must call the one *auturgic*, or the thing itself effected, but the image, representative.

Theaetetus/ I now understand you better, and I admit these two species of the effective art, with a two-fold division, viz. the divine and human according to one section; and the thing itself effected, and the offspring of certain imitations, according to the other.

Stranger/ Let us, therefore, recollect, that of the image-producing art we said, one kind would be assimilative, and the other fantastic, if it should appear that the false is truly false, and one certain thing belonging to beings.

Theaetetus/ We did say so.

Stranger/ Is it not, therefore, apparent, that we have now indubitably enumerated two species?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ We must, therefore, again give a two-fold distribution to the fantastic species.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ One kind being that which is effected through instruments, but the other being the phantasm of that which exhibits itself as the instrument of the efficient.

Theaetetus/ How do you say?

Stranger/ I think, when anyone employing your figure causes body to appear similar to body, or voice to voice, this is particularly called an imitation belonging to the fantastic species.

Theaetetus/ It is.

Stranger/ Calling this then imitative, we will divide it; but we will dismiss the whole of the other member, as being now weary, and we will permit some other person to collect it into one, and give it a proper denomination.

Theaetetus/ Let the member then you speak of be divided, and let us dismiss the other.

Stranger/ And indeed, Theætetus, it is fit to think that this also is two-fold; but take notice on what account.

Theaetetus/ Say.

Stranger/ Of those who imitate, some knowing that which they imitate do this, but others not knowing it. Though, can

we place any division greater than that of ignorance and knowledge?

Theaetetus/ We cannot.

Stranger/ Will not, therefore, that which we just now Spoke of be an imitation of those that are endued with knowledge? For this man, knowing you, imitates your figure.

Theaetetus/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But what shall we say respecting the figure of justice, and, in short, of the whole of virtue? Do not many, though they are ignorant, think that they know this, and, while they imitate that which seems to them to be the figure of justice, endeavor, both in words and works, to make it appear that it is inherent in them?

Theaetetus/ Very many, indeed.

Stranger/ Are they not, therefore, disappointed in their expectations of appearing to be just, as they are not so in any respect? Or does the very contrary to this take place?

Theaetetus/ The very contrary takes place.

Stranger/ I think then we must say that this imitator is different from the other, he who is ignorant from him who knows.

Theaetetus/ We must.

Stranger/ Whence, then, can anyone derive a name adapted to each? Or is it evident that it is difficult? Because a certain ancient cause of the division of genera into species was unknown to our ancestors, so that none of them attempted to divide; and on this account they were necessarily very much in want of names. But at the same time, though it may be a bolder assertion, for the sake of distinction, we shall call the imitation which subsists with opinion *doxomimetic*; but that which subsists in conjunction with science, a certain historic imitation.

Theaetetus/ Be it so.

Stranger/ The other of these appellations, therefore, must be used: for a sophist was not found to be among the scientific, but among imitators.

Theaetetus/ And very much so.

Stranger/ Let us then consider this *doxastic imitator*, or one who imitates from opinion, as if he were iron, and see whether he is sound, or whether he contains in himself something two-fold.

Theaetetus/ Let us consider.

Stranger/ He is, therefore, very copious. For, of sophists, one is foolish, thinking that he knows the things which he opines: but the figure of another, through his rolling like a cylinder in discourse, is replete with abundance of suspicion and fear, that he is ignorant of those things which he feigns himself to know before others.

Theaetetus/ There are both these kinds of sophists, as you have said.

Stranger/ May we not, therefore, place one of these as a simple, and the other as an ironical imitator?

Theaetetus/ It is proper so to do.

Stranger/ And again, shall we say that the genus of this is one or two?

Theaetetus/ Do you see whether it is or not.

Stranger/ I consider; and two imitators appear to me: one employing irony among the multitude publicly, and in prolix discourses; and the other compelling the person who converses with him to contradict himself, and this privately, and by short discourses.

Theaetetus/ You speak most rightly.

Stranger/ What then did we evince the imitator to be who employs prolix discourses? Did we evince him to be a politician, or a popular speaker?

Theaetetus/ A popular speaker.

Stranger/ But what did we call the other, —a wise man, or sophistic?

Theaetetus/ To call him a wise man is impossible, since we have placed him as one who is ignorant; but as he is an imitator of a wise man, he must evidently receive a similar appellation. And I now nearly understand that this character ought truly to be called one who is in every respect a real sophist.

Stranger/ Shall we not, therefore, bind together his name, as we did before, connecting everything from the end to the beginning?

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ He, therefore, who compels those that converse with him to contradict themselves, who is a part of the ironic genus, and a doxastic imitator, who likewise belongs to the fantastic genus, which proceeds from the representative art, who is to be defined to be not a divine but a human production, and who by the artifice of his discourses belongs to the wonder-working division; he who says that a real sophist is of this stock and consanguinity will, as it appears, speak most truly.

Theaetetus/ Entirely so.

THE END OF THE SOPHISTA.

Sophist

Translated by Nicholas P. White.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Visitor, Theodorus, Theaetetus

Theodorus/ We've come at the proper time by yesterday's agreement, Socrates. We're also bringing this man who's visiting us. He's from Elea and he's a member of the group who gather around Parmenides and Zeno. And he's very much a philosopher.

Socrates/ Are you bringing a visitor, Theodorus? Or are you bringing a god without realizing it instead, like the ones Homer mentions? He says gods accompany people who are respectful and just. He also says the god of visitors—who's at least as much a god as any other—is a companion who keeps an eye on people's actions, both the criminal and the lawful ones. So your visitor might be a greater power following along with you, a sort of god of refutation to keep watch on us and show how bad we are at speaking—and to refute us.

Theodorus/ That's not our visitor's style, Socrates. He's more moderate than the enthusiasts for debating are. And he doesn't seem to me to be a god at all. He is divine—but then I call all philosophers that.

Socrates/ And that's the right thing for you to do, my friend. But probably it's no easier, I imagine, to distinguish that kind of person than it is to distinguish gods. Certainly the genuine philosophers who "haunt our cities"—by contrast to the fake ones—take on all sorts of different appearances just because of other people's ignorance. As philosophers look down from above at the lives of those below them, some people think they're worthless and others think they're worth everything in the world. Sometimes they take on the

appearance of statesmen, and sometimes of sophists. Sometimes, too, they might give the impression that they're completely insane. But if it's all right with our visitor I'd be glad to have him tell us what the people where he comes from used to apply the following names to, and what they thought about these things?

Theodorus/ What things?

Socrates/ Sophist, statesman, and philosopher.

Theodorus/ What, or what kind of thing, especially makes you consider asking that question? What special problem about them do you have in mind?

Socrates/ This: did they think that sophists, statesmen, and philosophers make up one kind of thing or two? Or did they divide them up into three kinds corresponding to the three names and attach one name to each of them?

Theodorus/ I don't think it would offend him to tell us about it. Or would it, sir?

Stranger/ No, Theodorus, it wouldn't offend me. I don't have any objection. And the answer is easy: they think there are three kinds. Distinguishing clearly what each of them is, though, isn't a small or easy job.

Theodorus/ Luckily, Socrates, you've gotten hold of words that are very much like the ones we happened to be asking him about. And he made the same excuse to us that he made to you just now—since he's heard a lot about the issue, after all, and hasn't forgotten it.

Socrates/ In that case, sir, don't refuse our very first request. Tell us this. When you want to explain something to somebody, do you usually prefer to explain it by yourself in a long speech, or to do it with questions? That's the way Parmenides did it one time, when he was very old and I was young. He used questions to generate a very fine discussion.

Stranger/ It's easier to do it the second way, Socrates, if you're talking with someone who's easy to handle and isn't a trouble-maker. Otherwise it's easier to do it alone.

Socrates/ You can pick anyone here you want. They'll all answer you politely. But if you take my advice you'll choose one of the young ones—Theaetetus here or for that matter any of the others you prefer.

Stranger/ As long as I'm here with you for the first time, Socrates, I'd be embarrassed not to make our meeting a conversational give-and-take, but instead to stretch things out and give a long continuous speech by myself or even to someone else, as if I were delivering an oration. A person wouldn't expect the issue you just mentioned to be as small as your question suggests. In fact it needs a very long discussion. On the other hand, it certainly seems rude and uncivilized for a visitor not to oblige you and these people here, especially when you've spoken the way you have. So I'll accept Theaetetus as the person to talk with, on the basis of your urging, and because I've talked with him myself before.

Theaetetus/ Then please do that, sir, and you'll be doing us all a favor, just as Socrates said.

Stranger/ We probably don't need to say anything more about that, then, Theaetetus. From now on you're the one I should have the rest of our talk with. But if you're annoyed at how long the job takes, you should blame your friends here instead of me.

Theaetetus/ I don't think I'll give out now, but if anything like that does happen we'll have to use this other Socrates over here as a substitute. He's Socrates' namesake, but he's my age and exercises with me and he's used to sharing lots of tasks with me.

Stranger/ Good. As the talk goes along you'll think about that on your own. But with me I think you need to begin the

investigation from the sophist—by searching for him and giving a clear account of what he is. Now in this case you and I only have the name in common, and maybe we've each used it for a different thing. In every case, though, we always need to be in agreement about the thing itself by means of a verbal explanation, rather than doing without any such explanation and merely agreeing about the name. But it isn't the easiest thing in the world to grasp the tribe we're planning to search for—I mean, the sophist—or say what it is. But if an important issue needs to be worked out well, then as everyone has long thought, you need to practice on unimportant, easier issues first. So that's my advice to us now, Theaetetus: since we think it's hard to hunt down and deal with the kind, sophist, we ought to practice our method of hunting on something easier first—unless you can tell us about another way that's somehow more promising.

Theaetetus/ I can't.

Stranger/ Do you want us to focus on something trivial and try to use it as a model for the more important issue?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ What might we propose that's unimportant and easy to understand, but can have an account given of it just as much as more important things can? For example, an angler: isn't that recognizable to everybody, but not worth being too serious about?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ That, I expect, will provide an appropriate method of hunting and way of talking for what we want.

Theaetetus/ That would be fine.

Stranger/ Well then, let's go after the angler from this starting point. Tell me, shall we take him to be an expert at something, or a nonexpert with another sort of capacity?

Theaetetus/ He's definitely not a nonexpert.

Stranger/ But expertise as a whole falls pretty much into two types.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ There's farming, or any sort of caring for any mortal body; and there's also caring for things that are put together or fabricated, which we call equipment; and there's imitation. The right thing would be to call all those things by a single name.

Theaetetus/ How? What name?

Stranger/ When you bring anything into being that wasn't in being before, we say you're a producer and that the thing you've brought into being is produced.

Theaetetus/ That's right.

Stranger/ And all the things we went through just now have their own capacity for that.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let's put them under the heading of production.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ Next, consider the whole type that has to do with learning, recognition, commerce, combat, and hunting. None of these creates anything. They take things that are or have come into being, and they take possession of some of them with words and actions, and they keep other things from being taken possession of. For that reason it would be appropriate to call all the parts of this type acquisition.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that would be appropriate.

Stranger/ If every expertise falls under acquisition or production, Theaetetus, which one shall we put angling in?

Theaetetus/ Acquisition, obviously.

Stranger/ Aren't there two types of expertise in acquisition? Is one type mutually willing exchange, through gifts and wages and purchase? And would the other type, which brings

things into one's possession by actions or words, be expertise in taking possession?

Theaetetus/ It seems so, anyway, given what we've said.

Stranger/ Well then, shouldn't we cut possession-taking in two?

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ The part that's done openly we label combat, and the part that's secret we call hunting.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And furthermore it would be unreasonable not to cut hunting in two.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ We divide it into the hunting of living things and the hunting of lifeless things.

Theaetetus/ Yes, if there are both kinds.

Stranger/ How could there not be? But we should let the part involving lifeless things go. It doesn't have a name, except for some kinds of diving and other trivial things like that. The other part—namely the hunting of living animals—we should call animal-hunting.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ And isn't it right to say that animal-hunting has two types? One is land-hunting, the hunting of things with feet, which is divided into many types with many names. The other is aquatic hunting, which hunts animals that swim.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And things that swim, we see, fall into things with wings and things living underwater.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And all hunting of things that have wings, I suppose, is called bird-catching.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And all hunting of underwater things is fishing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well then, this kind of hunting might be divided into two main parts.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One of them does its hunting with stationary nets and the other one does it by striking.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? How are you dividing them?

Stranger/ The first one is whatever involves surrounding something and enclosing it to prevent it from escaping, so it's reasonable to call it enclosure.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Shouldn't baskets, nets, slipknots, creels, and so forth be called enclosures?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So we'll call this part of hunting enclosure-hunting or something like that.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But the kind that's done by striking with hooks or three-pronged spears is different, and we should call it by one word, strike-hunting. Or what term would be better?

Theaetetus/ Let's not worry about the name. That one will do.

Stranger/ Then there's a part of striking that's done at night by firelight, and as it happens is called torch-hunting by the people who do it.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But the whole daytime part is called hooking, since even the three-pronged spears have hooks on their points.

Theaetetus/ Yes, that's what it's called.

Stranger/ Then one part of the hooking part of striking is done by striking downward from above. And since you usually use a three-pronged spear that way, I think it's called spearing.

Theaetetus/ Some people do call it that.

Stranger/ And I suppose there's only one type left.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ It's the type of striking contrary to the previous one. It's done with a hook, not to just any part of the fish's body but always to the prey's head and mouth, and pulls it upward from below with rods or reeds. What are we going to say its name should be, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ I think we've now found what we said we aimed to find.

Stranger/ So now we're in agreement about the angler's expertise, not just as to its name; in addition we've also sufficiently grasped a verbal explanation concerning the thing itself. Within expertise as a whole one half was acquisitive; half of the acquisitive was taking possession; half of possession-taking was hunting; half of hunting was animal-hunting; half of animal-hunting was aquatic hunting; all of the lower portion of aquatic hunting was fishing; half of fishing was hunting by striking; and half of striking was hooking. And the part of hooking that involves a blow drawing a thing upward from underneath is called by a name that's derived by its similarity to the action itself, that is, it's called draw-fishing or angling—which is what we're searching for.

Theaetetus/ We've got a completely adequate demonstration of that, anyway.

Stranger/ Well then, let's use that model to try and find the sophist, and see what he is.

Theaetetus/ Fine.

Stranger/ The first question, then, was whether we should suppose the angler is a nonexpert, or that he's an expert at something?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well, shall we suppose the sophist is a layman, or completely and truly an expert?

Theaetetus/ He's not a layman at all. I understand what you're saying: he has to be the kind of person that the name sophist indicates.

Stranger/ So it seems we need to take him to have a kind of expertise.

Theaetetus/ But what is it?

Stranger/ For heaven's sake, don't we recognize that the one man belongs to the same kind as the other?

Theaetetus/ Which men?

Stranger/ The angler and the sophist.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ To me they both clearly appear to be hunters.

Theaetetus/ We said which kind of hunting the angler does. What kind does the sophist do?

Stranger/ We divided all hunting into two parts, one for land animals and one for swimming animals.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ We went through one part, about the animals that swim underwater. But we left the land part undivided, though we noted that it contains many types.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Up till that point the sophist and the angler go the same way, beginning from expertise in acquisition.

Theaetetus/ They seem to, anyway.

Stranger/ Starting from animal hunting, though, they turn away from each other. One goes to ponds, rivers, and the sea, and hunts for the animals there.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ The other one goes to the land and to different kinds of rivers, which are like plentiful meadows of wealthy youths, to take possession of the things living there.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ There are two main kinds of things to hunt on land.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ Tame things and wild ones.

Theaetetus/ Is there any such thing as hunting tame animals?

Stranger/ There is if human beings are tame animals, at any rate. Make whichever assumption you like: either there are no tame animals, or there are tame animals but humans are wild, or else, you'll say, humans are tame but aren't hunted. Specify whichever you prefer to say.

Theaetetus/ I think we're tame animals and I'll say that humans are in fact hunted.

Stranger/ Then let's say that the hunting of tame animals falls into two parts.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ Let's take piracy, enslavement, tyranny, along with everything that has to do with war, and let's define them all together as hunting by force.

Theaetetus/ Fine.

Stranger/ And we'll also take legal oratory, political oratory, and conversation all together in one whole, and call them all one single sort of expertise, expertise in persuasion.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ Let's say that there are two kinds of persuasion.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One is done privately, and the other is done in public.

Theaetetus/ Yes, each of those is one type.

Stranger/ And doesn't one part of private hunting earn wages, while the other part gives gifts?

Theaetetus/ I don't understand.

Stranger/ It seems you aren't paying attention to the way lovers hunt.

Theaetetus/ In what connection?

Stranger/ The fact that when they hunt people they give presents to them too.

Theaetetus/ Very true.

Stranger/ Let's call this type expertise in love.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ One part of the wage-earning type approaches people by being agreeable, uses only pleasure as its bait, and earns only its own room and board. I think we'd all call it flattery, or expertise in pleasing people.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But doesn't the kind of wage-earning that actually earns money, though it claims to deal with people for the sake of virtue, deserve to be called by a different name?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ What name? Try and tell me.

Theaetetus/ It's obvious. I think we've found the sophist. I think that's the name that would be suitable for him.

Stranger/ So according to our account now, Theaetetus, it seems that this sort of expertise belongs to appropriation, taking possession, hunting, animal-hunting, hunting on land, human hunting, hunting by persuasion, hunting privately, and money-earning. It's the hunting of rich, prominent young men. And according to the way our account has turned out, it's what should be called the expertise of the sophist.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Still, let's look at it this way too, since what we're looking for isn't a trivial sort of expertise but quite a diverse one. And even in what we've just said earlier it actually presents the appearance of being not what we're now saying, but a different type.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ Expertise in acquisition had two parts, hunting and exchanging.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And let's say there are two types of exchanging, giving and selling.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ And we're also going to say that selling divides in two.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ One part is the sale of things that the seller himself makes. The other is purveying, that is, the purveying of things other people make.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then what? Isn't the part of purveying that's done within the city—about half of it—called retailing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And isn't wholesaling the part that buys and sells things for exchange between one city and another?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And can't we see that one part of wholesaling sells things for the nourishment and use of the body in exchange for cash, and the other sells things for the soul?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by that?

Stranger/ Maybe we don't understand the one for the soul—since certainly we understand the other kind.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let's consider every kind of music that's carried from one city to another and bought here and sold there, as well as painting and shows and other things for the soul. Some of them are transported and sold for amusement and others for serious purposes. We can use the word wholesaler for the transporter and seller of these things just as well as for someone who sells food and beverages.

Theaetetus/ That's absolutely true.

Stranger/ Wouldn't you use the same name for somebody who bought and exchanged items of knowledge for money from city to city?

Theaetetus/ Definitely.

Stranger/ Wouldn't the right thing to say be that the art of display is one part of that soul-wholesaling? And don't we have to call the other part of it, the part that consists in selling knowledge, by a name that's similar and also equally ridiculous?

Theaetetus/ Definitely.

Stranger/ And one name should be used for the part of this knowledge-selling that deals with knowledge of virtue, and another name for the part that deals with knowledge of other things?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ "Expertise-selling" would fit the second one. You try and tell me the name of the first one.

Theaetetus/ What other name could you mention that would fit, except for the kind, sophist, which we're looking for right now?

Stranger/ I couldn't mention any other one. Come on now and let's collect it all together. We'll say that the expertise of the part of acquisition, exchange, selling, wholesaling, and soul-wholesaling, dealing in words and learning that have to do with virtue—that's sophistry in its second appearance.

Theaetetus/ Definitely.

Stranger/ In the third place I think you'd call somebody just the same thing if he settled here in the city and undertook to make his living selling those same things, both ones that he'd bought and ones that he'd made himself.

Theaetetus/ Yes, I would.

Stranger/ So apparently you'll still say that sophistry falls under acquisition, exchange, and selling, either by retailing things that others make or by selling things that he makes himself. It's the retail sale of any learning that has to do with the sorts of things we mentioned.

Theaetetus/ It has to be, since we need to stay consistent with what we said before.

Stranger/ Now let's see whether the type we're chasing is something like the following.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ Combat was one part of acquisition.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And it makes sense to divide it in two.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ We'll take one part to be competition and the other part to be fighting.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And it would be fitting and proper to give a name like violence to the part of fighting in which one body fights against another.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And as for the part that pits words against words, what else would you call it other than controversy?

Theaetetus/ Nothing else.

Stranger/ But we have to have two types of controversy.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ So far as it involves one long public speech directed against another and deals with justice and injustice, it's forensic.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But if it goes on in private discussions and is chopped up into questions and answers, don't we usually call it disputation?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ One part of disputation involves controversy about contracts and isn't carried on in any systematic or expert way. We should take that to be a type of disputation, since we can express what makes it different. But it hasn't been given a name before and it doesn't deserve to get one from us.

Theaetetus/ That's true. Its subtypes are too small and varied.

Stranger/ But what about disputation that's done expertly and involves controversy about general issues, including what's just and what's unjust? Don't we normally call that debating?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Part of debating, it turns out, wastes money and the other part makes money.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Let's try and say what each of them ought to be called.

Theaetetus/ We have to.

Stranger/ I think one type of debating is a result of the pleasure a person gets from the activity, and involves neglecting his own livelihood. But its style is unpleasant to most people who hear it, and in my view it's right to call it chatter.

Theaetetus/ That's pretty much what people do call it.

Stranger/ You take a turn now. Say what its contrary is, which makes money from debates between individuals.

Theaetetus/ How could anyone go wrong in saying that the amazing sophist we've been after has turned up once again for the fourth time.

Stranger/ It seems his type is precisely the money-making branch of expertise in debating, disputation, controversy, fighting, combat, and acquisition. According to what our account shows us now, that's the sophist.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ So you see how true it is that the beast is complex and can't be caught with one hand, as they say.

Theaetetus/ It does take both hands.

Stranger/ Yes, and you need all your capacity to follow his tracks in what's to come. Tell me: don't we call some things by names that house-servants use?

Theaetetus/ A lot of things. But what are you asking about?

Stranger/ For example things like filtering, straining, winnowing.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And also we know about carding, spinning, weaving, and a million other things like that which are involved in experts' crafts. Is that right?

Theaetetus/ What general point are you trying to make with these examples?

Stranger/ All the things I've mentioned are kinds of dividing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Since there's a single kind of expertise involved in all of them, then according to what I've said we'll expect it to have a single name.

Theaetetus/ What shall we call it?

Stranger/ Discrimination.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ Think about whether we can see two types in it.

Theaetetus/ You're asking me to do some quick thinking.

Stranger/ In fact in what we've called discriminations one kind separates what's worse from what's better and the other separates like from like.

Theaetetus/ That's obvious—now that you've said it.

Stranger/ I don't have an ordinary name for one of them, but I do have a name for the kind of discrimination that leaves what's better and throws away what's worse.

Theaetetus/ What? Tell me.

Stranger/ I think everyone says that that kind of discrimination is cleansing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Won't everyone see that cleansing has two types?

Theaetetus/ Yes, maybe, if they had time, but I don't see now.

Stranger/ Many kinds of cleansing that have to do with the body can appropriately be included under a simple name.

Theaetetus/ Which ones? What name?

Stranger/ There's the cleansing of the inside part of living bodies, which is done by gymnastics and medicine. And there's the cleansing of the insignificant outside part that's done by bathing. And also there's the cleansing of nonliving bodies, which fulling and all kinds of furbishing take care of and which have lots of specialized and ridiculous-seeming names.

Theaetetus/ Very ridiculous.

Stranger/ Of course, Theaetetus. But our method of dealing with words doesn't care one way or the other whether cleansing by sponging or by taking medicine does a lot of good or only a little. The method aims at acquiring intelligence, so it tries to understand how all kinds of expertise belong to the same kind or not. And so for that it values them all equally without thinking that some of them are more ridiculous than others, as far as their similarity is concerned. And it doesn't consider a person more impressive because he exemplifies hunting by military expertise rather than by picking lice. Instead it usually considers him more vapid. Moreover you just asked about what name we call all the capacities that are assigned to living or nonliving bodies. As far as that's concerned, it doesn't matter to our method which name would seem to be the most appropriate, just so long as it keeps the cleansing of the soul separate from the cleansing of everything else. For the time being, the method has only tried to distinguish the cleansing that concerns thinking from the other kinds—if, that is, we understand what its aim is.

Theaetetus/ I do understand, and I agree that there are two types of cleansing, one dealing with the soul and a separate one dealing with the body.

Stranger/ Fine. Next listen and try to cut the one we've mentioned in two.

Theaetetus/ I'll try to follow your lead and cut it however you say.

Stranger/ Do we say that wickedness in the soul is something different from virtue?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And to cleanse something was to leave what's good and throw out whatever's inferior.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So insofar as we can find some way to remove what's bad in the soul, it will be suitable to call it cleansing.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ We have to say that there are two kinds of badness that affect the soul.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One is like bodily sickness, and the other is like ugliness.

Theaetetus/ I don't understand.

Stranger/ Presumably you regard sickness and discord as the same thing, don't you?

Theaetetus/ I don't know what I should say to that.

Stranger/ Do you think that discord is just dissension among things that are naturally of the same kind, and arises out of some kind of corruption?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And ugliness is precisely a consistently unattractive sort of disproportion?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well then, don't we see that there's dissension in the souls of people in poor condition, between beliefs and desires, anger and pleasures, reason and pains, and all of those things with each other?

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ But all of them do have to be akin to each other.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ So we'd be right if we said that wickedness is discord and sickness of the soul.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely right.

Stranger/ Well then, suppose something that's in motion aims at a target and tries to hit it, but on every try passes by it and misses. Are we going to say that it does this because it's properly proportioned or because it's out of proportion?

Theaetetus/ Out of proportion, obviously.

Stranger/ But we know that no soul is willingly ignorant of anything.

Theaetetus/ Definitely.

Stranger/ But ignorance occurs precisely when a soul tries for the truth, but swerves aside from understanding and so is beside itself.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ So we have to take it that an ignorant soul is ugly and out of proportion.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Stranger/ Then there are, it appears, these two kinds of badness in the soul. Most people call one of them wickedness, but it's obviously a disease of the soul.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ They call the other one ignorance, but if it occurs only in a person's soul they aren't willing to agree that it's a form of badness.

Theaetetus/ One thing absolutely must be granted—the point I was in doubt about when you made it just now—that there are two kinds of deficiency in the soul. We need to say that cowardice, licentiousness, and injustice are a disease in us, and that to be extremely ignorant of all sorts of things is a kind of ugliness.

Stranger/ In the case of the body, weren't there two kinds of expertise dealing with those two conditions?

Theaetetus/ What were they?

Stranger/ Gymnastics for ugliness and medicine for sickness.

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Stranger/ And isn't correction the most appropriate of all kinds of expertise for treating insolence, injustice, and cowardice?

Theaetetus/ So it seems, to judge by what people think.

Stranger/ Well then, for all kinds of ignorance wouldn't teaching be the right treatment to mention?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Now should we say that there's only one kind of expertise in teaching or more than one, with two of them being the most important ones? Think about it.

Theaetetus/ I am.

Stranger/ I think we'll find it quickest this way.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ By seeing whether ignorance has a cut down the middle of it. If it has two parts, that will force teaching to have two parts too, one for each of the parts of ignorance.

Theaetetus/ Well, do you see what we're looking for?

Stranger/ I think I see a large, difficult type of ignorance marked off from the others and overshadowing all of them.

Theaetetus/ What's it like?

Stranger/ Not knowing, but thinking that you know. That's what probably causes all the mistakes we make when we think.

Theaetetus/ That's true.

Stranger/ And furthermore it's the only kind of ignorance that's called lack of learning.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Well then, what should we call the part of teaching that gets rid of it?

Theaetetus/ The other part consists in the teaching of crafts, I think, but here in Athens we call this one education.

Stranger/ And just about all other Greeks do too, Theaetetus. But we still have to think about whether education is indivisible or has divisions that are worth mentioning.

Theaetetus/ We do have to think about that.

Stranger/ I think it can be cut somehow.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ One part of the kind of teaching that's done in words is a rough road, and the other part is smoother.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean by these two parts?

Stranger/ One of them is our forefathers' time-honored method of scolding or gently encouraging. They used to employ it especially on their sons, and many still use it on them nowadays when they do something wrong. Admonition would be the right thing to call all of this.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ As for the other part, some people seem to have an argument to give to themselves that lack of learning is always involuntary, and that if someone thinks he's wise, he'll never be willing to learn anything about what he thinks he's clever at. These people think that though admonition is a lot of work, it doesn't do much good.

Theaetetus/ They're right about that.

Stranger/ So they set out to get rid of the belief in one's own wisdom in another way.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ They cross-examine someone when he thinks he's saying something though he's saying nothing. Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these people will easily scrutinize them. They collect his opinions together during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict with each other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things and in the same respects. The people who are being examined see this, get angry at themselves, and become calmer toward others. They lose their inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter to hear or has a more lasting effect on them. Doctors who work on the body think it can't benefit from any food that's offered to it until what's interfering with it from inside is removed. The people who cleanse the soul, my young friend, likewise think the soul, too, won't get any advantage from any learning that's offered to it until someone shames it by refuting it, removes the opinions that interfere with learning, and exhibits it cleansed, believing that it knows only those things that it does know, and nothing more.

Theaetetus/ That's the best and most healthy-minded way to be.

Stranger/ For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we have to say that refutation is the principal and most important kind of

cleansing. Conversely we have to think that even the king of Persia, if he remains unrefuted, is uncleansed in the most important respect. He's also uneducated and ugly, in just the ways that anyone who is going to be really happy has to be completely clean and beautiful.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Well then, who are we going to say the people who apply this form of expertise are? I'm afraid to call them sophists.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ So we don't pay sophists too high an honor.

Theaetetus/ But there's a similarity between a sophist and what we've been talking about.

Stranger/ And between a wolf and a dog, the wildest thing there is and the gentlest. If you're going to be safe, you have to be especially careful about similarities, since the type we're talking about is very slippery. Anyway, let that description of them stand. I certainly don't think that when the sophists are enough on their guard the dispute will be about an unimportant distinction.

Theaetetus/ That seems right.

Stranger/ So let it be the cleansing part of the expertise of discriminating things; and let it be marked off as the part of that which concerns souls; and within that it's teaching; and within teaching it's education. And let's say that within education, according to the way the discussion has turned now, the refutation of the empty belief in one's own wisdom is nothing other than our noble sophistry.

Theaetetus/ Let's say that. But the sophist has appeared in lots of different ways. So I'm confused about what expression or assertion could convey the truth about what he really is.

Stranger/ You're right to be confused. But we have to think that he's extremely confused, too, about where he can go to escape from our account of him. The saying that you can't escape all your pursuers is right. So now we really have to go after him.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ But let's stop first and catch our breath, so to speak. And while we're resting let's ask ourselves, "Now, how many different appearances has the sophist presented to us?" I think we first discovered him as a hired hunter of rich young men.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Second, as a wholesaler of learning about the soul.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ Third, didn't he appear as a retailer of the same things?

Theaetetus/ Yes, and fourth as a seller of his own learning?

Stranger/ Your memory's correct. I'll try to recall the fifth way: he was an athlete in verbal combat, distinguished by his expertise in debating.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ The sixth appearance was disputed, but still we made a concession to him and took it that he cleanses the soul of beliefs that interfere with learning.

Theaetetus/ Definitely.

Stranger/ Well then, suppose people apply the name of a single sort of expertise to someone, but he appears to have expert knowledge of lots of things. In a case like that don't you notice that something's wrong with the way he appears? Isn't it obvious that if somebody takes him to be an expert at many things, then that observer can't be seeing clearly what it is in

his expertise that all of those many pieces of learning focus on—which is why he calls him by many names instead of one?

Theaetetus/ That definitely does seem to be the nature of the case.

Stranger/ So let's not let laziness make that happen to us. First let's take up one of the things we said about the sophist before, which seemed to me to exhibit him especially clearly.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ We said that he engages in disputes, didn't we?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And also that he teaches other people to do the same thing too?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then let's think: what subject do people like him claim to make others able to engage in disputes about? Let's start with something like this: do sophists make people competent to dispute about issues about the gods, which are opaque to most people?

Theaetetus/ Well, people say they do.

Stranger/ And also things that are open to view, on the earth and in the sky, and related matters?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And when people make general statements in private discussions about being and coming-to-be, we know that sophists are clever at contradicting them and they also make other people able to do the same thing?

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ And what about laws and all kinds of political issues? Don't sophists promise to make people capable of engaging in controversies about them?

Theaetetus/ If they didn't promise that, practically no one would bother to discuss anything with them.

Stranger/ As a matter of fact you can find anything you need to say to contradict any expert himself, both in general and within each particular field, laid out published and written down for anybody who wants to learn it.

Theaetetus/ Apparently you're talking about Protagoras' writings on wrestling and other fields of expertise.

Stranger/ And on many other things, too, my friend. In fact, take expertise in disputation as a whole. Doesn't it seem like a capacity that's sufficient for carrying on controversies about absolutely everything?

Theaetetus/ It doesn't seem to leave much of anything out, anyway.

Stranger/ But for heaven's sake, my boy, do you think that's possible? Or maybe you young people see into this issue more keenly than we do.

Theaetetus/ Into what? What are you getting at? I don't fully understand what you're asking.

Stranger/ Whether it's possible for any human being to know everything.

Theaetetus/ If it were, sir, we'd be very well off.

Stranger/ But how could someone who didn't know about a subject make a sound objection against someone who knew about it?

Theaetetus/ He couldn't.

Stranger/ Then what is it in the sophist's capacity that's so amazing?

Theaetetus/ About what?

Stranger/ How the sophists can ever make young people believe they're wiser than everyone else about everything. It's obvious that they didn't make correct objections against anyone, or didn't appear so to young people. Or if they did appear to make correct objections, but their controversies

didn't make them look any the wiser for it, then—just as you say—people would hardly be willing to pay them money to become their students.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ But people are willing to?

Theaetetus/ They certainly are.

Stranger/ Since sophists do seem, I think, to know about the things they dispute about.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And they do it, we say, about every subject?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So to their students they appear wise about everything?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But without actually being wise—since that appeared impossible.

Theaetetus/ Of course it's impossible.

Stranger/ So the sophist has now appeared as having a kind of belief-knowledge about everything, but not truth.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely. What you've said about them is probably just right.

Stranger/ But let's consider a pattern that will exhibit them more clearly.

Theaetetus/ What pattern is that?

Stranger/ This one. Pay attention to me, and try to do a good job of answering my questions.

Theaetetus/ Which questions?

Stranger/ If someone claimed that by a single kind of expertise he could know, not just how to say things or to contradict people, but how to make and do everything, then …

Theaetetus/ What do you mean, everything?

Stranger/ You don't understand the first thing I say! Seemingly you don't understand everything!

Theaetetus/ No, I don't.

Stranger/ Well, I mean everything to include you and me and also the other animals and plants …

Theaetetus/ What are you talking about?

Stranger/ If someone claimed that he'd make you and me and all the other living things …

Theaetetus/ What kind of making are you talking about? You're not talking about some kind of gardener—after all, you did say he made animals.

Stranger/ Yes, and also I mean the sea and earth and heaven and gods and everything else. And furthermore he makes them each quickly and sells them at a low price.

Theaetetus/ You're talking about some kind of game for schoolchildren.

Stranger/ Well, if someone says he knows everything and would teach it to someone else cheaply and quickly, shouldn't we think it's a game?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Do you know of any game that involves more expertise than imitation does, and is more engaging?

Theaetetus/ No, not at all, since you've collected everything together and designated a very broad, extremely diverse type.

Stranger/ So think about the man who promises he can make everything by means of a single kind of expertise. Suppose that by being expert at drawing he produces things that have the same names as real things. Then we know that when he shows his drawings from far away he'll be able to fool the more mindless young children into thinking that he can actually produce anything he wants to.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Well then, won't we expect that there's another kind of expertise—this time having to do with words—and that someone can use it to trick young people when they stand even farther away from the truth about things? Wouldn't he do it by putting words in their ears, and by showing them spoken copies of everything, so as to make them believe that the words are true and that the person who's speaking to them is the wisest person there is?

Theaetetus/ Yes, why shouldn't there be that kind of expertise too?

Stranger/ So, Theaetetus, suppose enough time has passed and the sophist's hearers have gotten older, and that they approach closer to real things and are forced by their experiences to touch up palpably against them. Won't most of them inevitably change their earlier beliefs, which made large things appear small and easy things appear hard? And won't the facts they've encountered in the course of their actions completely overturn all the appearances that had come to them in the form of words?

Theaetetus/ Yes—at least as far as what someone my age can tell. But I think I'm one of the young people who are still standing far away from real things.

Stranger/ That's why all of us here will keep trying to take you as close to them as possible, but without your needing those experiences to force you. But tell me about the sophist. Is it obvious by now that he's a kind of cheat who imitates real things? Or are we still in any doubt about whether he truly knows all the things that he seems to be able to engage in controversies about?

Theaetetus/ But, sir, how could we be in any doubt? By this time it's pretty obvious from what we've said that he's one of those people who play games.

Stranger/ So we have to regard him as a cheat and an imitator.

Theaetetus/ How could we avoid it?

Stranger/ Well, now it's our job not to let the beast escape. We've almost hemmed him in with one of those net-like devices that words provide for things like this. So anyway he won't get away from this next point.

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ From being taken to be a kind of magician.

Theaetetus/ That's what he seems to me to be too.

Stranger/ So it's settled. We'll divide the craft of copy-making as quickly as we can and we'll go down into it. Then if the sophist gives up right away we'll obey the royal command and we'll capture him and hand our catch over to the king. But if the sophist slips down somewhere into the parts of the craft of imitation, we'll follow along with him and we'll divide each of the parts that contain him until we catch him. Anyway, neither he nor any other kind will ever be able to boast that he's escaped from the method of people who are able to chase a thing through both the particular and the general.

Theaetetus/ Good. That's how we have to do it.

Stranger/ Going by the method of division that we've used so far, I think I see two types of imitation here too. But I don't think I can clearly tell yet which one the type or form we're looking for is in.

Theaetetus/ Well, first tell us what distinction you mean.

Stranger/ One type of imitation I see is the art of likeness-making. That's the one we have whenever someone produces an imitation by keeping to the proportions of length, breadth, and depth of his model, and also by keeping to the appropriate colors of its parts.

Theaetetus/ But don't all imitators try to do that?

Stranger/ Not the ones who sculpt or draw very large works. If they reproduced the true proportions of their beautiful subjects, you see, the upper parts would appear smaller than they should, and the lower parts would appear larger, because we see the upper parts from farther away and the lower parts from closer.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ So don't those craftsmen say goodbye to truth, and produce in their images the proportions that seem to be beautiful instead of the real ones?

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ So can't the first sort of image be called a likeness, since it's like the thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And as we said before, the part of imitation that deals with that should be called likeness-making.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Now, what are we going to call something that appears to be like a beautiful thing, but only because it's seen from a viewpoint that's not beautiful, and would seem unlike the thing it claims to be like if you came to be able to see such large things adequately? If it appears the way the thing does but in fact isn't like it, isn't it an appearance?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And this part of imitation covers a great deal of painting and of the rest of imitation.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Wouldn't appearance-making be the right thing to call expertise in producing appearances that aren't likenesses?

Theaetetus/ Yes, definitely.

Stranger/ Well, these are the two types of copy-making I meant, likeness-making and appearance-making.

Theaetetus/ You were right about that.

Stranger/ But still I can't see clearly the thing I was in doubt about then, namely, which type we should put the sophist in. He's really an amazing man—very hard to make out. He's still escaped neatly into an impossibly confusing type to search through.

Theaetetus/ It seems that way.

Stranger/ Are you agreeing with me because you know that, or is the current dragging you, so to speak, into agreement so quickly because the discussion has given you a habit of agreeing?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? Why do you say that?

Stranger/ Really, my young friend, this is a very difficult investigation we're engaged in. This appearing, and this seeming but not being, and this saying things but not true things—all these issues are full of confusion, just as they always have been. It's extremely hard, Theaetetus, to say what form of speech we should use to say that there really is such a thing as false saying or believing, and moreover to utter this without being caught in a verbal conflict.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ Because this form of speech of ours involves the rash assumption that that which is not is, since otherwise falsity wouldn't come into being. But when we were boys, my boy, the great Parmenides testified to us from start to finish, speaking in both prose and poetic rhythms, that

> Never shall this force itself on us, that that which is not may be;
>
> While you search, keep your thought far away from this path.

So we have his testimony to this. And our own way of speaking itself would make the point especially obvious if it we examined it a little. So if it's all the same to you, let's look at that first.

Theaetetus/ As far as I'm concerned you can do what you want. But as far as our way of speaking is concerned, think about how it will go best, and follow along with it and take me along the road with you.

Stranger/ That's what we have to do. Tell me: do we dare to utter the sound that which in no way is?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But suppose one of our listeners weren't debating or playing a game but had to think seriously and answer the following question: What should the name, that which is not, be applied to? Why do we think he' use it, and in what connection, and for what kind of purpose? And what would he indicate by it to someone else who wanted to find out about it?

Theaetetus/ That's a hard question. In fact, it's just about completely, impossibly confusing for someone like me to answer.

Stranger/ But anyway this much is obvious to us, that that which is not can't be applied to any of those which are.

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Stranger/ So if you can't apply it to that which is, it wouldn't be right either to apply it to something.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ It's obvious to us that we always apply this something to a being, since it's impossible to say it by itself, as if it were naked and isolated from all beings. Isn't that right?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Are you agreeing because you're thinking that a person who says something has to be saying some one thing?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Since you'd say that something is a sign of one, and that a couple of things is a sign of two, and somethings is a sign of a plurality?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And it's absolutely necessary, it seems, that someone who does not say something says nothing at all.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Therefore don't we have to refuse to admit that a person like that speaks but says nothing? Instead, don't we have to deny that anyone who tries to utter that which is not is even speaking?

Theaetetus/ Then our way of speaking would have reached the height of confusion.

Stranger/ Don't do any boasting yet. There are still more confusions to come, including the primary and most fundamental one, which actually happens to be at the source of the whole problem.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? Don't hold back. Tell me.

Stranger/ To that which is there might belong some other of those which are.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But shall we say that any of those which are can ever belong to that which is not?

Theaetetus/ How could they?

Stranger/ Now then, we take all the numbers to be beings.

Theaetetus/ Yes, if we take anything else to be.

Stranger/ Then let's not even try to apply either plurality of number or one to that which is not.

Theaetetus/ Our way of speaking itself tells us that it would be wrong to try to.

Stranger/ Then how would anyone try either to say those which are not or that which is not out loud, or even grasp them in thought, apart from number?

Theaetetus/ Tell me.

Stranger/ Whenever we speak of those which are not, aren't we trying to apply numerical plurality to them?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And when we speak of that which is not aren't we applying one to it?

Theaetetus/ Obviously.

Stranger/ But we say it isn't either right or correct to try to attach that which is to that which is not.

Theaetetus/ That's absolutely true.

Stranger/ Do you understand, then, that it's impossible to say, speak, or think that which is not itself correctly by itself? It's unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable, and unformulable in speech.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ So was I wrong just now when I said that I would formulate the biggest confusion about it, when we have this other one to state which is even bigger?

Theaetetus/ What is it?

Stranger/ My good young friend, don't you notice on the basis of the things we said that that which is not even confuses the person who's refuting it in just this way, that whenever someone tries to refute it, he's forced to say mutually contrary things about it?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? Say it more clearly.

Stranger/ You shouldn't expect more clarity from me. I was the one who made the statement that that which is not should

not share either in one or in plurality. But even so I've continued after all that to speak of it as one, since I say that which is not. You understand?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And again a little earlier I said that it is unutterable, unsayable, and inexpressible in speech. Do you follow?

Theaetetus/ I follow, of course.

Stranger/ So in trying to attach being to it wasn't I saying things that were the contrary of what I'd said before?

Theaetetus/ Apparently.

Stranger/ And in attaching that which, wasn't I speaking of it as one?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And also in speaking of it as something inexpressible in speech, unsayable, and unutterable, I was speaking of it as one thing.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But we say that if someone speaks correctly he shouldn't definitely fix it as either one or plural. He shouldn't even call it, it at all, since even calling it by that label he'd be addressing it by means of the form, one.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Then what would somebody say about me? He'd find that the refutation of that which is not has been defeating me for a long time. So, as I said, let's not use what I say to help us think of how to speak correctly about that which is not. Come on, let's use what you say instead.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Come on, pull yourself together for us as well as you can and try it—since you're young. Try to say something

correct about that which is not, without attaching either being, one, or numerical plurality to it.

Theaetetus/ I'd have to have a strangely large amount of enthusiasm for the project to try it myself after seeing what you've gone through.

Stranger/ Well, let's give up on both you and me, if you prefer. But until we meet someone who can do it let's say that the sophist has stopped at nothing. He's escaped down into inaccessible confusion.

Theaetetus/ He certainly seems to have.

Stranger/ So if we say he has some expertise in appearance-making, it will be easy for him to grab hold of our use of words in return and twist our words in the contrary direction. Whenever we call him a copy-maker he'll ask us what in the world we mean by a "copy." We need to think, Theaetetus, about how to answer the young man's question.

Theaetetus/ Obviously we'll say we mean copies in water and mirrors, and also copies that are drawn and stamped and everything else like that.

Stranger/ Evidently, Theaetetus, you haven't seen a sophist.

Theaetetus/ Why do you say that?

Stranger/ He'll seem to you to have his eyes shut, or else not to have any eyes at all.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ He'll laugh at what you say when you answer him that way, with talk about things in mirrors or sculptures, and when you speak to him as if he could see. He'll pretend he doesn't know about mirrors or water or even sight, and he'll put his question to you only in terms of words.

Theaetetus/ What sort of question?

Stranger/ He'll ask about what runs through all those things which you call many, but which you thought you should call by the one name, copy, to cover them all, as if they were all one thing. Say something, then, and defend yourself, and don't give any ground to him.

Theaetetus/ What in the world would we say a copy is, sir, except something that's made similar to a true thing and is another thing that's like it?

Stranger/ You're saying it's another true thing like it? Or what do you mean by like it?

Theaetetus/ Not that it's true at all, but that it resembles the true thing.

Stranger/ Meaning by true, really being?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And meaning by not true, contrary of true?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ So you're saying that that which is like is not really that which is, if you speak of it as not true.

Theaetetus/ But it is, in a way.

Stranger/ But not truly, you say.

Theaetetus/ No, except that it really is a likeness.

Stranger/ So it's not really what is, but it really is what we call a likeness?

Theaetetus/ Maybe that which is not is woven together with that which is in some way like that—it's quite bizarre.

Stranger/ Of course it's strange. Anyway, you can see that the many-headed sophist is still using this interweaving to force us to agree unwillingly that that which is not in a way is.

Theaetetus/ I definitely do see it.

Stranger/ Well then, how can we define his field of expertise, so as to be consistent?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean? What kind of problem are you afraid of?

Stranger/ When we say that he deceives us about appearances and that he's an expert at deception, are we saying so because his expertise makes our souls believe what is false? Or what shall we say?

Theaetetus/ Just that. What else would we say?

Stranger/ Again, a false belief will be a matter of believing things that are contrary to those which are? Or what?

Theaetetus/ Yes, contrary.

Stranger/ So you're saying that a false belief is believing those which are not.

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Stranger/ Believing that those which are not are not, or that those which in no way are in a way are?

Theaetetus/ That those which are not are in a way, it has to be, if anyone is ever going to be even a little bit wrong.

Stranger/ Well, doesn't a false belief also believe that those which completely are in no way are?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And this is false too?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And I think we'll also regard false speaking the same way, as saying that those which are, are not, and that those which are not are.

Theaetetus/ How else would it be false?

Stranger/ I don't suppose there's any other way. The sophist, though, is going to deny that this way is possible. And how could any sensible person accept it, now that what we

agreed to earlier has been reinforced. Do we understand what he's saying, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ How could we not understand that when we dare to say that falsity is in beliefs and words contain falsity, we're saying what is contrary to what we said just before. We're forced to attach that which is to that which is not, even though we agreed just now that that's completely impossible.

Stranger/ Your memory's correct. But think about what we need to do about the sophist. You see how many and easily available his supply of objections and confusions is if we assume, as we search for him, that he's an expert at cheating and falsehood-making.

Theaetetus/ Definitely.

Stranger/ He's got a practically infinite supply of them, and we've gone through only a small fraction.

Theaetetus/ If so, then it seems it would be impossible to catch him.

Stranger/ What, then? Are we going to go soft and give up?

Theaetetus/ I say we shouldn't, if there's even the smallest chance that we can catch him.

Stranger/ So you'll be forgiving and, as you said, happy if we can somehow extricate ourselves even slightly from such a powerful argument?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then I've got something even more urgent to request.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ Not to think that I'm turning into some kind of patricide.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ In order to defend ourselves we're going to have to subject father Parmenides' saying to further examination,

and insist by brute force both that that which is not somehow is, and then again that that which is somehow is not.

Theaetetus/ It does seem that in what we're going to say, we'll to have to fight through that issue.

Stranger/ That's obvious even to a blind man, as they say. We'll never be able to avoid having to make ourselves ridiculous by saying conflicting things whenever we talk about false statements and beliefs, either as copies or likenesses or imitations or appearances, or about whatever sorts of expertise there are concerning those things—unless, that is, we either refute Parmenides' claims or else agree to accept them.

Theaetetus/ That's true.

Stranger/ So that's why we have to be bold enough to attack what our father says. Or, if fear keeps us from doing that, then we'll have to leave it alone completely.

Theaetetus/ Fear, anyway, isn't going to stop us.

Stranger/ Well then, I've got a third thing to ask you, something small.

Theaetetus/ Just tell me what it is.

Stranger/ When I was talking a minute ago I said that I've always given up whenever I've tried to refute what Parmenides said, just the way I did this time.

Theaetetus/ Yes, you did say that.

Stranger/ I'm afraid I'll seem insane to you if I'm always shifting my position back and forth, given what I've said. It's for your sake that we'll be trying to refute what Parmenides said—if we can do it.

Theaetetus/ Go ahead, then. Don't worry about that. I won't think you're behaving inappropriately in any way if you go right ahead with your refutation and demonstration.

Stranger/ Well then, how shall I begin this dangerous discussion? The path we absolutely have to turn onto, my boy, is this.

Theaetetus/ Namely, ...?

Stranger/ We have to reconsider whether we may not be somehow confused about things that now seem to be clear, and whether over-hasty judgment may make us agree too easily.

Theaetetus/ Say what you mean more clearly.

Stranger/ Parmenides' way of talking to us has been rather easygoing, it seems to me. So does the way of talking that everyone uses who has ever urged us to specify just how many beings there are and what they're like.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ They each appear to me to tell us a myth, as if we were children. One tells us that there are three beings, and that sometimes they're somehow at war with each other, while at other times they become friendly, marry, give birth, and bring up their offspring. Another one says that there are two beings, wet and dry or hot and cold. He marries them off and makes them set up house together. And our Eleatic tribe, starting from Xenophanes and even people before him, tells us their myth on the assumption that what they call "all things" are just one. Later on, some Ionian and Sicilian muses both had the idea that it was safer to weave the two views together. They say that that which is, is both many and one, and is bound by both hatred and friendship. According to the terser of these muses, in being taken apart they're brought together. The more relaxed muses, though, allow things to be free from that condition sometimes. They say that all that there is alternates, and that sometimes it's one and friendly under Aphrodite's influence, but at other times it's many and at war with itself because of some kind of strife. It's hard to

say whether anyone of these thinkers has told us the truth or not, and it wouldn't be appropriate for us to be critical of such renowned and venerable men. But it wouldn't be offensive to note the following thing, either.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ That they've been inconsiderate and contemptuous toward us. They've simply been talking their way through their explanations, without paying any attention to whether we were following them or were left behind.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ For heaven's sake, Theaetetus, do you understand anything of what they mean each time one of them says that many or one or two things are or have become or are becoming, or when another one speaks of hot mixed with cold and supposes that there are separations and combinations? Earlier in my life I used to think I understood exactly what someone meant when he said just what we're confused about now, namely, this is not. You do see what confusion we're in about it?

Theaetetus/ Yes, I do.

Stranger/ But just perhaps the very same thing has happened to us equally about is. We say we're in the clear about it, and that we understand when someone says it, but that we don't understand is not. But maybe we're in the same state about both.

Theaetetus/ Maybe.

Stranger/ And let's suppose the same thing may be true of the other expressions we've just used.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ We can look into most of them later, if that seems to be the best thing to do. Now we'll think about the most fundamental and most important expression.

Theaetetus/ Which one? Oh, obviously you're saying that being is the one we have to explore first—that we have to ask what people who say it think they're indicating by it.

Stranger/ You understand exactly, Theaetetus. I'm saying we have to follow the track this way. Let's ask—as if they were here—"Listen, you people who say that all things are just some two things, hot and cold or some such pair. What are you saying about them both when you say that they both are and each one is? What shall we take this being to be? Is it a third thing alongside those two beings, so that according to you everything is no longer two but three? Surely in calling one or the other of the two of them being, you aren't saying that they both are, since then in either case they' be one and not two."

Theaetetus/ That's true.

Stranger/ "But you do want to call both of them being?"

Theaetetus/ Probably.

Stranger/ "But," we'll say, "if you did that, friends, you'd also be saying very clearly that the two are one."

Theaetetus/ That's absolutely right.

Stranger/ "Then clarify this for us, since we're confused about it. What do you want to signify when you say being? Obviously you've known for a long time. We thought we did, but now we're confused about it. So first teach it to us, so we won't think we understand what you're saying when just the contrary is the case." Would it be the least bit inappropriate for us to ask them this, and anyone else who says that everything is more than one?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Stranger/ Well, then, shouldn't we do our best to find out from the people who say that everything is one what they mean by being?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then they should answer this question: “Do you say that only one thing is?” “We do,” they’ll say, won’t they?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ “Well then, you call something being?”

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ “Is that just what you call one, so that you use two names for the same thing? Or what?”

Theaetetus/ How will they answer that question?

Stranger/ Obviously it’s not the easiest thing in the world to answer that question—or any other question, either—for someone who makes the supposition that they do.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ Surely it’s absurd for someone to agree that there are two names when he maintains that there’s only one thing.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And it’s completely absurd, and unacceptable, for someone to say that there’s a name if there’s no account of it.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ If he supposes that a thing is different from its name, then surely he’s mentioning two things.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And moreover if he supposes that the name is the same as the thing, he’ll either be forced to say that the name is the name of nothing, or else, if he says that it’s the name of something, then it’s the name of nothing other than itself and so will turn out to be only the name of a name and nothing else.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And also the one, being the name of the one, will also be the one of the name.

Theaetetus/ It will have to be.

Stranger/ Well then, will they say that the whole is different from the one being, or the same as it?

Theaetetus/ Of course they'll say it's the same, and they do.

Stranger/ But suppose a whole is, as even Parmenides says;

> All around like the bulk of a well-formed sphere,
> Equal-balanced all ways from the middle, since neither anything more
> Must it be, this way or that way, nor anything less.

If it's like that, then that which is will have a middle and extremities. And if it has those then it absolutely has to have parts, doesn't it?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But if a thing has parts then nothing keeps it from having the characteristic of being one in all its parts, and in that way it's all being and it's also one whole.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But something with that characteristic can't be just the one itself, can it?

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ Surely a thing that's truly one, properly speaking, has to be completely without parts.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But a thing like what we've described, which consists of many parts, won't fit that account.

Theaetetus/ I understand.

Stranger/ Now if that which is has the characteristic of the one in this way, will it be one and a whole? Or shall we simply deny it's a whole at all?

Theaetetus/ That's a hard choice.

Stranger/ You're right. If it has the characteristic of somehow being one, it won't appear to be the same as the one. Moreover, everything will then be more than one.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Further if that which is, is not a whole by possessing that as a characteristic, but rather just is the whole itself, that which is will turn out to be less than itself.

Theaetetus/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And because it's deprived of itself, that which is will be not being, according to that account.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And everything will be more than one, since that which is and the whole will each have its own separate nature.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But if the whole is not at all, then the very same things are true of that which is, and in addition to not being, it would not even become a being.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ Invariably whatever becomes has at some point become as a whole. So we can't label either being or becoming as being without taking the whole to be among the beings too.

Theaetetus/ That seems entirely right.

Stranger/ And moreover something that isn't a whole can't be of any quantity at all, since something that's of a certain quantity has to be a whole of that quantity, whatever it may be.

Theaetetus/ Exactly.

Stranger/ And millions of other issues will also arise, each generating indefinitely many confusions, if you say that being is only two or one.

Theaetetus/ The ones that just turned up show that. One problem led to another, and at each step there was more and more difficulty and uncertainty about what we'd just said at the previous stage.

Stranger/ We haven't gone through all the detailed accounts that people give of that which is and that which is not, but this is enough. Now we have to look at the people who discuss the issue in another way. Our aim is to have them all in view and that way to see that saying what that which is, is isn't a bit easier than saying what that which is not is.

Theaetetus/ So we need to go on to these people too.

Stranger/ It seems that there's something like a battle of gods and giants among them, because of their dispute with each other over being.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ One group drags everything down to earth from the heavenly region of the invisible, actually clutching rocks and trees with their hands. When they take hold of all these things they insist that only what offers tangible contact is, since they define being as the same as body. And if any of the others say that something without a body is, they absolutely despise him and won't listen to him anymore.

Theaetetus/ These are frightening men you're talking about. I've met quite a lot of them already.

Stranger/ Therefore the people on the other side of the debate defend their position very cautiously, from somewhere up out of sight. They insist violently that true being is certain nonbodily forms that can be thought about. They take the bodies of the other group, and also what they call the truth, and they break them up verbally into little bits and call them

a process of coming-to-be instead of being. There's a never-ending battle going on constantly between them about this issue.

Theaetetus/ That's true.

Stranger/ Let's talk with each of these groups about the being that they posit.

Theaetetus/ How shall we do it?

Stranger/ It's easier to talk with the ones who put being in the forms. They're gentler people. It's harder—and perhaps just about impossible—with the ones who drag everything down to body by force. It seems to me that we have to deal with them this way.

Theaetetus/ Namely ...?

Stranger/ Mainly by making them actually better than they are—if we somehow could. But if we can't do that in fact, then let's do it in words, by supposing that they're willing to answer less wildly than they actually do. Something that better people agree to is worth more than what worse ones agree to. Anyway we're not concerned with the people; we're looking for what's true.

Theaetetus/ That's absolutely right.

Stranger/ Then tell the better people to answer you and interpret what they say.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ Then let them tell us this: do they say that anything is a mortal animal?

Theaetetus/ Of course they do.

Stranger/ And they agree that a mortal animal is an ensouled body?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And so they're placing soul among the beings?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ What then? Do they say that this soul is just and that soul is unjust, and that this one's intelligent and that one isn't?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But isn't a soul just by the possession and presence of justice, and isn't another soul contrary to it by the possession and presence of the contrary?

Theaetetus/ Yes, they agree with that.

Stranger/ But they'll say further that at any rate what can be present to a thing or absent from it is something.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So since there is justice and intelligence and the rest of virtue, and also their contraries, and moreover since there is a soul in which those things come to be present, do they say that any of these are visible or touchable, or that they all are invisible?

Theaetetus/ They can hardly say any of them is visible.

Stranger/ And what about these invisible things? Do they say that they have bodies?

Theaetetus/ They don't give one single answer to that question. They do say that the soul seems to them to have a kind of body. But as far as intelligence and the other things you've asked about are concerned, they're ashamed and don't dare either to agree that they are not beings or to insist that everything is a body.

Stranger/ Obviously this breed of men has improved, Theaetetus. The native earthborn giants would never have been ashamed to hold the line for their position, that anything they can't squeeze in their hands is absolutely nothing.

Theaetetus/ That pretty much describes their thinking.

Stranger/ Then let's go back to questioning them. It's enough if they admit that even a small part of that which is

doesn't have body. They need to say something about what's common to both it and the things that do have body, which they focus on when they say that they both are. Maybe that will raise some confusion for them. If it does, then think about whether they' be willing to accept our suggestion that that which is, is something like the following.

Theaetetus/ Like what? Tell me and maybe we'll know.

Stranger/ I'm saying that a thing really is if it has any capacity at all, either by nature to do something to something else or to have even the smallest thing done to it by even the most trivial thing, even if it only happens once. I'll take it as a definition that those which are amount to nothing other than capacity.

Theaetetus/ They accept that, since they don't have anything better to say right now.

Stranger/ Fine. Maybe something else will occur to them later, and to us too. For now let's agree with them on this much.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ Let's turn to the other people, the friends of the forms. You serve as their interpreter for us.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ You people distinguish coming-to-be and being and say that they are separate? Is that right?

Theaetetus/ "Yes."

Stranger/ And you say that by our bodies and through perception we have dealings with coming-to-be, but we deal with real being by our souls and through reasoning. You say that being always stays the same and in the same state, but coming-to-be varies from one time to another.

Theaetetus/ "We do say that."

Stranger/ And what shall we say this dealing with is that you apply in the two cases? Doesn't it mean what we said just now?

Theaetetus/ "What?"

Stranger/ What happens when two things come together, and by some capacity one does something to the other or has something done to it. Or maybe you don't hear their answer clearly, Theaetetus. But I do, probably because I'm used to them.

Theaetetus/ Then what account do they give?

Stranger/ They don't agree with what we just said to the earth people about being.

Theaetetus/ What's that?

Stranger/ We took it as a sufficient definition of beings that the capacity be present in a thing to do something or have something done to it, to or by even the smallest thing or degree.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ In reply they say that coming-to-be has the capacity to do something or have something done to it, but that this capacity doesn't fit with being.

Theaetetus/ Is there anything to that?

Stranger/ We have to reply that we need them to tell us more clearly whether they agree that the soul knows and also that being is known.

Theaetetus/ "Yes," they say.

Stranger/ Well then, do you say that knowing and being known are cases of doing, or having something done, or both? Is one of them doing and the other having something done? Or is neither a case of either?

Theaetetus/ Obviously neither is a case of either, since otherwise they' be saying something contrary to what they said before.

Stranger/ Oh, I see. You mean that if knowing is doing something, then necessarily what is known has something done to it. When being is known by knowledge, according to this account, then insofar as it's known it's changed by having something done to it—which we say wouldn't happen to something that's at rest.

Theaetetus/ That's correct.

Stranger/ But for heaven's sake, are we going to be convinced that it's true that change, life, soul, and intelligence are not present in that which wholly is, and that it neither lives nor thinks, but stays changeless, solemn, and holy, without any understanding?

Theaetetus/ If we did, sir, we'd be admitting something frightening.

Stranger/ But are we going to say that it has understanding but doesn't have life?

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Stranger/ But are we saying that it has both those things in it while denying that it has them in its soul?

Theaetetus/ How else would it have them?

Stranger/ And are we saying that it has intelligence, life, and soul, but that it's at rest and completely changeless even though it's alive?

Theaetetus/ All that seems completely unreasonable.

Stranger/ Then both that which changes and also change have to be admitted as being.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And so, Theaetetus, it turns out that if no beings change then nothing anywhere possesses any intelligence about anything.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely not.

Stranger/ But furthermore if we admit that everything is moving and changing, then on that account we take the very same thing away from those which are.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ Do you think that without rest anything would be the same, in the same state in the same respects?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Stranger/ Well then, do you see any case in which intelligence is or comes-to-be anywhere without these things?

Theaetetus/ Not in the least.

Stranger/ And we need to use every argument we can to fight against anyone who does away with knowledge, understanding, and intelligence but at the same time asserts anything at all about anything.

Theaetetus/ Definitely.

Stranger/ The philosopher—the person who values these things the most—absolutely has to refuse to accept the claim that everything is at rest, either from defenders of the one or from friends of the many forms. In addition he has to refuse to listen to people who say that that which is changes in every way. He has to be like a child begging for "both," and say that that which is—everything—is both the unchanging and that which changes.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ Well now, apparently we've done a fine job of making our account pull together that which is, haven't we?

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ But for heaven's sake, Theaetetus,... Now I think we'll recognize how confused our investigation about it is.

Theaetetus/ Why, though? What do you mean?

Stranger/ Don't you notice, my young friend, that we're now in extreme ignorance about it, though it appears to us that we're saying something.

Theaetetus/ It does to me anyway. But I don't completely understand how we got into this situation without noticing.

Stranger/ Then think more clearly about it. Given what we've just agreed to, would it be fair for someone to ask us the same question we earlier asked the people who say that everything is just hot and cold?

Theaetetus/ What was it? Remind me.

Stranger/ Certainly. And I'll try, at any rate, to do it by asking you in just the same way as I asked them, so that we can move forward at the same pace.

Theaetetus/ Good.

Stranger/ Now then, wouldn't you say that change and rest are completely contrary to each other?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And you'd say they both equally are, and that each of them equally is?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ When you admit that they are, are you saying that both and each of them change?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Stranger/ And are you signifying that they rest when you say that they both are?

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Stranger/ So do you conceive that which is as a third thing alongside them which encompasses rest and change? And

when you say that they both are, are you taking the two of them together and focusing on their association with being?

Theaetetus/ It does seem probably true that when we say change and rest are, we do have a kind of omen of that which is as a third thing.

Stranger/ So that which is isn't both change and rest; it's something different from them instead.

Theaetetus/ It seems so.

Stranger/ Therefore by its own nature that which is doesn't either rest or change.

Theaetetus/ I suppose it doesn't.

Stranger/ Which way should someone turn his thoughts if he wants to establish for himself something clear about it?

Theaetetus/ I don't know.

Stranger/ I don't think any line is easy. If something isn't changing, how can it not be resting? And how can something not change if it doesn't in any way rest? But now that which is appears to fall outside both of them. Is that possible?

Theaetetus/ Absolutely not.

Stranger/ In this connection we ought to remember the following.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ When we were asked what we should apply the name that which is not to, we became completely confused. Do you remember?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And now aren't we in just as much confusion about that which is?

Theaetetus/ We seem to be in even more confusion, if that's possible.

Stranger/ Then we've now given a complete statement of our confusion. But there's now hope, precisely because both that which is and that which is not are involved in equal confusion. That is, in so far as one of them is clarified, either brightly or dimly, the other will be too. And if we can't see either of them, then anyway we'll push our account of both of them forward as well as we can.

Theaetetus/ Fine.

Stranger/ Let's give an account of how we call the very same thing, whatever it may be, by several names.

Theaetetus/ What, for instance? Give me an example.

Stranger/ Surely we're speaking of a man even when we name him several things, that is, when we apply colors to him and shapes, sizes, defects, and virtues. In these cases and a million others we say that he's not only a man but also is good and indefinitely many different things. And similarly on the same account we take a thing to be one, and at the same time we speak of it as many by using many names for it.

Theaetetus/ That's true.

Stranger/ Out of all this we've prepared a feast for young people and for old late-learners. They can grab hold of the handy idea that it's impossible for that which is many to be one and for that which is one to be many. They evidently enjoy forbidding us to say that a man is good, and only letting us say that that which is good is good, or that the man is a man. You've often met people, I suppose, who are carried away by things like that. Sometimes they're elderly people who are amazed at this kind of thing, because their understanding is so poor and they think they've discovered something prodigiously wise.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then let's direct our questions now both to these people and also to the others we were talking with before. That

way our account will be addressed to everyone who's ever said anything at all about being.

Theaetetus/ What questions do you mean?

Stranger/ Shall we refuse to apply being to change or to rest, or anything to anything else? Shall we take these things to be unblended and incapable of having a share of each other in the things we say? Or shall we pull them all together and treat them all as capable of associating with each other? Or shall we say that some can associate and some can't? Which of these options shall we say they' choose, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus/ I don't know how to answer for them.

Stranger/ Why don't you reply to the options one by one by thinking about what results from each of them?

Theaetetus/ Fine.

Stranger/ First, if you like, let's take them to say that nothing has any capacity at all for association with anything. Then change and rest won't have any share in being.

Theaetetus/ No, they won't.

Stranger/ Well then, will either of them be, if they have no association with being?

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ It seems that agreeing to that destroys everything right away, both for the people who make everything change, for the ones who make everything an unchanging unit, and for the ones who say that beings are forms that always stay the same and in the same state. All of these people apply being. Some do it when they say that things really are changing, and others do it when they say that things really are at rest.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Also there are people who put everything together at one time and divide them at another. Some put

them together into one and divide them into indefinitely many, and others divide them into a finite number of elements and put them back together out of them. None of these people, regardless of whether they take this to happen in stages or continuously, would be saying anything if there isn't any blending.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ But furthermore the most ridiculous account is the one that's adopted by the people who won't allow anything to be called by a name that it gets by association with something else.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ They're forced to use being about everything, and also separate, from others, of itself, and a million other things. They're powerless to keep from doing it—that is, from linking them together in their speech. So they don't need other people to refute them, but have an enemy within, as people say, to contradict them, and they go carrying him around talking in an undertone inside them like the strange ventriloquist Eurycles.

Theaetetus/ That's a very accurate comparison.

Stranger/ Well then, what if we admit that everything has the capacity to associate with everything else?

Theaetetus/ I can solve that one.

Stranger/ How?

Theaetetus/ Because if change and rest belonged to each other then change would be completely at rest and conversely rest itself would be changing.

Stranger/ But I suppose it's ruled out by very strict necessity that change should be at rest and that rest should change.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ So the third option is the only one left.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Certainly one of the following things has to be the case: either everything is willing to blend, or nothing is, or some things are and some are not.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And we found that the first two options were impossible.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So everyone who wants to give the right answer will choose the third.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Since some will blend and some won't, they'll be a good deal like letters of the alphabet. Some of them fit together with each other and some don't.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ More than the other letters the vowels run through all of them like a bond, linking them together, so that without a vowel no one of the others can fit with another.

Theaetetus/ Definitely.

Stranger/ So does everyone know which kinds of letters can associate with which, or does it take an expert?

Theaetetus/ It takes an expert.

Stranger/ What kind?

Theaetetus/ An expert in grammar.

Stranger/ Well then, isn't it the same with high and low notes? The musician is the one with the expertise to know which ones mix and which ones don't, and the unmusical person is the one who doesn't understand that.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And in other cases of expertise and the lack of it we'll find something similar.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Well then, we've agreed that kinds mix with each other in the same way. So if someone's going to show us correctly which kinds harmonize with which and which kinds exclude each other, doesn't he have to have some kind of knowledge as he proceeds through the discussion? And in addition doesn't he have to know whether there are any kinds that run through all of them and link them together to make them capable of blending, and also, when there are divisions, whether certain kinds running through wholes are always the cause of the division?

Theaetetus/ Of course that requires knowledge—probably just about the most important kind.

Stranger/ So, Theaetetus, what shall we label this knowledge? Or for heaven's sake, without noticing have we stumbled on the knowledge that free people have? Maybe we've found the philosopher even though we were looking for the sophist?

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Aren't we going to say that it takes expertise in dialectic to divide things by kinds and not to think that the same form is a different one or that a different form is the same?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So if a person can do that, he'll be capable of adequately discriminating a single form spread out all through a lot of other things, each of which stands separate from the others. In addition he can discriminate forms that are different from each other but are included within a single form that's outside them, or a single form that's connected as a unit throughout many wholes, or many forms that are completely

separate from others. That's what it is to know how to discriminate by kinds how things can associate and how they can't.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ And you'll assign this dialectical activity only to someone who has a pure and just love of wisdom.

Theaetetus/ You certainly couldn't assign it to anyone else.

Stranger/ We'll find that the philosopher will always be in a location like this if we look for him. He's hard to see clearly too, but not in the same way as the sophist.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ The sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not, which he's had practice dealing with, and he's hard to see because the place is so dark. Isn't that right?

Theaetetus/ It seems to be.

Stranger/ But the philosopher always uses reasoning to stay near the form, being. He isn't at all easy to see because that area is so bright and the eyes of most people's souls can't bear to look at what's divine.

Theaetetus/ That seems just as right as what you just said before.

Stranger/ We'll think about the philosopher more clearly soon if we want to. But as far as the sophist is concerned we obviously shouldn't give up until we've gotten a good enough look at him.

Theaetetus/ Fine.

Stranger/ We've agreed on this: some kinds will associate with each other and some won't, some will to a small extent and others will associate a great deal, nothing prevents still others from being all-pervading—from being associated with every one of them. So next let's pursue our account together this way. Let's not talk about every form. That way we won't

be thrown off by dealing with too many of them. Instead let's choose some of the most important ones. First we'll ask what they're like, and next we'll ask about their ability to associate with each other. Even if our grasp of that which is and that which is not isn't completely clear, our aim will be to avoid being totally without an account of them—so far as that's allowed by our present line of inquiry—and see whether we can get away with saying that that which is not really is that which is not.

Theaetetus/ That's what we have to do.

Stranger/ The most important kinds we've just been discussing are that which is, rest, and change.

Theaetetus/ Yes, by far.

Stranger/ And we say that two of them don't blend with each other.

Theaetetus/ Definitely not.

Stranger/ But that which is blends with both of them, since presumably both of them are.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ We do have three of them.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So each of them is different from two of them, but is the same as itself.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But what in the world are the same and the different that we've been speaking of? Are they two kinds other than those three but necessarily always blending with them? And do we have to think of them all as being five and not three? Or have what we've been calling the same and the different turned out, without our realizing it, to be among those three?

Theaetetus/ Maybe.

Stranger/ But change and rest are certainly not different or the same.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ Whatever we call change and rest in common can't be either one of them.

Theaetetus/ Why not?

Stranger/ Then change would rest and rest would change. In both cases, if either change or rest comes to be either same or different, then it will force the other to change to the contrary of its own nature, since it will share in its contrary.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ And both do share in the same and in the different.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then anyway let's not say that change is the same or the different, nor that rest is.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ But do we have to think of that which is and the same as one thing?

Theaetetus/ Maybe.

Stranger/ But if that which is and the same don't signify distinct things, then when we say that change and rest both are, we'll be labeling both of them as being the same.

Theaetetus/ But certainly that's impossible.

Stranger/ So it's impossible for the same and that which is to be one.

Theaetetus/ I suppose so.

Stranger/ Shall we take the same as a fourth in addition to the other three forms?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Well then, do we have to call the different a fifth? Or should we think of it and that which is as two names for one kind?

Theaetetus/ Maybe.

Stranger/ But I think you'll admit that some of those which are, are said by themselves, but some are always said in relation to other things.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But the different is always said in relation to another, isn't it?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ But it wouldn't be if that which is and the different weren't completely distinct. If the different shared in both kinds the way that which is does, then some of the things that are different would be different without being different in relation to anything different. In fact, though, it turns out that whatever is different definitely has to be what it is from something that's different.

Theaetetus/ That's exactly the way it is.

Stranger/ And we do have to call the nature of the different a fifth among the forms we're choosing.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And we're going to say that it pervades all of them, since each of them is different from the others, not because of its own nature but because of sharing in the type of the different.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Let's take up each of the five one by one and say this.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ First let's say that change is completely different from rest. Shall we say that?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So it is not rest.

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Stranger/ But it is, because it shares in that which is.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then again change is different from the same.

Theaetetus/ Pretty much.

Stranger/ So it is not the same.

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ But still it was the same, we said, because everything has a share of that.

Theaetetus/ Definitely.

Stranger/ We have to agree without any qualms that change is the same and not the same. When we say that it's the same and not the same, we aren't speaking the same way. When we say it's the same, that's because it shares in the same in relation to itself. But when we say it's not the same, that's because of its association with the different. Because of its association with the different, change is separated from the same, and so becomes not it but different. So that it's right to say that it's not the same.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ So if change itself ever somehow had a share in rest, there would be nothing strange about labeling it resting?

Theaetetus/ That's absolutely right, as long as we admit that some kinds will blend with each other and some won't.

Stranger/ That, though, we demonstrated earlier, before we came to this point, and we showed that by nature it has to be so.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ To repeat, change is different from different, just as it's other than both the same and rest.

Theaetetus/ It has to be.

Stranger/ So in a way it is different and not different, according to what we've said.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ So what next? Are we going to say that change is different from the first three but not from the fourth, in spite of the fact that we've agreed that there were five things we were going to investigate?

Theaetetus/ How could we do that? We can't admit that there are fewer of them than there appeared to be just now.

Stranger/ So shall we go on fearlessly contending that change is different from that which is?

Theaetetus/ Yes, we should be absolutely fearless.

Stranger/ So it's clear that change really is both something that is not, but also a thing that is since it partakes in that which is?

Theaetetus/ That's absolutely clear.

Stranger/ So it has to be possible for that which is not to be, in the case of change and also as applied to all the kinds. That's because as applied to all of them the nature of the different makes each of them not be, by making it different from that which is. And we're going to be right if we say that all of them are not in this same way. And on the other hand we're also going to be right if we call them beings, because they have a share in that which is.

Theaetetus/ It seems that way.

Stranger/ So as concerning each of the forms that which is, is extensive, and that which is not is indefinite in quantity.

Theaetetus/ That seems right.

Stranger/ So we have to say that that which is itself is different from the others.

Theaetetus/ Necessarily.

Stranger/ So even that which is, is not, in as many applications as there are of the others, since, not being them, it is one thing, namely itself, and on the other hand it is not those others, which are an indefinite number.

Theaetetus/ I suppose so.

Stranger/ So then we shouldn't even be annoyed about this conclusion, precisely because it's the nature of kinds to allow association with each other. And if somebody doesn't admit that, then he needs to win us over from our earlier line of argument for it, in order to win us over from its consequences.

Theaetetus/ That's entirely fair.

Stranger/ Now let's look at this.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ It seems that when we say that which is not, we don't say something contrary to that which is, but only something different from it.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ It's like this. When we speak of something as not large, does it seem to you that we indicate the small rather than the equal?

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Stranger/ So we won't agree with somebody who says that denial signifies a contrary. We'll only admit this much: when "not" and "non-" are prefixed to names that follow them, they indicate something other than the names, or rather, other than the things to which the names following the negation are applied.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ If you don't mind, though, let's think about this.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ The nature of the different appears to be chopped up, just like knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ Knowledge is a single thing, too, I suppose. But each part of it that has to do with something is marked off and has a name peculiar to itself. That's why there are said to be many expertises and many kinds of knowledge.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And so the same thing happens to the parts of the nature of the different, too, even though it's one thing.

Theaetetus/ Maybe. But shall we say how?

Stranger/ Is there a part of the different that's placed over against the beautiful?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Shall we say that it's nameless, or does it have a name?

Theaetetus/ It has a name. What we call not beautiful is the thing that's different from nothing other than the nature of the beautiful.

Stranger/ Now go ahead and tell me this.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ Isn't it in the following way that the not beautiful turns out to be, namely, by being both marked off within one kind of those that are, and also set over against one of those that are?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then it seems that the not beautiful is a sort of setting of a being over against a being.

Theaetetus/ That's absolutely right.

Stranger/ Well then, according to this account, is the beautiful more a being than the not beautiful?

Theaetetus/ Not at all.

Stranger/ So we have to say that both the not large and the large equally are.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So we also have to put the not just on a par with the just, in that neither is any more than the other.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And we'll speak about the others in the same way too, since the nature of the different appeared as being one of those that are. And because it is, we have to posit its parts as no less beings.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ So it seems that the setting against each other of the nature of a part of the different and the nature of that which is, is not any less being—if we're allowed to say such a thing—than that which is itself. And it does not signify something contrary to that which is but only something different from it.

Theaetetus/ Clearly.

Stranger/ So what shall we call it?

Theaetetus/ Obviously that which is not—which we were looking for because of the sophist—is just exactly this.

Stranger/ Then does it have just as much being as any of the others, as you said it did? Should we work up the courage now to say that that which is not definitely is something that has its own nature? Should we say that just as the large was large, the beautiful was beautiful, the not large was not large, and the not beautiful was not beautiful, in the same way that which is not also was and is not being, and is one form among

the many that are? Do we, Theaetetus, still have any doubts about that?

Theaetetus/ No.

Stranger/ You know, our disbelief in Parmenides has gone even farther than his prohibition.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ We've pushed our investigation ahead and shown him something even beyond what he prohibited us from even thinking about.

Theaetetus/ In what way?

Stranger/ Because he says, remember;

> Never shall it force itself on us, that that which is not may be;
>
> Keep your thought far away from this path of searching.

Theaetetus/ That's what he says.

Stranger/ But we've not only shown that those which are not are. We've also caused what turns out to be the form of that which is not to appear. Since we showed that the nature of the different is, chopped up among all beings in relation to each other, we dared to say that that which is not really is just this, namely, each part of the nature of the different that's set over against that which is.

Theaetetus/ And what we've said seems to me completely and totally true.

Stranger/ Nobody can say that this that which is not, which we've made to appear and now dare to say is, is the contrary of that which is. We've said good-bye long ago to any contrary of that which is, and to whether it is or not, and also to whether or not an account can be given of it. With regard to that which is not, which we've said is, let someone refute us and persuade us that we've made a mistake—or else, so long as he can't do that, he should say just what we say. He

has to say that the kinds blend with each other, that that which is and the different pervade all of them and each other, that the different shares in that which is and so, because of that sharing, is. But he won't say that it is that which it shares in, but that it is different from it, and necessarily, because it is different from that which is, it clearly can be what is not. On the other hand that which is has a share in the different, so, being different from all of the others, it is not each of them and it is not all of the others except itself. So that which is indisputably is not millions of things, and all of the others together, and also each of them, are in many ways and also are not in many ways.

Theaetetus/ True.

Stranger/ And if anyone doesn't believe these contrarieties, he has to think about them himself and say something better than what we've said. But if he thinks he's recognized a problem in it and enjoys dragging the argument back and forth, then he's been carried away by something that's not worth much of anyone's attention—to go by what we've just been saying, anyway. A thing like that isn't clever or hard to discover, but the other thing is both difficult and at the same time beautiful.

Theaetetus/ What other thing?

Stranger/ The thing we said earlier. That is, we should leave pointless things like this alone. Instead we should be able to follow what a person says and scrutinize it step by step. When he says that what's different is the same in a certain way or that what's the same is different in a certain way, we should understand just what way he means, and the precise respect in which he's saying that the thing is the same or different. But when someone makes that which is the same appear different in just any old way, or vice versa, or when he makes what's large appear small or something that's similar

appear dissimilar—well, if someone enjoys constantly trotting out contraries like that in discussion, that's not true refutation. It's only the obvious new-born brain-child of someone who just came into contact with those which are.

Theaetetus/ Definitely.

Stranger/ In fact, my friend, it's inept to try to separate everything from everything else. It's the sign of a completely unmusical and unphilosophical person.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ To dissociate each thing from everything else is to destroy totally everything there is to say. The weaving together of forms is what makes speech possible for us.

Theaetetus/ That's true.

Stranger/ Think about what a good moment we picked to fight it out against people like that, and to force them further to let one thing blend with another.

Theaetetus/ Why a good moment?

Stranger/ For speech's being one kind among those that are. If we were deprived of that, we'd be deprived of philosophy—to mention the most important thing. Besides, now we have to agree about what speech is, but we'd be able to say nothing if speech were taken away from us and weren't anything at all. And it would be taken away if we admitted that there's no blending of anything with anything else.

Theaetetus/ This last thing is right, anyway. But I don't understand why we have to agree about speech.

Stranger/ Well, perhaps you'll understand if you follow me this way.

Theaetetus/ Where?

Stranger/ That which is not appeared to us to be one kind among others, but scattered over all those which are.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So next we have to think about whether it blends with belief and speech.

Theaetetus/ Why?

Stranger/ If it doesn't blend with them then everything has to be true. But if it does then there will be false belief and false speech, since falsity in thinking and speaking amount to believing and saying those that are not.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And if there's falsity then there's deception.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And if there's deception then necessarily the world will be full of copies, likenesses, and appearances.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ We said that the sophist had escaped into this region, but that he denied that there has come to be or is such a thing as falsity. For he denied that anyone either thinks or says that which is not, on the ground that that which is not never in any way has a share in being.

Theaetetus/ That's what he said.

Stranger/ But now it apparently does share in that which is, so he probably wouldn't still put up a fight about that. Perhaps, though, he might say that some forms share in that which is not and some don't, and that speech and belief are ones that don't. So he might contend again that copy-making and appearance-making—in which we said he was contained—totally are not. His ground would be that belief and speech don't associate with that which is not, and that without this association falsity totally is not. That's why we have to search around for speech, belief, and appearance, and first discover what they are, so that when they appear we see their association with that which is not clearly. Then when we've seen that clearly we can show that falsity is, and when

we've shown that we can tie the sophist up in it, if we can keep hold of him—or else we'll let him go and look for him in another kind.

Theaetetus/ What you said at the start seems absolutely true. The sophist is a hard kind to hunt down. He seems to have a whole supply of roadblocks, and whenever he throws one down in our way we have to fight through it before we can get to him. But now when we've barely gotten through the one about how that which is not is not, he's thrown another one down and we have to show that falsity is present in both speech and belief. And next, it seems, there will be another and another after that. A limit, it seems, never appears.

Stranger/ Even if you can only make a little progress, Theaetetus, you should cheer up. If you give up in this situation, what will you do some other time when you don't get anywhere or even are pushed back? A person like that would hardly capture a city, as the saying goes. But since we've done what you just said, my friend, the largest wall may already have been captured and the rest of them may be lower and easier.

Theaetetus/ Fine.

Stranger/ Then let's take up speech and belief, as we said just now. That way we can calculate whether that which is not comes into contact with them, or whether they're both totally true and neither one is ever false.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ Come on, then. Let's think about names again, the same way as we spoke about forms and letters of the alphabet. What we're looking for seems to lie in that direction.

Theaetetus/ What kind of question about them do we have to answer?

Stranger/ Whether they all fit with each other, or none of them do, or some of them will and some of them won't.

Theaetetus/ Anyway it's clear that some will and some won't.

Stranger/ Maybe you mean something like this: names that indicate something when you say them one after another fit together, and names that don't signify anything when you put them in a row don't fit.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ The same thing I thought you were assuming when you agreed with me just now—since there are two ways to use your voice to indicate something about being.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ One kind is called names, and the other is called verbs.

Theaetetus/ Tell me what each of them is.

Stranger/ A verb is the sort of indication that's applied to an action.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And a name is the kind of spoken sign that's applied to things that perform the actions.

Theaetetus/ Definitely.

Stranger/ So no speech is formed just from names spoken in a row, and also not from verbs that are spoken without names.

Theaetetus/ I didn't understand that.

Stranger/ Clearly you were focusing on something else when you agreed with me just now. What I meant was simply this: things don't form speech if they're said in a row like this.

Theaetetus/ Like what?

Stranger/ For example, "walks runs sleeps," and other verbs that signify actions. Even if somebody said all of them one after another that wouldn't be speech.

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Stranger/ Again, if somebody said “lion stag horse,” and whatever names there are of things that perform actions, the series wouldn’t make up speech. The sounds he uttered in the first or second way wouldn’t indicate either an action or an inaction or the being of something that is or of something that is not—not until he mixed verbs with nouns. But when he did that, they’ fit together and speech—the simplest and smallest kind of speech, I suppose—would arise from that first weaving of name and verb together.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ When someone says “man learns,” would you say that’s the shortest and simplest kind of speech?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Since he gives an indication about what is, or comes to be, or has come to be, or is going to be. And he doesn’t just name, but accomplishes something, by weaving verbs with names. That’s why we said he speaks and doesn’t just name. In fact this weaving is what we use the word “speech” for.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ So some things fit together and some don’t. Likewise some vocal signs don’t fit together, but the ones that do produce speech.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ But there’s still this small point.

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ Whenever there’s speech it has to be about something. It’s impossible for it not to be about something.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And speech also has to have some particular quality.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Now let's turn our attention to ourselves.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ I'll produce some speech by putting a thing together with an action by means of a name and a verb. You have to tell me what it's about.

Theaetetus/ I'll do it as well as I can.

Stranger/ "Theaetetus sits." That's not a long piece of speech, is it?

Theaetetus/ No, not too long.

Stranger/ Your job is to tell what it's about, what it's of.

Theaetetus/ Clearly it's about me, of me.

Stranger/ Then what about this one?

Theaetetus/ What one?

Stranger/ "Theaetetus (to whom I'm now talking) flies."

Theaetetus/ No one would ever deny that it's of me and about me.

Stranger/ We also say that each piece of speech has to have some particular quality.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ What quality should we say each one of these has?

Theaetetus/ The second one is false, I suppose, and the other one is true.

Stranger/ And the true one says those that are, as they are, about you.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And the false one says things different from those that are.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So it says those that are not, but that they are.

Theaetetus/ I suppose so.

Stranger/ But they're different things that are from the things that are about you—since we said that applied to each thing many beings are and many are not.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ In the first place, the second piece of speech I said about you must be one of the shortest there is, according to our definition of speech.

Theaetetus/ We agreed to that just now, anyway.

Stranger/ And we agreed that it's of something.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And if it is not of you, it isn't of anything else.

Theaetetus/ Of course not.

Stranger/ And if it were not of anything it would not be speech at all, since we showed that it was impossible for speech that is, to be speech that is of nothing.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely right.

Stranger/ But if someone says things about you, but says different things as the same or not beings as beings, then it definitely seems that false speech really and truly arises from that kind of putting together of verbs and names.

Theaetetus/ Yes, very true.

Stranger/ Well then, isn't it clear by now that both true and false thought and belief and appearance can occur in our souls?

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ The best way for you to know how is for you first to grasp what they are and how they're different from each other.

Theaetetus/ Then just tell me.

Stranger/ Aren't thought and speech the same, except that what we call thought is speech that occurs without the voice, inside the soul in conversation with itself?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And the stream of sound from the soul that goes through the mouth is called speech?

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ And then again we know that speech contains …

Theaetetus/ What?

Stranger/ Affirmation and denial.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So when affirmation or denial occurs as silent thought inside the soul, wouldn't you call that belief?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And what if that doesn't happen on its own but arises for someone through perception? When that happens, what else could one call it correctly, besides appearance?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So since there is true and false speech, and of the processes just mentioned, thinking appeared to be the soul's conversation with itself, belief the conclusion of thinking, and what we call appearing the blending of perception and belief, it follows that since these are all the same kind of thing as speech, some of them must sometimes be false.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ So you realize we've found false belief and speech sooner than we expected to just now. Then we were afraid that to look for it would be to attack a completely hopeless project.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ So let's not be discouraged about what's still left. Since these other things have come to light, let's remember the divisions by types that we made earlier.

Theaetetus/ Which ones?

Stranger/ We divided copy-making into two types, likeness-making and appearance-making.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And we said we were confused about which one to put the sophist in.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And in our confusion about that we plunged into even greater bewilderment, when an account emerged that disagreed with everyone, by denying that there are likenesses or copies or appearances at all, on the ground that there isn't ever any falsity in any way anywhere.

Theaetetus/ That's right.

Stranger/ But now since false speech and false belief both appear to be, it's possible for imitations of those that are to be, and for expertise in deception to arise from that state of affairs.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And we agreed before that the sophist does fall under one of the two types we just mentioned.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then let's try again to take the kind we've posited and cut it in two. Let's go ahead and always follow the right-hand part of what we've cut, and hold onto things that the sophist is associated with until we strip away everything that he has in common with other things. Then when we've left his own peculiar nature, let's display it, especially to ourselves but also to people to whom this sort of procedure is naturally congenial.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ Didn't we begin by dividing expertise into productive and acquisitive?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And under the acquisitive part the sophist appeared in hunting, combat, wholesaling, and types of that sort.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ But now, since he's included among experts in imitation, first we obviously have to divide productive expertise in two. We say imitation is a sort of production, but of copies and not of the things themselves. Is that right?

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ First of all, production has two parts.

Theaetetus/ What are they?

Stranger/ Divine and human.

Theaetetus/ I don't understand yet.

Stranger/ If you remember how we started, we said production was any capacity that causes things to come to be that previously were not.

Theaetetus/ I remember.

Stranger/ Take animals and everything mortal, including plants and everything on the earth that grows from seeds and roots, and also all lifeless bodies made up inside the earth, whether fusible or not. Are we going to say that anything besides the craftsmanship of a god makes them come to be after previously not being? Or shall we rely on the saying and the widespread belief that …?

Theaetetus/ That what?

Stranger/ Are we going to say that nature produces them by some spontaneous cause that generates them without any

thought, or by a cause that works by reason and divine knowledge derived from a god?

Theaetetus/ I often shift back and forth on that from one view to the other, maybe because of my age. When I'm focusing on you now, and supposing that you think they come to be by the agency of a god, that's what I think too.

Stranger/ Fine, Theaetetus. If we thought you were the kind of person who might believe something different in the future we'd try to use some cogent, persuasive argument to make you agree. But since I know what your nature is and I know, too, that even without arguments from us it will tend in the direction that it's pulled toward now, I'll let the issue go. It would take too much time. I'll assume divine expertise produces the things that come about by so-called nature, and that human expertise produces the things that humans compound those things into. According to this account there are two kinds of production, human and divine.

Theaetetus/ Right.

Stranger/ Since there are two of them, cut each of them in two again.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ It's as if you'd already cut production all the way along its width, and now you'll cut it along its length.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ That way there are four parts of it all together, two human ones related to us and two divine ones related to the gods.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then if we take the division we made the first way, one part of each of those parts is the production of originals. Just about the best thing to call the two parts that

are left might be “copy-making.” That way, production is divided in two again.

Theaetetus/ Tell me again how each of them is divided.

Stranger/ We know that we human beings and the other living things, and also fire, water, and things like that, which natural things come from, are each generated and produced by a god. Is that right?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ And there are copies of each of these things, as opposed to the things themselves, that also come about by divine workmanship.

Theaetetus/ What kinds of things?

Stranger/ Things in dreams, and appearances that arise by themselves during the day. They’re shadows when darkness appears in firelight, and they’re reflections when a thing’s own light and the light of something else come together around bright, smooth surfaces and produce an appearance that looks the reverse of the way the thing looks from straight ahead.

Theaetetus/ Yes, those are two products of divine production—the things themselves and the copies corresponding to each one.

Stranger/ And what about human expertise? We say house-building makes a house itself and drawing makes a different one, like a human dream made for people who are awake.

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ And just the same way in other cases, too, there are pairs of products of human production, that is, the thing itself, we say, and the copy.

Theaetetus/ Now I understand better and I take it that there are two kinds of double production, divine and human

in each division. One kind produces things themselves, and the other kind produces things similar to them.

Stranger/ Let's recall that one part of copy-making is likeness-making. The other kind was going to be appearance-making, if falsity appeared to be truly falsity and by nature one of those that are.

Theaetetus/ Yes, it was.

Stranger/ But falsity did turn out that way, so are we going to count likeness-making and appearance-making as indisputably two forms?

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then let's divide appearance-making in two again.

Theaetetus/ How?

Stranger/ Into one sort that's done with tools and one that uses one's own self as the tool of the person making the appearance.

Theaetetus/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ When somebody uses his own body or voice to make something similar to your body or voice, I think the best thing to call this part of appearance-making is "imitating."

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let's set this part off by calling it imitation, and let's be lazy and let the other part go. We'll leave it to someone else to bring it together into a unit and give it a suitable name.

Theaetetus/ All right, let's take the one and let the other go.

Stranger/ But the right thing, Theaetetus, is still to take imitation to have two parts. Think about why.

Theaetetus/ Tell me.

Stranger/ Some imitators know what they're imitating and some don't. And what division is more important than the one between ignorance and knowledge?

Theaetetus/ None.

Stranger/ Wasn't the imitation that we just mentioned the kind that's associated with knowledge? Someone who knew you and your character might imitate you, mightn't he?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ What about the character of justice and all of virtue taken together? Don't many people who are ignorant of it, but have some beliefs about it, try hard to cause what they believe it is to appear to be present in them. And don't they imitate it in their words and actions as much as they can?

Theaetetus/ Very many people do that.

Stranger/ And are they all unsuccessful at seeming to be just without being just at all? Or is the opposite true?

Theaetetus/ Yes, the opposite.

Stranger/ I think we have to say that this person, who doesn't know, is a very different imitator from the previous one, who does.

Theaetetus/ Yes.

Stranger/ Where would you get a suitable name for each of them? Isn't it obviously hard to, just because the people who came before us were thoughtless and lazy about dividing kinds into types, and so they never even tried to divide them. That's why we necessarily lack a good supply of names. Still, even though it sounds daring let's distinguish them by calling imitation accompanied by belief "belief-mimicry" and imitation accompanied by knowledge "informed mimicry."

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ Then we need to use the former term, since the sophist isn't one of the people who know but is one of the people who imitate.

Theaetetus/ He certainly is.

Stranger/ Let's examine the belief-mimic the way people examine iron, to see whether it's sound or has a crack in it.

Theaetetus/ All right.

Stranger/ Well, it has a big one. One sort of belief-mimic is foolish and thinks he knows the things he only has beliefs about. The other sort has been around a lot of discussions, and so by temperament he's suspicious and fearful that he doesn't know the things that he pretends in front of others to know.

Theaetetus/ There definitely are both types that you've mentioned.

Stranger/ Shall we take one of these to be a sort of sincere imitator and the other to be an insincere one?

Theaetetus/ That seems right.

Stranger/ And are there one or two kinds of insincere ones?

Theaetetus/ You look and see.

Stranger/ I'm looking, and there clearly appear to be two. I see that one sort can maintain his insincerity in long speeches to a crowd, and the other uses short speeches in private conversation to force the person talking with him to contradict himself.

Theaetetus/ You're absolutely right.

Stranger/ How shall we show up the long-winded sort, as a statesman or as a demagogue?

Theaetetus/ A demagogue.

Stranger/ And what shall we call the other one? Wise, or a sophist?

Theaetetus/ We can't call him wise, since we took him not to know anything. But since he imitates the wise man he'll obviously have a name derived from the wise man's name. And now at last I see that we have to call him the person who is really and truly a sophist.

Stranger/ Shall we weave his name together from start to finish and tie it up the way we did before?

Theaetetus/ Of course.

Stranger/ Imitation of the contrary-speech-producing, insincere and unknowing sort, of the appearance-making kind of copy-making, the word-juggling part of production that's marked off as human and not divine. Anyone who says the sophist is of this "blood and family" will be saying, it seems, the complete truth.

Theaetetus/ Absolutely.

The Statesman.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Theodorus, a Guest, and Socrates Junior.

Socrates/ I owe you, Theodorus, surely many thanks for my acquaintance with Theætetus and this guest to boot.

Theodorus/ Perhaps, Socrates, you will owe me thrice as many, when they shall have worked out for you a statesman and a philosopher.

Socrates/ Be it so. But shall we say we have thus heard this from you, the most powerful in calculations and geometry?

Theodorus/ How, Socrates?

Socrates/ As having put down each of these men of equal worth, who are in value more removed from each other than accords with the analogy of your art.

Theodorus/ By our god Ammon, Socrates, you have well and justly, and very rememberingly reproved me for my error in calculation. But I will follow you up about this at a future time. But do not you, O guest, in any respect be faint-hearted in gratifying us; but select for us either first a statesman, or a philosopher; and having selected go through the discussion.

Stranger/ This must be done, Theodorus; for since we have put our hand to this discussion, we must not stand aloof, till we arrive at the end of it. But what must I do with Theætetus here?

Theodorus/ As regards what?

Stranger/ Shall we suffer him to rest, and take in his stead Socrates here, his fellow-combatant? Or how do you advise?

Theodorus/ Take him, as you say, in his stead. For, both being young men, they will after resting easily endure every labor.

Socrates/ And indeed, O guest, both of them appear almost to have an affinity with me from some quarter. For you say that one of them Theætetus seems to resemble me in the natural form of his face; and the appellation of the other, being of the same name as myself, and his address furnish a kind of family connection. It is meet then for us to recognize always with readiness in conversation those of the same kin. Now yesterday I mingled in a conversation with Theætetus, and I have now heard him answering; but neither case applies to Socrates here. It is meet, however, for us to consider him likewise. Let him then at some other time answer me, but at present you.

Stranger/ Be it so. Do you, Socrates junior, hear this Socrates?

Socrates Younger/ I do.

Stranger/ Do you then agree to what he says?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely.

Stranger/ It appears then, that your affairs will not be an hindrance; and perhaps it is requisite for me to be much less an hindrance. But after the sophist it is necessary, as it appears to me, for us to seek out the statesman. Tell me then, whether must we place this character too among the possessors of knowledge, or how?

Socrates Younger/ In this way.

Stranger/ We must then divide the sciences, as we did when we were inquiring into the former character.

Socrates Younger/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ But yet the division appears to me, Socrates, to be not after the same manner.

Socrates Younger/ Why not?

Stranger/ But after another.

Socrates Younger/ It would seem so.

Stranger/ Where then can one find the statesman's path? For find it we must; and separating it from the rest, put on it the seal of one general form, and on the other deflections the mark of another species; and thus cause our soul to conceive that all the sciences do in reality belong to two species.

Socrates Younger/ I think, O guest, that this is your business, and not mine.

Stranger/ But indeed, Socrates, it must needs be yours too, when it becomes apparent to us.

Socrates Younger/ You speak well.

Stranger/ Are not then arithmetic, and certain other sciences allied to this, divested of action; and do they not afford a subject of thought alone?

Socrates Younger/ It is so.

Stranger/ But those which pertain to carpenter's work, and the whole of handicraft trades, possess a science, as it were, innate in their operations, and at the same time complete the bodies produced by them, which had not an existence previously.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ In this manner then divide sciences in general, calling one practical and the other merely intellectual.

Socrates Younger/ Let there be then of one whole science two species.

Stranger/ Whether then shall we lay down the statesman, the king, the despot, and the head of a household, and call them all by one name? Or shall we say there are as many sciences as have been their mentioned names? Or rather follow me hither.

Socrates Younger/ Whither?

Stranger/ On this road. If a private person is able to give advice sufficiently well to any of the public physicians, is it not necessary for him to be called by the name of the art, the same as he is, to whom he gives advice.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ What then, whatever private person is skilled in giving advice to the king of a country, shall we not say that he possesses the science, which the ruler himself ought to possess?

Socrates Younger/ We shall.

Stranger/ But surely the science of a true king is a kingly science.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And may not he, who possesses this science, whether he is a private man, or a king, be in every respect rightly called, according to this art, king-like.

Socrates Younger/ Justly so.

Stranger/ And are not the head of a household and a despot the same?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ But what, will the size of an extensive household or the swollen form of a small state make any difference as regards the government?

Socrates Younger/ Not at all.

Stranger/ It is evident then, what is indeed the thing we were just now inquiring, that there is one science respecting

all these. But whether anyone calls it the science of a king, a statesman, or a family-man, let us not differ about it.

Socrates Younger/ Why should we?

Stranger/ This too is evident, that each individual king has in his hands, and the whole of his body, some little power towards retaining his rule, as compared with the intelligence and strength of his soul.

Socrates Younger/ It is evident.

Stranger/ Are you willing then for us to say that a king is more allied to intellectual than to manual and wholly practical science?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ We will then put together in the same class statesmanship and a statesman, kingship and a king, as being all one thing.

Socrates Younger/ It is evident.

Stranger/ Shall we not proceed then in an orderly manner, if after this we divide the intellectual science?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Attend, then, and inform me whether we can perceive any point of union?

Socrates Younger/ Tell me of what kind.

Stranger/ Of this kind. We have a certain calculating art.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And this I think entirely belongs to the intellectual arts.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ Shall we concede to the calculating art, that knows the difference in numbers, anything more than that it distinguishes things, the subjects of intellect.

Socrates Younger/ How should we?

Stranger/ For every architect is not a workman himself, but is the ruler over workmen.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And he imparts indeed intellect, but not the work by hand.

Socrates Younger/ Just so.

Stranger/ He may justly then be said to have a share in intellectual science.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely.

Stranger/ And for him I think it is fitting, after he has passed a judgment, not to have an end, nor to be freed, as the calculator was freed from doing more, but to command every workman to do that which is suited to him, until they shall have worked out what has been commanded.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ Are not then all such as these, and such as are consequent upon the calculating art, intellectual? And do not these two genera differ from each other in judgment and commandment?

Socrates Younger/ They appear to do so.

Stranger/ If then we should divide the whole of the intellectual science into two parts, and call the one mandatory, and the other judicial, should we not say that we have made a careful division?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, according to my mind.

Stranger/ But for those, who do anything in common, it is delightful to be of one mind.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ As far then as we participate on this point, we must bid farewell to the opinions of others.

Socrates Younger/ Why not?

Stranger/ Come, then, inform me in which of these arts we must place the kingly character. Must we place him in the judicial art, as some spectator? Or rather, shall we place him in the commanding art, as being a despot?

Socrates Younger/ How not rather in this?

Stranger/ We may consider again the commanding art, whether it stands in any way apart. For it appears to me, that as the art of a huckster is separated from his, who sells his own goods, so is the genus of a king from the genus of public criers.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ Hucksters, having received the previously sold works of others, afterwards sell them again themselves.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ The tribe of criers too, after receiving the thoughts of strangers, enjoins them again to others.

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ What then, shall we mix in the same class the king-art, and that of the interpreting, ordering, prophesying, and public-crying, and many other arts allied to these, all which have this in common that they command? Or are you willing that, as we just now instituted a resemblance in things, we should make a resemblance in the name likewise? since the genus of those, who rule their own concerns, is nearly without a name; and shall we so divide these, by placing the kingly genus among those, who command their own concerns, and by neglecting everything else, leave anyone to put another name on them? For our method was adopted for the sake of a ruler, and not for its contrary.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Since then this stands at a moderate distance apart from those, and is separated from that, which is

foreign, into that which is domestic, it is necessary to divide this again, if we have yet any yielding section in this.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ And, indeed, it appears that we have. But follow me and divide.

Socrates Younger/ Whither?

Stranger/ Shall we not find that all such as we conceive to be rulers, do, by making use of a command, give a command for the sake of producing something?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ And indeed it is not at all difficult for all things that are produced, to receive a twofold division.

Socrates Younger/ In what way?

Stranger/ Some among all of them are animated, and others are inanimate.

Socrates Younger/ They are so.

Stranger/ If we wish to cut the portion of intelligence, that has a commanding power over these very things, we will cut it.

Socrates Younger/ According to what?

Stranger/ By assigning one part over the generation of inanimate things, and the other over the generation of animated. And thus the whole will be divided into two parts.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ One part then let us put aside, and take up again the other; and after taking it up, divide the whole into two parts.

Socrates Younger/ But which of these do you say is to be resumed?

Stranger/ By all means, that which has a command over animals. For it is not the province of the kingly science to

have a command over things inanimate, like the science of architecture; but, being of a more noble nature, over animals; and it ever possesses a power relating to such very things.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ With respect to the generation and nurture of animals, a person may see the former as single-feeding, but the latter as the common-feeding of the nurslings in herds.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ But we shall find that the statesman is not a breeder of his own property, like an ox-driver, or some horse-currier; but is rather like the person who rears horses and oxen.

Socrates Younger/ What has been just said seems to be the fact.

Stranger/ Whether then with respect to the nurture of animals, shall we call the common-rearing of all together a herd-rearing, or a certain general-rearing.

Socrates Younger/ Whichever may happen in the discourse.

Stranger/ You have said well, Socrates. And if you avoid paying too serious an attention to names, you will appear in old age to be more rich in prudence. But now we must do as you recommended. But do you understand how someone will, having divided the herd-rearing art into two, cause, what is now sought for in a double, to be sought for then in halves?

Socrates Younger/ I shall be eager to do so: and it appears to me that there is one rearing of men, and another of beasts.

Stranger/ You have divided in every respect most readily and courageously. However, we must be careful to the utmost of our power not to suffer hereafter this.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That we do not take away one small part as applicable to many and great parts, nor yet without a species; but let it always have at the same time a species. For it is very well to separate immediately the thing sought for from all the rest, if the separation be rightly made; just as you did a little before, through conceiving the division to be rightly made, hasten on, seeing that the discourse was tending to man. But, my friend, it is not safe to divide with subtlety; but it is more safe to proceed in the middle by dividing continually; for thus will one more readily meet with forms of existence. But the whole of this relates to our inquiries.

Socrates Younger/ How say you this, O guest?

Stranger/ I must endeavor to speak yet more clearly, through a kind feeling towards your disposition, Socrates. But it is impossible in the subject at hand to show what is now said in a manner wanting in nothing; still we must endeavor, for the sake of perspicuity, to carry on the inquiry a little further.

Socrates Younger/ In what respect then do you say we have, by dividing, just now not rightly done?

Stranger/ In this respect; that, should anyone attempt to give a twofold division to the human genus, he would divide, in the way that the majority here divide. For by separating the Grecian genus, as one apart from all, they give to all the rest, who are innumerable, unmixt, and not speaking the same language with each other, one name, that of a Barbarian race; and through this one name they fancy the race itself to be one; or as if someone, thinking that number should be divided into two species, should, after cutting off ten thousand from all numbers, put it aside as one species, and, giving one name to all the rest, should think that,

through that appellation, this genus will become separate and different from the other. He however would make in a more beautiful manner, and more according to species, and a two-fold division, who should divide number into even and odd, and the human species into male and female; and, after arranging the Lydians or Phrygians, or some other nations, should then separate them into wholes, when he is incapable of finding the genus, and at the same time the species of each of the divided portions.

Socrates Younger/ Most right. But explain, O guest, this very thing—How can anyone rather clearly know that genus and species are not the same, but different from each other?

Stranger/ O Socrates, thou best of men, thou commands no trifling thing. Already have we wandered further from our proposed discourse than is fitting; and yet you order us to wander still further. Now then let us, as is reasonable, turn back again; and hereafter we will at leisure pursue this point, as having come upon the track. Do not, however, by any means guard against this, that you have heard from me this point clearly determined.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That species and part are different from each other.

Socrates Younger/ Why say you so?

Stranger/ When anything is a species of something, it is necessary for it to be a part of the thing of which it is said to be the species: but there is no necessity for a part to be a species. Always consider me, therefore, Socrates, as asserting this rather than that.

Socrates Younger/ Be it so.

Stranger/ But tell me that, which is after this.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ The point of the digression which has brought us hither. For I think it was especially at that point, when, on your being asked how we must divide herd-rearing, you answered very readily, that there were two kinds of animals, the one of man, and the other of brutes taken all together.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And you then appeared to me, after taking away a part, to think that you ought to leave the remainder as one genus of all brutes, because you could give to them all the same name, by calling them brutes.

Socrates Younger/ Such was the case.

Stranger/ But this, O most courageous of men, is just as if some other prudent animal, such as seems to be the crane, or some other animal of a similar kind, should, in the same manner as you do, oppose the cranes, as one race, to all other animals, and make itself an object of respect; and, putting all the rest together with men into one race, call them perhaps nothing else but brutes. Let us then endeavor to avoid everything whatsoever of this kind.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ By not dividing every genus of animals, that we may suffer the less.

Socrates Younger/ For there is no necessity.

Stranger/ For we then erred in this way.

Socrates Younger/ In what?

Stranger/ Such part of intellectual science as related to commanding was said by us to be of the animal-rearing kind, as regards gregarious animals. Was it not?

Socrates Younger/ It was.

Stranger/ The whole animal genus, therefore, was even then divided into the tame and wild. For those animals that

have a nature to become gentle, are called tame; but those that have not, are called wild.

Socrates Younger/ Correctly.

Stranger/ But the science, of which we are in the hunt, was and is in the case of tame animals, and is to be sought for among the gregarious rearlings.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let us then not divide, as formerly, looking to all animals, nor with haste, so that we may quickly arrive at state-science. For this has caused us to suffer even now according to the proverb—

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ By not well dividing quietly, to complete the task more slowly.

Socrates Younger/ And it has, O guest, properly caused us to suffer.

Stranger/ Be it so then. But let us again from the beginning endeavor to divide the common-rearing of animals. For perhaps the discourse itself, being brought to a conclusion, will more clearly unfold what you desire. But tell me—

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ This; if indeed you have frequently heard it from certain persons. For I do not think you have met with the tame-fish places in the Nile, or in the royal lakes. But perhaps you have seen the taming of these in artificial fountains.

Socrates Younger/ I have seen these frequently, and I have heard of those from many.

Stranger/ You have likewise heard and believe that geese and cranes are reared, though you have never wandered about the Thessalian plains.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ On this account I have asked you all these questions, because the rearing of herds of animals is partly of those moving in the water, and partly on dry land.

Socrates Younger/ It is so.

Stranger/ Does it not then appear to you likewise, that we ought to cut in two the common-rearing science, distributing to each of them its own part, and call the one a rearing-in-moisture, and the other a rearing-on-dry-land.

Socrates Younger/ It does so appear to me.

Stranger/ But we will not in the same manner inquire to which of these arts king-science belongs. For it is evident to everyone.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ And everyone can separate the dry-rearing portion of the herd-rearing.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ Into the flying and walking-on-foot.

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ But what of state-science, must it be inquired whether it relates to the walking-on-foot? Or do you not think, that the most stupid person, so to say, would imagine so?

Socrates Younger/ I do.

Stranger/ But it is requisite to show that the art of rearing foot-walking animals is, as number was just now, cut into two parts.

Socrates Younger/ This is evident.

Stranger/ And yet to the part, to which our discourse has led us on, there seem to be some two paths extending themselves; the one quicker, by being divided, a small part as compared with a large one; but the other longer, from

preserving rather the precept, which we mentioned before, that we ought to cut as much as possible through the middle. It is in our power then to proceed by either of the paths we may wish.

Socrates Younger/ Is it then impossible to proceed by both?

Stranger/ What by both at once, O wonderful youth? Alternately, however, it is plain the thing is possible.

Socrates Younger/ I choose then both alternately.

Stranger/ The thing is easy; since short is the remainder of the road. In the beginning indeed and middle of our journey the command would have been difficult. But now, since this seems good, let us first proceed by the longer road. For, as we are fresh, we shall more easily journey through it. But do you look to the division.

Socrates Younger/ Speak it.

Stranger/ Of such tame animals as are gregarious, the foot-walking have been divided by us according to nature.

Socrates Younger/ What nature?

Stranger/ By some of their race being hornless and others horned.

Socrates Younger/ So it appears.

Stranger/ Divide then the art of rearing foot-walking animals, and assign to each part, making use of reason. For should you wish to name them, the thing will become complicated more than is fitting.

Socrates Younger/ How then must one speak of them?

Stranger/ Thus. Of the science of rearing foot-walking animals, divided into two parts, let one portion be assigned to the horned part of the herd, but the other to the hornless.

Socrates Younger/ Let this be so said: for they have been sufficiently shown to be so.

Stranger/ Now then the king is evidently the shepherd over a flock of animals deprived of horns.

Socrates Younger/ For how is he not evident?

Stranger/ Breaking then this herd into portions, let us endeavor to assign the result to him the king.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Whether then are you willing for us to divide it the herd by the cloven, or, what is called, the solid hoof? Or by a common or individual generation? For you understand.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That the race of horses and asses naturally procreate with each other.

Socrates Younger/ It does.

Stranger/ But the other still remaining portion of the smooth-haired herd of tame animals, is unmixed in their generation with each other.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ But whether does the Statesman appear to take care of animals having a common, or individual generation?

Socrates Younger/ It is evident of the unmixed generation.

Stranger/ We must then, as it seems, divide this, as those before, into two parts.

Socrates Younger/ Yes; we must.

Stranger/ But we have cut into minute portions nearly every tame and gregarious animal, except two genera. For it is not fit to rank the genus of dogs among gregarious cattle.

Socrates Younger/ It is not. But in what manner shall we divide these two?

Stranger/ In that, by which it is just for you and Theætetus to divide them, since you are handling the science of geometry.

Socrates Younger/ In what manner?

Stranger/ By the diameter, and again by the diameter of the diameter.

Socrates Younger/ How say you?

Stranger/ Is the nature, which the race of us men possesses, adapted to locomotion in any other way than as a diameter, which is two feet in power?

Socrates Younger/ In no other way.

Stranger/ Moreover the nature of the remaining genus is again according to the power of our power, a diameter, if it naturally consists of twice two feet.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly. And now I nearly understand what you wish to show.

Stranger/ But in addition to these, do we perceive, Socrates, something else belonging to those having a reputation for laughter, which happened to us in making the former division?

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ This our human race, sharing the same lot and running the same course with a race the most generous and most handy of existing animals.

Socrates Younger/ I perceive it happening very absurdly too.

Stranger/ Is it not fit that the slowest things should arrive last of all?

Socrates Younger/ It is.

Stranger/ But we do not perceive this, that a king appears still more ridiculous, when running together with the herd,

and performing his course in conjunction with him, who is exercised in the best manner with respect to a tractable life.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ For now, Socrates, that is more apparent, which was said by us in our search for a sophist.

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ That in such a method of discourse there is no greater care for what is venerable, than what is not, nor does it prefer the small to the great, but always accomplishes that which according to itself is most true.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ After this, that you may not anticipate me by asking what is the shorter road to the definition of a king, shall I traverse it the first?

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ I say then, that we ought to have divided forthwith the foot-walking genus into the biped and quadruped; and, seeing that the human race shared the same lot with the genus flying alone, we ought to have again divided the two-footed into the wingless and winged; and this division having been made, and the art shown, which is the rearer of men, we ought to have brought forward and placed over it the statesman and kingly character, like a charioteer, and given him the reins of the city, in consequence of this science being peculiarly his own.

Socrates Younger/ You have spoken beautifully, and given me an account, as it were, of a debt, and added a digression, by way of interest, and completed the transaction.

Stranger/ Come then, let us, going back to the beginning, connect with the end the discourse concerning the name of the statesman's art.

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ One part then of intellectual science was at the beginning the commanding; and the part assimilated to this was called the self-commanding. Again, of the self-commanding, the rearing of animals was cut off, as not the smallest part of the genera; and of the rearing of animals, the rearing of herds was a species; and of the rearing of herds, a part was the care of foot-walking animals; and of the care of foot-walking animals, the science of rearing the hornless race was especially cut off. But of this again, it is necessary to connect a part, not less than the triple, if anyone is desirous of bringing it under one name, by calling it the science of tending an unmixed genus. But a section from this, which alone remains, and which rears men, as being a biped flock, is the part which has been just now explored, and is called, at one and the same time, the kingly and statesmanly kind.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Do you then, Socrates, think that this has been, as you say, really done well?

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That the thing proposed has been in every respect sufficiently discussed. Or has our investigation been particularly deficient in this very thing, that the account has been given in words, but not in all respects worked out to the end?

Socrates Younger/ How say you?

Stranger/ I will endeavor to explain to ourselves more clearly what I am thinking of.

Socrates Younger/ Say it.

Stranger/ There is then of many herdsmen's arts, that have appeared to us, one, the statesman's, and the guardianship of some one herd.

Socrates Younger/ There is.

Stranger/ This our discourse has defined to be neither the rearer of horses, nor of other animals, but to be the science of rearing men in common.

Socrates Younger/ It did so.

Stranger/ Now let us see what is the difference between all herdsmen and kings.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ If anyone of the rest, possessing the name of another art, says and pretends to be the rearer in common of the herd, what should we say?

Socrates Younger/ How say you?

Stranger/ Just as if all merchants, and husbandmen, and purveyors of food, and besides these, teachers of gymnastics, and the genus of physicians, should, you know that by their speeches oppose altogether the herdsmen of the human race, whom we have called statesmen, and assert that it is their care to rear men, and not only men herded together, but even the rulers themselves—

Socrates Younger/ Would they not rightly say?

Stranger/ Perhaps so. And we will consider this too. We know that no one will contend with a herdsman about things of this kind; since he is himself the rearer, himself the physician, and himself, as it were, the bridesman of the herd, and is alone skilled in the midwife's art respecting the birth and delivery of the produce. No one, besides, is better able, by such sport and music as cattle can, by their nature, share in, to console and soothe, and render gentle, both with instruments and the naked mouth, handling in the best way the music of his flock. And the same may be said of other herdsmen. Or may it not?

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ How then will our discourse respecting a king appear to be right and entire, when we place him alone, as the herdsman and rearer of the human herd, selecting him alone out of ten thousand others contending with him?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ Did we not then a little before very properly fear, when we suspected, lest we should only speak of a certain figure of a king, and not perfectly work out the statesman, until by taking away those, who were diffused around him, and laid claim to a fellow-rearing, and, by separating him from them, we should exhibit him alone and pure?

Socrates Younger/ Most rightly did we fear.

Stranger/ This then, Socrates, must be done by us, unless we are about to bring disgrace upon our discourse at its end.

Socrates Younger/ But this at least must by no means be done.

Stranger/ We must then march by another road again from another beginning.

Socrates Younger/ By what road?

Stranger/ By mixing up almost some merriment. For it is requisite to make use of the prolix portion of a long story, and, as regards what still remains, to take away, as we did before, always a part from a part, till we arrive at the summit of the inquiry. Must we not do so?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Give then, as children do, entirely your attention to my story; for you are not altogether flying from many years of merriment.

Socrates Younger/ Relate it.

Stranger/ Of the things then said of old, there have been, and will be still, many others preserved, and the prodigy likewise relating to the reported contests between Atreus and Thyestes. For you have surely heard and remember what is then said to have happened.

Socrates Younger/ Perhaps you mean the prodigy respecting the golden ewe.

Stranger/ By no means; but respecting the change in the rising and setting of the sun, and of the other constellations, how that they set then at the very place from whence they now rise, and rose from the opposite one; and that the deity gave a testimony in favor of Atreus, and changed the heavens into the present figure.

Socrates Younger/ This too is reported.

Stranger/ And we have likewise heard from many of the kingdom over which Kronos (Saturn) ruled.

Socrates Younger/ We have from very many.

Stranger/ And that the men of former times were produced earth-born, and not begotten from each other?

Socrates Younger/ This too is one of the things said of old.

Stranger/ All these things then arose from the same circumstance, and in addition to these ten thousand others, and still more wonderful. But, through the length of time, some of them have become extinct, and others are told in a dispersed manner, separate from each other. But that which is the cause of this to all these, no person has told as yet; and it must be now told; for being told it will be something conspicuous for showing forth the king.

Socrates Younger/ You have spoken most beautifully. Say on then, and omit nothing.

Stranger/ Hear, then. This universe the deity does at one time conduct himself, as it proceeds, and with it rolls on; but at another leaves it, when its revolutions shall have received the measure of the fitting time; and it is then brought back again of its own accord to a contrary state, being a thing of life, and having a share of intelligence from him, who put it together at its outset. Now this movement backwards has been of necessity implanted in it through this.

Socrates Younger/ Through what?

Stranger/ To subsist always according to the same, and in a similar manner, and to be the same, belongs to the most divine of all things alone. But the nature of body is not of this order. But that, which we have called heaven and the world, has a share in many and blessed gifts from the producing cause; moreover, it has had a share of body; from whence it cannot be entirely without a share of change; nevertheless, according to its power it is moved as much as possible in the same, and according to the same, by one impetus. Hence it is allotted a revolving movement, as being the smallest change in its motion. But scarcely anything is able to turn itself by itself, except that which is the leader of all things that are moved. And it is not lawful for this to move at one time in one way, and at another in a contrary way. From all this then we must say, that the world does not always cause itself to revolve, nor that the whole is always made by the deity to revolve in two and contrary revolutions: nor, again, that some two deities, whose thoughts are contrary to each other, cause it to revolve; but what has been said just now, and remains alone, that at one time it is conducted by another divine cause, possessing the power to live again, and receiving an immortality prepared by the demiurgus; but that at another time, when it is let loose, it proceeds itself by itself; and, after being thus let loose for such a time as to perform back again many myriads of

revolutions, it proceeds by its being of the greatest size, and most equally balanced, to move at the smallest foot.

Socrates Younger/ All that you have gone through appears to be said very reasonably indeed.

Stranger/ Reasoning then from what has been said already, let us think together on the circumstance, which we stated was the cause of all these wonderful doings. For it is this very thing.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That the movement of the universe is at one time carried on, as it is at present, in a circle, and at another time in the contrary direction.

Socrates Younger/ How is this?

Stranger/ We must consider this change of motion to be the greatest and most perfect of all the revolutions, relating to the heavenly bodies.

Socrates Younger/ It is likely.

Stranger/ It is proper then to think that the greatest changes happen at that time to us, who are living within the universe.

Socrates Younger/ And this too is likely.

Stranger/ But do we not know that the nature of animals sustains with difficulty changes great, numerous, and of all kinds?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ Hence the greatest destruction of other animals necessarily takes place at that time, and that of the human race only some small portion remains. And to these many other wonderful and novel circumstances happen at the same time; but this is the greatest, and follows that revolution of the universe at that period, when a turn occurs contrary to the present state of things.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ The period of life, which each animal then had, this was first arrested in all; and all that was mortal ceased to be seen advancing to old age, but changing back to the contrary, grew, as it were, younger and more delicate. The white hairs too of older people became black, and the cheeks of those that had beards becoming smooth, brought back each person to the past blooming period of life. The bodies likewise of such as were in manhood's prime, becoming smoother and smaller each day and night, returned again to the nature of a newly-born child, and were assimilated to this nature, both in soul and body; and thenceforth wasting away, disappeared in reality entirely; and the corpses of those, who died at that time through violence, did, through undergoing the selfsame fate, become in a manner unseen, and in a few days, quite putrid.

Socrates Younger/ But what was then, O guest, the generation of animals, and in what manner were they produced from each other?

Stranger/ It is evident, Socrates, that at that time there was no generation of one thing from another; but, it is said, there was once an earth-born race; this was at that period restored back again from out the earth; and the tradition of it was remembered by our first progenitors, who were close upon the revolution that reached to the period next in order, and were born at the beginning of the present state of things. For they became the heralds to us of those accounts, which are at present disbelieved improperly by the multitude. For I think we ought to reflect together on the consequence. For from the fact of old men coming to the nature of boys, it follows, that of such as were dead, but not laid in the earth, the corpses would be put together and made to revive by the turn of production revolving in a contrary direction; and that the earth-born race would, according to this method being

necessarily produced, have their name and speech, except such as a deity conveyed elsewhere, or invested with another fate.

Socrates Younger/ This really follows from what has been said above. But with respect to the life, which you say was under the rule of Kronos (Saturn), did it subsist in those revolutions, or in these? For it is evident that the change in the position of the stars and the sun coincides with both these revolutions.

Stranger/ You have followed well the discourse. But, in answer to your question respecting all things being produced spontaneously for mankind, this by no means is the case in the present revolution; but it occurred in the former. For then the deity was at first the ruler and guardian of the whole revolving circle; just as now the parts of the world are locally distributed by gods ruling in the very same way. Divine dæmons, too, had a share, after the manner of shepherds, in animals according to genera and herds, each being sufficient for all things pertaining to the several particulars over which he presided; so that there was nothing of a wild nature, no eating of each other, no war, nor sedition of any kind; and ten thousand other things might be stated, which follow upon such an arrangement. But what is said respecting the spontaneous life of these men, has been stated on this account. The deity himself tended them, and was their protector; just as men now, being an animal more divine than others, tend other races meaner than themselves; and as he tended them, there were no forms of state or polity, nor a property in women and children; for all these were restored to life from the earth, and had no recollection of former events. But all such things were absent; they had however fruit in abundance from oaks, and many other trees, not grown by land tilling, but given spontaneously by the earth. They lived, too, for the

most part naked, upon no strewed couch, and in the open air; for the temperament of the seasons was not painful to them; theirs were soft beds of grass, springing up without grudging from the earth. And thus, Socrates, you hear what was the life of men under Kronos (Saturn): but you, being present yourself, perceive what is life now, which is said to be under Zeus (Zeus). But are you able and willing likewise to judge which of these is the happier?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ Do you wish then that I should, after a fashion, judge for you?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ If then those nurtured by Kronos (Saturn), when they had so much leisure and the power to converse not only with men, but with brutes likewise, had used all these means for the purposes of philosophy, associating with brutes and with each other, and inquiring of every nature which had a perceptive power of its own, in what respect it differed from the rest for the collecting together of prudence, it is easy to judge that the men of that time were ten thousand-fold happier than those of the present. But if, being filled to satiety with meats and drinks, they discoursed with each other, and with brutes, in fables such as are now told of them, it is easy, according to my opinion, to prove the very same thing. Let us, however, dismiss this question, until someone shall appear sufficient to point out whether the men of that time had any desire for science and the need of discourse. But let us now state for what reason we have raised up the fable, in order that we may after this proceed onwards. For when the time of all these was completed, and it was necessary for a change to take place, and moreover when the whole race on earth was already consumed, and every soul had given up its generations, and as many seeds

as were ordained for each soul, it having fallen on the earth, —then did the governor of the universe, releasing himself, as it were, from the handle of a rudder, depart to his own place of a look-out; and then Fate and implanted Desire. again caused the world to revolve. All the gods then, who govern locally, in conjunction with the greatest divinity, knowing what was now taking place, again deprived the parts of the world of their providential care. But the world having undergone a change in its revolution, conflicting and rushing with the contrary impulse of a beginning and end, and producing in itself a mighty concussion, worked out again another destruction of all kinds of animals. After this, when a sufficient time had gone on, the world ceasing from tumult, confusion, and concussions, did, taking advantage of a calm, proceed, arranged most beautifully in its usual course, possessing a guardianship and dominion itself over the things in itself and belonging to itself; and remembering, to the utmost of its power, the instructions of the demiurgus and father. Now at the commencement it performed this duty more carefully, but at the end more obtusely. But the cause of this is in the corporeal form of the temperature, which had grown up with its former nature; since it partook of much disorder, before it arrived at its present orderly arrangement. For from him, who put it together, it obtained every good; but from its previous habit, whatever harshness and injustice exist in heaven, these it does both possess itself from that former habit, and introduce likewise into animals. In conjunction then with the ruler, the world, when nourishing the animals within it, brings forth evil of a small kind, but good of a large; but separated from him, it conducts all things beautifully during the time nearest to his departure; but as time goes on, and oblivion comes on it, the circumstance of its former unfitness domineers with greater force; and at the concluding period of time it bursts out into

the full flower of wrong; and producing only a little good, but mingling much of the temperament of things contrary to good, it arrives at the danger of both its own destruction, and of the things within it. Hence the god, who arranged the world, perceiving it in difficulties, and anxious lest, being thus tempest-tost, it should be thoroughly loosened by the hurly-burly, and be plunged into the infinite sea of dissimilitude, again seats himself at the helm; and whatever is laboring and loosened in its own former period, he having turned arranges, and by putting straight, renders the world free from death and old age. This then is one end of the whole story. But this is sufficient to show, from what has been said, the nature of a king to such, as lay hold of the discourse. For the world having been again turned to the present path of generation, its age was again stopped, and it imparted novel things, the contrary to what it had done formerly. For animals, wanting but little to be through their small size annihilated, are increased; and hoary bodies recently born from the earth, dying again, descend into the earth; and all other things are changed, imitating and following the condition of the universe. The imitation, likewise, of conception, generation, and nourishing, followed all things from necessity. For it was no longer possible for an animal to be produced in the earth, through the different things, which compose it; but, as the world was ordained to be the absolute ruler of its own progress, so after the same manner its parts also were destined by a similar guidance to spring forth, generate, and nourish, as far as they were able. But we have now arrived at the very question for the sake of which the whole of our discourse has proceeded. For, with respect to other beasts, many circumstances, and of a prolix nature, might be gone through; such as, from what each is, and through what cause they have been changed; but those relating to man are shorter, and more to our purpose. For

mankind having become destitute of the guardian care of the dæmon, who possesses and tends us, while the majority of animals, that were naturally cruel, have on the other hand become savage, men, now weak, and without a guard, were torn in pieces by such animals; and, in those earliest times, they were without inventions and arts; for after the earth had failed in its spontaneous food, they did not know how to procure it, through no want having previously compelled them to get it. From all these causes they were in the greatest difficulties. Hence, the old-mentioned gifts were given us by gods, together with the necessary instruction and erudition; fire from Prometheus, and arts from Hephaestus Vulcan, and his fellow-artist Pallas; on the other hand, seeds and plants were given by others, and all such things as furnish a support for human life, were produced from these; since, as was stated just now, the guardian care of the gods had deserted mankind; and it became requisite for men to have the conduct and care of themselves, in the same manner as the whole world; in the imitating and following which, through all the revolutions of time, we live and are born, now in this way, and now in that. Let this then be the end of the story. But we will make it useful for discovering how far we have erred in defining the characters of a king and statesman in our previous discourse.

Socrates Younger/ In what respect then, and how far, do you say has there been an error?

Stranger/ Partly less, and partly in a very generous manner, and in a greater degree, and more than before.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ Because, when we were asked respecting a king and a statesman belonging to the present revolution and generation, we spoke of a person tending a human herd of the contrary period, and this too a god, and not a man. In

this then we transgressed very much. But when we exhibited him as the ruler of the whole state, we did not say in what manner he was so; and in this respect the truth was told, but not the whole truth, nor was it clearly enunciated; hence we erred less in this case than in that.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ We ought then, it seems, to expect that the statesman will have been completely described by us, when we shall have defined the manner of governing a state.

Socrates Younger/ Very well.

Stranger/ On this account we have brought forward the story, in order that one might show, with respect to the herd-tending, not only that all contend about it with the person now sought for; but that we might more clearly perceive him, whom alone it is fitting, according to the pattern of shepherds and neat-herds, to have the tending of the human herd, and alone worthy to be called by that name.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ But I think, Socrates, that this figure of a divine shepherd is still greater than becomes a king; and that the statesmen now existing here are much more like subjects in their nature, and take more nearly a share in discipline and nurture.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But they will have to be investigated neither more nor less, whether they are naturally in this position or in that.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ Let us then turn back again. For we said, that there was a self-commanding art respecting animals, which took care of them, not privately, but in common; and this art

we then straightway called the herd-tending art. Do you recollect?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ In this then we erred. For we have not by any means laid hold of the statesman, nor given him a name; but as regards the appellation, it has lain hid from and escaped us.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ To tend the several kinds of herds belongs to all other herdsmen; but we have not given a fitting name to the statesman, it being requisite for him to bear one of those common to all.

Socrates Younger/ You speak the truth, if indeed there happens to be a common one.

Stranger/ But how is it not possible to apply the word healing, as something common to all, neither tending nor any other occupation being stated? and if it is lawful for persons giving a name to an art to wrap it up in words like herd-tending, or healing in any way, as being applicable generally, it is lawful to wrap up the word statesman likewise together with others, especially since reason shows that this should be done?

Socrates Younger/ Right. But after this in what manner would the division be made?

Stranger/ In the same manner, as we before divided the herd-tending art for the walking and wingless tribes, and for the unmixed and hornless, in the very same manner by dividing the herd-tending, we shall have comprehended both the present kingly rule and that in the time of Kronos (Saturn) similarly in our discourse.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so. But I am seeking what will be after this.

Stranger/ It is plain that if the word herd-tending had been thus spoken, no one would have contended with us that there is no idea whatever of attention in it; as it was then justly contended, that there is no art amongst us which deserves the appellation of tending; and that if there were, it belongs to many things prior and preferable to anything pertaining to kings.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ But no other art would be willing to say that it is more and before kingly rule, as a careful tending of the whole of human fellowship, and of men taken generally.

Socrates Younger/ You say rightly.

Stranger/ But after this, Socrates, do you perceive that an error has been made frequently towards the very end?

Socrates Younger/ Of what kind?

Stranger/ In this, that though we have conceived that there is a certain rearing art of a biped herd, we ought not any more to have straightway called it, as if entirely complete, the art of the king and statesman.

Socrates Younger/ Why not?

Stranger/ In the first place, as we said, we ought to have suited the name more to guardianship than to nutriment: and in the next place, to make a division in this guardianship. For it will have no small divisions.

Socrates Younger/ Of what kind?

Stranger/ In that we can surely place apart the divine shepherd, and the human guardian.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ And again it is necessary to cut into two the distributed guardianship.

Socrates Younger/ Into what?

Stranger/ Into the violent and the voluntary.

Socrates Younger/ What then?

Stranger/ By erring before in this more stupidly than was fitting, we put down together a king and a tyrant as the same; although they are most dissimilar both in themselves and in their form of government respectively.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Now therefore, again correcting ourselves, let us, as I have already said, divide human guardianship into the violent and the voluntary.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ And calling the guardianship by the violent tyrannic, but the voluntary, and the herd-tending of voluntary biped animals, statesmanship, let us show, that he who possesses this art and guardianship is truly a king and a statesman.

Socrates Younger/ And thus the demonstration, O guest, respecting the statesman, is very like to appear to us as being perfect.

Stranger/ This would be well for us, Socrates. But it is requisite that this should appear not only to you, but likewise to me, in common with you. At present, however, the king appears to me not to possess as yet a perfect figure; but just as statuaries, who by hastening their work sometimes unseasonably, do, through introducing more and greater things than are fitting, retard it; so have we at present, in order that we might show both quickly and splendidly, that we erred in the former part of our digression, through thinking that great patterns should be employed in the case of a king? have brought in a marvelous mass of a myth, and been compelled to use a greater portion of it than was proper. On this account, we have made a rather prolix demonstration, and have not entirely finished the fable. But our discourse really appears somewhat like an animal, to

have its outline defined sufficiently, but to have not received the distinctness given by pigments, and the mixture of colors. But it is more becoming to exhibit every animal by a description, to such as are able to follow the account, than by painting, and all the work of hand; but to other persons through works of the hand.

Socrates Younger/ This indeed is said rightly: but show me why you say you have not yet spoken sufficiently.

Stranger/ It is difficult, O divine youth, to exhibit great things sufficiently, without using patterns. For each of us appear to know all things as in a night-dream, and again to be ignorant of all things according to a day-dream.

Socrates Younger/ How said you this?

Stranger/ We appear in the present case to have mooted very absurdly the circumstance relating to the knowledge which is in us.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ The pattern, O blessed one, has required itself again a pattern.

Socrates Younger/ What? Tell me, and do not, on my account at least, hesitate.

Stranger/ I must speak, since you are ready to follow. For we know, that children know their letters.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That they understand sufficiently each of the letters in the shortest and easiest syllables, and are able to speak the truth concerning them.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ But, being on the other hand doubtful about those in other syllables, they say what is false in idea and word.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Is it not then the easiest and the best thing to lead them thus to what is not yet known?

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ By first leading them back to those things, in which they had correct ideas respecting those very same matters; and after leading them, to place before them things not yet known; and by comparing them together, to show that there is the same likeness and nature in both the combinations, till the things conceived, having been compared with all the unknown, are shown correctly; and, after being shown and becoming thus patterns, cause each one of all the letters in all the syllables to be called one different, and another the same, as being always under the same circumstances, different and the same respectively.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ This then we sufficiently comprehend, that the production of a pattern then takes place, when that, which is the same, is, in the case of another thing placed apart, rightly conceived by opinion, and being brought together to it, produces one true opinion respecting either, as it did about both.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ Shall we then wonder, if our soul, suffering naturally the same thing respecting the elements of all things, does at one time stand firm in certain points under the influence of truth respecting each individual thing, and at another time fluctuates in other points respecting all things? and that when, as regards some elements of comminglings, it thinks rightly, it should somehow or another again be ignorant of these very same things, when they are transferred to long and difficult syllable-like unions of things?

Socrates Younger/ There is nothing wonderful in this.

Stranger/ But how, my friend, can anyone, beginning from false opinion, arrive at even a small portion of truth, and thus acquire wisdom?

Socrates Younger/ Nearly not at all.

Stranger/ If then these things are naturally in this way, you and I shall not in any respect overdo it, if, by first endeavoring to perceive the nature of the whole pattern in some other small and partial one, and after this, by transferring to the nature of a king, which is the greatest of all patterns, the same species, from lesser things from some quarter, we shall be about to endeavor again, through a pattern, to know by art the care of state affairs, so that there may be a day-dream instead of a night one.

Socrates Younger/ Perfectly right.

Stranger/ Again then let us take up the preceding reasoning, that since ten thousand persons contend with the kingly genus, respecting the guardianship of a state, it is requisite to separate all these, and to leave it by itself. And for this purpose we said we have need of some pattern.

Socrates Younger/ And very much so.

Stranger/ By producing then what pattern, which embraces an occupation similar to statesmanship, and is the smallest possible, could one sufficiently find the thing sought for? Are you, Socrates, willing, by Zeus, unless we have something else at hand, for us to choose at least the weaving art? and this too not the whole, if it seems good; for, perhaps, the art relating to weaving of wool will suffice. For it may happen, that even this portion being chosen will witness to what we want to show.

Socrates Younger/ For why should it not?

Stranger/ Why then have we not, as we did before, after cutting the parts, each of them separate, done the very same thing now in the case of the weaving art? and why, after

passing over all things to the best of our power in the shortest manner possible, have we not come to what is useful at present?

Socrates Younger/ How say you?

Stranger/ I will make the digression itself an answer.

Socrates Younger/ You speak most excellently.

Stranger/ Of all the things which we fabricate and possess, some are for the sake of our doing something, and others are defenses against our not suffering. And of these defenses some are medicinal, both divine and human; others are protective. And of the protective, some are warlike implements, others peaceful defenses. And of the peaceful defenses, some are veils, others are to ward off heat and cold. And of those that ward off, some cover at a distance, others near. And of the near, some are extended under, others around. And of those extended around, some are cut as a whole piece, others put together. And of those put together, some are perforated, others are bound together, not perforated. And of those that are not perforated, some are composed of the fibers of the plants of the earth, others are hairy. And of the hairy, some are conglutinated by water and earth, others are connected themselves with themselves. Now to these defenses and coverings, which are wrought from the things bound together, themselves with themselves, we give the name of dress. And let us call the art, which is especially conversant with dresses, dress-making, from the thing itself; in the same manner as we called above the art respecting a state, statesmanship. And let us say too, that the weaving art, so far as it weaves for the most part garments, differs in nothing but the name from the dress-making art; just as we said there, that the king-art differed only nominally from statesmanship.

Socrates Younger/ Most correctly.

Stranger/ After this let us reason thus, that someone may perhaps think that the weaving art relating to dresses has been thus defined sufficiently, he being unable to perceive that it is not yet distinguished from its proximate co-operators, but is separated from many other things of a kindred nature.

Socrates Younger/ Tell me what things of a kindred nature.

Stranger/ You have not followed what has been said, as it seems. It appears, therefore, that we must return from the end to the beginning. For, if you understand affinity, we have now separated this from that, by separating the composition of coverings into things put under, and around.

Socrates Younger/ I understand you.

Stranger/ We have likewise separated every kind of manufacture from flax and hemp, and all such things as we just now described in the list of the fibers of plants. We also defined the art of making a felt-like substance, and the putting together by means of perforation and sewing, which for the most part pertains to the cobbler's art.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ We have also separated the care bestowed on the cobbler's art relating to coverings cut in the whole piece, and of such as are employed in building, and in the whole of the carpenter's art, and in all others that are employed in stopping the flowing of water, and such arts too of peaceful defenses as furnish works to be an impediment to thieving and to acts of violence, and which are employed about the production of obstacles and the fixing of doors, and are distributed as parts of the bolt-making art. We have likewise divided the armor-making art, which is a section of the great and varied power of defense-making. We also defined, in the very beginning, the whole art of quackery, which is

conversant with medicines; and we left, so that we might seem to be, the very art defensive against storms, of which we are in search, and which produces woolen vestments, and is called the art of weaving.

Socrates Younger/ It seems so.

Stranger/ But this matter, O boy, has not been perfectly detailed. For he, who first engaged in the making of garments, appeared to act in a manner directly contrary to weaving.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ For the work of weaving is a certain knitting together.

Socrates Younger/ It is.

Stranger/ But the work of the garment-maker consists in loosening things put together, and felted together.

Socrates Younger/ What kind of work is this?

Stranger/ The work of the art of the wool-carder. Or shall we dare to call the art of wool-carding the weaving art, and a wool-carder a weaver?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ But if anyone should call the art of making the warp and woof the weaving art, would he not assert a paradox, and give it a false name?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ But whether shall we say that the whole of the fuller's and the mender's art contribute nothing to the attention to and care of garments? Or shall we call all these weaving arts?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ But all these contend with the power of the weaving art, respecting the care and the production of garments; attributing, indeed, to it the greatest part, but

likewise assigning to themselves great portions of the same art.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Besides these, it further appears requisite, that the handicraft arts, relating to the instruments through which the works of the weaver are performed, should lay claim to be co-causes of all weaving.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ Whether then will our discourse about the weaving art, a part of which we have chosen, be sufficiently defined, it we lay it down that it is the most beautiful and the greatest of all the arts, which are employed about woolen garments? Or shall we thus, indeed, speak something of the truth, but yet neither clearly nor perfectly, till we have separated all these arts from it?

Socrates Younger/ Correctly.

Stranger/ Must we not then after this so act, that, what we say, may proceed in an orderly series?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ In the first place then let us consider two arts, which exist about all things.

Socrates Younger/ What are they?

Stranger/ One is the co-cause of generation, and the other is the cause itself.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ Such arts, as do not fabricate the thing itself, but prepare instruments for the fabricating arts, without the presence of which the proposed work could not be effected by each of the arts, these are co-causes: but those, which fabricate the thing itself, are causes.

Socrates Younger/ This is reasonable.

Stranger/ In the next place, those arts which produce the distaff, and the shuttle, and such other instruments as contribute to the making of garments, all these are co-causes: but those which pay attention to and fabricate garments, causes.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ But of causes, it is reasonable to comprehend that portion of it especially, which pertains to washing and mending, and all the caring about these, since the adorning art is abundant, and to denominate the whole the fuller's art.

Socrates Younger/ It will so.

Stranger/ Moreover, the carding and spinning, and all that relates to the making of the garment, of which we are detailing the parts, is one art, called by all persons the wool-working.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ Of the wool-working there are two sections, and each of these are together naturally parts of two arts.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ The carding, and the half of that which uses the shuttle, and separates from each other whatever are placed together, all this in short is a part of the wool-working art; and there were two great parts as regards the whole, one commingling, and the other separating.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Of the separating then, both the carding and all those just now mentioned are a part. For that, which in the case of the wool and thread is the separating art, takes place, after one manner with the shuttle, and after another with the hands, has the names which we have just now mentioned.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Again, let us take a part of the commingling, and of the wool-working contained in it; but let us pass by all that was there relating to the separating, and let us bisect the wool-working art together into the commingling and separating section.

Socrates Younger/ Let it be so divided.

Stranger/ We must then, Socrates, divide the commingling, and at the same time the wool-working, if we are about to comprehend sufficiently the proposed weaving art.

Socrates Younger/ It will be requisite.

Stranger/ It will indeed; and let us say, that one part of it is twisting, and the other complicating.

Socrates Younger/ Do I then understand you? For you appear to me to say that the working of the thread is twisting.

Stranger/ Not the working of this only, but likewise of the woof. Or shall we find any production of it which is not twisting?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ Define also each of these: for perhaps the definition will be suitable.

Socrates Younger/ In what way?

Stranger/ In this. We say that of the operations of wool-carding, that which has been drawn out into length and possesses breadth, is a certain filament.

Socrates Younger/ We do.

Stranger/ And of this, when it is turned by the spindle, and becomes a solid thread, do thou call a stamen; but the art, which regulates it, let us say that this is stamen-weaving.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ But such fabrics as receive a loose twisting, and, by the enfolding of the stamen through the dragging of the knapping process, acquire a moderate softness, of these we call what is spun the woof, but the art itself which presides over these, woof-spinning.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ And now that part of the weaving art, which we have brought forward, is obvious to everyone. For, with respect to a part of the commingling art in wool-working, when it accomplishes that, which is woven by a straight-knitting together of the woof and the thread, then the whole of the thing woven we call a woolen garment, but the art presiding over it, weaving.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ Be it so. But why then did we not immediately answer, that the weaving art is that which enfolds the woof and the thread, instead of proceeding in a round-about way, and defining many things in vain?

Socrates Younger/ It does not appear to me, O guest, that of what has been said a single thing has been said in vain.

Stranger/ This is not at all wonderful. But perhaps, O blessed youth, it will appear so. But against such a disorder, should it hereafter by chance come upon you—for nothing is wonderful—hear a certain discourse, proper to be spoken about all such things as these.

Socrates Younger/ Only relate it.

Stranger/ Let us then in the first place look into the whole of excess and deficiency, in order that we may praise and blame according to reason whatever is said on each occasion at greater length, or the contrary, than is becoming in disputations of this kind.

Socrates Younger/ It will be proper so to do.

Stranger/ Our discourse taking place on these points, would, I think, take place rightly.

Socrates Younger/ About what things?

Stranger/ About length and shortness, and the whole of excess and deficiency. For the art of measuring is conversant with all these.

Socrates Younger/ It is.

Stranger/ Let us divide it then into two parts. For it is necessary for that, to which we are hastening.

Socrates Younger/ Inform me how this division is to be made.

Stranger/ Thus. One part according to the ideas relating in common to great and little, but the other part according to the necessary existence of production.

Socrates Younger/ How say you?

Stranger/ Does it not appear to you to be according to nature, that we ought to speak of the greater as being greater than nothing else but the lesser? and on the other hand of the lesser, as being lesser than the greater, but nothing else?

Socrates Younger/ To me it does.

Stranger/ But what, must we not say that, what surpasses the nature of moderation, and is surpassed by it, whether in words or actions, is, when produced in reality, that by which the good and bad of us differ the most from each other?

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ These twofold existences then and judgments respecting the great and the small we must lay down; but not, as we just now said, with reference to each other only; but, as is just now said, we must speak of one as being referable to each other, but of the other as referable to

moderation. Are we however willing to learn on what account this is requisite?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ If anyone admits the nature of the greater to be referable to nothing but the lesser, it will not be referable to moderation. Will it?

Socrates Younger/ It will be thus.

Stranger/ Shall we not then destroy the arts themselves, and all their works, according to this reasoning? And shall we not cause to disappear entirely the statesman's science, which we are now investigating, and that which is called the weaving art? For all such things as these guard against that, which is more or less than moderation, not as if it had no existence, but as a thing of a difficult nature in practice; and after this manner preserving moderation, they effect everything beautiful and good.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ If then we cause to disappear the statesman's science, will not our subsequent search of king-science be without a road?

Socrates Younger/ Very much so.

Stranger/ Whether then, as in the *Sophist*, we compelled nonentity to exist, after the discourse about it had fled from us in that direction, so now we shall compel the more and the less to become measured, not only with reference to each other, but likewise to the production of moderation? For no one can become indisputably a statesman, or be any person else, possessing a knowledge relating to actions, if this be not acknowledged.

Socrates Younger/ We ought then to do this even now as much as possible.

Stranger/ This, Socrates, is a still greater work than that; although we remember how great was its prolixity. But it is very just to put hypothetically something of this kind respecting them.

Socrates Younger/ Of what kind?

Stranger/ That there will be a need of what has been just stated, for the demonstration of what is accurate respecting it. But as regards the present question, this reasoning is shown, well and sufficiently, it appears to me, to assist us in a conspicuous manner, so that we must think all arts are to be measured according to something more and at the same time less, not only with reference to one another, but to the production likewise of moderation. For when this exists, they exist also; and when they exist, this exists also; but when either of these does not exist, neither of those will exist.

Socrates Younger/ This indeed is right. But what is there after this?

Stranger/ It is evident that we should divide the art of measuring, as has been said, into two parts; placing as one of its parts all those arts, which measure number, and length, and depth, and breadth, and thickness, with reference to the contrary; but placing as its other part, such arts as regard the moderate and the becoming, the seasonable and the fit, and all such as are separated from the extremes towards the middle point.

Socrates Younger/ Each of these sections is great, and they differ much from each other.

Stranger/ That, Socrates, which many clever men, who think they are saying something wise, sometimes assert, when they say that the art of measuring is conversant with all generated natures, that very thing happens to be now asserted by us. For all things of art do after a certain manner partake of measure; but, in consequence of not being

accustomed to divide according to species, these men immediately bring together to the same point things widely differing from each other, and consider them as similar; and, on the other hand, they do the very contrary to this, by not dividing according to their parts things that are different; although it is requisite that when anyone first perceives the communion of many things, he should not desist till he perceives all the differences in it, which are placed in species; and again, when the all-various dissimilitudes in multitudes are perceived, he should not be able, through a feeling of disgust, to desist from this unpleasant view, till, having enclosed all such things as are allied in one similitude, he invests them with the existence of a certain genus. And thus much may suffice respecting these particulars, and concerning defect and excess. Let us only carefully observe, that two genera of the measuring art respecting these have been found out, and let us remember what we say they are.

Socrates Younger/ We will remember.

Stranger/ After this discussion, let us assume another respecting the objects of our search, and the whole mental exercise in discourses of this kind.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ If anyone should ask us respecting the assembling together of those that learn their letters, when one is asked of what letters does any word consist, shall we say that the inquiry is then made for the sake of the one word proposed, rather than that of the party becoming more skillful as a grammarian, with respect to everything placed before him.

Socrates Younger/ Evidently as regards everything of grammar.

Stranger/ Has the inquiry respecting a statesman been proposed by us more for the sake of the statesman himself, than for ourselves to become more skillful dialecticians on every point?

Socrates Younger/ This too is evident, that it is for ourselves to become such on every point.

Stranger/ No one indeed endued with intellect would be willing to hunt out the rationale of the art of weaving, for its own sake alone. But I think it has lain hid from most men, that to some things, which are naturally easy to learn, there are certain similitudes to be perceived by the senses, which it is not difficult to make manifest, when anyone wishes to point them out to someone inquiring a reason respecting a thing, not with trouble, but easily without a long speech. But of things the greatest and the most honored, there is not any image made clear for men, by which being shown, he who wishes to fill the soul of the inquirer, will fill it sufficiently by suiting it to one of the senses. Hence it is requisite to practice oneself in being able to give and receive a reason for everything. For incorporeal natures, being the most beautiful and the greatest, are exhibited by reason alone, and by nothing else; and it is for this that all has been said now. But the consideration of every particular occurs more easily in small things than in great.

Socrates Younger/ You speak most beautifully.

Stranger/ Let us then remember that all these things have been said by us on this account.

Socrates Younger/ On what?

Stranger/ Not the least on account of the disgust, which we have felt disgustingly through the prolix discourse about the weaving art, and about the revolution of the universe, and that of the *Sophist* about the existence of a non-entity, conceiving it to have a rather considerable length. And on all

these accounts we reproached ourselves, fearing lest we should speak superfluously in conjunction with prolixity. That we may not then suffer anything of this kind again, think that on account of all these things our former remarks have been made.

Socrates Younger/ Be it so. Only say what is in order.

Stranger/ I say then, it is requisite that both you and I should be mindful of what we have now said, and to give on each occasion blame and praise of brevity as well as prolixity respecting what we may happen to be speaking, not judging of prolixities with reference to each other, but according to that part of the measuring art, which we then said we ought to remember relating to the becoming.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ But yet all things are not to be referred to this. For we shall not be in need of prolixity, which, as regards pleasure, is not all fitting, unless as something of no importance: on the other hand, as regards the search of what has been proposed, in order that we may find it most easily, and quickly, reason bids us regard it as a secondary, not primary object; but to honor the most and in the first place, the method of being able to divide according to species; and to pay a serious regard to a discourse, if when spoken at great length it renders the hearer more inventive; and not to take it ill; and in like manner, if it be shorter. And still, in addition to this, reason says that he who blames long discourses in meetings such as these, and who does not admit round-about periods, must not dismiss them altogether, rapidly, and immediately, by abusing merely what has been spoken at great length, but he must show moreover that he thinks that words being shorter would render persons coming together more fitted for dialectics, and more able to discover the demonstration by reason of

existing things; but of the praise and blame of others relating to any other subjects we need take no thought, nor appear to hear at all such words as these. But of this there is enough, if so it seems likewise to you. Let us then again return to the statesman, introducing the pattern of the above-mentioned weaving art.

Socrates Younger/ You speak well; and let us do as you say.

Stranger/ Has not then the king been separated from the majority of arts, as are fellow-tending, or rather from all that relate to herds? But the remaining, we say, are those that belong to the co-causes, and causes relating to the state itself, which we must separate from each other.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ You know then that it is difficult to bisect these; and the reason will, I think, as we advance, be not the less apparent.

Socrates Younger/ It will be then meet to do so.

Stranger/ Let us then separate them like a victim piecemeal; since we cannot do so by a bisection: for it is always requisite to cut into the nearest number possible.

Socrates Younger/ How then shall we do so at present?

Stranger/ Just as before; for we laid down as co-causes whatever arts furnished instruments for weaving.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ The same thing therefore we must do now, and still more than then. For such arts as fabricate, with regard to a state instrument, either small or large, we must lay down all of them as co-causes; since without these a state could not exist, nor yet statesmanship. But on the other hand we will not lay down anyone of these as the work of kingship.

Socrates Younger/ We will not.

Stranger/ And yet we are attempting to do a difficult thing, in separating this genus from the rest. For if it appears that he, who says that whatever exists is an instrument of some one thing, says what is credible, still on the other hand let us say that there is this thing different from the possessions in a state.

Socrates Younger/ What thing?

Stranger/ As it is not having this very power. For that thing is not put together like an instrument, as a cause of production, but for the safety of that which is fabricated.

Socrates Younger/ What kind of thing?

Stranger/ That thing, which being worked up from materials dry and moist, and exposed to fire, and without fire, is a species of varied kind, which we call by one appellation, a vessel; and though it is a numerous species, it does not I think belong at all to the science we are seeking.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ Of these possessions, there is another and third species very numerous to be looked into, being on land and in the water, and much-wandering and not-wandering, and honorable and dishonorable; but possessing one name, because the whole of it exists for the sake of a certain sitting, as becoming always a seat for something.

Socrates Younger/ What kind of thing is it?

Stranger/ We call it a vehicle, a thing not at all the work of the statesman's science, but rather more of the carpenter, potter, and brass-founder.

Socrates Younger/ I understand.

Stranger/ What of the fourth species? Must we speak of one different from these, in which the most of the things formerly mentioned are contained; every kind of dress, the

greater part of arms, and all walls, such as are thrown round, of earth or stone, and ten thousand other things. And since all these are constructed for the sake of a protection, the whole may most justly be called a defense; and may, for the most part, be considered much more the work of the architect, and more rightly of the weaver, than of the statesman.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Are we willing to rank in the fifth place the arts of adorning and painting, and such as making use of it painting and music, finish as imitations, fabricated for our pleasure, and which may be justly comprehended in one name?

Socrates Younger/ In what name?

Stranger/ They may be surely denominated amusement.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ This one name then will suit, when pronounced, with all these: for not one of these things is done through seriousness, but all for the sake of amusement.

Socrates Younger/ This too I nearly understand.

Stranger/ But that, which prepares for all these materials bodies, out of which and in which, whatever arts have now been mentioned, manufacture something, shall we not place as a sixth all-various species, the offspring of many other arts.

Socrates Younger/ Of what art are you speaking?

Stranger/ That which furnishes gold and silver, and other substances found as metals, and whatever the art of felling trees, and the whole of the clipping art, furnishes to the carpenter, and the knitting art, and still further that which barks trees, and takes off the skins of living animals, the

currier's art, and all such arts as are conversant with things of this kind, and such as working on corks, and papyrus-reeds, and withies, furnish the means of manufacturing from genera, not put together, species that are put together. The whole of this let us call the first-born possession of man, without any putting together, and by no means the work of the science of kingship.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ The possession of nutriment, and of such things as when mingled with the body possess a certain power, by their parts, to be subservient to the parts of the body, we must rank in the seventh place, by calling it altogether our nurse, unless we have some other better name to give. However, we will place the whole of this under agriculture, hunting, exercise, medicine, and cooking, and attribute it to these arts more properly than to the science of the statesman.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ Nearly then all, whatsoever is connected with possession, with the exception of tame animals, has I think been mentioned in these seven genera. But consider. For it was most just that the species called first-born should be placed first; and after this, instrument, vessel, vehicle, protection, amusement, and cattle. But if anything of no great consequence has escaped us, which it is possible to suit only with difficulty to some one of these, we omit it; such as the idea of coin, of seals, and of everything bearing a mark. For these things have not in themselves a genus much in common; but some will agree as regards ornament, others as regards instruments, drawn into the discussion indeed with violence, but nevertheless completely. But the tending of herds, as previously divided, will appear to have

comprehended the whole possession of tame animals with the exception of slaves.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ The genus of slaves and of all servants remains; amongst whom I conjecture will become apparent those, who engaged in the very thing woven, contend with the king in the same manner as those above, that are engaged in knitting, and in wool-combing, and in such other arts as we then mentioned, did with the weavers. But all the rest, spoken of as co-causes, have, together with the works just now mentioned, been done away with, and separated from the action of the king and statesman.

Socrates Younger/ So they seem.

Stranger/ Come then, let us approach nearer, and consider the rest, that we may perceive them more firmly.

Socrates Younger/ It is requisite to do so.

Stranger/ We shall find then that the greatest servants, so far as we can see from those here, are in a pursuit, and under circumstances the very contrary to what we have suspected.

Socrates Younger/ Who are they?

Stranger/ They who are purchased, and in this manner become a property; whom, beyond all controversy, we may call slaves and laying the least claim to the kingly science.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ But what shall we say of those free-born persons, who willingly put themselves to ministering to the parties mentioned just now, and by conveying the produce of agriculture, and of other arts, to each other, and by equalizing the possession and value of articles, do some at home markets, and others by going from state to state, by sea and land exchange coin against other things, or itself

against itself, whom we have called money-changers, ship-owners, and hucksters, will these contend for any part of the statesman's science?

Socrates Younger/ Perhaps some of the foreign merchants will.

Stranger/ And yet we shall never find those, who for wages most readily become servants to all persons, laying any claim to the science of a king.

Socrates Younger/ For how should we?

Stranger/ What then shall we say of those, that do such ministering for us on each occasion.

Socrates Younger/ Of what and whom are you speaking?

Stranger/ I speak of the tribe of heralds, and of those who become accomplished in the art of writing, and often act as ministers, and certain other persons, who have very great talents for some other and many kinds of business connected with public offices. What shall we say of these?

Socrates Younger/ What you have said just now, that they are ministers, but no rulers in states.

Stranger/ But surely I was not, I think, seeing a vision, when I said that in this way, perchance, would be seen those strenuously contending for the science of a statesman. And yet it would seem to be very absurd to seek after these in any ministering portion.

Socrates Younger/ Very much so, indeed.

Stranger/ Let us then approach still nearer to those who have not been as yet examined. Now these are such as possess a certain portion of ministering science relating to divination. For they are held to be the interpreters of gods to men.

Socrates Younger/ They are.

Stranger/ The genus too of priests, as the law says, knows how gifts should be offered by us through sacrifices to the gods, agreeably to them; and how we should request of them by prayer the possession of good things. Now both these are parts of the ministering art.

Socrates Younger/ So it appears.

Stranger/ Now then we seem to me to touch, as it were, upon some foot-print of the object to which we are on the road. For the figure of priests and prophets is replete with prudence, and obtains a reputation for respect through the greatness of the matters in their hands; so that in Egypt it is not permitted for a king to govern without the sacerdotal science; and should anyone previously of another genus of men become by violence the king, he is afterwards compelled to be initiated in the mysteries of this genus. Further still among the Greeks, one may find in many places that the greatest sacrifices relating to matters of this kind are imposed upon the greatest offices; and what I assert is shown particularly among you. For to him who is chosen by lot the king here, they say that of all the ancient sacrifices, those held in the highest veneration and most peculiar to the country are assigned.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ We must then consider these kings chosen by lot, together with the priests, and their ministers, and a certain other very numerous crowd, which has just now become manifest to us, apart from those previously mentioned.

Socrates Younger/ Of whom are you speaking?

Stranger/ Of certain very strange persons.

Socrates Younger/ Why so?

Stranger/ As I was just now speculating, their genus appeared to me to be all kinds. For many men resemble lions

and centaurs, and other things of this kind; and very many are similar to satyrs, and to weak and versatile wild beasts. They likewise rapidly change their forms and their power into each other. And indeed, Socrates, I appear to myself to have just now perceived these men for the first time.

Socrates Younger/ Speak; for you seem to see something strange.

Stranger/ I do; for what is strange is the result of ignorance in the case of all. And I myself just now suffered the very same thing: for I was suddenly involved in doubt on seeing the dancing-troop relating to state affairs.

Socrates Younger/ Of what kind?

Stranger/ The greatest wizard of all the wise, and the most skilled in this art; who must be separated from the really existing statesmen and kings, although it is very difficult so to separate him, if we are about to see clearly the object of our search.

Socrates Younger/ We must not give up this, at least.

Stranger/ Not, indeed, according to my opinion: but tell me this.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ Is not a monarchy one of the forms of state-rule?

Socrates Younger/ It is.

Stranger/ And after a monarchy one would, I think, speak of an oligarchy.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ But is not the rule of the many called by the name of a democracy, a third form of state-polity?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Do not these being three become after a manner five, by two producing from themselves two other names in addition to their own?

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ They who look to the violent and the voluntary, to poverty and wealth, to law and lawlessness, which take place in them, give a twofold division to each one of the two, and call monarchy, as exhibiting two species, by two names, one tyranny, the other royalty.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ But the state ever governed by a few, we call an aristocracy and an oligarchy.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But of a democracy, whether the people govern the rich violently, or with their consent, and whether they strictly guard the laws or not, no one is ever accustomed to change the name at all.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ What then? Do we think that anyone of these state-polities is right, thus bounded by these definitions, such as by one, and a few, and a many, and by wealth and poverty, by the violent and the voluntary, and happening to exist by statutes and without laws?

Socrates Younger/ What should hinder?

Stranger/ Consider more attentively, following me by this road.

Socrates Younger/ What road?

Stranger/ Shall we abide by what was asserted at first, or shall we dissent from it?

Socrates Younger/ To what assertion are you alluding?

Stranger/ I think we said that a regal government was one of the sciences.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Yet not of those taken together as a whole; but we selected it from the other sciences, as something judicial and presiding.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And from the presiding science we selected one part, as belonging to inanimate acts, and the other as belonging to animals. And dividing after this fashion, we have arrived thus far, not forgetful of science, but unable to determine with sufficient accuracy what science is.

Socrates Younger/ You say rightly.

Stranger/ Do we then understand this very thing, that the definition must be respecting them, not as regards the few, nor the many, nor the voluntary or involuntary, nor poverty or wealth, but as regards a certain science, if we follow what has been formerly detailed?

Socrates Younger/ It is impossible, indeed, not to do this.

Stranger/ We must of necessity then consider now this; in which of these does the science respecting the government of men happen to exist, being nearly the greatest and most difficult to obtain. For it is requisite to inspect it, that we may perceive who are the parties we must take away from a prudent king, who lay claim to be statesmen, and persuade the multitude of it, and yet are so not at all.

Socrates Younger/ We must do so, as the reasoning has previously told us.

Stranger/ Does it then appear to you that the mass in a city is able to acquire this science?

Socrates Younger/ How can they?

Stranger/ But in a city of a thousand men, is it possible for a hundred, or even fifty, to acquire it sufficiently?

Socrates Younger/ It would be then the most easy of all arts. For we know that among a thousand men there could not be found so many tip-top draught-players as compared with those in the rest of Greece, much less kings. For, according to our former reasoning, we must call him, who possesses the science of a king, whether he governs or not, a regal character.

Stranger/ You have very properly reminded me. And I think it follows from this, that a right government, when it exists rightly, ought to be investigated as about one person, or two, or altogether about a few.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ And we must hold, as we think now, that these exercise rule according to a certain art, whether they govern the willing or the unwilling, whether according to statutes or without statutes, and whether they are rich or poor. For we have considered those as not the less physicians, whether they cure us, willing or unwilling, by cutting, or burning, or applying any other pain; and whether according to written rules or not, and whether they are themselves poor or rich. In all these cases we say that they are no less physicians, so long as they stand over the patient according to art, purging or some other way attenuating the body, or in causing it to increase, and so long as, for the good of the body alone, they bring it from a worse to a better state, and by attending preserve each body attended to. After this manner, and in no other, as I think, we will lay down that the definition of the medicinal or any other rule is rightly made.

Socrates Younger/ And very much so.

Stranger/ It is necessary then, as it seems, that of polities that must be pre-eminently correct, and the only polity, in which the governors are found to possess science truly, and not in appearance merely; whether they rule according to

laws or without laws, over the willing or the unwilling, and are themselves poor or rich. For not one of these things must we consider at all, as regards any rectitude of government.

Socrates Younger/ Beautifully said.

Stranger/ And whether they purge the state to its good, by putting to death or banishing certain persons; or by sending out colonies somewhere, like a swarm of bees, they reduce it to a less size; or whether by introducing some others from abroad they make citizens of them, and thus increase its size, so long as by making use of science and justice, they preserve it, and cause it to the utmost of their power to pass from a worse condition to a better one, then, and according to such limits, must we speak of a polity as alone rightly existing. But we must say that such others, as we have mentioned, are not genuine, nor do they in reality exist; but that those, which we call well-regulated, imitate this for the better, the others for the worse.

Socrates Younger/ The other points, O guest, appear to have been stated with moderation: but that it is requisite to govern without laws, has been stated as a thing rather harsh to hear.

Stranger/ You have anticipated me a little, Socrates, by your question. For I was about to ask you, whether you admit all these points, or whether you find any difficulty in any matter that has been stated. It is however evident, that we now wish to discuss the point respecting the rectitude of those, who govern without laws.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ After a certain manner it is evident that legislation is a part of the science of a king: but it is best, not for the laws to prevail, but for a man, who has with prudence the power of a king. Do you know in what way?

Socrates Younger/ In what way do you mean?

Stranger/ Because the law cannot, by comprehending that which is the best and most accurately just in all cases, at the same time ordain what is the best. For the inequalities of men and their actions, and the fact that not a single atom, so to say, of human affairs, enjoys a state of rest, do not permit any art whatever to exhibit in any case anything simple without exception respecting all matters and through all time. Shall we admit this?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ And yet we see the law tending nearly to this very point; and, like a certain self-willed and ignorant man, it does not suffer any person to do anything contrary to its own orders, nor to put a question, not even should something new happen to be in some case better as compared with the decree it had ordained.

Socrates Younger/ True. For the law does really so, as you have just now said, to each of us.

Stranger/ Is it not then impossible for that, which is under all cases simple, to do well in cases which are never at any time simple?

Socrates Younger/ It appears so nearly.

Stranger/ Why then is it necessary to lay down laws? since law is not a thing of the greatest rectitude. Of this we must inquire the cause.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ Are there not then amongst us, as in other cities likewise, certain exercises of men collected together for the sake of competition relating to running, or something else?

Socrates Younger/ Yes. There are very many.

Stranger/ Come then, let us again recall to our memory the orders of those, who practice scientifically exercises in meetings of this kind.

Socrates Younger/ What is this?

Stranger/ They do not conceive it is requisite to be very fine in ordering, according to each individual, what is suited to the body of each; but think more stupidly, that they ought to make their arrangements of what benefits the body, suited to the majority of circumstances and persons.

Socrates Younger/ Excellent.

Stranger/ On which account assigning now equal labors to persons collected together, they urge them on together, and stop them together in the race, and wrestling, and all the labors of the body.

Socrates Younger/ Such is the fact.

Stranger/ Let us hold then, that the legislator who would preside over his herds in matters of justice, and their contracts with each other, will never be sufficient for all collectively, by accurately enjoining upon each individual what is fitting.

Socrates Younger/ This is likely.

Stranger/ But I think he will establish laws suited to the majority of persons and circumstances, and somehow thus in a more stupid way for each, delivering them in writings, and in an unwritten form, and legislating according to the customs of the country.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ Right indeed. For how, Socrates, can anyone be so all-sufficient as, by sitting near through the whole of life, to enjoin accurately what is adapted to each? Since, although anyone soever of those who possess the science of

a king could, I think, do this, he would scarcely impose on himself impediments, by writing down the so-called laws.

Socrates Younger/ So it appears, O guest, from what has been now said.

Stranger/ And still more, O thou best one, from what will be said.

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ Of this kind. For let us thus say to ourselves. Would not a physician, or any teacher of gymnastics, being about to travel, and to be absent as he fancied from those under his care for a long time, and thinking that those engaged in exercises, or sick, would not remember his precepts, be willing to write something to refresh their memory? Or how would he act?

Socrates Younger/ In this way.

Stranger/ But what, if the physician, having been abroad a less time than he expected, should come back, would he not dare to suggest certain other things besides those contained in his writings, other circumstances occurring more favorable for the sick, through winds, or anything else of those that are wont to take place from Zeus the air, contrary to expectation? Would he think that he ought to persevere in not going out of his old injunctions, and neither himself order other things, nor dare to do to the sick man things different from what had been written, as if these were medicinal and salubrious, but those of a different kind noxious, and not according to art? Or rather, would not everything of this kind, occurring according to science and true art, in all matters become altogether the greatest ridicule of such injunctions?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But shall not he, who writes down what is just and unjust, beautiful and base, good and evil, and who

establishes unwritten laws for the herds of human beings who live in cities, in each according to the laws of those who have written them, —whether he comes himself back after having written laws contrary to art, or some other like him, be permitted to enjoin things different from these? Or, would not this interdiction appear to be in reality no less ridiculous than the former?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ Do you know then the language spoken by the multitude respecting such a thing?

Socrates Younger/ I have it not at present in my mind.

Stranger/ And yet it is very specious. For they say that, if anyone knows of laws better than those of their ancestors, such a person should, after persuading his own state, become a legislator; otherwise not.

Socrates Younger/ Do they not then say rightly?

Stranger/ Perhaps so. But if anyone should, not by persuasion, force on the better, what would be the name of this violence? Do not however say a word, but previously respecting the former.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Should someone, not by persuading a person under a physician, but by possessing his art correctly, compel a boy, or a man, or a woman, contrary to prescriptions, to do that which is better, what will be the name of this violence? Ought it not to be called rather anything than some mischievous transgression of art? And is it not for us to say, that everything has happened to the compelled person, rather than that he has suffered anything mischievous and without art from the compelling physicians?

Socrates Younger/ You speak most true.

Stranger/ But what is that error called by us, which is contrary to the statesman's art? Must it not be the base, evil, and unjust?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Of those, who have been forced to act contrary to the written precepts, and the customs of the country, more justly, better, and more beautifully than before, come, tell me, can anyone, unless he is about to be the most ridiculous of all men, pronounce a disapprobation of such violence done to such persons? Must it not be said rather by him on each occasion, that they, who have been forced, have suffered at the hands of the forcing party everything, except what is base, unjust, and evil?

Socrates Younger/ You speak most true.

Stranger/ But if he who forces is rich, will the acts done forcibly by him be just, but, if he is poor, unjust? Or, whether a person persuades or does not persuade, whether rich or poor, and whether according or contrary to written statutes, he does what is useful, must this be the definition the most true on all sides of the correct administration of a state, by which a wise and good man will well administer the interests of those under his charge; just as a pilot watches over whatever happens to conduce to the welfare of the vessel and crew; and not by laying down written orders, but by making his skill a law, he preserves his fellow-sailors. And thus, after this very same manner, will an upright polity be produced by those who are able to govern thus, by exhibiting a strength of skill superior to the laws. And indeed in the case of prudent rulers there will be no error, let them do everything; as long as they observe this one great maxim, to distribute ever with intellect and art to those in the state what is the most just, to keep them such as they are, and to

finish by rendering them, as far as possible, better instead of worse.

Socrates Younger/ It is not possible to say the contrary to what has been now asserted.

Stranger/ Nor yet against those to say even a word.

Socrates Younger/ Of what are you speaking?

Stranger/ That no mob of any persons whatever can receive this kind of science, and be able to administer with intellect a state, but that we must seek for a correct polity amongst a small number, and a few, and one person; and that we must lay down other polities as imitations, as we observed a little before, some for the better, and some for the worse.

Socrates Younger/ How and why say you this? For I did not understand just now forsooth the remark respecting imitations.

Stranger/ Truly it were not a stupid act for a person, after starting an argument of this kind, to lay it down there, and not, by going through it, to show the error which at present exists about it.

Socrates Younger/ What error?

Stranger/ It is meet to search into a thing of such a kind as is not very usual, nor easy to perceive; but at the same time we must endeavor to apprehend it. For, come, since the polity of which we have spoken is the only correct one, you know that other polities ought to be thus preserved, while they use the institutions of this, and do what was just now praised, though it is not most right?

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ That no one of those in the city dare to do anything contrary to the laws; and that he who dares, shall pay the forfeit by death, and all the extreme of punishments.

This too is most right and beautiful, as a second thing; after that someone shall have first changed the just now said. But in what manner that, which we have called second, exists, let us proceed to state. Shall we not?

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ Let us then again return to the images, to which it is ever necessary to assimilate kingly rulers.

Socrates Younger/ Of what kind?

Stranger/ The noble-minded pilot, and the physician, who is of equal worth with many others. Let us then, after molding from these two a certain figure, contemplate it.

Socrates Younger/ Of what kind?

Stranger/ Such a one, as if we all conceived that we are suffering the most dreadful things from them. For such of us as either of them wish to save, they do equally save; and such as they wish to injure, they injure by cutting and burning, at the same time ordering us to bring to them the means of expense, as a tribute, of which they spend on the sick little or even nothing, but they and their domestics make use of the rest. And lastly, receiving money as wages, from either the kindred or some enemies of the sick man, they cause him to die. They too who have the command of a vessel, do ten thousand other things of this kind. For after some plotting, when out at sea, they leave persons deserted, and, committing errors at sea, hurl them into the sea, and do them other mischief. If then, reflecting on these matters, we should enter into some consultation respecting them, so that we should no longer permit either of those arts to have an absolute control over slaves or the free-born; but that we should collect together an assembly consisting of ourselves or all the people, or the rich alone; and that it should be lawful for private individuals, and the rest of the operatives, to bring together their opinions respecting sailing and

diseases, as to what manner it is meet to use medicines, and medical instruments, for those that are ill; and moreover, how to use both the vessels themselves and nautical instruments for the requirements of vessels in case of danger during the voyage from winds and the sea and the meeting with pirates, and, if requisite, in fighting with long ships against others of the like kind; and that, what shall have been decreed by the multitude on these points, by the advice of physicians and pilots, or of other unskilled individuals, persons should inscribe in triangular tables and pillars, and laying down other unwritten regulations, as the customs of the country, it should be necessary to navigate vessels in all future times according to this method, and to administer remedies to the sick.

Socrates Younger/ You have mentioned things really very absurd.

Stranger/ Further, that rulers of the people should be appointed yearly, whoever may be chosen by lot from the rich or from all the people; and that the rulers so appointed should rule according to the written regulations, like pilots over vessels and physicians over the sick.

Socrates Younger/ These things are still more harsh.

Stranger/ Let us see now after this what follows. For when the year of each governor shall have expired, it will be necessary to appoint tribunals of persons, taken either by a selection from the rich or from all the people by lot, and to bring the rulers before them and to pass their accounts, and for anyone to accuse them for not having acted, during his year, the pilot, according to the written regulations, nor according to the old customs of their forefathers; and for the very same things to take place in the case of those healing the sick; and that whoever of them should be convicted,

certain persons should fix what the party must suffer in person or pay in purse.

Socrates Younger/ Would not he, who is ready of his own accord to be a ruler under such circumstances, most justly suffer in person and pay in purse?

Stranger/ Further still, it will be necessary to make a law on all these points, that, if anyone be proved to be seeking out the art relating to piloting and ships in general, or to health, and the truth of the physician's theory about winds, heat and cold, contrary to the written regulations, or devising anything whatever about affairs of this kind, he shall, in the first place, be called neither as one skilled in physicking or piloting, but a talker of matters on high, or some babbler; and that, in the next place, it shall be lawful for anyone to write down an indictment against him for lawlessness, and to bring him before some court of justice, as corrupting the younger, and persuading the silly to put their hands to the arts of a pilot and a physician not according to the laws, and to rule self-willed over vessels and the sick; and that if anyone shall be found persuading either young or old men, contrary to the laws, and the written regulations, it shall be lawful to punish him with the extreme of punishments. For no one ought to be wiser than the laws; nor on the other hand, should anyone be ignorant of the arts of medicine and of healing, nor of piloting and shipping, according to the written regulations and the customs laid down of the country; for he who wishes may learn. If then, Socrates, this should take place about the sciences we mentioned, and we should look into any portion of the general's art, and the whole of any kind of hunting, and of painting, or of imitation in general, and carpentry, and the formation in general of instruments of any kind, and of agriculture, and the art relating to plants in general; or, again, into the care of breeding horses, according to written

regulations, and herds of cattle of every kind, and prophecy, and all the portion that the ministering art embraces, the playing at games of dice, the whole of arithmetic, whether simple or relating to a plane, either in depth, or swiftness; if respecting all these things it were so done, what would appear produced according to written regulations, and not according to art?

Socrates Younger/ It is evident that all arts would be entirely subverted, nor would they exist again, through such a law forbidding one to investigate. So that life, which is now difficult, would at that time become utterly unable to be endured.

Stranger/ But what will you say to this? If we should compel each of the above-mentioned to take place according to written regulations, and should appoint as the guardian of these statutes a man either chosen by suffrage, or chance, but who, giving no thought to them, either for the sake of a certain gain, or private pleasure, should endeavor, although knowing nothing, to act contrary to these statutes, would not this be a still greater evil than the former?

Socrates Younger/ Most truly so.

Stranger/ For he, who should dare to act contrary to those laws, which have been laid down after much experience, or through certain advisers recommending each in a pleasant manner, and persuading the people to pass them, will commit an error many-fold greater than an error, and subvert every process much more than written statutes.

Socrates Younger/ How is he not about to do so?

Stranger/ Hence there is a second sailing, as is said, for those that establish laws and statutes respecting anything whatever, that is, not to suffer any one person, or the multitude, to do anything of any kind at any time contrary to them.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ Will not these statutes then, written by men intelligent as far as their power permits, be imitations of the truth of each of these?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ And yet, if we remember, we said that the man, who is in reality a statesman, would, being intelligent, do many things from art, in reference to his own course of action, without giving a thought to statutes, when other things seem to him better than what had been written by himself and enjoined upon some persons absent.

Socrates Younger/ We did say so.

Stranger/ Would not then any single man whatever, or any people whatever, by whom laws happen to be laid down, act in the same way as that true statesman, should they endeavor to do to the utmost of their power contrary to them the laws what is something different and better?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ If then they should without knowledge act in this manner, would they not attempt to imitate what is true? and yet they would imitate all badly; but if with art, this is no longer an imitation, but is the very truth itself.

Socrates Younger/ Altogether so.

Stranger/ And yet it was before laid down as a thing acknowledged by us, that the mob is incapable of receiving any art whatever.

Socrates Younger/ It was so laid down.

Stranger/ If then there is a certain kingly art, the mob of the rich, and the whole of the people, could never receive this science of the statesman.

Socrates Younger/ For how can they?

Stranger/ It is requisite then, as it seems, that such-like polities, if they are about to imitate correctly, to the best of their power, the true polity under a single person ruling with art, must never, the laws having been laid down by them, do anything contrary to the written statutes and customs of the country.

Socrates Younger/ You speak most beautifully.

Stranger/ When therefore the rich imitate this polity, we then denominate such a polity an aristocracy; but when they give no thought to the laws, an oligarchy.

Socrates Younger/ So it nearly seems.

Stranger/ And again, when one man rules according to the laws, imitating the person endued with science, we call him a king, not distinguishing byname the person ruling alone with science, or with opinion according to the laws.

Socrates Younger/ We nearly appear to do so.

Stranger/ If then a person possessing in reality science rules alone, he is called altogether by the same name, a king, and no other will be mentioned in addition: through which the five names of the polities just now mentioned become only one.

Socrates Younger/ So it appears.

Stranger/ But when one man rules neither according to the laws nor the customs of the country, but pretends, as the person possessing science, that the best is to be done, contrary to the written statutes, and there exist a certain desire and ignorance as the leaders of this imitation, must we not call each man of this kind a tyrant?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ Thus then we say has been produced a tyrant, a king, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy, from mankind indignantly bearing with such a single monarch,

and not believing that anyone would ever be worthy of such an office, so as to be both willing and able to rule with virtue and science, and to distribute properly to all persons things just and holy; but disposed to maim, and kill, and maltreat whomsoever he might wish: yet, if such a person should arise, as we have mentioned, he would be beloved and live at home happily, guiding throughout, like a pilot, alone a polity accurately correct.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ But now, as we truly say, since there is no such king produced in states, as is produced by nature in a swarm of bees, excelling straightway alone in body and soul, we must, as it seems, come together and write down statutes, treading in the footsteps of a polity the most true.

Socrates Younger/ It nearly appears so.

Stranger/ And do we wonder then, Socrates, that in suchlike polities evils, such as do happen, and will happen, are produced, when the foundation placed under them exists by statutes and customs, and not with the foundation of science, which performs its actions in a different way than what a polity does, which, making use of imprudence, will be evident to everyone, that it will destroy everything produced by that imprudence. Or ought we not to wonder rather at this, how strong a thing a city naturally is? For, though cities have for time without end been suffering thus, yet some of them are still remaining, and are not overturned. Many however sometimes, like sinking vessels, are perishing, have perished, and will perish, through the incorrect conduct of the pilots and sailors, who, having obtained the greatest ignorance respecting the greatest concerns, do still, although they know nothing about state affairs, think they have obtained this knowledge the most clearly of all.

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ Which then of these incorrect polities, where all are full of difficulties, is the least difficult to live in, and which the most oppressive, it is meet for us to look into a little; although it is what is called a by-deed as regards our present inquiry; yet, perhaps, on the whole, we all of us do all things for the sake of a thing of this kind.

Socrates Younger/ It is meet. How not?

Stranger/ Of three things then, say that the same is remarkably difficult, and at the same time most easy.

Socrates Younger/ How say you?

Stranger/ Not otherwise than, as I said before, that a monarchy, the government of a few, and of many, are those three polities mentioned by us at the commencement of the discourse, which has now flowed upon us.

Socrates Younger/ They were.

Stranger/ Bisecting then each of these, we shall produce six, separating from these the correct polity, as a seventh.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ Out of monarchy there came, we said, the regal and the tyrannic; and out of that composed not of the many, the well-omened aristocracy and oligarchy. But out of that composed of the many, we then laid it down under the name of a simple democracy; but we must now lay it down as two-fold.

Socrates Younger/ How so? And after what manner do we make this division?

Stranger/ Not at all different from the others; even although the name of this is now two-fold. But to govern according to the laws, and contrary to them, is common both to this and the rest.

Socrates Younger/ It is so.

Stranger/ Then indeed, when we were seeking a correct polity, this bisection was of no use, as we have shown above; but since we have separated it from the others, and have considered the others as necessary, the being contrary or according to law causes a bisection in each of these.

Socrates Younger/ So it appears from what has now been said.

Stranger/ A monarchy then, yoked to correct writings, which we call laws, is the best of all the six polities; but when it is without law, it is grievous, and most burthensome to live under.

Socrates Younger/ It nearly appears so.

Stranger/ But the polity of the not-many we have considered as a medium between both, as a few is a medium between one and many; but on the other hand, the polity of the many, as being weak in all things, and unable, as compared with the others, to do anything great, either for good or evil, through the offices in this polity being divided into small parts amongst many. Hence, of all the polities acting according to law, this is the worst, but the best of all such as act contrary to law. And where all are intemperate, it is the best to live in a democracy; but where all are temperate, this polity is the worst to live in. In the first polity is the first and best condition of life, with the exception of the seventh; for we must separate this from all the other polities, as a god from men.

Socrates Younger/ These things appear thus to be produced and happen; and that must be done, which you mention.

Stranger/ Ought we not then to take away the sharers in all these polities, with the exception of the scientific one, as being not truly statesman-like but seditious-like; and as presiding over the greatest resemblances, and being such

themselves; and, as they are the greatest mimics and enchanters, to be called too the greatest sophists of sophists?

Socrates Younger/ This appellation seems nearly to be retorted most correctly on those called statesmen.

Stranger/ Be it so. This indeed is, as it were, a drama for us; just as it was lately said, that we saw a certain dancing-troop of Centaurs and Satyrs, which was to be separated from the statesman's art; and now this separation has been with so much difficulty effected.

Socrates Younger/ So it appears.

Stranger/ But another thing remains, still more difficult than this, through its being more allied to the kingly genus, and at the same time more difficult to understand. And we appear to me to be affected in a manner similar to those that wash gold.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ Those workmen first of all separate earth, stones, and many other things; but after this there are left substances, allied to gold, mixed together and of value, and to be separated only by fire, such as brass and silver, and sometimes a diamond; which being with difficulty separated by the experiments of fusion in the crucible, suffer us to see itself by itself that which is called pure gold.

Socrates Younger/ It is said that such things are so done.

Stranger/ After the same manner then it seems that things different from, and such as are foreign and not friendly to, the statesman's science, have been separated by us; but there have been left such as are of value and allied to it. Now of these are the military and judicial arts, and that oratory, which has a share of the kingly science, and does, by persuading men to do justice, conjointly regulate affairs in states; by separating all of which in a certain manner,

most easily will a person show naked and alone by itself the character of which we are now in search.

Socrates Younger/ It is evident that we should endeavor to do this in some way.

Stranger/ As far as experiment goes, it will be evident. But let us endeavor to show it by means of music. Tell me, then—

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ Have we any teaching of music, and universally of the sciences, relating to handicraft trades?

Socrates Younger/ We have.

Stranger/ But what, shall we say that there is this too, a certain science respecting those very things, which teaches us whether we ought to learn anyone of them whatever or not? Or how shall we say?

Socrates Younger/ We will say that there is?

Stranger/ Shall we not then confess, that this is different from the others?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But whether must we say that not one of them ought to rule over the other? or the others over this? or that this, as a guardian, ought to rule over all the others?

Socrates Younger/ That this science ought to rule over those; which teaches whether it is requisite to learn, or not.

Stranger/ You tell us then, that it ought to rule over both the taught and the teaching.

Socrates Younger/ Very much so.

Stranger/ And that the science which decides whether it is requisite to persuade or not, should rule over that which is able to persuade?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ To what science then shall we attribute that, which persuades the multitude and the crowd, through fable-talking, but not through teaching?

Socrates Younger/ I think it is evident that this is to be attributed to the science of the orator.

Stranger/ But on what science, on the other hand, shall we impose this, to decide whether it is meet to do anything whatever to any persons by persuasion, or violence, or to abstain entirely.

Socrates Younger/ To that, which rules over the arts of persuasion and discourse.

Stranger/ But this, as I think, will not be any other than the power of the statesman.

Socrates Younger/ You have spoken most beautifully.

Stranger/ Thus then the science of the orator appears to have been very rapidly separated from that of the statesman, as being another species, but subservient to this.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But what on the other hand must we conceive respecting this power?

Socrates Younger/ What power?

Stranger/ Respecting that, by which we are to war with each of those against whom we may have chosen to war. Whether shall we say that this power is without art or with art?

Socrates Younger/ And how can we conceive that power to be without art, which the general's art and all warlike operations put into practice?

Stranger/ But must we consider that power, which is able and skillful in deliberating, whether we ought to engage in war, or separate peaceably, as different from this, or the same with it?

Socrates Younger/ To those following the preceding reasoning it is of necessity different.

Stranger/ Shall we not, then, assert that this the art of deliberation rules over that which carries on war, if we understand in a manner similar to what has been advanced before?

Socrates Younger/ So I say.

Stranger/ What power then shall we endeavor to show as the mistress of the whole art of war, so terrible and mighty, except the truly kingly science?

Socrates Younger/ None other.

Stranger/ We must not then lay down the science of generalship as that of the statesman, of which the former is the ministering assistant.

Socrates Younger/ It is not reasonable.

Stranger/ But come, let us contemplate the power of judges, who judge rightly.

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ Is it then capable of doing anything more than merely judging respecting compacts, when, having received from a king the lawgiver, whatever has been laid down as legal, and looking both to those, and to what has been ordained to be just and unjust, it exhibits its own peculiar virtue, of never being overcome by certain bribes, or fear, or pity, or any other hatred, or love, so as to be willing to settle mutual accusations contrary to the ordinance of the legislator.

Socrates Younger/ The employment of this power is nearly nothing else, than what you have mentioned.

Stranger/ We find then, that the strength of judges is not kingly, but the guardianship of the laws, and ministering to the kingly science.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ This also must be understood by him, who looks into all the aforesaid sciences, that the statesman's science has not appeared to be one of them. For it is not meet for the truly kingly science to act itself, but to rule over those able to act; since it knows that the commencement and progress of things of the greatest consequence in states depends on opportunity and the want of it; but it is the province of the other sciences to do as they are ordered.

Socrates Younger/ Right?

Stranger/ Hence, since the sciences which we have just now discussed, neither rule over each other nor themselves, but that each is occupied with a certain proper employment of its own, they have justly obtained according to the peculiarity of their actions a peculiar name.

Socrates Younger/ So they seem.

Stranger/ But we having rightly comprehended its power under an appellation in common, should, it seems, most justly call that the science of the statesman, which rules over all these and takes care of the laws, and of everything relating to the state, and weaves all things together most correctly.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Are we then willing to go through this science at present, according to the pattern of the weaving art, since all the genera pertaining to a state have become manifest to us?

Socrates Younger/ And very much so.

Stranger/ We must then, as it seems, define what is the kingly entwining, and what, after entwining, is the web it produces for us.

Socrates Younger/ It is evident.

Stranger/ It has become necessary, as it appears, to show forth a thing really difficult.

Socrates Younger/ It must however be told by all means.

Stranger/ For that a part of virtue differs in a certain manner from a species of virtue, is a point that may be very easily attacked by those, who contend in discourses against the opinions of the many.

Socrates Younger/ I do not understand you.

Stranger/ Think again in this way. For I suppose you consider fortitude to be one part of virtue.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ And that temperance is different indeed from fortitude, but that this is also a part of what that is likewise.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ On these points then we must dare to unfold a certain marvelous discourse.

Socrates Younger/ Of what kind?

Stranger/ That they have after a certain manner very greatly an enmity with each other, and are of an opposite faction in many of the things that exist.

Socrates Younger/ How say you?

Stranger/ An assertion by no means usual. For all the parts of virtue are said to be friendly to each other.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let us consider then, applying very closely our mind, whether this is so without exception, or whether rather any part of them differs from their kindred.

Socrates Younger/ Inform me how we are to consider.

Stranger/ In all such things as we call beautiful, it is proper to investigate, but we refer them to two species contrary to each other.

Socrates Younger/ Speak more clearly.

Stranger/ Of acuteness then and swiftness, either in bodies or mind, or of the throwing out the voice, when such things exist themselves or in their resemblances, such as music and painting by imitating exhibit, have you ever been a praiser yourself, or, being not present, have you heard another person praising anyone of these things?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ Do you likewise remember after what manner they do this in each of these cases?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ Shall I then be able to point out to you through words, as I have it in my mind?

Socrates Younger/ Why not?

Stranger/ You seem to think a thing of this kind easy. Let us consider it then in genera somewhat contrary. For in many actions, and oftentimes on each occasion, when we admire the swiftness, vehemence, and acuteness of thought, body, or voice, we praise them, and at the same time employ one of the appellations of manliness.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ We say it is acute and manly, swift and manly, and in a similar manner vehement: and, universally, by applying the name which I say is common to all these natural qualities, we praise them.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But what, have we not often praised in many actions the species of quiet production?

Socrates Younger/ And very much so.

Stranger/ Do we not then, in saying the contrary to what we did about them, say this?

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ As we speak on each occasion of things done quietly and moderately as regards the mind, and admire them; and as regards actions, slowly and softly; and further as respects voice, smoothly and gravely, and of all rhythmical movement, and the whole of music which makes use of slowness opportunely, do we not assign to all these the appellation of the moderate, and not of the manly?

Socrates Younger/ Most assuredly.

Stranger/ But when, on the other hand, both these take place unseasonably, we then in turn blame each of them by their names, distributing them back to their opposites.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ By calling things that are and seem to be more acute, and quick, and harsh than is seasonable, by the names of insolent and mad; but those that are more slow and soft, by the names of timid and slothful. And for the most part nearly we find that these, and the moderate and manly natures, having like hostile species obtained by lot their respective stations opposite to each other, never mingle together in actions about things of this kind; and still further we shall see, if we pursue the inquiry diligently, that they, who possess these in their souls, are at variance with each other.

Socrates Younger/ Where do you say?

Stranger/ In all the points which we have just now mentioned, and, it is likely, in many others. For I think that, on account of their alliance with each, by praising some things as their own property, but blaming the things of those who differ, as being foreign, they stand in great enmity with each other and on account of many things.

Socrates Younger/ They nearly appear to do so.

Stranger/ This difference then between these species is a kind of sport. But a disease the most baneful of all others happens to states about things of the greatest consequence.

Socrates Younger/ About what things are you speaking?

Stranger/ About the whole form of living, as it is reasonable I should. For they who are pre-eminently well-ordered are always prepared to live a quiet life, themselves by themselves, managing only their own concerns, and so associating with all at home, and being ready, in like manner, to be at peace, after a certain fashion, with foreign states; and through this desire, more unseasonable than is fitting, when they are doing that which they wish, they become unconsciously unwarlike, and affect the young men in a similar manner, and become ever the prey of parties attacking; of whom in not many years themselves, their children, and the whole city, often unconsciously, instead of being free, become the slaves.

Socrates Younger/ You speak of a severe and terrible suffering.

Stranger/ But what are they, who incline more to manliness? Do they not incite their own cities ever to some warfare, through a desire more vehement than is becoming of such a kind of life; and thus standing in hostile array against many and powerful nations, either entirely destroy their own country, or place it in slavery under the power of their foes?

Socrates Younger/ This too is the case.

Stranger/ How then shall we not say, that in these cases both these genera have ever against each other the greatest enmity and array?

Socrates Younger/ It can never be that we should say no.

Stranger/ Have we not then found out, what we were considering at the beginning, that certain parts of virtue

differ not a little from each other naturally, and that they likewise cause those, who possess them, to do the same?

Socrates Younger/ They nearly appear to do so.

Stranger/ Let us handle again this too.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ Whether anyone of the sciences, that bring things together, does compose any act of its works, although it should be the vilest, willingly from things evil and useful? Or does every science always reject things evil to the utmost of its power, and receive such as are apt and useful? and that from these, both similar and dissimilar, it does, by collecting all into one, fabricate one certain power and form?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ The statesman's science, when it really exists according to nature, will never willingly form a state composed of good and bad men; but it is very evident, that it will first examine by means of play; and, after the examination, it will hand over to such as are able to instruct and to minister to this very purpose, itself commanding and presiding, just as the weaving art presides over the wool-combers, and those who prepare the rest of the materials for weaving, and following them up, gives its orders and stands over them, pointing out to each to complete their work, such as it conceives to be fitted for its own putting together.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ In the very same way the kingly science appears to me to keep to itself the power of the presiding art, and not to permit all, who instruct and rear up according to law, to practice aught, except what anyone would, by working out a manner suited to its own temperament, effect; and this alone it exhorts them to teach; but those who are unable to communicate a manner manly and moderate, and whatever else tends to virtue, and through the force of a

depraved nature are impelled to ungodliness, and insolence, and injustice, it casts out, punishing them with death and exile and the greatest of dishonors.

Socrates Younger/ This is said to be the case.

Stranger/ But those who wallow in ignorance and have a very abject spirit, it yokes to the race of slaves.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ With respect to the rest however, whose natures meeting with instruction are sufficient to reach to what is high-minded, and to receive through art a commingling with each other, of these it considers such, as incline more to manliness, to have a firmness of conduct like the strong thread in the web; but such as incline more to a well-ordered conduct it considers as making use of a thread supple and soft, and, according to the simile from weaving, suited to a thinner stuff; and it endeavors to bind and weave together the natures inclining in a contrary direction from each other in some such manner—

Socrates Younger/ In what manner?

Stranger/ In the first place, according to the alliance having fitted together the eternal part of their soul with a divine bond; and after that the divine portion that produces life with human—

Socrates Younger/ Why again have you said this?

Stranger/ When an opinion really true exists with firmness in the soul, respecting the beautiful, and just, and good, and the contraries to these, I say that a god-like opinion is produced in a divine genus.

Socrates Younger/ It is proper it should.

Stranger/ Do we not know that it befits the statesman and a good legislator alone to be able, with the discipline of the kingly science, to effect this very thing in those who take

properly a share in instruction, and whom we have just now mentioned?

Socrates Younger/ This is reasonable.

Stranger/ But the person, Socrates, who cannot accomplish a thing of this kind, we must by no means call by the names now sought for.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ What then? Is not a manly soul, when it lays hold of a truth of this kind, rendered mild? and would it not be willing in the highest degree to partake of things just? But not sharing it, will it not incline rather to a certain savage nature?

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ But what, does not that, which is a part of a well-ordered nature, after receiving these opinions, become truly moderate and prudent, at least in a polity? But when it has not partaken of the things we are speaking of, does it not obtain most justly some disgraceful reputation for stupidity?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Must we not say that this entwining and binding together of the evil with themselves, and of the good with the evil, can never become stable, and that no science will ever employ it with any serious care on such as these?

Socrates Younger/ For how can it?

Stranger/ But that in those alone, who have been born with noble manners from the first, and educated according to nature, this bond is naturally implanted through the laws? and for these too there is a remedy through art; and, as we said before, that this is the more divine bond of the parts of virtue which are naturally dissimilar, and tending to contraries?

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ Since then this divine bond exists, there is scarcely any difficulty in either understanding the other bonds which are human, or for a person understanding to bring them to a completion.

Socrates Younger/ How so? And what are these bonds?

Stranger/ Those of intermarriages and of a communion of children, and those relating to private betrothals and espousals. For the majority are in these matters not properly bound together for the purpose of begetting children.

Socrates Younger/ Why?

Stranger/ The pursuit of wealth and power on such occasions who would seriously blame, as being worthy of notice?

Socrates Younger/ It is not.

Stranger/ But it will be more just to speak of those, who make the genera the object of their care, should they do anything not according to propriety.

Socrates Younger/ It is at least reasonable.

Stranger/ They do not indeed at all act from right reason, but pursue a life easy for the present; and through their hugging those similar to themselves, and of not loving those that are dissimilar, they give up themselves for the greatest part to an unpleasant feeling.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ They that are well-ordered seek after manners like their own, and as far as they can marry from amongst such; and on the other hand send away to them their own daughters to be married. In the same manner acts the genus that delights in manliness, while going in the pursuit of its own nature; whereas it is requisite for both the genera to do entirely the contrary.

Socrates Younger/ How, and on what account?

Stranger/ Because manliness, having been propagated, unmixed for many generations with a temperate nature, is naturally at the beginning blooming with strength, but in the end bursts out altogether into madness.

Socrates Younger/ It is likely.

Stranger/ On the other hand, a soul very full of modesty, and unmixed with manly boldness, when it has been propagated in this manner for many generations, naturally becomes unseasonably sluggish, and at last perfectly mutilated.

Socrates Younger/ And this also is likely to happen.

Stranger/ I have said that it is not difficult to bind together these bonds, the fact being that both genera have one opinion respecting things beautiful and good. For this is the one and entire work of kingly weaving, never to suffer moderate manners to subsist apart from such as are manly; but, placing both in the same shuttle, to bring out from them a web smooth, and, as it is said, well-woven, by means of similar opinions, and honors, and dishonors, and glories, and the interchange of pledges, and to commit over to these in common the offices in the state.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ Wherever there happens to be a need of one governor, by choosing a president who possesses both these manners; but where there is need of more than one, by mingling a portion of both of them. For the manners of temperate governors are very cautious, just, and conservative; but they are in want of a certain sourness, and a sharp and practical daring.

Socrates Younger/ These things also appear so to me.

Stranger/ On the other hand, manliness is with respect to justice and caution rather deficient in those virtues; but

it has pre-eminently in actions a daring. It is however impossible for all things pertaining to states, both of a private and public nature, to well exist, unless both of these are present.

Socrates Younger/ How not?

Stranger/ Let us say then that this is the end of the web of the statesman's doing, so as for him to weave with straight-weaving the manners of manly and temperate men, when the kingly science shall by bringing together their common life, through a similarity in sentiment and friendship, complete the most magnificent and excellent of all webs, so as to be common, and enveloping all the rest in the state, both slaves and free-men, shall hold them together by this texture, and, as far as it is fitting for a state to become prosperous, shall rule and preside over it, deficient in that point not one jot.

Socrates Younger/ You have brought, O guest, most beautifully, on the other hand, the characters of the king and statesman to a finish.

Statesman.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Theodorus, The Eleatic Stranger,

Socrates, The Younger Socrates.

Socrates/ I owe you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the acquaintance both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger.

Theodorus/ And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me three times as many, when they have completed for you the delineation of the Statesman and of the Philosopher, as well as of the Sophist.

Socrates/ Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator and geometrician?

Theodorus/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean that you rate them all at the same value, whereas they are really separated by an interval, which no geometrical ratio can express.

Theodorus/ By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very fair hit; and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will retaliate on you at some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger, who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed either with the Statesman or with the Philosopher, whichever he prefers.

Stranger/ That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go on, and not leave the work unfinished. But what shall be done with Theaetetus?

Theodorus/ In what respect?

Stranger/ Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young Socrates, instead of him? What do you advise?

Theodorus/ Yes, give the other a turn, as you propose. The young always do better when they have intervals of rest.

Socrates/ I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be in some way related to me; for the one, as you affirm, has the cut of my ugly face, the other is called by my name. And we should always be on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style of his conversation. I myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday, and I have just been listening to his answers; my namesake I have not yet examined, but I must. Another time will do for me; to-day let him answer you.

Stranger/ Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates is proposing?

Socrates Younger/ I do.

Stranger/ And do you agree to his proposal?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ As you do not object, still less can I. After the Sophist, then, I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order of enquiry. And please to say, whether he, too, should be ranked among those who have science.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then the sciences must be divided as before?

Socrates Younger/ I dare say.

Stranger/ But yet the division will not be the same?

Socrates Younger/ How then?

Stranger/ They will be divided at some other point.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We must find and separate off, and set our seal upon this, and we will set the mark of another class upon all diverging paths. Thus the soul will conceive of all kinds of knowledge under two classes.

Socrates Younger/ To find the path is your business, Stranger, and not mine.

Stranger/ Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when once made, must be yours as well as mine.

Socrates Younger/ Very good.

Stranger/ Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts, merely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action?

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ But in the art of carpentering and all other handicrafts, the knowledge of the workman is merged in his work; he not only knows, but he also makes things which previously did not exist.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then let us divide sciences in general into those which are practical and those which are purely intellectual.

Socrates Younger/ Let us assume these two divisions of science, which is one whole.

Stranger/ And are 'statesman,' 'king,' 'master,' or 'householder,' one and the same; or is there a science or art answering to each of these names? Or rather, allow me to put the matter in another way.

Socrates Younger/ Let me hear.

Stranger/ If anyone who is in a private station has the skill to advise one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a physician?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And if anyone who is in a private station is able to advise the ruler of a country, may not he be said to have the knowledge which the ruler himself ought to have?

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ But surely the science of a true king is royal science?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether he happens to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in reference to his art, be truly called 'royal'?

Socrates Younger/ He certainly ought to be.

Stranger/ And the householder and master are the same?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Again, a large household may be compared to a small state: will they differ at all, as far as government is concerned?

Socrates Younger/ They will not.

Stranger/ Then, returning to the point which we were just now discussing, do we not clearly see that there is one science of all of them; and this science may be called either royal or political or economical; we will not quarrel with anyone about the name.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ This, too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with his hands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his empire, compared with what he does by the intelligence and strength of his mind.

Socrates Younger/ Clearly not.

Stranger/ Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to knowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in general?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly he has.

Stranger/ Then we may put all together as one and the same—statesmanship and the statesman—the kingly science and the king.

Socrates Younger/ Clearly.

Stranger/ And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we go on to divide the sphere of knowledge?

Socrates Younger/ Very good.

Stranger/ Think whether you can find any joint or parting in knowledge.

Socrates Younger/ Tell me of what sort.

Stranger/ Such as this: You may remember that we made an art of calculation?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Which was, unmistakably, one of the arts of knowledge?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And to this art of calculation which discerns the differences of numbers shall we assign any other function except to pass judgment on their differences?

Socrates Younger/ How could we?

Stranger/ You know that the master-builder does not work himself, but is the ruler of workmen?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ He contributes knowledge, not manual labor?

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical science?

Socrates Younger/ Quite true.

Stranger/ But he ought not, like the calculator, to regard his functions as at an end when he has formed a judgment; —he must assign to the individual workmen their appropriate task until they have completed the work.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Are not all such sciences, no less than arithmetic and the like, subjects of pure knowledge; and is

not the difference between the two classes, that the one sort has the power of judging only, and the other of ruling as well?

Socrates Younger/ That is evident.

Stranger/ May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge, there are two divisions—one which rules, and the other which judges?

Socrates Younger/ I should think so.

Stranger/ And when men have anything to do in common, that they should be of one mind is surely a desirable thing?

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not mind about the fancies of others?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the king? —Is he a judge and a kind of spectator? Or shall we assign to him the art of command—for he is a ruler?

Socrates Younger/ The latter, clearly.

Stranger/ Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the art of command too. I am inclined to think that there is a distinction similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer, which parts off the king from the herald.

Socrates Younger/ How is this?

Stranger/ Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the productions of others, which have been sold before?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly he does.

Stranger/ And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive orders, and in his turn give them to others?

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with the art of the herald, the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, and the numerous kindred arts which exercise command; or, as in the preceding comparison we spoke of manufacturers, or sellers for themselves, and of retailers, —seeing, too, that the class of supreme rulers, or rulers for themselves, is almost nameless—shall we make a word following the same analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or ruling-for-self science, leaving the rest to receive a name from someone else? For we are seeking the ruler; and our enquiry is not concerned with him who is not a ruler.

Socrates Younger/ Very good.

Stranger/ Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between the man who gives his own commands, and him who gives another's. And now let us see if the supreme power allows of any further division.

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ I think that it does; and please to assist me in making the division.

Socrates Younger/ At what point?

Stranger/ May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of producing something?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Nor is there any difficulty in dividing the things produced into two classes.

Socrates Younger/ How would you divide them?

Stranger/ Of the whole class, some have life and some are without life.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And by the help of this distinction we may make, if we please, a subdivision of the section of knowledge which commands.

Socrates Younger/ At what point?

Stranger/ One part may be set over the production of lifeless, the other of living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ That division, then, is complete; and now we may leave one half, and take up the other; which may also be divided into two.

Socrates Younger/ Which of the two halves do you mean?

Stranger/ Of course that which exercises command about animals. For, surely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman, a science presiding over lifeless objects; — the king has a nobler function, which is the management and control of living beings.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And the breeding and tending of living beings may be observed to be sometimes a tending of the individual; in other cases, a common care of creatures in flocks?

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ But the statesman is not a tender of individuals—not like the driver or groom of a single ox or horse; he is rather to be compared with the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, I see, thanks to you.

Stranger/ Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the art of managing a herd, or the art of collective management?

Socrates Younger/ No matter; —whichever suggests itself to us in the course of conversation.

Stranger/ Very good, Socrates; and, if you continue to be not too particular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when you are an old man. And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of the name, —can you see a way in which a person, by showing the art of herding to be of two kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst twice the number of things, to be then sought amongst half that number?

Socrates Younger/ I will try; —there appears to me to be one management of men and another of beasts.

Stranger/ You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and manly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think that we had better avoid.

Socrates Younger/ What is the error?

Stranger/ I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion which is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should be a species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you were under the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would come to man; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you should not chip off too small a piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through the middle; which is also the more likely way of finding classes. Attention to this principle makes all the difference in a process of enquiry.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean, Stranger?

Stranger/ I will endeavor to speak more plainly out of love to your good parts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain myself, I will try, as we proceed, to make my meaning a little clearer.

Socrates Younger/ What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty in our recent division?

Stranger/ The error was just as if someone who wanted to divide the human race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in this part of the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and all the other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have no ties or common language, they include under the single name of 'barbarians,' and because they have one name they are supposed to be of one species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to cut off ten thousand from all the rest, and make of it one species, comprehending the rest under another separate name, you might say that here too was a single class, because you had given it a single name. Whereas you would make a much better and more equal and logical classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd and even; or of the human species, if you divided them into male and female; and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe, and arrayed them against the rest of the world, when you could no longer make a division into parts which were also classes.

Socrates Younger/ Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a part and a class could still be made somewhat plainer.

Stranger/ O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a very difficult task. We have already digressed further from our original intention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further away. But we must now return to our subject; and hereafter, when there is a leisure hour, we will follow up the other track; at the same time, I wish you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare—

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That a class and a part are distinct.

Socrates Younger/ What did I hear, then?

Stranger/ That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar necessity that a part should be a class; that is the view which I should always wish you to attribute to me, Socrates.

Socrates Younger/ So be it.

Stranger/ There is another thing which I should like to know.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ The point at which we digressed; for, if I am not mistaken, the exact place was at the question, Where you would divide the management of herds. To this you appeared rather too ready to answer that there were two species of animals; man being one, and all brutes making up the other.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ I thought that in taking away a part, you imagined that the remainder formed a class, because you were able to call them by the common name of brutes.

Socrates Younger/ That again is true.

Stranger/ Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes against all other animals to their own special glorification, at the same time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the appellation of brutes, —here would be the sort of error which we must try to avoid.

Socrates Younger/ How can we be safe?

Stranger/ If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we shall be less likely to fall into that error.

Socrates Younger/ We had better not take the whole?

Stranger/ Yes, there lay the source of error in our former division.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which was concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of living creatures, —I mean, with animals in herds?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ In that case, there was already implied a division of all animals into tame and wild; those whose nature can be tamed are called tame, and those which cannot be tamed are called wild.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And the political science of which we are in search, is and ever was concerned with tame animals, and is also confined to gregarious animals.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But then we ought not to divide, as we did, taking the whole class at once. Neither let us be in too great haste to arrive quickly at the political science; for this mistake has already brought upon us the misfortune of which the proverb speaks.

Socrates Younger/ What misfortune?

Stranger/ The misfortune of too much haste, which is too little speed.

Socrates Younger/ And all the better, Stranger; we got what we deserved.

Stranger/ Very well: Let us then begin again, and endeavor to divide the collective rearing of animals; for probably the completion of the argument will best show what you are so anxious to know. Tell me, then—

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ Have you ever heard, as you very likely may—for I do not suppose that you ever actually visited them—of

the preserves of fishes in the Nile, and in the ponds of the Great King; or you may have seen similar preserves in wells at home?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, to be sure, I have seen them, and I have often heard the others described.

Stranger/ And you may have heard also, and may have been assured by report, although you have not travelled in those regions, of nurseries of geese and cranes in the plains of Thessaly?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ I asked you, because here is a new division of the management of herds, into the management of land and of water herds.

Socrates Younger/ There is.

Stranger/ And do you agree that we ought to divide the collective rearing of herds into two corresponding parts, the one the rearing of water, and the other the rearing of land herds?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ There is surely no need to ask which of these two contains the royal art, for it is evident to everybody.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Anyone can divide the herds which feed on dry land?

Socrates Younger/ How would you divide them?

Stranger/ I should distinguish between those which fly and those which walk.

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ And where shall we look for the political animal? Might not an idiot, so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ The art of managing the walking animal has to be further divided, just as you might halve an even number.

Socrates Younger/ Clearly.

Stranger/ Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that part or class which the argument aims at reaching, —the one a speedier way, which cuts off a small portion and leaves a large; the other agrees better with the principle which we were laying down, that as far as we can we should divide in the middle; but it is longer. We can take either of them, whichever we please.

Socrates Younger/ Cannot we have both ways?

Stranger/ Together? What a thing to ask! but, if you take them in turn, you clearly may.

Socrates Younger/ Then I should like to have them in turn.

Stranger/ There will be no difficulty, as we are near the end; if we had been at the beginning, or in the middle, I should have demurred to your request; but now, in accordance with your desire, let us begin with the longer way; while we are fresh, we shall get on better. And now attend to the division.

Socrates Younger/ Let me hear.

Stranger/ The tame walking herding animals are distributed by nature into two classes.

Socrates Younger/ Upon what principle?

Stranger/ The one grows horns; and the other is without horns.

Socrates Younger/ Clearly.

Stranger/ Suppose that you divide the science which manages pedestrian animals into two corresponding parts, and define them; for if you try to invent names for them, you will find the intricacy too great.

Socrates Younger/ How must I speak of them, then?

Stranger/ In this way: let the science of managing pedestrian animals be divided into two parts, and one part assigned to the horned herd, and the other to the herd that has no horns.

Socrates Younger/ All that you say has been abundantly proved, and may therefore be assumed.

Stranger/ The king is clearly the shepherd of a polled herd, who have no horns.

Socrates Younger/ That is evident.

Stranger/ Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and endeavor to assign to him what is his?

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed? You know what I mean.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ I mean that horses and asses naturally breed from one another.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals will not mix the breed.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ And of which has the Statesman charge, —of the mixed or of the unmixed race?

Socrates Younger/ Clearly of the unmixed.

Stranger/ I suppose that we must divide this again as before.

Socrates Younger/ We must.

Stranger/ Every tame and herding animal has now been split up, with the exception of two species; for I hardly think that dogs should be reckoned among gregarious animals.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining species?

Stranger/ There is a measure of difference which may be appropriately employed by you and Theaetetus, who are students of geometry.

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ The diameter; and, again, the diameter of a diameter.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet?

Socrates Younger/ Just so.

Stranger/ And the power of the remaining kind, being the power of twice two feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly; and now I think that I pretty nearly understand you.

Stranger/ In these divisions, Socrates, I descry what would make another famous jest.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest and airiest of creation, and have been running a race with them.

Socrates Younger/ I remark that very singular coincidence.

Stranger/ And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last?

Socrates Younger/ Indeed I should.

Stranger/ And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that the king is found running about with the herd, and in close competition with the bird-catcher, who of all mankind is most of an adept at the airy life.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of what was said in the enquiry about the Sophist.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and does not set the great above the small, but always arrives in her own way at the truest result.

Socrates Younger/ Clearly.

Stranger/ And now, I will not wait for you to ask me, but will of my own accord take you by the shorter road to the definition of a king.

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ I say that we should have begun at first by dividing land animals into biped and quadruped; and since the winged herd, and that alone, comes out in the same class with man, we should divide bipeds into those which have feathers and those which have not, and when they have been divided, and the art of the management of mankind is brought to light, the time will have come to produce our Statesman and ruler, and set him like a charioteer in his place, and hand over to him the reins of state, for that too is a vocation which belongs to him.

Socrates Younger/ Very good; you have paid me the debt, —I mean, that you have completed the argument, and I suppose that you added the digression by way of interest.

Stranger/ Then now, let us go back to the beginning, and join the links, which together make the definition of the name of the Statesman's art.

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ The science of pure knowledge had, as we said originally, a part which was the science of rule or command, and from this was derived another part, which was called command-for-self, on the analogy of selling-for-self; an important section of this was the management of living animals, and this again was further limited to the management of them in herds, and again in herds of pedestrian animals. The chief division of the latter was the art of managing pedestrian animals which are without horns; this again has a part which can only be comprehended under one term by joining together three names, —shepherding pure-bred animals. The only further subdivision is the art of man-herding, —this has to do with bipeds, and is what we were seeking after, and have now found, being at once the royal and political.

Socrates Younger/ To be sure.

Stranger/ And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as you say?

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ Do you think, I mean, that we have really fulfilled our intention? —There has been a sort of discussion, and yet the investigation seems to me not to be perfectly worked out: this is where the enquiry fails.

Socrates Younger/ I do not understand.

Stranger/ I will try to make the thought, which is at this moment present in my mind, clearer to us both.

Socrates Younger/ Let me hear.

Stranger/ There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the political, which had the charge of one particular herd?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing, not horses or other brutes, but the art of rearing man collectively?

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Note, however, a difference which distinguishes the king from all other shepherds.

Socrates Younger/ To what do you refer?

Stranger/ I want to ask, whether anyone of the other herdsmen has a rival who professes and claims to share with him in the management of the herd?

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ I mean to say that merchants, husbandmen, providers of food, and also training-masters and physicians, will all contend with the herdsmen of humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring that they themselves have the care of rearing or managing mankind, and that they rear not only the common herd, but also the rulers themselves.

Socrates Younger/ Are they not right in saying so?

Stranger/ Very likely they may be, and we will consider their claim. But we are certain of this, —that no one will raise a similar claim as against the herdsman, who is allowed on all hands to be the sole and only feeder and physician of his herd; he is also their match-maker and accouter; no one else knows that department of science. And he is their merry-maker and musician, as far as their nature is susceptible of such influences, and no one can console and soothe his own herd better than he can, either with the natural tones of his voice or with instruments. And the same may be said of tenders of animals in general.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ But if this is as you say, can our argument about the king be true and unimpeachable? Were we right

in selecting him out of ten thousand other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human flock?

Socrates Younger/ Surely not.

Stranger/ Had we not reason just now to apprehend, that although we may have described a sort of royal form, we have not as yet accurately worked out the true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot reveal him as he truly is in his own nature, until we have disengaged and separated him from those who hang about him and claim to share in his prerogatives?

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ And that, Socrates, is what we must do, if we do not mean to bring disgrace upon the argument at its close.

Socrates Younger/ We must certainly avoid that.

Stranger/ Then let us make a new beginning, and travel by a different road.

Socrates Younger/ What road?

Stranger/ I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a famous tale, of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then we may resume our series of divisions, and proceed in the old path until we arrive at the desired summit. Shall we do as I say?

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to hear; and you are not too old for childish amusement.

Socrates Younger/ Let me hear.

Stranger/ There did really happen, and will again happen, like many other events of which ancient tradition has preserved the record, the portent which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes. You

have heard, no doubt, and remember what they say happened at that time?

Socrates Younger/ I suppose you to mean the token of the birth of the golden lamb.

Stranger/ No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how the sun and the stars once rose in the west, and set in the east, and that the god reversed their motion, and gave them that which they now have as a testimony to the right of Atreus.

Socrates Younger/ Yes; there is that legend also.

Stranger/ Again, we have been often told of the reign of Cronos.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, very often.

Stranger/ Did you ever hear that the men of former times were earth-born, and not begotten of one another?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that is another old tradition.

Stranger/ All these stories, and ten thousand others which are still more wonderful, have a common origin; many of them have been lost in the lapse of ages, or are repeated only in a disconnected form; but the origin of them is what no one has told, and may as well be told now; for the tale is suited to throw light on the nature of the king.

Socrates Younger/ Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole story, and leave out nothing.

Stranger/ Listen, then. There is a time when God himself guides and helps to roll the world in its course; and there is a time, on the completion of a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a living creature, and having originally received intelligence from its author and creator, turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in the opposite direction.

Socrates Younger/ Why is that?

Stranger/ Why, because only the most divine things of all remain ever unchanged and the same, and body is not included in this class. Heaven and the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been endowed by the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature, and therefore cannot be entirely free from perturbation. But their motion is, as far as possible, single and in the same place, and of the same kind; and is therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the least alteration possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of himself; and to think that he moves them at one time in one direction and at another time in another is blasphemy. Hence we must not say that the world is either self-moved always, or all made to go round by God in two opposite courses; or that two Gods, having opposite purposes, make it move round. But as I have already said (and this is the only remaining alternative) the world is guided at one time by an external power which is divine and receives fresh life and immortality from the renewing hand of the Creator, and again, when let go, moves spontaneously, being set free at such a time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a reverse movement: this is due to its perfect balance, to its vast size, and to the fact that it turns on the smallest pivot.

Socrates Younger/ Your account of the world seems to be very reasonable indeed.

Stranger/ Let us now reflect and try to gather from what has been said the nature of the phenomenon which we affirmed to be the cause of all these wonders. It is this.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ The reversal which takes place from time to time of the motion of the universe.

Socrates Younger/ How is that the cause?

Stranger/ Of all changes of the heavenly motions, we may consider this to be the greatest and most complete.

Socrates Younger/ I should imagine so.

Stranger/ And it may be supposed to result in the greatest changes to the human beings who are the inhabitants of the world at the time.

Socrates Younger/ Such changes would naturally occur.

Stranger/ And animals, as we know, survive with difficulty great and serious changes of many different kinds when they come upon them at once.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Hence there necessarily occurs a great destruction of them, which extends also to the life of man; few survivors of the race are left, and those who remain become the subjects of several novel and remarkable phenomena, and of one in particular, which takes place at the time when the transition is made to the cycle opposite to that in which we are now living.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ The life of all animals first came to a standstill, and the mortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed and grew young and delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened again, and the cheeks of the bearded man became smooth, and recovered their former bloom; the bodies of youths in their prime grew softer and smaller, continually by day and night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a newly-born child in mind as well as body; in the succeeding stage they wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the bodies of those who died by violence at that time quickly passed through the like changes, and in a few days were no more seen.

Socrates Younger/ Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those days; and in what way were they begotten of one another?

Stranger/ It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the then order of nature as the procreation of animals from one another; the earth-born race, of which we hear in story, was the one which existed in those days—they rose again from the ground; and of this tradition, which is now-a-days often unduly discredited, our ancestors, who were nearest in point of time to the end of the last period and came into being at the beginning of this, are to us the heralds. And mark how consistent the sequel of the tale is; after the return of age to youth, follows the return of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to life; simultaneously with the reversal of the world the wheel of their generation has been turned back, and they are put together and rise and live in the opposite order, unless God has carried any of them away to some other lot. According to this tradition they of necessity sprang from the earth and have the name of earth-born, and so the above legend clings to them.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly that is quite consistent with what has preceded; but tell me, was the life which you said existed in the reign of Cronos in that cycle of the world, or in this? For the change in the course of the stars and the sun must have occurred in both.

Stranger/ I see that you enter into my meaning; —no, that blessed and spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world, but to the previous one, in which God superintended the whole revolution of the universe; and the several parts of the universe were distributed under the rule of certain inferior deities, as is the way in some places still. There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various species and herds of animals, and each one was in all respects sufficient for those of whom he was the shepherd;

neither was there any violence, or devouring of one another, or war or quarrel among them; and I might tell of ten thousand other blessings, which belonged to that dispensation. The reason why the life of man was, as tradition says, spontaneous, is as follows: In those days God himself was their shepherd, and ruled over them, just as man, who is by comparison a divine being, still rules over the lower animals. Under him there were no forms of government or separate possession of women and children; for all men rose again from the earth, having no memory of the past. And although they had nothing of this sort, the earth gave them fruits in abundance, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not planted by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, and mostly in the open air, for the temperature of their seasons was mild; and they had no beds, but lay on soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully out of the earth. Such was the life of man in the days of Cronos, Socrates; the character of our present life, which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your own experience. Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem the happier?

Socrates Younger/ Impossible.

Stranger/ Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men, but with the brute creation, had used all these advantages with a view to philosophy, conversing with the brutes as well as with one another, and learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and was able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom, there would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand times happier than the men of our own

day. Or, again, if they had merely eaten and drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another and to the animals—such stories as are now attributed to them—in this case also, as I should imagine, the answer would be easy. But until some satisfactory witness can be found of the love of that age for knowledge and discussion, we had better let the matter drop, and give the reason why we have unearthed this tale, and then we shall be able to get on. In the fullness of time, when the change was to take place, and the earth-born race had all perished, and every soul had completed its proper cycle of births and been sown in the earth her appointed number of times, the pilot of the universe let the helm go, and retired to his place of view; and then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion of the world. Then also all the inferior deities who share the rule of the supreme power, being informed of what was happening, let go the parts of the world which were under their control. And the world turning round with a sudden shock, being impelled in an opposite direction from beginning to end, was shaken by a mighty earthquake, which wrought a new destruction of all manner of animals. Afterwards, when sufficient time had elapsed, the tumult and confusion and earthquake ceased, and the universal creature, once more at peace, attained to a calm, and settled down into his own orderly and accustomed course, having the charge and rule of himself and of all the creatures which are contained in him, and executing, as far as he remembered them, the instructions of his Father and Creator, more precisely at first, but afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling off was the admixture of matter in him; this was inherent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder, until attaining to the present order. From God, the constructor, the world received all that is good in him, but from a previous state came elements of evil and unrighteousness, which, thence

derived, first of all passed into the world, and were then transmitted to the animals. While the world was aided by the pilot in nurturing the animals, the evil was small, and great the good which he produced, but after the separation, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded well enough; but, as time went on, there was more and more forgetting, and the old discord again held sway and burst forth in full glory; and at last small was the good, and great was the admixture of evil, and there was a danger of universal ruin to the world, and to the things contained in him. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender care, seeing that the world was in great straits, and fearing that all might be dissolved in the storm and disappear in infinite chaos, again seated himself at the helm; and bringing back the elements which had fallen into dissolution and disorder to the motion which had prevailed under his dispensation, he set them in order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and immortal. And this is the whole tale, of which the first part will suffice to illustrate the nature of the king. For when the world turned towards the present cycle of generation, the age of man again stood still, and a change opposite to the previous one was the result. The small creatures which had almost disappeared grew in stature, and the newly-born children of the earth became grey and died and sank into the earth again. All things changed, imitating and following the condition of the universe, and of necessity agreeing with that in their mode of conception and generation and nurture; for no animal was any longer allowed to come into being in the earth through the agency of other creative beings, but as the world was ordained to be the lord of his own progress, in like manner the parts were ordained to grow and generate and give nourishment, as far as they could, of themselves, impelled by a similar movement. And so we have arrived at the real end of this discourse; for although there might be

much to tell of the lower animals, and of the condition out of which they changed and of the causes of the change, about men there is not much, and that little is more to the purpose. Deprived of the care of God, who had possessed and tended them, they were left helpless and defenseless, and were torn in pieces by the beasts, who were naturally fierce and had now grown wild. And in the first ages they were still without skill or resource; the food which once grew spontaneously had failed, and as yet they knew not how to procure it, because they had never felt the pressure of necessity. For all these reasons they were in a great strait; wherefore also the gifts spoken of in the old tradition were imparted to man by the gods, together with so much teaching and education as was indispensable; fire was given to them by Prometheus, the arts by Hephaestus and his fellow-worker, Athene, seeds and plants by others. From these is derived all that has helped to frame human life; since the care of the Gods, as I was saying, had now failed men, and they had to order their course of life for themselves, and were their own masters, just like the universal creature whom they imitate and follow, ever changing, as he changes, and ever living and growing, at one time in one manner, and at another time in another. Enough of the story, which may be of use in showing us how greatly we erred in the delineation of the king and the statesman in our previous discourse.

Socrates Younger/ What was this great error of which you speak?

Stranger/ There were two; the first a lesser one, the other was an error on a much larger and grander scale.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ I mean to say that when we were asked about a king and statesman of the present cycle and generation,

we told of a shepherd of a human flock who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who was a god when he ought to have been a man; and this was a great error. Again, we declared him to be the ruler of the entire State, without explaining how: this was not the whole truth, nor very intelligible; but still it was true, and therefore the second error was not so great as the first.

Socrates Younger/ Very good.

Stranger/ Before we can expect to have a perfect description of the statesman we must define the nature of his office.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And the myth was introduced in order to show, not only that all others are rivals of the true shepherd who is the object of our search, but in order that we might have a clearer view of him who is alone worthy to receive this appellation, because he alone of shepherds and herdsmen, according to the image which we have employed, has the care of human beings.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ And I cannot help thinking, Socrates, that the form of the divine shepherd is even higher than that of a king; whereas the statesmen who are now on earth seem to be much more like their subjects in character, and much more nearly to partake of their breeding and education.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Still they must be investigated all the same, to see whether, like the divine shepherd, they are above their subjects or on a level with them.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ To resume: —Do you remember that we spoke of a command-for-self exercised over animals, not singly but collectively, which we called the art of rearing a herd?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, I remember.

Stranger/ There, somewhere, lay our error; for we never included or mentioned the Statesman; and we did not observe that he had no place in our nomenclature.

Socrates Younger/ How was that?

Stranger/ All other herdsmen 'rear' their herds, but this is not a suitable term to apply to the Statesman; we should use a name which is common to them all.

Socrates Younger/ True, if there be such a name.

Stranger/ Why, is not 'care' of herds applicable to all? For this implies no feeding, or any special duty; if we say either 'tending' the herds, or 'managing' the herds, or 'having the care' of them, the same word will include all, and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the rest, as the argument seems to require.

Socrates Younger/ Quite right; but how shall we take the next step in the division?

Stranger/ As before we divided the art of 'rearing' herds accordingly as they were land or water herds, winged and wingless, mixing or not mixing the breed, horned and hornless, so, we may divide by these same differences the 'tending' of herds, comprehending in our definition the kingship of to-day and the rule of Cronos.

Socrates Younger/ That is clear; but I still ask, what is to follow.

Stranger/ If the word had been 'managing' herds, instead of feeding or rearing them, no one would have argued that there was no care of men in the case of the politician, although it was justly contended, that there was no human

art of feeding them which was worthy of the name, or at least, if there were, many a man had a prior and greater right to share in such an art than any king.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ But no other art or science will have a prior or better right than the royal science to care for human society and to rule over men in general.

Socrates Younger/ Quite true.

Stranger/ In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that a great error was committed at the end of our analysis.

Socrates Younger/ What was it?

Stranger/ Why, supposing we were ever so sure that there is such an art as the art of rearing or feeding bipeds, there was no reason why we should call this the royal or political art, as though there were no more to be said.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the name, so as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to divide, for there may be still considerable divisions.

Socrates Younger/ How can they be made?

Stranger/ First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human guardian or manager.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And the art of management which is assigned to man would again have to be subdivided.

Socrates Younger/ On what principle?

Stranger/ On the principle of voluntary and compulsory.

Socrates Younger/ Why?

Stranger/ Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here; for our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together, whereas they are utterly distinct, like their modes of government.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and compulsory.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny, and the voluntary management of herds of voluntary bipeds politics, may we not further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the true king and statesman?

Socrates Younger/ I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the account of the Statesman.

Stranger/ Would that we had, Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself as well as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king is not yet perfected; like statuaries who, in their too great haste, having overdone the several parts of their work, lose time in cutting them down, so too we, partly out of haste, partly out of a magnanimous desire to expose our former error, and also because we imagined that a king required grand illustrations, have taken up a marvelous lump of fable, and have been obliged to use more than was necessary. This made us discourse at large, and, nevertheless, the story never came to an end. And our discussion might be compared to a picture of some living being which had been fairly drawn in outline, but had not yet attained the life and clearness which is given by the blending of colors. Now to intelligent persons a living being had better be delineated by language and discourse than by any painting or work of art: to the duller sort by works of art.

Socrates Younger/ Very true; but what is the imperfection which still remains? I wish that you would tell me.

Stranger/ The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth except through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a dreamy sort of way, and then again to wake up and to know nothing.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ I fear that I have been unfortunate in raising a question about our experience of knowledge.

Socrates Younger/ Why so?

Stranger/ Why, because my 'example' requires the assistance of another example.

Socrates Younger/ Proceed; you need not fear that I shall tire.

Stranger/ I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener in you: when children are beginning to know their letters—

Socrates Younger/ What are you going to say?

Stranger/ That they distinguish the several letters well enough in very short and easy syllables, and are able to tell them correctly.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, and think and speak falsely of them.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a knowledge of what they do not as yet know be—

Socrates Younger/ Be what?

Stranger/ To refer them first of all to cases in which they judge correctly about the letters in question, and then to compare these with the cases in which they do not as yet know, and to show them that the letters are the same, and

have the same character in both combinations, until all cases in which they are right have been placed side by side with all cases in which they are wrong. In this way they have examples, and are made to learn that each letter in every combination is always the same and not another, and is always called by the same name.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Are not examples formed in this manner? We take a thing and compare it with another distinct instance of the same thing, of which we have a right conception, and out of the comparison there arises one true notion, which includes both of them.

Socrates Younger/ Exactly.

Stranger/ Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly fixed by the truth in each particular, and then, again, in other cases is altogether at sea; having somehow or other a correct notion of combinations; but when the elements are transferred into the long and difficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of them?

Socrates Younger/ There is nothing wonderful in that.

Stranger/ Could anyone, my friend, who began with false opinion ever expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom?

Socrates Younger/ Hardly.

Stranger/ Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see the nature of example in general in a small and particular instance; afterwards from lesser things we intend to pass to the royal class, which is the highest form of the same nature, and endeavor to discover by rules of art what the management of cities is; and then the dream will become a reality to us.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument, and as there were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim to have the care of states, let us part them all off, and leave him alone; and, as I was saying, a model or example of this process has first to be framed.

Socrates Younger/ Exactly.

Stranger/ What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy with the political occupation? Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no other example at hand, we choose weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool—this will be quite enough, without taking the whole of weaving, to illustrate our meaning?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Why should we not apply to weaving the same processes of division and subdivision which we have already applied to other classes; going once more as rapidly as we can through all the steps until we come to that which is needed for our purpose?

Socrates Younger/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ I shall reply by actually performing the process.

Socrates Younger/ Very good.

Stranger/ All things which we make or acquire are either creative or preventive; of the preventive class are antidotes, divine and human, and also defenses; and defenses are either military weapons or protections; and protections are veils, and also shields against heat and cold; and shields against heat and cold are shelters and coverings; and coverings are blankets and garments; and garments are some of them in one piece, and others of them are made in several parts; and of these latter some are stitched, others are fastened and not stitched; and of the not stitched, some are made of the sinews of plants, and some of hair; and of

these, again, some are cemented with water and earth, and others are fastened together by themselves. And these last defenses and coverings which are fastened together by themselves are called clothes, and the art which superintends them we may call, from the nature of the operation, the art of clothing, just as before the art of the Statesman was derived from the State; and may we not say that the art of weaving, at least that largest portion of it which was concerned with the making of clothes, differs only in name from this art of clothing, in the same way that, in the previous case, the royal science differed from the political?

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ In the next place, let us make the reflection, that the art of weaving clothes, which an incompetent person might fancy to have been sufficiently described, has been separated off from several others which are of the same family, but not from the co-operative arts.

Socrates Younger/ And which are the kindred arts?

Stranger/ I see that I have not taken you with me. So I think that we had better go backwards, starting from the end. We just now parted off from the weaving of clothes, the making of blankets, which differ from each other in that one is put under and the other is put around: and these are what I termed kindred arts.

Socrates Younger/ I understand.

Stranger/ And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles made of flax and cords, and all that we just now metaphorically termed the sinews of plants, and we have also separated off the process of felting and the putting together of materials by stitching and sewing, of which the most important part is the cobbler's art.

Socrates Younger/ Precisely.

Stranger/ Then we separated off the currier's art, which prepared coverings in entire pieces, and the art of sheltering, and subtracted the various arts of making water-tight which are employed in building, and in general in carpentering, and in other crafts, and all such arts as furnish impediments to thieving and acts of violence, and are concerned with making the lids of boxes and the fixing of doors, being divisions of the art of joining; and we also cut off the manufacture of arms, which is a section of the great and manifold art of making defenses; and we originally began by parting off the whole of the magic art which is concerned with antidotes, and have left, as would appear, the very art of which we were in search, the art of protection against winter cold, which fabricates woolen defenses, and has the name of weaving.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Yes, my boy, but that is not all; for the first process to which the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ Weaving is a sort of uniting?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But the first process is a separation of the clotted and matted fibers?

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ I mean the work of the carder's art; for we cannot say that carding is weaving, or that the carder is a weaver.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ Again, if a person were to say that the art of making the warp and the woof was the art of weaving, he would say what was paradoxical and false.

Socrates Younger/ To be sure.

Stranger/ Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the mender has nothing to do with the care and treatment of clothes, or are we to regard all these as arts of weaving?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they are concerned with the treatment and production of clothes; they will dispute the exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though assigning a larger sphere to that, will still reserve a considerable field for themselves.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Besides these, there are the arts which make tools and instruments of weaving, and which will claim at least to be co-operative causes in every work of the weaver.

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ Well, then, suppose that we define weaving, or rather that part of it which has been selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest of arts which are concerned with woolen garments—shall we be right? Is not the definition, although true, wanting in clearness and completeness; for do not all those other arts require to be first cleared away?

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that the argument may proceed in a regular manner?

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ Let us consider, in the first place, that there are two kinds of arts entering into everything which we do.

Socrates Younger/ What are they?

Stranger/ The one kind is the conditional or co-operative, the other the principal cause.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing, but which furnish the necessary tools for the manufacture, without which the several arts could not fulfill their appointed work, are co-operative; but those which make the things themselves are causal.

Socrates Younger/ A very reasonable distinction.

Stranger/ Thus the arts which make spindles, combs, and other instruments of the production of clothes, may be called cooperative, and those which treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ The arts of washing and mending, and the other preparatory arts which belong to the causal class, and form a division of the great art of adornment, may be all comprehended under what we call the fuller's art.

Socrates Younger/ Very good.

Stranger/ Carding and spinning threads and all the parts of the process which are concerned with the actual manufacture of a woolen garment form a single art, which is one of those universally acknowledged, —the art of working in wool.

Socrates Younger/ To be sure.

Stranger/ Of working in wool, again, there are two divisions, and both these are parts of two arts at once.

Socrates Younger/ How is that?

Stranger/ Carding and one half of the use of the comb, and the other processes of wool-working which separate the composite, may be classed together as belonging both to the art of wool-working, and also to one of the two great arts which are of universal application—the art of composition and the art of division.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ To the latter belong carding and the other processes of which I was just now speaking; the art of discernment or division in wool and yarn, which is effected in one manner with the comb and in another with the hands, is variously described under all the names which I just now mentioned.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Again, let us take some process of wool-working which is also a portion of the art of composition, and, dismissing the elements of division which we found there, make two halves, one on the principle of composition, and the other on the principle of division.

Socrates Younger/ Let that be done.

Stranger/ And once more, Socrates, we must divide the part which belongs at once both to wool-working and composition, if we are ever to discover satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving.

Socrates Younger/ We must.

Stranger/ Yes, certainly, and let us call one part of the art the art of twisting threads, the other the art of combining them.

Socrates Younger/ Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be referring to manufacture of the warp?

Stranger/ Yes, and of the woof too; how, if not by twisting, is the woof made?

Socrates Younger/ There is no other way.

Stranger/ Then suppose that you define the warp and the woof, for I think that the definition will be of use to you.

Socrates Younger/ How shall I define them?

Stranger/ As thus: A piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise and breadth-wise is said to be pulled out.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the wool thus prepared, when twisted by the spindle, and made into a firm thread, is called the warp, and the art which regulates these operations the art of spinning the warp.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And the threads which are more loosely spun, having a softness proportioned to the intertexture of the warp and to the degree of force used in dressing the cloth, —the threads which are thus spun are called the woof, and the art which is set over them may be called the art of spinning the woof.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ And, now, there can be no mistake about the nature of the part of weaving which we have undertaken to define. For when that part of the art of composition which is employed in the working of wool forms a web by the regular intertexture of warp and woof, the entire woven substance is called by us a woolen garment, and the art which presides over this is the art of weaving.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of entwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit?

Socrates Younger/ I thought, Stranger, that there was nothing useless in what was said.

Stranger/ Very likely, but you may not always think so, my sweet friend; and in case any feeling of dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in your mind, as it very well may, let me lay down a principle which will apply to arguments in general.

Socrates Younger/ Proceed.

Stranger/ Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess and defect, and then we shall have a rational ground on which we may praise or blame too much length or too much shortness in discussions of this kind.

Socrates Younger/ Let us do so.

Stranger/ The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the following: —

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ Length and shortness, excess and defect; with all of these the art of measurement is conversant.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts, with a view to our present purpose.

Socrates Younger/ Where would you make the division?

Stranger/ As thus: I would make two parts, one having regard to the relativity of greatness and smallness to each other; and there is another, without which the existence of production would be impossible.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Do you not think that it is only natural for the greater to be called greater with reference to the less alone, and the less, less with reference to the greater alone?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well, but is there not also something exceeding and exceeded by the principle of the mean, both in speech and action, and is not this a reality, and the chief mark of difference between good and bad men?

Socrates Younger/ Plainly.

Stranger/ Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are discerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before, only relatively to one another, but there

must also be another comparison of them with the mean or ideal standard; would you like to hear the reason why?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the less, there will never be any comparison of either with the mean.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid art of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the watch against excess and defect, not as unrealities, but as real evils, which occasion a difficulty in action; and the excellence or beauty of every work of art is due to this observance of measure.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But if the science of the Statesman disappears, the search for the royal science will be impossible.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the inference that not-being had an existence, because here was the point at which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavor to show that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one another, but also have to do with the production of the mean; for if this is not admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action can be an undisputed master of his science.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then.

Stranger/ But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other, of which we only too well remember the length. I think,

however, that we may fairly assume something of this sort: —

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That we shall someday require this notion of a mean with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument that the very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the possibility of measuring more or less, not only with one another, but also with a view to the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand support and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are maintaining; for if there are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a standard of measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is neither.

Socrates Younger/ True; and what is the next step?

Stranger/ The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into two parts, as we have said already, and to place in the one part all the arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness with their opposites; and to have another part in which they are measured with the mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those words, in short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the extremes.

Socrates Younger/ Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very different spheres.

Stranger/ There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say, believing themselves to speak wisely, that the art of measurement is universal, and has to do with all things. And this means what we are now saying; for all things which come within the province of art do certainly in some sense partake of measure. But these persons, because they are not accustomed to distinguish classes according to real forms, jumble together two widely different things, relation to one another, and to a standard, under the idea that they are the

same, and also fall into the converse error of dividing other things not according to their real parts. Whereas the right way is, if a man has first seen the unity of things, to go on with the enquiry and not desist until he has found all the differences contained in it which form distinct classes; nor again should he be able to rest contented with the manifold diversities which are seen in a multitude of things until he has comprehended all of them that have any affinity within the bounds of one similarity and embraced them within the reality of a single kind. But we have said enough on this head, and also of excess and defect; we have only to bear in mind that two divisions of the art of measurement have been discovered which are concerned with them, and not forget what they are.

Socrates Younger/ We will not forget.

Stranger/ And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to consider another question, which concerns not this argument only but the conduct of such arguments in general.

Socrates Younger/ What is this new question?

Stranger/ Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his letters: when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we say that the question is intended to improve his grammatical knowledge of that particular word, or of all words?

Socrates Younger/ Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge of all words.

Stranger/ And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to improve our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally?

Socrates Younger/ Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is general.

Stranger/ Still less would any rational man seek to analyze the notion of weaving for its own sake. But people seem to forget that some things have sensible images, which are readily known, and can be easily pointed out when anyone desires to answer an enquirer without any trouble or argument; whereas the greatest and highest truths have no outward image of themselves visible to man, which he who wishes to satisfy the soul of the enquirer can adapt to the eye of sense, and therefore we ought to train ourselves to give and accept a rational account of them; for immaterial things, which are the noblest and greatest, are shown only in thought and idea, and in no other way, and all that we are now saying is said for the sake of them. Moreover, there is always less difficulty in fixing the mind on small matters than on great.

Socrates Younger/ Very good.

Stranger/ Let us call to mind the bearing of all this.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we may have experienced in the discussion about weaving, and the reversal of the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the being of not-being. I know that they were felt to be too long, and I reproached myself with this, fearing that they might be not only tedious but irrelevant; and all that I have now said is only designed to prevent the recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future.

Socrates Younger/ Very good. Will you proceed?

Stranger/ Then I would like to observe that you and I, remembering what has been said, should praise or blame the length or shortness of discussions, not by comparing them with one another, but with what is fitting, having

regard to the art of measurement, which, as we said, was to be borne in mind.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to what is fitting; for we should only want such a length as is suited to give pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter; and reason tells us, that we should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an enquiry, not our first, but our second object; the first and highest of all being to assert the great method of division according to species—whether the discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should be taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed indifferently, according as either of them is better calculated to sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who censures the length of discourses on such occasions and cannot away with their circumlocution, that he should not be in such a hurry to have done with them, when he can only complain that they are tedious, but he should prove that if they had been shorter they would have made those who took part in them better dialecticians, and more capable of expressing the truth of things; about any other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself—he should pretend not to hear them. But we have had enough of this, as you will probably agree with me in thinking. Let us return to our Statesman, and apply to his case the aforesaid example of weaving.

Socrates Younger/ Very good; —let us do as you say.

Stranger/ The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts of shepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do with herds at all. There still remain, however, of the causal and co-operative arts those which are immediately concerned with States, and which must first be distinguished from one another.

Socrates Younger/ Very good.

Stranger/ You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into two halves; the reason will be very evident as we proceed.

Socrates Younger/ Then we had better do so.

Stranger/ We must carve them like a victim into members or limbs, since we cannot bisect them. For we certainly should divide everything into as few parts as possible.

Socrates Younger/ What is to be done in this case?

Stranger/ What we did in the example of weaving—all those arts which furnished the tools were regarded by us as cooperative.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make any implement in a State, whether great or small, may be regarded by us as co-operative, for without them neither State nor Statesmanship would be possible; and yet we are not inclined to say that any of them is a product of the kingly art.

Socrates Younger/ No, indeed.

Stranger/ The task of separating this class from others is not an easy one; for there is plausibility in saying that anything in the world is the instrument of doing something. But there is another class of possessions in a city, of which I have a word to say.

Socrates Younger/ What class do you mean?

Stranger/ A class which may be described as not having this power; that is to say, not like an instrument, framed for production, but designed for the preservation of that which is produced.

Socrates Younger/ To what do you refer?

Stranger/ To the class of vessels, as they are comprehensively termed, which are constructed for the preservation of things moist and dry, of things prepared in the fire or out of the fire; this is a very large class, and has, if I am not mistaken, literally nothing to do with the royal art of which we are in search.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ There is also a third class of possessions to be noted, different from these and very extensive, moving or resting on land or water, honorable and also dishonorable. The whole of this class has one name, because it is intended to be sat upon, being always a seat for something.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ A vehicle, which is certainly not the work of the Statesman, but of the carpenter, potter, and coppersmith.

Socrates Younger/ I understand.

Stranger/ And is there not a fourth class which is again different, and in which most of the things formerly mentioned are contained, —every kind of dress, most sorts of arms, walls and enclosures, whether of earth or stone, and ten thousand other things? all of which being made for the sake of defense, may be truly called defenses, and are for the most part to be regarded as the work of the builder or of the weaver, rather than of the Statesman.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Shall we add a fifth class, of ornamentation and drawing, and of the imitations produced by drawing and music, which are designed for amusement only, and may be fairly comprehended under one name?

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ Plaything is the name.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ That one name may be fitly predicated of all of them, for none of these things have a serious purpose—amusement is their sole aim.

Socrates Younger/ That again I understand.

Stranger/ Then there is a class which provides materials for all these, out of which and in which the arts already mentioned fabricate their works; —this manifold class, I say, which is the creation and offspring of many other arts, may I not rank sixth?

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ I am referring to gold, silver, and other metals, and all that wood-cutting and shearing of every sort provides for the art of carpentry and plaiting; and there is the process of barking and stripping the cuticle of plants, and the currier's art, which strips off the skins of animals, and other similar arts which manufacture corks and papyri and cords, and provide for the manufacture of composite species out of simple kinds—the whole class may be termed the primitive and simple possession of man, and with this the kingly science has no concern at all.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ The provision of food and of all other things which mingle their particles with the particles of the human body, and minister to the body, will form a seventh class, which may be called by the general term of nourishment, unless you have any better name to offer. This, however, appertains rather to the husbandman, huntsman, trainer, doctor, cook, and is not to be assigned to the Statesman's art.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ These seven classes include nearly every description of property, with the exception of tame animals. Consider; —there was the original material, which ought to

have been placed first; next come instruments, vessels, vehicles, defenses, playthings, nourishment; small things, which may be included under one of these—as for example, coins, seals and stamps, are omitted, for they have not in them the character of any larger kind which includes them; but some of them may, with a little forcing, be placed among ornaments, and others may be made to harmonize with the class of implements. The art of herding, which has been already divided into parts, will include all property in tame animals, except slaves.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and I suspect that in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are the rivals of the king in the formation of the political web, will be discovered; just as spinners, carders, and the rest of them, were the rivals of the weaver. All the others, who were termed co-operators, have been got rid of among the occupations already mentioned, and separated from the royal and political science.

Socrates Younger/ I agree.

Stranger/ Let us go a little nearer, in order that we may be more certain of the complexion of this remaining class.

Socrates Younger/ Let us do so.

Stranger/ We shall find from our present point of view that the greatest servants are in a case and condition which is the reverse of what we anticipated.

Socrates Younger/ Who are they?

Stranger/ Those who have been purchased, and have so become possessions; these are unmistakably slaves, and certainly do not claim royal science.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ Again, freemen who of their own accord become the servants of the other classes in a State, and who exchange and equalize the products of husbandry and the other arts, some sitting in the market-place, others going from city to city by land or sea, and giving money in exchange for money or for other productions—the money-changer, the merchant, the ship-owner, the retailer, will not put in any claim to statecraft or politics?

Socrates Younger/ No; unless, indeed, to the politics of commerce.

Stranger/ But surely men whom we see acting as hirelings and serfs, and too happy to turn their hand to anything, will not profess to share in royal science?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ But what would you say of some other serviceable officials?

Socrates Younger/ Who are they, and what services do they perform?

Stranger/ There are heralds, and scribes perfected by practice, and divers others who have great skill in various sorts of business connected with the government of states—what shall we call them?

Socrates Younger/ They are the officials, and servants of the rulers, as you just now called them, but not themselves rulers.

Stranger/ There may be something strange in any servant pretending to be a ruler, and yet I do not think that I could have been dreaming when I imagined that the principal claimants to political science would be found somewhere in this neighborhood.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Well, let us draw nearer, and try the claims of some who have not yet been tested: in the first place, there are diviners, who have a portion of servile or ministerial science, and are thought to be the interpreters of the gods to men.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ There is also the priestly class, who, as the law declares, know how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices which are acceptable to them, and to ask on our behalf blessings in return from them. Now both these are branches of the servile or ministerial art.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, clearly.

Stranger/ And here I think that we seem to be getting on the right track; for the priest and the diviner are swollen with pride and prerogative, and they create an awful impression of themselves by the magnitude of their enterprises; in Egypt, the king himself is not allowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be of another class and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in the priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistracies, and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been chosen by lot to be the King Archon.

Socrates Younger/ Precisely.

Stranger/ But who are these other kings and priests elected by lot who now come into view followed by their retainers and a vast throng, as the former class disappears and the scene changes?

Socrates Younger/ Whom can you mean?

Stranger/ They are a strange crew.

Socrates Younger/ Why strange?

Stranger/ A minute ago I thought that they were animals of every tribe; for many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many more like satyrs and such weak and shifty creatures; —Protean shapes quickly changing into one another's forms and natures; and now, Socrates, I begin to see who they are.

Socrates Younger/ Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange vision.

Stranger/ Yes; everyone looks strange when you do not know him; and just now I myself fell into this mistake—at first sight, coming suddenly upon him, I did not recognize the politician and his troop.

Socrates Younger/ Who is he?

Stranger/ The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who must at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we are ever to see daylight in the present enquiry.

Socrates Younger/ That is a hope not lightly to be renounced.

Stranger/ Never, if I can help it; and, first, let me ask you a question.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ Is not monarchy a recognized form of government?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of the few?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude, which is called by the name of democracy?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And do not these three expand in a manner into five, producing out of themselves two other names?

Socrates Younger/ What are they?

Stranger/ There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary, poverty and riches, law and the absence of law, which men now-a-days apply to them; the two first they subdivide accordingly, and ascribe to monarchy two forms and two corresponding names, royalty and tyranny.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ And the government of the few they distinguish by the names of aristocracy and oligarchy.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Democracy alone, whether rigidly observing the laws or not, and whether the multitude rule over the men of property with their consent or against their consent, always in ordinary language has the same name.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ But do you suppose that any form of government which is defined by these characteristics of the one, the few, or the many, of poverty or wealth, of voluntary or compulsory submission, of written law or the absence of law, can be a right one?

Socrates Younger/ Why not?

Stranger/ Reflect; and follow me.

Socrates Younger/ In what direction?

Stranger/ Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract our words?

Socrates Younger/ To what do you refer?

Stranger/ If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out of the rest as having a character which is at once judicial and authoritative?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And there was one kind of authority over lifeless things and another over living animals; and so we proceeded in the division step by step up to this point, not losing the idea of science, but unable as yet to determine the nature of the particular science?

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Hence we are led to observe that the distinguishing principle of the State cannot be the few or many, the voluntary or involuntary, poverty or riches; but some notion of science must enter into it, if we are to be consistent with what has preceded.

Socrates Younger/ And we must be consistent.

Stranger/ Well, then, in which of these various forms of States may the science of government, which is among the greatest of all sciences and most difficult to acquire, be supposed to reside? That we must discover, and then we shall see who are the false politicians who pretend to be politicians but are not, although they persuade many, and shall separate them from the wise king.

Socrates Younger/ That, as the argument has already intimated, will be our duty.

Stranger/ Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain political science?

Socrates Younger/ Impossible.

Stranger/ But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a hundred, or say fifty, who could?

Socrates Younger/ In that case political science would certainly be the easiest of all sciences; there could not be

found in a city of that number as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged by the standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be as many kings. For kings we may truly call those who possess royal science, whether they rule or not, as was shown in the previous argument.

Stranger/ Thank you for reminding me; and the consequence is that any true form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one, two, or, at any rate, of a few.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And these, whether they rule with the will, or against the will, of their subjects, with written laws or without written laws, and whether they are poor or rich, and whatever be the nature of their rule, must be supposed, according to our present view, to rule on some scientific principle; just as the physician, whether he cures us against our will or with our will, and whatever be his mode of treatment, —incision, burning, or the infliction of some other pain, —whether he practices out of a book or not out of a book, and whether he be rich or poor, whether he purges or reduces in some other way, or even fattens his patients, is a physician all the same, so long as he exercises authority over them according to rules of art, if he only does them good and heals and saves them. And this we lay down to be the only proper test of the art of medicine, or of any other art of command.

Socrates Younger/ Quite true.

Stranger/ Then that can be the only true form of government in which the governors are really found to possess science, and are not mere pretenders, whether they rule according to law or without law, over willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor themselves—none of these

things can with any propriety be included in the notion of the ruler.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And whether with a view to the public good they purge the State by killing some, or exiling some; whether they reduce the size of the body corporate by sending out from the hive swarms of citizens, or, by introducing persons from without, increase it; while they act according to the rules of wisdom and justice, and use their power with a view to the general security and improvement, the city over which they rule, and which has these characteristics, may be described as the only true State. All other governments are not genuine or real, but only imitations of this, and some of them are better and some of them are worse; the better are said to be well governed, but they are mere imitations like the others.

Socrates Younger/ I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you say; but as to their ruling without laws—the expression has a harsh sound.

Stranger/ You have been too quick for me, Socrates; I was just going to ask you whether you objected to any of my statements. And now I see that we shall have to consider this notion of there being good government without laws.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the law should rule, but that a man should rule supposing him to have wisdom and royal power. Do you see why this is?

Socrates Younger/ Why?

Stranger/ Because the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest and most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The differences of men and actions, and

the endless irregular movements of human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. And no art whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time.

Socrates Younger/ Of course not.

Stranger/ But the law is always striving to make one like an obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary to his appointment, or any question to be asked—not even in sudden changes of circumstances, when something happens to be better than what he commanded for someone.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly; the law treats us all precisely in the manner which you describe.

Stranger/ A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state of things which is the reverse of simple.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are we compelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has next to be investigated.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic contests in your city, such as there are in other cities, at which men compete in running, wrestling, and the like?

Socrates Younger/ Yes; they are very common among us.

Stranger/ And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by professional trainers or by others having similar authority? Can you remember?

Socrates Younger/ To what do you refer?

Stranger/ The training-masters do not issue minute rules for individuals, or give every individual what is exactly suited to his constitution; they think that they ought to go more

roughly to work, and to prescribe generally the regimen which will benefit the majority.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them all; they send them forth together, and let them rest together from their running, wrestling, or whatever the form of bodily exercise may be.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And now observe that the legislator who has to preside over the herd, and to enforce justice in their dealings with one another, will not be able, in enacting for the general good, to provide exactly what is suitable for each particular case.

Socrates Younger/ He cannot be expected to do so.

Stranger/ He will lay down laws in a general form for the majority, roughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of them he will deliver in writing, and others will be unwritten; and these last will be traditional customs of the country.

Socrates Younger/ He will be right.

Stranger/ Yes, quite right; for how can he sit at every man's side all through his life, prescribing for him the exact particulars of his duty? Who, Socrates, would be equal to such a task? No one who really had the royal science, if he had been able to do this, would have imposed upon himself the restriction of a written law.

Socrates Younger/ So I should infer from what has now been said.

Stranger/ Or rather, my good friend, from what is going to be said.

Socrates Younger/ And what is that?

Stranger/ Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or trainer, who is about to go into a far country, and is expecting to be a long time away from his patients—thinking that his instructions will not be remembered unless they are written down, he will leave notes of them for the use of his pupils or patients.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he had intended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other celestial influences, something else happened to be better for them, —would he not venture to suggest this new remedy, although not contemplated in his former prescription? Would he persist in observing the original law, neither himself giving any new commandments, nor the patient daring to do otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea that this course only was healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science and true art, would not all such enactments be utterly ridiculous?

Socrates Younger/ Utterly.

Stranger/ And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, determining what was good or bad, honorable or dishonorable, just or unjust, to the tribes of men who flock together in their several cities, and are governed in accordance with them; if, I say, the wise legislator were suddenly to come again, or another like to him, is he to be prohibited from changing them? —would not this prohibition be in reality quite as ridiculous as the other?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is in point?

Socrates Younger/ I do not recall what you mean at the moment.

Stranger/ They say that if anyone knows how the ancient laws may be improved, he must first persuade his own State of the improvement, and then he may legislate, but not otherwise.

Socrates Younger/ And are they not right?

Stranger/ I dare say. But supposing that he does use some gentle violence for their good, what is this violence to be called? Or rather, before you answer, let me ask the same question in reference to our previous instances.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Suppose that a skillful physician has a patient, of whatever sex or age, whom he compels against his will to do something for his good which is contrary to the written rules; what is this compulsion to be called? Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the art, or a breach of the laws of health? Nothing could be more unjust than for the patient to whom such violence is applied, to charge the physician who practices the violence with wanting skill or aggravating his disease.

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ In the political art error is not called disease, but evil, or disgrace, or injustice.

Socrates Younger/ Quite true.

Stranger/ And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is compelled to do what is juster and better and nobler than he did before, the last and most absurd thing which he could say about such violence is that he has incurred disgrace or evil or injustice at the hands of those who compelled him.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich man, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust? May

not any man, rich or poor, with or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against the will of the citizens, do what is for their interest? Is not this the true principle of government, according to which the wise and good man will order the affairs of his subjects? As the pilot, by watching continually over the interests of the ship and of the crew, — not by laying down rules, but by making his art a law, — preserves the lives of his fellow-sailors, even so, and in the self-same way, may there not be a true form of polity created by those who are able to govern in a similar spirit, and who show a strength of art which is superior to the law? Nor can wise rulers ever err while they observing the one great rule of distributing justice to the citizens with intelligence and skill, are able to preserve them, and, as far as may be, to make them better from being worse.

Socrates Younger/ No one can deny what has been now said.

Stranger/ Neither, if you consider, can anyone deny the other statement.

Socrates Younger/ What was it?

Stranger/ We said that no great number of persons, whoever they may be, can attain political knowledge, or order a State wisely, but that the true government is to be found in a small body, or in an individual, and that other States are but imitations of this, as we said a little while ago, some for the better and some for the worse.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean? I cannot have understood your previous remark about imitations.

Stranger/ And yet the mere suggestion which I hastily threw out is highly important, even if we leave the question where it is, and do not seek by the discussion of it to expose the error which prevails in this matter.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or familiar; but we may attempt to express it thus: —Supposing the government of which I have been speaking to be the only true model, then the others must use the written laws of this—in no other way can they be saved; they will have to do what is now generally approved, although not the best thing in the world.

Socrates Younger/ What is this?

Stranger/ No citizen should do anything contrary to the laws, and any infringement of them should be punished with death and the most extreme penalties; and this is very right and good when regarded as the second best thing, if you set aside the first, of which I was just now speaking. Shall I explain the nature of what I call the second best?

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ I must again have recourse to my favorite images; through them, and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers.

Socrates Younger/ What images?

Stranger/ The noble pilot and the wise physician, who 'is worth many another man'—in the similitude of these let us endeavor to discover some image of the king.

Socrates Younger/ What sort of an image?

Stranger/ Well, such as this: —Every man will reflect that he suffers strange things at the hands of both of them; the physician saves any whom he wishes to save, and any whom he wishes to maltreat he maltreats—cutting or burning them, and at the same time requiring them to bring him payments, which are a sort of tribute, of which little or nothing is spent upon the sick man, and the greater part is consumed by him and his domestics; and the finale is that he receives money from the relations of the sick man or from some enemy of his, and puts him out of the way. And the

pilots of ships are guilty of numberless evil deeds of the same kind; they intentionally play false and leave you ashore when the hour of sailing arrives; or they cause mishaps at sea and cast away their freight; and are guilty of other rogueries. Now suppose that we, bearing all this in mind, were to determine, after consideration, that neither of these arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute control either over freemen or over slaves, but that we will summon an assembly either of all the people, or of the rich only, and that anybody who likes, whatever may be his calling, or even if he have no calling, may offer an opinion either about seamanship or about diseases—whether as to the manner in which physic or surgical instruments are to be applied to the patient, or again about the vessels and the nautical implements which are required in navigation, and how to meet the dangers of winds and waves which are incidental to the voyage, how to behave when encountering pirates, and what is to be done with the old-fashioned galleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar build—and that, whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points, upon the advice of persons skilled or unskilled, shall be written down on triangular tablets and columns, or enacted although unwritten to be national customs; and that in all future time vessels shall be navigated and remedies administered to the patient after this fashion.

Socrates Younger/ What a strange notion!

Stranger/ Suppose further, that the pilots and physicians are appointed annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole people, and that they are elected by lot; and that after their election they navigate vessels and heal the sick according to the written rules.

Socrates Younger/ Worse and worse.

Stranger/ But hear what follows: —When the year of office has expired, the pilot or physician has to come before a court of review, in which the judges are either selected from the wealthy classes or chosen by lot out of the whole people; and anybody who pleases may be their accuser, and may lay to their charge, that during the past year they have not navigated their vessels or healed their patients according to the letter of the law and the ancient customs of their ancestors; and if either of them is condemned, some of the judges must fix what he is to suffer or pay.

Socrates Younger/ He who is willing to take a command under such conditions, deserves to suffer any penalty.

Stranger/ Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if anyone is detected enquiring into piloting and navigation, or into health and the true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other conditions of the atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any ingenious notions about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or physician, but a cloudy prating sophist; —further, on the ground that he is a corrupter the young, who would persuade them to follow the art of medicine or piloting in an unlawful manner, and to exercise an arbitrary rule over their patients or ships, anyone who is qualified by law may inform against him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found to be persuading any, whether young or old, to act contrary to the written law, he is to be punished with the utmost rigor; for no one should presume to be wiser than the laws; and as touching healing and health and piloting and navigation, the nature of them is known to all, for anybody may learn the written laws and the national customs. If such were the mode of procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and about generalship, and any branch of hunting, or about painting or imitation in general, or carpentry, or any sort of handicraft, or husbandry, or planting, or if we were to see

an art of rearing horses, or tending herds, or divination, or any ministerial service, or draught-playing, or any science conversant with number, whether simple or square or cube, or comprising motion, —I say, if all these things were done in this way according to written regulations, and not according to art, what would be the result?

Socrates Younger/ All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life, which is bad enough already, would then become utterly unendurable.

Stranger/ But what, if while compelling all these operations to be regulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of the laws someone elected by a show of hands, or by lot, and he caring nothing about the laws, were to act contrary to them from motives of interest or favor, and without knowledge, —would not this be a still worse evil than the former?

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience, and the wisdom of counselors who have graciously recommended them and persuaded the multitude to pass them, would be a far greater and more ruinous error than any adherence to written law?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best thing in legislating is not to allow either the individual or the multitude to break the law in any respect whatever.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as far as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who have knowledge?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly they would.

Stranger/ And, as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a true Statesman, will do many things within his own sphere of action by his art without regard to the laws, when he is of opinion that something other than that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed during his absence would be better.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, we said so.

Stranger/ And any individual or any number of men, having fixed laws, in acting contrary to them with a view to something better, would only be acting, as far as they are able, like the true Statesman?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill; but if they had knowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth, and an imitation no longer.

Socrates Younger/ Quite true.

Stranger/ And the principle that no great number of men are able to acquire a knowledge of any art has been already admitted by us.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, it has.

Stranger/ Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art, will never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob.

Socrates Younger/ Impossible.

Stranger/ Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of government can ever make to the true government of the one scientific ruler, is to do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national customs.

Socrates Younger/ Very good.

Stranger/ When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is called aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Or again, when an individual rules according to law in imitation of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules according to law, we give him the same name, whether he rules with opinion or with knowledge.

Socrates Younger/ To be sure.

Stranger/ And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his name will surely be the same—he will be called a king; and thus the five names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one.

Socrates Younger/ That is true.

Stranger/ And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation, may not such an one be called a tyrant?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the king, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies, —because men are offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that anyone can be worthy of such authority, or is able and willing in the spirit of virtue and knowledge to act justly and holily to all; they fancy that he will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he pleases of us; for if there could be such a despot as we describe, they would acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to have him, and that he alone would be the happy ruler of a true and perfect State.

Socrates Younger/ To be sure.

Stranger/ But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has no natural head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body and in mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavor to approach as nearly as they can to the true form of government.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at the miseries which there are, and always will be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation and thus conducted, would ruin all that it touched. Ought we not rather to wonder at the natural strength of the political bond? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, like ships at sea, founder from time to time, and perish and have perished and will hereafter perish, through the badness of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths—I mean to say, that they are wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Then the question arises which of these untrue forms of government is the least oppressive to their subjects, though they are all oppressive; and which is the worst of them? Here is a consideration which is beside our present purpose, and yet having regard to the whole it seems to influence all our actions: we must examine it.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, we must.

Stranger/ You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the hardest and the easiest.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ I am speaking of the three forms of government, which I mentioned at the beginning of this discussion—monarchy, the rule of the few, and the rule of the many.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the true one may be distinguished as a seventh.

Socrates Younger/ How would you make the division?

Stranger/ Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of the few into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and oligarchy; and democracy or the rule of the many, which before was one, must now be divided.

Socrates Younger/ On what principle of division?

Stranger/ On the same principle as before, although the name is now discovered to have a twofold meaning. For the distinction of ruling with law or without law, applies to this as well as to the rest.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ The division made no difference when we were looking for the perfect State, as we showed before. But now that this has been separated off, and, as we said, the others alone are left for us, the principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them all.

Socrates Younger/ That would seem to follow, from what has been said.

Stranger/ Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws, is the best of all the six, and when lawless is the most bitter and oppressive to the subject.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ The government of the few, which is intermediate between that of the one and many, is also intermediate in good and evil; but the government of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either any

great good or any great evil, when compared with the others, because the offices are too minutely subdivided and too many hold them. And this therefore is the worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all lawless ones. If they are all without the restraints of law, democracy is the form in which to live is best; if they are well ordered, then this is the last which you should choose, as royalty, the first form, is the best, with the exception of the seventh, for that excels them all, and is among States what God is among men.

Socrates Younger/ You are quite right, and we should choose that above all.

Stranger/ The members of all these States, with the exception of the one which has knowledge, may be set aside as being not Statesmen but partisans, —upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves idols; and, being the greatest imitators and magicians, they are also the greatest of Sophists.

Socrates Younger/ The name of Sophist after many windings in the argument appears to have been most justly fixed upon the politicians, as they are termed.

Stranger/ And so our Satiric drama has been played out; and the troop of Centaurs and Satyrs, however unwilling to leave the stage, have at last been separated from the political science.

Socrates Younger/ So I perceive.

Stranger/ There remain, however, natures still more troublesome, because they are more nearly akin to the king, and more difficult to discern; the examination of them may be compared to the process of refining gold.

Socrates Younger/ What is your meaning?

Stranger/ The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and stones and the like; there remain in a confused mass the valuable elements akin to gold, which can only be

separated by fire, —copper, silver, and other precious metal; these are at last refined away by the use of tests, until the gold is left quite pure.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that is the way in which these things are said to be done.

Stranger/ In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been separated from political science, and what is precious and of a kindred nature has been left; there remain the nobler arts of the general and the judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal art, and persuades men to do justice, and assists in guiding the helm of States: —How can we best clear away all these, leaving him whom we seek alone and unalloyed?

Socrates Younger/ That is obviously what has in some way to be attempted.

Stranger/ If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be brought to light; and I think that the illustration of music may assist in exhibiting him. Please to answer me a question.

Socrates Younger/ What question?

Stranger/ There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in general?

Socrates Younger/ There is.

Stranger/ And is there any higher art or science, having power to decide which of these arts are and are not to be learned; —what do you say?

Socrates Younger/ I should answer that there is.

Stranger/ And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the others?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or no single science to any other? Or ought this science to be the overseer and governor of all the others?

Socrates Younger/ The latter.

Stranger/ You mean to say that the science which judges whether we ought to learn or not, must be superior to the science which is learned or which teaches?

Socrates Younger/ Far superior.

Stranger/ And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade or not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching?

Socrates Younger/ That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to rhetoric.

Stranger/ And to what science do we give the power of determining whether we are to employ persuasion or force towards anyone, or to refrain altogether?

Socrates Younger/ To that science which governs the arts of speech and persuasion.

Stranger/ Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?

Socrates Younger/ Very good.

Stranger/ Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics, being a different species, yet ministering to it.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But what would you think of another sort of power or science?

Socrates Younger/ What science?

Stranger/ The science which has to do with military operations against our enemies—is that to be regarded as a science or not?

Socrates Younger/ How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as other than a science?

Stranger/ And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we are to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different?

Socrates Younger/ If we are to be consistent, we must say different.

Stranger/ And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are not to give up our former notion?

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war is, can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal?

Socrates Younger/ No other.

Stranger/ The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not political?

Socrates Younger/ Exactly.

Stranger/ Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge.

Socrates Younger/ Very good.

Stranger/ Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he receives from the king and legislator, —showing his own peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or by any sort of favor or enmity, into deciding the suits of men with one another contrary to the appointment of the legislator?

Socrates Younger/ No; his office is such as you describe.

Stranger/ Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not royal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to the royal power?

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is political or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself to act, but to rule over those who are able to act; the king ought to know what is and what is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in matters of the greatest importance, whilst others should execute his orders.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they have no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them concerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to have, special names corresponding to their several actions.

Socrates Younger/ I agree.

Stranger/ And the science which is over them all, and has charge of the laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them all into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of their common nature, most truly we may call politics.

Socrates Younger/ Exactly so.

Stranger/ Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a State, shall I analyze politics after the pattern which weaving supplied?

Socrates Younger/ I greatly wish that you would.

Stranger/ Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how the various threads are woven into one piece.

Socrates Younger/ Clearly.

Stranger/ A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult, appears to be necessary.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly the attempt must be made.

Stranger/ To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from another, is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who appeal to popular opinion.

Socrates Younger/ I do not understand.

Stranger/ Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would consider courage to be a part of virtue?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly I should.

Stranger/ And you would think temperance to be different from courage; and likewise to be a part of virtue?

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one another and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature.

Socrates Younger/ How singular!

Stranger/ Yes, very—for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be friendly to one another.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with their kindred in some respect.

Socrates Younger/ Tell me how we shall consider that question.

Stranger/ We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we consider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes.

Socrates Younger/ Explain; what are they?

Stranger/ Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the movement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting and music supply, you must have praised yourself before now, or been present when others praised them.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And do you remember the terms in which they are praised?

Socrates Younger/ I do not.

Stranger/ I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought which is passing in my mind.

Socrates Younger/ Why not?

Stranger/ You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider these notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under which they fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness, whether of mind or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality which we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or courage.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and manly, and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak as the common attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise them.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also?

Socrates Younger/ To be sure.

Stranger/ And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the other?

Socrates Younger/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow and quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness in action, of smoothness and depth of voice, and of all rhythmical movement and of music in general, when these have a proper solemnity. Of all such actions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place, the names of either are changed into terms of censure.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed violence or madness: too great slowness or gentleness is called cowardice or sluggishness; and we may we observe, that for the most part these qualities, and the temperance and manliness of the opposite characters, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle with one another in their respective actions; and if we pursue the enquiry, we shall find that men who have these different qualities of mind differ from one another.

Socrates Younger/ In what respect?

Stranger/ In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and very likely of many others. According to their respective affinities to either class of actions they distribute praise and blame, —praise to the actions which are akin to their own, blame to those of the opposite party—and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise among them.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ The difference between the two classes is often a trivial concern; but in a state, and when affecting really important matters, becomes of all disorders the most hateful.

Socrates Younger/ To what do you refer?

Stranger/ To nothing short of the whole regulation of human life. For the orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, quietly doing their own business; this is their manner of behaving with all men at home, and they are equally ready to find some way of keeping the peace with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of theirs for peace, which is often out of season where their influence prevails, they become by degrees unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like themselves; they are at the mercy of their enemies; whence in a few years they and their children and the whole city often pass imperceptibly from the condition of freemen into that of slaves.

Socrates Younger/ What a cruel fate!

Stranger/ And now think of what happens with the more courageous natures. Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing to their excessive love of the military life? they raise up enemies against themselves many and mighty, and either utterly ruin their native-land or enslave and subject it to its foes?

Socrates Younger/ That, again, is true.

Stranger/ Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist, they always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one another?

Socrates Younger/ We cannot deny it.

Stranger/ And returning to the enquiry with which we began, have we not found that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one another, and give rise to a

similar opposition in the characters who are endowed with them?

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Let us consider a further point.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ I want to know, whether any constructive art will make any, even the most trivial thing, out of bad and good materials indifferently, if this can be helped? does not all art rather reject the bad as far as possible, and accept the good and fit materials, and from these elements, whether like or unlike, gathering them all into one, work out some nature or idea?

Socrates Younger/ To be sure.

Stranger/ Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never allow any State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if this can be avoided; but will begin by testing human natures in play, and after testing them, will entrust them to proper teachers who are the ministers of her purposes—she will herself give orders, and maintain authority; just as the art of weaving continually gives orders and maintains authority over the carders and all the others who prepare the material for the work, commanding the subsidiary arts to execute the works which she deems necessary for making the web.

Socrates Younger/ Quite true.

Stranger/ In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be the mistress of all lawful educators and instructors, and having this queenly power, will not permit them to train men in what will produce characters unsuited to the political constitution which she desires to create, but only in what will produce such as are suitable. Those which have no share of manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous inclination, and, from the necessity of an evil nature, are

violently carried away to godlessness and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of by death and exile, and punishes them with the greatest of disgraces.

Socrates Younger/ That is commonly said.

Stranger/ But those who are wallowing in ignorance and baseness she bows under the yoke of slavery.

Socrates Younger/ Quite right.

Stranger/ The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have education, something noble may be made, and who are capable of being united by the statesman, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those which incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in the figure as spun thick and soft, after the manner of the woof—these, which are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the following manner:

Socrates Younger/ In what manner?

Stranger/ First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul and binds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then the animal nature, and binds that with human cords.

Socrates Younger/ I do not understand what you mean.

Stranger/ The meaning is, that the opinion about the honorable and the just and good and their opposites, which is true and confirmed by reason, is a divine principle, and when implanted in the soul, is implanted, as I maintain, in a nature of heavenly birth.

Socrates Younger/ Yes; what else should it be?

Stranger/ Only the Statesman and the good legislator, having the inspiration of the royal muse, can implant this

opinion, and he, only in the rightly educated, whom we were just now describing.

Socrates Younger/ Likely enough.

Stranger/ But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the names which are the subject of the present enquiry.

Socrates Younger/ Very right.

Stranger/ The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes civilized, and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but when not partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is not that true?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in these opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may be in a State, but if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious name of silliness.

Socrates Younger/ Quite true.

Stranger/ Can we say that such a connection as this will lastingly unite the evil with one another or with the good, or that any science would seriously think of using a bond of this kind to join such materials?

Socrates Younger/ Impossible.

Stranger/ But in those who were originally of a noble nature, and who have been nurtured in noble ways, and in those only, may we not say that union is implanted by law, and that this is the medicine which art prescribes for them, and of all the bonds which unite the dissimilar and contrary parts of virtue is not this, as I was saying, the divinest?

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in imagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other bonds, which are human only.

Socrates Younger/ How is that, and what bonds do you mean?

Stranger/ Rights of intermarriage, and ties which are formed between States by giving and taking children in marriage, or between individuals by private betrothals and espousals. For most persons form marriage connections without due regard to what is best for the procreation of children.

Socrates Younger/ In what way?

Stranger/ They seek after wealth and power, which in matrimony are objects not worthy even of a serious censure.

Socrates Younger/ There is no need to consider them at all.

Stranger/ More reason is there to consider the practice of those who make family their chief aim, and to indicate their error.

Socrates Younger/ Quite true.

Stranger/ They act on no true principle at all; they seek their ease and receive with open arms those who are like themselves, and hate those who are unlike them, being too much influenced by feelings of dislike.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their own, and as far as they can they marry and give in marriage exclusively in this class, and the courageous do the same; they seek natures like their own, whereas they should both do precisely the opposite.

Socrates Younger/ How and why is that?

Stranger/ Because courage, when untempered by the gentler nature during many generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, but at last bursts forth into downright madness.

Socrates Younger/ Like enough.

Stranger/ And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty and has no element of courage in many successive generations, is apt to grow too indolent, and at last to become utterly paralyzed and useless.

Socrates Younger/ That, again, is quite likely.

Stranger/ It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty in creating them, if only both classes originally held the same opinion about the honorable and good; — indeed, in this single work, the whole process of royal weaving is comprised—never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honors and reputation, and by the giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one smooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of State.

Socrates Younger/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a ruler who has both these qualities—when many, you must mingle some of each, for the temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe, but is wanting in thoroughness and go.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly, that is very true.

Stranger/ The character of the courageous, on the other hand, falls short of the former in justice and caution, but has the power of action in a remarkable degree, and where either of these two qualities is wanting, there cities cannot altogether prosper either in their public or private life.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly they cannot.

Stranger/ This then we declare to be the completion of the web of political action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn the two minds into communion

with one another by unanimity and friendship, and having perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political life admits, and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over them, and, in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a city, in no particular fails to secure their happiness.

Socrates Younger/ Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less than of the Sophist, is quite perfect.

Statesman

Translated by C. J. Rowe.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Visitor, Theodorus, Socrates Younger

Socrates/ I'm really much indebted to you, Theodorus, for introducing me to Theaetetus, and also to our visitor.

Theodorus/ And perhaps, Socrates, your debt will be three times as great, when they complete both the statesman and the philosopher for you.

Socrates/ Well, yes and no: shall we say, my dear Theodorus, that we've heard the best arithmetician and geometer putting it like that?

Theodorus/ How do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because you assumed that each of the three were to be assigned equal worth, when in fact they differ in value by more than can be expressed in terms of mathematical proportion.

Theodorus/ Well said, Socrates, by our god Ammon; a just rebuke—you've remembered your arithmetic very well, to bring me up on my mistake like that. As for you, I'll get my own back for this on another occasion. But turning to our guest—don't you give up at all on obliging us, but, whether you choose the statesman first or the philosopher, make your choice and go through him in his turn.

Stranger/ That, Theodorus, is what we must do, since we have tried our hand once, and we must not desist until we come to the end of what we have in hand. But I have a question: what should I do about Theaetetus here?

Theodorus/ In what respect?

Stranger/ Should we give him a rest and substitute for him young Socrates here, who trains with him? Or what's your advice?

Theodorus/ As you say, make the substitution; since they are young, they'll put up with any sort of exertion more easily if they take a rest.

Socrates/ What's more, my friend, both of them seem somehow to have a certain kinship with me. One of them you all say is like me in the way he looks; as for the other, he is called and designated by the same name as I am, and that produces a certain relatedness. Well, we must always be eager to recognize those akin to us by talking to them. With Theaetetus I myself got together in discussion yesterday, and I have just now heard him answering questions, whereas neither applies in Socrates' case; we must take a look at him too. He'll answer me on another occasion; for now let him answer you.

Stranger/ I'll go along with that. Socrates, do you hear what Socrates says?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then do you agree to it?

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ It seems there is no obstacle on your side, and perhaps there should be even less on mine. Well then, after the sophist, it seems to me that the two of us must search for the statesman. Now tell me: should we posit in the case of this person too that he is one of those who possess knowledge, or what assumption should we make?

Socrates Younger/ That's what we should assume.

Stranger/ In that case we must divide the various sorts of knowledge, as we did when we were considering the previous individual?

Socrates Younger/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ But it's not in the same place, Socrates, that I think I see a cut.

Socrates Younger/ Why not?

Stranger/ It's in a different place.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, apparently.

Stranger/ So in what direction will one discover the path that leads to the statesman? For we must discover it, and after having separated it from the rest we must impress one character on it; and having stamped a single different form on the other turnings we must make our minds think of all sorts of knowledge there are as falling into two classes.

Socrates Younger/ That, I think, is actually for you to do, visitor, not for me.

Stranger/ But, Socrates, it must also be a matter for you, when it becomes clear to us what it is.

Socrates Younger/ You're right.

Stranger/ Well then: isn't it the case that arithmetic and some other sorts of expertise that are akin to it don't involve any practical actions, but simply provide knowledge?

Socrates Younger/ That's so.

Stranger/ Whereas for their part the sorts of expertise involved in carpentry and manufacture as a whole have their knowledge as it were naturally bound up with practical actions, and use it to complete those material objects they cause to come into being from not having been before?

Socrates Younger/ What of that?

Stranger/ Well, divide all cases of knowledge in this way, calling the one sort practical knowledge, the other purely theoretical.

Socrates Younger/ I grant you these as two classes of that single thing, knowledge, taken as a whole.

Stranger/ Then shall we posit the statesman and king and slave-master, and the manager of a household as well, as one thing, when we refer to them by all these names, or are we to say that they are as many sorts of expertise as the names we use to refer to them? Or rather, let me take this way, and you follow me.

Socrates Younger/ What way is that?

Stranger/ This one. If someone who is himself in private practice is capable of advising a doctor in public employment, isn't it necessary for him to be called by the same professional title as the person he advises?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well then, won't we say that the person who is clever at giving advice to a king of a country, although he is himself a private individual, himself has the expert knowledge that the ruler himself ought to have possessed?

Socrates Younger/ We will.

Stranger/ But the knowledge that belongs to the true king is the knowledge of kingship?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And isn't it the case that the person who possesses this, whether he happens to be a ruler or a private citizen, in all circumstances, in virtue of his possession of the expertise itself, will correctly be addressed as an expert in kingship?

Socrates Younger/ That's fair.

Stranger/ Next, a household manager and a slave-master are the same thing.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Well then, surely there won't be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a large

household, on the one hand, and the bulk of a small city on the other?

Socrates Younger/ None.

Stranger/ So, in answer to the question we were asking ourselves just now, it's clear that there is one sort of expert knowledge concerned with all these things; whether someone gives this the name of expertise in kingship, or statesmanship, or household management, let's not pick any quarrel with him.

Socrates Younger/ I agree—why should we?

Stranger/ But this much is clear, that the power of any king to maintain his rule has little to do with the use of his hands or his body in general in comparison with the understanding and force of his mind.

Socrates Younger/ Clearly.

Stranger/ Then do you want us to assert that the king is more closely related to the theoretical sort of knowledge than to the manual or generally practical sort?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ In that case we shall put all these things together—the statesman's knowledge and the statesman, the king's knowledge and the king—as one, and regard them as the same?

Socrates Younger/ Clearly.

Stranger/ Well, would we be proceeding in the right order, if after this we divided theoretical knowledge?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ So look closely to see if we can detect some break in it.

Socrates Younger/ Of what sort? Tell me.

Stranger/ Of this sort. We agreed, I think, that there is such a thing as an art of calculation?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And I suppose it belongs absolutely among the theoretical sorts of expertise.

Socrates Younger/ Quite.

Stranger/ Because once it recognizes that there is a difference between numbers, there surely isn't any further job we'll assign to it than judging what it has recognized?

Socrates Younger/ No, certainly not.

Stranger/ And all master-builders too—they don't act as workers themselves, but manage workers.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ In so far—I suppose—as what the master-builder provides is understanding rather than manual labor.

Socrates Younger/ Just so.

Stranger/ It would be right to say, then, that he has a share in the theoretical sort of knowledge?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But it belongs to him, I think, once he has given his professional judgment, not to be finished or to take his leave, in the way that the expert in calculation took his, but to assign whatever is the appropriate task to each group of workers until they complete what has been assigned to them.

Socrates Younger/ That's correct.

Stranger/ So both all sorts of knowledge like this and all those that go along with the art of calculation are theoretical, but these two classes of knowledge differ from each other in so far as one makes judgments, while the other directs?

Socrates Younger/ They appear to do so.

Stranger/ So if we divided off two parts of theoretical knowledge as a whole, referring to one as directive and the other as making judgments, would we say that it had been divided suitably?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, at least according to my view.

Stranger/ But if people are doing something together, it is enough if they agree with one another.

Socrates Younger/ Quite.

Stranger/ So for as long as we are sharing in the present task, we should say goodbye to what everybody else may think.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ So tell me: in which of these two sorts of expertise should we locate the expert in kingship? In the one concerned with making judgments, as if he were some sort of spectator, or shall we rather locate him as belonging to the directive sort of expertise, seeing that he is master of others?

Socrates Younger/ In the second, of course.

Stranger/ Then we should need to look at directive expertise in its turn, to see if it divides somewhere. And to me it seems that it does so somewhere in this direction: in the way that the expertise of the retail-dealer is distinguished from that of the 'self-seller' or producer who sells his own products, so the class of kings appears set apart from the class of heralds.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ The retailer, I think, takes over someone else's products, which have previously been sold, and sells them on, for a second time.

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Well then, the class of heralds takes over directions that have been thought up by someone else, and itself issues them for a second time to another group.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ So—shall we mix together the expertise of the king with that of the interpreter, the person who gives the time

to the rowers, the seer, the herald, and many other sorts of expertise related to these, just because they all have the feature of issuing directions? Or do you want us to make up a name in line with the analogy we were using just now, since in fact the class of 'self-directors' happens pretty much to be without a name of its own? Should we divide these things this way, locating the class of kings as belonging to the 'self-directing' sort of expertise, and taking no notice of all the rest, leaving someone else to propose another name for them? For we set up our investigation in order to find the person who rules, not his opposite.

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Well then, since this is at a certain distance from those others, distinguished by difference in relation to kinship, we must in turn divide it too, if we still find some cut yielding to us in it?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And what's more, we seem to have one: follow on and make the cut with me.

Socrates Younger/ Where?

Stranger/ All those in control of others that we can think of as employing directions—we shall find them issuing their directions, won't we, for the sake of something's coming into being?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ And it's not at all difficult to separate into two all of those things that come into being.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ I imagine that, of all of them taken together, some are inanimate and some are animate.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And it's by these very things that we'll cut the part of the theoretical which is directive, if indeed we wish to cut it.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ By assigning part of it to the production of inanimate things, part to that of animate things; and in this way it will all immediately be divided into two.

Socrates Younger/ I agree absolutely.

Stranger/ So then let's leave one of these parts to one side, and take up the other; and then let's divide the whole of it into two parts.

Socrates Younger/ Which of the two parts do you say we should take up?

Stranger/ I suppose it must be the one that issues directions in relation to living creatures. For surely it is not the case that the expert knowledge that belongs to a king is ever something that oversees inanimate things, as if it were the knowledge of the master-builder; it is something nobler, which always has its power among living creatures and in relation to just these.

Socrates Younger/ Correct.

Stranger/ Now, as one can observe, either the production and rearing of living creatures is done singly, or it is a caring for creatures together in herds.

Socrates Younger/ Correct.

Stranger/ But we'll certainly not find the statesman rearing individual creatures, like some ox-driver or groom, but rather resembling a horse-breeder or cowherd.

Socrates Younger/ It certainly seems so, now you say it.

Stranger/ Well then: when it comes to rearing living creatures, are we to call the shared rearing of many creatures together a sort of 'herd-rearing' or 'collective rearing'?

Socrates Younger/ Whichever turns out to fit, in the course of the argument.

Stranger/ Well said, Socrates; and if you persevere in not paying serious attention to names, you will be seen to be richer in wisdom as you advance to old age. But now we must do just as you instruct. Do you see how by showing the collective rearing of herds to be twin in form one will make what is now being sought in double the field then be sought in half of that?

Socrates Younger/ I shall try my hardest. It seems to me that there is a different sort of rearing of human beings, and in turn another sort where animals are concerned.

Stranger/ Yes, absolutely, you've made a very keen and courageous division! But let's try to avoid this happening to us again.

Socrates Younger/ What sort of thing?

Stranger/ Let's not take off one small part on its own, leaving many large ones behind, and without reference to real classes; let the part bring a real class along with it. It's a really fine thing to separate off immediately what one is searching for from the rest, if one gets it right—as you thought you had the right division, just before, and hurried the argument on, seeing it leading to human beings; but in fact, my friend, it's not safe to make thin cuts; it's safer to go along cutting through the middle of things, and that way one will be more likely to encounter real classes. This makes all the difference in relation to philosophical investigations.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean by this, visitor?

Stranger/ I must try to tell you still more clearly, Socrates, out of good will towards your natural endowments. In the present circumstances, I have to say, it is impossible to show what I mean with absolute completeness; but I must bring it just a little further forward for the sake of clarity.

Socrates Younger/ Well then, what sort of thing are you saying we weren't doing right just now in our divisions?

Stranger/ This sort of thing: it's as if someone tried to divide the human race into two and made the cut in the way that most people here carve things up, taking the Greek race away as one, separate from all the rest, and to all the other races together, which are unlimited in number, which don't mix with one another, and don't share the same language—calling this collection by the single appellation 'barbarian'. Because of this single appellation, they expect it to be a single family or class too. Another example would be if someone thought that he was dividing number into two real classes by cutting off the number ten-thousand from all the rest, separating it off as a single class, and in positing a single name for all the rest supposed here too that through getting the name this class too came into existence, a second single one apart from the other. But I imagine the division would be done better, more by real classes and more into two, if one cut number by means of even and odd, and the human race in its turn by means of male and female, and only split off Lydians or Phrygians or anyone else and ranged them against all the rest when one was at a loss as to how to split in such a way that each of the halves split off was simultaneously a real class and a part.

Socrates Younger/ Quite right; but this very thing—how is one to see it more plainly, that class and part are not the same but different from each other?

Stranger/ An excellent response, Socrates, but what you demand is no light thing. We have already wandered far away from the discussion we proposed, and you are telling us to wander even more. Well, as for now, let's go back to where we were, which seems the reasonable thing to do; and these other things we'll pursue like trackers on another occasion, when we have the time. However, there is one thing you must

absolutely guard against, and that is ever to suppose that you have heard from me a plain account of the matter.

Socrates Younger/ Which?

Stranger/ That class and part are different from each other.

Socrates Younger/ What should I say I have heard from you?

Stranger/ That whenever there is a class of something, it is necessarily also a part of whatever thing it is called a class of, but it is not at all necessary that a part is a class. You must always assert, Socrates, that this is what I say rather than the other way round.

Socrates Younger/ I shall do just that.

Stranger/ Tell me, then, about the next thing.

Socrates Younger/ What's that?

Stranger/ The point from which our digression brought us to where we are now. I think it was pretty much the point at which you were asked how to divide herd-rearing, and you said with great keenness that there were two classes of living creatures, one human, and a second single one consisting of all the rest—the animals—together.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And to me you appeared then to think that in taking away a part you had left behind the rest as in its turn a single class, consisting of all of them, because you had the same name, 'animals', to apply to them all.

Socrates Younger/ This too was as you say.

Stranger/ And yet, my courageous friend, maybe, if by chance there is some other animal which is rational, as for example the crane seems to be, or some other such creature, and which perhaps distributes names on the same principles as you, it might oppose cranes as one class to all other living creatures and give itself airs, taking all the rest together with

human beings and putting them into the same category, which it would call by no other name except—perhaps—'animals'. So let's try to be very wary of everything of this sort.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ By not dividing the class of living creatures as a whole, in order to lessen the risk of its happening to us.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, we must certainly avoid it.

Stranger/ Yes; and we were going wrong in this way just at that point.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ Of that theoretical knowledge which was directive we had a part, I think, of the class concerned with rearing living creatures, one which was concerned with creatures living in herds. True?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well then, living creatures as a whole together had in effect already at that point been divided by the categories of domesticated and wild; for those that have a nature amenable to domestication are called tame, and those who resist it are called wild.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ But the knowledge we are hunting had to be and still is concerned with tame things, and must be looked for with reference to herd animals.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well then, let's not divide in the way we did then, looking at everything, or in a hurry, just in order to get quickly to statesmanship. It has already put us in the proverbial situation.

Socrates Younger/ What situation is that?

Stranger/ That by not quietly getting on with dividing properly we have got to our destination more slowly.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, visitor, and a fine situation it is!

Stranger/ If you say so. In any case, let's go back and try again from the beginning to divide collective rearing; perhaps, as we go through it in detail, the argument itself will be better able to reveal to you what you are so keen to find. Tell me this.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ This—I wonder if perhaps you've heard about it from others? You certainly haven't yourself any direct acquaintance, I know, with the instances of domesticated fish-rearing in the Nile and in the King's ponds. In ornamental fountains, at any rate, you may perhaps have seen them.

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely—I've both seen these and heard about the others from many people.

Stranger/ And again, examples of goose-rearing and crane-rearing—even if you haven't travelled over the plains of Thessaly, you've certainly heard about these and believe that they exist.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Look, it's for this purpose that I've asked you all this: of the rearing of herd animals, some has to do with creatures living in water, some also with creatures that live on dry land.

Socrates Younger/ It does.

Stranger/ Do you agree, then, that we must split the expert knowledge of collective rearing into two in this way, allocating one of its two parts to each of these, calling one aquatic rearing, the other dry-land rearing?

Socrates Younger/ I do.

Stranger/ And we certainly shan't ask, in this case, to which of the two sorts of expertise kingship belongs; it's quite clear to anyone.

Socrates Younger/ Quite.

Stranger/ Everybody would divide the dry-land rearing sort of herd-rearing.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ By separating it by reference to the winged and what goes on foot.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Well then—mustn't we look for statesmanship in relation to what goes on foot? Or don't you think that practically even the simplest of minds supposes so?

Socrates Younger/ I do.

Stranger/ And the expertise to do with the management of creatures that go on foot—we must show it being cut into two, like an even number.

Socrates Younger/ Clearly.

Stranger/ Now it seems that there are two routes to be seen stretching out in the direction of the part towards which our argument has hurried, one of them quicker, dividing a small part off against a large one, while the other more closely observes the principle we were talking about earlier, that one should cut in the middle as much as possible, but is longer. We can go down whichever of the two routes we like.

Socrates Younger/ What if I were to ask if it is impossible to follow both?

Stranger/ An extraordinary suggestion, if you mean both at once; but clearly it is possible to take each in turn.

Socrates Younger/ Then I opt for taking both, in turn.

Stranger/ That's easy, since the part that remains is short; if we had been at the beginning or in the middle of our journey, the instruction would have been difficult to carry out. As it is, since you think we should take this option, let's go down the longer route first; while we are fresher we'll travel it more easily. Observe the division.

Socrates Younger/ Tell me what it is.

Stranger/ Of tame things that live in herds, we find those that go on foot naturally divided into two.

Socrates Younger/ By what?

Stranger/ By the fact that some of them come into being without horns, some with horns.

Socrates Younger/ Evidently.

Stranger/ Well then, divide the management of creatures that go on foot by assigning it to each of these two parts, using a descriptive phrase for the results of the division. For if you want to give them names, it will be more complicated than necessary.

Socrates Younger/ How then should it be put?

Stranger/ Like this: by saying that when the knowledge that has to do with the management of creatures that go by foot is divided into two, one part is allocated to the horned part of the herd, the other to the hornless part.

Socrates Younger/ Let it be put like that; in any case it's sufficiently clear.

Stranger/ Now, as for the next step, it's perfectly obvious to us that the king tends a sort of docked herd—of hornless creatures.

Socrates Younger/ How couldn't it be clear?

Stranger/ So by breaking this up let's try to assign what falls to him.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, certainly.

Stranger/ Well, do you want to divide it by the split-hooved and the so-called 'single-hooved', or by interbreeding and non-interbreeding? I think you grasp the point.

Socrates Younger/ What's that?

Stranger/ That horses and donkeys are naturally such as to breed from one another.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Whereas what is still left of the smooth-headed herd of tame creatures is unmixed in breeding, one with another.

Socrates Younger/ Quite.

Stranger/ So: does the statesman, then, seem to take care of an interbreeding or of some non-interbreeding sort?

Socrates Younger/ Clearly, of the non-mixing sort.

Stranger/ This, then, it seems, we must separate into two, as we did in the previous cases.

Socrates Younger/ Indeed we must.

Stranger/ Now those creatures that are tame and live in herds have pretty well all now been cut into their pieces, except for two classes. For it is not worth our while to count the class of dogs as among creatures living in herds.

Socrates Younger/ No indeed. But what are we to use to divide the two classes?

Stranger/ Something that is absolutely appropriate for Theaetetus and you to use in your distributions, since it's geometry the two of you engage in.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ The diagonal, one could say, and then again the diagonal of the diagonal.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ The nature which the family or class of us humans possesses surely isn't endowed for the purpose of going from place to place any differently from the diagonal that has the power of two feet?

Socrates Younger/ No.

Stranger/ And what's more the nature of the remaining class has in its turn the power of the diagonal of our power, if indeed it is endowed with two times two feet.

Socrates Younger/ Of course it is—and I actually almost understand what you want to show.

Stranger/ And there's more—do we see, Socrates, that there's something else resulting in our divisions that would itself have done well as a comic turn?

Socrates Younger/ What's that?

Stranger/ That our human class has shared the field and run together with the noblest and also most easy-going class of existing things?

Socrates Younger/ I see it turning out very oddly indeed.

Stranger/ Well, isn't it reasonable to expect the slowest—or sow-est—to come in last?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, I can agree with that.

Stranger/ And don't we notice that the king looks even more ridiculous, when he continues to run, along with his herd, and has traversed convergent paths, with the man who for his part is best trained of all for the easy-going life?

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely right.

Stranger/ Yes, Socrates, and what we said before, in our inquiry about the sophist, is now plainer.

Socrates Younger/ What was that?

Stranger/ That such a method of argument as ours is not more concerned with what is more dignified than with what is not, and neither does it at all despise the smaller more than the greater, but always reaches the truest conclusion by itself.

Socrates Younger/ It seems so.

Stranger/ Well then, after this, so that you don't get in before me and ask what the shorter way is—the one we spoke of earlier—to the definition of the king, shall I go first and show you the way?

Socrates Younger/ Very much so.

Stranger/ Then I say that in this case one must immediately distribute what goes on foot by opposing the two-footed to the four-footed class, and when one sees the human still sharing the field with the winged alone, one must go on to cut the two-footed herd by means of the non-feathered and the feathered; and when it has been cut, and the expertise of human-herding has then and there been brought into the light, one must lift the expert in statesmanship and kingship like a charioteer into it and install him there, handing over the reins of the city as belonging to him, and because this expert knowledge is his.

Socrates Younger/ That's well done, and you've paid me the account I asked for as if it were a debt, adding the digression as a kind of interest, making up the sum.

Stranger/ Come on, then: let's go back to the beginning and gather together from there to the end our account of the name of the expertise of the statesman.

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Well then: of theoretical knowledge, we had at the beginning a directive part; and of this, the section we wanted was by analogy said to be 'self-directing'. Then again, rearing of living creatures, not the smallest of the classes of self-directing knowledge, was split off from it; then a herd-rearing form from rearing of living creatures, and from that, in turn, rearing of what goes on foot; and from that, as the relevant part, was cut off the expertise of rearing the hornless sort. Of this in turn the part must be woven together as not less than triple, if one wants to bring it together into a single name, calling it expert knowledge of rearing of non-interbreeding creatures. The segment from this, a part relating to a two-footed flock, concerned with rearing of human beings, still left on its own—this very part is now what we were looking for, the same thing we call both kingly and statesmanlike.

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Is it really the case, Socrates, that we have actually done this, as you have just said?

Socrates Younger/ Done what?

Stranger/ Given a completely adequate response to the matter we raised. Or is our search lacking especially in just this respect, that our account of the matter has been stated in a certain way, but has not been finished off to complete perfection?

Socrates Younger/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ I shall try now to show, for both of us, still more clearly just what I am thinking of.

Socrates Younger/ Please go ahead.

Stranger/ Well then, of the many sorts of expertise to do with rearing herds that appeared in our view just now, statesmanship was one, and was care of someone sort of herd?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And our account defined it not as rearing of horses, or of other animals, but as knowledge of the collective rearing of human beings.

Socrates Younger/ Just so.

Stranger/ Then let us look at the difference between all herdsmen, on the one hand, and kings on the other.

Socrates Younger/ What's that?

Stranger/ Let us see if in the case of any other herdsman anyone who has the title of another expertise claims or pretends to share the rearing of the herd with him.

Socrates Younger/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ Like this: that merchants, farmers, millers and bakers, all of them, and gymnastic trainers too, and doctors as a class—all of these, as you well know, would loudly

contend against the herdsmen concerned with things human whom we called statesmen that they care for human rearing, not merely for that of human beings in the herd, but for that of the rulers as well.

Socrates Younger/ Well, would they be right?

Stranger/ Perhaps. That we'll consider, but what we know is that with a cowherd no one will dispute about any of these things, but the herdsman is by himself rearer of the herd, by himself its doctor, by himself its matchmaker, as it were, and sole expert in the midwife's art when it comes to the births of offspring and confinements. Again, to the extent that the nature of his charges allows them to partake in play and music, no one else is more capable of comforting them and soothing them with his incantations, performing best, as he does, the music that belongs to his flock with instruments or with unaccompanied voice. And it's the same way with all other herdsmen. True?

Socrates Younger/ Quite right.

Stranger/ So how will our account of the king appear to us right and complete, when we posit him as sole herdsman and rearer of the human herd, singling him out on his own from among tens of thousands of others who dispute the title with him?

Socrates Younger/ There's no way in which it can.

Stranger/ Then our fears a little earlier were right, when we suspected that we should prove in fact to be describing some kingly figure, but not yet accurately to have finished the statesman off, until we remove those who crowd round him, pretending to share his herding function with him, and having separated him from them, we reveal him on his own, uncontaminated with anyone else?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, absolutely right.

Stranger/ Well then, Socrates, this is what we must do, if we are not going to bring disgrace on our argument at its end.

Socrates Younger/ That is something we must certainly avoid doing at all costs.

Stranger/ Then we must travel some other route, starting from another point.

Socrates Younger/ What route is that?

Stranger/ By mixing in, as one might put it, an element of play: we must bring in a large part of a great story, and as for the rest, we must then—as in what went before—take away part from part in each case and so arrive at the furthest point of the object of our search. So should we do it?

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ In that case, pay complete attention to my story, as children do; you certainly haven't left childish games behind for more than a few years.

Socrates Younger/ Please go ahead.

Stranger/ Then I'll begin. There have occurred in the past, and will occur in the future, many of the things that have been told through the ages; one is the portent relating to the quarrel between Atreus and Thyestes. I imagine you remember hearing what people say happened then.

Socrates Younger/ You're referring, perhaps, to the sign of the golden lamb.

Stranger/ Not at all; rather to that of the changing of the setting and rising of the sun and the other stars—it's said that they actually began setting in the region from which they now rise, and rising from the opposite region, and that then after having given witness in favor of Atreus the god changed everything to its present configuration.

Socrates Younger/ Yes indeed, they do say this as well.

Stranger/ And what's more, we've also heard from many about the kingship exercised by Cronus.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, from a great many.

Stranger/ And what of the report that earlier men were born from the earth and were not reproduced from each other?

Socrates Younger/ This too is one of the things that have been told through the ages.

Stranger/ Well, all these things together are consequences of the same state of affairs, and besides these thousands of others still more astonishing than they; but through the great lapse of time since then some have been obliterated, while others have been reported in a scattered way, each separate from one another. But as for the state of affairs that is responsible for all of these things, no one has related it, and we should relate it now; for once it has been described, it will be a fitting contribution towards our exposition of the king.

Socrates Younger/ I very much like what you say; go on, and leave nothing out.

Stranger/ Listen then. This universe the god himself sometimes accompanies, guiding it on its way and helping it move in a circle, while at other times he lets it go, when its circuits have completed the measure of the time allotted to it; then it revolves back in the opposite direction, of its own accord, being a living creature and having had intelligence assigned to it by the one who fitted it together in the beginning. This backward movement is inborn in it from necessity, for the following reason.

Socrates Younger/ What reason, exactly?

Stranger/ Remaining permanently in the same state and condition, and being permanently the same, belongs only to the most divine things of all, and by its nature body is not of this order. Now the thing to which we have given the name of 'heavens' and 'cosmos' certainly has a portion of many blessed

things from its progenitor, but on the other hand it also has its share of body. In consequence it is impossible for it to be altogether exempt from change, although as far as is possible, given its capacities, it moves in the same place, in the same way, with a single motion; and this is why it has reverse rotation as its lot, which is the smallest possible variation of its movement. To turn itself by itself forever is, I dare say, impossible for anything except the one who guides all the things which, unlike him, are in movement; and for him to cause movement now in one way, now in the opposite way is not permitted. From all of these considerations, it follows that one must neither say that the cosmos is always itself responsible for its own turning, nor say at all that it is turned by god in a pair of opposed revolutions, nor again that it is turned by some pair of gods whose thoughts are opposed to each other; it is rather what was said just now, which is the sole remaining possibility, that at times it is helped by the guidance of another, divine, cause, acquiring life once more and receiving a restored immortality from its craftsman, while at other times, when it is let go, it goes on its own way under its own power, having been let go at such a time as to travel backwards for many tens of thousands of revolutions because of the very fact that its movement combines the effects of its huge size, perfect balance, and its resting on the smallest of bases.

Socrates Younger/ It certainly seems that everything you have gone through is very reasonable.

Stranger/ Then drawing on what's just been said, let's reflect on the state of affairs we said was responsible for all those astonishing things. In fact it's just this very thing.

Socrates Younger/ What's that?

Stranger/ That the movement of the universe is now in the direction of its present rotation, now in the opposite direction.

Socrates Younger/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ We must suppose that this change is, of the turnings that occur in the heavens, the greatest and the most complete turning of all.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, it certainly seems so.

Stranger/ We must suppose, then, that at that time the greatest changes also occur for us who live within the universe?

Socrates Younger/ That too seems likely.

Stranger/ And don't we recognize that living creatures by their nature have difficulty in tolerating changes that are at once large, great in number, and of all different sorts?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly we do.

Stranger/ Necessarily, then, there occur at that time cases of destruction of other living creatures on a very large scale, and humankind itself survives only in small numbers. Many new and astonishing things happen to them, but the greatest is the one I shall describe, one that is in accordance with the retrogradation of the universe, at the time when its turning becomes the opposite of the one that now obtains.

Socrates Younger/ What kind of thing do you mean?

Stranger/ First, the visible age of each and every creature, whatever it was, stopped increasing, and everything that was mortal ceased moving in the direction of looking older; instead it changed back in the opposite direction, and grew as it were younger, more tender. The white hairs of the older men became black, and in turn the cheeks of those who had their beards became smooth again, returning each to his past bloom; the bodies of those in their puberty, becoming smoother and smaller each day and night, went back to the

form of new-born children, which they came to resemble both in mind and in body, and from then on they proceeded to waste away until they simply disappeared altogether. As for those who died a violent death at that time, the body of the dead person underwent the same effects and quickly dissolved to nothing in a few days.

Socrates Younger/ But, visitor, how did living creatures come into being in that time? And in what way were they produced from each other?

Stranger/ Clearly, Socrates, reproduction from one another was not part of the nature of things then. It was the earth-born race, the one said to have existed once, that existed then, returning to life again from the earth; it was remembered by our first ancestors, who lived in the succeeding time but bordered on the ending of the previous period, growing up at the beginning of this one. They became our messengers for the accounts of the earth-born, which are nowadays wrongly disbelieved by many people. For I think we must reflect on what is implied by what we have said. If old men went back to being children, it follows that people should be put together again from the dead, there in the earth, and come back to life; they would be following the reversal of things, with coming-into-being turning round with it to the opposite direction, and since they would according to this argument necessarily come into existence as earth-born, they would thus acquire that name and have that account given of them—all those of them, that is, whom god did not take off to another destiny.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, quite; this does seem to follow on what went before. But as for the life which you say there was in the time of Cronus' power—was it in that period of rotation or in this one? For it clearly turns out that the change affecting the stars and the sun occurs in each period.

Stranger/ You have been keeping up with the argument well. As for what you asked, about everything's springing up of its own accord for human beings, it belongs least to the period that now obtains; it too belonged to the one before. For then the god began to rule and take care of the rotation itself as a whole, and as for the regions, in their turn, it was just the same, the parts of the world-order having everywhere been divided up by gods ruling over them. As for living things, divine spirits had divided them between themselves, like herdsmen, by kind and by herd, each by himself providing independently for all the needs of those he tended, so that none of them was savage, nor did they eat each other, and there was no war or internal dissent at all; and as for all the other things that belong as consequences to such an arrangement, there would be tens of thousands of them to report. But to return to what we have been told about a human life without toil, the origin of the report is something like this. A god tended them, taking charge of them himself, just as now human beings, themselves living creatures, but different and more divine, pasture other kinds of living creatures more lowly than themselves; and given his tendance, they had no political constitutions, nor acquired wives and children, for all of them came back to life from the earth, remembering nothing of the past. While they lacked things of this sort, they had an abundance of fruits from trees and many other plants, which grew not through cultivation but because the earth sent them up of its own accord. For the most part they would feed outdoors, naked and without bedding; for the blend of the seasons was without painful extremes, and they had soft beds from abundant grass that sprang from the earth. What you are hearing about, then, Socrates, is the life of those who lived in the time of Cronus; as for this one, which they say is in the time of Zeus, the present one, you are familiar with it from personal experience.

Would you be able and willing to judge which of the two is the more fortunate?

Socrates Younger/ Not at all.

Stranger/ Then do you want me to make some sort of decision for you?

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Well then, if, with so much leisure available to them, and so much opportunity to get together in conversation not only with human beings but also with animals—if the nurslings of Cronus used all these advantages to do philosophy, talking both with animals and with each other, and inquiring from all sorts of creatures whether anyone of them had some capacity of its own that enabled it to see better in some way than the rest with respect to the gathering of wisdom, the judgment is easy, that those who lived then were far, far more fortunate than those who live now. But if they spent their time gorging themselves with food and drink and exchanging stories with each other and with the animals of the sort that even now are told about them, this too, if I may reveal how it seems to me, at least, is a matter that is easily judged. But however that may be, let us leave it to one side, until such time as someone appears who is qualified to inform us in which of these two ways the desires of men of that time were directed in relation to the different varieties of knowledge and the need for talk; we must now state the point of our rousing our story into action, in order to move forward and bring what follows to its end. When the time of all these things had been completed and the hour for change had come, and in particular all the earth-born race had been used up, each soul having rendered its sum of births, falling to the earth as seed as many times as had been laid down for each, at that point the steersman of the universe, let go—as it were—of the bar of the steering-oars and

retired to his observation-post; and as for the cosmos, its allotted and innate desire turned it back again in the opposite direction. So all the gods who ruled over the regions together with the greatest divinity, seeing immediately what was happening, let go in their turn the parts of the cosmos that belonged to their charge; and as it turned about and came together with itself, impelled with opposing movements, both the one that was beginning and the one that was now ending, it produced a great tremor in itself, which in its turn brought about another destruction of all sorts of living things. After this, when sufficient time had elapsed, it began to cease from noise and confusion and attained calm from its tremors; it set itself in order, into the accustomed course that belongs to it, itself taking charge of and mastering both the things within it and itself, because it remembered so far as it could the teaching of its craftsman and father. At the beginning it fulfilled his teaching more accurately, but in the endless keenly; the cause of this was the bodily element in its mixture, its companion since its origins long in the past, because this element was marked by a great disorder before it entered into the present world-order. For from the one who put it together the world possesses all fine things; from its previous condition, on the other hand, it both has for itself from that source everything that is bad and unjust in the heavens, and produces it in its turn in living things. So while it reared living things in itself in company with the steersman, it created only slight evils, and great goods; but in separation from him, during all the time closest to the moment of his letting go, it manages everything very well, but as time moves on and forgetfulness increases in it, the condition of its original disharmony also takes greater control of it, and, as this time ends, comes to full flower. Then the goods it mixes in are slight, but the admixture it causes of the opposite is great, and it reaches the point where it is in danger of destroying

both itself and the things in it. It is for this reason that now the god who ordered it, seeing it in difficulties, and concerned that it should not, storm-tossed as it is, be broken apart in confusion and sink into the boundless sea of unlikeness, takes his position again at its steering-oars, and having turned round what had become diseased and been broken apart in the previous rotation, when the world was left to itself, orders it and by setting it straight renders it immortal and ageless. What has been described, then, is the end-point of everything; as for what is relevant to our showing the nature of the king, it is sufficient if we take up the account from what went before. When the cosmos had been turned back again on the course that leads to the sort of coming-into-being which obtains now, the movement of the ages of living creatures once again stopped and produced new effects which were the opposite of what previously occurred. For those living creatures that were close to disappearing through smallness began to increase in size, while those bodies that had just been born from the earth already gray-haired began to die again and return into the earth. And everything else changed, imitating and following on the condition of the universe, and in particular, there was a change to the mode of conception, birth and rearing, which necessarily imitated and kept pace with the change to everything; for it was no longer possible for a living creature to grow within the earth under the agency of others' putting it together, but just as the world-order had been instructed to be master of its own motion, so too in the same way its parts were instructed themselves to perform the functions of begetting, birth and rearing so far as possible by themselves, under the agency of a similar impulse. We are now at the point that our account has all along been designed to reach. To go through the changes that have occurred in relation to the other animals, and from what causes, would involve a description of considerable length; those that relate

to human beings will be shorter to relate and more to the point. Since we had been deprived of the god who possessed and pastured us, and since for their part the majority of animals—all those who had an aggressive nature—had gone wild, human beings, by themselves weak and defenseless, were preyed on by them, and in those first times were still without resources and without expertise of any sort; their spontaneous supply of food was no longer available to them, and they did not yet know how to provide for themselves, having had no shortage to force them to do so before. As a result of all of this they were in great difficulties. This is why the gifts from the gods, of which we have ancient reports, have been given to us, along with an indispensable requirement for teaching and education: fire from Prometheus, crafts from Hephaestus and his fellow craft-worker, seeds and plants from others. Everything that has helped to establish human life has come about from these things, once care from the gods, as has just been said, ceased to be available to human beings, and they had to live their lives through their own resources and take care for themselves, just like the cosmos as a whole, which we imitate and follow for all time, now living and growing in this way, now in the way we did then. As for the matter of our story, let it now be ended, and we shall put it to use in order to see how great our mistake was when we gave our account of the expert in kingship and statesmanship in our preceding argument.

Socrates Younger/ So how do you say we made a mistake, and how great was it?

Stranger/ In one way it was lesser, in another it was very high-minded, and much greater and more extensive than in the other case.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ In that when asked for the king and statesman from the period of the present mode of rotation and generation we replied with the shepherd from the opposite period, who cared for the human herd that existed then, and at that a god instead of a mortal—in that way we went very greatly astray. But in that we revealed him as ruling over the whole city together, without specifying in what manner he does so, in this way, by contrast, what we said was true, but incomplete and unclear, which is why our mistake was lesser than in the respect just mentioned.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ So we should define the manner of his rule over the city; it's in this way that we should expect our discussion of the statesman to reach its completion.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ It was just for these reasons that we introduced our story, in order that it might demonstrate, in relation to herd-rearing, not only that as things now stand everyone disputes this function with the person we are looking for, but also in order that we might see more plainly that other person himself whom alone, in accordance with the example of shepherds and cowherds, because he has charge of human rearing, it is appropriate to think worthy of this name, and this name alone.

Socrates Younger/ Correct.

Stranger/ But in my view, Socrates, this figure of the divine herdsman is still greater than that of a king, and the statesmen who belong to our present era are much more like their subjects in their natures and have shared in an education and nurture closer to theirs.

Socrates Younger/ I suppose you must be right.

Stranger/ Yet they will be neither less nor more worth looking for, whether their natures are of the latter or of the former sort.

Socrates Younger/ Quite.

Stranger/ Then let's go back by the following route. The sort of expertise we said was 'self-directing' in the case of living creatures, but which took its care of them not as individuals but in groups, and which we then went on immediately to call herd-rearing—you remember?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well, in a way we missed in our aim at this expertise; for we did not at all succeed in grasping the statesman along with the rest or name him, but he eluded us in our naming, and we did not notice.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ All the other sorts of herdsmen, I think, share the feature of rearing their several herds, but although the statesman does not we still applied the name to him, when we should have applied to all of them one of the names that belongs in common to them.

Socrates Younger/ What you say is true, if indeed there is such a name.

Stranger/ And how would—perhaps—'looking after' not have been common to them all, without any specification of it as 'rearing', or any other sort of activity? By calling it some sort of expertise in 'herd-keeping' or 'looking after', or 'caring for', as applying to them all, we could have covered the statesman too as well as the rest, given that this was the requirement our argument indicated.

Socrates Younger/ Correct. But in what way would the division following this be made?

Stranger/ In the same way as we previously divided herd-rearing by footed and wingless, and non-interbreeding and hornless—by dividing herd-keeping too by these same things, I think, we would have included in our account to the same degree both the present sort of kingship and that in the time of Cronus.

Socrates Younger/ It seems so; but again I ask what step follows this.

Stranger/ It's clear that if we had used the name 'herd-keeping' like this, no one would ever have contended with us on the grounds that there is no such thing as caring at all, in the way that it was then justly contended that there was no sort of expertise available that deserved this appellation of 'rearing', but that if there really were such a thing, many people had a prior and better claim to it than any of our kings.

Socrates Younger/ Correct.

Stranger/ But care of the whole human community together—no other sort of expertise would be prepared to say that it had a better and prior claim to being that than kingly rule, which is over all human beings.

Socrates Younger/ What you say is correct.

Stranger/ But after that, Socrates, do we see that at the very end of our account we again made a large mistake?

Socrates Younger/ What sort of mistake?

Stranger/ It was this, that even if we had been quite convinced that there was some expertise concerned with the rearing of the two-footed herd, we should certainly not for that reason immediately have called it the expertise of the king and statesman, as if that were the end of the matter.

Socrates Younger/ What should we have done?

Stranger/ First of all, as we are saying, we should have altered the name, aligning it more with caring for things than

with rearing, and then we should have cut this; for it would still offer room for cuts of no small size.

Socrates Younger/ Where would they be?

Stranger/ I imagine, where we would have divided off the divine herdsman, on one side, and the human carer on the other.

Socrates Younger/ Correct.

Stranger/ But again we ought to have cut into two the art of the carer resulting from this apportionment.

Socrates Younger/ By using what distinction?

Stranger/ That between the enforced and the voluntary.

Socrates Younger/ Why so?

Stranger/ I think we made a mistake before in this way too, by behaving more simple-mindedly than we should have. We put king and tyrant into the same category, when both they themselves and the manner of their rule are very unlike one another.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ But now should we set things to rights again, and, as I said, should we divide the expertise of the human carer into two, by using the categories of the enforced and the voluntary?

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ And should we perhaps call tyrannical the expertise that relates to subjects who are forced, and the herd-keeping that is voluntary and relates to willing two-footed living things that expertise which belongs to statesmanship, displaying, in his turn, the person who has this expertise and cares for his subjects in this way as being genuinely king and statesman?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, visitor, and it's likely that in this way our exposition concerning the statesman would reach completion.

Stranger/ It would be a fine thing for us, Socrates. But this mustn't be just your view alone; I too have got to share it in common with you. And as it is, according to my view our discussion does not yet seem to have given a complete shape to the king. Just as sculptors sometimes hurry when it is not appropriate to do so and actually lose time by making additions and increasing the size of the various parts of their work beyond what is necessary, so too in our case—I suppose that in order to give a grand as well as a quick demonstration of the mistake in the route we previously took, we thought it was appropriate to the king to give large-scale illustrations. We took upon ourselves an astonishing mass of material in the story we told, so forcing ourselves to use a greater part of it than necessary; thus we have made our exposition longer, and have in every way failed to apply a finish to our story, and our account, just like a portrait, seems adequate in its superficial outline, but not yet to have received its proper clarity, as it were with paints and the mixing together of colors. But it is not painting or any other sort of manual craft, but speech and discourse, that constitute the more fitting medium for exhibiting all living things, for those who are able to follow; for the rest, it will be through manual crafts.

Socrates Younger/ That much is correct; but show me how you say we have not yet given an adequate account.

Stranger/ It's a hard thing, my fine friend, to demonstrate any of the more important subjects without using models. It looks as if each of us knows everything in a kind of dreamlike way, and then again is ignorant of everything when as it were awake.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ I do seem rather oddly now to have stirred up the subject of what happens to us in relation to knowledge.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ It has turned out, my dear fellow, that the idea of a 'model' itself in its turn also has need of a model to demonstrate it.

Socrates Younger/ How so? Explain, and don't hold back for my sake.

Stranger/ Explain I must, in view of your own readiness to follow. I suppose we recognize that when children are just acquiring skill in reading and writing—

Socrates Younger/ Recognize what?

Stranger/ That they distinguish each of the individual letters well enough in the shortest and easiest syllables, and come to be capable of indicating what is true in relation to them.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ But then once again they make mistakes about these very same letters in other syllables, and think and say what is false.

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Well then, isn't this the easiest and best way of leading them on to the things they're not yet recognizing?

Socrates Younger/ What way?

Stranger/ To take them first back to those cases in which they were getting these same things right, and having done that, to put these beside what they're not yet recognizing. By comparing them, we demonstrate that there is the same kind of thing with similar features in both combinations, until the things that they are getting right have been shown set beside all the ones that they don't know; once the things in question have been shown like this, and so become models, they bring

it about that each of all the individual letters is called both different, on the basis that it is different from the others, and the same, on the basis that it is always the same as, and identical to itself, in all syllables.

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely right.

Stranger/ Well then, have we grasped this point adequately, that we come to be using a model when a given thing, which is the same in something different and distinct, is correctly identified there, and having been brought together with the original thing, brings about a single true judgment about each separately and both together?

Socrates Younger/ It seems so.

Stranger/ Then would we be surprised if our minds by their nature experienced this same thing in relation to the individual 'letters' of everything, now, in some cases, holding a settled view with the aid of truth in relation to each separate thing, now, in others, being all at sea in relation to all of them—somehow or other getting the constituents of the combinations themselves right, but once again not knowing these same things when they are transferred into the long 'syllables' of things and the ones that are not easy?

Socrates Younger/ There would be absolutely nothing surprising in it.

Stranger/ Right, my friend: how could anyone begin from false belief and get to even a small part of the truth, and so acquire wisdom?

Socrates Younger/ I dare say it's impossible.

Stranger/ Well, if that's the way it is, the two of us would not at all be in the wrong in having first attempted to see the nature of models as a whole in the specific case of a further insignificant model, with the intention then of bringing to the case of the king, which is of the greatest importance, something of the same form from less significant things

somewhere, in an attempt once more through the use of a model to recognize in an expert, systematic way what looking after people in the city is, so that it may be present to us in our waking state instead of in a dream?

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely right.

Stranger/ Then we must take up once again what we were saying before, to the effect that since tens of thousands of people dispute the role of caring for cities with the kingly class, what we have to do is to separate all these off and leave the king on his own; and it was just for this purpose that we said we needed a model.

Socrates Younger/ Very much so.

Stranger/ So what model, involving the same activities as statesmanship, on a very small scale, could one compare with it, and so discover in a satisfactory way what we are looking for? By Zeus, Socrates, what do you think? If there isn't anything else to hand, well, what about weaving? Do you want us to choose that? Not all of it, if you agree, since perhaps the weaving of cloth from wool will suffice; maybe it is this part of it, if we choose it, which would provide the testimony we want.

Socrates Younger/ I've certainly no objection.

Stranger/ Why then don't we now do the very same thing with weaving that we did in what preceded, dividing each thing by cutting it into parts, and then cutting them? We'll get back to what is useful in the present context after covering everything as briefly and quickly as we can.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ I shall make my answer to you by just going through it.

Socrates Younger/ An excellent suggestion.

Stranger/ Well then: all the things we make and acquire are either for the sake of our doing something, or they prevent

something's happening to us. Of preventives, some are charms, whether divine or human, warding things off, others forms of defense. Of forms of defense some are ways of arming for war, others forms of protection. Of forms of protection some are screens, others means of warding off cold and hot weather. Of the latter type of protectives some are shelters, others coverings; of coverings one sort consists of things spread under, a different sort of things put round. Of things put round, some are cut out in one piece, while a different sort are compound; of the compound some are perforated, others bound together without perforation; of the unperforated some are made of the 'sinews' of things growing from the earth, others of hair. Of those made of hair, some are stuck together by means of water and earth, others are bound together with themselves. It is to these preventives and coverings manufactured from materials that are being bound together with themselves that we give the name 'clothes'; as for the expertise that especially has charge of clothes—just as before we gave the name of 'statesmanship' to the sort of expertise that especially had charge of the state, so too now shall we call this sort 'the art of clothes-making', from the thing itself? And shall we say that weaving too, in so far as it represented the largest part of the manufacture of clothes, does not differ at all, except in name, from this art of clothes-making, just as in that other case we said that the art of kingship did not differ from that of statesmanship?

Socrates Younger/ Yes; absolutely correct.

Stranger/ As for what comes next, let's reflect that someone might perhaps suppose that weaving had been adequately described when put like this, being unable to grasp that it had not yet been divided off from those cooperative arts that border on it, while it had been parceled off from many other related ones.

Socrates Younger/ Tell me—which related ones?

Stranger/ You didn't follow what's been said, it seems; so it looks as if we must go back again, starting from the end. If you grasp the kinship in this case, we cut off one 'related' expertise from weaving just now, separating off the putting together of blankets by means of the distinction between putting round and putting under.

Socrates Younger/ I understand.

Stranger/ What's more, we took away all craftwork out of flax, esparto, and what we just now by analogy called 'sinews' of plants; again we divided off both the art of felting and the sort of putting together that uses perforation and sewing, of which the largest is the art of cobbling.

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Still further, working with skins, which looks after coverings cut in a single piece, and those sorts of activities that look after shelters, all those involved in building and carpentry in general and, in other sorts of expertise, contriving shelter from inflowing water—all of these we took away. Also, all those sorts of expertise in forms of protection that offer preventive products in relation to thefts and violent acts, and those that have to do with carrying out the work of lid-making, and fixings to doorways, which are assigned as parts of the art of joinery. And we cut away the art of arms-manufacture, a segment of that great and varied capacity which is defense-production. Then again our first and immediate move was to divide off the whole of the art of magic which is concerned with protective charms, and we have left behind—as we might suppose—the very expertise we looked for, which protects us against cold weather, productive of a woolen defense, and called by the name of weaving.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that seems to be so.

Stranger/ But put like this, my boy, it is not yet complete. The person who puts his hand first to the production of clothes seems to do the opposite of weaving.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ The business of weaving, I suppose, is a sort of intertwining.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But in fact what I'm talking about is a matter of breaking apart things that are combined or matted together.

Socrates Younger/ What is it you're referring to?

Stranger/ The function of the art of the carder. Or shall we dare to call the art of carding the art of weaving, and treat the carder as if he were a weaver?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ And then too if someone calls the art of manufacturing warp and woof 'weaving', he is using a name that is not only odd but false.

Socrates Younger/ Quite.

Stranger/ And what about these cases? Are we to put down the whole of the art of fulling, and clothes-mending, as being no sort of care for clothes, nor as any sort of looking after them, or shall we refer to all of these too as arts of weaving?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ Yet all of these will dispute the role of looking after and producing clothes with the capacity which is the art of weaving, conceding a very large part to it, but assigning large shares to themselves too.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Then again, in addition to these, we must suppose that the sorts of expertise responsible for making the tools through which the products of weaving are completed

will also lay claim to being at least a contributory cause of every woven article.

Socrates Younger/ Quite correct.

Stranger/ So will our account of that part of the art of weaving that we selected be sufficiently definite, if we proceed to set it down as finest and greatest of all those sorts of care that exist in relation to woolen clothing? Or would we be saying something true, but not clear or complete, until such time as we remove all of these too from around it?

Socrates Younger/ Correct.

Stranger/ Then after this we must do what we're saying we should do, in order that our account may proceed in due order.

Socrates Younger/ Quite.

Stranger/ Well then, let's look at two sorts of expertise that there are in relation to all the things that people do.

Socrates Younger/ Which are they?

Stranger/ One which is a contributory cause of production, one which is itself a cause.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ Those which do not make the thing itself, but which provide tools for those that do—tools which, if they were not present, what has been assigned to each expertise would never be accomplished: these are what I mean by contributory causes, while those that bring the thing itself to completion are causes.

Socrates Younger/ That seems to make sense.

Stranger/ Then as a next step shall we call contributory causes all those that are concerned with spindles and shuttles and whatever other tools share in the process of production in relation to garments, calling those that look after and make garments themselves causes?

Socrates Younger/ Quite correct.

Stranger/ Then among the causes, washing and mending and the whole business of looking after clothes in these sorts of ways—it's perfectly reasonable to encompass this part of the extensive field covered by the art of preparation by calling it all 'the art of the fuller'.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ Again, carding and spinning and everything relating to the making of clothes itself—which is the thing whose parts we're talking about—all constitute a single expertise among those everybody recognizes, namely wool-working.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Next, there are two segments of wool-working, and each of these is a part of two sorts of expertise at once.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ What has to do with carding, and half of the art of the shuttle, and all those activities that set apart from each other things that are together—all of this we can, I suppose, declare as one and as belonging to wool-working itself? And there were, we agreed, two great sorts of expertise in every sphere, that of combination and that of separation.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well then, it's to the art of separation that belong that of carding and all the things just mentioned; for separation in the case of wool and the warp, which happens in different ways, in the first case through the shuttle, in the second through use of the hands, has acquired as many names as we referred to a moment ago.

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Then again, by contrast, let's take a part that is simultaneously a part of combination and of wool-working

and takes place in the latter; and whatever parts of separation there were here, let's let all of them go, cutting wool-working into two by means of the cut between separation and combination.

Socrates Younger/ Count it as divided.

Stranger/ Then in its turn, Socrates, you should divide the part that is simultaneously combination and wool-working, if indeed we are going to capture the aforesaid art of weaving.

Socrates Younger/ Then I must.

Stranger/ Indeed you must: and let's say that part of it is twisting, part intertwining.

Socrates Younger/ Do I understand correctly? By twisting, you seem to me to be talking about what relates to the manufacture of the warp.

Stranger/ Not only of the warp, but of the woof too; or are we going to find some origin for the woof which doesn't involve twisting?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ Well, define each of these two things too; perhaps you might find defining them timely.

Socrates Younger/ Define them how?

Stranger/ Like this: among the products of carding, when its material is drawn out to a certain length and has acquired breadth, do we say that there's a 'flock' of wool?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Of this, then, the yarn that has been twisted by the spindle and been made firm you'll call the warp, and the expertise that guides its production 'warp-spinning'.

Socrates Younger/ Correct.

Stranger/ But those threads that in their turn get a loose twisting, and have a softness appropriate to the twining in of the warp, but also to what is needed for drawing out in the

dressing process, you'll call these—the products of the spinning—the woof, and the expertise that is set over their production—let's call it 'woof-spinning'.

Socrates Younger/ Quite correct.

Stranger/ And as for the part of weaving that we put forward for investigation, I suppose that's now clear to anyone. When the part of combination which is contained in wool-working produces something intertwined, by the regular intertwining of woof and warp, the whole product of the intertwining we refer to as a piece of woolen clothing, and we refer to the expertise that is over this as weaving.

Socrates Younger/ Quite correct.

Stranger/ Good; so why ever, then, didn't we immediately reply that weaving was an intertwining of woof and warp, instead of going round in a circle defining a whole collection of things to no purpose?

Socrates Younger/ To me at least, visitor, nothing of what we have said seemed to have been said to no purpose.

Stranger/ And that isn't at all surprising, I may say; but perhaps, my dear fellow, it might seem so. So against such a malady, in case it should come upon you later (that wouldn't be at all surprising), listen to a point which it's appropriate to make in all cases like this.

Socrates Younger/ Do make it.

Stranger/ First, then, let's look at excess and deficiency in general, so that we may distribute praise and censure proportionately on each occasion, when things are said at greater length than necessary and when the opposite occurs in discussions like the present one.

Socrates Younger/ That's what we must do, then.

Stranger/ If we talked about these very things, I think we'd be proceeding correctly.

Socrates Younger/ What things?

Stranger/ About length and brevity, and excess and deficiency in general. I suppose the art of measurement relates to all of these.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then let's divide it into two parts; that's what we need towards our present objective.

Socrates Younger/ Please tell me how we should divide it.

Stranger/ This way: one part will relate to the association of greatness and smallness with each other, the other to what coming into being necessarily is.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Does it not seem to you that by its nature the greater has to be said to be greater than nothing other than the less, and the less in its turn less than the greater, and than nothing else?

Socrates Younger/ It does.

Stranger/ What about this: shan't we also say that there really is such a thing as what exceeds what is in due measure, and everything of that sort, in what we say or indeed in what we do? Isn't it just in that respect that those of us who are bad and those who are good most differ?

Socrates Younger/ It seems so.

Stranger/ In that case we must lay it down that the great and the small exist and are objects of judgment in these twin ways. It is not as we said just before, that we must suppose them to exist only in relation to each other, but rather as we have now said, that we should speak of their existing in one way in relation to each other, and in another in relation to what is in due measure. Do we want to know why?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ If someone will admit the existence of the greater and everything of the sort in relation to nothing other than the less, it will never be in relation to what is in due measure—you agree?

Socrates Younger/ That's so.

Stranger/ Well, with this account of things we shall destroy—shan't we? —both the various sorts of expertise themselves and their products, and in particular we shall make the one we're looking for now, statesmanship, disappear, and the one we said was weaving. For I imagine all such sorts of expertise guard against what is more and less than what is in due measure, not as something which is not, but as something which is and is troublesome in relation to what they do. It is by preserving measure in this way that they produce all the good and fine things they do produce.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ If, then, we make the art of statesmanship disappear, our search after that for the knowledge of kingship will lack any way forward?

Socrates Younger/ Very much so.

Stranger/ Is it the case then that just as with the sophist we compelled what is not into being as well as what is, when our argument escaped us down that route, so now we must compel the more and less, in their turn, to become measurable not only in relation to each other but also in relation to the coming into being of what is in due measure? For if this has not been agreed, it is certainly not possible for either the statesman or anyone else who possesses knowledge of practical subjects to acquire an undisputed existence.

Socrates Younger/ Then now too we must do the same as much as we can.

Stranger/ This task, Socrates, is even greater than the former one—and we remember what the length of that was.

Still, it's very definitely fair to propose the following hypothesis about the subject in question.

Socrates Younger/ What's that?

Stranger/ That at some time we shall need what I referred to just now for the sort of demonstration that would be commensurate with the precise truth itself. But so far as concerns what is presently being shown, quite adequately for our immediate purposes, the argument we are using seems to me to come to our aid in magnificent fashion. Namely, we should surely suppose that it is similarly the case that all the various sorts of expertise exist, and at the same time that greater and less are measured not only in relation to each other but also in relation to the coming into being of what is in due measure. For if the latter is the case, then so is the former, and also if it is the case that the sorts of expertise exist, the other is the case too. But if one or the other is not the case, then neither of them will ever be.

Socrates Younger/ This much is right; but what's the next move after this?

Stranger/ It's clear that we would divide the art of measurement, cutting it in two in just the way we said, positing as one part of it all those sorts of expertise that measure the number, lengths, depths, breadths and speeds of things in relation to what is opposed to them, and as the other, all those that measure in relation to what is in due measure, what is fitting, the right moment, what is as it ought to be—everything that removes itself from the extremes to the middle.

Socrates Younger/ Each of the two sections you refer to is indeed a large one, and very different from the other.

Stranger/ Yes, Socrates; and what many sophisticated people sometimes say, supposing themselves to be expressing something clever, to the effect that there is in fact an art of

measurement relating to everything that comes into being—that's actually the very thing we have just said. For it is indeed the case, in a certain way, that all the products of the various sorts of expertise share in measurement. But because of their not being accustomed to carrying on their investigations by dividing according to real classes, the people in question throw these things together at once, despite the degree of difference between them, thinking them alike—and then again they also do the opposite of this by dividing other things not according to parts, when the rule is that when one perceives first the community between the members of a group of many things, one should not desist until one sees in it all those differences that are located in classes, and conversely, with the various unlikenesses, when they are seen in multitudes, one should be incapable of pulling a face and stopping before one has penned all the related things within one likeness and actually surrounded them in some real class. So let this be enough for us to say about these things, and about modes of defect and excess; and let's just keep hold of the fact that two distinct classes of measurement have been discovered in relation to them, and remember what we say they are.

Socrates Younger/ We'll remember.

Stranger/ Well then, after this point, let's admit another one that relates both to the very things we are inquiring into and to the whole business of discussions of this sort.

Socrates Younger/ What's that?

Stranger/ What if someone put the following question about our pupils sitting together learning their letters. When one of them is asked what letters make up some word or other, are we to say that for him on that occasion the inquiry takes place more for the sake of the single question set before him, or for the sake of his becoming more able to answer all questions relating to letters?

Socrates Younger/ Clearly for the sake of his being able to answer all.

Stranger/ What then about our inquiry now about the statesman? Has it been set before us more for the sake of that very thing, or for the sake of our becoming better dialecticians in relation to all subjects?

Socrates Younger/ That's clear too—for the sake of our becoming better dialecticians generally.

Stranger/ I certainly don't suppose that anyone with any sense would want to hunt down the definition of weaving for the sake of weaving itself. But I think the majority of people fail to recognize that for some of the things there are, there are certain perceptible likenesses which are there to be easily understood, and which it is not at all hard to point out when one wants to make an easy demonstration, involving no trouble and without recourse to verbal means, to someone who asks for an account of one of these things. Conversely, for those things that are greatest and most valuable, there is no image at all which has been worked in plain view for the use of mankind, the showing of which will enable the person who wants to satisfy the mind of an inquirer to satisfy it adequately, just by fitting it to one of the senses. That is why one must practice at being able to give and receive an account of each thing; for the things that are without body, which are finest and greatest, are shown clearly only by verbal means and by nothing else, and everything that is now being said is for the sake of these things. But practice in everything is easier in smaller things, rather than in relation to the greater.

Socrates Younger/ Very well said.

Stranger/ Well then, let's remind ourselves of the reasons why we've said all this on these subjects.

Socrates Younger/ Why did we say it all?

Stranger/ Not least because of the difficulty we found in accepting the length of our talk about weaving—and about the reversal of the universe, and about the being of the non-being which is the sphere of the sophist; we reflected that it had a rather great length, and in all these cases we rebuked ourselves, out of fear that what we were saying would turn out to be superfluous as well as long. So, the thing for you to say is that the foregoing was for the sake of all those cases, in order that we shan't suffer any of this sort of misgiving on any future occasion.

Socrates Younger/ I shall do as you say. Tell me what comes next.

Stranger/ Well, I say that you and I must be careful to remember what we have now said, and to distribute censure and praise of both shortness and length, whatever subjects we happen to be talking about on each occasion, by judging lengths not in relation to each other but, in accordance with the part of the art of measurement we previously said we must remember, in relation to what is fitting.

Socrates Younger/ Correct.

Stranger/ Well, that's right, but we mustn't refer everything to this. For one thing, we shan't have any need for a length that fits in relation to pleasure, except perhaps as an incidental consideration. And again, as for what contributes towards the inquiry into the subject set before us, what we have said commits us to making a second and not a first priority of the question how we might find it most easily and quickly, and to give by far the greatest and primary value to the pursuit itself of the ability to divide by classes. In particular, if an account is very long but renders the hearer better at discovering things, our business is to take this one seriously and not feel at all irritated at its length, and similarly if a shorter one, in its turn, has the same effect. Then again,

over and above this, if in relation to such discussions someone finds fault with the length of what is said and will not put up with going round in circles, we must not let such a person go just like that without a backward glance—with his having made the simple complaint that what has been said has taken a long time. We should think it right that he should also demonstrate, in addition, that if it had been shorter it would make the partners in the discussion better dialecticians and better at discovering how to display in words the things there are. We shall take no notice at all of the other sorts of censure and praise, relating to some other criteria, nor even seem to hear such things at all when they are said. Now enough of these things, if I have your agreement too; let's go back again to the statesman, and bring the model of weaving, which we talked about before, to bear on it.

Socrates Younger/ Well said—let's do what you say.

Stranger/ Well then, the king has been separated off from the many sorts of expertise that share his field—or rather from all of them concerned with herds; there remain, we are saying, those sorts of expertise in the city itself that are contributory causes and those that are causes, which we must first divide from each other.

Socrates Younger/ Correct.

Stranger/ So do you recognize that it is difficult to cut them into two? The cause, I think, will become more evident if we proceed.

Socrates Younger/ Well, then that's what we should do.

Stranger/ Then let's divide them limb by limb, like a sacrificial animal, since we can't do it into two. For we must always cut into the nearest number so far as we can.

Socrates Younger/ So how are we to do it in this case?

Stranger/ Just as before: the sorts of expertise that provided tools relating to weaving—all of these, of course, we put down then as contributory causes.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ We must do the same thing now too, but to a still greater degree than we did then. For we must put down as being contributory causes all the sorts of expertise that produce any tool in the city, whether small or large. Without these there would never come to be a city, nor statesmanship, but on the other hand we shan't, I think, put down any of them as the product of the expertise of the king.

Socrates Younger/ No, we shan't.

Stranger/ And yet we're trying to do a difficult thing in separating this class of things from the rest; in fact it is possible for someone to treat anything you like as a tool of something and seem to have said something credible. Nevertheless, among the things people possess in a city, let's treat the following as being of a different sort.

Socrates Younger/ Different in what way?

Stranger/ Because it does not have the same capacity that tools have. For it is not put together with the purpose of causing the coming into being of something, as a tool is, but for the sake of preserving what craftsmen have produced.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ That varied class of things which is worked for things liquid and solid, and for things that are prepared on the fire and things that are not—what we refer to with the single name of 'vessel': a common class, and one that, I think, simply does not belong at all to the sort of expert knowledge we are looking for.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ We must then observe a third very extensive class of things that people possess, different from these others, which is found on land and on water, moves about a lot and is fixed, and is accorded high value and none, but has a single name, because it is all for the sake of some supporting or other, always being a seat for something.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ I suppose we call it by the name of 'vehicle'; not at all a product of the art of statesmanship, but much more of those of carpentry, pottery, and bronze-working.

Socrates Younger/ I see.

Stranger/ And what is fourth? Should we say that it is something different from these, something that includes the larger part of the things we mentioned before, all clothing, most armor, and walls, all those encirclements made out of earth, or out of stone, and tens of thousands of other things? Since all of them together are worked for the purpose of defending, it would be most apposite to call the whole class that of 'defense', and it would be thought to be a product much more of the expertise of the builder and the weaver, most of it, more correctly than it would be thought to belong to that of the statesman.

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Would we want to put down as a fifth class things to do with decoration, painting, and those representations that are completed by the use of painting, and of music, which have been executed solely to give us pleasures, and which would appropriately be embraced by a single name?

Socrates Younger/ What name?

Stranger/ I think we talk about something we call a 'plaything'.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Well, this one name will be fittingly given to all of them; for not one of them is for the sake of a serious purpose, but all are done for amusement.

Socrates Younger/ This too I pretty well understand.

Stranger/ And what provides materials for all these things, from which and in which all of the sorts of expertise that have now been mentioned work, a varied class that is itself the offspring of many other sorts of expertise—shall we not put it down as a sixth?

Socrates Younger/ What exactly are you referring to?

Stranger/ Gold and silver, and everything that is mined, and all that the art of tree-felling and any lopping cuts and provides for the art of the carpenter and the basket-weaver—and again the art of stripping off the outer covering of plants, and the one that removes skins from bodies of living things, the art of the skinner; and all the sorts of expertise there are in relation to such things, which by producing cork, and papyrus, and materials for bindings make possible the working up of classes of composite things from classes of things that are not put together. Let us call it all one thing, the first-born and incomposite possession of mankind, which is in no way a product of the knowledge of kingship.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ Then again that sort of possession that consists in nutrition, and all those things which when they are blended into the body, their own parts with parts of the body, have a capacity for promoting its care, we must say is a seventh, calling it all together 'nurture', unless we have some more attractive term to propose. And if we place it under the arts of the farmer, the hunter, the trainer in the gymnasium, the doctor and the cook, we shall be assigning it more correctly than if we give it to the art of the statesman.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Well then, we have, I think, pretty well dealt, in these seven classes, with all the things that have to do with possessions, with the exception of tame living creatures. Look at our list: it would be most appropriate if we put down the 'first-born' class of things at the beginning, and after this 'tool', 'vessel', 'vehicle', 'defense', 'plaything', 'nourishment'. If anything of no great importance has escaped us, we leave it to one side, because it is capable of fitting into one or other of these, for example the class consisting of currency, seals, and any sort of engraving. For these do not have any great shared class among them, but if some of them are dragged off into decoration, others into tools, it will be forcibly done, but nevertheless they'll wholly agree to it. As for what relates to possession of tame living creatures, apart from slaves, the art of herd-rearing which we divided into its parts before will clearly be seen to have caught them all.

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Then what remains is the class of slaves and all those people who are subordinate to others, among whom, I strongly suspect, those who dispute with the king about the 'woven fabric' itself will come into view, just as in the case of weaving we found those concerned with spinning and carding and all the other things we mentioned disputing with the weavers over their product. All the others, who have been described as 'contributory causes', have been disposed of along with the products we have just listed, as each was separated off from the practical activity which is the sphere of the art of kingship and statesmanship.

Socrates Younger/ So it seems, at any rate.

Stranger/ Come along, then: let's get up close to those people that are left and take a look at them, so that we may get a firmer knowledge of them.

Socrates Younger/ That's what we should do.

Stranger/ Well, those who are subordinate to the greatest degree, looked at from our present perspective, we find possessing a function and condition which are the opposite of what we suspected just now.

Socrates Younger/ Who are they?

Stranger/ Those who are bought, and acquired as possessions by this means; people whom we can indisputably call slaves, and who least pretend to kingly expertise.

Socrates Younger/ Quite.

Stranger/ What then of all those among free men who voluntarily place themselves in the service of those we have been discussing, conveying their products—the products of farming and the other sorts of expertise—between them, and establishing equality between these products; some in market-places, others moving from one city to another, whether by sea or by land, exchanging currency both for everything else and for itself—people to whom we give the names of 'money-changers', 'merchants', 'ship-owners', and 'retailers': surely they won't lay claim at all to the art of statesmanship?

Socrates Younger/ It may be, perhaps, that they will—to the sort that has to do with commercial matters.

Stranger/ But those we see placing themselves with complete readiness at the service of all, for hire, as day-laborers—these we shall never find pretending to kingly expertise.

Socrates Younger/ Quite so.

Stranger/ What in that case are we to say about those who perform services of the following sorts for us whenever we need them?

Socrates Younger/ What services do you mean, and who is it you're talking about?

Stranger/ Among others, the tribe of heralds, and all those who become accomplished at writing by having repeatedly given their services in this respect, and certain others who are very clever at working through many different tasks relating to public offices: what shall we call these?

Socrates Younger/ What you called them just now—subordinates, and not themselves rulers in cities.

Stranger/ But I certainly wasn't dreaming, I think, when I said that somewhere here there would appear those who particularly lay claim to the art of statesmanship. And yet it would seem very odd indeed to look for them in some portion of the subordinate arts.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, quite.

Stranger/ Then let's get still closer to those we haven't yet cross-examined. There are those who have a part of a subordinate sort of expert knowledge in relation to divination; for they are, I believe, considered to be interpreters from gods to men.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And then too the class of priests, in its turn, has—as custom tells us—expert knowledge about the giving through sacrifices of gifts from us to the gods which are pleasing to them, and about asking from them through prayers for the acquisition of good things for us. I imagine that both of these things are parts of a subordinate art.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so, at any rate.

Stranger/ Well now, it seems to me that at this point we are, as it were, getting close to some sort of trail leading to our destination. For the type of priests and seers is filled full of self-importance and gets a lofty reputation because of the magnitude of what they undertake, so that in Egypt it is not even permitted for a king to hold office without also exercising that of priest. If in fact he happens to have acceded to power

at the beginning by force from another class, it is later necessary for him to be initiated into the class of priests. And again among the Greeks too, in many places, it is to the greatest offices that one would find being assigned the performance of the greatest of the sacrifices in relation to such things. And in fact what I'm saying receives the clearest illustration in your case; for they say that the most solemn and ancestral of the ancient sacrifices are assigned here to the person who becomes king by lot.

Socrates Younger/ Most certainly.

Stranger/ Well then, we must look both at these king-priests by lot, and their subordinates, and also at a certain other very large crowd of people which has just become visible to us, now that the previous ones have been separated off.

Socrates Younger/ But who are the people you mean?

Stranger/ Some very odd people indeed.

Socrates Younger/ How, exactly?

Stranger/ It's a class mixed out of all sorts, or so it seems to me as I look at it just now. For many of the men resemble lions and centaurs and other such things, and very many resemble satyrs and those animals that are weak but versatile; and they quickly exchange their shapes and capacity for action for each other's. And yet now> Socrates, I think I have identified the men in question.

Socrates Younger/ Please explain; you seem to have something odd in view.

Stranger/ Yes; it's a universal experience that not recognizing something makes it odd. And this is exactly what happened to me just now: at the moment when I first saw the chorus of those concerned with the affairs of cities I failed to recognize them.

Socrates Younger/ What chorus?

Stranger/ That of the greatest magician of all the sophists, and the most versed in their expertise. Although removing him from among those who really are in possession of the art of statesmanship and kingship is a very difficult thing to do, remove him we must if we are going to see plainly what we are looking for.

Socrates Younger/ We must certainly not let this slip.

Stranger/ Certainly not, if you ask my view. So tell me this.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ We recognize monarchy, don't we, as one of the varieties of rule in cities?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ After monarchy one would, I think, list the holding of power by the few.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ And isn't a third type of constitution rule by the mass of the people, called by the name of 'democracy'?

Socrates Younger/ Most certainly.

Stranger/ So there are three of them—but don't they in a certain way become five, giving birth from among them to two other names in addition to themselves?

Socrates Younger/ What are these?

Stranger/ I think that as things are people refer to the aspects of force and consent, poverty and wealth, and law and lawlessness as they occur in them, and use these to divide each of the first two types into two. So they call monarchy by two names, on the grounds that it exhibits two forms, the one 'tyrannical', the other 'kingly' monarchy.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ And any city which has come to be controlled by a few people they call by the names of 'aristocracy' and 'oligarchy'.

Socrates Younger/ Most certainly.

Stranger/ With democracy, on the other hand, whether in fact it's by force or with their consent that the mass rules over those who possess the wealth, and whether by accurately preserving the laws or not, in all these cases no one is in the habit of changing its name.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ What then? Do we suppose that any of these constitutions is correct, when it is defined by these criteria—one, few and many, wealth and poverty, force and consent, and whether it turns out to be accompanied by written laws or without laws?

Socrates Younger/ Why, what actually prevents it?

Stranger/ Look at it more clearly, following this way.

Socrates Younger/ Which?

Stranger/ Shall we abide by what we said when we first began, or shall we be in discord with it?

Socrates Younger/ What was that?

Stranger/ We said, I think, that kingly rule was one of the sorts of expert knowledge.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And not just one of them all, but we chose out from the rest particularly one that was concerned in a sense with making judgments and controlling.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And then from the controlling sort, we took one that was set over inanimate products, and one set over living creatures; and it's by splitting things up in just this way that we have been progressing all the time to the point where we are now. We haven't forgotten that it's knowledge, but as for what sort of knowledge it is, we're not yet able to give a sufficiently accurate answer.

Socrates Younger/ Your account is correct.

Stranger/ Then do we see just this very point, that the criterion in the things in question must not be few, nor many, nor consent nor the lack of it, nor poverty nor wealth, but some sort of knowledge, if indeed we are going to be consistent with what we said before?

Socrates Younger/ But that we can't possibly fail to do.

Stranger/ Necessarily, then, we must now consider in which, if any, of these types of rule expert knowledge about ruling human beings turns out to occur—practically the most difficult and the most important thing of which to acquire knowledge. For we must catch sight of it, in order to consider which people we must remove from the wise king's company, who pretend to possess of the art of statesmanship, and persuade many people that they do, but in fact do not have it at all.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, we must indeed do this, as our argument has already told us.

Stranger/ Well, does it seem that a mass of people in the city are capable of acquiring this expertise?

Socrates Younger/ How could they?

Stranger/ But in a city of a thousand men, is it possible for a hundred or so, or again fifty, to acquire it adequately?

Socrates Younger/ In that case, it would be quite the easiest of all the sorts of expertise there are; for we know that among a thousand men there would never be so many top petteia-players in relation to those among the rest of the Greeks, let alone kings. For it is that man who actually possesses the expert knowledge of kingship, whether he rules or not, who must in any case be called an expert in kingship, according to what we said before.

Stranger/ You've remembered well. As a consequence of this, I think, we must look for correct rule in relation to some one person, or two, or altogether few—when it is correct.

Socrates Younger/ We certainly must.

Stranger/ Yes, but these people, whether they rule over willing or unwilling subjects, whether according to written laws or without them, and whether they rule as rich men or poor, we must suppose—as is now our view—to be carrying out whatever sort of rule they do on the basis of expertise. Doctors provide the clearest parallel. We believe in them whether they cure us with our consent or without it, by cutting or burning or applying some other painful treatment, and whether they do so according to written rules or apart from written rules, and whether as poor men or rich. In all these cases we are no less inclined at all to say they are doctors, so long as they are in charge of us on the basis of expertise, purging or otherwise reducing us, or else building us up—it is no matter, if only each and every one of those who care for our bodies acts for our bodies' good, making them better than they were, and so preserves what is in their care. It's in this way, as I think, and in no other that we'll lay down the criterion of medicine and of any other sort of rule whatsoever; it is the only correct criterion.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, just so.

Stranger/ It must then be the case, it seems, that of constitutions too the one that is correct in comparison with the rest, and alone a constitution, is the one in which the rulers would be found truly possessing expert knowledge, and not merely seeming to do so, whether they rule according to laws or without laws, over willing or unwilling subjects, and whether the rulers are poor or wealthy—there is no principle of correctness according to which any of these must be taken into any account at all.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ And whether they purge the city for its benefit by putting some people to death or else by exiling them, or whether again they make it smaller by sending out colonies somewhere like swarms of bees, or build it up by introducing people from somewhere outside and making them citizens—so long as they act to preserve it on the basis of expert knowledge and what is just, making it better than it was so far as they can, this is the constitution which alone we must say is correct, under these conditions and in accordance with criteria of this sort. All the others that we generally say are constitutions we must say are not genuine, and not really constitutions at all, but imitations of this one; those we say are 'law-abiding' have imitated it for the better, the others for the worse.

Socrates Younger/ The rest of it, visitor, seems to have been said in due measure; but that ideal rule may exist even without laws was something harder for a hearer to accept.

Stranger/ You got in just a little before me with your question, Socrates. For I was about to ask you whether you accept all of this, or whether in fact you find any of the things we have said difficult to take. But as it is it's already apparent that we'll want a discussion of this matter of the correctness of those who rule without laws.

Socrates Younger/ Quite.

Stranger/ Now in a certain sense it is clear that the art of the legislator belongs to that of the king; but the best thing is not that the laws should prevail, but rather the kingly man who possesses wisdom. Do you know why?

Socrates Younger/ What then is the reason?

Stranger/ That law could never accurately embrace what is best and most just for all at the same time, and so prescribe what is best. For the dissimilarities between human beings

and their actions, and the fact that practically nothing in human affairs ever remains stable, prevent any sort of expertise whatsoever from making any simple decision in any sphere that covers all cases and will last for all time. I suppose this is something we agree about?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But we see law bending itself more or less towards this very thing; it resembles some self-willed and ignorant person, who allows no one to do anything contrary to what he orders, nor to ask any questions about it, not even if, after all, something new turns out for someone which is better, contrary to the prescription which he himself has laid down.

Socrates Younger/ True; the law does absolutely as you have just said with regard to each and every one of us.

Stranger/ Then it is impossible for what is perpetually simple to be useful in relation to what is never simple?

Socrates Younger/ Very likely.

Stranger/ Why then is it ever necessary to make laws, given that law is not something completely correct? We must find out the cause of this.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Now with you, too, people train in groups in the way they do in other cities, whether for running or for anything else, for competitive purposes?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, very frequently.

Stranger/ Well, now let's recall to mind the instructions that expert trainers give when they're in charge of people in such circumstances.

Socrates Younger/ What are you thinking of?

Stranger/ That they don't suppose there is room for them to make their prescriptions piece by piece to suit each

individual, giving the instruction appropriate to the physical condition of each; they regard it as necessary to make rougher prescriptions about what will bring physical benefit, as suits the majority of cases and a large number of people.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ And it's just for this reason that, as it is, they give equally heavy exercises to the group as a whole, starting them off together and stopping them together in their running, wrestling, and the rest of their physical exercises.

Socrates Younger/ That's so.

Stranger/ Then let's suppose the same about the legislator too, the person who will direct his herds in relation to justice and their contracts with one another: he will never be capable, in prescribing for everyone together, of assigning accurately to each individual what is appropriate for him.

Socrates Younger/ What you say certainly sounds reasonable.

Stranger/ Instead he will, I think, set down the law for each and every one according to the principle of 'for the majority of people, for the majority of cases, and roughly, somehow, like this', whether expressing it in writing or in unwritten form, legislating by means of ancestral customs.

Socrates Younger/ Correct.

Stranger/ Yes, it certainly is. For how would anyone ever be capable, Socrates, of sitting beside each individual perpetually throughout his life and accurately prescribing what is appropriate to him? Since in my view, if he were capable of this, anyone of those who had really acquired the expert knowledge of kingship would hardly put obstacles in his own way by writing down these laws we talked about.

Socrates Younger/ It certainly follows from what we have now said, visitor.

Stranger/ Yes, but more, my good friend, from the things that are going to be said.

Socrates Younger/ And what are they?

Stranger/ Things like the following. Are we to say—that is, between us—that if a doctor, or else some gymnastic trainer, were going to be out of the country and away from his charges for what he thought would be a long time, and thought that the people being trained, or his patients, would not remember the instructions he had given them, he would want to write down reminders for them—or what are we to say?

Socrates Younger/ As you suggested.

Stranger/ But what if he came back unexpectedly, having been away for less time than he thought he would be? Do you think he wouldn't propose other prescriptions, contrary to the ones he had written down, when things turned out to be different, and better, for his patients because of winds or else some other of the things that come from Zeus which had come about contrary to expectation, in some way differently from the usual pattern? Would he obstinately think that neither he nor the patient should step outside those ancient laws that had once been laid down—he himself by giving other instructions, the patient by daring to do different things contrary to what was written down—on the grounds that these were the rules of the art of medicine and of health, and that things that happened differently were unhealthy and not part of his expertise? Or would all such things, if they happened in the context of truly expert knowledge, cause altogether the greatest ridicule, in all spheres, for acts of legislation of this sort?

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely right.

Stranger/ And as for the person who has written down what is just and unjust, fine and shameful, good and bad, or has laid down unwritten laws on these subjects, for all those

herds of human beings that graze, city by city, according to the laws of those who wrote them down in each case—if the person who wrote them on the basis of expertise, or someone else resembling him, arrives, is it really not to be permitted to him to give different instructions contrary to these? Or wouldn't this prohibition appear in truth no less ridiculous than the other one?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Well then, do you know what the majority of people say in such a case?

Socrates Younger/ It doesn't come to mind for the moment, just like that.

Stranger/ Well, it sounds fine enough. What they say is that if someone recognizes laws that are better, contrary to those established by people before him, then he must introduce them by persuading his city to accept them in each case, but not otherwise.

Socrates Younger/ Well then? Is that not a correct view?

Stranger/ Perhaps. But first things first: if someone forces through what is better without the use of persuasion, tell me, what will be the name to give to the use of force in this case? No—not yet; answer me first in relation to the previous cases.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ If then—to continue with our example—someone does not persuade his patient, but has a correct grasp of the relevant expertise, and forces child, or man, or woman, to do what is better, contrary to what has been written down, what will be the name to give to this use of force? Surely anything rather than what we called an unhealthy mistake contrary to the expertise in question? And the last thing the person who was the object of such force can correctly say about such a thing is that he had unhealthy things done to him by the

doctors who used force on him, things that did not belong to their expertise?

Socrates Younger/ What you say is very true.

Stranger/ And what do we really suppose to be the sort of mistake we're talking about, the one in contravention of the expertise of the statesman? Isn't it what is shameful, what is bad, and unjust?

Socrates Younger/ I agree, absolutely.

Stranger/ Then those who have been forced, contrary to what has been written down and to ancestral custom, to do different things that are more just, better and finer than the things they did before—tell me, if people in this kind of situation for their part censure this kind of use of force, isn't it true that, if their censure isn't to be the most laughable of all, they must say anything on each occasion rather than that those who have been forced have had shameful, unjust and bad things done to them by those who did the forcing?

Socrates Younger/ What you say is very true.

Stranger/ But are the things forced on them just, if the person who did the forcing is rich, and unjust if he happens to be poor? Or if, whether by using persuasion or not, whether as a rich or a poor man, or according to written law or contrary to it, he does what is not to the benefit of the citizens or what is to their benefit, must that be the criterion, and must it have to do with these things—the truest criterion of correct government of a city, the one according to which the wise and good man will govern the interests of the ruled? Just as a steersman, always watching out for what is to the benefit of the ship and the sailors, preserves his fellow sailors not by putting things down in writing but offering his expertise as law, so too in this same manner a constitution would be correct, would it not, if it issued from those who are able to rule in this way, offering the strength of their expertise as

more powerful than the laws? And there is no mistake, is there, for wise rulers, whatever they do, provided that they watch for one great thing, that by always distributing to those in the city what is most just, as judged by the intelligent application of their expertise, they are able both to preserve them and so far as they can to bring it about that they are better than they were?

Socrates Younger/ It is certainly not possible to contradict what has just been said.

Stranger/ And neither should one contradict those other things we said.

Socrates Younger/ What are you referring to?

Stranger/ That a mass of any people whatsoever would never be able to acquire this sort of expert knowledge and so govern a city with intelligence; and that we must look for that one constitution, the correct one, in relation to a small element in the population, few in number, or even a single individual, putting down the other constitutions as imitations, as was said a little earlier, some of them imitating this one for the better, the others for the worse.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean by this? What are you saying? For I did not understand the point about imitations when it was made just now either.

Stranger/ And it's no small matter, if one stirs up this subject and then proceeds to leave it where it is instead of going through it and showing the mistake that now occurs in relation to it.

Socrates Younger/ What mistake is that?

Stranger/ This sort of thing we must hunt for, since it is not altogether what we are used to or easy to see; but all the same let's try to get hold of it. Tell me: given that this constitution we have talked about is on our view the only correct one, do you recognize that the others ought to employ

the written documents that belong to this one, and save themselves in that way, doing what is now praised, although it is not the most correct thing to do?

Socrates Younger/ What are you referring to?

Stranger/ The principle that no one in the city should dare to do anything contrary to the laws, and that the person who dares to do so should be punished by death and all the worst punishments. This is very correct and fine as a second choice, when one changes the principle we discussed just now, which is our first choice; but let us go over the way in which what we have called 'second-best' has come about. Do you agree?

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Well then, let's go back to the likenesses to which we must always compare our kingly rulers.

Socrates Younger/ Which likenesses?

Stranger/ The noble steersman and the doctor who is 'worth many others'. Let us look at the matter by fashioning a kind of figure, using these as material.

Socrates Younger/ A figure of what kind?

Stranger/ Of the following sort: let's suppose that we all thought of them as doing the most terrible things to us. For the one as much as the other saves whichever of us he wishes to save; and whichever of us they wish to mutilate, they do it by cutting and burning us and directing us to pay them expenses as if they were taxes, of which they spend little or none on the patient, while they themselves and their household use the rest; and the final step is for them to take money from relatives or some enemies of the patient as pay for killing him. And steersmen, in their turn, bring about thousands of other things of a similar sort, leaving people stranded on voyages because of some conspiracy or other, causing shipwrecks on the seas and throwing people overboard, and doing other malicious things. Let's suppose

then that we thought this, and came to a conclusion about them in a sort of council, no longer to allow either of these sorts of expertise to have autonomous control either of slaves or of free men, but to call together an assembly with ourselves as members, consisting either of the people all together or only of the rich. The rule would be that both laymen and craftsmen other than steersmen and doctors would be permitted to contribute an opinion, whether about sailing or about diseases, as to the basis on which drugs and the tools of the doctor's art should be used on patients, and even how to employ ships themselves, and the tools of the sailor's art for operating them, for facing not only the dangers affecting the voyage itself from winds and sea, but encounters with pirates, and perhaps, if it should turn out to be necessary, for fighting a sea battle with long ships against others of the same type. And once there was a record, on *kurbeis* or blocks of stone of some sort, of what the majority had decided, whether with the advice of some doctors and steersmen or of those who had no specialized knowledge of medicine or steersmanship, then all our sailing and caring for patients for all future time would have to be done according to this, along with certain other rules established as unwritten ancestral customs.

Socrates Younger/ What you've described is distinctly odd.

Stranger/ Yes—and let's suppose that a further conclusion was that we should set up officers annually who belong to the mass of people, whether from the rich or from the whole people, whoever has office assigned to him by lot; and that those who take office should execute it by steering the ships and healing patients according to the written rules.

Socrates Younger/ This is even harder to take.

Stranger/ Then consider too what follows after this. When the year ends for each and every one of the officers, there will be a requirement to set up courts, either of the rich on the

basis of preselection or again those chosen by lot from the whole people together, and to bring before these judges those who have held office, in order to examine their conduct. Anyone who wishes will be permitted to charge an officer that he failed to steer the ships during the year according to the written rules or according to the ancient customs of our ancestors. There will be these same requirements also in the case of those healing the sick, and for any officers condemned by the vote, the judges will have to assess what penalty they should suffer or what financial restitution they should make.

Socrates Younger/ Well, anyone who willingly and voluntarily undertakes to hold office under such conditions would fully deserve to suffer any penalty whatever and to pay back any amount.

Stranger/ And further still it will be necessary to establish a law against all the following things. Suppose anyone is found inquiring into steersmanship and seafaring, or health and truth in the doctor's art, in relation to winds and heat and cold, above and beyond the written rules, and making clever speculations of any kind in relation to such things. In the first place one must not call him an expert doctor or an expert steersman, but a stargazer, some babbling sophist. The next provision will be that anyone who wishes from among those permitted to do so shall indict him and bring him before some court or other as corrupting other people younger than himself and inducing them to engage in the arts of the steersman and the doctor not in accordance with the laws, but instead by taking autonomous control of ships and patients. If he is found guilty of persuading anyone, whether young or old, contrary to the laws and the written rules, the most extreme penalties shall be imposed on him. For (so the law will say) there must be nothing wiser than the laws; no one is ignorant about what belongs to the art of the doctor, or about

health, or what belongs to the art of the steersman, or seafaring, since it is possible for anyone who wishes to understand things that are written down and things established as ancestral customs. Suppose then these things came about, Socrates, in the way we say, both in relation to these sorts of expert knowledge, and to generalship, and all the art of hunting, of whatever kind; to painting, or any part whatever of all the art of imitation; to carpentry, the whole of tool-making, of whatever kind, or again farming and the whole of the expertise that deals with plants. Or again, suppose we imagined a sort of horse-rearing that took place according to written rules, or all of herd-keeping, or the art of divination, or every part included in the art of the subordinate, or petteia, or all the science of numbers, whether perhaps dealing with them on their own, or in two dimensions, or in solids, or in speeds. If all of these were practiced in this way, and they were done on the basis of written rules and not on the basis of expertise, what on earth would be the result?

Socrates Younger/ It's clear both that we should see all the various sorts of expertise completely destroyed, and that they would never be restored, either, because of this law prohibiting inquiry; so that life, which even now is difficult, in such a time would be altogether unlivable.

Stranger/ But what about the following consideration? Suppose we required each of the things mentioned to be done according to written rules, and we required the person elected or appointed to office by lot, on the basis of chance, to oversee these written rules of ours: what then if this person were to take no notice of what is written down, in order either to profit in some way or to do some personal favor, and were to take it upon himself to do different things, contrary to these, when he possesses no knowledge? Would this not be an evil still greater than the previous one?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, very true.

Stranger/ Yes, for if, I imagine, contrary to the laws that have been established on the basis of much experiment, with some advisers or other having given advice on each subject in an attractive way, and having persuaded the majority to pass them—if someone were brazen enough to act contrary to these, he would be committing a mistake many times greater than the other, and would overturn all expert activity to a still greater degree than do the written rules.

Socrates Younger/ Yes—how would he not?

Stranger/ For these reasons, then, the second-best method of proceeding, for those who establish laws and written rules about anything whatever, is to allow neither individual nor mass ever to do anything contrary to these—anything whatsoever.

Socrates Younger/ Correct.

Stranger/ Well, imitations of the truth of each and everything would be these, wouldn't they—the things issuing from those who know which have been written down so far as they can be?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Now we said—if we remember—that the knowledgeable person, the one who really possesses the art of statesmanship, would do many things in relation to his own activity by using his expertise, without taking any notice of the written laws, when other things appear to him to be better, contrary to those that have been written down by him and given as orders to people who are not currently with him.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that's what we said.

Stranger/ Well, any individual whatever or any large collection of people whatever, for whom there are actually written laws established, who undertake to do anything at all that is different, contrary to these, on the grounds that it is

better, will be doing, won't they, the same thing as that true expert, so far as they can?

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Well then, if they were to do such a thing without having expert knowledge, they would be undertaking to imitate what is true, but would imitate it altogether badly; but if they did it on the basis of expertise, this is no longer imitation but that very thing that is most truly what it sets out to be?

Socrates Younger/ I agree completely—I think.

Stranger/ But it is established as agreed between us—we agreed to it before, at any rate—that no large collection of people is capable of acquiring any sort of expertise whatever.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, it remains agreed.

Stranger/ Then if some sort of kingly expertise exists, neither the collection of people that consists of the rich, nor all the people together, could ever acquire this expert knowledge of statesmanship.

Socrates Younger/ How could they?

Stranger/ The requirement, then, as it seems, for all constitutions of this sort, if they are going to produce a good imitation of that true constitution of one man ruling with expertise, so far as they can, is that—given that they have their laws—they must never do anything contrary to what is written or to ancestral customs.

Socrates Younger/ Very well said.

Stranger/ In that case, when the rich imitate it, then we shall call such a constitution an 'aristocracy'; when they take no notice of the laws, we shall call it an 'oligarchy'.

Socrates Younger/ Possibly.

Stranger/ And, in turn, when one person rules according to laws, so imitating the person with expert knowledge, we

shall call him a king, not distinguishing by name the one ruling on his own with expert knowledge or the one doing so on the basis of opinion, according to laws.

Socrates Younger/ Possibly we shall.

Stranger/ Well then, if in fact some one person rules who really possesses expert knowledge, in every case he will be called by the same name of king and not by any other one. As a result of this the five names of what are now called constitutions have become only one.

Socrates Younger/ It seems so, at any rate.

Stranger/ And what of the case when some one ruler acts neither according to laws nor according to customs, but pretends to act like the person with expert knowledge, saying that after all one must do what is contrary to what has been written down if it is best, and there is some desire or other combined with ignorance controlling this imitation? Surely in those circumstances we must call every such person a tyrant?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Then it is in this way that the tyrant has come about, we say, and the king, and oligarchy, and aristocracy, and democracy—because people found themselves unable to put up with the idea of that single individual of ours as monarch, and refused to believe that there would ever come to be anyone who deserved to rule in such a way, so as to be willing and able to rule with virtue and expert knowledge, distributing what is just and right correctly to all. They think that a person in such a position always mutilates, kills and generally maltreats whichever of us he wishes; although if there were to come to be someone of the sort we are describing, he would be prized and would govern a constitution that would alone be correct in the strict sense, steering it through in happiness.

Socrates Younger/ Quite.

Stranger/ But as things are, when—as we say—a king does not come to be in cities as a king-bee is born in a hive, one individual immediately superior in body and mind, it is necessary—so it seems—for people to come together and write things down, chasing after the traces of the truest constitution.

Socrates Younger/ Possibly.

Stranger/ Do we wonder, then, Socrates, at all the evils that turn out to occur in such constitutions, and all those that will turn out for them, when a foundation of this sort underlies them, one of carrying out their functions according to written rules and customs without knowledge—which if used by another expertise would manifestly destroy everything that comes about through it? Or should we rather wonder at something else, namely at how strong a thing a city is by its nature? For in fact cities have suffered such things now for time without limit, but nevertheless some particular ones among them are enduring and are not overturned. Yet many from time to time sink like ships, and perish, and have perished, and will perish in the future through the depravity of their steersmen and sailors, who have acquired the greatest ignorance about the greatest things—although they have no understanding at all about what belongs to the art of statesmanship, they think they have completely acquired this sort of expert knowledge, most clearly of them all.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ So which of these 'incorrect' constitutions is least difficult to live with, given that they are all difficult, and which the heaviest to bear? Should we take a brief look at this, although a discussion of it will be a side-issue in relation to the subject now set before us? And yet, at any rate in general, perhaps everything that all of us do is for the sake of this sort of thing.

Socrates Younger/ We should certainly look at it.

Stranger/ Well then, what you should say is that, if there are three sorts of constitution, the same one is at the same time exceptionally difficult and easiest.

Socrates Younger/ What are you saying?

Stranger/ Just this: monarchy, I'm saying, rule by a few and rule by many—there were these three sorts of constitution we were talking about at the beginning of the discussion with which we have now been deluged.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, there were.

Stranger/ Well then, let's divide these, each single one into two, and make six, separating off the correct one from these on its own, as a seventh.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ Out of monarchy let's make kingly and tyrannical rule; out of the sort that doesn't involve many, we said there was the auspiciously named aristocracy, and oligarchy, while out of the sort that does involve many, there was democracy, which we then called single and put it down as such, but now in turn we must put this too down as double.

Socrates Younger/ How, then? And dividing it by what criterion?

Stranger/ By one that is no different from the other cases, even if its name, 'democracy', is now double; but certainly ruling according to laws and contrary to laws belongs both to this and to the others.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, it does.

Stranger/ Well, at the time when we were looking for the correct constitution, this cut was not useful, as we demonstrated in what we said before; but since we have now set that correct constitution to one side, and have put down the rest as necessary, in the case of these, certainly, the

criterion of contrary to and abiding by laws cuts each of them in two.

Socrates Younger/ It seems so, given what has now been said.

Stranger/ Well then, when monarchy is yoked in good written rules, which we call laws, it is best of all six; but if it is without laws, it is difficult and heaviest to live with.

Socrates Younger/ Possibly.

Stranger/ And as for the rule of those who are not many, just as few is in the middle between one and a large number, let's suppose it to be middling in both ways; while that of the mass, in its turn, we may suppose to be weak in all respects and capable of nothing of any importance either for good or for bad as judged in relation to the others, because under it offices are distributed in small portions among many people. For this reason, if all the types of constitution are law-abiding, it turns out to be the worst of them, but if all are contrary to law, the best; and if all are uncontrolled, living in a democracy takes the prize, but if they are ordered, life in it is least livable, and in first place and best by far will be life in the first, except for the seventh. For of all of them, that one we must separate out from the other constitutions, like a god from men.

Socrates Younger/ This seems both to follow, and to be, as you say; and we must do as you suggest.

Stranger/ So then we must also remove those who participate in all these constitutions, except for the one based on knowledge, as being, not statesmen, but experts in faction; we must say that, as presiding over insubstantial images, on the largest scale, they are themselves of the same sort, and that as the greatest imitators and magicians they turn out the be the greatest sophists among sophists.

Socrates Younger/ This term 'sophist' looks as if it has been only too correctly turned round against the so-called experts in statesmanship.

Stranger/ So: this is our play, as it were—as we said just now that there was some band of centaurs and satyrs in view, one that we had to set apart from the expertise of the statesman; and now it has been set apart, as we have seen, with great difficulty.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ Yes, but there is something else remaining that is still more difficult than this, by reason of its being both more akin to the kingly class, and closer to it, and harder to understand; and we seem to me to be in a situation similar to that of those who refine gold.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ I imagine that these craftsmen also begin by separating out earth, and stones, and many different things; and after these, there remain commingled with the gold those things that are akin to it, precious things and only removable with the use of fire: copper, silver, and sometimes adamant, the removal of which through repeated smelting and testing leaves the 'unalloyed' gold that people talk about there for us to see, itself alone by itself.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, they certainly do say these things happen in this way.

Stranger/ Well, it seems that in the same way we have now separated off those things that are different from the expert knowledge of statesmanship, and those that are alien and hostile to it, and that there remain those that are precious and related to it. Among these, I think, are generalship, the art of the judge, and that part of rhetoric which in partnership with kingship persuades people of what is just and so helps in steering through the business of cities. As for these, in what

way will one most easily portion them off and show, stripped and alone by himself, that person we are looking for?

Socrates Younger/ It's clear that we must try to do this somehow.

Stranger/ Well, if it depends on our trying, we'll find him; music will help us reveal him. Answer me this.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ I imagine we recognize such a thing as the learning of music, and in general of the sorts of expert knowledge involving work with the hands?

Socrates Younger/ We do.

Stranger/ And what of this—the matter of whether we should learn anyone of these or not? Shall we say that this too, in its turn, is a sort of knowledge, concerned with these very things, or what shall we say?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, we'll say that it is.

Stranger/ Then shall we agree that this sort of knowledge is distinct from those?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And shall we agree that no one of them should control any other, or that the others should control this one, or that this one should manage and control all the others together?

Socrates Younger/ This one should control them.

Stranger/ In that case you, at any rate, declare it to be your opinion that the one that decides whether one should learn or not should be in control, so far as we are concerned, over the one that is the object of learning and does the teaching?

Socrates Younger/ Very much so.

Stranger/ And also, in that case, that the one which decides whether one should persuade or not should control the one which is capable of persuading?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Well then: to which sort of expert knowledge shall we assign what is capable of persuading mass and crowd, through the telling of stories, and not through teaching?

Socrates Younger/ This too is clear, I think: it must be given to rhetoric.

Stranger/ And the matter of whether to do through persuasion whatever it may be in relation to some people or other, or else by the use of some sort of force, or indeed to do nothing at all: to what sort of expert knowledge shall we attach this?

Socrates Younger/ To the one that controls the art of persuasion and speaking.

Stranger/ This would be none other, I think, than the capacity of the statesman.

Socrates Younger/ Very well said.

Stranger/ This matter of rhetoric too seems to have been separated quickly from statesmanship, as a distinct class, but subordinate to it.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ What should we think about the following sort of capacity, in its turn?

Socrates Younger/ Which one?

Stranger/ The one that decides how to make war against each group of people against whom we choose to make war. The question is whether we shall say that this is or is not a matter of expertise.

Socrates Younger/ And how could we suppose it not to involve expertise: that capacity which is exercised by generalship and all activity concerned with war?

Stranger/ And are we to understand as different from this the expertise that is able and knows how to reach a considered decision about whether we should make war, or whether we should withdraw in friendly fashion? Or are we to take it to be the same as this one?

Socrates Younger/ Anyone who was following what was said before must suppose that it is distinct.

Stranger/ Shall we then declare our view that it controls it, if in fact we are going to take things in line with what we said before?

Socrates Younger/ I say yes.

Stranger/ Then what mistress will we even try to propose for so terrifying and important an expertise, the whole of that concerned with war, except the true art of kingship?

Socrates Younger/ No other.

Stranger/ In that case we shall not set down the expert knowledge of generals as statesmanship, since it is subordinate.

Socrates Younger/ It seems unlikely that we shall.

Stranger/ Come on then; let's look at the capacity that belongs to those judges who judge correctly.

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ Well then, does its capacity extend to anything more than taking over from the legislator-king all those things that are established as lawful in relation to contracts, and judging by reference to these the things that have been prescribed as just and unjust, providing its own individual excellence by virtue of the fact that it would not be willing to decide the complaints of one citizen against another contrary to the prescription of the legislator through being overcome by presents of some sort, or fears, or feelings of compassion, or again by any enmity or friendship?

Socrates Younger/ No, the function of this capacity extends, roughly speaking, to what you have said.

Stranger/ In that case we discover the power of judges too not to be that belonging to the king, but to be a guardian of the laws and a subordinate of that other capacity.

Socrates Younger/ It seems so, at any rate.

Stranger/ If then one looks at all the sorts of expert knowledge that have been discussed, it must be observed that none of them has been declared to be statesmanship. For what is really kingship must not itself perform practical tasks, but control those with the capacity to perform them, because it knows when it is the right time to begin and set in motion the most important things in cities, and when it is the wrong time; and the others must do what has been prescribed for them.

Socrates Younger/ Correct.

Stranger/ For this reason, then, the sorts of expertise we have just examined control neither each other nor themselves, but each is concerned with some individual practical activity of its own, and in accordance with the individual nature of the activities in question has appropriately acquired a name that is individual to it.

Socrates Younger/ That seems so, at any rate.

Stranger/ Whereas the one that controls all of these, and the laws, and cares for every aspect of things in the city, weaving everything together in the most correct way—this, embracing its capacity with the appellation belonging to the whole, we would, it seems, most appropriately call statesmanship.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, absolutely.

Stranger/ At this point we'll want, won't we, to pursue it further by reference to the model of the art of weaving, now that all the classes of things in the city have become clear to us?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, very much so.

Stranger/ Then it seems that we should discuss the intertwining that belongs to kingship—of what kind it is, and in what way it intertwines to render us what sort of fabric.

Socrates Younger/ Clearly.

Stranger/ What it seems we have to deal with, in that case, is certainly a difficult thing to show.

Socrates Younger/ But in any case we have to discuss it.

Stranger/ To say that part of virtue is in a certain sense different in kind from virtue provides an all too easy target for those expert in disputing statements, if we view things in relation to what the majority of people think.

Socrates Younger/ I don't understand.

Stranger/ I'll put it again, like this. I imagine you think that courage, for us, constitutes one part of virtue.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ And also that moderation is something distinct from courage, but at the same time that this too is one part of what the other is part of.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well, we must take our courage in our hands and declare something astonishing in relation to these two.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That, in some sort of way, they are extremely hostile to each other and occupy opposed positions in many things.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Not in any way the sort of thing people are used to saying. For certainly, I imagine, all the parts of virtue are said to be amicably disposed towards each other, if anything is.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then should we look, with extremely close attention, to see whether this is unqualifiedly the case, or whether emphatically some aspects of them admit of dissent in some respect with what is related to them?

Socrates Younger/ Yes; please say how we should do so.

Stranger/ We should look at the matter in relation to all those things that we call fine, but then go on to place them in two classes which are opposed to each other.

Socrates Younger/ Put it still more clearly.

Stranger/ Sharpness and speed, whether in bodies, or in minds, or in the movement of the voice, whether belonging to the things themselves or as represented in images of them—all those imitations that music, and painting too, provide: have you ever either praised any of these yourself, or been present to hear someone else praising them?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ And do you remember how they do it in every one of such cases?

Socrates Younger/ I don't at all.

Stranger/ Then would I be able, I wonder, to show it to you in words just as I have it before my mind?

Socrates Younger/ Why not?

Stranger/ You seem to think this kind of thing easy; but in any case let's consider it in the two opposite sorts of case. Often, and in many activities, whenever we admire speed and vigor and sharpness, of mind and body, and again of voice, we speak in praise of it by using a single appellation, that of 'courage'.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ I think we say 'sharp and courageous'—that's a first example; and 'fast and courageous', and similarly with

‘vigorous’. In every case it’s by applying the name I’m talking about in common to all these sorts of thing that we praise them.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But again—in many activities, don’t we often praise the class of things that happen gently?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, very much so.

Stranger/ Well then, don’t we express this by saying the opposite of what we say of the other things?

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ In that, I think, we say on each occasion that they are ‘quiet and moderate’, admiring things done in the mind, and in the sphere of actions themselves, that are slow and soft, and also things the voice does that turn out smooth and deep—and all rhythmic movement, and the whole of music when it employs slowness at the right time. We apply to them all the name, not of courage, but of orderliness.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ And when, conversely, both of these sets of qualities occur at the wrong time, we change round and censure each of them, assigning them to opposite effect by the names we use.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ By calling them ‘excessive and manic’ when they turn out sharper than is timely, and appear too fast and hard, and calling things that are too deep and slow and soft ‘cowardly and lethargic’. It’s pretty much a general rule that we find that these qualities, and the moderate type as a whole, and the ‘courage’ of the opposite qualities do not mix with each other in the relevant activities, as if they were sorts of thing that had a warring stance allotted to them. Moreover we shall

see that those who possess them in their souls are at odds with each other, if we go looking for them.

Socrates Younger/ Where do you mean us to look?

Stranger/ Both in all the spheres we mentioned just now, and no doubt in many others. For I think because of their affinity to either set of qualities, they praise some things as belonging to their own kin, and censure those of their opponents as alien, engaging in a great deal of hostility towards each other, about a great many things.

Socrates Younger/ Very likely.

Stranger/ Well, this disagreement, of these classes of people, is a sort of play; but in relation to the most important things, it turns out to be a disease which is the most hateful of all for cities.

Socrates Younger/ In relation to what, do you mean?

Stranger/ In relation to the organization of life as a whole. For those who are especially orderly are always ready to live the quiet life, carrying on their private business on their own by themselves. They both associate with everyone in their own city on this basis, and similarly with cities outside their own, being ready to preserve peace of some sort in any way they can. As a result of this passion of theirs, which is less timely than it should be, when they do what they want nobody notices that they are being unwarlike and making the young men the same, and that they are perpetually at the mercy of those who attack them. The consequence is that within a few years they themselves, their children, and the whole city together often become slaves instead of free men before they have noticed it.

Socrates Younger/ What you describe is a painful and terrifying thing to go through.

Stranger/ But what about those who incline more towards courage? Isn't it the case that they are always drawing their

cities into some war or other because of their desire for a life of this sort, which is more vigorous than it should be, and that they make enemies of people who are both numerous and powerful, and so either completely destroy their own fatherlands, or else make them slaves and subjects of their enemies?

Socrates Younger/ This too is true.

Stranger/ How then can we deny that in these things both of these classes of people always admit of much hostility and dissent between them, even to the greatest degree?

Socrates Younger/ There's no way we shall deny it.

Stranger/ Then we have found, haven't we, what we were originally looking into, that parts of virtue of no small importance are by nature at odds with each other, and moreover cause those who possess them to be in this same condition?

Socrates Younger/ Very likely they do.

Stranger/ Then let's take the following point in its turn.

Socrates Younger/ What's that?

Stranger/ Whether, I suppose, any of the sorts of expert knowledge that involve putting things together voluntarily puts together any at all of the things it produces, even of the lowliest kind, out of bad and good things, or whether every sort of expert knowledge everywhere throws away the bad so far as it can, and takes what is suitable and good, bringing all of this—both like and unlike—together into one, and so producing some single kind of thing with a single capacity.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ In that case, neither will what we have decided is by nature truly the art of statesmanship ever voluntarily put together a city out of good and bad human beings. It's quite clear that it will first put them to the test in play, and

after the test it will in turn hand them over to those with the capacity to educate them and serve it towards this particular end. It will itself lay down prescriptions for the educators and direct them, in the same way that weaving follows along with the carders, and those who prepare the other things it needs for its own work, prescribing for and directing them, giving indications to each group to finish their products in whatever way it thinks suitable for its own interweaving.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, absolutely.

Stranger/ In just this very way, it seems to me, the art of kingship—since it is this that itself possesses the capacity belonging to the directing art—will not permit the educators and tutors, who function according to law, to do anything in the exercise of their role that will not ultimately result in some disposition which is appropriate to its own mixing role. It calls on them to teach these things alone; and those of their pupils that are unable to share in a disposition that is courageous and moderate, and whatever else belongs to the sphere of virtue, but are thrust forcibly away by an evil nature into godlessness, excess and injustice, it throws out by killing them, sending them into exile, and punishing them with the most extreme forms of dishonor.

Socrates Younger/ At least it is put something like that.

Stranger/ And again those who wallow in great ignorance and baseness it brings under the yoke of the class of slaves.

Socrates Younger/ Quite correct.

Stranger/ Then as for the others, whose natures are capable of becoming composed and stable in the direction of nobility, if they acquire education, and, with the help of expertise, of admitting commingling with each other—of these, it tries to bind together and intertwine the ones who strain more towards courage, its view being that their firm disposition is as it were like the warp, and the ones who

incline towards the moderate, who produce an ample, soft, and—to continue the image—woof-like thread, two natures with opposite tendencies; and it does so in something like the following way.

Socrates Younger/ What way is that?

Stranger/ First, by fitting together that part of their soul that is eternal with a divine bond, in accordance with its kinship with the divine, and after the divine, in turn fitting together their mortal aspect with human bonds.

Socrates Younger/ Again, what do you mean by this?

Stranger/ I call divine, when it comes to be in souls, that opinion about what is fine, just and good, and the opposites of these, which is really true and is guaranteed; it belongs to the class of the more than human.

Socrates Younger/ That's certainly a fitting view to take.

Stranger/ Then do we recognize that it belongs to the statesman and the good legislator alone to be capable of bringing this very thing about, by means of the music that belongs to the art of kingship, in those who have had their correct share of education—the people we were speaking of just now?

Socrates Younger/ That's certainly reasonable.

Stranger/ Yes, and let's never call anyone who is incapable of doing this sort of thing by the names we are now investigating.

Socrates Younger/ Quite correct.

Stranger/ Well then—is a 'courageous' soul that grasps this sort of truth not tamed, and wouldn't it be especially willing, as a result, to share in what is just, whereas if it fails to get a share of it, doesn't it rather slide away towards becoming like some kind of beast?

Socrates Younger/ Quite.

Stranger/ And what of the case of the 'moderate' sort of nature? If it gets a share of these opinions, doesn't it become genuinely moderate and wise, so far as wisdom goes in the context of life in a city, while if it fails to get a portion of the things we're talking about, doesn't it very appropriately acquire a disgraceful reputation, for simplemindedness?

Socrates Younger/ Absolutely.

Stranger/ And let's not say, shall we, that this sort of interweaving and bonding, in the case of vicious men in relation to each other and good men in relation to the vicious, ever turns out to be lasting, nor that any sort of expert knowledge would ever seriously use it in relation to people like this?

Socrates Younger/ No; how would it?

Stranger/ What I propose we should say is that it only takes root, through laws, in those dispositions that were both born noble in the first place and have been nurtured in accordance with their nature; and that it is for these that this remedy exists, by virtue of expertise. As we said, this bonding together is more divine, uniting parts of virtue that are by nature unlike each other, and tend in opposite directions.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Yes, and the remaining bonds, which are human, once this divine one exists, are perhaps not difficult at all either to understand, or to effect once one has understood them.

Socrates Younger/ How then, and what are they?

Stranger/ Those that consist in intermarriages and the sharing of children, and in those matters relating to private giving-away in marriage. For most people, in the way they handle these things, do not bind themselves together correctly with respect to the procreation of children.

Socrates Younger/ Why so?

Stranger/ Is there any reason why anyone should seriously concern themselves with censuring the pursuit of wealth and forms of influence in such contexts, as if it were worth discussing?

Socrates Younger/ None.

Stranger/ No; it would be more appropriate for us to discuss those people who pay attention to family-types, and ask whether they are acting erroneously in some way.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that's reasonable.

Stranger/ Well, they act out of entirely the wrong sort of consideration: they go for what is immediately easiest, welcoming those who are much like them, and not liking those who are unlike them, assigning the largest part of their decisions to their feelings of antipathy.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ The moderate, I think, look out for people with the disposition they themselves possess, and so far as they can they both marry from among these and marry off the daughters they are giving away back to people of this sort. The type related to courage does just the same thing, seeking after the nature that belongs to itself, when both types ought to do completely the opposite of this.

Socrates Younger/ How, and why?

Stranger/ Because it is in the nature of courage that when it is reproduced over many generations without being mixed with a moderate nature, it comes to a peak of power at first, but in the end it bursts out completely in fits of madness.

Socrates Younger/ That's likely.

Stranger/ And in its turn the soul that is too full of reserve and has no admixture of courageous initiative, and is reproduced over many generations in this way, by nature

grows more sluggish than is timely and then in the end is completely crippled.

Socrates Younger/ It's likely that this too turns out as you say.

Stranger/ It was these bonds that I meant when I said that there was no difficulty at all in tying them together once the situation existed in which both types had a single opinion about what was fine and good. For this is the single and complete task of kingly weaving-together, never to allow moderate dispositions to stand away from the courageous. Rather, by working them closely into each other as if with a shuttle, through sharing of opinions, through honors, dishonor, esteem, and the giving of pledges to one another, it draws together a smooth and 'fine-woven' fabric out of them, as the expression is, and always entrusts offices in cities to these in common.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ By choosing the person who has both qualities to put in charge wherever there turns out to be a need for a single officer, and by mixing together a part of each of these groups where there is a need for more than one. For the dispositions of moderate people when in office are markedly cautious, just, and conservative, but they lack bite, and a certain sharp and practical keenness.

Socrates Younger/ This too certainly seems to be the case.

Stranger/ And the dispositions of the courageous, in their turn, are inferior to the others in relation to justice and caution, but have an exceptional degree of keenness when it comes to action. Everything in cities cannot go well, either on the private or on the public level, unless both of these groups are there to give their help.

Socrates Younger/ Quite.

Stranger/ Then let us say that this marks the completion of the fabric which is the product of the art of statesmanship: the weaving together, with regular intertwining, of the dispositions of brave and moderate people—when the expertise belonging to the king brings their life together in agreement and friendship and makes it common between them, completing the most magnificent and best of all fabrics and covering with it all the other inhabitants of cities, both slave and free; and holds them together with this twining and rules and directs without, so far as it belongs to a city to be happy, falling short of that in any respect.

Socrates/ Another most excellent portrait, visitor, this one that you have completed for us, of the man who possesses the art of kingship: the statesman.

Statesman.

Translated by J. B. Skemp.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Stranger, Theodorus, Socrates Younger

Socrates/ Theodorus, I am really very much indebted to you for my introduction to Theaetetus and to our guest from Elea.

Theodorus/ Good, but you are likely to be three times as much in my debt, Socrates, when they have done their task and defined the statesman and the philosopher as well as the Sophist for you.

Socrates/ Three times as much? Really, my dear Theodorus, must it go on record that we heard our greatest mathematician and geometer say that?

Theodorus/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ Are we to say that we heard you reckoning all these three as of equal value when their real values differ to an extent that defies all your mathematical expressions of proportion?

Theodorus/ By Ammon, god of Libya, well said, Socrates, and a fair hit! Your dropping on my blunder in calculation like this shows that you have really remembered your mathematics! But I will have my revenge for this some other time. Now, sir, we turn to you. Pray do not tire of favoring us with your assistance but go on to define the statesman or the philosopher, whichever you prefer to seek.

Stranger/ Yes, we must do that, Theodorus. We have set ourselves to the task and now we must not withdraw from it till all our definitions are complete. But we must also consider Theaetetus here—what ought I to do about him?

Theodorus/ In what way?

Stranger/ Shall we give him a rest from philosophical wrestling and take on his fellow gymnast, the young Socrates, in his place—or have you any other suggestion?

Theodorus/ No, take on young Socrates this time, as you suggest. They are both young and will be better able to carry through stiff exercise by being rested in turn.

Socrates/ Furthermore, sir, they might both be said to have some sort of kinship with me. Theaetetus, according to you, is like me in looks and Socrates bears the same name. Sharing a name entails kinship in some sense, and, of course, we ought always to seize opportunities of discovering those who may be our kinsfolk by conversing with them. Yesterday I joined in discussion with Theaetetus; today I have listened to him answering you. I have not heard Socrates speak either in discussion or in reply. He too must be tested. So he shall reply to me another time, but this afternoon let him answer you.

Stranger/ Very good! Socrates, you hear what Socrates says?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Do you agree to his proposal?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, certainly.

Stranger/ Evidently you are putting no obstacles in the way of our advance, and I think I am still less entitled to do so. Well, then, after finding the Sophist, the task we now have to face together is to search out the statesman, or so it seems to me. Tell me, then, Socrates, whether he too must be classified as one of those who possess some kind of expert knowledge, or must we begin with some other kind of definition?

Socrates Younger/ No, he is to be defined as a kind of expert.

Stranger/ Well then, must we distinguish the forms of knowledge as we did when looking for his predecessor?

Socrates Younger/ It would seem so.

Stranger/ But the line of cleavage required now appears to differ from the previous one, Socrates.

Socrates Younger/ What then?

Stranger/ It follows another division.

Socrates Younger/ It may well be so.

Stranger/ Where shall a man find the way of the statesman then? For we must distinguish this path from all the rest by setting upon it the special sign of its distinctive form. All roads divergent from it we must mark out also as one common class. Thus we must bring our minds to conceive of all forms of knowledge as falling under one or the other of these two classes—statecraft and knowledge other than statecraft.

Socrates Younger/ This must be your task, sir. It is not for me to attempt it.

Stranger/ Yes, but it will be your achievement as well, Socrates, when all becomes clear to us both.

Socrates Younger/ It is kind of you to say so.

Stranger/ Then consider the science of number and certain other sciences closely akin to it. Are they not unconcerned with any form of practical activity, yielding us pure knowledge only?

Socrates Younger/ That is the case.

Stranger/ But it is quite otherwise with carpentry and manufacture in general. These possess science embodied as it were in a practical activity and inseparable from it. Their products do not exist before the arts come into operation and their operation is an integral part of the emergence of the product from its unworked state.

Socrates Younger/ True. What of it?

Stranger/ You must use this distinction to divide the totality of sciences into two classes. Name the one ‘applied,' the other ‘pure.'

Socrates Younger/ I agree. Let your distinction be drawn, and let all science be divided into these two parts.

Stranger/ Are we then to regard the statesman, the king, the slave-master, and the master of a household as essentially one though we use all these names for them, or shall we say that four distinct sciences exist, each of them corresponding to one of the four titles? But let me put this in another way easier to follow.

Socrates Younger/ And what is that?

Stranger/ I will tell you. Suppose we find a medical man who is not himself practicing as a public medical officer but who nevertheless is competent to advise a doctor actually serving in that capacity? Must not the expert knowledge the adviser possesses be described by the same title as that of the functionary whom he is advising?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well then, consider a man who, though himself a private citizen, is capable of giving expert advice to the ruler of a country. Shall we not say that he possesses the same science as the ruler himself possesses—or, rather ought to have possessed?

Socrates Younger/ We shall indeed say so.

Stranger/ But the science possessed by the true king is the science of kingship?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ The possessor of this science then, whether he is in fact in power or has only the status of a private citizen,

will properly be called a ‘statesman' since his knowledge of the art qualifies him for the title whatever his circumstances.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, he is undoubtedly entitled to that name.

Stranger/ Then consider a further point. The slave-master and the master of a household are identical.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Furthermore, is there much difference between a large household organization and a small-sized city, so far as the exercise of authority over it is concerned?

Socrates Younger/ None.

Stranger/ Well then, our point is clearly made. One science covers all these several spheres and we will not quarrel with a man who prefers anyone of the particular names for it; he can call it royal science, political science, or science of household management.

Socrates Younger/ It makes no difference.

Stranger/ Now comes another point that can hardly be controversial. What a king can do to maintain his rule by using his hands or his bodily faculties as a whole is very slight in comparison with what he can do by mental power and force of personality.

Socrates Younger/ Manifestly.

Stranger/ So a king's art is closer to theoretical knowledge than to manual work or indeed to practical work in general?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ You agree then that we may speak either of statesmanship and the statesman or of kingship and the king, these terms being convertible, since they are identical in force?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Let us go on to the next stage and see if we can proceed to a division of the kinds of theoretical knowledge.

Socrates Younger/ Good.

Stranger/ Look attentively then and see if we cannot discover a natural cleavage within such knowledge.

Socrates Younger/ Tell me where it is.

Stranger/ See, it is here. There exists, we agree, an art of counting.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ That belongs quite definitely to the class of theoretical sciences, I presume.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Now when the art of counting has ascertained a numerical difference we do not assign it any further task save that of pronouncing on what has been ascertained, do we?

Socrates Younger/ No.

Stranger/ Now consider a master builder. No master builder is a manual worker—he directs the work of others.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ He provides the knowledge but not the manual labor.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ So he might fairly be said to possess one of the theoretical forms of science.

Socrates Younger/ He might indeed.

Stranger/ But it is characteristic of him that when he has delivered a verdict on the facts he has not ended his task in the way the calculator has. The master builder must give the appropriate directions to each of the workmen and see that they complete the work assigned.

Socrates Younger/ That is so.

Stranger/ Therefore all this class of sciences are quite as ‘theoretical' as calculation and its kindred sciences are, but the two groups differ from one another in that the latter are content to give a verdict, but the former issue a command for performance of further actions.

Socrates Younger/ This is clearly the difference between them.

Stranger/ Well then, may we claim that it is a sound division to split the whole of theoretical science into two parts and to call one critical and the other directive?

Socrates Younger/ Yes—I would agree to it at any rate.

Stranger/ I hope so, for it is much to be desired that those sharing a task should be of one mind.

Socrates Younger/ Indeed it is.

Stranger/ So long as we ourselves share this happy agreement we can let the judgments of the rest of the world look after themselves.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well then, in which of these groups of sciences do we find a place for the king? In the critical class—as though he were a mere spectator of truth? Is he not rather in the other, directive class? Does not his position in control of men imply this?

Socrates Younger/ Of course he is in the second group.

Stranger/ Good, but we must now look further at the directive class and see if we find a cleavage in it somewhere. I think I have lighted on one. There is a difference between kings and heralds analogous to the difference between the art of the producer-salesman and of that of the retailer.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ Retailers take over what someone else has made and then sell a second time what was first sold to them.

Socrates Younger/ Quite so.

Stranger/ Similarly heralds receive commands which have been thought out and issued by someone else; then they issue them at second hand to others.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Well then, are we going to confound the science of kingship with the science of the interpreter, the coxswain, the prophet, or the herald, or with any of this large group of kindred sciences, simply because all of them are concerned, as admittedly they are, with issuing orders? We thought out an analogy just now. Cannot we think out a name as well, seeing that unfortunately there is no normal description of the general class of 'givers of firsthand orders'? We will make the cleavage at this point and name a 'predirective' class into which we will put the race of kings. The other class, now distinct, we can neglect, leaving it to someone else to invent a further common name for the tribes it covers. It is for the king we are searching—not for his opposite.

Socrates Younger/ Exactly.

Stranger/ Well then, his group has been distinguished from the others, the decisive factor being that the kingly group issues its own commands while the other group merely passes commands on. Now we must subdivide the kingly group if we find it susceptible of a division.

Socrates Younger/ We must look for one.

Stranger/ Yes, and I think I have found one. Keep close to me and share the work of dividing.

Socrates Younger/ Where is the division?

Stranger/ Take any ruler we may observe at his work of issuing orders. Is not the purpose of his action the production of something?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Products in general need not detain us; they are easily divided into two classes.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ Considering them as a whole we find some lifeless, the rest alive.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ By this distinction we can divide, if we wish to do so, the directive group of theoretical sciences.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ We assign one section to superintendence of the production of lifeless things, the other to superintendence of the production of living things. This effects an exhaustive division of the group.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, it does.

Stranger/ Let us put aside the one section and, taking the other as our unit, divide it into two.

Socrates Younger/ Which of the two sections do you suggest that we take for subdivision?

Stranger/ Surely the section concerned with the issue of directives about living creatures. It goes without saying that the king is never concerned with directives concerning lifeless things in the way the master builder is. Kingship is a nobler thing; it works among living creatures and its functions have to do with these alone.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Now the breeding and nurturing of living creatures can be seen to be of two kinds. They may either be reared singly or in flocks collectively.

Socrates Younger/ They may.

Stranger/ But we shall certainly not find the statesman to be a man in charge of one creature like some cowman or groom. He is much more like the man in charge of a whole herd of cows or of a stud of horses.

Socrates Younger/ That is quite clear, once it is put as you have put it now.

Stranger/ How shall we describe the section of the art of rearing living things which has to do with rearing them collectively? Shall we call it 'herd nurture' or 'collective nurture'?

Socrates Younger/ We can use whichever name better helps our argument.

Stranger/ Excellently said, Socrates. If you hold fast to this principle of avoiding contention over names you will be seen to be rich with an ever greater store of wisdom as you come to old age. We will apply this sound principle to the present case and do as you bid me. Do you see how we can divide the nurture of herds into twin sections, so as to cordon off the object of our search in one of them and leave him an area only half the size of the one he is free to roam in at present?

Socrates Younger/ I will try my hardest to cordon him off. I think the division is to be made between nurture of men and nurture of beasts.

Stranger/ You were keenness itself and you fenced the king off like a man, but I think we must not let this happen again if we can help it.

Socrates Younger/ Why, what has happened? What have we done?

Stranger/ We must beware lest we break off one small fragment of a class and then contrast it with all the important sections left behind. We must only divide where

there is a real cleavage between specific forms. The section must always possess a specific form. It is splendid if one really can divide off the class sought for immediately from all the rest—that is, if the structure of reality authorizes such immediate division. You had such direct tactics in mind just now and hastened the argument to its conclusion. You saw that our search led us to men, and so you thought you had found the real division. But, it is dangerous, Socrates, to chop reality up into small portions. It is always safer to go down the middle to make our cuts. The real cleavages among the forms are more likely to be found thus, and the whole art of these definitions consists in finding these cleavages.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean, sir?

Stranger/ I will try to be still clearer, Socrates, for you are the kind of person it is a pleasure to teach. A fully satisfactory demonstration is not possible now, circumstances being what they are, but we must try for the sake of clearness to push the explanation a stage further.

Socrates Younger/ Thank you, but what kind of mistake do you say that we made in our division just now?

Stranger/ The kind of mistake a man would make who, seeking to divide the class of human beings into two, divided them into Greeks and barbarians. This is a division most people in this part of the world make. They separate the Greeks from all other nations making them a class apart; thus they group all other nations together as a class, ignoring the fact that it is an indeterminate class made up of peoples who have no intercourse with each other and speak different languages. Lumping all this non-Greek residue together, they think it must constitute one real class because they have a common name 'barbarian' to attach to it. Take another example. A man might think that he was dividing number into its true classes if he cut off the number

ten thousand from all others and set it apart as one class. He might go on to invent a single name for the whole of the rest of number, and then claim that because it possessed the invented common name it was in fact the other true class of number—'number other than ten thousand.' Surely it would be better and closer to the real structure of the forms to make a central division of number into odd and even or of humankind into male and female. A division setting Lydians or Phrygians or any other peoples in contradistinction to all the rest can only be made when a man fails to arrive at a true division into two groups each of which after separation is not only a portion of the whole class to be divided but also a real subdivision of it.

Socrates Younger/ Quite so, sir, but this is just the difficulty. How can one learn to distinguish more clearly between a mere portion and a true subdivision and recognize them as being really different?

Stranger/ My dear Socrates, this is no light order. We have already strayed rather too far from the argument set as our task, and here you are asking that we stray still further! For the moment let us go back to the argument as is only right. We will get on the track of your problem some other time when we are free to do so and then we will follow it out to the end. But there is one caution I will add here. Do not suppose that in what I say now I have given you a full explanation of the principle.

Socrates Younger/ What principle do you mean?

Stranger/ The principle that a portion and a subdivision of a class are not identical.

Socrates Younger/ Can you be more explicit?

Stranger/ Where a true subdivision of a wider class is made, this subdivision must necessarily also be a portion of the total class of which it is declared a subdivision. But the

converse is not true, since a portion is not necessarily a true subdivision. You can claim my authority, Socrates, for asserting this and for denying the contrary.

Socrates Younger/ This ruling will be followed.

Stranger/ Good! Now help me to settle the next question.

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ Consider the class which caused us to stray from the argument and brought us to this point. I think that the trouble began at the moment when you were asked how we were to divide the science of tending herds and you answered with alacrity that there are two classes of living creatures, one of them being mankind, and the other the rest of the animals lumped together.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ It became clear to me then that you were breaking off a mere portion, and that because you were able to give the common name ‘animals' to what was left, namely to all creatures other than man, you thought that these creatures do in actual fact make up one class.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that was so.

Stranger/ But, my gallant young friend, pray consider this! This kind of classification might be undertaken by any other creature capable of rational thought—for instance cranes are reputed to be rational in this way and there may be others. They might invest themselves with a unique and proper dignity and classify the race of cranes as being distinct from all other creatures; the rest they might well lump together, men included, giving them the common appellation of ‘the beasts.' So let us try to be on the watch against mistakes of that kind.

Socrates Younger/ How can we avoid them?

Stranger/ By not attempting too general a division of the class of living creatures. We shall be less liable to such errors if we avoid this.

Socrates Younger/ Indeed we must not do it.

Stranger/ No, for it was here our mistake was made just now.

Socrates Younger/ What precisely was it?

Stranger/ The directive section of theoretical science, in so far as it directs the rearing of living creatures was our concern, but we added 'the rearing of them in *herds.'* That is so, is it not?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ This last element of the definition, 'rearing in herds,' implied a prior division of all living creatures according to wildness and tameness. Types amenable to training and control we call tame animals; those resisting control, wild animals.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Now it will be conceded that the science we are hunting down has always been and still is one that works among tame creatures; furthermore, it is to be looked for among tame creatures which are gregarious.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let us avoid making divisions in the way we did just now, in a desperate hurry and with our attention fixed only on the whole class. Only thus shall we reach the statesman in good time. This statesman's art has already landed us in the situation the proverb warns us against!

Socrates Younger/ Which proverb is this?

Stranger/ 'More haste' in our work of correct division has meant 'less speed' for us.

Socrates Younger/ But it has been a happy mischance, sir.

Stranger/ That may be so, but now let us try again from the beginning to divide the science of collective rearing. It may well be that the argument itself as we proceed with it will show you more clearly the very thing you are in such eagerness to discover. Answer me this.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ I want to know if you happen to have heard people speak of something you can hardly have seen for yourself—herds of tame fishes. I know you have not been to see them in the aquariums in the Nile or in the Great King's ponds. But you might possibly have seen such fishes in ornamental fountains yourself.

Socrates Younger/ Of course I have seen them, and I have heard many people speak of the others.

Stranger/ It is the same with the flocks of tame cranes and tame geese in Thessaly—you have never toured the Thessalian plains but you have at least heard of them and you believe that such flocks exist.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, of course.

Stranger/ My reason for asking you all this is to show that creatures reared in herds may be of two kinds. Some live in water; others live on land.

Socrates Younger/ Yes. I agree.

Stranger/ Have I your agreement, then, that we have to divide herd rearing on this principle into two sections? May we assign one subdivision to each of these subsidiary sciences and call the one ‘water herd rearing,' the other ‘land herd rearing'?

Socrates Younger/ Again, I agree.

Stranger/ One need hardly ask to which of these sciences the kingly art belongs—the answer is obvious.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ The next subdivision of the land herd rearing section of herd rearing can be made by anyone.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ By dividing it between walkers and fliers.

Socrates Younger/ Oh yes, of course.

Stranger/ Well then, is not the statesman's art to be sought among the arts dealing with walking herds? Do you not think that practically everyone, even the most witless, would judge this to be so?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, I do.

Stranger/ Then we must effect a subdivision of land herd tendance into two parts, just as we recently divided number into two.

Socrates Younger/ Clearly.

Stranger/ But see what has happened. In the region into which the argument has moved we see two paths lying before us inviting us to our goal. One path reaches the goal more quickly but divides off a small class from a large one. The other is a longer way round but it observes the principle we enunciated before, that we should always divide down the middle where possible. We can go on by whichever of these paths we prefer.

Socrates Younger/ Is it impossible to take them both?

Stranger/ To take both at once is impossible—that is an amazing suggestion, Socrates! But obviously you can take first one, then the other.

Socrates Younger/ Then I vote for taking first one way, then the other.

Stranger/ That is easy, for there is not much farther to go. At the outset or halfway your command would have been difficult for us to obey, but since we are nearly there and you desire it, let us take the longer path first; we shall get to its end more easily now while we are fresher. See this division then.

Socrates Younger/ Tell me what it is.

Stranger/ We find a division of tame herded walking creatures ready-made in nature.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ Some have horns; the rest have none.

Socrates Younger/ That is evident.

Stranger/ Divide then the science of rearing walking herds into two sections, assigning each its sphere, but use a general description in doing so. For if you are anxious about naming each, the business will be complicated needlessly.

Socrates Younger/ How shall we state the matter then?

Stranger/ We will say this. The science of rearing walking herds has been divided into two. The one section of it is assigned to rearing horned herds, and the other to rearing hornless herds.

Socrates Younger/ The division shall stand in these terms. In any case there can be no further question about it.

Stranger/ See now, our king stands out clearly once more; he is shepherd of a hornless herd.

Socrates Younger/ Unmistakably so!

Stranger/ Let us divide up this herd into its component parts then, and try to assign to the king the place really belonging to him.

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ Where shall we divide it? By distinguishing whole-hoofed and cloven-hoofed, or interbreeding and non-

interbreeding? Which do you prefer? You understand what I mean, I suppose?

Socrates Younger/ About what?

Stranger/ You know that horses and asses are capable of interbreeding?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But all other tame hornless herds are incapable of interbreeding.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ What of the statesman then? Is the herd he has in his charge capable of interbreeding with another or incapable?

Socrates Younger/ Incapable, of course.

Stranger/ This group we must now divide again into two as before, it would seem.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, we must.

Stranger/ But the class of tame, gregarious living creatures has already been reduced to its component elements save for the division of two of these from each other. For dogs cannot claim to be counted in the class of gregarious animals.

Socrates Younger/ No they cannot, but by what means are we to separate the remaining pair?

Stranger/ By a method very appropriate for application by Theaetetus and yourself, seeing that both of you are geometers.

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ I would say, 'by the diagonal and secondly by the diagonal of the diagonal.'

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ What say you of our human constitution? How is this human race of ours endowed? So far as its peripatetic potential is concerned, is it not very like the diagonal? Has it not a potency of two feet?

Socrates Younger/ So it has.

Stranger/ Moreover the character of the remaining component of the class is in turn of the potency possessed by the diagonal of our human diagonal, since its native peripatetic potential is one of two feet twice over.

Socrates Younger/ Of course it is, and I think I see what you are meaning to say.

Stranger/ Good! Now here is another conclusion which we have reached by our divisions which is not without its interest for the comedians. Do we see it, Socrates?

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ For neighbor and competitor in the race this humanity of ours has the most portly and the most easygoing of all the creatures.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, I see. What a funny coincidence!

Stranger/ Still, isn't it reasonable after all? The slowest shuffle in—or snuffle in—last.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, of course you're right.

Stranger/ But there is another thing to notice. What a funny situation the king is in! He has kept pace with his herd and so he has been running a race with the man who is of all men best trained for living an easy life!

Socrates Younger/ Yes, just so.

Stranger/ This is a still clearer illustration of the principle we laid down in our inquiry concerning the Sophist.

Socrates Younger/ What was that?

Stranger/ That in a philosophical search for a definition, like the present one, the presence or absence of dignity in

the object under definition is an irrelevance. Lowly and exalted must receive equal consideration and the argument must proceed by proper stages in its own right to reach the truest conclusion obtainable.

Socrates Younger/ That seems to be right.

Stranger/ Well now, am I to lead you, without waiting for you to ask me, along the shorter of the roads which we discovered as leading to the definition of the king?

Socrates Younger/ Do so, please.

Stranger/ In my opinion then, we must start from the point we reached by separating out herded creatures on land and this time divide these forthwith into two-footed and four-footed. We shall then see the human race sharing the occupation of the two-footed class with the winged tribes and none else; having observed this, we shall divide the two-footed herds into winged and wingless. Then the science of shepherding mankind will have been brought to light. Now we must bring our statesman and king and set him over this class like a charioteer, and hand over to him the reins of government of the state, for they belong to him and his alone is this art of government.

Socrates Younger/ Your debt to me, sir, is nobly discharged by the definition you have made—and you have more than paid the debt, for you have thrown in the digression by way of interest.

Stranger/ Come then, let us gather up the threads of our argument and work out from start to finish our definition of what is called ‘political science.'

Socrates Younger/ Let us do so by all means.

Stranger/ We made a first division of theoretical science by taking the directive part of it. Of this we took the part which we described by analogy with the producer-salesman as ‘predirective.' From this predirective science we cut off

that which directs the rearing of living things, a very important part of the whole. Animal rearing was divided and we chose out of it rearing in herds, and, next to this, rearing of herds of creatures that live on land. Dividing this again, we chose rearing of hornless herds. We then took a part of this, and if one must employ its name, it will be a name three words long—'non-interbreeding herd tendance.' As for the further divisions, only the class ‘man tendance' is left in the two-footed section of the last-named class—and so we reach the object of our search, namely, statesmanship or kingship, which is another name for statesmanship.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, we really have reached our conclusion.

Stranger/ Do you really think so, Socrates? Do you think our task as complete as you make out?

Socrates Younger/ Why do you ask?

Stranger/ Have we dealt fully with the problem we were given a to solve? Is there not a fault and a very grave one in our treatment of it, the fault of arriving at a definition of a king but failing to work through to a really complete and adequate definition?

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ I will try to make my meaning clearer—to myself as well as to you.

Socrates Younger/ Do so, please.

Stranger/ We found just now many arts of herd tendance of which statesmanship is one particular instance. Statesmanship is in charge of the rearing of a particular kind of herd.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Our argument defined it as the science of the collective rearing of men—as distinct from the rearing of horses or other animals.

Socrates Younger/ Quite so.

Stranger/ But we have to notice one respect in which a king differs from all other herdsmen.

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ Do we find any other herdsman challenged by a rival who practices another art and yet claims that he shares with the herdsman the duty of feeding the herd?

Socrates Younger/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ You see how merchants, farmers, and all who prepare the grain for food—yes, and teachers of gymnastics and doctors as well—would all dispute the title ‘feeders of mankind' with the herdsman we have called ‘statesman.' These others would all contend that they are in charge of the feeding of mankind—and of feeding the leaders themselves as well as the mass of the herd.

Socrates Younger/ Would they not be quite right?

Stranger/ Maybe. We will examine this point further, but we can say at once with certainty that no one else disputes a cowherd's position in any of these matters. He feeds his herd himself, and he is also its doctor. He is its matchmaker too, one might say, and none but he understands the midwife's duties when confinements occur and babies have to be brought into the world. Furthermore, in so far as his charges feel a need for games and music, who so good as he to cheer them, who so gifted to charm and soothe them? For he is master of the music best suited to his herd, be it rendered on the pipes or in song unaccompanied. And so it is in the case of every other herdsman, is it not?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly it is.

Stranger/ How then can the definition of the king reached in our discussion show up as correct and flawless in the light of these new facts? We are claiming that he alone is herdsman and shepherd of the human flock, but we are merely singling him out as such from a host of competitors.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly this will not do.

Stranger/ Then we were quite right to feel anxious a little while ago when the suspicion came over us that though the figure we described was a kingly one we had not yet achieved a real portrait of the statesman. We might well hesitate, for we cannot reveal him finally in his proper quality till we have removed and put apart from him the throng of rivals that crowds around him and claims to share his herdsmanship.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, we were quite right to hesitate.

Stranger/ So we must aim at a complete description, Socrates, unless we are to bring disgrace on our argument in the end.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, for we must avoid that at all costs.

Stranger/ Then we must begin all over again from another starting point and travel by another road.

Socrates Younger/ What kind of road must this be?

Stranger/ We have to bring in some pleasant stories to relieve the strain. There is a mass of ancient legend a large part of which we must now use for our purposes; after that we must go on as before, dividing always and choosing one part only, until we arrive at the summit of our climb and the object of our journey. Shall we begin?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, certainly.

Stranger/ Come then, listen closely to my story as a child would. After all, you are not so very many years too old for stories.

Socrates Younger/ Do continue, please.

Stranger/ These old stories have been told before and will be told again. Among them is the one about the portent that settled the famous quarrel between Atreus and Thyestes. I expect you have heard the story and remember the details of it as they are described to us.

Socrates Younger/ You refer, I suppose, to the strange sign of the golden lamb.

Stranger/ Oh no, not to that, but to the alteration in rising and setting of the sun and the other planets. The story tells us that on this famous occasion these all set where they now rise and rose where they now set. Afterward, however, when he had testified by this miracle to the justice of Atreus's claims, Zeus restored all these heavenly bodies to their present system of motion.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that comes into the story too.

Stranger/ Then again, we have heard of the reign of Cronus from many storytellers.

Socrates Younger/ From most of them, I should say.

Stranger/ Yes, and what else? Are we not told that men of that former age were earthborn and not born of human parents?

Socrates Younger/ That is also one of the old stories.

Stranger/ All these stories originate from the same event in cosmic history, and so do hosts of others yet more marvelous than these. However, as this great event took place so long ago, some of them have faded from man's memory; others survive but they have become scattered and have come to be told in a way which obscures their real connection with one another. No one has related the great event of history which gives the setting of all of them; it is this event which we must now recount. Once it has been related, its relevance to our present demonstration of the nature of a king will become apparent.

Socrates Younger/ Excellent, sir. Please go on, and leave nothing unsaid.

Stranger/ Listen then, and you shall hear. There is an era in which God himself assists the universe on its way and guides it by imparting its rotation to it. There is also an era in which he releases his control. He does this when its circuits under his guidance have completed the due limit of the time thereto appointed. Thereafter it begins to revolve in the contrary sense under its own impulse—for it is a living creature and has been endowed with reason by him who framed it in the beginning. Now this capacity for rotation in reverse is of necessity native to it for a reason I must tell.

Socrates Younger/ Of what nature is it?

Stranger/ Ever to be the same, steadfast and abiding, is the prerogative of the divinest of things only. The nature of the bodily does not entitle it to this rank. Now the heaven, or the universe as we have chosen to call it, has received many blessed gifts from him who brought it into being, but it has also been made to partake of bodily form. Hence it is impossible that it should abide forever free from change, and yet, as far as may be, its movement is uniform, invariable, and in one place. Thus it is that it has received from God a rotation in reverse—the least possible variation of its proper motion. To revolve ever in the same sense belongs to none but the lord and leader of all things that move, and even he cannot move the universe now in the one sense now in the other—for this would flout eternal decrees. For all these reasons there are many doctrines we are forbidden to affirm concerning this universe. We must not say that it moves itself, perpetually revolving in one and the same sense. We may not say that it is God who turns it in its entirety throughout all time in two opposed alternating revolutions. We may not say that a pair of divinities make it revolve alternately in these opposed senses because the mind of the

one god is contrary to the mind of the other. We must therefore affirm the doctrine stated above, which is the one remaining possibility. In the one era it is assisted on its way by the transcendent divine cause, receiving a renewal of life from its creator, an immortality of his contriving. In the other era, when it has been released, it moves by its innate force and it has stored up so much momentum at the time of its release that it can revolve in the reverse sense for thousands of revolutions, because its size is so great, its balance so perfect, and the pivot on which it turns so very small.

Socrates Younger/ Your whole account seems to me very consistent and very probable.

Stranger/ Let us think about this together. Let us study this great cosmic fact underlying all these miraculous stories in the light of what we have just said. It is this great fact that I have been speaking about.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ The fact that the revolution of the heaven is sometimes in its present sense, sometimes in the reverse sense.

Socrates Younger/ How would you state its significance?

Stranger/ This change of motion we must regard as the most important and the most complete of all ‘turnings-back' occurring in the celestial orbits.

Socrates Younger/ It would seem so.

Stranger/ We must believe then, that at the time such changes take place in the universe we human beings living within that universe have to undergo the most drastic changes also.

Socrates Younger/ That is to be expected.

Stranger/ Do we not know from experience that when great changes of any kind come upon them at once, all living beings feel the strain intensely and can hardly stand it?

Socrates Younger/ We do indeed.

Stranger/ So it must needs be that in the cosmic crisis there is widespread destruction of living creatures other than man and that only a remnant of the human race survives. Many strange new experiences befall this remnant, but there is one of deeper import than all. It follows on God's first taking over the rewinding of the universe, at the moment when the revolution counter to the one now prevalent begins to operate.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ First of all, every living creature, whatever the stage of life it had attained, ceased to grow any older. All mortal beings halted on their way to bent and hoary age, and each began to grow backward, as it were, toward youth and ever greater immaturity. The white hairs of the older men began to grow dark again; the cheeks of bearded men grew smooth once more and restored to each the long-lost bloom of his youth. The bodies of the young men lost the signs of manhood and, growing smaller every day and every night, they returned again to the condition of newborn children, being made like to them in mind as well as in body. Next they faded into nonexistence and one by one they were gone. Moreover the bodies of those who died by violence in that time of crisis exhibited these same changes—and did so with such rapidity that in their case disappearance took place within a few days.

Socrates Younger/ But how did living creatures come into being in that era, sir? How did they produce their offspring?

Stranger/ Clearly, Socrates, it was no part of man's natural endowment in that era to beget children by

intercourse. Our legends tell us that once upon a time there was an earthborn race. Now it was this race which at that moment of crisis began to return to life out of the earth. The memory of it has lived on, for it was handed down to us by the earliest of our forebears. These earliest forebears were the children of earthborn parents; they lived in the period directly following the end of the era of the earthborn, at the close of the former period of cosmic rotation and the beginning of the present one. These ancestors of ours passed on to us these stories of the earthborn, and it is an unsound judgment to disbelieve them as so many do nowadays. For I think that we must consider what follows in the cosmic story. It is only to be expected that along with the reversal of the old men's course of life and their return to childhood, a new race of men should arise too—a new race formed from men dead and long laid in earth but now formed in her womb anew and thence returning to life once more. Such resurrection of the dead was in keeping with the cosmic change, all creation being now turned in the reverse direction. This race was, as it needs must be, 'born from the earth'; hence comes the name and hence the legend. Birth out of the ground was the law for all of them, save for some few whom God translated to another destiny.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, this is fully in keeping with what went before, but tell me about the life of man in the reign of Cronus of which you speak. Did this life obtain in the former world era or in this one? For clearly a change of direction of sun and planets occurs at both points in history at which the universe changes its sense of rotation.

Stranger/ You have followed the story closely. As for your inquiry concerning the age when all good things come without man's a labor, the answer is that this also most certainly belongs to the former era, not to the present one. In that era God was supreme governor in charge of the actual

rotation of the universe as a whole, but divine also, and in like manner was the government of its several regions, for these were all portioned out to be provinces under the surveillance of tutelary deities. Over every herd of living creatures throughout all their tribes was set a heavenly daemon to be its shepherd. Each of them was all in all to his flock—providing for the needs of all his charges. So it befell that savagery was nowhere to be found nor preying of creature on creature, nor did war rage nor any strife whatsoever. There were numberless consequences of this divine ordering of the world, but we must leave them all aside save those concerning man, for we must go on to explain the origin of our traditions concerning man's life in that paradise. A god was their shepherd and had charge of them and fed them even as men now have charge of the other creatures inferior to them—for men are closer to the divine than they. When God was shepherd there were no political constitutions and no taking of wives and begetting of children. For all men rose up anew into life out of the earth, having no memory of the former things. Instead they had fruits without stint from trees and bushes; these needed no cultivation but sprang up of themselves out of the ground without man's toil. For the most part they disported themselves in the open needing neither clothing nor couch, for the seasons were blended evenly so as to work them no hurt, and the grass which sprang up out of the earth in abundance made a soft bed for them. This is the story, Socrates, of the life of men under the government of Cronus. Our present life—said to be under the government of Zeus—you are alive to experience for yourself. But which of these two makes for greater happiness do you think? Can you give a verdict? And will you do so?

Socrates Younger/ No, I cannot decide.

Stranger/ Do you want me to make a tentative decision for you?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, please do.

Stranger/ The crucial question is—did the nurslings of Cronus make a right use of their time? They had abundance of leisure and were at an advantage in being able to converse with the animals as well as with one another. Did they use all these advantages to promote philosophical inquiry? As they associated with one another and with the animals, did they seek to learn from each several tribe of creatures whether its special faculties enabled it to apprehend some distinctive truth not available to the rest which it could bring as its contribution to swell the common treasure store of wisdom? If they really did all this, it is easy to decide that the happiness of the men of that era was a thousand fold greater than ours. But if, when they had taken their fill of eating and of drinking, the discussions they had with each other and with the animals were of the kind that the surviving stories make them out to have been, then, according to my judgment at any rate, it is equally clear what our verdict must be. But be that as it may, let us leave this question aside till we find someone who can inform us accurately whether or not their hearts were set on gaining knowledge and on the true commerce of minds. But this much must be stated here, so that we may be free to proceed to the rest of the story, for it was precisely to see the age of Cronus in its true setting that we brought the whole story to life again.

For when this whole order of things had come to its destined end, there must needs be universal change once more. For the earthborn seed had by now become quite exhausted—each soul had run through its appointed number of births and had returned as seed to the earth as many times as had been ordained for it. And now the pilot

of the ship of the universe—for so we may speak of it—let go the handle of its rudder and retired to his conning tower in a place apart. Then destiny and its own inborn urge took control of the world again and reversed the revolution of it. Then the gods of the provinces, who had ruled under the greatest god, knew at once what was happening and relinquished the oversight of their regions. A shudder passed through the world at the reversing of its rotation, checked as it was between the old control and the new impulse which had turned end into beginning for it and beginning into end. This shock set up a great quaking which caused—in this crisis of the world just as in the former one—destruction of living creatures of all kinds. Then, after the interval needed for its recovery, it gained relief at last from its clamors and confusion, and attaining quiet after great upheaval it returned to its ordered course and continued in it, having control and government of itself and of all within it and remembering, so far as it was able, the instruction it had received from God, its maker and its father. At first it remembered his instructions more clearly, but as time went on its recollection grew dim. The bodily element in its constitution was responsible for its failure. This bodily factor belonged to it in its most primeval condition, for before it came into its present order as a universe it was an utter chaos of disorder. It is from God's act when he set it in its order that it has received all the virtues it possesses, while it is from its primal chaotic condition that all the wrongs and evils arise in it—evils which it engenders in turn in the living creatures within it. When it is guided by the divine pilot, it produces much good and but little evil in the creatures it raises and sustains. When it must travel on without God, things go well enough in the years immediately after he abandons control, but as time goes on and forgetfulness of God arises in it, the ancient condition of chaos also begins

to assert its sway. At last, as this cosmic era draws to its close, this disorder comes to a head. The few good things it produces it corrupts with so gross a taint of evil that it hovers on the very brink of destruction, both of itself and of the creatures in it.

The God looks upon it again, he who first set it in order. Beholding it in its troubles, and anxious for it lest it sink racked by storms and confusion, and be dissolved again in the bottomless abyss of unlikeness, he takes control of the helm once more. Its former sickness he heals; what was disrupted in its former revolution under its own impulse he brings back into the way of regularity, and, so ordering and correcting it, he achieves for it its agelessness and deathlessness.

This is the full tale told, but to meet our need—the delineation of the king—it is enough if we take up the earlier part of our tale. When the most recent cosmic crisis occurred and the cosmic order now existing was established, the course of man's life stood still once more and then began to manifest changes in the opposite sense to the changes accompanying the other cosmic crisis. Creatures which were well-nigh disappearance because of their smallness began to grow again; those who were just born from the earth, stalwart in their prime of life, now grew snowy-haired and then died and returned to the earth again. Following the change in the universe, all other things had to change, and, in particular, a new law governing conception, birth, and nurture was made binding on the whole universe—and therefore on all the creatures, for they must needs imitate its ways. For it was no longer possible for creatures to be brought to birth in the earth by the formative action of external agents. It has now been ordained that the universe must take sole responsibility and control of its course. And so by a like ruling, the same impulse bade its constituent

elements achieve by their own power, so far as they might, conception, procreation, and rearing of young. We have now come to the point which the whole of this story of ours has been seeking to reach. It would take long to tell of all the changes that befell the various creatures and show whence these arose and how they were effected, but man's story is shorter and more relevant for us now. Bereft of the guardian care of the daemon who had governed and reared us up, we had become weak and helpless, and we began to be ravaged by wild beasts—for the many evil-natured beasts had by now turned savage. Men lacked all tools and all crafts in the early years. The earth no longer supplied their food spontaneously and they did not yet know how to win it for themselves; in the absence of necessity they had never been made to learn this. For all these reasons they were in direst straits. It was to meet this need that the gifts of the gods famous in ancient story were given, along with such teaching and instruction as was indispensable. Fire was the gift of Prometheus, the secrets of the crafts were made known by Hephaestus and his partner in craftsmanship, and seeds and plants were made known by other gods. From these gifts everything has come which has furnished human life since the divine guardianship of men ceased—in the way our story has just described—and men had to manage their lives and fend for themselves in the same way as the whole universe was forced to do. Thus likened to the universe and following its destiny through all time, our life and our begetting are now on this wise now on that.

Here let our work of storytelling come to its end, but now we must use the story to discern the extent of the mistake we made in our earlier argument in our delineation of the king or statesman.

Socrates Younger/ How did we go wrong then? Do you think that we are seriously off the track?

Stranger/ One mistake was not so serious, but the other was a mistake on the grand scale. It is graver and more far-reaching than I thought it was.

Socrates Younger/ In what way?

Stranger/ We were asked to define the king and statesman of this present era, and of humanity as we know it, but in fact we took from the contrary cosmic era the shepherd of the human flock as it then was, and described him as the statesman. He is a god, not a mortal. We went as far astray as that. Furthermore, we showed him as ruler of all the life of the state but did not specify the manner of his rule. Here too, what was said was true, but it cannot be regarded as the whole truth or as a clear and sufficient description. We have gone wrong in this also, though not as badly wrong as on the other issue.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Obviously then we must try to define the way in which the statesman controls the state. We can be reasonably confident that in doing this we shall achieve the complete definition of the statesman.

Socrates Younger/ Very good.

Stranger/ But our aim when we actually introduced the story was to show two things at once concerning the ‘nurture of the herd.' We were anxious to show the host of rivals with whose claims to be ‘nurturers of the herd' the statesman whom we now seek has to compete, but we were still more anxious to follow out our analogy and to see the statesman himself in a clearer light as being alone entitled to be called ‘shepherd of the people,' feeding humankind in the way shepherds feed their sheep and cowherds their cattle.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ It appears to me now, Socrates, that the divine shepherd is so exalted a figure that no king can be said to

attain to his eminence. Those who rule these states of ours in this present era are like their subjects, far closer to them in training and in nurture than ever shepherd could be to flock.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that is certainly so.

Stranger/ But whether they are human or superhuman creatures, we are still as committed as we were—neither more so nor less—to the task of seeking to reveal their true nature.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ We must go back again for reconsideration of one of our divisions. We said that there is a 'predirective' art concerned with living creatures, and with these in herds rather than as individuals. Without further division, we described this as 'the science of the *rearing* of herds.' You recall this, do you not?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, I do.

Stranger/ It was at a point in our tracking down of this art that we began to lose the scent. We did not catch the statesman at all in this definition or name him properly. He eluded us without our knowing it while we were intent on the process of naming.

Socrates Younger/ How did he do it?

Stranger/ There is no other herdsman who is not charged with the bodily nurture of his herd. This characteristic is absent in the statesman and yet we called him a herdsman. We should have used a wider name, covering all guardians, whether nurturers or not.

Socrates Younger/ You are right if there is in fact such a name.

Stranger/ Surely 'concern' is available as such a class name; it implies no specific limitation to bodily nurture or to

any other specific activity. If we had named the art ‘concern for herds,' ‘attention to herds,' or ‘charge of herds'—all of them terms which cover all species—we could have included the statesman with the rest, for the run of the argument was indicating to us that we ought to do this.

Socrates Younger/ True, but how would the subsequent division have proceeded?

Stranger/ On the same lines as before. We divided ‘nurture of herds' into nurture of land animals, wingless, non-interbreeding, and hornless. We could have divided ‘care of herds' in the same way and our definition would then have included both the shepherd king of the reign of Cronus and the ruler of our present era.

Socrates Younger/ That seems clear, but I still want to know what follows.

Stranger/ It is clear that if we had used this correct term ‘concern for herds' we should not have had to face the unreasonable objection that some make, that ruling is in *no* sense an art of tendance, as well as the other reasonable objection we met that there is no specific art of nurture of *human beings* and that if there were, there would be many more directly involved in its exercise than any ruler is.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ But if it is a question of an art of ‘responsible charge' of a whole community, what art has a better or prior claim than statesmanship to fulfill this function? What other art can claim to be the art of bearing sovereign rule, the art which bears sovereign rule over all men?

Socrates Younger/ None can.

Stranger/ Yes, Socrates, but do we realize that we fell into another considerable error at the very end of our definition?

Socrates Younger/ What was that?

Stranger/ However clearly we had determined in our minds that there exists an art of nurture of two-footed herds, we were not entitled without further examination to name this art kingship or statesmanship, thereby implying that a full definition of it had been obtained.

Socrates Younger/ What should we have done then?

Stranger/ First of all, as we have just been saying, the class name has to be modified from ‘nurture' to ‘concern.' Secondly, this ‘concern' must be subdivided, for several further divisions are possible.

Socrates Younger/ Which are they?

Stranger/ By one division we should have set apart the divine shepherd and the human tender of men.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ By another division we should have divided into two the art assigned to this human tender of men.

Socrates Younger/ By what division?

Stranger/ By distinguishing enforced tendance from tendance voluntarily accepted.

Socrates Younger/ Surely.

Stranger/ I think we really went wrong at this point in our earlier definitions; we made a confusion—a needlessly stupid one—of the king and the tyrant, and these are entirely different people, differing in the manner of their rule.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, they are.

Stranger/ Then let us be right this time, and, as I said, let us divide the art of concern for men into two—enforced tendance and tendance accepted voluntarily.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Tendance of human herds by violent control is the tyrant's art; tendance freely accepted by herds of free

bipeds we call statesmanship. Shall we now declare that he who possesses this latter art and practices this tendance is the true king and the true statesman?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, and I should think, sir, that at this point we have really completed our definition of the statesman.

Stranger/ That would be excellent, Socrates, but it is not enough for you to think so; I must think so too. Now as a matter of fact I think that the likeness of the statesman has not been perfectly drawn yet. Sculptors sometimes rush at their work in ill-timed enthusiasm and then elaborate the details of the work to such an extent that they have to bring in extra material to complete it and this in the end slows down their progress. Something like this happened earlier in our discussion, when we wanted to make it immediately clear where we were mistaken and to give a really impressive demonstration of the point. Supposing that where a king was concerned only large-scale illustrations could be suitable, we reared our massive myth and then had to use more myth material than the occasion warranted; thus our demonstration became too long and we did not give the myth a complete form after all. Our definition, too, seems to me like a portrait which is as yet an outline sketch and does not represent the original clearly because it has still to be painted in colors properly balanced with one another. Remember, however, that a definition couched in words is a better description of a living creature than a drawing or any model of it can be—a better description, I mean, for those capable of following such a definition; for those who cannot do so the model or visible illustration is appropriate enough.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that is true, but pray make clear where you still find our description of the statesman inadequate.

Stranger/ It is difficult, my dear Socrates, to demonstrate anything of real importance without the use of examples. Every one of us is like a man who sees things in a dream and thinks that he knows them perfectly and then wakes up, as it were, to find that he knows nothing.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean by this?

Stranger/ I have made a real fool of myself by choosing this moment to discuss our strange human plight where the winning of knowledge is concerned.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Example, my good friend, has been found to require an example.

Socrates Younger/ What is this? Say on and do not hesitate for my sake.

Stranger/ I will—in fact, I must, since you are so ready to follow. When young children have only just learned their letters—

Socrates Younger/ What is this?

Stranger/ We know that they distinguish particular letters only in the shortest and simplest syllables; in these, however, they do distinguish them and can tell you correctly what each of them is.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But if they see the same letters combined into other syllables, they fall into doubt once more, and judge them incorrectly by making wrong identifications.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ What then is the easiest and best method of leading them to the knowledge they have not yet reached? I think I know it.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ Take them to the syllables in which they have identified the letters correctly; then set them in front of the syllables they cannot decipher; then place known syllables and unknown syllables side by side and point out to them the similar nature of the letters occurring in both. In the end, by this method when the rightly identified letters have been shown to them and set alongside all the unknown letters—and by being shown thus the known letters have been used as *examples*—the teacher will achieve his aim, which is to have each letter rightly recognized and named in every syllable, for then the pupil will have identified each letter with itself and distinguished it from all the others.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ Have we not gathered enough information now to show how the method of example proceeds? It operates, does it not, when a factor identical with a factor in a less-known object is rightly believed to exist in some other bettor-known object in quite another sphere of life? This common factor in each object, when it has been made the basis of a parallel examination of them both, makes it possible for us to achieve a single true judgment about each of them as forming one of a pair.

Socrates Younger/ That appears to be how it works.

Stranger/ Would we be surprised, then, to find our own mind reacting in the same way to the letters with which the universe is spelled out? Truth sometimes guides the mind to a comprehension of every member of some groups of things and yet the same mind a moment later is hopelessly adrift in its attempt to cope with the members that make up another group. Somehow or other it makes a right judgment of a particular combination of elements but when it sees the same elements transferred to the long and very difficult

syllables of everyday existence, it fails to recognize again the very elements it discerned a moment before.

Socrates Younger/ One cannot wonder at it.

Stranger/ It is impossible, is it not, to achieve real understanding in an approach to any part of the total area of true reality, however small, if one begins from a false opinion?

Socrates Younger/ I should say that it is quite impossible.

Stranger/ Well then, if this is the true state of the case, you and I could claim to be sound in our former method and in what we plan to do now. We have tried to discover the nature of example in general by studying a small and particular example of example. What we intend now is to discover scientifically by means of the method of example the nature of 'tendance' as applied to the whole community, and we intend to do it by taking from lesser realms the quality identical with the kingly quality and to use its lesser manifestation there in order to discern its supreme manifestation in him.

Socrates Younger/ We will hope so.

Stranger/ So we must take up once again an earlier stage of our discussion. For seeing that there prove to be any number of competitors to dispute with the kingly class the duties of the tendance of states, we must surely set aside all competitors and leave only the king in possession. It was to help us to this end that we decided that we needed to employ an example.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Well then, what example is there on a really small scale which we can take and set beside kingship, and which, because it comprises an activity common to it and to kingship can be of real help to us in finding what we are looking for? By heaven, Socrates, I believe I know one. Do

you agree that, if there is no other example ready to hand, it would be quite in order for us to select the art of weaving for the purpose. Would you be prepared for us to choose out weaving—if there is nothing else obviously suitable? Moreover, if you agree, we will not take the whole of weaving, for I think that a part of it, the art of weaving woolens, will prove adequate for us. I suspect that just this section of the weaver's art, if it were chosen as our example, would give the evidence we require concerning the statesman.

Socrates Younger/ It might well prove to be so.

Stranger/ No dallying, then! Why should we not divide weaving now just as we divided the other classes of things, dividing it into its true parts? We must run through each stage as briefly and quickly as we can so as to come back to what is relevant to our present discussion.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ I can best explain by making the actual division for you.

Socrates Younger/ Excellent!

Stranger/ All we make and all we get has one of two aims—the aim of doing something, or the aim of preventing something being done. Preventives may be divided into (*a*) charms, divine or human, against evils and (*b*) protections—protections into (*a*) warlike armaments or defense works and (*b*) other means of fending off—nonmilitary means of fending off into (*a*) screens and (*b*) protections from storm and heat—protections from storm and heat into (*a*) housing and (*b*) shields for the person—shields for the person into (*a*) blankets spread below and (*b*) garments spread around. Garments that we put around us are of one piece or compounded of several. Those compounded of several are either stitched or combined by a method other than stitching; of the unstitched some are made of vegetable

fibers, others are made of hair; of those made of hair, some are felted by water and earth, others are combined by their inherent substance. To these manufactured means of warding off which are coverings of the person and compacted in their own substance we give the name ‘clothes.' The art specifically concerned with producing clothes we will describe from the name of its product as the ‘clothes-working' art, just as we called the art of controlling a state statesmanship. We may also say that the art of weaving—or at any rate that very large section of it concerned with the production of clothes—is distinct in nothing but name from this ‘art of clothes-working,' just as in the other case we regarded the arts of kingship and statesmanship as synonymous.

Socrates Younger/ Quite right.

Stranger/ Let us observe now that it might be supposed at this point that the definition of the art of weaving clothes, as drawn up in these terms, had been complete and sufficient. But if one supposed this, one would have failed to see that the art has not yet been distinguished from arts exercising a closely similar function to it, and that in spite of this many other arts which are akin to it have been severed from it.

Socrates Younger/ What are these kindred arts of which you are thinking?

Stranger/ Evidently you are not following what has been said. We must go back then, and begin from the other end, for if you really can apprehend affinities between arts you will find that some kindred arts are detached from weaving in our recent division. For instance, in the division of what is put under from what is put around we divided off the art of blanket-making from the art of clothes-making.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, I see.

Stranger/ Furthermore, we disjoined from weaving all fabrication of flax, of Spanish broom, and of all the natural products we termed vegetable fibers. We also disjoined from it felting and the art of fashioning by piercing and sewing—the art of which the shoemaker is the chief practitioner.

Socrates Younger/ We did.

Stranger/ Then in excluding the art of making garments of one piece we excluded the art of the skinner. Among arts of protective housing we excluded the art of stemming inroads of water along with house-building, erection in wood, and similar arts. We also excluded all the arts of fencing off, but these include the arts of providing means of preventing theft and other violence, arts connected with making lids and door fastenings normally assigned as sections of the arts of joinery. We also cut off the whole art of armor-making, which is an extensive and extremely various section of the art of producing defenses. Finally we separated off, right at the beginning of our definition, the magician's art and that of making spells to ward off evil. The remainder when all these had been excluded was, we might fairly suppose, the art we had been seeking—the art concerned with producing works of woolen protection designed to ward off violences of climate, called by the name 'weaving.'

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that seems to be accurate.

Stranger/ But we have not yet achieved a complete description of the matter under discussion. For it is evident that the man responsible for the first stage in the production of clothes does just the opposite of weaving.

Socrates Younger/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ The process of weaving is, I take it, a form of plaiting together?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But the art I spoke of is an art of dissociating strands from a mass of material in which they are found close and matted.

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ The work done by the art of carding. Dare we call carding weaving, or speak of the carder as a weaver?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly not.

Stranger/ Now consider the art which produces warp and woof. If one calls that art 'weaving' it sounds odd, but it is more than that—it is false in fact.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Furthermore, consider the art of the fuller in all its forms, and that of darning. Are we going to deny that these are, in a sense, arts of tendance or care of clothes? But if we admit that they are such, does it follow that we shall call them all arts of weaving?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ And yet, the claim to preside over the care and the production of clothes is a claim which all of these arts dispute with the weavers' mystery. They are ready to concede to weaving a very considerable part of the whole province of clothes-working, but at the same time they demand the assignment of no small part of it to themselves.

Socrates Younger/ That is very true.

Stranger/ Then in addition to these arts we have to consider the arts which produce the instruments by which the weaving process is carried out. We must suppose that all have their claim to be at least contributory to the making of every piece of fabric actually woven.

Socrates Younger/ That is so.

Stranger/ Do we still suppose that weaving—or rather our selected portion of it—will have been adequately defined if

we declare it to be ‘the highest and most dignified of all the arts concerned with woolen clothing'? Would not this definition, though true as far as it goes, lack clearness and finality until we have dissociated all these other arts from weaving?

Socrates Younger/ It would.

Stranger/ Then our next duty is to make this separation, so that our definition may proceed by the right stages.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ To begin with, let us observe that two groups of arts are involved in active operations of all kinds.

Socrates Younger/ What are they?

Stranger/ One class contributory to the production, the other actually producing.

Socrates Younger/ In what way?

Stranger/ I mean by ‘contributory' arts those which do not fashion the product itself but prepare the tools for the arts which actually produce it—they are arts without whose previous assistance the specific task of the productive arts could never be performed. The arts which fashion the product itself are the ‘productive' arts, strictly speaking.

Socrates Younger/ That is at any rate a reasonable distinction.

Stranger/ Then may we take the further step of distinguishing arts which manufacture spindles, shuttles, and all the other instruments of clothes manufacture as ‘contributory arts' from the directly ‘productive' arts which actually treat and produce the clothes?

Socrates Younger/ We certainly may.

Stranger/ Among these ‘productive' arts those of washing, darning, and general servicing of clothes—the relevant section of the very extensive art of adornment—may fairly be

grouped together and we may call the whole group ‘the art of the fuller.'

Socrates Younger/ We may.

Stranger/ Carding and spinning and all the other special processes involved in the manufacture of woolen garments together form part of the art of wool manufacture. This time we have an art with a name familiar to everyone.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Wool-working has two principal sections; each of them is comprised of arts which are parts of a pair of arts.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Carding, half the operation of the shuttle and all the processes which pull strands of close material apart—let us class these together as one art and this art is manifestly part of wool-working. But we must remember too the pair of arts we found to be of universal scope, the art of combining and that of separating.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Well, carding and the other arts just mentioned come under separation. Thus it is *separation* of the raw wool and *separation* of the strands of warp—the former being done by hand, the latter by the shuttle—which have been given their respective names which we used a moment ago.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ Now let us consider in turn the art of combination and look for the part of it which coincides with part of the art of wool-working. We must now omit all sections of wool-working which come under separation. Then we shall have divided wool-working by distinguishing the part which combines and the part which separates.

Socrates Younger/ Let us assume this division.

Stranger/ Then, Socrates, you will find that we have to subdivide the part of wool-working which combines, if we are to run our quarry to earth by finding the art of weaving which we made our objective.

Socrates Younger/ Then we must divide again.

Stranger/ We must. To name the divisions let us call one section of the art ‘twisting' and the other ‘plaiting.'

Socrates Younger/ Do I understand you? I take you to mean by ‘twisting' the art concerned with producing the threads of warp.

Stranger/ Yes, but not of the warp only—of the woof too. You surely do not imagine that we shall find it produced by some process other than twisting?

Socrates Younger/ No.

Stranger/ Now divide each of these two arts, for you may well find this division significant.

Socrates Younger/ At what point must I divide?

Stranger/ I will tell you. The finished product of the carding processes, when it has achieved certain recognized dimensions, we describe as a ‘flock' of wool.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ The thread twisted out of this by the spindle to form a firm yarn you will, no doubt, describe as ‘warp' and the art directing its production as warp spinning.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But there are other threads from the flock which are only loosely twisted so as to be soft enough for intertwining with the warp but strong enough to stand up to the dressing process after being intertwined with it. These threads we call ‘woof' and the art superintending their manufacture woof spinning.

Socrates Younger/ Quite so.

Stranger/ Well then, the section of the art of weaving which we selected is now clearly defined for all to see. When the section of the art of combination which is also a section of the art of wool-working produces a fabric by the due intertwining of warp and woof, we call the finished fabric a woolen garment and the art superintending its production the art of weaving.

Socrates Younger/ That is perfectly correct.

Stranger/ Good. But why did we not distinguish weaving straightaway as the art of intertwining warp and woof? Why did we set about it in this roundabout fashion defining so pointlessly a host of arts we met on the way?

Socrates Younger/ Oh no, sir! So far as I can see, there was nothing pointless in the whole course of our argument.

Stranger/ I am not surprised that you think so now, but someday you may think differently. I want to administer a prophylactic against this malady of doubt, should it one day come upon you as indeed from time to time it well may. There would be nothing surprising in its doing so! Listen, then, to a prophylactic argument applicable to all troublesome questions of this kind.

Socrates Younger/ Pray explain it, sir.

Stranger/ First let us examine excess and deficiency in general. In this way we shall obtain a standard of length applicable to what is said on any occasion in this kind of discussion—a standard by which we can accord praise to what is said or censure it, either as excessive or as deficient.

Socrates Younger/ Let us make the examination then.

Stranger/ We can only discuss the matter effectively by considering these qualities in their real nature.

Socrates Younger/ Which qualities?

Stranger/ Length and brevity, and excess and defect in general. We are agreed, I presume, that the art of measurement is involved in all these.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Let us divide it into two then. We must do so to get to the conclusion we are eager to reach.

Socrates Younger/ Please tell us where the division comes.

Stranger/ I will. We divide the art of measurement into a section concerned with the relative greatness or smallness of objects and another section concerned with their size in relation to the fixed norm to which they must approximate if they are to exist at all.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ Do you not agree that in the nature of things ‘the greater' can be so called only in relation to the less and to nothing else, and, conversely, that ‘the less' can only be ‘less' than a greater? It cannot be ‘less' than anything else.

Socrates Younger/ It cannot. I quite agree.

Stranger/ On the other hand, will we not also be ready to assert that we do in fact hear words spoken and see acts done which at one time exceed the essentially right measure and at another time fall short of it? Is it not just this matter of attaining the due measure which marks off good men from bad in human society?

Socrates Younger/ It is evident.

Stranger/ Then we must posit two types and two standards of greatness and smallness. We must not assert as we did just now that the only standard possible is that of relative comparison. We have just seen how we must amend the statement. The standard of relative comparison will remain, but we must acknowledge a second standard, which

is a standard of comparison with the due measure. Do we want to know why this must be admitted?

Socrates Younger/ Why is it needed?

Stranger/ If a man refuses to admit the possibility of a 'greater' except in relation to a 'lesser' he will rule out all possibility of relating it to a due measure, will he not?

Socrates Younger/ He will.

Stranger/ Are we really prepared for the consequences of this refusal? Are we going to abolish the arts and all their products? In particular, shall we deprive statecraft, which we are trying to define, and weaving, which we have just defined, of their very existence? For it seems clear to me that all such arts guard against exceeding the due measure or falling short of it. Certainly they do not treat such excess or defect as meaningless—on the contrary, they shun it as a very real peril. In fact it is precisely by this effort they make to maintain the due measure that they achieve effectiveness and beauty in all that they produce.

Socrates Younger/ That is very true.

Stranger/ But you must admit that if we dismiss statecraft as unreal, we shall have blocked all means of approach to any subsequent study of the science of kingly rule.

Socrates Younger/ Obviously.

Stranger/ Must we not do now what we had to do when discussing the Sophist? We had to insist then on the admission of an additional postulate, that 'what is "not *x*" nevertheless exists.' We had to introduce this postulate because the only alternative to asserting it which our argument left us was to allow the Sophist to escape definition altogether. In our present discussion too there is an additional postulate on which we must insist, and it is this. 'Excess and deficiency are measurable not only in

relative terms but also in respect of attainment of a norm or due measure.' For if we cannot first gain assent to this postulate, we are bound to fail if we advance the claim that a man possesses statecraft, or indeed that a man possesses any other of the special forms of knowledge that function in human society.

Socrates Younger/ In that case we must certainly follow the precedent and admit the additional postulate in our present discussion too.

Stranger/ Our present task is greater than the previous one, Socrates, and we can hardly have forgotten what a very long time that took us. However, while discussing these problems, there is one thing to be said at the outset that it is perfectly right and proper to say here.

Socrates Younger/ What is this?

Stranger/ That when one day we come to give a full exposition of true accuracy in dialectic method, we shall find the need of this postulate concerning the due measure which we have just enunciated. However, the statement in the form that we have made it and with the demonstration—adequate for present purposes—which we have given of it, is a very great help to us, or so it seems to me. For it shows that two propositions stand or fall together. The first is that the arts exist; the second is that excess and deficiency are measurable not only relatively but in terms of the realization of a norm or due measure. Thus if measure in this second sense exists, so do the arts, and, conversely, if there are arts, then there is this second kind of measurement. To deny either is to deny both.

Socrates Younger/ So much is fully established, but what follows?

Stranger/ Clearly we should divide the art of measurement into two on the principle enunciated by

dividing it at this point. One section will comprise all arts of measuring number, length, depth, breadth, or velocity of objects by relative standards. The other section comprises arts concerned with due occasion, due time, due performance, and all such standards as have removed their abode from the extremes and are now settled about the mean.

Socrates Younger/ Each of the subdivisions you have named is very extensive, and the one differs vastly from the other.

Stranger/ Does not the statement we have just made turn out to be precisely what many of our 'erudite' friends say from time to time—and say with the air of men uttering a profound truth? We are saying like them that measurement is involved in all that is brought into being. For all activities directed by arts involve measurement in some form or other. But our friends, for all their erudition, have not been trained to study things by dividing them into real classes. As a result here we find them confusing these two types of measurement, which are in fact so different, just because they have judged them to be of like nature. There are other classes of things about which they commit the opposite error; they distinguish them but fail to distinguish according to the real distinctions. Now the following would be the right method. Whenever it is the essential *affinity* between a given group of forms which the philosopher perceives on first inspection, he ought not to forsake his task until he sees clearly as many true differences as exist within the whole complex unity—the differences which exist in reality and constitute the several species. Conversely, when he begins by contemplating all the *unlikenesses* of one kind or another which are to be found in various groups of forms, the true philosopher must not pull a wry face and give up in disgust, until he has gathered together all the forms which are in fact

cognate and has penned them safely in their common fold by comprehending them all in their real general group. But let this suffice on these topics and on excess and deficiency in general. Let us, however, be careful to maintain the ground we have won. We have discovered beyond dispute two distinct forms of the art of measurement concerned with excess and deficiency and we must remember what we have declared them to be.

Socrates Younger/ We shall not forget.

Stranger/ So much for that theme. Now let us prepare to entertain another which has to do not only with our present inquiry but with all discussions of this kind as well.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ Suppose someone asked us this question about our class of elementary schoolchildren learning to read. 'When a child is asked what letters spell a word—it can be any word you please—are we to regard this exercise as undertaken to discover the correct spelling of the particular word the teacher set or as designed rather to make the child better able to deal with all words he may be asked to spell?'

Socrates Younger/ Surely we reply that the purpose is to teach him to read them all.

Stranger/ How then does this principle apply to our present search for the statesman? Why did we set ourselves the problem? Is our chief purpose to find the statesman, or have we the larger aim of becoming better philosophers, more able to tackle all questions?

Socrates Younger/ Here, too, the answer is clear; we aim to be able to solve all problems.

Stranger/ Exactly, for I cannot think that any reasonable person would want to trace down the definition of the art of weaving just for its own sake. But there is a paradox here which, it seems to me, most thinkers have failed to notice.

Likenesses which the senses can grasp are available in nature to those real existents which are in themselves easy to understand, so that when someone asks for an account of these existents one has no trouble at all—one can simply indicate the sensible likeness and dispense with any account in words. But to the highest and most important class of existents there are no corresponding visible resemblances, no work of nature clear for all to look upon. In these cases nothing visible can be pointed out to satisfy the inquiring mind; the instructor cannot cause the inquirer to perceive something with one or other of his senses and so make him really satisfied that he understands the thing under discussion. Therefore we must train ourselves to give and to understand a *rational* account of every existent thing. For the existents which have no visible embodiment, the existents which are of highest value and chief importance, are demonstrable only by reason and are not to be apprehended by any other means. All our present discussions have the aim of training us to apprehend this highest class of existents. For purposes of practice, however, it is easier in every case to work on lesser objects rather than on greater ones.

Socrates Younger/ You are quite right.

Stranger/ Let us then recall what led us to this long digression on these matters.

Socrates Younger/ What was it?

Stranger/ Was it not mainly due to the impatience we felt and expressed at the long-windedness, as we presumed to call it, of our definition of the art of weaving? We felt a like impatience with the long account of reversal of rotation in the universe and with our inquiry into the Sophist when we had to discuss the existence of not-being. We Conceived the notion that these discussions had been too lengthy, and we

blamed ourselves for this because we feared that they had been irrelevant too. Please realize, therefore, that the principles we have just worked out together apply to all discussions of this kind and not just to this one, and that they are intended to prevent any like apprehensions in future.

Socrates Younger/ It shall be so, sir, but, pray, proceed.

Stranger/ I say then, that it is your duty and mine to observe the principles we have just laid down whenever we have to accord praise or blame to an argument on the score of its length or its brevity. The length of one discourse is not to be compared simply with the length of another. We said just now that we must never forget the second section of the art of measuring, and it is this standard we must always apply in judgments like these—the standard of suitability I mean.

Socrates Younger/ Quite so.

Stranger/ Yes, but even 'suitability' is not in every case an adequate criterion. For instance, we shall not look for such length in an argument as is 'suitable' for giving pleasure, except as a very incidental consideration. Again, ease and speed in reaching the answer to the problem propounded are most commendable, but our principle requires that this be only a secondary, not a primary reason for commending an argument. What we must value first and foremost, above all else, is the philosophical method itself, and this consists in ability to divide according to real forms. If, therefore, either a full-length statement of an argument or an unusually brief one leaves the hearer more able to find real forms, it is this presentation of it which must be diligently carried through; there must be no expression of annoyance at its length or at its brevity as the case may be. Furthermore, if we find a man who criticizes the length of an argument while a discussion

like the present one is in progress and refuses to wait for the proper rounding-off of the process of reasoning, he is not to be permitted to escape thus with a mere grumble that ‘these discussions are long drawn out'; he must be required to support his grumble with a proof that a briefer statement of the case would have left him and his fellow disputants better philosophers, more able to demonstrate real truth by reasoned argument. Blame and praise on other grounds, aimed at other merely incidental traits in our discourse, we must simply ignore and act as though we had not heard them at all. Now we may leave this topic, if I carry you with me in this judgment. Let us go back to the statesman, our real subject, and set beside him for comparison the art of weaving as we have just defined it.

Socrates Younger/ Excellent. Let us do as you say.

Stranger/ Well then, the kingly art has been set apart from most of those occupying the same region—from all, that is to say, which have to do with control of herds. But in the actual community of citizens there are other arts not yet distinguished from statesmanship. They comprise both contributory and directive productive arts, and these must first be distinguished.

Socrates Younger/ Very well.

Stranger/ Do you realize that in this case they resist division into two? I think that the reason will become evident to us as we go on to enumerate them.

Socrates Younger/ Let us do so then.

Stranger/ Seeing that we cannot bisect them, let us divide them according to their natural divisions as we would carve a sacrificial victim. For we must in every case divide into the minimum number of divisions that the structure permits.

Socrates Younger/ How shall we do it then, in the present instance?

Stranger/ As we did before. All the arts which provide tools for weaving we distinguished then as ‘contributory.'

Socrates Younger/ We did.

Stranger/ We must do the same now as then, but with even greater care. Every art which fashions any object, large or small, which ministers to the needs of an organized human community must be classed as ‘contributory.' For without the things provided by these arts there could be no community and so no art of rule, and yet we can hardly regard it as the duty of the kingly art to produce any of these things.

Socrates Younger/ No.

Stranger/ We are attempting a difficult thing when we try to distinguish this instrumental class of arts from the others. For anything whatever can be shown with some plausibility to be an instrumental means to something or other. However, there is a class of things a community must acquire to which we must proceed to give a different name.

Socrates Younger/ In what way different?

Stranger/ In that its function differs from that of instruments. It is not made, as an instrument is, with a view to the production of something but in order to preserve a thing once it has been produced.

Socrates Younger/ What kind of thing do you mean?

Stranger/ A class of objects wrought in the greatest variety of shapes and used for holding liquids or solids, some made for standing on the fire, some not able to do so. As a general name we term such an object a ‘container.' It is a ubiquitous class of objects, and again, I think, the arts manufacturing it have nothing whatever to do with the art of the ruler which we are now seeking.

Socrates Younger/ Nothing at all.

Stranger/ We must now recognize a third class of things to be acquired, also a very large one. Some things belonging to it are on land, others on water; some move from place to place, others do not; some are of high honor, others are not so distinguished. All share one name and form a class because each is made to support something or serve as a base for something.

Socrates Younger/ What common name have they?

Stranger/ 'Carriage,' I should say—and the production of such things is the work of the carpenter, the potter, or the chariot builder, not of the statesman.

Socrates Younger/ I understand.

Stranger/ What is our fourth class? Must we not distinguish from all these three a further class to which most of the things mentioned in our definition of weaving belong—the whole class of clothing, most armor, all walls, all earth or stonework defenses erected around a city, and many other such things. All exist for defensive protection and so the whole class can best be called 'defenses.' To provide these is in most cases the work of the builder or weaver, and never that of the statesman.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ Might we agree to name a fifth class including all arts concerned in decoration and portraiture and every art which produces artistic representations whether in these visual arts or for the ear in poetry and music? The works all these arts produce are wrought simply to give pleasure, and all may properly be included under one description.

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ We use the expression 'diversion,' do we not?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, what of it?

Stranger/ Then this is the name we can apply to the products of this whole group of arts. None of them has a serious purpose; all are performed for pure amusement.

Socrates Younger/ I think I understand this too.

Stranger/ Consider now those arts which provide the stuffs which are wrought by the arts we have been talking about. This is a most various class of arts. Often such an art is itself working on the products of several yet more primitive arts. Shall we not name this the sixth kind?

Socrates Younger/ Of what are you thinking?

Stranger/ Gold and silver and all mined metals, all the pioneer work done by the woodman and the sawmill to provide material for carpentry and wickerwork, the currier's art which removes the skins of animals, the art of stripping bark which has the same function in the plant realm, and all arts kindred to these, the arts of making cork, papyrus, and rope. All these arts produce the main types of raw material for working up into the more complex kinds of objects which we use. Let us call this class of object by the general description, 'basic material at the stage of its first working when it is not yet wrought into particular objects,' and the production of this is obviously no concern of the kingly science.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ We come lastly to the getting of food and of all the substances the parts of which are capable of combining with the parts of the body to promote its health. This we will make a seventh class and call it 'nourishment' unless we can find some better name for it. Provision of it is rightly to be assigned to the arts of farming, hunting, gymnastics, medicine, or butchering rather than to political science.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ I think that possessions of practically every kind that we find belonging to men have been enumerated in these seven classes, with the single exception of tame living creatures. Listen while I run through the list. First place in it should really have been taken by ‘basic material at its first working'; after that come instruments, then vessels, carriages, defenses, diversions, and nourishments. We may neglect any class of merely slight importance which may have escaped us, for it can be made to fit in one or other of these main classes. For example, consider the class consisting of coins, seals, and every other kind of engraved dies. These have not, as a class, one of the great classes with which all coincide. Some have to be subsumed under ‘diversions,' some under ‘instruments'; it is a forced classification, but they can be made to fit into one or other of these classes somehow or other. As for tame animals other than slaves, all these clearly come under the art of nourishing herds which we have previously analyzed.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, they do.

Stranger/ The class that remains, then. is that of slaves and personal servants of all kinds. It is just here that I strongly suspect that those will be discovered who really dispute the fashioning of the web of state with the king in the way that we found spinners, carders, and the rest disputing the fashioning of clothes with the weavers. All the others, since they pursue what we have described as ‘contributory' arts, have been disposed of along with their occupations which we have enumerated just now, and thus they have all been severed from any share in the kingly art of ruling the state.

Socrates Younger/ So at any rate it would seem.

Stranger/ Come then, let us examine the rest and approach them more closely to scrutinize them more effectively.

Socrates Younger/ Let us do so.

Stranger/ The most extensive class of servants, as seen from our new vantage point, we find to be engaged in pursuits and sunk in a condition of life quite contrary to those we had suspected we might discover.

Socrates Younger/ To whom do you refer?

Stranger/ To those who are bought and sold and so become their master's property. No one would think of challenging our description of these as slaves or our contention that they cannot possibly claim any share in the practice of the art of ruling.

Socrates Younger/ That goes without saying.

Stranger/ But what of servants who are personally free? What of those among them who of their own volition place themselves and their services at the disposal of the various craftsmen we have named and effect a systematic distribution of agricultural and manufactured products maintaining an economic balance between them? Some of these do their work at home in the market square, but others are travelers from city to city, either overland or by sea routes. They exchange money for goods or one currency for another. Our names for them are money-changers, merchants, venturers, retailers. They cannot be said to dispute the province of the ruler, can they?

Socrates Younger/ I wonder if they might—in the realm of commerce, that is to say.

Stranger/ Certainly not. You can be sure that such men who can be hired for pay, who work for a daily wage and who are always ready to work for any employer, will never be found daring to claim any share in the art of ruling.

Socrates Younger/ No, of course not.

Stranger/ But there are those who render other kinds of service.

Socrates Younger/ What kinds of service? Whom do you mean?

Stranger/ Heralds and clerks, who often develop great facility from long performance of their form of service, and certain other very able minor civil servants who do all manner of administrative work for the elected officials. What shall we call these?

Socrates Younger/ What you just called them—civil servants, but not rulers exercising an independent authority in the state.

Stranger/ I was not cheated by a mere dream, I think, when I said that it was here that the king's serious challengers in the art of rule would reveal themselves. But how strange to have to look for them in a servant class!

Socrates Younger/ Very strange.

Stranger/ Now let us tackle those we have not yet put under examination. First come the soothsayers, practicing their particular form of expert ministration. For do we not recognize them as serving as interpreters of the gods to men?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Next come the priestly tribe. According to the orthodox view they understand how to offer our gifts to the gods in sacrifices in a manner pleasing to them, and they know, too, the right forms of prayer for petitioning the gods to bestow blessings on us. Both of these expert activities are parts of the art of ministration, are they not?

Socrates Younger/ Well, it would seem that they are.

Stranger/ In that case I think that we are coming at last upon the tracks of our quarry, so to speak. For the priest

and the diviner have great social standing and a keen sense of their own importance. They win veneration and respect because of the high tasks they undertake. This is shown in the fact that in Egypt none can be king unless he belongs to the priestly caste, and if a man of some other caste succeeds in forcing his way to the throne, he must then be made a priest by special ordination. In many of the Greek cities also one finds that the duty of making the chief sacrifice on the state's behalf is laid upon the chief officers of state. You have a very striking example of it here in Athens, for I am led to understand that the most solemn ancestral sacrifices of this nation are the responsibility of the archon whom the lot designates as King-Archon.

Socrates Younger/ That is so.

Stranger/ Very well, we must study these kings chosen by lot and these priests with their ministerial assistants, very closely. But we must also look at another group—quite a large mob, in fact, which is coming clearly into view now that all these particular groups have been distinguished.

Socrates Younger/ And who are these you speak of?

Stranger/ A very queer crowd.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ A race of many tribes—or so they seem to be at first sight. Some are like lions, some like centaurs, or similar monsters. A great many are satyrs or chameleons, beasts that are masters of quick change in order to conceal their weakness. Indeed they take each other's shapes and characters with bewildering rapidity. Yes, Socrates, and I think I have now identified these gentlemen.

Socrates Younger/ Tell me about them. You seem to look upon a strange sight.

Stranger/ Yes, strange until recognized! I was actually impressed by them myself at first sight. Coming suddenly on

this strange cry of players acting their part in public life I did not know what to make of them.

Socrates Younger/ What players can these be?

Stranger/ The chief wizards among all the Sophists, the chief pundits of the deceiver's art. Such impersonators are hard to distinguish from the real statesmen and kings; yet we must distinguish them and thrust them aside if we are to see clearly the king we are seeking.

Socrates Younger/ Well, we must not abandon the search.

Stranger/ No, I agree. Tell me this now.

Socrates Younger/ Well?

Stranger/ Is not monarchy one of the possible forms of government as we know it?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Next to monarchy one would naturally mention the constitution in which it is the few who wield power.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then the third type must be the rule of the many—democracy as it is called.

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ These are the three main constitutions, but do not the three in a sense become five by evolving two further types out of themselves?

Socrates Younger/ What are these?

Stranger/ If we consider the violence or consent, the poverty or riches, the law-abidingness or disregard of law which they exhibit we shall find that two of the three forms of government are really twofold and can therefore be divided. Monarchy then yields us two forms, called tyranny and constitutional monarchy, respectively.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Constitutions where the few wield power can always be similarly divided; the subdivisions are aristocracy and oligarchy.

Socrates Younger/ Quite so.

Stranger/ In the case of democracy we do not usually alter the name. Democracy is always ‘democracy' whether the masses control the wealthy by force or by consent and whether or not it abides strictly by the laws.

Socrates Younger/ That is true.

Stranger/ What then? Do we imagine that any of these constitutions can be declared a ‘true' constitution so long as the only criteria for judging it are whether one, few, or many rule, whether it be rich or poor, whether it rule by violence or consent, whether it have or lack a code of laws?

Socrates Younger/ But what prevents our judging it to be a true constitution by such criteria?

Stranger/ Try to follow what I am going to say and you will be bound to see more clearly.

Socrates Younger/ What line are you going to take?

Stranger/ Shall we abide by our original argument or are we now going against it?

Socrates Younger/ Which argument do you mean?

Stranger/ We decided, did we not, that the art of rule is one of the sciences?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Furthermore we agreed that it is a particular kind of science. Out of the whole class of sciences we selected the judging class and more particularly the directive class.

Socrates Younger/ We did.

Stranger/ We divided the directive into direction of lifeless things and direction of living beings, and by this process of

subdivision we arrived by regular stages where we are now, never losing sight of the fact that statesmanship is a form of knowledge but unable as yet to say precisely what form of knowledge it is.

Socrates Younger/ You are quite right.

Stranger/ Do we realize, then, that the real criterion in judging constitutions must not be whether few or many rule, whether rule is by violence or consent, or whether the rulers are poor or rich? If we are going to abide by our previous conclusions, the criterion must be the presence or absence of an art directing the ruling.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, for we simply must abide by those conclusions.

Stranger/ Then we are forced to look at the issue in this light. In which, if any, of these constitutions do we find the art of ruling being practiced in the actual government of men? What art is more difficult to learn? But what art is more important to us? We must see it for what it is so as to be able to decide which are the other public figures we must remove from the true king's company, those personages who claim to be statesmen, who win over the mass of men to believe them to be statesmen, but are in actual fact nothing of the kind.

Socrates Younger/ We must indeed, for this was the task set for our discussion.

Stranger/ Do you think that any considerable number of men in a particular city will be capable of acquiring the art of statesmanship?

Socrates Younger/ That is quite out of the question.

Stranger/ In a city with a population of a thousand, could a hundred, say, acquire it satisfactorily—or could fifty, perhaps?

Socrates Younger/ Statesmanship would be the easiest of the arts if so many could acquire it. We know quite well that there would never be fifty first-class draughts players among a thousand inhabitants—that is, not if they were judged by proper inter-Hellenic standards. How much less can you expect to find fifty kings! For according to our former argument it is only the man possessed of the art of kingship who must be called a king, though he is just as much a king when he is not in power as when he is.

Stranger/ You have very rightly recalled that point. I think it follows that if the art of government is to be found in this world at all in its pure form, it will be found in the possession of one or two, or, at most, of a select few.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ On this principle it is the men who possess the art of ruling and these only, whom we are to regard as rulers, whatever constitutional form their rule may take. It makes no difference whether their subjects be willing or unwilling; they may rule with or without a code of laws; they may be poor or wealthy. It is the same with doctors. We do not assess the medical qualification of a doctor by the degree of willingness on our part to submit to his knife or cautery or other painful treatment. Doctors are still doctors whether they work according to fixed prescriptions or without them and whether they be poor or wealthy. So long as they control our health on a scientific basis, they may purge and reduce us or they may build us up, but they still remain doctors. The one essential condition is that they act for the good of our bodies to make them better instead of worse, and treat men's ailments in every case as healers acting to preserve life. We must insist that in this disinterested scientific ability we see the distinguishing mark of true authority in medicine—and of true authority everywhere else as well.

Socrates Younger/ Quite So.

Stranger/ Then the constitution par excellence, the only constitution worthy of the name, must be the one in which the rulers are not men making a show of political cleverness but men really possessed of scientific understanding of the art of government. Then we must not take into consideration on any sound principle of judgment whether their rule be by laws or without them over willing or unwilling subjects or whether they themselves be rich men or poor men.

Socrates Younger/ No.

Stranger/ They may purge the city for its better health by putting some of the citizens to death or banishing others. They may lessen the citizen body by sending off colonies like bees swarming off from a hive, or they may bring people in from other cities and naturalize them so as to increase the number of citizens. So long as they work on a reasoned scientific principle following essential justice and act to preserve and improve the life of the state so far as may be, we must call them real statesmen according to our standards of judgment and say that the state they rule alone enjoys good government and has a real constitution. We must go on to say that all the other state fabrics called constitutions are not genuine, but counterfeit; they imitate the true constitution. Those which we call law-abiding copy it fairly closely, but the rest are more or less shocking caricatures of it.

Socrates Younger/ All the rest, sir, I believe to have been spoken in due measure—but the saying about ruling without laws is a hard saying for us to hear.

Stranger/ You are a little too quick for me, Socrates! I was just going to cross-examine you to see if you really accepted all I have said or felt some objection. I realize, however, from what you say that the point we are anxious to discuss in

detail is this question whether a good governor can govern without laws.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, it is.

Stranger/ In one sense it is evident that the art of kingship does include the art of lawmaking. But the political ideal is not full authority for laws but rather full authority for a man who understands the art of kingship and has kingly ability. Do you understand why?

Socrates Younger/ No, please tell me why.

Stranger/ Law can never issue an injunction binding on all which really embodies what is best for each; it cannot prescribe with perfect accuracy what is good and right for each member of the community at any one time. The differences of human personality, the variety of men's activities, and the inevitable unsettlement attending all human experience make it impossible for any art whatsoever to issue unqualified rules holding good on all questions at all times. I suppose that so far we are agreed.

Socrates Younger/ Most emphatically.

Stranger/ But we find practically always that the law tends to issue just this invariable kind of rule. It is like a self-willed, ignorant man who lets no one do anything but what he has ordered and forbids all subsequent questioning of his orders even if the situation has shown some marked improvement on the one for which he originally legislated.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that is just how the law treats us all.

Stranger/ It is impossible, then, for something invariable and unqualified to deal satisfactorily with what is never uniform and constant.

Socrates Younger/ I am afraid it is impossible.

Stranger/ But why then must there be a system of laws, seeing that law is not the ideal form of control? We must find out why a legal system is necessary.

Socrates Younger/ We must.

Stranger/ You have courses of training here in Athens, have you not, just as they have in other cities—courses in which pupils are trained in a group to fit themselves for athletic contests in running or in other sports?

Socrates Younger/ Of course. We have quite a number of them.

Stranger/ Let us call to mind the commands which professional trainers give to the athletes under their regimen in these courses.

Socrates Younger/ In what particular?

Stranger/ The view such trainers take is that they cannot do their work in detail and issue special commands adapted to the condition of each member of the group. When they lay down rules for physical welfare they find it necessary to give bulk instructions having regard to the general benefit of the average pupil.

Socrates Younger/ Quite so.

Stranger/ That is why we find them giving the same exercises to whole groups of pupils, starting or stopping all of them at the same time in their running, wrestling, or whatever it may be.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Similarly we must expect that the legislator who has to give orders to whole communities of human creatures in matters of right and of mutual contractual obligation will never be able in the laws he prescribes for the whole group to give every individual his due with absolute accuracy.

Socrates Younger/ Very probably not.

Stranger/ But we shall find him making the law for the generality of his subjects under average circumstances. Thus he will legislate for all individual citizens, but it will be by what may be called a 'bulk' method rather than an individual treatment, and this method of 'bulk' prescription will be followed by him whether he makes a written code of law or refrains from issuing such a code, preferring to legislate by using unwritten ancestral customs.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, and quite rightly so.

Stranger/ Of course he is right, Socrates. How could any law-giver be capable of prescribing every act of a particular individual and sit at his side, so to speak, all through his life and tell him just what to do? And if among the few who have really attained this true statesmanship there arose one who was free to give this detailed guidance to an individual, he would hardly put obstacles in his own way by deliberately framing legal codes of the kind we are criticizing.

Socrates Younger/ That certainly follows, sir, from what has been said.

Stranger/ I would rather say, Socrates, that it follows from what is going to be said.

Socrates Younger/ And what is that?

Stranger/ Let us put this case to ourselves. A doctor or trainer plans to travel abroad and expects to be away from his charges for quite a long time. The doctor might well think that his patients would forget any verbal instructions he gave and the trainer might think likewise. In these circumstances each might want to leave written reminders of his orders—do you not think so yourself, Socrates?

Socrates Younger/ Exactly So, sir.

Stranger/ Well now, suppose our doctor did not stay abroad as long as he had expected and so came back the sooner to his patients. Would he hesitate to substitute different prescriptions for the original ones if his patients' condition happened to be better than anticipated because of a climatic improvement or some other unusual and unexpected development of that kind? Would the doctor feel it his duty to maintain stubbornly that there must be no transgression of the strict letter of those original prescriptions of his? Would he refuse to issue new prescriptions or conditions, or condemn a patient who was venturing to act contrary to the prescriptions he had written out for him? Would the doctor declare all such action must be wrong because those former prescriptions were the true canons of medicine and of health and therefore that all contravention of them must lead to disease and be contrary to medical science? Surely any such claims, in circumstances where a science is involved and a real art is at work, would only make the man who made the claim and his precious prescriptions supremely ridiculous.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, it would indeed.

Stranger/ Imagine then the case of a scientific legislator. Suppose that by a written code or by support given to unwritten customs he has laid down what is just and honorable and what is not, and what benefits society and what hurts it. Suppose him to do this service for the several communities of the human flock who live in their cities as their appointed pasture shepherded by the codes their legislators have provided. If this man, who drew up his code by the art of statesmanship, wishes to amend it, or if another scientific legislator of this kind appears on the scene, will these be forbidden to enact new laws differing from the earlier ones? Surely such a prohibition would appear as

ridiculous in the case of the legislator as it was in the case of the doctor, would it not?

Socrates Younger/ Of course.

Stranger/ But are you familiar with the argument one usually hears advanced when an issue like this is raised?

Socrates Younger/ No, I cannot remember it at the moment, at any rate.

Stranger/ It is quite a plausible argument, I grant that. They contend that if a man discovers better laws than those already enacted he is entitled to get them brought into effect, but only if in every instance he has first persuaded his own city to accept them.

Socrates Younger/ But what of this? Surely this is a sound contention.

Stranger/ It may be, but answer this question. Suppose a man fails to persuade his city and forces his better laws upon it, what name are we to apply to force so used? But no, do not answer me that question yet, for there are others to be answered first.

Socrates Younger/ What can they be?

Stranger/ Consider once more the case of the patient under the doctor's treatment. Suppose that the doctor fails to persuade the patient but has a mastery of medical knowledge, and suppose that he forces a particular course of treatment which goes against written prescription but is actually more salutary on a child patient, maybe, or on a man or a woman. What are we to call force of this kind? Whatever we decide to call it, we shall not call it ‘the sin against true medicine' or ‘a breach of the laws of health.' Surely the very last thing a patient who is so constrained is entitled to say is that the doctor's act in applying the constraint was contrary to good medicine and an aggravation of his disease.

Socrates Younger/ You are quite right.

Stranger/ By what name, then, do we call the sin against the art of statesmanship? Would it not be called dishonor, vice, injustice?

Socrates Younger/ Assuredly.

Stranger/ What, then, shall we say of citizens of a state who have been forced to do things which are contrary to written laws and ancestral customs but are nevertheless juster, more effective, and more noble than the directions of these traditional authorities? How shall we regard censure by these citizens of the force which has applied in these circumstances? Unless they wish to appear ridiculous in the extreme there is one thing they must refrain from saying. They must not assert in any such instance that in being subjected to compulsion they have suffered disgrace, injustice, or evil at the hands of those who compelled them.

Socrates Younger/ That is quite true.

Stranger/ Can it be the case that acts imposed under compulsion are right if the compeller is rich, but wrong if he is poor? Surely what matters is that with or without persuasion, rich or poor, according to a code or against it, the ruler does what is really beneficial. These are the real issues and all is well if he passes this test, the only genuine test of good government in a community and the only principle by which the understanding and upright ruler will administer the affairs of those whom he rules. The ship's captain fixes his attention on the real welfare at any given time of his ship and his crew. He lays down no written enactments but supplies a law in action by practical application of his knowledge of seamanship to the needs of the voyage. It is in this way that he preserves the lives of all in his ship. Would not a true constitution be just like this and work in the same way if the rulers really understood

what government is and employed their art as a stronger power for good than any written laws? By rulers with this sound attitude of mind no wrong can possibly be done so long as they keep firmly to the one great principle, that they must always administer impartial justice to their subjects under the guidance of intelligence and the art of government. Then they will not only preserve the lives of their subjects but reform their characters too, so far as human nature permits of this.

Socrates Younger/ There can be no objection to your last remarks at any rate.

Stranger/ No, nor can there be to my earlier ones either.

Socrates Younger/ To which are you referring?

Stranger/ You remember that we said that in no community whatsoever could it happen that a large number of people received this gift of political wisdom and the power to govern by pure intelligence which would accompany it. Only in the hands of the select few or of the enlightened individual can we look for that right exercise of political power which is itself the one true constitution. For we must call all other constitutions mere imitations of this. Some are more perfect copies of it; others are grosser and less adequate imitations.

Socrates Younger/ What do you really mean by this? For I must admit that I did not really understand what you said before about these 'imitations.'

Stranger/ But I must make you understand. It would be a serious failing to start a discussion of this issue and then simply drop it without exposing the error which is rampant today in all that is said about it.

Socrates Younger/ And what is this error?

Stranger/ That is what we must now seek out, though it involves a search over unfamiliar ground and the error is

hard to discover. We may say, then, that there is only one constitution in the true sense—the one we have described. For the rest of them owe their very preservation to their following a code of laws enacted for this true state and to a strict adherence to a rule which we admit to be desirable though it falls short of the ideal.

Socrates Younger/ What rule is this?

Stranger/ The rule that none of the citizens may venture to do any act contrary to the laws, and that if any of them ventures to do such act, the penalty is to be death or the utmost rigor of punishment. This is the justest and most desirable course as a second best when the ideal we have just described has been set aside. We must now go on to say how this state of affairs we have just called second best is achieved in practice, must we not?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, we must.

Stranger/ Let us go back once again to the parallel cases with which we have constantly to compare the ruler who really is a statesman.

Socrates Younger/ Who are they?

Stranger/ Our good friend the ship's captain and the doctor 'worth a dozen other men.' Let us picture to ourselves a situation in which they might find themselves and see how it all works out in their case.

Socrates Younger/ What situation?

Stranger/ Suppose we all suddenly decided that we are the victims of the worst possible outrages at their hands. Every doctor, you see, can preserve the life of any he will among us, and can hurt any he will by knife or cautery or by demanding fees which are nothing but imposed taxes—for only the tiniest proportion of them is spent on medicaments for the patient and all the rest goes to keep the doctor and his household. Their final enormity is to accept

bribes from the patient's relations or from his enemies and put him to death. Ships' captains are guilty of a different set of crimes, but they are just as heinous. They will enter into a conspiracy to put out to sea with you and then leave you stranded, or else they will scuttle the ship and throw the passengers overboard—and these are not all their misdeeds. Suppose we formed this view of doctors and captains and then held a council at which the following decree was passed.

Neither medicine nor seamanship may be trusted in future with absolute control in its particular sphere, either over slaves or over free citizens. We therefore resolve to gather together an assembly of *all,* or of *the wealthy among,* the people. It shall be lawful for men of no calling or men of any other calling to advise this assembly on seamanship and medicine—that is to say, on the drugs and surgical instruments appropriate to the treatment of the sick, on ships and their tackle, on the handling of vessels, and on perils of the sea, including risks arising from wind and tide, risks arising from encountering pirates, and risks arising from maneuver of warships against enemy warships in the event of a naval engagement.

So much for the decree on these matters. The executive is to embody this decree of the assembly of the people—based, you remember, on the advice of a few doctors and sailors maybe, but certainly on the advice of many unqualified people too—in laws which they are to inscribe on tablets of wood and of stone, and in the case of some of the rules so resolved upon, they must see that they find their place among the unwritten ancestral customs. Thereafter forever medicine and navigation may only be practiced according to these laws and customs.

Socrates Younger/ A pretty state of affairs this!

Stranger/ But we have not done yet. Suppose that they resolve further to appoint magistrates chosen by lot annually from the citizen body, whether from the wealthy only or from all citizens. Some of these magistrates, once they are appointed, are to take command of ships and navigate them; others are to cure the sick according to the written code.

Socrates Younger/ This is getting worse!

Stranger/ But we have not done—see what follows. When the year of office of each of these magistrates expires, a court must be established and a jury chosen by lot, perhaps from among wealthier citizens whose names are on a list of previously selected jurors, perhaps from the people as a whole. The magistrates are to be summoned before this court and it is to subject them to audit. It is open to anyone to lay an accusation against them that during their year of office they failed to sail the ships according to the written laws or the ancient custom of our forebears. Similar charges may be brought concerning the healers of the sick. If the verdict goes against any of them, the court must assess the penalty or the fine the convicted parties must pay.

Socrates Younger/ Well then, the man who took office voluntarily in such a society would deserve any punishment and any fine that might be imposed.

Stranger/ Then there can be further misdemeanors, and we must enact a law to provide against them. It will be a law against independent research. If a man be found guilty of inquiry into seamanship or medicine in contravention of this law—of inquiry into nautical practice, for instance, or into climatic influences and bodily temperatures, and especially if he be guilty of airing theories of his own on such things, action must be taken to suppress him. First we must deny him the title of ‘doctor' or ‘captain.' Instead we must call him a man with his head in the clouds, one of these chattering

Sophists. Furthermore it will be lawful for any citizen so desiring to indict him before a court of justice—or what passes for such a court—on the charge of corrupting the younger men and influencing them to go in for seamanship and medicine in an illegal manner by setting up as doctors or captains on their own authority. If he is found guilty of influencing young or old against the laws and written enactments, he shall suffer the utmost penalties. For there can be no claim to possess wisdom greater than the wisdom of the laws. No one need be ignorant of seamanship or medicine, of sailing regulations or health regulations. The laws are there written out for our conning; the ancient customs are firmly established in our midst. Any who really desire to learn may learn.

Suppose, Socrates, that all the arts are treated like this. How do you imagine that generalship and hunting in all its forms would be affected? What would happen to painting and other representational arts, or to building and manufacture of all types of implements under such conditions, and how could farming or any cultivation whatever be carried on? Imagine the rearing of horses and other animals tied down to legal prescription, or divination and similar ministerial functions so controlled. What would legally governed draughts be like or legal mathematics, whether simple arithmetic, plane geometry, stereometry, or kinematics? What would the world be like if everything worked on this principle, organized throughout according to written laws instead of according to the relevant arts?

Socrates Younger/ It is quite clear that the arts as we know them would be annihilated and that they could never be resurrected because of this law which puts an embargo on all research. The result would be that life, which is hard enough as it is, would be quite impossible then and not to be endured.

Stranger/ Yes, but there is a further possible degradation to consider. Suppose we compel each of these arts to function according to a legal code and place a magistrate in charge of this code either by election or by the fall of the lot, and make him rule according to it. Suppose then that he has no regard for the code and acts only from motives of ambition and favoritism. He embarks on a course of action contrary to law but does not act on any basis of scientific knowledge. Evil as the former state was, will not this latter one be still worse?

Socrates Younger/ It will indeed.

Stranger/ The laws which have been laid down represent the fruit of experience—one must admit that. Each of them has been put forward by some advocate who has been fortunate enough to hit on the right method of commending it and who has thus persuaded the public Assembly to enact it. Any man who dares by his action to infringe these laws is guilty of a wrong many times greater than the wrong done by strict laws, for such transgression, if tolerated, would do even more than a rigid code to pervert all ordered activity.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, of course it would.

Stranger/ Then so long as men enact laws and written codes governing any department of life, our second-best method of government is to forbid any individual or any group to perform any act in contravention of these laws.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Then laws would seem to be written copies of scientific truth in the various departments of life they cover, copies based as far as possible on the instructions received from those who really possess the scientific truth on these matters.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, of course.

Stranger/ And yet we must never lose sight of the truth we stated before. The man with the real knowledge, the true statesman, will in many instances allow his activities to be dictated by his art and pay no regard to written prescriptions. He will do this whenever he is convinced that there are measures which are better than the instructions he previously wrote and sent to people at a time when he could a not be there to control them personally.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that was what we said.

Stranger/ So an individual or a group who possess a code of laws but try to introduce some change in them because they consider it an improvement are doing the same thing according to their lights as the true statesman.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But if they acted like this with minds unenlightened by knowledge, they would indeed try to copy the true original, but would copy it very badly. If on the other hand they possessed scientific knowledge, it would no longer be a case of copying at all; it would be the real and original statesmanship we are talking about.

Socrates Younger/ Yes—or so I should say.

Stranger/ Now it has been argued already and we have agreed that no large group of men is capable of acquiring any art, be it what you will.

Socrates Younger/ That stands as our agreed conclusion.

Stranger/ Granted then that an art of kingly rule exists, the wealthy group or the whole citizen body would never be able to acquire this scientific art of statesmanship.

Socrates Younger/ How could they?

Stranger/ It seems to follow that there is an invariable rule which these imitative constitutions must obey if they mean to reproduce as far as they can that one real

constitution, which is government by a real statesman using real statecraft. They must all keep strictly to the laws once they have been laid down and never transgress written enactments or established national customs.

Socrates Younger/ Quite right.

Stranger/ When the wealthy seek to copy the ideal constitution we call the constitution which results ‘aristocracy,' but when they disregard the laws, the constitution produced is ‘oligarchy.'

Socrates Younger/ I suppose so.

Stranger/ But when one individual governs according to laws, imitating the truly wise ruler, we call him ‘king.' We make no difference in name between the individual ruler guided by political science and the individual ruler guided by a right opinion and acting according to the laws.

Socrates Younger/ That seems to be so.

Stranger/ And so if there really were an example of a truly wise ruler in power his name would undoubtedly be the same—'the king'—it could not be anything else. So the total of the names of the constitutions now under consideration comes to five only.

Socrates Younger/ So it seems.

Stranger/ But stay, what of the case where one man rules but does not govern his actions either by laws or by ancient customs, but claims falsely what only the truly wise ruler has a right to claim, and says that the ‘best' course must be taken in defiance of written codes? If in fact it is only his passion and his ignorance that lead him to attempt to copy the true statesman in this defiance of law, must we not call him and all like him by the name of tyrant?

Socrates Younger/ Unquestionably.

Stranger/ So then we have the tyrant and the king, then oligarchy and aristocracy, then democracy, all of which arise when men turn down the idea of the one true and scientific ruler. Men doubt whether any man will ever be found fit to bear such perfect rule. They despair of finding anyone man willing and able to rule with moral and intellectual insight and to render every man his due with strictest fairness. They feel sure that a man with such absolute power will be bound to employ it to the hurt and injury of his personal enemies and to put them out of the way. But it remains true that if the ideal ruler we have described were to appear on earth he would be acclaimed, and he would spend his days guiding in strictest justice and perfect felicity that one and only true commonwealth worthy of the name.

Socrates Younger/ That is so of course.

Stranger/ We must take things as they are, however, and kings do not arise in cities in the natural course of things in the way the royal bee is born in a beehive—one individual obviously outstanding in body and mind and capable of taking charge of things at once. And therefore it seems men gather together and work out written codes, chasing as fast as they can the fading vision of the true constitution.

Socrates Younger/ So it would seem.

Stranger/ Is it any wonder that under these makeshift constitutions of ours hosts of ills have arisen and more must be expected in the future? They all rest on the sandy foundation of action according to law and custom without real scientific insight. Another art that worked on such a foundation would obviously ruin all that it sought to build up. But something even more remarkable than these besetting ills is the sheer native strength a city possesses nevertheless. For all our cities, as we know, have been subject to such ills for many generations now, and yet some

of them have not come to ruin but still stand firm. However, we see many instances of cities going down like sinking ships to their destruction. There have been such wrecks in the past and there surely will be others in the future, caused by the wickedness of captains and crews alike. For these are guilty men, whose sin is supreme ignorance of what matters most. They are men who know little or nothing of real political truth and yet they consider themselves to know it from end to end and suppose that they are better instructed in this art than in any other.

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ All these imperfect constitutions are difficult to live under, but we might ask ourselves which of them is hardest to bear and which is most tolerable. Ought we perhaps to examine this matter, though it is not directly relevant to our appointed theme? After all one must remember that, speaking quite generally, the aim of all the actions of men everywhere is to secure for themselves the most tolerable life they can.

Socrates Younger/ Then we can hardly help considering the question.

Stranger/ There is one of three constitutions which you must regard as being at once the hardest to live under and the easiest.

Socrates Younger/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ I just want to remind you that at the beginning of this supplementary discussion we enumerated three constitutions—the rule of one, the rule of the few, and the rule of the many.

Socrates Younger/ We did.

Stranger/ Dividing each of three into two let us make six, having first separated the true constitution from all, calling it the seventh.

Socrates Younger/ How shall we divide the three others?

Stranger/ Under the rule of one we get kingly rule and tyranny; under the rule of the few, as we said, come the auspicious form of it, aristocracy, and also oligarchy. As for the subdividing of democracy, though we gave both forms of it one name previously, we must now treat it as twofold.

Socrates Younger/ How is this? How can it be divided?

Stranger/ By the same division as the others, even though the word ‘democracy' proves to be doing double duty. Rule according to law is as possible under democracy as under the other constitutions.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, it is.

Stranger/ This division of democracy into two kinds was not serviceable previously as we indicated at the time, for we were seeking then to define a perfect constitution. Now, however, we have excluded the perfect constitution from our reckoning and have before us those that have to serve us as constitutions in default of it. In this group we find the principle of obedience to law or contravention of law dividing each type of ruler into two types.

Socrates Younger/ So it seems from the argument that was put forward just now.

Stranger/ The rule of one man, if it has been kept within the traces, so to speak, by the written rules we call laws, is the best of all the six. But when it is lawless it is hard, and the most grievous to have to endure.

Socrates Younger/ So it would seem.

Stranger/ As for the rule of a few, just as the few constitute a middle term between the one and the many, so we must regard the rule of the few as of middle potency for good or ill. The rule of the many is weakest in every way; it is not capable of any real good or of any serious evil as compared with the other two. This is because in a democracy

sovereignty has been divided out in small portions among a large number of rulers. If therefore all three constitutions are law-abiding, democracy is the worst of the three, but if all three flout the laws, democracy is the best of them. Thus if all constitutions are unprincipled the best thing to do is to live in a democracy. But when constitutions are lawful and ordered, democracy is the least desirable, and monarchy, the first of the six, is by far the best to live under—unless of course the seventh is possible, for that must always be exalted, like a god among mortals, above all other constitutions.

Socrates Younger/ Things do seem to work out in this way, and so we must take your advice and act as you say.

Stranger/ Therefore all who take part in one of these governments—apart from the one based on real knowledge—are to be distinguished from the true statesman. They are not statesmen; they are party leaders, leaders of bogus governments and themselves as bogus as their systems. The supreme imitators and tricksters, they are of all Sophists the arch-Sophists.

Socrates Younger/ It seems to me that the wheel has come full circle, now that the title of Sophist goes to those who most deserve it, to the men who get themselves called political leaders.

Stranger/ So this fantastic pageant that seemed like some strange masque of centaurs or some band of satyrs stands revealed for what it is. At much pains we have succeeded at last in distinguishing them and setting them apart, as we must, from all true practice of statesmanship.

Socrates Younger/ So we see.

Stranger/ There remains another task, and it is even more difficult because the class to be set apart is closer akin to the kingly ruler and also in itself harder to discern clearly.

It seems to me that we have reached a point where we have to act like gold refiners.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ We are told that at the first stage of their work they separate off earth and stones and much else from the ore. When these are gone there still remain those precious substances akin to gold which are so combined with it as to be separable only in the furnace; I mean bronze and silver and sometimes adamant as well. These are removed only with difficulty as the metal is tried in the refining fire until at last the process yields the sight of unalloyed gold separated off by itself.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, they do say that refining is done like that.

Stranger/ It looks as though we are in a like situation. We have separated off the elements which are quite different from statesmanship, the elements which are quite foreign and repugnant to it, but there still remain the precious elements which are akin to it. These include the art of generalship, the art of administering justice, and that department of the art of public speaking which is closely allied to the kingly art. This last persuades men to do what is right and therefore takes its share in controlling what goes on in a true community. How can we best separate these arts also from statesmanship and so bring out the nature of the statesman as such, in his essential character? That, after all, is our present object.

Socrates Younger/ Clearly we must make the attempt by one means or another.

Stranger/ If trying will do it, he shall be shown in his true character. Music will provide us with an example which will help us in our task. I will begin by putting a question to you.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ There is such a thing as learning the principles of music or the principles of any of the crafts, is there not?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But are we willing to admit that there exists an art of a higher order also concerned with this process of acquiring special skills? This second art is the one whose province is to decide whether or not we *ought* to learn any particular art.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, we will attest the existence of an art of this higher order.

Stranger/ We must also agree then, that it is to be distinguished from all arts of the lower order.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Ought there to be no priority at all as between these two orders of art? On the other hand, if there is to be priority, must the lower order control the higher or the higher guide and control the lower?

Socrates Younger/ The higher order should control the lower.

Stranger/ Your decision is then, that the art which decides whether we learn a skill or not ought to have control of the art which actually teaches us that skill.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, certainly.

Stranger/ Then in the same way the art which decides whether persuasion should or should not be used ought to control the operation of the art of persuasion itself.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Which is the art to which we must assign the task of persuading the general mass of the population by telling them suitable stories rather than by giving them formal instruction?

Socrates Younger/ I should say that it is obvious that this is the province to be assigned to rhetoric.

Stranger/ But to which art must we assign the function of deciding whether in any particular situation we must proceed by persuasion, or by coercive measures against a group of men, or whether it is right to take no action at all?

Socrates Younger/ The art which can teach us how to decide that will be the art which controls rhetoric and the art of public speaking.

Stranger/ This activity can be none other than the work of the statesman, I suggest.

Socrates Younger/ Excellent! That is exactly what it is.

Stranger/ Oratory, it seems, has been quickly set apart from statesmanship. It is distinct from statesmanship, and yet its auxiliary.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Now we must consider the working of another art.

Socrates Younger/ Which is that?

Stranger/ Consider the taking of decisions on military strategy once war has been declared by the state on an enemy state. What shall we say about this? Is such decision governed by no art at all, or shall we say that there is most certainly an art involved here?

Socrates Younger/ How could we dream of saying that no art is concerned? Surely generalship and the whole art of warfare operates precisely in this field.

Stranger/ But which is the art which possesses the knowledge and capacity to form a reasoned decision whether to fight or settle a dispute on friendly terms? Is this the work of generalship or does it belong to another art?

Socrates Younger/ Consistency to our earlier argument requires us to say that it is a different one which is involved.

Stranger/ So if our views here are to be consistent with our earlier views on the place of rhetoric, we must decide that this second art controls generalship.

Socrates Younger/ I agree.

Stranger/ What art can we attempt to enthrone as queen over that mighty and dreadful art, the art of war in all its range, except the art of truly royal rule?

Socrates Younger/ None other.

Stranger/ Then we must not describe the art that generals practice as statesmanship, for it proves to be but a servant of statesmanship.

Socrates Younger/ Apparently that is so.

Stranger/ Now turn to another art and let us consider the activity of judges who make straight judgments.

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ Does its province extend beyond the sphere of the mutual contractual obligations of the citizens? It has to act in this sphere by judging what is just or unjust according to the standards set up for it and embodied in the legal rules which it has received from the kingly lawgiver. It shows its peculiar virtue by coming to an impartial decision on the conflicting claims it examines, by refusing to pervert the lawgiver's ordinance through yielding to bribery or threats or sentimental appeals, and by rising above all considerations of personal friendship or enmity.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that is so. You have given us, sir, a succinct account of the juryman's function and of his duty.

Stranger/ We find, then, that the power of the judges is a lesser thing than the power of the king. The judge guards the law and serves the king.

Socrates Younger/ So it would seem.

Stranger/ If you will view the three arts we have spoken of as a group with a common character you will be bound to see that none of them has turned out to be itself the art of statesmanship. This is because it is not the province of the real kingly art to act for itself but rather to control the work of the arts which instruct us in the methods of action. The kingly art controls them according to its power to perceive the right occasions for undertaking and setting in motion the great enterprises of state. The other arts must do what they are told to do by the kingly art.

Socrates Younger/ Precisely so.

Stranger/ The three arts we have just treated in detail may not control one another. They may not even control themselves, in fact. Each has its special field of action and each is entitled to the name which designates its proper sphere.

Socrates Younger/ So it would seem.

Stranger/ There is an art which controls all these arts. It is concerned with the laws and with all that belongs to the life of the community. It weaves all into its unified fabric with perfect skill. It is a universal art and so we call it by a name of universal scope. That name is one which I believe to belong to this art and to this alone, the name of 'statesmanship.'

Socrates Younger/ Yes, I agree absolutely.

Stranger/ Now that all the classes of arts active in the government of the state have been distinguished, shall we go on to scrutinize statesmanship and base our scrutiny of it on the art of weaving which provides our example for it?

Socrates Younger/ Most certainly.

Stranger/ Then we must describe the kingly weaving process. What is it like? How is it done? What is the fabric that results from its labors?

Socrates Younger/ These are just the questions we must answer.

Stranger/ The task of finding the answers is hard, but we cannot shirk it.

Socrates Younger/ No, we must find them at all costs.

Stranger/ To say that ‘one kind of goodness clashes with another kind of goodness' is to preach a doctrine which is an easy target for the disputatious who appeal to commonly accepted ideas.

Socrates Younger/ I do not follow you.

Stranger/ Then let me put the matter in this way. You regard courage as one part of virtue I suppose.

Socrates Younger/ Surely.

Stranger/ Moderation differs from courage but is a specific kind of goodness just as courage is.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ We have now to be daring and make a startling statement about these two virtues.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ This pair of virtues are in a certain sense enemies from of old, ranged in opposition to each other in many realms of life.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean?

Stranger/ The doctrine is not a familiar one by any means. I suppose that the usual statement is that all the several parts of goodness are in mutual accord.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Then we must give our very special attention to the matter. Is the position quite so simple as that? Is there not, on the contrary, something inherent in them which keeps alive a family quarrel among them?

Socrates Younger/ Certainly we must consider this. Please tell us how we are to do so.

Stranger/ We must consider instances drawn from all levels of existence of things which we regard as excellent and yet classify as mutually opposed.

Socrates Younger/ Please explain still more clearly.

Stranger/ Take swiftness and speed as an instance—swiftness of mind and body and rapid vibration of sound in a voice. Such swiftness may be seen in an actual living person or it may be represented in music or painting. Have you ever praised examples of such swiftness or listened with approval when one of your friends praised them?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Do you happen to remember the way in which the approval is expressed in all these instances?

Socrates Younger/ No, I can't say that I remember that in the least.

Stranger/ I wonder if I could really manage to put my thoughts on the subject into words and make them clear to you.

Socrates Younger/ I am sure you could.

Stranger/ You seem to think it a light task! However, let us see the principle at work wherever those mutually opposite qualities are manifested. We admire speed and intensity and vivacity in many forms of action and under all kinds of circumstances. But whether the swiftness of mind or body or the vibrant power of the voice is being praised, we

always find ourselves using one word to praise it—the word 'vigorous.'

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ 'That is alert and vigorous,' we say in the first instance, in another case, 'That is speedy and vigorous,' or, in yet another case, 'That is intense and vigorous.' In all the instances we use this epithet 'vigorous,' as applying in common to the people or things concerned, in order to express our approval of this quality in them.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ On the other hand, do we not quite often find ourselves approving gentleness and quietness when it is shown in many kinds of human behavior?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, very decidedly.

Stranger/ Do we not describe this behavior by using an epithet which is the exact opposite of 'vigorous,' which was the term we applied to the other group of things?

Socrates Younger/ How do you mean?

Stranger/ We constantly admire quietness and moderation, in processes of restrained thinking, in gentle deeds, in a smooth deep voice, in steady balance in movement, or in suitable restraint in artistic representation. Whenever we express such approval do we not use the expression 'controlled' to describe all these excellences rather than the word 'vigorous'?

Socrates Younger/ Very true.

Stranger/ But when we find either of these kinds of behavior appearing out of its due time, we have different names for each of them and in that case we express our censure by attributing quite contrary qualities when we mention them.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ If speed and swiftness are excessive and unseasonable and if the voice is harsh to the point of being violent we speak of all these as ‘excessive' and even ‘maniacal.' Unseasonable heaviness, slowness, or softness we call ‘cowardly' or ‘indolent.' One can generalize further. The very classes ‘energy' and ‘moderation' are ranged in mutual exclusiveness and in opposition to each other; it is not simply a case of conflict between those particular manifestations of them. They never meet in the activities of life without causing conflicts, and if we pursue the matter further, by studying people whose characters come to be dominated by either of them, we shall find inevitable conflict between them and people of the opposite type.

Socrates Younger/ In what sphere do these conflicts occur?

Stranger/ In all the things we have just considered, of course, but in many others too, I think. Men react to situations in one way or another according to the affinities of their own dispositions. They favor some forms of action as being akin to their own character, and they recoil from acts arising from opposite tendencies as being foreign to themselves. Thus men come into violent conflict with one another on many issues.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, they seem to do so.

Stranger/ Considered as a conflict of temperaments, this is a mere trifle, but when the conflict arises over matters of high public importance it becomes the most inimical of all the plagues which can threaten the life of a community.

Socrates Younger/ What kind of evils do you mean?

Stranger/ Of course I mean all which concern the organization of the community as a whole. Men who are notable for moderation are always ready to support ‘peace and tranquility.' They want to keep themselves to themselves

and to mind their own business. They conduct all their dealings with their fellow citizens on this principle and are prone to take the same line in foreign policy and preserve peace at any price with foreign states. Because of their indulgence of this passion for peace at the wrong times, whenever they are able to carry their policy into effect they become unwarlike themselves without being aware of it and render their young men unwarlike as well. Thus they are at the mercy of the chance aggressor. He swoops down on them and the result is that within a very few years they and their children and all the community to which they belong wake up to find that their freedom is gone and that they are reduced to slavery.

Socrates Younger/ You have described a hard and bitter experience.

Stranger/ What then is the history of the party whose bent is rather toward strong action? Do we not find them forever dragging their cities into war and bringing them up against powerful foes on all sides just because they love a military existence too fiercely? And what is the result? Either they destroy their country altogether, or else they bring it into subjection to its enemies just as surely as the peace party did.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that is true too.

Stranger/ Can we deny, then, that in these high matters the two types of character concerned are bound to become hostile to one another and so take up opposing party lines?

Socrates Younger/ We are bound to admit it.

Stranger/ We have discovered, then, the answer to the question into which we set out to inquire when we began this conversation. We find that important parts of goodness are at variance with one another and that they set at variance the men in whom they predominate.

Socrates Younger/ So it seems.

Stranger/ There is a further point to consider.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ Does any art which works by combining materials deliberately choose to make any of its products, even the least important of them, out of a combination of good material with bad? Does not every art, whatever material it works in, reject bad material as far as possible and use what is good and serviceable? The materials may be alike or dissimilar, but surely it is desirable that they should be sound, so that the art may combine them to form one product and fashion them to a structure proper to their specific function.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ Surely then the true and genuine statesmanship we are concerned with could never choose deliberately to construct the life of any community out of a combination of good characters with bad characters? Obviously it will first put the young children to the test in games. After this first test it will go on to entrust the young to competent educators trained to render this particular service, but it will retain direction and oversight of them all the time. This is exactly like weaving. The art of weaving hands over the materials it intends to use for the fabric to the carders and others concerned with preparatory processes, and yet it watches their work at every stage, retaining the direction and oversight itself and indicating to each auxiliary art such duties as it deems that each can usefully perform to make ready the threads for its own task of fashioning the web.

Socrates Younger/ Precisely.

Stranger/ This is the way I see the true statesman dealing with those who rear and educate children according to the

educational laws. He keeps the power of direction to himself. The only form of training he will permit is the one by which the educator produces the type of character fitted for his own task of weaving the web of state. He bids the educator encourage the young in these activities and in no others. Some pupils cannot be taught to be courageous and moderate and to acquire the other virtuous tendencies, but are impelled to godlessness and to vaunting pride and injustice by the drive of an evil nature. These the king expels from the community. He puts them to death or banishes them or else he chastises them by the severest public disgrace.

Socrates Younger/ So one usually hears it stated.

Stranger/ Furthermore, he makes those who prove incapable of rising above ignorance and groveling subservience slaves to the rest of the community.

Socrates Younger/ Quite rightly.

Stranger/ The statesman will then take over all the rest—all those who, under the training process, do in fact achieve sufficient nobility of character to stand up to the royal weaving process and yet to submit to it while it combines them all scientifically into a unity. Those in whom courage predominates will be treated by the statesman as having the firm warp-like character as one might call it. The others will be used by him for what we may likewise call the supple, soft, woof-like strands of the web. He then sets about his task of combining and weaving together these two groups exhibiting their mutually opposed characters.

Socrates Younger/ How does he do it?

Stranger/ He first unites that element in their souls which is supernatural by a divine bond, since this element in them is akin to the divine. After this supernatural link will

come the natural bond, human ties to supplement the divine ones.

Socrates Younger/ What do you mean by this? Once more I do not follow.

Stranger/ When there arises in the soul of men a right opinion concerning what is good, just, and profitable, and what is the opposite of these—an opinion based on absolute truth and settled as an unshakable conviction—I declare that such a conviction is a manifestation of the divine occurring in a race which is in truth of supernatural lineage.

Socrates Younger/ It could not be more suitably described.

Stranger/ Do we realize that it is the true statesman, in that he is the good and true lawgiver, who alone is able—for who else should possess the power—to forge by the wondrous inspiration of the kingly art this bond of true conviction uniting the hearts of the young folk of whom we were speaking just now—the young folk who have profited as they should from their education?

Socrates Younger/ That is certainly as one would expect.

Stranger/ The ruler who cannot weld that bond we will never honor with those glorious titles, ‘statesman' and ‘king.'

Socrates Younger/ Most rightly not.

Stranger/ Well then, will it not work out like this? The soul full of vigor and courage will be made gentle by its grasp of this truth and there is nothing as well calculated as this to make it a willing member of a community based on justice. If such a soul refused this gift, it will sink in the scale and become savage like a beast.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ What of the moderate soul? Sharing this firm conviction of truth, will it not be truly moderate and prudent,

or at any rate prudent enough, to meet its public duties? But if it refuses to share this conviction, it deserves to be called foolish and our reproach of it is entirely proper.

Socrates Younger/ It is indeed.

Stranger/ Do we agree then that this interweaving, this linking together, can never be lasting and permanent if vicious men are joined with other vicious men or good men with vicious? Surely no art would seriously try to forge such links where these faults of character exist?

Socrates Younger/ How could it?

Stranger/ But in those of noble nature from their earliest days whose nurture too has been all it should be, the laws can foster the growth of this common bond of conviction and only in these. This is the talisman appointed for them by the design of pure intelligence. This most godlike bond alone can unite the elements of goodness which are diverse in nature and would else be opposing in tendency.

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ There remain the other bonds, the human ones. When one sets to work with the divine link already forged it is not very difficult to see what these are and then to set about the forging of them.

Socrates Younger/ But what are these links and how can they be forged?

Stranger/ They are forged by establishing intermarriage between the two types so that the children of the mixed marriages are so to speak shared between them and by restricting private arrangements for marrying off daughters. Most men make unsuitable matches from the point of view of the begetting of children of the best type of character.

Socrates Younger/ What can you mean?

Stranger/ Would anyone think it worthwhile to censure in any respect the prevalent practice of pursuing wealth or influence when making such matches?

Socrates Younger/ No, there is nothing very wrong in it.

Stranger/ But when we are specially concerned with the very people who make much of being 'well connected,' justice requires that we should be all the more outspoken if we find them acting unsuitably.

Socrates Younger/ That is reasonable.

Stranger/ They do not act on any sound or self-consistent principle. See how they pursue the immediate satisfaction of their desire by hailing with delight those who are like themselves and by disliking those who are different. Thus they assign far too great an importance to their own likes and dislikes.

Socrates Younger/ In what way?

Stranger/ The moderate natures look for a partner like themselves, and so far as they can, they choose their wives from women of this quiet type. When they have daughters to bestow in marriage, once again they look for this type of character in the prospective husband. The courageous class does just the same thing and looks for others of the same type. All this goes on, though both types should be doing exactly the opposite.

Socrates Younger/ How can they, and why should they?

Stranger/ Because if a courageous character is reproduced for many generations without any admixture of the moderate type, the natural course of development is that at first it becomes superlatively powerful but in the end it breaks out into sheer fury and madness.

Socrates Younger/ That is to be expected.

Stranger/ But the character which is too full of modest reticence and untinged by valor and audacity, if reproduced after its kind for many generations, becomes too dull to respond to the challenges of life and in the end becomes quite incapable of acting at all.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, this is also the result one would expect.

Stranger/ I repeat what I was saying. There is no difficulty in forging these human bonds if the divine bond has been forged first. That bond is a conviction about values and standards shared by both types of character. There is one absorbing preoccupation for the kingly weaver as he makes the web of state. He must never permit the gentle characters to be separated from the brave ones; to avoid this he must make the fabric close and firm by working common convictions in the hearts of each type of citizen and making public honors and triumphs subserve this end, and finally, each must be involved with the other in the solemn pledges of matrimony. When he has woven his web smooth and 'close-woven,' as the phrase goes, out of men of these differing types, he must entrust the various offices of state to them to be shared in all cases between them.

Socrates Younger/ How can he do this?

Stranger/ When a single magistrate happens to be needed, the statesman must choose a man possessing both characteristics and set him in authority. Where several magistrates are wanted he must bring together some representatives of each type to share the duties. Magistrates of the moderate type are exceedingly cautious, fair, and tenacious of precedent, but they lack pungency and the drive which makes for efficiency.

Socrates Younger/ Yes, that certainly seems to be a fair summing up of the case.

Stranger/ The courageous type for their part have far less of the gifts of fairness and caution than their moderate brethren, but they have in a marked degree the drive that gets things done. A community can never function well either in the personal intercourse of its citizens or in its public activities unless both of these elements of character are present and active.

Socrates Younger/ Of course that is so.

Stranger/ Now we have reached the appointed end of the weaving of the web of state. It is fashioned by the statesman's weaving; the strands run true, and these strands are the gentle and the brave. Here these strands are woven together into a unified character. For this unity is won where the kingly art draws the life of both types into a true fellowship by mutual concord and by ties of friendship. It is the finest and best of all fabrics. It enfolds all who dwell in the city, bond or free, in its firm contexture. Its kingly weaver maintains his control and oversight over it, and it lacks nothing that makes for happiness so far as happiness is obtainable in a human community.

Socrates/ You have done what we requested of you, sir, and you have set beside your definition of the Sophist a picture drawn to perfection of the true king and statesman.

The Politicus.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. A Guest.

Theodorus. And Socrates Junior.

Socrates/ I am greatly indebted to you, Theodorus, for making me acquainted with Theætetus and this guest.

Theodorus/ Perhaps, Socrates, you will be indebted to me the triple of this, after these men have made you a politician and a philosopher.

Socrates/ Be it so. But shall we say we have heard this of you, who are most skillful in reasoning, and in things pertaining to geometry?

Theodorus/ What is that, Socrates?

Socrates/ That we should consider each of these men as of equal worth, though they are more remote from each other in honor than accords with the analogy of your art.

Theodorus/ By our God Ammon, Socrates, you have properly, justly, and promptly reproved me for my error in computation! But I shall speak with you about this at some other time. But do not you, O guest, in any respect be weary in gratifying us, but discuss for us, in order, either a politician first, or, if it is more agreeable to you, a philosopher.

Stranger/ We shall do so, Theodorus, as soon as we attempt this discussion, nor shall we desist till we arrive at the end of it. But what ought I to do respecting Theætetus here?

Theodorus/ About what?

Stranger/ Shall we suffer him to rest, and take in his stead Socrates here, as our associate in the discussion? Or how do you advise?

Theodorus/ As you say, take Socrates in his stead: for, both being young men, they will easily by resting be able to endure every kind of labor.

Socrates/ And indeed, O guest, both of them appear to be allied to me in a certain respect. For you say that one of them (Theætetus) appears to resemble me in the formation of his face; and the other possesses a certain alliance, through having the same name as myself. But it is requisite that we who are allied should always readily recognize this alliance by discourse. With Theætetus, therefore, I yesterday joined in discourse, and today I have heard him answering this guest: but neither of them has yet discoursed with Socrates here. It is, however, proper that he should be considered. Let him then answer me some other time, but at present let him answer you.

Stranger/ Let it be so, Socrates. Do you hear this, Socrates junior?

Socrates Younger/ I do.

Stranger/ Do you, therefore, assent to what he says?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ It appears, therefore, that you will be no impediment to our discussion; and perhaps it is requisite that much less should I be an impediment. But after a sophist, it is necessary, as it appears to me, that we should investigate a politician. Tell me, therefore, whether this character should be placed among the number of those that possess a scientific knowledge. Or how shall we say?

Socrates Younger/ That it ought.

Stranger/ We must, therefore, make a division of the sciences, just as we made a division in our investigation of the sophist.

Socrates Younger/ Perhaps so.

Stranger/ But yet it appears to me, Socrates, that we should not divide in the same manner.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly not.

Stranger/ But after another manner.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ Who then can find the political path? For it is requisite to find it, and, separating it from other things, to impress it with one idea, and, marking the other deflections, with another species, to make our soul conceive that all the sciences are comprehended in two species.

Socrates Younger/ I think, O guest, that this is your business, and not mine.

Stranger/ But indeed, Socrates, it is also requisite that it should be yours when it becomes apparent to us.

Socrates Younger/ You speak well.

Stranger/ Are not, therefore, the arithmetic, and certain other arts allied to this, divested of action, and do they not afford knowledge alone?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But those arts which pertain to architecture, and the whole of manual operation, possess, as it were, science connate with actions, and at the same time give completion to bodies produced by them, which before this had not a being.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ After this manner, therefore, divide all sciences, calling one practic, and the other gnostic alone.

Socrates Younger/ Let there be, therefore, one whole science, and two species of it.

Stranger/ Whether, therefore, shall we consider and denominate a politician, a king, a despot, and the governor of a family, as one and the same thing? Or shall we say there are as many arts pertaining to these as there are names? Or rather follow me hither.

Socrates Younger/ Whither?

Stranger/ To the consideration of this. If any private person is able to advise sufficiently a public physician, is it not necessary to call him by the name of that art which he who is advised professes?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And if any private person is able to give advice to a king, shall we not say that such a one possesses that science which the king himself ought to possess?

Socrates Younger/ We shall.

Stranger/ But is not the science of a true king royal?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ And may not he who possesses this science, whether he is a private man, or a ruler, be in every respect rightly called, according to this art, royal?

Socrates Younger/ He may, justly.

Stranger/ And are not the governor of a family and a despot the same?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But what? Is it of any consequence with respect to empire, whether the city is of a small or of an ample size?

Socrates Younger/ It is of no consequence.

Stranger/ It is evident, therefore (which is the thing we were just now inquiring), that there is one science respecting all these. But we do not think it is of any consequence

whether anyone denominates this science royal, or political, or economic.

Socrates Younger/ For of what consequence can it be?

Stranger/ This too is evident, that every king is able to do but a little with his hands, and the whole of his body, towards the possession of empire, but much by the wisdom and strength of his soul.

Socrates Younger/ It is evident.

Stranger/ Are you willing, therefore, we should say that a king is more allied to the gnostic than to the manual, and, in short, to the practic science?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ We must, therefore, combine into the same the political science and a politician, the royal science and a royal man, as all these are one thing.

Socrates Younger/ It is evident.

Stranger/ Let us, therefore, proceed in an orderly manner, and after this divide the gnostic science.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Attend, then, and inform me whether we can apprehend any way of escape in this.

Socrates Younger/ Tell me of what kind.

Stranger/ Of this kind. There is a certain logistic art.

Socrates Younger/ There is.

Stranger/ And this I think entirely belongs to the gnostic arts.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But the logistic art knows the difference in numbers. Shall we, therefore, attribute to it any further employment than that of distinguishing and judging about things known?

Socrates Younger/ Why?

Stranger/ For no architect works himself, but rules over workmen.

Socrates Younger/ It is so.

Stranger/ And he imparts indeed knowledge, but not manual operation.

Socrates Younger/ He does.

Stranger/ He may justly, therefore, be said to participate of the gnostic science.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But I think this belongs to the office of a judge, not to possess the end, nor to be liberated, in the same manner as the reckoner is liberated, but to order every manual operator that portion of work which is adapted to him, till that which they are commanded to do receives its completion.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ Are not, therefore, all such things as these gnostic, and likewise such as are consequent to the logistic art? And do not these two genera differ from each other in judgment and mandate?

Socrates Younger/ They appear to do so.

Stranger/ If, therefore, we should divide the whole of the gnostic science into two parts, denominating the one mandatory, and the other judicial, may we not say that we have made an elegant division?

Socrates Younger/ Yes, according to my opinion.

Stranger/ But those that do anything in common are delighted when they accord with each other.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ As far, therefore, as we accord in this particular we shall bid farewell to the opinions of others.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Come, then, inform me in which of these arts we must place a royal character. Must we place him in the judicial art, as a certain spectator? Or rather, shall we place him in the commanding art, acting as a despot?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly, rather in this.

Stranger/ Let us again consider whether the commanding art admits of distinction. For it appears to me, that as the art of a huckster differs from his art who sells his own goods, so the royal genus from the genus of public criers.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ Hucksters, first receiving the saleable works of others, afterwards sell them again themselves.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ In like manner, the tribe of criers, receiving the mandates of others, again imparts them to others.

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ What then? Shall we mingle the royal into the same with the interpretative, commanding, prophetic, and præconic genus, and with many other arts allied to these, all which have this in common that they command? Or are you willing that, as we just now assimilated, we should at present assimilate a name? since this genus of those who command their own concerns is nearly without a name. And thus we shall so divide these as to place the royal genus among the number of those that command their own concerns, neglecting every other particular, which anyone may denominate as he pleases. For our method was adopted for the sake of a ruler, and not for the sake of the contrary.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Since, therefore, this is sufficiently separated from those, and is brought by division from that which is

foreign to that which is domestic, it is necessary that this again should be divided, if we have yet any compliant section in this.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ And, indeed, it appears that we have. But follow me in dividing.

Socrates Younger/ Whither?

Stranger/ Do we not find that all such as rule by command issue out their commands for the sake of the generation of something?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ And, indeed, it is not in every respect difficult to give a two-fold division to all generated natures.

Socrates Younger/ After what manner?

Stranger/ Some among all of them are animated, and others are inanimate.

Socrates Younger/ They are so.

Stranger/ If we wish to cut the commanding division into these parts of the gnostic science, we should accordingly cut them.

Socrates Younger/ According to what?

Stranger/ One part of it should be assigned to the genera of inanimate natures, and the other to the genera of such as are animated. And thus the whole will receive a two-fold division.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ One part, therefore, we must omit, and resume the other; the whole of which we must again divide into two parts.

Socrates Younger/ But inform me which of these is to be resumed.

Stranger/ By all means, that which rules over animals. For it is not the province of the royal science to command things inanimate, like the architectonic science; but, being of a more generous nature, it always possesses its power in animals, and about things pertaining to them.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ With respect to the generation and nurture of animals, attention to the latter is confined to one animal, but the care belonging to the former extends in common to the whole herd.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ But we do not find that the attention of the politic science is of a private nature, like that of an ox-driver, or an equerry; but it is rather similar to the attention paid by him who feeds horses and oxen.

Socrates Younger/ This appears to be the case.

Stranger/ Whether, therefore, with respect to the nurture of animals, shall we denominate the nurture of a flock the common nurture of many, or a certain common nutrition?

Socrates Younger/ Both may be adopted in discourse.

Stranger/ You have answered well, Socrates. And if you avoid paying serious attention to names, you will appear in old-age to be more rich in intellectual prudence. Let us, therefore, now do as you advise. But do you understand how someone, by showing that the nurture of a herd is two-fold, will render that which is now investigated in things double, to be sought after in halves?

Socrates Younger/ I endeavor to do so: and it appears to me that there is one kind of nurture of men, and another of brutes.

Stranger/ You have divided in every respect promptly and valiantly. We must however to the utmost of our power be careful that we may not suffer this again.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That, we do not take away one small part in opposition to many and great parts, nor yet take it away without species, but always in conjunction with species. For it is most beautiful to separate immediately the object of inquiry from other things, if the separation is rightly made; just as you a little before hastily thought respecting division, in consequence of perceiving the discourse tending to mankind. Though indeed, my friend, it is not safe to divide with subtlety: but it is more safe to proceed dividing through media; for thus we shall more readily meet with ideas. But the whole of this confers to the objects of our investigation.

Socrates Younger/ How do you mean, O guest?

Stranger/ I will endeavor to speak yet more clearly, on account of the benevolence of your nature, Socrates. It is impossible, therefore, to evince the things now proposed in such a manner that nothing shall be wanting: but yet we must endeavor to rise a little higher in our speculation, for the sake of perspicuity.

Socrates Younger/ In what respect then do you say we have not just now rightly divided?

Stranger/ In this respect, that if anyone should attempt to give a two-fold division to the human genus, he would divide just as many of the present day divide. For these separate the Grecian genus apart from all others, as one thing; and denominate all other kinds of men, which are innumerable, unmixt, and discordant with each other, by one appellation, that of Barbarians; and through this one appellation, the genus itself appears to them to be one. But this is just as if someone, thinking that number should be

divided into two species, should cut off ten thousand from all numbers, as one species, and, giving one name to all the rest, should think that this genus will become separate and different from the other through the appellation. He however will divide in a more beautiful manner, and more according to species, and a two-fold division, who cuts number into the even and odd, and the human species into male and female; and who then separates the Lydians or Phrygians, or certain other nations, from all others, when he is incapable of finding the genus and at the same time part of each of the divided members.

Socrates Younger/ Most right. But inform me, O guest, how anyone may more clearly know that genus and part are not the same, but different from each other.

Stranger/ O Socrates, best of men, you enjoin me no trifling thing. And, indeed, we have now wandered further from our proposed discourse than is fit; and yet you order us to wander still more. Now, therefore, let us again return thither, whence we have digressed, as it is fit we should; and hereafter we will at leisure investigate the question proposed by you. However, do not by any means think that you have heard this clearly determined from me.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That species and part are different from each other.

Socrates Younger/ Why so?

Stranger/ When anything is a species of something, it is also necessary that it should be a part of the thing of which it is said to be the species: but it is by no means necessary that a part should be a species. Always consider me, therefore, Socrates, as asserting this rather than that.

Socrates Younger/ Be it so.

Stranger/ But inform me after this.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ Respecting that whence we have digressed hither. For I think that we principally digressed in consequence of your being asked how the nurture of a herd should be divided, and very readily answering that there were two kinds of animals, the one human, and the other comprehending the whole of the brutal species.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ And you then appeared to me, having taken away a part, to have thought that the remainder should be left as one genus of all brutes, because you could call all of them by the same name, viz. brutes.

Socrates Younger/ These things were so.

Stranger/ But this, O most valiant of men, is just as if some other prudent animal, as for instance a crane, should after your manner call cranes rational, thus exalting himself, and consider them as forming one genus among other animals, but, comprehending all the rest together with men, should perhaps denominate them nothing else than brutes. We should endeavor, therefore, to avoid everything of this kind.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ By not dividing every genus of animals, that we may be less exposed to this mistake.

Socrates Younger/ For there is no occasion.

Stranger/ We, therefore, then erred in this respect.

Socrates Younger/ In what respect?

Stranger/ That part of the gnostic science which is commanding was determined by us to be of that kind which is employed in the nurture of animals, viz. of gregarious animals. Was it not?

Socrates Younger/ It was.

Stranger/ The whole animal genus, therefore, was then divided into the tame and wild. For those animals that are naturally capable of being rendered gentle are called tame; but those that are not are denominated wild.

Socrates Younger/ Well said.

Stranger/ But the science which we are in search of, was and is in tame animals, and is to be investigated among such of these as are gregarious. Is it not so?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ We must not. therefore, divide as then, looking to all animals, nor must we divide hastily, in order that we may rapidly comprehend the politic science. For this would cause us to suffer that which the proverb speaks of.

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ By dividing too hastily, we shall finish more slowly.

Socrates Younger/ And it would very properly cause us to suffer, O Guest.

Stranger/ Be it so then. But let us again from the beginning endeavor to divide the common nurture of animals. For perhaps the discourse itself being brought to a conclusion will more clearly unfold that which you desire. But tell me this.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ What perhaps you have often heard from certain persons. For I do not think you have met with those who tame fish about the Nile, or the royal lakes. But perhaps you have been a spectator of the taming of these in fountains.

Socrates Younger/ I have been a spectator of this, and I have heard of the former from many.

Stranger/ You have likewise heard and believe that geese and cranes are fed by certain persons, though you have never wandered about the Thessalian plains.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ I have asked you all these questions, because the nurture of herds of animals is partly aquatic and partly terrestrial.

Socrates Younger/ It is so.

Stranger/ Does it not, therefore, appear to you, as well as to me, that the science respecting the common nurture of animals should receive a two-fold division, and that one part should be denominated that which nourishes in moisture, and the other that which nourishes in dryness?

Socrates Younger/ It does appear to me.

Stranger/ But we do not in the same manner inquire to which of these arts the royal science belongs. For it is evident to everyone.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ For everyone can divide the nurture of herds in dryness.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ Into the volant and gradient.

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ That the political science, however, is to be investigated among gradient animals, is, as I may say, obvious to the most stupid. Or do you not think it is?

Socrates Younger/ I do.

Stranger/ But it is requisite that, dividing the art of feeding animals, like an even number, we should show that it is two-fold.

Socrates Younger/ This is evident.

Stranger/ Moreover, the part to which our discourse impels us appears to extend itself in two certain paths; the one being short, in consequence of separating a small from a large part; but the other long, from preserving that precept which we mentioned before, that we ought to divide through media, as this is the most, ample division. It is permitted us, therefore, to proceed in either of these paths, as is most agreeable to us.

Socrates Younger/ Is it then impossible to proceed in both?

Stranger/ Not in both at once, O wonderful youth! But it is evident that it is possible to proceed in them separately.

Socrates Younger/ I will choose, therefore, to proceed in each apart from the other.

Stranger/ It is easy so to do, since what remains is but short. In the beginning, indeed, and middle of our journey we should have found it difficult to comply with this mandate. But now, since it appears to be best, let us first proceed in the longer road. For, as we have but recently engaged in this affair, we shall more easily journey through it. But look to the division.

Socrates Younger/ Say what it is.

Stranger/ The pedestrian genus of such tame animals as are gregarious must be divided by us according to nature.

Socrates Younger/ Why?

Stranger/ Because they must be divided into such as are without horns, and into such as are horned.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ Dividing then the art of feeding pedestrian animals, describe the condition of each part. For, if you should be willing to name them, you would be involved in difficulties more than is becoming.

Socrates Younger/ How then is it proper to speak of them?

Stranger/ Thus. Since the science of feeding animals receives a two-fold division, one member of it consists in the horned part of the flock, but the other in that part which is without horns.

Socrates Younger/ Let these things be so said: for they are sufficiently shown to be so.

Stranger/ Again, therefore, it will appear to us, that a king feeds a certain herd of mutilated hornless animals.

Socrates Younger/ For how is it possible this should not be evident?

Stranger/ Breaking this, therefore, in pieces, we will endeavor to exhibit that which is transacted by a king.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Whether, therefore, are you willing we should divide this herd into what is called the fissured and the solid hoof? Or man we divide it into common and private generation? For you understand me.

Socrates Younger/ What kind of generation do you mean?

Stranger/ That of horses and asses, which naturally generate from each other.

Socrates Younger/ They do.

Stranger/ But the remaining species, belonging to the one herd of tame animals, do not promiscuously mingle with each other, but those only of the same kind copulate together.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But whether does the political science appear to take care of the common, or of the private generation of animals?

Socrates Younger/ It is evident that it takes care of the unmingled generation of animals.

Stranger/ It is evident, then, as it seems, that we should give a two-fold division to this, as we did to the preceding particulars.

Socrates Younger/ It is indeed necessary.

Stranger/ But we have already nearly separated into minute parts every tame and gregarious animal, except two genera. For it is not fit to rank the genus of dogs among gregarious cattle.

Socrates Younger/ It is not. But how shall we divide these two?

Stranger/ After that manner, which it is just you and Theætetus should adopt in distributing, since you have touched on geometry.

Socrates Younger/ What manner is that?

Stranger/ By the diameter, and again by the diameter of the diameter.

Socrates Younger/ How do you say?

Stranger/ Is the condition of the human genus in any other way naturally adapted to progression than as a diameter, in power a biped?

Socrates Younger/ In no other way.

Stranger/ But again, the condition of the remaining genus is, according to the power of our power, a diameter, since it naturally consists of twice two feet.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly. And now I nearly understand what you wish to evince.

Stranger/ But besides these things, do we perceive, Socrates, a circumstance worthy of laughter, which happened to us in making the former division?

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ The human genus, mingled and concurring with a genus the most generous and tractable of all others.

Socrates Younger/ I perceive it, and likewise that it is a very absurd circumstance.

Stranger/ Is it not fit that the slowest things should arrive last of all?

Socrates Younger/ It is.

Stranger/ But we do not perceive this, that a king appears still more ridiculous when running together with the herd, and performing his course in conjunction with him who is exercised in the best manner with respect to a tractable life.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ For now, Socrates, that is more apparent which was said by us in our investigation of a sophist.

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ That, in such a method of discourse as this, he neither pays more attention to what is venerable than what is not, nor does he prefer the small to the great, but always accomplishes that which is most true.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ After this, that you may not accuse me, as you have inquired what is the shorter way to the definition of a king, I will, in the first place, consider this.

Socrates Younger/ By all means, do so.

Stranger/ But I say that a gradient animal ought to have been divided by us above into the biped and quadruped genus; and perceiving that man then alone remained in conjunction with the volant genus, the biped herd should again have been divided into the winged and without wings. But this division being made, and being evinced by that art which is the nurse of men, a political and royal character should be placed over it, like a charioteer, and the reins of

the city should be given to him, in consequence of this science being adapted to him.

Socrates Younger/ You have answered me beautifully, and as if you had been discharging a debt; and you have added a digression, by way of interest, and as the completion of your discourse.

Stranger/ Come, then, let us connect, by recurring from the beginning to the end, the discourse concerning the name of the politic art.

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ One part, therefore, of the gnostic science was asserted by us in the beginning to be of a commanding nature; and we said that the part of this science which commands from itself was assimilated to this. Again, we asserted that the nurture of animals was a part of the self-commanding science, and that this was not the smallest part. Likewise, that the nurture of herds was a species of the nurture of animals; and that the art which is nutritive of animals without horns, especially belongs to the art of feeding pedestrian animals. Again, it is necessary to connect not less than the triple of this part, if anyone is desirous of comprehending it in one name, viz. the science of an unmingled genus of feeding. But a section from this, which alone remains, and which feeds men, as ranking among bipeds, is the part which we are now exploring, and which we denominate royal, and at the same time political.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Do you therefore think, Socrates, that we have really done well, as you say?

Socrates Younger/ In what?

Stranger/ I mean that the thing proposed by us has been in every respect and sufficiently discussed. Or has our investigation been particularly deficient in this, that it has

given, indeed, a description of the thing, but such a one as is not perfectly finished?

Socrates Younger/ How do you say?

Stranger/ I will endeavor to explain my meaning more clearly.

Socrates Younger/ Do so.

Stranger/ Since, therefore, it has appeared that there are many pastoral arts, the politic science is one of these, and is the curator of one certain herd.

Socrates Younger/ It is.

Stranger/ Our discourse defined this to be neither the nurse of horses, nor of any other brutes, but to be the common nutritive science of men.

Socrates Younger/ It did so.

Stranger/ But let us contemplate the difference of all shepherds and kings.

Socrates Younger/ What is the difference?

Stranger/ If anyone possessing the name of another art should assert and vindicate to himself the nutrition in common of the human herd, what should we say?

Socrates Younger/ How is this?

Stranger/ Just as if all merchants, husbandmen, and cooks, and besides these the professors of gymnastic, and the genus of physicians, should verbally oppose the shepherds of the human race, whom we have called politicians, and should assert that the care of nurturing men belonged to them, and that they were not only shepherds of the herds of men, but even of rulers themselves.

Socrates Younger/ And would not their assertion be right?

Stranger/ Perhaps so. And let us also consider this. For we know that no one would contend with a herdsman about

things of this kind; since he is, doubtless, the nurse, the physician, and as it were brideman of a herd, and is alone skilled in the obstetric art respecting parturition and offspring. No one, besides, is better calculated, by such sport and music as the nature of cattle is capable of receiving, of consoling, and by alluring arts mitigating, with instruments, or the mere mouth, the herd committed to his care. And the same may be said of other shepherds. Or may it not?

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ How, then, will our discourse respecting a king appear to be right and entire, since we assert that he alone is the shepherd and nurse of the human herd, when at the same time ten thousand others contend for the same office?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ Did we not, therefore, a little before very properly fear, when we suspected lest we should only introduce a certain royal figure, and should not perfectly define a political character, unless we comprehended those that are connected with this character, and who profess themselves to be equally shepherds; and, separating a king from them, alone exhibited him pure?

Socrates Younger/ Our fear, indeed, was most right.

Stranger/ This therefore, Socrates, must be done by us, unless we intend to disgrace our discourse at the end.

Socrates Younger/ But this must by no means take place.

Stranger/ Again, therefore, we must proceed in another way from another beginning.

Socrates Younger/ In what way?

Stranger/ By nearly inferring a jest. For it is requisite to employ a copious part of a long fable, and to act in the same manner with what remains of our discussion, as we did above, viz. always to take away a part from a part, till we

arrive at the summit of our inquiry. Is it not proper to act in this manner?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Give me then, after the manner of boys, all your attention to the fable: for you are not very much removed from puerile years.

Socrates Younger/ Only relate it.

Stranger/ There were then, and still will be, many memorials of ancient affairs; and among others, there is one prodigious relation respecting the contention of Atreus and Thyestes. For you have heard and remember what is then said to have happened.

Socrates Younger/ Perhaps you speak of the prodigy respecting the golden ram.

Stranger/ By no means: but respecting the mutation of the rising and setting of the sun, and the other stars. For whence they now rise they did then set: and their rising was from a contrary place. Divinity, therefore, then giving a testimony to Atreus, changed the heavens into the present figure.

Socrates Younger/ This also is reported.

Stranger/ We have likewise heard from many respecting the kingdom of which Saturn was the founder.

Socrates Younger/ We have from very many.

Stranger/ And were not those ancient men born from the earth, and not generated from each other?

Socrates Younger/ This also is one of the things which are said to have happened formerly.

Stranger/ All these things, therefore, proceed from the same circumstance, and ten thousand others besides these, and which are still more wonderful. But, through length of time, some of them have become extinct, and others are

related in a dispersed manner, separate from each other. But that circumstance which is the cause of this taking place has not been mentioned by anyone. It must, however, now be related: for the relation will contribute to the demonstration of the nature of a king.

Socrates Younger/ You speak most beautifully. Speak, therefore, and do not omit anything.

Stranger/ Hear, then. Divinity himself sometimes conducts this universe in its progression, and convolves it: but at another time he remits the reins of his government, when the periods of the universe have received a convenient measure of time. But the world is again spontaneously led round to things contrary, since it is an animal, and is allotted wisdom from him who cooperated with it from the first in harmonizing all its parts with the whole. This progression, however, to things contrary is naturally implanted in it through the following cause.

Socrates Younger/ Through what cause?

Stranger/ To subsist always according to the same, and in a similar manner, and to be the same, alone belongs to the most divine of all things: but the nature of body is not of this order. But that which we call heaven and the world, receives many and blessed gifts from its producing cause. However, as it participates of body, it cannot be entirely void of mutation: nevertheless, as far as it is able, it is moved in the same, and according to the same, with one lation. Hence it is allotted a circular motion, because there is the smallest mutation of its motion. But nearly nothing is able to revolve itself, except that which is the leader of all things that are moved. And it is not lawful that this should at one time move in one way, and at another time in a different way. From all this, therefore, it must be said, that the world neither always revolves itself, nor that the whole of it is always convolved by

Divinity with two-fold and contrary convolutions: nor, again, that two certain Gods convolve it, whose decisions are contrary to each other. But that must be asserted which we just now said, and which alone remains, that at one time it is conducted by another divine cause, receiving again an externally acquired life, and a renewed immortality from the demiurgus; but that at another time, when he remits the reins of government, it proceeds by itself, and, being thus left for a time, performs many myriads of retrograde revolutions, because it is most great, and most equally balanced, and accomplishes its progressions with the smallest foot.

Socrates Younger/ All that you have said appears to be very probable.

Stranger/ From what has been said, therefore, we may now, by a reasoning process, apprehend that circumstance which we said was the cause of all wonderful things. For it is this very thing.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ That the circular motion of the universe is at one time accomplished as at present, and at another time in a contrary manner.

Socrates Younger/ But how is this the cause of all wonderful things?

Stranger/ It is requisite to think that this mutation is the greatest and most perfect of all the celestial conversions.

Socrates Younger/ It is likely.

Stranger/ It is proper, therefore, to think that the greatest mutations then happen to us who are the inhabitants of the world.

Socrates Younger/ And this also is likely.

Stranger/ But do we not know that the nature of animals sustains with difficulty great, numerous, and all-various mutations?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Hence, the greatest corruptions of other animals then necessarily take place, and very few of the human race remain. And to these many other wonderful and novel circumstances at the same time happen; but this is the greatest, and follows that revolution of the universe in which a conversion is effected contrary to the present.

Socrates Younger/ What circumstance do you mean?

Stranger/ That which takes place the first of all, when, in whatever age a mortal animal is constituted, he is no longer seen advancing to old-age, but is again changed to the contrary, and naturally becomes, as it were, younger and more delicate. The white hairs, too, of those more advanced in years then became black, and the cheeks of those that had beards became smooth; and thus each was restored to the past flower of his age. The bodies, likewise, of such as were in the bloom of youth, becoming smoother and smaller every day and night, again returned to the nature of a child recently born: and such were assimilated to this nature, both in soul and body. And at length their bodies, rapidly wasting away, perished. But the dead bodies of those who at that time died through violence were in like manner immanifestly, and in a few days, corrupted.

Socrates Younger/ But what was then, O guest, the generation of animals, and after what manner were they produced from each other?

Stranger/ It is evident, Socrates, that at that time there was no generation of one thing from another. But, as it is said that there was once an earth-born race, this race was at that period restored back again from the earth. This

information, too, was delivered to us by those our first progenitors, who lived immediately after the close of the last revolution. For they were public witnesses of the truth of our assertions, which at present are disbelieved, though improperly, by the multitude. For I think this particular ought to be attended to, as consequent to a part of the narration. For, if old men tended to the nature of boys, it follows, that such as were dead, but laid in the earth, must be again restored from thence, revive again, and follow that revolution of the universe, in which generation is convolved in a contrary order; and that the earth-born race, which according to this reason is necessarily produced, should thus be denominated and defined, viz. such of them as Divinity has transferred into another destiny.

Socrates Younger/ This very much follows from what has been said above. But with respect to the life which you say was under the power of Saturn, did it subsist in those revolutions, or in these? For it is evident that the mutation of the stars and the sun happens in both these revolutions.

Stranger/ You follow the discourse well. But, in answer to your question respecting all things being produced spontaneously for mankind, this by no means is the case in the present, but happened in the former revolution. For then Divinity was first the ruler and curator of the whole circulation; just as now the several parts of the world are locally distributed by ruling Gods. Divine dæmons, too, were allotted, after the manner of shepherds, animals according to genera and herds; each being sufficient for all things pertaining to the several particulars over which he presided. So that there was nothing rustic, no mutual rapine, no war, nor sedition of any kind; and ten thousand other things took place, which are the consequences of such a period. But what is said respecting the spontaneous life of these men is asserted because Divinity himself fed them, and was their

curator; just as men who are of a more divine, are the shepherds of brutes, who are of a baser, nature. In consequence, too, of men being fed by Divinity, there were no polities, nor possessions of women and children. For all these were restored to life from the earth, and without having any recollection of former events. But all such things as these were absent. The inhabitants, too, had fruits in abundance from oaks, and many other trees, which did not grow through the assistance of agriculture, but were spontaneously given by the earth. And for the most part they were naked, slept without coverlids, and were fed in the open air. For the temperament of the seasons was innoxious to them. They had soft beds, too, from grass, which germinated in unenvying abundance from the earth. And thus, Socrates, you have heard what was the life of men under the reign of Saturn: but you yourself have seen what the condition of the present life is, which is said to be under Zeus. But are you able, and likewise willing, to judge which of these is the more happy?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ Are you willing, therefore, that I should after a manner judge for you?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ If, therefore, those that were nurtured by Saturn in so much leisure, and with the power not only of converting with men, but with brutes, used all the above-mentioned particulars for the purpose of philosophy, associating with brutes and with each other, and inquiring of every nature which had a perceptive power of its own, in what respect it differed from others as to the common possession of prudence; from all this it may be easily inferred, that the men of those times were incomparably more happy than those that exist at present. But if, being

abundantly filled with meats and drinks, their discourses with each other, and with brutes, were such as at present they are related to have been, from this also, in my opinion, their superior felicity may be very easily inferred. At the same time, however, we shall dismiss these particulars till some sufficient judge of them shall arise, who will unfold to us whether the men of that period were inclined to sciences and discourse. But let us now relate on what account we introduced the fable, that we may after this bring to a conclusion what remains. For, after the time of all these was consummated, and it was requisite that a mutation should take place, and besides this, the whole terrestrial genus being consumed, as all the generations of every soul had received their completion, and as many seeds having fallen on the earth as were destined to each soul, —then the governor of the universe, laying aside as it were the handle of his rudder, departed to that place of survey whence he contemplates himself. But then fate and connate desire again convolved the world. All those Gods, therefore, who govern locally, in conjunction with the greatest dæmon, knowing what had now happened, again deprived the parts of the world of their providential care. But the world becoming inverted, conflicting with itself, and being agitated by an impulse contrary to its beginning and end, and likewise making an abundant concussion in itself, produced again another corruption of all-various animals. After these things, however, and the expiration of a sufficient length of time, the tumult, confusion, and concussions ceased, and the world, becoming tranquil and adorned, again proceeded in its usual course, possessing a providential care and dominion, both over itself and the natures which it contains; remembering, to the utmost of its power, the instructions of the demiurgus and father. At the beginning, therefore, it accomplished this more perfectly, but at the end more

remissly. But the cause of this is the corporeal form of the temperature, and which was nursed together with an ancient nature. For it was a participant of much disorder before it arrived at the present ornament. For, from its composing artificer, indeed, it possesses every good; but, from its former habit, all that atrocity and injustice which subsist within the heavens. And these the world both possesses from that former habit, and inserts in animated natures. The world, therefore, when nourishing the animals which it contains, in conjunction with the governor, brings forth small evils, and mighty goods: but when it is separated from him, during the nearest time of its departure, it conducts all things beautifully. At a more distant period, however, and from oblivion being generated in it, the property of its former dissonance rules with greater force. And at the last period of time it becomes deflorescent; and producing small goods, but mingling much of the temperament of things contrary to good, it arrives at the danger of both itself, and the natures which it contains, being dissolved. Hence that God who adorned the world, then perceiving the difficulties under which it labors, and anxious lest, being thus tempestuously agitated, it should be dissolved by the tumult, and be plunged into the infinite sea of dissimilitude, again resumes the helm, and adorns and corrects whatever is diseased and dissolved through the inordinate motion of the former period, and renders the world immortal and unconscious of age. This, therefore, is the end of the whole narration. But this is sufficient to show the nature of a king to such as attend to what has been already said. For, the world being again converted to the present path of generation, the progression of its age again stopped, and it imparted novel things, the very contraries to what it then imparted. For animals proximate to death, on account of their smallness, are increased. But bodies

recently born from the earth, hoary, again dying, descend into the earth; and all other things are transmuted, imitating and following the condition of the universe. The imitation, likewise, of motion, generation, and nutriment, follows all things from necessity. For it is no longer possible for an animal to be produced in the earth, through other things mutually composing it; but, as the world was destined to be the absolute ruler of its own progression, after the same manner its parts also were destined by a similar guidance to spring forth, generate, and nourish, as far as they are able. But we have now arrived at that for the sake of which the whole of our discourse was undertaken. For, with respect to other animals, many particulars, and of a prolix nature, might be discussed; such as, from what things they are severally composed, and through what causes they were changed: but the particulars respecting men are shorter, and more to our purpose. For, mankind being destitute of the guardian care of the dæmon whole possession we are, and who is the shepherd of our race, and as many animals who are naturally cruel became transported with rage, hence men, now imbecile, and without a guard, were torn in pieces by such animals. And besides this, men in those first times were unskillful, and had no knowledge of the arts, because the earth spontaneously afforded them nutriment: but they did not know how to procure it, because they were not compelled by any previous necessity. From all these causes they were involved in the greatest difficulties. Hence, those gifts which are said to have been formerly imparted to us by the Gods were imparted with necessary instruction and erudition: fire, indeed, from Prometheus, but the arts from Vulcan and Minerva. Again, seeds and plants were imparted by other divinities; and, in short, all such things as are the support of human life. For men, as we have said, were not left destitute of the guardian care of the Gods; and it became

requisite that they also should pay attention to the concerns of life, in the same manner as the whole world; in the imitating and following which, through all the revolutions of time, we live and are born in a different manner at different periods. And let this be the end of the fable. But we shall make it useful to discover how far we have erred in the above definition of a royal and political character.

Socrates Younger/ In what respect, and how far, do you say we have erred?

Stranger/ Partly less, and in a more generous manner, and partly in a greater degree, and more abundantly.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ Because, while we were asked respecting a king and politician belonging to the present circulation and generation, we adduced a shepherd of a herd of men belonging to the contrary period; and in consequence of this shepherd being a God, and not a man, we transgressed abundantly: but again, because we evinced that this shepherd was the governor of the whole city, but yet did not say after what manner, in this respect we asserted what is true, but were deficient as to the whole and the perspicuous; and on this account we erred less in this latter case than in the former.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ We ought, therefore, as it seems, to think that we shall then have perfectly described a political character when we have defined the mode of governing a city.

Socrates Younger/ Beautifully said.

Stranger/ On this account we related that fable, not only that those might be pointed out who oppose the royal character we are now investigating with respect to the nurture of a herd, but that we might more clearly perceive him who alone ought to be called a pastor, since after the

manner of a shepherd and herdsman he takes care of the nurture of the human race.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ But I think, Socrates, that this figure of a divine shepherd is still greater than that which belongs to a king; and that the politicians of the present day are naturally much more similar to subjects than governors, and in a manner more allied to these participate of discipline and nurture.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But we must not inquire whether they have been more or less so, and whether they are naturally so or not.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly not.

Stranger/ Again, therefore, let us thus resume our inquiry. We said, then, that there was a self-commanding art respecting animals, which took care of them, not privately, but in common; and this art we then directly called the herd-nourishing art. Do you recollect?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ In this, therefore, we erred. For we have not by any means comprehended in a definition the political character, nor given it a name; but its name as yet flies from us.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ To nourish the several herds of animals belongs to all other shepherds; but we have not given a fit name to the political character, which requires the application of something common.

Socrates Younger/ You speak the truth, if this common something can be obtained.

Stranger/ But is it not possible to apply healing, as that which is common to all things, without either defining nutriment, or any other thing? and to introduce another certain art, either pertaining to the nurture of herds, or therapeutic, or adapted to take care of something; and thus to comprehend the political character together with others, since reason signifies that this ought to be done?

Socrates Younger/ Right. But after this, in what manner must the division be made?

Stranger/ As before we divided the herd-nourishing art into the gradient and winged tribes, and into the horned and without horns, in the same manner we should divide the art pertaining to the care of herds, which will thus be similarly comprehended in our discourse, together with the kingdom of Saturn.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so. But go on with your inquiries.

Stranger/ If, then, the name of the art pertaining to the care of herds had been thus adopted, no one would have opposed us, as if there were no careful attention whatever; just as then it was justly contended, that there is no art in us which deserves the appellation of nutritive; and that, if there were any such art, it belongs to many things prior to, and preferable to, anything pertaining to kings.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ But no other art endeavors to accomplish this more, and in a milder manner, as if it paid a careful attention to the whole of human communion, than the royal art.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ But after these things, Socrates, do you perceive how very much we have erred about the end?

Socrates Younger/ What kind of error have we committed?

Stranger/ We have erred in this, that though we have conceived that there is a certain nutritive art of a biped herd, yet we ought not immediately to have called it royal and politic, as if entirely complete.

Socrates Younger/ Why not?

Stranger/ In the first place, as we have said, the name ought to be accommodated more to attentive care than to nutriment: and in the next place, this attentive care ought to be divided. For it will receive no small sections.

Socrates Younger/ Of what kind?

Stranger/ The sections will be a divine shepherd, and a human curator.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ And again, it is necessary to give a two-fold distribution to human care.

Socrates Younger/ What are the two parts?

Stranger/ The violent and the voluntary.

Socrates Younger/ What then?

Stranger/ And erring in this, with greater ineptitude than is becoming, we considered a king and a tyrant as the same, though they are most dissimilar both in themselves and in their mode of government.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ Now, therefore, again correcting ourselves (as I have already said), we shall divide human care into the violent and the voluntary.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ And the violent we shall call tyrannic: but the voluntary, and the attention paid to the herds of voluntary biped animals, we shall denominate politic. We shall therefore evince, that he who possesses this art and care is truly a king and a politician.

Socrates Younger/ And thus the demonstration, O guest, respecting political affairs will, as it appears, be perfect.

Stranger/ It will be well for us, Socrates, if this is the case. But it is requisite that these things should not only be apparent to you, but likewise to me, in common with you. But at present a king appears to me not to possess as yet a perfect figure: but just as Statuaries, who by hastening their work sometimes unseasonably, and adding more and larger things than are fit, finish it more slowly; so we at present have not only rapidly and magnificently evinced that we erred in the former part of our discussion, in consequence of thinking that great paradigms should be employed about a king, but we reviled the wonderful bulk of the fable, and were compelled to use a greater part of it than was proper. On this account, we have made a more prolix demonstration, and have not entirely finished the fable. But, indeed, our discourse, like an animal, appears to have its exterior delineation sufficiently perfect, but is not yet perspicuous, through paint, and the mixture of colors. But it is more becoming to exhibit every animal by words and discourse, to such as are able to follow the disquisition, than by painting, and the whole of manual operation; but other things are to be exhibited through the operations of the hand.

Socrates Younger/ This, indeed, is rightly said: but show me why you say you have not yet spoken sufficiently.

Stranger/ It is difficult, O divine youth, to exhibit great things perspicuously, without examples. For each of us appears to know all things as in a dream, and again to be ignorant of all things according to a wakeful perception.

Socrates Younger/ How do you say this?

Stranger/ We appear at present to have moved very absurdly the passion respecting science which is in us.

Socrates Younger/ In what respect?

Stranger/ The example, O blessed youth, which I have adduced will again require an example.

Socrates Younger/ Why? Tell me, and do not in any respect be remiss on my account.

Stranger/ I will, since you are prepared to follow me. For we know what boys do as soon as they have acquired a knowledge of their letters.

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ They sufficiently perceive each of the elements in the shortest and easiest syllables, and are able to speak the truth concerning them.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But, being again dubious about these in other syllables, they are deceived in opinion and discourse.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ May they not, therefore, thus be easily, and in the most beautiful manner, led to things which they do not yet know?

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ By leading them first to those syllables in which they have had right opinions respecting these very same things; but, when we have thus led them, to place before them things which they do not yet know; and, by comparing them together, to show them that there is the same similitude and nature in both the complications, till the things conceived by true opinion are presented to the view compared with all the unknown particulars. But these being presented to the view, and examples of them produced, it will cause them to denominate that which is different in all the elements of every syllable as different from other things; but that which is the same, as always the same, according to things the same with itself.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ This, therefore, we sufficiently comprehend, viz. that the generation of a paradigm then takes place, when that which is the same in another divulged particular being rightly conceived by opinion, and accommodated to each, produces one true opinion of both.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ Shall we therefore wonder, if our soul, suffering the same thing naturally about the elements of all things, at one time is established in certain particulars by truth itself about each individual thing, and at another time fluctuates in other particulars, about all things? And that when, in certain commixtions, it thinks rightly, it should again be ignorant of these very same things, when it is transferred to long and difficult syllables of things?

Socrates Younger/ There is nothing wonderful in this.

Stranger/ For how, my friend, can anyone, beginning from false opinion, arrive at any, even the smallest part of truth, and thus acquire wisdom?

Socrates Younger/ Nearly no one.

Stranger/ If, therefore, these things naturally subsist in this manner, you and I shall not in any respect err, if we first of all endeavor to perceive the nature of the whole paradigm in another small and partial paradigm; and after this, betaking ourselves to the paradigm of a king, which is the greatest of all paradigms, and deriving it from lesser things, endeavor again, through a paradigm, to know by art the remedy of political affairs, that we may be partakers of wakeful perceptions instead of a dream.

Socrates Younger/ Perfectly right.

Stranger/ Again, therefore, let us resume the former part of our discourse, viz. that since an innumerable multitude, together with the royal genus, doubt respecting the

government of a city, it is requisite to separate all these from the royal genus, and to leave it by itself. And for this purpose we said it was requisite that we should have a certain paradigm.

Socrates Younger/ And very much so.

Stranger/ But what paradigm can anyone adduce which both contains political concerns, and is the smallest possible, so that he may sufficiently find the object of his investigation? Are you willing, by Zeus, unless we have something else at hand, that we choose the weaving art? Not the whole, indeed, if it is agreeable to you: for, perhaps, the weaving of wool will be sufficient. For it may happen that this part being chosen may testify that which we wish to evince.

Socrates Younger/ For why should it not?

Stranger/ Shall we therefore now, with respect to this part of the weaving art, act in the same manner as we did above, viz. divide every particular by cutting the parts of parts? and, passing over all things in the shortest manner possible, return to that which is useful to our present purpose?

Socrates Younger/ How do you say?

Stranger/ My answer to you shall be an explanation of the thing.

Socrates Younger/ You speak most excellently.

Stranger/ Of all the things which we fabricate and possess, some are for the sake of doing something, and others are auxiliaries against any inconvenience we may suffer. And of auxiliaries, some are alexipharmic, as well divine as human; but others are subservient to defense. And of things subservient to defense, some consist of warlike apparatus, and others are enclosures. And of enclosures, some are veils, and others are defenses against heat and

cold. But of defenses, some are coverings, and others are apparel. And of apparel, one part is an under veil, and another a surrounding covering. And of surrounding coverings, some are simple, and others composite. But of the composite, some are perforated, but others are connected together without perforation. And of those that are without perforation, some are composed from the nerves of things growing out of the earth, but others are hairy. And of the hairy, some are conglutinated by water and earth, but others are themselves connected together with themselves. To these auxiliaries and coverings, which are wrought from the same things being bound together, we give the name of garments. But we call that art which is especially conversant with garments, vestific, from the thing itself, in the same manner as above we called the art respecting a city politic. We likewise say that the weaving art, so far as for the most part it weaves garments, differs in nothing but the name from the vestific art; just in the same manner as we formerly observed that a royal differed only nominally from a political character.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ But after this we should thus reason: that someone may, perhaps, think it has been sufficiently shown that the weaving art is conversant with garments, but may not be able to perceive, that though it is not yet distinguished from things which cooperate near together, it is separated from many other things of a kindred nature.

Socrates Younger/ Tell me what things of a kindred nature.

Stranger/ You do not understand what has been said, as it seems. It appears, therefore, that we should return from the end to the beginning. For, if you understand propinquity, we have now separated this from the weaving art, by

distributing the composition of coverings into things put under, and things surrounding us.

Socrates Younger/ I understand you.

Stranger/ We have likewise separated every kind of fabrication from thread and broom, and all such plantal productions as we just now called nerves. We also defined the compressive art, and the composition which employs perforation and sewing, which for the most part pertains to the currier's art.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ We also separated the fabrication of simple coverings from skins, and of such coverings as are employed in building, and in the whole of the tectonic, and in all other arts which are employed in stopping the effluxions of water. Also such arts as procure restraints in joining, and violent actions, and which are employed about the construction of doors, and distribute the parts of the cementing art. We have likewise divided the armor-making art, which is a section of the great and all-various power effective of defense. We also defined, in the very beginning, the whole art of cooking, which is conversant with alexipharmics; and we left a certain art, which appears to be that we are in pursuit of, viz. which defends against cold, produces woolen vestments, and is called the art of weaving.

Socrates Younger/ It seems so.

Stranger/ But we have not yet, O boy, perfectly discussed this matter. For he who is first engaged in the making of garments appears to act in a manner directly contrary to the weaver.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ For the work of the weaver is a certain knitting together.

Socrates Younger/ It is.

Stranger/ But the work of him who first engages in the making of garments consists in dissolving things joined together.

Socrates Younger/ What kind of work is this?

Stranger/ The work of the art of carding wool. Or shall we dare to call the art of carding wool the weaving art, and a wool-carder a weaver?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ But if anyone should call the art effective of the thread and woof in a loom the weaving art, he would assert a paradox, and give it a false name.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But whether shall we say that the whole attention and care of the fuller and the mender contribute nothing to the making of garments? Or shall we also call these weaving arts?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ But all these contend with the power of the weaving art, respecting the care and the making of garments; attributing, indeed, to it the greatest part, but likewise assigning to themselves great portions of the same art.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Besides these, it further appears requisite, that the arts effective of the instruments through which the weaver accomplishes his work, should be considered as concauses of every work accomplished by weaving.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ Whether, therefore, will our discourse about the weaving art, a part of which we have chosen, be sufficiently defined, if we assert that it is the most beautiful and the greatest of all the arts which are employed about

woolen garments? Or shall we thus, indeed, speak something of the truth, but yet neither clearly nor perfectly till we have separated all these arts from it?

Socrates Younger/ This will be the case.

Stranger/ Must we not, therefore, in the next place act in this manner, that our discourse may proceed in an orderly series?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ In the first place, therefore, let us consider two arts which subsist about all things.

Socrates Younger/ What are they?

Stranger/ One is the concause of generation, and the other is the cause itself.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ Such arts as do not fabricate the thing itself, but prepare instruments for the fabricators, without which instruments the proposed work cannot be effected, —these are concauses: but those which fabricate the thing itself are causes.

Socrates Younger/ This distinction is reasonable.

Stranger/ In the next place, those arts which produce the distaff, and the shuttle, and such other instruments as contribute to the making of garments, —all these I call concauses: but those which pay attention to and fabricate garments I call causes.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ But, of causes, it will be proper especially to collect that which pertains to the washing of garments, and that which is skilled in mending, and all the therapeutic care about these, since the cosmetic art is abundant, and to denominate the whole the fuller's art.

Socrates Younger/ It will so.

Stranger/ But there is one art comprehending that part which cards wool and spins, and likewise everything pertaining to the making of garments, and which is called by all men the wool-working art.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ The art of carding wool, and the half of that art which uses the shuttle, and that art which separates from each other things joined together, —all these, in short, form a part of the wool-working art, of which there are two great parts, one collective, and the other separative.

Socrates Younger/ There are so.

Stranger/ The art of carding wool, therefore, and all those other arts which we just now mentioned, belong to the separative part. For that art which divides in wool and thread, after one manner with the shuttle, and after another with the hands, has all the names which we have just now mentioned.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Again, we must take a part of the collective part, and of the wool-working art contained in it; but we must pass by all such things of a separating nature as we happen to find there, and bisect the wool-working art, together with the collective and separative section.

Socrates Younger/ Let us divide them.

Stranger/ It will be proper for you, therefore, Socrates, to divide the collective, together with the wool-working part, if we wish to apprehend sufficiently the proposed weaving art.

Socrates Younger/ It will be requisite.

Stranger/ It will indeed: and we say, therefore, that one part of it is streptic, or conversant with rolling, and the other symplectic, or complicative.

Socrates Younger/ Do I then understand you? For you appear to me to say that the elaboration of the thread is streptic.

Stranger/ Not the elaboration of this only, but likewise of the woof. Or can we find any generation of it which is not streptic?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ Desire also each of these: for perhaps you will find the definition seasonable.

Socrates Younger/ In what respect?

Stranger/ In this. We say that the work of the wool-carder, when it is drawn out into length and breadth, is a certain fracture.

Socrates Younger/ We do.

Stranger/ This, when it is turned by the distaff, and becomes a solid thread, is called stamen: but they say that the art which directs this is stemonic, or conversant with stuff to be woven.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ But such things as receive a loose contortion, and by the implication of the thread with the attraction of the polish acquire a measured softness, —of these we call what is spun the woof, but the art itself which presides over these, wool-spinning.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ And now that part of the weaving art which we proposed is obvious to everyone. For, with respect to a part of the collective art in the working of wool, when it accomplishes that which is woven by a fit knitting together of the woof and the thread, then the whole of the thing woven is called a woolen garment, but the art presiding over this, textorian.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ Be it so. But why then did we not immediately answer, that the plectic art is that which weaves together the woof and the thread, instead of proceeding in a circle, and defining many things in vain?

Socrates Younger/ It does not appear to me, O guest, that we have said anything in vain.

Stranger/ This is not at all wonderful. But perhaps, O blessed youth, it will be seen that you will often hereafter fall into this disease. Nor is it wonderful. But hear ascertain discourse, which is proper to be delivered respecting all such particulars as these.

Socrates Younger/ Only relate it.

Stranger/ Let us, therefore, in the first place, behold the whole of excess and deficiency, that we may praise and blame according to reason whatever is said with more prolixity or brevity than is becoming in disputations of this kind.

Socrates Younger/ It will be proper so to do.

Stranger/ But I think we shall do right by discoursing about these things.

Socrates Younger/ About what things?

Stranger/ About prolixity and brevity, and the whole of excess and deficiency. For the art of measuring is conversant with all these.

Socrates Younger/ It is.

Stranger/ We will divide it, therefore, into two parts. For it is requisite to that after which we are hastening.

Socrates Younger/ Inform me how this division is to be made.

Stranger/ Thus. One part according to the communion of magnitude and parvitude with each other; but the other part according to the necessary essence of generation.

Socrates Younger/ How do you say?

Stranger/ Does it not appear to you to be natural, that the greater ought to be called greater than nothing else than the lesser? and again, that the lesser should not be lesser than anything than the greater?

Socrates Younger/ To me it does.

Stranger/ But what? Must we not say that what surpasses the nature of mediocrity, and is surpassed by it, whether in words or actions, is that by which especially good and bad men differ from each other?

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ These two-fold essences, therefore, and judgments of the great and the small must be established; but not, as we just now said, with reference to each other only. But, as we now say, they are rather partly to be referred to each other, and partly to mediocrity. Are we however willing to learn on what account this is requisite?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ If someone refers the nature of the greater to nothing else than the nature of the lesser, he will not refer it to mediocrity. Or will he?

Socrates Younger/ He will not.

Stranger/ May we not, therefore, divide the arts themselves, and all their works, according to this reasoning? And shall we not entirely take away the political science which we are now investigating, and that which is called the weaving art? For all such things as these guard against that which is more or less than mediocrity, not as if it had no subsistence, but as a thing of a difficult nature in actions.

And after this manner preserving mediocrity, they effect everything beautiful and good.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ If, therefore, we take away the politic science, will not our investigation after this of the royal science be dubious?

Socrates Younger/ Very much so.

Stranger/ Whether, therefore, as in our investigation of a sophist, we compelled non-being to be, after discourse about it fled from us, so now shall we compel the more and the less to become measured, not only with reference to each other, but likewise to the generation of mediocrity? For no one can indubitably become a politician, or knowing in anything else pertaining to actions, unless he assents to this.

Socrates Younger/ We ought, therefore, especially to do this now.

Stranger/ This, Socrates, is a still greater work than that; though, as we may remember, that was very prolix. But a thing of this kind may be supposed respecting them, and very justly.

Socrates Younger/ Of what kind?

Stranger/ That there is occasion for what we are now speaking of, in order to evince what is accurate respecting this thing. Further still, with respect to the present particulars, it appears to me to have been shown sufficiently, that this discourse will afford us magnificent assistance, as leading us to think that all arts are to be similarly measured according to the more and the less, not only among themselves, but likewise with reference to the generation of mediocrity. For, this having a subsistence, they also are: and, these subsisting, this also is And either of these being taken away, neither of them will subsist.

Socrates Younger/ This indeed is right. But what follows?

Stranger/ We should evidently divide the art of measuring (as we have said) into two parts; placing as one of its parts all those arts which measure number, length, breadth, depth, and velocity, with reference to the contrary; but placing as its other part, such arts as regard the moderate and the becoming, the seasonable and the fit, and all such as fly from the extremes to the middle.

Socrates Younger/ Each of these sections is great, and they differ much from each other.

Stranger/ That, Socrates, which is sometimes asserted by many of those elegant men, who think they assert something wise, when they say that the art of measuring is conversant with all generated natures, is now asserted by us. For all artificial things after a certain manner participate of measure; but, in consequence of not being accustomed to divide according to species, these men immediately collect into the same these things which so widely differ from each other, and consider them as similar. And, again, they do the very contrary to this: for things which are different they do not divide according to parts, though it is requisite that, when anyone first perceives the communion of many things, he should not desist till he perceives all the differences in it which are placed in species: and again, when he perceives all-various dissimilitudes in multitudes, he cannot desist from this difficult perception, till, having enclosed all such things as are allied in one similitude, he comprehends them in the essence of a certain genus. And thus much may suffice respecting these particulars, and concerning defect: and excess. This only must be carefully observed, that two genera of measures about these particulars have been invented, and that we should remember what they are.

Socrates Younger/ We will remember.

Stranger/ But, after this discussion, let us assume another respecting the objects of our investigation, and the whole purport of this discourse.

Socrates Younger/ What is it?

Stranger/ If anyone should ask us respecting the custom of those that learn their letters, when they are asked from what letters a word is composed, shall we say that the inquiry is then made for the sake of one word only, or that they may become more skillful in everything pertaining to grammar?

Socrates Younger/ Evidently that they may become more skillful in the whole of grammar.

Stranger/ But what again? Is our inquiry respecting a politician undertaken by us more for the sake of the politician, than that we may become more skillful in every discussion?

Socrates Younger/ This also is evident, that it is undertaken on this latter account.

Stranger/ No one indeed endued with intellect would be willing to investigate the art of weaving, for its own sake alone: but I think most men are ignorant, that there are certain sensible similitudes of things which are naturally capable of being easily learnt, and that there is no difficulty in making these manifest, when anyone wishes to point them out to someone inquiring a reason respecting them, not in conjunction with things, but with facility, without aligning a reason. But of things the greatest and the most honorable, there is not any image clearly fabricated for men, which being exhibited by him who wishes to fill the soul of the inquirer, can, by being harmonized to some one of the senses, sufficiently fill the soul. Hence it is requisite to meditate how we may be able to give and receive a reason for everything. For incorporeal natures, as they are the most

beautiful and the greatest of all things, can alone be clearly pointed out by reason, but by nothing else. And all we have said at present is asserted for the sake of these things. But the consideration of every particular is more easily effected in small things than in such as are great.

Socrates Younger/ You speak most beautifully.

Stranger/ Do we, therefore, remember on what account all these things have been said by us?

Socrates Younger/ On what account?

Stranger/ Principally on account of the difficulty in which we were involved, through the prolix discourse about the weaving art, and the revolution of the universe. We likewise considered the discourse of the sophist about the essence of non-being, as full of prolixity. And on all these accounts we terrified ourselves, fearing lest we should speak superfluously in conjunction with prolixity. Consider, therefore, all these things as said by us, in order that we may not suffer anything of this kind again.

Socrates Younger/ Be it so. Only discuss what remains.

Stranger/ I say, therefore, it is requisite that both you and I should be mindful of what we have now said, as often as brevity or prolixity of discourse is blamed, not judging the prolixities by one another, but according to that part of the measuring art, which we said above ought to be remembered with a view to the becoming.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ But yet all things are not referred to this. For we do not require In order to obtain pleasure a prolixity which harmonizes with nothing, unless as a certain appendix. Nor is it proper to make the easy and rapid discovery of the object of our investigation our principal intention; but this ought to be considered by us as a secondary thing. But we should by far most especially, and

in the first place, honor the method which is able to divide according to species. We should likewise by no means, be indignant with a discourse, however extended, which renders the hearer more inventive; and the same must be said of a discourse however short. Further still, it becomes him who blames long discourses in disquisitions such as these, and who does not admit circular periods, not to condemn them altogether rapidly, and immediately, but to show first that we shall be more fit for discussion, and more capable of discovering things by reason, by shorter discourses: but we should neither pay any attention to, nor even seem to hear any other praise or blame. And thus much may suffice for these things, if it also seems so to you. Let us, therefore, again return to the political character, introducing the before-mentioned paradigm of the weaving art.

Socrates Younger/ You speak well: and let us do as you say.

Stranger/ Is not, therefore, the office of a king to be separated from that of many shepherds, or rather from that of all those who have the charge of herds?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But we say that the consideration of causes and concauses respecting a city remains, which are first to be divided from each other.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ You know, therefore, that it is difficult to bisect these. But the cause of this will, I think, in the course of our inquiry be not less apparent.

Socrates Younger/ It will be proper, therefore, so to do.

Stranger/ Let us, then, divide them into parts, like victims, since we cannot bisect them: For it is always requisite to cut into the nearest number possible.

Socrates Younger/ How, therefore, shall we do at present?

Stranger/ Just as we did above: for we placed all such instruments as are subservient to weaving, as concauses.

Socrates Younger/ We did.

Stranger/ The same thing, therefore, must be done by us now, and it is still more necessary than it was then. For such things as fabricate in a city either a small or a large instrument are all of them to be considered as concauses; since without these a city could never subsist, nor yet the politic science. But yet again we do not establish anyone of these as the business of the royal science.

Socrates Younger/ We do not.

Stranger/ We likewise attempt to accomplish a difficult thing, in separating this genus from others. For he who says that it is an instrument of some particular being, appears to speak probably: but at the same time we must say that this is different from the possessions belonging to a city.

Socrates Younger/ In what respect?

Stranger/ Because it has not this power. For causes do not adhere to generation as an instrument, but on account of the safety of that which is fabricated.

Socrates Younger/ What kind of thing do you mean?

Stranger/ An all-various species produced from things dry and moist, fiery and without fire, and which we call by one appellation, a vessel, though it is an abundant species: but I think this does not at all belong to the science we are investigating.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly not.

Stranger/ But the third species, or that of possessions, appears to be multiform, consisting of the terrestrial and aquatic, the much wandering and the inerratic, the honorable and the ignoble; and it has one name, because the

whole of it subsists for the sake of a certain fitting, as it always becomes a seat to something.

Socrates Younger/ What kind of thing is it?

Stranger/ It is that which is called a vehicle, a thing which is not entirely the work of the politic science, but rather of the tectonic, ceramic, and calcotypic.

Socrates Younger/ I understand you.

Stranger/ Must we then mention a fourth species of these, in which most of the things formerly spoken of by us are contained? viz. every kind of garment, many arms, walls, all enclosures, consisting either of earth or stone, and ten thousand other things. And since all these are constructed for the sake of defense, the whole may most justly be called a fortification; and, for the most part, may more properly be considered as much more the work of the architect and weaver than of the politician.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Are we, therefore, willing to rank in the fifth place the arts of adorning, painting, and music, together with such arts as use these; from which certain imitations are devised for the sake of procuring us pleasure, and which may be justly comprehended in one name?

Socrates Younger/ In what name?

Stranger/ They may be denominated sportive.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ This one name, therefore, accords with all these: for no one of them does anything seriously, but all their operations are for the sake of sport.

Socrates Younger/ This also I nearly understand.

Stranger/ But ought we not to place as a sixth all-various species, and, which is the offspring of many other arts, that

art which, prepares bodies for all the above-mentioned particulars?

Socrates Younger/ Of what art are you speaking?

Stranger/ That art which digs gold and silver, and other metals, out of the bowels of the earth; likewise that which cuts down trees, that which constructs something by shaving off the hair, the knitting art, that which cuts off the barks of trees, and the skins of animals, and all such arts as are conversant with things of this kind. Also, such arts as procure cork, books, and bonds, fabricating composite species from genera which are not composite. The whole of this we call the first-born possession of mankind, simple, and by no means the work of the royal science.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ The possession of nutriment, and such things as when mingled with the body can, by their parts, administer to its wants, must be ranked in the seventh place. And the whole of this must be denominated by us nutriment, unless we have anything better to adopt instead of it. However, we may place the whole of this under agriculture, hunting, gymnastic, medicine, and cooking, and attribute it to these more properly than to the politic science.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Nearly, therefore, all possessions, except those of tame animals, may I think be found in these seven genera. But consider: For it was most just that the species which we called first-born should be introduced first; and after this, instrument, vessel, vehicle, fortification, that which is sportive, and cattle. But if anything of no great consequence is latent, which may be accommodated to some one of these, we omit it; such as the idea of coin, of seals, and of everything impressed or carved. For these things are not very much allied to the genus; but some accord with it, for the

purpose of ornament, others as subservient to instruments, violently, indeed, but at the same time they may be drawn to this end. But the nurture of herds which we before distributed, seems to comprehend the whole possession of tame animals, slaves being excepted.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ The genus of slaves, and of all servants, remains, in which I prophesy, that those who contend with a king respecting the thing woven will become apparent, in the same manner as above, those that knit, and those that comb wool, and such others as were then mentioned by us, contended with the weavers. But all the others who were called by us concauses, together with the works just now mentioned, are set aside, and are separated from royal and political action.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ Let us then, approaching nearer, consider the rest, that we may more firmly perceive them.

Socrates Younger/ It is, therefore, requisite to do so.

Stranger/ We shall find, then, that the greatest servants, so far as we can see in this affair, are engaged in a pursuit, and possess a property the very contrary to what we have expected.

Socrates Younger/ What are these?

Stranger/ Men acquired by purchase; whom, beyond all controversy, we ought to call slaves, and of whom we should assert, that they by no means vindicate to themselves the royal art.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But what shall we say of those free-born men who voluntarily engage in the servile employments mentioned by us above, viz. who transmit the works of

husbandry, and of the other arts, to each other, and who are engaged in mutual traffic, domestic or foreign, whether they change money for other things, or like for like, (whom we denominate moneychangers, pilots, and hucksters,) shall we say that these will contend for any part of the politic science?

Socrates Younger/ Perhaps merchants will.

Stranger/ But yet we never find that those mercenaries who readily offer their services to everyone vindicate to themselves the royal science.

Socrates Younger/ For how can they?

Stranger/ What then shall we say of those that act in this servile capacity everywhere?

Socrates Younger/ Of whom are you speaking? and of what kind of servile offices?

Stranger/ I speak of the tribe of criers, and of those who become wise respecting letters, and often act in the capacity of servants, together with certain other persons who are very skillful in the labors pertaining to government. What again shall we say of these?

Socrates Younger/ That which you just now said, that they are servants, but no rulers in cities.

Stranger/ I do not think, therefore, I was looking at a dream, when I said that many on this account would be seen strenuously contending for the royal science, though it may appear to be very absurd to seek after these in any servile portion.

Socrates Younger/ Very much so, indeed.

Stranger/ Let us, besides, approach still nearer to those whom we have not yet examined. But these are such as possess a certain portion of ministrant science about divination. For they are considered as interpreting to men things proceeding from the Gods.

Socrates Younger/ They are.

Stranger/ The genus too of priests, as established by law, knows in what manner we should offer gifts, through sacrifices, to the Gods, so as to render the divinities propitious to us; and likewise, after what manner we should request of them, by prayer, the possession of good things. But both these are parts of the ministrant art.

Socrates Younger/ So it appears.

Stranger/ Now, therefore, we appear to me to touch, as it were, upon a certain vestige of the object of our search. For the figure of priests and prophets is very replete with prudence, and receives a venerable opinion through the magnitude of the undertakings. Hence, among the Egyptians, a king is not allowed to govern without the sacerdotal science; so that, if anyone belonging to another genus of men usurps the kingdom, he is afterwards compelled to be initiated in their mysteries, that he may be skilled in the sacerdotal science. Further still, in many places belonging to the Greeks, we shall find that the greatest sacrifices of this kind are under the direction of the greatest magistrates; and the truth of what I assert is particularly evinced among you. For, when a king is elected, they say that the most venerable of all the ancient sacrifices, and such as are most peculiar to the country, are to be consigned to the care of the new king.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ We should, therefore, consider these kings chosen by lot, together with the priests, their servants, and a certain other numerous crowd, which just now became manifest to us, apart from our former assertions.

Socrates Younger/ Of whom are you speaking?

Stranger/ Of certain very wonderful persons.

Socrates Younger/ Why so?

Stranger/ As I was just now speculating, the genus of them appeared to me to be all-various. For many men resemble lions and centaurs, and other things of this kind; and very many are similar to satyrs, and to imbecile and multiform wild beasts. They likewise rapidly change their ideas and their power into each other. And indeed, Socrates, I appear to myself to have just now perceived these men for the first time.

Socrates Younger/ Speak: for you seem to behold something unusual.

Stranger/ I do: for the unusual or wonderful happens to all men from ignorance. And I myself just now suffered the very same thing: for I was suddenly involved in doubt on perceiving the choir of civil concerns.

Socrates Younger/ What choir?

Stranger/ The greatest enchanter of all sophists, and the most skilled in this art, who must be separated from truly political and royal characters, though this is difficult in the extreme, if we intend to see clearly the object of our investigation.

Socrates Younger/ We must by no means omit to do this.

Stranger/ We must not, indeed, according to my opinion: but tell me this.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ Is not a monarchy one of our political governments?

Socrates Younger/ It is.

Stranger/ And after a monarchy I think an oligarchy may be placed.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But is not the third scheme of a polity the government of the multitude, and which is called a democracy?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ May not these three become after a manner five, since they produce two other names from themselves?

Socrates Younger/ What are these two?

Stranger/ Those who now look to the violent and the voluntary, to poverty and riches, law and the transgression of law, which take place in these governments, and who give a two-fold division to each of the two, and call monarchy by two names, as affording two species, viz. tyrannic and royal.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But they denominate a city which is governed by a few an aristocracy and an oligarchy.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But no one is ever accustomed to change the name of a democracy, whether the people govern the rich violently, or with their consent, and whether they accurately defend the laws or not.

Socrates Younger/ True.

Stranger/ What then? Shall we think that anyone of these polities is right, thus bounded by these definitions, viz. by one, and a few, and a many, by riches and poverty, by the violent and the voluntary, by written laws, and the privation of laws?

Socrates Younger/ What should hinder?

Stranger/ Consider more attentively, following me hither.

Socrates Younger/ Whither?

Stranger/ Shall we abide by that which was asserted by us at first, or shall we dissent from it?

Socrates Younger/ Of what assertion are you speaking?

Stranger/ I think we said that a royal government was one of the sciences.

Socrates Younger/ We did.

Stranger/ Yet we did not consider it as anyone science indiscriminately; but we selected it from the other sciences, as something judicial and presiding.

Socrates Younger/ We did.

Stranger/ And of the presiding science, dividing one part, as belonging to animate works, and the other as belonging to animals, we have proceeded thus far, not forgetting that we were scientifically employed; but we have not yet been able to determine with sufficient accuracy what this science is.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ Do we, therefore, understand this, that the definition must not be made by the few, nor by the many, nor yet by the voluntary or involuntary, nor by poverty or riches, but according to a certain science, if we follow what has been formerly delivered?

Socrates Younger/ But, indeed, it is impossible that this should not be done.

Stranger/ From necessity, therefore, we must now consider in which of these the science respecting the government of men happens to subsist; this government being nearly the greatest of all others, and the most difficult to obtain. For it is requisite to inspect: it, that we may perceive what are the things which must be taken away from a prudent king, and who those are that pretend to be, and persuade the multitude that they are, politicians, but who are by no means so.

Socrates Younger/ Our former reasoning evinces that it is requisite to act in this manner.

Stranger/ Does it then appear to you that the multitude in a city is able to acquire this science?

Socrates Younger/ How can they?

Stranger/ In a city, therefore, consisting of a thousand men, is it possible that a hundred or five hundred of the inhabitants can sufficiently acquire this science?

Socrates Younger/ If this were the case, it would be the most easy of all arts. For we know that among a thousand men there cannot be found so great a number of those that excel the other Greeks in the game of chess, much less can there be found as many kings. But, according to our former reasoning, it is requisite to call him royal who possesses the royal science, whether he governs or not.

Stranger/ You very properly remind me: but I think it follows from this, that a right government, when it subsists rightly, ought to be investigated about one person, or two, or altogether about a few.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ And, as we now think, those that govern according to a certain art are to be considered as political and regal characters, whether they govern the willing or the refractory, whether according to or without written laws, and whether they are rich or poor. For we call those who heal the maladies of the body, no less physicians, whether they cure by cutting, or burning, or any other painful application, the voluntary or the refractory; and whether from writings or without writings; and whether they are poor or rich. In all these cases we say that they are no less physicians, so long as they proceed according to art, in purging or some other way attenuating the body, or in causing it to increase; and so long as, alone regarding the good of the body, they restore it from a worse to a better habit, and preserve it when thus restored. After this manner alone, as I think, we must say

that the definition of the medicinal or any other government is rightly made.

Socrates Younger/ And very much so.

Stranger/ It is necessary, therefore, as it seems, that that polity alone must in the highest degree be rightly established, in which the governors are found to be truly, and not in appearance only, scientific; whether they govern according to laws, or without laws; whether they rule over the obedient, or the refractory; and whether they are rich or poor. For no one of these is of any consequence with respect to rectitude of government.

Socrates Younger/ Beautifully said.

Stranger/ Nor yet is it of any consequence, whether they purge the city with a view to its good, by putting to death or banishing certain persons; or whether they send out colonies, like a swarm of bees, and thus diminish the people; or whether, introducing certain foreigners, they make citizens of them, and thus increase the city. For, so long as, employing science and justice, they cause the city, to the utmost of their power, to pass from a worse to a better condition, and preserve it in this state, —so far, and according to such definitions, we say that a polity is alone rightly established; but that such others, as we have mentioned, are neither genuinely nor truly polities. We must likewise willingly say that such polities as imitate this are consonant to reason, and tend to things more beautiful, but that such as do not, tend to deformity by an imitation of things evil.

Socrates Younger/ Other things indeed, O guest, appear to have been discussed sufficiently: but it is not easy to admit your assertion, that it is requisite to govern without laws.

Stranger/ You have got before me a little, Socrates, by your question. For I was going to ask you, whether you admit all these things, or whether you find any difficulty in anything that has been said. It is however evident, that we now wish to inquire concerning the rectitude of those that govern without laws.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ After a certain manner it is evident that legislation pertains to the royal science: but it is best, not for the laws to prevail, but a man who is royal in conjunction with prudence. Do you know why?

Socrates Younger/ Inform me.

Stranger/ Because law cannot, by comprehending that which is most excellent, and at the same time most accurately just, for all men, always enjoin that which is best. For the dissimilitudes of men and actions, and the unceasing restlessness, as I may say, of human affairs, do not permit any art whatever to be exhibited respecting all things, and through every time. Shall we admit these assertions?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But we see that law nearly endeavors to accomplish this very thing, like a certain arrogant and ignorant man, who does not suffer anything to be done contrary to his own orders, nor anyone to ask whether it would not be better to make some new regulation, contrary to what he has ordained.

Socrates Younger/ True. For the law does as you say.

Stranger/ But it is impossible that a thing which is simple should prevail in things which are never at any time simple.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ The cause, therefore, must be found out why it is necessary to establish laws, since law does not possess the greatest rectitude.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Are there not, therefore, among us, as also in other cities, certain exercises of men collected together, whether belonging to the course, or to anything else which is undertaken for the sake of contention?

Socrates Younger/ There are very many such exercises.

Stranger/ Come then, let us again recall to our memory the mandates of those who preside over gymnastic exercises according to art.

Socrates Younger/ What are their mandates?

Stranger/ They do not think that a subtle division should be made, according to each individual, so as to enjoin that which is adapted to the body of each; but that attention should be paid to what is more common, and which is advantageous for the most part, and to a many.

Socrates Younger/ Excellent.

Stranger/ Hence at present assigning equal labors to collected bodies of men, they at the same time impel them to begin the contest together, and to rest from the race, from wrestling, and from all the labors of the body, at one and the same time.

Socrates Younger/ They do so.

Stranger/ We, therefore, think that the legislator who presides over the herds of men, and enjoins them what is just respecting their compacts with each other, cannot, while he gives laws to them collectively, accurately assign what is fit to each individual.

Socrates Younger/ This is likely to be the case.

Stranger/ But I think that in a less subtle way he will establish laws for the multitude, and for the most part, both written and unwritten, and such as are agreeable to the manners of the country.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ Right indeed. For how, Socrates, can anyone attend sufficiently to individuals through the whole of life, and accurately enjoin what is adapted to each? For, though he who possesses the royal science could, I think, do this, he would scarcely prescribe for himself those impediments which are called laws.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so, O guest, from what has been now said.

Stranger/ Rather, O most excellent youth, from what will be said.

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ This, For we thus say to ourselves: If a physician, or master of gymnastic, intending to travel, and to be absent from those under his care for a long time, should think that those who are exercised, or those who are sick, would not remember his precepts, he will wish to write commentaries for them. Or how shall we say?

Socrates Younger/ That he will wish to do so.

Stranger/ But what? If the physician should return sooner than he thought, will he venture to order them certain other things besides those contained in his writings, if anything better should occur for the sick, through winds, or anything else, which is wont to take place through Zeus, contrary to expectation? Will he think that he ought strenuously to persevere in his former injunctions, neither himself ordering anything else, nor the sick man daring to do anything different from his written prescriptions; these being medicinal and salubrious, but things of a different

nature, noxious, and contrary to art? Or rather, everything of this kind happening about all things according to science and true art, will not his edicts become the most ridiculous of all others?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But shall not he who writes things just and unjust, beautiful and base, good and evil, and who establishes unwritten laws for the herds of mankind, who live in cities according to written laws, —shall not he, I say, who has written laws according to art, or any other who resembles him, be permitted on his return to enjoin things different from these? Or, rather, would not this interdiction appear in reality to be no less ridiculous than the former?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Do you know, therefore, what the multitude say respecting a thing of this kind?

Socrates Younger/ I do not at present remember.

Stranger/ But it is very specious. For they say, if anyone has found out laws better than those that are already established, and can persuade his citizens that they are better, he should establish them; otherwise not.

Socrates Younger/ Do they not, therefore, say rightly?

Stranger/ Perhaps so. But if someone should introduce that which is best, not by persuasion, but by force, what name must be given to this violence? Or, rather, first answer me respecting the former particulars.

Socrates Younger/ Of what particulars are you speaking?

Stranger/ If anyone who is properly skilled in the medical art should not persuade but compel a boy, or a man, or a woman, to do that which is better, but at the same time contrary to written prescriptions, what will be the name of this violence? Ought it not to be called rather anything than

a transgression of art, or a noxious error? And should we not say that everything will happen to the compelled person, rather than anything noxious and contrary to art from the compelling physicians?

Socrates Younger/ You speak most true.

Stranger/ But what is that error to be called which is contrary to the political art? Must it not be denominated base, evil, and unjust?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ But come, will not he be the most ridiculous of all men, who should blame the violence of those that force men to act more justly, better, and more beautifully than before, contrary to written precepts, and the laws of their country? And ought not everything rather to be asserted of those that are thus compelled, than that they suffer things base, unjust, and evil?

Socrates Younger/ Your assertion is most true.

Stranger/ But if he who compels is rich, will his compulsions be just, —but, if he is poor, unjust? Or shall we not rather say, that he who effects what is advantageous, whether he persuades or does not persuade, whether he is rich or poor, and whether he acts according or contrary to written injunctions, will act conformably to the most true definition of the right government of a city? For a wise and good man will always govern in this manner, always attending to the advantage of his subjects, in the same manner as a pilot is watchful for the safety of the ship and the sailors. And as the pilot preserves the sailors, not by written mandates but by exhibiting to them laws according to art, after the same manner an upright polity will be produced by those who are thus able to govern, by exhibiting a strength of art better than the laws. And, in short, prudent governors never err in any part of their conduct, as long as

they observe this one thing, viz. by always distributing that which is most just to the citizens, in conjunction with intellect and art, to preserve them, and, from being worse, render them better to the utmost of their power.

Socrates Younger/ These assertions cannot be contradicted.

Stranger/ Nor yet those.

Socrates Younger/ What assertions do you mean?

Stranger/ That no multitude whatever can receive that science, by which a city is governed according to intellect, but that an upright polity must be investigated about a small number, and a few, and one person; and that other polities are to be considered as imitations, as we observed a little before, some resembling this in a more beautiful, and others in a more deformed manner.

Socrates Younger/ How do you say this? For I do not understand what you just now said respecting imitations.

Stranger/ He would not act badly, who, after introducing a discourse of this kind, should desist before he had shown the error which is at present committed.

Socrates Younger/ What error do you mean?

Stranger/ It is requisite to investigate a thing of that kind, which is not altogether usual, nor yet easy to perceive; but at the same time we must endeavor to apprehend it. For, since an upright polity is that alone of which we have spoken, do you not know that other polities ought to be preserved, while they use the institutions of this, and do that which we just now praised, though it is not most right?

Socrates Younger/ What is that?

Stranger/ That no citizen shall dare to act in any respect contrary to the laws, and that he who dares to do so shall be punished with death, and shall suffer all extreme

punishments. This is most right and beautiful in the second place; for that which was just now mentioned must be ranked in the first place. But we should unfold the manner in which that which we call secondary subsists. Or should we not?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But let us again return to images, to which it is always necessary to assimilate royal governors.

Socrates Younger/ What kind of images?

Stranger/ The generous pilot, and, as Homer says, the physician, who is of equal worth with many others. Let us consider the affair by devising a certain figure in these things.

Socrates Younger/ Of what kind?

Stranger/ Such a one, as if we all conceived that we suffered the most dire things from these persons. For such of us as they wish to save, they do save; and such as they wish to injure, they injure by cutting and burning; at the same time ordering money to be given them as a reward for this, not spending anything themselves on the sick, but they and their familiars making use of others. And lastly, receiving money either from the kindred or from certain enemies of the sick man, they cause him to die. Pilots too effect ten thousand other things of this kind. For they designedly leave men by themselves in certain recesses, and, committing an error in navigation, hurl them into the sea, and injure them in other respects. In consequence of considering these things, let us suppose that we consult how we may deprive these arts of their independent authority, so that they may no longer possess absolute power, either over slaves or the free-born. Hence, we assemble together for this purpose, and convene either all the people, or the rich only. In this assembly, obscure individuals and mechanics give

their opinion respecting the ship and diseases; viz. after what manner medicines, and medical instruments, should be employed about the diseased; and likewise ships and nautical instruments in navigation, in the dangers to which ships are subject, through the winds, the sea, and pirates, and when there is occasion to fight with long ships against others of the like kind. Let us likewise suppose that the opinions, either of certain physicians and pilots, or of other private persons, given in this assembly, are inscribed in triangular tables and pillars, and that certain unwritten customs of the country are established, according to which in all future times navigation is to be conducted, and remedies for the sick administered.

Socrates Younger/ You have spoken of very absurd things.

Stranger/ Let us likewise suppose that yearly governors of the multitude are established, whether chosen by lot from the rich, or from all the people; and let them govern both ships and the diseased, according to those written institutions.

Socrates Younger/ These things appear still more difficult.

Stranger/ Let us likewise see what is consequent to these things. For when the year of each governor is expired, it will be necessary that courts of justice should be established, which are composed either of chosen rich men, or from all the people, for the purpose of calling the governors to account, and reproving them when requisite. Let everyone likewise who is willing be permitted to accuse the governors, as neither governing the ships, during the year, according to the written injunctions, nor according to the ancient manners of their ancestors. And let the same things be permitted to take place respecting those that cure the

diseased. But let those that are convicted be punished in whatever manner the judges shall think fit.

Socrates Younger/ He, therefore, who voluntarily governs these men will most justly suffer from them, and receive whatever punishment they please.

Stranger/ Further still, it will be requisite that a law should be established for all these, that if anyone introduces a mode of piloting different from the written institutions, or shall be found investigating the salubrious, and the truth of the medicinal art, contrary to the writings, about winds, heat and cold, or devising anything whatever, about affairs of this kind; —in the first place, he shall neither be called a pilot nor a physician, but a certain boastful and garrulous sophist; and, in the next place, he shall be brought before a court of justice, by any person who is willing, as one who corrupts other young men, and persuades them that everyone should be permitted to pilot ships, and cure the diseased, not according to the laws, but according to his own will. And if anyone shall be found persuading either young or old men, contrary to the laws, and the written mandates, he shall be punished in the extreme. For nothing ought to be wiser than the laws. Besides, no one should be ignorant of the medicinal and the salubrious, nor of nautical affairs. For everyone who is willing is permitted to learn the written mandates, and the customs of his country. If these particulars, Socrates, should take place about these sciences, viz. about military concerns, the whole of hunting, and painting, imitation, and architecture, the formation of instruments of every kind, agriculture, botany; or, again, about the care pertaining to horses, and herds of cattle of every kind, prophecy, the whole of servile offices, the game of chess, the whole of arithmetic in its simple state, whether it is conversant with planes or depths, or swiftness and slowness; —if these particulars, I say, should take place

about these sciences, so as to cause them to be effected according to the written mandates, and not according to art, what shall we say?

Socrates Younger/ It is evident that all arts must be entirely subverted, without ever being restored, in consequence of the law which forbids investigation. So that life, which is at present difficult, would then be perfectly intolerable.

Stranger/ But what will you say to this? If we should compel each of the above-mentioned particulars to take place according to written injunctions, and should appoint as the guardian of these writings a man either chosen by suffrage, or chance, but who paying no attention to them, either for the sake of a certain gain, or private pleasure, should endeavor, though ignorant of everything, to act contrary to these mandates; would not this be a greater evil than the former?

Socrates Younger/ It most truly would.

Stranger/ For he who should dare to act contrary to those laws which have been established from long experience by those who, consulting how to gratify the people, have persuaded them to adopt them, will commit an error of a very extended nature, and subvert every action in a much greater degree than written mandates are capable of effecting.

Socrates Younger/ How is it possible he should not?

Stranger/ Hence, as it is said, there is a second navigation for those that establish laws and written mandates respecting anything whatever, viz. that neither one person, nor the multitude, should ever be suffered to do anything at any time contrary to them.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ Will not these writings, therefore, be certain imitations of truths composed by intelligent men, in the greatest perfection of which they are capable?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But, if we remember, we have said, that a man truly knowing in political concerns will do many things from art, without paying any attention to written mandates, when anything occurs to him better than what he has left behind him in writing.

Socrates Younger/ We did say so.

Stranger/ And if anything better than what is established by law should occur either to an individual, or to the people at large, will they not in this case, to the utmost of their power, act in the same manner as the true politician?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ If, therefore, they should act in this manner, without possessing science, they would attempt to imitate that which is true, but the whole of their imitation would be vicious; but if their conduct is the effect of art, this is no longer an imitation, but is a thing itself most true.

Socrates Younger/ It is so in every respect.

Stranger/ It was likewise acknowledged by us above, that the multitude is incapable of receiving any art whatever.

Socrates Younger/ It was.

Stranger/ If, therefore, there is a certain royal art, the multitude of the rich, and the whole of the people, can never receive this politic science.

Socrates Younger/ For how can they?

Stranger/ It is requisite then (as it seems) that such-like polities, if they intend to imitate as much as possible that true polity which is governed according to art by one man,

must never do anything contrary to their written laws, and the customs of their country.

Socrates Younger/ You speak most beautifully.

Stranger/ When, therefore, the rich imitate this polity, we then denominate such a polity an aristocracy: but when they pay no attention to the laws, an oligarchy.

Socrates Younger/ So it appears.

Stranger/ And again, when one man governs according to the laws, imitating him who is endued with science, then we call such a one a king, not distinguishing by name him who governs with science from the monarch who governs with opinion according to the laws.

Socrates Younger/ We appear to do so.

Stranger/ If, therefore, one man governs, who truly possesses a scientific knowledge of government, he is entirely called by this name a king, and by no other; for this alone, of the five names of the polities just now mentioned, belongs to him.

Socrates Younger/ So it appears.

Stranger/ But when one man governs neither according to the laws, nor according to the customs of the country, but at the same time pretends that he possesses a scientific knowledge, and that it is best to act in this manner, contrary to the written mandates, though a certain intemperate desire and ignorance are the leaders of this imitation, must not a man of this kind be called a tyrant?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ Thus, then, we say, a tyrant, a king, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy, will be produced; mankind indignantly bearing the authority of a monarch, and not believing that any man will ever be found worthy of such a government, so as to be both willing and

able to govern with virtue and science, and properly distribute to all men things just and holy. They are likewise fearful, that one man endued with absolute power will injure, oppress, and slay whomsoever he pleases: though, if such a character should arise, as we have mentioned, he would be beloved, and his administration, on account of its accurate rectitude, would alone render a polity happy.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But now, since no such king is to be found in cities, who, as if produced in a swarm of bees, excels from the very beginning both in body and soul, it is requisite, as it seems, that men assembling together should compose written institutions, treading in the footsteps of the most true polity.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ And shall we wonder, Socrates, that in such-like polities those evils should take place which we behold at present, and which will subsist in future, when they rest on the foundation of written mandates and long established customs, and not on the firm basis of science? Or ought we not rather to admire how strong a thing a city naturally is? For, though cities have subsisted for an immense length of time in this condition, yet some of them have continued stable, and have not been subverted; at the same time many of them, like vessels merged in the sea, have perished, do perish, and will perish, through the depravity of the pilots and sailors, who are involved in the greatest ignorance respecting the greatest concerns; for though they know nothing about political affairs, yet they think their knowledge of the political science is the most clear of all scientific knowledge.

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ As, therefore, all these erroneous polities are full of difficulties, we should consider in which it is the least difficult and burthensome to live; for, though this is superfluous with respect to our present inquiry, yet, perhaps, universally we all of us do all things for the sake of this.

Socrates Younger/ It is impossible it should not be requisite to consider this.

Stranger/ Of three things, therefore, they say that one is remarkably difficult, and at the same time easy.

Socrates Younger/ How do you say?

Stranger/ No otherwise than as I said before, that there are three polities, a monarchy, the government of a few, and the government of a many, which three polities were at first mentioned by us in a confused manner.

Socrates Younger/ There were.

Stranger/ Bisecting, therefore, each of these, we shall produce six, separating from these the upright polity, as a seventh.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ We must distribute monarchy into the royal and the tyrannic; but the polity which is not composed from a multitude, into an aristocracy and oligarchy, which form an illustrious division. Again, we formerly considered the polity which is composed from a multitude as simple, and called it a democracy, but we must now establish this as two-fold.

Socrates Younger/ How so? And after what manner do we make this division?

Stranger/ Not at all different from the others, though the name of this is now two-fold. But to govern according to the

laws, and to transgress the laws, is common both to this and the other polities.

Socrates Younger/ It is so.

Stranger/ Then, indeed, when we were investigating an upright polity, this section was of no use, as we have shown above: but since we have separated it from the others, and have considered the others as necessary, in these we divide each according to the legal, and the transgression of law.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so from what has now been said.

Stranger/ A monarchy, therefore, when conjoined with good written institutions, which we call laws, is the best of all the six polities; but when subsisting without law is grievous, and most burthensome to live under.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ But the polity which is composed of not many, ought to be considered by us as a medium, in the same manner as a few is a medium between one and many. But again, we should consider the polity which is composed of many as in all things imbecile, and as incapable, when compared with the others, of accomplishing either any great good or great evil; in consequence of authority in this polity being divided according to small parts among many. Hence, this is the worst of all these legal polities, but the best of all such as are illegal. And where all are intemperate, it is best to live in a democracy; but where all are temperate, this polity is the worst to live in. The first and best condition of life is in the first polity, the seventh being excepted. For this must be separated from all the other polities, in the same manner as divinity from men.

Socrates Younger/ These things appear thus to subsist and happen; and that must be done which you mention.

Stranger/ Ought not, therefore, the governors of all these polities (the governor of the scientific polity being excepted) to be withdrawn, as not being truly political but seditious characters; and as presiding over the greatest images, and being such themselves? And as they are the greatest imitators and enchanters, are they not the greatest sophists of sophists?

Socrates Younger/ This appellation seems to pertain, with the greatest rectitude, to those that are called politicians.

Stranger/ Be it so. This, indeed, is as a drama for us; just as we lately said that we saw a certain Centauric and Saryric Bacchic choir, which was to be separated from the politic art, and now this has scarcely been separated by us.

Socrates Younger/ So it appears.

Stranger/ But another thing still more difficult than this remains, which is more allied to the royal genus, and which at the same time it is more difficult to understand. And we appear to me to be affected in a manner similar to those that purify gold.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ Those workmen first of all separate earth, stones, and many other things; but, after this, such things as are allied to gold remain, which are honorable, and alone to be separated by fire, —I mean brass and silver and sometimes diamonds. These being with difficulty separated by fusion, scarcely suffer us to see that which is called perfectly pure gold.

Socrates Younger/ So it is said respecting these things.

Stranger/ After the same manner, we also appear now to have separated from the politic science things different, and such as are foreign and not friendly, and to have left such as are honorable and allied to it. But among the number of

these, the military and judicial arts, and that rhetoric which communicates with the royal science, persuading men to act justly, and which, together with that science, governs the affairs of cities, may be ranked. These if someone should after a certain manner separate with facility, he will show naked and alone by himself that character which we are investigating.

Socrates Younger/ It is evident that we should endeavor to do this.

Stranger/ For the sake of an experiment, therefore, it will be evident: but we should endeavor to render it apparent through music. Inform me, therefore.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ Have we any discipline of music, and universally of the sciences, concerning manual operations?

Socrates Younger/ We have.

Stranger/ But what? Shall we say that anyone among these is a certain science which teaches us what we ought to learn respecting these things, and what we ought not? Or how shall we say?

Socrates Younger/ We must say that there is.

Stranger/ Shall we not, therefore, confess that this is different from the others?

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ But whether must we say that no one of them rules over the other? or that the others rule over this? or that this, as a guardian, ought to rule over all the others?

Socrates Younger/ That this science ought to rule over the others, which teaches us, whether it is requisite to learn anyone of them, or not.

Stranger/ You assert, therefore, that it ought to rule over both the teacher and the learner.

Socrates Younger/ Very much so.

Stranger/ And do you likewise assert, that the science which judges whether it is requisite to persuade or not, should rule over him who is able to persuade?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ To what science, therefore, shall we attribute that which persuades the multitude and the crowd, through mythology, but not through doctrine?

Socrates Younger/ I think it is evident that this is to be attributed to the rhetoric science.

Stranger/ But again, to what science shall we attribute the power of judging, whether we should act towards certain persons through persuasion, or through a certain violence; or, universally, whether we ought ever to employ either persuasion or violence?

Socrates Younger/ To that which rules over the arts of persuasion and discourse.

Stranger/ But this, as I think, will not be any other than the power of the politician.

Socrates Younger/ You speak most beautifully.

Stranger/ Thus, therefore, the rhetoric appears to have been very rapidly separated from the politic science, as being another species, but subservient to this science.

Socrates Younger/ Certainly.

Stranger/ But again, what must we conceive respecting this power?

Socrates Younger/ What power?

Stranger/ That by which we war upon those against whom we have declared war. Whether shall we say that this is endued with, or deprived of, art?

Socrates Younger/ How can we conceive that power to be deprived of art which the commanding art and all warlike actions employ?

Stranger/ But shall we consider that power which is able to consult scientifically, whether it is proper to engage in war, or make peace, as different from this, or the same with it?

Socrates Younger/ From what has been before established, it necessarily follows that it must be different.

Stranger/ Must not, therefore, the military science have dominion over the warrior, if we in a similar manner follow what has been before advanced?

Socrates Younger/ It must.

Stranger/ What science then shall we endeavor to evince as the despot of the whole of the military art, which is thus skillful and mighty, except the truly royal science?

Socrates Younger/ No other whatever.

Stranger/ We must not, therefore, consider the science of military commanders as the same with the political, to which it is subservient.

Socrates Younger/ It is not proper we should.

Stranger/ But come, let us contemplate the power of judges who judge rightly.

Socrates Younger/ By all means.

Stranger/ Is it not, therefore, capable of doing more than merely judging what is just or unjust, respecting such compacts as are legal, and which have been established by royal authority; employing for this purpose its own proper virtue, so as never to wish to dissolve mutual accusations, either through the influence of certain gifts, or fear, or pity, or hatred, or love, contrary to the order of the legislator?

Socrates Younger/ It will never wish to act in this manner; but that which you have mentioned is nearly the employment of this power.

Stranger/ We find, therefore, that the strength of judges is not royal, but is the guardian of the laws, and subservient to the royal science.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ This also must be observed, that no one of the above mentioned sciences will appear to be the politic science to him who perceives all of them. For the province of the truly royal science is not to act itself. but to rule over those that are able to act, since it knows the dominion and impulse of those that are the greatest in the city, respecting what is opportune and the contrary: but it is the province of the other sciences to do as they are ordered.

Socrates Younger/ Right.

Stranger/ Hence, since the sciences which we have just now discussed neither rule over each other nor themselves, but each is conversant with a certain proper employment of its own, they are justly denominated according, to the peculiarity of their actions.

Socrates Younger/ It appears so.

Stranger/ But rightly comprehending by a common appellation the power of that science which rules over all these, and takes care of the laws, and of everything in the city, we may most justly, as it seems, call it the politic science.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Shall we not, therefore, discuss this science at present, according, to the paradigm of the weaving art, since all the genera pertaining to a city have become manifest to us?

Socrates Younger/ And very much so.

Stranger/ We must therefore, as it seems, relate what the royal connection is, after what manner it weaves together, and what kind of web it produces for us.

Socrates Younger/ It is evident.

Stranger/ It is, indeed, a thing difficult to be evinced; but, as it appears, it is necessary it should be unfolded.

Socrates Younger/ It must, by all means.

Stranger/ For, that a part of virtue differs from the species of virtue, may be easily proved from the opinion of the multitude, in opposition to the contentious.

Socrates Younger/ I do not understand you.

Stranger/ But again, thus consider. For I think that you consider fortitude as one part of virtue.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ And likewise, that temperance is different from fortitude, but that the former is a part of the same thing as the latter.

Socrates Younger/ Yes.

Stranger/ We must dare to unfold a certain wonderful discourse respecting these things.

Socrates Younger/ Of what kind?

Stranger/ That after a certain manner they are in many things very adverse and contrary to each other.

Socrates Younger/ How do you say?

Stranger/ My assertion is by no means usual. For all the parts of virtue are said to be friendly to each other.

Socrates Younger/ It is so said.

Stranger/ Let us consider, therefore, with the greatest attention, whether this is so simple, or differs more than anything from these, in things of a kindred nature.

Socrates Younger/ Inform me how we are to consider.

Stranger/ In all such things as we call beautiful it is proper to investigate, and refer them to two species contrary to each other.

Socrates Younger/ You speak most clearly.

Stranger/ Have you ever then either praised yourself, or heard some other person praising sharpness and swiftness, either in bodies or souls, or the motion of voice, or in such imitations of these as musical and graphical imitations exhibit?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly I have.

Stranger/ Do you likewise remember after what manner praise is bestowed in each of these?

Socrates Younger/ By no means.

Stranger/ Shall we, therefore, be able to point out to you my conceptions of this in words?

Socrates Younger/ What should hinder?

Stranger/ You seem to think a thing of this kind easy. Let us consider it, therefore, in subcontrary genera. For often, and in many actions, when we admire the swiftness, vehemence, and acuteness of thought, body, or voice, we praise them, and at the same time employ one of the appellations of fortitude.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ In the first place, we say it is acute and strenuous, swift and virile, and in a similar manner vehement: and, universally, we praise all these natures, by applying this name to them in common.

Socrates Younger/ We do.

Stranger/ But what? Do we not often praise in many actions the species of quiet generation?

Socrates Younger/ And very much so.

Stranger/ Do we not, therefore, in praising these, assert things contrary to what we did in praising those?

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ We say that each of these is quiet and temperate, and we admire these when they take place about cogitation; but about actions, we admire the slow and the soft, about voice, the smooth and the grave, all rhythmical motion, and the whole of the muse which employs slowness opportunely; and to all these we give the appellation of the moderate, and not of fortitude.

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ But when both these take place unseasonably, we then blame each of them, and call them by contrary names.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ When they appear to be unseasonably acute, swift, and hard, we then call them insolent and insane; but when they are unseasonably grave, slow, and soft, we call them timid and slothful. And we nearly find that these, and the nature of fortitude and temperance, are for the most part contrary to each other, as being hostile and seditious forms, and which are never mingled together in actions about things of this kind. We shall likewise find by investigation, that those who possess these in their souls, are discordant with each other.

Socrates Younger/ Where do you say?

Stranger/ In all those particulars which we have just now mentioned, and, it is probable, in many others. For, I think, praising some things as their own property, on account of their alliance to both, but blaming others as things foreign, they become very adverse to each other in many things.

Socrates Younger/ They appear to do so.

Stranger/ This difference, therefore, is the sport of these species. But a disease the most baneful of all others happens to cities about, things of the greatest consequence.

Socrates Younger/ About what things?

Stranger/ About the whole apparatus of living, as it is likely it should. For those who are remarkably modest are always prepared to live a quiet life, attending privately to their own concerns, and being after a certain manner disposed to associate peaceably both with their fellow citizens and foreigners. Through this love, however, which is more unseasonable than is fit, when they do that which they wish to accomplish, they become secretly enervated, and render young men similarly affected. Hence, they are always subject to injuries; and in a short time themselves, their children, and the whole city, often by slow degrees, from being free become slaves.

Socrates Younger/ You speak of a severe and dire passion.

Stranger/ But those that verge more to fortitude, do they not incite the cities to which they belong to war, through a more vehement desire of a life of this kind than is becoming, and thus rendering many nations and potentates hostile to their country, either entirely subvert it, or bring it in subjection to the enemy?

Socrates Younger/ They do.

Stranger/ How is it possible, therefore, we should not say, that in these things both genera are in the greatest degree adverse to each other?

Socrates Younger/ It is impossible we should say otherwise.

Stranger/ Have we not, therefore, found that which we were considering in the beginning, that certain parts of virtue, which are not small naturally, differ from each other,

and that they likewise cause those that possess them to do the same?

Socrates Younger/ It appears we have.

Stranger/ Let us again too consider this.

Socrates Younger/ What?

Stranger/ Whether there is anything belonging to synthetic sciences which has anyone of its works, though it should be the vilest, composed from things evil and at the same time useful? Or shall we say, that every science always rejects things evil to the utmost of its power, and receives such as are apt and useful? and that from these, which are both similar and dissimilar, collected into one, it fabricates one certain power and idea?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ The truly political science, therefore, according to nature, will never be willing that a city should be composed from good and bad men; but it is very evident that it will first of all examine everything by discipline, and, after the examination, will commit this employment to such as are able to instruct others, and at the same time be subservient to others, itself commanding and presiding: just in the same manner as the weaving art presides over the wool-combers, and others that prepare the materials for weaving, and gives such orders to the preparatory workmen as it thinks will best contribute to the work it has in view.

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ The royal science appears to me to do the very same, permitting those that instruct and educate others according to law, alone to exercise and teach that which being effected according to its temperature will produce worthy manners. But it punishes with death, exile, and the greatest disgrace, those that are unable to participate of fortitude, temperance, and such other things as tend to

virtue, but through a depraved nature are violently impelled to impiety, insolence and injustice.

Socrates Younger/ This is said to be the case.

Stranger/ But those that are rolled like cylinders in ignorance and an abject spirit, it subjugates to servile employments.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ It preserves and defends, therefore, such as are naturally qualified for acquiring the generous and the noble, when properly disciplined, and who through art can be mingled with each other. And such among these as verge more to fortitude, it considers as resembling strong thread in the loom on account of their solid manners; but such as verge more to modesty, as similar to fat and soft matter; and, that we may use an image from the weaving art, as resembling saffron-colored thread. And such as tend contrary to these, it endeavors to bind together and connect after the following manner.

Socrates Younger/ After what manner?

Stranger/ In the first place, according to the allied, it harmonizes together the eternal part of their soul with a divine bond. But after that which is divine it harmonizes together their vivisic part with human bonds.

Socrates Younger/ How again is this?

Stranger/ When true opinion becomes stably inherent in the soul respecting things beautiful, just and good, and the contraries to these, we say that the divine in the dæmoniacal genus is produced.

Socrates Younger/ It is proper it should.

Stranger/ Do we, therefore, know that a politician and a good legislator ought alone to be able, with the Muse of the

royal science, to effect this in those that are properly disciplined, and whom we have just now mentioned?

Socrates Younger/ It is fit this should be the case.

Stranger/ But he, Socrates, who cannot accomplish a thing of this kind, must by no means be called by the names which we are now investigating.

Socrates Younger/ Most right.

Stranger/ What then? Must not a brave soul, when it receives truth of this kind, become mild, and thus be willing in the highest degree to partake of things just? But when it does not receive it, must it not be considered as verging more to a certain savage nature?

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ But what? Will not a soul of a modest nature, when receiving these opinions, become truly temperate and moderate in a polity? But when it does not partake of the things we are speaking of, will it not be most disgracefully branded with stupidity?

Socrates Younger/ Entirely so.

Stranger/ Must we not say, that this connection and binding together of the evil with each other, and of the good with the evil, can never become stable, and that no science will ever seriously attempt to accomplish this with such as these?

Socrates Younger/ For how can it?

Stranger/ But in those alone who are endued with worthy manners from the first, and who are educated according to nature, this bond is naturally implanted through the laws. In these, too, this art is a remedy; and, as we said before, the natural virtue of the parts is the more divine bond of things dissimilar, and tending to contraries.

Socrates Younger/ Most true.

Stranger/ Since this divine bond exists, there is scarcely any difficulty in either understanding the other bonds which are human, or in bringing them to perfection when understood.

Socrates Younger/ How so? And what are these bonds?

Stranger/ The communions of alliances and children, and those respecting private locations and marriages. For many respecting these things are not properly bound together for the purpose of begetting children.

Socrates Younger/ Why?

Stranger/ Is it worthwhile to relate how anxiously they pursue riches and power in these things?

Socrates Younger/ It is not.

Stranger/ But it will be more just to speak of those who make the human race the object of their care, and to consider if they do anything improperly.

Socrates Younger/ It will.

Stranger/ They do not indeed at all act from right reason, but pursue present pleasure; and in consequence of being delighted with those similar to themselves, and of not loving those that are dissimilar, they attribute the greatest part to molestation.

Socrates Younger/ How so?

Stranger/ Those that are modest seek after their own manners, and as much as possible marry those that are endued with them, and likewise marry their own offspring to such as resemble themselves. The genus about fortitude acts in the same manner, pursuing its own nature; when at the same time it is requisite that both genera should act in a manner entirely contrary.

Socrates Younger/ How, and on what account?

Stranger/ Because this is the natural condition of fortitude, that when it has been unmingled for many generations with a temperate nature, it is florid with strength in the beginning, but in the end becomes entirely efflorescent with insanity.

Socrates Younger/ It is likely.

Stranger/ Again, a soul very full of shame, and void of audacious fortitude, when it has subsisted in this manner for many generations, naturally becomes unseasonably sluggish, and at last perfectly mutilated.

Socrates Younger/ And this also is likely to happen.

Stranger/ We have said that there is no difficulty in binding men with these bonds, if both genera have one opinion respecting things beautiful and good. For this is the one and entire work of royal weaving, viz. never to suffer temperate manners to subsist apart from such as are valiant, but, weaving together both these, from according opinions, honor, dishonor, and glory, to collect from these a web smooth, and, as it is said, well woven, and always to commit in common the authority of governors in cities to these.

Socrates Younger/ How?

Stranger/ Where it happens that one governor is sufficient, a president should be chosen who possesses both these; but where more than one is necessary, parts of these must be mingled together. For the manners of temperate governors are very cautious, just, and salutary; but they require acrimony, and a certain acute and practical temerity.

Socrates Younger/ These things also appear so to me.

Stranger/ Again, fortitude with respect to justice and caution is more indigent than those other virtues; but it excels them in actions. But it is impossible that all things

pertaining to cities, both of a private and public nature, should subsist beautifully, unless both these are present.

Socrates Younger/ Undoubtedly.

Stranger/ We must say then that this end of the web of politic action is then rightly woven, when the royal art, connecting the manners of brave and temperate men by concord and friendship, collects together their life in common, producing the most magnificent and excellent of all webs; —and besides this, when, embracing in common all others in the city, both, slaves and free-born, it holds them together by this texture, and governs and presides over the city in such a manner that nothing may in any respect be wanting which is requisite to its felicity.

Socrates Younger/ You have finished, O guest, your description of the royal and political character most beautifully.

THE END OF THE POLITICUS.

Crito.

or

The Duty Of A Citizen.

Translated by Henry Cary.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Crito.

Socrates/ Why have you come at this hour, Crito? Is it not very early?

Crito/ It is.

Socrates/ About what time?

Crito/ Scarce day-break.

Socrates/ I wonder how the keeper of the prison came to admit you.

Crito/ He is familiar with me, Socrates, from my having frequently come hither; and he is under some obligations to me.

Socrates/ Have you just now come, or some time since?

Crito/ A considerable time since.

Socrates/ Why then did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting down by me in silence:

Crito/ By Zeus, Socrates, I should not myself like to be so long awake and in such affliction. But I have been for some time wondering at you, perceiving how sweetly you slept; and I purposely did not awake you, that you might pass your time as pleasantly as possible. And indeed I have often before throughout your whole life considered you happy in your disposition, but far more so in the present calamity, seeing how easily and meekly you bear it.

Socrates/ However, Crito, it would be disconsonant for a man at my time of life to repine because he must needs die.

Crito/ But others, Socrates, at your age have been involved in similar calamities, yet their age has not hindered their repining at their present fortune.

Socrates/ So it is. But why did you come so early?

Crito/ Bringing sad tidings, Socrates; not sad to you, as it appears, but to me and all your friends sad and heavy; and which I, I think, shall bear worst of all.

Socrates/ What tidings? Has the ship arrived from Delos, on the arrival of which I must die?

Crito/ It has not yet arrived; but it appears to me that it will come to-day, from what certain persons report who have come from Sunium, and left it there. It is clear, therefore, from these messengers, that it will come to-day, and consequently it will be necessary, Socrates, for you to die to-morrow.

Socrates/ But with good fortune, Crito: and if so it please the gods, so be it. I do not think, however, that it will come to-day.

Crito/ Whence do you form this conjecture?

Socrates/ I will tell you. I must die on the day after that on which the ship arrives.

Crito/ So they say who have the control of these things.

Socrates/ I do not think, then, that it will come to-day, but tomorrow. I conjecture this from a dream which I had this very night, not long ago; and you seem very opportunely to have refrained from waking me.

Crito/ But what was this dream?

Socrates/ A beautiful and majestic woman, clad in white garments, seemed to approach me, and to call to me and say, “Socrates, three days hence you will reach fertile Phthia.”

Crito/ What a strange dream, Socrates!

Socrates/ Very clear, however, as it appears to me, Crito.

Crito/ Very much so, as it seems. But, my dear Socrates, even now be persuaded by me, and save yourself. For, if you die, not only a single calamity will befall me, but besides being deprived of such a friend as I shall never meet with again, I shall also appear to many who do not know you and me well, when I might have saved you, had I been willing to spend my money, to have neglected to do so. And what character can be more disgraceful than this to appear to value one's riches more than one's friends? For the generality of men will not be persuaded that you were unwilling to depart hence, when we urged you to it.

Socrates/ But why, my dear Crito, should we care so much for the opinion of the many? For the most worthy men, whom we ought rather to regard, will think that matters have transpired as they really have.

Crito/ Yet you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to attend to the opinion of the many. For the very circumstances of the present case show that the multitude are able to effect not only the smallest evils, but even the greatest, if anyone is calumniated to them.

Socrates/ Would, O Crito, that the multitude could effect the greatest evils, that they might also effect the greatest good, for then it would be well. But now they can do neither; for they can neither make a man wise, nor foolish; but they do whatever chances.

Crito/ So let it be then. But answer me this, Socrates; are you not anxious for me and other friends, lest, if you should escape from hence, informers should give us trouble, as having secretly carried you off, and so we should be compelled either to lose all our property, or a very large sum, or to suffer something else beside this? For, if you fear anything of the kind, dismiss your fears. For we are justified

in running this risk to save you, and, if need be, even a greater than this. But be persuaded by me, and do not refuse.

Socrates/ I am anxious about this, Crito, and about many other things.

Crito/ Do not fear this, however; for the sum is not large on receipt of which certain persons are willing to save you, and take you hence. In the next place, do you not see how cheap these informers are, so that there would be no need of a large sum for them? My fortune is at your service, sufficient, I think, for the purpose: then if, out of regard to me, you do not think right to spend my money, these strangers here are ready to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought with him a sufficient sum for the very purpose. Cebes, too, is ready, and very many others. So that, as I said, do not through fears of this kind hesitate to save yourself, nor let what you said in court give you any trouble, that if you went from hence you would not know what to do with yourself. For in many places, and wherever you go, men will love you: and if you are disposed to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will esteem you very highly, and will ensure your safety, so that no one in Thessaly will molest you.

Moreover, Socrates, you do not appear to me to pursue a just course in giving yourself up when you might be saved; and you press on the very results with respect to yourself which your enemies would press and have pressed in their anxiety to destroy you. Besides this, too, you appear to me to betray your own sons, whom, when it is in your power to rear and educate them, you will abandon, and, as far as you are concerned, they will meet with such a fate as chance brings them, and, as is probable, they will meet with such things as orphans are wont to experience in a state of orphanage. Surely one ought not to have children, or one

should go through the toil of rearing and instructing them. But you appear to me to have chosen the most indolent course; though you ought to have chosen such a course as a good and brave man would have done, since you profess to have made virtue your study through the whole of your life; so that I am ashamed both for you and for us who are your friends, lest this whole affair of yours should seem to be the effect of cowardice on our part; your appearing to stand your trial in the court, since you appeared when it was in your power not to have done so, the very manner in which the trial was conducted, and this last circumstance, as it were a ridiculous consummation of the whole business, your appearing to have escaped from us through our indolence and cowardice, who did not save you, nor did you save yourself, when it was practicable and possible, had we but exerted ourselves a little. Think of these things, therefore, Socrates, and beware, lest, besides the evil that will result, they be disgraceful both to you and to us; advise then with yourself, though indeed there is no longer time for advising, your resolve should be already made. And there is but one plan; for in the following night the whole must be accomplished. If we delay, it will be impossible and no longer practicable. By all means, therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and on no account refuse.

Socrates/ My dear Crito, your zeal would he very commendable were it united with right principle; otherwise, by how much the more earnest it is, by so much is it the more sad. We must consider, therefore, whether this plan should be adopted or not. For I not now only, but always, am a person who will obey nothing within me but reason, according as it appears to me on mature deliberation to be best. And the reasons, which I formerly professed, I cannot now reject, because this misfortune has befallen me; but they appear to me in much the same light, and I respect and

honor them as before; so that if we are unable to adduce any better at the present time, be assured that I shall not give in to you, even though the power of the multitude should endeavor to terrify us like children, by threatening more than it does now, bonds and death, and confiscation of property. How, therefore, may we consider the matter most conveniently? First of all, if we recur to the argument which you used about opinions, whether on former occasions it was rightly resolved or not, that we ought to pay attention to some opinions, and to others not; or whether, before it was necessary that I should die, it was rightly resolved, but now it has become clear that it was said idly for argument's sake, though in reality it was merely jest and trifling. I desire then, Crito, to consider, in common with you, whether it will appear to me in a different light now that I am in this condition, or the same, and whether we shall give it up or yield to it. It was said, I think, on former occasions, by those who were thought to speak seriously, as I just now observed, that of the opinions which men entertain some should be very highly esteemed and others not. By the gods, Crito, does not this appear to you to be well said? For you, in all human probability, are out of all danger of dying to-morrow, and the present calamity will not lead your judgment astray. Consider then: does it not appear to you to have been rightly settled, that we ought not to respect all the opinions of men, but some we should and others not? Nor yet the opinions of all men, but of some we should and of others not? What say you? Is not this rightly resolved?

Crito/ It is.

Socrates/ Therefore, we should respect the good but not the bad?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are not the good those of the wise, and the bad those of the foolish?

Crito/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ Come then, how again were the following points settled? Does a man who practices gymnastic exercises, and applies himself to them, pay attention to the praise and censure and opinion of everyone, or of that one man only who happens to be a physician or teacher of the exercises?

Crito/ Of that one only.

Socrates/ He ought, therefore, to fear the censures and covet the praises of that one, but not those of the multitude.

Crito/ Clearly.

Socrates/ He ought, therefore, so to practice and exercise himself, and to eat and drink, as seems fitting to the one who presides and knows, rather than to all others together.

Crito/ It is so.

Socrates/ Well, then, if he disobeys the one, and disregards his opinion and praise, but respects that of the multitude and of those who know nothing, will he not suffer some evil?

Crito/ How should he not?

Socrates/ But what is this evil? whither does it tend, and on what part of him that disobeys will it fall?

Crito/ Clearly on his body, for this it ruins.

Socrates/ You say well. The case is the same too, Crito, with all other things, not to go through them all. With respect, then, to things just and unjust, base and honorable, good and evil, about which we are now consulting, ought we to follow the opinion of the multitude, and to respect it, or that of one, if there is anyone who understands, whom we ought to reverence and respect rather than all others together? and if we do not obey him, shall we not corrupt

and injure that part of ourselves which becomes better by justice, but is ruined by injustice? Or is this nothing?

Crito/ I agree with you, Socrates.

Socrates/ Come then, if we destroy that which becomes better by what is wholesome, but is impaired by what is unwholesome, through being persuaded by those who do not understand, can we enjoy life when that is impaired? And this is the body we are speaking of, is it not?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ Can we then enjoy life with a diseased and impaired body?

Crito/ By no means.

Socrates/ But can we enjoy life when that is impaired which injustice ruins, but justice benefits? Or do we think that to be of less value than the body, whatever part of us it may be, about which injustice and justice are concerned?

Crito/ By no means.

Socrates/ But of more value?

Crito/ Much more.

Socrates/ We must not, then, my excellent friend, so much regard what the multitude will say of us, but what he will say who understands the just and unjust; the one, even truth itself. So that at first you did not set out with a right principle, when you laid it down that we ought to regard the opinion of the multitude with respect to things just and honorable and good, and their contraries. However, someone may say, are not the multitude able to put us to death?

Crito/ This, too, is clear, Socrates; anyone might say so.

Socrates/ You say truly. But, my admirable friend, this principle which we have just discussed appears to me to be the same as it was before. And consider this moreover,

whether it still holds good with us or not, that we are not to be anxious about living, but about living well.

Crito/ It does hold good.

Socrates/ And does this hold good or not, that to live well and honorably and justly, are the same thing?

Crito/ It does.

Socrates/ From what has been admitted, then, this consideration arises, whether it is just or not, that I should endeavor to leave this place without the permission of the Athenians. And should it appear to be just, we will make the attempt; but if not, we will give it up; but as to the considerations which you mention, of an outlay of money, reputation, and the education of children, beware, Crito, lest such considerations as these in reality belong to these multitudes, who rashly put one to death, and would restore one to life, if they could do so, without any reason at all. But we, since reason so requires, must consider nothing else than what we just now mentioned, whether we shall act justly in paying money and contracting obligations to those who will lead me hence, as well they who lead me as we who are led hence, or whether in truth we shall not act unjustly in doing all these things. And if we should appear in so doing to be acting unjustly, observe that we must not consider whether from remaining here and continuing quiet we must needs die, or suffer anything else, rather than whether we shall be acting unjustly.

Crito/ You appear to me to speak wisely, Socrates; but see what we are to do.

Socrates/ Let us consider the matter together, my friend; and if you have anything to object to what I say make good your objection, and I will yield to you; but if not, cease, my excellent friend, to urge upon me the same thing so often, that I ought to depart hence, against the will of the

Athenians. For I highly esteem your endeavors to persuade me thus to act, so long as it is not against my will. Consider, then, the beginning of our enquiry, whether it is stated to your entire satisfaction, and endeavor to answer the question put to you exactly as you think right.

Crito/ I will endeavor to do so.

Socrates/ Say we, then, that we should on no account deliberately commit injustice, or may we commit injustice under certain circumstances, under others not? Or is it on no account either good or honorable to commit injustice, as we have often agreed on former occasions, and as we just now said? Or have all those our former admissions been dissipated in these few days; and have we, Crito, old men as we are, been for a long time seriously conversing with each other, without knowing that we in no respect differ from children? Or does the case, beyond all question, stand as we then determined? whether the multitude allow it or not, and whether we must suffer a more severe or a milder punishment than this, still is injustice on every account both evil and disgraceful to him who commits it? Do we admit this, or not?

Crito/ We do admit it.

Socrates/ On no account, therefore, ought we to act unjustly.

Crito/ Surely not.

Socrates/ Neither ought one who is injured to return the injury, as the multitude think, since it is on no account right to act unjustly.

Crito/ It appears not.

Socrates/ What then? Is it right to do evil, Crito, or not?

Crito/ Surely it is not right, Socrates.

Socrates/ But what? To do evil in return when one has been evil-entreated, is that right or not?

Crito/ By no means.

Socrates/ For to do evil to men, differs in no respect from committing injustice.

Crito/ You say truly.

Socrates/ It is not right, therefore, to return an injury, or to do evil to any man, however one may have suffered from him. But take care Crito, that in allowing these things, you do not allow them contrary to your opinion. For I know that to some few only these things both do appear and will appear to be true. They then to whom these things appear true, and they to whom they do not, have no sentiment in common, and must needs despise each other, while they look to each other's opinions. Consider well then, whether you coincide and think with me; and whether we can begin our deliberations from this point, that it is never right either to do an injury, or to return an injury, or when one has been evil-entreated to revenge oneself by doing evil in return; or, do you dissent from and not coincide in this principle? For so it appears to me both long since and now; but if you in any respect think otherwise, say so and inform me. But if you persist in your former opinions, hear what follows.

Crito/ I do persist in them and think with you. Speak on then.

Socrates/ I say next then, or rather I ask; whether when a man has promised to do things that are just, he ought to do them, or evade his promise?

Crito/ He ought to do them.

Socrates/ Observe then what follows. By departing hence without the leave of the city, are we not doing evil to some, and that to those to whom we ought least of all to do it, or

not? And do we abide by what we agreed on as being just, or do we not?

Crito/ I am unable to answer your question, Socrates: for I do not understand it.

Socrates/ Then consider it thus. If while we were preparing to run away, or by whatever name we should call it, the laws and commonwealth should come and, presenting themselves before us, should say: "Tell me, Socrates, what do you purpose doing? Do you design anything else by this proceeding in which you are engaged, than to destroy us, the laws, and the whole city as far as you are able? Or do you think it possible for that city any longer to subsist and not be subverted, in which judgments that are passed have no force, but are set aside and destroyed by private persons?" What should we say, Crito, to these and similar remonstrances? For anyone, especially an orator, would have much to say on the violation of the law, which enjoins that judgments passed shall be enforced. Shall we say to them that the city has done us an injustice and not passed a right sentence? Shall we say this, or what else?

Crito/ This, by Zeus, Socrates.

Socrates/ What then if the laws should say: "Socrates, was it not agreed between us that you should abide by the judgments which the city should pronounce?" And if we should wonder at their speaking thus, perhaps they would say, "Wonder not, Socrates, at what we say, but answer, since you are accustomed to make use of questions and answers. For come, what charge have you against us and the city, that you attempt to destroy us? Did we not first give you being? and did not your father through us take your mother to wife and beget you? Say then, do you find fault with those laws amongst us that relate to marriage as being bad?" I should say, "I do not find fault with them." "Do you

with those that relate to your nurture when born, and the education with which you were instructed? Or did not the laws, ordained on this point, enjoin rightly, in requiring your father to instruct you in music and gymnastic exercises?" I should say, rightly. Well then: since you were born, nurtured, and educated through our means, can you say, first of all, that you are not both our offspring and our slave, as well you as your ancestors? And if this be so, do you think that there are equal rights between us, and whatever we attempt to do to you, do you think you may justly do to us in turn? Or had you not equal rights with your father, or master, if you happened to have one, so as to return what you suffered, neither to retort when found fault with, nor when stricken to strike again, nor many other things of the kind; but that with your country and the laws you may do so; so that if we attempt to destroy you, thinking it to be just, you also should endeavor as far as you are able, in return to destroy us, the laws, and your country, and in doing this will you say that you act justly, you who, in reality, make virtue your chief object? Or are you so wise as not to know that one's country is more honorable, venerable and sacred, and more highly prized both by gods and men possessed of understanding, than mother and father, and all other progenitors and that one ought to reverence, submit to, and appease one's country, when angry, rather than one's father, and either persuade it or do what it orders, and to suffer quietly if it bids one suffer, whether to be beaten, or put in bonds; or if it sends one out to battle there to be wounded or slain, this must be done, for justice so requires, and one must not give way, or retreat, or leave one's post; but that both in war, and in a court of justice, and everywhere, one must do what one's city and country enjoins, or persuade it in such manner as justice allows: but that to offer violence either to one's mother or father is not holy, much less to

one's country? What shall we say to these things, Crito? That the laws speak the truth or not?

Crito/ It seems so to me.

Socrates/ "Consider, then, Socrates," the laws perhaps might say, "whether we say truly that in what you are now attempting you are attempting to do what is not just towards us. For we, having given you birth, nurtured, instructed you, and having imparted to you and all other citizens all the good in our power, still proclaim, by giving the power to every Athenian who pleases, when he has arrived at years of discretion and become acquainted with the business of the state, and us, the laws, that anyone, who is not satisfied with us, may take his property and go wherever he pleases. And if anyone of you wishes to go to a colony, if he is not satisfied with us and the city, or to migrate and settle in another country, none of us, the laws, hinder or forbid him going whithersoever he pleases, taking with him all his property. But whoever continues with us after he has seen the manner in which we administer justice, and in other respects govern the city, we now say, that he has in fact entered into a compact with us, to do what we order, and we affirm that he who does not obey is in three respects guilty of injustice, because he does not obey us who gave him being, and because he does not obey us who nurtured him, and because, having made a compact that he would obey us, he neither does so nor does he persuade us if we do anything wrongly, though we propose for his consideration, and do not rigidly command him to do what we order, but leave him the choice of one of two things, either to persuade us, or to do what we require, and yet he does neither of these.

"And we say that you, O Socrates, will be subject to these charges if you accomplish your design, and that not least of the Athenians, but most so of all." And if I should ask, for what reason? They would probably justly retort on me by

saying, that among all the Athenians I especially made this compact with them. For they would say, “Socrates, we have strong proof of this, that you were satisfied both with us and the city; for of all the Athenians you especially would never have dwelt in it, if it had not been especially agreeable to you. For you never went out of the city to any of the public spectacles, except once to the Isthmian games, nor anywhere else, except on military service, nor have you ever gone abroad as other men do, nor had you ever had any desire to become acquainted with any other city or other laws, but we and our city were sufficient for you; so strongly were you attached to us, and so far did you consent to submit to our government, both in other respects and in begetting children in this city, in consequence of your being satisfied with it. Moreover in your very trial, it was in your power to have imposed on yourself a sentence of exile, if you pleased, and might then have done, with the consent of the city, what you now attempt against its consent. Then indeed you boasted yourself as not being grieved if you must needs die; but you preferred, as you said, death to exile. Now, however, you are neither ashamed of those professions, nor do you revere us, the laws, since you endeavor to destroy us; and you act as the vilest slave would act, by endeavoring to make your escape contrary to the conventions and the compacts by which you engaged to submit to our government. First then, therefore, answer us this, whether we speak the truth or not in affirming that you agreed to be governed by us in deed though not in word?” What shall we say to this, Crito? Can we do otherwise than assent?

Crito/ We must needs do so, Socrates?

Socrates/ “What else, then,” they will say, “Are you doing but violating the conventions and compacts which you made with us, though you did not enter into them from compulsion or through deception, or from being compelled

to determine in a short time, but during the space of seventy years, in which you might have departed if you had been dissatisfied with us, and the compacts had not appeared to you to be just? You, however, neither preferred Lacedaemon nor Crete, which you several times said are governed by good laws, nor any other of the Grecian or barbarian cities; but you have been less out of Athens than the lame and the blind, and other maimed persons. So much, it is evident, were you satisfied with the city and us, the laws, beyond the rest of the Athenians: for who can be satisfied with a city without laws? But now will you not abide by your compacts? You will, if you are persuaded by us, Socrates, and will not make yourself ridiculous by leaving the city.

"For consider, by violating these compacts and offending against any of them, what good you will do to yourself or your friends. For that your friends will run the risk of being themselves banished, and deprived of the rights of citizenship, or of forfeiting their property, is pretty clear. And as for yourself, if you should go to one of the neighboring cities, either Thebes or Megara, for both are governed by good laws, you will go there, Socrates, as an enemy to their polity, and such as have any regard for their country will look upon you with suspicion, regarding you as a corrupter of the laws, and you will confirm the opinion of the judges, so that they will appear to have condemned you rightly, for whoso is a corrupter of the laws will appear in all likelihood to be a corrupter of youths and weak-minded men. Will you then avoid these well-governed cities, and the best-ordered men? And should you do so, will it be worth your while to live? Or will you approach them, and have the effrontery to converse with them, Socrates, on subjects the same as you did here, that virtue and justice, legal institutions and laws, should be most highly valued by men? And do you not think that this conduct of Socrates would be very indecorous? You

must think so. But you will keep clear of these places, and go to Thessaly, to Crito's friends, for there is the greatest disorder and licentiousness, and perhaps they will gladly hear you relating how drolly you escaped from prison, clad in some dress or covered with a skin, or in some other disguise such as fugitives are wont to dress themselves in, having so changed your usual appearance. And will no one say that you, though an old man, with but a short time to live, in all probability, have dared to have such a base desire of life as to violate the most sacred laws? Perhaps not, should you not offend anyone. But if you should, you will hear, Socrates, many things utterly unworthy of you. You will live, too, in a state of abject dependence on all men, and as their slave. But what will you do in Thessaly besides feasting, as if you had gone to Thessaly to a banquet? And what will become of those discourses about justice and all other virtues? —But do you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may rear and educate them? What then? Will you take them to Thessaly, and there rear and educate them, making them aliens to their country, that they may owe you this obligation too? Or if not so, being reared here, will they be better reared and educated while you are living, though not with them? for your friends will take care of them. Whether, if you go to Thessaly, will they take care of them, but if you go to Hades will they not take care of them? If, however, any advantage is to be derived from those that say they are your friends, we must think they will.

"Then, O Socrates, be persuaded by us who have nurtured you, and do not set a higher value on your children, or on life, or on anything else than justice, that, when you arrive in Hades, you may have all this to say in your defense before those who have dominion there. For neither here in this life, if you do what is proposed, does it appear to be better, or more just, or more holy to yourself,

or any of your friends; nor will it be better for you when you arrive there. But now you depart, if you do depart, unjustly treated, not by us, the laws, but by men; but should you escape, having thus disgracefully returned injury for injury, and evil for evil, having violated your own compacts and conventions which you made with us, and having done evil to those to whom you least of all should have done it, namely, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, both we shall be indignant with you as long as you live, and there our brothers, the laws in Hades, will not receive you favorably, knowing that you attempted, as far as you were able, to destroy us. Let not Crito, then, persuade you to do what he advises, rather than we."

These things, my dear friend Crito, be assured I seem to hear, as the votaries of Cybele seem to hear the flutes. And the sound of these words booms in my ear, and makes me incapable of hearing anything else. Be sure, then, so long as I retain my present opinions, if you should say anything contrary to these, you will speak in vain. If, however, you think that you can prevail at all, say on.

Crito/ But, Socrates, I have nothing to say.

Socrates/ Desist, then, Crito, and let us pursue this course, since this way the deity leads us.

Crito

Translated by Church.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Crito.

SCENE. The prison of Socrates.

Socrates/ Why have you come at this hour, Crito? Is it not still early?

Crito/ Yes, very early.

Socrates/ About what time is it?

Crito/ It is just day-break.

Socrates/ I wonder that the jailor was willing to let you in.

Crito/ He knows me now, Socrates, I come here so often; and besides, I have done him a service.

Socrates/ Have you been here long?

Crito/ Yes; some time.

Socrates/ Then why did you sit down without speaking? why did you not wake me at once?

Crito/ Indeed, Socrates, I wish that I myself were not so sleepless and sorrowful. But I have been wondering to see how sweetly you sleep. And I purposely did not wake you, for I was anxious not to disturb your repose. Often before, all through your life, I have thought that your temper was a happy one; and I think so more than ever now, when I see how easily and calmly you bear the calamity that has come to you.

Socrates/ Nay, Crito, it would be absurd if at my age I were angry at having to die.

Crito/ Other men as old are overtaken by similar calamities, Socrates; but their age does not save them from being angry with their fate.

Socrates/ That is so, but tell me, why are you here so early?

Crito/ I am the bearer of bitter news, Socrates, not bitter, it seems, to you; but to me, and to all your friends, both bitter and grievous, and to none of them, I think, is it more grievous than to me.

Socrates/ What is it? Has the ship come from Delos, at the arrival of which I am to die?

Crito/ No, it has not actually arrived, but I think that it will be here to-day, from the news which certain persons have brought from Sunium, who left it there. It is clear from their news that it will be here to-day; and then, Socrates, to-morrow your life will have to end.

Socrates/ Well, Crito, may it end fortunately. Be it so, if so the gods will. But I do not think that the ship will be here to-day.

Crito/ Why do you suppose not?

Socrates/ I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the ship arrives, am I not?

Crito/ That is what the authorities say.

Socrates/ Then I do not think that it will come to-day, but to-morrow. I judge from a certain dream which I saw a little while ago in the night, so it seems to be fortunate that you did not wake me.

Crito/ And what was this dream?

Socrates/ A fair and comely woman, clad in white garments, seemed to come to me, and call me and say, “O Socrates—

'The third day hence shall thou fair Phthia reach.'"

Crito/ What a strange dream, Socrates!

Socrates/ But its meaning is clear; at least to me, Crito.

Crito/ Yes, too clear, it seems. But, O my ill. good Socrates, I beseech you for the last time to listen to me and save yourself. For to me your death will be more than a single disaster, not only shall I lose a friend the like of whom I shall never find again, but many persons, who do not know you and me well, will think that I might have saved you if I had been willing to spend money, but that I neglected to do so. And what character could be more disgraceful than the character of caring more for money than for ones friends? The world will never believe that we were anxious to save you, but that you yourself refused to escape.

Socrates/ But, my excellent Crito, why should we care so much about the opinion of the world? The best men, of whose opinion it is worth our while to think, will believe that we acted as we really did.

Crito/ But you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to care about the opinion of the world too. This very thing that has happened to you proves that the multitude can do a man not the least, but almost the greatest harm, if he be falsely accused to them.

Socrates/ I wish that the multitude were able to do a man the greatest harm, Crito, for then they would be able to do him the greatest good too. That would have been well. But, as it is, they can do neither. They cannot make a man either wise or foolish, they act wholly at random.

Crito/ Well, be it so. But tell me this, Socrates. You surely are not anxious about me and your other friends, and afraid lest, if you escape, the informers should say that we stole you away, and get us into trouble, and involve us in a great deal of expense, or perhaps in the loss of all our property, and, it may be, bring some other punishment upon us besides? If you have any fear of that kind, dismiss it. For of course we are bound to run those risks, and still greater risks than those if necessary, in saving you. So do not, I beseech you, refuse to listen to me.

Socrates/ I am anxious about that, Crito, and about much besides.

Crito/ Then have no fear on that score. There are men who, for no very large sum, are ready to bring you out of prison into safety. And then, you know, these informers are cheaply bought, and there would be no need to spend much upon them. My fortune is at your service, and I think that it is sufficient, and if you have any feeling about making use of my money, there are strangers in Athens, whom you know, ready to use theirs; and one of them, Simmias of Thebes, has actually brought enough for this very purpose. And Cebes and many others are ready too. And therefore, I repeat, do not shrink from saving yourself on that ground. And do not let what you said in the Court, that if you went into exile you would not know what to do with yourself, stand in your way; for there are many places for you to go to, where you will be welcomed. If you choose to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you, and shelter you from any annoyance from the people of Thessaly.

And besides, Socrates, I think that you will be doing what is wrong, if you abandon your life when you might

preserve it. You are simply playing the game of your enemies; it is exactly the game of those who wanted to destroy you. And what is more, to me you seem to be abandoning your children too, you will leave them to take their chance in life, as far as you are concerned, when you might bring them up and educate them. Most likely their fate will be the usual fate of children who are left orphans. But you ought not to beget children unless you mean to take the trouble of bringing them up and educating them. It seems to me that you are choosing the easy way, and not the way of a good and brave man, as you ought, when you have been talking all your life long of the value that you set upon virtue. For my part, I feel ashamed both for you, and for us who are your friends. Men will think that the whole of this thing which has happened to you—your appearance in court to take your trial, when you need not have appeared at all; the very way in which the trial was conducted; and then lastly this, for the crowning absurdity of the whole affair, is due to our cowardice. It will look as if we had shirked the danger out of miserable cowardice; for we did not save you, and you did not save yourself, when it was quite possible to do so, if we had been good for anything at all. Take care, Socrates, lest these things be not evil only, but also dishonorable to you and to us. Consider then; or rather the time for consideration is past; we must resolve; and there is only one plan possible. Everything must be done to-night. If we delay any longer, we are lost. O Socrates, I implore you not to refuse to listen to me.

Socrates/ My dear Crito, if your anxiety to save me be right, it is most valuable, but if it be not right, its greatness makes it all the more dangerous. We must consider then whether we are to do as you say, or not;

for I am still what I always have been, a man who will listen to no voice but the voice of the reasoning which on consideration I find to be truest. I cannot cast aside my former arguments because this misfortune has come to me. They seem to me to be as true as ever they were, and I hold exactly the same ones in honor and esteem as I used to, and if we have no better reasoning to substitute for them, I certainly shall not agree to your proposal, not even though the power of the multitude should scare us with fresh terrors, as children are scared with hobgoblins, and inflict upon us new fines, and imprisonments, and deaths. How then shall we most fitly examine the question? Shall we go back first to what you say about the opinions of men, and ask if we used to be right in thinking that we ought to pay attention to some opinions, and not to others?, Used we to be right in saying so before I was condemned to die, and has it now become apparent that we were talking at random, and arguing for the sake of argument, and that it was really nothing but play and nonsense? I am anxious, Crito, to examine our former reasoning with your help, and to see whether my present position will appear to me to have affected its truth in any way, or not; and whether we are to set it aside, or to yield assent to it. Those of us who thought at all seriously, used always to say, I think, exactly what I said just now, namely, that we ought to esteem some of the opinions which men form highly, and not others. Tell me, Crito, if you please, do you not think that they were right? For you, humanly speaking, will not have to die tomorrow, and your judgment will not be biased by that circumstance. Consider then, do you not think it reasonable to say that we should not esteem all the opinions of men, but only some, nor the opinions of all

men, but only of some men? What do you think? Is not this true?

Crito/ It is.

Socrates/ And we should esteem the good opinions, and not the worthless ones?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the good opinions are those of the wise, and the worthless ones those of the foolish?

Crito/ Of course.

Socrates/ And what used we to say about this? Does a man who is in training, and who is in earnest about it, attend to the praise and blame and opinion of all men, or of the one man only who is a doctor or a trainer?

Crito/ He attends only to the opinion of the one man.

Socrates/ Then he ought to fear the blame and welcome the praise of this one man, not of the many?

Crito/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then he must act and exercise, and eat and drink in whatever way the one man who is his master, and who understands the matter, bids him; not as others bid him?

Crito/ That is so.

Socrates/ Good. But if he disobeys this one man, and disregards his opinion and his praise, and esteems instead what the many, who understand nothing of the matter, say, will he not suffer for it?

Crito/ Of course he will.

Socrates/ And how will he suffer? In what direction, and in what part of himself?

Crito/ Of course in his body. That is disabled.

Socrates/ You are right. And, Crito, to be brief, is it not the same, in everything? And, therefore, in questions of right and wrong, and of the base and the honorable, and of good and evil, which we are now considering, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and fear that, or the opinion of the one man who under stands these matters (if we can find him), and feel more shame and fear before him than before all other men? For if we do not follow him, we shall cripple and maim that part of us which, we used to say, is improved by right and disabled by wrong. Or is this not so?

Crito/ No, Socrates, I agree with you.

Socrates/ Now, if, by listening to the opinions of those who do not understand, we disable that part of us which is improved by health and crippled by disease, is our life worth living, when it is crippled? It is the body, is it not?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is life worth living with the body crippled and in a bad state?

Crito/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ Then is life worth living when that part of us which is maimed by wrong and benefited by right is crippled? Or do we consider that part of us, whatever it is, which has to do with right and wrong to be of less consequence than our body?

Crito/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ But more valuable?

Crito/ Yes, much more so.

Socrates/ Then, my excellent friend, we must not think so much of what the many will say of us; we must think of what the one man, who understands right and

wrong, and of what Truth herself will say of us. And so you are mistaken to begin with, when you invite us to regard the opinion of the multitude concerning the right and the honorable and the good, and their opposites. But, it may be said, the multitude can put us to death?

Crito/ Yes, that is evident. That may be said, Socrates.

Socrates/ True. But, my excellent friend, to me it appears that the conclusion which we have just reached, is the same as our conclusion of former times. Now consider whether we still hold to the belief, that we should set the highest value, not on living, but on living well?

Crito/ Yes, we do.

Socrates/ And living well and honorably and rightly mean the same thing, do we hold to that or not?

Crito/ We do.

Socrates/ Then, starting from these premises, we have to consider whether it is right or not right for me to try to escape from prison, without the consent of the Athenians. If we find that it is right, we will try, if not, we will let it alone. I am afraid that considerations of expense, and of reputation, and of bringing up my children, of which you talk, Crito, are only the reflections of our friends, the many, who lightly put men to death, and who would, if they could, as lightly bring them to life again, without a thought. But reason, which is our guide, shows us that we can have nothing to consider but the question which I asked just now, namely, shall we be doing right if we give money and thanks to the men who are to aid me in escaping, and if we ourselves take our respective parts in my escape? Or shall we in truth be doing wrong, if we do all this?

And if we find that we should be doing wrong, then we must not take any account either of death, or of any other evil that may be the consequence of remaining quietly here, but only of doing wrong.

Crito/ I think that you are right, Socrates. But what are we to do?

Socrates/ Let us consider that together, my good sir, and if you can contradict anything that I say, do so, and I will be convinced, but if you cannot, do not go on repeating to me any longer, my dear friend, that I should escape without the consent of the Athenians. I am very anxious to act with your approval, I do not want you to think me mistaken. But now tell me if you agree with the doctrine from which I start, and try to answer my questions as you think best.

Crito/ I will try.

Socrates/ Ought we never to do wrong intentionally at all; or may we do wrong in some ways, and not in others? Or, as we have often agreed in former times, is it never either good or honorable to do wrong? Have all our former conclusions been forgotten in these few days? Old men as we were, Crito, did we not see, in days gone by, when we were gravely conversing with each other, that we were no better than children? Or is not what we used to say most assuredly the truth, whether the world agrees with us or not? Is not wrongdoing an evil and a shame to the wrong-doer in every case, whether we incur a heavier or a lighter punishment than death as the consequence of doing right? Do we believe that?

Crito/ We do.

Socrates/ Then we ought never to do wrong at all?

Crito/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Neither, if we ought never to do wrong at all, ought we to repay wrong with wrong, as the world thinks we may?

Crito/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ Well then, Crito, ought we to do evil to anyone?

Crito/ Certainly I think not, Socrates.

Socrates/ And is it right to repay evil with evil, as the world thinks, or not right?

Crito/ Certainly it is not right.

Socrates/ For there is no difference, is there, between doing evil to a man, and wronging him?

Crito/ True.

Socrates/ Then we ought not to repay wrong with wrong or do harm to any man, no matter what we may have suffered from him. And in conceding this, Crito, be careful that you do not concede more than you mean. For I know that only a few men hold, or ever will hold this opinion. And so those who hold it, and those who do not, have no common ground of argument; they can of necessity only look with contempt on each other's belief. Do you therefore consider very carefully whether you agree with me and share my opinion. Are we to start in our inquiry from the doctrine that it is never right either to do wrong, or to repay wrong with wrong, or to avenge ourselves on any man who harms us, by harming him in return? Or do you disagree with me and dissent from my principle? I myself have believed in it for a long time, and I believe in it still. But if you differ in any way, explain to me how. If you still hold to our former opinion, listen to my next point.

Crito/ Yes, I hold to it, and I agree with you. Go on.

Socrates/ Then, my next point, or rather my next question, is this, Ought a man to perform his just agreements, or may he shuffle out of them?

Crito/ He ought to perform them.

Socrates/ Then consider. If I escape without the states consent, shall I be injuring those whom I ought least to injure, or not? Shall I be abiding by my just agreements or not?

Crito/ I cannot answer your question, Socrates. I do not understand it.

Socrates/ Consider it in this way. Suppose the laws and the commonwealth were to come and appear to me as I was preparing to run away (if that is the right phrase to describe my escape) and were to ask, 'Tell us, Socrates, what have you in your mind to do? What do you mean by trying to escape, but to destroy us the laws, and the whole city, so far as in you lies? Do you think that a state can exist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law are of no force, and are disregarded and set at naught by private individuals?' How shall we answer questions like that, Crito? Much might be said, especially by an orator, in defense of the law which makes judicial decisions supreme. Shall I reply, 'But the state has injured me, it has decided my cause wrongly.' Shall we say that?

Crito/ Certainly we will, Socrates.

Socrates/ And suppose the laws were to reply, 'Was that our agreement? or was it that you would submit to whatever judgments the state should pronounce?' And if we were to wonder at their words, perhaps they would say, 'Socrates, wonder not at our words, but answer us; you yourself are accustomed to ask questions and to answer them. What complaint have you against us and

the city, that you are trying to destroy us? Are we not, first, your parents? Through us your father took your mother and begat you. Tell us, have you any fault to find with those of us that are the laws of marriage?' 'I have none,' I should reply. 'Or have you any fault to find with those of us that regulate the nurture and education of the child, which you, like others, received? Did not we do well in bidding your father educate you in music and gymnastic?' 'You did,' I should say. 'Well then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, how, in the first place, can you deny that you are our child and our slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this be so, do you think that your rights are on a level with ours? Do you think that you have a right to retaliate upon us if we should try to do anything to you. You had not the same rights that your father had, or that your master would have had, if you had been a slave. You had no right to retaliate upon them if they ill-treated you, or to answer them if they reviled you, or to strike them back if they struck you, or to repay them evil with evil in any way. And do you think that you may retaliate on your country and its laws? If we try to destroy you, because we think it right, will you in return do all that you can to destroy us, the laws, and your country, and say that in so doing you are doing right, you, the man, who in truth thinks so much of virtue? Or are you too wise to see that your country is worthier, and more august, and more sacred, and holier, and held in higher honor both by the gods and by all men of understanding, than your father and your mother and all your other ancestors; and that it is your bounden duty to reverence it, and to submit to it, and to approach it more humbly than you would approach your father, when it is angry with you; and either to do

whatever it bids you to do or to persuade it to excuse you; and to obey in silence if it orders you to endure stripes or imprisonment, or if it send you to battle to be wounded or to die? That is what is your duty. You. must not give way, nor retreat, nor desert your post. In war, and in the court of justice, and everywhere, you must do whatever your city and your country bid you do, or you must convince them that their commands are unjust. But it is against the law of God to use violence to your father or to your mother; and much more so is it against the law of God to use violence to your country.' What answer shall we make, Crito? Shall we say that the laws speak truly, or not?

Crito/ I think that they do.

Socrates/ 'Then consider, Socrates,' perhaps they would say, 'if we are right in saying that by attempting to escape you are attempting to injure us. We brought you into the world, we nurtured you, we educated you, we gave you and every other citizen a share of all the good things we could. Yet we proclaim that if any man of the Athenians is dissatisfied with us, he may take his goods and go away whithersoever he pleases, we give that permission to every man who chooses to avail himself of it, so soon as he has reached man's estate, and sees us, the laws, and the administration of our city. No one of us stands in his way or forbids him to take his goods and go wherever he likes, whether it be to an Athenian colony, or to any foreign country, if he is dissatisfied with us and with the city. But we say that every man of you who remains here, seeing how we administer justice, and how we govern the city in other matters, has agreed, by the very fact of remaining here, to do whatsoever we bid him. And, we say, he who disobeys us, does a threefold wrong, he disobeys us who

are his parents, and he disobeys us who fostered him, and he disobeys us after he has agreed to obey us, without persuading us that we are wrong. Yet we did not bid him sternly to do whatever we told him. We offered him an alternative; we gave him his choice, either to obey us, or to convince us that we were wrong, but he does neither.

'These are the charges, Socrates, to which we say that you will expose yourself, if you do what you intend; and that not less, but more than other Athenians.' And if I were to ask, 'And why?' they might retort with justice that I have bound myself by the agreement with them more than other Athenians. They would say, 'Socrates, we have very strong evidence that you were satisfied with us and with the city. You would not have been content to stay at home in it more than other Athenians, unless you had been satisfied with it more than they. You never went away from Athens to the festivals, save once to the Isthmian games, nor elsewhere except on military service; you never made other journeys like other men; you had no desire to see other cities or other laws; you were contented with us and our city. So strongly did you prefer us, and agree to be governed by us, and what is more, you begat children in this city, you found it so pleasant. And besides, if you had wished, you might at your trial have offered to go into exile. At that time you could have done with the states consent, what you are trying now to do without it. But then you gloried in being willing to die. You said that you preferred death to exile. And now you are not ashamed of those words, you do not respect us the laws, for you are trying to destroy us, and you are acting just as a miserable slave would act, trying to run away, and breaking the covenant and agreement which you made

to submit to our government. First, therefore, answer this question. Are we right, or are we wrong, in saying that you have agreed not in mere words, but in reality, to live under our government?' What are we to say, Crito? Must we not admit that it is true?

Crito/ We must, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then they would say, 'Are you not breaking your covenants and agreements with us? And you were not led to make them by force or by fraud, you had not to make up your mind in a hurry. You had seventy years in which you might have gone away, if you had been dissatisfied with us, or if the agreement had seemed to you unjust. But you preferred neither Lacedaemon nor Crete, though you are fond of saying that they are well governed, nor any other state, either of the Hellenes, or the Barbarians. You went away from Athens less than the lame and the blind and the cripple. Clearly you, far more than other Athenians, were satisfied with the city, and also with us who are its laws, for who would be satisfied with a city which had no laws? And now will you not abide by your agreement? If you take our advice, you will, Socrates, then you will not make yourself ridiculous by going away from Athens.

'For consider, what good will you do yourself or your friends by thus transgressing, and breaking your agreement? It is tolerably certain that they, on their part, will at least run the risk of exile, and of losing their civil rights, or of forfeiting their property. For yourself, you might go to one of the neighboring cities, to Thebes or to Megara for instance for both of them are well governed but, Socrates, you will come as an enemy to these commonwealths; and all who care for their city will look askance at you, and think that you are a

subverter of law. And you will confirm the judges in their opinion, and make it seem that their verdict was a just one. For a man who is a subverter of law, may well be supposed to be a corrupter of the young and thoughtless. Then will you avoid well-governed states and civilized men? Will life be worth having, if you do? Or will you consort with such men, and converse without shame about what, Socrates? About the things which you talk of here? Will you tell them that virtue, and justice, and institutions. and law are the most precious things that men can have? And do you not think that that will be a shameful thing in Socrates? You ought to think so. But you will leave these places; you will go to the friends of Crito in Thessaly, for there, there is most disorder and license, and very likely they will be delighted to hear of the ludicrous way in which you escaped from prison, dressed up in peasants clothes, or in some other disguise which people put on when they are running away, and with your appearance altered. But will no one say how you, an old man, with probably only a few more years to live, clung so greedily to life that you dared to transgress the highest laws? Perhaps not, if you do not displease them. But if you do, Socrates, you will hear much that will make you blush. You will pass your life as the flatterer and the slave of all men; and what will you be doing but feasting in Thessaly? It will be as if you had made a journey to Thessaly for an entertainment. And where will be all our old sayings about justice and virtue then? But you wish to live for the sake of your children? You want to bring them up and educate them? What? will you take them with you to Thessaly, and bring them up and educate them there? Will you make them strangers to their own country, that- you may bestow this benefit on them too?

Or supposing that you leave them in Athens, will they be brought up and educated better if you are alive, though you are not with them? Yes; your friends will take care of them. Will your friends take care of them if you make a journey to Thessaly, and not if you make a journey to Hades? You ought not to think that, at least if those who call themselves your friends are good for anything at all.

'No, Socrates, be advised by us who have fostered you. Think neither of children, nor of life, nor of any other thing before justice, that when you come to the other world you may be able to make your defense before the rulers who sit in judgment there. It is clear that neither you nor any of your friends will be happier, or juster, or holier in this life, if you do this thing, nor will you be happier after you are dead. Now you will go away wronged, not by us, the laws, but by men. But if you repay evil with evil, and wrong with wrong in this shameful way, and break your agreements and covenants with us, and injure those whom you should least injure, yourself, and your friends, and your country, and us, and so escape, then we shall be angry with you while you live, and when you die our brethren, the laws in Hades, will not receive you kindly; for they will know that on earth you did all that you could to destroy us. Listen then to us, and let not Crito persuade you to do as he says.'

Know well, my dear friend Crito, that this is what I seem to hear, as the worshippers of Cybele seem, in their frenzy, to hear the music of flutes, and the sound of these words rings loudly in my ears, and drowns all other words.

And I feel sure, that if you try to change my mind you will speak in vain; nevertheless, if you think that you will succeed, say on.

Crito/ I can say no more, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then let it be, Crito, and let us do as I say, seeing that God so directs us.

Crito

[OR ON DUTY; ETHICAL]

Translated by Fowler, Harold North.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Crito

Socrates/ Why have you come at this time, Crito? Or isn't it still early?

Crito/ Yes, very early.

Socrates/ About what time?

Crito/ Just before dawn.

Socrates/ I am surprised that the watchman of the prison was willing to let you in.

Crito/ He is used to me by this time, Socrates, because I come here so often, and besides I have done something for him.

Socrates/ Have you just come, or some time ago?

Crito/ Some little time ago.

Socrates/ Then why did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting by me in silence?

Crito/ No, no, by Zeus, Socrates, I only wish I myself were not so sleepless and sorrowful. But I have been wondering at you for some time, seeing how sweetly you sleep; and I purposely refrained from waking you, that you might pass the time as pleasantly as possible. I have often thought throughout your life hitherto that you were of a happy disposition, and I think so more than ever in this present misfortune, since you bear it so easily and calmly.

Socrates/ Well, Crito, it would be absurd if at my age I were disturbed because I must die now.

Crito/ Other men as old, Socrates, become involved in similar misfortunes, but their age does not in the least prevent them from being disturbed by their fate.

Socrates/ That is true. But why have you come so early?

Crito/ To bring news, Socrates, sad news, though apparently not sad to you, but sad and grievous to me and all your friends, and too few of them, I think, so grievous as to me.

Socrates/ What is this news? Has the ship come from Delos, at the arrival of which I am to die?

Crito/ It has not exactly come, but I think it will come to-day from the reports of some men who have come from Sunium and left it there. Now it is clear from what they say that it will come to-day, and so to-morrow, Socrates, your life must end.

Socrates/ Well, Crito, good luck be with us! If this is the will of the gods, so be it. However, I do not think it will come to-day.

Crito/ What is your reason for not thinking so?

Socrates/ I will tell you. I must die on the day after the ship comes in, must I not?

Crito/ So those say who have charge of these matters.

Socrates/ Well, I think it will not come in to-day, but to-morrow. And my reason for this is a dream which I had a little while ago in the course of this night. And perhaps you let me sleep just at the right time.

Crito/ What was the dream?

Socrates/ I dreamed that a beautiful, fair woman, clothed in white raiment, came to me and called me and

said, “Socrates, on the third day thou wouldst come to fertile Phthia.”

Crito/ A strange dream, Socrates.

Socrates/ No, a clear one, at any rate, I think, Crito.

Crito/ Too clear, apparently. But, my dear Socrates, even now listen to me and save yourself. Since, if you die, it will be no mere single misfortune to me, but I shall lose a friend such as I can never find again, and besides, many persons who do not know you and me well will think I could have saved you if I had been willing to spend money, but that I would not take the trouble. And yet what reputation could be more disgraceful than that of considering ones money of more importance than ones friends? For most people will not believe that we were eager to help you to go away from here, but you refused.

Socrates/ But, my dear Crito, why do we care so much for what most people think? For the most reasonable men, whose opinion is more worth considering, will think that things were done as they really will be done.

Crito/ But you see it is necessary, Socrates, to care for the opinion of the public, for this very trouble we are in now shows that the public is able to accomplish not by any means the least, but almost the greatest of evils, if one has a bad reputation with it.

Socrates/ I only wish, Crito, the people could accomplish the greatest evils, that they might be able to accomplish also the greatest good things. Then all would be well. But now they can do neither of the two; for they are not able to make a man wise or foolish, but they do whatever occurs to them.

Crito/ That may well be. But, Socrates, tell me this; you are not considering me and your other friends, are you, fearing that, if you escape, the informers will make trouble for us by saying that we stole you away, and we shall be forced to lose either all our property or a good deal of money, or be punished in some other way besides? For if you are afraid of anything of that kind, let it go; since it is right for us to run this risk, and even greater risk than this, if necessary, provided we save you. Now please do as I ask.

Socrates/ I am considering this, Crito, and many other things.

Crito/ Well, do not fear this! for it is not even a large sum of money which we should pay to some men who are willing to save you and get you away from here. Besides, don't you see how cheap these informers are, and that not much money would be needed to silence them? And you have my money at your command, which is enough, I fancy; and moreover, if because you care for me you think you ought not to spend my money, there are foreigners here willing to spend theirs; and one of them, Simmias of Thebes, has brought for this especial purpose sufficient funds; and Cebes also and very many others are ready. So, as I say, do not give up saving yourself through fear of this. And do not be troubled by what you said in the court, that if you went away you would not know what to do with yourself. For in many other places, wherever you go, they will welcome you; and if you wish to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you and will protect you, so that no one in Thessaly shall annoy you.

And besides, Socrates, it seems to me the thing you are undertaking to do is not even right betraying yourself when you might save yourself. And you are

eager to bring upon yourself just what your enemies would wish and just what those were eager for who wished to destroy you. And moreover, I think you are abandoning your children, too, for when you might bring them up and educate them, you are going to desert them and go away, and, so far as you are concerned, their fortunes in life will be whatever they happen to meet with, and they will probably meet with such treatment as generally comes to orphans in their destitution. No. Either one ought not to beget children, or one ought to stay by them and bring them up and educate them. But you seem to me to be choosing the laziest way; and you ought to choose as a good and brave man would choose, you who have been saying all your life, that you cared for virtue. So I am ashamed both for you and for us, your friends, and I am afraid people will think that this whole affair of yours has been conducted will) a sort of cowardice on our part—both the fact that the case came before the court, when it might have been avoided, and the way in which the trial itself was carried on, and finally they will think, as the crowning absurdity of the whole affair, that this opportunity has escaped us through some base cowardice on our part, since we did not save you, and you did not save yourself, though it was quite possible if we had been of any use whatever. Take care, Socrates, that these things be not disgraceful, as well as evil, both to you and to us. Just consider, or rather it is time not to consider any longer, but to have finished considering. And there is just one possible plan; for all this must be done in the coming night. And if we delay it can no longer be done. But I beg you, Socrates, do as I say and don't refuse.

Socrates/ My dear Crito, your eagerness is worth a great deal, if it should prove to be rightly directed; but otherwise, the greater-it is, the more hard to bear. So we must examine the question whether we ought to do this or not; for I am not only now but always a man who follows nothing but the reasoning which on consideration seems to me best. And I cannot, now that this has happened to us, discard the arguments I used to advance, but they seem to me much the same as ever, and I revere and honor the same ones as before. And unless we can bring forward better ones in our present situation, be assured that I shall not give way to you, not even if the power of the multitude frighten us with even more terrors than at present, as children are frightened with goblins, threatening us with imprisonments and deaths and confiscations of property. Now how could we examine the matter most reasonably? By taking up first what you say about opinions and asking whether we were right when we always used to say that we ought to pay attention to some opinions and not to others? Or were we right before I was condemned to death, whereas it has now been made clear that we were talking merely for the sake of argument and it was really mere play and nonsense? And I wish to investigate, Crito, in common with you, and see whether our former argument seems different to me under our present conditions, or the same, and whether we shall give it up or be guided by it. But it used to be said, I think, by those who thought they were speaking sensibly, just as I was saying now, that of the opinions held by men some ought to be highly esteemed and others not. In God's name, Crito, do you not think this is correct? For you, humanly speaking, are not involved in the necessity of dying to-

morrow, and therefore present conditions would not lead your judgment astray. Now say, do you not think we were correct in saying that we ought not to esteem all the opinions of men, but some and not others, and not those of all men, but only of some? What do you think? Is not this true?

Crito/ It is.

Socrates/ Then we ought to esteem the good opinions and not the bad ones?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the good ones are those of the wise and the bad ones those of the foolish?

Crito/ Of course.

Socrates/ Come then, what used we to say about this? If a man is an athlete and makes that his business, does he pay attention to every man's praise and blame and opinion or to those of one man only who is a physician or a trainer?

Crito/ To those of one man only.

Socrates/ Then he ought to fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man and not of the multitude.

Crito/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And he must act and exercise and eat and drink as the one man who is his director and who knows the business thinks best rather than as all the others think.

Crito/ That is true.

Socrates/ Well then; if he disobeys the one man and disregards his opinion and his praise, but regards the words of the many who have no special knowledge, will he not come to harm?

Crito/ Of course he will.

Socrates/ And what is this harm? In what direction and upon what part of the one who disobeys does it act?

Crito/ Evidently upon his body; for that is what it ruins.

Socrates/ Right. Then in other matters, not to enumerate them all, in questions of right and wrong and disgraceful and noble and good and bad, which we are now considering, ought we to follow and fear the opinion of the many or that of the one, if there is anyone who knows about them, whom we ought to revere and fear more than all the others? And if we do not follow him, we shall injure and cripple that which we used to say is benefited by the right and is ruined by the wrong. Or is there nothing in this?

Crito/ I think it is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, if through yielding to the opinion of the ignorant we ruin that which is benefited by health and injured by disease, is life worth living for us when that is ruined? And that is the body, is it not?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then is life worth living when the body is worthless and ruined?

Crito/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But is it worth living when that is ruined which is injured by the wrong and improved by the right? Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with right and wrong, is less important than the body?

Crito/ By no means.

Socrates/ But more important?

Crito/ Much more.

Socrates/ Then, most excellent friend, we must not consider at all what the many will say of us, but what he who knows about right and wrong, the one man, and truth herself will say. And so you introduced the discussion wrongly in the first place, when you began by saying we ought to consider the opinion of the multitude about the right and the noble and the good and their opposites. But it might, of course, be said that the multitude can put us to death.

Crito/ That is clear, too. It would be said, Socrates.

Socrates/ That is true. But, my friend, the argument we have just finished seems to me still much the same as before; and now see whether we still hold to this, or not, that it is not living, but living well which we ought to consider most important.

Crito/ We do hold to it.

Socrates/ And that living well and living rightly are the same thing, do we hold to that, or not?

Crito/ We do.

Socrates/ Then we agree that the question is whether it is right for me to try to escape from here without the permission of the Athenians, or not right. And if it appears to be right, let us try it, and if not, let us give it up. But the considerations you suggest, about spending money, and reputation, and bringing up my children, these are really, Crito, the reflections of those who lightly put men to death, and would bring them to life again, if they could, without any sense, I mean the multitude. But we, since our argument so constrains us, must consider only the question we just broached, whether we shall be doing right in giving money and thanks to these men who will help me to escape, and in escaping or aiding the escape ourselves, or shall in

truth be doing wrong, if we do all these things. And if it appears that it is wrong for us to do them, it may be that we ought not to consider either whether we must die if we stay here and keep quiet or whether we must endure anything else whatsoever, but only the question of doing wrong.

Crito/ I think what you say is right, Socrates; but think what we should do.

Socrates/ Let us, my good friend, investigate in common, and if you can contradict anything I say, do so, and I will yield to your arguments; but if you cannot, my dear friend, stop at once saying the same thing to me over and over, that I ought to go away from here without the consent of the Athenians; for I am anxious to act in this matter with your approval, and not contrary to your wishes. Now see if the beginning of the investigation satisfies you, and try to reply to my questions to the best of your belief.

Crito/ I will try.

Socrates/ Ought we in no way to do wrong intentionally, or should we do wrong in some ways but not in others? Or, as we often agreed in former times, is it never right or honorable to do wrong? Or have all those former conclusions of ours been overturned in these few days, and have we old men, seriously conversing with each other, failed all along to see that we were no better than children? Or is not what we used to say most certainly true, whether the world agree or not? And whether we must endure still more grievous sufferings than these, or lighter ones, is not wrongdoing inevitably an evil and a disgrace to the wrongdoer? Do we believe this or not?

Crito/ We do.

Socrates/ Then we ought not to do wrong at all.

Crito/ Why, no.

Socrates/ And we ought not even to requite wrong with wrong, as the world thinks, since we must not do wrong at all.

Crito/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Well, Crito, ought one to do evil or not?

Crito/ Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, then, is it right to requite evil with evil, as the world says it is, or not right?

Crito/ Not right, certainly.

Socrates/ For doing evil to people is the same thing as wronging them.

Crito/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us. And be careful, Crito, that you do not, in agreeing to this, agree to something you do not believe; for I know that there are few who believe or ever will believe this. Now those who believe this, and those who do not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must necessarily, in view of their opinions, despise one another. Do you therefore consider very carefully whether you agree and share in this opinion, and let us take as the starting point of our discussion the assumption that it is never right to do wrong or to requite wrong with wrong, or when we suffer evil to defend ourselves by doing evil in return. Or do you disagree and refuse your assent to this starting point? For I have long held this belief and I hold it yet, but if you have reached any other conclusion, speak and

explain it to me. If you still hold to our former opinion, hear the next point.

Crito/ I do hold to it and I agree with you; so go on.

Socrates/ Now the next thing I say, or rather ask, is this; "ought a man to do what he has agreed to do, provided it is right, or may he violate his agreements?"

Crito/ He ought to do it.

Socrates/ Then consider whether, if we go away from here without the consent of the state, we are doing harm to the very ones to whom we least ought to do harm, or not, and whether we are abiding by what we agreed was right, or not.

Crito/ I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand.

Socrates/ Consider it in this way. If, as I was en the point of running away (or whatever it should be called), the laws and the commonwealth should come to me and ask, "Tell me, Socrates, what have you in mind to do? Are you not intending by this thing you are trying to do, to destroy us, the laws, and the entire state, so far as in you lies? Or do you think that state can exist and not be overturned, in which the decisions reached by the courts have no force but are made invalid and annulled by private persons?" What shall we say, Crito, in reply to this question and others of the same kind? For one might say many things, especially if one were an orator, about the destruction of that law which provides that the decisions reached by the courts shall be valid. Or shall we say to them, "The state wronged me and did not judge the case rightly?" Shall we say that, or what?

Crito/ That is what we shall say, by Zeus, Socrates.

Socrates/ What then if the laws should say, "Socrates, is this the agreement you made with us, or

did you agree to abide by the verdicts pronounced by the state?" Now if I were surprised by what they said, perhaps they would continue, "Don't be surprised at what we say, Socrates, but answer, since you are in the habit of employing the method of question and answer. Come, what fault do you find with us and the state, that you are trying to destroy us? In the first place, did we not bring you forth? Is it not through us that your father married your mother and begat you? Now tell us, have you any fault to find with those of us who are the laws of marriage?"

"I find no fault," I should say. "Or with those that have to do with the nurture of the child after he is born and with his education which you, like others, received? Did those of us who are assigned to these matters not give good directions when we told your father to educate you in music and gymnastics?" "You did, I should say. "Well then, when you were born and nurtured and educated, could you say to begin with that you were not our offspring and our slave, you yourself and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you think right as between you and us rests on a basis of equality, so that whatever we undertake to do to you it is right for you to retaliate? There was no such equality of right between you and your father or your master, if you had one, so that whatever treatment you received you might return it, answering them if you were reviled, or striking back if you were struck, and the like; and do you think that it will be proper for you to act so toward your country and the laws, so that if we undertake to destroy you, thinking it is right, you will undertake in return to destroy us laws and your country, so far as you are able, and will say that in doing this you are doing right, you who really care for virtue? Or is your wisdom such that

you do not see that your country is more precious and more to be revered and is holier and in higher esteem among the gods and among men of understanding than your mother and your father and all your ancestors, and that you ought to show to her more reverence and obedience and humility when she is angry than to your father, and ought either to convince her by persuasion or to do whatever she commands, and to suffer, if she commands you to suffer, in silence, and if she orders you to be scourged or imprisoned or if she leads you to war to be wounded or slain, her will is to be done, and this is right, and you must not give way or draw back or leave your post, but in war and in court and everywhere, you must do whatever the state, your country, commands, or must show her by persuasion what is really right, but that it is impious to use violence against either your father or your mother, and much more impious to use it against your country?" What shall we reply to this, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not?

Crito/ I think they do.

Socrates/ "Observe then, Socrates," perhaps the laws would say, "that if what we say is true, what you are now undertaking to do to us is not right. For we brought you into the world, nurtured you, and gave a share of all the good things we could to you and all the citizens. Yet we proclaim, by having offered the opportunity to any of the Athenians who wishes to avail himself of it, that anyone who is not pleased with us when he has become a man and has seen the administration of the city and us, the laws, may take his goods and go away wherever he likes. And none of us stands in the way or forbids any of you to take his goods and go away wherever he pleases, if we and the

state do not please him, whether it be to an Athenian colony or to a foreign country where he will live as an alien. But we say that whoever of you stays here, seeing how we administer justice and how we govern the state in other respects, has thereby entered into an agreement with us to do what we command; and we say that he who does not obey does threefold wrong, because he disobeys us who are his parents, because he disobeys us who nurtured him, and because after agreeing to obey us he neither obeys us nor convinces us that we are wrong, though we give him the opportunity and do not roughly order him to do what we command, but when we allow him a choice of two things, either to convince us of error or to do our bidding, he does neither of these things."

"We say that you, Socrates, will be exposed to these reproaches, if you do what you have in mind, and you not least of the Athenians but more than most others." If then I should say, "How so?" perhaps they might retort with justice that I had made this agreement with them more emphatically than most other Athenians. For they would say, "Socrates, we have strong evidence that we and the city pleased you; for you would never have stayed in it more than all other Athenians if you had not been better pleased with it than they; you never went out from the city to a festival, or anywhere else, except on military service, and you never made any other journey, as other people do, and you had no wish to know any other city or other laws, but you were contented with us and our city. So strongly did you prefer us and agree to live in accordance with us; and besides, you begat children in the city, showing that it pleased you. And moreover even at your trial you might have offered exile as your penalty, if you wished, and

might have done with the states consent what you are now undertaking to do without it. But you then put on airs and said you were not disturbed if you must die, and you preferred, as you said, death to exile. And now you are not ashamed to think of those words and you do not respect us, the laws, since you are trying to bring us to naught; and you are doing what the meanest slave would do, since you are trying to run away contrary to the compacts and agreements you made with us that you would live in accordance with us. First then, answer this question, whether we speak the truth or not when we say that you agreed, not in word, but by your acts, to live in accordance with us." What shall we say to this, Crito? Must we not agree that it is true?

Crito/ We must, Socrates.

Socrates/ "Are you then," they would say, "not breaking your compacts and agreements with us, though you were not led into them by compulsion or fraud, and were not forced to make up your mind in a short time, but had seventy years, in which you could have gone away, if we did not please you and if you thought the agreements were unfair? But you preferred neither Lacedaemon nor Crete, which you are always saying are well governed, nor any other of the Greek states, or of the foreign ones, but you went away from this city less than the lame and the blind and the other cripples. So much more than the other Athenians were you satisfied with the city and evidently therefore with us, its laws; for who would be pleased with a city apart from its laws? And now will you not abide by your agreement? You will if you take our advice, Socrates; and you will not make yourself ridiculous by going away from the city.

“For consider. By transgressing in this way and committing these errors, what good will you do to yourself or any of your friends? For it is pretty clear that your friends also will be exposed to the risk of banishment and the loss of their homes in the city or of their property. And you yourself, it you go to one of the nearest cities, to Thebes or Megara for both are well governed will go as an enemy, Socrates, to their government, and all who care for their own cities will look askance at you, and will consider you a destroyer of the laws, and you will confirm the judges in their opinion, so that they will think their verdict was just. For he who is destroyer of the laws might certainly be regarded as a destroyer of young and thoughtless men. Will you then avoid the well-governed cities and the most civilized men? And if you do this will your life be worth living? Or will you go to them and have the face to carry on what kind of conversation, Socrates? The same kind you carried on here, saying that virtue and justice and lawful things and the laws are the most precious things to men? And do you not think that the conduct of Socrates would seem most disgraceful? You cannot help thinking so. Or you will keep away from these places and go to Crito’s friends in Thessaly; for there, great disorder and lawlessness prevail, and perhaps they would be amused to hear of the ludicrous way in which you ran away from prison by putting on a disguise, a peasants leathern cloak or some of the other things in which runaways dress themselves up, and changing your appearance. But will no one say that you, an old man, who had probably but a short time yet to live, clung to life with such shameless greed that you transgressed the highest laws? Perhaps not, if you do not offend anyone; but if you do, Socrates, you will have

to listen to many things that would be a disgrace to you. So you will live as an inferior and a slave to everyone. And what will you do except feast in Thessaly, as if you had gone to Thessaly to attend a banquet? What will become of our conversations about justice and virtue? But perhaps you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them? How so? Will you take them to Thessaly to be brought up and educated, making exiles of them, that you may give them that blessing also? Or perhaps you will not do that, but if they are brought up here while you are living, will they be better brought up and educated if you are not with them than if you were dead? Oh yes! your friends will care for them. Will they care for them if you go away to Thessaly and not if you go away to the dwellings of the dead? If those who say they are your friends are of any use, we must believe they will care for them in both cases alike.

"Ah, Socrates, be guided by us who tended your infancy. Care neither for your children nor for life nor for anything else more than for the right, that when you come to the home of the dead, you may have all these things to say in your own defense. For clearly if you do this thing it will not be better for you here, or more just or holier, no, nor for any of your friends, and neither will it be better when you reach that other abode. Now, however, you will go away wronged, if you do go away, not by us, the laws, but by men; but if you escape after so disgracefully requiting wrong with wrong and evil with evil, breaking your compacts and agreements with us, and injuring those whom you least ought to injure—yourself, your friends, your country and us—we shall be angry with you while you live, and there our brothers, the laws in Hades realm, will not receive you

graciously; for they will know that you tried, so far as in you lay, to destroy us. Do not let Crito persuade you to do what he says, but take our advice."

Be well assured, my dear friend, Crito, that this is what I seem to hear, as the frenzied dervishes of Cybele seem to hear the flutes, and this sound of these words re-echoes within me and prevents my hearing any other words. And be assured that, so far as I now believe, if you argue against these words you will speak in vain. Nevertheless, if you think you can accomplish anything, speak.

Crito/ No, Socrates, I have nothing to say.

Socrates/ Then, Crito, let it be, and let us act in this way, since it is in this way that God leads us.

Crito

Translated by G.M.A. Grube.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Crito.

Socrates/ Why have you come so early, Crito? Or is it not still early?

Crito/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ How early?

Crito/ Early dawn.

Socrates/ I am surprised that the warder was willing to listen to you.

Crito/ He is quite friendly to me by now, Socrates. I have been here often and I have given him something.

Socrates/ Have you just come, or have you been here for some time?

Crito/ A fair time.

Socrates/ Then why did you not wake me right away but sit there in silence?

Crito/ By Zeus no, Socrates. I would not myself want to be in distress and awake so long. I have been surprised to see you so peacefully asleep. It was on purpose that I did not wake you, so that you should spend your time most agreeably. Often in the past throughout my life, I have considered the way you live happy, and especially so now that you bear your present misfortune so easily and lightly.

Socrates/ It would not be fitting at my age to resent the fact that I must die now.

Crito/ Other men of your age are caught in such misfortunes, but their age does not prevent them resenting their fate.

Socrates/ That is so. Why have you come so early?

Crito/ I bring bad news, Socrates, not for you, apparently, but for me and all your friends the news is bad and hard to bear. Indeed, I would count it among the hardest.

Socrates/ What is it? Or has the ship arrived from Delos, at the arrival of which I must die?

Crito/ It has not arrived yet, but it will, I believe, arrive today, according to a message some men brought from Sunium, where they left it. This makes it obvious that it will come today, and that your life must end tomorrow.

Socrates/ May it be for the best. If it so please the gods, so be it. However, I do not think it will arrive today.

Crito/ What indication have you of this?

Socrates/ I will tell you. I must die the day after the ship arrives.

Crito/ That is what those in authority say.

Socrates/ Then I do not think it will arrive on this coming day, but on the next. I take to witness of this a dream I had a little earlier during this night. It looks as if it was the right time for you not to wake me.

Crito/ What was your dream?

Socrates/ I thought that a beautiful and comely woman dressed in white approached me. She called me and said: "Socrates, may you arrive at fertile Phthia on the third day."

Crito/ A strange dream, Socrates.

Socrates/ But it seems clear enough to me, Crito.

Crito/ Too clear it seems, my dear Socrates, but listen to me even now and be saved. If you die, it will not be a single misfortune for me. Not only will I be deprived of a friend, the like of whom I shall never find again, but many people who do not know you or me very well will think that I could have saved you if I were willing to spend money, but that I did not care to

do so. Surely there can be no worse reputation than to be thought to value money more highly than one's friends, for the majority will not believe that you yourself were not willing to leave prison while we were eager for you to do so.

Socrates/ My good Crito, why should we care so much for what the majority think? The most reasonable people, to whom one should pay more attention, will believe that things were done as they were done.

Crito/ You see, Socrates, that one must also pay attention to the opinion of the majority. Your present situation makes clear that the majority can inflict not the least but pretty well the greatest evils if one is slandered among them.

Socrates/ Would that the majority could inflict the greatest evils, for they would then be capable of the greatest good, and that would be fine, but now they cannot do either. They cannot make a man either wise or foolish, but they inflict things haphazardly.

Crito/ That may be so. But tell me this, Socrates, are you anticipating that I and your other friends would have trouble with the informers if you escape from here, as having stolen you away, and that we should be compelled to lose all our property or pay heavy fines and suffer other punishment besides? If you have any such fear, forget it. We would be justified in running this risk to save you, and worse, if necessary. Do follow my advice, and do not act differently.

Socrates/ I do have these things in mind, Crito, and also many others.

Crito/ Have no such fear. It is not much money that some people require to save you and get you out of here. Further, do you not see that those informers are cheap, and that not much money would be needed to deal with them? My money is available and is, I think, sufficient. If, because of your affection for me, you feel you should not spend any of mine,

there are those strangers here ready to spend money. One of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought enough for this very purpose. Cebes, too, and a good many others. So, as I say, do not let this fear make you hesitate to save yourself, nor let what you said in court trouble you, that you would not know what to do with yourself if you left Athens, for you would be welcomed in many places to which you might go. If you want to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will greatly appreciate you and keep you safe, so that no one in Thessaly will harm you.

Besides, Socrates, I do not think that what you are doing is just, to give up your life when you can save it, and to hasten your fate as your enemies would hasten it, and indeed have hastened it in their wish to destroy you. Moreover, I think you are betraying your sons by going away and leaving them, when you could bring them up and educate them. You thus show no concern for what their fate may be. They will probably have the usual fate of orphans. Either one should not have children, or one should share with them to the end the toil of upbringing and education. You seem to me to choose the easiest path, whereas one should choose the path a good and courageous man would choose, particularly when one claims throughout one's life to care for virtue.

I feel ashamed on your behalf and on behalf of us, your friends, lest all that has happened to you be thought due to cowardice on our part: the fact that your trial came to court when it need not have done so, the handling of the trial itself, and now this absurd ending which will be thought to have got beyond our control through some cowardice and unmanliness on our part, since we did not save you, or you save yourself, when it was possible and could be done if we had been of the slightest use. Consider, Socrates, whether this is not only evil, but shameful, both for you and for us. Take counsel with yourself, or rather the time for counsel is past and the decision

should have been taken, and there is no further opportunity, for this whole business must be ended tonight. If we delay now, then it will no longer be possible, it will be too late. Let me persuade you on every count, Socrates, and do not act otherwise.

Socrates/ My dear Crito, your eagerness is worth much if it should have some right aim; if not, then the greater your keenness the more difficult it is to deal with. We must therefore examine whether we should act in this way or not, as not only now but at all times I am the kind of man who listens only to the argument that on reflection seems best to me. I cannot, now that this fate has come upon me, discard the arguments I used; they seem to me much the same. I value and respect the same principles as before, and if we have no better arguments to bring up at this moment, be sure that I shall not agree with you, not even if the power of the majority were to frighten us with more bogeys, as if we were children, with threats of incarcerations and executions and confiscation of property. How should we examine this matter most reasonably? Would it be by taking up first your argument about the opinions of men, whether it is sound in every case that one should pay attention to some opinions, but not to others? Or was that well-spoken before the necessity to die came upon me, but now it is clear that this was said in vain for the sake of argument, that it was in truth play and nonsense? I am eager to examine together with you, Crito, whether this argument will appear in any way different to me in my present circumstances, or whether it remains the same, whether we are to abandon it or believe it. It was said on every occasion by those who thought they were speaking sensibly, as I have just now been speaking, that one should greatly value some people's opinions, but not others. Does that seem to you a sound statement?

You, as far as a human being can tell, are exempt from the likelihood of dying tomorrow, so the present misfortune is not likely to lead you astray. Consider then, do you not think it a sound statement that one must not value all the opinions of men, but some and not others, nor the opinions of all men, but those of some and not of others? What do you say? Is this not well said?

Crito/ It is.

Socrates/ One should value the good opinions, and not the bad ones?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ The good opinions are those of wise men, the bad ones those of foolish men?

Crito/ Of course.

Socrates/ Come then, what of statements such as this: Should a man professionally engaged in physical training pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of any man, or to those of one man only, namely a doctor or trainer?

Crito/ To those of one only.

Socrates/ He should therefore fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man, and not those of the many?

Crito/ Obviously.

Socrates/ He must then act and exercise, eat and drink in the way the one, the trainer and the one who knows, thinks right, not all the others?

Crito/ That is so.

Socrates/ Very well. And if he disobeys the one, disregards his opinion and his praises while valuing those of the many who have no knowledge, will he not suffer harm?

Crito/ Of course.

Socrates/ What is that harm, where does it tend, and what part of the man who disobeys does it affect?

Crito/ Obviously the harm is to his body, which it ruins.

Socrates/ Well said. So with other matters, not to enumerate them all, and certainly with actions just and unjust, shameful and beautiful, good and bad, about which we are now deliberating, should we follow the opinion of the many and fear it, or that of the one, if there is one who has knowledge of these things and before whom we feel fear and shame more than before all the others. If we do not follow his directions, we shall harm and corrupt that part of ourselves that is improved by just actions and destroyed by unjust actions. Or is there nothing in this?

Crito/ I think there certainly is, Socrates.

Socrates/ Come now, if we ruin that which is improved by health and corrupted by disease by not following the opinions of those who know, is life worth living for us when that is ruined? And that is the body, is it not?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is life worth living with a body that is corrupted and in bad condition?

Crito/ In no way.

Socrates/ And is life worth living for us with that part of us corrupted that unjust action harms and just action benefits? Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, that is concerned with justice and injustice, is inferior to the body?

Crito/ Not at all.

Socrates/ It is more valuable?

Crito/ Much more.

Socrates/ We should not then think so much of what the majority will say about us, but what he will say who understands justice and injustice, the one, that is, and the truth itself. So that, in the first place, you were wrong to believe that we should care for the opinion of the many about

what is just, beautiful, good, and their opposites. “But,” someone might say “the many are able to put us to death.”

Crito/ That too is obvious, Socrates, and someone might well say so.

Socrates/ And, my admirable friend, that argument that we have gone through remains, I think, as before. Examine the following statement in turn as to whether it stays the same or not, that the most important thing is not life, but the good life.

Crito/ It stays the same.

Socrates/ And that the good life, the beautiful life, and the just life are the same; does that still hold, or not?

Crito/ It does hold.

Socrates/ As we have agreed so far, we must examine next whether it is just for me to try to get out of here when the Athenians have not acquitted me. If it is seen to be just, we will try to do so; if it is not, we will abandon the idea. As for those questions you raise about money, reputation, the upbringing of children, Crito, those considerations in truth belong to those people who easily put men to death and would bring them to life again if they could, without thinking; I mean the majority of men. For us, however, since our argument leads to this, the only valid consideration, as we were saying just now, is whether we should be acting rightly in giving money and gratitude to those who will lead me out of here, and ourselves helping with the escape, or whether in truth we shall do wrong in doing all this. If it appears that we shall be acting unjustly, then we have no need at all to take into account whether we shall have to die if we stay here and keep quiet, or suffer in another way, rather than do wrong.

Crito/ I think you put that beautifully, Socrates, but see what we should do.

Socrates/ Let us examine the question together, my dear friend, and if you can make any objection while I am speaking,

make it and I will listen to you, but if you have no objection to make, my dear Crito, then stop now from saying the same thing so often, that I must leave here against the will of the Athenians. I think it important to persuade you before I act, and not to act against your wishes. See whether the start of our inquiry is adequately stated, and try to answer what I ask you in the way you think best.

Crito/ I shall try.

Socrates/ Do we say that one must never in any way do wrong willingly, or must one do wrong in one way and not in another? Is to do wrong never good or admirable, as we have agreed in the past, or have all these former agreements been washed out during the last few days? Have we at our age failed to notice for some time that in our serious discussions we were no different from children? Above all, is the truth such as we used to say it was, whether the majority agree or not, and whether we must still suffer worse things than we do now, or will be treated more gently, that nonetheless, wrongdoing or injustice is in every way harmful and shameful to the wrongdoer? Do we say so or not?

Crito/ We do.

Socrates/ So one must never do wrong.

Crito/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor must one, when wronged, inflict wrong in return, as the majority believe, since one must never do wrong.

Crito/ That seems to be the case.

Socrates/ Come now, should one mistreat anyone or not, Crito?

Crito/ One must never do so.

Socrates/ Well then, if one is oneself mistreated, is it right, as the majority say, to mistreat in return, or is it not?

Crito/ It is never right.

Socrates/ Mistreating people is no different from wrongdoing.

Crito/ That is true.

Socrates/ One should never do wrong in return, nor mistreat any man, no matter how one has been mistreated by him. And Crito, see that you do not agree to this, contrary to your belief. For I know that only a few people hold this view or will hold it, and there is no common ground between those who hold this view and those who do not, but they inevitably despise each other's views. So then consider very carefully whether we have this view in common, and whether you agree, and let this be the basis of our deliberation, that neither to do wrong nor to return a wrong is ever right, nor is bad treatment in return for bad treatment. Or do you disagree and do not share this view as a basis for discussion? I have held it for a long time and still hold it now, but if you think otherwise, tell me now. If, however, you stick to our former opinion, then listen to the next point.

Crito/ I stick to it and agree with you. So say on.

Socrates/ Then I state the next point, or rather I ask you: when one has come to an agreement that is just with someone, should one fulfill it or cheat on it?

Crito/ One should fulfill it.

Socrates/ See what follows from this: if we leave here without the city's permission, are we mistreating people whom we should least mistreat? And are we sticking to a just agreement, or not?

Crito/ I cannot answer your question, Socrates. I do not know.

Socrates/ Look at it this way. If, as we were planning to run away from here, or whatever one should call it, the laws and the state came and confronted us and asked:

The State/: “Tell me, Socrates, what are you intending to do? Do you not by this action you are attempting intend to destroy us, the laws, and indeed the whole city, as far as you are concerned? Or do you think it possible for a city not to be destroyed if the verdicts of its courts have no force but are nullified and set at naught by private individuals?”

Socrates/ What shall we answer to this and other such arguments? For many things could be said, especially by an orator on behalf of this law we are destroying, which orders that the judgments of the courts shall be carried out. Shall we say in answer, “The city wronged me, and its decision was not right.” Shall we say that, or what?

Crito/ Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, that is our answer.

Socrates/ Then what if the laws said:

The State/: “Was that the agreement between us, Socrates, or was it to respect the judgments that the city came to?”

Socrates/ And if we wondered at their words, they would perhaps add:

The State/: “Socrates, do not wonder at what we say but answer, since you are accustomed to proceed by question and answer. Come now, what accusation do you bring against us and the city, that you should try to destroy us? Did we not, first, bring you to birth, and was it not through us that your father married your mother and begat you? Tell you, do you find anything to criticize in those of us who are concerned with marriage?”

Socrates/ And I would say that I do not criticize them.

The State/: “Or in those of us concerned with the nurture of babies and the education that you too received? Were those assigned to that subject not right to instruct your father to educate you in the arts and in physical culture?”

Socrates/ And I would say that they were right.

The State/: “Very well,”

Socrates/ they would continue;

The State/: “and after you were born and nurtured and educated, could you, in the first place, deny that you are our offspring and servant, both you and your forefathers? If that is so, do you think that we are on an equal footing as regards the right, and that whatever we do to you it is right for you to do to us? You were not on an equal footing with your father as regards the right, nor with your master if you had one, so as to retaliate for anything they did to you, to revile them if they reviled you, to beat them if they beat you, and so with many other things. Do you think you have this right to retaliation against your country and its laws? That if we undertake to destroy you and think it right to do so, you can undertake to destroy us, as far as you can, in return? And will you say that you are right to do so, you who truly care for virtue? Is your wisdom such as not to realize that your country is to be honored more than your mother, your father and all your ancestors, that it is more to be revered and more sacred, and that it counts for more among the gods and sensible men, that you must worship it, yield to it and placate its anger more than your father’s? You must either persuade it or obey its orders, and endure in silence whatever it instructs you to endure, whether blows or bonds, and if it leads you into war to be wounded or killed, you must obey. To do so is right, and one must not give way or retreat or leave one’s post, but both in war and in courts and everywhere else, one must obey the commands of one’s city and country, or persuade it as to the nature of justice. It is impious to bring violence to bear against your mother or father, it is much more so to use it against your country.”

Socrates/ What shall we say in reply, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not?

Crito/ I think they do.

The State/: “Reflect now, Socrates,”

Socrates/ the laws might say

The State/: “that if what we say is true, you are not treating us rightly by planning to do what you are planning. We have given you birth, nurtured you, educated you, we have given you and all other citizens a share of all the good things we could. Even so, by giving every Athenian the opportunity, once arrived at voting age and having observed the affairs of the city and us the laws, we proclaim that if we do not please him, he can take his possessions and go wherever he pleases. Not one of our laws raises any obstacle or forbids him, if he is not satisfied with us or the city, if one of you wants to go and live in a colony or wants to go anywhere else, and keep his property. We say, however, that whoever of you remains, when he sees how we conduct our trials and manage the city in other ways, has in fact come to an agreement with us to obey our instructions. We say that the one who disobeys does wrong in three ways, first because in us he disobeys his parents, also those who brought him up, and because, in spite of his agreement, he neither obeys us nor, if we do something wrong, does he try to persuade us to do better. Yet we only propose things, we do not issue savage commands to do whatever we order; we give two alternatives, either to persuade us or to do what we say. He does neither. We do say that you too, Socrates, are open to those charges if you do what you have in mind; you would be among, not the least, but the most guilty of the Athenians.”

Socrates/ And if I should say “Why so?” they might well be right to upbraid me and say that I am among the Athenians who most definitely came to that agreement with them. They might well say:

The State/: “Socrates, we have convincing proofs that we and the city were congenial to you. You would not have dwelt here most consistently of all the Athenians if the city had not been exceedingly pleasing to you. You have never left the city, even to see a festival, nor for any other reason except military service; you have never gone to stay in any other city, as people do; you have had no desire to know another city or other laws; we and our city satisfied you.

“So decisively did you choose us and agree to be a citizen under us. Also, you have had children in this city, thus showing that it was congenial to you. Then at your trial you could have assessed your penalty at exile if you wished, and you are now attempting to do against the city’s wishes what you could then have done with her consent. Then you prided yourself that you did not resent death, but you chose, as you said, death in preference to exile. Now, however, those words do not make you ashamed, and you pay no heed to us, the laws, as you plan to destroy us, and you act like the meanest type of slave by trying to run away, contrary to your commitments and your agreement to live as a citizen under us. First then, answer us on this very point, whether we speak the truth when we say that you agreed, not only in words but by your deeds, to live in accordance with us.”

Socrates/ What are we to say to that, Crito? Must we not agree?

Crito/ We must, Socrates.

The State/: “Surely,”

Socrates/ they might say;

The State/: “you are breaking the commitments and agreements that you made with us without compulsion or deceit, and under no pressure of time for deliberation. You have had seventy years during which you could have gone away if you did not like us, and if you thought our agreements

unjust. You did not choose to go to Sparta or to Crete, which you are always saying are well governed, nor to any other city, Greek or foreign. You have been away from Athens less than the lame or the blind or other handicapped people. It is clear that the city has been outstandingly more congenial to you than to other Athenians, and so have we, the laws, for what city can please without laws? Will you then not now stick to our agreements? You will, Socrates, if we can persuade you, and not make yourself a laughingstock by leaving the city.

"For consider what good you will do yourself or your friends by breaking our agreements and committing such a wrong? It is pretty obvious that your friends will themselves be in danger of exile, disfranchisement and loss of property. As for yourself, if you go to one of the nearby cities—Thebes or Megara, both are well governed—you will arrive as an enemy to their government; all who care for their city will look on you with suspicion, as a destroyer of the laws. You will also strengthen the conviction of the jury that they passed the right sentence on you, for anyone who destroys the laws could easily be thought to corrupt the young and the ignorant. Or will you avoid cities that are well governed and men who are civilized? If you do this, will your life be worth living? Will you have social intercourse with them and not be ashamed to talk to them? And what will you say? The same as you did here, that virtue and justice are man's most precious possession, along with lawful behavior and the laws? Do you not think that Socrates would appear to be an unseemly kind of person? One must think so. Or will you leave those places and go to Crito's friends in Thessaly? There you will find the greatest license and disorder, and they may enjoy hearing from you how absurdly you escaped from prison in some disguise, in a leather jerkin or some other things in which escapees wrap themselves, thus altering your appearance. Will there be no one to say that you, likely to live but a short time more, were

so greedy for life that you transgressed the most important laws? Possibly, Socrates, if you do not annoy anyone, but if you do, many disgraceful things will be said about you.

"You will spend your time ingratiating yourself with all men, and be at their beck and call. What will you do in Thessaly but feast, as if you had gone to a banquet in Thessaly? As for those conversations of yours about justice and the rest of virtue, where will they be? You say you want to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them. How so? Will you bring them up and educate them by taking them to Thessaly and making strangers of them, that they may enjoy that too? Or not so, but they will be better brought up and educated here, while you are alive, though absent? Yes, your friends will look after them. Will they look after them if you go and live in Thessaly, but not if you go away to the underworld? If those who profess themselves your friends are any good at all, one must assume that they will.

"Be persuaded by us who have brought you up, Socrates. Do not value either your children or your life or anything else more than goodness, in order that when you arrive in Hades you may have all this as your defense before the rulers there. If you do this deed, you will not think it better or more just or more pious here, nor will anyone of your friends, nor will it be better for you when you arrive yonder. As it is, you depart, if you depart, after being wronged not by us, the laws, but by men; but if you depart after shamefully returning wrong for wrong and mistreatment for mistreatment, after breaking your agreements and commitments with us, after mistreating those you should mistreat least—yourself, your friends, your country and us—we shall be angry with you while you are still alive, and our brothers, the laws of the underworld, will not receive you kindly, knowing that you tried to destroy us as far

as you could. Do not let Crito persuade you, rather than us, to do what he says."

Socrates/ Crito, my dear friend, be assured that these are the words I seem to hear, as the Corybants seem to hear the music of their flutes, and the echo of these words resounds in me, and makes it impossible for me to hear anything else. As far as my present beliefs go, if you speak in opposition to them, you will speak in vain. However, if you think you can accomplish anything, speak.

Crito/ I have nothing to say, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let it be then, Crito, and let us act in this way, since this is the way the god is leading us.

Crito.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Crito.

Scene: —The Prison of Socrates.

Socrates/ Why have you come at this hour, Crito? it must be quite early?

Crito/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ What is the exact time?

Crito/ The dawn is breaking.

Socrates/ I wonder that the keeper of the prison would let you in.

Crito/ He knows me, because I often come, Socrates; moreover, I have done him a kindness.

Socrates/ And are you only just arrived?

Crito/ No, I came some time ago.

Socrates/ Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of at once awakening me?

Crito/ I should not have liked myself, Socrates, to be in such great trouble and unrest as you are—indeed I should not: I have been watching with amazement your peaceful slumbers; and for that reason I did not awake you, because I wished to minimize the pain. I have always thought you to be of a happy disposition; but never did I see anything like the easy, tranquil manner in which you bear this calamity.

Socrates/ Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought not to be repining at the approach of death.

Crito/ And yet other old men find themselves in similar misfortunes, and age does not prevent them from repining.

Socrates/ That is true. But you have not told me why you come at this early hour.

Crito/ I come to bring you a message which is sad and painful; not, as I believe, to yourself, but to all of us who are your friends, and saddest of all to me.

Socrates/ What? Has the ship come from Delos, on the arrival of which I am to die?

Crito/ No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably be here to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium tell me that they left her there; and therefore to-morrow, Socrates, will be the last day of your life.

Socrates/ Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; but my belief is that there will be a delay of a day.

Crito/ Why do you think so?

Socrates/ I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the arrival of the ship.

Crito/ Yes; that is what the authorities say.

Socrates/ But I do not think that the ship will be here until tomorrow; this I infer from a vision which I had last night, or rather only just now, when you fortunately allowed me to sleep.

Crito/ And what was the nature of the vision?

Socrates/ There appeared to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely, clothed in bright raiment, who called to me and said: O Socrates,.

'The third day hence to fertile Phthia shalt thou go.'

Crito/ What a singular dream, Socrates!

Socrates/ There can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito, I think.

Crito/ Yes; the meaning is only too clear. But, oh! my beloved Socrates, let me entreat you once more to take my advice and escape. For if you die I shall not only lose a friend

who can never be replaced, but there is another evil: people who do not know you and me will believe that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give money, but that I did not care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than this—that I should be thought to value money more than the life of a friend? For the many will not be persuaded that I wanted you to escape, and that you refused.

Socrates/ But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the many? Good men, and they are the only persons who are worth considering, will think of these things truly as they occurred.

Crito/ But you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many must be regarded, for what is now happening shows that they can do the greatest evil to anyone who has lost their good opinion.

Socrates/ I only wish it were so, Crito; and that the many could do the greatest evil; for then they would also be able to do the greatest good—and what a fine thing this would be! But in reality they can do neither; for they cannot make a man either wise or foolish; and whatever they do is the result of chance.

Crito/ Well, I will not dispute with you; but please to tell me, Socrates, whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your other friends: are you not afraid that if you escape from prison we may get into trouble with the informers for having stolen you away, and lose either the whole or a great part of our property; or that even a worse evil may happen to us? Now, if you fear on our account, be at ease; for in order to save you, we ought surely to run this, or even a greater risk; be persuaded, then, and do as I say.

Socrates/ Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no means the only one.

Crito/ Fear not—there are persons who are willing to get you out of prison at no great cost; and as for the informers, they are far from being exorbitant in their demands—a little money will satisfy them. My means, which are certainly ample, are at your service, and if you have a scruple about spending all mine, here are strangers who will give you the use of theirs; and one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a large sum of money for this very purpose; and Cebes and many others are prepared to spend their money in helping you to escape. I say, therefore, do not hesitate on our account, and do not say, as you did in the court, that you will have a difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself anywhere else. For men will love you in other places to which you may go, and not in Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you like to go to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalian will give you any trouble. Nor can I think that you are at all justified, Socrates, in betraying your own life when you might be saved; in acting thus you are playing into the hands of your enemies, who are hurrying on your destruction. And further I should say that you are deserting your own children; for you might bring them up and educate them; instead of which you go away and leave them, and they will have to take their chance; and if they do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will be small thanks to you. No man should bring children into the world who is unwilling to persevere to the end in their nurture and education. But you appear to be choosing the easier part, not the better and manlier, which would have been more becoming in one who professes to care for virtue in all his actions, like yourself. And indeed, I am ashamed not only of you, but of us who are your friends, when I reflect that the whole business will be attributed entirely to our want of courage. The trial need never have come on, or might have been managed differently; and this last act, or crowning

folly, will seem to have occurred through our negligence and cowardice, who might have saved you, if we had been good for anything; and you might have saved yourself, for there was no difficulty at all. See now, Socrates, how sad and discreditable are the consequences, both to us and you. Make up your mind then, or rather have your mind already made up, for the time of deliberation is over, and there is only one thing to be done, which must be done this very night, and if we delay at all will be no longer practicable or possible; I beseech you therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and do as I say.

Socrates/ Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger; and therefore we ought to consider whether I shall or shall not do as you say. For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best; and now that this chance has befallen me, I cannot repudiate my own words: the principles which I have hitherto honored and revered I still honor, and unless we can at once find other and better principles, I am certain not to agree with you; no, not even if the power of the multitude could inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors. What will be the fairest way of considering the question? Shall I return to your old argument about the opinions of men? —we were saying that some of them are to be regarded, and others not. Now were we right in maintaining this before I was condemned? And has the argument which was once good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking—mere childish nonsense? That is what I want to consider with your help, Crito: —whether, under my present circumstances, the argument appears to be in any way different or not; and is to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument, which, as

I believe, is maintained by many persons of authority, was to the effect, as I was saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men not to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are not going to die to-morrow—at least, there is no human probability of this—and therefore you are disinterested and not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in which you are placed. Tell me then, whether I am right in saying that some opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and that other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I ask you whether I was right in maintaining this?

Crito/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of the unwise are evil?

Crito/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what was said about another matter? Is the pupil who devotes himself to the practice of gymnastics supposed to attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only—his physician or trained, whoever he may be?

Crito/ Of one man only.

Socrates/ And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of that one only, and not of the many?

Crito/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ And he ought to act and train, and eat and drink in the way which seems good to his single master who has understanding, rather than according to the opinion of all other men put together?

Crito/ True.

Socrates/ And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding, will he not suffer evil?

Crito/ Certainly he will.

Socrates/ And what will the evil be, whither tending and what affecting, in the disobedient person?

Crito/ Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the evil.

Socrates/ Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we need not separately enumerate? In questions of just and unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them; or the opinion of the one man who has understanding? ought we not to fear and reverence him more than all the rest of the world: and if we desert him shall we not destroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice; —there is such a principle?

Crito/ Certainly there is, Socrates.

Socrates/ Take a parallel instance: —if, acting under the advice of those who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improved by health and is deteriorated by disease, would life be worth having? And that which has been destroyed is—the body?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?

Crito/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be destroyed, which is improved by justice and depraved by injustice? Do we suppose that principle,

whatever it may be in man, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?

Crito/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ More honorable than the body?

Crito/ Far more.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us: but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when you advise that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. —'Well,' someone will say, 'but the many can kill us.'

Crito/ Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.

Socrates/ And it is true: but still I find with surprise that the old argument is unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may say the same of another proposition—that not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued?

Crito/ Yes, that also remains unshaken.

Socrates/ And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable one—that holds also?

Crito/ Yes, it does.

Socrates/ From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I ought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the Athenians: and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations which you mention, of money and loss of character and the duty of educating one's children, are, I fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to restore people to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death—and with as little reason. But now, since the argument has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains to be considered is, whether we

shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money and thanks, or whether in reality we shall not do rightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity which may ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the calculation.

Crito/ I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?

Socrates/ Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute me if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend, from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the Athenians: for I highly value your attempts to persuade me to do so, but I may not be persuaded against my own better judgment. And now please to consider my first position, and try how you can best answer me.

Crito/ I will.

Socrates/ Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dishonorable, as I was just now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us? Are all our former admissions which were made within a few days to be thrown away? And have we, at our age, been earnestly discoursing with one another all our life long only to discover that we are no better than children? Or, in spite of the opinion of the many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, shall we insist on the truth of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil and dishonor to him who acts unjustly? Shall we say so or not?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we must do no wrong?

Crito/ Certainly not. ‘

Socrates/ Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imagine; for we must injure no one at all?

Crito/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ Again, Crito, may we do evil?

Crito/ Surely not, Socrates.

Socrates/ And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality of the many—is that just or not?

Crito/ Not just.

Socrates/ For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?

Crito/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to anyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another when they see how widely they differ. Tell me, then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premise of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For so I have ever thought, and continue to think; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as formerly, I will proceed to the next step.

Crito/ You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.

Socrates/ Then I will go on to the next point, which may be put in the form of a question: —Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or ought he to betray the right?

Crito/ He ought to do what he thinks right.

Socrates/ But if this is true, what is the application? In leaving the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or rather do I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert the principles which were acknowledged by us to be just—what do you say?

Crito/ I cannot tell, Socrates; for I do not know.

Socrates/ Then consider the matter in this way: —Imagine that I am about to play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you like), and the laws and the government come and interrogate me: 'Tell us, Socrates,' they say; 'what are you about? are you not going by an act of yours to overturn us—the laws, and the whole state, as far as in you lies? Do you imagine that a state can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and trampled upon by individuals?' What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words? Anyone, and especially a rhetorician, will have a good deal to say on behalf of the law which requires a sentence to be carried out. He will argue that this law should not be set aside; and shall we reply, 'Yes; but the state has injured us and given an unjust sentence.' Suppose I say that?

Crito/ Very good, Socrates.

Socrates/ 'And was that our agreement with you?' the law would answer; 'or were you to abide by the sentence of the state?' And if I were to express my astonishment at their words, the law would probably add: 'Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes—you are in the habit of asking and answering questions. Tell us, —What complaint have you to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the state? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to

urge against those of us who regulate marriage?' None, I should reply. 'Or against those of us who after birth regulate the nurture and education of children, in which you also were trained? Were not the laws, which have the charge of education, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?' Right, I should reply. 'Well then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to your father or your master, if you had one, because you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands? —you would not say this? And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? Will you, O professor of true virtue, pretend that you are justified in this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even more than a father, and either to be persuaded, or if not persuaded, to be obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and if she lead us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right; neither may anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less may he do violence to his country.' What answer

shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?

Crito/ I think that they do.

Socrates/ Then the laws will say: 'Consider, Socrates, if we are speaking truly that in your present attempt you are going to do us an injury. For, having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good which we had to give, we further proclaim to any Athenian by the liberty which we allow him, that if he does not like us when he has become of age and has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him. None of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Anyone who does not like us and the city, and who wants to emigrate to a colony or to any other city, may go where he likes, retaining his property. But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the state, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong; first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are unjust; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us; —that is what we offer, and he does neither.

'These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions; you, above all other Athenians.' Suppose now I ask, why I rather than anybody else? they will justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged the agreement. 'There is clear proof,' they will say, 'Socrates, that

we and the city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the most constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be supposed to love. For you never went out of the city either to see the games, except once when you went to the Isthmus, or to any other place unless when you were on military service; nor did you travel as other men do. Nor had you any curiosity to know other states or their laws: your affections did not go beyond us and our state; we were your special favorites, and you acquiesced in our government of you; and here in this city you begat your children, which is a proof of your satisfaction. Moreover, you might in the course of the trial, if you had liked, have fixed the penalty at banishment; the state which refuses to let you go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you preferred death to exile, and that you were not unwilling to die. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us the laws, of whom you are the destroyer; and are doing what only a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of all answer this very question: Are we right in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not in word only? Is that true or not?' How shall we answer, Crito? Must we not assent?

Crito/ We cannot help it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then will they not say: 'You, Socrates, are breaking the covenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in any haste or under any compulsion or deception, but after you have had seventy years to think of them, during which time you were at liberty to leave the city, if we were not to your mind, or if our covenants appeared to you to be unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone either to Lacedaemon or Crete, both which states are often praised by you for their good

government, or to some other Hellenic or foreign state. Whereas you, above all other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the state, or, in other words, of us her laws (and who would care about a state which has no laws?), that you never stirred out of her; the halt, the blind, the maimed were not more stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and forsake your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city.

'For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way, what good will you do either to yourself or to your friends? That your friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose their property, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if you fly to one of the neighboring cities, as, for example, Thebes or Megara, both of which are well governed, will come to them as an enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you, and all patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter of the laws, and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the justice of their own condemnation of you. For he who is a corrupter of the laws is more than likely to be a corrupter of the young and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and virtuous men? and is existence worth having on these terms? Or will you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? And what will you say to them? What you say here about virtue and justice and institutions and laws being the best things among men? Would that be decent of you? Surely not. But if you go away from well-governed states to Crito's friends in Thessaly, where there is great disorder and license, they will be charmed to hear the tale of your escape from prison, set off with ludicrous particulars of the manner in which you were wrapped in a goatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed as the manner is of runaways; but will there

be no one to remind you that in your old age you were not ashamed to violate the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of a little more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper; but if they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things; you will live, but how? —as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men; and doing what? —eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad in order that you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine sentiments about justice and virtue? Say that you wish to live for the sake of your children—you want to bring them up and educate them—will you take them into Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship? Is this the benefit which you will confer upon them? Or are you under the impression that they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still alive, although absent from them; for your friends will take care of them? Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care of them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world that they will not take care of them? Nay; but if they who call themselves friends are good for anything, they will—to be sure they will.

'Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least of all to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in

the world below, will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito'

This, dear Crito, is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you may say will be vain. Yet speak, if you have anything to say.

Crito/ I have nothing to say, Socrates.

Socrates/ Leave me then, Crito, to fulfil the will of God, and to follow whither he leads.

Crito.

Translated by More.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Crito.

Socrates/ Why have you come at this hour, Crito? It must be quite early yet.

Crito/ Quite early.

Socrates/ What is the hour?

Crito/ The day is just breaking.

Socrates/ I wonder that the jailer would let you in.

Crito/ I have come so often that he has grown used to me, Socrates; and besides he owes me a certain favor.

Socrates/ Have you been waiting long?

Crito/ Not very.

Socrates/ Why didn't you wake me at once, instead of sitting there in silence?

Crito/ God forbid, Socrates. I, too, should wish to sleep and forget my anxiety. I have been wondering this long while to see how quietly you slept; and I did not disturb you purposely, that you might pass the time in peace. All through life I have praised the serenity of your temper, but more than ever now, to see how lightly and calmly you bear this present calamity.

Socrates/ Why, Crito, it would be folly at my age to fret because death is at hand.

Crito/ Other men, Socrates, as old as you, have fallen into calamities like this, but I never saw that their age saved them from fretting.

Socrates/ Very true; but why have you come so early?

Crito/ I am the bearer of news, Socrates, not painful to you, it may be, but to me and to all your friends, painful and sad, —most sad and painful to me of all.

Socrates/ What is it? Has the ship arrived from Delos, at whose coming I am to die?

Crito/ Not yet; but from the report of persons coming from Sunium, where they left her, I am expecting her to-day. It is clear from their reports she will be here to-day, and on the morrow, Socrates, you must end your life.

Socrates/ Heaven prosper us, Crito. If it so please the gods, who can gainsay it? Yet I hardly think she will come to-day.

Crito/ What reason have you for saying that?

Socrates/ I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the ship arrives.

Crito/ So the magistrates declare.

Socrates/ Then I think she will not come on the present day, but on the morrow. I draw my conclusion from a dream which I had in the night, just a little while ago; and it is well you didn't wake me.

Crito/ Tell me the dream.

Socrates/ I seemed to see a woman, fair and good to look upon, clad in white robes, who approached me, and called and said: "O Socrates—

> 'Two days and thou to deep-soiled Phthia comest.'"

Crito/ A strange dream, Socrates.

Socrates/ But its meaning, I think, is clear, Crito.

Crito/ Only too clear. But, my dear Socrates, there is still time; listen to me even now and save yourself. You must know that your death will be a twofold disaster to me. I shall lose such a friend as no time or chance may replace; and besides that, many persons who know us but slightly will

blame me, supposing I might have rescued you with my money. And what opinion of me could be more hideous than that I valued my money above my friends? Very few will ever believe that you yourself refused to escape when we were eager to help you.

Socrates/ But, my dear Crito, why do we care so much for the opinion of the world? Good men, all who are worthy of considering, will understand just what has happened.

Crito/ But you see, Socrates, we must care for the opinion of the world. Our present embarrassment shows that if the people take a prejudice against anyone, they are capable of inflicting the very worst evils.

Socrates/ Would to heaven, Crito, the people were capable of doing us the greatest evil, if they might equally do us the greatest good. But as it is, they can do neither: they cannot make a man wise or unwise; they do but the bidding of their whims.

Crito/ That may be all very well; but tell me, Socrates: are you refusing out of consideration for me and your friends? Are you afraid if you escape that the informers will pounce down on us for stealing you away, and that we shall be forced to pay large sums of money, or perhaps our whole fortune, not to mention other risks? If that is your anxiety, put it quite out of mind; there is no reason why we shouldn't run such risks, or even greater ones, if necessary, to save you. Take me at my word, and don't refuse.

Socrates/ Yes, Crito, I am anxious about that and much else besides.

Crito/ Have no fear on that account. There are men ready to get you away and save you for a small sum. And then, you know, it doesn't cost much to buy off these informers. My fortune is at your service, and is quite sufficient, I think. But if you scruple to accept so much from me, there are

strangers in town ready to pay. One of them, Simmias of Thebes, has brought a sufficient sum of money for this very purpose. Cebes is also willing, and a host of others. I beg of you, then, do not from any fear of that sort hesitate to escape; and do not, as you said in court, hang back because you would not know what to do with yourself in exile.

You will be made welcome in many places; and if you choose to go to Thessaly, I have friends in that country who will make much of you and see that no one there annoys you.

And besides, Socrates, are you quite justified in throwing away your life when you might save it? Are you not doing by yourself what your enemies would desire, what in fact they actually did desire when they sought to destroy you? And more than that, you are, I fear, betraying your own sons. You are abandoning them when you might rear and educate them; you are leaving them to the mercy of chance, and their fortune will be the usual lot of orphans. Either a man ought not to have children, or else he should go through the hardship of rearing and educating them. But you apparently are choosing the easier part, rather than the part of a brave and good man. —you who profess to make virtue the aim of your whole life. Indeed, I am ashamed for you and for us, your friends. This whole affair will be attributed to our sloth and lack of courage, —the permission of the trial when it might have been blocked, the way it was conducted, and last of all this miserable fiasco of letting you die in prison when, if we were men of any spirit, you might easily be rescued. Do you not see, Socrates, that all this is discreditable to you and to us, as well as painful? Consider, then—or rather the time for that is past: our plans are made and we must act. There is but one plan, and everything must be done this coming night. If we delay longer, all is lost and we are helpless. With all my heart, Socrates, I beg you to yield and not refuse.

Socrates/ My dear Crito, your kind zeal in my behalf is very precious; but is it well directed? Otherwise, the greater the zeal, the more the danger. Let us reflect whether we should do as you bid; for I am now and always the same man, and I can hearken to no other claim or desire except only to that voice of reason which seems to me best on consideration. I cannot now in this time of trial reject the reasons that I have given before. These sound to me now as they did then, and I still reverence and honor them. Unless, therefore, we can think of better reasons in the present, be assured I will not yield, no, not even if the all-powerful multitude terrify us tenfold worse with bonds and executions and confiscations, and all their hobgoblins made to frighten children. How shall we consider the case most fairly? Shall we take up this matter of opinions which you appeal to, and go back to our old discussions of them? We used to agree; but were we right in concluding that certain opinions of men ought to be heeded and others neglected? Or were our arguments very well before this necessity of death came upon me, whereas now it is clear that we were only bandying words, indulging in jest and nonsense? Help me, Crito, to look into the argument and see whether it will appear to me, as I stand now, in quite a new and different form, and whether ire shall dismiss it with a god-speed or heed its admonition. Those of us who talked seriously used in the jest to say, as I said just now, that certain opinions of men ought to be highly esteemed, and others not it all. Tell me, I adjure you, Crito, was not this well said? You, in all human calculation, are not going to die to-morrow, and no such thoughts will disturb your judgment. Consider, then, was it not well said that not all opinions are worthy of respect, nor the opinions of all men? What do you think? Is it not well said?

Crito/ It is well said.

Socrates/ And we are to respect good opinions and not bad?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the opinions of the wise are good, and those of the unwise bad?

Crito/ It couldn't be otherwise.

Socrates/ And what did we say about training? If a man is in hard training, will he heed every critic who chooses to praise and blame and give an opinion, or only his physician or trainer?

Crito/ Only the latter.

Socrates/ And so he will fear the blame and rejoice at the praise of this one man, and disregard the crowd?

Crito/ Evidently.

Socrates/ And he must live and exercise and eat and drink so as to satisfy this one man, his manager and trainer, rather than all the rest of the world?

Crito/ As you say.

Socrates/ Very well. And if he disobeys this one man and disregards his opinion and commendation, out of respect for the ignorant crowd, will he not come to grief?

Crito/ He certainly will.

Socrates/ How and with what result? What part of him will suffer for his disobedience?

Crito/ His body, of course; he will ruin it.

Socrates/ Exactly. And in brief, Crito, is it not just so with everything else? And in what we are discussing now, right and wrong, foul and fair, good and evil, ought we to follow the opinion of all the world and stand in awe of it? Rather, if there be any one man who has knowledge of these things, ought we not to feel shame and fear before him more than before all the world? For if we do not follow him we shall

injure and ruin that part of ourselves which grows better with right-doing and perishes with wrong. Or am I quite mistaken?

Crito/ You are right, Socrates.

Socrates/ There is, then, a part of us that is made better by health and injured by disease, and you will agree that life is hardly worth living if we ruin this part by following the opinion of the ignorant. And this part of ourselves we call the body, do we not?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is life worth living with a corrupt and vitiated body?

Crito/ By no means.

Socrates/ But is life any more worth living with that organ vitiated which is deteriorated by wrongdoing and improved by right? Is the body more precious than that part of us, whatever it be, which has to do with evil and righteousness?

Crito/ By no means.

Socrates/ This is rather of more honor, is it not?

Crito/ Much more.

Socrates/ I think, then, my dear friend, we need trouble ourselves very little about what the world says of us. Let us look to the opinion of the one man who knows what is right and wrong, —and to truth herself. And so your first proposition was wrong, that we should listen to the voice of the multitude in what is right and fair and good and the contrary. —But still, some one may retort, the multitude has power over your life.

Crito/ Very likely, Socrates, and with truth, too.

Socrates/ No doubt. And yet, my friend, this present discussion resembles strangely one of a former occasion. We

agreed then that not life but living well was to be prized; does our conclusion still hold?

Crito/ It still holds.

Socrates/ We agreed that living well is the same as living honorably and uprightly; and does this still hold?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ So far agreed. It only remains to determine whether my attempt to escape hence, without the permission of the Athenians, would be upright or wrong. If it appears upright, let us make the attempt; if wrong, let us forego it. As for your considerations of expense and reputation and children, I fear they are like the considerations of the thoughtless multitude who put us to death and would as lightly bring us to life again, if they could. Our argument has at least made one point clear: we have only to consider, as I was saying, whether we shall be acting uprightly in paying money and gratitude to those who are to get me away, and in planning and sharing this escape, or whether we shall be acting quite wrongly. And if it should appear wrong to act thus, then I fear we must not take thought of the peril of death we incur by remaining quietly here; we must suffer anything rather than do wrong.

Crito/ I think you are right, Socrates; but what is to be done?

Socrates/ Let us examine the matter together, my friend; if you are able to find flaws in what I say, do so and I will surrender. But if not, then, pray, as you love me, no longer din this old story into my ears, insisting that I ought to escape against the will of the Athenians. Indeed, I want very much to act with your approval and not contrarily. Look well to the beginning of the argument, and try to answer my questions as seems best.

Crito/ I will try.

Socrates/ Are we never of our free will to do wrong, or under certain circumstances is the rule relaxed? Is it quite true, as we used constantly to admit, that wrong-doing is never in any way good or honorable? Have the events of these few days played havoc with all our fine arguments of former times? and have we, Crito, talking gravely together all these years, like old men as we thought, been no nearer the truth than children? Or is it uncompromisingly true, as we used to think, that all wrong-doing under all circumstances is an evil and a disgrace to the wrong-doer, no matter what the world says, and no matter what we may suffer for refusing? Is this true?

Crito/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And we ought in no wise to do wrong?

Crito/ In no wise.

Socrates/ Neither if we are wronged should we return the wrong, as the world commends; for wrong-doing is never right.

Crito/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And what follows? Ought we to do any man evil?

Crito/ We ought not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Is it right or wrong to return evil for evil, as the world bids?

Crito/ It is never right.

Socrates/ For to do evil to men is no different from wrong-doing.

Crito/ True.

Socrates/ So we must not wrong any man or do him evil, no matter what we have suffered at his hands. But look, Crito, that you do not make this concession against your real belief; for I know that very few men believe this or ever will

believe. And I fear, too, that between those who hold this opinion and those who do not there can never be any genuine sympathy, for they must mutually despise each other's views. I would start in my argument from this belief, that it is never right to do wrong or return wrong, or to avenge ourselves by rendering evil for evil: tell me, do you yield this point and fully agree with me, or do you object at the very outset? This has long been and still is my belief. If you think differently, let me hear what you have to say; or if you abide by your former opinion, I will proceed.

Crito/ I abide by it and agree with you; do you go on.

Socrates/ I will proceed, then; or rather let me question you. If a man enters into an agreement right in itself, must he perform his part, or may he slink out by deceit?

Crito/ He must do his part.

Socrates/ Go a step further. If we escape hence without the consent of the city, are we not doing an injury, and that to those whom we ought least to wrong? and are we abiding by our just agreement?

Crito/ I can't answer your question, Socrates; I don't quite understand.

Socrates/ Look at it in this way. Suppose I am about to run away—or whatever you call my escape—and the laws and commonwealth should come to me and say: Tell us, Socrates, what do you propose to do? Is it your purpose by acting in this way to destroy us, the laws, and the whole city, so far as your influence extends? Do you think it possible for a city to exist and avoid utter ruin in which the decisions of law do not stand valid, but are set aside and nullified by individual citizens? —What should we reply, Crito, to questions like that? One of our orators might say a good deal in favor of the law, now threatened, which commands that judicial decisions stand valid. Perhaps you would have me

retort on the laws that the city has wronged me and given a false decision?

Crito/ A fair retort, Socrates.

Socrates/ But suppose, then, the laws should say: Was this our agreement, Socrates, or were you to abide by the decisions of the city? —And if we hesitated in surprise at this speech, perhaps they would add: Do not stand dumb at our words, Socrates, but answer; for question and answer is an old trick of your own. Go to, now; what is your complaint against us and the city that you seek to destroy us? Do you not owe to us your life? Did not your father wed your mother by our aid and beget you? Speak out; have you any fault to find with those laws among us that regulate marriage? —I have none, I should reply. —Or with the laws that regulate the kind of nurture and education in which you were reared? Were not we wise, we who had charge of this, in directing your father to educate you in music and gymnastics? —Yes, you were, I should reply. —Good! And now since you were begotten and nurtured and educated under us, dare you once say you are not our offspring and servant, you and your fathers before you? And this being granted, dare you say that the right stands equal between us, and that you may presume to pay back in kind our treatment of you? Would you have any right to retaliate on your father or your master, had you a master, returning word for word and blow for blow? We think not. And now will you retaliate on your country and its laws? Because we propose to take your life, deeming it right so to do, are you, the boasted searcher after virtue, ready to destroy us, your country, and your country's laws, and will you justify such an act? Are you grown so wise as to have forgotten that a man's country is more honorable and august and holy than mother or father or the pride of family, and is more reverenced by gods and enlightened men? Have you forgotten that a man ought to revere his

native land in her wrath and yield subservience to her more than to his own father, obeying her commands, and suffering her chastisements, whether she punish us with blows or bonds? if she leads us into battle, there to endure wounds or death, that here, too, a man must follow, for so righteousness demands? and that he must not yield nor give way nor leave the ranks, but in war and in court and wherever he may be, he must do as his city and country command? Have you forgotten all this? You may use persuasion with her, as nature permits; but if it is impious to offer violence to mother or father, how much more impious so to treat your country? —Have we any reply to such words, Crito? Do not the laws utter truth?

Crito/ I admit they do.

Socrates/ See, then, O Socrates, perhaps the laws might continue, see, then, if we speak the truth, how great a wrong to us is your present undertaking. We bestowed upon you life and nurture and education; we gave you and the other citizens a share in all the good things we possess; and still more we announce and give authority to every Athenian, when he has come of age and has seen the laws and administration of the city, to take his property, if we do not please him, and depart whithersoever he wishes to any colony or foreign state: there is no law to hinder or impede. If after this any man remains, having seen in what way we administer justice and the other affairs of the city, then we affirm that such a man has by his very act ratified an agreement with us to do whatever we command; and we affirm that he who disobeys us does a threefold wrong: he disobeys those who gave him life, he disobeys those who nurtured him, and he breaks a solemn compact. We have given him his choice: either to follow our commands, which are indeed not severe, or to alter us by persuasion if we are wrong; yet neither of these things will he do.

Of such blame we say that you will be guilty, O Socrates, if you do as you now intend, —and you above all other Athenians. —If I should ask them, Why me especially? no doubt they would reply justly, that I in a peculiar manner have entered into this compact with the city.

And they would say, Is there not great and sufficient proof, O Socrates, that we and the city satisfied you? Certainly, unless it satisfied you in some particular manner, you would not have clung to the city more persistently than all other Athenians. You have never left it even to go to the festivals, except once to the Isthmus, nor to journey anywhere else unless on some military expedition. Other men travel about, but you never; nor have you shown any curiosity to learn the laws and customs of other states, but have always been content with us and our city. You have loved us with a great love; you have agreed to pass your life under us; and you have even begotten children here, as being fully satisfied with the city. At the time of the trial yon might have proposed exile as your penalty, and so have done legally what now you are undertaking against the will of the city. But at that time you put on a bold face as not grudging to die if needs be, and preferred, to use your own words, death to exile. And now you do not honor your own covenant, and have no respect for us whom you propose to destroy. You are acting like a wretched slave, undertaking to run away contrary to your compact and agreement to live under us. Come now, tell us first of all: Are we not right in saying you agreed to live under us, and that not by word but by deed? —What shall we reply, Crito? Must we not admit this?

Crito/ I fear we must, Socrates.

Socrates/ Thereupon they would ask: Are you not then violating your compact and agreement with us, which you made under no compulsion and under no deception? Neither can you claim any lack of time for counsel, for any day these

seventy years now you might have departed, if we did not satisfy you and the covenant seemed unjust. You have shown no preference for Lacedaemon or Crete, both of which you admit to be well governed, nor for any other city of the Greeks or Barbarians, but have journeyed hence less than the very lame and blind and crippled. Evidently the city pleased you above all other Athenians, —and we, the laws, too, for who would be content with a city devoid of laws? And now will you abide by our covenant? We think so, Socrates, if there is any persuasion in us. We would not have you bring ridicule on yourself by running away.

For ask yourself: What good will come to you or your friends by such a transgression and breach of honor? It is pretty clear that your friends will themselves incur the risk of exile and banishment from the city. And you, if you go to one of the neighboring cities (Thebes or Megara, for example, which are both well governed), will come as an enemy of their government, and all who have any regard for their own city will look askance upon you as a subverter of the laws. And you will confirm the opinion of the judges and justify their sentence, for the man who subverts the laws may well be regarded as a perverter of the young and unformed. Or perhaps you will avoid well-governed cities and law-abiding men? But will life seem to you quite worthwhile if you do? Or will you appear before such men with effrontery and talk—talk of what, Socrates? Of virtue forsooth, as you lo here, and of justice and institutions and laws, calling them the most precious of human possessions? Would that be quite becoming in Socrates? Hardly, we think. But such places you will leave, and will go to Crito's friends in Thessaly, for there the greatest disorder and license prevail, and no doubt they will be delighted to hear of your absurd escape, —how you ran away from jail, begirt in some queer attire, a shepherd's hide or the like, after the style of

runaway slaves, and with your face disguised. And will there be no one to say: Look at this old man; in all likelihood he had but a few years to live, yet he has transgressed the most sacred laws in his mad and greedy desire of life? You may be spared such reproaches if you take care to offend nobody, Socrates; but otherwise you will hear much to your shame. You will live the cringing slave of all the world, —and doing what? feasting and reveling in Thessaly, as if you had gone a journey to Thessaly for a dinner. All your fine sayings about justice and the other virtues, where will they be then? But perhaps you desire to live for your children's sake, that you may rear and educate them? So! Will you carry them into Thessaly, and as a great kindness rear and educate them there to be foreigners? Or if they are brought up here far away from you, will they be any the better that you are alive? Your friends, you think, will take charge of them. But will your friends care for them if you go a journey to Thessaly, yet neglect them if you go that other journey to the world below? Hardly, if there be any profit in these so-called friends of yours.

Hearken to us, Socrates, who raised you up. Do not think first of children or life or any such thing, but rather of justice; and so, when you come to the world below, you shall make a good defense before the rulers of that realm. It does not appear that either you or any of yours will be happier or juster or holier in this world if you follow out your design, nor will it be better for you when you come yonder. Now if you depart, you go as one having suffered wrong, not from us, the laws, but from men; but if you depart hence, having returned wrong for wrong and evil for evil, having violated your compact and agreement with us, having wrought harm to those who least deserve it, to yourself, your friends, the city, and us, —if you depart with this guilt upon you, we shall be angered against you in this life, and in death our

brothers, the laws of the world below, will receive you anything but graciously, for they will know of your attempt to subvert us. Beware, and hearken not to Crito's words rather than to ours. —Crito, my dearest comrade, such words I seem to hear, as the mystic worshippers seem to hear the piping of flutes; and the sound of this voice so murmurs in my ears that I can hear no other. I warn you, so far as I can now judge, whatever you plead against it, will be in vain. Yet if you still hope, speak.

Crito/ There is nothing I can say, Socrates.

Socrates/ Enough, then, Crito. Let me proceed thus, for God leadeth the way.

Crito.

OR, OF WHAT WE OUGHT TO DO.

Translated and edited by Henry Morley. 1783

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates and Crito.

Socrates/ What's the occasion of your coming here so soon, Crito? As I take it, 'tis very early.

Crito/ Indeed it is.

Socrates/ What o clock may it be then?

Crito/ A little before the break of day.

Socrates/ I wonder that the jailer permitted you to come in.

Crito/ He is one I know very well. I have been with him here frequently; and he is in some measure obliged to me.

Socrates/ Are you but just come? Or is it long since you came?

Crito/ I have been here a good while.

Socrates/ Why did you not awaken me then when you came in?

Crito/ Pray God forbid, Socrates. For my own part, I would gladly shake off the cares and anxiety that keep my eyes from shutting. But when I entered this room, I wondered to find you so sound asleep, and was loth to awaken you, that I might not deprive you of those happy minutes. Indeed, Socrates, ever since I became acquainted with you, I have been always delighted with your patience and calm temper; but in a distinguishing manner in this juncture, since, in the circumstances you are in, your eye looks so easy and unconcerned.

Socrates/ Indeed, Crito, it would be very unbecoming in one of my age to be fearful of death.

Crito/ Ay! And how many do we see every day, under the like misfortunes, whom age does not free from those dreads?

Socrates/ That is true. But after all what made you come hither so early?

Crito/ I came to tell you a perplexing piece of news, which, though it may not seem to affect you, yet it overwhelms both me and your relations and friends with insupportable grief. In short, I bring the most terrible news that ever could be brought.

Socrates/ What news? Is the ship arrived from Delos, upon whose return I am to die?

Crito/ It is not yet arrived; but doubtless it will be here this day, according to the intelligence we have from some persons that came from Sunium, and left it there. For at that rate it cannot fail of being here to-day; and to-morrow you must unavoidably die.

Socrates/ Why not, Crito? Be it so, since 'tis the will of God. However, I do not think that the vessel will arrive this day.

Crito/ What do you ground that conjecture upon?

Socrates/ I'll tell you; I am not to die till the day after the arrival of the vessel.

Crito/ At least, those who are to execute the sentence say so.

Socrates/ That vessel will not arrive till to-morrow, as I conjecture from a certain dream I had this night about a minute ago. And it seems to me a pleasure that you did not awaken me.

Crito/ Well, what is this dream?

Socrates/ I thought I saw a very gentle comely woman, dressed in white, come up to me, who calling me by name, said, “In three days thou shalt be in the fertile Phthia.”

Crito/ That is a very remarkable dream, Socrates.

Socrates/ ’tis a very significant one, Crito.

Crito/ Yes, without doubt. But for this time, prithee, Socrates, take my advice, and make your escape. For my part, if you die, besides the irreparable loss of a friend, which I shall ever bewail, I am afraid that numbers of people, who are not well acquainted either with you or me, will believe that I have forsaken you, in not employing my interest for promoting your escape, now that it is in my power. Is there anything more base than to lie under the disrepute of being wedded to my money more than to my friend? For, in fine, the people will never believe that ’twas you who refused to go from hence, when we urged you to be gone.

Socrates/ My dear Crito, why should we be so much concerned for the opinion of the people? Is it not enough that the more sensible part, who are the only men we ought to regard, know how the case stands?

Crito/ But you see, Socrates, there’s a necessity of being concerned for the noise of the mob; for your example is sufficient instance that they are capable of doing, not only small, but the greatest of injuries, and display their passion in an outrageous manner against those who are once run down by the vulgar opinion.

Socrates/ I wish, Crito, that the people were able to do the greatest of injuries. Were it so, they would likewise be capable of doing the greatest good. That would be a great happiness. But neither the one nor the

other is possible. For they cannot make men either wise men or fools.

Crito/ I grant it. But pray answer me; Is it out of tenderness to me and your other friends that you will not stir from hence? Is it fear lest upon your escape we should be troubled, and charged with carrying you off, and by that means be obliged to quit our possession, or pay a large sum of money, or else suffer something more fatal than either? If that be your fear, shake it off Socrates, in the name of the gods. Is not it highly reasonable that we should purchase your escape at the rate of exposing ourselves to these dangers, and greater ones, if there be occasion? Once more, my dear Socrates, believe me, and go along with me.

Socrates/ I own, Crito, that I have such thoughts, and several others besides in my view.

Crito/ Fear nothing, I entreat you; for, in the first place, they require no great sum to let you out. And on the other hand, you see what a pitiful condition those are in who probably might arraign us. A small sum of money will stop their mouths; my estate alone will serve for that. If you scruple to accept of my offer, here are a great many strangers who desire nothing more than to furnish you with what money you want. Simmias the Theban himself has brought up very considerable sums. Cebes is capable of doing as much, and so are several others. Let not your fears then stifle the desire of making your escape. And as for what you told me the other day, in court, that if you made your escape, you should not know how to live—pray let not that trouble you. Whithersoever you go, you'll be beloved in all parts of the world. If you'll go to Thessaly, I have friends there, who will honor you according to your merit, and think themselves happy in supplying you with what you want,

and covering you from all occasions of fear in their country. Besides, Socrates, without doubt you are guilty of a very unjust thing in delivering up yourself, while 'tis in your power to make your escape, and promoting what your enemies so passionately wish for. For you not only betray yourself, but likewise your children by abandoning them, when you might make a shift to maintain and educate them. You are not at all concerned at what may befall them, though at the same time they are like to be in as dismal a condition as ever poor orphans were. A man ought either to have no children, or else to expose himself to the care and trouble of breeding them. You seem to me to act the softest and most insensible part in the world; whereas you ought to take up a resolution worthy of a generous soul; above all, you who boast that you pursued nothing but virtue all the days of your life. I tell you, Socrates, I am ashamed upon the account of you and your relations, since the world will believe 'twas owing to our cowardliness that you did not get off. In the first place, they will charge you with standing a trial that you might have avoided; then they will censure your conduct in making your defenses; and at last, which is the most shameful of all, they will upbraid us with forsaking you through fear or cowardice, since we did not accomplish your escape. Pray consider of it, my dear Socrates; if you do not prevent the approaching evil, you'll bear a part in the shame that will cover us all. Pray advise with yourself quickly. But now I think on it, there is not time for advising, there's no choice left, all must be put in execution.

Socrates/ My dear Crito, your good-will is very commendable, provided it agree with right reason; but if it swerve from that, the stronger it is, the more is it

blameworthy. The first thing to be considered is, whether we ought to do as you say, or not? For you know, 'tis not of yesterday that I've accustomed myself only to follow the reasons that appear most just after a mature examination. Though fortune frowns upon me, yet I'll never part with the principles I have all along professed. These principles appear always the same, and I esteem them equally at all times. So, if your advice be not backed by the strongest reasons, assure yourself I will never comply, not if all the power of the people should arm itself against me, or offer to frighten me like a child, by laying on fresh chains, and threatening to deprive me of the greatest good, and oblige me to suffer the cruelest death.

Crito/ Now, how shall we manage this inquiry justly?.

Socrates/ To be sure, the fairest way is to resume what you have been saying of the vulgar opinions; that is, to inquire whether there are some reports that we ought to regard, and others that are to be slighted; or, whether the saying so is only a groundless and childish proposition. I have a strong desire, upon this occasion, to try, in your presence, whether this principle will appear to me in different colors from what it did while I was in other circumstances, or whether I shall always find it the same, in order to determine me to compliance or refusal.

If I mistake not, 'tis certain that several persons, who thought themselves men of sense, have often maintained in this place, that of all the opinions of men, some are to be regarded and others to be slighted. In the name of the gods, Crito, do not you think that was well said? In all human appearance you are in no danger of dying to-morrow; and therefore 'tis presumed

that the fear of the present danger cannot work any change upon you. Wherefore, pray consider it well; do not you think they spoke justly who said that all the opinions of men are not always to be regarded, but only some of them; and those not of all men, but only of some? What do you say? Do not you think 'tis very true?

Crito/ Very true.

Socrates/ At any rate, then, ought not we to esteem the good opinions and slight the bad ones?

Crito/ Ay, doubtless.

Socrates/ Are not the good opinions then those of wise men, and the bad ones those of fools?

Crito/ It cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ Let us see, then, how you will answer this. A man who makes his exercises, when he comes to have his lesson, whether shall he regard the commendation or censure of whoever comes first, or only of him that is either a physician or a master?

Crito/ Of the last, to be sure.

Socrates/ Then he ought to fear the censure and value the commendation of that man alone, and slight what comes from others.

Crito/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ For that reason this young man must neither eat nor drink, nor do anything, without the orders of that master, that man of sense, and he is not at all to govern himself by the caprices of others.

Crito/ That is true.

Socrates/ Let us fix upon that, then. But suppose he disobeys this master, and disregards his applause or censure, and suffers himself to be blinded by the

caresses and applauses of the ignorant mob, will not he come to some harm by this means?

Crito/ How is it possible it should be otherwise?

Socrates/ But what will be the nature of this harm that will accrue to him thereupon? where will it terminate? and what part of him will it affect?

Crito/ His body, without doubt; for by that means he'll ruin himself.

Socrates/ Very well, but is not the case the same all over? Upon the point of justice or injustice, honesty or dishonesty, good or evil, which at present are the subject of our dispute, shall we rather refer ourselves to the opinion of the people than to that of an experienced wise man, who justly challenges more respect and deference from us than all the world besides? And if we do not act conformably to the opinion of this one man, is it not certain that we shall ruin ourselves, and entirely lose that which only lives and gains new strength by justice, and perishes only through injustice? Or must we take all that for a thing of no account?

Crito/ I am of your opinion.

Socrates/ Take heed, I entreat you; if, by following the opinions of the ignorant, we destroy that which is only preserved by health and wasted by sickness, can we survive the corruption of that, whether it be our body or somewhat else?

Crito/ That's certain.

Socrates/ Can one live then after the corruption and destruction of the body?

Crito/ No, to be sure.

Socrates/ But can one survive the corruption of that which lives only by justice, and dies only through injustice? Or is this thing (whatever it be) that has justice or injustice for its object, to be less valued than the body?

Crito/ Not at all.

Socrates/ What, is it much more valuable then?

Crito/ A great deal more.

Socrates/ Then, my dear Crito, we ought not to be concerned at what the people say, but what he says, who knows what is just and unjust; and that alone is nothing else but the truth. Thus you see you established false principles at first, in saying that we ought to pay a deference to the opinions of the people upon what is just, good, honest, and its contraries. Some, perhaps, will object that the people are able to put us to death.

Crito/ To be sure they will start that objection.

Socrates/ 'tis also true. But that does not alter the nature of what we were saying; that is still the same. For you must still remember that 'tis not life, but a good life, that we ought to court.

Crito/ That is a certain truth.

Socrates/ But is it not likewise certain that this good life consists in nothing else but honesty and justice?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, before we go farther, let us examine, upon the principles you have agreed to, whether my departure from hence, without the permission of the Athenians, is just or unjust. If it be found just, we must do our utmost to bring it about; but if it be unjust, we must lay aside the design. For as to the considerations

you alleged just now of money, reputation, and family, these are only the thoughts of the baser mob, who put innocent persons to death, and would afterwards bring them to life if 'twere possible. But as for us who bend our thoughts another way, all that we are to mind is whether we do a just thing in giving money, and lying under an obligation to those who promote our escape; or whether both we and they do not commit a piece of injustice in so doing? If this be an unjust thing, we need not reason much upon the point, since 'tis better to abide here and die than to undergo somewhat more terrible than death.

Crito/ You are in the right, Socrates; let us see then how it will fall.

Socrates/ We shall go hand in hand in the inquiry. If you have anything of weight to answer, pray do it when I have spoken, that so I may comply; if not, pray forbear any farther to press me to go hence without the consent of the Athenians. I shall be infinitely glad if you can persuade me to do it; but I cannot do it without being first convinced. Take notice then whether my way of pursuing this inquiry satisfies you, and do your utmost to make answer to my questions.

Crito/ I will.

Socrates/ Is it true that we ought not to do an unjust thing to any man? Or is it lawful in any measure to do it to one when we are forbidden to do it to another? Or is it not absolutely true that all manner of injustice is neither good nor honest, as we were saying but now? Or, in fine, are all these sentiments which we formerly entertained, vanished in a few days? And is it possible, Crito, that those of years, our most serious conferences, should resemble those of children, and we at the same

time not be sensible that 'tis so? Ought not we rather to stand to what we have said, as being a certain truth, that all injustice is scandalous and fatal to the person that commits it, let men say what they will, and let our fortune be never so good or bad?

Crito/ That's certain.

Socrates/ Then must we avoid the least measure of injustice?

Crito/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Since we are to avoid the least degree of it, then we ought not to do it to those who are unjust to us, notwithstanding that this people think it lawful?

Crito/ So I think.

Socrates/ But what! Ought we to do evil or not?

Crito/ Without doubt we ought not.

Socrates/ But is it justice to repay evil with evil, pursuant to the opinion of the people, or is it unjust?

Crito/ 'tis highly unjust.

Socrates/ Then there's no difference between doing evil and being unjust?

Crito/ I own it.

Socrates/ Then we ought not to do the least evil or injustice to any man, let him do by us as he will. But take heed, Crito, that by this concession you do not speak against your own sentiments. For I know very well there are few that will go this length; and 'tis impossible for those who vary in their sentiments upon this point to agree well together. Nay, on the contrary, the contempt of one another's opinions leads them to a reciprocal contempt of one another's persons. Consider well then if you are of the same opinion with me; and let us ground our reasonings upon this principle, that we

ought not to do evil for evil, or treat those unjustly who are unjust to us.

For my part, I never did, nor ever will, entertain any other principle. Tell me then if you have changed your mind; if not, give ear to what follows.

Crito/ I give ear.

Socrates/ Well; a man that has made a just promise, ought he to keep it, or to break it?

Crito/ He ought to keep it.

Socrates/ If I go hence without the consent of the Athenians, shall not I injure some people, and especially those who do not deserve it? Or shall we in this follow what we think equally just to everybody?

Crito/ I cannot answer you, for I do not understand you.

Socrates/ Pray take notice; when we put ourselves in a way of making our escape, or going hence, or how you please to call it, suppose the law and the republic should present themselves in a body before us, and accost us in this manner: "Socrates, what are you going to do? To put in execution what you now design, were wholly to ruin the laws and the state. Do you think a city can subsist when justice has not only lost its force, but is likewise perverted, overturned, and trampled underfoot by private persons?" What answer could we make to such and many other questions? For what is it that an orator cannot say upon the overturning of that law which provides that sentences once pronounced shall not be infringed? Shall we answer, that the republic has judged amiss, and passed an unjust sentence upon us? Shall that be our answer?

Crito/ Ah, without any scruple, Socrates.

Socrates/ What will the laws say then? “Socrates, is it not true that you agreed with us to submit yourself to a public trial?” And if we should seem to be surprised at such language, they’ll continue, perhaps, “Be not surprised, Socrates, but make an answer, for you yourself used to insist upon question and answer. Tell then what occasion you have to complain of the republic and of us, that you are so eager upon destroying it? Are not we the authors of your birth? Is it not by our means that your father married her who brought you forth? What fault can you find with the laws we have established as to marriage?” “Nothing at all,” should I answer. “As to the nourishing and bringing up of children, and the manner of your education, are not the laws just that we enacted upon that head, by which. we obliged your father to bring you up to music and the exercises?” “Very just,” I’d say. “Since you were born, brought up, and educated under our influence, durst you maintain that you are not our nursed child and subject as well as your father? And if you are, do you think to have equal power with us, as if it were lawful for you to inflict upon us all we enjoin you to undergo? But since you cannot lay claim to any such right against your father or your master, so as to repay evil for evil, injury for injury, how can you think to obtain that privilege against your country and the laws, insomuch that if we endeavor to put you to death, you’ll counteract us, by endeavoring to prevent us and to ruin your country and its law? Can you call such an action just, you that are an inseparable follower of true virtue? Are you ignorant that your country is more considerable, and more worthy of respect and veneration before God and man than your father, mother, and all your relations together? That you ought to honor your

country, yield to it, and humor it more than an angry father? That you must either reclaim it by your counsel, or obey its injunctions, and suffer without grumbling all that it imposes upon you? If it orders you to be whipped, or laid in irons, if it sends you to the wars, there to spend your blood, you ought to do it without demurring; you must not shake off the yoke, or flinch or quit your post; but in the army, in prison, and everywhere else, ought equally to obey the orders of your country, or else assist it with wholesome counsel. For if offering violence to a father or mother be a piece of grand impiety, to put force upon ones country is a much greater." What shall we answer to all this, Crito? Shall we acknowledge the truth of what the laws advance?

Crito/ How can we avoid it?

Socrates/ "Do you see, then, Socrates," continue they, "what reason we have to brand your enterprise against us as unjust? Of us you hold your birth, your maintenance, your education; in fine, we have done you all the good we are capable of, as well as the other citizens. Indeed, we do not fail to make public proclamation, that 'tis lawful for every private man, if he does not find his account in the laws and customs of our republic, after a mature examination, to retire with all his effects whither he pleases. And if any of you cannot comply with our customs, and desires to remove and live elsewhere, not one of us shall hinder him, he may go where he pleases. But on the other hand, if anyone of you continues to live here, after he has considered our way of administering justice, and the policy observed in the state, then, we say, he is in effect obliged to obey all our commands, and we maintain that his disobedience is unjust on a three-fold account; for not obeying those to whom he owes his birth; for

trampling under foot those that educated him; and for violating his faith after he engaged to obey us, and not taking the pains to make remonstrances to us, if we happen to do any unjust thing. For notwithstanding that we only propose things without using any violence to procure obedience, and give every man his choice whether to obey us, or reclaim us by his counsel or remonstrances, yet he does neither the one nor the other. And we maintain, Socrates, that if you execute what you are now about, you will stand charged with all these crimes, and that in a much higher degree than if another private man had committed the same injustice." If I asked them the reason, without doubt they would stop my mouth by telling me that I submitted myself in a distinguishing manner to all these conditions. "And we," continue they, "have great evidence that you were always pleased with us and the republic; for if this city had not been more agreeable to you than any other, you had never continued in it, no more than the other Athenians. None of the shows could ever tempt you to go out of the city, except once, that you went to see the games at the Isthmus; you never went anywhere else, excepting your military expeditions, and never undertook a voyage, as others are wont to do.

You never had the curiosity to visit other cities, or inquire after other laws, as being contented with us and our republic. You always made a distinguishing choice of us, and on all occasions testified that you submitted with all your heart to live according to our maxims. Besides, your having had children in this city is an infallible evidence that you like it. In fine, in this very last juncture you might have been sentenced to banishment if you would, and might then have done,

with the consent of the republic, what you now attempt without their permission. But you were so stately, so unconcerned at death, that in your own terms you preferred death to banishment. But now you have no regard to these fine words, you are no further concerned for the laws, since you are going to overturn them. You do just what a pitiful slave would offer to do, by endeavoring to make your escape contrary to the laws of the treaty you have signed, by which you obliged yourself to live according to our rules. Pray answer us; Did not we say right in affirming that you agreed to this treaty, and submitted yourself to these terms, not only in words but in deeds?" What shall we say to all this, Crito? And what can we do else but acknowledge that 'tis so?

Crito/ How can we avoid it, Socrates?

Socrates/ "What else then," continue they, "is this action of yours but a violation of that treaty, and all its terms? That treaty that you were not made to sign either by force or surprise, not without time to think on it; for you had the whole course of seventy years to have removed in, if you had been dissatisfied with us, or unconvinced of the justice of our proposals. You neither pitched upon Lacedaemon nor Crete, notwithstanding that you always cried up their laws; nor any of the other Grecian cities, or strange countries. You have been less out of Athens than the lame and the blind which is an invincible proof that the city pleased you in a distinguishing manner, and consequently that we did, since a city never can be agreeable if its laws are not such. And yet at this time you counteract the treaty. But, if you will take our advice, Socrates, we would have you to stand to your treaty, and not expose yourself to be ridiculed by the citizens, by stealing out from hence.

Pray consider what advantage can redound either to you or your friends by persisting in that goodly design. Your friends will infallibly be either exposed to danger or banished their country, or have their estates forfeited. And as for yourself, if you retire to any neighboring city, such as Thebes or Megara, which are admirably well governed, you'll there be looked upon as an enemy. All that have any love for their country will look upon you as a corrupter of the laws. Besides, you'll fortify in them the good opinion they have of your judges, and move them to approve the sentence given against you; for a corrupter of the law will at any time pass for a debaucher of the youth, and of the vulgar people. What, will you keep out of these well-governed cities, and these assemblies of just men? But pray will you have enough to live upon in that condition? Or will you have the face to go and live with them? And pray what will you say to them, Socrates? Will you preach to them, as you did here, that virtue, justice, the laws and ordinances ought to be reverenced by men? Do you not think that this will sound very ridiculous in their ears? You ought to think so. But perhaps you'll quickly leave those well-governed cities, and go to Thessaly, to Crito's friends, where there is less order, and more licentiousness; and doubtless in that country they'll take a singular pleasure in hearing you relate in what equipage you made your escape from this prison, that is, covered with some old rags, or a beasts skin, or disguised some other way, as fugitives are wont to be. Everybody will say, 'This old fellow, that has scarce any time to live, had such a strong passion for living, that he did not stand to purchase his life by trampling underfoot the most sacred laws.' Such stories will be bandied about of you at a time when you offend no man;

but upon the least occasion of complaint, they'll tease you with a thousand other reproaches unworthy of you. You'll spend your time in sneaking and insinuating yourself into the favor of all men, one after another, and owning an equal subjection to them all. For what can you do? Will you feast perpetually in Thessaly, as if the good cheer had drawn you thither? But what will become then of all your fine discourses upon justice and virtue? Besides, if you design to preserve your life for the sake of your children, that cannot be in order to bring them up in Thessaly, as if you could do them no other service but make them strangers. Or if you design to leave them here, do you imagine that during your life they'll be better brought up here, in your absence, under the care of your friends? But will not your friends take the same care of them after your death that they would do in your absence? You ought to be persuaded that all those who call themselves your friends, will at all times do them all the service they can. To conclude, Socrates, submit yourself to our reasons, follow the advice of those who brought you up, and do not put your children, your life, or anything whatsoever, in the balance with justice; to the end that when you come before the tribunal of Pluto, you may be able to clear yourself before your judges. For do not deceive yourself; if you perform what you now design, you will neither better your own cause, nor that of your party; you will neither enlarge its justice nor sanctity either here or in the regions below. But if you die bravely, you owe your death to the injustice, not of the laws, but of men; whereas if you make your escape by repulsing so shamefully the injustice of your enemies, by violating at once both your own faith and our treaty, and injuring so many innocent persons as yourself, your friends, and

your country, together with us, we will still be your enemies as long as you live; and when you are dead, our sisters, the laws in the other world, will certainly afford you no joyful reception, as knowing that you endeavored to ruin us. Where fore do not prefer Crito's counsel to ours."

I think, my dear Crito, I hear what I have now spoken, just as the priests of Cybele imagine they hear the cornets and flutes; and the sound of these words makes so strong an impression in my ears, that it stops me from hearing anything else. These are the sentiments I like; and all you can say to take me off them will be in vain. However, if you think to succeed, I do not prevent you from speaking.

Crito/ I have nothing to say, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then be quiet, and let us courageously run this course, since God calls and guides us to it.

The Crito.

Translated by Taylor, Thomas.

Persons of the Dialog.

SOCRATES and CRITO.

SCENE: —The Prison of SOCRATES.

Socrates/ Why came you at this early hour, Crito? Or is it not yet morning?

Crito/ It is.

Socrates/ But what time of the morning is it?

Crito/ It is now the break of day.

Socrates/ I wonder how the keeper of the prison came to admit you.

Crito/ He is accustomed to me, Socrates, in consequence of my frequently coming hither; and he is also in a certain respect under obligations to me.

Socrates/ Did you come just now, or some time ago?

Crito/ It is a considerable time since I came.

Socrates/ But why did you not immediately call me, and not sit down in silence?

Crito/ Not so, by Zeus, Socrates; nor should I myself be willing to be for so long a time awake and in sorrow. But I have for some time admired you, on perceiving how sweetly you slept. And I designedly did not call you, that you might continue in that pleasant condition. Indeed I have often and formerly through the whole of your life considered you as happy on account of your manners, but far more so in the present calamity, because you bear it so easily and mildly.

Socrates/ But it would be absurd, Crito, if a man of my age were to be indignant when it is necessary for him to die.

Crito/ And yet others, Socrates, equally old, when they have been involved in such-like calamities, have notwithstanding their age been indignant with their present fortune.

Socrates/ It is so. But why did you come to me so early?

Crito/ I come, Socrates, bearing a message not unpleasant to you, as it appears to me, but bitter and weighty to me and to all your associates; and which I indeed shall bear most heavily.

Socrates/ What is it? Is the ship come from Delos, on the arrival of which it is necessary I should die?

Crito/ Not yet; but it appears to me, from what certain persons coming from Sunium have announced, and who left it there, that it will arrive today. From these messengers, therefore, it is evident that it will be here today; and consequently it will be necessary for you, Socrates, to die tomorrow.

Socrates/ But with good fortune, Crito: and if it please the Gods, be it so. Yet I do not think that it will arrive here today.

Crito/ Whence do you infer this?

Socrates/ I will tell you. For on the day after, or on the very day in which the ship arrives, it is necessary that I should die.

Crito/ Those that have power over these things say so.

Socrates/ I do not, therefore, think it will come this, but the next day. But I infer this from a certain dream which I saw this night a little before you came; and you appear very opportunely not to have disturbed me.

Crito/ But what was this dream?

Socrates/ A certain woman, beautiful, of a pleasing aspect and in white raiment, seemed to approach, and

calling me to say, The third day hence, O Socrates, you will arrive at the fertile Phthia.

Crito/ What a strange dream, Socrates!

Socrates/ Manifest however, as it appears to me, O Crito.

Crito/ Very much so, as it seems. But, O blessed Socrates, be now persuaded by me, and save yourself. For, if you die, not one calamity only will befall me; but, exclusively of being deprived of you, an associate so necessary as I never have found any other to be, those who do not well know me and you, will think that I might have saved you if I had been willing to spend my money, but that I neglected to do so. Though what can be more base than such an opinion, by which I should appear to value riches more than my friends? For the multitude will not be persuaded that you were unwilling to depart hence, though we endeavored to effect your escape.

Socrates/ But why, O blessed Crito, should we so much respect the opinion of the multitude? For the most worthy men, whose opinion ought rather to be regarded, will think these things to have been so transacted as they were.

Crito/ Nevertheless you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to pay attention to the opinion of the multitude. For the present circumstances now evince that the multitude can effect not the smallest of evils, but nearly the greatest. if anyone is calumniated by them.

Socrates/ I wish, O Crito, the multitude could effect the greatest evils, that they might also accomplish the greatest good: for then it would be well. But now they can do neither of these. For they can neither make a man wise, nor destitute of wisdom; but they do whatever casually takes place.

Crito/ Let these things be so. But answer me, Socrates, whether your concern for me and the rest of your associates prevents you from escaping hence, lest we should be

molested by calumniators, as having fraudulently taken you from hence, and be forced either to lose all our property, or a great sum of money, or to suffer something else besides this? For, if you fear any such thing, bid farewell to it. For we shall be just in saving you from this danger, and, if it were requisite, from one even greater than this. But be persuaded by me, and do not act otherwise.

Socrates/ I pay attention to these things, Crito, and also to many others.

Crito/ Do not, therefore, dread these things. For those who have agreed to save you, and to take you from hence, demand no great sum for this purpose. And, in the next place, do you not see how poor your calumniators are, and that on this account your liberty may be purchased at a small expense? My property too, which I think is sufficient, is at your service. And if, out of regard to me, you do not think fit, to accept my offer, these guests here are readily disposed to pay what may be necessary. One also among them, Simmias the Theban, has brought with him a sum of money sufficient for this purpose. Cebes, too, and very many others are ready to do the same: so that, as I said, neither fearing these things, should you hesitate to save yourself, nor should you be troubled on leaving the city (as in court you said you should) from not knowing how to conduct yourself. For in many other places, wherever you may go, you will be beloved. And if you are disposed to go to Thessaly, you will there find my guests, who will pay you every attention, and will render your abode there so secure, that no one in Thessaly will molest you. Besides this, Socrates, neither do you appear to me to attempt a just thing, in betraying when you might save yourself; and in endeavoring to promote the earnest wishes of your enemies, who strive to destroy you. To this I may also add, that you appear to me to betray your own children, whom it is incumbent on you

to maintain and educate; and, as far as pertains to you, leave them to the guidance of chance; though it is likely that such things will happen to them as orphans are wont to experience. However, either it is not proper to beget children, or it is requisite to labor in rearing and instructing them when begotten. But you appear to me to have chosen the most indolent mode of conduct; though it is proper that you should choose such things as a good and brave man would adopt, especially as you profess to have made virtue the object of your attention through the whole of life. I am, therefore, ashamed both for you, and those familiars who are our associates as well as yours, lest the whole affair concerning you should appear to have been accomplished through a certain cowardice on our part. And in the first place, your standing a trial which might have been prevented; in the next place, your defense; and, in the last place, the extremity to which you are now brought, will be placed to the account of our viciousness and cowardice, and will be considered as so many ridiculous circumstances which might have been avoided, if we had exerted ourselves even in a trifling degree. See, therefore, O Socrates, whether these things, besides being evil, will not also be disgraceful both to you and us. Advise then with yourself quickly, though indeed there is no time for consultation; for on the following night all this must be done. But, if we delay, it will be impossible to effect your escape. By all means, therefore, be persuaded by me, Socrates, and do not in any respect otherwise.

Socrates/ My dear Crito, your alacrity is very commendable, if it is attended with a certain rectitude; but if not, by how much the greater it is, by so much is it the more blamable. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether these things ought to be done or not. For I am a man of that kind, not only now but always, who acts in

obedience to that reason which appears to me on mature deliberation to be the best. And the reasons which I have formerly adopted, I am not able now to reject in my present fortune, but they nearly appear to me to be similar: and I venerate and honor the same principles as formerly; so that, unless we have anything better to adduce at present than these, be well assured that I shall not comply with your request, not though the power of the multitude should endeavor to terrify us like children, by threatening more bonds and deaths, and ablations of property.

Crito/ How, therefore, may we consider these things in the best manner?

Socrates/ If, in the first place, we resume that which you said concerning opinions, considering whether it was well said by us or not, that to some opinions we ought to pay attention, and to others not; or rather indeed, before it was necessary that I should die, it was well said, but now it becomes evident that it was asserted for the sake of discussion, though in reality it was merely a jest and a trifle. I desire, however, O Crito, to consider, in common with you, whether that assertion appears to me in my present condition to be different, or the same, and whether we shall bid farewell to or be persuaded by it. But thus I think it is everywhere said by those who appear to say anything pertinently, that, as I just now asserted of the opinions which men opine, some ought to be very much attended to, and others not. By the Gods, Crito, does not this appear to you to be well said? For you, so far as relates to human power, are out of danger of dying tomorrow, and such a calamity as the present will not seduce you into a false decision. Consider then: does it not appear to you to have been asserted with sufficient rectitude, that it is not fit to reverence all the opinions of men, but that some should be honored and others not? Nor yet the opinions of all men, but

those of some and not those of others? What do you say? Are not these things well said?

Crito/ Well.

Socrates/ Are not worthy opinions, therefore, to be honored, but base opinions not?

Crito/ They are.

Socrates/ And are not worthy opinions those of wise men; but base opinions those of the unwise?

Crito/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Come then, let us again consider how things of this kind were asserted. Whether does he who is conversant in gymnastic exercises pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of that one man alone who is a physician, or the preceptor of boys in their bodily exercises?

Crito/ Of that one alone.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, proper that he should fear the blame and embrace the praise of that one, but not the praise and blame of the multitude?

Crito/ Evidently.

Socrates/ In this manner, therefore, he ought to act and exercise himself, and also to eat and drink, which appears fit to the one who presides and knows, rather than in that which may appear to be proper to all others.

Crito/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Be it so. But if he is disobedient to that one, and disregards his opinion and his praise, but honors the opinion and praise of the multitude, who know nothing, will he not suffer some evil?

Crito/ How is it possible he should not?

Socrates/ But what is this evil, whither does it tend, and to which of the things pertaining to him who is disobedient?

Crito/ Evidently to his body, for this it corrupts.

Socrates/ You speak well. We must form the same conclusion, therefore, Crito, in other things, that we may not run through all of them. With respect, therefore, to things just and unjust, base and beautiful, good and evil, and which are now the subjects of our consultation, whether ought we to follow the opinion of the multitude, and to dread it, or that of one man if there is anyone knowing in these things, whom we ought to reverence and fear rather than all others; to whom if we are not obedient, we shall corrupt and injure that which becomes better by the just, but is destroyed by the unjust? Or is this nothing?

Crito/ I think, Socrates, we ought to follow the opinion of that one.

Socrates/ Come then, if not being persuaded by the opinion of those that are judges, we destroy that which becomes better by the salubrious, but is corrupted by the insalubrious, can we live after this destruction? But is not this very thing of which we are speaking the body?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ Can we, therefore, live after the body is depraved and corrupted?

Crito/ By no means.

Socrates/ But can we live when that is corrupted which is injured by the unjust, but benefited by the just? Or shall we think that to be viler than the body, whatever it may be, pertaining to us, about which justice and injustice subsist?

Crito/ By no means.

Socrates/ It is, therefore, more honorable.

Crito/ By far.

Socrates/ We should not, therefore, O best of men, be so very much concerned about what the multitude say of us, but what that one man who knows what is just and unjust,

and what truth itself is, asserts respecting us. So that you did not act rightly at first, in introducing the opinion of the multitude concerning things just, beautiful and good, and the contraries of these, as that to which we ought to pay attention. Though some one may say that the multitude are able to destroy us.

Crito/ Someone, Socrates, may indeed say so.

Socrates/ True, But, O wonderful man, the assertion which we have discussed appears to me to be dissimilar and prior to this: and again consider whether this is still granted by us, that we are not to admit the merely living, but living well, to be a thing of the greatest consequence.

Crito/ It is granted.

Socrates/ And is this also granted, or not, that it is the same thing to live well, beautifully, and justly?

Crito/ It is.

Socrates/ From what has been assented to, therefore, this must be considered, whether it is just for me to endeavor to depart hence, the Athenians not dismissing me, or whether it is not just. And if it should appear to be just indeed, we should endeavor to accomplish it; but if not, we must bid farewell to the attempt. For as to the considerations which you adduce concerning money, opinion, and the education of children, see, Crito, whether these are not in reality the reflections of the vulgar, who rashly put men to death, and if it were in their power would recall them to life, and this without being at all guided by intellect. But by us, since reason requires it, nothing else is to be considered than as we just now said, whether we shall act justly in giving money and thanks to those who may lead me hence; or whether in reality, both we that are led from hence and those that lead us, shall not in all these things act unjustly. And if it should appear that we in so doing shall act unjustly, We must by

no means pay attention to these things, rather than to the consideration whether we shall do anything unjustly, not even if it should be necessary for us to die, staying here and being quiet, or to suffer anything else whatever.

Crito/ You appear to me, Socrates, to speak well; but see what is to be done.

Socrates/ Let us consider, O good man, in common; and if you can in any respect contradict what I say, contradict me, and I will assent to you; but if you cannot, cease, O blessed man, to repeat often to me the same thing, that I ought to depart hence, though the Athenians are unwilling. For I shall think it a great thing if you can persuade me thus to act, but not if you attempt this contrary to my will. See then, whether the beginning of this consideration satisfies you, and endeavor to answer the interrogation in such a way as you especially think it is proper.

Crito/ I will endeavor.

Socrates/ Shall we say then, that we should by no means willingly act unjustly? Or may we in a certain respect act unjustly, and in a certain respect not? Or is to act unjustly by no means neither good nor beautiful, as we have often confessed before, and as we just now said? Or are all those things which we formerly assented to dissipated in these few days; and has it for some time been concealed from us, that though we are so old, yet in seriously discoursing with each other, we have in no respect differed from children? Or does it not thus subsist more than anything, as we then said, whether the multitude admit it or not? And whether it be necessary that we should suffer things still more grievous, or such as are milder than these, at the same time shall we say or not that to act unjustly is evil and base to him who thus acts?

Crito/ We shall say so.

Socrates/ By no means, therefore, ought we to act unjustly.

Crito/ We ought not.

Socrates/ Neither, therefore, ought he who is injured to return the injury, as the multitude think, since it is by no means proper to act unjustly.

Crito/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But what then? Is it proper to do evil to anyone, O Crito, or not?

Crito/ It is not proper, Socrates.

Socrates/ But what? Is it just to repay evil with evil, as the multitude say, or is it not just?

Crito/ By no means.

Socrates/ For he who does evil to men, differs in no respect from him who acts unjustly.

Crito/ Your assertion is true.

Socrates/ Neither, therefore, is it proper to return an injury, nor to do evil to any man, however you may be injured by him. But see, Crito, while you acknowledge these things, that you do not assent to them contrary to your opinion. For I know that these things appear to and are opined by very few. But those to whom these things appear, and those to whom they do not, disagree with each other in their decisions; and it is necessary that these should despise each other, while they look to each other's deliberations. Do you therefore consider, and very diligently, whether it thus appears to you in common with me, and whether deliberating we should begin from hence, that it is never right either to do an injury, or to return an injury, or when suffering evil to revenge it by doing evil in return; or, whether you will depart and not agree with us in this principle. For it thus appears to me both formerly and now; but if it in any

respect appears otherwise to you, speak and inform me. And if you acquiesce in what has been said above, hear what follows.

Crito/ But I do acquiesce and accord with you. Speak, therefore.

Socrates/ I will say then that which is consequent to this, or rather I will ask you, whether when a man has promised to do things that are just, he ought to do them or to break his promise.

Crito/ He ought to do them.

Socrates/ From these things then thus consider. If we should depart hence without the consent of the city, shall we do evil to certain persons, and those such as we ought not in the smallest degree to injure, or shall we not? And shall we acquiesce in those things which we assented to as being just; or shall we not?

Crito/ I cannot reply to your question, Socrates: for I do not understand it.

Socrates/ But thus consider. If to us, intending to escape from hence, or in whatever manner it may be requisite to denominate it, the Laws and the Republic should present themselves in a body, and thus address us, —Tell us, O Socrates, what is it you intend to do? Do you conceive that by this thing which you attempt, you will destroy anything else than, as far as you are able, us the Laws, and the whole city? Or does it appear to you to be possible for that city to subsist and not be subverted, in which Justice is not only without strength, but is likewise diverted of its authority and corrupted by private persons? —What should we say, Crito, to these things, and to others of a similar kind? For much might be said, and particularly by rhetoricians, on the subversion of that law which provides that sentences once passed shall not be infringed. Shall we say to them that the

city has not passed an equitable sentence upon us? Shall we say this, or something else?

Crito/ This, by Zeus, Socrates.

Socrates/ Will not the Laws then thus address us? O Socrates, has it not been admitted by us and you, that you should acquiesce in the sentence which the city has passed? If, therefore, we should wonder at the Laws thus speaking, perhaps they would say, Be not surprised, O Socrates, at what we have asserted, but answer, since you are accustomed both to interrogate and reply, For what is the charge against us and the city, for which you endeavor to destroy us? Did we not first beget you? And was it not through us that your father married your mother, and planted you? Tell us, therefore, whether you blame these laws of ours concerning marriage as improper? I should say I do not blame them. But do you blame those laws concerning the nurture and education of children in which you were yourself instructed? Or did not the laws framed for this purpose order in a becoming manner when they commanded your father to instruct you in music and gymnastic? I should say they ordered well. Since then we begot and nourished and educated you, can you deny that both you and your progenitors are our offspring and servants? And if this be the case, do you think that there is an equality of justice between us and you, and that it is just for you to attempt to do those things to us which we endeavor to do to you? Or will you admit that there is no equality of justice between you and your father, or master, if you happen to have either of them so that you are not to return to these any evil you may suffer from them nor, when they reproach you, contradict them nor, when they strike you, strike them again, nor do many other things of a similar nature; but that against your country and the Laws it is lawful for you to act in this manner, so that if we endeavor

to destroy you, thinking it to be just, you also should endeavor, as far as you are able, to destroy in return, us the Laws and your country, and should say that in so doing you act justly, —you who in reality make virtue the object of your care? Or, are you so wise as to be ignorant that your country is more honorable, venerable and holy, than your mother and father, and all the rest of your progenitors, and ranks higher both among the Gods and among men endued with intellect? That it is also more necessary for a man to venerate, obey and assent to his country, when conducting itself with severity, than to his father? Likewise that he should be persuaded by it, and do what it orders? That he should quietly suffer, if it orders him to suffer? And that, if it commands him to be beaten, or confined in bonds, or sends him to battle to be wounded or slain, he should do these things, and that it is just to comply? And that he should neither decline nor recede from nor desert his rank; but in war, in a court of justice, and everywhere, the commands of the city and his country should be obeyed; or he should persuade his country to that which is naturally just; but that it is not holy to offer violence either to a mother or a father, and much less to one's country? —What shall we say to these things, Crito? Shall we acknowledge that the Laws speak the truth or not?

Crito/ To me it appears that they do.

Socrates/ Consider, therefore, O Socrates, perhaps the Laws will say, whether our assertion is true, that your present attempt against us is unjust. For we are the authors of your birth, we nourished, we educated you, imparting both to you and all the other citizens all the good in our power, at the same time proclaiming, that every Athenian who is willing has the liberty of departing wherever he pleases, with all his property, if after having explored and seen the affairs of the city, and us the Laws, we should not

be constituted according to his wishes. Nor does anyone of us the Laws impede or forbid anyone of you from migrating into some colony, or any other place, with all his property, if we and the city do not please him. But, on the other hand, if anyone of you continues to live here after he has seen the manner in which we administer justice, and govern the city in other particulars, we now say, that he in reality acknowledges to us, that he will do such things as we may command. We also say, that he who is not obedient is triply unjust, because he is disobedient to his begetters, and to those by whom he was educated; and because, having promised to be persuaded by us, he is neither persuaded, nor does he persuade us, if we do anything improperly; though at the same time we only propose, and do not fiercely command him to do what we order, but leave to his choice one of two things, either to persuade us, or to obey our mandates; and yet he does neither of these.

And we say that you also, O Socrates, will be obnoxious to these crimes if you execute what you intend to do; nor will you be the least, but the most obnoxious of all the Athenians. If, therefore, I should ask them the reason of this, they would perhaps justly reproach me by saying, that I promised to submit to all these conditions beyond the rest of the Athenians. For they would say, This, O Socrates, is a great argument with us, that both we and the city were pleasing to you; that you especially of all the Athenians would never have dwelt in it, if it had not been particularly agreeable to you. For you never left the city for any of the public spectacles except once, when you went to the Isthmian games, nor did you ever go elsewhere, except in your military expeditions. You never went any other journey like other men; nor had you ever any desire of seeing any other city, or becoming acquainted with any other laws; but we and our city were sufficient for you, so exceedingly were

you attached to us, and so much did you consent to be governed by our mandates. Besides, you have procreated children in this city, in consequence of being pleased with it. Further still, in this very judicial process, you might have been condemned to exile, if you had been willing, and might then have executed with the consent of the city what you now attempt without it. Then however you carried yourself loftily, as one who would not be indignant, if it were requisite that you should die; but you preferred, as you said, death to exile. But now you are neither ashamed of those assertions, nor do you revere us the Laws, since you endeavor to destroy us. You also do that which the most vile slave would do, by endeavoring to make your escape contrary to the compacts and agreements according to which you consented to become a member of this community. In the first place, therefore, answer us this very thing, whether we speak the truth in asserting, that you consented to be governed by us in reality, and not merely in words? Do we in asserting this speak the truth? What shall we say to these things, Crito? Can we say anything else than that we assent to them?

Crito/ It is necessary so to do, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you not then, they will say, violate these compacts and agreements between us; which you consented to neither from necessity nor through deception, nor in consequence of being compelled to deliberate in a short time; but during the space of seventy years, in which you might have departed if you had been dissatisfied with us, and the compacts had appeared to you to be unjust? You however neither preferred Lacedæmon nor Crete, which you are perpetually saying are governed by good laws, nor any other city of the Greeks or Barbarians; but you have been less out of Athens than the lame and the blind, and other mutilated persons. So much did the city and we the Laws please you beyond the rest of the Athenians. For who can be pleased

with a city without the laws? But now you do not abide by the compacts. You will however abide by them if you are persuaded by us, Socrates, and do not become ridiculous by escaping from the city.

For consider what advantage can be derived either to yourself or your friends by violating those compacts. For in consequence of your escaping from hence, it is nearly evident that your friends will be exposed to the danger either of banishment, or of the loss of their property. And as for yourself, if you retire to any neighboring city, whether Thebes or Megara (for both are governed by good laws), you will be considered, Socrates, as an enemy to their polity. And such as have any regard for their country will look upon you as a corrupter of the laws. You will also confirm them in their good opinion of your judges, who will appear to have very properly condemned you. For he who is a corrupter of the laws will very much appear to be a corrupter of youth and of stupid men. Will you then avoid these well-governed cities, and men of the most elegant manners? Supposing you should, will it, therefore, be worthwhile for you to live? Or, should you go to these cities, will you not blush, Socrates, to discourse about the same things as you did here, viz. that virtue and justice, legal institutes. and the laws, should be objects of the greatest attention to men? And do you not think that this conduct of Socrates would be very indecorous? You must necessarily think so. But perhaps, avoiding these cities, you will go to Thessaly, to the guests of Crito. For there is the greatest disorder and intemperance. And perhaps they will willingly hear you relating how ridiculously you escaped from prison, investing yourself with a certain apparatus, such as a skin, or something else which those that make their escape are accustomed to provide, and thus altering your usual appearance.

Do you think no one will say, that you, though an old man, and likely to live but a very little longer, have dared to desire life with such sordid avidity, and to transgress the greatest laws? Perhaps this will be the case, though you should not have offended anyone. But if you should, you will hear, Socrates, many things unworthy of you. You will however live obnoxious, and in subjection to all men. But what will you do in Thessaly besides feasting? having come to Thessaly as to a supper. And where shall we find those discourses concerning justice, and the other virtues? —But do you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may nurture and instruct them? What then? Bringing them to Thessaly, will you there educate them making them to be stranger guests, that they may also derive this advantage from you? Or, if you should not do this, but should leave them here, will they be better nurtured and educated in your absence? for your friends will take care of them. Do you suppose then that your children will be taken care of by your friends if you go to Thessaly, and that they will be neglected by them if you depart to Hades? If indeed any advantage is to be derived from those that call themselves your friends, it is proper to think that they will not.

But, O Socrates, being persuaded by us your nurses, neither pay more attention to your children, nor to life, nor to anything else than to justice, that, when you arrive at Hades, you may be able to defend all these particulars to the rulers there. For If, transgressing the laws, you should thus act, it will neither be better, nor more just, nor more holy to yourself, nor to anyone of your friends; nor will it be more advantageous to you when you arrive at Hades. But you will depart, if you do depart, not injured by us the Laws, but by men. If however you should so disgracefully escape, returning injury for injury, and evil for evil, transgressing your agreements and compacts with us, and injuring those

whom you ought not to injure in the smallest degree, viz. yourself, your friends, your country, and us; —in this case, we shall be indignant with you as long as you live; and in another life, our brothers the Laws who reside in Hades will not benevolently receive you; knowing that you attempted, as far as you was able, to destroy us. Let not Crito, therefore, rather than us, persuade you to do what he says.

Be well assured, my dear friend Crito, that I seem to hear these things, just as those who are agitated with Corybantic fury appear to hear the melody of pipes. And the sound of these words, like the humming of bees, in my ears, renders me incapable of hearing anything else. You see then what appears to me at present; and if you should say anything contrary to these things, you will speak in vain. At the same time, if you think that anything more should be done, tell me.

Crito/ But, Socrates, I have nothing further to say.

Socrates/ Desist, therefore, Crito, and let us adopt this conduct, since Divinity persuades us thus to act.

THE END OF THE CRITO.

Crito.

Translated by Hugh Tredennich.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Crito.

Socrates/ Here already, Crito? Surely it is still early?

Crito/ Indeed it is.

Socrates/ About what time?

Crito/ Just before dawn.

Socrates/ I wonder that the warder paid any attention to you.

Crito/ He is used to me now, Socrates, because I come here so often. Besides, he is under some small obligation to me.

Socrates/ Have you only just come, or have you been here for long?

Crito/ Fairly long.

Socrates/ Then why didn't you wake me at once, instead of sitting by my bed so quietly?

Crito/ I wouldn't dream of such a thing, Socrates. I only wish I were not so sleepless and depressed myself. I have been wondering at you, because I saw how comfortably you were sleeping, and I deliberately didn't wake you because I wanted you to go on being as comfortable as you could. I have often felt before in the course of my life how fortunate you are in your disposition, but I feel it more than ever now in your present misfortune when I see how easily and placidly you put up with it.

Socrates/ Well, really, Crito, it would be hardly suitable for a man of my age to resent having to die.

Crito/ Other people just as old as you are get involved in these misfortunes, Socrates, but their age doesn't keep them from resenting it when they find themselves in your position.

Socrates/ Quite true. But tell me, why have you come so early?

Crito/ Because I bring bad news, Socrates—not so bad from your point of view, I suppose, but it will be very hard to bear for me and your other friends, and I think that I shall find it hardest of all.

Socrates/ Why, what is this news? Has the boat come in from Delos—the boat which ends my reprieve when it arrives?

Crito/ It hasn't actually come in yet, but I expect that it will be here today, judging from the report of some people who have just arrived from Sunium and left it there. It's quite clear from their account that it will be here today, and so by tomorrow, Socrates, you will have to—to end your life.

Socrates/ Well, Crito, I hope that it may be for the best. If the gods will it so, so be it. All the same, I don't think it will arrive today.

Crito/ What makes you think that?

Socrates/ I will try to explain. I think I am right in saying that I have to die on the day after the boat arrives?

Crito/ That's what the authorities say, at any rate.

Socrates/ Then I don't think it will arrive on this day that is just beginning, but on the day after. I am going by a dream that I had in the night, only a little while ago. It looks as though you were right not to wake me up.

Crito/ Why, what was the dream about?

Socrates/ I thought I saw a gloriously beautiful woman dressed in white robes, who came up to me and addressed

me in these words : Socrates, 'To the pleasant land of Phthia on the third day thou shalt come.'

Crito/ Your dream makes no sense, Socrates.

Socrates/ To my mind, Crito, it is perfectly clear.

Crito/ Too clear, apparently. But look here, Socrates, it is still not too late to take my advice and escape. Your death means a double calamity for me. I shall not only lose a friend whom I can never possibly replace, but besides a great many people who don't know you and me very well will be sure to think that I let you down, because I could have saved you if I had been willing to spend the money. And what could be more contemptible than to get a name for thinking more of money than of your friends? Most people will never believe that it was you who refused to leave this place although we tried our hardest to persuade you.

Socrates/ But my dear Crito, why should we pay so much attention to what 'most people' think? The really reasonable people, who have more claim to be considered, will believe that the facts are exactly as they are.

Crito/ You can see for yourself, Socrates, that one has to think of popular opinion as well. Your present position is quite enough to show that the capacity of ordinary people for causing trouble is not confined to petty annoyances, but has hardly any limits if you once get a bad name with them.

Socrates/ I only wish that ordinary people *had* an unlimited capacity for doing harm; then they might have an unlimited power for doing good, which would be a splendid thing, if it were so. Actually they have neither. They cannot make a man wise or stupid; they simply act at random.

Crito/ Have it that way if you like, but tell me this, Socrates. I hope that you aren't worrying about the possible effects on me and the rest of your friends, and thinking that if you escape we shall have trouble with informers for having

helped you to get away, and have to forfeit all our property or pay an enormous fine, or even incur some further punishment? If any idea like that is troubling you, you can dismiss it altogether. We are quite entitled to run that risk in saving you, and even worse, if necessary. Take my advice, and be reasonable.

Socrates/ All that you say is very much in my mind, Crito, and a great deal more besides.

Crito/ Very well, then, don't let it distress you. I know some people who are willing to rescue you from here and get you out of the country for quite a moderate sum. And then surely you realize how cheap these informers are to buy off; we shan't need much money to settle them, and I think you've got enough of my money for yourself already. And then even supposing that in your anxiety for my safety you feel that you oughtn't to spend my money, there are these foreign gentlemen staying in Athens who are quite willing to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias of Thebes, has actually brought the money with him for this very purpose, and Cebes and a number of others are quite ready to do the same. So, as I say, you mustn't let any fears on these grounds make you slacken your efforts to escape, and you mustn't feel any misgivings about what you said at your trial—that you wouldn't know what to do with yourself if you left this country. Wherever you go, there are plenty of places where you will find a welcome, and if you choose to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you and give you complete protection, so that no one in Thessaly can interfere with you.

Besides, Socrates, I don't even feel that it is right for you to try to do what you are doing, throwing away your life when you might save it. You are doing your best to treat yourself

in exactly the same way as your enemies would, or rather did, when they wanted to ruin you. What is more, it seems to me that you are letting your sons down too. You have it in your power to finish their bringing-up and education, and instead of that you are proposing to go off and desert them, and so far as you are concerned they will have to take their chance. And what sort of chance are they likely to get? The sort of thing that usually happens to orphans when they lose their parents. Either one ought not to have children at all, or one ought to see their upbringing and education through to the end. It strikes me that you are taking the line of least resistance, whereas you ought to make the choice of a good man and a brave one, considering that you profess to have made goodness your object all through life. Really, I am ashamed, both on your account and on ours, your friends'. It will look as though we had played something like a coward's part all through this affair of yours. First there was the way you came into court when it was quite unnecessary—that was the first act. Then there was the conduct of the defense—that was the second. And finally, to complete the farce, we get this situation, which makes it appear that we have let you slip out of our hands through some lack of courage and enterprise on our part, because we didn't save you, and you didn't save yourself, when it would have been quite possible and practicable, if we had been any use at all.

There, Socrates, if you aren't careful, besides the suffering there will be all this disgrace for you and us to bear. Come, make up your mind. Really it's too late for that now; you ought to have it made up already. There is no alternative; the whole thing must be carried through during this coming night. If we lose any more time, it can't be done; it will be too late. I appeal to you, Socrates, on every ground; take my advice and please don't be unreasonable!

Socrates/ My dear Crito, I appreciate your warm feelings very much—that is, assuming that they have some justification. If not, the stronger they are, the harder they will be to deal with. Very well, then, we must consider whether we ought to follow your advice or not. You know that this is not a new idea of mine; it has always been my nature never to accept advice from any of my friends unless reflection shows that it is the best course that reason offers. I cannot abandon the principles which I used to hold in the past simply because this accident has happened to me; they seem to me to be much as they were, and I respect and regard the same principles now as before. So unless we can find better principles on this occasion, you can be quite sure that I shall not agree with you—not even if the power of the people conjures up fresh hordes of bogies to terrify our childish minds, by subjecting us to chains and executions and confiscations of our property.

Well, then, how can we consider the question most reasonably? Suppose that we begin by reverting to this view which you hold about people's opinions. Was it always right to argue that some opinions should be taken seriously but not others? Or was it always wrong? Perhaps it was right before the question of my death arose, but now we can see clearly that it was a mistaken persistence in a point of view which was really irresponsible nonsense. I should like very much to inquire into this problem, Crito, with your help, and to see whether the argument will appear in any different light to me now that I am in this position, or whether it will remain the same, and whether we shall dismiss it or accept it.

Serious thinkers, I believe, have always held some such view as the one which I mentioned just now, that some of the opinions which people entertain should be respected, and others should not. Now I ask you, Crito, don't you think that this is a sound principle? You are safe from the prospect

of dying tomorrow, in all human probability, and you are not likely to have your judgment upset by this impending calamity. Consider, then, don't you think that this is a sound enough principle, that one should not regard all the opinions that people hold, but only some and not others? What do you say? Isn't that a fair statement?

Crito/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ In other words, one should regard the good ones and not the bad?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ The opinions of the wise being good, and the opinions of the foolish bad?

Crito/ Naturally.

Socrates/ To pass on, then, what do you think of the sort of illustration that I used to employ? When a man is in training, and taking it seriously, does he pay attention to all praise and criticism and opinion indiscriminately, or only when it comes from the one qualified person, the actual doctor or trainer?

Crito/ Only when it comes from the one qualified person.

Socrates/ Then he should be afraid of the criticism and welcome the praise of the one qualified person, but not those of the general public.

Crito/ Obviously.

Socrates/ So he ought to regulate his actions and exercises and eating and drinking by the judgment of his instructor, who has expert knowledge, rather than by the opinions of the rest of the public.

Crito/ Yes, that is so.

Socrates/ Very well. Now if he disobeys the one man and disregards his opinion and commendations, and pays

attention to the advice of the many who have no expert knowledge, surely he will suffer some bad effect?

Crito/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what is this bad effect? Where is it produced? I mean, in what part of the disobedient person?

Crito/ His body, obviously; that is what suffers.

Socrates/ Very good. Well now, tell me, Crito—we don't want to go through all the examples one by one—does this apply as a general rule, and above all to the sort of actions which we are trying to decide about, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable, good and bad? Ought we to be guided and intimidated by the opinion of the many or by that of the one—assuming that there is someone with expert knowledge? Is it true that we ought to respect and fear this person more than all the rest put together, and that if we do not follow his guidance we shall spoil and mutilate that part of us which, as we used to say, is improved by right conduct and destroyed by wrong? Or is this all nonsense?

Crito/ No, I think it is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then consider the next step. There is a part of us which is improved by healthy actions and ruined by unhealthy ones. If we spoil it by taking the advice of nonexperts, will life be worth living when this part is once ruined? The part I mean is the body. Do you accept this?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, is life worth living with a body which is worn out and ruined in health?

Crito/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ What about the part of us which is mutilated by wrong actions and benefited by right ones? Is life worth living with this part ruined? Or do we believe that this part

of us, whatever it may be, in which right and wrong operate, is of less importance than the body?

Crito/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ It is really more precious?

Crito/ Much more.

Socrates/ In that case, my dear fellow, what we ought to consider is not so much what people in general will say about us but how we stand with the expert in right and wrong, the one authority, who represents the actual truth. So in the first place your proposition is not correct when you say that we should consider popular opinion in questions of what is right and honorable and good, or the opposite. Of course one might object, All the same, the people have the power to put us to death.

Crito/ No doubt about that! Quite true, Socrates. It is a possible objection.

Socrates/ But so far as I can see, my dear fellow, the argument which we have just been through is quite unaffected by it. At the same time I should like you to consider whether we are still satisfied on this point, that the really important thing is not to live, but to live well.

Crito/ Why, yes.

Socrates/ And that to live well means the same thing as to live honorably or rightly?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then in the light of this agreement we must consider whether or not it is right for me to try to get away without an official discharge. If it turns out to be right, we must make the attempt; if not, we must let it drop. As for the considerations you raise about expense and reputation and bringing up children, I am afraid, Crito, that they represent the reflections of the ordinary public, who put people to

death, and would bring them back to life if they could, with equal indifference to reason. Our real duty, I fancy, since the argument leads that way, is to consider one question only, the one which we raised just now. Shall we be acting rightly in paying money and showing gratitude to these people who are going to rescue me, and in escaping or arranging the escape ourselves, or shall we really be acting wrongly in doing all this? If it becomes clear that such conduct is wrong, I cannot help thinking that the question whether we are sure to die, or to suffer any other ill effect for that matter, if we stand our ground and take no action, ought not to weigh with us at all in comparison with the risk of doing what is wrong.

Crito/ I agree with what you say, Socrates, but I wish you would consider what we ought to *do.*

Socrates/ Let us look at it together, my dear fellow; and if you can challenge any of my arguments, do so and I will listen to you; but if you can't, be a good fellow and stop telling me over and over again that I ought to leave this place without official permission. I am very anxious to obtain your approval before I adopt the course which I have in mind. I don't want to act against your convictions. Now give your attention to the starting point of this inquiry—I hope that you will be satisfied with my way of stating it—and try to answer my questions to the best of your judgment.

Crito/ Well, I will try.

Socrates/ Do we say that one must never willingly do wrong, or does it depend upon circumstances? Is it true, as we have often agreed before, that there is no sense in which wrongdoing is good or honorable? Or have we jettisoned all our former convictions in these last few days? Can you and I at our age, Crito, have spent all these years in serious discussions without realizing that we were no better than a

pair of children? Surely the truth is just what we have always said. Whatever the popular view is, and whether the alternative is pleasanter than the present one or even harder to bear, the fact remains that to do wrong is in every sense bad and dishonorable for the person who does it. Is that our view, or not?

Crito/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Then in no circumstances must one do wrong.

Crito/ No.

Socrates/ In that case one must not even do wrong when one is wronged, which most people regard as the natural course.

Crito/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Tell me another thing, Crito. Ought one to do injuries or not?

Crito/ Surely not, Socrates.

Socrates/ And tell me, is it right to do an injury in retaliation, as most people believe, or not?

Crito/ No, never.

Socrates/ Because, I suppose, there is no difference between injuring people and wronging them.

Crito/ Exactly.

Socrates/ So one ought not to return a wrong or an injury to any person, whatever the provocation is. Now be careful, Crito, that in making these single admissions you do not end by admitting something contrary to your real beliefs. I know that there are and always will be few people who think like this, and consequently between those who do think so and those who do not there can be no agreement on principle; they must always feel contempt when they observe one another's decisions. I want even you to consider very carefully whether you share my views and agree with me,

and whether we can proceed with our discussion from the established hypothesis that it is never right to do a wrong or return a wrong or defend oneself against injury by retaliation, or whether you dissociate yourself from any share in this view as a basis for discussion. I have held it for a long time, and still hold it, but if you have formed any other opinion, say so and tell me what it is. If, on the other hand, you stand by what we have said, listen to my next point.

Crito/ Yes, I stand by it and agree with you. Go on.

Socrates/ Well, here is my next point, or rather question. Ought one to fulfill all one's agreements, provided that they are right, or break them?

Crito/ One ought to fulfill them.

Socrates/ Then consider the logical consequence. If we leave this place without first persuading the state to let us go, are we or are we not doing an injury, and doing it in a quarter where it is least justifiable? Are we or are we not abiding by our just agreements?

Crito/ I can't answer your question, Socrates. I am not clear in my mind.

Socrates/ Look at it in this way. Suppose that while we were preparing to run away from here—or however one should describe it—the laws and constitution of Athens were to come and confront us and ask this question;

The State/ Now, Socrates, what are you proposing to do? Can you deny that by this act which you are contemplating you intend, so far as you have the power, to destroy us, the laws, and the whole state as well? Do you imagine that a city can continue to exist and not be turned upside down, if the legal judgments which are pronounced in it have no force but are nullified and destroyed by private persons?

Socrates/ How shall we answer this question, Crito, and others of the same kind? There is much that could be said, especially by a professional advocate, to protest against the invalidation of this law which enacts that judgments once pronounced shall be binding. Shall we say, Yes, I do intend to destroy the laws, because the state wronged me by passing a faulty judgment at my trial? Is this to be our answer, or what?

Crito/ What you have just said, by all means, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then what supposing the laws say;

The State/ Was there provision for this in the agreement between you and us, Socrates? Or did you undertake to abide by whatever judgments the state pronounced?

Socrates/ If we expressed surprise at such language, they would probably say;

The State/ Never mind our language, Socrates, but answer our questions; after all, you are accustomed to the method of question and answer. Come now, what charge do you bring against us and the state, that you are trying to destroy us? Did we not give you life in the first place? Was it not through us that your father married your mother and begot you? Tell us, have you any complaint against those of us laws that deal with marriage?

Socrates/ No, none, I should say.

The State/ Well, have you any against the laws which deal with children's upbringing and education, such as you had yourself? Are you not grateful to those of us laws which were instituted for this end, for requiring your father to give you a cultural and physical education?

Socrates/ Yes, I should say.

The State/ Very good. Then since you have been born and brought up and educated, can you deny, in the first place, that you were our child and servant, both you and your

ancestors? And if this is so, do you imagine that what is right for us is equally right for you, and that whatever we try to do to you, you are justified in retaliating? You did not have equality of rights with your father, or your employer—supposing that you had had one—to enable you to retaliate. You were not allowed to answer back when you were scolded or to hit back when you were beaten, or to do a great many other things of the same kind. Do you expect to have such license against your country and its laws that if we try to put you to death in the belief that it is right to do so, you on your part will try your hardest to destroy your country and us its laws in return? And will you, the true devotee of goodness, claim that you are justified in doing so? Are you so wise as to have forgotten that compared with your mother and father and all the rest of your ancestors your country is something far more precious, more venerable, more sacred, and held in greater honor both among gods and among all reasonable men? Do you not realize that you are even more bound to respect and placate the anger of your country than your father's anger? That if you cannot persuade your country you must do whatever it orders, and patiently submit to any punishment that it imposes, whether it be flogging or imprisonment? And if it leads you out to war, to be wounded or killed, you must comply, and it is right that you should do so. You must not give way or retreat or abandon your position. Both in war and in the law courts and everywhere else you must do whatever your city and your country command, or else persuade them in accordance with universal justice, but violence is a sin even against your parents, and it is a far greater sin against your country.

Socrates/ What shall we say to this, Crito—that what the laws say is true, or not?

Crito/ Yes, I think so.

The State/ Consider, then, Socrates;

Socrates/ the laws would probably continue;

The State/ whether it is also true for us to say that what you are now trying to do to us is not right. Although we have brought you into the world and reared you and educated you, and given you and all your fellow citizens a share in all the good things at our disposal, nevertheless by the very fact of granting our permission we openly proclaim this principle, that any Athenian, on attaining to manhood and seeing for himself the political organization of the state and us its laws, is permitted, if he is not satisfied with us, to take his property and go away wherever he likes. If any of you chooses to go to one of our colonies, supposing that he should not be satisfied with us and the state, or to emigrate to any other country, not one of us laws hinders or prevents him from going away wherever he likes, without any loss of property. On the other hand, if anyone of you stands his ground when he can see how we administer justice and the rest of our public organization. we hold that by so doing he has in fact undertaken to do anything that we tell him. And we maintain that anyone who disobeys is guilty of doing wrong on three separate counts : first because we are his parents, and secondly because we are his guardians, and thirdly because, after promising obedience, he is neither obeying us nor persuading us to change our decision if we are at fault in any way. And although all our orders are in the form of proposals, not of savage commands, and we give him the choice of either persuading us or doing what we say, he is actually doing neither. These are the charges, Socrates, to which we say that you will be liable if you do what you are contemplating, and you will not be the least culpable of your fellow countrymen, but one of the most guilty.

Socrates/ If I asked why, they would no doubt pounce upon me with perfect justice and point out that there are

very few people in Athens who have entered into this agreement with them as explicitly as I have. They would say;

The State/ Socrates, we have substantial evidence that you are satisfied with us and with the state. You would not have been so exceptionally reluctant to cross the borders of your country if you had not been exceptionally attached to it. You have never left the city to attend a festival or for any other purpose, except on some military expedition. You have never traveled abroad as other people do, and you have never felt the impulse to acquaint yourself with another country or constitution. You have been content with us and with our city. You have definitely chosen us, and undertaken to observe us in all your activities as a citizen, and as the crowning proof that you are satisfied with our city, you have begotten children in it. Furthermore, even at the time of your trial you could have proposed the penalty of banishment, if you had chosen to do so—that is, you could have done then with the sanction of the state what you are now trying to do without it. But whereas at that time you made a noble show of indifference if you had to die, and in fact preferred death, as you said, to banishment, now you show no respect for your earlier professions, and no regard for us, the laws, whom you are trying to destroy. You are behaving like the lowest type of menial, trying to run away in spite of the contracts and undertakings by which you agreed to live as a member of our state. Now first answer this question. Are we or are we not speaking the truth when we say that you have undertaken, in deed if not in word, to live your life as a citizen in obedience to us?

Socrates/ What are we to say to that, Crito? Are we not bound to admit it?

Crito/ We cannot help it, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is a fact, then, they would say, that;

The State/ You are breaking covenants and undertakings made with us, although you made them under no compulsion or misunderstanding, and were not compelled to decide in a limited time. You had seventy years in which you could have left the country. if you were not satisfied with us or felt that the agreements were unfair. You did not choose Sparta or Crete—your favorite models of good government—or any other Greek or foreign state. You could not have absented yourself from the city less if you had been lame or blind or decrepit in some other way. It is quite obvious that you stand by yourself above all other Athenians in your affection for this city and for us its laws. Who would care for a city without laws? And now, after all this, are you not going to stand by your agreement? Yes, you are, Socrates, if you will take our advice, and then you will at least escape being laughed at for leaving the city.

We invite you to consider what good you will do to yourself or your friends if you commit this breach of faith and stain your conscience. It is fairly obvious that the risk of being banished and either losing their citizenship or having their property confiscated will extend to your friends as well. As for yourself, if you go to one of the neighboring states, such as Thebes or Megara, which are both well governed, you will enter them as an enemy to their constitution, and all good patriots will eye you with suspicion as a destroyer of law and order. Incidentally you will confirm the opinion of the jurors who tried you that they gave a correct verdict; a destroyer of laws might very well be supposed to have a destructive influence upon young and foolish human beings. Do you intend, then, to avoid well-governed states and the higher forms of human society? And if you do, will life be worth living? Or will you approach these people and have the impudence to converse with them? What arguments will you use, Socrates? The same which you used here, that

goodness and integrity, institutions and laws, are the most precious possessions of mankind? Do you not think that Socrates and everything about him will appear in a disreputable light? You certainly ought to think so.

But perhaps you will retire from this part of the world and go to Crito's friends in Thessaly? That is the home of indiscipline and laxity, and no doubt they would enjoy hearing the amusing story of how you managed to run away from prison by arraying yourself in some costume or putting on a shepherd's smock or some other conventional runaway's disguise, and altering your personal appearance. And will no one comment on the fact that an old man of your age, probably with only a short time left to live, should dare to cling so greedily to life, at the price of violating the most stringent laws? Perhaps not, if you avoid irritating anyone. Otherwise, Socrates, you will hear a good many humiliating comments. So you will live as the toady and slave of all the populace, literally 'roistering in Thessaly,' as though you had left this country for Thessaly to attend a banquet there. And where will your discussions about goodness and uprightness be then, we should like to know? But of course you want to live for your children's sake, so that you may be able to bring them up and educate them. Indeed! By first taking them off to Thessaly and making foreigners of them, so that they may have that additional enjoyment? Or if that is not your intention, supposing that they are brought up here with you still alive, will they be better cared for and educated without you, because of course your friends will look after them? Will they look after your children if you go away to Thessaly, and not if you go away to the next world? Surely if those who profess to be your friends are worth anything, you must believe that they would care for them.

No, Socrates, be advised by us your guardians, and do not think more of your children or of your life or of anything

else than you think of what is right, so that when you enter the next world you may have all this to plead in your defense before the authorities there. It seems clear that if you do this thing, neither you nor any of your friends will be the better for it or be more upright or have a cleaner conscience here in this world, nor will it be better for you when you reach the next. As it is, you will leave this place, when you do, as the victim of a wrong done not by us, the laws, but by your fellow men. But if you leave in that dishonorable way, returning wrong for wrong and evil for evil, breaking your agreements and covenants with us, and injuring those whom you least ought to injure—yourself, your friends, your country, and us—then you will have to face our anger in your lifetime, and in that place beyond when the laws of the other world know that you have tried, so far as you could, to destroy even us their brothers, they will not receive you with a kindly welcome. Do not take Crito's advice, but follow ours.

Socrates/ That, my dear friend Crito, I do assure you, is what I seem to hear them saying, just as a mystic seems to hear the strains of music, and the sound of their arguments rings so loudly in my head that I cannot hear the other side. I warn you that, as my opinion stands at present, it will be useless to urge a different view. However, if you think that you will do any good by it, say what you like.

Crito/ No, Socrates, I have nothing to say.

Socrates/ Then give it up, Crito, and let us follow this course, since God points out the way.

Crito.

Translated by Woodhead, W.D. 1953

Persons of the Dialog

Crito, Socrates

Socrates/ Why have you come at this time of day, Crito? Is it not still very early?

Crito/ Yes, quite early.

Socrates/ About what time?

Crito/ Just before daybreak.

Socrates/ I am surprised that the prison-warder was willing to answer the door.

Crito/ He is by now well acquainted with me, Socrates, because I am a constant visitor: and besides, I have done him a small kindness.

Socrates/ Have you been here long, or have you just arrived?

Crito/ Pretty long.

Socrates/ Then why did you not wake me at once instead of sitting by me in silence?

Crito/ No indeed, Socrates, I could have wished that I myself were not so wide-awake and sorrowful. But I have long been marveling to see how sweetly you slumber: and I purposely avoided rousing you, that you might enjoy the sweetest repose. I have often before this, throughout your life, thought you happy in your disposition: but in your present misfortune I do so more than ever: so quietly and calmly do you bear it.

Socrates/ Why, it would be presumptuous on my part to be vexed, at my age, if I have to die.

Crito/ Others at your age, Socrates, are overtaken by similar misfortunes, but their age does not prevent them from resenting their present fate.

Socrates/ That is true. But why have you come so early?

Crito/ To break a piece of news, Socrates, which to you apparently will not seem cruel, but to me and to all your friends is cruel and grievous: and I myself, I think, will take it more to heart than any.

Socrates/ What is it? Has the ship arrived from Delos, at whose coming I must die?

Crito/ It has not yet arrived: but in my opinion it will arrive today, according to the reports of some men who have come from Sunium and left it there. It is clear then from what they say that it will arrive today, and you will have to end your life tomorrow, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, Crito, may all prove for the best: if such be the will of the gods, so be it. But I do not think the ship will arrive today.

Crito/ What makes you infer that?

Socrates/ I will tell you. I have to die, I believe, on the day after the ship's arrival?

Crito/ That at any rate is what the authorities say.

Socrates/ Then I do not think it will come in the course of today, but to-morrow: and I infer this from a dream that I dreamt a little while ago in the night. And perhaps your failure to wake me was not inopportune.

Crito/ And what was this dream?

Socrates/ I thought that a fair and beautiful woman in white raiment came to me and called out to me saying, 'Socrates, "two days from now you will come to fertile Phthia".'

Crito/ A strange dream, Socrates.

Socrates/ But clear enough in my opinion, Crito.

Crito/ Only too clear, it seems. But, my good Socrates, late as it is, listen to me and save yourself. For if you die, it is not one misfortune alone for me: but apart from my being deprived of such a friend as I shall never find again, many who do not know either of us well will think that, while I might have saved you if I had been willing to spend the money, I neglected the opportunity. And yet what baser reputation could a man incur than that of valuing money more than friends? For the majority of people will never be persuaded that despite our eagerness you yourself were unwilling to escape.

Socrates/ But, bless my heart, Crito, why should we trouble about what most people think? The best folk will think that things took place as they did; and they alone are worthy of consideration.

Crito/ Ah, but you see, Socrates, that we must heed the opinions of the general public also. For it is plain from your present situation that they are able to do, not the least, but almost the greatest mischief, if a man be slandered among them.

Socrates/ If only the public, Crito, were able to do the greatest of mischief! —then they might be able also to do the greatest good, and all would be well. But as it is they can do neither. They cannot make a man sensible or foolish, but what they do is a matter of indifference to them.

Crito/ Well, suppose that may be so: but tell me this, Socrates. Is it for me and your other friends that you are concerned? Are you afraid that if you leave prison blackmailers may make trouble for us by accusing us of stealing you away, and that we may be forced to lose all our property or a large sum of money or to suffer some further penalty? If that is what you fear, you may dismiss it: for

surely it is only right that we should run this and even a greater risk in saving you. But listen to me, and do not refuse me.

Socrates/ That is one concern, Crito; that, and many others.

Crito/ Then do not be afraid: there are men who for quite a small sum of money are ready to save you and convey you hence. And then again, do you not see how cheap these blackmailers are, and that we should not need much money to deal with them? And my money is at your disposal and is ample, I believe: and even if, out of regard for me, you think you should not spend my money, there are strangers here who are ready to contribute. One of them, Simmias of Thebes, has for this very purpose brought with him sufficient funds, and Cebes too is ready and quite a number of others. So, as I said, do not throw up the task of saving yourself through fear of this, and do not, as you said in the courtroom, feel any repugnance at the thought that if you escape you would not know what to do with yourself. For wherever you go, you will find many to welcome you with kindness; and if you wish to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you and give you a safe refuge, so that no one in Thessaly shall vex you.

And further, Socrates, it seems to me that what you intend to do is not even right. You are betraying yourself when you might be saved, and you are eager to see yourself suffer the very fate which your enemies would be, nay, were eager to see inflicted in their desire to destroy you. Moreover, it seems to me that you are abandoning your own children, and though you might rear and educate them, you will go away and leave them and, as far as you are concerned, it is a matter of indifference what happens to them: and what will happen, in all probability, is the usual experience of orphans in their destitution. Either you ought not to have children,

or you should endure throughout the toil of rearing and educating them: but it seems to me that you are choosing the laziest way: whereas you should make the choice of a good man and brave, you who claim that throughout your life you have cared for goodness. I myself feel ashamed both for you and for us who are your friends, and I fear that this whole affair of yours may be thought to have been so managed through some lack of courage on our part—how the case was brought into court when it need never have been, and the way in which it was conducted, and now as a climax, the crowning absurdity of the whole business, it may be thought, I fear, that we lost our opportunity through a base lack of courage: for we did not rescue you nor did you save yourself, though it was quite possible and feasible if we had been of any use whatever. Take heed then, Socrates, lest this conduct prove not only wrong, but also dishonorable to you and to us. But make your plan—or rather there is no longer any time to make it now, it must be made already: and there is but one plan. Everything must be finished by tonight: and if we still insist on waiting, it is impossible and beyond our power. But do listen to me, Socrates, and do not refuse.

Socrates/ My dear Crito, your enthusiasm is invaluable, if your intention be right. But if not, the greater it is, the more dangerous. We must consider then whether we should take such action or not. For my principle both in the past and at this moment has always been the same, to listen to nothing else in me except the rule which on reflection seems the best. And my utterances of the past I cannot now discard because this fate has befallen me, but I feel very much the same about them; and I respect and honor the same arguments as before. And if we can find nothing better to say at this moment, I can assure you I shall never surrender to you, no! even if the power of the multitude brings yet more

hobgoblins to scare us like children, visiting us with imprisonments and deaths and confiscations of property.

How then can we investigate these matters in the fairest possible way? If we take up first of all what you say about opinions. Were we right in saying on various occasions that we should pay heed to some opinions, but not to others? Or was the statement correct before I was doomed to die, whereas it has now become evident that it was mere words, uttered for the sake of talking, but in reality child's-play and nonsense? I am anxious to inquire, Crito, along with you, whether the statement will appear somewhat different to me in my present plight, or the same: and whether we shall dismiss it or accept it. It was observed, I believe, on many occasions by those who fancied they were speaking to the point that, as I said just now, we should attach high value to some of the opinions held by men, but not to others. Tell me, Crito, in heaven's name, do you not think this was a wise saying—for in all human probability you do not face the prospect of dying tomorrow, and the present situation cannot warp your judgment. Consider then: do you think it a satisfactory statement that we should respect some, but not all, of the opinions of men; and not the opinions of all men, but those of some, and not of others? What do you say? Is this a true statement?

Crito/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ We should, then, respect good opinions, not bad?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ And those of the wise are good, those of the foolish bad?

Crito/ Of course.

Socrates/ Come now, what did we formerly say about such matters as the following? When a man is in training

and is making this his present concern, does he listen to the praise and censure and opinion of any and every man, or of the one man who is a doctor or trainer?

Crito/ Of the one man alone.

Socrates/ He should fear, then, the censure and welcome the praise of that one man rather than of the many.

Crito/ That is plain.

Socrates/ And so he must act and exercise, eat and drink with the approval of the one man, the master and expert, rather than as all the others approve?

Crito/ That is so.

Socrates/ Well then: if he disobeys this one man, disregarding his opinion and approval and respecting those of the ignorant multitude, will he not suffer harm?

Crito/ Of course he will.

Socrates/ What harm? What direction will it take, and what part of the disobedient man does it affect?

Crito/ Obviously the body: that is what it ruins.

Socrates/ You are right. And in other matters too, Crito, not to go into detail, is not the same thing true? And specifically in the case of right and wrong, the shameful and the honorable, good and evil, which are now under discussion, should we follow the opinion of the many and fear it, or of the one man (if there are any expert in such matters), whom we ought to fear and respect more than all the others? Since if we refuse to follow him, we shall injure and destroy that which, we saw, is improved by right and ruined by wrong. Or do you not agree?

Crito/ I think you are right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, if by refusing to heed the expert's opinion we ruin that which is improved by health and

impaired by sickness, is life worth living when this is ruined? And this is the body, is it not?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is life worth living with a crippled, ruined body?

Crito/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then surely life is not worth living with that part of us ruined which wrong injures and right improves. Or do we consider inferior to the body that part of us, whatever it is, which is the sphere of righteousness and injustice?

Crito/ By no means.

Socrates/ But more precious?

Crito/ Far more.

Socrates/ Then, my good friend, we must not pay too much heed to what the many will say about us, but rather to the judgment of the expert in right and wrong, the one man, and to Truth herself. And so you were wrong in proposing that we should take account of the opinion of the multitude in matters of the right, the noble, the good, and their opposites. 'All very well', a man might remark, 'but the many are able to put us to death.'

Crito/ Yes, that is quite plain. You are right, Socrates, that might be said.

Socrates/ But, my strange friend, the argument we have just concluded seems to me at least as valid as ever. And consider further whether it still holds good with us or not that it is not life, but the good life, that we should esteem of the highest importance.

Crito/ It still holds good.

Socrates/ And does it hold good or not that the right, the noble, and the good are one and the same?

Crito/ It holds good.

Socrates/ In the light of these admissions then let us consider whether or not it is right for me to attempt to escape from here without the permission of the Athenians: and if it appears right, let us try: but if not, let us give it up. But as to the considerations you mention about monetary expense and reputation and the rearing of children, perhaps, Crito, these are in reality the reflections of those who lightly put to death, yes and would bring men to life again without a thought, if they could, your friends the many. We ourselves, however, since our calculations so prove, should perhaps consider nothing but what we were just now discussing—whether we shall be acting aright in paying money and thanks to those who are to spirit us away, and in escaping and forwarding the escape, or whether in truth we shall be doing wrong in so acting. And if it becomes evident that herein we are acting wrongly, we should not take any account of the death we may have to suffer by staying here and remaining quiet, or of anything else except doing wrong.

Crito/ I think what you say is right, Socrates: but consider what we are to do.

Socrates/ Let us examine things together, my good friend, and if you have any objections to offer while I speak, offer them and I will listen: but if not, then at last put an end, my dear fellow, to repeating so often the same story, that I must escape from here without the permission of the Athenians. For I esteem it most important to win your approval in acting as I do, rather than to act against your wishes. But consider now whether you are satisfied with the starting-point of our inquiry, and try to answer my question in accordance with your true convictions.

Crito/ I will try.

Socrates/ Should we in no way whatever do intentional wrong, or may we do it in some ways but not in others? Or

is wrong-doing under no circumstances good or honorable, as we have often agreed in the past? Or have all those previous arguments been upset in these few days, and have we for all these years at our time of life, Crito, been talking so seriously together without realizing that we were no better than children? Or is what we formerly said true beyond all question—whether the many assent or not, and whether we must experience still harsher measures than now, or gentler either, nevertheless is not wrong-doing an evil and a disgrace in every case to the guilty? Do we agree or not?

Crito/ We agree.

Socrates/ One should never do wrong then?

Crito/ Never.

Socrates/ Even when wronged then we should never retaliate with wrong, as the many think we should, since we must never do wrong.

Crito/ Evidently not.

Socrates/ Well, then, Crito, should we do injury to anyone or not?

Crito/ We should certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ And is it right or not to repay injury with injury, as the many think we should?

Crito/ By no means.

Socrates/ For there is no difference between injuring and wronging a man.

Crito/ You are right.

Socrates/ We should not then requite wrong with wrong or injure any man, no matter what he has done to us. And in assenting to this, Crito, mind you do not assent against your real opinion. For I know that but few people hold or will ever hold this view. There can therefore be no common ground of discussion between those who do and those who

do not believe this, but they must necessarily despise each other when they view each other's opinions. You too then must consider most seriously whether you share and partake of this opinion and whether we are to make this our starting-point in our deliberations, that it is never right to do wrong or to repay wrong with wrong or to take revenge by returning an injury when we have suffered one, or whether you dissent and reject this starting-point. I have long believed it and believe it still: if you have come to a different decision, inform and instruct me. But if you still hold to our former view, listen to what follows.

Crito/ I do hold to it, and share your view. Say on.

Socrates/ My next point then is this, or rather my next question: should we do what we have agreed with any man to do, provided it be right, or should we play him false?

Crito/ We should do it.

Socrates/ As a consequence of this then, consider whether in leaving the prison without the city's consent we are not doing an injury, and that too to those whom we least ought to injure; and whether or not we are abiding by our just agreement.

Crito/ I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand it.

Socrates/ Well, look at it in this way. Supposing, as we were on the point of flitting away or whatever you like to call it, the laws of the city and the commonwealth made their appearance and asked: 'Tell us, Socrates, what do you propose to do? By this act which you contemplate is it not your intention to destroy us, the laws, and the whole city, as far as you can? Do you think it possible for a state still to exist and not be overturned, in which verdicts that are reached have no force but are set at naught and destroyed by private citizens?' What shall we say, Crito, in answer to

these and similar questions? For much might be said, especially by an orator, when a law is threatened which prescribes the validity of court verdicts. Shall we reply to the laws: 'The state wronged us and rendered an unjust verdict?' Shall we say that, or what shall we say?

Crito/ Say that, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then what if the laws reply: 'Socrates, was that the agreement reached between you and us, or that you would abide by the decisions of the state?' And if we were astonished at their words, perhaps they would say: 'Socrates, do not marvel at what we say, but answer, since you habitually use the method of question and answer. Tell us what fault you find with us and the city, that you seek to destroy us. Did we not, in the first place, bring you to birth? Was it not through us that your father was wedded to your mother and begot you? Tell us, then, do you censure as faulty those of us concerned with marriage?'

'I do not', I should reply. 'Or those concerned with the nurture of the child, and the education, in which you shared along with others. Did not those of us assigned to this task order things aright in bidding your father educate you in music and gymnastic?'

'You did', I should answer. 'Well then, when you were born and brought up and educated, could you deny in the first place that you were our offspring and our slave—you and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you think that you enjoy equality with us and imagine that you have the right to retaliate in kind, whatever we undertake to do to you? You had no equal rights with your father, or your owner, if you had one, permitting you to repay whatever treatment you received or to render abuse for abuse or blow for blow or other such conduct: will you then have this privilege against your fatherland and the laws, so that if we try to destroy you

because we think it right, you to the utmost of your power will endeavor in turn to destroy us, the laws, and your fatherland, and will claim you are right in so acting, you who set up to be the true devotee of goodness? Have you still so little wisdom as to be unaware that your country is more precious than mother and father and all ancestors, and more sacred and majestic and held in higher esteem both by gods and by men of good sense; and that you should revere her and submit to her and conciliate her when she is angry even more than you do your father; and that you should either convert her to your view or do whatever she bids, and passively submit to whatever she commands you to endure, whether stripes or bonds, and if she leads you into battle to suffer wounds or death, you must do your duty? That is the right, and you must not yield or retreat or forsake your post, but in war and at law and everywhere you must obey the orders of the city and fatherland or convert it to your opinion of what is right: but to lay violent hands on your mother or father is impious, and much more so upon your fatherland.' What shall we say in answer to this, Crito? That the laws are speaking the truth or not?

Crito/ I think they are.

Socrates/ 4 Then consider, Socrates', the laws may say, 'whether we speak the truth in saying that what you are now attempting to do to us is not right. We gave you birth and brought you up and educated you, giving to you and to all other citizens your share in all the blessings we could: nevertheless by the liberty which we grant we proclaim to any Athenian who so wishes that, when once he has reached manhood and seen the government of the city and us, the laws, he may take what is his and go wherever he desires, if he does not like us. And no one of us stands in his way or forbids him to take his property and depart wherever he will, if he dislikes us and the city, whether he wishes to go to a

colony or to some other country. But if a man remains here when he has seen the way in which we administer justice and carry on the general government of the state, we assert that he has already by his very action agreed to do our bidding, and the man who disobeys is guilty, we say, of threefold wrong, disobedience to us, his begetters, disobedience to us who nurtured him, and a breach of his covenant to obey us, since he neither obeys us nor wins us over to his view if in any way we are wrong, though we offer him his choice and do not harshly order him to do our bidding. Nay, though we allow him two alternatives, to convert us to his view or to do as we order, he does neither. You too, Socrates, we claim, will be subject to these charges, if you are bent upon doing what you intend, and that too not least, but most of all Athenians.' And if I should ask why, they would, I think, reproach me with justice, insisting that I have made this covenant with them more firmly than most Athenians. 'Socrates', they would say, 'we have abundant proof that you liked us and the city. You would not have remained at home far more than all other Athenians, if you had not been exceptionally fond of us: but you never left the city to see the world, except for one visit to the Isthmus: you never travelled anywhere else except on military service, you made no other journey, as other men do, and felt no desire to know any other city or other laws, but were satisfied with us and our city: so decisively did you choose us and agree to abide by us: and in particular you begot your children here, in proof that you liked the city. Moreover, if you had wished, you might at your trial itself have proposed the penalty of exile, and what you are now attempting without, you might have done with, the city's consent. But at that time you prided yourself on not being vexed at having to die, and said yourself that you preferred death to exile. And now you are not ashamed to face these words, and pay no respect to us,

the laws, whom you are trying to destroy: but you are behaving like the meanest of slaves, attempting to run away in defiance of the covenants and agreements by which you bound yourself to live as a citizen. First of all then, answer whether we are speaking the truth or not in claiming that you had consented by deed and not by word alone to live as a citizen in submission to us.' What are we to answer to this, Crito? Must we not acknowledge it?

Crito/ We must, Socrates.

Socrates/ 'You are then transgressing your covenants and agreements with us', they will say, 'though none compelled you to consent nor were you deceived or forced to come to a quick decision, but you had seventy years in which you might have left us if you did not like us or thought that these agreements were unfair. But you did not prefer Lacedaemon or Crete, though you are always saying they are well governed, or any other state, Greek or barbarian, but you departed from this city less than the halt and the blind and other cripples: so much more than any other Athenian were you pleased with the city, yes, and with us, the laws, too: for who could take pleasure in a city apart from its laws? And will you now refuse to abide by your covenants? Not if you take our advice, Socrates: then you will not make a laughing-stock of yourself by leaving the city.

'For consider, what good will you do yourself or your friends by thus transgressing or committing any such offence? It must be pretty evident that your friends too will be in danger of being exiled and deprived of their country or of losing their property: and as for you, first of all if you go to one of the nearest cities, to Thebes or Megara, which are both well governed, you will arrive, Socrates, as an enemy to their government, and all who care for their own cities will look askance at you, considering you one who destroys the laws: and you will confirm the opinion of the judges, who will

consider their verdict justified. For a corrupter of the laws must seem more than likely to be a corrupter of young and thoughtless people. Well then, will you avoid well-governed cities and well-disciplined men? But will life be worth living if you do? Or will you consort with them and have the effrontery to repeat—what kind of discourse, Socrates, the kind you engaged in here—that goodness and righteousness are man's most precious possessions, and lawful institutions and laws? And do you not think that this will seem shameful behavior on the part of Socrates? Surely you must. But will you depart from these places and go to visit Crito's friends in Thessaly? For there you will find abundant disorder and lawlessness, and perhaps they would enjoy hearing the ludicrous conditions under which you ran away from prison, wearing some disguise—a peasant's cloak or other such dress as runaways are wont to wear—and altering your appearance. But will no one say that you, an old man with probably not much longer to live, stooped to so greedy a passion for life that you transgressed the most sacred laws? Perhaps not, if you do not vex anybody: but if you do, Socrates, you will hear much abuse that will fill you with shame. You will pass your life as a slave obsequious to one and all, and what else will you do but feast in Thessaly, as though you had journeyed thither for the sake of a dinner? And pray what will become of those discourses about justice and goodness in general?

'But it is for your children's sake that you must live on, that you may rear and educate them? What? Will you take them to Thessaly to rear and educate them and make exiles of them, that they may have that too to thank you for? Or, if you will not do that, will they be brought up and educated better here in Athens if you are alive, even though you are not with them? Because your friends will look after them? Will those friends look after them if you depart to Thessaly,

but refuse to do so if you depart this life? If those who claim to be your friends are good for anything, you may be sure they will not refuse.

'Then listen to us, Socrates, who nurtured you, and do not hold children or life or anything else of more account than the right; that when you arrive in the other world you may offer all this in your defense to the judges there. For neither in this world does such conduct seem good or righteous or holy for you or for any of your friends, nor will it seem good in you when you have gone to the other world. As it is, if you depart, you are departing the victim of injustice wrought not by us, but by men. But if you make your escape after having so basely repaid injustice with injustice and evil with evil, breaking your agreements and covenants with us and injuring those whom you least should injure, yourself and your friends, your country and ourselves, we shall be angry with you as long as you live, and there our brothers, the laws in the other world, will give you no kindly welcome: for they will know that, to the best of your power, you attempted to destroy us. But do not let Crito persuade you to do what he says, but listen to us.'

This, my dear friend Crito, I assure you, is what I fancy I hear, even as Corybantic worshippers fancy in their frenzy that they hear the music of the flutes: and the sound of these words rings in my ears and makes it impossible for me to hear any others. And you may be certain, according at least to my present opinion, that if you speak in opposition to these words, you will plead in vain. However, if you think that you will achieve any success, say on.

Crito/ No, Socrates, I can say no more.

Socrates/ Then let things be, Crito: let us act as I say, since this is the path along which the god directs us.

Phaedo.

or

The Immortality Of The Soul.

Translated by Henry Cary.

Persons of the Dialog

First Echecrates, Phædo.

Then Socrates, Apollodorus, Cebes, Simmias, and Crito.

Echecrates/ Were you personally present, Phædo, with Socrates on that day when he drank the poison in prison? or did you hear an account of it from someone else?

Phaedo/ I was there myself, Echecrates.

Echecrates/ What then did he say before his death? and how did he die? for I should be glad to hear: for scarcely any citizen of Phlius ever visits Athens now, nor has any stranger for a long time come from thence, who was able to give us a clear account of the particulars, except that he died from drinking poison; but he was unable to tell us anything more.

Phaedo/ And did you not hear about the trial how it went off?

Echecrates/ Yes; someone told me this; and I wondered, that as it took place so long ago, he appears to have died long afterwards. What was the reason of this, Phædo?

Phaedo/ An accidental circumstance happened in his favor, Echecrates: for the poop of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos, chanced to be crowned on the day before the trial.

Echecrates/ But what is this ship?

Phaedo/ It is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus formerly conveyed the fourteen boys and girls to Crete, and saved both them and himself. They, therefore,

made a vow to Apollo on that occasion, as it is said, that if they were saved they would every year dispatch a solemn embassy to Delos; which from that time to the present, they send yearly to the god. When they begin the preparations for this solemn embassy, they have a law that the city shall be purified during this period, and that no public execution shall take place until the ship has reached Delos, and returned to Athens: and this occasionally takes a long time, when the winds happen to impede their passage. The commencement of the embassy is when the priest of Apollo has crowned the poop of the ship. And this was done, as I said, on the day before the trial: on this account Socrates had a long interval in prison between the trial and his death.

Echecrates/ And what, Phaedo, were the circumstances of his death? what was said and done? who of his friends were with him? or would not the magistrates allow them to be present, but did he die destitute of friends?

Phaedo/ By no means; but some, indeed several, were present.

Echecrates/ Take the trouble, then, to relate to me all the particulars as clearly as you can, unless you have any pressing business.

Phaedo/ I am at leisure, and will endeavor to give you a full account: for to call Socrates to mind, whether speaking myself or listening to someone else, is always most delightful to me.

Echecrates/ And indeed, Phaedo, you have others to listen to you who are of the same mind. However, endeavor to relate everything as accurately as you can.

Phaedo/ I was indeed wonderfully affected by being present, for I was not impressed with a feeling of pity, like one present at the death of a friend; for the man appeared to me to be happy, Echecrates, both from his manner and

discourse, so fearlessly and nobly did he meet his death: so much so, that it occurred to me, that in going to Hades he was not going without a divine destiny, but that when he arrived there he would be happy, if anyone ever was. For this reason I was entirely uninfluenced by any feeling of pity, as would seem likely to be the case with one present on so mournful an occasion; nor was I affected by pleasure from being engaged in philosophical discussions, as was our custom; for our conversation was of that kind. But an altogether unaccountable feeling possessed me, a kind of unusual mixture compounded of pleasure and pain together, when I considered that he was immediately about to die. And all of us who were present were affected in much the same manner, at one time laughing, at another weeping, one of us especially, Apollodorus, for you know the man and his manner.

Echecrates/ How should I not?

Phaedo/ He, then, was entirely overcome by these emotions; and I too was troubled, as well as the others.

Echecrates/ But who were present, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ Of his fellow-countrymen, this Apollodorus was present, and Critobulus, and his father Crito, moreover Hermogenes, Epigenes, Æschines, and Antisthenes; Ctesippus the Pæanian, Menexenus, and some other of his countrymen were also there: Plato I think was sick.

Echecrates/ Were any strangers present?

Phaedo/ Yes: Simmias the Theban, Cebes, and Phædondes: and from Megara, Euclides and Terpsion.

Echecrates/ But what! were not Aristippus and Cleombrotus present?

Phaedo/ No, for they were said to be at Ægina.

Echecrates/ Was anyone else there?

Phaedo/ I think that these were nearly all who were present.

Echecrates/ Well now: what do you say was the subject of conversation?

Phaedo/ I will endeavor to relate the whole to you from the beginning. On the preceding days I and the others were constantly in the habit of visiting Socrates, meeting early in the morning at the court-house where the trial took place, for it was near the prison. Here then we waited every day till the prison was opened, conversing with each other; for it was not opened very early, but, as soon as it was opened we went in to Socrates, and usually spent the day with him. On that occasion however, we met earlier than usual; for on the preceding day, when we left the prison in the evening, we heard that the ship had arrived from Delos. We therefore urged each other to come as early as possible to the accustomed place; accordingly we came, and the porter, who used to admit us, coming out, told us to wait, and not enter until he called us. "For," he said, "the Eleven are now freeing Socrates from his bonds, and announcing to him that he must die today." But in no long time he returned, and bade us enter.

When we entered, we found Socrates just freed from his bonds, and Xantippe, you know her, holding his little boy and sitting by him. As soon as Xantippe saw us, she wept aloud and said such things as women usually do on such occasions, as

Xanthippe/ "Socrates, your friends will now converse with you for the last time and you with them."

Phaedo/ But Socrates, looking towards Crito, said;

Socrates/ "Crito, let someone take her home."

Phaedo/ Upon which some of Crito's attendants led her away, wailing and beating herself.

But Socrates sitting up in bed, drew up his leg, and rubbed it with his hand, and as he rubbed it, said;

Socrates/ "What an unaccountable thing, my friends, that seems to be, which men call pleasure; and how wonderfully is it related towards that which appears to be its contrary, pain; in that they will not both be present to a man at the same time, yet, if anyone pursues and attains the one, he is almost always compelled to receive the other, as if they were both united together from one head.

"And it seems to me, that if Æsop had observed this he would have made a fable from it, how the deity, wishing to reconcile these warring principles, when he could not do so, united their heads together, and from hence whomsoever the one visits the other attends immediately after; as appears to be the case with me, since I suffered pain in my leg before from the chain, but now pleasure seems to have succeeded."

Phaedo/ Hereupon Cebes, interrupting him, said;

Cebes/ "By Zeus, Socrates, you have done well in reminding me: with respect to the poems which you made, by putting into meter those Fables of Æsop and the hymn to Apollo, several other persons asked me, and especially Evenus recently, with what design you made them after you came here, whereas before you had never made any. If, therefore, you care at all that I should be able to answer Evenus, when he asks me again, for I am sure he will do so, tell me what I must say to him."

Socrates/ "Tell him the truth then, Cebes, that I did not make them from a wish to compete with him, or his poems, for I knew that this would be no easy matter; but that I might discover the meaning of certain dreams, and discharge my conscience, if this should happen to be the music which they have often ordered me to apply myself to. For they were to the following purport: often in my past life the same dream

visited me, appearing at different times in different forms, yet always saying the same thing, 'Socrates' it said, 'apply yourself to and practice music.' And I formerly supposed that it exhorted and encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in, as those who cheer on racers, so that the dream encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in, namely, to apply myself to music, since philosophy is the highest music, and I was devoted to it. But now since my trial took place, and the festival of the god retarded my death, it appeared to me that, if by chance the dream so frequently enjoined me to apply myself to popular music, I ought not to disobey it but do so, for that it would be safer for me not to depart hence before I had discharged my conscience by making some poems in obedience to the dream. Thus, then, I first of all composed a hymn to the god whose festival was present, and after the god, considering that a poet, if he means to be a poet, ought to make fables and not discourses, and knowing that I was not skilled in making fables, I therefore put into verse those fables of Æsop, which were at hand, and were known to me, and which first occurred to me.

Tell this then to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and, if he is wise, to follow me as soon as he can. But I depart, as it seems, to-day; for so the Athenians order."

Simmias/ "What is this, Socrates, which you exhort Evenus to do? for I often meet with him; and from what I know of him, I am pretty certain that he will not at all be willing to comply with your advice."

Socrates/ "What then, is not Evenus a philosopher?"

Simmias/ "To me he seems to be so."

Socrates/ "Then he will be willing and so will everyone who worthily engages in this study; perhaps indeed he will

not commit violence on himself, for that they say is not allowable."

Phaedo/ And as he said this he let down his leg from the bed on the ground, and in this posture continued during the remainder of the discussion.

Cebes/ "What do you mean, Socrates, by saying that it is not lawful to commit violence on one's-self, but that a philosopher should be willing to follow one who is dying?"

Socrates/ "What, Cebes, have not you and Simmias, who have conversed familiarly with Philolaus on this subject, heard?"

Cebes/ "Nothing very clearly, Socrates."

Socrates/ "I however speak only from hearsay; what then I have heard I have no scruple in telling. And perhaps it is most becoming for one who is about to travel there, to enquire and speculate about the journey thither, what kind we think it is. What else can one do in the interval before sunset?"

Cebes/ "Why then, Socrates, do they say that it is not allowable to kill one's-self? for I, as you asked just now, have heard both Philolaus, when he lived with us, and several others say that it was not right to do this; but I never heard anything clear upon the subject from anyone."

Socrates/ "Then you should consider it attentively, for perhaps you may hear: probably however, it will appear wonderful to you, if this alone of all other things is an universal truth, and it never happens to a man, as is the case in all other things, that at sometimes and to some persons only it is better to die than to live; yet that these men for whom it is better to die—this probably will appear wonderful to you—may not without impiety do this good to themselves, but must await another benefactor."

Phaedo/ Then Cebes, gently smiling, said, speaking in his own dialect;

Cebes/ “Jove be witness.”

Socrates/ “And indeed, it would appear to be unreasonable, yet still perhaps it has some reason on its side. The maxim indeed given on this subject in the mystical doctrines, that we men are in a kind of prison, and that we ought not to free ourselves from it and escape, appears to me difficult to be understood, and not easy to penetrate. This however appears to me, Cebes, to be well said, that the gods take care of us, and that we men are one of their possessions. Does it not seem so to you?”

Cebes/ “It does.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, if one of your slaves were to kill himself, without your having intimated that you wished him to die, should you not be angry with him, and should you not punish him if you could?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Perhaps then in this point of view, it is not unreasonable to assert, that a man ought not to kill himself before the deity lays him under a necessity of doing so, such as that now laid on me.”

Cebes/ “This, indeed, appears to be probable. But what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers should be very willing to die, appears to be an absurdity, if what we said just now is agreeable to reason, that it is God who takes care of us, and that we are his property. For that the wisest men should not be grieved at leaving that service in which they govern them who are the best of all masters, namely the gods, is not consistent with reason. For surely he cannot think that he will take better care of himself when he has become free: but a foolish man might perhaps think thus, that he should fly from his master, and would not reflect that

he ought not to fly from a good one, but should cling to him as much as possible, therefore he would fly against all reason: but a man of sense would desire to be constantly with one better than himself. Thus, Socrates, the contrary of what you just now said is likely to be the case; for it becomes the wise to be grieved at dying, but the foolish to rejoice."

Phaedo/ Socrates, on hearing this, appeared to me to be pleased with the pertinacity of Cebes, and looking towards us, said;

Socrates/ "Cebes, you see, always searches out arguments, and is not at all willing to admit at once anything one has said."

Simmias/ "But indeed, Socrates, Cebes appears to me, now, to say something to the purpose: for with what design should men really wise fly from masters who are better than themselves, and so readily leave them? And Cebes appears to me to direct his argument against you, because you so easily endure to abandon both us, and those good rulers, as you yourself confess, the gods."

Socrates/ "You speak justly, for I think you mean that I ought to make my defense to this charge, as if I were in a court of justice."

Simmias/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Come then, I will endeavor to defend myself more successfully before you than before the judges. For, Simmias and Cebes, if I did not think that I should go first of all amongst other deities who are both wise and good, and, next, amongst men who have departed this life, better than any here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death: but now be assured, I hope to go amongst good men, though I would not positively assert it; that, however, I shall go amongst gods who are perfectly good masters, be assured I can positively assert this, if I can anything of the kind. So that,

on this account, I am not so much troubled, but I entertain a good hope that something awaits those who die, and that, as was said long since, it will be far better for the good than the evil."

Simmias/ "What then, Socrates, would you go away keeping this persuasion to yourself, or would you impart it to us? For this good appears to me to be also common to us; and at the same time it will be an apology for you, if you can persuade us to believe what you say."

Socrates/ "I will endeavor to do so. But first let us attend to Crito here, and see what it is he seems to have for some time wished to say."

Crito/ "What else, Socrates, but what he who is to give you the poison told me some time ago, that I should tell you to speak as little as possible? For he says that men become too much heated by speaking, and that nothing of this kind ought to interfere with the poison, and that otherwise, those who did so were sometimes compelled to drink two or three times."

Socrates/ "Let him alone, and let him attend to his own business, and prepare to give it me twice, or, if occasion requires, even thrice."

Crito/ "I was almost certain what you would say, but he has been some time pestering me."

Socrates/ "Never mind him."

"But now I wish to render an account to you, my judges, of the reason why a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy, when he is about to die, appears to me, on good grounds, to have confidence, and to entertain a firm hope that the greatest good will befall him in the other world, when he has departed this life. How then this comes to pass, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavor to explain.

“For as many as rightly apply themselves to philosophy seem to have left all others in ignorance, that they aim at nothing else than to die and be dead. If this then is true, it would surely be absurd to be anxious about nothing else than this during their whole life, but, when it arrives, to be grieved at what they have been long anxious about and aimed at.”

Simmias/ “By Zeus, Socrates, though I am not now at all inclined to smile, you have made me do so; for I think that the multitude, if they heard this, would think it was very well said in reference to philosophers, and that our countrymen particularly would agree with you, that true philosophers do desire death, and that they are by no means ignorant that they deserve to suffer it.”

Socrates/ “And indeed, Simmias, they would speak the truth, except in asserting that they are not ignorant; for they are ignorant of the sense in which true philosophers desire to die, and in what sense they deserve death, and what kind of death. But, let us take leave of them, and speak to one another. Do we think that death is anything?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Is it anything else than the separation of the soul from the body? and is not this to die, for the body to be apart by itself separated from the soul, and for the soul to subsist apart by itself separated from the body? Is death anything else than this?”

Simmias/ “No, but this.”

Socrates/ “Consider then, my good friend, whether you are of the same opinion as me; for thus I think we shall understand better the subject we are considering. Does it appear to you to be becoming in a philosopher to be anxious about pleasures, as they are called, such as meats and drinks?”

Simmias/ “By no means, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “But what? about the pleasures of love?”

Simmias/ “Not at all.”

Socrates/ “What then? does such a man appear to you to think other bodily indulgences of value? for instance, does he seem to you to value or despise the possession of magnificent garments and sandals, and other ornaments of the body, except so far as necessity compels him to use them?”

Simmias/ “The true philosopher, appears to me to despise them.”

Socrates/ “Does not then, the whole employment of such a man appear to you to be, not about the body, but to separate himself from it as much as possible, and be occupied about his soul?”

Simmias/ “It does.”

Socrates/ “First of all then, in such matters, does not the philosopher, above all other men, evidently free his soul as much as he can from communion with the body?”

Simmias/ “It appears so.”

Socrates/ “And it appears, Simmias, to the generality of men, that he who takes no pleasure in such things, and who does not use them, does not deserve to live; but that he nearly approaches to death who cares nothing for the pleasures that subsist through the body.”

Simmias/ “You speak very truly.”

Socrates/ “But what with respect to the acquisition of wisdom, is the body an impediment or not, if anyone takes it with him as a partner in the search? What I mean is this: Do sight and hearing convey any truth to men, or are they such as the poets constantly sing, who say that we neither hear nor see anything with accuracy? If however these bodily

senses are neither accurate nor clear, much less can the others be so: for they are all far inferior to these. Do they not seem so to you?"

Simmias/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "When then, does the soul light on the truth? for, when it attempts to consider anything in conjunction with the body, it is plain that it is then led astray by it."

Simmias/ "You say truly."

Socrates/ "Must it not then be by reasoning, if at all, that any of the things that really are become known to it?"

Simmias/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "And surely the soul then reasons best when none of these things disturb it, neither hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor pleasure of any kind, but it retires as much as possible within itself, taking leave of the body, and, as far as it can, not communicating or being in contact with it, it aims at the discovery of that which is."

Simmias/ "Such is the case."

Socrates/ "Does not then the soul of the philosopher, in these cases, despise the body, and flee from it, and seek to retire within itself?

Simmias/ "It appears so."

Socrates/ "But what as to such things as these, Simmias? Do we say that justice itself is something or nothing?"

Simmias/ "We say it is something, by Zeus."

Socrates/ "And that beauty and goodness are something?"

Simmias/ "How not?"

Socrates/ "Now then have you ever seen anything of this kind with your eyes?"

Simmias/ "By no means."

Socrates/ “Did you ever lay hold of them by any other bodily sense? but I speak generally, as of magnitude, health, strength, and, in a word, of the essence of everything, that is to say, what each is. Is then the exact truth of these perceived by means of the body, or is it thus, whoever amongst us habituates himself to reflect most deeply and accurately on each several thing about which he is considering, he will make the nearest approach to the knowledge of it?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Would not he, then, do this with the utmost purity, who should in the highest degree approach each subject by means of the mere mental faculties, neither employing the sight in conjunction with the reflective faculty, nor introducing any other sense together with reasoning; but who, using pure reflection by itself, should attempt to search out each essence purely by itself, freed as much as possible from the eyes and ears, and, in a word, from the whole body, as disturbing the soul, and not suffering it to acquire truth and wisdom, when it is in communion with it. Is not he the person, Simmias, if anyone can, who will arrive at the knowledge of that which is?”

Simmias/ “You speak with wonderful truth, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Wherefore, it necessarily follows from all this, that some such opinion as this should be entertained by genuine philosophers, so that they should speak among themselves as follows: ‘A by-path, as it were, seems to lead us on in our researches undertaken by reason, because as long as we are encumbered with the body, and our soul is contaminated with such an evil, we can never fully attain to what we desire; and this, we say, is truth. For the body subjects us to innumerable hindrances on account of its necessary support, and moreover if any diseases befall us,

they impede us in our search after that which is; and it fills us with longings, desires, fears, all kinds of fancies, and a multitude of absurdities, so that, as it is said in real truth, by reason of the body it is never possible for us to make any advances in wisdom. “For nothing else but the body and its desires occasion wars, seditions, and contests; for all wars amongst us arise on account of our desire to acquire wealth: and we are compelled to acquire wealth on account of the body, being enslaved to its service; and consequently on all these accounts we are hindered in the pursuit of philosophy. But the worst of all is, that if it leaves us any leisure, and we apply ourselves to the consideration of any subject, it constantly obtrudes itself in the midst of our researches, and occasions trouble and disturbance, and confounds us so that we are not able by reason of it to discern the truth. It has then in reality been demonstrated to us, that if we are ever to know anything purely, we must be separated from the body, and contemplate the things themselves by the mere soul. And then, as it seems, we shall obtain that which we desire, and which we profess ourselves to be lovers of, wisdom, when we are dead, as reason shows, but not while we are alive. For if it is not possible to know anything purely in conjunction with the body, one of these two things must follow, either that we can never acquire knowledge, or only after we are dead; for then the soul will subsist apart by itself, separate from the body, but not before. And while we live, we shall thus, as it seems, approach nearest to knowledge, if we hold no intercourse or communion at all with the body, except what absolute necessity requires, nor suffer ourselves to be polluted by its nature, but purify ourselves from it, until God himself shall release us. And thus being pure, and freed from the folly of body, we shall in all likelihood be with others like ourselves, and shall of ourselves know the whole real essence, and that probably is

truth; for it is not allowable for the impure to attain to the pure. Such things, I think, Simmias, all true lovers of wisdom must both think and say to one another. Does it not seem so to you?"

Simmias/ "Most assuredly, Socrates."

Socrates/ "If this then, is true, my friend, there is great hope for one who arrives where I am going, there, if anywhere, to acquire that in perfection for the sake of which we have taken so much pains during our past life; so that the journey now appointed me is set out upon with good hope, and will be so by any other man who thinks that his mind has been as it were purified."

Simmias/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "But does not purification consist in this, as was said in a former part of our discourse, in separating as much as possible the soul from the body, and in accustoming it to gather and collect itself by itself on all sides apart from the body, and to dwell, as far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, delivered as it were from the shackles of the body?"

Simmias/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Is this then called death, this deliverance and separation of the soul from the body?"

Simmias/ "Assuredly."

Socrates/ "But, as we affirmed, those who pursue philosophy rightly, are especially and alone desirous to deliver it, and this is the very study of philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul from the body, is it not?"

Simmias/ "It appears so."

Socrates/ "Then, as I said at first, would it not be ridiculous for a man who has endeavored throughout his life

to live as near as possible to death, then, when death arrives, to grieve? would not this be ridiculous?"

Simmias/ "How should it not?"

Socrates/ "In reality then, Simmias, those who pursue philosophy rightly study to die; and to them of all men death is least formidable. Judge from this. Since they altogether hate the body and desire to keep the soul by itself, would it not be irrational if, when this comes to pass, they should be afraid and grieve, and not be glad to go to that place, where on their arrival they may hope to obtain that which they longed for throughout life; but they longed for wisdom; and to be freed from association with that which they hated? Have many of their own accord wished to descend into Hades, on account of human objects of affection, their wives and sons, induced by this very hope of their seeing and being with those whom they have loved; and shall one who really loves wisdom, and firmly cherishes this very hope, that he shall nowhere else attain it in a manner worthy of the name, except in Hades, be grieved at dying, and not gladly go there? We must think that he would gladly go, my friend, if he be in truth a philosopher; for he will be firmly persuaded of this, that he will nowhere else but there attain wisdom in its purity? and if this be so, would it not be very irrational, as I just now said, if such a man were to be afraid of death?"

Simmias/ "Very much so, by Zeus."

Socrates/ "Would not this then, be a sufficient proof to you, with respect to a man whom you should see grieved when about to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of his body? and this same person is probably a lover of riches and a lover of honor, one or both of these."

Simmias/ "It certainly is as you say."

Socrates/ "Does not then, that which is called fortitude, Simmias, eminently belong to philosophers?"

Simmias/ “By all means.”

Socrates/ “And temperance also, which even the multitude call temperance, and which consists in not being carried away by the passions, but in holding them in contempt, and keeping them in subjection, does not this belong to those only who most despise the body, and live in the study of philosophy?”

Simmias/ “Necessarily so.”

Socrates/ “For, if you will consider the fortitude and temperance of others, they will appear to you to be absurd.”

Simmias/ “How so, Socrates?”

Socrates/ “Do you know, that all others consider death among the great evils?”

Simmias/ “They do indeed.”

Socrates/ “Then do the brave amongst them endure death, when they do endure it, through dread of greater evils?”

Simmias/ “It is so.”

Socrates/ “All men, therefore, except philosophers, are brave through being afraid and fear; though it is absurd that anyone should be brave through fear and cowardice.”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “But what, are not those amongst them who keep their passions in subjection, affected in the same way? and are they not temperate through a kind of intemperance? and although we may say, perhaps, that this is impossible, nevertheless the manner in which they are affected with respect to this silly temperance resembles this; for, fearing to be deprived of other pleasures, and desiring them, they abstain from some, being mastered by others. And though they call intemperance the being governed by pleasures, yet it happens to them that, by being mastered by some

pleasures, they master others; and this is similar to what was just now said, that in a certain manner they become temperate through intemperance."

Simmias/ "So it seems."

Socrates/ "My dear Simmias, consider that this is not a right exchange for virtue, to barter pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, fear for fear, and the greater for the lesser, like pieces of money; but that that alone is the right coin, for which we ought to barter all these things, wisdom; and for this, and with this everything is in reality bought and sold, fortitude, temperance, and justice, and, in a word, true virtue subsists with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears, and everything else of the kind, are present or absent; but when separated from wisdom, and changed one for another, consider whether such virtue is not a mere outline, and in reality servile, possessing neither soundness nor truth; but the really true virtue is a purification from all such things, and temperance, justice, fortitude, and wisdom itself, are a kind of initiatory purification. And those who instituted the mysteries for us appear to have been by no means contemptible, but in reality to have intimated long since that whoever shall arrive in Hades unexpiated and uninitiated shall lie in mud, but he that arrives there purified and initiated, shall dwell with the gods. 'For there are,' say those who preside at the mysteries, 'many wand-bearers, but few inspired.' These last, in my opinion, are no other than those who have pursued philosophy rightly: that I might be of their number, I have, to the utmost of my ability, left no means untried, but have endeavored to the utmost of my power. But whether I have endeavored rightly and have in any respect succeeded, on arriving there I shall know clearly, if it please God, very shortly, as it appears to me.

"Such then, Simmias and Cebes, is the defense I make, for that I, on good grounds, do not repine or grieve at leaving

you and my masters here, being persuaded that there, no less than here, I shall meet with good masters and friends. But to the multitude this is incredible. If however I have succeeded better with you in my defense than I did with the Athenian judges, it is well."

Phaedo/ When Socrates had thus spoken, Cebes, taking up the discussion said;

Cebes/ "Socrates, all the rest appears to me to be said rightly, but what you have said respecting the soul will occasion much incredulity in many from the apprehension that, when it is separated from the body, it no longer exists anywhere, but is destroyed and perishes on the very day in which a man dies, and that immediately it is separated and goes out from the body, it is dispersed and vanishes like breath or smoke, and is no longer anywhere; since, if it remained anywhere united in itself, and freed from those evils which you have just now enumerated, there would be an abundant and good hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But this probably needs no little persuasion and proof, that the soul of a man who dies, exists, and possesses activity and intelligence."

Socrates/ "You say truly, Cebes, but what shall we do? Are you willing that we should converse on these points, whether such is probably the case or not?"

Cebes/ "Indeed, I should gladly hear your opinion on these matters."

Socrates/ "I do not think, that anyone who should now hear us, even though he were a comic poet, would say that I am talking idly, or discoursing on subjects that do not concern me. If you please, then, we will examine into it. Let us consider it in this point of view, whether the souls of men who are dead exist in Hades, or not. This is an ancient saying, which we now call to mind, that souls departing

hence exist there, and return hither again, and are produced from the dead. And if this is so, that the living are produced again from the dead, can there be any other consequence than that our souls are there? for surely they could not be produced again if they did not exist; and this would be a sufficient proof that these things are so, if it should in reality be evident that the living are produced from no other source than the dead. But, if this is not the case, there will be need of other arguments."

Cebes/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "You must not, then, consider this only with respect to men, if you wish to ascertain it with greater certainty, but also with respect to all animals and plants, and, in a word, with respect to everything that is subject to generation, let us see whether they are not all so produced, no otherwise than contraries from contraries, wherever they have any such quality, as for instance the honorable is contrary to the base, and the just to the unjust, and so with ten thousand other things. Let us consider this, then, whether it is necessary that all things which have a contrary should be produced from nothing else than their contrary. As for instance, when anything becomes greater is it not necessary that, from being previously smaller, it afterwards became greater?"

Cebes/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "And if it becomes smaller, will it not, from being previously greater, afterwards become smaller?"

Cebes/ "It is so."

Socrates/ "And from stronger, weaker? and from slower, swifter?"

Cebes/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ “What then? if anything becomes worse, must it not become so from better? and if more just, from more unjust?”

Cebes/ “How should it not?”

Socrates/ “We have then, sufficiently determined this, that all things are thus produced, contraries from contraries?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “What next? is there also something of this kind in them, for instance, between all two contraries a mutual twofold production, from one to the other, and from that other back again? for between a greater thing and a smaller there is increase and decrease, and do we not accordingly call the one to increase, the other to decrease?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And must not to be separated and commingled, to grow cold and to grow warm, and everything in the same manner, even though sometimes we have not names to designate them, yet in fact be everywhere thus circumstanced of necessity, as to be produced from each other, and be subject to a reciprocal generation?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “What then? Has life any contrary, as waking has its contrary, sleeping?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “What?”

Cebes/ “Death.”

Socrates/ “Are not these, then, produced from each other, since they are contraries, and are not the modes by which they are produced twofold, intervening between these two?”

Cebes/ “How should it be otherwise?”

Socrates/ “I then, will describe to you one pair of the contraries which I have just now mentioned, both what it is and its mode of production; and do you describe to me the other. I say that one is to sleep, the other to awake; and from sleeping awaking is produced, and from awaking sleeping, and that the modes of their production are the one to fall asleep, the other to be roused. Have I sufficiently explained this to you or not?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Do you then, describe to me, in the same manner, with respect to life and death? Do you not say that life is contrary to death?”

Cebes/ “I do.”

Socrates/ “And that they are produced from each other?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “What then, is produced from life?”

Cebes/ “Death.”

Socrates/ “What, then, is produced from death?

Cebes/ “I must needs confess, that life is.”

Socrates/ “From the dead, then, O Cebes, living things and living men, are produced.”

Cebes/ “It appears so.”

Socrates/ “Our souls, therefore, exist in Hades.”

Cebes/ “So it seems.”

Socrates/ “With respect, then, to their mode of production, is not one of them very clear? for to die surely is clear? is it not?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “What then shall we do? Shall we not find a corresponding contrary mode of production, or will nature

be defective in this? Or must we discover a contrary mode of production to dying?"

Cebes/ "By all means."

Socrates/ "What is this?"

Cebes/ "To revive."

Socrates/ "Therefore, if there is such a thing as to revive, will not this reviving be a mode of production from the dead to the living?"

Cebes/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Thus, then, we have agreed, that the living are produced from the dead, no less than the dead from the living: but, this being the case, there appears to me sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they are again produced."

Cebes/ "It appears to me, Socrates, that this must necessarily follow from what has been admitted."

Socrates/ "See now, O Cebes, that we have not agreed on these things improperly, as it appears to me: for if one class of things were not constantly given back in the place of another, revolving as it were in a circle, but generation were direct from one thing alone into its opposite, and did not turn round again to the other, or retrace its course, do you know that all things would at length have the same form, be in the same state, and cease to be produced?"

Cebes/ "How say you?"

Socrates/ "It is by no means difficult, to understand what I mean; if, for instance, there should be such a thing as falling asleep, but no reciprocal waking again produced from a state of sleep, you know that at length all things would show the fable of Endymion to be a jest, and it would be thought nothing at all of, because everything else would be in the same state as him, namely, asleep. And if all things

were mingled together, but never separated, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be verified, 'all things would be together.' Likewise, my dear Cebes, if all things that partake of life should die, and after they are dead should remain in this state of death, and not revive again, would it not necessarily follow that at length all things should be dead, and nothing alive? for if living beings are produced from other things, and living beings die, what could prevent their being all absorbed in death?"

Cebes/ "Nothing whatever, I think, Socrates, but you appear to me to speak the exact truth."

Socrates/ "For, Cebes, as it seems to me, such undoubtedly is the case, and we have not admitted these things under a delusion, but it is in reality true that there is a reviving again, that the living are produced from the dead, that the souls of the dead exist, and that the condition of the good is better, and of the evil, worse."

Cebes/ "And indeed, according to that doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently in the habit of advancing, if it is true, that our learning is nothing else than reminiscence, according to this it is surely necessary that we must at some former time have learned what we now remember. But this is impossible, unless our soul existed somewhere before it came into this human form; so that from hence also the soul appears to be something immortal."

Simmias/ "But, Cebes, what proofs are there of these things? remind me of them, for I do not very well remember them at present."

Cebes/ "It is proved, by one argument, and that a most beautiful one, that men, when questioned, if one questions them properly, of themselves describe all things as they are: however, if they had not innate knowledge and right reason, they would never be able to do this. Moreover, if one leads

them to diagrams, or anything else of the kind, it is then most clearly apparent that this is the case."

Socrates/ "But if you are not persuaded in this way, Simmias, see if you will agree with us on considering the matter thus. For do you doubt how that which is called learning is reminiscence?"

Simmias/ "I do not doubt, but I require this very thing of which we are speaking, to be reminded; and indeed, from what Cebes has begun to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded; nevertheless, however, I should like to hear now how you would attempt to prove it."

Socrates/ "I do it thus, we admit surely that if anyone be reminded of anything, he must needs have known that thing at some time or other before."

Simmias/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Do we then admit this also, that when knowledge comes in a certain manner it is reminiscence? But the manner I mean is this; if anyone, upon seeing or hearing, or perceiving through the medium of any other sense, some particular thing, should not only know that, but also form an idea of something else, of which the knowledge is not the same, but different, should we not justly say, that he remembered that of which he received the idea?"

Simmias/ "How mean you?"

Socrates/ "For instance; the knowledge of a man is different from that of a lyre."

Simmias/ "How not?"

Socrates/ "Do you not know, then, that lovers when they see a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which their favorite is accustomed to use, are thus affected; they both recognize the lyre, and receive in their minds the form of the person to whom the lyre belonged? This is reminiscence: just as

anyone, seeing Simmias, is often reminded of Cebes, and so in an infinite number of similar instances."

Simmias/ "An infinite number indeed, by Zeus."

Socrates/ "Is not then, something of this sort a kind of reminiscence? especially when one is thus affected with respect to things which, from lapse of time, and not thinking of them, one has now forgotten?"

Simmias/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "But what? Does it happen, that when one sees a painted horse or a painted lyre, one is reminded of a man, and that when one sees a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Cebes!"

Simmias/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "And does it not also happen, that on seeing a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Simmias himself?"

Simmias/ "It does indeed."

Socrates/ "Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence arises partly from things like, and partly from things unlike?"

Simmias/ "It does."

Socrates/ "But when one is reminded by things like, is it not necessary that one should be thus further affected, so as to perceive whether, as regards likeness, this falls short or not of the thing of which one has been reminded?"

Simmias/ "It is necessary."

Socrates/ "Consider, then, if the case is thus. Do we allow that there is such a thing as equality? I do not mean of one log with another, nor one stone with another, nor anything else of this kind, but something altogether different from all these, abstract equality; do we allow that there is any such thing or not?"

Simmias/ "By Zeus, we most assuredly do allow it."

Socrates/ “And do we know what it is itself?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we have just now mentioned, and that from seeing logs, or stones, or other things of the kind, equal, we have from these formed an idea of that which is different from these? for does it not appear to you to be different? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones that are equal, and logs sometimes that are the same, appear at one time equal, and at another not?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “But what? does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or equality inequality?”

Simmias/ “Never, Socrates, at any time.”

Socrates/ “These equal things, then, and abstract equality, are not the same?”

Simmias/ “By no means, Socrates, as it appears.”

Socrates/ “However, from these equal things, which are different from that abstract equality, have you not formed your idea and derived your knowledge of it?”

Simmias/ “You speak most truly.”

Socrates/ “Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “But it makes no difference. When, therefore, on seeing one thing, you form, from the sight of it, the notion of another, whether like or unlike, this, must necessarily be reminiscence.”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “What, then, as to this? Are we affected in any such way with regard to logs and the equal things we have just now spoken of? and do they appear to us to be equal in

the same manner as abstract equality itself is, or do they fall short in some degree, or not at all, of being such as equality itself is?"

Simmias/ "They fall far short."

Socrates/ "Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular thing, perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being like something else that exists, but falls short of it, and cannot become such as that is, but is inferior to it, do we admit that he who perceives this must necessarily have had a previous knowledge of that which he says it resembles, though imperfectly?"

Simmias/ "It is necessary."

Socrates/ "What then? are we affected in some such way, or not, with respect to things equal and abstract equality itself?"

Simmias/ "Assuredly."

Socrates/ "It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract equality before the time when on first seeing equal things, we perceived that they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in doing so."

Simmias/ "Such is the case."

Socrates/ "Moreover, we admit this too, that we perceived this, and could not possibly perceive it by any other means than the sight, or touch, or some other of the senses: for I say the same of them all."

Simmias/ "For they are the same, Socrates, so far as our argument is concerned."

Socrates/ "However, we must perceive by means of the senses, that all things which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality, and yet fall short of it: or how shall we say it is?"

Simmias/ "Even so."

Socrates/ “Before, then, we began to see, and hear, and use our other senses, we must have had a knowledge of equality itself, what it is, if we were to refer to it those equal things that come under the senses, and observe that all such things aim at resembling that, but fall far short of it.”

Simmias/ “This necessarily follows, Socrates, from what has been already said.”

Socrates/ “But did we not, as soon as we were born, see and hear, and possess our other senses?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “But, we have said, before we possessed these, we must have had a knowledge of abstract equality?”

Simmias/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ ‘We must have had it, then, as it seems, before we were born.”

Simmias/ “It seems so.”

Socrates/ “If, therefore, having this before we were born, we were born possessing it, we knew both before we were born, and as soon as we were born, not only the equal and the greater and smaller, but all things of the kind; for our present discussion is not more respecting equality than the beautiful itself, the good, the just, and the holy, and in one word, respecting everything which we mark with the seal of existence, both in the questions we ask, and the answers we give. So that we must necessarily have had a knowledge of all these before we were born.”

Simmias/ “Such is the case.”

Socrates/ “And if, having once had it, we did not constantly forget it, we should always be born with this knowledge, and should always retain it through life: for to know is this, when one has got a knowledge of anything, to

retain and not lose it; for, do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the loss of knowledge?"

Simmias/ "Assuredly, Socrates."

Socrates/ "But if, having had it before we were born, we lose it at our birth, and afterwards, through exercising the senses about these things, we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed, would not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own knowledge? and in saying that this is to remember should we not say rightly?"

Simmias/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "For this appeared to be possible, for one having perceived anything, either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, to form an idea of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and with which this was connected by being unlike or like. So that, as I said, one of these two things must follow, either we are all born with this knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we say learn afterwards do nothing else but remember, and this learning will be reminiscence,"

Simmias/ "Such certainly is the case, Socrates."

Socrates/ "Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that we are born with knowledge, or that we afterwards remember what we had formerly known?"

Simmias/ "At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose?"

Socrates/ "But what? are you able to choose in this case, and what do you think about it? Can a man, who possesses knowledge, give a reason for the things that he knows, or not?"

Simmias/ "He needs must be able to do so, Socrates."

Socrates/ "And do all men appear to you, to be able to give a reason for the things of which we have just now been speaking?"

Simmias/ “I wish they could, but I am much more afraid, that at this time to-morrow, there will no longer be anyone able to do this properly.”

Socrates/ “Do not all men then, Simmias, seem to you to know these things?”

Simmias/ “By no means.”

Socrates/ “Do they remember, then, what they once learned?”

Simmias/ “Necessarily so.”

Socrates/ “When did our souls receive this knowledge? not surely, since we were born into the world.”

Simmias/ “Assuredly not.”

Socrates/ “Before then.”

Simmias/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Our souls therefore, Simmias, existed before they were in a human form, separate from bodies, and possessed intelligence.”

Simmias/ “Unless, Socrates, we receive this knowledge at our birth, for this period yet remains.”

Socrates/ “Be it so, my friend. But at what other time do we lose it? for we are not born with it, as we have just now admitted. Do we lose it then at the very time in which we receive it? Or can you mention any other time?”

Simmias/ “By no means, Socrates: I was not aware that I was saying nothing to the purpose.”

Socrates/ “Does the case then stand thus with us, Simmias. If those things which we are continually talking about really exist, the beautiful, the good, and every such essence, and to this we refer all things that come under the senses, as finding it to have a prior existence, and to be our own, and if we compare these things to it, it necessarily follows, that as these exist, so likewise our soul exists even

before we are born; but if these do not exist this discussion will have been undertaken in vain. Is it not so? and is there not an equal necessity, both that these things should exist, and our souls also before we are born, and if not the former neither the latter?"

Simmias/ "Most assuredly, Socrates, there appears to me to be the same necessity, and the argument admirably tends to prove that our souls exist before we are born; just as that essence does which you have now mentioned. For I hold nothing so clear to me as this, that all such things most certainly exist, as the beautiful, the good, and all the rest that you just now spoke of; and as far as I am concerned the case is sufficiently demonstrated."

Socrates/ "But how does it appear to Cebes, for it is necessary to persuade Cebes too."

Simmias/ "He is sufficiently persuaded, I think. Although he is the most pertinacious of men in distrusting arguments. Yet I think he is sufficiently persuaded of this, that our soul existed before we were born. But whether when we are dead, it will still exist, does not appear to me to have been demonstrated, Socrates, but that popular doubt, which Cebes just now mentioned, still stands in our way, whether, when a man dies, the soul is not dispersed, and this is the end of its existence. For what hinders its being born, and formed from some other source, and existing before it came into a human body, and yet when it has come, and is separated from this body, its then also dying itself, and being destroyed?"

Cebes/ "You say well, Simmias; for it appears that only one half of what is necessary has been demonstrated, namely, that our soul existed before we were born: but it is necessary to demonstrate further, that when we are dead, it

will exist no less than before we were born, if the demonstration is to be made complete."

Socrates/ "This has been even now demonstrated, Simmias and Cebes, if you will only connect this last argument with that which we before assented to, that everything living is produced from that which is dead. For if the soul exists before, and it is necessary for it when it enters into life, and is born, to be produced from nothing else than death, and from being dead, how is it not necessary for it also to exist after death, since it must needs be produced again? What you require then, has been already demonstrated. However, both you and Simmias appear to me as if you wished to sift this argument more thoroughly, and to be afraid like children, lest on the soul's departure from the body the winds should blow it away and disperse it, especially if one should happen to die not in a calm, but in a violent storm."

Phaedo/ Upon this Cebes smiling said;

Cebes/ "Endeavor to teach us better, Socrates, as if we were afraid, or rather not as if we were afraid, though perhaps there is some boy within us, who has such a dread. Let us then endeavor to persuade him not to be afraid of death, as of hobgoblins."

Socrates/ "But you must charm him every day, until you have quieted his fears."

Cebes/ "But whence, Socrates, can we procure a skillful charmer for such a case, now that you are about to leave us?"

Socrates/ "Greece is wide, Cebes. And in it surely there are skillful men, there are also many barbarous nations, all of which you should search through, seeking such a charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, as there is nothing on which you can more seasonably spend your money. You

should also seek for him among yourselves; for perhaps you could not easily find any more competent than yourselves to do this."

Cebes/ "This shall be done, but, if it is agreeable to you, let us return to the point from whence we digressed."

Socrates/ "It will be agreeable to me, for how should it not?"

Cebes/ "You say well."

Socrates/ "We ought then, to ask ourselves some such question as this, to what kind of thing it appertains to be thus affected, namely to be dispersed, and for what we ought to fear, lest it should be so affected, and for what not. And after this, we should consider which of the two the soul is; and in the result should either be confident or fearful for our soul."

Cebes/ "You speak truly."

Socrates/ "Does it not, then, appertain to that which is formed by composition, and is naturally compounded, to be thus affected, to be dissolved in the same manner as that in which it was compounded; and if there is anything not compounded, does it not appertain to this alone, if to anything, not to be thus affected?"

Cebes/ "It appears to me to be so."

Socrates/ "Is it not most probable then that things which are always the same, and in the same state, are uncompounded, but that things which are constantly changing, and are never in the same state, are compounded?"

Cebes/ "To me it appears so."

Socrates/ "Let us return then, to the subjects on which we before discoursed. Whether is essence itself, of which we gave this account that it exists, both in our questions and

answers, always the same, or does it sometimes change? Does equality itself, the beautiful itself, and each several thing which is, ever undergo any change, however small? Or does each of them which exists, being an unmixed essence by itself, continue always the same, and in the same state, and never undergo any variation at all under any circumstances?"

Cebes/ "They must of necessity continue the same and in the same state, Socrates."

Socrates/ "But what shall we say of the many beautiful things, such as men, horses, garments, or other things of the kind, whether equal, or beautiful, or of all things synonymous with them? Do they continue the same, or, quite contrary to the former, are they never at any time, so to say, the same, either with respect to themselves or one another?"

Cebes/ "These on the other hand, never continue the same."

Socrates/ "These then you can touch, or see, or perceive by the other senses; but those that continue the same, you cannot apprehend in any other way than by the exercise of thought; for such things are invisible, and are not seen?"

Cebes/ "You say what is strictly true."

Socrates/ "We may assume then, if you please, that there are two species of things, the one visible, the other invisible?"

Cebes/ "We may."

Socrates/ "And the invisible always continuing the same, but the visible never the same?"

Cebes/ "This too, we may assume."

Socrates/ "Come then, is there anything else belonging to us, than on the one hand body, and on the other soul?"

Cebes/ "Nothing else."

Socrates/ “To which species, then, shall we say the body is more like, and more nearly allied?”

Cebes/ “It is clear to everyone, that it is to the visible.”

Socrates/ “But what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?”

Cebes/ “It is not visible to men, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “But we speak of things which are visible or not so to the nature of men: or to some other nature, think you?”

Cebes/ “To that of men.”

Socrates/ “What then shall we say of the soul, that it is visible, or not visible?”

Cebes/ “Not visible.”

Socrates/ “Is it then invisible?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “The soul then is more like the invisible than the body, and the body, the visible?”

Cebes/ “It must needs be so, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “And did we not some time since say this too, that the soul, when it employs the body to examine anything, either by means of the sight or hearing, or any other sense, for to examine anything by means of the body is to do so by the senses, is then drawn by the body to things that never continue the same, and wanders and is confused, and reels as if intoxicated through coming into contact with things of this kind?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “But when it examines anything by itself, does it approach that which is pure, eternal, immortal, and unchangeable, and, as being allied to it, continue constantly with it, so long as it subsists by itself, and has the power, and does it cease from its wandering, and constantly continue the same with respect to those things, through

coming into contact with things of this kind? and is this affection of the soul called wisdom?"

Cebes/ "You speak, in every respect, well and truly, Socrates."

Socrates/ "To which species of the two, then, both from what was before, and now said, does the soul appear to you to be more like and more nearly allied?"

Cebes/ "Everyone, I think, would allow, Socrates, even the dullest person, from this method of reasoning that the soul is in every respect more like that which continues constantly the same, than that which does not so."

Socrates/ "But what as to the body?"

Cebes/ "It is more like the other."

Socrates/ "Consider it also thus, that, when soul and body are together, nature enjoins the latter to be subservient and obey, the former to rule and exercise dominion. And in this way, which of the two appears to you to be like the divine, and which the mortal? Does it not appear to you to be natural that the divine should rule and command, but the mortal obey and be subservient?"

Cebes/ "To me it does so."

Socrates/ "Which then, does the soul resemble?"

Cebes/ "It is clear, Socrates, that the soul resembles the divine, but the body, the mortal."

Socrates/ "Consider then, Cebes, whether, from all that has been said, these conclusions follow, that the soul is most like that which is divine, immortal, intelligent, uniform, indissoluble, and which always continues in the same state, but that the body on the other hand is most like that which is human, mortal, unintelligent, multiform, dissoluble, and which never continues in the same state. Can we say

anything against this, my dear Cebes, to show that it is not so?"

Cebes/ "We cannot."

Socrates/ "What then? Since these things are so, does it not appertain to the body to be quickly dissolved, but to the soul, on the contrary, to be altogether indissoluble, or nearly so?"

Cebes/ "How not?"

Socrates/ "You perceive, however, that when a man dies, the visible part of him, the body, which is exposed to sight, and which we call a corpse, to which it appertains to be dissolved, to fall asunder and be dispersed, does not immediately undergo any of these affections, but remains for a considerable time, and especially so if anyone should die with his body in full vigor, and at a corresponding age; for when the body has collapsed and been embalmed, as those that are embalmed in Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incredible length of time; and some parts of the body, even though it does decay, such as the bones and nerves, and everything of that kind, are nevertheless, as one may say, immortal. Is it not so?"

Cebes/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "Can the soul, then, which is invisible, and which goes to another place like itself, excellent, pure, and invisible, and therefore truly called the invisible world, to the presence of a good and wise God, whither if God will, my soul also must shortly go, can this soul of ours, I ask, being such and of such a nature, when separated from the body be immediately dispersed and destroyed, as most men assert? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias. But the case is much rather thus; if it is separated in a pure state, taking nothing of the body with it, as not having willingly communicated with it in the present life, but having

shunned it and gathered itself within itself, as constantly studying this; but this is nothing else than to pursue philosophy aright, and in reality to study how to die easily; would not this be to study how to die?"

Cebes/ "Most assuredly."

Socrates/ "Does not the soul, then, when in this state, depart to that which resembles itself, the invisible, the divine, immortal, and wise? and on its arrival there, is it not its lot to be happy, free from error, ignorance, fears, wild passions, and all the other evils to which human nature is subject, and, as is said of the initiated, does it not in truth pass the rest of its time with the gods? Must we affirm that it is so, Cebes, or otherwise?"

Cebes/ "So, by Zeus."

Socrates/ "But, I think, if it departs from the body polluted and impure, as having constantly held communion with the body, and having served and loved it, and been bewitched by it, through desires and pleasures, so as to think that there is nothing real except what is corporeal, which one can touch and see, and drink and eat, and employ for sensual purposes; but what is dark and invisible to the eyes, which is intellectual and apprehended by philosophy, having been accustomed to hate, fear, and shun this, do you think that a soul thus affected can depart from the body by itself, and uncontaminated?"

Cebes/ "By no means whatever."

Socrates/ "But I think it will be impressed with that which is corporeal, which the intercourse and communion of the body, through constant association and great attention, have made natural to it."

Cebes/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "We must think, my dear Cebes, that this is ponderous and heavy, earthly and visible, by possessing

which such a soul is weighed down, and drawn again into the visible world through dread of the invisible and of Hades, wandering, as it is said, amongst monuments and tombs, about which, indeed, certain shadowy phantoms of souls have been seen, being such images as those souls produced which have not departed pure from the body, but which partake of the visible, on which account also they are visible."

Cebes/ "That is probable, Socrates."

Socrates/ "Probable indeed, Cebes; and not that these are the souls of the good, but of the wicked, which are compelled to wander about such places, paying the penalty of their former conduct, which was evil; and they wander about so long, until, through the desire of the corporeal nature that accompanies them, they are again united to a body; and they are united, as is probable, to animals having the same habits as those they have given themselves up to during life."

Cebes/ "But what do you say these are, Socrates?"

Socrates/ "For instance, those who have given themselves up to gluttony, wantonness, and drinking, and have put no restraint on themselves, will probably be clothed in the form of asses and brutes of that kind. Do you not think so?"

Cebes/ "You say what is very probable."

Socrates/ "And that such as have set great value on injustice, tyranny, and rapine, will be clothed in the species of wolves, hawks, and kites? Where else can we say such souls go?"

Cebes/ "Without doubt, into such as these."

Socrates/ "Is it not then evident, as to the rest, whither each will go, according to the resemblances of their several pursuits?"

Cebes/ "It is evident, how not?"

Socrates/ “Of these, then, Are not they the most happy, and do they not go to the best place, who have practiced that social and civilized virtue, which they call temperance and justice, and which is produced from habit and exercise, without philosophy and reflection?”

Cebes/ “In what respect are these the most happy?”

Socrates/ “Because it is probable that these should again migrate into a corresponding civilized and peaceable kind of animals, such as bees perhaps, or wasps, or ants, or even into the same human species again, and from these become moderate men.”

Cebes/ “It is probable.”

Socrates/ “But it is not lawful for anyone, who has not studied philosophy and departed this life perfectly pure, to pass into the rank of gods, but only for the true lover of wisdom. And on this account, my friends Simmias and Cebes, those who philosophize rightly abstain from all bodily desires, and persevere in doing so, and do not give themselves up to them, not fearing the loss of property and poverty, as the generality of men and the lovers of wealth; nor again dreading disgrace and ignominy like those who are lovers of power and honor, do they then abstain from them.”

Cebes/ “For it would not become them to do so, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “It would not, by Zeus. Wherefore, Cebes, they who care at all for their soul, and do not spend their lives in the culture of their bodies, despising all these, proceed not in the same way with them, as being ignorant whither they are going, but being convinced that they ought not to act contrary to philosophy, but in accordance with the freedom and purification she affords, they give themselves up to her direction, following her wherever she leads.”

Cebes/ “How, Socrates?”

Socrates/ “I will tell you. The lovers of wisdom know, that philosophy receiving their soul plainly bound and glued to the body, and compelled to view things through this, as through a prison, and not directly by herself, and sunk in utter ignorance, and perceiving too the strength of the prison, that it arises from desire, so that he that is bound as much as possible assists in binding himself. I say, then, the lovers of wisdom know that philosophy, receiving their soul in this state, gently exhorts it, and endeavors to free it, by showing that the view of things by means of the eyes is full of deception, “as also is that through the ears and the other senses, persuading an abandonment of these so far as it is not absolutely necessary to use them, and advising the soul to be collected and concentrated within itself, and to believe nothing else but herself, with respect to what she herself understands of things that have a real subsistence, and to consider nothing true which she views through the medium of others, and which differ under different aspects; for that a thing of this kind is sensible and visible, but that what she herself perceives is intelligible and invisible. The soul of the true philosopher, therefore, thinking that she ought not to oppose this deliverance, accordingly abstains as much as possible from pleasures and desires, griefs and fears, considering that when anyone is exceedingly delighted or alarmed, grieved or influenced by desire, he does not merely suffer such evil from these things as one might suppose, such as either being sick or wasting his property, through indulging his desires; but that which is the greatest evil, and the worst of all, this he suffers and is not conscious of it.”

Cebes/ “But what is this evil, Socrates?”

Socrates/ “That the soul of every man is compelled to be either vehemently delighted or grieved about some particular thing, and at the same time to consider that the thing about which it is thus strongly affected is most real and most true,

though it is not so. But these are chiefly visible objects; are they not?"

Cebes/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "In this state of affection, then, is not the soul especially shackled by the body?"

Cebes/ "How so?"

Socrates/ "Because each pleasure and pain, having a nail as it were, nails the soul to the body, and fastens it to it, and causes it to become corporeal, deeming those things to be true whatever the body asserts to be so. For, in consequence of its forming the same opinions with the body, and delighting in the same things, it is compelled, I think, to possess similar manners, and to be similarly nourished, so that it can never pass into Hades in a pure state, but must ever depart polluted by the body, and so quickly falls again into another body, and grows up as if it were sown, and consequently is deprived of all association with that which is divine, and pure, and uniform."

Cebes/ "You speak most truly, Socrates."

Socrates/ "For these reasons, therefore, Cebes, those who are truly lovers of wisdom are moderate and resolute, and not for the reasons that most people say. Do you think as they do?"

Cebes/ "Assuredly not."

Socrates/ "No, truly. But the soul of a philosopher would reason thus, and would not think that philosophy ought to set it free, and that when it is freed it should give itself up again to pleasures and pains, to bind it down again, and make her work void, weaving a kind of Penelope's web the reverse way. On the contrary, effecting a calm of the passions, and following the guidance of reason, and being always intent on this, contemplating that which is true and divine, and not subject to opinion, and being nourished by

it, it thinks that it ought to live in this manner as long as it does live, and that when it dies it shall go to a kindred essence, and one like itself, and shall be freed from human evils. From such a regimen as this the soul has no occasion to fear, Simmias and Cebes, while it strictly attends to these things, lest being torn to pieces at its departure from the body it should be blown about and dissipated by the winds, and no longer have an existence anywhere."

Phaedo/ When Socrates had thus spoken, a long silence ensued; and Socrates himself was pondering upon what had been said, as he appeared, and so did most of us: but Cebes and Simmias were conversing a little while with each other. At length Socrates perceiving them, said;

Socrates/ "What think you of what has been said? does it appear to you to have been proved sufficiently? for many doubts and objections still remain if anyone will examine them thoroughly. If, then, you are considering some other subject, I have nothing to say; but if you are doubting about this, do not hesitate both yourselves to speak and express your opinion, if it appears to you in any respect that it might have been argued better, and to call me in again to your assistance, if you think you can be at all benefited by my help."

Simmias/ "Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the truth: for some time each of us, being in doubt, has been urging and exhorting the other to question you, from a desire to hear our doubts solved, but we were afraid of giving you trouble, lest it should be disagreeable to you in your present circumstances."

Phaedo/ But he, upon hearing this, gently smiled, and said;

Socrates/ "Bless me, Simmias; with difficulty indeed, could I persuade other men that I do not consider my present

condition a calamity, since I am not able to persuade even you; but you are afraid lest I should be more morose now than during the former part of my life. And, as it seems, I appear to you to be inferior to swans with respect to divination, who, when they perceive that they must needs die, though they have been used to sing before, sing then more than ever, rejoicing that they are about to depart to that deity whose servants they are. But men, through their own fear of death, belie the swans too, and say that, they lamenting their death, sing their last song through grief, and they do not consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold, or is afflicted with any other pain, not even the nightingale, or swallow, or the hoopoes, which they say sing lamenting through grief. But neither do these birds appear to me to sing through sorrow, nor yet do swans; but in my opinion, belonging to Apollo, they are prophetic, and foreseeing the blessings of Hades, they sing and rejoice on that day more excellently than at any preceding time. But I too consider myself to be a fellow-servant of the swans, and sacred to the same god, and that I have received the power of divination from our common master no less than they, and that I do not depart from this life with less spirits than they. On this account, therefore, it is right that you should both speak and ask whatever you please, as long as the Athenian Eleven permit."

Simmias/ "You say well, and both I will tell you what are my doubts, and he in turn how far he does not assent to what has been said. For it appears to me, Socrates, probably as it does to you with respect to these matters, that to know them clearly in the present life is either impossible, or very difficult: on the other hand, however, not to test what has been said of them in every possible way, so as not to desist until on examining them in every point of view, one has exhausted every effort, is the part of a very weak man. For

we ought with respect to these things, either to learn from others how they stand, or to discover them for one's-self, or, if both these are impossible, then, taking the best of human reasonings and that which is the most difficult to be confuted, and embarking on this, as one who risks himself on a raft, so to sail through life, unless one could be carried more safely, and with less risk, on a surer conveyance or some divine reason. I, therefore, shall not now be ashamed to question you, since you bid me do so, nor shall I blame myself hereafter, for not having now told you what I think; for to me, Socrates, when I consider the matter, both with myself and with Cebes, what has been said does not appear to have been sufficiently proved."

Socrates/ "Perhaps, my friend, you have the truth on your side; but tell me in what respect it was not sufficiently proved."

Simmias/ "In this, because anyone might use the same argument with respect to harmony, and a lyre, and its chords, that harmony is something invisible and incorporeal, very beautiful and divine, in a well-modulated lyre: but the lyre and its chords are bodies, and of corporeal form, compounded and earthly, and akin to that which is mortal. When anyone, then, has either broken the lyre, or cut or burst the chords, he might maintain from the same reasoning as yours, that it is necessary the harmony should still exist and not be destroyed; for there could be no possibility that the lyre should subsist any longer when the chords are burst, and that the chords which are of a mortal nature should subsist, but that the harmony, which is of the same nature and akin to that which is divine and immortal, should become extinct, and perish before that which is mortal; but he might say that the harmony must needs subsist somewhere, and that the wood and chords must decay, before it can undergo any change. For I think,

Socrates, that you yourself have arrived at this conclusion, that we consider the soul to be pretty much of this kind, namely, that our body being compacted and held together by heat and cold, dryness and moisture, and other such qualities, our soul is the fusion and harmony of these, when they are well and duly combined with each other. If then, the soul is a kind of harmony, it is evident that when our body is unduly relaxed or strained through diseases and other maladies, the soul must of necessity immediately perish, although it is most divine, just as other harmonies which subsist in sounds or in the various works of artisans, but that the remains of the body of each person last for a long time, till they are either burnt or decayed. Consider then what we shall say to this reasoning, if anyone should maintain that the soul being a fusion of the several qualities in the body, perishes first in that which is called death."

Phaedo/ Socrates, therefore, looking steadfastly at us, as he was generally accustomed to do, and smiling, said;

Simmias/ "Simmias indeed speaks justly. If then, anyone of you is more prompt than I am, why does he not answer? for he seems to have handled my argument not badly. It appears to me, however, that before we make our reply we should first hear from Cebes, what he too objects to our argument, in order that, sometime intervening, we may consider what we shall say, and then when we have heard them, we may give up to them, if they appear to speak agreeably to truth, or if not, we may then uphold our own argument. Come then, Cebes, say what it is that disturbs you, so as to cause your unbelief."

Cebes/ "I will tell you; the argument seems to me to rest where it was, and to be liable to the same objection that we mentioned before. For, that our soul existed even before it came into this present form, I do not deny has been very elegantly, and, if it is not too much to say so, very fully

demonstrated: but that it still exists anywhere when we are dead, does not appear to me to have been clearly proved; nor do I give in to the objection of Simmias, that the soul is not stronger and more durable than the body, for it appears to me to excel very far all things of this kind. 'Why then,' reason might say, 'do you still disbelieve? for, since you see that when a man dies his weaker part still exists, does it not appear to you to be necessary that the more durable part should still be preserved during this period?' Consider then, whether I say anything to the purpose in reply to this. For I too, as well as Simmias, as it seems, stand in need of an illustration: for the argument appears to me to have been put thus, as if anyone should advance this argument about an aged weaver who had died, that the man has not yet perished, but perhaps still exists somewhere; and as a proof, should exhibit the garment which he wore and had woven himself, that it is entire and has not perished; and if anyone should disbelieve him he would ask, whether of the two is the more durable, the species of a man or of a garment, that is constantly in use and being worn; then should anyone answer, that the species of man is much more durable, he would think it demonstrated, that beyond all question the man is preserved, since that which is less durable has not perished. But I do not think, Simmias, that this is the case, and do you consider what I say, for everyone must think that he who argues thus argues foolishly. For this weaver, having worn and woven many such garments, perished after almost all of them, but before the last I suppose, and yet it does not on this account follow any the more that a man is inferior to or weaker than a garment. And I think the soul might admit this same illustration with respect to the body, and he who should say the same things concerning them would appear to me to speak correctly, that the soul is more durable, but the body weaker and less durable; for he would say that each

soul wears out many bodies, especially if it lives many years; for, if the body wastes and is dissolved while the man still lives, but the soul continually weaves anew what is worn out, it must necessarily follow that when the soul is dissolved it must then have on its last garment, and perish before this alone; but when the soul has perished the body would show the weakness of its nature, and quickly rot and vanish. So that it is not by any means right to place implicit reliance on this argument, and to believe that when we die our soul still exists somewhere. For, if anyone should concede to him who admits even more than you do, and should grant to him that not only did our soul exist before we were born, but that even when we die nothing hinders the souls of some of us from still existing, and continuing to exist hereafter, and from being often born, and dying again; for so strong is it by nature, that it can hold out against repeated births; if he granted this, he would not yet concede that it does not exhaust itself in its many births, and at length perish altogether in some one of the deaths. But he would say that no one knows this death and dissolution of the body, which brings destruction to the soul; for it is impossible for anyone of us to perceive it. If however, this be the case, it follows that everyone who is confident at the approach of death is foolishly confident, unless he is able to prove that the soul is absolutely immortal and imperishable: otherwise it necessarily follows that he who is about to die must be alarmed for his soul, lest in its present disunion from the body it should entirely perish."

Phaedo/ Upon this, all of us who had heard them speaking were disagreeably affected, as we afterwards mentioned to each other; because, after we had been fully persuaded by the former arguments, they seemed to disturb us anew, and to cast us into a distrust, not only of the arguments already adduced, but of such as might

afterwards be urged, for fear lest we should not be fit judges of anything, or lest the things themselves should be incredible.

Echecrates/ By the gods, Phædo, I can readily excuse you: for, while I am now hearing you, it occurs to me to ask myself some such question as this, What arguments can we any longer believe? since the argument which Socrates advanced, and which was exceedingly credible, has now fallen into discredit. For this argument, that our soul is a kind of harmony, produces a wonderful impression on me, both now and always, and in being mentioned, it has reminded me, as it were, that I too was formerly of the same opinion: so that I stand in need again, as if from the very beginning, of some other argument which may persuade me that the soul of one who dies does not die with the body. Tell me therefore, by Zeus, how Socrates followed up the argument; and whether he too, as you confess was the case with yourselves, seemed disconcerted at all, or not, but calmly maintained his position; and maintained it sufficiently, or defectively. Relate everything to me as accurately as you can.

Phaedo/ Indeed, Echecrates, though I have often admired Socrates, I was never more delighted than at being with him on that occasion. That he should be able to say something is perhaps not at all surprising; but I especially admired this in him, first of all that he listened to the argument of the young men so sweetly, affably, and approvingly; in the next place, that he so quickly perceived how we were affected by their arguments; and lastly, that he cured us so well and recalled us, when we were put to flight as it were and vanquished, and encouraged us to accompany him, and consider the argument with him.

Echecrates/ How was that?

Phaedo/ I will tell you: I happened to be sitting at his right hand, near the bed, upon a low seat, but he himself sat much higher than I. Stroking my head, then, and laying hold of the hair that hung on my neck, for he used, often, to play with my hairs;

Socrates/ "To-morrow, perhaps, Phædo, you will cut off these beautiful locks?"

Phaedo/ "It seems likely, Socrates."

Socrates/ "Not if you are persuaded by me."

Phaedo/ "Why so?"

Socrates/ "To-day, both I ought to cut off mine and you yours, if our argument must die, and we are unable to revive it. And I, if I were you, and the arguments were to escape me, would take an oath, as the Argives do, not to suffer my hair to grow until I had renewed the contest, and vanquished the arguments of Simmias and Cebes."

Phaedo/ "But, even Hercules himself is said not to have been a match for two."

Socrates/ "Call upon me, then, as your Iolaus, while it is yet day."

Phaedo/ "I do call on you, then, not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but as Iolaus upon Hercules."

Socrates/ "It will make no difference. But first of all we must beware lest we meet with some mischance."

Phaedo/ "What?"

Socrates/ "That we do not become, haters of reasoning as some become haters of men; for no greater evil can happen to anyone than to hate reasoning. But hatred of reasoning and hatred of mankind both spring from the same source. For hatred of mankind is produced in us from having placed too great reliance on someone without sufficient knowledge of him, and from having considered him to be a man

altogether true, sincere, and faithful, and then after a little while finding him depraved and unfaithful, and after him another. And when a man has often experienced this, and especially from those whom he considered his most intimate and best friends, at length, having frequently stumbled, he hates all men, and thinks that there is no soundness at all in any of them. Have you not perceived that this happens so?"

Phaedo/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Is it not a shame? And is it not evident that such a one attempts to deal with men, without sufficient knowledge of human affairs? For if he had dealt with them with competent knowledge, as the case really is, so he would have considered that the good and the bad are each very few in number, and that those between both are most numerous."

Phaedo/ "How say you?"

Socrates/ "In the same manner, as with things very little and very large. Do you think that anything is more rare than to find a very large or a very little man, or dog, or anything else? and again swift or slow, beautiful or ugly, white or black? Do you not perceive that of all such things the extremes are rare and few, but that the intermediate are abundant and numerous?"

Phaedo/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Do you not think, then, that if a contest in wickedness were proposed, even here very few would be found pre-eminent?"

Phaedo/ It is probable."

Socrates/ "It is so; but in this respect reasonings do not resemble men, for I was just now following you as my leader, but in this they do resemble them, when anyone believes in any argument as true without being skilled in the art of

reasoning, and then shortly afterwards it appears to him to be false, at one time being so and at another time not, and so on with one after another; and especially they who devote themselves to controversial arguments, you are aware at length think they have become very wise, and have alone discovered that there is nothing sound and stable either in things or reasonings, but that all things that exist, as is the case with the Euripus, are in a constant state of flux and reflux, and never continue in anyone condition for any length of time."

Phaedo/ "You speak perfectly true."

Socrates/ "Would it not then, Phædo, be a sad thing if, when there is a true and sound reasoning, and such as one can understand, one should then, through lighting upon such arguments as appear to be at one time true, and at another false, not blame one's-self and one's own want of skill, but at length through grief should anxiously transfer the blame from one's-self to the arguments, and thereupon pass the rest of one's life in hating and reviling arguments, and so be deprived of the truth and knowledge of things that exist?"

Phaedo/ "By Zeus, it would be sad indeed."

Socrates/ "In the first place, then, let us beware of this, and let us not admit into our souls the notion, that there appears to be nothing sound in reasoning, but much rather that we are not yet in a sound condition, and that we ought vigorously and strenuously to endeavor to become sound, you and the others, on account of your whole future life, but I, on account of my death, since I am in danger at the present time, of not behaving as becomes a philosopher, with respect to this very subject, but as a wrangler like those who are utterly uninformed. For they, when they dispute about anything, care nothing at all for the subject about which the

discussion is, but are anxious about this, that what they have themselves advanced shall appear true to the persons present. And I seem to myself on the present occasion to differ from them only in this respect; for I shall not be anxious to make what I say appear true to those who are present, except that may happen by the way, but that it may appear certainly to be so to myself. For I thus reason, my dear friend, and observe how interestedly, if what I say be true, it is well to be persuaded of it: but if nothing remains to one that is dead, I shall at least during the interval before death, be less disagreeable to those present by my lamentations. But this ignorance of mine will not continue long, for that would be bad, but will shortly be put an end to. Thus prepared then, Simmias and Cebes, I now proceed to my argument. Do you however, if you will be persuaded by me, pay little attention to Socrates, but much more to the truth, and if I appear to you to say anything true, assent to it, but if not, oppose me with all your might, taking good care that in my zeal I do not deceive both myself and you, and like a bee depart leaving my sting behind."

"But let us proceed; first of all, remind me of what you said, if I should appear to have forgotten it. For Simmias, as I think, is in doubt and fears lest the soul, though more divine and beautiful than the body, should perish before it, as being a species of harmony. But Cebes appeared to me to grant me this, that the soul is more durable than the body, but he argued that it is uncertain to everyone, whether when the soul has worn out many bodies, and that repeatedly, it does not, on leaving the last body, itself also perish, so that this very thing is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body never ceases decaying. Are not these the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we have to enquire into?"

Phaedo/ They both agreed that they were.

Socrates/ “Whether, then, do you reject all our former arguments, or some of them only, and not others?”

Simmias/ “Some we do. And others not.”

Socrates/ “What then do you say about that argument, in which we asserted that knowledge is reminiscence, and that, this being the case, our soul must necessarily have existed somewhere before it was enclosed in the body?”

Cebes/ “I, indeed, was both then wonderfully persuaded by it, and now persist in it, as in no other argument.”

Simmias/ “And I too, am of the same mind, and should very much wonder if I should ever think otherwise on that point.”

Socrates/ “Then, you must needs think otherwise, my Theban friend, if this opinion holds good, that harmony is "something compounded, and that the soul is a kind of harmony that results from the parts compacted together in the body. For surely you will not allow yourself to say that harmony was composed prior to the things from which it required to be composed. Would you allow this?”

Simmias/ “By no means Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Do you perceive then, that this results from what you say, when you assert that the soul existed before it came into a human form and body, but that it was composed from things that did not yet exist? For harmony is not such as that to which you compare it; but first the lyre, and the chords, and the sounds yet unharmonized, exist, and last of all harmony is produced, and first perishes. How then will this argument accord with that?”

Simmias/ “Not at all.”

Socrates/ “And yet, if in any argument, there ought to be an accordance in one respecting harmony.”

Simmias/ “There ought.”

Socrates/ “This of yours however, is not in accordance. Consider then, which of these two statements do you prefer, that knowledge is reminiscence, or the soul harmony?”

Simmias/ “The former, by far, Socrates, for the latter occurred to me without demonstration, through a certain probability and speciousness whence most men derive their opinions. But I am well aware that arguments which draw their demonstrations from probabilities are idle; and unless one is on one’s guard against them, they are very deceptive, both in geometry and all other subjects. But the argument respecting reminiscence and knowledge may be said to have been demonstrated by a satisfactory hypothesis. For in this way it was said that our soul existed before it came into the body, because the essence that bears the appellation of ‘that which is,’ belongs to it. But of this, as I persuade myself, I am fully and rightly convinced. It is therefore necessary, as it seems, that I should neither allow myself nor anyone else to maintain that the soul is harmony.”

Socrates/ “But what, Simmias, if you consider it thus? Does it appear to you to appertain to harmony, or to any other composition, to subsist in any other way than the very things do of which it is composed?”

Simmias/ “By no means.”

Socrates/ “And indeed, as I think, neither to do anything, nor suffer anything else, besides what they do or suffer.”

Phaedo/ He agreed.

Socrates/ “It does not, therefore, appertain to harmony to take the lead of the things of which it is composed, but to follow them.”

Phaedo/ He assented.

Socrates/ “It is then far from being the case that harmony is moved or sends forth sounds contrariwise, or is in any other respect opposed to its parts?”

Simmias/ “Far indeed.”

Socrates/ “What then? is not every harmony naturally harmony, so far as it has been made to accord?”

Simmias/ “I do not understand you.”

Socrates/ “Whether, if it should be in a greater degree and more fully made to accord, supposing that were possible, would the harmony be greater and more full, but if in a less degree and less fully, then would it be inferior and less full?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Is this then the case with the soul, that, even in the smallest extent, one soul is more fully and in a greater degree, or less fully and in a less degree this very thing, a soul, than another?”

Simmias/ “In no respect whatever.”

Socrates/ “Well then, by Zeus, is one soul said to possess intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and another folly and vice, and to be bad? and is this said with truth?”

Simmias/ “With truth, certainly.”

Socrates/ “Of those, then, who maintain that the soul is harmony, what will anyone say that these things are in the soul, virtue and vice? Will he call them another kind of harmony and discord? and say that the one, the good soul, is harmonized, and, being harmony, contains within itself another harmony, but that the other is discordant, and does not contain within itself another harmony?”

Simmias/ “I am unable to say, but it is clear that he who maintains that opinion would say something of the kind.”

Socrates/ “But it has been already granted, that one soul is not more or less a soul than another; and this is an admission that one harmony is not to a greater degree or more fully, or to a less degree or less fully, a harmony, than another: is it not so?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “And that that which is neither more nor less harmony, is neither more nor less harmonized: is it so?”

Simmias/ “It is.”

Socrates/ “But does that which is neither more nor less harmonized partake of more or less harmony, or an equal amount?”

Simmias/ “An equal amount.”

Socrates/ “A soul, therefore, since it is not more or less this very thing, a soul, than another, is not more or less harmonized?”

Simmias/ “Even so.”

Socrates/ “Such then being its condition, it cannot partake of a greater degree of discord or harmony?”

Simmias/ “Certainly not.”

Socrates/ “And again, such being its condition, can one soul partake of a greater degree of vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord, and virtue harmony?”

Simmias/ “It cannot.”

Socrates/ “Or rather, surely, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul will partake of vice, if it is harmony: for doubtless harmony, which is perfectly such, can never partake of discord?”

Simmias/ “Certainly not.”

Socrates/ “Neither, therefore, can a soul, which is perfectly a soul, partake of vice.”

Simmias/ “How can it, from what has been already said?”

Socrates/ “From this reasoning, then, all souls of all animals will be equally good, if at least they are by nature equally this very thing, souls?”

Simmias/ “It appears so to me, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “And does it appear to you, to have been thus rightly argued, and that the argument would lead to this result, if the hypothesis were correct, that the soul is harmony?”

Simmias/ “On no account whatever.”

Socrates/ “But what of all the things that are in man, is there anything else that you say bears rule except the soul, especially if it be wise?”

Simmias/ “I should say not.”

Socrates/ “Whether by yielding to the passions in the body, or by opposing them? My meaning is this, for instance, when heat and thirst are present, by drawing it the contrary way, so as to hinder it from drinking, and when hunger is present, by hindering it from eating; and in ten thousand other instances we see the soul opposing the desires of the body. Do we not?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “But have we not before allowed that if the soul were harmony, it would never utter a sound contrary to the tension, relaxation, vibration, or any other affection to which its component parts are subject, but would follow, and never govern them?”

Simmias/ “We did allow it, for how could we do otherwise?”

Socrates/ “What, then, does not the soul now appear to act quite the contrary, ruling over all the parts, from which anyone might say it subsists, and resisting almost all of them through the whole of life, and exercising dominion over them in all manner of ways, punishing some more severely even with pain, both by gymnastics and medicine, and others more mildly, partly threatening, and partly admonishing the desires, angers, and fears, as if, being itself of a different nature, it were conversing with something quite

different? Just as Homer has done in the Odyssey, where he speaks of Ulysses: 'Having struck his breast, he chid his heart in the following words, Bear up, my heart; ere this thou hast borne far worse.' Do you think that he composed this in the belief that the soul was harmony, and capable of being led by the passions of the body, and not rather that it was able to lead and govern them, as being something much more divine than to be compared with harmony?"

Simmias/ "By Zeus, Socrates, it appears so to me."

Socrates/ "Therefore, my excellent friend, it is on no account correct for us to say that the soul is a kind of harmony; for as it appears, we should neither agree with Homer, that divine poet, nor with ourselves."

Simmias/ "Such is the case."

Socrates/ "Be it so, then, we have already, as it seems, sufficiently appeased this Theban harmony. But how, Cebes, and by what arguments shall we appease this Cadmus?"

Cebes/ "You appear to me, to be likely to find out; for you have made out this argument against harmony wonderfully beyond my expectation. For when Simmias was saying what his doubts were, I wondered very much whether anyone would be able to answer his reasoning. It therefore appeared to me unaccountable that he did not withstand the very first onset of your argument. I should not, therefore, be surprised if the arguments of Cadmus met with the same fate."

Socrates/ "My good friend, do not speak so boastfully, lest some envious power should overthrow the argument that is about to be urged. These things, however, will be cared for by the deity, but let us, meeting hand to hand, in the manner of Homer, try whether you say anything to the purpose. This, then, is the sum of what you enquire: you require it to be proved that our soul is imperishable and immortal; if a philosopher that is about to die, full of confidence and hope

that after death he shall be far happier than if he had died after leading a different kind of life, shall not entertain this confidence foolishly and vainly. But to show that the soul is something strong and divine, and that it existed before we men were born, you say not at all hinders, but that all these things may evince, not its immortality, but that the soul is durable, and existed an immense space of time before, and knew and did many things. But that, for all this, it was not at all the more immortal, but that its very entrance into the body of a man was the beginning of its destruction, as if it were a disease, so that it passes through this life in wretchedness, and at last perishes in that which is called death. But you say that it is of no consequence whether it comes into a body once or often, with respect to our occasion of fear: for it is right he should be afraid, unless he is foolish, who does not know, and cannot give a reason to prove, that the soul is immortal. Such, I think, Cebes, is the sum of what you say; and I purposely repeat it often, that nothing may escape us, and, if you please, you may add to or take from it."

Cebes/ "I do not wish at present either to take from or add to it; that is what I mean."

Phaedo/ Socrates, then, having paused for some time, and considered something within himself, said;

Socrates/ "You enquire into no easy matter, Cebes; for it is absolutely necessary to discuss the whole question of generation and corruption. If you please, then, I will relate to you what happened to me with reference to them; and afterwards, if anything that I shall say shall appear to you useful, towards producing conviction on the subject you are now treating of, make use of it."

Cebes/ "I do indeed wish it."

Socrates/ “Hear my relation then. When I was a young man, Cebes, I was wonderfully desirous of that wisdom which they call a history of nature: for it appeared to me to be a very sublime thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing is generated, why it perishes, and why it exists. And I often tossed myself upwards and downwards, considering first such things as these, whether when heat and cold have undergone a certain corruption, as some say, then animals are formed; and whether the blood is that by means of which we think, or air, or fire, or none of these, but that it is the brain that produces the perceptions of hearing, seeing, and smelling, and that from these come memory and opinion, and from memory and opinion, when in a state of rest, in the same way knowledge is produced? And again considering the corruptions of these, and the affections incidental to the heavens and the earth, I at length appeared to myself so unskillful in these speculations, that nothing could be more so. But I will give you a sufficient proof of this: for I then became, by these very speculations, so very blind with respect to things which I knew clearly before, as it appeared to myself and others, that I unlearnt even the things which I thought I knew before, both on many other subjects and also this, why a man grows. For before I thought this was evident to everyone, that it proceeds from eating and drinking; for that, when, from the food, flesh is added to flesh, bone to bone, and so on in the same proportion, what is proper to them is added to the several other parts, then the bulk which was small becomes afterwards large, and thus that a little man becomes a big one. Such was my opinion at that time: does it appear to you correct?”

Cebes/ “To me it does.”

Socrates/ “Consider this further. I thought that I had formed a right opinion, when on seeing a tall man standing

by a short one, I judged that he was taller by the head, and in like manner one horse than another: and still more clearly than this, ten appeared to me to be more than eight, by two being added to them, and that two cubits are greater than one cubit, by exceeding it a half."

Cebes/ "But now, what think you of these matters?"

Socrates/ "By Zeus, I am far from thinking that I know the cause of these, for that I cannot even persuade myself of this, when a person has added one to one, whether the one to which the addition has been made has become two, or whether that which has been added, and that to which the addition has been made, have become two by the addition of the one to the other. For I wonder, if when each of these was separate from the other, each was one, and they were not yet two, but when they have approached nearer each other, this should be the cause of their becoming two, namely, the union by which they have been placed nearer one another. Nor yet, if any person should divide one, am I able to persuade myself that this, their division, is the cause of its becoming two. For this cause is the contrary to the former one of their becoming two; for then it was because they were brought nearer to each other, and the one was added to the other; but now it is, because one is removed and separated from the other. Nor do I yet persuade myself, that I know why one is one, nor, in a word, why anything else is produced or perishes, or exists, according to this method of proceeding; but I mix up another method of my own at random, for this I can on no account give in to.

"But having once heard a person reading from a book, written, as he said, by Anaxagoras, and which said that it is intelligence that sets in order and is the cause of all things, I was delighted with this cause, and it appeared to me in a manner to be well that intelligence should be the cause of all things, and I considered with myself, if this is so, that the

regulating intelligence orders all things, and disposes each in such way as will be best for it. If anyone, then, should desire to discover the cause of everything, in what way it is produced, or perishes, or exists, he must discover this respecting it, in what way it is best for it either to exist, or to suffer, or do anything else; from this mode of reasoning, then, it is proper that a man should consider nothing else, both with respect to himself and others, than what is most excellent and best: and it necessarily follows that this same person must also know that which is worst, for that the knowledge of both of them is the same. Thus reasoning with myself, I was delighted to think I had found in Anaxagoras a preceptor who would instruct me in the causes of things, agreeably to my own mind, and that he would inform me, first, whether the earth is flat or round, and when he had informed me, would moreover explain the cause and necessity of its being so, arguing on the principle of the better, and showing that it is better for it to be such as it is, and if he should say that it is in the middle, that he would moreover explain how it is better for it to be in the middle; and if he should make all this clear to me, I was prepared no longer to require any other species of cause. I was in like manner prepared to enquire respecting the sun, and moon, and the other stars, with respect to their velocities in reference to each other and their revolutions, and other conditions, in what way it is better for both to act and be affected as it does and is. For I never thought that after he had said that these things were set in order by intelligence, he would introduce any other cause for them than that it is best for them to be as they are: hence, I thought, that in assigning the cause to each of them, and to all in common, he would explain that which is best for each, and the common good of all. And I would not have given up my hopes for a good deal, but having taken up his books with great

eagerness, I read through them as quickly as I could, that I might as soon as possible know the best, and the worst.

"From this wonderful hope, however, my friend, I was speedily thrown down, when, as I advance and read over his works, I meet with a man who makes no use of intelligence, nor assigns any causes for the ordering of all things, but makes the causes to consist of air, ether, and water, and many other things equally absurd. And he appeared to me to be very like one who should say, that whatever Socrates does he does by intelligence, and then, attempting to describe the causes of each particular action, should say, first of all, that for this reason I am now sitting here, because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and that the bones are hard, and have joints separate from each other, but that the sinews, being capable of tension and contraction, cover the bones, together with the flesh and skin which contains them. The bones, therefore, being suspended in their sockets, the nerves relaxing and tightening enable me to bend my limbs as I now do, and from this cause I sit here bent up. And if again, he should assign other similar causes for my conversing with you, assigning as causes voice, and air, and hearing, and ten thousand other things of the kind, omitting to mention the real causes, that since it appeared better to the Athenians to condemn me, I therefore thought it better to sit here, and more just to remain and submit to the punishment which they have ordered; for, by the dog, I think these sinews and bones would have been long ago either in Megara or Boeotia, borne thither by an opinion of that which is best, if I had not thought it more just and honorable to submit to whatever sentence the city might order, than to flee and run stealthily away. But to call such things causes is too absurd. But if anyone should say that without possessing such things as bones and sinews, and whatever else I have, I could not do

what I pleased, he would speak the truth; but to say that I do as I do through them, and that I act thus by intelligence, and not from the choice of what is best, would be a great and extreme disregard of reason. For this would be not to be able to distinguish that the real cause is one thing, and that another without which a cause could not be a cause: which indeed the generality of men appear to me to do, fumbling as it were in the dark, and making use of strange names, so as to denominate them as the very cause. Wherefore one encompassing the earth with a vortex from heaven, makes the earth remain fixed; but another, as if it were a broad trough, rests it upon the air as its base: but the power by which these things are now so disposed that they may be placed in the best manner possible, this they neither enquire into, nor do they think that it requires any superhuman strength; but they think they will some time or other find out an Atlas stronger and more immortal than this, and more capable of containing all things, and in reality, the good, and that which ought to hold them together and contain them, they take no account of at all. I then should most gladly have become the disciple of anyone who would teach me of such a cause, in what way it is. But when I was disappointed of this, and was neither able to discover it myself, nor to learn it from another, do you wish, Cebes, that I should show you in what way I set out upon a second voyage in search of the cause?"

Cebes/ "I wish it exceedingly."

Socrates/ "It appeared to me then, after this, when I was wearied with considering things that exist, that I ought to beware lest I should suffer in the same way as they do who look at and examine an eclipse of the sun, for some lose the sight of their eyes, unless they behold its image in water, or some similar medium. And I was affected with a similar feeling, and was afraid lest I should be utterly blinded in my

soul through beholding things with the eyes, and endeavoring to grasp them by means of the several senses. It seemed to me, therefore, that I ought to have recourse to reasons, and to consider in them the truth of things. Perhaps, however, this similitude of mine may in some respect be incorrect; for I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in their reasons considers them in their images, more than he does who views them in their effects. However, I proceeded thus, and on each occasion laying down the reason, which I deem to be the strongest, whatever things appear to me to accord with this I regard as true, both with respect to the cause and everything else, but such as do not accord I regard as not true. But I wish to explain my meaning to you in a clearer manner; for I think that you do not yet understand me."

Cebes/ "No, by Zeus, not well."

Socrates/ "However, I am now saying nothing new, but what I have always at other times, and in a former part of this discussion, never ceased to say. I proceed then to attempt to explain to you that species of cause which I have busied myself about, and return again to those well-known subjects, and set out from them, laying down as an hypothesis, that there is a certain abstract beauty, and goodness, and magnitude, and so of all other things; which if you grant me, and allow that they do exist, I hope that I shall be able from these to explain the cause to you, and to discover that the soul is immortal."

Cebes/ "But, since I grant you this, you may draw your conclusion at once."

Socrates/ "But consider, what follows from thence, and see if you can agree with me. For it appears to me, that if there be anything else beautiful, besides beauty itself, it is not beautiful for any other reason than because it partakes

of that abstract beauty; and I say the same of everything. Do you admit such a cause?"

Cebes/ "I do admit it."

Socrates/ "I do not yet understand, nor am I able to conceive, those otherwise causes; but if anyone should tell me why anything is beautiful, either because it has a blooming florid color, or figure, or anything else of the kind, I dismiss all other reasons, for I am confounded by them all; but I simply, wholly, and perhaps foolishly, confine myself to this, that nothing else causes it to be beautiful, except either the presence or communication of that abstract beauty, by whatever means and in whatever way communicated: for I cannot yet affirm this with certainty, but only that by means of beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. For this appears to me the safest answer to give both to myself and others, and adhering to this, I think that I shall never fall, but that it is a safe answer both for me and anyone else to give, that by means of beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Does it not also seem so to you?"

Cebes/ "It does."

Socrates/ "And that by magnitude great things become great, and greater things, greater; and by littleness less things become less?"

Cebes/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "You would not then approve of it, if anyone said that one person is greater than another by the head, and that the less is less by the very same thing, but you would maintain that you mean nothing else than that everything that is greater than another is greater by nothing else than magnitude, and that it is greater on this account, that is on account of magnitude, and that the less is less by nothing else than littleness, and on this account less, that is, on account of littleness, being afraid, I think, lest some

opposite argument should meet you if you should say that anyone is greater and less by the head; as first, that the greater is greater, and the less, less by the very same thing; and next, that the greater is greater by the head, which is small; and that it is monstrous to suppose that anyone is great through something small. Should you not be afraid of this?"

Cebes/ "Indeed I should."

Socrates/ "Should you not, then, be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two, and for this cause exceeds it, and not by number, and on account of number? and that two cubits are greater than one cubit by half, and not by magnitude? for the fear is surely the same."

Cebes/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "What then? when one has been added to one, would you not beware of saying that the addition is the cause of its being two, or division when it has been divided; and would you not loudly assert that you know no other way in which each thing subsists, than by partaking of the peculiar essence of each of which it partakes, and that in these cases you can assign no other cause of its becoming two than its partaking of duality; and that such things as are to become two must needs partake of this, and what is to become one, of unity; but these divisions and additions, and other such subtleties, you would dismiss, leaving them to be given as answers by persons wiser than yourself: whereas you, fearing, as it is said, your own shadow and inexperience, would adhere to this safe hypothesis, and answer accordingly? But if anyone should assail this hypothesis of yours, would you not dismiss him and refrain from answering him till you had considered the consequences resulting from it, whether in your opinion they agree with or differ from each other? But when it should be necessary for

you to give a reason for it, would you give one in a similar way, by again laying down another hypothesis, which should appear the best of higher principles, until you arrived at something satisfactory, but at the same time you would avoid making confusion, as disputants do, in treating of the first principle and the results arising from it, if you really desire to arrive at the truth of things. For they, perhaps, make no account at all of this, nor pay any attention to it, for they are able, through their wisdom, to mingle all things together, and at the same time please themselves. But you, if you are a philosopher, would act, I think, as I now describe."

Simmias/ "You speak most truly."

Cebes/ "You speak most truly."

Echecrates/ By Zeus, Phædo, they said so with good reason: for he appears to me to have explained these things with wonderful clearness, even to one endued with a small degree of intelligence.

Phaedo/ Certainly, Echecrates, and so it appeared to all who were present.

Echecrates/ And so it appears to me, who was absent, and now hear it related. But what was said after this?

Phaedo/ As well as I remember, when these things had been granted him, and it was allowed that each several idea exists of itself, and that other things partaking of them receive their denomination from them, he next asked:

Socrates/ "If then, you admit that these things are so, whether, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates, but less than Phædo, do you not then say that magnitude and littleness are both in Simmias?"

Cebes/ "I do."

Socrates/ "And yet, you must confess that Simmias's exceeding Socrates is not actually true in the manner in

which the words express it; for Simmias does not naturally exceed Socrates, in that he is Simmias, but in consequence of the magnitude which he happens to have; nor, again, does he exceed Socrates, because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates possesses littleness in comparison with his magnitude?"

Cebes/ "True."

Socrates/ "Nor, again, is Simmias exceeded by Phædo, because Phædo is Phædo, but because Phædo possesses magnitude in comparison with Simmias's littleness?"

Cebes/ "It is so."

Socrates/ "Thus, then, Simmias has the appellation of being both little and great, being between both, by exceeding the littleness of one through his own magnitude, and to the other yielding a magnitude that exceeds his own littleness."

Phaedo/ And at the same time, smiling, he said;

Socrates/ "I seem to speak with the precision of a short-hand writer; however, it is as I say."

Phaedo/ He allowed it.

Socrates/ "But I say it for this reason, wishing you to be of the same opinion as myself. For it appears to me, not only that magnitude itself is never disposed to be at the same time great and little, but that magnitude in us never admits the little, nor is disposed to be exceeded, but one of two things, either to flee and withdraw when its contrary, the little, approaches it, or when it has actually come, to perish; but that it is not disposed, by sustaining and receiving littleness, to be different from what it was. Just as I, having received and sustained littleness, and still continuing the same person that I am, am this same little person: but that, while it is great, never endures to be little. And in like manner the little that is in us is not disposed at any time to become or to be great, nor is anything else among contraries,

while it continues what it was, at the same time disposed to become and to be its contrary; but in this contingency it either departs or perishes."

Cebes/ "It appears so to me, in every respect."

Phaedo/ But some one of those present, on hearing this, I do not clearly remember who he was, said;

Someone/ "By the gods, was not the very contrary of what is now asserted admitted in the former part of our discussion, that the greater is produced from the less, and the less from the greater, and in a word, that the very production of contraries is from contraries? But now it appears to me to be asserted that this can never be the case."

Phaedo/ Upon this Socrates, having leant his head forward and listened, said;

Socrates/ "You have reminded me in a manly way; you do not, however, perceive the difference between what is now and what was then asserted. For then it was said, that a contrary thing is produced from a contrary; but now, that a contrary can never become contrary to itself, neither that which is in us, nor that which is in nature. For then, my friend, we spoke of things that have contraries, calling them by the appellation of those things; but now we are speaking of those very things, from the presence of which things so called receive their appellation, and of these very things we say that they are never disposed to admit of production from each other."

Phaedo/ And, at the same time looking at Cebes;

Socrates/ "Has anything that has been said, Cebes, disturbed you?"

Cebes/ "Indeed, I am not at all so disposed; however, I by no means say that there are not many things that disturb me."

Socrates/ “Then, we have quite agreed to this, that a contrary can never be contrary to itself.”

Cebes/ “Most certainly.”

Socrates/ “But further, consider whether you will agree with me in this also. Do you call heat and cold anything?”

Cebes/ “I do.”

Socrates/ “The same as snow and fire?

Cebes/ “By Zeus, I do not.”

Socrates/ “But heat is something different from fire, and cold something different from snow?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “But this, I think, is apparent to you, that snow, while it is snow, can never, when it has admitted heat, as we said before, continue to be what it was, snow and hot, but, on the approach of heat, it must either withdraw or perish?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “And again, that fire, when cold approaches it, must either depart or perish; but that it will never endure, when it has admitted coldness, to continue what it was, fire and cold?”

Cebes/ “You speak truly.”

Socrates/ “It happens then, with respect to some of such things, that not only is the idea itself always thought worthy of the same appellation, but likewise something else which is not indeed that idea itself but constantly retains its form so long as it exists. What I mean will perhaps be clearer in the following examples. The odd in number must always possess the name by which we now call it; must it not?

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Must it alone of all things, for this I ask, or is there anything else, which is not the same as the odd, but

yet which we must always call odd, together with its own name, because it is so constituted by nature, that it can never be without the odd? But this I say is the case with the number three, and many others. For consider with respect to the number three; does it not appear to you that it must always be called by its own name, as well as by that of the odd, which is not the same as the number three? Yet such is the nature of the number three, five, and the entire half of number, that though they are not the same as the odd, yet each of them is always odd. And again, two and four, and the whole other series of number, though not the same as the even, are nevertheless each of them always even: do you admit this or not?

Cebes/ "How should I not?"

Socrates/ "Observe then, what I wish to prove. It is this, that it appears, not only that these contraries do not admit each other, but that even such things as are not contrary to each other, and yet always possess contraries, do not appear to admit that idea which is contrary to the idea that exists in themselves, but, when it approaches, perish or depart. Shall we not allow that the number three would first perish, and suffer anything whatever, rather than endure, while it is still three, to become even?"

Cebes/ "Most certainly."

Socrates/ "And yet, the number two is not contrary to three."

Cebes/ "Surely not."

Socrates/ "Not only, then, do ideas that are contrary never allow the approach of each other, but some other things also do not allow the approach of contraries."

Cebes/ "You say very truly."

Socrates/ "Do you wish, then, that, if we are able, we should define what these things are?"

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Would they not then, Cebes, be such things as whatever they occupy, compel that thing not only to retain its own idea, but also that of something which is always a contrary?

Cebes/ “How do you mean?”

Socrates/ “As we just now said. For you know surely, that whatever things the idea of three occupies must of necessity not only be three, but also odd?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “To such a thing, then, we assert, that the idea contrary to that form which constitutes this can never come.”

Cebes/ “It cannot.”

Socrates/ “But did the odd make it so?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And is the contrary to this the idea of the even?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “The idea of the even, then, will never come to the three?”

Cebes/ “No surely.”

Socrates/ “Three, then, has no part in the even?”

Cebes/ “None whatever.”

Socrates/ “The number three is uneven?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “What therefore I said should be defined, namely, what things they are which, though not contrary to some particular thing, yet do not admit of the contrary itself, as in the present instance, the number three though not contrary to the even, does not any the more admit it, for it

always brings the contrary with it, just as the number two does to the odd, fire to cold, and many other particulars, consider then, whether you would thus define, not only that a contrary does not admit a contrary, but also that that which brings with it a contrary to that to which it approaches, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it. But call it to mind again, for it will not be useless to hear it often repeated. Five will not admit the idea of the even, nor ten, its double, that of the odd. This double then, though it is itself contrary to something else, yet will not admit the idea of the odd; nor will half as much again, nor other things of the kind, such as the half and the third part admit the idea of the whole, if you follow me and agree with me that it is so."

Cebes/ "I entirely agree with you, And follow you."

Socrates/ "Tell me again, then, from the beginning; and do not answer me in the terms in which I put the question, but in different ones, imitating my example. For I say this because, besides that safe mode of answering, which I mentioned at first, from what has now been said, I see another no less safe one. For if you should ask me what that is, which if it be in the body will cause it to be hot, I should not give you that safe but unlearned answer, that it is heat, but one more elegant, from what we have just now said, that it is fire: nor, if you should ask me what that is, which if it be in the body, will cause it to be diseased, should I say that it is disease, but fever; nor, if you should ask what that is, which if it be in number, will cause it to be odd, should I say that it is unevenness, but unity, and so with other things. But consider whether you sufficiently understand what I mean."

Cebes/ "Perfectly so."

Socrates/ “Answer me then, what that is, which when it is in the body, the body will be alive?”

Cebes/ “Soul.”

Socrates/ “Is not this, then, always the case?”

Cebes/ “How should it not be?”

Socrates/ “Does the soul, then, always bring life to whatever it occupies?”

Cebes/ “It does indeed.”

Socrates/ “Whether, then, is there anything contrary to life or not?”

Cebes/ “There is.”

Socrates/ “What?”

Cebes/ “Death.”

Socrates/ “The soul, then, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it, as has been already allowed?”

Cebes/ “Most assuredly.”

Socrates/ “What then? How do we denominate that which does not admit the idea of the even?”

Cebes/ “Uneven.”

Socrates/ “And that which does not admit the just, nor the musical?”

Cebes/ “Unmusical, and unjust.”

Socrates/ “Be it so. But what do we call that which does not admit death?”

Cebes/ “Immortal.”

Socrates/ “Therefore does not the soul admit death?”

Cebes/ “No.”

Socrates/ “Is the soul, then, immortal?”

Cebes/ “Immortal.”

Socrates/ “Be it so. Shall we say then, that this has been now demonstrated? or how think you?”

Cebes/ “Most completely, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “What then, Cebes, if it were necessary for the uneven to be imperishable, would the number three be otherwise than imperishable?”

Cebes/ “How should it not?”

Socrates/ “If, therefore, it were also necessary that what is without heat should be imperishable, when anyone should introduce heat to snow, would not the snow withdraw itself, safe and unmelted? For it would not perish; nor yet would it stay and admit the heat.”

Cebes/ “You say truly.”

Socrates/ “In like manner, I think, if that which is insusceptible of cold were imperishable, that when anything cold approached the fire, it would neither be extinguished nor perish, but would depart quite safe.”

Cebes/ “Of necessity.”

Socrates/ “Must we not then of necessity speak thus of that which is immortal? if that which is immortal is imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish, when death approaches it. For, from what has been said already, it will not admit death, nor will ever be dead, just as we said that three will never be even, nor again will the odd, nor will fire be cold, nor yet the heat that is in fire. But someone may say, what hinders, though the odd can never become even by the approach of the even, as we have allowed, yet, when the odd is destroyed, that the even should succeed in its place? We could not contend with him who should make this objection, that it is not destroyed; for the uneven is not imperishable; since, if this were granted us, we might easily have contended, that on the approach of the even the odd and the three depart; and we might have contended in the

same way with respect to fire, heat, and the rest; might we not?"

Cebes/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Wherefore, with respect to the immortal, if we have allowed that it is imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being immortal, must also be imperishable; if not, there will be need of other arguments."

Cebes/ "But there is no need, as far as that is concerned; for scarcely could anything not admit of corruption, if that which is immortal and eternal is liable to it."

Socrates/ "The deity, indeed, I think, and the idea itself of life, and if anything else is immortal, must be allowed by all beings to be incapable of dissolution."

Cebes/ "By Zeus, by all men indeed, and still more, as I think, by the gods."

Socrates/ "Since, then, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, can the soul, since it is immortal, be anything else than imperishable?"

Cebes/ "It must of necessity be so."

Socrates/ "When, therefore, death approaches a man, the mortal part of him, as it appears, dies, but the immortal part departs safe and uncorrupted, having withdrawn itself from death?"

Cebes/ "It appears so."

Socrates/ "The soul, therefore, Cebes, is most certainly immortal and imperishable, and our souls will really exist in Hades."

Cebes/ "Therefore, Socrates, I have nothing further to say against this, nor any reason for doubting your arguments. But if Simmias here or anyone else has anything to say, it were well for him not to be silent: for I know not to what

other opportunity beyond the present anyone can defer it, who wishes either to speak or hear about these things."

Simmias/ "But indeed, neither have I any reason to doubt what has been urged; yet from the magnitude of the subject discussed, and from my low opinion of human weakness, I am compelled still to retain a doubt within myself with respect to what has been said."

Socrates/ "Not only so, Simmias, but you say this well, and moreover the first hypotheses, even though they are credible to you, should nevertheless be examined more carefully; and if you should investigate them sufficiently, I think you will follow my reasoning as far as it is possible for man to do so; and if this very point becomes clear, you will enquire no further."

Simmias/ "You speak truly."

Socrates/ "But it is right, my friends, that we should consider this, that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care not only for the present time, which we call life, but for all time; and the danger would now appear to be dreadful, if one should neglect it. For if death were a deliverance from everything, it would be a great gain for the wicked, when they die, to be delivered at the same time from the body, and from their vices together with the soul: but now, since it appears to be immortal, it can have no other refuge from evils, nor safety, except by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul goes to Hades, possessing nothing else but its discipline and education, which are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment to the dead, on the very beginning of his journey thither. For thus it is said; that each person's demon who was assigned to him while living, when he dies conducts him to some place, where they that are assembled together must receive sentence and then proceed to Hades with that guide, who has been ordered to conduct them from

hence thither. But there having received their deserts, and having remained the appointed time, another guide brings them back hither again, after many and long revolutions of time. The journey, then, is not such as the Telephus of Æschylus describes it. For he says that a simple path leads to Hades; but it appears to me to be neither simple nor one: for there would be no need of guides, nor could anyone ever miss the way, if there were but one. But now it appears to have many divisions and windings; and this I conjecture from our religious and funeral rites. The well-ordered and wise soul, then, both follows, and is not ignorant of its present condition; but that which through passion clings to the body, as I said before, having longingly fluttered about it for a long time, and about its visible place, after vehement resistance and great suffering, is forcibly and with great difficulty led away by its appointed demon. And when it arrives at the place where the others are, impure and having done any such thing as the committal of unrighteous murders or other similar actions, which are kindred to these, and are the deeds of kindred souls, everyone shuns it and turns away from it, and will neither be its fellow-traveler or guide, but it wanders about, oppressed with every kind of helplessness until certain periods have elapsed: and when these are completed, it is carried of necessity to an abode suitable to it; but the soul which has passed through life with purity and moderation, having obtained the gods for its fellow-travelers and guides, settles each in the place suited to it. There are indeed many and wonderful places in the earth, and it is itself neither of such a kind, nor of such a magnitude, as is supposed by those who are accustomed to speak of the earth, as I have been persuaded by a certain person."

Simmias/ "How mean you, Socrates? For I too have heard many things about the earth, not however those things

which have obtained your belief: I would therefore gladly hear them."

Socrates/ "Indeed, Simmias, the art of Glaucus does not seem to me to be required to relate what these things are; that they are true however, appears to me more than the art of Glaucus can prove, and besides, I should probably not be able to do it, and even if I did know how, what remains to me of life, Simmias, seems insufficient for the length of the subject. However, the form of the earth, such as I am persuaded it is, and the different places in it, nothing hinders me from telling."

Simmias/ "But that will be enough."

Socrates/ "I am persuaded, then, in the first place, that, if the earth is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a spherical form, it has no need of air, nor of any other similar force, to prevent it from falling, but that the similarity of the heavens to themselves on every side, and the equilibrium of the earth itself, are sufficient to support it; for a thing in a state of equilibrium when placed in the middle of something that presses it equally on all sides cannot incline more or less on any side, but being equally affected all around remains unmoved. In the first place then, I am persuaded of this."

Simmias/ "And very properly so."

Socrates/ "Yet further, that it is very large, and that we who inhabit some small portion of it, from the river Phasis to the pillars of Hercules, dwell about the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh, and that many others elsewhere dwell in many similar places, for that there are everywhere about the earth many hollows of various forms and sizes into which there is a confluence of water, mist, and air; but that the earth itself, being pure, is situated in the pure heavens, in which are the stars, and which most persons who are

accustomed to speak about such things call ether; of which these things are the sediment and are continually flowing into the hollow parts of the earth. That we are ignorant, then, that we are dwelling in its hollows, and imagine that we inhabit the upper parts of the earth, just as if anyone dwelling in the bottom of the sea, should think that he dwelt on the sea, and, beholding the sun and the other stars through the water, should imagine that the sea was the heavens, but through sloth and weakness should never have reached the surface of the sea, nor, having emerged and risen up from the sea to this region, have seen how much more pure and more beautiful it is than the place where he is, nor has heard of it from anyone else who has seen it. This then is the very condition in which we are; for, dwelling in some hollow of the earth, we think that we dwell on the surface of it, and call the air heaven, as if the stars moved through this, being heaven itself. But this is because by reason of our weakness and sloth, we are unable to reach to the summit of the air. Since, if anyone could arrive at its summit, or, becoming winged, could fly up thither, or emerging from hence, he would see, —just as with us, fishes emerging from the sea, behold what is here, —so anyone would behold the things there, and if his nature were able to endure the contemplation, he would know that that is the true heaven, and the true light, and the true earth. For this earth and these stones, and the whole region here, are decayed and corroded, as things in the sea by the saltness; for nothing of any value grows in the sea, nor, in a word, does it contain anything perfect, but there are caverns and sand, and mud in abundance, and filth, in whatever parts of the sea there is earth, nor are they at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful things with us. But on the other hand, those things in the upper regions of the earth would appear far more to excel the things with us. For, if we may

tell a beautiful fable, it is well worth hearing, Simmias, what kind the things are on the earth beneath the heavens."

Simmias/ "Indeed, Socrates, we should be very glad to hear that fable."

Socrates/ "First of all then, my friend, this earth, if anyone should survey it from above, is said to have the appearance of balls covered with twelve different pieces of leather, variegated and distinguished with colors, of which the colors found here, and which painters use, are as it were copies. But there the whole earth is composed of such, and far more brilliant and pure than these; for one part of it is purple, and of wonderful beauty, part of a golden color, and part of white, more white than chalk or snow, and in like manner composed of other colors, and those more in number and more beautiful than any we have ever beheld. And those very hollow parts of the earth, though filled with water and air, exhibit a certain species of color, shining among the variety of other colors, so that one continually variegated aspect presents itself to the view. In this earth, being such, all things that grow, grow in a manner proportioned to its nature, trees, flowers, and fruits; and again, in like manner, its mountains and stones possess, in the same proportion, smoothness and transparency, and more beautiful colors; of which the well-known stones here that are so highly prized are but fragments, such as sardin-stones, jaspers, and emeralds, and all of that kind. But there, there is nothing subsists that is not of this character, and even more beautiful than these. But the reason of this is, because the stones there are pure, and not eaten up and decayed, like those here, by rottenness and saltness, which flow down hither together, and which produce deformity and disease in the stones and the earth, and in other things, even animals and plants. But that earth is adorned with all these, and moreover with gold and silver, and other things of the

kind: for they are naturally conspicuous, being numerous and large, and in all parts of the earth; so that to behold it is a sight for the blessed. There are also many other animals and men upon it, some dwelling in mid-earth, others about the air, as we do about the sea, and others in islands which the air flows round, and which are near the continent: and in one word, what water and the sea are to us, for our necessities, the air is to them; and what air is to us, that ether is to them. But their seasons are of such a temperament that they are free from disease, and live for a much longer time than those here, and surpass us in sight, hearing, and smelling, and everything of this kind, as much as air excels water, and ether air, in purity. Moreover, they have abodes and temples of the gods, in which gods really dwell, and voices and oracles, and sensible visions of the gods, and such-like intercourse with them; the sun too, and moon, and stars, are seen by them such as they really are, and their felicity in other respects is correspondent with these things.

"And such indeed is the nature of the whole earth, and the parts about the earth; but there are many places all round it throughout its cavities, some deeper and more open than that in which we dwell: but others that are deeper, have a less chasm than our region, and others are shallower in depth than it is here and broader. But all these are in many places perforated one into another under the earth, some with narrower and some with wider channels, and have passages through, by which a great quantity of water flows from one into another, as into basins, and there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the earth, both of hot and cold water, and a great quantity of fire, and mighty rivers of fire, and many of liquid mire, some purer, and some more miry, as in Sicily there are rivers of mud that flow before the lava, and the lava itself, and from these the several

places are filled, according as the overflow from time to time happens to come to each of them. But all these move up and down as it were by a certain oscillation existing in the earth. And this oscillation proceeds from such natural cause as this: one of the chasms of the earth is exceedingly large, and perforated through the entire earth, and is that which Homer speaks of, 'very far off, where is the most profound abyss beneath the earth.' which elsewhere both he and many other poets have called Tartarus. For into this chasm all rivers flow together, and from it flow out again: but they severally derive their character from the earth through which they flow. And the reason why all streams flow out from thence, and flow into it, is because this liquid has neither bottom nor base. Therefore it oscillates and fluctuates up and down, and the air and the wind around it do the same; for they accompany it both when it rushes to those parts of the earth, and when to these. And as in respiration the flowing breath is continually breathed out and drawn in, so there the wind oscillating with the liquid, causes certain vehement and irresistible winds both as it enters and goes out. When, therefore, the water rushing in descends to the place which we call the lower region, it flows through the earth into the streams there and fills them, just as men pump up water. But when again it leaves those regions and rushes hither, it again fills the rivers here, and these, when filled, flow through channels and through the earth, and having severally reached the several places to which they are journeying, they make seas, lakes, rivers, and fountains. Then sinking again from thence beneath the earth, some of them having gone round longer and more numerous places, and others round fewer and shorter, they again discharge themselves into Tartarus, some much lower than they were drawn up, others only a little so, but all of them flow in again beneath the point at which they flowed out. And some issue

out directly opposite the place by which they flow in, others on the same side: there are also some which having gone round altogether in a circle, folding themselves once or several times round the earth, like serpents, when they had descended as low as possible, discharge themselves again: and it is possible for them to descend on either side as far as the middle, but not beyond; for in each direction there is an acclivity to the streams both ways.

"Now there are many other large and various streams, but among this great number there are four certain streams, of which the largest, and that which flows most outwardly round the earth, is called Ocean, but directly opposite this, and flowing in a contrary direction, is Acheron, which flows through other desert places, and moreover passing under the earth, reaches the Acherusian lake, where the souls of most who die arrive, and having remained there for certain destined periods, some longer and some shorter, are again sent forth into the generations of animals. A third river issues midway between these, and near its source falls into a vast region, burning with abundance of fire, and forms a lake larger than our sea, boiling with water and mud; from hence it proceeds in a circle, turbulent and muddy, and folding itself round it reaches both other places and the extremity of the Acherusian lake, but does not mingle with its water; but folding itself oftentimes beneath the earth, it discharges itself into the lower parts of Tartarus. And this is the river which they call Pyriphlegethon, whose burning streams emit dissevered fragments in whatever part of the earth they happen to be. Opposite to this again the fourth river first falls into a place dreadful and savage, as it is said, having its whole color like cyanus: this they call Stygian, and the lake, which the river forms by its discharge, Styx. This river having fallen in here, and received awful power in the water, sinking beneath the earth, proceeds, folding itself

round, in an opposite course to Pyriphlegethon, and meets it in the Acherusian lake from a contrary direction. Neither does the water of this river mingle with any other, but it too, having gone round in a circle, discharges itself into Tartarus, opposite to Pyriphlegethon. Its name, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

"These things being thus constituted, when the dead arrive at the place to which their demon leads them severally, first of all they are judged, as well those who have lived well and piously, as those who have not. And those who appear to have passed a middle kind of life, proceeding to Acheron, and embarking in the vessels they have, on these arrive at the lake, and there dwell, and when they are purified, and have suffered punishment for the iniquities they may have committed, they are set free, and each receives the reward of his good deeds, according to his deserts: but those who appear to be incurable, through the magnitude of their offences, either from having committed many and great sacrileges, or many unjust and lawless murders, or other similar crimes, these a suitable destiny hurls into Tartarus, whence they never come forth.

But those who appear to have been guilty of curable, yet great offences, such as those who through anger have committed any violence against father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their life in a state of penitence, or they who have become homicides in a similar manner, these must of necessity fall into Tartarus, but after they have fallen, and have been there for a year, the wave casts them forth, the homicides into Cocytus, but the parricides and matricides into Pyriphlegethon: but when, being borne along, they arrive at the Acherusian lake, there they cry out to and invoke, some those whom they slew, others those whom they injured, and invoking them, they entreat and implore them to suffer them to go out into the lake, and to

receive them, and if they persuade them, they go out, and are freed from their sufferings, but if not, they are borne back to Tartarus, and thence again to the rivers, and they do not cease from suffering this until they have persuaded those whom they have injured, for this sentence was imposed on them by the judges. But those who are found to have lived an eminently holy life, these are they, who, being freed and set at large from these regions in the earth, as from a prison, arrive at the pure abode above, and dwell on the upper parts of the earth. And among these, they who have sufficiently purified themselves by philosophy shall live without bodies, throughout all future time, and shall arrive at habitations yet more beautiful than these, which it is neither easy to describe, nor at present is there sufficient time for the purpose.

"But for the sake of these things which we have described, we should use every endeavor, Simmias, so as to acquire virtue and wisdom in this life; for the reward is noble, and the hope great.

"To affirm positively, indeed, that these things are exactly as I have described them, does not become a man of sense; that however either this, or something of the kind, takes place with respect to our souls and their habitations—since our soul is certainly immortal—this appears to me most fitting to be believed, and worthy the hazard for one who trusts in its reality; for the hazard is noble, and it is right to allure ourselves with such things, as with enchantments; for which reason I have prolonged my story to such a length. On account of these things, then, a man ought to be confident about his soul, who during this life has disregarded all the pleasures and ornaments of the body as foreign from his nature, and who, having thought that they do more harm than good, has zealously applied himself to the acquirement of knowledge, and who having adorned his

soul not with a foreign but its own proper ornament, temperance, justice, fortitude, freedom, and truth, thus waits for his passage to Hades, as one who is ready to depart whenever destiny shall summon him. You then, Simmias and Cebes, and the rest, will each of you depart at some future time; but now destiny summons me, as a tragic writer would say, and it is nearly time for me to betake myself to the bath; for it appears to me to be better to drink the poison after I have bathed myself, and not to trouble the women with washing my dead body."

Phaedo/ When he had thus spoken, Crito said;

Crito/ "So be it, Socrates, but what commands have you to give to these or to me, either respecting your children, or any other matter, in attending to which we can most oblige you?"

Socrates/ "What I always say, Crito, nothing new; that by taking care of yourselves you will oblige both me and mine, and yourselves, whatever you do, though you should not now promise it; but if you neglect yourselves, and will not live as it were in the footsteps of what has been now and formerly said, even though you should promise much at present, and that earnestly, you will do no good at all."

Crito/ "We will endeavor then so to do; but how shall we bury you?"

Socrates/ "Just as you please, if only you can catch me, and I do not escape from you."

Phaedo/ And at the same time smiling gently, and looking round on us, he said;

Socrates/ "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that I am that Socrates who is now conversing with you, and who methodizes each part of the discourse; but he thinks that I am he whom he will shortly behold dead, and asks how he should bury me. But that which I some time since argued at

length, that when I have drunk the poison I shall no longer remain with you, but shall depart to some happy state of the blessed, this I seem to have urged to him in vain, though I meant at the same time to console both you and myself. Be ye then my sureties to Crito, in an obligation contrary to that which he made to the judges; for he undertook that I should remain; but do you be sureties that, when I die, I shall not remain, but shall depart, that Crito may more easily bear it, and when he sees my body either burnt or buried, may not be afflicted for me, as if I suffered some dreadful thing, nor say at my interment that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or is buried. For be well assured, most excellent Crito, that to speak improperly is not only culpable as to the thing itself, but likewise occasions some injury to our souls. You must have a good courage then, and say that you bury my body, and bury it in such a manner as is pleasing to you, and as you think is most agreeable to our laws."

Phaedo/ When he had said thus he rose, and went into a chamber to bathe, and Crito followed him, but he directed us to wait for him. We waited, therefore, conversing among ourselves about what had been said, and considering it again, and sometimes speaking about our calamity, how severe it would be to us, sincerely thinking that, like those who are deprived of a father, we should pass the rest of our life as orphans. When he had bathed, and his children were brought to him, for he had two little sons and one grown up, and the women belonging to his family were come, having conversed with them in the presence of Crito, and given them such injunctions as he wished, he directed the women and children to go away, and then returned to us. And it was now near sun-set; for he spent a considerable time within. But when he came from bathing he sat down, and did not speak much afterwards; then the officer of the Eleven came in, and standing near him, said;

Jailer/ “Socrates, I shall not have to find that fault with you that I do with others, that they are angry with me, and curse me, when, by order of the archons, I bid them drink the poison. But you, on all other occasions during the time you have been here, I have found to be the most noble, meek, and excellent man of all that ever came into this place: and, therefore, I am now well convinced that you will not be angry with me, for you know who are to blame, but with them. Now, then, for you know what I came to announce to you, farewell, and endeavor to bear what is inevitable as easily as possible.”

Phaedo/ And at the same time, bursting into tears, he turned away and withdrew.

And Socrates, looking after him, said;

Socrates/ “And thou, too, farewell, we will do as you direct.”

Phaedo/ At the same time turning to us, he said;

Socrates/ “How courteous the man is; during the whole time I have been here he has visited me, and conversed with me sometimes, and proved the worthiest of men; and now how generously he weeps for me. But come, Crito, let us obey him, and let someone bring the poison, if it is ready pounded, but if not, let the man pound it.”

Crito/ “But I think, Socrates, that the sun is still on the mountains, and has not yet set. Besides, I know that others have drunk the poison very late, after it had been announced to them, and have supped and drunk freely, and some even have enjoyed the objects of their love. Do not hasten then, for there is yet time.”

Socrates/ “These men whom you mention, Crito, do these things with good reason, for they think they shall gain by so doing, and I too with good reason shall not do so; for I think I shall gain nothing by drinking a little later, except to

become ridiculous to myself, in being so fond of life, and sparing of it when none any longer remains. Go then, obey, and do not resist."

Phaedo/ Crito having heard this, nodded to the boy that stood near. And the boy having gone out, and staid for some time, came, bringing with him the man that was to administer the poison, who brought it ready pounded in a cup. And Socrates, on seeing the man, said;

Socrates/ "Well, my good friend, as you are skilled in these matters, what must I do?"

Jailer/ "Nothing else, than when you have drunk it walk about, until there is a heaviness in your legs, then lie down; thus it will do its purpose."

Phaedo/ And at the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. And he having received it very cheerfully, Echecrates, neither trembling, nor changing at all in color or countenance, but, as he was wont, looking steadfastly at the man, said;

Socrates/ "What say you of this potion, with respect to making a libation to anyone, is it lawful or not?"

Jailer/ "We only pound so much, Socrates, as we think sufficient to drink."

Socrates/ "I understand you, but it is certainly both lawful and right to pray to the gods, that my departure hence thither may be happy; which therefore I pray, and so may it be."

Phaedo/ And as he said this he drank it off readily and calmly. Thus far, most of us were with difficulty able to restrain ourselves from weeping, but when we saw him drinking, and having finished the draught, we could do so no longer; but in spite of myself the tears came in full torrent, so that, covering my face, I wept for myself, for I did not weep for him, but for my own fortune, in being deprived

of such a friend. But Crito, even before me, when he could not restrain his tears, had risen up. But Apollodorus even before this had not ceased weeping, and then bursting into an agony of grief, weeping and lamenting, he pierced the heart of everyone present, except Socrates himself.

Socrates/ "What are you doing, my admirable friends? I indeed, for this reason chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not commit any folly of this kind. For I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be quiet, therefore, and bear up."

Phaedo/ When we heard this we were ashamed, and restrained our tears. But he, having walked about, when he said that his legs were growing heavy, laid down on his back; for the man so directed him. And at the same time he who gave him the poison, taking hold of him, after a short interval examined his feet and legs; and then having pressed his foot hard, he asked if he felt it: he said that he did not. And after this he pressed his thighs; and thus going higher, he showed us that he was growing cold and stiff. Then Socrates touched himself, and said, that when the poison reached his heart he should then depart. But now the parts around the lower belly were almost cold; when uncovering himself, for he had been covered over, he said, and they were his last words;

Socrates/ "Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not neglect it."

Crito/ "It shall be done, but consider whether you have anything else to say."

Phaedo/ To this question he gave no reply; but shortly after he gave a convulsive movement, and the man covered him, and his eyes were fixed; and Crito, perceiving it, closed his mouth and eyes.

This, Echecrates, was the end of our friend, a man, as we may say, the best of all of his time that we have known, and moreover, the most wise and just.

Phaedo.

Translated by Church, F. J.

Persons of the Dialog.

Echecrates. Socrates. Cebes.

Simmias. Apollodorus. Crito.

The Servant of the Eleven.

SCENE. First Phlius, then the Prison of Socrates.

Echecrates/ Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on that day when he drank the poison in the prison, or did you hear the story from someone else?

Phaedo/ I was there myself, Echecrates.

Echecrates/ Then what was it that our master said before his death, and how did he die? I should be very glad if you would tell me. None of our citizens go very much to Athens now; and no stranger has come from there for a long time, who could give us any definite account of these things, except that he drank the poison and died. We could learn nothing beyond that.

Phaedo/ Then have you not heard about the trial either, how that went?

Echecrates/ Yes, we were told of that: and we were rather surprised to find that he did not die till so long after the trial. Why was that, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ It was an accident, Echecrates. The stern of the ship, which the Athenians send to Delos, happened to have been crowned on the day before the trial.

Echecrates/ And what is this ship?

Phaedo/ It is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus took the seven youths and the seven maidens to Crete, and saved them from death, and himself was saved. The Athenians made a vow then to Apollo, the story goes, to send a sacred mission to Delos every year, if they should be saved; and from that time to this they have always sent it to the god, every year. They have a law to keep the city pure as soon as the mission begins, and not to execute any sentence of death until the ship has returned from Delos; and sometimes, when it is detained by contrary winds, that is a long while. The sacred mission begins when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship: and, as I said, this happened to have been done on the day before the trial. That was why Socrates lay so long in prison between his trial and his death.

Echecrates/ But tell me about his death, Phaedo. What was said and done, and which of his friends were with our master? Or would not the authorities let them be there? Did he die alone?

Phaedo/ Oh, no: some of them were there, indeed several.

Echecrates/ It would be very good of you, if you are not busy, to tell us the whole story as exactly as you can.

Phaedo/ No: I have nothing to do and I will try to relate it. Nothing is more pleasant to me than to recall Socrates to my mind, whether by speaking of him myself, or by listening to others.

Echecrates/ Indeed, Phaedo, you will have an audience like yourself. But try to tell us everything that happened as precisely as you can.

Phaedo/ Well, I myself was strangely moved on that day. I did not feel that I was being present at the death of a dear friend: I did not pity him, for he seemed to me happy, Echecrates, both in his bearing and in his words, so fearlessly and nobly did he die. I could not help thinking that the gods

would watch over him still on his journey to the other world, and that when he arrived there it would be well with him, if it was ever well with any man. Therefore I had scarcely any feeling of pity, as you would expect at such a mournful time. Neither did I feel the pleasure which I usually felt at our philosophical discussions; for our talk was of philosophy. A very singular feeling came over me, a strange mixture of pleasure and of pain when I remembered that he was presently to die. All of us who were there were in much the same state, laughing and crying by turns; particularly Apollodorus. I think you know the man and his ways.

Echecrates/ Of course I do.

Phaedo/ Well, he did not restrain himself at all; and I myself and the others were greatly agitated too.

Echecrates/ Who were there, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ Of native Athenians, there was this Apollodorus, and Critobulus, and his father Crito, and Hermogenes, and Epigenes, and Aeschines, and Antisthenes. Then there was Ctesippus the Paeanian, and Menexenus, and some other Athenians. Plato, I believe was ill.

Echecrates/ Were any strangers there?

Phaedo/ Yes, there was Simmias of Thebes, and Cebes, and Phaedondes; and Eucleides and Terpsion from Megara.

Echecrates/ But Aristippus and Cleombrotus? were they present?

Phaedo/ No, they were not. They were said to be in Egina.

Echecrates/ Was anyone else there?

Phaedo/ No, I think that these were all.

Echecrates/ Then tell us about your conversation.

Phaedo/ I will try to relate the whole story to you from the beginning. On the previous days I and the others had always met in the morning at the court where the trial was held,

which was close to the prison; and then we had gone in to Socrates. We used to wait each morning until the prison was opened, conversing: for it was not opened early. When it was opened we used to go in to Socrates, and we generally spent the whole day with him. But on that morning we met earlier than usual; for the evening before we had learnt, on leaving the prison, that the ship had arrived from Delos. So we arranged to be at the usual place as early as possible. When we reached the prison the porter, who generally let us in, came out to us and bade us wait a little, and not to go in until he summoned us himself; for the Eleven, he said, are releasing Socrates from his fetters, and giving directions for his death to-day. In no great while he returned and bade us enter. So we went in and found Socrates just released, and Xanthippe—you know her—sitting by him, holding his child in her arms. When Xanthippe saw us, she wailed aloud, and cried, in her woman's way;

Xanthippe/ This is the last time, Socrates, that you will talk with your friends, or they with you.

Phaedo/ And Socrates glanced at Crito, and said;

Socrates/ Crito, let her be taken home.

Phaedo/ So some of Crito's servants led her away, weeping bitterly and beating her breast. But Socrates sat up on the bed, and bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and while he was rubbing it said to us;

Socrates/ How strange a thing is what men call pleasure! How wonderful is its relation to pain, which seems to be the opposite of it! They will not come to a man together: but if he pursues the one and gains it, he is almost forced to take the other also, as if they were two distinct things united at one end. And I think, that if Esop had noticed them he would have composed a fable about them, to the effect that God had wished to reconcile them when they were quarrelling, and

that, when he could not do that, he joined their ends together; and that therefore whenever the one comes to a man, the other is sure to follow. That is just the case with me. There was pain in my leg caused by the chains: and now, it seems, pleasure is come following the pain.

Phaedo/ Cebes interrupted him and said;

Cebes/ By the bye Socrates, I am glad that you reminded me. Several people have been inquiring about your poems, the hymn to Apollo, and Esops fables which you have put into meter, and only a day or two ago Evenus asked me what was your reason for writing poetry on coming here, when you had never written a line before. So if you wish me to be able to answer him when he asks me again, as I know that he will, tell me what to say.

Socrates/ Then tell him the truth, Cebes. Say that it was from no wish to pose as a rival to him, or to his poems. I knew that it would not be easy to do that. I was only testing the meaning of certain dreams, and acquitting my conscience about them, in case they should be bidding me make this kind of music. The fact is this. The same dream used often to come to me in my past life, appearing in different forms at different times, but always saying the same words, Socrates, work at music and compose it. Formerly I used to think that the dream was encouraging me and cheering me on in what was already the work of my life, just as the spectators cheer on different runners in a race. I supposed that the dream was encouraging me to create the music at which I was working already: for I thought that philosophy was the highest music, and my life was spent in philosophy. But then, after the trial, when the feast of the god delayed my death, it occurred to me that the dream might possibly be bidding me create music in the popular sense, and that in that case I ought to do so, and not to disobey: I thought that it would be safer to acquit my conscience by creating poetry in obedience to the dream before

I departed. So first I composed a hymn to the god whose feast it was. And then I turned such fables of Esop as I knew, and had ready to my hand, into verse, taking those which came first: for I reflected that a man who means to be a poet has to use fiction and not facts for his poems; and I could not invent fiction myself.

Tell Evenus this, Cebes, and bid him farewell from me; and tell him to follow me as quickly as he can, if he is wise. I, it seems, shall depart to-day, for that is the will of the Athenians.

Phaedo/ And Simmias said;

Simmias/ What strange advice to give Evenus, Socrates! I have often met him, and from what I have seen of him, I think that he is certainly not at all the man to take it, if he can help it.

Socrates/ What, is not Evenus a philosopher?

Simmias/ Yes, I suppose so.

Socrates/ Then Evenus will wish to die, and so will every man who is worthy of having any part in this study. But he will not lay violent hands on himself; for that, they say, is wrong.

Phaedo/ And as he spoke he put his legs off the bed on to the ground, and remained sitting thus for the rest of the conversation.

Then Cebes asked him;

Cebes/ What do you mean, Socrates, by saying that it is wrong for a man to lay violent hands on himself, but that the philosopher will wish to follow the dying man?

Socrates/ What, Cebes? Have you and Simmias been with Philolaus, and not heard about these things?

Cebes/ Nothing very definite, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, I myself only speak of them from hearsay: yet there is no reason why I should not tell you what I have

heard. Indeed, as I am setting out on a journey to the other world, what could be more fitting for me than to talk about my journey, and to consider what we imagine to be its nature? How could we better employ the interval between this and sunset?

Cebes/ Then what is their reason for saying that it is wrong for a man to kill himself, Socrates? It is quite true that I have heard Philolaus say, when he was living at Thebes, that it is not right; and I have heard the same thing from others too: but I never heard anything definite on the subject from any of them.

Socrates/ You must be of good cheer, possibly you will hear something someday. But perhaps you will be surprised if I say that this law, unlike every other law to which mankind are subject, is absolute and without exception; and that it is not true that death is better than life only for some persons and at some times. And perhaps you will be surprised if I tell you that these men, for whom it would be better to die, may not do themselves a service, but that they must await a benefactor from without.

Phaedo/ Cebes, laughing quietly, and speaking in his native dialect, said;

Cebes/ Oh indeed;

Socrates/ Indeed, so stated it may seem strange: and yet perhaps a reason may be given for it. The reason which the secret teaching gives, that man is in a kind of prison, and that he may not set himself free, nor escape from it, seems to me rather profound and not easy to fathom. But I do think, Cebes, that it is true that the gods are our guardians, and that we men are a part of their property. Do you not think so?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ Well then, if one of your possessions were to kill itself, though you had not signified that you wished it to die,

should you not be angry with it? Should you not punish it, if punishment were possible?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then in this way perhaps it is not unreasonable to hold that no man has a right to take his own life, but that he must wait until God sends some necessity upon him, as has now been sent upon me.

Cebes/ Yes, that does seem natural. But you were saying just now that the philosopher will desire to die. Is not that a paradox, Socrates, if what we have just been saying, that God is our guardian and that we are his property, be true. It is not reasonable to say that the wise man will be content to depart from this service, in which the gods, who are the best of all rulers, rule him. He will hardly think that when he becomes free he will take better care of himself than the gods take of him.

A fool perhaps might think so, and say that he would do well to run away from his master: he might not consider that he ought not to run away from a good master, but that he ought to remain with him as long as possible, and so in his thoughtlessness he might run away. But the wise man will surely desire to remain always with one who is better than himself. But if this be true, Socrates, the reverse of what you said just now seems to follow. The wise man should grieve to die, and the fool should rejoice.

Phaedo/ I thought Socrates was pleased with Cebes insistence. He looked at us, and said;

Socrates/ Cebes is always examining arguments. He will not be convinced at once by anything that one says.

Simmias/ Yes, Socrates, but I do think that now there is something in what Cebes says. Why should really wise men want to run away from masters who are better than themselves, and lightly quit their service? And I think Cebes

is aiming his argument at you, because you are so ready to leave us, and the gods, who are good rulers, as you yourself admit.

Socrates/ You are right. I suppose you mean that I must defend myself against your charge, as if I were in a court of justice.

Simmias/ That is just our meaning.

Socrates/ Well then, let me try to make a more successful defense to you than I did to the judges at my trial. I should be wrong, Cebes and Simmias, not to grieve at death, if I did not think that I was going to live both with other gods who are good and wise, and with men who have died, and who are better than the men of this world. But you must know that I hope that I am going to live among good men, though I am not quite sure of that. But I am as sure as I can be in such matters that I am going to live with gods who are very good masters. And therefore I am not so much grieved at death. I am confident that the dead have some kind of existence, and, as has been said of old, an existence that is far better for the good than for the wicked.

Simmias/ Well, Socrates, do you mean to go away and keep this belief to yourself, or will you let us share it with you? It seems to me that we too have an interest in this good. And it will also serve as your defense, if you can convince us of what you say.

Socrates/ I will try. But I think Crito has been wanting to speak to me. Let us first hear what he has to say.

Crito/ Only, Socrates, that the man who is going to give you the poison has been telling me to warn you not to talk much. He says that talking heats people, and that the action of the poison must not be counteracted by heat. Those who excite themselves sometimes have to drink it two or three times.

Socrates/ Let him be, let him mind his own business, and be prepared to give me the poison twice, or, if need be, thrice.

Crito/ I knew that would be your answer, but the man has been importunate.

Socrates/ Never mind him. But I wish now to explain to you, my judges, why it seems to me that a man who has really spent his life in philosophy has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and may well hope after death to gain in the other world the greatest good. I will try to show you, Simmias and Cebes, how this may be.

The world, perhaps, does not see that those who rightly engage in philosophy, study only dying and death. And, if this be true, it would be surely strange for a man all through his life to desire only death, and then, when death comes to him, to be vexed at it, when it has been his study and his desire for so long.

Phaedo/ Simmias laughed, and said.

Simmias/ Indeed, Socrates, you make me laugh, though I am scarcely in a laughing humor now. If the multitude heard that, I fancy they would think that what you say of philosophers is quite true; and my countrymen would entirely agree with you that philosophers are indeed eager to die, and they would say that they know full well that philosophers deserve to be put to death.

Socrates/ And they would be right, Simmias, except in saying that they know it. They do not know in what sense the true philosopher is eager to die, or what kind of death he deserves, or in what sense he deserves it. Let us dismiss them from our thoughts, and converse by ourselves. Do we believe death to be anything?

Simmias/ We do.

Socrates/ And do we not believe it to be the separation of the soul from the body? Does not death mean that the body

comes to exist by itself, separated from the soul, and that the soul exists by herself, separated from the body? What is death but that?

Simmias/ It is that.

Socrates/ Now consider, my good friend, if you and I are agreed on another point which I think will help us to understand the question better. Do you think that a philosopher will care very much about what are called pleasures, such as the pleasures of eating and drinking?

Simmias/ Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Or about the pleasures of sexual passion?

Simmias/ Indeed, no.

Socrates/ And, do you think that he holds the remaining cares of the body in high esteem? Will he think much of getting fine clothes, and sandals, and other bodily adornments, or will he despise them, except so far as he is absolutely forced to meddle with them?

Simmias/ The real philosopher, I think, will despise them.

Socrates/ In short, you think that his studies are not concerned with the body? He stands aloof from it, as far as he can, and turns towards the soul?

Simmias/ I do.

Socrates/ Well then, in these matters, first, it is clear that the philosopher releases his soul from communion with the body, so far as he can, beyond all other men?

Simmias/ It is.

Socrates/ And does not the world think, Simmias, that if a man has no pleasure in such things, and does not take his share in them, his life is not worth living? Do not they hold that he who thinks nothing of bodily pleasures is almost as good as dead?

Simmias/ Indeed you are right.

Socrates/ But what about the actual acquisition of wisdom? If the body is taken as a companion in the search for wisdom, is it a hindrance or not? For example, do sight and hearing convey any real truth to men? Are not the very poets forever telling us that we neither hear nor see anything accurately? But if these senses of the body are not accurate or clear, the others will hardly be so, for they are all less perfect than these, are they not?

Simmias/ Yes, I think so, certainly.

Socrates/ Then when does the soul attain truth? We see that, as often as she seeks to investigate anything in company with the body, the body leads her astray.

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ Is it not by reasoning, if at all, that any real truth becomes manifest to her?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And she reasons best, I suppose, when none of the senses, whether hearing, or sight, or pain, or pleasure, harasses her. when she has dismissed the body, and released herself as far as she can from all intercourse or contact with it, and so, coming to be as much alone with herself as is possible, strives after real truth.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ And here too the soul of the philosopher very greatly despises the body, and flies from it, and seeks to be alone by herself, does she not?

Simmias/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And what do you say to the next point, Simmias? Do we say that there is such a thing as absolute justice, or not?

Simmias/ Indeed we do.

Socrates/ And absolute beauty, and absolute good?

Simmias/ Of course.

Socrates/ Have you ever seen any of them with your eyes?

Simmias/ Indeed, I have not.

Socrates/ Did you ever grasp them with any bodily sense? I am speaking of all absolutes, whether size, or health, or strength; in a word of the essence or real being of everything. Is the very truth of things contemplated by the body? Is it not rather the case that the man, who prepares himself most carefully to apprehend by his intellect the essence of each thing which he examines, will come nearest to the knowledge of it?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And will not a man attain to this pure thought most completely, if he goes to each thing, as far as he can, with his mind alone, taking neither sight, nor any other sense along with his reason in the process of thought, to be an encumbrance? In every case he will pursue pure and absolute being, with his pure intellect alone. He will be set free as far as possible from the eye, and the ear, and, in short, from the whole body, because intercourse with the body troubles the soul, and hinders her from gaining truth and wisdom. Is it not he who will attain the knowledge of real being, if any man will?

Simmias/ Your words are admirably true, Socrates.

Socrates/ And, must not all this cause real philosophers to reflect, and make them say to each other, It seems that there is a narrow path which will bring us safely to our journeys end, with reason as our guide. As long as we have this body, and an evil of that sort is mingled with our souls, we shall never fully gain what we desire; and that is truth. For the body is forever taking up our time with the care which it needs. and, besides, whenever diseases attack it, they hinder us in our pursuit of real being. It fills us with passions, and desires, and fears, and all manner of phantoms, and much foolishness.

and so, as the saying goes, in very truth we can never think at all for it. It alone, and its desires, cause wars and factions and battles, for the origin of all wars is the pursuit of wealth, and we are forced to pursue wealth because we live in slavery to the cares of the body. And therefore, for all these reasons, we have no leisure for philosophy. And last of all, if we ever are free from the body for a time, and then turn to examine some matter, it falls in our way at every step of the inquiry, and causes confusion and trouble and panic, so that we cannot see the truth for it. Verily we have learnt that if we are to have any pure knowledge at all, we must be freed from the body; the soul by herself must behold things as they are. Then, it seems, after we are dead, we shall gain the wisdom which we desire, and for which we say we have a passion, but not while we are alive, as the argument shows. For if it be not possible to have pure knowledge while the body is with us, one of two things must be true. either we cannot gain knowledge at all, or we can gain it only after death. For then, and not till then, will the soul exist by herself, separate from the body. And while we live, we shall come nearest to knowledge, if we have no communion or intercourse with the body beyond what is absolutely necessary, and if we are not defiled with its nature. We must live pure from it until God himself releases us. And when we are thus pure and released from its follies, we shall dwell, I suppose, with others who are pure like ourselves, and we shall of ourselves know all that is pure; and that may be the truth. For I think that the impure is not allowed to attain to the pure. Such, Simmias, fancy must needs be the language and the reflections of the true lovers of knowledge. Do you not agree with me?

Simmias/ Most assuredly I do, Socrates.

Socrates/ And, my friend, if this be true, I have good hope that, when I reach the place whither I am going, I shall there, if anywhere, gain fully that which we have sought so earnestly

in the past. And so I shall set forth cheerfully on the journey that is appointed me to-day, and so may every man who thinks that his mind is prepared and purified.

Simmias/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ And does not the purification consist, as we have said, in separating the soul from the body, as far as is possible, and in accustoming her to collect and rally herself together from the body on every side, and to dwell alone by herself as much as she can both now and hereafter, released from the bondage of the body?

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Is not what we call death a release and separation of the soul from the body?

Simmias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And the true philosopher, we hold, is alone in his constant desire to set his soul free? His study is simply the release and separation of the soul from the body, is it not?

Simmias/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Would it not be absurd then, as I began by saying, for a man to complain at death coming to him, when in his life he has been preparing himself to live as nearly in a state of death as he could? Would not that be absurd?

Simmias/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ In truth, then, Simmias, the true philosopher studies to die, and to him of all men is death least terrible. Now look at the matter in this way. In everything he is at enmity with his body, and he longs to possess his soul alone. Would it not then be most unreasonable, if he were to fear and complain when he has his desire, instead of rejoicing to go to the place where he hopes to gain the wisdom that he has passionately longed for all his life, and to be released from the company of his enemy? Many a man has willingly gone to the

other world, when a human love, or wife or son has died, in the hope of seeing there those whom he longed for, and of being with them. and will a man who has a real passion for wisdom, and a firm hope of really finding wisdom in the other world and nowhere else, grieve at death, and not depart rejoicing? Nay, my friend, you ought not to think that, if he be truly a philosopher. He will be firmly convinced that there and nowhere else will he meet with wisdom in its purity. And if this be so, would it not, I repeat, be very unreasonable for such a man to fear death?

Simmias/ Yes, indeed, it would.

Socrates/ Does not this show clearly, that any man whom you see grieving at the approach of death, is after all no lover of wisdom, but a lover of his body? He is also, most likely, a lover either of wealth, or of honor, or, it may be, of both.

Simmias/ Yes, it is as you say.

Socrates/ Well then, Simmias, does not what is called courage belong especially to the philosopher?

Simmias/ Certainly I think so.

Socrates/ And does not temperance, the quality which even the world calls temperance, and which means to despise and control and govern the passions—does not temperance belong only to such men as most despise the body, and pass their lives in philosophy?

Simmias/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ For if you will consider the courage and the temperance of other men, you will find that they are strange things.

Simmias/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ You know, that all other men regard death as one of the great evils to which mankind are subject?

Simmias/ Indeed they do.

Socrates/ And when the brave men of them submit to death, do not they do so from a fear of still greater evils?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then all men but the philosopher are brave from fear and because they are afraid. Yet it is rather a strange thing for a man to be brave out of fear and cowardice.

Simmias/ Indeed it is.

Socrates/ And are not the orderly men of them in exactly the same case? Are not they temperate from a kind of intemperance? We should say that this cannot be. but in them this state of foolish temperance comes to that. They desire certain pleasures, and fear to lose them; and so they abstain from other pleasures because they are mastered by these. Intemperance is defined to mean being under the dominion of pleasure. yet they only master certain pleasures because they are mastered by others. But that is exactly what I said just now, that, in a way, they are made temperate from intemperance.

Simmias/ It seems to be so.

Socrates/ My dear Simmias, I fear that virtue is not really to be bought in this way, by bartering pleasure for pleasure, and pain for pain, and fear for fear, and the greater for the less, like coins. There is only one sterling coin for which all these things ought to be exchanged, and that is wisdom. All that is bought and sold for this and with this, whether courage, or temperance, or justice, is real. in one word true virtue cannot be without wisdom, and it matters nothing whether pleasure, and fear, and all other such things, are present or absent. But I think that the virtue which is composed of pleasures and fears bartered with one another, and severed from wisdom, is only a shadow of true virtue, and that it has no freedom, nor health, nor truth. True virtue in reality is a kind of purifying from all these things. and

temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom itself, are the purification. And I fancy that the men who established our mysteries had a very real meaning. in truth they have been telling us in parables all the time that whosoever comes to Hades uninitiated and profane, will lie in the mire; while he that has been purified and initiated shall dwell with the gods. For 'the thyrsus-bearers are many,' as they say in the mysteries, 'but the inspired few.' And by these last, I believe, are meant only the true philosophers. And I in my life have striven as hard as I was able, and have left nothing undone that I might become one of them. Whether I have striven in the right way, and whether I have succeeded or not, I suppose that I shall learn in a little while, when I reach the other world, if it be the will of God.

That is my defense, Simmias and Cebes, to show that I have reason for not being angry or grieved at leaving you and my masters here. I believe that in the next world, no less than in this, I shall meet with good masters and friends, though the multitude are incredulous of it. And if I have been more successful with you in my defense than I was with my Athenian judges, it is well.

Phaedo/ When Socrates had finished. Cebes replied to him, and said;

Cebes/ I think that for the most part you are right, Socrates. But men are very incredulous of what you have said of the soul. They fear that she will no longer exist anywhere when she has left the body, but that she will be destroyed and perish on the very day of death. They think that the moment that she is released and leaves the body, she will be dissolved and vanish away like breath or smoke, and thenceforward cease to exist at all. If she were to exist somewhere as a whole, released from the evils which you enumerated just now, we should have good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But it will need no little persuasion and assurance to

show that the soul exists after death, and continues to possess any power or wisdom.

Socrates/ True, Cebes; but what are we to do? Do you wish to converse about these matters and see if what I say is probable?

Cebes/ I for one, should gladly hear your opinion about them.

Socrates/ I think, that no one who heard me now, even if he were a comic poet, would say that I am an idle talker about things which do not concern me. So, if you wish it, let us examine this question.

Let us consider whether or no the souls of men exist in the next world after death, thus. There is an ancient belief, which we remember, that on leaving this world they exist there, and that they return hither and are born again from the dead. But if it be true that the living are born from the dead, our souls must exist in the other world. otherwise they could not be born again. It will be a sufficient proof that this is so if we can really prove that the living are born only from the dead. But if this is not so, we shall have to find some other argument.

Cebes/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Well, the easiest way of answering the question will be to consider it not in relation to men only, but also in relation to all animals and plants, and in short to all things that are generated. Is it the case that everything, which has an opposite, is generated only from its opposite. By opposites I mean, the honorable and the base, the just and the unjust, and so on in a thousand other instances. Let us consider then whether it is necessary for everything that has an opposite to be generated only from its own opposite. For instance, when anything becomes greater, I suppose it must first have been less and then become greater?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if a thing becomes less, it must have been greater, and afterwards become less?

Cebes/ That is so.

Socrates/ And further, the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the worse is generated from the better, and the more just from the more unjust?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then it is sufficiently clear to us that all things are generated in this way, opposites from opposites?

Cebes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And in every pair of opposites, are there not two generations between the two members of the pair, from the one to the other, and then back again from the other to the first? Between the greater and the less are growth and diminution, and we say that the one grows and the other diminishes, do we not?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And there is division and composition, and cold and hot, and so on. In fact is it not a universal law, even though we do hot always express it in so many words, that opposites are generated always from one another, and that there is a process of generation from one to the other?

Cebes/ It is.

Socrates/ Well, is there an opposite to life, in the same way that sleep is the opposite of being awake?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What is it?

Cebes/ Death.

Socrates/ Then if life and death are opposites, they are generated the one from the other. they are two, and between them there are two generations. Is it not so?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, I will explain to you one of the two pairs of opposites of which I spoke just now, and its generations, and you shall explain to me the other. Sleep is the opposite of waking. From sleep is produced the state of waking. and from the state of waking is produced sleep. Their generations are, first, to fall asleep; secondly, to awake. Is that clear?

Cebes/ Yes, quite.

Socrates/ Now then, do you tell me about life and death. Death is the opposite of life, is it not?

Cebes/ It is.

Socrates/ And they are generated the one from the other?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then what is that which is generated from the living?

Cebes/ The dead.

Socrates/ And what is generated from the dead?

Cebes/ I must admit that it is the living.

Socrates/ Then living things and living men are generated from the dead, Cebes?

Cebes/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then our souls exist in the other world?

Cebes/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Now of these two generations the one is certain? Death I suppose is certain enough, is it not?

Cebes/ Yes, quite.

Socrates/ What then shall we do? Shall we not assign an opposite generation to correspond? Or is nature imperfect here? Must we not assign some opposite generation to dying?

Cebes/ I think so, certainly.

Socrates/ And what must it be?

Cebes/ To come to life again.

Socrates/ And if there be such a thing as a return to life, it will be a generation from the dead to the living, will it not?

Cebes/ It will, certainly.

Socrates/ Then we are agreed on this point. namely, that the living are generated from the dead no less than the dead from the living. But we agreed that, if this be so, it is a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must exist somewhere, whence they come into being again.

Cebes/ I think, Socrates, that that is the necessary result of our premises.

Socrates/ And I think, Cebes, that our conclusion has not been an unfair one. For if opposites did not always correspond with opposites as they are generated, moving as it were round in a circle, and there were generation in a straight line forward from one opposite only, with no turning or return to the other, then, you know, all things would come at length to have the same form and be in the same state, and would cease to be generated at all.

Cebes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ It is not at all hard to understand my meaning. If, for example, the one opposite, to go to sleep, existed, without the corresponding opposite, to wake up, which is generated from the first, then all nature would at last make the tale of Endymion meaningless, and he would no longer be conspicuous; for everything else would be in the same state of sleep that he was in. And if all things were compounded

together and never separated, the Chaos of Anaxagoras would soon be realized. Just in the same way, my dear Cebes, if all things, in which there is any life, were to die, and when they were dead were to remain in that form and not come to life again, would not the necessary result be that everything at last would be dead, and nothing alive? For if living things were generated from other sources than death, and were to die, the result is inevitable that all things would be consumed by death. Is it not so?

Cebes/ It is indeed, I think, Socrates; I think that what you say is perfectly true.

Socrates/ Yes, Cebes, I think it is certainly so. We are not misled into this conclusion. The dead do come to life again, and the living are generated from them, and the souls of the dead exist; and with the souls of the good it is well, and with the souls of the evil it is evil.

Cebes/ And besides, Socrates, if the doctrine which you are fond of stating, that our learning is only a process of recollection, be true, then I suppose we must have learnt at some former time what we recollect now. And that would be impossible unless our souls had existed somewhere before they came into this human form. So that is another reason for believing the soul immortal.

Simmias/ But, Cebes, what are the proofs of that? Recall them to me. I am not very clear about them at present.

Cebes/ One argument, and the strongest of all, is that if you question men about anything in the right way, they will answer you correctly of themselves. But they would not have been able to do that, unless they had had within themselves knowledge and right reason. Again, show them such things as geometrical diagrams, and the proof of the doctrine is complete.

Socrates/ And if that does not convince you, Simmias, look at the matter in another way and see if you agree then. You have doubts, I know, how what is called knowledge can be recollection.

Simmias/ Nay, I do not doubt. But I want to recollect the argument about recollection. What Cebes undertook to explain has nearly brought your theory back to me and convinced me. But I am none the less ready to hear how you undertake to explain it.

Socrates/ In this way. We are agreed, I suppose, that if a man remembers anything, he must have known it at some previous time.

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are we agreed that when knowledge comes in the following way, it is recollection? When a man has seen or heard anything, or has perceived it by some other sense, and then knows not that thing only, but has also in his mind an impression of some other thing, of which the knowledge is quite different, are we not right in saying that he remembers the thing of which he has an impression in his mind?

Simmias/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean this. The knowledge of a man is different from the knowledge of a lyre, is it not?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And you know that when lovers see a lyre, or a garment, or anything that their favorites are wont to use, they have this feeling. They know the lyre, and in their mind they receive the image of the youth whose the lyre was. That is recollection. For instance, someone seeing Simmias often is reminded of Cebes; and there are endless examples of the same thing.

Simmias/ Indeed there are.

Socrates/ Is not that a kind of recollection; and more especially when a man has this feeling with reference to things which the lapse of time and inattention have made him forget?

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Well, is it possible to recollect a man on seeing the picture of a horse, or the picture of a lyre? or to recall Simmias on seeing a picture of Cebes?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And it is possible to recollect Simmias himself on seeing a picture of Simmias?

Simmias/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Then in all these cases there is recollection caused by similar objects, and also by dissimilar objects?

Simmias/ There is.

Socrates/ But when a man has a recollection caused by similar objects, will he not have a further feeling, and consider whether the likeness to that which he recollects is defective in any way or not?

Simmias/ He will.

Socrates/ Now see if this is true. Do we not believe in the existence of equality, —not the equality of pieces of wood, or of stones; but something beyond that, —equality in the abstract? Shall we say that there is such a thing, or not?

Simmias/ Yes indeed, most emphatically we will.

Socrates/ And do we know what this abstract equality is?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Where did we get the knowledge of it? Was it not from seeing the equal pieces of wood, and stones, and the like, which we were speaking of just now? Did we not form from them the idea of abstract equality, which is different from them? Or do you think that it is not different? Consider the question in this way. Do not equal pieces of wood and stones

appear to us sometimes equal, and sometimes unequal, though in fact they remain the same all the time?

Simmias/ Certainly they do.

Socrates/ But did absolute equals ever seem to you to be unequal, or abstract equality to be inequality?

Simmias/ No, never, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then equal things, are not the same as abstract equality?

Simmias/ No, certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yet it was from these equal things, which are different from abstract equality, that you have conceived and got your knowledge of abstract equality?

Simmias/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ And that whether it is like them or unlike them?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But that makes no difference. As long as the sight of one thing brings another thing to your mind, there must be recollection, whether or no the two things are like.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Well then, do the equal pieces of wood, and other similar equal things, of which we have been speaking, affect us at all in this way? Do they seem to us to be equal, in the way that abstract equality is equal? Do they come short of being like abstract equality, or not?

Simmias/ Indeed, they come very short of it.

Socrates/ Are we agreed about this? A man sees something and thinks to himself, 'This thing that I see aims at being like some other thing; but it comes short, and cannot be like that other thing; it is inferior:' must not the man who thinks that, have known at some previous time that other thing, which he says that it resembles, and to which it is inferior?

Simmias/ He must.

Socrates/ Well, have we ourselves had the same sort of feeling with reference to equal things, and to abstract equality?

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Then we must have had knowledge of equality before we first saw equal things, and perceived that they all strive to be like equality, and all come short of it.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ And we are agreed also that we have not, nor could we have, obtained the idea of equality except from sight or touch or some other sense. the same is true of all the senses.

Simmias/ Yes, Socrates, for the purposes of the argument that is so.

Socrates/ At any rate it is by the senses that we must perceive that all sensible objects strive to resemble absolute equality, and are inferior to it. Is not that so?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then before we began to see, and to hear, and to use the other senses, we must have received the knowledge of the nature of abstract and real equality; otherwise we could not have compared equal sensible objects with abstract equality, and seen that the former in all cases strive to be like the latter, though they are always inferior to it?

Simmias/ That is the necessary consequence of what we have been saying, Socrates.

Socrates/ Did we not see, and hear, and possess the other senses as soon as we were born?

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And we must have received the knowledge of abstract equality before we had these senses?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, it seems, we must have received that knowledge before we were born?

Simmias/ It does.

Socrates/ Now if we received this knowledge before our birth, and were born with it, we knew, both before, and at the moment of our birth, not only the equal, and the greater, and the less, but also everything of the same kind, did we not? Our present reasoning does not refer only to equality. It refers just as much to absolute good, and absolute beauty, and absolute justice, and absolute holiness; in short, I repeat, to everything which we mark with the name of the real, in the questions and answers of our dialectic. So we must have received our knowledge of all realities before we were born.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ And we must always be born with this knowledge, and must always retain it throughout life, if we have not each time forgotten it, after having received it. For to know means to receive and retain knowledge, and not to have lost it. Do not we mean by forgetting the loss of knowledge, Simmias?

Simmias/ Yes, certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ But, I suppose, if it be the case that we lost at birth the knowledge which we received before we were born, and then afterwards, by using our senses on the objects of sense, recovered the knowledge which we had previously possessed, then what we call learning is the recovering of knowledge which is already ours And are we not right in calling that recollection?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For we have found it possible to perceive a thing by sight, or hearing, or any other sense, and thence to form a notion of some other thing, like or unlike, which had been

forgotten, but with which this thing was associated. And therefore, I say, one of two things must be true.

Either we are all born with this knowledge, and retain it all our life; or, after birth, those whom we say are learning are only recollecting, and our knowledge is recollection.

Simmias/ Yes indeed, that is undoubtedly true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then which do you choose, Simmias? Are we born with knowledge, or do we recollect the things of which we have received knowledge before our birth?

Simmias/ I cannot say at present, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, have you an opinion about this question? Can a man who knows give an account of what he knows, or not? What do you think about that?

Simmias/ Yes, of course he can, Socrates.

Socrates/ And do you think that everyone can give an account of the ideas of which we have been speaking?

Simmias/ I wish I did, indeed, but I am very much afraid that by this time to-morrow there will no longer be any man living able to do so as it should be done.

Socrates/ Then, Simmias, you do not think that all men know these things?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then they recollect what they once learned?

Simmias/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And when did our souls gain this knowledge? It cannot have been after we were born men.

Simmias/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ Then it was before?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, Simmias, our souls existed formerly, apart from our bodies, and possessed intelligence before they came into man's shape.

Simmias/ Unless we receive this knowledge at the moment of birth, Socrates. That time still remains.

Socrates/ Well, my friend. and at what other time do we lose it? We agreed just now that we are not born with it. do we lose it at the same moment that we gain it? or can you suggest any other time?

Simmias/ I cannot, Socrates. I did not see that I was talking nonsense.

Socrates/ Then, Simmias, is not this the truth? If, as we are forever repeating, beauty, and good, and the other ideas really exist, and if we refer all the objects of sensible perception to these ideas which were formerly ours, and which we find to be ours still, and compare sensible objects with them, then, just as they exist, our souls must have existed before ever we were born. But if they do not exist, then our reasoning will have been thrown away. Is it so? If these ideas exist, does it not at once follow that our souls must have existed before we were born, and if they do not exist, then neither did our souls?

Simmias/ Admirably put, Socrates. I think that the necessity is the same for the one as for the other. The reasoning has reached a place of safety in the common proof of the existence of our souls before we were born, and of the existence of the ideas of which you spoke. Nothing is so evident to me as that beauty, and good, and the other ideas, which you spoke of just now, have a very real existence indeed. Your proof is quite sufficient for me.

Socrates/ But what of Cebes? I must convince Cebes too.

Simmias/ I think that he is satisfied, though he is the most skeptical of men in argument. But I think that he is perfectly convinced that our souls existed before we were born.

But I do not think myself, Socrates, that you have proved that the soul will continue to exist when we are dead. The common fear which Cebes spoke of, that she may be scattered to the winds at death, and that death may be the end of her existence, still stands in the way. Assuming that the soul is generated and comes together from some other elements, and exists before she ever enters the human body, why should she not come to an end and be destroyed, after she has entered into the body, when she is released from it?

Cebes/ You are right, Simmias. I think that only half the required proof has been given. It has been shown that our souls existed before we were born; but it must also be shown that our souls will continue to exist after we are dead, no less than that they existed before we were born, if the proof is to be complete.

Socrates/ That has been shown already, Simmias and Cebes, if you will combine this reasoning with our previous conclusion, that all life is generated from death. For if the soul exists in a previous state, and if when she comes into life and is born, she can only be born from death, and from a state of death, must she not exist after death too, since she has to be born again? So the point which you speak of has been already proved.

Still I think that you and Simmias would be glad to discuss this question further. Like children, you are afraid that the wind will really blow the soul away and disperse her when she leaves the body; especially if a man happens to die in a storm and not in a calm.

Phaedo/ Cebes laughed and said;

Cebes/ Try and convince us as if we were afraid, Socrates; or rather, do not think that we are afraid ourselves. Perhaps there is a child within us who has these fears. Let us try and persuade him not to be afraid of death, as if it were a bugbear.

Socrates/ You must charm him every day, until you have charmed him away.

Cebes/ And where shall we find a good charmer, Socrates, now that you are leaving us?

Socrates/ Hellas is a large country, Cebes, and good men may doubtless be found in it; and the nations of the Barbarians are many. You must search them all through for such a charmer, sparing neither money nor labor; for there is nothing on which you could spend money more profitably. And you must search for him among yourselves too, for you will hardly find a better charmer than yourselves.

Cebes/ That shall be done. But let us return to the point where we left off, if you will.

Socrates/ Yes, I will, why not?.

Cebes/ Very good.

Socrates/ Well, must we not ask ourselves this question? What kind of thing is liable to suffer dispersion, and for what kind of thing have we to fear dispersion? And then we must see whether the soul belongs to that kind or not, and be confident or afraid about our own souls accordingly.

Cebes/ That is true.

Socrates/ Now is it not the compound and composite which is naturally liable to be dissolved in the same way in which it was compounded? And is not what is uncompounded alone not liable to dissolution, if anything is not?

Cebes/ I think that that is so.

Socrates/ And what always remains in the same state and unchanging is most likely to be uncompounded, and what is

always changing and never the same is most likely to be compounded, I suppose?

Cebes/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ Now let us return to what we were speaking of before in the discussion. Does the being, which in our dialectic we define as meaning absolute existence, remain always in exactly the same state, or does it change? Do absolute equality, absolute beauty, and every other absolute existence, admit of any change at all? or does absolute existence in each case, being essentially uniform, remain the same and unchanging, and never in any case admit of any sort or kind of change whatsoever?

Cebes/ It must remain the same and unchanging, Socrates.

Socrates/ And what of the many beautiful things, such as men, and horses, and garments, and the like, and of all which bears the names of the ideas, whether equal, or beautiful, or anything else? Do they remain the same, or is it exactly the opposite with them? In short, do they never remain the same at all, either in themselves or in their relations?

Cebes/ These things, never remain the same.

Socrates/ You can touch them, and see them, and perceive them with the other senses, while you can grasp the unchanging only by the reasoning of the intellect. These latter are invisible and not seen. Is it not so?

Cebes/ That is perfectly true.

Socrates/ Let us assume then, if you will, that there are two kinds of existence, the one visible, the other invisible.

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the invisible is unchanging, while the visible is always changing.

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are not we men made up of body and soul?

Cebes/ There is nothing else.

Socrates/ And which of these kinds of existence should we say that the body is most like, and most akin to?

Cebes/ The visible; that is quite obvious.

Socrates/ And the soul? Is that visible or invisible?

Cebes/ It is invisible to man, Socrates.

Socrates/ But we mean by visible and invisible, visible and invisible to man; do we not?

Cebes/ Yes; that is what we mean.

Socrates/ Then what do we say of the soul? Is it visible, or not visible?

Cebes/ It is not visible.

Socrates/ Then is it invisible?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the soul is more like the invisible than the body; and the body is like the visible.

Cebes/ That is necessarily so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Have we not also said that, when the soul employs the body in any inquiry, and makes use of sight, or hearing, or any other sense, —for inquiry with the body means inquiry with the senses, —she is dragged away by it to the things which never remain the same, and wanders about blindly, and becomes confused and dizzy, like a drunken man, from dealing with things that are ever changing?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But when she investigates any question by herself, she goes away to the pure, and eternal, and immortal, and unchangeable, to which she is akin, and so she comes to be ever with it, as soon as she is by herself, and can be so. and then she rests from her wanderings, and dwells with it

unchangingly, for she is dealing with what is unchanging? And is not this state of the soul called wisdom?

Cebes/ Indeed, Socrates, you speak well and truly.

Socrates/ Which kind of existence do you think from our former and our present arguments that the soul is more like and more akin to?

Cebes/ I think, Socrates, that after this inquiry the very dullest man would agree that the soul is infinitely more like the unchangeable than the changeable.

Socrates/ And the body?

Cebes/ That is like the changeable.

Socrates/ Consider the matter in yet another way. When the soul and the body are united, nature ordains the one to be a slave and to be ruled, and the other to be master and to rule. Tell me once again, which do you think is like the divine, and which is like the mortal? Do you not think that the divine naturally rules and has authority, and that the mortal naturally is ruled and is a slave?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ Then which is the soul like?

Cebes/ That is quite plain, Socrates. The soul is like the divine, and the body is like the mortal.

Socrates/ Now tell me, Cebes; is the result of all that we have said that the soul is most like the divine, and the immortal, and the intelligible, and the uniform, and the indissoluble, and the unchangeable; while the body is most like the human, and the mortal, and the unintelligible, and the multiform, and the dissoluble, and the changeable? Have we any other argument to show that this is not so, my dear Cebes?

Cebes/ We have not.

Socrates/ Then if this is so, is it not the nature of the body to be dissolved quickly, and of the soul to be wholly or very nearly indissoluble?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ You observe, that after a man is dead, the visible part of him, his body, which lies in the visible world, and which we call the corpse, which is subject to dissolution and decomposition, is not dissolved and decomposed at once? It remains as it was for a considerable time, and even for a long time, if a man dies with his body in good condition, and in the vigor of life. And when the body falls in and is embalmed, like the mummies of Egypt, it remains nearly entire for an immense time. And should it decay, yet some parts of it, such as the bones and muscles, may almost be said to be immortal. Is it not so?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And shall we believe that the soul, which is invisible, and which goes hence to a place that is like herself, glorious, and pure, and invisible, to Hades, which is rightly called the unseen world, to dwell with the good and wise God, whither, if it be the will of God, my soul too must shortly go; —shall we believe that the soul, whose nature is so glorious, and pure, and invisible, is blown away by the winds and perishes as soon as she leaves the body, as the world says? Nay, dear Cebes and Simmias, it is not so. I will tell you what happens to a soul which is pure at her departure, and which in her life has had no intercourse that she could avoid with the body, and so draws after her, when she dies, no taint of the body, but has shunned it, and gathered herself into herself, for such has been her constant study; —and that only means that she has loved wisdom rightly, and has truly practiced how to die. Is not this the practice of death?

Cebes/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Does not the soul, then, which is in that state, go away to the invisible that is like herself, and to the divine, and the immortal, and the wise, where she is released from error, and folly, and fear, and fierce passions, and all the other evils that fall to the lot of men, and is happy, and for the rest of time lives in very truth with the gods, as they say that the initiated do? Shall we affirm this, Cebes?

Cebes/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ But if she be defiled and impure when she leaves the body, from being ever with it, and serving it and loving it, and from being besotted by it, and by its desires and pleasures, so that she thinks nothing true, but what is bodily, and can be touched, and seen, and eaten, and drunk, and used for men's lusts; if she has learnt to hate, and tremble at, and fly from what is dark and invisible to the eye, and intelligible and apprehended by philosophy—do you think that a soul which is in that state will be pure and without alloy at her departure?

Cebes/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ She is penetrated, I suppose, by the corporeal, which the unceasing intercourse and company and care of the body has made a part of her nature.

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And, my dear friend, the corporeal must be burdensome, and heavy, and earthy, and visible; and it is by this that such a soul is weighed down and dragged back to the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible world of Hades, and haunts, it is said, the graves and tombs, where shadowy forms of souls have been seen, which are the phantoms of souls which were impure at their release, and still cling to the visible; which is the reason why they are seen.

Cebes/ That is likely enough, Socrates.

Socrates/ That is likely, certainly, Cebes, and these are not the souls of the good, but of the evil, which are compelled to wander in such places as a punishment for the wicked lives that they have lived; and their wanderings continue until, from the desire for the corporeal that clings to them, they are again imprisoned in a body.

And, they are imprisoned, probably, in the bodies of animals with habits similar to the habits which were theirs in their lifetime.

Cebes/ What do you mean by that, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean that men who have practiced unbridled gluttony, and wantonness, and drunkenness, probably enter the bodies of asses, and suchlike animals. Do you not think so?

Cebes/ Certainly that is very likely.

Socrates/ And those who have chosen injustice, and tyranny, and robbery, enter the bodies of wolves, and hawks, and kites. Where else should we say that such souls go?

Cebes/ No doubt, they go into such animals.

Socrates/ In short, it is quite plain, whither each soul goes; each enters an animal with habits like its own.

Cebes/ Certainly, that is so.

Socrates/ And of these, the happiest, who go to the best place, are those who have practiced the popular and social virtues which are called temperance and justice, and which come from habit and practice, without philosophy or reason?

Cebes/ And why are they the happiest?

Socrates/ Because it is probable that they return into a mild and social nature like their own, such as that of bees, or wasps, or ants; or, it may be, into the bodies of men, and that from them are made worthy citizens.

Cebes/ Very likely.

Socrates/ But none but the philosopher or the lover of knowledge, who is wholly pure when he goes hence, is permitted to go to the race of the gods; and therefore, my friends Simmias and Cebes, the true philosopher is temperate, and refrains from all the pleasures of the body, and does not give himself up to them. It is not squandering his substance and poverty that he fears, as the multitude and the lovers of wealth do; nor again does he dread the dishonor and disgrace of wickedness, like the lovers of power and honor. It is not for these reasons, that he is temperate.

Cebes/ No, it would be unseemly in him if he were, Socrates.

Socrates/ Indeed it would, and therefore all those who have any care for their souls, and who do not spend their lives in forming and molding their bodies, bid farewell to such persons, and do not walk in their ways, thinking that they know not whither they are going. They themselves turn and follow whithersoever philosophy leads them, for they believe that they ought not to resist philosophy, or its deliverance and purification.

Cebes/ How, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you. The lovers of knowledge know that when philosophy receives the soul, she is fast bound in the body, and fastened to it. she is unable to contemplate what is, by herself, or except through the bars of her prison-house, the body; and she is wallowing in utter ignorance. And philosophy sees that the dreadful thing about the imprisonment is that it is caused by lust, and that the captive herself is an accomplice in her own captivity. The lovers of knowledge, I repeat, know that philosophy takes the soul when she is in this condition, and gently encourages her, and strives to release her from her captivity, showing her that the perceptions of the eye, and the ear, and the other senses, are full of deceit, and persuading

her to stand aloof from the senses, and to use them only when she must, and exhorting her to rally and gather herself together, and to trust only to herself, and to the real existence which she of her own self apprehends. and to believe that nothing which is subject to change, and which she perceives by other faculties, has any truth, for such things are visible and sensible, while what she herself sees is apprehended by reason and invisible. The soul of the true philosopher thinks that it would be wrong to resist this deliverance from captivity, and therefore she holds aloof, so far as she can, from pleasure, and desire, and pain, and fear; for she reckons that when a man has vehement pleasure, or fear, or pain, or desire, he suffers from them, not merely the evils which might be expected, such as sickness, or some loss arising from the indulgence of his desires; he suffers what is the greatest and last of evils, and does not take it into account.

Cebes/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean that when the soul of any man feels vehement pleasure or pain, she is forced at the same time to think that the object, whatever it be, of these sensations is the most distinct and truest, when it is not. Such objects are chiefly visible ones, are they not?

Cebes/ They are.

Socrates/ And is it not in this state that the soul is most completely in bondage to the body?

Cebes/ How so?

Socrates/ Because every pleasure and pain has a kind of nail, and nails and pins her to the body, and gives her a bodily nature, making her think that whatever the body says is true. And so, from having the same fancies and the same pleasures as the body, she is obliged, I suppose, to come to have the same ways, and way of life. she must always be defiled with the body when she leaves it, and cannot be pure when she

reaches the other world; and so she soon falls back into another body, and takes root in it, like seed that is sown. Therefore she loses all part in intercourse with the divine, and pure, and uniform.

Cebes/ That is very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is for these reasons then, Cebes, that the real lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; and not for the worlds reasons. Or do you think so?

Cebes/ No, certainly I do not.

Socrates/ Assuredly not. The soul of a philosopher will consider that it is the office of philosophy to set her free. She will know that she must not give herself up once more to the bondage of pleasure and pain, from which philosophy is releasing her, and, like Penelope, do a work, only to undo it continually, weaving instead of unweaving her web. She gains for herself peace from these things, and follows reason and ever abides in it, contemplating what is true and divine and real, and fostered up by them. So she thinks that she should live in this life, and when she dies she believes that she will go to what is akin to and like herself, and be released from human ills. A soul, Simmias and Cebes, that has been so nurtured, and so trained, will never fear lest she should be torn in pieces at her departure from the body, and blown away by the winds, and vanish, and utterly cease to exist.

Phaedo/ At these words there was a long silence. Socrates himself seemed to be absorbed in his argument, and so were most of us. Cebes and Simmias conversed for a little by themselves When Socrates observed them, he said.

Socrates/ What? Do you think that our reasoning is incomplete? It still offers many points of doubt and attack, if it is to be examined thoroughly. If you are discussing another question, I have nothing to say. But if you have any difficulty about this one, do not hesitate to tell me what it is, and, if you

are of opinion that the argument should be stated in a better way, explain your views yourselves. and take me along with you, if you think that you will be more successful in my company.

Simmias/ Well, Socrates, I will tell you the truth. Each of us has a difficulty, and each has been pushing on the other, and urging him to ask you about it. We were anxious to hear what you have to say; but we were reluctant to trouble you, for we were afraid that it might be unpleasant to you to be asked questions now.

Phaedo/ Socrates smiled at this answer, and said;

Socrates/ Dear me! Simmias; I shall find it hard to convince other people that I do not consider my fate a misfortune, when I cannot convince even you of it, and you are afraid that I am more peevish now than I used to be. You seem to think me inferior in prophetic power to the swans, which, when they find that they have to die, sing more loudly than they ever sang before, for joy that they are about to depart into the presence of God, whose servants they are. The fear which men have of death themselves makes them speak falsely of the swans, and they say that the swan is wailing at its death, and that it sings loud for grief. They forget that no bird sings when it is hungry, or cold, or in any pain; not even the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor the hoopoe, which, they assert, wail and sing for grief. But I think that neither these birds nor the swan sing for grief. I believe that they have a prophetic power and foreknowledge of the good things in the next world, for they are Apollo's birds. and so they sing and rejoice on the day of their death, more than in all their life. And I believe that I myself am a fellow slave with the swans, and consecrated to the service of the same God, and that I have prophetic power from my master no less than they; and that I am not more despondent than they are at leaving this life. So, as far as

vexing me goes, you may talk to me and ask questions as you please, as long as the Eleven of the Athenians will let you.

Simmias/ Good; I will tell you my difficulty, and Cebes will tell you why he is dissatisfied with your statement. I think, Socrates, and I daresay you think so too, that it is very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to obtain clear knowledge about these matters in this life. Yet I should hold him to be a very poor creature who did not test what is said about them in every way, and persevere until he had examined the question from every side, and could do no more. It is our duty to do one of two things. We must learn, or we must discover for ourselves, the truth of these matters; or, if that be impossible, we must take the best and most irrefragable of human doctrines, and embarking on that, as on a raft, risk the voyage of life, unless a stronger vessel, some divine word, could be found, on which we might take our journey more safely and more securely. And now, after what you have said, I shall not be ashamed to put a question to you. and then I shall not have to blame myself hereafter for not having said now what I think. Cebes and I have been considering your argument; and we think that it is hardly sufficient.

Socrates/ I daresay you are right, my friend. But tell me, where is it insufficient?

Simmias/ To me it is insufficient, because the very same argument might be used of a harmony, and a lyre, and its strings. It might be said that the harmony in a tuned lyre is something unseen, and incorporeal, and perfectly beautiful, and divine, while the lyre and its strings are corporeal, and with the nature of bodies, and compounded, and earthly, and akin to the mortal. Now suppose that, when the lyre is broken and the strings are cut or snapped, a man were to press the same argument that you have used, and were to say that the harmony cannot have perished, and that it must still exist. for it cannot possibly be that the lyre and the strings, with their

mortal nature, continue to exist, though those strings have been broken, while the harmony, which is of the same nature as the divine and the immortal, and akin to them, has perished, and perished before the mortal lyre. He would say that the harmony itself must still exist somewhere, and that the wood and the strings will rot away before anything happens to it. And I think, Socrates, that you too must be aware that many of us believe the soul to be most probably a mixture and harmony of the elements by which our body is, as it were, strung and held together, such as heat and cold, and dry and wet, and the like, when they are mixed together well and in due proportion. Now if the soul is a harmony, it is clear that, when the body is relaxed out of proportion, or over-strung by disease or other evils, the soul, though most divine, must perish at once, like other harmonies of sound and of all works of art, while what remains of each body must remain for a long time, until it be burnt or rotted away. What then shall we say to a man who asserts that the soul, being a mixture of the elements of the body, perishes first, at what is called death?

Phaedo/ Socrates looked keenly at us, as he often used to do, and smiled.

Socrates/ Simmias objection is a fair one. If any of you is readier than I am, why does he not answer? For Simmias looks like a formidable assailant. But before we answer him, I think that we had better hear what fault Cebes has to find with my reasoning, and so gain time to consider our reply. And then, when we have heard them both, we must either give in to them, if they seem to harmonies, or, if they do not, we must proceed to argue in defense of our reasoning. Come, Cebes, what is it that troubles you, and makes you doubt?

Cebes/ I will tell you. I think that the argument is just where it was, and still open to our former objection. You have shown very cleverly, and, if it is not arrogant to say so, quite

conclusively, that our souls existed before they entered the human form. I don't retract my admission on that point. But I am not convinced that they will continue to exist after we are dead. I do not agree with Simmias objection, that the soul is not stronger and more lasting than the body. I think that it is very much superior in those respects. 'Well, then,' the argument might reply, 'do you still doubt, when you see that the weaker part of a man continues to exist after his death? Do you not think that the more lasting part of him must necessarily be preserved for as long?' See, therefore, if there is anything in what I say; for I think that I, like Simmias, shall best express my meaning in a figure. It seems to me that a man might use an argument similar to yours, to prove that a weaver, who had died in old age, had not in fact perished, but was still alive somewhere; on the ground that the garment, which the weaver had woven for himself and used to wear, had not perished or been destroyed. And if anyone were incredulous, he might ask whether a human being, or a garment constantly in use and wear, lasts the longest; and on being told that a human being lasts much the longest, he might think that he had shown beyond all doubt that the man was safe, because what lasts a shorter time than the man had not perished. But that, I suppose, is not so, Simmias; for you too must examine what I say. Everyone would understand that such an argument was simple nonsense. This weaver wove himself many such garments and wore them out; he outlived them all but the last, but he perished before that one. Yet a man is in no wise inferior to his cloak, or weaker than it, on that account. And I think that the souls relation to the body may be expressed in a similar figure. Why should not a man very reasonably say in just the same way that the soul lasts a long time, while the body is weaker and lasts a shorter time? But, he might go on, each soul wears out many bodies, especially if she lives for many years. For if the body is in a

state of flux and decay in the man's lifetime, and the soul is ever repairing the worn-out part, it will surely follow that the soul, on perishing, will be clothed in her last robe, and perish before that alone. But when the soul has perished, then the body will show its weakness and quickly rot away. So as yet we have no right to be confident, on the strength of this argument, that our souls continue to exist after we are dead. And a man might concede even more than this to an opponent who used your argument; he might admit not only that our souls existed in the period before we were born, but also that there is no reason why some of them should not continue to exist in the future, and often come into being, and die again, after we are dead; for the soul is strong enough by nature to endure coming into being many times. He might grant that, without conceding that she suffers no harm in all these births, or that she is not at last wholly destroyed at one of the deaths; and he might say that no man knows when this death and dissolution of the body, which brings destruction to the soul, will be, for it is impossible for any man to find out that. But if this is true, a man's confidence about death must be an irrational confidence, unless he can prove that the soul is wholly indestructible and immortal. Otherwise everyone who is dying must fear that his soul will perish utterly this time in her separation from the body.

Phaedo/ It made us all very uncomfortable to listen to them, as we afterwards said to each other. We had been fully convinced by the previous argument; and now they seemed to overturn our conviction, and to make us distrust all the arguments that were to come, as well as the preceding ones, and to doubt if our judgment was worth anything, or even if certainty could be attained at all.

Echecrates/ By the gods, Phaedo, I can understand your feelings very well. I myself felt inclined while you were speaking to ask myself, 'Then what reasoning are we to believe

in future? That of Socrates was quite convincing, and now it has fallen into discredit.' For the doctrine that our soul is a harmony has always taken a wonderful hold of me, and your mentioning it reminded me that I myself had held it. And now I must begin again and find some other reasoning which shall convince me that a man's soul does not die with him at his death. So tell me, I pray you, how did Socrates pursue the argument? Did he show any signs of uneasiness, as you say that you did, or did he come to the defense of his argument calmly? And did he defend it satisfactorily or no? Tell me the whole story as exactly as you can.

Phaedo/ I have often, Echecrates, wondered at Socrates; but I never admired him more than I admired him then. There was nothing very strange in his having an answer. what I chiefly wondered at was, first, the kindness and good-nature and respect with which he listened to the young men's objections; and, secondly, the quickness with which he perceived their effect upon us; and, lastly, how well he healed our wounds, and rallied us as if we were beaten and flying troops, and encouraged us to follow him, and to examine the reasoning with him.

Echecrates/ How?

Phaedo/ I will tell you. I was sitting by the bed on a stool at his right hand, and his seat was a good deal higher than mine. He stroked my head and gathered up the hair on my neck in his hand—you know he used often to play with my hair—and said;

Socrates/ To-morrow, Phaedo, I daresay you will cut off these beautiful locks.

Phaedo/ I suppose so, Socrates.

Socrates/ You will not, if you take my advice.

Phaedo/ Why not?

Socrates/ You and I will cut off our hair to-day, if our argument be dead indeed, and we cannot bring it to life again. And I, if I were you, and the argument were to escape me, would swear an oath, as the Argives did, not to wear my hair long again, until I had renewed the fight and conquered the argument of Simmias and Cebes.

Phaedo/ But Heracles himself, they say, is not a match for two.

Socrates/ Then summon me to aid you, as your Iolaus, while there is still light.

Phaedo/ Then I summon you, not as Heracles summoned Iolaus, but as Iolaus might summon Heracles.

Socrates/ It will be the same. But first let us take care not to make a mistake.

Phaedo/ What mistake?

Socrates/ The mistake of becoming misologists, or haters of reasoning, as men become misanthropists for to hate reasoning is the greatest evil that can happen to us. Misology and misanthropy both come from similar causes. The latter arises out of the implicit and irrational confidence which is placed in a man, who is believed by his friend to be thoroughly true and sincere and trustworthy, and who is soon afterwards discovered to be a bad man and untrustworthy. This happens again and again; and when a man has had this experience many times, particularly at the hands of those whom he has believed to be his nearest and dearest friends, and he has quarreled with many of them, he ends by hating all men, and thinking that there is no good at all in anyone. Have you not seen this happen?

Phaedo/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not discreditable? Is it not clear that such a man tries to deal with men without understanding human nature? Had he understood it he would have known that, in

fact, good men and bad men are very few indeed, and that the majority of men are neither one nor the other.

Phaedo/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Just what is true of extremely large and extremely small things. What is rarer than to find a man, or a dog, or anything else which is either extremely large or extremely small? Or again, what is rarer than to find a man who is extremely swift or slow, or extremely base or honorable, or extremely black or white? Have you not noticed that in all these cases the extremes are rare and few, and that the average specimens are abundant and many?

Phaedo/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And in the same way, if there were a competition in wickedness, don't you think that the leading sinners would be found to be very few?

Phaedo/ That is likely enough.

Socrates/ Yes, it is. But this is not the point in which arguments are like men. it was you who led me on to discuss this point. The analogy is this. When a man believes some reasoning to be true, though he does not understand the art of reasoning, and then soon afterwards, rightly or wrongly, comes to think that it is false, and this happens to him time after time, he ends by disbelieving in reasoning altogether. You know that persons who spend their time in disputation, come at last to think themselves the wisest of men, and to imagine that they alone have discovered that there is no soundness or certainty anywhere, either in reasoning or in things; and that all existence is in a state of perpetual flux, like the currents of the Euripus, and never remains still for a moment.

Phaedo/ Yes, that is certainly true.

Socrates/ And, Phaedo, if there be a system of reasoning which is true, and certain, and which our minds can grasp, it

would be very lamentable that a man, who has met with some of these arguments which at one time seem true and at another false, should at last, in the bitterness of his heart gladly put all the blame on the reasoning, instead of on himself and his own unskillfulness, and spend the rest of his life in hating and reviling reasoning, and lose the truth and knowledge of reality.

Phaedo/ Indeed, that would be very lamentable.

Socrates/ First then, let us be careful not to admit into our souls the notion that all reasoning is very likely unsound. let us rather think that we ourselves are not yet sound. And we must strive earnestly like men to become sound, you, my friends, for the sake of all your future life; and I, because of my death. For I am afraid that at present I can hardly look at death like a philosopher; I am in a contentious mood, like the uneducated persons who never give a thought to the truth of the question about which they are disputing, but are only anxious to persuade their audience that they themselves are right. And I think that to-day I shall differ from them only in one thing. I shall not be anxious to persuade my audience that I am right, except by the way; but I shall be very anxious indeed to persuade myself. For see, my dear friend, how selfish my reasoning is. If what I say is true, it is well to believe it. But if there is nothing after death, at any rate I shall pain my friends less by my lamentations in the interval before I die. And this ignorance will not last forever that would have been an evil—it will soon come to an end. So prepared, Simmias and Cebes, I come to the argument. And you, if you take my advice, will think not of Socrates, but of the truth; and you will agree with me, if you think that what I say is true. otherwise you will oppose me with every argument that you have. and be careful that, in my anxiety to convince you, I do not deceive both you and myself, and go away, leaving my sting behind me, like a bee.

Now let us proceed. And first, if you find I have forgotten your arguments, repeat them. Simmias, I think, has fears and misgivings that the soul, being of the nature of a harmony, may perish before the body, though she is more divine and nobler than the body.

Cebes, if I am not mistaken, conceded that the soul is more enduring than the body; but he said that no one could tell whether the soul, after wearing out many bodies many times, did not herself perish on leaving her last body, and whether death be not precisely this, the destruction of the soul; for the destruction of the body is unceasing. Is there anything else, Simmias and Cebes, which we have to examine?

Phaedo/ They both agreed that these were the questions.

Socrates/ Do you reject all our previous conclusions, or only some of them?

Phaedo/ Only some of them.

Socrates/ Well, what do you say of our doctrine that knowledge is recollection, and that therefore our souls must necessarily have existed somewhere else, before they were imprisoned in our bodies?

Cebes/ I, was convinced by it at the time in a wonderful way. and now there is no doctrine to which I adhere more firmly.

Simmias/ And I am of that mind too; and I shall be very much surprised if I ever change it.

Socrates/ But, my Theban friend, you will have to change it, if this opinion of yours, that a harmony is a composite thing, and that the soul is a harmony composed of the elements of the body at the right tension, is to stand. You will hardly allow yourself to assert that the harmony was in existence before the things from which it was to be composed? Will you do that?

Simmias/ Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ But you see that that is what your assertion comes to when you say that the soul existed before she came into the form and body of man, and yet that she is composed of elements which did not yet exist? Your harmony is not like what you compare it to. the lyre and the strings and the sounds, as yet untuned, come into existence first. and the harmony is composed last of all, and perishes first. How will this belief of yours accord with the other?

Simmias/ It will not.

Socrates/ And yet, an argument about harmony is hardly the place for a discord.

Simmias/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Well, there is a discord in your argument. You must choose which doctrine you will retain, that knowledge is recollection, or that the soul is a harmony.

Simmias/ The former, Socrates, certainly. The latter has never been demonstrated to me; it rests only on probable and plausible grounds, which make it a popular opinion. I know that doctrines which ground their proofs on probabilities are impostors, and that they are very apt to mislead, both in geometry and everything else, if one is not on ones guard against them. But the doctrine about recollection and knowledge rests upon a foundation which claims belief. We agreed that the soul exists before she ever enters the body, as surely as the essence itself which has the name of real being, exists. And I am persuaded that I believe in this essence rightly and on sufficient evidence. It follows therefore, I suppose, that I cannot allow myself or anyone else to say that the soul is a harmony.

Socrates/ And, consider the question in another way, Simmias. Do you think that a harmony or any other composition can exist in a state other than the state of the elements of which it is composed?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor, I suppose, can it do or suffer anything beyond what they do and suffer?

Phaedo/ He assented.

Socrates/ A harmony therefore cannot lead the elements of which it is composed; it must follow them?

Phaedo/ He agreed.

Socrates/ And much less can it be moved, or make a sound, or do anything else, in opposition to its parts.

Simmias/ Much less, indeed.

Socrates/ Well; is not every harmony by nature a harmony according as it is adjusted?

Simmias/ I don't understand you.

Socrates/ If it is tuned more, and to a greater extent, supposing that to be possible, will it not be more a harmony, and to a greater extent, while if it is tuned less, and to a smaller extent, will it not be less a harmony, and to a smaller extent?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, is this true of the soul? Can one soul be more a soul, and to a greater extent, or less a soul, and to a smaller extent, than another, even in the smallest degree?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well then, please tell me this; is not one soul said to have intelligence and virtue and to be good, while another is said to have folly and vice and to be bad? And is it not true?

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ What then will those, who assert that the soul is a harmony, say that the virtue and the vice which are in our souls are? Another harmony and another discord? Will they say that the good soul is in tune, and that, herself a harmony, she has within herself another harmony, and that the bad

soul is out of tune herself, and has no other harmony within her?

Simmias/ I, cannot tell. But it is clear that they would have to say something of the kind.

Socrates/ But it has been conceded, that one soul is never more or less a soul than another. In other words, we have agreed that one harmony is never more, or to a greater extent, or less, or to a smaller extent a harmony than another. Is it not so?

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And the harmony which is neither more nor less a harmony, is not more or less tuned. Is that so?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And has that which is neither more nor less tuned, a greater, or a less, or an equal share of harmony?

Simmias/ An equal share.

Socrates/ Then, since one soul is never more nor less a soul than another, it has not been more or less tuned either?

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ Therefore it can have no greater share of harmony or of discord?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And, therefore, can one soul contain more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord, and virtue harmony?

Simmias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Or rather, Simmias, to speak quite accurately, I suppose that there will be no vice in any soul, if the soul is a harmony. I take it, there can never be any discord in a harmony, which is a perfect harmony.

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Neither can a soul, if it be a perfect soul, have any vice in it?

Simmias/ No; that follows necessarily from what has been said.

Socrates/ Then the result of this reasoning is that all the souls of all living creatures will be equally good, if the nature of all souls is to be equally souls.

Simmias/ Yes, I think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ And do you think that this is true, and that this would have been the fate of our argument, if the hypothesis that the soul is a harmony had been correct?

Simmias/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ Well, of all the parts of a man, should you not say that it was the soul, and particularly the wise soul, which rules?

Simmias/ I should.

Socrates/ Does she yield to the passions of the body, or does she oppose them? I mean this. When the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul drag it away and prevent it from drinking, and when it is hungry does she not prevent it from eating? And do we not see her opposing the passions of the body in a thousand other ways?

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ But we have also agreed that, if she is a harmony, she can never give a sound contrary to the tensions, and relaxations, and vibrations, and other changes of the elements of which she is composed; that she must follow them, and can never lead them?

Simmias/ Yes, we certainly have.

Socrates/ Well, now do we not find the soul acting in just the opposite way, and leading all the elements of which she is said to consist, and opposing them in almost everything all

through life; and lording it over them in every way, and chastising them, sometimes severely, and with a painful discipline, such as gymnastic and medicine, and sometimes lightly; sometimes threatening and sometimes admonishing the desires and passions and fears, as though she were speaking to something other than herself, as Homer makes Odysseus do in the Odyssey, where he says that

> "He smote upon his breast, and chid his heart.
> 'Endure, my heart, even worse hast thou endured.'"

Do you think that when Homer wrote that, he supposed the soul to be a harmony, and capable of being led by the passions of the body, and not of a nature to lead them, and be their lord, being herself far too divine a thing to be like a harmony?

Simmias/ Certainly, Socrates, I think not.

Socrates/ Then, my excellent friend, it is quite wrong to say that the soul is a harmony. For then, you see, we should not be in agreement either with the divine poet Homer, or with ourselves.

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ Very good; I think that we have contrived to appease our Theban Harmonia with tolerable success. But how about Cadmus, Cebes? How shall we appease him, and with what reasoning?

Cebes/ I daresay that you will find out how to do it. At all events you have argued that the soul is not a harmony in a way which surprised me very much. When Simmias was stating his objection, I wondered how anyone could possibly dispose of his argument. and so I was very much surprised to see it fall before the very first onset of yours. I should not wonder if the same fate awaited the argument of Cadmus.

Socrates/ My good friend, do not be over confident, or some evil eye will overturn the argument that is to come. However, that we will leave to God; let us, like Homers heroes,

‘advancing boldly,’ see if there is anything in what you say. The sum of what you seek is this. You require me to prove to you that the soul is indestructible and immortal; for if it be not so, you think that the confidence of a philosopher, who is confident in death, and who believes that when he is dead he will fare infinitely better in the other world than if he had lived a different sort of life in this world, is a foolish and idle confidence. You say that to show that the soul is strong and godlike, and that she existed before we were born men, is not enough; for that does not necessarily prove her immortality, but only that she lasts a long time, and has existed an enormous while, and has known and done many things in a previous state. Yet she is not any the more immortal for that. her very entrance into man’s body was, like a disease, the beginning of her destruction. And, you say, she passes this life in misery, and at last perishes in what we call death. You think that it makes no difference at all to the fears of each one of us, whether she enters the body once or many times. for everyone but a fool must fear death, if he does not know and cannot prove that she is immortal. That, I think, Cebes, is the substance of your objection. I state it again and again on purpose, that nothing may escape us, and that you may add to it or take away from it anything that you wish.

Cebes/ No, that is my meaning. I don’t want to add or to take away anything at present.

Phaedo/ Socrates paused for some time and thought. Then he said;

Socrates/ It is not an easy question that you are raising, Cebes. We must examine fully the whole subject of the causes of generation and decay. If you like, I will give you my own experiences, and if you think that you can make use of anything that I say, you may employ it to satisfy your misgivings.

Cebes/ Indeed, I should like to hear your experiences.

Socrates/ Listen, then, and I will tell you, Cebes. When I was a young man, I had a passionate desire for the wisdom which is called Physical Science. I thought it a splendid thing to know the causes of everything; why a thing comes into being, and why it perishes, and why it exists. I was always worrying myself with such questions as, Do living creatures take a definite form, as some persons say, from the fermentation of heat and cold? Is it the blood, or the air, or fire by which we think? Or is it none of these, but the brain which gives the senses of hearing and sight and smell, and do memory and opinion come from these, and knowledge from memory and opinion when in a state of quiescence? Again, I used to examine the destruction of these things, and the changes of the heaven and the earth, until at last I concluded that I was wholly and absolutely unfitted for these studies. I will prove that to you conclusively. I was so completely blinded by these studies, that I forgot what I had formerly seemed to myself and to others to know quite well. I unlearnt all that I had been used to think that I understood; even the cause of man's growth. Formerly I had thought it evident on the face of it that the cause of growth was eating and drinking; and that, when from food flesh is added to flesh, and bone to bone, and in the same way to the other parts of the body their proper elements, then by degrees the small bulk grows to be large, and so the boy becomes a man. Don't you think that my belief was reasonable?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ Then here is another experience for you. I used to feel no doubt, when I saw a tall man standing by a short one, that the tall man was, it might be, a head the taller, or, in the same way, that one horse was bigger than another. I was even clearer that ten was more than eight by the addition

of two, and that a thing two cubits long was longer by half its length than a thing one cubit long.

Cebes/ And what do you think now?

Socrates/ I think that I am very far from believing that I know the cause of any of these things. Why, when you add one to one, I am not sure either that the one to which one is added has become two, or that the one added and the one to which it is added become, by the addition, two. I cannot understand how, when they are brought together, this union, or placing of one by the other, should be the cause of their becoming two, whereas, when they were separated, each of them was one, and they were not two. Nor, again, if you divide one into two, can I convince myself that this division is the cause of one becoming two. for then a thing becomes two from exactly the opposite cause. In the former case it was because two units were brought together, and the one was added to the other; while now it is because they are separated, and the one divided from the other. Nor, again, can I persuade myself that I know how one is generated; in short, this method does not show me the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything. I have in my own mind a confused idea of another method, but I cannot admit this one for a moment.

But one day I listened to a man who said that he was reading from a book of Anaxagoras, which affirmed that it is Mind which orders and is the cause of all things. I was delighted with this theory; it seemed to me to be right that Mind should be the cause of all things, and I thought to myself, If this is so, then Mind will order and arrange each thing in the best possible way. So if we wish to discover the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a thing, we must discover how it is best for that thing to exist, or to act, or to be acted on. Man therefore has only to consider what is best and fittest for himself, or for other things, and then it follows necessarily that he will know what is bad; for both are

included in the same science. These reflections made me very happy. I thought that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of existence after my own heart, and I expected that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round, and that he would then go on to explain to me the cause and the necessity, and tell me what is best, and that it is best for the earth to be of that shape. If he said that the earth was in the center of the universe, I thought that he would explain that it was best for it to be there; and I was prepared not to require any other kind of cause, if he made this clear to me. In the same way I was prepared to ask questions about the sun, and the moon, and the stars, about their relative speeds, and revolutions, and changes; and to hear why it is best for each of them to act and be acted on as they are acted on. I never thought that, when he said that things are ordered by Mind, he would introduce any reason for their being as they are, except that they are best so. I thought that he would assign a cause to each thing, and a cause to the universe, and then would go on to explain to me what was best for each thing, and what was the common good of all. I would not have sold my hopes for a great deal. I seized the books very eagerly, and read them as fast as I could, in order that I might know what is best and what is worse.

All my splendid hopes were dashed to the ground, my friend, for as I went on reading I found that the writer made no use of Mind at all, and that he assigned no causes for the order of things. His causes were air, and ether, and water, and many other strange things. I thought that he was exactly like a man who should begin by saying that Socrates does all that he does by Mind, and who, when he tried to give a reason for each of my actions, should say, first, that I am sitting here now, because my body is composed of bones and muscles, and that the bones are hard and separated by joints, while the muscles can be tightened and loosened, and, together with the

flesh, and the skin which holds them together, cover the bones; and that therefore, when the bones are raised in their sockets, the relaxation and contraction of the muscles makes it possible for me now to bend my limbs, and that that is the cause of my sitting here with my legs bent. And in the same way he would go on to explain why I am talking to you. he would assign voice, and air, and hearing, and a thousand other things as causes; but he would quite forget to mention the real cause, which is that since the Athenians thought it right to condemn me, I have thought it right and just to sit here and to submit to whatever sentence they may think fit to impose. For, by the dog of Egypt, I think that these muscles and bones would long ago have been in Megara or Boeotia, prompted by their opinion of what is best, if I had not thought it better and more honorable to submit to whatever penalty the state inflicts, rather than escape by flight. But to call these things causes is too absurd! If it were said that without bones and muscles and the other parts of my body I could not have carried my resolutions into effect, that would be true. But to say that they are the cause of what I do, and that in this way I am acting by Mind, and not from choice of what is best, would be a very loose and careless way of talking. It simply means that a man cannot distinguish the real cause from that without which the cause cannot be the cause, and this it is, I think, which the multitude, groping about in the dark, speak of as the cause, giving it a name which does not belong to it. And so one man surrounds the earth with a vortex, and makes the heavens sustain it. Another represents the earth as a flat kneading-trough, and supports it on a basis of air. But they never think of looking for a power which is involved in these things being disposed as it is best for them to be, nor do they think that such a power has any divine strength. they expect to find an Atlas who is stronger and more immortal and abler to hold the world together, and they never for a moment

imagine that it is the binding force of good which really binds and holds things together. I would most gladly learn the nature of that kind of cause from any man; but I wholly failed either to discover it myself, or to learn it from anyone else. However, I had a second string to my bow, and perhaps, Cebes, you would like me to describe to you how I proceeded in my search for the cause.

Cebes/ I should like to hear very much indeed.

Socrates/ When I had given up inquiring into real existence, I thought that I must take care that I did not suffer as people do who look at the sun during an eclipse. For they are apt to lose their eyesight, unless they look at the suns reflection in water or some such medium. That danger occurred to me. I was afraid that my soul might be completely blinded if I looked at things with my eyes, and tried to grasp them with my senses. So I thought that I must have recourse to conceptions, and examine the truth of existence by means of them. Perhaps my illustration is not quite accurate. I am scarcely prepared to admit that he who examines existence through conceptions is dealing with mere reflections, any more than he who examines it as manifested in sensible objects. However I began in this way. I assumed in each case whatever principle I judged to be strongest; and then I held as true whatever seemed to agree with it, whether in the case of the cause or of anything else, and as untrue, whatever seemed not to agree with it. I should like to explain my meaning more clearly. I don't think you understand me yet.

Cebes/ Indeed I do not very well.

Socrates/ I mean nothing new; only what I have repeated over and over again, both in our conversation to-day and at other times. I am going to try to explain to you the kind of cause at which I have worked, and I will go back to what we have so often spoken of, and begin with the assumption that

there exists an absolute beauty, and an absolute good, and an absolute greatness, and so on. If you grant me this, and agree that they exist, I hope to be able to show you what my cause is, and to discover that the soul is immortal.

Cebes/ You may assume that I grant it you; go on with your proof.

Socrates/ Then do you agree with me in what follows? It appears to me that if anything besides absolute beauty is beautiful, it is so simply because it partakes of absolute beauty, and I say the same of all phenomena. Do you allow that kind of cause?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ Well then, I no longer recognize, nor can I understand, these otherwise causes. if I am told that anything is beautiful because it has a rich color, or a goodly form, or the like, I pay no attention, for such language only confuses me; and in a simple and plain, and perhaps a foolish way, I hold to the doctrine that the thing is only made beautiful by the presence or communication, or whatever you please to call it, of absolute beauty I do not wish to insist on the nature of the communication, but what I am sure of is, that it is absolute beauty which makes all beautiful things beautiful. This seems to me to be the safest answer that I can give myself or others; I believe that I shall never fall if I hold to this; it is a safe answer to make to myself or anyone else, that it is absolute beauty which makes beautiful things beautiful. Don't you think so?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ And it is size that makes large things large, and larger things larger, and smallness that makes smaller things smaller?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if you were told that one man was taller than another by a head, and that the shorter man was shorter by a head, you would not accept the statement. You would protest that you say only that the greater is greater by size, and that size is the cause of its being greater; and that the less is only less by smallness, and that smallness is the cause of its being less. You would be afraid to assert that a man is greater or smaller by a head, lest you should be met by the retort, first, that the greater is greater, and the smaller, smaller, by the same thing, and secondly, that the greater is greater by a head, which is a small thing, and that it is truly marvelous that a small thing should make a man great. Should you not be afraid of that?

Phaedo/ laughing Cebes said: —

Cebes/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And you would be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two, and that two is the cause of the excess; you would say that ten was more than eight by number, and that number is the cause of the excess? And in just the same way you would be afraid to say that a thing two cubits long was longer than a thing one cubit long by half its length, instead of by size, would you not?

Cebes/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Again, you would be careful not to affirm that, if one is added to one, the addition is the cause of two, or, if one is divided, that the division is the cause of two? You would protest loudly that you know of no way in which a thing can be generated, except by participation in its own proper essence; and that you can give no cause for the generation of two except participation in duality; and that all things which are to be two must participate in duality, while whatever is to be one must participate in unity. You would leave the explanation of these divisions and additions and all such

subtleties to wiser men than yourself. You would be frightened, as the saying is, at your own shadow and ignorance, and would hold fast to the safety of our principle, and so give your answer. But if anyone should attack the principle itself, you would not mind him or answer him until you had considered whether the consequences of it are consistent or inconsistent, and when you had to give an account of the principle itself, you would give it in the same way, by assuming some other principle which you think the strongest of the higher ones, and so go on until you had reached a satisfactory resting-place. You would not mix up the first principle and its consequences in your argument, as mere disputants do, if you really wish to discover anything of existence. Such persons will very likely not spend a single word or thought upon that. for they are clever enough to be able to please themselves entirely, though their argument is a chaos. But you, I think, if you are a philosopher, will do as I say.

Phaedo/ Very true, said Simmias and Cebes together.

Echecrates/ And they were right, Phaedo. I think the clearness of his reasoning, even to the dullest, is quite wonderful.

Phaedo/ Indeed, Echecrates, all who were there thought so too.

Echecrates/ So do we who were not there, but who are listening to your story. But how did the argument proceed after that?

Phaedo/ They had admitted that each of the Ideas exists, and that Phenomena take the names of the Ideas as they participate in them. Socrates, I think, then went on to ask, —

Socrates/ If you say this, do you not, in saying that Simmias is taller than Socrates and shorter than Phaedo, say

that Simmias possesses both the attribute of tallness and the attribute of shortness?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ But you admit, that the proposition that Simmias is taller than Socrates is not exactly true, as it is stated. Simmias is not really taller because he is Simmias, but because of his height. Nor again is he taller than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because of Socrates shortness compared with Simmias tallness.

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ Nor is Simmias shorter than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because of Phaedo tallness compared with Simmias shortness.

Cebes/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then in this way Simmias is called both short and tall, when he is between the two, he exceeds the shortness of one by the excess of his height, and gives the other a tallness exceeding his own shortness. I daresay you think, that my language is like a legal document for precision and formality. But I think that it is as I say.

Phaedo/ He agreed.

Socrates/ I say it because I want you to think as I do. It seems to me not only that absolute greatness will never be great and small at once, but also that greatness in us never admits smallness, and will not be exceeded. One of two things must happen. either the greater will give way and fly at the approach of its opposite, the less, or it will perish. It will not stand its ground, and receive smallness, and be other than it was, just as I stand my ground, and receive smallness and remain the very same small man that I was. But greatness cannot endure to be small, being great. Just in the same way again smallness in us will never become nor be great. nor will any opposite, while it remains what it was, become or be at

the same time the opposite of what it was. Either it goes away, or it perishes in the change.

Cebes/ That is exactly what I think.

Phaedo/ Thereupon someone—I am not sure who—said;

Someone/ But surely is not this just the reverse of what we agreed to be true earlier in the argument, that the greater is generated from the less, and the less from the greater, and, in short, that opposites are generated from opposites? But now it seems to be denied that this can ever happen.

Phaedo/ Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened.

Socrates/ Well and bravely remarked but you have not noticed the difference between the two propositions. What we said then was that a concrete thing is generated from its opposite what we say now is that the absolute opposite can never become opposite to itself, either when it is in us, or when it is in nature. We were speaking then of things in which the opposites are, and we named them after those opposites but now we are speaking of the opposites themselves, whose inherence gives the things their names; and they, we say, will never be generated from each other.

Phaedo/ At the same time he turned to Cebes and asked;

Socrates/ Did his objection trouble you at all, Cebes?

Cebes/ No; I don't feel that difficulty. But I will not deny that many other things trouble me.

Socrates/ Then we are quite agreed on this point. An opposite will never be opposite to itself.

Cebes/ No, never.

Socrates/ Now tell me again; do you agree with me in this? Are there not things which you call heat and cold?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are they the same as snow and fire?

Cebes/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ Heat is different from fire, and cold from snow?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ But I suppose, as we have said, that you do not think that snow can ever receive heat, and yet remain what it was, snow and hot. it will either retire or perish at the approach of heat.

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And fire, again, will either retire or perish at the approach of cold. It will never endure to receive the cold and still remain what it was, fire and cold.

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ Then, it is true of some of these things, that not only the idea itself has a right to its name for all time, but that something else too, which is not the idea, but which has the form of the idea wherever it exists, shares the name. Perhaps my meaning will be clearer by an example. The odd ought always to have the name of odd, ought it not?

Cebes/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Well, my question is this. Is the odd the only thing with this name, or is there something else, which is not the same as the odd, but which must always have this name, together with its own, because its nature is such that it is never separated from the odd? There are many examples of what I mean. let us take one of them, the number three, and consider it. Do you not think that we must always call it by the name of odd, as well as by its own name, although the odd is not the same as the number three? Yet the nature of the number three, and of the number five, and of half the whole series of numbers, is such that each of them is odd, though none of them is the same as the odd. In the same way the number two, and the number four, and the whole of the other

series of numbers, are each of them always even, though they are not the same as the even. Do you agree or not?

Cebes/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ Then see what I want to show you. It is not only opposite ideas which appear not to admit their opposites; things also which are not opposites, but which always contain opposites, seem as if they would not admit the idea which is opposite to the idea that they contain. they either perish, or retire at its approach. Shall we not say that the number three would perish or endure anything sooner than become even while it remains three?

Cebes/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And yet, the number two is not the opposite of the number three.

Cebes/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ Then it is not only the ideas which will not endure the approach of their opposites; there are some other things besides which will not endure such an approach.

Cebes/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Shall we determine, if we can, what is their nature?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Will they not be those things, Cebes, which force whatever they are in to have always not its own idea only, but the idea of some opposite as well?

Cebes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Only what we were saying just now. You know, I think, that whatever the idea of three is in, is bound to be not three only, but odd as well.

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, we say that the opposite idea to the form which produces this result will never come to that thing.

Cebes/ Indeed, no.

Socrates/ But the idea of the odd produces it?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the idea of the even is the opposite of the idea of the odd?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the idea of the even will never come to three?

Cebes/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ So three has no part in the even?

Cebes/ None.

Socrates/ Then the number three is uneven?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ So much for the definition which I undertook to give of things which are not opposites, and yet do not admit opposites; thus we have seen that the number three does not admit the even, though it is not the opposite of the even, for it always brings with it the opposite of the even; and the number two does not admit the odd, nor fire cold, and so on. Do you agree with me in saying that not only does the opposite not admit the opposite, but also that whatever brings with it an opposite of anything to which it goes, never admits the opposite of that which it brings? Let me recall this to you again; there is no harm in repetition. Five will not admit the idea of the even, nor will the double of five—ten—admit the idea of the odd. It is not itself an opposite, yet it will not admit the idea of the odd. Again, one and a half, a half, and the other numbers of that kind will not admit the idea of the whole, nor again will such numbers as a third. Do you follow and agree?

Cebes/ I follow you and entirely agree with you.

Socrates/ Now begin again, and answer me. And imitate me; do not answer me in the terms of my question. I mean, do

not give the old safe answer which I have already spoken of, for I see another way of safety, which is the result of what we have been saying. If you ask me, what is that which must be in the body to make it hot, I shall not give our old safe and stupid answer, and say that it is heat; I shall make a more refined answer, drawn from what we have been saying, and reply, fire. If you ask me, what is that which must be in the body to make it sick, I shall not say sickness, but fever. and again to the question what is that which must be in number to make it odd, I shall not reply oddness, but unity, and so on. Do you understand my meaning clearly yet?

Cebes/ Yes, quite.

Socrates/ Tell me, what is that which must be in a body to make it alive?

Cebes/ A soul.

Socrates/ And is this always so?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then the soul always brings life to whatever contains her?

Cebes/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And is there an opposite to life, or not?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ What is it?

Cebes/ Death.

Socrates/ And we have already agreed that the soul cannot ever receive the opposite of what she brings?

Cebes/ Yes, certainly we have.

Socrates/ Well; what name did we give to that which does not admit the idea of the even?

Cebes/ The uneven.

Socrates/ And what do we call that which does not admit justice or music?

Cebes/ The unjust, and the unmusical.

Socrates/ Good; and what do we call that which does not admit death?

Cebes/ The immortal.

Socrates/ And the soul does not admit death?

Cebes/ No.

Socrates/ Then the soul is immortal?

Cebes/ It is.

Socrates/ Good. Shall we say that this is proved? What do you think?

Cebes/ Yes, Socrates, and very sufficiently.

Socrates/ Well, Cebes, if the odd had been necessarily imperishable, must not three have been imperishable?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if cold had been necessarily imperishable, snow would have retired safe and unmelted, whenever warmth was applied to it. It would not have perished, and it would not have stayed and admitted the heat.

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ In the same way, I suppose, if warmth were imperishable, whenever cold attacked fire, the fire would never have been extinguished or have perished. It would have gone away in safety.

Cebes/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And must we not say the same of the immortal? If the immortal is imperishable, the soul cannot perish when death comes upon her. It follows from what we have said that she will not ever admit death, or be in a state of death, any more than three, or the odd itself, will ever be even, or fire, or

the heat itself which is in fire, cold. But, it may be said, Granted that the odd does not become even at the approach of the even; why, when the odd has perished, may not the even come into its place? We could not contend in reply that it does not perish, for the uneven is not imperishable. if we had agreed that the uneven was imperishable, we could have easily contended that the odd and three go away at the approach of the even; and we could have urged the same contention about fire and heat and the rest, could we not?

Cebes/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And now, if we are agreed that the immortal is imperishable, then the soul will be not immortal only, but also imperishable; otherwise we shall require another argument.

Cebes/ Nay, there is no need of that, as far as this point goes; for if the immortal, which is eternal, will admit of destruction, what will not?

Socrates/ And all men would admit, that God, and the essential form of life, and all else that is immortal, never perishes.

Cebes/ All men, indeed, and, what is more, I think, all gods would admit that.

Socrates/ Then if the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if it be immortal, be imperishable?

Cebes/ Certainly, it must.

Socrates/ Then, it seems, when death attacks a man, his mortal part dies, but his immortal part retreats before death, and goes away safe and indestructible.

Cebes/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then, Cebes, beyond all question the soul is immortal and imperishable; and our souls will indeed exist in the other world.

Cebes/ I, Socrates, have no more objections to urge; your reasoning has quite satisfied me. If Simmias, or anyone else, has anything to say, it would be well for him to say it now. for I know not to what other season he can defer the discussion, if he wants to say or to hear anything touching this matter.

Simmias/ No, indeed; neither have I any further ground for doubt after what you have said. Yet I cannot help feeling some doubts still in my mind; for the subject of our conversation is a vast one, and I distrust the feebleness of man.

Socrates/ You are right, Simmias, and more than that, you must re-examine our original assumptions, however certain they seem to you; and when you have analyzed them sufficiently, you will, I think, follow the argument, as far as man can follow it; and when that becomes clear to you, you will seek for nothing more.

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ But then, my friends, we must think of this. If it be true that the soul is immortal, we have to take care of her, not merely on account of the time which we call life, but also on account of all time. Now we can see how terrible is the danger of neglect. For if death had been a release from all things, it would have been a godsend to the wicked; for when they died they would have been released with their souls from the body and from their own wickedness. But now we have found that the soul is immortal; and so her only refuge and salvation from evil is to become as perfect and wise as possible. For she takes nothing with her to the other world but her education and culture; and these, it is said, are of the greatest service or of the greatest injury to the dead man, at the very beginning of his journey thither. For it is said that the genius, who has had charge of each man in his life, proceeds to lead him, when he is dead, to a certain place, where the departed have to assemble and receive judgment, and then go

to the world below with the guide who is appointed to conduct them thither. And when they have received their deserts there, and remained the appointed time, another guide brings them back again after many long revolutions of ages. So this journey is not as Eschylus describes it in the Telephus, where he says that 'a simple way leads to Hades.' But I think that the way is neither simple nor single; there would have been no need of guides had it been so; for no one could miss the way, if there were but one path. But this road must have many branches and many windings, as I judge from the rites of burial on earth. The orderly and wise soul follows her leader, and is not ignorant of the things of that world; but the soul which lusts after the body, flutters about the body and the visible world for a long time, as I have said, and struggles hard and painfully, and at last is forcibly and reluctantly dragged away by her appointed genius. And when she comes to the place where the other souls are, if she is impure and stained with evil, and has been concerned in foul murders, or if she has committed any other crimes that are akin to these, and the deeds of kindred souls, then everyone shuns her and turns aside from meeting her, and will neither be her companion nor her guide, and she wanders about by herself in extreme distress until a certain time is completed, and then she is borne away by force to the habitation which befits her. But the soul that has spent her life in purity and temperance has the gods for her companions and guides, and dwells in the place which befits her. There are many wonderful places in the earth; and neither its nature nor its size is what those who are wont to describe it imagine, as a friend has convinced me.

Simmias/ What do you mean, Socrates? I have heard a great deal about the earth myself, but I have never heard the view of which you are convinced. I should like to hear it very much.

Socrates/ Well, Simmias, I don't think that it needs the skill of Glaucus to describe it to you, but I think that it is beyond the skill of Glaucus to prove it true. I am sure that I could not do so; and besides, Simmias, even if I knew how, I think that my life would come to an end before the argument was finished. But there is nothing to prevent my describing to you what I believe to be the form of the earth, and its regions.

Simmias/ Well, that will do.

Socrates/ In the first place then, I believe that the earth is a spherical body placed in the center of the heavens, and that therefore it has no need of air or of any other force to support it. The equiformity of the heavens in all their parts, and the equipoise of the earth itself, are sufficient to hold it up. A thing in equipoise placed in the center of what is equiform cannot incline in any direction, either more or less. it will remain unmoved and in perfect balance. That, is the first thing that I believe.

Simmias/ And rightly.

Socrates/ Also, I think that the earth is of vast extent, and that we who dwell between the Phasis and the pillars of Heracles inhabit only a small portion of it, and dwell round the sea, like ants or frogs round a marsh; and I believe that many other men dwell elsewhere in similar places. For everywhere on the earth there are many hollows of every kind of shape and size, into which the water and the mist and the air collect; but the earth itself lies pure in the purity of the heavens, wherein are the stars, and which men who speak of these things commonly call ether. The water and the mist and the air, which collect into the hollows of the earth, are the sediment of it. Now we dwell in these hollows though we think that we are dwelling on the surface of the earth. We are just like a man dwelling in the depths of the ocean, who thought that he was dwelling on its surface, and believed that the sea

was the heaven, because he saw the sun and the stars through the water; but who was too weak and slow ever to have reached the water's surface, and to have lifted his head from the sea, and come out from his depths to our world, and seen, or heard from one who had seen, how much purer and fairer our world was than the place wherein he dwelt. We are just in that state; we dwell in a hollow of the earth, and think that we are dwelling on its surface; and we call the air heaven, and think it to be the heaven wherein the stars run their courses. But the truth is that we are too weak and slow to pass through to the surface of the air. For if any man could reach the surface, or take wings and fly upward, he would look up and see a world beyond, just as the fishes look forth from the sea, and behold our world. And he would know that that was the real heaven, and the real light, and the real earth, if his nature were able to endure the sight. For this earth, and its stones, and all its regions have been spoilt and corroded, as things in the sea are corroded by the brine. nothing of any worth grows in the sea, nor, in short, is there anything therein without blemish, but, wherever land does exist, there are only caves, and sand, and vast tracts of mud and slime, which are not worthy even to be compared with the fair things of our world. But you would think that the things of that other world still further surpass the things of our world. I can tell you a tale, Simmias, about what is on the earth that lies beneath the heavens, which is worth your hearing.

Simmias/ Indeed, Socrates, we should like to hear your tale very much.

Socrates/ Well, my friend, this is my tale. In the first place, the earth itself, if a man could look at it from above, is like one of those balls which are covered with twelve pieces of leather, and is marked with various colors, of which the colors that our painters use here are, as it were, samples. But there the whole earth is covered with them, and with others which are

far brighter and purer ones than they. For part of it is purple of marvelous beauty, and part of it is golden, and the white of it is whiter than chalk or snow. It is made up of the other colors in the same way, and also of colors which are more beautiful than any that we have ever seen. The very hollows in it, that are filled with water and air, have themselves a kind of color, and glisten amid the diversity of the others, so that its form appears as one unbroken and varied surface. And what grows in this fair earth—its trees and flowers and fruit—is more beautiful than what grows with us in the same proportion: and so likewise are the hills and the stones in their smoothness and transparency and color. the pebbles which we prize in this world, our cornelians, and jaspers, and emeralds, and the like, are but fragments of them. but there all the stones are as our precious stones, and even more beautiful still. The reason of this is that they are pure, and not corroded or spoilt, as ours are, with the decay and brine from the sediment that collects in the hollows, and brings to the stones and the earth and all animals and plants deformity and disease. All these things, and with them gold and silver and the like, adorn the real earth. and they are conspicuous from their multitude and size, and the many places where they are found; so that he who could behold it would be a happy man. Many creatures live upon it; and there are men, some dwelling inland, and others round the air, as we dwell round the sea, and others in islands encircled by the air, which lie near the continent. In a word, they use the air as we use water and the sea, and the ether as we use the air. The temperature of their seasons is such that they are free from disease, and live much longer than we do; and in sight, and hearing, and smell, and the other senses, they are as much more perfect than we, as air is purer than water, and ether than air. Moreover they have sanctuaries and temples of the gods, in which the gods dwell in very truth; they hear the voices and oracles of the gods, and

see them in visions, and have intercourse with them face to face. and they see the sun and moon and stars as they really are; and in other matters their happiness is of a piece with this.

That is the nature of the earth as a whole, and of what is upon it; and everywhere on its globe there are many regions in the hollows, some of them deeper and more open than that in which we dwell; and others also deeper, but with narrower mouths; and others again shallower and broader than ours. All these are connected by many channels beneath the earth, some of them narrow and others wide; and there are passages, by which much water flows from one of them to another, as into basins, and vast and never-failing rivers of both hot and cold water beneath the earth, and much fire, and great rivers of fire, and many rivers of liquid mud, some clearer and others more turbid, like the rivers of mud which precede the lava stream in Sicily, and the lava stream itself. These fill each hollow in turn, as each stream flows round to it. All of them are moved Up and down by a certain oscillation which is in the earth, and which is produced by a natural cause of the following kind. One of the chasms in the earth is larger than all the others, and pierces right through it, from side to side. Homer describes it in the words

> 'Far away, where is the deepest depth beneath the earth.'

And elsewhere he and many others of the poets have called it Tartarus. All the rivers flow into this chasm, and out of it again; and each of them comes to be like the soil through which it flows. The reason why they all flow into and out of the chasm is that the liquid has no bottom or base to rest on. it oscillates and surges up and down, and the air and wind around it do the same. for they accompany it in its passage to the other side of the earth, and in its return; and just as in breathing the breath is always in process of being exhaled and inhaled, so there the wind, oscillating with the water,

produces terrible and irresistible blasts as it comes in and goes out. When the water retires with a rush to what we call the lower parts of the earth, it flows through to the regions of those streams, and fills them, as if it were pumped into them. And again, when it rushes back hither from those regions, it fills the streams here again, and then they flow through the channels of the earth, and make their way to their several places, and create seas, and lakes, and rivers, and springs. Then they sink once more into the earth, and after making, some a long circuit through many regions, and some a shorter one through fewer, they fall again into Tartarus, some at a point much lower than that at which they rose, and others only a little lower; but they all flow in below their point of issue. And some of them burst forth again on the side on which they entered; others again on the opposite side; and there are some which completely encircle the earth, twining round it, like snakes, once or perhaps oftener, and then fall again into Tartarus, as low down as they can. They can descend as far as the center of the earth from either side but no farther. Beyond that point on either side they would have to flow uphill. These streams are many, and great, and various; but among them all are four, of which the greatest and outermost, which flows round the whole of the earth, is called Oceanus. Opposite Oceanus, and flowing in the reverse direction, is Acheron, which runs through desert places, and then under the earth until it reaches the Acherusian lake, whither the souls of the dead generally go, and after abiding there the appointed time, which for some is longer, and for others shorter, are sent forth again to be born as animals. The third river rises between these two, and near its source falls into a vast and fiery region, and forms a lake larger than our sea, seething with water and mud. Thence it goes forth turbid and muddy round the earth, and after many windings comes to the end of the Acherusian lake, but it does not mingle with

the waters of the lake; and after many windings more beneath the earth, it falls into the lower part of Tartarus. This is the river that men name Pyriphlegethon; and portions of it are discharged in the lava streams, wherever they are found on the earth. The fourth river is on the opposite side, it is said to fall first into a terrible and savage region, of which the color is one dark blue. It is called the Stygian stream, and the lake which its waters create is called Styx. After falling into the lake and receiving strange powers in its waters, it sinks into the earth, and runs winding about in the opposite direction to Pyriphlegethon, which it meets in the Acherusian lake from the opposite side. Its waters too mingle with no other waters. it flows round in a circle and falls into Tartarus opposite to Pyriphlegethon. Its name, the poets say, is Cocytus.

Such is the nature of these regions; and when the dead come to the place whither each is brought by his genius, sentence is first passed on them according as their lives have been good and holy, or not. Those whose lives seem to have been neither very good nor very bad, go to the river Acheron, and embarking on the vessels which they find there, proceed to the lake. There they dwell, and are punished for the crimes which they have committed, and are purified and absolved; and for their good deeds they are rewarded, each according to his deserts. But all who appear to be incurable from the enormity of their sins—those who have committed many and great sacrileges, and foul and lawless murders, or other crimes like these—are hurled down to Tartarus by the fate which is their due, whence they never come forth again. Those who have committed sins which are great, but not too great for atonement, such, for instance, as those who have used violence towards a father or a mother in wrath, and then repented of it for the rest of their lives, or who have committed homicide in some similar way, have also to descend into Tartarus. but then when they have been there a year, a wave

casts them forth, the homicides by Cocytus, and the parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon; and when they have been carried as far as the Acherusian lake they cry out and call on those whom they slew or outraged, and beseech and pray that they may be allowed to come out into the lake, and be received as comrades. And if they prevail, they come out, and their sufferings cease; but if they do not, they are carried back to Tartarus, and thence into the rivers again, and their punishment does not end until they have prevailed on those whom they wronged. such is the sentence pronounced on them by their judges. But such as have been preeminent for holiness in their lives are set free and released from this world, as from a prison. they ascend to their pure habitation, and dwell on the earth's surface. And those of them who have sufficiently purified themselves with philosophy, live thenceforth without bodies, and proceed to dwellings still fairer than these, which are not easily described, and of which I have not time to speak now. But for all these reasons, Simmias, we must leave nothing undone that we may obtain virtue and wisdom in this life. Noble is the prize, and great the hope. A man of sense will not insist that these things are exactly as I have described them. But I think that he will believe that something of the kind is true of the soul and her habitations, seeing that she is shown to be immortal, and that it is worth his while to stake everything on this belief. The venture is a fair one, and he must charm his doubts with spells like these. That is why I have been prolonging the fable all this time. For these reasons a man should be of good cheer about his soul, if in his life he has renounced the pleasures and adornments of the body, because they were nothing to him, and because he thought that they would do him not good but harm; and if he has instead earnestly pursued the pleasures of learning, and adorned his soul with the adornment of temperance, and justice, and courage, and

freedom, and truth, which belongs to her, and is her own, and so awaits his journey to the other world, in readiness to set forth whenever fate calls him. You, Simmias and Cebes, and the rest will set forth at some future day, each at his own time. But me now, as a tragic poet would say, fate calls at once; and it is time for me to betake myself to the bath. I think that I had better bathe before I drink the poison, and not give the women the trouble of washing my dead body.

Phaedo/ When he had finished speaking Crito said;

Crito/ Be it so, Socrates. But have you any commands for your friends or for me about your children, or about other things? How shall we serve you best?

Socrates/ Simply by doing what I always tell you, Crito. Take care of your own selves, and you will serve me and mine and yourselves in all that you do, even though you make no promises now. But if you are careless of your own selves, and will not follow the path of life which we have pointed out in our discussions both to-day and at other times, all your promises now, however profuse and earnest they are, will be of no avail.

Crito/ We will do our best. But how shall we bury you?

Socrates/ As you please; only you must catch me first, and not let me escape you.

Phaedo/ And then he looked at us with a smile and said.

Socrates/ My friends, I cannot convince Crito that I am the Socrates who has been conversing with you, and arranging his arguments in order. He thinks that I am the body which he will presently see a corpse, and he asks how he is to bury me. All the arguments which I have used to prove that I shall not remain with you after I have drunk the poison, but that I shall go away to the happiness of the blessed, with which I tried to comfort you and myself, have been thrown away on him. Do you therefore be my sureties to him, as he was my

surety at the trial, but in a different way. He was surety for me then that I would remain; but you must be my sureties to him that I shall go away when I am dead, and not remain with you, then he will feel my death less; and when he sees my body being burnt or buried, he will not be grieved because he thinks that I am suffering dreadful things, and at my funeral he will not say that it is Socrates whom he is laying out, or bearing to the grave, or burying. For, dear Crito, you must know that to use words wrongly is not only a fault in itself; it also creates evil in the soul. You must be of good cheer, and say that you are burying my body. and you must bury it as you please, and as you think right.

Phaedo/ With these words he rose and went into another room to bathe himself. Crito went with him and told us to wait. So we waited, talking of the argument, and discussing it, and then again dwelling on the greatness of the calamity which had fallen upon us, it seemed as if we were going to lose a father, and to be orphans for the rest of our life. When he had bathed, and his children had been brought to him, he had two sons quite little, and one grown up, —and the women of his family were come, he spoke with them in Crito's presence, and gave them his last commands; then he sent the women and children away, and returned to us. By that time it was near the hour of sunset, for he had been a long while within. When he came back to us from the bath he sat down, but not much was said after that. Presently the servant of the Eleven came and stood before him and said;

Jailer/ I know that I shall not find you unreasonable like other men, Socrates. They are angry with me and curse me when I bid them drink the poison because the authorities make me do it. But I have found you all along the noblest and gentlest and best man that has ever come here; and now I am sure that you will not be angry with me, but with those who

you know are to blame. And so farewell, and try to bear what must be as lightly as you can; you know why I have come.

Phaedo/ With that he turned away weeping, and went out.

Socrates looked up at him, and replied;

Socrates/ Farewell. I will do as you say.

Phaedo/ Then he turned to us and said;

Socrates/ How courteous the man is! And the whole time that I have been here, he has constantly come in to see me, and sometimes he has talked to me, and has been the best of men; and now, how generously he weeps for me! Come, Crito, let us obey him, let the poison be brought if it is ready; and if it is not ready, let it be prepared.

Crito/ Nay, Socrates, I think that the sun is still upon the hills; it has not set. Besides, I know that other men take the poison quite late, and eat and drink heartily, and even enjoy the company of their chosen friends, after the announcement has been made. So do not hurry; there is still time.

Socrates/ And those whom you speak of, Crito, naturally do so; for they think that they will be gainers by so doing. And I naturally shall not do so; for I think that I should gain nothing by drinking the poison a little later, but my own contempt for so greedily saving up a life which is already spent. So do not refuse to do as I say.

Phaedo/ Then Crito made a sign to his slave who was standing by; and the slave went out, and after some delay returned with the man who was to give the poison, carrying it prepared in a cup. When Socrates saw him, he asked;

Socrates/ You understand these things, my good sir, what have I to do?

Jailer/ You have only to drink this, and to walk about until your legs feel heavy, and then lie down; and it will act of itself.

Phaedo/ With that he handed the cup to Socrates, who took it quite cheerfully, Echecrates, without trembling, and without any change of color or of feature, and looked up at the man with that fixed glance of his, and asked;

Socrates/ What say you to making a libation from this draught? May I, or not?

Jailer/ We only prepare so much as we think sufficient, Socrates.

Socrates/ I understand. But I suppose that I may, and must, pray to the gods that my journey hence may be prosperous, that is my prayer; be it so.

Phaedo/ With these words he put the cup to his lips and drank the poison quite calmly and cheerfully. Till then most of us had been able to control our grief fairly well; but when we saw him drinking, and then the poison finished, we could do so no longer, my tears came fast in spite of myself, and I covered my face and wept for myself, it was not for him, but at my own misfortune in losing such a friend. Even before that Crito had been unable to restrain his tears, and had gone away; and Apollodorus, who had never once ceased weeping the whole time, burst into a loud cry, and made us one and all break down by his sobbing and grief, except only Socrates himself.

Socrates/ What are you doing, my friends? I sent away the women chiefly in order that they might not offend in this way; for I have heard that a man should die in silence. So calm yourselves and bear up.

Phaedo/ When we heard that we were ashamed, and we ceased from weeping. But he walked about, until he said that his legs were getting heavy, and then he lay down on his back, as he was told. And the man who gave the poison began to examine his feet and legs, from time to time, then he pressed his foot hard, and asked

Jailer/ Do you feel this?

Socrates/ No.

Phaedo/ and then his legs, and so higher and higher, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. And Socrates felt himself, and said;

Socrates/ When it comes to my heart, I will go.

Phaedo/ He was already growing cold about the groin, when he uncovered his face, which had been covered, and spoke for the last time.

Socrates/ Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; do not forget to pay it.

Crito/ It shall be done. Is there anything else that you wish?

Phaedo/ He made no answer to this question; but after a short interval there was a movement, and the man uncovered him, and his eyes were fixed. Then Crito closed his mouth and his eyes.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, a man, I think, who was the wisest and justest, and the best man that I have ever known.

Phaedo.

Translated by E. M. Cope.

Persons of the Dialog.

Echecrates. Cebes. Phaedo.

Simmias. Apollodorus. Crito.

Socrates. Attendant.

Echecrates/ Were you present yourself, Phaedo, with Socrates that memorable day when he drank the poison in the prison, or did you hear the story from someone else?

Phaedo/ I was there myself, Echecrates.

Echecrates/ Then do pray tell me what it was that he said before his death and how he died. I should be so glad to hear. For in fact none of my fellow-townsmen, of Phlius, are just now very much in the habit of going to stay at Athens, nor has any stranger paid us a visit from that place for a long time who might have brought us an accurate report of all this—except indeed merely that he was put to death by poison; but of all the rest no one could tell us anything.

Phaedo/ Then I suppose you didn't hear the account of the issue of the trial either?

Echecrates/ Yes, some one brought us news of that; and surprised we were, to be sure, to hear that he seems not to have suffered till long after it took place. Now why was this, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ It was quite an accident, Echecrates, for it happened that the stern of the vessel which the Athenians are in the habit of sending to Delos had been decorated just the day before the trial.

Echecrates/ And pray what vessel do you mean?

Phaedo/ This is the vessel, according to the Athenian tradition, in which Theseus once went with those twice seven to Crete, and saved their lives and his own to boot. So they made a vow to Apollo, as the story goes, at the time, that if they got safe back they would dispatch a sacred embassy to Delos every year: which in fact they have sent ever since year by year to the God, as they still continue to do. Well, from the very commencement of the sacred embassy, it is the custom with them that their city be kept pure all this time, and that no state execution be allowed until the vessel has made its voyage to Delos and back again here; and this occasionally requires a long time, whenever the crew chance to be arrested by contrary winds. The commencement of the sacred embassy dates from the crowning of the vessels stern by the priest of Apollo; and, as I say, this happened to have been done the day before the trial. And this was the reason why Socrates had so long an interval in the prison between the trial and his death.

Echecrates/ Well, but the story of the death itself, Phaedo; what was all that was said and done? and which of his friends were with him? or did the magistrates refuse them permission to be present, so that he had no friends near him at his death?

Phaedo/ By no means; on the contrary, there were some present, aye and a good many.

Echecrates/ Then pray be good enough to give me as exact an account as you can of it all—unless you happen to be engaged.

Phaedo/ Oh no, I am not at all busy, and I will do my best to tell you the whole story; for indeed to recall

Socrates to mind, whether by talking of him myself or by listening to another, to me has ever been the most agreeable thing in the world.

Echecrates/ Well, Phaedo, you may make sure of finding a similar feeling in the audience that is going to be. So pray try to describe all the circumstances as precisely as you possibly can.

Phaedo/ Well, to be sure, for my own part I was in a strange state of mind all the time I was there. For no feeling of compassion such as might be expected in one who is present at a friend's death entered my mind—for the man seemed to me, Echecrates, quite happy both in his behavior and in his language, so fearlessly and nobly did he meet his death; so that to my mind he presented himself as one whose journey even to the world below was not unattended by a divine providence, nay, whose lot when he arrived there would be a happy one, if any human being ever was happy; for this reason, I say, no feeling at all of pity entered my mind, as would seem natural to one present at a scene of woe, nor on the other hand of pleasure, as was to be expected when we were engaged in our ordinary way upon philosophy—for in fact our conversation was of that nature but I found myself in quite a singular state of mind and in an unwonted mixture of feeling, a feeling at once of pleasure and of pain, when I reflected that our friend was presently to die. And all of us that were there were pretty nearly in the same state, laughing one while, and anon weeping; and one of us, Apollodorus, beyond all the rest; you know the man, I dare say, and his humor?

Echecrates/ Of course I do.

Phaedo/ Well, as I say, he abandoned himself without reserve to these emotions; but at the same time I myself and the rest participated in them.

Echecrates/ But who were they, Phaedo, that chanced to be present?

Phaedo/ Why of natives there was this same Apollodorus, and Critobulus and his father Crito, and besides, Hermogenes, and Epigenes, and Eschines, and Antisthenes, There was also Ctesippus the Paeanian, and Menexenus, and some other native Athenians; but Plato, I believe, was ill.

Echecrates/ And were there any strangers there?

Phaedo/ Oh yes, Simmias of Thebes of course, and Cebes, and Phiedondes, and Euclides and Terpsion of Megara.

Echecrates/ Well? but Aristippus and Cleombrotus were with him, I suppose?

Phaedo/ No they were not; they were said to be in Egina.

Echecrates/ And was there anyone else there?

Phaedo/ I think that these were pretty nearly all.

Echecrates/ Well to proceed then—let us have your account of the conversation.

Phaedo/ I will endeavor to relate it all to you from the first. And so to begin. We had been in the constant habit, I and the rest, of visiting Socrates also during the preceding days, beginning to assemble in the early morning at the court in which the trial was held, as it was in the neighborhood of the prison. Well, we used always to loiter about conversing amongst ourselves until the prison happened to be opened—which did not take place very early—but as soon as it was opened we

went in to Socrates, and generally spent the whole day with him. However on this particular occasion we met earlier than usual; for having learnt the day before, when we quitted the prison in the evening, that the vessel had returned from Delos, we parted with mutual admonitions to be present as early as possible at the usual spot. So when we came, the porter who was accustomed to answer our knock came out to us and told us to wait and not appear until he summoned us himself. 'For,' said he, 'the Eleven are taking off Socrates irons, and bidding him prepare for death to-day.' However he did not wait long before he returned and bade us walk in. So we entered, and found Socrates just released from his fetters, and Xanthippe, whom you know, holding his little boy in her arms and seated near him. As soon as she saw us she burst into lamentations and exclamations such as women are wont to indulge in;

Xanthippe/ O Socrates, this is the very last time that your friends will speak to you and you to them.

Phaedo/ And Socrates with a glance towards Crito said;

Socrates/ Crito, let someone take her away home.

Phaedo/ So some of Crito's people led her away screaming and beating her breast; but Socrates lay down again upon the bed, and bending his leg together rubbed it with his hand; and as he was rubbing it, he said;

Socrates/ What a strange thing that seems to be which men call pleasure; how wonderfully it is associated by nature with that which seems its opposite, pain; in that the pair of them will never present themselves to mankind together, and yet if a

man pursue the one and grasp it, he is almost always obliged to take the other too, as if, distinct as they are, they were fastened together from one head. And I think, that if Aesop had noticed them he would have made a fable upon it, that God, anxious to compose their differences, but finding himself unable to do so, fastened their heads together, and that that is the reason why, if anyone has obtained possession of the one, the other also is sure to follow upon it; just, you see, as it seems in my own case—after the pain had been first caused in my leg by the irons, the corresponding pleasure seems now to have come in its train.

Phaedo/ Here Cebes broke in.

Cebes/ Aye indeed, Socrates, I am much obliged to you for reminding me. For to be sure about those poems which you have composed—your metrical version of the fables of Aesop and your prelude to Apollo—I have been asked already by several people, and quite lately by Evenus himself, what could possibly have been your intention in writing them since you came here, when you never yet wrote any verses before. If then you care for my having an answer to give to Evenus when he repeats his question—for I am sure he will—tell me what I must say.

Socrates/ Well then, tell him the truth, Cebes; that it was from no desire to set myself up as a rival to him or his poems that I composed them—for I knew it was not easy to do that—but that I did so in an attempt to make out the meaning of certain dreams, and to acquit my conscience in respect of them in case this might chance to be the kind of music that they enjoined me to cultivate. Something like this they were; the same dream used constantly to haunt me during my past life,

assuming different shapes at different times but always with the same burden; 'Socrates,' it said, 'cultivate music and practice it.' And I used formerly to suppose that it was encouraging me and cheering me on in the very occupation which I was following—that, exactly as people cheer the runners in a race, even so my dream was urging me onward in my ordinary pursuit, the cultivation of music—under the idea that philosophy was the highest kind of music, and that that was what I was practicing. But now, since my trial took place and the festival of Apollo meanwhile delayed my death, I thought it my duty, in case perhaps it might be this popular kind of music that the dream enjoined me to cultivate, not to be disobedient, but to try. For it was safer, I thought, not to depart ere I had discharged my conscience by composing poems in obedience to the dream. Thus it was then that I first addressed a hymn to the God in whose honor the present festival was held; and after the God, having conceived the notion that it was the poet's business, if he meant to be a poet, to write fables and not mere histories in verse, whilst I myself had no genius for fiction, for this reason I turned into verse accordingly the fables that I had ready to my hand and knew by heart, Æsop's namely, just as they happened to occur to me.

This then, Cebes, is what you may tell Evenus; and at the same time bid him fare-well, and, if he be wise, follow me as soon as he can. And I am to depart today, as it seems; for the Athenians will have it so.

Simmias/ How strange an exhortation is this, Socrates, to convey to Evenus! I have often met the man ere now, and I am pretty sure from what I have remarked that he will not have the smallest inclination to comply with your suggestion.

Socrates/ How say you? Isn't Evenus a philosopher?

Simmias/ Oh yes, I suppose so.

Socrates/ Well then, he will desire it, and not only he but everyone who worthily takes part in this study. However I don't exactly mean to say that he will lay violent hands on himself; for they say this is wrong.

Phaedo/ (And as he said this, he let his legs drop from the bed upon the ground, and in this posture he remained during the rest of the dialogue.)

Thereupon Cebes asked him;

Cebes/ What do you mean, Socrates, by saying that it is not right for a man to lay violent hands upon himself, and yet that the philosopher would desire to follow the dying man?

Socrates/ How, Cebes? have you and Simmias never heard anything on such subjects during your intercourse with Philolaus?

Cebes/ No, Socrates, nothing distinct.

Socrates/ Well to be sure I myself speak of them from mere hearsay; however what I have heard I don't grudge telling you. For in fact it is perhaps particularly suitable for one who is on the point of travelling in that direction to examine narrowly and mythologize about the conception we have formed of the nature of the journey thither; for how could one better employ the interval between this and sunset?

Cebes/ Then what can be their reason, Socrates, for asserting that it is unlawful to kill oneself? For it is true that, as you just now asked me, I have heard Philolaus, as well as yourself, say, at the time when he was residing in our city, and others besides him ere now, that it was not right to do this; but I have never heard from anyone anything distinct upon the subject.

Socrates/ Well you must keep up your spirits, for perhaps you may now. Possibly however it will seem surprising to you, that this, contrary to the universal rule, should be true without exception, and that it should never happen to mankind, as in everything else it does, that in certain cases and for certain people only it is better to die than to live. And again, in cases where death is preferable, you may be surprised that these men are not allowed to do themselves a service, but are bound to wait for an extraneous benefactor.

Phaedo/ Cebes, with a quiet smile, and speaking in his native dialect, replied;

Cebes/ Aye, Heaven knows.

Socrates/ In fact, when stated thus nakedly, it would seem unreasonable; still it cannot be denied that there may be some sense in it. At the same time the account that is given of it in the mystic system, that we men are kept in a kind of ward, and that accordingly one must not endeavor to deliver oneself or run away from it, seems to me to be somewhat deep, and not very easy to see ones way through. Not that I mean to deny, Cebes, the correctness of this opinion, as far as I can see, that Gods are our guardians, and that we men are part of the property of the Gods. You think so, don't you?

Cebes/ Oh yes.

Socrates/ Well, and wouldn't you, if any of your chattels were to put itself to death without any indication from you that you wished it to die, be angry with it? and if you could find any means of punishment, wouldn't you have recourse to it?

Cebes/ I certainly should.

Socrates/ Perhaps then in this point of view it is not unreasonable to say that no one has a right to kill

himself, until God has imposed upon him an absolute necessity of some kind, like that which now lies before me.

Cebes/ No doubt, this does seem likely. However, as to what you said just now, that all philosophers would be willing and glad to die, that sounds like a paradox, Socrates, if what we were just now saying is correct, that God is our guardian, and that we are his property. For that the wisest men should not be concerned to quit this service wherein they are under the superintendence of Gods, the best of all possible masters, is highly unreasonable. For I presume no one imagines that he can take better care of himself when he has obtained his freedom. A fool, no doubt, might perhaps think that it is good for him to fly from his master, and would not reflect that it is his interest not to fly from one that is good, but rather to use every effort to abide with him, and so might fly from him in his folly; but the man of sense would desire, I presume, to be attached forever to one who is better than himself. And yet according to this view of the matter, Socrates, the contrary to what was said just now seems to be true; for it is the wise that should be reluctant to die, and the fools that should be glad.

Phaedo/ On hearing all this Socrates seemed to me to be pleased with Cebes pertinacity, and said with a glance towards us;

Socrates/ You see Cebes is always tracking some speculation or other, and is not at all inclined to be satisfied at once with anything that he may be told.

Simmias/ Well to be sure, Socrates, this time I myself am disposed to think that there is something in what Cebes alleges; for what motive could in duce men who

are really wise to fly from masters better than themselves and lightly quit their service? And, I imagine, it is at you that Cebes is aiming his argument, because you are so little affected at leaving us, as well as Gods whom you yourself own to be good rulers.

Socrates/ What you say is quite fair; that is, I suppose you mean that I am to defend myself against this charge as if I were in court.

Simmias/ By all means.

Socrates/ Come then, let me try to make a more successful defense to you than I did to my judges. For did I not think, Simmias and Cebes, that I should go to dwell in the company not only of Gods wise and good, but next also of men that have died better than those here on earth, I should be wrong in not feeling sorry at my approaching death. But, as it is, be assured that I trust to join the society not only of good men—and on this I would not so strongly insist—but that I shall go to abide with Gods, perfectly good masters, of all things of the kind, this, be assured, I would most confidently maintain. And so this is why I am not so much moved, but have a confident hope that the dead have some existence, and that existence, as indeed has been maintained ever so long ago, a far better one for the good than for the bad.

Simmias/ What, Socrates! Surely you don't mean to depart and keep this belief to yourself without letting us share it with you? For it seems to me that this is a benefit in which we also are entitled to participate; and at the same time it will serve for your defense, if you succeed in convincing us of the truth of what you say.

Socrates/ Well, I will do my best at all events. But first let us enquire what it is that Crito there has been so long, apparently, anxious to tell me.

Crito/ Why, Socrates, merely this; that the man who is to administer the poison to you has been suggesting to me ever so long to tell you to talk as little as possible; for he says that those that talk get too much excited, and that no excitement of this sort should be allowed to interfere with the action of the poison; otherwise, those who act in this way are sometimes obliged to take two or three doses of it.

Socrates/ Let him alone; he need only mind his own business, and be prepared to give me two, or even three doses, if necessary.

Crito/ Nay, I knew well enough what answer you would make; but he has been plaguing me ever so long.

Socrates/ Never mind him. But to you, my judges, I will now render my account, how it is that it seems to me reasonable that a man who has really spent his life in the pursuit of philosophy should be cheerful in the near prospect of death, and have a sure hope after death of obtaining in another world the highest blessings. In what way then this may be true, Simmias and Cebes. I will endeavor to explain to you.

For it appears that all who apply themselves to the study of philosophy aright are, unknown to the rest of the world, as far as depends on themselves, engaged in nothing else than in studying the art of dying and death. If then this be true, it would surely be absurd of them to be striving eagerly all their lives after this alone, and then, when it has arrived, to feel vexed at what they had been so long eager for and studying.

Phaedo/ Here Simmias laughed and said;

Simmias/ Upon my word, So crates, you have made me laugh, though I am just now in anything but a laughing humor. For I fancy, you see, that the vulgar, had they heard precisely what you have been saying, would think that it applies with perfect truth to the philosophers; and that the people here would be ready enough to agree that the philosophers have quite a passion for death, aye and that they, the people, know well enough that they deserve it.

Socrates/ Yes, and it would be quite true, Simmias; except, at least, when they say that they know well enough; for they do not know in what sense genuine philosophers have a passion for death, and in what sense they deserve it, and what kind of death they deserve. However, let us bid adieu to them, and discuss the matter amongst ourselves. Do we hold death to be anything?

Simmias/ Certainly we do.

Socrates/ In fact, the separation of the soul from the body? so that the state of death is merely this, the separate existence of the body by itself apart from the soul, and the separate existence of the soul by herself apart from the body? Do you take death to be anything else but this?

Simmias/ No, merely this.

Socrates/ Well then consider, my good friend, if perchance you and I agree in our opinions; for I think that from what I am going to say we shall be better able to form a judgment upon the subject of our investigation. Does it seem to you to belong to the character of a philosopher to be eager in the pursuit of what are called pleasures, such for example as the pleasures of eating and drinking?

Simmias/ Very far from it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Or again of the pleasures of sex?

Simmias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Or again the other services of the body—think you that such a person would hold them in esteem? For example, the possession of splendid cloaks and shoes and all other means of personal adornment—think you he would value or scorn them, except so far as it is absolutely necessary for him to meddle with them?

Simmias/ Scorn them, I should think; at least the genuine philosopher.

Socrates/ Then you think, that the studies of such a man are absolutely unconnected with the body, but keep aloof from it as far as possible, and are directed to the soul?

Simmias/ I do.

Socrates/ Then herein first, in such things as these, the philosopher beyond all other men manifests his anxiety to release the soul as much as possible from her connection with the body, doesn't he?

Simmias/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ And most people are of opinion, I fancy, Simmias, that to a man who derives no pleasure from such things, and has no share in them, life is not worth having; but that one who cares nothing for the enjoyments of which the body is the vehicle, verges pretty closely upon the state of death.

Simmias/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Well and what about the acquisition of wisdom itself? Is the body an impediment or not, if a man take it with him as an associate in his search? To

illustrate my meaning—do sight and hearing convey any certain truth to men? or rather, are not the very poets constantly harping to us upon this theme, that there is nothing accurate in what we either see or hear? However, if these two of our bodily senses are not accurate nor to be depended upon, it is hardly likely that the rest are; for they are all, I presume, inferior to these. You do think so, don't you?

Simmias/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Then when, does the soul attain to the truth? For whenever she attempts to pursue any investigation in company with the body, it is plain that then she is deluded by it.

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ Is it not then in thinking, if at all, that any real truth becomes manifest to her?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But she thinks, I should suppose, then best when there is none of these accessories to annoy her, neither hearing nor sight nor pain nor pleasure of any kind, but when she is as much as possible alone by herself and bids adieu to the body, and, as far as possible free from communication and contact with it, aspires to that which is.

Simmias/ It is so.

Socrates/ Here then it is that the philosophers soul most despises the body, and flies from it, and seeks to be alone by herself?

Simmias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And what say you to this, Simmias? do we admit that there is such a thing as absolute justice or not?

Simmias/ We do indeed.

Socrates/ And absolute beauty and good?

Simmias/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Then did you ever yet see any of such things as these with your eyes?

Simmias/ No, never.

Socrates/ Well, did you ever arrive at the knowledge of them by any other of the senses which act through the body? And I mean to include everything, for instance greatness, health, strength, and in a word, the reality of everything else, that is to say, what each thing really is. Is it by means of the body that their truest nature is contemplated? or does the case stand thus—that whoever amongst us has most completely and most exactly prepared himself to apprehend by thought each thing which may be the object of his investigation in its essence, he it is that will make the nearest approach to the knowledge of it?

Simmias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And would not this purity of thought be best attained by anyone who strives to reach each thing as much as possible with his intellect alone, and neither takes as an accessory the sight in thinking, nor drags after him any other of his senses whatever to keep company with his reasoning faculty; but employs his intellect by itself in its purity in the attempt to catch each particular being by itself in its purity, freed as far as possible from eyes and ears, and so to speak from all the body together, because he thinks it only disturbs the soul and will not let her obtain possession of truth and wisdom when it is in communication with her? Is not this he, Simmias, who, if any, will attain to the reality of things?

Simmias/ What you say is all admirably true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, from all that I have said, some such notion as this cannot fail to present itself to the minds of all genuine philosophers, and lead them to use language like this to each other; It seems, to be sure, that it is only a sort of by-way that can bring us to the end of our journey in company with our reason in our inquiries; in so far that, as long as we have our body, and our soul is blended in a confused mass with a nuisance such as that, we never can fully attain to the object of our desires; by which we mean truth. For infinite are the businesses in which the body involves us from the necessity of providing for its support, besides which, if ever we are attacked by diseases of any kind, these throw impediments in the way of our chase after what really exists and it fills us with desires and passions and terrors and vain imaginations of all kinds and a host of frivolities, so that in very truth it never allows us even 'to think at all' of anything, as the phrase is. For in fact wars and seditions and battles are entailed upon us by nothing in the world but the body and its passions. For it is by the pursuit of wealth and power that all our wars are engendered, and this wealth and power we are forced to seek for the body's sake, because we are enslaved to its service; and so it comes to pass that we have no leisure for the pursuit of philosophy in consequence of all this. And last and worst of all, if ever we do obtain any leisure from its exactions and apply ourselves to any course of reflection, in the very midst of our researches again at every moment it interrupts us, creating tumult and disturbance, and gives us such a shock that we are prevented by it from obtaining a clear view of the truth,

but in fact it is made quite plain to us that, if we are ever to gain untroubled knowledge of anything, we must get rid of it, and with the soul by itself look at things in themselves; and then, as it seems, we shall have what we desire and profess a love for, that is to say, wisdom, after death, as our argument indicates, but not as long as we live. For if it is impossible to attain to pure knowledge while we are associated with the body, one of two things must follow; either we can nowhere at all acquire it, or only after death; for then the soul will be by herself separated from the body, but not before. And during our lifetime we shall in this way, I think, make the nearest approach to knowledge, if we abstain as far as possible from inter course and communication with the body—except so far as is absolutely necessary—and preserve ourselves from infection by its nature, keeping ourselves instead clear of it until God himself has set us free. And so, released unsullied from the vanity of the body, we shall dwell in all likelihood with beings like ourselves, and shall know by our own selves all that is pure; and this is, it is to be presumed, the truth. For that the impure ever attain to the pure is, I fear, unlawful. Such, I imagine, Simmias, must needs be the kind of language held amongst themselves and opinions entertained by all real lovers of learning. You agree with me, don't you?

Simmias/ Most completely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, my friend, if this be true, there is abundant reason for hope that, on my arrival at the country for which I am now setting forth, I may there be able, if it be anywhere possible, fully to obtain possession of that to which the long study of my past life has been directed; so that the journey which is now enforced upon me is made with a good cheer by me or

by anyone else who thinks that his mind has been prepared as it were by a process of purification.

Simmias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And may we not consider purification to be. what has been long indicated in the course of our discussion, the most complete attainable separation of the soul from the body and habituation of it to collect and concentrate itself by itself from all quarters out of the body, and to dwell as far as possible both in the time now present and in the future alone by itself, released from the body as from a prison?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ This then is what is called death, a release and separation of soul from body?

Simmias/ Yes, unquestionably.

Socrates/ And the true philosophers, as we say, and they alone, are ever most earnest to release it, and the study of philosophers is neither more nor less than this, the release and separation of soul from body, is it not?

Simmias/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Well then, as I said at first, it would be ridiculous for a man first to prepare himself during his life to live in a state bordering as closely as possible on death, and then when it has come upon him to complain, would it not?

Simmias/ Of course.

Socrates/ In fact then, Simmias true philosophers do practice dying, and death is to them of all men least terrible. Consider the question from this point of view. Assuming that there is a complete rupture between them and their body, and that they do desire to have their soul all by itself, if when this actually happens

they were to be alarmed and indignant, would it not be most unreasonable not to be glad to go to the place where on their arrival they may hope to obtain what they were in love with all through their life—which is, as we saw, wisdom—and to get entirely rid of the association of that which had become so odious to them? Or, whilst very many men upon the death of human loves and wives and children chose of their own free will to descend to the realms below, allured by this hope of beholding there those they longed for, and being in their company, is it likely that one who has a genuine love of wisdom and has taken a firm hold of this same expectation, that he will nowhere else meet with it in any degree worth mentioning than in the other world, should be vexed at dying, and not rather glad to go there? Surely he must think so, my friend, if at least he be indeed a philosopher—he will be strongly persuaded of this, that he will find pure wisdom nowhere but there. And if this be so, as I was just now saying, would it not be great folly for such a man to be afraid of death?

Simmias/ Great indeed, upon my word.

Socrates/ Here then, you have a sufficient token of anyone that you ever see afflicted at the approach of death, that he was not after all a lover of wisdom but a mere lover of his body. And this very same man is most likely a lover of wealth or a lover of honor, either one of them, or even both.

Simmias/ Yes, it is exactly as you say.

Socrates/ Then, Simmias, is not what is called fortitude also natural to men of this temper more than to any others?

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Well and temperance again, —that which even the vulgar call temperance, not to be thrown into a Butter by the passions, but to preserve an indifferent and sober demeanor, —is it not natural to those alone who are most scornfully indifferent to the body and pass-their lives in philosophy?

Simmias/ It must be.

Socrates/ Yes, for if you will notice, the fortitude and temperance of all others, you will think them very odd.

Simmias/ How so?

Socrates/ You know, that all the rest of mankind reckon death to be one of the great evils of our condition?

Simmias/ Certainly, I do.

Socrates/ And so it is from fear of greater evils that the brave amongst them support death, when they do support it?

Simmias/ It is so.

Socrates/ It follows then that all but philosophers are courageous only because they are afraid and from fear? Yet it is an odd thing for a man to be brave out of fear and cowardice?

Simmias/ It is, no doubt.

Socrates/ Again, is not the case exactly the same with their sober characters? Are they not temperate from a sort of intemperance? And yet, though we should be disposed to say that it is impossible, still their case in respect of this foolish kind of temperance does come to bear a close resemblance to this: for from mere fear of being deprived of one kind of pleasures and from desire of them, they abstain from some whilst they are under the dominion of others. However, to be under the

empire of pleasures people call intemperance, and yet at the same time they succeed in mastering some pleasures just because they are mastered by others; and this is like what was said just now, that in a sort of way they are made temperate by intemperance.

Simmias/ It certainly seems so.

Socrates/ My dear friend, I fear this is not the true exchange towards the acquisition of virtue, to change pleasures against pleasures, and pains against pains, and fear against fear, and greater against less, like so many coins; but I am rather inclined to think that this alone is the true coin for which we must exchange all these things, that is to say, wisdom, and that all that is bought and sold for this and with this—that and that alone is in reality, whether it be fortitude or temperance or justice; and in a word that true virtue only exists when accompanied by wisdom. whether pleasures and fears and all the rest of such things be thrown in or withdrawn; whereas, separated from wisdom and exchanged one against another, such virtue as this, I am afraid, is a mere rough sketch and really servile, with no soundness nor genuineness about it; whilst the reality of it is in fact a sort of cleansing from all such things, and true temperance and justice and fortitude and wisdom itself is a kind of purificatory rite. And indeed those famous men who established the mysteries amongst us seem to have been no mean thinkers, but in reality to have been from the earliest times darkly hinting to us that whosoever reaches the world below uninitiated and unsanctified shall lie wallowing in mire, whilst he that has been purified and sanctified shall on his arrival there dwell with Gods. For there are, you know, say the ministers of the mysteries, 'many that bear the thyrsus, but few bacchanals;' and

these last are according to my views no other than the true votaries of philosophy. And to become one of them I too during my life spared no effort, but used all diligence in every way; but whether I was right in so doing, and whether I have in any measure succeeded, we shall know for certain by and bye, when we have arrived at our journey's end, if it be God's will, as I think. Such then, Simmias and Cebes, is the defense I set up to show you that it is with reason that I feel no grief nor indignation at quitting you and my earthly masters, thinking as I do that there also no less than here on earth I shall find good masters and friends; though the vulgar are incredulous. So if I have succeeded better in convincing you by my defense than my Athenian judges, it is well.

Phaedo/ So when Socrates had ended, Cebes took up the discourse and said;

Cebes/ Socrates, all the rest of what you have said is in my judgment admirable, but as to the soul mankind are apt to feel a deep distrust that after its departure from the body it may no longer exist anywhere, but be destroyed and perish on the very day of a man's death, —lest, I say, at the very instant of its being released from and quitting the body it may be dispersed, be dissolved, and vanish, like a breath or smoke, and be nowhere anymore; for, were it to exist anywhere collected by itself and set free from all those ills which you just now enumerated, there would be indeed a strong and fair hope, Socrates, that all that you say is true. But it is precisely this that requires, I am inclined to think, no slight persuasion and assurance, that the soul does exist after the man is dead, and preserves any of its faculties or its reason.

Socrates/ True, Cebes; but what then are we to do? Would you have us enter upon a detailed discussion of this obscure question itself, whether it is probable that it is so or not?

Cebes/ Certainly, speaking for myself, I should be very glad to hear your opinion upon it.

Socrates/ Well, I don't think anyone would say now if he heard me, not even if he were a comic poet, that I am chattering and conversing on things which don't concern us. So, if you please, well go through the enquiry.

And let us pursue it in some such way as the following, the enquiry, that is to say, whether the souls of men after their death exist in the world below, or not. Now there is an old tradition which I remember to this effect, that after their departure from this world they are in the other, and then return to this earth and arise from the dead. And if this be so, that the living rise again from the dead, must not our souls necessarily exist there below? for surely they never could have returned to life if they had no existence; and this would be a sufficient proof of its being as we say, if it were really to be made evident that the living derive their origin from no other source than from the dead. But if this is not so, the doctrine will require some other evidence.

Cebes/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Then, if you want to take the easiest method of gaining a knowledge of it, don't confine your attention to the human race, but, taking in the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms, and, in a word, everything which is subject to the condition of birth, let us consider whether everything is thus generated, that is from no other origin than opposites from their

opposites—all those, I mean, that have anything of the sort; as for example the fair is opposite, I suppose, to the foul, and just to unjust, and so on through an infinity of other cases. Let this then be the subject of our enquiry, whether it be necessary that everything that has any opposite derive its origin from nothing else than from that which is opposite to it. For instance, whenever anything becomes greater, I suppose that it must first have been less, and then out of that become greater?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well and if it became less, it must be greater first, and thence afterwards become less?

Cebes/ As you say.

Socrates/ And further, from stronger the weaker must be generated, and from slower the faster?

Cebes/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And again, if a thing becomes worse, is it not from better, and if juster, from more unjust?

Cebes/ Of course it is.

Socrates/ Are we then quite satisfied of this, that all things are produced in this way, that is to say, from opposites the opposite things?

Cebes/ Yes, quite.

Socrates/ And again, is there in them also something like a pair of generations between both members of each pair of opposites, from the one to the other, and back again from the latter to the former? is there not, that is to say, between a greater thing and a less, growth and decline, and don't we give them these names, growing to the one, and declining to the other?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well and separation and composition, and cold and hot, and so on for all the rest—even if we do not employ the names sometimes, still in reality at any rate it must be so in every case, that they take their origin one from the other, and that there is a generation from each of the two into the other reciprocally?

Cebes/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Well, has living any opposite, as the state of sleeping is to that of waking?

Cebes/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ What?

Cebes/ Death.

Socrates/ Well, are these born one from the other, since they are opposites, and are the generations between them two like themselves?

Cebes/ Of course they must be.

Socrates/ Then the one pair of those which I just now mentioned, I will name to you, itself and its generations; and do you tell me the other. The one which I mean is sleeping and being awake, and I maintain that from sleep the state of being awake is generated, and from being awake the state of sleep, and that their generations are in the one case going to sleep, and in the other awaking. Are you satisfied with my explanation or not?

Cebes/ Quite.

Socrates/ Then tell me in your turn, in the same way about life and death. Don't you say that death is opposite to life?

Cebes/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ And that they are generated one from the other?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ What then is that which is generated from the living?

Cebes/ The dead.

Socrates/ And again, what from the dead?

Cebes/ The living, it must be admitted.

Socrates/ Then it is from the dead, Cebes, that the living, persons as well as things, are generated?

Cebes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Then, our souls exist in the lower world.

Cebes/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Well and of the two generations that belong to these the one is plain enough: for death is a tolerably certain fact, isn't it?

Cebes/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ What shall we do then? Shall we refuse to assign the opposite generation to correspond, and sup pose nature to remain mutilated on this side? Are we not rather obliged to balance dying by some opposite generation?

Cebes/ Absolutely, I should say.

Socrates/ What is that?

Cebes/ Coming back to life.

Socrates/ Well then, if there be such a thing as coming back to life, it must be a generation from the dead into the living, this same coming back to life?

Cebes/ Just so.

Socrates/ Then we are brought by this process of reasoning again to the conclusion that the living are generated from the dead just as much as the dead from the living; and if this be so, we thought it, I believe,

sufficient evidence of the necessary existence, of the souls of the dead in some place or other from which they might be born back into life?

Cebes/ I suppose, Socrates, that this is a necessary consequence of our former conclusions.

Socrates/ Then, Cebes, let the following considerations convince you that we have not arrived at those conclusions in any unfair way, as it seems to me. For if there were not a perpetual correspondence between the two in generation, just as if they revolved in a circle, but the generation were forwards in a straight line as it were, only from the one to its opposite, and did not bend back its course to the other nor make a return, you know that all things at last would be reduced to the same form, and find themselves in the same condition, and cease to be born altogether.

Cebes/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ There is no difficulty, in understanding what I say; but to take an instance, if there were such a thing as going to sleep without any corresponding waking again generated from that which is asleep, you know that at last universal nature would make the famous Endymion a mere farce, and he would be quite eclipsed, because everything else would be in the same state as himself, asleep. And if all things were to be mixed together and never separated, the saying of Anaxagoras would soon be brought about, 'all things together.' And so also in the same way, my dear Cebes, if everything were to die which was endowed with life, and after their death things were to remain in this shape and never come back to life, isn't it absolutely necessary that everything should be at last dead, and nothing alive? For if all living things were to be generated out of

all the rest, and the living were to die, what remedy could possibly be found to prevent everything being swallowed up in death?

Cebes/ None whatever, I believe, Socrates; on the contrary what you say seems to me infallibly true.

Socrates/ Yes, Cebes, and so it is in my judgment most surely as I say; and we have not been cheated into these particular admissions; but the return to life is a real fact, and so it is that the living are born from the dead, and that the souls of the dead do exist, and that there is a better fate in store for those that are good and for the bad a worse.

Cebes/ And besides taking up the argument, according to that doctrine too, Socrates, if it be true, which you are so often accustomed to lay down, that our learning is nothing but recollection, it would follow, I should suppose, necessarily from that too, that we have learnt at some earlier time what we now recollect; but that is impossible, unless our soul was existing somewhere before it was enclosed in this human form; so that thus too the soul seems to be an immortal thing.

Simmias/ But, Cebes, what are the proofs of this? Refresh my memory; for I have no very accurate remembrance of them just at present.

Cebes/ One argument, the strongest of all, is that men, when questions are put to them, provided they are put adroitly, give of themselves an accurate account of anything, whereas if they had not within them a scientific knowledge and true theory, they would never be able to do it: and then if anyone be set before geometrical figures or anything else of that sort, he thereupon most clearly shows the truth of this.

Socrates/ But if you are not convinced in this way, Simmias, see if you may be brought to agree by considerations of the following kind; for your doubt, I suppose, is as to how what is called learning can be recollection?

Simmias/ No, don't doubt it at all; but I want to be brought into precisely the state which is the subject of our discourse, that is to say, recollection: indeed from the explanation that Cebes undertook to give I am already pretty well reminded and convinced; however I should not be at all less glad to hear from you now in what way you undertook to represent it.

Socrates/ In this way, I. We are ready to admit, no doubt, that, if anyone is to recollect anything, he must have known it before at some time or other.

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Well, do we allow this too, that, whenever knowledge presents itself in a manner such as I am about to describe, it is recollection? I mean in some such manner as the following. Suppose a person, after having seen or heard something first or perceived it by any other sense, not only to know that, but also to have an impression in his mind of something else, the knowledge of which is not the same but different, may we not fairly say that he recollected that of which he received the mental impression?

Simmias/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ For example, such cases as the following: the knowledge of a man and the knowledge of a lyre are distinct, I presume?

Simmias/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, you know that lovers, whenever they catch sight of a lyre or a cloak or anything else which

their favorites are in the habit of using, experience this: they recognize the lyre and at the same time receive in their minds the image of the youth to whom the lyre belonged; which is recollection: just as a man by seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and so on doubtless in an infinite number of other cases of the same kind.

Simmias/ Infinite indeed, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Well, is not such a case as that a kind of recollection? especially however when this happens to a person in the case of such things as had been already effaced from his memory by time and want of attention?

Simmias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Again, is it possible for anyone to recall to mind a man by seeing a picture of a horse or a picture of a lyre? or by seeing a portrait of Simmias to remember Cebes?

Simmias/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ Or again, by seeing a portrait of Simmias to call Simmias himself to mind?

Simmias/ It is, no doubt.

Socrates/ Does it not then happen in all these cases that recollection is derived at one time from similar, and at another from dissimilar things?

Simmias/ It does.

Socrates/ But whenever any particular recollection is suggested to anyone by similar objects, must not this further phenomenon present itself, the perception, namely, whether or not this in any respect falls short, in point of resemblance, of the thing which he remembers?

Simmias/ It must.

Socrates/ Consider then, whether this be so. We allow, I believe, that there is such a thing as 'equal.' I don't mean stick to stick, or stone to stone, or anything else of that kind, but beyond all these something else, absolute equality: are we to admit that it is anything or nothing?

Simmias/ 'Faith, let us admit it by all means, most emphatically.

Socrates/ Do we also know it absolutely?

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And where did we get our knowledge of it? Wasn't it from the things we were mentioning just now, from the sight of sticks or stones or any other equal things—was it not from them that we obtained the other conception, distinct as it is from them? You think it is distinct, don't you? Look at it again in this way. Does it not sometimes happen that equal stones and sticks, though they remain the same, appear at one time equal, and at another the contrary?

Simmias/ Unquestionably it does.

Socrates/ Well, did the absolute equals ever appear to you unequal? or equality inequality?

Simmias/ No, never, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, those equal things which we spoke of just now are not the same as equality itself.

Simmias/ Not at all, according to my view, Socrates.

Socrates/ But still from those equals, distinct as they are from the other equal, you nevertheless have conceived and obtained the knowledge of it?

Simmias/ Most true.

Socrates/ And that, whether it resemble them or the reverse?

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And that makes no difference. Whenever by seeing one thing you obtain from this sight the conception of another, whether like or unlike, it must of necessity have been, an act of recollection.

Simmias/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ What say you to this then? Have we any such feeling as this about the equalities in bits of wood and those equal things that we were just now speaking of? Do they seem to us to be equal in the same sense as the very, absolute equal, or do they at all fall short of that, in that they are not of the same nature as the equal, or not?

Simmias/ Indeed, they do fall very far short of it.

Socrates/ So then, whenever a person in seeing a thing perceives that this, for instance, which I now have before my eyes means to be like something else existing, but falls short of it, and cannot attain to the nature of the other, but is inferior, we must admit, I think, that the person who perceives this must necessarily have had some previous knowledge of that which he says it resembles though it does not come up to it?

Simmias/ We must.

Socrates/ Well then, is this the case also with ourselves, or not, in respect of equals and absolute equality?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It follows then that we must have had a previous knowledge of the equal, before that time when we first saw equal things and perceived that all of them aspire to be of the same nature as the equal but cannot reach it.

Simmias/ It is so.

Socrates/ And further we acknowledge this also, that we have not obtained, and it was not possible for us to obtain, the conception of it from any other source except from the sight or touch or some other of the senses; for I say the same of all of them.

Simmias/ Why, the cases are the same, Socrates, as far as regards that which our argument would show.

Socrates/ But, be that as it may, it is from the senses that we must obtain the conception that everything in the domain of sense strives after that absolute equality, though it falls short of it. Or, if not, what is our view of the question?

Simmias/ As you say.

Socrates/ Consequently, before we began to use our sight and hearing and the rest of our senses we must have obtained somewhere a knowledge of the nature of the absolutely equal to enable us, in referring the equals which we gather from our senses to it, to see that they are all eager to be such as the other, but yet are inferior to it.

Simmias/ It follows necessarily from our previous statements, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, were we from the very moment of our birth in possession of sight and hearing and all the rest of our senses?

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And yet we say that we must have obtained the knowledge of the equal antecedently?

Simmias/ We do.

Socrates/ Then, as it appears, we must have obtained it before we were born?

Simmias/ It seems so.

Socrates/ So then if we obtained this knowledge before our birth and so were born with it in our possession, we had also before we were born and from the moment of our birth the knowledge not only of the equal and the greater and the less, but of the whole number of things of that kind? for our argument now does not turn upon the equal any more than upon the absolutely beautiful and the absolutely good and just and holy, and, as I say, upon everything which we stamp with this impression, reality, in our questions when we question, and in our answers when we answer. So that we must needs have gained the knowledge of each of them previous to our birth.

Simmias/ It is so.

Socrates/ And had we not each in his own case forgotten what we had gained, we should have been constantly born with this knowledge and have constantly preserved it throughout our life: for to know is this, first, to obtain knowledge of a thing and then to keep it without having lost it. This is what we call forgetfulness, isn't it Simmias, the loss of knowledge?

Simmias/ To be sure it is, precisely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, and if it be true, I should think, that, having obtained it before we were born, we lost it at our birth, and that we then afterwards, by employing our senses upon such things as those, recover that knowledge which we once had in a former state, would not what we call learning be the recovery of our own knowledge? and should we not in calling this recollection give it its right name?

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ For this, you know, we found to be possible, for a man, after he has received an impression of something either by sight or by hearing or by any other of his senses, to derive from this a conception of something different that he had forgotten, with which this was associated, whether unlike or like. Wherefore, as I say, one of two things, either we are born with the knowledge of them and all retain that knowledge through our life, or subsequently to birth, those who learn, as we call it, —they do nothing but recall to mind, and so learning would be recollection.

Simmias/ It must be so, beyond all doubt, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then which of the two do you choose, Simmias? That we are born with the knowledge, or that we recall to mind afterwards that of which we had gained the knowledge before?

Simmias/ I can't tell which to choose yet, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, can you make choice in this case, or what is your opinion about it—can a man that has knowledge give a rational account of the subjects in which his knowledge lies, or not?

Simmias/ Of course he can, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you think also that everybody is able to give an explanation of these things of which we were just now speaking?

Simmias/ Indeed I wish they could: but on the contrary I am much more disposed to fear that tomorrow at this time there will be no longer any man alive capable of doing it as it ought to be done.

Socrates/ So then, it is not your opinion, Simmias, that all men have the knowledge of them?

Simmias/ Assuredly not.

Socrates/ Then they recollect what they learnt at some time or other?

Simmias/ It must be so.

Socrates/ And when did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? For it certainly is not since we were born men.

Simmias/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Then it was at some former time?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then our souls were existing likewise, Simmias, at an earlier time, ere they were enclosed in a human form, apart from their bodies, and were endowed with thought?

Simmias/ Unless perchance, Socrates, we acquire this knowledge at the very moment of our birth: for this period is still left.

Socrates/ Be it so, my friend: but at what other time do we lose it? For surely we are not born in possession of it, as we just now admitted. Or do we lose it at the very time at which we also acquire it? Or can you name any other time?

Simmias/ None whatever, Socrates; but I didn't perceive that I was talking nonsense.

Socrates/ Then, is it thus with us, Simmias? If the things really exist which we have constantly in our mouths, beautiful, and good, and all reality of this kind, and if we refer all the impressions of our senses to this latter, as a thing that had been once ours and which we rediscover to be in our possession, and bring them into comparison with it, it follows of necessity that in the same way in which these things exist, so also does our soul exist even before we are born: but if these things

have no real existence, this argument of ours would have been thrown away? Is it indeed so, and is it just as certain that our souls exist as that these things exist, even before we were born, and if not the one, then not the other either?

Simmias/ It seems to me beyond all question, Socrates, that there is the same certainty, and it is well that our discussion has run for shelter to so safe a harbor as this equal assurance of the existence of our soul previous to our birth and of the existence of the absolute being which you even now refer to. For, for my own part I could not name anything which is so evident to me as this, that all such things exist in the highest sense of the word, that is to say, beautiful and good and all the rest which you mentioned just now: and for me the demonstration which has been given is sufficient.

Socrates/ But how is it then with Cebes? For Cebes too must be convinced.

Simmias/ It must be sufficient for him, I should think: although of all mankind he is the most pertinacious skeptic as to arguments. Nevertheless I think he must be by this time sufficiently convinced of this, that our soul was in existence before we were born. However, I don't think myself, Socrates, that it has been shown whether it will have a continued existence also after our death, but there is still an objection derived from that apprehension of the vulgar which Cebes just now alluded to, that the soul at the very instant of the man's death is scattered to the winds, and that this is an end of its existence. For admitting that it derives its origin and its composition from some other source and has existence before it reached a human body, what is to prevent it, when after having arrived there it takes its

departure from it, coming to an end itself at the same time and being destroyed?

Cebes/ Well said, Simmias; for it does seem that only half, as one may say, of the demonstration which we require has been given, that, namely, our soul was in existence previous to our birth: but we want to prove besides that it will exist after our death no less than before our birth, if our demonstration is to be complete.

Socrates/ You will find, Simmias and Cebes, that it has been proved already, if you will combine this argument with our previous conclusion, that everything living derives its origin from the dead. For if our soul does exist in a previous state, whilst on entering into life and being born it can be generated only out of death and the state of the dead, how can it possibly fail to exist after death too, since it has to be born again? Nay, the thing you speak of has been proved already. But still I fancy that you and Simmias would be glad to push this discussion too still further, and that you are haunted with that childish apprehension that the wind will literally blow it to pieces and disperse it as it issues from the body, especially whenever it happens that a man dies not in a calm, but in a high wind.

Phaedo/ To which Cebes replied, laughing at the conceit;

Cebes/ Suppose that we are, Socrates, and try to convince us: or rather you need not suppose that we are frightened ourselves, but there is perhaps a kind of child within us that is subject to such apprehensions. Him then let us try to persuade not to be frightened at death as at those frightful masks.

Socrates/ Well, you must apply a charm to it every day until you have succeeded in charming it.

Cebes/ But where, shall we find a charmer skillful enough for our purpose, Socrates, now that you are leaving us?

Socrates/ Greece is wide, Cebes, wherein doubtless good men are to be found, and many also are the tribes of the barbarians, all of whom it is your duty to search through in quest of such a charmer, and to spare neither money nor toil, for there is nothing on which you can lay out money to better purpose. And you must seek also yourselves in discussion with one another: for I dare say it may not be easy either to find persons better qualified for the task than you are.

Cebes/ Nay, this shall certainly be done: but now let us return to the point where we left off, if you have no objection.

Socrates/ Oh certainly, I have no objection. Why should I have any?

Cebes/ Thank you.

Socrates/ Well then, the question we must ask ourselves is something of this kind: what sort of thing that is whose nature it is to be subject to this accident, that is to say, dispersion; and what sort of thing that is for which we need feel any fear of its being subject to it, and the reverse? And after this again we must review the question to which of the two classes soul is to be referred, and thence derive either confidence or apprehension about our own soul.

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ Then is it not the compounded and that which has a composite nature that is liable to this accident, to be dissolved, that is, in the same way in

which it was put together: but if there be anything uncompounded, does it not belong to this alone of all possible things to be exempt from such an accident?

Cebes/ I should think it must be so.

Socrates/ Well, the things that are always in the same state and wear the same aspect, —is it not most likely that these are the uncompounded? and those that are different at different times and never in the same state, —that these, I say, are the composite?

Cebes/ I should think so.

Socrates/ Then let us pass, to those same things with which we were engaged in the former part of our argument. The Being in itself which in our questions and answers we characterize as real existence, —is that always in the same state and with the same aspect, or different at different times? Absolute equality, absolute beauty, absolute everything which is, —do these ever admit change of any kind whatever? or does each of them of which we predicate real existence, uniform in its pure simplicity, constantly preserve the same aspect and condition and never in any way on any occasion whatever admit any variation?

Cebes/ They must needs be constant and permanent in their nature, Socrates.

Socrates/ But what of the many beautiful things, men for instance, or horses, or clothes, or any other whatever of the same kind, whether equal, or beautiful, or all that bear the same name with the ideas? Are they permanent in their condition? or, just the reverse of the others, do they never, as one may say, at all preserve any constancy, either in themselves or in their relations to one another?

Cebes/ You are right again: they are never the same.

Socrates/ Well, these latter you may touch, or see, or apprehend by the rest of your senses, may you not? whilst the permanent and immutable you can never lay hold of by any other instrument than the reasoning of the intellect; but all such things are invisible and beyond the reach of sight?

Cebes/ What you say is exactly true.

Socrates/ Then let us assume, if you please, two kinds of existing things, one visible and the other invisible.

Cebes/ Very well.

Socrates/ And the invisible constant and immutable, but the visible subject to perpetual change.

Cebes/ This again let us assume.

Socrates/ Come then, as to ourselves, are we not made up of body and soul?

Cebes/ There is nothing else.

Socrates/ Then to which of the two kinds should we say that the body bears the greater resemblance and is the more nearly akin?

Cebes/ Oh that must be quite obvious to everyone; to the visible.

Socrates/ And the soul again—is it visible or invisible?

Cebes/ Not visible to the eyes of men at least, Socrates.

Socrates/ But of course when we said visible and the contrary, we meant to the human constitution? You don't suppose it was to any other, do you?

Cebes/ No, to that of men.

Socrates/ Then what do we say about soul, that it is visible or not visible?

Cebes/ Not visible.

Socrates/ Then it is invisible?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Consequently soul bears a nearer resemblance than body to the invisible, but the latter to the visible.

Cebes/ Quite necessary, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, and were we not saying ever so long ago that the soul, whenever it employs the body as an assistant in the investigation of any subject through the medium either of the sight or of the hearing or of any other sense—for that is what we mean by through the medium of the body, to employ the senses in the investigation of a thing that then she is dragged by the body into the sphere of the ever-changing, and goes astray herself, and becomes confused and dizzy as if she were intoxicated, inasmuch as she is trying to lay hold of things of the same kind?

Cebes/ We certainly were saying so.

Socrates/ But whenever she contemplates anything by herself, she is gone at once into that region, to the pure and eternal and deathless and unchangeable, and from the affinity of her nature converses ever with that, whenever, that is, she can isolate herself and thus has the power of doing so, and then she rests from her wanderings, and in association with it is herself ever constant and unchangeable, seeing that she is laying hold upon things of a like sort; and is not this state of hers called thought?

Cebes/ Most nobly and truly spoken, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then to which of the two kinds, let me ask you again, taking into consideration our former conclusions as well as our present ones, do you think

the soul bears a greater resemblance, and to which is it nearer akin?

Cebes/ I suppose, Socrates, anyone, even the most stupid, would be forced by the method of demonstration that you have pursued to admit that wholly and entirely soul is more like that which is ever the same than that which is not.

Socrates/ And the body again?

Cebes/ More like the other.

Socrates/ And now look at the thing again in this point of view, that, namely, so long as soul and body are together, nature dictates to the one servitude and subjection, and to the other dominion and mastery: and in this respect again, which of the two appears to you to resemble the divine, and which the mortal? You think, don't you, that the divine is endowed with a nature formed for dominion and authority, and the mortal for subjection and servitude?

Cebes/ Oh yes, I do.

Socrates/ Which of the two then does the soul resemble?

Cebes/ It is quite plain, Socrates, that the soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal.

Socrates/ Then consider, Cebes, whether from all that has been said we obtain this result, that soul is most like the divine and immortal and intelligible and uniform and indissoluble and that which is ever invariably consistent with itself, and that body again most resembles what is human and mortal and unintelligible and multi form and dissoluble and never consistent with itself. Have we anything else to say on the other side, my dear Cebes, in contradiction of it?

Cebes/ Nothing whatever.

Socrates/ Well then, if this be so, is it not the nature of body to be quickly dissolved, but of soul on the contrary to be altogether indissoluble or nearly so?

Cebes/ No doubt it is.

Socrates/ And you observe, that after the man is dead, his body, the visible part of him, placed in the sphere of the visible—which, you know, we call a corpse—whose nature it is to be dissolved and to fall in pieces and to be dispersed in air, does not at once undergo any of these things, but is preserved a tolerably long time; if a man die with his body in a vigorous state and at a vigorous period of his life, a very considerable time in deed. For the body, when it has settled and been embalmed like those Egyptian mummies, remains nearly whole an incredible length of time. Nay, some parts of the body, even after it has rotted away, bones and sinews and all such parts, are nevertheless, so to speak, immortal: is it not so?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ But must the soul then, the invisible which flies at once to a place like itself, noble and pure and invisible, Hades in very truth so called, to dwell with the good and wise God, whither if it be God's will my own soul must shortly go, —must she, I say, being such as she is and so endowed by nature, on her departure from the body be at once scattered to the winds and perish, as the vulgar tell us? No, far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias, but rather, far rather is the case thus: if she leave the body pure, dragging naught of it after her, as indeed during her lifetime she never with her goodwill had any communication with it, but avoided it and concentrated herself in herself, inasmuch, I say, as she was constantly practicing this

and this is exactly what a truly philosophic soul is, and one that really studies the art of taking death easily—this is the practice of death, isn't it?

Cebes/ Yes, quite so.

Socrates/ Well, as I say, if she be in this condition, she departs to what is like herself, the invisible, the divine and deathless and wise; and arrived there she enjoys a happy lot, released from error and folly and fears and wild passions and all the rest of human ills; and, as is said of the initiated, passes in reality the rest of her existence with the gods. Is this to be our opinion, Cebes, or otherwise?

Cebes/ This, assuredly.

Socrates/ But, I suppose, if she take her departure from the body polluted and impure, which is likely, because she has been so constantly connected with it, and has waited on it and loved it, and has been so bewitched by it, I mean by its passions and its pleasures, that nothing seemed true to her but the corporeal, that is, what one may touch and see and drink and eat and use for one's lusts; whilst that which is to the eyes indeed dark and invisible, but by reason intelligible and by philosophy to be apprehended, this she has been accustomed to hate and shudder at and avoid, —think you that a soul in this state will quit the body pure, without ad mixture?

Cebes/ By no possibility.

Socrates/ But on the contrary distracted, I presume, by the corporeal, which the intercourse and union with the body from her constant association with it and her continual occupation about it has made a part of her very nature.

Cebes/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ But this, my friend, we must conceive to be ponderous and heavy and earthy and visible: and it is in fact by its union with this that the soul such as we have described it is weighed down and dragged back into the region of the visible, through fear of the invisible and of Hades haunting as men tell us, the tombs and graves, about which in fact certain shadowy phantoms of souls are sometimes seen—just such shapes as those souls are likely to exhibit which have been set free in a state not pure, but with the visible still clinging to them, which is in fact why they are seen.

Cebes/ Yes, that is likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is indeed, Cebes; and that these are in no respect the souls of the good, but those of the bad, which are compelled to wander about such like places, paying the penalty of their former education, because it was evil. And so long they continue thus to wander, until from the craving of the corporeal nature that attends them they are again confined in a body.

And they are confined, as is probable, in characters of the same kind as those which they have practiced during their past life.

Cebes/ What sort of characters do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ For example, those who have cultivated habits of gluttony and wantonness and drunkenness, and have not exercised thorough discretion in their conduct, enter, it is likely, into the race of asses and such like beasts. Don't you think so?

Cebes/ What you say is extremely likely.

Socrates/ And those that have had a propensity to injustice and tyranny and rapine, into the race of wolves

and hawks and kites. Or, if not, where else should we say that such souls go?

Cebes/ To be sure they do, into animals of that kind.

Socrates/ Well then, is it quite clear for all the rest into what bodies each will pass according to the resemblance of their practice?

Cebes/ Quite so, of course.

Socrates/ Well then, of these again, those are happiest and pass into the happiest place who have exercised that popular and social virtue which men, you know, call temperance and justice, springing from habit and practice without philosophy and reason?

Cebes/ In what sense do you mean that they are happiest?

Socrates/ Because it is probable that they may be restored to a gregarious and civilized race, either bees perhaps or wasps or ants, or even back again into the same human race as before, and that respectable men may be made of them.

Cebes/ Like enough.

Socrates/ But the race of gods none may reach without having spent his life in the pursuit of wisdom and quitted it perfectly pure, —none but the lover of learning. And this is the reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, why true philosophers abstain from the indulgence of all their bodily passions, and remain firm, and do not surrender themselves to them; not at all because they fear ruin and poverty like the vulgar and money-lovers: nor again, because they fear disgrace and the reproach of depravity like the lovers of power and of honor, is this the reason why they abstain from them.

Cebes/ Why, to be sure, it would ill become them.

Socrates/ Assuredly it would. Therefore, Cebes, those who have any concern for their own soul, instead of living merely to get fat and enjoy themselves, bid adieu to all such as these, and walk not in the same path, being assured that they know not where they are going: but they themselves, persuaded that they ought not to run counter to philosophy and to its liberating and purifying operations, take that direction, following her whithersoever she leads the way.

Cebes/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you. For, the lovers of learning know that philosophy, receiving under its care their soul quite a close prisoner in the body and glued fast to it and forced to take its view of real things through it as it were through the walls of a dungeon, instead of alone by herself, and wallowing in every kind of ignorance, and clearly discerning that the fearfulness of the dungeon consists in her eager desire to make as much as possible the captive himself an accomplice in his own confinement, —well, I say, the lovers of learning know that philosophy, having taken their soul under its care in this condition, quietly talks her over and endeavors to set her free, by showing her that all observation by the eyes is full of illusion, and equally so that by the ears and the rest of the senses, and by persuading her to withdraw from them, except just so far as she is absolutely obliged to employ them, and by exhorting her to collect and concentrate herself into herself, and to put no faith in anything but herself, that is, in that portion of real existence in and by itself which she can apprehend in and by herself, but whatsoever she contemplates by different organs varying in various things, —to hold none of that to be true, but that all such things belong to the realm of sense and of the

visible, whereas what she sees herself belongs to the intelligible and invisible. Thinking then that she ought not to oppose herself to this process of liberation, the soul of the true philosopher holds herself aloof accordingly from pleasures and passions and pains and fears so far as she can, reflecting that, whenever anyone is violently moved by pleasure or fear or pain or desire, the evil that he contracts from them is not of that slight magnitude that one might think—a fit of sickness for instance or some loss incurred by the indulgence of his passions—but he suffers that which is the greatest and extremist of all ills, though he never takes it into account.

Cebes/ What is that, Socrates?

Socrates/ That every man's soul in the very act of feeling violent pleasure or pain at anything is forced into the belief that everything which most excites this feeling is the most real and the most true, though it is not so. And these are, most of all, the visible things. Aren't they?

Cebes/ Yes, no doubt.

Socrates/ Well, is it not in this feeling that soul is most completely chained down by body?

Cebes/ How so?

Socrates/ Because every pleasure and pain has, as one may say, a nail, with which it nails and buckles her to the body and gives her a bodily shape, fancying anything to be true which the body on its part asserts to be so. For from participation in the fancies of the body and taking pleasure in the same things she is forced, I conceive, to become like it also in its habits and it's alimentation, and of such a nature that she never can reach the world below in a pure state, but must ever

take her departure from the body corrupted by it, so that she soon falls back into another body and takes root in it as if she were planted there, and hence loses all part in the intercourse with what is divine and pure and simple in its nature.

Cebes/ Most true, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is for this reason then, Cebes, that those that may be fairly called the true lovers of learning are regular and manly; and not for those which the vulgar assign you don't think so, do you?

Cebes/ Not I, you may be sure.

Socrates/ Why no. But a philosophers soul would reason thus, and would not think that, whilst it was the business of philosophy to set her free, she might still, while it was employed in doing it, abandon herself to her habitual pleasures and pains so as to be again made close prisoner in them, and so undo all the work again, plying a sort of Penelope's loom, only in the opposite sense; on the contrary, providing for herself a calm repose from all of them, following her reason and in it ever abiding, contemplating what is true and divine and be yond the sphere of mere opinion, and nourished by it, she deems that she must thus pass her life as long as it lasts, and after her death is to make her way to that which is akin and congenial to herself and so be delivered from all human ills. With such a nurture as this there is no fear of her being alarmed, after such a preparation, Simmias and Cebes, at the idea of being torn asunder on her departure from the body, and being blown in pieces and scattered by the winds, and so that she vanish and have no more any existence anywhere.

Phaedo/ So after Socrates had said this a silence ensued for a long time, Socrates himself being intent

upon the preceding discussion, as his appearance plainly showed; and so indeed were most of us. But Cebes and Simmias were talking a little to one another. And Socrates, when he observed them, asked;

Socrates/ Tell me, what was the subject of your conversation? You think, I dare say, that the question has not been thoroughly discussed? for, to be sure, it still leaves room for a multitude of doubts and objections, if, that is to say, the question is to be thoroughly gone into. However, if you are pursuing any other enquiry, I have nothing to say: but if you have any difficulty about this one, don't hesitate for a moment, either to speak yourselves and explain your views if it seems to you that it has been treated in any better way, or again to call me in to your assistance if you think that with my aid you are at all more likely to be successful.

Simmias/ Very well, Socrates, I will tell you the truth. We have been puzzled, and each of us has been for some time past pushing the other on and urging him to ask a question, because we were anxious to hear what you have to say, and yet were reluctant to trouble you for fear it may be disagreeable to you in consequence of your present misfortune.

Phaedo/ And he, when he heard this, smiled quietly, and said;

Socrates/ Bless me! Simmias; truly it must be difficult for me to persuade the rest of the world that I do not look upon my present case as a misfortune, when I can't convince even you, but you are afraid that I may be in a worse humor now than I used to be in old times. And you take me, it seems, to be inferior in the gift of foresight to the swans; which, as soon as they feel that

they must die, sing then louder and better than they have ever sung in all their past lives, for joy that they are about to depart into the presence of the God whose servants they are. But men from their own dread of death belie the swans too, and say that the song they pour forth is a dirge for their death out of grief, not reflecting that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or suffering from any other pain, not even the nightingale herself nor the swallow nor the hoopoe, whose song they say is a dirge for grief: but neither these nor the swans seem to me to be in pain when they sing. But, I believe, as they belong to the service of Apollo, they are endowed with foresight, and, having foreknowledge of the good things in the world below, they sing and show their delight all through that day far more than in all their lives before. And I think myself, too, a fellow-slave of the swans and consecrated to the service of the same God, and that I have received the faculty of foresight from my master in no inferior measure to them, and that I am not more despondent than they are at the thought of departing from life. On the contrary, as far as any such feeling as this is concerned, you may say anything or ask me any question you please, as long as the eleven good men of Athens will allow.

Simmias/ You are very good: and so I will tell you my difficulty, and Cebes in his turn, to what extent it is that he cannot assent to what has been said. For to me it seems, Socrates, as I dare say it does to you, that to know what is certain of such subjects as this is in the present life either impossible or extremely difficult; yet on the other hand to refuse to test in every way the received opinions about them, and not to persevere until his powers have failed him in the examination of them from every point of view—this I take to be a sign

of a very feeble character. For it is our duty in respect of them to effect one at least of these things, either to learn from others or discover for oneself the true account of them, or else, if this is a thing impossible, to take at any rate the best and most irrefragable of human doc trines, and conveyed upon it as it were upon a raft to hazard the voyage through life, unless indeed one could find a surer conveyance, that is, a divine doctrine, whereon to make the passage more safely and with less risk. And so now for myself at any rate, I shall not be deterred by any feeling of shame from putting my question—especially as you say what you have said—nor will I expose myself to my own reproaches at a future time for not having expressed my opinion now. For I do think, Socrates, when I look to myself as well as to him, that the subject has not been quite sufficiently discussed.

Socrates/ Why, my friend, I dare say you are right: but tell me how you think it insufficient.

Simmias/ In this way I find it so, as, you know, one might apply the same explanation to a harmony and a lyre and its strings, and say that the harmony is a thing in visible and incorporeal and eminently beautiful and divine in the tuned lyre, and yet the lyre itself and its strings are bodies and corporeal and composite and earthy and akin to what is mortal. And so whenever anyone breaks the lyre, or cuts it in pieces, or even bursts its strings, supposing anyone were to insist, by the same argument as yourself, that that harmony must needs be still in existence and cannot have perished, — for, he might argue, it would be absolutely impossible for the lyre with its strings burst, and its strings, of mortal-mold as they are, to be still in existence and yet that the harmony should have perished, which is of like

nature and near akin to the divine and immortal, and should have perished before the mortal—but were to say that the harmony itself must be still somewhere extant, and that the wood and strings would decay before anything happened to it, —for in fact now, Socrates, I should imagine this must often have occurred to you yourself, that the popular notion amongst us of the nature of the soul is something like this, that, our body being as it were raised to a certain pitch or held together by hot and cold, and dry and moist, and such like things, our soul is a mixture and harmony of just these things, the result of their being well and duly blended one with another: —supposing therefore that our soul is a harmony, it is plain that, whenever our body is relaxed or strung up out of due proportion by diseases and other ills, the soul must of necessity perish instantly, most divine as it is, like all other harmonies, whether they be in sounds or in any other works of craftsmen, whilst the relics of each body last for a long time, until they are consumed either by fire or by decay; —see then what reply we shall have to make to this hypothesis, should anyone think fit to maintain that the soul, being a mixture of the component parts of the body, perishes first in what is called death.

Phaedo/ Whereupon Socrates, looking fixedly as was his constant custom and smiling, replied;

Socrates/ That is quite fair, what Simmias says: so if any of you has a readier wit than myself, he ought to answer at once. For indeed he looks quite a formidable assailant of my argument. At the same time, before I make my answer, I think we had better first hear Cebes also, what fault he on his part has to find with our argument, in order that we may gain time during the interval to deliberate upon our reply; and so, when we

have heard him, we must either give way to them if they seem to be concordant, or, if not, then finally take up the defense of our theory. Come then, Cebes, tell me, what is it that disturbed you on your side and made you incredulous?

Cebes/ Then I tell you. It seems to me, that is, that our argument is still just where it was, and liable to the same objection as we urged in the former case. For that it has been cleverly enough, and indeed, if it is not presumptuous to say so, quite satisfactorily demonstrated that our soul was in existence also before it entered into this frame of ours, —that admission I am not disposed to retract: but that after our death it has any longer a local existence, —of that I am not convinced. Not that I agree with Simmias objection that soul is not stronger nor more durable than body: for in all these points I hold it very far superior. Then why, the argument might say, do you still refuse to believe me? when you see that after the man's death the weaker part still remains in existence, don't you think it is a necessary consequence that the more durable part should continue safe at that time? To meet this objection then, see if the answer I am about to make has any weight: for I too, it seems, like Simmias, require an illustration to express my meaning. For the argument we have employed seems to me to be much as if anyone were to apply the same theory to a weaver who had died old, that the man has not perished but is probably somewhere in existence, and were to produce in evidence that the cloak which he had woven for his own wearing still exists entire and has not perished, and, in case of anyone refusing his assent, were to ask him which is the more durable kind, that of a man or that of a cloak when it is in constant use and wearing,

and receiving for answer, that of a man by far, were to suppose it to have been demonstrated that then consequently beyond all manner of doubt the man must be safe and sound, seeing that the less durable object has not perished. Whereas, I believe, Simmias, the truth is otherwise; —for I wish you too to pay attention to what I say—everyone would be of opinion that this is the language of a simpleton. For this weaver of ours has worn out and woven for himself again many a similar cloak, and outlived it is true all those many, but died, I presume, before the last, and yet a man is not a bit the more on that account inferior to or weaker than a cloak. And the very same image, I suppose, may be applied to the relation of soul and body, and should think that, if anyone were to apply just what we are saying to their case, he would be quite reasonable in maintaining that the soul no doubt is durable, and the body weaker and less durable; yet still, he might say, each of our souls does wear out many bodies, especially if we suppose her to live many years: for sup posing the body to be in a state of flux and perishing while the man still lives, but the soul meanwhile to be constantly re-weaving her garment as it wears out, it must certainly follow of necessity that whenever the soul does die she must be wearing her last dress, and that she must be outlasted by this alone: but after the soul has perished, the body would then finally exhibit its natural weakness and speedily decay and be gone out of sight. So that one is not yet entitled to put so much faith in this argument as to feel any confidence that after death our soul still enjoys existence anywhere. For if one were even to concede to the arguer still more than you, Simmias, allow, granting to him not only that our soul was in existence in the time preceding our birth, but even that

after our death there is nothing to prevent the souls of some of us still existing and having future existence and being born many times over and dying again, —for soul is by its nature so strong as to hold out through many different births, —but after granting all this were to stop short in his concessions and refuse to allow that she suffers no harm in the course of her many births and does not in fact at last in one of her various deaths perish outright, but this particular death and this dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul, he were to say, no one can determine, for it is impossible for anyone of us to perceive it—if, I say, all this be so, no confidence that a man can feel about death can be otherwise than an irrational confidence, unless he can undertake to prove that soul is absolutely immortal and imperishable: otherwise, he who is about to die must ever feel apprehension for his soul, lest in the present separation from his body she should perish utterly.

Phaedo/ So when we heard this we were all, as we afterwards owned to one another, affected with an uncomfortable feeling, in that, after we had been so fully convinced by the preceding argument, they now seemed to unsettle our minds again, and not merely to throw us into doubt of the validity of the foregoing results, but also as to any arguments that might follow to inspire us with the fear of our being possibly incompetent judges or even of the things themselves admitting in fact of no certainty.

Echecrates/ Yes, by heaven, Phaedo, I can excuse you. For in fact, as I was listening to you just now myself, a thought struck me, and I said to myself something of this sort: Then what reasoning can Ave trust in future? for how extremely plausible that

argument of Socrates was, which has now quite sunk into discredit. For that theory, that our soul is a kind of harmony, has now, as it has always had, a wonderful hold upon me, and, when it was stated, suggested to my memory, as it were, that it had been my own opinion previously. And again I am as completely at fault as at starting for some other reason to persuade me that the soul of the dead man does not die with him. Tell me then, in God's name, how did Socrates pursue the discussion? And whether he too, as you say that you did, betrayed any symptoms of vexation, or no, but on the contrary advanced quietly to the rescue of his argument; and whether he defended it satisfactorily or inadequately: tell me the whole story as exactly as you can.

Phaedo/ In good truth, Echecrates, often as I have wondered at Socrates, I never yet felt so much admiration of him as at that interview. Now for a man like him to be able to find an answer is perhaps nothing remarkable: but what I was most struck with in him was, first of all this, that he listened so sweetly and kindly and admiringly to the young men's objections; next, that he so quickly perceived the effect they had produced upon us; and finally, that he so skillfully applied a remedy, and rallied us, as it were, from our rout and defeat, and encouraged us to advance by his side and join him in considering the argument.

Echecrates/ How, pray?

Phaedo/ I will tell you. I chanced to be sitting on his right by the bedside on a low stool, whilst his seat was a good deal higher than mine. So stroking down my head and pressing together the hair upon my neck—for

it was a habit of his ever and anon to play with my hair said; —

Socrates/ So, Phaedo, to-morrow, I dare say, you will have all these beautiful locks cut off.

Phaedo/ I suppose so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Not if you take my advice.

Phaedo/ Why not?

Socrates/ We ought to do it to-day, I mine and you these, if our argument be really dead and we are unable to bring it to life again. Indeed, for my own part, if I were you and the argument had slipt through my fingers, I would make a vow, like the Argives, never to let my hair grow until I had renewed the struggle and defeated Simmias and Cebes reasoning.

Phaedo/ Nay, Hercules himself, says the proverb, is not a match for two.

Socrates/ Well then, call me in, your Iolaus, to your aid whilst it is still light.

Phaedo/ I summon you then to my aid, not in the character of Hercules, but in that of Iolaus summoning Hercules.

Socrates/ It won't matter. But first of all let us be on our guard against falling into a certain error.

Phaedo/ What is that?

Socrates/ Against becoming speculation-haters, as people become man-haters: for there is no greater evil, that can befall a man than this, that he have come to hate speculation. And speculation-hating arises from the same cause as man-hating. For the latter enters our minds from an excess of confidence artlessly placed in a person, and from an opinion conceived that the man is in all respects true and sincere and trust worthy, and

then shortly afterwards finding him to be a villain and untrustworthy, and so again another: and when a man has often been treated thus, and particularly by any of those whom he would be inclined to esteem his nearest and dearest friends, so at last by frequent collisions of this kind he comes to hate everybody and to think that there is nothing at all sound and sincere in anyone. You have observed, haven't you, that this is the kind of way in which this feeling originates?

Phaedo/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Well, isn't it shameful, and plain that such a person is venturing to hold intercourse with men without a knowledge of mankind? For, I presume, if he had conducted his dealings on principles of art, he would in that case have believed, as is really the case, that the excessively good and bad are each of them rare, but that the intermediate sort are most numerous.

Phaedo/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Just as is the case, with the excessively big and little: do you think there is anything rarer than to meet with a man either extremely big or extremely little, or a dog, or anything else you please? or again swift or slow, or ugly or handsome, or white or black? or have you not observed that in all such things the very extremes are rare and few in number, but the means abundant and numerous?

Phaedo/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Don't you think then, that, if a contest of rascality were to be proposed, the most distinguished would show themselves as scarce there as elsewhere?

Phaedo/ Like enough.

Socrates/ Why, so it is: however, this is not the way in which speculations resemble men, [viz. that the

extremes are rare]—I merely followed your lead just now—but this, in that, when a man has believed a theory to be true independently of the art of reasoning, and then soon after it seems to him false, sometimes really being so and sometimes not, and again assumes different aspects in succession, and most especially those who devote themselves to the practice of disputation end, you know, by thinking that they have become the cleverest fellows in the world, and are the only people that have discovered that neither in things nor in speculations is there anything sound or sure, but that all existing objects are in a constant flux and reflux, exactly as in the Euripus, and never abide an instant in any position.

Phaedo/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ It would indeed, Phaedo, be a lamentable case, if there be any true and certain doctrine attainable by our understanding, that a man, from lending his ear to speculations of such a nature that they seem, though the same, to be sometimes true and sometimes false, instead of accusing himself and his own want of skill, should at last out of mere vexation be glad to shift the blame from his own shoulders upon the speculations, and spend the rest of his life thenceforward in hating and abusing these speculations, and remain a stranger to the truth and knowledge of things.

Phaedo/ Upon my word, lamentable indeed.

Socrates/ First of all then, let us be on our guard against this, and let us not admit into our soul the fancy that there is nothing sound in philosophy; on the contrary we are much more bound to suppose that we ourselves are not yet in a sound state, but that we must strive manfully and earnestly to be so—you and the rest

for the sake of your future life as well, and I as a preparation for death itself: for, for myself, I am afraid that on this very subject just at present I am not in a philosophical mood, but rather, like those very vulgar disputants, in a contentious humor. For they in fact, whenever they dispute on a point, are utterly regardless of the real truth of the question under examination, but direct all their efforts to making their own positions appear true to their audience: and I think in the present case that the difference between me and them will be merely this, that I shall not be anxious to convince my audience of the truth of my opinion, unless it were as a merely subordinate object, but to convince myself, as far as I possibly can, of the truth of what I say. For I make this calculation, my dear friend, —and mark in what a selfish spirit—if what I say should be really true, it is well indeed to be persuaded of it; but if there is nothing at all after our decease, yet at any rate for the mere interval that is to elapse before my death I shall be less likely to give offence by my complaints to my friends present. Besides, this ignorance of mine wont accompany me after death, —for that would have been a misery, —but will soon be gone. Thus armed, Simmias and Cebes, I advance to the encounter of the theory. You however, if you take my advice, will care little for Socrates, but much more for the truth: and so if I seem to you to say anything that is true, give me your assent; but if otherwise, oppose with every argument within your reach, and take care that I do not out of my zeal and earnestness cheat both myself and you, and so be gone like a bee with my sting left in the wound.

Come, let us on. First of all recall to my mind what you were saying, in case my memory be found at fault. For Simmias, I believe, is doubtful and alarmed lest the

soul, more divine and more noble though it be than the body, should perish before it, being of the nature of a harmony: but Cebes, if I am not mistaken, granted me this, that soul is more lasting than body, but thought that nobody could feel sure that the soul, after having many times over worn out ever so many bodies, does not at last perish herself this time when she leaves it, and whether death be not precisely this, that is to say, souls destruction; for as to body, that knows no pause in its constant course of decay. Is there anything besides these two, Simmias and Cebes, which we are required to review?

Phaedo/ They both agreed that these were the points.

Socrates/ Then do you reject, all our previous conclusions; or only some of them, and accept the others?

Phaedo/ Only some of them, they replied.

Socrates/ What then say you, to that argument in which we maintained that learning is recollection, and if this be so, that it follows of necessity that our souls were in existence somewhere else before they were confined in the body?

Cebes/ For my part, I was then wonderfully impressed by it, and I still adhere to it more firmly than to any other.

Simmias/ And I too, am myself of the same mind; and I should be quite surprised, if, on this point at least, I ever altered my opinion.

Socrates/ Aye, but you must alter it, my Theban friend, if this notion of yours is to stand, that a harmony is a composite thing, and that soul is a kind of harmony composed of the elements of the body strung to the proper pitch. For you never will allow yourself to say

that a harmony was in being and those things were in existence of which it was to be composed. Will you?

Simmias/ Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you perceive then, that this is what you assert when you say that the soul existed before ever it entered into a human form and body, and was in being, composed of elements not yet in existence? For surely your harmony is not like what you compare it to; but the lyre and its strings and sounds are first called into being still untuned, and the harmony is composed last of all and is the first to perish. How then will this doctrine of yours harmonize with the other?

Simmias/ Not at all.

Socrates/ And yet, of all arguments in the world, that on the subject of harmony should be harmonious.

Simmias/ It should, no doubt.

Socrates/ However this theory of yours is not: so you must consider which of the two doctrines you choose, that learning is recollection, or that soul is a harmony.

Simmias/ I much prefer the former, Socrates. For the other has become mine without demonstration, resting merely on certain probable and plausible grounds, sources from which the vulgar usually derive their opinions; but I am conscious that doctrines which build their proofs upon mere probability are impostors, and if one be not on ones guard against them they thoroughly delude one, whether it be in geometry or in anything else: whereas the doctrine of recollection and learning has been delivered upon a basis of proof sufficient to warrant our acceptance of it. For it was stated, I believe, that our soul was in being before ever it entered the body on the ground that to it appertains the absolute existence to which we give the name of 'that which is.'

But the truth of this absolute essence I have accepted, I flatter myself, on right and satisfactory grounds. For this reason therefore I am forced, as it seems, to listen to no assertion either from myself or from anyone else that soul is a harmony.

Socrates/ And again, Simmias, looking at it in this point of view, what say you? Think you that it is the nature of a harmony or of any other composition to be in any different state to its own component elements?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor, again, to do anything, I suppose, nor to suffer anything beyond what those elements do or suffer?

Phaedo/ He assented.

Socrates/ Then consequently it is not the nature of a harmony to take the lead of its own component parts, but to follow them?

Phaedo/ He agreed to that.

Socrates/ Far less then can it have a contrary motion or sound, or act in any other way in opposition to its own parts?

Simmias/ Far indeed.

Socrates/ But again. Is not every harmony naturally a harmony in proportion to the adaptation of the elements?

Simmias/ I don't understand.

Socrates/ Would it not, if it be better tuned and to a higher degree—supposing this possible—be more a harmony and in a higher degree? but if less and to a lower degree, less so and in a lower?

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Well, is this possible in respect of soul, that one soul in the very smallest degree can be to a greater extent and more, or to a smaller extent and less, than another, just what it is, that is to say, soul?

Simmias/ In no way whatever.

Socrates/ Come then, in heavens name, is not one soul said to contain wisdom and virtue, and to be good; and another, folly and vice, and to be bad? and are not these phrases true?

Simmias/ True, indeed.

Socrates/ What then will any of those that hold the view that soul is a harmony say that these things, virtue and vice, are in our souls? that they are again a different harmony and discord? and that the one is in tune, the good one, and in itself, a harmony, contains a second harmony; but that the other is out of tune itself, and contains no other within itself?

Simmias/ I'm sure I can't tell you: but it is plain that anyone who adopts that hypothesis must maintain something of that sort.

Socrates/ But it has been admitted before, that one soul is not a whit more or less so than another. And that admission is as much as to say that one harmony is not a whit more or in a higher degree such, nor less so or in a lower degree, than another. Isn't it so?

Simmias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Yes, and that, that which is no more nor less a harmony is neither more nor less tuned. Is it so?

Simmias/ It is.

Socrates/ And that which is neither more nor less in tune—has it a greater or less share of harmony, or the same?

Simmias/ The same.

Socrates/ Well then, soul, seeing that one is in no degree more or less than another just what it is, that is to say, soul, —neither, consequently, is it more or less tuned?

Simmias/ Just so.

Socrates/ But if it be thus affected, it can have no greater share of discord or harmony?

Simmias/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ And if this be true of it, can one have at all a larger share of vice or virtue than another, supposing vice to be a discord and virtue a harmony?

Simmias/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Or rather, I should imagine, Simmias, to be quite accurate, no soul at all will be infected with vice, if it is a harmony. For a harmony surely, if it be completely neither more nor less than this, a harmony, never can admit discord.

Simmias/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Nor again soul, I presume, if it be perfectly soul, vice.

Simmias/ No: how could it according to our previous reasoning?

Socrates/ It will follow then from this theory that all souls of all living creatures are equally good, if it belongs to the nature of all souls alike to be neither more nor less than this, that is to say, soul.

Simmias/ I should think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you think also, that this is well said, and that this must be the fate of our argument, if the sup position was correct that soul is a harmony?

Simmias/ No, nor anything like well said.

Socrates/ But again, of all that is in man, think you that there is anything else that has the command but soul, especially if it be a wise one?

Simmias/ Nothing, I should think.

Socrates/ And does it always fall in with the affections of the body, or sometimes oppose them? I mean, for instance, when there is heat and thirst in the body, that it drags it the contrary way to abstain from drinking, or, when hungry, to abstain from eating: and in an infinity of other cases we see the soul setting itself in opposition to the affections of the body, don't we?

Simmias/ To be sure we do.

Socrates/ At the same time, on the other hand, we came to the conclusion in our preceding discussion that, if it be a harmony, it never could produce notes contrary to the tension or relaxation or vibration or any other affection whatever of the elements of which it is made up, but must always follow them, and can never take the lead?

Simmias/ We did, of course.

Socrates/ Well, but are we not now supposing it to be doing the precise opposite, taking the lead, namely, of all those parts of which it may be said to be constituted, and setting itself in opposition in nearly every circumstance during its whole life, and exercising the mastery over them in every possible way, disciplining them, sometimes more severely and with pain in the way of bodily exercises and medicine, and again in a milder form, and now threatening, now admonishing its appetites and passions and terrors, like one distinct being holding converse with something else, just as Homer has represented in the Odyssey, where he says of Ulysses—

> "And he smote his breast, and chiding bespake his heart:
>
> 'Be patient still, O my heart: thou hast borne ere now even worse.'"

Think you that, when he wrote this, he considered it as a harmony and of a nature to be influenced by the affections of the body, instead of, as it really is, capable of leading them all, and lording it over them, and itself far too divine a thing to be compared with a harmony?

Simmias/ No, upon my word, I should think not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, my excellent friend, it can in no sense be right for us to say that soul is a kind of harmony: for it seems, if we did, we should agree neither with that divine poet Homer nor with ourselves.

Simmias/ It is so.

Socrates/ Very good, we have succeeded tolerably well, it seems, in propitiating the Theban Harmony: but how about Cadmus, Cebes, how shall we appease him and by what words?

Cebes/ I dare say, you'll find a way: at all events your late argument against the harmony has had for me a singularly unexpected result. For whilst Simmias was speaking, when he expressed his doubts, I marveled much if any way could be found of dealing with his theory; and accordingly I thought it very odd that it instantly gave way at the very first onset of your argument. So I shouldn't be surprised if Cadmus theory shared the same fate.

Socrates/ My worthy friend, don't talk big, for fear some evil eye bring discomfiture upon the argument upon which we are about to enter. However heaven will take care of all that; but let us, like Homers heroes,

‘advance near,’ and try if there is anything in what you say. The sum of your enquiry is, I believe, this: you require it to be demonstrated that our soul is indestructible and immortal, in order that, if a philosopher at the point of death feel confident and believe that after death, in the world beyond, he will enjoy a lot beyond comparison better than if he had died after a life passed in any other manner, that confidence which he feels may not be senseless and idle. But as to proving that the soul is something strong and godlike, and that it was in existence even before we men were born, —there is no reason, say you, why all that should not indicate, not indeed its immortality, but that soul is durable and probably existed in a previous state an immensely long time and knew and did a number of things; and yet, for all that, it was not a bit the more immortal, but the very entrance into man’s body was the commencement of its destruction, like a disease: and so, you say, it passes all this its life in trouble and distress, and at last in what is called death perishes. And, to be sure, say you, it makes no difference, in respect at least of the alarm which each one of us may feel, whether it enters a body once or several times: for it is natural for anyone to feel alarm, unless he were insensible, who does not know nor can prove that it is immortal. That, I think, Cebes, is a tolerably exact account of your objection; and I purposely repeat it often, in order that nothing may escape us, and that you may make any addition or withdraw anything you please.

Cebes/ Nay, I have no occasion at present either to take away or to add anything: that is in fact just what I mean.

Phaedo/ Upon this, Socrates made a long pause, and after reflecting with himself said at length:

Socrates/ It is no trifling question, Cebes, that you raise: for we must enter into a full discussion of the whole subject of the cause of generation and corruption. I will therefore, if you like, describe to you my own experience on the subject: and then, if any of my statements appear to you likely to be of service, you will make use of it for your conviction in the matter you speak of.

Cebes/ Oh, certainly, I should like to do so.

Socrates/ Then listen to what I am going to say. In my youth, Cebes, I was singularly fond of this kind of science which they call physics. For it seemed to me a magnificent sort of science, to know the causes of everything, why it comes into being, and why it perishes, and why it exists: and I often drifted backwards and forwards in the examination, first of all, of questions like these, whether it was in consequence of a sort of fermentation engendered by heat and cold, as some once maintained, that living creatures grow into a consistent shape, and whether it is the blood which is the vehicle of thought, or the air, or fire, or none of all these, but the brain that furnishes the senses of hearing and sight and smell, and from these arise memory and opinion, and from memory and opinion, when they have attained a state of quiescence, in this way springs knowledge. And again I investigated the manner of destruction of all these things, and the various phenomena of the heavens and the earth, until at last I arrived at the conclusion that nothing in the world could be more stupid in such studies than myself. I will give you a satisfactory proof of it: for what I knew well enough before, in my own opinion and in that of

the rest of the world—I was then so completely blinded by these studies that I unlearnt even what I thought I knew previously on a vast number of points, and amongst them, why it is that a man grows. For I formerly thought that it was quite plain to everyone that it is caused by eating and drinking: when, namely, from his food flesh has grown on to his flesh, and bone to his bones, and so by the same rule to all the rest the elements that are related to them, each to each, —that then it was that the small bulk be comes in process of time large, and so the little man grows into a big one. So I then thought: don't you think it was with reason?

Cebes/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Well then, here is another point for your consideration. I thought I was tolerably sure whenever a man appeared tall standing by a short one, that he was taller by the head itself for instance, and similarly horse larger than horse: or again, what was still plainer, ten seemed to me more than eight because two were added to it, and a thing two cubits long longer than one of one cubit because it exceeded it by half its length.

Cebes/ Well but what is your opinion of it now?

Socrates/ Why, 'faith, that I am far enough from thinking, that I am acquainted with the cause of anyone of them: for I can't accept my own assurance even, when one is added to one, either that that to which the one is added has become two, or that the one added and that to which it is added have become two by the addition of the one to the other: for I am surprised that, whereas, whilst each of them was separate the one from the other, each was one, and they were not then two, when they were brought together it should then follow that this was the cause of their becoming two, that is to say,

the combination caused by their being placed near one another. No, nor can I any longer persuade myself, if one be divided into two, that this again, that is to say, the division, has been the cause of its becoming two: for here we find a cause of a thing becoming two, the exact opposite of that in the former case: for in the former instance it was because they were brought together near to one another and added one to another, but now it is because they are carried away and separated one from another. No, nor can I any longer bring myself to believe that I know why a thing becomes one, nor, in a word, why anything else whatever comes into being, or perishes, or exists, that is to say, according to this method of investigation; but I follow another disorderly, confused kind of method of my own, but this one I can by no means admit.

But I happened once upon a time to hear someone reading out of a book, as he said, of Anaxagoras, and saying, that it is Mind that sets all in order and is the cause of all. I was at once delighted with this cause, and it seemed to me right in a manner that the supreme Mind should be the cause of all things, and I thought, if this be so, that the Mind in its ordering must order and arrange everything, each in that way in which it is best that it should be: should therefore anyone want to find the cause of each individual thing, how it comes into being, or perishes, or exists, he must first ascertain this in respect of it, how, namely, it is best for it either to be, or to do or suffer anything else: and so according to this theory a man was bound to enquire after nothing, in his own case and in that of everything else, but what is best and most perfect: and it would follow of necessity that the same person would also become acquainted with the worse, because the science that belongs to them is

the same. Reflecting then upon all this, I was glad to think I had discovered a teacher of the cause of existing things after my own heart, Anaxagoras namely, and that he would tell me first of all whether the earth is flat or round, and after he had told me, would add a complete explanation of the reason and the necessity., stating what is better, and then showing that it is better for it to be of that shape: and if he maintained that it is in the center of the universe, that he would explain into the bargain that it is better for it to be in the center: and if he made all this clear to me, I had made up my mind to require no other kind of cause beyond that. And so again with respect to the sun and the moon and the rest of the stars, I had determined similarly to carry on my enquiry in the same way, about their relative speed and their revolutions and the rest of their affections, how, that is, it may be better for them each to act and be acted on as they are. For I never should have thought that, whilst he asserted that they were ordered by Mind, he would afterwards apply to them any other cause besides than that it is best for them so to be as they are: and so I supposed that, in assigning its cause to each in particular and to all generally, he would describe in addition what was best for each and what was the common good of all. And I would not have bartered my expectations for a great deal, but I seized the book with the greatest avidity, and read it as fast as ever I could, in order to become acquainted as soon as possible with the best and the worse.

Glorious then was the hope, my friend, from which I was hurled down, when, as I went on in my reading, I saw a man making no use of his Mind, nor alleging any causes with reference to the ordering of things, but assigning as causes a parcel of airs and skies and

waters and a hundred other things equally absurd. And the case with him seemed to me to be exactly similar to that of one who were to maintain that Socrates does all that he does in virtue of Mind, and then in the attempt to state the individual causes of each of my actions were to say first of all that the reason of my sitting here now is because my body is composed of bones and muscles, and the bones are solid and separated by joints from one another, and the muscles are capable of contraction and relaxation, surrounding the bones together with the flesh and the skin which keeps them together; accordingly, as the bones turn in their sockets, the muscles, expanding and contracting, give me the power now, we may suppose, of bending my limbs, and that is the reason why I am sitting here with my knees bent: and again with regard to the conversation I am holding with you, were to bring forward some other causes like these, a set of sounds namely and airs and hearings and an infinity of other things of the same kind, and forget to mention the real causes, that is to say, that, whereas it seemed better to the Athenians to condemn me to death, for that reason I too have thought it better in my turn to remain sitting here, and more right to stay and undergo my sentence, whatever it may be that they have ordered: for, by the dog, as I think, these muscles and bones would have been long ago in the region of Megara or Boeotia, put in motion by the 'opinion of what is best,' had I not thought it more right and honorable, rather than fly and run away, to undergo any penalty that the city chooses to impose upon me. However, to call such things as these causes is excessively absurd: if anyone were to say indeed that without all such things, bones and muscles and everything else that I have, I should never have been able to put my resolutions into

execution, it would be quite true; but to say that this is the reason of my doing anything that I do, or that this is the meaning of acting by Mind, and not rather the choice of what is best, would be a very extraordinarily careless way of speaking. For to be unable to distinguish the essential difference between the real cause of a thing, and that without which the cause never could be a cause—which, in fact, is what the generality of thinkers seem to be groping after, as it were in the dark, and to apply a name quite foreign to it when they speak of it as if it were a cause. And so it is that one makes the earth to be kept steady, forsooth, by the heavens, by surrounding it with a vortex; another represents it as a flat kneading-trough supported by the air beneath as a basis for it to rest upon: but the meaning of their being disposed according to the best possible arrangement for them, —this they neither search after, nor deem it to possess any divine force, but suppose they might some time or other discover an Atlas stronger and more immortal than this, and more capable of holding the universe together, and conceive that the 'good and binding' does, in fact, bind and hold together nothing whatever. Now to learn the true nature of such a cause as this, I for my own part would most gladly have put myself to school under anyone in the world: but when I found myself cheated of it, and unable either to discover it myself or to obtain the knowledge of it from anyone else, —would you like me, Cebes, to give you a description of the way in which I have proceeded, as the second best course, in my search after the cause?

Cebes/ Oh, I should like it monstrously.

Socrates/ Well then I thought to myself, that next, after I had exhausted myself in my enquiries after the nature of things, I must take good care to avoid the fate

of those who are looking at and examining an eclipse of the sun: for some of them, I rather think, lose their eyes, unless they look at the reflection of him in water or some such thing. Such was my own notion; and I was afraid of having my soul quite blinded, if I looked at things with my eyes, or attempted to reach them with any of my senses. Accordingly it occurred to me that I must have recourse to words, and in them carry on the investigation of the true nature of things. Now perhaps the illustration that I employ to a certain degree does not correspond with the reality: for I do not altogether admit that anyone who pursues his researches after things in words regards them in mere reflections any more than one who goes straight to the real objects: but be that as it may, this is the way in which I started; and having laid down any conception which I judge to be most incontestable in each case, I assume as true whatever seems to me to be in accordance with it, whether it be in the case of cause or in that of anything else, and whatever is not, as false. But I will explain to you more clearly my meaning; for I think that at present you don't understand.

Cebes/ No, upon my honor, Socrates, not particularly well.

Socrates/ Well, this is what I mean; no novelty, but what I have never ceased to say constantly on all other occasions as well as in our past discussion. For I am in fact about to make the attempt to exhibit to you the kind of cause which has been the object of my studies, and to return to the old burden of my song, and to begin with it; with the assumption, that is, that there is such a thing as what is beautiful in itself independently, and good, and great, and so forth: and if you grant me this and admit the existence of such, I hope to be able from

this to show you what the cause is, and to discover that the soul is immortal.

Cebes/ Nay, you may assume that I grant this, and so draw your conclusion as soon as you please.

Socrates/ Then consider, whether you agree with me in what follows. For it appears to me that, if anything else is beautiful except the absolutely beautiful, the only possible cause of its beauty is that it participates in the nature of that absolute beauty: and so on for all the rest. Do you admit this kind of cause?

Cebes/ Oh, yes.

Socrates/ That being the case, I can no longer understand nor recognize all those other ingenious causes: but if anyone assign to me as a reason for the beauty of any object, either that it has a blooming color, or a fine figure, or any other such reason as these, to all the rest I pay no sort of attention, for I am merely confused by them, but to this one thing I hold simply and artlessly and perhaps foolishly, that it is nothing else that makes it beautiful but that ideal beauty—whether we are to call it presence or communication, or in whatever way or by whatever means the connection is brought about—for on this latter point I can no longer pronounce any strong affirmation, but only to the extent that it is by the absolute beauty that all beautiful things are made beautiful. For this seems to me the safest answer to return either to myself or to anyone else, and as long as I hold fast to this I think I can never fall, but that this is a safe reply to make to myself and to anyone else whatever, that it is by the absolute beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful. Don't you agree with me?

Cebes/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ And consequently, that it is by greatness that great things become great, and greater things greater, and by smallness that the less become less?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then neither would you assent, if anyone were to maintain that a man is taller than another 'by the head,' and that one who is shorter is shorter by precisely the same thing: but you would protest that you have nothing else to say about the matter than that everything that is greater, one than another, is greater by nothing else than by greatness, and that the cause of its being greater is its greatness; and that the less is less by nothing else I than smallness, and that the cause of its being less is its smallness; dreading no doubt the encounter of some ad verse argument, if you assert that a person is taller or shorter by the head, first, that it is by the very same thing that the greater is greater and the less, less, and secondly, that your greater is greater by the head which is a little thing, and that it would be indeed a prodigy that a man should be great by a little thing. You would be afraid of this, wouldn't you?

Phaedo/ Cebes laughed at this, and replied;

Cebes/ I certainly should.

Socrates/ Well, that ten is more than eight by two, and that two is the reason of its excess, you would be afraid to assert, instead of saying by number and by reason of its number? and that two cubits are greater than one by half, and not by size? for there is the same fear, I imagine.

Cebes/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And again, in the case of the addition of one, wouldn't you carefully avoid saying that the addition is the cause of their becoming two, or, when a thing is divided, the division; and loudly exclaim that you know no other way whatever in which each particular thing comes into being except by the participation in the appropriate being of each in which it does participate, and that in such cases you have no other cause to assign for their becoming two but their participation in the idea of two, and that all objects that are to be two must participate in this, and all that is to be one, in unity? And all these divisions and additions and the rest of such like subtleties, you would let alone, leaving the explanation of them to cleverer fellows than yourself: but you, frightened, as the phrase is, by your own shadow and ignorance, would hold fast to that certainty of our hypothesis, and so shape your answer. And should anyone attack the hypothesis itself, you would let it pass and make no answer, until you had examined the consequences that proceed from it, whether you find they agree or disagree with one another. And then next when you were required to give an account of that itself, you would do so in like manner, by the assumption again of any second hypothesis which appeared to you the best of the higher generalizations, until you arrived at something satisfactory: and you would not, like those mere debaters, talk about the first principle and its consequences in such a way as to jumble them all up together, supposing you really wished to attain to the knowledge of any real thing? For they, I dare say, have no consideration at all or anxiety about this; for their cleverness enables them to give themselves entire satisfaction, whilst they mix everything together: but

you, if you belong to the order of lovers of wisdom, would do, I doubt not, as I say.

Phaedo/ Most true, said Simmias and Cebes both together.

Echecrates/ Yes, by Zeus, Phaedo, like enough. For I am amazingly struck with the clearness with which he explained this for anyone possessed of a grain of sense.

Phaedo/ No doubt, Echecrates, and so were all that were there.

Echecrates/ Why so are we that were not there, and hear it now for the first time. But pray tell us what was said next.

Phaedo/ I think, after this was conceded to him, and it was admitted that each one of the ideas has a real existence, and that it is by participation in these that everything else bears the name of themselves, he next enquired;

Socrates/ If then, you accept this doctrine, do you not, whenever you pronounce Simmias to be taller than Socrates and shorter than Phaedo, say at the same time that both these things reside in Simmias, greatness and smallness?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ But still, you allow that the proposition, Simmias exceeds Socrates in height, is not exactly true as it is expressed in words: for surely it is not Simmias nature to be taller in virtue of this, that he is Simmias, but in virtue of the tallness which he happens to have; nor again, to be taller than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness compared with the others greatness.

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ No, nor again to be surpassed in height by Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has height compared with Simmias shortness.

Cebes/ It is so.

Socrates/ Thus it is then that Simmias may be called short and tall at the same time, whilst he really is between both, exceeding the shortness of the one by excess of height, and lending to the other by comparison a size exceeding his own shortness.

Phaedo/ And at the same time smiling;

Socrates/ One would fancy, that I am going to talk like a legal document; but still what I say is not far from the truth.

Phaedo/ He agreed.

Socrates/ And my reason for dwelling upon the subject is the desire that I have to see you of my opinion. For it seems to me, not only that greatness in itself will never be great and small at once, but also that greatness in ourselves never admits what is small nor will be surpassed; but one of two things, either it flies and gives way on the approach of its opposite, the little, or, if the other make good its advance, perishes outright; but it will not stand its ground and admit littleness so as to be different to what it was, in the same way as I can admit and sustain the attack of littleness, and still be what I am, this very identical little fellow; whereas the other cannot bear to be small when it is great: and in the very same way what is small in us will never be come or be great, nor will any other of the opposite ideas, whilst it still remains what it was, become or be its opposite, but in such a case it either retires or ceases to be.

Cebes/ That is exactly my own view.

Phaedo/ And then one of the company present—but who it was I don't distinctly remember—said as soon as he heard this:

Someone/ In heavens name, didn't we, in an earlier part of our discussion, arrive at a conclusion exactly opposite to what has been just said, that the greater springs from the less, and the less from the greater, and that this is just the source from which opposites are generated, that is to say, their opposites? But now it seems to be denied that this can ever take place.

Phaedo/ And Socrates, who had bent his head forward to listen, answered;

Socrates/ Manfully suggested: nevertheless you don't remark the difference between our present and former assertions. For it was maintained on the occasion you allude to that the opposite thing derives its origin from the thing opposite to it; but now, that the absolute opposite can never become opposite to itself, neither what resides in ourselves nor what resides In universal nature. For on the former occasion, my friend, we were talking about the things that contain the opposites, and gave them the name that belongs to the latter: but now we are speaking of the ideas themselves, by the inherence of which phenomena named receive the name that they bear; but the ideas themselves, we maintain, never would admit a reciprocal generation.

Phaedo/ And at the same time he looked at Cebes, and asked;

Socrates/ You too, Cebes, were troubled I dare say at something in what he said?

Cebes/ No, I have not the same feeling this time: although I by no means aver that there are not a good many things that trouble me.

Socrates/ Then, we have arrived at this conclusion absolutely, that the opposite idea will never be opposite to itself.

Cebes/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then further, let me beg you to consider if you are inclined to agree to this too. There are such things as what you call hot and cold?

Cebes/ To be sure there are.

Socrates/ The same as snow and fire?

Cebes/ No indeed, of course not.

Socrates/ But heat is a thing distinct from fire, and cold a thing distinct from snow?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ But this, I suppose, you allow, that snow as snow can never admit the presence of heat, according to what we were saying before, so as still to be what it was, snow and hot, but upon the approach of heat will either give place to it or perish?

Cebes/ Yes, by all means.

Socrates/ And that fire again on the approach of cold must either yield to it or perish, but never will bear to admit cold and still be what it was, fire and cold?

Cebes/ Quite true.

Socrates/ It is true then, in respect of some of such things as we have been talking of, that not only is the idea itself held to have a right to its own name forever, but also something else which is not it, but always has its form whensoever it occurs. But, to proceed, my meaning will perhaps appear more clearly in the following case. The idea of odd must always, I presume, receive this name as we now pronounce it: must it not?

Cebes/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Is that the only thing in nature which must receive it, —for this is the drift of my question—or something else besides, which is not the same as the odd, but still, together with its own name, must ever receive this appellation also, because its nature is such that it never can be separated from the odd? As an example of what I mean we may take the case of the number three, and many others: but let us examine the number three. Don't you think that it must be called not only by its own name but also by that of the odd, though that be not the same as the number three? Yet still the nature of the number three and the number five and the entire half of the set of numbers is of such sort that each of them, though it be not the same as the odd, is nevertheless always odd. And again, two and four and the whole of the other row of numbers again, though it be not the same as the even, is still in each case constantly even. Do you admit this, or not?

Cebes/ Of course I do.

Socrates/ Then pay attention to what I want to explain; which is this, that it appears that not only those opposite ideas do not admit one another, but also all those things which, though not opposite to one another, have opposites in separably attached to them—that these too have all the air of not admitting that idea which is opposite to that which inheres in themselves, but upon the accession of it either perish or give way. Or must we not say that the number three would perish or undergo any other extremity whatever sooner than submit to become even, whilst still remaining three?

Cebes/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Nor again, is the number two opposite to the number three.

Cebes/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ Then not only the opposite ideas reciprocally exclude each other, but there are also certain other things which are incompatible with the intrusion of the opposites.

Cebes/ Most true.

Socrates/ Should you like us then, to determine, if we can, of what nature these things are?

Cebes/ Yes, of all things.

Socrates/ Then do you think it likely, Cebes, that they are such as force whatsoever they have possession of, not merely to entertain the idea proper to itself, but also to entertain constantly that of some opposite?

Cebes/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Just what we were saying a while ago: for you understand, I suppose, that all things which are possessed by the idea of three must of necessity be not only three but also odd.

Cebes/ Oh, certainly.

Socrates/ Accordingly our assertion is that the idea opposite to that form which effects this [makes it odd] can never obtain access to such a thing as that.

Cebes/ No, never.

Socrates/ But it was effected by the idea of the odd.

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And opposite to this is that of the even.

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ It follows that the idea of the even will never make its way to three.

Cebes/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then three has no portion in the even.

Cebes/ None.

Socrates/ Consequently the number three is uneven.

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, the definition I undertook to give of the nature of those things which, though not opposite to something else, still do not admit it, this opposite, as in the instance we just now took, the number three, though not opposite to the even, does not admit it any the more for that, for it the number three always brings to it the even its opposite the odd, and similarly the number two to the odd, and fire to cold, and a vast number of others—but see now if you accept my definition, that not only the opposite does not admit the opposite idea, but also whenever a thing brings with it an opposite to anything that it goes to, the importing object itself can never admit the opposite belonging to the imported. But recall it to mind once again, for it is just as well to hear it often. Five will not admit the idea of even, nor ten the double of it, that of odd. Now this double in its own nature is opposite to something else, but nevertheless will not admit the idea of odd: nor again will one and a half and all the rest of numbers of that kind, the half for instance, admit that of the whole, and a third again and so on—if you follow me and agree with what I say.

Cebes/ I agree with you entirely, and follow you too.

Socrates/ Then answer me over again from the beginning. And do not express your answer in the terms of my question, but in different words, as I shall set you the example. And I speak with reference to another safe method of answering which I have discovered from the

observations just made, besides that mode, that sure one, which I pointed out at first. For supposing you were to ask me what it is that must reside in a body to make it hot, I shall not now make you that safe, ignorant answer that a body will be hot in which heat resides, but a more refined one derived from our recent conclusions, 'one in which fire resides;' nor, should you enquire what must reside in a body to make it sick, shall I answer sickness, but, a fever; nor again, should you ask what must reside in a number to make it odd, shall I say, oddness; but unity and so forth. Now consider if you by this time understand my meaning sufficiently.

Cebes/ Oh yes, quite sufficiently.

Socrates/ Then answer me; what must reside in a body in order that it may be alive?

Cebes/ Soul.

Socrates/ Well but is this always so?

Cebes/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ It follows then that the soul ever by her presence brings life to whatsoever body she herself occupies?

Cebes/ She does indeed.

Socrates/ And is there anything opposite to life, or nothing?

Cebes/ There is.

Socrates/ What?

Cebes/ Death.

Socrates/ Well then soul can never possibly admit the contrary of that which she herself ever brings with her, according to the conclusion resulting from our previous discussion?

Cebes/ Beyond all possibility of doubt.

Socrates/ But again. What name did we give just now to that which does not admit the idea of even?

Cebes/ Uneven.

Socrates/ And to that which does not admit justice, or music?

Cebes/ Unmusical, and the other, unjust.

Socrates/ Very well: and what do we call that which does not admit death?

Cebes/ Immortal.

Socrates/ And does the soul not admit death?

Cebes/ No.

Socrates/ Consequently the soul(is immortal?

Cebes/ It is.

Socrates/ Very well; may we say now that this has been demonstrated? or how think you?

Cebes/ Yes indeed, and quite satisfactorily, Socrates.

Socrates/ But once more, Cebes, suppose the uneven had been necessarily imperishable, would not three have been imperishable too?

Cebes/ Of course it would.

Socrates/ Well, if again that which is without heat had been necessarily imperishable, whenever anyone applied heat to snow, the snow would slip away safe and unmelted, for it certainly would not perish nor stay to admit heat.

Cebes/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And exactly in the same way, I suppose, if what is unsusceptible of cold had been imperishable, when anything cold approached the fire, it would never have been extinguished nor have perished, but would have made good its escape.

Cebes/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Well then, must we not hold the same language about what is immortal? If the immortal is also imperishable, it is impossible for a soul to perish at the approach of death: for, agreeably to our previous conclusions, it certainly will not admit death nor exist in a state of death; just as three, we said, will not be even, any more than the, odd itself, nor again, fire cold, any more than the heat which is in the fire. But, it may be said, though, as has been settled, the odd cannot become even on the approach of the even, yet what is to prevent its perishing and an even number coming, in to being in its place? Against one who urges this objection we could not contend that it does not perish: for the uneven is not imperishable; for had we come to this conclusion, we could easily have contended that on the approach of the even the odd and three take their departure: and about fire and heat and the rest we might have contended in the same way: might we not?

Cebes/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Well and in the present instance of the immortal, if we are agreed that it is also imperishable, it would follow that soul is imperishable as well as immortal: or if not, we should require a new train of reasoning.

Cebes/ Nay, as far as this is concerned, there is no need of it: for it is hardly likely that anything else could be incapable of destruction, if the immortal, being as it is eternal, can be supposed capable of it.

Socrates/ And surely the Divine Being, and the very idea of life, and all else that is immortal, must be admitted by all to be forever exempt from destruction.

Cebes/ By all men, most certainly, and still more, I should conceive, by gods.

Socrates/ If then what is immortal is also indestructible, must not soul, if it be immortal, be also imperishable?

Cebes/ Infallibly.

Socrates/ Consequently, when death comes upon the whole man, the mortal part of him, as it appears, dies, but the immortal part gives place to death and takes its flight far away safe and indestructible.

Cebes/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then nothing can be more certain, Cebes, than that soul is immortal and imperishable, and that our souls will really exist in the world below.

Cebes/ I at any rate, Socrates, have nothing else to say in opposition to this, nor can I in any way refuse my assent to your arguments. But if perhaps Simmias here or anyone else has anything to say, it would be well not to suppress it: for I know not to what other season than the present he may think to put off his enquiries, if he desire to say or to hear anything on such subjects.

Simmias/ Nay indeed, neither have I myself any further ground for withholding my assent after what has been said: yet nevertheless I am compelled by the importance of the subject of our discussion and the distrust inspired by our human weakness, still to remain unconvinced in my own mind as to the truth of our conclusions.

Socrates/ Yes, Simmias, and not only so, but, besides what you have just so rightly suggested, you should also, however secure they may seem to you, nevertheless re-examine our first premises; and when you have submitted them to a sufficient analysis, you

will then, as I believe, follow the course of the proof, so far at least as it is in any way possible for a human being to follow it; and if this particular point become clear to you, you will make no further search.

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ But here is another point, my friends, which it is right to consider, that is to say, that, if the soul is immortal, it surely requires care and forethought to provide, not only for this time in which consists what we call life, but for the whole: and the hazard of neglecting it must now indeed appear fearful. For, had death been a release from everything, it would have been a godsend to the vicious to be released once for all by death from the body and from their own vice together with the soul: but now, whereas it proves to be immortal, there can be no other refuge for it nor salvation from its misery but to become as good and wise as possible. For the soul takes its journey to the lower world with nothing whatever but its education and cultivation, which in fact, as we are told, bring at once upon the dead the highest service or the deepest injury at the very outset of his journey thither. Now there is a tradition to the effect that each man's genius, to whose charge he had been allotted during his life, — he, when he dies, undertakes to conduct him to some particular place, at which they are all to assemble, and then, after having sentence passed upon them, to proceed to the lower regions in company with that guide to whom has been assigned the office of conveying the inhabitants of this world to the other. And there after they have received each man his appointed lot and have stayed the appointed time, another guide conducts them back hither after many and long revolutions of ages. And the journey, as they say, is not such as

Eschylus' Telephus describes it: for he says that "a simple path leads to the world below;" whereas to me it seems to be neither one nor simple: for had it been so, there would have been no need of guides; for no one, I suppose, would go astray in any direction where there is only one road: whereas in reality it seems to have many branches and windings; a conclusion which I derive from the religious and funereal rites as they are practiced here. So the well-ordered and wise soul follows obediently, for she is not absolutely unacquainted with the present state of things: but that which has a passionate desire after the body, as I said before, fluttering long about it and the visible world, after many struggles and much suffering, with reluctance and difficulty is carried off by the appointed genius. And on her arrival at the place where the rest are, if she be impure and guilty of any such crimes as these, either stained, for example, with unrighteous murders or having committed any other such things as are akin to these and the deeds of kindred souls, her everyone shuns and shrinks from, and will be neither her fellow-traveler nor her guide, and she wanders by herself involved in utter most perplexity until certain seasons have elapsed, at the end of which she is borne by necessity to the habitation fitted for her; whilst the souls that have passed their life with purity and discretion obtain gods for companions and guides, and dwell each in the place that is suitable to her nature. Now there are many and wondrous regions in the earth, and the earth itself is neither in quality nor in size what it is imagined to be by those who are accustomed to describe it, as a certain person has convinced me.

Simmias/ How mean you, Socrates? For I myself have heard a vast deal about the earth, not however the

view you have accepted. I should therefore like very much to hear it.

Socrates/ Nay, in truth, Simmias, to describe to you what it is, seems to me hardly to require the skill of Glaucus: but to decide whether it be true, appears to me too hard even for Glaucus skill; and not only should I very likely find myself quite unable to do so, but also, even if I knew how, my life seems hardly long enough, Simmias, for an argument of such magnitude. Nevertheless the figure of the earth, such as I am convinced it is, and its various regions, there is nothing to prevent my describing to you.

Simmias/ Well, we will be content even with that.

Socrates/ My persuasion is then, first of all, that, if the earth is of a spherical figure and placed in the center of the heavens, it has no need either of air to keep it from falling, or of any other similar sustaining force; but that the perfect uniformity of the heavens in all their parts and the equipoise of the earth itself are sufficient to support it: for a thing in equilibrium, placed in the center of another, perfectly uniform and correspondent, will have no reason for inclining more or less to one side than another, and accordingly, as it does so correspond, will remain fixed and immoveable. Here you have then the first article of my creed.

Simmias/ And a sound one too.

Socrates/ And still further, that it is of vast size, and that we who are settled from the Phasis to the Columns of Hercules occupy quite a little bit of it, dwelling round the sea like ants or frogs round a pond, and that there are many others in various parts living in many similar regions. For in every direction round the earth there are many hollows, of every kind in shape and size,

whereinto collect the water and the mist and the air; whilst the earth itself lies pure in the purity of the heaven, wherein are the stars, which in fact is called the sky by most of those who are accustomed to give an opinion upon such matters: whereof, as we may suppose, all this [water, mist, and air] is the mere sediment, which collects constantly into the cavities of the earth. Accordingly we are living without being aware of it in the hollows of the earth, fancying all the time that we are dwelling above on its surface; just as if a person living at the very bottom of the ocean were to suppose that he was living on its surface, and seeing the sun and all the other stars through the water were to imagine that the sea was heaven, and by reason of his dullness and infirmity had never risen to the top of the water, nor had been able to extricate himself and peer out of the sea into the regions of earth, so as to see how much purer and fairer they are than those with them, nor had heard the tale from one who had seen it. Precisely the same, I say, is the case with ourselves: for dwelling as we do in a kind of cavern of the earth, we yet fancy that we inhabit its surface, and call the air heaven, as though this were heaven and through it the stars ran their courses; whereas the case is just the same with ourselves, that from infirmity and dullness we are unable to penetrate to the outermost parts of the air: for, could anyone reach its upper surface or make him wings to fly so high, he might peep out and descry—just as here on earth the fishes by raising their heads out of the sea can see objects on earth—so, I say, might a man descry also objects there, and, were our nature strong enough to endure the contemplation of them, might discover that that is the true heaven and the true light and the true earth. For this earth where

we dwell and these stones and the whole region here are corrupted and gnawed away, as things in the sea are by the brine: and nothing grows in the sea worth noticing, neither is there anything, as one may say, perfect, but there are caves and sand and mud and slime—wherever there is land—in endless quantity, all utterly unworthy to be compared to the beautiful objects with us: and those others again would seem still further to surpass things which with us are esteemed beautiful. For if I must tell you a pretty fable, it is worth your while to hear, Simmias, the story of all that is to be found upon the earth beneath the heaven.

Simmias/ Nay, you may be sure, Socrates, that we should be glad to hear your fable.

Socrates/ Well then, my friend, the story goes, first of all, that this earth of which we are speaking, if it could be seen from above, is to look upon like those balls covered with twelve patches of leather, many-colored, distinguished with hues whereof the colors here which our painters make use of are, as it were, samples: but there the whole earth is painted with similar colors, nay, with colors even far more brilliant and purer than these; for part of it is of purple and of marvelous beauty, and part of the color of gold, and the part that is white whiter than chalk or snow, and of all the other colors it is composed in like manner, yet still more numerous and fairer than all that we have ever seen. Even these mere hollows of it, filled as they are with water and air, present a peculiar kind of color, glittering in the diversity of the rest of them, so that its form appears as one unbroken variegated surface. And in this, such as I have described it, the plants that grow are in like proportion, trees and flowers and their fruits: and the

mountains again in like manner, and the stones have their smoothness and transparency and colors fairer in the same proportion; of which also the pebbles here, those that are so highly prized, are fragments, carnelians and jaspers and emeralds and all of that kind; but there everything without exception is of the same sort, nay, still fairer than these. And the reason of this is that those stones are pure, and not eaten away nor spoiled like those on earth by corruption and brine produced by all the sediments that collect here and engender ugliness and diseases in stones and earth and animals and plants as well. But the real earth is embellished, not only with all these ornaments, but with gold besides and silver and everything else of that kind: for from their great number and size and the multitude of places where they are found they are very conspicuous, so that to see it is a sight for the blessed. And not to mention a number of other living creatures, there are also men upon it, some dwelling inland, and some on the shores of the air, as we of the ocean, and others in islands encircled by the air, lying adjacent to the mainland: and in one word, what to us the water and the sea is in regard of our use, that the air is there, and what to us the air is, to them is the sky. And the seasons are so tempered for them that they are free from disease and live a much longer time than men here, and in sight and hearing and smell and all such things are removed from us by exactly the same distance as air is from water and sky from air in respect of purity. And furthermore they have temples of the gods and sacred edifices wherein the gods are actually dwellers, and they enjoy voices and responses and visions of the gods and all intercourse with them of that nature: and the sun and moon and stars are seen by them such as they

really are, and their bliss in all other respects corresponds to this.

Such then is the nature of the earth as a whole and its surface: but there are in the hollow parts of it round its entire circumference a number of places, some deeper and more widely open than the one in which we ourselves dwell, whilst others that are deeper have their mouth narrower than the region which we inhabit, whilst others again are shallower and wider than the one here. And all these are pierced in many places below the earth so as to communicate with one another by channels narrower and wider, and have passages where a quantity of water flows from one to the other, as it were into basins, and never-failing rivers of enormous size beneath the earth of hot water and of cold, and a mass of fire and great rivers of fire, and many of liquid mud purer as well as fouler, like the torrents of mud that burst forth in Sicily before the eruption of lava and the lava-stream itself; wherewith each of the places is filled in turn as the stream in its course round chances each time to reach it. And all this is moved up and down by a kind of oscillation in the earth; which is produced, as is said, by a natural cause of the following description. One in particular of the openings in the earth, besides that it is the largest of all, is also pierced right through the entire earth; that, namely, which Homer meant when he says of it;

> "Very far away, where is the deepest abyss beneath the earth,"

to which in fact elsewhere not only he but many others of the poets have given the name of Tartarus. For into this hollow all the rivers run together, and from it they again run out; and each of them takes a character corresponding to that of the earth through which it

flows. And the reason why all the streams flow out of and into it is, that this liquid has no bottom nor resting-place: it is accordingly held in suspension and surges up and down, and the air and the wind about it do the same; for it is accompanied by them in its passage equally to the other side and to this side of the earth; and just as in the process of breathing the breath is constantly in motion by expiration and inspiration, so there also the wind which is held in suspension with the liquid creates by rushing in and out fearful and irresistible sorts of blasts. And whensoever the water retires with impetuous current to the region which is called 'below,' it flows through the earth to the neighborhood of those streams and fills them, as it were by a pump: and again whenever it quits those regions and rushes back hither, it fills in their turn the streams on our side; and these when they are filled flow through the channels and through the earth, and, arriving each at the places towards which in each instance they are making their way, produce seas and lakes and rivers and fountains: and thence descending again beneath the earth, after a circuit, some longer and of more places, some shorter and of fewer, they again discharge themselves into Tartarus, some far lower, and others a little lower, than the point at which they were pumped into their beds: but all of them enter at a lower point than that at which they issued. And some of them make their escape on the side directly opposite to their entrance, and some in the same quarter: but a few there are which encompass the earth completely round, twining round it like snakes once or even oftener, and then throw themselves again into Tartarus at the lowest depth they can possibly reach. And the depth they are able to attain is the center of the earth in either

direction, no lower: for the part beyond from either side is an ascent for both streams.

Now, to say nothing of all the rest of the streams many and large and various, there are in this great number four in particular, whereof the largest and outermost, flowing entirely round, is that which is called Ocean; opposite to it and flowing in the contrary direction is Acheron, which not only traverses various desert regions, but also flows in a subterranean channel till it reaches the Acherusian lake, in the quarter where the souls of most of the dead repair, and after abiding there certain appointed seasons, some longer and some shorter, are again sent out to animate the bodies of living creatures. And between these a third river rises, and not far from its source falls into a vast region burning with a great lire, and makes a lake larger than our sea, boiling with water and mud; and thence it pursues its circular course all turbid and muddy, and as it rolls round, besides other places, it arrives at the extremity of the Acherusian lake, though it mingles not with its waters; and after winding many times round underground it falls into the lower depths of Tartarus; and this is the one to which they give the name of Pyriphlegethon, whereof fragments are discharged by our volcanoes, wherever they chance to be found on the face of the earth. And on the opposite side to this the fourth river falls first into a place fearful and wild, as we are told, with a pervading color like indigo, which goes by the name of Stygian, and the lake which the river makes by its discharge, Styx. But after falling into it and contracting horrible properties in its waters, it buries itself under ground, and flows in a winding course in the opposite direction to the Pyriphlegethon, until it meets it from the opposite side in the Acherusian lake;

and neither do its waters mingle with any other, but this also, after flowing round and round, discharges itself into Tartarus in the opposite direction to the Pyriphlegethon; and its name, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

Such being the nature of these regions, as soon as the dead have arrived at the spot to which each is conveyed by his genius, they first receive sentence whether they have led good and holy lives or no. And those that are found to have passed tolerable lives proceed to Acheron, and embarking in the vessels there provided for them are conveyed upon them to the lake; and there they dwell, either undergoing purification by the penalty they pay for their transgressions till they are absolved from the offences anyone may have committed, or receiving rewards for their good deeds each according to his deserts. But those that are found to be incurable by reason of the enormity of their offences, either many and grievous acts of sacrilege or many unrighteous and lawless murders of which they have been guilty or any other crimes of that magnitude, —them the fate due to their guilt precipitates into Tartarus, whence they never come forth. But those that prove to have been guilty of offences curable indeed yet great, as for instance if they have been driven by passion to offer violence to father or mother but pass the rest of their lives in penitence for the act, or have committed homicide in any other similar way, —these must also be thrown into Tartarus, but after they have been cast in and have continued there a year, they are thrown out by the tide, the homicides by the Cocytus, and the parricides and matricides by the Pyriphlegethon; and as soon as they arrive in their course at the Acherusian lake, there with loud cries

they invoke those whom they slew or insulted, and when they have thus summoned them, they implore and entreat them to suffer them to come out into the lake, and to admit them into their company; and if they prevail, they come forth and cease from their miseries, but if not, they are borne back into Tartarus, and thence again into the rivers, and this they never cease to endure until they have won over those whom they wronged; for this was the sentence pronounced upon them by their judges. But those that are found to have passed a preeminently holy life—these are they that are delivered and set free from these our earthly regions, as it were from a dungeon, and attain to that pure dwelling-place above, and make their abode upon the surface of the earth. And further of these all that have fully purified themselves by philosophy pass their lives for the future entirely without bodies, and attain to habitations still fairer than these, which, it is neither easy to describe nor would the time suffice at the present moment.

However, for the reasons I have assigned, Simmias, it is incumbent upon us to leave nothing undone for the acquisition of a share in virtue and wisdom during our lifetime: for noble is the prize and great the hope.

Now to insist upon it that everything is precisely as I have described, is unworthy of a man of sense: that however this or something like this is true of our souls and their dwelling-places, seeing that it is evident that the soul is a thing immortal, —this does seem to me to be worthy of one, and that it is worthwhile for him to run any risk in this belief: for noble is the hazard, and it is well to encourage oneself by such incantations, for so one may call them, as these: for which reason in fact I have been ever so long spinning out my fable. However,

for these reasons any man may well feel confidence about his own soul, who during his lifetime has bid adieu to all other pleasures of the body and to its ornaments, because he thought them foreign to his true nature and rather likely to work mischief than good, and has zealously pursued the pleasures of knowledge, and having decked his soul with no foreign ornament, but with her own true one, temperance and justice and fortitude and freedom and truth, so awaits his journey to the other world, prepared to depart whenever fate call him.

You, Simmias and Cebes and the rest, will make this journey each at his own time in the future; but me, as a tragic poet would say, destiny summons forthwith at this very moment, and it is about time for me to betake myself to my bath; for it seems to me better to bathe before I drink the poison, and so save the women the trouble of washing the corpse.

Phaedo/ So after he had finished speaking, Crito said;

Crito/ Well, Socrates, but what charge have you to give your friends here or myself, either about your children or in any other matter, in which we may be able to serve you best?

Socrates/ Just what I always tell you, Crito, nothing more than usual: by attending to yourselves you will gratify not only me and mine but yourselves too in all that you do, even though you are not inclined to admit it now: but if you neglect yourselves and do not choose to pass your lives as it were in the track of what has been said now and on former occasions, you will gain nothing by it, no, not even if you bind yourselves to-day by ever so many and ever so sacred promises.

Crito/ Well then, we will do our best, to comply with your wishes: but how are we to bury you?

Socrates/ Anyhow you please, provided, that is, you catch me, and I don't escape you altogether.

Phaedo/ And at the same time with a quiet smile and a glance at us;

Socrates/ I can't convince Crito, my friends, that the Socrates who is now conversing with you and arranges in due order each part of his discourse is my real self, but he fancies that I am that body which he will by and by see a corpse, and so he asks how to bury me. But all that long argument that I have held, to the effect that as soon as I have drunk the poison I shall stay with you no longer, but shall be gone at once to some happy state of the blessed, —all this he takes for mere idle talk to comfort you and myself alike. Go bail for me therefore to Crito, only in the opposite way to that which he offered for me to the judges. For he was security for me that I would assuredly stay; but I want you to be my bail that I shall assuredly not stay after my death, but shall be gone at once, so that Crito may be less afflicted, and may not be vexed about me when he sees my body burnt or buried, as if I were shamefully ill-treated, and may not say at my funeral that it is Socrates that he is laying out or carrying to his grave or burying. For be assured, my excellent Crito, that to use improper expressions not merely is an offence in respect of the thing itself, but also engenders some mischief in our souls. On the contrary you should take heart and say that it is my body that you bury, and bury it precisely as is most agreeable to yourself and as you deem most conform able to custom.

Phaedo/ Having thus spoken he rose to retire into another room to take his bath, and Crito accompanied him, but bade us wait. Accordingly we waited, talking over amongst ourselves and reconsidering the subject of our conversation, and then again dwelling upon the magnitude of the calamity which had befallen us, regarding ourselves exactly in the light of orphans who would have to pass the rest of our lives deprived of a father. And after he had bathed and his children had been brought to him—for he had two sons of tender age and one grown up—and the women of his family had arrived, he conversed with the latter in the presence of Crito and gave them his parting injunctions, and then, desiring the women and children to go away, returned himself to us. And it was now near sunset; for he had spent a considerable time within. And he came and sat down after his bath, and after this he did not talk much. By and by came the officer of the Eleven, and standing near him said;

Jailer/ I am sure, Socrates, I shall not have to find the same fault with you as with the rest, that they are angry with me and curse me when I bring them the order to drink the poison because the magistrates force me: but I have found you all along the noblest and gentlest and best man of all that ever came here, and now too I am quite sure that you will not be angry with me, for you know who are to blame—but with them. Now therefore—for you know the message with which I came—farewell, and try to bear your fate as easily as you can.

Phaedo/ And bursting into tears he turned away and left the room. And Socrates, looking up at him, said;

Socrates/ And you too farewell, and we will do as you bid.

Phaedo/ And at the same time to us;

Socrates/ How courteous the man is! in fact during the whole time I have spent here he used to pay me visits and sometimes talk to me, and was the best fellow in the world: and now how generous it is of him to weep for me! So come therefore, Crito, let us do as he says, and let someone bring the poison, if it is bruised; or if not, let the fellow bruise it.

Crito/ Nay, I think, Socrates, the sun is still upon the mountains and is not set yet Besides, I know that others take it quite late, after the order has been brought them eating and drinking heartily and some enjoying the society of their intimates. Let me entreat you not to be in a hurry; for there is still time.

Socrates/ Yes, it is natural enough for those you speak of to act thus, for they suppose they shall be gainers by doing so, and it will be equally natural for me to do otherwise: for I think I should gain nothing by a little delay in taking it, except my own contempt and ridicule for showing such greediness of life and 'husbanding it when there is no longer a drop left.' So go, do as I bid you, and don't disoblige me.

Phaedo/ And Crito, when he heard this, made a sign to his slave standing by: and the slave went out, and after some delay came back with the man who was to administer the poison, which he carried bruised in a cup. And as soon as Socrates saw the fellow, he said;

Socrates/ Well, my excellent friend, as you understand these things, what is to be done?

Jailer/ Nothing else, but walk about after you have swallowed it until a feeling of heaviness comes on in your legs, and then lie down; and so it will act of itself.

Phaedo/ And at the same time he handed the cup to Socrates; who took it, and with the utmost cheerfulness, Echecrates, without trembling in the least or changing a jot either of color or of feature, but just as usual, with his fixed under-look at the man, said;

Socrates/ What say you to offering a libation to anyone of this draught? may I or not?

Jailer/ We bruise only just as much, Socrates, as we think sufficient for a dose.

Socrates/ I understand; but at any rate I suppose I may, and indeed must, pray to the Gods that my change of abode from this world to the other may turn out prosperous: which indeed I do pray, and so be it.

Phaedo/ And just as he finished these words, he put the cup to his lips, and with the most perfect serenity and cheerfulness drank it off. And most of us up to this time had been tolerably successful in controlling our tears, but when we saw him drinking and the cup actually finished, it was all over, but in spite of myself my tears began to flow in torrents, so that I was obliged to cover my face and weep for myself; —for assuredly it was not for him, but for my own fate in being deprived of such a friend. And Crito, still earlier than myself, finding that he could not repress his tears, rose and quitted the room. But Apollodorus, who all along had never ceased weeping, burst out then into loud sobs, and by his tears and expressions of grief quite overcame everyone that was present, except Socrates himself. But he exclaimed;

Socrates/ What conduct is this, my very worthy friends! Why, this was my chief reason for sending away the women, that they might not offend in this way: for

indeed I have heard that one should die in silence. Pray be quiet and have patience.

Phaedo/ These words made us feel ashamed, and we refrained from weeping. But he walked about for some time, and then, when he told us that his legs began to feel heavy, lay down on his back: for such were the directions of the attendant. And at the same time the man that administered the poison touched him at intervals to examine his feet and legs, and then pressing his foot hard enquired

Jailer/ Do you feel this?

Socrates/ No.

Phaedo/ and next his legs again: and so advancing upwards, showed us that he was growing cold and stiff. And he himself did the same, and told us that as soon as it reached his heart, then he should be gone. Well, the cold was already beginning to affect the region of the abdomen, when he uncovered his face—for it had been covered—and said, —which were indeed the last words he spoke, —

Socrates/ Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius: pray pay it, and don't forget.

Crito/ Oh, certainly, it shall be done: but consider if you have any other injunctions for us?

Phaedo/ To this question he made no reply this time; but after a short interval he stirred, and the attendant uncovered his face, and his eyes were fixed: upon which Crito, observing it, closed his mouth and his eyes.

This, Echecrates, was the end of our friend, a man, in my judgment, of all his contemporaries that I ever had any knowledge of, the best natured, and besides the wisest and most just.

Phaedo.

[OR ON THE SOUL; ETHICAL]

Translated by Fowler, Harold North.

Persons of the Dialog

Echecrates, Phaedo, Apollodorus, Socrates, Cebes, Simmias,

Crito, The Servant of The Eleven.

Echecrates/ Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?

Phaedo/ I was there myself, Echecrates.

Echecrates/ Then what did he say before his death? and how did he die? I should like to hear, for nowadays none of the Phliasians go to Athens at all, and no stranger has come from there for a long time, who could tell us anything definite about this matter, except that he drank poison and died, so we could learn no further details.

Phaedo/ Did you not even hear about the trial and how it was conducted?

Echecrates/ Yes, someone told us about that, and we wondered that although it took place a long time ago, he was put to death much later. Now why was that, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ It was a matter of chance, Echecrates. It happened that the stern of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos was crowned on the day before the trial.

Echecrates/ What ship is this?

Phaedo/ This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once went to Crete with the fourteen youths and maidens, and saved them and himself. Now the Athenians made a vow to Apollo, as the story goes, that if they were saved they would send a mission every year to Delos. And from that time even to the present day they send it annually in honor of the god. Now it is their law that after the mission begins the city must be pure and no one may be publicly executed until the ship has gone to Delos and back; and sometimes, when contrary winds detain it, this takes a long time. The beginning of the mission is when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship; and this took place, as I say, on the day before the trial. For that reason Socrates passed a long time in prison between his trial and his death.

Echecrates/ What took place at his death, Phaedo? What was said and done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities forbid them to be present, so that he died without his friends?

Phaedo/ Not at all. Some were there, in fact, a good many.

Echecrates/ Be so good as to tell us as exactly as you can about all these things, if you are not too busy.

Phaedo/ I am not busy and I will try to tell you. It is always my greatest pleasure to be reminded of Socrates whether by speaking of him myself or by listening to someone else.

Echecrates/ Well, Phaedo, you will have hearers who feel as you do; so try to tell us everything as accurately as you can.

Phaedo/ For my part, I had strange emotions when I was there. For I was not filled with pity as I might

naturally be when present at the death of a friend; since he seemed to me to be happy, both in his bearing and his words, he was meeting death so fearlessly and nobly. And so I thought that even in going to the abode of the dead he was not going without the protection of the gods, and that when he arrived there it would be well with him, if it ever was well with anyone. And for this reason I was not at all filled with pity, as might seem natural when I was present at a scene of mourning; nor on the other hand did I feel pleasure because we were occupied with philosophy, as was our custom—and our talk was of philosophy; —but a very strange feeling came over me, an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and of pain together, when I thought that Socrates was presently to die. And all of us who were there were in much the same condition, sometimes laughing and sometimes weeping; especially one of us, Apollodorus; you know him and his character.

Echecrates/ To be sure I do.

Phaedo/ He was quite unrestrained, and I was much agitated myself, as were the others.

Echecrates/ Who were these, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ Of native Athenians there was this Apollodorus, and Critobulus and his father, and Hermogenes and Epiganes and Aeschines and Antisthenes; and Ctesippus the Paeanian was there too, and Menexenus and some other Athenians. But Plato, I think, was ill.

Echecrates/ Were any foreigners there?

Phaedo/ Yes, Simmias of Thebes and Cebes and Phaedonides, and from Megara Euclides and Terpsion.

Echecrates/ What? Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

Phaedo/ No. They were said to be in Aegina.

Echecrates/ Was anyone else there?

Phaedo/ I think these were about all.

Echecrates/ Well then, what was the conversation?

Phaedo/ I will try to tell you everything from the beginning. On the previous days I and the others had always been in the habit of visiting Socrates. We used to meet at daybreak in the court where the trial took place, for it was near the prison; and every day we used to wait about, talking with each other, until the prison was opened, for it was not opened early; and when it was opened, we went in to Socrates and passed most of the day with him. On that day we came together earlier; for the day before, when we left the prison in the evening we heard that the ship had arrived from Delos. So we agreed to come to the usual place as early in the morning as possible. And we came, and the jailer who usually answered the door came out and told us to wait and not go in until he told us. "For," he said, "the eleven are releasing Socrates from his fetters and giving directions how he is to die to-day." So after a little delay he came and told us to go in. We went in then and found Socrates just released from his fetters and Xanthippe—you know her—with his little son in her arms, sitting beside him. Now when Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the kind of thing that women always do say;

Xanthippe/ Oh Socrates, this is the last time now that your friends will speak to you or you to them.

Phaedo/ And Socrates glanced at Crito and said;

Socrates/ Crito, let somebody take her home.

Phaedo/ And some of Crito's people took her away wailing and beating her breast. But Socrates sat up on his couch and bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and while he was rubbing it, he said;

Socrates/ What a strange thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure! How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain, in that they will not both come to a man at the same time, and yet if he pursues the one and captures it, he is generally obliged to take the other also, as if the two were joined together in one head. And I think if Aesop had thought of them, he would have made a fable telling how they were at war and god wished to reconcile them, and when he could not do that, he fastened their heads together, and for that reason, when one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after. Just so it seems that in my case, after pain was in my leg on account of the fetter, pleasure appears to have come following after.

Phaedo/ Here Cebes interrupted and said;

Cebes/ By Zeus, Socrates, I am glad you reminded me. Several others have asked about the poems you have composed, the metrical versions of Aesop's fables and the hymn to Apollo, and Evenus asked me the day before yesterday why you who never wrote any poetry before, composed these verses after you came to prison. Now, if you care that I should be able to answer Evenus when he asks me again—and I know he will ask me—tell me what to say.

Socrates/ Then tell him, Cebes, the truth, that I composed these verses not because I wished to rival him or his poems, for I knew that would not be easy, but because I wished to test the meaning of certain dreams, and to make sure that I was neglecting no duty in case

their repeated commands meant that I must cultivate the Muses in this way. They were something like this. The same dream came to me often in my past life, sometimes in one form and sometimes in another, but always saying the same thing; 'Socrates,' it said, 'make music and work at it.' And I formerly thought it was urging and encouraging me to do what I was doing already and that just as people encourage runners by cheering, so the dream was encouraging me to do what I was doing, that is, to make music, because philosophy was the greatest kind of music and I was working at that. But now, after the trial and while the festival of the god delayed my execution, I thought, in case the repeated dream really meant to tell me to make this which is ordinarily called music, I ought to do so and not to disobey. For I thought it was safer not to go hence before making sure that I had done what I ought, by obeying the dream and composing verses. So first I composed a hymn to the god whose festival it was; and after the god, considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, must compose myths and not speeches, since I was not a maker of myths, I took the myths of Aesop, which I had at hand and knew, and turned into verse the first I came upon. So tell Evenus that, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to come after me as quickly as he can. I, it seems, am going to-day; for that is the order of the Athenians.

Phaedo/ And Simmias said;

Simmias/ What a message that is, Socrates, for Evenus! I have met him often, and from what I have seen of him, I should say that he will not take your advice in the least if he can help it.

Socrates/ Why so? Is not Evenus a philosopher?

Simmias/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then Evenus will take my advice, and so will every man who has any worthy interest in philosophy. Perhaps, however, he will not take his own life, for they say that is not permitted.

Phaedo/ And as he spoke he put his feet down on the ground and remained sitting in this way through the rest of the conversation.

Then Cebes asked him

Cebes/ What do you mean by this, Socrates, that it is not permitted to take one's life, but that the philosopher would desire to follow after the dying?

Socrates/ How is this, Cebes? Have you and Simmias, who are pupils of Philolaus, not heard about such things?

Cebes/ Nothing definite, Socrates.

Socrates/ I myself speak of them only from hearsay; but I have no objection to telling what I have heard. And indeed it is perhaps especially fitting, as I am going to the other world, to tell stories about the life there and consider what we think about it; for what else could one do in the time between now and sunset?

Cebes/ Why in the world do they say that it is not permitted to kill oneself, Socrates? I heard Philolaus, when he was living in our city, say the same thing you just said, and I have heard it from others, too, that one must not do this; but I never heard anyone say anything definite about it.

Socrates/ You must have courage, and perhaps you might hear something. But perhaps it will seem strange to you that this alone of all laws is without exception, and it never happens to mankind, as in other matters, that only at some times and for some persons it is better

to die than to live; and it will perhaps seem strange to you that these human beings for whom it is better to die cannot without impiety do good to themselves, but must wait for some other benefactor.

Phaedo/ And Cebes, smiling gently, said, speaking in his own dialect;

Cebes/ Gawd knows it doos.

Socrates/ It would seem unreasonable, if put in this way, but perhaps there is some reason in it. Now the doctrine that is taught in secret about this matter, that we men are in a kind of prison and must not set ourselves free or run away, seems to me to be weighty and not easy to understand. But this at least, Cebes, I do believe is sound, that the gods are our guardians and that we men are one of the chattels of the gods. Do you not believe this?

Cebes/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Well then, if one of your chattels should kill itself when you had not indicated that you wished it to die, would you be angry with it and punish it if you could?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then perhaps from this point of view it is not unreasonable to say that a man must not kill himself until god sends some necessity upon him, such as has now come upon me.

Cebes/ That, seems sensible. But what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers ought to be ready and willing to die, that seems strange if we were right just now in saying that god is our guardian and we are his possessions. For it is not reasonable that the wisest men should not be troubled when they leave that service in which the gods, who are the best overseers in the

world, are watching over them. A wise man certainly does not think that when he is free he can take better care of himself than they do. A foolish man might perhaps think so, that he ought to run away from his master, and he would not consider that he must not run away from a good master, but ought to stay with him as long as possible; and so he might thoughtlessly run away; but a man of sense would wish to be always with one who is better than himself. And yet, Socrates, if we look at it in this way, the contrary of what we just said seems natural; for the wise ought to be troubled at dying and the foolish to rejoice.

Phaedo/ When Socrates heard this I thought he was pleased by Cebes' earnestness, and glancing at us, he said;

Socrates/ Cebes is always on the track of arguments and will not be easily convinced by whatever anyone says.

Simmias/ Well, Socrates, this time I think myself that Cebes is right. For why should really wise men run away from masters who are better than they and lightly separate themselves from them? And it strikes me that Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are so ready to leave us and the gods, who are, as you yourself agree, good rulers.

Socrates/ You have a right to say that; for I think you mean that I must defend myself against this accusation, as if we were in a law court.

Simmias/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Well, then, I will try to make a more convincing defense than I did before the judges. For if I did not believe, that I was going to other wise and good gods, and, moreover, to men who have died, better men

than those here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death. But as it is, you may rest assured that I expect to go to good men, though I should not care to assert this positively; but I would assert as positively as anything about such matters that I am going to gods who are good masters. And therefore, so far as that is concerned, I not only do not grieve, but I have great hopes that there is something in store for the dead, and, as has been said of old, something better for the good than for the wicked.

Simmias/ Well, do you intend to go away, Socrates, and keep your opinion to yourself, or would you let us share it? It seems to me that this is a good which belongs in common to us also, and at the same time, if you convince us by what you say, that will serve as your defense.

Socrates/ I will try. But first let us ask Crito there what he wants. He has apparently been trying to say something for a long time.

Crito/ Only, Socrates, that the man who is to administer the poison to you has been telling me for some time to warn you to talk as little as possible. He says people get warm when they talk and heat has a bad effect on the action of the poison; so sometimes he has to make those who talk too much drink twice or even three times.

Socrates/ Never mind him. Just let him do his part and prepare to give it twice or even, if necessary, three times.

Crito/ I was pretty sure that was what you would say, but he has been bothering me for a long time.

Socrates/ Never mind him. I wish now to explain to you, my judges, the reason why I think a man who has

really spent his life in philosophy is naturally of good courage when he is to die, and has strong hopes that when he is dead he will attain the greatest blessings in that other land. So I will try to tell you, Simmias, and Cebes, how this would be.

—Other people are likely not to be aware that those who pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead. Now if this is true, it would be absurd to be eager for nothing but this all their lives, and then to be troubled when that came for which they had all along been eagerly practicing.

Phaedo/ And Simmias laughed and said;

Simmias/ By Zeus, Socrates, I don't feel much like laughing just now, but you made me laugh. For I think the multitude, if they heard what you just said about the philosophers, would say you were quite right, and our people at home would agree entirely with you that philosophers desire death, and they would add that they know very well that the philosophers deserve it.

Socrates/ And they would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing very well. For they do not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what way they deserve death, nor what kind of a death it is. Let us then, speak with one another, paying no further attention to them. Do we think there is such a thing as death?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We believe, do we not, that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and that the state of being dead is the state in which the body is separated from the soul and exists alone by itself and the soul is separated from the body and exists alone by itself? Is death anything other than this?

Simmias/ No, it is this.

Socrates/ Now, my friend, see if you agree with me; for, if you do, I think we shall get more light on our subject. Do you think a philosopher would be likely to care much about the so-called pleasures, such as eating and drinking?

Simmias/ By no means, Socrates.

Socrates/ How about the pleasures of love?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well, do you think such a man would think much of the other cares of the body I mean such as the possession of fine clothes and shoes and the other personal adornments? Do you think he would care about them or despise them, except so far as it is necessary to have them?

Simmias/ I think the true philosopher would despise them.

Socrates/ Altogether, then, you think that such a man would not devote himself to the body, but would, so far as he was able, turn away from the body and concern himself with the soul?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ To begin with, then, it is clear that in such matters the philosopher, more than other men, separates the soul from communion with the body?

Simmias/ It is.

Socrates/ Now certainly most people think that a man who takes no pleasure and has no part in such things doesn't deserve to live, and that one who cares nothing for the pleasures of the body is about as good as dead.

Simmias/ That is very true.

Socrates/ Now, how about the acquirement of pure knowledge? Is the body a hindrance or not, if it is made to share in the search for wisdom? What I mean is this; Have the sight and hearing of men any truth in them, or is it true, as the poets are always telling us, that we neither hear nor see anything accurately? And yet if these two physical senses are not accurate or exact, the rest are not likely to be, for they are inferior to these. Do you not think so?

Simmias/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ Then, when does the soul attain to truth? For when it tries to consider anything in company with the body, it is evidently deceived by it.

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ In thought, then, if at all, something of the realities becomes clear to it?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But it thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality.

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ In this matter also, then, the soul of the philosopher greatly despises the body and avoids it and strives to be alone by itself?

Simmias/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Now how about such things as this, Simmias? Do we think there is such a thing as absolute justice, or not?

Simmias/ We certainly think there is.

Socrates/ And absolute beauty and goodness.

Simmias/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, did you ever see anything of that kind with your eyes?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or did you ever reach them with any of the bodily senses? I am speaking of all such things, as size, health, strength, and in short the essence or underlying quality of everything. Is their true nature contemplated by means of the body? Is it not rather the case that he who prepares himself most carefully to understand the true essence of each thing that he examines would come nearest to the knowledge of it?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning nor dragging in any of the other senses along with his thinking, but who employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of things, and who removes himself, so far as possible, from eyes arid ears, and, in a word, from his whole body, because he feels that its companionship disturbs the soul and hinders it from attaining truth and wisdom? Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?

Simmias/ That is true as true can be, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, all this must cause good lovers of wisdom to think and say one to the other something like this; 'There seems to be a short cut which leads us and our argument to the conclusion in our search that so long as we have the body, and the soul is contaminated

by such an evil, we shall never attain completely what we desire, that is, the truth. For the body keeps us constantly busy by reason of its need of sustenance; and moreover, if diseases come upon it they hinder our pursuit of the truth. And the body fills us with passions and desires and fears, and all sorts of fancies and foolishness, so that, as they say, it really and truly makes it impossible for us to think at all. The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions and battles; for all wars arise for the sake of gaining money, and we are compelled to gain money for the sake of the body. We are slaves to its service. And so, because of all these things, we have no leisure for philosophy. But the worst of all is that if we do get a bit of leisure and turn to philosophy, the body is constantly breaking in upon our studies and disturbing us with noise and confusion, so that it prevents our beholding the truth, and in fact we perceive that, if we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone. And then, as our argument shows, when we are dead we are likely to possess the wisdom which we desire and claim to be enamored of, but not while we live. For, if pure knowledge is impossible while the body is with us, one of two thing must follow, either it cannot be acquired at all or only when we are dead; for then the soul will be by itself apart from the body, but not before. And while we live, we shall, I think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is absolutely necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free. And in this way, freeing ourselves from the foolishness of the body and being pure, we

shall, I think, be with the pure and shall know of ourselves all that is pure, —and that is, perhaps, the truth. For it cannot be that the impure attain the pure.' Such words as these, I think, Simmias, all who are rightly lovers of knowledge must say to each other and such must be their thoughts. Do you not agree?

Simmias/ Most assuredly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, if this is true, my friend, I have great hopes that when I reach the place to which I am going, I shall there, if anywhere, attain fully to that which has been my chief object in my past life, so that the journey which is now imposed upon me is begun with good hope; and the like hope exists for every man who thinks that his mind has been purified and made ready.

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And does not the purification consist in this which has been mentioned long ago in our discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the soul from the body and teaching the soul the habit of collecting and bringing itself together from all parts of the body, and living, so far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as from fetters?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, this is what we call death, is it not, a release and separation from the body?

Simmias/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ But, as we hold, the true philosophers and they alone are always most eager to release the soul, and just this—the release and separation of the soul from the body—is their study, is it not?

Simmias/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Then, as I said in the beginning, it would be absurd if a man who had been all his life fitting himself to live as nearly in a state of death as he could, should then be disturbed when death came to him. Would it not be absurd?

Simmias/ Of course.

Socrates/ In fact, then, Simmias, the true philosophers practice dying, and death is less terrible to them than to any other men. Consider it in this way. They are in every way hostile to the body and they desire to have the soul apart by itself alone. Would it not be very foolish if they should be frightened and troubled when this very thing happens, and if they should not be glad to go to the place where there is hope of attaining what they longed for all through life—and they longed for wisdom—and of escaping from the companionship of that which they hated? When human loves or wives or sons have died, many men have willingly gone to the other world led by the hope of seeing there those whom they longed for, and of being with them; and shall he who is really in love with wisdom and has a firm belief that he can find it nowhere else than in the other world grieve when he dies and not be glad to go there? We cannot think that, my friend, if he is really a philosopher; for he will confidently believe that he will find pure wisdom nowhere else than in the other world. And if this is so, would it not be very foolish for such a man to fear death?

Simmias/ Very foolish, certainly.

Socrates/ Then is it not, a sufficient indication, when you see a man troubled because he is going to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body?

And this same man is also a lover of money and of honor, one or both.

Simmias/ Certainly, it is as you say.

Socrates/ Then, Simmias, is not that which is called courage especially characteristic of philosophers?

Simmias/ By all means.

Socrates/ And self-restraint—that which is commonly called self-restraint, which consists in not being excited by the passions and in being superior to them and acting in a seemly way—is not that characteristic of those alone who despise the body and pass their lives in philosophy?

Simmias/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ For, if you care to consider the courage and the self-restraint of other men, you will see that they are absurd.

Simmias/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ You know, do you not, that all other men count death among the great evils?

Simmias/ They certainly do.

Socrates/ And do not brave men face death—when they do face it—through fear of greater evils?

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then all except philosophers are brave through fear. And yet it is absurd to be brave through fear and cowardice.

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And how about those of seemly conduct? Is their case not the same? They are self-restrained because of a kind of self-indulgence. We say, to be sure, that this is impossible, nevertheless their foolish self-restraint amounts to little more than this; for they fear

that they may be deprived of certain pleasures which they desire, and so they refrain from some because they are under the sway of others. And yet being ruled by pleasures is called self-indulgence. Nevertheless they conquer pleasures because they are conquered by other pleasures. Now this is about what I said just now, that they are self-restrained by a kind of self-indulgence.

Simmias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ My dear Simmias, I suspect that this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for less, as if they were coins, but the only right coinage, for which all those things must be exchanged and by means of and with which all these things are to be bought and sold, is in fact wisdom; and courage and self-restraint and justice and, in short, true virtue exist only with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and other things of that sort are added or taken away. And virtue which consists in the exchange of such things for each other without wisdom, is but a painted imitation of virtue and is really slavish and has nothing healthy or true in it; but truth is in fact a purification from all these things, and self-restraint and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification. And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. For as they say in the mysteries, 'the thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few;' and these mystics are, I believe, those who have been true philosophers. And I in my life have, so far as I could, left nothing undone,

and have striven in every way to make myself one of them. But whether I have striven aright and have met with success, I believe I shall know clearly, when I have arrived there, very soon, if it is God's will. This then, Simmias and Cebes, is the defense I offer to show that it is reasonable for me not to be grieved or troubled at leaving you and the rulers I have here, because I believe that there, no less than here, I shall find good rulers and friends. If now I am more successful in convincing you by my defense than I was in convincing my Athenian judges, it is well.

Phaedo/ When Socrates had finished, Cebes answered and said;

Cebes/ Socrates, I agree to the other things you say, but in regard to the soul men are very prone to disbelief. They fear that when the soul leaves the body it no longer exists anywhere, and that on the day when the man dies it is destroyed and perishes, and when it leaves the body and departs from it, straightway it flies away and is no longer anywhere, scattering like a breath or smoke. If it exists anywhere by itself as a unit, freed from these evils which you have enumerated just now, there would be good reason for the blessed hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But perhaps no little argument and proof is required to show that when a man is dead the soul still exists and has any power and intelligence.

Socrates/ What you say, Cebes, is true. Now what shall we do? Do you wish to keep on conversing about this to see whether it is probable or not?

Cebes/ I do. I should like to hear what you think about it.

Socrates/ Well, I do not believe anyone who heard us now, even if he were a comic poet, would say that I am

chattering and talking about things which do not concern me. So if you like, let us examine the matter to the end.

Let us consider it by asking whether the souls of men who have died are in the nether world or not. There is an ancient tradition, which we remember, that they go there from here and come back here again and are born from the dead. Now if this is true, if the living are born again from the dead, our souls would exist there, would they not? For they could not be born again if they did not exist, and this would be a sufficient proof that they exist, if it should really be made evident that the living are born only from the dead. But if this is not so, then some other argument would be needed.

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now, if you wish to find this out easily, do not consider the question with regard to men only, but with regard to all animals and plants, and, in short, to all things which may be said to have birth. Let us see with regard to all these, whether it is true that they are all born or generated only from their opposites, in case they have opposites, as for instance, the noble is the opposite of the disgraceful, the just of the unjust, and there are countless other similar pairs. Let us consider the question whether it is inevitable that everything which has an opposite be generated from its opposite and from it only. For instance, when anything becomes greater it must inevitably have been smaller and then have become greater.

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if it becomes smaller, it must have been greater and then have become smaller?

Cebes/ That is true.

Socrates/ And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the slower from the quicker?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the worse from the better and the more just from the more unjust?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then, we have this fact sufficiently established, that all things are generated in this way, opposites from opposites?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now then, is there between all these pairs of opposites what may be called two kinds of generation, from one to the other and back again from the other to the first? Between a larger thing and a smaller thing there is increment and diminution and we call one increasing and the other decreasing, do we not?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And similarly analyzing and combining, and cooling and heating, and all opposites in the same way. Even if we do not in every case have the words to express it, yet in fact is it not always inevitable that there is a process of generation from each to the other?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, is there anything that is the opposite of living, as being awake is the opposite of sleeping?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What?

Cebes/ Being dead.

Socrates/ Then these two are generated from each other, and as they are two, so the processes between them are two; is it not so?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, I will tell about one of the two pairs of which I just spoke to you and its intermediate processes and do you tell me about the other. I say one term is sleeping and the other is being awake, and being awake is generated from sleeping, and sleeping from being awake, and the processes of generation are, in the latter case, falling asleep, and in the former, waking up. Do you agree, or not?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now do you, tell me in this way about life and death. Do you not say that living is the opposite of being dead?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ And that they are generated one from the other?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now what is it which is generated from the living?

Cebes/ The dead.

Socrates/ And what, from the dead?

Cebes/ I can say only one thing—the living.

Socrates/ From the dead, then, Cebes, the living, both things and persons, are generated?

Cebes/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then, our souls exist in the other world.

Cebes/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And of the two processes of generation between these two, the one is plain to be seen; for surely dying is plain to be seen, is it not?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, what shall we do next? Shall we deny the opposite process, and shall nature be one-sided in this instance? Or must we grant that there is some process of generation the opposite of dying?

Cebes/ Certainly we must.

Socrates/ What is this process?

Cebes/ Coming to life again.

Socrates/ Then, if there be such a thing as coming to life again, this would be the process of generation from the dead to the living?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So by this method also we reach the conclusion that the living are generated from the dead, just as much as the dead from the living; and since this is the case, it seems to me to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead exist somewhere, whence they come back to life.

Cebes/ I think, Socrates, that results necessarily from our previous admissions.

Socrates/ Now here is another method, Cebes, to prove, as it seems to me, that we were right in making those admissions. For if generation did not proceed from opposite to opposite and back again, going round, as it were in a circle, but always went forward in a straight line without turning back or curving, then, you know, in the end all things would have the same form and be acted upon in the same way and stop being generated at all.

Cebes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ It is not at all hard, to understand what I mean. For example, if the process of falling asleep existed, but not the opposite process of waking from

sleep, in the end, you know, that would make the sleeping Endymion mere nonsense; he would be nowhere, for everything else would be in the same state as he r sound asleep. Or if all things were mixed together and never separated, the saying of Anaxagoras, 'all things are chaos,' would soon come true. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things that have life should die, and, when they had died, the dead should remain in that condition, is it not inevitable that at last all things would be dead and nothing alive? For if the living were generated from any other things than from the dead, and the living were to die, is there any escape from the final result that all things would be swallowed up in death?

Cebes/ I see none, Socrates. What you say seems to be perfectly true.

Socrates/ I think, Cebes, it is absolutely so, and we are not deluded in making these admissions, but the return to life is an actual fact, and it is a fact that the living are generated from the dead and that the souls of the dead exist.

Cebes/ And besides, if it is true, Socrates, as you are fond of saying, that our learning is nothing else than recollection, then this would be an additional argument that we must necessarily have learned in some previous time what we now remember. But this is impossible if our soul did not exist somewhere before being born in this human form; and so by this argument also it appears that the soul is immortal.

Simmias/ But, Cebes, what were the proofs of this? Remind me; for I do not recollect very well just now.

Cebes/ Briefly, a very good proof is this; When people are questioned, if you put the questions well, they

answer correctly of themselves about everything; and yet if they had not within them some knowledge and right reason, they could not do this. And that this is so is shown most clearly if you take them to mathematical diagrams or anything of that sort.

Socrates/ And if you are not convinced in that way, Simmias, see if you don't agree when you look at it in this way. You are incredulous, are you not, how that which is called learning can be recollection?

Simmias/ I am not incredulous, but I want just what we are talking about, recollection. And from what Cebes undertook to say I already begin to recollect and be convinced; nevertheless, I should like to hear what you were going to say.

Socrates/ It was this. We agree, I suppose, that if anyone is to remember anything, he must know it at some previous time?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then do we agree to this also, that when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection? What I mean is this; If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that he recollects the thing of which he has the perception?

Simmias/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Let me give an example. Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre.

Simmias/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind receives

an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could cite countless such examples.

Simmias/ To be sure you could.

Socrates/ Now, is that sort of thing a kind of recollection? Especially when it takes place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and inattention?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?

Simmias/ Surely.

Socrates/ And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded of Simmias himself?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they not?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not?

Simmias/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ Now see, if this is true. We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract. Shall we say there is such a thing, or not?

Simmias/ We shall say that there is, most decidedly.

Socrates/ And do we know what it is?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or equality inequality?

Simmias/ No, Socrates, never.

Socrates/ Then, those equals are not the same as equality in the abstract.

Simmias/ Not at all, I should say, Socrates.

Socrates/ But from those equals, which are not the same as abstract equality, you have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And it is either like them or unlike them?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It makes no difference. Whenever the sight of one thing brings you a perception of another, whether they be like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection.

Simmias/ Surely.

Socrates/ Now then, do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now

affect us in this way; Do they seem to us to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?

Simmias/ They fall very far short of it.

Socrates/ Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, 'This thing that I see aims at being like some other thing that exists, but falls short and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior to it,' he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing which he says the other resembles but falls short of?

Simmias/ We must.

Socrates/ Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?

Simmias/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ Then we must have had knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and thought, 'All these things are aiming to be like equality but fall short.'

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ And we agree, also, that we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses? I consider that all the senses are alike.

Simmias/ Yes, Socrates, they are all alike, for the purposes of our argument.

Socrates/ Then it is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it. Is that our view?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we perceive by the senses, and see that all such things; yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it.

Simmias/ That follows necessarily from what we have said before, Socrates.

Socrates/ And we saw and heard and had the other senses as soon as we were born?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But, we say, we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were born.

Simmias/ It does.

Socrates/ Now if we had acquired that knowledge before we were born, and were born with it, we knew before we were born and at the moment of birth not only the equal and the greater and the less, but all such abstractions? For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short, with all those things which we stamp with the seal of 'absolute' in our dialectic process of questions and answers; so that we must necessarily have acquired knowledge of all these before our birth.

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ And if after acquiring it we have not, in each case, forgotten it, we must always be born knowing these things, and must know them throughout our life;

for to know is to have acquired knowledge and to have retained it without losing it, and the loss of knowledge is just what we mean when we speak of forgetting, is it not, Simmias?

Simmias/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ But, I suppose, if we acquired knowledge before we were born and lost it at birth, but afterwards by the use of our senses regained the knowledge which we had previously possessed, would not the process which we call learning really be recovering knowledge which is our own? And should we be right in calling this recollection?

Simmias/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ For we found that it is possible, on perceiving a thing by the sight or the hearing or any other sense, to call to mind from that perception another thing which had been forgotten, which was associated with the thing perceived, whether like it or unlike it; so that, as I said, one of two things is true, either we are all born knowing these things and know them all our lives, or afterwards, those who are said to learn merely remember, and learning would then be recollection.

Simmias/ That is certainly true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Which then do you choose, Simmias? Were we born with the knowledge, or do we recollect afterwards things of which we had acquired knowledge before our birth?

Simmias/ I cannot choose at this moment, Socrates.

Socrates/ How about this question? You can choose and you have some opinion about it; When a man knows, can he give an account of what he knows or not?

Simmias/ Certainly he can, Socrates.

Socrates/ And do you think that everybody can give an account of the matters about which we have just been talking?

Simmias/ I wish they might; but on the contrary I fear that to-morrow, at this time, there will be no longer any man living who is able to do so properly.

Socrates/ Then, Simmias, you do not think all men know these things?

Simmias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then they recollect the things they once learned?

Simmias/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Surely not after we were born as human beings.

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then previously.

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, Simmias, the souls existed previously, before they were in human form, apart from bodies, and they had intelligence.

Simmias/ Unless, Socrates, we acquire these ideas at the moment of birth; for that time still remains.

Socrates/ Very well, my friend. But at what other time do we lose them? For we are surely not born with them, as we just now agreed. Do we lose them at the moment when we receive them, or have you some other time to suggest?

Simmias/ None whatever, Socrates. I did not notice that I was talking nonsense.

Socrates/ Then, Simmias, is this the state of the case? If, as we are always saying, the beautiful exists,

and the good, and every essence of that kind, and if we refer all our sensations to these, which we find existed previously and are now ours, and compare our sensations with these, is it not a necessary inference that just as these abstractions exist, so our souls existed before we were born; and if these abstractions do not exist, our argument is of no force? Is this the case, and is it equally certain that provided these things exist our souls also existed before we were born, and that if these do not exist, neither did our souls?

Simmias/ Socrates, it seems to me that there is absolutely the same certainty, and our argument comes to the excellent conclusion that our soul existed before we were born, and that the essence of which you speak likewise exists. For there is nothing so clear to me as this, that all such things, the beautiful, the good, and all the others of which you were speaking just now, have a most real existence. And I think the proof is sufficient.

Socrates/ But how about Cebes? For Cebes must be convinced, too.

Simmias/ He is fully convinced, I think; and yet he is the most obstinately incredulous of mortals. Still, I believe he is quite convinced of this, that our soul existed before we were born. However, that it will still exist after we die does not seem even to me to have been proved, Socrates, but the common fear, which Cebes mentioned just now, that when a man dies the soul is dispersed and this is the end of his existence, still remains. For assuming that the soul comes into being and is brought together from some source or other and exists before it enters into a human body, what prevents it, after it has entered into and left that body, from coming to an end and being destroyed itself?

Cebes/ You are right, Simmias. It seems to me that we have proved only half of what is required, namely, that our soul existed before our birth. But we must also show that it exists after we are dead as well as before our birth, if the proof is to be perfect.

Socrates/ It has been shown, Simmias and Cebes, already, if you will combine this conclusion with the one we reached before, that every living being is born from the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and, when it comes into life and is born, cannot be born from anything else than death and a state of death, must it not also exist after dying, since it must be born again? So the proof you call for has already been given. However, I think you and Simmias would like to carry on this discussion still further. You have the childish fear that when the soul goes out from the body the wind will really blow it away and scatter it, especially if a man happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather.

Phaedo/ And Cebes laughed and said;

Cebes/ Assume that we have that fear, Socrates, and try to convince us; or rather, do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child within us, who has such fears. Let us try to persuade him not to fear death as if it were a hobgoblin.

Socrates/ Ah, you must sing charms to him every day until you charm away his fear.

Cebes/ Where then, Socrates, shall we find a good singer of such charms, since you are leaving us?

Socrates/ Hellas, Cebes, is a large country, in which there are many good men, and there are many foreign peoples also. You ought to search through all of them in quest of such a charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, for there is no greater need for which you could

spend your money. And you must seek among yourselves, too, for perhaps you would hardly find others better able to do this than you.

Cebes/ That, shall be done.

Socrates/ But let us return to the point where we left off, if you are willing.

Cebes/ Oh, I am willing, of course.

Socrates/ Good.

—Well then, must we not ask ourselves some such question as this? What kind of thing naturally suffers, dispersion, and for what kind of thing might we naturally fear it, and again what kind of thing is not liable to it? And after this must we not inquire to which class the soul belongs and base our hopes or fears for our souls upon the answers to these questions?

Cebes/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ Now is not that which is compounded and composite naturally liable to be decomposed, in the same way in which it was compounded? And if anything is uncompounded is not that, if anything, naturally unlikely to be decomposed?

Cebes/ I think that is true.

Socrates/ Then it is most probable that things which are always the same and unchanging are the uncompounded things and the things that are changing and never the same are the composite things?

Cebes/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ Let us then, turn to what we were discussing before. Is the absolute essence, which we in our dialectic process of question and answer call true being, always the same or is it liable to change? Absolute equality, absolute beauty, any absolute

existence, true being do they ever admit of any change whatsoever? Or does each absolute essence, since it is uniform and exists by itself, remain the same and never in any way admit of any change?

Cebes/ It must, necessarily, remain the same, Socrates.

Socrates/ But how about the many things, for example, men, or horses, or cloaks, or any other such things, which bear the same names as the absolute essences and are called beautiful or equal or the like? Are they always the same? Or are they, in direct opposition to the essences, constantly changing in themselves, unlike each other, and, so to speak, never the same?

Cebes/ The latter; they are never the same.

Socrates/ And you can see these and touch them and perceive them by the other senses, whereas the things which are always the same can be grasped only by the reason, and are invisible and not to be seen?

Cebes/ Certainly, that is true.

Socrates/ Now, shall we assume two kinds of existences, one visible, the other invisible?

Cebes/ Let us assume them.

Socrates/ And that the invisible is always the same and the visible constantly changing?

Cebes/ Let us assume that also.

Socrates/ Well then, are we not made up of two parts, body and soul?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now to which class should we say the body is more similar and more closely akin?

Cebes/ To the visible; that is clear to everyone.

Socrates/ And the soul? Is it visible or invisible?

Cebes/ Invisible, to man, at least, Socrates.

Socrates/ But we call things visible and invisible with reference to human vision, do we not?

Cebes/ Yes, we do.

Socrates/ Then what do we say about the soul? Can it be seen or not?

Cebes/ It cannot be seen.

Socrates/ Then it is invisible?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the soul is more like the invisible than the body is, and the body more like the visible.

Cebes/ Necessarily, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now we have also been saying for a long time, have we not, that, when the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other senses—for inquiry through the body means inquiry through the senses, —then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because it lays hold upon such things?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But when the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom. Is it not so?

Cebes/ Socrates, what you say is perfectly right and true.

Socrates/ And now again, in view of what we said before and of what has just been said, to which class do you think the soul has greater likeness and kinship?

Cebes/ I think, Socrates, that anyone, even the dullest, would agree, after this argument that the soul is infinitely more like that which is always the same than that which is not.

Socrates/ And the body?

Cebes/ Is more like the other.

Socrates/ Consider, then, the matter in another way. When the soul and the body are joined together, nature directs the one to serve and be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Now this being the case, which seems to you like the divine, and which like the mortal? Or do you not think that the divine is by nature fitted to rule and lead, and the mortal to obey and serve?

Cebes/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ Which, then, does the soul resemble?

Cebes/ Clearly, Socrates, the soul is like the divine and the body like the mortal.

Socrates/ Then see, Cebes, if this is not the conclusion from all that we have said, that the soul is most like the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and ever unchanging, and the body, on the contrary, most like the human and mortal and multiform and unintellectual and dissoluble and ever changing. Can we say anything, my dear Cebes, to show that this is not so?

Cebes/ No, we cannot.

Socrates/ Well then, since this is the case, is it not natural for the body to meet with speedy dissolution

and for the soul, on the contrary, to be entirely indissoluble, or nearly so?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Observe, that when a man dies, the visible part of him, the body, which lies in the visible world and which we call the corpse, which is naturally subject to dissolution and decomposition, does not undergo these processes at once, but remains for a considerable time, and even for a very long time, if death takes place when the body is in good condition, and at a favorable time of the year. For when the body is shrunk and embalmed, as is done in Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incalculable time. And even if the body decay, some parts of it, such as the bones and sinews and all that, are, so to speak, indestructible. Is not that true?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the soul, the invisible, which departs into another place which is, like itself, noble and pure and invisible, to the realm of the god of the other world in truth, to the good and wise god, whither, if God will, my soul is soon to go, —is this soul, which has such qualities and such a nature, straightway scattered and destroyed when it departs from the body, as most men say? Far from it, dear Cebes and Simmias, but the truth is much rather this; —if it departs pure, dragging with it nothing of the body, because it never willingly associated with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself into itself alone, since this has always been its constant study—but this means nothing else than that it pursued philosophy rightly and really practiced being in a state of death; or is not this the practice of death?

Cebes/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then if it is in such a condition, it goes away into that which is like itself, into the invisible, divine, immortal, and wise, and when it arrives there it is happy, freed from error and folly and fear and fierce loves and all the other human ills, and as the initiated say, lives in truth through all after time with the gods. Is this our belief, Cebes, or not?

Cebes/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But, I think, if when it departs from the body it is defiled and impure, because it was always with the body and cared for it and loved it and was fascinated by it and its desires and pleasures, so that it thought nothing was true except the corporeal, which one can touch and see and drink and eat and employ in the pleasures of love, and if it is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which is shadowy and invisible to the eyes but is intelligible and tangible to philosophy—do you think a soul in this condition will depart pure and uncontaminated?

Cebes/ By no means.

Socrates/ But it will be interpenetrated, I suppose, with the corporeal which intercourse and communion with the body have made a part of its nature because the body has been its constant companion and the object of its care?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And, my friend, we must believe that the corporeal is burdensome and heavy and earthly and visible. And such a soul is weighed down by this and is dragged back into the visible world, through fear of the invisible and of the other world, and so, as they say, it flits about the monuments and the tombs, where shadowy shapes of souls have been seen, figures of

those souls which were not set free in purity but retain something of the visible; and this is why they are seen.

Cebes/ That is likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is likely, Cebes. And it is likely that those are not the souls of the good, but those of the base, which are compelled to flit about such places as a punishment for their former evil mode of life. And they flit about until through the desire of the corporeal which clings to them they are again imprisoned in a body. And they are likely to be imprisoned in natures which correspond to the practices of their former life.

Cebes/ What natures do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean, for example, that those who have indulged in gluttony and violence and drunkenness, and have taken no pains to avoid them, are likely to pass into the bodies of asses and other beasts of that sort. Do you not think so?

Cebes/ Certainly that is very likely.

Socrates/ And those who have chosen injustice and tyranny and robbery pass into the bodies of wolves and hawks and kites. Where else can we imagine that they go?

Cebes/ Beyond a doubt, they pass into such creatures.

Socrates/ Then, it is clear where all the others go, each in accordance with its own habits?

Cebes/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ Then, the happiest of those, and those who go to the best place, are those who have practiced, by nature and habit, without philosophy or reason, the social and civil virtues which are called moderation and justice?

Cebes/ How are these happiest?

Socrates/ Don't you see? Is it not likely that they pass again into some such social and gentle species as that of bees or of wasps or ants, or into the human race again, and that worthy men spring from them?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And no one who has not been a philosopher and who is not wholly pure when he departs, is allowed to enter into the communion of the gods, but only the lover of knowledge. It is for this reason, dear Simmias and Cebes, that those who truly love wisdom refrain from all bodily desires and resist them firmly and do not give themselves up to them, not because they fear poverty or loss of property, as most men, in their love of money, do; nor is it because they fear the dishonor or disgrace of wickedness, like the lovers of honor and power, that they refrain from them.

Cebes/ No, that would not be seemly for them, Socrates.

Socrates/ Most assuredly not. And therefore those who care for their own souls, and do not live in service to the body, turn their backs upon all these men and do not walk in their ways, for they feel that they know not whither they are going. They themselves believe that philosophy, with its deliverance and purification, must not be resisted, and so they turn and follow it whithersoever it leads.

Cebes/ How do they do this, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you. The lovers of knowledge, perceive that when philosophy first takes possession of their soul it is entirely fastened and welded to the body and is compelled to regard realities through the body as through prison bars, not with its own unhindered

vision, and is wallowing in utter ignorance. And philosophy sees that the most dreadful thing about the imprisonment is the fact that it is caused by the lusts of the flesh, so that the prisoner is the chief assistant in his own imprisonment. The lovers of knowledge, then, I say, perceive that philosophy, taking possession of the soul when it is in this state, encourages it gently and tries to set it free, pointing out that the eyes and the ears and the other senses are full of deceit, and urging it to withdraw from these, except in so far as their use is unavoidable, and exhorting it to collect and concentrate itself within itself, and to trust nothing except itself and its own abstract thought of abstract existence; and to believe that there is no truth in that which it sees by other means and which varies with the various objects in which it appears, since everything of that kind is visible and apprehended by the senses, whereas the soul itself sees that which is invisible and apprehended by the mind. Now the soul of the true philosopher believes that it must not resist this deliverance, and therefore it stands aloof from pleasures and lusts and griefs and fears, so far as it can, considering that when anyone has violent pleasures or fears or griefs or lusts he suffers from them not merely what one might think for example, illness or loss of money spent for his lusts but he suffers the greatest and most extreme evil and does not take it into account.

Cebes/ What is this evil, Socrates?

Socrates/ The evil is that the soul of every man, when it is greatly pleased or pained by anything, is compelled to believe that the object which caused the emotion is very distinct and very true; but it is not. These objects are mostly the visible ones, are they not?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when this occurs, is not the soul most completely put in bondage by the body?

Cebes/ How so?

Socrates/ Because each pleasure or pain nails it as with a nail to the body and rivets it on and makes it corporeal, so that it fancies the things are true which the body says are true. For because it has the same beliefs and pleasures as the body it is compelled to adopt also the same habits and mode of life, and can never depart in purity to the other world, but must always go away contaminated with the body; and so it sinks quickly into another body again and grows into it, like seed that is sown. Therefore it has no part in the communion with the divine and pure and absolute.

Cebes/ What you say, Socrates, is very true.

Socrates/ This, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; not the worlds reason. Or do you disagree?

Cebes/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ No, for the soul of the philosopher would not reason as others do, and would not think it right that philosophy should set it free, and that then when set free it should give itself again into bondage to pleasure and pain and engage in futile toil, like Penelope unweaving the web she wove. No, his soul believes that it must gain peace from these emotions, must follow reason and abide always in it, beholding that which is true and divine and not a matter of opinion, and making that its only food; and in this way it believes it must live, while life endures, and then at death pass on to that which is akin to itself and of like nature, and be free from human ills. A soul which has been nurtured in this way, Simmias and Cebes, is not likely to fear that it will

be torn asunder at its departure from the body and will vanish into nothingness, blown apart by the winds, and be no longer anywhere.

Phaedo/ When Socrates had said this there was silence for a long time, and Socrates himself was apparently absorbed in what had been said, as were also most of us. But Simmias and Cebes conversed a little with each other; and Socrates saw them and said;

Socrates/ Do you think there is any incompleteness in what has been said? There are still many subjects for doubt and many points open to attack, if anyone cares to discuss the matter thoroughly. If you are considering anything else, I have nothing to say; but if you are in any difficulty about these matters, do not hesitate to speak and discuss them yourselves, if you think anything better could be said on the subject, and to take me along with you in the discussion, if you think you can get on better in my company.

Simmias/ Socrates, I will tell you the truth. For some time each of us has been in doubt and has been egging the other on and urging him to ask a question, because we wish to hear your answer, but hesitate to trouble you, for fear that it may be disagreeable to you in your present misfortune.

Phaedo/ And when he heard this, he laughed gently and said;

Socrates/ Ah, Simmias! I should have hard work to persuade other people that I do not regard my present situation as a misfortune, when I cannot even make you believe it, but you are afraid I am more churlish now than I used to be. And you seem to think I am inferior in prophetic power to the swans who sing at other times also, but when they feel that they are to die, sing most

and best in their joy that they are to go to the god whose servants they are. But men, because of their own fear of death, misrepresent the swans and say that they sing for sorrow, in mourning for their own death. They do not consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or has any other trouble; no, not even the nightingale or the swallow or the hoopoe which are said to sing in lamentation. I do not believe they sing for grief, nor do the swans; but since they are Apollos birds, I believe they have prophetic vision, and because they have foreknowledge of the blessings in the other world they sing and rejoice on that day more than ever before. And I think that I am myself a fellow-servant of the swans, and am consecrated to the same God and have received from our master a gift of prophecy no whit inferior to theirs, and that I go out from life with as little sorrow as they. So far as this is concerned, then, speak and ask whatever questions you please, so long as the eleven of the Athenians permit.

Simmias/ Good. I will tell you my difficulty, and then Cebes in turn will say why he does not agree to all you have said. I think, Socrates, as perhaps you do yourself, that it is either impossible or very difficult to acquire clear knowledge about these matters in this life. And yet he is a weakling who does not test in every way what is said about them and persevere until he is worn out by studying them on every side. For he must do one of two things; either he must learn or discover the truth about these matters, or if that is impossible, he must take whatever human doctrine is best and hardest to disprove and, embarking upon it as upon a raft, sail upon it through life in the midst of dangers, unless he can sail upon some stronger vessel, some divine revelation, and make his voyage more safely and

securely. And so now I am not ashamed to ask questions, since you encourage me to do so, and I shall not have to blame myself hereafter for not saying now what I think. For, Socrates, when I examine what has been said, either alone or with Cebes, it does not seem quite satisfactory.

Socrates/ Perhaps, my friend, you are right. But tell me in what respect it is not satisfactory.

Simmias/ In this, that one might use the same argument about harmony and a lyre with its strings. One might say that the harmony is invisible and incorporeal, and very beautiful and divine in the well attuned lyre, but the lyre itself and its strings are bodies, and corporeal and composite and earthy and akin to that which is mortal. Now if someone shatters the lyre or cuts and breaks the strings, what if he should maintain by the same argument you employed, that the harmony could not have perished and must still exist? For there would be no possibility that the lyre and its strings, which are of mortal nature, still exist after the strings are broken, and the harmony, which is related and akin to the divine and the immortal, perish before that which is mortal. He would say that the harmony must still exist somewhere, and that the wood and the strings must rot away before anything could happen to it. And I fancy, Socrates, that it must have occurred to your own mind that we believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness, and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements, when they are well and properly mixed. Now if the soul is a harmony, it is clear that when the body is too much relaxed or is too tightly strung by diseases or other ills, the soul must of

necessity perish, no matter how divine it is, like other harmonies in sounds and in all the works of artists, and the remains of each body will endure a long time until they are burnt or decayed. Now what shall we say to this argument, if anyone claims that the soul, being a mixture of the elements of the body, is the first to perish in what is called death?

Phaedo/ Then Socrates, looking keenly at us, as he often used to do, smiled and said;

Socrates/ Simmias raises a fair objection. Now if any of you is readier than I, why does he not reply to him? For he seems to score a good point. However, I think before replying to him we ought to hear what fault our friend Cebes finds with our argument, that we may take time to consider what to say, and then when we have heard them, we can either agree with them, if they seem to strike the proper note, or, if they do not, we can proceed to argue in defense of our reasoning. Come, Cebes, tell us what it was that troubled you.

Cebes/ Well, I will tell you. The argument seems to me to be just where it was, and to be still open to the objection I made before. For I do not deny that it has been very cleverly, and, if I may say so, conclusively shown that the soul existed before it entered into this bodily form, but it does not seem to me proved that it will still exist when we are dead. I do not agree with Simmias objection, that the soul is not stronger and more lasting than the body, for I think it is far superior in all such respects. 'Why then,' the argument might say, 'do you still disbelieve, when you see that after a man dies the weaker part still exists? Do you not think the stronger part must necessarily be preserved during the same length of time?' Now see if my reply to this has any sense. I think I may, like Simmias, best express

myself in a figure. It seems to me that it is much as if one should say about an old weaver who had died, that the man had not perished but was safe and sound somewhere, and should offer as a proof of this the fact that the cloak which the man had woven and used to wear was still whole and had not perished. Then if anyone did not believe him, he would ask which lasts longer, a man or a cloak that is in use and wear, and when the answer was given that a man lasts much longer, he would think it had been proved beyond a doubt that the man was safe, because that which was less lasting had not perished.

Cebes/ But I do not think he is right, Simmias, and I ask you especially to notice what I say. Anyone can understand that a man who says this is talking nonsense. For the weaver in question wove and wore out many such cloaks and lasted longer than they, though they were many, but perished, I suppose, before the last one. Yet a man is not feebler or weaker than a cloak on that account at all. And I think the same figure would apply to the soul and the body and it would be quite appropriate to say in like manner about them, that the soul lasts a long time, but the body lasts a shorter time and is weaker. And one might go on to say that each soul wears out many bodies, especially if the man lives many years. For if the body is constantly changing and being destroyed while the man still lives, and the soul is always weaving anew that which wears out, then when the soul perishes it must necessarily have on its last garment, and this only will survive it, and when the soul has perished, then the body will at once show its natural weakness and will quickly disappear in decay.

And so we are not yet justified in feeling sure, on the strength of this argument, that our souls will still exist somewhere after we are dead. For if one were to grant even more to a man who uses your argument, Socrates, and allow not only that our souls existed before we were born, but also that there is nothing to prevent some of them from continuing to exist and from being born and dying again many times after we are dead, because the soul is naturally so strong that it can endure repeated births, —even allowing this, one might not grant that it does not suffer by its many births and does not finally perish altogether in one of its deaths. But he might say that no one knows beforehand the particular death and the particular dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul, for none of us can perceive that. Now if this is the case, anyone who feels confident about death has a foolish confidence, unless he can show that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. Otherwise a man who is about to die must always fear that his soul will perish utterly in the impending dissolution of the body.

Phaedo/ Now all of us, as we remarked to one another afterwards, were very uncomfortable when we heard what they said; for we had been thoroughly convinced by the previous argument, and now they seemed to be throwing us again into confusion and distrust, not only in respect to the past discussion but also with regard to any future one. They made us fear that our judgment was worthless or that no certainty could be attained in these matters.

Echecrates/ By the gods, Phaedo, I sympathies with you; for I myself after listening to you am inclined to ask myself; “What argument shall we believe henceforth? For the argument of Socrates was perfectly convincing,

and now it has fallen into discredit." For the doctrine that the soul is a kind of harmony has always had (and has now) a wonderful hold upon me, and your mention of it reminded me that I had myself believed in it before. Now I must begin over again and find another argument to convince me that when a man dies his soul does not perish with him. So, for heaven's sake, tell how Socrates continued the discourse, and whether he also, as you say the rest of you did, showed any uneasiness, or calmly defended his argument. And did he defend it successfully? Tell us everything as accurately as you can.

Phaedo/ Echecrates, I have often wondered at Socrates, but never did I admire him more than then. That he had an answer ready was perhaps to be expected; but what astonished me more about him was, first, the pleasant, gentle, and respectful manner in which he listened to the young men's criticisms, secondly, his quick sense of the effect their words had upon us, and lastly, the skill with which he cured us and, as it were, recalled us from our flight and defeat and made us face about and follow him and join in his examination of the argument.

Echecrates/ How did he do it?

Phaedo/ I will tell you. I was sitting at his right hand on a low stool beside his couch, and his seat was a good deal higher than mine. He stroked my head and gathered the hair on the back of my neck into his hand—he had a habit of playing with my hair on occasion—and said;

Socrates/ To-morrow, perhaps, Phaedo, you will cut off this beautiful hair.

Phaedo/ I suppose so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Not if you take my advice.

Phaedo/ What shall I do then?

Socrates/ You will cut it off to-day, and I will cut mine, if our argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again. If I were you and the argument escaped me, I would take an oath, like the Argives, not to let my hair grow until I had renewed the fight and won a victory over the argument of Simmias and Cebes.

Phaedo/ But, they say that even Heracles is not a match for two.

Socrates/ Well, call me to help you, as your Iolaus, while there is still light.

Phaedo/ I call you to help, then not as Heracles calling Iolaus, but as Iolaus calling Heracles.

Socrates/ That is all one. But first let us guard against a danger.

Phaedo/ Of what sort?

Socrates/ The danger of becoming misologists or haters of argument, as people become misanthropists or haters of man; for no worse evil can happen to a man than to hate argument. Misology and misanthropy arise from similar causes. For misanthropy arises from trusting someone implicitly without sufficient knowledge. You think the man is perfectly true and sound and trustworthy, and afterwards you find him base and false. Then you have the same experience with another person. By the time this has happened to a man a good many times, especially if it happens among those whom he might regard as his nearest and dearest friends, he ends by being in continual quarrels and by hating everybody and thinking there is nothing sound in anyone at all. Have you not noticed this?

Phaedo/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, is it not disgraceful, and is it not plain that such a man undertakes to consort with men when he has no knowledge of human nature? For if he had knowledge when he-dealt with them, he would think that the good and the bad are both very few and those between the two are very many, for that is the case.

Phaedo/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean just what I might say about the large and small. Do you think there is anything more unusual than to find a very large or a very small man, or dog, or other creature, or again, one that is very quick or slow, very ugly or beautiful, very black or white? Have you not noticed that the extremes in all these instances are rare and few, and the examples between the extremes are very many?

Phaedo/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And don't you think, that if there were to be a competition in rascality, those who excelled would be very few in that also?

Phaedo/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Yes, very likely. But it is not in that respect that arguments are like men; I was merely following your lead in discussing that. The similarity lies in this; when a man without proper knowledge concerning arguments has confidence in the truth of an argument and afterwards thinks that it is false, whether it really is so or not, and this happens again and again; then you know, those men especially who have spent their time in disputation come to believe that they are the wisest of men and that they alone have discovered that there is nothing sound or sure in anything, whether argument or anything else, but all things go up and down, like the

tide in the Euripus, and nothing is stable for any length of time.

Phaedo/ Certainly, that is very true.

Socrates/ Then, Phaedo, if there is any system of argument which is true and sure and can be learned, it would be a sad thing if a man, because he has met with some of those arguments which seem to be sometimes true and sometimes false, should then not blame himself or his own lack of skill, but should end, in his vexation, by throwing the blame gladly upon the arguments and should hate and revile them all the rest of his life, and be deprived of the truth and knowledge of reality.

Phaedo/ Yes, by Zeus, it would be sad.

Socrates/ First, then, let us be on our guard against this, and let us not admit into our souls the notion that there is no soundness in arguments at all. Let us far rather assume that we ourselves are not yet in sound condition and that we must strive manfully and eagerly to become so, you and the others for the sake of all your future life, and I because of my impending death; for I fear that I am not just now in a philosophical frame of mind as regards this particular question, but am contentious, like quite uncultured persons. For when they argue about anything, they do not care what the truth is in the matters they are discussing, but are eager only to make their own views seem true to their hearers. And I fancy I differ from them just now only to this extent; I shall not be eager to make what I say seem true to my hearers, except as a secondary matter, but shall be very eager to make myself believe it. For see, my friend, how selfish my attitude is. If what I say is true, I am the gainer by believing it; and if there be nothing for

me after death, at any rate I shall not be burdensome to my friends by my lamentations in these last moments. And this ignorance of mine will not last, for that would be an evil, but will soon end.

Socrates/ So, Simmias and Cebes, I approach the argument with my mind thus prepared. But you, if you do as I ask, will give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth; and if you think what I say is true, agree to it, and if not, oppose me with every argument you can muster, that I may not in my eagerness deceive myself and you alike and go away, like a bee, leaving my sting sticking in you.

But we must get to work. First refresh my memory, if I seem to have forgotten anything. Simmias, I think, has doubts and fears that the soul, though more divine and excellent than the body, may perish first, being of the nature of a harmony. And, Cebes, I believe, granted that the soul is more lasting than the body, but said that no one could know that the soul, after wearing out many bodies, did not at last perish itself upon leaving the body; and that this was death—the destruction of the soul, since the body is continually being destroyed. Are those the points, Simmias and Cebes, which we must consider?

Phaedo/ They both agreed that these were the points.

Socrates/ Now, do you reject all of our previous arguments, or only some of them?

Phaedo/ Only some of them, they replied.

Socrates/ What do you think, about the argument in which we said that learning is recollection and that, since this is so, our soul must necessarily have been somewhere before it was imprisoned in the body?

Cebes/ I, was wonderfully convinced by it at the time and I still believe it more firmly than any other argument.

Simmias/ And I too, feel just as he does, and I should be much surprised if I should ever think differently on this point.

Socrates/ You must, my Theban friend, think differently, if you persist in your opinion that a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a harmony made up of the elements that are strung like harp-strings in the body. For surely you will not accept your own statement that a composite harmony existed before those things from which it had to be composed, will you?

Simmias/ Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then do you see, that this is just what you say when you assert that the soul exists before it enters into the form and body of a man, and that it is composed of things that do not yet exist? For harmony is not what your comparison assumes it to be. The lyre and the strings and the sounds come into being in a tuneless condition, and the harmony is the last of all to be composed and the first to perish. So how can you bring this theory into harmony with the other?

Simmias/ I cannot at all.

Socrates/ And yet, there ought to be harmony between it and the theory about harmony above all others.

Simmias/ Yes, there ought.

Socrates/ Well, there is no harmony between the two theories. Now which do you prefer, that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?

Simmias/ The former, decidedly, Socrates. For this other came to me without demonstration; it merely

seemed probable and attractive, which is the reason why many men hold it. I am conscious that those arguments which base their demonstrations on mere probability are deceptive, and if we are not on our guard against them they deceive us greatly, in geometry and in all other things. But the theory of recollection and knowledge has been established by a sound course of argument. For we agreed that our soul before it entered into the body existed just as the very essence which is called the absolute exists. Now I am persuaded that I have accepted this essence on sufficient and right grounds. I cannot therefore accept from myself or anyone else the statement that the soul is a harmony.

Socrates/ Here is another way of looking at it, Simmias. Do you think a harmony or any other composite thing can be in any other state than that in which the elements are of which it is composed?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And it can neither do nor suffer anything other than they do or suffer?

Phaedo/ He agreed.

Socrates/ Then a harmony cannot be expected to lead the elements of which it is composed, but to follow them.

Phaedo/ He assented.

Socrates/ A harmony, then, is quite unable to move or make a sound or do anything else that is opposed to its component parts.

Simmias/ Quite unable.

Socrates/ Well then, is not every harmony by nature a harmony according as it is harmonized?

Simmias/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Would it not, be more completely a harmony and a greater harmony if it were harmonized more fully and to a greater extent, assuming that to be possible, and less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony if less completely harmonized and to a less extent?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is this true of the soul? Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?

Simmias/ Not in the least.

Socrates/ Well now, one soul is said to possess sense and virtue and to be good, and another to possess folly and wickedness and to be bad; and is this true?

Simmias/ Yes, it is true.

Socrates/ Now what will those who assume that the soul is a harmony say that these things—the virtue and the wickedness—in the soul are? Will they say that this is another kind of harmony and a discord, and that the soul, which is itself a harmony, has within it another harmony and that the other soul is discordant and has no other harmony within it?

Simmias/ I cannot tell, but evidently those who make that assumption would say something of that sort.

Socrates/ But we agreed, that one soul is no more or less a soul than another; and that is equivalent to an agreement that one is no more and to no greater extent, and no less and to no less extent, a harmony than another, is it not?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that which is no more or less a harmony, is no more or less harmonized. Is that so?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But has that which is no more and no less harmonized any greater or any less amount of harmony, or an equal amount?

Simmias/ An equal amount.

Socrates/ Then a soul, since it is neither more nor less a soul than another, is neither more nor less harmonized.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ And therefore can have no greater amount of discord or of harmony?

Simmias/ No.

Socrates/ And therefore again one soul can have no greater amount of wickedness or virtue than another, if wickedness is discord and virtue harmony?

Simmias/ It cannot.

Socrates/ Or rather, to speak exactly, Simmias, no soul will have any wickedness at all, if the soul is a harmony; for if a harmony is entirely harmony, it could have no part in discord.

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then the soul, being entirely soul, could have no part in wickedness.

Simmias/ How could it, if what we have said is right?

Socrates/ According to this argument, then, if all souls are by nature equally souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good.

Simmias/ So it seems, Socrates.

Socrates/ And, do you think that this is true and that our reasoning would have come to this end, if the theory that the soul is a harmony were correct?

Simmias/ Not in the least.

Socrates/ Well, of all the parts that make up a man, do you think any is ruler except the soul, especially if it be a wise one?

Simmias/ No, I do not.

Socrates/ Does it yield to the feelings of the body or oppose them? I mean, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul oppose it and draw it away from drinking, and from eating when it is hungry, and do we not see the soul opposing the body in countless other ways?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Did we not agree in our previous discussion that it could never, if it be a harmony, give forth a sound at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other conditions of the elements which compose it, but that it would follow them and never lead them?

Simmias/ Yes, we did, of course.

Socrates/ Well then, do we not now find that the soul acts in exactly the opposite way, leading those elements of which it is said to consist and opposing them in almost everything through all our life, and tyrannizing over them in every way, sometimes inflicting harsh and painful punishments (those of gymnastics and medicine), and sometimes milder ones, sometimes threatening and sometimes admonishing, in short, speaking to the desires and passions and fears as if it were distinct from them and they from it, as Homer has shown in the Odyssey when he says of Odysseus;

—He smote his breast, and thus he chid his heart;

'Endure it, heart, thou didst bear worse than this?'

—Do you suppose that, when he wrote those words, he thought of the soul as a harmony which would be led by the conditions of the body, and not rather as something fitted to lead and rule them, and itself a far more divine thing than a harmony?

Simmias/ By Zeus, Socrates, the latter, I think.

Socrates/ Then, my good friend, it will never do for us to say that the soul is a harmony; for we should, it seems, agree neither with Homer, the divine poet, nor with ourselves.

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ Very well, Harmonia, the Theban goddess, has, it seems, been moderately gracious to us; but how, Cebes, and by what argument can we find grace in the sight of Cadmus?

Cebes/ I think, you will find a way. At any rate, you conducted this argument against harmony wonderfully and better than I expected. For when Simmias was telling of his difficulty, I wondered if anyone could make head against his argument; so it seemed to me very remarkable that it could not withstand the first attack of your argument. Now I should not be surprised if the argument of Cadmus met with the same fate.

Socrates/ My friend, do not be boastful, lest some evil eye put to rout the argument that is to come. That, however, is in the hands of God. Let us, in Homeric fashion, 'charge the foe' and test the worth of what you say. Now the sum total of what you seek is this; You

demand a proof that our soul is indestructible and immortal, if the philosopher, who is confident in the face of death and who thinks that after death he will fare better in the other world than if he had lived his life differently, is not to find his confidence senseless and foolish. And although we show that the soul is strong and godlike and existed before we men were born as men, all this, you say, may bear witness not to immortality, but only to the fact that the soul lasts a long while, and existed somewhere an immeasurably long time before our birth, and knew and did various things; yet it was none the more immortal for all that, but its very entrance into the human body was the beginning of its dissolution, a disease, as it were; and it lives in toil through this life and finally perishes in what we call death. Now it makes no difference, you say, whether a soul enters into a body once or many times, so far as the fear each of us feels is concerned; for anyone, unless he is a fool, must fear, if he does not know and cannot prove that the soul is immortal. That, Cebes, is, I think, about what you mean. And I restate it purposely that nothing may escape us and that you may, if you wish, add or take away anything.

Cebes/ I do not at present wish to take anything away or to add anything. You have expressed my meaning.

Phaedo/ Socrates paused for some time and was absorbed in thought. Then he said;

Socrates/ It is no small thing that you seek; for the cause of generation and decay must be completely investigated. Now I will tell you my own experience in the matter, if you wish; then if anything I say seems to you to be of any use, you can employ it for the solution of your difficulty.

Cebes/ Certainly, I wish to hear your experiences.

Socrates/ Listen then, and I will tell you. When I was young, Cebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature. I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists; and I was always unsettling myself with such questions as these; Do heat and cold, by a sort of fermentation, bring about the organization of animals, as some people say? Is it the blood, or air, or fire by which we think? Or is it none of these, and does the brain furnish the sensations of hearing and sight and smell, and do memory and opinion arise from these, and does knowledge come from memory and opinion in a state of rest? And again I tried to find out how these things perish, and I investigated the phenomena of heaven and earth until finally I made up my mind that I was by nature totally unfitted for this kind of investigation. And I will give you a sufficient proof of this. I was so completely blinded by these studies that I lost the knowledge that I, and others also, thought I had before; I forgot what I had formerly believed I knew about many things and even about the cause of man's growth. For I had thought previously that it was plain to everyone that man grows through eating and drinking; for when, from the food he eats, flesh is added to his flesh and bones to his bones, and in the same way the appropriate thing is added to each of his other parts, then the small bulk becomes greater and the small man large. That is what I used to think. Doesn't that seem to you reasonable?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now listen to this, too. I thought I was sure enough, when I saw a tall man standing by a short one,

that he was, say, taller by a head than the other, and that one horse was larger by a head than another horse; and, to mention still clearer things than those, I thought ten were more than eight because two had been added to the eight, and I thought a two-cubit rule was longer than a one-cubit rule because it exceeded it by half its length.

Cebes/ And now, what do you think about them?

Socrates/ By Zeus, I am far from thinking that I know the cause of any of these things, I who do not even dare to say, when one is added to one, whether the one to which the addition was made has become two, or the one which was added, or the one which was added and the one to which it was added became two by the addition of each to the other. I think it is wonderful that when each of them was separate from the other, each was one and they were not then two, and when they were brought near each other this juxtaposition was the cause of their becoming two. And I cannot yet believe that if one is divided, the division causes it to become two; for this is the opposite of the cause which produced two in the former case; for then two arose because one was brought near and added to another one, and now because one is removed and separated from another. And I no longer believe that I know by this method even how one is generated or, in a word, how anything is generated or is destroyed or exists, and I no longer admit this method, but have another confused way of my own.

Then one day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, that it is the mind that arranges and causes all things. I was pleased with this theory of cause, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all things, and I

thought, 'If this is so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything and establishes each thing as it is best for it to be. So if anyone wishes to find the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a particular thing, he must find out what sort of existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity is best for it. And therefore in respect to that particular thing, and other things too, a man need examine nothing but what is best and most excellent; for then he will necessarily know also what is inferior, since the science of both is the same.' As I considered these things I was delighted to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of things quite to my mind, and I thought he would tell me whether the earth is flat or round, and when he had told me that, would go on to explain the cause and the necessity of it, and would tell me the nature of the best and why it is best for the earth to be as it is; and if he said the earth was in the center, he would proceed to show that it is best for it to be in the center; and I had made up my mind that if he made those things clear to me, I would no longer yearn for any other kind of cause. And I had determined that I would find out in the same way about the sun and the moon and the other stars, their relative speed, their revolutions, and their other changes, and why the active or passive condition of each of them is for the best. For I never imagined that, when he said they were ordered by intelligence, he would introduce any other cause for these things than that it is best for them to be as they are. So I thought when he assigned the cause of each thing and of all things in common he would go on and explain what is best for each and what is good for all in common. I prized my hopes very highly, and I seized the books very eagerly and read them as fast as I could, that

I might know as fast as I could about the best and the worst.

My glorious hope, my friend, was quickly snatched away from me. As I went on with my reading I saw that the man made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other absurdities. And it seemed to me it was very much as if one should say that Socrates does with intelligence whatever he does, and then, in trying to give the causes of the particular thing I do, should say first that I am now sitting here because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide them and the sinews can be contracted and relaxed and, with the flesh and the skin which contains them all, are laid about the bones; and so, as the bones are hung loose in their ligaments, the sinews, by relaxing and contracting, make me able to bend my limbs now, and that is the cause of my sitting here with my legs bent. Or as if in the same way he should give voice and air and hearing and countless other things of the sort as causes for our talking with each other, and should fail to mention the real causes, which are, that the Athenians decided that it was best to condemn me, and therefore I have decided that it was best for me to sit here and that it is right for me to stay and undergo whatever penalty they order. For, by the Dog, I fancy these bones and sinews of mine would have been in Megara or Boeotia long ago, carried thither by an opinion of what was best, if I did not think it was better and nobler to endure any penalty the city may inflict rather than to escape and run away. But it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper

if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right. But to say that those things are the cause of my doing what I do, and that I act with intelligence but not from the choice of what is best, would be an extremely careless way of talking. Whoever talks in that way is unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. And so it seems to me that most people, when they give the name of cause to the latter, are groping in the dark, as it were, and are giving it a name that does not belong to it. And so one man makes the earth stay below the heavens by putting a vortex about it, and another regards the earth as a flat trough supported on a foundation of air; but they do not look for the power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed, nor do they think it has any divine force, but they think they can find a new Atlas more powerful and more immortal and more all-embracing than this, and in truth they give no thought to the good, which must embrace and hold together all things. Now I would gladly be the pupil of anyone who would teach me the nature of such a cause; but since that was denied me and I was not able to discover it myself or to learn of it from anyone else, do you wish me, Cebes, to give you an account of the way in which I have conducted my second voyage in quest of the cause?

Cebes/ I wish it with all my heart.

Socrates/ After this, then, since I had given up investigating realities, I decided that I must be careful not to suffer the misfortune which happens to people who look at the sun and watch it during an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyes unless they look at its

image in water or something of the sort. I thought of that danger, and I was afraid my soul would be blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with any of my senses. So I thought I must have recourse to conceptions and examine in them the truth of realities. Now perhaps my metaphor is not quite accurate; for I do not grant in the least that he who studies realities by means of conceptions is looking at them in images any more than he who studies them in the facts of daily life. However, that is the way I began. I assume in each case some principle which I consider strongest, and whatever seems to me to agree with this, whether relating to cause or to anything else, I regard as true, and whatever disagrees with it, as untrue. But I want to tell you more clearly what I mean; for I think you do not understand now.

Cebes/ Not very well, certainly.

Socrates/ Well, this is what I mean. It is nothing new, but the same thing I have always been saying, both in our previous conversation and elsewhere. I am going to try to explain to you the nature of that cause which I have been studying, and I will revert to those familiar subjects of ours as my point of departure and assume that there are such things as absolute beauty and good and greatness and the like. If you grant this and agree that these exist, I believe I shall explain cause to you and shall prove that the soul is immortal.

Cebes/ You may assume, that I grant it, and go on.

Socrates/ Then, see if you agree with me in the next step. I think that if anything is beautiful besides absolute beauty it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of absolute beauty; and this applies to everything. Do you assent to this view of cause?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ Now I do not yet, understand, nor can I perceive those other ingenious causes. If anyone tells me that what makes a thing beautiful is its lovely color, or its shape or anything else of the sort, I let all that go, for all those things confuse me, and I hold simply and plainly and perhaps foolishly to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful but the presence or communion (call it which you please) of absolute beauty, however it may have been gained; about the way in which it happens, I make no positive statement as yet, but I do insist that beautiful things are made beautiful by beauty. For I think this is the safest answer I can give to myself or to others, and if I cleave fast to this, I think I shall never be overthrown, and I believe it is safe for me or anyone else to give this answer, that beautiful things are beautiful through beauty. Do you agree?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ And great things are great and greater things greater by greatness, and smaller things smaller by smallness?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you would not accept the statement, if you were told that one man was greater or smaller than another by a head, but you would insist that you say only that every greater thing is greater than another by nothing else than greatness, and that it is greater by reason of greatness, and that which is smaller is smaller by nothing else than smallness and is smaller by reason of smallness. For you would, I think, be afraid of meeting with the retort, if you said that a man was greater or smaller than another by a head, first that the greater is greater and the smaller is smaller by the same

thing, and secondly, that the greater man is greater by a head, which is small, and that it is a monstrous thing that one is great by something that is small. Would you not be afraid of this?

Phaedo/ And Cebes laughed and said;

Cebes/ Yes, I should.

Socrates/ Then, you would be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two and that this is the reason it is more. You would say it is more by number and by reason of number; and a two cubit measure is greater than a one-cubit measure not by half but by magnitude, would you not? For you would have the same fear.

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, if one is added to one or if one is divided, you would avoid saying that the addition or the division is the cause of two? You would exclaim loudly that you know no other way by which anything can come into existence than by participating in the proper essence of each thing in which it participates, and therefore you accept no other cause of the existence of two than participation in duality, and things which are to be two must participate in duality, and whatever is to be one must participate in unity, and you would pay no attention to the divisions and additions and other such subtleties, leaving those for wiser men to explain. You would distrust your inexperience and would be afraid, as the saying goes, of your own shadow; so you would cling to that safe principle of ours and would reply as I have said. And if anyone attacked the principle, you would pay him no attention and you would not reply to him until you had examined the consequences to see whether they agreed with one another or not; and when you had to give an

explanation of the principle, you would give it in the same way by assuming some other principle which seemed to you the best of the higher ones, and so on until you reached one which was adequate. You would not mix things up, as disputants do, in talking about the beginning and its consequences, if you wished to discover any of the realities; for perhaps not one of them thinks or cares in the least about these things. They are so clever that they succeed in being well pleased with themselves even when they mix everything up; but if you are a philosopher, I think you will do as I have said.

Simmias/ That is true.

Cebes/ That is true.

Echecrates/ By Zeus, Phaedo, they were right. It seems to me that he made those mutters astonishingly clear, to anyone with even a little sense.

Phaedo/ Certainly, Echecrates, and all who were there thought so, too.

Echecrates/ And so do we who were not there, and are hearing about it now. But what was said after that?

Phaedo/ As I remember it, after all this had been admitted, and they had agreed that each of the abstract qualities exists and that other things which participate in these get their names from them, then Socrates asked;

Socrates/ Now if you assent to this, do you not, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, say that there is in Simmias greatness and smallness?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But, you agree that the statement that Simmias is greater than Socrates is not true as stated in those words. For Simmias is not greater than

Socrates by reason of being Simmias, but by reason of the greatness he happens to have; nor is he greater than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness relatively to his greatness.

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ And again, he is not smaller than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias smallness.

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then Simmias is called small and great, when he is between the two, surpassing the smallness of the one by exceeding him in height, and granting to the other the greatness that exceeds his own smallness.

Phaedo/ And he laughed and said;

Socrates/ I seem to be speaking like a legal document, but it really is very much as I say.

Phaedo/ Simmias agreed.

Socrates/ I am speaking so because I want you to agree with me. I think it is evident not only that greatness itself will never be great and also small, but that the greatness in us will never admit the small or allow itself to be exceeded. One of two things must take place; either it flees or withdraws when its opposite, smallness, advances toward it, or it has already ceased to exist by the time smallness comes near it. But it will not receive and admit smallness, thereby becoming other than it was. So I have received and admitted smallness and am still the same small person I was; but the greatness in me, being great, has not suffered itself to become small. In the same way the smallness in us will never become or be great, nor will any other opposite which is still what it was, ever become or be

also its own opposite. It either goes away or loses its existence in the change.

Cebes/ That, seems to me quite evident.

Phaedo/ Then one of those present—I don't just remember who it was—said; In Heavens name, is not this present doctrine the exact opposite of what was admitted in our earlier discussion, that the greater is generated from the less and the less from the greater and that opposites are always generated from their opposites? But now it seems to me we are saying that this can never happen.

Socrates cocked his head on one side and listened.

Socrates/ You have spoken up like a man, but you do not observe the difference between the present doctrine and what we said before. We said before that in the case of concrete things opposites are generated from opposites; whereas now we say that the abstract concept of an opposite can never become its own opposite, either in us or in the world about us. Then we were talking about things which possess opposite qualities and are called after them, but now about those very opposites the immanence of which gives the things their names. We say that these latter can never be generated from each other.

Phaedo/ At the same time he looked at Cebes and said;

Socrates/ And you—are you troubled by any of our friends objections?

Cebes/ No, not this time; though I confess that objections often do trouble me.

Socrates/ Well, we are quite agreed upon this, that an opposite can never be its own opposite.

Cebes/ Entirely agreed.

Socrates/ Now, see if you agree with me in what follows; Is there something that you call heat and something you call cold?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are they the same as snow and fire?

Cebes/ No, not at all.

Socrates/ But heat is a different thing from fire and cold differs from snow?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yet I fancy you believe that snow, if (to employ the form of phrase we used before) it admits heat, will no longer be what it was, namely snow, and also warm, but will either withdraw when heat approaches it or will cease to exist.

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And similarly fire, when cold approaches it, will either withdraw or perish. It will never succeed in admitting cold and being still fire, as it was before, and also cold.

Cebes/ That is true.

Socrates/ The fact is, in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea. But perhaps I can make my meaning clearer by some examples. In numbers, the odd must always have the name of odd, must it not?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But is this the only thing so called (for this is what I mean to ask), or is there something else, which is not identical with the odd but nevertheless has a right to the name of odd in addition to its own name, because

it is of such a nature that it is never separated from the odd? I mean, for instance, the number three, and there are many other examples. Take the case of three; do you not think it may always be called by its own name and also be called odd, which is not the same as three? Yet the number three and the number five and half of numbers in general are so constituted, that each of them is odd though not identified with the idea of odd. And in the same way two and four and all the other series of numbers are even, each of them, though not identical with evenness. Do you agree, or not?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now see what I want to make plain. This is my point, that not only abstract opposites exclude each other, but all things which, although not opposites one to another, always contain opposites; these also, we find, exclude the idea which is opposed to the idea contained in them, and when it approaches they either perish or withdraw. We must certainly agree that the number three will endure destruction or anything else rather than submit to becoming even, while still remaining three, must we not?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But the number two is not the opposite of the number three.

Cebes/ No.

Socrates/ Then not only opposite ideas refuse to admit each other when they come near, but certain other things refuse to admit the approach of opposites.

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ Shall we then, determine if we can, what these are?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then, Cebes, will they be those which always compel anything of which they take possession not only to take their form but also that of some opposite?

Cebes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Such things as we were speaking of just now. You know of course that those things in which the number three is an essential element must be not only three but also odd.

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now such a thing can never admit the idea which is the opposite of the concept which produces this result.

Cebes/ No, it cannot.

Socrates/ But the result was produced by the concept of the odd?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the opposite of this is the idea of the even?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the idea of the even will never be admitted by the number three.

Cebes/ No.

Socrates/ Then three has no part in the even.

Cebes/ No, it has none.

Socrates/ Then the number three is uneven.

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now I propose to determine what things, without being the opposites of something, nevertheless refuse to admit it, as the number three, though it is not the opposite of the idea of even, nevertheless refuses to

admit it, but always brings forward its opposite against it, and as the number two brings forward the opposite of the odd and fire that of cold, and so forth, for there are plenty of examples. Now see if you accept this statement; not only will opposites not admit their opposites, but nothing which brings an opposite to that which it approaches will ever admit in itself the oppositeness of that which is brought. Now let me refresh your memory; for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the idea of the even, nor will ten, the double of five, admit the idea of the odd. Now ten is not itself an opposite, and yet it will not admit the idea of the odd; and so one-and-a-half and other mixed fractions and one-third and other simple fractions reject the idea of the whole. Do you go with me and agree to this?

Cebes/ Yes, I agree entirely, and am with you.

Socrates/ Then, please begin again at the beginning. And do not answer my questions in their own words, but do as I do. I give an answer beyond that safe answer which I spoke of at first, now that I see another safe reply deduced from what has just been said. If you ask me what causes anything in which it is to be hot, I will not give you that safe but stupid answer and say that it is heat, but I can now give a more refined answer, that it is fire; and if you ask, what causes the body in which it is to be ill, I shall not say illness, but fever; and if you ask what causes a number in which it is to be odd, I shall not say oddness, but the number one, and so forth. Do you understand sufficiently what I mean?

Cebes/ Quite sufficiently.

Socrates/ Now answer. What causes the body in which it is to be alive?

Cebes/ The soul.

Socrates/ Is this always the case?

Cebes/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ Then if the soul takes possession of anything it always brings life to it?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is there anything that is the opposite of life?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ What?

Cebes/ Death.

Socrates/ Now the soul, as we have agreed before, will never admit the opposite of that which it brings with it.

Cebes/ Decidedly not.

Socrates/ Then what do we now call that which does not admit the idea of the even?

Cebes/ Uneven.

Socrates/ And those which do not admit justice and music?

Cebes/ Unjust, and unmusical.

Socrates/ Well then what do we call that which does not admit death?

Cebes/ Deathless or immortal.

Socrates/ And the soul does not admit death?

Cebes/ No.

Socrates/ Then the soul is immortal.

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Very well. Shall we say then that this is proved?

Cebes/ Yes, and very satisfactorily, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, Cebes, if the odd were necessarily imperishable, would not the number three be imperishable?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if that which is without heat were imperishable, would not snow go away whole and unmelted whenever heat was brought in conflict with snow? For it could not have been destroyed, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat.

Cebes/ That is very true.

Socrates/ In the same way, I think, if that which is without cold were imperishable, whenever anything cold approached fire, it would never perish or be quenched, but would go away unharmed.

Cebes/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And must not the same be said of that which is immortal? If the immortal is also imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish when death comes against it. For, as our argument has shown, it will not admit death and will not be dead, just as the number three, we said, will not be even, and the odd will not be even, and as fire, and the heat in the fire, will not be cold. But, one might say, why is it not possible that the odd does not become even when the even comes against it (we agreed to that), but perishes, and the even takes its place? Now we cannot silence him who raises this question by saying that it does not perish, for the odd is not imperishable. If that were conceded to us, we could easily silence him by saying that when the even approaches, the odd and the number three go away; and we could make the corresponding reply about fire and heat and the rest, could we not?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And so, too, in the case of the immortal; if it is conceded that the immortal is imperishable, the soul would be imperishable as well as immortal, but if not, further argument is needed.

Cebes/ But, it is not needed, so far as that is concerned; for surely nothing would escape destruction, if the immortal, which is everlasting, is perishable.

Socrates/ All, I think, would agree that God and the principle of life, and anything else that is immortal, can never perish.

Cebes/ All men would, certainly, and still more, I fancy, the Gods.

Socrates/ Since, then, the immortal is also indestructible, would not the soul, if it is immortal, be also imperishable?

Cebes/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Then when death comes to a man, his mortal part, it seems, dies, but the immortal part goes away unharmed and undestroyed, withdrawing from death.

Cebes/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then, Cebes, it is perfectly certain that the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will exist somewhere in another world.

Cebes/ I, have nothing more to say against that, and I cannot doubt your conclusions. But if Simmias, or anyone else, has anything to say, he would do well to speak, for I do not know to what other time than the present he could defer speaking, if he wishes to say or hear anything about those matters.

Simmias/ But, I don't see how I can doubt, either, as to the result of the discussion; but the subject is so great, and I have such a poor opinion of human weakness, that I cannot help having some doubt in my own mind about what has been said.

Socrates/ Not only that, Simmias, but our first assumptions ought to be more carefully examined, even though they seem to you to be certain. And if you analyze them completely, you will, I think, follow and agree with the argument, so far as it is possible for man to do so. And if this is made clear, you will seek no farther.

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ But my friends, we ought to bear in mind, that, if the soul is immortal, we must care for it, not only in respect to this time, which we call life, but in respect to all time, and if we neglect it, the danger now appears to be terrible. For if death were an escape from everything, it would be a boon to the wicked, for when they die they would be freed from the body and from their wickedness together with their souls. But now, since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape from evil or be saved in any other way than by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul takes with it to the other world nothing but its education and nurture, and these are said to benefit or injure the departed greatly from the very beginning of his journey thither. And so it is said that after death, the tutelary genius of each person, to whom he had been allotted in life, leads him to a place where the dead are gathered together; then they are judged and depart to the other world with the guide whose task it is to conduct thither those who come from this world; and when they have there received their due and remained through the time

appointed, another guide brings them back after many long periods of time. And the journey is not as Telephus says in the play of Aeschylus; for he says a simple path leads to the lower world, but I think the path is neither simple nor single, for if it were, there would be no need of guides, since no one could miss the way to any place if there were only one road. But really there seem to be many forks of the road and many windings; this I infer from the rites and ceremonies practiced here on earth. Now the orderly and wise soul follows its guide and understands its circumstances; but the soul that is desirous of the body, as I said before, flits about it, and in the visible world for a long time, and after much resistance and many sufferings is led away with violence and with difficulty by its appointed genius. And when it arrives at the place where the other souls are, the soul which is impure and has done wrong, by committing wicked murders or other deeds akin to those and the works of kindred souls, is avoided and shunned by all, and no one is willing to be its companion or its guide, but it wanders about alone in utter bewilderment, during certain fixed times, after which it is carried by necessity to its fitting habitation. But the soul that has passed through life in purity and righteousness, finds gods for companions and guides, and goes to dwell in its proper dwelling. Now there are many wonderful regions of the earth, and the earth itself is neither in size nor in other respects such as it is supposed to be by those who habitually discourse about it, as I believe on someone's authority.

Simmias/ What do you mean, Socrates? I have heard a good deal about the earth myself, but not what you believe; so I should like to hear it.

Socrates/ Well Simmias, I do not think I need the art of Glaucus to tell what it is. But to prove that it is true would, I think, be too hard for the art of Glaucus, and perhaps I should not be able to do it; besides, even if I had the skill, I think my life, Simmias, will end before the discussion could be finished. However, there is nothing to prevent my telling what I believe the form of the earth to be, and the regions in it.

Simmias/ Well, that will be enough.

Socrates/ I am convinced, then, that in the first place, if the earth is round and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither the air nor any other similar force to keep it from falling, but its own equipoise and the homogeneous nature of the heavens on all sides suffice to hold it in place; for a body which is in equipoise and is placed in the center of something which is homogeneous cannot change its inclination in any direction, but will remain always in the same position. This, then, is the first thing of which I am convinced.

Simmias/ And rightly.

Socrates/ Secondly, I believe that the earth is very large and that we who dwell between the pillars of Hercules and the river Phasis live in a small part of it about the sea, like ants or frogs about a pond, and that many other people live in many other such regions. For I believe there are in all directions on the earth many hollows of very various forms and sizes, into which the water and mist and air have run together; but the earth itself is pure and is situated in the pure heaven in which the stars are, the heaven which those who discourse about such matters call the ether; the water, mist and air are the sediment of this and flow together into the

hollows of the earth. Now we do not perceive that we live in the hollows, but think we live on the upper surface of the earth, just as if someone who lives in the depth of the ocean should think he lived on the surface of the sea, and, seeing the sun and the stars through the water, should think the sea was the sky, and should, by reason of sluggishness or feebleness, never have reached the surface of the sea, and should never have seen, by rising and lifting his head out of the sea into our upper world, and should never have heard from anyone who had seen, how much purer and fairer it is than the world he lived in. Now I believe this is just the case with us; for we dwell in a hollow of the earth and think we dwell on its upper surface; and the air we call the heaven, and think that is the heaven in which the stars move. But the fact is the same, that by reason of feebleness and sluggishness, we are unable to attain to the upper surface of the air; for if anyone should come to the top of the air or should get wings and fly up, he could lift his head above it and see, as fishes lift their heads out of the water and see the things in our world, so he would see things in that upper world; and, if his nature were strong enough to bear the sight, he would recognize that that is the real heaven and the real light and the real earth. For this earth of ours, and the stones and the whole region where we live, are injured and corroded, as in the sea things are injured by the brine, and nothing of any account grows in the sea, and there is, one might say, nothing perfect there, but caverns and sand and endless mud and mire, where there is earth also, and there is nothing at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful things of our world. But the things in that world above would be seen to be even more superior to those in this world of ours. If I may tell

a story, Simmias, about the things on the earth that is below the heaven, and what they are like, it is well worth hearing.

Simmias/ By all means, Socrates; we should be glad to hear this story.

Socrates/ Well then, my friend, to begin with, the earth when seen from above is said to look like those balls that are covered with twelve pieces of leather; it is divided into patches of various colors, of which the colors which we see here may be regarded as samples, such as painters use. But there the whole earth is of such colors, and they are much brighter and purer than ours; for one part is purple of wonderful beauty, and one is golden, and one is white, whiter than chalk or snow, and the earth is made up of the other colors likewise, and they are more in number and more beautiful than those which we see here. For those very hollows of the earth which are full of water and air, present an appearance of color as they glisten amid the variety of the other colors, so that the whole produces one continuous effect of variety. And in this fair earth the things that grow, the trees, and flowers and fruits, are correspondingly beautiful; and so too the mountains and the stones are smoother, and more transparent and more lovely in color than ours. In fact, our highly prized stones, sards and jaspers, and emeralds, and other gems, are fragments of those there, but there everything is like these or still more beautiful. And the reason of this is that there the stones are pure, and not corroded or defiled, as ours are, with filth and brine by the vapors and liquids which flow together here and which cause ugliness and disease in earth and stones and animals and plants. And the earth there is adorned with all these jewels and also with gold and silver and everything of

the sort. For there they are in plain sight, abundant and large and in many places, so that the earth is a sight to make those blessed who look upon it. And there are many animals upon it, and men also, some dwelling inland, others on the coasts of the air, as we dwell about the sea, and others on islands, which the air flows around, near the mainland; and in short, what water and the sea are in our lives, air is in theirs, and what the air is to us, ether is to them. And the seasons are so tempered that people there have no diseases and live much longer than we, and in sight and hearing and wisdom and all such things are as much superior to us as air is purer than water or the ether than air. And they have sacred groves and temples of the gods, in which the gods really dwell, and they have intercourse with the gods by speech and prophecies and visions, and they see the sun and moon and stars as they really are, and in all other ways their blessedness is in accord with this.

Socrates/ Such then is the nature of the earth as a whole, and of the things around it. But round about the whole earth, in the hollows of it, are many regions, some deeper and wider than that in which we live, some deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some also less in depth and wider. Now all these are connected with one another by many subterranean channels, some larger and some smaller, which are bored in all of them, and there are passages through which much water flows from one to another as into mixing bowls; and there are everlasting rivers of huge size under the earth, flowing with hot and cold water; and there is much fire, and great rivers of fire, and many streams of mud, some thinner and some thicker, like the rivers of mud that flow before the lava in Sicily, and the lava itself. These fill the various regions as they

happen to flow to one or another at any time. Now a kind of oscillation within the earth moves all these up and down. And the nature of the oscillation is as follows; One of the chasms of the earth is greater than the rest, and is bored right through the whole earth; this is the one which Homer means when he says;

Far off, the lowest abyss beneath the earth;

and which elsewhere he and many other poets have called Tartarus. For all the rivers flow together into this chasm and flow out of it again, and they have each the nature of the earth through which they flow. And the reason why all the streams flow in and out here is that this liquid matter has no bottom or foundation. So it oscillates and waves up and down, and the air and wind about it do the same; for they follow the liquid both when it moves toward the other side of the earth and when it moves toward this side, and just as the breath of those who breathe blows in and out, so the wind there oscillates with the liquid and causes terrible and irresistible blasts as it rushes in and out. And when the water retires to the region which we call the lower, it flows into the rivers there and fills them up, as if it were pumped into them; and when it leaves that region and comes back to this side, it fills the rivers here; and when the streams are filled they flow through the passages and through the earth and come to the various places to which their different paths lead, where they make seas and marshes, and rivers and springs. Thence they go down again under the earth, some passing around many great regions and others around fewer and smaller places, and flow again into Tartarus, some much below the point where they were sucked out, and some only a little; but all flow in below their exit. Some flow in on the side from which they flowed out, others

on the opposite side; and some pass completely around in a circle, coiling about the earth once or several times, like serpents, then descend to the lowest possible depth and fall again into the chasm. Now it is possible to go down from each side to the center, but not beyond, for there the slope rises upward in front of the streams from either side of the earth.

Now these streams are many and great and of all sorts, but among the many are four streams, the greatest and outermost of which is that called Oceanus, which flows round in a circle, and opposite this, flowing in the opposite direction, is Acheron, which flows through various desert places and, passing under the earth, comes to the Acherusian lake. To this lake the souls of most of the dead go and,, after remaining there the appointed time, which is for some longer and for others shorter, are sent back to be born again into living beings. The third river flows out between these two, and near the place whence it issues it falls into a vast region burning with a great fire and makes a lake larger than our Mediterranean sea, boiling with water and mud. Thence it flows in a circle, turbid and muddy, and comes in its winding course, among other places, to the edge of the Acherusian lake, but does not mingle with its water. Then, after winding about many times underground, it flows into Tartarus at a lower level. This is the river which is called Pyriphlegethon, and the streams of lava which spout up at various places on earth are offshoots from it. Opposite this the fourth river issues, it is said, first into a wild and awful place, which is all of a dark blue color, like lapis lazuli. This is called the Stygian river, and the lake which it forms by flowing in is the Styx. And when the river has flowed in here and has received fearful powers into its waters, it passes

under the earth and, circling round in the direction opposed to that of Pyriphlegethon, it meets it coming from the other way in the Acherusian lake. And the water of this river also mingles with no other water, but this also passes round in a circle and falls into Tartarus opposite Pyriphlegethon. And the name of this river, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

Such is the nature of these things. Now when the dead have come to the place where each is led by his genius, first they are judged and sentenced, as they have lived well and piously, or not. And those who are found to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the Acheron and, embarking upon vessels provided for them, arrive in them at the lake; there they dwell and are purified, and if they have done any wrong they are absolved by paying the penalty for their wrong doings, and for their good deeds they receive rewards, each according to his merits. But those who appear to be incurable, on account of the greatness of their wrong-doings, because they have committed many great deeds of sacrilege, or wicked and abominable murders, or any other such crimes, are cast by their fitting destiny into Tartarus, whence they never emerge. Those, however, who are curable, but are found to have committed great sins—who have, for example, in a moment of passion done some act of violence against father or mother and have lived in repentance the rest of their lives, or who have slain some other person under similar conditions—these must needs be thrown into Tartarus, and when they have been there a year the wave casts them out, the homicides by way of Cocytus, those who have outraged their parents by way of Pyriphlegethon. And when they have been brought by the current to the Acherusian lake, they shout and cry out, calling to

those whom they have slain or outraged, begging and beseeching them to be gracious and to let them come out into the lake; and if they prevail they come out and cease from their ills, but if not, they are borne away again to Tartarus and thence back into the rivers, and this goes on until they prevail upon those whom they have wronged; for this is the penalty imposed upon them by the judges. But those who are found to have excelled in holy living are freed from these regions within the earth and are released as from prisons; they mount upward into their pure abode and dwell upon the earth. And of these, all who have duly purified themselves by philosophy live henceforth altogether without bodies, and pass to still more beautiful abodes which it is not easy to describe, nor have we now time enough.

But, Simmias, because of all these things which we have recounted we ought to do our best to acquire virtue and wisdom in life. For the prize is fair and the hope great.

Now it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal, I think he may properly and worthily venture to believe; for the venture is well worth while; and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms, which is the reason why I have been lengthening out the story so long. This then is why a man should be of good cheer about his soul, who in his life has rejected the pleasures and ornaments of the body, thinking they are alien to him and more likely to do him harm than good, and has sought eagerly for those of learning, and after adorning his soul with no

alien ornaments, but with its own proper adornment of self-restraint and justice and courage and freedom and truth, awaits his departure to the other world, ready to go when fate calls him. You, Simmias and Cebes and the rest, will go hereafter, each in his own time; but I am now already, as a tragedian would say, called by fate, and it is about time for me to go to the bath; for I think it is better to bathe before drinking the poison, that the women may not have the trouble of bathing the corpse.

Phaedo/ When he had finished speaking, Crito said;

Crito/ Well, Socrates, do you wish to leave any directions with us about your children or anything else—anything we can do to serve you?

Socrates/ What I always say, Crito, nothing new. If you take care of yourselves you will serve me and mine and yourselves, whatever you do, even if you make no promises now; but if you neglect yourselves and are not willing to live following step by step, as it were, in the path marked out by our present and past discussions, you will accomplish nothing, no matter how much or how eagerly you promise at present.

Crito/ We will certainly try hard to do as you say. But how shall we bury you?

Socrates/ However you please, if you can catch me and I do not get away from you.

Phaedo/ And he laughed gently, and looking towards us, said;

Socrates/ I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that the Socrates who is now conversing and arranging the details of his argument is really I; he thinks I am the one whom he will presently see as a corpse, and he asks how to bury me. And though I have been saying at great

length that after I drink the poison I shall no longer be with you, but shall go away to the joys of the blessed you know of, he seems to think that was idle talk uttered to encourage you and myself. So, give security for me to Crito, the opposite of that which he gave the judges at my trial; for he gave security that I would remain, but you must give security that I shall not remain when I die, but shall go away, so that Crito may bear it more easily, and may not be troubled when he sees my body being burnt or buried, or think I am undergoing terrible treatment, and may not say at the funeral that he is laying out Socrates, or following him to the grave, or burying him. For, dear Crito, you may be sure that such wrong words are not only undesirable in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. No, you must be of good courage, and say that you bury my body, —and bury it as you think best and as seems to you most fitting.

Phaedo/ When he had said this, he got up and went into another room to bathe; Crito followed him, but he told us to wait. So we waited, talking over with each other and discussing the discourse we had heard, and then speaking of the great misfortune that had befallen us, for we felt that he was like a father to us and that when bereft of him we should pass the rest of our lives as orphans. And when he had bathed and his children had been brought to him—for he had two little sons and one big one—and the women of the family had come, he talked with them in Crito's presence and gave them such directions as he wished; then he told the women to go away, and he came to us. And it was now nearly sunset; for he had spent a long time within. And he came and sat down fresh from the bath. After that not

much was said, and the servant of the eleven came and stood beside him and said;

Jailer/ Socrates, I shall not find fault with you, as I do with others, for being angry and cursing me, when at the behest of the authorities, I tell them to drink the poison. No, I have found you in all this time in every way the noblest and gentlest and best man who has ever come here, and now I know your anger is directed against others, not against me, for you know who are to blame. Now, for you know the message I came to bring you, farewell and try to bear what you must as easily as you can.

Phaedo/ And he burst into tears and turned and went away. And Socrates looked up at him and said;

Socrates/ Fare you well, too; I will do as you say.

Phaedo/ And then he said to us;

Socrates/ How charming the man is! Ever since I have been here he has been coming to see me and talking with me from time to time, and has been the best of men, and now how nobly he weeps for me! But come, Crito, let us obey him, and let someone bring the poison, if it is ready; and if not, let the man prepare it.

Crito/ But I think, Socrates, the sun is still upon the mountains and has not yet set; and I know that others have taken the poison very late, after the order has come to them, and in the meantime have eaten and drunk and some of them enjoyed the society of those whom they loved. Do not hurry; for there is still time.

Socrates/ Crito, those whom you mention are right in doing as they do, for they think they gain by it; and I shall be right in not doing as they do; for I think I should gain nothing by taking the poison a little later. I should only make myself ridiculous in my own eyes if I clung to

life and spared it, when there is no more profit in it. Come, do as I ask and do not refuse.

Phaedo/ Thereupon Crito nodded to the boy who was standing near. The boy went out and stayed a long time, then came back with the man who was to administer the poison, which he brought with him in a cup ready for use. And when Socrates saw him, he said;

Socrates/ Well, my good man, you know about these things; what must I do?

Jailer/ Nothing, except drink the poison and walk about till your legs feel heavy; then lie down, and the poison will take effect of itself.

Phaedo/ At the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. He took it, and very gently, Echecrates, without trembling or changing color or expression, but looking up at the man with wide open eyes, as was his custom, said;

Socrates/ What do you say about pouring a libation to some deity from this cup? May I, or not?

Jailer/ Socrates, we prepare only as much as we think is enough.

Socrates/ I understand; but I may and must pray to the gods that my departure hence be a fortunate one; so I offer this prayer, and may it be granted.

Phaedo/ With these words he raised the cup to his lips and very cheerfully and quietly drained it. Up to that time most of us had been able to restrain our tears fairly well, but when we watched him drinking and saw that he had drunk the poison, we could do so no longer, but in spite of myself my tears rolled down in floods, so that I wrapped my face in my cloak and wept for myself; for it was not for him that I wept, but for my own misfortune in being deprived of such a friend. Crito had

got up and gone away even before I did, because he could not restrain his tears. But Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time before, then wailed aloud in his grief and made us all break down, except Socrates himself. But he said;

Socrates/ What conduct is this, you strange men! I sent the women away chiefly for this very reason, that they might not behave in this absurd way; for I have heard that it is best to die in silence. Keep quiet and be brave.

Phaedo/ Then we were ashamed and controlled our tears. He walked about and, when he said his legs were heavy, lay down on his back, for such was the advice of the attendant. The man who had administered the poison laid his hands on him and after a while examined his feet and legs, then pinched his foot hard and asked if he felt it. He said

Socrates/ No;

Phaedo/ then after that, his thighs; and passing upwards in this way he showed us that he was growing cold and rigid. And again he touched him and said that when it reached his heart, he would be gone. The chill had now reached the region about the groin, and uncovering his face, which had been covered, he said— and these were his last words, —

Socrates/ Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius. Pay it and do not neglect it.

Crito/ That, shall be done; but see if you have anything else to say.

Phaedo/ To this question he made no reply, but after a little while he moved; the attendant uncovered him; his eyes were fixed. And Crito when he saw it, closed his mouth and eyes.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, who was, as we may say, of all those of his time whom we have known, the best and wisest and most righteous man.

Phaedo

Translated by G.M.A. Grube.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Phaedo, Echecrates, Crito, Cebes, Simmias, Apollodorus, Attendant, Xanthippe, Someone, Jailer

Echecrates/ Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did someone else tell you about it?

Phaedo/ I was there myself, Echecrates.

Echecrates/ What are the things he said before he died? And how did he die? I should be glad to hear this. Hardly anyone from Phlius visits Athens nowadays, nor has any stranger come from Athens for some time who could give us a clear account of what happened, except that he drank the poison and died, but nothing more.

Phaedo/ Did you not even hear how the trial went?

Echecrates/ Yes, someone did tell us about that, and we wondered that he seems to have died a long time after the trial took place. Why was that, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ That was by chance, Echecrates. The day before the trial, as it happened, the prow of the ship that the Athenians send to Delos had been crowned with garlands.

Echecrates/ What ship is that?

Phaedo/ It is the ship in which, the Athenians say, Theseus once sailed to Crete, taking with him the two lots of seven victims. He saved them and was himself saved. They vowed then to Apollo, so the story goes, that if they were saved they would send a mission to Delos every year. And from that time to this they send such an annual mission to the god. They have a law to keep the city pure while it lasts, and no

execution may take place once the mission has begun until the ship has made its journey to Delos and returned to Athens, and this can sometimes take a long time if the winds delay it. The mission begins when the priest of Apollo crowns the prow of the ship, and this happened, as I say, the day before Socrates' trial. That is why Socrates was in prison a long time between this trial and his execution.

Echecrates/ What about his actual death, Phaedo? What did he say? What did he do? Who of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities not allow them to be present and he died with no friends present?

Phaedo/ By no means. Some were present, in fact, a good many.

Echecrates/ Please be good enough to tell us all that occurred as fully as possible, unless you have some pressing business.

Phaedo/ I have the time and I will try to tell you the whole story, for nothing gives me more pleasure than to call Socrates to mind, whether talking about him myself, or listening to someone else do so.

Echecrates/ Your hearers will surely be like you in this, Phaedo. So do try to tell us every detail as exactly as you can.

Phaedo/ I certainly found being there an astonishing experience. Although I was witnessing the death of one who was my friend, I had no feeling of pity, for the man appeared happy both in manner and words as he died nobly and without fear, Echecrates, so that it struck me that even in going down to the underworld he was going with the gods' blessing and that he would fare well when he got there, if anyone ever does. That is why I had no feeling of pity, such as would seem natural in my sorrow, nor indeed of pleasure, as we engaged in philosophical discussion as we were accustomed to do—for our arguments were of that sort—but I

had a strange feeling, an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and pain at the same time as I reflected that he was just about to die. All of us present were affected in much the same way, sometimes laughing, then weeping; especially one of us, Apollodorus—you know the man and his ways.

Echecrates/ Of course I do.

Phaedo/ He was quite overcome; but I was myself disturbed, and so were the others.

Echecrates/ Who, Phaedo, were those present?

Phaedo/ Among the local people there was Apollodorus, whom I mentioned, Critobulus and his father, also Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines and Antisthenes. Ctesippus of Paeania was there, Menexenus and some others. Plato, I believe, was ill.

Echecrates/ Were there some strangers present?

Phaedo/ Yes, Simmias from Thebes with Cebes and Phaedondes, and from Megara, Euclides and Terpsion.

Echecrates/ What about Aristippus and Cleombrotus? Were they there?

Phaedo/ No. They were said to be in Aegina.

Echecrates/ Was there anyone else?

Phaedo/ I think these were about all.

Echecrates/ Well then, what do you say the conversation was about?

Phaedo/ I will try to tell you everything from the beginning. On the previous days also both the others and I used to visit Socrates. We foregathered at daybreak at the court where the trial took place, for it was close to the prison, and each day we used to wait around talking until the prison should open, for it did not open early. When it opened we used to go in to Socrates and spend most of the day with him. On this day we gathered rather early, because when we left the prison on the

previous evening we were informed that the ship from Delos had arrived, and so we told each other to come to the usual place as early as possible. When we arrived the gatekeeper who used to answer our knock came out and told us to wait and not go in until he told us to.

Jailer/ 'The Eleven, are freeing Socrates from his bonds and telling him how his death will take place today."

Phaedo/ After a short time he came and told us to go in. We found Socrates recently released from his chains, and Xanthippe—you know her—sitting by him, holding their baby. When she saw us, she cried out and said the sort of thing that women usually say:

Xanthippe/ "Socrates, this is the last time your friends will talk to you and you to them."

Phaedo/ Socrates looked at Crito.

Socrates/ "Crito, let someone take her home."

Phaedo/ And some of Crito's people led her away lamenting and beating her breast.

Socrates sat up on the bed, bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and as he rubbed he said:

Socrates/ "What a strange thing that which men call pleasure seems to be, and how astonishing the relation it has with what is thought to be its opposite, namely pain! A man cannot have both at the same time. Yet if he pursues and catches the one, he is almost always bound to catch the other also, like two creatures with one head. I think that if Aesop had noted this he would have composed a fable that a god wished to reconcile their opposition but could not do so, so he joined their two heads together, and therefore when a man has the one, the other follows later. This seems to be happening to me. My bonds caused pain in my leg, and now pleasure seems to be following."

Phaedo/ Cebes intervened and said:

Cebes/ “By Zeus, yes, Socrates, you did well to remind me. Evenus asked me the day before yesterday, as others had done before, what induced you to write poetry after you came to prison, you who had never composed any poetry before, putting the fables of Aesop into verse and composing the hymn to Apollo. If it is of any concern to you that I should have an answer to give to Evenus when he repeats his question, as I know he will, tell me what to say to him.”

Socrates/ Tell him the truth, Cebes, that I did not do this with the idea of rivaling him or his poems, for I knew that would not be easy, but I tried to find out the meaning of certain dreams and to satisfy my conscience in case it was this kind of art they were frequently bidding me to practice. The dreams were something like this: the same dream often came to me in the past, now in one shape now in another, but saying the same thing: “Socrates,” it said, “practice and cultivate the arts.” In the past I imagined that it was instructing and advising me to do what I was doing, such as those who encourage runners in a race, that the dream was thus bidding me do the very thing I was doing, namely, to practice the art of philosophy, this being the highest kind of art, and I was doing that.

But now, after my trial took place, and the festival of the god was preventing my execution, I thought that, in case my dream was bidding me to practice this popular art, I should not disobey it but compose poetry. I thought it safer not to leave here until I had satisfied my conscience by writing poems in obedience to the dream. So I first wrote in honor of the god of the present festival. After that I realized that a poet, if he is to be a poet, must compose fables, not arguments. Being no teller of fables myself, I took the stories I knew and had at hand, the fables of Aesop, and I versified the first ones I came across. Tell this to Evenus, Cebes, wish him well and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to follow me as

soon as possible. I am leaving today, it seems, as the Athenians so order it.

Simmias/ “What kind of advice is this you are giving to Evenus, Socrates? I have met him many times, and from my observation he is not at all likely to follow it willingly.”

Socrates/ How so, is Evenus not a philosopher?

Simmias/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then Evenus will be willing, like every man who partakes worthily of philosophy. Yet perhaps he will not take his own life, for that, they say, is not right.

Phaedo/ As he said this, Socrates put his feet on the ground and remained in this position during the rest of the conversation.

Cebes/ “How do you mean Socrates, that it is not right to do oneself violence, and yet that the philosopher will be willing to follow one who is dying?”

Socrates/ Come now, Cebes, have you and Simmias, who keep company with Philolaus, not heard about such things?

Cebes/ Nothing definite, Socrates.

Socrates/ Indeed, I too speak about this from hearsay, but I do not mind telling you what I have heard, for it is perhaps most appropriate for one who is about to depart yonder to tell and examine tales about what we believe that journey to be like. What else could one do in the time we have until sunset?

Cebes/ But whatever is the reason, Socrates, for people to say that it is not right to kill oneself? As to your question just now, I have heard Philolaus say this when staying in Thebes and I have also heard it from others, but I have never heard anyone give a clear account of the matter.

Socrates/ Well, we must do our best, and you may yet hear one. And it may well astonish you if this subject, alone of all things, is simple, and it is never, as with everything else,

better at certain times and for certain people to die than to live. And if this is so, you may well find it astonishing that those for whom it is better to die are wrong to help themselves, and that they must wait for someone else to benefit them.

Phaedo/ And Cebes, lapsing into his own dialect, laughed quietly and said:

Cebes/ "Zeus knows it is."

Socrates/ Indeed, it does seem unreasonable when put like that, but perhaps there is reason to it. There is the explanation that is put in the language of the mysteries, that we men are in a kind of prison, and that one must not free oneself or run away. That seems to me an impressive doctrine and one not easy to understand fully. However, Cebes, this seems to me well expressed, that the gods are our guardians and that men are one of their possessions. Or do you not think so?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ And would you not be angry if one of your possessions killed itself when you had not given any sign that you wished it to die, and if you had any punishment you could inflict, you would inflict it?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Perhaps then, put in this way, it is not unreasonable that one should not kill oneself before a god had indicated some necessity to do so, like the necessity now put upon us.

Cebes/ That seems likely. As for what you were saying, that philosophers should be willing and ready to die, that seems strange, Socrates, if what we said just now is reasonable, namely, that a god is our protector and that we are his possessions. It is not logical that the wisest of men should not resent leaving this service in which they are governed by the best of masters, the gods, for a wise man cannot believe that

he will look after himself better when he is free. A foolish man might easily think so, that he must escape from his master; he would not reflect that one must not escape from a good master but stay with him as long as possible, because it would be foolish to escape. But the sensible man would want always to remain with one better than himself. So, Socrates, the opposite of what was said before is likely to be true; the wise would resent dying, whereas the foolish would rejoice at it.

Phaedo/ I thought that when Socrates heard this he was pleased by Cebes' argumentation. Glancing at us, he said:

Socrates/ "Cebes is always on the track of some arguments; he is certainly not willing to be at once convinced by what one says."

Simmias/ "But actually, Socrates, I think myself that Cebes has a point now. Why should truly wise men want to avoid the service of masters better than themselves, and leave them easily? And I think Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are bearing leaving us so lightly, and leaving those good masters, as you say yourself, the gods."

Socrates/ You are both justified in what you say, and I think you mean that I must make a defense against this, as if I were in court.

Simmias/ You certainly must.

Socrates/ Come then, let me try to make my defense to you more convincing than it was to the jury. For, Simmias and Cebes, I should be wrong not to resent dying if I did not believe that I should go first to other wise and good gods, and then to men who have died and are better than men are here. Be assured that, as it is, I expect to join the company of good men. This last I would not altogether insist on, but if I insist on anything at all in these matters, it is that I shall come to gods who are very good masters. That is why I am not so resentful, because I have good hope that some future awaits

men after death, as we have been told for years, a much better future for the good than for the wicked.

Simmias/ Well now, Socrates, do you intend to keep this belief to yourself as you leave us, or would you share it with us? I certainly think it would be a blessing for us too, and at the same time it would be your defense if you convince us of what you say.

Socrates/ I will try, but first let us see what it is that Crito here has, I think, been wanting to say for quite a while.

Crito/ What else, Socrates, but what the man who is to give you the poison has been telling me for some time, that I should warn you to talk as little as possible. People get heated when they talk, he says, and one should not be heated when taking the poison, as those who do must sometimes drink it two or three times.

Socrates/ 'Take no notice of him; only let him be prepared to administer it twice or, if necessary, three times."

Crito/ I was rather sure you would say that, but he has been bothering me for some time.

Socrates/ Let him be, I want to make my argument before you, my judges, as to why I think that a man who has truly spent his life in philosophy is probably right to be of good cheer in the face of death and to be very hopeful that after death he will attain the greatest blessings yonder. I will try to tell you, Simmias and Cebes, how this may be so. I am afraid that other people do not realize that the one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death. Now if this is true, it would be strange indeed if they were eager for this all their lives and then resent it when what they have wanted and practiced for a long time comes upon them.

Phaedo/ Simmias laughed and said:

Simmias/ “By Zeus, Socrates, you made me laugh, though I was in no laughing mood just now. I think that the majority, on hearing this, will think that it describes the philosophers very well, and our people in Thebes would thoroughly agree that philosophers are nearly dead and that the majority of men is well aware that they deserve to be.

Socrates/ And they would be telling the truth, Simmias, except for their being aware. They are not aware of the way true philosophers are nearly dead, nor of the way they deserve to be, nor of the sort of death they deserve. But never mind them, let us talk among ourselves. Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it anything else than the separation of the soul from the body? Do we believe that death is this, namely, that the body comes to be separated by itself apart from the soul, and the soul comes to be separated by itself apart from the body? Is death anything else than that?

Simmias/ No, that is what it is.

Socrates/ Consider then, my good sir, whether you share my opinion, for this will lead us to a better knowledge of what we are investigating. Do you think it is the part of a philosopher to be concerned with such so-called pleasures as those of food and drink?

Simmias/ By no means.

Socrates/ What about the pleasures of sex?

Simmias/ Not at all.

Socrates/ What of the other pleasures concerned with the service of the body? Do you think such a man prizes them greatly, the acquisition of distinguished clothes and shoes and the other bodily ornaments? Do you think he values these or despises them, except in so far as one cannot do without them?

Simmias/ I think the true philosopher despises them.

Socrates/ Do you not think, that in general such a man's concern is not with the body but that, as far as he can, he turns away from the body towards the soul?

Simmias/ I do.

Socrates/ So in the first place, such things show clearly that the philosopher more than other men frees the soul from association with the body as much as possible?

Simmias/ Apparently.

Socrates/ A man who finds no pleasure in such things and has no part in them is thought by the majority not to deserve to live and to be close to death; the man, that is, who does not care for the pleasures of the body.

Simmias/ What you say is certainly true.

Socrates/ Then what about the actual acquiring of knowledge? Is the body an obstacle when one associates with it in the search for knowledge? I mean, for example, do men find any truth in sight or hearing, or are not even the poets forever telling us that we do not see or hear anything accurately, and surely if those two physical senses are not clear or precise, our other senses can hardly be accurate, as they are all inferior to these. Do you not think so?

Simmias/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ When then, does the soul grasp the truth? For whenever it attempts to examine anything with the body, it is clearly deceived by it.

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ Is it not in reasoning if anywhere that any reality becomes clear to the soul?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And indeed the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain

nor pleasure, but when it is most by itself, taking leave of the body and as far as possible having no contact or association with it in its search for reality.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ And it is then that the soul of the philosopher most disdains the body, flees from it and seeks to be by itself?

Simmias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ What about the following, Simmias? Do we say that there is such a thing as the Just itself, or not?

Simmias/ We do say so, by Zeus.

Socrates/ And the Beautiful, and the Good?

Simmias/ Of course.

Socrates/ And have you ever seen any of these things with your eyes?

Simmias/ In no way.

Socrates/ Or have you ever grasped them with any of your bodily senses? I am speaking of all things such as Size, Health, Strength and, in a word, the reality of all other things, that which each of them essentially is. Is what is most true in them contemplated through the body, or is this the position: whoever of us prepares himself best and most accurately to grasp that thing itself which he is investigating will come closest to the knowledge of it?

Simmias/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Then he will do this most perfectly who approaches the object with thought alone, without associating any sight with his thought, or dragging in any sense perception with his reasoning, but who, using pure thought alone, tries to track down each reality pure and by itself, freeing himself as far as possible from eyes and ears, and in a word, from the whole body, because the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom

whenever it is associated with it. Will not that man reach reality, Simmias, if anyone does?

Simmias/ What you say, is indeed true.

Socrates/ All these things will necessarily make the true philosophers believe and say to each other something like this: "There is likely to be something such as a path to guide us out of our confusion, because as long as we have a body and our soul is fused with such an evil we shall never adequately attain what we desire, which we affirm to be the truth. The body keeps us busy in a thousand ways because of its need for nurture. Moreover, if certain diseases befall it, they impede our search for the truth. It fills us with wants, desires, fears, all sorts of illusions and much nonsense, so that, as it is said, in truth and in fact no thought of any kind ever comes to us from the body. Only the body and its desires cause war, civil discord and battles, for all wars are due to the desire to acquire wealth, and it is the body and the care of it, to which we are enslaved, which compel us to acquire wealth, and all this makes us too busy to practice philosophy.

Worst of all, if we do get some respite from it and turn to some investigation, everywhere in our investigations the body is present and makes for confusion and fear, so that it prevents us from seeing the truth.

"It really has been shown to us that, if we are ever to have pure knowledge, we must escape from the body and observe things in themselves with the soul by itself. It seems likely that we shall, only then, when we are dead, attain that which we desire and of which we claim to be lovers, namely, wisdom, as our argument shows, not while we live; for if it is impossible to attain any pure knowledge with the body, then one of two things is true: either we can never attain knowledge or we can do so after death. Then and not before, the soul is by itself apart from the body. While we live, we shall be closest to

knowledge if we refrain as much as possible from association with the body and do not join with it more than we must, if we are not infected with its nature but purify ourselves from it until the god himself frees us. In this way we shall escape the contamination of the body's folly; we shall be likely to be in the company of people of the same kind, and by our own efforts we shall know all that is pure, which is presumably the truth, for it is not permitted to the impure to attain the pure."

Such are the things, Simmias, that all those who love learning in the proper manner must say to one another and believe. Or do you not think so?

Simmias/ I certainly do, Socrates.

Socrates/ And if this is true, my friend, there is good hope that on arriving where I am going, if anywhere, I shall acquire what has been our chief preoccupation in our past life, so that the journey that is now ordered for me is full of good hope, as it is also for any other man who believes that his mind has been prepared and, as it were, purified.

Simmias/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ And does purification not turn out to be what we mentioned in our argument some time ago, namely, to separate the soul as far as possible from the body and accustom it to gather itself and collect itself out of every part of the body and to dwell by itself as far as it can both now and in the future, freed, as it were, from the bonds of the body?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that freedom and separation of the soul from the body is called death?

Simmias/ That is altogether so.

Socrates/ It is only those who practice philosophy in the right way, we say, who always most want to free the soul; and this release and separation of the soul from the body is the preoccupation of the philosophers?

Simmias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Therefore, as I said at the beginning, it would be ridiculous for a man to train himself in life to live in a state as close to death as possible, and then to resent it when it comes?

Simmias/ Ridiculous, of course.

Socrates/ In fact, Simmias, those who practice philosophy in the right way are in training for dying and they fear death least of all men. Consider it from this point of view: if they are altogether estranged from the body and desire to have their soul by itself, would it not be quite absurd for them to be afraid and resentful when this happens? If they did not gladly set out for a place, where, on arrival, they may hope to attain that for which they had yearned during their lifetime, that is, wisdom, and where they would be rid of the presence of that from which they are estranged?

Many men, at the death of their lovers, wives or sons, were willing to go to the underworld, driven by the hope of seeing there those for whose company they longed, and being with them. Will then a true lover of wisdom, who has a similar hope and knows that he will never find it to any extent except in Hades, be resentful of dying and not gladly undertake the journey thither? One must surely think so, my friend, if he is a true philosopher, for he is firmly convinced that he will not find pure knowledge anywhere except there. And if this is so, then, as I said just now, would it not be highly unreasonable for such a man to fear death?

Simmias/ It certainly would, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Then you have sufficient indication, that any man whom you see resenting death was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body, and also a lover of wealth or of honors, either or both.

Simmias/ It is certainly as you say.

Socrates/ And, Simmias, does not what is called courage belong especially to men of this disposition?

Simmias/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And the quality of moderation which even the majority call by that name, that is, not to get swept off one's feet by one's passions, but to treat them with disdain and orderliness, is this not suited only to those who most of all despise the body and live the life of philosophy?

Simmias/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ If you are willing to reflect on the courage and moderation of other people, you will find them strange.

Simmias/ In what way, Socrates?

Socrates/ You know that they all consider death a great evil?

Simmias/ Definitely.

Socrates/ And the brave among them face death, when they do, for fear of greater evils?

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Therefore, it is fear and terror that make all men brave, except the philosophers. Yet it is illogical to be brave through fear and cowardice.

Simmias/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ What of the moderate among them? Is their experience not similar? Is it license of a kind that makes them moderate? We say this is impossible, yet their experience of this unsophisticated moderation turns out to be similar: they fear to be deprived of other pleasures which they desire, so they keep away from some pleasures because they are overcome by others. Now to be mastered by pleasure is what they call license, but what happens to them is that they master certain pleasures because they are mastered by

others. This is like what we mentioned just now, that in some way it is a kind of license that has made them moderate.

Simmias/ That seems likely.

Socrates/ My good Simmias, I fear this is not the right exchange to attain virtue, to exchange pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains and fears for fears, the greater for the less like coins, but that the only valid currency for which all these things should be exchanged is wisdom. With this we have real courage and moderation and justice and, in a word, true virtue, with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and all such things be present or absent. Exchanged for one another without wisdom such virtue is only an illusory appearance of virtue; it is in fact fit for slaves, without soundness or truth, whereas, in truth, moderation and courage and justice are a purging away of all such things, and wisdom itself is a kind of cleansing or purification. It is likely that those who established the mystic rites for us were not inferior persons but were speaking in riddles long ago when they said that whoever arrives in the underworld uninitiated and unsanctified will wallow in the mire, whereas he who arrives there purified and initiated will dwell with the gods. There are indeed, as those concerned with the mysteries say, many who carry the thyrsus but the Bacchants are few. These latter are, in my opinion, no other than those who have practiced philosophy in the right way. I have in my life left nothing undone in order to be counted among these as far as possible, as I have been eager to be in every way. Whether my eagerness was right and we accomplished anything we shall, I think, know for certain in a short time, god willing, on arriving yonder.

This is my defense, Simmias and Cebes, that I am likely to be right to leave you and my masters here without resentment or complaint, believing that there, as here, I shall find good

masters and good friends. If my defense is more convincing to you than to the Athenian jury, it will be well.

Phaedo/ When Socrates finished, Cebes intervened:

Cebes/ Socrates, everything else you said is excellent, I think, but men find it very hard to believe what you said about the soul. They think that after it has left the body it no longer exists anywhere, but that it is destroyed and dissolved on the day the man dies, as soon as it leaves the body; and that, on leaving it, it is dispersed like breath or smoke, has flown away and gone and is no longer anything anywhere. If indeed it gathered itself together and existed by itself and escaped those evils you were recently enumerating, there would then be much good hope, Socrates, that what you say is true; but to believe this requires a good deal of faith and persuasive argument, to believe that the soul still exists after a man has died and that it still possesses some capability and intelligence."

Socrates/ What you say is true, Cebes, but what shall we do? Do you want to discuss whether this is likely to be true or not?

Cebes/ Personally, I should like to hear your opinion on the subject.

Socrates/ I do not think, that anyone who heard me now, not even a comic poet, could say that I am babbling and discussing things that do not concern me, so we must examine the question thoroughly, if you think we should do so. Let us examine it in some such a manner as this: whether the souls of men who have died exist in the underworld or not. We recall an ancient theory that souls arriving there come from here, and then again that they arrive here and are born here from the dead. If that is true, that the living come back from the dead, then surely our souls must exist there, for they could not come back if they did not exist, and this is a

sufficient proof that these things are so if it truly appears that the living never come from any other source than from the dead. If this is not the case we should need another argument.

Cebes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Do not, confine yourself to humanity if you want to understand this more readily, but take all animals and all plants into account, and, in short, for all things which come to be, let us see whether they come to be in this way, that is, from their opposites if they have such, as the beautiful is the opposite of the ugly and the just of the unjust, and a thousand other things of the kind. Let us examine whether those that have an opposite must necessarily come to be from their opposite and from nowhere else, as for example when something comes to be larger it must necessarily become larger from having been smaller before.

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then if something smaller comes to be, it will come from something larger before, which became smaller?

Cebes/ That is so.

Socrates/ And the weaker comes to be from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Further, if something worse comes to be, does it not come from the better, and the juster from the more unjust?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ So we have sufficiently established that all things come to be in this way, opposites from opposites?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ There is a further point, something such as this, about these opposites: between each of those pairs of opposites there are two processes: from the one to the other

and then again from the other to the first; between the larger and the smaller there is increase and decrease, and we call the one increasing and the other decreasing?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so too there is separation and combination, cooling and heating, and all such things, even if sometimes we do not have a name for the process, but in fact it must be everywhere that they come to be from one another, and that there is a process of becoming from each into the other?

Cebes/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Well then, is there an opposite to living, as sleeping is the opposite of being awake?

Cebes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ What is it?

Cebes/ Being dead.

Socrates/ Therefore, if these are opposites, they come to be from one another, and there are two processes of generation between the two?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ I will tell you, one of the two pairs I was just talking about, the pair itself and the two processes, and you will tell me the other. I mean, to sleep and to be awake; to be awake comes from sleeping, and to sleep comes from being awake. Of the two processes one is going to sleep, the other is waking up. Do you accept that, or not?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ You tell me in the same way about life and death. Do you not say that to be dead is the opposite of being alive?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ And they come to be from one another?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ What comes to be from being alive?

Cebes/ Being dead.

Socrates/ And what comes to be from being dead?

Cebes/ One must agree that it is being alive.

Socrates/ Then, Cebes, living creatures and things come to be from the dead?

Cebes/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Then our souls exist in the underworld.

Cebes/ That seems likely.

Socrates/ Then in this case one of the two processes of becoming is clear, for dying is clear enough, is it not?

Cebes/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ What shall we do then? Shall we not supply the opposite process of becoming? Is nature to be lame in this case? Or must we provide a process of becoming opposite to dying?

Cebes/ We surely must.

Socrates/ And what is that?

Cebes/ Coming to life again.

Socrates/ Therefore, if there is such a thing as coming to life again, it would be a process of coming from the dead to the living?

Cebes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ It is agreed between us then that the living come from the dead in this way no less than the dead from the living and, if that is so, it seems to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must be somewhere whence they can come back again.

Cebes/ I think, Socrates, that this follows from what we have agreed on.

Socrates/ Consider in this way, Cebes, that, as I think, we were not wrong to agree. If the two processes of becoming did not always balance each other as if they were going round in a circle, but generation proceeded from one point to its opposite in a straight line and it did not turn back again to the other opposite or take any turning, do you realize that all things would ultimately be in the same state, be affected in the same way, and cease to become?

Cebes/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ It is not hard to understand what I mean. If, for example, there was such a process as going to sleep, but no corresponding process of waking up, you realize that in the end everything would show the story of Endymion to have no meaning. There would be no point to it because everything would have the same experience as he, be asleep. And if everything were combined and nothing separated, the saying of Anaxagoras would soon be true, "that all things were mixed together." In the same way, my dear Cebes, if everything that partakes of life were to die and remain in that state and not come to life again, would not everything ultimately have to be dead and nothing alive? Even if the living came from some other source, and all that lived died, how could all things avoid being absorbed in death?

Cebes/ It could not be, Socrates, and I think what you say is altogether true.

Socrates/ I think, Cebes, that this is very definitely the case and that we were not deceived when we agreed on this: coming to life again in truth exists, the living come to be from the dead, and the souls of the dead exist.

Cebes/ Furthermore, Socrates, such is also the case if that theory is true that you are accustomed to mention frequently, that for us learning is no other than recollection. According to this, we must at some previous time have learned what we

now recollect. This is possible only if our soul existed somewhere before it took on this human shape. So according to this theory too, the soul is likely to be something immortal.

Simmias/ Cebes, what are the proofs of this? Remind me, for I do not quite recall them at the moment.

Cebes/ There is one excellent argument, namely that when men are interrogated in the right manner, they always give the right answer of their own accord, and they could not do this if they did not possess the knowledge and the right explanation inside them. Then if one shows them a diagram or something else of that kind, this will show most clearly that such is the case.

Socrates/ If this does not convince you, Simmias, see whether you agree if we examine it in some such way as this, for do you doubt that what we call learning is recollection?

Simmias/ It is not that I doubt, but I want to experience the very thing we are discussing, recollection, and from what Cebes undertook to say, I am now remembering and am pretty nearly convinced. Nevertheless, I should like to hear now the way you were intending to explain it.

Socrates/ This way. We surely agree that if anyone recollects anything, he must have known it before.

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Do we not also agree that when knowledge comes to mind in this way, it is recollection? What way do I mean? Like this: when a man sees or hears or in some other way perceives one thing and not only knows that thing but also thinks of another thing of which the knowledge is not the same but different, are we not right to say that he recollects the second thing that comes into his mind?

Simmias/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Things such as this: to know a man is surely a different knowledge from knowing a lyre.

Simmias/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, you know what happens to lovers: whenever they see a lyre, a garment or anything else that their beloved is accustomed to use, they know the lyre, and the image of the boy to whom it belongs comes into their mind. This is recollection, just as someone, on seeing Simmias, often recollects Cebes, and there are thousands of other such occurrences.

Simmias/ Thousands indeed.

Socrates/ Is this kind of thing not recollection of a kind? especially so when one experiences it about things that one had forgotten, because one had not seen them for some time? —

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Further, can a man seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre recollect a man, or seeing a picture of Simmias recollect Cebes? —

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Or seeing a picture of Simmias, recollect Simmias himself? —

Simmias/ He certainly can.

Socrates/ In all these cases the recollection can be occasioned by things that are similar, but it can also be occasioned by things that are dissimilar? —

Simmias/ It can.

Socrates/ When the recollection is caused by similar things, must one not of necessity also experience this: to consider whether the similarity to that which one recollects is deficient in any respect or complete? —

Simmias/ One must.

Socrates/ Consider, whether this is the case: we say that there is something that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal

to a stick or a stone to a stone, or anything of that kind, but something else beyond all these, the Equal itself. Shall we say that this exists or not?

Simmias/ Indeed we shall, by Zeus, most definitely.

Socrates/ And do we know what this is? —

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Whence have we acquired the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we mentioned just now, from seeing sticks or stones or some other things that are equal we come to think of that other which is different from them? Or doesn't it seem to you to be different? Look at it also this way: do not equal stones and sticks sometimes, while remaining the same, appear to one to be equal and to another to be unequal? —

Simmias/ Certainly they do.

Socrates/ But what of the equals themselves? Have they ever appeared unequal to you, or Equality to be Inequality?

Simmias/ Never, Socrates.

Socrates/ These equal things and the Equal itself are therefore not the same?

Simmias/ I do not think they are the same at all, Socrates.

Socrates/ But it is definitely from the equal things, though they are different from that Equal, that you have derived and grasped the knowledge of equality?

Simmias/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Whether it be like them or unlike them?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It makes no difference. As long as the sight of one thing makes you think of another, whether it be similar or dissimilar, this must of necessity be recollection?

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Well then, do we experience something like this in the case of equal sticks and the other equal objects we just mentioned? Do they seem to us to be equal in the same sense as what is Equal itself? Is there some deficiency in their being such as the Equal, or is there not?

Simmias/ A considerable deficiency.

Socrates/ Whenever someone, on seeing something, realizes that that which he now sees wants to be like some other reality but falls short and cannot be like that other since it is inferior, do we agree that the one who thinks this must have prior knowledge of that to which he says it is like, but deficiently so?

Simmias/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Well, do we also feel this about the equal objects and the Equal itself, or do we not?

Simmias/ Very definitely.

Socrates/ We must then possess knowledge of the Equal before that time when we first saw the equal objects and realized that all these objects strive to be like the Equal but are deficient in this.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then surely we also agree that this conception of ours derives from seeing or touching or some other sense perception, and cannot come into our mind in any other way, for all these senses, I say, are the same.

Simmias/ They are the same, Socrates, at any rate in respect to that which our argument wishes to make plain.

Socrates/ Our sense perceptions must surely make us realize that all that we perceive through them is striving to reach that which is Equal but falls short of it; or how do we express it?

Simmias/ Like that.

Socrates/ Then before we began to see or hear or otherwise perceive, we must have possessed knowledge of the Equal itself if we were about to refer our sense perceptions of equal objects to it, and realized that all of them were eager to be like it, but were inferior.

Simmias/ That follows from what has been said, Socrates.

Socrates/ But we began to see and hear and otherwise perceive right after birth?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We must then have acquired the knowledge of the Equal before this.

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ It seems then that we must have possessed it before birth.

Simmias/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Therefore, if we had this knowledge, we knew before birth and immediately after not only the Equal, but the Greater and the Smaller and all such things, for our present argument is no more about the Equal than about the Beautiful itself, the Good itself, the Just, the Pious and, as I say, about all those things to which we can attach the word "itself," both when we are putting questions and answering them. So we must have acquired knowledge of them all before we were born.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ If, having acquired this knowledge in each case, we have not forgotten it, we remain knowing and have knowledge throughout our life, for to know is to acquire knowledge, keep it and not lose it. Do we not call the losing of knowledge forgetting?

Simmias/ Most certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ But, I think, if we acquired this knowledge before birth, then lost it at birth, and then later by the use of our senses in connection with those objects we mentioned, we recovered the knowledge we had before, would not what we call learning be the recovery of our own knowledge, and we are right to call this recollection?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It was seen to be possible for someone to see or hear or otherwise perceive something, and by this to be put in mind of something else which he had forgotten and which is related to it by similarity or difference. One of two things follows, as I say: either we were born with the knowledge of it, and all of us know it throughout life, or those who later, we say, are learning, are only recollecting, and learning would be recollection.

Simmias/ That is certainly the case, Socrates.

Socrates/ Which alternative do you choose, Simmias? That we are born with this knowledge or that we recollect later the things of which we had knowledge previously?

Simmias/ I have no means of choosing at the moment, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, can you make this choice? What is your opinion about it? A man who has knowledge would be able to give an account of what he knows, or would he not?

Simmias/ He must certainly be able to do so, Socrates.

Socrates/ And do you think everybody can give an account of the things we were mentioning just now?

Simmias/ I wish they could, but I'm afraid it is much more likely that by this time tomorrow there will be no one left who can do so adequately.

Socrates/ So you do not think that everybody has knowledge of those things?

Simmias/ No indeed.

Socrates/ So they recollect what they once learned?

Simmias/ They must.

Socrates/ When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Certainly not since we were born as men.

Simmias/ Indeed no.

Socrates/ Before that then?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So then, Simmias, our souls also existed apart from the body before they took on human form, and they had intelligence.

Simmias/ Unless we acquire the knowledge at the moment of birth, Socrates, for that time is still left to us.

Socrates/ Quite so, my friend, but at what other time do we lose it? We just now agreed that we are not born with that knowledge. Do we then lose it at the very time we acquire it, or can you mention any other time?

Simmias/ I cannot, Socrates. I did not realize that I was talking nonsense.

Socrates/ So this is our position, Simmias? If those realities we are always talking about exist, the Beautiful and the Good and all that kind of reality, and we refer all the things we perceive to that reality, discovering that it existed before and is ours, and we compare these things with it, then, just as they exist, so our soul must exist before we are born. If these realities do not exist, then this argument is altogether futile. Is this the position, that there is an equal necessity for those realities to exist, and for our souls to exist before we were born? If the former do not exist, neither do the latter?

Simmias/ I do not think, Socrates, that there is any possible doubt that it is equally necessary for both to exist, and it is opportune that our argument comes to the

conclusion that our soul exists before we are born, and equally so that reality of which you are now speaking. Nothing is so evident to me personally as that all such things must certainly exist, the Beautiful, the Good, and all those you mentioned just now. I also think that sufficient proof of this has been given.

Socrates/ Then what about Cebes? for we must persuade Cebes also.

Simmias/ He is sufficiently convinced I think, though he is the most difficult of men to persuade by argument, but I believe him to be fully convinced that our soul existed before we were born. I do not think myself, however, that it has been proved that the soul continues to exist after death; the opinion of the majority which Cebes mentioned still stands, that when a man dies his soul is dispersed and this is the end of its existence. What is to prevent the soul coming to be and being constituted from some other source, existing before it enters a human body and then, having done so and departed from it, itself dying and being destroyed?

Cebes/ You are right, Simmias. Half of what needed proof has been proved, namely, that our soul existed before we were born, but further proof is needed that it exists no less after we have died, if the proof is to be complete.

Socrates/ It has been proved even now, Simmias and Cebes, if you are ready to combine this argument with the one we agreed on before, that every living thing must come from the dead. If the soul exists before, it must, as it comes to life and birth, come from nowhere else than death and being dead, so how could it avoid existing after death since it must be born again? What you speak of has then even now been proved. However, I think you and Simmias would like to discuss the argument more fully. You seem to have this childish fear that the wind would really dissolve and scatter the soul, as it leaves

the body, especially if one happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather.

Phaedo/ Cebes laughed and said:

Cebes/ “Assuming that we were afraid, Socrates, try to change our minds, or rather do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child in us who has these fears; try to persuade him not to fear death like a bogey.”

Socrates/ You should, sing a charm over him every day until you have charmed away his fears.

Cebes/ Where shall we find a good charmer for these fears, Socrates, now that you are leaving us?

Socrates/ Greece is a large country, Cebes, and there are good men in it; the tribes of foreigners are also numerous. You should search for such a charmer among them all, sparing neither trouble nor expense, for there is nothing on which you could spend your money to greater advantage. You must also search among yourselves, for you might not easily find people who could do this better than yourselves.

Cebes/ That shall be done, but let us, if it pleases you, go back to the argument where we left it.

Socrates/ Of course it pleases me.

Cebes/ Splendid.

Socrates/ We must then ask ourselves something like this: what kind of thing is likely to be scattered? On behalf of what kind of thing should one fear this, and for what kind of thing should one not fear it? We should then examine to which class the soul belongs, and as a result either fear for the soul or be of good cheer.

Cebes/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ Is not anything that is composite and a compound by nature liable to be split up into its component

parts, and only that which is non-composite, if anything, is not likely to be split up?

Cebes/ I think that is the case.

Socrates/ Are not the things that always remain the same and in the same state most likely not to be composite, whereas those that vary from one time to another and are never the same are composite?

Cebes/ I think that is so.

Socrates/ Let us then return to those same things with which we were dealing earlier, to that reality of whose existence we are giving an account in our questions and answers; are they ever the same and in the same state, or do they vary from one time to another; can the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real, ever be affected by any change whatever? Or does each of them that really is, being uniform by itself, remain the same and never in any way tolerate any change whatever?

Cebes/ It must remain the same, and in the same state, Socrates.

Socrates/ What of the many beautiful particulars, be they men, horses, clothes, or other such things, or the many equal particulars, and all those which bear the same name as those others? Do they remain the same or, in total contrast to those other realities, one might say, never in any way remain the same as themselves or in relation to each other?

Cebes/ The latter is the case, they are never in the same state.

Socrates/ These latter you could touch and see and perceive with the other senses, but those that always remain the same can only be grasped by the reasoning power of the mind? They are not seen but are invisible?

Cebes/ That is altogether true.

Socrates/ Do you then want us to assume two kinds of existences, the visible and the invisible?

Cebes/ Let us assume this.

Socrates/ And the invisible always remains the same, whereas the visible never does?

Cebes/ Let us assume that too.

Socrates/ Now one part of ourselves is the body, another part is the soul?

Cebes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ To which class of existence do we say the body is more alike and akin?

Cebes/ To the visible, as anyone can see.

Socrates/ What about the soul? Is it visible or invisible?

Cebes/ It is not visible to men, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, we meant visible and invisible to human eyes; or to any others, do you think?

Cebes/ To human eyes.

Socrates/ Then what do we say about the soul? Is it visible or not visible?

Cebes/ Not visible.

Socrates/ So it is invisible? —

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ So the soul is more like the invisible than the body, and the body more like the visible? —

Cebes/ Without any doubt, Socrates.

Socrates/ Haven't we also said some time ago that when the soul makes use of the body to investigate something, be it through hearing or seeing or some other sense—for to investigate something through the body is to do it through the senses—it is dragged by the body to the things that are never the same, and the soul itself strays and is confused and dizzy,

as if it were drunk, in so far as it is in contact with that kind of thing?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But when the soul investigates by itself it passes into the realm of what is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging, and being akin to this, it always stays with it whenever it is by itself and can do so; it ceases to stray and remains in the same state as it is in touch with things of the same kind, and its experience then is what is called wisdom?

Cebes/ Altogether well said and very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Judging from what we have said before and what we are saying now, to which of these two kinds do you think that the soul is more alike and more akin?

Cebes/ I think, Socrates, that on this line of argument any man, even the dullest, would agree that the soul is altogether more like that which always exists in the same state rather than like that which does not.

Socrates/ What of the body?

Cebes/ That is like the other.

Socrates/ Look at it also this way: when the soul and the body are together, nature orders the one to be subject and to be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Then again, which do you think is like the divine and which like the mortal? Do you not think that the nature of the divine is to rule and to lead, whereas it is that of the mortal to be ruled and be subject?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ Which does the soul resemble?

Cebes/ Obviously, Socrates, the soul resembles the divine, and the body resembles the mortal.

Socrates/ Consider then, Cebes, whether it follows from all that has been said that the soul is most like the divine,

deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself, whereas the body is most like that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble and never consistently the same. Have we anything else to say to show, my dear Cebes, that this is not the case?

Cebes/ We have not.

Socrates/ Well then, that being so, is it not natural for the body to dissolve easily, and for the soul to be altogether indissoluble, or nearly so?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ You realize, that when a man dies, the visible part, the body, which exists in the visible world, and which we call the corpse, whose natural lot it would be to dissolve, fall apart and be blown away, does not immediately suffer any of these things but remains for a fair time, in fact, quite a long time if the man dies with his body in a suitable condition and at a favorable season? If the body is emaciated or embalmed, as in Egypt, it remains almost whole for a remarkable length of time, and even if the body decays, some parts of it, namely bones and sinews and the like, are nevertheless, one might say, deathless. Is that not so? —

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Will the soul, the invisible part which makes its way to a region of the same kind, noble and pure and invisible, to Hades in fact, to the good and wise god whither, god willing, my soul must soon be going—will the soul, being of this kind and nature, be scattered and destroyed on leaving the body, as the majority of men say? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias, but what happens is much more like this: if it is pure when it leaves the body and drags nothing bodily with it, as it had no willing association with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself together by itself and always practiced this, which is no other than practicing philosophy

in the right way, in fact, training to die easily. Or is this not training for death?

Cebes/ It surely is.

Socrates/ A soul in this state makes its way to the invisible, which is like itself, the divine and immortal and wise, and arriving there it can be happy, having rid itself of confusion, ignorance, fear, violent desires and the other human ills and, as is said of the initiates, truly spend the rest of time with the gods. Shall we say this, Cebes, or something different?

Cebes/ This, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But I think that if the soul is polluted and impure when it leaves the body, having always been associated with it and served it, bewitched by physical desires and pleasures to the point at which nothing seems to exist for it but the physical, which one can touch and see or eat and drink or make use of for sexual enjoyment, and if that soul is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which is dim and invisible to the eyes but intelligible and to be grasped by philosophy—do you think such a soul will escape pure and by itself?

Cebes/ Impossible.

Socrates/ It is no doubt permeated by the physical, which constant intercourse and association with the body, as well as considerable practice, has caused to become ingrained in it?

Cebes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ We must believe, my friend, that this bodily element is heavy, ponderous, earthy and visible. Through it, such a soul has become heavy and is dragged back to the visible region in fear of the unseen and of Hades. It wanders, as we are told, around graves and monuments, where shadowy phantoms, images that such souls produce, have been seen, souls that have not been freed and purified but share in the visible, and are therefore seen.

Cebes/ That is likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is indeed, Cebes. Moreover, these are not the souls of good but of inferior men, which are forced to wander there, paying the penalty for their previous bad upbringing. They wander until their longing for that which accompanies them, the physical, again imprisons them in a body, and they are then, as is likely, bound to such characters as they have practiced in their life.

Cebes/ What kind of characters do you say these are, Socrates?

Socrates/ Those, for example, who have carelessly practiced gluttony, violence and drunkenness are likely to join a company of donkeys or of similar animals. Do you not think so?

Cebes/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Those who have esteemed injustice highly, and tyranny and plunder will join the tribes of wolves and hawks and kites, or where else shall we say that they go?

Cebes/ Certainly to those.

Socrates/ And clearly, the destination of the others will conform to the way in which they have behaved?

Cebes/ Clearly, of course.

Socrates/ The happiest of these, who will also have the best destination, are those who have practiced popular and social virtue, which they call moderation and justice and which was developed by habit and practice, without philosophy or understanding?

Cebes/ How are they the happiest?

Socrates/ Because it is likely that they will again join a social and gentle group, either of bees or wasps or ants, and then again the same kind of human group, and so be moderate men.

Cebes/ That is likely.

Socrates/ No one may join the company of the gods who has not practiced philosophy and is not completely pure when he departs from life, no one but the lover of learning. It is for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that those who practice philosophy in the right way keep away from all bodily passions, master them and do not surrender themselves to them; it is not at all for fear of wasting their substance and of poverty, which the majority and the money-lovers fear, nor for fear of dishonor and ill repute, like the ambitious and lovers of honors, that they keep away from them.

Cebes/ That would not be natural for them, Socrates.

Socrates/ By Zeus, no. Those who care for their own soul and do not live for the service of their body dismiss all these things. They do not travel the same road as those who do not know where they are going but, believing that nothing should be done contrary to philosophy and their deliverance and purification, they turn to this and follow wherever philosophy leads.

Cebes/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you. The lovers of learning know that when philosophy gets hold of their soul, it is imprisoned in and clinging to the body, and that it is forced to examine other things through it as through a cage and not by itself, and that it wallows in every kind of ignorance. Philosophy sees that the worst feature of this imprisonment is that it is due to desires, so that the prisoner himself is contributing to his own incarceration most of all. As I say, the lovers of learning know that philosophy gets hold of their soul when it is in that state, then gently encourages it and tries to free it by showing them that investigation through the eyes is full of deceit, as is that through the ears and the other senses. Philosophy then persuades the soul to withdraw from the senses in so far as it

is not compelled to use them and bids the soul to gather itself together by itself, to trust only itself and whatever reality, existing by itself, the soul by itself understands, and not to consider as true whatever it examines by other means, for this is different in different circumstances and is sensible and visible, whereas what the soul itself sees is intelligible and invisible. The soul of the true philosopher thinks that this deliverance must not be opposed and so keeps away from pleasures and desires and pains as far as he can; he reflects that violent pleasure or pain or passion does not cause merely such evils as one might expect, such as one suffers when one has been sick or extravagant through desire, but the greatest and most extreme evil, though one does not reflect on this.

Cebes/ What is that, Socrates?

Socrates/ That the soul of every man, when it feels violent pleasure or pain in connection with some object, inevitably believes at the same time that what causes such feelings must be very clear and very true, which it is not. Such objects are mostly visible, are they not?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And doesn't such an experience tie the soul to the body most completely?

Cebes/ How so?

Socrates/ Because every pleasure and every pain provides, as it were, another nail to rivet the soul to the body and to weld them together. It makes the soul corporeal, so that it believes that truth is what the body says it is. As it shares the beliefs and delights of the body, I think it inevitably comes to share its ways and manner of life and is unable ever to reach Hades in a pure state; it is always full of body when it departs, so that it soon falls back into another body and grows with it as if it had been sewn into it. Because of this, it can have no part in the company of the divine, the pure and uniform.

Cebes/ What you say is very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ This is why genuine lovers of learning are moderate and brave, or do you think it is for the reasons the majority says they are?

Cebes/ I certainly do not.

Socrates/ Indeed no. This is how the soul of a philosopher would reason: it would not think that while philosophy must free it, it should while being freed surrender itself to pleasures and pains and imprison itself again, thus laboring in vain like Penelope at her web. The soul of the philosopher achieves a calm from such emotions; it follows reason and ever stays with it contemplating the true, the divine, which is not the object of opinion. Nurtured by this, it believes that one should live in this manner as long as one is alive and, after death, arrive at what is akin and of the same kind, and escape from human evils. After such nurture there is no danger, Simmias and Cebes, that one should fear that, on parting from the body, the soul would be scattered and dissipated by the winds and no longer be anything anywhere.

Phaedo/ When Socrates finished speaking there was a long silence. He appeared to be concentrating on what had been said, and so were most of us. But Cebes and Simmias were whispering to each other. Socrates observed them and questioned them.

Socrates/ Come, do you think there is something lacking in my argument? There are still many doubtful points and many objections for anyone who wants a thorough discussion of these matters. If you are discussing some other subject, I have nothing to say, but if you have some difficulty about this one, do not hesitate to speak for yourselves and expound it if you think the argument could be improved, and if you think you will do better, take me along with you in the discussion.

Simmias/ I will tell you the truth, Socrates, both of us have been in difficulty for some time, and each of us has been urging the other to question you because we wanted to hear what you would say, but we hesitated to bother you, lest it be displeasing to you in your present misfortune.

Phaedo/ When Socrates heard this he laughed quietly and said:

Socrates/ "Really, Simmias, it would be hard for me to persuade other people that I do not consider my present fate a misfortune if I cannot persuade even you, and you are afraid that it is more difficult to deal with me than before. You seem to think me inferior to the swans in prophecy. They sing before too, but when they realize that they must die they sing most and most beautifully, as they rejoice that they are about to depart to join the god whose servants they are. But men, because of their own fear of death, tell lies about the swans and say that they lament their death and sing in sorrow. They do not reflect that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or suffers in any other way, neither the nightingale nor the swallow nor the hoopoe, though they do say that these sing laments when in pain. Nor do the swans, but I believe that as they belong to Apollo, they are prophetic, have knowledge of the future and sing of the blessings of the underworld, sing and rejoice on that day beyond what they did before. As I believe myself to be a fellow servant with the swans and dedicated to the same god, and have received from my master a gift of prophecy not inferior to theirs, I am no more despondent than they on leaving life. Therefore, you must speak and ask whatever you want as long as the authorities allow it."

Simmias/ Well spoken. I will tell you my difficulty, and then Cebes will say why he does not accept what was said. I believe, as perhaps you do, that precise knowledge on that subject is impossible or extremely difficult in our present life, but that it

surely shows a very poor spirit not to examine thoroughly what is said about it, and to desist before one is exhausted by an all-round investigation. One should achieve one of these things: learn the truth about these things or find it for oneself, or, if that is impossible, adopt the best and most irrefutable of men's theories, and, borne upon this, sail through the dangers of life as upon a raft, unless someone should make that journey safer and less risky upon a firmer vessel of some divine doctrine. So even now, since you have said what you did, I will feel no shame at asking questions, and I will not blame myself in the future because I did not say what I think. As I examine what we said, both by myself and with Cebes, it does not seem to be adequate.

Socrates/ "You may well be right, my friend, but tell me how it is inadequate."

Simmias/ In this way, as it seems to me: "One might make the same argument about harmony, lyre and strings, that a harmony is something invisible, without body, beautiful and divine in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal. Then if someone breaks the lyre, cuts or breaks the strings and then insists, using the same argument as you, that the harmony must still exist and is not destroyed because it would be impossible for the lyre and the strings, which are mortal, still to exist when the strings are broken, and for the harmony, which is akin and of the same nature as the divine and immortal, to be destroyed before that which is mortal; he would say that the harmony itself still must exist and that the wood and the strings must rot before the harmony can suffer. And indeed Socrates, I think you must have this in mind, that we really do suppose the soul to be something of this kind; as the body is stretched and held together by the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist and other such things, and our soul is a mixture and harmony of

those things when they are mixed with each other rightly and in due measure. If then the soul is a kind of harmony or attunement, clearly, when our body is relaxed or stretched without due measure by diseases and other evils, the soul must immediately be destroyed, even if it be most divine, as are the other harmonies found in music and all the works of artists, and the remains of each body last for a long time until they rot or are burned. Consider what we shall say in answer to one who deems the soul to be a mixture of bodily elements and to be the first to perish in the process we call death."

Phaedo/ Socrates looked at us keenly, as was his habit, smiled and said:

Socrates/ "What Simmias says is quite fair. If one of you is more resourceful than I am, why did he not answer him, for he seems to have handled the argument competently. However, I think that before we answer him, we should hear Cebes' objection, in order that we may have time to deliberate on an answer. When we have heard him we should either agree with them, if we think them in tune with us or, if not, defend our own argument. Come then, Cebes. What is troubling you?"

Cebes/ I tell you, the argument seems to me to be at the same point as before and open to the same objection. I do not deny that it has been very elegantly and, if it is not offensive to say so, sufficiently proved that our soul existed before it took on this present form, but I do not believe the same applies to its existing somewhere after our death. Not that I agree with Simmias' objection that the soul is not stronger and much more lasting than the body, for I think it is superior in all these respects. "Why then," the argument might say, "are you still unconvinced? Since you see that when the man dies, the weaker part continues to exist, do you not think that the more lasting part must be preserved during that time?" On this point consider whether what I say makes sense.

Like Simmias, I too need an image, for I think this argument is much as if one said at the death of an old weaver that the man had not perished but was safe and sound somewhere, and offered as proof the fact that the cloak the old man had woven himself and was wearing was still sound and had not perished. If one was not convinced, he would be asked whether a man lasts longer than a cloak which is in use and being worn, and if the answer was that a man lasts much longer, this would be taken as proof that the man was definitely safe and sound, since the more temporary thing had not perished. But Simmias, I do not think that is so, for consider what I say. Anybody could see that the man who said this was talking nonsense. That weaver had woven and worn out many such cloaks. He perished after many of them, but before the last. That does not mean that a man is inferior and weaker than a cloak. The image illustrates, I think, the relationship of the soul to the body, and anyone who says the same thing about them would appear to me to be talking sense, that the soul lasts a long time while the body is weaker and more short-lived. He might say that each soul wears out many bodies, especially if it lives many years. If the body were in a state of flux and perished while the man was still alive, and the soul wove afresh the body that is worn out, yet it would be inevitable that whenever the soul perished it would be wearing the last body it wove and perish only before this last. Then when the soul perished, the body would show the weakness of its nature by soon decaying and disappearing. So we cannot trust this argument and be confident that our soul continues to exist somewhere after our death. For, if one were to concede, even more than you do, to a man using that argument, if one were to grant him not only that the soul exists in the time before we are born, but that there is no reason why the soul of some should not exist and continue to exist after our death, and thus frequently be born and die in

turn; if one were to grant him that the soul's nature is so strong that it can survive many bodies, but if, having granted all this, one does not further agree that the soul is not damaged by its many births and is not, in the end, altogether destroyed in one of those deaths, he might say that no one knows which death and dissolution of the body brings about the destruction of the soul, since not one of us can be aware of this. And in that case, any man who faces death with confidence is foolish, unless he can prove that the soul is altogether immortal. If he cannot, a man about to die must of necessity always fear for his soul, lest the present separation of the soul from the body bring about the complete destruction of the soul.

Phaedo/ When we heard what they said we were all depressed, as we told each other afterwards. We had been quite convinced by the previous argument, and they seemed to confuse us again, and to drive us to doubt not only what had already been said but also what was going to be said, lest we be worthless as critics or the subject itself admitted of no certainty.

Echecrates/ By the gods, Phaedo, you have my sympathy, for as I listen to you now I find myself saying to myself: "What argument shall we trust? That of Socrates, which was extremely convincing, has now fallen into discredit; the statement that the soul is some kind of harmony has a remarkable hold on me, now and always, and when it was mentioned it reminded me that I had myself previously thought so. And now I am again quite in need, as if from the beginning, of some other argument to convince me that the soul does not die along with the man. Tell me then, by Zeus, how Socrates tackled the argument. Was he obviously distressed, as you say you people were, or was he not, but quietly came to the rescue of his argument, and did he do so

satisfactorily or inadequately? Tell us everything as precisely as you can.

Phaedo/ I have certainly often admired Socrates, Echecrates, but never more than on this occasion. That he had a reply was perhaps not strange. What I wondered at most in him was the pleasant, kind and admiring way he received the young men's argument, and how sharply he was aware of the effect the discussion had on us, and then how well he healed our distress and, as it were, recalled us from our flight and defeat and turned us around to join him in the examination of their argument.

Echecrates/ How did he do this?

Phaedo/ I will tell you. I happened to be sitting on his right by the couch on a low stool, so that he was sitting well above me. He stroked my head and pressed the hair on the back of my neck, for he was in the habit of playing with my hair at times.

Socrates/ "Tomorrow, Phaedo, you will probably cut this beautiful hair."

Phaedo/ Likely enough, Socrates.

Socrates/ Not if you take my advice.

Phaedo/ Why not?

Socrates/ t is today, that I shall cut my hair and you yours, if our argument dies on us, and we cannot revive it. If I were you, and the argument escaped me, I would take an oath, as the Argives did, not to let my hair grow before I fought again and defeated the argument of Simmias and Cebes.

Phaedo/ But, they say that not even Heracles could fight two people.

Socrates/ hen call on me as your Iolaus, as long as the daylight lasts.

Socrates/ I shall call on you, but in this case as Iolaus calling on Heracles.

Socrates/ It makes no difference, but first there is a certain experience we must be careful to avoid.

Phaedo/ What is that?

Socrates/ That we should not become misologues, as people become misanthropes. There is no greater evil one can suffer than to hate reasonable discourse. Misology and misanthropy arise in the same way. Misanthropy comes when a man without knowledge or skill has placed great trust in someone and believes him to be altogether truthful, sound and trustworthy; then, a short time afterwards he finds him to be wicked and unreliable, and then this happens in another case; when one has frequently had that experience, especially with those whom one believed to be one's closest friends, then, in the end, after many such blows, one comes to hate all men and to believe that no one is sound in any way at all. Have you not seen this happen?

Phaedo/ I surely have.

Socrates/ This is a shameful state of affairs, and obviously due to an attempt to have human relations without any skill in human affairs, for such skill would lead one to believe, what is in fact true, that the very good and the very wicked are both quite rare, and that most men are between those extremes.

Phaedo/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ The same as with the very tall and the very short. Do you think anything is rarer than to find an extremely tall man or an extremely short one? Or a dog or anything else whatever? Or again, one extremely swift or extremely slow, ugly or beautiful, white or black? Are you not aware that in all those cases the most extreme at either end are rare and few, but those in between are many and plentiful?

Phaedo/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Therefore, if a contest of wickedness were established, there too the winners, you think, would be very few?

Phaedo/ That is likely.

Socrates/ Likely indeed, but arguments are not like men in this particular. I was merely following your lead just now. The similarity lies rather in this: it is as when one who lacks skill in arguments puts his trust in an argument as being true, then shortly afterwards believes it to be false—as sometimes it is and sometimes it is not—and so with another argument and then another. You know how those in particular who spend their time studying contradiction in the end believe themselves to have become very wise and that they alone have understood that there is no soundness or reliability in any object or in any argument, but that all that exists simply fluctuates up and down as if it were in the Euripus and does not remain in the same place for any time at all.

Phaedo/ What you say, is certainly true.

Socrates/ It would be pitiable, Phaedo, when there is a true and reliable argument and one that can be understood, if a man who has dealt with such arguments as appear at one time true, at another time untrue, should not blame himself or his own lack of skill but, because of his distress, in the end gladly shift the blame away from himself to the arguments, and spend the rest of his life hating and reviling reasonable discussion and so be deprived of truth and knowledge of reality.

Phaedo/ Yes, by Zeus, that would be pitiable indeed.

Socrates/ This then is the first thing we should guard against. We should not allow into our minds the conviction that argumentation has nothing sound about it; much rather we should believe that it is we who are not yet sound and that we must take courage and be eager to attain soundness, you

and the others for the sake of your whole life still to come, and I for the sake of death itself. I am in danger at this moment of not having a philosophical attitude about this, but like those who are quite uneducated, I am eager to get the better of you in argument, for the uneducated, when they engage in argument about anything, give no thought to the truth about the subject of discussion but are only eager that those present will accept the position they have set forth. I differ from them only to this extent: I shall not be eager to get the agreement of those present that what I say is true, except incidentally, but I shall be very eager that I should myself be thoroughly convinced that things are so. For I am thinking—see in how contentious a spirit—that if what I say is true, it is a fine thing to be convinced; if, on the other hand, nothing exists after death, at least for this time before I die I shall distress those present less with lamentations and my folly will not continue to exist along with me—that would be a bad thing—but will come to an end in a short time. Thus prepared, Simmias and Cebes, I come to deal with your argument. If you will take my advice, you will give but little thought to Socrates but much more to the truth. If you think that what I say is true, agree with me; if not, oppose it with every argument and take care that in my eagerness I do not deceive myself and you and, like a bee, leave my sting in you when I go.

We must proceed, and first remind me of what you said if I do not appear to remember it. Simmias, as I believe, is in doubt and fear that the soul, though it is more divine and beautiful than the body, yet predeceases it, being a kind of harmony. Cebes, I thought, agrees with me that the soul lasts much longer than the body, but that no one knows whether the soul often wears out many bodies and then, on leaving its last body, is now itself destroyed. This then is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body is always being

destroyed. Are these the questions, Simmias and Cebes, which we must investigate?

Phaedo/ They both agreed that they were.

Socrates/ Do you then, reject all our previous statements, or some but not others?

Phaedo/ Some, they both said, but not others.

Socrates/ What, about the statements we made that learning is recollection and that, if this was so, our soul must of necessity exist elsewhere before us, before it was imprisoned in the body?

Cebes/ For myself, I was wonderfully convinced by it at the time and I stand by it now also, more than by any other statement.

Simmias/ That, is also my position, and I should be very surprised if I ever changed my opinion about this.

Socrates/ But you must change your opinion, my Theban friend, if you still believe that a harmony is a composite thing, and that the soul is a kind of harmony of the elements of the body in a state of tension, for surely you will not allow yourself to maintain that a composite harmony existed before those elements from which it had to be composed, or would you?

Simmias/ Never, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you realize, that this is what you are in fact saying when you state that the soul exists before it takes on the form and body of a man and that it is composed of elements which do not yet exist? A harmony is not like that to which you compare it; the lyre and the strings and the notes, though still unharmonized, exist; the harmony is composed last of all, and is the first to be destroyed. How will you harmonize this statement with your former one?

Simmias/ In no way.

Socrates/ And surely, a statement about harmony should do so more than any other.

Simmias/ It should.

Socrates/ So your statement is inconsistent? Consider which of your statements you prefer, that learning is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?

Simmias/ I much prefer the former, Socrates. I adopted the latter without proof, because of a certain probability and plausibility, which is why it appeals to most men. I know that arguments of which the proof is based on probability are pretentious and, if one does not guard against them, they certainly deceive one, in geometry and everything else. The theory of recollection and learning, however, was based on an assumption worthy of acceptance, for our soul was said to exist also before it came into the body, just as the reality does that is of the kind that we qualify by the words "which truly is," and I convinced myself that I was quite correct to accept it. Therefore, I cannot accept the theory that the soul is a harmony either from myself or anyone else.

Socrates/ What of this, Simmias? Do you think it natural for a harmony, or any other composite, to be in a different state from that of the elements of which it is composed?

Simmias/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Nor, as I think, can it act or be acted upon in a different way than its elements?

Phaedo/ He agreed.

Socrates/ One must therefore suppose that a harmony does not direct its components, but is directed by them.

Phaedo/ He accepted this.

Socrates/ A harmony is therefore far from making a movement, or uttering a sound, or doing anything else, in a manner contrary to that of its parts.

Simmias/ Far from it indeed.

Socrates/ Does not the nature of each harmony depend on the way it has been harmonized?

Simmias/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Will it not, if it is more and more fully harmonized, be more and more fully a harmony, and if it is less and less fully harmonized, it will be less and less fully a harmony?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Can this be true about the soul, that one soul is more and more fully a soul than another, or is less and less fully a soul, even to the smallest extent?

Simmias/ Not in any way.

Socrates/ Come now, by Zeus. One soul is said to have intelligence and virtue and to be good, another to have folly and wickedness and to be bad. Are those things truly said?

Simmias/ They certainly are.

Socrates/ What will someone who holds the theory that the soul is a harmony say that those things are which reside in the soul, that is, virtue and wickedness? Are these some other harmony and disharmony? That the good soul is harmonized and, being a harmony, has within itself another harmony, whereas the evil soul is both itself a lack of harmony and has no other within itself?

Simmias/ I don't know what to say, but one who holds that assumption must obviously say something of that kind.

Socrates/ We have previously agreed, that one soul is not more and not less a soul than another, and this means that one harmony is not more and more fully, or less and less fully, a harmony than another. Is that not so?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now that which is no more and no less a harmony is not more or less harmonized. Is that so?

Simmias/ It is.

Socrates/ Can that which is neither more nor less harmonized partake more or less of harmony, or does it do so equally?

Simmias/ Equally.

Socrates/ Then if a soul is neither more nor less a soul than another, it has been harmonized to the same extent?

Simmias/ This is so.

Socrates/ If that is so, it would have no greater share of disharmony or of harmony?

Simmias/ It would not.

Socrates/ That being the case, could one soul have more wickedness or virtue than another, if wickedness is disharmony and virtue harmony?

Simmias/ It could not.

Socrates/ But rather, Simmias, according to correct reasoning, no soul, if it is a harmony, will have any share of wickedness, for harmony is surely altogether this very thing, harmony, and would never share in disharmony.

Simmias/ It certainly would not.

Socrates/ Nor would a soul, being altogether this very thing, a soul, share in wickedness?

Simmias/ How could it, in view of what has been said?

Socrates/ So it follows from this argument that all the souls of all living creatures will be equally good, if souls are by nature equally this very thing, souls.

Simmias/ I think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Does our argument seem right, and does it seem that it should have come to this, if the hypothesis that the soul is a harmony was correct?

Simmias/ Not in any way.

Socrates/ Further, of all the parts of a man, can you mention any other part that rules him than his soul, especially if it is a wise soul?

Simmias/ I cannot.

Socrates/ Does it do so by following the affections of the body or by opposing them? I mean, for example, that when the body is hot and thirsty the soul draws him to the opposite, to not drinking; when the body is hungry, to not eating, and we see a thousand other examples of the soul opposing the affections of the body. Is that not so?

Simmias/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ On the other hand we previously agreed that if the soul were a harmony, it would never be out of tune with the stress and relaxation and the striking of the strings or anything else done to its composing elements, but that it would follow and never direct them?

Simmias/ We did so agree, of course.

Socrates/ Well, does it now appear to do quite the opposite, ruling over all the elements of which one says it is composed, opposing nearly all of them throughout life, directing all their ways, inflicting harsh and painful punishment on them, at times in physical culture and medicine, at other times more gently by threats and exhortations, holding converse with desires and passions and fears as if it were one thing talking to a different one, as Homer wrote somewhere in the Odyssey where he says that Odysseus "struck his breast and rebuked his heart saying, 'Endure, my heart, you have endured worse than this.'"

Do you think that when he composed this the poet thought that his soul was a harmony, a thing to be directed by the affections of the body? Did he not rather regard it as ruling over them and mastering them, itself a much more divine thing than a harmony?

Simmias/ Yes, by Zeus, I think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Therefore, my good friend, it is quite wrong for us to say that the soul is a harmony, and in saying so we would disagree both with the divine poet Homer and with ourselves.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Very well. Harmonia of Thebes seems somehow reasonably propitious to us. How and by what argument, my dear Cebes, can we propitiate Cadmus?

Cebes/ I think, that you will find a way. You dealt with the argument about harmony in a manner that was quite astonishing to me. When Simmias was speaking of his difficulties I was very much wondering whether anyone would be able to deal with his argument, and I was quite dumbfounded when right away he could not resist your argument's first onslaught. I should not wonder therefore if that of Cadmus suffered the same fate.

Socrates/ My good sir, do not boast, lest some malign influence upset the argument we are about to make. However, we leave that to the care of the god, but let us come to grips with it in the Homeric fashion, to see if there is anything in what you say. The sum of your problem is this: you consider that the soul must be proved to be immortal and indestructible before a philosopher on the point of death, who is confident that he will fare much better in the underworld than if he had led any other kind of life, can avoid being foolish and simple-minded in this confidence. To prove that the soul is strong, that it is divine, that it existed before we were born

as men, all this, you say, does not show the soul to be immortal but only long-lasting. That it existed for a very long time before, that it knew much and acted much, makes it no more immortal because of that; indeed, its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease; it would live that life in distress and would in the end be destroyed in what we call death. You say it makes no difference whether it enters a body once or many times as far as the fear of each of us is concerned, for it is natural for a man who is no fool to be afraid, if he does not know and cannot prove that the soul is immortal. This, I think, is what you maintain, Cebes; I deliberately repeat it often, in order that no point may escape us, and that you may add or subtract something if you wish.

Cebes/ "There is nothing that I want to add or subtract at the moment. That is what I say."

Phaedo/ Socrates paused for a long time, deep in thought. He then said:

Socrates/ "This is no unimportant problem that you raise, Cebes, for it requires a thorough investigation of the cause of generation and destruction. I will, if you wish, give you an account of my experience in these matters. Then if something I say seems useful to you, make use of it to persuade us of your position."

Cebes/ I surely do wish that.

Socrates/ Listen then, and I will, Cebes. When I was a young man I was wonderfully keen on that wisdom which they call natural science, for I thought it splendid to know the causes of everything, why it comes to be, why it perishes and why it exists. I was often changing my mind in the investigation, in the first instance, of questions such as these: Are living creatures nurtured when heat and cold produce a kind of putrefaction, as some say? Do we think with our blood,

or air, or fire, or none of these, and does the brain provide our senses of hearing and sight and smell, from which come memory and opinion, and from memory and opinion which has become stable, comes knowledge? Then again, as I investigated how these things perish and what happens to things in the sky and on the earth, finally I became convinced that I have no natural aptitude at all for that kind of investigation, and of this I will give you sufficient proof. This investigation made me quite blind even to those things which I and others thought that I clearly knew before, so that I unlearned what I thought I knew before, about many other things and specifically about how men grew. I thought before that it was obvious to anybody that men grew through eating and drinking, for food adds flesh to flesh and bones to bones, and in the same way appropriate parts were added to all other parts of the body, so that the man grew from an earlier small bulk to a large bulk later, and so a small man became big. That is what I thought then. Do you not think it was reasonable?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ Then further consider this: I thought my opinion was satisfactory, that when a large man stood by a small one he was taller by a head, and so a horse was taller than a horse. Even clearer than this, I thought that ten was more than eight because two had been added, and that a two-cubit length is larger than a cubit because it surpasses it by half its length.

Cebes/ And what do you think now about those things?

Socrates/ That I am far, by Zeus, from believing that I know the cause of any of those things. I will not even allow myself to say that where one is added to one either the one to which it is added or the one that is added becomes two, or that the one added and the one to which it is added become two because of the addition of the one to the other. I wonder that,

when each of them is separate from the other, each of them is one, nor are they then two, but that, when they come near to one another, this is the cause of their becoming two, the coming together and being placed closer to one another. Nor can I any longer be persuaded that when one thing is divided, this division is the cause of its becoming two, for just now the cause of becoming two was the opposite. At that time it was their coming close together and one was added to the other, but now it is because one is taken and separated from the other.

I do not any longer persuade myself that I know why a unit or anything else comes to be, or perishes or exists by the old method of investigation, and I do not accept it, but I have a confused method of my own. One day I heard someone reading, as from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything. I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best. If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best. The same man must inevitably also know what is worse, for that is part of the same knowledge. As I reflected on this subject I was glad to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher about the cause of things after my own heart, and that he would tell me, first, whether the earth is flat or round, and then would explain why it is so of necessity, saying which is better, and that it was better to be so. If he said it was in the middle of the universe, he would go on to show that it was better for it to be in the middle, and if he showed me those things I should be prepared never to desire

any other kind of cause. I was ready to find out in the same way about the sun and the moon and the other heavenly bodies, about their relative speed, their turnings and whatever else happened to them, how it is best that each should act or be acted upon. I never thought that Anaxagoras, who said that those things were directed by Mind, would bring in any other cause for them than that it was best for them to be as they are. Once he had given the best for each as the cause for each and the general cause of all, I thought he would go on to explain the common good for all, and I would not have exchanged my hopes for a fortune. I eagerly acquired his books and read them as quickly as I could in order to know the best and the worst as soon as possible.

This wonderful hope was dashed as I went on reading and saw that the man made no use of Mind, nor gave it any responsibility for the management of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other strange things. That seemed to me much like saying that Socrates' actions are all due to his mind, and then in trying to tell the causes of everything I do, to say that the reason that I am sitting here is because my body consists of bones and sinews, because the bones are hard and are separated by joints, that the sinews are such as to contract and relax, that they surround the bones along with flesh and skin which hold them together, then as the bones are hanging in their sockets, the relaxation and contraction of the sinews enable me to bend my limbs, and that is the cause of my sitting here with my limbs bent.

Again, he would mention other such causes for my talking to you: sounds and air and hearing, and a thousand other such things, but he would neglect to mention the true causes, that, after the Athenians decided it was better to condemn me, for this reason it seemed best to me to sit here and more right to remain and to endure whatever penalty they ordered. For

by the dog, I think these sinews and bones could long ago have been in Megara or among the Boeotians, taken there by my belief as to the best course, if I had not thought it more right and honorable to endure whatever penalty the city ordered rather than escape and run away. To call those things causes is too absurd. If someone said that without bones and sinews and all such things, I should not be able to do what I decided, he would be right, but surely to say that they are the cause of what I do, and not that I have chosen the best course, even though I act with my mind, is to speak very lazily and carelessly. Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause from that without which the cause would not be able to act as a cause. It is what the majority appear to do, like people groping in the dark; they call it a cause, thus giving it a name that does not belong to it. That is why one man surrounds the earth with a vortex to make the heavens keep it in place, another makes the air support it like a wide lid. As for their capacity of being in the best place they could possibly be put, this they do not look for, nor do they believe it to have any divine force, but they believe that they will some time discover a stronger and more immortal Atlas to hold everything together more, and they do not believe that the truly good and "binding" binds and holds them together. I would gladly become the disciple of any man who taught the workings of that kind of cause. However, since I was deprived and could neither discover it myself nor learn it from another, do you wish me to give you an explanation of how, as a second best, I busied myself with the search for the cause, Cebes?

Cebes/ I would wish it above all else.

Socrates/ After this, when I had wearied of investigating things, I thought that I must be careful to avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless they watch its reflection in water or some such material. A similar thought crossed my mind, and

I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of things by means of words. However, perhaps this analogy is inadequate, for I certainly do not admit that one who investigates things by means of words is dealing with images any more than one who looks at facts. However, I started in this manner: taking as my hypothesis in each case the theory that seemed to me the most compelling, I would consider as true, about cause and everything else, whatever agreed with this, and as untrue whatever did not so agree. But I want to put my meaning more clearly for I do not think that you understand me now.

Cebes/ No, by Zeus, not very well.

Socrates/ This, is what I mean. It is nothing new, but what I have never stopped talking about, both elsewhere and in the earlier part of our conversation. I am going to try to show you the kind of cause with which I have concerned myself. I turn back to those oft-mentioned things and proceed from them. I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest. If you grant me these and agree that they exist, I hope to show you the cause as a result, and to find the soul to be immortal.

Cebes/ Take it that I grant you this, and hasten to your conclusion.

Socrates/ Consider then, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. Do you agree to this sort of cause? —

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is

beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else. And if I stick to this I think I shall never fall into error. This is the safe answer for me or anyone else to give, namely, that it is through Beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful. Or do you not think so too? —

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ And that it is through Bigness that big things are big and the bigger are bigger, and that smaller things are made small by Smallness? —

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you would not accept the statement that one man is taller than another by a head and the shorter man shorter by the same, but you would bear witness that you mean nothing else than that everything that is bigger is made bigger by nothing else than by Bigness, and that is the cause of its being bigger, and the smaller is made smaller only by Smallness and this is why it is smaller. I think you would be afraid that some opposite argument would confront you if you said that someone is bigger or smaller by a head, first, because the bigger is bigger and the smaller, smaller by the same, then because the bigger is bigger by a head which is small, and this would be strange, namely, that someone is made bigger by something small. Would you not be afraid of this?

Cebes/ I certainly would.

Phaedo/ said Cebes, laughing.

Socrates/ Then you would be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two, and that this is the cause of the excess, and not magnitude and because of magnitude, or that two cubits is bigger than one cubit by half and not by Bigness, for this is the same fear. —

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then would you not avoid saying that when one is added to one it is the addition and when it is divided it is the division that is the cause of two? And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness, and you would dismiss these additions and divisions and other such subtleties, and leave them to those wiser than yourself to answer. But you, afraid, as they say, of your own shadow and your inexperience, would cling to the safety of your own hypothesis and give that answer. If someone then attacked your hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and would not answer until you had examined whether the consequences that follow from it agree with one another or contradict one another. And when you must give an account of your hypothesis itself you will proceed in the same way: you will assume another hypothesis, the one which seems to you best of the higher ones until you come to something acceptable, but you will not jumble the two as the debaters do by discussing the hypothesis and its consequences at the same time, if you wish to discover any truth. This they do not discuss at all nor give any thought to, but their wisdom enables them to mix everything up and yet to be pleased with themselves, but if you are a philosopher I think you will do as I say.

Phaedo/ What you say is very true, said Simmias and Cebes together.

Echecrates/ Yes, by Zeus, Phaedo, and they were right, I think he made these things wonderfully clear to anyone of even small intelligence.

Phaedo/ Yes indeed, Echecrates, and all those present thought so too.

Echecrates/ And so do we who were not present but hear of it now. What was said after that?

Phaedo/ As I recall it, when the above had been accepted, and it was agreed that each of the Forms existed, and that other things acquired their name by having a share in them, he followed this up by asking:

Socrates/ If you say these things are so, when you then say that Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, do you not mean that there is in Simmias both tallness and shortness? —

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ But, do you agree that the words of the statement 'Simmias is taller than Socrates' do not express the truth of the matter? It is not, surely, the nature of Simmias to be taller than Socrates because he is Simmias but because of the tallness he happens to have? Nor is he taller than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness compared with the tallness of the other? —

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ Nor is he shorter than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has tallness compared with the shortness of Simmias? —

Cebes/ That is so.

Socrates/ So then Simmias is called both short and tall, being between the two, presenting his shortness to be

overcome by the tallness of one, and his tallness to overcome the shortness of the other.

Phaedo/ He smilingly added;

Socrates/ I seem to be going to talk like a book, but it is as I say.

Phaedo/ The other agreed.

Socrates/ My purpose is that you may agree with me. Now it seems to me that not only Tallness itself is never willing to be tall and short at the same time, but also that the tallness in us will never admit the short or be overcome, but one of two things happens: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite, the short, approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach. It is not willing to endure and admit shortness and be other than it was, whereas I admit and endure shortness and still remain the same person and am this short man. But Tallness, being tall, cannot venture to be small. In the same way, the short in us is unwilling to become or to be tall ever, nor does any other of the opposites become or be its opposite while still being what it was; either it goes away or is destroyed when that happens. —

Cebes/ I altogether agree.

Phaedo/ When he heard this, someone of those present—I have no clear memory of who it was—said:

Someone/ “By the gods, did we not agree earlier in our discussion to the very opposite of what is now being said, namely, that the larger came from the smaller and the smaller from the larger, and that this simply was how opposites came to be, from their opposites, but now I think we are saying that this would never happen?”

Phaedo/ On hearing this, Socrates inclined his head towards the speaker and said:

Socrates/ “You have bravely reminded us, but you do not understand the difference between what is said now and what

was said then, which was that an opposite thing came from an opposite thing; now we say that the opposite itself could never become opposite to itself, neither that in us nor that in nature. Then, my friend, we were talking of things that have opposite qualities and naming these after them, but now we say that these opposites themselves, from the presence of which in them things get their name, never can tolerate the coming to be from one another."

Phaedo/ At the same time he looked to Cebes and said:

Socrates/ "Does anything of what this man says also disturb you?"

Cebes/ Not at the moment, but I do not deny that many things do disturb me.

Socrates/ We are altogether agreed then, that an opposite will never be opposite to itself. —

Cebes/ Entirely agreed.

Socrates/ Consider then whether you will agree to this further point. There is something you call hot and something you call cold. —

Cebes/ There is.

Socrates/ Are they the same as what you call snow and fire? —

Cebes/ By Zeus, no.

Socrates/ So the hot is something other than fire, and the cold is something other than snow? —

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ You think, I believe, that being snow it will not admit the hot, as we said before, and remain what it was and be both snow and hot, but when the hot approaches it will either retreat before it or be destroyed. —

Cebes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ So fire, as the cold approaches, will either go away or be destroyed; it will never venture to admit coldness and remain what it was, fire and cold. —

Cebes/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ It is true then about some of these things that not only the Form itself deserves its own name for all time, but there is something else that is not the Form but has its character whenever it exists. Perhaps I can make my meaning clearer: the Odd must always be given this name we now mention. Is that not so? —

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it the only one of existing things to be called odd? —this is my question—or is there something else than the Odd which one must nevertheless also always call odd, as well as by its own name, because it is such by nature as never to be separated from the Odd? I mean, for example, the number three and many others. Consider three: do you not think that it must always be called both by its own name and by that of the Odd, which is not the same as three? That is the nature of three, and of five, and of half of all the numbers; each of them is odd, but it is not the Odd. Then again, two and four and the whole other column of numbers; each of them, while not being the same as the Even, is always even. Do you not agree? —

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Look now. What I want to make clear is this: not only do those opposites not admit each other, but this is also true of those things which, while not being opposite to each other yet always contain the opposites, and it seems that these do not admit that Form which is opposite to that which is in them; when it approaches them, they either perish or give way. Shall we not say that three will perish or undergo anything before, while remaining three, becoming even? —

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Yet surely two is not the opposite of three? —

Cebes/ Indeed it is not.

Socrates/ It is then not only opposite Forms that do not admit each other's approach, but also some other things that do not admit the onset of opposites. —

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ Do you then want us, if we can, to define what these are? —

Cebes/ I surely do.

Socrates/ Would they be the things that are compelled by whatever occupies them not only to contain that thing's Form but also always that of some opposite? —

Cebes/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ As we were saying just now, you surely know that what the Form of three occupies must not only be three but also odd. —

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And we say that the opposite Form to the Form that achieves this result could never come to it. —

Cebes/ It could not.

Socrates/ Now it is Oddness that has done this? —

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And opposite to this is the Form of the Even? —

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ So then the Form of the Even will never come to three? —

Cebes/ Never.

Socrates/ Then three has no share in the Even? —

Cebes/ Never.

Socrates/ So three is uneven? —

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ As for what I said we must define, that is, what kind of things, while not being opposites to something, yet do not admit the opposite, as for example the triad, though it is not the opposite of the Even, yet does not admit it because it always brings along the opposite of the Even, and so the dyad in relation to the Odd, fire to the Cold, and very many other things, see whether you would define it thus: Not only does the opposite not admit its opposite, but that which brings along some opposite into that which it occupies, that which brings this along will not admit the opposite to that which it brings along. Refresh your memory, it is no worse for being heard often. Five does not admit the form of the Even, nor will ten, its double, admit the form of the Odd. The double itself is an opposite of something else, yet it will not admit the form of the Odd. Nor do one-and-a-half and other such fractions admit the form of the Whole, nor will one-third, and so on, if you follow me and agree to this.

Cebes/ I certainly agree, and I follow you.

Socrates/ Tell me again from the beginning, and do not answer in the words of the question, but do as I do. I say that beyond that safe answer, which I spoke of first, I see another safe answer. If you should ask me what, coming into a body, makes it hot, my reply would not be that safe and ignorant one, that it is heat, but our present argument provides a more sophisticated answer, namely, fire, and if you ask me what, on coming into a body, makes it sick, I will not say sickness but fever. Nor, if asked the presence of what in a number makes it odd, I will not say oddness but oneness, and so with other things. See if you now sufficiently understand what I want. —

Cebes/ Quite sufficiently.

Socrates/ Answer me then, what is it that, present in a body, makes it living? —

Cebes/ A soul.

Socrates/ And is that always so? —

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Whatever the soul occupies, it always brings life to it? —

Cebes/ It does.

Socrates/ Is there, or is there not, an opposite to life? —

Cebes/ There is.

Socrates/ What is it? —

Cebes/ Death.

Socrates/ So the soul will never admit the opposite of that which it brings along, as we agree from what has been said?

Cebes/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Well, and what do we call that which does not admit the form of the even? —

Cebes/ The uneven.

Socrates/ What do we call that which will not admit the just and that which will not admit the musical?

Cebes/ The unmusical, and the other the unjust.

Socrates/ Very well, what do we call that which does not admit death?

Cebes/ The deathless.

Socrates/ Now the soul does not admit death? —

Cebes/ No.

Socrates/ So the soul is deathless? —

Cebes/ It is.

Socrates/ Very well. Shall we say that this has been proved, do you think?

Cebes/ Quite adequately proved, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well now, Cebes, if the uneven were of necessity indestructible, surely three would be indestructible? —

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if the non-hot were of necessity indestructible, then whenever anyone brought heat to snow, the snow would retreat safe and unthawed, for it could not be destroyed, nor again could it stand its ground and admit the heat? —

Cebes/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ In the same way, if the non-cold were indestructible, then when some cold attacked the fire, it would neither be quenched nor destroyed, but retreat safely. —

Cebes/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Must then the same not be said of the deathless? If the deathless is also indestructible, it is impossible for the soul to be destroyed when death comes upon it. For it follows from what has been said that it will not admit death or be dead, just as three, we said, will not be even nor will the odd; nor will fire be cold, nor the heat that is in the fire. But, someone might say, what prevents the odd, while not becoming even as has been agreed, from being destroyed, and the even to come to be instead? We could not maintain against the man who said this that it is not destroyed, for the uneven is not indestructible. If we had agreed that it was indestructible we could easily have maintained that at the coming of the even, the odd and the three have gone away and the same would hold for fire and the hot and the other things. —

Cebes/ Surely.

Socrates/ And so now, if we are agreed that the deathless is indestructible, the soul, besides being deathless, is indestructible. If not, we need another argument. —

Cebes/ There is no need for one as far as that goes, for hardly anything could resist destruction if the deathless, which lasts forever, would admit destruction.

Socrates/ All would agree, that the god, and the Form of life itself, and anything that is deathless, are never destroyed. —

Cebes/ All men would agree, by Zeus, to that, and the gods, I imagine, even more so.

Socrates/ If the deathless is indestructible, then the soul, if it is deathless, would also be indestructible? —

Cebes/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Then when death comes to man, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, but his deathless part goes away safe and indestructible, yielding the place to death. —

Cebes/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Therefore the soul, Cebes, is most certainly deathless and indestructible and our souls will really dwell in the underworld. —

Cebes/ I have nothing more to say against that, Socrates, nor can I doubt your arguments. If Simmias here or someone else has something to say, he should not remain silent, for I do not know to what further occasion other than the present he could put it off if he wants to say or to hear anything on these subjects.

Simmias/ Certainly, I myself have no remaining grounds for doubt after what has been said; nevertheless, in view of the importance of our subject and my low opinion of human weakness, I am bound still to have some private misgivings about what we have said.

Socrates/ You are not only right to say this, Simmias, but our first hypotheses require clearer examination, even though we find them convincing. And if you analyze them adequately,

you will, I think, follow the argument as far as a man can and if the conclusion is clear, you will look no further. —

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ It is right to think then, gentlemen, that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care not only for the time we call our life, but for the sake of all time, and that one is in terrible danger if one does not give it that care. If death were escape from everything, it would be a great boon to the wicked to get rid of the body and of their wickedness together with their soul. But now that the soul appears to be immortal, there is no escape from evil or salvation for it except by becoming as good and wise as possible, for the soul goes to the underworld possessing nothing but its education and upbringing, which are said to bring the greatest benefit or harm to the dead right at the beginning of the journey yonder.

We are told that when each person dies, the guardian spirit who was allotted to him in life proceeds to lead him to a certain place, whence those who have been gathered together there must, after being judged, proceed to the underworld with the guide who has been appointed to lead them thither from here. Having there undergone what they must and stayed there the appointed time, they are led back here by another guide after long periods of time. The journey is not as Aeschylus' Telephus describes it. He says that only one single path leads to Hades, but I think it is neither one nor simple, for then there would be no need of guides; one could not make any mistake if there were but one path. As it is, it is likely to have many forks and crossroads; and I base this judgment on the sacred rites and customs here.

The well-ordered and wise soul follows the guide and is not without familiarity with its surroundings, but the soul that is passionately attached to the body, as I said before, hovers around it and the visible world for a long time, struggling and

suffering much until it is led away by force and with difficulty by its appointed spirit. When the impure soul which has performed some impure deed joins the others after being involved in unjust killings, or committed other crimes which are akin to these and are actions of souls of this kind, everybody shuns it and turns away, unwilling to be its fellow traveler or its guide; such a soul wanders alone completely at a loss until a certain time arrives and it is forcibly led to its proper dwelling place. On the other hand, the soul that has led a pure and moderate life finds fellow travelers and gods to guide it, and each of them dwells in a place suited to it.

There are many strange places upon the earth, and the earth itself is not such as those who are used to discourse upon it believe it to be in nature or size, as someone has convinced me.

Simmias/ "What do you mean, Socrates? I have myself heard many things said about the earth, but certainly not the things that convince you. I should be glad to hear them."

Socrates/ Indeed, Simmias, I do not think it requires the skill of Glaucus to tell you what they are, but to prove them true requires more than that skill, and I should perhaps not be able to do so. Also, even if I had the knowledge, my remaining time would not be long enough to tell the tale. However, nothing prevents my telling you what I am convinced is the shape of the earth and what its regions are.

Simmias/ Even that is sufficient.

Socrates/ Well then, the first thing of which I am convinced is that if the earth is a sphere in the middle of the heavens, it has no need of air or any other force to prevent it from falling. The homogeneous nature of the heavens on all sides and the earth's own equipoise are sufficient to hold it, for an object balanced in the middle of something homogeneous will have no tendency to incline more in any direction than any other

but will remain unmoved. This, is the first point of which I am persuaded.

Simmias/ And rightly so.

Socrates/ Further, the earth is very large, and we live around the sea in a small portion of it between Phasis and the pillars of Heracles, like ants or frogs around a swamp; many other people's live in many such parts of it. Everywhere about the earth there are numerous hollows of many kinds and shapes and sizes into which the water and the mist and the air have gathered. The earth itself is pure and lies in the pure sky where the stars are situated, which the majority of those who discourse on these subjects call the ether. The water and mist and air are the sediment of the ether and they always flow into the hollows of the earth. We, who dwell in the hollows of it, are unaware of this and we think that we live above, on the surface of the earth. It is as if someone who lived deep down in the middle of the ocean thought he was living on its surface. Seeing the sun and the other heavenly bodies through the water, he would think the sea to be the sky; because he is slow and weak, he has never reached the surface of the sea or risen with his head above the water or come out of the sea to our region here, nor seen how much purer and more beautiful it is than his own region, nor has he ever heard of it from anyone who has seen it.

Our experience is the same: living in a certain hollow of the earth, we believe that we live upon its surface; the air we call the heavens, as if the stars made their way through it; this too is the same: because of our weakness and slowness we are not able to make our way to the upper limit of the air; if anyone got to this upper limit, if anyone came to it or reached it on wings and his head rose above it, then just as fish on rising from the sea see things in our region, he would see things there and, if his nature could endure to contemplate them, he would know that there is the true heaven, the true light and

the true earth, for the earth here, these stones and the whole region, are spoiled and eaten away, just as things in the sea are by the salt water.

Nothing worth mentioning grows in the sea, nothing, one might say, is fully developed; there are caves and sand and endless slime and mud wherever there is earth—not comparable in any way with the beauties of our region. So those things above are in their turn far superior to the things we know. Indeed, if this is the moment to tell a tale, Simmias, it is worth hearing about the nature of things on the surface of the earth under the heavens.

Simmias/ At any rate, Socrates, we should be glad to hear this story.

Socrates/ Well then, my friend, in the first place it is said that the earth, looked at from above, looks like those spherical balls made up of twelve pieces of leather; it is multi-colored, and of these colors those used by our painters give us an indication; up there the whole earth has these colors, but much brighter and purer than these; one part is sea-green and of marvelous beauty, another is golden, another is white, whiter than chalk or snow; the earth is composed also of the other colors, more numerous and beautiful than any we have seen. The very hollows of the earth, full of water and air, gleaming among the variety of other colors, present a color of their own so that the whole is seen as a continuum of variegated colors. On the surface of the earth the plants grow with corresponding beauty, the trees and the flowers and the fruits, and so with the hills and the stones, more beautiful in their smoothness and transparency and color. Our precious stones here are but fragments, our cornelians, jaspers, emeralds and the rest. All stones there are of that kind, and even more beautiful. The reason is that there they are pure, not eaten away or spoiled by decay and brine, or corroded by the water and air which have flowed into the hollows here and

bring ugliness and disease upon earth, stones, the other animals and plants. The earth itself is adorned with all these things, and also with gold and silver and other metals. These stand out, being numerous and massive and occurring everywhere, so that the earth is a sight for the blessed. There are many other living creatures upon the earth, and also men, some living inland, others at the edge of the air, as we live on the edge of the sea, others again live on islands surrounded by air close to the mainland. In a word, what water and the sea are to us, the air is to them and the ether is to them what the air is to us. The climate is such that they are without disease, and they live much longer than people do here; their eyesight, hearing and intelligence and all such are as superior to ours as air is superior to water and ether to air in purity; they have groves and temples dedicated to the gods, in which the gods really dwell, and they communicate with them by speech and prophecy and by the sight of them; they see the sun and moon and stars as they are, and in other ways their happiness is in accord with this.

This then is the nature of the earth as a whole and of its surroundings; around the whole of it there are many regions in the hollows; some are deeper and more open than that in which we live; others are deeper and have a narrower opening than ours, and there are some that have less depth and more width. All these are connected with each other below the surface of the earth in many places by narrow and broader channels, and thus have outlets through which much water flows from one to another as into mixing bowls; huge rivers of both hot and cold water thus flow beneath the earth eternally, much fire and large rivers of fire, and many of wet mud, both more pure and more muddy, such as those flowing in advance of the lava and the stream of lava itself in Sicily. These streams then fill up every and all regions as the flow reaches each, and all these places move up and down with the oscillating

movement of the earth. The natural cause of the oscillation is as follows: one of the hollows of the earth, which is also the biggest, pierces through the whole earth; it is that which Homer mentioned when he said: “Far down where is the deepest pit below the earth…,” and which he elsewhere, and many other poets, call Tartarus; into this chasm all the rivers flow together, and again flow out of it, and each river is affected by the nature of the land through which it flows. The reason for their flowing into and out of Tartarus is that this water has no bottom or solid base but it oscillates up and down in waves, and the air and wind about it do the same, for they follow it when it flows to this or that part of the earth. Just as when people breathe, the flow of air goes in and out, so here the air oscillates with the water and creates terrible winds as it goes in and out. Whenever the water retreats to what we call the lower part of the earth, it flows into those parts and fills them up as if the water were pumped in; when it leaves that part for this, it fills these parts again, and the parts filled flow through the channels and through the earth and in each case arrive at the places to which the channels lead and create seas and marshes and rivers and springs. From there the waters flow under the earth again, some flowing around larger and more numerous regions, some round smaller and shallower ones, then flow back into Tartarus, some at a point much lower than where they issued forth, others only a little way, but all of them at a lower point, some of them at the opposite side of the chasm, some on the same side; some flow in a wide circle round the earth once or many times like snakes, then go as far down as possible, then go back into the chasm of Tartarus. From each side it is possible to flow down as far as the center, but not beyond, for this part that faces the river flow from either side is steep.

There are many other large rivers of all kinds, and among these there are four of note; the biggest which flows on the

outside (of the earth) in a circle is called Oceanus; opposite it and flowing in the opposite direction is the Acheron; it flows through many other deserted regions and further underground makes its way to the Acherusian lake to which the souls of the majority come after death and, after remaining there for a certain appointed time, longer for some, shorter for others, they are sent back to birth as living creatures. The third river issues between the first two, and close to its source it falls into a region burning with much fire and makes a lake larger than our sea, boiling with water and mud. From there it goes in a circle, foul and muddy, and winding on its way it comes, among other places, to the edge of the Acherusian lake but does not mingle with its waters; then, coiling many times underground it flows lower down into Tartarus; this is called the Pyriphlegethon, and its lava streams throw off fragments of it in various parts of the earth. Opposite this the fourth river issues forth, which is called Stygion, and it is said to flow first into a terrible and wild region, all of it blue-gray in color, and the lake that this river forms by flowing into it is called the Styx. As its waters fall into the lake they acquire dread powers; then diving below and winding round it flows in the opposite direction from the Pyriphlegethon and into the opposite side of the Acherusian lake; its waters do not mingle with any other; it too flows in a circle and into Tartarus opposite the Pyriphlegethon. The name of that fourth river, the poets tell us, is Cocytus.

Such is the nature of these things. When the dead arrive at the place to which each has been led by his guardian spirit, they are first judged as to whether they have led a good and pious life. Those who have lived an average life make their way to the Acheron and embark upon such vessels as there are for them and proceed to the lake. There they dwell and are purified by penalties for any wrongdoing they may have committed; they are also suitably rewarded for their good

deeds as each deserves. Those who are deemed incurable because of the enormity of their crimes, having committed many great sacrileges or wicked and unlawful murders and other such wrongs—their fitting fate is to be hurled into Tartarus never to emerge from it. Those who are deemed to have committed great but curable crimes, such as doing violence to their father or mother in a fit of temper but who have felt remorse for the rest of their lives, or who have killed someone in a similar manner, these must of necessity be thrown into Tartarus, but a year later the current throws them out, those who are guilty of murder by way of Cocytus, and those who have done violence to their parents by way of the Pyriphlegethon. After they have been carried along to the Acherusian lake, they cry out and shout, some for those they have killed, others for those they have maltreated, and calling them they then pray to them and beg them to allow them to step out into the lake and to receive them. If they persuade them, they do step out and their punishment comes to an end; if they do not, they are taken back into Tartarus and from there into the rivers, and this does not stop until they have persuaded those they have wronged, for this is the punishment which the judges imposed on them.

Those who are deemed to have lived an extremely pious life are freed and released from the regions of the earth as from a prison; they make their way up to a pure dwelling place and live on the surface of the earth. Those who have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy live in the future altogether without a body; they make their way to even more beautiful dwelling places which it is hard to describe clearly, nor do we now have the time to do so. Because of the things we have enunciated, Simmias, one must make every effort to share in virtue and wisdom in one's life, for the reward is beautiful and the hope is great.

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places, since the soul is evidently immortal, and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation, which is why I have been prolonging my tale. That is the reason why a man should be of good cheer about his own soul, if during life he has ignored the pleasures of the body and its ornamentation as of no concern to him and doing him more harm than good, but has seriously concerned himself with the pleasures of learning, and adorned his soul not with alien but with its own ornaments, namely, moderation, righteousness, courage, freedom and truth, and in that state awaits his journey to the underworld.

Now you, Simmias, Cebes and the rest of you, will each take that journey at some other time but my fated day calls me now, as a tragic character might say, and it is about time for me to have my bath, for I think it better to have it before I drink the poison and save the women the trouble of washing the corpse.

Phaedo/ When Socrates had said this Crito spoke.

Crito/ Very well, Socrates, what are your instructions to me and the others about your children or anything else? What can we do that would please you most? —

Socrates/ Nothing new, Crito, but what I am always saying, that you will please me and mine and yourselves by taking good care of your own selves in whatever you do, even if you do not agree with me now, but if you neglect your own selves, and are unwilling to live following the tracks, as it were, of what we have said now and on previous occasions, you will achieve nothing even if you strongly agree with me at this moment.

Crito/ We shall be eager to follow your advice, but how shall we bury you?

Socrates/ In any way you like, if you can catch me and I do not escape you.

Phaedo/ And laughing quietly, looking at us, he said:

Socrates/ I do not convince Crito that I am this Socrates talking to you here and ordering all I say, but he thinks that I am the thing which he will soon be looking at as a corpse, and so he asks how he shall bury me. I have been saying for some time and at some length that after I have drunk the poison I shall no longer be with you but will leave you to go and enjoy some good fortunes of the blessed, but it seems that I have said all this to him in vain in an attempt to reassure you and myself too. Give a pledge to Crito on my behalf, the opposite pledge to that he gave the jury. He pledged that I would stay, you must pledge that I will not stay after I die, but that I shall go away, so that Crito will bear it more easily when he sees my body being burned or buried and will not be angry on my behalf, as if I were suffering terribly, and so that he should not say at the funeral that he is laying out, or carrying out, or burying Socrates. For know you well, my dear Crito, that to express oneself badly is not only faulty as far as the language goes, but does some harm to the soul. You must be of good cheer, and say you are burying my body, and bury it in any way you like and think most customary.

Phaedo/ After saying this he got up and went to another room to take his bath, and Crito followed him and he told us to wait for him. So we stayed, talking among ourselves, questioning what had been said, and then again talking of the great misfortune that had befallen us. We all felt as if we had lost a father and would be orphaned for the rest of our lives. When he had washed, his children were brought to him—two of his sons were small and one was older—and the women of

his household came to him. He spoke to them before Crito and gave them what instructions he wanted. Then he sent the women and children away, and he himself joined us. It was now close to sunset, for he had stayed inside for some time. He came and sat down after his bath and conversed for a short while, when the officer of the Eleven came and stood by him and said:

Jailer/ "I shall not reproach you as I do the others, Socrates. They are angry with me and curse me when obeying the orders of my superiors, I tell them to drink the poison. During the time you have been here I have come to know you in other ways as the noblest, the gentlest and the best man who has ever come here. So now too I know that you will not make trouble for me; you know who is responsible and you will direct your anger against them. You know what message I bring. Fare you well, and try to endure what you must as easily as possible."

Phaedo/ The officer was weeping as he turned away and went out. Socrates looked up at him and said:

Socrates/ "Fare you well also, we shall do as you bid us."

Phaedo/ And turning to us he said:

Socrates/ "How pleasant the man is! During the whole time I have been here he has come in and conversed with me from time to time, a most agreeable man. And how genuinely he now weeps for me. Come, Crito, let us obey him. Let someone bring the poison if it is ready; if not, let the man prepare it."

Crito/ But Socrates, I think the sun still shines upon the hills and has not yet set. I know that others drink the poison quite a long time after they have received the order, eating and drinking quite a bit, and some of them enjoy intimacy with their loved ones. Do not hurry; there is still some time.

Socrates/ It is natural, Crito, for them to do so, for they think they derive some benefit from doing this, but it is not

fitting for me. I do not expect any benefit from drinking the poison a little later, except to become ridiculous in my own eyes for clinging to life, and be sparing of it when there is none left. So do as I ask and do not refuse me.

Phaedo/ Hearing this, Crito nodded to the slave who was standing near him; the slave went out and after a time came back with the man who was to administer the poison, carrying it made ready in a cup. When Socrates saw him he said:

Socrates/ "Well, my good man, you are an expert in this, what must one do?"—

Attendant/ "Just drink it and walk around until your legs feel heavy, and then lie down and it will act of itself."

Phaedo/ And he offered the cup to Socrates who took it quite cheerfully, Echecrates, without a tremor or any change of feature or color, but looking at the man from under his eyebrows as was his wont, asked:

Socrates/ "What do you say about pouring a libation from this drink? It is allowed?"—

Attendant/ "We only mix as much as we believe will suffice."

Socrates/ I understand, but one is allowed, indeed one must, utter a prayer to the gods that the journey from here to yonder may be fortunate. This is my prayer and may it be so.

Phaedo/ And while he was saying this, he was holding the cup, and then drained it calmly and easily. Most of us had been able to hold back our tears reasonably well up till then, but when we saw him drinking it and after he drank it, we could hold them back no longer; my own tears came in floods against my will. So I covered my face. I was weeping for myself, not for him—for my misfortune in being deprived of such a comrade. Even before me, Crito was unable to restrain his tears and got up. Apollodorus had not ceased from weeping

before, and at this moment his noisy tears and anger made everybody present break down, except Socrates.

Socrates/ “What is this, you strange fellows. It is mainly for this reason that I sent the women away, to avoid such unseemliness, for I am told one should die in good-omened silence. So keep quiet and control yourselves.”

Phaedo/ His words made us ashamed, and we checked our tears. He walked around, and when he said his legs were heavy he lay on his back as he had been told to do, and the man who had given him the poison touched his body, and after a while tested his feet and legs, pressed hard upon his foot and asked him if he felt this, and Socrates said no. Then he pressed his calves, and made his way up his body and showed us that it was cold and stiff. He felt it himself and said that when the cold reached his heart he would be gone. As his belly was getting cold Socrates uncovered his head—he had covered it—and said—these were his last words—

Socrates/ ”Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius; make this offering to him and do not forget.”—

Crito/ ”It shall be done, tell us if there is anything else.”

Phaedo/ But there was no answer. Shortly afterwards Socrates made a movement; the man uncovered him and his eyes were fixed. Seeing this Crito closed his mouth and his eyes.

Such was the end of our comrade, Echecrates, a man who, we would say, was of all those we have known the best, and also the wisest and the most upright.

Phaedo.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Phaedo, *who is the narrator of the Dialogue to Echecrates of Phlius*. Socrates. Apollodorus. Simmias. Cebes. Crito. Attendant of the Prison.

Scene: —The Prison of Socrates.

Place of the Narration: —Phlius.

Echecrates/ Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with Socrates on the day when he drank the poison?

Phaedo/ Yes, Echecrates, I was.

Echecrates/ I should so like to hear about his death. What did he say in his last hours? We were informed that he died by taking poison, but no one knew anything more; for no Phliasian ever goes to Athens now, and it is a long time since any stranger from Athens has found his way hither; so that we had no clear account.

Phaedo/ Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial?

Echecrates/ Yes; someone told us about the trial, and we could not understand why, having been condemned, he should have been put to death, not at the time, but long afterwards. What was the reason of this?

Phaedo/ An accident, Echecrates: the stern of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day before he was tried.

Echecrates/ What is this ship?

Phaedo/ It is the ship in which, according to Athenian tradition, Theseus went to Crete when he took with him the

fourteen youths, and was the savior of them and of himself. And they are said to have vowed to Apollo at the time, that if they were saved they would send a yearly mission to Delos. Now this custom still continues, and the whole period of the voyage to and from Delos, beginning when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship, is a holy season, during which the city is not allowed to be polluted by public executions; and when the vessel is detained by contrary winds, the time spent in going and returning is very considerable. As I was saying, the ship was crowned on the day before the trial, and this was the reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until long after he was condemned.

Echecrates/ What was the manner of his death, Phaedo? What was said or done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities forbid them to be present—so that he had no friends near him when he died?

Phaedo/ No; there were several of them with him.

Echecrates/ If you have nothing to do, I wish that you would tell me what passed, as exactly as you can.

Phaedo/ I have nothing at all to do, and will try to gratify your wish. To be reminded of Socrates is always the greatest delight to me, whether I speak myself or hear another speak of him.

Echecrates/ You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you, and I hope that you will be as exact as you can.

Phaedo/ I had a singular feeling at being in his company. For I could hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore I did not pity him, Echecrates; he died so fearlessly, and his words and bearing were so noble and gracious, that to me he appeared blessed. I thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine call,

and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived there; and therefore I did not pity him as might have seemed natural at such an hour. But I had not the pleasure which I usually feel in philosophical discourse (for philosophy was the theme of which we spoke). I was pleased, but in the pleasure there was also a strange admixture of pain; for I reflected that he was soon to die, and this double feeling was shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping by turns, especially the excitable Apollodorus—you know the sort of man?

Echecrates/ Yes.

Phaedo/ He was quite beside himself; and I and all of us were greatly moved.

Echecrates/ Who were present?

Phaedo/ Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes; likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania, Menexenus, and some others; Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill.

Echecrates/ Were there any strangers?

Phaedo/ Yes, there were; Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaedondes; Euclid and Terpsion, who came from Megara.

Echecrates/ And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus?

Phaedo/ No, they were said to be in Aegina.

Echecrates/ *Anyone* else?

Phaedo/ I think that these were nearly all.

Echecrates/ Well, and what did you talk about?

Phaedo/ I will begin at the beginning, and endeavor to repeat the entire conversation. On the previous days we had been in the habit of assembling early in the morning at the court in which the trial took place, and which is not far from

the prison. There we used to wait talking with one another until the opening of the doors (for they were not opened very early); then we went in and generally passed the day with Socrates. On the last morning we assembled sooner than usual, having heard on the day before when we quitted the prison in the evening that the sacred ship had come from Delos; and so we arranged to meet very early at the accustomed place. On our arrival the jailer who answered the door, instead of admitting us, came out and told us to stay until he called us. 'For the Eleven,' he said, 'are now with Socrates; they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that he is to die to-day.' He soon returned and said that we might come in. On entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe, whom you know, sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms. When she saw us she uttered a cry and said, as women will:

Xanthippe/ 'O Socrates, this is the last time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with you.'

Phaedo/ Socrates turned to Crito and said:

Socrates/ 'Crito, let someone take her home.'

Phaedo/ Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and beating herself. And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch, bent and rubbed his leg, saying, as he was rubbing:

Socrates/ How singular is the thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be the opposite of it; for they are never present to a man at the same instant, and yet he who pursues either is generally compelled to take the other; their bodies are two, but they are joined by a single head. And I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had remembered them, he would have made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife, and how, when he could not, he fastened their heads together; and this is the

reason why when one comes the other follows: as I know by my own experience now, when after the pain in my leg which was caused by the chain pleasure appears to succeed.

Cebes/ I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the name of Aesop. For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by many, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the poet—he will be sure to ask it again, and therefore if you would like me to have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to him: —he wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of poetry, now that you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables into verse, and also composing that hymn in honor of Apollo.

Socrates/ Tell him, Cebes what is the truth—that I had no idea of rivaling him or his poems; to do so, as I knew, would be no easy task. But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about the meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had intimations in dreams 'that I should compose music.' The same dream came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying the same or nearly the same words: 'Cultivate and make music,' said the dream.

And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has been the pursuit of my life, and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was bidding me do what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor in a race is bidden by the spectators to run when he is already running. But I was not certain of this; for the dream might have meant music in the popular sense of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me a respite, I thought that it would be safer for me to satisfy the scruple, and, in obedience to the dream, to compose a few verses before I departed. And first I made a hymn in honor

of the god of the festival, and then considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, should not only put together words, but should invent stories, and that I have no invention, I took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and which I knew—they were the first I came upon—and turned them into verse. Tell this to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him come after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely to be going, for the Athenians say that I must.

Simmias/ What a message for such a man! having been a frequent companion of his I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never take your advice unless he is obliged.

Socrates/ Why, —is not Evenus a philosopher?

Simmias/ I think that he is.

Socrates/ Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to die; but he will not take his own life, for that is held to be unlawful.

Phaedo/ Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting.

Cebes/ Why do you say that a man ought not to take his own life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?

Socrates/ And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are the disciples of Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?

Cebes/ Yes, but his language was obscure, Socrates.

Socrates/ My words, too, are only an echo; but there is no reason why I should not repeat what I have heard: and indeed, as I am going to another place, it is very meet for me to be thinking and talking of the nature of the pilgrimage which I am about to make. What can I do better in the interval between this and the setting of the sun?

Cebes/ Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful? as I have certainly heard Philolaus, about whom you were just now asking, affirm when he was staying with us at Thebes; and there are others who say the same, although I have never understood what was meant by any of them.

Socrates/ Do not lose heart and the day may come when you will understand. I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to be the only exception, and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another.

Phaedo/ Cebes, laughing gently and speaking in his native Boeotian, said;

Cebes/ Fery true.

Socrates/ I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying; but there may not be any real inconsistency after all. There is a doctrine whispered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I too believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we men are a possession of theirs. Do you not agree?

Cebes/ Yes, I quite agree.

Socrates/ And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and would you not punish him if you could?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then, if we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take his

own life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me.

Cebes/ Yes, Socrates, there seems to be truth in what you say. And yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our guardian and we his possessions, with the willingness to die which you were just now attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men should be willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the best of rulers, is not reasonable; for surely no wise man thinks that when set at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of him. A fool may perhaps think so—he may argue that he had better run away from his master, not considering that his duty is to remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, and that there would be no sense in his running away. The wise man will want to be ever with him who is better than himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now said; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at passing out of life.

Phaedo/ The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates, turning to us.

Socrates/ Here is a man who is always enquiring, and is not so easily convinced by the first thing which he hears.

Simmias/ And certainly the objection which he is now making does appear to me to have some force. For what can be the meaning of a truly wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than himself? And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods whom you acknowledge to be our good masters.

Socrates/ Yes; there is reason in what you say. And so you think that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court?

Simmias/ We should like you to do so.

Socrates/ Then I must try to make a more successful defense before you than I did before the judges. For I am quite ready to admit, Simmias and Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in the first place that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of which I am as certain as I can be of any such matters), and secondly (though I am not so sure of this last) to men departed, better than those whom I leave behind; and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil.

Simmias/ But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? Will you not impart them to us? —for they are a benefit in which we too are entitled to share. Moreover, if you succeed in convincing us, that will be an answer to the charge against yourself.

Socrates/ I will do my best. But you must first let me hear what Crito wants; he has long been wishing to say something to me.

Crito/ Only this, Socrates: —the attendant who is to give you the poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are not to talk much; talking, he says, increases heat, and this is apt to interfere with the action of the poison; persons who excite themselves are sometimes obliged to take a second or even a third dose.

Socrates/ Then let him mind his business and be prepared to give the poison twice or even thrice if necessary; that is all.

Crito/ I knew quite well what you would say; but I was obliged to satisfy him.

Socrates/ Never mind him.

And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world. And how this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavor to explain. For I deem that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying; and if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why when his time comes should he repine at that which he has been always pursuing and desiring?

Phaedo/ Simmias said laughingly:

Simmias/ Though not in a laughing humor, you have made me laugh, Socrates; for I cannot help thinking that the many when they hear your words will say how truly you have described philosophers, and our people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers desire is in reality death, and that they have found them out to be deserving of the death which they desire.

Socrates/ And they are right, Simmias, in thinking so, with the exception of the words 'they have found them out;' for they have not found out either what is the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, or how he deserves or desires death. But enough of them: —let us discuss the matter among ourselves. Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?

Simmias/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Is it not the separation of soul and body? And to be dead is the completion of this; when the soul exists in herself, and is released from the body and the body is released from the soul, what is this but death?

Simmias/ Just so.

Socrates/ There is another question, which will probably throw light on our present enquiry if you and I can agree about it: —Ought the philosopher to care about the pleasures—if they are to be called pleasures—of eating and drinking?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And what about the pleasures of love—should he care for them?

Simmias/ By no means.

Socrates/ And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature needs? What do you say?

Simmias/ I should say that the true philosopher would despise them.

Socrates/ Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body? He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body and to turn to the soul.

Simmias/ Quite true.

Socrates/ In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be observed in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the communion of the body.

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead.

Simmias/ That is also true.

Socrates/ What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge? —is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have

sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses? —for you will allow that they are the best of them?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then when does the soul attain truth? —for in attempting to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure, —when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true being?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And in this the philosopher dishonors the body; his soul runs away from his body and desires to be alone and by herself?

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an absolute justice?

Simmias/ Assuredly there is.

Socrates/ And an absolute beauty and absolute good?

Simmias/ Of course.

Socrates/ But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense? —and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of everything. Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of each thing which he considers?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any other sense together with reason, but with the very light of the mind in her own clearness searches into the very truth of each; he who has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge—who, if not he, is likely to attain to the knowledge of true being?

Simmias/ What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates.

Socrates/ And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the following? 'Have we not found,' they will say, 'a path of thought which seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion, that while we are in the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after true being: it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears,

and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and in fact, as men say, takes away from us the power of thinking at all. Whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? Wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy; and, last and worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the truth. It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body—the soul in herself must behold things in themselves: and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers; not while we live, but after death; for if while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows—either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist in herself alone. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth.' For the impure are not permitted to approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You would agree; would you not?

Simmias/ Undoubtedly, Socrates.

Socrates/ But, O my friend, if this be true, there is great reason to hope that, going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that his mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified.

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can; —the release of the soul from the chains of the body?

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death?

Simmias/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial study?

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet repining when it comes upon them.

Simmias/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible. Look at the matter thus: —if they have been in every way the enemies of the body, and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this

desire of theirs is granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined, instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired—and this was wisdom—and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely he will, O my friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that there, and there only, he can find wisdom in her purity. And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were afraid of death.

Simmias/ He would indeed.

Socrates/ And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money or power, or both?

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic of the philosopher?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ There is temperance again, which even by the vulgar is supposed to consist in the control and regulation of the passions, and in the sense of superiority to them—is not temperance a virtue belonging to those only who despise the body, and who pass their lives in philosophy?

Simmias/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, are really a contradiction.

Simmias/ How so?

Socrates/ Well, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a great evil.

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet greater evils?

Simmias/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear, and because they are afraid; and yet that a man should be courageous from fear, and because he is a coward, is surely a strange thing.

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate because they are intemperate—which might seem to be a contradiction, but is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish temperance. For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing; and in their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because they are overcome by others; and although to be conquered by pleasure is called by men intemperance, to them the conquest of pleasure consists in being conquered by pleasure. And that is what I mean by saying that, in a sense, they are made temperate through intemperance.

Simmias/ Such appears to be the case.

Socrates/ Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, is not the exchange of virtue. O my blessed Simmias, is there not one true coin for which all things ought to be exchanged? —and that is wisdom; and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the

companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her? But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true exchange there is a purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself are the purgation of them. The founders of the mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning, and were not talking nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods. For 'many,' as they say in the mysteries, 'are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics,'—meaning, as I interpret the words, 'the true philosophers.' In the number of whom, during my whole life, I have been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place; —whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the other world—such is my belief. And therefore I maintain that I am right, Simmias and Cebes, in not grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world, for I believe that I shall equally find good masters and friends in another world. But most men do not believe this saying; if then I succeed in convincing you by my defense better than I did the Athenian judges, it will be well.

Cebes/ I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. But in what concerns the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of death she may perish and come to an end—immediately on her release from the body, issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air and

in her flight vanishing away into nothingness. If she could only be collected into herself after she has obtained release from the evils of which you were speaking, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But surely it requires a great deal of argument and many proofs to show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists, and has any force or intelligence.

Socrates/ True, Cebes; and shall I suggest that we converse a little of the probabilities of these things?

Cebes/ I am sure that I should greatly like to know your opinion about them.

Socrates/ I reckon that no one who heard me now, not even if he were one of my old enemies, the Comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking about matters in which I have no concern: —If you please, then, we will proceed with the enquiry.

Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below. There comes into my mind an ancient doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and returning hither, are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again? And this would be conclusive, if there were any real evidence that the living are only born from the dead; but if this is not so, then other arguments will have to be adduced.

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only, but in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which there is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such things as good and evil, just and unjust—and there are

innumerable other opposites which are generated out of opposites. And I want to show that in all opposites there is of necessity a similar alternation; I mean to say, for example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after being less.

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have become less.

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower.

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more unjust.

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them are generated out of opposites?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other opposite, and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is also an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not always expressed in words—they are really generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them?

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of waking?

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ And what is it?

Cebes/ Death.

Socrates/ And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, and have their two intermediate processes also?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you shall analyze the other to me. One of them I term sleep, the other waking. The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleeping waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up. Do you agree?

Cebes/ I entirely agree.

Socrates/ Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner. Is not death opposed to life?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And they are generated one from the other?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ What is generated from the living?

Cebes/ The dead.

Socrates/ And what from the dead?

Cebes/ I can only say in answer—the living.

Socrates/ Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the dead?

Cebes/ That is clear.

Socrates/ Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below?

Cebes/ That is true.

Socrates/ And one of the two processes or generations is visible—for surely the act of dying is visible?

Cebes/ Surely.

Socrates/ What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the opposite process? and shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only? Must we not rather assign to death some corresponding process of generation?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what is that process?

Cebes/ Return to life.

Socrates/ And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the world of the living?

Cebes/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and this, if true, affords a most certain proof that the souls of the dead exist in some place out of which they come again.

Cebes/ Yes, Socrates; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of our previous admissions.

Socrates/ And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, may be shown, I think, as follows: If generation were in a straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return of elements into their opposites, then you know that all things would at last have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more generation of them.

Cebes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep. You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping and waking, the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning, because all other things would be asleep too, and he would not be distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only, and no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive—what other result could there be? For if the living spring from any other things, and they too die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death?

Cebes/ There is no escape, Socrates; and to me your argument seems to be absolutely true.

Socrates/ Yes, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion; and we have not been deluded in making these admissions; but I am confident that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil.

Cebes/ Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul had been in some place before existing in the form of man; here then is another proof of the soul's immortality.

Simmias/ But tell me, Cebes, what arguments are urged in favor of this doctrine of recollection. I am not very sure at the moment that I remember them.

Cebes/ One excellent proof is afforded by questions. If you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give a true

answer of himself, but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram or to anything of that sort.

Socrates/ But if you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another way; —I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection?

Simmias/ Incredulous I am not; but I want to have this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced: but I should still like to hear what you were going to say.

Socrates/ This is what I would say: —We should agree, if I am not mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous time.

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection? I mean to ask, Whether a person who, having seen or heard or in any way perceived anything, knows not only that, but has a conception of something else which is the subject, not of the same but of some other kind of knowledge, may not be fairly said to recollect that of which he has the conception?

Simmias/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance: —The knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an image of the

youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection. In like manner anyone who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there are endless examples of the same thing.

Simmias/ Endless, indeed.

Socrates/ And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering that which has been already forgotten through time and inattention.

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to remember Cebes;

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike?

Simmias/ It may be.

Socrates/ And when the recollection is derived from like things, then another consideration is sure to arise, which is—whether the likeness in any degree falls short or not of that which is recollected?

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but that, over and above this, there is absolute equality? Shall we say so?

Simmias/ Say so, yes and swear to it, with all the confidence in life.

Socrates/ And do we know the nature of this absolute essence?

Simmias/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another way: —Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal?

Simmias/ That is certain.

Socrates/ But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality the same as of inequality?.

Simmias/ Impossible, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?

Simmias/ I should say, clearly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you conceived and attained that idea?

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ Which might be like, or might be unlike them?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But that makes no difference: whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection?

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they fall short of this perfect equality in a measure?

Simmias/ Yes, in a very great measure too.

Socrates/ And must we not allow, that when I or anyone, looking at any object, observes that the thing which he sees

aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, was inferior?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality?

Simmias/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it?

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect?

Simmias/ Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the same as the other.

Socrates/ From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that standard the equals which are derived from the senses? —for to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short.

Simmias/ No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements.

Socrates/ And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon as we were born?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence was in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?

Simmias/ We may.

Socrates/ But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what in each case we acquired, then we must always have come into life having knowledge, and shall always continue to know as long as life lasts—for knowing is the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?

Simmias/ Quite true, Socrates.

Socrates/ But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what we previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be rightly termed recollection?

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ So much is clear—that when we perceive something, either by the help of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we are able to obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is associated with it but has been forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one of two alternatives follows: —either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection.

Simmias/ Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.

Socrates/ And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at our birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to our birth?

Simmias/ I cannot decide at the moment.

Socrates/ At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge will or will not be able to render an account of his knowledge? What do you say?

Simmias/ Certainly, he will.

Socrates/ But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very matters about which we are speaking?

Simmias/ Would that they could, Socrates, but I rather fear that to-morrow, at this time, there will no longer be anyone alive who is able to give an account of them such as ought to be given.

Socrates/ Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But when did our souls acquire this knowledge? —not since we were born as men?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And therefore, previously?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, Simmias, our souls must also have existed without bodies before they were in the form of man, and must have had intelligence.

Simmias/ Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions are given us at the very moment of birth; for this is the only time which remains.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, but if so, when do we lose them? for they are not in us when we are born—that is admitted. Do we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or if not at what other time?

Simmias/ No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense.

Socrates/ Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all things; and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession—then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were born, as that our souls existed before we were born; and if not the ideas, then not the souls.

Simmias/ Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the one as for the other; and the argument retreats successfully to the position that the existence of the soul before birth cannot be separated from the existence of the essence of which you speak. For there is

nothing which to my mind is so patent as that beauty, goodness, and the other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence; and I am satisfied with the proof.

Socrates/ Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied? for I must convince him too.

Simmias/ I think that Cebes is satisfied: although he is the most incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is sufficiently convinced of the existence of the soul before birth. But that after death the soul will continue to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction. I cannot get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was referring—the feeling that when the man dies the soul will be dispersed, and that this may be the extinction of her. For admitting that she may have been born elsewhere, and framed out of other elements, and was in existence before entering the human body, why after having entered in and gone out again may she not herself be destroyed and come to an end?

Cebes/ Very true, Simmias; about half of what was required has been proven; to wit, that our souls existed before we were born: —that the soul will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of which the proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied; when that is given the demonstration will be complete.

Socrates/ But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given, if you put the two arguments together—I mean this and the former one, in which we admitted that everything living is born of the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and in coming to life and being born can be born only from death and dying, must she not after death continue to exist, since she has to be born again? —Surely the proof which you desire has been already furnished. Still I suspect that you and Simmias would be glad to probe the

argument further. Like children, you are haunted with a fear that when the soul leaves the body, the wind may really blow her away and scatter her; especially if a man should happen to die in a great storm and not when the sky is calm.

Echecrates/ Cebes answered with a smile:

Cebes/ Then, Socrates, you must argue us out of our fears—and yet, strictly speaking, they are not our fears, but there is a child within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin: him too we must persuade not to be afraid when he is alone in the dark.

Socrates/ Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you have charmed away the fear.

Cebes/ And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Socrates, when you are gone?

Socrates/ Hellas is a large place, Cebes, and has many good men, and there are barbarous races not a few: seek for him among them all, far and wide, sparing neither pains nor money; for there is no better way of spending your money. And you must seek among yourselves too; for you will not find others better able to make the search.

Cebes/ The search shall certainly be made. And now, if you please, let us return to the point of the argument at which we digressed.

Socrates/ By all means; what else should I please?

Cebes/ Very good.

Socrates/ Must we not ask ourselves what that is which, as we imagine, is liable to be scattered, and about which we fear? and what again is that about which we have no fear? And then we may proceed further to enquire whether that which suffers dispersion is or is not of the nature of soul—our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn upon the answers to these questions.

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally capable, as of being compounded, so also of being dissolved; but that which is uncompounded, and that only, must be, if anything is, indissoluble.

Cebes/ Yes; I should imagine so.

Socrates/ And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging, whereas the compound is always changing and never the same.

Cebes/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true existence—whether essence of equality, beauty, or anything else—are these essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change? or are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple self-existent and unchanging forms, not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at any time?

Cebes/ They must be always the same, Socrates.

Socrates/ And what would you say of the many beautiful—whether men or horses or garments or any other things which are named by the same names and may be called equal or beautiful, —are they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse? May they not rather be described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with one another?

Cebes/ The latter; they are always in a state of change.

Socrates/ And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind—they are invisible and are not seen?

Cebes/ That is very true.

Socrates/ Well then, let us suppose that there are two sorts of existences—one seen, the other unseen.

Cebes/ Let us suppose them.

Socrates/ The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?

Cebes/ That may be also supposed.

Socrates/ And, further, is not one part of us body, another part soul?

Cebes/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And to which class is the body more alike and akin?

Cebes/ Clearly to the seen—no one can doubt that.

Socrates/ And is the soul seen or not seen?

Cebes/ Not by man, Socrates.

Socrates/ And what we mean by 'seen' and 'not seen' is that which is or is not visible to the eye of man?

Cebes/ Yes, to the eye of man.

Socrates/ And is the soul seen or not seen?

Cebes/ Not seen.

Socrates/ Unseen then?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen?

Cebes/ That follows necessarily, Socrates.

Socrates/ And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight or hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of perceiving through the body is perceiving through the senses)—were we not saying that the soul too is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and wanders and is confused; the world

spins round her, and she is like a drunkard, when she touches change?

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ But when returning into herself she reflects, then she passes into the other world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. And this state of the soul is called wisdom?

Cebes/ That is well and truly said, Socrates.

Socrates/ And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may be inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one?

Cebes/ I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of everyone who follows the argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable—even the most stupid person will not deny that.

Socrates/ And the body is more like the changing?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yet once more consider the matter in another light: When the soul and the body are united, then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the body to obey and serve. Now which of these two functions is akin to the divine? and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that which is subject and servant?

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ And which does the soul resemble?

Cebes/ The soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal—there can be no doubt of that, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then reflect, Cebes: of all which has been said is not this the conclusion? —that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied?

Cebes/ It cannot.

Socrates/ But if it be true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution? and is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do you further observe, that after a man is dead, the body, or visible part of him, which is lying in the visible world, and is called a corpse, and would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and dissipated, is not dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for some time, nay even for a long time, if the constitution be sound at the time of death, and the season of the year favorable? For the body when shrunk and embalmed, as the manner is in Egypt, may remain almost entire through infinite ages; and even in decay, there are still some portions, such as the bones and ligaments, which are practically indestructible: —Do you agree?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is it likely that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the place of the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to go, —that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, will be blown away and destroyed immediately on quitting the body, as the many say? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth rather is, that the soul which

is pure at departing and draws after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily during life had connection with the body, which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself; —and making such abstraction her perpetual study—which means that she has been a true disciple of philosophy; and therefore has in fact been always engaged in the practice of dying? For is not philosophy the study of death? —

Cebes/ Certainly—

Socrates/ That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world—to the divine and immortal and rational: thither arriving, she is secure of bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild passions and all other human ills, and forever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in company with the gods. Is not this true, Cebes?

Cebes/ Yes, beyond a doubt.

Socrates/ But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste, and use for the purposes of his lusts, —the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy; —do you suppose that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed?

Cebes/ Impossible.

Socrates/ She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual association and constant care of the body have wrought into her nature.

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty and earthy, and is that element of sight by which a soul is depressed and dragged down again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world below—prowling about tombs and sepulchers, near which, as they tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of souls which have not departed pure, but are cloyed with sight and therefore visible.

Cebes/ That is very likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, that is very likely, Cebes; and these must be the souls, not of the good, but of the evil, which are compelled to wander about such places in payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life; and they continue to wander until through the craving after the corporeal which never leaves them, they are imprisoned finally in another body. And they may be supposed to find their prisons in the same natures which they have had in their former lives.

Cebes/ What natures do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ What I mean is that men who have followed after gluttony, and wantonness, and drunkenness, and have had no thought of avoiding them, would pass into asses and animals of that sort. What do you think?

Cebes/ I think such an opinion to be exceedingly probable.

Socrates/ And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and violence, will pass into wolves, or into hawks and kites; —whither else can we suppose them to go?

Cebes/ Yes; with such natures, beyond question.

Socrates/ And there is no difficulty in assigning to all of them places answering to their several natures and propensities?

Cebes/ There is not.

Socrates/ Some are happier than others; and the happiest both in themselves and in the place to which they go are those who have practiced the civil and social virtues which are called temperance and justice, and are acquired by habit and attention without philosophy and mind.

Cebes/ Why are they the happiest?

Socrates/ Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle and social kind which is like their own, such as bees or wasps or ants, or back again into the form of man, and just and moderate men may be supposed to spring from them.

Cebes/ Very likely.

Socrates/ No one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at the time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the Gods, but the lover of knowledge only. And this is the reason, Simmias and Cebes, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts, and hold out against them and refuse to give themselves up to them, —not because they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the lovers of money, and the world in general; nor like the lovers of power and honor, because they dread the dishonor or disgrace of evil deeds.

Cebes/ No, Socrates, that would not become them.

Socrates/ No indeed; and therefore they who have any care of their own souls, and do not merely live molding and fashioning the body, say farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her influence, and whither she leads they turn and follow.

Cebes/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you. The lovers of knowledge are conscious that the soul was simply fastened and glued to the

body—until philosophy received her, she could only view real existence through the bars of a prison, not in and through herself; she was wallowing in the mire of every sort of ignorance, and by reason of lust had become the principal accomplice in her own captivity. This was her original state; and then, as I was saying, and as the lovers of knowledge are well aware, philosophy, seeing how terrible was her confinement, of which she was to herself the cause, received and gently comforted her and sought to release her, pointing out that the eye and the ear and the other senses are full of deception, and persuading her to retire from them, and abstain from all but the necessary use of them, and be gathered up and collected into herself, bidding her trust in herself and her own pure apprehension of pure existence, and to mistrust whatever comes to her through other channels and is subject to variation; for such things are visible and tangible, but what she sees in her own nature is intelligible and invisible. And the soul of the true philosopher thinks that she ought not to resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, as far as she is able; reflecting that when a man has great joys or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them, not merely the sort of evil which might be anticipated—as for example, the loss of his health or property which he has sacrificed to his lusts—but an evil greater far, which is the greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks.

Cebes/ What is it, Socrates?

Socrates/ The evil is that when the feeling of pleasure or pain is most intense, every soul of man imagines the objects of this intense feeling to be then plainest and truest: but this is not so, they are really the things of sight.

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ And is not this the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the body?

Cebes/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails and rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the body, and believes that to be true which the body affirms to be true; and from agreeing with the body and having the same delights she is obliged to have the same habits and haunts, and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to the world below, but is always infected by the body; and so she sinks into another body and there germinates and grows, and has therefore no part in the communion of the divine and pure and simple.

Cebes/ Most true, Socrates.

Socrates/ And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives.

Cebes/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Certainly not! The soul of a philosopher will reason in quite another way; she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she may deliver herself up again to the thralldom of pleasures and pains, doing a work only to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's web. But she will calm passion, and follow reason, and dwell in the contemplation of her, beholding the true and divine (which is not matter of opinion), and thence deriving nourishment. Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own kindred and to that which is like her, and to be freed from human ills. Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits, will at her departure from the body be scattered and blown away by the winds and be nowhere and nothing.

Phaedo/ When Socrates had done speaking, for a considerable time there was silence; he himself appeared to be meditating, as most of us were, on what had been said; only Cebes and Simmias spoke a few words to one another. And Socrates observing them asked what they thought of the argument, and whether there was anything wanting? For, said he;

Socrates/ There are many points still open to suspicion and attack, if anyone were disposed to sift the matter thoroughly. Should you be considering some other matter I say no more, but if you are still in doubt do not hesitate to say exactly what you think, and let us have anything better which you can suggest; and if you think that I can be of any use, allow me to help you.

Simmias/ I must confess, Socrates, that doubts did arise in our minds, and each of us was urging and inciting the other to put the question which we wanted to have answered but which neither of us liked to ask, fearing that our importunity might be troublesome at such a time.

Socrates/ O Simmias, what are you saying? I am not very likely to persuade other men that I do not regard my present situation as a misfortune, if I cannot even persuade you that I am no worse off now than at any other time in my life. Will you not allow that I have as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans? For they, when they perceive that they must die, having sung all their life long, do then sing more lustily than ever, rejoicing in the thought that they are about to go away to the god whose ministers they are. But men, because they are themselves afraid of death, slanderously affirm of the swans that they sing a lament at the last, not considering that no bird sings when cold, or hungry, or in pain, not even the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor yet the hoopoe; which are said indeed to tune a lay of sorrow, although I do not believe this to be true of them any more

than of the swans. But because they are sacred to Apollo, they have the gift of prophecy, and anticipate the good things of another world; wherefore they sing and rejoice in that day more than ever they did before. And I too, believing myself to be the consecrated servant of the same God, and the fellow-servant of the swans, and thinking that I have received from my master gifts of prophecy which are not inferior to theirs, would not go out of life less merrily than the swans. Never mind then, if this be your only objection, but speak and ask anything which you like, while the eleven magistrates of Athens allow.

Simmias/ Very good, Socrates; then I will tell you my difficulty, and Cebes will tell you his. I feel myself (and I daresay that you have the same feeling), how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of any certainty about questions such as these in the present life. And yet I should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every side. For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two things: either he should discover, or be taught the truth about them; or, if this be impossible, I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life—not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him. And now, as you bid me, I will venture to question you, and then I shall not have to reproach myself hereafter with not having said at the time what I think. For when I consider the matter, either alone or with Cebes, the argument does certainly appear to me, Socrates, to be not sufficient.

Socrates/ I dare say, my friend, that you may be right, but I should like to know in what respect the argument is insufficient.

Simmias/ In this respect: —Suppose a person to use the same argument about harmony and the lyre—might he not say that harmony is a thing invisible, incorporeal, perfect, divine, existing in the lyre which is harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and material, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality? And when someone breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this view would argue as you do, and on the same analogy, that the harmony survives and has not perished—you cannot imagine, he would say, that the lyre without the strings, and the broken strings themselves which are mortal remain, and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and immortal nature and kindred, has perished—perished before the mortal. The harmony must still be somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before anything can happen to that. The thought, Socrates, must have occurred to your own mind that such is our conception of the soul; and that when the body is in a manner strung and held together by the elements of hot and cold, wet and dry, then the soul is the harmony or due proportionate admixture of them. But if so, whenever the strings of the body are unduly loosened or overstrained through disease or other injury, then the soul, though most divine, like other harmonies of music or of works of art, of course perishes at once; although the material remains of the body may last for a considerable time, until they are either decayed or burnt. And if anyone maintains that the soul, being the harmony of the elements of the body, is first to perish in that which is called death, how shall we answer him?

Phaedo/ Socrates looked fixedly at us as his manner was, and said with a smile:

Socrates/ Simmias has reason on his side; and why does not some one of you who is better able than myself answer him? for there is force in his attack upon me. But perhaps,

before we answer him, we had better also hear what Cebes has to say that we may gain time for reflection, and when they have both spoken, we may either assent to them, if there is truth in what they say, or if not, we will maintain our position. Please to tell me then, Cebes, what was the difficulty which troubled you?

Cebes/ I will tell you. My feeling is that the argument is where it was, and open to the same objections which were urged before; for I am ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily form has been very ingeniously, and, if I may say so, quite sufficiently proven; but the existence of the soul after death is still, in my judgment, unproven. Now my objection is not the same as that of Simmias; for I am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more lasting than the body, being of opinion that in all such respects the soul very far excels the body. Well then, says the argument to me, why do you remain unconvinced? —When you see that the weaker continues in existence after the man is dead, will you not admit that the more lasting must also survive during the same period of time? Now I will ask you to consider whether the objection, which, like Simmias, I will express in a figure, is of any weight. The analogy which I will adduce is that of an old weaver, who dies, and after his death somebody says: —He is not dead, he must be alive; —see, there is the coat which he himself wove and wore, and which remains whole and undecayed. And then he proceeds to ask of someone who is incredulous, whether a man lasts longer, or the coat which is in use and wear; and when he is answered that a man lasts far longer, thinks that he has thus certainly demonstrated the survival of the man, who is the more lasting, because the less lasting remains. But that, Simmias, as I would beg you to remark, is a mistake; anyone can see that he who talks thus is talking nonsense. For the truth is,

that the weaver aforesaid, having woven and worn many such coats, outlived several of them; and was outlived by the last; but a man is not therefore proved to be slighter and weaker than a coat. Now the relation of the body to the soul may be expressed in a similar figure; and anyone may very fairly say in like manner that the soul is lasting, and the body weak and short-lived in comparison. He may argue in like manner that every soul wears out many bodies, especially if a man live many years. While he is alive the body deliquesces and decays, and the soul always weaves another garment and repairs the waste. But of course, whenever the soul perishes, she must have on her last garment, and this will survive her; and then at length, when the soul is dead, the body will show its native weakness, and quickly decompose and pass away. I would therefore rather not rely on the argument from superior strength to prove the continued existence of the soul after death. For granting even more than you affirm to be possible, and acknowledging not only that the soul existed before birth, but also that the souls of some exist, and will continue to exist after death, and will be born and die again and again, and that there is a natural strength in the soul which will hold out and be born many times—nevertheless, we may be still inclined to think that she will weary in the labors of successive births, and may at last succumb in one of her deaths and utterly perish; and this death and dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can have had any experience of it: and if so, then I maintain that he who is confident about death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to prove that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. But if he cannot prove the soul's immortality, he who is about to die will always have reason to fear that when the body is disunited, the soul also may utterly perish.

Phaedo/ All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an unpleasant feeling at hearing what they said. When we had been so firmly convinced before, now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and uncertainty, not only into the previous argument, but into any future one; either we were incapable of forming a judgment, or there were no grounds of belief.

Echecrates/ There I feel with you—by heaven I do, Phaedo, and when you were speaking, I was beginning to ask myself the same question: What argument can I ever trust again? For what could be more convincing than the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit? That the soul is a harmony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful attraction for me, and, when mentioned, came back to me at once, as my own original conviction. And now I must begin again and find another argument which will assure me that when the man is dead the soul survives. Tell me, I implore you, how did Socrates proceed? Did he appear to share the unpleasant feeling which you mention? or did he calmly meet the attack? And did he answer forcibly or feebly? Narrate what passed as exactly as you can.

Phaedo/ Often, Echecrates, I have wondered at Socrates, but never more than on that occasion. That he should be able to answer was nothing, but what astonished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving manner in which he received the words of the young men, and then his quick sense of the wound which had been inflicted by the argument, and the readiness with which he healed it. He might be compared to a general rallying his defeated and broken army, urging them to accompany him and return to the field of argument.

Echecrates/ What followed?

Phaedo/ You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right hand, seated on a sort of stool, and he on a couch which was a good deal higher. He stroked my head, and pressed the hair upon my neck—he had a way of playing with my hair; and then he said:

Socrates/ To-morrow, Phaedo, I suppose that these fair locks of yours will be severed.

Phaedo/ Yes, Socrates, I suppose that they will.

Socrates/ Not so, if you will take my advice.

Phaedo/ What shall I do with them?

Socrates/ To-day and not to-morrow, if this argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again, you and I will both shave our locks: and if I were you, and the argument got away from me, and I could not hold my ground against Simmias and Cebes, I would myself take an oath, like the Argives, not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict and defeated them.

Phaedo/ Yes; but Heracles himself is said not to be a match for two.

Socrates/ Summon me then and I will be your Iolaus until the sun goes down.

Phaedo/ I summon you rather not as Heracles summoning Iolaus, but as Iolaus might summon Heracles.

Socrates/ That will do as well. But first let us take care that we avoid a danger.

Phaedo/ Of what nature?

Socrates/ Lest we become misologists: no worse thing can happen to a man than this. For as there are misanthropists or haters of men, there are also misologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same cause, which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy arises out of the too great confidence of inexperience; —you trust a man and

think him altogether true and sound and faithful, and then in a little while he turns out to be false and knavish; and then another and another, and when this has happened several times to a man, especially when it happens among those whom he deems to be his own most trusted and familiar friends, and he has often quarreled with them, he at last hates all men, and believes that no one has any good in him at all. You must have observed this trait of character?

Phaedo/ I have.

Socrates/ And is not the feeling discreditable? Is it not obvious that such an one having to deal with other men, was clearly without any experience of human nature; for experience would have taught him the true state of the case, that few are the good and few the evil, and that the great majority are in the interval between them.

Phaedo/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean as you might say of the very large and very small—that nothing is more uncommon than a very large or very small man; and this applies generally to all extremes, whether of great and small, or swift and slow, or fair and foul, or black and white: and whether the instances you select be men or dogs or anything else, few are the extremes, but many are in the mean between them. Did you never observe this?

Phaedo/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ And do you not imagine that if there were a competition in evil, the worst would be found to be very few?

Phaedo/ Yes, that is very likely.

Socrates/ Yes, that is very likely; although in this respect arguments are unlike men—there I was led on by you to say more than I had intended; but the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which he afterwards

imagines to be false, whether really false or not, and then another and another, he has no longer any faith left, and great disputers, as you know, come to think at last that they have grown to be the wisest of mankind; for they alone perceive the utter unsoundness and instability of all arguments, or indeed, of all things, which, like the currents in the Euripus, are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and flow.

Phaedo/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Yes, Phaedo and how melancholy, if there be such a thing as truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge—that a man should have lighted upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and then turned out to be false, and instead of blaming himself and his own want of wit, because he is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer the blame from himself to arguments in general: and forever afterwards should hate and revile them, and lose truth and the knowledge of realities.

Phaedo/ Yes, indeed; that is very melancholy.

Socrates/ Let us then, in the first place, be careful of allowing or of admitting into our souls the notion that there is no health or soundness in any arguments at all. Rather say that we have not yet attained to soundness in ourselves, and that we must struggle manfully and do our best to gain health of mind—you and all other men having regard to the whole of your future life, and I myself in the prospect of death. For at this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a philosopher; like the vulgar, I am only a partisan. Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions. And the difference between him and me at the present moment is merely this—that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers

that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself; to convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me. And do but see how much I gain by the argument. For if what I say is true, then I do well to be persuaded of the truth; but if there be nothing after death, still, during the short time that remains, I shall not distress my friends with lamentations, and my ignorance will not last, but will die with me, and therefore no harm will be done. This is the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the argument. And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth and not of Socrates: agree with me, if I seem to you to be speaking the truth; or if not, withstand me might and main, that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm, and like the bee, leave my sting in you before I die.

And now let us proceed. And first of all let me be sure that I have in my mind what you were saying. Simmias, if I remember rightly, has fears and misgivings whether the soul, although a fairer and diviner thing than the body, being as she is in the form of harmony, may not perish first. On the other hand, Cebes appeared to grant that the soul was more lasting than the body, but he said that no one could know whether the soul, after having worn out many bodies, might not perish herself and leave her last body behind her; and that this is death, which is the destruction not of the body but of the soul, for in the body the work of destruction is ever going on. Are not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points which we have to consider?

Phaedo/ They both agreed to this statement of them.

Socrates/ And did you deny the force of the whole preceding argument, or of a part only?

Phaedo/ Of a part only, they replied.

Socrates/ And what did you think of that part of the argument in which we said that knowledge was recollection, and hence inferred that the soul must have previously existed somewhere else before she was enclosed in the body?

Phaedo/ Cebes said that he had been wonderfully impressed by that part of the argument, and that his conviction remained absolutely unshaken. Simmias agreed, and added that he himself could hardly imagine the possibility of his ever thinking differently.

Socrates/ But, you will have to think differently, my Theban friend, if you still maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the soul is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the body; for you will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is prior to the elements which compose it.

Simmias/ Never, Socrates.

Socrates/ But do you not see that this is what you imply when you say that the soul existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up of elements which as yet had no existence? For harmony is not like the soul, as you suppose; but first the lyre, and the strings, and the sounds exist in a state of discord, and then harmony is made last of all, and perishes first. And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other?

Simmias/ Not at all.

Socrates/ And yet there surely ought to be harmony in a discourse of which harmony is the theme?

Simmias/ There ought.

Socrates/ But there is no harmony in the two propositions that knowledge is recollection, and that the soul is a harmony. Which of them will you retain?

Simmias/ I think that I have a much stronger faith, Socrates, in the first of the two, which has been fully

demonstrated to me, than in the latter, which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on probable and plausible grounds; and is therefore believed by the many. I know too well that these arguments from probabilities are impostors, and unless great caution is observed in the use of them, they are apt to be deceptive—in geometry, and in other things too. But the doctrine of knowledge and recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds: and the proof was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body, because to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence. Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a harmony.

Socrates/ Let me put the matter, Simmias, in another point of view: Do you imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other than that of the elements, out of which it is compounded?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer?

Phaedo/ He agreed.

Socrates/ Then a harmony does not, properly speaking, lead the parts or elements which make up the harmony, but only follows them.

Phaedo/ He assented.

Socrates/ For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality which is opposed to its parts.

Simmias/ That would be impossible.

Socrates/ And does not the nature of every harmony depend upon the manner in which the elements are harmonized?

Simmias/ I do not understand you.

Socrates/ I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more truly and fully harmonized, to any extent which is possible; and less of a harmony, and less completely a harmony, when less truly and fully harmonized.

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another?

Simmias/ Not in the least.

Socrates/ Yet surely of two souls, one is said to have intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and the other to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul: and this is said truly?

Simmias/ Yes, truly.

Socrates/ But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this presence of virtue and vice in the soul? —will they say that here is another harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is harmonized, and herself being a harmony has another harmony within her, and that the vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her?

Simmias/ I cannot tell; but I suppose that something of the sort would be asserted by those who say that the soul is a harmony.

Socrates/ And we have already admitted that no soul is more a soul than another; which is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less harmony, or more or less completely a harmony?

Simmias/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less harmonized?

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ And that which is not more or less harmonized cannot have more or less of harmony, but only an equal harmony?

Simmias/ Yes, an equal harmony.

Socrates/ Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is not more or less harmonized?

Simmias/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And therefore has neither more nor less of discord, nor yet of harmony?

Simmias/ She has not.

Socrates/ And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony?

Simmias/ Not at all more.

Socrates/ Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony, will never have any vice; because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has no part in the inharmonical.

Simmias/ No.

Socrates/ And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice?

Simmias/ How can she have, if the previous argument holds?

Socrates/ Then, if all souls are equally by their nature souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good?

Simmias/ I agree with you, Socrates.

Socrates/ And can all this be true, think you? For these are the consequences which seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a harmony?

Simmias/ It cannot be true.

Socrates/ Once more, what ruler is there of the elements of human nature other than the soul, and especially the wise soul? Do you know of any?

Simmias/ Indeed, I do not.

Socrates/ And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at variance with them? For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul incline us against drinking? and when the body is hungry, against eating? And this is only one instance out of ten thousand of the opposition of the soul to the things of the body.

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ But we have already acknowledged that the soul, being a harmony, can never utter a note at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other affections of the strings out of which she is composed; she can only follow, she cannot lead them?

Simmias/ It must be so.

Socrates/ And yet do we not now discover the soul to be doing the exact opposite—leading the elements of which she is believed to be composed; almost always opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout life, sometimes more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic; then again more gently; now threatening, now admonishing the desires, passions, fears, as if talking to a thing which is not herself, as Homer in the Odyssey represents Odysseus doing in the words—

> 'He beat his breast, and thus reproached his heart:
> Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured!'

Do you think that Homer wrote this under the idea that the soul is a harmony capable of being led by the affections of the body, and not rather of a nature which should lead and master them—herself a far diviner thing than any harmony?

Simmias/ Yes, Socrates, I quite think so.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, we can never be right in saying that the soul is a harmony, for we should contradict the divine Homer, and contradict ourselves.

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ Thus much, of Harmonia, your Theban goddess, who has graciously yielded to us; but what shall I say, Cebes, to her husband Cadmus, and how shall I make peace with him?

Cebes/ I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him; I am sure that you have put the argument with Harmonia in a manner that I could never have expected. For when Simmias was mentioning his difficulty, I quite imagined that no answer could be given to him, and therefore I was surprised at finding that his argument could not sustain the first onset of yours, and not impossibly the other, whom you call Cadmus, may share a similar fate.

Socrates/ Nay, my good friend, let us not boast, lest some evil eye should put to flight the word which I am about to speak. That, however, may be left in the hands of those above; while I draw near in Homeric fashion, and try the mettle of your words. Here lies the point: —You want to have it proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal, and the philosopher who is confident in death appears to you to have but a vain and foolish confidence, if he believes that he will fare better in the world below than one who has led another sort of life, unless he can prove this: and you say that the demonstration of the strength and divinity of the soul, and of her existence prior to our becoming men, does

not necessarily imply her immortality. Admitting the soul to be long-lived, and to have known and done much in a former state, still she is not on that account immortal; and her entrance into the human form may be a sort of disease which is the beginning of dissolution, and may at last, after the toils of life are over, end in that which is called death. And whether the soul enters into the body once only or many times, does not, as you say, make any difference in the fears of individuals. For any man, who is not devoid of sense, must fear, if he has no knowledge and can give no account of the soul's immortality. This, or something like this, I suspect to be your notion, Cebes; and I designedly recur to it in order that nothing may escape us, and that you may, if you wish, add or subtract anything.

Cebes/ But as far as I see at present, I have nothing to add or subtract: I mean what you say that I mean.

Phaedo/ Socrates paused awhile, and seemed to be absorbed in reflection. At length he said:

Socrates/ You are raising a tremendous question, Cebes, involving the whole nature of generation and corruption, about which, if you like, I will give you my own experience; and if anything which I say is likely to avail towards the solution of your difficulty you may make use of it.

Cebes/ I should very much like to hear what you have to say.

Socrates/ Then I will tell you. When I was young, Cebes, I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called the investigation of nature; to know the causes of things, and why a thing is and is created or destroyed appeared to me to be a lofty profession; and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of questions such as these: —Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and cold principle

contracts, as some have said? Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire? or perhaps nothing of the kind—but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing and sight and smell, and memory and opinion may come from them, and science may be based on memory and opinion when they have attained fixity. And then I went on to examine the corruption of them, and then to the things of heaven and earth, and at last I concluded myself to be utterly and absolutely incapable of these enquiries, as I will satisfactorily prove to you. For I was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things which I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well; I forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths; e.g. such a fact as that the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking; for when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger and the small man great. Was not that a reasonable notion?

Cebes/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ Well; but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I thought that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and when I saw a great man standing by a little one, I fancied that one was taller than the other by a head; or one horse would appear to be greater than another horse: and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is two more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one, because two is the double of one.

Cebes/ And what is now your notion of such matters?

Socrates/ I should be far enough from imagining that I knew the cause of any of them, by heaven I should; for I cannot satisfy myself that, when one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, or that the two

units added together make two by reason of the addition. I cannot understand how, when separated from the other, each of them was one and not two, and now, when they are brought together, the mere juxtaposition or meeting of them should be the cause of their becoming two: neither can I understand how the division of one is the way to make two; for then a different cause would produce the same effect, — as in the former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the cause of two, in this the separation and subtraction of one from the other would be the cause. Nor am I any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why one or anything else is either generated or destroyed or is at all, but I have in my mind some confused notion of a new method, and can never admit the other.

Then I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this notion, which appeared quite admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place: and I argued that if anyone desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what state of being or doing or suffering was best for that thing, and therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would also know the worse, since the same science comprehended both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round; and whichever was true, he would proceed to explain the cause and the necessity of this being so, and then he would teach me the nature of the best and show that this was best; and if he said that the earth was in the center, he would further explain that this position was the best, and I should be satisfied with the explanation

given, and not want any other sort of cause. And I thought that I would then go on and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and their returnings and various states, active and passive, and how all of them were for the best. For I could not imagine that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would give any other account of their being as they are, except that this was best; and I thought that when he had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he would go on to explain to me what was best for each and what was good for all. These hopes I would not have sold for a large sum of money, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better and the worse.

What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavored to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture—that is what he would say; and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true

cause, which is, that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; for I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara or Boeotia—by the dog they would, if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, of enduring any punishment which the state inflicts. There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming. And thus one man makes a vortex all round and steadies the earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to the earth, which is a sort of broad trough. Any power which in arranging them as they are arranges them for the best never enters into their minds; and instead of finding any superior strength in it, they rather expect to discover another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more everlasting and more containing than the good; —of the obligatory and containing power of the good they think nothing; and yet this is the principle which I would fain learn if anyone would teach me. But as I have failed either to discover myself, or to learn of anyone else, the nature of the best, I will exhibit to you, if you like, what I have found to be the second best mode of enquiring into the cause.

Cebes/ I should very much like to hear.

Socrates/ —I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation of true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of my soul; as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing on the sun during an eclipse, unless they take the precaution of only looking at the image reflected in the water, or in some similar medium. So in my own case, I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the help of the senses. And I thought that I had better have recourse to the world of mind and seek there the truth of existence. I dare say that the simile is not perfect—for I am very far from admitting that he who contemplates existences through the medium of thought, sees them only 'through a glass darkly' any more than he who considers them in action and operation. However, this was the method which I adopted: I first assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning more clearly, as I do not think that you as yet understand me.

Cebes/ No indeed, not very well.

Socrates/ There is nothing new in what I am about to tell you; but only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of everyone, and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul.

Cebes/ You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant you this.

Socrates/ Well, then I should like to know whether you agree with me in the next step; for I cannot help thinking, if there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty should there be such, that it can be beautiful only in so far as it partakes of absolute beauty—and I should say the same of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the cause?

Cebes/ Yes, I agree.

Socrates/ I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that the bloom of color, or form, or any such thing is a source of beauty, I leave all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. This appears to me to be the safest answer which I can give, either to myself or to another, and to this I cling, in the persuasion that this principle will never be overthrown, and that to myself or to anyone who asks the question, I may safely reply, That by beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree with me?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ And that by greatness only great things become great and greater, greater, and by smallness the less become less?

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ Then if a person were to remark that A is taller by a head than B, and B less by a head than A, you would refuse to admit his statement, and would stoutly contend

that what you mean is only that the greater is greater by, and by reason of, greatness, and the less is less only by, and by reason of, smallness; and thus you would avoid the danger of saying that the greater is greater and the less, less by the measure of the head, which is the same in both, and would also avoid the monstrous absurdity of supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of the head, which is small. You would be afraid to draw such an inference, would you not?

Phaedo/ laughing Cebes said:

Cebes/ Indeed, I should.

Socrates/ In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by, and by reason of, two; but would say by, and by reason of, number; or you would say that two cubits exceed one cubit not by a half, but by magnitude? — for there is the same liability to error in all these cases.

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to one, or the division of one, is the cause of two? And you would loudly asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence except by participation in its own proper essence, and consequently, as far as you know, the only cause of two is the participation in duality—this is the way to make two, and the participation in one is the way to make one. You would say: I will let alone puzzles of division and addition—wiser heads than mine may answer them; inexperienced as I am, and ready to start, as the proverb says, at my own shadow, I cannot afford to give up the sure ground of a principle. And if anyone assails you there, you would not mind him, or answer him, until you had seen whether the consequences which follow agree with one another or not, and when you are further required to give an explanation of this principle,

you would go on to assume a higher principle, and a higher, until you found a resting-place in the best of the higher; but you would not confuse the principle and the consequences in your reasoning, like the Eristics—at least if you wanted to discover real existence. Not that this confusion signifies to them, who never care or think about the matter at all, for they have the wit to be well pleased with themselves however great may be the turmoil of their ideas. But you, if you are a philosopher, will certainly do as I say.

Phaedo/ What you say is most true, said Simmias and Cebes, both speaking at once.

Echecrates/ Yes, Phaedo; and I do not wonder at their assenting. Anyone who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clearness of Socrates' reasoning.

Phaedo/ Certainly, Echecrates; and such was the feeling of the whole company at the time.

Echecrates/ Yes, and equally of ourselves, who were not of the company, and are now listening to your recital. But what followed?

Phaedo/ After all this had been admitted, and they had agreed that ideas exist, and that other things participate in them and derive their names from them, Socrates, if I remember rightly, said: —

Socrates/ This is your way of speaking; and yet when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of Simmias both greatness and smallness?

Cebes/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as the words may seem to imply, because he is Simmias, but by reason of the size which he has; just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is Simmias, any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but

because he has smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias?

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, this is not because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias, who is comparatively smaller?

Cebes/ That is true.

Socrates/ And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small, because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one by his greatness, and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his smallness.

Phaedo/ He added, laughing;

Socrates/ I am speaking like a book, but I believe that what I am saying is true.

Phaedo/ Simmias assented.

Socrates/ I speak as I do because I want you to agree with me in thinking, not only that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but that greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or admit of being exceeded: instead of this, one of two things will happen, either the greater will fly or retire before the opposite, which is the less, or at the approach of the less has already ceased to exist; but will not, if allowing or admitting of smallness, be changed by that; even as I, having received and admitted smallness when compared with Simmias, remain just as I was, and am the same small person. And as the idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to be or become small, in like manner the smallness in us cannot be or become great; nor can any other opposite which remains the same ever be or become its own opposite, but either passes away or perishes in the change.

Cebes/ That is quite my notion.

Phaedo/ Hereupon one of the company, though I do not exactly remember which of them, said:

Someone/ In heaven's name, is not this the direct contrary of what was admitted before—that out of the greater came the less and out of the less the greater, and that opposites were simply generated from opposites; but now this principle seems to be utterly denied.

Phaedo/ Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened.

Socrates/ I like your courage in reminding us of this. But you do not observe that there is a difference in the two cases. For then we were speaking of opposites in the concrete, and now of the essential opposite which, as is affirmed, neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance with itself: then, my friend, we were speaking of things in which opposites are inherent and which are called after them, but now about the opposites which are inherent in them and which give their name to them; and these essential opposites will never, as we maintain, admit of generation into or out of one another.

Phaedo/ At the same time, turning to Cebes, he said:

Socrates/ Are you at all disconcerted, Cebes, at our friend's objection?

Cebes/ No, I do not feel so; and yet I cannot deny that I am often disturbed by objections.

Socrates/ Then we are agreed after all, that the opposite will never in any case be opposed to itself?

Cebes/ To that we are quite agreed.

Socrates/ Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point of view, and see whether you agree with me: —There is a thing which you term heat, and another thing which you term cold?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But are they the same as fire and snow?

Cebes/ Most assuredly not.

Socrates/ Heat is a thing different from fire, and cold is not the same with snow?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before said, is under the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat; but at the advance of the heat, the snow will either retire or perish?

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or perish; and when the fire is under the influence of the cold, they will not remain as before, fire and cold.

Cebes/ That is true.

Socrates/ And in some cases the name of the idea is not only attached to the idea in an eternal connection, but anything else which, not being the idea, exists only in the form of the idea, may also lay claim to it. I will try to make this clearer by an example: —The odd number is always called by the name of odd?

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ But is this the only thing which is called odd? Are there not other things which have their own name, and yet are called odd, because, although not the same as oddness, they are never without oddness? —that is what I mean to ask—whether numbers such as the number three are not of the class of odd. And there are many other examples: would you not say, for example, that three may be called by its proper name, and also be called odd, which is not the same with three? and this may be said not only of

three but also of five, and of every alternate number—each of them without being oddness is odd; and in the same way two and four, and the other series of alternate numbers, has every number even, without being evenness. Do you agree?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then now mark the point at which I am aiming: —not only do essential opposites exclude one another, but also concrete things, which, although not in themselves opposed, contain opposites; these, I say, likewise reject the idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them, and when it approaches them they either perish or withdraw. For example; Will not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, while remaining three?

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ And yet, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number three?

Cebes/ It is not.

Socrates/ Then not only do opposite ideas repel the advance of one another, but also there are other natures which repel the approach of opposites.

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ Suppose that we endeavor, if possible, to determine what these are.

Cebes/ By all means.

Socrates/ Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have possession, not only to take their own form, but also the form of some opposite?

Cebes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean, as I was just now saying, and as I am sure that you know, that those things which are possessed

by the number three must not only be three in number, but must also be odd.

Cebes/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the opposite idea will never intrude?

Cebes/ No.

Socrates/ And this impress was given by the odd principle?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And to the odd is opposed the even?

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three?

Cebes/ No.

Socrates/ Then three has no part in the even?

Cebes/ None.

Socrates/ Then the triad or number three is uneven?

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposed, and yet do not admit opposites—as, in the instance given, three, although not opposed to the even, does not any the more admit of the even, but always brings the opposite into play on the other side; or as two does not receive the odd, or fire the cold—from these examples (and there are many more of them) perhaps you may be able to arrive at the general conclusion, that not only opposites will not receive opposites, but also that nothing which brings the opposite will admit the opposite of that which it brings, in that to which it is brought. And here let me recapitulate—for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the nature of the even, any more than ten, which is the double of five, will admit the nature of

the odd. The double has another opposite, and is not strictly opposed to the odd, but nevertheless rejects the odd altogether. Nor again will parts in the ratio 3 : 2, nor any fraction in which there is a half, nor again in which there is a third, admit the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to the whole: You will agree?

Cebes/ Yes, I entirely agree and go along with you in that.

Socrates/ And now, let us begin again; and do not you answer my question in the words in which I ask it: let me have not the old safe answer of which I spoke at first, but another equally safe, of which the truth will be inferred by you from what has been just said. I mean that if anyone asks you 'what that is, of which the inherence makes the body hot,' you will reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and stupid answer), but fire, a far superior answer, which we are now in a condition to give. Or if anyone asks you 'why a body is diseased,' you will not say from disease, but from fever; and instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd numbers, you will say that the monad is the cause of them: and so of things in general, as I dare say that you will understand sufficiently without my adducing any further examples.

Cebes/ Yes, I quite understand you.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body alive?

Cebes/ The soul.

Socrates/ And is this always the case?

Cebes/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life?

Cebes/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And is there any opposite to life?

Cebes/ There is.

Socrates/ And what is that?

Cebes/ Death.

Socrates/ Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of what she brings.

Cebes/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And now, what did we just now call that principle which repels the even?

Cebes/ The odd.

Socrates/ And that principle which repels the musical or the just?

Cebes/ The unmusical and the unjust.

Socrates/ And what do we call that principle which does not admit of death?

Cebes/ The immortal.

Socrates/ And does the soul admit of death?

Cebes/ No.

Socrates/ Then the soul is immortal?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And may we say that this has been proven?

Cebes/ Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates.

Socrates/ Supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be imperishable?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm principle came attacking the snow, must not the snow have retired whole and unmelted—for it could never have perished, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat?

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable, the fire when assailed by cold would not have perished or have been extinguished, but would have gone away unaffected?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish; for the preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever be dead, any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or fire, or the heat in the fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say: 'But although the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the odd?' Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable; for this has not been acknowledged, but if this had been acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure; and the same argument would have held good of fire and heat and any other thing.

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; but if not, some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be given.

Cebes/ No other proof is needed; for if the immortal, being eternal, is liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable.

Socrates/ Yes and yet all men will agree that God, and the essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never perish.

Cebes/ Yes, all men—that is true; and what is more, gods, if I am not mistaken, as well as men.

Socrates/ Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she is immortal, be also imperishable?

Cebes/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is preserved safe and sound?

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world!

Cebes/ I am convinced, Socrates, and have nothing more to object; but if my friend Simmias, or anyone else, has any further objection to make, he had better speak out, and not keep silence, since I do not know to what other season he can defer the discussion, if there is anything which he wants to say or to have said.

Simmias/ But I have nothing more to say; nor can I see any reason for doubt after what has been said. But I still feel and cannot help feeling uncertain in my own mind, when I think of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man.

Socrates/ Yes, Simmias, that is well said: and I may add that first principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully considered; and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a sort of hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow the course of the argument; and if that be plain and clear, there will be no need for any further enquiry.

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ But then, O my friends, if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of

eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their souls. But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom. For the soul when on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education; and these are said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the very beginning of his journey thither.

For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered together, whence after judgment has been given they pass into the world below, following the guide, who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other: and when they have there received their due and remained their time, another guide brings them back again after many revolutions of ages. Now this way to the other world is not, as Aeschylus says in the Telephus, a single and straight path—if that were so no guide would be needed, for no one could miss it; but there are many partings of the road, and windings, as I infer from the rites and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three ways meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul follows in the straight path and is conscious of her surroundings; but the soul which desires the body, and which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius; and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, whether foul murders

or other crimes which are the brothers of these, and the works of brothers in crime—from that soul everyone flees and turns away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, and when they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation; as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper home.

Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is indeed in nature and extent very unlike the notions of geographers, as I believe on the authority of one who shall be nameless.

Simmias/ What do you mean, Socrates? I have myself heard many descriptions of the earth, but I do not know, and I should very much like to know, in which of these you put faith.

Socrates/ And I, Simmias, if I had the art of Glaucus would tell you; although I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove the truth of my tale, which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if I could, I fear, Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the argument was completed. I may describe to you, however, the form and regions of the earth according to my conception of them.

Simmias/ That will be enough.

Socrates/ Well then, my conviction is, that the earth is a round body in the center of the heavens, and therefore has no need of air or of any similar force to be a support, but is kept there and hindered from falling or inclining any way by the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise. For that which, being in equipoise, is in the center of that which is equably diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, but will always remain in the same state and not deviate. And this is my first notion.

Simmias/ Which is surely a correct one.

Socrates/ Also I believe that the earth is very vast, and that we who dwell in the region extending from the river Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles inhabit a small portion only about the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh, and that there are other inhabitants of many other like places; for everywhere on the face of the earth there are hollows of various forms and sizes, into which the water and the mist and the lower air collect. But the true earth is pure and situated in the pure heaven—there are the stars also; and it is the heaven which is commonly spoken of by us as the ether, and of which our own earth is the sediment gathering in the hollows beneath. But we who live in these hollows are deceived into the notion that we are dwelling above on the surface of the earth; which is just as if a creature who was at the bottom of the sea were to fancy that he was on the surface of the water, and that the sea was the heaven through which he saw the sun and the other stars, he having never come to the surface by reason of his feebleness and sluggishness, and having never lifted up his head and seen, nor ever heard from one who had seen, how much purer and fairer the world above is than his own. And such is exactly our case: for we are dwelling in a hollow of the earth, and fancy that we are on the surface; and the air we call the heaven, in which we imagine that the stars move. But the fact is, that owing to our feebleness and sluggishness we are prevented from reaching the surface of the air: for if any man could arrive at the exterior limit, or take the wings of a bird and come to the top, then like a fish who puts his head out of the water and sees this world, he would see a world beyond; and, if the nature of man could sustain the sight, he would acknowledge that this other world was the place of the true heaven and the true light and the true earth. For our earth, and the stones, and the entire region which

surrounds us, are spoilt and corroded, as in the sea all things are corroded by the brine, neither is there any noble or perfect growth, but caverns only, and sand, and an endless slough of mud; and even the shore is not to be compared to the fairer sights of this world. And still less is this our world to be compared with the other. Of that upper earth which is under the heaven, I can tell you a charming tale, Simmias, which is well worth hearing.

Simmias/ And we, Socrates, shall be charmed to listen to you.

Socrates/ The tale, my friend, is as follows: —In the first place, the earth, when looked at from above, is in appearance streaked like one of those balls which have leather coverings in twelve pieces, and is decked with various colors, of which the colors used by painters on earth are in a manner samples. But there the whole earth is made up of them, and they are brighter far and clearer than ours; there is a purple of wonderful luster, also the radiance of gold, and the white which is in the earth is whiter than any chalk or snow. Of these and other colors the earth is made up, and they are more in number and fairer than the eye of man has ever seen; the very hollows (of which I was speaking) filled with air and water have a color of their own, and are seen like light gleaming amid the diversity of the other colors, so that the whole presents a single and continuous appearance of variety in unity. And in this fair region everything that grows—trees, and flowers, and fruits—are in a like degree fairer than any here; and there are hills, having stones in them in a like degree smoother, and more transparent, and fairer in color than our highly-valued emeralds and sardonyxes and jaspers, and other gems, which are but minute fragments of them: for there all the stones are like our precious stones, and fairer still. The reason is, that they are pure, and not, like our precious

stones, infected or corroded by the corrupt briny elements which coagulate among us, and which breed foulness and disease both in earth and stones, as well as in animals and plants. They are the jewels of the upper earth, which also shines with gold and silver and the like, and they are set in the light of day and are large and abundant and in all places, making the earth a sight to gladden the beholder's eye. And there are animals and men, some in a middle region, others dwelling about the air as we dwell about the sea; others in islands which the air flows round, near the continent; and in a word, the air is used by them as the water and the sea are by us, and the ether is to them what the air is to us. Moreover, the temperament of their seasons is such that they have no disease, and live much longer than we do, and have sight and hearing and smell, and all the other senses, in far greater perfection, in the same proportion that air is purer than water or the ether than air. Also they have temples and sacred places in which the gods really dwell, and they hear their voices and receive their answers, and are conscious of them and hold converse with them; and they see the sun, moon, and stars as they truly are, and their other blessedness is of a piece with this.

Such is the nature of the whole earth, and of the things which are around the earth; and there are divers regions in the hollows on the face of the globe everywhere, some of them deeper and more extended than that which we inhabit, others deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some are shallower and also wider. All have numerous perforations, and there are passages broad and narrow in the interior of the earth, connecting them with one another; and there flows out of and into them, as into basins, a vast tide of water, and huge subterranean streams of perennial rivers, and springs hot and cold, and a great fire, and great rivers of fire, and streams of liquid mud, thin or thick (like

the rivers of mud in Sicily, and the lava streams which follow them), and the regions about which they happen to flow are filled up with them. And there is a swinging or see-saw in the interior of the earth which moves all this up and down, and is due to the following cause: —There is a chasm which is the vastest of them all, and pierces right through the whole earth; this is that chasm which Homer describes in the words, —

> 'Far off, where is the inmost depth beneath the earth;'

and which he in other places, and many other poets, have called Tartarus. And the see-saw is caused by the streams flowing into and out of this chasm, and they each have the nature of the soil through which they flow. And the reason why the streams are always flowing in and out, is that the watery element has no bed or bottom, but is swinging and surging up and down, and the surrounding wind and air do the same; they follow the water up and down, hither and thither, over the earth—just as in the act of respiration the air is always in process of inhalation and exhalation; —and the wind swinging with the water in and out produces fearful and irresistible blasts: when the waters retire with a rush into the lower parts of the earth, as they are called, they flow through the earth in those regions, and fill them up like water raised by a pump, and then when they leave those regions and rush back hither, they again fill the hollows here, and when these are filled, flow through subterranean channels and find their way to their several places, forming seas, and lakes, and rivers, and springs. Thence they again enter the earth, some of them making a long circuit into many lands, others going to a few places and not so distant; and again fall into Tartarus, some at a point a good deal lower than that at which they rose, and others not much lower, but all in some degree lower than the point from which they came. And some burst forth again on the opposite side,

and some on the same side, and some wind round the earth with one or many folds like the coils of a serpent, and descend as far as they can, but always return and fall into the chasm. The rivers flowing in either direction can descend only to the center and no further, for opposite to the rivers is a precipice.

Now these rivers are many, and mighty, and diverse, and there are four principal ones, of which the greatest and outermost is that called Oceanus, which flows round the earth in a circle; and in the opposite direction flows Acheron, which passes under the earth through desert places into the Acherusian lake: this is the lake to the shores of which the souls of the many go when they are dead, and after waiting an appointed time, which is to some a longer and to some a shorter time, they are sent back to be born again as animals. The third river passes out between the two, and near the place of outlet pours into a vast region of fire, and forms a lake larger than the Mediterranean Sea, boiling with water and mud; and proceeding muddy and turbid, and winding about the earth, comes, among other places, to the extremities of the Acherusian lake, but mingles not with the waters of the lake, and after making many coils about the earth plunges into Tartarus at a deeper level. This is that Pyriphlegethon, as the stream is called, which throws up jets of fire in different parts of the earth. The fourth river goes out on the opposite side, and falls first of all into a wild and savage region, which is all of a dark blue color, like lapis lazuli; and this is that river which is called the Stygian river, and falls into and forms the Lake Styx, and after falling into the lake and receiving strange powers in the waters, passes under the earth, winding round in the opposite direction, and comes near the Acherusian lake from the opposite side to Pyriphlegethon. And the water of this river too mingles with no other, but flows round in a circle and falls into

Tartarus over against Pyriphlegethon; and the name of the river, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the place to which the genius of each severally guides them, first of all, they have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously or not. And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river Acheron, and embarking in any vessels which they may find, are carried in them to the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds, and having suffered the penalty of the wrongs which they have done to others, they are absolved, and receive the rewards of their good deeds, each of them according to his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes—who have committed many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the like—such are hurled into Tartarus which is their suitable destiny, and they never come out. Those again who have committed crimes, which, although great, are not irremediable—who in a moment of anger, for example, have done some violence to a father or a mother, and have repented for the remainder of their lives, or, who have taken the life of another under the like extenuating circumstances—these are plunged into Tartarus, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a year, but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth—mere homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon—and they are borne to the Acherusian lake, and there they lift up their voices and call upon the victims whom they have slain or wronged, to have pity on them, and to be kind to them, and let them come out into the lake. And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if not, they are carried back again into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain mercy from those whom they

have wronged: for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those too who have been pre-eminent for holiness of life are released from this earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the purer earth; and of these, such as have duly purified themselves with philosophy live henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer still, which may not be described, and of which the time would fail me to tell.

Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do that we may obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize, and the hope great!

A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be very confident, that the description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who having cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him and working harm rather than good, has sought after the pleasures of knowledge; and has arrayed the soul, not in some foreign attire, but in her own proper jewels, temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, and truth—in these adorned she is ready to go on her journey to the world below, when her hour comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as a tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison; and I think that I had better repair to the bath first, in order that the women may not have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead.

Phaedo/ When he had done speaking, Crito said:

Crito/ And have you any commands for us, Socrates—anything to say about your children, or any other matter in which we can serve you?

Socrates/ Nothing particular, Crito: only, as I have always told you, take care of yourselves; that is a service which you may be ever rendering to me and mine and to all of us, whether you promise to do so or not. But if you have no thought for yourselves, and care not to walk according to the rule which I have prescribed for you, not now for the first time, however much you may profess or promise at the moment, it will be of no avail.

Crito/ We will do our best: And in what way shall we bury you?

Socrates/ In any way that you like; but you must get hold of me, and take care that I do not run away from you.

Phaedo/ Then he turned to us, and added with a smile:—

Socrates/ I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body—and he asks, How shall he bury me? And though I have spoken many words in the endeavor to show that when I have drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed, —these words of mine, with which I was comforting you and myself, have had, as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore I want you to be surety for me to him now, as at the trial he was surety to the judges for me: but let the promise be of another sort; for he was surety for me to the judges that I would remain, and you must be my surety to him that I shall not remain, but go away and depart; and then he will suffer less at my death, and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say

at the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and do with that whatever is usual, and what you think best.

Phaedo/ When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into a chamber to bathe; Crito followed him and told us to wait. So we remained behind, talking and thinking of the subject of discourse, and also of the greatness of our sorrow; he was like a father of whom we were being bereaved, and we were about to pass the rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath his children were brought to him—(he had two young sons and an elder one); and the women of his family also came, and he talked to them and gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito; then he dismissed them and returned to us.

Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed while he was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after his bath, but not much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the Eleven, entered and stood by him, saying: —

Jailer/ To you, Socrates, whom I know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me, when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink the poison—indeed, I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are aware, and not I, are to blame. And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what must needs be—you know my errand.

Phaedo/ Then bursting into tears he turned away and went out.

Socrates looked at him and said:

Socrates/ I return your good wishes, and will do as you bid.

Phaedo/ Then turning to us, he said;

Socrates/ How charming the man is: since I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to me, and was as good to me as could be, and now see how generously he sorrows on my account. We must do as he says, Crito; and therefore let the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared: if not, let the attendant prepare some.

Crito/ Yet, the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and I know that many a one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him, he has eaten and drunk, and enjoyed the society of his beloved; do not hurry—there is time enough.

Socrates/ Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in so acting, for they think that they will be gainers by the delay; but I am right in not following their example, for I do not think that I should gain anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should only be ridiculous in my own eyes for sparing and saving a life which is already forfeit. Please then to do as I say, and not to refuse me.

Phaedo/ Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by; and he went out, and having been absent for some time, returned with the jailer carrying the cup of poison. Socrates said:

Socrates/ You, my good friend, who are experienced in these matters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed.

Jailer/ You have only to walk about until your legs are heavy, and then to lie down, and the poison will act.

Phaedo/ At the same time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest manner, without the least fear or change of color or feature, looking at the man with all

his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said:

Socrates/ What do you say about making a libation out of this cup to any god? May I, or not?

Jailer/ We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough.

Socrates/ I understand: but I may and must ask the gods to prosper my journey from this to the other world—even so—and so be it according to my prayer.

Phaedo/ Then raising the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow; but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept, not for him, but at the thought of my own calamity in having to part from such a friend. Nor was I the first; for Crito, when he found himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up, and I followed; and at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time, broke out in a loud and passionate cry which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness:

Socrates/ What is this strange outcry? I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not misbehave in this way, for I have been told that a man should die in peace. Be quiet then, and have patience.

Phaedo/ When we heard his words we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and then looked at his feet and legs; and after a while he pressed his foot hard, and asked him if he could feel; and he said;

Socrates/ No.

Phaedo/ and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and said:

Socrates/ When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end.

Phaedo/ He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said—they were his last words—he said:

Socrates/ Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt?

Crito/ The debt shall be paid; is there anything else?

Phaedo/ There was no answer to this question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend; concerning whom I may truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest and justest and best.

Phaedo.

Translated and edited by Henry Morley. 1783

or, a dialogue on the immortality of the soul.

Persons of the Dialog

Echecrates and Phaedo.

Echecrates/ Phaedo, were you present when Socrates drank the poison? Or did anyone give you an account how he behaved in that juncture?

Phaedo/ I was present.

Echecrates/ What were his last words then, and how expired he? You'll oblige me much with the narration; for the Philasians have but little correspondence with the Athenians, and 'tis a long time since we had any stranger from Athens to inform us how things went. We only heard that he died after drinking the poison, but could not understand any particulars concerning his death.

Phaedo/ What! Did you not hear how he was arraigned?

Echecrates/ Yes, truly, somebody told us that; and we thought it strange that his sentence was so long in being put in execution after his trial.

Phaedo/ That happened only accidentally, for the day before his trial, the stern of the sacred ship which the Athenians send every year to Delos, was crowned for the voyage.

Echecrates/ What is that sacred ship?

Phaedo/ If you credit the Athenians, it is the same ship in which Theseus transported the four teen young children to Crete, and brought them safe back again;

and ’tis said the Athenians at that time vowed to Apollo, that if the children were preserved from the impending danger, they would send every year to Delos presents and victims aboard the vessel, and this they do ever since. As soon as the ship is cleared, and ready to put to sea, they purify the city, and observe an inviolable law for putting none to death before the return of the ship. Now sometimes it stays long out, especially if the winds be contrary. This festival, which is properly called Theoria, commences when the priest of Apollo has crowned the stern of the ship. Now, as I told you, this happened on the day preceding Socrates trial. And ’twas upon that account that he was kept so long in prison after his commitment.

Echecrates/ And during his imprisonment, what did he do? What said he? Who was with him? Did the judges order him to be kept from visits? and did he die without the assistance of his friends?

Phaedo/ Not at all; several of his friends stayed with him to the last minute.

Echecrates/ If you re at leisure, pray relate the whole story.

Phaedo/ At present I have nothing to do, and so shall endeavor to satisfy your demands. Be sides, I take the greatest pleasure in the world in speaking, or hearing others speak, of Socrates.

Echecrates/ Assure yourself, Phaedo, you shall not take more pleasure in speaking than I in hearing. Begin, pray; and above all, take care to omit nothing.

Phaedo/ You’ll be surprised when you hear what a condition I was then in. I was so far from being sensibly touched with the misfortune of a friend whom I loved very tenderly, and who died before my eyes, that I envied

his circumstances, and could not forbear to admire the goodness, sweetness, and tranquility that appeared in all his discourses, and the bravery he showed upon the approach of death.

Everything that I saw furnishes me with a proof that he did not pass to the shades below without the assistance of some deity, that took care to conduct him, and put him in possession of that transcendent felicity of the blessed. But as, on one hand, these thoughts stifled all the sentiments of compassion that might seem due at such a mortifying sight; so, on the other hand, they lessened the pleasure I was wont to have in hearing all his other discourses, and affected me with that sorrowful reflection that, in the space of a minute, this divine man would leave us forever. Thus was my heart crossed with contrary motions, that I could not define. 'twas not properly either pleasure or grief, but a confused mixture of these two passions, which produced almost the same effect in all the bystanders. One while we melted into tears, and another while gave surprising signs of real joy and sensible pleasure. Above all, Apollodorus distinguished himself upon this occasion; you know his humor.

Echecrates/ Nobody knows it better.

Phaedo/ In him was the difference of these motions most observable. As for me, and all the rest, our behavior was not so distinguishing, as being mixed with the trouble and confusion I spoke of just now.

Echecrates/ Who was there then besides yourself?

Phaedo/ There were no other Athenians, but Apollodorus, Critobulus, and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes, Ctesippus, Menexemus, and a few more. Plato was sick.

Echecrates/ Were there no strangers?

Phaedo/ Yes; Simmias the Theban, with Cebes and Phedondes; and from Megara, Euclides and Terpsion.

Echecrates/ What! were not Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

Phaedo/ No, sure; for 'tis said, they were at Aegina.

Echecrates/ Who was there besides?

Phaedo/ I believe I have named most of those that were there.

Echecrates/ Let me hear then what his last discourses were.

Phaedo/ I shall endeavor to give you a full account, for we never missed one day in visiting Socrates. To this end, we met every morning in the place where he was tried, which joined to the prison; and there we waited till the prison doors were opened; at which time we went straight to him, and commonly passed the whole day with him. On the day of his execution, we came thither sooner than ordinary, having heard, as we came out of the city, that the ship was returned from Delos. When we arrived, the jailer that used to let us in came to us, and desired we would stay a little, and not go in till he came to conduct us. "For," said he, "the eleven magistrates are now untying Socrates, and acquainting him that he must die on this day." When we came in, we found Socrates untied, and his wife Xantippe (you know her) sitting by him with one of his children in her arms; and as soon as she spied us, she fell a-crying and making a noise, as you know women commonly do on such occasions.

Xanthippe/ Socrates, this is the last time your friends shall see you.

Phaedo/ Upon which Socrates, turning to Crito, said;

Socrates/ Crito, pray send this woman home.

Phaedo/ Accordingly 'twas done. Crito's folks carried Xantippe off, who beat her face and cried bitterly. In the meantime, Socrates, sitting upon the bed, softly strokes the place of his leg where the chain had been tied, and says;

Socrates/ To my mind what men call pleasure is a pretty odd sort of a thing, which agrees admirably well with pain; though people believe 'tis quite contrary, because they cannot meet in one and the same subject. For whoever enjoys the one, must unavoidably be possessed of the other, as if they were naturally joined.

Had Aesop been aware of this truth, perhaps he had made a fable of it; and had told us that God designing to reconcile these two enemies, and not being able to compass His end, contented Himself with tying them to one chain; so that ever since the one follows the other, according to my experience at this minute. For the pain occasioned by my chain is now followed with a great deal of pleasure.

Cebes/ I am infinitely glad that you have mentioned Aesop, for by so doing you have put it in my head to ask you a question that many have asked me of late, especially Evenus. The question relates to your poems in turning the fables of sop into verse, and making a hymn to Apollo. They want to know what moved you, that never made verses before, to turn poet since you came into the prison. If Evenus asks the same question of me again, as I know he will, what would you have me to say?

Socrates/ You have nothing to do, but to tell him the plain matter of fact as it stands, namely, that I did not at all mean to rival him in poetry, for I knew such an

attempt was above my reach; but only to trace the meaning of some dreams, and put myself in a capacity of obeying, in case poetry happened to be the music that they allotted for my exercise. For you must know that all my lifetime I have had dreams which always recommended the same thing to me, sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another. 'Socrates,' said they, 'apply yourself to music.' This I always took for a simple exhortation, like that commonly given to those who run races, ordering me to pursue my wonted course of life, and carry on the study of wisdom, that I made my whole business, which is the most perfect music. But since my trial, the festival of Apollo having retarded the execution of my sentence, I fancied these dreams might have ordered me to apply myself to that vulgar and common sort of music; and since I was departing this world, I thought it safer to sanctify myself by obeying the gods, and essaying to make verses, than to disobey them. Pursuant to this thought, my first essay was a hymn to the god whose festival was then celebrated. After that, I considered that a true poet ought not only to make discourses in verse, but likewise fable. Now finding myself not disposed to invent new fables, I applied myself to those of Aesop, and turned those into verse that came first into my mind.

This, my dear Cebes, is the answer you re to give Evenus assuring him that I wish him all happiness; and tell him that if he be wise he'll follow me. For in all appearance I am to make my exit this day, since the Athenians have given orders to that effect.

Simmias/ What sort of counsel is that you give to Evenus? I have seen that man often; and by what I know of him, I can promise you, he'll never follow you with his will.

Socrates/ What! is not Evenus a philosopher?

Simmias/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then, he, and all others that are worthy of that profession, will be willing to follow me. I know he will not kill himself, for that, they say, is not lawful.

Phaedo/ Having spoken these words, he drew his legs off the bed, and sat down upon the ground, in which posture he entertained us the whole remaining part of the day. Cebes put the first question to him, which was this;

Cebes/ How do you reconcile this, Socrates, that 'tis not lawful to kill one's self, and at the same time that a philosopher ought to follow you?

Socrates/ What! did neither you nor Simmias ever hear your friend Philolaus discourse that point?

Cebes/ No, he never explained himself clearly upon that point.

Socrates/ As for me, I know nothing but what I have heard, and shall not grudge to communicate all that I have learned. Besides, there's no exercise so suitable for a man upon the point of death, as that of examining and endeavoring thoroughly to know what voyage this is that we must all make, and making known his own opinion upon it.

Cebes/ What is the ground of that assertion, that 'tis not lawful for a man to kill himself? I have often heard Philolaus and others say that it was an ill action, but I never heard them say more.

Socrates/ Have patience, you shall know more presently, and perhaps you'll be surprised to find it an eternal truth that never changes, whereas most other things in this world alter according to their circumstances; this is still the same, even in the case of

those to whom death would be more agreeable than life. Is it not a surprising thing that such men are not allowed to possess themselves of the good they want, but are obliged to wait for another deliverer?

Cebes/ Zeus only knows that.

Socrates/ This may seem unreasonable to you, but after all, it is not so. The discourses we are entertained with every day in our ceremonies and mysteries, that is to say, that God has put us in this life, as in a post which we cannot quit without His leave, etc. —these, I say, and such-like expressions, may seem hard, and surpass our understanding. But nothing is easier to be understood or better said than this, that the gods take care of men, and that men are one of the possessions that belong to the gods. Is not this true?

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ Would not you yourself, be angry if one of your slaves killed himself without your order; and would not you punish him severely if you could?

Cebes/ Yes, doubtless.

Socrates/ By the same reason, a man should not kill himself, but should wait for an express order from God for making his exit, like this sent me now.

Cebes/ That stands to reason, but your saying that a philosopher ought nevertheless to die, is what I think strange, and I cannot reconcile these two opinions, especially if it be true what you said but now, that the gods take care of men, as being their property; for that a philosopher should not be troubled to be without the gods for his guardians, and to quit a life where such perfect beings—the better governors of the world—take care of him, seems very unreasonable to me. Do they imagine they will be more capable to govern themselves

when left to themselves? I can easily conceive that a fool may think it his duty to flee from a good master, at any rate; and will not be convinced that he ought to stick to what if good, and never lose sight of it. But I affirm that a wise man will desire never to quit a dependence upon a perfecter being than himself. From whence I infer the contrary of what you advanced, and conclude that the wise are sorry to die, and fools are fond of death.

Phaedo/ Socrates seemed to be pleased with Cebes wit; and, turning to us, told us that

Socrates/ Cebes has always something to object, and takes care not to assent at first to what is told him.

Simmias/ Indeed, I must say I find a great deal of reason in what Cebes advances. What can the sages pretend to gain by quitting better masters than themselves, and willingly depriving themselves of their aid? Do you mind that? 'Tis you alone that he addresses himself to, meaning to reprove you for your insensibility in being so willing to part with us, and quit the gods, who, according to your own words, are such good and wise governors.

Socrates/ You are in the right of it, I see you mean to oblige me to make formal defenses, such as I gave in at my trial.

Simmias/ That's the very thing.

Socrates/ Then, you must satisfy your selves, so that this my last apology may have more influence upon you than my former had upon my judges. For my part, if I thought I should not find in the other world gods as good, and as wise, and men infinitely better than we, 'twould be a piece of injustice in me not to be troubled at death. But be it known to you, Simmias, and you, Cebes, that I hope to arrive at the assembly of the just.

Indeed, in this point, I may flatter myself; but as for my finding, in the other world, matters infinitely good and wise, that I can assure you of, as much as things of that nature will bear; and therefore it is that death is no trouble to me, hoping that there is something reserved for the dead after this life, and that the good meet with better treatment in the world to come than the bad.

Simmias/ How! would you have quitted this life without communicating those sentiments to us? This methinks will be a common good; and if you convince us of all that you believe with reference to this point, you have made a sufficient apology.

Socrates/ That is what I design to try, but I would first hear what Crito has to say. I thought he had a mind to offer something a short time ago.

Crito/ I have nothing to say, but what your executioner has been pushing me on to tell you this great while, that you ought to speak as little as you can, for fear of over-heating yourself, since nothing is more contrary to the operation of poison; insomuch that, if you continue to speak so, you'll be obliged to take two or three doses.

Socrates/ Let him do his office. Let him make ready two doses of poison, or three if he will.

Crito/ I knew you would give me that answer, but still he importunes me to speak to you.

Socrates/ Pray let that alone, and suffer me to explain before you, who are my judges, for what reasons a man enlightened by philosophy Ought to die with courage, and a firm hope that in the other world he shall enjoy a felicity beyond anything in this. Pray do you, Simmias and Cebes, listen to my arguments.

True philosophers make it the whole business of their lifetime to learn to die. Now, 'tis extremely ridiculous for them, after they run out a whole course incessantly in order to compass that one end, to flinch and be afraid when it comes up to them, when they are Justin a capacity of obtaining it after a long and painful search.

Phaedo/ Whereupon Simmias laughed, and told him;

Simmias/ In earnest, Socrates, you make me laugh, not withstanding the small occasion I have to laugh in this juncture. For I am certain the greatest part of those who hear you talk so, will say you talk much better of the philosophers than you believe. Above all, the Athenians would be glad that all the philosophers would learn that lesson so well as to die in effect; and they'll be ready to tell you death is the only thing they are worthy of.

Socrates/ Simmias, our Athenians would so speak the truth without knowing it to be such. For they are ignorant in what manner philosophers desire to die, or how they are worthy of it. But let us leave the Athenians to themselves, and talk of things within our own company. Does death appear to be anything to you?

Simmias/ Yes, without doubt.

Socrates/ Is it not, the separation of soul and body so that the body has one separate being, and the soul another?

Simmias/ Just so.

Socrates/ Lets try, then, my dear Simmias, if your thoughts and mine agree, by what means we shall set the object of our present inquiry in a clearer light. Do you think a philosopher courts what the world calls pleasure, as that of eating and drinking, and so on?

Simmias/ Not at all, Socrates.

Socrates/ Nor that of love?

Simmias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Do you think that they pursue or mind the other pleasures relating to the body, such as good clothes, handsome shoes, and the other ornaments of the body? Whether do you think they value or slight those things, when necessity does not enforce their use?

Simmias/ In my mind, a true philosopher must needs contemn them.

Socrates/ Then you believe, that the body is not at all the object of the care and business of a philosopher; but, on the contrary, that his whole business is to separate himself from it, and mind only the concerns of his soul?

Simmias/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Thus, 'tis plain upon the whole that a philosopher labors in a more distinguishing manner than other men to purchase the freedom of his soul, and cut off all commerce between it and the body. I am likewise of the opinion, Simmias, that most men will grant that whoever avoids those corporeal things, and takes no pleasure in them, is not worthy to live; and that he who does not use the pleasures of the body is near to death.

Simmias/ You speak truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ But what shall we say of the acquiring of prudence? Is the body an obstacle or not, when employed in that work? I'll explain my meaning by an example; Have seeing and hearing anything of truth in them, and is their testimony faithful? Or are the poets in the right in singing that we neither see nor hear things truly? For, if these two senses of seeing and

hearing are not true and trusty, the other which are much weaker, will be far less such. Do not you think so?

Simmias/ Yes, without doubt.

Socrates/ When does the soul, then, find out the truth? We see that while the body is joined in the inquiry, this body plainly cheats and seduces it.

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ Is it not by reasoning that the soul embraces truth? And does it not reason better than before, when 'tis not encumbered by seeing or hearing, pain or pleasure? When shut up within itself, it bids adieu to the body, and entertains as little correspondence with it as possible, and pursues the knowledge of things without touching them.

Simmias/ That is incomparably well spoken.

Socrates/ Is it not, especially upon this occasion, that the soul of a philosopher despises and avoids the body, and wants to be by itself?

Simmias/ I think so.

Socrates/ What shall we say, then, my dear Simmias, of all the objects of the soul? For instance, shall we call justice something or nothing?

Simmias/ We must certainly give it the title of Something.

Socrates/ Shall we not likewise call it Good and Fine?

Simmias/ Ay, doubtless.

Socrates/ But did you ever see these objects with the eye of your body? Or with any other sense? Did you ever touch any of those things I now speak of, such as magnitude, health, fortitude, and, in a word, the

essence of all other things? Is the truth of them discovered by the body? Or is it not certain that whoever puts himself in a condition to examine them more narrowly, and trace them to the bottom, will better compass the end, and know more of them?

Simmias/ That's very true.

Socrates/ Now the simplest and purest way of examining things is to pursue every particular thought alone, without offering to support our meditation by seeing, or backing our reasonings by any other corporeal sense; by employing the naked thought without any mixture, and so endeavoring to trace the pure and genuine essence of things without the ministry of the eyes or ears; the soul being, if I may so speak, entirely disengaged from the whole mass of body, which only cumbers the soul, and cramps it in the quest of wisdom and truth, as often as it is admitted to the least correspondence with it. If the essence of things be ever known, must it not be in the manner above mentioned?

Simmias/ Right, Socrates; you have spoken incomparably well.

Socrates/ Is it not a necessary consequence from this principle, that true philosophers should have such language among themselves? This life is a road that's apt to mislead us and our reason in our inquiries, because, while we have a body, and while our soul is drowned in so much corruption, we shall never attain the object of our wishes, in other words, truth. The body throws a thousand obstacles and crosses in our way, by demanding necessary food; and then the diseases that ensue do quite disorder our inquiry. Besides, it fills us with love, desires, fears, and a thousand foolish

imaginations, insomuch that there is nothing truer than the common saying, 'That the body will never conduct us to wisdom.' What is it that gives rise to wars, and occasions seditions and dueling? Is it not the body and its desires? In effect, all wars take rise from the desire of riches, which we are forced to heap up for the sake of our body, in order to supply its wants, and serve it like slaves. 'Tis this that cramps our application to philosophy. And the greatest of all our evils is that when it has given us some respite, and we are set upon meditation, it steals in and interrupts our meditation all of a sudden. It cumbers, troubles, and surprises us in such a manner that it hinders us from descrying the truth. Now we have made it out, that in order to trace the purity and truth of anything, we should lay aside the body, and only employ the soul to examine the objects we pursue. So that we can never arrive at the wisdom we court till after death. Reason is on our side. For if it is impossible to know anything purely while we are in the body, one of these two things must be true; either the truth is never known, or it is known after death; because at that time the soul will be left to itself, and freed of its burden, and not before. And while we are in this life, we can only approach to the truth in proportion to our removing from the body, and renouncing all correspondence with it that is not of mere necessity, and keeping ourselves clear from the contagion of its natural corruption, and all its filth, till God Himself comes to deliver us. Then, indeed, being freed from all bodily folly, we shall converse, in all probability, with men that enjoy the same liberty, and shall know within ourselves the pure essence of things, which perhaps is nothing but the truth. But he who is not pure is not allowed to approach to purity itself. This,

my dear Simmias, as I take it, should be the thought and language of true philosophers. Are not you of the same mind?

Simmias/ Most certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, my dear Simmias, whoever shall arrive where I am now going, has great reason to hope that he will there be possessed of what we look for here with so much care and anxiety; so that the voyage I am now sent upon fills me with a sweet and agreeable hope. And it will have the same effect upon all who are persuaded that the soul must be purged before it knows the truth. Now the purgation of the soul, as we were saying but just now, is only its separation from the body, its accustoming itself to retire and lock itself up, renouncing all commerce with it as much as possible, and living by itself, whether in this or the other world, without being chained to the body.

Simmias/ All that is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well! what we call death, is not that the disengagement and separation of the body from the soul?

Simmias/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Are not the true philosophers the only men that seek after this disengagement? and is not that separation and deliverance their whole business?

Simmias/ So I think, Socrates.

Socrates/ Is it not a ridiculous fancy, that a man that has lived in the expectation of death, and during his whole lifetime has been preparing to die, upon his arrival at the point of desired death, should think to retire, and be afraid of it. Would not that be a very scandalous apostasy?

Simmias/ How should it be otherwise?

Socrates/ 'Tis certain, then, Simmias, that death is so far from being terrible to true philosophers that 'tis their whole business to die; which may be easily inferred thus; if they slight and contemn their body, and passionately desire to enjoy their soul by itself, is it not a piece of extravagance to decline going to that place, where those who get to it, hope to obtain the good things they have wished for all their life time? For they desired wisdom, and a deliverance from the body, as being their burden, and the object of their hatred and contempt. Do not many upon the loss of their mistresses, wives, or children, willingly cut the thread of life, and convey themselves into the other world, merely upon the hope of meeting there, and cohabiting with the persons they love? And shall a true lover of wisdom, and one that firmly hopes to attain the perfection of it in the other world, shall he be startled by death, and be unwilling to go to the place that will furnish him with what his soul loves? Doubtless, my dear Simmias, if he be a true philosopher, he'll go with a great deal of pleasure; as being persuaded that there's no place in the regions below that can furnish him with that pure wisdom that he's in quest of. Now, if things stand thus, would it not be a piece of extravagance in such a man to fear death?

Simmias/ To be sure, it would be so with a witness.

Socrates/ And consequently, when a man shrinks and retires at the point of death, it is a certain evidence that he loves not wisdom, but his own body, or honor, or riches, or perhaps all three together.

Simmias/ 'Tis so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, Simmias, does not what we call Fortitude belong in a peculiar manner to philosophers? And does not Temperance, or that sort of wisdom that

consists in controlling our desires, and living soberly and modestly, suit admirably well with those who contemn their bodies, and live philosophically?

Simmias/ That is certain, Socrates.

Socrates/ Were you to inspect the fortitude and temperance of other men, you'll find 'em very ridiculous.

Simmias/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ You know, all other men look upon death as the greatest affliction.

Simmias/ That's true.

Socrates/ When those you call stout suffer death with some courage, they do it only for fear of some greater evil.

Simmias/ That I must grant.

Socrates/ And by consequence, all men, bating the philosophers, are only stout and valiant through fear. And is it not ridiculous to believe a man to be brave and valiant that is only influenced by fear and timorousness?

Simmias/ You are in the right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Is not the case the same with your temperate persons? 'Tis only intemperance makes them such. Though at first view this may seem impossible, yet it is no more than what daily experience shows to be the result of that foolish and ridiculous temperance. For such persons disclaim one pleasure only for fear of being robbed of other pleasures that they covet, and which have an ascendant over them. They'll cry out to you as long as you will, that intemperance consists in being ruled and over awed by our passions; but at the same time that they give you this fine definition, 'tis only their subjection to some predominant pleasures that

make them discard others. Now this is much what I have just said, that they are only temperate through intemperance.

Simmias/ That is very clear, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let us not be imposed upon, my dear Simmias; the straight road to virtue does not lie in shifting pleasures for pleasures, fears for fears, or one melancholy thought for another, and imitating those who change a large piece of money for many small ones. But wisdom is the only true and unalloyed coin, for which all others must be given in exchange. With that piece of money we purchase all fortitude, temperance, justice. In a word, that virtue is always true that accompanies wisdom, without any dependence upon pleasures, grief, fears, or any other passions. Whereas all other virtues stripped of wisdom, which run upon a perpetual exchange, are only shadows of virtue. True virtue is really and in effect a purgation from all these sorts of passions. Temperance, justice, fortitude, and prudence, or wisdom itself, are not exchanged for passions, but cleanse us of them. And it is pretty evident, that those who instituted the purifications called by us Teletes, in other words, perfect expiations, were persons of no contemptible rank, men of great genius, who in the first ages meant by such riddles to give us to know that whoever enters the other world without being initiated and purified shall be hurled headlong into the vast abyss; and that whoever arrives there after due purgation and expiation shall be lodged in the apartment of the gods. For, as the dispensers of these expiations say, There are many who bear the Thyrsus, but few that are possessed by the spirit of God. Now those who are thus possessed, as I take it, are the true philosophers. I have tried all means to be lifted in

that number, and have made it the business of my whole life to compass my end. If it please God, I hope to know in a minute that my efforts have not been ineffectual, and that success has crowned my endeavors. This, my dear Simmias, and my dear Cebes, is the apology with which I offer to justify my not [being troubled or afflicted for parting with you, and quitting my governors in this life; hoping to find good friends and rulers there, as well as here. This the vulgar cannot digest. However, I shall be satisfied if my defenses take better with you than they did with my judges.

Phaedo/ Socrates having thus spoken, Cebes took up the discourse to this purpose.

Cebes/ Socrates, I subscribe to the truth of all you have said, There is only one thing that men look upon as incredible, that is to say, what you advanced of the soul. For almost everybody fancies that when the soul parts from the body it is no more, it dies along with it; in the very minute of parting it vanishes, like a vapor or smoke which flies off, and disperses, and has no existence. For if it subsisted by itself, were gathered and retired into itself, and freed from all the above-mentioned evils, there were a fair and promising prospect ascertaining the truth of what you have said. But, that the soul lives after the death of a man, that it is sensible, that it acts and thinks, that, I say, needs both insinuation and solid proofs to make it go down.

Socrates/ You say right, Cebes, but how shall we manage the affair? Shall we in this interview examine whether that is probable or not?

Cebes/ I shall be very glad, to hear your thoughts upon the matter.

Socrates/ At least, I cannot think that any man hearing us, though he were a comedian, would upbraid me with raillery, and charge me with not speaking of such things as concern us very much. If you have a mind that we should trace this affair to the bottom, my opinion is that we should proceed in the following method, in order to know whether the souls of the dead have a being in the other world or not.

'Tis a very ancient opinion, that souls quitting this world repair to the infernal regions, and return after that to live in the world. If it be so, that men return to life after death, it follows necessarily that during that interval their souls are lodged in the lower regions; for if they had not a being they could not return to this world. For this will be a sufficient proof of what we affirm, if we be convinced that the living spring from the dead; if otherwise, then we must look out for other proofs.

Cebes/ That is certain.

Socrates/ But to assure ourselves of this truth, 'tis not sufficient to examine the point upon the comparison with men; but likewise upon that with other animals, plants, and whatever has a vegetable principle. By that means we shall be convinced that all things are born after the same manner—that is, whatever has a contrary—owes its first rise to its contrary. For instance, handsome is the contrary to ugly, and just to unjust. And the same is the case of an infinite number of other things. Now, lets see if it be absolutely necessary that whatever has a contrary should spring from that contrary. As when a thing becomes bigger, of necessity it must formerly have been lesser before it acquired that magnitude. And when it dwindles into a lesser form, it must needs have been greater before its

diminution. In like manner the strongest arises from the weakest, and the swiftest from the slowest.

Cebes/ That's a plain truth.

Socrates/ And pray, when a thing becomes worse, was it not formerly better? and when it grows just, is it not because it was formerly more unjust?

Cebes/ Yes, surely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then it is sufficiently proved that everything is generated by its contrary.

Cebes/ Sufficiently, Socrates.

Socrates/ But is not there always a certain medium between these two contraries? There are two births, or two processions, one of this from that, and another of that from this. The medium between a greater and a lesser thing is increase and diminution. The same is the case of what we call mixing, separating, heating, cooling, and all other things in infinitum. For though it sometimes falls out that we have not terms to express those changes and mediums, vet experience shows that by an absolute necessity things take rise from one another, and pass reciprocally from one to another through a medium.

Cebes/ There's no doubt of that.

Socrates/ And what, has not life likewise its contrary, as awaking has sleeping?

Cebes/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ What is the contrary?

Cebes/ Death.

Socrates/ Since these two things are contrary, do not they take rise one from the other? And between these two are there not two generations, or two processions?

Cebes/ Why not?

Socrates/ But, I am about to tell you how the new-mentioned combination stands, and to show you the origin and progress of each of these two things which make up the compound. Pray tell [me how awaking and sleeping are related? Does not sleep beget watchfulness and watching sleep? And is not the generation of sleep the falling asleep? and that of watching the awaking?

Cebes/ All very clear.

Socrates/ Now, pray view the combination of life and death. Is not death the contrary of life?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does not the one breed the other?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ What is it that life breeds?

Cebes/ Death.

Socrates/ What is it that death breeds?

Cebes/ It must certainly be life.

Socrates/ Then, all living things and men are bred from death.

Cebes/ So I think.

Socrates/ And, by consequence, our souls are lodged in the infernal world after our death.

Cebes/ The consequence seems just.

Socrates/ But of these two generations, one, that is to say, death, is very palpable; it discovers itself to the eye, and is touched by the hand.

Cebes/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Shall we not then attribute to death the virtue of producing its contrary, as well as to life? Or shall we say that nature is lame and maimed on that score?

Cebes/ There's an absolute necessity, of ascribing to death the generation of its contrary.

Socrates/ What is that contrary?

Cebes/ Reviving, or returning to life.

Socrates/ If there is such a thing as returning to life, 'tis nothing else but the birth of the dead returning to life. And thus we agree that the living are as much the product of the dead, as the dead are of the living. Which is an incontestable proof that the souls of the dead must remain in some place or other, from whence they return to life.

That, as I take it, Cebes, is a necessary consequence from the principles we have agreed on.

And, as I take it, Cebes, these principles are well grounded. Consider them yourself. If all these contraries had not their productions and generations in their turns, which make a circle; and if there were nothing but one birth, and one direct product from one to the other contrary, without the return of the last contrary to the first that produce it; were it not so, all things would terminate in the same figure, and be affected in the same manner, and at last cease to be born.

Cebes/ How do you say, Socrates?

Socrates/ There's no difficulty in conceiving what I now say. If there was nothing but sleep, and if sleep did not produce watching, 'tis plain that everything would be an emblem of the fable of Endymion, and nothing would be seen anywhere, because the same thing must happen to them which happened to Endymion, that is to say, they must always sleep. If everything were mingled without any subsequent separation, we should quickly see Anaxagoras's doctrine fulfilled, and all

things jumbled together. At the same rate, my dear Cebes, if all living things died, and being dead, continued such without reviving, would not all things unavoidably come to an end at last, insomuch that there would not be a living thing left in being? For if living things did not arise from dead ones when the living ones die, of necessity all things must at last be swallowed up by death, and entirely annihilated.

Cebes/ It is necessarily so, all that you have said seems to be incontestable.

Socrates/ As I take it, Cebes, there is no objection made against those truths, neither are we mistaken in receiving them; for 'tis certain there is a return to life; 'tis certain that the living rise out of the dead; that the souls departed have a being, and upon their returning to this life, the good souls are in a better, and the bad ones in a worse condition.

Cebes/ What you now advance, is only a necessary consequence of another principle that I have often heard you lay down, that is to say, that all our acquired knowledge is only remembrance. For if that principle be true, we must necessarily have learnt at another time what we call to mind in this. Now that's impossible, unless our soul had a being before its being invested with this human form. So that this same principle concludes the immortality of the soul.

Simmias/ But, Cebes, what demonstration have we of that principle? Pray refresh my memory with it, for at present it is out of my head.

Cebes/ There's a very pretty demonstration for it, all men being duly interrogated, find out all things of themselves, which they could never do without knowledge and right reason. Put them at unawares

upon the figure of geometry, and other things of that nature, they'll presently perceive that 'tis as 'tis said.

Socrates/ Simmias, if you will not rely upon this experience, pray try, whether the same method will not bring you over to our sentiments. Do you find great difficulty in believing that learning is only remembering?

Simmias/ I do not find very much, but I would gladly learn that remembrance you speak of. By what Cebes has said, I almost remember it, and I begin to believe it; but that shall not hinder me from hearing with pleasure the arguments you can offer for it.

Socrates/ I argue thus. We all agree, that in order to remember, a man must have known before what he then calls to mind.

Simmias/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And let us likewise agree upon this, that knowledge coming in a certain manner is remembrance. I say, in a certain manner; for instance, when a man by feeling, hearing, or perceiving a thing by any of the senses knows what it is that thus strikes the senses, and at the same time imagines to himself another thing, independent of that knowledge, by virtue of a quite different knowledge, do not we justly say that the man remembers the thing that comes thus into his mind?

Simmias/ How do you say?

Socrates/ I say, for example, that we know a man by one sort of knowledge, and a harp by another.

Simmias/ That's certain.

Socrates/ Well, then, do not you know what happens to lovers, when they see the harp, habit, or any other

thing, that their friends or mistresses used to make use of? It is just as I said but now. Upon seeing and knowing the harp they form in their thoughts the image of the person to whom the harp belongs. This is remembrance. Thus it often falls out that one seeing Simmias, thinks of Cebes. I could cite a thousand instances.

This, then, is remembrance, especially when the things called to mind are such as had been forgot through length of time, or being out of sight.

Simmias/ That is very certain.

Socrates/ But, upon seeing the picture of a horse or harp, may not one call to mind the man? and upon seeing the picture of Simmias, may not one think of Cebes?

Simmias/ Sure enough.

Socrates/ Much more, upon seeing the picture of Simmias, will he call to mind Simmias himself?

Simmias/ Ay, with ease.

Socrates/ From all these instances we infer that remembrance is occasioned sometimes by things that are like the thing remembered, and sometimes by things that are unlike. But when one remembers a thing by virtue of a likeness, does it not necessarily come to pass that the mind at first view discovers whether the picture does resemble the thing designed lamely or perfectly?

Simmias/ It must needs be so.

Socrates/ Then pray mind whether your thoughts of what I am about to say agree with mine. Is not there something that we call equality? I do not speak of the equality between one tree and another, one stone and another, and several other things that are alike; I speak of the abstracted equality of things. Shall we call that something or nothing?

Simmias/ Surely, we must call it something; but that will only come to pass when we mean to speak philosophically and of marvelous things.

Socrates/ But then do we know this equality?

Simmias/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ From whence do we derive that knowledge? Is it not from the things we mentioned but now? 'Tis upon seeing equal trees, equal stones, and several other things of the nature, that we form the idea of that equality, which is not either the trees or the stones, but something abstracted from all subjects. Do not you find it such? Pray take notice. The stones and the trees are always the same, and yet do not they sometimes appear unequal?

Simmias/ Sure enough.

Socrates/ What! Do equal things appear unequal? Or, does equality take up the form of inequality?

Simmias/ By no means, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then equality, and the thing which is equal, are two different things?

Simmias/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ But after all, these equal things, which are different from equality, furnish us with the idea and knowledge of that abstracted equality.

Simmias/ That's true.

Socrates/ The case is the same, whether this equality bears a resemblance to the things that occasioned its idea or not.

Simmias/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ When, upon seeing one thing, you call to mind another, 'tis no matter if it be like it or not; still it is remembrance.

Simmias/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ But what shall we say to this, when we behold trees or other things that are equal, are they equal according to the idea or not?

Simmias/ Very far from it.

Socrates/ Then we agree upon this. When a man sees a thing before him, and thinks it would be equal to another thing, but at the same time is far from being so perfectly equal as the equality of which he has the idea, then, I say, he who thinks thus must necessarily have known beforehand this intellectual being which the thing resembles, but imperfectly.

Simmias/ There's an absolute necessity for that.

Socrates/ And is not the case the same when we compare things equal with the equality?

Simmias/ Sure enough, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then of necessity we must have known that equality before the time in which we saw the equal things, and thereupon thought that they all tender to be equal as equality itself, but could not reach it.

Simmias/ That is certain.

Socrates/ But we likewise agree upon this, that this thought can be derived from nothing else but one of our senses, from seeing, touching, or feeling one way or other. And the same conclusion will hold of all things, whether intellectual or sensible.

Simmias/ All things will equally conclude for what you design.

Socrates/ Then 'tis from the senses themselves that we derive this thought; that all the objects of our senses have a tendency towards this intellectual equality, but come short of it. Is it not?

Simmias/ Yes, without doubt, Socrates.

Socrates/ In effect, Simmias, before we began to see, feel, or use our senses, we must have had the knowledge of this intellectual equality, else we could not be capable to compare it with the sensible things, and perceive that they have all a tendency towards it, but fall short of its perfection.

Simmias/ That is a necessary consequence from the premises.

Socrates/ But it is not certain, that immediately after our birth we saw, we heard, and made use of our other senses?

Simmias/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then it follows, that before that time we had the knowledge of that equality?

Simmias/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ And by consequence we were possessed of it before we were born.

Simmias/ So I think.

Socrates/ If we possessed it before we were born, then we knew things before we were born, and immediately after our birth; knew not only what is equal, what great, what small, but all other things of that nature. For what we now advance of equality is equally applicable to goodness, justice, sanctity, and, in a word, to all other things that have a real existence. So that of necessity we must have known all these things before we came into this world.

Simmias/ That's certain.

Socrates/ And being possessed of that knowledge, if we did not forget apace every day, we should not only be born with it, but retain it all our lifetime. For to know

is only to preserve the knowledge we have received, and to lose it. And to forget is to lose the knowledge we enjoy before.

Simmias/ That's certain, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now if, after having possessed that knowledge before we were born, and having lost it since, we come to retrieve it by the ministry of our senses which we call learning, shall we not justly entitle it Remembrance?

Simmias/ With a great deal of reason, Socrates.

Socrates/ For we have agreed upon this, that 'tis very possible that a man seeing, hearing, or perceiving one thing by anyone of his senses, should frame to himself the imagination of another thing that he had forgot; to which the thing perceived by the senses has some relation, whether it resembles the other or not. So that one of two things must necessarily follow; either we were born with that knowledge, and preserved it all along, or else retrieved it after wards by way of remembrance. Which of these two do you pitch upon, Simmias? Are we born with that knowledge, or do we call it to mind after having had it, and forgot it?

Simmias/ Indeed, Socrates, I do not know which to choose at present.

Socrates/ But mind what I am about to say to you, and then let us see which you'll choose. A man that knows anything, can he give a reason for his knowledge or not?

Simmias/ Doubtless he can, Socrates.

Socrates/ And you think all men can give a reason for what we have been speaking of?

Simmias/ I wish they could, but I'm afraid to-morrow we shall have none here that's capable to do it.

Socrates/ Then you think all men have not this knowledge?

Simmias/ No, surely.

Socrates/ Do they call to mind, then, the things they have known?

Simmias/ That may be.

Socrates/ At what time did our souls learn that knowledge? It cannot be since we were men.

Simmias/ No, surely.

Socrates/ Then it must be some time before that.

Simmias/ Yes, without doubt.

Socrates/ And, by consequence, Simmias, our souls had a being before that time, that is to say, before they were invested with a human form, while they knew and understood.

Simmias/ Unless you'll allow, Socrates, that we learned it in the minute of our birth. There is no other time left.

Socrates/ Be it so, my dear Simmias, but at what other time did we lose it? For we did not bring it into the world with us, as we concluded but now. Did we lose it in the same minute that we obtained it? Or can you assign any other time?

Simmias/ No, Socrates, I did not perceive that what I said was to no purpose.

Socrates/ Then, Simmias, this must be a standing truth. That if the objects of our daily conversation have a real existence, I mean, if justice, goodness, and all that essence with which we compare the objects of our senses, and which having an existence before us, proves to be of the same nature with our own essence, and is the standard by which we measure all things. I say, if

all these things have a real existence, our soul is likewise entitled to existence, and that before we were born; and if these things have no being, then all our discourses are useless. Is it not a standing truth, and withal a just and necessary consequence, that the existence of our souls before our birth stands and falls with that of those things?

Simmias/ That consequence, seems to me to be equally just and wonderful, and the result of the whole discourse affords something very glorious and desirable on our behalf, since it concludes that before we were born our souls had an existence, as well as that intelligible essence you mentioned but now. For my part, I think there's nothing more evident, and more sensible, than the existence of all these things, goodness, justice, and so on, and you have sufficiently made it out.

Socrates/ Now for Cebes, for Cebes must likewise be convinced.

Simmias/ I believe, though he is the stiffest man upon earth, and very much proof against arguments, yet he'll own your proof to be very convincing. In the meantime, though I am sufficiently convinced that our souls had a being before we were born, I have not yet heard sufficient proof for its continuing after our death. For that popular opinion, which Cebes mentioned but now, remains in all its force, that is to say, that after the death of men the soul disperses and ceases to be. And indeed I cannot see why the soul should not be born, or proceed from some part or other, and have a being before it animates the body in this life; and when it removes from the body, ceases to be, and makes its exit as well as the body.

Cebes/ You speak well, Simmias, to my mind, Socrates has only proved the half of what he proposed. 'Tis true he demonstrated that the soul has a being before the body; but to complete his demonstration he should have proved that our soul has an existence after death, as well as before this life.

Socrates/ But I have demonstrated it to you both, and you'll be sensible of it, if you join this last proof with what you acknowledge before, that is to say, that the living rise from the dead. For if 'tis true that our soul was in being before we were born, then, of necessity, when it comes to life it proceeds, so to speak, from the bosom of death; and why should it not lie under the same necessity of being after death, since it must return to life? Thus, what you speak of is made out. But I perceive both of you desire to sound this matter to the bottom; and are apprehensive, like children, that when the soul departs the body the winds run away with it, and disperses it, especially when a man dies in an open country, in a place exposed to the winds.

Phaedo/ Whereupon Cebes, smiling, replied;

Cebes/ Pray, then, Socrates, try to discuss our fears, or rather convince us, as if we feared nothing. Though, indeed, there be some among us who lie under those childish apprehensions. Persuade us, then, not to fear death as a vain phantom.

Socrates/ As for that, you must employ spells and exorcisms every day till you be cured.

Cebes/ But pray, Socrates, where shall we meet with an excellent conjurer, since you are going to leave us?

Socrates/ Greece is large enough, and well stored with learned men. Besides, there are a great many barbarous nations which you must scour in order to

find out the conjurer, without sparing either labor or charges, for you cannot employ your money in a better cause. You must likewise look for one among yourselves, for 'tis possible there may he none found more capable to perform those enchantments than yourselves.

Cebes/ We shall obey your order, Socrates, in looking out for one; but in the meanwhile, if you please, let us resume our former discourse.

Socrates/ With all my heart, Cebes.

Cebes/ Well said, Socrates.

Socrates/ The first question we ought to ask ourselves, is, What sort of things they are that are apt to be dissipated, what things are liable to that accident, and what part of those things? Then we must inquire into the nature of the soul, and form our hopes or fears accordingly.

Cebes/ That's very true.

Socrates/ Is it not certain, that only compounded things, or such as are of a compoundable nature, admit of being dissipated at the same rate that they were compounded? If there are any uncompounded beings, they alone are free from this accident, and naturally incapable of dissipation.

Cebes/ That, I think, is very clear.

Socrates/ Is it not very likely that things which are always the same, and in the same condition, are not at all compounded? and that those which are liable to perpetual changes, and are never the same, are certainly compounded.

Cebes/ I am of your mind, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let us betake ourselves to the things we were speaking of but now, the existence whereof is never contested either in question or answer. Are these always the same, or do they sometimes change? Equality, beauty, goodness, and every singular thing, —i.e., the essence itself—do these receive the least alteration, or are they so pure and simple that they continue always the same, without undergoing the least change?

Cebes/ Of necessity, they must continue still the same without alteration.

Socrates/ And all these fine things, such as men, horses, habits, movables, and a great many other things of the same nature, are they entirely opposite to the former, that they never continue in the same condition, either with reference to themselves or others, but are subject to perpetual alterations

Cebes/ They never continue in the same condition.

Socrates/ Now these are the things that are visible, touchable, perceptible by some other sense; whereas the former, which continue still the same, can only be reached by thought, as being immaterial and invisible.

Cebes/ That's true, Socrates.

Socrates/ If you please, I'll in stance in two things—the one visible, the other invisible; one still the same, and the other betraying continual alterations.

Cebes/ With all my heart.

Socrates/ Let us see, then. Are not we compounded of a body and a soul; or is there any other ingredient in our composition?

Cebes/ No, surely.

Socrates/ Which of the two kinds of things does our body most resemble?

Cebes/ All men own that it is most conformable to the visible sort.

Socrates/ And pray, my dear Cebes, is our soul visible or invisible?

Cebes/ At least 'tis not visible to men.

Socrates/ But when we speak of visible or invisible things, we mean with reference to men, without minding any other nature. Once more, then, is the soul visible or not?

Cebes/ 'Tis not visible.

Socrates/ Then 'tis immaterial and invisible?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by consequence the soul is more conformable than the body to the invisible kind of things, and the body suits better with the visible?

Cebes/ There is an absolute necessity for that.

Socrates/ When the soul makes use of the body in considering anything, by seeing, hearing, or any other sense (that being the sole function of the body, to consider things by the senses), should not we then say that the body draws the soul upon mutable things? In this condition it strays, frets, staggers, and is giddy like a man in drink, by reason of its being engaged in matter. Whereas, when it pursues things by itself without calling in the body, it betakes itself to what is pure, immortal, immutable; and as being of the same nature, dwells constantly upon it while it is master of itself. Then its errors are at an end, and it is always the same, as being united to what never changes; and this passion of the soul is what we call wisdom or prudence.

Cebes/ That's admirably well spoken, Socrates, and a very great truth.

Socrates/ After all, then, what sort of things does the soul seem to resemble most?

Cebes/ To my mind, Socrates, there is no man so stupid and stiff as not to be obliged, by your method of arguing, to acknowledge that the soul bears a greater resemblance and conformity to the immutable being, than to that which is always upon the change.

Socrates/ And as for the body?

Cebes/ It bears a greater resemblance to the other.

Socrates/ Lets try another way. During the conjunction of body and soul, nature orders the one to obey and be a slave, and the other to command and hold the empire. Which of these two characters is most suitable to the Divine Being, and which to that is mortal? Are not you sensible that the divine is only capable of commanding and ruling, and what mortal is only worthy of obedience and slavery?

Cebes/ Sure enough.

Socrates/ Which of these two, then, agrees best with the soul?

Cebes/ 'Tis evident, Socrates, that our soul resembles what is divine, and our body what is mortal.

Socrates/ You see, then, my dear Cebes, the necessary result of all is, that our soul bears a strict resemblance to what is divine, immortal, intellectual, simple, indissolvable; and is always the same, and always like, and that our body does perfectly resemble what is human, mortal, sensible, compounded, dissolvable, always changing, and never like itself. Can anything be alleged to destroy that consequence or to make out the contrary?

Cebes/ No, surely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Does not it, then, suit with the body to be quickly dissolved, and with the soul to be always indissolvable, or something very near it?

Cebes/ That is a standing truth.

Socrates/ Accordingly you see every day, when a man dies, his visible body, that continues exposed to our view, and which we call the corpse, that alone admits of dissolution, alteration, and dissipation; this, I say, does not immediately undergo any of these accidents, but continues a pretty while in its entire form, or in its flower, if I may so speak, especially in this season. Bodies embalmed after the manner of those in Egypt remain entire for an infinity of years, and even in those that corrupt, there are always some parts, such as the bones, nerves, and the like, that continue in a manner immortal. Is not this true?

Cebes/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now as for the soul, which is an invisible being, that goes to a place like itself, marvelous, pure, and invisible, in the infernal world; and returns to a God full of goodness and wisdom, which I hope will be the fate of my soul in a minute, if it please God. Shall a soul of this nature, and created with all these advantages, be dissipated and annihilated, as soon as it parts from the body, as most men believe? No such thing, my dear Simmias, and my dear Cebes. I'll tell you what will rather come to pass, and what we ought to believe steadily. If the soul retain its purity without any mixture of filth from the body, as having entertained no voluntary correspondence with it, but on the contrary, having always avoided it, and recollected itself within itself in continual meditations; that is, in studying the true philosophy, and effectually learning to die; for

philosophy is a preparation to death; I say, if the soul departs in this condition, it repairs to a being like itself, a being That's divine, immortal, and full of wisdom; in which it enjoys an inexpressible felicity, as being freed from its errors, its ignorance, its fears, its amours, that tyrannized over it, and all the other evils pertaining to human nature; and as 'tis said of those who have been initiated into holy mysteries, it truly passes a whole course of eternity with the gods? Ought not this to be the matter of our belief?

Cebes/ Sure enough, Socrates.

Socrates/ But if the soul depart full of uncleanness and impurity, as having been all along mingled with the body, always employed in its service, always possessed by the love of it, wheedled and charmed by its pleasures and lusts, insomuch that it is believed there was nothing real or true beyond what is corporeal, what may be seen, touched, drank, or eaten, or what is the object of carnal pleasures, that it hated, dreaded, and avoided what the eyes of the body could not descry, and all that is intelligible, and can only be enjoyed by philosophy. Do you think, I say, that a soul in this condition can depart pure and simple from the body?

Cebes/ No, surely, Socrates, That's impossible.

Socrates/ On the contrary, it departs stained with corporeal pollution, which was rendered natural to it by its continual commerce and too intimate union with the body, at a time when it was its constant companion, and was still employed in serving and gratifying it.

Cebes/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ This pollution, my dear Cebes, is a gross, heavy, earthy, and visible mass; and the soul loaded

with such a weight, is dragged into that visible place, not only by the weight, but by its own dreading the light and the invisible place; and, as we commonly say, it wanders in the churchyards, round the tombs, where dark phantoms and apparitions are often seen, such as these souls that did not depart the body in purity or simplicity, but polluted with that earthy and visible matter that makes them degenerate into a visible form.

Cebes/ That is very likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes without doubt, Cebes; and 'tis also likely that 'tis not the good but the bad souls that are forced to wander in those places of impurity, where they suffer for their former ill-life, and continue to wander, till through the love they have to this corporeal mass, which always follows them, they engage again in a new body, and in all probability plunge themselves into the same manners and passions as were the occupation of the first life.

Cebes/ How do you say, Socrates?

Socrates/ I say, Cebes, that for instance those who made their belly their god, and loved nothing but indolence and impurity, without any shame, and without any reserve; those enter into the bodies of asses or such like creatures. Do not you think this very probable?

Cebes/ Yes, surely, Socrates.

Socrates/ And those souls which loved only injustice, tyranny, and rapine, are employed to animate the bodies of wolves, hawks, and falcons. Where else should souls of that stamp go?

Cebes/ Nowhere else, Socrates.

Socrates/ The case of all the rest is much the same. They go to animate the bodies of beasts of different species, according as they resemble their first courses.

Cebes/ According to these principles, it cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ The happiest of all these men, whose souls are sent to the most agreeable place, are those who have always made a profession of popular and civil virtues, which are called temperance and justice, to which they have brought themselves only by habit and exercise, without any assistance from philosophy and the mind.

Cebes/ How can they be so happy, then?

Socrates/ 'Tis probable that after their death their souls arc joined to the bodies of politic and meek animals, such as bees, wasps, and ants; or else return to human bodies, and become temperate and wise men. But as for approaching to the nature of God, that is not at all allowed to those who did not live philosophically, and whose souls did not depart with all their purity. The great privilege is reserved for the love of true wisdom. And 'tis upon the consideration of this, my dear Simmias, and my dear Cebes, that the true philosophers renounce the desires of the body, and keep themselves up from its lusts; they are not apprehensive of the ruin of their families, or of poverty, as the vulgar are, and those who are wedded to their riches; they fear neither ignominy nor reproach, as those do who court only dignities and honor. In a word, they renounce all things and even themselves.

Cebes/ It would not be suitable for them to do otherwise.

Socrates/ No, surely, In the like manner, all those who value their souls, and do not live for the body,

depart from all such lusts, and follow a different course from those insensible creatures that do not know where they go. They are persuaded that they ought not to do anything contrary to philosophy, or harbor anything that destroys its purifications and retards their liberty; and accordingly resign themselves to its conduct, and follow it whithersoever it leads them.

Cebes/ How do you say, Socrates?

Socrates/ I'll explain it to you. The philosophers, finding their soul tied and chained to the body, and by that means obliged to employ the body in the pursuit of objects which it cannot follow alone, so that it still floats in an abyss of ignorance, are very sensible that the force of this bond lies in its own desires, insomuch that the prisoner itself helps to lock up the chains. They are sensible that philosophy, coming to seize upon the soul in this condition, gently instructs and comforts it, and endeavors to disengage it, by giving it to know that the eye of the body is full of illusion and deceit, as well as all its other senses, by advertising it not to use the body farther than necessity requires; and advising it to recollect and shut up itself within itself; to receive no disposition but its own after it has examined within itself the intrinsic nature of everything, and-stripped it of the covering that conceals it from our eyes, and to continue fully persuaded that whatever is tried by all its other senses, being different from the former discovery, is certainly false; now whatever is tried by the corporeal senses is visible. And what it views by itself without the ministry of the body is invisible and unintelligible. So that the soul of a true philosopher, being convinced that it should not oppose its own liberty, disclaims as far as is possible the pleasures, lusts, fears, and sorrows of the body; for it knows that when one has enjoyed many

pleasures or given way to extreme grief or timorousness, or given himself to his desires, he not only is afflicted by the sensible evils known to all the world, such as the loss of health or estate, but is doomed to the last and greatest of evils—an evil that is so much the more dangerous and terrible that it is not obvious to our senses.

Cebes/ What evil is that, Socrates?

Socrates/ 'Tis this; that the soul, being forced to rejoice or be afflicted upon any occasion, is persuaded that what causes its pleasure or grief is a real and true thing, though, at the same time it is not; and such is the nature of all sensible and visible things that are capable to occasion joy or grief.

Cebes/ That is certain, Socrates.

Socrates/ Are not these passions, then, the chief instruments particularly that imprison and mew up the soul within the body?

Cebes/ How's that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Every pleasure, every melancholy thought, being armed with a strong and keen nail, nails the soul to the body with such force that it becomes material and corporeal, and fancies there are no real and true objects but such as the body accounts so; for as it entertains the same opinions and pursues the same pleasures with the body, so it is obliged to the same actions and habits. For which reason it cannot descend in purity to the lower world, but is daubed all over with the pollution of the body itself, and quickly re-enters another body, where it takes root as if it had been sown, and puts a period to all commerce with the pure, simple, and divine essence.

Cebes/ That is very certain, Socrates.

Socrates/ These are the motives that oblige the true philosophers to make it their business to acquire temperance and fortitude, and not such motives as the vulgar think of. Are not you of my opinion, Cebes?

Cebes/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ All true philosophers will still be of that mind. Their souls will never entertain such a thought as if philosophy should disengage it to the end that when 'tis freed it should follow its pleasures, and give way to its fears and sorrows; that it should put on its chains again, and always want to begin again, like Penelope's web. On the contrary, it continues in a perfect tranquility and freedom from passion, and always follows reason for its guide, without departing from its measures; it incessantly contemplates what is true, divine, immutable, and above opinion, being nourished by this pure truth; it is convinced that it ought to follow the same course of life while it is united to the body; and hopes that after death, being surrendered to that immortal being as its source, twill be freed from all the afflictions of the human nature. After such a life, and upon such principles, my dear Simmias and Cebes, what should the soul be afraid of? Shall it fear that upon its departure from the body the winds will dissipate it and run away with it, and that annihilation will be its fate?

Phaedo/ Socrates having thus spoken, he stopped for a while, seeming to be altogether intent upon what he had said. Most of us were in the same condition; Cebes and Simmias had a short conference together. At last Socrates, perceiving their conference, asked them what they were speaking of.

Socrates/ Do you think, that my arguments were lame? I think, indeed, there is room left for a great many doubts and objections, if any will take the pains to retail them out. If you are speaking of anything else I have nothing to say. But though you have no doubts, pray tell me freely whether you think of any better demonstration, and make me a companion in your inquiry, if you think I can assist you to compass your end.

Simmias/ I'll tell you, the naked truth. It is some time since Cebes and I thought of some doubts; and, being desirous to have them resolved, pushed on one another to propose them to you. But we were both afraid to importune you and propose disagreeable questions in the unseasonable hour of your present misfortune.

Socrates/ Oh, my dear Simmias, certainly I should find great difficulty in persuading other men that I find no misfortune in my present circumstances, since I cannot get you to believe it. You think that upon the score of fore knowledge and divining I am infinitely inferior to the swans. When they perceive approaching death they sing more merrily than before, because of the joy they have in going to the God they serve. But men, through the fear of death, reproach the swans, in saying that they lament their death and tune their grief in sorrowful notes. They forget to make this reflection, that no fowl sings when 'tis hungry, or cold, or sad; nay, not the nightingale, the swallow, or the lapwing, whose music they say is a true lamentation and the effect of grief. But, after all, these fowls do not all sing out of grief; and far less the swans, which by reason of their belonging to Apollo are diviners, and sing more joyfully on the day of their death than before, as foreseeing the good that awaits them in the other world. And, as for

me, I think I serve Apollo as well as they. I am consecrated to that God as well as they; I have received from our common Master the art of divining as well as they, and I am as little concerned for making my exit as they are. So that you may freely propose what doubts you please, and put questions to me as long as the eleven magistrates suffer me to be here.

Simmias/ You say well, Socrates, since 'tis so I will suppose my doubts first, and then Cebes shall give in his. I agree with you that 'tis impossible, or, at least, very difficult, to know the truth in this life; and that it is the property of a lazy and dull head not to weigh exactly what he says or to supersede the examination before he has made all his efforts, and be obliged to give over by insurmountable difficulties. For one of these two things must be done, we must either learn the truth from others or find it out ourselves, If both ways fail us, amidst all human reasons, we must pitch upon the strongest and most forcible, and trust to that as to a ship while we pass through this stormy sea, and endeavor to avoid its tempests and shelves; till we find out one more firm and sure, such as a promise or revelation upon which we may happily accomplish the voyage of this life as in a vessel that fears no danger. I shall therefore not be ashamed to put the questions to you, now that you allow me; and shall avoid the reproach I might one day cast upon myself of not having told you my thoughts upon this occasion. When I survey what you spoke to me and to Cebes I must own I do not think your proofs sufficient.

Socrates/ Perhaps you have reason, my dear Simmias; but where does their insufficiency appear?

Simmias/ In this; that the same things might be asserted of the harmony of a harp. For one may

reasonably say that the harmony of a harp, well stringed and well-tuned, is invisible, immaterial, excellent, and divine; and that the instrument and its strings are the body, the compounded earthy and mortal matter. And if the instrument were cut in pieces or its strings broken, might not one with equal reason affirm that this harmony remains after the breaking of the harp and has no end? For, since it is evident that the harp remains after the strings are broken, or that the strings, which are likewise mortal, continue after the harp is broken or dismounted, it must needs be impossible, might one say, that this immortal and divine harmony should perish before that which is mortal and earthly; nay, it is necessary that this harmony should continue to be without the least damage when the body of the harp and its strings are gone to nothing. For, without doubt, Socrates, you are sensible that we hold the soul to be something that resembles a harmony; and that as our body is a being composed of hot and cold, dry and moist, so our soul is nothing else but the harmony resulting from the just proportion of these mixed qualities. Now, if our soul is only a sort of harmony, 'tis evident that when our body is overstretched, or unbended by diseases, or any other disorder, of necessity our soul, with all its divinity, must come to an end, as well as the other harmonies which consist in sounds or are the effect of instruments; and that the remains of everybody continue for a considerable time, till they be burnt or moldered away. This, you see, Socrates, might be alleged in opposition to your arguments, that if the soul be only a mixture of the qualities of our body it perishes first in what we call death.

Phaedo/ Then Socrates looked upon us all, one after another, as he did often, and began to smile.

Socrates/ Simmias speaks with reason, his question is well put; and if anyone of you has a greater dexterity in answering his objections than I have, why do you not do if? For he seems thoroughly to understand both my arguments, and the exceptions they are liable to. But before we answer him, 'tis proper to hear what Cebes has to object, that while he speaks we may have time to think upon what we are to say; and after we have heard them both, that we may yield if their reasons are uniform and valid, and if otherwise, may stand by our principles to the utmost. Tell us, then, Cebes, what is it that hinders you from agreeing with what I have laid down?

Cebes/ I'll tell you, your demonstration seems to be lame and imperfect; it is faulty upon the same head that we took notice of before. That the soul has a being before its entrance into the body, is admirably well said, and I think sufficiently made out; but I can never be persuaded that it has likewise an existence after death. At the same time, I cannot subscribe to Simmias s allegation, that the soul is neither stronger nor more durable than the body, for to me it appears to be infinitely more excellent. But why, then, says the objection, do you refuse to believe it? Since you see with your eyes, that when a man is dead his weakest part remains still, is it not therefore absolutely necessary that the more durable part should last yet longer? Pray take notice if I answer this objection right. For to let you into my meaning, I must use resemblance or comparison, as well as Simmias. Your allegation, to my mind, is just the same, as if upon the death of an old tailor one should say, this tailor is not dead, he has a

being still somewhere or other; and for proof of that, there's the suit of clothes he wore, which he made for himself, so that he's still in being. If anyone should not be convinced by this proof, he would not fail to ask him, whether the man or the clothes he wears is most durable? To which, of necessity, he must answer that the man is; and upon this ground, your philosopher would pretend to demonstrate that since the less durable possession of the tailor is still in being, by stronger consequence he himself is so too. Now, my dear Simmias, the parallel is not just. Pray hear what I have to answer to it.

'Tis evident, at first view, that the objection is ridiculous. For the tailor, having used several suits of clothes, died after them, and only before the last suit, which he had not time to wear, and though the suit survived the man, if I may so speak, yet we cannot say the man is weaker or less durable than the suit of clothes. This simile is near enough, for as the man is to this suit of clothes, so is the soul to the body; and whoever applies to the soul and body what is said of the man and his suit of clothes will speak to the purpose. For he'll make the soul more durable, and the body a weaker being, and less capable to hold out for a long time. He'll add, that e very soul wears several bodies, especially if it lives several years. For the body wastes while the man is yet alive, and the soul still forms to itself a new habit of body out of the former that decays; but when the last comes to die, it has then its last habit on, and dies before its consummation; and when the soul is dead, the body quickly betrays the weakness of its nature, since it corrupts and molders away very speedily. So that we cannot put such confidence in your demonstration, as to hold it for a standing truth that

our souls continue in being after death. For supposing it were granted that our soul has not a being antecedent to our birth, but that, for anything we know, the souls of some continue in being after death; and that 'tis very possible they may return again to the world, and be born again, so to speak, several times, and die at last; for the strength and advantage of the soul beyond the body, consists in this, that it can undergo several births, and wear several bodies one after another, as a man does a suit of clothes; supposing, I say, that all this were granted, still it cannot be denied, but that in all those repeated births it decays and wastes, and at last comes to an end in one of the deaths. However, 'tis impossible for any man to discern in which of the deaths 'tis totally sunk. Since things stand thus, whoever does not fear death must be senseless, unless he can demonstrate that the soul is altogether immortal and incorruptible. For otherwise every dying man must of necessity be afraid for his soul, for fear the body it is quitting be its last body, and it perishes without any hopes of return.

Phaedo/ Having heard them propose these objections, we were very much troubled, as we afterwards told them, that at a time when we were just convinced by Socrates' arguments, they should come to amuse us with their objections, and throw us into a fit of unbelief and jealousy, not only of all that had been said to us by Socrates, but likewise of what he might say for the future; for we would always be apt to believe that either we were not proper judges of the points in debate, or else that his propositions were in themselves incredible.

Echecrates/ Indeed, Phaedo, I can easily pardon your trouble upon that account. For I myself, while I

heard you relate the matter, was saying to myself, what shall we believe hereafter, since Socrates' arguments, which seemed so valid and convincing, are become doubtful and uncertain? In effect that objection of Simmias's, that the soul is only a harmony, moves me wonderfully, and always did so. It awakes in me the memory of my being formerly of the same opinion. So that my belief is unhinged, and I want new proofs to convince me that the soul does not die with the body. Wherefore, prithee tell me, Phaedo, in the name of God, how Socrates came off, whether he seemed to be as much nettled as you, or if he maintained his opinion with his wonted temper; and in fine, whether his demonstration gave you full satisfaction, or seemed chargeable with imperfections? Pray tell me the whole story, without omitting the minutest circumstance.

Phaedo/ I protest to you, Echecrates, I admire Socrates all my lifetime, and upon this occasion admired him more than ever. That such a man as he had his answers in readiness is no great surprisal; but my greatest admiration was to see, in the first place, with what calmness, patience, and good humor he received the objections of these youngsters; and then how dexterously he perceived the impression they had made upon us, and cured us of the same. He rallied us like men put to flight after a defeat, and inspired us with a fresh ardor to turn our heads and renew the charge.

Echecrates/ How was that?

Phaedo/ I am about to tell you. As I sat at his right hand upon a little stool lower than his, he drew his hand over my head, and taking hold of my hair that hung down upon my shoulders, as he was wont to do for his diversion;

Socrates/ Phaedo, will not you cut this pretty hair to-morrow?

Phaedo/ 'Tis probable I shall.

Socrates/ If you take my advice, you will not stay so long.

Phaedo/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Both you and I, ought to cut our hair, if our opinion be so far dead that we cannot raise it again. Were I in your place, and defeated, I would make a vow, as the men of Argos did, never to wear my hair before I conquered these arguments of Simmias and Cebes.

Phaedo/ But, Socrates, you have forgotten the old proverb, that Hercules himself is not able to engage two.

Socrates/ And why, do you not call on me to assist you as your Iolas, while 'tis yet time?

Phaedo/ And accordingly I do call on you, not as Hercules did Iolas, but as Iolas did Hercules.

Socrates/ 'Tis no matter for that, 'tis all one. Above all, let us be cautious to avoid one great fault.

Phaedo/ What fault?

Socrates/ That, of being reason-haters, for such there are, as well as men-haters. The former is the greatest evil in the world, and arises from the same source with the hatred of man. For the latter comes from one man's plighting his faith for another man, without any precaution or inquiry, whom he always took for a true-hearted, solid, and trusty man, but finds him at last to be a false, faithless cheat; and thus being cheated in several such instances, by those whom he looked on as his best friends, and at last weary of being so often noosed, he equally hates all men, and is convinced there is not one that is not wicked and

perfidious. Are not you sensible that this man-hating is formed at this rate by degrees?

Phaedo/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ Is it not a great scandal, then, and a superlative crime, to converse with men without being acquainted with the art of trying them and knowing them? For if one were acquainted with this art, he would see how things stand, and would find that the good and the wicked are very rare, but those in the middle region swarm in infinite numbers.

Phaedo/ How do you say, Socrates?

Socrates/ I say, Phaedo, the case of the good and bad is much the same with that of very large or very little men. Do not you see that there's nothing more uncommon than a very big or a very little man? The case is the same with reference to dogs, horses, and all other things; and may likewise be applied to swiftness and slowness, handsomeness and deformity, whiteness and blackness. Are not you convinced that in all these matters the two extremes are very uncommon, and the medium is very common?

Phaedo/ I perceive it very plainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ If a match were proposed for wickedness, would not there be very few that could pretend to the first rank?

Phaedo/ That's very likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is certainly so. But upon this score the case of reason and men is not exactly the same. I'll follow you step by step. The only resemblance of the two lies in this, that when a man unskilled in the art of examination entertains a reason as true, and afterwards finds it to be false, whether it be so in itself

or not, and when the same thing happens to him often—as indeed it does to those who amuse themselves in disputing with the sophisters, that contradict everything—he at last believes himself to be extraordinary well skilled, and fancies he's the only man that has perceived there's nothing true or certain, either in things or reasons, but that all is like Euripus, in a continual flux and reflux, and that nothing continues so much as one minute in the same state.

Phaedo/ That is the pure truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ Is it not, then, a very deplorable misfortune, my dear Phaedo, that while there are true, certain, and very comprehensive reasons, there should be men found who, after they have suffered them to pass, call them again in question upon hearing these frivolous disputes, where sometimes truth and falsehood comes uppermost; and instead of charging themselves without these doubts, or blaming their want of art, cast the blame at last upon the reasons themselves; and, being of a sour temper, pass their life in hating and calumniating all reason, and by that means rob themselves both of truth and knowledge?

Phaedo/ That's certainly a most deplorable thing.

Socrates/ We ought to be very cautious, that this misfortune be not our lot, and that we are not prepossessed by this thought, that there's nothing solid or true in all arguments whatsoever. We should rather be persuaded that 't is ourselves who are wanting in solidity and truth and use our utmost efforts to recover that solidity and justness of thought. This is a duty incumbent upon you, who have time yet to live; and likewise upon me, who am about to die; and I am much afraid that upon this occasion I have been so far from

acting the part of a true philosopher, that I have behaved myself like a disputant overborne with prejudice, as all those ignorants do who in their disputes do not mind the perception of the truth, but mean only to draw their hearers over to their opinions. The only difference between them and me is, that convincing my audience of the truth of what I advance is not my only aim—indeed, I shall be infinitely glad if that come to pass—but my chief scope is to persuade myself of the truth of these things; for I argue thus, my dear Phaedo, and you'll find that this way of arguing is highly useful. If my propositions prove true, it is well done to believe them; and if after my death they be found false, I still reap that advantage in this life, that I have been less affected by evils which commonly accompany it. But I shall not remain long under this ignorance. If I were, I should reckon it a great misfortune; but by good luck it will quickly be dispelled. Being fortified by these thoughts, my dear Simmias and Cebes, I make account to answer your objections; and if you take my advice, you'll rely less upon the authority of Socrates than that of the truth. If what I am about to advance appear true, embrace it; if other wise, attack it with all your force. Thus, I shall neither deceive myself, nor impose upon you by the influence of zeal and goodwill, or quit you like a wasp that leaves its sting in the wound it has made.

To begin, then, pray see if I remember rightly what was objected. Simmias, as I take it, rejects our belief only because he fears our souls, not-with-standing their being divine and more excellent, will die before our bodies, as being only a sort of harmony. And, Cebes, if I mistake not, granted that the soul is more durable than the body, but thinks it possible that the soul, after

having used several bodies, may die at last, when it quits the last body, and that this death of the soul is a true death. Are not these the two points I am to examine, my dear Simmias and Cebes?

Phaedo/ When they had all agreed that the objections were justly summed up, he continued thus; —

Socrates/ Do you absolutely reject all that I have said, or do you acknowledge part of it to be true?

Phaedo/ They answered that they did not reject the whole.

Socrates/ But what, is your opinion of what I told you, that is to say, that learning is only remembrance, and that, by a necessary consequence, the soul must have an existence before its conjunction with the body?

Cebes/ As for me, I perceived the evidence of it at first view, and do not know any principles of more certainty and truth.

Simmias/ I am of the same mind, and should think it very strange if ever I changed my opinion.

Socrates/ But, my dear Theban, you must needs change it, if you retain your opinion that harmony is compounded, and that the soul is a sort of harmony, arising from the due union of the qualities of the body; for 'tis presumed you would not believe yourself if you said that harmony has a being before those things of which it is composed.

Simmias/ Sure enough. I would not believe myself if I did.

Socrates/ Do not you see, then, that you are not of a piece with yourself when you say the soul had a being before it came to animate the body; and at the same time, that it is compounded of things that had not then

an existence? Do not you compare the soul to a harmony? And is it not evident that the harp, the strings, and the very discordant sounds exist before the harmony, which is an effect that results from all these things that perishes sooner than they? Does this latter part of your discourse suit with the first?

Simmias/ Not at all.

Socrates/ And yet, if ever a discourse be all of a piece, it ought to be such when harmony is its subject.

Simmias/ That's right.

Socrates/ But yours is not so. Let's hear, then, which of these two opinions you side with; whether is learning only remembrance, or is the soul a sort of harmony?

Simmias/ I side with the first.

Socrates/ And that opinion I have explained to you, without having any recourse to demonstrations full of similes and examples, which are rather colors of the truth, and therefore please the people best; but as for me, I am of opinion that all discourses proving their point by similes are full of vanity, and apt to seduce and deceive, unless one be very cautious, whether it relate to geometry or any other science; whereas the discourse I made for proving that knowledge is remembrance is grounded upon a very credible hypothesis; for I told you that the soul exists as well as its essence before it comes to animate the body. By essence, I mean the principle from which it derives its being, which has no other name but that which is. And this proof I take to be good and sufficient.

Simmias/ By that reason, I must not listen either to myself or others, who assert the soul to be a sort of harmony.

Socrates/ In earnest, Simmias, do you think that a harmony, or any other composure, can be anything different from the parts of which it is compounded

Simmias/ By no means, Socrates.

Socrates/ Or, can it do or suffer what those parts do not?

Phaedo/ Simmias answered that it could not.

Socrates/ Then, a harmony does not precede, but follow the thing it is composed of.; and it cannot have sounds and motions, or anything else contrary to its parts.

Simmias/ No, surely.

Socrates/ But what, is not all harmony only such in proportion to the concord of its parts?

Simmias/ I do not well understand you.

Socrates/ I mean, according as the parts have more or less of concord, the harmony is more or less a harmony, is it not?

Simmias/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ Can we say of the soul, at the same rate, that a small difference makes a soul to be more or less a soul?

Simmias/ No, surely, Socrates.

Socrates/ How is it, then, in the name of God? Do not we say, for example, that such a soul endowed with understanding and virtue is good, and another filled with folly and mischief is wicked? Is not this right?

Simmias/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ But those who hold the soul to be a harmony, what will they call these qualities of the soul, that vice, and that virtue? Will they say, the one's harmony, and the other discord? That a virtuous and

good soul, being harmony in its nature, is entitled to another harmony, and that a vicious wicked soul wants that addition, harmony?

Simmias/ I cannot be positive, but indeed 'tis very probable the patrons of that opinion may advance some such thing.

Socrates/ But we concluded, that one soul is not more or less a soul than another; that is, that it is not more or less a harmony, than another harmony.

Simmias/ I own it.

Socrates/ And since it is not more or less a harmony then it has not more or less concord? Is it not so?

Simmias/ Yes, surely, Socrates.

Socrates/ And since it has not more or less of concord, can one have more harmony than another, or must the harmony of them all be equal?

Simmias/ Questionless it must be equal.

Socrates/ Since one soul cannot be more or less a soul than another, by the same reason, it cannot have more or less of concord.

Simmias/ That's true.

Socrates/ Then it follows necessarily that one soul cannot have either more harmony or discord than another?

Simmias/ I agree to it.

Socrates/ And by consequence, since the soul is of that nature, it cannot have more virtue or vice than another; if so be that vice is discord, and virtue harmony?

Simmias/ That is a standing truth.

Socrates/ Or, would not right reason rather say that vice could find no place in the soul, if so be the soul is

harmony? for harmony, continuing in its perfect nature, is not capable of discord.

Simmias/ There is no question of that.

Socrates/ In like manner the soul, while perfectly a soul, is not capable of vice.

Simmias/ According to the principles we agreed upon, I cannot see how it should.

Socrates/ From the same very principles it will follow, that the souls of all animals are equally good, since they are equally souls.

Simmias/ So I think.

Socrates/ But do you think that it stands with right reason, if the hypothesis of the souls being a harmony be true?

Simmias/ No, surely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then I ask you, Simmias, if of all the parts of a man the soul is not best entitled to command, especially when she is prudent and wise?

Simmias/ There is no other part can pretend to it.

Socrates/ Does it command by giving way to the passions of the body, or by resisting them? As, for example, when the body is seized with thirst in the cold fit of a fever, does not the soul restrain it from drinking? Or when 'tis hungry, does it not restrain from eating? As well as in a thousand other instances, which manifestly show that the soul curbs the passions of the body. Is it not so?

Simmias/ Without question.

Socrates/ But we agreed above that the soul being a sort of harmony, can never sound contrary to the sound of those things which arise, or lower, or move it, nor have other passions different from those of its parts;

and that it is necessarily obliged to follow them, as being incapable to guide them.

Simmias/ 'Tis certain we agreed upon that, how could we avoid it?

Socrates/ But, is it not evident that the conduct of the soul is the downright contrary? That it governs and rules those very things which are alleged for ingredients in its composition; that it thwarts and attacks them almost all its lifetime; that it is every way their mistress, punishing and repressing some by the harder measures of pain, school-exercises, and physic; and treating others more gently, as contenting itself with threatening or insulting over its lusts, passion, and fear. In a word, we see the soul speaks to the body, as something of a different nature from itself, which Homer was sensible of, when in his Odyssey, he tells that 'Ulysses beating his breast, rebuked his heart, and said to it, Support thyself, you hast stood out against harder and more difficult things than these.'

Do you think the poet spoke that under the apprehensions of the souls being a harmony to be managed and conducted by the body? Or do you not rather believe that he knew it was the soul s part to command, and that it is of a nature more divine than harmony?

Simmias/ Yes, Socrates; I swear I am persuaded Homer knew that truth.

Socrates/ And, by consequence, my dear Simmias, there is not the least color of reason for the souls being a harmony; should we assert it to be such we should contradict both Homer, that divine poet, and likewise ourselves.

Phaedo/ Simmias yielded, and Socrates proceeded thus.

Socrates/ I think we have sufficiently tempered and moderated this Theban harmony, so that it will do us no harm. But Cebes, how shall we do to appease and disarm this Cadmus? How shall we hit on a discourse duly qualified with a persuasive force?

Cebes/ If you'll be at the pains, Socrates, you can easily find such a discourse. The last you had against the harmony of the soul moved me mightily, and indeed beyond my expectation; for when Simmias proposed his doubts, I thought nothing short of a prodigy or miracle could solve them, and I was mightily surprised when I saw he could not stand the first attack. So that now it will be no surprisal to me to see Cadmus undergo the same fate.

Socrates/ My dear Cebes, do not you speak too big upon the matter, lest envy should overturn all I have said, and render it useless and ineffectual. But That's in the hands of God. As for us, let us approach one another, as Homer says, and try our strength and arms. What you want comes all to this point; You would have the immortality and incorruptibility of the soul demonstrated, to the end that a philosopher who dies bravely in the hopes of being infinitely more happy in the other world than in this, may not hope in vain. You say, the souls being a durable and divine substance, existing before its joining the body, does not conclude its immortality; and the only inference that it will bear is, that it lasts a great while longer, and was in being many ages before us, during which it knew and did several things, but without immortality; for on the contrary, the first minute of its descent into the body is the commencement of its death, or, as it were, a disease

to it; for it passes this life in anguish and trouble, and at last is quite swallowed up and annihilated by what we call death. You add that 'tis the same thing, whether it animates a body only once, or returns to it several times, since that does not alter the occasion of our fears, forasmuch as all wise men ought still to fear death, while they are uncertain of the immortality of their souls. This, I take it, is the sum of what you said; and I repeat it so often, on purpose that nothing may escape my view, and that you may have the opportunity of adding or impairing as you please.

Cebes/ At present, I have nothing to alter; that is the just sum of all I have yet said.

Phaedo/ Socrates was silent a pretty while, as being drowned in profound meditation. —

Socrates/ At last, Cebes, 'tis truly not a small matter that you demand; for in order to a just satisfaction, there's a necessity of making a narrow inquiry into the cause of generation and corruption. If you please, I'll tell you what happened to me upon this very matter; and if what I say seem useful to you, you shall be at liberty to make use of it to support your sentiments.

Simmias/ With all my heart.

Socrates/ Pray give ear, then. In my youth I had an insatiable desire to learn that science which is called natural history; for I thought it was something great and divine to know the causes of everything, of their generation, death, and existence. And I spared no pains, nor omitted any means, for trying, in the first place, if a certain corruption of hot and cold will, as some pretend, give being and nourishment to animals; if the blood makes the thought, if air or fire, or the brain alone is the cause of our senses of seeing, hearing, smelling, and

so on, if memory and opinion take their rise from these senses, and if knowledge be the result of memory and opinion. Then I wanted to know the causes of their corruption, and extended my curiosity both to the heavens and the cavities of the earth, and would fain have known the cause of all the phenomena we meet with. At last, after a great deal of trouble, I found myself strangely unqualified for such inquiries; and of this I am about to give you a sensible proof. This fine study made me so blind in the things I knew more evidently before, according to my own and other persons thoughts, that I quite forgot all that I had known from several subjects, particularly that of a man's growth. I thought 'twas evident to the whole world that a man grows only by eating and drinking; for flesh being added to flesh, bones to bones, and all the other parts joined to their similar parts by nourishment, make a small bulk to swell and grow, so that a little man becomes a large. This was my thought, do you think 'twas just?

Cebes/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ Mind what follows. I thought likewise that I knew the reason why one man is taller than another by the head, and one horse higher than another; and with reference to plainer and more sensible things, I thought, for instance, that ten was more than eight, because two was added to it; and that two cubits were larger than one because they contained one-half more.

Cebes/ And what are your present thoughts of those things?

Socrates/ I am so far, from thinking that I know the cause of all these things, that when one is added to one, I do not believe I can tell whether it is that very one to which the other is added that becomes two, or whether

the one is added, and the one to which the addition was made make two together? For, in their separate state, each of them was one, and not two, and after their being placed one by the other they became two. Neither can I tell how, upon the division of anything, what was formerly one becomes two, from the very minute of division; for that cause is quite contrary to that which makes one and one become two. There, this one and this one become two by reason of their being placed near, and added the one to the other; but here this one thing becomes two by reason of its division and separation. Far less do I pretend to know whence this one thing comes, and by this method, in other words, by physical reasons, I cannot find how the least thing takes rise or perishes, or how it exists. But without so much ceremony, I mix another method of my own with this, for by this I can learn nothing. Having one day heard somebody reading a book of Anaxagoras s, who said the divine intellect was the cause of all beings, and drew them upon their proper ranks and classes, I was ravished with joy. I perceived there was nothing more certain than this principle, that the intellect is the cause of all things. For I justly thought that this intellect, having methodized all things and ranked them in their classes, planting everything in the place and condition that was best and most useful to it, in which it could best do and suffer whatever the intellect had allotted to it; and I apprehended that the result of this principle was, that the only thing a man ought to look for, either for himself or others, is this better and more useful thing; for having once found what is best and most useful, he'll necessarily know what is worst, since there is but one knowledge both for the one and the other. Upon this score I was infinitely glad that I had found

such a master as Anaxagoras, who I hoped would give a satisfactory account of the cause of all things; and would not only tell me, for instance, that the earth is broad or round, but likewise assign the necessary cause, obliging it to be so; who would point out to me what is best, and at the same time give me to understand why it was so. In like manner, if he affirmed the seat of the earth to be in the center of the world, I expected he would give me a reason why it was so; and after I should have received sufficient instruction from him, designed never to admit of any other cause for a principle.

I prepared some question to be put to him concerning the sun, moon, and the stars, in order to know the reasons of their revolutions, motions, and other accidents, and why what each of them does is always the best; for I could not imagine that after he had told me that the intellect ranked them, and drew them up in order, he could give me no other reason of that order than this, that it was best. And I flattered myself with hopes, that after he had assigned both the general and particular causes, he would give me to know wherein the particular good of every individual thing, as well as the common good of all things, consists. I would not have parted with these hopes for all the treasures of the world.

Socrates/ So I bought his books with a great deal of impatience, and made it my business to peruse them as soon as possible I could, in order to a speedy knowledge of the good and evil of all this; but I found myself frustrated of my mighty hopes, for as soon as I had made a small progress in the perusal I found the author made no use of this intellect, and assigned no reason of

that fine order and disposition; but assigned, as causes, the air, whirl winds, the waters, and other things equally absurd.

His whole performance seemed to reach no farther, than if a man should say, that Socrates does all by the intellect; and after that, meaning to give a reason for my actions, should say, for instance, to-day I am set upon my bed, because my body is composed of bones and nerves; the bones being hard and solid are separated by the joints; and the nerves, being capable to bend and unbend themselves, tie the bones to the flesh and the skin, which receives and includes both the one and the other; that the bones being disengaged at the joints, the nerves, which bend and unbend, enable me to fold my legs as you see; and that, forsooth, is the reason that I sit in this posture. Or if a man pretending to assign the cause of my present conference with you should insist only upon the second causes, the voice, the air, hearing, and such other things, and should take no notice of the true cause, that is to say, that the Athenians thought it fit to condemn me, and that by the same reason I thought it fitter for me to be here, and patiently wait the execution of my sentence, for I can safely swear that these nerves and these bones should long ere now have been translated to Megara, or Boeotia, if that had been fitted for me, and if I had not been persuaded that it was better and fitter for me to endure the punishment I am doomed to by my country, than to flee like a slave or a banished person. As I take it, 'tis highly ridiculous to assign such causes upon such an occasion, and to rest satisfied in them.

If it be replied, that without bones and nerves, and such other things, I could not do what I mean to do, the allegation is true. But it savors of the greatest absurdity

to fancy that these bones or nerves should be the cause of my actions, rather than the choice of what is best; and that my intellect is employed on that score, for that were to sink the difference between the cause and the thing, without which the cause could not be such, And yet the vulgar people, who take things by hearsay, and see by other people's eyes, as if they walked in thick darkness, take the true cause of things to be of that nature. Pursuant to this notion, some surround the earth with a vortex that turns eternally round, and suppose it to be fixed in the center of the universe; others conceive it to be a broad and large trough, which has the air for its base and foundation. And as for the power of Him who ranked and disposed of everything to its best advantage, that is not in their view, and they don t believe that He is entitled to any divine virtue. They fancy they know of a stronger and more immortal Atlas, more capable to support all things. And this good and immortal tie that is only capable to unite and comprehend all things, they take for a chimera.

I am of their mind, but would willingly list myself a disciple to any that could tell me the cause, let it be what it will. But since I could not compass the knowledge of it, neither by myself nor others, if you please I'll give you an account of a second trial I made-in order to find it.

Cebes/ I am very desirous to hear it.

Socrates/ After I had wearied myself in examining all things, I thought it my duty to be cautious of avoiding what happens to those who contemplate an eclipse of the sun; for they lose the sight of it, unless they be careful to view its reflection in water or any other medium. A thought much like to that came into my head, and I feared? should lose the eyes of my soul if I

viewed objects with the eyes of my body, or employed any of my senses in endeavoring to know them. I thought I should have recourse to reason, and contemplate the truth of all things as reflected from it. 'Tis possible the simile I use in explaining myself is not very just, for I myself cannot affirm that he who beholds things in the glass of reason sees them more by reflection and similitude than he? who beholds them in their operations. However, the way I followed was this; from that time forward, I grounded all upon the reason that seemed to be best, and took all for truth that I found conformable to it, whether in things or causes. And what was not conformable I rejected, as being false. I'll explain my meaning more distinctly, for I fancy you do not yet understand me.

Cebes/ I'll swear, I do not well understand you.

Socrates/ But after all, I advance no new thing. This is no more than what I have said a thousand times, and particularly in the foregoing dispute; for all that I aim at is to demonstrate what sort of cause this is that I sought after so carefully. I begin with his qualities, which are so much talked of, and which I take for the foundation. I say, then, there is something that is good, fine, just, and great of itself. If you grant me this principle, I hope by it to demonstrate the cause, and make out the immortality of the soul.

Cebes/ I grant it, you cannot be too quick in perfecting your demonstration.

Socrates/ Mind what follows, and see if you agree to it as I take it. If there is anything fine, besides fineness itself, it must be such by partaking of that first good; and so of all the other qualities. Are you of this opinion?

Cebes/ I am.

Socrates/ I protest, I cannot well understand all the other learned causes that are commonly given us. But if any man ask me what makes a thing fine, whether the liveliness of its colors, or the just proportion of its parts, and the like, I waive all these plausible reasons, which serve only to confound me, and without ceremony or art, make answer, and perhaps too simply, that its fineness is only owing to the presence, or approach, or communication of the original fine being, whatever be the way of that communication. For I am not yet certain in what manner it is; I only know certainly that all these fine things are rendered such by the presence of this fine being. While I stand by this principle I reckon I cannot be deceived, and I am persuaded that I may safely make answer to all questions whatsoever, that all fine things owe their fineness to the presence of! the above-mentioned being. Are not you of the same mind?

Cebes/ Yes, surely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Are not great and small things rendered such in like manner? If one told you that such a thing is larger than another by the head, would not you think the expression far from being exact? and would not you make answer, that whatever is larger is rendered such by magnitude itself, and what is smaller owes its littleness to littleness itself? For if you said that such a thing is greater or smaller than another by the head, I fancy you would fear being censured for making both the greater and lesser thing to be such by the same cause; and besides, for using such an expression as seems to imply that the head, which is a small part, makes the largeness of the greater, which in effect is a monster; for what can be more absurd than to say that a small matter makes a thing large? Would not you fear such objections?

Cebes/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ By the same reason would not you be afraid to say that ten are more than eight, and surpasses it by two? and would not you rather say that ten are more than eight by quantity? In like manner, of two cubits, would not you say they are larger than one by magnitude, rather than by the half? For still there's the same occasion of fear.

Cebes/ You say well.

Socrates/ But when one is added to one, or a thing divided into halves, would not you avoid saying that in the former case addition makes one and one two? and in the latter, division makes one thing become two? And would not you protest that you know no other cause of the existence of things than the participation of the essence That's peculiar to every subject, and consequently no other reason why one and one makes two, but the participation of quality, as one is one by the participation of unity? Would not you discard these additions, divisions, and all the other fine answers, and leave them to those who know more than you do? And, for fear of your own shadow, as the proverb goes, or rather of your ignorance, would not you confine yourself to this principle? And if anyone attacked it, would not you let it stand without deigning him an answer till you had surveyed all the consequences to see if they are of a piece or not? And if afterwards you should be obliged to give a reason for them, would not you do it by having recourse to some of these other hypotheses that should appear to be the best, and so proceed from hypothesis to hypothesis till you lighted upon somebody that satisfied you as being a sure and standing truth? At the same time, you would be loth to perplex and confound all things, as those disputants do who call all things in

question? 'Tis true, these disputants perhaps are not much concerned for the truth, and by thus mingling and perplexing all things by an effect of their profound knowledge they are sure to please themselves. But as for you, if you are true philosophers, you will do as I say.

Phaedo/ Simmias and Cebes jointly replied, That he said well.

Echecrates/ Indeed, Phaedo, I think it no wonder; for to my mind Socrates explained his principles with a wonderful neatness sufficient to make an impression upon any man of common sense.

Phaedo/ All the audience thought the same.

Echecrates/ Even we who have it only at second hand find it so. But what was said next?

Phaedo/ If I remember right, after they had granted that the species of things have a real subsistence, and that the things participating of their nature take their denomination from them, then, I say, Socrates interrogated Cebes as follows;

Socrates/ If your principle be true, when you say Simmias is larger than Socrates and lesser than Phaedo, do not you imply that both magnitude and littleness are lodged at the same time in Simmias?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ But do not you own that this proposition, Simmias is bigger than Socrates, is not absolutely and in itself true? For Simmias is not bigger because he is Simmias, but because he is possessed of magnitude. Neither is Simmias lesser than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo is big when compared to Simmias, who is little.

Cebes/ That's true.

Socrates/ Thus, Simmias is called both big and little, as being between two; by par taking of bigness he is bigger than Socrates, and by partaking also of littleness he is lesser than Phaedo.

Phaedo/ Then he smiled, and said;

Socrates/ Methinks I have insisted too long on these things, but I should not have amused myself with these large strokes had it not been to convince you more effectually of the truth of my principle. For, as I take it, not only magnitude itself cannot be at the same time big and small, but, besides, the magnitude that is in us does not admit of littleness, and has no mind to be surpassed, for cither the magnitude flees and yields its place when it sees its enemy approaching, or else it vanishes and perishes entirely; and, when once it has received it, it desires to continue as it is. As I, for instance, having received littleness, while I am as you see me, cannot but be little. For that which is big does never attempt to be little. And in like manner littleness never encroaches upon magnitude. In a word, any of the contraries, while it is what it is, is never to be found with its contrary; but either disappears or perishes when the other comes in.

Phaedo/ Cebes agreed to it, but one of the company, I forgot who, addressed himself to Socrates thus; In the name of all the gods, did not you say contrary to what you now advance? Did not you conclude upon this, that greater things take rise from the lesser, and the lesser from the greater; and, in a word, that contraries do still produce their contraries? Whereas now, as I take it, you allege that can never be.

Phaedo/ Whereupon Socrates put his head further out of the bed, and having heard the objection, said to him;

Socrates/ Indeed, you do well to put us in mind of what we said; but you do not perceive the difference between the former and the latter. In the former we asserted that every contrary owes its being to its contrary, and in the latter we teach that a contrary is never contrary to itself, neither in us, nor in the course of nature. There we spoke of things that had contraries, meaning to call every one of them by their proper names, but here we speak of such things as give a denomination to their subjects, which, we told you, could never admit of their contraries.

Phaedo/ Then turning to Cebes;

Socrates/ Did not this objection, likewise give you some trouble?

Cebes/ No, indeed, Socrates, I can assure you that few things are capable to trouble me at present.

Socrates/ Then we agreed upon this simple proposition, that a contrary can never be contrary to itself.

Cebes/ That is true.

Socrates/ But what do you say to this? Is cold and heat anything?

Cebes/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ What, is it like snow and fire?

Cebes/ No, surely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then you own that heat is different from fire, and cold from snow?

Cebes/ Without question, Socrates.

Socrates/ I believe you'll likewise own that when the snow receives heat it is no more what it was, but either gives way, or disappears for good and all, when the heat approaches. In like manner the fire will either yield or be extinguished when the cold prevails upon it; for then it cannot be fire and cold together.

Cebes/ 'Tis so.

Socrates/ There are also some contraries that not only give name to their species, but likewise impart it to other things different from it, which preserve its figure and form while they have a being. For instance, must not an odd thing have always the same name?

Cebes/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ Is that the only thing that is so called? Or, is not there some other things different from it, which must needs be called by the same name, by reason that it belongs to its nature never to be without odds? For instance, must not the ternary number be called not only by its own name, but; likewise by the name of an odd number; though at the same time to be odd and to be three are two different things? Now, such is the nature of the number three, five, and all other odd numbers; each of them is always odd, and yet their nature is not the same with the nature of the odd. In like manner, even numbers, such as two, four, eight, are all of them even, though at the same time their nature is not that of the even. Do not you own this?

Cebes/ How can I do otherwise?

Socrates/ Pray, mind what I infer from hence. 'Tis, that not only these contraries, which are incapable of receiving their contraries, but all other things which are not opposite one to another, and yet have always their contraries; all these things, I say, are incapable of

receiving a form opposite to their own; and either disappear to perish upon the appearance of the opposite form. For instance; Number three will sink a thousand times rather than become an even number, while it continues to be three. Is it not so?

Cebes/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ But after all, two are not contrary to three.

Cebes/ No, surely.

Socrates/ Then the contrary species are not the only things that refuse admission to their contraries; since, as you see other things that are not contrary cannot abide the approach of that which has the least shadow of contrariety.

Cebes/ That is certain.

Socrates/ Do you desire, then, that I should define them as clear as possible?

Cebes/ Ay, with all my heart, Socrates.

Socrates/ Must not contraries be such things as give such a form to that in which they are lodged, that it is not capable of giving admission to another That's contrary to them?

Cebes/ How do you say?

Socrates/ I say as I said but now; Wherever the idea or form of three is lodged, that thing must of necessity continue, not only to be three, but to be odd.

Cebes/ Who doubts that?

Socrates/ And by consequence 'tis impossible for the idea or form that's contrary to its constituent form, ever to approach.

Cebes/ That's a plain case.

Socrates/ Well, is not the constituent form an odd?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is not even the form that's contrary to odd?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the form of even is never lodged in three?

Cebes/ No, surely.

Socrates/ Then three is incapable of being even.

Cebes/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And that, because three is odd?

Cebes/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ Now, this is the conclusion I meant to prove, that some things that are not contrary to one another are as incapable of that other thing, as if it were truly a contrary; as, for instance, though three is not contrary to an even number, yet it can never admit of it. For two brings always something contrary to an odd number, like fire to cold, and several other things. Would not you agree, then, to this definition, that a contrary does not only refuse admission to its contrary, but like wise to that which, being not contrary, brings upon it something of a contrary name, which by that sort of contrariety destroys its form?

Cebes/ I pray you let me hear that again, for 'tis worth the while to hear it often.

Socrates/ I say number five will never be an even number; just as ten, which is its double, will never be odd; no more than three-fourths, or a third part, or any other part of a whole, will ever admit of the form and idea of the whole. Do you understand me? do you take me up, and do you agree with what I say?

Cebes/ I understand you; I apprehend you to a miracle; and I agree with you too.

Socrates/ Since you understand me, pray answer me as I do you; that is, answer me, not what I ask, but something else, according to the idea and example I have given you; I mean, that besides the true and certain way of answering spoken of already, I have yet another in my view that springs from that, and is fully as sure. For instance, if you ask me what it is that being in the body, makes it hot, I would not give you this ignorant, though sure answer, that 'tis heat; but would draw a more particular answer from what we have been speaking of, and would tell you that it is fire. And if you should ask what it is that makes the body sick, I would not say 'twas the disease, but the fever. If you ask me what makes a number odd, I would not tell you that it is the oddness, but unity; and so of the rest. Do you understand what I mean?

Cebes/ I understand you perfectly well.

Socrates/ Answer me, then, what makes the body live?

Cebes/ The soul.

Socrates/ Is the soul always the same?

Cebes/ How would it be otherwise?

Socrates/ Does the soul, then, carry life along with it into all the bodies it enters?

Cebes/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Is there anything that's contrary to life, or is there nothing?

Cebes/ Yes, death is the contrary of life.

Socrates/ Then the soul will never receive that which is contrary to what it carries in its bosom; That's a necessary consequence from our principles.

Cebes/ 'Tis a plain consequence.

Socrates/ But what name do we give to that which refuses admission to the idea and form of evenness?

Cebes/ 'Tis the odd number.

Socrates/ How do we call that which never receives justice, and that which never receives good?

Cebes/ The one is called injustice, and the other evil.

Socrates/ And how do you call that which never admits of death?

Cebes/ Immortal.

Socrates/ Does the soul admit of death?

Cebes/ No.

Socrates/ Then the soul is immortal.

Cebes/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Is that fully demonstrated, or was the demonstration imperfect?

Cebes/ It is fully made out, Socrates.

Socrates/ If an odd number of necessity were incorruptible, would not three be so too?

Cebes/ Who doubts it?

Socrates/ If whatever is without heat were necessarily incorruptible, would not snow, when put to the fire, withdraw itself safe from the danger? For since it cannot perish, it will never receive the heat, notwithstanding its being held to the fire.

Cebes/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ In like manner, if that which is not susceptible of cold were by a natural necessity exempted from perishing, though a whole river were thrown upon the fire, it would never go out, but on the contrary would come off with its full force.

Cebes/ There is an absolute necessity for that.

Socrates/ Then of necessity we must say the same of what is immortal. If that which is immortal is incorruptible, though death approach to the soul, it shall never fall in the attack; for, as we said but now, the soul will never receive death, and will never die, just as three, or any odd number, will never be even; fire will never be cold, nor its heat be turned to coldness.

Perhaps some may answer that 'tis true the odd can never become even, by the accession of what is even, while it continues odd; but what should hinder the even to take up the room of the odd when it comes to perish? To this objection it cannot be answered that the odd does not perish, for it is incorruptible. Had we established its incorruptibility, we should justly have maintained, that notwithstanding the attacks of the even, the odd of three would still come off without loss; and we should have asserted the same of fire, heat, and such other things, should not we?

Cebes/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And, by consequence, if we agree upon this, that every immortal thing is incorruptible, it will necessarily follow, not only that the soul is immortal, but that it is incorruptible. And if we cannot agree upon that, we must look out for another proof.

Cebes/ There is no occasion for that, Socrates, for what is it that should avoid corruption and death, if an immortal and eternal being be liable to them?

Socrates/ All the world will agree, that God, and life itself, and whatever 'tis that is immortal, does not perish.

Cebes/ At least, all men will profess so.

Socrates/ The consequence is absolutely necessary and certain. And by consequence, when a man comes

to die, his mortal and corruptible part dies; but the immortal part goes off safe, and triumphs over death.

Cebes/ That's plain and evident.

Socrates/ Then, my dear Cebes, if there be any such thing as an immortal and incorruptible being, such is the soul; and by consequence our souls shall live hereafter.

Cebes/ I have nothing to object, and cannot but yield to your arguments. But if Simmias, or any of the company, has anything to offer, they'll do well not to stifle it; for when will they find another occasion for discoursing and satisfying themselves upon these important subjects?

Simmias/ For my part, I cannot but subscribe to what Socrates has said. But I own that the greatness of the subject, and the natural weakness of man, occasion within me a sort of distrust and incredulity.

Socrates/ You have not only spoken well, but besides, notwithstanding the apparent certainty of our first hypothesis, 'tis needful you should resume them, in order to a more leisurely view, and to convince yourself more clearly and effectually. If you understand them sufficiently, you'll willingly second my thoughts as much as possible for a man to do; and when you are once fully convinced, you'll need no other proof.

Cebes/ That's well said.

Socrates/ There's one thing more, my friends, that is a very just thought, that is to say, that if the soul is immortal, it stands in need of cultivating and improvement, not only in the time that we call the time of life, but for the future, or what we call the time of eternity; for if you think justly upon this point you'll find it very dangerous to neglect the soul. Were death the

dissolution of the whole man, it would be a great advantage to the wicked after death to be rid at once of their body, their soul, and their vices-But forasmuch as the soul is immortal, the only way to avoid those evils and obtain salvation is to become good and wise; for it carries nothing along with it but its good or bad actions, and its virtues or vices, which are the cause of its eternal happiness or misery, commencing from the first minute of its arrival in the other world. And 'tis said that after the death of every individual person, the Demon or Genius, that was partner with it and conducted it during life, leads it to a certain place, where all the dead are obliged to appear, in order to be judged, and from thence are conducted by a guide to the world below. And, after they have there received their good or bad deserts, and continued there their appointed time, another conductor brings them back to this life, after several revolutions of ages. Now this road is not a plain united road, else there would be no occasion for guides, and nobody would miss their way; but there are several by ways and cross-ways, as I conjecture from the method of our sacrifices and religious ceremonies. So that a temperate, wise soul follows its guide, and is not ignorant of what happens to it; but the soul That's nailed to its body, as I said just now, that is inflamed with the love of it, and has been long its slave, after much struggling and suffering in this visible world, is at last dragged along against its will by the Demon allotted for its guide. And when it arrives at that rendezvous of all souls, if it has been guilty of any impurity, or polluted with murder, or has committed any of those atrocious crimes that desperate and lost souls are commonly guilty of, the other souls abhor it, and avoid its company; it finds neither companion nor guide, but

wanders in a fearful solitude and horrible desert, till after a certain time necessity drags it into the mansions it deserves; whereas the temperate and pure soul has the gods themselves for its guides and conductors, and goes to cohabit with them in the mansions of pleasure prepared for it. For, my friends, there are several marvelous places in the earth; and 'tis not at all such as the describers of it are wont to make it, as I was taught by one who knew it very well.

Simmias/ How do you say, Socrates? I have likewise heard several things of the earth, but not what you have heard. Wherefore I wish you would be pleased to tell us what you know.

Socrates/ To recount that to you, my dear Simmias, I do not believe we have any occasion for Glaucus's art. But to make out the truth of it is a more difficult matter, and I question if all Glaucus's art can reach it. Such an attempt is not only above my reach, but supposing it were not, the short time I have left me will not suffer me to embark in so long a discourse. All that I can do is to give you a general idea of this earth, and the places it contains.

Simmias/ That will be enough.

Socrates/ In the first place, I am persuaded that if the earth is placed in the middle of heaven (the air), as they say it is, it stands in no need of air, or any other support to prevent its fall; for heaven itself is wrapped equally about it, and its own equilibrium is in the middle of a thing that presses equally upon it, cannot incline to either side, and consequently stands firm and immovable. This I am convinced of.

Simmias/ You have reason to be so.

Socrates/ I am farther persuaded that the earth is very large and spacious, and that we only inhabit that part of it which reaches from the river Phasis to the Straits of Gibraltar, upon which we are scattered like so many ants dwelling in holes, or like frogs that reside in some marsh near the sea. There are several other nations that inhabit its other parts that are unknown to us; for all over the earth there are holes of all sizes and figures, always filled with gross air, and covered with thick clouds, and over-flown by the waters that rush in on all sides.

There is another pure earth above the pure heaven where the stars are, which is commonly called Ether. The earth we inhabit is properly nothing else but the sediment of the other, and its grosser part which flows continually into those holes. We are immured in those cells, though we are not sensible of it, and fancy we inhabit the upper part of the pure earth, much after the same rate as if one living in the depths of the sea should fancy his habitation to be above the waters, and when he sees the sun and other stars through the waters, should fancy the sea to be the heavens, and by reason of his heaviness and weakness, having never put forth his sea head or raised himself above the waters, should never know that the place we inhabit is purer and nearer than his, and should never meet with any person to inform him. This is just our condition; we are mewed up within some hole of the earth, and fancy we live at the top of all; we take the air for the true heavens, in which the stars run their rounds. And the cause of our mistake is our heaviness and weakness, that keep us from surmounting this thick and muddy air. If any could mount up with wings to the upper surface, he would no sooner put his head out of the gross air but

he would behold what's transacted in those blessed mansions, just as the fishes skipping above the surface of the waters see what's done in the air in which we breathe. And if he were a man fit for long contemplation, he would find it to be the true heaven and the true light; in a word, to be the true earth. For this earth that we inhabit, those stones, and all places are entirely corrupted and gnawed, just as whatever is in the sea is corroded by the sharpness of the salts. And the sea produces nothing That's perfect or valuable. It contains nothing but caves and mud; and wherever any ground is found, there's nothing but deep sloughs, nothing comparable to what we have here. Now the things in the other mansions are more above what we have here, than what we have here is above what we meet with in the sea. And in order to make you conceive the beauty of this pure earth situated in the heavens, if you please, I'll tell you a pretty story That's worth your hearing.

Simmias/ We shall hear it, with a great deal of pleasure.

Socrates/ First of all, my dear Simmias, if one looks upon this earth from a high place, they say it looks like one of our packs covered with twelve welts of different colors. For it is varied with a greater number of different colors, of which those made use of by our painters are but sorry patterns. For the colors of this earth are infinitely more clean and lively. One is an admirable purple another a color of gold, more sparkling than gold itself; a third a white more lively than the snow; and so on of all the rest, the beauty whereof leaves our colors here far behind it. The chinks of this earth are filled with water and air, which make up an infinity of admirable shadows, so wonderfully diversified by that infinite variety of colors.

In this so perfect an earth everything has a perfection answerable to its qualities. The trees, flowers, fruits, and mountains are charmingly beautiful; they produce all sorts of precious stones of an incomparable perfection, clearness, and splendor; those we esteem so much here, such as emeralds, jasper, and sapphire, are but small parcels of them. There is not one in that blessed earth that is not infinitely more pretty than of ours. The cause of all which is, that all these precious stones are pure, neither gnawed nor spoiled by the sharpness of the salts, or the corruption of the sediment or dregs that fall from thence into our lower earth, where they assemble, and infect not only the stones and the earth, but the plants and animals, with all sorts of pollution and diseases.

Besides all these beauties now mentioned, this blessed earth is enriched with gold and silver, which being scattered all over in great abundance, casts forth a charming splendor on all sides, so that a sight of this earth is a view of the blessed. It is inhabited by all sorts of animals, and by men, some of whom are cast into the center of the earth, and others are scattered about the air, as we are above the sea. There are some also that inhabit the isles formed by the air near the continent. For there the air is the same thing that water and sea are here; and the aether does them the same service that the air does to us. Their seasons are so admirably well-tempered that their life is much longer than ours, and always free from distempers; and as for their sight, hearing, and all their other senses, and even their intellect itself, they surpass us as far as the aether they breathe in exceeds our gross air for simplicity and purity. They have sacred groves, and temples actually inhabited by the gods, who give evidence of their

presence by oracles, divinations, inspirations, and all other sensible signs, and who converse with them. They see the sun and moon without an intervening medium, and view the stars as they are in themselves. And all the other branches of their felicity are proportional to these.

This is the situation of the earth, and this is the matter of all that surrounds it. All about it there are several abysses in its cavities, some of which are deeper and more open than the country we in habit; others are deeper, but not so open; and some again have a more extensive breadth, but a lesser depth. And these abysses are bored through in several parts, and have pipes communicating one with another, through which there runs, just as in the caves of Mount Ætna, a vast quantity of water, very large and deep rivers, springs of cold and hot waters, fountains, and rivers of fire, and other rivers of mud, some thinner and some thicker and more muddy, like those torrents of mud and of fire that are cast out from Mount Ætna.

These abysses are filled with these waters in proportion to their falling out of one into another.

All these sources move both downwards and upwards, like a vessel hung above the earth, which vessel is naturally one, and indeed the greatest of these abysses. It goes across the whole earth, and is open on two sides. Homer speaks of it when he says, 'I'll throw it into the obscure Tartarus, that is a great way from hence, the deepest abyss under the earth.' Homer is not the only author that called this place by the name of Tartarus; most of the other poets did the same.

All the rivers rendezvous in this abyss, and run out from thence again. Each of these rivers is tinctured with the nature of the earth through which it runs. And the

reason of their not stagnating in these abysses is this, that they find no ground, but roll and throw their waters upside down. The air and wind that girds them about does the same, for it follows them when they rise above the earth, and when they descend towards us. And just as in the respiration of animals there is an incessant ingress and egress of air, so the air that mingles with the waters accompanies them in their ingress and egress, and raises raging winds.

When these waters fall into this lower abyss, they diffuse themselves into all the channels of the springs and rivers, and fill them up, just as if one were drawing up water with two pails, one of which fills as the other empties. For these waters, flowing from hence, fill up our channels; from whence diffusing themselves all about, they fill our seas, rivers, lakes, and fountains. After that they disappear, and diving into the earth, some with a large compass, and others by small turnings, repair to Tartarus, where they enter by other passages than those they came out by, and much lower. Some re-enter on the same side, and others on the opposite to that of their egress; and some again enter on all sides after they have made one or several turns round the earth, like serpents folding their bodies into several rolls; and having gained entrance, rise up to the middle of the abyss, but cannot reach farther, by reason that the other half is higher than the level. They form several very great and large currents; but there are four principal ones, the greatest of which is the outermost of all, and is called the Ocean.

Opposite to that is Acheron, which runs through the desert place, and diving through the earth, falls into the marsh, which from it is called the Acherusian Lake, whither all souls repair upon their departure from this

body; and having stayed there all the time appointed, some a shorter, some a longer time, are sent back to this world to animate beasts.

Between Acheron and the ocean there runs a third river, which retires again not far from its source, and falls into a vast space full of fire; there it forms a lake greater than our sea, in which the water mixed with mud boils, and setting out from thence all black and muddy, runs along the earth to the end of the Acherusian Lake, without mixing with its waters; and after having made several turnings under the earth, throws itself underneath Tartarus; and this is the naming river called Phlegethon, the streams whereof are seen to fly up on the earth in several places.

Opposite to this is the fourth river, which fall first into a horrible wild place, of a bluish color, called by the name of Stygian, where it forms the formidable Lake of Styx; and after it Las tinctured itself with horrible qualities from the water of that lake, dives into the earth, where it makes several turns, and directing its course over against Phlegethon, at last meets it in the Lake of Acheron, where it does not mingle its waters with those of the other rivers, but after it has run its round on the earth, throws itself into Tartarus by a passage opposite to that of Phlegethon. This fourth river is called by the poets Cocytus. Nature having thus disposed of all these things, when the dead arrive at that place whither their Demon leads them, they are all tried and judged, both those that lived a holy and just life, and those who wallowed in injustice and impiety.

Those who are found to have lived neither entirely a criminal, nor absolutely an innocent life, are sent to Acheron. There they embark in boats, and are transported to the Acherusian Lake, where they dwell,

and suffer punishment proportionable to their crimes; till at last being purged and cleansed from their sins, and set at liberty, they receive the recompense of their good actions.

Those whose sins are incurable, and who have been guilty of sacrilege and murder, or such other crimes, are by a just and fatal destiny thrown headlong into Tartarus, where they are kept prisoners forever.

But those who are found guilty of curable (venial) sins, though very great ones, such as offering of violence to their father or mother in a passion, or killing a man, and repenting for it all their life time, must of necessity be likewise cast into Tartarus; but after a year's abode there, the tide throws the homicides back into Cocytus, and the parricides into Phlegethon, which draws them into the Acherusian Lake. There they cry out bitterly, and invoke those whom they have killed or offered violence to, to aid them, and conjure them to forgive them, and to suffer them to pass the lake, and give them admittance. If they are prevailed with, they pass the lake, and are delivered from their misery; if not, they are cast again into Tartarus, which throws them back into these rivers; and this continues to be repeated till they have satisfied the injured persons. For such is the sentence pronounced against them.

But those who have distinguished themselves by a holy life are released from these earthly places, these horrible prisons, and received above into that pure earth where they dwell; and those of them who are sufficiently purged by philosophy live forever without their body, and are received into yet more admirable and delicious mansions, which I cannot easily describe, neither do the narrow limits of my time allow me to launch into that subject.

What I told you but now is sufficient, my dear Simmias, to show that we ought to labor all our lifetime to purchase virtue and wisdom, since we have so great a hope and so great a reward proposed to us.

No man of sense can pretend to assure you that all these things are just as I have said; but all thinking men will be positive that the state of the soul, and the place of its abode after death, is absolutely such as I represent it to be, or at least very near it, provided the soul be immortal; and will certainly find it worth his danger to run the risk; for what danger is more inviting? One must needs be charmed with that blessed hope; and for this reason I have dilated a little upon this subject.

Everyone who during his lifetime renounced the pleasures of the body, who looked upon the appurtenances of the body as foreign ornaments, and siding with the contrary party, pursued only the pleasures of true knowledge, and beautified his soul, not with foreign ornaments, but with ornaments suitable to its nature, such as temperance, justice, fortitude, liberty, and truth; —such a one, being firmly confident of the happiness of his soul, ought to wait peaceably for the hour of his removal, as being always ready for the voyage whenever his fate calls him.

As for you, my dear Simmias, Cebes, and all you of this company, you shall follow me when your hour comes. Mine is now, and, as a tragic poet would say, the surly pilot calls me aboard; where fore ’tis time I should go to the bath, for I think ’tis better to drink the poison after I am washed, in order to save the women the trouble of washing me after I am dead.

Phaedo/ Socrates having thus spoke, Crito addressed himself to Socrates thus;

Crito/ Alas, then! in God's name be it. But what orders do you give me and the rest here present with reference to your children or your affairs, that by putting them in execution we may at least have the comfort of obliging you?

Socrates/ What I now recommend to you, Crito, is what I always recommended, that is, to take care of yourselves. You cannot do your selves a more considerable piece of service, nor oblige me and my family more, than to promise me at this time so to do. Whereas, if you neglect yourselves, and refuse to form your lives according to the model I proposed to you, and follow it, as it were, by the footsteps, all your protestations and offers of service will be altogether useless to me.

Crito/ We shall do our utmost, Socrates, to obey you. But how will you be buried?

Socrates/ Just as you please, if you can but catch me, and if I do not give you the slip.

Phaedo/ At the same time, looking upon us with a gentle smile;

Socrates/ I cannot compass my end, in persuading Crito that this is Socrates who discourses with you, and methodizes all the parts of this discourse; and still he fancies that Socrates is the thing that shall see death by-and-by. He confounds me with my corpse, and in that view asks how I must be buried? And this long discourse that I made to you but now, in order to make it out, that as soon as I shall have taken down the poison I shall stay no longer with you, but shall part from hence, and go to enjoy the felicity of the blessed—in a word, all that I have said for your consolation and mine is to no purpose, but is all lost with reference to

him. I beg of you that you will be bail for me to Crito, but after a contrary manner to that in which he offered to bail me to my judges, for he engaged that I would not be gone. Pray engage for me that I shall be no sooner dead but I shall be gone, to the end that poor Crito may bear my death more steadfastly; and when he sees my body burnt or interred, may not despair, as if I suffered great misery, and say at my funeral that Socrates is interred. For you must know, my dear Crito, that speaking amiss of death is not only a fault in the way of speaking, but likewise wounds the soul. You should have more courage and hope, and say that my body is to be interred. That you may inter as you please, and in the manner That's most conformable to our laws and customs.

Phaedo/ Having spoken thus, he rose, and went into the next room to bathe. Crito followed him, and he desired we should attend him. Accordingly we all attended him, and entertained ourselves one while with a repetition and farther examination of what he had said, another while in speaking of the miserable state that was before us. For we all looked upon ourselves as persons deprived of our good father, that were about to pass the rest of our life in an orphan state.

After he came out of the bath, they brought his children to him, for he had three—two little ones, and one that was pretty big; and the women of his family came all in to him. He spoke to them some time in the presence of Crito, gave them their orders, and ordered them to retire, carry his children along with them, and then come back to us. 'twas then towards sun-setting, for he had been a long while in the little room.

When he came in, he sat down upon his bed, without saying much; for much about the same time the officer of the eleven magistrates came in, and drawing near to him;

Jailer/ Socrates, I have no occasion to make the same complaint of you that I have every day of those in the same condition; for as soon as I come to acquaint them by orders from the eleven magistrates that they must drink the poison, they are incensed against me and curse me. But as for you, ever since you came into this place, I have found you to be the most even-tempered, the calmest, and the best man that ever entered this prison; and I am confident that at present you are not angry with me; doubtless you are angry with none but those who are the cause of your misfortune. You know them without naming. On this occasion, Socrates, you know what I come to tell you. Farewell! Endeavor to bear this necessity with a constant mind.

Phaedo/ Having spoken thus, he began to cry, and, turning his back upon us, retired a little.

Socrates/ Farewell, my friend, I'll follow the counsel you give.

—Mind, what honesty is in that fellow. During my imprisonment he came often to see me, and conversed with me. He's more worth than all the rest. How heartily he cries for me! Let us obey him with a handsome mien, my dear Crito; if the poison be brewed, let him bring it; if not, let him brew it himself.

Crito/ But methinks, Socrates, the sun shines upon the mountains, and is not yet set; and I know several in your circumstances did not drink the poison till a long time after the order was given; that they supped very well, and enjoyed anything they had a mind to.

Wherefore I conjure you not to press so hard; you have yet time enough.

Socrates/ Those who do as you say, Crito, have their own reasons; they think it is just as much time gained. And I have likewise my reasons for not doing so; for the only advantage I can have by drinking it later is only to make myself ridiculous to myself, in being so foolishly fond of life as to pretend to husband it in the last minute when there's no more to come. Go, then, my dear Crito, and do as I bid you do, and do not vex me any longer.

Phaedo/ Whereupon Crito gave the sign to the slave who waited just by. The slave went out, and after he had spent some time in brewing the poison, returned, accompanied by him who was to give it, and brought it all together in one cup. Socrates seeing him come in;

Socrates/ That's very well, my friend, but what must I do? For you know best, and 'tis your business to direct me.

Jailer/ You have nothing else to do, but whenever you have drank it to walk until you find your legs stiff, and then to lie down upon your bed. This is all you have to do.

Phaedo/ And at the same time he gave him the cup. Socrates took it, not only without any commotion or change of color or countenance, but with joy; and looking upon the fellow with a steady and bold eye, as he was wont to do;

Socrates/ What do you say of this mixture, is it allowable to make a drink offering of it?

Jailer/ Socrates, we never brew more at once than what serves for one dose.

Socrates/ I understand you, but at least is it lawful for me to pray to the gods that they would bless the

voyage and render it happy. This I beg of them with all my soul.

Phaedo/ Having said this he drank it off with an extraordinary calmness and an inexpressible tranquility.

We had until this time, almost all of us, the power to refrain from tears; but when we saw him drink it off we were no longer masters of ourselves. In spite of all my efforts I was forced to cover myself with my mantle, that I might freely regret my condition; for 'twas not Socrates misfortune, but my own that I deplored in reflecting what a friend I was bereft of. Crito, who likewise could not abstain from crying, had prevented me, and risen up. And Apollodorus, who scarce ceased to cry during the whole conference, did then howl and cry aloud, insomuch that he moved everybody. Only Socrates himself was not at all moved. On the contrary, he chid them.

Socrates/ What are you doing, my friends? What! such fine men as you are! Oh, where is virtue? Was it not for this reason that I sent off those women, for fear they should have fallen into these weaknesses? for I always heard it said that a man ought to die in peace and blessing God. Be easy, then, and show more steadiness and courage.

Phaedo/ These words filled us with confusion, and obliged us to suppress our tears.

In the meantime he continued to walk, and when he felt his legs stiff he lay down on his back, as the man had commanded him. At the same time the same man that gave him the poison came up to him, and, after looking upon his legs and feet, bound up his feet with all his strength, and asked him if he felt it. He said

Socrates/ No.

Phaedo/ Then he bound up his legs; and, having carried his hand higher, gave us the signal that he was quite cold. Socrates likewise felt himself with his hand, and told us that when the cold came up to his heart he should leave us. All his lower belly was already frozen. And then uncovering himself (for he was covered);

Socrates/ Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius; discharge this vow for me, and do not forget it.

Phaedo/ (these were his last words)

Crito/ It shall be done. But see if you have anything else to say to us.

Phaedo/ He made no answer, but after a little space of time expired. The man, who was still by him, having uncovered him, received his last looks which continued fixed upon him. Crito, seeing that advanced and shut his mouth and eyes.

This, Echecrates, was the end of our friend, a man who, beyond all dispute, was the best, and most sensible, and the honestest of all our acquaintance.

Phædo.

or

The Immortality Of The Soul.

Translated by Charles S. Stanford. 1854

Persons of the Dialog.

Echecrates, Phædo, Socrates, Apollodorus,
Simmias, Crito, the Officer of the Prison.

Echecrates/ Were you. in personal attendance, Phædo, upon Socrates, on that day in which he drank the hemlock in prison, or did you hear of the matter from another?

Phaedo/ I was there myself, Echecrates.

Echecrates/ What was the purport of his conversation before he died, and what was the manner of his death? —for I should be glad to hear, since none of the citizens of Phlius at all frequent Athens at present, nor has any foreigner arrived here from thence, for a long time, who could give any more distinct account than that he died from the draught of poison, but of the attendant circumstances he could say nothing.

Phaedo/ Did you not hear of the trial either how it proceeded?

Echecrates/ Yes; one brought me intelligence of this, and I am surprised that as it terminated some time since, he appears to have died so long subsequent to it. How did this happen, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ Owing to accident, Echecrates; for the poop of the vessel which the Athenians are accustomed to send to Delos chanced to be crowned upon the day preceding the trial.

Echecrates/ What does this vessel mean?

Phaedo/ It is the same, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once set out with fourteen in the flower of youth, for Crete, whom he managed to preserve, and was also saved himself. They made a vow, it is said, to Apollo upon that occasion, that in event of their preservation they would dispatch a solemn deputation to Delos, which, ever since then, up to the present time, they send out yearly in honor of the god. When they commence the celebration of this ceremony then, the usage is, during the interval between the arrival of the vessel at Delos, and its return hither, to purify the city and to allow no public execution; but this interval is at times of some duration, when the winds are unfavorable. The commencement of the embassy is notified by the priest of Apollo crowning the poop of the ship, and this happened, as I mentioned, on the day preceding the trial. On this account Socrates had a long interval in prison, between the trial and his death.

Echecrates/ But, Phaedo, what were the particulars of his decease? What was said, and done, and which of his intimates were present with him? Or did the Eleven prevent their attendance, and did he die forsaken by his friends?

Phaedo/ By no means; there were some, indeed several, present.

Echecrates/ Be pleased now to give me the most distinct possible account of each particular, unless you have some business on hands.

Phaedo/ I am quite at leisure, and shall endeavor to tell you all, for to call Socrates to mind, whether speaking myself or listening to another, is ever most delightful to me.

Echecrates/ Even such as yourself, Phædo, have you to listen to you; but try, with all possible accuracy, to enumerate to me everything.

Phaedo/ In truth I was strangely affected upon my arrival. No feeling of compassion struck me, as one who stood by to witness the last moments of a dearly familiar friend, for the man appeared to me, Echecrates, at perfect ease, both in his manner and discourse, with such an intrepid and noble bearing he met his death; so much so, that it struck me he was not descending to the Shades but by divine direction, and that he, if ever there were one, should be blest in his arrival there. For this reason I was not moved, in any degree, to the compassion which would be natural to one present at a scene so sorrowful, nor yet did I experience the pleasure, as when we were engaged, according to our custom, in philosophical pursuits, although our discourse partook of some such character, but an altogether unaccountable affection seized me, and a species of unusual, mixed feeling, compounded alike of pleasure and of pain, upon reflecting how very soon he was about to die. And all present were almost similarly disposed, now indeed smiling, and again in tears, but one especially amongst us, Apollodorus; you doubtless know the man and his character.

Echecrates/ How should I not?

Phaedo/ He indeed resigned himself entirely to these emotions, and the rest, with myself, were perturbed alike.

Echecrates/ But who besides were present, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ Of our countrymen this Apollodorus was present, Critobulus and his father Crito; besides Hermogenes and Epigenes, Æschines and Antisthenes. There were also Ctesippus of the Paianian tribe, Menexenus, and some others of our countrymen; but Plato, I believe, was ill.

Echecrates/ Were any strangers present?

Phaedo/ Yes; Simmias of Thebes, Cebes and Phaedondes, and from Megara, Euclides and Terpsion.

Echecrates/ Tell me: Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

Phaedo/ No truly; they were said to be in Ægina.

Echecrates/ Was anyone else present?

Phaedo/ I believe those whom I mentioned were almost all that were present.

Echecrates/ Well now; what was the subject of your conversation?

Phaedo/ I shall endeavor to narrate to you everything from the commencement. We were constantly in the habit, both the rest and myself, of visiting Socrates on the preceding days; assembling together at the tribunal where the trial took place, for it was contiguous to the prison, we used to wait every day until the prison was opened, conversing with each other, for it was not opened very early; but as soon as it was so we went in to Socrates and generally passed the day with him. Upon that occasion we assembled at an earlier hour, because on the preceding day, when we were going out of the prison, we understood that the vessel had arrived from Delos, upon which we agreed to return as early as possible on the following day to the usual place. We did so; and the jailer who used to admit us, coming out, requested us to wait and not seek for admission until he should direct; "For," said he, "the Eleven are unbinding Socrates, and acquainting him that he must die to-day." But after a little time he returned and desired us to enter.

When we had come in we found Socrates just unfettered, and Xantippe—you know her—sitting beside him with his little son. As soon as she observed us she wept aloud, and expressed herself in the customary manner of her sex, saying;

Xanthippe/ "Socrates, now for the last time your friends converse with you and you with them."

Phaedo/ Upon which Socrates, looking at Crito, said;

Socrates/ "Crito, let someone conduct her home."

Phaedo/ And some of Crito's retinue led her away weeping and lamenting bitterly.

But Socrates sitting up in the bed, bended his leg and rubbed it with his hands, and while doing so, observed;

Socrates/ "How strange, my friends, this thing appears to be which mankind calls pleasure, and how wonderful it is disposed towards that which seems to be its opposite, pain; since they are not inclined both to befall a man at once, but should any pursue and attain the one, he is almost invariably compelled to admit the other, as if they being two were connected by one head. And it seems to me that if Æsop had turned his mind to this he would have composed a fable to the effect that the deity being anxious to reconcile those contending principles, when he failed in the attempt, joined their heads together, so that whomsoever the one should visit the other arrives with immediately after. Even so it appears to me, since I suffered pain in my leg before by reason of the chain, but pleasure seems to have followed in succession now."

Cebes/ "By Jove, Socrates, you have done well to remind me, for several others have asked me already, and Evenus very lately, respecting the poems you have composed, your versification of Æsop's Fables, and the hymn to Apollo, with what object you wrote them after you had come here, having never executed anything of the kind before. If you are at all concerned then in my being enabled to give Evenus an answer when he questions me again, for I know well he will do so, tell me what I am to say."

Socrates/ "Tell him the truth, Cebes, that I did not write them with a view to any competition with him, or his productions, for this I knew should not be any easy task, but

investigating the purport of certain dreams, and acquitting my conscience if this perchance were a branch of the liberal arts which they enjoined me to attend to. But the dreams were of the following character: the same vision came repeatedly during the course of my past life, appearing at various times under various forms, but always with the same injunction, "Socrates, adopt and cultivate the liberal arts." And I indeed imagined that it was animating and encouraging me, as those who cheer on racers at the games, to continue the pursuit in which I had been previously engaged; and that in like manner the vision urged upon me the course in which I was engaged; that is, the study of the liberal arts, since philosophy indeed is the most refined of the liberal arts, and I was intently occupied in this. But now, when the trial was over, and the festival of the deity was delaying my death, I thought that in case the vision had intended by its frequent injunctions the composition of popular poetry, I should not disobey but attempt it. For I deemed it was safer not to depart from hence before I had acquitted my conscience in the composition of some poems in obedience to the dream. Consequently, I first composed one on the deity whose festival was at hand; but after this token of respect to the god, with the impression that it became a poet, if he aspired to the name, to write fictions and not true narratives, besides my not being skilled in the fabulous, I, upon this account, turned into verse the first which occurred of those fables of Æsop which I remembered and was well acquainted with. "Tell this then, Cebes, to Evenus, and wish him health and strength, and say, that if he is wise, he will follow me; but I depart as it appears this day, for the Athenians ordain it so."

Simmias/ "What is this, Socrates, which you enjoin upon Evenus? I have often met the man before now, and from my

general conception of his character he certainly will not willingly take your advice."

Socrates/ "But, is not Evenus a philosopher?"

Simmias/ "To me he seems so."

Socrates/ "Therefore, both Evenus shall be willing, and everyone who participates worthily in this study of philosophy; he shall not certainly, however, lay violent hands upon himself, for this, as it is said, is not to be allowed."

Phaedo/ Upon saying this he let his legs down from the bed on the ground, and sitting in this posture he proceeded with the remainder of the discussion.

Cebes/ "How, Socrates, say you this, that it is not allowable for one to lay hands upon himself, but that a philosopher should be desirous of following one who is going to die?"

Socrates/ "What, Cebes, have not you and Simmias been informed on such subjects after your familiar intimacy with Philolaus?"

Cebes/ "Not very distinctly, Socrates."

Socrates/ "But I merely speak of these things from hearsay, what I happen then to have heard there is no objection to my telling. For it is perhaps especially suited to one who is on the eve of departing to another world, to inquire into, and speculate upon his migration thither, of what nature we suppose it to be. What else could one engage in during the time that intervenes till sunset?"

Cebes/ "Why then, Socrates, do they say that it is not allowable for one to dispatch himself? For I have heard, as you asked just now, both from Philolaus when he was in the habit of intercourse with us, and from some others beside, that it was not right to do this; but I never heard anything distinctly from anyone on the subject."

Socrates/ “You must pursue your inquiry then, for perhaps you might hear (what you wish). Probably, however, it shall appear strange to you if this alone, of all things, is unexceptionably true (that death is better than life), and that never at any time, as is the case with the rest of human affairs, it should occur that at some times and to some persons only, death is better than life. But it appears strange to you, perhaps, that it is not lawful for those men to whom death is preferable, to confer this favor upon themselves, but that they must await another benefactor.”

Phaedo/ Upon this, Cebes with a gentle smile, speaking in the dialect of his country, said;

Cebes/ “I swear by Zeus it seems so.”

Socrates/ “And indeed, at first sight it would appear to be unreasonable; still it has, perhaps, some good grounds. The maxim conveyed in the mysteries, upon this subject, to the effect that we of the human race are in a species of prison, and that it is unlawful to set one’s self at liberty and escape from it, seems to me too affected and by no means easy to penetrate. This, however, appears to me to be urged with good reason, that the gods are our guardians and that we mortals are part of the household property of the gods. Do you agree with me or not?”

Cebes/ “I do.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, if one of your slaves were to put himself to death without your having signified to him that you wished him to die, should you not be indignant at him, and if you had any means of punishment should you not inflict it?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Perhaps then in this point of view it is not unreasonable to insist that one should not dispatch himself

before the deity imposes upon him a necessity of the kind, such as he has imposed at present upon me."

Cebes/ "But, this appears natural enough With respect, however, to what you said just now that philosophers should show a ready inclination to die; this seems to be absurd, if what we lately admitted is good sense, that the deity is our guardian, and that we are his servants. For that the wisest individuals should feel no dissatisfaction at their departure from this tutelage in which the best of all possible governors, the gods, direct them, is quite against reason. Since no one surely imagines that when he is thus set at liberty he will take better care of himself; some senseless being might perhaps be so convinced that he ought to fly from his master, and would not reflect that he should not abandon a good one, but by all means continue to abide with him, consequently he would inconsiderately leave him, while the rational man would be anxious to remain forever with one superior to himself. Thus, Socrates, the direct contrary of what was just now allowed is likely to be the case; for it becomes the wise to feel dissatisfied at death, but the foolish to rejoice."

Phaedo/ Socrates, hearing this, appeared to be delighted at the ingenuity of Cebes, and. turning his eyes towards us, observed;

Socrates/ "Cebes is always starting some points, and is not at all disposed at once to give in to what one has asserted."

Simmias/ "But, Socrates, to me, now, Cebes appears to urge something of importance; for with what object would men who are really wise fly from those masters who are better than themselves, and thoughtlessly abandon them? Cebes also seems to me to direct this argument against yourself, because you bear so quietly your abandonment of

us, and those good governors, as you yourself admit, the gods."

Socrates/ "You speak fairly, and I understand you to mean that I should enter upon my defense in this case as at the tribunal."

Simmias/ "Exactly so."

Socrates/ "Come now, let me essay to plead my cause more persuasively than I did before the judges. For, Simmias and Cebes, were it not that I believe I shall arrive amongst other deities, both wise and good, and further, amongst men who have departed this life, far better than those here, I should be wrong in feeling no discontent at death; but now you are well aware that I expect to arrive amongst good men; yet I would not altogether insist upon this; that I should fall in, however, with admirable masters, the gods, be assured that I should insist on this, if on anything else of the kind. Wherefore I am not equally discontented (as if I thought the matter were otherwise), and I indulge in good hopes that there is something in reserve for those who die, and that, as was said long since, it is far better for the good than the evil."

Simmias/ "What then, Socrates, do you meditate departing from us, reserving this consideration to yourself, or would you impart it to us also? For this blessing seems to me a common concern to both, and it shall serve, at the same time, as your defense, if you should convince us of what you assert."

Socrates/ "I shall endeavor to do so, but let us, in the first place, attend to Crito here, and see what it is that he, for some time now, seems anxious to say."

Crito/ "What else, Socrates, than what the person who is to minister the poison to you told me something since, that I should tell you to argue as little as possible. For he says that those who engage in dispute become too warm, and one

should not let anything of the kind interfere with the progress of the poison, otherwise, those who did so were sometimes compelled to take two or three draughts."

Socrates/ "Take your leave of him, and let him attend to his own peculiar province, to supply two draughts, or even three, if it be so required."

Crito/ "Indeed, I knew you would speak nearly to this effect, but he is troubling me this some time."

Socrates/ "Do not mind him."

"But I wish now to unfold to you, as being my judges, the reason why a man, who has in good earnest devoted his life to philosophy, appears to be full of confidence when on the eve of death, and to cherish a favorable hope that he shall secure the greatest possible blessings in another life, after he shall have departed from this. How this, then, should be so, Simmias and Cebes, I shall endeavor to explain.

"As many as engage with sincerity in the study of philosophy, appear to leave all others in the dark as to the fact of their applying themselves diligently to no other object than dying and death. If this be true, it surely were absurd throughout their entire life to have nothing else in view but this, and when it had come to feel dissatisfied at what they had formerly so earnestly desired and studied to attain."

Phaedo/ Upon this Simmias, smiling, said;

Simmias/ "By Jove, Socrates, you have made me smile, being by no means at present inclined to do so. For I imagine that the multitude, if they heard this observation, would suppose that it had been justly made in reference to philosophers, and would agree unanimously with you, our own fellow-countrymen in particular, that true philosophers have a desire for death, and they have not left them (the multitude) indeed in the dark as to the fact of their deserving it."

Socrates/ “And they would say the truth, Simmias, with the exception of their not being left in the dark; for they are quite ignorant in what sense true philosophers desire to die, and in what sense they merit it, and what kind of death. But let us, taking leave of them, address ourselves to each other. Do we imagine death to be anything?”

Simmias/ “Something, surely.”

Socrates/ “Whether is it anything else than the separation of the soul from the body? And is this death, the body being apart by itself, disunited from the soul, and the soul disunited from the body, existing apart by itself? Is death anything but this?”

Simmias/ “Nothing else than this.”

Socrates/ “Observe now, my good friend, whether you and I agree in our view of the ease, for from hence I think we shall come to a better understanding on the subject of our inquiry. Does it seem to you to be consistent with the character of a philosopher to be solicitous about pleasures, as they are called, of this kind, eating and drinking for instance?”

Simmias/ “By no means, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Well, then; about the pleasures of love?”

Simmias/ “Not at all”

Socrates/ “Well; does such a character appear to you to hold in estimation any other bodily luxuries? —for example, the possession of distinguished robes, sandals and other personal ornaments; whether does he appear to you to value or despise it, at least so far as absolute necessity may not require him to use them?”

Simmias/ “A true philosopher, appears to me to hold them in contempt.”

Socrates/ “Are you, therefore, wholly of opinion that the concern of such a character is not about the body, but that

as far as he can, he stands apart from this, and is altogether devoted to the soul?"

Simmias/ "I am so."

Socrates/ "In matters of this kind, then, is it not in the first place the philosopher evidently, who above all other men, principally absolves the soul from its communion with the body."

Simmias/ "So it appears."

Socrates/ "And the generality of mankind, Simmias, are of opinion, that he who has no pleasure in such things, and does not partake of them, deserves not to live, but that he makes a close approach towards death who feels no concern in any of those pleasures which arise from the body."

Simmias/ "You say so with great truth."

Socrates/ "But what of the acquisition of wisdom; is the body an obstacle or not, if one should take it along with him as a partner in his search? What I mean to say is this: do the sight and hearing convey any certainty to mankind, or are they such as the poets incessantly report them, who say that we neither hear nor see anything as it is? And if, indeed, of our corporeal senses these are neither accurate nor distinct, scarcely could the rest be so, for they are all far inferior to these. Do they not' seem so to you?"

Simmias/ "They do, indeed."

Socrates/ "When, then, does the soul attain to the truth? For when it attempts to investigate anything along with the body, it is plain that it is then led astray by it."

Simmias/ "You say true."

Socrates/ "Is it not then by reasoning, if by anything, that reality is made manifest to the soul?"

Simmias/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ “But it reasons most effectually when none of the corporeal senses harass it; neither hearing, sight pain, or pleasure of any kind; but it retires as much as possible within itself, and aims at the knowledge of what is real, taking leave of the body, and as far as it can, abstaining from any union or participation with it.”

Simmias/ “Even so.”

Socrates/ “Does not the soul of the philosopher in this instance, therefore, show the greatest contempt, for the body, and shrink from it, while it seeks to be left alone to itself?”

Simmias/ “It appears so.”

Socrates/ “What, then, do you say of what follows, Simmias? Do we assert that justice is anything or not?”

Simmias/ “We say that it is, by Jove.”

Socrates/ “And beauty and goodness also?”

Simmias/ “Why not?”

Socrates/ “Did you ever see anything of the kind with your eyes?”

Simmias/ “Never.”

Socrates/ “Have you laid hold of them with any other of your bodily senses? —but I am speaking (not of goodness and beauty only, but) generally, of magnitude, health, strength, and in a word, of the essence of everything, that is, the real existence of each—whether is their truest character discovered by means of the body, or does the case stand thus; that whoever amongst us prepares with the greatest caution and accuracy to reflect upon that particular thing by itself about which he is inquiring, he must make the nearest approach to a knowledge of it?”

Simmias/ “By all means, indeed.”

Socrates/ “Would he then accomplish this with the least possible alloy, who comes with the aid of the purest reflection to the investigation of every essence, neither employing the sight in the process of reflection, nor bringing in any other sense to share in the process of reasoning, but who using reflection alone and unalloyed, endeavors to investigate every reality by itself and unmixed, abstaining as much as possible from the use of the eyes, and in a word, of every part of the body, as confounding the soul, and preventing, when united to it, its attainment to wisdom and truth? Is not such an one, if any, likely to arrive at what really exists?”

Simmias/ “You speak, Socrates, with amazing truth.”

Socrates/ “It is necessary therefore, that in consequence of all this a certain impression must strike those who are genuine philosophers, of such a nature that they would express themselves mutually to this effect: —A by-path, as it were, appears to conduct us, (out of the common track,) with reason for our guide, in this research; because so long as we are encumbered with the body, and our soul is contaminated by so great corruption, we shall never fully attain to that which we desire, but this we assert to be the truth. For the body imposes upon us innumerable constraints on account of its necessary support—moreover, should any maladies befall it, they too impede the ardent pursuit of truth, while it fills us up with lusts, desires, fears, chimeras of every kind, and unbounded folly; so that, as is truly observed, there is never, in fact, any possibility by reason of it of our progressing in wisdom. Besides, it is nothing else except the body, and its appetites, that occasions wars, seditions, and contentions; since all wars originate with us through the passion for amassing wealth, and we are compelled to acquire it on account of the body, slaves as we are to our attendance on it; so that owing to the

body, and by reason of these its affections, we have no time to spare for philosophy.

"But the last and worst of all is, that if we should obtain any spare time from it, and turn our attention to the investigation of any subject, obtruding itself suddenly, on all occasions, in the midst of our research, it causes disturbance and commotion, and confounds us so that we are disqualified by it for the discernment of the truth. In reality, then, it has been demonstrated to us, that if we are ever likely to arrive at a clear intelligence of anything we must be separated from the body, and contemplate with the soul itself all objects as they are; and then, in all likelihood, we shall enjoy that wisdom which we desire and profess to be enamored of, when we have departed from this life, as the argument points out, but not while we live here. For if it is impossible to have any clear intelligence in conjunction with the body, one of two things must follow, either that it is in no case practicable to acquire knowledge, or it is so after death, for then the soul shall be apart from the body, completely independent, but not before. While we are living also, as it appears, we shall make the nearer advances to knowledge the more that we avoid all connection and union with the body—unless when absolute necessity requires—shrink from the contagion of its nature, and keep ourselves pure from its pollutions until the Deity himself shall absolve us from its influence. Thus being undefiled, delivered from the irrationality of the body, in all likelihood we shall be classed with others of a similar stamp, and we shall, of ourselves, have cognizance of every unmixed essence; but this is probably the truth, since it is not allowed the impure to be conversant with what is pure. Such, Simmias, are the expressions which I believe to be incumbent on all true lovers of wisdom to use amongst each other, and the opinions they should entertain; does it not seem so to you?"

Simmias/ “By all means, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, if this, my friend, be true, there are great hopes for one who shall arrive where I am setting out for now, that there, if anywhere, he shall acquire this abundantly on account of which I have endured such great anxiety during my life past; so that this departure which has been prescribed me now abounds for me in favorable hope, as it should for any Athenian who deems his mind to have been so regulated that it was the same as cleansed from its impurity.”

Simmias/ “Such is indeed the case.”

Socrates/ “But does not the purification consist in this, as was observed in an early stage of the discussion, in separating the soul as much as possible from the body, and inuring it to gather and collect itself independently from all parts of the human frame, and to dwell, so far as it can, both at the present and through all future time completely by itself, ransomed as it were from the shackles of the body?”

Simmias/ “Certainly so.”

Socrates/ “Is this, therefore, called death, this deliverance and separation of the soul from the body?”

Simmias/ “By all means.”

Socrates/ “But the true philosophers alone are mainly desirous at all times to set it free, as I asserted; and this is the identical study of philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul from the body, or is it not?”

Simmias/ “So it seems to be.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, as I said at the outset, should it appear ridiculous for a man who throughout his existence had so studied to live as if on the very confines of death, to feel annoyed as soon as it had actually come? —Should not this be absurd?”

Simmias/ “How not?”

Socrates/ “In fact then, Simmias, true philosophers are earnestly intent on death, and to them, of all mankind, death is least formidable. But judge from this. If they show an unqualified hostility against the body, and are desirous to keep the soul entirely by itself, but when the time for this arrives they should give way to dread and discontent, should not their folly be extreme, since they would not depart delighted to that place where on their arrival they have the prospect of attaining to that which they were enamored of through life—but they were enamored of wisdom, —and of being liberated from any further association with that to which they were averse? Whether, for the sake of human objects of affection, wives and sons deceased, have numbers of their own free choice desired to descend to Orcus, induced by this very hope of seeing and living together there with those for whom they longed; and shall one who is seriously enamored of wisdom, and who has strongly entertained a similar expectation that he could find it nowhere else deserving of the name except in Orcus, be indignant at the approach of death, and depart thither in displeasure? We must suppose that he would gladly go, my friend, if he is indeed a philosopher, for he will be firmly convinced of this, that nowhere else but there shall he find wisdom unalloyed. If this be so, as I declared just now, should it not be the height of folly in such a man to be afraid of death?”

Simmias/ “It should be so, by Jove.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, should not this be a sufficiently strong proof against a man whom you observed to be dissatisfied when about to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but of the body. But the same man is perhaps a lover of riches and honors, and looks to the attainment of one or the other of these, or probably both.”

Simmias/ “The case stands altogether as you state it.”

Socrates/ “Does not fortitude then so called, Simmias, chiefly belong to those who are disposed to the study of philosophy?”

Simmias/ “By all means.”

Socrates/ “So likewise that temperance, which even the multitude call by its right name, and which consists in not being transported by the passions, but moderating them with coolness and composure, does it not chiefly belong to those alone who hold the body in contempt, and live in the study of philosophy?”

Simmias/ “Necessarily so.”

Socrates/ “For if, you are inclined to reflect upon the fortitude and temperance of others, they shall appear to you absurd.”

Simmias/ “How so, Socrates?”

Socrates/ “Are you not aware, that all others reckon death amongst the great evils?”

Simmias/ “Certainly they do.”

Socrates/ “Is it then through dread of greater evils that the brave amongst them endure death, whenever they do so?”

Simmias/ “It is so.”

Socrates/ “Therefore all, except the philosophers, are courageous through the act and principle of fear; and yet it is strange enough that one should be courageous through fear and timidity.”

Simmias/ “It is surely.”

Socrates/ “What then; are not those of well-regulated morals amongst them affected thus? —Are they not temperate through a kind of intemperance? and impossible as we assert this to be, nevertheless it so happens that they

have an affection similar to this—that which arises from their senseless temperance; for, dreading to be deprived of other pleasures, which they anxiously desire, they abstain from some while they are under the dominion of others, and though they call it intemperance to be governed by pleasures of any kind, yet it happens to be the case with them, that while under the control of pleasures generally, they merely exercise a control over some. But this is analogous to what was said just now, that in a manner they are made temperate through intemperance."

Simmias/ "So it seems, indeed."

Socrates/ "My dear Simmias, let us beware lest this be not a correct exchange with virtue, the commutation of pleasures with pleasures, pains with pains, and fear with fear, the greater too with the less, like pieces of money, while wisdom is the only sterling coin for which we ought to exchange all things; and for this, and with it, all things in reality are bought and sold, both fortitude, temperance, and justice; and true virtue, in sum, is inseparable from wisdom, whether pleasures, fears, and all things else of the kind, are present or absent; but where they are distinctly separated from wisdom, and mutually interchanged for each other, take care lest this species of virtue be not a mere semblance, and, in reality, servile, while it possesses nothing sound or sincere, whereas true virtue is a complete purification from all the passions, and temperance, justice, fortitude, and wisdom itself, form the prelude, as it were, to this cleansing from pollution. Wherefore, these celebrated characters who established our initiatory ceremonies appear to have had no mean understanding, but, in fact, to have obscurely hinted long since that whoever descends to Orcus uninitiated and uncleansed, shall grovel in mire; but he who is purified and initiated upon his arrival there, shall abide with the gods. For, say those who preside at the mysteries, Many indeed

bear the wand, but the inspired are few; and these latter are, in my judgment, none other than the true philosophers, to be enrolled with whom I left no means untried, so far as I was competent through life, but in every way endeavored to effect it. Whether I directed my endeavors right, and at all prevailed, I shall know distinctly, if the Deity should please, when I shall have descended there, some short time hence as it appears to me.

"Such is the defense I make to you, Simmias and Cebes, for my naturally feeling no displeasure or discontent at taking leave of you and those who are in authority over me here, being convinced that I shall there, no less than here, fall in with excellent masters and friends; but with the multitude this obtains no credence. If then, in the course of this explanation, I appear more deserving of belief to you than to the judges of Athenians it is well."

Phaedo/ Upon Socrates having thus expressed himself, Cebes rejoined;

Cebes/ "All else that you have said, Socrates, appears to me to be advanced with reason, but those observations upon the soul, meet amongst mankind with the strongest disbelief, being afraid (as they are) lest, on its departure from the body, it should no longer exist, but should perish, and be annihilated upon the same day on which a man dies; and being dispersed immediately on its separation and egress from the body, like a breath or smoke, it should vanish, and have no further being; otherwise, if it existed anywhere independent, concentered within itself, and removed from the sphere of those evils which you have enumerated just now, great indeed, and cheering should be the hope that that which you say is true. But this requires, probably, no small persuasiveness and proof that the soul of a deceased man exists, and is capable of certain faculties and reflection."

Socrates/ “You say true, Cebes; but what are we to do? Are you willing that we should converse together upon these points, as to the probability that the case stands thus or not?”

Cebes/ “For my part, I should gladly hear what opinion you entertain upon them.”

Socrates/ “I do not imagine, that anyone, not if he were even a comic poet, would now say that I am trifling, and conversing upon extraneous subjects. If you approve, then, let us examine the question.”

“But let us examine it in this point of view, whether the souls of the deceased survive in Orcus or not. There is indeed an old tradition which we have called to mind, that souls which set out thither from hence do survive, and return hither again, and come to life from death. If this be so, then, that the living are reproduced from the dead, must it not be that our souls are in existence there? For if they existed no longer, they could not surely be reproduced; and in support of the truth of this it will be sufficiently strong testimony if it appears palpably clear, that the living are produced from no other source whatever than from the dead. If such be not the case, we must recur to other proofs.”

Cebes/ “I agree with you.”

Socrates/ “Do not then, examine this matter merely in reference to mankind, if you are anxious to understand it more distinctly, but in reference to all animals and plants, and whatever things, in sum, are generated; let us direct our attention to all, and see if they are, without exception, produced in no other way than contraries from contraries, in the case of those which have any such opposite quality, as, for example, fair is the contrary of foul, justice of injustice, and so in ten thousand other instances. Let us then consider this, whether it is absolutely necessary in the

case of as many things as have a contrary, that this contrary should arise from no other source than from a contrary to itself. For instance, when anything becomes greater, must it not follow, that from being previously less it subsequently became greater?"

Cebes/ "Yes"

Socrates/ "So too, if anything becomes less, shall it become so subsequent to its being previously greater?"

Cebes/ "Such is the case."

Socrates/ "And weaker from stronger, swifter from slower?"

Cebes/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Well then; if anything becomes worse is it from better, and if juster from more unjust?"

Cebes/ "Why should it not?"

Socrates/ "We are then sufficiently assured of this, that all things are so produced, contraries from contraries?"

Cebes/ "Sufficiently so."

Socrates/ "But further; is there something of this nature m them; for instance, two stages of generation between each pair, as all contraries imply two extremes, from the one to the other, and from the other back again to it? For between the greater and the less intervenes the process of increase and diminution; and do we, therefore, call the one the act of increasing and the other that of diminishing?"

Cebes/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "So, therefore, with the act of separating and of mixing, of growing cold and growing warm, and all things similarly, even though we should not have names to designate them by at times, still must they not in fact be at all times so disposed as to be produced from each other and that their generation should be reciprocal?"

Cebes/ “By all means.”

Socrates/ “What then, has life any contrary, as sleeping has its contrary, waking?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “What is it?”

Cebes/ “Death”

Socrates/ “Are not these then produced from each other, since they are contraries, and the stages of generation between them are two, since they are two themselves.”

Cebes/ “How should it be otherwise?”

Socrates/ “I shall tell you then, one combination of contraries amongst those which I mentioned just now, both itself and its stages of generation, but do you tell me the other. I say then, that sleeping is one thing, and waking another, and that waking is produced from sleeping and sleeping from waking, and that the stages of their generation are, the one falling asleep, and the other awakening. Is this sufficiently clear or not?”

Cebes/ “Quite so indeed.”

Socrates/ “Do you now tell me likewise in regard to life and death. Do you not say that death is the contrary of life?”

Cebes/ “I say so.”

Socrates/ “And that they are produced from each other?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “What then is that which is produced from life?”

Cebes/ “Death.”

Socrates/ “And that which is produced from death?”

Cebes/ “I must allow, to be life.”

Socrates/ “Then, Cebes, from the dead are living things and living men produced?”

Cebes/ “It seems so.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, our souls exist in Orcus (after death).”

Cebes/ “I think so.”

Socrates/ “Of their stages of generation, then, is not one, at least, obviously distinct? For dying is surely an intelligible idea, is it not?”

Cebes/ “Certainly it is.”

Socrates/ “How then, shall we do? Shall we not oppose in turn to this, the contrary process of generation, but shall nature fail in this? Or must we allow some process of generation contrary to dying?”

Cebes/ “By all means.”

Socrates/ “What is it then?”

Cebes/ “Reviving.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, if reviving is granted, this should be the process of generation from the dead to the living, namely, reviving?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “We allow then in this way that the living are produced from the dead, no less than the dead from the living; but such being the case, it appeared to me to furnish adequate proof that the souls of the deceased exist somewhere, from whence they return again to life.”

Cebes/ “Such, Socrates, appears to me to be the necessary result from what has been admitted,”

Socrates/ “Observe now, Cebes, that we have not, in my judgment, made these admissions without reason; for if those things which are produced, were not continually to alternate with each other as if revolving in a circle, but the generation were direct from the one (contrary), merely to its opposite, nor should take a circuit and come round again to

the first, are you aware that all things at last should assume the same figure, submit to the same affection, and cease to be produced at all?"

Cebes/ "How say you this?"

Socrates/ "There is no difficulty in comprehending what I say; but if, for instance, falling asleep be granted, and that awaking, which is produced from sleeping, were not to alternate with it, be assured that all things coming to an end, would render the fable of Endymion a mere jest, and he should no longer be considered of importance, because all things else should be influenced by an affection such as he was, by sleep; further, if all things were confounded together, and never divided asunder, the theory of Anaxagoras should soon be realized, all should be chaos. Thus, my dear Cebes, if all things which had partaken of life should die, and when dead should remain in the same state of death, and not revive again, should there not be an unavoidable necessity that everything should [perish at last, and nothing revive? For if living things were produced from anything else (than what had died), and those living things should die, what remedy would there be against all things being finally destroyed by death?"

Cebes/ "None whatever, Socrates, in my mind, but to me you seem to speak the clearest truth."

Socrates/ "Such, Cebes, the case unquestionably seems to me, and that we do not acknowledge these things under the influence of delusion, but there is in reality a reviving and producing of the living from the dead, a surviving of the souls of the deceased, and, happiness for the good, but misery for the evil amongst them."

Cebes/ "And indeed, according to that argument, if a true one, which you are in the habit of advancing so frequently, that our knowledge is nothing else but reminiscence,

according to this, I say, we must have learned! at some former period what we remember now. But this is impossible, unless our souls existed before they appeared in this mortal guise; so that in this way the soul appears somewhat immortal."

Simmias/ "But, Cebes, what proofs have you of this? Remind me, for I do not well recollect just now."

Cebes/ "To comprise all, in one most admirable argument, (it is proved thus) because when men are questioned, if one puts the question fairly, they describe things as they really are; yet if they had not innate discernment, and right reason, they should be quite incapable of this. Further, if one were to try them with geometrical figures, or anything else of the kind, he has the clearest evidence that the case is so"

Socrates/ "If you do not give in to this, Simmias, see if you will coincide with us upon considering the subject thus. You hesitate to admit that knowledge, so called, is reminiscence?"

Simmias/ "I do not hesitate indeed, but I require to be made sensible of this very thing, which is the subject of the argument, namely, to be reminded: and though from what Cebes, commenced to say, I even now nearly remember and am inclined to agree, nevertheless, I would now hear how you essay to argue the subject."

Socrates/ "In some measure thus; we allow doubtless, that if one be reminded of anything, he must have known it at some time before"

Simmias/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Do we allow this also, that when knowledge comes after a certain manner, it is reminiscence? But the manner I speak of is this: if one who has either seen, or heard, or has perceived by any other sense, someone object,

should not only have a knowledge of this, but should form a notion of another of which the knowledge was not the same, but quite distinct, do we not with justice affirm that he remembered that of which he so received the notion?"

Simmias/ "How do you mean?"

Socrates/ "Thus, for example; the cognizance of a man is quite different from that of a lyre."

Simmias/ "Why not?"

Socrates/ "Are you aware then, that lovers, when they see a lyre, a piece of dress, or anything else which their favorites are accustomed to use, are thus affected; they recognize the lyre, and form in their minds the image of the girl to whom the lyre belonged? But this is reminiscence; just as anyone seeing Simmias is as constantly reminded of Cebes, and so in ten thousand similar instances."

Simmias/ "Ten thousand indeed, by Jove."

Socrates/ "Therefore, is not reminiscence something of this nature, especially when one is thus affected with regard to these things which he has forgotten in the lapse of time, and from having lost sight of them?"

Simmias/ "By all means."

Socrates/ "Well then, is it the case that one who sees a horse in a painting, and a lyre likewise, is reminded of a human being, and that one who sees Simmias in a painting is reminded of Cebes?"

Simmias/ "Certainly so."

Socrates/ "And must not one who sees Simmias in a painting, call to mind Simmias himself?"

Simmias/ "It is so indeed."

Socrates/ "Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence arises partly from similitude, and partly from contrast?"

Simmias/ “It does so.”

Socrates/ “But when one remembers anything from similitude, is it not necessary that he should be still further affected, so as to consider whether this, as far as regards the likeness, comes short in any respect or not, of that which he remembered?”

Simmias/ “Necessarily so.”

Socrates/ “Observe now, if this be so. Do we allow any such thing as equality. I do not mean as between one log or stone, and another log or stone, nor anything of the kind, but something else distinct from all these, equality in the abstract, —do we allow that there is anything of this kind or not?”

Simmias/ “Truly, by Jove, we do allow it, and to a very great extent too.”

Socrates/ “Do we understand what that abstract equality is?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Whence did we derive our knowledge of it? Was it not from what we spoke of just now, that seeing logs or stones or some other objects equal, from these we formed the notion of the former, which is quite distinct from these? Does it not appear to you to be distinct? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones which are equal, and logs which are at times the same, appear at one time to be equal, and another time not?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “What then? That which is equal in itself does it ever appear unequal, or does equality seem inequality?”

Simmias/ “Never, Socrates, at any time.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, those things which are equal, and equality in the abstract, are not the same.”

Simmias/ “By no means do they appear so to me, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Nevertheless, from those equal things, which are quite distinct from that abstract equality, have you not formed your notions and derived your knowledge of it?”

Simmias/ “You say very truly.”

Socrates/ “From some similitude, therefore, or dissimilitude in them?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “But, it makes no difference. When looking at one thing, then, you form from the sight of it the notion of another, whether like or unlike of necessity that very process must be reminiscence.

Simmias/ “No doubt.”

Socrates/ “But what of the following? Are we affected in any such wise with regard to the equality of the logs, or the equal things which we spoke of just now? Do they appear to us to be equal as equality in itself is, or do they fall short of it in any degree so as not to be such as equality in itself is, or in no degree whatever?”

Simmias/ “They fall short in a great degree indeed.”

Socrates/ “Do we therefore allow that when one, upon seeing any object, has perceived that it aims (as this object which I look at now) at being like to some other existing object, but falls short of it and cannot become anything such as it is, since it is far inferior to it, it is necessary for one perceiving this to have known beforehand that to which he asserts it to bear a resemblance, but still to be far short of a complete one?”

Simmias/ “It must be so.”

Socrates/ “What then? Are we similarly affected, or not, with regard to objects that are equal, and equality in the abstract?”

Simmias/ “We are by all means so.”

Socrates/ “Therefore we must have had a previous knowledge of equality before that time when having first seen equal objects, we perceived that all these aimed at a resemblance to equality, but came short of it.”

Simmias/ “Such is the case.”

Socrates/ “But we allow this also that it is impossible to have formed a perception of, or to perceive this by any other means than by the sight, touch, or some other of the senses; for I assert the same of all.”

Simmias/ “It comes to the same thing, Socrates, as far at least as regards that which the argument tends to establish.”

Socrates/ “But we must perceive, then, by the senses, that all things which come under the senses aim at this abstract equality, and are at the same time inferior to it; or how else shall we say it is?”

Simmias/ “It is even thus.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, before we began to see and hear, and use our other senses, we must have had knowledge of the nature of this abstract equality, if we were likely so to refer to it those equal objects which come under the senses, as to conclude that they all aimed at being such as the former, but fell short of it far.”

Simmias/ “This is a necessary consequence, Socrates, of what was said before.”

Socrates/ “Do we not then after our birth immediately see and hear, and exercise our other senses?”

Simmias/ “Assuredly.”

Socrates/ “But previous to the exercise of these, as we said, we must have had a knowledge of equality?”

Simmias/ “Yes”

Socrates/ “Therefore we must have had it, as it appears, before we were born?”

Simmias/ “It seems so.”

Socrates/ “If, then, having received this knowledge before we were born, we were born with it, should we not have known both previous to our birth, and immediately after, not only what is equal, and greater and smaller, but all things of the kind? For our present discussion is not rather on the subject of equality than on that which is beautiful in itself, good, just, and holy, and, in a word, about all things upon which we set the seal of real existence, both in the questions which we ask, and the replies which we return. So that we must have had knowledge of all these before we were born.”

Simmias/ “Such is the case.”

Socrates/ “And if having once attained to it we did not as constantly lose it, we should be always born with this knowledge, and retain it always through life; for to know is this, to retain knowledge when one has received it and never to lose it. Do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the loss of knowledge?”

Simmias/ “Assuredly we call it so, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “But if having attained to it before we are born we lose it at our birth, and afterwards, when we exercise our senses upon such things, we recover the knowledge which at one time we previously possessed, would not that which we call learning be the recovering of our own proper knowledge? And if we said that this was to remember, would we call it by its proper name?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “For this seemed possible, for one having perceived anything by the sight or hearing, or exercise of any other sense, to form a notion of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and to which this approached nearly as a contrast, or similitude. Wherefore, in a word, one of two things must occur; either we are all born possessing this knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we set down as learning after, do nothing else than remember, and knowledge must be reminiscence.”

Simmias/ “Such, Socrates, is certainly the case.”

Socrates/ “Which of the two then, Simmias, do you choose? That we should be born with this knowledge, or subsequently remember what we had previously known?”

Simmias/ “At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose.”

Socrates/ “What now? Can you choose in this case, and what is your opinion concerning it? Can one who has the knowledge give an account of what he knows or not?

Simmias/ “There is a strong necessity for it, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Do all men appear to you to be competent to give an account of those things which we were speaking of just now?”

Simmias/ “I could wish they were, but I am far more apprehensive that at this time to-morrow there will be no longer anyone here who can do this with effect”

Socrates/ “Do not all men then, Simmias, seem to you to be acquainted with those things?”

Simmias/ “By no means.”

Socrates/ “Do they remember, then, what they once learned?”

Simmias/ “It must be so.”

Socrates/ “When did our soul attain to this knowledge? Not, surely, since we were born into the world.”

Simmias/ “Assuredly not.”

Socrates/ “Previously then?”

Simmias/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, Simmias, our souls existed before they appeared in this human form, separately from the body, and were possessed of intelligence.”

Simmias/ “Unless, perhaps, we receive this knowledge, Socrates, at our birth; for this period yet remains.”

Socrates/ “Be it so, my friend; but at what other period (than this) do we lose it? For we are not born with it indeed, as we admitted just now. Do we then lose it at the very moment we receive it? Or can you mention any other time?”

Simmias/ “Not at all, Socrates; I was not aware that I was saying what imports nothing.”

Socrates/ “Does the case then stand thus between us, Simmias? If those things which we are constantly speaking of really exist, the beautiful, the good, and every essence of a similar kind, and to such we refer all those objects that come under the senses, being aware that these essences had a previous existence and were our own, and with them compare these objects, it follows of necessity that as these exist, so our souls also exist before we are born; but if these do not exist, then has this argument been urged in vain. Is such the case, and is there an equal necessity that these objects should exist and our souls also before we are born, and if not the former neither the latter?”

Simmias/ “In the highest degree, Socrates, there seems to be this necessity, and the argument has an excellent tendency in establishing that our souls exist in like manner previous to our being born, as also the essence of which you are speaking now. Since for my part I hold nothing to be so evidently clear as this, that all such things to the utmost certainty exist, both the beautiful, the good, and the rest

which you mentioned just now; and so far as I am concerned, the case is sufficiently proved."

Socrates/ "But how does it strike Cebes? For we must convince Cebes too."

Simmias/ "Just as satisfactorily, as far as I can judge, although he is the most pertinacious of mankind in his mistrust of argument. Still I think that he has been sufficiently convinced of this, that our souls existed before we were born."

"Whether when we die, however, it shall still exist, does not appear to me, Socrates, to have been demonstrated, but that question raised by the multitude, which Cebes mentioned just now, lest at the same time with the decease of the man, the soul should be dispersed, and this should be the end of its existence, is still in the way. For what is to prevent its being born indeed, and made up from some place or other, and existing before it merged into the human body, but when it departs and is separated from this, then to die itself and be destroyed?"

Cebes/ "You say well, Simmias, for but half, as it were, of what is necessary appears to have been proved, that our souls existed before we were born; but it is requisite to prove further that whenever we die, it shall exist no less than before we were born, if the demonstration is to be made complete."

Socrates/ "This has been demonstrated indeed, Simmias and Cebes, already, if you are satisfied to connect together this argument with that which we concluded on before, that everything living is produced from the dead. For if the soul has a pre-existence, and it is necessary that on its birth and entrance into life, it should be produced from no other source whatever than from dying and being dead; how must it not of necessity exist even after death, since it must needs

be reproduced? That which you require, then, has been already proved."

"However, both you and Simmias appear to me as if you would gladly examine into this argument at still greater length, and that you entertain a childish fear lest the wind should in good earnest disperse and dissipate the soul on its departure from the body, especially if one should not happen to die in a calm, but in anything of a great storm."

Cebes/ "Endeavor then, to convince us, as if we really dreaded this, or rather as if we entertained no such dread at all, although, perhaps, there is within us something of the child, which fills us with such fears. Let us then endeavor to persuade it not to be afraid of death, as of unsightly specters."

Socrates/ "You must soothe it by charms then, until you have subdued its fears by them."

Cebes/ "Whence then, Socrates, shall we procure a charmer skillful in such arts, now that you are leaving us?"

Socrates/ "Greece is wide indeed, Cebes, in which such skillful men abound, but there are also many barbarian countries, all of which you ought to search through, seeking such a charmer, sparing neither wealth nor toil, since there is nothing upon which you could more suitably expend your money. But it is necessary that you should yourselves examine into the matter amongst each other, for you could not, perhaps, easily find any more competent than you are, to enter on this office."

Cebes/ "This shall be done indeed, but let us return from whence we digressed, if so it please you."

Socrates/ "It pleases me indeed; how should it not?"

Cebes/ "You speak fairly."

Socrates/ "Therefore, we ought to put to ourselves a question of this nature, what is that to which it is suitable

to undergo this affection, that of being dispersed, and for what have we reason to fear lest it should be so affected, and for what have we not? And next to consider which of the two the soul is, and thence to feel confident or alarmed in behalf of our souls?"

Simmias/ "You speak truly."

Socrates/ "Whether then is it suitable to that which has been compounded, and that which is naturally compound, to be thus affected, to be dissolved in the same manner in which it was compounded; but if there be anything simple, to this alone, if anything, it is unsuitable to be thus affected?"

Cebes/ "So it seems to me to be."

Socrates/ "Therefore, whatever things continue always the same, and in the same condition, these above all is it natural to regard as simple, but those things which are variable and never the same, that such should be compound?"

Cebes/ "So at least it appears to me."

Socrates/ "Let us then, return to the subject of the former part of our discourse. This essence, which in the course of our questions and answers we defined by saying that it is, whether is it always in the same condition and the same, or is it variable? Whether, too, do absolute equality, absolute beauty, and every absolute essence which really exists, admit of any change whatever? Or is every one of those essences which really exists, a simple and unmixed existence, always in the same condition and the same, and does it never in any degree whatever allow of any alteration?"

Cebes/ "They must remain in the same condition and the same, Socrates."

Socrates/ "But what are we to say of those many beautiful things, for instance, human beings, horses, garments, or

anything else whatever of the kind, whether they are equal or beautiful, or of all things synonymous with such? Whether do they continue the same, or, in direct contrariety to the former, are they, in a word, never at any time the same, neither with themselves nor with each other?"

Cebes/ "Such is their contrariety, they never are secure from change."

Socrates/ "These latter then you might either touch, or see, or perceive by any other of the senses, but the former, which remain the same, it is impossible to apprehend in any other way than by reflection, and such as these are invisible and concealed from sight."

Cebes/ "You assert, what is strictly true."

Socrates/ "May we then suppose, two species of existences, the one visible, but the other invisible?"

Cebes/ "Let us suppose them."

Socrates/ "And that the invisible is always the same, but the visible never at any time so?"

Cebes/ "Let us, suppose this also."

Socrates/ "Come now, is anything else the case than that one part of us consists of body and the other of soul?"

Cebes/ "Nothing else."

Socrates/ "To which of the two, then, shall we say that the body bears the greater resemblance, and is the more closely allied?"

Cebes/ "To the visible, as must be plain to everyone."

Socrates/ "But what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"

Cebes/ "It is not visible to mankind at least, Socrates."

Socrates/ "But we were speaking surely of what is visible, and what is not so according to the nature of man. Or do you think it was with a view to any other?"

Cebes/ "It was according to the nature of man."

Socrates/ “What then do we assert of the soul? That it is visible or invisible?”

Cebes/ “Invisible.”

Socrates/ “Is it then immaterial?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Does the soul therefore bear a greater resemblance to the immaterial than the body, but the latter resemble more the visible?”

Cebes/ “It is imperatively so, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Did we not likewise lay this down a short time since, that when the soul makes use of the body to investigate anything, either by the sight, hearing, or any other sense, —for to consider an object through means of the senses, is the same as through means of the body, —it is then indeed forced by the body in the direction of those things which are forever subject to change, upon which it becomes distracted and confused, and reels as if inebriated, because it is involved in matters of this kind?”

Cebes/ “It is certainly so.”

Socrates/ “But when it considers any subject by itself, does it proceed in the direction of what is pure, everlasting, immortal, and immutable, and, as if closely allied to this, does it abide with it ever when it is left to itself and is empowered to do so, and is it relieved of its distraction, and, as being placed in connection with things like itself, is it always identical, and unchangeable with regard to them? And is this condition of the soul called wisdom?”

Cebes/ “You speak, Socrates, with the utmost fairness and truth.”

Socrates/ “To which species of the two, then, both from what was said before, and that just now, does the soul appear to be more like and the more closely allied?”

Cebes/ “Everyone, Socrates, even the dullest, would in my mind allow, from this mode of investigation, that the soul in every respect bears a greater resemblance to that which is always the same, than to that which is not.”

Socrates/ “But what of the body?”

Cebes/ “It more resembles the latter.”

Socrates/ “But view it also in this light; that when the soul and body are together, nature enjoins submission and-obedience on the one, and on the other authority and command. In this light again, which of the two seems to you to resemble the divine, and which the human? Does it not appear to you that the divine is naturally adapted to govern and guide, but the human to be governed and to serve?”

Cebes/ “So it seems.”

Socrates/ “Which, then, does the soul resemble?”

Cebes/ “It is evident, Socrates, that the soul resembles the divine, but the body the human.”

Socrates/ “Observe then, Cebes, if such be our conclusion from all that has been said, that the soul bears the strongest resemblance to that which is divine, immortal, intelligent, uniform, indissoluble, always the same and identical with itself; but that the body resembles most that which is human, mortal, unintelligent, multiform, soluble, and at no time identical with itself. 'Dan we object to this conclusion, my dear Cebes, that it is not fairly drawn?”

Cebes/ “We cannot, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “What then? When these things are so, is it not natural for the body to be speedily dispersed, and, for the soul to be altogether indissoluble, or very near it?”

Cebes/ “Why not?”

Socrates/ “You perceive, then, that when a man dies, that part of him which is visible, the body which is exposed to the

sense of sight; that which we call the corpse, whose nature it is to be dissolved, to fall asunder and be dissipated, does not immediately undergo any of these affections, but lasts for a tolerably long time, and particularly so, if he should die with his body in full vigor, and at a similarly healthy time of life. For when the body has collapsed and been embalmed, like those who are embalmed in Egypt, it lasts nearly entire for an inconceivable time. But some parts of the body, even though it should decay, the bones, for instance, sinews, and everything of a similar nature, are, nevertheless, in a word, incorruptible; are they not?"

Cebes/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "Is the soul, then, the invisible, that which departs into a region of like nature with itself, excellent, pure, into that which is Hades or invisible in good earnest, to abide with a good and wise deity, (whither, if God will, my own soul too must soon depart,) is this soul of ours, I say, being such in itself and in its nature, on its separation from the body straightway, as the multitude say, likely to be dissipated and destroyed? Far from it, my dear Simmias and Cebes; the case is much more likely to stand thus: if indeed it shall have departed pure, bringing with it nothing belonging to the body as having no voluntary communication with it through life, but flying from it and gathered up within itself as making this its constant care, — but this means nothing else than to philosophize aright, and in reality to study how to die composedly. For would not this (to philosophize right) be studying how to die?"

Cebes/ "By all means, indeed."

Socrates/ "Therefore being so disposed, does it go hence to that which resembles itself, which is invisible, divine, immortal, and wise; on its arrival at which, its condition is one of perfect happiness, being set far apart from error,

ignorance, fears, unbridled passions, and the rest of human miseries; and, as is said of the initiated, abiding really forever with the gods? Must we say that it is so, Cebes, or otherwise?"

Cebes/ "We must allow it to be so."

Socrates/ "But, in my opinion, if it shall have departed from the body polluted and impure, in consequence of its constant communication with the body, its subservience and attachment to this, and its being imposed on by it, and by its desires and pleasures, so far as to imagine that there is nothing real except what is corporeal, which one may touch and see, eat and drink, and make use of for sensual purposes; but that which is obscured from the sight, and invisible, which is intellectual and comprehensible by the aid of philosophy, being inured to the hatred, terror, and abandonment of this, think you that a soul which is so disposed, would be likely to depart independent and uncontaminated?"

Cebes/ "Not by any means."

Socrates/ "But enmeshed by the corporeal, which familial intercourse and union with the body has naturalized to it by continued communication and great assiduity"

Cebes/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "This, then, my friend, we must regard as oppressive, earth-formed, and visible, of which a soul of such a character being possessed, is weighed down. and forced back again into the visible world through dread of the invisible and of Hades, to linger, as they say, about the sepulchers and tombs, round which some shadowy phantoms of souls have, been seen, such specters as these souls present which have not departed pure from life retaining a portion of that which is visible on account of which they are seen themselves."

Cebes/ “This is very likely, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Most likely, Cebes; and further, that these are not the souls of the good, but of the evil; which are compelled to wander about such places, to make atonement for their former wicked mode of life. And they wander about for so long until, at the instigation of the corporeal part which accompanies them, they are again enclosed in a body. But they are involved, as is natural, in similar dispositions to those which they may have indulged in during their former life.”

Cebes/ “What kind of dispositions do you mean, Socrates?”

Socrates/ “That those, for instance, who have been devoted to the exercise of gluttony, insolence and intemperance, and who have taken no thought to check them, should be clothed with the form of asses, and such like beasts, is natural enough; do you not think so?”

Cebes/ “You say what is highly probable indeed.”

Socrates/ “But that those who have set the highest price upon injustice, tyranny, and violence, should be clothed in the forms of wolves, hawks, and kites. Into what shape else can we say that such should merge?”

Cebes/ “Without question, into such shapes as these.”

Socrates/ “Is it then evident in all other instances whither each soul departs according to the similarity of its practices?”

Cebes/ “It is evident; how should it not?”

Socrates/ “Are not those therefore, the happiest amongst this class and do they not proceed into the happiest region, who have practiced those popular and social virtues which they call moderation and justice, which result from habit and exercise independently of philosophy and reflection?”

Cebes/ “In what respect are these the happiest?”

Socrates/ “Because it is probable that they shall transmigrate into a like social and civilized class; of bees perhaps, or wasps, or ants, or even back again into the same human species, and upright characters shall be produced from them.”

Cebes/ “Probably so.”

Socrates/ “But it is not lawful for anyone, but one who has practiced philosophy, and departed completely pure from life, to arrive at the rank of the Gods; (not for any) except the true philosopher. On this account, my friends Simmias and Cebes, those who philosophize aright abstain from the gratification of all the bodily appetites, persevere in doing so, and do not resign themselves to them; not being apprehensive of the loss of property, and of poverty, as the multitude are, and the avaricious; nor dreading the disgrace and disrepute of a low estate, like those who aspire after civil offices and dignities, do they on that account stand aloof from them.”

Cebes/ “Surely it would not become them to act otherwise, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Assuredly not, by Jove; wherefore they who have some concern for their souls, who do not pass their lives in the culture of the body, bidding adieu to all the rest, do not proceed in the same route with them, as being ignorant whither they are going, but impressed with the conviction that resistance should not be offered to philosophy, to the deliverance and purification she affords them, they submit to her direction, and follow her whithersoever she leads the way.”

Cebes/ “How so, Socrates?”

Socrates/ “I shall tell you. The lovers of wisdom are aware that philosophy having taken to herself the soul, which was

obviously shackled down and cemented to the body, and compelled to view objects through this as through a dungeon, but not of and by itself, which lay groveling too in utter ignorance; and having observed the influence of this prison-house, how eagerly it is directed towards making the prisoner, as far as possible, a party concerned in riveting 1 his own chains; —the lovers of wisdom, I say then, are aware that philosophy having taken to herself their souls when in this state, gently admonishes and endeavors to liberate them, showing that the observation of objects by the aid of the eyes is replete with illusion, and that likewise by the aid of the ears, and the other senses, and advising a disengagement from these, so far as it may not be absolutely necessary to use them, and urging a concentrating and condensing of the soul within itself, and besides a distrust of everything else except itself with regard whatsoever real, independent essence it may of itself perceive, but whatsoever it may observe, by any other means (than itself), which varies according to those variable means, is in no wise to look on it as true; since such indeed is sensible and visible, but what the soul itself perceives is intelligible and immaterial. The soul of the true philosopher, then, convinced that it ought not to withstand this deliverance, abstains accordingly from pleasures, desires, griefs and fears, so far as it is able, reflecting that when one yields to the excess of joy, fear, sorrow, or desire, he suffers not in consequence merely such evil as one might suppose to result from sickness, or extravagance in gratifying his appetites, but that which of all evils is the gravest and the worst, this he suffers and is not conscious of it."

Cebes/ "What is this, Socrates?"

Socrates/ "That the soul of every man is compelled to give way to the extremes of joy and grief, and further, to the impression that this on account of which it is so strongly

affected is most real, and most true, though it is not so. But things like these are principally visible things, are they not?"

Cebes/ "Certainly, indeed."

Socrates/ "Is the soul when under the influence of such affections, then chiefly shackled by the body?"

Cebes/ "How so?"

Socrates/ "Because every pleasure and pain, with a nail as it were, nails and fastens it to the body, and makes it of the nature of the body, while it believes those things to be true which the body asserts to be so. For, from its conformity of opinions, and identity of pleasures, with those of the body, it is forced, I imagine to become identified with its manners and habits, insomuch, that it never can arrive in Hades pure, but must always depart polluted by the body, so that it speedily sinks again into another body, and grows again as if it had been sown, whence it is deprived of all communion with that which is pure, unspotted, and divine."

Cebes/ "You say most truly, Socrates."

Socrates/ "On this account then, Cebes, the true lovers of wisdom are temperate and firm, not for the reason which the multitude give. Do you agree with them?"

Cebes/ "Surely I do not."

Socrates/ "No, truly. But the soul of the philosopher would adopt this line of reasoning, and would not imagine that philosophy indeed ought to set it free, and when she did so, that it should resign itself again to pleasures and to pains, to bind it down and make her service void, as if engaged upon a kind of Penelope's web, but with her plan reversed; on the contrary, calming the passions to rest, taking reason for its guide, being ever intent upon this, the contemplation of what is true, divine, and unchangeable, and being nourished by it, it thinks that while it lives it ought to live conformably, and when it departs from life, having

attained to that which is congenial to and like itself, it shall be released from mortal miseries. From such a regimen as this, Simmias and Cebes, we have no cause to fear that the soul, having attended to it strictly, should dread, lest falling asunder at its departure from the body, it should be dissipated and dispersed by the winds, and exist no more."

Phaedo/ After Socrates had thus expressed himself, silence ensued for a considerable time, and both Socrates himself, as he appeared, was engaged in meditation upon the subject that had been so discussed, as were also many amongst ourselves. But Cebes and Simmias were conversing for a while together, and Socrates observing them, asked;

Socrates/ "What think you of what has been said? Does it appear to have been urged with sufficient effect? For it still presents many doubts and objections, if one would pursue them in adequate detail. If, then, you are engaged in the consideration of any other subject, I have nothing to say; but if you entertain any doubts upon this, do not hesitate yourselves to express and enumerate them, if you think the subject could be placed in a more effective point of view, and to call me in also to your assistance, if you imagine that with my aid you shall have better success."

Simmias/ "Indeed, Socrates, I shall tell you the truth. For some time past each of us being in doubt, is pushing forward and urging the other to question you, on account of our anxiety to hear indeed, and at the same time a hesitation to give you any trouble, as it may not be agreeable to you in your present distress."

Phaedo/ Hearing this, he smiled sweetly, and said;

Socrates/ "How strange, Simmias! With difficulty, indeed, could I persuade other men that I do not regard my present condition as a calamity, when I am unable to convince even you; but you are apprehensive lest I should be more

morosely disposed now than during the former portion of my life. It seems, too, that I appear to you inferior in the art of divination to the swans, who when they perceive that they must die, though given to song before, then sing the most of all, delighted at the prospect of their departure to the deity whose ministers they are. But mankind say falsely of the swans that it is through dread of death, and assert that they sing from grief, bewailing their decease, and do not reflect that no bird sings when it is hungry, or cold, or afflicted with any other pain, not even the nightingale, or swallow, or hoopoe, which sing, they say, a dirge-like strain for grief; but neither do they appear to me to sing for grief, nor swans, but as pertaining to Apollo they are skilled in the divining art, and having a foreknowledge of the bliss in Hades, they express their joy in song on that day rather than at any previous time. But I believe myself to be a fellow-servant of the swans, and consecrated to the same divinity, and that I am no less gifted by my master in the art of divination, nor am I departing life with less good grace than they. On this account, then, you ought to speak and ask me what you please, while the Athenian Eleven give you leave."

Simmias/ "You say well, and I shall tell you whence my doubts arise; and he, too, how far he rejects what has been urged. To me it appears, Socrates, and perhaps to you with regard to such matters, that it is either impossible or very difficult to arrive at certainty in the present life, at the same time that it shows a very imbecile character not to examine in every way into what is said concerning them, so as never to desist until one is quite exhausted in the extent of his research. For in regard to such matters it is necessary to accomplish some one of these things; either to learn from others how they stand, or find out upon investigation by one's self, having laid hold on the very best indeed of human reasonings, and the least likely to be confuted, to sail

through life embarking in this, as one who risks himself upon a raft, unless one could effect a safer and less hazardous passage in a more secure conveyance, that of some heaven-sent reason. For my part, then, I shall not be ashamed to question you, as you propose, nor shall I have to blame myself in time to come, because I did not say what my opinion is. For, Socrates, when I consider both by myself and with Cebes what has been said, it does not at all appear to me to have been adequately proved."

Socrates/ "Perhaps, my friend, your views are just; but say where the inadequacy lies."

Simmias/ "In this, I think, that one might use the same argument in respect to harmony, and a lyre and its chords, that the harmony indeed in a well-tuned lyre is something invisible, incorporeal, very beautiful and divine, but the lyre itself, and its chords, are bodies, and corporeal, compound, earthly, and akin to mortality. When anyone, then, has broken the lyre, or cut or rent the chords, were he to insist upon the same line of argument as you, he should assert it to be necessary for that harmony still to exist, | and not have been destroyed; for there could be no possibility that the lyre should still exist with its chords torn asunder; and the chords too, which are mortal, (should exist,) but that the harmony of like nature with and allied to the immortal and divine, should perish, being destroyed prior to that which is mortal; but he should assert (I say) that the harmony must still exist somewhere, and that the woodwork and the strings should be decayed before it suffered any change. I think that you have yourself too, Socrates, perceived this, that we suppose for the most part the soul to be something of this nature, that our bodies being, as it were, set in order, and evenly balanced by heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, our souls are a mixture of some such qualities, and a harmony arising from them, when they are duly and justly combined

with each other. If, then, the soul is a harmony, it is evident that when our bodies are immoderately relaxed, or overstrained by diseases or any other ills, the soul must immediately perish, divine as it is, like other harmonies, both those of musical sounds, and those which result from all the works of skillful artisans, but the relics of each individual body must last for a long time until it has been burned or decayed. Consider now what answer we shall make to this argument; if one should require it to be admitted that the soul being a mixture of those qualities in the body, is the first to perish in that which is called death?"

Phaedo/ Upon this, Socrates looking steadfastly at us, as he generally used to do, and smiling, said;

Socrates/ "In truth, Simmias speaks justly. If there is one among you then more ready than me, why did he not answer him? For he seems to have impugned the argument with no mean success. However, it appears to me that we ought to hear from Cebes yet before we make our answer, what charge he has to make against the argument, that during the interval we may consult what we shall say, and then when we have heard them, either to give up to them, if they seem to speak reasonably, or if not, to support the argument. Come then, Cebes, tell what it is that perplexed you, so as to occasion your mistrust."

Cebes/ "I shall tell you. The argument seems to me to remain in the same place, and to be liable to the same objections which we made before. For, that our souls existed before they merged into this human form, I do not deny to have been very interestingly, and, if it be not too fulsome to add, most convincingly proved; but that it exists anywhere after we die, does not so clearly appear. I do not indeed give in to the objection of Simmias, that the soul is not stronger and more durable than the body, for it seems to me to excel by far all things of the kind. 'Why then,' might the argument

say, ‘do you still disbelieve, when you see that on the death of the individual, that which is weaker still exists? But it does not seem necessary to you that the more durable should be still during this interval preserved.’ Observe, if I urge anything of weight in answer to this; but, as it appears, I too, as well as Simmias, must avail myself of an illustration of some kind. This subject seems to me to be treated in like manner as one would advance a similar argument in the case of an aged weaver deceased, and say that the man has not perished, but exists probably somewhere, and, as a proof, should adduce the garment which he wore and had woven himself, which was safe, and had not been destroyed; and if one were to doubt him, he would ask whether of the two is the more durable—the human species or the garment which is constantly wanted and worn; but when one answers that the human species is far more durable, he would imagine that it had been proved beyond all question that the man is alive, since that which is less durable was not destroyed. But I do not think that it is so, Simmias; and attend now to what I say. Everyone must suppose that one who asserted this, asserted an absurdity. For this weaver having worn out and woven many such garments, perished subsequently to these, however numerous, but prior I imagine to the last, and yet the man is not, on this account, inferior to and frailer than the garment. But the soul, I think, might admit of this same illustration in reference to the body, and anyone who applies a similar argument to them would seem to me to express himself correctly, to the effect that the soul is something durable, but the body frailer and more transitory. But he would farther say, that every soul wore out a number of bodies, especially if it lived many years; for if the body is in a state of decline and decay while the man is still alive, but the soul is always weaving anew that part which is worn out, it must follow, of necessity, that

when the soul perishes it must have its last garment then, and be destroyed previous to this alone; but on the destruction of the soul, the body must then display the weakness of its nature, and quickly rot away. Wherefore it is not by any means right for one to place implicit faith in this argument, and to feel confident that when we die our souls still exist somewhere. For if one should concede to another who insisted upon still more than you, admitting to him that not only did our souls exist before we were born, but that when we die, there is nothing to prevent the souls of some from existing, and being likely to exist, and being repeatedly born and dying again, —for so strong is it by nature, that the soul can bear up against repeated births; —conceding this, I say, he would not vet allow but that it becomes exhausted after a number of births, and perishes at last altogether in some one of the deaths. But he would say that no one was aware of the precise death and precise dissolution of the body which occasion the destruction of the soul, for it is impossible for anyone of us whosoever to be made sensible of it. If this be so, it applies to everyone who is bold at the approach of death, that he entertains this confidence on foolish grounds, unless he can prove that the soul is absolutely immortal and incorruptible; otherwise it follows of course, that one who is on the eve of death must be alarmed on his soul's account, lest it should perish altogether on its immediate disunion from the body."

Phaedo/ Upon this, all of us who were listening to what they said, were, as we afterwards told each other, most unpleasantly affected; because they seemed to disturb our minds anew, after we had been fully convinced by the preceding arguments, and to reduce us to a mistrust not only of the pre-established reasonings, but of what was likely to be urged in future, on the grounds of our being

incompetent judges, or the uncertainty of the facts themselves.

Echecrates/ By the Gods! Phaedo, I make all allowance for you; for, in some degree, a like reflection strikes myself. What reasoning shall we trust henceforward, since that which Socrates advanced, with such strong semblance of conviction, has now lost all claim on our belief? For this doctrine, that our souls are a kind of harmony, makes a wonderful impression on me at all times as well as now, and it reminded me, as it were, while being developed, that such had been a previous impression of my own. Wherefore I require, as if at the very commencement, some other argument which shall convince me that the soul does not die with the dead. Tell me, then, in the name of Jove, how Socrates followed up the argument? —and whether he, as you say of yourselves, was obviously disconcerted, or not so, but calmly bore the argument out? —and did he do so efficiently or imperfectly? Tell me everything as accurately as you can.

Phaedo/ In truth, Echecrates, often as I admired Socrates, I was never more delighted than in being with him on that occasion. That he was able to make a reply is not, perhaps, so surprising; but this I was particularly struck with in the first instance—the pleasure, affability, and approbation, with which he attended to the argument of the young men; in the next place, his sharpness in perceiving how we were affected by their objections; then how skillfully he applied his remedies—recalled us when, as it were, routed and overcome—and encouraged us to accompany him in a concise consideration of the subject.

Echecrates/ How was that?

Phaedo/ I shall tell you. I was sitting beside the bed, upon a low seat; but he was sitting somewhat higher than I was.

Stroking my head, then, gently, and taking hold of the hair which fell down my neck—for he was accustomed, on occasion, to amuse himself so with my hair—he said;

Socrates/ "To-morrow, perhaps, Phædo, you will cut off these comely locks."

Phaedo/ "Likely so, Socrates."

Socrates/ "Not, if you take my advice."

Phaedo/ "What would you have me do?"

Socrates/ "To-day, I shall cut off mine, and you these locks of yours, in case our argument should perish, and we prove unable to revive it. Were I, too, you, and the argument were to escape me, I should bind myself by oath, like the Argives, never to allow my hair to grow until I gained the victory in my contest with the argument of Simmias and Cebes."

Phaedo/ "But, Hercules himself, even, is said not to have been a match for two."

Socrates/ "Call upon me, then, as an Iolaus, while it is yet daylight."

Phaedo/ "I do call upon you, then, not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but Iolaus upon him."

Socrates/ "It will come to the same thing."

Socrates/ "But, first of all, let us beware, lest we meet with some mischance."

Phaedo/ "What mischance?"

Socrates/ "That, of becoming haters of reasoning, as some become haters of men, since there is no greater mishap than this for one to meet with, to hate reasoning. But the hatred of reasoning and hatred of mankind arise from a similar source. For the latter arises in the mind from an excessive and artless confidence in anyone, and the impression that a man is altogether sincere, upright and

honest; then, after a little, the discovery that he is vicious, faithless, and changing with the occasion. When one has frequently experienced this, especially at the hands of those men whom he believed to be his dearest and most familiar friends, in the end, after numerous disappointments, he hates the whole race, and is convinced that nothing upright whatsoever is in existence at all. Do you not think that this feeling arises so?"

Phaedo/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Is it not a shame, then, and plain, too, that such a person endeavors to deal with man-kind without any judgment on human affairs; for, if he had dealt with them with judgment, such as it really is he should have felt the case to be, that the excessively good and evil are but few in either extreme; but the middle class is very numerous."

Phaedo/ "How do you mean?"

Socrates/ "Just as in the case, of things that are small and large in extremes. Do you think that there is anything more rare than to discover a man, a dog, or anything whatsoever which is great or small in extremes? Or, again, swift or slow, beautiful or ugly, white or black? Do you not perceive that of all such things the extremes are rare and scarce, but the means are plentiful and abundant?"

Phaedo/ "It is certainly so."

Socrates/ "Think you then, if a trial were proposed for a prize in vice, that, in such a case, but very few would appear pre-eminent?"

Phaedo/ "It is likely so."

Socrates/ "Very likely; yet reasonings do not in this particular resemble the case of mankind, for I merely in this instance was following as you led the way; but so far they bear a resemblance, as in the case where one yields assent to an argument as true, without any judgment in reasoning,

and it appears to him a little after to be false, standing to reason at one time and not so at another, and again changing and variable; and especially in the case of those who are conversant with sophistical reasonings, you are aware that in the end they imagine themselves to have become the wisest of all, and alone to have perceived that neither in material things is there anything perfect or certain, nor in (abstract) reasonings, but that all existing things are absolutely, like the Euripus, subject to a continual flux and reflux, and never remain in any place for any time."

Phaedo/ "What you say, is strictly true."

Socrates/ "It should, surely, then, Phaedo, be a deplorable grievance, if, when a true, certain and intelligible mode of reasoning actually exists, yet in consequence of one's falling in with such a description of arguments as while they remain the same, appear still to be true at one time and at another not, he should not lay the blame upon himself nor upon his own want of judgment, but in the end through vexation should gladly transfer all censure from himself upon the arguments, and pass the remainder of his life in hatred and abuse of them, while he is blinded to the truth and knowledge of what really exists."

Phaedo/ "By Jove, it is grievous indeed."

Socrates/ "In the first place, then, let us beware of this, and let us not be persuaded that there is a chance of there being nothing sound in arguments, but much rather that we are not yet in sound condition, but must exert ourselves with manly resolution and energy to become so, you and the rest indeed on account of your whole life to come, but I on account of death itself, since I am in danger of deporting myself at present upon the very subject in question, not as a philosopher, but as a caviler, like those who are

exceedingly uninformed. For they, when they are disputing about anything, pay no attention to the bearings of the question on which the argument is based, but make this their principal object, the point of view in which what they have laid down shall appear to those present. And I seem to myself to be likely to differ from such on the present occasion merely in so far; for I shall not endeavor to affect that what I say shall appear to those present to be true, unless the conviction should arise incidentally, but how it shall appear to wear the strongest character of reality to myself. For I am reflecting, my beloved friend, (and observe with what partiality to myself,) that, if what I assert be true, it is well to be persuaded of it; but, if there is nothing that survives the dead, I shall yet, for the period previous to my death, on this account, occasion less annoyance to those present by my complaints. This state of ignorance, however, shall not continue long—it would be bad if so—but in a little time hence shall come to an end. Thus prepared, Simmias and Cebes, I proceed to bear my argument out; but do you, if you will take my advice giving little heed to Socrates but much rather to the truth, if I appear to you to express what is true, agree to it; but, if not, by every argument oppose it, taking good care that I shall not, having deceived at once both myself and you, depart, like the bee, having left a sting behind."

"But, to proceed. Remind' me, in the first place, of what you said, in case I should appear to have forgotten it. Simmias, then, as I judge, is in doubt, and fears lest the soul, although it is more divine and beautiful than the body, should perish before it, as being in the similitude of a harmony. But, Cebes, indeed, seemed to allow me this, that the soul is more durable than the body, yet nobody knows but that the soul, after the repeated wearing out of several bodies, and having left the last body, then perishes itself;

and that this very thing is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body is always in a state of decay. Is this, Simmias and Cebes, what we are to inquire into?"

Phaedo/ They both agreed that it was.

Socrates/ "Whether, then, do you reject all the preceding arguments, or some of them indeed, and not others?"

Phaedo/ "Some we do," they replied, "and others we do not"

Socrates/ "What say you, then, with regard to that argument in which we asserted that knowledge is reminiscence; and that such being the case, our souls must, of necessity, have existed somewhere before they were imprisoned in the body?"

Cebes/ "For my part, I was wonderfully convinced by it then, and I still cling to it closer than to any other"

Simmias/ "And I indeed, am possessed by the same feeling, and should be much surprised if I ever entertained a different opinion upon this subject."

Socrates/ "But you must, my Theban friend, entertain a different opinion if this impression be firmly fixed with you, that harmony indeed is something compounded, and that the soul, like a kind of harmony, is composed of the concordant qualities of the body. For you will not surely allow yourself to say that the harmony existed, duly compounded, prior to the existence of these materials from which it should have been composed Or will you approve of your asserting this?"

Simmias/ "By no means, Socrates."

Socrates/ "Do you observe, then, that this is the natural consequence of what you assert when you say that the soul existed before it merged into the human form and body, but that it is composed of what does not yet exist? However, this harmony of yours is not anything like to that to which you

compare it, but the lyre and the chords, and the tones, as yet discordant, come into existence first, and last of all, the harmony is produced and perishes the first. How shall this proposition then accord with the former?"

Simmias/ "Not in any way."

Socrates/ "And yet, if it is the rule in any other argument, surely one regarding harmony should not admit of discord?"

Simmias/ "It is right that it should not."

Socrates/ "This argument of yours, then, is not in perfect accord; but observe which of the two propositions do you prefer? that knowledge is reminiscence, or the soul a harmony?"

Simmias/ "The former by much, Socrates, for the latter arose in my mind independently of any demonstration, in consequence of a kind of verisimilitude and speciousness, from which source the opinions of many are derived; but for my part, I am convinced that the arguments which establish their demonstrations by means of verisimilitudes, both in geometry and all other instances, are futile, and especially deceptive, should one be not upon his guard against them. But the argument respecting reminiscence and knowledge has been advanced upon a principle well deserving of assent. For in this way our soul was said to exist previous to its merging into the body, since to it belongs the essence which bears the name of that which is. This principle I have, I am persuaded, fully and fitly admitted; it follows then, as it would appear, of necessity, that I must neither allow myself nor any other to assert that the soul is a harmony."

Socrates/ "What if you view the question in this light, Simmias, does it appear to you to be suited to harmony, or to any other composition to be otherwise disposed than those materials are from which it is produced?"

Simmias/ "By no means."

Socrates/ “Nor yet to do or suffer anything contrary to what those materials do or suffer.”

Phaedo/ He agreed.

Socrates/ “It is not therefore suitable for harmony to take the lead of those things of which it is composed, but to follow them.”

Phaedo/ He consented.

Socrates/ “It is, then, far from being the case, that harmony is contrariwise produced, or sends forth sounds or in any respect is opposed to its component parts.”

Simmias/ “Far from it.”

Socrates/ “What then? Is not every harmony naturally so far a harmony as it has been duly arranged?”

Simmias/ “I do not understand you.”

Socrates/ “Whether, if it should be more fully and effectively arranged, supposing such a case possible, should not the harmony be fuller and more effective, but if it were in an inferior degree, and less efficiently so, should not the harmony be inferior and less efficient?”

Simmias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Is this then the case with regard to the soul, that, even in the least degree possible, one soul is more fully and effectively this very thing, a soul, or in an inferior degree and less efficiently so than another?”

Simmias/ “Not by any possibility.”

Socrates/ “Come now, by Jove; is one soul said to be possessed of intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and another of ignorance and vice, and to be evil? And is this said with reason?”

Simmias/ “With reason, no doubt.”

Socrates/ “What shall anyone of those who pronounce the soul to be a harmony, assert those things to be which exist

in the soul, virtue and vice? Will they call the one harmony and the other discord; and assert the one soul, the good, to be duly attempered, and to contain within itself, being a harmony, a second harmony, but the other to be itself discordant and to contain no second harmony in it?"

Simmias/ "For my part, I cannot say so; but it is plain that the advocate of the principle would assert something of the kind."

Socrates/ "But, it has been already admitted that one soul is not more or less a soul than another; and this amounts to an acknowledgment that one harmony is not more fully and effectively, nor in an inferior degree, nor less efficiently a harmony than another. Is it so?"

Simmias/ "Certainly indeed."

Socrates/ "And that a harmony which is neither in a greater nor in a less degree a harmony, is not in a greater or a less degree arranged to become so. Is this the case?"

Simmias/ "It is so."

Socrates/ "But that which has not been in a greater or a less degree so arranged, does it partake of harmony in a greater or less degree, or has it a just proportion?"

Simmias/ "A just one."

Socrates/ "Therefore, when one soul is not this very thing, a soul, in a greater or less degree than another soul, it has not been in any respect more or less harmonized?"

Simmias/ "Even so."

Socrates/ "But such being its condition, it cannot partake in a greater degree of harmony or discord than another?"

Simmias/ "Certainly not."

Socrates/ "But again, when such is its condition, can one soul partake to a greater extent of vice or virtue than another, if vice indeed be discord, and virtue harmony?"

Simmias/ “It cannot.”

Socrates/ “But the rather, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul at all shall partake of vice, if indeed it be a harmony. For a harmony which is essentially this very thing, a harmony, never at any time could partake of discord.”

Simmias/ “Assuredly not.”

Socrates/ “Neither indeed could a soul, which is essentially a soul, of vice.”

Simmias/ “How could it, indeed, from what has been already established?”

Socrates/ “According to this mode of reasoning, then, shall all the souls of all animals be equally good, provided they are equally disposed by nature to be this very thing, souls?”

Simmias/ “So, Socrates, it seems to me at least.”

Socrates/ “Think you, that such a position could be fairly urged, and that our reasoning should be subject to such inferences, if the hypothesis be true that the soul is a harmony?”

Simmias/ “Not by any means.”

Socrates/ “What, then; of all these things which are in man, is there anything else except the soul which you assert to exercise supreme authority, especially when it is a prudent one?”

Simmias/ “Nothing else.”

Socrates/ “Whether by yielding to the bodily affections, or by resisting them? —I mean, for instance, as in the case of heat and thirst besetting the body, by urging it in an opposite direction, not to drink, and when hunger besets it not to eat; in innumerable other examples, besides, we observe the soul resisting the bodily affections. Do we not?”

Simmias/ “Certainly we do.”

Socrates/ “But did we not allow, in the course of our previous reasonings, that the soul, if it were a harmony, could not breathe any tones at variance with the tension, relaxation, vibration, and any other affection to which the elements were liable of which it was composed, but should follow them, and never at any time become their guide?”

Simmias/ “We did admit it; how should we do otherwise?”

Socrates/ “What then? Does it not seem to us to act an opposite part now, in its control of all those qualities of which one might pretend it was composed, in its resisting them through the whole course almost of life, and exercising authority in every way over them; punishing some more severely and with pains, (according to the principles of the gymnastic and healing art,) but others more mildly; rebuking indeed in part, but in part suggesting warnings to the desires, the angry passions, and the fears, as if, being a distinct existence, it conferred with another object distinct from itself? Something like what Homer has represented in the Odyssey, when he speaks of Ulysses, who, ‘Striking his breast, in such terms chid his heart, Bear up, my heart; thou hast already borne much worse.’ Think you that Homer composed this with the impression, that the soul was a '"harmony and capable of being led by the bodily affections, and not as being competent to lead and govern them, and as being something far more divine in its nature than is consistent with a harmony?”

Simmias/ “By Jove, Socrates, I agree with you.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, my excellent friend, it is by no means correct to assert, that the soul is a kind of harmony; for as it appears, we should not agree with Homer, the divine poet, nor with ourselves.”

Phaedo/ He allowed that it was so.

Socrates/ “Very well; as it would seem, the Theban Harmonia has been sufficiently reconciled. But, with regard to Cadmus, how and by what course of reasoning shall we satisfy him?”

Cebes/ “You appear to me, to be likely to invent some means; at least you have succeeded in this argument against the harmony strangely contrary to my expectation. For, while Simmias was explaining on what points he doubted, I wondered much if one could be able to do anything with his arguments; however, he appeared in the most unaccountable manner to shrink from the very first onset of your reply. So that I should not be surprised if the same thing should befall the argument of Cadmus.”

Socrates/ “My good friend, speak not in such a laudatory strain, lest some envious power should overturn the argument I am about to urge. These matters, indeed, shall be the province of the gods, but let us, ‘advancing hand to hand.’ like Homer’s heroes, try if you advance anything of consequence. But this is the sum of what you seek after; — You require that our souls should be proved to be imperishable and immortal, if a philosopher, on the eve of death, full of confidence and expectation that after his decease he shall be far happier than if he had died having passed through any other life (than that of a philosopher), is to entertain this confidence on wise and prudent grounds. But the demonstration that the soul is something potent and divine, and that it was yet in existence before we were born ourselves, you say there is nothing to prevent all this from signifying, not that the soul is immortal, but only that it has long duration, and pre-existed for an immeasurable time, and was both conversant with, and engaged in the execution of many things; yet nothing the more was the soul immortal, but its very entrance into the human body, like a disease, was the very origin of its decay, so that it passes through

this life in misery, and perishes finally in that which is called death. But you assert, it makes no difference whether the soul is united to a body once or frequently, as far as regards our several apprehensions; for it is right that he should feel afraid unless he is a fool, who is not fully aware and cannot advance a satisfactory argument in favor of the immortality of the soul. Such, Cebes, I think is the character of your objections, and I purposely make frequent repetition of them, that nothing may escape us, and, if you wish, you may add to or take from them."

Cebes/ "For my part, at present, I neither wish to subtract from, nor add to them; but they are just what I would urge."

Phaedo/ Socrates then, after some delay, and pondering somewhat to himself, said;

Socrates/ "You inquire, Cebes, into no easy matter, for it is absolutely necessary to discuss the origin of generation and corruption. I shall then, if you please, recount to you how I was affected myself upon these subjects, then if anything that I say should appear available to you, you shall adopt it to produce conviction in the matter of your discourse."

Cebes/ "I wish, indeed, to hear you."

Socrates/ "Attend then, as I intend to tell you. When I was a young man, Cebes, I had a wonderful fondness for that wisdom which they call a knowledge of nature. For this appeared to me to be a consummate wisdom, to be acquainted with the causes of everything, why it is produced, why it perishes, why it continues in existence; and I used to turn my attention constantly from side to side upon my first investigation of such questions as these, —whether, when heat and cold are in a state of corruption, as some asserted, then animated beings are produced, whether it is owing to the blood that we think, or, whether it is owing to

air or fire, or to none of these things, but it is the brain which produces the sensations of hearing, sight, and smell, and from these arise memory, and opinion, and from memory, and opinion, in a state of rest, in the same manner, knowledge is produced. Upon considering, further, the decay of these things, and the affections incidental to the heavens and the earth, I looked upon myself at last as so unsuited to this investigation that nothing could be more so. But of this I shall give you satisfactory proof; for the things which I formerly with certainty knew, as far at least as I appeared to myself and to others, I was then, in consequence of this investigation, so utterly blinded to, that I lost all knowledge of what I supposed myself to be acquainted with before in many other particulars, besides that of the mode of the growth of man. For previous to this I had supposed it evident to everyone that it was owing to eating and drinking; since when by reason of nourishment flesh has been added to flesh, bones to bones, and so, in like manner, to everything else has been added what is of similar nature to it; then the bulk which is (originally) small becomes afterwards great, and thus a man of little size proceeds to become large. Such were my opinions then; do I not seem to you to have entertained them justly?"

Cebes/ "To me, at least, you do."

Socrates/ "But consider the matter still further. I supposed myself sufficiently ascertained of the fact, when a man of large stature stood by one of small, that he exceeded him by a head, and so with one horse and another; and still more obviously than this, ten appeared to me to exceed eight by the addition of two, and two cubits to exceed one cubit by an excess of half."

Cebes/ "But now, what is your opinion on these matters?"

Socrates/ “I am far, by Jove, from thinking, that I am in any degree conversant with the cause of these things, who cannot satisfy myself even in this—whether, when to one a person has added one, that one to which it was added has become two; or, that one added, and that to which it was added, have become two, on account of the addition of the one to the other. For I wonder if, when each of them was separate, each separately was one, and they were not then two. But when they are joined together, this is the cause of their becoming two, namely, their conjunction by being approximated to each other. Neither, indeed, if any person should divide one (from the other), can I yet be persuaded that this, on the other hand, is the cause, namely, their division, of their becoming two. For this is quite an opposite cause to the former of their becoming two; since then it was because they were mutually conjoined, and added the one to the other; but now it is because the one is divided and separated from the other. Neither am I persuaded yet, according to this system of inquiry, that I know why one is one, nor in a word, anything else, why it is produced, perishes, or exists; but I proceed to compound at random some other system, while I by no means approve of this.”

“But having heard a certain person reading once in a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, to the effect that it is Mind which regulates and is the cause of all things, I was, indeed, delighted with such a theory of causation; and it appeared to me in a manner to be quite just, for Mind to be the cause of everything; and I supposed, if such were the case, that the regulating Mind sets all things in order, and disposes them severally in such a mode as they may best abide in. Should one, then, desire to investigate the cause of everything, how it is produced, or perishes, or exists, he must find out this respecting it, in what manner it is best for it either to exist, or, in any other way, to be passively or actively affected; but,

from this mode of consideration, a man must look to nothing else, so far as concerns himself and others, but what is most excellent and the best. Besides, it is necessary for this same person to be acquainted with what is worst, since the knowledge of both one and other is the same. With such impressions, I was delighted to think that I had found an instructor to my mind, Anaxagoras, in the cause of things existing, and that he would explain to me, in the first instance, whether the earth is flat or round, and, when he had explained this, would develop the cause and necessity of its form, going upon the principle of all things being for the better, and consequently that it should be such, for the better, as he would describe it; and, further, if he asserted that it occupied the center, that he would unfold how it is for the better that it does so; and, if he would make all these things clear to me, I was fully prepared so as to require no more any other species of cause. With regard to the sun, I was, in like manner, determined to make inquiry; and with regard to the moon and the rest of the planets, their mutual velocity, revolutions, and other affections, in what manner, on occasions, it is best for each of them to be affected, both actively and passively. For I never at all supposed that, when he had declared those things to be controlled by Mind, he would adduce any other cause in their case than that it is so best for them to be arranged as they are; I thought, therefore, that he, ascribing a cause to each thing in particular, and all things in common, would explain in full what was best for each and the general good of all. And I should not, for a great consideration, have parted with my hopes; but, having taken up the work with the greatest earnestness, I perused it as hastily as I could, that I might the sooner be acquainted with the best and the worst.

"I was baffled, however, in this wonderful hope, when, in the course of my study, I observe the man making no use

whatever of Mind, nor adducing any causes for the regulation of all things, otherwise than assigning the air, atmosphere and water, as causes; besides many other things equally absurd. And to me he appeared to bear the closest resemblance to one who would say, 'Socrates commits all his actions through the operation of Mind;' and, upon attempting to explain the causes of my several actions, would assert, in the first instance, that the reason why I am now sitting here is because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and the bones are hard indeed, and have their diaphyses separately, one from the other; but the sinews are capable of tension and relaxation, enfolding the bones along with the flesh and skin, which binds them together; when the bones, then, play freely in their joints, the extension and contraction of the sinews give me the power of bending my limbs, and for this reason I am sitting here now in such a posture; and again, he would assign other causes of a like nature for my conversing with you, alleging as causes the sound of the voice, the air, and the faculty of hearing, omitting all mention of the real causes, that since the Athenians thought it better to condemn me, on this account it appeared preferable to me to sit here, and the more honest course to stay and endure the penalty they have prescribed, since, by the Dog, these sinews and bones should have been long ago in Megara or Bœotia, borne thither with the impression that it would be for the best, had I not judged it to be more upright and honorable to undergo whatever punishment the state might direct in preference to escaping by flight like a slave. But to denominate such things causes is exceedingly absurd; yet, if one were to say, that without having such things as bones and sinews, and such like, as I am possessed of, I should not be able to do what I pleased, he would assert the truth; but to assert that it is through them that I effect what I do, and so far act under the

influence of mind, and not from the choice of what is best, should be the highest and most palpable absurdity. For how silly is it that one should be incapable of distinguishing that the real cause is one thing, and that, without which the cause could not ever be a cause, is another; which the majority, feeling for, as it were, in the dark, appear to me, while they call it by a name quite foreign from the true, to designate as the very cause itself. Wherefore, one indeed, encompassing the earth with a vortex of the heavens, makes the earth to remain fixed (in the center), while another supports it like a broad kneading-trough upon the air, as a base; but the power by which these things are so maintained in the best possible way in which they could be disposed, this they neither inquire into, nor do they suppose that it involves a kind of superhuman skill, but they imagine that they have found a more powerful, a more enduring, and a more comprehensive Atlas than this; and what is really excellent and suitable, they believe to be incapable of uniting and combining anything whatever. I should therefore have gladly become the disciple of anyone, in order to understand the nature of a cause like this; but when I was disappointed of it, and could not find it out of myself, nor learn it from another, would you wish me to show you, Cebes, in what manner I set about a second voyage for the discovery of this cause?"

Cebes/ "Most anxiously I wish it."

Socrates/ "It seemed to me, subsequently, when I had exhausted myself in the investigation of things existing, that I should beware lest I should be affected like those who regard attentively an eclipse of the sun; for some destroy their sight unless they look at its reflection in the water, or some similar medium. With some such feeling then was I impressed, and I feared lest I should altogether be blinded in my soul while examining objects by the sight, and

endeavoring to grasp them with each of the senses. I thought then that I should have recourse to the reasons of things, and discover in them the truth of their existence. Perhaps, however, this similitude does not hold good to the full extent of the comparison; for I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in their reasons, is contemplating them more by means of images than he who contemplates them in their effects; I proceeded then in the following way, to lay down, on every occasion, that principle which I judged the most incontrovertible and whatever things shall appear to me to coincide with this I set down as true, as well in causation ns in the case of all things else, but whatever things do not coincide as false. But I am anxious to explain to you more clearly what I mean, for I do not think you understand me now."

Cebes/ "No, by Jove, not well."

Socrates/ "Yet, I am not saying anything new, but what always upon other occasions, and in our past discussions, I have never ceased to say. For I proceed to try and explain to you that species of cause which I have concerned myself about, and revert to those much talked of subjects with which I also set out, supposing that there is beauty in the abstract, goodness, greatness, and all such things, which if you grant me and allow to exist I hope from hence to discover and demonstrate to you the cause of the immortality of the soul."

Cebes/ "Then come to your conclusion at once, as I grant you this."

Socrates/ "Observe now, what follows from the preceding; if you agree with me on the subject. For it appears to me if there is anything else beautiful besides beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of that

(abstract) beauty; and so I assert of everything. Do you agree to such a kind of cause as this?"

Cebes/ "I do."

Socrates/ "I do not yet, understand, nor am I able to conceive those other subtle causes; but if one were to account to me for the beauty of anything, either from its blooming color or figure, or anything else of the kind, I bid adieu to extraneous reasons, for I am confounded by all such, but I simply, artlessly, and foolishly perhaps, confine myself to this, that nothing else renders it beautiful but either the presence or participation of that (abstract) beauty, or by whatever means and in whatever manner it is communicated, for upon this I do not yet insist, but merely that through beauty all things beautiful are made so. Since this appears to me to be the safest answer to make to myself and any other also; and holding firmly by this I do not think that I shall ever fall, but that it is safe for me, and every person whosoever to reply, that through beauty things beautiful are made so. Does it not seem so to you?"

Cebes/ "It does."

Socrates/ "And that through magnitude great things are great, and greater things greater; and through parvitude things less are less?"

Cebes/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "Nor yet would you approve if any said that one is greater than another by the head, and that the less is less by this very same; but you would maintain that you mean nothing else than that everyone thing greater than another is greater on no other account than that of magnitude; and on this account, its magnitude, it is greater, but the less is less on no other account than its parvitude, and on this account, its parvitude, it is less: dreading, I imagine, lest any argument of a contrary kind should oppose you, in case you

should assert anyone to be greater and less by the head, (to the effect that,) in the first instance, the greater is the greater, and the less is the less, owing to the very same thing; and in the next place, that the greater individual is the greater in consequence of the head which is small, but this were indeed a wonder for one to be great owing to something small. Would you not be afraid of this?"

Phaedo/ Upon which, Cebes, smiling, replied;

Cebes/ "I should indeed."

Socrates/ "Would you not be afraid to say, that ten is more than eight by two, and owes its excess to this, and not to number? And that two cubits are greater than one cubit by half, and not from magnitude? For the fear is the same."

Cebes/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "What then? When to one has been added one, would you not hesitate to say whether the addition is the cause of being two, or the division when it has been divided? And would you not loudly insist that you are not aware of any other mode whatever in which each thing exists than by a participation in the essence peculiar to each, of which it partakes, and in this case you are not aware of any other cause of their becoming two, except a participation in duality, of which that must partake which is likely to be two, and in unity whatsoever is likely to be one, but these divisions and additions, and such other subtleties you would bid adieu to, leaving replies upon such matters to wiser than yourself; and would you, being in dread, as the proverb says, of your own shadow and inexperience, clinging firmly to the security which the principle affords, make answer accordingly? But should anyone attack this self-same principle, would you not take leave of him, and decline to answer until you had considered the consequences derived from it, whether they agree or differ from each other? And

when you should be required to enter upon an explanation of it, would you render it in this manner, by laying down another further principle, whichever may appear the best of the more general, until you have arrived at some satisfactory result, and would you not, at the same time, avoid making confusion, like the contentious disputants, in treating of the first cause and its consequences, if you were anxious to attain to the truth of things? For those disputants have no consideration, perhaps, nor concern about this subject; since they are quite contented, while in their wisdom they throw all things into a general disorder, to be nevertheless competent to please themselves; but you, if you really belong to the class of philosophers, would act, I imagine, as I advise."

Phaedo/ "You speak most truly," replied Simmias and Cebes together.

Echecrates/ By Jove, Phaedo, they said so justly; for he seems to me to have explained the subject with wonderful clearness to one of even limited intelligence.

Phaedo/ Such, indeed, was the impression, Echecrates, of all present.

Echecrates/ And such our own, though absent then, at hearing your recital now. But what was the subject of the subsequent discourse?

Phaedo/ As I remember when these concessions had been made him, and it was admitted that every idea actually exists, and that other things participate in them so as to receive their name, he afterwards asked;

Socrates/ "if you assert these matters to be so, whether, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates but less than Phaedo, do you not then affirm that both magnitude and parvitude are in Simmias?"

Cebes/ "I do"

Socrates/ “Do you allow, however, that Simmias, exceeding Socrates is not actually true, as it is said to be in words? For Simmias is not adapted by nature to exceed him in consequence of his being Simmias, but of the magnitude which he has; nor, again, does he exceed Socrates, because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has parvitude in comparison with his magnitude.”

Cebes/ “True”

Socrates/ “Neither, indeed, is Simmias exceeded by Phædo, because Phædo is Phædo, but because Phædo has magnitude in comparison with the parvitude of Simmias.”

Cebes/ “Such is the case.”

Socrates/ “Thus, then, Simmias has the name of being both small and great, since he is between the two, surpassing the parvitude of the one by his magnitude, but yielding to the other a magnitude which surpasses his own parvitude.”

Phaedo/ Upon this he said with a smile;

Socrates/ “I appear to express myself with the accuracy of a written contract, but still things are as I say.”

Phaedo/ Cebes agreed.

Socrates/ “But I urge them for this reason, because I wish you to be of the same opinion with myself. For it appears to me not only that magnitude itself is never disposed to be at the same time great and small, but r that the magnitude also in ourselves never admits the small, nor is disposed to be surpassed; but one of the two cases occurs, either that it retires and withdraws upon the approach of its contrary, the small, or ceases to exist when it has actually come; but it is not disposed, abiding and admitting parvitude, to be anything else than what it was before, as I, for instance, having sustained the reception of parvitude, and still continuing to be the same person that I am, am this small

person, but that which is great, while it is so, never endures to be small. In like manner the small in us is not disposed at any time to become or to be great, nor any other of things contrary, while it continues to be what it was, to become and be its contrary at the same time, but it retires, indeed, or perishes in this contingency."

Cebes/ "Thus in every way, it appears to me."

Phaedo/ Then some one of those present, (but who he was I do not clearly recollect,) when he heard this, said;

Someone/ "In the name of the gods was not the very contrary of what is now asserted laid down in the previous part of the discussion, that the greater is produced from the less, and the less from the greater, and this positively is the mode of generating contraries from contraries? But now it seems to me to be asserted that this never can be so."

Phaedo/ Upon which, Socrates, having moved his head forward and listened to him, said;

Socrates/ "You have reminded me like a man, however you do not observe the distinction between what is advanced now and what was so then. For then it was argued that a contrary thing is produced from a contrary; but now that contrariety itself can never become its own contrary, neither that which is in ourselves, nor that which is in nature. For, then, my friend, we were speaking of those things which involve their contraries, calling them by the name of the former; but now we are speaking of those former (contrary essences), by reason of which, being inherent, the things so called retain their name; but those we never at any time asserted to be disposed to admit of mutual generation."

Phaedo/ At the same time, looking at Cebes, he said;

Socrates/ "Have any of these things he mentioned troubled you at all?"

Cebes/ “I am not disposed to be so, although I by no means deny that there are many things which perplex me.”

Socrates/ “We plainly, then, agreed to acknowledge this, that a contrary can never be its own contrary,”

Cebes/ “By all means.”

Socrates/ “But observe further if you will agree with me in this. Is there anything you call heat and cold?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “The same as snow and fire?”

Cebes/ “Assuredly not.”

Socrates/ “Is heat then something different from fire, and cold something different from snow?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “But this, I think, is evident to you, that snow, while it is snow, can never, having admitted heat, as we said before, continue to be what it was, snow and hot, but on the approach of heat it will either give way to it or be destroyed.”

Cebes/ “Certainly so”

Socrates/ “And fire, on the other hand, on the approach of cold must either give way to it or be destroyed, nor can it ever endure, having admitted cold, to continue to be what it was, fire and cold.”

Cebes/ “You say true.”

Socrates/ “It happens, therefore, in respect to some such things, that not only the same idea is always designated by the same name, but something else too, which is not indeed the former, but retains its form always so long as it exists. But perhaps what I mean will be still clearer in the following example. The odd (in numbers) must always bear this name which now we give it; must it not?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Must it alone of all things bear this name, for I ask you this also, or is there anything else which is not the same as the odd, yet which we must designate by this name, as well as by its own, because its nature is such as that it never can at any time dispense with the odd? Such I assert to be the case with the number three and many other numbers. But observe now regarding the number three; does it not appear to you that it must be designated always by its own name, as well as by that of the odd, which is not the same as the number three? But still such is the nature of the number three, five, and the entire half of number, that not being the same as the odd, each of them is yet always odd. On the other hand, two, four, and the other whole series of number, though not the same as the even, are nevertheless each of them even. Do you allow this or not?”

Cebes/ “How should I not.”

Socrates/ “Observe now, what I wish to prove. But it is this, that not only do contraries appear not to receive each other, but as many things also as though not contrary to each other always involve contraries, such do not either appear to receive that idea which is contrary to the idea existing in themselves, but on its approach they perish or recede. Shall we not insist that the number three should perish first, and submit to anything else whatever, before it would endure while it was yet three to become even?”

Cebes/ “Certainly, indeed.”

Socrates/ “Nor yet, is the number two the contrary of the number three.”

Cebes/ “Surely not.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, not only ideas that are contrary do not await the approach of their contraries, but some other things also do not endure the approach of those which are really contraries.”

Cebes/ “You say very truly.”

Socrates/ “Do you wish then, if we can, that we should define what the nature of these things is?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Would they then be such as to compel whatever they occupied, not only itself to retain its own idea, but always that of something which is itself a contrary?”

Cebes/ “How do you mean?”

Socrates/ “As we said just now. For you are doubtless aware that whatever the idea of three may have occupied, it is not only necessary for that to be three, but odd besides?”

Cebes/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “At such, we say now, the idea contrary to the form which effected this, can never at all arrive.”

Cebes/ “No, surely.”

Socrates/ “But did the idea of odd make it so?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And contrary to this is the idea of even?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “The idea of even then shall never arrive at being three.”

Cebes/ “Never surely.”

Socrates/ “Therefore three has not any share in even?”

Cebes/ “Not any.”

Socrates/ “Three, then, is uneven?”

Cebes/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “That, therefore, which I proposed to determine—what things they are which, though contrary to any contrary, yet do not admit it, as for instance, now the number three, though not being the contrary of the even, does not the more admit it, for it always brings a contrary;

against it, as the number two to the odd, fire to cold, and in many other examples—see now if you determine thus, not only that a contrary does not admit a contrary, but that also which brings any contrary against whatever it approaches, can never, at any time, receive the contrary of that which is so brought. But think over it again, for it is profitable to give it constant attention. Five will not admit the idea of even, nor ten, its double, the idea of odd; this double too, indeed, which is itself contrary to something else, will not, nevertheless, admit the idea of odd, no more than three-halves, the half, the third, and all such like will admit the idea of the whole, if you follow and agree with me in opinion that the case is so."

Cebes/ "Most distinctly, I follow and agree with you."

Socrates/ "But, answer me again as from the beginning; and do not reply in the same terms of my question, but in different, after my example. I say this, because I perceive, besides the certain mode of answering which I spoke of at first, another certainty (in answering), arising from what has just been said. For, if you were to ask me, owing to the existence of what in the body it shall be warm, I shall not make you that safe, unlearned answer, that it is owing to heat, but a more subtle one from what has been laid down just now, that it is owing to fire; nor if you should ask me, owing to the existence of what in the body, shall it be sick? I will not answer that it is owing to disease, but to a fever; nor if, owing to the existence of what in number, it shall be odd? I will not say, owing to oddness, but to unity, and so on. But observe now if you sufficiently understand what I mean."

Cebes/ "Quite so."

Socrates/ "But, answer me, owing to the existence of what in a body shall it be a living body?"

Cebes/ "To the existence of soul."

Socrates/ “Is this then invariably the case?”

Cebes/ “How should it not?”

Socrates/ “Whatever, therefore, the soul may have occupied, does it always bring it life?

Cebes/ “It does, indeed.”

Socrates/ “Is there anything contrary to life or not?”

Cebes/ “There is.”

Socrates/ “What is it?”

Cebes/ “Death.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, the soul can never, at any time, admit the contrary of that which it always brings with it, as has been allowed from previous proof?”

Cebes/ “And most convincingly.”

Socrates/ “What, then? What do we now call that which does not admit the idea of the even?”

Cebes/ “Odd.”

Socrates/ “And that which does not admit the just, nor the graceful?”

Cebes/ “The one ungraceful, and the other unjust.”

Socrates/ “Be it so. But by what name do we call that which does not admit death?”

Cebes/ “Immortal.”

Socrates/ “Does the soul, then, not admit death?”

Cebes/ “No.”

Socrates/ “Is the soul, therefore, immortal?”

Cebes/ “Immortal.”

Socrates/ “Be it so. Shall we say then that this has been now demonstrated? Or how think you of it?”

Cebes/ “Most satisfactorily, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “What, then, Cebes? If it is necessary that the odd must be imperishable, must not the number three be imperishable?”

Cebes/ “Why not?”

Socrates/ “If, then, that which is without heat must of necessity be imperishable, when anyone applies heat to snow, should not the snow withdraw safe and unmelted? For it could not, indeed, be destroyed, nor yet would it stay to admit the heat.”

Cebes/ “You say truly.”

Socrates/ “In like manner, I imagine, if that which is without cold were imperishable, when one should move any cold body to the fire, it should never be extinguished nor destroyed, but should depart quite whole.”

Cebes/ “It must be so.”

Socrates/ “Must we not, express ourselves in like manner in regard to that which is immortal? If, indeed, that which is immortal is also imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish, when death comes against it: for from what has been already laid down, it shall not admit death, nor become dead, just as three, we said, shall never be even, nor yet the odd (be even), nor shall fire be cold, neither, indeed, the heat that is in the fire. But someone may say, granting that the odd does not become even on the approach of the even, as has been allowed, what is there to prevent, on the annihilation of the odd, the even succeeding in its stead? With one who urged such an objection, we cannot contend that it is not annihilated, for the odd is not imperishable, otherwise if we established this, we could have easily argued, that on the approach of the even, the odd, and the three (merely) disappear; and so we could have argued with regard to fire, heat, and the rest. Could we not?”

Cebes/ “Certainly, indeed.”

Socrates/ “And so now, consequently, with regard to the, immortal; if we allow it to be imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being immortal, must be imperishable likewise; otherwise we must have recourse to another argument.”

Cebes/ “But there is no necessity, as far as regards this at least; for scarcely could anything reject decay if that which is immortal and eternal shall endure it.”

Socrates/ “The Deity, indeed, and life itself, and if there is anything else immortal, must be confessed by all to be at no time annihilated,”

Cebes/ “By all men, indeed, by Jove, and still more, as I imagine, by the gods.”

Socrates/ “Since, then, the immortal is also incorruptible, must not the soul, since it is immortal, be likewise imperishable?”

Cebes/ “There is strong necessity for it.”

Socrates/ “Therefore on the approach of death to man, that which is mortal of him dies, as it appears; but that which is immortal departs safe and incorrupt, having withdrawn from death.”

Cebes/ “So it appears.”

Socrates/ “Unquestionably, then, Cebes, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls shall, in reality, exist in Hades.”

Cebes/ “I cannot, for my part, Socrates, say anything against this, nor refuse consenting to your arguments. But if Simmias here, or any other has aught to say, it were better not be silent, since I know not to what other time, beyond the present, one could defer it, if he wished to speak or hear further on such subjects.”

Simmias/ “Nor yet am I, disposed at all to dissent from what has been said; however, from the grandeur of the subject of our discussion, and my low estimate of human weakness, I am forced to remain still (to a degree) incredulous upon the matter in debate.”

Socrates/ “You do not, Simmias, speak on other things only, but on this also well, and credible as these first principles may be, they must yet be reviewed with greater care; and when you have sifted them sufficiently, you will, as I imagine, adopt my course of reasoning, as far as it is possible for man to do so, and if once this very case becomes distinctly plain you will inquire no further.”

Simmias/ “You speak true.”

Socrates/ “But it is right, my friends, for us to reflect that since the soul is immortal it requires our anxious care, not merely for this interval which we call life, but always; and we must now suppose the danger to be great should one neglect it. For if death were a deliverance from everything, it should be great gain for the wicked to be delivered, by death, at once from the body and their iniquity along with the soul; but now, since the soul appears to be immortal, it can have no other refuge nor safety from evil except in remaining as good and wise as possible. For the soul descends to Orcus with nothing else but the results of its mode of discipline and education, which are said to be either of the greatest advantage or injury to the departed, at the very outset of his journey thither. But it is thus said; that each man’s demon, who was assigned to him while living, proceeds to conduct him, after death, to a certain place where they must assemble together for judgment, and proceed to Orcus, accompanied by that guide upon whom it was enjoined to lead them there from hence. But having there received their deserts, and remained for the time prescribed, the guide conducts them back again after many and long revolutions

of ages. But the passage is not such as the Telephus of Æschylus describes it; for he says, 'It is a simple path that leads to Orcus;' but to me it appears to be neither simple nor one, for there had been no need of guides since no one could possibly go astray when there is but the one road. But it seems now to have numbers of sections and circuits; I say this from conjecture, in consequence of the funeral sacrifices and ceremonies here. The soul, then, that is temperate and wise, follows willingly its guide, and is fully conscious of its immediate destiny; but that which has a passionate desire for the body, as I said before, clinging to it devotedly for a long time, in a visible quarter, after violent resistance and intense suffering, is forcibly, and with difficulty, led away by its appointed demon. But on its arrival amongst the other souls, impure indeed and guilty of some such crime as the participation in unrighteous murders, or the commission of any such iniquities as are similar to them, and the work of congenial souls, everyone flies and turns away from it with aversion, and shrinks from becoming either its fellow-traveler or guide, but it strays about involved in utter perplexity, until a certain period has elapsed, on the expiration of which it is of necessity carried into an abode suitable to it; but the soul that has led a pure and well-regulated life, having the gods for associates and guides, proceeds to inhabit a region adapted to each like itself."

"But there are many and wonderful regions in the earth, and it is itself, neither in regard to its nature or magnitude, such as it is supposed by those who are in the habit of describing it, as I have heard a certain person declare."

Simmias/ "How do you mean, Socrates? For I have heard a good deal respecting the earth; not, however, those things which you are persuaded of, so that I would gladly hear them."

Socrates/ “But, indeed, Simmias, it does not seem to me to require the art of Glaucus to narrate what these things are; but to prove them true seems to me more difficult than is consistent with the art of Glaucus, and I should, perhaps, be just as incompetent to do so, as even had I the knowledge the remaining portion of my life appears to be inadequate to the extended nature of the subject. What I am persuaded, however, that the form of the earth is, and what its different regions, there is nothing to prevent my telling.”

Simmias/ “But this, is enough.”

Socrates/ “I am convinced then, in the first place, that if the earth is of a spherical form in the center of the universe, it has no need of air, nor any other sustaining force to prevent its falling, but the similitude of the universe on all sides to itself, and the equilibrium of the earth itself is quite sufficient to support it; for anything in a state of equilibrium being placed in the center of something like itself, cannot incline more or less to any side, but being alike on all sides remains unmoved. This I am in the first place convinced of.”

Simmias/ “And justly.”

Socrates/ “Besides, that it is of considerable size, and that we are inhabiting a very small portion of it, from Phasis as far as the pillars of Hercules, dwelling by the sea like ants or frogs about a marsh; and that there are many others in different directions who inhabit numbers of such regions as our own. For in every direction round the earth there are numerous cavities, diversified both in their shape and size, into which water, clouds, and air flow together; but the pure earth itself rests still in the pure firmament, in which are the stars, and which the majority of those who are accustomed to treat of such subjects call by the name of aether, of which the former are but the grounds, and are perpetually flowing into these cavities of the earth. Therefore, that we are

unconscious to ourselves of our inhabiting the cavities of the earth, and imagine that we are dwelling upon its surface, just as if one who lived in the midst of the bottom of the sea were to suppose that he was living on the sea, and observing the sun and the rest of the planets through the water, would imagine the sea to be sky, but owing to indolence and imbecility should have never arrived at the surface of the sea, nor, having risen and emerged from the sea, have beheld the region here, how much purer and more beautiful it is than that with them, nor should have ever heard of it from one who had beheld it. But we are just affected the same way, for while dwelling in some cavity of the earth we imagine that we live upon its surface, and call the air sky, as if through this, being the firmament, the planets moved. And this amounts to our being incompetent, through imbecility and indolence, to arrive at the upper part of the air, since if one were to ascend to its surface, or reach it by the assistance of wings, he should behold on his emerging, —as with us the fishes emerging from the sea observe what is here—so, I say, one should behold the things that are there, and if our nature were capable of enduring the sight, one should perceive that that is in reality the heavens, in reality the light, and in reality the earth. For this (our) earth, indeed, and stones, and the whole region here, are decayed and corroded, as things are in the sea by the brine; and nothing at all worthy of consideration exists in the sea, nor, in a word, has it anything perfect, but there are submarine caverns, and sand, and slime in abundance, and filth wherever there may be earth also; and they are not in any degree to be compared with the specimens of the beautiful with us. But the things formerly spoken of would appear, on the other hand, still further to excel the things with us. Whence, if we are to tell a pleasing fable, Simmias, it is

worthwhile to hear what kind the things are on the surface of the earth, beneath the firmament."

Simmias/ "In truth, Socrates, we would gladly hear this fable."

Socrates/ "In the first place then, my friend, this earth is said to be similar in its appearance, should one survey it from above, to balls made of twelve pieces of differently colored leather, variegated, marked out with dyes, of which the colors which the painters use are like samples. But there the whole earth consists of such, and far more brilliant and chaster than those here; for one part of the earth is purple, of wonderful beauty, another golden, a third, so far as it is white, whiter than chalk or snow, besides its being made up in like manner of other colors, and those more numerous and beautiful than we have ever seen. And these its very cavities too, filled as they are with water and air, show a kind of color, refulgent amid the diversity of other colors, so that it presents one continually variegated aspect. But in this earth, being such as I describe, are produced analogous plants, trees, flowers, and fruits; and the mountains and stones have both polish and transparency, and the more beautiful colors; of which these well-known little stones here which are so highly prized are merely fragments, cornelian, jasper, emeralds, and all such like. But there is nothing there which is not of this character, and still more beautiful than these. And the reason of it is, because those stones are pure, and neither corroded nor decayed, like these here, by rottenness nor brine, which descend here together, and produce deformity and disease in the stones, the earth, and other things, in animals and even plants. But the earth itself is adorned with all these things, and with gold, moreover, and silver, and other matters of the kind. For they are naturally conspicuous, being many in number, and large, and on all sides of the earth, so that to behold it is a sight to

make spectators blest. But there are many other animals upon it besides men, who inhabit partly the central portion of the earth, partly live bordering on the air as we do on the sea, and partly on the islands near the mainland, which the air surrounds; in a word, that which with us and for our necessities is water and sea, is air with them, while our air is their aether. But their seasons are of such a temperature, that they are exempt from disease, and live for a much longer period than those here, and excel us in sight, hearing, wisdom, and all such like, by as great an interval as the air surpasses water, and the aether air in purity. And they have temples of the gods, and shrines in which the gods in reality abide, and colloquial intercourse, oracular responses, visions of the gods, and such like communications take place between the one and the other. Besides, the sun, the moon, and stars are seen by them such as they really are, and the rest of their felicity is conformable to this."

"And such is the nature of the whole earth, and those things around the earth; but there are in it, throughout its cavities, many places around its entire compass, some deeper and broader than this region wherein we are dwelling, others deeper and having a more narrow aperture than this region of ours, and others of a more shallow depth and broader. But all these are mutually perforated under the earth in various directions, some with more narrow, and others with broader openings; they have conduits also, by which means a vast body of water flows from one cavity into another, as into basins, as also perennial rivers of enormous size under the earth, and waters hot and cold; moreover, fire in great quantities, and large streams of fire, many too of liquid mud, some thinner and some more miry; like the streams of mud which precede the burning torrent of lava in Sicily, and the torrent of lava itself; with which, further, these places severally are filled, to whichever each time the

overflow may chance to come. But all these move up and down, as it were from a kind of libration existing in the earth. And this libration is owing to a certain innate property in the earth. Among the chasms in the earth, there is one especially large, which, penetrates quite through the entire earth; this Homer makes mention of, speaking of it as 'Far removed, where there is a profound abyss beneath the earth;' which elsewhere he, as well as many others of the poets, have called Tartarus. Into this chasm, then, all the rivers flow together, and issue forth from it again; and each of them partakes of the nature of that earth, whatever its kind, through which they flow. But this is the reason of all the streams issuing out from thence and flowing in, because this liquid mass has neither bottom nor base. Hence it librates and fluctuates up and down, and the air and wind around it do the same; for they accompany it both when it moves with violence towards the upper and towards the lower parts of the earth; and as in the case of persons respiring, the wind being in constant motion is continually breathed out and drawn in, so there also, the wind partaking of the movements of the liquid mass occasions fearful and tremendous storms by its exits and its entrances. When, therefore, the water rushing with violence descends into that place which is called the lower region, then having passed through the earth it flows into the beds of the rivers there, and fills them up in the manner of those who pump up the water from the hold of a ship; as soon then as it leaves the region there, and turns its course this way, it fills the beds of the rivers here again, and when they have been filled, they flow through the channels and through the earth, and arriving at those places into which severally they make their way, they cause seas, lakes, streams, and fountains. But when they sink into the earth again from thence, some, indeed, having encompassed places of greater size and

number, and others fewer places, and of less extent, they are emptied into Tartarus again, some far deeper down than they were drawn up, and others at less depth, but they are all emptied below the point of their discharge. And some, indeed, issue out exactly opposite their point of influx, and others at the same side; there are some too which, having described a complete circle, coiling either once or oftener around the earth, like serpents, when they have descended as low as possible empty themselves into Tartarus again. But it is possible to descend in either direction as far as the center, and not beyond it; for in either direction an ascent is presented to the rivers on both sides.

"The rest of the rivers, indeed, are numerous, large, and of various descriptions; but amongst these many there are four rivers in particular, of which the largest truly, which flowing outermost encompasses the earth, is called Ocean; but on the opposite side to this, and with a contrary current, flows Acheron; which traverses several other desert regions, and finally, sinking under the earth, empties itself in the Acherusian lake, where the souls of numbers of the dead descend, and having remained there for a destined period, some for a longer and others for a shorter duration, they are sent back again into the generations of animals. But the third river issues forth between these two, and close to its point of issue it falls into a vast region blazing with enormous fires, and makes a lake larger than our sea, boiling up with water and slime; thence it proceeds in a circular course, turbid and muddy, and making the compass of the earth, it reaches, among other places, the extremity of the Acherusian lake, without mixing, however, with its waters; but after a variety of windings beneath the earth, it is discharged into the depths of Tartarus. And this is the river which they call Pyriphlegethon, whose burning currents emit with violence forcibly separated portions (of

the river) in whatever part of the earth they may be. But opposite to this the fourth river empties itself first into a region awful and wild, as they say, of the color of cyanus, which (region) they call Stygian, and the lake which the river makes by its discharge, Styx. And being emptied here, and endued by the water with a mischievous efficacy, penetrating the earth, it proceeds by a circular course to meet Pyriphlegethon, and encounters it in the Acherusian lake, at the opposite extremity; neither does the water of this river mingle with any other, but having made a compass of the earth, it empties itself into Tartarus, opposite to Pyriphlegethon; but the name by which the poets call it is Cocytus.

"These things then being so, as soon as the dead arrive at that region whither his daemon carries each, in the first place those who have led an upright and a holy life, and those who have lived otherwise are judged. And those who appear to have led a course of life between the two, proceeding to Acheron, and embarking in those conveyances they have, arrive in them at the (Acherusian) lake, and there abide; and when they are purified and have suffered the penalty of their iniquities, if any of them has committed such, they are absolved; they also obtain the reward of their good deeds, each according to his deserts; but those who appear to be incurable on account of their enormous offences, who have committed either many and flagrant sacrileges, or many murders in contempt of justice and the law, or any other similar crimes, these a suitable destiny precipitates into Tartarus, whence they never at any time come forth. But those who appear to have committed remediable indeed but great offences, having, for instance, used some violence under the influence of anger, towards father or mother, or who have become homicides in consequence of any other similar impulse, and when •they

have repented lead a different life, such must, of necessity, be plunged into Tartarus, and after that they have been so and remained there for a year, the wave casts them forth; the homicides, indeed, into Cocytus, but the parricides and matricides into Pyriphlegethon; and when borne along by those rivers, they have arrived at the Acherusian lake, there they entreat and call aloud, some upon those whom they have slain, others upon those whom they have offended, and they implore and beseech of them by name, to allow them to enter upon the lake, and to receive them, and if they obtain their leave, they enter upon it, and rest from their sufferings, but if not, they are borne back into Tartarus, and thence again into the rivers, and they never cease from suffering thus until they have appeased those whom they wronged; for this punishment was ordained them by the judges. But whoever may appear to be eminently distinguished for a holy life, these are they who being delivered from those places in the earth, and discharged as it were from dungeons, ascend into a pure abode above, and dwell upon the surface of the earth. And as many of these same as have been completely purified by philosophy, both live throughout all future time without bodies and arrive at still more beautiful abodes than the former, which it is not easy nor have we at the present sufficient time to describe."

"But on account of these matters which we have considered, Simmias, we are bound to make every exertion for the acquisition of virtue and wisdom during life; for the prize is glorious, and the hope is great."

"To insist, however, that these things are just as I have described them, becomes not an intelligent man; that either these, however, or something else of the kind, are the circumstances affecting our souls and their abodes, since the soul appears to be assuredly immortal, this appears to me to be both becoming and worth one's while, who so

thinks, to run the risk of the belief; for the hazard is honorable, and it is one's duty to apply as charms such impressions to himself, wherefore I am now for so long a time protracting this discourse. On account of these things, then, that man must have good hopes about his soul who, during life has bid adieu to all the other pleasures and ornaments of the body as quite extraneous, convinced that they aggravate the evil, but has concerned himself about knowledge, and having adorned his soul, not with extraneous but with its own proper decoration, temperance, justice, fortitude, freedom, and truth, so awaits with patience his passage to Hades, prepared to depart whenever fate may summon him. You then, Simmias and Cebes, and the rest, shall depart each of you at some future time; but fate now summons me, as a tragic writer would say, and it is almost time for me to adjourn to the bath; for I think it better to drink the poison when I have bathed, and not trouble the women to wash a corpse."

Phaedo/ When he had expressed himself thus, Crito said;

Crito/ "Be it so, Socrates; but what directions do you leave for them or me on the subject of your children or any other matter, by attending to which we may act most agreeably to you?"

Socrates/ "Such as I am always impressing upon you, Crito, nothing more; that by taking care of yourselves, you shall adopt a course of conduct most agreeable to me and to mine and to yourselves, even though you should make no such promise now; but if you disregard yourselves, and are unwilling to order your life, as in a beaten track, according to what has been established now and at a former time, no matter how many promises you may have made at the present time, you shall effect nothing the more."

Crito/ “We shall exert ourselves then, to act as you advise; but how shall we bury you?”

Socrates/ “Just as you please, if only you can catch me and I do not escape from you.”

Phaedo/ Upon this, smiling gently and looking round on us, he replied;

Socrates/ “My friends, I cannot persuade Crito that I am the actual Socrates who is now conferring with you and arranging the several subjects of discussion; but he thinks that I am the person whom he shall behold, a short time hence, a corpse, and he asks how he must bury me. But the argument which I urged at such length and for so long a time, to prove that when I shall have drunk the poison I shall abide with you no more, but shall take my departure hence for the happy state of the blessed, this I appear to press on him in vain, while I console by it, at the same time, both you and myself. Enter then into security for me to Crito of an opposite character to that which he gave the judges. For he, indeed, went security for my stay; but be you my sureties that I shall not remain after I die, but shall take my departure, that Crito may bear the matter more easily, and may not, when he sees my body either burned or interred, be troubled on my account as if I suffered something dreadful, nor say at my funeral that he is laying out Socrates, or bearing him forth, or burying him. For, be assured, my excellent Crito, that to use improper terms is not only culpable as far as regards itself, but it also works some mischief to our souls. I must be of good heart then, and direct you to bury my body, (not myself,) and to bury it in such a way as may satisfy you and you think to be most consistent with the laws.”

Phaedo/ When he had said this, he arose and went into a certain chamber to bathe, and Crito accompanied him, but

he directed us to wait for him. We remained then at one time conversing upon and reviewing the subjects discussed, and again speaking of our misfortune, how severely it had befallen us, fully conscious that being deprived as it were of a parent we should pass like orphans all our future life. But when he had bathed and his children were brought to him—for he had two little sons and one grown up—and his kinswomen had arrived, having conversed with them in presence of Crito, and given them the directions he wished, he desired the women and children to depart and he returned to us himself.

And it was now near sunset; for he had delayed a long time inside. But when he came back from the bath, he sat down, and did not afterwards speak much; and the officer of the Eleven came and stood beside him and said;

Jailer/ "Socrates, I shall not reproach you at least with what I condemn in others, their being indignant with and execrating me, when at the command of the magistrates I direct them to drink the poison. But I have found you upon all other occasions during the time of your imprisonment, the most noble, mildest, and most excellent of men who ever entered here, wherefore, at this time, too, I am well assured that you will not be angry with me but with those who are to blame, for you know well who are so. Now, therefore, since you are aware what I have come to announce, farewell, and try to bear what is inevitable with all possible resignation."

Phaedo/ Upon this, bursting into tears, he turned away and withdrew.

And Socrates looked towards him and said;

Socrates/ "And you, too, farewell, we shall do as you direct."

Phaedo/ At the same time (turning to us) he said;

Socrates/ “How kindly polite this man is; during the whole time (of my imprisonment) he used to visit me, and converse with me occasionally, and proved one of the worthiest of men; how heartily, too, does he lament me now. But come, Crito, let us attend his bidding, and let someone bring the poison, if it has been ground; if not, let the man grind it.”

Crito/ “But I think that the sun is still upon the mountains, and has not sunk as yet. Besides, I am aware that others are in the habit of drinking the poison very late, after they have been commanded to drink it, when they have supped and drunk very freely, and some of them after they have enjoyed the society of those they love. Do not then be in haste; for there is yet time.”

Socrates/ “Naturally those persons whom you mention, Crito, act this part; for they imagine that they shall be gainers by so doing, and for my part I shall avoid with equal reason acting thus; for I expect to be no otherwise a gainer by drinking the poison a little later, than to appear ridiculous in my own eyes, if still anxious to live, and sparing that of which no more exists. But go, obey, and do not thwart me.”

Phaedo/ When Crito heard this, he made signs to an attendant standing near; and the attendant went out, and after a delay of some time, he returned with the person who was to administer the poison, who carried it ready ground in a cup; and, when Socrates saw the man, he said;

Socrates/ “Well, now, good friend, what must I do, for you are conversant with these matters?”

Jailer/ “Nothing, but walk about when you have drunk the poison until you feel a weight in your legs, then lie down, and so the poison will work of itself.”

Phaedo/ At the same time he held out the cup to Socrates, and he took it, and with the utmost cheerfulness, Echecrates, without the slightest sign of fear or change in his complexion or his face, but looking steadfastly as he was accustomed on the man, he said;

Socrates/ "What say you of this cup with regard to our making a libation to anyone? Is it lawful, or not?"

Jailer/ "We grind just so much, Socrates, as we think sufficient for a draught."

Socrates/ "I understand; but surely it is both lawful, at least, and expedient to pray to the gods that our journey may be happy hence to them, which I earnestly implore indeed, and may such be the result."

Phaedo/ And having so said, raising the cup at the same time to his lips, he drained it with the greatest coolness and unconcern.

And for a time, indeed, the greater number of us were just able to refrain from tears, but when we saw him drink and finish the draught, we could do so no longer, but in spite of myself the tears flowed copiously, so that I covered my face and grieved for myself, not at all indeed for him, but at my own misfortune in having lost so dear a friend. Crito stood up to retire rather sooner than I did, as he had not been able to forbear from tears. But Apollodorus even before this never ceased weeping, and then, too, bursting out into lamentation, bewailing and complaining, he pierced the heart of everyone present except Socrates himself. But he said;

Socrates/ "What are you doing, my admirable friends? On this account chiefly I dismissed the women in order that they might not commit such foolishness; I have heard, too, that one should die with auspicious language. Be still, then, and be firm."

Phaedo/ Upon hearing this we were ashamed, and checked our tears. But when he had walked awhile, as soon as he said his legs grew heavy, he lay down on his back, for so the man directed him. At the same time he who administered the poison, taking hold of him, examined after some interval his feet and legs, and then pressing his foot hard asked if he felt it, and he said not. Afterwards he did the same again with his legs; and so going higher up he showed us that he was growing cold and stiff. He then touched him himself, and said that when the chill reached his heart then he should die. Already the region of the lower belly had grown cold, and having uncovered his face, for he was covered with a garment, he said, —the last words, too, which he uttered, —

Socrates/ "Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius; pay it, and by no means neglect it."

Crito/ "It shall be done; but see if you have any other charge to give."

Phaedo/ When he was asked this, he made no further answer: but after a little time he stirred and the attendant uncovered him, and his eyes were fixed; but Crito observing this closed his mouth and eyes.

Such was the death, Echecrates, of our friend; a man, the very best of those of whom we had experience then, and moreover the most sensible and just.

The Phaedo.

Translated by Thomas Taylor. 1804

Persons of the Dialog,

Echecrates and Phædo.

Echecrates/ Were you present, Phædo, with Socrates that day when he drank the poison in prison? or did you hear an account of it from any other?

Phaedo/ I myself, Echecrates, was present.

Echecrates/ What then was his discourse previous to his death? and how did he die? for I should be very glad to hear the account: for scarcely does anyone of the Phliasian citizens now visit Athens; and it is some time since any stranger has arrived from thence who might afford us some clear information about these particulars. All indeed that we heard was, that he died through drinking the poison; but he who acquainted us with this had nothing further to say about other particulars of his death.

Phaedo/ What! did you not hear the manner in which he was tried?

Echecrates/ Yes: a certain person related this to us; and we wondered, as his sentence was passed so long ago, that he should not die till a considerable time after. What then, Phædo, was the reason of this?

Phaedo/ A certain fortune happened to him, Echecrates: for, the day before his trial, the stern of that ship was crowned which the Athenians send every year to Delos.

Echecrates/ But what is the meaning of this?

Phaedo/ This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus formerly carried the twice seven young children to Crete, and preserved both them and himself. The Athenians, therefore, as it is reported, then vowed to Apollo, that if the

children were preserved, they would lead every year a sacred spectacle to Delos; which, from that time, they regularly send every year to the God. As soon, therefore, as the preparations for the sacred spectacle commence, the law orders that the city shall be purified, and that no one shall be put to death by a public decree till the ship has arrived at Delos, and again returned to Athens. But this sometimes takes a long time in accomplishing, when the winds impede their passage; but the festival itself commences when the priest of Apollo has crowned the stern of the ship. Now this, as I told you, took place on the day preceding the trial; and on this account that length of time happened to Socrates in prison between his sentence and his death.

Echecrates/ And what, Phædo, were the circumstances respecting his death? what were his sayings and actions? and who of his familiars were present with him? or would not the magistrates suffer that any should be admitted to him, so that he died deprived of the presence of his friends?

Phaedo/ By no means; but some, and indeed many, were present with him.

Echecrates/ Endeavor to relate all these particulars to us in the clearest manner, unless you have some business which may prevent you.

Phaedo/ But I am at leisure, and will endeavor to gratify your request: for indeed to call to mind Socrates, whether I myself speak or hear others, is to me always the most pleasant of all things.

Echecrates/ Truly, Phædo, others who hear you will be affected in the same manner: but endeavor, as much as you are able, to narrate every circumstance in the most accurate manner.

Phaedo/ And indeed I myself, who was present, was wonderfully affected; for I was not influenced with pity, like

one present at the death of a familiar: for this man, O Echecrates, appeared to me to be blessed, when I considered his manner and discourses, and his intrepid and generous death. Hence it appeared to me, that he did not descend to Hades without a divine destiny, but that there also he would be in a happy condition, if this can ever be asserted of anyone. On this account I was entirely uninfluenced with pity, though apparently I ought not to have been, on so mournful an occasion; nor yet again was I influenced by pleasure through philosophical converse, as I used to be; for our discourses were of this kind. But, to speak ingenuously, a certain wonderful passion, and an unusual mixture of pleasure and grief, were present with me, produced by considering that he must in a very short time die. And, indeed, all of us who were present were nearly affected in the same manner, at one time laughing, and at another weeping: but this was eminently the case with one of us, Apollodorus; for you know the man, and his manner of behavior.

Echecrates/ How is it possible that I should not?

Phaedo/ He, therefore, was remarkably affected in this manner; and I myself, and others, experienced great trouble and confusion.

Echecrates/ Who then, Phædo, happened to be present?

Phaedo/ Of the natives, Apollodorus, Critobulus, and his father Crito, were present; likewise Hermogenes, Epigenes, Æschines, and Antisthenes. And besides these, Ctesippus the Pœanian, Menexenus, and some other Athenians were present: but Plato I think was sick.

Echecrates/ Were there no strangers?

Phaedo/ Yes: Simmias the Theban, Cebes, and Phædondes; and among the Megarensians, Euclid and Terpsion.

Echecrates/ But what! were not Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

Phaedo/ By no means: for they were said to be at Ægina.

Echecrates/ Was any other person present?

Phaedo/ I think those I have mentioned were nearly all.

Echecrates/ Will you now then relate what were his discourses?

Phaedo/ I will endeavor to relate the whole to you from the beginning. For we were always accustomed to visit Socrates, myself and others meeting in the morning at the place where he was tried, for it was very near to the prison. Here we waited every day till the prison was opened, discoursing among ourselves, For it was not opened very early in the morning; but, as soon as we could be admitted, we went to Socrates, and generally spent the whole day with him. And then, indeed, we met together sooner than usual; for the day before, when we left the prison, we heard that the ship from Delos was returned. We determined, therefore, among ourselves, to come very early in the morning to the usual place; and we met together accordingly: but when we arrived, the jailer, who used to attend upon us, told us to wait, and not enter till he called us. For, says he, the eleven magistrates are now freeing Socrates from his bonds, and announcing to him that he must die today. But not long after this he returned, and ordered us to enter. When we entered, we found Socrates just freed from his fetters, but Xantippe (you know her) holding one of his children, and sitting by him. As soon, therefore, as Xantippe saw us, she began to lament in a most violent manner, and said such things as are usual with women in affliction; and among the rest;

Xanthippe/ Socrates, this is the last time your friends will speak to you, or you to them.

Phaedo/ But Socrates looking upon Crito;

Socrates/ Crito, let someone take her home.

Phaedo/ Upon which some of Crito's domestics led her away, beating herself, and weeping bitterly. But Socrates, sitting upright on the bed, drew up his leg, and, stroking it with his hand, said at the same time;

Socrates/ What a wonderful thing is this, my friends, which men call *the pleasant and agreeable*! and how admirably is it affected by nature towards that which appears to be its contrary, *the painful*! for they are unwilling to be present with us both together; and yet, if any person pursues and receives the one, he is almost always under a necessity of receiving the other, as if both of them depended from one summit. And it seems to me, that if Æsop had perceived this he would have composed a fable from it, and would have informed us, that Divinity, being willing to reconcile contending natures, but not being able to accomplish this design, conjoined their summits in a nature one and the same; and that hence it comes to pass, that whoever partakes of the one is soon after connected with the other. And this, as it appears, is the case with myself at present; for the pain which was before in my leg, through the bond, is now succeeded by a pleasant sensation.

Cebes/ By Zeus, Socrates, you have very opportunely caused me to recollect: for certain persons have asked me concerning those poems which you composed, *viz.* the Fables of Æsop which you versified, and your exordium to Apollo, and other pieces of composition; and, among the rest, Evenus lately inquired with what design you did this after coming here, when before you have never attempted anything of the kind. If, therefore, you have any desire that I may have an answer ready for Evenus, when he again interrogates me on this occasion (and I am certain that he will do so), tell me what I must say to him.

Socrates/ You may truly inform him, Cebes, that I did not compose these verses with any design of rivaling him, or his poems (for I knew that this would be no easy matter); but that I might try to explore the meaning of certain dreams, and that I might make a proper expiation, if this should happen to be the music which they have often ordered me to exercise. For in the past part of my life the same dream has often occurred to me, exhibiting at different times a different appearance, yet always advising me the same thing; for it said, Socrates, make and exercise music. And indeed, in the former part of my life, I considered that this dream persuaded and exhorted me respecting what I should do, in the same manner as those in the races are exhorted; for, by persuading me to exercise music, it signified that I should labor in philosophy, which is the greatest music. But now since my sentence has taken place, and the festival of the God has retarded my death, it appeared to me to be necessary, that, if the music which the dream has so often exhorted me to undertake should happen to be of the popular sort, I should by no means resist its persuasions, but comply with the exhortation: for I considered that it would be more safe for me not to depart from hence before I had made an expiation by composing verses, and obeying the dream. Thus, in the first place, I composed some verses in honor of the God to whom the present festival belongs; but after the God, considering it necessary that he who designs to be a poet should make fables and not discourses, and knowing that I myself was not a mythologist, on these accounts I versified the fables of Æsop, which were at hand, and were known to me; and began with those first, that first presented themselves to my view.

Give this answer, Cebes, to Evenus: at the same time bid him farewell for me; and tell him, if he is wise he will follow

me. But I shall depart, as it seems, today; for such are the orders of the Athenians.

Simmias/ What is this, Socrates, which you command me to tell Evenus? for I often meet with him; and from what I know of him, I am certain that he will never willingly comply with your request.

Socrates/ What then, is not Evenus a philosopher?

Simmias/ To me he appears to be so.

Socrates/ Both Evenus, therefore, will be willing to follow me, and everyone who is worthy to partake of philosophy; not perhaps indeed by violently depriving himself of life, for this they say is unlawful.

Phaedo/ And at the same time, as he thus spoke, he withdrew his leg from the bed, and placed it on the ground; and afterwards continued to discourse with us, in a sitting posture, the remaining part of the time.

Cebes/ How is this to be understood, Socrates, that it is not lawful to commit suicide, and yet that a philosopher should be willing to follow one who is about to die?

Socrates/ What, Cebes, have not you and Simmias heard your familiar Philolaus discourse concerning things of this kind?

Cebes/ We have not, Socrates, heard anything clearly on this subject.

Socrates/ But I speak in consequence of having heard; and what I have heard I will not enviously conceal from you. And perhaps it is becoming in the most eminent degree, that he who is about to depart thither should consider and mythologize about this departure: I mean, what kind of a thing we should think it to be. For what else can such a one be more properly employed about, till the setting of the sun?

Cebes/ On what account then, Socrates, do they say that it is unlawful for a man to kill himself? for I myself have some time since heard from Philolaus, when he resided with us, and from some others, that it was not proper to commit such an action; but I never heard anything clear upon the subject from anyone.

Socrates/ Prepare yourself, then, for perhaps you may be satisfied in this particular: and perhaps it may appear to you wonderful, if this alone of everything else is something simple, and by no means happens to a man like other events, but still remains the same, even with respect to those to whom it is better to die than to live; though, perhaps, it may seem wonderful to you, that it should be better for those men to die, in whom it would be unholy to benefit themselves by suicide, and who ought to expect some other, as a benefactor on this occasion.

Phaedo/ Then Cebes, gently laughing and speaking in his own tongue;

Cebes/ Zeus knows that.

Socrates/ For this indeed appears to be irrational; and yet, perhaps, it is not so, but has a certain reason on its side. For the discourse which is delivered about these particulars, in the arcana of the mysteries, that we are placed as in a certain prison secured by a guard, and that it is not proper for anyone to free himself from this confinement, and make his escape, appears to me to be an assertion of great moment, and not easy to be understood. But this appears to me, O Cebes, to be well said, that the Gods take care of us, and that we who are men are one of the possessions belonging to the Gods. Or does not this appear to you to be the case?

Cebes/ It does to me.

Socrates/ Would not you, therefore, if anyone of your servants should destroy himself, when at the same time you did not signify that you was willing he should die, would you not be angry with him? and if you had any punishment, would you not chastise him?

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Perhaps, therefore, it is not irrational to assert, that a man ought not to kill himself before Divinity lays him under a certain necessity of doing so, such as I am subject to at present.

Cebes/ This, indeed, appears to be reasonable. But that which you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers would very readily be willing to die, appears to be absurd, if what we have asserted is agreeable to reason, that Divinity takes care of us, and that we are one of his possessions; for it is irrational to suppose that the most prudent men should not be grieved, when departing from that servitude in which they are taken care of by the Gods, who are the best of governors. For such a one will by no means think that he shall be better taken care of when he becomes free: but someone who is deprived of intellect may perhaps think that he should fly from his master, and will not consider that he ought not to fly from a good master, but that he should by all means abide in his service. Hence he will depart from him in a most irrational manner: but he who is endowed with intellect will desire to live perpetually with one who is better than himself. And thus, Socrates, it is reasonable that the contrary of what you just now said should take place: for it is proper that the prudent, when about to die, should be sorrowful, but that the foolish should rejoice.

Phaedo/ Socrates, therefore, upon hearing this, seemed to me to be pleased with the reasoning of Cebes; and looking upon us;

Socrates/ Cebes never suffers anything to pass without investigation, and is by no means willing to admit immediately the truth of an assertion.

Simmias/ But indeed, Cebes, O Socrates, appears to me to say something now to the purpose. For with what design can men, truly wise, fly from masters who are better than themselves, and, without any reluctance, free themselves from their servitude? And Cebes appears to me to direct his discourse to you, because you so easily endure to leave us, and those beneficent rulers the Gods, as you yourself confess.

Socrates/ You speak justly; for I think you mean that I ought to make my defense, as if I was upon my trial.

Simmias/ By all means.

Socrates/ Be it so then: and I shall endeavor that this my apology may appear more reason able to you than it did to my judges. For, with respect to myself, O Simmias and Cebes, unless I thought that I should depart, in the first place, to other Gods who are wise and good, and, in the next place, to men who have migrated from the present life, and are better than any among us, it would be unjust not to be troubled at death: but now believe for certain, that I hope to dwell with good men; though this, indeed, I will not confidently assert: but that I shall go to Gods who are perfectly good rulers, you may consider as an assertion which, if anything of the kind is so, will be strenuously affirmed by me. So that, on this account, I shall not be afflicted at dying, but shall entertain a good hope that something remains for the dead; and, as it was formerly said, that it will be much better hereafter for the good than the evil.

Simmias/ What then, Socrates, would you have departed with such a conception in your intellect, without

communicating it to us? Or will you not render us also partakers of it? For it appears to me, that this will be a common good; and at the same time it will be an apology for you, if you can persuade us to believe what you say.

Socrates/ I will endeavor to do so. But let us first consider what that is which it appears to me Crito some time since was desirous of saying.

Crito/ What else should it be, Socrates, except what he who is to give you the poison has long ago told me, that you ought to speak as little as possible? For he says that those who dispute become too much heated, and that nothing of this kind ought to be introduced with the poison, since those who do not observe this caution are sometimes obliged to drink the poison twice or thrice.

Socrates/ Let him only take care of his proper employment, as one who must administer the poison twice; and even, if occasion requires, thrice.

Crito/ I was almost certain that this, would be your answer; but he enjoined me to do this, as I said, some time since.

Socrates/ Permit him to do so; but I am desirous of rendering to you, as my judges, the reason, as it appears to me, why a man who has truly passed his life in the exercise of philosophy should with great propriety be confident when about to die, and should possess good hopes of obtaining the greatest advantages after death; and in what manner this takes place I will endeavor, Simmias and Cebes, to explain:

Those who are conversant with philosophy in a proper manner, seem to have concealed from others that the whole of their study is nothing else than how to die and be dead. If this then is true, it would certainly be absurd, that those who have made this alone their study through the whole of life, should when it arrives be afflicted at a circumstance

upon which they have before bestowed all their attention and labor.

Phaedo/ But here Simmias laughing, said;

Simmias/ By Zeus, Socrates, you cause me to laugh, though I am very far from desiring to do so at present: for I think that the multitude, if they heard this, would consider it as well said respecting philosophers; and that men of the present day would perfectly agree with you, that philosophers should in reality desire death, and that they are by no means ignorant that men of this description deserve to suffer death.

Socrates/ And indeed, Simmias, they would speak the truth, except in asserting that they are not ignorant of it: for both the manner in which true philosophers desire to die, and how they are worthy of death, is concealed from them. But let us bid farewell to such as these, and discourse among ourselves: and to begin, Do you think that death is anything?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is it anything else than a liberation of soul from body? and is not this to die, for the body to be liberated from the soul, and to subsist apart by itself? and likewise for the soul to be liberated from the body, and to be essentially separate? Is death anything else but this?

Simmias/ It is no other.

Socrates/ Consider then, excellent man, whether the same things appear to you as to me; for from hence I think we shall understand better the subjects of our investigation. Does it appear to you that the philosopher is a man who is anxiously concerned about things which are called pleasures, such as meats and drinks?

Simmias/ In the smallest degree, Socrates.

Socrates/ But what, is he sedulously employed in venereal concerns?

Simmias/ By no means

Socrates/ Or does such a man appear to you to esteem other particulars which regard the observance of the body, such as the acquisition of excellent garments and sandals, and other ornaments of the body? whether does he appear to you to esteem or despise such particulars, employing them only so far as an abundant necessity requires?

Simmias/ A true philosopher appears to me to be one who will despise everything of this kind.

Socrates/ Does it, therefore, appear to you, that the whole employment of such a one will not consist in things which regard the body, but in separating himself from the body as much as possible, and in converting himself to his soul?

Simmias/ It does appear so to me.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, first of all evident, in things of this kind, that a philosopher, in a manner far surpassing other men, separates his soul in the highest degree from communion with the body?

Simmias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And to the many, O Simmias, it appears that he who accounts nothing of this kind pleasant, and who does not partake of them is not worthy to live; but that he nearly approaches to death who is not concerned about the pleasures which subsist through the body.

Simmias/ You entirely speak the truth.

Socrates/ But what with respect to the acquisition of wisdom? Is the body an impediment or not, if anyone associates it in the investigation of wisdom? What I mean is this: Have sight and hearing in men any truth? or is the case such as the poets perpetually sing, that

"We nothing accurate or see or hear?"

Though if these corporeal senses are neither accurate nor clear, by no means can the rest be so: for all the others are in a certain respect more depraved than these. Or does it not appear so to you?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ When then does the soul touch upon the truth? for, when it endeavors to consider anything in conjunction with the body, it is evidently then deceived by the body.

Simmias/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Must not, therefore, something of reality become manifest to the soul, in the energy of reasoning, if this is ever the case?

Simmias/ It must.

Socrates/ But the soul then reasons in the most beautiful manner, when it is disturbed by nothing belonging to the body, neither by hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor any pleasure, but subsists in the most eminent degree, itself by itself, bidding farewell to the body, and, as much as possible neither communicating nor being in contact with it, extends itself towards real being.

Simmias/ These things are so.

Socrates/ Does not the soul of a philosopher, therefore, in these employments, despise the body in the most eminent degree, and, flying from it, seek to become essentially subsisting by itself?

Simmias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But what shall we say, Simmias, about such things as the following? Do we say that the *just itself* is something or nothing?

Simmias/ By Zeus, we say it is something.

Socrates/ And do we not also say, that the beautiful and the good are each of them something?

Simmias/ How is it possible we should not?

Socrates/ But did you ever at any time behold anyone of these with your eyes?

Simmias/ By no means.

Socrates/ But did you ever touch upon these with any other corporeal sense? (but I speak concerning all of them; as for instance, about magnitude, health, strength, and, in one word, about the essence of all the rest, and which each truly possesses.) Is then the most true nature of these perceived through the ministry of the body? or rather shall we not say, that whoever among us prepares himself to think dianoëtically in the most eminent and accurate manner about each particular object of his speculation, such a one will accede the nearest possible to the knowledge of each?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will not he, therefore, accomplish this in the most pure manner, who in the highest degree betakes himself to each through his dianoëtic power, neither employing sight in conjunction with the dianoëtic energy, nor attracting any other sense, together with his reasoning; but who, exercising a dianoëtic energy by itself sincere, at the same time endeavors to hunt after everything which has true being subsisting by itself separate and pure; and who in the most eminent degree is liberated from the eyes and ears, and in short from the whole body, as disturbing the soul, and not suffering it to acquire truth and wisdom by its conjunction? Will not such a man, Simmias, procure for himself real being, if this can ever be asserted of anyone?

Simmias/ You speak the truth, Socrates, in a transcendent manner.

Socrates/ Is it not necessary, therefore, from hence, that an opinion of this kind should be present with genuine philosophers in such a manner, that they will speak among themselves as follows: In the consideration of things, this opinion, like a certain path, leads us in conjunction with reason from the vulgar track, that, as long as we are connected with a body, and our soul is contaminated with such an evil, we can never sufficiently obtain the object of our desire; and this object we have asserted to be truth? For the body subjects us to innumerable occupations through necessary aliment, and fills us with love, desire, fear, all various images, and a multitude of trifling concerns; not to mention that, if we are invaded by certain diseases, we are hindered by them in our hunting after real being; so that, as it is said, we can never truly, and in reality, acquire wisdom through the body. For nothing else but the body and its desires cause wars, seditions, and contests, of every kind: for all wars arise through the possession of wealth; and we are compelled to acquire riches through the body, becoming subservient to its cultivation; so that on all these accounts we have no leisure for the exercise of philosophy. But this is the extremity of all evils, that if at any time we are at leisure from its attendance, and betake ourselves to the speculation of anything, then invading us on all sides in our investigations, it causes agitations and tumults, and so vehemently impels us, that we are not able through its pretense to perceive the truth; but it in reality demonstrated to us, that, if we are designed to know anything purely, we must be liberated from the body, and behold things with the soul itself. And then; as it appears, we shall obtain the object of our desire, and of which we profess ourselves lovers, viz. wisdom, when we are dead, as our discourse evinces; but by no means while we are alive: for, if we can know nothing purely in conjunction with the body, one of these two

consequences must ensue, either that we can never possess knowledge, or that we must obtain it after death; for then the soul will subsist apart by itself, separate from the body, but never before this takes place; and while we live in the body, as it appears, we shall approach in the nearest manner possible to knowledge, if in the most eminent degree we have no association with the body, nor any communication with it (except what the greatest necessity requires), nor are filled with its nature, but purify ourselves from its defiling connection, till Divinity itself dissolve, our bonds. And thus being pure, and liberated from the madness of body, it is proper to believe that we shall then associate with others who are similarly pure, and shall through ourselves know everything genuine and sincere: and this perhaps is the truth itself; for it is by no means lawful that the pure should be touched by that which is impure. And such, O Simmias, in my opinion, ought to be the discourse and sentiments of all such as are lovers of learning in a proper manner. Or does it not seem so to you?

Simmias/ It does, Socrates, more so than anything.

Socrates/ If all this then is true, my friend, much hope remains for him who arrives at that place to which I am now departing, that he shall there, if ever anywhere, sufficiently obtain that for the sake of which we take so much pains in the present life: so that the journey which is now assigned me will be accompanied with good hope; as will likewise be the case with any other man who thinks that he ought to prepare his dianoëtic part in such a manner that it may become as it were pure.

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But does not purification consist in this, as we formerly asserted in our discourse: I mean, in separating the soul from the body in the most eminent degree, and in

accustoming it to call together and collect itself essentially on all sides from the body, and to dwell as much as possible, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, becoming by this mean liberated, from the body as from detaining bonds?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is not death called a solution and separation of the soul from body?

Simmias/ Perfectly so

Socrates/ But those alone who philosophize rightly, as we have said, always and especially providentially attend to the solution of the soul: and this is the meditation of philosophers, a solution and separation of the soul from the body; or do you not think so?

Simmias/ I do.

Socrates/ Would it not, therefore, as I said at first, be ridiculous for a man who has so prepared himself in the present life as to approach very near to death, to live indeed in the manner we have described, and yet, when death arrives, be afflicted? would not this be ridiculous?

Simmias/ How indeed should it not?

Socrates/ In reality, therefore, O Simmias, those who philosophize rightly will meditate how to die; and to be dead will be to them of all men a thing the least terrible. But from hence consider as follows: for, if they are on all sides enemies to the body, but desire to possess the soul subsisting by itself, would it not be very irrational for them to be terrified and troubled when death approaches, and to be unwilling to depart to that place, where when they have arrived they may hope to enjoy that which they were lovers of in the present life (but they were lovers of wisdom), and to be liberated from the association of that nature to which they were always inimical? Or do you think it possible, that many should be willing, of their own accord, to descend into Hades, allured

by the hope of seeing and converting with departed beautiful youths, wives and children whom they have loved; and that the true lover of wisdom, who has exceedingly nourished this hope, that he shall never possess wisdom as he ought anywhere but in Hades, should be afflicted when dying, and should not depart thither with readiness and delight? For it is necessary, my friend, to think in this manner of one who is a true philosopher; since such a one is very much of opinion, that he shall never anywhere, but in that place, acquire the possession of wisdom with purity; and if this be the case, would it not be very irrational, as we just now said, for a man of this kind to be terrified at death?

Simmias/ Very much so, by Zeus."

Socrates/ This then will be an argument sufficient to convince you, that he whom you behold afflicted, when about to die, is not a philosopher, but a lover of body; and this same person is a lover of riches and honors, either desiring the possession of one of these, or of both.

Simmias/ The case is entirely so as you represent it.

Socrates/ Does not then, O Simmias, that which is called fortitude eminently belong to such as are thus disposed?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Does not temperance also, which even the multitude thus denominate as a virtue, through which we are not agitated by desires, but regard them with moderation and contempt; does it not, I say, belong to those only who despise the body in the most eminent degree, and live in the exercise of philosophy?

Simmias/ It is necessary."

Socrates/ For, if you are willing to consider the fortitude and temperance of others, they will appear to you to be absurdities.

Simmias/ But how, Socrates?

Socrates/ You know that all others look upon death as the greatest of evils.

Simmias/ In the highest degree so."

Socrates/ Those who are bold, therefore, among these, sustain death when they do sustain it, through the dread of greater evils.

Simmias/ They do so.

Socrates/ All men, therefore, except philosophers, are bold through fearing and dread, though it is absurd that anyone should be bold through fear or cowardice.

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what, are not the moderate among these affected in the same manner? and are they not temperate by a certain intemperance? Though this is in a certain respect impossible, yet a passion similar to this happens to them with respect to this foolish temperance: for, fearing to be deprived of other pleasures which at the same time they desire, they abstain from others, by others being vanquished. And though they call intemperance a subjection to pleasures; yet at the same time it happens to them that, being vanquished by certain pleasures, they rule over others; and this is similar to what I just now said, that after a certain manner they become temperate through intemperance.

Simmias/ It seems so, indeed.

Socrates/ But, O blessed Simmias, this is by no means the right road to virtue, to change pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, fear for fear, and the greater for the lesser, like pieces of money: but that alone is the proper coin, I mean wisdom, for which all these ought to be changed. And indeed, for the sake of this, and with this everything must in reality be bought and sold, both fortitude and temperance, justice, and, in one word, true virtue, which subsists with

wisdom, whether pleasures and pains, and everything else of this kind, are present or absent: but if these are separated from wisdom, and changed from one another, such virtue does not merit to be called even a shadowy description, but is in reality servile, and possesses nothing salutary and true. But that which is in reality true virtue is a purification from everything of this kind; and temperance and justice, fortitude, and, prudence itself, are each of them a certain purification. And those who instituted the mysteries for us appear to have been by no means contemptible persons, but to have really signified formerly, in an obscure manner, *that whoever descended into Hades uninitiated, and without being a partaker of the mysteries, should be plunged into mire; but that whoever arrived there, purified and initiated, should dwell with the Gods*. For, as it is said by those who write about the mysteries.

> "The thyrsus-bearers numerous are seen,
> "But few the Bacchuses have always been."

These few are, in my opinion, no other than those who philosophize rightly; and that I may be ranked in the number of these, I shall leave nothing unattempted, but exert myself in all possible ways. But whether or not my exertions will be properly directed, and whether I shall accomplish anything when I arrive thither, I shall clearly know, very shortly, if Divinity pleases, as it appears to me. And this, Simmias and Cebes, is my apology, why upon leaving you, and the rulers of the present life, I ought not to be afflicted and indignant, since I am persuaded that I shall there meet with masters and companions not less good than such as are here. This indeed is incredible to many; but if my apology shall have more influence with you than with the judges of the Athenians, it will have a good effect.

Phaedo/ When Socrates had thus spoken, Cebes, renewing the discourse, said;

Cebes/ Other things, Socrates, appear to me to be well spoken; but what you have asserted about the soul will produce in men much incredulity, who think, when it is liberated from the body, that it is no longer anywhere, but that, on that very day in which a man dies, it is corrupted and perishes, and this immediately as it is freed from the body; and, besides this, that on its departure it becomes dissipated like wind or smoke, makes its escape, and flies away, and is no longer anywhere: for if it remained anywhere essentially collected in itself, and liberated from those evils which you have now enumerated, there would be an abundant and fair hope, Socrates, that what you have asserted is true. But it will perhaps require no small allurement and faith, in order to be persuaded that the soul remains, though the man dies, and that it possesses a certain power and prudence.

Socrates/ You speak the truth, Cebes; but what shall we do? Are you willing that we should discourse about these particulars, whether it is proper that this should be the case with the soul, or not?

Cebes/ Indeed, I shall hear with great pleasure your opinion on this subject.

Socrates/ For I do not think that anyone who should hear this discussion, even though he should be a comic poet, could say that I trifled, and discoursed about things not accommodated to my condition. If it is agreeable to you, therefore, and it is requisite to investigate these particulars, let us consider whether the souls of dead men, survive in Hades, or not.

The assertion indeed, which we now call to mind, is an ancient one, I mean that souls departing from hence exist in Hades, and that they again return hither, and are generated from the dead. And if the case is such that living natures are

again generated from the dead, can there be any other consequence than that our souls are there? for they could not be again generated if they had no subsistence; and this will be a sufficient argument that these things are so, if it is really evident that the living cannot be generated from anything else than the dead. But, if this is not the case, it will be necessary to adduce some other reason.

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ You should not, therefore, consider this assertion with respect to men alone, if you wish to learn with facility; but we should survey it as connected with all animals and plants, and, in one word, with everything which is endued with generation. Are not all things, therefore, so generated, that they are produced no otherwise than contraries from contraries, I mean those to which anything of this kind happens? as the beautiful is contrary to the base, and the just to the unjust; and a thousand other particulars subsist in the same manner. We should consider, therefore, whether it is necessary, respecting everything which has a contrary, that this contrary should be generated from nothing else than that which is its contrary. As for instance, is it not necessary that, when anything becomes greater, it should become so from being before smaller?

Cebes/ It is so.

Socrates/ And is not the weaker generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower?

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what if anything becomes worse, must it not become so from the better? and if more just, must it not be generated from the more unjust?

Cebes/ How should it not?

Socrates/ We have then sufficiently determined this, that everything is thus generated, viz. contraries from contraries.

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what, is there anything among these which has a middle subsistence between both (since all contraries are two), so as to cause two generations from this to that, and from that again to this? for between a greater and a lesser thing there is increase and diminution; and hence we say that the one is increased, but the other diminished.

Cebes/ It is so.

Socrates/ And must not to be separated and mingled, to be cooled and heated, and everything in the same manner, though sometimes we do not distinguish the several particulars by names, must they not in reality be everywhere thus circumstanced, be generated from each other, and be subject to a mutual generation of each into one another?

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ What then, is there anything contrary to the being alive, as sleeping is contrary to waking?

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what is this contrary?

Cebes/ To be dead.

Socrates/ Are not these, therefore, generated from each other, since they are contraries? and since they are two, are there not two generations between them?

Cebes/ How should there not?

Socrates/ I will, therefore, tell you what one of these conjunctions is which I have just now spoken of, and what its generations are; do you tell me what the other is. But I say, that the one of these is *to sleep*, but the other *to awake*, and from sleeping awaking is generated, and from awaking sleeping; and the generations of these are on the one hand

to be laid asleep, and on the other to be roused. Have I sufficiently explained this to you or not?

Cebes/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, inform me, in a similar manner, concerning life and death. Do you not say that living is the contrary of to be dead?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ And that they are generated from each other?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What then is generated from that which is alive?

Cebes/ That which is dead.

Socrates/ But what is generated from the dead?

Cebes/ It is necessary to confess that this must be the living.

Socrates/ From the dead, therefore, O Cebes, living things, and men who are alive, are generated.

Cebes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Our souls therefore subsist in Hades.

Cebes/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Is not, therefore, one of the generations subsisting about these manifest? for to die is, I think, sufficiently clear; is it not?

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ What then shall we do? shall we not render back a contrary generation in its turn, but say that nature is defective and lame in this particular? Or is it necessary to assign a certain contrary generation *to the being dead*?

Cebes/ Entirely so."

Socrates/ But what is this?

Cebes/ *To be restored back again to life*.

Socrates/ But, if there is such a thing as to revive again, will not this reviving be a generation from the dead to the living?

Cebes/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ This then is agreed upon by us, that the living are generated from the dead no less than the dead from the living: but, this being the case, it is a sufficient argument to prove that the souls of the dead must necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they may again be generated.

Cebes/ It appears to me, Socrates, that this must necessarily follow from what has been admitted.

Socrates/ Take notice then, O Cebes! that we have not unjustly made these concessions, as it appears to me: for if other things, when generated, were not always restored in the place of others, revolving as it were in a circle, but generation subsisted according to a right line, proceeding from one thing alone into its opposite, without recurring again to the other, and making an inflection, you know that all things would at length possess the same form, would be affected with the same passion, and would cease to be generated.

Cebes/ How do you say?

Socrates/ It is by no means difficult to understand what I assert; but just as if there should be such a thing as falling asleep without recurring again to a vigilant state, generated from a sleepy condition, you know that all things would at length exhibit the delusions of Endymion, and would nowhere present themselves to the view, because everything else would suffer the same as happened to him, viz. would be laid asleep. And if all things were mingled together, without ever being separated, the doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be verified; for all things would be at once collected in a heap. In the same manner, my dear Simmias,

if all such things as participate of life should die, and after they are dead should abide in that lifeless form, and not revive again, would there not be a great necessity that all things should at length die, and that nothing should live? for if living beings are generated from other things, and living beings die, how can it be otherwise but that all things must be extinguished through being dead?

Cebes/ It appears to me, Socrates, that it cannot be otherwise; and in my opinion you perfectly speak the truth.

Socrates/ For to me, Cebes, it seems to be so more than anything, and that we have not assented to this through deception; But that there is such a thing in reality as reviving again; that the living are generated from the dead; that the souls of the dead have a subsistence; and that the condition of the good after this life will be better than at present; but of the evil, worse.

Cebes/ But, according to that doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently accustomed to employ (if it is true), that learning, with respect to us, is nothing else than reminiscence; according to this, it is necessary that we must have learned the things which we now call to mind in some former period of time. But this is impossible, unless our soul subsisted somewhere before it took up its residence in this human form; so that from hence the soul will appear to be a certain immortal nature.

Simmias/ But, Cebes, recall into my memory what demonstrations there are of these particulars; for I do not very much remember them at present.

Cebes/ The truth of this is evinced by one argument, and that a most beautiful one; that men, when interrogated, if they are but interrogated properly, will speak about everything just as it is. At the same time, they could never do this unless science and right reason resided in their

natures. And, in the second place, if anyone leads them to diagrams, or anything of this kind, he will in these most clearly discover that this is really the case.

Socrates/ But if you are not persuaded from this, Simmias, see if, from considering the subject in this manner, you will perceive as we do. For you do not believe how that which is called learning is reminiscence.

Simmias/ I do not disbelieve it; but I desire to be informed concerning this, which is the subject of our discourse, I mean reminiscence; and indeed, from what Cebes has endeavored to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded: but nevertheless I would at present hear how you attempt to support this opinion.

Socrates/ We defend it then as follows: we confess without doubt, that if anyone calls anything to mind, it is necessary that at some time or other he should have previously known this.

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Shall we not confess this also, that when science is produced in us, after some particular manner, it is reminiscence? But I mean by a particular manner, thus: If anyone, upon seeing or hearing anything, or apprehending it through the medium of any other sense, should not only know it, but should also think upon something else, of which there is not the same, but a different science, should we not justly say, that he recollects or remembers the particular, of which he receives a mental conception?

Simmias/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Thus: In a certain respect the science of a man is different from that of a lyre.

Simmias/ How should it not?

Socrates/ Do you not, therefore, know that lovers when they see a lyre, or a vestment, or anything else which the

objects of their affection were accustomed to use, no sooner know the lyre, than they immediately receive in their dianoëtic part the form of the beloved person to whom the lyre belonged? But this is no other than reminiscence: just as anyone, upon seeing Simmias, often recollects Cebes; and in a certain respect an infinite number of such particulars continually occur.

Simmias/ An infinite number indeed, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Is not then something of this kind a certain reminiscence; and then especially so, when anyone experiences this affection about things which, through time, and ceasing to consider them he has now forgotten?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what, does it happen, that when anyone sees a painted horse and a painted lyre, he calls to mind a man? and that when he beholds a picture of Simmias, he recollects Cebes?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And will it not also happen, that on seeing a picture of Simmias he will recollect Simmias himself?

Simmias/ It certainly will happen so.

Socrates/ Does it not therefore follow, that in all these instances reminiscence partly takes place from things similar, and partly from such as are dissimilar?

Simmias/ It does.

Socrates/ But when anyone recollects anything from similars, must it not also happen to him, that he must know whether this similitude is deficient in any respect, as to likeness, from that particular of which he has the remembrance?

Simmias/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Consider then if the following particulars are thus circumstanced: Do we say that anything is in a certain respect equal? I do not say one piece of wood to another, nor one stone to another, nor anything else of this kind; but do we say that equal itself, which is something different from all these, is something or nothing?

Simmias/ We say it is something different, by Zeus, Socrates, and that in a wonderful manner.

Socrates/ Have we also a scientific knowledge of that which is equal itself?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But from whence do we receive the science of it? Is it not from the particulars we have just now spoken of, viz. on seeing wood, stones, or other things of this kind, which are equals, do we not form a conception of that which is different from these? But consider the affair in this manner: Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, which sometimes remain the same, at one time appear equal, and at another not?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what, can *equals themselves* ever appear to you unequal? or can equality seem to be inequality?

Simmias/ By no means, Socrates.

Socrates/ These equals, therefore, are not the same with equal itself.

Simmias/ By no means, Socrates, as it appears to me.

Socrates/ But from these equals, which are different from equal itself, you at the same time understand and receive the science of equal itself

Simmias/ You speak most true.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, either similar to these or dissimilar?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But indeed this is of no consequence: for while, in consequence of seeing one thing, you understand another, from the view of this, whether it is dissimilar or similar, it is necessary that this conception of another thing should be reminiscence.

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what will you determine concerning this? Do we suffer anything of this kind respecting the equality in pieces of wood, and other such equals as we have just now spoken of? and do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as equal itself? and is something or nothing wanting, through which they are less equal than equal itself?

Simmias/ There is much wanting.

Socrates/ Must we not, therefore, confess, that when anyone, on beholding some particular thing, understands that he wishes this which I now perceive to be such as something else is, but that it is deficient, and falls short of its perfection; must we not confess that he who understands this, necessarily had a previous knowledge of that to which he asserts this to be similar, but in a defective degree?

Simmias/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ What then, do we suffer something of this kind or not about equals and equal itself?

Simmias/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ It is necessary, therefore, that we must have previously known equal itself before that time, in which, from first seeing equal things, we understood that we desired all these to be such as equal itself but that they had a defective subsistence.

Simmias/ It is so.

Socrates/ But this also we must confess, that we neither understood this, nor are able to understand it, by any other means than either by the sight, or the touch, or some other of the senses.

Simmias/ I speak in the same manner about all these. For they are the same, Socrates, with respect to that which your discourse wishes to evince. But indeed, from the senses, it is necessary to understand that all equals in sensible objects aspire after equal itself and are deficient from its perfection. Or how shall we say?

Socrates/ In this manner: Before, therefore, we begin to see, or hear, and to perceive other things, it necessarily follows, that we must in a certain respect have received the science of equal itself so as to know what it is, or else we could never refer the equals among sensibles to equal itself and be convinced that all these desire to become such as equal itself but fall short of its perfection.

Simmias/ This, Socrates, is necessary, from what has been previously said.

Socrates/ But do we not, as soon as we are born, see and hear, and possess the other senses?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But we have said it is necessary that prior to these we should have received the science of equal itself.

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We must necessarily, therefore, as it appears, have received it before we were born.

Simmias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, receiving this before we were born, we were born possessing it; we both knew prior to our birth, and as soon as we were born, not only the equal, the greater, and the lesser, but everything of this kind: for our discourse

at present is not more concerning the equal than the beautiful, the good, the just, and the holy, and in one word, about everything which we mark with the signature of that which is, both in our interrogations when we interrogate, and in our answers when we reply: so that it is necessary we should have received the science of all these before we were born.

Simmias/ All this is true.

Socrates/ And if, since we receive these sciences, we did not forget each of them we should always be born knowing, and should always know them through the whole course of our life: for to know is nothing else than this, to retain the science which we have received, and not to lose it. Or do we not call oblivion the loss of science?

Simmias/ Entirely so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But if, receiving science before we were born, we lose it at the time of our birth, and afterwards, through exercising the senses about these particulars, receive back again those sciences which we once before possessed, will not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own proper science? and shall we not speak rightly when we call this a certain reminiscence?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ For this appears to be possible, that when anyone perceives anything, either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, he may at the same time know something different from this, which he had forgotten, and to which this approaches, whether it is dissimilar or similar. So that, as I said, one of these two things must be the consequence: either that we were born knowing these, and possess a knowledge of all of them through the whole of our life; or that we only remember what we are said to learn afterwards; and thus learning will be reminiscence.

Simmias/ The case is perfectly so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Which, therefore, will you choose, Simmias: that we are born knowing, or that we afterwards remember the particulars of which we formerly received the science?

Simmias/ At present, Socrates, I have no choice.

Socrates/ But what will be your choice in the following instance, and what will be your opinion about it? Can a man, who possesses science, render a reason concerning the objects of his knowledge, or not?

Simmias/ There is a great necessity, Socrates, that he should.

Socrates/ And does it also appear to you, that all men can render a reason of the particulars concerning which we have just now spoken?

Simmias/ I wish they could; but I am much more afraid, that tomorrow there will no longer be anyone here who can accomplish this in a becoming manner.

Socrates/ You do not therefore think, Simmias, that all men know these particulars?

Simmias/ By no means.

Socrates/ They remember, therefore, the things which they have once learned.

Simmias/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ But when did our souls receive this science? for they did not receive them from those from whom we are born men.

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Before this period, therefore.

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Our souls therefore, Simmias, had a subsistence before they were in a human form, separate from bodies, and possessed intellectual prudence.

Simmias/ Unless, Socrates, we received these sciences while we were making our entrance into the present life; for that space of time is yet left for us.

Socrates/ Let it be so, my friend. But in what other time did we lose these? for we were not born possessing them as we have just now acknowledged. Did we lose them at the very time in which we received them? Or can you mention any other time?

Simmias/ By no means, Socrates: but I was ignorant that I spoke nothing to the purpose.

Socrates/ Will then the case remain thus for us, Simmias? For if those things have a subsistence which we perpetually proclaim, viz. a certain something beautiful and good, and every such essence; and if we refer to this all sensible objects, as finding it to have a prior subsistence, and to be ours, and assimilate these to it, as images to their exemplar; it is necessary that, as these have a subsistence, so likewise that our soul should have subsisted before we were born: but if these are not, this discourse will have been undertaken in vain. Is it not so? and is there not an equal necessity, both that these should have a subsistence, and that our souls should have had a being before we were born, and that the one cannot be without the other?

Simmias/ The same necessity, Socrates, appears to me to take place in a most transcendent manner; and the discourse flies to a beautiful circumstance, I mean that our soul subsisted before we were born, in a manner similar to that essence which you now speak of. For I possess nothing which is so clear to me as this, that all such things as the beautiful and the good subsist, in the most eminent degree, together with everything else which you now mention; and, with respect to myself, it is sufficiently demonstrated.

Socrates/ But how does it appear to Cebes? For it is necessary that Cebes also should be persuaded.

Simmias/ In my opinion he is sufficiently so, although he is the most resolute of all men in not assenting to what is said. Yet I think he is sufficiently persuaded that our soul had a subsistence before we were born. But whether or not the soul remains after death, does not appear to me, Socrates, to be yet demonstrated; but that doubt of the multitude, which Cebes mentioned, still presses hard upon me, whether, when a man dies, the soul is not dissipated, and this is the end of its existence. For what hinders but that it may be born, and may have had a subsistence elsewhere, and this before it came into a human body; and yet, after it departs, and is liberated from this body, may then die and be corrupted?

Cebes/ You speak well, Simmias; for it appears that the half only of what was necessary has been demonstrated, I mean that our soul subsisted before we were born: but it is necessary that you should demonstrate, besides this, that it no less subsists after we are dead, than it did before we were born, in order that the demonstration may be complete.

Socrates/ This, Simmias and Cebes, is even now demonstrated, if you are only willing to connect into one and the same the present discourse and that which we before assented to; I mean that every vital nature is generated from that which is dead. For if the soul had a prior subsistence, and it is necessary when it proceeds into the present life, and is generated man, that it should be generated from nothing else than death, and to be dead; how is it not necessary that it should also subsist after death, since it is requisite that it should be generated again? Its existence therefore, after death, is even now, as I said, demonstrated. But you and Simmias appear to me still more earnestly to discuss this assertion in a very pleasant manner, and to be

afraid like boys, left on the soul's departure from the body the winds should tear it in pieces, and widely disperse it, especially if anyone should die during a stormy blast, and not when the heavens are serene.

Cebes/ Endeavor, O Socrates, to persuade us of the contrary, as if we were afraid, or rather as if we were not afraid; though, perhaps, there is some boy among us, by whom circumstances of this kind may be dreaded: him, therefore, we should endeavor to persuade not to be terrified at death, as if it was some dreadful specter.

Socrates/ But it is necessary to charm him every day till he becomes well.

Cebes/ But from whence, O Socrates, can a man acquire skill in such enchantment, since you are about to leave us?

Socrates/ Greece, Cebes, is very spacious, in some part of which good men may be found: and there are many barbarous nations, all which must be wandered over, inquiring after an enchanter of this kind, without sparing either riches or labor, as there is nothing for which wealth can be more seasonably bestowed. But it is necessary that you should inquire among yourselves; for perhaps you will not easily find anyone who is more able to accomplish this than yourselves.

Cebes/ Let these things be so: but, if you please, let us return from whence we made this digression.

Socrates/ It will be agreeable to me: for how should it not be so?

Cebes/ You speak well."

Socrates/ Some such thing, therefore, we ought to inquire of ourselves, viz. to what being the passion of becoming dissipated belongs; and respecting what we ought to fear, lest this should take place; and to whom a fear of this kind is proper: and after this, we should consider whether it is

soul or not; and, as the result of these speculations, should either be confident or fearful concerning our soul.

Cebes/ You speak true.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, a passion natural to that which is collected together, and a composite, that it should be dissolved so far as it is a composite; and that, if there is anything without composition, to this alone, if to any other, it belongs not to suffer affections of this kind?

Cebes/ This appears to me to be the case.

Socrates/ But does it not follow, that things which always subsist according to the same, and in a similar manner, are in the most eminent degree incomposite; but that such things as subsist differently at different times, and never according to the same, are composites?

Cebes/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ Let us return, therefore, to the particulars of our former discourse: Whether is essence itself (which both in our inquiries and answers we established as having a being) that which always subsists similarly, and according to the same, or that which subsists differently at different times? And does the equal itself the beautiful itself and everything which truly is, ever receive any kind of mutation? Or does not everything which always truly is, and has a uniform subsistence, essentially abide in a similar manner according to the same, and never in any respect receive any mutation?

Cebes/ It is necessary, Socrates, that it should subsist similarly, and according to the same.

Socrates/ But what shall we say concerning many beautiful things, such as men, horses, garments, or other things of this kind, which are either equal, or beautiful; and of all such as are synonymous to these? Do these also subsist according to the same, or rather are they not entirely

contrary to those, so that they neither subsist similarly according to the same, either with respect to themselves or to one another, or, in one word, in any manner whatever?

Cebes/ These never subsist in a similar condition.

Socrates/ These, therefore, may be touched, may be seen and perceived by the other senses; but those natures which always subsist according to the same, cannot be apprehended by any other means than the discursive energy of the dianoëtic power. But things of this kind are invisible, and cannot be seen. Are you willing, therefore, that we should establish two species of beings, the one visible, and the other invisible?

Cebes/ Let us establish them.

Socrates/ And that the invisible subsists always according to the same, but the visible never according to the same.

Cebes/ And this also we will establish.

Socrates/ Come then, is there anything else belonging to us, than on the one hand body, and on the other soul?

Cebes/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ To which species, therefore, shall we say the body is more similar and allied?

Cebes/ It is manifest to everyone, that it is allied to the visible species.

Socrates/ But what shall we say of the soul? Is it visible, or invisible?

Cebes/ It is certainly not visible to men, Socrates.

Socrates/ But we speak of things which are visible or not so, with respect to the nature of men. Or do you think we speak of things visible to any other nature?

Cebes/ Of those which regard the nature of men.

Socrates/ What then shall we say respecting the soul, that it is visible, or cannot be seen?

Cebes/ That it cannot be seen.

Socrates/ The soul, therefore, is more similar to the invisible species than the body, but the body is more similar to the visible.

Cebes/ It is perfectly necessary it should be so, Socrates.

Socrates/ And have we not also formerly asserted this, that the soul, when it employs the body in the speculation of anything, either through sight, or hearing, or some other sense (for to speculate through sense is to speculate through body), then, indeed, it is drawn by the body to things which never subsist according to the same, wanders and is agitated, and becomes giddy like one intoxicated, through passing into contact with things of this kind?

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But when it speculates anything, itself subsisting by itself, then it departs to that which is pure, eternal, and immortal, and which possesses a sameness of subsistence: and, as being allied to such a nature, it perpetually becomes united with it, when it subsists alone by itself, and as often as it is lawful for it to obtain such a conjunction: and then, too, it rests from its wanderings, and perpetually subsists similarly according to the same, about such natures, as passing into contact with them; and this passion of the soul is denominated prudence.

Cebes/ You speak, Socrates, in every respect beautifully and true.

Socrates/ To which species, therefore, of things, formerly and now spoken of, does the soul appear to you to be more similar and allied?

Cebes/ It appears to me, Socrates, that everyone, and even the most indocile, must admit, in consequence of this

method of reasoning, that the soul is both totally and universally more similar to that which subsists perpetually the same, than to that which does not so.

Socrates/ But to which is the body most similar?

Cebes/ To the other species.

Socrates/ But consider also as follows: that, since soul and body subsist together, nature commands that the one should be subservient and obey, but that the other should rule and possess dominion. And in consequence of this, which again of these appears to you to be similar to a divine nature, and which to the mortal nature? Or does it not appear to you that the divine nature is essentially adapted to govern and rule, but the mortal to be governed and be subservient?

Cebes/ To me it does so.

Socrates/ To which, therefore, is the soul similar?

Cebes/ It is manifest, Socrates, that the soul is similar to the divine, but the body to the mortal nature.

Socrates/ But consider, Cebes, whether, from all that has been said, these conclusions will result to us, that the soul is most similar to the divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform and indissoluble nature, and which always subsists similarly according to the same; but that the body is most similar to the nature which is human, mortal, void of intellect, multiform, dissoluble, and which never subsists according to the same. Can we, my deaf Cebes, produce any arguments to show that this is not the case?

Cebes/ We cannot.

Socrates/ What then? in consequence of all this, must it not be the property of the body, to be swiftly dissolved; but of the soul, on the contrary, to be entirely indissoluble, or something bordering on such an affection?

Cebes/ How should it not?

Socrates/ Do you conceive, therefore, that when a man dies, the visible part of him, or the body, which is situated in a visible region (and which we call a dead body subject to dissolution, ruin, and dissipation), does not immediately suffer any of these affections, but remains for a considerable space of time; and if anyone dies possessing a graceful body, that it very much retains its elegant form? for, when the body is bound and buried according to the manner in which the Egyptians bury their dead, it remains almost entire for an incredible space of time; and though some parts of the body may become rotten, yet the bones and nerves, and everything of this kind, are preserved as one may say immortal. Is it not so?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Can the soul, therefore, which is invisible, and which departs into another place of this kind, a place noble, pure, and invisible, viz. into Hades, to a beneficent and prudent God (at which place, if Divinity is willing, my soul will shortly arrive); can the soul, I say, since it is naturally of this kind, be immediately dissipated and perish on its being liberated from the body, as is asserted by the many? This is certainly, my dear Cebes and Simmias, far from being the case. But this will much more abundantly take place, if it is liberated in a pure condition, attracting to itself nothing of the body, as not having willingly communicated with it in the present life, but fled from it and collected itself into itself; an employment of this kind having been the subject of its perpetual meditation. But this is nothing else than to philosophize rightly, and to meditate with facility, how to be dead in reality. Or will not this be a meditation of death?

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will not the soul, therefore, when in this condition, depart to that which is similar to itself, a divine nature, and which is likewise immortal and prudent? and when it arrives thither, will it not become happy, being liberated from wandering and ignorance, terror and insane love, and from all other evils belonging to the human nature; and so, as it is said of the initiated, will in reality pass the rest of its time in the society of the Gods? Shall we speak in this manner, Cebes, or otherwise?

Cebes/ In this manner, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But I think that if the soul departs polluted and impure from the body, as having always been its associate, attending upon and loving the body, and becoming enchanted by it, through its desires and pleasures, in such a manner as to think that nothing really is, except what is corporeal, which can be touched and seen, eaten and drunk, and employed for the purposes of venereal occupations, and at the same time is accustomed to hate, dread and avoid, that which is dark and invisible to the eye of sense, which is intelligible and apprehended by philosophy; do you think that a soul thus affected can be liberated from the body, so as to subsist sincerely by itself?

Cebes/ By no means.

Socrates/ But I think that it will be contaminated by a corporeal nature, to which its converse and familiarity with the body, through perpetual association and abundant meditation, have rendered it similar and allied.

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But it is proper, my dear Cebes, to think that such a nature is ponderous and heavy, terrestrial and visible; and that a soul of this kind, through being connected with such a nature, is rendered heavy, and drawn down again into the visible region from its dread of that which is

invisible and Hades, and, as it is said, wanders about monuments and tombs; about which indeed certain shadowy phantoms of souls appear, being the images produced by such souls as have not been purely liberated from the body, but which participate of the visible nature; and on this account they become visible.

Cebes/ It is very reasonable to suppose so, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is reasonable indeed, Cebes: and likewise that these are not the souls of the worthy, but of the depraved, who are compelled to wander about such places; by these means suffering the punishment of their former conduct, which was evil; and they are compelled thus to wander till, through the desire of a corporeal nature, which attends them they are again bound to a body. They are bound, however, as it is proper they should be, to such manners as they have exercised in the present life.

Cebes/ But what do you say these manners are, Socrates?

Socrates/ As for example, that such as are addicted to gluttony, arrogant injuries, and drinking, and this without any fear of consequences, shall enter into the tribes of asses and brutes of this kind. Or do you not think it proper that they should?

Cebes/ You speak in a manner perfectly becoming.

Socrates/ But shall we not say, that such as held in the highest estimation injustice, tyranny, and rapine shall enter into the tribes of wolves, hawks, and kites? Or where else can we say such souls depart?

Cebes/ Into tribes of this kind, certainly.

Socrates/ It will, therefore, be manifest concerning the rest into what nature each departs, according to the similitudes of manners which they have exercised.

Cebes/ It is manifest; for how should it not be so?

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, those among these the most happy, and such as depart into the best place, who have made popular and political virtue their study, which they call indeed temperance and justice, and which is produced from custom and exercise, without philosophy and intellect?

Cebes/ But how are these the most happy?

Socrates/ Because it is fit that these should again migrate into a political and mild tribe of this kind; such as bees, wasps, or ants, or into the same human tribe again, and from these become moderate men.

Cebes/ It is fit.

Socrates/ But it is not lawful for any to pass into the genus of Gods, except such as, through a love of learning, have philosophized, and departed from hence perfectly pure. And for the sake of this, my dear Simmias and Cebes, those who have philosophized rightly abstain from all desires belonging to the body, and strenuously persevere in this abstinence, without giving themselves up to their dominion; nor is it because they dread the ruin of their families, and poverty, like the multitude of the lovers of wealth; nor yet because they are afraid of ignominy and the infamy of improbity, like those who are lovers of dominion and honors, that they abstain from these desires.

Cebes/ For it would not, Socrates, become them so to do.

Socrates/ It would not, by Zeus. Hence those, O Cebes! who take care of their soul, and do not live in a state of subserviency to their bodies, bidding farewell to all such characters as we have mentioned above, do not proceed in the same path with these during the journey of life, because such characters are ignorant how they should direct their course; but considering that they ought not to act contrary to philosophy, and to its solution and purification, they give themselves up to its direction, and follow wherever it leads.

Cebes/ In what manner, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you. The lovers of learning well know, that when philosophy receives their soul into her protection (and when she does so, she finds it vehemently bound and agglutinated to the body, and compelled to speculate things through this, as through a place of confinement, instead of beholding herself through herself; and besides this, rolled in every kind of ignorance: philosophy likewise beholds the dire nature of the confinement, that it arises through desire; so that he who is bound in an eminent degree assists in binding himself); the lovers of learning therefore, I say, know that philosophy, receiving their soul in this condition, endeavors gently to exhort it, and dissolve its bonds; and this she attempts to accomplish, by showing that the inspection of things through the eyes is full of deception, and that this is likewise the case with perception through the ears and the other senses. Philosophy too persuades the soul to depart from all these fallacious informations, and to employ them no further than necessity requires; and exhorts her to call together and collect herself into one. And besides this, to believe in no other than herself, with respect to what she understands, herself subsisting by herself, of that which has likewise a real subsistence by itself; and not to consider that as having a true being which she speculates through others, and which has its subsistence in others. And lastly, that a thing of this kind is sensible and visible; but that what she herself perceives is intelligible and invisible. The soul of a true philosopher, therefore, thinking that he ought not to oppose this solution, abstains as much as possible from pleasures and desires, griefs and fears, considering that when anyone is vehemently delighted or terrified, afflicted or desirous, he does not suffer any such mighty evil from these as someone may perhaps conceive, I mean such as disease and a consumption of wealth, through indulging his desires;

but that he suffers that which is the greatest, and the extremity of all evils, and this without apprehending that he does so.

Cebes/ But what is this evil, Socrates?

Socrates/ That the soul of every man is compelled at the same time to be either vehemently delighted or afflicted about some particular thing, and to consider that about which it is thus eminently passive, as having a most evident and true subsistence, though this is by no means the case; and that these are most especially visible objects. Is it not so?

Cebes/ Entirely.

Socrates/ In this passion, therefore, is not the soul in the highest degree bound to the body?

Cebes/ In what manner?

Socrates/ Because every pleasure and pain, as if armed with a nail, fasten and rivet the soul to the body, cause it to become corporeal, and fill it with an opinion, that whatever the body asserts is true. For, in consequence of the soul forming the same opinions with the body, and being delighted with the same objects, it appears to me that it is compelled to possess similar manners, and to be similarly nourished, and to become so affected, that it can never pass into Hades in a pure condition; but always departs full of a corporeal nature; and thus swiftly falls again into another body, and, becoming as it were sown, is engendered; and lastly, that from these it becomes destitute of a divine, pure, and uniform association.

Cebes/ You speak most true, Socrates.

Socrates/ For the sake of these things therefore, O Cebes I those who are justly lovers of learning are moderate and brave, and not for the sake of such as the multitude assert. Or do you think it is?

Cebes/ By no means; for it cannot be.

Socrates/ But the soul of a philosopher reasons in this manner; and does not think that philosophy ought to free him from the body, but that when he is freed he may give himself up to pleasures and pains, by which he will again be bound to the body, and will undertake a work which it is impossible to finish, reweaving a certain web of Penelope. But procuring tranquility with respect to these, and following the guidance of the reasoning power, and being always conversant with this, contemplating at the same time that which is true, divine, and not the subject of opinion, and being likewise nourished by such an object of contemplation, he will think that he ought to live in this manner while he lives, and that when he dies he shall depart to a kindred essence, and an essence of this kind, being liberated from the maladies of the human nature. But from a nutriment of this kind the soul has no occasion to fear (while it makes these, O Simmias and Cebes! its study) lest, in its liberation from the body, it should be lacerated, and, being blown about and dissipated by the winds, should vanish, and no longer have anywhere a subsistence.

Phaedo/ When Socrates had thus spoken, a long silence ensued; and Socrates seemed to revolve with himself what had been said; as likewise did the greatest part of us: but Cebes and Simmias discoursed a little with each other. And Socrates at length looking upon them;

Socrates/ What, do our assertions appear to you to have been not sufficiently demonstrated? for many doubts and suspicions yet remain, if anyone undertakes to investigate them sufficiently. If, therefore, you are considering something else among yourselves, I have nothing to say; but if you are doubting about those particulars which we have just now made the subject of our discourse, do not be remiss in speaking about and running over what has been said, if

it appears to you in any respect that we might have spoken better; and receive me again as your associate, if you think that you can be any ways benefited by my assistance.

Simmias/ Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the truth: for some time since each of us being agitated with doubts, we impelled and exhorted one another to interrogate you, through our desire of hearing them solved; but we were afraid of causing a debate, lest it should be disagreeable to you in your present circumstances.

Phaedo/ But Socrates, upon hearing this, gently laughed, and said;

Socrates/ This is strange, indeed, Simmias; for I shall with difficulty be able to persuade other men that I do not consider the present fortune as a calamity, since I am not able to persuade even you; but you are afraid lest I should be more morose now than I was prior to the present event. And, as it seems, I appear to you to be more despicable than swans with respect to divination, who, when they perceive that it is necessary for them to die, sing not only as usual, but then more than ever; rejoicing that they are about to depart to that Deity in whose service they are engaged. But men, because they themselves are afraid of death, falsely accuse the swans, and assert that, in consequence of their being afflicted at death, their song is the result of grief. Nor do they consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold, or is afflicted with any other malady; neither the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor the lapwing, all which they say sing lamenting through distress. But neither do these birds, as it appears to me, sing through sorrow, nor yet the swans; but in my opinion these last are prophetic, as belonging to Apollo; and in consequence of foreseeing the good which Hades contains, they sing and rejoice at that period more remarkably than at any preceding time. But I consider myself as a fellow-servant of the swans, and sacred to the

same Divinity. I possess a divining power from our common master no less than they; nor shall I be more afflicted than the swan in being liberated from the present life. Hence it is proper that you should both speak and inquire about whatever you please, as long as the eleven magistrates will permit.

Simmias/ You speak excellently well; and as you give me permission, I will both tell you what are my doubts, and how far Cebes does not admit what has been said. For, as to myself, Socrates, I am perhaps of the same opinion about these particulars as yourself; that to know them clearly in the present life is either impossible. or a thing very difficult to obtain. But not to argue about what has been said in every possible way, and to desist before by an arduous investigation on all sides weariness is produced, can only take place among indolent and effeminate men. For it is necessary, in things of this kind, either to learn or to discover the manner of their subsistence; or, if both these are impossible, then, by receiving the best of human reasons, and that which is the most difficult of confutation, to venture upon this as on a raft, and sail in it through the ocean of life, unless someone should be able to be carried more safely, and with less danger, by means of a firmer vehicle, or a certain divine reason. I shall not, therefore, now be ashamed to interrogate, in consequence of the confession which you have made; nor shall I blame myself hereafter, that I have not spoken what appears to me at present: for, upon considering what has been said, both with myself and together with Cebes, your doctrine did not seem to be sufficiently confirmed.

Socrates/ And perhaps, my friend, you have the truth on your side; but inform me in what respect it did not seem to be sufficiently confirmed.

Simmias/ In this; because anyone may assert the same about harmony, and a lyre, and its chords; that, for instance, harmony is something invisible and incorporeal, all-beautiful and divine, in a well-modulated lyre: but the lyre and its chords are bodies, and of a corporeal nature; are composites and terrestrial, and allied to that which is mortal. When anyone, therefore, shall either have broken the lyre, or cut and burst the chords, some person may contend from the same reasoning as yours, that it is necessary the harmony should yet remain, and not be destroyed (for it cannot in any respect be possible that the lyre should subsist when the chords are burst, and the chords themselves are of a mortal nature; but the harmony, which is connate and allied to that which is divine and immortal, will become extinct, and perish prior to the mortal nature itself); because it is necessary that harmony should be somewhere, and that the wood and chords must suffer putrefaction, before this can be subject to any passion. For I think, Socrates, that you yourself have also perceived this, that we consider the soul in the most eminent degree, as something of such a kind as to become the temperament of hot and cold, moist and dry, and such-like affections, for the reception of which our body is extended, and by which it is contained: and that the soul is the harmony of all these, when they are beautifully and moderately tempered with each other. If, therefore, the soul is a certain harmony, it is evident that when our body suffers either intension or remission, through diseases and other maladies, the soul must from necessity immediately perish, though of the most divine nature (in the same manner as other harmonies perish, which either subsist in sounds or in the works of artificers); but the remaining parts of the body of each person must subsist for a long time, till they are either burnt or become rotten. Consider then what we shall say to this

discourse, if anyone should think, since the soul is the temperament of things subsisting in the body, that it perishes the first, in that which is called death.

Phaedo/ Socrates, therefore, beholding us, and laughing as he was accustomed to do very often.

Socrates/ Simmias speaks justly. If anyone of you, therefore, is more prompt than I am, why does he not reply to these objections?, for he seems not to have handled this affair badly. But it appears to me, that before we make our reply we should first hear Cebes, and know what it is which he objects to our discourse; that, in consequence of sometime intervening, we may deliberate what we shall say; and that afterwards, upon hearing the objections, we may either assent to them if they appear to assert anything becoming; or, if they do not, that we may defend the discourse we have already delivered. But tell me. Cebes, what it is which so disturbs you, as to cause your unbelief.

Cebes/ I will tell you: your discourse seems to me to be yet in the same state, and to be liable to the same accusation as we mentioned before. For, that our soul had a subsistence before it came into the present form, is an assertion, I will not deny, of a very elegant kind, and (if it is not too much to say) sufficiently demonstrated: but that it still remains when we are dead, does not appear to me to have been clearly proved; nor do I assent to the objection of Simmias, that the soul is not stronger and more lasting than the body, For it appears to me to be much more excellent than all these. Why then, says reason, do you yet disbelieve? for, since you see that when a man dies that which is, more imbecile still remains, does it not appear to you to be necessary that the more lasting nature should be preserved during this period of time? Consider. therefore, whether I shall say anything to the purpose in reply. For I, as well as Simmias, as it seems, stand in need of a certain similitude: for to me these things

appear to be asserted in the same manner, as if anyone should say concerning an aged dead weaver, that the man has not yet perished, but perhaps still survives somewhere; and should exhibit as an argument in proof of this assertion a vestment woven by himself, which he wore, and which is yet safe and entire. And if he should ask someone not crediting his assertion, which is the more lasting, the genus of man or of a garment, whose subsistence consists in its use and in being worn; then should it be replied, that the genus of man is much more lasting, he might think it demonstrated, that the man is by a much stronger reason preserved, since that which is of a shorter duration has not yet perished. But I do not think, Simmias, that this is the case. For consider with yourself what I say: since every person must apprehend, that he who asserts this speaks foolishly. For this weaver, having worn and woven many such vestments, died after them being many, but I think before the last; and yet it cannot be anything the more inferred on this account, that the man is viler or more imbecile than a vestment. And I think that the soul, with respect to the body, will receive the same similitude; and he who shall assert the same concerning these, will appear to me to speak in a very equitable manner; I mean that the soul is of a lasting nature, but the body more debile and lets durable. But I should say that each soul wears many bodies, especially if it lives many years; for, if the body glides away like a stream, and is dissolved while the man yet lives, but the soul perpetually reweaves that which is worn and consumed, it will be necessary indeed, that when the soul is destroyed it should then be clothed with the last vestment, and should perish prior to this alone. But the soul having perished, then the body will evince the nature of its imbecility, and, becoming rapidly rotten, will be perfectly dissolved: so that, in consequence of this reasoning, it is not

yet proper that we should be persuaded to believe with confidence, that our soul subsists somewhere after we are dead. For, if anyone should assent to him who asserts even more than you have done, and should grant that not only our soul had an existence before we were born into the present life, but that nothing hinders us from admitting that certain souls after death may still have a subsistence, exist in some future period, and often be born, and again perish (for so naturally strong is the soul, that it will preserve itself through frequent births); but this being granted, it may still follow, that it will not only labor in those many generations, but that, finishing its course, in some one of these deaths, it will entirely perish. But no one should say that this death and dissolution of the body, which also introduces destruction to the soul, can be known: For it is impossible that it can be perceived by anyone of us. If this, however, be the case, it will not follow that he who possesses the confidence of good hope concerning death is not foolishly confident, unless he can demonstrate that the soul is perfectly immortal and undecaying: for otherwise it will be necessary, that he who is about to die should always fear for his soul, lest in the death, which is at hand, he should entirely perish through the separation of his body.

Phaedo/ When we heard them therefore, speak in this manner, we were all of us very disagreeably affected, as we afterwards declared to each other; because, as we were in the highest degree persuaded by the former discourse, they again seemed to disturb us and to cast us into unbelief; and this in such a manner, as not only to cause us to deny our assent to the arguments which had been already adduced, but to such as might afterwards be asserted, fearing lest either we should not be proper judges of anything, or that the things themselves should be unworthy of belief.

Echecrates/ By the Gods, Phædo, I can easily pardon you: for, while I am now hearing you, I cannot refrain from saying to myself, In what arguments can we any longer believe? For the discourse of Socrates, which a little before was exceedingly credible, is now fallen into unbelief. For the assertion, that our soul is a certain harmony, gained my assent both now and always in a wonderful manner; and now it is mentioned, it recalls as it were into my memory a knowledge that I formerly was of the same opinion. And thus I am perfectly indigent again of some other reason, as if from the very beginning, which may persuade me that the soul of a dead man does not die together with the body. Tell me therefore, by Zeus, how Socrates pursued the discourse; and whether he, as you confess was the case with yourself, seemed troubled at these objections; or, on the contrary, answered them with facility; and whether he defended his doctrine sufficiently, or in a defective manner. Relate all these particulars to us as accurately as you can.

Phaedo/ Indeed, Echecrates, I have often admired Socrates; but never more so than at that time. That he should be able indeed to say something in reply, is perhaps not wonderful; but I especially admired, in the first place, this in him, that he received the discourse of the young men in such a pleasant, benevolent and wonderful manner; and, in the next place, that he so acutely perceived how we were affected by their objections; and lastly, that he so well cured our disturbance, recalled us, as if flying and vanquished, and caused us, in conjunction with himself, to pursue and consider the discourse.

Echecrates/ But how did he do this?

Phaedo/ I will tell you: I happened at that time to sit at his right hand, upon a low seat near his bed; but he himself sat much higher than I did. Stroking me on the head,

therefore, and compressing the hair which hung on my neck (for he used sometimes to play with my hairs);

Socrates/ Tomorrow, Phædo, you will perhaps cut off these beautiful locks.

Phaedo/ It seems so, indeed, Socrates.

Socrates/ But you will not, if you will be persuaded by me.

Phaedo/ But why not?

Socrates/ For both you and I ought to cut off our hair today, if our discourse must die, and we are not able to recall it to life again. And I indeed, if I was you, and I found that discourse fled from me, would take an oath after the manner of the Argives, that I would never suffer my hair to grow, till, by contesting in disputation, I had vanquished the objections of Simmias and Cebes.

Phaedo/ But Hercules is reported not to have been sufficient against two.

Socrates/ Call upon me, therefore, as your Iolaus, while the light yet lasts.

Phaedo/ I call then, not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but as Iolaus upon Hercules.

Socrates/ It is of no consequence. But, in the first place, we must be careful that we are not influenced by a certain passion.

Phaedo/ What passion?

Socrates/ That we do not become haters of reason, in the same manner as some become, haters of men. For no greater evil can happen to anyone than to be a hater of reasons. But a hatred of reason and a hatred of mankind are both produced in the same manner. For misanthropy is produced in us through very much believing without art in some particular person, and considering him as a man true,

sincere, and faithful, whom in the course of a short acquaintance we find to be depraved and unfaithful; and that this is the case again with another. And when anyone often suffers this disappointment, and especially from those whom he considered as his most intimate familiars and friends, at length, through finding himself thus frequently hurt, he hates all men, and thinks that there is nothing in any respect sincere in anyone. Or have you never perceived that this is the case?

Phaedo/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But is not this base? and is it not evident that such a one attempts to make use of men, without possessing the art which respects human affairs? For If, in a certain respect, he employed them with art, he would think, as the case really is, that men very good, or very bad, are but few in number; and that the greater part of mankind are those which subsist between these.

Phaedo/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ In the same manner as about things very small and very great. Do you think that anything is more rare than to find a very large or a very small man, or dog, or anything else; and again anything excessively swift or slow, beautiful or base, white or black? Or do you not perceive that the summits of the extremes of all these are rare and few, but that things subsisting between these are copious and many?

Phaedo/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Do you not, therefore, think that if a contest of improbity should be proposed, those who hold the first rank among the base would be found to be but few?

Phaedo/ It is agreeable to reason to think so.

Socrates/ It is so, indeed; but in this respect reasons are not similar to men (for I shall now follow you as the leader); but in this they are similar, when anyone, for instance,

without possessing the art belonging to discourse, believes that a certain discourse is true, and shortly after it appears to him to be false, as it is sometimes the one and sometimes the other, and the same thing happens to him about different discourses. And this is particularly the case with those who are familiar with contradictory arguments; for these you know think that they at length become most wise, and alone perceive that there is nothing sound and stable either in things or reasons; but that everything is whirled upwards and downwards, as if existing in the river Euripus, and does not abide in anyone condition for any portion of time whatever.

Phaedo/ You speak perfectly true.

Socrates/ Would it not then, Phædo, be a passion worthy of commiseration, if, when a certain reason is true and firm, and is capable of being understood, yet someone falling from this should be involved in doubt, because he has heard reasons, which, though remaining the same, yet have at one time appeared to be true, and at another false; and should not accuse himself and his own want of skill, but at length through grief should transfer all the blame from himself to the reasons; and thus should pass the remainder of his life, hating and slandering reasons, and deprived of the truth and science of things?

Phaedo/ By Zeus, such a one would be miserable indeed.

Socrates/ In the first place, therefore, we should be very careful against admitting an opinion, that no reasoning appears to be valid; but we should much rather think that we are not yet in a healthy condition, and that we ought vigorously and cheerfully to study how to be well. And this indeed ought to be the case with you and others, for the sake of the whole remainder of your life, but with me, for the sake of death itself; as there is danger at the present time, lest I

should not behave philosophically, but, like those who are perfectly unskilled, contentiously. For such as these, when they controvert any particular, are not at all concerned how that subsists about which they dispute; but are alone anxious, that what they have established may appear to the persons present to be true. And I seem to myself at present to differ alone in this respect from such as these: for I am not solicitous that my discourse may appear true to those who are present (except just as it may happen in passing), but that it may appear to be so in the most eminent degree to me myself. For I thus reason, my dear friend (and see in how fraudulent a manner), that if my assertions are true, it will be a beautiful circumstance to be persuaded of their truth; but that if nothing remains for the dead, I shall at least have the advantage of being less afflicted with my present condition than others. But this ignorance of mine will not continue long (For it would be bad if it should), but shortly after this will be dissolved; and being thus prepared, Simmias and Cebes, I shall now return to the discourse. But, that you may be persuaded by me, pay no attention to the person of Socrates, but be much more solicitous in assenting to the truth, if I should appear to you to assert anything true; but if this should not be the case, oppose me with all your might, and beware, lest through too much ardor I should deceive both myself and you, and, acting in this respect like bees, should depart from you, leaving my sting behind.

But to begin: In the first place, remind me of what you have said, if it should appear that I have forgotten it. For Simmias, I think, distrusted and was afraid lest the soul, though it is at the same time more divine and beautiful than the body, should perish before it, as subsisting in the form of harmony. But Cebes appears to me to have admitted this, that the soul is more lasting than the body; but yet that it is perfectly uncertain, whether after the soul has worn out

many bodies, and this often, it may not at length, leaving body behind, itself also perish; so that this will be death itself, I mean the destruction of the soul, since the body perpetually perishes without ceasing. Are not these the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we ought to consider?

Phaedo/ They both confessed that the particulars were these.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, do you reject the whole of our former discourse, or do you reject some things and not others?

Phaedo/ They replied, We admit some things, and not others.

Socrates/ What then do you say about that discourse, in which we asserted that learning is reminiscence; and that, this being the case, our soul most necessarily have subsisted somewhere before it was bound in the body?

Cebes/ I indeed was both then wonderfully persuaded by that discourse, and now firmly abide in the same opinion.

Simmias/ And I also am affected in the same manner; and I should very much wonder should I ever conceive otherwise about this particular.

Socrates/ But it is necessary, my Theban guest, that it should appear otherwise to you, if you still continue of the opinion, that harmony is something composite, and that the soul is a certain harmony, composed from things extended through the body. For you will never assent to yourself asserting, that harmony was composed prior to the things from which it ought to be composed; or do you think you can?

Simmias/ By no means, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you perceive, therefore, that you will not be consistent in your assertions, when you say that the soul had at subsistence before it came into a human form and

into body, but that at the same time it was composed from things which then had not a being? For neither is harmony such as that to which you assimilate it; but the lyre, and the chords, and the sounds yet unharmonized, have a prior existence; but harmony is composed the last of all, and is the first dissolved. How, therefore, can this discourse be consonant with that?

Simmias/ In no respect.

Socrates/ But it certainly is proper that a discourse about harmony should be consonant, if this can ever be asserted of any other.

Simmias/ It is proper, indeed.

Socrates/ But this discourse of yours is not consonant. Consider, therefore, which of these assertions you will choose, that learning is reminiscence, or that the soul is harmony.

Simmias/ I prefer the former, Socrates, by much; for the latter gained my assent without a demonstration, through nothing more than a certain probability and specious appearance; from whence also it appears evident to the multitude of mankind. But I well know, that the discourses which frame their demonstrations from assimilative reasons only are nothing more than empty boastings; and unless a man defends himself against them they will very much deceive him, both in geometry and all other speculations. But the discourse about reminiscence and learning was delivered through an hypothesis highly worthy of reception. For in this it was said that our soul had a subsistence somewhere before it came into the present body, as it is an essence possessing the appellation of that which truly is. But, as I persuade myself, I assent to this doctrine in a manner sufficient and proper; and hence it is necessary, as

it appears to me, that I should neither assent to myself nor to any other asserting that the soul is harmony.

Socrates/ But what, Simmias? Does it appear to you that it can either belong to this harmony, or to any composition, to subsist differently from the things from which it is composed?

Simmias/ By no means.

Socrates/ And indeed, as it appears to me, it can neither perform nor suffer anything else, besides what these perform and suffer.

Phaedo/ He agreed it could not.

Socrates/ It does not, therefore, belong to harmony to be the leader of the materials from which it is composed, but to follow them.

Phaedo/ This also he granted.

Socrates/ It is far, therefore, from being the case, that harmony will either be moved or found contrary, or in any other respect be adverse to its parts.

Simmias/ Very far, indeed.

Socrates/ But what, does not every harmony naturally subsist in such a manner as to be harmony, so far as it receives a congruous temperament?

Simmias/ I do not understand you.

Socrates/ But if it were possible that it could be congruously tempered with still greater vehemence, and more in quantity, would it not be more vehemently harmony and more in quantity; but if less vehemently and less in quantity, just the contrary?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But can it be said of the soul, that, even in the smallest circumstance, one soul is more vehemently and

more in quantity, or lest vehemently and less in quantity, soul, than another?

Simmias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Consider then, by Zeus, is it truly said, that one soul possesses intellect and virtue, and is good; but that another is foolish and vicious, and is bad?

Simmias/ It is truly said.

Socrates/ Among those, therefore, who establish the soul as harmony, what can anyone call virtue and vice in the soul? Will he call the one harmony, and the other discord? And that the one, that is to say the good soul, is harmonized; and, as it is harmony, possesses another harmony in itself; but that the other is discord, and does not contain in itself another harmony?

Simmias/ I know not what to reply; but it is manifest, that he who establishes this would make some such reply.

Socrates/ But it has been granted, that one soul is not more or less soul than another; and this is no other than to confess, that one harmony is not more vehemently and more in quantity, nor less vehemently and less in quantity, harmony, than another: is it not so?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But that which is neither more nor less harmony, is neither more nor less harmonized: is it not so?

Simmias/ It is

Socrates/ But can that which is neither more nor less harmonized participate more or less of harmony? or does it equally participate?

Simmias/ Equally.

Socrates/ The soul, therefore, since it is not more or less soul than another, is not more or less harmonized.

Simmias/ It is not.

Socrates/ But since it is thus affected, it will neither participate more of discord nor of harmony.

Simmias/ By no means.

Socrates/ And again, in consequence of this passion, can one soul participate more of vice or virtue than another, since vice is discord, but virtue harmony?

Simmias/ It cannot.

Socrates/ But rather, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul will participate of vice, since it is harmony: for doubtless the harmony, which is perfectly such, can never participate of discord.

Simmias/ It certainly cannot.

Socrates/ Neither, therefore, can the soul, which is perfectly soul, participate of vice: for how can it, in consequence of what has been said? In consequence of this reasoning, therefore, the souls of all animals will be similarly good; since they are naturally similarly souls, with respect to the essence of soul.

Simmias/ To me it appears so, Socrates.

Socrates/ If the hypothesis therefore was right, would it appear to you to be beautifully said, and that this consequence ensued, that the soul is harmony?

Simmias/ By no means.

Socrates/ But what, among all the things which are inherent in man, would you say that anything else governed except soul, if he be a prudent man?

Simmias/ I should not.

Socrates/ But whether does the soul govern, by assenting to the passions belonging to the body, or by opposing them? My meaning is this, that when heat and thirst are present, the soul, if it governs, will frequently draw the body to the contrary, i.e. not to drink; and hunger being present, that it

shall not eat; and in a thousand other instances we may behold the soul opposing the desires of the body: may we not?

Simmias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Have we not above confessed, that if the soul was harmony, it would never found contrary to the intensions, remissions, or vibrations, or any other passion belonging to its component parts, but that it would follow, and never rule over them?

Simmias/ We have granted this; for how could we do otherwise?

Socrates/ But what, does not the soul now appear to act just the contrary to this, ruling over all those particulars, from which it may be said it subsists. nearly opposing all of them through the whole of life, and exercising absolute dominion over them all manner of ways, punishing some of these indeed with greater difficulty, and accompanied with pain; some through gymnastic and medicine, and some by milder methods, and some again by threats, and others by admonishing desire, anger, and fear; addressing that which it opposes, as being itself of a different nature? just as Homer does in the Odyssey, where he says of Ulysses:

> "His breast he struck, and cried, My heart, sustain,
> "This ill! for thou hast borne far greater pain."

Do you think that Homer devised this in consequence of thinking that the soul is harmony, and of such a kind as to be led by the passions of the body, and not such as is naturally adapted to lead and govern, and which is something much more divine than harmony?

Simmias/ By Zeus, Socrates, I do not think that he did.

Socrates/ By no means, therefore, most excellent man, shall we do well, in asserting that the soul is a *certain* harmony: for by thus asserting, as it appears, we shall

neither agree with Homer, that divine poet, nor be consistent with ourselves.

Simmias/ It is so, indeed.

Socrates/ Let it then be so; and thus, as it appears, we have sufficiently appeased the patrons of the Theban harmony. But how, Cebes, and by what discourse shall we appease the patrons of Cadmus?

Cebes/ You appear to me to be likely to find out a way: for you have delivered this discourse against harmony in a wonderful manner, and beyond what I expected. For, while Simmias related his doubts, I thought it would be a most admirable thing, should anyone be able to reply to his discourse. He therefore appears to me, in a manner perfectly extraordinary, not to have sustained the very first assault of your discourse. I should not, therefore, be surprised if the arguments of Cadmus met with the same fate.

Socrates/ My good friend, do not speak so magnificently, lest a certain envy should subvert our future discourse. These things, indeed, will be taken care of by Divinity. But we, approaching near in an Homeric manner, will try whether you say anything to the purpose. This then is the sum of what you inquire: you think it proper to demonstrate that our soul is without decay, and immortal; that a philosopher who is about to die with all the confidence of hope, and who thinks that after death he shall be far more happy than in the present life, may not indulge a stupid and foolish confidence. But you say, though it should be shown that the soul is something robust and deiform, and that it subsisted before we were born, yet nothing hinders but that all these arguments may not evince its immortality, but only that the soul is more lasting than the body, that it formerly existed somewhere for an immense period of time, and that it knew and performed a multitude of things. But that, for

all this, it will be nothing the more immortal; but that, entering into the body of a man, it will be the principle of destruction to itself, as if connected with a disease: so that it will both lead a miserable life in the body, and at last will perish in that which is called death. But you say it is of no consequence whether it comes into body once or often, with respect to our occasion of fear: For it is very proper that he who neither knows, nor is able to render a reason, why the soul is immortal, should be afraid of death, unless he is deprived of intellect. This, I think, Cebes, is the sum of what you say; and I have repeated it often, that nothing may escape our observation; and that, if you are willing, you may either add or take away from our statement of the objections.

Cebes/ I have nothing at present either to add or take away; but these are the objections which I make.

Phaedo/ Socrates, therefore, after he had been silent for a long time, and considering something by himself, said;

Socrates/ You require, Cebes, a thing of no small importance: For it is perfectly necessary to treat concerning the cause of generation and corruption. If you are willing, therefore, I will relate to you what happened to me in this investigation; and afterwards, if anything which I shall say shall appear to you useful, with respect to persuading you in the present inquiry, employ it for this purpose.

Cebes/ But I am most assuredly willing.

Socrates/ Hear then my narration: When I was a young man, Cebes, I was in a wonderful manner desirous of that wisdom which they call a history of nature: For it appeared to me to be a very superb affair to know the causes of each particular, on what account each is generated, why it perishes, and why it exists. And I often tossed myself as it were upwards and downwards; considering, in the first place, whether after that which is hot and cold has received

a certain rottenness, as some say, then animals are nourished; and whether the blood is that through which we become prudent, or air, or fire; or whether none of these, but the brain, is that which affords the senses of hearing, seeing, and smelling; so that memory and opinion are generated from these, and that from memory and opinion obtaining tranquility, science is accordingly produced? And again considering the corruptions of these, and the properties which take place about the heavens and the earth, I at length appeared to myself so unskillful in the speculation of these, as to receive no advantage from my inquiries. But I will give you a sufficient proof of the truth of this: for I then became so very blind, with respect to things which I knew before with great clearness (as it appeared both to myself and others) through this speculation, as to want instruction both in many particulars, which I thought I had known before, and in this, why a man is increased. For I thought it was evident to everyone that this took place through eating and drinking: for when, from the aliment, flesh accedes to flesh, bone to bone, and everywhere kindred to kindred parts, then the bulk which was small becomes afterwards great; and thus a little man becomes a large one. Such was then my opinion; does it appear to you a becoming one?

Cebes/ To me, indeed, it does.

Socrates/ But still further, consider as follows: for I thought that I seemed to myself sufficiently right in my opinion, when, on seeing a tall man standing by a short one, I judged that he was taller by the head; and in like manner one horse than another: and still more evident than these, ten things appeared to me to be more than eight, because two is added to them and that a bicubital is greater than a cubital magnitude, through its surpassing it by the half.

Cebes/ But now what appears to you respecting these?

Socrates/ By Zeus, I am so far from thinking that I know the cause of these, that I cannot even persuade myself, when any person adds one to one, that then the one to which the addition was made becomes two; or that the added one, and that to which it is added, become two, through the addition of the one to the other. For I should wonder, since each of these, when separate from one another, was one, and not then two; if, after they have approached nearer to each other, this should be the cause of their becoming two, viz. the association through which they are placed nearer to each other. Nor yet, if any person should divide one, am I able to persuade myself that this division is the cause of its becoming two. For that former cause of two being produced is contrary to this. For then this took place, because they were collected near to each other, and the one was applied to the other; but now, because the one is removed and separated from the other. Nor do I any longer persuade myself, that I know why one is produced; nor, in one word, why anything else is either generated or corrupted, or is, according to this method of proceeding: but, in order to obtain this knowledge, I venture to mingle another method of my own, by no means admitting this which I have mentioned.

But having once heard a person reading from a certain book, composed, as he said, by Anaxagoras when he came to that part, in which he says that intellect orders and is the cause of all things, I was delighted with this cause, and thought that, in a certain respect, it was an excellent thing for intellect to be the cause of all; and I considered that, if this was the case, disposing intellect would adorn all things, and place everything in that situation in which it would subsist in the best manner. If anyone, therefore, should be willing to discover the cause through which everything is generated, or corrupted, or is, he ought to discover how it

may subsist in the best manner, or suffer, or perform anything else. In consequence of this, therefore, it is proper that a man should consider nothing else, either about himself or about others, except that which is the most excellent and the best: but it is necessary that he who knows this should also know that which is subordinate, since there is one and the same science of both. But thus reasoning with myself, I rejoiced, thinking that I had found a preceptor in Anaxagoras, who would instruct me in the causes of things agreeably to my own conceptions; and that he would inform me, in the first place, whether the earth is flat or round; and afterwards explain the cause and necessity of its being so, adducing for this purpose that which is better, and showing that, it is better for the earth to exist in this manner. And if he should say it is situated in the middle, that he would, besides this, show that it is better For it to be in the middle; and if he should render all this apparent to me, I was so disposed as not to require any other species of cause. I had likewise prepared myself in a similar manner for an inquiry respecting the sun, and moon, and the other stars, their velocities and revolutions about each other, and all their other properties; so as to be able to know why it is better for each to operate in a certain manner, and to suffer that which it suffers. For I by no means thought, after he had said that all these were orderly disposed by intellect, he would introduce any other cause of their subsistence, except that which shows that it is best for them to exist as they do. Hence I thought that in assigning the cause common to each particular, and to all things, he would explain that which is best for each, and is the common good of all. And indeed I would not have exchanged these hopes for a mighty gain! but having obtained his books with prodigious eagerness, I read them with great celerity, that I might with great celerity know that which is the best, and that which is base.

From this admirable hope however, my friend, I was forced away, when, in the course of my reading, I saw him make no use of intellect, nor employ certain causes, for the purpose of orderly disposing particulars, but assign air, æther, and water, and many other things equally absurd, as the causes of things. And he appeared to me to be affected in a manner similar to him who should assert, that all the actions of Socrates are produced by intellect; and afterwards, endeavoring to relate the causes of each particular action, should say, that, in the first place, I now sit here because my body is composed from bones and nerves, and that the bones are solid, and are separated by intervals from each other; but that the nerves, which are of a nature capable of intension and remission, cover the bones, together with the flesh and skin by which they are contained. The bones, therefore, being suspended from their joints, the nerves, by straining and relaxing them enable me to bend my limbs as at present; and through this cause I here sit in an inflected position—and again, should assign other such-like causes of my conversation with you, viz. voice, and air, and hearing, and a thousand other such particulars, neglecting to adduce the true cause, that since it appeared to the Athenians better to condemn me, on this account, it also appeared to me to be better and more just to sit here, and, thus abiding, sustain the punishment which they have ordained me. For otherwise, by the dog, as it appears to me, these nerves and bones would have been carried long ago either into Megara or Bœotia, through an opinion of that which is best, if I had not thought it more just and becoming to sustain the punishment ordered by my country, whatever it might be, than to withdraw myself and run away. But to call things of this kind causes is extremely absurd. Indeed, if anyone should say that without possessing such things as bones and nerves, and other

particulars which belong to me, I could not act in the manner I appear to do, he would speak the truth: but to assert that I act as I do at present through these, and that I operate with this intellect, and not from the choice of that which is best, would be an assertion full of extreme negligence and sloth. For this would be the consequence of not being able to collect by division, that the true cause of a thing is very different from that without which a cause would not be a cause. And this indeed appears to me to be the case with the multitude of mankind, who, handling things as it were in darkness, call them by names foreign from the truth, and thus denominate things causes which are not so. Hence, one placing round the earth a certain vortex, produced by the celestial motion, renders by this mean the earth fixt in the center; but another places air under it, as if it was a basis to a broad trough. But they neither investigate that power through which things are now disposed in the best manner possible, nor do they think that it is endued with any dæmoniacal strength: but they fancy they have found a certain Atlas, more strong and immortal than such a strength, and far more sustaining all things; and they think that the good and the becoming do not in reality connect and sustain anything. With respect to myself, indeed, I would most willingly become the disciple of anyone; so that I might perceive in what manner a cause of this kind subsists. But since I am deprived of this advantage, and have neither been able to discover it myself, nor to learn it from another, are you willing, Cebes, that I should show you the manner in which I made a prosperous voyage to discover the cause of things?

Cebes/ I am willing in a most transcendent degree.

Socrates/ It appeared to me therefore afterwards, when I was wearied with such speculations, that I ought to take care lest I should be affected in the same manner as those

are who attentively behold the sun in an eclipse: for some would be deprived of their sight, unless they beheld its image in water, or in a similar medium. And something of this kind I perceived with respect to myself, and was afraid lest my soul should be perfectly blinded through beholding things with the eyes of my body, and through endeavoring to apprehend them by means of the several senses. Hence I considered that I ought to fly to reasons, and in them survey the truth of things. Perhaps, indeed, this similitude of mine may not in a certain respect be proper: for I do not entirely admit that he who contemplates things in reasons, surveys them in images, more than he who contemplates them in external effects. This method, therefore, I have adopted; and always establishing that reason as an hypothesis, which I judge to be the most valid, whatever appears to me to be consonant to this, I fix upon as true, both concerning the cause of things and everything else; but such as are not consonant I consider as not true. But I wish to explain to you what I say in a clearer manner: for I think that you do not at present understand me.

Cebes/ Not very much, by Zeus.

Socrates/ However, I now assert nothing new, but what I have always asserted at other times, and in the preceding disputation. For I shall now attempt to demonstrate to you that species of cause which I have been discoursing about, and shall return again to those particulars which are so much celebrated; beginning from these, and laying down as an hypothesis, that there is a certain something beautiful, itself subsisting by itself; and a certain something good and great, and so of all the rest; which if you permit me to do, and allow that such things have a subsistence, I hope that I shall be able from these to demonstrate this cause to you, and discover that the soul is immortal.

Cebes/ But, in consequence of having granted you this already, you cannot be hindered from drawing such a conclusion.

Socrates/ But consider the things consequent to these, and see whether you will then likewise agree with me. For it appears to me, that if there be anything else beautiful, besides the beautiful itself, it cannot be beautiful on any other account than because it participates of the beautiful itself; and I should speak in the same manner of all things. Do you admit such a cause?

Cebes/ I admit it.

Socrates/ I do not therefore any longer perceive, nor am I able to understand, those otherwise causes; but if anyone tells me why a certain thing is beautiful, and assigns as a reason, either its possessing a florid color, or figure, or something else of this kind, I bid farewell to other hypotheses (for in all others I find myself disturbed); but this I retain with myself, simply, inartificially, and perhaps foolishly, that nothing else causes it to be beautiful, than either the presence, or communion, or in whatever manner the operations may take place, of the beautiful itself. For I cannot yet affirm how this takes place; but only this, that all beautiful things become such through the beautiful itself. For it appears to me most safe thus to answer both myself and others; and adhering to this, I think that I can never fall, but that I shall be secure in answering, that all beautiful things are beautiful through the beautiful itself. Does it not also appear so to you?

Cebes/ It does.

Socrates/ And that great things, therefore, are great, and things greater, greater through magnitude itself; and things lesser, lesser through smallness itself?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Neither, therefore, would you assent, if it should be said that someone is larger than another by the head, and that he who is lesser is lesser by the very same thing, i.e. the head: but you would testify that you said nothing else than that, with respect to everything great, one thing is greater than another by nothing else than magnitude, and that through this it is greater, i.e. through magnitude; and that the lesser is lesser through nothing else than smallness, and that through this it is lesser, i.e. through smallness. For you would be afraid, I think, lest, if you should say that anyone is greater and lesser by the head, you should contradict yourself: first, in asserting that the greater is greater, and the lesser, lesser, by the very same thing; and afterwards that the greater is greater by the head, which is a small thing; and that it is monstrous to suppose, that anything which is great can become so through something which is small. Would you not be afraid of all this?

Phaedo/ says Cebes, laughing;

Cebes/ Indeed I should.

Socrates/ Would you not also be afraid to say that ten things are more than eight by two, and that through this cause ten transcends eight, and not by multitude and through multitude? And in like manner, that a thing which is two cubits in length is greater than that which is but one cubit, by the half, and not by magnitude? for the dread is indeed the same.

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what? one being added to one, will the addition be the cause of their becoming two? or if one is divided, and two produced, would you not be afraid to assign division as the cause? Indeed you would cry with a loud voice, that you know no other way by which anything

subsists, than by participating the proper essence of everything which it participates; and that in these you can assign no other cause of their becoming two, than the participation of the duad; and that it is proper all such things as are about to become two, should participate of this, and of unity, whatever is about to become one. But you would bid farewell to these divisions and additions, and other subtitles of this kind, and would leave them to be employed in answering, by those who are wiser than yourself. And fearing, as it is said, your own shadow, and your own unskillfulness, you would adhere to this safe hypothesis, and answer in the manner I have described. But if anyone should adhere to this hypothesis, you would refrain from answering him till you had considered the consequences resulting from thence, and whether they were consonant or dissonant to one another. But when it is necessary for you to assign a reason for your belief in this hypothesis, you will assign it in a similar manner, laying down again another hypothesis, which shall appear to be the best among supernal natures, till you arrive at something sufficient. At the same time you will by no means confound things by mingling them together, after the manner of the contentious, when you discourse concerning the principle and the consequences arising from thence, if you are willing to discover anything of true beings. For by such as these, perhaps, no attention is paid to this. For These, through their wisdom, are sufficiently able to mingle all things together, and at the same time please themselves. But you, if you rank among the philosophers, will act, I think, in the manner I have described.

Phaedo/ Both Simmias and Cebes said, You speak most truly.

Echecrates/ By Zeus, Phædo, they assented with great propriety: for he appears to me to have asserted this in a

manner wonderfully clear; and this even to one endued with the smallest degree of intellect.

Phaedo/ And so indeed, Echecrates, it appeared in every respect to all who were present.

Echecrates/ And well it might: For it appears so to us, now we hear it, who were not present. But what was the discourse after this?

Phaedo/ If I remember right, after they had granted all this, and had confessed that each of the several species was something, and that others participating of these received the same denomination, he afterwards interrogated them as follows:

Socrates/ If then you allow that these things are so, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates, but less than Phædo, do you not then assert that both magnitude and parvitude are inherent in Simmias?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ And yet you must confess, that this circumstance of Simmias surpassing Socrates does not truly subsist in the manner which the words seem to imply. For Simmias is not naturally adapted to surpass Socrates, so far as he is Simmias, but by the magnitude which he possesses: nor, again, does he surpass Socrates so far as Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates possesses parvitude with respect to his magnitude.

Cebes/ True.

Socrates/ Nor, again, is Simmias surpassed by Phædo, because Phædo is Phædo, but because Phædo possesses magnitude with respect to the parvitude of Simmias.

Cebes/ It is so.

Socrates/ Simmias, therefore, is allotted the appellation of both small and great, being situated in the middle of both;

exhibiting his smallness to be surpassed by the greatness of the one, and his greatness to the other's smallness, which it surpasses. And at the same time, gently laughing, I seem to have spoken with all the precision of an historian; but, notwithstanding this, it is as I say.

Phaedo/ He allowed it.

Socrates/ But I have mentioned these things, in order that you may be of the same opinion as myself. For to me it appears, not only that magnitude is never willing to be at the same time both great and small, but that the magnitude which we contain never desires to receive that which is small, nor be surpassed; but that it is willing to do one of these two things either, to fly away, and gradually withdraw itself, when its contrary the small approaches to it, or to perish when it arrives; but that it is unwilling, by sustaining and receiving parvitude, to be different from what it was. In the same manner as I myself receiving and sustaining parvitude, and still remaining that which I am, am nevertheless small. But that being great dares not to be small. And in like manner the small, which resides in us, is not willing at any time to subsist in becoming to be great, or to be great: nor does anything else among contraries, while it remains that which it was, wish at the same time to subsist in becoming to be, and to be, its contrary; but it either departs or perishes in consequence of this passion.

Cebes/ It appears so to me in every respect.

Phaedo/ But a certain person, who was present, upon hearing this (I do not clearly remember who it was);

Someone/ By the Gods, was not the very contrary of what you now assert admitted by you in the former part of your discourse, viz. that the greater was generated from the less, and the less from the greater; and that generation among

contraries plainly took place from contraries? But now you appear to me to say, that this can never be the case.

Phaedo/ Upon this Socrates, after he had extended his head a little further, and had listened to his discourse, said;

Socrates/ You very manfully put me in mind; yet you do not understand the difference between what is now and what was then asserted. For then it was said, that a contrary thing was generated from a contrary; but now, that a contrary can never become contrary to itself, neither that contrary which subsists in us; nor that which subsists in nature. For then, my friend, we spoke concerning things which possess contraries, calling the contraries by the appellation of the things in which they reside; but now we speak of things which receive their denomination from the contraries residing in them. And we should never be willing to assert that these contraries receive a generation from one another.

Phaedo/ And at the same time, beholding Cebes, he said;

Socrates/ Did anything which has been said by this person disturb you also?

Cebes/ Indeed it did not; and at such a time as this there are not many things which can disturb me.

Socrates/ We ingenuously, therefore, assent to this, that a contrary can never become contrary to itself.

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But still further, consider whether you agree with me in this also. Do you call the hot and the cold anything?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ Are they the same with snow and fire?

Cebes/ They are not, by Zeus.

Socrates/ The hot, therefore, is something different from fire, and the cold from snow.

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But this also is, I think, apparent to you, that snow, as long as it is such, can never, by receiving heat, remain what it was before, viz. snow, and at the same time become hot; but, on the accession of heat, must either withdraw itself from it, or perish.

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And again, that fire, when cold approaches to it, must either depart or perish; but that it will never dare, by receiving coldness, still to remain what it was, i.e. fire, and yet be at the same time cold.

Cebes/ You speak truly.

Socrates/ But it happens to some of these, that not only the species itself is always thought worthy of the same appellation, but likewise something else, which is not indeed that species, but which perpetually possesses the form of it as long as it exists. But in the following instances my meaning will perhaps be more apparent: for the odd number ought always to possess that name by which we now call it: should it not?

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But is this the case with the odd number alone (for this is what I inquire)? or is there anything else which is not indeed the same with the odd, but yet which ought always to be called odd, together with its own proper name, because it naturally subsists in such a manner, that it can never desert the form of the odd? But this is no other than what happens to the number three, and many other things. For consider, does not the number three appear to you to be always called by its proper name, and at the same time by the name of the odd, though the odd is not the same as the triad? Yet the triad, and the pentad, and the entire half of number, naturally subsist in such a manner, that though

they are not the same as the odd, yet each of them is always odd. And again, two and four, and the whole other order of number, though they are not the same as the even, yet each of them is always even: do you admit this or not?

Cebes/ How should I not?

Socrates/ See then what I wish to evince. But it is as follows: It has appeared, not only that contraries do not receive one another, but that even such things as are not contrary to each other, and yet always possess contraries, do not appear to receive that idea which is contrary to the idea which they contain; but that on its approach they either perish or depart. Shall we not, therefore, say that three things would first perish, and endure anything whatever, sooner than sustain to be three things, and at the same time to be even?

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And yet the duad is not contrary to the triad.

Cebes/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Not only, therefore, do contrary species never sustain the approach of each other, but certain other things likewise cannot sustain the accession of contraries.

Cebes/ You speak most true.

Socrates/ Are you willing, therefore, that, if we are able, we should desire what kind of things these are?

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will they not then, Cebes, be such things as compel whatever they occupy, not only to retain their idea, but likewise not to receive a contrary to it?

Cebes/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Exactly as we just now said. For you know it is necessary, that whatever things the idea of three occupies should not only be three, but likewise odd.

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ To a thing of this kind, therefore, we assert, that an idea contrary to that form, through which it becomes what it is, will never approach.

Cebes/ It cannot.

Socrates/ But it becomes what it is through the odd: does it not?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But is not the contrary to this the idea of the even?

Cebes/ It is

Socrates/ The idea of the even, therefore, will never accede to three things.

Cebes/ Never.

Socrates/ Are not three things, therefore, destitute of the even?

Cebes/ Destitute.

Socrates/ The triad, therefore, is an odd number.

Cebes/ It is

Socrates/ The things which I mentioned then are defined, viz. such things, which, though they are not contrary to some particular nature, yet do not at the same time receive that which is contrary; just as the triad in the present instance, though it is not contrary to the even, yet does not anything more receive it on this account: For it always brings with it that which is contrary to the even; and in like manner the duad to the odd, and fire to cold, and an abundant multitude of other particulars. But see whether you would thus define, not only that a contrary does not receive a contrary, but likewise that the nature which brings with it a contrary to that to which it approaches, will never receive the contrariety of that which it introduces. But recollect

again, For it will not be useless to hear it repeated often. Five things will not receive the form of the even; neither will ten things, which are the double of five, receive the form of the odd. This, therefore, though it is itself contrary to something else, yet will not receive the form of the odd; nor will the sesquialter, nor other things of this kind, such as the half and the third part, ever receive the form of the whole, if you pursue and assent to these consequences.

Cebes/ I most vehemently pursue and assent to them.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, speak to me from the beginning; and this not by answering to what I inquire, but, in a different manner, imitating me. For I say this, in consequence of perceiving another mode of answering, arising from what has now been said, no less secure than that which was established at first. For, if you should ask me what that is, which, when inherent in any body, causes the body to be hot, I should not give you that cautious and unskillful answer, that it is heat, but one more elegant deduced from what we have just now said; I mean, that it is fire. Nor, if you should ask me what that is, which when inherent in a certain body, the body is diseased, I should not say that it is disease, but a fever. Nor, if you should ask what that is, which when inherent in a number, the number will be odd, I should not say that it is imparity, but unity, and in a similar manner in other particulars. But see whether you sufficiently understand my meaning.

Cebes/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ Answer me then, what that is, which when inherent in the body, the body will be alive?

Cebes/ Soul.

Socrates/ Is this then always the case?

Cebes/ How should it not?

Socrates/ Will soul, therefore, always introduce life to that which it occupies?

Cebes/ It will truly.

Socrates/ But is there anything contrary to life, or not?

Cebes/ There is

Socrates/ But what?

Cebes/ Death.

Socrates/ The soul, therefore, will never receive the contrary to that which it introduces, in consequence of what has been already admitted.

Cebes/ And this most vehemently so.

Socrates/ But what? how do we denominate that which does not receive the idea of the even?

Cebes/ Odd.

Socrates/ And how do we call that which does not receive justice, and that which does not receive music?

Cebes/ We call the one unjust, and the other unmusical.

Socrates/ Be it so. But what do we call that which does not receive death?

Cebes/ Immortal.

Socrates/ The soul does not receive death?

Cebes/ It does not.

Socrates/ The soul, therefore, is immortal.

Cebes/ Immortal.

Socrates/ Let it be so. And shall we say that this is now demonstrated? Or how does it appear to you?

Cebes/ It appears to me, Socrates, to be most sufficiently demonstrated.

Socrates/ What then, Cebes, if it were necessary to the odd that it should be free from destruction, would not three things be indestructible?

Cebes/ How should they not?

Socrates/ If, therefore, it was also necessary that a thing void of heat should be indestructible, when anyone should introduce heat to snow, would not the snow withdraw itself, base and unliquefied? For it would not perish; nor yet, abiding, would it receive the heat.

Cebes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ In like manner, I think if that which is void of cold was indestructible, that when anything cold approached to fire, the fire would neither be extinguished nor destroyed, but would depart free from damage.

Cebes/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Hence it is necessary to speak in this manner concerning that which is immortal: for, if that which is immortal is indestructible, it is impossible that the soul, when death approaches to it, should perish. For it follows, from what has been said, that it does not receive death, and of course it will never be dead. Just as we said, that three things will never be even, nor will this ever be the case with that which is odd: nor will fire ever be cold, nor yet the heat which is inherent in fire. But someone may say, What hinders but that the odd may never become the even, through the accession of the even, as we have confessed; and yet, when the odd is destroyed, the even may succeed instead of it? We cannot contend with him who makes this objection, that it is not destroyed: for the odd is not free from destruction; since, if this was granted to us, we might easily oppose the objection, and obtain this concession, that the odd and three things would depart, on the approach of the even; and we might contend in the same manner about fire and heat, and other particulars: might we not?

Cebes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And now, therefore, since we have confessed respecting that which is immortal, that it is indestructible, it must follow that the soul is, together with being immortal, likewise indestructible: but if this be not admitted, other arguments will be necessary for our conviction.

Cebes/ But there is no occasion for this. For it is scarcely possible that anything else should be void of corruption, if that which is immortal and eternal is subject to dissolution.

Socrates/ But I think that Divinity, and the form itself of life, and if anything else besides this is immortal, must be confessed by all beings to be entirely free from dissolution.

Cebes/ All men, indeed, by Zeus, must acknowledge this; and much more, as it appears to me, must it be admitted by the Gods.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, will not the soul, since it is immortal, be indestructible?

Cebes/ It is perfectly necessary.

Socrates/ When, therefore, death invades a man, the mortal part of him, as it appears, dies; but the immortal part departs safe and uncorrupted, and withdraws itself from death.

Cebes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ The soul, therefore, O Cebes, will, more than anything, be immortal and indestructible; and our souls will in reality subsist in Hades.

Cebes/ And therefore, Socrates, I have nothing further to object to these arguments, nor any reason why I should disbelieve their reality: but if either Simmias, or any person present, has anything to say, he will do well not to be silent: for I know not what other opportunity he can have, besides the present, if he wishes either to speak or hear about things of this kind.

Simmias/ But indeed I have nothing which can hinder my belief in what has been said. But yet on account of the magnitude of the things about which we have discoursed, and through my despising human imbecility, I am compelled to retain with myself an unbelief about what has been asserted.

Socrates/ Indeed, Simmias, you not only speak well in the present instance, but it is necessary that even those first hypotheses which we established, and which are believed by us, should at the same time be more clearly considered: and if you sufficiently investigate them you will follow reason, as it appears to me, in as great a degree as is possible to man. And if this becomes manifest, you will no longer make any further inquiry.

Simmias/ You speak true.

Socrates/ But it is just, my friends, to think that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care and attention, not only for the present time, in which we say it lives, but likewise with a view to the whole of time: and it will now appear, that he who neglects it must subject himself to a most dreadful danger. For, if death were the liberation of the whole man, it would be an unexpected gain to the wicked to be liberated at the same time from the body, and from their vices together with their soul: but now, since the soul appears to be immortal, no other flight from evils, and no other safety remains for it, than in becoming the best and most prudent possible. For when the soul arrives at Hades, it will possess nothing but discipline and education, which are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment to the dead, in the very beginning of their progression thither. For thus it is said: that the dæmon of each person, which was allotted to him while living, endeavors to lead each to a certain place, where it is necessary that all of them being collected together, after they have been judged, should proceed to

Hades, together with their leader, who is ordered to conduct them from hence thither. But there receiving the allotments proper to their condition, and abiding for a necessary time, another leader brings them back hither again, in many and long periods of time. The journey, therefore, is not such as Telephus asserts it to be in Æschylus. For he says that a simple path leads to Hades: but it appears to me that the path is neither simple nor one. For there would be no occasion of leaders, nor could anyone ever wander from the right road, if there was but one way. But now it appears to have many divisions and dubious turnings: and this I conjecture from our holy and legal rites. The soul, therefore, which is properly adorned with virtue, and which possesses prudence, willingly follows its leader, and is not ignorant of its present condition: but the soul which still adheres to body through desire (as I said before), being for a long space of time terrified about it, and struggling and suffering abundantly about the visible place, is with violence and great difficulty led away by its presiding dæmon. And when it arrives at that place where other souls are assembled, all the rest fly from and avoid this unpurified soul, which has been guilty either of unjust slaughter, or has perpetrated such deeds as are allied to this, and are the works of kindred souls; nor is anyone willing to become either its companion or leader. But such a soul wanders about, oppressed with every kind of anxiety and trouble, till certain periods of time are accomplished: and these being completed, it is driven by necessity to an abode accommodated to its nature. But the soul which has passed through life with purity and moderation, obtaining the Gods for its companions and leaders, will reside in a place adapted to its purified condition.

There are indeed many and admirable places belonging to the earth; and the earth itself is neither of such a kind, nor

of such a magnitude, as those who are accustomed to speak about it imagine, as I am persuaded from a certain person's account.

Simmias/ How is this, Socrates? For I myself also have heard many things about the earth; and yet perhaps not these particulars which have obtained your belief. I should therefore be glad to hear you relate them.

Socrates/ Indeed, Simmias, the art of Glaucus does not appear to me to be necessary, in order to relate these particulars; but to evince their truth, seems to me to be an undertaking beyond what the art of Glaucus can accomplish. Besides, I myself perhaps am not able to accomplish this; and even though I should know how, the time which is allotted me to live, Simmias, seems by no means sufficient for the length of such a discourse. However, nothing hinders me from informing you what I am persuaded is the truth, respecting the form of the earth, and the places which it contains.

Simmias/ And this information will be sufficient.

Socrates/ I am persuaded, therefore, in the first place, that if the earth is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a spherical figure, it has no occasion of air, nor of any other such-like necessity, to prevent it from falling: but that the perfect similitude of the heavens to themselves, and the equilibrium of the earth, are sufficient causes of its support. For that which is equally inclined, when placed in the middle of a similar nature, cannot tend more or less to one part than another; but, subsisting on all sides similarly affected, it will remain free from all inclination. This is the first thing of which I am persuaded.

Simmias/ And very properly so.

Socrates/ But yet further, that the earth is prodigiously great; that we who dwell in places extending from Phasis to

the pillars of Hercules, inhabit only a certain small portion of it, about the Mediterranean sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh; and that there are many others elsewhere, who dwell in many such-like places. For I am persuaded, that there are everywhere about the earth many hollow places of all-various forms and magnitudes; into which there is a confluence of water, mists, and air: but that the earth itself, which is of a pure nature, is situated in the pure heavens, in which the stars are contained, and which most of those who are accustomed to speak about such particulars denominate æther. But the places which we inhabit are nothing more than the dregs of this pure earth, or cavities into which its dregs continually flow. We are ignorant, therefore, that we dwell in the cavities of this earth, and imagine that we inhabit its upper parts, Just as if someone dwelling in the middle bottom of the sea, should think that he resided on its surface, and, beholding the sun and the other stars through the water, should imagine that the sea is the heavens; but through sloth and imbecility having never ascended to the top of the sea, nor emerged from its deeps into this region, has never perceived how much purer and more beautiful it is than the place which he inhabits, nor has received this information from any other who has beheld this place of our abode. In the very same manner are we affected: for, dwelling in a certain hollow of the earth, we think that we reside on its surface; and we call the air heaven, as if the stars passed through this, as through the heavens themselves. And this likewise, in the same manner as in the above instance, happens to us through our imbecility and sloth, which render us incapable of ascending to the summit of the air. For, otherwise, if anyone could arrive at its summit, or, becoming winged, could fly thither, he would be seen emerging from hence; and just as fishes, emerging hither from the sea, perceive what our region

contains, in the same manner would he behold the several particulars belonging to the summit of the earth. And besides this, if his nature was sufficient for such an elevated survey, he would know that the heavens which he there beheld were the true heavens, and that he perceived the true light and the true earth. For this earth which we inhabit, the stones which it contains, and the whole region of our abode, are all corrupted and gnawed, just as thing is in the sea are corroded by the salt: for nothing worthy of estimation grows in the sea, nor does it contain anything perfect; but caverns and sand, and immense quantities of mud and filth, are found in it wherever there is earth. Nor are its contents to be by any means compared with the beauty of the various particulars in our place of abode. But those upper regions of the earth will appear to be yet far more excellent than these which we inhabit. For, if it is proper to tell you a beautiful fable, it is well worth hearing, Simmias, what kind of places those are on the upper earth, situated under the heavens.

It is reported then, my friend, in the first place, that this earth, if anyone surveys it from on high, appears like globes covered with twelve skins, various, and distinguished with colors; a pattern of which are the colors found among us; and which our painters use. But there the whole earth is composed from materials of this kind, and such as are much more splendid and pure than our region contains: for they are partly indeed purple, and endued with a wonderful beauty; partly of as golden color; and partly more white than plaster or snow; and are composed from other colors in a similar manner, and those more in number and more beautiful than any we have ever beheld. For the hollow parts of this pure earth, being filled with water and air, exhibit a certain species of color, shining among the variety of other colors in such a manner, that one particular various form, of the earth continually presents itself to the view. Hence,

whatever grows in this earth grows analogous to its nature, such as trees, and flowers, and fruits: and again, its mountains and stones possess a similar perfection and transparency, and are rendered beautiful through various colors; of which the stones so much honored by us in this place of our abode are but small parts, such as sardin-stones, jaspers, and emeralds, and all of this kind. But there nothing subsists which is not of such a nature as I have described; and there are other things far more beautiful than even these. But the reason of this is because the stones there are pure, and not consumed and corrupted, like ours, through rottenness and salt, from a conflux of various particulars, which in our places of abode cause filthiness and disease to the stones and earth, animals and plants, which are found among us. But this pure earth is adorned with all these, and with gold and silver, and other things of a similar nature: for all these are naturally apparent, since they are both numerous and large, and are diffused everywhere throughout the earth; so that to behold it is the spectacle of blessed spectators. This earth too contains many other animals and men, some of whom inhabit its middle parts; others dwell about the air, as we do about the sea; and others reside in islands which the air flows round, and which are situated not far from the continent. And in one word, what water and the sea are to us, with respect to utility, that air is to them: but what air is to us, that æther is to the inhabitants of this pure earth. But the seasons there are endued with such an excellent temperament, that the inhabitants are never molested with disease, and live for a much longer time than those who dwell in our regions; and they surpass us in sight, hearing, and prudence, and everything of this kind, as much as air excels water in purity—and æther, air. And besides this, they have groves and temples of the Gods, in which the Gods dwell in reality;

and likewise oracles and divinations, and sensible perceptions of the Gods, and such-like associations with them. The sun too, and moon, and stars, are seen by them such as they really are; and in every other respect their felicity is of a correspondent nature.

And in this manner indeed the whole earth naturally subsists, and the parts which are situated about it. But it contains about the whole of its ambit many places in its concavities; some of which are more profound and extended than the region which we inhabit: but others are more profound, indeed, but yet have a less chasm than the places of our abode; and there are certain parts which are less profound, but broader than ours. But all these are in many places perforated into one another under the earth, according to narrower and broader avenues, and have passages of communication through which a great quantity of water flows into the different hollows of the earth, as into bowls; and besides this, there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the earth, and of hot and cold waters; likewise a great quantity of fire, mighty rivers of fire, and many of moist mire, some of which are purer, and others more muddy; as in Sicily there are rivers of mud, which flow before a stream of fire, which is itself a flaming torrent. And from these the several places are filled, into which each flows at particular times. But all these are moved upwards and downwards, like a hanging vessel, situated in the earth. This hanging vessel too, through a certain nature of this kind, is one of the chasms of the earth; and this the greatest, and totally perforated through the whole earth. And of this Homer thus speaks:

> Far, very far, where under earth is found
> A gulf, of every depth, the most profound.

which he elsewhere and many other poets denominate Tartarus. For into this chasm there is a conflux of all rivers,

from which they again flow upwards. But each derives its quality from the earth through which it flows, And the reason why they all flow into, and again out of this chasm, is because this moisture cannot find either a bottom or a basis. Hence it becomes elevated, and fluctuates upwards and downwards: and this too is the case with, the air and spirit which are situated about it. For they follow this moisture, both when they are impelled to more remote places of the earth, and when to the places of our abode. And as in respiration the flowing breath is perpetually expired and inspired, so there the spirit, which is elevated together with the moisture, causes certain vehement and immense winds during its ingress and departure. When the water, therefore, being impelled, flows into that place which we call downwards, then the rivers flow through the earth into different channels, and fill them; just as those who pour into another vessel the water which they have drawn. But when this water, departing from thence, is impelled; hither, it again fills the rivers, on the earth; and these, when filled, flow through channels and through the earth; and when they have severally passed through the avenues, which are open to each, they produce seas, lakes, rivers, and fountains. Flowing back again from hence under the earth, and some of them streaming round longer and more numerous places, but others round such as are shorter and less numerous, they again hurl themselves into Tartarus; and some indeed much more profoundly, but others less so, than they were drawn: but the influxions of all of them are deeper than the places from which they flow upwards. And the effluxions of some are in a direction contrary to their influxions, but in others both take place according to the same part. There are some again which entirely flow round in a circle, folding themselves like snakes, once or often about the earth; and being bent downwards as much as

possible, they are again, hurled forth on each side till they arrive at the middle, but never beyond this, For each part of the earth becomes steep to both these streams.

The other rivers, indeed, are many, great, and various: but among this abundance there are certain streams, four in number, of which the greatest, and which circularly flows round the earth the outermost of all, is called the Ocean. But that which flows opposite, and in a contrary direction to this, is Acheron; which, flowing through other solitary places, and under the earth, devolves its waters into the Acherusian marsh, into which many souls of the dead pass; and abiding there for certain destined spaces of time, some of which are more and others less extended, they are again sent into the generations of animals. The third river of these hurls itself forth in the middle, and near its source falls into a mighty place, burning with abundance of fire, and produces a sake greater than our sea, and hot with water and mud. But it proceeds from hence in a circle, turbulent and miry, and, surrounding the earth, arrives both elsewhere and at the extremities of the Acherusian marsh, with the water of which it does not become mingled; but, often revolving itself under the earth, flows into the more downward parts of Tartarus. And this is the river which they still denominate Pyriphlegethon; the streams of which send forth dissevered rivers to various parts of the earth. But the fourth river, which is opposite to this, first falls as it is said into a place dreadful and wild, and wholly tinged with an azure color, which they denominate Styx: and the influxive streams of this river form the Stygian marsh. But falling into this, and receiving vehement powers in its water, it hides itself under the earth, and, rolling round, proceeds contrary to Pyriphlegethon, and meets with it in the Acherusian marsh, in a contrary direction. Nor is the water of this river mingled with anything, but, revolving in a circle, it hurls itself into

Tartarus, in a course opposite to Pyriphlegethon. But its name, according to the poets, is Cocytus.

These being thus naturally constructed, when the dead arrive at that place into which the dæmon leads each, in the first place they are judged, as well those who have lived in a becoming manner, and piously, and justly, as those who have not. And those who appear to have passed a middle kind of life, proceeding to Acheron, and ascending the vehicles prepared for them arrive in these at the Acherusian lake, and dwell there; till being purified, and having suffered punishment for any injuries they may have committed, they are enlarged; and each receives the reward of his beneficence, according to his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable, through the magnitude of their offences, because they have perpetrated either many and great sacrileges, or many unjust slaughters, and such as are contrary to law, or other things of this kind—these, a destiny adapted to their guilt hurls into Tartarus, from which they will never be discharged. But those who are found to have committed curable, but yet mighty crimes, such as those who have been guilty through anger of any violence against their father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their lives penitent for the offence, or who have become homicides in any other similar manner; with respect to these, it is necessary that they should fall into Tartarus: but after they have fallen, and have dwelt there for a year, the waves hurl them out of Tartarus; and the homicides indeed into Cocytus, but the violators of fathers and mothers into Pyriphlegethon. But when, being borne along by these rivers, they arrive at the Acherusian marsh, they here bellow and invoke one part those whom they have slaughtered, and another part those whom they have injured. But, invoking these, they suppliantly entreat that they would suffer them to enter into the lake, and forgive them. And if they persuade

them to do this, they depart, and find an end to their maladies: but if they are unable to accomplish this, they are carried back again into Tartarus, and from thence again into the rivers. And they do not cease from suffering this, till they have persuaded those they have injured to forgiveness. For this punishment was ordained them by the judges. But those who shall appear to have lived most excellently, with respect to piety—these are they, who, being liberated and dismissed from these places in the earth, as from the abodes of a prison, shall arrive at the pure habitation on high, and dwell on the ætherial earth. And among these, those who are sufficiently purified by philosophy shall live without bodies, through the whole of the succeeding time, and shall arrive at habitations yet more beautiful than these, which it is neither easy to describe, nor is the present time sufficient for such an undertaking.

But for the sake of these particulars which we have related, we should undertake everything, Simmias, that we may participate of virtue and prudence in the present life. For the reward is beautiful, and the hope mighty. To affirm, indeed, that these things subsist exactly as I have described them is not the province of a man endued with intellect. But to assert that either these or certain particulars of this kind take place, with respect to our souls and their habitations—since our soul appears to be immortal—this is, I think, both becoming, and deserves to be hazarded by him who believes in its reality. For the danger is beautiful; and it is necessary to allure ourselves with things of this kind, as with enchantments: and, on this account, I produced the fable which you have just now heard me relate. But, for the sake of these, it is proper that the man should be confident about his soul, who in the present life bidding farewell to those pleasures which regard the body and its ornaments, as things foreign from his nature, has earnestly applied himself

to disciplines, as things of far greater consequence; and who having adorned his soul not with a foreign but its own proper ornament, viz. with temperance and justice, fortitude, liberty and truth, expects a migration to Hades, as one who is ready to depart whenever he shall be called upon by Fate. You, therefore, Simmias and Cebes, and the rest who are here assembled, will each depart in some period of time posterior to the present; but

Me now calling, Fate demands:

(as some tragic poet would say) and it is almost time that I should betake myself to the bath. For it appears to me better to wash myself before I drink the poison, and not to trouble the women with washing my dead body.

Phaedo/ When, therefore, he had thus spoken;

Crito/ Be it so, Socrates: but what orders do you leave to these who are present, or to myself, or respecting your children, or anything else in the execution of which we can particularly oblige you?

Socrates/ None such as are new, Crito, but that which I have always said to you; that if you take care of yourselves, you will always perform in whatever you do that which is acceptable to myself, to my family, and to your own selves, though you should not promise me anything at present. But if you neglect yourselves, and are unwilling to live according to what has been now and formerly said, as vestiges of direction in your course, you will accomplish nothing, though you should now promise many things, and in a very vehement manner.

Crito/ We shall take care, therefore, to act as you desire. But how would you be buried?

Socrates/ Just as you please, if you can but catch me, and I do not elude your pursuit.

Phaedo/ And at the same time gently laughing, and addressing himself to us;

Socrates/ I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that I am that Socrates who now disputes with you, and methodizes every part of the discourse; but he thinks that I am he whom he will shortly behold dead, and asks how I ought to be buried. But all that long discourse which some time since I addressed to you, in which I asserted that after I had drunk the poison I should no longer remain with you, but should depart to certain felicities of the blessed, this I seem to have declared to him in vain, though it was undertaken to console both you and myself. Promise, therefore, for me to Crito, just the contrary of what he promised to my judges. For he promised that I should not run away; but do you engage that when I die I shall not stay with you, but shall depart and entirely leave you; that Crito may more easily bear this separation, and may not be afflicted when he sees my body either burnt or buried, as if I suffered some dreadful misfortune; and that he may not say at my interment, that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or is buried. For be well assured of this, excellent Crito, that when we do not speak in a becoming manner, we are not only culpable with respect to our speech, but likewise affect our souls with a certain evil. But it is proper to be confident, and to say that my body will be buried, and in such a manner as is pleasing to you, and which you think is most agreeable to our laws.

Phaedo/ When he had thus spoken he rose, and went into a certain room, that he might wash himself, and Crito followed him: but he ordered us to wait for him. We waited, therefore, accordingly, discoursing over and reviewing among ourselves what had been said; and sometimes speaking about his death, how great a calamity it would be to us; and sincerely thinking that we, like those who are deprived of their father, should pass the rest of our life in

the condition of orphans. But when he had washed himself, his sons were brought to him (for he had two little ones, and one considerably advanced in age), and the women belonging to his family likewise came in to him: but when he had spoken to them before Crito, and had left them such injunctions as he thought proper, he ordered the boys and women to depart; and he himself returned to us. And it was now near the setting of the sun: for he had been absent for a long time in the bathing-room. But when he came in from washing, he sat down; and did not speak much afterwards. For then the servant of the eleven magistrates came in, and standing near him;

Jailer/ I do not perceive that in you, Socrates, which I have taken notice of in others; I mean, that they are angry with me, and curie me, when, being compelled by the magistrates, I announce to them that they must drink the poison. But, on the contrary, I have found you at the present time to be the most generous, mild, and the best of all the men that ever came into this place: and, therefore, I am well convinced that you are not angry with me, but with the authors of your present condition. You know those whom I allude to. Now, therefore (for you know what I came to tell you), farewell, and endeavor to bear this necessity as easily as possible.

Phaedo/ And at the same time bursting into tears, and turning himself away, he departed. But Socrates looking after him;

Socrates/ And thou too, farewell; and we shall take care to act as you advise.

Phaedo/ And at the same time turning to us;

Socrates/ How courteous is the behavior of that man! During the whole time of my abode here, he has visited and often conversed with me, and proved himself to be the best

of men; and now how generously he weeps on my account! But let us obey him, Crito, and let someone bring the poison, if it is bruised; but if not, let the man whose business it is bruise it himself.

Crito/ But, Socrates, I think that the sun still hangs over the mountains, and is not yet set. And at the same time I have known others who have drunk the poison very late, after it was announced to them; who have supped and drunk abundantly; and who have enjoyed the objects of their love. Therefore, do not be in such haste; for there is yet time enough.

Socrates/ Such men, Crito, act with great propriety in the manner you have described (for they think to derive some advantage by so doing), and I also with great propriety shall not act in this manner. For I do not think I shall gain anything by drinking it later, except becoming ridiculous to myself through desiring to live, and being sparing of life when nothing of it any longer remains. Go, then, be persuaded, and comply with my request.

Phaedo/ Then Crito, hearing this, gave the sign to the boy that stood near him. And the boy departing, and having staid for some time, came, bringing with him the person that was to administer the poison, and who brought it properly prepared in a cup. But Socrates, beholding the man

Socrates/ It is well, my friend; but what is proper to do with it? for you are knowing in these affairs.

Jailer/ You have nothing else to do, but when you have drunk it to walk about, till a heaviness takes place in your legs; and afterwards lie down: this is the manner in which you should act.

Phaedo/ And at the same time he extended the cup to Socrates. But Socrates received it from him and indeed, Echecrates, with great cheerfulness; neither trembling, nor

suffering any alteration for the worse in his color or countenance: but, as he was accustomed to do, beholding the man with a bull-like aspect;

Socrates/ What say you respecting this potion? Is it lawful to make a libation of it, or not?

Jailer/ We only bruise, Socrates, as much as we think sufficient for the purpose.

Socrates/ I understand you: but it is certainly both lawful and proper to pray to the Gods, that my departure from hence thither may be attended with prosperous fortune; which I entreat them to grant may be the case.

Phaedo/ And at the same time ending his discourse, he drank the poison with exceeding facility and alacrity. And thus far, indeed, the greater part of us were tolerably well able to refrain from weeping: but when we saw him drinking, and that he had drunk it, we could no longer restrain our tears. But from me, indeed, notwithstanding the violence which I employed in checking them they flowed abundantly; so that, covering myself with my mantle, I deplored my misfortune. I did not indeed weep for him, but for my own fortune; considering what an associate I should be deprived of. But Crito, who was not able to restrain his tears, was compelled to rise before me. And Apollodorus, who during the whole time prior to this had not ceased from weeping, then wept aloud with great bitterness; so that he infected all who were present, except Socrates. But Socrates, upon seeing this, exclaimed;

Socrates/ What are you doing, excellent men? For, indeed, I principally sent away the women, lest they should produce a disturbance of this kind. For I have heard that it is proper to die joyfully and with propitious omens. Be quiet, therefore, and summon fortitude to your assistance.

Phaedo/ When we heard this we blushed, and restrained our tears. But he, when he found during his walking that his legs felt heavy, and had told us so, said himself down in a supine position. For the man had ordered him to do so. And at the same time he who gave him the poison, touching him at intervals, considered his feet and legs. And after he had vehemently pressed his foot, he asked him if he felt it. But Socrates answered he did not. And after this he again pressed his thighs: and thus ascending with his hand, he showed us that he was cold and stiff. And Socrates also touched himself, and said, that when the poison reached his heart he should then leave us. But now his lower belly was almost cold; when uncovering himself (for he was covered), he said (which were his last words):

Socrates/ Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius. Discharge this debt, therefore, for me, and do not neglect it.

Crito/ It shall be done: but consider whether you have any other commands.

Phaedo/ To this inquiry of Crito he made no reply; but shortly after moved himself, and the man covered him. And Socrates fixed his eyes. Which when Crito perceived, he closed his mouth and eyes. This, Echecrates, was the end of our associate; a man, as it appears to me, the best of those whom we were acquainted with at that time, and, besides this, the most prudent and just.

THE END OF THE PHÆDO.

Phaedo.

Translated by Hugh Tredennich. 1954

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Phaedo, Echecrates, Crito, Cebes, Simmias, Apollodorus, Attendant, Xanthippe, Someone, Jailer

Echecrates/ Were you there with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, when he was executed, or did you hear about it from somebody else?

Phaedo/ No, I was there myself, Echecrates.

Echecrates/ Then what did the master say before he died, and how did he meet his end? I should very much like to know. None of the people in Phlius go to Athens much in these days, and it is a long time since we had any visitor from there who could give us any definite information, except that he was executed by drinking hemlock. Nobody could tell us anything more than that.

Phaedo/ Then haven't you even heard how his trial went?

Echecrates/ Yes, someone told us about that, and we were surprised because there was obviously a long interval between it and the execution. How was that, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ A fortunate coincidence, Echecrates. It so happened that on the day before the trial they had just finished garlanding the stern of the ship which Athens sends to Delos.

Echecrates/ What ship is that?

Phaedo/ The Athenians say that it is the one in which Theseus sailed away to Crete with the seven youths and seven maidens, and saved their lives and his own as well. The story says that the Athenians made a vow to Apollo that if these young people's lives were saved they would send a

solemn mission to Delos every year, and ever since then they have kept their vow to the god, right down to the present day. They have a law that as soon as this mission begins the city must be kept pure, and no public executions may take place until the ship has reached Delos and returned again, which sometimes takes a long time, if the winds happen to hold it back. The mission is considered to begin as soon as the priest of Apollo has garlanded the stern of the ship, and this happened, as I say, on the day before the trial. That is why Socrates spent such a long time in prison between his trial and execution.

Echecrates/ But what about the actual circumstances of his death, Phaedo? What was said and done, and which of the master's companions were with him? Or did the authorities refuse them admission, so that he passed away without a friend at his side?

Phaedo/ Oh no, some of them were there—quite a number, in fact.

Echecrates/ I wish you would be kind enough to give us a really detailed account—unless you are pressed for time.

Phaedo/ No, not at all. I will try to describe it for you. Nothing gives me more pleasure than recalling the memory of Socrates, either by talking myself or by listening to someone else.

Echecrates/ Well, Phaedo, you will find that your audience feels just the same about it. Now try to describe every detail as carefully as you can.

Phaedo/ In the first place, my own feelings at the time were quite extraordinary. It never occurred to me to feel sorry for him, as you might have expected me to feel at the deathbed of a very dear friend. The master seemed quite happy, Echecrates, both in his manner and in what he said; he met his death so fearlessly and nobly. I could not help

feeling that even on his way to the other world he would be under the providence of God, and that when he arrived there all would be well with him, if it ever has been so with anybody. So I felt no sorrow at all, as you might have expected on such a solemn occasion, and at the same time I felt no pleasure at being occupied in our usual philosophical discussions—that was the form that our conversation took. I felt an absolutely incomprehensible emotion, a sort of curious blend of pleasure and pain combined, as my mind took it in that in a little while my friend was going to die. All of us who were there were affected in much the same way, between laughing and crying; one of us in particular, Apollodorus—you know what he is like, don't you?

Echecrates/ Of course I do.

Phaedo/ Well, he quite lost control of himself, and I and the others were very much upset.

Echecrates/ Who were actually there, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ Why, of the local people there were this man Apollodorus, and Critobulus and his father, and then there were Hermogenes and Epigenes and Aeschines and Antisthenes. Oh yes, and Ctesippus of Paeania, and Menexenus, and some other local people. I believe that Plato was ill.

Echecrates/ Were there any visitors from outside?

Phaedo/ Yes, Simmias of Thebes, with Cebes and Phaedondas, and Euclides and Terpsion from Megara.

Echecrates/ Why, weren't Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

Phaedo/ No, they were in Aegina, apparently.

Echecrates/ Was there anybody else?

Phaedo/ I think that's about all.

Echecrates/ Well, what form did the discussion take?

Phaedo/ I will try to tell you all about it from the very beginning. We had all made it our regular practice, even in the period before, to visit Socrates every day. We used to meet at daybreak by the courthouse where the trial was held, because it was close to the prison. We always spent some time in conversation while we waited for the door to open, which was never very early, and when it did open, we used to go in to see Socrates, and generally spent the day with him. On this particular day we met earlier than usual, because when we left the prison on the evening before, we heard that the boat had just arrived back from Delos; so we urged one another to meet at the same place as early as possible. When we arrived, the porter, instead of letting us in as usual, told us to wait and not to come in until he gave us the word. The commissioners are taking off Socrates' chains, he said, and warning him that he is to die today.

After a short interval he came back and told us to go in. When we went inside we found Socrates just released from his chains, and Xanthippe—you know her! —sitting by him with the little boy on her knee. As soon as Xanthippe saw us she broke out into the sort of remark you would expect from a woman;

Xanthippe/ Oh, Socrates, this is the last time that you and your friends will be able to talk together!

Phaedo/ Socrates looked at Crito.

Socrates/ Crito, someone had better take her home.

Phaedo/ Some of Crito's servants led her away crying hysterically. Socrates sat up on the bed and drew up his leg and massaged it, saying as he did so;

Socrates/ What a queer thing it is, my friends, this sensation which is popularly called pleasure! It is remarkable how closely it is connected with its conventional opposite, pain. They will never come to a man both at once,

but if you pursue one of them and catch it, you are nearly always compelled to have the other as well; they are like two bodies attached to the same head. I am sure that if Aesop had thought of it he would have made up a fable about them, something like this—God wanted to stop their continual quarreling, and when he found that it was impossible, he fastened their heads together; so wherever one of them appears, the other is sure to follow after. That is exactly what seems to be happening to me. I had a pain in my leg from the fetter, and now I feel the pleasure coming that follows it.

Phaedo/ Here Cebes broke in and said;

Cebes/ Oh yes, Socrates, I am glad you reminded me. Evenus asked me a day or two ago, as others have done before, about the lyrics which you have been composing lately by a adapting Aesop's fables and 'The Prelude' to Apollo. He wanted to know what induced you to write them now after you had gone to prison, when you had never done anything of the kind before. If you would like me to be able to answer Evenus when he asks me again—as I am sure he will—tell me what I am to say.

Socrates/ Tell him the truth, that I did not compose them to rival either him or his poetry—which I knew would not be easy. I did it in the attempt to discover the meaning of certain dreams, and to clear my conscience, in case this was the art which I had been told to practice. It is like this, you see. In the course of my life I have often had the same dream, appearing in different forms at different times, but always saying the same thing, 'Socrates, practice and cultivate the arts.' In the past I used to think that it was impelling and exhorting me to do what I was actually doing; I mean that the dream, like a spectator encouraging a runner in a race, was urging me on to do what I was doing already, that is, practicing the arts, because philosophy is the greatest of the arts, and I was practicing it. But ever since my trial, while

the festival of the god has been delaying my execution, I have felt that perhaps it might be this popular form of art that the dream intended me to practice, in which case I ought to practice it and not disobey. I thought it would be safer not to take my departure before I had cleared my conscience by writing poetry and so obeying the dream. I began with some verses in honor of the god whose festival it was. When I had finished my hymn, I reflected that a poet, if he is to be worthy of the name, ought to work on imaginative themes, not descriptive ones, and I was not good at inventing stories. So I availed myself of some of Aesop's fables which were ready to hand and familiar to me, and I versified the first of them that suggested themselves. You can tell Evenus this, Cebes, and bid him farewell from me, and tell him, if he is wise, to follow me as quickly as he can. I shall be going today, it seems; those are my country's orders.

Simmias/ What a piece of advice for Evenus, Socrates! I have had a good deal to do with him before now, and from what I know of him he will not be at all ready to obey you.

Socrates/ Why? Isn't Evenus a philosopher?

Simmias/ So I believe.

Socrates/ Well then, he will be quite willing, just like anyone else who is properly grounded in philosophy. However, he will hardly do himself violence, because they say that it is not legitimate.

Phaedo/ As he spoke he lowered his feet to the ground, and sat like this for the rest of the discussion.

Cebes now asked him;

Cebes/ Socrates, what do you mean by saying that it is not legitimate to do oneself violence, although a philosopher will be willing to follow a friend who dies?

Socrates/ Why, Cebes, have you and Simmias never heard about these things while you have been with Philolaus?

Cebes/ Nothing definite, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, even my information is only based on hearsay, but I don't mind at all telling you what I have heard. I suppose that for one who is soon to leave this world there is no more suitable occupation than inquiring into our views about the future life, and trying to imagine what it is like. What else can one do in the time before sunset?

Cebes/ Tell me then, Socrates, what are the grounds for saying that suicide is not legitimate? I have heard it described as wrong before now, as you suggested, both by Philolaus, when he was staying with us, and by others as well, but I have never yet heard any definite explanation for it.

Socrates/ Well, you must not lose heart. Perhaps you will hear one someday. However, no doubt you will feel it strange that this should be the one question that has an unqualified answer—I mean, if it never happens in the case of life and death, as it does in all other connections, that sometimes and for some people death is better than life. And it probably seems strange to you that it should not be right for those to whom death would be an advantage to benefit themselves, but that they should have to await the services of someone else.

Phaedo/ Cebes laughed gently and, dropping into his own dialect, said;

Cebes/ Aye, that it does.

Socrates/ Yes, put in that way it certainly might seem unreasonable, though perhaps it has some justification. The allegory which the mystics tell us—that we men are put in a sort of guard post, from which one must not release oneself

or run away—seems to me to be a high doctrine with difficult implications. All the same, Cebes, I believe that this much is true, that the gods are our keepers, and we men are one of their possessions. Don't you think so?

Cebes/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Then take your own case. If one of your possessions were to destroy itself without intimation from you that you wanted it to die, wouldn't you be angry with it and punish it, if you had any means of doing so?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So if you look at it in this way I suppose it is not unreasonable to say that we must not put an end to ourselves until God sends some compulsion like the one which we are facing now.

Cebes/ That seems likely, I admit. But what you were saying just now, that philosophers would be readily willing to die—that seems illogical, Socrates, assuming that we were right in saying a moment ago that God is our keeper and we are his possessions. If this service is directed by the gods, who are the very best of masters, it is inexplicable that the very wisest of men should not be grieved at quitting it, because he surely cannot expect to provide for himself any better when he is free. On the other hand a stupid person might get the idea that it would be to his advantage to escape from his master. He might not reason it out that one should not escape from a good master, but remain with him as long as possible, and so he might run away unreflectingly. A sensible man would wish to remain always with his superior. If you look at it in this way, Socrates, the probable thing is just the opposite of what we said just now. It is natural for the wise to be grieved when they die, and for fools to be happy.

Phaedo/ When Socrates had listened to this he seemed to me to be amused at Cebes' persistence, and looking round at us he said;

Socrates/ You know, Cebes is always investigating arguments, and he is not at all willing to accept every statement at its face value.

Simmias/ Well, but, Socrates, I think that this time there is something in what he says. Why should a really wise man want to desert masters who are better than himself, and to get rid of them so lightly? I think Cebes is aiming his criticism at you, because you are making so light of leaving us, and the gods too, who as you admit are good masters.

Socrates/ What you and Cebes say is perfectly fair. You mean, I suppose, that I must make a formal defense against this charge.

Simmias/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Very well then, let me try to make a more convincing defense to you than I made at my trial. If I did not expect to enter the company, first, of other wise and good gods, and secondly of men now dead who are better than those who are in this world now, it is true that I should be wrong in not grieving at death. As it is, you can be assured that I expect to find myself among good men. I would not insist particularly on this point, but on the other I assure you that I shall insist most strongly—that I shall find there divine masters who are supremely good. That is why I am not so much distressed as I might be, and why I have a firm hope that there is something in store for those who have died, and, as we have been told for many years, something much better for the good than for the wicked.

Simmias/ Well, what is your idea, Socrates? Do you mean to keep this knowledge to yourself now that you are leaving us, or will you communicate it to us too? I think that

we ought to have a share in this comfort; besides, it will serve as your defense, if we are satisfied with what you say.

Socrates/ Very well, I will try. But before I begin, Crito here seems to have been wanting to say something for some time. Let us find out what it is.

Crito/ Only this, Socrates, that the man who is to give you the poison has been asking me for a long time to tell you to talk as little as possible. He says that talking makes you heated, and that you ought not to do anything to affect the action of the poison. Otherwise it is sometimes necessary to take a second dose, or even a third.

Socrates/ That is his affair. Let him make his own preparations for administering it twice or three times if necessary.

Crito/ I was pretty sure you would say that, but he's been bothering me for a long time.

Socrates/ Never mind him. Now for you, my jury. I want to explain to you how it seems to me natural that a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy should be cheerful in the face of death, and confident of finding the greatest blessing in the next world when his life is finished. I will try to make clear to you, Simmias and Cebes, how this can be so.

Ordinary people seem not to realize that those who really apply themselves in the right way to philosophy are directly and of their own accord preparing themselves for dying and death. If this is true, and they have actually been looking forward to death all their lives, it would of course be absurd to be troubled when the thing comes for which they have so long been preparing and looking forward.

Phaedo/ Simmias laughed and said;

Simmias/ Upon my word, Socrates, you have made me laugh, though I was not at all in the mood for it. I am sure

that if they heard what you said, most people would think—and our fellow countrymen would heartily agree—that it was a very good hit at the philosophers to say that they are half dead already, and that they, the normal people, are quite aware that death would serve the philosophers right.

Socrates/ And they would be quite correct, Simmias—except in thinking that they are 'quite aware.' They are not at all aware in what sense true philosophers are half dead, or in what sense they deserve death, or what sort of death they deserve. But let us dismiss them and talk among ourselves. Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?

Phaedo/ Taking up the role of answering, Simmias said;

Simmias/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Is it simply the release of the soul from the body? Is death nothing more or less than this, the separate condition of the body by itself when it is released from the soul, and the separate condition by itself of the soul when released from the body? Is death anything else than this?

Simmias/ No, just that.

Socrates/ Well then, my boy, see whether you agree with me. I fancy that this will help us to find out the answer to our problem. Do you think that it is right for a philosopher to concern himself with the so-called pleasures connected with food and drink?

Simmias/ Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ What about sexual pleasures?

Simmias/ No, not at all.

Socrates/ And what about the other attentions that we pay to our bodies? Do you think that a philosopher attaches any importance to them? I mean things like providing himself with smart clothes and shoes and other bodily ornaments; do you think that he values them or despises

them—in so far as there is no real necessity for him to go in for that sort of thing?

Simmias/ I think the true philosopher despises them.

Socrates/ Then it is your opinion in general that a man of this kind is not concerned with the body, but keeps his attention directed as much as he can away from it and toward the soul?

Simmias/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ So it is clear first of all in the case of physical pleasures that the philosopher frees his soul from association with the body, so far as is possible, to a greater extent than other men?

Simmias/ It seems so.

Socrates/ And most people think, do they not, Simmias, that a man who finds no pleasure and takes no part in these things does not deserve to live, and that anyone who thinks nothing of physical pleasures has one foot in the grave?

Simmias/ That is perfectly true.

Socrates/ Now take the acquisition of knowledge. Is the body a hindrance or not, if one takes it into partnership to share an investigation?

What I mean is this. Is there any certainty in human sight and hearing, or is it true, as the poets are always dinning into our ears, that we neither hear nor see anything accurately? Yet if these senses are not clear and accurate, the rest can hardly be so, because they are all inferior to the first two. Don't you agree?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then when is it that the soul attains to truth? When it tries to investigate anything with the help of the body, it is obviously led astray.

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Is it not in the course of reflection, if at all, that the soul gets a clear view of facts?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Surely the soul can best reflect when it is free of all distractions such as hearing or sight or pain or pleasure of any kind—that is, when it ignores the body and becomes as far as possible independent, avoiding all physical contacts and associations as much as it can, in its search for reality.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then here too—in despising the body and avoiding it, and endeavoring to become independent—the philosopher's soul is ahead of all the rest.

Simmias/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Here are some more questions, Simmias. Do we recognize such a thing as absolute uprightness?

Simmias/ Indeed we do.

Socrates/ And absolute beauty and goodness too?

Simmias/ Of course.

Socrates/ Have you ever seen any of these things with your eyes?

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well, have you ever apprehended them with any other bodily sense? By 'them' I mean not only absolute tallness or health or strength, but the real nature of any given thing—what it actually is. Is it through the body that we get the truest perception of them? Isn't it true that in any inquiry you are likely to attain more nearly to knowledge of your object in proportion to the care and accuracy with which you have prepared yourself to understand that object in itself?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Don't you think that the person who is likely to succeed in this attempt most perfectly is the one who approaches each object, as far as possible, with the unaided intellect, without taking account of any sense of sight in his thinking, or dragging any other sense into his reckoning—the man who pursues the truth by applying his pure and unadulterated thought to the pure and unadulterated object, cutting himself off as much as possible from his eyes and ears and virtually all the rest of his body, as an impediment which by its presence prevents the soul from attaining to truth and clear thinking? Is not this the person, Simmias, who will reach the goal of reality, if anybody can?

Simmias/ What you say is absolutely true, Socrates.

Socrates/ All these considerations, must surely prompt serious philosophers to review the position in some such way as this. It looks as though this were a bypath leading to the right track. So long as we keep to the body and our soul is contaminated with this imperfection, there is no chance of our ever attaining satisfactorily to our object, which we assert to be truth. In the first place, the body provides us with innumerable distractions in the pursuit of our necessary sustenance, and any diseases which attack us hinder our quest for reality. Besides, the body fills us with loves and desires and fears and all sorts of fancies and a great deal of nonsense, with the result that we literally never get an opportunity to think at all about anything. Wars and revolutions and battles are due simply and solely to the body and its desires. All wars are undertaken for the acquisition of wealth, and the reason why we have to acquire wealth is the body, because we are slaves in its service. That is why, on all these accounts, we have so little time for philosophy. Worst of all, if we do obtain any leisure from the body's claims and turn to some line of inquiry, the body intrudes once more into our investigations, interrupting, disturbing,

distracting, and preventing us from getting a glimpse of the truth. We are in fact convinced that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of anything, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things by themselves with the soul by itself. It seems, to judge from the argument, that the wisdom which we desire and upon which we profess to have set our hearts will be attainable only when we are dead, and not in our lifetime. If no pure knowledge is possible in the company of the body, then either it is totally impossible to acquire knowledge, or it is only possible after death, because it is only then that the soul will be separate and independent of the body. It seems that so long as we are alive, we shall continue closest to knowledge if we avoid as much as we can all contact and association with the body, except when they are absolutely necessary, and instead of allowing ourselves to become infected with its nature, purify ourselves from it until God himself gives us deliverance. In this way, by keeping ourselves uncontaminated by the follies of the body, we shall probably reach the company of others like ourselves and gain direct knowledge of all that is pure and uncontaminated—that is, presumably, of truth. For one who is not pure himself to attain to the realm of purity would no doubt be a breach of universal justice.

Something to this effect, Simmias, is what I imagine all real lovers of learning must think themselves and say to one another. Don't you agree with me?

Simmias/ Most emphatically, Socrates.

Socrates/ Very well, then, if this is true, there is good reason for anyone who reaches the end of this journey which lies before me to hope that there, if anywhere, he will attain the object to which all our efforts have been directed during my past life. So this journey which is now ordained for me carries a happy prospect for any other man also who believes that his mind has been prepared by purification.

Simmias/ It does indeed.

Socrates/ And purification, as we saw some time ago in our discussion, consists in separating the soul as much as possible from the body, and accustoming it to withdraw from all contact with the body and concentrate itself by itself, and to have its dwelling, so far as it can, both now and in the future, alone by itself, freed from the shackles of the body. Does not that follow?

Simmias/ Yes, it does.

Socrates/ Is not what we call death a freeing and separation of soul from body?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the desire to free the soul is found chiefly, or rather only, in the true philosopher. In fact the philosopher's occupation consists precisely in the freeing and separation of soul from body. Isn't that so?

Simmias/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Well then, as I said at the beginning, if a man has trained himself throughout his life to live in a state as close as possible to death, would it not be ridiculous for him to be distressed when death comes to him?

Simmias/ It would, of course.

Socrates/ Then it is a fact, Simmias, that true philosophers make dying their profession, and that to them of all men death is least alarming. Look at it in this way. If they are thoroughly dissatisfied with the body, and long to have their souls independent of it, when this happens would it not be entirely unreasonable to be frightened and distressed? Would they not naturally be glad to set out for the place where there is a prospect of attaining the object of their lifelong desire—which is wisdom—and of escaping from an unwelcome association? Surely there are many who have chosen of their own free will to follow dead lovers and wives

and sons to the next world, in the hope of seeing and meeting there the persons whom they loved. If this is so, will a true lover of wisdom who has firmly grasped this same conviction—that he will never attain to wisdom worthy of the name elsewhere than in the next world—will he be grieved at dying? Will he not be glad to make that journey? We must suppose so, my dear boy, that is, if he is a real philosopher, because then he will be of the firm belief that he will never find wisdom in all its purity in any other place. If this is so, would it not be quite unreasonable, as I said just now, for such a man to be afraid of death?

Simmias/ It would, indeed.

Socrates/ So if you see anyone distressed at the prospect of dying, it will be proof enough that he is a lover not of wisdom but of the body. As a matter of fact, I suppose he is also a lover of wealth and reputation—one or the other, or both.

Simmias/ Yes, you are quite right.

Socrates/ Doesn't it follow, Simmias, that the virtue which we call courage belongs primarily to the philosophical disposition?

Simmias/ Yes, no doubt it does.

Socrates/ Self-control, too, as it is understood even in the popular sense—not being carried away by the desires, but preserving a decent indifference toward them—is not this appropriate only to those who regard the body with the greatest indifference and spend their lives in philosophy?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If you care to consider courage and self-control as practiced by other people, you will find them illogical.

Simmias/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ You know, don't you, that everyone except the philosopher regards death as a great evil?

Simmias/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Isn't it true that when a brave man faces death he does so through fear of something worse?

Simmias/ Yes, it is true.

Socrates/ So in everyone except the philosopher courage is due to fear and dread, although it is illogical that fear and cowardice should make a man brave.

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ What about temperate people? Is it not, in just the same way, a sort of self-indulgence that makes them self-controlled? We may say that this is impossible, but all the same those who practice this simple form of self-control are in much the same case as that which I have just described. They are afraid of losing other pleasures which they desire, so they refrain from one kind because they cannot resist the other. Although they define self-indulgence as the condition of being ruled by pleasure, it is really because they cannot resist some pleasures that they succeed in resisting others, which amounts to what I said just now—that they control themselves, in a sense, by self-indulgence.

Simmias/ Yes, that seems to be true.

Socrates/ I congratulate you on your perception, Simmias. No, I am afraid that, from the moral standpoint, it is not the right method to exchange one degree of pleasure or pain or fear for another, like coins of different values. There is only one currency for which all these tokens of ours should be exchanged, and that is wisdom. In fact, it is wisdom that makes possible courage and self-control and integrity or, in a word, true goodness, and the presence or absence of pleasures and fears and other such feelings makes no difference at all, whereas a system of morality

which is based on relative emotional values is a mere illusion, a thoroughly vulgar conception which has nothing sound in it and nothing true. The true moral ideal, whether self-control or integrity or courage, is really a kind of purgation from all these emotions, and wisdom itself is a sort of purification. Perhaps these people who direct the religious initiations are not so far from the mark, and all the time there has been an allegorical meaning beneath their doctrine that he who enters the next world uninitiated and unenlightened shall lie in the mire, but he who arrives there purified and enlightened shall dwell among the gods. You know how the initiation practitioners say, 'Many bear the emblems, but the devotees are few'? Well, in my opinion these devotees are simply those who have lived the philosophical life in the right way—a company which, all through my life, I have done my best in every way to join, leaving nothing undone which I could do to attain this end. Whether I was right in this ambition, and whether we have achieved anything, we shall know for certain, if God wills, when we reach the other world, and that, I imagine, will be fairly soon.

This is the defense which I offer you, Simmias and Cebes, to show that it is natural for me to leave you and my earthly rulers without any feeling of grief or bitterness, since I believe that I shall find there, no less than here, good rulers and good friends. If I am any more convincing in my defense to you than I was to my Athenian jury, I shall be satisfied.

Phaedo/ When Socrates had finished, Cebes made his reply.

Cebes/ The rest of your statement, Socrates, seems excellent to me, but what you said about the soul leaves the average person with grave misgivings that when it is released from the body it may no longer exist anywhere, but may be dispersed and destroyed on the very day that the man

himself dies, as soon as it is freed from the body, that as it emerges it may be dissipated like breath or smoke, and vanish away, so that nothing is left of it anywhere. Of course if it still existed as an independent unity, released from all the evils which you have just described, there would be a strong and glorious hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But I fancy that it requires no little faith and assurance to believe that the soul exists after death and retains some active force and intelligence.

Socrates/ Quite true, Cebes. But what are we to do about it? Is it your wish that we should go on speculating about the subject, to see whether this view is likely to be true or not?

Cebes/ For my part, I should be very glad to hear what you think about it.

Socrates/ At any rate, I hardly think that anyone who heard us now—even a comic poet—would say that I am wasting time and discoursing on subjects which do not concern me. So if that is how you feel, we had better continue our inquiry. Let us approach it from this point of view. Do the souls of the departed exist in another world or not?

There is an old legend, which we still remember, to the effect that they *do* exist there, after leaving here, and that they return again to this world and come into being from the dead. If this is so—that the living come into being again from the dead—does it not follow that our souls exist in the other world? They could not come into being again if they did not exist, and it will be sufficient proof that my contention is true if it really becomes apparent that the living come from the dead, and from nowhere else. But if this is not so, we shall need some other argument.

Cebes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ If you want to understand the question more readily, consider it with reference not only to human beings but to all animals and plants. Let us see whether in general everything that admits of generation is generated in this way and no other—opposites from opposites, wherever there is an opposite—as for instance beauty is opposite to ugliness and right to wrong, and there are countless other examples. Let us consider whether it is a necessary law that everything which has an opposite is generated from that opposite and from no other source. For example, when a thing becomes bigger, it must, I suppose, have been smaller first before it became bigger?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And similarly if it becomes smaller, it must be bigger first, and become smaller afterward?

Cebes/ That is so.

Socrates/ And the weaker comes from the stronger, and the faster from the slower?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ One more instance. If a thing becomes worse, is it not from being better? And if more just, from being more unjust?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Are we satisfied, then, that everything is generated in this way—opposites from opposites?

Cebes/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ Here is another question. Do not these examples present another feature, that between each pair of opposites there are two processes of generation, one from the first to the second, and another from the second to the first? Between a larger and a smaller object are there not the

processes of increase and decrease, and do we not describe them in this way as increasing and decreasing?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it not the same with separating and combining, cooling and heating, and all the rest of them? Even if we sometimes do not use the actual terms, must it not in fact hold good universally that they come one from the other, and that there is a process of generation from each to the other?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, is there an opposite to living, as sleeping is opposite to waking?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What?

Cebes/ Being dead.

Socrates/ So if they are opposites, they come from one another, and have their two processes of generation between the two of them?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Very well, then, I will state one pair of opposites which I mentioned just now—the opposites themselves and the processes between them—and you shall state the other. My opposites are sleeping and waking, and I say that waking comes from sleeping and sleeping from waking, and that the processes between them are going to sleep and waking up. Does that satisfy you, or not?

Cebes/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ Now you tell me in the same way, about life and death. Do you not admit that death is the opposite of life?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ And that they come from one another?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then what comes from the living?

Cebes/ The dead.

Socrates/ And what comes from the dead?

Cebes/ I must admit that it is the living.

Socrates/ So it is from the dead, Cebes, that living things and people come?

Cebes/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then our souls do exist in the next world.

Cebes/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And one of the two processes in this case is really quite certain—dying is certain enough, isn't it?

Cebes/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ What shall we do, then? Shall we omit the complementary process, and leave a defect here in the law of nature? Or must we supply an opposite process to that of dying?

Cebes/ Surely we must supply it.

Socrates/ And what is it?

Cebes/ Coming to life again.

Socrates/ Then if there is such a thing as coming to life again, it must be a process from death to life?

Cebes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ So we agree upon this too—that the living have come from the dead no less than the dead from the living. But I think we decided that if this was so, it was a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must exist in some place from which they are reborn.

Cebes/ It seems to me, Socrates, that this follows necessarily from our agreement.

Socrates/ I think there is another way too, Cebes, in which you can see that we were not wrong in our agreement.

If there were not a constant correspondence in the process of generation between the two sets of opposites, going round in a sort of cycle, if generation were a straight path to the opposite extreme without any return to the starting point or any deflection, do you realize that in the end everything would have the same quality and reach the same state, and change would cease altogether?

Cebes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Nothing difficult to understand. For example, if 'falling asleep' existed, and 'waking up' did not balance it by making something come out of sleep, you must realize that in the end everything would make Endymion look foolish. He would be nowhere, because the whole world would be in the same state—asleep. And if everything were combined and nothing separated, we should soon have Anaxagoras' 'all things together.' In just the same way, my dear Cebes, if everything that has some share of life were to die, and if after death the dead remained in that form and did not come to life again, would it not be quite inevitable that in the end everything should be dead and nothing alive? If living things came from other living things, and the living things died, what possible means could prevent their number from being exhausted by death?

Cebes/ None that I can see, Socrates. What you say seems to be perfectly true.

Socrates/ Yes, Cebes, if anything is true, I believe that this is, and we were not mistaken in our agreement upon it. Coming to life again is a fact, and it is a fact that the living come from the dead, and a fact that the souls of the dead exist.

Cebes/ Besides, Socrates, there is that theory which you have often described to us—that what we call learning is really just recollection. If that is true, then surely what we

recollect now we must have learned at some time before, which is impossible unless our souls existed somewhere before they entered this human shape. So in that way too it seems likely that the soul is immortal.

Simmias/ How did the proofs of that theory go, Cebes? Remind me, because at the moment I can't quite remember.

Cebes/ One very good argument is that when people are asked questions, if the question is put in the right way they can give a perfectly correct answer, which they could not possibly do unless they had some knowledge and a proper grasp of the subject. And then if you confront people with a diagram or anything like that, the way in which they react is an unmistakable proof that the theory is correct.

Socrates/ And if you don't find that convincing, Simmias, see whether this appeals to you. I suppose that you find it hard to understand how what we call learning can be recollection?

Simmias/ Not at all. All that I want is to be helped to do what we are talking about—to recollect. I can practically remember enough to satisfy me already, from Cebes' approach to the subject, but I should be nonetheless glad to hear how you meant to approach it.

Socrates/ I look at it in this way. We are agreed, I suppose, that if a person is to be reminded of anything, he must first know it at some time or other?

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Are we also agreed in calling it recollection when knowledge comes in a particular way? I will explain what I mean. Suppose that a person on seeing or hearing or otherwise noticing one thing not only becomes conscious of that thing but also thinks of a something else which is an object of a different sort of knowledge. Are we not justified in

saying that he was reminded of the object which he thought of?

Simmias/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Let me give you an example. A human being and a musical instrument, I suppose you will agree, are different objects of knowledge.

Simmias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Well, you know what happens to lovers when they see a musical instrument or a piece of clothing or any other private property of the person whom they love. When they recognize the thing, their minds conjure up a picture of its owner. That is recollection. In the same way the sight of Simmias often reminds one of Cebes, and of course there are thousands of other examples.

Simmias/ Yes, of course there are.

Socrates/ So by recollection we mean the sort of experience which I have just described, especially when it happens with reference to things which we had not seen for such a long time that we had forgotten them.

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Well, then, is it possible for a person who sees a picture of a horse or a musical instrument to be reminded of a person, or for someone who sees a picture of Simmias to be reminded of Cebes?

Simmias/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ And is it possible for someone who sees a portrait of Simmias to be reminded of Simmias himself?

Simmias/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Does it not follow from all this that recollection may be caused either by similar or by dissimilar objects?

Simmias/ Yes, it does.

Socrates/ When you are reminded by similarity, surely you must also be conscious whether the similarity is perfect or only partial.

Simmias/ Yes, you must.

Socrates/ Here is a further step. We admit, I suppose, that there is such a thing as equality—not the equality of stick to stick and stone to stone, and so on, but something beyond all that and distinct from it—absolute equality. Are we to admit this or not?

Simmias/ Yes indeed, most emphatically.

Socrates/ And do we know what it is?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Where did we get our knowledge? Was it not from the particular examples that we mentioned just now? Was it not from seeing equal sticks or stones or other equal objects that we got the notion of equality, although it is something quite distinct from them? Look at it in this way. Is it not true that equal stones and sticks sometimes, without changing in themselves, appear equal to one person and unequal to another?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, now, have you ever thought that things which were absolutely equal were unequal, or that equality was inequality?

Simmias/ No, never, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then these equal things are not the same as absolute equality.

Simmias/ Not in the least, as I see it, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet it is these equal things that have suggested and conveyed to you your knowledge of absolute equality, although they are distinct from it?

Simmias/ Perfectly true.

Socrates/ Whether it is similar to them or dissimilar?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It makes no difference. So long as the sight of one thing suggests another to you, it must be a cause of recollection, whether the two things are alike or not.

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Well, now, what do we find in the case of the equal sticks and other things of which we were speaking just now? Do they seem to us to be equal in the sense of absolute equality, or do they fall short of it in so far as they only approximate to equality? Or don't they fall short at all?

Simmias/ They do, a long way.

Socrates/ Suppose that when you see something you say to yourself, This thing which I can see has a tendency to be like something else, but it falls short and cannot be really like it, only a poor imitation. Don't you agree with me that anyone who receives that impression must in fact have previous knowledge of that thing which he says that the other resembles, but inadequately?

Simmias/ Certainly he must.

Socrates/ Very well, then, is that our position with regard to equal things and absolute equality?

Simmias/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then we must have had some previous knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and realized that they were striving after equality, but fell short of it.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ And at the same time we are agreed also upon this point, that we have not and could not have acquired this notion of equality except by sight or touch or one of the other senses. I am treating them as being all the same.

Simmias/ They are the same, Socrates, for the purpose of our argument.

Socrates/ So it must be through the senses that we obtained the notion that all sensible equals are striving after absolute equality but falling short of it. Is that correct?

Simmias/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ So before we began to see and hear and use our other senses we must somewhere have acquired the knowledge that there is such a thing as absolute equality. Otherwise we could never have realized, by using it as a standard for comparison, that all equal objects of sense are desirous of being like it, but are only imperfect copies.

Simmias/ That is the logical conclusion, Socrates.

Socrates/ Did we not begin to see and hear and possess our other senses from the moment of birth?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But we admitted that we must have obtained our knowledge of equality before we obtained them.

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So we must have obtained it before birth.

Simmias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then if we obtained it before our birth, and possessed it when we were born, we had knowledge, both before and at the moment of birth, not only of equality and relative magnitudes, but of all absolute standards. Our present argument applies no more to equality than it does to absolute beauty, goodness, uprightness, holiness, and, as I maintain, all those characteristics which we designate in our discussions by the term 'absolute.' So we must have obtained knowledge of all these characteristics before our birth.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ And unless we invariably forget it after obtaining it we must always be born *knowing* and continue to *know* all through our lives, because 'to know' means simply to retain the knowledge which one has acquired, and not to lose it. Is not what we call 'forgetting' simply the loss of knowledge, Simmias?

Simmias/ Most certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ And if it is true that we acquired our knowledge before our birth, and lost it at the moment of birth, but afterward, by the exercise of our senses upon sensible objects, recover the knowledge which we had once before, I suppose that what we call learning will be the recovery of our own knowledge, and surely we should be right in calling this recollection.

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Yes, because we saw that it is possible for the perception of an object by sight or hearing or any of the other senses to suggest to the percipient, through association, whether there is any similarity or not, another object which he has forgotten. So, as I maintain, there are two alternatives. Either we are all born with knowledge of these standards, and retain it throughout our lives, or else, when we speak of people learning, they are simply recollecting what they knew before. In other words, learning is recollection.

Simmias/ Yes, that must be so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Which do you choose, then, Simmias? That we are born with knowledge, or that we recollect after we are born the things of which we possessed knowledge before we were born?

Simmias/ I don't know which to choose on the spur of the moment, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, here is another choice for you to make. What do you think about this? Can a person who knows a subject thoroughly explain what he knows?

Simmias/ Most certainly he can.

Socrates/ Do you think that everyone can explain these questions about which we have just been talking?

Simmias/ I should like to think so, but I am very much afraid that by this time tomorrow there will be no one on this earth who can do it properly.

Socrates/ So you don't think, Simmias, that everyone has knowledge about them?

Simmias/ Far from it.

Socrates/ Then they just recollect what they once learned.

Simmias/ That must be the right answer.

Socrates/ When do our souls acquire this knowledge? It cannot be after the beginning of our mortal life.

Simmias/ No, of course not.

Socrates/ Then it must be before.

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then our souls had a previous existence, Simmias, before they took on this human shape. They were independent of our bodies, and they were possessed of intelligence.

Simmias/ Unless perhaps it is at the moment of birth that we acquire knowledge of these things, Socrates. There is still that time available.

Socrates/ No doubt, my dear fellow, but just tell me, what other time is a there to lose it in? We have just agreed that we do not possess it when we are born. Do we lose it at the same moment that we acquire it? Or can you suggest any other time?

Simmias/ No, of course not, Socrates. I didn't realize what nonsense I was talking.

Socrates/ Well, how do we stand now, Simmias? If all these absolute realities, such as beauty and goodness, which we are always talking about, really exist, if it is to them, as we rediscover our own former knowledge of them, that we refer, as copies to their patterns, all the objects of our physical perception—if these realities exist, does it not follow that our souls must exist too even before our birth, whereas if they do not exist, our discussion would seem to be a waste of time? Is this the position, that it is logically just as certain that our souls exist before our birth as it is that these realities exist, and that if the one is impossible, so is the other?

Simmias/ It is perfectly obvious to me, Socrates, that the same logical necessity applies to both. It suits me very well that your argument should rely upon the point that our soul's existence before our birth stands or falls with the existence of your grade of reality. I cannot imagine anything more self-evident than the fact that absolute beauty and goodness and all the rest that you mentioned just now exist in the fullest possible sense. In my opinion the proof is quite satisfactory.

Socrates/ What about Cebes? We must convince Cebes too.

Simmias/ To the best of my belief he is satisfied. It is true that he is the most obstinate person in the world at resisting an argument, but I should think that he needs nothing more to convince him that our souls existed before our birth. As for their existing after we are dead as well, even I don't feel that that has been proved, Socrates. Cebes' objection still holds—the common fear that a man's soul may be disintegrated at the very moment of his death, and that this

may be the end of its existence. Supposing that it is born and constituted from some source or other, and exists before it enters a human body. After it has entered one, is there any reason why, at the moment of release, it should not come to an end and be destroyed itself?

Cebes/ Quite right, Simmias. It seems that we have got the proof of one half of what we wanted—that the soul existed before birth—but now we need also to prove that it will exist after death no less than before birth, if our proof is to be complete.

Socrates/ As a matter of fact, my dear Simmias and Cebes, it is proved already, if you will combine this last argument with the one about which we agreed before, that every living thing comes from the dead. If the soul exists before birth, and if when it proceeds toward life and is born it must be born from death or the dead state, surely it must also exist after death, if it must be born again. So the point which you mention has been proved already. But in spite of this I believe that you and Simmias would like to spin out the discussion still more. You are afraid, as children are, that when the soul emerges from the body the wind may really puff it away and scatter it, especially when a person does not die on a calm day but with a gale blowing.

Phaedo/ Cebes laughed.

Cebes/ Suppose that we are afraid, Socrates, and try to convince us. Or rather don't suppose that it is we that are afraid. Probably even in us there is a little boy who has these childish terrors. Try to persuade him not to be afraid of death as though it were a bogy.

Socrates/ What you should do, is to say a magic spell over him every day until you have charmed his fears away.

Simmias/ But, Socrates, where shall we find a magician who understands these spells now that you… are leaving us?

Socrates/ Greece is a large country, Cebes, which must have good men in it, and there are many foreign races too. You must ransack all of them in your search for this magician, without sparing money or trouble, because you could not spend your money more opportunely on any other object. And you must search also by your own united efforts, because it is probable that you would not easily find anyone better fitted for the task.

Cebes/ We will see to that. But let us return to the point where we left off, if you have no objection.

Socrates/ Of course not. Why should I?

Cebes/ Thank you.

Socrates/ We ought, I think, to ask ourselves this. What sort of thing is it that would naturally suffer the fate of being dispersed? For what sort of thing should we fear this fate, and for what should we not? When we have answered this, we should next consider to which class the soul belongs, and then we shall know whether to feel confidence or fear about the fate of our souls.

Cebes/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Would you not expect a composite object or a natural compound to be liable to break up where it was put together? And ought not anything which is really incomposite to be the one thing of all others which is not affected in this way?

Cebes/ That seems to be the case.

Socrates/ Is it not extremely probable that what is always constant and invariable is incomposite, and what is inconstant and variable is composite?

Cebes/ That is how it seems to me.

Socrates/ Then let us return to the same examples which we were discussing before. Does that absolute reality which

we define in our discussions remain always constant and invariable, or not? Does absolute equality or beauty or any other independent entity which really exists ever admit change of any kind? Or does each one of these uniform and independent entities remain always constant and invariable, never admitting any alteration in any respect or in any sense?

Cebes/ They must be constant and invariable, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, what about the concrete instances of beauty—such as men, horses, clothes, and so on—or of equality, or any other members of a class corresponding to an absolute entity? Are they constant, or are they, on the contrary, scarcely ever in the same relation in any sense either to themselves or to one another?

Cebes/ With them, Socrates, it is just the opposite; they are never free from variation.

Socrates/ And these concrete objects you can touch and see and perceive by your other senses, but those constant entities you cannot possibly apprehend except by thinking; they are invisible to our sight.

Cebes/ That is perfectly true.

Socrates/ So you think that we should assume two classes of things, one visible and the other invisible?

Cebes/ Yes, we should.

Socrates/ The invisible being invariable, and the visible never being the same?

Cebes/ Yes, we should assume that too.

Socrates/ Well, now, are we not part body, part soul?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then to which class do we say that the body would have the closer resemblance and relation?

Cebes/ Quite obviously to the visible.

Socrates/ And the soul, is it visible or invisible?

Cebes/ Invisible to men, at any rate, Socrates.

Socrates/ But surely we have been speaking of things visible or invisible to our human nature. Do you think that we had some other nature in view?

Cebes/ No, human nature.

Socrates/ What do we say about the soul, then? Is it visible or invisible?

Cebes/ Not visible.

Socrates/ Invisible, then?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ So soul is more like the invisible, and body more like the visible?

Cebes/ That follows inevitably, Socrates.

Socrates/ Did we not say some time ago that when the soul uses the instrumentality of the body for any inquiry, whether through sight or hearing or any other sense—because using the body implies using the senses—it is drawn away by the body into the realm of the variable, and loses its way and becomes confused and dizzy, as though it were fuddled, through contact with things of a similar nature?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But when it investigates by itself, it passes into the realm of the pure and everlasting and immortal and changeless, and being of a kindred nature, when it is once independent and free from interference, consorts with it always and strays no longer, but remains, in that realm of the absolute, constant and invariable, through contact with beings of a similar nature. And this condition of the soul we call wisdom.

Cebes/ An excellent description, and perfectly true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Very well, then, in the light of all that we have said, both now and before, to which class do you think that the soul bears the closer resemblance and relation?

Cebes/ I think, Socrates, that even the dullest person would agree, from this line of reasoning, that the soul is in every possible way more like the invariable than the variable.

Socrates/ And the body?

Cebes/ To the other.

Socrates/ Look at it in this way too. When soul and body are both in the same place, nature teaches the one to serve and be subject, the other to rule and govern. In this relation which do you think resembles the divine and which the mortal part? Don't you think that it is the nature of the divine to rule and direct, and that of the mortal to be subject and serve?

Cebes/ I do.

Socrates/ Then which does the soul resemble?

Cebes/ Obviously, Socrates, soul resembles the divine, and body the mortal.

Socrates/ Now, Cebes, see whether this is our conclusion from all that we have said. The soul is most like that which is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, and ever self-consistent and invariable, whereas body is most like that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, dissoluble, and never self-consistent. Can we adduce any conflicting argument, my dear Cebes, to show that this is not so?

Cebes/ No, we cannot.

Socrates/ Very well, then, in that case is it not natural for body to disintegrate rapidly, but for soul to be quite or very nearly indissoluble?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Of course you know that when a person dies, although it is natural for the visible and physical part of him, which lies here in the visible world and which we call his corpse, to decay and fall to pieces and be dissipated, none of this happens to it immediately. It remains as it was for quite a long time, even if death takes place when the body is well nourished and in the warm season. Indeed, when the body is dried and embalmed, as in Egypt, it remains almost intact for an incredible time, and even if the rest of the body decays, some parts of it—the bones and sinews and anything else like them—are practically everlasting. That is so, is it not?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the soul, the invisible part, which goes away to a place that is, like itself, glorious, pure, and invisible—the true Hades or unseen world—into the presence of the good and wise God, where, if God so wills, my soul must shortly go—will it, if its very nature is such as I have described, be dispersed and destroyed at the moment of its release from the body, as is the popular view? Far from it, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth is much more like this. If at its release the soul is pure and carries with it no contamination of the body, because it has never willingly associated with it in life, but has shunned it and kept itself separate as its regular practice—in other words, if it has pursued philosophy in the right way and really practiced how to face death easily—this is what 'practicing death' means, isn't it?

Cebes/ Most decidedly.

Socrates/ Very well, if this is its condition, then it departs to that place which is, like itself, invisible, divine, immortal, and wise, where, on its arrival, happiness awaits it, and release from uncertainty and folly, from fears and uncontrolled desires, and all other human evils, and where, as they say of the initiates in the Mysteries, it really spends the rest of time with God. Shall we adopt this view, Cebes, or some other?

Cebes/ This one, by all means.

Socrates/ But, I suppose, if at the time of its release the soul is tainted and impure, because it has always associated with the body and cared for it and loved it, and has been so beguiled by the body and its passions and pleasures that nothing seems real to it but those physical things which can be touched and seen and eaten and drunk and used for sexual enjoyment, and if it is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid what is invisible and hidden from our eyes, but intelligible and comprehensible by philosophy—if the soul is in this state, do you think that it will escape independent and uncontaminated?

Cebes/ That would be quite impossible.

Socrates/ On the contrary, it will, I imagine, be permeated by the corporeal, which fellowship and intercourse with the body will have ingrained in its very nature through constant association and long practice.

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And we must suppose, my dear fellow, that the corporeal is heavy, oppressive, earthly, and visible. So the soul which is tainted by its presence is weighed down and dragged back into the visible world, through fear, as they say, of Hades or the invisible, and hovers about tombs and graveyards. The shadowy apparitions which have actually been seen there are the ghosts of those souls which have not

got clear away, but still retain some portion of the visible, which is why they can be seen.

Cebes/ That seems likely enough, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, it does, Cebes. Of course these are not the souls of the good, but of the wicked, and they are compelled to wander about these places as a punishment for their bad conduct in the past. They continue wandering until at last, through craving for the corporeal, which unceasingly pursues them, they are imprisoned once more in a body. And as you might expect, they are attached to the same sort of character or nature which they have developed during life.

Cebes/ What sort do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ Well, those who have cultivated gluttony or selfishness or drunkenness, instead of taking pains to avoid them, are likely to assume the form of donkeys and other perverse animals. Don't you think so?

Cebes/ Yes, that is very likely.

Socrates/ And those who have deliberately preferred a life of irresponsible lawlessness and violence become wolves and hawks and kites, unless we can suggest any other more likely animals.

Cebes/ No, the ones which you mention are exactly right.

Socrates/ So it is easy to imagine into what sort of animals all the other kinds of soul will go, in accordance with their conduct during life.

Cebes/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ I suppose that the happiest people, and those who reach the best destination, are the ones who have cultivated the goodness of an ordinary citizen—what is called self-control and integrity—which is acquired by habit and practice, without the help of philosophy and reason.

Cebes/ How are these the happiest?

Socrates/ Because they will probably pass into some other kind of social and disciplined creature like bees, wasps, and ants, or even back into the human race again, becoming decent citizens.

Cebes/ Very likely.

Socrates/ But no soul which has not practiced philosophy, and is not absolutely pure when it leaves the body, may attain to the divine nature; that is only for the lover of wisdom. This is the reason, my dear Simmias and Cebes, why true philosophers abstain from all bodily desires and withstand them and do not yield to them. It is not because they are afraid of financial loss or poverty, like the average man who thinks of money first, nor because they shrink from dishonor and a bad reputation, like those who are ambitious for distinction and authority.

Cebes/ No, those would be unworthy motives, Socrates.

Socrates/ They would indeed. And so, Cebes, those who care about their souls and do not subordinate them to the body dissociate themselves firmly from these others and refuse to accompany them on their haphazard journey, and, believing that it is wrong to oppose philosophy with her offer of liberation and purification, they turn and follow her wherever she leads.

Cebes/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will explain. Every seeker after wisdom knows that up to the time when philosophy takes it over his soul is a helpless prisoner, chained hand and foot in the body, compelled to view reality not directly but only through its prison bars, and wallowing in utter ignorance. And philosophy can see that the imprisonment is ingeniously effected by the prisoner's own active desire, which makes him first accessory to his own confinement. Well, philosophy takes over the soul in this condition and by gentle

persuasion tries to set it free. She points out that observation by means of the eyes and ears and all the other senses is entirely deceptive, and she urges the soul to refrain from using them unless it is necessary to do so, and encourages it to collect and concentrate itself by itself, trusting nothing but its own independent judgment upon objects considered in themselves, and attributing no truth to anything which it views indirectly as being subject to variation, because such objects are sensible and visible but what the soul itself sees is intelligible and invisible. Now the soul of the true philosopher feels that it must not reject this opportunity for release, and so it abstains as far as possible from pleasures and desires and griefs, because it reflects that the result of giving way to pleasure or fear or desire is not as might be supposed the trivial misfortune of becoming ill or wasting money through self-indulgence, but the last and worst calamity of all, which the sufferer does not recognize.

Cebes/ What is that, Socrates?

Socrates/ When anyone's soul feels a keen pleasure or pain it cannot help supposing that whatever causes the most violent emotion is the plainest and truest reality, which it is not. It is chiefly visible things that have this effect, isn't it?

Cebes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Is it not on this sort of occasion that soul passes most completely into the bondage of body?

Cebes/ How do you make that out?

Socrates/ Because every pleasure or pain has a sort of rivet with which it fastens the soul to the body and pins it down and makes it corporeal, accepting as true whatever the body certifies. The result of agreeing with the body and finding pleasure in the same things is, I imagine, that it cannot help becoming like it in character and training, so

that it can never get entirely away to the unseen world, but is always saturated with the body when it sets out, and so soon falls back again into another body, where it takes root and grows. Consequently it is excluded from all fellowship with the pure and uniform and divine.

Cebes/ Yes, that is perfectly true, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is for these reasons, Cebes, that true philosophers exhibit self-control and courage—not for the reasons which are generally supposed. Or do you think that the popular view is right?

Cebes/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ No, indeed. A philosopher's soul will take the view which I have described. It will not first expect to be set free by philosophy, and then allow pleasure and pain to reduce it once more to bondage, thus taking upon itself an endless task, like Penelope when she undid her own weaving. No, this soul secures immunity from its desires by following reason and abiding always in her company, and by contemplating the true and divine and unconjecturable, and drawing inspiration from it, because such a soul believes that this is the right way to live while life endures, and that after death it reaches a place which is kindred and similar to its own nature, and there is rid forever of human ills. After such a training, my dear Simmias and Cebes, the soul can have no grounds for fearing that on its separation from the body it will be blown away and scattered by the winds, and so disappear into thin air, and cease to exist altogether.

Phaedo/ There was silence for some time after Socrates had said this. He himself, to judge from his appearance, was still occupied with the argument which he had just been stating, and so were most of us, but Simmias and Cebes went on talking in a low voice.

When Socrates noticed them he said;

Socrates/ Why, do you feel that my account is inadequate? Of course it is still open to a number of doubts and objections, if you want to examine it in detail. If it is something else that you two are considering, never mind, but if you feel any difficulty about our discussion, don't hesitate to put forward your own views, and point out any way in which you think that my account could be improved. And by all means make use of my services too, if you think I can help at all to solve the difficulty.

Simmias/ Very well, Socrates, I will be quite open with you. We have both been feeling difficulties for some time, and each of us has been urging the other to ask questions. We are anxious to have your answers, but we did not like to bother you, for fear of annoying you in your present misfortune.

Phaedo/ When Socrates heard this he laughed gently and said;

Socrates/ I am surprised at you, Simmias. I shall certainly find it difficult to convince the outside world that I do not regard my present lot as a misfortune if I cannot even convince you, and you are afraid that I am more irritable now than I used to be. Evidently you think that I have less insight into the future than a swan; because when these birds feel that the time has come for them to die, they sing more loudly and sweetly than they have sung in all their lives before, for joy that they are going away into the presence of the god whose servants they are. It is quite wrong for human beings to make out that the swans sing their last song as an expression of grief at their approaching end. People who say this are misled by their own fear of death, and fail to reflect that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or distressed in any other way—not even the nightingale or swallow or hoopoe, whose song is supposed to be a lament. In my opinion neither they nor the swans sing because they are

sad. I believe that the swans, belonging as they do to Apollo, have prophetic powers and sing because they know the good things that await them in the unseen world, and they are happier on that day than they have ever been before. Now I consider that I am in the same service as the swans, and dedicated to the same god, and that I am no worse endowed with prophetic powers by my master than they are, and no more disconsolate at leaving this life. So far as that fear of yours is concerned, you may say and ask whatever you like, so long as the Athenian officers of justice permit.

Simmias/ Thank you. I will tell you my difficulty first and then Cebes shall tell you where he finds your theory unacceptable. I think, just as you do, Socrates, that although it is very difficult if not impossible in this life to achieve certainty about these questions, at the same time it is utterly feeble not to use every effort in testing the available theories, or to leave off before we have considered them in every way, and come to the end of our resources. It is our duty to do one of two things, either to ascertain the facts, whether by seeking instruction or by personal discovery, or, if this is impossible, to select the best and most dependable theory which human intelligence can supply, and use it as a raft to ride the seas of life—that is, assuming that we cannot make our journey with greater confidence and security by the surer means of a divine revelation. And so now, after what you have said, I shall not let any diffidence prevent me from asking my question, and so make me blame myself afterward for not having spoken my mind now. The fact is, Socrates, that on thinking it over, and discussing it with Cebes here, I feel that your theory has serious flaws in it.

Socrates/ Your feeling is very likely right, my dear boy, but tell me where you think the flaws are.

Simmias/ What I mean is this. You might say the same thing about tuning the strings of a musical instrument, that

the attunement is something invisible and incorporeal and splendid and divine, and located in the tuned instrument, while the instrument itself and its strings are material and corporeal and composite and earthly and closely related to what is mortal. Now suppose that the instrument is broken, or its strings cut or snapped. According to your theory the attunement must still exist—it cannot have been destroyed, because it would be inconceivable that when the strings are broken the instrument and the strings themselves, which have a mortal nature, should still exist, and the attunement, which shares the nature and characteristics of the divine and immortal, should exist no longer, having predeceased its mortal counterpart. You would say that the attunement must still exist somewhere just as it was, and that the wood and strings will rot away before anything happens to it. I say this, Socrates, because, as I think you yourself are aware, we Pythagoreans have a theory of the soul which is roughly like this.

The body is held together at a certain tension between the extremes of hot and cold, and dry and wet, and so on, and our soul is a temperament or adjustment of these same extremes, when they are combined in just the right proportion. Well, if the soul is really an adjustment, obviously as soon as the tension of our body is lowered or increased beyond the proper point, the soul must be destroyed, divine though it is—just like any other adjustment, either in music or in any product of the arts and crafts, although in each case the physical remains last considerably longer until they are burned up or rot away. Find us an answer to this argument, if someone insists that the soul, being a temperament of physical constituents, is the first thing to be destroyed by what we call death.

Phaedo/ Socrates opened his eyes very wide—a favorite trick of his—and smiled.

Socrates/ Really, Simmias' criticism is quite justified, so if any of you are readier-witted than I am, you had better answer him. It seems to me that he is not handling the argument at all badly. However, before we have the answer, I think we should hear what criticisms Cebes has to make in his turn, so that we may have time to decide what we shall say. When we have heard him, we must either agree with them if they seem to be at all on the right note, or if not, we must then proceed to champion our theory.

Come on, Cebes, tell us what has been troubling you.

Cebes/ Very well. It seems to me that the argument is just where it was. I mean that it is open to the same criticism that we made before. The proof that our soul existed before it took on this present shape is perfectly satisfying—I might even say convincing. I am not changing my position about that. But as for its still existing somewhere after we are dead, I think that the proof fails in this way. Mind you, I don't agree with Simmias' objection that soul is not stronger and more durable than body; it seems to me to be far superior in every way like that. Then why, your theory might inquire, are you still skeptical, when you can see that after a man dies even the weaker part of him continues to exist? Don't you think the more durable part of him must logically survive as long?

Well, here is my answer. I want you to consider whether there is anything in what I say—because like Simmias I must have recourse to an illustration. Suppose that an elderly tailor has just died. Your theory would be just like saying that the man is not dead, but still exists somewhere safe and sound, and offering as proof the fact that the coat which he had made for himself and was wearing has not perished but is still intact. If anyone was skeptical, I suppose you would ask him which is likely to last longer, a man or a coat which is being regularly used and worn, and when he replied that the former was far more likely, you would imagine that you

had proved conclusively that the man is safe and sound, since the less-enduring object has not perished. But surely this is not so, Simmias—because I want your opinion too. Anyone would dismiss such a view as absurd. The tailor makes and wears out any number of coats, but although he outlives all the others, presumably he perishes before the last one, and this does not mean that a man is inferior to a coat, or has a weaker hold upon life. I believe that this analogy might apply to the relation of soul to body, and I think that it would be reasonable to say of them in the same way that soul is a long-lived thing, whereas body is relatively feeble and short-lived. But while we may admit that each soul wears out a number of bodies, especially if it lives a great many years—because although the body is continually changing and disintegrating all through life, the soul never stops replacing what is worn away—still we must suppose that when the soul dies it is still in possession of its latest covering, and perishes before it in this case only, although when the soul has perished the body at last reveals its natural frailty and quickly rots away. If you accept this view there is no justification yet for any confidence that after death our souls still exist somewhere.

Suppose that one conceded to the exponent of immortality even more than you claim, granting not only that our souls existed before our birth, but also that some of them may continue to exist or come into existence after death, and be born and die again several times—soul having such natural vitality that it persists through successive incarnations—unless in granting this he made the further concession that the soul suffers no ill effects in its various rebirths, and so does not, at one of its 'deaths,' perish altogether. If he had to admit that nobody knows which of these 'deaths' or separations from the body may prove fatal to the soul, because such insight is impossible for any of us—on these

terms, Socrates, no one but a fool is entitled to face death with confidence, unless he can prove that the soul is absolutely immortal and indestructible. Otherwise everyone must always feel apprehension at the approach of death, for fear that in this particular separation from the body his soul may be finally and utterly destroyed.

Phaedo/ Well, when we had heard them state their objections, we all felt very much depressed, as we told one another later. We had been quite convinced by the earlier part of the discussion, and now we felt that they had upset our convictions and destroyed our confidence not only in what had been said already, but also in anything that was to follow later. Perhaps we were incompetent to judge, or the facts themselves might prove to be unreliable.

Echecrates/ You certainly have my full sympathy, Phaedo. After hearing your account I find myself faced with the same misgiving. How can we believe in anything after this? Socrates' argument was absolutely convincing, and now it is completely discredited. That theory that our soul is a sort of attunement has always had an extraordinary attraction for me, and when I heard it stated it reminded me that I myself had formed the same opinion. What I really need now is another proof, right from the beginning, to convince me that when a man dies his soul does not die with him. Tell me, how did Socrates pick up the trail again? And did he show any sign of being upset, like the rest of you, or did he quietly come to the rescue of the argument? And did he rescue it effectively or not? Tell us every detail as accurately as you can.

Phaedo/ I can assure you, Echecrates, that Socrates often astonished me, but I never admired him more than on this particular occasion. That he should have been ready with an answer was, I suppose, nothing unusual, but what impressed me was, first, the pleasant, kindly, appreciative

way in which he received the two boys' objections, then his quick recognition of how the turn of the discussion had affected us, and lastly the skill with which he healed our wounds, rallied our scattered forces, and encouraged us to join him in pursuing the inquiry.

Echecrates/ How did he do that?

Phaedo/ I will tell you. I happened to be sitting to the right of his bed, on a footstool, and he was much higher than I was. So he laid his hand on my head and gathered up the curls on my neck—he never missed a chance of teasing me about my curls—and said;

Socrates/ Tomorrow, I suppose, Phaedo, you will cut off this beautiful hair.

Phaedo/ I expect so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Not if you take my advice.

Phaedo/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because I shall cut off mine today, and you ought to do the same, that is, if we let our argument die and fail to bring it to life again. What is more, if I were you, and let the truth escape me, I should make a vow like the Argives' never to let my hair grow again until I had defeated the argument of Simmias and Cebes in a return battle.

Phaedo/ But, I objected, not even Heracles can take on two at once.

Socrates/ You had better call upon me to be your Iolaus, while the daylight lasts.

Phaedo/ Very well, but I am Iolaus appealing to Heracles, not Heracles to Iolaus.

Socrates/ The effect will be just the same. But first there is one danger that we must guard against.

Phaedo/ What sort of danger?

Socrates/ Of becoming misologic, in the sense that people become misanthropic. No greater misfortune could happen to anyone than that of developing a dislike for argument. Misology and misanthropy arise in just the same way. Misanthropy is induced by believing in somebody quite uncritically. You assume that a person is absolutely truthful and sincere and reliable, and a little later you find that he is shoddy and unreliable. Then the same thing happens again. After repeated disappointments at the hands of the very people who might be supposed to be your nearest and most intimate friends, constant irritation ends by making you dislike everybody and suppose that there is no sincerity to be found anywhere. Have you never noticed this happening?

Phaedo/ Indeed, I have.

Socrates/ Don't you feel that it is reprehensible? Isn't it obvious that such a person is trying to form human relationships without any critical understanding of human nature? Otherwise he would surely recognize the truth—that there are not many very good or very bad people, but the great majority are something between the two.

Phaedo/ How do you make that out?

Socrates/ On the analogy of very large or small objects. Can you think of anything more unusual than coming across a very large or small man, or dog, or any other creature? Or one which is very swift or slow, ugly or beautiful, white or black? Have you never realized that extreme instances are few and rare, while intermediate ones are many and plentiful?

Phaedo/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So you think that if there were a competition in wickedness, very few would distinguish themselves even there?

Phaedo/ Probably.

Socrates/ Yes, it is probable. However, you have led me into a digression. The resemblance between arguments and human beings lies not in what I said just now, but in what I said before, that when one believes that an argument is true without reference to the art of logic, and then a little later decides rightly or wrongly that it is false, and the same thing happens again and again—you know how it is, especially with those who spend their time in arguing both sides—they end by believing that they are wiser than anyone else, because they alone have discovered that there is nothing stable or dependable either in facts or in arguments, and that everything fluctuates just like the water in a tidal channel, and never stays at any point for any time.

Phaedo/ That is perfectly true.

Socrates/ Well, then, Phaedo, supposing that there is an argument which is true and valid and capable of being discovered, if anyone nevertheless, through his experience of these arguments which seem to the same people to be sometimes true and sometimes false, attached no responsibility to himself and his lack of technical ability, but was finally content, in exasperation, to shift the blame from himself to the arguments, and spend the rest of his life loathing and decrying them, and so missed the chance of knowing the truth about reality—would it not be a deplorable thing?

Phaedo/ It would indeed.

Socrates/ Very well, that is the first thing that we must guard against. We must not let it enter our minds that there may be no validity in argument. On the contrary we should recognize that we ourselves are still intellectual invalids, but that we must brace ourselves and do our best to become healthy—you and the others partly with a view to the rest of your lives, but I directly in view of my death,

because at the moment I am in danger of regarding it not philosophically but self-assertively. You know how, in an argument, people who have no real education care nothing for the facts of the case, and are only anxious to get their point of view accepted by the audience? Well, I feel that at this present moment I am as bad as they are, only with this difference, that my anxiety will be not to convince my audience, except incidentally, but to produce the strongest possible conviction in myself. This is how I weigh the position, my dear fellow—see how selfish I am! If my theory is really true, it is right to believe it, while, even if death is extinction, at any rate during this time before my death I shall be less likely to distress my companions by giving way to self-pity, and this folly of mine will not live on with me—which would be a calamity—but will shortly come to an end.

That, my dear Simmias and Cebes, is the spirit in which I am prepared to approach the discussion. As for you, if you will take my advice, you will think very little of Socrates, and much more of the truth. If you think that anything I say is true, you must agree with me; if not, oppose it with every argument that you have. You must not allow me, in my enthusiasm, to deceive both myself and you, and leave my sting behind when I fly away.

Well, we must go ahead. First remind me of what you said, if you find my memory inaccurate. Simmias, I believe, is troubled with doubts. He is afraid that, even if the soul is more divine and a higher thing than the body, it may nevertheless be destroyed first, as being a kind of attunement. Cebes on the other hand appeared to agree with me that soul is more enduring than body, but to maintain that no one can be sure that, after repeatedly wearing out a great many bodies, it does not at last perish itself, leaving the last body behind; and he thinks that death may be precisely this, the destruction of the soul, because the body

never stops perishing all the time. Am I right, Simmias and Cebes, in thinking that these are the objections which we have to investigate?

Phaedo/ They agreed that this was so.

Socrates/ Well, then, do you reject all our previous arguments, or only some of them?

Phaedo/ Only some of them.

Socrates/ What is your opinion of the reasoning by which we asserted that learning is recollection, and that, if this is so, our souls must have existed somewhere else before they were confined in the body?

Cebes/ Speaking for myself, I found it remarkably convincing at the time, and I stick to it still as I do to no other theory.

Simmias/ Yes, indeed, it is just the same with me. I should be very much surprised if I ever changed my opinion about that.

Socrates/ But you will have to change it, my Theban friend, if the conception stands that an attunement is a composite thing, and that the soul is an attunement composed of our physical elements at a given tension. I imagine that you would not accept even from yourself the assertion that a composite attunement existed before the elements of which it was to be composed. Or would you?

Simmias/ Not for a moment, Socrates.

Socrates/ Don't you see that that is just what it amounts to when you say that the soul exists before it enters the human form or body, and also that it is composed of elements which do not yet exist? Surely an attunement is not at all like the object of your comparison. The instrument and the strings and their untuned notes come first. The attunement is the last of all to be constituted and the first to

be destroyed. How will this account harmonize with the other?

Simmias/ Not at all.

Socrates/ And yet, if any account ought to be harmonious, it should be an account of attunement.

Simmias/ Yes, it should.

Socrates/ Well, this one does not harmonize with your view. Make up your mind which theory you prefer—that learning is recollection, or that soul is an attunement.

Simmias/ The former, without any hesitation, Socrates. The other appealed to me, without any proof to support it, as being based on plausible analogy, which is why most people find it attractive. But I realize that theories which rest their proof upon plausibility are impostors, and unless you are on your guard, they deceive you properly, both in geometry and everywhere else. On the other hand, the theory of recollection and learning derives from a hypothesis which is worthy of acceptance. The theory that our soul exists even before it enters the body surely stands or falls with the soul's possession of the ultimate standard of reality—a view which I have, to the best of my belief, fully and rightly accepted. It seems therefore that I must not accept, either from myself or from anyone else, the assertion that soul is an attunement.

Socrates/ There is this way of looking at it too, Simmias. Do you think that an attunement, or any other composite thing, should be in a condition different from that of its component elements?

Simmias/ No, I do not.

Socrates/ And it should not act, or be acted upon, I presume, differently from them?

Phaedo/ He agreed.

Socrates/ So an attunement should not control its elements, but should follow their lead?

Phaedo/ He assented.

Socrates/ There is no question of its conflicting with them, either in movement or in sound or in any other way.

Simmias/ None at all.

Socrates/ Very well, then, is it not the nature of every attunement to be an attunement in so far as it is tuned?

Simmias/ I don't understand.

Socrates/ Surely, if it is tuned more, that is, in a greater degree—supposing this to be possible—it must be more of an attunement, and if it is tuned less, that is, in a lesser degree, it must be less of an attunement.

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And is this the case with the soul—that one soul is, even minutely, more or less of a soul than another?

Simmias/ Not in the least.

Socrates/ Now please give me your closest attention. Do we say that one kind of soul possesses intelligence and goodness, and is good, and that another possesses stupidity and wickedness, and is evil? And is this true?

Simmias/ Yes, it is true.

Socrates/ Then how will a person who holds that the soul is an attunement account for the presence in it of goodness and badness? Will he describe them as yet another attunement or lack of it? Will he say that the good soul is in tune, and not only is an attunement itself, but contains another, whereas the bad soul is out of tune and does not contain another attunement?

Simmias/ I really could not say, but obviously anyone who held that view would have to say something of the sort.

Socrates/ But we have already agreed, that no soul can be more or less of a soul than another, and this is the same as agreeing that no attunement can be more of an attunement and in a greater degree, or less of an attunement and in a lesser degree, than another. Is that not so?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that what is neither more nor less of an attunement is neither more nor less in tune. Is that so?

Simmias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does that which is neither more nor less in tune contain a greater or smaller proportion of attunement, or an equal one?

Simmias/ An equal one.

Socrates/ Then since no soul is any more or less than just a soul, it is neither more nor less in tune.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Under this condition it cannot contain a greater proportion of discord or attunement.

Simmias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And again under this condition can one soul contain a greater proportion of badness or goodness than another, assuming that badness is discord and goodness attunement?

Simmias/ No, it cannot.

Socrates/ Or rather, I suppose, Simmias, by strict reasoning no soul will contain any share of badness, if it is an attunement, because surely since attunement is absolutely attunement and nothing else, it can never contain any share of discord.

Simmias/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Nor can the soul, since it is absolutely soul, contain a share of badness.

Simmias/ Not in the light of what we have said.

Socrates/ So on this theory every soul of every living creature will be equally good—assuming that it is the nature of all souls to be equally souls and nothing else.

Simmias/ I think that follows, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you also think that this view is right? Would the argument ever have come to this if our hypothesis, that the soul is an attunement, had been correct?

Simmias/ Not the least chance of it.

Socrates/ Well, do you hold that it is any other part of a man than the soul that governs him, especially if it is a wise one?

Simmias/ No, I do not.

Socrates/ Does it yield to the feelings of the body, or oppose them? I mean, for instance, that when a person is feverish and thirsty it impels him the other way, not to drink, and when he is hungry, not to eat, and there are thousands of other ways in which we see the soul opposing the physical instincts. Is that not so?

Simmias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Did we not also agree a little while ago that if it is an attunement it can never sound a note that conflicts with the tension or relaxation or vibration or any other condition of its constituents, but must always follow them and never direct them?

Simmias/ Yes, we did, of course.

Socrates/ Well, surely we can see now that the soul works in just the opposite way. It directs all the elements of which it is said to consist, opposing them in almost everything all through life, and exercising every form of control—sometimes by severe and unpleasant methods like those of physical training and medicine, and sometimes by milder

ones, sometimes scolding, sometimes encouraging—and conversing with the desires and passions and fears as though it were quite separate and distinct from them. It is just like Homer's description in the *Odyssey* where he says that Odysseus;

> Then beat his breast, and thus reproved his heart,
> Endure, my heart; still worse hast thou endured.

Do you suppose that when he wrote that he thought that the soul was an attunement, liable to be swayed by physical feelings? Surely he regarded it as capable of swaying and controlling them, as something much too divine to rank as an attunement.

Simmias/ That is certainly how it seems to me, Socrates.

Socrates/ Good. In that case there is no justification for our saying that soul is a kind of attunement. We should neither agree with Homer nor be consistent ourselves.

Simmias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Well now, we seem to have placated the Theban lady Harmonia with moderate success. But what about Cadmus, Cebes? How shall *we* placate him, and what argument shall we use?

Cebes/ I think that you will find a way. This argument which you brought forward against the attunement theory far surpassed all my expectations. When Simmias was explaining his difficulties I wondered very much whether anyone would be able to do anything with his argument; so I was quite astonished that it could not stand up against your very first attack. I should not be surprised if Cadmus' argument met the same fate.

Socrates/ My dear fellow, don't boast, or some misfortune will upset the forthcoming argument. However, we will leave that to God; it is our task to come to close quarters in the Homeric manner and test the validity of your contention.

What you require, in a nutshell, is this. You consider that unless the confidence of a philosopher who at the point of dying believes that after death he will be better off for having lived and ended his life in philosophy than in any other way of living is to be a blind and foolish confidence, the soul must be proved to be indestructible and immortal. To show that it has great vitality and a godlike nature, and even that it existed before we were born—all this, you say, may very well indicate not that the soul is immortal, but merely that it is long-lived, and pre-existed somewhere for a prodigious period of time, enjoying a great measure of knowledge and activity. But all this did not make it any the more immortal. Indeed its very entrance into the human body was, like a disease, the beginning of its destruction; it lives this life in increasing weariness, and finally perishes in what we call death. You also say that, to our individual fears, it makes no difference whether it enters the body once or often. Anyone who does not know and cannot prove that the soul is immortal must be afraid, unless he is a fool.

That, I believe, is the substance of your objection, Cebes. I am deliberately reviewing it more than once, in order that nothing may escape us, and that you may add to it or subtract from it anything that you wish.

Cebes/ But at the present moment there is no need for me to add or subtract anything; that is precisely my point of view.

Phaedo/ After spending some time in reflection Socrates said;

Socrates/ What you require is no light undertaking, Cebes. It involves a full treatment of the causes of generation and destruction. If you like, I will describe my own experiences in this connection, and then, if you find

anything helpful in my account, you can use it to reassure yourself about your own objections.

Cebes/ Yes, indeed, I should like that very much.

Socrates/ Then listen, and I will tell you. When I was young, Cebes, I had an extraordinary passion for that branch of learning which is called natural science. I thought it would be marvelous to know the causes for which each thing comes and ceases and continues to be. I was constantly veering to and fro, puzzling primarily over this sort of question. Is it when heat and cold produce fermentation, as some have said, that living creatures are bred? Is it with the blood that we think, or with the air or the fire that is in us? Or is it none of these, but the brain that supplies our senses of hearing and sight and smell, and from these that memory and opinion arise, and from memory and opinion, when established, that knowledge comes? Then again I would consider how these faculties are lost, and study celestial and terrestrial phenomena, until at last I came to the conclusion that I was uniquely unfitted for this form of inquiry. I will give you a sufficient indication of what I mean. I had understood some things plainly before, in my own and other people's estimation, but now I was so befogged by these speculations that I unlearned even what I had thought I knew, especially about the cause of growth in human beings. Previously I had thought that it was quite obviously due to eating and drinking—that when, from the food which we consume, flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and when in the same way the other parts of the body are augmented by their appropriate particles, the bulk which was small is now large, and in this way the small man becomes a big one. That is what I used to believe—reasonably, don't you think?

Cebes/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Consider a little further. I had been content to think, when I saw a tall man standing beside a short one, that he was taller by a head, and similarly in the case of horses. And it seemed to me even more obvious that ten is more than eight because it contains two more, and that two feet is bigger than one because it exceeds it by half its own length.

Cebes/ And what do you believe about them now?

Socrates/ Why, upon my word, that I am very far from supposing that I know the explanation of any of these things. I cannot even convince myself that when you add one to one either the first or the second one becomes two, or they both become two by the addition of the one to the other. I find it hard to believe that, although when they were separate each of them was one and they were not two, now that they have come together the cause of their becoming two is simply the union caused by their juxtaposition. Nor can I believe now, when you divide one, that this time the cause of its becoming two is the division, because this cause of its becoming two is the opposite of the former one; then it was because they were brought close together and added one to the other, but now it is because they are taken apart and separated one from the other. Nor can I now persuade myself that I understand how it is that things become one, nor, in short, why anything else comes or ceases or continues to be, according to this method of inquiry. So I reject it altogether, and muddle out a haphazard method of my own.

However, I once heard someone reading from a book, by Anaxagoras, and asserting that it is mind that produces order and is the cause of everything. This explanation pleased me. Somehow it seemed right that mind should be the cause of everything, and I reflected that if this is so, mind in producing order sets everything in order and arranges each individual thing in the way that is best for it. Therefore

if anyone wished to discover the reason why any given thing came or ceased or continued to be, he must find out how it was best for that thing to be, or to act or be acted upon in any other way. On a this view there was only one thing for a man to consider, with regard both to himself and to anything else, namely the best and highest good, although this would necessarily imply knowing what is less good, since both were covered by the same knowledge.

These reflections made me suppose, to my delight, that in Anaxagoras I had found an authority on causation who was after my own heart. I assumed that he would begin by informing us whether the earth is flat or round, and would then proceed to explain in detail the reason and logical necessity for this by stating how and why it was better that it should be so. I thought that if he asserted that the earth was in the center, he would explain in detail that it was better for it to be there; and if he made this clear, I was prepared to give up hankering after any other kind of cause. I was prepared also in the same way to receive instruction about the sun and moon and the other heavenly bodies, about their relative velocities and their orbits and all the other phenomena connected with them—in what way it is better for each one of them to act or be acted upon as it is. It never entered my head that a man who asserted that the ordering of things is due to mind would offer any other explanation for them than that it is best for them to be as they are. I thought that by assigning a cause to each phenomenon separately and to the universe as a whole he would make perfectly clear what is best for each and what is the universal good. I would not have parted with my hopes for a great sum of money. I lost no time in procuring the books, and began to read them as quickly as I possibly could, so that I might know as soon as possible about the best and the less good.

It was a wonderful hope, my friend, but it was quickly dashed. As I read on I discovered that the fellow made no use of mind and assigned to it no causality for the order of the world, but adduced causes like air and æther and water and many other absurdities. It seemed to me that he was just about as inconsistent as if someone were to say, The cause of everything that Socrates does is mind—and then, in trying to account for my several actions, said first that the reason why I am lying here now is that my body is composed of bones and sinews, and that the bones are rigid and separated at the joints, but the sinews are capable of contraction and relaxation, and form an envelope for the bones with the help of the flesh and skin, the latter holding all together, and since the bones move freely in their joints the sinews by relaxing and contracting enable me somehow to bend my limbs, and that is the cause of my sitting here in a bent position. Or again, if he tried to account in the same way for my conversing with you, adducing causes such as sound and air and hearing and a thousand others, and never troubled to mention the real reasons, which are that since Athens has thought it better to condemn me, therefore I for my part have thought it better to sit here, and more right to stay and submit to whatever penalty she orders. Because, by dog, I fancy that these sinews and bones would have been in the neighborhood of Megara or Boeotia long ago—impelled by a conviction of what is best! —if I did not think that it was more right and honorable to submit to whatever penalty my country orders rather than take to my heels and run away. But to call things like that causes is too absurd. If it were said that without such bones and sinews and all the rest of them I should not be able to do what I think is right, it would be true. But to say that it is because of them that I do what I am doing$_s$ and not through choice of what is best—although my actions are controlled by mind—would be a very lax and

inaccurate form of expression. Fancy being unable to distinguish between the cause of a thing and the condition without which it could not be a cause! It is this latter, as it seems to me, that most people, groping in the dark, call a cause—attaching to it a name to which it has no right. That is why one person surrounds the earth with a vortex, and so keeps it in place by means of the heavens, and another props it up on a pedestal of air, as though it were a wide platter. As for a power which keeps things disposed at any given moment in the best possible way, they neither look for it nor believe that it has any supernatural force. They imagine that they will someday find a more mighty and immortal and all-sustaining Atlas, and they do not think that anything is really bound and held together by goodness or moral obligation. For my part, I should be delighted to learn about the workings of such a cause from anyone, but since I have been denied knowledge of it, and have been unable either to discover it myself or to learn about it from another, I have worked out my own makeshift approach to the problem of causation. Would you like me to give you a demonstration of it, Cebes?

Cebes/ I should like it very much indeed.

Socrates/ Well, after this, when I was worn out with my physical investigations, it occurred to me that I must guard against the same sort of risk which people run when they watch and study an eclipse of the sun; they really do sometimes injure their eyes, unless they study its reflection in water or some other medium. I conceived of something like this happening to myself, and I was afraid that by observing objects with my eyes and trying to comprehend them with each of my other senses I might blind my soul altogether. So I decided that I must have recourse to theories, and use them in trying to discover the truth about things. Perhaps my illustration is not quite apt, because I do

not at all admit that an inquiry by means of theory employs 'images' any more than one which confines itself to facts. But however that may be, I started off in this way, and in every case I first lay down the theory which I judge to be soundest, and then whatever seems to agree with it—with regard either to causes or to anything else—I assume to be true, and whatever does not I assume not to be true. But I should like to express my meaning more clearly, because at present I don't think that you understand.

Cebes/ No, indeed I don't, not a bit.

Socrates/ Well, what I mean is this, and there is nothing new about it. I have always said it; in fact I have never stopped saying it, especially in the earlier part of this discussion. As I am going to try to explain to you the theory of causation which I have worked out myself, I propose to make a fresh start from those principles of mine which you know so well—that is, I am assuming the existence of absolute beauty and goodness and magnitude and all the rest of them. If you grant my assumption and admit that they exist, I hope with their help to explain causation to you, and to find a proof that soul is immortal.

Cebes/ Certainly I grant it. You need lose no time in drawing your conclusion.

Socrates/ Then consider the next step, and see whether you share my opinion. It seems to me that whatever else is beautiful apart from absolute beauty is beautiful because it partakes of that absolute beauty, and for no other reason. Do you accept this kind of causality?

Cebes/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Well, now, that is as far as my mind goes; I cannot understand these other ingenious theories of causation. If someone tells me that the reason why a given object is beautiful is that it has a gorgeous color or shape or

any other such attribute, I disregard all these other explanations—I find them all confusing—and I cling simply and straightforwardly and no doubt foolishly to the explanation that the one thing that makes that object beautiful is the presence in it or association with it, in whatever way the relation comes about, of absolute beauty. I do not go so far as to insist upon the precise details—only upon the fact that it is by beauty that beautiful things are beautiful. This, I feel, is the safest answer for me or for anyone else to give, and I believe that while I hold fast to this I cannot fall; it is safe for me or for anyone else to answer that it is by beauty that beautiful things are beautiful. Don't you agree?

Cebes/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Then is it also by largeness that large things are large and larger things larger, and by smallness that smaller things are smaller?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ So you too, like myself, would refuse to accept the statement that one man is taller than another 'by a head,' and that the shorter man is shorter by the same. You would protest that the only view which you yourself can hold is that whatever is taller than something else is so simply by tallness—that is, because of tallness—and that what is shorter is so simply by shortness, that is, because of shortness. You would be afraid, I suppose, that if you said that one man is taller than another by a head, you would be faced by a logical objection—first that the taller should be taller and the shorter, shorter by the same thing, and secondly that the taller person should be taller by a head, which is a short thing, and that it is unnatural that a man should be made tall by something short. Isn't that so?

Phaedo/ Cebes laughed and said;

Cebes/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Then you would be afraid to say that ten is more than eight 'by two,' or that two is the cause of its excess over eight, instead of saying that it is more than eight by, or because of, being a larger number, and you would be afraid to say that a length of two feet is greater than one foot by a half, instead of saying that it is greater by its larger size—because there is the same danger here too?

Cebes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Suppose next that we add one to one. You would surely avoid saying that the cause of our getting two is the addition, or in the case of a divided unit, the division. You would loudly proclaim that you know of no other way in which any given object can come into being except by participation in the reality peculiar to its appropriate universal, and that in the cases which I have mentioned you recognize no other cause for the coming into being of two than participation in duality, and that whatever is to become two must participate in this, and whatever is to become one must participate in unity. You would dismiss these divisions and additions and other such niceties, leaving them for persons wiser than yourself to use in their explanations, while you, being nervous of your own shadow, as the saying is, and of your inexperience, would hold fast to the security of your hypothesis and make your answers accordingly. If anyone should fasten upon the hypothesis itself, you would disregard him and refuse to answer until you could consider whether its consequences were mutually consistent or not. And when you had to substantiate the hypothesis itself, you would proceed in the same way, assuming whatever more ultimate hypothesis commended itself most to you, until you reached one which was satisfactory. You would not mix the two things together by discussing both the principle and its consequences, like one of these destructive critics—that

is, if you wanted to discover any part of the truth. They presumably have no concern or care whatever for such an object, because their cleverness enables them to muddle everything up without disturbing their own self-complacence, but you, I imagine, if you are a philosopher, will follow the course which I describe.

Simmias/ You are perfectly right.

Cebes/ You are perfectly right.

Echecrates/ I can assure you, Phaedo, I am not surprised. It seems to me that Socrates made his meaning extraordinarily clear to even a limited intelligence.

Phaedo/ That was certainly the feeling of all of us who were present, Echecrates.

Echecrates/ No doubt, because it is just the same with us who were not present and are hearing it now for the first time. But how did the discussion go on?

Phaedo/ I think that when Socrates had got this accepted, and it was agreed that the various forms exist, and that the reason why other things are called after the forms is that they participate in the forms, he next went on to ask;

Socrates/ If you hold this view, I suppose that when you say that Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, you mean that at that moment there are in Simmias both tallness and shortness?

Simmias/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ But do you agree that the statement 'Simmias is bigger than Socrates' is not true in the form in which it is expressed? Surely the real reason why Simmias is bigger is not because he is Simmias but because of the height which he incidentally possesses, and conversely the reason why he is bigger than Socrates is not because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has the attribute of shortness in comparison with Simmias' height.

Simmias/ True.

Socrates/ And again Simmias' being smaller than Phaedo is due not to the fact that Phaedo is Phaedo, but to the fact that Phaedo has the attribute of tallness in comparison with Simmias' shortness.

Simmias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ So that is how Simmias comes to be described as both short and tall, because he is intermediate between the two of them, and allows his shortness to be surpassed by the tallness of the one while he asserts his superior tallness over the shortness of the other.

Phaedo/ He added with a smile;

Socrates/ I seem to be developing an artificial style, but the facts are surely as I say.

Phaedo/ Simmias agreed.

Socrates/ I am saying all this because I want you to share my point of view. It seems to me not only that the form of tallness itself absolutely declines to be short as well as tall, but also that the tallness which is in us never admits smallness and declines to be surpassed. It does one of two things. Either it gives way and withdraws as its opposite shortness approaches, or it has already ceased to exist by the time that the other arrives. It cannot stand its ground and receive the quality of shortness in the same way as I myself have done. If it did, it would become different from what it was before, whereas I have not lost my identity by acquiring the quality of shortness—I am the same man, only short—but my tallness could not endure to be short instead of tall. In the same way the shortness that is in us declines ever to become or be tall, nor will any other quality, while still remaining what it was, at the same time become or be the opposite quality; in such a situation it either withdraws or ceases to exist.

Cebes/ I agree with you entirely.

Phaedo/ At this point one of the company—I can't remember distinctly who it was—said;

Someone/ Look here! Didn't we agree, earlier in the discussion, on the exact opposite of what you are saying now—that the bigger comes from the smaller and the smaller from the bigger, and that it is precisely from their opposites that opposites come? Now the view seems to be that this is impossible.

Phaedo/ Socrates had listened with his head turned toward the speaker.

Socrates/ It was brave of you to refresh my memory, but you don't realize the difference between what we are saying now and what we said then. Then we were saying that opposite *things* come from opposite *things;* now we are saying that the opposite *itself* can never become opposite to itself—neither the opposite which is in us nor that which is in the real world. Then, my friend, we were speaking about objects which possess opposite qualities, and calling them by the names of the latter, but now we are speaking about the qualities themselves, from whose presence in them the objects which are called after them derive their names. We maintain that the opposites themselves would absolutely refuse to tolerate coming into being from one another.

Phaedo/ As he spoke he looked at Cebes.

Socrates/ I suppose that nothing in what he said worried you too, Cebes?

Cebes/ No, not this time, though I don't deny that a good many other things do.

Socrates/ So we are agreed upon this as a general principle, that an opposite can never be opposite to itself.

Cebes/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Then consider this point too, and see whether you agree about it too. Do you admit that there are such things as heat and cold?

Cebes/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Do you think they are the same as snow and fire?

Cebes/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Heat is quite distinct from fire, and cold from snow?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ But I suppose you agree, in the light of what we said before, that snow, being what it is, can never admit heat and still remain snow, just as it was before, only with the addition of heat. It must either withdraw at the approach of heat, or cease to exist.

Cebes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Again, fire must either retire or cease to exist at the approach of cold. It will never have the courage to admit cold and still remain fire, just as it was, only with the addition of cold.

Cebes/ That is true.

Socrates/ So we find, in certain cases like these, that the name of the form is eternally applicable not only to the form itself, but also to something else, which is not the form but invariably possesses its distinguishing characteristic. But perhaps another example will make my meaning clearer. Oddness must always be entitled to this name by which I am now calling it, isn't that so?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ This is the question. Is it unique in this respect, or is there something else, not identical with oddness, to which we are bound always to apply not only its own name

but that of odd as well, because by its very nature it never loses its oddness? What I mean is illustrated by the case of the number three; there are plenty of other examples, but take the case of three. Don't you think that it must always be described not only by its own name but by that of odd, although odd and three are not the same thing? It is the very nature of three and five and all the alternate integers that every one of them is invariably odd, although it is not identical with oddness. Similarly two and four and all the rest of the other series are not identical with even, but each one of them always is even. Do you admit this, or not?

Cebes/ Of course I do.

Socrates/ Well, then, pay careful attention to the point which I want to make, which is this. It seems clear that the opposites themselves do not admit one another, but it also looks as though any things which, though not themselves opposites, always have opposites in them, similarly do not admit the opposite form to that which is in them, but on its approach either cease to exist or retire before it. Surely we must assert that three will sooner cease to exist or suffer any other fate than submit to become even while it is still three?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And yet two and three are not opposites.

Cebes/ No, they are not.

Socrates/ So it is not only the opposite forms that cannot face one another's approach; there are other things too which cannot face the approach of opposites.

Cebes/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Shall we try, if we can, to define what sort of things these are?

Cebes/ By all means.

Socrates/ Well, then, Cebes, would this describe them—that they are things which are compelled by some form which takes possession of them to assume not only its own form but invariably also that of some other form which is an opposite?

Cebes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Just what we were saying a minute ago. You realize, I suppose, that when the form of three takes possession of any group of objects, it compels them to be odd as well as three.

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then I maintain that into such a group the opposite form to the one which has this effect can never enter.

Cebes/ No, it cannot.

Socrates/ And it was the form of odd that had this effect?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the opposite of this is the form of even?

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ So the form of even will never enter into three.

Cebes/ No, never.

Socrates/ In other words, three is incompatible with evenness.

Cebes/ Quite.

Socrates/ So the number three is uneven.

Cebes/ Yes.

Socrates/ I proposed just now to define what sort of things they are which, although they are not themselves directly opposed to a given opposite, nevertheless do not admit it, as in the present example, three, although not the opposite of even, nevertheless does not admit it, because

three is always accompanied by the opposite of even—and similarly with two and odd, or fire and cold, and hosts of others. Well, see whether you accept this definition. Not only does an opposite not admit its opposite, but if anything is accompanied by a form which has an opposite, and meets that opposite, then the thing which is accompanied never admits the opposite of the form by which it is accompanied. Let me refresh your memory; there is no harm in hearing a thing several times. Five will not admit the form of even, nor will ten, which is double five, admit the form of odd. Double has an opposite of its own, but at the same time it will not admit the form of odd. Nor will one and a half, or other fractions such as one half or three quarters and so on, admit the form of whole. I assume that you follow me and agree.

Cebes/ I follow and agree perfectly.

Socrates/ Then run over the same ground with me from the beginning, and don't answer in the exact terms of the question, but follow my example. I say this because besides the 'safe answer' that I described at first, as the result of this discussion I now see another means of safety.

Suppose, for instance, that you ask me what must be present in body to make it hot. I shall not return the safe but ingenuous answer that it is heat, but a more sophisticated one, based on the results of our discussion—namely that it is fire. And if you ask what must be present in a body to make it diseased, I shall say not disease but fever. Similarly if you ask what must be present in a number to make it odd, I shall say not oddness but unity, and so on. See whether you have a sufficient grasp now of what I want from you.

Cebes/ Quite sufficient.

Socrates/ Then tell me, what must be present in a body to make it alive?

Cebes/ Soul.

Socrates/ Is this always so?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ So whenever soul takes possession of a body, it always brings life with it?

Cebes/ Yes, it does.

Socrates/ Is there an opposite to life, or not?

Cebes/ Yes, there is.

Socrates/ What?

Cebes/ Death.

Socrates/ Does it follow, then, from our earlier agreement, that soul will never admit the opposite of that which accompanies it?

Cebes/ Most definitely.

Socrates/ Well, now, what name did we apply just now to that which does not admit the form of even?

Cebes/ Uneven.

Socrates/ And what do we call that which does not admit justice, or culture?

Cebes/ Uncultured, and the other unjust.

Socrates/ Very good. And what do we call that which does not admit death?

Cebes/ Immortal.

Socrates/ And soul does not admit death?

Cebes/ No.

Socrates/ So soul is immortal.

Cebes/ Yes, it is immortal.

Socrates/ Well, can we say that that has been proved? What do you think?

Cebes/ Most completely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Here is another question for you, Cebes. If the uneven were necessarily imperishable, would not three be imperishable?

Cebes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then again, if what is not hot were necessarily imperishable, when you applied heat to snow, would not the snow withdraw still intact and unmelted? It could not cease to exist, nor on the other hand could it remain where it was and admit the heat.

Cebes/ That is true.

Socrates/ In the same way I assume that if what is not cold were imperishable, when anything cold approached fire, it could never go out or cease to exist; it would depart and be gone unharmed.

Cebes/ That must be so.

Socrates/ Are we not bound to say the same of the immortal? If what is immortal is also imperishable, it is impossible that at the approach of death soul should cease to be. It follows from what we have already said that it cannot admit death, or be dead—just as we said that three cannot be even, nor can odd; nor can fire be cold, nor can the heat which is in the fire. But, it may be objected, granting, as has been agreed, that odd does not become even at the approach of even, why should it not cease to exist, and something even take its place? In reply to this we could not insist that the odd does not cease to exist—because what is not even is not imperishable—but if this were conceded, we could easily insist that, at the approach of even, odd and three retire and depart. And we could be equally insistent about fire and heat and all the rest of them, could we not?

Cebes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So now in the case of the immortal, if it is conceded that this is also imperishable, soul will be

imperishable as well as immortal. Otherwise we shall need another argument.

Cebes/ There is no need on that account. If what is immortal and eternal cannot avoid destruction, it is hard to see how anything else can.

Socrates/ And I imagine that it would be admitted by everyone, that God at any rate, and the form of life, and anything else that is immortal, can never cease to exist.

Cebes/ Yes indeed, by all men certainly, and even more, I suppose, by the gods.

Socrates/ Then since what is immortal is also indestructible, if soul is really immortal, surely it must be imperishable too.

Cebes/ Quite inevitably.

Socrates/ So it appears that when death comes to a man, the mortal part of him dies, but the immortal part retires at the approach of death and escapes unharmed and indestructible.

Cebes/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then it is as certain as anything can be, Cebes, that soul is immortal and imperishable, and that our souls will really exist in the next world.

Cebes/ Well, Socrates, for my part I have no criticisms, and no doubt about the truth of your argument. But if Simmias here or anyone else has any criticism to make, he had better not keep it to himself, because if anyone wants to say or hear any more about this subject, I don't see to what other occasion he is to defer it.

Simmias/ As a matter of fact, I have no doubts myself either now, in view of what you have just been saying. All the same, the subject is so vast, and I have such a poor opinion

of our weak human nature, that I can't help still feeling some misgivings.

Socrates/ Quite right, Simmias, and what is more, even if you find our original assumptions convincing, they still need more accurate consideration. If you and your friends examine them closely enough, I believe that you will arrive at the truth of the matter, in so far as it is possible for the human mind to attain it, and if you are sure that you have done this, you will not need to inquire further.

Simmias/ That is true.

Socrates/ But there is a further point, gentlemen, which deserves your attention. If the soul is immortal, it demands our care not only for that part of time which we call life, but for all time. And indeed it would seem now that it will be extremely dangerous to neglect it. If death were a release from everything, it would be a boon for the wicked, because by dying they would be released not only from the body but also from their own wickedness together with the soul, but as it is, since the soul is clearly immortal, it can have no escape or security from evil except by becoming as good and wise as it possibly can. For it takes nothing with it to the next world except its education and training, and these, we are told, are of supreme importance in helping or harming the newly dead at the very beginning of his journey there.

This is how the story goes. When any man dies, his own guardian spirit, which was given charge over him in his life, tries to bring him to a certain place where all must assemble, and from which, after submitting their several cases to judgment, they must set out for the next world, under the guidance of one who has the office of escorting souls from this world to the other. When they have there undergone the necessary experiences and remained as long as is required,

another guide brings them back again after many vast periods of time.

Of course this journey is not as Aeschylus makes Telephus describe it. He says that the path to Hades is straightforward, but it seems clear to me that it is neither straightforward nor single. If it were, there would be no need for a guide, because surely nobody could lose his way anywhere if there were only one road. In fact, it seems likely that it contains many forkings and crossroads, to judge from the ceremonies and observances of this world.

Well, the wise and disciplined soul follows its guide and is not ignorant of its surroundings, but the soul which is deeply attached to the body, as I said before, hovers round it and the visible world for a long time, and it is only after much resistance and suffering that it is at last forcibly led away by its appointed guardian spirit. And when it reaches the same place as the rest, the soul which is impure through having done some impure deed, either by setting its hand to lawless bloodshed or by committing other kindred crimes which are the work of kindred souls, this soul is shunned and avoided by all. None will company with it or guide it, and it wanders alone in utter desolation until certain times have passed, whereupon it is borne away of necessity to its proper habitation. But every soul that has lived throughout its life in purity and soberness enjoys divine company and guidance, and each inhabits the place which is proper to it. There are many wonderful regions in the earth, and the earth itself is neither in nature nor in size such as geographers suppose it to be—so someone has assured me.

Simmias/ How can you say that, Socrates? I myself have heard a great many theories about the earth, but not this belief of yours. I should very much like to hear it.

Socrates/ Why, really, Simmias, I don't think that it calls for the skill of a Glaucus to explain what my belief is, but to prove that it is true seems to me to be too difficult even for a Glaucus. In the first place I should probably be unable to do it, and in the second, even if I knew how, it seems to me, Simmias, that my life is too short for a long explanation. However, there is no reason why I should not tell you what I believe about the appearance of the earth and regions in it.

Simmias/ Well, even that will do.

Socrates/ This is what I believe, then. In the first place, if the earth is spherical and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither air nor any other such force to keep it from falling; the uniformity of the heavens and the equilibrium of the earth itself are sufficient to support it. Anybody in equilibrium, if it is set in the middle of a uniform medium, will have no tendency to sink or rise in any direction more than another, and having equal impulses will remain suspended. This is the first article of my belief.

Simmias/ And quite right too.

Socrates/ Next, I believe that it is vast in size, and that we who dwell between the river Phasis and the Pillars of Hercules inhabit only a minute portion of it—we live round the sea like ants or frogs round a pond—and there are many other people's inhabiting similar regions. There are many hollow places all-round the earth, places of every shape and size, into which the water and mist and air have collected. But the earth itself is as pure as the starry heaven in which it lies, and which is called aether by most of our authorities. The water, mist, and air are the dregs of this aether, and they are continually draining into the hollow places in the earth. We do not realize that we are living in its hollows, but assume that we are living on the earth's surface. Imagine someone living in the depths of the sea. He might think that

he was living on the surface, and seeing the sun and the other heavenly bodies through the water; he might think that the sea was the sky. He might be so sluggish and feeble that he had never reached the top of the sea, never emerged and raised his head from the sea into this world of ours, and seen for himself—or even heard from someone who had seen it—how much purer and more beautiful it really is than the one in which his people lives. Now we are in just the same position. Although we live in a hollow of the earth, we assume that we are living on the surface, and we call the air heaven, as though it were the heaven through which the stars move. And this point too is the same, that we are too feeble and sluggish to make our way out to the upper limit of the air. If someone could reach to the summit, or put on wings and fly aloft, when he put up his head he would see the world above, just as fishes see our world when they put up their heads out of the sea. And if his nature were able to bear the sight, he would recognize that that is the true heaven and the true light and the true earth. For this earth and its stones and all the regions in which we live are marred and corroded, just as in the sea everything is corroded by the brine, and there is no vegetation worth mentioning, and scarcely any degree of perfect formation, but only caverns and sand and measureless mud, and tracts of slime wherever there is earth as well, and nothing is in the least worthy to be judged beautiful by our standards. But the things above excel those of our world to a degree far greater still. If this is the right moment for an imaginative description, Simmias, it will be worth your while to hear what it is really like upon the earth which lies beneath the heavens.

Simmias/ Yes, indeed, Socrates, it would be a great pleasure to us, at any rate, to hear this description.

Socrates/ Well, my dear boy, the real earth, viewed from above, is supposed to look like one of these balls made of

twelve pieces of skin, variegated and marked out in different colors, of which the colors which we know are only limited samples, like the paints which artists use, but there the whole earth is made up of such colors, and others far brighter and purer still. One section is a marvelously beautiful purple, and another is golden. All that is white of it is whiter than chalk or snow, and the rest is similarly made up of the other colors, still more and lovelier than those which we have seen. Even these very hollows in the earth, full of water and air, assume a kind of color as they gleam amid the different hues around them, so that there appears to be one continuous surface of varied colors. The trees and flowers and fruits which grow upon this earth are proportionately beautiful. The mountains too and the stones have a proportionate smoothness and transparency, and their colors are lovelier. The pebbles which are so highly prized in our world—the jaspers and rubies and emeralds and the rest—are fragments of these stones, but there everything is as beautiful as they are, or better still. This is because the stones there are in their natural state, not damaged by decay and corroded by salt water as ours are by the sediment which has collected here, and which causes disfigurement and disease to stones and earth, and animals and plants as well. The earth itself is adorned not only with all these stones but also with gold and silver and the other metals, for many rich veins of them occur in plain view in all parts of the earth, so that to see them is a sight for the eyes of the blessed.

There are many kinds of animals upon it, and also human beings, some of whom live inland, others round the air, as we live round the sea, and others in islands surrounded by air but close to the mainland. In a word, as water and the sea are to us for our purposes, so is air to them, and as air is to us, so the æther is to them. Their climate is so

temperate that they are free from disease and live much longer than people do here, and in sight and hearing and understanding and all other faculties they are as far superior to us as air is to water or æther to air in clarity.

They also have sanctuaries and temples which are truly inhabited by gods, and oracles and prophecies and visions and all other kinds of communion with the gods occur there face to face. They see the sun and moon and stars as they really are, and the rest of their happiness is after the same manner.

Such is the nature of the earth as a whole and of the things that are upon it. In the earth itself, all over its surface, there are many hollow regions, some deeper and more widely spread than that in which we live, others deeper than our region but with a smaller expanse, some both shallower than ours and broader. All these are joined together underground by many connecting, channels, some narrower, some wider, through which, from one basin to another, there flows a great volume of water—monstrous unceasing subterranean rivers of waters both hot and cold—and of fire too, great rivers of fire, and many of liquid mud, some clearer, some more turbid, like the rivers in Sicily that flow mud before the lava comes, and the lava stream itself. By these the several regions are filled in turn as the flood reaches them.

All this movement to and fro is caused by an oscillation inside the earth, and this oscillation is brought about by natural means, as follows.

One of the cavities in the earth is not only larger than the rest, but pierces right through from one side to the other. It is of this that Homer speaks when he says. 'Far, far away, where lies earth's deepest chasm,' while elsewhere both he and many other poets refer to it as Tartarus. Into this gulf all the rivers flow together, and from it they flow forth again,

and each acquires the nature of that part of the earth through which it flows. The cause of the flowing in and out of all these streams is that the mass of liquid has no bottom or foundation; so it oscillates and surges to and fro, and the air or breath that belongs to it does the same, for it accompanies the liquid both as it rushes to the further side of the earth and as it returns to this. And just as when we breathe we exhale and inhale the breath in a continuous stream, so in this case, too, the breath, oscillating with the liquid, causes terrible and monstrous winds as it passes in and out. So when the water retires to the so-called lower region the streams in the earth flow into those parts and irrigate them fully, and when in turn it ebbs from there and rushes back this way, it fills our streams again, and when they are filled they flow through their channels and through the earth; and arriving in those regions to which their ways have been severally prepared, they make seas and lakes and rivers and springs. Then sinking again beneath the ground, some by way of more and a further regions, others by fewer and nearer, they empty themselves once more into Tartarus, some much lower, some only a little lower than the point at which they were emitted, but they all flow in at a level deeper than their rise. Some flow in on the opposite side to that on which they came out, and others on the same side, while some make a complete circle and, winding like a snake one or even more times round the earth, descend as far as possible before they again discharge their waters. It is possible to descend in either direction as far as the center, but no further, for either direction from the center is uphill, whichever way the streams are flowing.

Among these many various mighty streams there are four in particular. The greatest of these, and the one which describes the outermost circle, is that which is called Oceanus. Directly opposite to this and with a contrary

course is Acheron, which not only flows through other desolate regions but passes underground and arrives at the Acherusian Lake, where the souls of the dead for the most part come, and after staying there for certain fixed periods, longer or shorter, are sent forth again to the births of living creatures. Halfway between these two a third river has its rise, and near its source issues into a great place burning with sheets of fire, where it forms a boiling lake of muddy water greater than our sea. From there it follows a circular course, flowing turbid and muddy, and as it winds round inside the earth it comes at last to the margin of the Acherusian Lake, but does not mingle with the waters, and after many windings underground, it plunges into Tartarus at a lower point. This is the river called Pyriphlegethon, whose fiery stream belches forth jets of lava here and there in all parts of the world. Directly opposite to this in its turn the fourth river breaks out, first, they say, into a wild and dreadful place, all leaden gray, which is called the Stygian region, and the lake which the river forms on its entry is called Styx. After falling into this, and acquiring mysterious powers in its waters, the river passes underground and follows a spiral course contrary to that of Pyriphlegethon, which it meets from the opposite direction in the Acherusian Lake. This river too mingles its stream with no other waters, but circling round falls into Tartarus opposite Pyriphlegethon, and its name, the poets say, is Cocytus.

Such is the conformation of the earth and its rivers. And when the newly dead reach the place to which each is conducted by his guardian spirit, first they submit to judgment, both those who have lived well and holily, and those who have not. Those who are judged to have lived a neutral life set out for Acheron, and embarking in those vessels which await them, are conveyed in them to the lake, and there they dwell, and undergoing purification are both

absolved by punishment from any sins that they have committed, and rewarded for their good deeds, according to each man's deserts. Those who on account of the greatness of their sins are judged to be incurable, as having committed many gross acts of sacrilege or many wicked and lawless murders or any other such crimes—these are hurled by their appropriate destiny into Tartarus, from whence they emerge no more. Others are judged to have been guilty of sins which, though great, are curable—if, for example, they have offered violence to father or mother in a fit of passion, but spent the rest of their lives in penitence, or if they have committed manslaughter after the same fashion. These too must be cast into Tartarus, but when this has been done and they have remained there for a year, the surge casts them out—the manslayers down Cocytus and the offenders against their parents down Pyriphlegethon. And when, as they are swept along, they come past the Acherusian Lake, there they cry aloud and call upon those whom they have killed or misused, and calling, beg and entreat for leave to pass from the stream into the lake, and be received by them. If they prevail, they come out and there is an end of their distress, but if not, they are swept away once more into Tartarus and from there back into the rivers, and find no release from their sufferings until they prevail upon those whom they have wronged, for this is the punishment which their judge has appointed for them.

But those who are judged to have lived a life of surpassing holiness—these are they who are released and set free from confinement in these regions of the earth, and passing upward to their pure abode, make their dwelling upon the earth's surface. And of these such as have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy live thereafter altogether without bodies, and reach habitations even more beautiful, which it is not easy to portray—nor is there time

to do so now. But the reasons which we have already described provide ground enough, as you can see, Simmias, for leaving nothing undone to attain during life some measure of goodness and wisdom, for the prize is glorious and the hope great.

Of course, no reasonable man ought to insist that the facts are exactly as I have described them. But that either this or something very like it is a true account of our souls and their future habitations—since we have clear evidence that the soul is immortal—this, I think, is both a reasonable contention and a belief worth risking, for the risk is a noble one. We should use such accounts to inspire ourselves with confidence, and that is why I have already drawn out my tale so long.

There is one way, then, in which a man can be free from all anxiety about the fate of his soul—if in life he has abandoned bodily pleasures and adornments, as foreign to his purpose and likely to do more harm than good, and has devoted himself to the pleasures of acquiring knowledge, and so by decking his soul not with a borrowed beauty but with its own—with self-control, and goodness, and courage, and liberality, and truth—has fitted himself to await his journey to the next world. You, Simmias and Cebes and the rest, will each make this journey someday in the future, but for me the fated hour, as a tragic character might say, calls even now. In other words, it is about time that I took my bath. I prefer to have a bath before drinking the poison, rather than give the women the trouble of washing me when I am dead.

Phaedo/ When he had finished speaking, Crito said;

Crito/ Very well, Socrates. But have you no directions for the others or myself about your children or anything else? What can we do to please you best?

Socrates/ Nothing new, Crito, just what I am always telling you. If you look after yourselves, whatever you do will please me and mine and you too. even if you don't agree with me now. On the other hand, if you neglect yourselves and fail to follow the line of life as I have laid it down both now and in the past, however fervently you agree with me now, it will do no good at all.

Crito/ We shall try our best to do as you say. But how shall we bury you?

Socrates/ Any way you like, that is, if you can catch me and I don't slip through your fingers.

Phaedo/ He laughed gently as he spoke, and turning to us went on;

Socrates/ I can't persuade Crito that I am this Socrates here who is talking to you now and marshaling all the arguments. He thinks that I am the one whom he will see presently lying dead, and he asks how he is to bury me! As for my long and elaborate explanation that when I have drunk the poison I shall remain with you no longer, but depart to a state of heavenly happiness, this attempt to console both you and myself seems to be wasted on him. You must give an assurance to Crito for me—the opposite of the one which he gave to the court which tried me. He undertook that I should stay, but you must assure him that when I am dead I shall not stay, but depart and be gone. That will help Crito to bear it more easily, and keep him from being distressed on my account when he sees my body being burned or buried, as if something dreadful were happening to me, or from saying at the funeral that it is Socrates whom he is laying out or carrying to the grave or burying. Believe me, my dear friend Crito, misstatements are not merely jarring in their immediate context; they also have a bad effect upon the soul. No, you must keep up your spirits and say

that it is only my body that you are burying, and you can bury it as you please, in whatever way you think is most proper.

Phaedo/ With these words he got up and went into another room to bathe, and Crito went after him, but told us to wait. So we waited, discussing and reviewing what had been said, or else dwelling upon the greatness of the calamity which had befallen us, for we felt just as though we were losing a father and should be orphans for the rest of our lives. Meanwhile, when Socrates had taken his bath, his children were brought to see him—he had two little sons and one big boy—and the women of his household, you know, arrived. He talked to them in Crito's presence and gave them directions about carrying out his wishes. Then he told the women and children to go away, and came back himself to join us.

It was now nearly sunset, because he had spent a long time inside. He came and sat down, fresh from the bath, and he had only been talking for a few minutes when the prison officer came in, and walked up to him.

Jailer/ Socrates, at any rate I shall not have to find fault with you, as I do with others, for getting angry with me and cursing when I tell them to drink the poison—carrying out government orders. I have come to know during this time that you are the noblest and the gentlest and the bravest of all the men that have ever come here, and now especially I am sure that you are not angry with me, but with them, because you know who are responsible. So now—you know what I have come to say—good-by, and try to bear what must be as easily as you can.

Phaedo/ As he spoke he burst into tears, and turning round, went away. Socrates looked up at him and said;

Socrates/ Good-by to you, too. We will do as you say.

Phaedo/ Then addressing us he went on;

Socrates/ What a charming person! All the time I have been here he has visited me, and sometimes had discussions with me, and shown me the greatest kindness—and how generous of him now to shed tears for me at parting! But come, Crito, let us do as he says. Someone had better bring in the poison, if it is ready-prepared; if not, tell the man to prepare it.

Crito/ But surely, Socrates, the sun is still upon the mountains; it has not gone down yet. Besides, I know that in other cases people have dinner and enjoy their wine, and sometimes the company of those whom they love, long after they receive the warning, and only drink the poison quite late at night. No need to hurry. There is still plenty of time.

Socrates/ It is natural that these people whom you speak of should act in that way, Crito, because they think that they gain by it. And it is also natural that I should not, because I believe that I should gain nothing by drinking the poison a little later—I should only make myself ridiculous in my own eyes if I clung to life and hugged it when it has no more to offer. Come, do as I say and don't make difficulties.

Phaedo/ At this Crito made a sign to his servant, who was standing nearby. The servant went out and after spending a considerable time returned with the man who was to administer the poison. He was carrying it ready-prepared in a cup.

When Socrates saw him he said;

Socrates/ Well, my good fellow, you understand these things. What ought I to do?

Jailer/ Just drink it, and then walk about until you feel a weight in your legs, and then lie down. Then it will act of its own accord.

Phaedo/ As he spoke he handed the cup to Socrates, who received it quite cheerfully, Echecrates, without a tremor, without any change of color or expression, and said, looking up under his brows with his usual steady gaze;

Socrates/ What do you say about pouring a libation from this drink? Is it permitted, or not?

Jailer/ We only prepare what we regard as the normal dose, Socrates.

Socrates/ I see. But I suppose I am allowed, or rather bound, to pray the gods that my removal from this world to the other may be prosperous. This is my prayer, then, and I hope that it may be granted.

Phaedo/ With these words, quite calmly and with no sign of distaste, he drained the cup in one breath.

Up till this time most of us had been fairly successful in keeping back our tears, but when we saw that he was drinking, that he had actually drunk it, we could do so no longer. In spite of myself the tears came pouring out, so that I covered my face and wept brokenheartedly—not for him, but for my own calamity in losing such a friend. Crito had given up even before me, and had gone out when he could not restrain his tears. But Apollodorus, who had never stopped crying even before, now broke out into such a storm of passionate weeping that he made everyone in the room break down, except Socrates himself, who said;

Socrates/ Really, my friends, what a way to behave! Why, that was my main reason for sending away the women, to prevent this sort of disturbance, because I am told that one should make one's end in a tranquil frame of mind. Calm yourselves and try to be brave.

Phaedo/ This made us feel ashamed, and we controlled our tears. Socrates walked about, and presently, saying that his legs were heavy, lay down on his back—that was what

the man recommended. The man—he was the same one who had administered the poison—kept his hand upon Socrates, and after a little while examined his feet and legs, then pinched his foot hard and asked if he felt it. Socrates said no. Then he did the same to his legs, and moving gradually upward in this way let us see that he was getting cold and numb. Presently he felt him again and said that when it reached the heart, Socrates would be gone.

The coldness was spreading about as far as his waist when Socrates uncovered his face, for he had covered it up, and said—they were his last words—

Socrates/ Crito, we ought to offer a cock to Asclepius. See to it, and don't forget.

Crito/ No, it shall be done. Are you sure that there is nothing else?

Phaedo/ Socrates made no reply to this question, but after a little while he stirred, and when the man uncovered him, his eyes were fixed. When Crito saw this, he closed the mouth and eyes.

Such, Echecrates, was the end of our comrade, who was, we may fairly say, of all those whom we knew in our time, the bravest and also the wisest and most upright man.

Phaedo.

Translated by Woodhead, W. D. 1953

Persons of the Dialog

Reported by Phaedo:

Socrates Cebes Simmias Crito Phaedo

Xanthippe Prison Attendants

Echecrates/ Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear the story from another?

Phaedo/ I myself was there, Echecrates.

Echecrates/ Then what was it that he said before dying, and how did he meet his end? I should so like you to tell me. For nobody from Phlius goes very much to Athens now, and no stranger from Athens has come here for a long time, who could have given us any certain news about these events, except that he drank the poison and died. There was no other news we could learn.

Phaedo/ Did you not even hear then how the trial went?

Echecrates/ Oh yes, someone told us about that and we were surprised that though it took place so much earlier he was not put to death until long after. Why was this, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ It was an accident, Echecrates: the stern of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos had been crowned just the day before the trial.

Echecrates/ And what ship is this?

Phaedo/ This, the Athenians say, is the ship in which Theseus once went with the seven boys and seven maidens to Crete, and he saved them and was himself saved. At the time, we are told, the Athenians vowed to Apollo that, if they were saved, they would every year conduct a pilgrimage to

Delos: and ever since then they have always continued to send it every year to the god. Now when the pilgrimage begins it is their law that the city shall be pure of bloodshed and that none shall be put to death by the state until the ship has sailed to Delos and returned: and this sometimes takes a long while, when the ship is detained by contrary winds. The pilgrimage begins when the priest of Apollo crowns the ship's stern, and this happened, as I said, just the day before the trial. That is why Socrates spent that long time in the prison between his trial and death.

Echecrates/ And what about his death itself, Phaedo? What was said and done, and which of his friends were present? Or would the magistrates allow none to be present, so that he died all alone?

Phaedo/ By no means: there were some present, in fact quite a number.

Echecrates/ Do be so kind as to tell me all as exactly as you can, if you are not busy for the moment.

Phaedo/ Indeed I am not busy, and I will attempt to relate it: for to me there is no greater pleasure than to recall Socrates, whether I speak of him myself or listen to another.

Echecrates/ You will find your hearers, too, equally delighted, Phaedo: so try to narrate it all as accurately as you can.

Phaedo/ Well, I myself experienced the strangest of feelings in his company. I was not moved by the pity which is usual when one is present at the death of a dear friend: for I considered him happy, Echecrates, both in his demeanor and in his discourse; so fearlessly and nobly did he die: and so I concluded that even in departing to the other world he was under the care of providence and that he, if anybody, would find all well when he arrived there. For this reason I felt no such pity as might have been expected at a

scene of sorrow, nor again the pleasure I usually feel when occupied with philosophical discussions—for our conversation was of philosophy—but it was simply a strange feeling that came over me, an unusual blending of pleasure and pain, when I reflected that he was very soon to die. And all of us who were present were in much the same plight, now laughing, now in tears, especially one of our company, Apollodorus—you must know the man and his ways.

Echecrates/ Of course.

Phaedo/ He was completely a victim to this mood, and I and the others too were strangely agitated.

Echecrates/ Just who were there, Phaedo?

Phaedo/ Of our native Athenians this Apollodorus, and Critobulus and his father, and Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, and Antisthenes. Then Ctesippus of Paeania was there, and Menexenus, and some other Athenians. But Plato, I believe, was ill.

Echecrates/ And were any strangers there?

Phaedo/ Yes, Simmias of Thebes, and Cebes, and Phaedondas: and Eucleides and Terpsion of Megara.

Echecrates/ Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus present?

Phaedo/ No, they were said to be in Aegina.

Echecrates/ Was anyone else there?

Phaedo/ No, I think these were about all.

Echecrates/ Well, tell me about the discussion.

Phaedo/ I will try to tell you everything from the beginning. I had always been accustomed on the previous days to visit Socrates along with the others and we would meet together at daybreak in the court where the trial was held, for it is close to the prison, And so we would wait on each occasion until the prison was opened, talking together: for it was not opened early: and when it was opened, we

would go in to Socrates and generally spend all day with him. But on this occasion we gathered earlier; for the evening before, when we left the prison, we had learnt that the ship had arrived from Delos. And so we passed the word along to each other to meet at the usual place as early as possible. On our arrival, the porter who used to answer the door came out and told us to wait and not to enter till he himself called us: 'for', said he, 'the Eleven are now releasing Socrates from his fetters and giving orders for his death to-day.' However, after a short interval he returned and bade us enter. So we went in and found Socrates just freed from his fetters and Xanthippe—you know her—sitting beside him with the child in her arms. When she saw us, she cried aloud and uttered the kind of words that women commonly use:

Xanthippe/ 'Socrates, this is the very last time that your friends will talk to you and you to them.'

Phaedo/ And Socrates looked at Crito and said:

Socrates/ 'Crito, let someone take her home.'

Phaedo/ Some of Crito's people then led her away weeping aloud and beating her breast. And Socrates sat up on his bed and bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, saying as he rubbed it:

Socrates/ 'How strange, my friends, that feeling seems to be which men call pleasure! How wondrously related to pain, which appears to be its opposite! They refuse to come to a man together; but if he pursues and catches the one, he is practically always compelled to accept the other also, as if, though two, they were fastened to a single head. I believe that if Aesop had noticed them he would have composed a fable relating that God wished to reconcile their quarrel and, finding that he could not, joined their heads together: and for this reason whenever the one appears, the other follows later. And this seems to be the case with me. I first suffered

pain in my leg because of the fetters: but now pleasure, it seems, has come to succeed it.'

Cebes/ 'By heaven, I am glad you reminded me, Socrates. Several people have already questioned me about those poems you composed, setting the tales of Aesop to music and the prelude to Apollo: and Evenus asked me the other day what you had in mind in composing these after you came to prison, though you had never written poetry before. If you are interested, then, in having an answer ready for Evenus when he asks again—and you may be sure he will—tell me what to say.'

Socrates/ "'Tell him the truth, Cebes, that I had no desire in composing them to set up as a rival to him and his poems, for I knew that would not be easy: but I was trying to discover the meaning of some dreams and to salve my conscience in case it was this kind of music that they were bidding me compose. My experience was something like this: the same dream has often visited me in my past life, appearing in different forms on different occasions, but always saying the same thing: "Socrates, compose and practice music And previously I imagined it was urging and encouraging me to do just what I was already doing and that, like those who cheer on runners that are already running, so too the dream, in bidding me compose music, was urging me to do what I was already about, since philosophy is the finest music and in this I was engaged. But after the trial took place and the god's festival delayed my death, it seemed to me that, in case it was music in the ordinary sense that the dream enjoined upon me to compose, I should not disregard it, but should so compose: for it was safer, I thought, to salve my conscience by composing in obedience to the dream before my departure. And so I wrote first in honor of the god whose festival it was: and after addressing the god, I reflected that a poet, if he was to be a true poet, ought to write fables, not

tales of fact: and not being an inventor of fables myself, I chose for this reason such fables of Aesop as I had ready to hand and knew by heart, and put into verse the first that presented themselves. So tell Even us this, Cebes, and bid him farewell: and tell him to follow me with all speed, if he is wise. It seems I am departing to-day: for such is the bidding of the Athenians.'

Simmias/ 'What strange advice, Socrates, to give to Evenus! I have often met him, and from what I know of him it is pretty certain that he will not follow your counsel if he can help it.'

Socrates/ 'Why, is not Evenus a philosopher?'

Simmias/ 'Yes, I think so.'

Socrates/ 'Then Evenus will be ready to die, and anyone else who has a genuine interest in philosophy. But he will not perhaps do violence to himself: for they say that that is not permitted.'

Phaedo/ And as he said this he put his feet down from the bed to the ground and sat thus throughout the rest of the conversation.

Cebes/ 'What do you mean, Socrates, by saying that it is not permitted to do violence to ourselves, and yet that the philosopher would be ready to follow the dying man?'

Socrates/ 'Why, Cebes, surely you and Simmias, who are associates of Philolaus, have heard about these things?'

Cebes/ 'Nothing definite, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Well, I myself only speak about them from hearsay: but I have no objection to telling you what I have heard. For perhaps it is especially appropriate for one on the point of departure to the other world to reflect and tell tales about the sojourn there and what kind of life we think it is likely to be. What better, after all, could we do between now and sunset?'

Cebes/ 'Why then do they say that it is not permitted us to take our own lives, Socrates? As you asked just now, I have often heard from Philolaus, when he lived among us, and from others too, that we ought not to do this. But I have never heard anything definite from anyone about these matters.'

Socrates/ 'Well, you must be of good courage, for perhaps you will hear. But it may possibly seem strange to you if this of all things holds good without exception—if it never proves true, as in other matters, that it is better for man, that is to say, for certain men under certain conditions, to die than to live: and perhaps it will seem strange if those for whom it is better to die may not with piety do themselves this service, but must wait for some other to be their benefactor.'

Phaedo/ Cebes said with a gentle laugh, speaking in his own dialect;

Cebes/ 'That's true enow.'

Socrates/ 'It might indeed seem illogical. when put in this way: however, perhaps it can be justified. The account which is given in the Mysteries, that we men live in a kind of guard-house and that we should not discharge ourselves or run away, seems to me profound and not easy to comprehend: but this at least, Cebes, I consider a true statement, that it is the gods who care for us and that we men are the chattels of the gods. Do you not agree?'

Cebes/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Then. would you not be angry if one of your chattels were to kill itself without any indication on your part that you wished it to die, and if punishment were possible would you not punish it?'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Perhaps then in this way it is not beyond reason that a man ought not to kill himself unless god send

upon him some necessity, such as mine in my present position.'

Cebes/ 'Well, that seems reasonable enough. But your recent remark that philosophers would readily welcome death seems strange, Socrates, if we were right in saying just now that god cares for us and we are his chattels. It cannot be explained why the wisest of men are not angry at leaving a service in which the best of all possible masters, the gods, rule over them: for surely the wise man does not imagine that he will look after himself still better if freed from their care. A foolish man might perhaps think that he should run away from his master and might not reason that he should not flee from the good but should remain as long as he can where he is: and so he might senselessly run away: but the man of sense would surely desire to be always with one who is his better. And yet, Socrates, when we put it in this way, the opposite of what we said just now seems likely: wise men ought to be vexed at dying, and fools should rejoice.'

Phaedo/ When Socrates heard this, he seemed delighted at the persistence of Cebes, and looking at us he said:

Socrates/ 'Cebes, you see, is always on the scent of some argument or other, and is not by any means ready to accept at once what anyone says.'

Simmias/ 'Yes, but this time, Socrates, I too think there is something in what Cebes says. For what could really wise men want in running away from masters better than themselves and lightly leaving their service? And it seems to me that the arguments of Cebes point at you, because you are so little distressed at leaving us and leaving the gods whom you admit to be the best of masters.'

Socrates/ 'You are right in what you say, I think you mean that I must answer these charges, as though in a court of law.'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Well then, let me try to defend my cause more convincingly than I did before my judges. If I did not think, Simmias and Cebes, that I shall be departing in the first place to other gods who are wise and good, and secondly to the company of dead men who are better than those in this world, I should indeed be guilty in not being vexed at dying: but as it is, you may be assured that I hope to join good men—though this I would not positively insist upon—but I do assure you that, if there is anything in the world I would insist upon, it is that I am going to live with gods who are very good masters. And that is why I am not vexed as I might be, but am cheerfully confident that there is some existence for the dead and, as they tell us from olden times, a far better life for the good than for the evil.'

Simmias/ 'Why then, Socrates, do you intend to keep these beliefs to yourself when you depart, or will you give us a share of them? For the good you mention seems to be one in which we should partake; and at the same time you will be making your defense, if you can convince us by what you say.'

Socrates/ 'Well, I will try, but first let us discover what it is that Crito has apparently been wanting for some time to say.'

Crito/ 'Why, Socrates, merely that the man who is to administer the poison keeps asking me to inform you that you must talk as little as possible: for he says that people become overheated by conversation—a condition which must not be allowed to interfere with the poison. Those who behave so are at times compelled to drink it two or three times.'

Socrates/ 'Never mind him: just let him attend to his part and be ready to administer it twice or even three times, if need be.'

Crito/ 'I knew it pretty well, but he has been troubling me for some time.'

Socrates/ 'Let him be. But now I wish to render my account to you, my judges, explaining how it seems to me that a man who has truly spent his life in philosophy may naturally be void of fear when about to die, and may hope to win the greatest of blessings, after death, in the other world. I will now endeavor to explain to you, Simmias and Cebes, how this may be so.

'It seems as if other men are unaware that all who genuinely pursue philosophy of their own accord practice nothing else but dying and death. If this is true, then, it would surely be absurd to desire nothing but this throughout life, but, when death has come, to be vexed at what they so eagerly pursued and practiced.'

Simmias/ 'Socrates, you have indeed made me laugh though I was scarcely in a laughing mood. For I think that most men, if they heard this, would consider you have spoken the real truth about philosophers, and my own fellow-countrymen too would be in thorough agreement, that philosophers in fact are ripe for death; and they would insist they are well aware that death is just what these philosophers deserve.'

Socrates/ 'They would be quite right in their belief, Simmias, except in saying they are well aware. For they are not aware in what way true philosophers are ripe for death, in what way they deserve death, nor what kind of death they deserve. Let us discuss this matter among ourselves and pay no heed to them. We believe there is such a thing as death?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And that it is the separation of soul from body? And that death consists in this, the body existing alone and by itself, severed from the soul, and the soul existing alone and by itself separate from the body? Surely death is nothing else but this.'

Simmias/ 'No, just this.'

Socrates/ 'And now consider, my good friend; perhaps you share my opinion: for it is from the following questions, I believe, that we shall gain a clearer knowledge of what we are investigating. Do you think that a philosopher is much concerned with such so-called pleasures as eating and drinking?'

Simmias/ 'By no means, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'And what about the pleasures of love?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'And what about other cares of the body? Do you think he values them highly? For instance, the possession of fine clothes and shoes, and general bodily adornment—do you think he esteems or despises them, except in so far as they are absolutely necessary?'

Simmias/ 'The genuine philosopher, I think, disdains them.'

Socrates/ 'Do you not believe that such a man's concern is directed entirely to the soul, having nothing to do with the body, so far as he can escape its claims?'

Simmias/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Is it not clear then first of all in such matters as these that the philosopher separates the soul from communion with the body, to an extent beyond other men?'

Simmias/ 'It is evident.'

Socrates/ 'And most men, Simmias, I suppose, consider that life is not worth living for a man who finds no pleasure

in these things and takes no part in them, and they hold that the man who thinks nothing of bodily pleasures is all but dead.'

Simmias/ 'What you say is very true.'

Socrates/ 'And what about the actual acquisition of wisdom? Is the body an obstacle or not, if one takes it along as a partner in the search? What I mean to say is: do sight and hearing contain any real truth for men? Do not even the poets continually repeat that we neither hear nor see anything accurately? And yet if these bodily senses are not accurate or dependable, still less likely are the others, all of which are surely inferior to these two. Do you not agree?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then, when does the soul grasp truth? For when she attempts any investigation in company with the body, she is obviously deceived by it.'

Simmias/ 'That is true.'

Socrates/ 'Is it not by exact reasoning, if at all, that any truth becomes evident to her?'

Simmias/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And surely she reasons best, when none of these things, neither hearing nor vision, pain nor pleasure, intrudes to vex her, but when most she is alone and apart, paying no heed to the body and as far as possible secure from contact and communion with it in her effort to attain the truth.'

Simmias/ 'That is true.'

Socrates/ 'Here too, then, the philosopher's soul most disdains the body and flees from it, and seeks to be apart and alone.'

Simmias/ 'Clearly.'

Socrates/ ‘And what about the next point, Simmias? Do we assert that there exists a Right, which is just right and nothing else, or not?’

Simmias/ ‘We certainly do.’

Socrates/ ‘And a Beautiful and a Good?

Simmias/ ‘Of course.’

Socrates/ ‘And have you ever seen any of these with your eyes?’

Simmias/ ‘Certainly not.’

Socrates/ ‘Have you ever grasped them by any other bodily senses? I am speaking about all such things as Size, or Health, or Strength, and in a word about the essential being of all of them, just what each one exactly is. Is it by the body that their truest nature is contemplated, or is it not nearer the truth to say that, whosoever of us has most carefully and completely disciplined himself to comprehend by his intellect anything by itself alone which he investigates, will come nearest to knowing it in each case?’

Simmias/ ‘Certainly.’

Socrates/ ‘Would not this be achieved most purely by one who approached each thing as far as possible with thought alone, without taking account of sight in his thinking or dragging in any other sense to accompany his reasoning? By employing thought unalloyed and" thought alone he would attempt to track down each object in its pure reality, alone and by itself, freeing himself so far as he can from eyes and ears and in general from the whole body, since by its partnership it disturbs the soul and prevents her from acquiring wisdom and truth. Is not this the man, if there be any, Simmias, who will attain knowledge of reality?’

Simmias/ ‘There is wondrous truth, in what you say, Socrates.’

Socrates/ 'Then, should not all these conclusions bring home to genuine philosophers an opinion which they will express to each other in the following terms: "It seems as if a kind of short cut is bringing us on our path: for as long as we possess a body and our soul is contaminated by an evil of such a nature, we shall never completely attain the object of our desire—which we say is truth. For the body is constantly distracting us through its need of sustenance: moreover, if any sicknesses befall us, they hinder us in our quest for truth. And it fills us full of loves and passions, fears and fancies of every kind, and abundant folly, so that, as the saying goes, in actual fact it gives us not even a moment to think. The body and its appetites, and these alone, cause warfare and feuds and battles: for it is to acquire wealth that all wars arise, and wealth we are compelled to acquire for the sake of the body, in whose service we are slaves: and the result is that for all these reasons we have little leisure for philosophy. But the worst factor of all is that, if we gain a little leisure from it and turn to any inquiry, it constantly intrudes in the midst of our researches, causing such trouble and interruption and dismay that it will not allow us to see the truth. We have discovered in fact that if we are to achieve pure knowledge, we must be released from the body and by the soul itself alone we must behold things themselves alone: and then, it seems, we shall attain the goal of our desire, that wisdom of which we claim to be lovers—when we are dead, as the argument signifies, not while we live. For if it is impossible to win pure knowledge when in the body, then of two things one must be true: either knowledge can never be acquired, or only after death: for then the soul will exist by herself apart from the body, but not till then. And during life we shall apparently come closest to knowledge if as far as possible we keep no company with the body or communion with it beyond what is absolutely

necessary, and suffer not its nature to infect us but remain pure from it until God himself releases us. And departing thus pure from the foolishness of the body, in all likelihood we shall dwell with the pure and shall learn of ourselves all that is undefiled—and that, I think, is the true: for I believe it is not permitted to the impure to attain to the pure." Such, I think, Simmias, must be the words and the opinions which all genuine lovers of knowledge will communicate to each other. Do you not think so?'

Simmias/ 'Most assuredly, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Then if this is true, my friend, I have every hope that when I reach my journey's end, I shall there, if anywhere, fully attain the goal of all our earnest endeavor in our past life: and therefore the journey now appointed for me I greet with good hopes, and so may any other man who thinks that his mind is now prepared as by purification.'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And is not this purification just what we described some time ago in our discussion—to separate the soul, as far as possible, from the body, and to form in her the habit of isolating and gathering herself away from the body on every side, living, so far as she may, both in the present and hereafter, by herself alone, as she becomes free from the fetters of the body?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Is not death the name given to this release and separation of soul from body?'

Simmias/ 'Assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'And as we say, it is only the genuine philosophers who are always most eager for this severance, and the separation of soul from body is the actual pursuit of philosophers, is it not?'

Simmias/ 'Evidently.'

Socrates/ 'Then as I said at the beginning, it would be ridiculous if a man, who trained himself in life to live as nearly as possible in a state of death, should be vexed at death's coming.'

Simmias/ 'Ridiculous, of course.'

Socrates/ 'Then in actual fact, Simmias, true philosophers rehearse dying, and to them least of all men is death a terror. Look at the matter in this way. They are everywhere at variance with the body and yearn to possess the soul by itself alone: would it not then be utterly unreasonable if, when this came about, they were vexed and afraid, and if they did not gladly go where they may hope on their arrival to obtain what throughout life they longed for—and that is wisdom—and to be released from the company of that with which they were at odds? Many men, when their human favorites or wives or children have died, have been willing and ready to go to the other world in quest of them, drawn by the hope of seeing there and conversing with those for whom they longed: and shall a man then who is genuinely in love with wisdom and has firmly conceived this same hope, that in the other world and nowhere else can he in any measure worth speaking of attain her—shall such a man be reluctant to die and not gladly take his departure? Surely he must be glad if, my friend, he is truly a philosopher: for he will be strong in his belief that there and nowhere else can he achieve wisdom in her purity. And if this is so, then, as I said just now, it would surely be utterly unreasonable if such a man were afraid of death.'

Simmias/ 'Utterly indeed.'

Socrates/ 'Then, when you see a man troubled at the approach of death, is this not conclusive evidence that he was not after all a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body?

And this same man is, I believe, a lover of money and of power, either the one or both.'

Simmias/ 'The truth is indeed as you say.'

Socrates/ 'And now, Simmias, does not the quality called courage also especially belong to philosophers?'

Simmias/ 'Assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'And self-discipline, even in the popular sense of the word, that is to say, not to be excited by passions but to despise them and live an orderly life—does not that belong only to those who most disdain the body and live as philosophers?'

Simmias/ 'It certainly must.'

Socrates/ 'For if you care, to consider the courage and self-discipline of other men, you will find them quite absurd.'

Simmias/ 'How is that, Socrates?'

Socrates/ 'You know, that all other men think death one of the great evils.'

Simmias/ 'Yes indeed.'

Socrates/ 'And do not the brave among them face death, when they do face it, through fear of greater evils?'

Simmias/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'Then all except philosophers are brave through fear and apprehension: and yet it is unreasonable at least that a man should be brave through fear and cowardice.'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And what about the disciplined among them? Are they not precisely in the same case, self-disciplined through a kind of self-indulgence? We may say that this is impossible, but none the less their condition of naive self-restraint comes to much the same as this. They desire certain pleasures and are afraid of being deprived of them: consequently they abstain from other pleasures because

they are controlled by these. Men call it self-indulgence to be mastered by pleasures, but for all that these men control certain pleasures only because they are controlled by others. And this is much like what I was saying just now, that they have achieved self-discipline by a kind of self-indulgence.'

Simmias/ 'So it seems.'

Socrates/ 'Dear Simmias, I am afraid that, if we look to goodness as our standard, this is not the right form of exchange, to barter pleasure for pleasure, pain for pain, and fear for fear, trading the greater for the less, as though they were coins, but the only true currency for which all things should be exchanged is wisdom, and it is only when accompanied by wisdom that courage and self-control and justice and, in short, goodness itself are really what they claim to be, whether pleasures or fears or all other such things be added or not. Once these things are separated from wisdom and exchanged, the one for the other, the resultant goodness is, I fear, a mere stage illusion, slavish in reality and devoid of any soundness or truth; but the real goodness is a kind of purification from all these things, and self-control and justice and bravery and wisdom itself are a kind of purificatory rite. Apparently those who established the mysteries were no mean persons and really spoke in riddles when they said long ago that the man who reaches the other world uninitiated and unconsecrated will lie in the mire, but he who has been purified and initiated will on his arrival there dwell with the gods. For, as those concerned in the Mysteries say, "Many bear the emblems, but the adepts are few": and these last, in my opinion, are none but the true philosophers. And of their company I have throughout my life done all in my power to become a member, and in every way I have striven to join them: but whether I strove in the right way or met with any success, I shall learn for sure, I think, quite soon when I go to the other world, if it be God's

will. This then, Simmias and Cebes, is the defense I offer to prove that I am justified in not being vexed or troubled at leaving you and my masters in this world: for I believe that, there no less than here, I shall find good masters and friends: if then I am more convincing in my defense before you than before my Athenian judges, all will be well.'

Phaedo/ When Socrates had thus spoken, Cebes rejoined:

Cebes/ 'Socrates, everything else you said I think is right: but in what you said about the soul you will find many who disbelieve you and fear that, once the soul has left the body, she nowhere exists, but perishes and suffers destruction on the very day of a man's death, at the moment when she leaves the body, and issuing from it and dispersing like breath or smoke she flies away and is gone forever. If she did somewhere exist, gathered to herself alone and freed from the evils you just now recounted, we should have fair and abundant hopes, Socrates, that what you say is true: but it calls perhaps for considerable powers of persuasion and proof to convince us that the dead man's soul still exists and possesses some force and intelligence.'

Socrates/ 'Quite true, Cebes, but what are we to do? Do you suggest that we should employ our fancy in discussing the probability of such things?'

Cebes/ 'I myself at any rate, should be delighted to hear your opinion about them.'

Socrates/ 'I do not think, that anyone who heard me now, even if he were a comic poet, would maintain that I am babbling and talking about what does not concern me. If you like then, we may investigate the matter.

'And let us consider it in this way—whether it is true that the souls of the dead live on in the other world or not. Now there is an ancient story, which we recall, that they live in

that world on arriving from this, and that they return hither and are born again from the dead: and if this is so, and the living come to birth again from the dead, then surely our souls must dwell there: for they could not be born again if they did not exist. And it would be sufficient proof that they do exist, if it could really be shown that the living are born only from the dead: but if this is not so, then we should need some other argument.'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Well, if you want to discover the truth more easily, do not consider the problem as it concerns man only, but in relation to all animal and plant life and, in brief, all things that are born. Let us see in all these instances whether all that have opposites are generated only from those opposites; as for instance, the noble is the opposite of the base, the just of the unjust, and so with countless other examples. Let us then consider whether it is necessary that, where anything has an opposite, it can be generated from nothing else except that opposite. For example, if anything becomes larger, that larger size proceeds from what was smaller before?'

Cebes/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And if it becomes small, that smaller size proceeds from what was larger before?'

Cebes/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'And the wreaker proceeds from the stronger, and the faster from the slower?'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Again, if a thing becomes worse, it proceeds from the better, and more just from the more unjust?'

Cebes/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'Then we are sufficiently assured of this principle that all things are so produced, opposites proceeding from opposites.'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Once again: is it true that there exist in all pairs of opposites two processes between each pair, from one to the other and in reverse from the other to the one? For instance, between larger and smaller is there not growth and decrease, so that we speak of one as increasing and the other diminishing?'

Cebes/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And so too with separation and combination, cooling and heating, and all such things, even if we do not always use the precise terms, yet in fact at least this must everywhere hold good, that they are generated from each other and there is a process from the one to the other.'

Cebes/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then, has life an opposite, just as sleeping is the opposite of being awake?'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And what is it?'

Cebes/ 'Death.'

Socrates/ 'Then if these two are opposites, do they not proceed from each other; and since they are two, are there not two processes between them?'

Cebes/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'Now I will tell you, of one of the two pairs I mentioned just now, both the pair and the processes: and do you tell me of the other. One term I call sleep, the other, being awake; and from sleep proceeds waking, and from waking sleep: and the processes are falling asleep and waking up. Are you satisfied, or not?'

Cebes/ 'Perfectly.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you in your turn tell me similarly about life and death. Do you not hold that death and life are opposites?'

Cebes/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Generated from one another?'

Cebes/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then what is it that proceeds from the living?'

Cebes/ 'The dead.'

Socrates/ 'And what, from the dead?'

Cebes/ 'I must admit—the living.'

Socrates/ 'Then it is from the dead, Cebes, that living things and persons are generated?'

Cebes/ 'Evidently.'

Socrates/ 'Our souls therefore live on in the other world?'

Cebes/ 'So it seems.'

Socrates/ 'Now one of the two processes connected with these is manifest, for death is manifest, is it not?'

Cebes/ 'Assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'What are we to do then? Shall we refuse duly to assign the opposite process, and leave nature lame of one foot? Or must we acknowledge some opposite process to dying?'

Cebes/ 'Most certainly we must, I think.'

Socrates/ 'And what is this?'

Cebes/ 'Coming to life again.'

Socrates/ 'Then, if coming to life again be true, this return to life would be a process leading from the dead to the living?'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'In this way then also we agree that the living proceed from the dead no less than the dead from the living:

and this being so, we considered, I believe, that we had sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must somewhere exist, whence they come to life again.'

Cebes/ 'I think, Socrates, that this must necessarily be true as the result of our admissions.'

Socrates/ 'Consider in this way too, Cebes, that we were not wrong, in my opinion, in making these admissions. If each process had not a corresponding opposite process, moving with a kind of circular motion, and if the process were in a straight line from one state to the opposite only, without any reversal or return to the first, you realize, do you not, that finally all things would have the same form, suffer the same experiences, and cease to come into being.'

Cebes/ 'How do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'It is not difficult to understand my meaning. For instance, if falling asleep existed, but waking up again, which proceeds from sleep, did not exist as a corresponding opposite, you know that finally everything would make Endymion seem a mere trifle, and he would be nowhere in the reckoning because everything else would be in the same condition of slumber as himself. And if all things combined and there were no separation, the saying of Anaxagoras would quickly come to pass, and "all would be chaos". So too, my dear Cebes, if all things that partake of life were to die and, once dead, were to remain in that form and not come to life again, is it not absolutely necessary that finally all things should be dead and none be living? For if living things were generated from some other source and living things died, what is to prevent all things from being finally spent in death?'

Cebes/ 'Nothing in my opinion, Socrates, but what you say seems absolutely true.'

Socrates/ 'It is indeed so, Cebes, beyond all question, and we did not deceive ourselves in making these admissions, but it is actual truth that we return to life and that the living proceed from the dead and that the souls of the dead exist.'

Cebes/ 'Yes, and besides, if that doctrine of yours, which you so often affirm, is true, Socrates, that our learning is nothing else but reminiscence, according to that doctrine also we must in some time past have learnt that of which we are now reminded. But this is impossible unless our souls existed before they were born in this human form: here too, it seems, is an indication that the soul is immortal.'

Simmias/ 'But, Cebes, what are the proofs of this? Recall them to me, for I do not very well remember them at the moment.'

Cebes/ 'There is one very good argument, when people are questioned, if the questions are well put, they tell us of themselves the truth about things. But if they had no knowledge dwelling within them and could give no right account, they would not be able to do this: and then again, if you show men diagrams or other such things, you have conclusive proof that the facts are so.'

Socrates/ 'And if this is not enough to persuade you, Simmias, consider whether you share my view when you look at it like this: for you do not, it seems, believe that what we call learning can be recollection.'

Simmias/ 'It is not that I do not believe, but what I want is just the very thing we are discussing—to be reminded: and from what Cebes undertook to say, I am nearly reminded and convinced already. But none the less I should like to hear now how you intended to explain it.'

Socrates/ 'In this way. We surely agree that if a Man is to be reminded of anything, he must have had previous knowledge of it.'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then do we agree also that when knowledge occurs in the following way, it is reminiscence? The way that I mean is this: if a man sees or hears something or perceives it by some other sense, and not only knows that thing but also thinks of something else which is not the object of the same, but of another form of knowledge, do we not rightly say that he has "recollected" that second object of which he thought?'

Simmias/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'Take this example. Knowledge of a man is different from that of a lyre.'

Simmias/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'Now you know that when a lover sees a lyre or a garment or anything else his favorite is wont to use, this is his sensation: he knows the lyre and in his mind perceives the bodily form of the boy who owned it. And this is reminiscence. For instance, anyone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there are other examples innumerable.'

Simmias/ 'Innumerable indeed.'

Socrates/ 'Now is not this a kind of reminiscence, and particularly so when the experience is concerned with things already forgotten through lapse of time or lack of attention?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Again. Is it possible to be reminded of a man on seeing a picture of a horse or a lyre, and to be reminded of Cebes on seeing a portrait of Simmias?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And, on seeing a portrait of Simmias, to be reminded of Simmias?'

Simmias/ 'Undoubtedly.'

Socrates/ 'Do we not then conclude from all this that reminiscence may come both from like and from unlike objects?'

Simmias/ 'We do.'

Socrates/ 'But whenever we are reminded of something by what resembles it, must not this lead to a further experience—the reflection whether the resembling object in point of resemblance falls short or not of the object recalled by it?'

Simmias/ 'It assuredly must.'

Socrates/ 'Consider then, if this be the truth. We speak, do we not, about the existence of equality, I do not mean between wood and wood, stone and stone, or any such instance, but beyond all these something else, equality itself. Do we say it exists or not?'

Simmias/ 'Indeed we do and most emphatically too.'

Socrates/ 'And do we know this absolute reality?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Whence did we gain our knowledge of it? Is it not from seeing the things we mentioned just now, equal pieces of wood or stone or other such things? Did we not from seeing them form our conception of equality itself, which is different from them? Or do you not think it is different? Look at it in this way. Do not equal stones or sticks, though they are the same, sometimes appear equal to one person, but not to another?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But do things which are absolutely equal appear at times unequal to you, or equality itself inequality?'

Simmias/ 'Never, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Then, those equal objects mentioned above are not the same as the equal itself?'

Simmias/ 'No, by no means, I think, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Yet it was from these equal objects, which are different from the equal itself, that you conceived and grasped your knowledge of that equal.'

Simmias/ 'That is undoubtedly true.'

Socrates/ 'Whether it resembles these particular objects or not?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'That makes no difference. As long as, when you see one thing, the sight of it makes you think of another, whether it be like or unlike, the process must be reminiscence.'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And now, with regard to the equal pieces of wood and other equal objects mentioned just now, is this what we feel about them? Do they appear equal to us in the way in which equality itself is equal, or do they in any degree fall short of being just like equality itself, or not?'

Simmias/ 'They fall far short.'

Socrates/ 'We agree then, do we not, that whenever anyone sees something and thinks to himself, "what I am now looking at wants to be like some other thing, but it falls short and cannot be just like it and is inferior", then the man who thus thinks must have previous knowledge of that which, he says, the first object, though inferior, resembles?'

Simmias/ 'He must.'

Socrates/ 'Well then, have we ourselves too experienced the same feeling with regard to equal things and equality itself, or have we not?'

Simmias/ 'Assuredly we have.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must have had previous knowledge of equality before that time when we first saw equal objects and

reflected that all of them wanted to be like equality itself but fell short thereof.'

Simmias/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'But we agree also that we did not and could not conceive this idea except through sight or touch or some other bodily sense—I make no distinction between them.'

Simmias/ 'Yes, for they are the same, Socrates, for the purpose of our demonstration.'

Socrates/ 'But it is from the senses that we must conceive the idea that all the equal objects perceived by them aim at the real equality but fall short of it. Or what other account can we give?'

Simmias/ 'No other.'

Socrates/ 'Then before we began to see and hear and employ our other senses we must somehow have acquired a knowledge of the real equality, if we were to refer to it all the equals perceived by the senses and judge that all of them are eager to be just like the real equal, but are inferior to it?'

Simmias/ 'That follows necessarily from what we have already said, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Now we possessed sight and hearing and the other senses immediately we were born?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But we must, we say, have gained knowledge of equality itself before we had these senses?'

Simmias/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must have obtained it before we were born, it seems.'

Simmias/ 'So it seems.'

Socrates/ 'Now if we obtained it before our birth and were born with it, we knew before birth and immediately upon birth not only the equal, the greater, and the less, but all

such things: for we are not discussing the equal alone, but the beautiful, the good, the right, the holy, and, as I say, everything upon which, in the questions we ask and the answers we give, we set the seal of "being just what it is." So we must necessarily have obtained the knowledge of all these things before birth.'

Simmias/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'But if after acquiring knowledge we do not forget it each time we are born, then we must be born with knowledge each time and possess it throughout our lives: for to know is to have acquired knowledge of something and to retain it without losing it: is it not the loss of knowledge, Simmias, that we mean by forgetfulness?'

Simmias/ 'Yes, certainly, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'But, I suppose, if after acquiring it before birth we lost it at birth, and later by using the senses upon things we recover the knowledge we had before, then would not what we call learning be the recovery of knowledge which is our own? And should we not be right in calling this process reminiscence?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, for we discovered that, on perceiving some object, whether by sight or hearing or any other sense, we might from this perception conceive an idea of something else related to the perception, whether like or unlike it, which we had forgotten. And so, as I say, we have two alternatives to choose from: either we are born with a knowledge of these things and all know them throughout our lives, or after birth those whom we speak of as learning are merely recollecting, and learning must be reminiscence.'

Simmias/ 'That is very true, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Which do you choose then, Simmias? That we are born with knowledge, or that we are reminded later of what we knew before?'

Simmias/ 'I cannot choose at the moment, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Well, can you make a choice here, and what is your opinion in this matter? If a man has knowledge, could he give an account of what he knows, or not?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly he can, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'And do you think that all people are able to give an account of those things we were discussing just now?'

Simmias/ 'I wish they could, but I very much fear that by this time tomorrow there will no longer be anyone who can do so adequately.'

Socrates/ 'Then you do not think, Simmias, that all know these things.'

Simmias/ 'By no means.'

Socrates/ 'They are reminded, then, of what they once learned?'

Simmias/ 'It must be so.'

Socrates/ 'And when did our souls gain the knowledge? Certainly it was not after we were born as men.'

Simmias/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then it was earlier?'

Simmias/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Our souls then, Simmias, existed before they took on human form, apart from the body, and possessed intelligence?'

Simmias/ 'Yes, Socrates, unless we acquire this knowledge at the moment of birth: for that time still remains.'

Socrates/ 'Well then, my friend, at what other time, pray, do we lose it? For surely, as we agreed just now, we are not born with it. Do we lose it at the very moment when we acquire it? Or is there any other time you can name?'

Simmias/ 'By no means, Socrates: I did not realize that I was talking nonsense.'

Socrates/ 'Then the truth is this, Simmias, is it not? If those things exist that we so constantly talk about, the beautiful, the good, and every such essence, and if we refer all our sensations to these, which we discover to have existed before and still to be ours, and compare the objects of sensation with these realities, then just as surely as these realities exist, so surely must our souls have existed before we were born: but if these realities do not exist, our discussion must be all in vain. Is this the case, and is it equally necessary that these realities exist and that our souls existed before birth, and that if the one does not exist, then neither does the other?'

Simmias/ 'It is absolutely plain to me, Socrates, that the necessity in each case is the same; and most opportunely our argument is seeking refuge in the conclusion that our souls existed before birth just as surely as the reality now under discussion exists. For there is nothing so evident to me as that all these things, the beautiful, the good, and everything of which you just now spoke, have a most real existence. And I think this has been most satisfactorily proved.'

Socrates/ 'And what does Cebes think? For he too must be persuaded.'

Simmias/ 'He is satisfied, I think, yet he is the most stubborn of men in his refusal to accept an argument. But, I think, he needs no further proof to persuade him that our souls existed before birth. Whether they will still exist,

however, after death does not seem even to me, Socrates, to have been proved, but the objection voiced by Cebes just now still stands, the fear of the many that a man's soul is dispersed at death and that death is the end of her. The soul may be born and brought together from some other source and may exist elsewhere before arriving in a human body: but what is to prevent it from meeting its end and being destroyed, after entering and departing from that body?'

Cebes/ 'You are right, Simmias. It seems as if about half of what we wanted has been proved, namely that our souls existed before we were born: but we need further proof that when we are dead they will exist no less than before birth, if the demonstration is to be complete.'

Socrates/ 'That has already been proved, Simmias and Cebes, if you will combine this argument with that which we agreed upon before, namely that all that is living proceeds from the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and when she enters life and comes into being she must proceed from no other source than death and the state of the dead, surely it is necessary that she exists even after death, since she must come once more to birth. And so the point you raised has already been proved. Still it seems to me that you and Simmias would be glad to push the discussion still further, and that like children you are afraid that as she goes forth from the body the wind will really and truly blow her away and dissipate her, especially if one happens to die, not in calm weather, but in a high gale.'

Cebes/ 'You must try to convince us, Socrates, as if we were afraid; or rather not ourselves afraid, but perhaps there is within us a child who suffers such fears. Try to persuade him, then, not to fear death as though it were a bogeyman.'

Socrates/ 'Well, you must sing spells over him every day, until you dispel his fear.'

Cebes/ 'And where shall we find another good enchanter, Socrates, now that you are leaving us?'

Socrates/ 'Hellas is a wide country, and in it surely dwell good men; and there are many foreign races too. And in your search for such an enchanter you must ransack them one and all, sparing neither toil nor money, for there is nothing on which you could more fittingly spend money. And you must search too by yourselves in one another's company: for perhaps you could not easily find any more competent than yourselves.'

Cebes/ 'Well, you may rely upon that, but let us return to the point at which we digressed, if you are agreeable.'

Socrates/ 'I am quite agreeable: that goes without saying.'

Cebes/ 'Good.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must ask ourselves some such question as the following: to what kind of thing does it belong to experience dissipation, and for what kind of thing should we fear this experience, and what escapes it? And next we should inquire to which of the two classes the soul belongs, and in the light of the conclusions reached feel confidence or fear about the soul.'

Cebes/ 'Quite true.'

Socrates/ 'Now is it not the property of the compound and the naturally composite to be dissolved in the same way in which it was combined: whereas if a thing is not compounded, this alone if anything must fittingly escape dissolution?'

Cebes/ 'That is what I think.'

Socrates/ 'Then those things which always remain uniform and invariable are most likely to be uncompounded: but things that are constantly changing and never the same are compounded?'

Cebes/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'Let us go back to what we were discussing previously. What of reality itself, whose being we gave account of in questioning and answering? Is it always uniform and immutable, or does it suffer change? Equality itself, beauty itself, what each thing is by itself, reality—do these admit of any change whatever? Or does each thing which is just itself and no more, being uniform when considered by itself alone, remain constantly the same, admitting nowhere of any change whatever?'

Cebes/ 'It must remain uniform, Socrates, and immutable.'

Socrates/ 'But what of the many beautiful things, men, for instance, or horses, or garments, or any other such things, and the many equal things, or all things which share the names of these single realities? Are these constantly the same, or, quite the contrary, practically never uniform or stable in their relations either with themselves or each other?'

Cebes/ 'The latter is true, they are never uniform.'

Socrates/ 'Now these things you could touch and see and perceive with the other senses, but the things that are constantly the same you can grasp only by the process of thinking, and they are invisible, are they not, and never to be seen?'

Cebes/ 'You are absolutely right.'

Socrates/ 'Let us then assume, shall we, two types of objects, the seen and the unseen.'

Cebes/ 'Let us so assume.'

Socrates/ 'And the unseen is ever uniformly constant, but the seen is constantly changing?'

Cebes/ 'Let us assume that too.'

Socrates/ 'Well then, are we not made up of body and soul?'

Cebes/ 'Of nothing else.'

Socrates/ 'And to which type do we say the body is more like and more akin?'

Cebes/ 'That is evident to everybody, the visible.'

Socrates/ 'And what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?'

Cebes/ 'Invisible at any rate to man, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'But in speaking of visible and invisible we are referring, are we not, to human senses, not to others?'

Cebes/ 'To human senses.'

Socrates/ 'Then what have we to say about the soul? Can it be seen or not?'

Cebes/ 'It cannot.'

Socrates/ 'It is invisible then?'

Cebes/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then the soul more resembles the invisible than the body, and the body the visible?'

Cebes/ 'Necessarily so, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'And did we not say earlier that when the soul uses the aid of the body for any investigation, through the instrument of sight or hearing or any other sense—for investigation through the body means through the senses—she is torn away by the body into the region of constant fluctuation, and she herself wanders about in confusion, reeling like a drunken man, because of her contact with things in similar confusion?'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But when she pursues her inquiries by herself, she goes to the region of the pure, the eternal and immortal and ever-unchanging, and being akin thereto she ever dwells

in it, when she is by herself and it is possible for her to do so: and she has ceased from her wanderings and remains ever constant and changeless with the unchanging, because of her contact with things similarly immutable: and this condition of hers is called wisdom, is it not?'

Cebes/ 'All that you say, Socrates, is absolutely right and true.'

Socrates/ 'To which of the two types then, judging from our previous and our present arguments, do you think the soul is more alike or akin?'

Cebes/ 'Everybody, I think, Socrates, even the veriest dunce, would after this line of inquiry agree that the soul beyond all shadow of doubt is more like the constant and invariable than the ever-changing.'

Socrates/ 'And what of the body?'

Cebes/ 'That is more like the other.'

Socrates/ 'Consider the question in this way too: when soul and body are together, nature enjoins that the one shall serve and be governed, the other be master and govern. From this point of view also which do you think resembles the divine, and which the mortal? Do you not think that the divine is naturally fitted to rule and govern, the mortal to be subject and governed?'

Cebes/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Which of the two then does the soul resemble?'

Cebes/ 'It is obvious, Socrates, that the soul resembles the divine, the body the mortal.'

Socrates/ 'Now, Cebes, consider whether the conclusion of all our discussion is not this—that the soul most closely resembles the divine and immortal, intelligible and uniform and indissoluble and ever-unchangeable, while the body most resembles the human and mortal, the unintellectual

and dissoluble and ceaselessly changing. Have we anything else to say, Cebes, to show that this is not true?'

Cebes/ 'We have not.'

Socrates/ 'Then, this being so, is it not the body's part to be speedily dissolved, and the soul's to be completely indissoluble, or something close to it?'

Cebes/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'Now you notice that when a man dies, the visible part of him, the body, which is situated in the visible world and called his corpse, liable though it is to dissolution and decomposition and dissipation, does not experience any of these things immediately, but remains as it is for fairly long, for quite a long time, in fact, if a man dies with his body in good condition and at a favorable season: for when the body is shrunken and embalmed after the Egyptian manner, it remains all but entire for an incredible time, and some portions of it, bones and sinews and all such parts, even if the body decays, are practically indestructible. Is it not so?'

Cebes/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But the soul, the unseen, which departs to a place resembling itself, pure and noble and invisible, to Hades in the true sense of the word, to dwell with a God good and wise—whither, if God so will, my soul must shortly depart—can it ever be that with such a nature and origin she is straightway dissipated and destroyed when once she leaves the body, as most men tell us? Far from it, dear Cebes and Simmias, but the truth is much rather like this: if she takes her departure when pure, dragging along with her no taint of the body, because during life, so far as she was able, she held no communion with it but shunned it and withdrew into herself, since this was her constant practice—and this means that she genuinely loved wisdom and truly rehearsed death without repining: is not this the practice of death?'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'In this state then surely she departs to what resembles her, the unseen, the divine and deathless and wise: and when she has there arrived, happiness is her lot, for she is released from wandering and folly, fears and wild passions, and other human ills: and as is said of the initiated she in very truth lives through time to come with the gods. Is this what we are to say, Cebes, or not?'

Cebes/ 'This certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But if she departs from the body polluted and unclean, because she dwelt ever with it and served and loved it, and was bewitched by it and its pleasures and passions, so that she came to think nothing true but what is of the body, what one can touch and see, and eat and drink, and use to satisfy the lusts of the flesh, and if she becomes accustomed to hate and fear and tremble at what is dark and invisible to the eye, but intelligible and grasped by philosophy—do you think a soul in this condition will take her departure pure and unspotted?'

Cebes/ 'Never indeed.'

Socrates/ 'But I think she is interpenetrated by the corporeal, which association and intercourse with the body have ingrained in her, because of her constant communion with the body and her assiduous care of it.'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And this bodily element, my friend, must be considered burdensome and heavy, and earthy, and visible: and such a soul is borne down by it and dragged back into the visible world through fear of the invisible, the world of Hades; and, so they say, she haunts monuments and graves, about which shadowy forms of souls have been seen—the images of those souls that have not been released in their

purity but still partake of the visible: and this is why they are seen.'

Cebes/ 'That seems likely, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Likely indeed, Cebes: and likely also that these are not the souls of the good but of the evil, which are compelled to wander about in such places in punishment for their former evil way of life. And so they roam until, through their longing for the bodily element which is their constant companion, they are once more imprisoned in a body. And as we might expect, they are imprisoned in natures suited to their practices during their lifetime.'

Cebes/ 'What natures do you mean, Socrates?'

Socrates/ 'For example, those who have practiced gluttony and wantonness and drunkenness and have made no effort to avoid them are likely to enter into the forms of asses and similar creatures. Do you not think so?'

Cebes/ 'What you say is most probable.'

Socrates/ 'And those who have preferred injustice and tyranny and robbery enter the forms of wolves and hawks and kites. Where else can we say that such souls go?'

Cebes/ 'Into such forms, to be sure.'

Socrates/ 'And is not the direction that the others take in each case, obvious from the similarity of their pursuits?'

Cebes/ 'Obvious, of course.'

Socrates/ 'And of these others are not those the happiest, and do they not depart to the best places, who have practiced the popular virtues of the citizen, virtues which men call self-discipline and justice and which arise from habit and practice without philosophy or reason?'

Cebes/ 'In what way are they the happiest?'

Socrates/ 'Because it is to be expected that they will return again into some civilized and gentle creatures like

themselves, bees perhaps or wasps or ants, or back again to human-kind, and that from them will arise men of worth.'

Cebes/ 'That is likely.'

Socrates/ 'But no one who has not loved wisdom and departed wholly pure may join the company of the gods, none but the lover of knowledge. And it is for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that true philosophers abstain from all the desires of the flesh and hold out without yielding to them, not for fear of wasting their substance and of poverty, like the many in their love of money: nor again is it through dread of dishonor or the disgrace of evil-doing, like lovers of power or honor, that they abstain from them.'

Cebes/ 'No, that would ill befit them, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Ill indeed. Therefore all those who take any thought for their own souls and do not merely live for the body and mold it into shape, bid farewell to such men as these and do not walk the path they tread, because they do not know where they are going: but thinking that they should not oppose philosophy and the release and purification it offers, they take that path and follow where she guides.'

Cebes/ 'How, Socrates?'

Socrates/ 'I will tell you. Lovers of knowledge know that philosophy takes the soul in charge when she is literally bound fast and glued to the body and compelled to view reality as though through the bars of a prison, wallowing in the depth of ignorance, instead of being unfettered and by herself. And she sees how cunningly this prison-house is contrived—that it is contrived by desire in such a way that the prisoner may most fully contribute to his own imprisonment. As I say then, lovers of knowledge know that philosophy takes the soul in this condition and gently comforts her and endeavors to release her, pointing out that

the eyesight and hearing and perceptions of the other senses are full of deception, and persuading her to forsake these save in so far as she is compelled to use them, and to gather and concentrate into herself alone, trusting nothing but herself and her pure conception of pure reality: but the shifting and variable objects that she views through other aids, these she must consider void of truth: for such things are sensible and visible, but what she perceives is intelligible and invisible. The soul of the true philosopher then thinks that she should not oppose this liberation, and that is why, so far as she is able, she abstains from pleasures and desires and pains: for she reckons that whenever anyone experiences pleasure or fear or desire to excess, he suffers from no such trivial evil as one would imagine, such as sickness or some expense through satisfying his desires, but he suffers, without taking any account thereof, the very greatest and worst of evils.'

Cebes/ 'What is that, Socrates?'

Socrates/ 'The soul of a man cannot experience excessive pleasure or pain at anything without being forced at the same time to consider that the objects which arouse these feelings most strongly are the clearest and truest of all objects, though it is not so. And such objects are for the most part visible. Is it not so?'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And is it not in this condition that the soul is most completely imprisoned by the body?'

Cebes/ 'How so?'

Socrates/ 'Because each pleasure or pain nails her as with a nail to the body and pins her thereto, and makes her resemble the body, so that she believes all that the body says to be true. For by sharing the opinions of the body and its pleasures she is compelled, I suppose, to share in its habits

and its nurture and becomes incapable of departing in purity to the other world, but must ever go forth contaminated by the body: and so she quickly falls back into another body and grows in it as though sown there; and as a result she has no part in the communion with the divine and pure and the unchanging.'

Cebes/ 'You are quite right, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'It is for these reasons then, Cebes, and not for those held by the many, that real lovers of knowledge are disciplined and brave: or do you hold otherwise?'

Cebes/ 'No indeed, not I.'

Socrates/ 'Assuredly not. This is how the soul of a philosopher will reason: she will not think that, while philosophy should set her free, she should, when once released, of her own will surrender herself to pleasure and pain to bind her fast once more to the body and engage in the interminable task of a Penelope working ever in reverse upon her web. She gains instead peace from these desires and follows reason and ever dwells with it, contemplating what is true and divine and not the mere object of opinion, and seeking thence her nurture: and thus she thinks she should live, as long as she lives, and after death she believes she will depart to what is akin to her and like herself and have done with human evils. After such nurture as this, Simmias and Cebes, there is no danger of her fearing that she may be torn to pieces in parting from the body and blown away by the winds and fly apart into complete nothingness.'

Phaedo/ When Socrates had finished, there was silence for a long time, and Socrates himself, to judge by his appearance, was absorbed in pondering the foregoing discussion, and so were most of us: but Cebes and Simmias went on talking together in a low voice. And when Socrates noticed it, he asked:

Socrates/ 'What is it? Do you think we have not discussed the matter sufficiently? It certainly does still admit of many doubts and objections, if we are to examine it thoroughly. Well, if you are considering something else, I have nothing to say: but if you are puzzled about these matters, do not hesitate to speak yourselves and to explain it, if you think that we could have discussed it better, and to invite me to join you, if you believe you can solve your problems better with my help.'

Simmias/ 'Well, Socrates, I will tell you the truth. Each of us has for some time been puzzled and has been pushing the other forward and bidding him ask questions, because, though we are anxious to hear, we hesitated to bother you for fear that in your present misfortune it might be unwelcome to you'.

Phaedo/ Socrates when he heard this laughed gently and said:

Socrates/ 'Bless my soul, Simmias: I should indeed find it difficult to persuade others that I do not regard my present state as a misfortune, if I cannot convince you, but you are afraid that I am more ill-humored than I was in the past. And apparently you must think me inferior in the gift of prophecy to the swans, which, though they sing all through their lives, yet sing most constantly and most sweetly when they perceive that they have to die, rejoicing that they are on the point of departure to the presence of the god whose servants they are. But men through their own fear of death belie the swans, insisting that they sing their final song for sorrow, in lamentation over their death. They do not reflect that no bird sings when hungry or cold or suffering any other pain, no, not even the nightingale and swallow and hoopoe which, they say, sing dirges for grief. But I do not believe these birds sing in sorrow, or the swans either: but because they are Apollo's birds, they are inspired with prophecy, and

owing to their foreknowledge of the blessings of the other world, on that day they sing and rejoice more than they have ever done before. And I myself too consider that I am a fellow-slave with the swans, consecrated to the same god's service, and that I no less than they possess the gift of prophecy from my master, and that I depart from life no less cheerfully than they. But, so far as this hesitation of yours is concerned, you may speak and may ask any questions you like, as long as the Eleven officers of Athens allow.'

Simmias/ 'Good. I will tell you my difficulty, and Cebes in his turn will tell you where he does not accept your statements. To me, Socrates, as perhaps to you also, it seems either impossible or very difficult to know the truth about these matters in this life: but he would be a poor-spirited creature indeed who would not examine in every possible way what is said about them, refusing to give up till his search on every side leaves him completely exhausted. For we must in these questions do one of two things—either learn from another or discover the truth for ourselves, or, if these methods are impossible, take at least the best and most irrefutable of human theories, and embarking on this as upon a raft sail through life with all its attendant dangers, unless we can make our voyage with greater safety and security upon some more trustworthy vessel, some revelation of god. And so too now I shall feel no shame in questioning you, after what you say, and I shall not have to reproach myself hereafter for not saying now what I think. The fact is that when I examine what has been said, either alone or with Cebes, it does not seem altogether adequate.'

Socrates/ 'Perhaps, my friend, your impression is right: but tell me in what way our discussion is not adequate.'

Simmias/ 'In this way, I think. One might use the same argument about the tuning of a lyre and its strings, namely that the attuning is something unseen and incorporeal and

very beautiful and divine in the tuned lyre, but that the lyre itself and its strings are corporeal and material and composite and earthy and akin to the mortal. Now if the lyre should be broken or the strings cut or snapped, suppose that someone should maintain by the same argument as yours that the tuning must still exist and cannot have perished—for it would be quite impossible that the lyre should still exist and the strings too which are mortal of nature, though broken, and yet the attuning, which is of like nature and akin to the divine and the immortal, should have perished, and perished too before the mortal element. But, he would say, the attunement must still exist somewhere and the frame and the strings must rot to pieces before anything happens to that. Indeed, Socrates, I think that you yourself must have reflected that we consider the soul to be some such thing as this: that our body is attuned to pitch and held together by the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, and the like, and that our soul is a blending and attuning of these elements, when they are rightly and properly blended together. If then the soul is just a tuning, it is evident that, when the body is relaxed beyond measure or over-strung by sickness or any other evil, the soul, though most divine, must immediately perish, just as do other attunements both in musical notes and in all the works of artists, while the remains of each body last for a considerable time, until it be burned or molder away. Consider then what we are to say in answer to this argument, if one should claim that the soul, being a blending of the elements of the body, must be the first to perish in what we call death.'

Phaedo/ Socrates, with his characteristic broad stare, smiled and said:

Socrates/ 'What Simmias says is quite fair. If anyone of you then is better prepared to answer than I am, why should

he not do so? For Simmias seems to be handling the argument like a master. But I think that before answering we should listen to the further charges which Cebes has to bring against our statement, in order that when we have had sufficient time we may consider what reply to make: and when we have heard them both, we may either agree with them if they seem to be in tune, or if not, then and then only defend our position. But come, Cebes, tell us what your trouble is.'

Cebes/ 'I will do so'. It seems to me that the argument has not advanced but is liable to the same objections as we made before. I would not retract the statement that our souls existed even before entering this human form: it has been very neatly and, if it be not presumptuous to say so, very conclusively proved. But that the soul still somewhere exists when we are dead—here I think the proof is inadequate. I do not agree with Simmias' objection that the soul is no stronger and no more enduring than the body: for in all these respects I think she is far superior. "Why then", the argument might say, "are you still incredulous, when you see that the weaker part still continues to exist when a man is dead? Do you not think it necessary that the more enduring part must still be preserved during this time?" In answer to this, consider whether there is anything in what I say. And I too, Simmias, need to make use of a figure. I think your argument is very much as if a man should say about a weaver who has died old that the man is not dead but exists somewhere safe and sound, and should produce in evidence the fact that the cloak which he wore, woven by his own hands, is still sound and has not been destroyed. And if anyone should refuse to believe him, he might ask which is the more long-lasting, a human being or a cloak in continual use and wear: and when he received the answer that a man lasted much longer, he would consider it proved beyond

question that the man was safe because the more short-lived had not perished. But actually this is not the case, Simmias: for you too must consider what I am saying. Everybody would realize that this is a silly argument. For this weaver, after having woven many such cloaks, outlived them despite their number; but the last, I suppose, outlived him: yet a man is not on that account more insignificant or weaker than a cloak. And the same image might, I think, be applied to the relation of soul to body, and we should think it a reasonable argument if a man said just the same about them, namely, that the soul lasts long, and the body is weaker and more short-lived: but he might add that though each soul wears out many bodies, especially if a man lives for many years (for even if his body is in a state of dissolution and is perishing while he is still alive, yet the soul always weaves anew what is worn out), nevertheless it is inevitable that, when the soul perishes, she must be wearing her last woven garment and this alone will outlive her: and when she has perished, then the body reveals its natural weakness and quickly molders away and is gone. And so we may not yet put our trust in this argument and feel assured that, when we are dead, our souls still somewhere exist. For, he might say, one might even concede to him who uses the previous argument still more than you (Cebes) mention, granting not only that our souls existed in the time before our birth but also that there is nothing to prevent the souls of some, even after death, from existing and continuing to exist and being born again and dying again many times—for the soul is naturally so strong that she can endure through many a rebirth: but granting all this, he might not go the length of allowing that she suffers no deterioration in her many births and that she does not finally on the occasion of one of her deaths perish utterly; though none of us, he would say, can recognize this particular death and dissolution of

the body which brings destruction to the soul, since none of us can possibly perceive it. To sum up then, if this is the truth, any man who is confident in the face of death must be possessed of a foolish confidence, unless he can demonstrate that the soul is completely immortal and imperishable: and failing this, a man on the point of death must always be afraid that his soul may utterly perish in this impending separation from the body.'

Phaedo/ Now all of us who heard them speak were unpleasantly affected, as we afterwards confessed to one another: for we had been firmly convinced by the previous argument, and now again they seemed to upset us and cause us to distrust not only the previous discussion but also what was yet to come, for fear that we were incompetent critics or that these were matters beyond proof.

Echecrates/ By heaven, Phaedo, I can quite understand your feelings: for after hearing you just now, I myself am impelled to ask myself: 'then what argument shall we ever believe hereafter? How thoroughly convincing was the argument presented by Socrates, and now it has fallen under suspicion. For the doctrine that the soul is an attuning has now and always taken a wonderful hold upon me, and your mention of it reminded me, as it were, that I had previously held the belief myself. And now I must start afresh and I need more than ever some argument which will convince me that the soul of a dead man does not die with him. So tell me, in heaven's name, how Socrates pursued the discussion. Did he show signs, as you say you did, of being troubled, or did he calmly come to the aid of the argument? And did he defend it satisfactorily or the reverse? Tell me everything in as much detail as you can.

Phaedo/ Well, Echecrates, I have often wondered at Socrates, but I never admired him more than then. Perhaps there is nothing strange in his having had an answer to give:

but what specially impressed me was, first of all, the pleasure and kindliness and approval with which he greeted the words of the young men, and then the alertness with which he perceived the effect of their objections upon us, and finally the skill with which he healed us and rallied us in our defeat and flight and encouraged us to follow his lead and review the argument along with him.

Echecrates/ How?

Phaedo/ I will tell you. I was sitting to his right on a stool beside the bed, and he was seated much higher than I. He stroked my head and gathered the hair on my neck—it was his habit on occasions to tease me about my hair—and said:

Socrates/ 'Tomorrow perhaps, Phaedo, you will cut those handsome locks of yours.'

Phaedo/ 'I expect so.'

Socrates/ 'Not if you will listen to me.'

Phaedo/ 'What then?'

Socrates/ 'Today, I will cut mine and you yours, if our argument dies and we cannot restore it to life. And I, if I were you and the argument gave me the slip, would take an oath like the Argives, not to let my hair grow long until I have renewed the battle and defeated the arguments of Simmias and Cebes.'

Phaedo/ 'But, they say that Hercules himself was no match for two.'

Socrates/ 'Then summon me as your Iolaus, while there is still daylight.'

Phaedo/ 'Well then, I summon you, not as Hercules did Iolaus, but as Iolaus summoned Hercules.'

Socrates/ 'That will make no difference. But first of all let us beware of one weakness.'

Phaedo/ 'What weakness?'

Socrates/ 'Let us not prove ourselves misologists, as certain folk become misanthropists: for there is no greater evil a man can suffer than this. And misology and misanthropy both spring from the same cause. Misanthropy insinuates itself into us when we have placed in a man excessive confidence based on insufficient experience, thinking that he is completely truthful and sound and trustworthy, and then a little later have discovered that he is evil and untrustworthy; and then the same thing happens again. And when a man has often had this experience especially at the hands of those whom he would account his best and closest friends, he ends by constantly quarrelling and hating all men and thinking there is absolutely nothing sound in any man. Have you never seen this take place?'

Phaedo/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And is it not a shameful thing and does it not prove that such a man attempts to associate with his fellows without any experience of human nature? For if when he met them he possessed this experience, he would have thought, as the facts demonstrate, that there are very few superlatively good or bad people, but that most are something between the two.'

Phaedo/ 'What do you mean?

Socrates/ 'Just as in the case of things very small or very large, do you think there is anything more rare than to find a very large or very small man or dog or any other creature, or one that is very fast or slow, very ugly or beautiful, very white or black? Have you not observed that in all such things the extremes are few in number and rare, while the means that lie between them are numerous and abundant?'

Phaedo/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And do you not think that if a competition in wickedness were undertaken, here too the supreme sinners would be found to be very few?'

Phaedo/ 'Most likely.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, likely indeed. But it is not in this respect that arguments resemble men: I was merely following your lead in this digression: but the resemblance holds true when a man who is gifted with no experience in discussion believes an argument to be true, and then shortly afterwards thinks it false, which sometimes is and sometimes is not the case, and when this happens again and again. You know that those above all who have spent their time in disputation finally come to believe that they are the wisest of men and that they alone have discovered there is nothing sound or stable either in things or in arguments, but that everything is literally, like the Euripus, in constant ebb and flow and never for any length of time remains at rest.'

Phaedo/ 'What you say is very true.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Phaedo, if there is some true and stable doctrine which the mind is capable of grasping, it would indeed be a pitiful business if a man through contact with some of those arguments which seem now true, now false, should refuse to find fault with himself and his own lack of skill, but should finally in his annoyance gladly thrust the blame from his own shoulders upon the arguments and now continue for the rest of his life hating and abusing arguments, and thus rob himself of the truth and knowledge of realities.'

Phaedo/ 'Pitiful indeed.'

Socrates/ 'First of all, then, let us beware of admitting into our souls the thought that probably no arguments are sound: we should much rather admit that we ourselves are not yet sound. But we must play the man and zealously

strive after soundness, you and the others for the sake of all your future life, and I because of my impending death: for I am afraid that at the present moment I am not facing it like a philosopher but am merely bent upon victory, like those who are utterly devoid of culture. For they, whenever engaged in any dispute, care nothing for the truth of the matter under discussion, but are eager only to enforce their own point of view upon their hearers. And at present I fancy there is only one point in which I shall prove different from them: I shall not be anxious to convince my hearers that what I say is true, except incidentally, but shall be most anxious to convince myself. For I reason, my dear friend—you can see how unscrupulously—that if what I say is true, it is well to be persuaded: but if there is nothing for the dead, at any rate during the actual period before my death I shall be less likely to be tiresome to my friends with my lamentations, and this folly of mine will not long endure—that would be unfortunate—but will soon come to an end. It is in such a state of preparation then, Simmias and Cebes, that I have come to argue: but as for you, if you will heed my advice, you will care but little about Socrates, but much more about the truth: and if you think there is any truth in what I say, agree with it, but if not, fight me with every possible argument: and beware that I do not in my zeal deceive both myself and you, and then fly away leaving my sting in you like a bee.

'But I must go on. And first of all, remind me of what you both said, in case I appear to have forgotten. Simmias, I believe, is skeptical and afraid that the soul, though nobler and more divine than the body, may perish before it, being of the nature of an attunement. Cebes is ready to agree, I think, that the soul endures longer than the body, but insists that we cannot know for certain whether, after wearing out many bodies at different times, she may not

herself perish on leaving the last of them, and whether death is not just this, the destruction of the soul, since the body is continually perishing. Are these the questions, Simmias and Cebes, which we must investigate?"

Phaedo/ Both agreed that they were.

Socrates/ 'Do you reject all our previous arguments, or only some of them?'

Phaedo/ 'Some of them, not others', they replied.

Socrates/ 'What have you to say then, about our theory that knowledge is reminiscence, and that, this being so, our soul must necessarily have existed somewhere else, before being prisoned in the body?'

Cebes/ 'I was wonderfully taken by it at the time and there is no theory I cling to more firmly now.'

Simmias/ 'I too, am of the same opinion, and I should be much surprised if I should ever change it on this subject.'

Socrates/ 'But, my Theban friend, you must revise your opinion if you still hold to the belief that an attunement is something composite and that the soul is an attunement composed of elements of the body in proper tension: for you surely will never accept from yourself the statement that a composite attunement was in existence before the elements of which it was to be composed, will you?'

Simmias/ 'By no means, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'But you see, do you not, that this is what your statement amounts to, when you say that the soul existed before entering the form and body of man, and at the same time that she is a combination of elements that do not yet exist? For an attunement does not resemble the thing to which you compare it, but the lyre and its strings and notes first come into existence as yet untuned, and the tuning is effected last of all and is first to disappear. How can this belief then be in tune with the other?'

Simmias/ 'In no way.'

Socrates/ 'And yet, if any argument at all ought to be properly in tune, it is an argument about attuning.'

Simmias/ 'Yes, it should be.'

Socrates/ 'Well, this argument is out of tune. But consider for yourself which of the two statements you choose—that knowledge is reminiscence or that the soul is an attunement.'

Simmias/ 'The former I greatly prefer, Socrates. The latter I accepted without proof because it seemed probable and plausible—the reason why it appeals to most of those who accept it. But I know that arguments which base their proofs on analogies are impostors, and if one does not use caution, they thoroughly deceive us, in geometry and all other fields. The argument about reminiscence and knowledge, however, was based on a hypothesis worthy of acceptance. For it was stated that the existence of the soul before it entered the body is as sure as that it possesses the reality which is entitled to be called absolute and unqualified reality. This hypothesis I am convinced I have rightly accepted and on satisfactory proof. I must then, it seems, refuse to accept from myself or any other the statement that the soul is an attunement.'

Socrates/ 'And what if you look at it in this way, Simmias? Do you think it proper for an attunement or any other composite thing to differ in nature from the elements which compose it?'

Simmias/ 'By no means.'

Socrates/ 'And it cannot, I suppose, do or suffer anything except what they do or suffer?'

Phaedo/ He agreed.

Socrates/ 'An attunement therefore should not properly lead the elements which compose it, but must follow them?'

Phaedo/ He concurred.

Socrates/ 'It is utterly impossible then that it should vibrate or produce sounds or do anything in opposition to its own parts.'

Simmias/ 'Utterly.'

Socrates/ 'Again, is it not the nature of an attunement to be an attunement just as it is attuned?'

Simmias/ 'I do not understand.'

Socrates/ 'If it is tuned more truly or more completely (supposing such a thing possible), would it be more truly and completely an attunement, or if less truly and completely, less truly and completely an attunement?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Is it the case with the soul, that one soul can be in the slightest degree more truly and completely, or less truly and completely, a soul than another?'

Simmias/ 'By no means.'

Socrates/ 'And now pray tell me, one soul may be said to possess intelligence and worth and to be good, and another to possess folly and wickedness and to be evil: is this not a true saying?'

Simmias/ 'Yes, quite true.'

Socrates/ 'Then how will they define these qualities that exist in the soul, this virtue and vice—these people who assume that the soul is a tuning? As another attuning or discordance? And will they say that the good soul is in tune and being a tuning herself, has in her another attuning, and that the other (the evil), being herself out of tune, has no other attunement in herself?'

Simmias/ 'I cannot say, but it is plain that the man who made this assumption would say something like that.'

Socrates/ 'But we have already agreed that no one soul is more or less a soul than another: and that is the same as admitting that no attuning is more truly and completely or less truly and completely an attunement than another, is it not?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And the attunement which is neither more nor less an attunement is not more nor less tuned: is that so?'

Simmias/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'And has that which is neither more or less tuned a greater, less, or equal amount of tuning?'

Simmias/ 'An equal.'

Socrates/ 'Then the soul being neither more nor less a soul than another, is not more nor less tuned either.'

Simmias/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'And this being its condition, it could not have a greater amount of discordance or attunement?'

Simmias/ 'It could not.'

Socrates/ 'And in this case could one soul have a greater amount of vice or virtue than another—if vice be a lack of tuning, and virtue attunement?'

Simmias/ 'It could not.'

Socrates/ 'Or rather, Simmias, to speak correctly, no soul will partake of evil, if it is a tuning: for an attuning, being entirely an attuning, cannot have any part in discordance.'

Simmias/ 'No indeed.'

Socrates/ 'Nor can a soul then which is entirely a soul have any part in evil.'

Simmias/ 'How could it, in view of what has already been said?'

Socrates/ 'According to this argument then all souls of all living creatures will be equally good, since it is the nature of all souls to be equally souls.'

Simmias/ 'Yes, I agree, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Do you think that we are right, and that this could have happened to our argument, if the assumption that the soul is an attunement were correct?'

Simmias/ 'By no means.'

Socrates/ 'Again, of all the parts of man would you say that any other is ruler than the soul, and especially the wise soul?'

Simmias/ 'I would not.'

Socrates/ 'And does she comply with or oppose the passions of the body? I mean, when it is hot and thirsty, she drags it back and prevents it from drinking, and from eating when hungry, and in countless other ways we see the soul opposing the claims of the body. Is it not so?'

Simmias/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Now did we not previously agree that if she were an attunement she would never produce any sounds contrary to the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other affections of the elements that compose her, but would follow, never lead them?'

Simmias/ 'We agreed, of course.'

Socrates/ 'Well, now we find her doing just the opposite, leading all those elements of which she is said to be made up and opposing them in almost everything throughout her life, exercising her tyranny in every way, sometimes disciplining more harshly and painfully, by gymnastic and medicine, sometimes more gently, and now threatening, now admonishing, speaking to our desires, our passions and

fears as though addressing something not herself, just as Homer describes in the Odyssey, where he says of Odysseus:

> He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his heart:
> "Courage, my heart: thou hast borne worse than this."

Do you think he wrote this in the belief that the soul was an attunement and of a kind to be led by the passions of the body instead of herself leading and governing them, being herself far too divine a thing to be compared to a tuning?'

Simmias/ 'Indeed, Socrates, I agree with you.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my good friend, it is under no circumstances right to call the soul an attunement: for we should, it seems, be in disagreement both with the divine poet Homer and with ourselves.'

Simmias/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'Well, our Theban goddess Harmonia has, I think, proved quite gracious to us: and now what about Cadmus, Cebes? How shall we propitiate him, and by what argument?'

Cebes/ 'I think you will discover how the case against attunement you put forward at any rate in a manner that wonderfully exceeded my expectations. When Simmias was speaking in his perplexity, I much wondered whether anyone would be able to deal with his argument. It seems very strange that it could not withstand even the shock of your first assault. I should not be surprised then if the statement of Cadmus suffered the same fate.'

Socrates/ 'Good friend, do not speak boastfully, for fear some evil eye may defeat and rout my next argument. But that we will leave in God's hands: let us come to close quarters like Homer's heroes and discover whether there is anything in what you say. Now the sum and substance of your contention is this: you are asking for a proof that our souls are indestructible and immortal: for otherwise the

philosopher on the point of death will be guilty of a foolish and senseless confidence if he is fearless and convinced that after death he will fare far better in the other world than if he had lived another kind of life. And as for our proof that the soul is strong and godlike and existed before we were born men, there is nothing, you say, to prevent all this from proving, not that the soul is immortal, but that it is long-lived and existed somewhere before for a period beyond all reckoning, and knew and did many things: but she was not any the more immortal for all that, and her coming into a human body was actually, like a disease, the first step in her dissolution: and she passes this life in distress and finally perishes in what we call death. And you say it makes no difference whether she enters a body once or many times, so far as our individual fears are concerned: for the man who does not know and cannot demonstrate that the soul is immortal ought to be afraid, unless he is a fool. That, Cebes, is, I think, about what you say. I repeat it again and again on purpose, that no point may escape us and that, if you wish, you may add or withdraw anything.'

Cebes/ 'There is nothing that I want to add or retract for the moment. You have expressed my meaning.'

Phaedo/ Socrates paused for a considerable time in silent reflection: then he said:

Socrates/ 'It is no trivial task, this quest of yours: for we must thoroughly investigate the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. Well, I will relate my own experiences in these matters, if you wish, and then if you find anything I say useful, you may employ it to convince you in the problem under debate.'

Cebes/ 'Indeed, I do so wish.'

Socrates/ 'Then listen, and I will tell you. When I was young, Cebes, I was wonderfully eager to acquire that

wisdom which they call natural science: for it seemed to me a wondrous wisdom to know the causes of each thing, why it comes into being and passes away, and why it exists. And many a time I was tossed to and fro in doubt, as I asked first of all such questions as these: is it, as certain people say, when the hot and the cold produce putrefaction, that living creatures find their nourishment? And is it with blood that we think, or with air, or fire? Or is it none of these things, but the brain which produces the senses of hearing and sight and smell, and from these arise memory and opinion, and from memory and opinion in an undisturbed state comes knowledge? And again, when considering what destroys these things, and the phenomena of earth and heaven, I finally concluded that nothing could be more ungifted than I for such inquiries. Of this I will give you ample proof: this new inquiry so completely blinded me to what I had previously seemed both to myself and to others to know well, that I forgot even what I formerly imagined I knew about many subjects and in particular the cause of man's growth. I had previously believed it was obvious to all that this was due to eating and drinking: that new flesh was added to flesh by food, and bone to bone, and so too in the same way the elements proper to each thing were added to the other parts, and thus the smaller bulk later became greater and the boy became the man. That is what I used to believe. Do you not think that it sounds reasonable?'

Cebes/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Now consider this further point. I thought I had good grounds for my opinion, when a tall man standing beside a short one seemed to be taller just by a head, and so too with one horse beside another: and still more clearly than this did it seem true to me that ten was more than eight by the addition of two, and two cubits longer than one because they exceed the other by one half.'

Cebes/ ‘And what do you think about this now?’

Socrates/ ‘I am indeed, little likely to think I know the cause of any of these things, when I refuse to accept my own account that, when one is added to one, either the original one becomes two, or the added one, or the original one and the added one together, by reason of their addition, one to the other, have become two. When each was separated from the other, each of them was one, and they were not then two: it seems strange to me, then, that, when they have united together, this union should be the cause of their becoming two—the fusion which arises from their juxtaposition. Nor again, if one be divided in two, can I yet convince myself that it is this division which causes it to become two: for this is the opposite of the cause which formerly produced two. Then, it was the coming together and addition of one to the other: now, it is the withdrawing and separation of one from the other. Indeed I am not any longer convinced that I know even how the unit comes into being at all, nor, in a word, how anything comes to be or passes away or exists, by this method of inquiry; but I follow a new, confused method of my own, and the other I refuse to admit.

‘But one day I heard somebody reading from a book, by Anaxagoras as he said, the statement that Mind is the disposer and cause of all things: and I was delighted with this cause, and it seemed to me in a certain way right that Mind should cause all things, and I reflected that, if this were so, then Mind in ordering all things must order and arrange them in the best possible way. If then one wished to discover the cause why anything comes into being or passes away or exists, he will have to discover how it is best for that thing to exist or to act or be acted upon in any way: and the conclusion from this argument was that a man ought to take account only of what is best and most fitting both for himself and for everything else. And the same man must also know

the worse: for the same knowledge deals with good and evil. As I reasoned thus, I was happy to think that in Anaxagoras I had found a teacher after my own heart to explain the causes of things, and that he would tell me first of all whether the earth is flat or round, and after informing me, he would proceed to put forward the cause and the necessity, telling me what was best and that it is best for the earth to be what it is: and if he said that it was in the center, he would proceed to explain that it was better for it to be in the center: and if he could make this plain to me, I was prepared never to want any other kind of cause. And I was ready to make similar inquiries about the sun and the moon and the other heavenly bodies, with regard to their relative velocity, and the solstices and other conditions—just how it was better for each body to act and experience what it does. For I would never have believed that, when he claimed they were ordered by Mind, he would suggest any further cause than that it was best for them to be as they are. In assigning, then, a cause to all things both individually and collectively, he would, I thought, proceed to explain what was best for all things individually and collectively: and I would not have sold my hopes for a large sum, but I seized the books with the utmost eagerness and read them as quickly as I could, that I might as quickly as possible learn what was best and what was worst.

'My magnificent hopes were shattered, my friend, when, as my reading progressed, I found a man making no use whatever of Mind and ascribing to it no causal action in the ordering of things, but assigning such causes as air and ether and water and many other strange things. It seemed to me exactly as if a man were to say that everything Socrates did was done by Mind, and then, in attempting to offer reasons for each of my actions, should state, first of all, that I am now sitting here because my body is compacted of

bones and sinews, and that the bones are hard and have joints to separate them, and that the sinews naturally contract and relax and, along with the flesh and the skin which holds them together, envelop the bones: and, as the bones swing loose in their sockets, the strain and relaxation of the sinews make it possible for me now to bend my limbs; and this is the cause of my sitting here with legs bent. And again he might give you other such reasons for my talking to you, assigning such causes as sounds and air and hearing and countless other such things, neglecting to mention the true reasons, that since the Athenians thought good to condemn me, I too thought good to sit here and considered it more in accord with justice to hold my ground and submit to whatever punishment they order. For, by the dog, these sinews and bones of mine would, I imagine, long since have been in Megara or Boeotia, borne thither by my conception of what is best, had I not thought it more right and honorable to undergo whatever penalty the city inflicted rather than escape and be a runaway. But to call such things causes is too absurd. If anyone should say that I could not have done what seemed right to me without such things as bones and sinews and the like, that would be quite correct: but to say that these things, and not my choice of what is best, are the causes of my action, and that too though I act with intelligence, would be a very loose and idle way of talking. Just imagine being unable to distinguish between the real cause and the invariable concomitant of the cause! The majority of people, I suppose, groping about as though in the dark, call this the cause, applying to it a name that is not its own. And so one man surrounds the earth with a vortical motion and represents it as kept in its place by the heavens: another pictures the earth as a flat kneading-trough with the air as its foundation and support: but the force which keeps things placed as it is best for them to be placed—that force

they neither seek to know nor do they think it has any divine power, but they believe they will discover an Atlas stronger and more immortal than our own and more capable of holding the world together, and the good that binds in the truest sense of the word they imagine has no holding or binding force. Now here is a cause, the nature of which I should be glad to study as the pupil of any man: but since I was deprived of this and could neither discover it myself nor learn it from another, I adopted another method of travel for investigating it: would you like me, Cebes, to explain how I pursued it?'

Cebes/ 'I should very much indeed.'

Socrates/ 'After this, then, having given up investigating things, I felt that I must beware of suffering what happens to those who observe and gaze at the sun during eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyesight, unless they observe its reflection in water or some other medium. That was what I thought of, and I was afraid that my soul might be completely blinded if I gazed at objects with my eyes and attempted to grasp them by each of my senses. I decided then that I must have recourse to propositions and in them study the truth about things. Now perhaps my simile is in a way not quite faithful: for I do not entirely agree that a man who studies realities in propositions is examining them in reflection rather than he who examines them in things. However, this is the way in which I made, my start: assuming as true in each case the proposition which I judged to be the best assured, I set down as true whatever seems to agree with it, both in the matter of causes and in everything else; and whatever disagrees I reject as untrue. I should like to explain my meaning more clearly, for I think you do not yet understand.'

Cebes/ 'No indeed, I do not altogether.'

Socrates/ 'Well, this is what I mean: it is nothing new, but what I have persisted in saying both in to-day's conversation and at other times. I am going to try to show the kind of causation with which I have busied myself, and I will go back to that hackneyed theme and make my starting-point the assumption that there exists an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness and so on. If you allow this and grant that they exist, I hope as a result to reveal to you what the cause is and to discover the immortality of the soul.'

Cebes/ 'Well, I concede you this, and you need lose no time in proceeding.'

Socrates/ 'Consider what follows upon this, you may perhaps share my point of view. It seems to me that, if there is any other beautiful thing except beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it partakes of that beauty: and so too with everything else. Do you accept that kind of cause?'

Cebes/ 'I accept.'

Socrates/ 'Well, I no longer know nor can I understand these other clever causes of theirs: but if anyone tells me why something is beautiful—because it has a fresh and radiant color or a certain shape or anything else like this, I pay no heed to these other reasons, all of which only confuse me, but I hold to my doctrine simply and artlessly and perhaps foolishly, that nothing else makes an object beautiful except the presence of beauty itself or communion with it, or whatever or however you like to call it (I will not go the length of insisting upon exact terms), but I insist that it is by beauty that all beautiful objects become beautiful. This seems to me the safest answer I can give to myself or another, and if I cling to this I believe I shall never fall, but that it is safe to answer myself and anyone else that beauty makes beautiful all things beautiful. Do you not agree?'

Cebes/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'And it is greatness that makes great things great or greater things greater, and smallness that makes smaller things smaller?'

Cebes/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'You too then would not admit the statement if someone said that one man is taller or shorter than another by a head, but would protest that all you will say is that everything greater than another is greater by nothing but greatness, and greatness is the reason why it is greater, and the less is less by nothing but smallness, and smallness is the reason why it is smaller: for you would, I imagine, be afraid that, if you say a man is taller or shorter by a head, you may meet with the retort, first that the great is greater and the small smaller by the same thing, and secondly that the tall is taller by a head, which is something short, and that this is a portentous thing that any man should be great by reason of the small. Would you not be afraid of this?'

Phaedo/ With a laugh Cebes said;

Cebes/ 'I should indeed.'

Socrates/ 'Then, you would be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two and that this is the reason for the excess: you would say it was more by number, and that number was the cause: and that two cubits are more than one by length, not by a half. For you would feel the same fear.'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Again, would you not be wary of asserting that, when one is added to one, the addition, or when it is divided, the division is the cause of two? You would protest vigorously that you know of no other way in which any object can come into being except by partaking of the particular reality of each form in which it participates: and in the

examples mentioned you can give no other reason for becoming two except participation in duality, and all things that are to be two must partake of this, and what is to be one must partake of unity: and you would bid a long farewell to divisions and additions and all such refinements, leaving the answer to wiser men than you: but you, aware of your lack of experience, and shying, as they say, at your own shadow, would cling firmly to the sure support of your hypothesis and would give the answer we mentioned. And if anyone should lay hands on your hypothesis itself, you would let him be and would make no answer until you could consider whether the consequences of it were consistent with each other or not: and when you had to render an account of the hypothesis itself, you would render it in the same way, by assuming another hypothesis which seemed to you to be best among the more comprehensive ones, until you reached one which was really adequate: but at the same time you would not confound the two things together, as disputants do, when discussing your starting-point and its consequences, if you wished to discover any truths. For these disputants, I suppose, devote never a word nor a thought to such matters, being clever enough to be self-satisfied even when they have thrown everything into chaos: but you, if you are a philosopher, will, I believe, do as I say.'

Phaedo/ 'That is absolutely true', said Simmias and Cebes together.

Echecrates/ They were quite right too, Phaedo: for I think his argument is admirably clear even to the dullest of wits.

Phaedo/ Certainly, Echecrates: all who were present thought so too.

Echecrates/ And so do we who were not there but now are listening. But what was said next?

Phaedo/ I believe, when they had made these admissions and had agreed that each of the universal forms exists and that particular objects are called after them because they partake of them, his next question was:

Socrates/ 'Then if you accept all this, do you not, in saying that Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, assert that both elements, tallness and shortness, exist in Simmias?'

Cebes/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'However, you agree that when you speak of Simmias as taller than Socrates, the truth is not what the words imply: and that it is not because he is Simmias that he is taller, but in virtue of the tallness which is his: nor again is he taller than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but in virtue of the shortness of Socrates relatively to the tallness of Simmias.'

Cebes/ 'That is true.'

Socrates/ 'Nor is Simmias shorter than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because of the tallness of Phaedo relatively to the shortness of Simmias.'

Cebes/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'Thus it is then that Simmias is called short or tall, because he is intermediate, submitting his shortness to be exceeded by the tallness of the one, and offering his tallness to exceed the shortness of the other.'

Phaedo/ And with a smile, he continued:

Socrates/ 'It looks as if I am beginning to talk like a statute book: but at any rate the facts are much as I state.'

Phaedo/ He agreed.

Socrates/ 'My reason for thus speaking is that I want you to share my opinion. For I believe, not only that greatness itself will never become at the same time both great and

small, but that the greatness in us never admits the small nor suffers itself to be exceeded, but of two things one must happen: either it withdraws in flight when approached by its opposite, the small, or else at this approach it perishes: but it refuses to stand its ground, accept smallness, and be other than it was. Thus when I have stood my ground and accepted smallness, I remain Socrates still and am the same small person: but as the greatness in us, being great, has never submitted to become small, so too the smallness in us will never become or be great, nor will anything, while it still is what it was, become or be its opposite, but it either withdraws or perishes in this experience.'

Cebes/ 'That is exactly my opinion.'

Phaedo/ Then one of the company who heard him—I do not quite remember who it was—said:

Someone/ 'But in heaven's name, did we not in our earlier discussion agree upon the exact opposite of what we are now saying, stating that the greater is generated by the less, and the less by the greater? and that the generation of opposites simply proceeds from opposites? But now we seem to be saying that this could never take place.'

Phaedo/ Socrates turned his head and listened, and then said:

Socrates/ 'A gallant reminder but you do not notice the difference between what was said then and now. Then we stated that opposite objects are engendered by their opposites: but now we are saying that the opposite itself could never become opposite to itself, whether it be in us or in the world of reality. We were then talking, my friend, about things in which the opposites are found, naming them by the names of those opposites, but now we are speaking about those opposites themselves which are inherent in objects and give them their names: but the opposites

themselves would never, we insist, submit to becoming one another.'

Phaedo/ And with this he looked at Cebes and said:

Socrates/ 'Did anything our friend has said, Cebes, trouble you at all?'

Cebes/ 'No, not this time and yet I do not say that there are not many problems that trouble me.'

Socrates/ 'We are simply agreed then that an opposite can never be opposite to itself.'

Cebes/ 'Entirely agreed.'

Socrates/ 'And now once more, consider whether you will agree with me in this? There are things, are there not, which you call hot and cold?'

Cebes/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Are they the same as snow and fire?'

Cebes/ 'Indeed not.'

Socrates/ 'But heat is different from fire, and cold from snow?'

Cebes/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But this, I think, you do believe, that snow when it admits heat, as we have already said, will no longer be what it was, snow as well as hot, but at the approach of heat will either withdraw before it or perish.'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And fire too at the approach of cold will either withdraw or perish, but when it has admitted the cold it will never venture to remain what it was, fire as well as cold.'

Cebes/ 'Quite true.'

Socrates/ 'The truth then about some of these things is this not only is the form itself entitled to its own name forever, but another thing is also, which is not the form but

always, whenever it exists, possesses the character of that form. But perhaps my meaning will become plainer in the following example. The odd must always possess the name by which we call it, must it not?'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Is it the only thing that does—that is my question—or is there something else which is not identical with the odd but which, in addition to its own name, must always be called odd, because such is its nature that it never fails to be odd? The kind of instance I mean is the number three and many others. Consider the case of three. Do you not think that it must always be called both by its own name and by the name of odd, though the odd is not identical with three? Yet such is the nature of the number three and five and the half of the whole series of numbers that, though not identical with the odd, each of them is odd: and again two and four and all the other series of numbers, though not identical with the even, are each of them always even. Do you agree or not?'

Cebes/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'Then observe what I want to make plain. It is this. Not only do your actual opposite forms evidently exclude each other, but all things also which, though not opposites themselves, always contain opposites, seem never to admit that form which is opposite to the form contained in them, but at its approach they perish or withdraw. Shall we not affirm that three will perish or endure any fate rather than submit, while remaining three, to become even?'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And yet, two is not the opposite of three.'

Cebes/ 'It is not.'

Socrates/ 'Then not only do forms refuse to admit the invasion of their opposites, but there are certain other things that do not admit the invasion of opposites.'

Cebes/ 'Quite true.'

Socrates/ 'Shall we then, if we can, determine what kind of things these are?'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Would they not, Cebes, be things which, whenever they occupy anything, compel it to assume not only their own form but in each case also that of some opposite [to the attempting invader]?'

Cebes/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'Just what we were saying a moment ago. You know, of course, that all things in which the form of three is inherent must be not only three but odd as well.'

Cebes/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'To such a thing, we insist, the form contrary to that which produces this result can never come.'

Cebes/ 'It cannot.'

Socrates/ 'And the form that produced it was the odd?'

Cebes/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And the form of the even is the opposite of this?'

Cebes/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then the form of the even can never come to the number three?'

Cebes/ 'Never.'

Socrates/ 'So that three has no part in the even?'

Cebes/ 'No part.'

Socrates/ 'Then the number three is uneven?'

Cebes/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'I said we were to define what things, though not opposites of something, do not admit the opposite in question: for instance, three, which is not the opposite of the even, yet refuses to admit the even but always brings its opposite to confront it, and similarly with two and the odd, fire and cold and many other examples—but consider whether this definition satisfies you: not only does an opposite refuse admission to its opposite, but whatever brings an opposite to that which it invades will never itself admit the opposite of that which it brings. Just recollect once more: for it will do no harm to repeat. Five will not admit the form of the even, nor ten, its double, the form of the odd. It is true enough that the double is opposite to something else (the single), but none the less it will not admit the form of the odd either. Nor will such fractions as three over two or a half or a third and all the like admit the form of the whole, if you follow me and agree with me.'

Cebes/ 'I do follow and heartily agree.'

Socrates/ 'Let us go back once more to the beginning and do you answer me, not in the terms of my question, but in imitation of my example. For over and above the safe answer I first gave I see another safe reply based on what we were just saying. If you should ask me what exists in a body to make it hot, I will not give you that safe old foolish answer, heat, but a more clever answer suggested by our discussion, namely fire: and if you should ask me what exists in a body to make it ill, I shall not say sickness, but fever: and again, should you ask what must be in number to make it odd, I shall not answer oddness, but the number one, and so forth. Do you clearly understand my meaning now?'

Cebes/ 'Quite clearly.'

Socrates/ 'Then answer me. What must there be in a body to make it alive?'

Cebes/ 'A soul.'

Socrates/ 'Is this always so?'

Cebes/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'Whatever the soul occupies, then, she always brings life thereto?'

Cebes/ 'Yes, certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And is there an opposite to life or not?'

Cebes/ 'There is.'

Socrates/ 'What?'

Cebes/ 'Death.'

Socrates/ 'Now in accordance with what we have already agreed, the soul will never admit the opposite of what she brings with her?'

Cebes/ 'Most assuredly not.'

Socrates/ 'Well, what name did we give just now to what refused to admit the form of the even?'

Cebes/ 'The uneven.'

Socrates/ 'And what do we call that which refuses to admit justice and music?'

Cebes/ 'The unjust and the unmusical.'

Socrates/ 'Then what do we call that which does not admit death?'

Cebes/ 'The undying or immortal.'

Socrates/ 'Now the soul does not admit death?'

Cebes/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Then the soul is immortal?'

Cebes/ 'Immortal.'

Socrates/ 'Well: can we say that this has been proved? Or what do you think?'

Cebes/ 'Quite conclusively, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Now, Cebes, if the odd were of necessity indestructible, would not the number three be also?'

Cebes/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'And if that which is without heat were necessarily indestructible, then snow would withdraw safe and unmelted whenever heat approached it. For it could not perish nor could it hold its ground and admit heat.'

Cebes/ 'That is true.'

Socrates/ 'So too, I suppose, if that which cannot be made cold were indestructible, then when cold approached fire, that fire could neither be quenched nor could it perish, but it would withdraw and depart in safety.'

Cebes/ 'Necessarily so.'

Socrates/ 'Must we not speak in the same way about the immortal? If the immortal is also indestructible, it is impossible for the soul to be destroyed when death attacks her. For our previous argument proves that she will not admit death or be dead, just as we said the number three will never be even, no more will the odd, and fire will never be cold, nor will the heat in fire. "But", one might add, "though the odd, as we agree, will never be even, when attacked by the even, yet what is to prevent the odd from perishing and the even taking its place?" In reply to such an argument we could not contend that it does not perish: for the uneven is not imperishable: if indeed that were admitted, we might easily contend that at the coming of the even the odd and the number three would withdraw and depart: and we might contend in the same way regarding fire and heat and the rest, might we not?'

Cebes/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'So too now, with regard to the immortal, if we agree that it is indestructible also, then the soul would be

indestructible as well as immortal: if not, some further argument will be needed.'

Cebes/ 'But there is no such need, so far as that is concerned: it is hardly likely that anything else would escape destruction, if the immortal, which is eternal, will admit it.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, and all men, I think, would agree that God, and the form of life itself, and all else that is immortal, can never perish.'

Cebes/ 'All men indeed and still more, I think, all the gods.'

Socrates/ 'Then, since the immortal is also indestructible, the soul, if immortal, will be indestructible.'

Cebes/ 'Necessarily.'

Socrates/ 'When death, then, attacks a man, the mortal in him, it appears, will perish, but the immortal withdraws and departs safe and undestroyed, retiring before death.'

Cebes/ 'Evidently.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and indestructible, and our souls will really live on in the other world.'

Cebes/ 'There is no further objection, Socrates, that I can bring forward, nor can I doubt your statements. But if Simmias or anyone else has anything further to say, he had better not suppress it: for I know of no other opportunity beyond the present, to which he can postpone the discussion, if he wishes either to say or to hear anything about such matters.'

Simmias/ 'Well, Socrates, I too can find no further reasons to doubt, after what has been said: but owing to the immensity of the subject under debate and my distrust of human frailty, I cannot help still feeling some misgivings within me about our statements.'

Socrates/ 'More than that, Simmias, what you say is right, but we must still examine more carefully our first assumptions, even though they seem sure to you: and if you analyze them satisfactorily, you will, in my opinion, be able to follow the discussion, so far as it is in man's power to do so: and if you make certain that you have done this, you will have no further to seek.'

Simmias/ 'That is true.'

Socrates/ 'But, my friends, it is right for us to reflect that, if the soul is immortal, she needs our care not only for the period during which we enjoy what we call life, but also for all time: and now indeed the danger would seem to be terrible, if we are minded to neglect her. For if death were a deliverance from everything, it would be a godsend to the wicked, when they die, to be delivered at once from the body and from their own wickedness, along with their souls: but as it is, since the soul is plainly immortal, there could be no escape for her from evil nor any salvation except in acquiring the greatest goodness and wisdom. For on her journey to the other world the soul takes nothing with her except her education and culture, and these things, they say, render the dead man the very greatest benefit or harm, right at the beginning of that journey. We are told that after death man's guardian spirit allotted to him in life takes it in hand to lead him to a mysterious place where those who are gathered together must first submit their different claims to judgment and then proceed to the other world under the guidance of him whose task it is to convey thither those from the world above: and after receiving there the treatment that is their due and remaining for the allotted period, they are brought back hither after many long cycles of time by another guide. And this journey does not resemble that described in the Telephus of Aeschylus: for he says that one simple path leads to the other world, but apparently it is neither single

nor simple. In that case there would have been no need for guides, since nobody could stray anywhere from the path, if there were but one. But in fact it seems to have many forks and crossroads—at least so I judge from the evidence of sacrifices and ritual in this world.'

'Now the orderly and wise soul follows, quite familiar with her surroundings: but the soul that yearns for the body flutters, as I said before, for a long time about that body and the visible region, and only after violent resistance and much suffering is dragged away panting and reluctant by the appointed spirit. And when she has arrived to join the others, if the soul has been impure and done impure deeds, engaging in brutal murders or other such crimes that are akin to these and perpetrated by kindred souls, all shun her and turn aside to avoid her, and none will be her companion in travel or her guide, but she wanders alone in sore straits until a certain time has passed, at the end whereof she is borne away by necessity to her fitting habitation. But the souls which have passed their life in purity and goodness, with gods to accompany and guide them, dwell each in her proper dwelling-place. Now there are many wonderful regions in the earth: and the earth itself is not of the size or character imagined by those who are wont to speak about it, as a certain person has convinced me.'

Simmias/ 'What is this that you are saying, Socrates? I too have heard many theories about the earth, but not those which you believe. I should very much like to hear them.'

Socrates/ 'Well, Simmias, it does not require the skill of Glaucus, I think, to describe them to you: but to prove them true would, I believe, be beyond even the skill of Glaucus, Probably I am incapable of doing so: and, even if I knew how, I imagine, Simmias, that my future is not long enough for so lengthy a discussion. There is nothing, however, to prevent

me from telling you what I believe to be the form of the earth, and of the regions in it.'

Simmias/ 'Well, even that will suffice.'

Socrates/ 'I am convinced then, first of all that, if the earth is spherical and is in the middle of the heavens, it has no need of air or of any other force to prevent it from falling, but that the equiformity of the heavens on every side and the equilibrium of the earth itself are sufficient to keep it in place, for a body in equilibrium set in the middle of something equiform will not be able to incline either more or less in any direction, but being alike on every side it will remain undeviating. This, then, is the first article of my belief.'

Simmias/ 'And rightly too.'

Socrates/ 'And further, I am convinced that the earth is very large, and that we who dwell between the Pillars of Hercules and the River Phasis live in a tiny portion of it, around the sea, just like ants or frogs about a swamp, and that many others dwell in many similar regions elsewhere. For everywhere about the earth there are numerous hollows which vary in shape and size, and into these water and mist and air have flowed together: but the earth on its true surface lies pure in a pure heaven, wherein dwell the stars—a heaven which is called ether by most of those who are accustomed to speak on such matters: and water, mist, and air are the sediment of this, and constantly flow into the earth's hollows.

'Now we ourselves are unaware that we dwell in these hollows and fancy we are living on the surface above: just as if anyone dwelling half way to the bottom of the sea thought he was living on its surface, and on seeing the sun and the other heavenly bodies through the water imagined that the sea was the sky, and through slothfulness or weakness had

never reached the surface of the sea, had never risen from it and looked from the sea to this world of ours, and had never seen, or heard from another who had seen, how much more pure and beautiful is this world than that in which he lived. The same thing is true of us: for though we dwell in one of the hollows of the earth, we think we are living on its surface, and we call the air heaven, thinking that this is the heaven through which the constellations move; whereas our case is just the same—through weakness and slothfulness we are unable to penetrate to the upper surface of the air. If a man could reach that surface, or take wings and fly thither, then just as the fishes in the sea break surface and see what is here, so he too would look up and see what is there, and if his nature were able to sustain the sight, he would learn that yonder was the true heaven, the true light, and the real earth. For this earth in which we dwell and its stones and the whole region here are corrupted and corroded, just as the brine ruins objects in the sea and nothing of any value grows there nor practically speaking is anything brought to fullness there, but there are crevices and sand and fathomless mud and slime, wherever there is any earth to be found, and nothing fit to be compared in any way to the beauties of our world. But that upper world again would seem still more to excel this world of ours. If it is the opportune moment, Simmias, to tell a story, it may be worth your while to hear of the nature of that earth that lies beneath the heavens.'

Simmias/ 'Indeed, Socrates', we should be delighted to hear your story.'

Socrates/ 'Well, my friend, in the first place it is said that the true earth when seen from above resembles a ball made of twelve pieces of leather, a varied patchwork of different colors, of which the colors employed by painters here appear to be samples. But there the whole earth is made up of such

colors and of others far more brilliant and pure than these: for one portion is a sea-purple of marvelous beauty, and another of golden hue, and another, where it is white, is whiter than chalk or snow: and it is made up of other colors too in like manner and still more numerous and beautiful than those we have seen. For these very hollows in the earth, which are full of air and water, present a kind of color as they gleam amid the variety of the others, so that the form of the earth appears as a single unbroken but variegated surface. Such is its appearance, and all the things that grow on it, trees, flowers, and fruits, are in like proportion beautiful: and the mountains and stones likewise are correspondingly more beautiful in their smoothness and translucency and in their colors: and the precious stones so highly esteemed here are but broken lights of those—the sards and jaspers and emeralds and all such gems: but there one and all are like these and even more beautiful. And the reason for this is that there the stones are flawless and not corroded or spoilt like ours by corruption and brine brought by the elements which flow together here and produce ugliness and distemper in stones and earth, and in animals and plants as well. The true earth herself is adorned with all these things and also with gold and silver and all other such metals, all of which through their number and size and ubiquity are plainly exposed to view, so that to look upon her is a vision beatific. And upon that earth are many living creatures, including men, some of whom live inland, some on the borders of the air, as we dwell beside the sea, some in islands near the mainland with air flowing round them: and in a word, what water and sea are to serve our needs, air is to them, and what air is to us, ether is to them. And their seasons are so temperately blended that they are immune to diseases and live far longer than we, and in sight and hearing and intelligence and all such endowments they

are as far removed from us as air is purer than water and ether than air. And they have also groves and temples of the gods, in which the gods actually dwell, and sacred voices and oracles and direct vision of the gods and intercourse of this kind face to face: and they can see the sun and the moon and the stars as they really are, and their happiness in all things is in keeping with this.

'Such then is the nature of the earth as a whole and all that is about it: and there are many regions scattered about the whole earth in its hollows, some deeper and broader of surface than that wherein we dwell, some deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some at once shallower in depth and wider. And all these are interconnected by numerous subterranean channels, some narrow and some broad, and they have passages through which water flows in abundance from one to the other as though into basins: and there are ever-flowing rivers of stupendous size with water both hot and cold beneath the earth, and abundant fire and great rivers of flame, and also many of liquid mud, some clear, some turbid, like the streams of mud in Sicily that flow before the lava and the lava itself: and therewith each of these regions is filled as the stream around them happens at any time to reach it.

All these things are moved up and down by a kind of see-saw movement which exists in the earth; and this movement is due to the following natural cause. One of these hollows in the earth is larger than the others and is pierced right through the earth, and it is this of which Homer spoke when he said: Far off, where is the deepest abyss beneath the earth: and he himself elsewhere and many other poets have named it Tartarus. Into this gulf flow all rivers together and they issue forth from it again: and they assume in each case the character of the soil through which they flow. Now the reason why all streams flow in and out is that this watery

mass has no bottom or foundation. And hence it oscillates and surges up and down, and the air and wind around it act in the same way: for they follow it both when it presses toward the further side of the earth and when it returns to this side, and just as in respiration the breath flows in constant inhalation and exhalation, so too here the wind, in constant oscillation with the water, produces as it comes and leaves savage and violent gales. Now when the water withdraws in the direction which we call downward, the streams flow into those regions which are on the remoter side of the earth and fill them as though pumped thereinto: but when they leave these and head in our direction, they once more fill the streams here, and the streams thus filled flow through the channels and through the earth and reach the different places to which a channel has been opened for each of them, and they create seas and lakes and rivers and springs. And from here they once more plunge beneath the earth, and after making, some of them longer and more numerous circuits, others shorter and fewer, they once more fall into Tartarus, some far below where they were pumped into the channels, others but a little below: but all flow in at a level lower than their point of exit, and some enter opposite the place of issue, others on the same side: there are some too which make a complete circuit, with one or more spiral courses about the earth like serpents, and then pour down as low as they can and once more fall into Tartarus. They can in either direction descend as far as the middle, but no farther: for on either side of the middle (of Tartarus) there is an up-hill slope for both sets of streams.

'Now there are numerous other large streams of various kinds, but among these many there are four, the largest and outermost of which flows round in a circle and is called Oceanus: and directly opposite to this and flowing in the contrary direction is Acheron, a river which flows through

desert regions and passing beneath the earth too issues in the Acherusian lake. Hither come the souls of most of the dead, and after abiding for a destined period, which is in some cases long, in others short, they are once more sent forth to be born into living creatures. The third among these rivers issues from Tartarus between those two and near its place of exit falls into a vast region burning with fierce flame: and it creates a lake larger than our Mediterranean Sea, boiling with water and mud: and it travels thence in a circle with turbid and muddy waters, and coiling around within the earth it visits many other places before coming to the borders of the Acherusian lake, with whose waters it does not mingle: and after many a winding course beneath the earth it flows into a lower level in Tartarus. This is the stream which is named Pyriphlegethon, and its lava floods fling aloft their torn fragments at different points on earth. And over against this the fourth river issues first of all, they say, into a wild and savage region which is all of a steely blue color: and this is called the Stygian region and the lake created by waters of the river is named Styx. And the river after falling into the lake and in its waters conceiving dread powers sinks beneath the earth and flows in a winding course opposite to that of Pyriphlegethon, which it encounters in the Acherusian lake from the opposite side. This river's water too mingles with none: but after travelling in a circle it pours into Tartarus over against Pyriphlegethon: and its name, the poets say, is Cocytus.

'Such is the picture: and when the dead arrive at the place whither each is guided by his attendant spirit, first of all those who have and who have not lived good and pious lives submit their claims for judgment. And those who are found to have lived neither the one nor the other make their way to Acheron, and after embarking on the vessels ready for them, proceed on these to the lake: and there they dwell and are

purified of their misdeeds by punishment, if they have been guilty of wrong, and are then absolved: and for their good deeds they are rewarded each according to his deserts. But those who because of the magnitude of their crimes are judged incurable—men guilty of many heinous acts of sacrilege and of many abominable and unnatural murders and other like deeds—are flung by their appropriate destiny into Tartarus, whence they never come forth. Those who are judged to have committed sins which, though great, are not past healing—who have, for example, in a fit of passion laid violent hands on a father or mother and then lived repentant the rest of their days, or who have been guilty of homicide under similar circumstances—these too are doomed to be flung into Tartarus: and when they have been thrown in and have remained there a year, the wave expels them, the homicides down Cocytus, those who have done violence to their fathers or mothers down Pyriphlegethon. And when they are swept along and reach the Acherusian lake, they cry aloud and invoke, some those they have slain, others those to whom they have done violence, entreating and imploring them to receive them and to suffer them to come out into the lake: and if they persuade them, they come forth and cease from their sufferings: but if not, they are swept back once more into Tartarus and thence into the rivers again, and have no respite from their ills until they win over those whom they have wronged: for this is the sentence imposed on them by their judges. But whosoever are judged to have lived lives of exceptional piety, these are those who are set free and delivered from those regions within the earth as though from a prison, and who journey upward to that pure abode and dwell upon the true earth. And of their number those who have been thoroughly cleansed by philosophy live thereafter entirely free from bodies, and travel to homes still more beautiful than these, such as

cannot easily be pictured, nor does time suffice for it now. But for the sake of all that we have described, Simmias, we should make every effort during our lives to partake of goodness and wisdom: for fair is the guerdon and great the hope.

'Now it would ill become a man of sense to insist that things are exactly as I have described them: but that this or something like it is true about our souls and their dwellings, since the soul is plainly immortal—this, in my opinion, it is right to say, and it is worthwhile to risk the belief that this is so—for it is a noble venture—and such are the magic words that one should murmur over himself: and that is why I have so prolonged my story. But for these reasons a man ought to be hopeful about his own soul, who during his life has paid no attention to the pleasures and adornments of the body, considering they were alien to him and did more harm than good, but has eagerly pursued the pleasures of learning, adorning his soul with no alien charms but with her own natural ornaments of self-discipline and righteousness and courage, freedom and truth, and so awaits his journey to the other world. Now you, Simmias and Cebes and the rest, will depart each of you some time hereafter: but for me, as the tragic poet would say, the hour of fate has struck, and it is about time for me to go to my bath: for I think it is better for me to bathe myself before drinking the poison, instead of giving the women the trouble of bathing my dead body.'

Phaedo/ When he had spoken thus, Crito said:

Crito/ 'Well, Socrates: have you any injunctions for your friends or for me about your children or anything else, as to what service of ours would be most welcome to you?'

Socrates/ 'Just what I always say, Crito, nothing new. If you take care of yourselves, then whatever you do will be

most welcome to me and mine and to yourselves also, even if you do not admit it now: but if you neglect yourselves and will not in your lives follow the tracks of our discussions past and present, then, however many and earnest the promises you make now, you will profit nothing.'

Crito/ 'We will make our best endeavors to do this, but how shall we bury you?'

Socrates/ 'Any way you like, if you can catch me, and I do not give you the slip.'

Phaedo/ And with a gentle laugh he looked at us and said:

Socrates/ 'I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that I am Socrates, I, the man who is now conversing and ordering each detail of the discussion: but he thinks I am the corpse which he will see shortly, and actually asks how he is to bury me. But though I have already stated at considerable length that when I have drunk the poison I shall no longer be with you but shall depart to enjoy the mysterious happiness of the blessed, it seems to me that I speak to him in vain in my attempt to comfort you and myself. You, then, must be my sureties to Crito, with the opposite pledge to that which he gave my judges. For he offered security that I would remain: but you must be sureties that, when I am dead, I shall not remain, but shall take my departure: then Crito will take it less to heart and when he sees my body being burned or buried he will not be grieved at the terrible things I am suffering, or say at the burial that it is Socrates he is laying out or carrying to the tomb or burying. For you may be assured, dear Crito, that to say what is wrong is not only faulty in itself but engenders mischief in the soul. But you must be of good cheer, and say that it is my body you are burying: and you may bury it in whatever way you please or think most fitting.'

Phaedo/ After saying this, he arose and went to another room to bathe, and Crito went with him but told us to stay. And so we stayed talking to one another about the discussion and reviewing it, and then again speaking of the magnitude of the misfortune that had befallen us, for we felt literally as if we had been deprived of a father and must henceforth live as orphans. And when he was bathed and his children had been brought to him—he had two small sons and one who was now older—and the women of his family had come, he spoke to them in Crito's presence and gave such instructions as he wished, and then dismissed the women and children, and returned to us.

It was now drawing near to sunset; for he had spent a long time within. And he came and sat down after his bath, and not much had been said after that, when the servant of the Eleven entered and stepped up to him and said:

Jailer/ 'I shall not complain of you, Socrates, as I do of others, who are angry and curse me when, at the bidding of the authorities, I order them to drink the poison. For throughout your stay here I have found you the gentlest and noblest and best of all men who have ever come here, and now too I am well aware that you are not vexed with me but with others who, you know, are to blame. And now, you know on what errand I am come: farewell, and try to bear as lightly as possible your inevitable fate.'

Phaedo/ And then bursting into tears he turned and went away.

Socrates looked up at him and said:

Socrates/ 'Fare you well too: we will do your bidding.'

Phaedo/ And then he turned to us and said:

Socrates/ 'How charming the man is! Throughout my stay here he has come to see me and talked to me at all times and been the kindest of men: and how generously he mourns for

me! But come, Crito, let us obey him: let someone fetch the poison, if it is prepared: if not, let the man prepare it.'

Crito/ 'I think that the sun is still upon the hilltops, Socrates, and has not yet sunk to rest. And I know that others take the draught quite late after the word has been given, and they have eaten and drunk quite freely and some of them have enjoyed the company of their loved ones. Do not hurry: there is yet time to spare.'

Socrates/ 'Those whom you mention, Crito, are justified in such actions: for they think they gain by them: but I am justified in refusing to follow them: for I think that I should profit nothing by postponing the draught but should merely appear ridiculous in my own eyes by clinging so greedily to life and sparing the cup when it is already empty. But come let me persuade you, and do not refuse.'

Phaedo/ Crito on hearing this nodded to his slave who was standing by: and the slave left the room and after a considerable interval returned with the man who was to administer the poison, which he carried already prepared in a cup. And Socrates on seeing the man said:

Socrates/ 'Well, my good fellow, you are an expert in these matters: what have I to do?'

Jailer/ 'Merely to drink it and walk about until your legs become heavy, and then lie down, and the poison will do the rest'

Phaedo/ And with this he handed the cup to Socrates.

And Socrates took it, and quite cheerfully, Echecrates, without a trace of fear or any change of color or expression, but with that customary mischievous upturned glance of his, looked at the man and said:

Socrates/ 'What do you say to my pouring a libation from this cup? May I or not?'

Jailer/ 'We only prepare, Socrates, what we consider the right amount.'

Socrates/ 'I understand, but I may and must pray to the gods that my journey from this world to the other may be happy. Such then is my prayer, and so be it.'

Phaedo/ And with these words he held his breath and drained the cup cheerfully and without the least repugnance. Now up to that moment most of us had been pretty well able to restrain our tears, but when we saw him drinking and the cup empty, we could do so no longer, but in spite of myself the tears came in floods, so that I covered my face and wept, for myself, not for him, but for my own fate in being deprived of such a friend. And Crito even before me had been unable to control his tears and had moved away: and Apollodorus who had never ceased weeping even before that now burst into loud laments and with his tears and grief broke down one and all of us except Socrates himself.

Socrates/ 'What are you doing, my strange friends? My chief reason for dismissing the women was that they might not introduce such a discordant note: for I have heard that a man should die in silence. Be quiet then, and have courage.'

Phaedo/ At these words we were ashamed and restrained our tears. And Socrates walked around, and when he said that his legs were heavy, he lay on his back—for so the attendant bade him. And the attendant who gave him the poison touched him and at intervals examined his feet and legs, and then pinched his foot hard and asked him if he felt it: and Socrates said no: and after this his legs and so upward, and showed us that he was becoming cold and numb. And the man himself touched him and said that, when it reached the heart, he would be gone. And now the

region about the groin was already growing cold, when Socrates uncovered his face, which had been covered, and said—they were his last words—

Socrates/ 'Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius: pay the debt and do not neglect it.'

Crito/ 'It shall be done. Is there anything else?'

Phaedo/ Socrates made no answer to this question, but after a little there was a slight movement, and the attendant uncovered him and his eyes were fixed. And when Crito saw it, he closed his mouth and his eyes.

Such, Echecrates, was the death of our friend, a man whom of all the men of his time that we know we would call the best and the wisest and the most righteous.

Second Alcibiades.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Alcibiades.

Socrates/ Are you going, Alcibiades, to pray to the god?

Alcibiades/ Just so, Socrates.

Socrates/ You appear to have a serious look, and to be directing your eyes to the ground, as if thinking upon something.

Alcibiades/ Of what should a person be thinking, Socrates?

Socrates/ Of things, Alcibiades, of the greatest moment, as it seems to myself at least. For come, by Zeus, do you not think, when we happen to pray, either in private or in public, that the gods themselves sometimes grant some of those prayers, and some not, and to some persons they nod assent, but to some not?

Alcibiades/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Does it not seem then to you that there is need of much forethought, in order that a person may not unconsciously pray for great evils for himself, while thinking he is praying for good; and that the gods may not happen to be in such a disposition, as to grant whatever he happens to be praying for? just as they say Œdipus did, in praying that his sons might divide their patrimony by the sword; and when he might have prayed for his then present evils to be averted, he uttered a curse that others might be superadded; and thereupon both these were brought to pass, and after these others too, many and terrible, of which what need is there to speak singly?

Alcibiades/ But, Socrates, you have spoken of a man who was mad; for who, think you, of sound mind would venture to make such a prayer?

Socrates/ Does it seem to you, that to be mad is at all the contrary to being in one's senses?

Alcibiades/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ Do not men seem to you to be senseless and sensible?

Alcibiades/ Yes, to be so.

Socrates/ Come then, let us consider who these are. For that there are men senseless and sensible you have admitted, and others who are mad.

Alcibiades/ It has been admitted.

Socrates/ Moreover, there are some men in a sound state of health?

Alcibiades/ There are.

Socrates/ And are there not others in a bad state of health?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ These are not the same with those?

Alcibiades/ They are not.

Socrates/ Are there not others, who are in neither of those states?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ For every man must of necessity be either in a diseased state or not.

Alcibiades/ It seems so to myself at least.

Socrates/ What then with respect to intellect and non-intellect, have you the same opinion?

Alcibiades/ How say you?

Socrates/ Does it seem to you to be necessary for a man to be sensible or senseless? Or is there some third and middle state, which causes a man to be neither sensible nor senseless?

Alcibiades/ There certainly is not.

Socrates/ It is necessary then for him to be in the one or in the other of those states.

Alcibiades/ So it seems to me at least.

Socrates/ Do you not remember that you admitted this, that insanity is contrary to being in one's senses?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And that there is no middle or third state, which causes a man to be neither sensible nor senseless?

Alcibiades/ I admitted this too.

Socrates/ But how can two different things be contrary to one thing?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ To be senseless then, and to be mad, seem to be nearly the same thing.

Alcibiades/ They seem so.

Socrates/ If then we should pronounce that all fools were madmen, we should pronounce rightly, Alcibiades. For example, if some of your equals in age, happen to be senseless, as indeed they are, and some of your elders likewise, come, by Jove, do you not think that in this city there are few sensible men, but the majority senseless, whom you call madmen?

Alcibiades/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Think you then, that, living under the same state with so many madmen, we should be delighted, or that we should not be buffeted, and pelted, and have long since suffered punishment for such acts as madmen are wont to

commit? But consider, thou blessed man, whether this be the case.

Alcibiades/ What then could it be, Socrates? For it appears nearly to be not what I just now fancied.

Socrates/ Neither does it appear so to myself. But let us look at the matter in some such way as this.

Alcibiades/ In what way do you mean?

Socrates/ I will tell you. We understand that some men are in bad health; do we not?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Does it seem to you necessary for every man in bad health to have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia? Or does it not seem to you that a man, without suffering at all in this way, may be ill in some other disorder? For diseases, we suppose, are of many various kinds, and not these alone.

Alcibiades/ I suppose there are.

Socrates/ Does not every ophthalmia seem to be a disease?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But is every disease ophthalmia?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not, it seems to me. Yet still I am at a loss about your meaning.

Socrates/ If, however, you will give me your attention, by considering the matter, both of us together will peradventure discover it.

Alcibiades/ I am giving you, Socrates, all attention, to the best of my power.

Socrates/ Was it not agreed upon by us, that every ophthalmia was a disease; but every disease was not an ophthalmia?

Alcibiades/ It was agreed so.

Socrates/ And it seems to me to have been correctly agreed. For all persons in a fever have a disease; but not all, however, who have a disease, are in a fever; neither have they all I think the gout, nor ophthalmia. Everything indeed of this kind is a disease; and they, whom we call physicians, say that diseases produce different effects. For all diseases are not alike, nor do they all act similarly, but each according to its own peculiar power; and yet they are all diseases, just as we understand there are in the case of workmen; do we not?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Such as shoemakers, carpenters, statuaries, and very many others, whom why need one mention in detail? All these have divided amongst them portions of handicraftship, and yet all are handicraftsmen. They are not, however, carpenters, nor shoemakers, nor statuaries, taken altogether.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Just so have men divided folly amongst them. And those, who have the largest share, we call madmen; but those, who have a less, silly, and thunder-struck. But if we choose to speak of such in good-omened language, some call them high-spirited, but others simpletons; and others again, harmless and inexperienced, and speechless. You will also find, upon inquiry, many other names. But they all mean non-intellect; although they differ, just as one art has been shown by us to differ from another; and one disease from another. Or how does it seem to you?

Alcibiades/ To me in this way.

Socrates/ To the point then from whence we digressed let us return back again. For it was proposed, I think, in the beginning of our conversation to consider who are the

senseless, and sensible. For it was agreed that some such existed. Was it not?

Alcibiades/ Yes, it was so agreed.

Socrates/ Whether then do you understand by the sensible, those who know how to do and say what they ought?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And whom do you understand by the senseless? Are they not such as know neither of those things?

Alcibiades/ Those very persons.

Socrates/ Will not those persons then, who know neither of those things, unconsciously say and do what they ought?

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Now of these very persons, Alcibiades, Œdipus, I said, was one. And you will find many of those living even now, who, though not influenced by anger, as he was, pray for things hurtful to themselves; not fancying them to be so, but good rather. He indeed, as he did not pray for good, so neither did he fancy he was doing so. But some others there are, who have suffered the very contrary to this. For I think that you, if the god to whom you happen to be going should appear to you, and, before you had uttered a prayer, first ask you—"Will it suffice for you to become a despotic king of Athens;" and, if you thought this a trifle, and no great thing, should add "and over all the Greeks;" and, if he should see that you fancied you would still have too little, unless he were to appoint you king of the whole of Europe; and should undertake not this alone, (but) that on this very day, according to your wish, all should perceive that Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, is their autocrat—I think you would walk away exceedingly delighted, as if you had met with the greatest good.

Alcibiades/ I fancy, Socrates, that anyone else whatever would do so likewise, if such things were to happen to him.

Socrates/ You would not, however, be willing that the country of, and absolute dominion over, all the Greeks and Barbarians should be yours in exchange for your life.

Alcibiades/ I suppose not; for why should I? when I was about to make no use of them.

Socrates/ What then, if you were about to make a bad and detrimental use of them, you would not be willing even in such a case?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ You see then that it is not safe to accept at random gifts when offered; nor for a person to pray that things may take place, if he is about to be injured through them, or be totally released from life. Many, too, we could mention, who after having longed for absolute power, and labored to obtain it, as if about to enjoy some mighty good, have, on account of their tyranny, been plotted against and lost their lives. I think, too, that some events, which happened as it were but yesterday, have come to your ears, how that a favorite of Archelaus, tyrant of Macedonia, murdered his admirer, through his being as fond of absolute power, as the tyrant was of him, and with the view of becoming the tyrant himself, and a happy man; but that, possessing the power for three or four days, he was in turn plotted against by some of his friends and destroyed. You see, too, of our own fellow-citizens—for this we have not heard from others, but know by being present ourselves—that such as have longed for, and obtained, the command of an army, some are even now exiles from the city, and others have ended their lives; and such, as seemed to have fared the best, have passed through many trying dangers and terrors during the campaign itself; and when they have

returned to their own country, have suffered from informers a siege not at all inferior to that, which they have endured from foreign foes; so that some of them prayed they had never been at the head of an army, rather than to have borne a command. Now, if the dangers and toils had tended to their benefit, it would have had some reason; but now it is quite the reverse. And with respect to children, you will find in the very same manner, how that some persons, after having prayed for them to be born, have, when they are born, come into the greatest calamities and sorrows. For some, whose children have been thoroughly wicked, have passed the whole of their lives in sorrow; and some, whose children were well-behaved, have met with the misfortune to be deprived of them, and have come into calamities in no respect less than the others, and, like them, have wished rather that their children had been never born. And yet, although these, and many other instances of the like kind, are so very evident to persons, it is rare to find a man who would refuse what is offered, or who, if he is about to obtain it by prayer, would cease to pray for it. Nor would the majority refrain from absolute power, if offered them, or the command of an army, or many other things, which, when present, do more harm than good; but they would, on the contrary, pray for their possession, should such things happen not to be present to anyone. And yet, after waiting a little time, they sometimes recant, and pray the reverse of what they prayed before. I have therefore my doubts, that men do in reality accuse the gods unjustly, in saying that their evils come from them; for either by their own crimes or follies, we should say;

They griefs endure beyond their fated share.

And that poet, Alcibiades, was near to being a sensible person, who, when connected with some friends void of understanding, and observing them to do and pray for things

which it were better for them not to have, but which appeared to them to be good, thought proper to use in common a prayer, which he expresses somehow to this effect—

> Oh, Zeus, our king, whate'er is good vouchsafe
> To us, if prayers we offer or do not;
> But evil, when we pray thee to avert,
> Do thou ordain.

To me indeed the poet appears to speak correctly and safely. But if you have aught in your mind against this sentiment, do not hold your tongue.

Alcibiades/ It is a difficult matter, Socrates, to speak against anything which is said correctly. But I am thinking on that point, of how many evils to man is ignorance the cause; since, as it seems, through it we are unconsciously doing to ourselves the greatest mischiefs, and, what is the worst, even praying for them; a fact which no one would fancy; but everyone would conceive this rather, that he is competent to pray for things the best for himself, and not the worst; for this would in reality be like a curse, and not a prayer.

Socrates/ But perhaps, O best of men, someone who happens to be wiser than you or I, would say, that we do not speak correctly in blaming thus at random ignorance, unless we add that of some things and to some persons and under certain circumstances, ignorance is a good, as it is to them an evil.

Alcibiades/ How say you? Is there anything whatever, of which it is better for any person whatever, under any circumstances whatever, to be ignorant than to know?

Socrates/ So it seems to me at least; and does it not to you?

Alcibiades/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ I will not bring a verdict against you on the point of your being willing to do to your own mother, what they say Orestes and Alcmæon did, or whoever else may have happened to act in the same manner as they did.

Alcibiades/ Speak, by Zeus, words of good omen, Socrates.

Socrates/ There is no need, Alcibiades, of your bidding that person to speak words of good omen, who says that you would not be willing to do such a deed, but much rather him, who says the contrary. But since the deed appears to you to be so dreadful, that it ought not to be mentioned so easily, do you think that Orestes, if he had been a sensible person, and known what it was best for him to do, would have dared to commit any such act?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ Nor would, I think, any other man.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ The ignorance therefore of what is best is an evil; and to be ignorant of the best.

Alcibiades/ So it appears, at least to me.

Socrates/ And to him, and to all other men.

Alcibiades/ So I say.

Socrates/ Let us consider further this too. If it occurred to you on this very instant to think it were a better thing for you to take a dagger, and, going to the house of Pericles, your guardian and your friend, to ask—Is he within—with the intention of killing only him, and no other person, and that the servants should say—He is within. —I do not assert that you have an inclination to do any of these things; but if, as I think, it shall seem good to you, what surely nothing prevents, that to him, who is ignorant of what is the best, an opinion has at some time occurred, so that what is even the

worst, has been thought at some time to be the best. Or does it not seem to you it would be?

Alcibiades/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ If then, upon going within, you should see himself there, but not knowing him, should think he was some other person, would you still venture to kill him?

Alcibiades/ No, by Zeus; I do not think I should.

Socrates/ For you would not kill any person, who happened to meet you, but only that very person, whom you wished to kill. Is it not so?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if you made frequent attempts, but were always ignorant of his being Pericles, whenever you were about to do the deed, you never would make an attack upon him.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ What then, do you think that Orestes would ever have made an attack upon his mother, if in like manner he had not known her?

Alcibiades/ I think he would not.

Socrates/ For he too had it not in his mind to kill any woman, who might meet him, nor the mother of any person whatever, but his own mother.

Alcibiades/ Such is the fact.

Socrates/ To persons then so situated, and having such fancies, it is better not to know such things.

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Do you then perceive, that of some things, and to some persons, and under some circumstances, ignorance is a good, and not, as it seemed to you just now, an evil?

Alcibiades/ It is probable.

Socrates/ Further still, if you are willing to consider what is after this, it would perhaps appear to you to be absurd—

Alcibiades/ What especially, Socrates?

Socrates/ That the possession of all other sciences, so to speak, is, unless a person possesses the science of what is best, very near to being seldom a benefit, but generally hurtful to the person possessing it. And consider in this way. Does it not seem to you necessary that, when we are about to do or say anything, we ought to know, or previously fancy we know, or know in reality, what we are about to say or do rather readily?

Alcibiades/ To me at least it seems so.

Socrates/ Do not then our public speakers, either knowing how to counsel, or fancying they know, give us their counsel on the instant on every occasion, some about war and peace, others, about the building of walls, or furnishing harbors; and, in one word, whatever one state does to another state, or itself by itself, all takes place from the advice of the orators.

Alcibiades/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ See then what is after this.

Alcibiades/ If I am able.

Socrates/ You surely call persons sensible and senseless.

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you not call the many senseless, but the few sensible?

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ And you call both so, with an eye to something.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Would you call that man sensible, who knows how to give advice, but without knowing whether a thing is better, and in what it is better?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor him, I think, who knows war abstractedly, but without knowing when it is better, or for how long a time it is better. Is it not so?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Nor if a person knows how to murder another, or to take away his property, or to cause him to be an exile from his country, without knowing when it is better, or to whom it is better to do so.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ The man, therefore, who possesses any knowledge of such a kind, unless the knowledge also of what is best follows at his side—now this is surely the same as the knowledge of what is beneficial—Is it not so?

Alcibiades/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ Shall we say that he is a sensible and a competent counsellor both for the state and himself; but that the man who does not do so, is the contrary of these? Or how seems it to you?

Alcibiades/ To me in this way.

Socrates/ What then, should a person who knows how to ride, or shoot with a bow, or wrestle, or box, or engage in any other kind of combat, or in anything else which we know by art, by what name will you call him, who knows what takes place the better according to each art? Will you not call him, who knows according to the equestrian art, an equestrian?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And him who knows according to the boxing art, a boxer? but him, according to the hautboy-playing art, a hautboy-player; and in the rest of cases surely analogously to these? Or how otherwise?

Alcibiades/ Not otherwise than in this way.

Socrates/ Does it then seem to you necessary that the person knowing any of these, is a sensible man? Or shall we say that he wants much of being so?

Alcibiades/ Much indeed, by Zeus.

Socrates/ What kind of a commonwealth do you think there would be, composed of good bow-men and hautboy players, and still more of athletes and other artists, and of those mixed with such as we have just now mentioned, who know how to war in the abstract, and to murder in the abstract; and, moreover, of orators puffed up with the statesman's swell, but all devoid of the knowledge of what is best, and of that, which knows when it is better to make use of each one of those things, and against whom?

Alcibiades/ A bad one, Socrates, I think.

Socrates/ And you would say, I think, when you saw each one of these men full of ambition, and giving the greatest share he has in the commonwealth to that point;

Where he may happen to be best himself.

I mean that which becomes best according to his own art, but of that which is the best for the state, and himself for himself having missed for the most part, as having I think trusted without intellect to opinion. Since then such is the case, should we not speak correctly in saying that such a commonwealth was full of great disorder and of lawlessness?

Alcibiades/ Right indeed, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Did it not seem to us to be necessary that we ought previously to fancy we know, or to know in reality, what we are about to say or do readily?

Alcibiades/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Should then a person do what he knows, or thinks he knows, and there follow that we have ourselves beneficially and profitably both to the state and himself to himself, is not—

Alcibiades/ How not?

Socrates/ But if he does I think the contrary of these, there will be a benefit neither to the public nor himself.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ What then does it seem to you now? In the like manner, or somehow otherwise?

Alcibiades/ Not otherwise than this.

Socrates/ Did you not say that you called the many senseless, but the few sensible?

Alcibiades/ I did.

Socrates/ And do we not say again that the many have missed of what is the best, by having generally, I think, trusted to opinion without intellect?

Alcibiades/ We say it.

Socrates/ It is for the interest then of the many neither to know anything, nor to fancy they know, if they shall be more ready to do what they know, or fancy they know, and by doing so are about to be still more injured than benefited.

Alcibiades/ You say what is most true.

Socrates/ Do you see then that when I said, that the possession of the other sciences is, unless a person possesses the science of what is best, very near to being seldom beneficial, and generally hurtful to the person possessing it, did I not appear to be speaking in reality correctly?

Alcibiades/ If not then, yet now it seems so, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is requisite then for a state, and a soul that is about to live correctly, to cling to this science; just as a person in sickness does to a physician, or a person about to sail in safety does to a steersman, by so much as the soul may not previously have a favorable wind, either respecting the possession of property or the strength of body, or

anything else of such a kind, by so much the greater errors is it necessary, it seems, to arise from them; and he who possesses what is called much learning and much art, but is destitute of this very science, and is carried along by each of the others, will he not in reality justly encounter a violent storm, inasmuch as he is, I think, continuing at sea without a steersman, a time not long life of gods; so that it seems to me that here too suits the sentiment of the poet, which he expresses, while he is bringing a charge against someone that

Trades many knew he; but knew badly all.

Alcibiades/ But how, Socrates, does the verse of this poet suit here? For to me it seems to say nothing to the purpose.

Socrates/ Nay, it is very much to the purpose. But this poet writes enigmatically, and so do nearly all the others. For the whole of poetry is naturally enigmatical; and it is not for a person who is to be met with anywhere, to understand it; and in addition to its being such naturally, when it seizes upon a man of a grudging disposition and unwilling to make himself known, but desirous to conceal, as much as possible, his wisdom, it seems to be difficult beyond measure to understand what each of those poets mean. For you cannot, surely, think that Homer, a poet most divine and clever, was ignorant how impossible it is for a person to know a thing badly; for he it is, who says that Margites knew many things, but knew all badly; but he speaks enigmatically, I suppose, by introducing the word “badly” instead of the word “bad,” and “he knew” instead of “to know.” There is then a sentence composed, unshackled by the meter, and it expresses what he meant, that “He knew many trades; but that to know all was to him an evil.” It is evident then, that if to know many things was to him an evil, he himself was some worthless fellow; at least if we must give any credit to the reasonings previously produced.

Alcibiades/ And so it seems, Socrates, to me; for I should hardly give credit to other reasonings, if not to these.

Socrates/ And correctly does it seem so.

Alcibiades/ Again it seems to me.

Socrates/ But come, by Zeus, for you surely see, how great and of what kind is the difficulty and doubt, in which you too appear to me to have a share; as you never rest at all in changing your place up and down; but what may have seemed especially to you, this to have gone secretly away again, and so seems no longer in a similar manner. Should the god then, to whom you happen to be going, appear to you even now, and ask you, before you had prayed for anything whatever, whether it would be sufficient for you, if any of those things, mentioned at the beginning, were to take place; or should he leave it to yourself to make a request, how, think you, could you avail yourself of the opportunity? either by accepting any of the things offered, or by praying yourself for something to happen?

Alcibiades/ Now, by the gods, Socrates, I should not know what to say in such a case. But it seems to me to be a violent thing, and in good truth one of caution, in order that a person may not unconsciously pray for things evil, while fancying them to be good; and then after waiting, as you said, a little time, recant, and pray the reverse to what he did at first.

Socrates/ Did not then the poet, whom I mentioned at the beginning of the argument, know somewhat more than we do, when he begged of Zeus to avert terrible things from us when praying?

Alcibiades/ So it seems to me.

Socrates/ The Lacedæmonians, therefore, Alcibiades, having admired this very poet, or having so considered themselves the matter, put up on every occasion in private

and in public a similar prayer, by requesting the gods to grant them ever things honorable in addition to what are good; and no one has ever heard them pray for anything more. Accordingly, up to the passing time, they have been fortunate less than none. And even if it has happened to them to be not fortunate in everything, it was not on account of this prayer of theirs; but it is for the gods, I presume, to grant what a person happens to pray for, and the reverse. And I am desirous of telling you something else, which I once heard from certain elderly persons, how that, when differences arose between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, it so happened to our city, that whenever there was a battle, by land or sea, it was unsuccessful, and never able to gain a victory. Thereupon the Athenians, brooking ill their doings, and at a loss for some contrivance to find an escape from their present evils, held a council; and it seemed to them that it would be best to send to Ammon, and inquire of him, and in addition, this too likewise, on what account do the gods always give the victory to the Lacedæmonians, rather than to us; who, of all the Greeks, bring them sacrifices the most numerous and the most beautiful; and have decorated their temples with offerings such as none else have done; and are wont to make to the gods processions the most costly and the most solemn, each year; and to expend money, such as all the rest of the Greeks never did together; whereas the Lacedæmonians have never paid the least regard to any of these things; but conduct themselves in so slighting a manner towards the gods, as to sacrifice on each occasion animals, maimed even; and in all other matters fall far short of us not a little in honoring the gods, although possessing property not less than our state. When the messenger had thus spoken, and had inquired of the oracle what they ought to do to find a deliverance from their present evils, the prophet made no other answer; —for

it is evident the god did not permit him—but calling the messengers, said, —To the Athenians thus saith Ammon. He saith, that he prefers the good-omened address of the Lacedæmonians before all the sacrifices of the rest of the Greeks. —These words he said, and nothing more. Now it seems to me, that by a good-omened address the god means only that prayer of theirs; for it is in reality much superior to the prayers of others. For the rest of the Greeks are wont, some of them, after placing by the altar oxen with gilded horns, and others presenting the gods with offerings to be hung up in temples, to pray for whatever they happen to desire, whether it be good or evil. The gods therefore, on hearing their impious addresses, accept not their costly processions and sacrifices; so that there is need of much caution and consideration as to what is to be spoken and not. And you will find in Homer likewise other expressions similar to these. For he says, that the Trojans, on taken up their night quarters;

> The perfect hecatombs to th' Immortals gave.

and that the winds carried the savor of the fat to heaven;

> Sweet-smelling; but the blessed gods refused
> To taste it; for by them was hated much
> The holy Ilion, and Priam too,
> And of the careful Priam subjects all:

so that it was of no use for them to sacrifice, or to expend presents in vain, when they were thus hated by the gods. For the divine nature, I conceive, is not such, as to be seduced by presents, like a knavish judge. But we are giving a silly reason, if we think to get the better of the Lacedæmonians in this way. For it would be a dreadful thing indeed, if the gods looked to gifts and sacrifices, and not the soul, should a person happen to be holy and just. Nay, they look much more, I think, to this, than to expensive processions and sacrifices; for which there is nothing to prevent those from

having the power to pay each year, either individuals or states, who have sinned greatly against the gods, and greatly too against men. But they, as not receiving bribes, disdain all such things as these, as says the god, and the prophet of the gods. It seems, then, that justice and prudence are near to being honored above all things by the gods, and by men too, that have any sense. Now the sensible and the just are none other than such as know what it is meet to do and say both towards gods and men. But I should be glad to hear from you, what are your thoughts upon this subject.

Alcibiades/ To myself, Socrates, the matter seems to be in no other way, than it does to you and the god. For it would not be reasonable for me to vote contrary to the god.

Socrates/ Do you not remember, then, saying that you were much at a loss, lest you should unconsciously be praying for evil things, fancying them to be good?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ You see then, that it is not safe for you to go to the god with the view of praying, in order that, should it so happen, he may not hear you speaking impiously, and receive no part of your sacrifice, and you perchance meet with something different. It seems to me, therefore, that it is best to keep quiet. For through your high spirit—for that is the fairest of names for folly—I think you would not be willing to make use of the Lacedæmonian prayer. It is necessary, therefore, for a man to wait, until he has learnt how he ought to conduct himself towards gods and men.

Alcibiades/ But when, Socrates, will that time be? and who is he that will instruct me? for I should be very glad, I think, to see who the man is.

Socrates/ It is he, of whose care you are the object. But it seems to me, as Homer says of Minerva, that she removed the mist from before the eyes of Diomede;

That he might clearly see both gods and men;

so must he in the first place remove from your soul the mist, that now happens to be present there, and then apply those things, through which you will be about to know both good and evil. For now you seem to be unable to do so.

Alcibiades/ Let him then remove the mist, or anything else that he pleases; as I am prepared not to fly from anything ordered by him, whoever he may be, if I am about to become a better man.

Socrates/ And yet he has a very wonderful eagerness in your behalf.

Alcibiades/ Till that time then it seems to me to be best to put off my sacrifice.

Socrates/ And rightly it seems so to you. For it is safer than to run so great a risk.

Alcibiades/ But how, Socrates? However, since you seem to me to have given good advice, I will put this garland round your brows; and to the gods we will then present crowns, and all the other customary offerings, when I behold that day arrive; and it will in no long time arrive, if they are willing.

Socrates/ Well, I accept both this, and I would see myself readily accepting anything else given by you. And as Creon, when he sees Tiresias wearing garlands, and hears that he had obtained them as the first-fruits of spoils taken from the enemy, is made by Euripides to say;

This crown, as a happy omen, have I worn;
For well you know how tempest-tost we lie—

so do I place on myself this opinion on your part as an omen of good. For I seem to myself to be in no less a storm than Creon; and I would gladly be a victor over your admirers.

Alcibiades II.

Translated by B. Jowett, 3rd ed.

Persons Of The Dialogue.

Socrates and Alcibiades.

Socrates/ Are you going, Alcibiades, to offer prayer to Zeus?

Alcibiades/ Yes, Socrates, I am.

Socrates/ You seem to be troubled and to cast your eyes on the ground, as though you were thinking about something.

Alcibiades/ Of what do you suppose that I am thinking?

Socrates/ Of the greatest of all things, as I believe. Tell me, do you not suppose that the Gods sometimes partly grant and partly reject the requests which we make in public and private, and favor some persons and not others?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do you not imagine, then, that a man ought to be very careful, lest perchance without knowing it he implore great evils for himself, deeming that he is asking for good, especially if the Gods are in the mood to grant whatever he may request? There is the story of Oedipus, for instance, who prayed that his children might divide their inheritance between them by the sword: he did not, as he might have done, beg that his present evils might be averted, but called down new ones. And was not his prayer accomplished, and did not many and terrible evils thence arise, upon which I need not dilate?

Alcibiades/ Yes, Socrates, but you are speaking of a madman: surely you do not think that anyone in his senses would venture to make such a prayer?

Socrates/ Madness, then, you consider to be the opposite of discretion?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ And some men seem to you to be discreet, and others the contrary?

Alcibiades/ They do.

Socrates/ Well, then, let us discuss who these are. We acknowledge that some are discreet, some foolish, and that some are mad?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And again, there are some who are in health?

Alcibiades/ There are.

Socrates/ While others are ailing?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And they are not the same?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor are there any who are in neither state?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ A man must either be sick or be well?

Alcibiades/ That is my opinion.

Socrates/ Very good: and do you think the same about discretion and want of discretion?

Alcibiades/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Do you believe that a man must be either in or out of his senses; or is there some third or intermediate condition, in which he is neither one nor the other?

Alcibiades/ Decidedly not.

Socrates/ He must be either sane or insane?

Alcibiades/ So I suppose.

Socrates/ Did you not acknowledge that madness was the opposite of discretion?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that there is no third or middle term between discretion and indiscretion?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And there cannot be two opposites to one thing?

Alcibiades/ There cannot.

Socrates/ Then madness and want of sense are the same?

Alcibiades/ That appears to be the case.

Socrates/ We shall be in the right, therefore, Alcibiades, if we say that all who are senseless are mad. For example, if among persons of your own age or older than yourself there are some who are senseless, —as there certainly are, —they are mad. For tell me, by heaven, do you not think that in the city the wise are few, while the foolish, whom you call mad, are many?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ But how could we live in safety with so many crazy people? Should we not long since have paid the penalty at their hands, and have been struck and beaten and endured every other form of ill-usage which madmen are wont to inflict? Consider, my dear friend: may it not be quite otherwise?

Alcibiades/ Why, Socrates, how is that possible? I must have been mistaken.

Socrates/ So it seems to me. But perhaps we may consider the matter thus: —

Alcibiades/ How?

Socrates/ I will tell you. We think that some are sick; do we not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And must every sick person either have the gout, or be in a fever, or suffer from ophthalmia? Or do you believe that a man may labor under some other disease, even although he has none of these complaints? Surely, they are not the only maladies which exist?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And is every kind of ophthalmia a disease?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And every disease ophthalmia?

Alcibiades/ Surely not. But I scarcely understand what I mean myself.

Socrates/ Perhaps, if you give me your best attention, 'two of us' looking together, we may find what we seek.

Alcibiades/ I am attending, Socrates, to the best of my power.

Socrates/ We are agreed, then, that every form of ophthalmia is a disease, but not every disease ophthalmia?

Alcibiades/ We are.

Socrates/ And so far we seem to be right. For everyone who suffers from a fever is sick; but the sick, I conceive, do not all have fever or gout or ophthalmia, although each of these is a disease, which, according to those whom we call physicians, may require a different treatment. They are not all alike, nor do they produce the same result, but each has its own effect, and yet they are all diseases. May we not take an illustration from the artisans?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ There are cobblers and carpenters and sculptors and others of all sorts and kinds, whom we need not stop to enumerate. All have their distinct employments

and all are workmen, although they are not all of them cobblers or carpenters or sculptors.

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And in like manner men differ in regard to want of sense. Those who are most out of their wits we call 'madmen' while we term those who are less far gone 'stupid' or 'idiotic' or, if we prefer gentler language, describe them as 'romantic' or 'simple-minded' or, again, as 'innocent' or 'inexperienced' or 'foolish.' You may even find other names, if you seek for them; but by all of them lack of sense is intended. They only differ as one art appeared to us to differ from another or one disease from another. Or what is your opinion?

Alcibiades/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ Then let us return to the point at which we digressed. We said at first that we should have to consider who were the wise and who the foolish. For we acknowledged that there are these two classes? Did we not?

Alcibiades/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And you regard those as sensible who know what ought to be done or said?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ The senseless are those who do not know this?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ The latter will say or do what they ought not without their own knowledge?

Alcibiades/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Oedipus, as I was saying, Alcibiades, was a person of this sort. And even now-a-days you will find many who [have offered inauspicious prayers], although, unlike him, they were not in anger nor thought that they were asking evil. He neither sought, nor supposed that he sought

for good, but others have had quite the contrary notion. I believe that if the God whom you are about to consult should appear to you, and, in anticipation of your request, enquired whether you would be contented to become tyrant of Athens, and if this seemed in your eyes a small and mean thing, should add to it the dominion of all Hellas; and seeing that even then you would not be satisfied unless you were ruler of the whole of Europe, should promise, not only that, but, if you so desired, should proclaim to all mankind in one and the same day that Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, was tyrant: — in such a case, I imagine, you would depart full of joy, as one who had obtained the greatest of goods.

Alcibiades/ And not only I, Socrates, but anyone else who should meet with such luck.

Socrates/ Yet you would not accept the dominion and lordship of all the Hellenes and all the barbarians in exchange for your life?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not: for then what use could I make of them?

Socrates/ And would you accept them if you were likely to use them to a bad and mischievous end?

Alcibiades/ I would not.

Socrates/ You see that it is not safe for a man either rashly to accept whatever is offered him, or himself to request a thing, if he is likely to suffer thereby or immediately to lose his life. And yet we could tell of many who, having long desired and diligently labored to obtain a tyranny, thinking that thus they would procure an advantage, have nevertheless fallen victims to designing enemies. You must have heard of what happened only the other day, how Archelaus of Macedonia was slain by his beloved, whose love for the tyranny was not less than that of Archelaus for him. The tyrannicide expected by his crime to

become tyrant and afterwards to have a happy life; but when he had held the tyranny three or four days, he was in his turn conspired against and slain. Or look at certain of our own citizens, —and of their actions we have been not hearers, but eyewitnesses, —who have desired to obtain military command: of those who have gained their object, some are even to this day exiles from the city, while others have lost their lives. And even they who seem to have fared best, have not only gone through many perils and terrors during their office, but after their return home they have been beset by informers worse than they once were by their foes, insomuch that several of them have wished that they had remained in a private station rather than have had the glories of command. If, indeed, such perils and terrors were of profit to the commonwealth, there would be reason in undergoing them; but the very contrary is the case. Again, you will find persons who have prayed for offspring, and when their prayers were heard, have fallen into the greatest pains and sufferings. For some have begotten children who were utterly bad, and have therefore passed all their days in misery, while the parents of good children have undergone the misfortune of losing them, and have been so little happier than the others that they would have preferred never to have had children rather than to have had them and lost them. And yet, although these and the like examples are manifest and known of all, it is rare to find anyone who has refused what has been offered him, or, if he were likely to gain aught by prayer, has refrained from making his petition. The mass of mankind would not decline to accept a tyranny, or the command of an army, or any of the numerous things which cause more harm than good: but rather, if they had them not, would have prayed to obtain them. And often in a short space of time they change their tone, and wish their old prayers unsaid. Wherefore also I

suspect that men are entirely wrong when they blame the gods as the authors of the ills which befall them: 'their own presumption' or folly (whichever is the right word)—

> 'Has brought these unmeasured woes upon them.'

He must have been a wise poet, Alcibiades, who, seeing as I believe, his friends foolishly praying for and doing things which would not really profit them, offered up a common prayer in behalf of them all: —

> 'King Zeus, grant us good whether prayed for or unsought by us;
> But that which we ask amiss, do thou avert.'

In my opinion, I say, the poet spoke both well and prudently; but if you have anything to say in answer to him, speak out.

Alcibiades/ It is difficult, Socrates, to oppose what has been well said. And I perceive how many are the ills of which ignorance is the cause, since, as would appear, through ignorance we not only do, but what is worse, pray for the greatest evils. No man would imagine that he would do so; he would rather suppose that he was quite capable of praying for what was best: to call down evil seems more like a curse than a prayer.

Socrates/ But perhaps, my good friend, someone who is wiser than either you or I will say that we have no right to blame ignorance thus rashly, unless we can add what ignorance we mean and of what, and also to whom and how it is respectively a good or an evil?

Alcibiades/ How do you mean? Can ignorance possibly be better than knowledge for any person in any conceivable case?

Socrates/ So I believe: —you do not think so?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And yet surely I may not suppose that you would ever wish to act towards your mother as they say that

Orestes and Alcmaeon and others have done towards their parent.

Alcibiades/ Good words, Socrates, prithee.

Socrates/ You ought not to bid him use auspicious words, who says that you would not be willing to commit so horrible a deed, but rather him who affirms the contrary, if the act appear to you unfit even to be mentioned. Or do you think of that Orestes, had he been in his senses and knew what was best for him to do, would ever have dared to venture on such a crime?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor would anyone else, I fancy?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ That ignorance is bad then, it would appear, which is of the best and does not know what is best?

Alcibiades/ So I think, at least.

Socrates/ And both to the person who is ignorant and everybody else?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us take another case. Suppose that you were suddenly to get into your head that it would be a good thing to kill Pericles, your kinsman and guardian, and were to seize a sword and, going to the doors of his house, were to enquire if he were at home, meaning to slay only him and no one else the servants reply, 'Yes': Mind, I do not mean that you would really do such a thing; but there is nothing, you think, to prevent a man who is ignorant of the best, having occasionally the whim that what is worst is best?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ —If, then, you went indoors, and seeing him, did not know him, but thought that he was someone else, would you venture to slay him?

Alcibiades/ Most decidedly not [it seems to me].

Socrates/ For you designed to kill, not the first who offered, but Pericles himself?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if you made many attempts, and each time failed to recognize Pericles, you would never attack him?

Alcibiades/ Never.

Socrates/ Well, but if Orestes in like manner had not known his mother, do you think that he would ever have laid hands upon her?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ He did not intend to slay the first woman he came across, nor anyone else's mother, but only his own?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Ignorance, then, is better for those who are in such a frame of mind, and have such ideas?

Alcibiades/ Obviously.

Socrates/ You acknowledge that for some persons in certain cases the ignorance of some things is a good and not an evil, as you formerly supposed?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And there is still another case which will also perhaps appear strange to you, if you will consider it?

Alcibiades/ What is that, Socrates?

Socrates/ It may be, in short, that the possession of all the sciences, if unaccompanied by the knowledge of the best, will more often than not injure the possessor. Consider the matter thus: —Must we not, when we intend either to do or say anything, suppose that we know or ought to know that which we propose so confidently to do or say?

Alcibiades/ Yes, in my opinion.

Socrates/ We may take the orators for an example, who from time to time advise us about war and peace, or the building of walls and the construction of harbors, whether they understand the business in hand, or only think that they do. Whatever the city, in a word, does to another city, or in the management of her own affairs, all happens by the counsel of the orators.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ But now see what follows, if I can [make it clear to you]. You would distinguish the wise from the foolish?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ The many are foolish, the few wise?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And you use both the terms, 'wise' and 'foolish' in reference to something?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Would you call a person wise who can give advice, but does not know whether or when it is better to carry out the advice?

Alcibiades/ Decidedly not.

Socrates/ Nor again, I suppose, a person who knows the art of war, but does not know whether it is better to go to war or for how long?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Nor, once more, a person who knows how to kill another or to take away his property or to drive him from his native land, but not when it is better to do so or for whom it is better?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But he who understands anything of the kind and has at the same time the knowledge of the best course

of action: —and the best and the useful are surely the same? —

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ —Such an one, I say, we should call wise and a useful adviser both of himself and of the city. What do you think?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ And if anyone knows how to ride or to shoot with the bow or to box or to wrestle, or to engage in any other sort of contest or to do anything whatever which is in the nature of an art, —what do you call him who knows what is best according to that art? Do you not speak of one who knows what is best in riding as a good rider?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in a similar way you speak of a good boxer or a good flute-player or a good performer in any other art?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ But is it necessary that the man who is clever in any of these arts should be wise also in general? Or is there a difference between the clever artist and the wise man?

Alcibiades/ All the difference in the world.

Socrates/ And what sort of a state do you think that would be which was composed of good archers and flute-players and athletes and masters in other arts, and besides them of those others about whom we spoke, who knew how to go to war and how to kill, as well as of orators puffed up with political pride, but in which not one of them all had this knowledge of the best, and there was no one who could tell when it was better to apply any of these arts or in regard to whom?

Alcibiades/ I should call such a state bad, Socrates.

Socrates/ You certainly would when you saw each of them rivalling the other and esteeming that of the greatest importance in the state;

'Wherein he himself most excelled.'

—I mean that which was best in any art, while he was entirely ignorant of what was best for himself and for the state, because, as I think, he trusts to opinion which is devoid of intelligence. In such a case should we not be right if we said that the state would be full of anarchy and lawlessness?

Alcibiades/ Decidedly.

Socrates/ But ought we not then, think you, either to fancy that we know or really to know, what we confidently propose to do or say?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if a person does that which he knows or supposes that he knows, and the result is beneficial, he will act advantageously both for himself and for the state?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ And if he do the contrary, both he and the state will suffer?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, and are you of the same mind, as before?

Alcibiades/ I am.

Socrates/ But were you not saying that you would call the many unwise and the few wise?

Alcibiades/ I was.

Socrates/ And have we not come back to our old assertion that the many fail to obtain the best because they trust to opinion which is devoid of intelligence?

Alcibiades/ That is the case.

Socrates/ It is good, then, for the many, if they particularly desire to do that which they know or suppose that they know, neither to know nor to suppose that they know, in cases where if they carry out their ideas in action they will be losers rather than gainers?

Alcibiades/ What you say is very true.

Socrates/ Do you not see that I was really speaking the truth when I affirmed that the possession of any other kind of knowledge was more likely to injure than to benefit the possessor, unless he had also the knowledge of the best?

Alcibiades/ I do now, if I did not before, Socrates.

Socrates/ The state or the soul, therefore, which wishes to have a right existence must hold firmly to this knowledge, just as the sick man clings to the physician, or the passenger depends for safety on the pilot. And if the soul does not set sail until she have obtained this she will be all the safer in the voyage through life. But when she rushes in pursuit of wealth or bodily strength or anything else, not having the knowledge of the best, so much the more is she likely to meet with misfortune. And he who has the love of learning, and is skillful in many arts, and does not possess the knowledge of the best, but is under some other guidance, will make, as he deserves, a sorry voyage: —he will, I believe, hurry through the brief space of human life, pilotless in mid-ocean, and the words will apply to him in which the poet blamed his enemy: —

> '……Full many a thing he knew;
> But knew them all badly.'

Alcibiades/ How in the world, Socrates, do the words of the poet apply to him? They seem to me to have no bearing on the point whatever.

Socrates/ Quite the contrary, my sweet friend: only the poet is talking in riddles after the fashion of his tribe. For all

poetry has by nature an enigmatical character, and it is by no means everybody who can interpret it. And if, moreover, the spirit of poetry happen to seize on a man who is of a begrudging temper and does not care to manifest his wisdom but keeps it to himself as far as he can, it does indeed require an almost superhuman wisdom to discover what the poet would be at. You surely do not suppose that Homer, the wisest and most divine of poets, was unaware of the impossibility of knowing a thing badly: for it was no less a person than he who said of Margites that 'he knew many things, but knew them all badly' The solution of the riddle is this, I imagine: —By 'badly' Homer meant 'bad' and 'knew' stands for 'to know.' Put the words together; —the meter will suffer, but the poet's meaning is clear; —'Margites knew all these things, but it was bad for him to know them.' And, obviously, if it was bad for him to know so many things, he must have been a good-for-nothing, unless the argument has played us false.

Alcibiades/ But I do not think that it has, Socrates: at least, if the argument is fallacious, it would be difficult for me to find another which I could trust.

Socrates/ And you are right in thinking so.

Alcibiades/ Well, that is my opinion.

Socrates/ But tell me, by Heaven: —you must see now the nature and greatness of the difficulty in which you, like others, have your part. For you change about in all directions; and never come to rest anywhere: what you once most strongly inclined to suppose, you put aside again and quite alter your mind. If the God to whose shrine you are going should appear at this moment, and ask before you made your prayer, 'Whether you would desire to have one of the things which we mentioned at first, or whether he should leave you to make your own request:'—what in either case,

think you, would be the best way to take advantage of the opportunity?

Alcibiades/ Indeed, Socrates, I could not answer you without consideration. It seems to me to be a wild thing to make such a request; a man must be very careful lest he pray for evil under the idea that he is asking for good, when shortly after he may have to recall his prayer, and, as you were saying, demand the opposite of what he at first requested.

Socrates/ And was not the poet whose words I originally quoted wiser than we are, when he bade us [pray God] to defend us from evil even though we asked for it?

Alcibiades/ I believe that you are right.

Socrates/ The Lacedaemonians, too, whether from admiration of the poet or because they have discovered the idea for themselves, are wont to offer the prayer alike in public and private, that the Gods will give unto them the beautiful as well as the good: —no one is likely to hear them make any further petition. And yet up to the present time they have not been less fortunate than other men; or if they have sometimes met with misfortune, the fault has not been due to their prayer. For surely, as I conceive, the Gods have power either to grant our requests, or to send us the contrary of what we ask.

And now I will relate to you a story which I have heard from certain of our elders. It chanced that when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were at war, our city lost every battle by land and sea and never gained a victory. The Athenians being annoyed and perplexed how to find a remedy for their troubles, decided to send and enquire at the shrine of Ammon. Their envoys were also to ask, 'Why the Gods always granted the victory to the Lacedaemonians?' 'We' (they were to say,) 'offer them more and finer sacrifices

than any other Hellenic state, and adorn their temples with gifts, as nobody else does; moreover, we make the most solemn and costly processions to them every year, and spend more money in their service than all the rest of the Hellenes put together. But the Lacedaemonians take no thought of such matters, and pay so little respect to the Gods that they have a habit of sacrificing blemished animals to them, and in various ways are less zealous than we are, although their wealth is quite equal to ours' When they had thus spoken, and had made their request to know what remedy they could find against the evils which troubled them, the prophet made no direct answer, —clearly because he was not allowed by the God to do so; —but he summoned them to him and said: 'Thus saith Ammon to the Athenians: "The silent worship of the Lacedaemonians pleased me better than all the offerings of the other Hellenes."' Such were the words of the God, and nothing more. He seems to have meant by 'silent worship' the prayer of the Lacedaemonians, which is indeed widely different from the usual requests of the Hellenes. For they either bring to the altar bulls with gilded horns or make offerings to the Gods, and beg at random for what they need, good or bad. When, therefore, the Gods hear them using words of ill omen they reject these costly processions and sacrifices of theirs. And we ought, I think, to be very careful and consider well what we should say and what leave unsaid. Homer, too, will furnish us with similar stories. For he tells us how the Trojans in making their encampment;

> 'Offered up whole hecatombs to the immortals,'

and how the 'sweet savor' was borne 'to the heavens by the winds';

> 'But the blessed Gods were averse and received it not.
> For exceedingly did they hate the holy Ilium,
> Both Priam and the people of the spear-skilled king.'

So that it was in vain for them to sacrifice and offer gifts, seeing that they were hateful to the Gods, who are not, like vile usurers, to be gained over by bribes. And it is foolish for us to boast that we are superior to the Lacedaemonians by reason of our much worship. The idea is inconceivable that the Gods have regard, not to the justice and purity of our souls, but to costly processions and sacrifices, which men may celebrate year after year, although they have committed innumerable crimes against the Gods or against their fellowmen or the state. For the Gods, as Ammon and his prophet declare, are no receivers of gifts, and they scorn such unworthy service. Wherefore also it would seem that wisdom and justice are especially honored both by the Gods and by men of sense; and they are the wisest and most just who know how to speak and act towards Gods and men. But I should like to hear what your opinion is about these matters.

Alcibiades/ I agree, Socrates, with you and with the God, whom, indeed, it would be unbecoming for me to oppose.

Socrates/ Do you not remember saying that you were in great perplexity, lest perchance you should ask for evil, supposing that you were asking for good?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ You see, then, that there is a risk in your approaching the God in prayer, lest haply he should refuse your sacrifice when he hears the blasphemy which you utter, and make you partake of other evils as well. The wisest plan, therefore, seems to me that you should keep silence; for your 'high-mindedness'—to use the mildest term which men apply to folly—will most likely prevent you from using the prayer of the Lacedaemonians. You had better wait until we find out how we should behave towards the Gods and towards men.

Alcibiades/ And how long must I wait, Socrates, and who will be my teacher? I should be very glad to see the man.

Socrates/ It is he who takes an especial interest in you. But first of all, I think, the darkness must be taken away in which your soul is now enveloped, just as Athene in Homer removes the mist from the eyes of Diomede that

> 'He may distinguish between God and mortal man.'

Afterwards the means may be given to you whereby you may distinguish between good and evil. At present, I fear, this is beyond your power.

Alcibiades/ Only let my instructor take away the impediment, whether it pleases him to call it mist or anything else! I care not who he is; but I am resolved to disobey none of his commands, if I am likely to be the better for them.

Socrates/ And surely he has a wondrous care for you.

Alcibiades/ It seems to be altogether advisable to put off the sacrifice until he is found.

Socrates/ You are right: that will be safer than running such a tremendous risk.

Alcibiades/ But how shall we manage, Socrates? —At any rate I will set this crown of mine upon your head, as you have given me such excellent advice, and to the Gods we will offer crowns and perform the other customary rites when I see that day approaching: nor will it be long hence, if they so will.

Socrates/ I accept your gift, and shall be ready and willing to receive whatever else you may proffer. Euripides makes Creon say in the play, when he beholds Teiresias with his crown and hears that he has gained it by his skill as the first-fruits of the spoil: —

> 'An auspicious omen I deem thy victor's wreath:

> For well thou knowest that wave and storm oppress us.'

And so I count your gift to be a token of good-fortune; for I am in no less stress than Creon, and would fain carry off the victory over your lovers.

Second Alcibiades

Translated by Anthony Kenny.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Alcibiades.

Socrates/ Alcibiades, are you on your way to say your prayers?

Alcibiades/ Yes, indeed, Socrates.

Socrates/ You have a depressed and downcast look; you seem preoccupied.

Alcibiades/ And what might preoccupy me, Socrates?

Socrates/ The most serious of all questions, in my view. Tell me, in God's name, what you think. In public and private prayer we make requests to the gods: don't they sometimes grant some of them and not all of them, and don't they say yes to some people and no to others?

Alcibiades/ Indeed they do.

Socrates/ So don't you agree that there is a great need for caution, for fear you might, all unawares, be praying for great evils when you think you are asking for great goods? Suppose the gods were in a mood to give whatever was asked; it might be just like the case of Oedipus who blurted out the prayer that his sons might take arms to settle their inheritance. He could have prayed for relief from the ills which beset him without begging for others in addition! But in fact, what he asked for came to pass, with many terrible consequences which there is no need to enumerate.

Alcibiades/ But you're talking about a madman, Socrates: do you think any person of sound mind would have dared to make such a prayer?

Socrates/ Do you take madness to be the opposite of wisdom?

Alcibiades/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Do you think there are some people who are wise and some who are stupid?

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Well, then, let's see which are which. We have agreed that there are some people who are stupid, some who are wise, and others who are mad.

Alcibiades/ Agreed.

Socrates/ Are there some people who are healthy?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And others who are sick?

Alcibiades/ Indeed.

Socrates/ Not the same people?

Alcibiades/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Are there any other people who are neither one thing nor the other?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Because a person has to be either sick or not sick?

Alcibiades/ That's what I think.

Socrates/ Well now, do you have the same view about wisdom and stupidity?

Alcibiades/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Do you think it is only possible either to be wise or stupid, or is there also a third state in between in which a person is neither wise nor stupid?

Alcibiades/ No, there isn't.

Socrates/ So you have to be one or the other?

Alcibiades/ So I believe.

Socrates/ Now do you remember that you agreed that madness is the opposite of wisdom?

Alcibiades/ Yes, I did.

Socrates/ And that there is no third state in which a person is neither wise nor stupid?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And can one thing have two distinct opposites?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ So it looks as if stupidity and madness are one and the same thing.

Alcibiades/ It does.

Socrates/ So would it be correct to say that all stupid people are mad—not just any of your contemporaries who are stupid, as some of them certainly are, but even older people? Tell me, in God's name, don't you think that in our city the wise are in a minority, and most people are stupid, or, as you would say, mad?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ But do you think we could live comfortably in a city of so many madmen? Would we not have met our fate long ago, and been punched and beaten and subjected to every madman's trick? Things aren't quite like that, are they?

Alcibiades/ No, not at all; it looks as if I've not got the matter quite right.

Socrates/ I don't think so either. Try looking at it another way.

Alcibiades/ What way do you mean?

Socrates/ I'll tell you. We take it that some people are sick, don't we?

Alcibiades/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Do you think that anyone who is sick must necessarily have gout, or fever, or eye ache? Or can a person be sick in some other way without having any of these? Surely there are many other diseases besides these?

Alcibiades/ Surely.

Socrates/ Eye ache is always a sickness, don't you think?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ But is sickness always eye ache?

Alcibiades/ No; but I'm not sure what to say.

Socrates/ But if you pay attention to me, we may find out; for two heads are better than one.

Alcibiades/ I am paying attention, Socrates, as well as I can.

Socrates/ Well, we have agreed that while eye ache is always a sickness, not every sickness is eye ache, have we not?

Alcibiades/ Yes, we have.

Socrates/ And rightly. Anyone with a fever is sick, but not everyone who is sick has a fever—nor gout, I take it, nor eye ache. Each of these is a disease, but they present quite different symptoms, to use the doctors' term. They are not all alike, and they do not have like effects; each of them works according to its own nature, but they are all none the less diseases. Similarly, we classify some people as workmen, don't we?

Alcibiades/ Of course.

Socrates/ There are shoemakers, and carpenters, and sculptors, and very many others whom we needn't enumerate. They all have their own share of work, and they are all workmen; but they are not all carpenters or shoemakers or sculptors even though they are all workmen.

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Well now, in the same way people have shared out stupidity among themselves; those who have the largest share we call madmen, those with a smaller share we call fools or asses. People who prefer euphemisms call them big-hearted or simple, or perhaps innocent, naive, or dumb: you will come across many other names if you look for them. But all these things are stupidity, and differ from each other in the way one kind of work and one kind of disease differs from another. Isn't that right?

Alcibiades/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Let's go back, then. At the beginning of our discussion we set out to discover which people were wise and which were stupid, because we had agreed that some were one and some were the other.

Alcibiades/ We had indeed.

Socrates/ Is it your view that the wise are those who know what should be done and said?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And who are the stupid? Those who know neither of these things?

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ And those who know neither of these things will say and do what they ought not, without knowing that this is what they are saying and doing?

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And just such a person was Oedipus. And in our own time you will find many such people—not in a rage as he was—who pray for things that are bad for them in the belief that they are good for them. He did not think so, or pray so; but there are others who are in a very different case. Suppose that the god to whom you are about to pray were to appear to you and ask you, before you began praying, whether you

would be happy to be sole ruler of the city of Athens—or, if that seemed mean and tiny, were to offer you all the Greeks as well—or, if he saw that you regarded that too as insignificant unless the whole of Europe were included, were to promise you all of that plus simultaneous acknowledgment by the whole human race of the rule of Alcibiades son of Clinias. If that happened, I imagine, you would go home very happy and think you had come into possession of the greatest of goods.

Alcibiades/ So would anyone else, I imagine, Socrates, if he were given the same promise.

Socrates/ But you would not give your own life in exchange for the territory and sole rule of all the Greeks and all the barbarians?

Alcibiades/ I should think not, since they would be no use to me.

Socrates/ But suppose you were going to use them, but were going to make a bad and harmful use of them? Would you want them then?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ So you see, it is not safe to accept without thinking what one is given, nor to pray for something which is going to injure one or take away one's life altogether. We could name many people who set their hearts on obtaining sole ruler ship, and strove to achieve this goal as a great good, and then had their lives taken by plotters against their rule. I think you are not unaware of the events of the last few days: Archelaus of Macedon was in love with a man whose love for Archelaus' kingship was greater than Archelaus' love for him, and who killed his lover in order to make himself a king and a happy man. He had only ruled for three or four days when he in his turn fell victim to a plot and was killed himself.

Among our own citizens too—as we know not just by hearsay, but as eye-witnesses—we see some who have longed to command armies, and having got what they wanted are now exiled from the city or have lost their lives altogether. And even those who seem to have done best have lived amidst dangers and fears; not only during their campaigns, but when they have returned home where they have been besieged by informers as tightly as they were by the enemy, so that some of them wished to heaven that they had stayed privates rather than generals. Of course, it would make some sense if these dangers and burdens brought any benefit; but in fact it's quite the contrary.

You will find the same in the matter of children: some people pray to have them, and when they have them they bring them utter disaster and grief. Some people's children are so thoroughly bad that they make their whole life a misery; other people have good children and lose them in some calamity and end up no less miserable than the others, wishing they had never had children at all.

However, in spite of all these and similar dire examples, you rarely find anyone who declines a gift or who refrains from praying for what he hopes to be granted. Most people, if given the chance to become a ruler or a general, or any of the other things which bring more harm than good, will not hesitate to take the opportunity; and they will even pray for such things before they are on offer. After a while, however, they change their tune and pray away their former prayers.

I wonder, then, if humans are not wrong in "placing the blame" for their ills on the gods, when "they themselves by their own presumption"—or stupidity, should we say? —"have brought sorrows on themselves beyond their destined lot." There was a poet who composed a prayer for all his friends to say in common, more or less like this:

King Zeus, whether we pray or not, give us what is good for us What is bad for us, give us not, however hard we pray for it.

He certainly seems to have been a wise man: I expect he had stupid friends whom he had seen working and praying for things that it was better for them not to have, no matter what they thought. That is what he recommended, and in my view he spoke well and soundly; but if you have anything against what he said, speak up.

Alcibiades/ It is hard, Socrates, to speak against what has been well spoken. One thing I do observe is that the cause of very many human evils is ignorance: it is ignorance which deceives us into doing and—what is worse—praying for the greatest evils. No one, however, thinks thus about himself; each of us thinks himself quite capable of praying not for the worst but for the best. For such a prayer would really seem to be more like a curse than a prayer!

Socrates/ Well said! But perhaps someone even wiser than you and I might say that we were wrong to blame ignorance in such general terms; we should specify what it is ignorance of. Indeed, just as ignorance is an evil to some people, there are other people, in certain states, to whom it is a good.

Alcibiades/ How do you mean? Can there be anything of which it is better for people to have ignorance than knowledge, no matter what state they are in?

Socrates/ I think there can; don't you?

Alcibiades/ No, I don't; not on your life.

Socrates/ But surely I am not to judge that you would ever want to commit against your mother crimes like those of Orestes and Alcmaeon and anyone else like them?

Alcibiades/ Spare me, for God's sake, Socrates!

Socrates/ It isn't the person who says that you would not ever want to behave like that whom you should ask to spare

you, but rather anyone who contradicted him; for the act seems to you so horrendous that you do not like to hear it spoken of even by way of example. But do you think that Orestes, if he had been of sound mind and known what was best for him to do, would have dared to commit any such crime?

Alcibiades/ No, I don't.

Socrates/ Nor, I think, would anyone else.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ It seems then that it is ignorance of the best, failing to know what is best, that is a bad thing.

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And not only for the person himself, but also for everyone else?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Let's consider a further point. Suppose the thought sprang into your mind that it would be an excellent thing to kill your friend and mentor Pericles, and you took a dagger and went to his door and asked if he were at home, with the intention of killing him and him alone, and they said he was at home. I don't mean to say that you would wish to do any such thing; but just suppose that you were to think that the worst thing was the best thing—that's a thought that might at any time occur to someone who is ignorant of what is really best—or don't you think so?

Alcibiades/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Well then, if you went inside and saw Pericles, but did not recognize him and thought he was someone else, would you still go on to kill him?

Alcibiades/ I should think not, in God's name.

Socrates/ For your intention surely was to kill not just anyone you came across, but only that particular person. Isn't that right?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if, having tried several times, you always failed, when it came to the point, to recognize Pericles, you would never lay a hand on him.

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well then, do you think that Orestes would ever have laid a hand on his mother if he had failed to recognize her?

Alcibiades/ I don't think so.

Socrates/ For presumably he too had no intention of killing the first woman he came across, or killing just anyone's mother, but only his own.

Alcibiades/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then for those in that state, with such intentions, these are things which it is better not to know.

Alcibiades/ Very likely.

Socrates/ So you see that there are some things which, for certain people in certain states, it is better not to know than to know.

Alcibiades/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Now if you care to look at what follows from this, you may find that you're in for a surprise.

Alcibiades/ What surprise, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean that, in general, it seems that if someone lacks knowledge of what is best, the possession of other skills will only rarely help, but in most cases will harm, their possessor. Consider it this way. When we are about to say or do something, mustn't we first of all know, or at least believe we know, what we are so keen to say and do?

Alcibiades/ I believe so.

Socrates/ Orators, for instance, are bound to know, or at least to think they know, how to give us advice on various topics—whether it is about war and peace, or about the construction of walls or the equipment of harbors. Altogether, whatever a state does in foreign or domestic matters is done on the advice of the orators.

Alcibiades/ As you say.

Socrates/ See then what follows.

Alcibiades/ If I can.

Socrates/ You call some people wise and others stupid?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And you call most people stupid, and a few wise?

Alcibiades/ Exactly.

Socrates/ In each case you make use of a criterion?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, do you call a man wise who knows how to give advice, but not what advice is best to give or when it is best to give it?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor, I imagine, a man who knows how to make war, without knowing when or for how long war should best be made? Isn't that right?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor again a man who knows how to kill or steal or banish people without knowing when it is better to do this, or to whom?

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ So what we want is the person who knows one or other of these things but also has the knowledge of what is best—which no doubt is the same as knowledge of utility.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And this is the person whom we shall call wise, a reliable counselor for himself and for the state. But someone who is not like this we shall call the opposite. What do you think?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Now suppose we have a person who knows how to ride or shoot, or box, or wrestle, or compete in any other sport or exhibit any other skill. What do you call the person who knows how best to exercise a particular skill? If it is the skill of riding, I expect you will call him a good rider.

Alcibiades/ I will.

Socrates/ And if it is boxing, you will call him a good boxer, and if it is flute-playing you will call him a good flute-player, and so in other cases. Or do you disagree?

Alcibiades/ No, not at all.

Socrates/ Now do you think that knowing about these things suffices to make a person wise, or is more needed?

Alcibiades/ Much more, upon my life.

Socrates/ Suppose there were a state in which there were good archers and flute-players, good athletes and craftsmen, and among them the kind of people we have been talking about, who know only how to make war and only how to kill, and also fine orators who know how to sound off about politics, but none of them had the knowledge of what is best, and none of them knew when or on whom it was better for them to exercise their skills—what sort of state do you think that would be?

Alcibiades/ A miserable one, Socrates.

Socrates/ I'm sure you would if you saw them all competing with each other for honors, "each one assigning precedence in political matters to his own sphere of excellence"—I mean,

what is best according to the scope of his own skill—while he may be much mistaken about what is best for the state and for himself, since he has not used his intelligence but put his trust in mere seeming. If that's the situation, wouldn't we be right to describe such a state as a hotbed of dissension and lawlessness?

Alcibiades/ Indeed we would.

Socrates/ Did we not think that if you are on the point of saying or doing something, you must first know, or at least think you know what you are doing or saying?

Alcibiades/ We did.

Socrates/ So if someone does what he knows, or thinks he knows, and has in addition knowledge of utility, we will judge him a boon both to the state and to himself?

Alcibiades/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ But if he does the contrary, he will be no good to the state or to himself?

Alcibiades/ No good.

Socrates/ Well, then: are you still of the same mind, or have you changed it?

Alcibiades/ Still the same.

Socrates/ You said that you called most people stupid, and only a few wise?

Alcibiades/ I did.

Socrates/ So, to repeat, most people have been mistaken about what is best because they have not used their intelligence but put their trust in mere seeming.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ For most people, then, it is an advantage neither to know nor to think they know anything, if they are going to do themselves more harm than good by rushing to do what they know or think they know.

Alcibiades/ Very true.

Socrates/ So you see it seems that I was quite right when I said that it looked as if other skills, if not combined with the knowledge of what is best, are more often than not harmful to their possessors.

Alcibiades/ I may not have thought so then, but I do now, Socrates.

Socrates/ So if the life of a soul or a state is to go aright, this knowledge of what is best must be embraced with exactly the kind of trust a patient has in his doctor or a seafarer in his good ship's captain. For without this, the stronger the winds of fortune blow towards the acquisition of wealth or health and strength or anything else of that kind, the greater the errors to which these things will necessarily lead. Someone may have acquired so many skills as to deserve the name of polymath, but if he lets himself be led by one or other of these skills and lacks this true knowledge he will, as he indeed deserves, run into very rough weather, "alone on the high seas with no helmsman and with not long to live." There is a verse which fits his case, where the poet complains of someone that "he knew a lot of things but knew them all wrong."

Alcibiades/ Whatever has that verse got to do with the matter, Socrates? It does not seem at all to the point.

Socrates/ It is very much to the point; but you are right that he speaks enigmatically, just like a poet. All poetry, by its nature, is enigmatic, and not everyone can take it in; but when, in addition, it is housed in a poet who is miserly and wishes so far as possible to conceal rather than exhibit his wisdom, it may be quite remarkably difficult to find out what each of them might mean. For you don't think that Homer, the divinest and wisest of poets—for it is he who says that Margites knew a lot of things but knew them all wrong—didn't

know that it was impossible to know a thing wrong. He is riddling, I think; he meant “wrong” as an adjective, not as an adverb; and he meant “to know” rather than “knew.” So, if we forget about the original meter we can put together his meaning as this: he knew a lot of things, but it was wrong for him to know them all. Clearly, if it was wrong for him to know a lot of things, he must have been a bad man, if we are to trust our previous arguments.

Alcibiades/ I agree Socrates; if we cannot trust these arguments I really don’t know which ones we can trust.

Socrates/ You are right to think so.

Alcibiades/ But perhaps I should think again.

Socrates/ Oh, for God’s sake! You see what a terrible great muddle we are in, and it is partly your fault; for you change incessantly from side to side. No sooner are you convinced of something than you give it up again and change your mind. Well, if the god to whom you are on your way should appear to you at this very moment, before you start praying, and ask whether you would be happy to get one of the things we spoke of earlier, or whether he should leave the choice of prayer to you, which do you think offers the best prospect: accepting his offers or making your own prayer?

Alcibiades/ By the gods, Socrates, I would have to take time to answer your question; an impromptu response would be folly. You really have to take a great deal of care to make sure that you are not, all unawares, praying for evil in the belief that it is good, and that after a little while you won’t, as you said a moment ago, change your tune and call back all your prayers.

Socrates/ That poet I mentioned at the beginning of our discussion, who told us to pray to be saved from the evils we pray for—he was wiser than us, wasn’t he?

Alcibiades/ I guess so.

Socrates/ Whether in admiration of this poet, or because they have worked it out for themselves, the Spartans take the same course in their public and private prayers. They pray the gods to give them first what is good and then what is noble; no one ever hears them asking anything more. They have not, so far, been any less fortunate in consequence than any other people; and even if they have not invariably enjoyed good fortune it has not been because of their prayers. Whether we are given what we pray for or the reverse is in the lap of the gods.

I would like to tell you another story which I once heard from some of my elders. There was a quarrel between the Athenians and the Spartans, and whenever there was a battle, whether by land or sea, our city always came off worse and could never win a victory. The Athenians took this hard, and cast about to discover how they could find relief from their troubles. After discussion they decided to send a delegation to consult Ammon, to ask in particular why the gods granted victory to the Spartans rather than themselves. "We" they said "offer more and finer sacrifices than the rest of the Greeks, and we surpass all others in adorning the temples with emblems, and every year we organize for the gods' benefit the most solemn and sumptuous processions, spending more money than all the other Greeks put together. But the Spartans have never taken any such pains, and they are so mean to the gods that they regularly sacrifice blemished animals and fall well behind us in the quality of their worship, in spite of being no less wealthy than ourselves." Having said that, they also asked what they should do to be relieved from the evils that beset them. The prophet, no doubt under divine instruction, called them to him and said simply this. "Thus saith Ammon to the Athenians: I prefer the terse Laconic utterance to all the sacrifices of the Greeks." That was all he said; not a word more. By their "terse utterance" I expect the

god meant their prayer, for it is indeed very different from other prayers. Other Greeks offer bulls with gilded horns, and others present the gods with votive emblems, and pray for whatever comes into their heads, good or bad. But when the gods hear their profanities they scorn these magnificent processions and sacrifices. We should, I believe, be very careful and cautious when we consider what should be said and what should not.

In Homer you will find other similar stories. He tells how the Trojans, when they pitched camp, "sacrificed to the immortals perfect hecatombs" and how;

> The winds carried the delicious smell from the plain up to heaven.
>
> But the blessed gods took none of it, and had no pleasure in it;
>
> So deep was their hatred of holy Ilium, and Priam,
>
> And the people of Priam of the ashen spear.

So it was no help to them to sacrifice and offer vain gifts, when they were out of favor with the gods. For I don't imagine that it is like the gods to be swayed by gifts, like some low moneylender; we make ourselves sound very silly when we boast that we do better than the Spartans on this score.

It would be a strange and sorry thing if the gods took more account of our gifts and sacrifices than of our souls and whether there is holiness and justice to be found in them. Yes, that is what they care about, I believe, far more than about these extravagant processions and sacrifices offered year by year by states and individuals who may, for all we know, have sinned greatly against gods and men. The gods are not venal, and scorn all these things, as Ammon and his prophet told us. Gods and men of sound mind are more likely to hold justice and wisdom in especial honor; and none are wise and just but those who know how to behave and speak to gods and men.

But now I would like to hear what your opinion may be about all this.

Alcibiades/ No different from yours and the god's, Socrates; it would hardly be fitting for me to take sides against the god.

Socrates/ But you remember that you said you were very worried that without knowing it you might pray for evil, thinking it to be good?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ You see, then, how dangerous it is for you to go to pray to the god, in case he hears you speaking amiss, rejects your sacrifice altogether, and perhaps adds some further penalty. I think you would do best to hold your peace; for I expect you are rather too big-hearted (to use the favorite euphemism for stupidity) to be willing to use the Laconian prayer. It takes time to learn how to behave towards gods and men.

Alcibiades/ How long will it take, Socrates, and who will teach me? I would very much like to see the man who could do it.

Socrates/ It is the man who has his eye on you. But you remember how Homer says that Athena took away the fog from the eyes of Diomedes, "so that he could clearly see both god and man." You too need to get rid of the fog which is wrapped around your soul, so as to prepare you to receive the means of telling good from evil. At present I don't think you could do so.

Alcibiades/ Let him remove the fog, or whatever else it is; I am prepared to do whatever he tells me, whoever he may be, so long as it will make me better.

Socrates/ He too is more than anxious to help.

Alcibiades/ Then I think it is better to put off the sacrifice for the time being.

Socrates/ You're quite right; it is much safer than running such a big risk.

Alcibiades/ Here's an idea, Socrates; I'll put this garland on your head, for giving me such good advice. Only when there comes the day of which you have spoken will we give the gods their garlands and their customary dues. God willing, that day will not be too far off.

Socrates/ I am glad to accept, and I look forward to seeing myself receiving other gifts from you. In Euripides' play, when Creon sees Tiresias crowned with garlands and learns that he has been given them by the enemy as trophies to reward his skill, he says

> Good as an omen are your victor's wreaths
> For we, you know, are battered by the waves.

Just so, I regard the honor you have paid me as a good omen. For I am just as tempest-tossed as Creon, and I look forward to victory over your lovers.

Alcibiades II

Translated by Lamb.

[or ON PRAYER: "OBSTETRIC"]

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Alcibiades

Socrates/ Alcibiades, are you on your way to offer a prayer to the god?

Alcibiades/ I am, certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ You seem, let me say, to have a gloomy look, and to keep your eyes on the ground, as though you were pondering something.

Alcibiades/ And what might one ponder, Socrates?

Socrates/ The greatest of questions, Alcibiades, as I believe. For tell me, in Heaven's name, do you not think that the gods sometimes grant in part, but in part refuse, what we ask of them in our private and public prayers, and gratify some people, but not others?

Alcibiades/ I do, certainly.

Socrates/ Then you would agree that one should take great precautions against falling unawares into the error of praying for great evils in the belief that they are good, while the gods happen to be disposed to grant freely what one is praying for? Just as Oedipus, they say, suddenly prayed that his sons might divide their patrimony with the sword: it was open to him to pray that his present evils might by some means be averted, but he invoked others in addition to those which he had already. Wherefore not only were those words of his accomplished, but many other dread results therefrom, which I think there is no need to recount in detail.

Alcibiades/ But you have instanced a madman, Socrates: why, do you suppose that anyone could bring himself, while he was in a sound state, to utter such a prayer?

Socrates/ Do you regard madness as the opposite of wisdom?

Alcibiades/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ And there are some men whom you regard as unwise, and others as wise?

Alcibiades/ Why, yes.

Socrates/ Come then, let us consider who these people are. We have admitted that some are unwise, some wise, and others mad.

Alcibiades/ Yes, we have.

Socrates/ And again, there are some in sound health?

Alcibiades/ There are.

Socrates/ And others also who are in ill-health?

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And they are not the same?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And are there any others besides, who are found to be in neither state?

Alcibiades/ No, to be sure.

Socrates/ For a human being must needs be either sick or not sick.

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well then, do you hold the same view about wisdom and unwisdom?

Alcibiades/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Tell me, do you think it is only possible to be either wise or unwise, or is there some third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise?

Alcibiades/ No, there is not.

Socrates/ So he must needs be in one or the other of these two conditions.

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ And you remember that you admitted that madness is the opposite of wisdom?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And further, that there is no third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise?

Alcibiades/ Yes, I admitted that.

Socrates/ Well now, can there possibly be two opposites of one thing?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then it looks as though unwisdom and madness were the same.

Alcibiades/ Yes, apparently.

Socrates/ So we shall be right, Alcibiades, in saying that all unwise persons are mad; for example, such of your contemporaries as happen to be unwise—some such there are—and of your elders, even: for tell me, in Heaven's name, do you not think that in our city the wise people are but few, whereas the majority are unwise, and these you call mad?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Well, do you suppose we could safely live with so many madmen as our fellow-citizens, and should not long ago have paid the penalty for it in knocks and blows at their hands, and all the usual proceedings of madmen? Consider now, my wonderful friend, whether the case is not quite different?

Alcibiades/ Well, it must be, Socrates. For it looks as though it were not as I thought.

Socrates/ And I think so too. But there is another way of regarding it.

Alcibiades/ I wonder what way you mean.

Socrates/ Well, I will tell you. We conceive there are some who are sick, do we not?

Alcibiades/ We do, to be sure.

Socrates/ And do you believe that a sick man must necessarily have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia? Do you not think that, although he may be afflicted in none of these ways, he may be suffering from some other disease? For surely there are many of them: these are not the only ones.

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ And is every ophthalmia, in your opinion, a disease?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is every disease also ophthalmia?

Alcibiades/ No, I should think not: still, I am in doubt as to my meaning.

Socrates/ Well, if you will attend to me, "two together" will be searching, and so mayhap we shall find what we seek.

Alcibiades/ Nay, but I am attending, Socrates, to the best of my power.

Socrates/ Then we have admitted that while every ophthalmia is a disease, every disease, on the other hand, is not ophthalmia?

Alcibiades/ We have.

Socrates/ And our admission seems to me quite right. For everyone in a fever is sick, but yet not everyone who is sick has a fever or the gout or ophthalmia, I take it; though everything of the sort is a disease, but differs—to quote those whom we call doctors—in its manifestation. For they are not all alike, nor of like effect, but each works according to its own

faculty, and yet all are diseases. In the same way, we conceive of some men as artisans, do we not?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ That is, cobblers and carpenters and statuaries and a host of others, whom we need not mention in particular; but any way, they have their several departments of craft, and all of them are craftsmen; yet they are not all carpenters or cobblers or statuaries, though these taken together are craftsmen.

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ In the same way, then, have men divided unwisdom also among them, and those who have the largest share of it we call "mad," and those who have a little less, "dolts" and "idiots"; though people who prefer to use the mildest language term them sometimes "romantic," sometimes "simple-minded," or again "innocent," "inexperienced," or "obtuse"; and many another name will you find if you look for more. But all these things are unwisdom, though they differ, as we observed that one art or one disease differs from another. Or how does it strike you?

Alcibiades/ That is my view.

Socrates/ Then let us turn at this point and retrace our steps. For we said, you know, at the beginning that we must consider who the unwise can be, and who the wise: for we had admitted that there are such persons, had we not?

Alcibiades/ Yes, we have admitted it.

Socrates/ Then you conceive those to be wise who know what one ought to do and say?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And which are the unwise? Those who know neither of these things?

Alcibiades/ The same.

Socrates/ And those who know neither of these things will say and do unawares what one ought not?

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Well, just such a person, as I was saying, Alcibiades, was Oedipus; and even in our time you will find many who do the same, not in a fit of anger, as he was: they think they pray not for something evil, but for something good. He neither prayed for that, nor thought he did, but there are others who are in the opposite case. For I imagine that if the god to whom you are now going should appear to you and first ask you, before you made any prayer, whether you would be content to become sovereign of the Athenian state and, on your accounting this as something poor and unimportant, should add "and of all the Greeks also"; and if he saw you were still unsatisfied unless he promised you besides the mastery of all Europe, and should not merely promise you that, but on the self-same day a recognition by all men, if you so desired, of Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, as their sovereign—I imagine you would actually depart in a transport of delight, as having secured the greatest of goods.

Alcibiades/ So would anybody else, I imagine, Socrates, at such a stroke of luck!

Socrates/ But still you would not wish to sacrifice your life even for the territory and sovereignty of all the Greeks and barbarians together.

Alcibiades/ I should think not. How could I, without a prospect of making any use of them?

Socrates/ And what if you had a prospect of making an evil and injurious use of them? Not in this case either?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ So you see it is not safe either to accept casually what one is given, or to pray for one's own advancement, if one is going to be injured in consequence, or deprived of one's

life altogether. Yet we could tell of many ere now who, having desired sovereignty, and endeavored to secure it, with the idea of working for their good, have lost their lives by plots which their sovereignty has provoked. And V expect you are not unacquainted with certain events "of a day or two ago," when Archelaus, the monarch of Macedonia, was slain by his favorite, who was as much in love with the monarchy as Archelaus was with him, and who killed his lover with the expectation of being not only the monarch, but also a happy man: but after holding the monarchy for three or four days he was plotted against by others in his turn, and perished. You have only to look at some of our own citizens—and these are examples that we know, not by hearsay, but by personal observation—who in their time have desired to hold military command and have obtained it, and see how some to this very day are exiles from our city, while others have lost their lives. And even those who are deemed to be faring best have not only gone through many dangers and terrors in holding their command, but on returning home have continued to be as sorely besieged by informers as they were by the enemy, so that some of them wished to heaven that they had been anything but commanders rather than have held such appointments. Of course, if these dangers and toils were conducive to our advantage, there would be some reason for them; but the case is quite the contrary. And you will find it is just the same in regard to children: some people have been known to pray that they might have them, and when they have got them have fallen into the greatest disasters and pains. For some have had children that were utterly bad, and have spent their whole lives in vexation; while others, though they had good ones, were bereft of them by disasters that overtook them, and thus were cast into as great misfortune as the others, and wished that no children at all had been born to them. But nevertheless, with all this plain evidence, and a

great deal more of a similar kind, before men's eyes, it is rare to find anyone who has either declined what was offered to him or, when he was likely to gain something by prayer, refrained from praying. Most men would not decline the offer of either a monarchy or a generalship or any of the various other things which bring with them harm rather than benefit, but would even pray to be granted them in cases where they were lacking: but after a little while they often change their tune, and retract all their former prayers. I question therefore if men are not really wrong in blaming the gods as the authors of their ills, when "they themselves by their own presumption"—or unwisdom, shall we say? —"have gotten them more than destined sorrows." It would seem, at any rate, Alcibiades, that one old poet had some wisdom; for I conceive it was because he had some foolish friends, whom he saw working and praying for things that were not for their advantage, though supposed to be by them, that he made a common prayer on behalf of them all, in terms something like these:

> King Zeus, give unto us what is good, whether we pray or pray not;
> But what is grievous, even if we pray for it, do thou avert.

So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of an answer to his words, do not be silent.

Alcibiades/ It is difficult, Socrates, to gainsay what has been well spoken: one thing, however, I do observe —how many evils are caused to men by ignorance, when, as it seems, we are beguiled by her not only into doing, but—worst of all—into praying to be granted the greatest evils. Now that is a thing that no one would suppose of himself; each of us would rather suppose he was competent to pray for his own greatest good, not his greatest evil. Why, that would seem, in truth, more like some sort of curse than a prayer!

Socrates/ But perhaps, my excellent friend, some person who is wiser than either you or I may say we are wrong to be so free with our abuse of ignorance, unless we can add that it is ignorance of certain things, and is a good to certain persons in certain conditions, as to those others it is an evil.

Alcibiades/ How do you mean? Can there be anything of which it is better for anybody, in any condition whatsoever, to be ignorant than cognizant?

Socrates/ I believe so; and do not you?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed, upon my word.

Socrates/ But surely I shall not have to tax you with an inclination to commit such an act against your own mother as Orestes and Alcmaeon, and any others who have followed their example, are said to have committed against theirs.

Alcibiades/ No unlucky words, in Heaven's name, Socrates!

Socrates/ Why, it is not the person who says, Alcibiades, that you would not like to be guilty of such an act, whom you should bid avoid unlucky words, but much rather him who might say the contrary; since the act seems to you so very dreadful as to be unfit even for such casual mention. But do you think that Orestes, if he had had all his wits about him and had known what was best for him to do, would have brought himself to commit any act of the sort?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Nor would anyone else, I imagine.

Alcibiades/ No.

Socrates/ Then it seems that ignorance of what is best, and to be ignorant of the best, is a bad thing.

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ And not only for the person himself, but for everyone else?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then let us consider this further case. Suppose it should quite suddenly occur to your mind that you had better take a dagger and go to the door of Pericles, your own guardian and friend, and ask if he were at home, with the design of killing just him and no one else, and his servants said he was at home: now, I do not say you would be inclined to do any such thing, but I suppose, if you are under the impression which at some moment may well be present, surely, to the mind of a man who is ignorant of the best—that what is really the worst is best at some moment—or do you not agree?

Alcibiades/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Well then, if you went indoors and saw Pericles himself, but did not know him, and thought he was somebody else, would you still venture to kill him?

Alcibiades/ No, upon my word, I should think not.

Socrates/ For your man was, I presume, not anyone you met, but that particular person whom you wished to kill?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And although you might make a number of attempts, if you always failed to know Pericles when you were about to commit the act, you would never attack him.

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Well now, do you suppose that Orestes would ever have attacked his mother if he had similarly failed to know her?

Alcibiades/ I do not think he would.

Socrates/ For presumably he, too, had no intention of killing the first woman he met, or anybody else's mother, but only his own.

Alcibiades/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then to be ignorant in such matters is better for those who are so disposed and have formed such resolves.

Alcibiades/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So you see that ignorance of certain things is for certain persons in certain states a good, not an evil, as you supposed just now.

Alcibiades/ It seems to be.

Socrates/ Then if you care to consider the sequel of this, I daresay it will surprise you.

Alcibiades/ What may that be, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean that, generally speaking, it rather looks as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, if it does not include possession of the science of the best, will in a few instances help, but in most will harm, the owner. Consider it this way: must it not be the case, in your opinion, that when we are about to do or say anything, we first suppose that we know, or do really know, the thing we so confidently intend to say or do?

Alcibiades/ I think so.

Socrates/ Well, take the orators, for example: they either know, or think they know, how to advise us on various occasions—some about war and peace, and others about building walls or fitting up harbors; and in a word, whatever the city does to another city or within herself, all comes about by the advice of the orators.

Alcibiades/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then observe the consequence.

Alcibiades/ If I am able.

Socrates/ Why, surely you call men either wise or unwise?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And the many unwise, and the few wise?

Alcibiades/ Precisely.

Socrates/ And in either case you name them in reference to something?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then do you call a man wise who knows how to give advice, without knowing whether and when it is better to act upon it?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Nor, I conceive, a man who knows what war is in itself, without knowing when or for how long a time it is better to make war?

Alcibiades/ Agreed.

Socrates/ Nor, again, a man who knows how to kill another, or seize his property, or make him an exile from his native land, without knowing when or to whom it is better so to behave?

Alcibiades/ No, to be sure.

Socrates/ Then it is a man who knows something of this sort, and is assisted by knowledge of what is best, —and this is surely the same as knowledge of the beneficial, is it not?

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we shall call him wise, and a competent adviser both of the city and of his own self; but a man not so qualified we shall call the opposite of these. How do you think?

Alcibiades/ I agree.

Socrates/ And what of a man who knows how to ride or shoot, or else to box or wrestle or contend in any other sport, or do anything that we know by rule of art? What do you call him who knows what is better done by rule of that particular art? Do you not say that he who goes by the rules of riding is a good rider?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And the rules of boxing, I suppose, make a good boxer, and those of flute-playing a good flute-player, and so, on the same lines, I presume, with the rest; or is there any difference?

Alcibiades/ No, it is as you say.

Socrates/ Then do you think it inevitable that he who has some knowledge about these things should also be a wise man, or shall we say he comes far short of it?

Alcibiades/ Far short of it, I declare.

Socrates/ Then what sort of state do you suppose it would be, where the people were good bowmen and flute-players, together with athletes and artists in general, and mingled with these the men whom we have just mentioned as knowing war in itself and slaughter in itself, and orator-windbags too with their political bluster, but all of them lacked this knowledge of the best, and none knew when or upon whom it was better to employ their respective arts?

Alcibiades/ A paltry one, I should call it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, you would, I expect, when you saw each one of them vying with the other and assigning the largest part in the conduct of the state to that;

Wherein himself is found most excellent.

I mean, what is done best by rule of his particular art—while he is generally off the track of what is best for the state and for himself, because, I conceive, he has put his trust in opinion apart from intelligence. In these circumstances, should we not be right in saying that such a state is one great mass of turmoil and lawlessness?

Alcibiades/ We should, upon my word.

Socrates/ And we took it to be necessary that we should first think we know, or really know, anything that we intend either to do or to say with facility?

Alcibiades/ We did.

Socrates/ And if a man does what he knows or thinks he knows, and is assisted by knowing how to make it beneficial, we shall find him profitable both to the city and to himself?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But if, I suppose, he does the contrary, he will not be so either to the city or to himself?

Alcibiades/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Well then, do you still take the same view now as before, or do you think differently?

Alcibiades/ No, I take the same view.

Socrates/ And you said you called the many unwise, and the few wise?

Alcibiades/ I did.

Socrates/ So now we repeat our statement that the many have missed getting the best because in most cases, I conceive, they have put their trust in opinion apart from intelligence.

Alcibiades/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then it is an advantage to the many neither to know nor to think they know anything, if they are going to be specially eager to do what they know or think they know, but are likely on the whole, in doing it, to be injured rather than benefited.

Alcibiades/ That is very true.

Socrates/ So you see that when I said it looked as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, where it did not include the science of the best, in a few cases helped, but in most harmed the owner, I was evidently right in very truth, was I not?

Alcibiades/ Though I did not then, I think so now, Socrates.

Socrates/ Hence the state or soul that is to live aright must hold fast to this knowledge, exactly as a sick man does to a doctor, or as he who would voyage safely does to a pilot. For without this,' the more briskly it is wafted by fortune either to the acquisition of wealth or to bodily strength or aught else of the sort, the greater will be the mistakes in which these things, it would seem, must needs involve it. And he who has acquired the so-called mastery of learning and arts, but is destitute of this knowledge and impelled by this or that one among those others, is sure to meet with much rough weather, as he truly deserves; since, I imagine, he must continue without a pilot on the high seas, and has only the brief span of his life in which to run his course. So that his case aptly fits the saying of the poet, in which he complains of somebody or other that

> Full many crafts he knew: but still
> He knew them all so very ill.

Alcibiades/ Why, how on earth is the poet's saying apposite, Socrates? For to my mind it has nothing to do with the point.

Socrates/ It is very much to the point: but he, good sir, like almost every other poet, speaks in riddles. For poetry as a whole is by nature inclined to riddling, and it is not every man who can apprehend it. And furthermore, besides having this natural tendency, when it gets hold of a grudging person who wishes not to show forth to us his own wisdom but to conceal it as much as possible, we find it an extraordinarily difficult matter to make out whatever this or that one of them may mean. For surely you do not suppose that Homer, divinest and wisest of poets, did not know it was impossible to know ill; for it is he who says of Margites that he knew many things, but knew them all ill: but it is a riddle, I think, in which he has made "ill" stand for " evil," and "knew" for "to know." So if we put it together, letting the meter go, indeed, but grasping his

meaning, we get this: "Full many crafts he knew, but it was evil for him to know them all." Then clearly, if it was evil for him to know many things, he was in fact a paltry fellow, assuming we are to believe what we have previously argued.

Alcibiades/ But I think we may, Socrates: at least, if I cannot believe those arguments of ours, I shall find it hard to trust any others.

Socrates/ And you are right in so thinking.

Alcibiades/ Then again, I think not.

Socrates/ But come now, in Heaven's name—for I suppose you see how great and strange is our perplexity, in which you, as it seems to me, have your share; for you change about from this side to that without settling down for a moment, but as soon as you are firmly convinced of a thing you seem to slip out of it again and cease to hold the same view—well, if the god to whom you are going should even now appear to you and ask, before you uttered any prayer, whether you would be content to obtain one of those things which were mentioned at the beginning, or whether he should leave you to pray as you were, how do you suppose you would make the best of your chance—by accepting his offer, or by praying for something on your own account?

Alcibiades/ Well, by the gods, I could not answer your question, Socrates, offhand. Why, I take it to be a fatuous request, when it is really a case for great caution lest one pray unawares for what is evil while thinking it to be one's good, and then after a little while, as you were saying, one change one's tune and retract all one's former prayers.

Socrates/ And did not the poet whom I quoted at the beginning of our discussion know more than we, when he bade us pray for the averting of what is grievous, even though we pray for it?

Alcibiades/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then it is their admiration of this poet, Alcibiades, or perhaps the result of their own study, that causes the Spartans to offer a similar prayer whether the occasion be private or public—that the gods will give them for their own benefit the beautiful as well as the good: more than this no one can ever hear them pray for. The consequence is that to the present time they have been just as fortunate as any other people; and if it has befallen them to be not invariably fortunate, it was anyhow not owing to their prayer. It rests with the gods, I conceive, to give us either what we may pray for or the reverse.

And I would like to give you an account of something else, which I once heard from some of my seniors. A quarrel having arisen between the Athenians and the Spartans, it befell our city to be always unsuccessful in every battle by land and sea, and she could never win a victory. So the Athenians, in their annoyance at this result, and at a loss for some means of finding a deliverance from the trouble they were in, took counsel together and decided that the best thing they could do was to send and inquire of Ammon; and moreover, to ask also for what reason the gods granted victory to the Spartans rather than to themselves: "for we"—such was the message—"offer up to them more and finer sacrifices than any of the Greeks, and have adorned their temples with votive emblems as no other people have done, and presented to the gods the costliest and stateliest processions year by year, and spent more money thus than all the rest of the Greeks together. But the Spartans have never taken any such pains, and indeed are so neglectful in their behavior to the gods, that they make a practice of sacrificing defective victims, and generally are very much behind us in the honors that they pay, though the wealth they possess is quite equal to that of our city." When they had so spoken, and added the question, what they should do in order to find a deliverance from the trouble they were in,

the prophet's only answer—evidently it was all that the god allowed—was to call them to him and say: "Thus saith Ammon to the Athenians: I would rather have the reverent reserve of the Spartans than all the ritual of the Greeks." So much he said, and not a word further. Now by "reverent reserve" I suppose the god could only mean their prayer, since in fact it differs greatly from those that are generally offered. For the Greeks in general either lead up bulls with gilded horns, or else present the gods with votive emblems, and pray for any odd thing, whether it be good or bad: so when the gods hear their irreverent speech they reject all these costly processions and sacrifices. Whereas I think we ought to be very cautious, and fully consider what is to be said and what is not.

And in Homer too you will find other tales of a similar sort. For he relates how the Trojans, in making their bivouac;

> Sacrificed to the immortals perfect hecatombs.

and how the winds bore the sweet savor from the plain into heaven:

> But the blessed gods partook not of it, nor would have it,
> For deep was their hate against holy Ilium,
> And Priam, and the folk of Priam of the good ashen spear.

So it was nothing to their purpose to sacrifice and pay tribute of gifts in vain, when they were hated by the gods. For it is not, I imagine, the way of the gods to be seduced with gifts, like a base usurer. And indeed it is but silly talk of ours, if we claim to surpass the Spartans on this score. For it would be a strange thing if the gods had regard to our gifts and sacrifices instead of our souls, and the piety and justice that may be found in any of us. Far rather at these, I believe, do they look than at those costly processions and sacrifices which are offered, it well may be, by individual and state, year in, year out, though they may have offended greatly against the gods, or as greatly against their neighbors. But the gods are not to

be won by bribes, and so they despise all these things, as Ammon and the holy prophet say. Certainly it would seem that justice and wisdom are held in especial honor both by the gods and by men of intelligence; and wise and just are they alone who know what acts and words to use towards gods and men. But I should like now to hear what may be your opinion on the subject.

Alcibiades/ Why, Socrates, it in no wise differs from yours and the god's; for indeed it would not be fitting for me to record my vote against the god.

Socrates/ And you remember you professed to be in great perplexity lest you should pray unawares for evil, while supposing it to be good?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ You see, then, how unsafe it is for you to approach the god with your prayers, for it may chance that when he hears your irreverent speech he will reject your sacrifice altogether, and you may perhaps be accorded some other bad thing as well. In my opinion, therefore, it is best to hold your peace: for I expect you will not consent to use the Spartan's prayer, you have such a romantic spirit—to give it the fairest of folly's names. It is necessary, therefore, to bide one's time until one can learn how one should behave towards gods and men.

Alcibiades/ Well, when will that time arrive, Socrates, and who is to be my instructor? For I feel I should very much like to see who the man is.

Socrates/ It is he who is concerned about you. But I think, as Homer relates how Athena removed the mist from the eyes of Diomede;

> That he might well discern both god and man.

so you too must first have the mist removed which now enwraps your soul, and then you will be ready to receive the

means whereby you will discern both evil and good. For at present I do not think you could do so.

Alcibiades/ Let him remove the mist or whatever else he likes to call it: for I am prepared to obey every one of his commands, without shirking, whoever the man may be, so long as I am to be the better for them.

Socrates/ I tell you, he on his part is prodigiously anxious to help you.

Alcibiades/ Then I think it best to defer the sacrifice also till the time comes.

Socrates/ And you are quite right: for that is safer than running so serious a risk.

Alcibiades/ But how say you, Socrates? Look now, I will crown you with this garland, as I consider you have given me such good advice; and to the gods we shall offer both garlands and all the other customary things when I see that day has come. And come it will ere long, if they are willing.

Socrates/ Well, I accept this gift; and anything else besides, that you may give me, I shall be only too happy to accept. And as Euripides has made Creon say when he sees Teiresias wearing his wreaths, and hears that he has obtained them, on account of his art, as first-fruits of the spoils of war:

> As omen good I take thy victor's wreaths;
> For in the waves we labor, as thou knowest, —

so do I take this opinion of yours as a good omen. For I consider I am no less wave-tossed than Creon, and would like to come off victorious over your lovers.

The Second Alcibiades.

Translated by Mr. Sydenham.

Persons of the Dialog.

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SCENE. —The Way to the Temple of Jupiter.

Socrates/ Alcibiades! are you going to the temple to make your petitions to the God?

Alcibiades/ Your conjecture is perfectly right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Indeed your countenance appears close and cloudy; and your eyes are turned toward the ground, as if you were wrapped in some profound thought.

Alcibiades/ What profound thoughts could a man have at such a time, Socrates?

Socrates/ Thoughts, Alcibiades, such as seem to me of the highest importance. For tell me, in the name of Zeus, do you not think, when we happen, whether in private or in public, to be making our petitions to the Gods, that sometimes they grant a part of those petitions, and reject the rest; and that to some of their petitioners they hearken, but are deaf to others?

Alcibiades/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ Do you not think, then, that much previous consideration is requisite to prevent a man from praying unwittingly for things which are very evil, but which he imagines very good; if the Gods at that time when he is praying to them should happen to be disposed to grant whatever prayers he happens to make? As Œdipus, they say, inconsiderately prayed the Gods that his sons might divide their patrimony between them by the sword. Instead, therefore, of praying for his family, as he might have done, that the evils which it then suffered might be averted, he

cursed it by praying that more might be superadded. The event of which curse was this, that not only what he prayed for was accomplished, but from that accomplishment followed other evils, many and terrible, which there is no need to enumerate.

Alcibiades/ But, Socrates, you have now spoken of a man who was insane, for who, think you, in his sound mind would venture to make such sort of prayers?

Socrates/ Whether is it your opinion, that to be insane is to be in a state of mind contrary to that which is sound?

Alcibiades/ I am quite of opinion that it is.

Socrates/ And are you not of opinion, too, that there are men who want understanding, and men who have not that want?

Alcibiades/ I am.

Socrates/ Come, then, let us consider what sort of men these are. You have admitted, that men there are who want understanding, men who do not want it, and other men, you say, who are insane.

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Further now; are there not some men in a good state of health?

Alcibiades/ There are.

Socrates/ And are there not others in a bad state of health?

Alcibiades/ Certainly.

Socrates/ These, then, are not the same men with those.

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ Whether now are there any men who are in neither of those states?

Alcibiades/ Certainly, none.

Socrates/ For every man must of necessity either have good health, or want good health.

Alcibiades/ I think so too.

Socrates/ Well: do you think after the same manner with regard to the having of understanding and the want of understanding?

Alcibiades/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Do you think it to be necessary, that a man should either have or want a good understanding? Or is there, besides, some third and middle state, in which a man neither has nor wants a good understanding?

Alcibiades/ There certainly is not.

Socrates/ Every man, then, of necessity must be either in the one or in the other of those two conditions.

Alcibiades/ So it seems to me.

Socrates/ Do you not remember that you admitted this, that insanity was contrary to soundness of understanding?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you not remember that you admitted this also, that there was no middle or third state, in which a man neither has nor wants a good understanding?

Alcibiades/ I admitted this too.

Socrates/ But how can two different things be contrary to one and the same thing?

Alcibiades/ It is by no means possible.

Socrates/ Want of understanding, therefore, and insanity, are likely to be found the same, thing.

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ If then we should pronounce that all fools were madmen, we should pronounce rightly, Alcibiades.

Alcibiades/ We should.

Socrates/ In the first place, your equals in age, if any of them happen to be fools, as indeed they are, and some of your elders too, all these we must pronounce mad-men. For consider, are you not of opinion, that in this city there are few wise men, but a multitude of fools, whom you call mad-men?

Alcibiades/ I am of that opinion.

Socrates/ Can you imagine then, that, living in the same city with so many mad-men, we should live with any ease or comfort? or that we should not have suffered from them long ago, have been buffeted, and pelted, and have met with all other mischiefs which mad-men are wont to perpetrate? But consider, my good sir, whether we live not here in a different state of things.

Alcibiades/ What is then the truth of the case, Socrates, with respect to the multitude? For it is not likely to be what I just now imagined.

Socrates/ Neither do I think it is so myself. But we should consider it in some such way as this.

Alcibiades/ In what way do you mean?

Socrates/ I will tell you. We presume that some men there are who are ill in health: do we not?

Alcibiades/ Certainly we do.

Socrates/ Do you think it necessary then that every man, who is ill in health, should have the gout, or a fever, or an ophthalmia? do you not think that a man, without suffering from any of these diseases, may be ill of some other? For diseases, we suppose, are of many various kinds, and not of those only.

Alcibiades/ I suppose they are.

Socrates/ Do you not think that every ophthalmia is a disease?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you think that every disease, therefore, is an ophthalmia?

Alcibiades/ By no means, not I. Yet still I am at a loss about your meaning.

Socrates/ But if you will give me your attention, in considering the matter, both of us together, we shall go near to find the truth of it.

Alcibiades/ I give you, Socrates, all the attention I am master of.

Socrates/ Was it not agreed by us, that every ophthalmia was a disease; though not every disease an ophthalmia?

Alcibiades/ It was agreed so.

Socrates/ And I think it was rightly so agreed. For all persons who have a fever have a disease; not all, however, who have a disease have a fever; neither have they all of them the gout, nor all of them an ophthalmia. Everything indeed of this kind is a disease; but they whom we call physicians say that diseases differ in their effects on the human body. For all diseases are not alike, neither are they all attended with like symptoms; but each of them operates with a power peculiar to itself, and yet diseases are they all. Just as it is with respect to workmen; for workmen we suppose some men are, do we not?

Alcibiades/ Certainly we do.

Socrates/ Such as shoe-makers, smiths, statuaries, and a great multitude of others, whom it is needless to enumerate distinctly. All these have different parts of workmanship divided amongst them; and they all are workmen. They are not, however, smiths, nor shoe-makers, nor statuaries, indiscriminately all of them together. Just so folly is divided amongst men. And those who have the largest share of it, we call mad-men; such as have a portion

somewhat less, we call senseless and stupefied: but if we choose to speak of these in gentler terms, some of us say they are magnanimous; others call them simpletons; and others again, harmless and inexperienced in the world and speechless. You will also find, if you reflect, many other names given them beside these. But they are all comprised under the general term, folly or want of understanding. There is, however, a difference between them as one art differs from another, one disease from another. Or how otherwise doth the case seem to you?

Alcibiades/ To me exactly as you represent it.

Socrates/ This point, therefore, being settled, let us from hence return back again. For it was proposed, I think, in the beginning of our inquiry, to be considered by us what sort of men wanted understanding, and what sort were men of good understanding. For it was agreed that some there were of each sort. Was it not?

Alcibiades/ It was so agreed.

Socrates/ Whether then do you suppose, that such persons have a good understanding who know how they ought to act, and what they ought to say?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And what persons do you apprehend to be wanting in understanding? are they not such as are ignorant in both those cases?

Alcibiades/ These very persons.

Socrates/ Will not these persons then, who are ignorant of what they ought to do and to say, both say and do what they ought not without being sensible of it?

Alcibiades/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Well then, Alcibiades, of this sort of persons, I said, was Œdipus. And you may find many in our own times,

who, though they are not seized with sudden anger, as he was, yet pray for things hurtful to themselves; not suspecting evil in them and imagining naught but good. Œdipus indeed, as he did not wish for anything good, so neither did he imagine the thing he prayed for to be good. But some others there are, whose minds are in a disposition quite contrary to that of Œdipus. For you yourself, in my opinion, if the God to whom you are going to offer your petitions should appear to you, and, before you had made any petition to him, should ask you, "whether your desires would be satisfied with your becoming tyrant of Athens;" and (if you held this favor cheap, and no mighty grant) should add further, "and tyrant of all Greece and, if he should perceive that you deemed it still too little for you, unless you were tyrant of all Europe, should promise you that also; and not merely promise, but make you so immediately on the spot, if you were in haste to have all the Europeans acknowledge Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, for their lord and master; in this case, it is my opinion, that you yourself would march away full of joy, as if the greatest good had befallen you.

Alcibiades/ I believe, Socrates, that I should; and that so would any other man whatever, had he met with such an adventure.

Socrates/ You would not, however, accept of absolute dominion over the estates and persons of all the Grecians and Barbarians together, on condition of giving your life in exchange for it.

Alcibiades/ I suppose not. For why should I, when it could be of no use to me?

Socrates/ And, if you knew that you should make an ill use of it to your own detriment, would you not also in such a case refuse it?

Alcibiades/ Certainly I should.

Socrates/ You see, then, how dangerous it is, either inconsiderately to accept of it when offered, or to wish and pray for it of yourself; since a man, by having it, may suffer great detriment, if not the total loss of his life. In confirmation of this, we could mention many persons who longed after tyranny, and labored to obtain it, as if some mighty good were to be enjoyed from it; but having obtained it, were, from plots and conspiracies to deprive them of it, forced to part with their very lives. Nay, it cannot, I suppose, have escaped your own hearing, what happened as it were but yesterday, that Archelaus, tyrant of the Macedonians, was murdered by his favorite; for this favorite was no less fond of the tyranny, than the tyrant was of him; and imagined that, by obtaining the tyranny himself, he should be made a happy man; but that, after he had held the tyranny three or four days, he himself was, in his turn, secretly murdered by some others, who had conspired against him. Amongst our own fellow citizens, also, you see, (for this we have not from the report of others, but have been eye-witnesses of it ourselves,) that of those who succeeded in their ambition to command our armies, some were banished, and still at this day live in exile from the city; others lost their lives; and such as seem to have fared the best, such as had gone through many terrifying dangers in their campaigns, and were returned to their own country, have ever afterwards suffered at home, from sycophants and detractors, a siege as fierce and as dangerous as any from open enemies in the field, so that some of them at length wished they had never known how to command an army, much rather than ever to have born the burden of that command. Indeed if the dangers and toils, which they underwent, had tended to their advantage, they would have had something plausible to plead in behalf of their ambition:

but their case is quite the reverse of that. In the same manner, with respect to the having of children, you will find many men who wish and pray for them; but after they have them are brought, on that very account, into the greatest calamities and griefs: for some, whose children were incurably wicked, have spent all their after days in sorrow; and some, who had good children, but lost them by some bad accident, have been reduced to a state of mind no less miserable than the others, and, like them have wished that their children never had been born. And yet, notwithstanding the evidence of these and many other cases of like kind, it is rare to find a man who would refuse those gifts of fortune, were they offered to him; or who, could he obtain them by his prayers, would forbear to pray for them. Few men would reject even a tyranny, if offered them; or the chief command of an army; or many other things, which often bring more mischief than benefit to the possessor. Nay, there are few men, of those who happen not to have them at present, who would not be glad if ever they came into their possession. And yet such, as obtain them every now and then recant their wishes, and pray to be disencumbered of what they before prayed to have. I suspect, therefore, that in reality men accuse the Gods unjustly, in saying, that the evils which they suffer come from them:

> For on themselves they draw, through their own crimes.

(or follies should we say?)

> More griefs than fate allots to human life.

And to me, Alcibiades, it seems probable, that some wise man or other, happening to be connected with certain persons void of understanding, and observing them to pursue and to pray for things, which it were better for them still to be without, but which appeared to them good,

composed for their use a common prayer; the words of which are nearly these—

> Sov'reign of Nature! grant us what is good,
> Be it, or not, the subject of our pray'rs;
> And from thy supplicants, whate'er is ill,
> Tho' supplicating For it, still avert.

Now in this prayer, it seems to me, that the poet says what is right; and that whoever makes use of it, incurs no danger. But if you have anything to say against it, speak your mind.

Alcibiades/ It is a difficult matter, Socrates, to speak against anything which is rightly said. But what I am thinking of is, how many evils are brought on men by ignorance: since to this it seems owing, that we labor to procure for ourselves the greatest mischiefs, without knowing what we are about; and how extreme our ignorance is, appears in our praying for them. And yet no man would imagine that to be his own case; and every one supposes himself sufficiently knowing, to pray for things the most advantageous to himself, and to avoid praying for things the most mischievous: for to pray for these things would in reality be like a curse, and not a prayer.

Socrates/ But perhaps, my good friend, some man or other, who happens to be wiser than you or I, might say, that we are wrong, in laying the blame so rashly on ignorance, unless we proceed to specify what things we mean the ignorance of. To some persons also, in certain conditions and circumstances, ignorance is a good; though it be an evil to those others we have been speaking of.

Alcibiades/ How say you? Is it possible there should be anything, which it is better for any person in any condition whatever to be ignorant of than to know?

Socrates/ I think it is: are not you of the same opinion?

Alcibiades/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Well now; —but observe, I am not going to charge you with having a will, disposed to have ever perpetrated a deed, like that of Orestes, upon his own mother, as it is reported; or like that of Alcmæon, or whoever else happened to act in the same manner.

Alcibiades/ Mention not such a horrid deed, I beseech you, Socrates.

Socrates/ The man, who acquits you of a disposition to have acted in that manner, you ought not, Alcibiades, to bid him avoid the mention of such a deed; but much rather ought you to lay that injunction on a man who should express a contrary opinion of you; since the deed appears to you so horrid, as not to admit a casual mention of it in conversation. But do you think that Orestes, had he been a wise and prudent man, and had he known how it was best for him to act, would have dared to be guilty of any such action?

Alcibiades/ By no means.

Socrates/ Nor, I suppose, would any other man.

Alcibiades/ Certainly, not.

Socrates/ The ignorance therefore of what is best is an evil thing; and whoever is ignorant of that best will always suffer evil.

Alcibiades/ So I think.

Socrates/ And did not he think so too? and do not all other men think the same?

Alcibiades/ I cannot deny it.

Socrates/ Further then, let us consider this also. Supposing, that it should come into your head all at once, from a sudden fancy of its being the best thing you can do, to take a dagger with you, and go to the house of Pericles, your guardian and your friend; and supposing that, when

you came there, upon your asking if Pericles was within, with intention to kill him only and no other person, you should receive this answer, He is within; —I do not say, that you have a will or inclination to verify any of these suppositions; I say no more than this—supposing you should be seized with such a fancy, and nothing, I think, hinders a man, who is ignorant of what is best, from being at some time or other so seized, in that case an opinion might be conceived, that the worst thing a man can do is, in some circumstances, the best: do not you think it might?

Alcibiades/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ If then, upon being admitted to his presence, you should see and yet not know him, but should mistake him for some other person, I ask you, whether you would, notwithstanding that, be so furious as to kill him?

Alcibiades/ No, by Zeus; I do not imagine that I should.

Socrates/ For you would not be so furious as to kill any person, whom chance threw in your way; but him only at whom you aimed. Is it not for this reason that you would not kill him?

Alcibiades/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ And if you attempted the same thing ever so often, and still mistook Pericles, whenever you were about to execute your design, you never would lay violent hands on him.

Alcibiades/ Certainly I should not.

Socrates/ Well; and can you think that Orestes would ever have laid violent hands on his mother, if in like manner he had mistaken her for some other person?

Alcibiades/ I think he would not.

Socrates/ For he too had it not in his mind to kill any woman he should chance to meet with, nor the mother of any man whatever, but his own mother only.

Alcibiades/ It is true.

Socrates/ To mistake therefore, and not to know things of that kind, is better for men who are in such dispositions, and who are seized with such imaginations.

Alcibiades/ It appears so to be.

Socrates/ Do you now perceive, that for some persons, in some circumstances, to be ignorant of some things, is a good, and not, as you just now imagined it, an evil?

Alcibiades/ It seems to me probable.

Socrates/ Further; if you are willing to consider what follows after this, though it be strange and paradoxical, you may perhaps be of opinion that there is some truth in it.

Alcibiades/ Above all things, Socrates, tell me what.

Socrates/ That the acquisition of other sciences, without the science of what is best, is, I may venture to say, likely to be found rarely beneficial, and generally hurtful to the person who has acquired them. And consider it in this way: do you not think it necessary that, when we are about to engage in any affair, or to speak on any subject, we should really know, or at least should fancy that we know, the subject we are about to speak on, or the affair we are going so readily to engage in?

Alcibiades/ I do think it is.

Socrates/ And do not our public orators, either knowing, or fancying that they know, what the city ought to do, give us accordingly their counsel offhand on every occasion? Some of them on the subject of war and peace; others, when the affair of building walls, or that of furnishing the port-towns with proper stores, is in debate. In a word, all the

negotiations between our city and any other, and all our domestic concerns, are they not conducted just as these orators advise?

Alcibiades/ True.

Socrates/ Observe then, how we proceed in this argument, if possible, Some men you call wise, and others you call foolish.

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Foolish do you not call the many, and wise the few?

Alcibiades/ Just so.

Socrates/ And do you not give those different epithets to those two sorts of persons, in consideration of something in which they differ?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ Whether do you call him a wise man, who knows how to harangue the people on those subjects of debate we mentioned, without knowing what advice is the best in general, and what on the present occasion?

Alcibiades/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor him neither, I suppose, who hath the knowledge of military affairs, but knows not when it is best to go to war, nor how long a time to continue it. Is not my supposition just?

Alcibiades/ It is.

Socrates/ Neither then do you call him a wise man, who knows how to procure another man's death, or the confiscation of his estate, or the banishment of him from his country, without knowing on what occasion, or what person, it is best so to persecute.

Alcibiades/ Indeed I do not.

Socrates/ The man, therefore, who possesses any knowledge of such a kind, if that knowledge of his be attended with the knowledge also of what is best, and this I presume to be the same with the knowledge of what is beneficial; Is it so?

Alcibiades/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ We shall say, that he is a wise man, and sufficiently well able to judge for himself, and to be also a counsellor to the city. But of the man who has not the knowledge of what is beneficial, we shall say the contrary. Or what is your opinion that we ought to say?

Alcibiades/ Mine agrees with yours.

Socrates/ Well now; let us suppose a man skilled in horsemanship, or in shooting with a bow, or in wrestling, or boxing, or other combat; or in anything else which art teaches: what do you say concerning him who knows what is executed best, in that art which he has learnt? The man, for instance, who knows what is performed best in horsemanship, do you not say of him, that he is skilled in the horseman's art?

Alcibiades/ I do.

Socrates/ And the man who knows what is performed best in wrestling, I presume you say of him, that he is skilled in the wrestler's art. Of a man who has the like knowledge in music, you say, that he is skilled in the musician's art. And of men who have the like knowledge in the performances of other arts, you speak after a like manner: or how otherwise?

Alcibiades/ No otherwise than just as you say.

Socrates/ Do you think now, that a man, skilled in any of these arts, must of necessity be a wise man? or shall we say, that he wants much of being so?

Alcibiades/ Much indeed does he, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Suppose then a commonwealth, composed of good bowmen and musicians, of wrestlers too and other artists; and mixed with these, such persons as we just now mentioned, such as understand military affairs, and such as know how to persecute a man to death; and superadded to them, your politicians, swollen with the pride of managing state-affairs; all these people void of the science of what is best; and not a man of them knowing when, or in what case, it is best to exercise the particular skill or knowledge that each man is master of; what sort of a commonwealth do you think this would prove?

Alcibiades/ But a bad one, Socrates, I think for my part.

Socrates/ Neither would you, I suppose, hesitate to pronounce it so, when you saw every one of these men ambitious of being honored, and making it his chief business in the commonwealth;

To attain to more, and still more, excellence.

(by excellence I mean that which is the best in his own art,) but in what is best for the public, and best also for himself, generally mistaken; as being, I suppose, without rational principles, and governed only by opinion. In this case, should we not be right in pronouncing that such a commonwealth was full of great disorder and of lawless doings?

Alcibiades/ Right indeed, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Did we not think it necessary for us, either to fancy that we know, or really to know previously, the business we are going to engage in, or offhand to speak upon?

Alcibiades/ We did.

Socrates/ And did we not also think, that if a man engages in any business which he knows, and his knowledge

of it be attended with the knowledge of what is beneficial, he will be in a way of profiting both the public and himself?

Alcibiades/ How could we think otherwise?

Socrates/ But that if it be attended with ignorance of what is beneficial, the contrary will happen; he will neither profit the public nor himself?

Alcibiades/ Certainly we thought he would not.

Socrates/ And what? are you still of the same opinion? or have you in any respect altered your way of thinking about these matters?

Alcibiades/ Not at all: I think as I did still.

Socrates/ Let me ask you then, whether you did not say that you called the many fools, and the few wise men?

Alcibiades/ I acknowledge it.

Socrates/ And do we not still say, that the many are mistaken in their opinion of what is best, for that they are generally, I suppose, without rational principles, and only governed by opinion?

Alcibiades/ We still say the same.

Socrates/ It is the interest, therefore, of the many not to be knowing in any affairs, nor to conceit themselves knowing; if what affairs they know, or conceit they know, they will be the more forward to engage in; and, engaging in them will receive more harm than benefit.

Alcibiades/ What you say is very true.

Socrates/ Do you see then; do I not appear to have been actually in the right, when I said, that the acquisition of other sciences, without the science of what is best, is rarely beneficial, and generally hurtful, to the person who has acquired them?

Alcibiades/ If I did not think so at that time, yet now, Socrates, I do.

Socrates/ It is incumbent therefore on every civil state, and every private person, if they would manage their affairs rightly, to depend absolutely on this science; just as the sick patient depends on his physician; or as the mariner, who would escape the dangers of the voyage, depends on the commander of the vessel. For without this science, the more vehemently an inward gale impels a man, whether it arise from the consideration of his wealth, or bodily strength, or some other advantage of the same kind with either of those, so much the greater miscarriages will of necessity it seems befall him, from those very advantages. And, in like manner, the man who has acquired what is called much learning, and many arts, but is destitute of this science, and is driven along by each of the others, will not he meet with, and justly too indeed, a very tempestuous voyage? and supposing him to continue still at sea, without a commander of the vessel in which he sails, it will not be long before he perishes. So that to such a man very applicable, I think, is that verse where the poet says of some person, in dispraise of him.

> Much knew he, and in many things had skill;
> But whate'er things he knew, he knew them ill.

Alcibiades/ How, Socrates, doth this verse of the poet fall in with what we are speaking of? for to me it seems nothing to the purpose.

Socrates/ Very much to the purpose is it. But poets, you must know, write enigmatically almost all of them but this poet more especially. For it is the genius of poetry in general to use an enigmatical language; and it is not for any ordinary person to understand it. But when, besides this difficulty, the poetical genius, so enigmatical in itself, seizes a man who is backward in communicating his knowledge, unwilling to tell us plainly what he means, and desirous to conceal his wisdom as much as possible from the world, it appears in the highest degree difficult to find out the real meaning of

any such poet. For you can by no means think that Homer, so very divine a poet as he was, could be ignorant, how impossible it was for a man, who possessed any science whatever, not to know it well. But he expresses himself enigmatically, I suppose, by using, instead of the words *evil*, and *to know*, the derivative words, *ill*, and he knew. If then we use the two proper words, there is formed this sentence, in plain prose indeed, but expressive of the poet's meaning, —*He was knowing and skilled in many things*, *but to know all those things was to him an evil*. —It is evident then, that if much knowledge was to him an evil, what knowledge he had was worthless, and he himself was some worthless fellow; supposing any credit to be due to the conclusions from our past reasonings.

Alcibiades/ And I think, Socrates, it is their due: for I should hardly give credit to any other rational conclusions, if I denied it to those.

Socrates/ And you think rightly too. But in the name of Zeus, let us proceed. For you see, how great are the perplexities attending the subject in which we are engaged; you see also, what the nature is of those perplexities. And you seem to me to have a share in them yourself; as you never rest from changing your thoughts over and over again upon this subject; discarding the opinions, which you had before so ardently embraced, and continuing no longer in the same mind. Should the God then, to whom you are going to make your prayers, appear to you, now after all our conclusions; and should he ask you, before you had presented any petition whatever to him—whether or no your desires would be satisfied, if you obtained any of those dominions mentioned in the beginning of our argument; —or should he leave to yourself the naming of what you wished for; —in which way, think you, could you best avail yourself

of this opportunity? whether in accepting any of the grants offered you, or in naming some other thing you wished for?

Alcibiades/ Now, by the gods, Socrates, I should not know what to say to such a proposal. Indeed, I think, that it would be rash in me to make any decisive answer at all; and that great caution is absolutely requisite in such a case; to prevent a man from praying unwarily for things evil, while he imagines them to be good; and from doing as you said, soon afterwards recanting his choice, and praying to be delivered from what he had before prayed to have.

Socrates/ Did not then the poet, whom I cited in the beginning of this argument, know somewhat more than we do, in supplicating Zeus to avert from us what is evil, even though we prayed For it?

Alcibiades/ Indeed I think so.

Socrates/ The Lacedæmonians, therefore, O Alcibiades! admiring and imitating this of the poet, or whether they had of themselves considered the subject in the same manner as he did, every one of them in private, and all of them in public, make a prayer similar to his: for they beseech the Gods to grant them such good things as at the same time are beautiful; and nothing more were they ever heard to pray for. Accordingly, no people have hitherto been more prosperous than they. And if it has happened to them not to prosper in all things, it was not because they prayed amiss; but because the Gods, I presume, have it in their choice, either to grant a man that for which he prays, or to send him the reverse. I have a mind to relate to you somewhat else on this subject, what I once heard from certain elderly men; —that, in the differences between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, it so fell out, that whenever they came to a battle, whether by land or by sea, our city was always unsuccessful, and was never able to get one victory: —that

the Athenians therefore, uneasy at these miscarriages, and at a loss for some contrivance to put an end to their pressing evils, held a council, and came to this conclusion, —that their best way would be to send to Ammon, and consult him what they should do; and at the same time to ask him this question father, —on what account the Gods always give victory to the Spartans their enemies, rather than to them; though of all the Grecians, we, said they, bring them the greatest number of sacrifices, and those the fairest in their kinds; and though we, beyond all other people, have decorated their temples with the presents that are hung up in them; and in honor of the Gods have made yearly processions, the most solemn and the most costly; and have paid them a greater tribute in money than all the rest of the Grecians put together: whilst the Lacedæmonians, they said, never regard any of these things; but, on the contrary, worship the Gods in so slighting a manner, as to make their sacrifices commonly of beasts full of blemishes; and, in all other instances, fall far short of us, said they, in honoring the Gods; at the same time that the riches they are masters of are not less than ours. When the ambassadors had thus spoken, and had inquired of the Oracle, what they should do to find an end of their present misfortunes, the prophet made no other answer than this; (for without doubt the God did not permit him:) sending for the Athenian ambassadors, he spake to them these words, Thus faith Ammon; he saith, that he prefers the pious addresses of the Lacedæmonians to all the sacrifices of all the Grecians. —These words, and no more, spake the prophet. Now it seems to me, that, by pious addresses, the God means only that prayer of theirs. And it is indeed much more excellent than the prayers of any other people. For the rest of the Grecians, when they have either led up to the altar oxen with their horns gilded, or brought rich offerings and presents to hang up in the

temples, pray for whatever they happen to desire, whether it be really good or evil. The Gods therefore, when they hear their impious addresses, accept not of their costly processions, sacrifices, and presents. So that much caution and consideration seem to me requisite on this subject, what is fit to be spoken to the Gods, and what is not. You will also find in Homer sentiments similar to those I have been expressing: for he tells us, that the Trojans, on a certain night, taking up their quarters without the city walls.

> In honor of the blest Immortals, slew
> Unblemish'd hecatombs:

and that the smoke from these sacrifices was by the winds wasted up into heaven:

> Sweet odorif'rous smoke; yet by the Gods
> Rejected, and the sav'ry taste refus'd.
> For strong aversion in their holy minds
> Was rooted, against Troy's devoted tow'rs,
> Against th' injurious might of Troy's proud king,
> And 'gainst the Trojan people, who withheld
> Helen, unjustly, from her wedded lord.

It was of no advantage therefore, it seems, to them to sacrifice, or to offer presents, to the Gods whom they had made their enemies. For the divine nature, I presume, is not of such a kind as to be seduced by presents, like those whose trade it is to make the most of their money, and who care not by what means they are enriched. Besides, we plead very foolishly, in our expostulations with the Gods, if we think to get the better of the Lacedæmonians by such arguments. For it would be a sad thing indeed, if the Gods regarded our presents and our sacrifices, and not the disposition of the soul, when a religious and just man addressed them. Nay, in my opinion, they have much more regard to this, than they have to those pompous processions and costly sacrifices. For nothing hinders, but that any, whether

private persons or civil states, let them have sinned against the Gods and against men ever so greatly, may be well able to pay the Gods such a tribute yearly. But they not being to be bribed, disdain all that outward worship; as faith the divine Oracle, and as also faith the Prophet of the Gods. It seems, therefore, that justice and prudence are honored, above all things, by the Gods, and by men too, such as have good sense and understanding. Now the prudent and the just are no other persons than such as know what behavior and what speech is proper to be used in our intercourse, whether with gods or with men. But I should be glad to hear from you what your thoughts are on this subject.

Alcibiades/ For my part, I am of the same opinion with you, Socrates, and with the Oracle. And indeed it would ill become me to give my vote opposite to the judgment of the God.

Socrates/ Do you not remember, that you acknowledged your being much at a loss concerning prayer; for fear you should unwarily pray for evil things, imagining them to be good?

Alcibiades/ I do remember it.

Socrates/ You perceive then, that it is not safe for you to go and make your prayer at the temple, as you intended; lest your addresses should happen to be impious, and the God hearing them should wholly reject your sacrifice, and you perhaps should draw upon your own head some farther evil. It seems to me, therefore, that your best way is to be at quiet. For because of your magnanimity, (that fairest of names given to folly,) I suppose you would not be willing to make use of the Lacedæmonian prayer. It is necessary, therefore, that a man should wait till he has learnt what disposition he ought to be in towards the Gods and towards men.

Alcibiades/ But, Socrates, how long will it be before that time comes? and who is he that will instruct me? for I should be very glad, methinks, to see that man, and to know who he is.

Socrates/ It is he, whose care you are the object of. But as Homer says of Minerva, that she removed the mist from before the eyes of Diomede;

> That he might clearly see, and gods from men
> Plainly distinguish, —

so must he in the first place, as it seems to me, remove from your soul the mist that now happens to surround it; and after that he will apply those medicines, by means of which you will clearly distinguish good from evil. For, at present, I think you would not be able so to do.

Alcibiades/ Let him then remove that mist, or any other obstruction that he pleases: for he will find me readily disposed to follow any of his prescriptions, whoever the man is, if by those means I may become a better man than I am at present.

Socrates/ It is wonderful to consider how greatly he is disposed towards the making you so.

Alcibiades/ Till that time therefore, I think, it is the better way to defer my sacrifice.

Socrates/ You think rightly too. For it is a safer way than to run so great a risk.

Alcibiades/ It is undeniable, O Socrates. In the meantime, however, since you seem to me to have counselled well, I shall put this crown about your brows. And to the Gods we shall present crowns, and all other accustomed offerings, then, when I see that day arrived. Nor will the time be long before its arrival, if it so please the Gods.

Socrates/ Well, I accept of this: and should have pleasure in seeing the time come, when you yourself shall have

received some other thing in return for your present to me. And as Creon, when Tiresias, showing him his crown [of Gold], said, it had been given him [by the Athenians], in honor of his science, as the first-fruits of [their] victory obtained over the enemy, is by Euripides made to say;

> This crown, a happy omen and preface,
> I deem, of conquest on our Theban side.
> For you know well, how temped-tost a sea
> We sail on—

I, in the same manner, deem this honor, you have now done me, to be a good presage. For, as I think myself sailing on a sea, no less tempest-tost than that of Creon, I should be glad to bear away the crown of victory from the rest of your admirers.

Charmides.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Chærepho, Critias, Charmides.

Socrates/ The day before yesterday I came in the evening from the army at Potidaea, and pleased, like a person who had returned after a long period, I went to my usual haunts for passing the time; and I entered the wrestling-place of Taureas, which is opposite to the temple, close by the portico of the court of the Archon-king. Here I fell in with very many persons, some unknown to me, but the greater part my acquaintances. As soon as they saw me entering unexpectedly, immediately from different sides they tendered at a distance their greetings. But Chærepho, as if he were mad, leaping from the midst of them, ran towards me, and taking me by the hand said;

Chaerephon/ How, Socrates, were you saved from the battle?

Socrates/ For a short time before we the Athenians came away, there was an engagement at Potidæa, of which those present here have just now heard.

And I answering him, said, Thus, as you see.

Chaerephon/ Indeed, it was reported here, that it was a hard-fought battle, and that many of our acquaintances had fallen in it.

Socrates/ And you were told what is very much the truth.

Chaerephon/ But, were you in the engagement?

Socrates/ I was.

Chaerephon/ Sit down here and tell us about it, for we have not yet clearly heard the whole.

Socrates/ And at the same time leading me along, he seated me near Critias, the son of Callæschrus. On sitting down then, I saluted Critias and the rest, and, according as anyone asked me, related what took place in the army. And some asked me one thing, and others another. And when we had had enough of such matters, I, in return, made inquiries about affairs here, as regards philosophy, what was its state at present; and respecting the young men, whether they had been remarkable for wisdom, or beauty, or both. Critias then, looking towards the door, and perceiving some young men entering and reviling each other, and another crowd following behind them, said;

Critias/ It appears to me, Socrates, with regard to beautiful youths, that you will know something on the instant. For those, who are now entering, are the forerunners and lovers of one, who is thought to be the most beautiful of all at the present time. And it appears to me, that, having advanced, he is already near.

Socrates/ But who is he, and of whom the son?

Critias/ You surely know, —although he was not yet grown up before you went away, Charmides, the son of our uncle Glauco, and my cousin.

Socrates/ I know him indeed, by Zeus; for he was not then to be despised, although but a boy; but now I think he must be almost a young man.

Critias/ You will immediately know of what age, and what kind he is.

Socrates/ And as he was thus speaking, Charmides entered. —And I, my friend, had no rule to go by; for with regard to handsome youths, I am a white rule; since nearly all young men appear to me to be beautiful. But he then appeared to me to be an object of wonder, both for his size and beauty; and all the rest seemed to me to be in love with

him; so astonished and so disturbed were they, when he entered. Many other lovers also followed among those, who were behind him. And as to the men like us indeed, this was less wonderful; but I also paid attention to the youths, and saw that none of them turned their eyes elsewhere than on him, not even the smallest among them, but all looked upon him, as on a statue. And Chæropho calling me, said;

Chaerephon/ What does the youth appear to you, Socrates? Is he not very beautiful?

Socrates/ Surpassingly.

Chaerephon/ And yet, if he were to undress, he would appear to be faceless, so very beautiful is his form.

Socrates/ And in this all the rest agreed with Chærepho. And by Hercules, I replied, you speak of a man not to be conquered, if only one small thing still happens to be his.

Critias/ What is that?

Socrates/ If in his soul, he should happen to be well formed; and it is surely becoming, Critias, for him to be so, as being one of your family.

Critias/ And he is very beautiful and good in this respect.

Socrates/ Why then, do we not strip off this very thing of his, and look upon it prior to his external form? For since he is of such an age, he will in every respect be willing to discourse.

Critias/ Very much so; since he is a philosopher, and, as it seems both to others and himself, very poetic.

Socrates/ This beauty, friend Critias, descends to you remotely, through your alliance to Solon. But why do you not call the youth hither, and present him to me? For it would be no disgrace for us to discourse with him, even if he were younger than he is, in the presence of yourself, who art his tutor and cousin.

Critias/ You speak well; and we will call him.

Socrates/ And at the same time turning to his attendant;

Critias/ Call, Charmides, and tell him that I wish to bring him in contact with a physician, touching the weakness of which he lately spoke to me.

Socrates/ Critias then said to me;

Critias/ Charmides lately has complained of a heaviness in his head when he rises in the morning. What then should hinder you from pretending to him, that you know of a cure for the head?

Socrates/ Nothing; let him only come.

Critias/ And come he shall.

Socrates/ Which was indeed the case; for he came, and caused much laughter. For each of us that were seated together, through eagerness to sit near Charmides, pushed his neighbor, till of those that were seated at the extremity, one we forced to rise up, and another to fall sideways on the ground. But he came and sat between me and Critias. Then, however, friend, I was perplexed, and the former confidence which I had felt, that I could easily discourse with Charmides, was cut down. But afterwards, on Critias telling him that I was the person who knew of a cure, he fixed his eyes upon me in a perplexing manner, and brought himself near as if to ask a question. Then all that were in the place of exercise, immediately gathered round us; and when, my noble fellow, I looked within his cloak, I was inflamed with the view, and was no longer myself; and I thought that Cydias was most wise in amatory affairs; who, when speaking of a beautiful boy, and giving a hint to another, said;

> "Beware, when coming in the face of lion,
> To take a portion of the flesh of fawn."

For I seemed to have been caught by an animal of this kind. However, on Charmides asking me whether I knew of a remedy for the disorder in his head, with difficulty I replied, that I did know.

Charmides/ What is it?

Socrates/ It is a certain leaf, and a certain incantation in addition to the medicine, which if anyone chanted and used at the same time as the leaf, the medicine could perfectly restore him to health; but that the leaf would be of no use without the incantation.

Charmides/ I will write down the incantation from you.

Socrates/ Will you do this, whether you persuade me or not?

Upon this he said, laughing;

Charmides/ I will, if I persuade you, Socrates.

Socrates/ Be it so; and do you accurately know my name?

Charmides/ Unless I am doing wrong; for there is no small talk about you amongst those of my age; and I can remember, too, that you associated with Critias when I was a boy.

Socrates/ You say well. For I will now tell you, with greater freedom of speech, what the incantation is. But just now I was doubtful after what manner I should show you its power. For this incantation is such, Charmides, that it is able to make not only the head sound; but, as perhaps you have already heard from clever physicians, when anyone comes to them with a pain in their eyes, who say that they must not attempt to cure the eyes alone, but that it is necessary for them at the same time to attend to the head, if the eyes are to be in a good state, and, on the other hand, that it would be great stupidity to think of attending to the head alone without the whole body. In consequence of this very reasoning, they turn themselves to the whole body, and

by diet and regimen endeavor to attend to and cure the part together with the whole. Or have you not heard that they thus speak, and that this is the case?

Charmides/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Does it then appear to you that it has been well said; and do you admit their doctrine?

Charmides/ The most of all things.

Socrates/ And I, on hearing him express his praise, took courage, and my confidence was again a little excited and I revived; and such then, Charmides, is the power of this incantation; and I learnt it there during the expedition, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zamolxis, who are said to render men even immortal. This Thracian said that "the Greek physicians beautifully assert the same things as I now assert. But our king Zamolxis," said he, "being a god, says that, as it is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the body, so neither is it proper to cure the body without the soul; and that this was the reason why many diseases escape the Greek physicians, because they are ignorant of the whole, to which attention ought to be paid; for when this is not in a good state, it is impossible for a part to be well. For all things," said he, "proceed from the soul, both the good and bad, to the body and to the whole man, and flow from thence, as from the head to the eyes; and that it is therefore requisite to attend to that point first, and especially if the parts of the head and the rest of the body are to be in a good state." And he said, thou happy youth, "that the soul was cured by certain incantations; and that these incantations were beautiful reasons; and that such temperance was generated in the soul, which, when generated and present, can easily impart health both to the head and to the rest of the body." Having then taught me the medicine and the incantations, "Let

none," said he, "persuade you to cure his head with this medicine, who shall not have first presented his soul to be cured by you with the incantation. For the fault, said he, of the present time respecting men is this, that certain persons endeavor to become physicians without a knowledge of either temperance or health." And he very earnestly enjoined me that no person should be so rich, or noble, or beautiful as to persuade me to act otherwise. I therefore, for I swore to him that I would obey him, and hence I must, will obey him. And indeed if you are willing, according to the injunctions of the stranger, to present your soul first for me to enchant by the incantations of the Thracian, I will administer also the medicine to your head; but if not, I cannot do anything whatever for you, friend Charmides.

Critias therefore, on hearing me speak thus, observed;

Critias/ This weakness in his head, Socrates, will be a godsend to the youth, if he shall be compelled to become through his head better in his intellect likewise. I assure you moreover that Charmides is thought to surpass all his equals, not only in his form, but in that very thing for which you say you have an incantation. Now you mean temperance. Is it not so?

Socrates/ Entirely so.

Critias/ Know then, that he appears to be by far the most temperate of those living at present; and that as regard all other points he is, as far as his age goes, inferior to none.

Socrates/ And it is just, Charmides, that you should excel the others in all such points as these. For I do not think that anyone of those here could readily show two families among the Athenians uniting in the same race, who could probably produce a more beautiful and excellent offspring than those from whom you are sprung. For your family on the father's side, that of Critias the son of Dropides, has been handed to

us as being celebrated by Anacreon and Solon, and many other poets, for its excelling in beauty, and virtue, and the rest of what is called good fortune. And on his mother's side again in like manner. For not one of those that dwell on the continent of Asia is said to have been thought a man of greater beauty and size than your uncle Pyrilampes, as often as he went as an ambassador to the great king of Persia, or to anyone else on the continent; and indeed the whole of his family on this side is in nothing inferior to that on the other. It is likely then that, sprung from such persons, you should be the first in all things. Hence, with respect to your visible form, you appear, thou dear son of Glauco, to me to disgrace none of your ancestors; and if, according to the assertion of this person here, you are sufficiently endued by nature as regards temperance and the other virtues, your mother, dear Charmides, has brought you forth blessed indeed. The case, then, is this: If temperance is present with you, as Critias here asserts, and you are sufficiently temperate, you will no longer require the incantations, either of Zamolxis, or the Hyperborean Abaris, but the medicine for the head should be immediately given you. But if you seem to be still in any respect wanting in these things, we must have the incantation before giving the medicine. Do you then tell me yourself whether you agree with this here Critias, and affirm that you participate sufficiently in temperance, or whether you are deficient. Hereupon Charmides, blushing, appeared in the first place to be still more beautiful, for bashfulness was suited to his age, and in the next, he answered me not without spirit. For, said he;

Charmides/ It was not easy at present either to confess to or deny what was asked: for, if I say that I am not temperate, it would be absurd for me to state so against myself, and at the same time I should show that Critias has spoken falsely, and many others, to whom I appear to be

temperate: but if, on the other hand, I say that I am temperate, by thus praising myself, I shall perhaps give offence: so that I do not know how to answer you.

Socrates/ You appear to me, Charmides, to say what is reasonable; and it seems we should consider in common whether you possess or not that, which I am asking about, that you may neither be compelled to say what you do not wish, nor I, on the other hand, turn myself without due consideration to the medical art. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, I am willing to consider this matter together with you; but if it is not, to leave it alone.

Charmides/ Nay, but it is the most agreeable to me of all things; so that for this matter at least do you consider it in whatever manner appears to you to be the better.

Socrates/ In this way then, the inquiry respecting it seems to me to be the best, if temperance is present with you, for it is evident that you have some opinion about it; for it is surely necessary that if it is really inherent in you, it must furnish some sensation of itself, from which you would have an opinion respecting it, what it is, and of what kind a thing is temperance. Or do you not think so?

Charmides/ I do think so.

Socrates/ And could you not surely tell me, since you know how to speak Greek, what you think of it, and what it appears to you?

Charmides/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ That we may therefore conjecture, whether it is inherent in you or not, tell me, what say you is temperance according to your opinion? And at first, indeed, he was shy and not altogether willing to answer. Afterwards, however, he said;

Charmides/ that temperance appears to consist in doing all things orderly and quietly, both in walking and

discoursing in the public ways, and acting similarly in everything else; and, in short, a certain quietness appears to be what you are asking about.

Socrates/ Are you then speaking correctly? At least, Charmides, persons say that the quiet are temperate. But let us see if they say anything to the purpose. For, tell me, is not temperance one of the things beautiful?

Charmides/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Whether then in a grammar-school is it more beautiful to write letters of the same size swiftly or slowly?

Charmides/ Swiftly.

Socrates/ And in reading, swiftly or slowly?

Charmides/ Swiftly.

Socrates/ And in playing on the harp, rapidly, and in wrestling, briskly, than quietly and slowly?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is there not the like in boxing, and contests where boxing and wrestling are united?

Charmides/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And in running and leaping, and all other actions of the body, do not those that take place briskly and rapidly belong to the beautiful, and those that are done slowly, with difficulty, and quietly, to the not beautiful?

Charmides/ It appears so.

Socrates/ It appears then to us, that with respect to the body, not the quiet, but the most rapid, and most brisk, are the most beautiful. Is it not so?

Charmides/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But temperance was something beautiful?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ Not quietness, therefore, but celerity will be the more temperate with respect to the body; since temperance is beautiful.

Charmides/ It seems so.

Socrates/ What then, is a facility in learning more beautiful than a difficulty?

Charmides/ It is.

Socrates/ But a facility in learning is to learn swiftly; and a difficulty in learning is to learn quietly and slowly.

Charmides/ It is.

Socrates/ And is it not more beautiful to teach another swiftly and vehemently, than quietly and slowly?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ What then, is it more beautiful to recollect and to remember things quietly and slowly, or vehemently and rapidly?

Charmides/ Vehemently and rapidly.

Socrates/ And is not sagacity a certain acuteness, and not a quietness of the soul?

Charmides/ True.

Socrates/ To understand then what is meant in the school of the grammarian, harpist, and everywhere else, not in the most quiet, but in the most rapid manner, is the most beautiful.

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ Moreover in the investigations of the soul, and in deliberating, not he, who is the most quiet, as I think, and deliberates and discovers a thing with difficulty, is worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and rapidly.

Charmides/ It is so.

Socrates/ Hence all things relating to the soul and the body, and such as are performed with quickness and briskness, appear to be more beautiful than such as are performed with slowness and quietness.

Charmides/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Temperance then will not be quietness, nor will a temperate life be a quiet one, at least from this reasoning; since a temperate one ought to be beautiful. For one of two things must take place, that either never, or very rarely, have quiet actions in life been shown to be more beautiful than such as are swift and strenuous. If then, my friend, not fewer actions, as quiet as possible, happen to be more beautiful than such as are vehement and rapid, not even on this ground would temperance consist at all the more in acting quietly, than vehemently and rapidly, either in walking or in speaking, or in anything else; nor would a quiet orderly life be more temperate than the unquiet one; since by our reasoning, temperance has been laid down as one of things beautiful; and things swift have appeared to be no less beautiful than things quiet.

Charmides/ You appear to me, Socrates, to have spoken correctly.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, Charmides, be still more attentive, and looking to yourself, consider what kind of a person temperance, when present, causes you to be, and being what sort of a thing itself, it would accomplish this. Reasoning, therefore, on all these particulars, inform me well, and in a manly manner, what it appears to you.

And he, stopping a while, considering the matter thoroughly with himself, said, in a very manly manner;

Charmides/ Temperance then seems to me to make a man ashamed and bashful: and temperance to be what shame is.

Socrates/ Be it so. But did you not just now acknowledge that temperance is something beautiful?

Charmides/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Are not therefore temperate, good men?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ Will therefore that be good, which does not render men good?

Charmides/ It will not.

Socrates/ Temperance, therefore, is not only beautiful, but good.

Charmides/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ What then, will you not believe that Homer speaks well, when he says;

Shame ill accompanies a man in need?

Charmides/ I do.

Socrates/ Shame, therefore, as it seems, is both not good, and good.

Charmides/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But temperance is good; since it makes those good, to whom it is present, but by no means bad.

Charmides/ The case appears to me to be as you say.

Socrates/ Temperance, therefore, will not be shame, if it happens to be a good thing, while shame is not in any respect more a good thing than a bad one.

Charmides/ It appears to me, Socrates, that this is rightly asserted. But consider this, what seems to you on the subject of temperance. For I have just now recollected what I had heard someone saying, that temperance is to manage one's own affairs. Consider, therefore, this, whether he, who says so, appears to you to have spoken correctly.

Socrates/ Thou vile youth! you have heard this from Critias, or from some other of the sophists.

Critias/ It seems, from some other person; for he did not from me.

Charmides/ But what difference does it make, Socrates, from whom I heard it?

Socrates/ None at all For we are not to consider this, who said it, but whether it is said correctly or not.

Charmides/ Now you speak correctly.

Socrates/ By Zeus, I do. But if we discover how this thing subsists, I shall wonder: for it is similar to a certain enigma.

Charmides/ On what account?

Socrates/ Because, the person, who said that temperance is to manage one's own affairs, did not mean what his words expressed. Or do you think that the teacher of letters does nothing when he writes or reads?

Charmides/ I think he does something.

Socrates/ Does the teacher of letters, therefore, appear to you to write and read his own name only, or to instruct you boys? And are ye not wont to write no less the names of your enemies than of your friends?

Charmides/ No less.

Socrates/ When, therefore, ye were doing this, were ye busily employed, and not temperate?

Charmides/ By no means.

Socrates/ And, moreover, were ye not doing your own business, if to write, and to read, is to do something?

Charmides/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ And besides, my friend, to heal, and to build, and to weave, and to effect by any art whatever any of the works belonging to arts, is surely to do something.

Charmides/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ What then, would that city appear to you to be well regulated through a law commanding each person to weave and wash his own garment, and to be the cobbler of his own shoes, and make an oil-cruse, and curry-comb, and everything according to the same reasoning, but not to touch things belonging to others, but to work and manage his own affairs?

Charmides/ It would not appear to me so.

Socrates/ However, a city temperately regulated would be well regulated.

Charmides/ How not?

Socrates/ For a man, therefore, to do such things as these, and to manage his own affairs, would not be temperance.

Charmides/ It appears not.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who said, that to manage one's own business is temperance, spoke, as I just now observed, obscurely; for he was surely not so stupid that his meaning should be the same as his words. Or did you, Charmides, hear some silly person assert this?

Charmides/ By no means; since he appeared to be very wise.

Socrates/ More than anything, therefore, as it seems to me, he proposed this enigma, because it is difficult to know what is the transacting one's own affairs.

Charmides/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Can you then tell me, what it is to transact one's own affairs?

Charmides/ By Zeus, I do not know. But perhaps there is nothing to hinder the person, who said this, from not knowing what he meant.

Socrates/ And as he said this, he slightly smiled and looked at Critias. And it was now evident that Critias, who had been for some while in an agony, and stimulated by ambition in the presence of Charmides and those there, and who had with difficulty contained himself, was then no longer able to do so. And it appeared to me more than ever, that what I suspected was true, that Charmides had heard this definition of temperance from Critias. Charmides, therefore, being willing not to support himself the reason for the reply, but that the other Critias should do so, and urged him on himself, showed as if he thought him confuted. This Critias could not endure; but appeared to me to be angry with Charmides, as a poet is with an actor who exhibits his poems badly; so that, looking at him, he said;

Critias/ Think you thus, Charmides, that, if you do not know what he meant, who said, that temperance is to manage one's own affairs, he did not know?

Socrates/ It is, Critias, thou best of men, no wonder that Charmides, who is but a youth, should not know; but it is surely likely for you to know, both on account of your age and attention to the subject. If then you agree that temperance is, what this person asserts, and will take up from him the conversation, I shall with greater pleasure consider with you whether what has been said is true or not.

Critias/ Nay, I do agree, entirely, and accept the conversation.

Socrates/ And you do well. But tell me, do you admit what I was just now asking, that all artists do something?

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ Do they appear to you to do only their own business, or the business of others likewise?

Critias/ Of others likewise.

Socrates/ Do they act temperately, therefore, who only do their own business?

Critias/ What should prevent them?

Socrates/ Not myself at all; but see whether there be not a hindrance to him, who, after having laid down that temperance is to transact one's own affairs, afterwards says, that nothing prevents those who transact the affairs of others from being temperate likewise.

Critias/ For where have I confessed that they, who transact the affairs of others, are temperate, like those, who I confessed make something?

Socrates/ Tell me, do you not say that to "make" a thing and to do is the same thing?

Critias/ Not I indeed, nor "to work" the same as "to make," for I have learned so from Hesiod, who says, "No work is a disgrace.", Think you, then, that if he had called by the terms of "to work" and "to make," such acts as you were just now speaking of, he would have said that there was no disgrace to a person being a cobbler, or a seller of pickled fish, or of one who sits at a brothel?, You must not think so, Socrates: but he I think did consider "a making" as something different from "action" and "working;" and that "making" is a disgrace, when it does not take place in conjunction with the beautiful; but that no "work" is ever a disgrace. For things which are made beautiful and useful, he called "works," and "makings" of this kind workings and doings. You must say too that he considered such things good alone as belong to home; but everything hurtful, as foreign. Hence, you must think that Hesiod, and every other sensible person, calls him, who transacts his own affairs, temperate.

Socrates/ As soon, Critias, as you began to speak, I perceived almost, that you called things belonging to home, a person's own by the name of good, and "the making" of

things good, actions. For I have heard Prodicus, when speaking of terms, make some ten thousand distinctions; and I will allow you to lay down every term as you please; but do you only clearly state, to what you would refer the term, of which you may be speaking. Now therefore again from the beginning define more clearly. Do you say that temperance is the “doing,” or the “making,” or in whatever manner you choose to call it, of good things?

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ He therefore is not temperate who acts badly, but he who acts well.

Critias/ Does it not, thou best of men, appear so to you?

Socrates/ Dismiss this question for let us not consider what appears to me, but what you are saying now.

Critias/ Nay, I do not assert that he is temperate, who does not do good but evil, but that he is temperate, who does good and not evil. For I clearly define to you, that temperance is the practice of things good.

Socrates/ And perhaps there is nothing to prevent you from speaking the truth. But nevertheless I should wonder, if you thought that persons who conduct themselves temperately were ignorant that they are temperate.

Critias/ But I do not think so.

Socrates/ Was it not, asserted by you a little before, that there is nothing to prevent artists, who make on the other hand things belonging to others, from being temperate?

Critias/ It was so asserted by me; but what then?

Socrates/ Nothing. But tell me, does any physician appear to you, while making a person to be in health, to do what is useful both to himself, and to him whom he cures?

Critias/ To me he does.

Socrates/ Does not he, then, who acts thus, do what is fitting?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not he temperate, who does what is fitting?

Critias/ He is temperate.

Socrates/ Is it not then fitting for a physician to know when he is curing usefully, and when not? and for each artist to know, when he will derive a benefit from the work which he is doing, and when not?

Critias/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ Sometimes then, when a physician acts usefully or hurtfully, he does not know himself how he is acting; although, according to your doctrine, when he acts usefully, he acts temperately; or did you not say so?

Critias/ I did.

Socrates/ Does it not then seem, that sometimes, when he acts usefully, he acts temperately, and is temperate, but is ignorant himself that he is temperate?

Critias/ But this, Socrates, could never take place; yet if you think that this necessarily results from what I have admitted above, I would rather retract some of those assertions; nor should I be ashamed to confess that I have improperly asserted something, rather than admit that the man, who is ignorant of himself, is temperate. For I almost assert, that to know oneself is temperance; and I agree with him who placed the precept upon the temple at Delphi, as being an address from the god to the comers, instead of "Hail!" Since this last to hail is not a correct address, nor should we exhort each other to this, but to be temperate. Thus the god addresses those coming to the temple, in a manner somewhat different to what men do; as he had in his mind, it appears to me, who put up the inscription; and he

says to the person coming nothing else than “be temperate;” but, as being a prophet, he expresses it more enigmatically. For “Know thyself,” and “Be temperate,” is the same thing, as both the writings and myself assert. But perhaps someone may think it to be different; which appears to me to have been the case with those, who placed the subsequent inscriptions, “Nothing too much,” and “A surety is near to calamity.” For they thought that “Know thyself” was a bit of advice, and not an address from the god for the sake of the comers; and then, that they might put up bits of advice not less useful, they put up these inscriptions. Now the reason, Socrates, for the sake of which I am saying all these things, is this, that I give up to you all that has been said before; for perhaps you have spoken more correctly about them; and perhaps, too, I; and there is, of what we have said, nothing very clear. But now I am willing to give you the reason for this, if you do not concede, that temperance is to know oneself.

Socrates/ But, Critias, you come against me, as if I asserted that I had a knowledge of what I am asking about, and if I wish, having agreed with you. But this is not the case. For I am seeking with you continually what is placed before us, through being myself ignorant. Hence, after having considered, I am willing to say whether I agree or not. But do you stop, till I have considered.

Critias/ Consider then.

Socrates/ I do consider.

For if to know a thing is temperance, it is evident that temperance would be some science, and of something. Or would it not?

Critias/ It is, and of itself.

Socrates/ Is not then medical science, the science of that which is healthy?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If then, you should ask me, for what is the medical science of that, which is healthy, useful to us, and what does it effect, I should reply, that it is of no small utility, because it effects for us health, a beautiful work. Do you admit this?

Critias/ I do admit it.

Socrates/ And if then you should ask me, what work does house-building, which is the science of house-building, effect, I should say, dwellings; and I should reply in a similar manner with respect to other arts. Since then, Critias, you say that temperance is the science of itself, you must, when asked, be able to tell in behalf of temperance, what beautiful work does temperance, being the science of itself, effect, and which deserves to be mentioned. Come then, tell me.

Critias/ Nay but, Socrates, you do not make the inquiry correctly. For temperance is not naturally similar to the other sciences, nor are the other sciences similar, some to some, and others to others. But you make your inquiry, as if they were similar. For tell me, what work is there in the calculating or geometric art, which is of the like nature with a dwelling, the work of the house-building art? or with that of a garment, the work of the weaving art? and in other works of such a kind, many of which anyone would be able to show, as belonging to many arts? Can you in these show me any such work? You will not be able.

Socrates/ You speak the truth. But this I can show, of what thing each of these sciences is the science, and which is something different from the science itself. Thus, for instance, the calculating science is the science of the even and the odd, how they are situated as regards multitude, with respect to themselves and to each other. Is it not?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, the even and the odd different from the calculating science?

Critias/ How not?

Socrates/ Moreover, the weighing science is that relating to a heavier and lighter weight; now the heavy and the light are different from the weighing science itself. Do you agree to this?

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ Tell me then, of what is temperance the science, and which is different from temperance itself?

Critias/ This is that very thing, Socrates, to which you have arrived by seeking in what point does temperance differ from all the other sciences: but you are seeking after some similitude in it to other sciences. This, however, is not the case. For all the other sciences are sciences of another thing, but not of themselves; but this alone is both the science of other sciences and of itself likewise. And these things ought to be far from lying hid from you. But I think you are doing the very thing, which you just now said you were not doing: for you are attempting to confute me, after leaving alone that, about which is our discourse.

Socrates/ What are you doing, by your thinking that if I should confute you as much as possible, I should do it on any other account, than for the sake of thoroughly searching out what I mean myself; as I am fearful lest, whilst I think I know something, I am unconsciously knowing nothing? And now I say I am doing this, while considering the argument, principally indeed for my own sake, but perhaps also for the sake of the rest of our friends. Or do you not think it is a good, common for nearly all men, that each thing should become apparent in what state it is?

Critias/ Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Boldly then, O give, thou blessed man, an answer when asked, how the matter appears to you, and leave, whether it is Critias or Socrates who is confuted, to go hang; but giving your attention to the reasoning itself, consider whither it will go, when confuted.

Critias/ I shall do so: for you appear to me to speak with moderation.

Socrates/ Tell me then, what do you mean on the question of temperance?

Critias/ I mean then, that this alone, of all other sciences, is both the science of itself and of the other sciences.

Socrates/ Will it then, be the science of ignorance, since it is of science?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ The temperate man therefore alone will know himself, and be able to examine what it is he happens to know, and what he does not; and in like manner he will be able to look into the rest of things, what it is that a person knows, and thinks he knows, if indeed he knows, and what on the other hand he thinks he knows, but does not know; but no other person will be able. And this then is to be temperate; and it is temperance, and the knowledge of oneself, to know what one knows, and what one does not know. Are these the things you assert?

Critias/ They are.

Socrates/ Again then, let us consider the third point from the beginning, as if it were the cup to the savior deity. In the first place, whether it is possible or not to know, with respect to what a person knows, and does not know, that he does know, and does not know; and, in the next place, if this be ever so completely possible, what will be the utility of it, to us, who know it.

Critias/ It is requisite, to consider this.

Socrates/ Come then, Critias, and consider whether you are more able to find a way on these points than myself. For I am in doubt, and where I am in doubt I will tell you.

Critias/ By all means.

Socrates/ The following consequence then will ensue, if there be, what you just now asserted, some one science, which is the science of nothing else than itself and the rest of the sciences, and of ignorance besides.

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ See then, my friend, how absurdly we have endeavored to argue. For if you consider this very same thing in other matters, it will, I think, appear to you to be impossible.

Critias/ How and where?

Socrates/ In these. For consider, whether it appears to you that a seeing power exists, which is not the seeing power of those things, which are the objects of the rest of seeing powers, but is the seeing power of itself and the rest of seeing powers, and similarly of not seeing powers; and though it is a seeing power, it does not see any color, but sees itself and the rest of the seeing powers. Does it appear to you that there is such a seeing power as this?

Critias/ By Zeus, it does not to me at least.

Socrates/ What then say you to the hearing power, which does not hear any sound, but hears itself, and the rest of the hearing powers, and the non-hearing power besides?

Critias/ Nor yet this.

Socrates/ To speak briefly then, consider with respect to all the senses, whether it appears to you that there is any sense, which perceives other senses and itself, but perceives none of those things which the other senses perceive.

Critias/ It does not appear to me at least.

Socrates/ But does it appear to you that there is any desire, which is the desire of no pleasure, but is the desire of itself and of the rest of desires?

Critias/ It does not.

Socrates/ Nor, as I think, is there any will, which wills no good, but wills itself alone and the rest of wills.

Critias/ There is not.

Socrates/ But would you say that there is a love of such a kind, as to be the love of nothing beautiful, but which is the love of itself and the rest of loves?

Critias/ Not I.

Socrates/ Have you ever conceived that there is any fear, which fears itself and the rest of fears, but fears nothing fearful?

Critias/ I have not conceived.

Socrates/ And have you conceived any fancy, which fancies fancies and itself, but which forms no fancy respecting those things, which are the subjects of the rest of fancies?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ But we say, as it seems, that there is a science of such a kind, as to be the science of no learning, but the science of itself and the rest of sciences.

Critias/ We do say so.

Socrates/ Would it not be strange if there were such a science? For let us not strenuously assert that there is not, but consider if there be.

Critias/ Right.

Socrates/ Come then, there is this science, the science of something; and it does possess some such power, as to be the science of something. Is it so?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ For we also say that the greater possesses some such power, as to be greater than something?

Critias/ It does so possess.

Socrates/ Is it not then greater than something less, if it is greater?

Critias/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ If therefore we should find something greater, which is greater than the greater and than itself, but which is not greater than any of those things than which the rest of things are greater, it would surely be in this situation, that if it is greater than itself, it would be also less than itself?

Critias/ Of this there is, Socrates, a great necessity.

Socrates/ If therefore there is anything which is the double of the rest of doubles and of itself, it will be the double of the rest of doubles and of itself, in consequence of its being the half; for nothing can be the double of anything else than of the half.

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ But being more than itself, will it not also be less than itself? and being heavier, be lighter than itself? and being older, be younger than itself? and similarly as regards all other properties? For whatever has a power of its own with respect to itself, will it not possess likewise that existence, to which that power is related? I mean some such thing as this. For instance, we say that hearing is nothing else than a hearing of sound. —Is it not so?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ If therefore it could hear itself, would it not hear itself, as having a voice? For otherwise it would not hear.

Critias/ This is perfectly necessary.

Socrates/ The sight too, thou best of men, if it could itself see itself, must necessarily have some color. For sight would never be able to see anything colorless.

Critias/ It would not.

Socrates/ You see therefore, Critias. that the matters we have gone through, appear to us to be, some of them, altogether impossible; and of others it is greatly disbelieved that they could have a power of their own with respect to themselves. For as regards magnitudes, multitudes, and things of this kind, it is perfectly impossible. Or is it not?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Again, that hearing hears itself, and sight sees itself, and that motion moves itself, and heat burns itself, and all other such like assertions, would bring disbelief to some, but to some perhaps not. There is then, my friend, a need of some great man to draw sufficiently a distinction through all things on this point, whether of existing things not one except science has naturally a power of its own with respect to itself, but with respect to another thing, or that some have, and some not: and again, if there are certain things, which have a power with respect to themselves, whether amongst these is the science, which we say is temperance. For I do not believe myself to be sufficient to draw such a distinction. Hence I am not able to affirm positively, whether it is possible for this to take place, that there is a science of science; nor, if there is, will I admit that temperance is that science, until I have considered whether, being such, it would be useful to us, or not. For I divine that temperance is something useful and good. Do you then, son of Callæschrus, —since you lay down that temperance is this science of a science, and likewise of a not-science, —show in the first place this; that what I have just now mentioned it is possible for you to show; and in the next place, in addition

to its being possible, show that it is useful; and thus perhaps you will satisfy me that you are correctly speaking about temperance, what it is.

On Critias hearing this, and seeing that I was in doubt, he did, as they do, who, through looking in the face of those, who are gaping, are affected in the very same way; and he seemed to me to be compelled by my doubting to be seized with a doubt himself. However, being in great repute on every occasion, he felt a shame before those who were present; and was neither willing to concede that he was unable to draw the distinction on points that I had proposed to him, nor did he say anything clearly, but concealed his perplexity. But, —in order that the discourse might proceed, if it seems good to you, Critias, let us now concede this, that it is possible for a science of a science to exist. But let us consider again whether it is or not in this way. Come then, if it is in the highest degree possible, in what way is it the more possible to know what a person does know, and what he does not? For we surely said that this is to know oneself, and to be temperate. Or did we not?

Critias/ Entirely so; and this happens in a certain respect to be the case, Socrates. For if anyone possesses the science, which knows itself, he will be such as that is which he possesses. Just as when anyone possesses swiftness, he is swift; and when beauty, is beautiful; and when knowledge, is knowing. So too when anyone possesses the knowledge, that knows itself, he will surely then become knowing himself.

Socrates/ I do not doubt that when anyone possesses that, which knows itself, he will be then knowing himself; but, what necessity is there for the person who possesses this knowledge, to know what he knows, and what he does not know?

Critias/ Because, Socrates, this is the same with that.

Socrates/ Perhaps so; but I am near to being always similar to myself. For I do not well understand how it is the same thing for a person to know, what he knows, and to know what he does not know.

Critias/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Thus. Since there is a science of science, will it be able to draw a distinction more than this; that of these things this is a science, and that is ignorance?

Critias/ It will not; but thus far alone.

Socrates/ Is the science, then, and ignorance of that, which is healthful, the same with the science and ignorance of that, which is just?

Critias/ By no means; but the one is, I think, a medical, and the other a political science; but this is nothing else than a science. —How not?

Socrates/ He therefore who does not know the healthy and the just, but knows only a science, as alone possessing a science of this, that he knows something, and that he possesses a certain science, would probably have a knowledge respecting both himself and the other things. Is it not so?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But how will he by this science know what he knows? For he knows the healthful by medical science, and not by temperance; and the harmonical by musical science, and not by temperance; and house-building by house-building science, and not by temperance; and so in everything else. Is it not so?

Critias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But how by temperance, if it is only a science of sciences, will he know that it knows the salubrious, or house-building?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ The person then ignorant of this will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.

Critias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ To know then what he knows and what he does not know, will not be to be temperate, nor will it be temperance, but, as it seems, only that he knows, and that he does not know.

Critias/ It nearly appears so.

Socrates/ Nor will this person be able to examine another, who professes to know something, whether he knows, or does not, what he says he knows; but as it seems he will only know thus much, that he possesses a certain science, but of what thing, temperance will not cause him to know.

Critias/ It does not appear it will.

Socrates/ Neither then will he be able to distinguish one who pretends to be a physician, but is not, from one who is a true physician; nor anyone else of those who are skilled or who are not. But let us view it from these points. If a temperate man, or any other person, intends to distinguish the true and false physician, will he not act in this way? He will not discourse with him respecting the medical science; for, as we have said, a physician attends to nothing but the healthy and the diseased, the salubrious and the noxious. Is it not so?

Critias/ It is.

Socrates/ But of science he knows nothing; for this we have attributed to temperance alone.

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ The physician therefore will not know anything of the medical art, since the medical art is a science.

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ And the temperate man will know, that the physician possesses a certain science; but someone else will look into the science of the physician, what it is, and of what things; which is then laid open, when it is known of what things it is the science. Or is not each science defined by this, by not only being a science, but by being what, and of what things?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the medical science has been defined to be different from the rest of sciences by its being the science of the healthy and diseased.

Critias/ It is.

Socrates/ Is it not therefore necessary, for the person wishing to consider the medical science, to view it in the things in which it is? For it is surely not to be considered in things external, in which it is not.

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ He therefore who considers rightly, will consider a physician, so far as he is a physician, in things healthy and diseased.

Critias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ In what is thus either said or done, he will be considering whether what is said is said truly, and what is done is done correctly?

Critias/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ But could anyone without medical science be able to follow either method?

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor yet can any other person, as it seems, but the physician, nor truly the temperate man. For he would be a physician in addition to temperance.

Critias/ So it is.

Socrates/ More than all, if temperance is merely the science of a science, and of ignorance, it will be able to distinguish neither the physician, who knows his art, nor him, who does not; the person who pretends to be, and him, who thinks he is a physician; nor any other person, who knows anything whatever, except a fellow-artist, as is the case with other operatives.

Critias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ What utility then, Critias, shall we derive from temperance, if it is of such a kind? For if, as we laid down at the beginning, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know, the former because he knows, and the latter because he does not know, and if he were able to consider respecting another person affected in the very same manner, there would, we assert, be some vast utility to us in being temperate. For both we, who possess temperance, and all the rest that were governed by us, would have passed through life without fault; for we should neither ourselves have endeavored to do anything, which we did not know, but finding out those who did know, we should have handed over those things to them; nor should we have permitted to the rest of those, whom we commanded, to do anything else than what by doing they would do well; now this would be that, of which they possessed a knowledge. And thus a family governed by temperance, would be about to be well governed, and a state correctly administered, and everything else, over which temperance rules. For error being taken away, and rectitude being the leader in every action, it is necessary for the persons thus situated to act honorably and

well, and for those who act well, to be happy. Were we not, Critias, speaking in this manner about temperance, saying how great a good it is to know what one does know, and what one does not know?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But now, you see that no such science has appeared to us anywhere.

Critias/ I see it.

Socrates/ Has not therefore, temperance, which we have now found to be that, which knows both science and ignorance, this good, that he who possesses it, will easily learn whatever else he may attempt to learn, and all things will appear in a clearer point of view to him, inasmuch as he is looking upon the science, which relates to each thing he may learn? And will he not examine other persons better respecting what he may learn? And must not they, who examine others without this, do it in a more weak and trifling manner? Are these, my friend, the things we enjoy through temperance? and do we look to something greater, and seek for it to be greater than it is?

Critias/ Perhaps, this would be the case.

Socrates/ Perhaps so; but perhaps too we have sought after nothing useful. And I conjecture so, because certain absurdities distinctly present themselves to me respecting temperance, if it be of such a nature. For let us see, if you please, admitting that it is possible for science to know, and, what we laid down at the beginning, that temperance is to know what it does know, and what it does not know, let us not take this away, but concede it; and having conceded all these points, let us still better consider, if being such it will benefit us at all. For what we just now said, that temperance would, if it were of such a nature, be a great good, by

regulating families and states, appears to me, Critias, to have been not correctly conceded.

Critias/ How so.

Socrates/ Because, we too easily conceded that it would be a great good to mankind, if each of us performed those things which we knew, and committed those, which we did not know, to persons who did know.

Critias/ Did we not then, rightly concede?

Socrates/ To me, we did not appear so.

Critias/ You are speaking, Socrates, really absurdly.

Socrates/ By the dog, so it appears to me. And just now, looking to these points, that they seemed to me to be absurd, and that I was afraid we had not rightly considered them. For in reality, if temperance be ever so much of such a nature, it does not appear evident to me, what good it will effect for us.

Critias/ How is this? speak, that we may also know what you mean.

Socrates/ I fancy, that I am trifling; nevertheless it is necessary to consider that, which presents itself to our view, and not carelessly to pass it by, if anyone takes the least thought of himself.

Critias/ You speak well.

Socrates/ Hear then, my dream, no matter whether it has passed through the gate of horn or ivory. For if temperance ruled us ever so much, would it not, being such as we have now defined it, be acted upon according to the sciences; and neither would he, who boasts to be a pilot when he is not, deceive us; nor would a physician, or a general of an army, or any other person, who pretends to know that, which he does not know, lie hid from us. But from this state of things something else would happen to us; for our bodies would be

more healthy than at present, and we should be preserved, when in danger at sea and in war; and all our utensils and garments, and all our shoes, and all the necessaries of life, all things else, would be made more scientifically through our employing true artists. And if you are willing, let us grant that prophecy is the science of that which is to be; and that temperance, presiding over it, turns away the boastful diviners, but appoints over us the true prophets of things to come. Furnished then in this way, the human race would, I concede, act and live scientifically. For temperance being our guard, it would not permit ignorance to interfere and cooperate with us. But that, by acting scientifically, we should do well and be happy, this, friend Critias, I am not yet able to understand.

Critias/ But, you will not however easily find any other method of doing well, if you despise the doing a thing scientifically.

Socrates/ Instruct me then still a little, of what scientifically doing are you speaking? Is it that of leather-cutting?

Critias/ By Zeus, it is not.

Socrates/ Is it that of brass-work?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ But is it that of working in wool, or wood, or any such things?

Critias/ It is not.

Socrates/ We do then, no longer persist in the assertion, that he is happy, who lives scientifically. For those artists, although living scientifically, are confessed by you to be not happy; but you seem to me to separate the happy man from them, when they possess a science of certain things. And perhaps you call happy the diviner, whom I just now

mentioned, who knows all that is to be. Do you mean this, or any other person?

Critias/ Both this, and another.

Socrates/ What other? You surely do not speak of the person, who knows, in addition to future events, everything past and present, and is ignorant of nothing; for let us admit that there is such a man, you will not say, I think, that anyone lives more scientifically than he at least does.

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But this also I desiderate. —Which of the sciences makes him happy? Or do all the sciences equally produce this effect?

Critias/ By no means equally.

Socrates/ But which the most? Is it that, by which he knows some of things present, past, and to come? Is it that, by which he knows the science of back-gammon?

Critias/ What back-gammon?

Socrates/ But is it that, by which he knows the calculating science?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ But is it that, by which he knows things healthful.

Critias/ Rather so?

Socrates/ But is it, that, of which I am speaking especially, by which he knows what?

Critias/ By which he knows good and evil.

Socrates/ O thou vile man; who for some while hast been drawing me round in a circle, concealing from me, that to live scientifically was not the causing to do well and to be happy, nor belonging to all the other sciences, but to one science alone, relating to good and evil. Since, Critias, if you were willing to take away this last science from the other

sciences, the physician's science will no less cause one to be healthy; and that of the shoe-maker, to be shod; and that of the weaver, to be clad; and no less the pilot's science prevent one from losing one's life at sea, and the general's science in war?

Critias/ No less.

Socrates/ But, friend Critias, by this science being absent, it will be no longer left for each of those other sciences to turn out well and usefully.

Critias/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ But this science, as it seems, is not temperance, but that, the work of which is to benefit us: for it is not the science of sciences and ignorances, but that of good and evil. So that if this be useful, temperance would be something else than useful.

Critias/ What then, would not temperance be useful? For if temperance is as much as possible a science of sciences, and presides over the other sciences, it will surely benefit us by ruling over that science which relates to the good.

Socrates/ But will temperance, cause us to be in health, and not the medical science? And will this perform the rest of the works of the arts, and not the rest, each its own work? Or did we not some time since testify that temperance is a science of science, and ignorance alone, but of nothing else? Is it not so?

Critias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ It is not then the worker of health.

Critias/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ For health is the work of another art. Is it not?

Critias/ Of another.

Socrates/ Nor is it, my friend, of utility; for we attributed this very work to another art. Did we not?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ How then will temperance be beneficial, since it is the worker of no utility?

Critias/ By no means, Socrates, as it seems.

Socrates/ Do you not see then, Critias, that I felt very properly some time since a fear, and justly blamed myself, because I could descry nothing useful about temperance? For that which is confessed to be the most beautiful of all things, would not have appeared to us to be useless, if there were anything useful in myself towards making a search correctly. But now, for we are vanquished on every side, and unable to discover for what purpose the name-founder assigned to temperance this very name. And yet we have conceded many things that did not result correctly from the reasoning. For we conceded, that there is a science of sciences, although the reasoning neither permits nor asserts this; and on the other hand, we conceded that we know by this science the works of the other sciences, the reasoning permitting not even this, in order that the temperate man might be one, who has a knowledge of what he knows, because he knows, and of those which he does not know, because he does not know. This indeed we conceded very liberally, without ever considering that it is impossible for a person to know in any way whatever what he does not know at all. For our concession says that he knows those things, because he does not know them. And yet as I think there is nothing which would appear more absurd than this. The inquiry however, having met with us so very easy tempered and by no means morose, is not a bit more able to discover the truth; but has rather laughed at it so much, that, what we formerly conceded to be temperance, and, after molding it into some shape, laid it down to be, this it has very saucily shown to us as being of no use. On my own account then I am less indignant; but for your sake, Charmides, I am, very

indignant, if you, so beautiful in body, and most temperate to boot in mind, derive no advantage from this temperance, and if it does not by its presence bring to you any benefit during life. But I am still more indignant for the sake of the incantation, which I learned from the Thracian, if being a thing of no worth, I have learnt it with so much labor. I do not then very much then think that this is the case, but that I am a bad searcher; since I consider temperance to be a great good, and that, if you possess it, you are blessed indeed. But see whether you do possess it, and do not require at all the incantation. For if you do possess it, I would rather advise you to think me a trifler, and incompetent to search out anything whatever by a course of reasoning, and yourself so much the happier, as you are the more temperate.

Charmides/ But by Zeus, Socrates, I do not know whether I possess it, or not. For how can I know that, which not even you can discover what it is, as you say yourself? I am not however much persuaded by you; and I consider myself, Socrates, to be greatly in want of the incantation; and no business of mine hinders me from being daily enchanted by you, until you shall say that I have had enough.

Critias/ Be it so. But, Charmides, if you act thus, it will be a proof to me at least that you are temperate, if you will give yourself up to Socrates to be enchanted, and will not desert him for anything, either great or small.

Charmides/ Consider me, as about to follow and not to desert him. For I should act in a fearful manner, if I did not obey you, my tutor, nor do as you bid me.

Critias/ Nay then, I do bid you.

Charmides/ I shall therefore do so, beginning from this very day.

Socrates/ But what are ye two deliberating to do?

Charmides/ Nothing: we have ceased to deliberate.

Socrates/ Will you then, use violence, and not grant me a previous inquiry?

Charmides/ Consider me as about to use violence, since Critias commands me. Do you therefore take counsel about what you are to do.

Socrates/ But no consultation, is left for me: for not one man will be able to oppose you, when endeavoring to do anything yourself and forcing him.

Charmides/ Do not you then oppose me.

Socrates/ I shall not indeed, oppose you.

Charmides.

Translated by Benjamin Jowett.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Chærephon, Critias, Charmides.

Socrates/ Yesterday evening we returned from the army at Potidaea, and having been a good while away, I thought that I should like to go and look at my old haunts. So I went into the palaestra of Taureas, which is over against the temple of Basile, and there I found a number of persons, most of whom I knew, but not all. My visit was unexpected, and no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me from afar on all sides, and Chaerephon, who always behaves like a madman, started up from among them and ran to me, seizing my hand and saying;

Chaerephon/ How did you escape from the battle, Socrates?

Socrates/ An engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we came away, of which the news had only just reached Athens.

Just as you see me now.

Chaerephon/ There was a report that the engagement was very severe, and that many of our acquaintance had fallen.

Socrates/ That was not far from the truth.

Chaerephon/ I suppose that you were present.

Socrates/ I was.

Chaerephon/ Then sit down here, and tell us the whole story, which as yet we have only heard imperfectly.

Socrates/ So saying he led me to a place by the side of Critias, the son of Callaeschrus, and when I had sat down

and saluted him and the rest of the company, I told them the news from the army, and answered their several inquiries.

Then, when there had been enough of this, I, in my turn, began to make inquiries about matters at home—about the present state of philosophy, and about the youth. I asked whether any of them were remarkable for wisdom or beauty, or both.

Critias glanced at the door and saw some youths coming in, and disputing noisily with one another, followed by a crowd.

Critias/ Of the beauties, Socrates, I fancy that you will soon be able to form a judgment. For those who are just entering are the advance guard and lovers of the great beauty of the day, as he is thought to be, and he is likely to be not far off himself.

Socrates/ Who is he and who is his father?

Critias/ Charmides is his name. He is my cousin, and the son of my uncle Glaucon. I rather think that you know him too, although he was not grown up at the time of your departure.

Socrates/ Certainly, I know him for he was remarkable even then when he was still a child, and I should imagine that by this time he must be almost a young man.

Critias/ You will see in a moment what age he has reached and what he is like.

Socrates/ He had scarcely said the word, when Charmides entered.

Now you know, my friend, that I am not good at measuring, and in the presence of the beautiful I am like a measuring line without marks, for almost all young persons appear to be beautiful in my eyes. But at that moment, when I saw him, I confess that I was quite astonished at his beauty

and stature. All the company seemed to be enamored of him. Amazement and confusion reigned when he entered, and a second troop of lovers followed behind him. That grown-up men like ourselves should have been affected in this way was not surprising, but I observed the boys and saw that all of them, down to the very smallest, turned and looked at him, as if he had been a statue.

Chaerephon called me and said;

Chaerephon/ What do you think of the young man, Socrates? Has he not a beautiful face?

Socrates/ Most beautiful.

Chaerephon/ But you would think nothing of his face if you could see his naked form; he is absolutely perfect.

Socrates/ And to this they all agreed.

Ye gods what a paragon, if he has only one other slight addition!

Critias/ What is that?

Socrates/ If he has a noble soul. And being of your house, Critias, he may be expected to have this.

Critias/ He is as fair and good within, as he is without.

Socrates/ Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to strip and show us his soul? He is surely just of an age at which he will like to talk.

Critias/ That he will and I can tell you that he is indeed a philosopher already, and also a considerable poet, not in his own opinion only, but in that of others.

Socrates/ That, my dear Critias is a distinction which has long been in your family, and is inherited by you from Solon. But why do you not call him, and show him to me? For even if he were younger than he is, there could be no impropriety in his talking to us before you, his guardian and cousin.

Critias/ Very well then I will call him.

Socrates/ And turning to the attendant, he said;

Critias/ Call Charmides, and tell him that I want him to come and see a physician about the illness of which he spoke to me the day before yesterday.

Socrates/ Then again addressing me, he added;

Critias/ He has been complaining lately of having a headache when he rises in the morning. Now why should you not make him believe that you know a cure for the headache?

Socrates/ Why not if only he will come.

Critias/ He will be sure to come.

Socrates/ So he came as he was bidden. Great amusement was occasioned by everyone making room and pushing with might and main at his neighbor in order to sit next to him, until at the two ends of the row one had to get up and the other was rolled over sideways. And he came and sat down between Critias and me. But I, my friend, was beginning to feel awkward. My former bold belief in my powers of conversing naturally with him had vanished. And when Critias told him that I was the person who had the cure, he looked at me in an indescribable manner, and made as though to ask me a question. And all the people in the palaestra crowded about us, and at that moment, my good friend, I caught a sight of the inwards of his garment, and took the flame. Then I could no longer contain myself. I thought how well Cydias understood the nature of love, when, in speaking of a fair youth, he warns someone 'not to bring the fawn in the sight of the lion to be devoured by him,' for I felt that I had been overcome by a sort of wild-beast appetite. But still when he asked me if I knew the cure for the headache, I answered, though with an effort, that I did know.

Charmides/ And what is it?

Socrates/ It is a kind of leaf, which required to be accompanied by a charm, and if a person would repeat the charm at the same time that he used the cure, he would be made whole, but that without the charm the leaf would be of no avail.

Charmides/ Then I will write out the charm from your dictation.

Socrates/ With my consent? Or without my consent?

Charmides/ With your consent, Socrates.

Socrates/ he said, laughing.

Very good. So you know my name, do you?

Charmides/ I ought to know you, for there is a great deal said about you among my companions, and I remember when I was a child seeing you in company with Critias here.

Socrates/ I am glad to find that you remember me, for I shall now be more at home with you and shall be better able to explain the nature of the charm, about which I felt a difficulty before. For the charm will do more, Charmides, than only cure the headache. I dare say that you have heard eminent physicians say to a patient who comes to them with bad eyes, that they cannot undertake to cure his eyes by themselves, but that if his eyes are to be cured, his head must be treated too. And then again they say that to think of curing the head alone, and not the rest of the body also, is the height of folly. And arguing in this way they apply their regime to the whole body, and try to treat and heal the whole and the part together. Did you ever observe that this is what they say?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ And they are right, and you would agree with them?

Charmides/ Yes, certainly I should.

Socrates/ His approving answers reassured me, and I began by degrees to regain confidence, and my natural heat returned to me.

Such, Charmides, is the nature of the charm, which I learned when serving with the army from one of the physicians of the Thracian king Zalmoxis who are said to be able even to give immortality. This Thracian told me that in these notions of theirs, which I was just now mentioning, 'the Greek physicians are quite right as far as they go, but Zalmoxis,' he added, 'our king, who is also a god, says further, 'that as you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul.' And this,' he said, 'is the reason why the cure of many diseases is unknown to the physicians of Hellas, because they disregard the whole, which ought to be studied also, for the part can never be well unless the whole is well.' 'For all good and evil, whether in the body or in the whole man, originates,' as he declared, 'in the soul, and overflows from thence, as if from the head into the eyes. And therefore if the head and body are to be well, you must begin by curing the soul—that is the first and essential thing.' And the cure of the soul, my dear youth, has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms are fair words, and by them temperance is implanted in the soul, and where temperance comes and stays, there health is speedily imparted, not only to the head, but to the whole body. And when he taught me the cure and the charm he added, 'Let no one persuade you to cure his head, until he has first given you his soul to be cured by the charm. For this,' he said, 'is the great error of our day in the treatment of human beings, that men try to be physicians of health and temperance separately.' And he strictly enjoined me not to let anyone, however rich or noble or fair, persuade me to

give him the cure, without the charm. Now I have sworn, and I must keep my oath, and therefore if you will allow me to apply the Thracian charm first to your soul, as the stranger directed, I will afterward proceed to apply the cure to your head. But if not, I do not know what I am to do with you, my dear Charmides.

Critias, when he heard this, said;

Critias/ The headache will be a blessing to my young cousin, if the pain in his head compels him to improve his mind. Yet I can tell you, Socrates, that Charmides is not only preeminent in beauty among his equals, but also in that quality for which you say you have the charm—temperance, is it not?

Socrates/ Yes.

Critias/ Then let me tell you that he is the most temperate of the young men of today, and for his age inferior to none in any quality.

Socrates/ Indeed, Charmides, I think that you ought to excel others in all good qualities, for if I am not mistaken there is no one present who could easily point out two Athenian houses, whose union would be likely to produce a better or nobler scion than the two from which you are sprung. There is your father's house, which is descended from Critias, the son of Dropides, whose family has been commemorated in the panegyrics of Anacreon, Solon, and many other poets, as famous for beauty and virtue and all other high fortune. And your mother's house is equally distinguished, for your maternal uncle, Pyrilampes, is reputed never to have found his superior for stature and beauty in Persia at the court of the Great King, or anywhere on the continent of Asia in all the places to which he went as ambassador; that whole family is not a whit inferior to the other. Having such ancestors you ought to be first in all

things, and, sweet son of Glaucon, your outward form is no dishonor to any of them. If to beauty you add temperance, and if in other respects you are what Critias declares you to be, then, dear Charmides, blessed is the son your mother bore. And here lies the point. For if, as he declares, you have this gift of temperance already, and are temperate enough, in that case you have no need of any charms, whether of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean, and I may as well let you have the cure of the head at once.

But if you have not yet acquired this quality, I must use the charm before I give you the medicine. Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias has been saying. Have you or have you not this quality of temperance?

Charmides blushed, and the blush heightened his beauty, for modesty is becoming in youth. He then made the graceful reply that he really could not at once answer, either yes or no, to the question which I had asked.

Charmides/ For if I affirm that I am not temperate, that would be a strange thing for me to say against myself, and also I should give the lie to Critias, and to many others who, according to him, think that I am temperate. But, on the other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to praise myself, which would be ill manners, and therefore I do not know how to answer you.

Socrates/ That is a natural reply, Charmides, and I think that you and I ought together to inquire whether you have this quality about which I am asking or not, and then you will not be compelled to say what you do not like; neither shall I rashly have recourse to medicine. Therefore, if you please, I will share the inquiry with you, but I will not press you if you would rather not.

Charmides/ There is nothing which I should like better, and as far as I am concerned you may proceed in the way which you think best.

Socrates/ I think that it would be best to approach the question in this way. If temperance abides in you, you must have an opinion about her. She must give some intimation of her nature and qualities, which may enable you to form a notion of her. Is not that true?

Charmides/ Yes, that I think is true.

Socrates/ You know your native language and therefore you must be able also to express your opinion.

Charmides/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ In order, then, that we may form a conjecture whether you have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me, what, in your opinion, is temperance?

At first he hesitated, and was not very willing to answer. Then he said that he thought

Charmides/ temperance is doing all things orderly and quietly—for example, walking in the streets, and talking, and indeed doing everything in that way. In a word, I should answer that, in my opinion, temperance is a kind of quietness.

Socrates/ Are you right, Charmides? No doubt some would affirm that the quiet are temperate, but let us see whether there is anything in this view. And first tell me whether you would not acknowledge temperance to be of the class of the noble and good?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ But which is better when you are at the writing master's, to write the same letters quickly or quietly?

Charmides/ Quickly.

Socrates/ And to read quickly or slowly?

Charmides/ Quickly again.

Socrates/ And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness and sharpness are far better than quietness and slowness?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium?

Charmides/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And in leaping and running and in bodily exercises generally, actions done quickly and with agility are good and noble; those done slowly and quietly are bad and unsightly?

Charmides/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest agility and quickness, is noblest and best?

Charmides/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And is temperance a good?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the more temperate, if temperance is a good?

Charmides/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Again, which is better—facility in learning, or difficulty in learning?

Charmides/ Facility.

Socrates/ Yes, and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?

Charmides/ True.

Socrates/ And is it not better to teach another quickly and energetically, rather than quietly and slowly?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ Once more, which is better, to call to mind and to remember quickly and readily, or quietly and slowly?

Charmides/ The former.

Socrates/ And is not cleverness a quickness of the soul, and not a quietness?

Charmides/ True.

Socrates/ Is it not then better to understand what is said, whether at the writing master's or the music master's or anywhere else, not as quietly as possible, but as quickly as possible?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ And further, in the searchings or deliberations of the soul, not the quietest, as I imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates and discovers, is thought worthy of praise, but he who does so most easily and quickly?

Charmides/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Well then, in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness?

Charmides/ Probably.

Socrates/ Then temperance is not quietness, nor is the temperate life quiet—certainly not upon this view, for the life which is temperate is admitted to be the good. And of two things one is true—either never, or very seldom, do the quiet actions in life appear to be better than the quick and energetic ones, or supposing at the best that of the nobler actions there are as many quiet as quick and vehement; still, even if we grant this, temperance will not be acting quietly any more than acting quickly and energetically, either in walking or talking or in anything else. Nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet, seeing that temperance

was placed by us among the good and noble things, and the quick have been shown to be as good as the quiet.

Charmides/ I think that you are right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then once more, Charmides, fix your attention more closely and look within you. Consider the effect which temperance has upon yourself, and the nature of that which should have this effect. Think over all this, and tell me truly and courageously—what is temperance?

After a moment's pause, in which he made a real manly effort to think, he said;

Charmides/ My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty.

Socrates/ Very good, and did not you admit, just now, that temperance is noble?

Charmides/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And therefore that temperate men are good men?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ And can that be good which does not make men good?

Charmides/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good?

Charmides/ That is my opinion.

Socrates/ Well, but surely you would agree with Homer when he says, 'Modesty is not good for a needy man'?

Charmides/ Yes, I agree.

Socrates/ Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good?

Charmides/ Apparently.

Socrates/ But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always good?

Charmides/ That appears to me to be as you say.

Socrates/ And the inference is that temperance cannot be modesty—if temperance is good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good?

Charmides/ All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true, but I should like to know what you think about another definition of temperance, which I have just remembered that I heard from someone, 'Temperance is doing our own business.' Please consider whether he was right who affirmed that.

Socrates/ You wicked boy! This is what Critias, or some other philosopher has told you.

Critias/ Someone else then, for certainly I have not.

Charmides/ But what matter from whom I heard this?

Socrates/ No matter at all, for the point is not who said the words, but whether they are true or not.

Charmides/ There you are in the right, Socrates.

Socrates/ To be sure. Yet I should be surprised if we are able to discover their truth or falsehood, for they are a kind of riddle.

Charmides/ What makes you think so?

Socrates/ Because, he who uttered them seems to me to have meant one thing, and said another. Is the schoolmaster, for example, to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or writes?

Charmides/ I should rather think that he was doing something.

Socrates/ And does the schoolmaster write or read, or teach you boys to write or read, his own name only, or did

you write your enemies' names as well as your own and your friends'?

Charmides/ As much one as the other.

Socrates/ And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this?

Charmides/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And yet you were doing what was not your own business if reading and writing are a form of doing.

Charmides/ But they certainly are.

Socrates/ And the healing art, my friend, and building, and weaving, and doing anything whatever which is done by art—these all clearly come under the head of doing?

Charmides/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do you think that a state would be well ordered by a law which compelled every man to weave and wash his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and strigil, and other implements, on this principle of everyone doing and performing his own, and abstaining from what is not his own?

Charmides/ I think not.

Socrates/ But a temperate state will be a well-ordered state.

Charmides/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then temperance will not be doing one's own business—not at least in this way, or doing things of this sort?

Charmides/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Then, as I was just now saying, he who declared that temperance is a man doing his own business had a hidden meaning, for I do not think that he could have been such a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool who told you, Charmides?

Charmides/ Nay, I certainly thought him a very wise man.

Socrates/ Then I am quite certain that he put forth his definition as a riddle, thinking that no one would easily discover the meaning of the words, 'doing his own business.'

Charmides/ I dare say.

Socrates/ And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? Can you tell me?

Charmides/ Indeed, I cannot, and I should not wonder if the man himself who used this phrase did not understand what he meant.

Socrates/ Whereupon he laughed slyly, and looked at Critias. Critias had long been showing uneasiness, for he felt that he had a reputation to maintain with Charmides and the rest of the company. He had, however, hitherto managed to restrain himself, but now he could no longer forbear, and I am convinced of the truth of the suspicion which I entertained at the time, that it was from Critias that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance. And Charmides, who did not want to defend it himself, but to make Critias defend it, tried to stir him up. He went on pointing out that he had been refuted, at which Critias grew angry, and appeared, as I thought, inclined to quarrel with him—just as a poet might quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in reciting them. So he looked hard at him and said;

Critias/ Do you imagine, Charmides, because you do not understand the meaning of this definition of temperance that its author likewise did not understand the meaning of his own words?

Socrates/ Why, at his age, most excellent Critias, he can hardly be expected to understand, but you, who are older, and have studied, may well be assumed to know the meaning of them. And therefore, if you agree, and accept his

definition of temperance, I would much rather argue with you than with him about the truth or falsehood of the definition.

Critias/ I entirely agree and accept the definition.

Socrates/ Very good, and now let me repeat my question. Do you admit, as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something?

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ And do they make or do their own business only, or that of others also?

Critias/ That of others also.

Socrates/ And are they temperate, seeing that they do not make or do their own business only?

Critias/ Why not?

Socrates/ No objection on my part, but there may be a difficulty on his who proposes as a definition of temperance, 'doing one's own business,' and then says that there is no reason why those who do the business of others should not be temperate.

Critias/ Nay, did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? I said those who make, not those who do.

Socrates/ What! Do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same?

Critias/ No more than making and working are the same. Thus much I have learned from Hesiod, who says that 'work is no disgrace.' Now do you imagine that if he had meant by working and doing such things as you were describing, he would have said that there was no disgrace in them—for example, in the manufacture of shoes, or in selling dried fish, or sitting for hire in a house of ill fame? That, Socrates, is not to be supposed, but I conceive him to have

distinguished making from doing and work, and, while admitting that making anything might sometimes become a disgrace, when the employment was not honorable, to have thought that work was never any disgrace at all. For things nobly and usefully made he called works, and such makings he called workings, and doings. And he must be supposed to have deemed only such things to be man's proper business, and all that is hurtful, not to be his business, and in that sense Hesiod, and any other wise man, may be reasonably supposed to call him wise who does his own work.

Socrates/ O Critias, no sooner had you opened your mouth than I pretty well knew that you would call that which is proper to a man, and that which is his own, good, and that the makings of the good you would call doings, for I am no stranger to the endless distinctions which Prodicus draws about names. Now I have no objection to your giving names any signification which you please, if you will only tell me to what you apply them. Please then to begin again, and be a little plainer. Do you mean that this doing or making, or whatever is the word which you would use, of good things, is temperance?

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?

Critias/ Yes, and you, friend, would agree.

Socrates/ No matter whether I should or not. Just now, not what I think, but what you are saying, is the point at issue.

Critias/ Well, I mean to say that he who does evil, and not good, is not temperate, and that he is temperate who does good, and not evil. For temperance I define in plain words to be the doing of good actions.

Socrates/ And you may be very likely right in what you are saying, but I am surprised that you think temperate men to be ignorant of their own temperance?

Critias/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate in doing another's work, as well as in doing their own?

Critias/ I was, but what is your drift?

Socrates/ I have no particular drift, but I wish that you would tell me whether a physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to his patient also.

Critias/ I think that he may.

Socrates/ And he who does so does his duty?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely?

Critias/ Yes, he acts wisely.

Socrates/ But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to prove beneficial, and when not? And must every worker necessarily know when he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the work which he is doing?

Critias/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ Then, the physician may sometimes do good or harm, without knowing which he has done, and yet in doing good, as you say, he has done temperately or wisely. Was not that your statement?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, as would seem, in doing good he may act wisely or temperately, and be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance?

Critias/ But that, Socrates, is impossible, and therefore if this is, as you imply, the necessary consequence of any of my previous admissions, I will withdraw them and will not be ashamed to acknowledge that I made a mistake, rather than admit that a man can be temperate or wise who does not know himself. For I would almost say that self-knowledge is the very essence of temperance, and in this I agree with him who dedicated the inscription 'Know thyself!' at Delphi. That inscription, if I am not mistaken, is put there as a sort of salutation which the god addresses to those who enter the temple—as much as to say that the ordinary salutation of 'Hail!' is not right, and that the exhortation 'Be temperate!' is far better. If I rightly understand the meaning of the inscription, the god speaks to those who enter his temple, not as men speak, but whenever a worshiper enters, the first word which he hears is 'Be temperate!' This, however, like a prophet he expresses in a sort of riddle, for 'Know thyself!' and 'Be temperate!' are the same, as I maintain, and as the words imply, and yet they may be thought to be different. And succeeding sages who added 'Never too much,' or 'Give a pledge, and evil is nigh at hand,' would appear to have so distinguished them, for they imagined that 'Know thyself!' was a piece of advice which the god gave, and not his salutation of the worshipers at their first coming in, and they dedicated their own inscriptions under the idea that they too would give equally useful pieces of advice. Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say all this? My object is to leave the previous discussion—in which I know not whether you or I are more right, but, at any rate, no clear result was attained—and to raise a new one in which I will attempt to prove, if you deny it, that temperance is self-knowledge.

Socrates/ Yes, Critias, but you come to me as though I professed to know about the questions which I ask, and as

though I could, if I only would, agree with you. Whereas the fact is that I am inquiring with you into the truth of that which is advanced from time to time, just because I do not know, and when I have inquired, I will say whether I agree with you or not. Please then to allow me time to reflect.

Critias/ Reflect.

Socrates/ I am reflecting, and discover that temperance or wisdom, if it is a species of knowledge, must be a science, and a science of something.

Critias/ Yes, the science of a man's self.

Socrates/ Is not medicine the science of health?

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ And suppose that I were asked by you what is the use or effect of medicine, which is this science of health. I should answer that medicine is of very great use in producing health, which, as you will admit, is an excellent effect.

Critias/ Granted.

Socrates/ And if you were to ask me what is the result or effect of architecture, which is the science of building, I should say houses, and so of other arts, which all have their different results. Now I want you, Critias, to answer a similar question about temperance or wisdom, which, according to you, is the science of a man's self. Admitting this view, I ask of you, what good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is the science of a man's self, effect? Answer me.

Critias/ That is not the true way of pursuing the inquiry, Socrates, for wisdom is not like the other sciences, any more than they are like one another, but you proceed as if they were alike. For tell me, what result is there of computation or geometry, in the same sense as a house is the result of building, or a garment of weaving, or any other work of any

of the many other arts? Can you show me any such result of them? You cannot.

Socrates/ That is true, but still I can show you that each of these sciences has a subject which is different from the science. The art of computation, for instance, has to do with odd and even numbers in their numerical relations to themselves and to each other. Is not that true?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation?

Critias/ They are not.

Socrates/ The art of weighing, again, has to do with lighter and heavier, but the art of weighing is one thing, and the heavy and the light are another. Do you admit that?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom is the science?

Critias/ You are just falling into the old error, Socrates. You come asking wherein wisdom or temperance differs from the other sciences, and then you try to discover some respect in which it is like them. But it is not, for all the other sciences are of something else, and not of themselves. Wisdom alone is a science of other sciences and of itself. And of this, as I believe, you are very well aware, and you are only doing what you denied that you were doing just now, trying to refute me, instead of pursuing the argument.

Socrates/ And what if I am? How can you think that I have any other motive in refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself? This motive would be just a fear of my unconsciously fancying that I knew something of which I was ignorant. And at this moment, I assure you, I pursue the argument chiefly for my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for the sake of my other friends. For

would you not say that the discovery of things as they truly are is a good common to all mankind?

Critias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Then, be cheerful, sweet sir, and give your opinion in answer to the question which I asked, never minding whether Critias or Socrates is the person refuted. Attend only to the argument, and see what will come of the refutation.

Critias/ I think that is reasonable and I will do as you say.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, what you mean to affirm about wisdom.

Critias/ I mean to say that wisdom is the only science which is the science of itself as well as of the other sciences.

Socrates/ But the science of science will also be the science of the absence of science.

Critias/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know himself, and be able to examine what he knows or does not know, and to see what others know and think that they know and do really know, and what they do not know and fancy that they know when they do not. No other person will be able to do this. And this is wisdom and temperance and self-knowledge—for a man to know what he knows, and what he does not know. That is your meaning?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now then, since the third time brings luck, let us begin again, and ask, in the first place, whether it is or is not possible for a person to know that he knows what he knows and that he does not know what he does not know, and in the second place, whether, if perfectly possible, such knowledge is of any use.

Charmides/ That is what we have to consider.

Socrates/ Well then, Critias, see if you are in a better position than I am. I am in a difficulty. Shall I tell you the nature of the difficulty?

Critias/ By all means.

Socrates/ Does not what you have been saying, if true, amount to this, that there must be a single science which is wholly a science of itself and of other sciences, and that the same is also the science of the absence of science?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But consider how monstrous this proposition is, my friend. In any parallel case, the impossibility will be obvious to you.

Critias/ How is that? And in what cases do you mean?

Socrates/ In such cases as this. Suppose that there is a kind of vision which is not like the ordinary vision, but a vision of itself and of other sorts of vision, and of the defect of them, which in seeing sees no color, but only itself and other sorts of vision. Do you think that there is such a kind of vision?

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them?

Critias/ There is not.

Socrates/ Or take all the senses together. Can you imagine that there is any sense which is a sense of itself and of other senses, but is incapable of perceiving the objects of the senses?

Critias/ I think not.

Socrates/ Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of itself and of all other desires?

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and all other wishes?

Critias/ I should answer no.

Socrates/ Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves?

Critias/ I should not.

Socrates/ Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but none of the objects of fear?

Critias/ I never did.

Socrates/ Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general?

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But, it seems, we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no subject matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences?

Critias/ Yes, that is what is affirmed.

Socrates/ It is certainly a curiosity if it really exists. We must not however as yet absolutely deny the possibility of such a science, but continue to inquire whether it exists.

Critias/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something, and is of a nature to be a science of something?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something else?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And this something else is less, if the other is conceived to be greater?

Critias/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself and greater than other great things, but not greater than those things in comparison of which the others are greater, then that thing would have the property of being greater and also less than itself?

Critias/ That, Socrates, is the inevitable inference.

Socrates/ Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles, both they and itself will be halves, for the double is relative to the half?

Critias/ That is true.

Socrates/ And that which is more than itself will also be less, and that which is heavier will also be lighter, and that which is older will also be younger—and the same of other things. That which has a nature relative to self will retain also the nature of its object; I mean to say, for example, that hearing is, as we say, of sound or voice. Is that true?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then if hearing hears itself, it must hear a voice, for there is no other way of hearing.

Critias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And sight also, my excellent friend, if it sees itself must have a color, for sight cannot see that which has no color.

Critias/ No.

Socrates/ Do you remark, Critias, that in several of the examples which have been recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible, and in other cases hardly credible—inadmissible, for example, in the case of magnitudes, numbers, and the like?

Critias/ Very true.

Socrates/ But in the case of hearing and sight, or in the power of self-motion, and the power of heat to burn, and so

on, this relation to self will be regarded as incredible by some, but perhaps not by others. And some great man, my friend, is wanted, who will satisfactorily determine for us whether there is nothing which has an inherent property of relation to self rather than to something else, or some things only and not others, and whether in this class of self-related things, if there be such a class, that science which is called wisdom or temperance is included. I altogether distrust my own power of determining these matters. I am not certain whether such a science of science can possibly exist, and even if it does undoubtedly exist, I should not acknowledge it to be wisdom or temperance, until I can also see whether such a science would or would not do us any good, for I have an impression that temperance is a benefit and a good. And therefore, O son of Callaeschrus, as you maintain that temperance or wisdom is a science of science, and also of the absence of science, I will request you to show in the first place, as I was saying before, the possibility, and in the second place, the advantage, of such a science. And then perhaps you may satisfy me that you are right in your view of temperance.

Critias heard me say this, and saw that I was in a difficulty, and as one person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of yawning from him, so did he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty. But as he had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed to admit before the company that he could not answer my challenge or determine the question at issue, and he made an unintelligible attempt to hide his perplexity.

In order that the argument might proceed, I said to him, Well then, Critias, if you like, let us assume that this science of science is possible—whether the assumption is right or wrong may hereafter be investigated. Admitting its complete possibility, will you tell me how such a science enables us to

distinguish what we know or do not know, which, as we were saying, is self-knowledge or wisdom? Was not that it?

Critias/ Yes, Socrates, and the rest I think follows. For he who has this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the knowledge which he has, in the same way that he who has swiftness will be swift, and he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know. In the same way he who has that knowledge which is self-knowing, will know himself.

Socrates/ I do not doubt that a man will know himself, when he possesses that which has self-knowledge, but what necessity is there that, having this, he should know what he knows and what he does not know?

Critias/ Because, Socrates, they are the same.

Socrates/ Very likely, but I fear I remain as stupid as ever, for still I fail to comprehend how this knowing what you know and do not know is the same as the knowledge of self.

Critias/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ This is what I mean; I will admit that there is a science of science. Can this do more than determine that of two things one is and the other is not science or knowledge?

Critias/ No, just that.

Socrates/ Is it then the same thing as knowledge or want of knowledge of health, or the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice?

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ The one is medicine, and the other is politics, whereas that of which we are speaking is knowledge pure and simple.

Critias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And if a man has only knowledge of knowledge, without any further knowledge of health and justice, the probability is that he will only know that he knows something, and has a certain knowledge, both in his own case and in that of others.

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows? For he knows health not through wisdom or temperance but through the art of medicine, and he has learned harmony from the art of music and building from the art of building, but in neither case from wisdom or temperance—and the same of other things.

Critias/ It seems so.

Socrates/ How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building?

Critias/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows, but not what he knows?

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the knowledge of the things which we do or do not know, but only the knowledge that we know or do not know?

Critias/ That is the inference.

Socrates/ Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to establish whether a claimant knows or does not know that which he says that he knows; he will only know that he has a knowledge of some kind, but wisdom will not show him of what the knowledge is?

Critias/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in medicine from the true physician, nor between

any other true and false professor of knowledge. Let us consider the matter in this way. If the wise man or any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, how will he proceed? He will not talk to him about the science of medicine, for as we were saying, the physician understands nothing but health and disease.

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ But the physician knows nothing about science, for this has been assumed to be the province of wisdom alone.

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ And further, since medicine is science, we must infer that he does not know anything about medicine.

Critias/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then the wise man may indeed know that the physician has some kind of science or knowledge, but when he wants to discover the nature of this he will ask, What is the subject matter? For the several sciences are distinguished not by the mere fact that they are sciences, but by the nature of their subjects. Is not that true?

Critias/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject matter of health and disease?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who would inquire into the nature of medicine must test it in health and disease, which are the sphere of medicine, and not in what is extraneous and is not its sphere?

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ And he who wishes to make a fair test of the physician as a physician will test him in what relates to these?

Critias/ He will.

Socrates/ He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is right, in relation to health and disease?

Critias/ He will.

Socrates/ But can anyone pursue the inquiry into either unless he have a knowledge of medicine?

Critias/ He cannot.

Socrates/ No one at all, it would seem, except the physician can have this knowledge—and therefore not the wise man. He would have to be a physician as well as a wise man.

Critias/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, if it is no more than a science of science and of the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the physician who knows what concerns his profession from one who does not know but pretends or thinks that he knows, or any other professor of anything at all. Like any other artist, the wise or temperate man will only know the man of his own trade, and no one else.

Critias/ That is evident.

Socrates/ But then what profit, Critias, is there any longer in wisdom or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom? If, indeed, as we were supposing at first, the wise man were able to distinguish what he knew and did not know, and that he knew the one and did not know the other, and to recognize a similar faculty of discernment in others, there would certainly be a great advantage in being wise, for then we should never make a mistake, but should pass through life the unerring guides of ourselves and of those who are under us. We should not attempt to do what we did not know, but we should find out those who know, and hand

the business over to them and trust in them. Nor should we allow those who were under us to do anything which they were not likely to do well, and they would be likely to do well just that of which they had knowledge. And the house or state which was ordered or administered under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of which wisdom was the lord, would be sure to be well ordered, for with truth guiding and error eliminated, in all their doings men must do nobly and well, and doing well means happiness. Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom—to know what is known and what is unknown to us?

Critias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And now you perceive, that no such science is to be found anywhere.

Critias/ I perceive.

Socrates/ May we assume, then, that wisdom, viewed in this new light as a knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, has this advantage—that he who possesses such knowledge will more easily learn anything which he learns, and that everything will be clearer to him, because, in addition to the several objects of knowledge, he sees the science, and this also will better enable him to test the knowledge which others have of what he knows himself, whereas the inquirer who is without this knowledge may be supposed to have a feebler and less effective insight? Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom? And are not we looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her?

Critias/ It may be.

Socrates/ Perhaps it may or perhaps again we have been inquiring to no purpose—as I am led to infer, because I observe that if this is wisdom, some strange consequences would follow. Let us, if you please, assume the possibility of

this science of sciences, and not refuse to allow that, as was originally suggested, wisdom is the knowledge of what we know and do not know. Assuming all this, let us consider more closely, Critias, whether wisdom, such as this, would do us much good. For we were wrong, I think, in supposing, as we were saying just now, that such wisdom ordering the government of house or state would be a great benefit.

Critias/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, we were far too ready to admit the great benefits which mankind would obtain from their severally doing the things which they knew, and committing the things of which they are ignorant to those who were better acquainted with them.

Critias/ Were we not right in making that admission?

Socrates/ I think not.

Critias/ How very strange, Socrates!

Socrates/ There, I most emphatically agree with you, and I was thinking as much just now when I said that strange consequences would follow, and that I was afraid we were on the wrong track. For however sure we may be that this is wisdom, I certainly cannot make out what good this sort of thing does to us.

Critias/ What do you mean? I wish that you could make me understand what you mean.

Socrates/ I dare say that what I am saying is nonsense, and yet if a man has any feeling of what is due to himself, he cannot let the thought which comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined.

Critias/ I like that.

Socrates/ Hear, then, my own dream—whether coming through the horn or the ivory gate, I cannot tell. The dream is this. Let us suppose that wisdom is such as we are now

defining, and that she has absolute sway over us. Then, each action will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he is not, no physician or general or anyone else pretending to know matters of which he is ignorant, will deceive or elude us. Our health will be improved; our safety at sea, and also in battle, will be assured; our coats and shoes, and all other instruments and implements will be skillfully made, because the workmen will be good and true. Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that prophecy will be a real knowledge of the future, and will be under the control of wisdom, who will deter deceivers and set up the true prophets in their place as the revealers of the future. Now I quite agree that mankind, thus provided, would live and act according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent ignorance from intruding on us in our work. But whether by acting according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy, my dear Critias—this is a point which we have not yet been able to determine.

Critias/ Yet I think, that if you discard knowledge, you will hardly find the crown of happiness in anything else.

Socrates/ Well, just answer me one small question. Of what is this knowledge? Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking?

Critias/ God forbid.

Socrates/ Or of working in brass?

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort?

Critias/ No, I do not.

Socrates/ Then, we are giving up the doctrine that he who lives according to knowledge is happy, for these live according to knowledge, and yet they are not allowed by you to be happy. But I think that you mean to confine happiness to those who live according to knowledge of some particular

thing, such for example as the prophet, who, as I was saying, knows the future. Is it of him you are speaking or of someone else?

Critias/ Yes, I mean him, but there are others as well.

Socrates/ Who? Evidently someone who knows the past and present as well as the future, and is ignorant of nothing. Let us suppose that there is such a person, and if there is, you will allow that he is the most knowing of all living men.

Critias/ Certainly he is.

Socrates/ Yet I should like to know one thing more. Which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Or do all equally make him happy?

Critias/ Not all equally.

Socrates/ But which most tends to make him happy? The knowledge of what past, present, or future thing? Is it, for example, the knowledge of the game of draughts?

Critias/ Nonsense, draughts indeed!

Socrates/ Or of computation?

Critias/ No.

Socrates/ Or of health?

Critias/ That is nearer the truth;

Socrates/ And that knowledge, which is nearest of all, is the knowledge of what?

Critias/ The knowledge with which he discerns good and evil.

Socrates/ You villain! You have been carrying me round in a circle, and all this time hiding from me the fact that it is not the life according to knowledge which makes men act rightly and be happy, not even if it be knowledge of all the sciences, but one science only, that of good and evil. For, let me ask you, Critias, whether, if you take away this science from the others, medicine will not equally give health, and

shoemaking equally produce shoes, and the art of the weaver clothes—whether the art of the pilot will not equally save our lives at sea, and the art of the general in war?

Critias/ Equally.

Socrates/ And yet, my dear Critias, none of these things will be well or beneficially done, if the science of the good be wanting.

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ But this science, it seems, is not wisdom or temperance, but a science of human advantage—not a science of other sciences, or of ignorance, but of good and evil. And if this be of advantage, then wisdom or temperance must be something else.

Critias/ And why will not wisdom be of advantage? For, however much we assume that wisdom is a science of sciences, and has a sway over other sciences, surely she will have this particular science of the good under her control, and in this way will benefit us.

Socrates/ And will wisdom give health? Is not this rather the effect of medicine? Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts—do they not each of them do their own work? Have we not long ago asseverated that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing else?

Critias/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then wisdom will not be the producer of health?

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ We found that health belonged to a different art?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor does wisdom give advantage, my good friend, for that again we have just now been attributing to another art.

Critias/ Very true.

Socrates/ How then can wisdom be advantageous, when it produces no advantage?

Critias/ Apparently it cannot, Socrates.

Socrates/ You see, then, Critias, that I was not far wrong in fearing that I was making no sound inquiry into wisdom—I was quite right in depreciating myself, for that which is admitted to be the best of all things would never have seemed to us useless, if I had been good for anything at an inquiry. But now I have been utterly defeated, and have failed to discover what that is to which the lawgiver gave this name of temperance or wisdom. And yet many more admissions were made by us than could be fairly granted, for we admitted that there was a science of science, although the argument said no, and protested against us. And we admitted further that this science knew the works of the other sciences—although this too was denied by the argument—because we wanted to show that the wise man had knowledge of what he knew and of what he did not know. We generously made the concession, and never even considered the impossibility of a man knowing in a sort of way that which he does not know at all. According to our admission, he knows that which he does not know—than which nothing, as I think, can be more irrational. And yet, after finding us so easy and good-natured, the inquiry is still unable to discover the truth, but mocks us to a degree, and has insolently proved the inutility of temperance or wisdom if truly described by a definition such as we have spent all this time in discussing and fashioning together—which

result, as far as I am concerned, is not so much to be lamented.

But for your sake, Charmides, I am very sorry—that you, having such beauty and such wisdom and temperance of soul, should have no profit nor good in life from your wisdom and temperance. And still more am I grieved about the charm which I learned with so much pain, and to so little profit, from the Thracian, in order to produce a thing which is nothing worth. I think indeed that there is a mistake, and that I must be a bad inquirer, for wisdom or temperance I believe to be really a great good. And happy are you, Charmides, if you possess it. Wherefore examine yourself, and see whether you have this gift and can do without the charm, for if you can, I would rather advise you to regard me simply as a fool who is never able to reason out anything, and to rest assured that the more wise and temperate you are, the happier you will be.

Charmides/ I am sure that I do not know, Socrates, whether I have or have not this gift of wisdom and temperance, for how can I know whether I have a thing, of which even you and Critias are, as you say, unable to discover the nature? Yet I do not quite believe you, and I am sure, Socrates, that I do need the charm, and as far as I am concerned, I shall be willing to be charmed by you daily, until you say that I have had enough.

Critias/ Very good, Charmides. If you do this I shall have a proof of your temperance—that is, if you allow yourself to be charmed by Socrates, and never desert him in things great or small.

Charmides/ You may depend on my following and not deserting him. If you who are my guardian command me, I should be very wrong not to obey you.

Critias/ And I do command you.

Charmides/ Then I will do as you say, and begin this very day.

Socrates/ You, sirs, what are you conspiring about?

Charmides/ We are not conspiring. We have conspired already.

Socrates/ And you are about to use violence, without even giving me a hearing in court?

Charmides/ Yes, I shall use violence, since he orders me, and therefore you had better consider what you will do.

Socrates/ But the time for consideration has passed. When you are determined on anything, and in the mood of violence, you are irresistible.

Charmides/ Do not you resist me then.

Socrates/ I shall not resist you then.

Charmides, Or Temperance.

Translated by Lamb.

[or ON TEMPERANCE: TENTATIVE]

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Chaerephon, Critias, Charmides

Socrates/ We arrived yesterday evening from the army at Potidaea, and I sought with delight, after an absence of some time, my wonted conversations. Accordingly I went into the wrestling-school of Taureas, opposite the Queen's shrine, and there I came upon quite a number of people, some of whom were unknown to me, but most of whom I knew. And as soon as they saw me appear thus unexpectedly, they hailed me from a distance on every side; but Chaerephon, like the mad creature that he is, jumped up from their midst and ran to me, and grasping me by the hand;

Chaerephon/ Socrates, how did you survive the battle?

Socrates/ (Shortly before we came away there had been a battle at Potidaea, of which the people here had only just had news.)

In the state in which you see me.

Chaerephon/ It has been reported here, you know, that the battle was very severe, and that many of our acquaintance have lost their lives in it.

Socrates/ Then the report is pretty near the truth.

Chaerephon/ You were present at the fighting?

Socrates/ I was present.

Chaerephon/ Then sit down here and give us a full account; for as yet we have had no clear report of it all.

Socrates/ And with that he led me to a seat by Critias, son of Callaeschrus. So I sat down there and greeted Critias

and the rest, and gave them all the news from the battlefield, in answer to their various questions; each had his inquiry to make.

When we had had enough of such matters, I in my turn began to inquire about affairs at home, how philosophy was doing at present, and whether any of the rising young men had distinguished themselves for wisdom or beauty or both. Then Critias, looking towards the door, for he saw some young fellows who were coming in with some railing at each other, and a crowd of people following on behind them, said;

Critias/ Concerning the beauties, Socrates, I expect you will get your knowledge at once: for these who are coming in are in fact forerunners and lovers of the person who is held, for the moment at least, to be the greatest beauty; and he himself, I imagine, must by now be nearly upon us.

Socrates/ Who is he and whose son?

Critias/ You must know, but he was not yet grown up when you went away, —Charmides, son of our uncle Glaucon, and my cousin.

Socrates/ I do know, to be sure; for he was not to be despised even then, when he was still a child, and now, I suppose, he will be quite a youth by this time.

Critias/ You will know this moment, both how much and to what purpose he has grown.

Socrates/ And just as he spoke these words, Charmides entered.

Now I, my good friend, am no measurer: I am a mere "white line in measuring beautiful people, for almost everyone who has just grown up appears beautiful to me. Nay and this time, moreover, the young man appeared to me a marvel of stature and beauty; and all the rest, to my thinking, were in love with him, such was their astonishment and confusion when he came in, and a

number of other lovers were following in his train. On the part of men like us it was not so surprising; but when I came to observe the boys I noticed that none of them, not even the smallest, had eyes for anything else, but that they all gazed at him as if he were a statue. Then Chaerephon called me and said;

Chaerephon/ How does the youth strike you, Socrates? Has he not a fine face?

Socrates/ Immensely so.

Chaerephon/ Yet if he would consent to strip, you would think he had no face, he has such perfect beauty of form.

Socrates/ And these words of Chaerephon were repeated by the rest. Then, —By Heracles! What an irresistible person you make him out to be, if he has but one more thing—a little thing—besides.

Critias/ What?

Socrates/ If in his soul, he is of good grain. And I should think, Critias, he ought to be, since he is of your house.

Critias/ Ah, he is right fair and good in that way also.

Socrates/ Why then, let us strip that very part of him and view it first, instead of his form; for anyhow, at that age, I am sure he is quite ready to have a discussion.

Critias/ Very much so; for, I may say, he is in fact a philosopher, and also—as others besides himself consider—quite a poet.

Socrates/ That, my dear Critias, is a gift which your family has had a long while back, through your kinship with Solon. But why not call the young man here and show him to me? For surely, even if he were younger still, there could be no discredit in our having a talk with him before you, who are at once his guardian and his cousin.

Critias/ You are quite right, and we will call him.

Socrates/ Thereupon he said to his attendant,;

Critias/ Boy, call Charmides; tell him I want him to see a doctor about the ailment with which he told me he was troubled yesterday.

Socrates/ Then, turning to me,;

Critias/ You know, he has spoken lately of having a headache, on getting up in the morning: now why should you not represent to him that you know a cure for headache?

Socrates/ Why not? only he must come.

Critias/ Oh, he will be here.

Socrates/ And so it was; for he came, and caused much laughter, because each of us who were seated made room for him by pushing hard at his neighbor so as to have him sitting beside himself, until at either end of the seat one had to stand up, and we tumbled the other off sideways; and he came and sat down between me and Critias. But here, my friend, I began to feel perplexed, and my former confidence in looking forward to a quite easy time in talking with him had been knocked out of me. And when, on Critias telling him that it was I who knew the cure, he gave me such a look with his eyes as passes description, and was just about to plunge into a question, and when all the people in the wrestling-school surged round about us on every side—then, ah then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught fire, and could possess myself no longer; and I thought none was so wise in love-matters as Cydias, who in speaking of a beautiful boy recommends someone to “beware of coming as a fawn before the lion, and being seized as his portion of flesh”; for I too felt I had fallen a prey to some such creature. However, when he had asked me if I knew the cure for headache, I somehow contrived to answer that I knew.

Charmides/ Then what is it?

Socrates/ So I told him that the thing itself was a certain leaf, but there was a charm to go with the remedy; and if one uttered the charm at the moment of its application, the remedy made one perfectly well; but without the charm there-was no efficacy in the leaf.

Charmides/ Then I will take down the charm, from you in writing.

Socrates/ Do you prefer to get my consent first, or to do without it?

This made him laugh, and he said:

Charmides/ To get your consent, Socrates.

Socrates/ Very well; and are you certain of my name?

Charmides/ Unless I am at fault; for there is no little talk of you among the set of our age, and I remember as a mere child the sight of you in company with Critias here.

Socrates/ That is a good thing: for I shall speak more freely to you about the charm, and its real nature; just now I was at a loss for the way to apprise you of its power. For it is of such a nature, Charmides, that it cannot cure the head alone; I daresay you have yourself sometimes heard good doctors say, you know, when a patient comes to them with a pain in his eyes, that it is not possible for them to attempt a cure of his eyes alone, but that it is necessary to treat his head too at the same time, if he is to have his eyes in good order; and so again, that to expect ever to treat the head by itself, apart from the body as a whole, is utter folly. And on this principle they apply their regimen to the whole body, and attempt to treat and heal the part along with the whole; or have you not observed that this is what they say, and is done in fact?

Charmides/ Certainly I have.

Socrates/ And you consider it well said, and accept the principle?

Charmides/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Then I, on hearing his approval, regained my courage; and little by little I began to muster up my confidence again, and my spirit began to rekindle. So I said, —Such, then, Charmides, is the nature of this charm. I learnt it on campaign over there, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zalmoxis, who are said even to make one immortal. This Thracian said that the Greeks were right in advising as I told you just now: “but Zalmoxis,” he said, “our king, who is a god, says that as you ought not to attempt to cure eyes without head, or head without body, so you should not treat body without soul”; and this was the reason why most maladies evaded the physicians of Greece—that they neglected the whole, on which they ought to spend their pains, for if this were out of order it was impossible for the part to be in order. For all that was good and evil, he said, in the body and in man altogether was sprung from the soul, and flowed along from thence as it did from the head into the eyes. Wherefore that part was to be treated first and foremost, if all was to be well with the head and the rest of the body. And the treatment of the soul, so he said, my wonderful friend, is by means of certain charms, and these charms are words of the right sort: by the use of such words is temperance engendered in our souls, and as soon as it is engendered and present we may easily secure health to the head, and to the rest of the body also. Now in teaching me the remedy and the charms he remarked, —”Let nobody persuade you to treat his head with this remedy, unless he has first submitted his soul for you to treat with the charm. For at present,” he said, “the cure of mankind is beset with the error of certain doctors who attempt to practice the one method without the other.” And he most particularly enjoined on me not to let anyone, however wealthy or noble or handsome, induce me to disobey him. So I, since I have

given him my oath, and must obey him, will do as he bids; and if you agree to submit your soul first to the effect of the Thracian charms, according to the stranger's injunctions, I will apply the remedy to your head: otherwise we shall be at a loss what to do with you, my dear Charmides.

Then Critias, when he heard me say this, remarked,;

Critias/ This affection of the head, Socrates, will turn out to be a stroke of luck for the young man, if he is to be compelled on account of his head to improve his understanding also. However, let me tell you, Charmides is considered to excel his comrades not only in appearance, but also in that very thing which you say is produced by your charm: temperance you say it is, do you not?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Critias/ Then be assured, that he is considered to be far and away the most temperate person now alive, while in every other respect, for a youth of his age, he is second to none.

Socrates/ Why, yes, and it is only right, Charmides, that you should excel the rest in all these respects; for I do not suppose there is anyone else here who could readily point to a case of any two Athenian houses uniting together which would be likely to produce handsomer or nobler offspring than those from which you are sprung. For your father's house, which comes from Critias, son of Dropides, has been celebrated by Anacreon and Solon and many other poets, so that it is famed by tradition among us as pre-eminent in beauty and virtue and all else that is accounted happiness; and then, your mother's house is famous in the same way, for of Pyrilampes, your uncle, it is said that no one in all the continent was considered to be his superior in beauty or stature, whenever he came as envoy to the great king or anyone else in Asia, and his house as a whole is no whit

inferior to the other. Sprung from such people, it is to be supposed that you would be first in all things. And indeed, as regards your visible form, dear son of Glaucon, I consider that nowhere have you fallen behind any of your ancestors. But if your nature is really rich in temperance and those other things, as our friend here says, blessed is the son, dear Charmides, that your mother has borne in you! However, the case stands thus: if you already possess temperance, as Critias here declares, and you are sufficiently temperate, then you never had any need of the charms of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean, and might well be given at once the remedy for the head; but if you prove to be still lacking that virtue, we must apply the charm before the remedy. So tell me yourself whether you agree with our friend, and can say that you are already sufficiently provided with temperance, or are deficient in it?

At this Charmides blushed and, for one thing, looked more beautiful than ever, for his modesty became his years; and then, too, he answered most ingenuously, saying

Charmides/ It is no easy matter at the moment either to admit or to deny the words of the question. For if, I say I am not temperate, not only is it a strange thing to say against oneself, but I shall at the same time be taxing with untruth both Critias and many others who consider me to be temperate, as he gives out; while if, on the other hand, I say I am, and praise myself, it will probably be found distasteful; so that I cannot see what answer I am to give you.

Socrates/ Your answer is a natural one, in my opinion, Charmides; and I think, that we must join in inquiring whether you possess the thing I am asking after, or not, in order that neither you may be forced to say what you do not wish, nor I on my part may recklessly try my hand at medicine. So if it is agreeable to you, I am ready to inquire with you; but, if it is not, to let it alone.

Charmides/ Why, nothing, could be more agreeable to me: so far as that goes, therefore, inquire in whatever way you think we had better proceed.

Socrates/ Then this is the way, in which I consider that our inquiry into this matter had best be conducted. Now, it is clear that, if you have temperance with you, you can hold an opinion about it. For being in you, I presume it must, in that case, afford some perception from which you can form some opinion of what temperance is, and what kind of thing it is: do you not think so?

Charmides/ I do.

Socrates/ And since you understand the Greek tongue, you can tell me, I suppose, your view of this particular thought of yours?

Charmides/ I daresay.

Socrates/ Then in order that we may make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me, what you say of temperance according to your opinion.

He at first hung back, and was not at all willing to answer: but presently he said that, to his mind;

Charmides/ Temperance is doing everything orderly and quietly—walking in the streets, talking, and doing everything else of that kind; and in a word, I think the thing about which you ask may be called quietness.

Socrates/ Well, are you right there? They do say, you know, Charmides, that quiet people are temperate: so let us see if there is anything in what they say. Tell me, is not temperance, however, among the honorable things?

Charmides/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Well, which is most honorable at the writing-master's, to write the same sort of letters quickly or quietly?

Charmides/ Quickly.

Socrates/ And in reading, to do it quickly or slowly?

Charmides/ Quickly.

Socrates/ And so, in the same way, to play the lyre quickly, or to wrestle nimbly, is far more honorable than to do it quietly and slowly?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what of boxing, alone or combined with wrestling? Is it not the same there too?

Charmides/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And in running and leaping and all activities of the body, are not nimble and quick movements accounted honorable, while sluggish and quiet ones are deemed disgraceful?

Charmides/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So we find, that in the body, at least, it is not quietness, but the greatest quickness and nimbleness that is most honorable, do we not?

Charmides/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And temperance was an honorable thing?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then in the body, at least, it is not quietness but quickness that will be the more temperate thing, since temperance is honorable.

Charmides/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Well now; in learning, is facility the more honorable, or difficulty?

Charmides/ Facility.

Socrates/ And facility in learning, is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is it not more honorable to teach another quickly and forcibly, rather than quietly and slowly?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well now, is it more honorable to be reminded and to remember quietly and slowly, or forcibly and quickly?

Charmides/ Forcibly, and quickly.

Socrates/ And is not readiness of mind a sort of nimbleness of the soul, not a quietness?

Charmides/ True.

Socrates/ And to apprehend what is said, whether at the writing-master's or the lyre-master's or anywhere else, not as quietly as possible, but as quickly, is most honorable?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, and in the searching's of the soul, and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person, I imagine, or he who deliberates and discovers with difficulty, that is held worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and quickly.

Charmides/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then in all, Charmides, that concerns either our soul or our body, actions of quickness and nimbleness are found to be more honorable than those of slowness and quietness?

Charmides/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ So temperance cannot be a sort of quietness, nor can the temperate life be quiet, by this argument at least; since, being temperate, it must be honorable. For we have these two alternatives: either in no cases, or I should think in very few, can we find that the quiet actions in life are more honorable than the quick and vigorous ones; or at all events, my friend, if of the more honorable actions there are absolutely as many quiet ones as forcible and quick, not

even so will temperance be acting quietly any more than acting forcibly and quickly, either in walking or in talking or in any other sphere; nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet; since in our argument we assumed that temperance is an honorable thing, and have found that quick things are just as honorable as quiet things.

Charmides/ Your statement, Socrates, seems to me to be correct.

Socrates/ Once more then, Charmides, attend more closely and look into yourself; reflect on the quality that is given you by the presence of temperance, and what quality it must have to work this effect on you. Take stock of all this and tell me, like a good, brave fellow, what it appears to you to be.

He paused a little, and after a quite manly effort of self-examination:

Charmides/ Well, I think that temperance makes men ashamed or bashful, and that temperance is the same as modesty.

Socrates/ Well now, did you not admit a moment ago that temperance is honorable?

Charmides/ Certainly I did.

Socrates/ And temperate men are also good?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, can that be good which does not produce good men?

Charmides/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And we conclude that it is not only honorable, but good also.

Critias/ I think so.

Socrates/ Well then, are you not convinced that Homer is right in saying;

Modesty, no good mate for a needy man?

Charmides/ I am.

Socrates/ Then it would seem that modesty is not good, and good.

Charmides/ Apparently.

Socrates/ But temperance is good, if its presence makes men good, and not bad.

Charmides/ It certainly seems to me to be as you say.

Socrates/ So temperance cannot be modesty, if it is in fact good, while modesty is no more good than evil.

Charmides/ Why, I think, Socrates, that is correctly stated; but there is another view of temperance on which I would like to have your opinion. I remembered just now what I once heard someone say, that temperance might be doing one's own business. I ask you, then, do you think he is right in saying this?

Socrates/ You rascal, you have heard it from Critias here, or some other of our wise men!

Critias/ Seemingly, from some other; for indeed he did not from me.

Charmides/ But what does it matter, Socrates, from whom I heard it?

Socrates/ Not at all; for in any case we have not to consider who said it, but whether it is a true saying or no.

Charmides/ Now you speak rightly.

Socrates/ Yes, on my word: but I shall be surprised if we can find out how it stands; for it looks like a kind of riddle.

Charmides/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because, presumably the speaker of the words "temperance is doing one's own business" did not mean them quite as he spoke them. Or do you consider that the scribe does nothing when he writes or reads?

Charmides/ I rather consider that he does something.

Socrates/ And does the scribe, in your opinion, write and read his own name only, and teach you boys to do the same with yours? Or did you write your enemies' names just as much as your own and your friends'?

Charmides/ Just as much.

Socrates/ Well, were you meddlesome or intemperate in doing this?

Charmides/ Not at all.

Socrates/ And you know you were not doing your own business, if writing and reading are doing something.

Charmides/ Why, so they are.

Socrates/ And indeed medical work, my good friend, and building and weaving and producing anything whatever that is the work of any art, I presume is doing something.

Charmides/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, do you think a state would be well conducted under a law which enjoined that everyone should weave and scour his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and scraper, and everything else on the same principle of not touching the affairs of others but performing and doing his own for himself?

Charmides/ I think not.

Socrates/ But still, a state whose conduct is temperate will be well conducted.

Charmides/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then doing one's own business in that sense and in that way will not be temperance.

Charmides/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ So that person was riddling, it seems, just as I said a moment ago, when he said that doing one's own business is temperance. For I take it he was not such a fool

as all that: or was it some idiot that you heard saying this, Charmides?

Charmides/ Far from it, for indeed he seemed to be very wise.

Socrates/ Then it is perfectly certain, in my opinion, that he propounded it as a riddle, in view of the difficulty of understanding what “doing one’s own business” can mean.

Charmides/ I daresay.

Socrates/ Well, what can it mean, this “doing one’s own business”? Can you tell me?

Charmides/ I do not know, upon my word: but I daresay it may be that not even he who said it knew in the least what he meant.

Socrates/ And as he said this he gave a sly laugh and glanced at Critias.

Now Critias for some time had been plainly burning with anxiety to distinguish himself in the eyes of Charm ides and the company, and having with difficulty restrained himself heretofore, he now could do so no longer; for I believe that what I had supposed was perfectly true—that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias. And so Charmides, wishing him to make answer instead of himself, sought to stir him up in particular, and pointed out that he himself had been refuted; but Critias rebelled against it, and seemed to me to have got angry with him, as a poet does with an actor who mishandles his verses on the stage: so he looked hard at him and said:

Critias/ Do you really suppose, Charmides, that if you do not know what can have been the meaning of the man who said that temperance was doing one’s own business, he did not know either?

Socrates/ Why, my excellent Critias, no wonder if our friend, at his age, cannot understand; but you, I should

think, may be expected to know, in view of your years and your studies. So if you concede that temperance is what he says, and you accept the statement, for my part I would greatly prefer to have you as partner in the inquiry as to whether this saying is true or not.

Critias/ Well, I quite concede it, and accept it.

Socrates/ That is good, then. Now tell me, do you also concede what I was asking just now—that all craftsmen make something?

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you consider that they make their own things only, or those of others also?

Critias/ Those of others also.

Socrates/ And are they temperate in not making their own things only?

Critias/ Yes: what reason is there against it?

Socrates/ None for me; but there may be for him who, after assuming that temperance is doing one's own business, proceeds to say there is no reason against those also who do others' business being temperate.

Critias/ And have I, pray, admitted that those who do others' business are temperate? Or was my admission of those who make things?

Socrates/ Tell me, do you not call making and doing the same?

Critias/ No indeed, nor working and making the same either: this I learnt from Hesiod, who said, "Work is no reproach." Now, do you suppose that if he had given the names of working and doing to such works as you were mentioning just now, he would have said there was no reproach in shoe-making or pickle-selling or serving the stews? It is not to be thought, Socrates; he rather held, I

conceive, that making was different from doing and working, and that while a thing made might be a reproach if it had no connection with the honorable, work could never be a reproach. For things honorably and usefully made he called works, and such makings he called workings and doings; and we must suppose that it was only such things as these that he called our proper concerns, but all that was harmful, the concerns of others. So that we must conclude that Hesiod, and anyone else of good sense, calls him temperate who does his own business.

Socrates/ Ah, Critias, you had hardly begun, when I grasped the purport of your speech—that you called one's proper and one's own things good, and that the makings of the good you called doings; for in fact I have heard Prodicus drawing innumerable distinctions between names. Well, I will allow you any application of a name that you please; only make clear to what thing it is that you attach such-and-such a name. So begin now over again, and define more plainly. Do you say that this doing or making, or whatever is the term you prefer, of good things, is temperance?

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?

Critias/ And do not you, my excellent friend, think so?

Socrates/ Leave that aside; for we have not to consider yet what I think, but what you say now.

Critias/ Well, all the same, I say, that he who does evil instead of good is not temperate, whereas he who does good instead of evil is temperate: for I give you "the doing of good things is temperance" as my plain definition.

Socrates/ And there is no reason, I daresay, why your statement should not be right; but still I wonder whether you judge that temperate men are ignorant of their temperance.

Critias/ No, I do not.

Socrates/ A little while ago, were you not saying that there was no reason why craftsmen should not be temperate in making others' things as well?

Critias/ Yes, I was, but what of it?

Socrates/ Nothing; only tell me whether you think that a doctor, in making someone healthy, makes a helpful result both for himself and for the person whom he cures.

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ And he who does this does his duty?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is not he who does his duty temperate?

Critias/ Indeed he is.

Socrates/ Well, and must the doctor know when his medicine will be helpful, and when not? And must every craftsman know when he is likely to be benefited by the work he does, and when not?

Critias/ Probably not.

Socrates/ Then sometimes, the doctor may have done what is helpful or harmful without knowing the effect of his own action; and yet, in doing what was helpful, by your statement, he has done temperately. Or did you not state that?

Critias/ I did.

Socrates/ Then it would seem that in doing what is helpful he may sometimes do temperately and be temperate, but be ignorant of his own temperance?

Critias/ But that, Socrates, could never be: if you think this in any way a necessary inference from my previous admissions, I would rather withdraw some of them, and not be ashamed to say my statements were wrong, than concede at any time that a man who is ignorant of himself is

temperate. For I would almost say that this very thing, self-knowledge, is temperance, and I am at one with him who put up the inscription of those words at Delphi. For the purpose of that inscription on the temple, as it seems to me, is to serve as the god's salutation to those who enter it, instead of "Hail!"—this is a wrong form of greeting, and they should rather exhort one another with the words, "Be temperate!" And thus the god addresses those who are entering his temple in a mode which differs from that of men; such was the intention of the dedicator of the inscription in putting it up, I believe; and that he says to each man who enters, in reality, "Be temperate!" But he says it in a rather riddling fashion, as a prophet would; for "Know thyself!" and "Be temperate!" are the same, as the inscription and I declare, though one is likely enough to think them different—an error into which I consider the dedicators of the later inscriptions fell when they put up "Nothing overmuch" and "A pledge, and thereupon perdition." For they supposed that "Know thyself!" was a piece of advice, and not the god's salutation of those who were entering; and so, in order that their dedications too might equally give pieces of useful advice, they wrote these words and dedicated them. Now my object in saying all this, Socrates, is to abandon to you all the previous argument—for, though perhaps it was you who were more in the right, or perhaps it was I, yet nothing at all certain emerged from our statements—and to proceed instead to satisfy you of this truth, if you do not admit it, that temperance is knowing oneself.

Socrates/ Why, Critias, you treat me as though I professed to know the things on which I ask questions, and needed only the will to agree with you. But the fact of the matter is rather that I join you in the inquiry, each time that a proposition is made, because I myself do not know; I wish

therefore to consider first, before I tell you whether I agree or not. Now, give me a moment to consider.

Critias/ Consider then.

Socrates/ Yes, and I am considering. For if temperance is knowing anything, obviously it must be a kind of science, and a science of something, must it not?

Critias/ It is and of self.

Socrates/ And medicine is a science of health?

Critias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then if you should ask me wherein medicine, as a science of health is useful to us, and what it produces, I should say it is of very great benefit, since it produces health; an excellent result, if you allow so much.

Critias/ I allow it.

Socrates/ And so, if you should ask me what result I take to be produced by building, as the builder's science, I should say houses; and it would be the same with the other arts. Now it is for you, in your turn, to find an answer to a question regarding temperance—since you say it is a science of self, Critias—and to tell me what excellent result it produces for us, as science of self, and what it does that is worthy of its name. Come now, tell me.

Critias/ But, Socrates, you are not inquiring rightly. For in its nature it is not like the other sciences, any more than any of them is like any other; whereas you are making your inquiry as though they were alike. For tell me, what result is there of the arts of reckoning and geometry, in the way that a house is of building, or a coat of weaving, or other products of the sort that one might point to in various arts? Well, can you, for your part, point to any such product in those two cases? You cannot.

Socrates/ What you say is true; but I can point out to you what is the peculiar subject of each of these sciences, distinct in each case from the science itself. Thus reckoning, I suppose, is concerned with the even and the odd in their numerical relations to themselves and to one another, is it not?

Critias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And you grant that the odd and the even are different from the actual art of reckoning?

Critias/ Of course.

Socrates/ And once more, weighing is concerned with the heavier and the lighter weight; but the heavy and the light are different from the actual art of weighing: you agree?

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ Then tell me, what is that of which temperance is the science, differing from temperance itself?

Critias/ There you are, Socrates: you push your investigation up to the real question at issue—in what temperance differs from all the other sciences—but you then proceed to seek some resemblance between it and them; whereas there is no such thing, for while all the rest of the sciences have something other than themselves as their subject, this one alone is a science of the other sciences and of its own self. And of this you are far from being unconscious, since in fact, as I believe, you are doing the very thing you denied you were doing just now: for you are attempting to refute me, without troubling to follow the subject of our discussion.

Socrates/ How can you think, if my main effort is to refute you, that I do it with any other motive than that which would impel me to investigate the meaning of my own words—from a fear of carelessly supposing, at any moment, that I knew something while I knew it not? And so it is now: that is what

I am doing, I tell you. I am examining the argument mainly for my own sake, but also, perhaps, for that of my other intimates. Or do you not think it is for the common good, almost, of all men, that the truth about everything there is should be discovered?

Critias/ Yes indeed, I do, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then take heart, my admirable friend, and answer the question put to you as you deem the case to be, without caring a jot whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted: give the argument itself your attention, and observe what will become of it under the test of refutation.

Critias/ Well, I will do so; for I think there is a good deal in what you say.

Socrates/ Then tell me, what you mean in regard to temperance.

Critias/ Why, I mean that it alone of all the sciences is the science both of itself and of the other sciences.

Socrates/ So then, it will be the science of the lack of science also, besides being the science of science?

Critias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then only the temperate person will know himself, and be able to discern what he really knows and does not know, and have the power of judging what other people likewise know and think they know, in cases where they do know, and again, what they think they know, without knowing it; everyone else will be unable. And so this is being temperate, or temperance, and knowing oneself—that one should know what one knows and what one does not know. Is that what you mean?

Critias/ It is.

Socrates/ Once more then, as our third offering to the Savior, let us consider afresh, in the first place, whether

such a thing as this is possible or not—to know that one knows, and does not know, what one knows and what one does not know; and secondly, if this is perfectly possible, what benefit we get by knowing it.

Critias/ We must indeed consider.

Socrates/ Come then, Critias, consider if you can show yourself any more resourceful than I am; for I am at a loss. Shall I explain to you in what way?

Critias/ By all means.

Socrates/ Well, what all this comes to, if your last statement was correct, is merely that there is one science which is precisely a science of itself and of the other sciences, and moreover is a science of the lack of science at the same time.

Critias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then mark what a strange statement it is that we are attempting to make, my friend: for if you will consider it as applied to other cases, you will surely see—so I believe—its impossibility.

Critias/ How so? In what cases?

Socrates/ In the following: ask yourself if you think there is a sort of vision which is not the vision of things that we see in the ordinary way, but a vision of itself and of the other sorts of vision, and of the lack of vision likewise; which, while being vision, sees no color, but only itself and the other sorts of vision. Do you think there is any such?

Critias/ Upon my word, I do not.

Socrates/ And what do you say to a sort of hearing which hears not a single sound, but hears itself and the other sorts of hearing and lack of hearing?

Critias/ I reject that also.

Socrates/ Then take all the senses together as a whole, and consider if you think there is any sense of the senses and of itself, but insensible of any of the things of which the other senses are sensible.

Critias/ I do not.

Socrates/ Now, do you think there is any desire which is the desire, not of any pleasure, but of itself and of the other desires?

Critias/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Nor, again, is there a wish, I imagine, that wishes no good, but wishes itself and the other wishes.

Critias/ Quite so; there is not.

Socrates/ And would you say there is any love of such a sort that it is actually a love of no beauty, but of itself and of the other loves?

Critias/ Not I.

Socrates/ And have you ever observed any fear which fears itself and the other fears, but has no fear of a single dreadful thing?

Critias/ No, I have not.

Socrates/ Or an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself, but without any opinion such as the other opinions have?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ But it is apparently a science of this kind that we are assuming—one that is a science of no branch of study, but a science of itself and of the other sciences.

Critias/ So we are.

Socrates/ And it is a strange thing, if it really exists? For we should not affirm as yet that it does not exist, but should still consider whether it does exist.

Critias/ You are right.

Socrates/ Well now, this science is a science of something, that is, it has a certain faculty whereby it can be a science of something, has it not?

Critias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For, you know, we say the greater has a certain faculty whereby it can be greater than something?

Critias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ That is, than something smaller, if it is to be greater.

Critias/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ So if we could find a greater which is greater than other greater things, and than itself, but not greater than the things beside which the others are greater, I take it there can be no doubt that it would be in the situation of being, if greater than itself, at the same time smaller than itself, would it not?

Critias/ Most inevitably, Socrates.

Socrates/ Or again, if there is a double of other doubles and of itself, both it and the others must of course be halves, if it is to be their double; for, you know, a double cannot be "of" anything else than its half.

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ And what is more than itself will also be less, and the heavier will be lighter, and the older younger, and so on with everything else: whatever has its own faculty applied to itself will have also the natural quality to which its faculty was applicable, will it not? For instance, hearing is, as we say, just a hearing of sound, is it not?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So if it is to hear itself, it will hear a sound of its own; for it would not hear otherwise.

Critias/ Most inevitably.

Socrates/ And sight, I suppose, my excellent friend, if it is to see itself, must needs have a color; for sight can never see what is colorless.

Critias/ No more it can.

Socrates/ Then do you perceive, Critias, in the various cases we have propounded, how some of them strike us as absolutely impossible, while others raise serious doubts as to the faculty of the thing being ever applicable to itself? For with magnitudes, numbers, and the like it is absolutely impossible, is it not?

Critias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But again, with hearing and sight, or in the further cases of motion moving itself and heat burning itself, and all other actions of the sort, the fact must appear incredible to some, but perhaps not to others. So what we want, my friend, is some great man who will determine to our satisfaction in every respect whether there is nothing in nature so constituted as to have its own faculty applicable to itself, and not only some other object, or whether there are some such, and others not such; and whether, again, if there are things that have such relation to themselves, they include a science which we assert to be temperance. For my part, I distrust my own competence to determine these questions, and hence I am neither able to affirm whether it is possible that there should be a science of science, nor willing, let it be ever so true, to acknowledge this to be temperance until I have made out whether such a thing as this would benefit us or not. For, you see, I have a presentiment that temperance is something beneficial and good; and you, therefore, son of Callaeschrus—since you lay it down that temperance is this very science of science, and moreover of the lack of science—shall first indicate the possibility, as I put it just now, and then the benefit added

to the possibility, of such a thing; and perhaps you will then satisfy me that your definition of temperance is correct.

Socrates/ Now when Critias heard this and saw me in a difficulty, he seemed to me—just as the sight of someone yawning opposite causes people to be affected in the same way—to be compelled by the sense of my difficulty to be caught in a difficulty himself. And so, since he usually contrived to distinguish himself, he was too ashamed to bring himself to admit to me before the company that he was unable to determine the questions with which I challenged him, but made a very indistinct reply in order to conceal his difficulty. Then I, to forward the discussion, remarked: Well, if you prefer, Critias, let us concede for the moment that there may possibly be a science of science: some other time we shall consider whether such is the fact or not. Come then; suppose it is perfectly possible: how is one helped thereby to know what one knows and does not know? For this, you are aware, we said was the meaning of self-knowledge and temperance, did we not?

Critias/ Certainly; and it must surely follow, Socrates; for if a man has a science which knows itself, he will be similar himself to that which he has. For instance, he who has swiftness will be swift, he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know; and when he has knowledge that is of itself, he will then, surely, be in the position of knowing himself.

Socrates/ I do not dispute that when a man has that which knows itself he will know himself; but having that, how is he bound to know what he knows and what he does not know?

Critias/ Because, Socrates, the two things are the same.

Socrates/ I daresay; but I am afraid I am still my old self: I still do not see how knowing what one knows and does not know is the same as the other.

Critias/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ In this way: will a science of science, if such exists, be able to do more than determine that one of two things is science, and the other is not science?

Critias/ No, only that.

Socrates/ Now, is science or lack of science of health the same as science or lack of science of justice?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ For the one, I suppose, is medicine, and the other politics, while the thing in question is merely science.

Critias/ Yes, to be sure.

Socrates/ And if a man has no added knowledge of health and justice, but knows only science, as having science of that alone, he will probably know that he has a certain piece of scientific knowledge about. himself and about other people, will he not?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But how will this science help him to know what he knows? For of course he knows health by means of medicine, not temperance, and harmony by means of music, not temperance, and building by means of the builder's art, not temperance; and so it will be in every case, will it not?

Critias/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And how will temperance, supposing it is only a science of sciences, help him to know that he knows health, or that he knows building?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then he who is ignorant of all this will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.

Critias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then being temperate, or temperance, will not be this knowledge of what one knows or does not know, but, it would seem, merely knowing that one knows or does not know.

Critias/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ Then such a person will also be unable to examine another man's claim to some knowledge, and make out whether he knows or does not know what he says he knows: he will merely know, it would seem, that he has a certain knowledge; but of what it is, temperance will not cause him to know.

Critias/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ So he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is none, from the man who really is one, nor any other man who has knowledge from him who has none. But let us consider it another way: if the temperate man or anybody else would discriminate between the true doctor and the false, he will go to work thus, will he not? He will surely not talk to him about medicine; for, as we were saying, the doctor understands nothing else but health and disease. Is not that so?

Critias/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ But about science he knows nothing, for that, you know, we assigned to temperance alone.

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So the medical man knows nothing about medicine either, since medicine is, of course, a science.

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ Then the temperate man will know, indeed, that the doctor has a certain science; but when he has to put its nature to the proof, must he not consider what its

subjects are? Is not each science marked out, not merely as a science, but as a particular one, by the particular subjects it has?

Critias/ It is, to be sure.

Socrates/ And medicine is marked out as different from the other sciences by being a science of health and disease.

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so anyone who wishes to inquire into medicine must make those things, whatever they may be, with which it is concerned, the matter of his inquiry; not those foreign things, I presume, with which it is not?

Critias/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Then he who conducts his inquiry aright will consider the doctor, as a medical man, in connection with cases of health and disease.

Critias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And will inquire whether, in what is said or done in such cases, his words are truly spoken, and his acts rightly done?

Critias/ He must.

Socrates/ Well now, could anyone follow up either of these points without the medical art?

Critias/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Nobody at all, it would seem, but a doctor; and so not the temperate man either: for he would have to be a doctor, in addition to his temperance.

Critias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then inevitably, if temperance is only a science of science and of lack of science, it will be equally unable to distinguish a doctor who knows the business of his art from one who does not know but pretends or thinks he does, and any other person who has knowledge of anything at all: one

will only distinguish one's fellow-artist, as craftsmen usually can.

Critias/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Then what benefit, Critias, can we still look for from temperance, if it is like that? For if, as we began by assuming, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know, and that he knows the one and does not know the other, and if he were able to observe this same condition in another man, it would be vastly to our benefit, we agree, to be temperate; since we should pass all our lives, both we who had temperance and all the rest who were governed by us, without error. For neither should we ourselves attempt to do what we did not know, instead of finding out those who knew and placing the matter in their hands, nor should we permit others under our governance to do anything but what they were likely to do aright; and they would do that when they had knowledge of it; and so it would be that a house which was ordered, or a state which was administered, as temperance bade, and everything else that was ruled by temperance, could not but be well ordered; for with error abolished, and rightness leading, in their every action men would be bound to do honorably and well under such conditions, and those who did well would be happy. Did we not so speak of temperance, Critias, when we remarked how great a boon it was to know what one knows and what one does not know?

Critias/ To be sure we did.

Socrates/ Whereas now, you see that nowhere can any such science be found.

Critias/ I see.

Socrates/ Then may we say, that there is this good point in the knowledge of knowledge and of lack of knowledge, which we now find to be what temperance is, that he who

has it will not only learn more easily whatever he learns, but will perceive everything more plainly, since besides the particular things that he learns he will behold the science; and hence he will probe more surely the state of other men respecting the things which he has learnt himself, while those who probe without such knowledge will do it more feebly and poorly? Are these, my friend, the kind of advantages that we shall gain from temperance?

But are we really looking at something greater, and requiring it to be something greater than it really is?

Critias/ Probably, that is so.

Socrates/ I daresay; and I daresay also our inquiry has been worthless. And this I conclude, because I observe certain strange facts about temperance, if it is anything like that. For suppose, if you please, we concede that there may possibly be a science of science, and let us grant, and not withdraw, our original proposition that temperance is the knowledge of what one knows and does not know; granting all this, let us still more thoroughly inquire whether on these terms it will be of any profit to us. For our suggestion just now, that temperance of that sort, as our guide in ordering house or state, must be a great boon, was not, to my thinking, Critias, a proper admission.

Critias/ How so?

Socrates/ Because, we too lightly admitted that it would be a great boon to mankind if each of us should do what he knows, but should place what he did not know in the hands of others who had the knowledge.

Critias/ Well, was that not a proper admission?

Socrates/ Not to my mind.

Critias/ In very truth, your words are strange! Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, by the Dog, and they strike me too in the same way; and it was in view of this, just now, that I spoke

of strange results that I noticed, and said I feared we were not inquiring rightly. For in truth, let temperance be ever so much what we say it is, I see nothing to show what good effect it has on us.

Critias/ How so? Tell us, in order that we on our side may know what you mean.

Socrates/ I expect, I am talking nonsense: but still one is bound to consider what occurs to one, and not idly ignore it, if one has even a little concern for oneself.

Critias/ And you are quite right.

Socrates/ Hear then, my dream, whether it has come through horn or through ivory. Suppose that temperance were such as we now define her, and that she had entire control of us: must it not be that every act would be done according to the sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he was not would deceive us, nor would a doctor, nor a general, nor anyone else pretending to know something he did not know, go undetected; and would not these conditions result in our having greater bodily health than we have now, safety in perils of the sea and war, and skillful workmanship in all our utensils, our clothes, our shoes, nay, everything about us, and various things besides, because we should be employing genuine craftsmen? And if you liked, we might concede that prophecy, as the knowledge of what is to be, and temperance directing her, will deter the charlatans, and establish the true prophets as our prognosticators. Thus equipped, the human race would indeed act and live according to knowledge, I grant you (for temperance, on the watch, would not suffer ignorance to foist herself in and take a hand in our labors), but that by acting according to knowledge we should do well and be happy—this is a point which as yet we are unable to make out, my dear Critias.

Critias/ But still, you will have some difficulty in finding any other fulfillment of welfare if you reject the rule of knowledge.

Socrates/ Then inform me further, on one more little matter. Of what is this knowledge? Do you mean of shoe-making?

Critias/ Good heavens, not I!

Socrates/ Well, of working in brass?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Well, in wool, or in wood, or in something else of that sort?

Critias/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Then we no longer hold, to the statement that he who lives according to knowledge is happy; for these workers, though they live according to knowledge, are not acknowledged by you to be happy: you rather delimit the happy man, it seems to me, as one who lives according to knowledge about certain things. And I daresay you are referring to my instance of a moment ago, the man who knows all that is to come, the prophet. Do you refer to him or to someone else?

Critias/ Yes, I refer to him and someone else too.

Socrates/ Whom? Is it the sort of person who might know, besides what is to be, both everything that has been and now is, and might be ignorant of nothing? Let us suppose such a man exists: you are not going to tell me, I am sure, of anyone alive who is yet more knowing than he.

Critias/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Then there is still one more thing I would fain know: which of the sciences is it that makes him happy? Or does he owe it to all of them alike?

Critias/ By no means to all alike.

Socrates/ But to which sort most? One that gives him knowledge of what thing, present, past or future? Is it that by which he knows draught-playing?

Critias/ Draught-playing indeed!

Socrates/ Well, reckoning?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Well, health?

Critias/ More likely.

Socrates/ And that science to which I refer as the most likely, gives him knowledge of what?

Critias/ Of good and of evil.

Socrates/ Vile creature! You have all this time been dragging me round and round, while concealing the fact that the life according to knowledge does not make us do well and be happy, not even if it be knowledge of all the other knowledges together, but only if it is of this single one concerning good and evil. For, Critias, if you choose to take away this science from the whole number of them, will medicine any the less give us health, or shoemaking give us shoes, or weaving provide clothes, or will the pilot's art any the less prevent the loss of life at sea, or the general's in war?

Critias/ None the less.

Socrates/ But, my dear Critias, to have any of these things well and beneficially done will be out of our reach if that science is lacking.

Critias/ That is true.

Socrates/ And that science, it seems, is not temperance, but one whose business is to benefit us; for it is not a science of sciences and lack of sciences, but of good and evil: so that if this is beneficial, temperance must be something else to us.

Critias/ But why should not it be beneficial? For if temperance is above all a science of the sciences, and presides too over the other sciences, surely she will govern this science of the good, and so benefit us.

Socrates/ And give us health also? Will she, and not medicine, do this? And will the several works of the other arts be hers, and not the particular works of each art? Have we not constantly protested that she is only knowledge of knowledge and of lack of knowledge, and of nothing else? Is not that so?

Critias/ Apparently it is.

Socrates/ Then she will not be a producer of health?

Critias/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ For health, we said, belongs to another art, did we not?

Critias/ We did.

Socrates/ Nor of benefit, my good friend; for this work, again, we assigned to another art just now, did we not?

Critias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then how will temperance be beneficial, if it produces no benefit?

Critias/ By no means, Socrates, as it seems.

Socrates/ So do you see, Critias, how all the time I had good reason for my fear, and fair ground for the reproach I made against myself, that my inquiry regarding temperance was worthless? For I cannot think that what is admitted to be the noblest thing in the world would have appeared to us useless if I had been of any use for making a good search. But now, you see, we are worsted every way, and cannot discover what thing it can possibly be to which the lawgiver gave this name, temperance. And yet we have conceded many points which were not deducible from our argument.

For you know we conceded that there was a science of science, when the argument was against it and would not agree; and we further conceded that this science could know the works also of the other sciences, when the argument was against this too, in order to make out that the temperate man had a knowledge of what he knew and did not know, so as to know that he knew the one and did not know the other. And we made this concession in a really magnificent manner, without considering the impossibility of a man knowing, in some sort of way, things that he does not know at all; for our admission says that he knows that he does not know them; and yet, in my opinion, there can be nothing more irrational than this. Nevertheless, although it has found us so simple-minded and tractable, the inquiry remains quite incapable of discovering the truth, but has utterly flouted it by most impudently showing us the inutility of that which we had been ever so long assuming, by our joint admissions and fictions, to be the meaning of temperance. Now, so far as I am concerned, I am not particularly distressed: but for your sake, Charmides, I am seriously distressed to think that you, with your goodly form and most temperate soul besides, are to have no profit or advantage from the presence of that temperance in all your life. And I am still more distressed about the charm which I learnt from the Thracian, that I should have spent so much pains on a lesson which has had such a worthless effect. Now I really do not think that this can be the case, but rather that I am a poor hand at inquiring; for temperance I hold to be a great good, and you to be highly blessed, if you actually have it. See now whether you have it, and are in no need of the charm; for if it is yours, I should rather advise you to regard me as a babbler who is unable to argue out any subject of inquiry whatsoever, and yourself as advancing in happiness as you advance in temperance.

Then Charmides said:

Charmides/ Why, upon my word, Socrates, I do not know at all whether I have it or have it not. For how can I know, when even you two are unable to discover what this thing is? —so you say, but of this you do not at all convince me—and I quite believe, Socrates, that I do need the charm, and for my part I have no objection to being charmed by you every day of my life, until you say I have had enough of the treatment.

Critias/ Very well: now, Charmides, if you do this, it will be a proof to me of your temperance—if you submit to be charmed by Socrates and do not forsake him through thick and thin.

Charmides/ Count on me to follow and not forsake him; for it would ill become me to disobey you, my guardian, and refuse to do your bidding.

Critias/ Well now, I bid you.

Charmides/ Then I will do as you bid and will start this very day.

Socrates/ There, there, what are you two plotting to do?

Charmides/ Nothing; we have made our plot.

Socrates/ So you will use force before even allowing me to make my affidavit?

Charmides/ You must expect me to use force, since he gives me the command: take counsel, therefore, on your side, as to what you will do.

Socrates/ But that leaves no room for counsel; for if once you set about doing anything and use force, no man alive will be able to withstand you.

Charmides/ Then do not you withstand me.

Socrates/ Then I will not withstand you.

Charmides

Translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Chærephon, Critias, Charmides.

Socrates/ We got back the preceding evening from the camp at Potidaea, and since I was arriving after such a long absence I sought out my accustomed haunts with special pleasure. To be more specific, I went straight to the palestra of Taureas (the one directly opposite the temple of Basile), and there I found a good number of people, most of whom were familiar, though there were some, too, whom I didn't know. When they saw me coming in unexpectedly, I was immediately hailed at a distance by people coming up from all directions, and Chaerephon, like the wild man he is, sprang up from the midst of a group of people and ran towards me and, seizing me by the hand, exclaimed;

Chaerephon/ "Socrates! how did you come off in the battle?"

Socrates/ (A short time before we came away there had been a battle at Potidaea and the people at home had only just got the news.)

And I said in reply, "Exactly as you see me."

Chaerephon/ "The way we heard it here, the fighting was very heavy and many of our friends were killed."

Socrates/ "The report is pretty accurate."

Chaerephon/ "Were you actually in the battle?"

Socrates/ "Yes, I was there."

Chaerephon/ "Well, come sit down and give us a complete account, because we've had very few details so far."

Socrates/ And while he was still talking he brought me over to Critias, the son of Callaeschrus, and sat me down there.

When I took my seat I greeted Critias and the rest and proceeded to relate the news from the camp in answer to whatever questions anyone asked, and they asked plenty of different ones.

When they had had enough of these things, I in my turn began to question them with respect to affairs at home, about the present state of philosophy and about the young men, whether there were any who had become distinguished for wisdom or beauty or both. Whereupon Critias, glancing towards the door and seeing several young men coming in and laughing with each other, with a crowd of others following behind, said

Critias/ "As far as beauty goes, Socrates, I think you will be able to make up your mind straight away, because those coming in are the advance party and the admirers of the one who is thought to be the handsomest young man of the day, and I think that he himself cannot be far off."

Socrates/ "But who is he, and who is his father?"

Critias/ "You probably know him, but he was not yet grown up when you went away. He is Charmides, the son of my mother's brother Glaucon, and my cousin."

Socrates/ "Good heavens, of course I know him, because he was worth noticing even when he was a child. By now I suppose he must be pretty well grown up."

Critias/ "It won't be long, before you discover how grown up he is and how he has turned out."

Socrates/ And while he was speaking Charmides came in.

You mustn't judge by me, my friend. I'm a broken yardstick as far as handsome people are concerned, because practically everyone of that age strikes me as beautiful. But even so, at the moment Charmides came in he seemed to me to be

amazing in stature and appearance, and everyone there looked to me to be in love with him, they were so astonished and confused by his entrance, and many other lovers followed in his train. That men of my age should have been affected this way was natural enough, but I noticed that even the small boys fixed their eyes upon him and no one of them, not even the littlest, looked at anyone else, but all gazed at him as if he were a statue. And Chaerephon called to me and said;

Chaerephon/ "Well, Socrates, what do you think of the young man? Hasn't he a splendid face?"

Socrates/ "Extraordinary."

Chaerephon/ "But if he were willing to strip, you would hardly notice his face, his body is so perfect."

Socrates/ Well, everyone else said the same things as Chaerephon, and I said, "By Heracles, you are describing a man without an equal—if he should happen to have one small thing in addition."

Critias/ "What's that?"

Socrates/ "If he happens to have a well-formed soul, It would be appropriate if he did, Critias, since he comes from your family."

Critias/ "He is very distinguished in that respect, too."

Socrates/ "Then why don't we undress this part of him and have a look at it before we inspect his body? Surely he has already reached the age when he is willing to discuss things."

Critias/ "Very much so, since he is not only a philosopher but also, both in his own opinion and that of others, quite a poet."

Socrates/ "This is a gift, my dear Critias, which has been in your family as far back as Solon. But why not call the young man over and put him through his paces? Even though he is still so young, there can be nothing wrong in talking to him

when you are here, since you are both his guardian and his cousin."

Critias/ "You are right, we'll call him."

Socrates/ And he immediately spoke to his servant and said;

Critias/ "Boy, call Charmides and tell him I want him to meet a doctor for the weakness he told me he was suffering from yesterday."

Socrates/ Then Critias said to me;

Critias/ "You see, just lately he's complained of a headache when he gets up in the morning. Why not pretend to him that you know a remedy for it?"

Socrates/ "No reason why not, if he will only come."

Critias/ "Oh, he will come."

Socrates/ Which is just what happened. He did come, and his coming caused a lot of laughter, because everyone of us who was already seated began pushing hard at his neighbor so as to make a place for him to sit down. The upshot of it was that we made the man sitting at one end get up, and the man at the other end was toppled off sideways. In the end he came and sat down between me and Critias. And then, my friend, I really was in difficulties, and although I had thought it would be perfectly easy to talk to him, I found my previous brash confidence quite gone. And when Critias said that I was the person who knew the remedy and he turned his full gaze upon me in a manner beyond description and seemed on the point of asking a question, and when everyone in the palestra surged all around us in a circle, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught on fire and was quite beside myself. And it occurred to me that Cydias was the wisest love-poet when he gave someone advice on the subject of beautiful boys and said that "the fawn should beware lest, while taking a look at the lion, he should provide part of the lion's dinner," because

I felt as if I had been snapped up by such a creature. All the same, when he asked me if I knew the headache remedy, I managed somehow to answer that I did.

Charmides/ “What exactly is it?”

Socrates/ And I said that it was a certain leaf, and that there was a charm to go with it. If one sang the charm while applying the leaf, the remedy would bring about a complete cure, but without the charm the leaf was useless.

Charmides/ “Well, then I shall write down the charm at your dictation.”

Socrates/ “With my permission, or without it?”

Charmides/ “With it, of course, Socrates.”

Socrates/ he said, laughing.

“Very well, And are you quite sure about my name?”

Charmides/ “It would be disgraceful if I were not because you are no small topic of conversation among us boys, and besides, I remember you being with Critias here when I was a child.”

Socrates/ “Good for you. Then I shall speak more freely about the nature of the charm. Just now I was in difficulties about what method I would adopt in order to demonstrate its power to you. Its nature, Charmides, is not such as to be able to cure the head alone. You have probably heard this about good doctors, that if you go to them with a pain in the eyes, they are likely to say that they cannot undertake to cure the eyes by themselves, but that it will be necessary to treat the head at the same time if things are also to go well with the eyes. And again it would be very foolish to suppose that one could ever treat the head by itself without treating the whole body. In keeping with this principle, they plan a regime for the whole body with the idea of treating and curing the part along with the whole. Or haven’t you noticed that this is what they say and what the situation is?”

Charmides/ “Yes, I have.”

Socrates/ “Then what I have said appears true, and you accept the principle?”

Charmides/ “Absolutely.”

Socrates/ And when I heard his approval, I took heart and, little by little, my former confidence revived, and I began to wake up. So I said, “Well Charmides, it is just the same with this charm. I learned it while I was with the army, from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis, who are also said to make men immortal. And this Thracian said that the Greek doctors were right to say what I told you just now. ‘But our king Zalmoxis,’ he said, ‘who is a god, says that just as one should not attempt to cure the eyes apart from the head, nor the head apart from the body, so one should not attempt to cure the body apart from the soul. And this, he says, is the very reason why most diseases are beyond the Greek doctors, that they do not pay attention to the whole as they ought to do, since if the whole is not in good condition, it is impossible that the part should be. Because,’ he said, ‘the soul is the source both of bodily health and bodily disease for the whole man, and these flow from the soul in the same way that the eyes are affected by the head. So it is necessary first and foremost to cure the soul if the parts of the head and of the rest of the body are to be healthy. And the soul,’ he said, ‘my dear friend, is cured by means of certain charms, and these charms consist of beautiful words. It is a result of such words that temperance arises in the soul, and when the soul acquires and possesses temperance, it is easy to provide health both for the head and for the rest of the body.’ So when he taught me the remedy and the charms, he also said, ‘Don’t let anyone persuade you to treat his head with this remedy who does not first submit his soul to you for treatment with the charm. Because nowadays,’ he said, ‘this is the mistake some doctors make with their patients. They try to produce health of body apart

from health of soul.' And he gave me very strict instructions that I should be deaf to the entreaties of wealth, position, and personal beauty. So I (for I have given him my promise and must keep it) shall be obedient, and if you are willing, in accordance with the stranger's instructions, to submit your soul to be charmed with the Thracian's charms first, then I shall apply the remedy to your head. But if not, there is nothing we can do for you, my dear Charmides."

When Critias heard me saying this, he said;

Critias/ "The headache will turn out to have been a lucky thing for the young man, Socrates, if, because of his head, he will be forced to improve his wits. Let me tell you, though, that Charmides not only outstrips his contemporaries in beauty of form but also in this very thing for which you say you have the charm; it was temperance, wasn't it?"

Socrates/ "Yes, indeed it was."

Critias/ "Then you must know that not only does he have the reputation of being the most temperate young man of the day, but that he is second to none in everything else appropriate to his age."

Socrates/ "And it is quite right, Charmides, that you should be superior to the rest in all such things because I don't suppose that anyone else here could so readily point to two Athenian families whose union would be likely to produce a more aristocratic lineage than that from which you are sprung. Your father's family, that of Critias, the son of Dropides, has been praised for us by Anacreon, Solon, and many other poets for superior beauty, virtue, and everything else called happiness. It's the same on your mother's side. Your maternal uncle Pyrilampes has the reputation of being the finest and most influential man in the country because of his numerous embassies to the Great King and others, so that this whole side of the family is not a bit inferior to the other.

As the offspring of such forebears, it is likely that you hold pride of place. In the matter of visible beauty, dear son of Glaucon, you appear to me to be in no respect surpassed by those who come before. But if, in addition, you have a sufficient share of temperance and the other attributes mentioned by your friend here, then your mother bore a blessed son in you, my dear Charmides. Now this is the situation: if temperance is already present in you, as Critias here asserts, and if you are sufficiently temperate, you have no need of the charms either of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean, and you may have the remedy for the head straightaway. But if you still appear to lack these things, you must be charmed before you are given the remedy. So tell me yourself: do you agree with your friend and assert that you already partake sufficiently of temperance, or would you say that you are lacking in it?"

At first Charmides blushed and looked more beautiful than ever, and his bashfulness was becoming at his age. Then he answered in a way that was quite dignified: he said that it was not easy for him, in the present circumstances, either to agree or to disagree with what had been asked.

Charmides/ "Because, if I should deny that I am temperate, it would not only seem an odd thing to say about oneself, but I would at the same time make Critias here a liar, and so with the many others to whom, by his account, I appear to be temperate. But if, on the other hand, I should agree and should praise myself, perhaps that would appear distasteful. So I do not know what I am to answer."

Socrates/ "What you say appears to me to be reasonable, Charmides. And I think we ought to investigate together the question whether you do or do not possess the thing I am inquiring about, so that you will not be forced to say anything against your will and I, on the other hand, shall not turn to doctoring in an irresponsible way. If this is agreeable to you, I

would like to investigate the question with you, but if not, we can give it up."

Charmides/ "Oh, I should like it above all things, so go ahead and investigate the matter in whatever way you think best."

Socrates/ "Well then, in these circumstances, I think the following method would be best. Now it is clear that if temperance is present in you, you have some opinion about it. Because it is necessary, I suppose, that if it really resides in you, it provides a sense of its presence, by means of which you would form an opinion not only that you have it but of what sort it is. Or don't you think so?"

Charmides/ "Yes, I do think so."

Socrates/ "Well, then, since you know how to speak Greek I suppose you could express this impression of yours in just the way it strikes you?"

Charmides/ "Perhaps."

Socrates/ "Well, to help us decide whether it resides in you or not, say what, in your opinion, temperance is."

At first he shied away and was rather unwilling to answer. Finally, however, he said that in his opinion temperance was doing everything in an orderly and quiet way—things like walking in the streets, and talking, and doing everything else in a similar fashion.

Charmides/ "So I think, taking it all together, that what you ask about is a sort of quietness."

Socrates/ "Perhaps you are right, at least they do say, Charmides, that the quiet are temperate. Let's see if there is anything in it. Tell me, temperance is one of the admirable things, isn't it?"

Charmides/ "Yes indeed."

Socrates/ “Now when you are at the writing master’s, is it more admirable to copy the letters quickly or quietly?”

Charmides/ “Quickly.”

Socrates/ “What about reading? Quickly or quietly?”

Charmides/ “Quickly.”

Socrates/ “And certainly to play the lyre quickly and to wrestle in a lively fashion is much more admirable than to do these things quietly and slowly?”

Charmides/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Well, isn’t the same thing true about boxing and the pancration?”

Charmides/ “Yes indeed.”

Socrates/ “And with running and jumping and all the movements of the body, aren’t the ones that are performed briskly and quickly the admirable ones, and those performed with difficulty and quietly the ugly ones?”

Charmides/ “It seems so.”

Socrates/ “And it seems to us that, in matters of the body, it is not the quieter movement but the quickest and most lively which is the most admirable. Isn’t it so?”

Charmides/ “Yes indeed.”

Socrates/ “But temperance was something admirable?”

Charmides/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Then in the case of the body it would not be quietness but quickness which is the more temperate, since temperance is an admirable thing.”

Charmides/ “That seems reasonable.”

Socrates/ “Well then, is facility in learning more admirable or difficulty in learning?”

Charmides/ “Facility.”

Socrates/ “But facility in learning is learning quickly? And difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?”

Charmides/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And to teach another person quickly—isn’t this far more admirable than to teach him quietly and slowly?”

Charmides/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Well then, to recall and to remember quietly and slowly—is this more admirable, or to do it vehemently and quickly?”

Charmides/ “Vehemently and quickly.”

Socrates/ “And isn’t shrewdness a kind of liveliness of soul, and not a kind of quietness?”

Charmides/ “True.”

Socrates/ “And again this is also true of understanding what is said, at the writing master’s and at the lyre teacher’s and everywhere else: to act not as quietly but as quickly as possible is the most admirable.”

Charmides/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And, further, in the operations of thought and in making plans, it is not the quietest man, I think, and the man who plans and finds out things with difficulty who appears to be worthy of praise but the one who does these things most easily and quickly.”

Charmides/ “Exactly so.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, Charmides, in all these cases, both of soul and body, we think that quickness and speed are more admirable than slowness and quietness?”

Charmides/ “It seems likely.”

Socrates/ “We conclude then that temperance would not be a kind of quietness, nor would the temperate life be quiet, as far as this argument is concerned at any rate, since the temperate life is necessarily an admirable thing. There are two

possibilities for us: either no quiet actions in life appear to be more admirable than the swift and strong ones, or very few. If then, my friend, even quite a few quiet actions should turn out to be more admirable than the violent and quick ones, not even on this assumption would temperance consist in doing things quietly rather than in doing them violently and quickly, neither in walking nor in speech nor in anything else; nor would the quiet life be more temperate than its opposite, since in the course of the argument we placed temperance among the admirable things, and the quick things have turned out to be no less admirable than the quiet ones."

Charmides/ "What you say seems to me quite right, Socrates."

Socrates/ "Then start over again, Charmides, and look into yourself with greater concentration, and when you have decided what effect the presence of temperance has upon you and what sort of thing it must be to have this effect, then put all this together and tell me clearly and bravely, what does it appear to you to be?"

He paused and, looking into himself very manfully, said;

Charmides/ "Well, temperance seems to me to make people ashamed and bashful, and so I think modesty must be what temperance really is."

Socrates/ "But, didn't we agree just now that temperance was an admirable thing?"

Charmides/ "Yes, we did."

Socrates/ "And it would follow that temperate men are good?"

Charmides/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "And could a thing be good that does not produce good men?"

Charmides/ "Of course not."

Socrates/ “Then not only is temperance an admirable thing, but it is a good thing.”

Charmides/ “I agree.”

Socrates/ “Well, then, you don’t agree with Homer when he said that ‘modesty is not a good mate for a needy man’?”

Charmides/ “Oh, but I do.”

Socrates/ “So it seems to be the case that modesty both is and is not a good.”

Charmides/ “Yes, it does.”

Socrates/ “But temperance must be a good if it makes those good in whom it is present and makes bad those in whom it is not.”

Charmides/ “Why yes, it seems to me to be exactly as you say.”

Socrates/ “Then temperance would not be modesty if it really is a good and if modesty is no more good than bad.”

Charmides/ “What you say has quite convinced me, Socrates.” “But give me your opinion of the following definition of temperance: I have just remembered having heard someone say that temperance is minding one’s own business. Tell me if you think the person who said this was right.”

Socrates/ “You wretch, you’ve picked this up from Critias or from some other wise man.”

Critias/ “I guess it was from some other, because it was certainly not from me.”

Charmides/ “What difference does it make, Socrates, from whom I heard it?”

Socrates/ “None at all, since the question at issue is not who said it, but whether what he said is true or not.”

Charmides/ “Now I like what you say.”

Socrates/ “Good for you, but if we succeed in finding out what it means, I should be surprised, because it seems to be a sort of riddle.”

Charmides/ “In what way?”

Socrates/ “I mean, that when he uttered the words, I don’t suppose the person speaking really meant that temperance was minding your own business. Or do you consider that the writing master does nothing when he writes or reads?”

Charmides/ “On the contrary, I do think he does something.”

Socrates/ “And do you think the writing master teaches you to read and write your own name only or those of the other boys as well? And do you write the names of your enemies just as much as your own names and those of your friends?”

Charmides/ “Just as much.”

Socrates/ “And are you a busybody and intemperate when you do this?”

Charmides/ “Not at all.”

Socrates/ “But aren’t you doing other people’s business if to read and write are to do something?”

Charmides/ “I suppose I am.”

Socrates/ “And then healing, my friend, is doing something, I suppose, and so is house-building and weaving and engaging in anyone of the arts.”

Charmides/ “Yes indeed.”

Socrates/ “Well then, do you think a city would be well governed by a law commanding each man to weave and wash his own cloak, make his own shoes and oil flask and scraper, and perform everything else by this same principle of keeping his hands off of other people’s things and making and doing his own?”

Charmides/ “No, I don’t think it would.”

Socrates/ “But, if a city is going to be temperately governed, it must be governed well.”

Charmides/ “Of course.”

Socrates/ “Then if temperance is ‘minding your own business’, it can’t be minding things of this sort and in this fashion.”

Charmides/ “Apparently not.”

Socrates/ “Then the person who said that temperance was ‘minding your own business’ must, apparently, have been riddling, as I pointed out just now, because I don’t suppose he was quite so simpleminded. Or was it some silly fellow you heard saying this, Charmides?”

Charmides/ “Far from it, he seemed very wise indeed.”

Socrates/ “Then I think he must certainly have tossed off a riddle, since it is difficult to know what in the world this ‘minding your own business’ can be.”

Charmides/ “Perhaps it is.”

Socrates/ “Then what in the world is ‘minding your own business’? Are you able to say?”

Charmides/ “I’m at a total loss.” “But perhaps the one who said it didn’t know what he meant either.”

Socrates/ And when he said this he smiled and looked at Critias.

It was clear that Critias had been agitated for some time and also that he was eager to impress Charmides and the rest who were there. He had held himself in with difficulty earlier, but now he could do so no longer. In my opinion, what I suspected earlier was certainly true, that Charmides had picked up this saying about temperance from Critias. And then Charmides, who wanted the author of the definition to take over the argument rather than himself, tried to provoke him to it by going on pointing out that the cause was lost.

Critias couldn't put up with this but seemed to me to be angry with Charmides just the way a poet is when his verse is mangled by the actors. So he gave him a look and said;

Critias/ "Do you suppose, Charmides, that just because you don't understand what in the world the man meant who said that temperance was 'minding your own business', the man himself doesn't understand either?"

Socrates/ "Well, my dear Critias, there would be nothing remarkable in his being ignorant of the matter at his age, but you, because of your age and experience, are very likely to understand it. So if you agree that temperance is what the man said it was and take over the argument, I would be very happy to investigate with you the question whether what was said is true or not."

Critias/ "I am quite ready to agree, and to take over the argument."

Socrates/ "I admire you for it." "Now tell me: do you also agree with what I was just saying, that all craftsmen make something?"

Critias/ "Yes I do."

Socrates/ "And do they seem to you to make their own things only, or those of other people as well?"

Critias/ "Those of others as well."

Socrates/ "And are they temperate in not making their own things only?"

Critias/ "Is there any objection?"

Socrates/ "None for me, but see whether there may not be one for the man who defines temperance as 'minding your own business' and then says there is no objection if those who do other people's business are temperate too."

Critias/ “But, have I agreed that those who do other people’s business are temperate by admitting that those making other people’s things are temperate?”

Socrates/ “Tell me, don’t you call making and doing the same thing?”

Critias/ “Not at all, nor do I call working and making the same. I have learned this from Hesiod, who said ‘work is no disgrace’. Do you suppose that Hesiod, if he referred to the sort of things you mentioned just now by both the term ‘work’ and the term ‘do’, would have said there was no disgrace in cobbling or selling salt fish or prostitution? One ought not to think this, Socrates, but rather believe, as I do, that he supposed making to be something other than doing and working, and that a ‘made’ or created thing became a disgrace on those occasions when it was not accompanied by the admirable, but that work is never any sort of disgrace. Because he gave the name ‘works’ to things done admirably and usefully, and it is creations of this sort which are ‘works’ and ‘actions’. We ought to represent him as thinking that only things of this sort are ‘one’s own’ and that all the harmful ones belong to other people. The result is that we must suppose that Hesiod and any other man of sense calls the man who minds his own business temperate.”

Socrates/ “Critias, I understood the beginning of your speech pretty well, when you said that you called things that were ‘one’s own’ and ‘of oneself’ good and called the doing of good things actions, because I have heard Prodicus discourse upon the distinction in words a hundred times. Well, I give you permission to define each word the way you like just so long as you make clear the application of whatever word you use. Now start at the beginning and define more clearly: the doing of good things or the making of them or whatever you want to call it—is this what you say temperance is?”

Critias/ “Yes, it is.”

Socrates/ “And the man who performs evil actions is not temperate, but the man who performs good ones?”

Critias/ “Doesn’t it seem so to you, my friend?”

Socrates/ “Never mind that, we are not investigating what I think but rather what you now say.”

Critias/ “Well then, I, deny that the man who does things that are not good but bad is temperate, and assert that the man who does things that are good but not bad is temperate. So I give you a clear definition of temperance as the doing of good things.”

Socrates/ “And there is no reason why you should not be speaking the truth. But it certainly does surprise me, if you believe that temperate men are ignorant of their temperance.”

Critias/ “I don’t think so at all.”

Socrates/ “But didn’t you say just a moment ago, that there was nothing to prevent craftsmen, even while they do other people’s business, from being temperate?”

Critias/ “Yes, I did say that.” “But what about it?”

Socrates/ “Nothing, but tell me if you think that a doctor, when he makes someone healthy, does something useful both for himself and for the person he cures.”

Critias/ “Yes, I agree.”

Socrates/ “And the man who does these things does what he ought?”

Critias/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And the man who does what he ought is temperate, isn’t he?”

Critias/ “Of course he is temperate.”

Socrates/ “And does a doctor have to know when he cures in a useful way and when he does not? And so with each of

the craftsmen: does he have to know when he is going to benefit from the work he performs and when he is not?"

Critias/ "Perhaps not."

Socrates/ "Then sometimes, the doctor doesn't know himself whether he has acted beneficially or harmfully. Now if he has acted beneficially, then, according to your argument, he has acted temperately. Or isn't this what you said?"

Critias/ "Yes, it is."

Socrates/ "Then it seems that on some occasions he acts beneficially and, in so doing, acts temperately and is temperate, but is ignorant of his own temperance?"

Critias/ "But this, Socrates, would never happen. And if you think it necessary to draw this conclusion from what I admitted before, then I would rather withdraw some of my statements, and would not be ashamed to admit I had made a mistake, in preference to conceding that a man ignorant of himself could be temperate. As a matter of fact, this is pretty much what I say temperance is, to know oneself, and I agree with the inscription to this effect set up at Delphi. Because this inscription appears to me to have been dedicated for the following purpose, as though it were a greeting from the god to those coming in in place of the usual 'Hail', as though to say 'hail' were an incorrect greeting, but we should rather urge one another to 'be temperate'. It is in this fashion, then, that the god greets those who enter his temple, not after the manner of man—or so I suppose the man thought who dedicated the inscription. What he says to the person entering is nothing else than 'be temperate'; this is what he says. Now in saying this he speaks very darkly, as a seer would do. That 'know thyself' and 'be temperate' are the same (as the inscription claims, and so do I) might be doubted by some, and this I think to be the case with those who dedicated the later inscriptions 'Nothing too much' and 'Pledges lead to

perdition'. Because these people thought that 'Know thyself' was a piece of advice and not the god's greeting to those who enter, so, with the idea of dedicating some admonitions which were no less useful, they wrote these things and put them up. But here's the reason why I say all this, Socrates: I concede to you everything that was said before—perhaps you said something more nearly right on the subject and perhaps I did, but nothing of what we said was really clear—but now I wish to give you an explanation of this definition, unless of course you already agree that temperance is to know oneself."

Socrates/ "But Critias, you are talking to me as though I professed to know the answers to my own questions and as though I could agree with you if I really wished. This is not the case—rather, because of my own ignorance, I am continually investigating in your company whatever is put forward. However, if I think it over, I am willing to say whether I agree or not. Just wait while I consider."

Critias/ "Well, think it over."

Socrates/ "Yes, I'm thinking." "Well, if knowing is what temperance is, then it clearly must be some sort of science and must be of something, isn't that so?"

Critias/ "Yes—of oneself."

Socrates/ "Then medicine, too, is a science and is of health?"

Critias/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Now, if you should ask me, 'If medicine is a science of health, what benefit does it confer upon us and what does it produce?' I would answer that it conferred no small benefit. Because health is a fine result for us, if you agree that this is what it produces."

Critias/ "I agree."

Socrates/ "And if you should ask me about house-building, which is a science of building houses, and ask what I say that

it produces, I would say that it produces houses, and so on with the other arts. So you ought to give an answer on behalf of temperance, since you say it is a science of self, in case you should be asked, 'Critias, since temperance is a science of self, what fine result does it produce which is worthy of the name?' Come along, tell me."

Critias/ "But, Socrates, you are not conducting the investigation in the right way. This science does not have the same nature as the rest, any more than they have the same nature as each other, but you are carrying on the investigation as though they were all the same. For instance, in the arts of calculation and geometry, tell me what is the product corresponding to the house in the case of house-building and the cloak in the case of weaving and so on—one could give many instances from many arts. You ought to point out to me a similar product in these cases, but you won't be able to do it."

Socrates/ "You are right. But I can point out to you in the case of each one of these sciences what it is a science of, this being distinct from the science itself. For instance, the art of calculation, of course, is of the odd and even—how many they are in themselves and with respect to other numbers—isn't that so?"

Critias/ "Yes indeed."

Socrates/ "Now aren't the odd and even distinct from the art of calculation itself?"

Critias/ "Of course."

Socrates/ "And again, the art of weighing is an art concerned with the heavier and lighter; and the heavy and light are distinct from the art of weighing. Do you agree?"

Critias/ "Yes, I do."

Socrates/ “Then, since temperance is also a science of something, state what that something is which is distinct from temperance itself.”

Critias/ “This is just what I mean, Socrates.” “You arrive at the point of investigating the respect in which temperance differs from all the other sciences, and then you start looking for some way in which it resembles all the others. It’s not like this; but rather, all the others are sciences of something else, not of themselves, whereas this is the only science which is both of other sciences and of itself. And I think you are quite consciously doing what you denied doing a moment ago—you are trying to refute me and ignoring the real question at issue.”

Socrates/ “Oh come, how could you possibly think that even if I were to refute everything you say, I would be doing it for any other reasons than the one I would give for a thorough investigation of my own statements—the fear of unconsciously thinking I know something when I do not. And this is what I claim to be doing now, examining the argument for my own sake primarily, but perhaps also for the sake of my friends. Or don’t you believe it to be for the common good, or for that of most men, that the state of each existing thing should become clear?”

Critias/ “Very much so, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Pluck up courage then, my friend, and answer the question as seems best to you, paying no attention to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted. Instead, give your attention to the argument itself to see what the result of its refutation will be.”

Critias/ “All right, I will do as you say, because you seem to me to be talking sense.”

Socrates/ “Then remind me, what it is you say about temperance.”

Critias/ “I say, that it is the only science that is both a science of itself and of the other sciences.”

Socrates/ “Would it then, also be a science of the absence of science, if it is a science of science?”

Critias/ “Of course.”

Socrates/ “Then only the temperate man will know himself and will be able to examine what he knows and does not know, and in the same way he will be able to inspect other people to see when a man does in fact know what he knows and thinks he knows, and when again he does not know what he thinks he knows, and no one else will be able to do this. And being temperate and temperance and knowing oneself amount to this, to knowing what one knows and does not know. Or isn’t this what you say?”

Critias/ “Yes, it is.”

Socrates/ “Then for our third libation, the lucky one, let us investigate, as though from the beginning, two points: first, whether it is possible or not to know that one knows and does not know what he knows and does not know and second, should this be perfectly possible, what benefit there would be for those who know this.”

Critias/ “Yes, we ought to look into this.”

Socrates/ “Then, come on, Critias, and consider whether you appear better off than I in these matters, because I am in difficulties. Shall I tell you where my difficulty lies?”

Critias/ “Yes, do.”

Socrates/ “Well, wouldn’t the whole thing amount to this, if what you said just now is true, that there is one science which is not of anything except itself and the other sciences and that this same science is also a science of the absence of science?”

Critias/ “Yes indeed.”

Socrates/ “Then see what an odd thing we are attempting to say, my friend—because if you look for this same thing in other cases, you will find, I think, that it is impossible.”

Critias/ “How is that, and what cases do you mean?”

Socrates/ “Cases like the following: consider, for instance, if you think there could be a kind of vision that is not the vision of the thing that other visions are of but is the vision of itself and the other visions and also of the lack of visions, and, although it is a type of vision, it sees no color, only itself and the other visions. Do you think there is something of this kind?”

Critias/ “Good heavens, no, not I.”

Socrates/ “And what about a kind of hearing that hears no sound but hears itself and the other hearings and non-hearings?”

Critias/ “Not this either.”

Socrates/ “Then take all the senses together and see if there is anyone of them that is a sense of the senses and of itself but that senses nothing which the other senses sense.”

Critias/ “I can’t see that there is.”

Socrates/ “And do you think there is any desire that is a desire for no pleasure but for itself and the other desires?”

Critias/ “Certainly not.”

Socrates/ “Nor indeed any wish, I think, that wishes for no good but only for itself and the other wishes.”

Critias/ “No, that would follow.”

Socrates/ “And would you say there was a love of such a sort as to be a love of no fine thing but of itself and the other loves?”

Critias/ “No, I would not.”

Socrates/ “And have you ever observed a fear that fears itself and the other fears, but of frightful things fears not a one?”

Critias/ “I have never observed such a thing.”

Socrates/ “Or an opinion that is of itself and other opinions but opines nothing that other opinions do?”

Critias/ “Never.”

Socrates/ “But we are saying, it seems, that there is a science of this sort, which is a science of no branch of learning but is a science of itself and the other sciences.”

Critias/ “Yes, we are saying that.”

Socrates/ “But isn’t it strange if there really is such a thing? However, we ought not yet to state categorically that there is not, but still go on investigating whether there is.”

Critias/ “You are right.”

Socrates/ “Come on then: is this science a science of something and does it have a certain faculty of being ‘of something’? What about it?”

Critias/ “Yes, it does.”

Socrates/ “And do we say the greater has a certain faculty of being greater than something?”

Critias/ “Yes, it has.”

Socrates/ “Presumably than something less, if it is going to be greater.”

Critias/ “Necessarily.”

Socrates/ “Then if we should discover something greater that is greater than the greater things and than itself, but greater than nothing than which the other greater things are greater, surely what would happen to it is that, if it were actually greater than itself, it would also be less than itself, wouldn’t it?”

Critias/ “That would certainly have to be the case, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “It would follow, too, that anything that was the double of the other doubles and of itself would, I suppose, be half of itself and of the other doubles—because I don’t suppose there is a double of anything else except a half.”

Critias/ “That’s true.”

Socrates/ “And something that is more than itself will also be less, and the heavier, lighter and the older, younger, and so with all the other cases—the very thing which has its own faculty applied to itself will have to have that nature towards which the faculty was directed, won’t it? I mean something like this: in the case of hearing don’t we say that hearing is of nothing else than sound?”

Critias/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Then if it actually hears itself, it will hear itself possessing sound? Because otherwise it would not do any hearing.”

Critias/ “Necessarily so.”

Socrates/ “And vision, I take it, O best of men, if it actually sees itself, will have to have some color? Because vision could certainly never see anything that has no color.”

Critias/ “No, that would follow.”

Socrates/ “You observe then, Critias, that of the cases we have gone through, some appear to us to be absolutely impossible, whereas in others it is very doubtful if they could ever apply their own faculties to themselves? And that magnitude and number and similar things belong to the absolutely impossible group, isn’t that so?”

Critias/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Again, that hearing or vision or, in fact, any sort of motion should move itself, or heat burn itself—all cases like

this also produce disbelief in some, though perhaps there are some in whom it does not. What we need, my friend, is some great man to give an adequate interpretation of this point in every detail, whether no existing thing can by nature apply its own faculty to itself but only towards something else, or whether some can, but others cannot. We also need him to determine whether, if there are things that apply to themselves, the science which we call temperance is among them. I do not regard myself as competent to deal with these matters, and this is why I am neither able to state categorically whether there might possibly be a science of science nor, if it definitely were possible, able to accept temperance as such a science before I investigate whether such a thing would benefit us or not. Now I divine that temperance is something beneficial and good. Do you then, O son of Callaeschrus, since the definition of temperance as the science of science and, more especially, of the absence of science belongs to you, first clear up this point, that what I just mentioned is possible and then, after having shown its possibility, go on to show that it is useful. And so, perhaps, you will satisfy me that you are right about what temperance is."

When Critias heard this and saw that I was in difficulties, then, just as in the case of people who start yawning when they see other people doing it, he seemed to be affected by my troubles and to be seized by difficulties himself. But since his consistently high reputation made him feel ashamed in the eyes of the company and he did not wish to admit to me that he was incapable of dealing with the question I had asked him, he said nothing clear but concealed his predicament. So I, in order that our argument should go forward, said, "But if it seems right, Critias, let us now grant this point, that the existence of a science of science is possible—we can investigate on some other occasion whether this is really the case or not. Come then, if this is perfectly possible, is it any

more possible to know what one knows and does not know? We did say, I think, that knowing oneself and being temperate consisted in this?"

Critias/ "Yes indeed, and your conclusion seems to me to follow, Socrates, because if a man has a science which knows itself, he would be the very same sort of man as the science which he has. For instance, whenever a person has speed he is swift, and when he has beauty he is beautiful, and when he has knowledge he is knowing. So when a person has a knowledge which knows itself, then I imagine he will be a person who knows himself."

Socrates/ "It is not this point, on which I am confused, that whenever someone possesses this thing which knows itself he will know himself, but how the person possessing it will necessarily know what he knows and what he does not know."

Critias/ "But this is the same thing as the other, Socrates."

Socrates/ "Perhaps, but I'm in danger of being as confused as ever, because I still don't understand how knowing what one knows and does not know is the same thing as knowledge of self."

Critias/ "How do you mean?"

Socrates/ "It's like this." "Supposing that there is a science of science, will it be anything more than the ability to divide things and say that one is science and the other not?"

Critias/ "No, it amounts to this."

Socrates/ "And is it the same thing as the science and absence of science of health, and as the science and absence of science of justice?"

Critias/ "Not at all."

Socrates/ "One is medicine, I think, and the other politics, but we are concerned with science pure and simple."

Critias/ "What else?"

Socrates/ “Therefore, when a person lacks this additional science of health and justice but knows science only, seeing that this is the only knowledge he has, then he will be likely, both in his own case and in that of others, to know that he knows something and has a certain science, won’t he?”

Critias/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And how will he know whatever he knows by this means of science? Because he will know the healthy by medicine, but not by temperance, and the harmonious by music, but not by temperance, and house-building by that art, but not by temperance, and so on—isn’t it so?”

Critias/ “It seems so.”

Socrates/ “But by temperance, if it is merely a science of science, how will a person know that he knows the healthy or that he knows house-building?”

Critias/ “He won’t at all.”

Socrates/ “Then the man ignorant of this won’t know what he knows, but only that he knows.”

Critias/ “Very likely.”

Socrates/ “Then this would not be being temperate and would not be temperance: to know what one knows and does not know, but only that one knows and does not know—or so it seems.”

Critias/ “Probably.”

Socrates/ “Nor, when another person claims to know something, will our friend be able to find out whether he knows what he says he knows or does not know it. But he will only know this much, it seems, that the man has some science; yes, but of what, temperance will fail to inform him.”

Critias/ “Apparently so.”

Socrates/ “So neither will he be able to distinguish the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the man who

really is one, nor will he be able to make this distinction for any of the other experts. And let's see what follows: if the temperate man or anyone else whatsoever is going to tell the real doctor from the false, how will he go about it? He won't, I suppose, engage him in conversation on the subject of medicine, because what the doctor knows, we say, is nothing but health and disease, isn't that so?"

Critias/ "Yes, that is the case."

Socrates/ "But about science the doctor knows nothing, because we have allotted precisely this function to temperance alone."

Critias/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "Neither will the doctor know anything about medicine since medicine is a science."

Critias/ "True."

Socrates/ "However, the temperate man will know that the doctor has some science, but in order to try and grasp what sort it is, won't he have to examine what it is of? Because hasn't each science been defined, not just as science, but also by that which it is of?"

Critias/ "By that, certainly."

Socrates/ "Now medicine is distinguished from the other sciences by virtue of its definition as science of health and disease."

Critias/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "It follows that the man who wants to examine medicine should look for it where it is to be found, because I don't suppose he will discover it where it is not to be found, do you?"

Critias/ "Certainly not."

Socrates/ “Then the man who conducts the examination correctly will examine the doctor in those matters in which he is a medical man, namely health and disease.”

Critias/ “So it seems.”

Socrates/ “And he will look into the manner of his words and actions to see if what he says is truly spoken and what he does is correctly done?”

Critias/ “Necessarily.”

Socrates/ “But, without the medical art, would anyone be able to follow up either of these things?”

Critias/ “Certainly not.”

Socrates/ “No one, in fact, could do this, it seems except the doctor—not even the temperate man himself. If he could, he would be a doctor in addition to his temperance.”

Critias/ “That is the case.”

Socrates/ “The upshot of the matter is, then, that if temperance is only the science of science and absence of science, the doctor will be able to distinguish neither the man who knows the particulars of his art from the man who does not know them but pretends or supposes he does, nor will he recognize any other genuine practitioner whatsoever, except the man in his own field, the way other craftsmen do.”

Critias/ “It seems so.”

Socrates/ “Then, Critias, what benefit would we get from temperance if it is of this nature? Because if, as we assumed in the beginning the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know (and that he knows the former but not the latter) and were able to investigate another man who was in the same situation, then it would be of the greatest benefit to us to be temperate. Because those of us who had temperance would live lives free from error and so would all those who were under our rule. Neither would we ourselves be

attempting to do things we did not understand—rather we would find those who did understand and turn the matter over to them—nor would we trust those over whom we ruled to do anything except what they would do correctly, and this would be that of which they possessed the science. And thus, by means of temperance, every household would be well-run, and every city well-governed, and so in every case where temperance reigned. And with error rooted out and rightness in control, men so circumstanced would necessarily fare admirably and well in all their doings and, faring well, they would be happy. Isn't this what we mean about temperance, Critias, when we say what a good thing it would be to know what one knows and what one does not know?"

Critias/ "This is certainly what we mean."

Socrates/ "But now you see, that no science of this sort has put in an appearance."

Critias/ "I see that."

Socrates/ "Well then, is this the advantage of the knowledge of science and absence of science, which we are now finding out to be temperance—that the man who has this science will learn whatever he learns more easily, and everything will appear to him in a clearer light since, in addition to what he learns, he will perceive the science? And he will examine others on the subjects he himself knows in a more effective fashion, whereas those without the science will conduct their examinations in a weaker and less fruitful way. And are not these, my friend, the kind of benefits we shall reap from temperance? Or are we regarding it as something greater, and demanding that it be greater than it really is?"

Critias/ "Perhaps that may be so."

Socrates/ "Perhaps, and perhaps we have been demanding something useless. I say this because certain odd things become clear about temperance if it has this nature. If you are

willing, let us investigate the matter by admitting both that it is possible to know a science and also what we assumed temperance to be in the beginning: to know what one knows and does not know—let us grant this and not deny it. And, having granted all these things, let us investigate more thoroughly whether, if it is like this, it will benefit us in any way. Because what we were saying just now, about temperance being regarded as of great benefit (if it were like this) in the governing of households and cities, does not seem to me, Critias, to have been well said."

Critias/ "In what way?"

Socrates/ "Because, we carelessly agreed that it would be a great good for men if each of us should perform the things he knows and should hand over what he does not know to those others who do."

Critias/ "And weren't we right in agreeing on this?"

Socrates/ "I don't think we were."

Critias/ "You certainly say some queer things, Socrates."

Socrates/ "By the dog, they seem queer to me too, and that is why, when I became aware of this a moment ago, I said that some strange things would come to light and that I was afraid we were not conducting the examination correctly. Because truly, even if there were no doubt that temperance is like this, it appears in no way clear to me that it does us any good."

Critias/ "How so?" "Tell me, so that we can both understand what you are saying."

Socrates/ "I think I am making a fool of myself, but all the same it is necessary to investigate what occurs to us and not to proceed at random, if we are going to have the least care for ourselves."

Critias/ "You are right."

Socrates/ “Listen then, to my dream, to see whether it comes through horn or through ivory. If temperance really ruled over us and were as we now define it, surely everything would be done according to science: neither would anyone who says he is a pilot (but is not) deceive us, nor would any doctor or general or anyone else pretending to know what he does not know escape our notice. This being the situation, wouldn’t we have greater bodily health than we do now, and safety when we are in danger at sea or in battle, and wouldn’t we have dishes and all our clothes and shoes and things skillfully made for us, and many other things as well, because we would be employing true craftsmen? And, if you will, let us even agree that the mantic art is knowledge of what is to be and that temperance, directing her, keeps away deceivers and sets up the true seers as prophets of the future. I grant that the human race, if thus equipped, would act and live in a scientific way—because temperance, watching over it, would not allow the absence of science to creep in and become our accomplice. But whether acting scientifically would make us fare well and be happy, this we have yet to learn, my dear Critias.”

Critias/ “But on the other hand, you will not readily gain the prize of faring well by any other means if you eliminate scientific action.”

Socrates/ “Instruct me on just one more small point.” “When you say that something is scientifically done, are you talking about the science of cutting out shoes?”

Critias/ “Good heavens no!”

Socrates/ “Of bronze working, then?”

Critias/ “Certainly not.”

Socrates/ “Then of wool or wood or some similar thing?”

Critias/ “Of course not.”

Socrates/ “Then, we no longer keep to the statement that the man who lives scientifically is happy. Because those who live in the ways we mentioned are not admitted by you to be happy, but rather you seem to me to define the happy man as one who lives scientifically concerning certain specific things. And perhaps you mean the person I mentioned a moment ago, the man who knows what all future events will be, namely the seer. Are you referring to this man or some other?”

Critias/ “Both to this one, and another.”

Socrates/ “Which one?” “Isn’t it the sort of man who, in addition to the future, knows everything that has been and is now and is ignorant of nothing? Let us postulate the existence of such a man. Of this man I think you would say that there was no one living who was more scientific.”

Critias/ “Certainly not.”

Socrates/ “There is one additional thing I want to know: which one of the sciences makes him happy? Do all of them do this equally?”

Critias/ “No, very unequally.”

Socrates/ “Well, which one in particular makes him happy? The one by which he knows which one of the things are and have been and are to come? Will it be the one by which he knows checker playing?”

Critias/ “Oh for heaven’s sake.”

Socrates/ “Well, the one by which he knows calculation?”

Critias/ “Of course not.”

Socrates/ “Well, will it be that by which he knows health?”

Critias/ “That’s better.”

Socrates/ “But the most likely case, is that by which he knows what?”

Critias/ “By which he knows good, and evil.”

Socrates/ “You wretch, all this time you’ve been leading me right round in a circle and concealing from me that it was not living scientifically that was making us fare well and be happy, even if we possessed all the sciences put together, but that we have to have this one science of good and evil. Because, Critias, if you consent to take away this science from the other sciences, will medicine any the less produce health, or cobbling produce shoes, or the art of weaving produce clothes, or will the pilot’s art any the less prevent us from dying at sea or the general’s art in war?”

Critias/ “They will do it just the same.”

Socrates/ “But my dear Critias, our chance of getting any of these things well and beneficially done will have vanished if this is lacking.”

Critias/ “You are right.”

Socrates/ “Then this science, at any rate, is not temperance, as it seems, but that one of which the function is to benefit us. For it is not a science of science and absence of science but of good and evil. So that, if this latter one is beneficial, temperance would be something else for us.”

Critias/ “But why should not temperance be beneficial?” “Because if temperance really is a science of sciences and rules over the other sciences, then I suppose it would rule over this science of the good and would benefit us.”

Socrates/ “And would this science make us healthy, and not the art of medicine? And would it perform the tasks of the other arts rather than each of them performing its own task? Didn’t we protest solemnly just a moment ago that it is a science of science and absence of science only and of nothing else? We did, didn’t we?”

Critias/ “It seems so, at any rate.”

Socrates/ “Then it will not be the craftsman of health?”

Critias/ “Certainly not.”

Socrates/ “Because health belonged to some other art, didn’t it?”

Critias/ “Yes, to another.”

Socrates/ “Then it will be of no benefit, my friend. Because we have just awarded this work to another art, isn’t that so?”

Critias/ “Yes indeed.”

Socrates/ “Then how will temperance be beneficial when it is the craftsman of no beneficial thing?”

Critias/ “Apparently it won’t be any benefit at all, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “You see then, Critias, that my earlier fears were reasonable and that I was right to blame myself for discerning nothing useful in temperance? Because I don’t suppose that the thing we have agreed to be the finest of all would have turned out to be of no benefit if I had been of any use in making a good search. But now we have got the worst of it in every way and are unable to discover to which one of existing things the lawgiver gave this name, temperance. Furthermore, we gave our joint assent to many things which did not follow from our argument. For instance, we conceded that there was a science of science when the argument did not allow us to make this statement. Again, we conceded that this science knew the tasks of the other sciences, when the argument did not allow us to say this either, so that our temperate man should turn out to be knowing, both that he knows things he knows and does not know things he does not know. And we made this concession in the most prodigal manner, quite overlooking the impossibility that a person should in some fashion know what he does not know at all—because our agreement amounts to saying he knows things he does not know. And yet, I think, there could be nothing more irrational than this. But in spite of the fact that the inquiry has shown us to be both complacent and easy, it is not a whit more capable of discovering the truth. It has, in fact, made fun of

the truth to this extent, that it has very insolently exposed as useless the definition of temperance which we agreed upon and invented earlier. I am not so much vexed on my own account, but on yours, Charmides, I am very vexed indeed, if, with such a body and, in addition, a most temperate soul, you should derive no benefit from this temperance nor should it be of any use to you in this present life. And I am still more vexed on behalf of the charm I took so much trouble to learn from the Thracian, if it should turn out to be worthless. I really do not believe this to be the case; rather I think that I am a worthless inquirer. Because I think that temperance is a great good, and if you truly have it, that you are blessed. So see whether you do have it and are in no need of the charm—because if you do have it, my advice to you would rather be to regard me as a babbler, incapable of finding out anything whatsoever by means of argument, and yourself as being exactly as happy as you are temperate."

And Charmides said;

Charmides/ "But good heavens, Socrates, I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't—because how would I know the nature of a thing when neither you nor Critias is able to discover it, as you say? However, I don't really believe you, Socrates, but I think I am very much in need of the charm, and as far as I am concerned I am willing to be charmed by you every day until you say I have had enough."

Critias/ "Very well, Charmides, if you do this, it will convince me of your temperance—if you submit yourself to be charmed by Socrates and let nothing great or small dissuade you from it."

Charmides/ "This is the course I shall follow, and I shall not give it up. I would be acting badly if I failed to obey my guardian and did not carry out your commands."

Critias/ "Well then, these are my instructions."

Charmides/ “And I shall execute them, from this day forward.”

Socrates/ “Look here, what are you two plotting?”

Charmides/ “Nothing, —our plotting is all done.”

Socrates/ “Are you going to use force, and don’t I get a preliminary hearing?”

Charmides/ “We shall have to use force, seeing that this fellow here has given me my orders. So you had better take counsel as to your own procedure.”

Socrates/ “What use is counsel? Because when you undertake to do anything by force, no man living can oppose you.”

Charmides/ “Well then, don’t oppose me.”

Socrates/ “Very well, I shan’t.”

The Charmides.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.
SOCRATES, CRITIAS, and
CHÆREPHO, CHARMIDES.

Socrates/ Yesterday, when I came in the evening from the army, I gladly returned to my accustomed exercise, in consequence of having been for some time absent from it; and entered into the Palestra of Taurean Neptune, which is opposite to the royal temple. Here I met with very many persons, some of whom were unknown to me, but the greater part of them I knew. And as soon as I was seen entering thus unexpectedly, some from all quarters immediately congratulated me at a distance. But Chærepho, as if he had been insane, leaping from the midst of them, ran towards me, and taking me by the hand.

Chaerephon/ O Socrates, how were you saved in the engagement?

Socrates/ For a short time before we came away there was a battle at Potidaea, of which those that are here just now heard.

And I answering them, It is as you see.

Chaerephon/ Indeed, a report was spread here, that a very sharp engagement had taken place, and that many of those that we know had perished in it.

Socrates/ You were told the truth.

Chaerephon/ But, was you in the engagement?

Socrates/ I was.

Chaerephon/ Sit down here and relate the affair to us; for we have not yet clearly heard the whole.

Socrates/ And at the same time leading me along, he seated me near Critias the son of Callæschrus. Being therefore seated, I saluted Critias, and the rest, and according as anyone asked me, related the affairs of the army. But some asked me one thing, and others another. And when we had had enough of things of this kind, I again asked them respecting philosophy, how it was circumstanced at present; and whether there were any young men who were remarkable for wisdom, or beauty, or both. Critias then, looking towards the gate, and perceiving certain young men entering and reviling each other, and another crowd following behind them, said;

Critias/ It appears to me, Socrates, that you will immediately have an answer to your question respecting beautiful youths. For those that are now entering, are forerunners and lovers of one who seems to be the most beautiful of all of the present time. And it appears to me that he is now nearly entering.

Socrates/ But who is he? And of whom is he the son?

Critias/ Perhaps you know (but he was very young when you left this place;) I say, perhaps you know Charmides, the son of our uncle Glauco, but my cousin.

Socrates/ I know him indeed, by Zeus, for he was not then to be despised, though he was but a boy, but now I think he must be almost a young man.

Critias/ You will immediately know, both his age, and the qualities which he has acquired.

Socrates/ And at the same time that he was thus speaking, Charmides entered.

No consideration therefore, my friend, is to be paid to me. For I am indeed a white rule with respect to those that are beautiful; since nearly all young men appear to me to be beautiful. But he then appeared to me to be wonderful, both

on account of the magnitude and the beauty of his body: and all the rest seemed to me to be in love with him; so astonished and so disturbed were they, when he entered. Many other lovers also followed among those that were behind him. And as to the men indeed, this was less wonderful: but I also paid attention to the boys, and saw that none of these beheld anyone else than him, not even the smallest among them, but the eyes of all were fixed on him, as on a statue. And Chærepho calling me, said;

Chaerephon/ What do you think of the youth, Socrates? Is he not a beautiful person?

Socrates/ Transcendently so.

Chaerephon/ But, if he were willing to show himself naked, he would appear to you to have a deformed face, his form is so very beautiful.

Socrates/ And this assertion of Chærepho was confirmed by all the rest.

I then said, By Hercules, you speak of an unconquerable man, if only one small thing further belongs to him.

Critias/ What is that?

Socrates/ If his soul is naturally in a good condition. It is however proper, Critias, that it should be so, as being one of your family.

Critias/ But, he is also very beautiful and good in this respect.

Socrates/ Why then, do we not expose this naked to the view, and contemplate it prior to his form? For since he is thus inwardly beautiful, he will in every respect be willing to discourse.

Critias/ Very much so; since he is a philosopher, and (as it appears both to others and himself) very poetic.

Socrates/ This beauty, friend Critias, descends to you remotely, through your alliance to Solon. But why do you not call the youth hither, and present him to me? For it would not disgrace us to discourse with him, even if he were younger than he is, while you are present, who are his cousin and tutor.

Critias/ You speak well; and we will call him.

Socrates/ And at the same time turning to the person that followed him;

Critias/ Call, Charmides, and tell him that I wish to commit him to the care of a physician, on account of the infirmity of which he has lately complained.

Socrates/ Critias therefore said to me;

Critias/ Charmides lately has complained of a heaviness in his head when he rose in the morning. What then should hinder you from pretending to him, that you know a remedy for this disorder of the head?

Socrates/ Nothing; let him only come.

Critias/ But he does come.

Socrates/ Which was indeed the case: for he came, and caused much laughter. For each of us that were seated together, through eagerness to sit near Charmides, pushed his neighbor; till of those that were seated last of all, some we forced to rise up, and others to fall on the ground. But he came and sat between me and Critias. And I then said, My friend, I am now perplexed, and the confidence which I before had, that I should easily discourse with Charmides, fails me. But when Critias had told him, that I was the person who knew a remedy for his disease, he fixed his eyes upon me as something prodigious, and drew near as if he meant to ask me a question. Then all that were in the Palestra immediately gathered round us; and when, O generous man, I saw the beauty of his form within his

garments, I was inflamed with the view, and was no longer myself. I likewise thought that Critias was most wise in amatory affairs, who said, when speaking of a beautiful boy, but employing the similitude of something else, that I should be cautious lest a fawn coming opposite to the lion, a portion of the flesh should be taken away: for he appeared to me to have been captured by an animal of this kind. But at the same time, when Charmides asked me, if I knew a remedy for the head, I scarcely knew what to answer.

Charmides/ What is it?

Socrates/ It is a certain leaf, but that a certain incantation must be added to the medicine, which if anyone employed together with the leaf, the medicine could perfectly restore him to health; but that the leaf would be of no use without the incantation.

Charmides/ I will write down this incantation from you.

Socrates/ Will you do this, whether you are persuaded by me or not?

Upon this, he said laughing;

Charmides/ I will, if I am persuaded by you, Socrates.

Socrates/ Be it so. And do you also accurately know my name?

Charmides/ I do, unless I am unjust. For there is no small talk about you, among those of my age: and I can remember that you associated with Critias when I was a boy.

Socrates/ You say well. For I shall now tell you, with greater freedom of speech, what the incantation is. But, just now, I was doubtful, after what manner I should show you its power. For this incantation is such, O Charmides, that it is not able to make the head alone well; just perhaps as you have often heard good physicians assert, when anyone comes to them with diseased eyes: for then they say, that they must not attempt to cure the eyes alone, but that it is

necessary for them at the same time to cure the head, if they design to render the eyes in a good condition. And again, that it would be very stupid to think to cure the head itself without the whole body. In consequence of this reasoning, they turn their attention to the regimen of the whole body, and endeavor to cure the part in conjunction with the whole. Or have you not heard that they thus speak, and that this is the case?

Charmides/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Does it therefore appear to you that they speak well; and do you admit this doctrine?

Charmides/ The most of all things.

Socrates/ And I, on hearing him praise this method of cure, took courage, and my confidence again was a little excited and revived: and I said, Such, therefore, O Charmides, is the power of this incantation. But I learnt it there, in the army, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zamolxis, who are said to render men immortal. This Thracian too said, "The Grecian physicians beautifully assert the same things as I now assert. But Zamolxis, said he, our king, being a god, says, that as it is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the body, so neither is it proper to cure the body without the soul: and that the reason why many diseases are unknown to the Grecian physicians is, because they are ignorant of the whole, to which attention ought to be paid. For when this is not well disposed, it is impossible that a part should be well affected. For all things, said he, originate from the soul, both such as are good and such as are evil, and emanate from thence into the body, and the whole man, just as things flow from the head to the eyes. It is requisite therefore that the maladies of this should in the first place and especially be healed, in order that the head and the

whole body may be well affected." But he said, O blessed youth, "that the soul was cured of its maladies by certain incantations; and that these incantations were beautiful reasons, from which temperance was generated in souls." He further added, "that when this was inserted and present, it was easy to impart health, both to the head and the rest of the body." Having therefore taught me the medicine, and the incantations, "Let none, said he, persuade you to cure the head of anyone with this medicine, who has not first presented his soul to be cured by you with the incantation. For the fault, said he, of the present time, respecting men, is this, that certain persons endeavor to become physicians without a knowledge of temperance and health." And he very earnestly ordered me to take care, that neither any rich, or noble, or beautiful person, ever persuaded me to do otherwise. I therefore declared to him, with an oath, that I would not; and hence it is necessary I should obey him, which I am determined to do. And indeed, if you are willing, according to the mandate of the stranger, to present your soul first of all to be enchanted by the incantations of the Thracian, I will administer the medicine to your head; but if not, I cannot in any respect benefit you, O friend Charmides.

Critias therefore hearing me thus speak, said;

Critias/ This heaviness of the head, O Socrates, will be gain to the youth, if he should be compelled to become better in his dianoëtic part through his head. I can indeed assure you, that Charmides not only surpasses all his equals in the form of his body, but in this very thing for which you say you have an incantation. But you say this is temperance. Or do you not?

Socrates/ Entirely so.

Critias/ Know then, that Charmides appears to be by far the most temperate of those that exist at present; and that,

as far as his age permits, he is not inferior to anyone in everything else.

Socrates/ It is but just, O Charmides, that you should excel all others in all such things as these. For I do not think that anyone now present can easily show two families among the Athenians, from a conjunction, between which by marriage, a beautiful and excellent offspring is so likely, to be produced, as from those that were your progenitors. For the paternal family of Critias, here, the son of Diopis, is celebrated by Anacreon, and Solon, and many other poets, as excelling in beauty, virtue, and the rest of what is called felicity. And again, there is the same renown on his mother's side: for no one of those that dwell on the continent is said to surpass in, beauty and grandeur your uncle Pyrilampes, as often as he goes in the character of ambassador to the great king, or to some other inhabitant of the continent. But the whole of his family is in nothing inferior to any other. It is likely, therefore, that, being the offspring of such characters, you should be the first in all things. Hence, O beloved son of Glauco, with respect to your visible form, you, appear to me to disgrace no one of your progenitors: and, if you are naturally endued with all that is sufficient to the possession of temperance, and the other virtues, according to the assertion of Critias here, your mother, O dear Charmides, brought you forth blessed. The case, then, is this: If temperance is present with you, as Critias says it is, and if you are sufficiently temperate, you will no longer require the incantations, either of Zamolxis, or the Hyperborean Abaris, but the medicine for the head should be immediately administered you. But if you are in any respect indigent of this, the incantation must precede the medicine. Inform me therefore, whether you assent to Critias, and affirm that you sufficiently participate of temperance, or whether you are deficient in this respect.

Charmides therefore blushing, in the first place appeared to be still more beautiful (for bashfulness becomes his age); and in the next place he answered me not ignobly. For he said;

Charmides/ It is not easy either to admit or reject the subjects of the present investigation: for, if I should affirm that I am not temperate, it would be absurd that I should assert such a thing of myself, and at the same time I should evince that Critias has spoken falsely, and many others to whom I appear to be temperate. But again, if I should affirm that I am temperate, by thus praising myself, I shall perhaps give offence: so that I do not know how to answer you.

Socrates/ You appear to me, O Charmides, to speak well: and I think we should consider in common whether you possess that which I inquire after, or not; that you may neither be compelled to speak contrary to your will, nor I may again inconsiderately turn myself to the medicinal art. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, I wish to consider this affair together with you; but if it is not, to dismiss it.

Charmides/ But it is the most agreeable to me of all things. Pursue therefore the inquiry, in whatever manner appears to you to be best.

Socrates/ This seems to me to be the best mode of considering the subject: For it is evident, if temperance is present with you, that you have some opinion about it; for it is necessary, if it is really inherent in you, that it must produce some sensation of itself, from which you will possess an opinion respecting it, what it is, and what are the qualities with which it is endued. Or do you not think so?

Charmides/ I do think so.

Socrates/ And do you not also think this, since you know how to speak the Greek tongue, that you can likewise inform me what temperance appears to you to be?

Charmides/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ That we may therefore conjecture whether it is inherent in you or not, tell me, what temperance is, according to your opinion? And at first, indeed, he was tardy, and was not altogether willing to answer; but afterwards he said;

Charmides/ Temperance appears to consist in doing all things in an orderly manner, in walking and discoursing quietly in the public ways, and acting similarly in everything else. And, in short that which is the object of your inquiry appears to me to be a certain quietness.

Socrates/ You speak well; for they say, O Charmides, that quiet are temperate persons. But let us see if they say anything to the purpose: for, tell me, is not temperance something beautiful?

Charmides/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, in the grammatic art, is it most beautiful to write similar letters swiftly or slowly?

Charmides/ Swiftly.

Socrates/ But what with respect to reading? Is it most beautiful to read swiftly or slowly?

Charmides/ Swiftly.

Socrates/ And is it also by far more beautiful to play on the harp rapidly, and to wrestle with celerity, than quietly and slowly?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does not the like take place in pugilistic and pancratiatic contests?

Charmides/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And with respect to running and leaping, and all other works of the body, are they not beautiful when

performed with vigor and rapidity; but when performed slowly, with difficulty, and quietly, are they not base?

Charmides/ It appears so.

Socrates/ It appears to us, therefore, that with respect to the body, not the quiet, but the most rapid, and the most vigorous, are the most beautiful. Is it not so?

Charmides/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But did we not say that temperance is something beautiful?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ Not quietness, therefore, but celerity will be the more temperate with respect to the body; since temperance is beautiful.

Charmides/ It seems so.

Socrates/ What then, is docility more beautiful than dullness?

Charmides/ It is.

Socrates/ But docility, is to learn swiftly; and dullness to learn quietly and slowly.

Charmides/ It is.

Socrates/ And is it not more beautiful to teach another swiftly and vehemently, than quietly and slowly.

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ And which is the more beautiful to recollect and commit things to memory quietly and slowly, or vehemently and rapidly?

Charmides/ Vehemently and rapidly.

Socrates/ And with respect to sagacity, is it not a certain acute energy, and not a quietness of the soul?

Charmides/ True.

Socrates/ Does it not therefore, follow, that it is most beautiful in the grammatic art, in the art of playing on the harp, and in everything else, to understand what is said, in the most rapid, and not in the most quiet manner?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ And again, in the investigations and consultations of the soul, it does not appear to me that he who consults and discovers in the most quiet manner, and with difficulty, is worthy of praise, but he who does this easily and rapidly.

To this also he assented.

Hence, in all things, both pertaining to the soul and the body, such as are performed with celerity and vigor appear to be more beautiful than such as are performed slowly and quietly.

Charmides/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Temperance, therefore, will not be quietness, nor will a temperate be a quiet life, from this reasoning: since that which is temperate ought to be beautiful: for one of two things must take place, viz. quiet actions in life must either never, or very rarely, appear to be more beautiful than such as are swift and strenuous. If then, my friend, it were even found that not fewer quiet actions are beautiful than such as are vehement and rapid, neither would it follow from hence that temperance consisted rather in acting quietly, than in vehement and rapid energy, either in walking or in reading, or anything else; nor would a quiet and orderly life be more temperate than one which is not orderly, since it has been admitted in our discourse, that temperance is something beautiful. But things swift have appeared to be no less beautiful than such as are quiet.

Charmides/ What you have said, Socrates, appears to me to be right.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, O Charmides, be still more attentive, and looking to yourself, consider what kind of a person temperance, when present, causes you to be, and what sort of a thing it is itself while it accomplishes this: reasoning, therefore, on all these particulars, inform me well, and in a virile manner, what appears to you to be the truth.

But then Charmides, collecting and looking into himself, in a very manly manner said;

Charmides/ Temperance seems to me to make a man blush and be ashamed; and I, therefore, conclude that temperance is shame.

Socrates/ Be it so: but did we not just now acknowledge that temperance is something beautiful?

Charmides/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Are not therefore temperate, good men?

Charmides/ Yes.

Socrates/ Will therefore that be good, which does not render men good?

Charmides/ It will not.

Socrates/ Temperance, therefore, is not only beautiful but good.

Charmides/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ What then, will you not believe that Homer speaks well, when he says;

> "Shame ill accompanies a man in need?"

Charmides/ I do.

Socrates/ Shame, therefore, as it seems, is both not good, and good.

Charmides/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But temperance is good; since it makes those good, to whom it is present, but by no means evil.

Charmides/ The case appears to me to be as you say.

Socrates/ Temperance, therefore, will not be shame; since temperance is good, but shame is not in any respect more good than evil.

Charmides/ It appears to me, Socrates, that this is rightly asserted. But attend to what I shall adduce respecting temperance. For just now I recollected what I had heard a certain person assert, viz. that temperance is to manage our own affairs. Consider, therefore, whether what I say appears, to you to be well said.

Socrates/ O vile youth! you have heard this from Critias, or from some other of the wise.

Critias/ It seems, he must have heard it from some other person, for he did not hear it from me.

Charmides/ But of what consequence is it, Socrates, from whom I heard it?

Socrates/ None at all. For we are not to consider who said It, but whether he has spoken the truth or not.

Charmides/ Now you speak as you ought.

Socrates/ By Zeus, I do. But if we discover how this thing subsists, I shall wonder: For it is similar to a certain enigma.

Charmides/ On what account.

Socrates/ Because, his meaning is not such as the words seem to imply, when he says that temperance is to manage our own affairs. Or do you think that a grammarian does nothing when he writes or reads?

Charmides/ I think he does something.

Socrates/ Does a grammarian, therefore, appear to you to write and read his own name only, or to instruct you boys? And do you in consequence of his instructions no less write the names of your enemies than the names of your friends?

Charmides/ No less.

Socrates/ When, therefore, you do this, are you too busily employed, and intemperate?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ And besides this, you do not perform things pertaining to yourself, if to write, and also to read, is to do something. But it certainly is. And besides, my friend, to be healed, to build, to weave, and to accomplish the work of any art, is certainly to do something. Is it not?

Charmides/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ What then, does that city appear to you to be well instituted in which there is a law commanding everyone to weave and wash his own garment, to make his own shoes, oil-cruise, currycomb, and every other necessary article, but not to touch things belonging to others, but to attend to his own affairs?

Charmides/ It does not appear to me that such a city is well instituted.

Socrates/ But, if a city is temperately, it is well instituted.

Charmides/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ For a man, therefore, to do such things as these, and to manage his own affairs, will not be temperance.

Charmides/ It does not appear that it will.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who said, that for a man to do things pertaining to himself is temperance, spoke, as I just now observed, obscurely: for he was not so stupid, as to mean that his words should be taken in the literal sense. Or did you hear some stupid person assert this, O Charmides?

Charmides/ By no means; since to me he appeared to be very wise.

Socrates/ More than anything, therefore, as it seems to me, he proposed this enigma, because it is difficult to know what it is for a man to transact his own affairs.

Charmides/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Can you therefore tell me what it is to transact one's own affairs?

Charmides/ By Zeus, I do not know. But perhaps nothing hinders, but that he who said this did not know the meaning of the assertion.

Socrates/ And at the same time that he thus spoke, he laughed, and looked at Critias. But it was evident that Critias, who had formerly contended with, and was stimulated by ambition against Charmides, and those that were present, and who could then scarcely contain himself, was now no longer able to do so. And it appeared to me that my former suspicion was more than anything true, that Charmides had heard this definition of temperance from Critias. Charmides, therefore, not being willing to support the definition himself, but being desirous that this province should fall to the lot of Critias, showed as if he thought him confuted. This Critias could not endure, but appeared to me to be as much enraged with Charmides, as a poet with a player who acts his poems badly. So that, looking at him, he said;

Critias/ Do you therefore think, O Charmides, that if you do not understand his meaning who said, that temperance is for a man to transact his own affairs, neither does he know what he asserted?

Socrates/ But, O Critias, best of men, it is nothing wonderful that Charmides, who is but a youth, should not understand this assertion; but it is fit that you should understand it, both on account of your age and employment. If therefore you affirm that this is a true definition of temperance, I shall very gladly consider with you, whether it is so or not.

Critias/ But I entirely assent to it.

Socrates/ You do well then. But inform me whether you admit what I just now asked: I mean, if all artists do something?

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ Do they therefore appear to you to do things belonging to themselves only, or things also belonging to others?

Critias/ Things also belonging to others.

Socrates/ Do they act temperately, therefore, who only do things belonging to themselves?

Critias/ What should hinder?

Socrates/ Nothing, so far as respects myself; but see whether there may not be a hindrance with respect to him who, defining temperance to be the transacting one's own affairs, afterwards says that nothing hinders but that those who transact the affairs of others may also be temperate.

Critias/ I, indeed, have confessed that those that transact the affairs of others may be temperate. But have I also acknowledged that this is the case with respect to those that make things pertaining to others?

Socrates/ But inform me, do you not affirm that to make a thing is the same us to do it?

Critias/ I do not indeed. Nor do I say that to operate is the same as to make. For I have learned to make this distinction from Hesiod, who says, "No work is a disgrace." Do you therefore think that if he had called by the names of to operate and to do, such works as you now speak of, he would have said that no work is a disgrace, whether it is that of the shoe-maker, or of a salter of fish, or of one who sits in a shop?

It is not proper to think he would, Socrates: but I think that he considered making as something different from

action and operation; and that a thing made sometimes becomes a disgrace, when it is not produced in conjunction with the beautiful; but that no work is ever a disgrace. For things which are made beautifully and with utility he calls works, and denominates operations and actions certain makings of this kind. It is likewise proper to assert that he considered such things as these, as alone domestic and allied, but everything noxious as foreign. Hence, it is requisite to think that Hesiod, and every other prudent person, calls him who transacts his own affairs temperate.

Socrates/ O Critias, as soon as you began to speak, I almost immediately perceived, that you called things allied to a man, and which are his own good, and that you denominated the making of things good, actions. For I have ten thousand times heard Prodicus dividing names: and I will allow you to use every name as you please, if you only evince what you mean to signify by any particular name. Now therefore again, from the beginning, define more clearly, whether you say that temperance is the doing, or the making, (or in whatever manner you may wish to denominate it,) of good things.

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ He therefore is not temperate who acts badly, but he who acts well.

Critias/ Does it not, O best of men, appear so to you?

Socrates/ Dismiss this question: for we do not consider what appears to me to be the case, but what you now say.

Critias/ But indeed, I do not assert that he is temperate, who does not do good but evil. For I clearly define to you, that temperance is the practice of things good.

Socrates/ And perhaps nothing hinders but that you speak the truth. But nevertheless I should wonder if you

thought that men who conduct themselves temperately were ignorant that they are temperate.

Critias/ But I do not think so.

Socrates/ Did you not say a little before, that nothing hindered but that artists who made things pertaining to others might be temperate?

Critias/ It was asserted by me. But what then?

Socrates/ Nothing. But inform me whether he appears to you to be a physician, who, in making anyone well, does that which is advantageous both to himself, and to him whom he cures?

Critias/ To me he does.

Socrates/ Des not he, therefore, who acts in this manner, act well?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not he temperate who acts well?

Critias/ He is temperate.

Socrates/ Is it not therefore necessary that a physician should know when he cures with advantage, and when not? And likewise that every artist should know when he will be benefited by the work which he does, and when not?

Critias/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ Sometimes, therefore, when a physician acts profitably, or noxiously, he will not know that he acts in this manner; though, according to your doctrine, when he acts profitably, he acts temperately. Or do you not say so?

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ Does it not therefore seem, that sometimes, when he acts profitably, he acts temperately, and is temperate, but is himself ignorant that he is temperate?

Critias/ But this, Socrates, can never take place. If you think that this necessarily follows from what I have admitted

above, I will readily grant it you. For I shall not be ashamed to confess, that something has been improperly asserted, rather than admit that the man who is ignorant of himself is temperate. For I nearly say, that to know ourselves, is temperance; and I agree with him who inscribed this precept in the temple of Apollo at Delphi. For this precept appears to me to have been inscribed as a salutation of Divinity, to be used by those that enter the temple, instead of *hail*! So that this inscription does not directly signify joy, or imply that we should exhort each other to rejoice, but rather, to be temperate. For thus the God speaks to those that enter the temple; and addresses us otherwise than men are wont to do, as he also conceived, in my opinion, who placed this inscription. It likewise says nothing else to those that enter, than that they should live temperately. But as speaking prophetically, it says this in a more enigmatic manner. For "Know thyself," is the same as "Be temperate," as both the writings and I assert. But perhaps someone may think it has a different meaning, which appears to me to have been the case with those who placed those posterior inscriptions, "Nothing too much", and "A surety is near to sorrow." For they thought that "Know thyself," was advice, and not an address of the Divinity to those that enter the temple. Afterwards, that they might suspend advice in no respect inferior to this, they placed these inscriptions. Hence, Socrates, that for the sake of which I assert all these things is this, that I may grant you all that has been said above. For perhaps you may have said something more right respecting them, and perhaps this may be the case with myself; but we have not advanced anything clear. However, I now wish to give you the reason of this, if you do not grant that temperance is to know one's self.

Socrates/ But, O Critias, you act by me as if I acknowledged that I knew that which is the subject of your

inquiry. But this is not the case. For I always inquire in conjunction with you, respecting that which is proposed to be considered, in consequence of being myself ignorant. I am considering, therefore, whether I shall assent or not. But stop till I have considered.

Critias/ Consider then.

Socrates/ I do. For if to know a certain thing is temperance, it is evident that temperance will be a certain science, and a science of something. Or will it not?

Critias/ It is, and of itself.

Socrates/ Is not therefore, medicine the science of that which is healthy?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If then, you should ask, since medicine is the science of that which is healthy, of what advantage it is to us, and what it accomplishes, I should reply that it is of no small advantage, because it procures us health, the effecting of which is beautiful, if you admit this.

Critias/ I do admit it.

Socrates/ If therefore you should again ask me, what architecture effects, which is the science of building, I should say, houses; and I should reply in a similar manner with respect to other arts: it is requisite therefore, Critias, since you say that temperance is the science of itself, that you should be able to answer him who asks you, what beautiful work temperance effects, and which deserves to be named. Tell me therefore what it is?

Critias/ But Socrates, you do not interrogate rightly. For temperance is not naturally similar to other sciences, nor are other sciences similar to other. But you make your inquiry as if they were similar. For tell me, what work is there in the logistic, or geometric art, which is of the like nature with a house, the work of the architectural art, or with that

of a garment, which is the work of the weaving art; and so in many other such particulars belonging to the several arts. Can you in these exhibit to me any such work? But you cannot.

Socrates/ You speak the truth. But this I can show you, of what each of these sciences is the science, and which is something different from that science. Thus, for instance, the logistic science is the science of even and odd multitude, how they subsist with respect to themselves and to each other. Is it not?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, the even and the odd different from the logistic science?

Critias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Statics also is the science of the weight of a heavier and lighter body. And the heavy and the light are different from statics itself. Do you admit this?

Critias/ I do.

Socrates/ Tell me then, what that is of which temperance is the science, and which is different from temperance itself?

Critias/ This very thing, Socrates, which you are now seeking, is that by which temperance differs from all other sciences: but you inquire after a certain similitude of it to other sciences. This however is not the case: for all other sciences are sciences of something different from themselves; but this alone is both the science of other sciences and of itself. And of these things you ought by no means to be ignorant. But I think that you do the very thing which you just now denied that you did: for you attempt to confute me, and dismiss that which is the subject of our discourse.

Socrates/ What are you doing? Do you think that if I should endeavor to confute you, I should do it on any other

account, than that I might discover the meaning of what I assert, as I am fearful, lest whilst I think myself knowing, when at the same time I am not, I should be unconscious of my ignorance? And now I say that I do this, viz. consider the discourse, principally indeed for my own sake, but, perhaps also for the sake of my other friends. Or do you not think it is a common good, for the condition of everything to become apparent nearly to all men?

Critias/ Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Boldly therefore, O blessed man, give your opinion in answer to the question, dismissing the consideration whether it is Critias or Socrates who is confuted; but attend to the discourse itself, considering what will be the consequence when either of us is confuted.

Critias/ I shall do so, for you appear to me to speak well.

Socrates/ Inform me therefore, what you say respecting temperance.

Critias/ I say then, that this alone, of all other science, is both the science of itself and of other sciences.

Socrates/ Will it therefore, be the science of ignorance, since it is of science?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ The temperate man therefore alone will know himself, and will be able to explore what it is he knows, and what it is he does not know. In a similar manner likewise he will be able to consider respecting others, what it is which anyone knows, and thinks he knows; and what it is which he himself thinks he knows, but does not know. But no other person will be able to accomplish this. Likewise this is to be temperate, and is temperance, and the knowledge of ourselves, to know what we know, and what we do not know. Are these the things which you assert?

Critias/ They are.

Socrates/ Again therefore, the third to the Savior, let us consider as it were from the beginning. In the first place, whether this is possible or not, that with respect to what a man knows, and does not know, he may know that he knows and does not know. And, in the next place, if this is possible, what will be the utility of it to us who know it.

Critias/ It is requisite, to consider this.

Socrates/ Come then, Critias, consider whether you have any clear conceptions respecting these things. For I am dubious, and I will tell you in what.

Critias/ By all means.

Socrates/ The following consequence then, will ensue (if that is true which you just now asserted), that there is one science which is not the science of anything else than of itself and other sciences, and of ignorance. Will not this be the case?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ See then, my friend, how absurdly we have endeavored to speak. For if you consider this same thing in other things, it will, I think, appear to you to be impossible.

Critias/ How and where?

Socrates/ In the following particulars. For consider, whether it appears to you that there is a certain sight, which is not the vision of those things which are the objects of other visions, but is the vision of itself and other visions, and is likewise the vision of that which is not vision: and again, in a similar manner, which does not see any color, though it is sight, but sees itself and other visions. Does it appear to you that there is such a sight as this?

Critias/ By Zeus, it does not.

Socrates/ What then? Can there be an auditory sense, which does not hear any sound, but hears itself, and other hearings, together with a privation of hearing?

Critias/ Nor yet this.

Socrates/ In short, therefore, consider with respect to all the senses, whether it appears to you that there is any sense, which perceives other senses and itself, but perceives none of those things which are the objects of the other senses.

Critias/ This does not appear to me to be the case.

Socrates/ But does it appear to you that there is any desire, which is the desire of no pleasure, but is the desire of itself and of other desires?

Critias/ It does not.

Socrates/ Nor, as I think, is there any will which wills no good, but alone wills itself and other wills.

Critias/ There is not.

Socrates/ But will you say that there is a love of such a kind, as to be the love of nothing beautiful, but which is the love of itself and other loves?

Critias/ Not I.

Socrates/ Do you conceive then, that there is any fear which fears itself and other fears, but fears nothing dreadful?

Critias/ I do not.

Socrates/ But is there any opinion which opines opinions and itself, but which forms no opinion respecting those things which are the subjects of other opinions?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ But we say, as it seems, that there is a science of such a kind, as to be the science of no discipline, but which is the science of itself and of other sciences.

Critias/ We do say so.

Socrates/ Must it not therefore be wonderful if there is such a science? For we do not as yet strenuously contend that there is not, but consider if there is.

Critias/ Right.

Socrates/ Come then, is this science the science of something? And does it possess a certain power, by which it is enabled to be the science of something?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And must we not also say that the greater possesses a certain power, by which it is greater than something?

Critias/ We must.

Socrates/ Must it not therefore be greater than something lesser, if it is greater?

Critias/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ If therefore we should find something greater, which is greater than things greater, and than itself, but which is not greater than any of those things than which other things are greater, would it not follow that a thing of this kind, since it is greater than itself, is also less than itself?

Critias/ This is perfectly necessary, Socrates.

Socrates/ If therefore there is anything which is double of other doubles, and of itself, it will be double of other doubles, and of itself, in consequence of being half. For nothing can be double of anything else than of half.

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ But being more than itself, will it not also be less than itself? And will not a thing which is heavier than, be also lighter than, itself? And that which is older than, be also younger than, itself? And in everything else, in a similar manner, will it not follow, that whatever has a power of its

own with respect to itself, will also possess that essence to which this power is related? But my meaning is this: Do we not say, that hearing is nothing else than a hearing of sound?

Critias/ We do?

Socrates/ If therefore it could hear itself, would it not hear in consequence of itself possessing a voice? For otherwise it would not hear.

Critias/ It is perfectly necessary this should be the case.

Socrates/ Sight likewise, O best of men, if it could itself see itself, must necessarily possess a certain color. For without color, sight would never be able to perceive anything.

Critias/ It would not.

Socrates/ You see therefore, O Critias, that the particulars which we have discussed, appear to us to be partly altogether impossible, and partly dubious in the extreme, whether they possess a power of their own with respect to themselves. For it is perfectly impossible that this can be the case with magnitude, multitude, and other things of this kind. Or is it not?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Again, that hearing hears itself, and sight sees itself, and that motion moves itself, and heat burns itself, and all other such like assertions, may be not credited by some, but may perhaps be believed by others. But there is occasion, my friend, for some great man, who may be able to show sufficiently, by a division through all things, whether nothing except science naturally possesses a power of its own with respect to itself, and not a power only over something else; or whether this is the case with some things, and not with others: and again, if there are certain things which possess a power with respect to themselves, whether

the science which we say is temperance, ranks in the number of these. For I do not believe myself sufficient for the discussion of these particulars: on which account I am not able strenuously to affirm, whether it is possible there can be a science of science. Nor if there is, could I admit that temperance is this science, till I had considered whether, being such, it would be of any advantage to us, or not. For I prophesy that temperance is something advantageous and good. Do you therefore, O son of Callæschrus, (since you assert that temperance is this science of science, and likewise of ignorance,) in the first place evince this, that it is possible for you to prove that which I have just now mentioned; and in the next place, in addition to its being possible, show that it is profitable: and thus perhaps you will satisfy me that what you have said respecting temperance is right.

But, Critias, when he had heard these things, and saw that I was dubious, in the same manner as those that look directly at others who are gaping, gape themselves, so he appeared to me to be involved in doubt, in consequence of my doubting. However, being very much celebrated, be was ashamed of those that were present; and was neither willing to grant me that he was incapable of deciding the question which I proposed to him, nor yet did he assert anything perspicuous, but concealed his perplexity. But I, that the discourse might proceed, said, If it is agreeable to you, Critias, we will now grant this, that it is possible there may be a science of science. But again, let us consider whether it is so or not. If therefore this is in the highest degree possible, why is it more possible to know what anyone knows, and what he does not know? For we say that this is for a man to know himself, and to be temperate. Or do we not?

Critias/ Entirely so, and this happens in a certain respect to be the case, Socrates. For if anyone possesses that science

which knows itself, he will be such as that is which he possesses. Just as when anyone possesses swiftness, he is swift; when he possesses beauty, is beautiful; and when knowledge, is knowing. But when anyone possesses a knowledge of himself, he will then become himself knowing himself.

Socrates/ I was not dubious, that when anyone possesses the knowledge of himself, he then knows himself; but I was doubtful, what necessity compels the man who possesses this knowledge to know what he knows, and what he does not know.

Critias/ Because, Socrates, this is the same with that.

Socrates/ Perhaps so; but I seem to be always similarly affected. For again, I do not understand how it is the same thing for a man to know what he knows, and to know what he does not know.

Critias/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Thus. Since there is a science of science, will this science be able to divide any further than this, that of these things this is science, and that is ignorance?

Critias/ It will not; but thus far alone.

Socrates/ Is the science therefore, and ignorance of that which is healthful, the same with the science and ignorance of the just?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ But I think that the one is a medicinal, and the other a political science; and that the science of science is nothing else than science.

Critias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ He therefore who has not a scientific knowledge of the healthy and the just, but alone knows science, as alone possessing science of this, such a one will know that

he knows, and that he possesses a certain science, both with respect to himself and other things. Or will he not?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But how will he know that he knows through this science? For he knows the healthful through the medicinal science, and not through temperance; the harmonic through the musical science, and not through temperance; and that which pertains to building through the architectural science, and not through temperance; and so in everything else. Is it not so?

Critias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But how can temperance, if it is the science of sciences, know that it knows the salubrious, or that which pertains to building?

Critias/ It cannot by any means.

Socrates/ Being therefore ignorant of this, it will not know that which it knows, but will alone know that it knows.

Critias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ To know therefore that which we know, and that of which we are ignorant, will not be to be temperate, nor yet will be temperance, but as it seems this will consist alone in knowing that we know, and that we do not know.

Critias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Hence, he who possesses this science of sciences, will not be able to examine another, who professes to have a scientific knowledge, whether he knows scientifically or not that which he says he knows; but as it seems he will alone know this, that he possesses a certain science, but temperance will not enable him to know the object of this science.

Critias/ It does not appear that it will.

Socrates/ Neither therefore will he be able to distinguish one who pretends to be a physician, but is not, from one who is a true physician, nor any other who is from one who is not endued with scientific knowledge. But let us thus consider; if a temperate man, or any other person, intends to discover a true and a false physician, will he not act as follows? He will not discourse with him respecting the medicinal science: for, as we have said, a physician attends to nothing else than the healthy and the diseased, the salubrious and the noxious. Is it not so?

Critias/ It is.

Socrates/ But he knows nothing respecting science; for this we have attributed to temperance alone.

Critias/ We have.

Socrates/ The physician therefore will not know anything about medicine, since medicine is a science.

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ And the temperate man will know that he possesses a certain science; but it is necessary that of this science the physician should make trial; and to know what this science is must be the province of some other person. Or is not every science defined by this, not only that it is a science, but by ascertaining what science it is, and what are its objects?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ The medicinal science, therefore, is defined to be different from other sciences in this, that it is the science of the salubrious and the noxious.

Critias/ It is.

Socrates/ Is it not therefore necessary, that he who wishes to consider the medicinal science, should consider the subjects with which it is conversant? For it is not proper

to contemplate it in things external, with which it is not conversant.

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ He therefore who contemplates rightly, will contemplate a physician, so far as he is a physician, in things salubrious and noxious.

Critias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ In words and actions therefore, will not such a one consider whether what is asserted is true, and whether what is done is done rightly?

Critias/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ But can anyone accomplish this without the medicinal science?

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor yet can any other, as it seems, except the physician; nor can this be accomplished by the temperate man. For, besides being temperate, he would be a physician.

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ More than anything therefore will it follow, if temperance is alone the science of science, and the science of ignorance, that neither can he who knows the medical art, nor he who does not, be able to distinguish the real or pretended physician, or one who thinks he is a physician, nor can any other person who is knowing in anything whatever, be able to accomplish this, except him who professes the same art, as is the case with other artists.

Critias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ What further utility then, Critias, shall we derive from temperance, if it is such as we have asserted it to be? For if, as we supposed in the beginning, the temperate man knows that which he knows, and that of which he is ignorant, knowing with respect to the former that he knows,

and with respect to the latter that he does not know, and is able to contemplate another person who is affected in the very same manner, if this be the case, we must say that we derive a great advantage from being temperate. For both we who possess temperance, and all such as are governed by us, shall pass through life without guilt; since we shall neither ourselves endeavor to do anything which we do not know, but finding out skillful persons, commit it to their care, nor shall we allow those that are in subjection to us to do anything else than what they will do well, but this will be that of which they possess a scientific knowledge. And thus through temperance we shall govern our families in a proper manner, well administer the affairs of cities, and everything else which is under the dominion of temperance. For erroneous conduct being taken away, and rectitude being the leader in every action, it is necessary that men with these qualifications should act beautifully and well; and that those that act well should be happy. Should we not, O Critias, speak in this manner respecting temperance; asserting, how great a good it is to know what anyone knows, and what he does not know?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But now, you see that no such science has appeared to us anywhere.

Critias/ I do see it.

Socrates/ Has not therefore, temperance, which we have now found to be that which knows both science and the privation of science, this good, that he who possesses it will easily learn whatever else he may attempt to learn, and all things will appear to him in a clearer point of view? Will not this likewise follow from his looking to science in whatever he learns? And will he not examine others better, respecting things which he has learned? And must not those who

examine others without this, do it in a more imbecile and unbecoming manner? Are these the privileges, my friend, which we enjoy through the possession of temperance? But at the same time, do we look to something greater, and require temperance to be greater than it really is?

Critias/ Perhaps, this is the case.

Socrates/ Perhaps so. And perhaps too we have investigated nothing profitable. But I conjecture this from hence, that certain absurd consequences appear to me to ensue respecting temperance, if it is such as we have defined it to be. For let us see, if you please admitting that it is possible to have a scientific knowledge of science; and let us not deprive temperance of the power of knowing what it knows, and what it does not know, which we ascribed to it at first, but let us confer upon it this power. And, admitting all these particulars, let us still more diligently consider, if being such it will benefit us at present. For what we just now said, I mean that temperance would be a great good, if it were of such a nature as to govern families and cities, does not appear to me, O Critias, to have been properly granted.

Critias/ How so.

Socrates/ Because, we easily admitted, that it would be a great good to mankind, if each of us performed those things which we knew, and committed to others endued with knowledge the management of things of which we are ignorant.

Critias/ Did we not then, do right in assenting to these things?

Socrates/ It appears to me, that we did not.

Critias/ You really speak absurdly, Socrates.

Socrates/ By the dog, thus it appears to me. And just now looking at these things, that they seemed to me to be absurd, and that I was afraid we had not rightly considered them.

For in reality, if temperance is such as we have described it, it does not appear evident to me, what good it will produce for us.

Critias/ Inform me how this is, that we also may know what you say.

Socrates/ I think that I am trifling; but at the same time, it is necessary to consider that which presents itself to our view, and not rashly omit it, if anyone pays to it the smallest degree of attention.

Critias/ You speak well.

Socrates/ Hear then, my dream, whether it has passed through the gate of horn, or through that of ivory. For if temperance should govern us, being such as we have now defined it to be, it would indeed act scientifically; nor would he who asserts himself to be a pilot, when he is not, deceive us; nor would a physician, nor a general of an army, nor any other who pretends to know that which he does not know, elude our penetration. But from these things thus subsisting, something else would happen to us; for our bodies would be more healthful than they are at present, and we should be preserved in the perils of the sea and war. We should likewise possess all our vessels and instruments, together with our garments, shoes, and all the conveniences and necessaries of life, more artificially constructed than at present, because we should employ true artists. If also you are willing we should grant that prophecy is the science of that which is future, and that temperance presiding over it, avoids arrogant diviners, but chooses true prophets for the prediction of future events, I should affirm that the human race, furnished with this, would act and live scientifically. For temperance being our guard, it will not suffer ignorance interfering to cooperate with us. But that we shall act well

and be happy, in consequence of acting scientifically, this, friend Critias, I am not yet able to understand.

Critias/ But indeed, you will not easily find any other end of acting well, if you despise acting scientifically.

Socrates/ Instruct me therefore more particularly, what kind of scientific action you mean. Is it that of cutting leather?

Critias/ It is not, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Is it that of a brazier?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Is it that of a woolworker, or a turner, or any such like artists?

Critias/ It is not.

Socrates/ We must therefore, no longer persist in the assertion, that he is happy who lives scientifically. For these artists, though they live scientifically, are not acknowledged by you to be happy; but it appears to me that the happy man should be ranked among certain persons that live scientifically. And perhaps you will assert the happy man to be him whom I just now mentioned, I mean the diviner, who knows all future events. Do you speak of this, or of any other character?

Critias/ Of this and another.

Socrates/ What other? Do you speak of the man who, besides knowing future events, knows everything past and present, and is not ignorant of anything? For let us admit that there is such a man: for I think you will not say that anyone lives more scientifically than this man.

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But this also should be added, Which of the sciences makes him happy? Or do all the sciences similarly produce this effect?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ But which most eminently accomplishes this? Is it that by which a man knows things past, present, and to come? And will it therefore be the science of chess?

Critias/ But why of chess?

Socrates/ Will it then be the logistic science?

Critias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Shall we say it is the science by which health is procured.

Critias/ Rather so.

Socrates/ But is it especially that science by which we know some particular thing?

Critias/ It is that by which we know good and evil.

Socrates/ O vile man, some time since you drew me round in a circle, concealing from me that to act well, and be happy, did not consist in living scientifically, and were not produced by the possession of all the other sciences, but are effected by one science alone, which enables us to know good and evil. And if, O Critias, you were willing to take away this science from the other sciences, would the medicinal science no less produce health, that of the leatherworker shoes, that of the weaver garments? And would the pilot's art no less prevent us from perishing in the sea, and the military science from being killed in battle?

Critias/ No less.

Socrates/ But, friend Critias, this science, by which we know good and evil, being taken away, each of these other sciences will no longer operate beneficially.

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ But this science, as it seems, is not temperance, but that, the employment of which is to benefit us: For it is not the science of sciences, and their privations,

but it is the science of good and evil. So that if temperance is beneficial, it will be useful to us in some other respect.

Critias/ But, is not temperance then beneficial? For if temperance is the science of sciences, and presides over other sciences, it will also benefit us by ruling over this science which is conversant with the good.

Socrates/ But will temperance, give us health, and not the medicinal science? And will this effect all that the other arts effect, so that each of these will no longer accomplish its proper work? Or did we not some, time since testify that temperance is the science of science, and ignorance alone, but of nothing else? Is it not so?

Critias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ It is not therefore the artificer of health.

Critias/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ For health is the production of another art. Is it not?

Critias/ It is.

Socrates/ Hence, my friend, temperance is not the artificer of utility: for we attributed this effect to another art. Did we not?

Critias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ How therefore will temperance be beneficial, since it is the artificer of no utility.

Critias/ By no means, Socrates, as it seems.

Socrates/ Do you not see, therefore, Critias, that I was very properly afraid some time since, and that I justly accused myself, because I beheld nothing useful respecting temperance? For that which is acknowledged to be the most beautiful of all things, would not have appeared to us to be useless, if I were myself in any respect useful for the purpose of proper investigation. But now we are every way

vanquished, and by no means able to discover with what design the legislator instituted this name temperance; although we have granted many things which by no means followed from our discourse. For we admitted, that there is a science of science, though our discourse neither suffers nor affirms this. We likewise granted that the works of other sciences were known by this science, though neither did our discourse suffer this, in order that we might desire a temperate man to be one who knows that he knows the things which he knows, and who likewise knows that he does not know the things of which he is ignorant. This indeed we granted in a manner perfectly magnificent, not considering that it is impossible, after a manner, for a man to know that which he in no respect knows. For we agreed that he who is ignorant of anything may know that he is ignorant of that thing, though in my opinion there is nothing which appears more irrational than this assertion. But at the same time, so silly were we, though not obstinate in the pursuit of this inquiry, that we were not rendered in any respect more able to discover the truth. Indeed, so ridiculous was our investigation, that what we had formerly acknowledged, and mutually devised to be temperance, this in a very insolent manner has appeared to us to be useless. On my own account, therefore, I am less indignant; but for your sake, O Charmides, I am very indignant, if you who are so beautiful in your body, and most temperate with respect to your soul, derive no advantage from this temperance, and are not in any respect benefited in life by its presence. But I am still more indignant for the sake of the incantation, which I learned from a Thracian, if being a thing of no worth, I have bestowed so much labor in learning it to no purpose. I do not, therefore, by any means think that this is the case, but I am of opinion that I am a bad investigator. For I consider temperance as a certain mighty good; and I am

persuaded, that if you possess it, you are blessed. But see if you do possess it, and do not in any respect require the incantation. For if you possess it, I shall rather advise you to consider me as a trifler, and one who is incapable of investigating by discourse; but I shall advise you to consider yourself happy in proportion to the degree of temperance which you possess. And, O Charmides…

Charmides/ But, by Zeus, Socrates, I do not know whether I possess it, or not. For how can I know that, the nature of which you, as you say, are unable to discover? I, indeed, am not very much persuaded by you, and I consider myself, Socrates, to be greatly in want of the incantation. I likewise am of opinion, so far as pertains to myself, that nothing hinders me from being daily enchanted by you, as long as you shall think it necessary.

Critias/ Be it so: but, O Charmides, if you act in this manner, it will be to me as an argument that you are temperate, because you will present yourself to Socrates to be enchanted, and will not desert him for any occasion, whether great or small.

Charmides/ I shall follow, and not desert him. For I should act in a dire manner, if I were not persuaded by you who are my tutor, and did not do what you order.

Critias/ But, I do order you.

Charmides/ I shall, therefore, act in this manner, beginning from this very day.

Socrates/ But what are these deliberating about?

Charmides/ Nothing: but we have determined to act in this manner.

Socrates/ You have employed violence, therefore, and do not permit me to interrogate.

Charmides/ Consider me as having used force, since Critias commands me to adopt this mode of conduct. Besides this, do you also consult what you are to do.

Socrates/ But, there is no place left for consultation: for no man is able to oppose you, when you are endeavoring and compelling to do anything.

Charmides/ Do not you, therefore, resist.

Socrates/ I shall not indeed, oppose you. —

THE END OF THE CHARMIDES.

The Cratylus.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Hermogenes, Cratylus, Socrates.

Hermogenes/ Are you willing then that we should communicate our discourse to Socrates here?

Cratylus/ If it seems good to you.

Hermogenes/ Cratylus here, O Socrates, says that there is a propriety of appellation naturally subsisting for everything that exists; and that this name is not, what certain persons conventionally call it, while they articulate with a part of their speech; but that there is a certain propriety of names, naturally the same both among the Greeks and all Barbarians. I ask him then whether Cratylus is his true name, or not. He confesses it is. What then is the true name of Socrates? He replies, Socrates. In the case of all other persons then, said I, is not that the name of each, by which we call him? Your name, says he, is not Hermogenes, although all men call you so. And upon my putting a question, and being very desirous to know what he means, he does not state anything distinctly, but uses dissimulation towards me, and a feint, as if he had some thoughts in his own mind, which, should he, as being conversant with the subject, be willing to state clearly, he would cause me to agree with him, and to say what he does himself. If then you can by any means unfold by guessing this oracular language of Cratylus, I shall very gladly hear you; or rather, if it is agreeable to you, I would much more gladly hear about the propriety of names, in what way the matter seems to stand to you.

Socrates/ O Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, there is an old proverb, that beautiful things are somehow difficult to learn. Now the learning relating to names happens to be no small affair. If however I had heard that exhibition of Prodicus valued at fifty drachms, by which he who heard might have been instructed, as he himself says, on this very point, nothing would have prevented you from knowing immediately the truth respecting the propriety of names. But I never heard except the one for a single drachm. Hence I know not where the truth is on such-like points; but am nevertheless prepared to seek it along with you and Cratylus. But as to his telling you, that your name is not in reality Hermogenes, I suspect that in this he is, as it were, scoffing at you; for he thinks, perhaps, that though covetous of wealth, you have failed on each occasion in acquiring it. But, as I just now said, it is hard to know such-like matters; by placing however the arguments in common, it is meet to consider whether the fact is as you say, or as Cratylus.

Hermogenes/ In good truth, Socrates, although I have frequently disputed with this person and many others, I cannot be persuaded that there is any other propriety of appellation, than through convention and common consent. For to me it appears, that the name, which anyone assigns to a thing, is the proper one; and that, if he should even change it to another, and call it no longer by the previous one, the latter name will be no less right than the former; just as we are accustomed to change the names of our servants, and the name so changed is not the less proper than the one previously given; for to each thing there is no name naturally inherent, but only through the law and custom of those who are wont so to call them. But, if the case is otherwise, I am ready both to learn and hear, not only from Cratylus, but from any other person whatever.

Socrates/ Perhaps, Hermogenes, you say something to the purpose. Let us then consider, Is that the name of a thing, which anyone puts on each thing as its appellation?

Hermogenes/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ And this, whether a private person so calls it, or a state?

Hermogenes/ So I say.

Socrates/ What then, if I should give a name to whatever that exists, in such a manner, as to denominate that a horse, which we now call a man, and that a man, which we now call a horse, the name of man will, as regards the public, remain to the same object; but as regards the individual, the name of horse? and on the other hand, as regards the individual, the name of man, but as regards the public, the name of horse? Do you say so?

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Tell me then, do you say it is a thing, to speak true and false?

Hermogenes/ I do.

Socrates/ There will then be a discourse, one true but another false.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will not that discourse then, which speaks of things as they are, be true; but that which speaks of them as they are not, false?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ This then is possible, to speak in a discourse of things which are, and which are not.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is the discourse, which is true, true as a whole, while its parts are not true?

Hermogenes/ No; but the parts are true likewise.

Socrates/ But are the greater portions true, and the smaller, not? or are they all true?

Hermogenes/ I think all.

Socrates/ Is there any part of a discourse, of what you arc speaking, smaller than a name?

Hermogenes/ No. This is the smallest of all.

Socrates/ And the name is said to be a part of a true discourse?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And it is, as you say, true.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ But is not the part of a false discourse false?

Hermogenes/ I say so.

Socrates/ It is then permitted to call a name true and false, since we can call a discourse so.

Hermogenes/ How not?

Socrates/ Is that, which each person says is the name of a thing, the name of each thing?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Will there be as many names to a thing, as any person assigns to it? and at that time, when he assigns them?

Hermogenes/ I have no other propriety of appellation, Socrates, than this; that I should call a thing by one name, which I assign to it, and you by another, which you assign to it. And after this manner, I see that by each state, names are assigned individually, sometimes to the same things, both by Greeks apart from the other Greeks, and by Greeks apart from Barbarians.

Socrates/ Come, let us see, Hermogenes, whether things that are, appear to you to exist in such a manner, with

respect to the peculiar essence of each, as Protagoras said, when he asserted that man was the measure of all things; and that things are to me, such as they appear to me; and that, on the other hand, they are to you such, as they appear to you; or do some of these seem to you to possess a certain stability of existence?

Hermogenes/ Already, Socrates, I have, through doubting, been led to this, which Protagoras asserts; but yet this does not perfectly appear to me to be the case.

Socrates/ But what, have you ever been led to this, so that it never seemed to you that a man existed perfectly evil?

Hermogenes/ Never, by Zeus! But I have often had this feeling, so as to think, that there are some men, and very many too, profoundly wicked.

Socrates/ But what, have there never seemed to you to be men very good?

Hermogenes/ Very few, indeed.

Socrates/ Yet they have seemed to be?

Hermogenes/ Yes, to me.

Socrates/ How, then, do you establish this? Is it thus? That the very good are very prudent, and the very bad are very imprudent?

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Is it possible then, if Protagoras speaks the truth, and this is the truth itself, that each thing is such, as it appears to each one to be, for some of us to be prudent, and some imprudent?

Hermogenes/ By no means.

Socrates/ And this, as I think, appears perfectly evident to you, that, since prudence and imprudence exist, it is not possible for Protagoras to speak the truth entirely; for one

person will not in truth be more prudent than another, if that, which seems to each one, is to each one true.

Hermogenes/ It is so.

Socrates/ I think however you will not, according to the theory of Euthydemus, imagine that all things exist to all persons in a similar manner, and at the same time, and always; for thus some persons would not be good, and others bad, if virtue and vice existed to all persons, and in a similar manner, and always inherent in all things.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ If then neither all things exist similarly and at the same time, and always to all persons, nor each thing is what it seems to each person, it is evident that there are things, which possess themselves a certain firm existence of their own; and this not as regards us, nor by being drawn upwards and downwards by us, through our imagination, but possessing of themselves their own existence, which is naturally theirs.

Hermogenes/ This appears to me, Socrates, to be the case.

Socrates/ Will then the things themselves exist naturally in this manner, but their actions not in the same manner? or are not their actions themselves one species of things?

Hermogenes/ They are perfectly so.

Socrates/ Actions too are performed then according to their own nature, and not according to our opinion. As, for instance, if we should attempt to cut any of things existing, whether must each particular be cut as we please, and with what we please? or if we should desire to cut anything, according to its nature of being cut, and with the instrument of which it is the nature to cut, shall we both cut and will something more take place, and shall we do this rightly? But

if we wish to act contrary to nature, shall we not err, and effect nothing?

Hermogenes/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ If then we should attempt to burn anything, we ought not to burn it, according to every opinion, but according to that which is the right one; and this is in the way, in which each thing is by nature to be burnt and burn, and with what it is by nature.

Hermogenes/ It is so.

Socrates/ Are not thus too the rest of things?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is not then to speak one of the things called actions?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whether then does he, who speaks in the way he thinks he ought to speak, correctly speak? or, should he speak in the way in which it is the nature of things to speak and be spoken of, and with the instrument, will he effect something and speak; but if not, will he err and effect nothing?

Hermogenes/ It appears to me it is thus as you say.

Socrates/ Is it not then a part of speaking to name a thing? For they who name a thing, speak the discourses.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is it not then an action to name a thing? since to speak about things was a certain action.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ But actions have appeared as existing not with respect to us, but as having a certain proper nature of their own.

Hermogenes/ They have so.

Socrates/ We must then give names to things, in the way and by the instrument through which they exist in nature, to name and be named, and not as we please, if there is about to be an assent to what has been said before. And thus we shall do something more, and give a name, but otherwise not.

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Come then, say we that a thing which we ought to cut, we ought to cut with something?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that what we ought to weave, we ought to weave with something? And that what we ought to bore, we ought to bore with something?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And what we ought to name, we ought to name by something?

Hermogenes/ It is so.

Socrates/ Now what is that with which we ought to bore?

Hermogenes/ An auger.

Socrates/ And what is that with which we ought to weave?

Hermogenes/ A shuttle.

Socrates/ And what is that by which we ought to name?

Hermogenes/ A name.

Socrates/ You speak well. The name then is a certain instrument.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If then I were to ask, What instrument is a shuttle? would you not answer, It is that with which we weave?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what do we perform with the shuttle? Do we not separate the warp and the woof, which have been mixed together?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Would you not be able to speak in the same manner of an auger, and the other instruments?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Can you in like manner speak of a name? Using the name as an instrument, what do we perform by naming?

Hermogenes/ I cannot tell.

Socrates/ Do we teach one another something, and distinguish things as they are?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ A name then is a kind of instrument to teach and distinguish the parts of existence, as a shuttle does those of a web.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The shuttle is a weaving instrument?

Hermogenes/ How not?

Socrates/ He who weaves then will employ a shuttle well; and by well, is meant in a weaver-like manner; and he who teaches will employ a name well, and by well, is meant in a teacher-like manner.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ By the work of whom does the weaver employ properly the shuttle, when he uses it?

Hermogenes/ The carpenter.

Socrates/ But is everyone a carpenter, or he only who possesses that art?

Hermogenes/ He who possesses the art?

Socrates/ By the work of whom does the borer properly use the auger, when he uses it?

Hermogenes/ The smith's.

Socrates/ Is then everyone a smith, or he only who possesses that art?

Hermogenes/ He who possesses the art.

Socrates/ Well then, by the work of whom does the teacher employ a name, when he uses it?

Hermogenes/ Not even this can I tell.

Socrates/ Nor can you tell even this, who has handed down to us the names which we use?

Hermogenes/ Not I.

Socrates/ Does it not appear to you that custom has handed down these?

Hermogenes/ It does.

Socrates/ He then who teaches, employs the work of the custom-introducer when he uses a name.

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ But does every man appear to you to be a custom-introducer, or he only who possesses that art?

Hermogenes/ He who possesses that art.

Socrates/ It is not then the province of every man, Hermogenes, to establish a name, but of a certain artificer of names; and this, as it seems, is the custom-introducer, who is the most rare of artificers among men.

Hermogenes/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But come, consider, to what does the custom-introducer look when he establishes names; and make the survey from the previous instances. To what does the carpenter look, when he makes a shuttle? Is it not to some such thing as is weaving naturally?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But if the shuttle should be broken by him while making it, would he make another, looking to the broken one, or to that form, according to which he was making the shuttle he had broken?

Hermogenes/ To that, it appears to me.

Socrates/ Should we not therefore most justly call that very form the shuttle itself?

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ When therefore it is requisite to make a shuttle, adapted to a thin or thick garment, either of thread or wool, or of any material whatever, it is necessary for all of them to have the form of the shuttle; but to impart its nature to each kind of work according as it is naturally the best suited for it.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the same method applies in the case of other instruments. For he who has discovered an instrument naturally suited to each thing, must assign it to that work, from which he will make not what he pleases, but that which is natural to the instrument. For as it seems, a person ought to know how to form of iron an auger naturally suited for each work.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And of wood a shuttle naturally suited for each work.

Hermogenes/ It is so.

Socrates/ For each shuttle, as it seems, is naturally suited to each kind of weaving; and so are the other instruments.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It is necessary then, O best of men, for the custom-introducer to know how to form a name of sounds and syllables; and looking to what is really a name, to frame and establish all names, if he is about to be the master-founder of names. But if each founder of names does not form of the same syllables a name, we ought not to be ignorant of this. For neither does every smith use the same iron, when making the same instrument for the sake of the same thing; but as long as he gives it the same form, although from even a different kind of iron, the instrument is equally correctly made, whether one makes it here, or among the Barbarians. Is not this the case?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will you not therefore deem it right to say, that, so long as the founder of names, both here and among the Barbarians, assigns the form of a name accommodated to each thing, in any kind of syllables whatever, the founder of names here is not worse than the founder in any other place whatever?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Who then is likely to know whether the convenient form of a shuttle exists in any kind whatever of wood? Is it the carpenter who made it, or the weaver who is to use it?

Hermogenes/ It is more probable he who is to use it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Who is it then that uses the work of the lyre-maker? Is it not he, who knows how best to superintend the maker, and knows when it is made, whether it is properly made or not?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But who is this?

Hermogenes/ The lyre-player.

Socrates/ And who is it that uses the work of the shipwright?

Hermogenes/ The pilot.

Socrates/ And who is he, that would superintend the best the work of the founder of names, and decide about it when finished, both here and among the Barbarians? Is it not he, who is to use it?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not this person, one who knows how to interrogate?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And likewise to answer?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ But would you call him, who knows how to interrogate and answer, anything else, than a dialectician?

Hermogenes/ No; but this.

Socrates/ It is the business then of the shipwright to make a rudder, while the pilot is superintending, if the rudder is about to be a good one.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And to make a name it is the business of the name-founder, it seems, to have a dialectician as his superintendent, if he is about to found names correctly.

Hermogenes/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ It nearly appears then, Hermogenes, that the imposition of names is not, as you think it, an affair of no moment, nor for men of no mark, nor of such as may be met with anywhere. And Cratylus speaks truly, when he says that names belong to things from nature; and that everyone is not the artificer of names, but he alone, who looks to that name, which is naturally suited to each thing, and who is able to mold its form into letters and syllables.

Hermogenes/ I know not, Socrates, how I ought to oppose myself to what you are saying. It is not however easy perhaps to be thus suddenly persuaded. But I think I should be more easily persuaded by you, if you could show me what is that which you call a natural propriety of appellation.

Socrates/ I myself, O blessed Hermogenes, say there is none. But you have forgotten, what I said a short time previously, that I knew nothing, but would consider the matter together with you. But now, to myself and you considering well the question together, thus much appears contrary to our former opinion, that the name possesses some natural propriety, and that it is not for every man to know how to give a name to anything whatever correctly. Or is it not so?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ It is necessary then to inquire, if you desire to know it, after this, in what does the propriety of a name consist.

Hermogenes/ But I do desire to know it.

Socrates/ Consider then.

Hermogenes/ How must I consider?

Socrates/ The most correct inquiry, my friend, will be with those, who know through your telling out money to them, and giving them thanks. These are the sophists, to whom your brother Callias told out a mint of money, and now appears to be a wise man. But, since you are not the master of your patrimony, you must earnestly entreat your brother, and beg of him to show you the propriety respecting things of this kind, which he has learned from Protagoras.

Hermogenes/ But this request of mine would be absurd, Socrates, if, when I reject entirely “The Truth” of Protagoras, I should embrace what is stated in such a truth, as things of any value.

Socrates/ But if this does not please you, we must learn from Homer, and the other poets.

Hermogenes/ And what says Homer, Socrates, about names; and where?

Socrates/ In many places. But those are the chief and most beautiful passages, in which he distinguishes between the names, which men and gods assign to the same things. Or do you not think that he says something great and wonderful in those passages relating to the propriety of names? For it is evident surely that the gods call things according to the propriety which names naturally possess. Or do you not think so?

Hermogenes/ I well know, that if the gods call anything by a name, they call it so correctly. But of what passages are you speaking?

Socrates/ Do you not know, that when speaking of the river at Troy, which fought in a single combat with Hephaestos, Vulcan, he says;

> Whom gods call Xanthus, but Scamander, men.

Hermogenes/ I do. What then?

Socrates/ Do you not think that this is something of high import, to know in what way it is right to call that river Xanthus, rather than Scamander? Or, if you prefer it, in the case of the bird, which he says;

> Chalcis the gods, but men Kymindis call.

Do you think this is a trifling piece of learning, to know how much more proper it is to call the same bird Chalcis than Cymindis, or Myrine than Batiea; and there are many other passages, both in this poet and in others. But these things are perhaps too great for me and you to discover. But the names Scamandrius and Astyanax are, as it appears to me, more for a common man to investigate and more easy to see, what is the propriety of the names, which, he says, were

given to the son of Hector. For you doubtless know the verses, in which are the names I am speaking of.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Which then of these names do you think Homer considered as more correctly given to the boy, Astyanax or Scamandrius?

Hermogenes/ I cannot tell.

Socrates/ But reflect in this way. If anyone should ask you, whether you thought the more wise or the less wise would call things in the more correct manner?

Hermogenes/ It is manifest I should answer, the more wise.

Socrates/ Whether then do women, or men, to speak of the whole human race, appear to you to be the wiser in cities?

Hermogenes/ The men.

Socrates/ Do you not then know, that Homer says that the son of Hector was called by the men of Troy, Astyanax, but Scamandrius, it is plain, by the women; since the men were wont to call him Astyanax.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Do you not then conceive that Homer considered the men of Troy wiser than the women?

Hermogenes/ I think so.

Socrates/ He therefore thought that the name Astyanax was more correctly given to the boy than Scamandrius.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But let us consider why he did so. Or does he not himself give the best explanation for the reason? For he says;

> To throw a bulwark he alone was found,
> The city's gates and the long walls around.

On this account then, as it seems, it is proper to call the son of the savior, Astyanax; of that which, as Homer says, his father preserved.

Hermogenes/ So it appears to me.

Socrates/ But what is this? For I do not myself understand this at all. Do you understand it?

Hermogenes/ By Zeus, I do not.

Socrates/ But, my good friend, Homer has himself given to Hector his name.

Hermogenes/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because it appears to me that this name of Hector is something similar to Astyanax, and these names appear to be Greek; for king and Hector signify nearly the same thing; both the names to be royal. For over whatsoever one is a king, he is also doubtless a Hector over it; since he evidently rules over it, possesses and has it. Or do I appear to you to say nothing to the purpose, but unconsciously err, in thinking I have hit upon, as it were, the track of Homer's thoughts respecting the propriety of names?

Hermogenes/ By Zeus, not you indeed, as it seems to me; but perhaps you have hit upon something.

Socrates/ For it is just, as it appears to me, to call the offspring of a lion, a lion, and the offspring of a horse, a horse. I do not mean, should something else than a horse be produced, like a monster, from a horse, but I speak of that which should be its offspring as a natural production. For if a horse should, contrary to nature, beget a calf, the produce of a cow by nature, we must call it not a colt, but a calf. Nor do I think that, if from a man an offspring should be produced not of a man, the progeny ought to be called a man; but if it be the offspring. And similar is the case of trees, and all other things. Or do you not agree with me?

Hermogenes/ I do agree.

Socrates/ You speak well. But take care lest I somehow cheat you. For according to the same reasoning, the offspring of a king ought to be called a king. Now it matters not whether the signification be the same in syllables different in one way or another; nor if a letter be added or taken away, is even this anything, so long as the existence of the thing is in force, and shown by the name.

Hermogenes/ How say you this?

Socrates/ Nothing complex; but as you know we pronounce the names of the elements, but not the elements themselves, except four, ε and υ, and ο and ω; and placing round, you know, other letters, as well to the other vowels as to the non-vowels, consonants, we form names, and pronounce them. But, as long as we insert the exhibited power of the element, it is well to call it by the name which the element exhibits. As, for instance, βῆτα. Here you see that, although the η and the τ and the α have been added, there is nothing to pain us, so as not to exhibit by the whole name the nature of that element which its name-founder intended; so well did he know how to give names to letters.

Hermogenes/ You appear to me to speak the truth.

Socrates/ Will not then the same reasoning take place respecting a king? For a king will be produced from a king, both good from a good one, and beautiful from a beautiful one; and so in the case of everything else, from each genus another such is the progeny, unless something monstrous is produced, and they must be called by the same name. But it is possible to vary the names by syllables, so that, to an unskilled person, what are the same would appear to be different from each other. Just as the drugs of physicians, when varied by colors or smells, appear to us to be different, although really the same; but to the physician, as one who looks to the power of the drugs, they appear to be the same,

nor is he struck at all with astonishment by the additions to them. In like manner, perhaps, he who is skilled in names looks to their value, and is not struck with astonishment if a letter is added, or changed, or taken away, or the same value of the name is found in the other letters taken all together. As in the names of Astyanax and Hector, which we have just spoken of; they do not possess anyone of the same letters, except the τ, and yet they signify the same thing. And what has ἀρχέολις ruler of a city in its letters common with the two preceding names? and yet it means the same thing. And there are many other words which signify nothing else than a king; and others again which signify an army-leader, as Ἄγις, Πολέμαρχος, Εὐπόλεμος; and others connected with medicine, as Ἰατροκλῆς and Ἀκεσίμβροτος. And perhaps we could find many others disagreeing in syllables and letters, but in their value speaking the same sense. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And that to those, who exist according to nature, the same names should be assigned?

Hermogenes/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ What then, to those, who are born contrary to nature, and in the form of monsters, as when from a good and pious man an impious one is produced; surely, as we said before, that if a horse should beget a progeny from a cow the offspring ought not to have the name of the begetter, but of the party that brought it forth?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ To the impious man, then, produced from the pious one, the name of his genus must be assigned?

Hermogenes/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ Not Theophilus, god-loving, nor Mnesitheus, god-remembering, nor any name of this kind, but something

which signifies the contrary to these, must we call such a son, if names are to possess any propriety.

Hermogenes/ By all means, Socrates.

Socrates/ Just as, Hermogenes, the name of Orestes nearly appears to be correct; whether a certain fortune assigned to him this appellation, or some poet, pointing out by this name the savageness of his nature, and his wildness, and the habits of a mountaineer.

Hermogenes/ So it appears, Socrates.

Socrates/ It seems also that the name of his father was according to nature.

Hermogenes/ It does so.

Socrates/ For it nearly appears that Agamemnon was such a person as, with respect to whatever he had determined to labor through and endure, to put the finish to what he had determined on through valor. And the proof of his patient endurance is his staying at Troy with so great a host. That this man therefore is to be admired for his staying, and is denoted by the name Agamemnon. Perhaps, too, Atreus is correctly said; for his murder of Chrysippus, and what he did so very cruelly to Thyestes, were all noxious and hurtful as regards virtue. The appellation, therefore, of the name turns a little on one side, and conceals its meaning, so as not to show the nature of the man to all; but to those who are skilled in names, Atreus sufficiently points out what it means. For his name properly exists in every way with reference to what is not worn down, not fearing, and hurtful. It appears also to me, that his name was properly given to Pelops: for this name signifies one who sees things near; and I think he is worthy of the appellation in some such way as this.

Hermogenes/ How?

Socrates/ In such a way as this. It is reported against this man, that in the murder of Myrtilus, he was neither able to think beforehand, nor perceive any of the things afar off relating to his whole race, with how great a calamity he would fill it; but only to see what was near, and on the instant; for such is the meaning of πέλας near, when he desired to obtain, by all means, his marriage with Hippodamia. From whence the name of Pelops comes from πέλας, near, and ὄψις, sight. To Tantalus, likewise, all would deem the name to have been properly and naturally assigned, if it be true what is told of him.

Hermogenes/ What is it?

Socrates/ That, while he was yet living, many and terrible misfortunes happened to him; of which at last his whole country was overthrown; and that, when he was dead, there was the vibration of the stone over his head in Hades, it being wonderfully in unison with his name; for it really seems as if one, wishing to call him ταλάντατος most miserable, did, concealing that name, call him by the name of Tantalus instead of Talantatus. And it seems that the accident of the rumor contributed to some such appellation. But it appears that the name of him, who was called his father, was made in an all-beautiful manner. It is however by no means easy to understand it. For in reality the name of Zeus is, as it were, a sentence; and persons dividing it into two parts, some of us make use of one part, and some of another; for some call him Ζὴν, and some Δίς. But these parts collected into one, exhibit the nature of the god; which, as we have said, a name ought and should be able to do. For there is no one, who is more the cause of living, both to us and everything else, than he who is the ruler and king of all. It follows therefore that this god is rightly named, through whom life is present to all living beings; but the name, though one, is distributed, as I have said, into two parts, Dis

and Zēn. Now he, who hears on a sudden that this god is the son of Kronos, may perhaps think it an insulting assertion. But it is according to reason for Zeus to be the offspring of some great intellect. Now Koros does not signify a boy, but the pure and unmixed nature of intellect. Now he Kronos is the son of Ouranus Heaven: and the sight directed to things above has fairly a right to be called by this name, Ourania heavenly, from beholding things on high. From whence too, Hermogenes, they who discourse on sublime affairs, say that a pure intellect is present with him, and that the name of Ouranus is very properly given to him. Indeed, if I had remembered Hesiod's genealogy of the gods, and whom he mentions as their still preceding progenitors, I should not have desisted from showing you how correctly their names have been laid down, until I had made trial of this wisdom, what it will effect, whether it faints or not, which has now recently come upon me so suddenly, I know not from whence.

Hermogenes/ Indeed, Socrates, you really appear to me to speak oracles on a sudden, like those inspired by a god.

Socrates/ And the reason I assign, Hermogenes, is, that this wisdom has come upon me through Euthyphron of the ward of Prospaltius: for I was much with him in the morning, and I gave him my ears. It nearly appears then, that, being divinely inspired, he has not only filled my ears with divine wisdom, but laid hold also of my very soul. It appears therefore to me, that we ought to act in this way; to make use of this wisdom to-day, and to contemplate what yet remains concerning the propriety of names; but to-morrow, if it seems good to you, we will send it away as a pollution, and purify ourselves from it, after finding out a person who is skilled in expiating things of this kind, whether he be one of the priests, or the sophists.

Hermogenes/ I assent to this; for I shall hear, with great pleasure, what remains of the discussion respecting names.

Socrates/ But it is necessary to act thus. From whence then do you wish us to begin the inquiry, since we have arrived at a certain form, that we may know whether the names themselves will testify in our favor, that they were not entirely fabricated from chance, but possess a certain propriety? Now the names that are mentioned of heroes and men would perhaps deceive us; for many of these exist according to the appellations of their ancestors, and do not suit some persons, as we stated at the commencement. But many assume them, as matters of boasting, such as Eutychides the son of the fortunate, Sosias the son of the saved, and Theophilus the god beloved, and many others. Such then as these, it appears to me, we ought to dismiss. But it is most probable that we shall find names properly imposed, respecting things existing forever, and naturally produced; for in these it is especially fitting for the imposition of names to be a careful study. But perhaps some of these have been given by a power more divine than that of man.

Hermogenes/ You appear to me, Socrates, to speak well.

Socrates/ Will it not then be just, to begin from the gods, when we are considering that very thing, why the gods are properly called by that name?

Hermogenes/ It will be reasonable.

Socrates/ I suspect then it is of this kind. It appears to me that the first men of those connected with Greece, considered those only as gods, whom many at present of the Barbarians do; the sun, and the moon, and the earth, and the stars, and the heavens. Now as they perceived all these moving and running round in a perpetual course, from this nature of running they called them gods; but afterwards,

perceiving that there were others, they called all of them by the same name. Seems what I say to be like the truth, or not?

Hermogenes/ It seems very like.

Socrates/ What then shall we consider after this? Is it not clear, we ought to consider about dæmons, heroes, and men?

Hermogenes/ About dæmons.

Socrates/ Now in good truth, Hermogenes, what does the word dæmons mean? Consider whether I say ought to the purpose?

Hermogenes/ Only say what it is.

Socrates/ Know you then whom Hesiod says are dæmons?

Hermogenes/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ But know you not that he says, the golden race of men was first created?

Hermogenes/ This I know.

Socrates/ He says, then, concerning it;

> But when concealed had Destiny this race,
> Dæmons there were, called holy, upon earth
> Good, ill-averters, and of man the guard.

Hermogenes/ What then?

Socrates/ I think he calls the race golden, not as being naturally of gold, but as being beautiful and good. And I infer this, from his calling us an iron race.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Do you not then think, that if anyone of those living now were good, Hesiod would say he was of that golden race?

Hermogenes/ Probably.

Socrates/ But are the good any other than the prudent?

Hermogenes/ The prudent.

Socrates/ On this account then, especially, as it appears to me, he speaks of them as dæmons; because they were dæmons prudent and learned. And, in our old language, this very name occurs. Hence both he, and many other poets, say well, who say that when a good man shall have reached his end, he receives a mighty destiny and honor, and becomes a dæmon, according to the appellation of prudence. I therefore give my vote for this, that every dæmon learned man, who is good, is dæmon-like, both while living and when dead, and is properly called a dæmon.

Hermogenes/ And I, Socrates, seem to myself to give entirely the same vote with you on this point. But what can the name of hero be?

Socrates/ This is by no means difficult to understand. For their name is drawn aside a little, showing that its origin is from love.

Hermogenes/ How is this?

Socrates/ Do you not know that heroes are demigods?

Hermogenes/ What then?

Socrates/ All of them were doubtless begotten either from a god falling in love with a mortal woman, or from a mortal man falling in love with a goddess. If then you consider the matter according to the old Attic language, this too you will more clearly understand. For it will show you that the word hero is slightly drawn aside, for the sake of the name, from the word love, through which the heroes were begotten. And either this says the heroes, or because they were wise and rhetoricians, powerful and skilled in dialectic, and all-sufficient to interrogate; for εἔρειν is the same as to speak. Hence, as we just now said, in the Attic language they, who are called heroes, coincide as certain rhetoricians, interrogators, and lovers: so that the genus of rhetoricians

and sophists becomes an heroic tribe. This, indeed, is not difficult to understand; but rather this respecting men, why they are called ἄνθρωποι. Can you tell the reason?

Hermogenes/ From whence, my good man, can I? And indeed were I at all able to find this out, I shall not exert myself, through my thinking that you will more easily discover it than myself.

Socrates/ You appear to me to rely on the inspiration of Euthyphron.

Hermogenes/ Evidently so.

Socrates/ And rightly relying. For I now seem to myself to understand it in a clever manner; and I shall run the risk, if I do not take care, of becoming to-day wiser than is fitting. But consider what I am saying. For this ought in the first place to be understood concerning names, that we often introduce letters, and often take some away, while we give names, as we please: and often change the acute syllables. As when we say Διὶ φίλος a friend of Dis: for, in order that there may be a noun instead of a verb, we take away the second ἰῶτα, and, instead of an acute syllable in the middle, we pronounce a grave one. But on the contrary, in others we introduce letters, and others again, with a graver accent, we pronounce with a more acute one.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Of these things one, as it appears to me, takes place in the name ἄνθρωπος man: for a noun is generated from a verb, one letter, α, being taken away, and the end of the word becoming more grave.

Hermogenes/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Thus. This name ἄνθρωπος indicates that other animals, who can see, neither consider, nor reason, nor contemplate; but that man sees—for such is the meaning of ὄπωπε—and at the same time contemplates and reasons

upon what he sees. Hence man alone, of all animals, is rightly denominated ἄνθρωπος, contemplating what he sees.

Hermogenes/ What then, shall I ask you what follows after this, and which I would very gladly hear?

Socrates/ By all means.

Hermogenes/ As then there appears to me to be something in order after these; for we surely call the soul and body of man by some name.

Socrates/ How not?

Hermogenes/ Let us, then, endeavor to divide these too, as we did the former subjects.

Socrates/ Do you say that you have considered first the soul, that it has with reason this name, and afterwards so has the body?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ To speak then off-hand, I think that those, who called the soul by that name, understood some such thing as this; that whenever it is present to the body, it is the cause of its life, giving it the power to breathe, and cooling it; but as soon as the cooling power ceases, the body is dissolved and comes to an end. From whence, as it appears to me, they called the soul ψυχή. But, if you please, be quiet. For I think I see something carrying more conviction than this to the followers of Euthyphron; for this, as it appears to me, they would despise, and consider it as farcical. But consider whether this will please you.

Hermogenes/ Only say it.

Socrates/ What else but the soul do you think contains and carries the nature of the whole body, so that it lives and goes about.

Hermogenes/ No other.

Socrates/ But what, do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that intellect and soul orders and holds the nature of everything else?

Hermogenes/ I do.

Socrates/ It will be proper then to give this name to that power which carries and holds nature, φυσέχην: but it may be called more elegantly ψυχή.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so; and this latter appellation appears to me to be more agreeable to art than the former.

Socrates/ For it is certainly so. It would however appear to be truly ridiculous, if it were named, as it is formed.

Hermogenes/ But what shall we next consider after this?

Socrates/ Are you speaking of the body?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ In many ways this appears to me, whether one causes it to deflect little or much. For some say it is the sepulcher of the soul, as being buried at the present time; and on the other hand, because whatever the soul marks out it marks out by the body; on this account it is properly called a mark. The followers however of Orpheus appear to me to have founded this name, especially since the soul suffers a punishment on account of the things it suffers; and that it may be preserved, it has this enclosure, the image of a prison; and that the body, as it is called, is the saving of the soul, until it the soul shall have paid the penalty due; and that there is no need of introducing a single letter.

Hermogenes/ On this, it appears to me, Socrates, enough has been said. But about the names of the gods, could we, in the same manner as you have just now spoken about Zeus, consider by what propriety their names are laid down.

Socrates/ By Zeus, Hermogenes, if we possessed any mind, we should have one the most beautiful method, by

confessing that we know nothing of the gods either themselves or the names by which they call themselves; for it is evident that they call themselves by correct names. But the second mode of propriety consists in our calling the gods by those names, by which there is a law for us to invoke them in our prayers, whatever they are, and by whatever name they like to be addressed, since we know of nothing else; for this appears to me to have been beautifully ordained. If you are willing, therefore, let us consider this point, having previously, as it were, declared to the gods, that we shall speculate nothing about them—for we do not think ourselves worthy to do so—but about the men, what thoughts they had, when they gave the names; for this will not expose us to their wrath.

Hermogenes/ You appear to me, Socrates, to speak with moderation; let us therefore act in this manner.

Socrates/ Ought we not then to begin, according to custom, from Hestia?

Hermogenes/ It is just what we should.

Socrates/ What then shall we say the person intended, who gave the name of Ἑστία?

Hermogenes/ By Zeus, I do not think this is an easy thing.

Socrates/ The men, O good Hermogenes, who first founded names, seem almost to be no mean persons, but conversant with high subjects and discourses on them.

Hermogenes/ What then?

Socrates/ It seems to me that the founding of names was the work of some such men. And indeed, if anyone considers foreign names, what each means is not the less discovered. For instance, in the case of that which we call Οὐσία, there are, who call it Ἐσία, and others again Ὠσία. In the first place then, according to one of these names Ἐσία, the existence of things Οὐσία has a right to be called Ἑστία; and again,

because we call that which participates in existence by the name of Ἑστία, it would on this ground be properly called Ἐσία: for we too seem of old to have pronounced Οὐσία, Ἐσία. Moreover, if anyone bears in mind the business of sacrifice, he will deem that this was in the thoughts of those who instituted the names. For it is likely, that they, who called Οὐσία Ousia, the existence of all things, Ἑστια Hestia, sacrificed to Hestia before all the gods. But they who called it Ὠσία Osia, would nearly, according to Heraclitus, consider that all things move, and nothing is at rest. The cause therefore and leader of things with them was τὸ ὠθοῦν the pushing on: and hence they very properly called it Ὠσία Osia. And thus much let it be said as if from those who know nothing. But, after Hestia, it is just to speculate about Rhea and Kronos, although we have discussed already the name of Kronos. But, perhaps, I say nothing to the purpose.

Hermogenes/ Why so, Socrates?

Socrates/ I perceive, my good man, a certain hive of wisdom.

Hermogenes/ Of what kind is it?

Socrates/ It is almost ridiculous to mention it; and yet I think it has some plausibility.

Hermogenes/ What is this?

Socrates/ I seem to myself to see Heracleitus speaking artlessly some old wise saw about Kronos and Rhea, which Homer too asserts.

Hermogenes/ How say you this?

Socrates/ Heracleitus says somewhere that all things move, and nothing is at rest; and comparing things to the flowing of a river, observes that “Thou canst not twice into the same stream go.”

Hermogenes/ Such is the fact.

Socrates/ What then, does he appear to you to think differently from Heracleitus, who gave the names of Rhea and Kronos to the progenitors of the other gods? And do you think that Heracleitus by chance assigned to both of them the names of flowing streams? As then Homer calls Ocean the generation of the gods, and Tethys their mother, so I think the same is asserted by Hesiod. Likewise Orpheus says somewhere;

> Ocean with lovely streams did first begin
> Marriage, and wedded Tethys, sister-kin.

Consider then, how all these harmonize with each, and all tend to the doctrine of Heracleitus.

Hermogenes/ You appear to me, Socrates, to Say something to the purpose. I do not however understand what the name Tethys means.

Socrates/ Surely it nearly implies this of itself, that there is a name of a fountain concealed; for that which is percolated, and strained through, is the representation of a fountain; and from both these names the name Tethys is composed.

Hermogenes/ This, Socrates, is elegant.

Socrates/ How is not about to be? But what is after this? Of Zeus we have already spoken.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us then speak of his brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, and of that other name by which he is called.

Hermogenes/ By all means.

Socrates/ The name then of Poseidon appears to me to have been given by the party first naming it, because the nature of the sea stopped him when walking, and did not permit him to proceed any further, but became as it were a chain to his feet. He therefore denominated the ruler of this power Ποσειδῶν, as Ποσί-δεσμος ὤν being a foot-chainer. But

the ε was perhaps added for the sake of elegance. And perhaps too it would not mean this; but two λλ were originally spoken instead of σ; signifying that this god is much-knowing. And perhaps likewise he was denominated ὁ σείων the shaking, from σείειν to shake, and π and δ were added. But Πλούτων Pluto was so called from the gift of Πλοῦτος wealth, because riches are dug out of the bowels of the earth. But by the appellation Αἵδης, the multitude appear to me to understand that τὸ ἀειδὲς was spoken of, and that, being terrified at this name, they call him Pluto.

Hermogenes/ But how does it seem, Socrates, to you?

Socrates/ In many ways do men appear to me indeed to have erred about the power of this god, and to have a fear of him, who is not worthy of it. For they fear that, when anyone of us dies, he remains there forever, and that the soul, divested of the body, departs to him, this too they fear. But all these things, the empire of the god, and his name, appear to me to tend to something the same.

Hermogenes/ How so?

Socrates/ I will tell you what appears to me. For tell me, Which of these is the stronger bond to any animal whatever, so as to cause it to remain in any place whatever, necessity, or desire?

Hermogenes/ Desire, Socrates, is by far the superior.

Socrates/ Do you not think that many would fly from Hades, unless it held those who go thither by the strongest bond?

Hermogenes/ This is evident.

Socrates/ It binds them then, as it appears, by a certain desire; since it binds them with the greatest bond, and not with necessity.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Now are there not many desires?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ It binds them therefore with the greatest of all desires, if it is about to bind them with the greatest of bonds.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is there then any greater desire, than when anyone, by associating with another, thinks that, through him, he shall become a better man?

Hermogenes/ By Zeus, Socrates, there is not any whatever.

Socrates/ On this account, Hermogenes, let us say, that not one of those there is willing to come hither, not even the Syrens themselves; but that both they, and all others, are enchanted; such beautiful discourses does Pluto, it seems, know how to utter. And by this reasoning this god is both a perfect sophist, and a great benefactor to those with him; and who sends up to those here such good things; so many things does he have in superfluity; and from hence he has the name of Pluto. And on the other hand, through his unwillingness to associate with men invested with bodies, but only to have an intercourse with them, when the soul becomes cleansed from all the evils and desires which were around the body, does he not appear to you to be a philosopher, and to have well considered this, that he should thus detain them, by binding them with the desire for virtue; but that if they possessed the flutterings and mad feelings of the body, not even his father Kronos would be able to detain them with him, in those bonds with which he was said to be bound.

Hermogenes/ You nearly seem, Socrates, to speak something to the purpose.

Socrates/ The name then, O Hermogenes, of Ἀΐδης, wants much of being called Ἀΐδης from Ἀειδὴς, "unseemly:" but it

is much rather from knowing all beautiful things, that Ἀΐδης was so called by the fabricator of names.

Hermogenes/ Be it so. But what shall we say of Demeter, and Hera, and Apollo, and Athena, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and of the rest of the gods?

Socrates/ It appears that Δημήτηρ Demeter was so called from the gift of food, as being διδοῦσα μήτηρ, "a giving mother." But Ἥρα Hera from being Ἐρατὴ beloved; as if Zeus is said to have loved her, and had her for a wife. Perhaps, also, the founder of this name, speculating upon things on high, denominated Ἀὴρ air Ἥρα: but, for the sake of concealment, he placed the beginning at the end. And this you will be convinced of, if you frequently pronounce the name Ἥρα. But Φερρέφαττα Proserpine many are terrified at, and at Ἀπόλλων Apollo, through a want of skill, as it appears, in the propriety of names. For by making a change, they think upon Φερσεφόνη; and this appears to them a thing of dread. But it Φερρέφαττα means, that the goddess is wise. For while things are carried along, that which touches upon, and handles, and is able to follow them, will be wisdom. This goddess therefore may with great propriety be named Φερέπαφα, or something of this kind, on account of her wisdom, and contact of that which is borne along: and hence the wise Ἀΐδης Pluto associates with her, because she too is such i.e. wise. But men now turn aside from this name, setting more value upon a good pronunciation than truth, so as to call her Φερρέφαττα. In like manner with respect to Ἀπόλλων Apollo, many, as I said before, are terrified at this name of the god, as if it signified something dreadful. Or know you not this?

Hermogenes/ I know it very well; and you speak the truth.

Socrates/ But this name, as it appears to me, is most beautifully laid down, with respect to the power of the god.

Hermogenes/ How?

Socrates/ I will endeavor to tell you what the fact appears to me. For there is no other name, which, although one, fits better with four powers of this god, so as to touch upon them all, and to show, in a certain manner, his art in music, prophecy, medicine, and archery.

Hermogenes/ Tell me, then; for you seem to me to speak of this name as something strange.

Socrates/ This name then is well fitted, as belonging to a musical god. For, in the first place, would not purgations and purifications, both according to the arts of medicine and prophecy, and likewise the going round with torches steeped in drugs, ordered by medical men and prophets, and the lustrations on such occasions, and the sprinklings, would not I say all these be able to do one thing, namely, to render a man pure, both in body and soul?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will not then the god who purifies, who washes, and who releases us from such evils, be of such a name?

Hermogenes/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ According then to the releasings and washings which he affords, as being the physician in the case of such-like things, he will be properly called Ἀπολούων the washer. But according to his prophetic power, and truth and simplicity, for these two are the same, he would most properly be called Ἁπλοῦς simple, as the Thessalians call him now for all the Thessalians call this god Ἁπλῶν. But, on account of his being ever mighty in shooting arrows by his skill in archery, he is Ἀεὶ-βάλλων ever-darting. But with respect to his musical power, it is proper to understand that, as in the words ἀκόλουθος a follower, and ἄκοιτις a wife, α often signifies the same as together; so here α and πολέω signify τὴν ὁμοῦ πολμσιν the rolling together, both about

heaven, which men call πόλους the poles; and about the harmony existing in song, which is called symphony; because all these, as the clever in music and astronomy assert, cause all things to roll together with a certain harmony. Now this god presides over harmony, ὁμοπολῶν, causing to roll all these things together, both among gods and men. As therefore we call ὁμόκελευθος following together and ὁμόκοιτις lying together, ἀκόλουθος and ἄκοιτις, by changing ο into α, so likewise we denominate Ἀπόλλων, who was ὁμοπολῶν, by inserting another λ because it would have been synonymous with the harsh name. And this some at the present day suspecting, in consequence of the value of this name not being rightly considered, are terrified at it, as if it signified some destruction. But, as was just now stated, the much is laid down, touching upon all the powers of the god, his simple, ever-darting, purifying, and together-rolling nature. But the name of the Μοῦσαι Muses, and of music universally, someone, as it seems, made from μῶσθαι to inquire, and from investigation and philosophy. But Λμτὼ Latona, is derived from the mildness of the goddess, with reference to her being ἐθελήμων willing, in what anyone might request; but perhaps, as foreigners call her; for many call her Ληθώ. It seems then that she was called Ληθὼ by those calling her by this name, with reference not to the roughness, but the gentleness and smoothness of her manner. But Ἄρτεμις Diana appears to be so called on account of her conduct being ἀρτεμὲς, flawless and orderly through her desire of virginity. Perhaps also the founder of her name so called her, as being cognizant of virtue. And it may be, that hating the ἄροτον ploughing of man in a woman, or through some of these or all of them, the founder of the name gave it to the goddess.

Hermogenes/ But what is Dionysus and Aphrodite?

Socrates/ You are asking about great things, O son of Hipponicus. But the manner of the appellations given to these divinities, has been said to be both serious and jocose. Ask therefore others about the serious manner; but nothing hinders us from relating the jocose; for these deities are lovers of jesting and sport. Now Διόννυσος Dionysus would be the giver of wine, and may be jocosely called Διδ-οινυσος. And οἶνος wine may be most justly called οἰόνους, because it makes the majority of those who drink it to have wit, not having it before. But, with respect to Aphrodite, it is not proper to contradict Hesiod, but to allow that she was called Ἀφροδίτη, through her generation from ἀφρὸς foam.

Hermogenes/ But, Socrates, as you are an Athenian, you will not forget either Athena, or Hephaestus, or Ares.

Socrates/ For it is by no means reasonable.

Hermogenes/ It is not.

Socrates/ One of the names of her, Athena, it is not difficult to say why it was imposed.

Hermogenes/ Which?

Socrates/ We surely call her Pallas?

Hermogenes/ How not?

Socrates/ Considering then this name to have been formed from dancing in armor, we shall, as it appears to me, think properly; for to lift up oneself or anything else on high, either from the earth, or to shake or be shaken in the hands, we call it to make to dance and to dance.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ The goddess therefore on this account we call Pallas.

Hermogenes/ And properly so. But what say you of her other name?

Socrates/ That of Athena?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ This name, my friend, is of greater weight. For the ancients appear to have considered Athena, as those of the present day do, who are skilled in the interpretation of Homer. For the majority of these, in explaining the poet, say that by Athena he intended mind and intellect. Now he who founded names seems to have understood some such thing as this respecting the goddess; or expressing rather something yet greater, he speaks of her as the intelligence of a god; for that she is a Θεοσνόη, the god-mind, employing after a foreign mode α instead of η, and taking away ι and σ. But perhaps it is not even in this way. But he called her Θεονόη, as she understood divine concerns better than all the rest. Nor is it far off to say that he was willing to call "intelligence in manner," as being this deity, by the name of Ἠθονόη. But either the founder himself, or some persons afterwards, turned the name aside to something more beautiful, as they thought, and called her Ἀθηνάα Athena.

Hermogenes/ But what will you say of Hephaestus?

Socrates/ Are you asking about the noble deity skilled in light?

Hermogenes/ I seem so.

Socrates/ Is he not evident to all as being Φαῖστος luminous, having drawn to himself the η.

Hermogenes/ It nearly appears so; unless as it seems it appears to you in some other way.

Socrates/ But, that it may not appear, ask about Ἄρης Mars.

Hermogenes/ I ask then.

Socrates/ If you please, then, the name of Ἄρης shall be derived from τὸ ἄρρεν the male, and τὸ ἀνδρεῖον the manly. But if, on the other hand, you wish it from his harsh and not-to-be-turned nature, which is called ἄρρατον, it will be

proper for a god warlike everywhere, to be called by this name.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Let us then, by the gods, free ourselves from the gods; for I fear to discourse about them. But about some others, if you wish it, propose as questions, that you may see of what kind are the horses of Euthyphro.

Hermogenes/ I will do what you say, after asking you one thing yet about Ἑρμῆς Hermes, since Cratylus says that I am not Hermogenes. Let us endeavor then to look into the name Hermes, that we may know whether he says anything to the purpose.

Socrates/ This name of Hermes does indeed seem to pertain somewhat to discourse, and to imply that with reference to his being an interpreter and a messenger, and to his stealing and deceiving in discourses and market-dealing, the whole of his business is connected with the power of speech. As then we said before, τὸ εἴειν is the use of speech, and as Homer frequently says, ἐμήσατο, he planned, now this is to plan. From both of these then this god, planning to speak, and the speech—but εἴρειν means to speak—just as if the name-founder gives his command to us, He, O men, who has planned the speaking, would be justly called Εἰρέμης. But we of the present times, thinking to give elegance to the name, denominate him Ἑρμῆς, Hermes. And Iris too it seems is so called, from εἴρειν, to speak, because she is a messenger.

Hermogenes/ By Zeus, well does Cratylus seem to me to have said that I am Hermogenes. I am not indeed a ready planner of a discourse.

Socrates/ It is likewise probable, my friend, that Pan is the two-formed son of Hermes.

Hermogenes/ How so?

Socrates/ You know that speech signifies the all, and circulates and causes to roll perpetually; and that it is two-fold, true and false.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is not then the truth of it smooth and divine, and dwelling on high amongst the gods; but that which is false dwells below amongst the mass of mankind, and is rough and goat-like? For from hence are the greatest number of fables, and the falsehoods connected with the goat-like life.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Rightly then would he, who indicates everything, and ever rolls, be Πὰν αἰπόλος, the biform son of Hermes; who in his upper parts is smooth, but in his lower parts rough and goat-formed: and Pan is either speech, or the brother of speech, since he is the son of Hermes. But it is by no means wonderful that brother should be similar to brother. However, as I just now said, O blessed man! let us free ourselves from the gods.

Hermogenes/ From gods of this kind, if you please, Socrates. But what hinders you from discussing such divinities as Ἥλιος sun, and Σελήνη moon, and Ἄστρα stars, and Γῆ earth, and Αἰθὴρ æther, and Ἀὴρ air, and Πῦρ fire, and Ὕδωρ water, and Ὧραι seasons, and Ἐνιαυτὸς year?

Socrates/ You enjoin me many things; still if it will gratify you, I am willing to speak.

Hermogenes/ You will indeed gratify me.

Socrates/ What then do you wish the first? Or shall we discuss as you have enumerated, first the sun?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ It seems then that this would become more manifest, if one should use the Doric name: for the Dorians

call the sun Ἅλιος. He will therefore be Ἅλιος, from ἁλίζειν collecting men into one spot when he rises; and he would be so, from always εἰλεῖν revolving while going round the earth. And he would seem to be so, because in going he causes to be various the productions of the earth. Now the verbs ποικίλλειν and αἰολεῖν have the same meaning.

Hermogenes/ But what will you say of Σελήνη moon?

Socrates/ This name seems to press upon Anaxagoras.

Hermogenes/ Why?

Socrates/ It seems to indicate something of a more ancient date than what he lately stated, that the moon obtains her light from the sun.

Hermogenes/ But how?

Socrates/ Σέλας is the same with φῶς light.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now this light about the moon is perpetually νέον new, and ἔνον old, if the Anaxagoreans say true; for, perpetually revolving in a circle, she perpetually renews this light; but the light of the former month becomes old.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And many call her Σελαναιία.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But, because it perpetually possesses new and old splendor, it may be more justly called σελα-ενο-νεο-άει-α, but compressed together it is called Σελαναία.

Hermogenes/ This name, Socrates, is dithyrambic. But what will you say of Μὴν month, and Ἄστρα stars?

Socrates/ Μεὶς month would be properly called μείης from μειοῦσθαι to be diminished; but Ἄστρα stars appear to derive their name from Ἀστραπὴ lightning. Now ἀστραπὴ would be ἀναστρωπὴ, because it ὦπα ἀναστρέφει turns the eyes; but being formed with elegance, it is now called ἀστραπή.

Hermogenes/ But what are Πῦρ fire and Ὕδωρ water?

Socrates/ About Πῦρ fire I am at a loss; and it nearly appears, that either the Muse of Euthyphro has deserted me, or this word is very difficult. Behold then the artifice which I introduce in all such cases where I am at a loss.

Hermogenes/ What is it?

Socrates/ I will tell you. Answer me then. Do you know on what account Πῦρ fire was so called?

Hermogenes/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ Consider then what my suspicions are concerning it. For I think that the Greeks, especially such as dwelt under the Barbarians, received many of their names from the Barbarians.

Hermogenes/ What then?

Socrates/ Should anyone then investigate how reasonably these names were given according to the Greek language, and not according to that from which the name happens to come, you know he would be at a loss.

Hermogenes/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Consider then, whether this name, πῦρ fire, is not of Barbaric origin. For it is by no means easy to adapt this to the Greek language. But the Phrygians are thus clearly calling fire, with a trifling deviation, and the word ὕδωσ water, and κύνεϛ dogs, and many other names.

Hermogenes/ They are so.

Socrates/ It is not proper then to use violence with these words; since anyone can say about them. On this account therefore I reject the words πῦρ and ὕδωρ. But Ἀὴρ air, Hermogenes, is so called because αἴρει it raises things from the earth; or because ἀεὶ ῥεῖ it always flows; or because, from its flowing, a breathing is produced: for the poets call winds ἀῆται breathings. Perhaps then it means as if a person

should say πνευματόρρουν a flowing breathing, or ἀητόρρουν a flowing wind, from whence he wishes to call it thus, because it is Ἀήρ. But I consider αἰθὴρ æther in some way as this; because ἀεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέων it always runs and flows about the air, it would be called ἀειθεήρ. But Γῆ earth, more plainly indicates its meaning, if anyone calls it Γαῖα. For γαῖα would be properly called γεννήτειρα producer, as Homer says; for he speaks of γεγάασι as γεγενῆσθαι to have been produced.

Hermogenes/ Be it so.

Socrates/ What is there then for us after this?

Hermogenes/ Ὧραι hours, Socrates, and Ἐνιαυτὸς and Ἔτος.

Socrates/ Now Ὧραι must be pronounced Ὅραι, as of old in the Attic dialect, if you wish to know what is reasonable. For they are ὅραι, through their determining winters and summers and winds, and the fruits of the earth; and as ὁρίζουσαι determining, they would be justly called ὅραι. But Ἐνιαυτὸς and Ἔτος year, nearly appear to be one thing, each in turn. For that which brings to light the natural productions of the earth, and does, itself by itself, explore them, is Ἐνιαυτὸς the year. And as stated before, regarding the name of Zeus, divided into two, some called the deity Zeus and some Dis, so here with respect to the year, it is called by some Ἐνιαυτὸς, because it explores ἐν ἑαυτῷ in itself; but Ἔτος, because ἑτάζει it explores. And the whole reasoning is for that, which explores in itself, to be called, being one, twofold; so that two names are produced, Ἐνιαυτὸς and Ἔτος, from one reason.

Hermogenes/ But then, Socrates, you have made a great progress.

Socrates/ I seem, indeed, to have driven a long way on the road to wisdom.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Perhaps you will speak something more.

Hermogenes/ But after this species of inquiry, I would most gladly contemplate those beautiful names relating to virtue, with what propriety φρόνησις prudence, σύνεσις consciousness, δικαιοσύνη justice, and all the rest of this kind are given.

Socrates/ You raise up, my friend, no mean a genus of names. But however, since I have put on the lion's skin, I must not act the coward; but, as it seems, look into prudence, and intelligence, and thought, and knowledge, and all the other beautiful names of which you speak.

Hermogenes/ We ought by no means to stand apart previously.

Socrates/ And indeed, by the dog, I seem to myself not to act the part of a prophet badly, about what I understand at present, that those ancient men, who laid down names, did, like the majority of the wise men of the present period, through their frequently turning themselves round, while in search of the spot where existences are, become dizzy beyond all bounds; and that subsequently all things appear to them to turn round and to be borne along on every side. They do not however blame what they suffer within themselves as the cause of this opinion, but that things are of themselves so formed by nature, that nothing is abiding and firm, but that all things flow and are carried along, and are full of all kinds of generation and destruction. I speak this, as having thought on the names just now mentioned.

Hermogenes/ How is this, Socrates?

Socrates/ Perhaps you have not perceived that those lately mentioned were imposed upon things altogether borne along, flowing, and in a state of generation.

Hermogenes/ I do not altogether consider it.

Socrates/ Now, in the first place, what we mentioned first is entirely something of this kind.

Hermogenes/ Which is that?

Socrates/ Φρόνησις prudence. For it is the perception of a movement and flowing. One may also understand by it the utility of movement. But at least it is connected with the idea of being carried along. But if you will, Γνῶμη thought indicates altogether the looking-into and agitating mentally a begetting; for the word νωμᾷν to agitate is the same as the word σκοπεῖν to look into. Or if you will, νόμσις intelligence is τοῦ νέου ἕσις the desire of a novelty; since for existing things to be new, it indicates that they are perpetually in the course of being produced. Hence he, who founded the word νεόεσιν, pointed out that the soul was desirous of this novelty: for it was not called νόησις anciently, but instead of η, it was necessary to pronounce ε twice, —νεόεσιν, But Σωφροσύνη temperance is the σωτηρία safety of that φρόνησις prudence which we have just now considered. Ἐπιστήμη science moreover points out that the soul, which is worthy of notice, follows things hurried along, and is neither left behind them, nor goes before them. Hence by throwing out ε, it ought to be called πιστήμη. But Σύνεσις understanding, on the other hand, would thus appear to be, as it were, a syllogism. For when it says συνίεναι to understand, it follows that the same thing in every respect is meant as by the word ἐπίστασθαι to know: for συνιέναι means that the soul marches along with things. Σοφία wisdom, however, means to touch upon movement. This, however, is rather obscure and foreign. But we should recollect, from out of the poets, that they often say, when they happen to say of a person from among those, who begin to go forward quickly, that ἐσύθη he rushed forth they say: and a man of Lacedæmon, one of the famous, had the name of Σοῦς rusher: for by this appellation the Lacedæmonians denominate a rapid rush. Of

this hurried motion then Σοφία wisdom signifies ἐπαφὴν the contact, as if things were continually carried along. But the word Ἀγαθὸν good is wont to be imposed as the name for that portion of all nature which is ἀγαστὸν to be admired: for since all existences march on, there is in some swiftness, but in others slowness prevails. Everything therefore is not swift, but there is a part of it ἀγαστὸν to be admired. To this portion, ἀγαστὸν to be admired, is given the appellation ἀγαθὸν good. But of Δικαιοσύνη justice it is easy to conjecture that its name was imposed on the perception of what is just. But what is just in itself, it is difficult to say: for it appears to be agreed upon by the multitude up to a certain point; but beyond it to be disputed. For indeed, such as think that the universe is on a march, conceive the greatest part of it to be of such a nature, that it does nothing but yield; and that, on this account, there is something pervading the universe by which all generated natures are produced; and that this pervading thing is most swift and most attenuated: for otherwise it would be unable to pass through everything while going on, unless it were the most attenuated, so as to hold nothing; and the most swift, so as to make use of the other things as if in a state of rest. Because therefore it governs all other things διαϊὸν by going through, it is properly called δίκαιον, receiving the value of the letter κ for the sake of an elegant pronunciation. And thus far, as we have just now stated, the multitude agree with us, that this is the meaning of the word δίκαιον just. But I, Hermogenes, being eager on this point, have inquired about all these things, and heard in the Ἀπόρρητα Mysteries to be unrevealed, that this is the just and the cause; for that, through which a thing is generated, is the cause; and someone has said privately, that it was on this account it was said so correctly. But when, after hearing this, I nevertheless quietly ask them, What, O best of men, is the

just, if this is said so correctly? I seem to inquire beyond what is becoming, and to leap, as it is said, over the lines dug out; for they say I have sufficiently inquired and heard, and they endeavor, through the wish to satisfy me, to say, one one thing, and another another, and they no longer chime-in together. For one says that the Sun is τὸ δίκαιον the just; for that by it alone, διαϊόντα pervading and καίοντα burning, it becomes the guardian of all things. But when, delighted, as having heard something beautiful, I mention this to another person, the hearer laughs at me, and asks me if I think there is nothing just amongst men, when the sun has set? Upon my begging then to know what the other means, he says it is fire itself. But this is by no means easy to understand. But another person says, it is not fire itself, but the heat itself which exists in fire. Another again says, that he laughs at all these opinions; but that the just was that intellect of which Anaxagoras speaks; for he said that this possesses a power from itself, and is not mixed up with anything, but that it puts into order all things while pervading all things. But here, my friend, I am in a much greater difficulty than before I attempted to learn what justice is. But at least this name, for the sake of which we have been making the inquiry, appears to have been given to it justice for these reasons.

Hermogenes/ You appear to me, Socrates, to have heard these notions from someone, and not to improvise them yourself.

Socrates/ But what of the rest?

Hermogenes/ Not entirely so.

Socrates/ Hear then; for perhaps I may deceive you in what remains, as if I had not heard what I am saying. What then remains for us after justice? I think we have not yet discussed Ἀνδρεία fortitude; for injustice is evidently a real

hindrance to the pervading power; but Ἀνδρεία fortitude signifies that it is so named from fortitude in fight. Now a fight, if things flow in reality, is nothing else than a contrary flowing. If then one takes away the δ from the name ἀνδρεία, the name Ἀνρεία, which remains, points out the thing itself. Hence it is evident that not the flowing, which is contrary to every flowing, is Ἀνδρεία fortitude, but only that which flows contrary to what is just; for otherwise fortitude would not be praised. In some similar manner τὸ ἄρρεν the male and ὁ ἀνὴρ man derive their origin from ἄνω ῥοή an upward flowing. But Γυνὴ woman appears to me to mean γονὴ begetting; and τὸ θῆλυ the female seems to be so called from θηλὴ the pap; but θηλὴ, Hermogenes, from causing, as it were, things irrigated to germinate.

Hermogenes/ It appears so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But the word θάλλειν to germinate appears to me to represent the increase of younglings, because it takes place swiftly and suddenly. Such then has he imitated by the name, having fitted it together from θεῖν to run and ἅλλεσθαι to leap. But do you not perceive that I am carried, as it were, out of the course, since I have come upon a smooth path? But many words yet remain of those that seem worthy of attention.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ One of these is Τέχνη art, which we must look into and see what it means.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Does not then this signify ἕξιν νοῦ a habit of thought, by taking away τ, and inserting ο between and χ, and between ν and η?

Hermogenes/ And this in a very poor manner, Socrates.

Socrates/ But do you not know, blessed man, that the names first formed, are now overlaid by those desirous of

travestying them in a stilted style; and who, for the sake of an elegant pronunciation, add and take away letters, and twist them in every way, partly through ornament, and partly through time? For in the word Κάτοπτρον mirror, does it not appear to you that the ρ has been absurdly introduced? But such alterations some, I think, make, who care nothing for truth, but molding prettily the mouth; so that, after adding much to the first names, they at length rendered it impossible for a single man to understand what the name means; as in the case of the Sphynx, which they call Σφίγξ instead of Φίγξ, and so in many others.

Hermogenes/ Such is indeed the case, Socrates.

Socrates/ Indeed, should anyone permit one to add to names, and take away from them whatever he wishes, there would be a very easy road; and one might adapt every name to everything.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ The truth indeed. But I think that you, who are a wise president, ought to keep a guard over what is moderate and the probable.

Hermogenes/ I wish I could.

Socrates/ And I too, Hermogenes, wish it with you. But do not, O divine man, discuss too accurately, "lest you perfectly exhaust my force:" for I shall ascend to the summit of what I have said, when, after τέχνην art, I have considered μηχανὴν artifice. For Μηχανὴ artifice seems to me to mean τὸ ἄνειν to complete a thing for the most part. For μῆκος signifies "length." From both of these, μῆκος length and ἄνειν to complete, is formed the word μηχανή. But, as I just now said, it is proper to ascend to the summit of our discourse. For we must inquire what the names of Ἀρετὴ virtue and Κακία vice mean. Now one of these I do not as yet see clearly; but the other appears to me to be manifest; for it chimes-in

with all that has been said before. For in consequence of all things moving on, whatever is κακῶς ἰὸν moving on badly will be κακία bad-moving; but this, when it subsists in the soul, through its badly moving on to her concerns, most eminently possesses the appellation of the whole of depravity. But that to move on badly, whatever it is, appears to me to show itself in Δειλία timidity, which we have not yet discussed, but have passed it over; although it is proper to consider it, after fortitude. And we likewise seem to have passed over many other names. Now δειλία timidity means, that the bond of the soul is strong: for the word λίαν vehemently is applied to strength: and hence the vehement and greatest bond of the soul will be timidity, just as ἀπορία want is an evil, and everything, as it seems, which is an impediment to going and marching on. To go on badly, then, seems to signify the marching on in a restrained and shackled manner; which when the soul suffers, it becomes full of κακίας evil. But if to such things the name of vice is applicable, the contrary of this would be ἀρετὴ virtue, signifying, in the first place, ease in marching; and, in the next place, that τὴν ῥοὴν the flowing of a good soul is ever let loose; so that what always flows unrestrained and unimpeded, very properly, as it seems, receives this appellation. It is right then to call it ἀειρείτη. Perhaps also someone may call it αἱρετὴ, as this is a habit the most eligible. But the word is molded together and called ἀρετή. Perhaps, too, you will say again, that I feign; but I assert, that if the name of vice is correct, as I have said above, this name of virtue is correct likewise.

Hermogenes/ But what does Κακὸν evil mean, through which word you have explained many things previously?

Socrates/ It appears to me, by Zeus, something strange, and difficult to conjecture. I bring therefore to this too that artifice.

Hermogenes/ What is that?

Socrates/ To assert that this name too is something barbaric.

Hermogenes/ And you seem to be like a person speaking correctly. But, if it seems good, we will omit these; and endeavor to see in what way the words Καλὸν beautiful and Αἰσχρὸν base are well said.

Socrates/ Αἰσχρὸν base, then, seems to me just now to be very plain as to what it means. For it corresponds with the preceding remarks. For he who founded names, appears to me to have throughout found fault with that, which hinders and restrains things from their flowing; and that he now assigned the name ἀεισχοῤῥουν to that which is ἀεὶ ἴσχον ῥοῦν ever restraining the flowing. But at present they call it, by molding the words together, αἰσχρόν.

Hermogenes/ But what is Καλὸν beautiful?

Socrates/ This is more difficult to understand; although he says that it is a derived only by the harmony and length of the ου.

Hermogenes/ But how?

Socrates/ It appears that this name is some appellation for intellect.

Hermogenes/ How say you?

Socrates/ What think you is the cause of each existing thing being called by some name? Is it not that which gives names?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will not then this cause be the intellect either of gods, or men, or of both?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ That then which calls things, and the beautiful, are the same, this intellect.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Whatever things then mind and intellect effect, these are to be praised; but what they do not, are to be blamed?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Now the medicinal business produces medical results; and the carpenter's business carpentry results: or how say you?

Hermogenes/ I say thus.

Socrates/ And the beautiful produces things beautiful?

Hermogenes/ It must needs do so.

Socrates/ But this, as we have said, is intellect.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Τὸ καλὸν the beautiful then will be properly the appellation of that φρόνησις prudence which produces such things as we call beautiful, and which we embrace.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ What then remains of such like names?

Hermogenes/ Those that are conversant with the ἀγαθὸν good, and the καλὸν beautiful, such as Συμφέροντα things conducive, and Λυσιτελοῦντα profitable, and Ωφέλιμα advantageous, and Κερδαλέα gainful, and their contraries.

Socrates/ You may then by reflecting find τὸ συμφέρον the conducive from the previous remarks; for it appears to be a kind of a brother to science. For it exhibits nothing but the motion of the soul in conjunction with things; and that what results from some such a thing should be called συμφέροντα and σύμφορα conducive, from συμπεριφέρεσθαι to be carried round in conjunction, is reasonable.

Hermogenes/ It is reasonable.

Socrates/ But κερδαλέον gainful is from κέρδος gain; and to him, who puts a ν instead of a δ in this name, it points out what it means: for it thus gives, after another manner,

the name for “good;” for as it is mingled with and pervades all things, he who assigned it this name expressed its power, and thus, by placing δ instead of ν, he pronounced it κέρδος.

Hermogenes/ But what is λυσιτελοῦν profitable?

Socrates/ It seems, Hermogenes, not as hucksters use it, should anyone settle an expenditure, does it seem good to me to understand τὸ λυσιτελοῦν the profitable; but being the swiftest thing in existence, it does not suffer things to stand still, nor the rushing-on to obtain an end of being borne along, and to stand still and to cease; but always frees it, should any end attempt to be produced, and renders it unceasing and immortal. In this way it seems to me that λυσιτελοῦν the profitable obtained the reputation of ἀγαθὸν the good; for τὸ τῆς φορᾶς λύον τὸ τέλος that which dissolves the end of rushing was called λυσιτελοῦν. But Ὠφέλιμον useful is a foreign name which Homer himself often uses, τῷ ὀφέλλειν. But this is the appellation of increasing and making.

Hermogenes/ But how stand the contraries of these?

Socrates/ Such of these as express a negation, there is no need, it appears to me, to go through.

Hermogenes/ But what are they?

Socrates/ The non-conducive, and useless, and unprofitable, and the non-lucrative.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ But Βλαβερὸν hurtful, and Ζημιῶδες noxious.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now τὸ Βλαβερὸν the hurtful, he says, is that which is βλαπτὸν τὸν ῥοῦν hurting the flowing. But βλάπτον means τὸ βουλόμενον ἅπτειν that which wishes to bind; and ἅπτειν to bind, is the same as δεῖν: but this he blames everywhere. He, therefore, who wishes ἅπτειν ῥοῦν to bind a

flowing, will be most properly called βουλαπτεροῦν; but it appears to me, that, being spoken elegantly, it becomes βλαβερόν.

Hermogenes/ A variety of names come out, Socrates, to your view; and you just now appeared to me to have played a prelude with your mouth, as it were, of the melody belonging to Athena, while you pronounced this name βουλάπτεροῦν.

Socrates/ I am not, Hermogenes, the cause of this, but those who founded the name.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth; but what can the word ζημιῶδες noxious be?

Socrates/ What can ζημιῶδες noxious be? Behold, Hermogenes, how I shall speak the truth by saying, that through adding and taking away letters, persons vary so very much the meanings of names, that by turning then aside sometimes only a little they cause words to have the very contrary meaning. As in τὸ δέον the needful. For I understood, and called to mind just now, in consequence of what I am about to say to you, that this new speech of ours, itself the beautiful, has turned round τὸ δέον and ζημιῶδες, so as to indicate the contrary, and causing to disappear what they mean: but the ancient speech points out what both these words mean.

Hermogenes/ How say you?

Socrates/ I will tell you. Our ancestors you know very frequently used the ι and δ, and not the least the women, who particularly preserved the ancient tongue. But now, instead of the ι, they perversely use either ε or η, and ζ instead of δ, as being more stately.

Hermogenes/ But how?

Socrates/ Just as, for instance, the most ancient men called ἡμέρα day ἰμέρα, and some of them ἐμέρα; but those of the present times ἡμέρα.

Hermogenes/ This is so.

Socrates/ You know then that this ancient name alone points out what was in the mind of the founder; for, because light is wont to emerge from darkness upon men pleased with and desiring its beams, on this account they called day ἰμέρα.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But as it is now spoken in high-flown language, you can by no means understand what ἡμέρα means; although some think that day is called on this account ἡμέρα, because it renders things ἥμερα, gentle.

Hermogenes/ So it appears to me.

Socrates/ And you likewise know that the ancients called Ζυγὸν a yoke Δυογὸν.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Now ζυγὸν indicates nothing. But that which exists for the two things together, for the sake of a binding, is justly called δυογόν. But it is now ζυγόν. And there are many others so circumstanced.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ In this way then at first the word δέον binding, when it is thus spoken, signifies the contrary to all the names connected with ἀγαθὸν good. For this name being a species of the good, appears to be a binding of, and hindrance to, a rushing-on, as being the brother of βλαβερὸν noxious.

Hermogenes/ It appears, Socrates, to be very much so.

Socrates/ But not if you use the ancient name; which it is likely was founded with much more propriety than the

present one. And it will agree with those former good names, if you substitute as of old ι for ε; for διὸν and not δέον, signifies that good, which the founder of names praises. And thus the founder of names will not contradict himself; but the names δέον, ὠφέλιμον, λυσιτελοῦν, κερδαλέον, ἀγαθὸν, συμφέρον, εὔπορον, easily-going, all appear the same; signifying by different names that what adorns and pervades everywhere is praised, but that what detains and binds, is blamed. And indeed, in the name ζημιῶδες, if, according to the ancient speech, you substitute δ for ζ, it will appear to you that this name was applied to δοῦντι τὸ ἰὸν binding that which is going, and was called δημιῶδες.

Hermogenes/ But, Socrates, what is Ἡδονὴ pleasure, and Λύπη pain, and Ἐπιθυμία desire, and such like names.

Socrates/ They do not appear to me to be very difficult, Hermogenes. For ἡδονὴ pleasure seems to have obtained this appellation as an action tending towards ὄνησις enjoyment; but the δ was added, that it might be called ἡδονὴ instead of ἡονή. But λύπη pain seems to be so named from the διάλυσις dissolution of the body, which the body undergoes in that suffering: and Ἀνία grief, as impeding τὸ ἰέναι going: but Ἀλγηδὼν torture appears to me to be some foreign word, and to be so called from ἀλγεινὸς torturing. But Ὀδύνη anxiety appears to be called from the ἔνδυσις ingress of pain. But Ἀχθηδὼν heaviness of heart is clear even to all that it is a name assimilated to the heaviness of rushing: for ἄχθος is "a burden," and ἰὸν "a thing moving". But Χαρὰ joy seems to be called from the διάχυσις diffusion and Εὐπορία easy going of the flowing of the soul; but Τέρψις delight was derived from τερπνὸν pleasant; but τερπνὸν was so called from being assimilated to πνοὴ the breath, creeping through the soul; it would be therefore justly called ἕρπ-νουν mind-creeping, but in time it was deflected into τερπνόν. But Εὐφροσύνη hilarity wants nothing to explain "the why" of its denomination; for

it is obvious to all, that it received its name, εὐφεροσύνη, in strict justice from the soul being εὖ well συμφέρεσθαι borne along with all things; nevertheless we call it εὐφροσύνη. Nor is Ἐπιθυμία desire difficult: for it is plain that this name was applied to a power going on to θυμὸς anger. But θυμὸς anger would have its appellation from θύσεως raging and ζέσεως boiling. And again, Ἵμερος desire was so called from ῥοῦς a flowing vehemently drawing the soul. For because ἱέμενος ῥεῖ it flows urged on, and is desirous of things, and thus strongly draws the soul through the sending-forth of its flowing, it is, from the whole of this power, called ἵμερος. Moreover Πόθος regret is so called signifying that there is something of desire not present, and of a stream, but from that which is elsewhere, and absent. From whence it is called πόθος regret, a feeling which is then called ἵμερος desire, when that is present, for which there is a wish. But Ἔρως: love, because it flows inwardly from without, and because this flowing is not the property of him who possesses it, but is introduced through the eyes, was on this account called of old ἔσρος, from ἐσρεῖν to flow towards; but at present it is called ἔρως, through the change of ω into ο. But what say you shall we still consider?

Hermogenes/ What does Δόξα opinion, and such-like names, seem to you to signify.

Socrates/ Δόξα opinion was denominated either from δίωξις pursuit, in which the soul proceeds, while pursuing its knowledge as to how things exist; or else from τόξου βολῆ the darting of an arrow; and to this it seems more like. Hence Οἴησις opinion chimes in with this; for it seems to be like ἱέσις a sending-forth of the soul to all things, when it is showing to those in doubt what each is in reality. For just as Βουλὴ counsel is to βολὴ shooting, so βούλεσθαι to wish, which signifies τὸ ἐφίεσθαι to desire, is to βουλεύεσθαι to consult. For all these in following δόξα opinion, appear to be

certain resemblances of βολὴ shooting; just again as, on the contrary, Ἀβουλια a want of counsel, appears to be the mishap of a person neither shooting, nor obtaining that at which he shot, and what he wished, and about what he deliberated, and what he desired.

Hermogenes/ You seem to me, Socrates, to have just now introduced these names rather thickly and rapidly.

Socrates/ For I now wish an end. But I wish then still to go through Ἀνάγκην necessity, which comes in order after those, and also Ἑκούσιον voluntary.

Socrates/ Now τὸ ἑκούσιον voluntary signifies τὸ εἶκον the yielding, and not the beating-against; but, as I say, εἶκον τῷ ἰόντι yielding to what is going on would be shown by this name, which exists according to βούλησις the will. But τὸ ἀναγκαῖον the necessary, and ἀντίτυπον the beating-against, the being contrary to the will, would be connected with ἁμαρτία error, and ἀμαθία ignorance. But they are likened to a going along κατὰ ἄγκη gorges; because being difficult to pass, and rugged and thick with bushes, they impede a going-on. And hence, perhaps, ἀνάγκη necessity was so called from its resemblance to a journey through a gorge. But as long as our strength remains, let us not give up the journey. Do not you then give up, but interrogate me.

Hermogenes/ I ask then about things the greatest and most beautiful, Ἀλήθεια truth, and Ψεῦδος falsehood, and τὸ Ὄν entity; and that very thing, about which is the subject of our present discourse, Ὄνομα name, why was it so called?

Socrates/ You say that μαίεσθαι means something.

Hermogenes/ I say it means ζητεῖν to inquire.

Socrates/ It looks like a name molded together from a discourse, which says that this name is an entity which an inquiry hits. But you would know it rather in the word which we pronounce ὀνομαστὸν to be named; for there it clearly

states that that is ὂν entity of which there is μάσμα an inquiry. But Ἀλήθεια truth, this seems to have been molded together like the rest; for the divine rushing-on of entity appears to have been addressed by this name ἀλήθεια, as being θεία ἄλη a divine wandering. But Ψεῦδος falsehood is contrary to a rushing-on. For here again returns that which is abused as being detained and is compelled to be at rest; and the name is assimilated to those, who sleep; but the ψ being added conceals the meaning of the name. But Ὄν entity and Οὐσία existence agree with ἀλήθεια truth, by receiving the addition of an ι; for then they signify ἰὸν going, and ἰουσία the act of going. And on the other hand οὐκ ὂν non-being, as some also call it, οὐκ ἰὸν not-going.

Hermogenes/ You appear to me, Socrates, to have rattled through these questions in a very manly manner. But should anyone ask you, what propriety of appellation have the words Ἰὸν going, Ῥέον flowing, and Δοῦν binding—

Socrates/ Should I be able to answer him? you mean. Is it not so?

Hermogenes/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ One thing I have just now got somehow, so that by answering I shall appear to say something to the purpose.

Hermogenes/ What is it?

Socrates/ To say that what we know not is of Barbarian origin: for perhaps this would be really the case with some; and the first names would be inscrutable on account of their antiquity. For through the names being twisted in every way, it would be not at all wonderful if the ancient speech, as compared with the present, differed in nothing from a Barbarian one.

Hermogenes/ You speak nothing from the purpose.

Socrates/ Nay, I speak what is reasonable. But yet the contest does not appear to me to admit of excuses; but we

must be ready to reflect upon these matters; and let us consider, that, should anyone always inquire into the verbs, through which a noun is spoken, and again those nouns through which verbs are enunciated, and should do this without ceasing, must not he, who answers such a one, fail at length in his replies?

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ When therefore will he, who fails to answer, justly fail? Will it not be when he arrives at those names, which are, as it were, the elements both of other discourses and names? For these, if they are so circumstanced, can no longer justly appear to be composed from other names. Just as we said above, that τὸ ἀγαθὸν was composed from ἀγαστὸς to be admired and ϑοὸς swift. But ϑοὸς, we may perhaps say, is composed from other words, and these last again from others: but if we ever lay hold of that, which is no longer composed from other names, we may justly say, that we have at length arrived at an element; and that we ought no longer to refer this to other names.

Hermogenes/ You seem to me to speak correctly.

Socrates/ Are not then the names, about which you are asking, elements? And must we not consider in some other manner what is their propriety?

Hermogenes/ It is likely.

Socrates/ It is likely indeed, Hermogenes. All the former names, therefore, must come back to these. And if this be the case, as it appears to me it is, consider again with me, lest I act like a silly person, while stating what the propriety of the first names ought to be.

Hermogenes/ Only do but speak, and I will, to the utmost of my power, consider the matter with you.

Socrates/ I think then you will agree with me in this, that there is one propriety in every name, both first and last; and that none of them differ, so far as they are names.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But the propriety of the names we have just now discussed, was such as to show of what kind is each of the things existing.

Hermogenes/ How should it be not so?

Socrates/ This property then the prior names ought to possess no less than the posterior, if they are to be names.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But the posterior names, as it appears, are able to effect this through the prior.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Be it so then. But after what manner will the first names, which no others precede, make, as much as they possibly can, the things existing clear to us, if they are about to be names? But answer me this. If we had neither voice nor tongue, and yet wished to point out things to one another, should we not, as the dumb do at present, endeavor to indicate them by the hands, head, and the rest of the body?

Hermogenes/ How could we otherwise, Socrates?

Socrates/ I think then that if we wished to indicate that which is going upwards and is light, we should raise our hands towards heaven and imitate the nature of the thing itself; but if to indicate things going downwards and heavy, we should point to the earth. And if we were desirous of indicating a horse running, or any other animal, you know that we should make our bodies and gestures as like as possible to those things.

Hermogenes/ It appears to me that the facts are necessarily as you say.

Socrates/ For in this manner, I think, the indication of anything is produced by the body imitating, as it seems, that which anyone wishes to point out.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But since we wish to indicate a thing by our voice, and tongue, and mouth, will not an indication of each thing then take place through these, when an imitation of anything whatever is produced through them?

Hermogenes/ It appears to me necessarily so.

Socrates/ A name then is, as it seems, an imitation by the voice of that, which he who imitates, imitates and nominates by the voice what he imitates.

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ But, by Zeus, my friend, I do not think that I have yet spoken in a becoming manner.

Hermogenes/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because we should be compelled to confess, that they who imitate sheep and cocks, and other animals, give names to the things which they imitate.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ But do you think this is correct?

Hermogenes/ I do not. But what imitation, Socrates, will the name be?

Socrates/ In the first place, as it appears to me, not if, as we imitate things with music, we so imitate, although we then imitate with the voice: and in the next place, if we imitate what music imitates, we do not appear to me to make use of names. But I assert something of this kind. There is a certain voice, figure to each thing, and a color to many.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ It appears then that although anyone should imitate in this way, the name-giving art would not be conversant with these imitations; for these are partly musical and partly painting. Is it not so?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what is this? Seems there not to you an existence to everything, as well as color, and the other things we just now mentioned? In the first place, is there not an existence to color itself, and voice, and to all the rest, which are deemed deserving of the appellation of being?

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ But what then, if anyone is able to imitate this very thing, the existence of each thing, by letters and syllables, would he not indicate what each thing is?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And what would you call him who is able to do this, as you called, of the former characters, one conversant with music, and the other with painting; how call you this?

Hermogenes/ This name, Socrates, appears to me what we are for some time seeking. For he would be a name-giver.

Socrates/ If then this is true, as it appears to be, let us consider those names about which you were inquiring; about Ροὴ flowing, and Ιέναι to go, and Σχέσις holding, whether in their letters and syllables a person lays hold of entity, so as to imitate existence or not.

Hermogenes/ By all means.

Socrates/ Come then, let us see whether these alone are a part of the first names, or whether there are many others.

Hermogenes/ I think there are many others.

Socrates/ For it is probable. But what shall be the mode of division from whence the imitator begins to imitate? Is it not, since the imitation happens to be by syllables and

letters, the most proper to distribute first the elements? just as those who put their hands to rhythms, distribute first the powers of the elements, and afterwards of the syllables, and thus at length come to consider the rhythms themselves, but previously not?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Ought we not then to divide thus the vowels, and afterwards the rest according to species, both consonants and mutes? —for so say those who are skilled in these matters—and again, such as are not indeed vowels yet are not mutes? and of the vowels themselves, such as have a different species from each other? and after we have properly distributed all these existences it is again requisite to impose names, and to consider, if there are certain things into which, as into elements, these may be referred; and from which it is possible to see both them, and whether there are species in them in the same manner as in the elements; and having well and thoroughly looked into all these points, it behooves us to know how to bring in each according to its likeness; whether it is necessary to bring in one to one, or to mix many with one; just as painters do, when they wish to produce a resemblance, sometimes introduce only the oyster a scarlet color, and sometimes any other pigment whatever; and sometimes again they mingle many colors together, as when they prepare the likeness of a man, or anything else of this kind; according as, I think, each picture seems to require each color. In the same manner we will bring the elements of words to things, and one to one, wherever it seems to be necessary, and many together, making what persons call syllables; and again, combining those syllables together, from which nouns and verbs are composed; and again, from these nouns and verbs we will compose something great and beautiful and entire, and like the animal there described by the painter's art, discourse by the

name-giving, or rhetorical, or whatever art it may be. Or rather, we will not do it. But I have in speaking been carried out of the course, for the ancients have put together the words in the way as they lie together. But we must, if we know how to consider them artistically, to distinguish them thus, and to see whether the first and last names were laid down in a proper manner or not; for to connect them otherwise take care lest it be wrong, my dear Hermogenes, and not in the road to reason.

Hermogenes/ Perhaps so, by Zeus, Socrates.

Socrates/ What then, can you trust yourself as being able to divide them in this manner? for I cannot.

Hermogenes/ I want indeed much of doing this.

Socrates/ Let us leave it then; or are you willing we should undertake it as we best can, although we are able to look but very little into them; by stating, as we said before, in the case of the gods, that, knowing nothing of the truth, we merely conjecture the dogmas of men concerning them; so now, on the other hand, we should proceed in our own case by declaring that, if these have been distributed in the best way either by us or by any other, they ought to have been so divided; but now it will be requisite for us to be busy about them as it said, as best we may. Or how say you?

Hermogenes/ It seems so to me.

Socrates/ I think, Hermogenes, it will appear ridiculous for things to become manifest through being imitated by letters and syllables. And yet it must be so. For we have not anything better than this, to which we can refer, touching the truth of the first names; unless, indeed, as the writers of tragedies, when they are in any difficulty, fly to their machinery and introduce the gods, so we shall be released by asserting that the gods founded the first names, and that on this account they exist correctly. Is not this the best of

reasons? or the other, that we have got them from some Barbarians? —for the Barbarians are more ancient than us. —Or that, through their antiquity it is impossible to perceive their meaning, as is the case with the Barbaric names? But all these would be the not very clever evasions on the part of him who is not willing to give a reason for the right imposition of the first names; although he who does not know the propriety of the first names, is surely unable to know that of the subsequent, which must necessarily be made manifest from the former, of which he knows nothing. But it is evident, that he who professes to be skilled in subsequent names ought to be able to explain the first, in the best and clearest manner, or to be well convinced that, as regards the subsequent, he is a mere trifler. Or does it appear otherwise to you?

Hermogenes/ Not otherwise, Socrates, in any respect whatever.

Socrates/ What I formerly fancied about the first names, appear to me now very saucy and ridiculous. If you wish it then, I will communicate them to you; but if you have anything better to obtain from any quarter, communicate it to me.

Hermogenes/ I will do so; but do you speak now boldly.

Socrates/ In the first place then ρ appears to me to be, as it were, the organ of all motion; although we have not yet stated why Κίνησις has this name. It is evident however that it implies ἴεσις going; for η was not used formerly, but ει. Its origin is from κίειν to go, which is a foreign name, and signifies ἰέναι. If then anyone could find out its ancient name, when transferred to our tongue, it might be very properly called ἴεσις. But now from the foreign name κίειν, and the change of the η, together with the interposition of the ν, it is called κίνησις, but it ought to be called κίεισις or

ἴεσις. But Στάσις standing is the negation of ἰέναι to go; and for the sake of elegance is called στάσις. The element therefore ρ, as I said, appeared to the founder of names to be a beautiful instrument of motion, for the purpose of expressing a similitude to rushing on; and hence he in many places employed it for this purpose. And in the first place, the words Ῥεῖν to flow and Ῥοὴ flowing imitate a rushing on by this letter; and in the next place, in the words Τρόμος trembling and Τραχὺς; rough; also in such verbs as Κρούπτειν, to strike, Θραύειν to break, Ἐρείκειν to pierce, Θρύπτειν to fritter, Κερματίζειν to cut into small pieces, and Ῥυμβεῖν to rumble: in all these he made for the most part a resemblance to ρ to a rushing-on. For he saw that the tongue remains quiet for the least time on this letter, but is moved the most; and hence it appears to me that he employed this letter for those words, but the ι for all things attenuated, which especially go through all things. And hence he imitated, by the words ἰέναι to go and ἴεσθαι to be sent, ι, just as by ϕ, ψ, σ, and ζ, because these letters are inflated, the name-giver imitated all such things as Ψυχρὸν cold, Ζέον boiling, Σείεσθαι to be shaken, and universally Σεισμὸν a shaking. And when the name-founder would imitate anything inflated, he everywhere, for the most part, appears to have introduced such-like letters. But he seems to have thought that the power of compression in δ and τ, and the pushing the tongue against the roof of the mouth, were useful for the imitation of the words Δεσμὸς bond and στάσις standing. But perceiving, on the other hand, that the tongue moves glibly in λ, by means of the resemblance he formed the names Λεῖα smooth, and the very word Ολισθάνειν to slide, Λιπαρὸν oily, Κολλῶδες glue-like, and all other such-like words. But where the power of γ lays hold of the tongue, sliding through λ, he imitated the Γλισχρὸν stickiness in Γλυκὺ sweet and Γλοιῶδες viscous. Perceiving likewise that

the sound of the ν was within, he made the names Ἔνδον the within and Εντὸς within, that he might assimilate the acts to the letters. But he assigned α to Μέγας great and η to Μῆκος length, because these letters are great. But requiring for Γογγύλος round the sign of ο, he mixed up ο for the most part in that name. And thus too the name-giver appears to have forced, as regards both letters and syllables, other circumstances to each of existing things, making both a mark and name; and from these to have composed what still remains, by imitating in this way. Such, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the propriety in names, unless Cratylus here asserts anything else.

Hermogenes/ In truth, Socrates, Cratylus very often gives me much trouble, as I stated at the beginning, by his asserting that there is a propriety in names; but he does not clearly inform me what it is; so that I am unable to know whether he thus obscurely speaks on each occasion willingly or unwillingly. Now then, Cratylus, state before Socrates, whether what Socrates says respecting names is pleasing to you, or whether you have anything better to produce? and if you have, mention it, so that either you may learn from Socrates, or teach us both.

Cratylus/ But what, Hermogenes, does it appear to you to be an easy matter to learn and teach anything so suddenly, and much less that which seems to be amongst the greatest?

Hermogenes/ To me, by Zeus, it does not. But the saying of Hesiod appears to me well said, that, should one a little to a little add, there would be something done of moment. If then you are able to do anything at all, although but trifling, do not be faint-hearted, but benefit Socrates here, for you can, and me.

Socrates/ I would not myself, Cratylus, confidently assert a single point of what I have said above. But I have considered with Hermogenes in the way it seemed good to me; so that, on this account at least, speak boldly, as I am ready to receive it, if you have anything better to say than this. Nor shall I wonder, if you have something to say better; for you seem to me to have considered things of this kind yourself, and to have learnt them from others. Should you then say anything better, write me down as one of your disciples respecting the propriety of names.

Cratylus/ And in truth, Socrates, I have, as you say, made this the subject of my meditations; and perhaps I shall cause you to become one of my disciples. And yet I fear that the very contrary of all this will take place. For somehow it comes into my mind to say to you, what Achilles did to Aias in that part of the poem called Λιταὶ supplications. For he says;

> "Aias, of Telamon the son, and sprung
> From Zeus, and leader of the people, all
> 'To my own heart thou seem'st to have well said."

And you too, Socrates, seem to have acted the prophet in a reasonable manner according to my notions, whether you were inspired by Euthyphron, or whether some other muse has been existing in you in secret.

Socrates/ My good Cratylus, I have for a long time ago been wondering myself at my own wisdom; and still do not believe it. I think it therefore requisite for me to examine again what I am saying. For to be deceived by one's own self is the most terrible of all things; for since the deceiver is never for a moment absent, but always present, how can it not be terrible? It is necessary then, as it seems, to turn ourselves frequently to what has been said before, and to endeavor, according to the saying of the poet, "to look at the same time before and behind." Let us then now take a view

of what has been asserted. We said then, that the propriety of name is that which points out the quality of a thing. Shall we say that this is sufficiently laid down?

Cratylus/ To me, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.

Socrates/ Names then are spoken for the sake of teaching?

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Shall we not therefore say that this is an art, and that there are workmen of it.

Cratylus/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ But who are they?

Cratylus/ Those name-givers which you spoke of at the beginning.

Socrates/ Shall we then say, that this art subsists in men, like other arts also, or not? I mean to say some such thing as this. Painters are surely some worse, some better.

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will not the better exhibit more beautiful pictures of animals as their productions; but the worse, worse? And in like manner, do not builders erect some more beautiful dwellings, others more ugly?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And with respect to name-givers, will not some exhibit their works more beautiful, others more ugly?

Cratylus/ This does not appear to me.

Socrates/ Does it not therefore appear to you, that some name-workers are better and others worse?

Cratylus/ It certainly does not.

Socrates/ And does not one name seem to you to be better laid down than another?

Cratylus/ It does not.

Socrates/ Are all names then correctly laid down?

Cratylus/ As far as they are names.

Socrates/ But what then shall we say to the name of Hermogenes here, which we spoke of before? Shall we say that this name was not rightly given him. unless something of Ἑρμοῦ γενέσεως of the generation of Hermes belongs to him, or that it was indeed given him, but not correctly?

Cratylus/ It seems to me, Socrates, to be not given to him, but only appears to be given; but that this is the name of some other person, whose nature points out the name.

Socrates/ Will not then a person say false, who says that he is Hermogenes? for see, lest on the other hand even this be possible, to call this person Hermogenes, if he is not so.

Cratylus/ How say you?

Socrates/ Does your reasoning mean this, that it is impossible to speak a falsehood? For there are many, my dear Cratylus, who say this now, and have said it of old.

Cratylus/ How is it possible, Socrates, that, when anyone speaks about anything, he should speak about that which is not? Or is not this to speak a falsehood, to speak of things which are not?

Socrates/ This reasoning, my friend, is more clever than suits me or my time of life. But however tell me thus much. Does it appear to you not possible to speak about a falsehood, but possible to pronounce it?

Cratylus/ It appears to me not possible even to pronounce it.

Socrates/ Nor to speak of, nor to address you. As, for instance, if anyone, meeting you, should, through his feeling as an host, take you by the hand, and say, All hail, Athenian guest, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion—would he say this, or

pronounce this, or speak of this, or thus address, not you, but Hermogenes here, or no one?

Cratylus/ It appears to me, Socrates, that he would pronounce these words in vain.

Socrates/ With this then let us be contented. But whether would he, who pronounced these words, pronounce that which is true or false? Or would a part be true, and a part false? for this last would be sufficient.

Cratylus/ I should say, that such a one would, moving himself in vain, make a noise, as the person would, who should move a piece of brass and strike it.

Socrates/ Come then, Cratylus, and see since we are reconciled somehow, would you not say that the name is one thing, and that, of which it is the name, is another?

Cratylus/ I would.

Socrates/ And do you not confess, that the name is some imitation of a thing?

Cratylus/ Most of all.

Socrates/ And do you not say, that pictures are in some other manner imitations of certain things?

Cratylus/ I do.

Socrates/ Come then—for perhaps I do not understand sufficiently what you mean, although you are perhaps speaking correctly—is it possible to distribute and assign both these imitations, the pictures and the names, to the things, of which they are imitations, or not?

Cratylus/ It is possible.

Socrates/ But consider this first. Can anyone assign the image of a man to a man, and that of a woman to a woman; and so in other things?

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And is it possible, on the contrary, to assign the image of a man to a woman, and that of a woman to a man?

Cratylus/ This also is possible.

Socrates/ Are then both these assignments correct: or only one of them?

Cratylus/ Only one of them.

Socrates/ That, I think, which assigns to each, what is suited to it and similar?

Cratylus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Lest then you and I, who are friends in fact, should become foes in words, receive from me what I say. For, my friend, I call such a distribution in the case of both imitations pictures of animals and names correct; but in the case of names, in addition to its being correct, true likewise: but I call the other, the giving and introduction, relating to the dissimilar, not correct; and, when it takes place in names, false.

Cratylus/ But consider, Socrates, whether this may not be in the case of paintings, to make an incorrect distribution, but in the case of names, not so; but that in this it is always necessarily correct.

Socrates/ How say you? In what does this differ from that? May not a person, on meeting a man, say to him, "This is your picture," and show him, it may be, his own likeness, or it may be, that of a woman? by showing, I mean, placing it before the sense of seeing.

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what, may he not again, meeting with the same person, say to him, "This is your name?" for a name, as well as a painting, is an imitation. I mean this. May he not say, "This is your name?" And after this, may he not present to the sense of hearing, it may be, an imitation of

himself, by saying that it is a man; and, it may be, an imitation of a female of the human species, by saying that it is a woman? Does it not appear to you, that it is possible for this to occur sometimes?

Cratylus/ I am willing to concede it, Socrates; and let it be so.

Socrates/ You do well, my friend, if such be the state of the case; for there is no need at present to contest much about it. If, then, there is a distribution of this kind on this point in names, we are willing to say that one of these speaks truly, but the other falsely. And if this be the case, and it is possible to distribute nouns not correctly, and not to assign things adapted to each, and to assign what is not adapted, it will be possible to do the very same thing with verbs. And if it is possible to thus put down verbs and nouns, there is a necessity to do so with sentences likewise; for sentences are, I think, but the putting together of those. Or how say you, Cratylus?

Cratylus/ Thus; for you appear to me to speak beautifully.

Socrates/ If then we assimilate the first names to letters, it is possible, as in the pictures of animals, to assign all the fitting colors and figures; and on the other hand, not to assign all, but to leave some and to add others, more and greater. Is it not so?

Cratylus/ It is.

Socrates/ Does not he then, who assigns everything proper, render beautiful both letters and resemblances; but he, who adds or takes away, works out indeed letters and images, but such as are faulty?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what does the person imitating the essence of things through syllables and letters? Will not there be,

according to the same reasoning, a beautiful image, when he assigns everything fitting? Now this is a name. But if he is deficient even in small matters, or sometimes makes an addition, a resemblance will be produced, but not a beautiful one, so that some of the names will be beautifully formed, but others badly?

Cratylus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Perhaps then the one will be a good artificer of names, but the other a bad one.

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now was not the name of this person a name-founder?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Perhaps then, by Zeus, as in other arts, one name-founder is good and another bad, if we agree in what has been said before.

Cratylus/ It is so. But you surely perceive, Socrates, that, when we assign the letters α and β, and each of the elements to names, according to the grammatical art, if we take away, add, or change anything, a name indeed is written by us, yet not properly; or it is not written at all; but there is immediately something else, if it suffers anything of this kind.

Socrates/ See, Cratylus, lest in viewing the matter in this way, we do not view it correctly.

Cratylus/ How then?

Socrates/ Perhaps such things as must necessarily be or not, when composed of a certain number, suffer what you say; as in the case of ten things, or whatever other number you will, if you take away or add aught, it immediately becomes some other number. But see that there is not the same propriety in the case of any certain quality and of every

resemblance, but a contrary one; and that it is not necessary to assign to an image all such as is that which one represents, if it is about to be a resemblance. But consider if I say anything to the purpose. Would there not be two things, such as Cratylus and the resemblance of Cratylus, if anyone of the gods should not only make a likeness of yourself in color and figure, as painters do, but should make all the inward parts such as yours are, and infuse into them the same softness, and warmth, and motion, and soul, and intellect, as is in you; and, in one word, fashion everything as you have, and place such other things close to you, whether would there be one Cratylus, and a resemblance of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses?

Cratylus/ It appears to me, Socrates, that there would be two.

Socrates/ You see then, my friend, that it is necessary to seek after another propriety of a resemblance than what we just now spoke of; and that there is no necessity, that, if anything is taken away or added, for it to be any longer a resemblance. Or do you not perceive how much resemblances want from being the same as their patterns?

Cratylus/ I do.

Socrates/ Those things then, of which the names are names, would suffer a ridiculous fate through their names, if they were in every respect assimilated to them; for all things would become double; nor could one tell of either of them, which was the thing itself and which the name.

Cratylus/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Boldly then, my noble fellow, admit that one name is well imposed and another not; nor compel it to have every letter, in order that it may be really such as is that, of which it is the name; but suffer it to introduce a letter which is not fitting, and if you suffer a letter to do so, suffer likewise

a noun in a discourse; and if a noun, suffer a sentence not suited to things to be introduced in a discourse, and not less a thing to be named and spoken of, so long as the type exists of the thing respecting which there is the discourse; just as in the names of the elements, which, if you remember, I and Hermogenes just now discussed.

Cratylus/ I do remember.

Socrates/ It is well. For when this the type is there, although it may not have all that is fitting, yet the thing itself will be told correctly, when all fitting things are there; incorrectly, when only a few. But let us now, blessed man! permit that the thing is spoken of, in order that we may not, like those who walk about late at night in Ægina, owe a debt; and thus appear to have arrived at the things by the truth itself, later than is becoming. Or at least seek after some other propriety of name, and do not confess that an indication by letters and syllables is a name: for, if you admit both these assertions, you cannot be consistent with yourself.

Cratylus/ But you appear to me, Socrates, to speak in a moderate manner; and I so do put down my vote.

Socrates/ Since then the same things seem good to us after these, let us consider this too. We say, that if the name is about to be properly imposed, it ought to have fitting letters.

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And it ought to have the letters similar to things?

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Such then as are beautifully composed are composed in this manner. But if anyone is not correctly composed, it will perhaps, for the most part, consist of fitting and similar letters, if it shall be a resemblance; but it will

have a portion not fitting, through which the name would be neither beautiful nor beautifully formed. Shall we speak in this way, or otherwise?

Cratylus/ There is no need, I think, to quarrel, Socrates; although it does not please me to say, that a name exists, and yet is not beautifully composed.

Socrates/ Does this too not please you, that the name is an indication of a thing?

Cratylus/ It does please me.

Socrates/ And does it not seem to you to be well said, that of names some are formed from the preceding, and others are themselves the first?

Cratylus/ To me it seems so.

Socrates/ But if the first names should be indications of certain things, have you any better method for their being indications than to make them as nearly as possible such as are the things which they ought to indicate? Or does the method which Hermogenes and many others speak of please you more, that names are conventional, and indicate their meaning to those who have agreed together and known beforehand the things so named; and that in this conventionality exists the propriety of names; and that it matters not whether anyone agrees to call them, as they are at present imposed, or the contrary, to call that which is now small o great ω, and great ω small o? Which of these methods is agreeable to you?

Cratylus/ It is wholly and universally, Socrates, better to indicate by a resemblance what one wishes to indicate, but not by any chance method.

Socrates/ You speak well. If then the name shall be similar to a thing, is it not necessary for the elements, from which a person shall have composed the first names, to be naturally similar to the things themselves? My meaning is

this, Could anyone put together a picture, which we have just now said is the resemblance of something existing, unless the pigments, from which the picture of living things is composed, were naturally similar to those which the art of painting imitates? Or is it impossible?

Cratylus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ In like manner then names would never become similar to anything, unless the things, from which names are composed, possessed originally at first some similitude to those of which the names are the imitations. Now elements are the things from which names are to be composed.

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ You therefore now take a share in the discourse which Hermogenes did a little before. Come then, do we seem to you to have said correctly, or not, that the letter ρ is similar to a rushing-on, and to motion, and to hardness?

Cratylus/ To me, correctly.

Socrates/ And that the letter λ is similar to the smooth and soft, and to what we just now mentioned?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you know then that for the same thing we say Σκληρότης, but the Eretrians Σκληρότηρ?

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Do then both ρ and σ seem to be similar to the same thing? and does that word indicate the same thing to them, ending with a ρ, as it does to us ending with a ς? or does it indicate nothing to the others of us.

Cratylus/ It indicates one thing to both.

Socrates/ Whether in that ρ and ς are similar, or in that they are not?

Cratylus/ In that they are similar.

Socrates/ Are they then similar in every way?

Cratylus/ At least in indicating a rushing-on.

Socrates/ But what as regards the inserted λ? Does it not indicate the contrary of hardness?

Cratylus/ Perhaps, Socrates, it is not correctly inserted; just as in the names which you lately mentioned to Hermogenes, by taking away and adding letters where it was requisite. And you then appeared to me to act properly. And now, perhaps, ρ ought to be inserted instead of λ.

Socrates/ You say well. What then, do we, as we are now speaking, mutually understand nothing, when one pronounces the hard word σκληρόν hard? And do you not understand what I am saying?

Cratylus/ I do, my very good friend, through custom.

Socrates/ But in saying custom, do you think you are saying anything different from convention? Or do you call custom anything else than this, that when I pronounce this word, I understand it, and you know that I understand it? Do you not mean this?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If then you know this, when I pronounce it, there is an indication of something to you through me.

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ From that which is dissimilar to what I have in mind, when I pronounce it, if λ is dissimilar to the σκληρότης, which you pronounce. And if this is the case, what else is it, than that you have made a convention with yourself, and that the propriety of the name is a compact with yourself; since both similar and dissimilar letters, when meeting with custom and compact, indicate the same thing to you? But if custom is very far from being a compact, it will be no longer proper to say that similitude is an indication, but custom

rather: for this, as it appears, indicates both by the similar and the dissimilar. Since then, Cratylus, we agree in this—for I will put down your silence as consent, it is surely necessary that compact and custom should contribute to the indication of what we have in mind and pronounce; since if, O best of men! you are willing to come to number, from whence do you think you will be able to attribute similar names to each number, if you do not permit this consent and compact of yours to possess some authority about the propriety of names? It pleases me, indeed, that names should be, as much as possible, similar to things; but yet I fear, lest perchance the attraction of this similitude be really very slight, according to the language of Hermogenes, and that it will be necessary for us to make use of that ridiculous thing, called compact, as regards a propriety of names; since words will be spoken perhaps in the most beautiful manner possible, when they shall be spoken by letters either entirely, or for the most part similar, that is, fitting; but in the most ugly manner, when the contrary takes place. But after these still tell me this. What power do names possess with respect to us, and what beautiful effect must we say they produce?

Cratylus/ To me, Socrates, they appear to teach; and that it is without exception true, that he who knows the names, knows the things likewise.

Socrates/ Perhaps, Cratylus, you mean some such thing as this; that when anyone knows the quality of the name, —now it is of the same quality as the thing, —he then also knows the thing; since it is similar to the name; and that there is one and the same art in all things, which are similar to one another; and in consequence of this you appear to me to assert, that he, who knows the names, knows also the things.

Cratylus/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ Come now, let us see what is this mode of teaching existing things, of which you are now speaking, and whether there is any other method, this however being the better; or whether there is no other than this. Which do you think is the case?

Cratylus/ I think thus, that there is no other method; but that this is the only one, and the best.

Socrates/ But whether do you think that there is likewise the very same invention of things existing, and that he, who invented the names, invented also the things, of which there are the names? Or that it is necessary to seek and find another method, but to learn this?

Cratylus/ Above all things to seek after and discover the very same method, as regards the same things.

Socrates/ Come then, let us consider, Cratylus, if anyone, while seeking after things, follows after names, and looks upon the quality of each, do you not consider that there is no small danger of his being deceived?

Cratylus/ How?

Socrates/ It is plain, that he, who first founded names, formed them, as we have said, such as he thought the things themselves were. Is it not so?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If then he did not think rightly, but formed them, as he fancied, what think you shall we suffer, who are his followers? Is it aught else, than for us to be deceived?

Cratylus/ But see, Socrates, lest this be not the case; but that it is necessary for him, who founded the names, to have founded them knowingly; for otherwise, as I before remarked, names would never have existed. And let this be the greatest proof to you that he, who founded them, did not stumble from the truth. For all things would not have thus chimed in with him. Or, did you not perceive this yourself,

when you were saying, that all names were composed according to the same, and for the same?

Socrates/ But this apology, my worthy Cratylus, is of no weight. For if the founder of names, after stumbling at first, forced the rest of the words to this point, and compelled them to chime in with himself, there is nothing strange; just as in the case of diagrams, in which sometimes the first mistake being trifling and unapparent, all the remaining parts, although very numerous, follow as they ought, and agree with each other. There ought then at the beginning of everything to be to every person much discussion and reflection, whether the principle is properly laid down or not; and this being sufficiently examined, the rest, I say, will appear to follow it. And yet I should not wonder if names chime in with each other. For let us again consider, what we discussed before, that of the whole going on, and carried on, and flowing, the names signify to us, we say, the existence. Do they seem to you to indicate anything else than in this way?

Cratylus/ Very much so; and that they correctly signify this.

Socrates/ Let us consider then again taking from out of them, in the first place, this name, Ἐπιστήμη science; since it is doubtful, and seems to signify that ἵστησιν it stops our soul in acts, rather than that it is borne along with them; and hence it is more proper to enunciate its beginning as now, than by throwing out ε, πιστήμη, and to make an insertion in that of ι in the place of that in ε. In the next place, the word Βεβαιον firm is so called, because it is the imitation of a certain βάσις basis, and στάσις standing, but not of φορὰ rushing-on. Again, Ἱστορία history indicates surely that ἵστησι τὸν ροῦν it stops the flowing; and the word Πιστὸν credible indicates a thing ἱστᾶν causing to stand. Likewise Μνήμη memory indicates surely to everyone, that

there is a μονὴ abiding in the soul, but not a rushing-on. And, if you will, Ἁμαρτία error, and Συμφορα contingency, if anyone follows them according to their name, will appear to be the same with the aforesaid intelligence, and Ἐπιστήμη science, and all the other names connected with serious matters. Still further, Ἀμαθια ignorance, and Ἀκολασία intemperance, appear to be similar to these: for ἀμαθία ignorance appears to be the march of one going ἅμα θεῷ with a god; but ἀκολασία intemperance appears to be ἀκολουθία a following in all respects of things. And thus, the names which we consider applicable to the basest things, would appear to be most similar to those applicable to the most beautiful. And I think that anyone would discover many others of this kind, if he busied himself about them; from which he would imagine, that the founder of names did not indicate things going on and borne along, but such as have an abiding.

Cratylus/ And yet you see, Socrates, that he indicated many things by that notion.

Socrates/ What is this, Cratylus? Shall we count the number of names as if they were votes by pebbles? And will their propriety consist in this, that the truth will be there, to which side soever the greater number of the names appear to point.

Cratylus/ Is not this reasonable?

Socrates/ Not in the least, my friend. But let us leave these points there, and consider whether you will agree or not with us in this. Have we not lately acknowledged, that those who founded names on each occasion in cities, both Grecian and Barbarian, were name-founders, and that the art, competent for this, is name-founding.

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Tell me now, did they, who were the first name-founders, found the first names, while they knew the things to which they assigned their names, or did not know?

Cratylus/ I think, Socrates, while they knew them.

Socrates/ For surely, friend Cratylus, they could not do so while they did not know.

Cratylus/ It does not appear to me that they could.

Socrates/ Let us then return to the point from whence we digressed; for you just now, in what has preceded, stated, if you recollect, that he, who founded names, must have previously known the things to which he assigned their names. Are you then of this opinion still, or not?

Cratylus/ Still.

Socrates/ Say you, that he who founded the first names, founded them knowing the things?

Cratylus/ Knowing them.

Socrates/ From what names then did he either learn or find out the things, if the first names were not yet laid down? But, on the other hand, said we not, that it is impossible to learn and find out the things by any other way, than by learning or finding out ourselves the quality of names?

Cratylus/ You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose.

Socrates/ After what manner then shall we say that they knew the things and founded their names? or that there were name-founders before any name whatever was laid down, and that they knew the things, if indeed it is impossible to learn things otherwise than from names?

Cratylus/ I think, Socrates, that the account respecting these matters is the most true, which says that a power greater than that of man assigned the first names to things, so that they must of necessity be in a correct state.

Socrates/ Do you think then that he who laid down names, whether he was a certain dæmon, or a god, would lay down things contrary to himself? Or do we appear to you, to have just now said nothing to the purpose?

Cratylus/ But see lest the other sort of these are not names.

Socrates/ Which sort, thou best of men? those which lead to standing, or those to rushing-on? For, as we just now said, it will not be determined by their number.

Cratylus/ It is thus indeed just, Socrates.

Socrates/ The names then being divided into factions, and some asserting that they are like the truth, and others that they are, how shall we decide? or to what tribunal go? For surely we cannot go to other names, different from these; for there are no others. But it is plain that certain other things, besides names, must be sought after, which will show us, without names, which of these are true, after having pointed out, it is evident that, the truth of things.

Cratylus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ It is possible, therefore, Cratylus, if such be the case, to learn, as it seems, existing things without names.

Cratylus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Through what else then do you expect to learn them? Is it through anything else than what is reasonable and most just, through their communion with each other, if they are in any way mutually allied, and especially through themselves? For surely that, which is different from and foreign to these, would indicate something different and foreign, but not them?

Cratylus/ You appear to me to speak the truth.

Socrates/ But hold, by Zeus. Have we not often confessed that names properly imposed are like the things, of which

they are the names laid down, and are the resemblances of the things?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ If then one may learn, as much as possible, the things through names, and likewise through themselves, which will be the best and clearest method of learning? To learn from a resemblance, both itself, whether it is a beautiful likeness, and likewise the truth, of which it is the resemblance; or from the truth, both itself, and whether its resemblance has been fashioned in a becoming manner?

Cratylus/ There appears to me a necessity to learn from the truth.

Socrates/ After what manner then one must learn, or find out existing things, is perhaps a greater task than for me and you to know; and we must be content to confess this, that they are to be learned and sought for, not from the names, but much rather themselves from themselves?

Cratylus/ It appears so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Still further let us consider this; that these many names tending to the same thing may not deceive us; if, in reality, they who founded them considered all things as going-on ever and flowing—for they appear to me to have so considered—and if this were the case it would not thus be well. But these men have fallen, as it were, into a certain vortex, and are themselves stirred about, and by dragging us along, hurl us into it. For consider, O wondrous Cratylus, what I often dream about, whether we should say or not that there exists in the abstract the beautiful and the good, and each of the things existing.

Cratylus/ It appears to me, Socrates, that there does exist.

Socrates/ Let us then consider that very thing, not as if a countenance or anything of this kind were beautiful—for all

these appear to flow—but shall we say that beauty in the abstract is not always such as it is?

Cratylus/ We must.

Socrates/ Can one then correctly say, if it is always secretly going away, first, that it is, and next, that it is of such a kind? Or is it necessary, while we are speaking about it, for it to become immediately something else, and to secretly withdraw itself, and to be such no longer.

Cratylus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ How then can that be anything, which never subsists in a similar manner? For if it ever subsists in a similar manner, during that time when it subsists in a similar manner, it is evident that it does not change; but, if it always subsists in a similar manner, and is the same, how can it change, or be moved, not having started out from its own form of existence?

Cratylus/ By no means.

Socrates/ But neither can it be known by anyone. For, as soon as that approaches which is about to know it, it becomes something else, and of a different kind, so that it cannot be known of what quality it is, or how it subsists. Now surely no knowledge knows that, which it knows has no manner of subsistence.

Cratylus/ It is as you say.

Socrates/ But neither, Cratylus, is it reasonable to say that knowledge exists, if all things change and fall away, and nothing abides. For if this very thing I mean knowledge itself does not change and fall away, so as to be not knowledge, it would remain forever knowledge, and be knowledge; but if the form itself of knowledge changes and falls away, it will at the same time change and fall away into a form different from knowledge, and will be knowledge no longer; but if it always changes and falls away, it will always be not

knowledge: and by this reasoning there would be neither the thing about to know, nor that about to be known. But if that always subsists which knows, then that which is known subsists, and the beautiful subsists, and the good subsists, and each single thing else of those existing; nor do these appear to me to be really similar to the flowing, or rushing-on, of which we were speaking. But whether these things subsist in this way, or in the way that the followers of Heraclitus and many others assert, see that it is by no means an easy subject of inquiry; nor is it the part of a person possessing much mind, to give himself up, and his own soul, to the study of names, and confiding in them and those that founded them, to make a bold assertion, as if he knew something, and to give a verdict against himself and existing things, as if nothing of anything were sound, but that all things did, like unsound vessels of clay, let the water run through; and really, like persons laboring under a catarrh, fancy that things are so disposed, and things are seized with a flowing and catarrh. Perhaps then, Cratylus, this is the case, and perhaps not. Hence it is proper to reflect upon this well and manfully, and not to receive anything easily: for as yet you are a young man, and possess the vigor of age; and if, after reflecting, you discover anything, communicate it to me.

Cratylus/ And so I will do. But rest assured, Socrates, that even now I am not without consideration; but to me on reflection, and having had trouble, it appears to be much more on that side as Heraclitus asserts.

Socrates/ Do you then hereafter, my friend, when you return hither, instruct me; but now, as you have made preparations, proceed to the country; and Hermogenes, here, will attend you.

Cratylus/ This shall be, Socrates; and do you also endeavor to think upon these matters, as is meet.

Cratylus

Translated by Benjamin Jowett.

Persons of the Dialog.

Hermogenes, Cratylus, Socrates.

Hermogenes/ Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument.

Cratylus/ If you please.

Hermogenes/ I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus has been arguing about names. He says that they are natural and not conventional—not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use—but that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him whether his own name of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers yes. And Socrates? Yes. Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which he is called. To this he replies, If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that would not be your name. And when I am anxious to have a further explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he has a notion of his own about the matter if he would only tell, and could entirely convince me if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means, or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far sooner hear.

Socrates/ Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying that 'hard is the knowledge of the good.' And the knowledge of names is a great part of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and language—these are his own words—and then I should have been at once able to answer your question about the

correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single drachma course, and therefore I do not know the truth about such matters. I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you; he means to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave the question open until we have heard both sides.

Hermogenes/ I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of correctness in names other than convention and agreement. Any name which you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give another, the new name is as correct as the old—we frequently change the names of our slaves, and the newly imposed name is as good as the old. For there is no name given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit of the users.

Such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of anyone else.

Socrates/ I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes. Let us see—your meaning is that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to call it?

Hermogenes/ That is my notion.

Socrates/ Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, now, let me take an instance. Suppose that I call a man a horse or a horse a man. You mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me individually,

and rightly called a man by the rest of the world, and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the world—that is your meaning?

Hermogenes/ He would, according to my view.

Socrates/ But how about truth, then? You would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And there are true and false propositions?

Hermogenes/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is not?

Hermogenes/ Yes, what other answer is possible?

Socrates/ Then in a proposition there is a true and false?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue?

Hermogenes/ No, the parts are true as well as the whole.

Socrates/ Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part?

Hermogenes/ I should say that every part is true.

Socrates/ Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?

Hermogenes/ No, that is the smallest.

Socrates/ Then the name is a part of the true proposition?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yes, and a true part, as you say.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and false?

Hermogenes/ So we must infer.

Socrates/ And the name of anything is that which anyone affirms to be the name?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that there are? And will they be true names at the time of uttering them?

Hermogenes/ Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other than this. You give one name, and I another, and in different cities and countries there are different names for the same things. Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another.

Socrates/ But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names differ? And are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own?

Hermogenes/ There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras, not that I agree with him at all.

Socrates/ What! Have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad man?

Hermogenes/ No, indeed, but I have often had reason to think that there are very bad men, and a good many of them.

Socrates/ Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?

Hermogenes/ Not many.

Socrates/ Still you have found them?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view?

Hermogenes/ It would.

Socrates/ But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to anyone, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?

Hermogenes/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really distinguishable you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another.

Hermogenes/ He cannot.

Socrates/ Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus that all things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always, for neither on his view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to all.

Hermogenes/ There cannot.

Socrates/ But if neither is right, and things are not relative to individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence; they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature.

Hermogenes/ I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth.

Socrates/ Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being?

Hermogenes/ Yes, the actions are real as well as the things.

Socrates/ Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument, but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting, and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all.

Hermogenes/ I should say that the natural way is the right way.

Socrates/ Again, in burning, not every way is the right way, but the right way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument.

Hermogenes/ True.

Socrates/ And this holds good of all actions?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And speech is a kind of action?

Hermogenes/ True.

Socrates/ And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure.

Hermogenes/ I quite agree with you.

Socrates/ And is not naming a part of speaking? For in giving names men speak.

Hermogenes/ That is true.

Socrates/ And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of action?

Hermogenes/ True.

Socrates/ And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own?

Hermogenes/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure; in this and no other way shall we name with success.

Hermogenes/ I agree.

Socrates/ But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with something?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that which has to be named has to be named with something?

Hermogenes/ True.

Socrates/ What is that with which we pierce?

Hermogenes/ An awl.

Socrates/ And with which we weave?

Hermogenes/ A shuttle.

Socrates/ And with which we name?

Hermogenes/ A name.

Socrates/ Very good. Then a name is an instrument?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Suppose that I ask; What sort of instrument is a shuttle? And you answer, A weaving instrument.

Hermogenes/ Well.

Socrates/ And I ask again; What do we do when we weave? The answer is that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof.

Hermogenes/ Very true.

Socrates/ And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in general?

Hermogenes/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names. Will you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name?

Hermogenes/ I cannot say.

Socrates/ Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things according to their natures?

Hermogenes/ Certainly we do.

Socrates/ Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?

Hermogenes/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Then the weaver will use the shuttle well—and well means like a weaver? And the teacher will use the name well—and well means like a teacher?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using well?

Hermogenes/ That of the carpenter.

Socrates/ And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?

Hermogenes/ Only the skilled.

Socrates/ And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well?

Hermogenes/ That of the smith.

Socrates/ And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?

Hermogenes/ The skilled only.

Socrates/ And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using?

Hermogenes/ There again I am puzzled.

Socrates/ Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use?

Hermogenes/ Indeed I cannot.

Socrates/ Does not the law seem to you to give us them?

Hermogenes/ Yes, I suppose so.

Socrates/ Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the legislator?

Hermogenes/ I agree.

Socrates/ And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?

Hermogenes/ The skilled only.

Socrates/ Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only a maker of names, and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the world is the rarest.

Hermogenes/ True.

Socrates/ And how does the legislator make names? And to what does he look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances. To what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making. Will he make another, looking to the broken one? Or will he look to the form according to which he made the other?

Hermogenes/ To the latter, I should imagine.

Socrates/ Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?

Hermogenes/ I think so.

Socrates/ And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woolen, or other material, ought all of them to have the true form of the shuttle, and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same holds of other instruments. When a man has discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the material, whatever it may be, which he employs. For example, he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their several uses?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their uses?

Hermogenes/ True.

Socrates/ For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several kinds of webs, and this is true of instruments in general.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, as to names, ought not our legislator also to know how to put the true natural name of each thing into

sounds and syllables, and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country—there is no difference.

Hermogenes/ Very true.

Socrates/ And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables—this or that country makes no matter.

Hermogenes/ Quite true.

Socrates/ But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? The carpenter who makes, or the weaver who is to use them?

Hermogenes/ I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates.

Socrates/ And who uses the work of the lyre maker? Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work is being well done or not?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And who is he?

Hermogenes/ The player of the lyre.

Socrates/ And who will direct the shipwright?

Hermogenes/ The pilot.

Socrates/ And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? Will not the user be the man?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And this is he who knows how to ask questions?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And how to answer them?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a dialectician?

Hermogenes/ Yes, that would be his name.

Socrates/ Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made.

Hermogenes/ True.

Socrates/ And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given?

Hermogenes/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance persons. And Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name which each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true forms of things in letters and syllables.

Hermogenes/ I cannot answer you, Socrates, but I find a difficulty in changing my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the natural fitness of names.

Socrates/ My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you just now—but you have forgotten—that I knew nothing, and was I not proposing to share the inquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the matter, a step has been gained, for we have discovered that names have by nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name.

Hermogenes/ Very good.

Socrates/ And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? That, if you care to know, is the next question.

Hermogenes/ Certainly, I care to know.

Socrates/ Then reflect.

Hermogenes/ How shall I reflect?

Socrates/ The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and you must pay them well both in money and in thanks—these are the Sophists, of whom your brother, Callias, has, rather dearly, bought the reputation of wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has learned from Protagoras about the fitness of names.

Hermogenes/ But how inconsistent should I be, if, while repudiating Protagoras and his truth, I were to attach any value to what he and his book affirm!

Socrates/ Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.

Hermogenes/ And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he say?

Socrates/ He often speaks of them—notably and nobly in the places where he distinguishes the different names which gods and men give to the same things. Does he not in these

passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness of names? For the gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right and natural names, do you not think so?

Hermogenes/ Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at all. But to what are you referring?

Socrates/ Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a single combat with Hephaestus—'whom,' as he says, 'the gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander'?

Hermogenes/ I remember.

Socrates/ Well, and about this river—to know that he ought to be called Xanthus and not Scamander—is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird which, as he says, 'the gods call *chalcis,* and men *cymindis'?* To be taught how much more correct the name *chalcis is* than the name *cymindis*—do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batiea and Myrina? And there are many other observations of the same kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the understanding of you and me, but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, which he affirms to have been the names of Rector's son, are more within the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think, and what the poet means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance. You will remember, I dare say, the lines to which I refer.

Hermogenes/ I do.

Socrates/ Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the names given to Rector's son—Astyanax or Scamandrius?

Hermogenes/ I do not know.

Socrates/ How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the unwise are more likely to give correct names?

Hermogenes/ I should say the wise, of course.

Socrates/ And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the wiser?

Hermogenes/ I should say, the men.

Socrates/ And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him Astyanax (king of the city), but if the men called him Astyanax, the other name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women.

Hermogenes/ That maybe inferred.

Socrates/ And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their wives?

Hermogenes/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius?

Hermogenes/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And what is the reason of this? Let us consider. Does he not himself suggest a very good reason, when he says, 'For he alone defended their city and long walls'? This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the savior king of the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes.

Hermogenes/ I see.

Socrates/ Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself, and do you?

Hermogenes/ No, indeed, not I.

Socrates/ But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name?

Hermogenes/ What of that?

Socrates/ The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of Astyanax—both are Hellenic. And a king (ἄναξ) (anax) and a holder (ἑκτωρ) (ektor) have nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king, for a man is clearly the holder of that of which he is king—he rules, and owns, and holds it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense, and indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined that I had found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the correctness of names.

Hermogenes/ I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be on the right track.

Socrates/ There is reason, I think, in calling the lion's whelp a lion, and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary course of nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary births. If contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you agree with me?

Hermogenes/ Yes, I agree.

Socrates/ Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not play tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not the same makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears in it.

Hermogenes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves with the exception of the

four, ε, υ, ο, ω (e, y, o, o). The names of the rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of other letters which we add to them, but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example, the letter *beta—the* addition of η, τ, α (ee, t, a) gives no offense, and does not prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator intended—so well did he know how to give the letters names.

Hermogenes/ I believe you are right.

Socrates/ And may not the same be said of a king? A king will often be the son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire, and similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature, is like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be disguised until they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may not recognize them, although they are the same, just as anyone of us would not recognize the same drugs under different disguises of color and smell, although to the physician, who regards the power of them, they are the same, and he is not put out by the addition. And in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the addition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed by the change of all the letters, for this need not interfere with the meaning. As was just now said, the names of Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which is the τ (t), and yet they have the same meaning. And how little in common with the letters of their names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)—and yet the meaning is the same. And there are many other names which just mean *king.* Again, there are several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior), and others which denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of mortals), and there are many others which might be cited, differing in their syllables

and letters, but having the same meaning. Would you not say so?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the course of nature?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and are prodigies? For example, when a good and religious man has an irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of a horse foaling a calf.

Hermogenes/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called irreligious?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names—if names are correctly given, his should have an opposite meaning.

Hermogenes/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains), who appears to be rightly called, whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain wilderness of his hero's nature.

Hermogenes/ That is very likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ And his father's name is also according to nature.

Hermogenes/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature. Agamemnon (admirable for remaining) is one who is patient

and persevering in the accomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them, and his continuance at Troy with all the vast army is a proof of that admirable endurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon. I also think that Atreus is rightly called, for his murder of Chrysippus and his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his reputation. The name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be intelligible to everyone, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ἀτειρής (ateyrees) the stubborn, or as ατρεστος the fearless, or as ἀτηρός (ateeros) the destructive one, the name is perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is also named appropriately, for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops who sees what is near only (ὁ τά πέλας ὁρῶν) (o ta pelas oron).

Hermogenes/ How so?

Socrates/ Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and immediate, or in other words, πέλας (pelas) (near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by all means for his bride. Everyone would agree that the name of Tantalus is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him are true.

Hermogenes/ And what are the traditions?

Socrates/ Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in his life—last of all, came the utter ruin of his country—and after his death he had the stone suspended (ταλαντεία) (talanteya) over his head in the world below. All this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine that some person who wanted to call him ταλάντατος (talantatos) (most weighed down by misfortune) disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus, and into this

form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been transmuted. The name of Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an excellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is divided into two parts, for some call him Zena (Ζήνα), and use the one half, and others who use the other half call him Dia (Δία); the two together signify the nature of the god, and the business of a name, as we were saying, is to express the nature. For there is none who is more the author of life to us and to all than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we are right in calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, although divided, meaning the god through whom all creatures always have life (δι' όν ζήν ἀεί πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει) (dy n zeen aey pasy toys zosyn yparkhey). There is an irreverence, at first sight, in calling him son of Cronus, who is a proverb for stupidity, and we might rather expect Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect, which is the fact, for this is the meaning of his father's name—Κρόνος (Kronos) quasi Κόρος (Koros) (κορέω (koreo), to sweep), not in the sense of a youth, but signifying τό καθαρόν καί ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ (to katharon kay akeeraton ty ny), the pure and garnished mind (sc. ἀπό τοῦ κορεῖν (apo ty koreyn)). He, as we are informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (ἀπό τοῦ ὁρᾶν τά ἄνω) (apo ty oran ta ano) from looking upward, which, as philosophers tell us, is the way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the gods—then I might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end.

Hermogenes/ You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly inspired, and to be uttering oracles.

Socrates/ Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long lecture which commenced at dawn. He talked and I listened, and his wisdom and enchanting ravishment have not only filled my ears but taken possession of my soul, and today I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the investigation of names—that will be the way—but tomorrow, if you are so disposed, we will conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can only find some priest or Sophist who is skilled in purifications of this sort.

Hermogenes/ With all my heart, for I am very curious to hear the rest of the inquiry about names.

Socrates/ Then let us proceed, and where would you have us begin, now that we have got a sort of outline of the inquiry? Are there any names which witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness? The names of heroes and of men in general are apt to be deceptive because they are often called after ancestors with whose names, as we were saying, they may have no business, or they are the expression of a wish, like Eutychides (the son of good fortune), or Sosias (the Savior), or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and others. But I think that we had better leave these, for there will be more chance of finding correctness in the names of immutable essences—there ought to have been more care taken about them when they were named, and perhaps there may have been some more-than-human power at work occasionally in giving them names.

Hermogenes/ I think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the gods, and show that they are rightly named gods?

Hermogenes/ Yes, that will be Well.

Socrates/ My notion would be something of this sort. I suspect that the sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the gods of many barbarians, were the only gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing that they were always moving and running, from their running nature they were called gods or runners (θεούς, θέοντας (theoys, theontas)), and when men became acquainted with the other gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to them all. Do you think that likely?

Hermogenes/ I think it very likely indeed.

Socrates/ What shall follow the gods?

Hermogenes/ Must not daemons and heroes and men come next?

Socrates/ Daemons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this word? Tell me if my view is right.

Hermogenes/ Let me hear.

Socrates/ You know how Hesiod uses the word?

Hermogenes/ I do not.

Socrates/ Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who came first?

Hermogenes/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ He says of them;

> But now that Fate has closed over this race,
> They are holy daemons upon the earth,
> Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.

Hermogenes/ What is the inference?

Socrates/ What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the golden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble, and I am convinced of this, because he further says that we are the iron race.

Hermogenes/ That is true.

Socrates/ And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him be said to be of golden race?

Hermogenes/ Very likely.

Socrates/ And are not the good wise?

Hermogenes/ Yes, they are wise.

Socrates/ And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called them daemons, because they were δαήμονες (knowing or wise), and in our older Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other poets say truly that when a good man dies he has honor and mighty portion among the dead, and becomes a daemon, which is a name given to him signifying wisdom. And I say too, that every wise man who happens to be a good man is more than human (δαιμόνιον) both in life and death, and is rightly called a daemon.

Hermogenes/ Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you, but what is the meaning of the word *hero* (ἡρας (eeras), in the old writing ἐρως (eros))?

Socrates/ I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the name is not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love.

Hermogenes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Do you not know that the heroes are demigods?

Hermogenes/ What then?

Socrates/ All of them sprang either from the love of a god for a mortal woman, or of a mortal man for a goddess. Think of the word in the old Attic, and you will see better that the name *heros* is only a slight alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang. Either this is the meaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skillful as rhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the question (ἐρωτᾶν (erotan)), for εἴρειν (eyreyn) is equivalent to λέγειν (legeyn). And therefore, as I was saying, in the Attic dialect the heroes turn

out to be rhetoricians and questioners. All this is easy enough; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of Sophists and rhetors. But can you tell me why men are called ἀνθρωποι (anthropoy)? That is more difficult.

Hermogenes/ No, I cannot, and I would not try even if I could, because I think that you are the more likely to succeed.

Socrates/ That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.

Hermogenes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Your faith is not vain, for at this very moment a new and ingenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before tomorrow's dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to me, and first, remember that we often put in and pull out letters in words, and give names as we please and change the accents. Take, for example, the word Διί φίλος (Dyy phylos); in order to convert this from a sentence into a noun, we omit one *iota* and sound the middle syllable grave instead of acute, as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes inserted in words instead of being omitted, and the acute takes the place of the grave.

Hermogenes/ That is true.

Socrates/ The name ἀνθρωπος (anthropos), which was once a sentence, and is now a noun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is the α, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been changed to a grave.

Hermogenes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean to say that the word *man* implies that other animals never examine, or consider, or look up at (ἀναθρεϊ (anathrey)) what they see, but that man not only sees (ὀπωπε (opope)) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and hence he alone of all animals is rightly

called ἀνθρωπος (anthropos), meaning ἀναθρῶν ἁ ὀπωπεν (anathron a opopen).

Hermogenes/ May I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Hermogenes/ I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order. You know the distinction of soul and body?

Socrates/ Of course.

Hermogenes/ Let us endeavor to analyze them like the previous words.

Socrates/ You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the word ψυχή (psykhee) (soul) and then of the word σώμα (soma) (body)?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine that those who first used the name ψυχή (psykhee) meant to express that the soul when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and revival (ἀναψῦχον (anapsykhon)), and when this reviving power fails then the body perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called *psyche.* But please stay a moment. I fancy that I can discover something which will be more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that they will scorn this explanation. What do you say to another?

Hermogenes/ Let me hear.

Socrates/ What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body? What else but the soul?

Hermogenes/ Just that.

Socrates/ And do you not believe with Anaxagoras that mind or soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things?

Hermogenes/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Then you may well call that power φυσέχη which carries and holds nature (ἡ φύσιν ὀχεῖ καὶ ἔχει (ee physyn okhey kay ekhey)), and this may be refined away into ψυχή.

Hermogenes/ Certainly, and this derivation is, I think, more scientific than the other.

Socrates/ It is so, but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that this was the true meaning of the name.

Hermogenes/ But what shall we say of the next word?

Socrates/ You mean σῶμα (soma) (body).

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ That may be variously interpreted, and yet more variously if a little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave (σῆμα (seema)) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life, or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives indications to (σημαίνει (seemayney)) the body. Probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and they were under the impression that the soul is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe (σῶμα, σώζηται (soma, sozeetay)), as the name σῶμα (soma) implies, until the penalty is paid. According to this view, not even a letter of the word need be changed.

Hermogenes/ I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the gods, like that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether any similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them.

Socrates/ Yes, indeed, Hermogenes, and there is one excellent principle which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge—that of the gods we know nothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give themselves, but we are sure that the names by which they call themselves, whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of all principles, and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will call them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics which they like, because we do not know of any other. That also, I think, is a very good custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if you please, in the first place announce to them that we are not inquiring about them—we do not presume that we are able to do so. But we are inquiring about the meaning of men in giving them these names—in this there can be small blame.

Hermogenes/ I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I should like to do as you say.

Socrates/ Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?

Hermogenes/ Yes, that will be very proper.

Socrates/ What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?

Hermogenes/ That is another and certainly a most difficult question.

Socrates/ My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good deal to say.

Hermogenes/ Well, and what of them?

Socrates/ They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still discernible. For example, that which we term σύσία (sysya) is by some called ἐσσία (essya), and by others again ὡσία (osya). Now that the

essence of things should be called ἑστία, which is akin to the first of these (ἐσσία (essya) = ἑστία (estya)), is rational enough. And there is reason in the Athenians' calling that ἑστία (estya) which participates in οὐσία (ysya). For in ancient times we too seem to have said ἐσσία for οὐσία, and this you may note to have been the idea of those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to ἑστία, which was natural enough if they meant that ἑστία was the essence of things. Those again who said ὡσία seem to have inclined to the opinion of Heraclitus, that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing principle (ὠθον (othon)) was the cause and ruling power of all things, and was therefore rightly called ὡσία (osya). Enough of this, which is all that we who know nothing can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and Cronus, although the name of Cronus has been already discussed. But I dare say that I am talking great nonsense.

Hermogenes/ Why, Socrates?

Socrates/ My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.

Hermogenes/ Of what nature?

Socrates/ Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible.

Hermogenes/ How plausible?

Socrates/ I fancy to myself Heraclitus repeating wise traditions of antiquity as old as the days of Cronus and Rhea, and of which Homer also spoke.

Hermogenes/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Heraclitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that you cannot go into the same water twice.

Hermogenes/ That is true.

Socrates/ Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the names of Cronus and Rhea to the ancestors of the gods agreed pretty much in the doctrine of Heraclitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I believe, Hesiod also, tells of 'Oceanus, the origin of gods, and mother Tethys.' And again, Orpheus says that The fair river of Oceanus was the first to marry, and he espoused his sister Tethys, who was his mother's daughter.' You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of Heraclitus.

Hermogenes/ I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates, but I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys.

Socrates/ Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a spring, a little disguised, for that which is strained and filtered (διαττώμενον (dyattomenon), ἠθούμενον (eethoymenn)) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys is made up of these two words.

Hermogenes/ The idea is ingenious, Socrates.

Socrates/ To be sure. But what comes next? Of Zeus we have spoken.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, whether the latter is called by that or by his other name.

Hermogenes/ By all means.

Socrates/ Poseidon is ποσίδεσμος, the chain of the feet. The original inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his walks, and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of this element Poseidon; the ε was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, not so, but the name may have been originally written with a double

λ (l) and not with a σ (s), meaning that the god knew many things (πολλά εἰδώς (polla eydos)). And perhaps also he, being the shaker of the earth, has been named from shaking (σείειν (seyeyn)), and then π (p) and δ (d) have been added. Pluto gives wealth (πλοντος (pltos)), and his name means the giver of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in general appear to imagine that the term Hades is connected with the invisible (ἀειδές (aeydes)), and so they are led by their fears to call the god Pluto instead.

Hermogenes/ And what is the true derivation?

Socrates/ In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body going to him, my belief is that all is quite consistent, and that the office and name of the god really correspond.

Hermogenes/ Why, how is that?

Socrates/ I will tell you my own opinion. But first I should like to ask you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger, and which confines him more to the same spot—desire or necessity?

Hermogenes/ Desire, Socrates, is stronger far.

Socrates/ And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?

Hermogenes/ Assuredly they would.

Socrates/ And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should certainly infer, and not by necessity?

Hermogenes/ That is clear.

Socrates/ And there are many desires?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the greatest?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be made better by associating with another?

Hermogenes/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, is the god able to infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the inhabitants of the other world, and even to us who are upon earth he sends from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more than he wants down there; wherefore he is called Pluto (the rich). Note also that he will have nothing to do with men while they are in the body, but only when the soul is liberated from the desires and evils of the body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and reflection in that, for in their liberated state he can bind them with the desire of virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronus himself would suffice to keep them with him in his own far-famed chains.

Hermogenes/ There is a deal of truth in what you say.

Socrates/ Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from the unseen (ἀειδές (aeydes))—far otherwise—but from his knowledge (εἰδέναι (eydenay)) of all noble things.

Hermogenes/ Very good. And what do we say of Demeter, and Hera, and Apollo, and Athena, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?

Socrates/ Demeter is ἡ διδοῦσα μήτηρ (ee dydoysa meeteer), who gives food like a mother. Hera is the lovely one (ἐρατή (ertee)), for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (ἀήρ (aeer)), putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the truth of this if you repeat the letters of Hera several times over. People dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread the name of Apollo—and with as little reason. The fear, if I am not mistaken, only arises from their ignorance of the nature of names, but they go changing the name into Phersephone, and they are terrified at this, whereas the new name means only that the goddess is wise (σοφή (sophee)). For seeing that all things in the world are in motion (φερομένων (pheromenon)), that principle which embraces and touches and is able to follow them is wisdom. And therefore the goddess may be truly called Pherepapha (Φερεπάφα), or some name like it, because she touches that which is in motion (τοῦ φερομένωυ ἐφαπτομένη (toy pheromenoy ephaptomenee)), herein showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she is wise. They alter her name into Pherephatta nowadays, because the present generation care for euphony more than truth. There is the other name, Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some terrible signification. Have you remarked this fact?

Hermogenes/ To be sure, I have, and what you say is true.

Socrates/ But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the power of the god.

Hermogenes/ How so?

Socrates/ I will endeavor to explain, for I do not believe that any single name could have been better adapted to

express the attributes of the god, embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them—music, and prophecy, and medicine, and archery.

Hermogenes/ That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the explanation.

Socrates/ Say rather a harmonious name, as beseems the god of harmony. In the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul.

Hermogenes/ Very true.

Socrates/ And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver from all impurities?

Hermogenes/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Ἀπολούων (Apoloyon) (purifier), or in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth and sincerity, which is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called ‘Απλώς (Aplos), from ἁπλοῦς (aploys) (sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him ‘Απλός (Aplos). Also, he is ἀεί βάλλων (ae ballon) (always shooting), because he is a master archer who never misses. Or again, the name may refer to his musical attributes, and then, as in ἀκόλονθος (akolonthos) and ἀκοιτις (akytys), and in many other words, the α is supposed to mean ‘together'; so the meaning of the name Apollo will be ‘moving together,' whether in the poles of heaven as they are called, or in the harmony of song, which is termed concord, because he moves all together by a harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians ingeniously declare. And he is the god who presides over harmony, and makes all things move together,

both among gods and among men. And as in the words ἀκόλουθος (akoloyths) and ἀκοιτις (akoytys) the α (a) is substituted for ὁμο (omo); so the name ‘Απόλλων (Apollon) is equivalent to ὁμοπολών (omopolon); only the second λ (l) is added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction (ἀπολών (apolon)). Now the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts the minds of some who do not consider the true value of the name, which, as I was saying just now, has reference to all the powers of the god, who is the single one, the ever-darting, the purifier, the mover-together (ἁπλοῦς, ἀεί βάλλων, ἀπολούων, δμοπολών (aploys, ae ballon, apoloyon, dmopolon)).

The name of the Muses and of music would seem to be derived from their making philosophical inquiries (μώσθαι (mosthay)). And Leto is called by this name, because she is such a gentle goddess, and so willing (εθελήμων (etheleemon)) to grant our requests, or her name may be Letho, as she is often called by strangers—they seem to imply by it her amiability, and her smooth and easy-going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy (ἀρτεμής (artemees)), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity, perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (ἀρετή (aretee)), and perhaps also as hating intercourse of the sexes (τόν ἀροτον μισήσασα (ton arton myseesasa)). He who gave the goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons.

Hermogenes/ What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?

Socrates/ Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question. There is a serious and also a facetious explanation of both these names; the serious explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no objection to your hearing the facetious one, for the gods too love a joke. Διόννσος (Dyonnsos) is

simply διδούς οἶνον (dydoys oynon) (giver of wine)—Διδωυσος (Dydysos), as he might be called in fun—and οἴος (oyos) is properly οἰόνονς (oyonons), because wine makes those who drink think (οἴσθαι (oysthay)) that they have a mind (νοῦν (noyn)) when they have none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam (ἀφρός (aphros)), may be fairly accepted on the authority of Hesiod.

Hermogenes/ Still there remains Athena, whom you. Socrates, as an Athenian, will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares.

Socrates/ I am not likely to forget them.

Hermogenes/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of Athena.

Hermogenes/ What other appellation?

Socrates/ We call her Pallas.

Hermogenes/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from armed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the earth, or by the use of the hands, we call shaking (πάλλειν (palleyn)), or dancing.

Hermogenes/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas?

Hermogenes/ Yes, but what do you say of the other name?

Socrates/ Athena?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the ancients. For most of these, in

their explanations of the poet, assert that he meant by Athena *mind* (νοῦς (noys)) and *intelligence* (διάνοια (dyanoya)). And the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about her, and indeed calls her by a still higher title, *divine intelligence* (θεοῦ νόησις (they noeesys)), as though he would say, This is she who has the mind of God (θεονόα (theonoa))—using α as a dialectic variety for η, and taking away ι and σ. Perhaps, however, the name Θεονόη (Theonoee) may mean *she who knows divine things* (θεῖα νοούσα (theya nooysa)) *better than others.* Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that the author of it wished to identify this goddess with moral intelligence (ἐν ἠθει νόησιν), and therefore gave her the name Ἠθονόη (Eethonoee), which, however, either he or his successors have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athena.

Hermogenes/ But what do you say of Hephaestus?

Socrates/ Speak you of the princely lord of light (φάεος ἵστορα (phaeos ystora))?

Hermogenes/ Surely.

Socrates/ Ἥφαιστος (Eephaystos) is Φαίστος (Phastos), and has added the η (ee) by attraction; that is obvious to anybody.

Hermogenes/ That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets into your head.

Socrates/ To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of Ares.

Hermogenes/ What is Ares?

Socrates/ Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (ἄρρεν (arren)) and manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, which is the meaning of ἄρρατος (arratos); the latter is a derivation in every way appropriate to the god of war.

Hermogenes/ Very true.

Socrates/ And now, by the gods, let us have no more of the gods, for I am afraid of them. Ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how the steeds of Euthyphro can prance.

Hermogenes/ Only one more god! I should like to know about Hermes, of whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall know whether there is any meaning in what Cratylus says.

Socrates/ I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and signifies that he is the interpreter (ἑρμηνεύς (ermeeneys)), or messenger, or thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with language. As I was telling you, the word εἴρειν (eyreyn) is expressive of the use of speech, and there is an often-recurring Homeric word ἐμήσατο, which means *he contrived.* Out of these two words, εἴρειν and μήσασθαι, the legislator formed the name of the god who invented language and speech, and we may imagine him dictating to us the use of this name. O my friends, says he to us, seeing that he is the contriver of tales or speeches, you may rightly call him Εἰρέμης. And this has been improved by us, as we think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called from the verb *to tell* (εἴρειν (eyreyn)), because she was a messenger.

Hermogenes/ Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying that I was no true son of Hermes (Ἑρμογένης (Ermogenees)), for I am not a good hand at speeches.

Socrates/ There is also reason, my friend, in Pan's being the double-formed son of Hermes.

Hermogenes/ How do you make that out?

Socrates/ You are aware that speech signifies all things (πάν (pan)), and is always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which dwells above among the gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and is rough like the goat of tragedy, for tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them?

Hermogenes/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (πάν (pan)) and the perpetual mover (ἀεὶ πολῶν (aey polon)) of all things, is rightly called οἰπόλος (oypolos) (goatherd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper part, and rough and goat-like in his lower regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is speech or the brother of speech, and that brother should be like brother is no marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from the gods.

Hermogenes/ From this sort of gods, by all means, Socrates. But why should we not discuss another kind of gods—the sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?

Socrates/ You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I will not refuse.

Hermogenes/ You will oblige me.

Socrates/ How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him whom you mentioned first—the sun?

Hermogenes/ Very good.

Socrates/ The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric form, for the Dorians call him ἁλιος, and this name is given to him because when he rises he gathers (ἁλίζοι (alyzoy)) men together or because he is always rolling in his course (ἀεὶ εἴλεῖν ἰών (aey eyleyn yon)) about the earth, or from αἰολεῖν (ayoleyn), of which the meaning is the same as

ποικίλλειν (poykylleyn) (to variegate), because he variegates the productions of the earth.

Hermogenes/ But what is σελήνη (seleenee) (the moon)?

Socrates/ That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras.

Hermogenes/ How so?

Socrates/ The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the moon receives her light from the sun.

Hermogenes/ Why do you say so?

Socrates/ The two words σέλας (selas) (brightness) and φώς (phos) (light) have much the same meaning?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ This light about the moon is always new (νέον (neon)) and always old (ἑνον (enon)), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his revolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the previous month.

Hermogenes/ Very true.

Socrates/ The moon is not infrequently called σελαναία (selanaya).

Hermogenes/ True.

Socrates/ And as she has a light which is always old and always new (ἕνον νέον ἀεὶ (enon neon aey)), she may very properly have the name σελαενονεοάεια (selaenoneoaeya), and this when hammered into shape becomes σελαναία (selanaya).

Hermogenes/ A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do you say of the month and the stars?

Socrates/ Μείς (Meys) (month) is called from μειοῦσθαι meyoysthay) (to lessen), because suffering diminution; the name of ἀστρα (astra) (stars) seems to be derived from

ἀστραπή (astrapee) (blinding light), which is an improvement on ἀναστρωπή (anastropee), signifying the upsetting of the eyes (ἀναστρέφειν ὠπα (anastrepheyn op)).

Hermogenes/ What do you say of πῦρ (pyr) (fire) and ὕδωρ (ydor) (water)?

Socrates/ I am at a loss how to explain πῦρ (pyr); either the Muse of Euthyphro has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the word. Please, however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a difficulty of this sort.

Hermogenes/ What is it?

Socrates/ I will tell you, but I should like to know first whether you can tell me what is the meaning of the word πῦρ (pyr).

Hermogenes/ Indeed I cannot.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of this and several other words? My belief is that they are of foreign origin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion of the barbarians, often borrowed from them.

Hermogenes/ What is the inference?

Socrates/ Why, you know that anyone who seeks to demonstrate the fitness of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not according to the language from which the words are derived, is rather likely to be at fault.

Hermogenes/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, consider whether this πῦρ is not foreign, for the word is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and the Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly changed, just as they have ὑδωρ

(ydor) (water) and κύνες (kynes) (dogs), and many other words.

Hermogenes/ That is true.

Socrates/ Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided, for something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of πῦρ (pyr) and ὕδωρ (ydor). Ἀήρ (Aeer) (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element which raises (αἴρει (arey)) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (ἀεί ρει (aey re)), or because the flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the winds *air blasts,* (ἀήται (aeety)); he who uses the term may mean, so to speak, *air flux* (ἀητόρρουν (aeetorroyn)), in the sense of *wind flux (*πνευματόρρουν (pneymatorroyn)), and because this moving wind may be expressed by either term he employs the word *air* (ἀήρ (aeer) = ἀήτης ῥέω (aeetees reo)). Αἰθήρ (Aytheer) (aether) I should interpret as ἀειθεήρ (aeytheeer); this may be correctly said, because this element is always running in a flux about the air (ἀεί θει περί τόν ἀέρα ῥέων (aey the pery ton aera reon)). The meaning of the word γῆ (gee) (earth) comes out better when in the form of γαια (gaa), for the earth may be truly called *mother* (γαία, γεννήτειρα (gaya, genneeteyra)), as in the language of Homer γεγάασι (gegaasy) means γεγεννήσθαι (gegenneesthay).

Hermogenes/ Good.

Socrates/ What shall we take next?

Hermogenes/ There are ὧραι (oray) (the seasons), and the two names of the year, ἐνιαυτός (enyaytos) and ἔτος (etos).

Socrates/ The ὧραι (oray) should be spelled in the old Attic way, if you desire to know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the ορα (oray) because they divide (ὁρίζουσω) the summers and winters and winds and the fruits of the earth. The words ἐνιαυτός (enyaytos) and

ετος (etos) appear to be the same—that which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth in their turn, and passes them in review within itself (ἐν ἑαντώ ἑξετάζει (en eanto exetazey))—this is broken up into two words, ἐνιαντός (enyantos) from ἐν ἑαυτώ (en eayto), and ἑτος (etos) from ἑτάζει (etazey), just as the original name of Ζεύς (Zeys) was divided into Ζήνα (Zeena) and Δία (Dya), and the whole proposition means that this power of reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two words ἑτος (etos) and ἐνιαντός (enyantos) being thus formed out of a single proposition.

Hermogenes/ Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress.

Socrates/ I am run away with.

Hermogenes/ Very true.

Socrates/ But am not yet at my utmost speed.

Hermogenes/ I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those charming words—wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?

Socrates/ That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring; still, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be faint of heart. And I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom (φρόνησις (phroneesys)) and understanding (αύνεσις (aynesys)), and judgment (γνώμη (gnomee)) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη (epysteemee)), and all those other charming words, as you call them.

Hermogenes/ Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning.

Socrates/ By the dog of Egypt I have not a bad notion which came into my head only this moment. I believe that the primeval givers of names were undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in their search after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from constantly

going round and round, and then they imagine that the world is going round and round and moving in all directions. And this appearance, which arises out of their own internal condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature; they think that there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is always full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of the names which I mentioned has led me into making this reflection.

Hermogenes/ How is that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have just been cited the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely indicated.

Hermogenes/ No, indeed, I never thought of it.

Socrates/ Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a name indicative of motion.

Hermogenes/ What was the name?

Socrates/ Φρόνησις (Phroneesys) (wisdom), which may signify φοράς καί ροῦ νόησις (phoras kay roy noeesys) (perception of motion and flux), or perhaps φοράς όνησις (phoras oneesys) (the blessing of motion), but is at any rate connected with φέρεσθαι (pheresthay) (motion); γνώμη (judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration (νώμησις (nomeesys)) of generation (γονή (gonee)), for to ponder is the same as to consider. Or, if you would rather, here is νόησις (noeesys), the very word just now mentioned, which is νέον εσις (neon esys) (the desire of the new); the word νέος (neos) implies that the world is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express his longing of the soul, for the original name was νεόεσις (neoesys), and not νόησις (noeesys), but η (ee) took the place of a double ε. The word σωφροσύνη (sophrosynee) is the salvation (σωτηρία (soteerya)) of that wisdom (φρόνησις (phroneesys)) which we were just now considering.

Ἐπιστήμη (Epysteemee) (knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good for anything follows (επεται (epetay)) the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind them; wherefore the word should rather be read as ἐπειστήμη (epeysteemee), inserting ε (e). Σύνεσις (Synesys) (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of conclusion; the word is derived from σννιέναι (snnyenay) (to go along with), and, like ἐπίοτασθαι (epyotasthay) (to know), implies the progression of the soul in company with the nature of things. Σοφία (Sophya) (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of native growth; the meaning is *touching the motion or stream of things.* You must remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid motion, often use the word ἐσύθη (esythee) (he rushed), and there was a famous Lacedaemonian who was named Σσῦς (Ssys) (Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and the touching (ἐπαφή (epaphee)) of motion is expressed by σοφία (sophya), for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good (ἀγαθόν (agathon)) is the name which is given to the admirable (ἀγαστώ (agasto)) in nature, for, although all things move, still there are degrees of motion—some are swifter, some slower—but there are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called ἀγαθόν (agathon).

Δικαιοσύνη (Dykayosynee) (justice) is clearly δικαίου σύνεσις (dykayoy synesys) (understanding of the just), but the actual word δίκαιον (dykayon) is more difficult. Men are only agreed to a certain extent about justice, and then they begin to disagree. For those who suppose all things to be in motion conceive the greater part of nature to be a mere receptacle, and they say that there is a penetrating power which passes through all this, and is the instrument of creation in all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element, for

if it were not the subtlest, and a power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest, passing by other things as if they were standing still, it could not penetrate through the moving universe. And this element, which superintends all things and pierces (διαϊὸν (dyayon)) all, is rightly called δἰκαιον (dykayon); the letter κ (k) is only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying, there is a general agreement about the nature of justice, but I, Hermogenes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery that the justice of which I am speaking is also the cause of the world. Now a cause is that because of which anything is created, and someone comes and whispers in my ear that justice is rightly so called because partaking of the nature of the cause. And I begin, after hearing what he has said, to interrogate him gently. Well, my excellent friend, say I, but if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice. Thereupon they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers, and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me with one derivation after another, and at length they quarrel. For one of them says that justice is the sun, and that he only is the piercing (διαϊόντα (dyayota)) and burning (κἀοντα (kaonta)) element which is the guardian of nature. And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered by the satirical remark, What, is there no justice in the world when the sun is down? And when I earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest opinion, he says, Fire in the abstract. But this is not very intelligible. Another says, No, not fire in the abstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire. Another man professes to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that justice is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and orders all things, and passes through all things. At last, my friend, I find myself in far greater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was

before I began to learn. But still I am of the opinion that the name, which has led me into this digression, was given to justice for the reasons which I have mentioned.

Hermogenes/ I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now. You must have heard this from someone else.

Socrates/ And not the rest?

Hermogenes/ Hardly.

Socrates/ Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in the originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think that we have as yet discussed courage (ἀνδρεία (andreya)). Injustice (ἀδικία (adykya)), which is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle (διαϊόντος (dyayonts)), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of ἀνδρεὶc seems to imply a battle—this battle is in the world of existence, and according to the doctrine of flux is only the counter-flux (εναντία ροή (enantya roee)). If you extract the δ (d) from ἀνδρεία (andreya), the name at once signifies the thing, and you may clearly understand that ἀνδρεία (andreya) is not the stream opposed to every stream, but only to that which is contrary to justice, for otherwise courage would not have been praised. The words ἀρρην (arreen) (male) and ἀνήρ (aneer) (man) also contain a similar allusion to the same principle of the upward flux (τῆ ἀνω ροή tee ano roee)). Γυνή (Gynee) (woman) I suspect to be the same word as γονή (gonee) (birth); θήλν (theel) (female) appears to be partly derived from θηλή (theelee) (the teat), because the teat is like rain, and makes things flourish (τεθηλέναι (tetheelenay)).

Hermogenes/ That is surely probable.

Socrates/ Yes, and the very word θάλλειν (thalleyn) (to flourish) seems to figure the growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed by the legislator in

the name, which is a compound of θεῖν (theyn) (running) and ἁλλεσθαι (allesthay) (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when I get on smooth ground. There are a good many names generally thought to be of importance, which have still to be explained.

Hermogenes/ True.

Socrates/ There is the meaning of the word τέχνη (tekhnee) (art), for example.

Hermogenes/ Very true.

Socrates/ That may be identified with ἐχονόη, and expresses the possession of mind—you have only to take away the τ (t) and insert ο (o), between the χ (kh) and ν (n), and between the ν (n) and η (ee).

Hermogenes/ That is a very shabby etymology.

Socrates/ Yes, my dear friend, but then you know that the original names have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and stripping off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in all sorts of ways, and time too may have had a share in the change. Take, for example, the word κάτοπτρον (katoptron) (mirror). Why is the letter ρ (r) inserted? This must surely be the addition of someone who cares nothing about the truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often such that at last no human being can possibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another example is the word σφίγξ (sphygx), σφιγγός (sphyggos), which ought properly to be φίγξ (phygx), φιγγός (phyggos), and there are other examples.

Hermogenes/ That is quite true, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may be adapted to any object.

Hermogenes/ True.

Socrates/ Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like yourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability.

Hermogenes/ Such is my desire.

Socrates/ And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a precisian, or 'you will unnerve me of my strength. When you have allowed me to add μηχανή (meekhanee) (contrivance) to τέχνη (tekhnee) (art) I shall be at the top of my bent, for I conceive μηχανή (meekhanee) to be a sign of great accomplishment (ἀνειν (aneyn)), for μήκος (meekos) has the meaning of greatness, and these two, μήκος (meekos) and ἀνειν (aneyn), make up the word μηχανή (meekhanee). But, as I was saying, being now at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words ἀρετή (aretee) (virtue) and κακία (vice); ἀρετή I do not as yet understand, but κακία is transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for all things being in a flux (ἰόντων (yonton)), κακία (kakya) is κακῶς ἰόν (kakos yo) (going badly), and this evil motion when existing in the soul has the general name of κακία (kakya), or vice, specially appropriated to it. The meaning of κακῶς ἰέναι (kakos yenay) may be further illustrated by the use of δειλία (deylya) (cowardice), which ought to have come after ἀνδρεία (andrey), but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word which has been passed over. Δειλία (Deylya) signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain (δεσμός (desmos)), for λίαν (lyan) means strength, and therefore δειλία (deylya) expresses the greatest and strongest bond of the soul. And ἀπορία (aporya) (difficulty) is an evil of the same nature (from α *not* and πορεύεσθαι (poreyesthay) *to go*), like anything else which is an impediment to motion and movement. Then the word κακία (kakya) appears to mean κακῶς ἰέναι (kakos yenay), or going badly, or limping and halting, of which the consequence is that the soul becomes filled with vice. And if

κακία (kakya) is the name of this sort of thing, ἀρετή (aretee) will be the opposite of it, signifying in the first place ease of motion, then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called ἀρετή (aretee), or, more correctly, ἀειρειτή (aeyreytee) (ever flowing), and may perhaps have had another form, αἱρετή (eligible), indicating that nothing is more eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into ἀρετή (aretee). I dare say that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think that if the previous word κακία (kakya) was right, then ἀρετή (aretee) is also right.

Hermogenes/ But what is the meaning of κακόν (kako) (bad), which has played so great a part in your previous discourse?

Socrates/ That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device.

Hermogenes/ What device?

Socrates/ The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word also.

Hermogenes/ Very likely you are right, but suppose that we leave these words, and endeavor to see the rationale of καλόν (kalon) (beautiful) and αἰσχρόν (ayskhron) (ugly).

Socrates/ The meaning of αἰσχρόν (askhron) is evident, being only άει ισχον ροής (e skhon roees) (always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with our former derivations. For the name giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all sorts, and hence he gave the name ἀεισχοροῦν (aeyskhoryn) to that which hindered the flux (ἀεὶ ἴσχον ροῦν ey yskhn royn)), and this is now beaten together into αἰσχρόν (ayskhron).

Hermogenes/ But what do you say of καλόν (kalon)?

Socrates/ That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity, and has been changed by altering ου (oy) into ο (o).

Hermogenes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ This name appears to denote mind.

Hermogenes/ How so?

Socrates/ Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name. Is not the principle which imposes the name the cause?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And must not this be the mind of gods, or of men, or of both?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is not mind that which called (καλέσαν (kalesan)) things by their names, and is not mind the beautiful (καλόν (kalon))?

Hermogenes/ That is evident.

Socrates/ And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, and are not other works worthy of blame?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the works of a carpenter?

Hermogenes/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?

Hermogenes/ Of course.

Socrates/ And that principle we affirm to be mind?

Hermogenes/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?

Hermogenes/ That is evident.

Socrates/ What more names remain to us?

Hermogenes/ There are the words which are connected with ἀγαθόν (agathon) and καλόν (kalon), such as συμφέρον (sympheron) and λυσιτελούν, ὠφέλιμον, κερδαλέον (lysyteloyn, ophelymon, kerdaleon), and their opposites.

Socrates/ The meaning of συμφέρον (sympheron) (expedient) I think that you may discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples, for it is a sister word to ἐπιστήμη (epysteemee), meaning just the motion (φορά (phora)) of the soul accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle are called σύμφορα (symphora) or συμφέροντα (sympheronta), because they are carried round with the world.

Hermogenes/ That is probable.

Socrates/ Again, κερδαλέον (kerdaleon) (gainful) is called from κέρδος (kerdos) (gain), but you must alter the ν (n) into δ (d) if you want to get at the meaning, for this word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the name intended to express the power of admixture (κεραννύμενον (kerannymenon)) and universal penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he inserted a δ (d) instead of a ν (n), and so made κέρδος (kerdos).

Hermogenes/ Well, but what is λυσιτελον (lysytelon) (profitable)?

Socrates/ I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the profitable the gainful or that which pays (λύει (lyey)) the retailer, but they use the word in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable (λυσιτελούν (lysyteloyn)) as that which, being the swiftest thing in existence, allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of motion, but always, if there begins to be any end, lets things go again (λύει (lyey)), and makes motion immortal and unceasing. And from this

point of view, as appears to me, the good was happily denominated λυσιτελούν (lysyteloyn)—being that which looses (λύον (lyon)) the end (τέλος (telos)) of motion. Ὠφέλιμον (Ophelymon) (the advantageous) is derived from ὀφέλλειν (ophelleyn), meaning that which creates and increases; this latter is a common Homeric word, and has a foreign character.

Hermogenes/ And what do you say of their opposites?

Socrates/ Of such as mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak.

Hermogenes/ Which are they?

Socrates/ The words ἀξύμφορον (axymphoron) (inexpedient), ἀνωφελές (anopheles) (unprofitable), ἀλυσιτελές (alysyteles) (unadvantageous), ἀκερδές (akerdes) (ungainful).

Hermogenes/ True.

Socrates/ I would rather take the words βλαβερόν (blaberon) (harmful), ζημιώδες (zeemyodes) (hurtful).

Hermogenes/ Good.

Socrates/ The word βλαβερόν (blaberon) is that which is said to hinder or harm (βλάπτειν (blapteyn)) the stream (ροῦν royn)); βλάπτον (blapton) is βουλόμενον απτειν (boylomenon apteyn) (seeking to hold or bind), for απτειν (apteyn) is the same as δεῖν (deyn), and δείν (deyn) is always a term of censure; βουλόμενον ἀτρτειν ρούν (boylomenon atteyn ron) (wanting to bind the stream) would properly be βουλαπτεροῦν boylapteroyn), and this, as I imagine, is improved into βλαβερόν (blaberon).

Hermogenes/ You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names, and when I hear the word βουλαπτερούν (boylapteroyn) I cannot help imagining that you are making

your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some prelude to Athena.

Socrates/ That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes—not mine.

Hermogenes/ Very true, but what is the derivation of ζημιώδες (zeemyodes)?

Socrates/ What is the meaning of ζημιώδες (zeemyodes)? Let me remark, Hermogenes, how right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight permutation will sometimes give an entirely opposite sense. I may instance the word δέον (deon), which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds me of what I was going to say to you, that the fine fashionable language of modern times has twisted and disguised and entirely altered the original meaning both of δέον (deon) and of ζημιώδες (zeemyodes), which in the old language is clearly indicated.

Hermogenes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved the sounds ι (y) and δ (d), especially the women, who are most conservative of the ancient language, but now they change ι (y) into η (ee) or ε (e), and δ (d) into ζ (z)—this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.

Hermogenes/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ For example, in very ancient times they called the day either ἰμέρα (ymera) or ἐμέρα (emer), which is called by us ἡμέρα (eemera).

Hermogenes/ That is true.

Socrates/ Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of the giver of the name? The reason is that men long for (ἰμείρουσι (ymeyroysy)) and love the light which comes after the darkness, and is therefore called ἰμέρα (mera), from ἵμερος (ymeros) (desire).

Hermogenes/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the meaning, although there are some who imagine the day to be called ἡμέρα (eemera) because it makes things gentle (ἡμερα (eemera)).

Hermogenes/ Such is my view.

Socrates/ And do you know that the ancients said δυογόν (dyogon) and not ζυγόν (zygon)?

Hermogenes/ They did so.

Socrates/ And ζνγόν (zngon) (yoke) has no meaning—it ought to be δυογόν (dyogon), which word expresses the binding of two together (δυεὶν δγωγή (dyeyn dgogee)) for the purpose of drawing—this has been changed into ζυγόν (zygon). And there are many other examples of similar changes.

Hermogenes/ There are.

Socrates/ Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the word δέον (deon) (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the other appellations of good, for δέον (deon) is here a species of good, and is, nevertheless, the chain (δεσμός (desmos)) or hinderer of motion, and therefore own brother of βλαβερόν (blaberon).

Hermogenes/ Yes, Socrates, that is quite plain.

Socrates/ Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to be the correct one, and read διόν (dyon) instead of δέον (deon); if you convert the ε (e) into an ι (y) after the old fashion, this word will then agree with other words meaning good, for διόν (dyon), not δέον (deon), signifies the good, and is a term of praise. And the author of names has not contradicted himself, but in all these various appellations, δέον (deon) (obligatory), ὠφέλιμον (ophelymon) (advantageous), λυσιτελοῦν (lysytelyn) (profitable), κερδαλέον

(kerdaleon) (gainful), αγαθόν (agathon) (good), συμφέρον (sympheron) (expedient), εύπορον (eyporon) (plenteous), the same conception is implied of the ordering or all-pervading principle which is praised, and the restraining and binding principle which is censured. And this is further illustrated by the word ζημιώδης (zeemyodees) (hurtful), which if the ζ (z) is only changed into δ (d), as in the ancient language, becomes δημιώδης (deemyodees), and this name, as you will perceive, is given to that which binds motion (δούντι ἰόν (dnty yo)).

Hermogenes/ What do you say of ἡδονή (eedonee) (pleasure), λύπη (lypee) (pain), ἐπιθυμία (epythymya) (desire), and the like, Socrates?

Socrates/ I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty about them—ἡδονή (eedonee) is ἡ ὄνησις (ee oneesys), the action which tends to advantage, and the original form may be supposed to have been ἡονή (eeonee), but this has been altered by the insertion of the δ (d). Λύπη (Lypee) appears to be derived from the relaxation (λύειν (lyey)) which the body feels when in sorrow; ἀνία (anya) (trouble) is the hindrance of motion (α and ἰέναι (yenay)); ἀλγηδών (algeedon) (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a foreign word, which is derived from ἀλγεινός (algeynos) (grievous); ὀδύνη (odyee) (grief) is called from the putting on (ἔνδυσις (endysys)) of sorrow; in ἀχθηδών (akhtheedon) (vexation) 'the word too labors,' as anyone may see; χαρά (khara) (joy) is the very expression of the fluency and diffusion of the soul (χέω (kheo)); τέρψις (terpsys) (delight) is so called from the pleasure creeping (ἕρπον (erpon)) through the soul, which may be likened to a breath (πνοή (pnoee)) and is properly ἑρπνοῦν (erpnoyn), but has been altered by time into τερπνόν (terpnon). Εὐφροσύνη (Eyphrosynee) (cheerfulness) and ἐτιθνμία (etythnmya) explain themselves;

the former, which ought to be εὐφεροσύνη (eypherosynee) and has been changed into εὐφρσσύνη (eyphrssynee), is named, as everyone may see, from the soul moving (φέρεσθαι (pheresthay)) in harmony with nature; ἐπιθυμία (epythymya) is really ἡ ἐπί τόν θνμόν ισυσα δύναμις (ee epy ton thnmon sys dynamys), the power which enters into the soul. Θυμός (Thymos) (passion) is called from the rushing (θύσεως (thyseos)) and boiling of the soul ἱμερος (ymeros) (desire) denotes the stream (ροῦς rys)) which most draws the soul διά τήν ἐσιν τής ροής (dya tee esyn tees roees), because flowing with desire (ἱέμενος (yemenos)), and expresses a longing after things and violent attraction of the soul to them, and is termed ἵμερος (ymeros) from possessing this power; πόθος (pothos) (pothos) (longing) is expressive of the desire of that which is not present but absent, and in another place (πον (pon)); this is the reason why the name πόθος (pothos) is applied to things absent, as ἵμερος (ymers) is to things present. "Ερως (Eros) (love) is so called because flowing in (ἐσρών (esron)) from without; the stream is not inherent, but is an influence introduced through the eyes, and from flowing in was called ἐσρος (esros) (influx) in the old time when they used ο (o) for ω (o), and is called ἐρως (eros), now that ω (o) is substituted for ο (o). But why do you not give me another word?

Hermogenes/ What do you think of δόξα (doxa) (opinion), and that class of words?

Socrates/ Δόξα (Doxa) is either derived from δίωξις (dyoxys) (pursuit), and expresses the march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a bow (τόξον (toxon)). The latter is more likely, and is confirmed by οἴησις (oyeesys) (thinking), which is only οἴσις (oysys) (moving), and implies the movement of the soul to the essential nature of each thing, just as βουλή (boylee)

(counsel) has to do with shooting (βολή (bolee)), and βούλεσθαι (boylesthay) (to wish) combines the notion of aiming and deliberating—all these words seem to follow δόξα (doxa), and all involve the idea of shooting, just as ἀβουλία (aboyly), absence of counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object.

Hermogenes/ You are quickening your pace now, Socrates.

Socrates/ Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I have explained ἀνάγκη (anagkee) (necessity), which ought to come next, and ἑκούσιον (ekoysyon) (the voluntary). Ἑκούσιον (Ekoysyon) is certainly the yielding (εἴκον (eykon)) and unresisting—the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, as I was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with our will. But the necessary and resistant, being contrary to our will, implies error and ignorance; the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is impassable, and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion—and this is the derivation of the word ἀναγκαιον (anagkan) (necessary), ἀν᾽ ἀγκη ἴόν (an agkee yon), going through a ravine. But while my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will persevere with your questions.

Hermogenes/ Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such as ἀλήθεια (aleethey) (truth) and ψῶῦδος psoyds) (falsehood) and ὀν (on) (being), not forgetting to inquire why the word ὀνομα (onoma) (name), which is the theme of our discussion, has this name of ὀνομα (onma) (onma).

Socrates/ You know the word μαίεσθαι (mayesthay) (to seek)?

Hermogenes/ Yes—meaning the same as ζητειν (zeeten) (to inquire).

Socrates/ The word ὀνομα (onoma) seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying ὀν σν ζήτημα (on sn zeeteema) (being for which there is a search), as is still more obvious in ὀνομαστόν (onomaston) (notable), which states in so many words that real existence is that for which there is a seeking (ὀν ον μάσμα (on on masm)); ἀλήθεια (aleetheya) is also an agglomeration of θεία ἀλη (theya alee) (divine wandering), implying the divine motion of existence. Ψεῦδος (Pseydos) (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep (ὠῦδειν (oydeyn)), but the original meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of ψ (ps). Ὄν (On) and σύσία (sysya) are ἰόν (yon) with an ι (y) broken off; this agrees with the true principle, for being (ὀν (on)) is also moving (ἰόν (yon)), and the same may be said of not-being, which is likewise called not-going (οὐκίον (oykyon) or οὐκὶ ὂν (oyky on) = σύκ ἰόν (syk yon)).

Hermogenes/ You have hammered away at them manfully, but suppose that someone were to say to you, What is the word ἰόν (yon), and what are ἐον (eon) and δοῦν doyn)? Show me their fitness.

Socrates/ You mean to say, how should I answer him?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already suggested.

Hermogenes/ What way?

Socrates/ To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign origin, and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this kind may be true of them, but also the

original forms of words may have been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all manner of ways that I should not be surprised if the old language when compared with that now in use would appear to us to be a barbarous tongue.

Hermogenes/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Yes, very likely. But still the inquiry demands our earnest attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember that if a person goes on analyzing names into words, and inquiring also into the elements out of which the words are formed, and keeps on always repeating this process, he who has to answer him must at last give up the inquiry in despair.

Hermogenes/ Very true.

Socrates/ And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the inquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the elements of all other names and sentences? For these cannot be supposed to be made up of other names. The word αγαθὸν (agathon) (good), for example, is, as we were saying, a compound of ἀγαστός (agastos) (admirable) and θοός (thoos) (swift). And probably θοός (thoos) is made up of other elements, and these again of others. But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution, then we shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary element, which need not be resolved any further.

Hermogenes/ I believe you to be in the right.

Socrates/ And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn out to be primary elements. Must not their truth or law be examined according to some new method?

Hermogenes/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Quite so, Hermogenes. All that has preceded would lead to this conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in stating the principle of primary names.

Hermogenes/ Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you.

Socrates/ I think that you will acknowledge with me that one principle is applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary—when they are regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them.

Hermogenes/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ All the names that we have been explaining were intended to indicate the nature of things.

Hermogenes/ Of course.

Socrates/ And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the secondary names is implied in their being names.

Hermogenes/ Surely.

Socrates/ But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the primary.

Hermogenes/ That is evident.

Socrates/ Very good, but then how do the primary names which precede analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown, which they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a question. Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to communicate with one another. Should we not, like the deaf and dumb, make signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body?

Hermogenes/ There would be no choice, Socrates.

Socrates/ We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of our hands to heaven would mean lightness and

upwardness; heaviness and downwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if we were describing the running of a horse, or any other animal, we should make our bodies and their gestures as like as we could to them.

Hermogenes/ I do not see that we could do anything else.

Socrates/ We could not, for by bodily imitation only can the body ever express anything.

Hermogenes/ Very true.

Socrates/ And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that which we want to express?

Hermogenes/ It must be so, I think.

Socrates/ Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator names or imitates?

Hermogenes/ I think so.

Socrates/ Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached the truth as yet.

Hermogenes/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they imitate.

Hermogenes/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then could I have been right in what I was saying?

Hermogenes/ In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?

Socrates/ In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, although that is also vocal, nor, again, an imitation of what music imitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the matter as follows. All objects have sound and figure, and many have color?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with imitations of this kind. The arts which have to do with them are music and drawing?

Hermogenes/ True.

Socrates/ Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a color, or sound? And is there not an essence of color and sound as well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence?

Hermogenes/ I should think so.

Socrates/ Well, and if anyone could express the essence of each thing in letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing?

Hermogenes/ Quite so.

Socrates/ The musician and the painter were the two names which you gave to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called?

Hermogenes/ I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name giver, of whom we are in search.

Socrates/ If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to consider the names ροή (ree) (stream), ἰέναι (enay) (to go), σχέσις (skhesys) (retention), about which you were asking, and we may see whether the namer has grasped the nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the essence or not.

Hermogenes/ Very good.

Socrates/ But are these the only primary names, or are there others?

Hermogenes/ There must be others.

Socrates/ So I should expect. But how shall we further analyze them, and where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by syllables and letters. Ought we

not, therefore, first to separate the letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the powers of elementary and then of compound sounds, and when they have done so, but not before, proceed to the consideration of rhythms?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Must we not begin in the same way with letters—first separating the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes, into classes, according to the received distinctions of the learned, also the semivowels, which are neither vowels nor yet mutes, and distinguishing into classes the vowels themselves? And when we have perfected the classification of things, we shall give their names, and see whether, as in the case of letters, there are any classes to which they may be all referred, and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether they have in them classes as there are in the letters. And when we have well considered all this, we shall know how to apply them to what they resemble, whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether there is to be an admixture of several of them, just as, in painting, the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or any other color, and sometimes mixes up several colors, as his method is when he has to paint flesh color or anything of that kind—he uses his colors as his figures appear to require them. And so, too, we shall apply letters to the expression of objects, either single letters when required, or several letters, and so we shall form syllables, as they are called, and from syllables make nouns and verbs, and thus, at last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large and fair and whole. And as the painter made a figure, even so shall we make speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by some other art. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried away—meaning to

say that this was the way in which not we, but the ancients formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject. And we must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction.

Hermogenes/ That, Socrates, I can quite believe.

Socrates/ Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyze them in this way? For I am certain that I should not.

Hermogenes/ Much less am I likely to be able.

Socrates/ Shall we leave them, then? Or shall we seek to discover, if we can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying by way of preface, as I said before of the gods, that of the truth about them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of them. And in this present inquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the higher method is the one which we or others who would analyze language to any good purpose must follow, but under the circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can. What do you think?

Hermogenes/ I very much approve.

Socrates/ That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be avoided—there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in the air, and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying that 'the gods gave the first names, and therefore they are right.' This will be the best contrivance, or

perhaps that other notion may be even better still, of deriving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than we are, or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them, which is the same sort of excuse as the last, for all these are not reasons but only ingenious excuses for having no reasons concerning the truth of words. And yet any sort of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary words, for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of languages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be true?

Hermogenes/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ My first notions of original names are truly wild and ridiculous, though I have no objection to imparting them to you if you desire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything better which you may have.

Hermogenes/ Fear not. I will do my best.

Socrates/ In the first place, the letter ρ appears to me to be the general instrument expressing all motion (κίνησις (kyneesys)). But I have not yet explained the meaning of this latter word, which is just ἰεσις (esys) (going), for the letter η (ee) was not in use among the ancients, who only employed ε (e), and the root is κίειν (kyeyn), which is a foreign form, the same as ἰέαι (yeay). And the old word κίνησις (kyneesys) will be correctly given as ἰεσις (yesys) in corresponding modern letters. Assuming this foreign root κίειν (kyeyn), and allowing for the change of the η (ee) and the insertion of the ν (n), we have κίνησις (kyneesys), which should have been κιείνησις (kyeyneesys) or εἴσις (eysys), and στάσις (stasys) is the negative of ἱέναι (enay) (or εἴσις (eysys)), and has been improved into στάσις (stasys). Now the letter ρ (r), as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an excellent

instrument for the expression of motion, and he frequently uses the letter for this purpose. For example, in the actual words ρεῖν (reyn) and ροή (roee) he represents motion by ρ (r)—also in the words τρόμος (tromos) (trembling), τραχύς (trakhys) (rugged), and again, in words such as κρούειν (kroyeyn) (strike), θραύειν (thrayey) (crush), ἐρείκειν (ereykey) (bruise), θρύπτειν (thrypteyn) (break), κερματίζειν (kermatyzey) (crumble). ρυμβεῖν (rymbeyn) (whirl). Of all these sorts of movements he generally finds an expression in the letter ρ (r), because, as I imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order to express motion, just as by the letter ι (y) he expresses the subtle elements which pass through all things. This is why he uses the letter ι (y) as imitative of motion, ἰέναι (yeny), ἵεσθαι (yesthy). And there is another class of letters, φ, ψ, σ, (ph, ps, s,) and ζ (z), of which the pronunciation is accompanied by great expenditure of breath; these are used in the imitation of such notions as ψυχρόν (psykhron) (shivering), ζέον (zeon) (seething), σείεσθαι (seyesthay) (to be shaken), σεισμός (seysmos) (shock). and are always introduced by the giver of names when he wants to imitate what is φυσώδες (physodes) (windy). He seems to have thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue in the utterance of δ (d) and τ (t) were expressive of binding and rest in a place. He further observed the liquid movement of λ (l), in the pronunciation of which the tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, as in λεῖος (leyos) (level), and in the word ὀλισθάνειν (olysthaneyn) (to slip) itself, λιπαρόν (lyparon) (sleek), in the word κολλώδες (kollodes) (gluey), and the like; the heavier sound of γ (g) detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion of a glutinous clammy nature, as in γλίσχρος (glyskhros), γλυκύς (glykys), γλοιώδες (glyodes). The ν (n) he

observed to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a notion of inwardness; hence he introduced the sound in ἔνδον (endon) and ἐντός (entos); α he assigned to the expression of size, and η (ee) of length, because they are great letters; ο (o) was the sign of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of ο (o) mixed up in the word γογγύλον (goggylon) (round). Thus did the legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, and impressing on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation compounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names, but I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to say.

Hermogenes/ But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never explains what is this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is intended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something better of your own? And if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of Socrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you.

Cratylus/ Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment—at any rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very greatest of all.

Hermogenes/ No, indeed, but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, ‘to add little to little' is worthwhile. And, therefore, if you think that you can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a little trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon you.

Socrates/ I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which Hermogenes and myself have worked out, and therefore do not hesitate to say what you think, which if it be better than my own view I shall gladly accept. And I

should not be at all surprised to find that you have found some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on these matters and have had teachers, and if you have really a better theory of the truth of names, you may count me in the number of your disciples.

Cratylus/ You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I fear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself moved to say to you what Achilles in the 'Prayers' says to Ajax;

> Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people,
> You appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind.

And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers much to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself.

Socrates/ Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom. I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself, What am I saying? For there is nothing worse than self-deception—when the deceiver is always at home and always with you—it is quite terrible, and therefore I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavor to 'look fore and aft,' in the words of the aforesaid Homer. And now let me see, where are we? Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing? Has this proposition been sufficiently proved?

Cratylus/ Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite true.

Socrates/ Names, then, are given in order to instruct?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And naming is an art, and has artificers?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And who are they?

Cratylus/ The legislators, of whom you spoke at first.

Socrates/ And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me explain what I mean. Of painters, some are better and some worse?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures, better, and the worse execute them worse. And of builders also, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse.

Cratylus/ True.

Socrates/ And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and some worse?

Cratylus/ No, there I do not agree with you.

Socrates/ Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse?

Cratylus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Or that one name is better than another?

Cratylus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then all names are rightly imposed?

Cratylus/ Yes, if they are names at all.

Socrates/ Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was mentioned before—assuming that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at all?

Cratylus/ I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has the nature which corresponds to it.

Socrates/ And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, if he is not.

Cratylus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this is your meaning I should answer that there have been plenty of liars in all ages.

Cratylus/ Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not—say something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which is not?

Socrates/ Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not said?

Cratylus/ Neither spoken nor said.

Socrates/ Nor uttered nor addressed? For example, if a person, saluting you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say, Hail, Athenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion—these words, whether spoken, said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all?

Cratylus/ In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking nonsense.

Socrates/ Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and partly false, which is all that I want to know.

Cratylus/ I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no purpose, and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of hammering at a brazen pot.

Socrates/ But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a meeting point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with the thing named?

Cratylus/ I should.

Socrates/ And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of the thing?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, but in another way?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand you. Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation—I mean both pictures or words—are not equally attributable and applicable to the things of which they are the imitation.

Cratylus/ They are.

Socrates/ First look at the matter thus. You may attribute the likeness of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman, and so on?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the woman, and of the woman to the man?

Cratylus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first?

Cratylus/ Only the first.

Socrates/ That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each that which belongs to it and is like it?

Cratylus/ That is my view.

Socrates/ Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you. The first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right, and the other mode of giving and assigning the name which

is unlike, I call wrong, and in the case of names, false as well as wrong.

Cratylus/ That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may be wrongly assigned. But not in the case of names—they must be always right.

Socrates/ Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to him, This is your picture, showing him his own likeness, or perhaps the likeness of a woman, and when I say show, I mean bring before the sense of sight.

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And may I not go to him again, and say, This is your name? For the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not say to him, This is your name? And may I not then bring to his sense of hearing the imitation of himself, when I say, This is a man, or of a female of the human species, when I say, This is a woman, as the case may be? Is not all that quite possible?

Cratylus/ I would fain agree with you, Socrates, and therefore I say, granted.

Socrates/ That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to objects, the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs, and if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made up of them. What do you say, Cratylus?

Cratylus/ I agree, and think that what you say is very true.

Socrates/ And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in pictures you may either give all the appropriate colors and figures, or you may not give them

all—some may be wanting or there may be too many or too much of them—may there not?

Cratylus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure, and he who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one.

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a good image, or in other words a name, but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer that some names are well and others ill made.

Cratylus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And this artist of names is called the legislator?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good.

Cratylus/ Very true, Socrates, but the case of language, you see, is different. For when by the help of grammar we assign the letters α or β, or any other letters, to a certain name, then, if we add, or subtract, or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only written wrongly, but not written at all, and in any of these cases becomes other than a name.

Socrates/ But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus.

Cratylus/ How so?

Socrates/ I believe that what you say maybe true about numbers, which must be just what they are, or not be at all. For example, the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other number, but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or to anything which is represented under an image. I should say rather that the image, if expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two objects. One of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus, and we will suppose, further, that some god makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and color, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness, and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form. Would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratyluses?

Cratylus/ I should say that there were two Cratyluses.

Socrates/ Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle of truth in images, and also in names, and not insist that an image is no longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent?

Cratylus/ Yes, I see.

Socrates/ But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which were the realities.

Cratylus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly given, and do not insist that the name shall be exactly the same with the thing, but allow the occasional substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named, and described, so long as the general character of the thing which you are describing is retained. And this, as you will remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance of the names of the letters.

Cratylus/ Yes, I remember.

Socrates/ Good, and when the general character is preserved, even if some of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified—well, if all the letters are given, not well, when only a few of them are given. I think that we had better admit this, lest we be punished like travelers in Regina who wander about the street late at night, and be likewise told by truth herself that we have arrived too late. Or if not, you must find out some new notion of correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a thing in letters or syllables, for if you say both, you will be inconsistent with yourself.

Cratylus/ I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very reasonable.

Socrates/ Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters.

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the proper letters are those which are like the things?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made up of proper and similar letters, or there would be no likeness, but there will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the beauty and formation of the word. You would admit that?

Cratylus/ There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarreling with you, since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a name at all.

Socrates/ Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?

Cratylus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived?

Cratylus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are representations of things, is there any better way of framing representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you can? Or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have agreed about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them, and that convention is the only principle? And whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and opposite one, according to which you call small great and great small—that, they would say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these two notions do you prefer?

Cratylus/ Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better than representation by any chance sign.

Socrates/ Very good, but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters out of which the first names are composed must also be like things. Returning to the image of the

picture, I would ask how anyone could ever compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if there were not pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated, and out of which the picture is composed.

Cratylus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing, unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation. And the original elements are letters?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter ρ (r) is expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in saying so?

Cratylus/ I should say that you were right.

Socrates/ And that λ (l) was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the like?

Cratylus/ There again you were right.

Socrates/ And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us σκληρότης (skleerotees), is by the Eretrians called σκληρότηρ (skleeroteer).

Cratylus/ Very true.

Socrates/ But are the letters ρ and σ equivalents, and is there the same significance to them in the termination ρ (r), which there is to us in σ (s), or is there no significance to one of us?

Cratylus/ Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us.

Socrates/ In so far as they are like, or in so far as they are unlike?

Cratylus/ In so far as they are like.

Socrates/ Are they altogether alike?

Cratylus/ Yes, for the purpose of expressing motion.

Socrates/ And what do you say of the insertion of the λ (l)? For that is expressive not of hardness but of softness.

Cratylus/ Why, perhaps the letter λ (l) is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and should be altered into ρ (r), as you were saying to Hermogenes, and in my opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon occasion.

Socrates/ Good, but still the word is intelligible to both of us. When I say σκληρός (skleeros) (hard), you know what I mean.

Cratylus/ Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom.

Socrates/ And what is custom but convention? When I utter a sound which I understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound—this is what you are saying?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication given by me to you?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as from like, for example, in the λ (l) of σκληρότης (skleerotees). But if this is true, then you have made a convention with yourself, and the correctness of a name turns out to be convention, since letters which are unlike are indicative equally with those which are like, if they are sanctioned by custom and convention. And even supposing that you distinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you must say that the signification of words is given by custom and not by likeness, for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. But as we are agreed thus far, Cratylus, for I shall assume that your silence gives consent, then custom and convention must be

supposed to contribute to the indication of our thoughts. For suppose we take the instance of number. How can you ever imagine, my good friend, that you will find names resembling every individual number, unless you allow that which you term convention and agreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names? I quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things, but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a shabby thing, which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention with a view to correctness. For I believe that if we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are perfectly appropriate, this would be the most perfect state of language, as the opposite is the most imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is the use of them?

Cratylus/ The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform. The simple truth is that he who knows names knows also the things which are expressed by them.

Socrates/ I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so also is the thing, and that he who knows the one will also know the other, because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same art or science, and therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know things.

Cratylus/ That is precisely what I mean.

Socrates/ But let us consider what is the nature of this information about things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the best sort of information? Or is there any other? What do you say?

Cratylus/ I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of information about them—there can be no other.

Socrates/ But do you believe that in the discovery of them he who discovers the names discovers also the things, or is

this only the method of instruction, and is there some other method of inquiry and discovery?

Cratylus/ I certainly believe that the methods of inquiry and discovery are of the same nature as instruction.

Socrates/ Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the search after things, and analyzes their meaning, is in great danger of being deceived?

Cratylus/ How so?

Socrates/ Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they signified—did he not?

Cratylus/ True.

Socrates/ And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according to his conception, in what position shall we who are his followers find ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him?

Cratylus/ But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely have known, or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all? And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and the proof is—that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose?

Socrates/ But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in this, any more than in geometric diagrams, which have often a slight and invisible flaw in the first part of the process, and are consistently mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is the reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention on the consideration of his first principles—are they or are they not rightly laid down? And when he has duly sifted them, all

the rest will follow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are really consistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion. Were we not saying that all things are in motion and progress and flux, and that this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of them?

Cratylus/ Yes, that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning.

Socrates/ Let us revert to ἐπιστήμη (epysteemee) (knowledge), and observe how ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than going round with them, and therefore we should leave the beginning as at present, and not reject the ε (e), but make an insertion of an ι (y) instead of an ε (e) (not πιστήμη (pysteemee), but ἐπιιστήμη (epyysteemee)). Take another example. Βέβαιον (Bebayon) (sure) is clearly the expression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word ἱστορία (ystorya) (inquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (ἱστάναι (ystany)) of the stream, and the word πιστόν (pyston) (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion; then, again, μνήμη (mneemee) (memory), as anyone may see, expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as ἁμορτία (amorty) and σνμφορά (snmphra), which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their etymologies will be the same as σύνεσις (synesys) and ἐπιστήμη (epysteemee) and other words which have a good sense (cf. ὁμαρτεῖν, συνιέναι, ἑπεσθαι, συμφέρεσθαι (omarteyn, synyenay, epesthay, sympheresthay)). And much the same may be said of ἀμαθία (amathya) and ἀκολασία (akolasya), for ἀμαθία (amathya) (ignorance) may be explained as ἡ ἅμα θεώ ἰόντος πορεία (ee ma theo yontos poreya) (the progress of one who goes with God), and ἀκολασία (akolasya) (unrestraint) as ἡ ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασιν (ee akoloythy toys pragmasyn) (movement in company with things). Thus the names which

in these instances we find to have the worst sense will turn out to be framed on the same principle as those which have the best. And anyone I believe who would take the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of names indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that they are at rest, which is the opposite of motion.

Cratylus/ Yes, Socrates, but observe, the greater number express motion.

Socrates/ What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? And is correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever sort there are most, those are the true ones?

Cratylus/ No, that is not reasonable.

Socrates/ Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and proceed to another, about which I should like to know whether you think with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of names in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that the art which gave names was the art of the legislator?

Cratylus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of the first names, know or not know the things which they named?

Cratylus/ They must have known, Socrates.

Socrates/ Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been ignorant.

Cratylus/ I should say not.

Socrates/ Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things which he named. Are you still of that opinion?

Cratylus/ I am.

Socrates/ And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a knowledge of the things which he named?

Cratylus/ I should.

Socrates/ But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if the primitive names were not yet given? For, if we are correct in our view, the only way of learning and discovering things is either to discover names for ourselves or to learn them from others.

Cratylus/ I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates.

Socrates/ But if things are only to be known through names, how can we suppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators, before there were names at all, and therefore before they could have known them?

Cratylus/ I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be that a power more than human gave things their first names, and that the names which are thus given are necessarily their true names.

Socrates/ Then how came the giver of the names, if he as an inspired being or god, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now that he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were we mistaken?

Cratylus/ But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all.

Socrates/ And which, then, did he make, my good friend—those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a point which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them.

Cratylus/ No, not in that way, Socrates.

Socrates/ But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that they are like the truth, others contending that *they* are, how or by what criterion are we to decide between

them? For there are no other names to which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without employing names, will make clear which of the two are right, and this must be a standard which shows the truth of things.

Cratylus/ I agree.

Socrates/ But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be known without names?

Cratylus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there be of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through their affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through themselves? For that which is other and different from them must signify something other and different from them.

Cratylus/ What you are saying is, I think, true.

Socrates/ Well, but reflect. Have we not several times acknowledged that names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they name?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn things through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn them from the things themselves. Which is likely to be the nobler and clearer way—to learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of which the image is the expression have been rightly conceived, or to learn of the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been duly executed?

Cratylus/ I should say that we must learn of the truth.

Socrates/ How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things is not to be

derived from names. No, they must be studied and investigated in themselves.

Cratylus/ Clearly, Socrates.

Socrates/ There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed upon by the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the same direction. I myself do not deny that the givers of names did really give them under the idea that all things were in motion and flux, which was their sincere but, I think, mistaken opinion. And having fallen into a kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried round, and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter, master Cratylus, about which I often dream, and should like to ask your opinion. Tell me whether there is or is not any absolute beauty or good, or any other absolute existence.

Cratylus/ Certainly, Socrates, I think so.

Socrates/ Then let us seek the true beauty, not asking whether a face is fair, or anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in a flux, but let us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful.

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing away, and is first this and then that? Must not the same thing be born and retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths?

Cratylus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? For obviously things which are the same cannot change while they remain the same, and if they are always the same and in the same state, and never depart from their original form, they can never change or be moved.

Cratylus/ Certainly they cannot.

Socrates/ Nor yet can they be known by anyone, for at the moment that the observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that you cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, for you cannot know that which has no state.

Cratylus/ True.

Socrates/ Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding. For knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge, and if the transition is always going on, there will always be no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will be no one to know and nothing to be known. But if that which knows and that which is known exist ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist, then I do not think that they can resemble a process or flux, as we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether the truth is what Heraclitus and his followers and many others say, is a question hard to determine, and no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names. Neither will he so far trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or imagine that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue, and therefore I would not have you be too easily persuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and do not easily accept such a doctrine, for you are young and of an age to learn. And when you have found the truth, come and tell me.

Cratylus/ I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that I have been considering the matter already, and the result of a great deal of trouble and consideration is that I incline to Heraclitus.

Socrates/ Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall give me a lesson, but at present, go into the country, as you are intending, and Hermogenes shall set you on your way.

Cratylus/ Very good, Socrates. I hope, however, that you will continue to think about these things yourself.

Cratylus

Translated by C. D. C. Reeve.

Persons of the Dialog.

Hermogenes, Cratylus, Socrates.

Hermogenes/ Shall we let Socrates here join our discussion?

Cratylus/ If you like.

Hermogenes/ Cratylus says, Socrates, that there is a correctness of name for each thing, one that belongs to it by nature. A thing's name isn't whatever people agree to call it—some bit of their native language that applies to it—but there is a natural correctness of names, which is the same for everyone, Greek or foreigner. So, I ask him whether his own name is truly 'Cratylus'. He agrees that it is. "What about Socrates?" I say. "His name is 'Socrates'." "Does this also hold for everyone else? Is the name we call him his name?" "It certainly doesn't hold of you. Your name isn't 'Hermogenes', not even if everyone calls you by it." Eagerly, I ask him to tell me what he means. He responds sarcastically and makes nothing clear. He pretends to possess some private knowledge which would force me to agree with him and say the very things about names that he says himself, were he to express it in plain terms. So, if you can somehow interpret Cratylus' oracular utterances, I'd gladly listen. Though I'd really rather find out what you yourself have to say about the correctness of names, if that's all right with you.

Socrates/ Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient proverb that "fine things are very difficult" to know about, and it certainly isn't easy to get to know about names. To be sure, if I'd attended Prodicus' fifty-drachma lecture course, which he himself advertises as an exhaustive

treatment of the topic, there' be nothing to prevent you from learning the precise truth about the correctness of names straightaway. But as I've heard only the one-drachma course, I don't know the truth about it. Nonetheless, I am ready to investigate it along with you and Cratylus. As for his denying that your real name is 'Hermogenes', I suspect he's making fun of you. Perhaps he thinks you want to make money but fail every time you try. In any case, as I was saying, it's certainly difficult to know about these matters, so we'll have to conduct a joint investigation to see who is right, you or Cratylus.

Hermogenes/ Well, Socrates, I've often talked with Cratylus—and with lots of other people, for that matter—and no one is able to persuade me that the correctness of names is determined by anything besides convention and agreement. I believe that any name you give a thing is its correct name. If you change its name and give it another, the new one is as correct as the old. For example, when we give names to our domestic slaves, the new ones are as correct as the old. No name belongs to a particular thing by nature, but only because of the rules and usage of those who establish the usage and call it by that name. However, if I'm wrong about this, I'm ready to listen not just to Cratylus but to anyone, and to learn from him too.

Socrates/ Perhaps you're on to something, Hermogenes, let's see. Are you saying that whatever anyone decides to call a particular thing is its name?

Hermogenes/ I am.

Socrates/ Whether it is a private individual or a community that does so?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ What about this? Suppose I call one of the things that are—for instance, the one we now call 'man'—suppose I

give that the name 'horse' and give the one we now call 'horse' the name 'man'. Will the same thing have the public name 'man' but the private name 'horse'? Is that what you mean?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ So whatever each person says is the name of something, for him, that is its name?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And however many names someone says there are for each thing, it will really have that number at whatever time he says it?

Hermogenes/ Yes, Socrates, for I can't conceive of any other way in which names could be correct. I call a thing by the name I gave it; you call it by the different name you gave it. In the same way, I see that different communities have different names for the same things—Greeks differing from other Greeks, and Greeks from foreigners.

Socrates/ Let's see, Hermogenes, whether the same also seems to you to hold of the things that are. Is the being or essence of each of them something private for each person, as Protagoras tells us? He says that man is "the measure of all things," and that things are to me as they appear to me, and are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree, or do you believe that things have some fixed being or essence of their own?

Hermogenes/ There have been times, Socrates, when I have been so puzzled that I've been driven to take refuge in Protagoras' doctrine, even though I don't believe it at all.

Socrates/ What's that? Have you actually been driven to believe that there is no such thing as a bad man?

Hermogenes/ No, by god, I haven't. Indeed, I've often found myself believing that there are very bad ones, and plenty of them.

Socrates/ What? Have you never believed that there are any who are very good?

Hermogenes/ Not many.

Socrates/ But you did believe that there were some good ones?

Hermogenes/ I did.

Socrates/ And what do you hold about such people? Or is it this: the very good are very wise, while the very bad are very foolish?

Hermogenes/ Yes, that's what I believe.

Socrates/ But if Protagoras is telling the truth—if it is the Truth that things are for each person as he believes them to be, how is it possible for one person to be wise and another foolish?

Hermogenes/ It isn't possible.

Socrates/ You strongly believe, it seems to me, that if wisdom exists, and foolishness likewise, then Protagoras cannot be telling the truth. After all, if what each person believes to be true is true for him, no one can truly be wiser than anyone else.

Hermogenes/ That's right.

Socrates/ But you also reject Euthydemus' doctrine that everything always has every attribute simultaneously. For if virtue and vice always belong to everything simultaneously, it follows once again that it is impossible for some people to be good and others to be bad.

Hermogenes/ That's true.

Socrates/ But if neither is right, if it isn't the case that everything always has every attribute simultaneously or that each thing has a being or essence privately for each person, then it is clear that things have some fixed being or essence of their own. They are not in relation to us and are not made to

fluctuate by how they appear to us. They are by themselves, in relation to their own being or essence, which is theirs by nature.

Hermogenes/ I agree, Socrates.

Socrates/ And if things are of such a nature, doesn't the same hold of actions performed in relation to them? Or aren't actions included in some one class of the things that are?

Hermogenes/ Of course they are.

Socrates/ So an action's performance accords with the action's own nature, and not with what we believe. Suppose, for example, that we undertake to cut something. If we make the cut in whatever way we choose and with whatever tool we choose, we will not succeed in cutting. But if in each case we choose to cut in accord with the nature of cutting and being cut and with the natural tool for cutting, we'll succeed and cut correctly. If we try to cut contrary to nature, however, we'll be in error and accomplish nothing.

Hermogenes/ That's my view, at least.

Socrates/ So, again, if we undertake to burn something, our burning mustn't accord with every belief but with the correct one—that is to say, with the one that tells us how that thing burns and is burned naturally, and what the natural tool for burning it is?

Hermogenes/ That's right.

Socrates/ And the same holds of all other actions?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now isn't speaking or saying one sort of action?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then will someone speak correctly if he speaks in whatever way he believes he should speak? Or isn't it rather the case that he will accomplish something and succeed in speaking if he says things in the natural way to say them, in

the natural way for them to be said, and with the natural tool for saying them? But if he speaks in any other way he will be in error and accomplish nothing?

Hermogenes/ I believe so.

Socrates/ Tell me this. Is there something you call speaking the truth and something you call speaking a falsehood?

Hermogenes/ Indeed, there is.

Socrates/ Then some statements are true, while others are false?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And those that say of the things that are that they are, are true, while those that say of the things that are that they are not, are false?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ So it is possible to say both things that are and things that are not in a statement?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is a whole true statement true but not its parts?

Hermogenes/ No, the parts are also true.

Socrates/ Are the large parts true but not the small ones, or are all of them true?

Hermogenes/ In my view, they are all true.

Socrates/ Is there a part of a statement that's smaller than a name?

Hermogenes/ No, it is the smallest.

Socrates/ In a true statement, is this smallest part something that's said?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And, on your view, this part is then true.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And a part of a false statement is false?

Hermogenes/ That's right.

Socrates/ So isn't it possible to say a true or a false name, since true or false statements are possible?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now using names is a part of saying; since it is by using names that people say things.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if speaking or saying is a sort of action, one that is about things, isn't using names also a sort of action?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And didn't we see that actions aren't in relation to us but have a special nature of their own?

Hermogenes/ We did.

Socrates/ So if we are to be consistent with what we said previously, we cannot name things as we choose; rather, we must name them in the natural way for them to be named and with the natural tool for naming them. In that way we'll accomplish something and succeed in naming, otherwise we won't.

Hermogenes/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Again, what one has to cut, one must cut with something?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what one has to weave, one must weave with something? And what one has to drill, one must drill with something?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what one has to name, one must name with something?

Hermogenes/ That's right.

Socrates/ What must drilling be done with?

Hermogenes/ A drill.

Socrates/ Weaving?

Hermogenes/ A shuttle.

Socrates/ And naming?

Hermogenes/ A name.

Socrates/ Well done! So a name is also a sort of tool?

Hermogenes/ That's right.

Socrates/ And suppose I ask, "What sort of tool is a shuttle?" Isn't the answer, "One we weave with"?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ What do we do when we weave? Don't we divide the warp and woof that are mixed together?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Would you answer in the same way about drills and other tools?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And you'd also answer in the same way about names, since they are tools. What do we do when we name?

Hermogenes/ I don't know what to answer.

Socrates/ Don't we instruct each other, that is to say, divide things according to their natures?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So just as a shuttle is a tool for dividing warp and woof, a name is a tool for giving instruction, that is to say, for dividing being.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Isn't a shuttle a weaver's tool?

Hermogenes/ Of course.

Socrates/ So a weaver will use shuttles well; and to use a shuttle well is to use it as a weaver does. By the same token,

an instructor will use names well; and to use a name well is to use it as an instructor does.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ When a weaver uses a shuttle well, whose product is he using?

Hermogenes/ A carpenter's.

Socrates/ Is everyone a carpenter or only those who possess the craft of carpentry?

Hermogenes/ Only those who possess the craft.

Socrates/ And whose product does a driller use well when he uses a drill?

Hermogenes/ A blacksmith's.

Socrates/ And is everyone a blacksmith or only those who possess the craft?

Hermogenes/ Only those who possess the craft.

Socrates/ Good. So whose product does an instructor use when he uses a name?

Hermogenes/ I don't know.

Socrates/ Can you at least tell me this? Who or what provides us with the names we use?

Hermogenes/ I don't know that either.

Socrates/ Don't you think that rules provide us with them?

Hermogenes/ I suppose they do.

Socrates/ So, when an instructor uses a name, he's using the product of a rule-setter.

Hermogenes/ I believe he is.

Socrates/ Do you think that every man is a rule-setter or only the one who possesses the craft?

Hermogenes/ Only the one who possesses the craft.

Socrates/ It follows that it isn't every man who can give names, Hermogenes, but only a name-maker, and he, it

seems, is a rule-setter—the kind of craftsman most rarely found among human beings.

Hermogenes/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Come now, consider where a rule-setter looks in giving names. Use the previous discussion as your guide. Where does a carpenter look in making a shuttle? Isn't it to that sort of thing whose nature is to weave?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Suppose the shuttle breaks while he's making it. Will he make another looking to the broken one? Or will he look to the very form to which he looked in making the one he broke?

Hermogenes/ In my view, he will look to the form.

Socrates/ Then it would be absolutely right to call that what a shuttle itself is.

Hermogenes/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Hence whenever he has to make a shuttle for weaving garments of any sort, whether light or heavy, linen or woolen, mustn't it possess the form of a shuttle? And mustn't he put into it the nature that naturally best suits it to perform its own work?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same holds of all other tools. When a craftsman discovers the type of tool that is naturally suited for a given type of work, he must embody it in the material out of which he is making the tool. He mustn't make the tool in whatever way he happens to choose, but in the natural way. So it seems that a blacksmith must know how to embody in iron the type of drill naturally suited for each type of work.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And a carpenter must embody in wood the type of shuttle naturally suited for each type of weaving.

Hermogenes/ That's right.

Socrates/ Because it seems that there's a type of shuttle that's naturally suited to each type of weaving. And the same holds of tools in general.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ So mustn't a rule-setter also know how to embody in sounds and syllables the name naturally suited to each thing? And if he is to be an authentic giver of names, mustn't he, in making and giving each name, look to what a name itself is? And if different rule-setters do not make each name out of the same syllables, we mustn't forget that different blacksmiths, who are making the same tool for the same type of work, don't all make it out of the same iron. But as long as they give it the same form—even if that form is embodied in different iron—the tool will be correct, whether it is made in Greece or abroad. Isn't that so?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Don't you evaluate Greek and foreign rule-setters in the same way? Provided they give each thing the form of name suited to it, no matter what syllables it is embodied in, they are equally good rule-setters, whether they are in Greece or abroad.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now, who is likely to know whether the appropriate form of shuttle is present in any given bit of wood? A carpenter who makes it or a weaver who uses it?

Hermogenes/ In all likelihood, Socrates, it is the one who uses it.

Socrates/ So who uses what a lyre-maker produces? Isn't he the one who would know best how to supervise the manufacture of lyres and would also know whether what has been made has been well made or not?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Who is that?

Hermogenes/ A lyre-player.

Socrates/ And who will supervise a ship-builder?

Hermogenes/ A ship's captain.

Socrates/ And who can best supervise the work of a rule-setter, whether here or abroad, and judge its products? Isn't it whoever will use them?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And isn't that the person who knows how to ask questions?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And he also knows how to answer them?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what would you call someone who knows how to ask and answer questions? Wouldn't you call him a dialectician?

Hermogenes/ Yes, I would.

Socrates/ So it's the work of a carpenter to make a rudder. And if the rudder is to be a fine one, a ship-captain must supervise him.

Hermogenes/ Evidently.

Socrates/ But it's the work of a rule-setter, it seems, to make a name. And if names are to be given well, a dialectician must supervise him.

Hermogenes/ That's right.

Socrates/ It follows that the giving of names can't be as inconsequential a matter as you think, Hermogenes, nor can it be the work of an inconsequential or chance person. So Cratylus is right in saying that things have natural names, and that not everyone is a craftsman of names, but only

someone who looks to the natural name of each thing and is able to put its form into letters and syllables.

Hermogenes/ I don't know how to oppose you, Socrates. It isn't easy for me suddenly to change my opinion, though. I think you would be more likely to persuade me if you showed me just what this natural correctness of names you're talking about consists in.

Socrates/ My dear Hermogenes, I don't have a position on this. You have forgotten what I told you a while ago, namely that I didn't know about names but that I would investigate them with you. And now that we are investigating them, you and I, at least this much is clearer than before, that names do possess some sort of natural correctness and that it isn't every man who knows how to name things well. Isn't that right?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So our next task is to try to discover what this correctness is, if indeed you want to know.

Hermogenes/ Of course I do.

Socrates/ Then investigate the matter.

Hermogenes/ How am I to do that?

Socrates/ The most correct way is together with people who already know, but you must pay them well and show gratitude besides—these are the sophists. Your brother Callias got his reputation for wisdom from them in return for a lot of money. So you had better beg and implore him to teach you what he learned from Protagoras about the correctness of names, since you haven't yet come into any money of your own.

Hermogenes/ But it would be absurd for me to beg for Protagoras' "Truth," Socrates, as if I desired the things contained in it and thought them worthwhile, when I totally reject them.

Socrates/ Well, if that doesn't suit you, you'll have to learn from Homer and the other poets.

Hermogenes/ And where does Homer say anything about names, Socrates, and what does he say?

Socrates/ In lots of places. The best and most important are the ones in which he distinguishes between the names humans call things and those the gods call them. Or don't you think that these passages tell us something remarkable about the correctness of names? Surely, the gods call things by their naturally correct names—or don't you think so?

Hermogenes/ I certainly know that if they call them by any names at all, it's by the correct ones. But what passages are you referring to?

Socrates/ Do you know where he says that the Trojan river that had single combat with Hephaestus is "called 'Xanthos' by the gods and 'Skamandros' by men"?

Hermogenes/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ And don't you think it's an awe-inspiring thing to know that the river is more correctly called 'Xanthos' than 'Skamandros'? Or consider, if you like, when he says about a certain bird that

The gods call it 'chalcis' but men call it 'cymindis'.

Do you think it's an inconsequential matter to learn that it is far more correct to call this bird 'chalcis' than to call it 'cymindis'? What about all the similar things that Homer and the other poets tell us? For example, that it is more correct to call a certain hill 'Murine' than 'Batieia'? But perhaps these examples are too hard for you and me to figure out. It is easier and more within human power, I think, to investigate the kind of correctness Homer ascribes to 'Skamandrios' and 'Astyanax', which he says are the names of Hector's son. You know, of course, the lines to which I refer.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Which of the names given to the boy do you suppose Homer thought was more correct, 'Astyanax' or 'Skamandrios'?

Hermogenes/ I really can't say.

Socrates/ Look at it this way. If you were asked who gives names more correctly, those who are wiser or those who are more foolish, what would you answer?

Hermogenes/ That it is clearly those who are wiser.

Socrates/ And which class do you think is wiser on the whole, a city's women or its men?

Hermogenes/ Its men.

Socrates/ Now you know, don't you, that Homer tells us that Hector's son was called 'Astyanax' by the men of Troy? But if the men called him 'Astyanax', isn't it clear that 'Skamandrios' must be what the women called him?

Hermogenes/ Probably so.

Socrates/ And didn't Homer also think that the Trojans were wiser than their women?

Hermogenes/ I suppose he did.

Socrates/ So mustn't he have thought that 'Astyanax' was a more correct name for the boy than 'Skamandrios'?

Hermogenes/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Well, let's investigate why it is more correct. Doesn't Homer himself suggest a very good explanation when he says

He alone defended their city and long walls?

For because of this, you see, it seems correct to call the son of the defender 'Astyanax' or lord of the city (astu, anax) which, as Homer says, his father was defending.

Hermogenes/ That seems right to me.

Socrates/ It does? You understand it, Hermogenes? For I don't understand it yet myself.

Hermogenes/ Then I certainly don't.

Socrates/ But, my good friend, didn't Homer also give Hector his name?

Hermogenes/ What if he did?

Socrates/ Well, it seems to me that 'Hector' is more or less the same as 'Astyanax', since both names seem to be Greek. After all, 'lord' ('anax') and 'possessor' ('hektor') signify pretty much the same, since both are names for a king. Surely, a man possesses that of which he is lord, since it is clear that he controls, owns, and has it. But perhaps you think I'm talking nonsense, and that I'm wrong to suppose that I've found a clue to Homer's beliefs about the correctness of names.

Hermogenes/ No, I don't think you're wrong. You may well have found a clue.

Socrates/ At any rate, it seems to me that it is right to call a lion's offspring a 'lion' and a horse's offspring a 'horse'. I'm not talking about some monster other than a horse that happens to be born from a horse but one that is a natural offspring of its kind. If, contrary to nature, a horse gave birth to a calf, it should be called a 'calf', not a 'colt'. And if something that isn't a human offspring is born to a human, I don't think it should be called a 'human'. And the same applies to trees and all the rest. Don't you agree?

Hermogenes/ I agree.

Socrates/ Good. But you had better watch out in case I trick you, for by the same argument any offspring of a king should be called a 'king'. But it doesn't matter whether the same thing is signified by the same syllables or by different ones. And if a letter is added or subtracted, that doesn't matter either, so long as the being or essence of the thing is in control and is expressed in its name.

Hermogenes/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ It's something fairly simple. You know that when we speak of the elements or letters of the alphabet, it is their names we utter, not the letters themselves, except in the case of these four e, u, o, and o. We make names for all the other vowels and consonants, as you know, by uttering additional letters together with them. But as long as we include the force or power of the letter, we may correctly call it by that name, and it will express it for us. Take 'beta', for example. The addition of 'e', T, and 'a' does no harm and doesn't prevent the whole name from expressing the nature of that element or letter which the rule-setter wished to name, so well did he know how to give names to the letters.

Hermogenes/ I believe you're right.

Socrates/ Doesn't the same argument apply to 'king'? For a king will probably be the son of a king, a good man the son of a good man, a fine man the son of a fine one, and so on. So, unless a monster is born, the offspring of a kind will be of the same kind and should be called by the same name. But because of variation in their syllables, names that are really the same seem different to the uninitiated. Similarly, a doctor's medicines, which have different colors and perfumes added to them, appear different to us, although they are really the same and appear the same to a doctor, who looks only to their power to cure and isn't disconcerted by the additives. Similarly, someone who knows about names looks to their force or power and isn't disconcerted if a letter is added, transposed, or subtracted, or even if the force a name possesses is embodied in different letters altogether. So, for example, in the names 'Hector' and 'Astyanax', which we were discussing just now, none of the letters is the same, except T, but they signify the same anyway. And what letters does 'Archepolis'—'Ruler-of-a-city'—have in common with them? Yet, it expresses the same thing. Many other names signify simply king; others signify general, for example, 'Agis'

('Leader',) 'Polemarchus' ('War-lord',) 'Eupolemus' ('Good-warrior'); and still others signify doctor, for example, Tatrocles' ('Famous-healer') and 'Acesimbrotus' ('Healer-of-mortals'.) And we might perhaps find many others, which differ in their letters and syllables, but which have the same force or power when spoken. Is that plain to you or not?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then those that are born according to nature should be given the same names as their fathers.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ What about the ones that are born contrary to nature, those that are some form of monster? For instance, when a good and pious man has an impious son, the latter shouldn't have his father's name but that of the kind to which he belongs, just as in our earlier example of a horse having a calf as offspring?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Therefore the impious son of a pious father should be given the name of the kind to which he belongs.

Hermogenes/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then he shouldn't be called 'Theophilus' ('God-beloved') or 'Mnesitheus' ('Mindful-of-god',) or anything of that sort, but something that signifies the opposite, if indeed names are to be actually correct.

Hermogenes/ That's absolutely right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Thus the name 'Orestes' ('Mountain-man') is surely correct, Hermogenes, whether it was given to him by chance or by some poet, who displayed in his name the brutality, savagery, and ruggedness of his nature.

Hermogenes/ It seems so, Socrates.

Socrates/ And his father's name also seems to accord with nature.

Hermogenes/ It does.

Socrates/ Yes, for Agamemnon is someone who worked hard and persevered, bringing his plans to completion because of his virtue or excellence. The stay of his army in Troy and his perseverance there is a sign of this. And thus the name 'Agamemnon' signifies that this man is admirable (agastos) for holding his ground (epimone.) The name 'Atreus' also seems to be correct; for both his murder of Chrysippus and his cruelty to Thyestes were damaging and destructive (atera) to his virtue. However, the meaning of his name is somewhat distorted and obscure, so that it doesn't express his nature to everyone. But to those who understand about names it adequately expresses what 'Atreus' means. For whether the name accords with his stubbornness (ateires,) or his boldness (atrestos,) or his destructiveness (ateros,) it is correctly given to him. I think Pelops also has a fitting name; for 'Pelops' signifies he who sees only what is near at hand (pelas, opsis.)

Hermogenes/ How is that?

Socrates/ Because, according to legend, he didn't think about or foresee what the long-term consequences of murdering Myrtilus would be for his entire family, or all the misery that would overwhelm them. In his eagerness to win Hippodameia by any available means, he saw only what was ready to hand and on the spot—that is to say, what was nearby (pelas.) Everyone would agree, too, that Tantalus' was given correctly and according to nature, if what's said about its bearer is true.

Hermogenes/ What's that?

Socrates/ They say that many terrible misfortunes happened to him in his life—the last of which was the total overthrow of his country—and that, in Hades, after his death, he had a stone suspended (talanteia) over his head, in

wondrous harmony with his name. It's exactly as if someone had wished to name him 'Talantatos' ('Most-weighed-upon') but had disguised the name and said Tantalus' instead. In some such way, in any case, the chance of legend supplied him with this name. His father, who is said to have been Zeus, also seems to have had an altogether fine name given to him—but it isn't easy to figure out. That's because the name 'Zeus' is exactly like a phrase that we divide into two parts, 'Zena' and 'Dia', some of us using one of them and some the other. But these two names, reunited into one, express the nature of the god—which is just what we said a name should do. Certainly, no one is more the cause of life (zen,) whether for us or for anything else, than the ruler and king of all things. Thus 'Zena' and 'Dia' together correctly name the god that is always the cause of life (di hon zen) for all creatures. But, as I say, his name, which is really one, is divided in two, 'Dia' and 'Zena'. When one hears that Zeus is the son of Cronus, one might find that offensive at first, and it might seem more reasonable to say that he is the offspring of a great intellect. But in fact Cronus' name signifies not a child (koros,) but the purity and clarity of his intellect or understanding. According to legend, he was the son of Uranus (Heaven,) whose name is also correctly given, for the sight of what is above is well called by the name 'ourania' ('heavenly')—looking at the things above (horosa ta and)—and astronomers say, Hermogenes, that that results in purity of intellect. If I could remember Hesiod's genealogy, and the even earlier ancestors of the gods he mentions, I wouldn't have stopped explaining the correctness of the names he gives them, until I had tested this wisdom which has suddenly come upon me—I do not know from where—to see whether or not it holds up till the end.

Hermogenes/ Indeed, Socrates, you do seem to me to be exactly like a prophet who has suddenly been inspired to deliver oracles.

Socrates/ Yes, Hermogenes, and I, for my part, mostly blame Euthyphro, of the deme of Prospalta, for its coming upon me. I was with him at dawn, lending an ear to his lengthy discussion. He must have been inspired, because it looks as though he has not only filled my ears with his superhuman wisdom but taken possession of my soul as well. So it seems to me that this is what we ought to do: Today, we'll use this wisdom and finish our examination of names, but tomorrow, if the rest of you agree, we'll exorcise it and purify ourselves, as soon as we've found someone—whether priest or wise man—who is clever at that kind of purification.

Hermogenes/ That's fine with me. I'd be very glad to hear what remains to be said about names.

Socrates/ Then that's what we must do. Since we now have some sort of outline to follow, which names do you want us to begin with, in order to find out whether names themselves will testify to us that they are not given by chance, but have some sort of correctness? The names that heroes and men are said to have might perhaps deceive us. After all, as we saw at the beginning, they are often given because they are the names of ancestors, and some of them are wholly inappropriate. Many, too, are given in the hope that they will prove appropriate, such as 'Eutychides' ('Son-of-good-fortune',) 'Sosias' ('Savior',) 'Theophilus' ('God-beloved',) and many others. In my view, we must leave such names aside. We are most likely to find correctly given names among those concerned with the things that by nature always are, since it is proper for their names to be given with the greatest care, and some may even be the work of a more than human power.

Hermogenes/ I think that's sensible, Socrates.

Socrates/ So isn't it right to begin by seeing why the name 'theoi' ('gods') is itself one that the gods are correctly called?

Hermogenes/ It probably is.

Socrates/ I suspect something like this. It seems to me that the first inhabitants of Greece believed only in those gods in which many foreigners still believe today—the sun, moon, earth, stars, and sky. And, seeing that these were always moving or running, they gave them the name 'theoi' because it was their nature to run (thein.) Later, when they learned about the other gods, they called them all by that name. Does that seem likely—or am I talking nonsense?

Hermogenes/ It's very likely.

Socrates/ What shall we investigate next? Clearly, it's daemons, then heroes, then humans, isn't it?

Hermogenes/ Yes, daemons are next.

Socrates/ And what is the correct meaning of the name 'daemons', Hermogenes? See if you think there's anything in what I'm about to say.

Hermogenes/ Say it, and I will.

Socrates/ Do you know what Hesiod says daemons are?

Hermogenes/ No, I don't remember.

Socrates/ Do you remember that he speaks of a golden race, which was the first race of human beings to be born?

Hermogenes/ Yes, I remember that.

Socrates/ He says this about it:

> Since this race has been eclipsed by fate,
> They are called sacred daemons;
> They live on earth and are good,
> Warding off evil and guarding mortal men.

Hermogenes/ So what?

Socrates/ Well, I don't think he's saying that the golden race is by nature made of gold, but that it is good and fine. I consider it a proof of this that he calls us a race of iron.

Hermogenes/ That's true.

Socrates/ So don't you think that if someone who presently exists were good, Hesiod would say that he too belonged to the golden race?

Hermogenes/ He probably would.

Socrates/ Are good people any different from wise ones?

Hermogenes/ No, they aren't.

Socrates/ It is principally because daemons are wise and knowing (daemones,) I think, that Hesiod says they are named 'daemons' ('daimones'.) In our older Attic dialect, we actually find the word 'daemones'. So, Hesiod and many other poets speak well when they say that when a good man dies, he has a great destiny and a great honor and becomes a 'daemon', which is a name given to him because it accords with wisdom. And I myself assert, indeed, that every good man, whether alive or dead, is daemonic, and is correctly called a 'daemon'.

Hermogenes/ And I think that I completely agree with you, Socrates. But what about the name 'hero' ('herds')? What is it?

Socrates/ That one isn't so hard to understand because the name has been little altered. It expresses the fact that heroes were born out of love (erōs.)

Hermogenes/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Don't you know that the heroes are demigods?

Hermogenes/ So what?

Socrates/ So all of them sprang from the love of a god for a mortal woman or of a mortal man for a goddess. And if, as before, you investigate the matter by relying on old Attic, you will get a better understanding, since it will show you that the name 'hero' ('herds') is only a slightly altered form of the word 'love' ('eros')—the very thing from which the heroes sprang. And either this is the reason they were called 'heroes' or else because they were sophists, clever speech-makers (rhetores)

and dialecticians, skilled questioners (erotan)—for 'eirein' is the same as 'legein' ('to speak'.) And therefore, as we were saying just now, in the Attic dialect, the heroes turn out to be speech-makers and questioners. Hence the noble breed of heroes turns out be a race of speech-makers and sophists. That isn't hard to understand. But can you tell me why members of the human race are called 'humans' ('anthropoi')? That's much harder to understand.

Hermogenes/ How could I do that, Socrates? I wouldn't strain myself to find it even if I could, because I think you're much more likely to find it than I am.

Socrates/ You really do have faith in Euthyphro's inspiration, it seems.

Hermogenes/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And you're certainly right to have faith in it. Indeed, I seem to have had such a clever insight just now, that, if I'm not careful, I'll be in danger of becoming altogether too wise before the day is out. So pay attention. First of all, we must bear in mind the following point about names: we often add letters or take them out and change the accents as well, thus swerving aside from what we want to name. For instance, take 'Dii philos' ('Friend-to-Zeus'.) In order for us to have a name instead of a phrase, we took out the second and pronounced the second syllable with a grave accent instead of an acute ('Diphilos'.) In other cases, we do the opposite, inserting letters and pronouncing a syllable with an acute accent instead of a grave.

Hermogenes/ That's true.

Socrates/ Now, I think our name for human beings is a case of just this sort. It was a phrase but became a name. One letter—'a'—has been taken away and the accent on the final syllable has become a grave.

Hermogenes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ The name ‘human’ signifies that the other animals do not investigate or reason about anything they see, nor do they observe anything closely. But a human being no sooner sees something—that is to say, ‘opope’—than he observes it closely and reasons about it. Hence human beings alone among the animals are correctly named ‘anthropos’—one who observes closely what he has seen (anathron ha opope.)

Hermogenes/ What comes next? May I tell you what I'd like to have explained?

Socrates/ Of course.

Hermogenes/ It seems to me to be next in order. We speak of the body and soul of a human being.

Socrates/ Certainly.

Hermogenes/ Then let’s try to analyze their names as we did the previous ones.

Socrates/ Are you saying that we should investigate whether soul and then body are reasonably named?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Speaking off the top of my head, I think that those who gave soul its name had something like this in mind. They thought that when the soul is present in the body, it causes it to live and gives it the power to breathe the air and be revitalized (anapsuchon,) and that when this revitalization fails, the body dies and is finished. It’s for this reason, I think, that they called it ‘soul’ (‘psuche.) But hold on a minute, if you don’t mind, for I imagine that the followers of Euthyphro would despise this analysis and think it crude. But I think I glimpse one they will find more persuasive. Have a look and see whether it pleases you.

Hermogenes/ Tell it to me and I will.

Socrates/ When you consider the nature of everybody, what, besides the soul, do you think sustains and supports it, so that it lives and moves about?

Hermogenes/ There isn't anything.

Socrates/ What about when you consider the nature of everything else? Don't you agree with Anaxagoras that it is ordered and sustained by mind or soul?

Hermogenes/ I do.

Socrates/ So a fine name to give this power, which supports and sustains (ochei kai echei) the whole of nature (phusis,) would be 'nature-sustainer' ('phuseche'.) This may also be pronounced more elegantly, 'psuche'.

Hermogenes/ Absolutely, and I also think this is a more scientific explanation than the other.

Socrates/ Yes, it is. Nevertheless, it sounds funny when it's named in the true way, with its actual name (i.e., 'phuseche'.)

Hermogenes/ What are we going to say about the next one?

Socrates/ Are you referring to the name 'body'?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ There's a lot to say, it seems to me—and if one distorted the name a little, there would be even more. Thus some people say that the body (soma) is the tomb (sema) of the soul, on the grounds that it is entombed in its present life, while others say that it is correctly called 'a sign' ('sema') because the soul signifies whatever it wants to signify by means of the body. I think it is most likely the followers of Orpheus who gave the body its name, with the idea that the soul is being punished for something, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is securely kept (sozetai)—as the name 'soma' itself suggests—until the penalty is paid; for, on this view, not even a single letter of the word needs to be changed.

Hermogenes/ I think we've adequately examined these names, Socrates. But could we investigate the names of the other gods along the lines of your earlier discussion of 'Zeus', to see with what kind of correctness they have been given?

Socrates/ By Zeus, we certainly can, Hermogenes. The first and finest line of investigation, which as intelligent people we must acknowledge, is this, that we admit that we know nothing about the gods themselves or about the names they call themselves—although it is clear that they call themselves by true ones. The second best line on the correctness of names is to say, as is customary in our prayers, that we hope the gods are pleased by the names we give them, since we know no others. I think this is an excellent custom. So, if it's all right with you, let's begin our investigation by first announcing to the gods that we will not be investigating them—since we do not regard ourselves as worthy to conduct such an investigation—but rather human beings, and the beliefs they had in giving the gods their names. After all, there's no offense in doing that.

Hermogenes/ What you say seems reasonable to me, Socrates, so let's proceed as you suggest.

Socrates/ Shall we begin, as is customary, with Hestia?

Hermogenes/ All right.

Socrates/ What do you think the person who gave Hestia her name had in mind by naming her that?

Hermogenes/ That's no easy question to answer, in my opinion.

Socrates/ At any rate, Hermogenes, the first name-givers weren't ordinary people, but lofty thinkers and subtle reasoners.

Hermogenes/ What of it?

Socrates/ Well, it's obvious to me that it was people of this sort who gave things names, for even if one investigates names

foreign to Attic Greek, it is equally easy to discover what they mean. In the case of what we in Attic call 'ousia' ('being',) for example, some call it 'essia' and others 'osia'. First, then, it is reasonable, according to the second of these names, to call the being or essence (ousia) of things 'Hestia'. Besides, we ourselves say that what partakes of being 'is' Restin',) so being is also correctly called 'Hestia' for this reason. We even seem to have called being 'essia' in ancient times. And, if one has sacrifices in mind, one will realize that the name-givers themselves understood matters in this way, for anyone who called the being or essence of all things 'essia' would naturally sacrifice to Hestia before all the other gods. On the other hand, those who use the name 'osia' seem to agree pretty much with Heraclitus' doctrine that the things that are, are all flowing and that nothing stands fast—for the cause and originator of them is then the pusher (iothoun,) and so is well named 'osia'. But that's enough for us to say about this, since we know nothing. After Hestia, it is right to investigate Rhea and Cronus, though we've already discussed the latter's name. Now, maybe what I'm about to tell you is nonsense.

Hermogenes/ Why do you say that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because I've got a whole swarm of wisdom in my mind!

Hermogenes/ What sort of wisdom?

Socrates/ It sounds completely absurd, yet it seems to me to have something very plausible about it.

Hermogenes/ How so?

Socrates/ I seem to see Heraclitus spouting some ancient bits of wisdom that Homer also tells us—wisdom as old as the days of Cronus and Rhea.

Hermogenes/ What are you referring to?

Socrates/ Heraclitus says somewhere that "everything gives way and nothing stands fast," and, likening the things

that are to the flowing (rhoe) of a river, he says that "you cannot step into the same river twice."

Hermogenes/ So he does.

Socrates/ Well, then, don't you think that whoever gave the names 'Rhea' and 'Cronus' to the ancestors of the other gods understood things in the same way as Heraclitus? Or do you think he gave them both the names of streams (rheumata) merely by chance? Similarly, Homer speaks of Ocean, origin of the gods, and their mother Tethys; I think Hesiod says much the same. Orpheus, too, says somewhere that

> Fair-flowing Ocean was the first to marry,
> And he wedded his sister, the daughter of his mother.

See how they agree with each other, and how they all lean towards the doctrines of Heraclitus.

Hermogenes/ I think there's something in what you say, Socrates, but I don't understand what the name 'Tethys' means.

Socrates/ But it practically tells you itself that it is the slightly disguised name of a spring! After all, what is strained (diattomenon) and filtered (iethoumenon) is like a spring, and the name 'Tethys' is a compound of these two names.

Hermogenes/ That's elegant, Socrates.

Socrates/ Indeed, it is. But what comes next? We've already talked about Zeus.

Hermogenes/ Yes, we have.

Socrates/ So let's discuss his brothers, Posidon and Pluto (whether we call him 'Pluto' or by his other name.)

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It seems to me that whoever first gave Posidon his name, gave it to him because he saw that the force of the waves stopped him from walking and prevented him from going any further, just like a shackle around his feet (desmos

ton podon.) So he called this god, who is the ruler of the sea's power, 'Posidon', because his 'feet were shackled' ('posides-mon')—the 'e' was probably added for the sake of euphony. But perhaps this isn't what it says. Perhaps, instead of the 's' the name was originally pronounced with a double 'l', because many things are known (poll' eidos) to the god. Or maybe he was called 'The Shaker' ('ho seion',) because he shook (seiein) the earth, and the 'p' and" were added on. As for Pluto, he was given that name because it accords with his being the source of wealth (ploutos,) since wealth comes up from below the ground. It seems to me that most people call him by the name 'Pluto', because they are afraid of what they can't see (aeides,) and they assume that his other name, 'Hades', associates him with that.

Hermogenes/ And what do you think yourself, Socrates?

Socrates/ I think people have lots of mistaken opinions about the power of this god and are unduly afraid of him. They are afraid because once we are dead we remain in his realm forever. They are terrified because the soul goes there stripped of the body. But I think that all these things, together with the name and office of the god, point in the same direction.

Hermogenes/ How so?

Socrates/ I'll tell you how it looks to me. But first answer me this: Of the shackles that bind a living being and keep him in a place, which is stronger, force or desire?

Hermogenes/ Desire is far stronger, Socrates.

Socrates/ Don't you think then that many people would escape from Hades, if he didn't bind those who come to him with the strongest of shackles?

Hermogenes/ Clearly.

Socrates/ So, if he is to bind them with the strongest of shackles, rather than holding them by force, he must, it seems, bind them with some sort of desire.

Hermogenes/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Now, there are lots of desires, aren't there?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, if he is really going to hold them with the greatest shackles, he has to bind them with the greatest desire.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is any desire greater than the desire to associate with someone whose company one believes will make one a better man?

Hermogenes/ No, there certainly isn't, Socrates.

Socrates/ So let's say that it is for these reasons, Hermogenes, that hitherto no one has wished to come back here from there. The words Hades knows how to speak are so beautiful, it seems, that everyone—even the Sirens—has been overcome by his enchantments. On this account, therefore, this god is a perfect sophist, and a great benefactor to those who are with him. So great is the wealth that surrounds him there below, indeed, that he even sends many good things to us from it. This is how he got the name 'Pluto'. On the other hand, because he is unwilling to associate with human beings while they have their bodies, but converses with them only when their souls are purified of all the desires and evils of the body, doesn't he seem to you to be a philosopher? For hasn't he well understood that when people are free of their bodies he can bind them with the desire for virtue, but that while they feel the agitation and madness of the body not even the famous shackles of his father Cronus could keep them with him?

Hermogenes/ Probably so, Socrates.

Socrates/ It's much more likely then, Hermogenes, that Hades derives his name not from what cannot be seen (aeides,) but from the fact that he knows (eidenai) everything

fine and beautiful, and that that is why the rule-setter called him 'Hades'.

Hermogenes/ All right. But what about Demeter, Hera, Apollo, Athena, Hephaestus, and all the other gods? What are we to say about them?

Socrates/ Demeter seems to have been so called because she gives (di-dousa) nourishment just like a mother (meter); Hera is a loveable one (erate,) and, indeed, Zeus is said to have married her for love. But perhaps the rule-setter, being a lofty thinker, called her 'Hera' as a disguised name for air (aer,) putting the end of her name at the beginning—you'll get the idea if you repeat the name 'Hera' over and over. As for 'pherrephatta': it seems that many people dread the names 'Pherrephatta' and 'Apollo' because they are ignorant about the correctness of names, for they change the first name to 'Phersephone', and then it seems terrifying to them. But really the name 'Pherrephatta' indicates that the goddess is wise—for since things are being swept along, wisdom is the power to grasp (ephaptomenon,) comprehend (epaphon,) and follow (epakolouthein) them. Thus it would be correct to call this goddess 'Pherepapha', or something like that, because of her wisdom, that is to say, her power to comprehend what is being swept along (epaphe tou pheromenou)—this is also the reason that Hades, since he is himself wise, associates with her. But people nowadays attach more importance to euphony than to truth, so they distort her name and call her 'Pherrephatta'. And, as I said, the same thing has happened to Apollo. Many people are afraid of his name because they think it indicates something terrifying. Haven't you noticed this?

Hermogenes/ I certainly have, and what you say is true.

Socrates/ In my view, however, the name is most beautifully suited to the power of the god.

Hermogenes/ How so?

Socrates/ I'll try to say how it seems to me, at least. I think no single name could be more in keeping with the four powers of the god. It comprehends each of them, expressing his power in music, prophecy, medicine, and archery.

Hermogenes/ It's a pretty remarkable name you're talking about; so go ahead and explain it.

Socrates/ It's certainly a harmonious one. After all, it's the name of the god of music. To begin with, the purgations and purifications that doctors and prophets use, the fumigations with medicinal and magical drugs, and the various washings and sprinklings that are involved in these processes, all have the same effect, don't they, namely, to make a person pure in body and soul?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But isn't Apollo the purifying god who washes away (apolouon) such evil impurities and releases (apoluon) us from them?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Since he washes and releases and is a doctor for our evil impurities, he might correctly be called 'Apolouon' (The Washer'.) On the other hand, it may well be most correct to call him by the name the Thessalians use, since it accords with his prophecy, that is to say, with his single-mindedness (haploun) or truthfulness (these being the same thing,) for all the Thessalians call this god 'Aploun'. And since he always (aei) makes his shots (bolon,) because of his skill in archery, he is also 'Aeiballon' ('Always-shooting'.) To understand how his name accords with his musical powers, we have to understand that the letter 'a' often signifies togetherness (to homou,) as it does in 'akolouthos' ('follower' or 'attendant') and 'akoitis' ('bed-fellow', 'spouse', 'husband'.) In this case, it signifies moving together (homou polesis,) whether the moving together of the heavens around what we call the 'poles' ('poloi',)

or the harmonious moving together in music, which we call 'being in concert' ('sumphonia'); for, as those who are clever in astronomy and music say, all these things move together simultaneously by a kind of harmony. Apollo is the god who directs the harmony, and makes all things move together (homopolon,) whether for gods or human beings. So, just as the names 'akolouthos' and 'akoitis' are derived from 'homokolouthos' and 'homokoitis' by replacing 'homo' with 'a', we called him 'Apollo', though he was really 'Homopolon' ('the one who makes things move together'.) We inserted the second 'l' lest his name become an oppressive one. Even as it is, indeed, some people, who haven't correctly investigated the force or power of his name, are afraid of it, because they suspect that it does signify some kind of destructiveness. But, as we said earlier, it really comprehends each of the powers of the god, who is a single-minded, always shooting washer, who makes things move together. As for the Muses and music and poetry in general, they seem to have derived their name from their eager desire (mosthai) to investigate and do philosophy. Leto is so-called because of being very gentle (pra(i)otetos) and willing (ethelemos) to do whatever is asked of her. Or perhaps her name derives from the one used by those who speak dialects other than Attic, many of whom call her 'Letho'—apparently on account of the fact that her character isn't rough but gentle and smooth (leion.) Artemis appears to have been so-called because of her soundness (artemes) and orderliness, and because of her desire for virginity (parthenia.) Or perhaps the one who gave her that name was calling her 'an investigator of virtue' ('aretes histor') or 'a hater of sexual intercourse between men and women' ('aroton misesases'.) It is for some one of these reasons or for all of them that the one who gave this name to the goddess gave it to her.

Hermogenes/ What about 'Dionysos' and 'Aphrodite'?

Socrates/ You're asking great things of me, son of Hipponicus, because there is not only a serious way of explaining the names of these divinities but a playful one as well. You'll have to ask others for the serious one, but there's nothing to prevent us from going through the playful one—even the gods love play. Dionysos, the giver of wine (ho didous ton oinon,) might playfully be called 'Didoinusos'; while wine (oinos) would most justly be called 'oionous', since it makes most drinkers think they understood (oiesthai noun echein) when they don't. As far as Aphrodite is concerned, there's no point in contradicting Hesiod—we should agree with him that she is called 'Aphrodite' because she was born from foam (aphros)?

Hermogenes/ Being an Athenian, Socrates, you surely aren't going to forget Athena, or Hephaestus and Ares either, for that matter.

Socrates/ Not likely.

Hermogenes/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ It isn't hard to explain how Athena got her other name.

Hermogenes/ Which one?

Socrates/ 'Pallas'—you know we call her that.

Hermogenes/ Of course.

Socrates/ In my view, we would be correct to think that this name derives from her dancing in arms and armor, for lifting oneself or anything else up, whether from the ground or in one's hands, is called 'shaking' ('pallein') and 'dancing' or 'being shaken' ('pallesthai') and 'being danced'.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ She's called 'Pallas' because of this.

Hermogenes/ And correctly so. But how do you explain her other name?

Socrates/ You mean ‘Athena’?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ That’s a much weightier issue, my friend. The ancients seem to have had the same opinion about Athena as do contemporary experts on Homer. Many of them say in their interpretations of the poet that he represents Athena as Understanding or Thought. The maker of names seems to think the same sort of thing about the goddess. Indeed, he speaks of her in still grander terms, saying she is the very mind of god (theou noesis,) as if she is ‘ha theonoa’—using ‘a’ in the non-Attic style in place of ‘ē’ and deleting ‘i’ and ‘s’. But perhaps this isn’t the explanation. Perhaps what he called her was ‘Theonoe’, because of her unparalleled knowledge of divine things (ta theia noousa.) Nor would we be far off the mark if we supposed that what he called her was ‘Ethonoe’, because he wanted to identify the goddess with her understanding character (he en toi ethei noesis.) Then he himself or others after him made the name more beautiful, as they thought, and called her ‘Athenaa’.

Hermogenes/ What about Hephaestus? How do you explain him?

Socrates/ Are you asking me about the noble judge of light (phaeos histor)?

Hermogenes/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Isn’t it clear to everyone then that he is ‘Phaestus’ with an ‘e’ added on?

Hermogenes/ It probably is—unless you happen to have yet another opinion on the matter. And you probably do.

Socrates/ Then to prevent me from giving it, ask me about Ares.

Hermogenes/ Consider yourself asked!

Socrates/ All right, if that's what you want. It is proper for a god who is in every way warlike to be called 'Ares', for 'Ares' accords with virility (arren) and courage (andreia,) or with a hard and unbending nature, the one that is called 'arratos'.

Hermogenes/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ Then for god's sake let's leave the subject of the gods, because it frightens me to talk about them. But ask me about anything else you like, "until we see what the horses" of Euthyphro "can do."

Hermogenes/ I'll do that, but there is still one god I want to ask you about, and that's Hermes, since Cratylus says that I am no Hermogenes (Son-of-Hermes.) So let's examine the name 'Hermes' and its meaning, to see whether there's anything in what he says.

Socrates/ Well, the name 'Hermes' seems to have something to do with speech: he is an interpreter (hermeneus,) a messenger, a thief and a deceiver in words, a wheeler-dealer—and all these activities involve the power of speech. Now, as we mentioned before, 'eirein' means 'to use words', and the other part of the name says—as Homer often does—'emesato' ('he contrived',) which means 'to devise'. And it was out of these two words that the rule-setter established the name of the god who devised speech (legein) and words, since 'eirein' means the same as 'legein' ('to speak'.) It's just as if he had told us: "Humans, it would be right for you to call the god who has contrived speech (to eirein emesato) 'Eirernes'." But we, beautifying the name, as we suppose, call him 'Hermes' nowadays.

Hermogenes/ I'm certain that Cratylus was right when he said that I'm no Hermogenes then, since I'm no good at devising speeches.

Socrates/ But it is reasonable for Pan to be Hermes' double-natured son.

Hermogenes/ How so?

Socrates/ You know speech signifies all things (to pan) and keeps them circulating and always going about, and that it has two forms—true and false?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, the true part is smooth and divine and dwells among the gods above, while the false part dwells below among the human masses, and is rough and goatish (tragikon); for it is here, in the tragic (tragikon) life, that one finds the vast majority of myths and falsehoods.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Therefore the one who expresses all things (pan) and keeps them always in circulation (aei polon) is correctly called 'Pan-the-goat-herd' ('Pan aipolos'.) The double-natured son of Hermes, he is smooth in his upper parts, and rough and goatish in the ones below. He is either speech itself or the brother of speech, since he is the son of Hermes. And it's not a bit surprising that a brother resembles his brother. But, as I said, let's leave the gods.

Hermogenes/ That sort of gods, Socrates, if that's what you want. But what keeps you from discussing these gods: the sun and moon, and stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, and the seasons and the year?

Socrates/ That's a lot you're asking of me! All the same, if it will please you, I am willing.

Hermogenes/ Of course, it will.

Socrates/ Which one do you want me to take up first? Or, since you mentioned the sun (helios) first, shall we begin with it?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If we use the Doric form of the name, I think matters will become clearer, for the Dorians call the sun

‘halios’. So ‘halios’ might accord with the fact that the sun collects (halizein) people together when it rises, or with the fact that it is always rolling (aei heilein ion) in its course around the earth, or with the fact that it seems to color (poikillei) the products of the earth, for ‘poikillein’ means the same as ‘aiolein’ (‘to shift rapidly to and fro’.)

Hermogenes/ What about the moon (selene)?

Socrates/ The name certainly seems to put Anaxagoras in an awkward position.

Hermogenes/ Why is that?

Socrates/ It seems to reveal that his recent theory about the moon deriving its light from the sun is in fact quite old.

Hermogenes/ In what way?

Socrates/ Selas (bright light) and phos (light) are the same thing.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, if what the Anaxagoreans say is true, the light of the moon (selene) is always both new (neon) and old (henon,) for they say that as the sun circles around the moon it always casts new light on it, but that the light from the previous month also remains there.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But many people call the moon ‘Selanaia’.

Hermogenes/ Yes, they do.

Socrates/ And, since its light is always both new and old (selas neon kai enon echei aei,) the right name to call it is ‘Selaenoneoaeia’, and this is the one that has been compressed into ‘Selanaia’.

Hermogenes/ And a dithyrambic name it is too, Socrates! But what have you to say about the month and the stars?

Socrates/ The correct name to call a month (meis) is ‘meies’ from ‘meious-thai' (‘to grow smaller’.) And the stars (astra)

seem to get their name given to them from 'astrape' ('lightning',) for lightning is what causes the eyes to turn upward (anastrephei ta opa.) Hence, it should really be called 'an-astrope', but nowadays the name is beautified and it is called 'astrape'.

Hermogenes/ What about fire and water?

Socrates/ I'm really puzzled about fire (pur.) So either Euthyphro's muse has abandoned me or this really is very hard. But notice the device I use in all such puzzling cases.

Hermogenes/ What is that?

Socrates/ I'll tell you. But first answer me this. Could you say in what way pur (fire) comes to be so called?

Hermogenes/ I certainly can't.

Socrates/ Here's what I suspect. I think that the Greeks, especially those who live abroad, have adopted many names from foreign tongues.

Hermogenes/ What of it?

Socrates/ Well, if someone were trying to discover whether these names had been reasonably given, and he treated them as belonging to the Greek language rather than the one they really come from, you know that he would be in a quandary.

Hermogenes/ He very probably would.

Socrates/ Now, look at 'fire' ('pur') and see whether it isn't a foreign name—for it certainly isn't easy to connect it with the Greek language. Besides, it's obvious that the Phrygrians use the same name slightly altered. And the same holds for 'water' ('hudor) and 'dog' ('kuon',) and lots of others.

Hermogenes/ So it does.

Socrates/ Consequently, though one might say something about these names, one mustn't push them too far. That, then, is how I get rid of 'fire' ('pur') and 'water' ('hudor'.) But what about air, Hermogenes? Is it called 'aer' because it raises

(airei) things from the earth? Or because it is always flowing (aei rhea)? Or because wind (pneuma) arises from its flow? For the poets call the winds (pneumata) 'gales' (aetai',) don't they? So, perhaps a poet says 'aetorrous' ('gale flow') in place of 'pneumatorrous' ('wind flow',) thereby indicating that what he is talking about is air. As for aether, I'd explain it as follows: it is right to call it 'aeitheer', because it is always running and flowing (aei thei rheon) about the air. The earth (ge) is better signified by the name 'gaia'; for gaia is correctly called a 'mother', as Homer tells us by using 'gegaasi' for 'to be born'. All right, what was to come next?

Hermogenes/ 'Seasons' ('Horai',) Socrates, and the two names for the year, 'eniautos' and 'etos'.

Socrates/ If you want to know the probable truth about the name 'horai' ('seasons',) you must look to the fact that it is spelled 'horai' in old Attic. The seasons are rightly called 'horai' ('things that distinguish or mark off one thing from another',) because they distinguish (horizein) the weathers of winter and summer, the winds, and the fruits of the earth. As for 'eniautos' and 'etos', they are actually one name. We saw earlier that Zeus' name was divided in two—some called him 'Zena', some 'Dia' in the accusative. Well, exactly the same is true of the name of the year. It is the year by itself that brings the plants and animals of the earth to light, each in its proper season, and passes them in review within itself (en heautoi exetazei.) Hence, some people call it 'etos', because it passes things in review (etazei,) while others call it 'eniautos', because it does this within itself (en heautoi.) The whole phrase is 'passing things in review within itself' ('en heautoi etazon',) but this single phrase results in the year being called these two different names. Thus, the two names, 'eniautos' and 'etos', derive from a single phrase.

Hermogenes/ I say, Socrates, you are making great progress!

Socrates/ I think I'm driving my apparent wisdom pretty hard at present.

Hermogenes/ You certainly are.

Socrates/ You'll be even more certain in a second.

Hermogenes/ Now that we've examined that sort of name, I'd next like to see with what correctness the names of the virtues are given. I mean 'wisdom' ('phronesis',) 'comprehension' ('sunesis',) 'justice' ('dikaiosune',) and all the other fine names of that sort.

Socrates/ That's no inconsequential class of names you're stirring up, Hermogenes, but, since I have put on the lion's skin, I mustn't lose heart. So, it seems I must investigate 'wisdom', 'comprehension', 'judgment' ('gnome',) 'knowledge' ('episteme',) and all those other fine names of which you speak.

Hermogenes/ We certainly mustn't stop until we've done so.

Socrates/ By the dog, I think that's a pretty good inspiration—what popped into my mind just now! Most of our wise men nowadays get so dizzy going around and around in their search for the nature of the things that are, that the things themselves appear to them to be turning around and moving every which way. Well, I think that the people who gave things their names in very ancient times are exactly like these wise men. They don't blame this on their own internal condition, however, but on the nature of the things themselves, which they think are never stable or steadfast, but flowing and moving, full of every sort of motion and constant coming into being. I say this, because the names you just mentioned put me in mind of it.

Hermogenes/ How did they do that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Perhaps you didn't notice that they are given on the assumption that the things they name are moving, flowing, and coming into being.

Hermogenes/ No, I didn't think of that at all.

Socrates/ Well, to begin with, the first name we mentioned is undoubtedly like this.

Hermogenes/ What name was that?

Socrates/ 'Wisdom' ('phronesis'.) Wisdom is the understanding of motion (phoras noesis) and flow. Or it might be interpreted as taking delight in motion (phoras onesis.) In either case, it has to do with motion. If you want another example, the name 'judgment' ('gnome') expresses the fact that to judge is to examine or study whatever is begotten (gones nomesis); for 'studying' ('noman') and 'examining' ('skopein') are the same. And if you want yet another example, understanding (noesis) itself is the longing for the new (neou hesis.) But to say that the things that are, are new is to signify that they are always coming into being. And such things are what the soul longs for, as the giver of the name, 'neoesis' expressed, for the ancient name wasn't 'noesis' but 'noesis', but an 'e' took the place of the double 'e'. Moderation (sophrosune) is the savior (soteria) of the wisdom (phronesis) we just looked at. 'Knowledge' ('episteme') indicates that a worthwhile soul follows (hepetai) the movement of things, neither falling behind nor running on ahead. So we ought to insert an 'e' in the name and spell it 'hepeisteme'. Comprehension (sunesis,) in turn, seems to be a kind of summing up (sullogismos,) and whenever one says 'comprehends' ('sunienai',) it's exactly as if one has said 'knows' ('epistasthai',) for 'sunienai' (literally, 'goes along with') means that the soul 'journeys together' with things. As for 'wisdom' ('sophia',) it signifies the grasp of motion. But it is rather obscure and non-Attic. Nonetheless, we must

remember that the poets often say of something that begins to advance quickly that it "rushed" ("esuthe".) Indeed, there was a famous Spartan man named 'Sous', for this is what the Spartans call a rapid advance. 'Wisdom' signifies the grasping (epaphe) of this motion, on the assumption that the things that are, are moving. The name 'good' ('agathon') is intended to signify everything in nature that is admirable (agaston.) The things that are, are moving, but some are moving quickly, others slowly. So what moves quickly is not all there is, but the admirable part of it. Hence this name 'tagathon' ('the good') is applied to what is admirable (agaston) about the fast (thoon.)

It's easy to figure out that 'justice' ('dikaiosune') is the name given to the comprehension of the just (dikaiou sunesis,) but the just itself is hard to understand. It seems that many people agree with one another about it up to a point, but beyond that they disagree. Those who think that the universe is in motion believe that most of it is of such a kind as to do nothing but give way, but that something penetrates all of it and generates everything that comes into being. This, they say, is the fastest and smallest thing of all; for if it were not the smallest, so that nothing could keep it out, or not the fastest, so that it could treat all other things as though they were standing still, it wouldn't be able to travel through everything. However, since it is governor and penetrator (diaion) of everything else, it is rightly called 'just' ('dikaion')—the 'k'-sound is added for the sake of euphony. As I was saying before, many people agree about the just up to this point. As for myself, Hermogenes, because I persisted at it, I learned all about the matter in secret—that this is the just and the cause, since that through which (di ho) a thing comes to be is the cause. Indeed, someone told me that it is correct to call this 'Dia' ('Zeus') for that reason. Even when I'd heard this, however, I persisted in gently asking, "If all this is true, my

friend, what actually is the just?" Thereupon, they think I am asking too many questions and demanding the impossible, and they tell me that I have already learned enough. Then they try to satisfy me by having each tell me his own view. But they disagree with each other. One says that the just is the sun, since only the sun governs all of the things that are, penetrating (diaion) and burning (kaon) them. Well-satisfied, I tell this fine answer to one of the others, but he ridicules me by asking if I think nothing just ever happens in human affairs once the sun has set. So I persist, and ask him to tell me what he thinks the just is, and he says that it is fire {to pur)—but that isn't easy to understand. Another says that it isn't fire, but the heat itself that is in fire. Another says that all these explanations are ridiculous, and that the just is what Anaxagoras talks about, namely, mind; for he says that mind is self-ruling, mixes with nothing else, orders the things that are, and travels through everything. Thereupon, my friend, I am even more perplexed than when I set out to learn what the just is. However, the goal of our investigation was the name 'just', and it seems to have been given for the reasons we mentioned.

Hermogenes/ I think you really must have heard this from someone, Socrates, rather than making it up as you went along.

Socrates/ What about the other explanations I've mentioned?

Hermogenes/ I certainly don't think you heard those.

Socrates/ Listen, then, and perhaps I'll be able to deceive you into thinking that I haven't heard the remaining ones either. After justice what's left? I don't think we've discussed courage—but it's clear that injustice (adikia) is really nothing more than a hindering of that which penetrates (idiaion.) 'Courage' ('andreia') signifies that this virtue was given its

name in battle. And if indeed the things that are, are flowing, then a battle cannot be anything but an opposing flow. If we remove the "from 'andreia' to get 'anreia' ('flowing back',) the name itself indicates this fact. Of course, it is clear that courage doesn't oppose every flow, but only the one that is contrary to justice; otherwise, courage wouldn't be praiseworthy. Similarly, 'male' ('arren') and 'man' ('aner') indicate upward flow (and rhoe.) It seems to me that 'gune' ('woman') wants to be 'gone' ('womb',) that 'thelus' ('female') comes from 'thele' ('nipple',) and that a nipple (thele) is so-called, Hermogenes, because it makes things flourish (tethelenai) in just the way that watering makes plants flourish.

Hermogenes/ Probably so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, 'thallein' itself seems to me to be like the sudden and rapid growth of the young, for the name-giver has imitated something like this in the name, which he put together from 'theiri ('to run') and 'hallesthai' ('to jump'.) Notice how I go off course, when I get on the flat. But there are still plenty of names left that seem important.

Hermogenes/ That's true.

Socrates/ And one of them is to see what the name 'techne' ('craft') means.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If you remove the T and insert an 'o' between the 'ch' and the 'n' and the 'n' and the 'e', doesn't it signify the possession of understanding (hexis nou)?

Hermogenes/ Yes, Socrates, but getting it to do so is like trying to haul a boat up a very sticky ramp!

Socrates/ But then you know, Hermogenes, that the first names given to things have long since been covered over by those who wanted to dress them up, and that letters were added or subtracted to make them sound good in the mouth,

resulting in distortions and ornamentation of every kind. You know, too, that time has had a share in this process. Take 'katoptron ('mirror',) for example, don't you think that the V is an absurd addition? In my view, this sort of thing is the work of people who think nothing of the truth, but only of the sounds their mouths make. Hence, they keep embellishing the first names, until finally a name is reached that no human being can understand. One example, among many others, is that they call the Sphinx by that name instead of 'Phix'.

Hermogenes/ That's right, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet, if we can add whatever we like to names, or subtract whatever we like from them, it will be far too easy to fit any name to anything.

Hermogenes/ That's true.

Socrates/ Yes, it is true. So, I think a wise supervisor, like yourself, will have to keep a close watch, to preserve balance and probability.

Hermogenes/ That's what I want to do.

Socrates/ And I want to do it along with you, Hermogenes, but don't demand too much precision, in case You enfeeble my strength.

Now that 'techne' is out of the way, I'm about to come to the summit of our inquiries. But first I'll investigate 'mechane' ('device'.) It seems to me that 'mechane' signifies great accomplishment (anein epi polu); for 'mekos' signifies some sort of greatness, and these two, 'mekos' and 'anein' make up the name 'mechane'. But, as I was saying just now, we must go on to the summit of our inquiries, and investigate the names 'arete' ('virtue') and 'kakia' ('vice'.) I don't yet understand the first of them, but the other seems clear enough, since it is in harmony with everything we said before. To the degree that things are in motion, all that is moving badly (kakos ion) should be called 'kakia', but the name for all

such things is mostly given to a soul in which this bad movement in relation to things resides. It seems to me that the name 'deilia' ('cowardice',) which we haven't discussed, expresses what this bad movement is. —We ought to have discussed 'deilia' after 'andreia' ('courage',) but we passed it by, as I believe we have passed by lots of other names. —Now, 'deilia' signifies the soul's being bound with a strong shackle (desmos,) for lian (too much) is a degree of strength. Therefore, 'deilia' signifies the strongest of the soul's shackles.

Aporia (perplexity, inability to move on) is a vice of the same sort, and so, it seems, is everything else that hinders movement and motion. This makes it clear that the bad movement in question is a restrained or hindered motion, whose possession by a soul causes it to become filled with vice. And, if 'kakia' is the name of that sort of thing, 'arete' is the opposite. It signifies, first, lack of perplexity (euporia, ease of movement,) and, second, that the flow of a good soul is always unimpeded; for it seems that it is given this name 'arete' because it is unrestrained and unhindered and so is always flowing (aei rheon.) Thus it is correct to call it 'aeirheite', but this has been contracted, and it is called 'arete'. Now, maybe you'll say that I'm inventing things again, but I think that if what I just said about 'kakia' is correct, then so is what I said about the name 'arete'.

Hermogenes/ What about 'kakon' ('bad',) which has been involved in many of the previous inquiries? What's the meaning of it?

Socrates/ It's a strange word, by god! At least, that's what I think. And one that's hard to interpret. So I'll use the device I introduced earlier on it as well.

Hermogenes/ Which one?

Socrates/ That of attributing a foreign origin to it.

Hermogenes/ And you may well be correct. So suppose we leave these inquiries, and try to see what rationale there is for 'kalon' ('fine', 'beautiful') and 'aischron' ('disgraceful', 'ugly'.)

Socrates/ The meaning of 'aischron' seems clear to me, and it is also in harmony with what we said before. It seems to me that the giver of names reviles everything that hinders or restrains the flowing of the things that are. In particular, he gave this name 'aeischoroun' to what always restrains their flowing (aei ischei ton rhoun.) But nowadays it is contracted and pronounced 'aischron'.

Hermogenes/ What about 'kalon'?

Socrates/ It's harder to understand. Indeed, it is pronounced like this only because it sounds harmonious to shorten the 'ou' to 'o'.

Hermogenes/ How so?

Socrates/ In my view, this name derives from a sort of thought (dianoia.)

Hermogenes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Tell me. What caused each of the things that are to be called by a name? Isn't it whatever gave them their names?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And wasn't it thought—whether divine or human or both—that did this?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And isn't what originally named them the same as what names (kaloun) them now, that is to say, thought?

Hermogenes/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Aren't all the works performed by thought and understanding praiseworthy, while those that aren't are blameworthy?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now, medicine performs medical works and carpentry performs works of carpentry? Do you agree?

Hermogenes/ I do.

Socrates/ And to name things (kaloun) is to perform beautiful (kalon) works?

Hermogenes/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And we say that it is thought that does this?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Therefore wisdom (phronesis) is correctly given the name 'kalon' ('beautiful',) since it performs the works that we say are beautiful and welcome as such.

Hermogenes/ Evidently.

Socrates/ What other such names still remain for us to examine?

Hermogenes/ Those related to the good and the beautiful, such as 'sum-pheron' ('advantageous',) 'lusiteloun' ('profitable',) 'ophelimon' ('beneficial',) 'kerdaleon' ('gainful',) and their opposites.

Socrates/ In light of the previous investigations, you should now be able to explain 'sumpheron' ('advantageous') for yourself, since it is obviously a close relative of 'episteme' ('knowledge'.) It expresses the fact that what is advantageous is nothing other than the movement (phora) of a soul in accord with the movement of things. The things that are done as a result of this movement are probably called 'sumphora' or 'sumpheronta' because they are being moved in harmony with things (sumperipheresthai.) But 'kerdaleon' ('gainful') derives from kerdos' ('gain'.) If you replace the "in 'kerdos' with a V, the name expresses its meaning clearly; it names the good, but in another way. Because the good penetrates everything, it has the power to regulate (kerannutai) everything, and the

one who gave it its name named it after this power. But he put a "instead of the 'n' and pronounced it 'kerdos'.

Hermogenes/ What about 'lusiteloun' ('profitable')?

Socrates/ I don't think, Hermogenes, that he uses the name 'lusiteloun' to mean the profit that releases (apoluei) a capital sum for reinvestment, which is what retailers use it to mean. The namer-giver calls the good by that name because it is the fastest of the things that are, it doesn't allow things to remain at rest, or permit their motion to stop, pause, or reach an end. Instead, it always does away with (luei) any attempt to let motion end, making it unceasing and immortal. In my view, it is for this reason that the good is said to be 'lusiteloun', because it does away with (luon) any end (telos) to motion. 'Ophelimon' ('beneficial') is a non-Attic name. Homer often uses it in the form 'ophellein', which derives from 'auxein' ('to increase') and 'poiein' ('to make'.)

Hermogenes/ And what are we to say about their opposites?

Socrates/ Those that are mere negations don't need any discussion, in my view.

Hermogenes/ Which ones are they?

Socrates/ 'Asumpheron' ('disadvantageous',) 'anopheles' ('nonbeneficial',) 'alusiteles' ('unprofitable',) and 'akerdes' ('non-gainful'.)

Hermogenes/ It's true, they don't need discussion.

Socrates/ But 'blaberon' ('harmful') and 'zemiodes' ('hurtful') do.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ 'Blaberon' ('harmful') means that which is harming (blapton) the flow (rhoun.) 'Blapton', in turn, signifies wanting to grasp (boulomenon haptein.) But grasping is the same as shackling, and the name-giver always finds fault with

that. Now what wants to grasp the flow (to boulomenon haptein rhoun) would be most correctly called 'boulapteroun', but this has been beautified, as it seems to me, and so it is called 'blaberon'.

Hermogenes/ What intricate names you come up with, Socrates! When you uttered the name 'boulapteroun' just now, you looked just as if you were whistling the flute-prelude of the Hymn to Athena!

Socrates/ I'm not responsible for them, Hermogenes; the name-givers are.

Hermogenes/ That's true. But what about 'zemiodes' ('hurtful')? What does it mean?

Socrates/ What does 'zemiodes' mean? See how right I was to say, Hermogenes, that people make huge changes in the meaning of names by adding or subtracting letters, and how even a very slight alteration of this sort can make a name signify the opposite of what it used to signify. 'Deon' ('obligation') is an example that has just occurred to me, and it reminds me of what I was about to say to you about 'zemiodes'. Our fine modern language has obliterated the true meaning of these names by so twisting them around that they now mean the opposite of what they used to, whereas the ancient language expresses clearly what they mean.

Hermogenes/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I'll tell you. You know that our ancestors made great use of 'i' and" (especially the women, who are the best preservers of the ancient language.) But nowadays people change 'i' to 'ē' or 'e', which are supposed to sound more grandiose.

Hermogenes/ They do?

Socrates/ Yes. For example, people now call the day 'hemera', but in very ancient times they called it 'himera' or 'hemera'.

Hermogenes/ That's true.

Socrates/ You know then that only the ancient name expresses the name-giver's meaning clearly? People welcome the daylight that comes out of the darkness and long for (himeirousin) it, and that's why they named it 'himera'.

Hermogenes/ Evidently.

Socrates/ But nowadays the name is so dressed up that no one can understand what it means. Although there are some who think the day is called 'hemera' because it makes things gentle (hemera.)

Hermogenes/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Do you also know that the ancients called a yoke 'duogon' not 'zugon'?

Hermogenes/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, 'zugon' expresses nothing clearly, but the name 'duogon', on the other hand, is quite rightly given to whatever binds two animals together so that they can pull a plough or cart (duoin agogen.) Nonetheless, nowadays 'zugon' it is. And there are plenty of other examples.

Hermogenes/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Similarly, 'deon' ('obligation',) when pronounced in this way, seems at first to signify the opposite of all the other names for the good. After all, even though an obligation is a kind of good, 'deon' plainly signifies a shackle (desmos) and obstacle to motion, and so is closely akin to 'blab-eron' ('harmful'.)

Hermogenes/ Yes, Socrates, it does plainly signify that.

Socrates/ But not if you use the ancient name, which is much more likely to have been correctly given than the present one. If you replace the 'e' with an 'z', as in the ancient name, it agrees with the earlier names of good things—for 'dion' ('passing through',) not 'deon', signifies a good, and is a

term of praise. So the name-giver didn't contradict himself, and 'deon' ('obligation') is plainly the same as 'ophelimon' ('beneficial',) 'lusitel-oun' ('profitable',) 'kerdaleon' ('gainful',) 'agathon' ('good',) 'sumpheron' ('advantageous',) and 'euporon' ('lack of perplexity',) which are different names signifying what orders and moves. This is always praised, while what restrains and shackles is found fault with. Likewise, in the case of 'zemiodes' ('hurtful',) if you replace the 'z' with a ", as in the ancient language, it will be plain to you that the name was given to what shackles motion (doun to ion,) since 'demiddes' derives from that.

Hermogenes/ What about 'hedone' ('pleasure',) 'lupe' ('pain',) and 'epi-thumia' ('appetite',) Socrates, and others like them?

Socrates/ I don't think there is any great difficulty about them, Hermogenes. Hedone (pleasure) seems to have been given its name because it is an activity that tends towards enjoyment (he onesis,) but a "has been inserted and we call it 'hedone' instead of 'heone'. 'Lupe' ('pain') seems to derive from the weakening (dialusis) the body suffers when in pain. 'Ania' ('sorrow') signifies what hinders (hienai) motion. 'Algedon' ('distress') seems to me to be a foreign name deriving from 'algeinos' ('distressing'.) 'Odune' ('grief') seems to be named after the entering in (endusis) of pain. It is clear to everyone that pronouncing the name 'achthedon' ('affliction') is like giving motion a burden (achthos) to carry. Chara (joy) seems to have been so called because it is an outpouring (diachusis) or good movement of the soul's flow (rhoe.) 'Terpsis' ('delight') comes from 'terpnon' ('delightful',) which, in turn, comes from that which glides (herpsis) through the soul like a breath (pnoe.) By rights it is called 'herpnoun', but over time its name has been changed to 'terpnon'. Euphrosune (lightheartedness) needs no explanation, since it is clear to everyone that it derives its name from the movement of the soul that well

accords (eu sumpheresthai) with that of things. By rights it is called ‘eupherosune’, but we call it ‘euphrosune’. Nor is there any difficulty about epithumia (‘appetite’,) for it is clear that its name derives from the power that opposes the spirited part of the soul (epi ton thumon iousa,) while ‘thumos’ (‘spirit’, ‘anger’) derives from the raging (thusis) and boiling of the soul. The name ‘himeros’ (‘desire’) derives from what most drives the soul’s flow. It flows with a rush (hiemenos rhei) and sets on (ephiemenos) things, thus violently dragging the soul because of the rush of its flow. And so, because it has all this power, it is called ‘himeros’. ‘Pothos’ (‘longing’,) on the other hand, signifies that it isn’t a desire (or flow) for what is present but for what is elsewhere (pou) or absent. So, when its object is absent, it is given the name ‘pothos’, and, when its object is present, it is called ‘himeros’. Eros (erotic love) is so called because it flows in from outside, that is to say, the flow doesn’t belong to the person who has it, but is introduced into him through his eyes. Because of this it was called ‘esros’ (‘influx’) in ancient times, when they used ‘o’ for ‘o’, but now that ‘o’ is changed to ‘o’, it is called ‘erds’. So, what other names do you think are left for us to examine?

Hermogenes/ What do you think about ‘doxa’ (‘opinion’) and the like?

Socrates/ ‘Doxa’ (‘opinion) either derives from the pursuit (dioxis) the soul engages in when it hunts for the knowledge of how things are, or it derives from the shooting of a bow (toxon.) But the latter is more likely. At any rate, ‘oiesis’ (‘thinking’) is in harmony with it. It seems to express the fact that thinking is the motion (oisis) of the soul towards everything, towards how each of the things that are really is. In the same way, ‘boule’ (‘planning’) has to do with trying to hit (bole) some target, and ‘boulesthai' (‘wishing’) and ‘bouleuesthai' (‘deliberating’) signify aiming at something (ephiesthai.) All these names seem to go along with ‘doxa’ in

that they're all like 'bole', like trying to hit some target. Similarly, the opposite, 'aboulia' ('lack of planning',) seems to signify a failure to get something (atuchia,) as when someone fails to hit or get what he shot at, wished for, planned, or desired.

Hermogenes/ The pace of investigating seems to be quickening, Socrates!

Socrates/ That's because I'm coming to the finishing post! But I still want to investigate 'ananke' ('compulsion') and 'hekousion' ('voluntary',) since they're next. The name 'hekousion' expresses the fact that it signifies yielding and not resisting, but yielding, as I said before, to the motion (eikon toi ionti)—the one that comes into being in accord with our wish. 'Anankaion' ('compulsory') and 'antitupnon' ('resistant',) on the other hand, since they signify motion contrary to our wish, are associated with 'error' and 'ignorance'. Indeed, saying 'anankaion' is like trying to get through a ravine (anke,) for ravines restrain motion, since they are rough-going, filled with bushes, and hard to get through. It's probably for this reason that we use 'anankaion' in the way we do—because saying it is like trying to get through a ravine. Nonetheless, while my strength lasts, let's not stop using it. Don't you stop, either, but keep asking your questions.

Hermogenes/ Well, then, let me ask about the finest and most important names, 'aletheia' ('truth',) 'pseudos' ('falsehood',) 'on' ('being',) and—the subject of our present conversation—'onoma' ('name',) and why it is so named.

Socrates/ Do you know what 'maiesthai' means?

Hermogenes/ Yes, it means 'to search' ('zetein'.)

Socrates/ Well, 'onoma' ('name') seems to be a compressed statement which says: "this is a being for which there is a search." You can see this more easily in 'onomaston' ('thing named',) since it clearly says: "this is a being for which there

is a search (on hou masma estin.)" 'Aletheia' ('truth') is like these others in being compressed, for the divine motion of being is called 'aletheia' because 'aletheia' is a compressed form of the phrase "a wandering that is divine (ale theia.)" 'Pseudos' ('falsehood') is the opposite of this motion, so that, once again, what is restrained or compelled to be inactive is reviled by the name-giver, and likened to people asleep (katheudousi)—but the meaning of the name is concealed by the addition of 'ps'. 'On' ('being') or 'ousia' ('being') says the same as 'alētheia' once an 'i' is added, since it signifies going (ion.) 'Ouk on' ('not being',) in turn, is 'ouk ion' ('not going',) and indeed some people actually use that name for it.

Hermogenes/ I think you've hammered these into shape manfully, Socrates. But suppose someone were to ask you about the correctness of the names 'ion' ('going',) 'rheon' ('flowing',) and 'doun' ('shackling')…

Socrates/ "How should we answer him?" Is that what you were going to say?

Hermogenes/ Yes, exactly.

Socrates/ One way of giving the semblance of an answer has been suggested already.

Hermogenes/ What way is that?

Socrates/ To say that a name has a foreign origin when we don't know what it signifies. Now, it may well be true that some of these names are foreign, but it is also possible that the basic or 'first' names are Greek, but not recoverable because they are so old. Names have been twisted in so many ways, indeed, that it wouldn't be surprising if the ancient Greek word was the same as the modern foreign one.

Hermogenes/ At any rate, it wouldn't be at all inappropriate for you to respond that way.

Socrates/ No, it probably wouldn't. Nevertheless, it seems to me that "once we're in the competition, we're allowed no

excuses," but must investigate these names vigorously. We should remember this, however: if someone asks about the terms from which a name is formed, and then about the ones from which those terms are formed, and keeps on doing this indefinitely, the answerer must finally give up. Mustn't he?

Hermogenes/ That's my view, at any rate.

Socrates/ At what point would he be right to stop? Wouldn't it be when he reaches the names that are as it were the elements of all the other statements and names? For, if these are indeed elements, it cannot be right to suppose that they are composed out of other names. Consider 'agathos' ('good',) for example; we said it is composed out of 'agaston' ('admirable') and 'thoon' ('fast'.) And probably 'thoon' is composed out of other names, and those out of still other ones. But if we ever get hold of a name that isn't composed out of other names, we'll be right to say that at last we've reached an element, which cannot any longer be carried back to other names.

Hermogenes/ That seems right to me, at least.

Socrates/ And if the names you're asking about now turn out to be elements, won't we have to investigate their correctness in a different manner from the one we've been using so far?

Hermogenes/ Probably so.

Socrates/ It is certainly probable, Hermogenes. At any rate, it's obvious that all the earlier ones were resolved into these. So, if they are indeed elements, as they seem to me to be, join me again in investigating them, to ensure that I don't talk nonsense about the correctness of the first names.

Hermogenes/ You have only to speak, and I will join in the investigation so far as I'm able.

Socrates/ I think you agree with me that there is only one kind of correctness in all names, primary as well as derivative,

and that considered simply as names there is no difference between them.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now, the correctness of every name we analyzed was intended to consist in its expressing the nature of one of the things that are.

Hermogenes/ Of course.

Socrates/ And this is no less true of primary names than derivative ones, if indeed they are names.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But it seems that the derivative ones were able to accomplish this by means of the primary ones.

Hermogenes/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And if the primary names are indeed names, they must make the things that are as clear as possible to us. But how can they do this when they aren't based on other names? Answer me this: If we hadn't a voice or a tongue, and wanted to express things to one another, wouldn't we try to make signs by moving our hands, head, and the rest of our body, just as dumb people do at present?

Hermogenes/ What other choice would we have, Socrates?

Socrates/ So, if we wanted to express something light in weight or above us, I think we'd raise our hand towards the sky in imitation of the very nature of the thing. And if we wanted to express something heavy or below us, we'd move our hand towards the earth. And if we wanted to express a horse (or any other animal) galloping, you know that we'd make our bodies and our gestures as much like theirs as possible.

Hermogenes/ I think we'd have to.

Socrates/ Because the only way to express anything by means of our body is to have our body imitate whatever we want to express.

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, if we want to express a particular fact by using our voice, tongue, and mouth, we will succeed in doing so, if we succeed in imitating it by means of them?

Hermogenes/ That must be right, I think.

Socrates/ It seems to follow that a name is a vocal imitation of what it imitates, and that someone who imitates something with his voice names what he imitates.

Hermogenes/ I think so.

Socrates/ Well, I don't. I don't think this is a fine thing to say at all.

Hermogenes/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because then we'd have to agree that those who imitate sheep, cocks, or other animals are naming the things they imitate.

Hermogenes/ That's true, we would.

Socrates/ And do you think that's a fine conclusion?

Hermogenes/ No, I don't. But then what sort of imitation is a name, Socrates?

Socrates/ In the first place, if we imitate things the way we imitate them in music, we won't be naming them, not even if the imitation in question is vocal. And the same holds if we imitate the things music imitates. What I mean is this: each thing has a sound and a shape, and many of them have a color. Don't they?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It doesn't seem to be the craft of naming that's concerned with imitating these qualities, however, but rather the crafts of music and painting. Isn't that so?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what about this? Don't you think that just as each thing has a color or some of those other qualities we mentioned, it also has a being or essence? Indeed, don't color and sound each have a being or essence, just like every other thing that we say "is"?

Hermogenes/ Yes, I think they do.

Socrates/ So if someone were able to imitate in letters and syllables this being or essence that each thing has, wouldn't he express what each thing itself is?

Hermogenes/ He certainly would.

Socrates/ And if you were to identify the person who is able to do this, in just the way that you said the first was a musician and the second a painter, what would you say he is?

Hermogenes/ I think he's the namer, Socrates, the one we've been looking for from the beginning.

Socrates/ If that's true, doesn't it seem that we are now in a position to investigate each of the names you were asking about—'rhoe' ('flowing',) 'ienai' ('going',) and 'schesis' ('restraining')—to see whether or not he has grasped the being or essence of each of the things they signify by imitating its being or essence in the letters and syllables of its name. Isn't that so?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come, then, let's see if these are the only primary names or if there are many others.

Hermogenes/ For my part, I think there are others.

Socrates/ Yes, there probably are. But how are we to divide off the ones with which the imitator begins his imitation? Since an imitation of a thing's being or essence is made out of letters and syllables, wouldn't it be most correct for us to divide off the letters or elements first, just as those who set to

work on speech rhythms first divide off the forces or powers of the letters or elements, then those of syllables, and only then investigate rhythms themselves?

Hermogenes/ Yes.

Socrates/ So mustn't we first divide off the vowels and then the others in accordance with their differences in kind, that is to say, the "consonants" and "mutes" (as I take it they're called by specialists in these matters) and the semivowels, which are neither vowels nor mutes? And, as to the vowels themselves, mustn't we also divide off those that differ in kind from one another? Then when we've also well divided off the things that are—the things to which we have to give names—if there are some things to which they can all be carried back, as names are to the letters, and from which we can see that they derive, and if different kinds of being are found among them, in just the way that there are among the letters—once we've done all this well, we'll know how to apply each letter to what it resembles, whether one letter or a combination of many is to be applied to one thing. It's just the same as it is with painters. When they want to produce a resemblance, they sometimes use only purple, sometimes another color, and sometimes—for example, when they want to paint human flesh or something of that sort—they mix many colors, employing the particular color, I suppose, that their particular subject demands. Similarly, we'll apply letters to things, using one letter for one thing, when that's what seems to be required, or many letters together, to form what's called a syllable, or many syllables combined to form names and verbs. From names and verbs, in turn, we shall finally construct something important, beautiful, and whole. And just as the painter painted an animal, so—by means of the craft of naming or rhetoric or whatever it is—we shall construct sentences. Of course, I don't really mean we ourselves—I was carried away by the discussion. It was the ancients who combined things in this

way. Our job—if indeed we are to examine all these things with scientific knowledge—is to divide where they put together, so as to see whether or not both the primary and derivative names are given in accord with nature. For, any other way of connecting names to things, Hermogenes, is inferior and unsystematic.

Hermogenes/ By god, Socrates, it probably is.

Socrates/ Well, then, do you think you could divide them in that way? I don't think I could.

Hermogenes/ Then it's even less likely that I could.

Socrates/ Shall we give up then? Or do you want us to do what we can, and try to see a little of what these names are like? Aren't we in a similar situation to the one we were in a while ago with the gods? We prefaced that discussion by saying that we were wholly ignorant of the truth, and were merely describing human beliefs about the gods. So, shouldn't we now say this to ourselves before we proceed: If anyone, whether ourselves or someone else, divides names properly, he will divide them in the way we have just described, but, given our present situation, we must follow the proverb and "do the best we can" to work at them? Do you agree or not?

Hermogenes/ Of course, I agree completely.

Socrates/ Perhaps it will seem absurd, Hermogenes, to think that things become clear by being imitated in letters and syllables, but it is absolutely unavoidable. For we have nothing better on which to base the truth of primary names. Unless you want us to behave like tragic poets, who introduce a deus ex machina whenever they're perplexed. For we, too, could escape our difficulties by saying that the primary names are correct because they were given by the gods. But is that the best account we can give? Or is it this one: that we got them from foreigners, who are more ancient than we are? Or this: that just as it is impossible to investigate foreign names,

so it is impossible to investigate the primary ones because they are too ancient? Aren't all these merely the clever excuses of people who have no account to offer of how primary names are correctly given? And yet regardless of what kind of excuse one offers, if one doesn't know about the correctness of primary names, one cannot know about the correctness of derivative ones, which can only express something by means of those others about which one knows nothing. Clearly, then, anyone who claims to have a scientific understanding of derivative names must first and foremost be able to explain the primary ones with perfect clarity. Otherwise he can be certain that what he says about the others will be worthless. Or do you disagree?

Hermogenes/ No, Socrates, not in the least.

Socrates/ Well, my impressions about primary names seem to me to be entirely outrageous and absurd. Nonetheless, I'll share them with you, if you like. But if you have something better to offer, I hope you'll share it with me.

Hermogenes/ Have no fear, I will.

Socrates/ First off, V seems to me to be a tool for copying every sort of motion (kinesis.)—We haven't said why motion has this name, but it's clear that it means 'hesis' ('a going forth',) since in ancient times we used 'e' in place of 'e'. The first part comes from 'kiein', a non-Attic name equivalent to 'ienai' ('moving'.) So if you wanted to find an ancient name corresponding to the present 'kinesis', the correct answer would be 'hesis'. But nowadays, what with the non-Attic word 'kiein', the change from 'e' to 'e', and the insertion of 'n', we say 'kinesis', though it ought to be 'kieinesis'. 'Stasis' ('rest') is a beautified version of a name meaning the opposite of 'ienai' ('moving'.)—In any case, as I was saying, the letter V seemed to the name-giver to be a beautiful tool for copying motion, at any rate he often uses it for this purpose. He first uses this

letter to imitate motion in the name ‘rhein’ (‘flowing’) and ‘rhoe’ (‘flow”) themselves. Then in ‘tromos’ (‘trembling’) and ‘trechein’ (‘running’,) and in such verbs as ‘krouein’ (‘striking’,) ‘thrauein’ (‘crushing’,) ‘ereikein’ (‘rending’,) ‘thruptein’ (‘breaking’,) ‘kermatizein’ (‘crumbling’,) ‘rhumbein’ (‘whirling’,) it is mostly ‘r’ he uses to imitate these motions. He saw, I suppose, that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in pronouncing this letter, and that’s probably why he used it in these names. He uses ‘i’, in turn, to imitate all the small things that can most easily penetrate everything. Hence, in ‘ienai' (‘moving’) and ‘hiesthai' (‘hastening’,) he uses ‘i’ to do the imitating. Similarly, he uses ‘phi’, ‘psi’, ‘s’, and ‘z’ to do the imitating in such names as ‘psuchron’ (‘chilling’,) ‘zeon’ (‘seething’,) ‘seiesthai' (‘shaking’,) and ‘seismos’ (‘quaking’,) because all these letters are pronounced with an expulsion of breath. Indeed, whenever the name-giver wants to imitate some sort of blowing or hard breathing (phusodes,) he almost always seems to employ them. He also seems to have thought that the compression and stopping of the power of the tongue involved in pronouncing ‘d’ and ‘t’ made such names as ‘desmos’ (‘shackling’) and ‘stasis’ (‘rest’) appropriately imitative. And because he observed that the tongue glides most of all in pronouncing ‘l’, he uses it to produce a resemblance in ‘olisthanein’ (‘glide’) itself, and in such names as ‘leion’ (‘smooth’,) ‘liparon’ (‘sleek’,) ‘kollddes’ (‘viscous’,) and the like. But when he wants to imitate something cloying, he uses names, such as ‘glischron’ (‘gluey’,) ‘gluku’ (‘sweet’,) and ‘gloiodes’ (‘clammy’,) in which the gliding of the tongue is stopped by the power of the ‘g’. And because he saw that ‘n’ is sounded inwardly, he used it in ‘endon’ (‘within’) and ‘entos’ (‘inside’,) in order to make the letters copy the things. He put an ‘a’ in ‘mega’ (‘large’) and an ‘e’ in ‘mekos’ (‘length’) because these letters are both pronounced long. He wanted ‘o’ to signify roundness, so he mixed lots of it into the name

‘gongulon’ (‘round’.) In the same way, the rule-setter apparently used the other letters or elements as likenesses in order to make a sign or name for each of the things that are, and then compounded all the remaining names out of these, imitating the things they name. That, Hermogenes, is my view of what it means to say that names are correct—unless, of course, Cratylus disagrees.

Hermogenes/ Well, Socrates, as I said at the beginning, Cratylus confuses me a lot of the time. He says that there is such a thing as the correctness of names, but he never explains clearly what it is. Consequently, I’m never able to determine whether his lack of clarity is intentional or unintentional.

So tell me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree with what he has been saying about names, or do you have something better to say? If you have, tell it to us, and either you’ll learn about your errors from Socrates or become our teacher.

Cratylus/ But, Hermogenes, do you really think that any subject can be taught or learned so quickly, not to mention one like this, which seems to be among the most important?

Hermogenes/ No, by god, I don’t. But I think that Hesiod is right in saying that if you can add even a little to a little, it’s worthwhile.

So, if you can add even a little more, don’t shrink from the labor, but assist Socrates—he deserves it—and assist me, too.

Socrates/ Yes, Cratylus, please do. As far as I’m concerned, nothing I’ve said is set in stone. I have simply been saying what seems right to me as a result of my investigations with Hermogenes. So, don’t hesitate to speak, and if your views are better than mine, I’ll gladly accept them. And it wouldn’t surprise me if they were better, for you’ve both investigated these matters for yourself and learned about them from

others. So, if indeed you do happen to have something better to offer, you may sign me up as a student in your course on the correctness of names.

Cratylus/ Yes, Socrates, I have, as you say, occupied myself with these matters, and it's possible that you might have something to learn from me. But I fear the opposite is altogether more likely. So much so, indeed, that it occurs to me to say to you what Achilles says to Ajax in the "Prayers":

> Ajax, son of Telamon, seed of Zeus, lord of the people,
> All you have said to me seems spoken after my own mind.

The same is true of me where you're concerned, Socrates: your oracular utterances—whether inspired by Euthyphro or by some other Muse who has long inhabited your own mind without your knowing about it—seem to be pretty much spoken after my own mind.

Socrates/ But, Cratylus, I have long been surprised at my own wisdom—and doubtful of it, too. That's why I think it's necessary to keep re-investigating whatever I say, since self-deception is the worst thing of all. How could it not be terrible, indeed, when the deceiver never deserts you even for an instant but is always right there with you? Therefore, I think we have to turn back frequently to what we've already said, in order to test it by looking at it "backwards and forwards simultaneously," as the aforementioned poet puts it. So, let's now see what we have said. We said that the correctness of a name consists in displaying the nature of the thing it names. And is that statement satisfactory?

Cratylus/ In my view, Socrates, it is entirely satisfactory.

Socrates/ So names are spoken in order to give instruction?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is there a craft for that and are there craftsmen who practice it?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Who are they?

Cratylus/ As you said at the beginning, they're the rule-setters.

Socrates/ Is this craft attributed to human beings in the same way as other crafts or not? What I mean is this: aren't some painters better or worse than others?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the better painters produce finer products or paintings, while the others produce inferior ones? Similarly with builders—some build finer houses, others build inferior ones?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ What about rule-setters? Do some of them produce finer products, others inferior ones?

Cratylus/ No, there I no longer agree with you.

Socrates/ So you don't think that some rules are better, others inferior?

Cratylus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor names either, it seems. Or do you think that some names have been better given, others worse?

Cratylus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ So all names have been correctly given?

Cratylus/ Yes, as many of them as are names at all.

Socrates/ What about the case of Hermogenes, which we mentioned earlier? Has he not been given this name at all, unless he belongs to the family of Hermes? Or has he been given it, only not correctly?

Cratylus/ I think he hasn't been given it at all, Socrates. People take it to have been given to him, but it is really the name of someone else, namely, the very one who also has the nature.

Socrates/ What about when someone says that our friend here is Hermogenes? Is he speaking falsely or is he not even managing to do that much? Is it even possible to say that he is Hermogenes, if he isn't?

Cratylus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ That false speaking is in every way impossible, for isn't that what you are trying to say? Certainly, many people do say it nowadays, Cratylus, and many have said it in the past as well.

Cratylus/ But, Socrates, how can anyone say the thing he says and not say something that is? Doesn't speaking falsely consist in not saying things that are?

Socrates/ Your argument is too subtle for me at my age. All the same, tell me this. Do you think it is possible to say something falsely, although not possible to speak it falsely?

Cratylus/ In my view, one can neither speak nor say anything falsely.

Socrates/ What about announcing something falsely or addressing someone falsely? For example, suppose you were in a foreign country and someone meeting you took your hand and said, "Greetings! Hermogenes, son of Smicrion, visitor from Athens," would he be speaking, saying, announcing, or addressing these words not to you but to Hermogenes—or to no one?

Cratylus/ In my view, Socrates, he is not articulating them as he should.

Socrates/ Well, that's a welcome answer. But are the words he articulates true or false, or partly true and partly false? If you tell me that, I'll be satisfied.

Cratylus/ For my part, I'd say he's just making noise and acting pointlessly, as if he were banging a brass pot.

Socrates/ Let's see, Cratylus, if we can somehow come to terms with one another. You agree, don't you, that it's one thing to be a name and another to be the thing it names?

Cratylus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ And you also agree that a name is an imitation of a thing?

Cratylus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And that a painting is a different sort of imitation of a thing?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, perhaps what you're saying is correct and I'm misunderstanding you, but can both of these imitations—both paintings and names—be assigned and applied to the things of which they are imitations, or not?

Cratylus/ They can.

Socrates/ Then consider this. Can we assign a likeness of a man to a man and that of a woman to a woman, and so on?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What about the opposite? Can we assign the likeness of a man to a woman and that of a woman to a man?

Cratylus/ Yes, we can.

Socrates/ And are both these assignments correct, or only the first?

Cratylus/ Only the first.

Socrates/ That is to say, the one that assigns to each thing the painting or name that is appropriate to it or like it?

Cratylus/ That's my view, at least.

Socrates/ Since you and I are friends, we don't want to mince words, so here's what I think. I call the first kind of

assignment correct, whether it's an assignment of a painting or a name, but if it's an assignment of a name, I call it both correct and true. And I call the other kind of assignment, the one that assigns and applies unlike imitations, incorrect, and, in the case of names, false as well.

Cratylus/ But it may be, Socrates, that it's possible to assign paintings incorrectly, but not names, which must always be correctly assigned.

Socrates/ What do you mean? What's the difference between them? Can't I step up to a man and say "This is your portrait," while showing him what happens to be his own likeness, or what happens to be the likeness of a woman? And by "show" I mean bring before the sense of sight.

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, can't I step up to the same man a second time and say, "This is your name"? Now, a name is an imitation, just as a painting or portrait is. So, can't I say to him, "This is your name," and after that put before his sense of hearing what happens to be an imitation of himself, saying "Man," or what happens to be an imitation of a female of the human species, saying "Woman"? Don't you think that all this is possible and sometimes occurs?

Cratylus/ I'm willing to go along with you, Socrates, and say that it occurs.

Socrates/ It's good of you to do so, Cratylus, provided you really are willing, since then we don't have to argue any further about the matter. So if some such assignments of names take place, we may call the first of them speaking truly and the second speaking falsely. But if that is so, it is sometimes possible to assign names incorrectly, to give them not to things they fit but to things they don't fit. The same is true of verbs. But if verbs and names can be assigned in this way, the same must be true of statements, since statements

are, I believe, a combination of names and verbs. What do you think, Cratylus?

Cratylus/ The same as you, since I think you're right.

Socrates/ Further, primary names may be compared to paintings, and in paintings it's possible to present all the appropriate colors and shapes, or not to present them all. Some may be left out, or too many included, or those included may be too large. Isn't that so?

Cratylus/ It is.

Socrates/ So doesn't someone who presents all of them, present a fine painting or likeness, while someone who adds some or leaves some out, though he still produces a painting or likeness, produces a bad one?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ What about someone who imitates the being or essence of things in syllables and letters? According to this account, if he presents all the appropriate things, won't the likeness—that is to say, the name—be a fine one? But if he happens to add a little or leave a little out, though he'll still have produced an image, it won't be fine? Doesn't it follow that some names are finely made, while others are made badly?

Cratylus/ Presumably.

Socrates/ So presumably one person will be a good craftsman of names and another a bad one?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And this craftsman is named a rule-setter.

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ By god, presumably some rule-setters are good and others bad then, especially if what we agreed to before is true, and they are just like other craftsmen.

Cratylus/ That's right. But you see, Socrates, when we assign 'b', and each of the other letters to names by using the

craft of grammar, if we add, subtract, or transpose a letter, we don't simply write the name incorrectly, we don't write it at all, for it immediately becomes a different name, if any of those things happens.

Socrates/ That's not a good way for us to look at the matter, Cratylus.

Cratylus/ Why not?

Socrates/ What you say may well be true of numbers, which have to be a certain number or not be at all. For example, if you add anything to the number ten or subtract anything from it, it immediately becomes a different number, and the same is true of any other number you choose. But this isn't the sort of correctness that belongs to things with sensory qualities, such as images in general. Indeed, the opposite is true of them—an image cannot remain an image if it presents all the details of what it represents. See if I'm right. Would there be two things—Cratylus and an image of Cratylus—in the following circumstances? Suppose some god didn't just represent your color and shape the way painters do, but made all the inner parts like yours, with the same warmth and softness, and put motion, soul, and wisdom like yours into them—in a word, suppose he made a duplicate of everything you have and put it beside you. Would there then be two Cratyluses or Cratylus and an image of Cratylus?

Cratylus/ It seems to me, Socrates, that there would be two Cratyluses.

Socrates/ So don't you see that we must look for some other kind of correctness in images and in the names we've been discussing, and not insist that if a detail is added to an image or omitted from it, it's no longer an image at all. Or haven't you noticed how far images are from having the same features as the things of which they are images?

Cratylus/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ At any rate, Cratylus, names would have an absurd effect on the things they name, if they resembled them in every respect, since all of them would then be duplicated, and no one would be able to say which was the thing and which was the name.

Cratylus/ That's true.

Socrates/ Take courage then and admit that one name may be well-given while another isn't. Don't insist that it have all the letters and exactly resemble the thing it names, but allow that an inappropriate letter may be included. But if an inappropriate letter may be included in a name, an inappropriate name may be included in a phrase. And if an inappropriate name may be included in a phrase, a phrase which is inappropriate to the things may be employed in a statement. Things are still named and described when this happens, provided the phrases include the pattern of the things they're about. Remember that this is just what Hermogenes and I claimed earlier about the names of the elements.

Cratylus/ I remember.

Socrates/ Good. So even if a name doesn't include all the appropriate letters, it will still describe the thing if it includes its pattern—though it will describe the thing well, if it includes all the appropriate letters, and badly, if it includes few of them. I think we had better accept this, Cratylus, or else, like men lost on the streets of Aegina late at night, we, too, may incur the charge of truly seeming to be the sort of people who arrive at things later than they should. For if you deny it, you cannot agree that a name is correct if it expresses things by means of letters and syllables and you'll have to search for some other account of the correctness of names, since if you both deny it and accept this account of correctness, you'll contradict yourself.

Cratylus/ You seem to me to be speaking reasonably, Socrates, and I take what you've said as established.

Socrates/ Well, then, since we agree about that, let's consider the next point. If a name is well given, don't we say that it must have the appropriate letters?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the appropriate letters are the ones that are like the things?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Therefore that's the way that well-given names are given. But if a name isn't well given, it's probable that most of its letters are appropriate or like the thing it names, if indeed it is a likeness of it, but that some are inappropriate and prevent the name from being good or well given. Is that our view or is it something different?

Cratylus/ I don't suppose there's anything to be gained by continuing to quarrel, Socrates, but I'm not satisfied that something is a name if it isn't well given.

Socrates/ But you are satisfied that a name is a way of expressing a thing?

Cratylus/ I am.

Socrates/ And you think it's true that some names are composed out of more primitive ones, while others are primary?

Cratylus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ But if the primary names are to be ways of expressing things clearly, is there any better way of getting them to be such than by making each of them as much like the thing it is to express as possible? Or do you prefer the way proposed by Hermogenes and many others, who claim that names are conventional signs that express things to those who already knew the things before they established the

conventions? Do you think that the correctness of names is conventional, so that it makes no difference whether we accept the present convention or adopt the opposite one, calling 'big' what we now call 'small', and 'small' what we now call 'big'? Which of these two ways of getting names to express things do you prefer?

Cratylus/ A name that expresses a thing by being like it is in every way superior, Socrates, to one that is given by chance.

Socrates/ That's right. But if a name is indeed to be like a thing, mustn't the letters or elements out of which primary names are composed be naturally like things? Let me explain by returning to our earlier analogy with painting. Could a painting ever be made like any of the things that are, if it were not composed of pigments that were by nature like the things that the art of painting imitates? Isn't that impossible?

Cratylus/ Yes, it's impossible.

Socrates/ Then by the same token can names ever be like anything unless the things they're composed out of have some kind of likeness to the things they imitate? And aren't they composed of letters or elements?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, consider what I said to Hermogenes earlier. Tell me, do you think I was right to say that V is like motion, moving, and hardness or not?

Cratylus/ You were right.

Socrates/ And is like smoothness, softness, and the other things we mentioned.

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yet you know that the very thing that we call 'sklerotes' ('hardness') is called 'skieroter' by the Eretrians?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then are both ‘r’ and ‘s’ like the same thing, and does the name ending in ‘r’ express the same thing to them as the one ending in ‘s’ does to us, or does one of them fail to express it?

Cratylus/ They both express it.

Socrates/ In so far as ‘r’ and ‘s’ are alike, or in so far as they are unlike?

Cratylus/ In so far as they are alike.

Socrates/ Are they alike in all respects?

Cratylus/ They are presumably alike with respect to expressing motion, at any rate.

Socrates/ What about the ‘l’ in these names? Doesn’t it express the opposite of hardness?

Cratylus/ Perhaps it is incorrectly included in them, Socrates. Maybe it’s just like the examples you cited to Hermogenes a while ago in which you added or subtracted letters. You were correct to do so, in my view. So, too, in the present case perhaps we ought to replace ‘l’ with ‘r’.

Socrates/ You have a point. But what about when someone says ‘skleron’ (‘hard’,) and pronounces it the way we do at present? Don’t we understand him? Don’t you yourself know what I mean by it?

Cratylus/ I do, but that’s because of usage.

Socrates/ When you say ‘usage’, do you mean something other than convention? Do you mean something by ‘usage’ besides this: when I utter this name and mean hardness by it, you know that this is what I mean? Isn’t that what you’re saying?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if when I utter a name, you know what I mean, doesn’t that name become a way for me to express it to you?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Even though the name I utter is unlike the thing I mean—since 'l' is unlike hardness (to revert to your example.) But if that's right, surely you have entered into a convention with yourself, and the correctness of names has become a matter of convention for you, for isn't it the chance of usage and convention that makes both like and unlike letters express things? And even if usage is completely different from convention, still you must say that expressing something isn't a matter of likeness but of usage, since usage, it seems, enables both like and unlike names to express things. Since we agree on these points, Cratylus, for I take your silence as a sign of agreement, both convention and usage must contribute something to expressing what we mean when we speak. Consider numbers, Cratylus, since you want to have recourse to them. Where do you think you'll get names that are like each one of the numbers, if you don't allow this agreement and convention of yours to have some control over the correctness of names? I myself prefer the view that names should be as much like things as possible, but I fear that defending this view is like hauling a ship up a sticky ramp, as Hermogenes suggested, and that we have to make use of this worthless thing, convention, in the correctness of names. For probably the best possible way to speak consists in using names all (or most) of which are like the things they name (that is, are appropriate to them,) while the worst is to use the opposite kind of names. But let me next ask you this. What power do names have for us? What's the good of them?

Cratylus/ To give instruction, Socrates. After all, the simple truth is that anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing.

Socrates/ Perhaps you mean this, Cratylus, that when you know what a name is like, and it is like the thing it names, then you also know the thing, since it is like the name, and

all like things fall under one and the same craft. Isn't that why you say that whoever knows a thing's name also knows the thing?

Cratylus/ Yes, you're absolutely right.

Socrates/ Then let's look at that way of giving instruction about the things that are. Is there also another one, but inferior to this, or is it the only one? What do you think?

Cratylus/ I think that it is the best and only way, and that there are no others.

Socrates/ Is it also the best way to discover the things that are? If one discovers something's name has one also discovered the thing it names? Or are names only a way of getting people to learn things, and must investigation and discovery be undertaken in some different way?

Cratylus/ They must certainly be undertaken in exactly the same way and by means of the same things.

Socrates/ But don't you see, Cratylus, that anyone who investigates things by taking names as his guides and looking into their meanings runs no small risk of being deceived?

Cratylus/ In what way?

Socrates/ It's clear that the first name-giver gave names to things based on his conception of what those things were like. Isn't that right?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if his conception was incorrect and he gave names based on it, what do you suppose will happen to us if we take him as our guide? Won't we be deceived?

Cratylus/ But it wasn't that way, Socrates. The name-giver had to know the things he was naming. Otherwise, as I've been saying all along, his names wouldn't be names at all. And here's a powerful proof for you that the name-giver didn't miss the truth: His names are entirely consistent with one another.

Or haven't you noticed that all the names you utter are based on the same assumption and have the same purpose?

Socrates/ But surely that's no defense, Cratylus. The name-giver might have made a mistake at the beginning and then forced the other names to be consistent with it. There would be nothing strange in that. Geometrical constructions often have a small unnoticed error at the beginning with which all the rest is perfectly consistent. That's why every man must think a lot about the first principles of anything and investigate them thoroughly to see whether or not it's correct to assume them. For if they have been adequately examined, the subsequent steps will plainly follow from them. However, I'd be surprised if names are actually consistent with one another. So let's review our earlier discussion. We said that names signify the being or essence of things to us on the assumption that all things are moving and flowing and being swept along. Isn't that what you think names express?

Cratylus/ Absolutely. Moreover, I think they signify correctly.

Socrates/ Of those we discussed, let's reconsider the name 'episteme' ('knowledge') first and see how ambiguous it is. It seems to signify that it stops (histesi) the movement of our soul towards (epi) things, rather than that it accompanies them in their movement, so that it's more correct to pronounce the beginning of it as we now do than to insert an 'e' and get 'hepeisteme'—or rather, to insert an instead of an 'e'. Next, consider 'bebaion' ('certain',) which is an imitation of being based (basis) or resting (stasis,) not of motion. 'Historia' ('inquiry',) which is somewhat the same, signifies the stopping (histesi) of the flow (rhous.) 'Piston' ('confidence',) too, certainly signifies stopping (histan.) Next, anyone can see that 'mneme' ('memory') means a staying (mone) in the soul, not a motion. Or consider 'hamartia' ('error') and 'sumphora' ('mishap',) if you like. If we take names as our guides, they seem to signify

the same as ‘sunesis’ (‘comprehension’) and ‘episteme’ (‘knowledge’) and other names of excellent things. Moreover, ‘amathia’ (‘ignorance’) and ‘akolasia’ (‘licentiousness’) also seem to be closely akin to them. For ‘amathia’ seems to mean the journey of someone who accompanies god (hama theoi ion,) and ‘akolasia’ seems precisely to mean movement guided by things (akolouthia tois pragmasin.) Thus names of what we consider to be the very worst things seem to be exactly like those of the very best. And if one took the trouble, I think one could find many other names from which one could conclude that the name-giver intended to signify not that things were moving and being swept along, but the opposite, that they were at rest.

Cratylus/ But observe, Socrates, that most of them signify motion.

Socrates/ What if they do, Cratylus? Are we to count names like votes and determine their correctness that way? If more names signify motion, does that make them the true ones?

Cratylus/ No, that’s not a reasonable view.

Socrates/ It certainly isn’t, Cratylus. So let’s drop this topic, and return to the one that led us here. A little while ago, you said, if you remember, that the name-giver had to know the things he named. Do you still believe that or not?

Cratylus/ I still do.

Socrates/ Do you think that the giver of the first names also knew the things he named?

Cratylus/ Yes, he did know them.

Socrates/ What names did he learn or discover those things from? After all, the first names had not yet been given. Yet it’s impossible, on our view, to learn or discover things except by learning their names from others or discovering them for ourselves?

Cratylus/ You have a point there, Socrates.

Socrates/ So, if things cannot be learned except from their names, how can we possibly claim that the name-givers or rule-setters had knowledge before any names had been given for them to know?

Cratylus/ I think the truest account of the matter, Socrates, is that a more than human power gave the first names to things, so that they are necessarily correct.

Socrates/ In your view then this name-giver contradicted himself, even though he's either a daemon or a god? Or do you think we were talking nonsense just now?

Cratylus/ But one of the two apparently contradictory groups of names that we distinguished aren't names at all.

Socrates/ Which one, Cratylus? Those which point to rest or those which point to motion? As we said just now, this cannot be settled by majority vote.

Cratylus/ No, that wouldn't be right, Socrates.

Socrates/ But since there's a civil war among names, with some claiming that they are like the truth and others claiming that they are, how then are we to judge between them, and what are we to start from? We can't start from other different names because there are none. No, it's clear we'll have to look for something other than names, something that will make plain to us without using names which of these two kinds of names are the true ones—that is to say, the ones that express the truth about the things that are.

Cratylus/ I think so, too.

Socrates/ But if that's right, Cratylus, then it seems it must be possible to learn about the things that are, independently of names.

Cratylus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ How else would you expect to learn about them? How else than in the most legitimate and natural way, namely,

learning them through one another, if they are somehow akin, and through themselves? For something different, something that was other than they, wouldn't signify them, but something different, something other.

Cratylus/ That seems true to me.

Socrates/ But wait a minute! Haven't we often agreed that if names are well given, they are like the things they name and so are likenesses of them?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So if it's really the case that one can learn about things through names and that one can also learn about them through themselves, which would be the better and clearer way to learn about them? Is it better to learn from the likeness both whether it itself is a good likeness and also the truth it is a likeness of? Or is it better to learn from the truth both the truth itself and also whether the likeness of it is properly made?

Cratylus/ I think it is certainly better to learn from the truth.

Socrates/ How to learn and make discoveries about the things that are is probably too large a topic for you or me. But we should be content to have agreed that it is far better to investigate them and learn about them through themselves than to do so through their names.

Cratylus/ Evidently so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Still, let's investigate one further issue so as to avoid being deceived by the fact that so many of these names seem to lean in the same direction—as we will be if, as seems to me to be the case, the name-givers really did give them in the belief that everything is always moving and flowing, and as it happens things aren't really that way at all, but the name-givers themselves have fallen into a kind of vortex and are whirled around in it, dragging us with them. Consider,

Cratylus, a question that I for my part often dream about: Are we or aren't we to say that there is a beautiful itself, and a good itself, and the same for each one of the things that are?

Cratylus/ I think we are, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let's not investigate whether a particular face or something of that sort is beautiful then, or whether all such things seem to be flowing, but let's ask this instead: Are we to say that the beautiful itself is always such as it is?

Cratylus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ But if it is always passing away, can we correctly say of it first that it is this, and then that it is such and such? Or, at the very instant we are speaking, isn't it inevitably and immediately becoming a different thing and altering and no longer being as it was?

Cratylus/ It is.

Socrates/ Then if it never stays the same, how can it be something? After all, if it ever stays the same, it clearly isn't changing—at least, not during that time; and if it always stays the same and is always the same thing, so that it never departs from its own form, how can it ever change or move?

Cratylus/ There's no way.

Socrates/ Then again it can't even be known by anyone. For at the very instant the knower-to-be approaches, what he is approaching is becoming a different thing, of a different character, so that he can't yet come to know either what sort of thing it is or what it is like—surely, no kind of knowledge is knowledge of what isn't in any way.

Cratylus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Indeed, it isn't even reasonable to say that there is such a thing as knowledge, Cratylus, if all things are passing on and none remain. For if that thing itself, knowledge, did not pass on from being knowledge, then

knowledge would always remain, and there would be such a thing as knowledge. On the other hand, if the very form of knowledge passed on from being knowledge, the instant it passed on into a different form than that of knowledge, there would be no knowledge. And if it were always passing on, there would always be no knowledge. Hence, on this account, no one could know anything and nothing could be known either. But if there is always that which knows and that which is known, if there are such things as the beautiful, the good, and each one of the things that are, it doesn't appear to me that these things can be at all like flowings or motions, as we were saying just now they were. So whether I'm right about these things or whether the truth lies with Heraclitus and many others isn't an easy matter to investigate. But surely no one with any understanding will commit himself or the cultivation of his soul to names, or trust them and their givers to the point of firmly stating that he knows something—condemning both himself and the things that are to be totally unsound like leaky sinks—or believe that things are exactly like people with runny noses, or that all things are afflicted with colds and drip over everything. It's certainly possible that things are that way, Cratylus, but it is also possible that they are not. So you must investigate them courageously and thoroughly and not accept anything easily—you are still young and in your prime, after all. Then after you've investigated them, if you happen to discover the truth, you can share it with me.

Cratylus/ I'll do that. But I assure you, Socrates, that I have already investigated them and have taken a lot of trouble over the matter, and things seem to me to be very much more as Heraclitus says they are.

Socrates/ Instruct me about it another time, Cratylus, after you get back. But now go off into the country, as you were planning to do, and Hermogenes here will see you on your way.

Cratylus/ I'll do that, Socrates, but I hope that you will also continue to think about these matters yourself.

The Cratylus.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS, SOCRATES.

Hermogenes/ Are you willing, then, that we should communicate this discourse to Socrates?

Cratylus/ If you think proper.

Hermogenes/ Cratylus here, Socrates, says, that there is a rectitude of names naturally subsisting in everything; and that this is not a name which certain persons pronounce from custom, while they articulate a portion of their voice; but that there is a certain rectitude of names which is naturally the same both among Greeks and Barbarians. I ask him, therefore, whether Cratylus is his true name, or not. He confesses it is, I then inquire of him, what is the appellation belonging to Socrates? He replies, Socrates. In all other particulars, therefore, I say, is not that the name by which we call each? Yet, says he, your name is not Hermogenes, though all men should agree in calling you so. And upon my eagerly desiring to know the meaning of what he says, he does not declare anything, but uses dissimulation towards me, feigning as if he was thinking about something on this subject, which if he should be willing to relate clearly, he would oblige me to agree with him in opinion, and to say the same as he does. If, therefore, you can by any means conjecture this divination of Cratylus, I shall very gladly hear you; or rather, if it is agreeable to you, I should much more gladly hear your opinion concerning the rectitude of names.

Socrates/ O Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, according to the ancient proverb, beautiful things are difficult to be

understood; and the discipline respecting names is no small affair. If, therefore, I had heard that demonstration of Prodicus, valued at fifty drachmas, which instructed the hearer in this very particular, as he himself says, nothing would hinder but that you might immediately know the truth respecting the rectitude of names: but I never have heard it; and am acquainted with nothing more than the circumstance about the drachmas. Hence I am unacquainted with the truth respecting these particulars; but am nevertheless prepared to investigate this affair, along with you and Cratylus. But as to his telling you, that your name is not in reality Hermogenes, I suspect that in this he derides you: for he thinks, perhaps, that you are covetous of wealth, and at the same time have not obtained your desire. But, as I just now said, the knowledge of these matters is difficult. However, placing the arguments in common, it is proper to consider, whether the truth is on your side, or on that of Cratylus.

Hermogenes/ But indeed, Socrates, though I have frequently disputed with Cratylus and many others, yet I cannot persuade myself, that there is any other rectitude of nomination, than what custom and mutual consent have established. For to me it appears, that the name which anyone assigns to a thing, is a proper name; and that, if he should even change it for another, this name will be no less right than the first; just as we are accustomed to change the names of our servants. For I am of opinion, that no name is naturally inherent in anything, but subsists only from the law and habit of those by whom it is instituted and called. But, if the case is otherwise, I am prepared both to learn and hear, not only from Cratylus, but from any other person whatever.

Socrates/ Perhaps, Hermogenes, you say something to the purpose. Let us consider therefore. Is that by which anyone calls anything, the name of that thing?

Hermogenes/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ And this, whether a private person calls it, or a city?

Hermogenes/ I think so.

Socrates/ What, then, if I should call anything in such a manner, as to denominate that an horse which we now call a man, and that a man which we now call a horse; would not the name man remain the same publicly, but the name horse privately; and again, privately the name man, and publicly the name horse? Would you not speak in this manner?

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, do you call it anything to speak true and false?

Hermogenes/ I do.

Socrates/ Therefore, one thing will be a true sentence, but another a false one. Will it not?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will not that sentence, then, which speaks of things as they are, be a true sentence; but that which speaks of them different from what they are, a false one?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is not this, therefore, to speak of things which are, and which are not, by discourse.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But with respect to a sentence which is true, is the whole true, but the parts of it not true?

Hermogenes/ The parts, also, are no otherwise than true.

Socrates/ But whether are the large parts true, and the small ones not? or, are all the parts true?

Hermogenes/ I think that all the parts are true.

Socrates/ Is there any part of what you say, smaller than a name?

Hermogenes/ There is not. But this is the smallest of all.

Socrates/ And does not this name belong to a true sentence?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And this, you say, is true.

Hermogenes/ I do.

Socrates/ But is not the part of a false sentence false?

Hermogenes/ I say it is.

Socrates/ It is permitted us, therefore, to call a name true and false, since we can call a sentence so.

Hermogenes/ How should it not be so?

Socrates/ Is that, therefore, which each person says the name of a thing is, the name of that thing?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Will there be as many names belonging to a thing, as any person assigns it; and at that time when he assigns them?

Hermogenes/ I have no other rectitude of name, Socrates, than this; that I may call a thing by one name, which I assign to it, and you by another, which you think proper to attribute to it. And after this manner, I see that in cities, the same things are assigned proper names, both among the Greeks with other Greeks, and among the Greeks with the Barbarians.

Socrates/ Let us see, Hermogenes, whether things appear to you to subsist in such a manner, with respect to the

peculiar essence of each, as they did to Protagoras, who said that man was the measure of all things; so that things are, with respect to me, such as they appear to me; and that they are such to you, as they appear to you: or do some of these appear to you to possess a certain stability of essence?

Hermogenes/ Sometimes, Socrates, through doubting, I have been led to this, which Protagoras asserts; but yet this does not perfectly appear to me to be the case.

Socrates/ But what, was you never led to conclude that there is no such thing as a man perfectly evil?

Hermogenes/ Never, by Zeus! But I have often been disposed to think, that there are some men profoundly wicked, and that the number of these is great.

Socrates/ But have you never yet seen men perfectly good?

Hermogenes/ Very few, indeed.

Socrates/ You have seen such then?

Hermogenes/ I have.

Socrates/ How, then, do you establish this? Is it thus: That those who are completely good, are completely prudent; and that the completely bad, are completely imprudent?

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ If, therefore, Protagoras speaks the truth, and this is the truth itself, for everything to be such as it appears to everyone, can some of us be prudent, and some of us imprudent?

Hermogenes/ By no means.

Socrates/ And this, as I think, appears perfectly evident to you, that, since there is such a thing as prudence and imprudence, Protagoras does not entirety speak the truth; for one person will not in reality be more prudent than

another, if that which appears to everyone, is to everyone true.

Hermogenes/ It is so.

Socrates/ But neither do I think you will agree with Euthydemus, that alt things subsist together with all, in a similar manner, and always; for thus things would not be good, and others evil, if virtue and vice were always and in a similar manner, inherent in all things.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ If, therefore, neither all things subsist together similarly and always with all things, nor each thing is what it appears to each person, it is evident that there are certain things which possess a stability of essence, and this not from us, nor in consequence of being drawn upwards and downwards by us, through the power of imagination, but which subsist from themselves, according to the essence which naturally belongs to them.

Hermogenes/ This appears to me, Socrates, to be the case.

Socrates/ Will, therefore, the things themselves naturally subsist in this manner, but their actions not so? or are their actions, in like manner, one certain species of things?

Hermogenes/ They are perfectly so.

Socrates/ Actions therefore, also, are performed according to the nature which they possess, and not according to our opinion. As, for instance, if we should attempt to cut anything, shall we say that each particular can be divided just as we please, and with what we please? or rather, shall we not say, that if we desire to cut anything according to its natural capacity of receiving section, and likewise with that instrument which is natural for the purpose, we shall divide properly, effect something satisfactory, and act rightly? But that if we do this contrary

to nature, we shall wander from the purpose, and perform nothing?

Hermogenes/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ If therefore we should attempt to burn anything, we ought not to burn it according to every opinion, but according to that which is right; and this is no other, than after that manner in which anything is naturally adapted to burn and be burnt, and with, those materials which are proper on the occasion.

Hermogenes/ It is so.

Socrates/ Must we. not, therefore, proceed with other things" after the same manner?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is not to speak, therefore, one particular operation?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, does he speak rightly, who speaks just as he thinks fit; or he, who speaks in such a manner as the nature of things requires him to speak, and themselves to be spoken of; and who thinks, that if he speaks of a thing with that which is accommodated to its nature, he shall effect something by speaking; but that, if he acts otherwise, he shall wander from the truth, and accomplish nothing to the purpose?

Hermogenes/ It appears to me, it will be just as you say.

Socrates/ Is not, therefore, the nomination of a thing, a certain part of speaking? For those who denominate things, deliver after a manner sentences.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is not the nomination of things, therefore, a certain action, since to speak is a certain action about things?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But it has appeared that actions do not subsist with respect to us, but that they have a certain proper nature of their own.

Hermogenes/ It has so.

Socrates/ It follows, therefore, that we must give names to things, in such a manner as their nature requires us to denominate, and them to be denominated, and by such means as are proper, and not just as we please, if we mean to assent to what we have before asserted. And thus we shall act and nominate in a satisfactory manner, but not by a contrary mode of conduct.

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Come then, answer me. Must we not say, that a thing which ought to be cut, ought to be cut with something?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that the thread, which ought to be separated in weaving, ought to be separated with something? And that the thing which ought to be perforated, ought to be perforated with something?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And likewise that the thing which ought to be named, ought to be named with something?

Hermogenes/ It ought.

Socrates/ But with what are the threads separated in weaving?

Hermogenes/ With the shuttle.

Socrates/ And what is that with which a thing is denominated?

Hermogenes/ A name.

Socrates/ You speak well. And hence a name is a certain organ.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, I should inquire what sort of an instrument a shuttle is, would you not answer, that it is an instrument with which we separate the threads in weaving?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what do we perform in weaving? Do we not separate the woof and the threads, which are confused together?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Would you not answer in the same manner concerning perforating, and other particulars?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Can you in like manner declare concerning a name, what it is which we perform, whilst we denominate anything with a name which is a certain instrument?

Hermogenes/ I cannot.

Socrates/ Do we teach one another anything, and distinguish things according to their mode of subsistence?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ A name, therefore, is an instrument endued with a power of teaching, and distinguishing the essence of a thing, in the same manner as a shuttle with respect to the web.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But is not the shuttle textural?

Hermogenes/ How should it not?

Socrates/ The weaver therefore uses the shuttle in a proper manner, so far as concerns the art of weaving; but he

who teaches employs a name beautifully, according to the proper method of teaching.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Through whose operation is it that the weaver acts properly when he uses the shuttle?

Hermogenes/ The carpenter's.

Socrates/ But is everyone a carpenter, or he only who possesses art?

Hermogenes/ He who possesses art.

Socrates/ And whose work does the piercer properly use, when he uses the auger?

Hermogenes/ The blacksmith's.

Socrates/ Is everyone therefore a blacksmith, or he only who possesses art?

Hermogenes/ He who possesses art.

Socrates/ But whose work does the teacher use when he employs a name?

Hermogenes/ I cannot tell.

Socrates/ Nor can you tell who delivered to us the names which we use?

Hermogenes/ I cannot.

Socrates/ Does it not appear to you that the law delivered these?

Hermogenes/ It does.

Socrates/ He who teaches, therefore, uses the work of the legislator when he uses a name.

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ But does every man appear to you to be a legislator, or he only who possesses art?

Hermogenes/ He who possesses art.

Socrates/ It is not the province, therefore, of every man, O Hermogenes, to establish a name, but of a certain artificer of names; and this, as it appears, is a legislator, who is the most rare of artificers among men.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But come, consider, what it is which the legislator beholds, when he establishes names; and make your survey from the instances above adduced. What is it which the carpenter looks to, when he makes a shuttle? Is it not to some such thing as is naturally adapted to the purposes of weaving?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But if the shuttle should break during its fabrication, do you think the carpenter would make another, taking pattern by the broken one? or rather would he not look to that form, agreeably to which he endeavored to make the broken shuttle?

Hermogenes/ It appears to me that he would look to this in his fabrication.

Socrates/ Do we not, therefore, most justly call this form, the shuttle itself?

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ When, therefore, it is requisite to make shuttles, adapted for the purpose of weaving a slender garment, or one of a closer texture, or of thread or wool, or of any other kind whatever, it is necessary that all of them should possess the form of the shuttle; but that each should be applied to the work to which it is naturally accommodated, in the most becoming manner.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the same reasoning takes place with respect to other instruments. For an instrument must be

found out which is naturally adapted to the nature of each particular, and a substance must be assigned to it, from which the artificer will not produce just what he pleases, but that which is natural to the instrument with which he operates. For it is necessary to know, as it appears, that an auger ought to be composed of iron, in order to operate in each particular naturally.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And that a shuttle should for this purpose be made of wood.

Hermogenes/ It is so.

Socrates/ For every shuttle, as it appears, is naturally adapted to every species of weaving; and other things in a similar manner.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It is necessary, therefore, excellent man, that the legislator should know how to place a name naturally, with respect to sounds and syllables; and that, looking towards that particular of which this is the name, he should frame and establish all names, if he is desirous of becoming the proper founder of names. But if the founder of names does not compose every name from the same syllables, we ought to take notice, that neither does every blacksmith use the same iron, when he fabricates the same instrument for the sake of the same thing; but that the instrument is properly composed, so long as they fabricate it according to the same idea, though from different sorts of iron, whether it is made here, or among the Barbarians;. Is not this the case?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will you not therefore be of opinion, that as long as a founder of names, both here and among the Barbarians, assigns a form of name accommodated to each,

in any kind of syllables, that while this is the case, the founder of names here will not be worse than the founder in any other place?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Who therefore is likely to know whether a convenient form of the shuttle is situated in every kind of wood? Does this belong to the artifice, of the shuttle, or to the weaver by whom it is used?

Hermogenes/ It is probable, Socrates, that he is more likely to know this, by whom the shuttle is used.

Socrates/ Who is it, then, that uses the work of the fabricator of the lyre? Is it not he who knows how to instruct the artificer of it in the best manner, and who is able to judge whether it is properly made or not?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But who is this?

Hermogenes/ The lyrist.

Socrates/ And who is it that uses the work of the shipwright?

Hermogenes/ The pilot.

Socrates/ And who is he that knows whether the work of the founder of names is beautiful, or not; and who is able to judge concerning it when finished, both here and among the Barbarians? Must it not be the person who uses this work?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not this person, one who knows, how to interrogate?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And likewise to answer?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But would you call him, who knows how to interrogate and answer anything else, than one who is skilled in dialectic?

Hermogenes/ I should not.

Socrates/ It is the business, therefore, of the shipwright to make a rudder, according to the directions of the pilot, if he means to produce a good rudder.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And the legislator, as it seems, ought, in the establishing of names, to consult a man skilled in dialectic, if he means to found them in a beautiful manner.

Hermogenes/ He ought.

Socrates/ It appears, therefore, O Hermogenes, that the imposition of names is no despicable affair, as you think it is, nor the business of depraved men, or of any that may occur. And Cratylus speaks truly, when he says that names belong to things from nature, and that everyone is not the artificer of names, but he alone who looks to that name which is naturally accommodated to anything, and who is able to insert this form of a name in letters and syllables.

Hermogenes/ I have nothing proper to urge, Socrates, in contradiction of what you say. And, perhaps, it is not easy to be thus suddenly persuaded. But I think that I should be more easily persuaded by you, if you could show me what that is which you call a certain rectitude of name according to nature.

Socrates/ As to myself, O blessed Hermogenes, I say nothing; but I even almost forget what I said a short time since, that I had no knowledge in this affair, but that I would investigate it in conjunction with you. But now, in consequence of our mutual survey, thus much appears to us, in addition to our former conviction, that a name possesses some natural rectitude; and that every man does

not know how to accommodate names to things, in a becoming manner. Is not this the case?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ After this, therefore, it is necessary to inquire, what the rectitude of name is, if you desire to know this.

Hermogenes/ But I do desire to know it.

Socrates/ Consider then.

Hermogenes/ But in what manner is it proper to consider?

Socrates/ The most proper mode of inquiry, my friend, must be obtained from those endued with science, offering them money for this purpose, and loading them with thanks: and these are the sophists, through whom your brother Callias, in consequence of having given them a great quantity of money, appears to be a wise man. But, since you have no authority in paternal matters, it is proper to supplicate your brother, and entreat him to show you that rectitude about things of this kind, which he has learned from Protagoras.

Hermogenes/ But this request of mine, Socrates, would be absurd, if, notwithstanding my entirely rejecting the truth of Protagoras, I should be pleased with assertions resulting from this truth, as things of any worth.

Socrates/ But if this does not please you, it is proper to derive our information from Homer, and the other poets.

Hermogenes/ And what does Homer say, Socrates, concerning names; and where?

Socrates/ Everywhere. But those are the greatest and most beautiful passages, in which he distinguishes between the names which are assigned to the same things by men, and those which are employed by the gods. Or do you not think that he speaks something in these, great and

wonderful, concerning the rectitude of names? For it is evident that the gods call things according to that rectitude which names naturally possess. Or do you not think so?

Hermogenes/ I well know, that if the gods denominate anything, they properly denominate it. But what are the passages you speak of?

Socrates/ Do you not know, that speaking of the Trojan river, which contested in a singular manner with Vulcan, he says.

> Xanthus its name with those of heavenly birth,
> But call's Scamander by the sons of earth?

Hermogenes/ I do.

Socrates/ But what then, do you not think that this is something venerable, to know in what respect it is more proper to call that river Xanthus, than Scamander? Likewise, if you are so disposed, take notice that he says, the same bird is called Chalcis by the gods, but Cymindis by men. And do you think this is a despicable piece of learning, to know how much more proper it is to call the same bird Chalcis than Cymindis, or Marines than Batik; and so in many other instances, which may be found both in this poet and others? But these things are, perhaps, beyond the ability of you and me to discover. But the names Scamandrius and Astyanax may, as it appears to me, be comprehended by human sagacity; and it may easily be seen, what kind of rectitude there is in these names, which, according to Homer, were given to the son of Hector. For you doubtless know the verses in which these names are contained.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Which therefore of these names do you think Homer considered as more properly adapted to the boy, Astyanax or Scamandrius?

Hermogenes/ I cannot tell.

Socrates/ But consider the affair in this manner: if anyone should ask you, which you thought would denominate things in the most proper manner, the more wise or the more unwise?

Hermogenes/ It is manifest that I should answer, the more wise.

Socrates/ Which therefore appears to you to be the more wise in cities, the women or the men, that I may speak of the whole genus?

Hermogenes/ The men.

Socrates/ Do you not therefore know that, according to Homer, the son of Hector was called by the men of Troy, Astyanax, but by the women, Scamandrius?

Hermogenes/ It appears that it was so.

Socrates/ Do you not think that Homer considered the Trojan men as wiser than the Trojan women?

Hermogenes/ I think he did.

Socrates/ He therefore thought that the name Astyanax was more proper for the boy than Scamandrius.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But let us consider the reason which he assigns for this denomination: for, says he;

> Astyanax the Trojans call's the boy.
> From his great father, the defense of Troy.

On this account, as it appears, it is proper to call the son of the savior of his country Astyanax, that is, the king of that city, which, as Homer says, his father preserved.

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ But why is this appellation more proper than that of Scamandrius? for I confess I am ignorant of the reason of this. Do you understand it?

Hermogenes/ By Zeus, I do not.

Socrates/ But, excellent man, Homer also gave to Hector his name.

Hermogenes/ But why?

Socrates/ Because it appears to me that this name is something similar to Astyanax, and that these names were considered by the Greeks as having the same meaning; for *king* and Hector nearly signify the same, since both these names are royal. For whoever is a *king*, is also doubtless *a Hector*; since such a one evidently *rules over*, *possesses*, and *has*, that of which he is the king. Or do I appear to you to say nothing to the purpose, but deceive myself, in thinking, as through certain vestiges, to touch upon the opinion of Homer respecting the rectitude of names?

Hermogenes/ By no means, by Zeus, but perhaps you in some degree apprehend his meaning.

Socrates/ For it is just, as it appears to me, to call the offspring of a lion, a lion, and the offspring of a horse, a horse. I do not say, that this ought to be the case when something monstrous is produced from a horse, and which is different from a horse; but only when the offspring is a natural production. For if the natural progeny of an ox should generate a horse, the offspring ought not to be called a calf, but a colt. [And if a horse, contrary to nature, should generate a calf, the offspring ought not to be called a colt, but a calf.] And again, if from a man an offspring not human should be produced, the progeny, I think, ought not to be called a man. And the same reasoning must take place respecting trees, and all other producing natures. Or does it not appear so to you?

Hermogenes/ It does.

Socrates/ You speak well: for take care that I do not fraudulently deceive you. For the same reason, therefore, the

offspring of a king ought to be called a king. But it is of no consequence, though the same thing should be expressed in different syllables, or a letter should be added or taken away, as long as the essence of the thing possesses dominion, and manifests itself in the name.

Hermogenes/ What is this which you say?

Socrates/ Nothing complex. But, as you well know, we pronounce the name, of the elements, but not the elements themselves, four alone excepted, viz. ε̄ & ῡ, and ō & ω̄: and adding other letters, as well to the other vowels as to the non-vowels, we form names, which we afterwards enunciate. But, as long as we insert the apparent power of the element, it is proper to call the name that which is manifested to us by the element. As is evident, for instance, in the letter βητα: for here you see that the addition of the η̄ (ee) and the τ̄ (t), and the ᾱ (a), does not hinder the nature of that element from being evinced by the whole name, agreeably to the intention of its founder; so well did he know how to give names to letters.

Hermogenes/ You appear to me to speak the truth.

Socrates/ Will not, therefore, the same reasoning take place respecting a king? For a king will be produced from a king, *good* from *good*, and *beauty* from *beauty*; and in the same manner with relation to everything else, from every genus a progeny of the same kind will be produced, unless something monstrous is generated; and will be called by the same name. But it is possible to vary these names in such a manner by syllables, that, to ignorant men, the very same appellations will appear to be different from each other. Just as the medicines of physicians, when varied with colors or smells, appear to us to be different, though they are still the same; but to the physician, as one who considers the power of the medicines, they appear to be the same, nor is he at all

astonished by the additions. In like manner, perhaps, he who is skilled in names speculates their power, and is not astonished, if at any time a letter should be added, or changed, or taken away; or that in other all-various letters, the same power of name should be found. As in the names Astyanax and Hector, which we have just spoken of, they do not possess anything of the same letters, except the τ (t), and yet, at the same time, they signify the same thing. So likewise with respect to the name αρχεπολις (arkhepolys), or a ruler of a city, what communication has it in letters with the two preceding names? and yet it has the same signification. And there are many other words which signify nothing else than a king; many which signify nothing else than the leader of an army, as, αγις, πολεμαρχος, ευπολεμος (agys, polemarkhos, eypolemos); and likewise many which imply a professor of medicine, as ιατροκλης (yatroklees), and ακεσιμβροτος (akesymbrotos). And perhaps many other may be found, disagreeing indeed in syllables, and letters, but in power vocally emitting the same signification. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And that to things which subsist according to nature, the same names should be assigned?

Hermogenes/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ But that, as often as generations take place contrary to nature, and by this means produce things in the form of monsters, as when from a good and pious man an impious man is generated, then the offspring ought not to be called by the name of his producer; just as we said before, that if a horse should generate the progeny of an ox, the offspring ought not to be called a horse, but an ox?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ When an impious man, therefore, is generated from one who is pious, the name of the genus to which he belongs must be assigned him.

Hermogenes/ It must so.

Socrates/ Such a son, therefore, ought not to be called either one who is a friend to divinity, or mindful of divinity, or anything of this kind: but he should be called by that which signifies the contrary of all this, if names ought to possess anything of rectitude.

Hermogenes/ This ought to be the case more than anything, Socrates.

Socrates/ Just, Hermogenes, as the name Orestes appear, to be properly invented; whether a certain fortune assigned him this name, or some poet, evincing by this appellation his rustic nature, correspondent to an inhabitant of mountains.

Hermogenes/ So it appears, Socrates.

Socrates/ It appears also, that the name of his father subsists according to nature.

Hermogenes/ It does so.

Socrates/ For it seems that Agamemnon was one who considered that he ought to labor and patiently endure hardships, and obtain the end of his designs through virtue. But his stay before Troy, with so great an army, evinces his patient endurance. That this man, therefore, was wonderful, with respect to perseverance, is denoted by the name Agamemnon. Perhaps also Atreus is a proper denomination: for his slaughter of Chrysippus, and the cruelty which he exercised towards Thyestes, evince that he was pernicious and noxious. His surname, therefore, suffers a small degree of declination, and conceals its meaning; so that the nature of the man is not evident to everyone; but to those who are skillful in names, the signification of Atreus is sufficiently

manifest. For his name properly subsists throughout, according to the intrepid, inexorable, and noxious. It appears also to me, that the name given to Pelops was very properly assigned: for this name signifies one who sees things near at hand, and that he is worthy of such a denomination.

Hermogenes/ But how?

Socrates/ Because it is reported of this man, that in the slaughter of Myrtilus, he neither provided for anything, nor could perceive afar off how great a calamity his whole race would be subject to from this circumstance; but he only regarded that which was just before him, and which then subsisted, that is, what was πελας (pelas), or near; and this when he desired, by all possible means, to receive Hippodamia in marriage. So that his name was derived from πελας (pelas) near, and οψις (opsys) sight. Everyone also must think that the name given to Tantalus was properly and naturally assigned him, if what is related concerning him is true.

Hermogenes/ But what is that relation?

Socrates/ That, while he was yet living, many unfortunate and dire circumstances happened to him, and at last the whole of his country was subverted; and that, when he was dead, a stone was suspended over his head in Hades, these particulars, as it appears corresponding with his name in a wonderful and artless manner: For it is just as if anyone should be willing to call him ταλαντατος, i.e. most miserable, but, at the same time, desirous to conceal this circumstance, should call him Tantalus instead of Talantatus. And it seems that the fortune of rumor caused him to receive this appellation. But it appears that the name of him who was called his father, is composed in an all-beautiful manner, though it is by no means easy to be understood: for in reality

the name of Zeus is, as it were, a sentence; but dividing it into two parts, some of us use one part, and some another, for some call him ζηνα (zeena), and some δια (dya). And these parts collected into one, evince the nature of the god; which, as we have said, a name ought to effect: For there is no one who is more the cause of living, both to us and everything else, than he who is the ruler and king of all things. It happens, therefore, that this god is rightly denominated, through whom life is present with all living beings; but the name, though one, is distributed, as I have said, into two parts, viz. into δια (dya), and ζηνα (zeena). But he who suddenly hears that this god is the son of Saturn, may perhaps think it a reproachful assertion: For it is rational to believe that Zeus is the offspring of a certain great dianoëtic power; for, when Saturn is called κορος (koros) it does not signify a boy, but the purity and incorruptible nature of his intellect. But, according to report, Saturn is the son of Heaven: and sight directed to things above is called by this names ουρανια, from beholding things situated on high. From whence, O Hermogenes, those who discourse on sublime affairs, say that a pure intellect is present with him, and that he is very properly denominated Heaven. Indeed, if I did but remember the genealogy of the gods, according to Hesiod, and the yet superior progenitors of these which he speaks of, I should not desist from showing you the rectitude of their appellations, until I had made trial of this wisdom, whether it produces anything of consequence, or not; and whether those explanations which I have just now so suddenly delivered, though I know not from whence, are defective or true.

Hermogenes/ Indeed, Socrates, you really appear to me to pour forth oracles on a sudden, like those who are agitated by some inspiring god.

Socrates/ And I think indeed, O Hermogenes, that this wisdom happened to me through the means of Euthyphro, the son of Pontius: for I was with him in the morning, and listened to him with great attention. It seems therefore, that, being divinely inspired, he has not only filled my ears with divine wisdom, but that he has also arrested my very soul. It appears therefore to me, that we ought to act in such a manner as to make use of this wisdom today, and contemplate what yet remains concerning the rectitude of names. But tomorrow, if it is agreeable to you, we will lay it aside, and purify ourselves from it, finding out for this purpose one who is Hulled in expiating things of this kind, whether he is some one of the priests, or the sophists.

Hermogenes/ I assent to this; for I shall hear, with great pleasure, what remains of the discussion concerning names.

Socrates/ It is necessary to act in this manner. From whence then are you willing we should begin our speculation, since we have insisted upon a certain formula of operation; that we may know whether names themselves will testify for us, that they were not entirely fabricated from chance, but contain a certain rectitude of construction? The names, therefore, of heroes and men may perhaps deceive us: for many of these subsist according to the surnames of their ancestors, and sometimes have no correspondence with the persons, as we observed in the beginning of this disputation. But many are added, as tokens of renown, such as the prosperous, the savior, the friend of divinity, and a variety of others of this kind. It appears to me, therefore, that we ought to neglect the discussion of these: but it is probable that we shall particularly find names properly fabricated, about eternal and natural beings; for it is most becoming to study the position of names in these. But, perhaps, some of these are established by a power more divine than that of men.

Hermogenes/ You appear to me, Socrates, to speak excellently well.

Socrates/ Will it not therefore be just, to begin from the gods, considering the reason why they are properly denominated gods?

Hermogenes/ It will be proper.

Socrates/ I therefore conjecture as follows, —It appears to me that the most ancient of the Greeks, or the first inhabitants of Greece, considered those only as gods, which are esteemed such at present by many of the Barbarians; I mean, the sun and the moon, the earth, the stars, and the heavens. As they therefore perceived all these running round in a perpetual course, from this nature of running they called them gods; but afterwards, understanding that there were others besides these, they called all of them by the same name. Has what I say any similitude to truth, or not?

Hermogenes/ It possesses a perfect similitude.

Socrates/ What then shall we consider after this?

Hermogenes/ It is evident that we ought to speculate concerning dæmons, heroes, and men.

Socrates/ Concerning dæmons? And truly, Hermogenes, this is the proper method of proceeding. What then are we to understand by the name dæmon? see whether I say anything to the purpose.

Hermogenes/ Only relate what it is.

Socrates/ Do you not know who those dæmons are which Hesiod speaks of?

Hermogenes/ I do not.

Socrates/ And are you ignorant that he says, the golden race of men was first generated?

Hermogenes/ This I know.

Socrates/ He says, therefore, concerning this, “that after this race was concealed by Fate, it produced dæmons, denominated holy, terrestrial, good, expellers of evil, and guardians of mortal men.”

Hermogenes/ But what then?

Socrates/ I think, indeed, that he calls it a golden race, not as naturally composed from gold, but as being beautiful and good: but I infer this, from his denominating our race an iron one.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Do you not therefore think, that if anyone of the present times should appear to be good, Hesiod would say he belonged to the golden race?

Hermogenes/ It is probable he would.

Socrates/ But are the good any other than such as are prudent?

Hermogenes/ They are the prudent.

Socrates/ On this account therefore, as it appears to me, more than any other he calls them dæmons, because they were prudent and learned (δαημονες (daeemones)). And, in our ancient tongue, this very name is to be found. Hence both he, and many other poets, speak in a becoming manner, when they say that a good man after death will receive a mighty destiny and renown, and will become a dæmon, according to the surname of prudence. I therefore assert the same, that every good man is learned and skillful; that he is dæmoniacal, both while living and when dead; and that he is properly denominated a dæmon.

Hermogenes/ And I also, Socrates, seem to myself to agree with you perfectly in this particular. But what does the name hero signify?

Socrates/ This is by no means difficult to understand; for this name is very little different from its original, evincing that its generation is derived from love.

Hermogenes/ How is this?

Socrates/ Do you not know that heroes are demigods?

Hermogenes/ What then?

Socrates/ All of them were doubtless generated either from the love of a god towards a mortal maid, or from the love of a man towards a goddess. If, therefore, you consider this matter according to the ancient Attic tongue, you will more clearly understand the truth of this derivation: For it will be evident to you that the word hero is derived from love, with a trifling mutation for the sake of the name: or you may say, that this name is deduced from their being wise and rhetoricians, sagacious and skilled in dialectic, and sufficiently ready in interrogating; for ειρειν is the same as to speak. Hence, as we just now said in the Attic tongue, those who are called heroes will prove to be certain rhetoricians, interrogators, and lovers: so that the genus of rhetoricians and sophists is, in consequence of this, an heroic tribe. This, indeed, is not difficult to understand; but rather this respecting men is obscure, I mean, why they were called ανθρωποι (anthropoy), *men*. Can you tell the reason?

Hermogenes/ From whence, my worthy friend, should I be able? And, indeed, if I was by any means capable of making this discovery. I should not exert myself for this purpose, because I think you will more easily discover it than I shall.

Socrates/ You appear to me to rely on the inspiration of Euthyphro.

Hermogenes/ Evidently so.

Socrates/ And your confidence is proper: for I now seem to myself to understand in a knowing and an elegant

manner; and I am afraid, if I do not take care, that I shall become today wiser than I ought. But consider what I say. For this, in the first place, ought to be understood concerning names, that we often add letters, and often take them away, while we compose names just as we please; and, besides this, often change the acute syllables. As when we say Διι φιλος (Dyy phylos), *a friend to Jove*: for, in order that this name may become instead of a verb to us, we take away the other ιωτα, and, instead of an acute middle syllable, we pronounce a grave one. But, on the contrary, in others we insert letters, and others again we enunciate with a graver accent.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ This, therefore, as it appears to me, takes place in the name man: for a noun is generated from a verb, one letter, ᾱ (a), being taken away, and the end of the word becoming more grave.

Hermogenes/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Thus. This name *man* signifies that other animals, endued with sight, neither consider, nor reason, nor contemplate; but man both sees, and at the same time contemplates and reasons upon that which he sees. Hence man alone, of all animals, is rightly denominated ανθρωπος (anthropos), viz. *contemplating what he beholds*. But what shall we investigate after this? Shall it be that, the inquiry into which will be very pleasing to me?

Hermogenes/ By all means.

Socrates/ It appears then to me, that we ought, in the next place, to investigate concerning soul and body; for we call the composition of soul and body, man.

Hermogenes/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Let us, then, endeavor to divide these in the same manner as the former subjects of our speculation. Will

you not therefore say, that we should first of all consider the rectitude of this name *soul*, and afterwards of the name *body*?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ That I may speak, then, what appears to me on a sudden, I think that those who assigned this name soul, understood some such thing as this, that whenever this nature is present with the body, it is the cause of its life, extending to, and refrigerating it with, the power of respiration; but that when the refrigerating power ceases, the body at the same time is dissolved and perishes: and from hence, as it appears to me, they called it soul (ψυχη). But, if you please, stop a little; for I seem to myself to perceive something more capable of producing persuasion than this, among the followers of Euthyphro: for, as it appears to me, they would despise this etymology, and consider it as absurd. But consider whether the following explanation will please you.

Hermogenes/ Only say what it is.

Socrates/ What other nature, except the soul, do you think gives life to the whole body, contains, carries, and enables it to walk about?

Hermogenes/ No other.

Socrates/ But what, do you not believe in the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that intellect and soul distribute into order, and contain the nature of everything else?

Hermogenes/ I do.

Socrates/ It will be highly proper, therefore, to denominate that power which carries and contains nature, φυσεχην (physekheen): but it may more elegantly be called ψυχη (psykhee).

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And this latter appellation appears to me to be more agreeable to art than the former.

Hermogenes/ For it certainly is so.

Socrates/ But it would truly appear to be ridiculous, if it was named according to its composition.

Hermogenes/ But what shall we next consider after this?

Socrates/ Shall we speak concerning body?

Hermogenes/ By all means.

Socrates/ But this name appears to me to deviate in a certain small degree from its original: for, according to some, it is the *sepulcher* of the soul, which they consider as buried at present; and because whatever the soul signifies, it signifies by the body; so that on this account it is properly called σημα, a *sepulcher*. And indeed the followers of Orpheus appear to me to have established this name, principally because the soul suffers in body the punishment of its guilt, and is surrounded with this enclosure that it may preserve the image of a prison. They are of opinion, therefore, that the body should retain this appellation, σωμα (soma), till the soul has absolved the punishment which is her due, and that no other letter ought to be added to the name.

Hermogenes/ But it appears to me, Socrates, that enough has been said concerning these particulars. But do you think we can speak about the names of the gods, in the same manner as we considered the name of Zeus, and determine the rectitude of their denominations?

Socrates/ By Zeus, Hermogenes, if we are endued with intellect, we shall confess that the most beautiful mode of conduct, on this occasion, is to acknowledge that we know nothing either concerning the gods, or the names by which they denominate themselves: For it is evident that they call themselves by true appellations. But the second mode of rectitude consists, I think, in calling the gods by those

names which the law ordains us to invoke them by in prayer, whatever the names may be which they rejoice to hear; and that we should act thus, as knowing nothing more than this: for the method of invocation which the law appoints appears to me to be beautifully established. If you are willing, therefore, let us enter on this speculation, previously, as it were, declaring to the gods that we speculate nothing concerning their divinities, as we do not think ourselves equal to such an undertaking; but that we direct our attention to the opinion entertained by those men who first fabricated their names: for this will be the means of avoiding their indignation.

Hermogenes/ You appear to me, Socrates, to speak modestly: let us therefore act in this manner.

Socrates/ Ought we not, therefore, to begin from Vesta, according to law?

Hermogenes/ It is just that we should.

Socrates/ What then shall we say is to be understood by this name Ἑστια?

Hermogenes/ By Zeus, I do not think it is easy to discover this.

Socrates/ It appears, indeed, excellent Hermogenes, that those who first established names were no despicable persons, but men who investigated sublime concerns, and were employed in continual meditation and study.

Hermogenes/ But what then?

Socrates/ It seems to me that the position of names was owing to some such men as these. And, indeed, if anyone considers foreign names, he will not less discover the meaning of each. As with respect to this which we call ουσια, essence, there are some who call it εσια (esya), and others again ωσια (osya). In the first place, therefore, it is rational to call the essence of things Ἑστια, according to one of these

names, εσια (esya): and because we denominate that which participates of essence Ἑστια (Estya), *essence*, Vesta may, in consequence of this, be properly called Ἑστια (Estya): for our ancestors were accustomed to call ουσια (oysya), essence, εσια (esya). Besides, if anyone considers the business of sacrifice, he will be led to think that this was the opinion of those by whom sacrifices were ordained. For it was proper, that those who denominated the essence of all things Ἑστια (Estya) (Vesta), should sacrifice to Vesta, before all the gods. But those who called *essence* ωσια (osya), these nearly, according to the opinion of Heraclitus, considered all things as perpetually flowing, and that nothing had any permanent subsistence. The cause, therefore, and leader of things, with them, is impulse: and hence they very properly denominated this impelling cause ωσια (osya). And thus much concerning the opinion of those who may be considered as knowing nothing. But, after Vesta, it is just to speculate concerning Rhea and Saturn, though we have discussed the name of Saturn already. But, perhaps, I say nothing to the purpose.

Hermogenes/ Why so, Socrates?

Socrates/ O excellent man, I perceive a certain hive of wisdom.

Hermogenes/ But of what kind is it?

Socrates/ It is almost ridiculous to mention it; and yet I think it is capable of producing a certain probability.

Hermogenes/ What probability is this?

Socrates/ I seem to myself to behold Heraclitus formerly asserting something wisely concerning Saturn and Rhea, and which Homer himself also asserts.

Hermogenes/ Explain your meaning.

Socrates/ Heraclitus then says, that all things subsist in a yielding condition, and that nothing abides; and

assimilating things to the flowing of a river, he says, that you cannot merge yourself twice in the same stream.

Hermogenes/ He does so.

Socrates/ Does he, therefore, appear to you to conceive differently from Heraclitus, who places Rhea and Saturn among the progenitors of the other gods? And do you think that Heraclitus assigned both of them by chance, the names of streams of water? As, therefore, Homer calls Ocean the generation of the gods, and Tethys their mother, so I think the same is asserted by Hesiod. Likewise Orpheus says.

> In beauteous flowing marriage first combined.
> Ocean, who mingling with his sister Tethys join's.

Behold, therefore, how all these consent with each other in their doctrine, and how they all tend towards the opinion of Heraclitus!

Hermogenes/ You seem to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose, but I do not understand what the name Tethys implies.

Socrates/ But this nearly implies the same, and signifies that it is the occult name of a fountain; for leaping forth, and straining through, represent the image of a fountain. But from both these names the name Tethys is composed.

Hermogenes/ This, Socrates, is an elegant explanation.

Socrates/ What then shall we next consider? Zeus we have already spoken of.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us, therefore, speak of his brothers, Neptune and Pluto, and that other name by which Pluto is called.

Hermogenes/ By all means.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who first called Neptune ποσειεων (poseyeon), appears to me to have given him this

name from the nature of the sea, restraining his course when he walks, and not permitting him to proceed any further, as if it became a bond to his feet. He, therefore, denominated the ruler of this power ποσειδων (poseydon), as ποσιδεσμον οντα (posydesmon onta), viz. having a fettered foot. The ε̄ (e) perhaps was added for the sake of elegance. But, perhaps, this was not the meaning of its founder, but two λλ (ll) were originally placed instead of σ̄ (s); signifying that this god knows a multitude of things. And, perhaps, likewise he was denominated σειων (seyon), i.e. *shaking*, from σειειν (seyeyn), *to shake*, to which π (p) and δ (d) were added. But Pluto was to called from the donation of πλουτος (ploytos), wealth, because riches are dug out of the bowels of the earth. But by the appellation αιδης (aydees), the multitude appear to me to conceive the same as αειδες (aeydes), i.e. obscure and dark; and that, being terrified at this name, they call him Pluto.

Hermogenes/ But what is your opinion, Socrates, about this affair?

Socrates/ It appears to me, that men have abundantly erred concerning the power of this god, and that they are afraid of him without occasion; for their fear arises from hence; because, when anyone of us dies, he abides forever in Hades; and because the soul departs to this god, diverted of the body. But both the empire of this god, and his name, and every other particular respecting him, appear to me to tend to one and the same thing.

Hermogenes/ But how?

Socrates/ I will tell you how this affair appears to me. Answer me, therefore, Which of these is the stronger bond to an animal, so as to cause its detention, necessity, or desire?

Hermogenes/ Desire, Socrates, is by far the most prevalent.

Socrates/ Do you not think that many would fly from Hades, unless it held those who dwell there by the strongest bond?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It binds them, therefore, as it appears, by a certain desire; since it binds them with the greatest bond, and not with necessity.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Are there not, therefore, many desires?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It binds them, therefore, with the greatest of all desires, if it binds them with the greatest of bonds.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is there then any greater desire, than that which is produced when anyone, by associating with another, thinks that, through his means, he shall become a better man?

Hermogenes/ By Zeus, Socrates, there is not any.

Socrates/ On this account, Hermogenes, we should say, that no one is willing to return from thence hither, not even the Syrens themselves; but that both they, and all others, are enchanted by the beautiful discourses of Pluto. And hence it follows that this god is a perfect sophist; that he greatly benefits those who dwell with him; and that he possesses such great affluence as enables him to supply us with those mighty advantages which we enjoy; and from hence he is called Pluto. But does he not also appear to you to be a philosopher, and one endued with excellent prudence and design, from his being unwilling to associate with men invested with bodies, but then only admits them to familiar converse with him, when their souls are purified from all the evils and desires which subsist about the body? for this

divinity considered, that he should be able to detain souls, if he bound them with the desire belonging to virtue; but that, while they possess the consternation and furious insanity of body, even his father Saturn would not be able to detain them with him, in those bonds with which he is said to be bound.

Hermogenes/ You seem, Socrates, to speak something to the purpose.

Socrates/ We ought then, O Hermogenes, by no means to denominate αιδης from dark and invisible, but much rather from a knowledge of all beautiful things: and from hence this god was called by the fabricator of names αδης.

Hermogenes/ Be it so. But what shall we say concerning the names Ceres, Hera, Apollo, Minerva, Vulcan, Mars, and those of the other gods?

Socrates/ It appears that Ceres was so called from the donation of aliment, being, as it were, διδουσα μητηρ (dydoysa meeteer), or *a bestowing mother*. But Hera, from being *lovely*, on account of the love which Zeus is said to have entertained for her. Perhaps also the founder of this name, speculating things on high, denominated the air ἠρα (eera); and, for the sake of concealment, placed the beginning at the end. And this you will be convinced of, if you frequently pronounce the name of Hera. With respect to the names φερῥεφατα (pherrephatta), or Proserpine, and Apollo, many are terrified at them, through unskillfulness as it appears in the rectitude of names. And indeed, changing the first of these names, they consider φερσεφονη (phersephonee); and this appears to them as something terrible and dire. But the other name, φερῥεφατα (pherrephatta), signifies that this goddess is wise: for that which is able to touch upon, handle, and pursue things which are borne along, will be wisdom. This goddess

therefore may, with great propriety, be named φερεπαφα, or something of this kind, on account of her wisdom, and contact of that which is borne along: and hence the wise αιδης or Pluto, associates with her, because of these characteristics of her nature. But men of the present times neglect this name, valuing good pronunciation more than truth; and on this account they call her φερῥεφαττα (pherrephatta). In like manner with respect to Apollo, many, as I said before, are terrified at this name of the god, as if it signified something dire. Or are you ignorant that this is the case?

Hermogenes/ I am not; and you speak the truth.

Socrates/ But this name, as it appears to me, is beautifully established, with respect to the power of the god.

Hermogenes/ But how?

Socrates/ I will endeavor to tell you what appears to me in this affair: for there is no other one name which can more harmonize with the four powers of this god, because it touches upon them all, and evinces, in a certain respect. his *harmonic*, *prophetic*, *medicinal*, and *arrow-darting skill*.

Hermogenes/ Tell me, then; for you seem to me to speak of this name, as something prodigious.

Socrates/ This name then is well harmonized as to its composition, as belonging to an harmonica god: for, in the first place, do not purgations and purifications, both according to medicine and prophecy, and likewise the operations of pharmacy, and the lustrations, warnings and sprinklings employed by the divining art, all tend to this one point, viz. the rendering man pure, both in body and soul?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will not then the purifying god, who washes and frees us from evils of this kind, be Apollo?

Hermogenes/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ According, therefore, to the solutions and warnings which he affords, as being the physician of such-like things, he will be properly called απολυων (apolyon) or the liberator; but according to his prophetic power and truth, he may be most properly called ἁπλος (aplos), or simple, as he is denominated by the Thessalians; since simplicity is the same with truth: for all the Thessalians call this god the simple. But, on account of his perpetually prevailing might in the jaculation of arrows, he may be called αεὶ ϐαλλων (aey ballon), that is, perpetually darting. But with respect to his harmonic power, it is proper to take notice, that ᾱ (a) often signifies the same as together, as in the words ακολουθος (akoloythos), a follower, and ακοιτις (akoytys), a wife. So likewise in the name of this god, ᾱ (a) and πολησις (poleesys) signify the revolution subsisting together with, and about the heavens, which they denominate the pole; and the harmony subsisting in song, which they call symphony. Because all these, according to the assertions of those who are skilled in music and astronomy, revolve together with a certain harmony. But this god presides over harmony, ομοπολων (omopolon), i.e. converting all these together, both among gods and men. As, therefore, we call ομοκελευθος (omokeleythos), and ομοκοιτις (omokoytys), i.e. going together, and lying together, ακολουθος (akoloythos) and ακοιτις (akoytys), changing ο (o) into α (a), so likewise we denominate Apollo as ομοπολων (omopolon), inserting at the same time another λ (l); because otherwise it would have been synonymous with a difficult name. And this many of the present time suspecting, through not rightly perceiving the power of this name, they are terrified at it, as if it signified a certain corruption. But in reality this name, as we just now observed, is so composed, that it touches upon all the powers of the god, viz. his simplicity, perpetual jaculation, purifying, and joint-revolving nature. —But the

name of the Muses, and universally that of Music, was derived, as it seems, from μωσθαι (mosthay), *to inquire*, and from investigation and philosophy. But λητω (leeto), i.e. Latona, was derived from the mildness of this goddess, because she is εθελημων (etheleemon), viz. willing to comply with the requests of her suppliants. Perhaps, too, they denominate her as a stranger; for many call her ληθω (leetho): and this name ληθω (leetho) they seem to have assigned her, because her manners are not rough, but gentle and mild. But αρτεμις (artemys), i.e. Diana, appears to Signify integrity and modesty, through her desire of virginity. Perhaps also the founder of her name so called her, as being skillful in virtue. And it is not likewise improbable, that, from her hating the copulation of man and woman, or through some one, or all of these, the institutor of her name thus denominated the goddess.

Hermogenes/ But what will you say concerning Dionysius and Venus?

Socrates/ You inquire about great things, O son of Hipponicus. But the mode of nomination, belonging to these divinities, is both serious and jocose. Ask therefore others about the serious mode; but nothing hinders us from relating the jocose: for these deities are lovers of jesting and sport. Dionysius, therefore, is the giver of wine, and may be jocosely called διδοινυσος (dydoynysos). But οινος (oynos), wine, may be most justly denominated οιονους (oyonoys), because it is accustomed to deprive those of intellect; who possessed it before. But, with respect to Venus, it is not proper to contradict Hesiod, but to allow that she was called αφροδιτη (aphrodytee), through her generation from αφρος (aphros), foam.

Hermogenes/ But, Socrates, as you are an Athenian, you ought not to neglect the investigation of Minerva, Vulcan, and Mars.

Socrates/ For such a neglect is, indeed, by no means becoming.

Hermogenes/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ One of the names of Minerva, therefore, it is by no means difficult to explain.

Hermogenes/ Which do you mean?

Socrates/ Do we not call her Pallas?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ This name, therefore, we must consider as derived from leaping in armor; and in so doing, we shall, as it appears to me, think properly: for to elevate oneself, or something else, either from the earth or in the hands, is denominated by us to vibrate and be vibrated, and to dance and be made to dance.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ The goddess, therefore, is on this account called Pallas.

Hermogenes/ And very properly so. But how will you explain her other name?

Socrates/ Do you mean that of Athena?

Hermogenes/ I do.

Socrates/ This name, my friend, is of greater moment; for the ancients appear to have considered Athena in the same manner as those of the present day, who are skilled in the interpretation of Homer: for many of these explain the poet as Signifying, by Athena, intellect and the dianoëtic power. And he who instituted names seems to have understood some such thing as this about the goddess, or rather something yet greater, expressing, by this means, the intelligence of the goddess, as if he had said that she is ϑεονοη (theonoee), or deific intelligence, employing after a foreign mode ᾱ (a) instead of η̄ (ee), and taking away ι (y) and

σ (s). Though perhaps this was not the case, but he called her ϑεονοη (theonoee), as understanding divine concerns in a manner superior to all others. Nor will it be foreign from the purpose to say that he was willing to call her ηθονοη (eethonoee), as being intelligence in manners. But either the original founder of this name, or certain persons who came after him, by producing it into something which they thought more beautiful, denominated her Athena.

Hermogenes/ But what will you say concerning Vulcan?

Socrates/ Do you inquire concerning the noble arbiter of light?

Hermogenes/ So it appears.

Socrates/ This divinity, therefore, being φαιστος, luminous, and attracting to himself a, is called ηφαιστος (eephaystos), or the arbiter of light.

Hermogenes/ It appears so, unless you think it requires some other explanation.

Socrates/ But, that it may not appear otherwise to me, inquire concerning Mars.

Hermogenes/ I inquire then.

Socrates/ If you please, then, the name of Mars shall be derived from το αρῥεν (arren) *masculine*, and το ανδρειον (andreyon) *bold*. But if you are willing that he should be called Mars, from his hard and inconvertible nature, the whole of which is denominated αρῥατον (arraton), this also will perfectly agree with the properties of the warlike god.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Let us therefore dismiss our investigations concerning the names of the gods, as I am afraid to discourse about them. But urge me to anything else you please, that you may see the quality of the horses of Euthyphro.

Hermogenes/ I will consent to what you say, if you will only suffer me to ask you concerning Hermes; for Cratylus says that I am not Hermogenes. Let us endeavor, then, to behold the meaning of the name Hermes, that we may know whether he says anything to the purpose.

Socrates/ This name seems to pertain to discourse, and to imply that this god is an interpreter and a messenger, one who steals, and is fraudulent in discourse, and who meddles with merchandise: and the whole of this subsists about the power of discourse. As, therefore, we said before, το ειρειν is the use of speech: and of this Homer frequently says, εμησατο (emeesato), i.e. he deliberated about it. This name, therefore, is composed both from to speak and to deliberate; just as if the institutor of the name had authoritatively addressed us as follows; "It is just, O men, that you should call that divinity, who makes speech the object of his care and deliberation, Ειρεμης (Eyremees)." But we of the present times, thinking to give elegance to the name, denominate him Ἑρμης (Ermees), Hermes. But Iris likewise is so called, from το ειρειν (eyreyn), *to speak* because she is a messenger.

Hermogenes/ By Zeus, then, Cratylus appears to me to have spoken well, in denying that I am Hermogenes; because I am by no means an excellent artist of discourse.

Socrates/ It is likewise probable, my friend, that Pan is the bipartite son of Hermes.

Hermogenes/ But why?

Socrates/ You know that speech signifies the all; that it circulates and rolls perpetually; and that it is two-fold, true and false.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is not, therefore, that which is true in speech, smooth and divine, and dwelling on high in the gods; but that which is false, a downward inhabitant, dwelling in the

multitude of mankind, and, besides this, rough and tragic? For in speech of this kind, the greater part of fables, and the falsities about a tragic life, subsist.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ With great propriety, therefore, he who indicates everything, and perpetually rolls, is παν αιπολος; the biform son of Hermes; who in his upper parts is smooth, but in his lower parts rough and goat-formed: and Pan is either speech, or the brother of speech, since he is the son of Hermes. But it is by no means wonderful that brother should be similar to brother. However, as I just now said, O blessed man! let us leave these investigations of the gods.

Hermogenes/ Gods of this kind, if you please, Socrates, we will omit; but what should hinder you from discussing the names of such divinities as the sun and moon, stars and earth, æther and air, fire and water, the seasons and the year?

Socrates/ You assign me an arduous talk; yet at the same time, if it will oblige you, I am willing to comply.

Hermogenes/ It will so, indeed.

Socrates/ What therefore do you wish we should first investigate? Or shall we, agreeably to the order in which you mentioned these, begin with the sun?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ It seems, then, that this would become more manifest, if anyone should use the Doric appellation: for the Dorians call the sun αλιον. He will therefore be αλιον, from his collecting men into one, when he rises; and likewise, from his always revolving about the earth. To which we may add, that this name belongs to him, because he varies, in his circulation, the productions of the earth. But το ποικιλειν (poykyleyn), and αιολειν (ayoleyn), have one and the same meaning.

Hermogenes/ But what will you say of σεληνη (seleenee), or the moon?

Socrates/ This name seems to press upon Anaxagoras.

Hermogenes/ Why?

Socrates/ Because it seems to manifest something of a more ancient date, which he lately revived, when he said that the moon derives her light from the sun.

Hermogenes/ But how?

Socrates/ Σελας (Selas) is the same with φως (phos), light.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But this light about the moon is perpetually νεον (neon) and εννον (ennon), *new* and *old*, if what the Anaxagoras say is true: for, perpetually revolving in a circle, it perpetually renews this light; but the light of the former month becomes old.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But many call the moon σελαναιας (selanayas).

Hermogenes/ They do so.

Socrates/ But, because it perpetually possesses new and old splendor, it may be more justly called σελαεννεοαεια (selaenneoaeya); but is now concisely denominated σελαναια (selanaya).

Hermogenes/ This name, Socrates, is dithyrambic. But what will you say of month and the stars?

Socrates/ Μειης (Meyees), or month, may be properly so called, from μειουσθαι (meyoysthay), *to be diminished*; but the stars appear to derive their appellation from αστραπη (astrapee), *coruscation*. But αστραπη (astrapee) is denominated from ωπας αναστρεφει (opas anastrephey), i.e. converting to itself the sight; but now, for the sake of elegance, it is called αστραπη (astrapee).

Hermogenes/ But what is your opinion concerning fire and water.

Socrates/ I am in doubt with respect to fire; and it appears, that either the Muse of Euthyphro deserts me, or that this word is most extremely difficult to explain. Behold then the artifice which I employ, in all such things as cause me to doubt.

Hermogenes/ What is it?

Socrates/ I will tell you. Answer me, therefore: Do you know on what account πυϱ (pyr), fire, is so called?

Hermogenes/ By Zeus, I do not.

Socrates/ But consider what I suspect concerning it: for I think that the Greeks, especially such as dwelt under the dominion of the Barbarians, received many of their names from the Barbarians.

Hermogenes/ But what then?

Socrates/ If anyone, therefore, should investigate the propriety of these names according to the Greek tongue, and not according to that language to which the name belongs, he would certainly be involved in doubt.

Hermogenes/ It is likely he would.

Socrates/ Consider then, whether this name, πυϱ (pyr), is not of Barbaric origin: For it is by no means easy to adapt this to the Greek tongue; and it is manifest that the Phrygians thus denominate fire, with a certain trifling deviation; as likewise that ὑδωϱ (ydor) *water*, κυνας (kynas) dogs, and many other names, are indebted to them for their origin.

Hermogenes/ They are so.

Socrates/ It is not proper, therefore, to use violence with these words, since no one can say anything to the purpose about them. On this account, therefore, I shall reject the

explanation of πυρ (pyr) fire, and ὑδωρ (ydor) water. But air, O Hermogenes, is so called, because it elevates things from the earth; or because it always flows; or because, from its flowing, spirit is produced: for the poets call spirits αηται (aeetay), winds. Perhaps, therefore, it is called as if implying *a flowing spirit*, or *a flowing blast of wind*. But I consider æther as deriving its appellation from always running in a flowing progression, about the air; and on this account it may be called αειθερ (aeytheeer). But γη (gee), or *earth*, will more plainly signify its meaning, if anyone denominates it γαια (gaya). For γαια (gaya) may be properly called γεννητειρα (genneeteyra), *the producer*, as Homer says; for he calls γεγαασι, γεγενησθαι (gegaasy, gegeneesthay), or that which is produced in itself.

Hermogenes/ Let it be so.

Socrates/ What then remains for us to investigate after this?

Hermogenes/ The hours, Socrates, and the year.

Socrates/ But ωραι (oray), that is, *the hours*, must be pronounced in the Attic tongue, as that which is more ancient, if you wish to know the probable meaning of this word. For they are ὡραι (oray), on account of their bounding the winter and summer, as likewise winds and proper occasions subservient to the fruits of the earth. And hence, because they bound, ὁριζουσαι (oryzoysay), they are most justly called ὡραι (oray). But ενιαυτος (enyaytos) and ετος (etos), *the year*, appear to be one and the same: for that which, at stated periods, educes into light the productions of the earth, and explores them in itself, is the year. And as in the foregoing part of our discourse we gave a two-fold distribution to the name of Zeus, and asserted that he was by some called ζηνα (zeena), and by others δια (dya); so likewise, with respect to the year, it is called by some

ενιαυτος (enyaytos), because *it explores* IN ITSELF; but ετος (etos), because *it explores*. But the entire reason of its denomination is because it explores things in itself; so that two names are generated, ενιαυτος (enyaytos) and ετος (etos), from one reason.

Hermogenes/ But now, Socrates, you have certainly proceeded to a great length.

Socrates/ I seem, indeed, to have pursued wisdom to a considerable distance.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Perhaps you will urge me still further.

Hermogenes/ But after this species of inquiry, I would most gladly contemplate the rectitude of those beautiful names concerning virtue, such as φρονησις (phroneesys) *prudence*, συνεσις (synesys) *consciousness*, δικαιοσυνη (dykayosynee) equity, and all the rest of this kind.

Socrates/ You raise up, my friend, no despicable genus of names. But however, since I have put on the lion's skin, I ought not to fly through fear, but to investigate prudence and intelligence, consideration and science, and all the other beautiful names which you speak of.

Hermogenes/ We ought by no means to desist till this is accomplished.

Socrates/ And indeed, by the dog, I seem to myself not to prophesy badly, about what I understand at present, that those ancient men who established names, experienced that which happens to many wise men of the present times; for, by their intense investigation concerning the manner in which things subsist, they became giddy, far beyond the rest of mankind, and afterwards, things themselves appeared to them to stagger and fluctuate. They did not however consider their inward giddiness as the cause of this opinion, but the outward natural fluctuation of things; for they

imagined that nothing was stable and firm, but that all things flowed and were continually hurried along, and were full of all-various agitation and generation. I speak this, as what I conceive respecting the names which we have just now mentioned.

Hermogenes/ How is this, Socrates?

Socrates/ Perhaps you have not perceived that these names were established as belonging to things borne along, flowing, and in continual generation.

Hermogenes/ I do not entirely perceive this.

Socrates/ And, in the first place, the first name which we mentioned entirely pertains to something of this kind.

Hermogenes/ Which is that?

Socrates/ *Prudence*, or φρονησις (phroneesys): for it is the intelligence of local motion and fluxion. It may also imply the advantage of local motion; so that it is plainly conversant with agitation. But if you will, γνωμη, or consideration, perfectly signifies the inspection and agitation of begetting: for το νωμᾷν (to noman) is the same as το σκοπειν (to skopeyn), to *speculate*. Again, νοησις (noeesys), or intelligence, if you please, is του νεο εσις (toy neo esys), or *the desire of that which is new*: but that things are new, signifies that they perpetually subsist in becoming to be. Hence, that the soul desires things of this kind, is indicated by him who established this name νεοεσις (neoesys): For it was not at first called νεοεσις (neoesys) but two ε̄ ε̄ (e e) ought to be substituted instead of η̄ (ee) so as to produce νεοεσις (neoesys). But temperance signifies the safety of that prudence which we have just now considered: and science, indeed, implies that the soul does not disdain to follow things hurried along with local motion; and that she neither leaves them behind, nor goes before them. On which,

account, by inserting ε̄ it ought to be called επιστημενης. But συνεσις appears to be, as it were, a syllogism. And when συνιεναι is said to take place, the same things happens in every respect, as when anyone is said ἐπιστασθαι (epystasthay), *to know*: for συνιεναι (synyenay) asserts that the soul follows along with things in their progressions; but wisdom signifies the touching upon local motion. This, however, is more obscure and foreign from us. But it is necessary to recollect from the poets, that when they wish to express anything which accedes on a sudden, they say εσυθη (esythee), *it rushed forth*: and the name of a certain illustrious Lacedæmonian was Σους (Soys), i.e. one who rushes forward; for thus the Lacedæmonians denominate a swift impulse. Wisdom, therefore, signifies the contact of this local motion, as if things were continually agitated and hurried along. But το ἀγαθον (agathon), *the good*, signifies that which excites admiration, in the nature of everything: for, since all things subsist in continual progression, in some swiftness, and in others slowness, prevails. Everything, therefore, is not swift, but there is something in everything which is *admirable*. Hence the name ταγαθον (tagathon) is the same with το ᾀγαστον (agaston), *the admirable*. But, with respect to the name equity, we may easily conjecture that it is derived from the intelligence of that which is just: but the signification of the *just itself*, is difficult to determine: For it appears that the multitude agree thus far 'to what we have said, but that what follows is a subject of doubt. For, indeed, such as think that the universe subsists in progression, consider the greatest part of it to be of such a nature that it does nothing else than yield to impulsion; that, on this account, something pervades through everything, from which all generated natures are produced; and that this pervading nature is the swiftest and most attenuated of all things: For it would not be able to pass through everything,

unless it was the most attenuated, so that nothing can stop its progression; and the swiftest, so that it may use other things as if in an abiding condition with respect to itself. Because, therefore, it governs all other things διαϊον (dyayon), i.e. by pervading through them, it is properly called δικαιον, receiving the power of the κ̄ (k) for the sake of elegant enunciation. And thus far the multitude agree with us, concerning the meaning of το δικαιον (dykayon), *the just*. But I, O Hermogenes, as being assiduous in my inquiries about this affair, have investigated all these particulars, and have discovered in the απορρητα, or sacred mysteries, that *the just* is the same with *cause*. For that through which a thing is generated, is the cause of that thing: and a certain person said, that it was on this account properly denominated το δικαιον (to dykayon). But, notwithstanding this information, I do not the less cease to inquire, O best of men, what the just is, if it is the same with cause. I seem, therefore, now to inquire further than is becoming, and to pass, as it is said, beyond the trench; for they will say that I have sufficiently interrogated and heard, and will endeavor, through being desirous to satisfy me, to give different solutions of the difficulty, and will no longer harmonize in their opinions. For a certain person says that the sun is the just, because the sun alone, by his pervading and heating power, governs all things. But when, rejoicing in this information, I related it to another person, as if I had heard something beautiful and excellent, he laughed at me when I told it him, and asked me if I thought that there was no longer anything just in men after sunset? Upon my inquiring, therefore, what the just was, according to him, he said it was fire. But this is by no means easy to understand. But another person said, it was not fire, but the heat which subsisted in fire. Another again said, that all these opinions were ridiculous, but that the just was that intellect which Anaxagoras speaks of; for he

said that this was an unrestrained governor, and that it was mingled with nothing, but that it adorned all things, pervading through all things. But in these explanations, my friend, I find myself exposed to greater doubts than before I endeavored to learn what justice is But, that we may return to that for the sake of which we entered on this disputation, this name appears to be attributed to equity, for the reasons which we have assigned.

Hermogenes/ You appear to me, Socrates, to have heard these particulars somewhere, and not to have fabricated them yourself.

Socrates/ But what do you say respecting my other explanations?

Hermogenes/ That this is not entirely the case with them.

Socrates/ Attentively hear then; for perhaps I may deceive you in what remains, by speaking as if I had not heard. — What then remains for us after equity? I think we have not yet discussed fortitude: for injustice is evidently a real hindrance to the pervading power; but fortitude signifies that it derived its appellation from contention, or battle. But contention in a thing, if it flows, is nothing else than a contrary fluxion. If anyone, therefore, takes away the δ (d) from this name ανδρια (andrya) *fortitude*, the name ἀνρια (anrya), which remains, will interpret its employment. Hence it is evident that a fluxion, contrary to every fluxion, is not fortitude, but that only which flows contrary to *the just*; for otherwise fortitude would not be laudable. In like manner το αῤῥεν (arren), that is, the male nature, and ἀνηρ (aneer) *man*, are derived from a similar origin, that is, from ανω ῥοη (ano roee), or a *flowing upwards*. But the name woman appears to me to imply *begetting*; and the name for the female nature seems to be so called from the pap or breast. But the pap or breast, O Hermogenes, seems to derive its appellation from

causing to germinate and shoot forth, like things which are irrigated.

Hermogenes/ It appears so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But the word θαλλειν (thalleyn), to flourish, appears to me to represent the increase of youth, because it takes place swiftly and suddenly: and this is imitated by the founder of the name, who composed it from θειν (theyn) to *run*, and αλλεσθαι (allesthay) *to leap*. But do you not perceive that I am borne, as it were, beyond my course, since I have met with words plain and easy? But many things yet remain, which appear to be worthy of investigation.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ And one of these is, that we should consider the meaning of the word *art*.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Does not the word τεχνη (tekhnee), then, signify εχονοη (ekhonoee), or the habit of intellect, taking away for this purpose τ (t), and inserting ō (o) between x (kh) and ν (n) between ν (n) and η (ee)?

Hermogenes/ And this in a very farfetched manner, Socrates.

Socrates/ But do you not know, blessed man! that such names as were first established, are now overwhelmed through the studious of tragic discourse; who, for the sake of elegant enunciation, add and take away letters; and who entirely pervert them, partly through ornament, and partly through time? For in the word κατοπτρω (katoptro), a mirror, does not the addition of the appear to you absurd? But such alterations as these are, I think, made by those who care nothing for truth, but are solicitous about the elegant conformation of the mouth: so that these men, having added many things to the first names, at length rendered it

impossible for anyone to apprehend the meaning of a name; as in the name Sphynx, which they call σφιγγξ (sphyggx) instead of σφιγξ (sphygx), and so in many others.

Hermogenes/ This is indeed the case, Socrates.

Socrates/ Indeed, if it should be allowed for everyone to add to, and take away from names, just as he pleased, this would certainly be a great license; and anyone might adapt every name to everything.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ The truth indeed. But I think that you who are a wise president, ought to preserve and guard the moderate and the probable.

Hermogenes/ I wish I could.

Socrates/ And I also, O Hermogenes, wish the same in conjunction with you. But you should not, O dæmoniacal man, demand a discussion very exact, lest you perfectly exhaust my force: for I shall ascend to the summit of what I have said, when, after art, I have considered *artifice* or *skill*. For μηχανη (meekhanee), or *artifice*, seems to me to signify the completion of a thing in a very high degree. It is composed therefore from μηκος (meekos), length, and ανειν (aneyn), to finish a thing completely. But, as I just now said, it is proper to ascend to the summit of our discourse, and to inquire the signification of the names virtue and vice. —One of these, therefore, I have not yet discovered but the others appears to me to be manifest, For it harmonizes with all that has been said before: for, in consequence of everything subsisting in progression, whatever passes on badly will be *depravity*; but this, when it subsists in the soul, badly acceding to her concerns, then most eminently possesses the appellation of the whole of depravity. But it appears to me, that the faulty mode of progression is manifest in timidity, which we have not yet discussed; though it is

proper to consider it, after fortitude. And we likewise seem to have omitted many other names. Timidity therefore signifies, *that the bond of the soul is strong*; for the word *vehement* implies a certain strength. And hence the most vehement and, greatest bond of the soul, will be timidity: just as *want* is an *evil*; and everything as it appears, which is an impediment to passing on and progression. —*Passing on badly*, therefore, seems, to evince a detention and hindrance of progression: and when the soul is thus affected, she then becomes full of evil. But if the name vice is applicable to such things as these, the contrary of this will be virtue; Signifying, in the first place, facility of progression; and, in the next place, that the flowing of a good soul ought to be perpetually loosened and free. And hence, that which always flows unrestrained and without impediment, may, as it appears, very properly receive this denomination, ᾳειῤῥητη (aeyrreetee). Perhaps also, someone may call it αἰρετη (ayretee), because this habit is the most eligible of all. Perhaps, too, you will say that I feign; but I assert, that if the preceding name vice is properly established, the same may be said of the name virtue.

Hermogenes/ But what is the meaning of το κακον (kakon), *evil*, through which you explained many things in the word *depravity*?

Socrates/ It appears to me, by Zeus, to imply something prodigious, and difficult to collect. I introduce therefore to this also the artifice mentioned above.

Hermogenes/ What is that?

Socrates/ To assert that this name is something Barbaric.

Hermogenes/ And, in so doing, you appear to me to speak properly. But, if you think fit, we will omit these, and endeavor to consider the rectitude of composition in the names, *the beautiful*, and *the base*.

Socrates/ *The base*, then, seems to me to evince its signification plainly, and to correspond with the preceding explanations: for he who established names appears to me, throughout, to have reviled that which hinders and detains the flowing of things; and that he now assigned the name ἀεισχοῤῥουν (aeyskhorroyn) to that which always detains a flowing progression. But, at present, they call it collectively αισχρον.

Hermogenes/ But what will you say concerning the *beautiful*?

Socrates/ This is more difficult to understand, though they say that the α (a) in this word, is produced only for the sake of harmony and length.

Hermogenes/ But how?

Socrates/ It appears that this appellation is the surname of the dianoëtic energy.

Hermogenes/ How do you prove this?

Socrates/ What do you think is the cause of the denomination of everything? Is it not that which establishes names?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will not this cause, then, be the dianoëtic conception, either of gods, or men, or of both?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ *To call things* therefore, and *the beautiful*, are the same with dianoëtic energy.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, the operations of *intellect* and the dianoëtic power laudable; but such things as are not the result of their energies blamable?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ That which belongs to medicine, therefore, produces medical works; and that which belongs to the carpenter's art, carpentry works: or what is your opinion on the subject?

Hermogenes/ The same as yours.

Socrates/ Does not therefore the *beautiful* produce things beautiful?

Hermogenes/ It is necessary that it should.

Socrates/ But this as we have said, is dianoëtic energy.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ το καλον (kalon), therefore, or *the beautiful*, will be properly the surname of *prudence*, which produces such things as, in consequence of acknowledging to be beautiful, we are delighted with.

Hermogenes/ It appears to be so.

Socrates/ What then remains for us to investigate, of such like names?

Hermogenes/ Whatever belongs to *the good* and *the beautiful*; such as the names signifying *things conducive*, *useful*, *profitable*, *lucrative*, and the contraries of these.

Socrates/ You may find then what το συμφερον, or *the conducive* is, from our foregoing speculations; for it appears to be a certain brother of science. For it evinces nothing else than the local motion of the soul, in conjunction with things; and that things resulting from hence should be called συμφεροντα and συμφορα, i.e. *conducive*, from συμπεριφερεσθαι (symperypheresthay), or *being borne along in conjunction*.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But the name *lucrative* (κερδαλεον (kerdaleon)) is derived from κερδος (kerdos), gain. And if anyone inserts a ν (n) instead of a δ (d) in this name, it will manifest its

meaning: For it will thus, after another manner, become the name for *good*; since he who assigned it this name intended to express that power which it possesses, of becoming mingled with, and pervading through all things, and thus, by placing δ (d) instead of ν (n) he pronounced it κερδος (kerdos).

Hermogenes/ But what will you say concerning λυσιτελουν (lysyteloyn), or the *useful*?

Socrates/ It appears, O Hermogenes! that this name was not established according to the meaning in which it is employed by inn-keepers, *because it frees from expense*; but because it is the swiftest of being, and, in consequence of this, does not suffer things to stand still, nor *lation*, by receiving an end of being borne along, to stop, and rest from its progression: but, on the contrary, it always departs from lation, as long as any end remains to be obtained, and renders it unceasing and immortal. And, on this account, it appears to me λυσιτελουν (lysyteloyn) was called *the good*; for that which *dissolves the end* of lation was called λυσιτελουν (lysyteloyn). But ωφελιμον (ophelymon), or *the profitable*, is a foreign name; and Homer himself often uses τῳ οφελλειν (to ophelleyn). But this is the surname of *increasing* and *making*.

Hermogenes/ But what shall we say respecting the contraries of these?

Socrates/ There is no occasion, as it appears to me, to evolve such as are the negations of these.

Hermogenes/ But what are they?

Socrates/ The *non-conducive*, *useless*, *unprofitable*, and the *non-lucrative*.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ But may we not inquire concerning βλαβερον (blaberon) and ζημιωδες (zeemyodes), the *noxious* and *pernicious*.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And το βλαβερον (blaberon), indeed, or *the noxious*, says that it is βλαπτον τον ῥουν (blapton ton royn). But βλαπτον (blapton) signifies *that which wishes to bind*; and ἁπτειν (apteyn), *to bind*, is the same as δεῖν (deyn): but this it blames in every respect. He, therefore, who wishes ἁπτειν ῥουν (apteyn royn), i.e. *to bind that which flows*, will be most properly called βουλαπτερουν (boylapteroyn); but it appears to me, that, for the sake of elegance, it was denominated βλαβερον (blaberon).

Hermogenes/ A variety of names, Socrates, presents itself for your consideration; and you just now appeared to me to have founded a prelude on your pipe, as it were, of the melody belonging to Minerva, while you pronounced this name βουλαπτερουν (boylapteroyn).

Socrates/ I am not, Hermogenes, the cause of this, but he who founded the name.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth; but what will you say about ζημιωδες (zeemyodes), the pernicious?

Socrates/ I will tell you, Hermogenes, the meaning of this word; and do you behold how truly I shall explain it, by asserting that men, through adding and taking away letters, very much vary the meaning of names, so that sometimes a very small alteration causes a word to imply the very contrary of what it did before. As, for instance, in the word το δεον (deon), *the becoming*, for I understood, and called to mind just now, in consequence of what I am about to say to you, that this beautiful word δεον is new to us, and induces us to enunciate το δεον (deon) and ζημιωδες (zeemyodes) contrary to their meaning, and by this means to obscure

their signification: but the ancient name evinces the sense of both these words.

Hermogenes/ How is this?

Socrates/ I will tell you. You know that our ancestors very frequently used the ι (y) and δ (d) that this was not less the case with such women as particularly preserved the ancient tongue. But now, instead of the ι (y), they perversely use either ε (e) or η (ee) and ξ (x) instead of δ (d), as being more magnificent.

Hermogenes/ But how?

Socrates/ Just as, for instance, the most ancient men called day ἰμερα (ymera), and some of them ἐμερα (emera); but those of the present times ημερα (eemera).

Hermogenes/ This is indeed the case.

Socrates/ You know, therefore, that this ancient name only manifests the conceptions of its founder; for, because light emerges from darkness, and shines upon men rejoicing in and desiring its beams, they called day ἰμερα (ymera).

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But as it is now celebrated in tragically performances, you can by no means understand what ἡμερα means; though some are of opinion that day is called ἡμερα (eemera), because it renders things ἡμερα (eemera), placid and gentle.

Hermogenes/ So it appears to me.

Socrates/ And you likewise know that the ancients called ζυγον (zygon), *a beam*, δυογον (dyogon).

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And ζυγον (zygon), indeed, manifests nothing: but that which subsists for the sake of bringing two things together, so that they may be bound, is very, justly named

δυογον (dyogon). But it is now called ζυγον (zygon); and this is the case with a great variety of other particulars.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Hence then, the word δεον (deon), when it is thus pronounced, signifies the contrary to all the names which belong to *the good*. For this name being a species of the good, appears to be a bond and impediment of local motion; as being the brother of βλαϐερον (blaberon), the noxious.

Hermogenes/ And indeed, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.

Socrates/ But this will not be the case if you use the ancient name, which it is much more probable was properly founded than the present name. But you will agree with those ancient good men, if you substitute ι (y) for ε (e); for διον (dyon), and not δεον (deon), will signify that good which is celebrated by the institutor of names. And thus the founder of names will not contradict himself, but the names δεον, ωφελιμον, λυσιτελουν, αγαθον, συμφερον, ευπορον (deon, ophelymon, lysyteloyn, agathon, symphron, eyporon), or *proceeding with facility*, will all of them appear to have the same meaning: for he meant to signify and celebrate, by different names, that which adorns and pervades through every part of the universe; and to reprobate that which detains and binds. And indeed, in the name ζημιωδες (zeemyodes), if, according to the ancient tongue, you substitute δ (d) for ζ (z), it will appear to you that this name was composed from δουντι το ιον (doynty to yon), or binding that which is in progression, and was called δημιωδες (deemyodes).

Hermogenes/ But what will you say concerning pleasure, pain, desire, and such like names?

Socrates/ They do not appear to me to be very difficult, Hermogenes: for *pleasure* seems to be an action tending towards emolument, and on this account to have derived its appellation; but the δ was added, that it might be called ἡδονη (eedonee), instead of ἡονη (eeonee). But pain seems to have derived its appellation from the dissolution of the body, which the body experiences in this passion: and the name *sorrow* was so called from impeding the motion of progression: but the name αλγηδων (algeedon), i.e. *torment*, appears to me to be foreign, and to be so called from αλγεινος (algeynos), *troublesome*. Οδυνη (Odynee), i.e. anxiety, was denominated from the ingress of pain.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But αχθηδων (akhtheedon), grief, clearly signifies that it is a name assimilated to the slowness of lation: for αχθος (akhthos) is a burthen, and ιον (yon), anything in progression. Joy seems to have received its appellation from the diffusion and easy progression of the flowing of the soul; but τερψις, delight, was derived from τερπνος (terpnos), the pleasant. But το τερπνον (to terpnon) was so called, from being assimilated to the breathing of delight through the soul; it was therefore justly called ἑρπνον (erpnon), i.e. inspiring; but in the course of time, it came to be denominated τερπνον. But, with respect to ευφροσυνη (eyphrosynee), or hilarity, there is no occasion to explain the why of its denomination; for it is obvious to everyone, that it was so called from ευ (ey) and συμφερεσθαι (sympheresthay), that is, from the soul's being well borne along in conjunction with things. Hence it ought, injustice, to be denominated ευφερωσυνη (eypherosynee); but, notwithstanding this, we call it ευφροσυνη (eyphrosynee). But neither is it difficult to discover the meaning of επιθυμια (epythymya), *desire*: For it evinces a power proceeding to ϑυμος (thymos), *anger*. But ϑυμος (thymos), *anger*, derives its appellation from ϑυσεως

(thyseos), and ζεσεως (zeseos), *raging* and *ardor*. And again, ιμερος (ymeros), *amatory desire*, was so called from ῥῳ (ro), or *a flowing which vehemently attracts the soul*; for because it flows *excited*, and *desiring the possession of things*, it strongly allures the soul through the incitement of its flowing. And hence, from the whole of this power, it is called ἱμερος (ymeros). But ποθος (pothos), *desire*, was so called, from nullifying that it is not conversant with present material desire, and its effusive streams, like ιμερος (ymeros), but with that which is elsewhere situated, and is absent. But, ερως (eros), love, received its appellation from implying that it flows inwardly from an external source; and that this, flowing is not the property of him by whom it is possessed, but that it is adventitious through the eyes. And hence love was called by our ancestors εσρος (esros), from εσρειν (esreyn), to *flow inwardly*. But at present it is called ερως (eros), through the insertion of ω (o) instead of ο (o). But what shall we consider after this?

Hermogenes/ What opinion, and such-like names, appear to you to signify.

Socrates/ Opinion, δοξα (doxa), was denominated from the *pursuing* which the soul employs in her progressive investigations concerning the nature of things, or else from *the darting of an arrow*; and this last appears to be the most likely derivation. Hence οιησις (oyeesys), *opinion*, harmonizes with δοξα (doxa); for it signifies the οισις (oysys), or ingress of the soul, in considering the οιον, or quality of a thing. Just as βουλη (boylee), counsel or deliberation, is so called from βολη (bolee), *hurling forth*: and ϐουλεσθαι (boylesthay), to be willing, signifies το εφιεσθαι (ephyesthay), to desire, and βουλευεσθαι (boyleyesthay), *to consult*. For all these following δοξα (doxa), opinion, appear to be certain resemblances of ϐολη (bolee), *hurling forth*; just as the contrary of this αϐουλια (aboylya), or *a want of counsel*, appears to be a misfortune,

as neither hurling forth, nor obtaining that which it wishes for, about which it deliberates, and which is the object of its desire.

Hermogenes/ You seem to me, Socrates, to have introduced these particulars with great density of conception; let us therefore now, if it is pleasing to divinity, end the discussion. Yet I should wish you to explain the meaning of *necessity*, which is consequent to what we have already unfolded, and *that which is voluntary*.

Socrates/ Το ἑκουσιον (Το ekoysyon), therefore, or *the voluntary*, signifies that which yields and does not resist, but as I may say εικον τῳ ιοντι (eykon to yonty), *yields to that which is in progression*; and thus evinces that this name subsists according to βουλησις (boyleesys) *the will*. But το αναγκαιον (anagkayon) and αντιτυπον (antytypon), i.e. *the necessary* and *the resisting*, since they are contrary to the will, must subsist about guilt and ignorance. But they are assimilated to a progression through a valley; because, on account of their being passed through with difficulty, and their rough and dense nature, like a place thick planted with trees, they impede progression. And hence, perhaps, necessity was denominated from an assimilation to a progression through a valley. But as long as our strength remains we ought not to desert it; do not therefore desist, but still interrogate me.

Hermogenes/ I ask you then about things the greatest and most beautiful, viz. *truth*, *falsehood*, and *being*; and why *name*, which is the subject of our present disputation, was so called?

Socrates/ What therefore do you call μαιεσθαι (mayesthay)?

Hermogenes/ I call it ζητειν (zeeteyn), *to inquire*.

Socrates/ It appears then that this word ονομα (onoma), a name, was composed from that discourse which asserts that ον (on), *being*, is that about which name inquires. But this will be more evident to you, in that which we call ονομαστον (onomaston), or *capable of being named*; for in this it clearly appears that name is an inquiry about being. With respect to αληθεια (aleetheya), *truth*, this name seems to have been mingled, as well as many others; for this name appears to have received its composition from the divine lation of being, and therefore implies that it is ϑεια αλη (theya alee), *a divine wandering*. But ψευδος (pseydos), *falsehood*, signifies the contrary to lation. For here again the institutor of names blames that which detains and compels anything to rest. This name, however, is assimilated to those who are asleep; but the addition of the ψ (ps) conceals its meaning. But ον (on), *being*, and ουσια (oysya), *essence*, harmonize with truth, by receiving the addition of an ι (y); for then they will signify ιον (yon), or that which is in progression. And again, το ουκ ον (to oyk on), or non-being, is by some denominated ουκ ιον (oyk yon); that is, not proceeding.

Hermogenes/ You appear to me, Socrates, to have discussed these particulars in a very strenuous manner. But if anyone should ask you, what rectitude of nomination there is in the words ιον (yon), *proceeding*, ῥεον (reon), *flowing*, and δουν, *binding*, would you be able to answer him or not?

Socrates/ I should perfectly so. And something just now occurred to me, by the mentioning of which I may appear to say something to the purpose.

Hermogenes/ What is it?

Socrates/ That, if we are ignorant of anything, we should say, it is of Barbaric origin: for, perhaps, this is really the case with some names; and others are, perhaps, inscrutable on account of their antiquity. For, through names being

everywhere wrested from their proper construction, it will be by no means wonderful, if the ancient tongue, when compared with the present, is in no respect different from a Barbaric language.

Hermogenes/ And, indeed, you say nothing foreign from the purpose.

Socrates/ I say that, indeed, which is probable; but yet the contest does not appear to me to admit of an excuse. Let us, however, endeavor to consider this affair, and make our inquiry, as follows: If anyone should always investigate those words through which a name derives its subsistence, and again those words through which words are enunciated, and should do this without ceasing, would not he who answers such a one at length fail in his replies?

Hermogenes/ It appear so to me.

Socrates/ When, therefore, will he who fails to answer, justly fail? Will it not be when he arrives at those names which are, as it were, the elements both of other discourses and names? For these, if they have an elementary subsistence, can no longer be justly said to be composed from other names. Just as we said above, that το αγαθον (to agathon) was composed from αγαστος (agastos), admirable, and ϑοος (thoos), swift. But ϑοος (thoos), we may perhaps say, is composed from other words, and these last again from others: but if we ever apprehend that which is no longer composed from other names, we may justly say, that we have at length arrived at an element; and that we ought no longer to refer this to other names.

Hermogenes/ You seem to me to speak properly.

Socrates/ Are not the names, then, which are the subject of your present inquiry, elements? And is it not necessary that the rectitude of their formation should be considered in a manner different from that of others?

Hermogenes/ It is probable.

Socrates/ It is probable certainly, Hermogenes. All the former names, therefore, must: be reduced to these: and if this be the case, as it appears to me it is, consider again along with me, lest I should act like one delirious, while I am explaining what the rectitude of the first names ought to be.

Hermogenes/ Only do but speak; and I will endeavor to the utmost of my ability to speculate in conjunction with you.

Socrates/ I think then you will agree with me in this, that there is one certain rectitude of every name, as well of that which is first as of that which is last; and that none of these differ from one another, so far as they are names.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But the rectitude of those names which we have just now discussed. consists in evincing the quality of everything.

Hermogenes/ How should it be otherwise?

Socrates/ This property, then, ought no less to belong to prior than posterior names, if they have the proper requisites of names.

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But posterior names, as it appears, produce this through such as are prior.

Hermogenes/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Be it so then. But after what manner can first names, which have no others preceding them, be able, as much as possible, to unfold to us the nature of things, if they have the properties of names? But answer me this question: If we had neither voice nor tongue, and yet wished to manifest things to one another, should we not, like those

who are at present mute, endeavor to signify our meaning by the hands, head, and other parts of the body?

Hermogenes/ How could it be otherwise, Socrates?

Socrates/ I think, therefore, that if we wished to signify that which is upwards and light, we should raise our hands towards the heavens, imitating the nature of the thing itself; but that if we wished to indicate things downwards and heavy, we should point with our hands to the earth. And again, if we were desirous of signifying a running horse, or any other animal, you know, that we should fashion the gestures and figures of our bodies, as near as possible, to a similitude of these things.

Hermogenes/ It appears to me, that it would necessarily be as you say.

Socrates/ In this manner then, I think, the manifestations of the body would take place; the body imitating, as it seems, that which it wishes to render apparent.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But since we wish to manifest a thing by our voice, tongue, and mouth, will not a manifestation of everything then take place through these, when an imitation of anything subsists through these?

Hermogenes/ It appears to me, that it must be necessarily so.

Socrates/ A name then, as it seems, is an imitation of voice, by which everyone who imitates anything, imitates and nominates through voice.

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ But, by Zeus, my friend, I do not think that I have yet spoken in a becoming manner.

Hermogenes/ Why?

Socrates/ Because we must be compelled to confess, that those who imitate sheep and cocks, and other animals. give names to the things which they imitate.

Hermogenes/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ But do you think this is becoming?

Hermogenes/ I do not. But what imitation, Socrates, will a name be?

Socrates/ In the first place, as it appears to me, it will not be such an intimation as that which takes place through music, although this imitation should be effected by the voice: nor, in the next place, though we should imitate the same things as music imitates, yet we should not appear to me to denominate things. But I reason thus: Is there not a certain voice, figure, and color, in many things?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ It appears, therefore, that though anyone should imitate these, yet the denominating art would not be conversant with these imitations: for these are partly musical, and partly the effects of painting. Is not this the case?

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what will you say to this? Do you not think that there is an essence belonging to everything, as well as color, and such things as we just now mentioned? And, in the first place, is there not an essence belonging to color, and voice, and to everything else, which is considered as deserving the appellation of being?

Hermogenes/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ But what then? If anyone is able to imitate the essence of everything, by letters and syllables, must he not evince what everything is?

Hermogenes/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And how would you denominate him who is able to do this? For, with respect to the former characters, one you called musical, and the other conversant with painting. But how will you call this character?

Hermogenes/ This person, Socrates, appears to me to be that institutor of names which we formerly sought after.

Socrates/ If this then is true, as it appears to be, let us consider about those names which are the subjects of your inquiry, i.e. ῥοη (roee), *flowing*, ιεναι (yenay), *to go*, σχεσις (skhesys), *habitude*, whether, in the letters and syllables from which they are composed, they really imitate essence, or not.

Hermogenes/ By all means.

Socrates/ Come then, let us see whether these alone belong to the first names or many others besides these.

Hermogenes/ I think that this is the case with many others besides these.

Socrates/ And your opinion is probable. But what will the mode of division be, from whence the imitator will begin to imitate? Since then the imitation of essence subsists through letters and syllables, will it not be most proper to distribute in the first place the elements? just as those who are conversant with rhythms, in the first place, distribute the powers of the elements, and afterwards of the syllables; and thus at length begin to speculate the rhythms themselves, but never till this is accomplished.

Hermogenes/ Certainly.

Socrates/ In like manner, therefore, ought not we first of all to divide the vowels, and afterwards the rest according to species, both mutes and semi-vowels? For this is the language of those who are skilled in these matters. And again, ought we not after this to divide such as are capable of being sounded indeed, yet are not semi-vowels, and

consider the different species of vowels, with reference to one another? And after we have properly distributed all these, it is again requisite to impose names, and to consider, if there are certain things into which both these may be referred as elements; and from which both these may be known; and whether species are contained in them after the same manner as in the elements. But all these particulars being contemplated in a becoming manner, it is proper to know how to introduce each according to similitude; whether one ought to be introduced to one, or many mingled together: just as painters, when they wish to produce a resemblance, sometimes only introduce a purple color, and sometimes any other paint: and sometimes again they mingle many colors together, as when they make preparations for the purpose of producing the likeness of a man, or anything else of this kind; and this in such a manner, I think, as to give to every image the colors which it requires. In the same manner we should accommodate the elements of words to things, and one to one, wherever it appears to be necessary, and should fabricate symbols, which they call syllables. And again, combining these syllables together, from which nouns and verbs are composed, we should again from these nouns and verbs compose something beautiful and entire; that what the animal described by the painter's art was in the above instance, discourse may be in this; whether constructed by the onomastic, or rhetorical, or any other art. Or rather this ought not to be our employment, since we have already surpassed the bounds of our discourse; for, if this is the proper mode of composition, it was adopted by the ancients. But if we mean to speculate artificially, it is proper that, distinguishing all these, we should consider whether or not first and last names are established in a proper manner; for to connect them without adopting such a method would be erroneous, my dear Hermogenes, and improper.

Hermogenes/ Perhaps so, indeed, by Zeus, Socrates.

Socrates/ What then? Do you believe that you can divide them in this manner? for I cannot.

Hermogenes/ There is much greater reason, then, that I should not be able to do this.

Socrates/ Let us give up the attempt then: or are you willing that we should undertake it to the best of our ability, though we are able to know but very little concerning such particulars? But as we said before respecting the gods, that, knowing nothing of the truth belonging to their names, we might conjecture the dogmas of men concerning them; so now, with regard to the present subject, we may proceed in its investigation, declaring that, if these particulars have been properly distributed, either by us or by any other, they ought, doubtless, to have been so divided. Now, therefore, as it is said, it is requisite that we should treat concerning them in the best manner we are able. Or, what is your opinion on the subject?

Hermogenes/ Perfectly agreeable to what you say.

Socrates/ It is ridiculous, I think, Hermogenes, that things should become manifest through imitation produced by letters and syllables: and yet it is necessary; for we have not anything better than this, by means of which we may judge concerning the truth of the first names; unless, perhaps, as the composers of tragedies, when they are involved in any difficulty, fly to their machinery, introducing the gods, in order to free them from their embarrassment; so we shall be liberated from our perplexity, by asserting that the gods established the first names, and that on this account they are properly instituted. Will not such an assertion be our strongest defense? or that which declares we received them from certain Barbarians? For the Barbarians are more ancient than us. Or shall we say that,

through antiquity, it is impossible to perceive their meaning, as is the case with Barbaric names? But all these solutions will only be so many plunderings, and very elegant evasions of those who are not willing to render a proper reason concerning the right imposition of the first names; though, indeed, he who is ignorant of the proper establishment of first names cannot possibly know such as are posterior; for the evidence of the latter must necessarily be derived from the former; and with these he is perfectly unacquainted. But it is evident, that he who professes a skill in posterior names ought to be able to explain such as are first, in the most eminent and pure manner, or, if this is not the case, to be well convinced that he trifles in his explanation of posterior names. Or does it appear otherwise to you?

Hermogenes/ No otherwise, Socrates.

Socrates/ My conceptions then, about the first names, appear to me very insolent and ridiculous. If you are willing, therefore, I will communicate them to you; and do you, in your turn, if you have anything better to offer, impart it to me.

Hermogenes/ I will do so; but speak confidently.

Socrates/ In the first place, then, ρ appears to me to be as it were the organ of all motion, though we have not yet explained why motion is called κινησις (kyneesys). But it is evident that it implies ιεσις (yesys), *going*; for η (ee) was not formerly used, but ε (e). But its origin is from κιειν (kyeyn), *to go*, which is a foreign name, and signifies ιεναι (yenay). If, therefore, anyone could find out its ancient name, when transferred to our tongue, it might be very properly called ιεσις (yesys). But now from the foreign, name κιειν (kyeyn), and the change of the η (ee), together with the interposition of the ν (n), it is called κινησις (kyneesys). It ought, however, to be called κιεινησις (kyeyneesys), or εισις (eysys). But στασις

(stasys), or *abiding*, is the negation of ιεναι (yenay), *to go*; and for the sake of ornament is called στασις (stasys). The element, therefore, ρ (r), as I said, appeared to the institutor of names to be a beautiful instrument of motion, for the purpose of expressing a similitude to lation; and hence he everywhere employed it for this purpose. And in the first place, the words ῥειν (reyn) and ῥοη (roee), that is, to, flow, and flowing, imitate lation, or local motion, by this letter; and this resemblance is found, in the next place, in the words τρομος (tromos) and τραχυς (trakhys), i.e. trembling, and rough; also, in words of this kind, κρουειν (kroyeyn), *to strike*; θραυειν (thrayeyn), *to wound*; ερυκειν (erykeyn), *to draw*; θρυπτειν (thrypteyn), *to break*, κερματιζεν (kermatyzen), *to cut into small pieces*; and ῥεμβειν (rembeyn), *to roll round*. For all these very much represent motion through, the ρ̄ (r). Not to mention that the tongue, in pronouncing this letter, is detained for the least space of time possible, and is agitated in the most eminent degree; and on this account it appears to me that this letter was employed in these words. But the institutor of names used the ι for the purpose of indicating all attenuated natures, and which eminently penetrate through all things. And hence this is imitated by the words ιεναι and ιεσθαι (yesthay), *to go*, and *to proceed*, through the ι (y): just as through φ, ψ, σ, (ph, ps, s,) and ζ (z), because these letters are more inflated, the author of names indicated all such things as ψυχρον (psykhron), *the cold*; ζεον (zeon), *the fervid*; σειοθαι (seyothay), *to be shaken*; and universally σεισμον (seysmon), concussion. And when he wished to imitate anything very much inflated, he everywhere, for the most part, appears to have introduced such-like letters. But he seems to have thought that the power of compressing δ (d) and τ (t), and the tongue's action in adhering, were useful for the purpose of imitating the words δεσμος (desmos), *a bond*, and στασις (stasys), *abiding*.

And because the tongue remarkably slides in pronouncing λ (l), the institutor of names perceiving this, and employing this letter in an assimilative way, he established the names λεια (leya), *smooth*; ολισθαινειν (olysthayneyn), *to flip*; λιπαρον (lyparon), *unctuous*; κολλωδες (kollodes), *liquid*; and all other such-like words. But in consequence of the tongue sliding through λ (l), he employed the power of the γ (g), and thus imitated γλισχρον (glyskhron), *the slippery*; γλυκυ (glyky), *the sweet*; and γλοιωδες (gloyodes), *the viscous*. Perceiving likewise that the sound of the ν (n) was inward, he denominated το ενδον (endon), *the inward*, and τα εντος (entos), *things inward*, that he might assimilate works to letters. But he assigned α (a) to μεγαλον (megalon), *the great*, and η (ee), to μηκος (meekos), *length*, because these letters are great. But in the construction of στρογγυλον (stroggylon), *round*, which requires the letter ο (o), he mingled ο (o) abundantly. And in the same manner the legislator appears to have accommodated other letters and syllables to everything which exists, fabricating a signature and name; and from these, in an assimilative manner, to have composed the other species of names. This, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the rectitude of names, unless Cratylus here asserts anything else.

Hermogenes/ And, indeed, Socrates, Cratylus often finds me sufficient employment, as I said in the beginning, while he declares that there is a rectitude of names, but does not clearly inform me what it is; so that I cannot tell whether he is willingly or unwillingly thus obscure in his assertions. Now, therefore, Cratylus, speak before Socrates, and declare whether you are pleased with what Socrates has said respecting names, or whether you have anything to say on the subject more excellent; and if you have, disclose it, that either you may learn from Socrates, or that you may teach both of us.

Cratylus/ But what, Hermogenes! Does it appear to you to be an easy matter to perceive and teach anything so suddenly, and much more that which seems to be the greatest, among things which are the greatest?

Hermogenes/ To me, by Zeus, it does not; but that assertion of Hesiod appears to me very beautiful, "that it is worthwhile to add a little to a little." If, therefore, you are able to accomplish anything, though but trifling, do not be weary, but extend your beneficence both to Socrates and me.

Socrates/ And, indeed, Cratylus, I do not confidently vindicate anything which I have above asserted; but I have considered with Hermogenes what appeared to me to be the truth: so that on this account speak boldly, if you have anything better to offer, as I am ready to receive it. Nor shall I be surprised if you produce something more beautiful on this subject; for you appear to me to have employed yourself in speculations of this kind, and to have been instructed in them by others. If, therefore, you shall assert anything more excellent, you may set me down as one of your disciples about the rectitude of names.

Cratylus/ But, indeed, Socrates, as you say, I have made this the subject of my meditations, and perhaps I shall bring you over to be one of my disciples: and yet I am afraid that the very contrary of all this will take place: for, in a certain respect, I ought to say to you what Achilles said to Ajax upon the occasion of his embassy; but he thus speaks: "O Jove-born Telamonian Ajax, prince of the people, you have spoken all things agreeably to my opinion." In like manner you, O Socrates, appear to have prophesied in conformity to my conceptions, whether you were inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some muse, who was latently inherent in you before, has now agitated you by her inspiring influence.

Socrates/ O worthy Cratylus, I myself have some time since wondered at my wisdom, and could not believe in its reality; and hence I think it is proper to examine what I have said: for to be deceived by oneself is the most dangerous of all things; for since the deceiver is not for the least moment of time absent, but is always present, how can it be otherwise than a dreadful circumstance? But it is necessary, as it seems, to turn ourselves frequently to the consideration of what we have before said, and to endeavor, according to the poet, "to look at the same time both before and behind." And let us at present take a view of what we said. We said then, that rectitude of name was that which pointed out the quality of a thing. Shall we say that this definition is sufficient for the purpose?

Cratylus/ To me, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.

Socrates/ Names, then, are employed in discourse for the sake of teaching?

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Shall we not therefore say, that this is an art, and that it has artificers?

Cratylus/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ But who are they?

Cratylus/ Those legislators, or authors of names, which you spoke of at first.

Socrates/ Shall we then say, that this art subsists in men, like other arts, or not? But what I mean is this: Are not some painters more excellent than others?

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will not such as are more excellent produce more beautiful works, i.e. the representations of animals; but such as are inferior, the contrary, And will not this also

be the case with builders, that some will fabricate more beautiful, and others more deformed houses?

Cratylus/ It will.

Socrates/ And with respect to legislators, will not some produce works more beautiful than others?

Cratylus/ It does not appear to me that they will.

Socrates/ It does not therefore appear to you, that some laws are better, and others worse?

Cratylus/ It certainly does not.

Socrates/ One name, therefore, does not seem to you to be better assigned than another?

Cratylus/ It does not.

Socrates/ All names, therefore, are properly established?

Cratylus/ Such indeed as are names.

Socrates/ But what then shall we say to this name of Hermogenes, which we spoke of before? Shall we say that this name was not rightly assigned him, unless something ἑρμου γενεσεως, of the generation of Mercury, belongs to him? Or that it was, indeed, assigned him, but improperly?

Cratylus/ It does not seem to me, Socrates, to have been assigned him in reality, but only in appearance; and I think that it is the name of some other person, who is endued with a nature correspondent to the name.

Socrates/ Will not he then be deceived, who says that he is Hermogenes? for he will no longer be the person whom he calls Hermogenes, if he is not Hermogenes.

Cratylus/ What is this which you say?

Socrates/ Is the efficacy of your assertion founded in the opinion, that it is impossible to speak anything which is false? for this has been said, my dear Cratylus, by many formerly, and is the opinion of many at present.

Cratylus/ How is it possible, Socrates, that, when anyone speaks about anything, he should speak about that which is not? Or is not to speak of non-being, to speak of things which are false?

Socrates/ This discourse, my friend, is more elegant than my condition and age require. But at the same time inform me, whether it appears to you impossible to discourse about that which is false, but possible to pronounce it?

Cratylus/ It appears to me impossible even to pronounce it.

Socrates/ And are you of opinion likewise, that it is impossible to denominate it? As if, for instance, anyone, on meeting you, should in an hospitable manner take you by the hand, and say, I am glad to see you, O Athenian guest, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion, would he not some way or other, by means of voice, express these words? And would it not be this Hermogenes, and not you, whom he thus denominated, or else no one?

Cratylus/ It appears to me, Socrates, that he would enunciate these words in vain.

Socrates/ Let it be so. But whether would he who pronounced these words, pronounce that which is true or false? Or would some of these words be true, and some false? for this last supposition will be sufficient.

Cratylus/ I should say, that he sounded these words, moving himself in vain, just as if anyone should move brass by striking on it.

Socrates/ Come then, see, Cratylus, whether we agree in any respect. Do you not say that a name is one thing, and that of which it is the name another?

Cratylus/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you not acknowledge, that a name is a certain imitation of a thing?

Cratylus/ I acknowledge this the most of all things.

Socrates/ And will you not therefore confess that pictures are in a different manner imitations of certain things?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But come, for perhaps I do not understand sufficiently what you say, through you perhaps speak properly. Can we distribute and introduce both these imitations, viz. the pictures and the names, to the things of which they are imitations? Or is this impossible?

Cratylus/ It is possible.

Socrates/ But consider this in the first place. Can anyone attribute the image of a man to a man, and that of a woman to a woman; and so in other things?

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And is it possible, on the contrary, to attribute the image of a man to a woman, and that of a woman to a man?

Cratylus/ This also is possible.

Socrates/ Are both these distributions therefore proper; or only one of them?

Cratylus/ Only one of them.

Socrates/ And this I think must be that which attributes to each, the peculiar and the similar?

Cratylus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Lest therefore you and I, who are friends, should fall into verbal contention, take notice of what I say; for I, my friend, call such a distribution in both imitations (i.e. in the pictures and names) right; and in names not only right, but true: but I call the other attribution and introduction of the dissimilar, not right; and when it takes place in names, false.

Cratylus/ But consider, Socrates, whether it may not indeed happen in paintings, that an improper distribution may take place, but not in names; but that these must always be necessarily right.

Socrates/ What do you say? What does this differ from that? May not someone, on meeting a man, say to him, This is your picture, and show him perhaps by chance his proper image, or by chance the image of a woman? But I mean by *showing*, placing it before his eyes.

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what, may he not again, meeting with the same person, say to him, This is your name? for a name is an imitation, as well as a painting. But my meaning is this: May he not therefore say, This is your name? And after this, may he not present to his sense of hearing, perhaps, an imitation of what he is, and which asserts that he is a man; and perhaps an imitation of a female of the human species, and which asserts that he is a woman? Does it not appear to you, that this may be some time or other possible?

Cratylus/ I am willing to allow you, Socrates, that this may be so.

Socrates/ You do well, my friend, if the thing subsists in this manner; for neither is it proper at present to contest much about it. If, therefore, there is a distribution of this kind in names, we must confess that one of these wishes to call a thing according to truth, but the other falsely. And if this is the case, and it is possible to distribute names erroneously, and not to attribute things adapted to each, it will also be possible to err in words. And if words and names may be thus established, this must likewise necessarily be the case with sentences; for sentences are, I think, the composition of these. Or what is your opinion, Cratylus?

Cratylus/ The same as yours; for you appear to me to speak beautifully.

Socrates/ If, therefore, we assimilate first names to letters, the same things will take place as in pictures, in which it is possible to attribute all convenient colors and figures; and again, not to attribute all, but to leave some and add others, and this according to the more and the less. Will not this be the case?

Cratylus/ It will.

Socrates/ He then who attributes everything proper, will produce beautiful letters and images; but he who adds or takes away, will indeed produce letters and images, but such as are defective?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But will not he who imitates the essence of things through syllables and letters, according to the same reasoning, produce a beautiful image, when he attributes everything in a convenient manner? And this beautiful image is a name. But if anyone fails in the least circumstance, or sometimes makes an addition, does it not follow that he will, indeed, produce an image, but not a beautiful one? And so that some of the names will be beautifully fabricated, and others badly?

Cratylus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Perhaps therefore the one will be a good, and the other a bad artificer of names?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But was not the name which we assigned to this character that of legislator?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Perhaps therefore, by Zeus, as in other arts, one legislator will be good and another bad, if we only agree in what has been before asserted?

Cratylus/ It will be so. But do you perceive, Socrates, that when we attribute the letters and α (a), and β (b), each of the elements to names, according to the grammatical art, if we take away, add, or change anything, a name indeed is described for us, yet not properly; or rather, it is by no means described, but becomes immediately something else, if it suffers anything of this kind?

Socrates/ Let us thus consider this affair, Cratylus, lest we should not contemplate it in a becoming manner.

Cratylus/ But how?

Socrates/ Perhaps such things as ought necessarily either to be composed or not from a certain number, are subject to the property which you speak of; as ten things, or if you will any other number, if you take away or add anything, immediately become some other number. But perhaps there is not the same rectitude of any certain quality and of every image, but a contrary one: for neither is it necessary to attribute to an image everything belonging to that which it represents, in order to its becoming an image. But consider if I say anything to the purpose. Would then these be two things, I mean Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, if anyone of the gods should not only assimilate your color and figure, after the manner of painters, but should produce all such inward parts as you contain, and attribute the same softness and heat, the same motion, soul, and wisdom, as you possess; and, in one word, should fashion everything else similar to the parts which you contain; whether in consequence of such a composition would one of these be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus, or would there be two Cratyluses?

Cratylus/ It appears to me, Socrates, that there would be two.

Socrates/ Do you see then, my friend, that it is necessary to seek after another rectitude of an image than that which we just now spoke of; and that it does not necessarily follow, that if anything is taken away or added, it will no longer be an image? Or do you not perceive how much images want, in order to possess the same things as their paradigms?

Cratylus/ I do.

Socrates/ Those particulars therefore of which names are names, would become ridiculous through names, if they were in every respect assimilated to them: for all things would become double; and the difference between a thing and its name could no longer be ascertained.

Cratylus/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ You may therefore, generous man, confidently own that some names are properly composed, and others not so; nor will you be obliged to attribute every letter to a name, that it may be perfectly such as that of which it is the name: but you will sometimes suffer a letter which is not convenient to be introduced; and if a letter, you will likewise permit an unadapted name in a discourse; and if a name, you will suffer a sentence unadapted to things to be introduced in a discourse; and will at the same time acknowledge, that a thing may nevertheless be denominated and spoken of, as long as the name or sentence contains the effigies of the thing which is the subject of discourse; just as in the names of the elements, which, if you remember, I and Hermogenes just now discussed.

Cratylus/ I do remember.

Socrates/ It is well, therefore; for when this effigies is inherent, though everything properly adapted may not be present, yet the representation may be said to subsist as it

ought. But let us now, blessed man! cease our disputation, that we may not be exposed to danger, like those who travel late by night in Ægina; and that we may not, in a similar manner, appear to have arrived at the truth of things later than is becoming. Or at least seek after some other rectitude of name, and do not confess that a manifestation produced by letters and syllables is the name of a thing: for, if you admit both these assertions, you cannot be consistent with yourself.

Cratylus/ But you appear to me, Socrates, to speak in a very becoming manner, and, I lay down the position which you mention.

Socrates/ Since therefore we thus far agree, let us consider what remains. We say then, that in order to the beautiful position of a name, it ought to possess convenient letters?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But it is proper that it should contain such as are similar to things?

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Such then as are beautifully composed will be composed in this manner. But if any name is not rightly composed, it will perhaps, for the most part, consist of convenient and similar letters, since it is an image; but it will possess something unadapted, through which it is neither beautiful, nor beautifully established. Shall we speak in this manner, or otherwise?

Cratylus/ There is no such occasion, I think, Socrates, of contesting; though it does not please me to say, that a name has a subsistence, and yet is not beautifully composed.

Socrates/ Is this also unpleasing to you, that a name is the manifestation of a thing?

Cratylus/ It is not.

Socrates/ But do you think it is not beautifully said, that some names are composed from such as are first, and that others are themselves first names?

Cratylus/ I think, it is well said.

Socrates/ But if first names ought to be manifestations of certain things, can you mention any better method of accomplishing this, than their being so formed as to become, in the most eminent degree, such as the things which they render manifest? Or does the method which Hermogenes and many others speak of, please you better, that names are signatures, that they manifest by signatures, and that they are prescient of things? And, besides this, that rectitude of name subsists by compact; and that it is of no consequence whether anyone composes them as they are at present composed, or the contrary; calling, for instance, that which is considered at present as small o (o), great, and ω, o (o, o)? Which of these modes is most agreeable to you?

Cratylus/ It is wholly and universally, Socrates, better to evince by similitude that which anyone wishes to evince, than by any other method.

Socrates/ You speak well. If, therefore, a name is similar to a thing, is it not necessary that the elements from which first names are composed should be naturally similar to things themselves? But my meaning is this: Could anyone produce a picture, which we have just now said is the similitude of some particular thing, unless the colors from which the picture is composed were naturally similar to the things which the art of painting imitates? Is it not otherwise impossible?

Cratylus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ In a similar manner, therefore, names can never become similar to anything, unless the things from which names are composed possess, in the first place, some

similitude to the particulars of which names are the imitations. But the component parts of names are elements.

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ You therefore now participate of the discourse which Hermogenes a little before received. Tell me, then, whether we appear to you to have determined in a becoming manner, or not, that the letter ρ (r) is similar to local motion, to motion in general, and to hardness?

Cratylus/ In a becoming manner, in my opinion.

Socrates/ But the letter λ (l) to the smooth and soft, and other things which we mentioned?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do you know therefore that the same word, i.e. hardness, is called by us σκληροτης (skleerotees), but by the Eretriensians σκληροτηϱ (skleeroteer)?

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, do both the ρ (r) and the σ (s) appear similar to the same thing; and does the termination of the ρ (r) manifest the same thing to them, as the termination of the σ (s) to us: or is nothing manifested by letters different from ours?

Cratylus/ The word evinces its meaning by both letters.

Socrates/ Is this accomplished, so far as ρ (r) and σ (s) are similars, or so far as they are not?

Cratylus/ So far as they are similars.

Socrates/ Are they, therefore, in every respect, similars?

Cratylus/ Perhaps they are so, for the purpose of manifesting lation.

Socrates/ But why does not the insertion of λ (l) signify the contrary of hardness?

Cratylus/ Perhaps, Socrates, it is not properly inserted, just as in the names which you lately discussed with

Hermogenes, taking away and adding letters where it was requisite. And you then appeared to me to act properly. And now, perhaps, ρ (r) ought to be inserted instead of λ (l).

Socrates/ You speak well. Do we, therefore, according to our present manner of speaking, mutually understand nothing when anyone pronounces the word σκληρον (skleeron)? And do you not understand what I now say?

Cratylus/ I do, my friend, through custom.

Socrates/ But when you say through custom, what else do you think you imply by this word, except compact? Or do you call custom anything else than this, that when I pronounce this word, and understand by it hardness, you also know that this is what I understand. Is not this what you mean?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If, then, you know this, when I pronounce it, something becomes manifest to you through me.

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what I understand, I enunciate from that which is dissimilar? since λ (l) is dissimilar to the σκληροτης (skleerotees), which you pronounce. But if this is the case, what else can be the consequence, but that you accustom yourself to this, and that you derive rectitude of name through compact; since both similar and dissimilar letters manifest the same thing to you, through custom and compact? But if custom is very far from being compact, it will no longer be proper to say that similitude is a manifestation, but this ought to be asserted of custom: for this, as it appears, manifests both from the similar and the dissimilar. Since then, Cratylus, we allow the truth of these things (for I consider your silence as a signal of assent), it is necessary that compact and custom should contribute to the manifestation of what we understand and enunciate. For if,

O best of men! you are willing to pass on to the consideration of number, from whence do you think you can be able to attribute similar names to each number, if you do not permit your consent and compact to possess some authority about the rectitude of names? The opinion, indeed, pleases me, which asserts that names should be as much as possible similar to things. But yet I am afraid, lest perhaps, as Hermogenes said, the attraction of this similitude should be very precarious, and we should be obliged, in this troublesome affair, to make use of compact, in order to obtain rectitude of names: since, perhaps, we shall then speak as much as possible in the most beautiful manner, when our speech is composed either entirely, or for the most part, from similars, that is, from things convenient; but in the most base manner, when the contrary takes place. But still further inform me, what power names possess with respect to us, and what beautiful effect we must assert they are able to produce.

Cratylus/ Names, Socrates, appear to me to teach, and that it is simply true, that he who knows names, knows also things.

Socrates/ Perhaps, Cratylus, your meaning is this: that when anyone knows the quality of a name (and it is of the same quality as a thing), he then also knows a thing, since it is similar to a name. But there is one art of all things which are similar to one another; and in consequence of this you appear to me to assert, that he who knows names, knows also things.

Cratylus/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ But come, let us see what this mode of teaching things is, which you now speak of, and whether there is any other method, this at the same time being the best; or

whether there is no other than this. Which do you think is the case?

Cratylus/ That there is no other method than this, but that this is the only one, and the best.

Socrates/ But whether do you think that the invention of things is the same as the invention of names, and the same as the discovery of those things, of which names are at present significant? Or do you think that it is necessary to seek and find according to another method, and that this should be learned?

Cratylus/ I think that we ought, above all things, to seek after and discover these things according to this method.

Socrates/ But let us consider, Cratylus, if anyone, while seeking after things, follows after names, speculating the quality of each, do you perceive that there is no small danger of his being deceived?

Cratylus/ How?

Socrates/ Because, evidently, he who first established names fashioned them such as he thought things themselves were. Is it not so?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If, therefore, he did not think rightly, but fashioned them agreeable to his conceptions, what must we think of those who were persuaded to follow him? Can it be anything else, than that they must be deceived?

Cratylus/ But this is not the case, Socrates: but it is necessary that he who composed names must have known how to compose them; for otherwise, as I have before observed, names would never have existed. But you may derive the greatest conviction, that the inventor of names did not wander from the truth, by considering that, if he had conceived erroneously, all things would not have thus corresponded with his conceptions. Or, did you not perceive

this, when you were saying that all names were composed according to the same conceptions, and tended to the same thing?

Socrates/ But this apology, my worthy Cratylus, is of no weight: for if the founder of names was deceived in the first instance, but compelled other things to this his first conception, and obliged them to harmonize with it; just as in diagrams, in which sometimes a very trifling and unapparent error taking place, all the remaining parts, which are very numerous, consent notwithstanding with each other: if this be the case, everyone ought in the beginning of a thing to employ much discussion and diligent consideration, in order that he may know whether the principle is properly established, or not; for this being sufficiently examined, what remains will appear consequent to the principle. And yet I should wonder if names harmonized with each other. For let us again consider what we discussed before; in the course of which we asserted, that, in consequence of everything *proceeding*, *hurrying along*, and *flowing*, names signified to us *essence*. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not?

Cratylus/ Very much so, and that they properly signify this.

Socrates/ Let us consider, then, repeating some of these. In the first place, then, this name επιστημη, *science*, is dubious, and seems rather to signify that it stops (ἱστησιν (ysteesyn)) our soul at certain things, than that it is borne along with them; and hence it is more proper to call its beginning as now, than by the ejection of ε (e), πιστημη (pysteemee), and to insert an ι (y) instead of ε (e). In the next place, το βεϐαιον (bebayon), *the firm*, is so called, because it is the imitation of a certain *basis* and *abiding*, but not of lation. Again, ἱστορια (ystorya), history, signifies that it stops the flowing of things; and πιστον, *the credible*, implies that

which produces perfect stability. Likewise μνημη (mneemee), or *memory*, entirely indicates *a quiet abiding in the soul*, and not local motion. And, if you will, ἁμαρτια (amartya), *guilt*, and συμφορα (symphora), *calamity*, when these names are attentively considered, appear to be the same with συνεσις (synesys), *intelligence*, and επιστημη (epysteemee), *science*, and all the other names belonging to things of an excellent nature. But still further, αμαθια (amathya), and ακολασια (akolasya), that is, *ignorance* and *intemperance*, will appear to be similar to these: for *ignorance* will signify the progression of one proceeding in conjunction with divinity; but intemperance will appear to be a perfect pursuit of things. And thus, those names which we consider as belonging to the basest of things, will appear to be most similar to the names of the most beautiful things. And I think that anyone may discover many others of this kind, if he applies himself to the investigation; from which he may be led to think, that the institutor of names did not indicate things proceeding and borne along, but such as stably abide.

Cratylus/ And yet you see, Socrates, that he signified many things according to the conception of agitation and flowing.

Socrates/ What then shall we do, Cratylus? Shall we number names like suffrages? And does their rectitude consist in the same thing being signified by the most names?

Cratylus/ This is by no means proper.

Socrates/ Certainly not, my friend. But, omitting these particulars, let us consider whether you will agree with us in this, or not. Have we not already acknowledged, that those who instituted names in the several cities, both of Greeks and Barbarians, were legislators, and that the art, which is capable of accomplishing this, is legislative?

Cratylus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Tell me now, then, whether those who founded the first names knew the things to which they assigned names, or were ignorant of them?

Cratylus/ It appears to me, Socrates, that they were acquainted with them.

Socrates/ For, friend Cratylus, they could not accomplish this, while ignorant of things.

Cratylus/ It does not appear to me that they could.

Socrates/ Let us then return again from whence we have digressed: for you lately said, if you recollect, that he who established names must have previously known the things to which he assigned names. Are you, therefore, of this opinion at present, or not?

Cratylus/ I am.

Socrates/ Will you say, that he who established first names, established them in consequence of possessing knowledge?

Cratylus/ Yes.

Socrates/ From what names, then, did he either learn or find out things, since first names were not yet established? But have we not said, that it is impossible to learn and find out things any other way, than by learning or finding out ourselves the quality of names?

Cratylus/ You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose.

Socrates/ After what manner then, shall we say that they possessing knowledge established names? Shall we say, that founders of names existed prior to the establishment of names, and that they then possessed a knowledge of names, since it is impossible to learn things otherwise than by names?

Cratylus/ I think, Socrates, that the opinion about these particulars is most true, which asserts that a power greater than the human assigned the first names to things; in consequence of which they must of necessity be rightly established.

Socrates/ Do you think that he who established names, whether he was a certain dæmon, or a god, would establish things contrary to himself? Or do we appear to you, to have just now said nothing to the purpose?

Cratylus/ But the other sort of these were not names.

Socrates/ Which sort do you mean, best of men! those which lead to permanency, or those which lead to lation? For, as we just now said, this cannot be determined by their multitude.

Cratylus/ Your observation is indeed just, Socrates.

Socrates/ Since names then contest with each other, and, as well these as those, assert that they are similar to the truth, how shall we be able to determine in this affair? Or where shall we turn ourselves? For we cannot have recourse to other names different from these; for there are no others. But it is evident that certain other things, besides names, must be sought after, which may show us, without names, which of these are true; pointing out for this purpose the truth of things.

Cratylus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ It is possible, therefore, Cratylus, as it seems, to learn things without names, if what we have just now asserted is true.

Cratylus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Through what else, then, do you expect to learn things? Can it be through anything else than that which is proper and most just, and through their communion with each other, if they are in any respect mutually allied, and

especially through themselves? For that which is different, and foreign from these, will signify something else, and not these.

Cratylus/ You appear to me to speak the truth.

Socrates/ But tell me, by Zeus, have we not often confessed that names, which are properly established, are similar to the things of which they are the names, and are indeed the images of things?

Cratylus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If then it is possible, in the most eminent degree, to learn things through names, and likewise through themselves, which will be the most excellent and the clearest discipline? Will it be possible to obtain this knowledge from an image, if it should be beautifully assimilated, and to perceive the truth, of which this is the image? Or rather, shall we be able from truth to obtain truth itself, and its image, if the image is but properly fabricated?

Cratylus/ It appears to me, that this must necessarily be obtained from truth.

Socrates/ After what manner, therefore, it is necessary to learn, or to find out things, is perhaps a degree of knowledge beyond what you and I are able to obtain. It will be sufficient, therefore, to acknowledge this, that things are not to be learned from names, but are much rather to be learned and discovered from themselves.

Cratylus/ It appears so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But still further, let us consider, lest this multitude of names tending to the same thing should deceive us, if, in reality, those by whom they were established considered all things as proceeding and flowing; for they appear to me to have held this opinion. But should this be the case, their opinion is however erroneous: for these men having fallen, as it were, into a certain vortex, are themselves

confounded, and would willingly, by dragging us along, hurl us into the same whirlpool. For consider, O wonderful Cratylus! that which I often dream about, whether or not we should say that there is any such thing as the beautiful itself, and the good, and so of everything else.

Cratylus/ It appears to me, Socrates, that there is.

Socrates/ Let us therefore consider this affair, not as if a certain countenance, or anything of this kind, is beautiful; for all these appear to flow: but we ask, whether the beautiful itself does not always remain such as it is?

Cratylus/ It is necessary that it should.

Socrates/ Can it therefore be properly denominated, if it is always secretly flying away? And can it, in the first place, be said that it is, and, in the next place, that it is of such a particular nature? Or is it not necessary, in this case, that, while we are speaking about it, it should immediately become something else, secretly withdraw itself, nor be any longer such as it was?

Cratylus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ How, then, can that be anything, which never subsists in a similar manner? For If, at any time, it should subsist in a similar manner, in that time in which it is thus similarly effected, it is evident that it would suffer no mutation: but, if it always subsists in a similar manner, and is the same, how can it suffer mutation, or be moved, since it never departs from its idea?

Cratylus/ By no means.

Socrates/ But neither can it be known by anyone; for, as soon as that which is endued with knowledge accedes to it, it becomes something different and various, so that it cannot be known what quality it possesses, or how it subsists: for no knowledge can know that which it knows, when the object of its knowledge has no manner of subsistence.

Cratylus/ It is as you say.

Socrates/ But neither, Cratylus, can there be any such thing as knowledge, if all things glide away, and nothing abides. For if knowledge itself does not fall from a subsistence, as knowledge, knowledge will perpetually abide, and will be always knowledge: but if the form itself of knowledge glides away, it will at the same time glide into something different from the form of knowledge, and will no longer be knowledge; but if it always glides away, it will always be something different from knowledge: and from hence it follows that neither knowledge, nor the object of knowledge, will have any subsistence. But if that which knows always is, then that which is known will always have a subsistence, together with the beautiful, the good, and everything else which we are now speaking of; and none of these, as it appears to me, will be similar either to that which flows, or is borne along. But whether things of this kind subsist in this manner, or whether as the followers of Heraclitus and many others assert, it is by no means easy to perceive: nor is it very much the province of a man endued with intellect, to give himself up, and his own soul, to the study of names, believing in their reality, and consisting in their author, as one endued with knowledge: and thus, in consequence of possessing no sound knowledge, either concerning the founder of names, or things themselves, considering all things as flowing like earthen vessels, and viewing them similar to men diseased with a rheum, as if everything subsisted according to flowing and distillation. Perhaps, therefore, Cratylus, this may be the case, and perhaps not. Hence it is proper to consider this affair in a very strenuous and diligent manner, since it is by no means easy to apprehend the truth: for as yet you are but a young man, and in the vigor of your age; and if you should discover

anything in the course of your inquiries, you ought to communicate it to me.

Cratylus/ I shall act in this manner. And I very well know, Socrates, that I am not at present without consideration; but, in consequence of speculating this affair, the truth seems to me to be much more on your side, than on that of Heraclitus.

Socrates/ Afterwards therefore, my friend, when you come hither again, instruct me: but now, agreeably to your determination, proceed to the field; and Hermogenes, here, will attend you.

Cratylus/ Be it so, Socrates: and do you also endeavor to think upon these things.

THE END OF THE CRATYLUS.

Eryxias.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

or

on wealth.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Eryxias, Critias, Erasistratus.

Socrates/ We happened to be taking a walk, myself and Eryxias, of the ward of Steiria, in the portico of Zeus, who presides over Freed-men, and there came to us Critias the son of Phæax, and the nephew of Erasistratus. Now Erasistratus happened at that time to be recently arrived from Sicily and those places; and on approaching near he said—

Erasistratus/ "Hail, Socrates."

Socrates/ And hail too thou. What then, can you tell us of any news from Sicily?

Erasistratus/ And very good too; but are you willing for us to sit down first? for I am tired from having walked yesterday from Megara.

Socrates/ Perfectly so, if it seems good to you.

Erasistratus/ What then of the events there do you wish to hear the first? Is it of the people there, themselves, what they are doing, or how they are affected towards this state of ours? For they appear to me to be in a case similar to wasps; for if anyone excites the latter in any slight manner to anger, they become difficult to battle against, until one falls upon them and destroys them nest and all. So, I think, are the people of Syracuse. For unless, after entertaining angry feelings, one shall go thither with a very large fleet, it is not possible for them to come under our power; but by all these little doings they will be enraged the more, so as to become

the most difficult of all to manage; and they have just now sent ambassadors, intending, as it seems to me, to deceive in some way the state.

Socrates/ During our conversation the ambassadors from Syracuse happened to pass by; when, pointing to one of them, Erasistratus observed—

Erasistratus/ That person, Socrates, is the most wealthy of the Siceliotes and Italiotes; and how should he not be, who has land without stint; so that it is easy for him, if one wished it, to cultivate a great deal of it; and it is of such a kind, that there is none other so good, at least amongst the Greeks; and he has still many things leading to wealth, chattels, and slaves, and horses, and gold and silver.

Socrates/ On seeing him excited, as if about to dilate upon the man's substance, I asked him—What kind of person, Erasistratus, does this man seem to be in Sicily?

Erasistratus/ This man both seems to be and is the most knavish of all the Siceliotes and Italiotes, by how much he is the wealthiest; so that, should you be willing to ask any Siceliote whom he thought to be the greatest rogue, not one would mention any other person than him.

Socrates/ Conceiving then that he was holding a conversation not upon trifling matters, but what seemed to be the greatest, namely, virtue and wealth, I asked him which would he say is the wealthier person, he, who happened to have two talents of silver, or he, who had a field worth two talents?

Erasistratus/ I think, the person who has the field.

Socrates/ By the same rule then, he, who happens to have garments, or bed-furniture, or other goods of greater value than are those, which the stranger possesses, would be the wealthier. To this he assented. Now, should anyone give you the choice, which would you wish?

Erasistratus/ I would wish that which is the most valuable.

Socrates/ Would you not say so, as conceiving yourself to be more wealthy?

Erasistratus/ Just so.

Socrates/ For the present then he appears to be the wealthiest, who possesses things the most valuable.

Erasistratus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Would not then, persons in health be more wealthy than those who are ill? at least if health is a possession more valuable than the property of a person who is ill. For surely there is no one, who would not set a higher value on health, although he possessed only a little money, than on illness, although he possessed the property of the great king, through his conceiving, it is plain, that health is of greater value; for he would never prefer it, unless he considered it of greater value than property.

Erasistratus/ He would not.

Socrates/ If then anything else seems to be of greater value than health, the person, who possesses that thing, would be the wealthiest.

Erasistratus/ Yes.

Socrates/ If then a person were to come to us and ask—Can you, Socrates, and Eryxias, and Erasistratus, tell me, what possession is the most valuable to man? Is it not that, by possessing which a person would deliberate the best on this point, how he could best transact his own affairs and those of his friends? What should we say is this?

Erasistratus/ To myself it appears, Socrates, that happiness is the thing of the greatest value to man.

Socrates/ And not wrongly so. But shall we consider those the most happy, who are the best to do?

Erasistratus/ To me those appear so.

Socrates/ Would not those then be the best to do, who err the least, in the case of themselves and the rest of mankind, and regulate affairs the most successfully?

Erasistratus/ By all means.

Socrates/ They then, who know what is evil and what is good, and what is to be done and what is not, would regulate affairs the most successfully, and err the least.

To this too he consented.

Now then, the same persons appear to be the wisest, and the best to do, and the happiest, and the wealthiest; if indeed wisdom is a possession of the greatest value.

Eryxias *taking up the* discourse, said: —

Eryxias/ Yes. But, of what advantage would food and drink, and if there is anything else of this kind, be to a person, if he were wiser than Nestor, and yet did not happen to have the necessaries of life? How would his wisdom be a benefit? Or how could he be the wealthiest, when nothing prevents him from being poor, while he possesses no resources for the necessaries of life?

Socrates/ And he thought indeed he had said something extremely well.

But would the person, who possesses wisdom, suffer in this way, even if he were in want of these things? For if a person possessed the residence of Polytion, and the residence were full of gold and silver, would he be in want of nothing?

Eryxias/ Nay, there is nothing to prevent that person from immediately disposing of his property, and obtaining in return for it whatever he happens to want for his living, or money even; in exchange for which he will be able to procure them, and to have on the instant all things in plenty.

Socrates/ Provided, persons existing happen to be in want of his residence, more than of the wisdom of that person; since, if they were such as to value more the wisdom of the man, and what results from it, he would have much more to dispose of, if he happened to be in want of anything, and wished to dispose both of it and the works resulting from it. Surely of the residence the use happens to be much and necessary; and great is the difference to a person in the case of things relating to life, as regards his living in a dwelling of this kind, or in a small and mean tenement; but of wisdom the use costs little, and slight is the difference for a person to be wise or untaught in questions of the greatest moment. And oh! that men should despise the one, and not be buyers of it! but that of cypress for their residence, and Pentelican marble, many should be in want, and willing to purchase! Now would not a person, if he were a clever pilot, or a skillful physician, and able to practice well and creditably his art, or any other of such kind of arts, be of greater value than anyone whatever of those of the greatest possessions according to substance? and would not he, who is able to deliberate well both for himself and another, how he might do the best, be able to dispose of his skill, if he wished to do so?

On this Eryxias, taking up the discourse, and looking with his eyes under, as if he had been injuriously treated, observed—

Eryxias/ And would you, Socrates, if one must speak the truth of you, assert that you are wealthier than Callias, the son of Hipponicus? And yet you would acknowledge that you are not less taught than he is on matters of the greatest moment, but wiser rather; and still you are not on this account the wealthier.

Socrates/ For perhaps you imagine, Eryxias, that these arguments, which we are now discussing, are a sport, since

the facts are not really so; but that they are like pebbles in the pebble-game, which if a person cleverly brings forward, he will be able to cause the opposite players to be beaten, so as not to have what they can bring forward against those movements. Perhaps then you imagine, that matters are thus without any reference to the rich; and that there are certain arguments in no respects either true or false, by detailing which, a person may get the better of his opponents, how that the wisest are likewise the wealthiest, and by saying these of such a kind of falsehood of persons saying true. And perhaps there is nothing wonderful in this; just as if two persons should be speaking about letters, one asserting that sigma σ begins the word Socrates, but the other alpha α, the argument of the party, who says that alpha α begins, should be superior to his, who says that sigma σ does.

And, looking round to the parties present, Eryxias observed, smiling at the same time, and blushing, as if he had not been present during what had been said before;

Eryxias/ I did not imagine, Socrates, that there was any need of arguments of that kind, by which a person would be able to persuade not one of those, who are present, nor be benefited by them. For who is there with any intellect, who would be persuaded that the richest are the wisest? but would rather be informed with greater delight, if it is necessary to talk about being wealthy, from whence it is honorable to be wealthy, and from whence disgraceful, and what it is to be wealthy, whether a good or an evil.

Socrates/ Be it so. Henceforth then we will be on our guard; and you do right in admonishing me. But why do not you yourself, since you have introduced the subject, endeavor to state whether it seems to you to be a good or an evil to be wealthy? especially since the previous arguments

do not appear to have been spoken with reference to this point.

Eryxias/ To myself then for the present it seems that to be wealthy is a good.

Socrates/ But while he was still desirous to state something, Critias suddenly interrupted him by saying—

Critias/ Tell me, Eryxias, do you consider it a good to be wealthy?

Eryxias/ Yes, I do, by Zeus. For I should be mad if I did not; and I think there is not a single person, who would not say so too.

Critias/ And yet, I think too that there is not a single person, whom I could not cause to say with myself that to some men it is an evil to be wealthy. If then it were a good, it would not have appeared to some to be an evil.

Socrates/ Hereupon I said to them that—If ye happened to be at variance about this point, which of you two is speaking with the greater truth about horsemanship, how a person would ride the best, and had I myself happened to be skilled in horsemanship, I would have endeavored to cause you to cease from your differences in opinion; for I should have been ashamed had I not, if present, prevented, as far as I could, your being at variance; or if you had been at variance upon any other matter whatever, and were about to separate not at all, unless you agreed upon this, rather as enemies instead of being friends. But now, since you happen to be at variance upon an affair of this kind, of which there must needs be the use through the whole of life, and a great difference, whether we are to attend to it, as being beneficial or not; and this too as being a part not of trifling questions, but of those that are thought to be the greatest by the Greeks, since fathers recommend this as the first point to their children, as soon as they arrive at the age for reflecting

upon what they ought; and they seem to consider from whence they shall become wealthy; so that should you possess anything you are worth something, but if not, nothing. If then this object is made so violently a serious pursuit, and you, who agree on other matters, differ upon this one of such great moment, and still in addition you are at variance on the question of wealth, not whether it is of a black color or white, nor whether of a light weight or heavy, but whether it is an evil or a good, so as even to be arrayed to the extreme of enmity, should you be at variance about things evil and good, and this too, although you are friends as much as possible, and relations, I will not, as far as rests with myself, neglect you, while at variance with each other; but, if I were able myself, I would tell you how the case stands, and cause you to cease from your difference in opinion. But now, since I happen to be not able, and each of you thinks himself able to cause the other to agree with him, I am prepared to take a part in the discussion, as far as I can, in order that it may be agreed upon by you how the matter stands. Do you then, Critias, said I, endeavor to cause us to agree with you, as you have undertaken to do.

Critias/ I would, as I have begun, gladly ask Eryxias here, whether there seem to him to be men unjust and just.

Eryxias/ By Zeus, and very much so.

Critias/ Well then, to act unjustly seems it to you to be an evil or a good?

Eryxias/ To me at least an evil.

Critias/ Would a man, who commits adultery with his neighbors' wives by means of money, seem to you to act unjustly? and this too when the state and the laws forbid it.

Eryxias/ To me at least he would seem to act unjustly.

Critias/ Consequently, if the unjust man happens to be wealthy, and both able and willing to expend money, he

would go astray; but if it were not his fortune to be rich, he would not have the means of expending, nor would he be able to accomplish what he wished, so that he would not even go astray. Hence it would be a greater benefit to the party to be not wealthy, since he would the less accomplish what he wished. Now he wished to do what was wrong. And again, would you say that to be ill is an evil or a good?

Eryxias/ I would say an evil.

Critias/ Well then, do there seem to you to be some men, who are without self-control?

Eryxias/ Yes, to me at least.

Critias/ If then it were better for a person of this kind for the sake of his health to abstain from food and drink, and the rest of things that are thought to be pleasant, while he is unable to do so through his want of self-control, it would be better for that person, that there should not be from whence he could procure those things for himself, rather than have a great superfluity in the necessaries of life; for thus there would not be the power for him to go astray, not even if he vehemently wished it.

Socrates/ So well and beautifully was Critias thought to have spoken, that had not Eryxias felt a respect for those, who were present, nothing would have prevented him from getting up and striking Critias; of so great a thing did he deem himself to have been deprived; since it was evident to him, that he had previously formed not a correct opinion on the subject of wealth. Perceiving then that Eryxias was in this state, and careful that abuse and opposition should not proceed too far, I remarked, that Prodicus, the wise man of Ceos, had, when detailing this very argument, seemed to those, who were present, to be such a trifler as to be unable to persuade a single person present that he was speaking what was true; and thereupon a lad very young and a clever

talker, who was sitting by, laughed at and jeered him, and put him up, desirous to get at the reasons for what he was saying; and in truth he became in much higher repute amongst the auditors than Prodicus himself.

Erasistratus/ Might you have it in your power to tell us his reasons?

Socrates/ Completely so, if indeed I remember it. For it was, I think, something to this effect.

The lad asked him, in what way he conceived wealth to be an evil, and in what a good? when he taking up the discourse, observed—Just as you do likewise, that to persons beautiful in body and mind it is a good, and to such as know how to use it, to these likewise it is a good; but to the depraved and those who do not know, it is an evil. And all the rest of things, said he, are in this state. For of what kind are some of those, who make use of things, such to them it is necessary for the things to be; and prettily, said he, appears to have been put into verse the sentiment of Archilochus—

> As the actions are men meet with, so the thoughts are, which they frame.

Now then, said the lad, if anyone should make me wise in that very wisdom, by which the good become wise men, it is necessary for him to make at the same time the rest of things good for me, without his troubling himself at all about those very things, because he has made me wise instead of being untaught; as if a person should make me now a grammarian, it is necessary for him to make the rest of things grammatical for me; and if a musician, musical; just as when he makes me good, it is necessary to have made things good at the same time for me. To the latter assertion Prodicus however did not assent; although he acknowledged the former. Does it seem to you, said he, that as it is the

work of a man to make a dwelling, so it is to make things good? or is it necessary for things to continue to the end to be such, as they may have been at the commencement, whether evil or good? And Prodicus seemed to me to suspect to what point the argument was about to proceed in so very clever a manner; and, in order that he might not appear before all present to be confuted by the lad—for he thought it would be a thing of indifference for him to suffer this when alone—he said it was the work of a man. Does virtue, said the lad, seem to you a thing to be taught, or is it innate? To be taught, he replied, at least by me. Would not then, said he, a person appear to be silly, if he thought that, by praying to the gods, he should become a grammarian or a musician, or obtain any other science, which it is necessary for a person to obtain by either learning from another or discovering himself? To this too he assented. Do not you then, Prodicus, said the lad, when you pray to the gods to do well, and for good things to happen, pray at that time for nothing else but to become beautiful in body and mind; since to men beautiful in body and mind things likewise happen to be good, but bad to the depraved. If then virtue happens to be able to be taught, you would appear to be praying for nothing else than to be taught, what you do not know.

I said then to Prodicus, that he seemed to me to have suffered a thing of not a trifling kind, if he had happened to fail in this; at least if he conceived that, what we pray for from the gods, would take place even at the same time. For should you go in haste on each occasion to a city, and in your prayers ask of the gods to give good things, you nevertheless would not know whether they are able to give you what you happen to ask for, as you would do, if you were to go to the doors of a grammar-master, and beg of him to impart the knowledge of grammar, and to trouble himself about nothing else but the science, which you can receive on

the instant, and by which you will be able to do the works of the grammar-master. On my saying this, Prodicus directed his course to the lad, as about to defend himself, and to make a display, as you have done just now, and taking it to heart should he appear to have prayed to the gods in vain. And thereupon the ruler of the Gymnasium advancing, bade him take himself away from the Gymnasium, as he was conversing upon subjects not suited to young persons; and if not suited, evidently wrong.

This account have I detailed for the sake of this, that you may see how situated are the persons engaged in philosophy. For if Prodicus had been present, and spoken thus, he would have appeared to those present to be so mad, as to be ejected even from the Gymnasium. But you seem to have now talked so extremely well, as not only to have persuaded those present, but to cause likewise the speaker on the opposite side to agree with you; and it is evident that, as in courts of law, if two persons happened to give the same evidence, one seeming to be correct in body and mind, but the other depraved in both, the judges would, on account of the testimony of the depraved character, be not at all convinced; but, as it might happen, do even the reverse; but if the person, who seemed to be correct in body and mind, had so stated alone, the statement would have seemed to be vehemently true. Perhaps then the parties are situated in some such manner with respect to yourself and Prodicus; and one they consider a sophist and a vain talker, but yourself a statesman and a man of much worth; and then they imagine that they ought not to look to the speech itself, but to the speakers, of what kind they may be.

Erasistratus/ But nevertheless, although you are speaking in ridicule, Socrates, it seems to myself at least, that Critias appears to say something well.

Socrates/ Nay, by Zeus, nothing whatever. But why, since you have conversed upon these matters well and beautifully, do you not finish what remains of your discourse? For there seems to me something still remaining of the inquiry, especially since this appears to be acknowledged, that wealth is to some a good, but to others an evil. There remains then to inquire what is wealth in the abstract. For if we do not know this first, we shall not be able to agree as to what portion is an evil, and what a good; and I am prepared, as far as I can, to make the inquiry with you. Let then the person, who asserts that to be wealthy is a good, say on this point how the case happens to be.

Erasistratus/ Nay, I do not, Socrates, define wealth in any way more cleverly than the rest of mankind. For this is to be wealthy, to possess much money. And I conceive that Critias here does not think that to be wealthy is anything else.

Socrates/ Even thus, there will be something still left to consider, of what kind is the money, in order that you may not shortly afterwards appear to be at variance on this point again. For instance, you know that the Carthaginians make use of money of this kind. In a small skin there is bound up as much as is the weight of a stater at most. But what is so bound up within, no one knows, except those who make it up. They then deem it a legal tender, when a seal has been put upon it; and he, who possesses the greatest number of these skins, is thought to possess the most money, and to be the wealthiest. But if anyone amongst us were in possession of such things to the greatest amount, he would be not a whit more wealthy, than if he possessed many pebbles from the mountain; but at Lacedæmon they deem a weight of iron a legal tender, and this when it is the useless part of iron; and he, who possesses a great weight of such kind of iron, is thought to be wealthy; but elsewhere its possession is worth nothing; while in Ethiopia they make

use of engraved stones, of which a man of Laconia would not have the power to make any use. But amongst the nomad Scythians, if a person possessed the residence of Polytion, he would be thought to be not at all more wealthy, than if a person amongst us were the owner of the mountain Lycabettus. It is plain then that each of these things cannot be property; since some of those, who have possessed them, appear to have been not at all more wealthy on this account. But each of these, said I, exist in reality as property to some persons, and they who possess them are wealthy; but to others they are not property, nor are persons on this account more wealthy; just as the same things are neither honorable nor disgraceful to all, but different to different persons. If then we are willing to inquire why amongst the Scythians houses are not property, but are so with us; or why amongst the Carthaginians skins are so, but not with us; or why amongst the Lacedæmonians iron is property, but not with us, should we not discover the reason best in this way? For example, should anyone at Athens possess a thousand talents-weight of the stones in the Market-place, of which we make no use, is it that he would be deemed to be wealthier on that account?

Erasistratus/ It appears not at least to me.

Socrates/ But if he possessed a thousand talents-weight of the stone called lychnite. we should say that he was very wealthy.

Erasistratus/ Very indeed.

Socrates/ Is it, on this account, because the latter is useful to us, but the former useless?

Erasistratus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Especially since amongst the Scythians houses are on this account not property to them, because they have no use for a house; nor would a Scythian put any value upon

the most beautiful house for himself rather than a sheep-skin cloak; because the latter is useful to him, but the former useless. Again, on the other hand, we do not consider the money of Carthage as property. For there is not an article of those we are in want of, which we can carry off by it, as we can by silver; so that it would be useless to us.

Erasistratus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Whatever things then happen to be useful to us, these are property; but whatever are useless, are not property.

Eryxias/ How is this, Socrates?

Socrates/ said Eryxias, taking up the discourse.

Eryxias/ Is there not what we make use of for conversing with each other, and for doing a hurt, and many other things? And would these be a property? And yet they appear to be useful.

Not even thus then has it appeared to us what is a property. For that it is necessary that a property, if it is about to exist at all, should be useful, is acknowledged nearly by all. But what is the kind of property, since it is not of every kind. Come then say, if we are to pursue the inquiry again in this way, would what we are in search of be discovered still better, by asking what is that, for which we make use of property, and for what has the possession of property been discovered, as drugs have for causing diseases to go away? for perhaps it would thus become more clear. Since then it seems a thing of necessity, that, whatever happens to be property, must be useful likewise, and that of things useful there is one kind, which we call property, it will still be left to inquire, for what need are the things, which are meet to be called property, useful? For all things are equally useful, of which we make use for any operation, just as all that have life are living things; of which living things one kind we call

man. If then a person were to ask us—By what thing being removed out of the way shall we have no need of the physician's art, nor of its instruments? we should be able to say—If diseases were removed from our bodies, and did not exist at all, or if existing, were removed on the instant. Of sciences then the medical is, as it seems, that, which is useful for this purpose, to cause the removal of diseases. And if a person should again ask us—By the removal of what thing are we in no need of property, should we be able to tell? But if not, let us consider the matter thus. Come say, if a man could live without food and drink, and were neither hungry nor thirsty, is there a reason why he should want those very things, or silver, or anything else, in order that he might obtain them?

Eryxias/ To myself at least it does not seem he would.

Socrates/ In the same manner then are the rest of things. For if we did not want the things, of which we are at present in want, for the care of the body, namely, both of warmth and of cold sometimes, and of the other things, of which the body being deficient is in want, that, which is called property, would be not used by us; at least if no one wanted at all anyone of these things, for the sake of which we should wish to possess property, in order that we may possess what is sufficient for our desires, and the wants of the body, of which we may on each occasion stand in need. If then the possession of property is useful for this purpose, namely, the attention to the wants of the body, should this be taken away from the midst of us, we should not be in want of property, and property would perhaps not exist at all.

Eryxias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ It appears then, as is likely, that what are useful for this doing of things, are property. That such was

property he acknowledged indeed; the reasoning nevertheless troubled him exceedingly.

But what are these kind of things? Shall we say that the same thing can be useful for the same operation at one time, but useless at another?

Eryxias/ I would not say so; but if we have any want of the same thing for the same operation, it seems to me it would be useful; but if not, not.

Socrates/ Hence, if we could work up a brazen image without fire, we should not be in want of fire for such an operation; and if we did not want it, it would not be useful to us. And the same reasoning applies to the rest of things.

Eryxias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Of such things then as it is possible for a thing to exist without them, not one of them would appear to be useful, at least for that thing.

Eryxias/ It would not.

Socrates/ If then we should appear at any time able, without silver and gold, and the rest of such kind of things, which we do not use for the body, as we do food, and drink, and clothing, and bedding, and dwellings, to cause the wants of the body to cease, so that there is no longer a need of them, neither silver nor gold nor the rest of things would appear to be useful for it, if it were able to exist without them.

Eryxias/ They would not.

Socrates/ Nor would those things appear to be property, unless they were useful. But those things would be property, by which we are able to obtain what are useful.

Eryxias/ I could never, Socrates, be able to be persuaded of this, that gold and silver and the rest of things of that kind are not property. For of this I am strongly persuaded, that,

as things without use are not property, so of things the most useful property is useful for it. Nevertheless I am not persuaded of this, that these things happen to be not useful to us; since by them we obtain the necessaries of life.

Socrates/ Come then say, how shall we speak of these things? Are there not certain persons, who teach music or letters, or any other science, who in return for such instruction obtain for themselves the necessaries of life by bargaining for a remuneration for such things?

Eryxias/ There are.

Socrates/ Would not then these persons by such science obtain for themselves the necessaries of life, by making an exchange for it, as we now do for gold and silver?

Eryxias/ I confess it.

Socrates/ If then they obtain by this act, what they make use of for living, this act would be useful for their living; for we have said that silver is useful on this account, that we are enabled by it to procure what is necessary for the body.

Eryxias/ It is so.

Socrates/ If then the sciences of things useful for it are these, sciences would appear to be property for the very same reason that gold and silver are.

Eryxias/ It is evident.

Socrates/ It is evident too that those, who possess these sciences, are rather wealthy. But we admitted a little before with so much difficulty the reasoning, whether they were the wealthiest. But from what has been just now admitted, this would of necessity happen, that the rather intelligent are rather wealthy. For should a person ask us—Do we think that a horse is a useful thing for every man? Would you not say that, to those who know how to use a horse, it would be a useful thing, but to those who do not know, not?

Eryxias/ I should say so.

Socrates/ Then, by the same rule a drug is not useful for every man, but only to him, who happens to know how to take it?

Eryxias/ I say so.

Socrates/ Are not then all the rest of things in a similar condition?

Eryxias/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Gold then and silver and the rest of things, which are thought to be property, would be useful to him alone, who happens to know how to use them.

Eryxias/ Just so.

Socrates/ Did it not seem before to be the part of persons superior both in body and mind to know where and how to make use of each of these things?

Eryxias/ I admit it.

Socrates/ To those men alone then, who are superior in body and mind, these things would be useful; since they alone know how to use them. If then they are useful to these alone, to these alone they would appear to be property. Is it so?

Eryxias/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Him too, who is unskilled in horsemanship, yet possesses horses that happen to be useless to him, should a person render skillful, would he not at the same time make him more wealthy, since he makes things to be useful to him which previously happened to be useless? For by imparting skill to the person he at the same time makes him wealthy likewise.

Eryxias/ It seems so.

Socrates/ And yet I think I could swear on behalf of Critias, that he is persuaded by none of these arguments.

Critias/ And truly so, by Zeus. For I should be mad if I were persuaded. But why have you not completed that part of the argument, how that gold and silver and the rest of things of that kind are not, although they seem to be, property? since I am very much delighted to hear those arguments, which you happen to be just now going through.

Socrates/ You appear to me, Critias, to be thus delighted at hearing me, as are such of the rhapsodists, as chaunt the verses of Homer; since not one of these arguments are thought by you to be true. Come then and say nevertheless, how shall we speak upon such matters? Would you not say that there are some things ever useful to house-builders for making a dwelling?

Critias/ So it seems at least to me.

Socrates/ Whether then shall we say that those things would be useful, which they make use of for house-building, namely, stones and bricks, and wood, and if there be anything else of this kind? or that there are tools, with which they make the dwelling, and by which they obtain these things, namely, the wood and the stone, and again, the tools for them?

Critias/ To myself at least it seems, that all these the tools are useful for those the materials.

Socrates/ Hence, in the case of the rest of operations, not only are those things useful, which we make use of for each of the works, but those also, by which we obtain them, and without which they would not exist.

Critias/ It is entirely so.

Socrates/ Hence, both for those, who possess these the tools, and if there be anything further up, and for those who possess these the materials and what is further up, so that at last they come to some infinite multitude, it is necessary for all these to appear useful for their operations.

Critias/ There is nothing, to prevent such from being the case.

Socrates/ Well then, if food and drink, and clothing, and the other things which a person is about to make use of for the body, were in his power, would he want in addition gold and silver, or anything else, by which he could obtain what was in his power?

Critias/ It appears to me he would not.

Socrates/ Would it not then appear to us, that sometimes a person does not want any of those things, which relate to the needs of the body?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ For he does not want them. Hence if they appeared to be useless for this operation, they could not, on the other hand, be deemed to appear useful. For it has been laid down, that it is not possible for things to be at one time useful, and at another useless, as regards the same operation.

Critias/ In this way at least, the same reasoning would hold good to both you and me.

Socrates/ For if these were at any time useful for this purpose, it never would happen for them to be on the other hand useless. But now to some operations of depraved doings, but to others of good.

Critias/ I should say so.

Socrates/ Is it not possible then for a depraved act to be useful for the working out of some good?

Critias/ It does not seem so to myself at least.

Socrates/ But good acts we should say are those, which a man does through virtue.

Critias/ I admit it.

Socrates/ Is it not possible for a person to learn some of the things, which are taught by conversation, although he were deprived of hearing, or anything else?

Critias/ By Zeus, it does not seem so to me at least.

Socrates/ Hence, of the things useful for virtue hearing would appear to be one, if at least virtue is to be taught by hearing, and we make use of it for instruction.

Critias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Hence, if medical art is able to cure a person diseased, even medical art would sometimes appear to be one of the things useful for virtue, if through it be furnished the power of hearing what relates to the thing to be taught.

Critias/ There is nothing to prevent it.

Socrates/ If then again we obtain medical science in return for property, even property would appear to be useful for virtue.

Critias/ Yes; for such it is.

Socrates/ Hence, again, in like manner, that would be useful, by which we could obtain property.

Critias/ Yes, all such by all means.

Socrates/ Now does it not seem to you that a person could from acts depraved and disgraceful obtain for himself silver, in return for which he might obtain medical science, or be able to hear, after being unable? and to use that very hearing for virtue, or any other things of that kind?

Critias/ To me at least it does seem very much so.

Socrates/ Would not then the depraved be useful for virtue?

Critias/ It would.

Socrates/ It is not necessary then for those things, by which we can obtain what is useful for each, to be themselves useful for the same. For things depraved would

sometimes seem to be useful for a thing that is good. And they would be still more evident in this case. For if these are useful for each of those, without which they would not exist, unless these had existed previously, come say, how shall we speak of things of this kind? Is it possible for ignorance to be useful for science, or disease for health, or vice for virtue?

Critias/ I should say, not.

Socrates/ And yet we should agree in this, that it is impossible for science to be produced in him, in whom ignorance had not existed previously; or health, in him in whom disease had not existed; or virtue, in him in whom vice had not.

Critias/ The fact, is so, as it seems to me.

Socrates/ Hence it would not be necessary for those things to be useful, without which a thing is not able to exist. For otherwise ignorance would appear to be useful for science; and disease, for health; and vice, for virtue. Of these arguments too he was very hard of belief, unless all these things shall be property. And I, knowing him thoroughly, that it would be an equally hard task to convince him, as, according to the saying, to boil a stone, said—Let us bid a long farewell to these arguments; since we are unable to agree, whether the same things are useful, and a property, or not. But how shall we say on this question? Whether shall we consider a person happier and better, who is in want of the greatest number of things necessary for his body and living, or him, who is in want of the fewest and most trifling? Now this question would perhaps be viewed in the best manner, thus. Should one compare a person himself with himself, and consider which of his states is the better, whether, when he happens to be ill, or in health.

Critias/ But this at least, does not require any great consideration.

Socrates/ For perhaps, it is easy for every simpleton to know that the state of the person in health is better than that of the person ill. Well then, at what time do we happen to be in want of things more in number and variety? when we are ill, or in health?

Critias/ When we are ill.

Socrates/ When therefore we happen to be lying in the worst condition for ourselves, we then are greatly in the desire, and the want of the greatest number of things that relate to the pleasures of the body.

Critias/ It is so.

Socrates/ According to the same rule then, as a person is in the best condition for himself, when he is in want of the fewest of these things, so on the other hand, if there were two persons, one of whom happened to be greatly in the desire and want of many things, and the other of few things and moderately so, as for example things of this kind, such men as are dice-players, others wine-tipplers, and others of a voracious appetite, for all these happen to be nothing else than desires.

Critias/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Now all desires are nothing else than the want of some things.

Critias/ Nothing.

Socrates/ The persons then, who have suffered the most of these, are in a more depraved state than those, who have suffered things of this kind either not at all, or to the least extent. I consider then persons of this kind to be very depraved; and the more they are of this kind, the more depraved. It seems then to us that it is not possible for these things to be useful for this purpose, unless we happen to be in the Want of these things for this purpose.

Critias/ I admit it.

Socrates/ It is necessary then, if these are about to be useful to us for the care of the wants of the body, that we too should want them for this purpose.

Critias/ So it seems at least to me.

Socrates/ He then, to whom the greatest number of things useful for this purpose belongs, would appear to be in want of the greatest number for this purpose, since it is necessary for him to feel a want of all useful things.

Critias/ To me at least it seems to appear in this way.

Socrates/ It is necessary therefore, according to this reasoning, for those, to whom there happens to be much property, to be in much want of the things necessary for the care of the body. For the things useful for this purpose have appeared to be property; so that of necessity they, who should appear to us to be the wealthiest, are in the most depraved state, since they are in want of the greatest number of things of this kind.

Eryxias.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Erasistratus.

Eryxias. Critias.

Scene: —The portico of a temple of Zeus.

Socrates/ It happened by chance that Eryxias the Steirian was walking with me in the Portico of Zeus the Deliverer, when there came up to us Critias and Erasistratus, the latter the son of Phaeax, who was the nephew of Erasistratus. Now Erasistratus had just arrived from Sicily and that part of the world. As they approached, he said;

Erasistratus/ Hail, Socrates!

Socrates/ The same to you; have you any good news from Sicily to tell us?

Erasistratus/ Most excellent. But, if you please, let us first sit down; for I am tired with my yesterday's journey from Megara.

Socrates/ Gladly, if that is your desire.

Erasistratus/ What would you wish to hear first? What the Sicilians are doing, or how they are disposed towards our city? To my mind, they are very like wasps: so long as you only cause them a little annoyance they are quite unmanageable; you must destroy their nests if you wish to get the better of them. And in a similar way, the Syracusans, unless we set to work in earnest, and go against them with a great expedition, will never submit to our rule. The petty injuries which we at present inflict merely irritate them enough to make them utterly intractable. And now they have

sent ambassadors to Athens, and intend, I suspect, to play us some trick. —

Socrates/ While we were talking, the Syracusan envoys chanced to go by, and Erasistratus, pointing to one of them, said to me;

Erasistratus/ That, Socrates, is the richest man in all Italy and Sicily. For who has larger estates or more land at his disposal to cultivate if he please? And they are of a quality, too, finer than any other land in Hellas. Moreover, he has all the things which go to make up wealth, slaves and horses innumerable, gold and silver without end.

Socrates/ I saw that he was inclined to expatiate on the riches of the man; so I asked him, Well, Erasistratus, and what sort of character does he bear in Sicily?

Erasistratus/ He is esteemed to be, and really is, the wickedest of all the Sicilians and Italians, and even more wicked than he is rich; indeed, if you were to ask any Sicilian whom he thought to be the worst and the richest of mankind, you would never hear anyone else named.

Socrates/ I reflected that we were speaking, not of trivial matters, but about wealth and virtue, which are deemed to be of the greatest moment, and I asked Erasistratus whom he considered the wealthier, —he who was the possessor of a talent of silver or he who had a field worth two talents?

Erasistratus/ The owner of the field.

Socrates/ And on the same principle he who had robes and bedding and such things which are of greater value to him than to a stranger would be richer than the stranger?

Erasistratus/ True.

Socrates/ And if anyone gave you a choice, which of these would you prefer?

Erasistratus/ That which was most valuable.

Socrates/ In which way do you think you would be the richer?

Erasistratus/ By choosing as I said.

Socrates/ And he appears to you to be the richest who has goods of the greatest value?

Erasistratus/ He does.

Socrates/ And are not the healthy richer than the sick, since health is a possession more valuable than riches to the sick? Surely there is no one who would not prefer to be poor and well, rather than to have all the King of Persia's wealth and to be ill. And this proves that men set health above wealth, else they would never choose the one in preference to the other.

Erasistratus/ True.

Socrates/ And if anything appeared to be more valuable than health, he would be the richest who possessed it?

Erasistratus/ He would.

Socrates/ Suppose that someone came to us at this moment and were to ask, Well, Socrates and Eryxias and Erasistratus, can you tell me what is of the greatest value to men? Is it not that of which the possession will best enable a man to advise how his own and his friends' affairs should be administered? —What will be our reply?

Erasistratus/ I should say, Socrates, that happiness was the most precious of human possessions.

Socrates/ Not a bad answer. But do we not deem those men who are most prosperous to be the happiest?

Erasistratus/ That is my opinion.

Socrates/ And are they not most prosperous who commit the fewest errors in respect either of themselves or of other men?

Erasistratus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And they who know what is evil and what is good; what should be done and what should be left undone; —these behave the most wisely and make the fewest mistakes?

Erasistratus agreed to this.

Socrates/ Then the wisest and those who do best and the most fortunate and the richest would appear to be all one and the same, if wisdom is really the most valuable of our possessions?

Eryxias/ Yes, but what use would it be if a man had the wisdom of Nestor and wanted the necessaries of life, food and drink and clothes and the like? Where would be the advantage of wisdom then? Or how could he be the richest of men who might even have to go begging, because he had not wherewithal to live?

Socrates/ I thought that what Eryxias was saying had some weight, and I replied, Would the wise man really suffer in this way, if he were so ill-provided; whereas if he had the house of Polytion, and the house were full of gold and silver, he would lack nothing?

Eryxias/ Yes; for then he might dispose of his property and obtain in exchange what he needed, or he might sell it for money with which he could supply his wants and in a moment procure abundance of everything.

Socrates/ True, if he could find someone who preferred such a house to the wisdom of Nestor. But if there are persons who set great store by wisdom like Nestor's and the advantages accruing from it, to sell these, if he were so disposed, would be easier still. Or is a house a most useful and necessary possession, and does it make a great difference in the comfort of life to have a mansion like Polytion's instead of living in a shabby little cottage, whereas wisdom is of small use and it is of no importance whether a

man is wise or ignorant about the highest matters? Or is wisdom despised of men and can find no buyers, although cypress wood and marble of Pentelicus are eagerly bought by numerous purchasers? Surely the prudent pilot or the skillful physician, or the artist of any kind who is proficient in his art, is more worth than the things which are especially reckoned among riches; and he who can advise well and prudently for himself and others is able also to sell the product of his art, if he so desire.

Eryxias looked askance, as if he had received some unfair treatment, and said;

Eryxias/ I believe, Socrates, that if you were forced to speak the truth, you would declare that you were richer than Callias the son of Hipponicus. And yet, although you claimed to be wiser about things of real importance, you would not any the more be richer than he.

Socrates/ I dare say, Eryxias, that you may regard these arguments of ours as a kind of game; you think that they have no relation to facts, but are like the pieces in the game of draughts which the player can move in such a way that his opponents are unable to make any countermove. And perhaps, too, as regards riches you are of opinion that while facts remain the same, there are arguments, no matter whether true or false, which enable the user of them to prove that the wisest and the richest are one and the same, although he is in the wrong and his opponents are in the right. There would be nothing strange in this; it would be as if two persons were to dispute about letters, one declaring that the word Socrates began with an S, the other that it began with an A, and the latter could gain the victory over the former.

Eryxias glanced at the audience, laughing and blushing at once, as if he had had nothing to do with what had just been said, and replied, —

Eryxias/ No, indeed, Socrates, I never supposed that our arguments should be of a kind which would never convince anyone of those here present or be of advantage to them. For what man of sense could ever be persuaded that the wisest and the richest are the same? The truth is that we are discussing the subject of riches, and my notion is that we should argue respecting the honest and dishonest means of acquiring them, and, generally, whether they are a good thing or a bad.

Socrates/ Very good, and I am obliged to you for the hint: in future we will be more careful. But why do not you yourself, as you introduced the argument, and do not think that the former discussion touched the point at issue, tell us whether you consider riches to be a good or an evil?

Eryxias/ I am of opinion, that they are a good.

Socrates/ He was about to add something more, when Critias interrupted him: —

Critias/ Do you really suppose so, Eryxias?

Eryxias/ Certainly; I should be mad if I did not: and I do not fancy that you would find anyone else of a contrary opinion.

Critias/ And I should say that there is no one whom I could not compel to admit that riches are bad for some men. But surely, if they were a good, they could not appear bad for anyone?

Socrates/ Here I interposed and said to them: If you two were having an argument about equitation and what was the best way of riding, supposing that I knew the art myself, I should try to bring you to an agreement. For I should be ashamed if I were present and did not do what I could to

prevent your difference. And I should do the same if you were quarrelling about any other art and were likely, unless you agreed on the point in dispute, to part as enemies instead of as friends. But now, when we are contending about a thing of which the usefulness continues during the whole of life, and it makes an enormous difference whether we are to regard it as beneficial or not, —a thing, too, which is esteemed of the highest importance by the Hellenes: —(for parents, as soon as their children are, as they think, come to years of discretion, urge them to consider how wealth may be acquired, since by riches the value of a man is judged): —When, I say, we are thus in earnest, and you, who agree in other respects, fall to disputing about a matter of such moment, that is, about wealth, and not merely whether it is black or white, light or heavy, but whether it is a good or an evil, whereby, although you are now the dearest of friends and kinsmen, the most bitter hatred may arise betwixt you, I must hinder your dissension to the best of my power. If I could, I would tell you the truth, and so put an end to the dispute; but as I cannot do this, and each of you supposes that you can bring the other to an agreement, I am prepared, as far as my capacity admits, to help you in solving the question. Please, therefore, Critias, try to make us accept the doctrines which you yourself entertain.

Critias/ I should like to follow up the argument, and will ask Eryxias whether he thinks that there are just and unjust men?

Eryxias/ Most decidedly.

Critias/ And does injustice seem to you an evil or a good?

Eryxias/ An evil.

Critias/ Do you consider that he who bribes his neighbor's wife and commits adultery with her, acts justly or

unjustly, and this although both the state and the laws forbid?

Eryxias/ Unjustly.

Critias/ And if the wicked man has wealth and is willing to spend it, he will carry out his evil purposes? whereas he who is short of means cannot do what he fain would, and therefore does not sin? In such a case, surely, it is better that a person should not be wealthy, if his poverty prevents the accomplishment of his desires, and his desires are evil? Or, again, should you call sickness a good or an evil?

Eryxias/ An evil.

Critias/ Well, and do you think that some men are intemperate?

Eryxias/ Yes.

Critias/ Then, if it is better for his health that the intemperate man should refrain from meat and drink and other pleasant things, but he cannot owing to his intemperance, will it not also be better that he should be too poor to gratify his lust rather than that he should have a superabundance of means? For thus he will not be able to sin, although he desire never so much.

Socrates/ Critias appeared to be arguing so admirably that Eryxias, if he had not been ashamed of the bystanders, would probably have got up and struck him. For he thought that he had been robbed of a great possession when it became obvious to him that he had been wrong in his former opinion about wealth. I observed his vexation, and feared that they would proceed to abuse and quarrelling: so I said, —I heard that very argument used in the Lyceum yesterday by a wise man, Prodicus of Ceos; but the audience thought that he was talking mere nonsense, and no one could be persuaded that he was speaking the truth. And when at last a certain talkative young gentleman came in, and, taking his

seat, began to laugh and jeer at Prodicus, tormenting him and demanding an explanation of his argument, he gained the ear of the audience far more than Prodicus.

Erasistratus/ Can you repeat the discourse to us?

Socrates/ If I can only remember it, I will. The youth began by asking Prodicus, In what way did he think that riches were a good and in what an evil? Prodicus answered, as you did just now, that they were a good to good men and to those who knew in what way they should be employed, while to the bad and the ignorant they were an evil. The same is true, he went on to say, of all other things; men make them to be what they are themselves. The saying of Archilochus is true: —

> 'Men's thoughts correspond to the things which they meet with.'

Well, then, replied the youth, if anyone makes me wise in that wisdom whereby good men become wise, he must also make everything else good to me. Not that he concerns himself at all with these other things, but he has converted my ignorance into wisdom. If, for example, a person teach me grammar or music, he will at the same time teach me all that relates to grammar or music, and so when he makes me good, he makes things good to me.

Prodicus did not altogether agree: still he consented to what was said.

And do you think, said the youth, that doing good things is like building a house, —the work of human agency; or do things remain what they were at first, good or bad, for all time?

Prodicus began to suspect, I fancy, the direction which the argument was likely to take, and did not wish to be put down by a mere stripling before all those present: —(if they two had been alone, he would not have minded): —so he

answered, cleverly enough: I think that doing good things is a work of human agency.

And is virtue in your opinion, Prodicus, innate or acquired by instruction?

The latter, said Prodicus.

Then you would consider him a simpleton who supposed that he could obtain by praying to the Gods the knowledge of grammar or music or any other art, which he must either learn from another or find out for himself?

Prodicus agreed to this also.

And when you pray to the Gods that you may do well and receive good, you mean by your prayer nothing else than that you desire to become good and wise: —if, at least, things are good to the good and wise and evil to the evil. But in that case, if virtue is acquired by instruction, it would appear that you only pray to be taught what you do not know.

Hereupon I said to Prodicus that it was no misfortune to him if he had been proved to be in error in supposing that the Gods immediately granted to us whatever we asked: —if, I added, whenever you go up to the Acropolis you earnestly entreat the Gods to grant you good things, although you know not whether they can yield your request, it is as though you went to the doors of the grammarian and begged him, although you had never made a study of the art, to give you a knowledge of grammar which would enable you forthwith to do the business of a grammarian. While I was speaking, Prodicus was preparing to retaliate upon his youthful assailant, intending to employ the argument of which you have just made use; for he was annoyed to have it supposed that he offered a vain prayer to the Gods. But the master of the gymnasium came to him and begged him to leave because he was teaching the youths doctrines which were unsuited to them, and therefore bad for them.

I have told you this because I want you to understand how men are circumstanced in regard to philosophy. Had Prodicus been present and said what you have said, the audience would have thought him raving, and he would have been ejected from the gymnasium. But you have argued so excellently well that you have not only persuaded your hearers, but have brought your opponent to an agreement. For just as in the law courts, if two witnesses testify to the same fact, one of whom seems to be an honest fellow and the other a rogue, the testimony of the rogue often has the contrary effect on the judges' minds to what he intended, while the same evidence if given by the honest man at once strikes them as perfectly true. And probably the audience have something of the same feeling about yourself and Prodicus; they think him a Sophist and a braggart, and regard you as a gentleman of courtesy and worth. For they do not pay attention to the argument so much as to the character of the speaker.

Erasistratus/ But truly, Socrates, though you may be joking, Critias does seem to me to be saying something which is of weight.

Socrates/ I am in profound earnest, I assure you. But why, as you have begun your argument so prettily, do you not go on with the rest? There is still something lacking, now you have agreed that [wealth] is a good to some and an evil to others. It remains to enquire what constitutes wealth; for unless you know this, you cannot possibly come to an understanding as to whether it is a good or an evil. I am ready to assist you in the enquiry to the utmost of my power: but first let him who affirms that riches are a good, tell us what, in his opinion, is wealth.

Erasistratus/ Indeed, Socrates, I have no notion about wealth beyond that which men commonly have. I suppose

that wealth is a quantity of money; and this, I imagine, would also be Critias' definition.

Socrates/ Then now we have to consider, What is money? Or else later on we shall be found to differ about the question. For instance, the Carthaginians use money of this sort. Something which is about the size of a stater is tied up in a small piece of leather: what it is, no one knows but the makers.

A seal is next set upon the leather, which then passes into circulation, and he who has the largest number of such pieces is esteemed the richest and best off. And yet if anyone among us had a mass of such coins he would be no wealthier than if he had so many pebbles from the mountain. At Lacedaemon, again, they use iron by weight which has been rendered useless: and he who has the greatest mass of such iron is thought to be the richest, although elsewhere it has no value. In Ethiopia engraved stones are employed, of which a Lacedaemonian could make no use. Once more, among the Nomad Scythians a man who owned the house of Polytion would not be thought richer than one who possessed Mount Lycabettus among ourselves. And clearly those things cannot all be regarded as possessions; for in some cases the possessors would appear none the richer thereby: but, as I was saying, some one of them is thought in one place to be money, and the possessors of it are the wealthy, whereas in some other place it is not money, and the ownership of it does not confer wealth; just as the standard of morals varies, and what is honorable to some men is dishonorable to others. And if we wish to enquire why a house is valuable to us but not to the Scythians, or why the Carthaginians value leather which is worthless to us, or the Lacedaemonians find wealth in iron and we do not, can we not get an answer in some such way as this: Would an Athenian, who had a thousand talents weight of the stones

which lie about in the Agora and which we do not employ for any purpose, be thought to be any the richer?

Erasistratus/ He certainly would not appear so to me.

Socrates/ But if he possessed a thousand talents weight of some precious stone, we should say that he was very rich?

Erasistratus/ Of course.

Socrates/ The reason is that the one is useless and the other useful?

Erasistratus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in the same way among the Scythians a house has no value because they have no use for a house, nor would a Scythian set so much store on the finest house in the world as on a leather coat, because he could use the one and not the other. Or again, the Carthaginian coinage is not wealth in our eyes, for we could not employ it, as we can silver, to procure what we need, and therefore it is of no use to us.

Erasistratus/ True.

Socrates/ What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is useless to us is not wealth?

Eryxias/ But how do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ Interrupting, Eryxias said;

Eryxias/ Do we not employ in our intercourse with one another speech and violence and various other things? These are useful and yet they are not wealth.

Socrates/ Clearly we have not yet answered the question, What is wealth? That wealth must be useful, to be wealth at all, —thus much is acknowledged by everyone. But what particular thing is wealth, if not all things? Let us pursue the argument in another way; and then we may perhaps find what we are seeking. What is the use of wealth, and for what purpose has the possession of riches been invented, —in the

sense, I mean, in which drugs have been discovered for the cure of disease? Perhaps in this way we may throw some light on the question. It appears to be clear that whatever constitutes wealth must be useful, and that wealth is one class of useful things; and now we have to enquire, What is the use of those useful things which constitute wealth? For all things probably may be said to be useful which we use in production, just as all things which have life are animals, but there is a special kind of animal which we call 'man.' Now if anyone were to ask us, What is that of which, if we were rid, we should not want medicine and the instruments of medicine, we might reply that this would be the case if disease were absent from our bodies and either never came to them at all or went away again as soon as it appeared; and we may therefore conclude that medicine is the science which is useful for getting rid of disease. But if we are further asked, What is that from which, if we were free, we should have no need of wealth? can we give an answer? If we have none, suppose that we restate the question thus: —If a man could live without food or drink, and yet suffer neither hunger nor thirst, would he want either money or anything else in order to supply his needs?

Eryxias/ He would not.

Socrates/ And does not this apply in other cases? If we did not want for the service of the body the things of which we now stand in need, and heat and cold and the other bodily sensations were unperceived by us, there would be no use in this so-called wealth, if no one, that is, had any necessity for those things which now make us wish for wealth in order that we may satisfy the desires and needs of the body in respect of our various wants. And therefore if the possession of wealth is useful in ministering to our bodily wants, and bodily wants were unknown to us, we should not

need wealth, and possibly there would be no such thing as wealth.

Eryxias/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth is what is useful to this end?

Eryxias once more gave his assent, but the small argument considerably troubled him.

And what is your opinion about another question: — Would you say that the same thing can be at one time useful and at another useless for the production of the same result?

Eryxias/ I cannot say more than that if we require the same thing to produce the same result, then it seems to me to be useful; if not, not.

Socrates/ Then if without the aid of fire we could make a brazen statue, we should not want fire for that purpose; and if we did not want it, it would be useless to us? And the argument applies equally in other cases.

Eryxias/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And therefore conditions which are not required for the existence of a thing are not useful for the production of it?

Eryxias/ Of course not.

Socrates/ And if without gold or silver or anything else which we do not use directly for the body in the way that we do food and drink and bedding and houses, —if without these we could satisfy the wants of the body, they would be of no use to us for that purpose?

Eryxias/ They would not.

Socrates/ They would no longer be regarded as wealth, because they are useless, whereas that would be wealth which enabled us to obtain what was useful to us?

Eryxias/ O Socrates, you will never be able to persuade me that gold and silver and similar things are not wealth. But I am very strongly of opinion that things which are useless to us are not wealth, and that the money which is useful for this purpose is of the greatest use; not that these things are not useful towards life, if by them we can procure wealth.

Socrates/ And how would you answer another question? There are persons, are there not, who teach music and grammar and other arts for pay, and thus procure those things of which they stand in need?

Eryxias/ There are.

Socrates/ And these men by the arts which they profess, and in exchange for them, obtain the necessities of life just as we do by means of gold and silver?

Eryxias/ True.

Socrates/ Then if they procure by this means what they want for the purposes of life, that art will be useful towards life? For do we not say that silver is useful because it enables us to supply our bodily needs?

Eryxias/ We do.

Socrates/ Then if these arts are reckoned among things useful, the arts are wealth for the same reason as gold and silver are, for, clearly, the possession of them gives wealth. Yet a little while ago we found it difficult to accept the argument which proved that the wisest are the wealthiest. But now there seems no escape from this conclusion. Suppose that we are asked, 'Is a horse useful to everybody?' will not our reply be, 'No, but only to those who know how to use a horse?'

Eryxias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And so, too, physic is not useful to everyone, but only to him who knows how to use it?

Eryxias/ True.

Socrates/ And the same is the case with everything else?

Eryxias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then gold and silver and all the other elements which are supposed to make up wealth are only useful to the person who knows how to use them?

Eryxias/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And were we not saying before that it was the business of a good man and a gentleman to know where and how anything should be used?

Eryxias/ Yes.

Socrates/ The good and gentle, therefore, will alone have profit from these things, supposing at least that they know how to use them. But if so, to them only will they seem to be wealth. It appears, however, that where a person is ignorant of riding, and has horses which are useless to him, if someone teaches him that art, he makes him also richer, for what was before useless has now become useful to him, and in giving him knowledge he has also conferred riches upon him.

Eryxias/ That is the case.

Socrates/ Yet I dare be sworn that Critias will not be moved a whit by the argument.

Critias/ No, by heaven, I should be a madman if I were. But why do you not finish the argument which proves that gold and silver and other things which seem to be wealth are not real wealth? For I have been exceedingly delighted to hear the discourses which you have just been holding.

Socrates/ My argument, Critias, appears to have given you the same kind of pleasure which you might have derived from some rhapsode's recitation of Homer; for you do not believe a word of what has been said. But come now, give me

an answer to this question. Are not certain things useful to the builder when he is building a house?

Critias/ They are.

Socrates/ And would you say that those things are useful which are employed in house building, —stones and bricks and beams and the like, and also the instruments with which the builder built the house, the beams and stones which they provided, and again the instruments by which these were obtained?

Critias/ It seems to me that they are all useful for building.

Socrates/ And is it not true of every art, that not only the materials but the instruments by which we procure them and without which the work could not go on, are useful for that art?

Critias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And further, the instruments by which the instruments are procured, and so on, going back from stage to stage *ad infinitum*, —are not all these, in your opinion, necessary in order to carry out the work?

Critias/ We may fairly suppose such to be the case.

Socrates/ And if a man has food and drink and clothes and the other things which are useful to the body, would he need gold or silver or any other means by which he could procure that which he now has?

Critias/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ Then you consider that a man never wants any of these things for the use of the body?

Critias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And if they appear useless to this end, ought they not always to appear useless? For we have already laid

down the principle that things cannot be at one time useful and at another time not, in the same process.

Critias/ But in that respect your argument and mine are the same. For you maintain if they are useful to a certain end, they can never become useless; whereas I say that in order to accomplish some results bad things are needed, and good for others.

Socrates/ But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good purpose?

Critias/ I should say not.

Socrates/ And we call those actions good which a man does for the sake of virtue?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is imparted by word of mouth if he is wholly deprived of the sense of hearing?

Critias/ Certainly not, I think.

Socrates/ And will not hearing be useful for virtue, if virtue is taught by hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving instruction?

Critias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And since medicine frees the sick man from his disease, that art too may sometimes appear useful in the acquisition of virtue, e.g. when hearing is procured by the aid of medicine.

Critias/ Very likely.

Socrates/ But if, again, we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine, shall we not regard wealth as useful for virtue?

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ And also the instruments by which wealth is procured?

Critias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then you think that a man may gain wealth by bad and disgraceful means, and, having obtained the aid of medicine which enables him to acquire the power of hearing, may use that very faculty for the acquisition of virtue?

Critias/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ But can that which is evil be useful for virtue?

Critias/ No.

Socrates/ It is not therefore necessary that the means by which we obtain what is useful for a certain object should always be useful for the same object: for it seems that bad actions may sometimes serve good purposes? The matter will be still plainer if we look at it in this way: —If things are useful towards the several ends for which they exist, which ends would not come into existence without them, how would you regard them? Can ignorance, for instance, be useful for knowledge, or disease for health, or vice for virtue?

Critias/ Never.

Socrates/ And yet we have already agreed—have we not? —that there can be no knowledge where there has not previously been ignorance, nor health where there has not been disease, nor virtue where there has not been vice?

Critias/ I think that we have.

Socrates/ But then it would seem that the antecedents without which a thing cannot exist are not necessarily useful to it. Otherwise ignorance would appear useful for knowledge, disease for health, and vice for virtue.

Critias still showed great reluctance to accept any argument which went to prove that all these things were useless. I saw that it was as difficult to persuade him as (according to the proverb) it is to boil a stone, so I said: Let us bid 'good-bye' to the discussion, since we cannot agree whether these things are useful and a part of wealth or not. But what shall we say to another question: Which is the

happier and better man, —he who requires the greatest quantity of necessaries for body and diet, or he who requires only the fewest and least? The answer will perhaps become more obvious if we suppose someone, comparing the man himself at different times, to consider whether his condition is better when he is sick or when he is well?

Critias/ That is not a question which needs much consideration.

Socrates/ Probably, I said, everyone can understand that health is a better condition than disease. But when have we the greatest and the most various needs, when we are sick or when we are well?.

Critias/ When we are sick.

Socrates/ And when we are in the worst state we have the greatest and most especial need and desire of bodily pleasures?

Critias/ True.

Socrates/ And seeing that a man is best off when he is least in need of such things, does not the same reasoning apply to the case of any two persons, of whom one has many and great wants and desires, and the other few and moderate? For instance, some men are gamblers, some drunkards, and some gluttons: and gambling and the love of drink and greediness are all desires?

Critias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But desires are only the lack of something: and those who have the greatest desires are in a worse condition than those who have none or very slight ones?

Critias/ Certainly I consider that those who have such wants are bad, and that the greater their wants the worse they are.

Socrates/ And do we think it possible that a thing should be useful for a purpose unless we have need of it for that purpose?

Critias/ No.

Socrates/ Then if these things are useful for supplying the needs of the body, we must want them for that purpose?

Critias/ That is my opinion.

Socrates/ And he to whom the greatest number of things are useful for his purpose, will also want the greatest number of means of accomplishing it, supposing that we necessarily feel the want of all useful things?

Critias/ It seems so.

Socrates/ The argument proves then that he who has great riches has likewise need of many things for the supply of the wants of the body; for wealth appears useful towards that end. And the richest must be in the worst condition, since they seem to be most in want of such things.

Eryxias

Translated by Mark Joyal.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Eryxias, Critias, Erasistratus.

Socrates/ I happened to be strolling about in the Stoa of Zeus the Liberator with Eryxias, from the deme Stiria, when Critias and Erasistratus, the nephew of Phaeax (Erasistratus' son), came up to us. Erasistratus, it turned out, was just recently back from Sicily and other places nearby. When he came to me he said;

Erasistratus/ "Greetings, Socrates."

Socrates/ "The same to you." "Well now, anything worth reporting to us from Sicily?"

Erasistratus/ "Certainly. But would you care to sit down first? I walked from Megara yesterday and now I'm exhausted."

Socrates/ "By all means, if that's what you want."

Erasistratus/ "What would you like to hear first about the situation over there? What the Sicilians are up to, or what attitude they're taking towards our city? Personally, I think that in their feelings towards us they're like wasps. If you stir them up and get them angry just a little at a time they become unmanageable; you have to drive them out by attacking their nest. That's what the Syracusans are like. Unless we make it our business to go to their city with a very large force, there's no chance they will ever submit to us. Half-measures can only make them angrier, and then they'll be extremely hard to deal with. In fact they've just now sent envoys to us, and I think they intend to trick our city somehow."

Socrates/ While we were talking the Syracusan envoys happened to pass by. Erasistratus pointed to one of them and said;

Erasistratus/ "That man over there, Socrates, is the wealthiest in all Sicily and Italy. He must be, since he has such an enormous amount of land at his disposal that he could easily farm a huge tract if he wanted to. This land of his is unlike any other, in Greece at any rate. And he also has plenty of the other things that make you wealthy—slaves, horses, gold, and silver."

Socrates/ When I saw that he was getting ready to babble on about the man's possessions, I asked him, "But, Erasistratus, what sort of reputation does he have in Sicily?"

Erasistratus/ "People think that he's the wickedest of all the Sicilians and Italians, and he really is. He's even more wicked than he is wealthy, so if you wanted to ask any Sicilian who he thinks is the wickedest man, and who is the wealthiest, everyone will say the same thing: he is."

Socrates/ I thought that what Erasistratus was talking about was no small matter; on the contrary, it's what people consider to be of the very highest importance, namely virtue and wealth. So I asked him, "Who's wealthier, a man who has one talent of silver, or a man who has a field worth two talents?"

Erasistratus/ "The man with the field, I suppose."

Socrates/ "By the same argument, if someone had clothes or blankets or other things worth yet more than our Sicilian fellow's property, he would be wealthier." Erasistratus agreed. "And if someone were to give you a choice between these two, which would you want?"

Erasistratus/ "I would choose the most valuable of them."

Socrates/ "Do you think that choice would make you wealthier?"

Erasistratus/ “I do.”

Socrates/ “So as it stands we think that whoever possesses the most valuable things is the wealthiest person?”

Erasistratus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Then healthy people would be wealthier than sick people, since health is a more valuable possession than the sick man’s property. Everyone, at any rate, would prefer to be healthy and possess little money than to be sick and possess the Great King’s fortune, since they obviously believe that health is more valuable. After all, nobody would ever choose in favor of health unless he thought it was preferable to wealth.”

Erasistratus/ “Of course not.”

Socrates/ “Again, if something else should seem more valuable than health, the one who possessed this would be the wealthiest person.”

Erasistratus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And suppose someone were to come up to us now and ask, ‘Can you tell me, Socrates, Eryxias, and Erasistratus, what the most valuable possession for a person is? Is it the thing whose possession would enable him to make the best decisions about how he could most effectively manage both his own affairs and those of his friends?’ What would we say this thing is?”

Erasistratus/ “In my view, Socrates, prosperity is a person’s most valuable possession.”

Socrates/ “That’s not a bad answer at all. But would we consider the most prosperous people in the world to be the most successful?”

Erasistratus/ “Yes, I believe so.”

Socrates/ “And wouldn’t the most successful people be the ones who make the fewest errors in handling their own affairs and those of others, while doing the most things right?”

Erasistratus/ “Exactly.”

Socrates/ “So those who know what’s bad and what’s good, and what a person should and shouldn’t do, would have the greatest success and make the fewest errors?” Erasistratus accepted this too. “As it is, then, the same men are apparently the wisest, the most successful, the most prosperous, and the wealthiest, since it turns out that wisdom is the most valuable possession.”

Erasistratus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ Eryxias interrupted:

Eryxias/ “But Socrates, how could it be any advantage to this person if he were wiser than Nestor but didn’t have the things he needed for day to day living—food, drink, clothing, and other things of that kind? What help could wisdom be? How could he be the wealthiest, since he might as well be a beggar if he has none of the basic necessities?”

Socrates/ I thought that Eryxias made a lot of sense, and answered, “But would this happen to the person who possessed wisdom but lacked these necessities? And if someone possessed the house of Poulytion, and it was full of gold and silver, would he need nothing?”

Eryxias/ “Why yes! He might very well sell his possessions at once and obtain in exchange whatever he actually needed for his day to day existence, or even spend hard currency, in exchange for which he could acquire those items and then have a good supply of everything right away.”

Socrates/ “True—provided that the other people actually wanted a house like Poulytion’s more than our friend’s wisdom. And yet if they were the sort of people who put greater stock in the man’s wisdom and what it produces, the wise man

would be able to sell it much more easily, if it was the case that he needed and wanted to sell it and its products. Do people actually feel such a powerful compulsion to have the use of a house, and does it make such a great difference in a person's life to live in a house like Poulytion's rather than in a small and humble dwelling, while the use of wisdom has little value, and it doesn't make much difference whether a person is wise or ignorant in things that really matter? Do people despise wisdom and refuse to pay for it, and are there many who need and want to purchase the cypress wood in Poulytion's house and marble from Mt. Pentelicon? At any rate, if a person were a navigator or a doctor skilled at his profession, or were able to have a successful practice in some other profession along those lines, he would be valued more highly than everyone of the greatest material possessions. And what about the person who can offer good advice about how to achieve success, both for himself and for someone else—wouldn't he be able to sell this skill, if that's what he wanted to do?"

Eryxias broke in, looking annoyed as though someone had done something wrong to him:

Eryxias/ "If you had to tell the truth, Socrates, would you really claim that you're wealthier than Callias, the son of Hipponicus? I'm sure you'd agree that you're no less intelligent in all the most important things, indeed wiser; but that hasn't made you any wealthier."

Socrates/ "Maybe, Eryxias, you think these arguments we're now discussing are just a game, since, as you suppose, they have no reality, like pieces in backgammon which you can move to gain an advantage over your opponents so that they have no move they can make to counter yours. Now maybe with regard to wealth, too, you think that the true situation is no more one way than another, and that some arguments are of the same kind, no more true than false. If a

person offered these arguments he could get the better of his opponents in claiming that the wisest are in our view also the wealthiest, even though what he was saying was false while his opponents were speaking the truth. Perhaps this isn't surprising; it's as if two men were talking about letters: one claims that the name 'Socrates' begins with an 'S,' the other that it begins with an 'A'; and the argument that the name begins with an 'A' proves stronger than the argument that it begins with an 'S'."

Eryxias cast a glance around at the people who were there, laughing and blushing as though he had not been present at the earliest discussions, and said:

Eryxias/ "Socrates, I thought that our arguments shouldn't be the kind that can't persuade any of the people here and provide some benefit to them. Who in his right mind could ever be persuaded that the wisest are the wealthiest? What we should be discussing, since we're talking about wealth, is under what conditions it's an admirable thing to be wealthy and under what conditions it's a disgraceful thing, and just what kind of thing wealth is, whether it's good or bad."

Socrates/ "All right, I'll be careful from now on; and thank you for your good advice. But since you're introducing the problem, why don't you venture to tell us yourself whether you consider it good or bad to be wealthy? —especially since you don't think that our earlier arguments dealt with this subject."

Eryxias/ "Well then, I think it's good to be wealthy."

Socrates/ He wanted to go on speaking, but Critias interrupted and said:

Critias/ "Tell me, Eryxias, do you consider it a good thing to be wealthy?"

Eryxias/ "I certainly do. I'd be crazy if I didn't; and I'm sure the whole world would agree with me about this."

Critias/ “But I also think I could convince everybody that for some people, being wealthy is a bad thing. Yet if it really were good, it wouldn’t appear bad to some of us.”

Socrates/ Then I said to them: “If the two of you couldn’t agree over who is the greater authority on expert horsemanship, and I happened to know about horses, I'd try to put a stop to your quarrel. After all, I'd be ashamed if I were there and didn’t do all I could to prevent your quarrelling; likewise if you couldn’t agree about anything else at all and were likely to go away as enemies instead of friends unless you came to an understanding. But as it is your disagreement is over something which you’re bound to deal with throughout your whole life, and it makes a big difference whether you should consider it useful or not. What’s more, the Greeks don’t think it’s any ordinary thing; they hold it in the highest regard—at any rate, that’s why the first thing that fathers advise their sons to consider, as soon as they think their sons have reached the age when they have their wits about them, is how they will become wealthy, since a man who has possessions is worth something, but one who doesn’t is worthless. Now if this is taken so seriously, and you see eye to eye on other things but differ over such an important matter—on top of that, not over whether wealth is black or white, or light or heavy, but whether it’s good or bad—that you actually become the worst of enemies if you argue over what’s good and what’s bad, even though you’re really the closest friends and relatives—well, as far as I can, I’m not going to ignore you while you’re carrying on your argument. If I could explain the situation to you and put a stop to your dispute, I would. But in fact, since I can’t do that, and since each of you thinks he can make the other agree with him, I’m ready to help you all I can to come to an agreement about wealth. So try to make us agree with you, Critias, as you had undertaken to do.”

Critias/ “As I intended, I'd like to ask Eryxias if he thinks there are just and unjust people.”

Eryxias/ “I most certainly do.”

Critias/ “Then do you think injustice is a good thing or a bad thing?”

Eryxias/ “A bad thing.”

Critias/ “Do you think a man would be behaving unjustly or not if he were to pay money to commit adultery with his neighbor’s wife, when in fact both the city and its laws forbid it?”

Eryxias/ “To my mind he would be acting unjustly.”

Critias/ “So if the unjust man who wanted to do this were wealthy and able to spend money on it, he would commit the crime. But if he weren’t wealthy and didn’t have the resources to spend, he simply wouldn’t be able to carry out what he wanted; and then there’ be no crime at all. It follows that this man would be better off if he weren’t wealthy, since he would have less chance of carrying out what he wanted when what he wanted was wrong.

“And here’s something else: would you say that being sick is bad or good?”

Eryxias/ “Bad.”

Critias/ “Now then, do you think that some people are weak-willed?”

Eryxias/ “Yes.”

Critias/ “Then if it were better for the weak-willed person’s health to stay away from food, drink, and the other things that people regard as pleasurable, but he wasn’t able to do this because of his weakness, would it be better for him if he didn’t have the means to acquire them, rather than if he had a superabundance of what he needed? For in that case he

wouldn't have the opportunity to go wrong, no matter how much he wanted to."

Socrates/ I was thinking that Critias had conducted this conversation so effectively that if it weren't for the embarrassment Eryxias was feeling in front of everyone there, he might very well have stood up and hit Critias. Eryxias thought that something important had been taken from him, since it had become apparent to him that his earlier opinions about wealth were wrong. I realized that he was feeling like this and was worried that it might lead to insults and antagonism, so I said: "Just a couple of days ago this very argument was being used in the Lyceum by a wise man named Prodicus, from Ceos. The people who were there thought he was talking such nonsense that he couldn't convince any of them that he was speaking the truth. As a matter of fact a very outspoken young man came up and sat beside Prodicus. He began to laugh and jeer at him and provoke him; he wanted Prodicus to explain what he was saying. What's more, his standing among the audience was much higher than Prodicus'."

Erasistratus/ "Would you like to give us a report of the conversation?"

Socrates/ "By all means, provided I can remember it. I think it went something like this.

"The young man asked him in what respect he thought wealth was bad and in what respect good. Prodicus responded as you did just now: 'It's good for gentlemen, the people who know in what situations they should use their property; but it's bad for those who are wicked and ignorant. The situation is the same with everything else as well: the nature of the things people deal in inevitably reflects the people themselves. I think that Archilochus' poem said it well: "Men's thoughts are like the things they encounter."'

"'In that case,' the young man said, 'suppose someone were to make me skilled in the same thing that good men are skilled in. He's bound at the same time to make everything else good for me as well. Yet that wasn't the point of his efforts, since he was concentrating on the thing at which he has made me skilled rather than ignorant. It's as if someone now were to make me skilled in letters: he would necessarily make the other things that have to do with letters good for me; and likewise with music too. It's the same story when he makes me good: inevitably he's made the other things good for me too.'

"To these analogies Prodicus didn't offer his agreement, yet he went along with the young man's initial remark.

"'Do you think,' the young man said, 'that doing good things is just like building a house, that it's the work of human hands? Or do things have to go on being the very same as they were at the outset, whether bad or good?'

"Prodicus, I think, was now suspicious about where their argument was headed. So to avoid being defeated by the young man in full view of everyone who was there—though he thought it made no difference if this happened while they were alone—he gave a very shrewd response, that doing good things is the work of human hands.

"'Do you think,' the young man said, 'that excellence can be taught, or is it innate?'

"I believe it can be taught." Prodicus said.

"'Do you think a person would be foolish if he supposed that by praying to the gods he could become skilled in letters or music or could gain some other expertise, which he could only possess by learning from another person or by finding it out for himself?'

"'Yes, I do.'

"'So, Prodicus,' the young man said, 'whenever you pray to the gods for success and good things, you're praying on those occasions for nothing other than to become a gentleman, since it's the case that things are actually good for gentlemen, but bad for mediocre people. But if excellence really can be taught, it would appear that you're praying for nothing other than to be taught what you don't know.'

"I told Prodicus that I thought he was under a serious delusion if it turned out that he was wrong in supposing that we receive from the gods what we pray for at the same time that we pray for it. 'Although you sometimes hurry to the Acropolis and pray to the gods and beg them to give you good things, you don't know that they can give you what you're begging for. It's the same as if you were to go to the doors of a schoolteacher and implore him to give you skill in letters without any effort on your part, so that after you had received it you too would immediately be able to do the work that a schoolteacher does.'

"While I was saying this Prodicus, annoyed that his prayers to the gods might appear useless, began to go after the young man in order to defend himself; he meant to offer the same arguments that you did a moment ago. But then the supervisor of the gymnasium came up and told him to leave. He thought that Prodicus' discussions weren't suitable for young ears, and if they weren't suitable, they must be wicked.

Socrates/ "The reason I've recounted this is so that you may observe how people feel about philosophy. If Prodicus were here arguing as he was, you would all think he was so mad that he should even be expelled from the gymnasium, whereas just now you seem to have conducted your argument so extremely well, Critias, that you not only convinced everyone here but also made your opponent agree with you. It's clearly like the situation in lawcourts: if two people were to offer the same testimony—one with the reputation of a

gentleman, the other of a wicked man—the jurors would remain unconvinced by the wicked man's testimony, but might possibly even do the opposite to what he wanted. But if the one who had the reputation of a gentleman were to say the same things, his words would be judged to be absolutely true. Perhaps the attitude your listeners have taken towards you and Prodicus is like this. They thought that Prodicus was a sophist and a charlatan, but they think you are an important man who is involved in the affairs of our city. They also believe that they should not concentrate on the argument itself but rather on the character of the people who are arguing."

Erasistratus/ "Why, Socrates, you may not be serious about what you're saying, but in my opinion Critias is clearly on to something important."

Socrates/ "Rest assured I'm absolutely serious. But since the two of you carried on your discussion so effectively, why not put the final touch on it as well? I think there's something left for you to investigate, since there seemed to be agreement at least on the point that wealth is good for some and bad for others. All that's left now is to examine what wealth itself is; unless you first determine this you won't even be able to reach an agreement on whether it's bad or good. I'm ready to give you as much help as I can to complete your investigation, so it's up to the one who claims that wealth is good to explain his position to us."

Erasistratus/ "My own opinion about wealth is no different from everyone else's: wealth is the possession of a lot of property. And I'm sure that Critias here also has the same opinion about wealth."

Socrates/ "In that case, then, you would still be left to consider what property is in order to avoid the appearance a bit later of arguing about this all over again. Let me illustrate this with the Carthaginians, who use the following kind of

currency. In a small piece of leather something roughly the size of a stater is tied up, but no one knows what this is except the people who did the tying. Then when this is sealed they put it into circulation, and the person who has the largest number of these is considered to have the most property and to be the wealthiest. Yet if any Greek had a tremendous amount of this currency, he wouldn't be any wealthier than if he had a lot of pebbles which he took from the hill. In Lacedaemon they put iron into circulation according to weight, and what's more, the useless kind. The person who has a large weight of this kind of iron is considered wealthy, yet elsewhere such a possession is worthless. In Ethiopia they use engraved stones which a Lacedaemonian would find useless. And among the Scythian nomads anyone who possessed the house of Poulytion would be considered no wealthier than an owner of Mount Lycabettus would be considered by us.

"So clearly, each of these things cannot be property since some of the people who possess them seem no wealthier because of it. Yet each of them really is property for some people, and these people are wealthy because of their possession of it; but for others neither is it property nor does it make them wealthier. Likewise the same things are not beautiful and ugly to everybody, but rather different things strike different people in different ways.

"If, then, we should wish to investigate why it is that houses are not property in the eyes of the Scythians but they are to us, or why leather is property to the Carthaginians but not to us, or why iron is property to the Lacedaemonians but not to us, wouldn't our findings be precisely like that? Let me elaborate. Suppose someone in Athens had a thousand talents in weight of the stones found in the marketplace. Since we have no use for these stones, is there any reason why we should consider him any wealthier because he has them?"

Erasistratus/ “Apparently not.”

Socrates/ “But suppose he had the same weight of lychnite, would we say that he was in fact very wealthy?”

Erasistratus/ “Of course.”

Socrates/ “Is it because the one thing is useful to us while the other is useless?”

Erasistratus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And that’s also why among the Scythians houses are not property, because the Scythians have no use for a house; nor would a Scythian prefer the finest house over a heavy leather coat, since the one thing is useful to him while the other isn’t. Again, we don’t think that the Carthaginian coinage is property, since we couldn’t possibly obtain from it what we need, as we do with silver; therefore it would be useless to us.”

Erasistratus/ “Fair enough.”

Socrates/ “It follows that everything that turns out to be useful to us is property, while everything useless is not.”

In response to this Eryxias said:

Eryxias/ “How can that be, Socrates? When we’re dealing with one another don’t we engage in talking and looking and many other things? Would we consider these property? They do seem useful. But even so we haven’t gained an impression of what property is. Everyone has pretty well agreed that something must be useful if it’s going to be property, but since not all useful things are property, what kinds of useful things are?”

Socrates/ “What if we were to pursue the question again through a comparison with drugs, which were invented for ending illnesses? Would we have a better chance of finding what we’re looking for, namely, what it is that we treat as property and for what purpose the possession of property was

invented? Possibly that approach would make it clearer to us. Now it appears that everything which is property must also be useful, and that what we call property is a species of these useful things. Therefore what we still have to do is consider for what use property is useful to use. For instance, all things which we use for work are useful, of course, just as all things that have life are animals, but of these animals we call one species man. Now suppose someone were to ask us what would have to be done away with so that we wouldn't need medicine or medical instruments. Our response would be, if illnesses were removed from the body and didn't occur at all, or if they were removed as soon as they did occur. Therefore it seems that medicine is the science which is useful for removing illnesses. "But if someone were then to ask us what would have to be removed so that we wouldn't need property, would we have an answer? If we don't, let's start over again along these lines: if a person could live without food and drink, and not go hungry or thirsty, what need would he have of these things, or of money or anything else to provide himself with them?"

Eryxias/ "None, I suppose."

Socrates/ "It's the same with other things, too. If we had no need of the things that we presently require to take care of our bodies, heat and cold for instance, and everything else too which the body lacks but requires, then what passes for property would be useless to us, since no one would have any need at all of the things for whose sake we want property. The result for us would be satisfaction, as far as the persistent desires and needs of the body are concerned. So if it's to care for the body's needs that the possession of property is useful, and if these needs were taken out of our way, we wouldn't have any need for property, and property might not even exist at all."

Eryxias/ "It looks like it."

Socrates/ “Then the things which are useful for that business appear to us, I suppose, to be property.”

Eryxias agreed with this, but he was becoming seriously confused by the argument.

Socrates/ “What about this way of looking at it? Would we say that the same thing can be sometimes useful, but sometimes useless, for one specific purpose?”

Eryxias/ “No, I don’t think so. Instead, if we were to have any need of the thing for that one purpose, then I do think it’s useful, but if we don’t, then it isn’t.”

Socrates/ “So if we were able to make a gold statue without using fire, we wouldn’t have any need of fire for that purpose. And if we didn’t have any need of fire, it wouldn’t be useful to us either. The same argument applies to other things as well.”

Eryxias/ “It seems so.”

Socrates/ “And so it would appear that whatever isn’t needed when something is being done is also not useful to us in that particular case.”

Eryxias/ “That’s right.”

Socrates/ “Then if it should turn out one day that we were able to put an end to the body’s needs so that it no longer had any, and we could do this without silver, gold, and other things of that kind which we don’t actually use for the body (in the way that we use food, drink, clothing, blankets and houses), then it would appear that silver, gold, and other such things wouldn’t even be useful to us for this particular purpose, provided that the body’s needs can one day be removed without using them.”

Eryxias/ “You’re right.”

Socrates/ “Then it would appear that these things aren’t property to us either if they aren’t useful, though they would be things which enable us to obtain what is useful.”

Eryxias/ “Socrates, I could never be convinced that gold, silver, and other things like them are not property, as you say. I’m certainly convinced that the things which are useless to us are not property, and that property ranks among the most useful things besides. But I’m not persuaded that these things are not actually useful to us for living, since we can obtain what we require by means of them.”

Socrates/ “Come on then, what would we say to this? Are there any teachers of music, letters, or some other skill, who obtain what they require for themselves by receiving compensation in return for their teaching?”

Eryxias/ “There are.”

Socrates/ “So it’s with this skill of theirs that these people can obtain what they require, by receiving something in return for that skill in the same way that we receive things in return for gold and silver.”

Eryxias/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “But if it’s with this that they obtain what they use for living, then it would actually be useful in itself for living. We did say, didn’t we, that property is useful because with it we’re able to obtain what we require for the body?”

Eryxias/ “Yes we did.”

Socrates/ “So if these skills are classified as useful for this purpose, then it appears they are property, for the same reason that gold and silver are property. It’s clear too that those who possess these skills are wealthier. Yet a little earlier we were having a lot of trouble accepting the argument that these are the wealthiest people. Based on the agreement we’ve just reached, however, it would have to follow that the more skillful are sometimes wealthier. For instance, if someone were to ask us whether we thought a horse is useful to everybody, wouldn’t you answer that it’s useful to those who know how to use a horse, but not to those who don’t?”

Eryxias/ “I would.”

Socrates/ “And by the same argument medicine also isn’t useful to everybody, but only to the person who knows how to use it?”

Eryxias/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Is it the same with everything else too?”

Eryxias/ “Apparently.”

Socrates/ “Then gold, silver, and the other things generally regarded as property would be useful only to the one who knows how they should be used?”

Eryxias/ “Right.”

Socrates/ “Now weren’t we under the impression earlier that it took a gentleman to know when and how to use each of these things?”

Eryxias/ “We were.”

Socrates/ “Then these things would be useful only to gentlemen, since they’re the ones who know how they should be used. But if these are useful only to them, then to them alone, it seems, would these things be property. It appears, moreover, that if someone were to take a person who knew nothing about riding a horse and who owned horses which were useless to him, and then made him knowledgeable about horses, he would have made him at the same time wealthier too, since he has taken what was previously useless to this man and made it useful. For by giving the man some knowledge he’s instantly made him wealthy.”

Eryxias/ “It seems so.”

Socrates/ “And yet I’m sure I could also swear on Critias’ behalf that he’s not convinced by any of these arguments.”

Critias/ “I’m certainly not. In fact I'd be crazy if I were. But go on and finish your argument that the things generally accepted as money—silver, gold, and other such things—are

not property. You can't imagine how much I admire these arguments of yours as I'm listening to you relate them right now."

Socrates/ "I think, Critias, that you enjoy listening to me in the same way that you enjoy listening to the rhapsodes who sing Homer's poems: you don't think a word of it is true. But come on, what would we say to this? Would you say that some things are useful for house-builders when they are constructing a house?"

Critias/ "Yes, I think so."

Socrates/ "Would we say that those things are useful which they use for this construction—stones, bricks, boards, and that kind of thing? Or are these things also useful, the tools they used to build the house and with which they provided themselves with the boards and the stones, and likewise the tools for these tools?"

Critias/ "I suppose that all the things involved in the operation are useful."

Socrates/ "Isn't this the case with all other activities? Not only are these things themselves useful which we use for each of our tasks, but also those by which we acquire these things and without which our work couldn't be done?"

Critias/ "Exactly."

Socrates/ "Then likewise the things with which these last things were made, and anything that came before them, and, again, the things with which these were made, and once more the things that preceded them, on and on endlessly—do all these things inevitably appear useful for the production of our work?"

Critias/ "Yes, that might well be the case."

Socrates/ "Now what if a person possessed food, drink, clothing, and whatever else he's likely to use for his body, would he have any additional need for gold, silver, or anything

else with which to acquire them, seeing that he already possesses them?"

Critias/ "I doubt it."

Socrates/ "Do you suppose a situation could occur when a man would need none of these things for the use of his body?"

Critias/ "No, I don't."

Socrates/ "Now if these things were to appear useless for this purpose, wouldn't it follow that they can never appear useful? After all it was a basis of our discussion that things could not be sometimes useful, but sometimes useless, for one specific purpose."

Critias/ "Well, in that respect, at least, our arguments may be in agreement: if these things should ever be useful for this purpose, they would never turn out also to be useless. As it is, for doing certain things…

Socrates/ …some for doing wicked things, others for doing good things?"

Critias/ "Yes, I would say so."

Socrates/ "Can something wicked be useful for the purpose of doing something good?"

Critias/ "No, I don't think so."

Socrates/ "Would we say that those acts are good which a person performs virtuously?"

Critias/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "Can a person learn anything which is taught orally, if he's completely deprived of his ability to hear somebody else?"

Critias/ "No, by Zeus, I don't think so."

Socrates/ "So it would appear that hearing is to be classified as useful for virtue, since virtue can be taught through the sense of hearing and we make use of this sense for learning."

Critias/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Since medicine can put an end to a person’s illness, it seems that sometimes medicine also may be classified as useful for virtue, if a person can acquire the sense of hearing through medicine.”

Critias/ “That may be so.”

Socrates/ “And again, if we were to obtain medicine in exchange for property, property would obviously be useful for virtue too.”

Critias/ “Yes, that’s quite true.”

Socrates/ “Likewise also the means by which we obtain the property?”

Critias/ “Absolutely.”

Socrates/ “Do you suppose that a person could obtain money by wicked and disgraceful means, and in return get hold of the medical knowledge by which he would be able to hear after having been unable to hear, and that he could make use of that same ability for excellence or for other things of a similar kind?”

Critias/ “I certainly think so.”

Socrates/ “Surely nothing wicked could be useful for virtue.”

Critias/ “No, it couldn’t.”

Socrates/ “Then those things by which we obtain what is useful for one purpose or another are not necessarily also useful for that same purpose. Otherwise bad things would sometimes appear to be useful for a good purpose. Perhaps this will make it clearer. If things are useful for one purpose or another, and this purpose couldn’t come into existence unless those things existed beforehand, tell me, what would you say about that? Can ignorance be useful for knowledge, or sickness for health, or wickedness for virtue?”

Critias/ “I don’t think so.”

Socrates/ “Yet on this we would agree, that knowledge can’t belong to a person if ignorance didn’t exist in him beforehand, that health can’t belong to him if sickness didn’t exist in him beforehand, and that excellence can’t belong to him if wickedness didn’t exist in him beforehand.”

Critias/ “Yes, I suppose we would.”

Socrates/ “Then it would appear that those things which are required for the creation of something else are not necessarily also useful for that thing. Otherwise it would seem that ignorance is useful for knowledge, sickness for health, and wickedness for virtue.”

Critias was finding it very hard to go along with these arguments, that not everything we had mentioned could be property. When I realized that it would be—as the saying goes—as easy to persuade him as it is to boil a stone, I said: “Let’s forget about those arguments, since we can’t agree whether or not useful things and property are the same. But what would we say about this? Would we consider a person to be more prosperous and better if his physical requirements and his requirements for day to day living were extremely numerous, or if they were as few and simple as possible? Maybe the best way to look at it would be to compare the person with himself by considering whether his condition is better when he is sick or when he is healthy.”

Critias/ “We certainly don’t have to consider that for very long.”

Socrates/ “No doubt it’s because everybody easily recognizes that the healthy person’s condition is superior to the sick person’s. Now then, in what circumstance would we have a greater need for all kinds of things, when we’re ill or when we’re healthy?”

Critias/ “When we’re ill.”

Socrates/ “So it’s when we’re in the worst condition that we have the most powerful and most numerous desires and needs, as far as physical pleasures are concerned?”

Critias/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And just as a person is in the best condition when he himself has the fewest requirements of that kind, can the same reasoning apply to two people, where one’s desires and needs are powerful and numerous, while the others are few and gentle? For example, consider anybody at all who is a gambler, or a drunkard, or else a glutton—all such conditions amount to nothing but desires.”

Critias/ “Exactly.”

Socrates/ “But all these desires are nothing but the need for something; and those who have the greatest needs are in a worse condition than those who have no needs at all or as few as possible.”

Critias/ “As far as I’m concerned, people like that are certainly in a very bad state; the more they need the worse off they are.”

Socrates/ “And so do we think that things can’t be useful for some purpose unless we need them for that purpose?”

Critias/ “That’s right.”

Socrates/ “Then if we suppose that these things are useful for taking care of the body’s needs, mustn’t we also require them for this purpose?”

Critias/ “I think so.”

Socrates/ “So the person who possesses the largest number of useful things for this purpose would also appear to require the largest number of things for this purpose, since he’s bound to require all the things that are useful.”

Critias/ “That’s how it seems to me.”

Socrates/ “According to this argument, at least, it appears that those who have a lot of property must also need many of the things required to take care of the body, since property was seen as useful for this purpose. So the wealthiest people would necessarily appear to us to be in the worst condition, since they are in need of the greatest number of these things.”

Euthydemus.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Crito, Socrates, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus,
Clinias, Ctesippus.

Crito/ Who was he, Socrates, with whom you were conversing yesterday in the Lyceum? where so great a crowd stood around you, that though I approached, desirous to hear, I could hear nothing clearly. However, leaning over I looked down, and it seemed to me that it was a stranger with whom you were conversing. Who was he?

Socrates/ About which of them, Crito, are you inquiring? for there was not one, but two.

Crito/ He whom I mean, sat the third from you on your right hand; but in the midst of you was a youth, the son of Axiochus, who appeared to me, Socrates, to have made a great progress, and does not differ much in age from our Critobulus; though that one is weazen-faced, but this one lanky but of a fair and engaging aspect.

Socrates/ This is Euthydemus, Crito, about whom you are inquiring: but he who sat by me, on my left hand, was his brother Dionysodorus, who also partook of the discourse.

Crito/ I know neither of them, Socrates.

Socrates/ They are some new wisdom-mongers, as it appears.

Crito/ Whence do they come; and what is their wisdom?

Socrates/ They are of a race somewhere hence, I think of Chius; but they migrated to Thurii, and having fled from thence, are dwelling for many years about these parts. But

as to your inquiry respecting their wisdom, it is wonderful, Crito; they are indeed all-wise. Since even I have not hitherto known they were pancratiasts: for they are skilled in every kind of contest; not after the manner of the brother pancratiasts of Acarnania; for these are able to contend with their body alone; but those, in the first place, are most powerful in body, and excel in the contest, which consists in vanquishing all men. For they are very skillful themselves in contending with their weapons, and they know how to impart their skill to any other person who will pay them. In the next place they are most powerful in judicial contests, and are able both to contend themselves, and instruct others, to speak and write speeches suited for courts of justice. Formerly they were terrible in these things alone; but now they have put a finish to their pancratiastic art; for the kind of contest, which was left by them undone, they have now completed, so that no one is able to lift a hand against them; so skillful have they become in verbal contests, and in confuting whatever happens to be said, whether it be true or false. I have a mind therefore, Crito, to put myself under these men; for they say that in a short time they can make any other person whatever skilled in the very same things.

Crito/ But fear you not, Socrates, for your age, that you are already too old?

Socrates/ By no means, Crito, as I have a sufficient argument and consolation against fear. For these very men, so to say, have, though old, begun the study of this wisdom, which I am longing for, in the art of contending. For last year, or the year before last, they were not wise in the least. But of one thing only I am afraid, lest I should bring disgrace upon these strangers, as I do upon the harper Connus, the son of Metrobius, who teaches me even now to play on the harp, The boys, therefore, who are my school-fellows, on seeing me, laugh, and call Connus the teacher of old men.

Lest therefore someone should reproach these strangers with the very same thing, and they, dreading this, should be unwilling to receive me, I have, Crito, persuaded other old men to go thither as my school-fellows; and here also I will endeavor to persuade others; and do you frequent the school with us. Perhaps too, as an allurement, we may bring your sons to them; for having a hankering after them, they will, I know, instruct even us.

Crito/ There is nothing to hinder us, Socrates, if it seems good to you. But first tell me what is the wisdom of these men, that I may know what it is we shall learn.

Socrates/ You shall quickly hear, since I cannot say that I did not attend to them; for I paid great attention, and very well remember what they said; and I will endeavor to relate the whole to you from the beginning. For, by some act of a god, I had seated myself alone in the Apodyterium where you saw me: and I had it just in my mind to rise up; but as I was rising up, there was the accustomed signal of my Genius. I therefore sat down again; and soon after those two, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, entered, and with them many others, disciples, it seemed to me; and having entered, they sauntered about in the covered course of the gymnasium. But they had not yet gone two or three rounds, when Clinias entered, who you say, and say truly, has made a great progress. Behind him there were many others his lovers, and Ctesippus too, a youth of the district of Paganea, very beautiful and good naturally, except that he was saucy in consequence of his youth. Clinias, therefore, seeing me from the entrance sitting alone, came straight towards me, and sat down on my right hand, as you say. And Dionysodorus and Euthydemus perceiving him, at first stopped and conversed with each other, looking at us on this side and on that for I beheld them very attentively and then advancing, they sat down, Euthydemus by the youth, and

the other Dionysodorus by me, on my left hand. The rest seated themselves just as each happened to do. These therefore I embraced, not having seen them for some time.

After this, I said to Clinias, These men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, O Clinias, are wise not in small but in great things. For they know everything pertaining to war, and whatever he, who would be a good general, ought to know, the arrangement and management of encampments, and whatever is to be taught for engaging with weapons; and they know too how to render a person able to assist himself in courts of justice, when anyone injures him. For thus speaking, however, I was held in contempt by them; and both therefore laughed, looking at each other.

Euthydemus/ We no longer engage in these matters as being serious, Socrates, but as of secondary moment.

Socrates/ And I being astonished said, Your serious studies must indeed be beautiful, if such great affairs are of secondary moment with you. Now by the gods inform me, what is this beautiful study of yours.

Euthydemus/ We think, Socrates, that we are able of all men to teach virtue in the best and quickest manner.

Socrates/ O Zeus! what a mighty thing are you telling! From whence did you get this windfall? I had hitherto conceived of you, for the most part, as I just now said, that you were very skillful in this, to fight in arms; and this I have said respecting you. For when you first tarried here, I remember, you publicly boasted of this. But now, if in reality you possess this science, may you be propitious. For I invoke you, as if you were gods, entreating you to pardon what I have before said. But see, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, if you have boasted truly: for it is by no means wonderful, from the magnitude of the boast, that a person should disbelieve.

Euthydemus/ Rest assured, Socrates, that it is so.

Socrates/ I therefore consider you much more blessed in this possession, than is the great king in his empire. But tell me thus much, whether you intend to exhibit this wisdom? or how have you determined?

Euthydemus/ We are here, Socrates, for this very purpose, as being about to exhibit and to teach, if anyone is willing to learn.

Socrates/ But that all, who do not possess wisdom, will be willing to learn, I am a guarantee: first, I myself am willing, and next, Clinias here; and in addition to us, Ctesippus and all the rest here

—I pointed out to him the lovers of Clinias, who happened to be standing round us: for Ctesippus at that time was sitting at a distance from Clinias. And as it seemed to me, Euthydemus, while he was discoursing with me, did by his stooping forward darken Ctesippus' view of Clinias, who was seated in the middle of us. Ctesippus therefore wishing to see his boy-love, and at the same time curious to hear, was the first to leap up, and stood directly opposite to me. Thus too the rest, when they saw him do so, stood around us, both the lovers of Clinias, and the friends of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. I therefore, pointing them out to Euthydemus, informed him they were all ready to learn. And Ctesippus and the rest very readily assented; and all of them in common exhorted him to exhibit the power of his wisdom.

I therefore said, Do, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, by all means gratify these persons, and exhibit your wisdom for my sake. Now to demonstrate the most of the things pertaining to this subject will, it is evident, be no small labor; but tell me this, whether you are able to make him alone a good man, who is already persuaded that he ought to be instructed by you, or him also, who is not yet persuaded,

through his not believing that virtue is a thing to be learnt, or that you are the teachers of it. Come then, say, is it the business of the same art, to persuade a man thus affected, that virtue may be taught, and that you are the persons from whom one could learn it the best; or is it of another?

Dionysodorus/ It is the business, Socrates, of the very same art.

Socrates/ You therefore, Dionysodorus, can, the best of all men now existing, exhort to philosophy and the study of virtue.

Dionysodorus/ We think we can, Socrates.

Socrates/ Of other things put off, for another time the exhibition, but show us this now. Persuade this youth that he ought to philosophize, and study virtue; and gratify me, and all these here. For this has happened to him, that both I, and all these, are desirous for him to become the best of men. He is the son of Axiochus, who is descended from the Alcibiades of olden times, and the cousin of now-living Alcibiades; and his name is Clinias. But he is still young, and we have a fear about him, as is reasonable in the case of a youth, lest someone should anticipate us, and by turning his mind to some other pursuit, corrupt it. You are therefore come most opportunely; and, if it makes no difference to you, make a trial of the youth and converse with him before us.

When I had thus spoken nearly these very words, Euthydemus replied with courage, and even with confidence;

Euthydemus/ It makes no difference, Socrates, if the youth is but willing to answer.

Socrates/ Nay, he is accustomed to do this. For frequently do these coming ask many questions of, and discourse much with him, so that he is sufficiently bold to answer.

But how, O Crito, shall I narrate to you correctly what occurred after this? For it is no trifling labor to be able to take up and go through wisdom so boundless. So that I am compelled, as poets are, in beginning the tale, to invoke the Muses and Mnemosyne. Euthydemus, then, began, I think, after some such manner.

Euthydemus/ Whether, O Clinias, are the men who learn, the wise or the unwise?

Socrates/ But the youth, through the greatness of the question, blushed, and being at a loss, looked at me. And I, perceiving he was flurried, said, Cheer up, Clinias, and answer boldly whatever seems good to you; for perhaps you will be benefited to the greatest extent. Whereupon Dionysodorus, bending a little towards my ear, and with a smile on his countenance, said;

Dionysodorus/ I tell you beforehand, Socrates, that in whatever manner the youth may answer, he will be confuted.

Socrates/ While he was thus speaking, Clinias happened to give an answer, so that it was not possible for me to exhort the youth to be on his guard.

And he answered, that;

Clinias/ the wise are those who learn.

Euthydemus/ Do you call certain persons teachers, or not?

Socrates/ He admitted he did.

Euthydemus/ Are not then teachers the teachers of those that learn? As, for instance, a harper and a grammarian were the teachers of you and other boys, and you were their disciples.

Socrates/ He assented.

Euthydemus/ When you learned, therefore, you did not know what you were learning.

Clinias/ I did not.

Euthydemus/ Were you then wise, when you were ignorant of these things?

Clinias/ By no means.

Euthydemus/ If then you were not wise, you were ignorant?

Clinias/ Entirely.

Euthydemus/ You then, when learning what you did not know, learned them as being ignorant?

Socrates/ The youth nodded assent.

Euthydemus/ The ignorant therefore learn, O Clinias, and not the wise, as you think.

Socrates/ On his saying this, the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, just like a chorus on a signal given by the ballet-master, made a great uproar and laughed. And before the youth could recover his breath, Dionysodorus, taking him up, said well and cleverly

Dionysodorus/ But, Clinias, when the grammarian says anything by word of mouth, are the boys who learn what he so gives out, the wise or the unwise?

Clinias/ The wise.

Dionysodorus/ The wise therefore learn, and not the ignorant; and you did not rightly just now answer Euthydemus.

Socrates/ On this, the admirers of these men laughed very loudly and made an uproar, struck with their wisdom; but the rest of us were amazed and remained silent. Euthydemus, therefore, perceiving our amazement, that we might yet still more wonder at him, did not let the lad go, but kept interrogating him; and, like skillful dancers, twisted his inquiries about the same thing in a double maze, and said;

Euthydemus/ Whether do learners learn what they know, or what they do not know?

Socrates/ And again Dionysodorus said to me in a whisper;

Dionysodorus/ This also, Socrates, is just such another question as the former.

Socrates/ O Zeus, even the former question appeared to be honorable to you.

Dionysodorus/ We always ask, Socrates, such-like questions, from which there is no escape.

Socrates/ Hence you appear to me, to be in high repute amongst your disciples.

In the meantime Clinias gave an answer to Euthydemus, that

Clinias/ learners learn what they do not know.

Socrates/ And Euthydemus interrogated him in the same manner as before.

Euthydemus/ Do you not, know your letters?

Clinias/ I do.

Euthydemus/ Do you not then know all?

Socrates/ He acknowledged it.

Euthydemus/ When therefore anyone recites anything, does he not recite letters?

Socrates/ He confessed it.

Euthydemus/ Hence he recites, something of what you know, if you know all the letters.

Socrates/ This also he acknowledged.

Euthydemus/ What then, do you not learn that, which someone recites?

Socrates/ He assented.

Euthydemus/ But do you learn, not knowing your letters?

Clinias/ I do not, but I learn, having known them.

Euthydemus/ Do you not therefore learn what you know, if you know all the letters?

Socrates/ He acknowledged it.

Euthydemus/ Hence, you have not answered rightly.

Socrates/ This had been spoken not violently by Euthydemus, when Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse, as if it had been a ball, again aimed at the lad as at a mark, and said;

Dionysodorus/ Euthydemus is deceiving you, Clinias. For tell me, is it not to learn, to receive the science of that which anyone learns?

Socrates/ Clinias assented.

Dionysodorus/ But, to know, is it anything else than to possess science?

Socrates/ He acknowledged it was nothing else.

Dionysodorus/ To know not, then, is to not possess science.

Socrates/ He assented to this.

Dionysodorus/ Whether then are the receivers of a thing, they who possess it already, or they who do not possess it?

Clinias/ They who do not possess it.

Dionysodorus/ Have you not then confessed that they who do not know, are among those who do not possess?

Socrates/ he nodded assent.

Dionysodorus/ They that learn, then, belong to those that receive, and not to those that possess.

Socrates/ He granted it.

Dionysodorus/ They therefore, Clinias, learn, who know not; and not they who know.

Socrates/ After this Euthydemus rushed to the third, as it were, wrestler-fall, being about to throw down the youth. But I, seeing the lad just sinking, and wishing to give him a respite, lest he should exhibit cowardice before us, said, in order to console him;

Do not wonder, Clinias, if these discourses appear to you to be unusual. For perhaps you do not perceive what the two strangers are doing about you. They are doing the same, that persons do in the initiation of the Corybantes, when they make an enthronement for him whom they are about to initiate; for there takes place the leading out to dance and sports, as I think you would understand if you had been initiated in these mysteries. And now these do nothing else but dance, and, as it were, sportively leap round, as if after this they would initiate you. Now therefore think that you have heard the first part of the sacred rites of sophists. For, in the first place, as Prodicus says, it is necessary to learn the proper signification of words; which these strangers exhibit to you, because you have not perceived that men apply "to learn" to a thing of this kind, when anyone, having at first no knowledge respecting a thing, afterwards receives the knowledge of it; and when anyone, having this knowledge, does by this very knowledge look into the very same thing, either while being done or being said. But they rather call this "to comprehend" than "to learn;" although sometimes they call it "to learn." But this, as they show, has lain hid from you, that the same word is applied to persons affected in a contrary manner, both to him who knows, and to him who does not know. Similar to this is that which was in the second question; in which they asked you, whether men learn what they know, or what they do not. These indeed are the playthings of learning. Hence I say that these men are playing with you. But I call these a plaything on this account; because, although someone may learn many, or

even all such particulars as these, yet he would not in any respect know better how things exist. However, by the difference of words he may play with men, tripping up and overturning what they assert; just as they do, who, drawing away the stools from under those, who are going to sit down, are delighted and laugh, when they see him whom they have overturned lying on his back. Consider therefore what has happened to you from these men as fun. But what is to follow, it is clear, they will exhibit to you as serious concerns; and I will be their guide, that they may give what they promised me. For they said they would exhibit their exhortatory wisdom: but now, it appears to me, they have thought it was requisite first to play with you.

Thus far therefore, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, let it have been made a sport by you; and there is perhaps enough of it. But in the next place exhort the lad, and show how he must pay attention to wisdom and virtue. But first I will point out to you how I understand the matter, and what I desire to hear concerning it. If, then, I shall appear to you to do this in a simple and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me; for, through a desire of hearing your wisdom, I will venture for a time to speak before you off-hand. Endure therefore to hear me, both you and your disciples, without laughing: but do you, O son of Axiochus, answer me.

Do we not all then wish to do well? Or is this question one of the ridiculous, of which I was just now afraid? For surely it is stupid to ask questions of this kind; for who is there that does not wish to do well?

Clinias/ There is no one that does not.

Socrates/ Be it so.

But in the next place, since we wish to do well, in what manner shall we do well? Shall we say, if we have many good

things? Or is this answer still more stupid than the former? for it is evident that this also must be the case.

He assented.

But come, what are the things, of those that exist, good for us? Or does it appear to be a thing neither difficult, nor belonging to a solemn person, to be at no loss in this? For everyone will tell us that it is good to be rich; will they not?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is it not also good to be in health, to be beautiful, and to be sufficiently furnished with other things pertaining to the body?

So it appeared to him.

But nobility also, power, and honors, in one's own country are plainly good.

He admitted it.

What then, yet remains for us among things good? Is it to be temperate, just, and brave? Whether, by Zeus, Clinias, do you think that we shall put down these things properly, if we consider them as good? or if we do not? for perhaps this may be disputed by someone. But how does it appear to you?

Clinias/ That they are good.

Socrates/ Be it so; but in what part of the chorus shall we place wisdom? among things good? or how say you?

Clinias/ Among things good.

Socrates/ But consider lest among things good we omit what is worthy of mention.

Clinias/ But, we appear to have omitted nothing.

Socrates/ However, I recollecting said, But, by Zeus, we appear to have nearly omitted the greatest of things good.

Clinias/ What is that?

Socrates/ Felicity, Clinias; which all men, and even the very bad, say is the greatest good.

Clinias/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ And I again, correcting myself, said, We have nearly, both I and thou, son of Axiochus, rendered ourselves ridiculous to these strangers.

Clinias/ How so?

Socrates/ Because, having placed felicity in the things we before enumerated, we now again speak of it.

Clinias/ But why is this improper?

Socrates/ It is surely ridiculous to adduce that again, which was formerly proposed, and to say the same things twice.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Wisdom, is certainly felicity: this even a boy knows.

And he indeed was astonished, so young and simple is he. And I, perceiving his astonishment, said;

Do you not know, Clinias, that as regards the felicity of flute-playing, flute-players are the most happy?

He admitted it.

Are not then, grammarians also most happy as regards the felicity of writing and reading?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what, as regards the dangers of the sea, do you think that anyone, so to say generally, are more happy than wise pilots?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Again, With whom would you, when in the army, more readily share in danger and fortune? with a clever, or ignorant general?

Clinias/ With a wise one.

Socrates/ And under whom would you, when you are dangerously ill, more readily be? under a clever or ignorant physician?

Clinias/ Under a clever one.

Socrates/ Is it not therefore, because you think that you would do better, by acting with a wise person than an ignorant one?

He granted it.

Wisdom, then, everywhere renders men happy; for surely no one can ever err through wisdom; but through this he must act rightly, and obtain his end: for otherwise it would not be wisdom.

At length, I know not how, we summarily agreed that this was the case; that, to whom wisdom is present, to him nothing of felicity is wanting.

After we had agreed on this point, I again asked him, how with regard to us would be what had been previously admitted? For, we admitted that if many good things were present with us, we should be happy and do well.

He assented to this.

Should we then be happy through present good, if it did not benefit us, or if it did?

Clinias/ If it benefited us.

Socrates/ Would then anything benefit us, if we only possessed it, but did not use it? As, for instance, if we possessed much food, but did not eat it; or drink, but did not drink it; could we be benefited at all?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But if all artificers had everything requisite prepared for them, each for his own work, but did not use them, when thus procured, would they do well through the

possession merely, because they possessed everything which an artificer ought to possess? Thus, if a carpenter had all kinds of instruments and wood prepared for him in sufficiency, but yet should fashion nothing, would he be benefited at all from the possession?

Clinias/ By no means.

Socrates/ But what, should anyone possess wealth, and all such things as we now denominate good, and should not use them, would he be happy through the possession of these goods?

Clinias/ He certainly would not, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is necessary then, as it seems, that he, who is to be happy, should not only possess good things of this kind, but should likewise use them.

Clinias/ You speak truly.

Socrates/ Is not then, Clinias, the possession and the use of good sufficient to make anyone happy?

Clinias/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Whether, if anyone uses good things properly, or if he does not?

Clinias/ If he uses them properly.

Socrates/ You say correctly, for I think the evil is greater if a person uses anything whatever not correctly, than if he lets it alone. For the former is wrong; but the latter is neither right nor wrong; or do we not say so?

He assented.

What then? In the workmanship and use of things pertaining to wood, is there anything else that produces a right use than the science of a carpenter?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ So too, in the workmanship relating to vases, it is science which causes for them a right use.

He admitted it.

Whether then, with respect to the use of those goods which we first mentioned, wealth, health, and beauty, is it science, leading and directing properly action, which enables us to use everything of this kind properly, or is it anything else?

Clinias/ It is science.

Socrates/ Science, then, imparts to men in possession and action, not only happiness, but, as it seems, likewise the well-doing.

He confessed it.

Is there then, by Zeus, any advantage to be derived from other possessions, without prudence and wisdom? Will a man be benefited, who, without intellect, possesses many things, and performs many actions? or, with intellect, possesses and performs a few? Consider it thus. Will he not, by doing less, err less? and erring less, will he not act less improperly? And acting less improperly, will he not be less miserable?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Whether then will he perform fewer things being poor, than being rich?

Clinias/ Being poor.

Socrates/ And whether being weak or strong?

Clinias/ Being weak.

Socrates/ Whether also, being honored or dishonored?

Clinias/ Being dishonored.

Socrates/ And whether, being brave and temperate, will he do less, or being timid?

Clinias/ Being timid?

Socrates/ Will not then this happen if he is indolent rather than active?

He admitted it.

And if he is slow, rather than quick? and if he sees and hears dully, rather than quickly?

In everything of this kind we agreed with each other.

And to crown all, it very nearly appears, Clinias, that, with respect to all the things which we first asserted to be good, the conclusion is not about this, that they are, taken by themselves, good naturally, but, as it seems, that they exist in this manner; that if ignorance guides them, they are greater evils than their contraries, by how much the more capable they are of ministering to that evil leader; but that if prudence and wisdom lead them, they are greater goods; but that taken by themselves, neither of them is of any worth.

Clinias/ It appears, to be as you say.

Socrates/ What then, from what has been said, takes place to us? Is it anything else than this, that not one of the other things is either good or evil, but that of these, being two, wisdom is a good but ignorance an ill?

He assented.

Let us then, consider further, what still remains. Since we all of us are eager to be happy, and we appear to become such from using things, and from using them rightly, and science affords the correctness of use and felicity, it is requisite, as it seems, that every man should by all possible means endeavor to become most wise; or is it not so?

Clinias/ It is so.

Socrates/ And he ought to think that he receives this from his father, guardians, friends, and the rest, who profess themselves to be his lovers, much more than wealth; and to beg and pray strangers and fellow-citizens to impart wisdom, is in no respect base; nor is it reprehensible, Clinias, for the sake of this, to act the minister and slave to a lover and to every man, and to willingly serve him in any honorable

service whatever, through an ardent desire of becoming wise. Or does it not appear so to you?

Clinias/ You appear, to me to speak very well.

Socrates/ If, Clinias, wisdom can indeed be taught, and does not exist of its own accord among men. For this is yet to be considered by us, and has not yet been assented to by me and you.

Clinias/ But to me, Socrates, it appears that it can be taught.

Socrates/ And I, being delighted, said, you speak beautifully, O best of men; and you have done well in liberating me from a long inquiry about this very thing, whether wisdom can, or cannot be taught. Now therefore since it appears to you that it can be taught, and that it is the only thing which can make a man happy and prosperous, would you say that anything else is necessary than to philosophize? And have you a mind to do this?

Clinias/ Entirely so, Socrates, as much as possible.

Socrates/ And I, delighted to hear this, said, My pattern, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, of exhortatory discourses, such as I desired them to be, is of this kind, like a common person's perhaps, and stated at length with difficulty: but let whichever of you is willing, do this very thing according to art, and exhibit it to us. But if you are not willing to do this, show to the lad in order, from the point where I left off, whether he ought to get every science, or whether there is one, which, when he gets it, he will necessarily be a happy and good man; and what that science is. For, as I said in the beginning, it is of great consequence to us that this youth should become wise and good.

This then, Crito, did I say; and I paid very great attention to what followed, and considered after what manner they would handle the discourse, and whence they would begin,

while they were exhorting the youth to study wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus then, who was the elder of them, first began the conference; and all of us looked at him, as about to hear immediately some wonderful reasons; which indeed happened to us. For the man, Crito, commenced an admirable discourse, which it is proper for you to hear, as being an exhortation to virtue.

Dionysodorus/ Tell me, Socrates, and the rest of you, who express a desire for this youth to become wise, whether you are jesting when you make this assertion, or truly and seriously desire it?

Socrates/ It was then I perceived, that they thought we had been previously jesting, when we exhorted them to converse with the youth, and that on this account they too had been jesting, and had not been acting seriously by him. Perceiving this, I said still more strongly, that we were serious in a wonderful degree.

Dionysodorus/ See, Socrates that you do not hereafter deny what you now assert.

Socrates/ I have considered this: for I shall never deny it.

Dionysodorus/ What is it then? Say you that you wish him to become wise?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ But, is Clinias now wise or not?

Socrates/ He says, not yet at all, and he is no braggart.

Dionysodorus/ But do you, wish him to become wise, and not be unlearned?

Socrates/ We acknowledged it.

Dionysodorus/ Do you not then wish him to become what he is not; and to be no longer what he now is?

Socrates/ And I, on hearing this, was confused. But he, on my being confused, taking up the discourse, said,

Dionysodorus/ Since you wish him to be no longer what he now is, you wish, as it seems, for him to perish. And yet such friends and lovers would certainly be of much worth, who should consider it a thing of great moment for their boy-loves to perish.

Socrates/ Ctesippus on hearing this was indignant, on account of his love for the youth; and said;

Ctesippus/ O Thurian stranger, if it were not rather rude to say so, I would say, On your head be the evil; for knowing what do you falsely ascribe to me and the rest a thing of this kind, which I think it is unholy to assert, that I should be willing for this youth to perish.

Euthydemus/ But, does it appear to you, Ctesippus, that it is possible to speak falsely?

Ctesippus/ By Zeus, it does, unless I am mad.

Euthydemus/ Whether, when a person is asserting a thing about which there is a discourse, or when not asserting it.

Ctesippus/ When asserting it.

Euthydemus/ If then he asserts it, he does not say anything else of things existing than what he asserts?

Ctesippus/ For how should he do otherwise?

Euthydemus/ But of existing things that, of which he speaks, is one apart from the rest.

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Euthydemus/ Does he then, when he speaks of that thing, not speak of that which has a being?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ But he who speaks of that which is, and of existing beings, speaks the truth; so that if Dionysodorus speaks of beings, he speaks the truth, and utters nothing false against you.

Ctesippus/ He does so; but he, who says this, does not speak, Euthydemus, of beings.

Euthydemus/ Are non-entities anything else than things which are not?

Ctesippus/ They are not.

Euthydemus/ Therefore, non-entities are beings nowhere.

Ctesippus/ Nowhere.

Euthydemus/ Is it possible then for anyone to do anything about non-entities, so as to make them to exist nowhere?

Ctesippus/ It does not appear to me, that he can.

Euthydemus/ What then? When orators speak to the people, do they nothing?

Ctesippus/ They do something.

Euthydemus/ If, then, they do something, do they not also make something?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ To speak, then, is to do and to make.

Socrates/ He assented.

Euthydemus/ But no one, speaks of non-entities: for he would make something; but you have acknowledged that no one can make non-entities: so that, according to your reasoning, no one can assert things which are false; but if Dionysodorus-speaks, he speaks things which are true, and he speaks of entities.

Ctesippus/ By Zeus, it is so, Euthydemus. Yet he speaks of entities after a certain manner, though not as they subsist.

Dionysodorus/ How say you, Ctesippus? Are there some who speak of things as they are?

Ctesippus/ There are indeed; and these are men worthy and good, and who assert things which are true.

Dionysodorus/ What then? are not good things, well, and things evil, ill-conditioned?

Socrates/ He conceded.

Dionysodorus/ And do you not acknowledge that the worthy and the good speak of things as they are?

Ctesippus/ I do.

Dionysodorus/ The good therefore, Ctesippus, speak ill of evil things, if they speak of them as they are.

Ctesippus/ Truly, by Zeus, they do very much so of bad men, for example; among whom, if you are persuaded by me, you will be careful not to be numbered, lest the good should speak ill of you; because you well know that the good speak ill of the bad.

Euthydemus/ Do they not also, speak in high terms of great men, and in warm terms of the fervent?

Ctesippus/ Very much so indeed; of cold men therefore they speak coldly, and assert that they converse frigidly.

Dionysodorus/ You are abusive, Ctesippus, you are abusive.

Ctesippus/ Not I, by Zeus; for, Dionysodorus, I love you; but I admonish you as my companion, and I endeavor to persuade you, never in my presence to so rudely assert, that I wish for the destruction of those on whom I set a great value.

Socrates/ I then, since they seemed to me to conduct themselves in a rather rude manner towards each other, had some fun with Ctesippus, and said, It appears to me, Ctesippus, that we ought to receive from the strangers what they assert, if they are willing to give, and not to contend about a word. For if they can destroy men in such a manner,

as to make them, from being wicked and senseless, good and wise, and this too whether they have discovered themselves, or learnt from some other person a corruption and destruction of this kind, so that having destroyed him who is wicked, they might afterwards exhibit him an honest man, if they know how to effect this, and it is evident that they do know; for they say that their newly discovered art does make men good after being wicked, we must therefore consent to this. Let them destroy the lad, and make him and all the rest of us wise. But if you young men are afraid, let the trial be made on me, as if I were a Carian; since, though an elderly man, I am prepared to run the risk; and I deliver myself up to this Dionysodorus, as Pelias did to Medea the Colchian woman. Let him destroy me, and, if he will, boil me, or do whatever else he pleases with me if he does but render me a good man. And Ctesippus said;

Ctesippus/ I also, Socrates, am prepared to deliver myself to these strangers, if they wish, for them to flay me more than they flay at present, provided my skin does not end in a bladder, like that of Marsyas, but in virtue. Dionysodorus indeed here thinks that I am angry with him. I am not, however, angry; but I contradict what I think he has not well said against me. But do not, my noble Dionysodorus, call contradiction reviling; for reviling is a different thing.

Dionysodorus/ Do you, Ctesippus, compose your discourse, as if contradiction existed?

Ctesippus/ Entirely, and very much so; or do you, Dionysodorus, think that there is no contradiction?

Dionysodorus/ You could not, prove that at any time, since you have heard no one contradicting another.

Ctesippus/ True; but let us now hear, whether I can prove it to you by Ctesippus contradicting Dionysodorus.

Dionysodorus/ Could you give a reason for this?

Ctesippus/ By all means.

Dionysodorus/ What then? are there words for each of the things that exist?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ Whether, then, as each thing is, or as it is not?

Ctesippus/ As it is.

Dionysodorus/ For if you remember, Ctesippus, we have just now shown that no one speaks of a thing as it is not. For no one is seen to speak of that which is not.

Ctesippus/ But why this? Do you and I contradict the less?

Dionysodorus/ Whether then, shall we contradict, if we both of us pronounce the word for the same thing, or shall we thus assert the same thing?

Socrates/ He admitted we should.

Dionysodorus/ But, when neither of us gives the word for that thing, shall we then contradict? Or, will it not follow, that thus neither will have made any mention at all of the thing?

Socrates/ And this too he granted.

Dionysodorus/ But, when I pronounce the word for that thing, and you for some other thing, do we then contradict each other? Or do I then speak of that thing, but you do not speak of it in any respect whatever? And how can he, who does not speak of a thing, contradict him who does?

Socrates/ And Ctesippus indeed was then silent. But I, wondering at the reasoning, said, How say you, Dionysodorus? For, though I have heard this reasoning often, and from many, yet I have always wondered at it. For Protagoras and others still more ancient have made much use of it. But to me it always appears to be wonderful,

through its subverting the reasoning of others and itself too. I think, however, that I shall learn its truth the best from you. Is the reasoning then other than this, that it is not possible to assert things which are false? For this is the force of the argument. Is it not? And that the speaker asserts things which are true, or does not assert?

He admitted it.

Whether, then, is it not possible to assert things which are false, but possible to form a false opinion?

Dionysodorus/ It is not possible, to form even a false opinion.

Socrates/ There is then, no such thing as a false opinion at all.

Dionysodorus/ There is not.

Socrates/ Neither then is there ignorance, nor are there ignorant persons. Or would not this be ignorance, if there were the power to speak falsely of things?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But, this is not possible.

Dionysodorus/ It is not.

Socrates/ Do you make this assertion, Dionysodorus, for the sake of talking, that you may say what is strange? or do you really think that no man is ignorant?

Dionysodorus/ Confute, the assertion.

Socrates/ Is it possible, according to your assertion, to confute when no man speaks falsely?

Euthydemus/ It is not.

Dionysodorus/ Neither did I, order you to confute. For how can anyone order that, which does not exist?

Socrates/ O Euthydemus, I do not clearly understand these clever and coherent assertions; but I have somehow a muddled perception of them. Perhaps then I shall ask

something rather unpleasant; but do you pardon me. See then. For if it is neither possible to speak falsely, nor to entertain a false opinion, nor to be ignorant, neither is it possible for anyone to err, when he does anything. For the doer cannot err in what he does. Do you not say so?

Euthydemus/ Just so.

Socrates/ This then, is the unpleasant question. For if we do not err, either acting, or speaking, or thinking, if this be the case, of what, by Zeus, are ye come as the teachers? Did you not just now say, that you could, the best of all men, impart virtue to a person willing to learn?

Then said Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse;

Dionysodorus/ Are you such a crone, Socrates, as to remember now what we first said, and would even now remember anything I said last year, yet do not know how to use what has been said at present?

Socrates/ For the words, are difficult to understand, and very reasonably so; for they are spoken by wise men; since it is very difficult to make use of the last words you are saying. For what do you mean, Dionysodorus, by the expression, “I know not how to use”? Does it not mean this, that I do not know how to confute it? Since, tell me, what other conception do you form of these words, “I do not know how to use the words.”

Dionysodorus/ But what you say, this is very difficult to use. Since answer.

Socrates/ What, before you have answered Dionysodorus?

Dionysodorus/ Will you not answer?

Socrates/ Is it just?

Dionysodorus/ It is certainly just.

Socrates/ For what reason? Or is it plain that it is for this; because you, a very wise person in words, have now come to us, and know when you ought to answer, and when not; and now you will not answer a jot, as knowing that you ought not.

Dionysodorus/ You are a babbler, and are careless in answering. But, my good man, be obedient and answer; since you acknowledge that I am a wise man.

Socrates/ I must yield then, and, as it seems, to necessity; for you are the ruler. Ask, then.

Dionysodorus/ Whether then do things that have a soul understand? or soul-less things also?

Socrates/ Those that have a soul.

Dionysodorus/ Do you know then, any word that has a soul?

Socrates/ Not I, by Zeus.

Dionysodorus/ Why then did you just now ask me, what my word understood?

Socrates/ For what else, than because I have erred through my stupidity: or, did I not err, but rightly said this too, when I asserted that my words understood? Whether then will you say that I did err, or I did not? For if I have not erred, neither will you confute, although you are a wise man; nor have you the power to make use of my assertion; but if I have erred, neither thus do you speak rightly, in saying that it is not possible to err. And I say this not in opposition to what you asserted last year. But this discourse, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, seems to remain in the same state, and still, as of old, having thrown down others, to fall itself; nor for this not to happen has it been discovered even by your art, and this too so wonderful for the accuracy of reasoning.

Ctesippus/ You certainly say wonderful things, O men of Thurii or Chios, or from whatever place you are, and by whatever name you delight to be called; as you care not to talk wildly.

Socrates/ And I, fearing lest reviling should take place, again softened down Ctesippus, and said;

What I told Clinias just now, I say also, Ctesippus, to you, that you do not know the wisdom of these strangers how wonderful it is. They are, however, unwilling to exhibit it to us seriously; but are imitating Proteus the Egyptian sophist, and deceive us by their sorcery. Let us, therefore, imitate Menelaus, and not separate ourselves from the men, till they have thoroughly shown us on what point they are serious; for I think that something of theirs very beautiful will appear, when they begin to be serious; and let us beg and exhort and pray them to exhibit themselves thoroughly.

It seems then good to me to again point out in what manner I prayed them to appear to me; for I will endeavor, as far as I can, to go through all in order from where I then left off, that I may call them out to pity me; and that commiserating me on a tenter-hook and acting seriously, they may act seriously themselves. But do you, Clinias, enable me to recollect from what point we broke off. As I think, we broke off somewhere there, when we acknowledged at last that we ought to philosophize; did we not?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But philosophy is a possession of knowledge; is it not so?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Socrates/ By possessing then what knowledge, shall we rightly possess it? Is not this the simple fact, that it is by possessing that knowledge which will benefit us?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Would it then benefit us at all, if we knew to know by going about in what part of the earth the most gold had been dug?

Ctesippus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ But formerly, this was our decision, that we should gain nothing, even though, without labor, and without digging the earth, all the gold that exists should be ours. So that if we knew how to make the rocks of gold, even this knowledge would be nothing worth: for if we knew not how to use the gold, its possession would appear to be of no advantage. Or do you not remember?

Ctesippus/ I remember very well.

Socrates/ Nor, as it seems, will any advantage be derived from any other science, either relating to money matters or to medicine, or to any other, by which a person knows how to make anything, but does not know how to use what he makes. Is it not so?

He assented.

Nor even if there were a science to make men immortal, without their knowing how to make use of such immortality, would there be, it seems, any advantage from it, if it is fair to infer anything from what has been previously admitted.

In all these points we both agreed.

There is a need then, O handsome youth, of some science of such a kind, as that there may concur in it both the power to make, and the knowledge how to use that which one makes.

Ctesippus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ We are far then, it seems, from being skillful lyre-makers, or from possessing any knowledge of that kind; for there the art that makes is on one side, and on the other the art that uses, and there is a division about the same

thing. For the lyre-making and the harp-making arts differ very much from each other. Is it not so?

He assented.

Nor shall we, it is plain, require the flute-making art: for this is another such-like art.

He was of that opinion.

But, by the gods, if we should learn the art of composing speeches, is this the art from the possession of which we should be happy?

Clinias, taking up the discourse, said;

Clinias/ I think not.

Socrates/ Of what proof, do you make use?

Clinias/ I see, some speech-makers, who do not know how to use their own speeches that they make themselves, just as lyre-makers do with their lyres; but here are others able to use the speeches which those have made, although unable to make speeches themselves. It is plain, then, that with respect to speeches, the art of making is separate from the art of using them.

Socrates/ You appear to me, to give a sufficient proof that the art of speechmakers is not that art, by the possession of which a person would be happy; and yet I thought that here would appear the science, of which for a long time we have been in search. For to me those very speech-makers, Clinias, appear to be vastly wise, when I am in their company; and this very art of theirs also appears to be something divine and elevated. This, however, is by no means wonderful. For it is a portion of the art of charming, and is but a little inferior to it; for the art of charming is that by which vipers, and phalangia, and scorpions, and other wild animals, and even diseases are charmed; but this happens to be the charming and soothing of judges, and of persons assembling

at public meetings, and of other mobs. Or are you of a different opinion?

Clinias/ I am not; but it appears to me as you say.

Socrates/ Where then, shall we yet turn ourselves? to what art?

Clinias/ I do not well see the way.

Socrates/ But I think, that I have discovered the art.

Clinias/ What is it?

Socrates/ The art of a general, appears to me, more than any other, to be that, by possessing which a person would be happy.

Clinias/ It does not appear so to me.

Socrates/ Why not?

Clinias/ This is certainly a man-hunting art.

Socrates/ What then?

Clinias/ No part, of the hunting art itself extends beyond hunting and getting into the hand; but when persons have got into their hands what they have hunted, they are not able to use it; but hunters and fishermen assign it to cooks. But on the contrary, geometricians, astronomers, and those skilled in arithmetic for these also are of the hunting art for each of these do not make diagrams, but find out things existing. As then not knowing how to use them, but only to hunt for them, they deliver up their inventions for those to make a bad use of in dialectics—such at least of them as are not very stupid.

Socrates/ Be it so, O most beautiful and most wise Clinias. But is such the case?

Clinias/ Certainly. And thus in the same manner, generals, when they have taken a city or camp, deliver it over to statesmen; for they know not how to use the things they have taken; just as, I think, the catchers of quails deliver

them up to quail-feeders. If then, we are in want of that art which, whether making or hunting, knows itself how to use what it possesses, and is such an art as will render us happy, we must, instead of the general's seek out some other art.

Crito/ What say you, Socrates? Did that lad talk thus?

Socrates/ Do you not think he did, Crito?

Crito/ By Zeus, I do not indeed. For I think if he had spoken thus, he would not have wanted either Euthydemus or any other man for his instruction.

Socrates/ But, by Zeus, was it not Ctesippus that spoke thus? for I do not remember.

Crito/ What, Ctesippus?

Socrates/ This, however, I well know, that it was neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus who spoke thus. But, good Crito, was it not some divinity, who being present said these things? For I well know that I heard them.

Crito/ It is so, by Zeus, Socrates; and to me it appears very much so indeed, to have been some divinity. But after this, did you still search out any art? And have you discovered or not that, for the sake of which you made the search?

Socrates/ Whence, blessed man, did we discover it? But we were altogether a subject of laughter, like children that run after larks; for we continually thought we should immediately catch each of the sciences, but they were always flying secretly away. Why therefore should I speak to you about the majority? But when we came to the regal art, and thoroughly considered whether it is that, which imparts and works out happiness, here falling, as it were, into a labyrinth, when we thought we were now at the end, we again turned round in our course, and appeared to be at the

beginning of our inquiry, and we wanted just as much of the mark, as when we were first making the search.

Crito/ But how did this happen, Socrates, to you?

Socrates/ I will tell you. For the art of the statesman and that of the king it has been determined by us are the same.

Crito/ What then?

Socrates/ To this art then, as alone knowing how to make a proper use of things, have the general's art and the other arts determined to give dominion over those works of which they are the mere artisans. This then clearly appeared to us to be the art we were seeking, and the cause of good conduct in a city; and really, according to the Iambic verse of Æschylus, that it alone is seated in the stern of the city, directing, as by the rudder, all things, and commanding all persons to do all things useful.

Crito/ Does not this then appear to you to be well said respecting this art?

Socrates/ You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what after this happened to us. For we were considering again somehow thus. Does that regal art, which rules over all, effect anything for us or nothing? We said to each other that it certainly will. For would not you too assert this, Crito?

Crito/ I would.

Socrates/ What then would you say is its effect? Just as if I should ask you, what effect does the physician's art produce in all the things over which it rules? Would you not say it is health?

Crito/ I should.

Socrates/ And what does agriculture, your art, effect in all the things over which it rules? Would you not say that it affords us food from the earth?

Crito/ I would.

Socrates/ And what does the regal art effect, while it commands everything over which it rules? Perhaps you do not very well see your way.

Crito/ I do not, by Zeus, Socrates.

Socrates/ Nor do we, Crito. But thus much at least you know, that if it is that art, which we are seeking, it ought to be useful.

Crito/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Ought it not, therefore, to impart to us a certain good?

Crito/ Necessarily so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But we have acknowledged to each other, I and Clinias, that good is nothing else than a certain science.

Crito/ Yes, you did say so.

Socrates/ The other works then, which one may say belong to the statesman's art but these would be many, for example, to make the citizens rich, free, and free from sedition do not they all appear to be neither evil nor good? But it is necessary for this art to make men wise, and to impart knowledge, if it is to be that, which benefits and renders men happy.

Crito/ It is so: and thus it was agreed upon by you, as you have narrated the discourse.

Socrates/ Does then the regal art make men wise and good?

Crito/ What prevents it, Socrates?

Socrates/ Does it then make all men so, and good in all respects? And is it the art which furnishes every science, that of the currier, of the carpenter, and all the other crafts?

Crito/ I think not, Socrates.

Socrates/ But what science does it furnish? To what purpose do we employ it? For of no works, either good or evil,

ought it to be the artificer, but to impart no other science than itself. Let us then say what it is; to what purpose we should use it. Are you willing, Crito, we should say it is that, by which we make others good?

Crito/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But in what will these be good, and to what purpose will they be useful? Or shall we still say that they will make others good, and that those others will make others so? However, they nowhere appear to us in what way they are good; because we have held in no honor the works, which are said to belong to the statesman's science. But in reality, there is, according to the proverb, Corinthus the son of Zeus; and as I have said, we are still equally, or even more, wanting towards knowing what the science is, which will make us happy.

Crito/ By Zeus, Socrates, you have come, it seems, to a great difficulty.

Socrates/ I myself then, Crito, since I had fallen into this difficulty, sent forth every kind of cry and entreated the strangers, and called upon them, as if they were the Dioscuri, to save us, both me and the lad, from the triple waves of the discourse; to be by all means serious, and seriously to show us what that science is, by the possession of which we may pass well through the remainder of life.

Crito/ And was then Euthydemus willing to show you anything?

Socrates/ How not? And he began, my friend, the discourse very magnificently thus.

Euthydemus/ Whether, Socrates, shall I teach you this science about which you formerly were at a loss, or show you that you possess it?

Socrates/ O blessed man, are you able to effect this?

Euthydemus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Show me, then, by Zeus, that I possess it; for this is much easier than for a man so old to learn.

Euthydemus/ Come then, answer me. Is there anything which you know?

Socrates/ Certainly; many things, but trifling.

Euthydemus/ It is sufficient. Does it then appear to you to be possible, that anything which exists should not be what it is?

Socrates/ It does not, by Zeus.

Euthydemus/ Did you not say that you knew something?

Socrates/ I did.

Euthydemus/ Are you not then knowing, if you know?

Socrates/ Certainly, in that very thing.

Euthydemus/ It makes no difference. But is it not necessary that you, being knowing, should know all things?

Socrates/ It is not, by Zeus, since there are many other things which I do not know.

Euthydemus/ If then you do not know a thing, you are not knowing?

Socrates/ Of that thing, friend.

Euthydemus/ Are you not then, less knowing? But you just now said, that you were knowing; and thus you are the very same person that you are, and again not the same person, according to the same things, and at the same time.

Socrates/ Be it so, Euthydemus: for, according to the saying, “You rattle indeed very pretty.” How then do I know that science which we were seeking? since it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. If I know one thing, do I know all things? For I cannot be knowing and not knowing at the same time. And since I know all things, do I possess that knowledge likewise? Is this then what you say? And is this that wise thing?

Euthydemus/ You are, Socrates, confuting yourself.

Socrates/ But what, Euthydemus, are you not suffering the very same thing? For whatever I may suffer together with you and Dionysodorus here, O beloved head, I shall not take much to heart. Tell me, do you not know some things, and know not others?

Dionysodorus/ By no means, Socrates.

Socrates/ How say you? Do you then know nothing?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do you then know all things, since you know anything whatever?

Dionysodorus/ All things. And you too, if you know one thing, know all things.

Socrates/ O Zeus! how wonderful and mighty a good you tell me has appeared. Do then all other men likewise know all things, or nothing?

Dionysodorus/ They surely, do not know some things, but do not know others; and are at the same time knowing, and not knowing.

Socrates/ But how is this?

Dionysodorus/ All men, know all things, if they know one thing.

Socrates/ O, by the gods! Dionysodorus, for it is now manifest to me that you are serious, though I with difficulty invoked you to be so, do you in reality know all things? For instance, the art of a carpenter and a cobbler?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are you also able to stitch shoes?

Dionysodorus/ I am, by Zeus, and also to mend them.

Socrates/ Do you also know such things as these, the number of the stars and the sands?

Dionysodorus/ Perfectly so. Think you, we should not confess that we do?

Socrates/ And Ctesippus then, taking up the discourse, said;

Ctesippus/ By Zeus, Dionysodorus, show me some proof of these things, that I may know that you are speaking the truth.

Dionysodorus/ What proof shall I show?

Ctesippus/ Do you know how many teeth Euthydemus has, and does Euthydemus know how many you have?

Dionysodorus/ Is it not enough, for you, to hear that we know all things?

Ctesippus/ By no means; but only tell us this one thing more, and show that you speak the truth. And if you tell how many teeth each of you have, and you appear on our counting them to have known this, we will then believe you in other things likewise.

Socrates/ They then, thinking they were mocked at, were unwilling to comply, but acknowledged they knew all things, while they were questioned on each point singly by Ctesippus. For there was nothing which Ctesippus did not ask them without concealment, and at last even if they knew the most indecent things. And they, confessing that they did know, advanced most bravely against the questions, like wild boars pressing on against the blow; so that I too, Crito, was at length compelled myself through my incredulity to ask Euthydemus, whether Dionysodorus knew also how to dance? and he said;

Euthydemus/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ However, he surely does not know how to act the tumbler upon swords, and to be whirled on a wheel, being so old. Or, so far towards wisdom has he come?

Euthydemus/ There is nothing, which he does not know.

Socrates/ But whether, do you only now know all things, or have you always known them?

Euthydemus/ Always.

Socrates/ And when you were children, and as soon as you were born, did you know?

All things, said both of them together.

To us the thing appeared to be incredible.

Euthydemus/ Do you disbelieve, Socrates?

Socrates/ Except, that it is likely you are wise men.

Euthydemus/ But, if you are willing to give me answers, I will also show you, giving your assent to these wonderful things.

Socrates/ Indeed, I shall most gladly, be confuted on these points. For if I am wise, not knowing it, and you demonstrate this that I know all things, and have always known, what greater wind-fall than this could I find in all my life?

Euthydemus/ Answer then.

Socrates/ Ask me, as one that will answer.

Euthydemus/ Whether, then, Socrates, do you know anything or not?

Socrates/ I do.

Euthydemus/ Do you then know by that thing, through which you are knowing, or by anything else?

Socrates/ By that by which I am knowing: for I suppose you mean the soul. Or do you not mean it?

Euthydemus/ Are you not ashamed of yourself, Socrates? You ask a question when you are asked one.

Socrates/ Be it so; but what shall I do? For I will do as you bid me. But when I know not what it is you ask me, you nevertheless order me to answer and not to ask a question.

Euthydemus/ You, doubtless, understand what I say.

Socrates/ I do.

Euthydemus/ Now then answer to that which you do understand.

Socrates/ What then, if you ask a question, thinking in one way, and I understand it in another, and then I give an answer to it, is it enough for you, if I answer nothing to the purpose?

Euthydemus/ To me it would, but not to you, I think.

Socrates/ I will not, by Zeus, answer, before I hear.

Euthydemus/ You will not answer, to what you may happen to understand, because you are a trifler, and more of a silly old man than is becoming.

Socrates/ And I then perceived he was annoyed at me for defining precisely what was said, as he was desirous to make me his prey by placing his words around me as a net. I recollected, therefore, that Connus was always annoyed at me, when I did not yield to him, and that afterwards he paid less attention to me, as one that was ignorant. But since I had determined to go as a scholar to those men, I thought I ought to yield, lest they should consider me a stupid fellow, and not receive me as a scholar. Hence I said, If it seems good for you to act thus, Euthydemus, let it be done: for perhaps in every respect you, who possess the art, know better how to converse than I do, who am an unskilled individual. Question me then again from the beginning.

Euthydemus/ Answer then again, whether you know what you know by something or not.

Socrates/ I do, by the soul.

Euthydemus/ Again, this man in his answer adds to the questions he is asked. For I did not ask by what you know, but if you know by anything.

Socrates/ Again I said, I have answered more than was necessary, through my want of instruction; but pardon me. For I will now answer simply, that I know always by something, what I know.

Euthydemus/ But, whether do you always know by the same thing? Or is it at one time by this thing and at another time by another?

Socrates/ Always by this, when I know.

Euthydemus/ Again, will you not cease to speak beside the question?

Socrates/ But I fear, lest this "always" should trip us up.

Euthydemus/ It will not us; but, if at all, it will you. But answer me, Do you always know by this?

Socrates/ Always; since I must take away the "when."

Euthydemus/ You therefore always know by this. And always knowing, whether do you know some things by that, by which you know, and other things by something else? or do you know all things by that?

Socrates/ All things, which I know, by that.

Euthydemus/ This has come, the same by-answer.

Socrates/ I take away then, the words "which I know."

Euthydemus/ Take not away, even one word; for I make you no request. But answer me, Would you be able to know all things, unless you could know all things?

Socrates/ This would be a prodigy.

Euthydemus/ Add now, whatever you like; for you confess that you know all things.

Socrates/ I appear to have done so; since the expression, “the things which I know,” possess no power whatever; but I know all things.

Euthydemus/ Have you not then confessed that you always know by that thing by which you know? whether it be when you know, or in whatever way you please: for you have confessed that you know always, and all things at the same time. It is evident, therefore, that you knew when you was a boy, and when you was begotten, and when you was born; and even before you was born, and before heaven and earth were produced, you knew all things, if you always possessed knowledge; and you, by Zeus, will know always, and all things, if I wish it.

Socrates/ And may you wish it, much-honored Euthydemus, if you speak the truth in reality. But I do not quite believe that you are sufficient for this, unless this your brother here, Dionysodorus, assist you with his counsel: and thus perhaps you would be sufficient.

But tell me, for in other things I cannot contend against you, men of such portentous wisdom, nor say that I do not know all things, since you assert it how, Euthydemus, shall I say that I know that good men are unjust? Come, tell me, do I know this, or do I not know it?

Euthydemus/ You certainly know it.

Socrates/ What, do I know?

Euthydemus/ That good men are not unjust.

Socrates/ This, I perfectly knew a long time ago. But I am not asking this; but where did I learn that good men are unjust?

Euthydemus/ Nowhere.

Socrates/ I do not therefore, know it.

Euthydemus then said to Dionysodorus;

Euthydemus/ You are destroying the reasoning; and this man will appear to be not knowing, that he is at the same time both knowing and not knowing.

Socrates/ And Dionysodorus blushed.

But, Euthydemus, how say you? Does not your brother, who knows all things, appear to you to speak correctly?

Dionysodorus, hastily taking up the discourse, said;

Dionysodorus/ But am I the brother of Euthydemus?

Socrates/ Leave me alone, my good man, till Euthydemus shall have taught me how I know that good men are unjust; and do not begrudge me the lesson.

Dionysodorus/ You are flying away, Socrates, and are unwilling to answer.

Socrates/ And reasonably so: for I am inferior even to either one of you; so that I have a great need to fly from the two. For I am somehow far weaker than Hercules; who was not able to contend with the Hydra a sophist that did by her wisdom, if one head of the discourse was cut off, send up again many instead of one and at the same time with the Crab, a certain other sophist, who, as it appears to me, had come recently from the sea; and when it was annoying Hercules on the left hand by speaking to and biting him, he called upon Iolaus, the son of his brother, to aid him; and he gave him sufficient aid. But if my Iolaus, Patrocles, were to come, he would rather produce mischief.

Dionysodorus/ Answer then, since this tale has been sung by you, whether Iolaus was more the nephew of Hercules than of you.

Socrates/ It is then best for me, Dionysodorus, to answer you. For you will not desist of this I am pretty well certain from asking questions, and grudging me to learn, and hindering Euthydemus from teaching me that wise thing.

Dionysodorus/ Answer, however.

Socrates/ I will answer then, that Iolaus was the nephew of Hercules, but, as it appears to me, mine not at all. For my brother, Patrocles, was not his father; but Iphicles, who nearly resembles him in name, was the brother of Hercules.

Dionysodorus/ But is Patrocles, your brother?

Socrates/ Certainly; for he had the same mother, though not the same father with myself.

Dionysodorus/ He is then your brother, and not your brother.

Socrates/ He was not from the same father, O best of men: for his father was Chæredemus, but mine Sophroniscus.

Dionysodorus/ But, Sophroniscus was a father, and Chæredemus likewise.

Socrates/ Certainly; the former was my father, and the latter his.

Dionysodorus/ Was not then, Chæredemus different from a father?

Socrates/ From my father.

Dionysodorus/ Was he then said he a father, different from a father? Or are you the same thing as the stone?

Socrates/ I fear, lest under you I shall appear to be the same; but I do not think so myself.

Dionysodorus/ Are you then, different from the stone?

Socrates/ Different, certainly.

Dionysodorus/ Being then something different from a stone, you are not a stone: and being different from gold, you are not gold.

Socrates/ It is so.

Dionysodorus/ Will not Chæredemus then, since he is different from a father, be not a father?

Socrates/ It seems, he is not a father.

Euthydemus, taking up the discourse, said;

Euthydemus/ For certainly, if Chæredemus is a father, and Sophroniscus, on the contrary, being different from a father, is not a father, so that you, Socrates, are without a father.

Socrates/ Ctesippus, taking up the discourse, said;

Ctesippus/ Is not your father in the very same predicament? for he is different from my father.

Euthydemus/ Very far from it.

Ctesippus/ Is he then the same?

Euthydemus/ Yes, the same.

Ctesippus/ I would not wish this. But whether, Euthydemus, is he my father alone, or the father of other men likewise?

Euthydemus/ Of other men likewise. Or do you think that the same person, being a father, is not a father?

Ctesippus/ So I thought indeed.

Euthydemus/ But what? Do you think that a thing being gold is not gold? or a person being a man is not a man?

Ctesippus/ Say not so. According to the proverb, you do not, Euthydemus, join thread with thread. For you speak of a dreadful thing, if your father is the father of all.

Euthydemus/ But he is.

Ctesippus/ Whether of men, or of horses too? or of all other animals likewise?

Euthydemus/ Of all animals.

Ctesippus/ Is your mother too the mother of all?

Euthydemus/ Yes, the mother.

Ctesippus/ Your mother then, is the mother of sea-urchins.

Euthydemus/ And yours too.

Ctesippus/ Hence then you are the brother of gudgeons, and puppies, and little pigs.

Euthydemus/ And so are you.

Ctesippus/ And besides this, your father is a dog too.

Euthydemus/ And so is yours.

Dionysodorus/ But, if you would answer me, you would forthwith acknowledge these things. For tell me, have you a dog?

Ctesippus/ Yes, a very bad one.

Dionysodorus/ Has he then puppies?

Ctesippus/ He has indeed, others very much of the same kind as himself.

Dionysodorus/ Is not the dog then their father?

Ctesippus/ At least, I saw him having connection with a bitch.

Dionysodorus/ What then? Is he not your dog?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ Being a father then, is he not yours? So that the dog becomes your father, and you are the brother of puppies.

Socrates/ And Dionysodorus again, quickly taking up the discourse, that Ctesippus might not get a word in before him, said;

Dionysodorus/ Answer me still in a small matter. Do you strike this dog?

Socrates/ And Ctesippus said, laughing;

Ctesippus/ By the gods, I do; for I cannot strike you.

Dionysodorus/ You strike your father then.

Ctesippus/ Much more justly, should I strike your father, who, having endured what, has begotten such wise sons. But surely, Euthydemus, your father and the father of the puppies has enjoyed many good things from this your wisdom.

Euthydemus/ But neither is he in want of many good things, Ctesippus, nor are you.

Ctesippus/ Nor are you, Euthydemus.

Euthydemus/ Nor is any other man said he in want of them. For tell me, Ctesippus, whether you think it good for a sick man to drink a medicine, or does it appear to you to be not good, when it is requisite; or when anyone is going to a battle, ought he rather to go armed, or unarmed?

Ctesippus/ To me, it appears; although I think that you are about to say some of your beautiful things.

Euthydemus/ You shall know the best; but answer me. For since you acknowledge that it is good for a man to drink medicine when it is requisite, is it not meet to drink as much as possible of this good, and will it not in this case be well there, if someone, bruising it, should mingle with it a cart-load of hellebore.

Ctesippus/ This would be very proper indeed, Euthydemus, if he who drank it were as large as the statue in Delphi.

Euthydemus/ As therefore, it is also good to have arms in battle, is it not meet to have a great number of shields and spears, since it is a good thing?

Ctesippus/ Very much so. But you are not of this opinion, Euthydemus; for you think that one shield and one spear are sufficient. Or do you not?

Euthydemus/ I do.

Ctesippus/ Would you, arm Geryones too and Briareus in this manner? But I thought you were more skillful than to do so, as being one who fights with a soldier's arms, and so too was this your friend.

Socrates/ And Euthydemus indeed was silent. But Dionysodorus asked, in reference to what had been before answered by Ctesippus;

Dionysodorus/ Does it not then appear to you to be good likewise to possess gold?

Ctesippus/ Certainly, and this too in plenty.

Dionysodorus/ What then, does it not appear to you to be a good thing to possess riches always, and everywhere?

Ctesippus/ Very much so.

Dionysodorus/ Do you not then acknowledge gold likewise to be a good thing?

Ctesippus/ I have acknowledged it.

Dionysodorus/ Is it not then meet to possess it always, and everywhere, and especially in one's self? And would not a man be most happy, if he had three talents of gold in his belly, a talent in his skull, and a stater of gold in each of his eyes?

Ctesippus/ They say indeed, Euthydemus, that those amongst the Scythians are the most happy and the best men, who have much gold in their own skulls, just as you lately spoke of the dog being your own father: and, what is still more wonderful, they say, that they drink out of their own golden skulls, and look within them, having their own head in their hands.

Euthydemus/ Whether, do the Scythians and other men see things which can be seen, or things which cannot be seen?

Ctesippus/ Things, surely, which can be seen.

Euthydemus/ Do you then do so likewise?

Ctesippus/ I do.

Euthydemus/ Do you then see our garments?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Can then these things see?

Ctesippus/ Beyond all measure.

Euthydemus/ But what?

Ctesippus/ Nothing. But perhaps you think you do not see them, so facetious are you; but to me you appear, Euthydemus, not sleeping to be asleep, and, if it were possible for a man, when speaking, to say nothing, to do this likewise.

Dionysodorus/ Is it not then possible, for him who is silent to speak?

Ctesippus/ By no means.

Dionysodorus/ Is it also impossible for him, who speaks, to be silent?

Ctesippus/ Still less so.

Dionysodorus/ When therefore you speak of stones, and woods, and things of iron, do you not speak of things silent?

Ctesippus/ I do not, if I am walking in braziers' shops; but the pieces of iron are speaking, and make the greatest noise, if anyone touches them. So that you know not that with all your wisdom you have said nothing. But further still, explain to me the other assertion, how it is possible for one who speaks to be silent.

Socrates/ And Ctesippus appeared to me to be in great agony on account of his boy-love.

Euthydemus/ When you are silent, are you not silent as to all things?

Ctesippus/ I am.

Euthydemus/ Are you not therefore silent as to things which speak, if things which speak are among the number of all things?

Ctesippus/ But what, are not all things silent?

Euthydemus/ Certainly not.

Ctesippus/ Do then, thou best of men, all things speak?

Euthydemus/ The speaking things do.

Ctesippus/ But, I do not ask this; but whether all things are silent, or speak?

Socrates/ Dionysodorus, hastily taking up the discourse, said;

Dionysodorus/ They do neither, and they do both. For I well knew, that you would not have anything to say to this answer.

Socrates/ And Ctesippus, as was usual with him, laughing very loudly, said;

Ctesippus/ Your brother, Euthydemus, has put his argument on both sides, and he has perished and is vanquished.

Socrates/ Clinias was very much delighted and laughed; so that Ctesippus became ten times as great as he was before. But Ctesippus, as being very crafty, appeared to me to have heard these things on the sly from these very men. For such kind of wisdom is not now possessed by any other persons.

Socrates/ Why do you laugh, Clinias, at things so serious and beautiful?

Dionysodorus/ What, Socrates, have you ever seen a beautiful thing?

Socrates/ I have, and many such, Dionysodorus.

Dionysodorus/ Were they then, things different from the beautiful, or the same with the beautiful?

Socrates/ And I then became perfectly involved in doubt, and thought I had suffered justly for having grunted out a word.

They are different from the beautiful; but a certain beauty is present with each of them.

Dionysodorus/ If, then, an ox is present with you, are you an ox? and because I now am present with you, are you Dionysodorus?

Socrates/ Say words of good omen.

Dionysodorus/ But after what manner, if even one thing is present with another, will that which is different be different?

Socrates/ Are you then, in a difficulty respecting this? For I have just now endeavored to imitate the wisdom of the men, as being desirous of it.

Dionysodorus/ How should I not doubt, both I and all other men, of that which is not?

Socrates/ What do you say, Dionysodorus? Is not the beautiful, beautiful, and the base, base?

Dionysodorus/ Provided, it appears so to me.

Socrates/ Does it then appear so to you?

Dionysodorus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is not likewise the same, same? and is not the different, different? For certainly the different is not the same. And I thought that not even a boy would doubt this, that the different is not different. But this, Dionysodorus, you have willingly passed by; since in other respects, like the artists, on whom it is incumbent to work out each part in detail, you seem to me to work out a discourse in a thoroughly beautiful manner.

Dionysodorus/ Do you know then, what is proper for each artist? In the first place, do you know to whom it belongs to work in copper?

Socrates/ I know that this belongs to copper-smiths.

Dionysodorus/ And to whom does it belong to fashion things in clay?

Socrates/ To a potter.

Dionysodorus/ And whose business is it to cut a throat, to flay, and, cutting off small pieces of flesh, to boil and roast them?

Socrates/ It is the business of a cook.

Dionysodorus/ If then, a man does things which are proper, does he not act rightly?

Socrates/ Perfectly.

Dionysodorus/ But it is proper, as you say, that a cook should cut a throat and flay. Have you assented to this or not?

Socrates/ I have assented; but pardon me.

Dionysodorus/ It is evident, then, that should anyone cut the throat of the cook and chop him into small pieces, and boil and roast him, he would do what is proper; and should anyone work like a brazier on the copper-smith himself, and like a potter on the potter, he too would do what is proper.

Socrates/ O Neptune, now you put the Colophon on your wisdom. Will it then ever be present with me, so as to become familiar tome?

Dionysodorus/ You will know it, Socrates, when it becomes familiar to you.

Socrates/ This, is evident, if you wish it.

Dionysodorus/ But what, do you think you know your own things?

Socrates/ Unless you say something else. For I must begin from you, and end with Euthydemus here.

Dionysodorus/ Do you then, consider those things yours, over which you have a power, and which you can use as you please, such as oxen and sheep? do you think that those are yours which it is lawful for you to sell, and to give away, and to sacrifice to whatever god you please; but that those, which are not so circumstanced, are not yours?

Socrates/ And I, for I knew that from the questions something beautiful would peep out, and at the same time I was desirous to hear as quickly as possible, said, It is perfectly so; things of this kind alone are mine.

Dionysodorus/ But what, do you not call those things animals, which possess a soul?

Socrates/ Yes.

Dionysodorus/ Do you acknowledge then, that those alone among animals are yours, to which you have the liberty of doing what I have just now mentioned?

Socrates/ I acknowledge it.

And he, pausing awhile, as if reflecting upon something of great consequence, said with an assumed gravity;

Dionysodorus/ Tell me, Socrates, is there with you a paternal Zeus?

Socrates/ And I suspecting that the discourse would come to the place where it ended, endeavored to fly from a certain crafty turn, and now twisted myself, as if caught in a net; and I said, There is not, Dionysodorus.

Dionysodorus/ You are therefore a miserable man; nor are you an Athenian, since you have neither paternal gods, nor sacred rites, nor anything else beautiful and good.

Socrates/ Hold, Dionysodorus; speak words of good omen, and do not instruct me harshly. For there are to me

altars and sacred rites, both domestic and belonging to my country, and the rest of the things of this kind as appertain to the Athenians.

Dionysodorus/ Then, is there not a paternal Zeus to the rest of the Athenians?

Socrates/ There is not. This appellation exists not to anyone of the Ionians, nor to such as are colonized from this city, nor to us. But Apollo is our paternal god, through the race of Ion; and Zeus is not called by us Paternal, but Herceus and Phratrius; and Minerva too is called Phratria.

Dionysodorus/ This is sufficient, said Dionysodorus; for you have, as it seems, Apollo, Zeus, and Minerva.

Socrates/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ Will not these then, be your gods?

Socrates/ Progenitors, and masters.

Dionysodorus/ To you then, they will be so. Or have you not confessed that they are yours?

Socrates/ I have confessed it. For what could I do?

Dionysodorus/ Are not then, these gods animals likewise? For you have acknowledged that whatever have a soul are animals. Or have not those gods a soul?

Socrates/ They have.

Dionysodorus/ Are they not therefore also animals?

Socrates/ Animals.

Dionysodorus/ But of animals, you have acknowledged these to be yours, which you can give and sell, and sacrifice to any god you please.

Socrates/ I have acknowledged it. For there is no backing out, Euthydemus.

Dionysodorus/ Come then, and straightway tell me, since you acknowledge that Zeus is yours and the other gods likewise, are you permitted to sell them, or give them, or to

use them in any way you please, as you would do other animals?

Socrates/ I then, O Crito, as if struck down by the argument, lay speechless; but Ctesippus, coming as it were to the rescue;

Ctesippus/ Pyppax Hercules, a beautiful discourse!

Dionysodorus/ Whether is Hercules Pyppax, or Pyppax Hercules?

Ctesippus/ O Neptune, what words of wisdom! I retire; the men are unconquerable.

Socrates/ Here indeed, friend Crito, there was not one of those present who did not exceedingly praise the discourse; and the two men were almost stretched at their length, laughing, clapping, and exulting. For upon each and all of the things said previously in a very beautiful manner, the admirers alone of Euthydemus made an uproar; but here, almost the pillars in the Lyceum made a clattering in favor of the two men, and were delighted. I too felt disposed myself to acknowledge that I had never at any time seen men so wise; and being perfectly enslaved by their wisdom, I turned myself to praising and passing encomiums on them; and I said;

O blessed ye for your wondrous genius, who have so rapidly, and in a short time, accomplished a thing of such magnitude! Your arguments indeed, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, contain many other beautiful things; but this is the most magnificent thing in them, that you care nothing for the mass of mankind, nor for persons of solemn mien, and who think themselves something, but only for those who are like yourselves. For I know well, that very few men similar to yourselves, would delight in these arguments; while the rest are so ignorant of them, that, I am sure, they would be more ashamed to confute others with such

arguments, than to be confuted themselves. This too again is another popular and gentle character in your arguments, that when you say there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, or anything else of this kind, and, in short, that one thing is not different from another, you in reality sew up the mouths of men, as indeed you assert you do; and not only the mouths of others, but ye would appear to sew up your own. Now this is a very gracious act, and removes whatever is oppressive in your arguments. The greatest thing however is, that these arguments subsist in such a manner, and have been discovered by you with such skill, that anyone may learn them in a very short time. For I have perceived, by directing my attention to Ctesippus, how rapidly on the instant he has been able to imitate you. The wisdom then of your practice, with respect to its being rapidly imparted to another, is beautiful; but it is not adapted for discussion before men. But, if you will be persuaded by me, be careful not to speak before many, lest through their learning rapidly, they should give you no thanks for your instruction. But especially converse amongst yourselves alone: and if not, should you discourse in the presence of another, let it be before him alone, who gives you silver for what you say. The same advice, if you are wise, you will give to your disciples likewise, never to discourse with any man, except with you and themselves. For that which is rare, Euthydemus, is valuable; but water, although the best of things, as Pindar says, may be bought very cheap. But lead on, and receive Clinias here and myself as your scholars on the sly.

Having, Crito, spoken these words and a few others, we departed. Consider therefore now, how you will accompany me to these men; for they say they are able to teach anyone who is willing to give them money; and that they do not exclude any natural disposition or age; and, what is

especially proper for you to hear, they say that an attention to moneymaking does not hinder anyone from easily receiving their wisdom.

Crito/ In good truth, Socrates, I am desirous of hearing them, and would willingly learn something from them; although I almost appear to be one of those, not like to Euthydemus, but to those who, as you have just said, would more willingly be confuted by such arguments, than confute them. It seems however to me to be ridiculous to give you advice; nevertheless, I wish to relate to you what I have heard. Know then, that as I was taking a walk, a man came to me from among those that had left you, and thinking himself to be very wise, as being one of those who are skilled in speeches suited for courts of justice, said to me

Someone/ Crito, have you heard nothing of these wise men?

Crito/ By Zeus, I have not. For, on account of the crowd, I was unable to stand close and hear.

Someone/ And yet, it was worthwhile to hear them.

Crito/ Why?

Someone/ Because you would have heard men discoursing, who are the wisest of all those who at present engage in such-like arguments.

Crito/ What then did they appear to you?

Someone/ What else, than that they are such as one will always hear from such-like triflers, who bestow unworthy attention on things of no worth.

Crito/ For so did he say in very words.

But certainly philosophy is an elegant thing.

Someone/ How, elegant, O blessed man! It is indeed a thing of no worth. But if you had been present just now, I think you would have been ashamed of your associate. He

was so absurd, as willingly to put himself in the power of men, who pay no attention to what they say, but lay hold of every word. And these men, as I just now said, are among the best of those that exist at present. But indeed, Crito, both the thing itself, and the men who are conversant with it, are worthless and ridiculous.

Crito/ But to me, Socrates, neither he appears to blame the thing with justice, nor would anyone else blame it. To be willing, however, to discourse with these men in the presence of many appears to me to be an act that may be justly blamed.

Socrates/ Wonderful, Crito, are the men of this kind. But I do not yet know what I am about to say. Of what class of men was he, who came to you, and blamed philosophy? Was he some pleader among those who are skillful in contending in courts of justice; or was he one of those who introduce men of this description, and a maker of the speeches with which orators contend?

Crito/ The least of all was he, by Zeus, an orator; nor do I think that he ever ascended the platform in a court of justice; but they say that he is knowing in the thing itself, by Zeus, and likewise that he is a person of power and composes powerful speeches.

Socrates/ I now understand; and I was myself just now about to speak of those men. For they are those, Crito, whom Prodicus says are on the confines of a philosopher and politician; and think themselves to be the wisest of all men; and in addition to their being such, they fancy they seem so to the many; so that none others but the persons engaged in philosophy are an impediment to their gaining a reputation amongst all. They think therefore, that if they can establish an opinion that philosophers are nothing worth, they shall, without a contest, carry off the prize of a reputation for

wisdom amongst all mankind. For they consider themselves to be in reality most wise; but think that they are lessened by the followers of Euthydemus, when they are intercepted in their private discourses. And yet they very reasonably think themselves wise men: for to possess philosophy in moderation, and with moderation to engage in political concerns, is very much according to reason; for this is to partake of both, as far as is requisite, and to enjoy the fruits of wisdom, secure from dangers and contests.

Crito/ What then, do they appear to you, Socrates, to say anything of consequence?

Socrates/ By no means.

Crito/ Yet the discourse of the men possesses a certain speciousness.

Socrates/ It has in reality, Crito, speciousness rather than truth. For it is not easy to persuade them, that in the case of men and all other things, which subsist between two certain things, and partake of both, such as are from good and evil, become better than the one, and worse than the other; but that such things as are from two goods, not tending to the same point, are worse than both, with respect to that, for which each of the things, of which they are composed, is useful; and that such things as are composed of two evils, not tending to the same, are in the middle, these taken alone are better than each of those things, in both of which they take a part. If then philosophy and political action are good, but each tends to something else, and these men, while they partake of both, are situated in the middle, they say nothing to the purpose; for they are viler than both. But if philosophy and political action are both good and bad, these men are better than some and worse than others. But if both are bad, they will thus assert something which is true; but otherwise, not at all. I do not therefore think they

will acknowledge, either that both these are bad, or that the one is bad and the other good; but partaking of both, they are in reality inferior to both, with respect to the performing of either, with a view to which both political science and philosophy are worthy of regard; and though in reality they are the third, they endeavor to appear to be the first. It is requisite, therefore, to pardon their desire, and not to be indignant at them; but we should consider them to be such as they are: for it is requisite to be content with whatever man says anything bordering on intellect, and who courageously labors in going through his task.

Crito/ And indeed, Socrates, I too, as I am always saying to you, am in a difficulty respecting my children, how I ought to treat them. The one indeed is still rather young, and little; but Critobulus is already an adult, and requires someone to be a benefit to him. When therefore I am associating with you, I feel disposed to think that it is madness to be, for the sake of children, so much concerned about many other things, such as marriage, that they may be born of a mother of high family, and about wealth, that they may become very rich, and yet to neglect their education. But when I look at any one of those, who profess to instruct men, I am amazed; and, to tell you the truth, every one of them appears to me, on reflection, to be unfit for the purpose; so that I know not how to give the youth a turn for philosophy.

Socrates/ Know you not, friend Crito, that in every pursuit, the bad are many and of no worth, but the good are few and worthy of all regard? For does not the art of the gymnast, that of the money-scrivener, that of the rhetorician, and that of the general, appear to you to be beautiful?

Crito/ To me in every respect.

Socrates/ What then, in each of these do you not see that the many are to be ridiculed with respect to each of their doings?

Crito/ Yes, by Zeus; and you speak with great truth.

Socrates/ Would you then on this account avoid all those pursuits yourself, and not impose them on your son?

Crito/ This surely, Socrates, would not be just.

Socrates/ Do not then, Crito, do what you ought not; but bidding farewell to those who study philosophy, whether they are good or bad, examine the thing itself, well and properly; and if it appear to you to be a vile thing, turn aside every man from it, and not your sons only; but if it appear to you such as I think it is, boldly pursue and practice it, according to the saying, 'both you and your children'.

Euthydemus.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus.

Crito., Ctesippus, Cleinias.

Scene: —The Lyceum.

Crito/ Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday at the Lyceum? There was such a crowd around you that I could not get within hearing, but I caught a sight of him over their heads, and I made out, as I thought, that he was a stranger with whom you were talking: who was he?

Socrates/ There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean?

Crito/ The one whom I mean was seated second from you on the right-hand side. In the middle was Cleinias the young son of Axiochus, who has wonderfully grown; he is only about the age of my own Critobulus, but he is much forwarder and very good-looking: the other is thin and looks younger than he is.

Socrates/ He whom you mean, Crito, is Euthydemus; and on my left hand there was his brother Dionysodorus, who also took part in the conversation.

Crito/ Neither of them are known to me, Socrates; they are a new importation of Sophists, as I should imagine. Of what country are they, and what is their line of wisdom?

Socrates/ As to their origin, I believe that they are natives of this part of the world, and have migrated from Chios to Thurii; they were driven out of Thurii, and have been living for many years past in these regions. As to their wisdom, about which you ask, Crito, they are wonderful—

consummate! I never knew what the true pancratiast was before; they are simply made up of fighting, not like the two Acarnanian brothers who fight with their bodies only, but this pair of heroes, besides being perfect in the use of their bodies, are invincible in every sort of warfare; for they are capital at fighting in armor, and will teach the art to anyone who pays them; and also they are most skillful in legal warfare; they will plead themselves and teach others to speak and to compose speeches which will have an effect upon the courts. And this was only the beginning of their wisdom, but they have at last carried out the pancratiastic art to the very end, and have mastered the only mode of fighting which had been hitherto neglected by them; and now no one dares even to stand up against them: such is their skill in the war of words, that they can refute any proposition whether true or false. Now I am thinking, Crito, of placing myself in their hands; for they say that in a short time they can impart their skill to anyone.

Crito/ But, Socrates, are you not too old? there may be reason to fear that.

Socrates/ Certainly not, Crito; as I will prove to you, for I have the consolation of knowing that they began this art of disputation which I covet, quite, as I may say, in old age; last year, or the year before, they had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive that I may bring the two strangers into disrepute, as I have done Connus the son of Metrobius, the harp-player, who is still my music-master; for when the boys who go to him see me going with them, they laugh at me and call him grand papa's master. Now I should not like the strangers to experience similar treatment; the fear of ridicule may make them unwilling to receive me; and therefore, Crito, I shall try and persuade some old men to accompany me to them, as I persuaded them to go with me to Connus, and I hope that you will make one: and perhaps

we had better take your sons as a bait; they will want to have them as pupils, and for the sake of them will be willing to receive us.

Crito/ I see no objection, Socrates, if you like; but first I wish that you would give me a description of their wisdom, that I may know beforehand what we are going to learn.

Socrates/ In less than no time you shall hear; for I cannot say that I did not attend—I paid great attention to them, and I remember and will endeavor to repeat the whole story. Providentially I was sitting alone in the dressing-room of the Lyceum where you saw me, and was about to depart; when I was getting up I recognized the familiar divine sign: so I sat down again, and in a little while the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus came in, and several others with them, whom I believe to be their disciples, and they walked about in the covered court; they had not taken more than two or three turns when Cleinias entered, who, as you truly say, is very much improved: he was followed by a host of lovers, one of whom was Ctesippus the Paeanian, a well-bred youth, but also having the wildness of youth. Cleinias saw me from the entrance as I was sitting alone, and at once came and sat down on the right hand of me, as you describe; and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him, at first stopped and talked with one another, now and then glancing at us, for I particularly watched them; and then Euthydemus came and sat down by the youth, and the other by me on the left hand; the rest anywhere. I saluted the brothers, whom I had not seen for a long time; and then I said to Cleinias: Here are two wise men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Cleinias, wise not in a small but in a large way of wisdom, for they know all about war, —all that a good general ought to know about the array and command of an army, and the whole art of fighting in armor: and they know

about law too, and can teach a man how to use the weapons of the courts when he is injured.

They heard me say this, but only despised me. I observed that they looked at one another, and both of them laughed; and then Euthydemus said:

Euthydemus/ Those, Socrates, are matters which we no longer pursue seriously; to us they are secondary occupations.

Socrates/ Indeed, if such occupations are regarded by you as secondary, what must the principal one be; tell me, I beseech you, what that noble study is?

Euthydemus/ The teaching of virtue, Socrates, is our principal occupation; and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than any man.

Socrates/ My God! and where did you learn that? I always thought, as I was saying just now, that your chief accomplishment was the art of fighting in armor; and I used to say as much of you, for I remember that you professed this when you were here before. But now if you really have the other knowledge, O forgive me: I address you as I would superior beings, and ask you to pardon the impiety of my former expressions. But are you quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? the promise is so vast, that a feeling of incredulity steals over me.

Euthydemus/ You may take our word, Socrates, for the fact.

Socrates/ Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king is in the possession of his kingdom. And please to tell me whether you intend to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do?

Euthydemus/ That is why we have come hither, Socrates; and our purpose is not only to exhibit, but also to teach anyone who likes to learn.

Socrates/ But I can promise you, that every unvirtuous person will want to learn. I shall be the first; and there is the youth Cleinias, and Ctesippus: and here are several others, pointing to the lovers of Cleinias, who were beginning to gather round us. Now Ctesippus was sitting at some distance from Cleinias; and when Euthydemus leaned forward in talking with me, he was prevented from seeing Cleinias, who was between us; and so, partly because he wanted to look at his love, and also because he was interested, he jumped up and stood opposite to us: and all the other admirers of Cleinias, as well as the disciples of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, followed his example. And these were the persons whom I showed to Euthydemus, telling him that they were all eager to learn: to which Ctesippus and all of them with one voice vehemently assented, and bid him exhibit the power of his wisdom. Then I said: O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I earnestly request you to do myself and the company the favor to exhibit. There may be some trouble in giving the whole exhibition; but tell me one thing, —can you make a good man of him only who is already convinced that he ought to learn of you, or of him also who is not convinced, either because he imagines that virtue is a thing which cannot be taught at all, or that you are not the teachers of it? Has your art power to persuade him, who is of the latter temper of mind, that virtue can be taught; and that you are the men from whom he will best learn it?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly, Socrates; our art will do both.

Socrates/ And you and your brother, Dionysodorus, of all men who are now living are the most likely to stimulate him to philosophy and to the study of virtue?

Dionysodorus/ Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are.

Socrates/ Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the exhibition, and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will confer a great favor on me and on everyone present; for the fact is I and all of us are extremely anxious that he should become truly good. His name is Cleinias, and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the old Alcibiades, cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young, and we are naturally afraid that someone may get the start of us, and turn his mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined. Your visit, therefore, is most happily timed; and I hope that you will make a trial of the young man, and converse with him in our presence, if you have no objection.

These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used; and Euthydemus, in a manly and at the same time encouraging tone, replied:

Euthydemus/ There can be no objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer questions.

Socrates/ He is quite accustomed to do so; for his friends often come and ask him questions and argue with him; and therefore he is quite at home in answering.

What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? For not slight is the task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and therefore, like the poets, I ought to commence my relation with an invocation to Memory and the Muses. Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows:

Euthydemus/ O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant?

Socrates/ The youth, overpowered by the question, blushed, and in his perplexity looked at me for help; and I, knowing that he was disconcerted, said:

Take courage, Cleinias, and answer like a man whichever you think; for my belief is that you will derive the greatest benefit from their questions.

Dionysodorus/ Whichever he answers;

Socrates/ leaning forward so as to catch my ear, his face beaming with laughter;

Dionysodorus/ I prophesy that he will be refuted, Socrates.

Socrates/ While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer: and therefore I had no time to warn him of the predicament in which he was placed, and he answered that those who learned were the wise.

Euthydemus/ There are some whom you would call teachers, are there not?

Socrates/ The boy assented.

Euthydemus/ And they are the teachers of those who learn—the grammar-master and the lyre-master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners?

Clinias/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning?

Clinias/ No.

Euthydemus/ And were you wise then?

Clinias/ No, indeed.

Euthydemus/ But if you were not wise you were unlearned?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Euthydemus/ You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were learning?

Socrates/ The youth nodded assent.

Euthydemus/ Then the unlearned learn, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine.

Socrates/ At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I spoke, like a chorus at the bidding of their director, laughed and cheered. Then, before the youth had time to recover his breath, Dionysodorus cleverly took him in hand, and said:

Dionysodorus/ Yes, Cleinias; and when the grammar-master, dictated anything to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who learned the dictation?

Clinias/ The wise.

Dionysodorus/ Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned; and your last answer to Euthydemus was wrong.

Socrates/ Then once more the admirers of the two heroes, in an ecstasy at their wisdom, gave vent to another peal of laughter, while the rest of us were silent and amazed. Euthydemus, observing this, determined to persevere with the youth; and in order to heighten the effect went on asking another similar question, which might be compared to the double turn of an expert dancer.

Euthydemus/ Do those who learn, learn what they know, or what they do not know?

Socrates/ Again Dionysodorus whispered to me:

Dionysodorus/ That, Socrates, is just another of the same sort.

Socrates/ Good heavens; and your last question was so good!

Dionysodorus/ Like all our other questions, Socrates, — inevitable.

Socrates/ I see the reason, why you are in such reputation among your disciples.

Meanwhile Cleinias had answered Euthydemus that those who learned learn what they do not know; and he put him through a series of questions the same as before.

Euthydemus/ Do you not know letters?

Socrates/ He assented.

Euthydemus/ All letters?

Clinias/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters?

Socrates/ To this also he assented.

Euthydemus/ Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know?

Socrates/ This again was admitted by him.

Euthydemus/ Then you do not learn that which he dictates; but he only who does not know letters learns?

Clinias/ Nay; but I do learn.

Euthydemus/ Then, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters?

Socrates/ He admitted that.

Euthydemus/ Then, you were wrong in your answer.

Socrates/ The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodorus took up the argument, like a ball which he caught, and had another throw at the youth.

Dionysodorus/ Cleinias, Euthydemus is deceiving you. For tell me now, is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns?

Socrates/ Cleinias assented.

Dionysodorus/ And knowing is having knowledge at the time?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Dionysodorus/ And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time?

Socrates/ He admitted that.

Dionysodorus/ And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing?

Clinias/ Those who have not.

Dionysodorus/ And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of those who have not?

Socrates/ He nodded assent.

Dionysodorus/ Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of those who have?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Dionysodorus/ Then, Cleinias, those who do not know learn, and not those who know.

Socrates/ Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall; but I knew that he was in deep water, and therefore, as I wanted to give him a respite lest he should be disheartened, I said to him consolingly:

You must not be surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of speech: this I say because you may not understand what the two strangers are doing with you; they are only initiating you after the manner of the Corybantes in the mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement, which, if you have ever been initiated, is, as you will know, accompanied by dancing and sport; and now they are just prancing and dancing about you, and will next proceed to initiate you; imagine then that you have gone through the first part of the sophistical ritual, which, as Prodicus says, begins with initiation into the correct use of terms. The two foreign gentlemen, perceiving that you did not know, wanted to explain to you that the word 'to learn' has two meanings, and is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of

some matter of which you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter, whether something done or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired knowledge; the latter is generally called 'knowing' rather than 'learning' but the word 'learning' is also used; and you did not see, as they explained to you, that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who know, and of those who do not know. There was a similar trick in the second question, when they asked you whether men learn what they know or what they do not know. These parts of learning are not serious, and therefore I say that the gentlemen are not serious, but are only playing with you. For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that ever was, he would not be at all the wiser; he would only be able to play with men, tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of words. He would be like a person who pulls away a stool from someone when he is about to sit down, and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of his friend overturned and laid on his back. And you must regard all that has hitherto passed between you and them as merely play. But in what is to follow I am certain that they will exhibit to you their serious purpose, and keep their promise (I will show them how); for they promised to give me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, but I suppose that they wanted to have a game with you first. And now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I think that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the nature of the task, and what sort of a discourse I desire to hear; and if I do this in a very inartistic and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me, for I only venture to improvise before you because I am eager to hear your wisdom: and I must therefore ask you and your disciples to refrain from

laughing. And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you:

Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought not to be asked by a sensible man: for what human being is there who does not desire happiness?

Clinias/ There is no one, who does not.

Socrates/ Well, then, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be happy? —that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.

He assented.

And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us this, which may be easily answered; for everyone will say that wealth is a good.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?

He agreed.

Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honors in one's own land, are goods?

He assented.

And what other goods are there? What do you say of temperance, justice, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say?

Clinias/ They are goods.

Socrates/ Very well; and where in the company shall we find a place for wisdom—among the goods or not?

Clinias/ Among the goods.

Socrates/ And now, think whether we have left out any considerable goods.

Clinias/ I do not think that we have.

Socrates/ Upon recollection, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the greatest of them all.

Clinias/ What is that?

Socrates/ Fortune, Cleinias; which all, even the most foolish, admit to be the greatest of goods.

Clinias/ True.

Socrates/ On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you and I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers.

Clinias/ Why do you say so?

Socrates/ Why, because we have already spoken of good-fortune, and are but repeating ourselves.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward good-fortune, which has a place in the list already, and saying the same thing twice over.

He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied:

Surely wisdom is good-fortune; even a child may know that.

The simple-minded youth was amazed; and, observing his surprise, I said to him: Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players are most fortunate and successful in performing on the flute?

He assented.

And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole than wise pilots?

Clinias/ None, certainly.

Socrates/ And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the risk—in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?

Clinias/ With a wise one.

Socrates/ And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness—a wise physician, or an ignorant one?

Clinias/ A wise one.

Socrates/ You think, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one?

He assented.

Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man would ever err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer.

We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind the previous state of the question.

You remember, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us?

He assented.

And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they profited us not, or if they profited us?

Clinias/ If they profited us.

Socrates/ And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them? For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them?

Clinias/ No indeed, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them?

Clinias/ True.

Socrates/ Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?

Clinias/ Yes, in my opinion.

Socrates/ And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?

Clinias/ He must use them rightly.

Socrates/ That is quite true. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse than the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a good nor an evil. You admit that?

He assented.

Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter?

Clinias/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them?

He agreed.

And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at first—wealth and health and beauty, is not knowledge that which directs us to the right use of them, and regulates our practice about them?

He assented.

Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good-fortune but success?

He again assented.

And tell me, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And who would do least—a poor man or a rich man?

Clinias/ A poor man.

Socrates/ A weak man or a strong man?

Clinias/ A weak man.

Socrates/ A noble man or a mean man?

Clinias/ A mean man.

Socrates/ And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man?

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And an indolent man less than an active man?

He assented.

And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones?

All this was mutually allowed by us.

Then, Cleinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them; and when under the guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater goods: but in themselves they are nothing?

Clinias/ That, is obvious.

Socrates/ What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the result—that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and ignorance the only evil?

He assented.

Let us consider a further point: Seeing that all men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, and a right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and good-fortune in the use of them, is given by knowledge, —the inference is that everybody ought by all means to try and make himself as wise as he can?

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when a man thinks that he ought to obtain this treasure, far more than money, from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor, whether citizen or stranger—the eager desire and prayer to them that they would impart wisdom to you, is not at all dishonorable, Cleinias; nor is anyone to be blamed for doing any honorable service or ministration to any man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you agree?

Clinias/ Yes, I quite agree, and think that you are right.

Socrates/ Yes, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not come to man spontaneously; for this is a point which has still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you and me—

Clinias/ But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught.

Socrates/ Best of men, I am delighted to hear you say so; and I am also grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome investigation as to whether wisdom, can be taught or not. But now, as you think that wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man happy and fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love wisdom, and you individually will try to love her?

Clinias/ Certainly, Socrates; I will do my best.

Socrates/ I was pleased at hearing this; and I turned to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus and said: That is an example, clumsy and tedious I admit, of the sort of exhortations which I would have you give; and I hope that one of you will set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic style: or at least take up the enquiry where I left off, and proceed to show the youth whether he should have all knowledge; or whether there is one sort of knowledge only which will make him good and happy, and what that is. For, as I was saying at first, the improvement of this young man in virtue and wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart.

Thus I spoke, Crito, and was all attention to what was coming. I wanted to see how they would approach the question, and where they would start in their exhortation to the young man that he should practice wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus, who was the elder, spoke first. Everybody's eyes were directed towards him, perceiving that something wonderful might shortly be expected. And certainly they

were not far wrong; for the man, Crito, began a remarkable discourse well worth hearing, and wonderfully persuasive regarded as an exhortation to virtue.

Euthydemus/ Tell me, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest?

Socrates/ I was led by this to imagine that they fancied us to have been jesting when we asked them to converse with the youth, and that this made them jest and play, and being under this impression, I was the more decided in saying that we were in profound earnest. Dionysodorus said:

Dionysodorus/ Reflect, Socrates; you may have to deny your words.

Socrates/ I have reflected; and I shall never deny my words.

Dionysodorus/ Well, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise?

Socrates/ Undoubtedly.

Dionysodorus/ And he is not wise as yet?

Socrates/ At least his modesty will not allow him to say that he is.

Dionysodorus/ You wish him, to become wise and not to be ignorant?

Socrates/ That we do.

Dionysodorus/ You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is?

Socrates/ I was thrown into consternation at this.

Taking advantage of my consternation he added:

Dionysodorus/ You wish him no longer to be what he is, which can only mean that you wish him to perish. Pretty lovers and friends they must be who want their favorite not to be, or to perish!

Socrates/ When Ctesippus heard this he got very angry (as a lover well might) and said:

Ctesippus/ Stranger of Thurii—if politeness would allow me I should say, A plague upon you! What can make you tell such a lie about me and the others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish?

Euthydemus/ And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to tell a lie?

Ctesippus/ Yes; I should be mad to say anything else.

Euthydemus/ And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not?

Ctesippus/ You tell the thing of which you speak.

Euthydemus/ And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ And that is a distinct thing apart from other things?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Euthydemus/ And he who says that thing says that which is?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ And he who says that which is, says the truth. And therefore Dionysodorus, if he says that which is, says the truth of you and no lie.

Ctesippus/ Yes, Euthydemus; but in saying this, he says what is not.

Euthydemus/ And that which is not is not?

Ctesippus/ True.

Euthydemus/ And that which is not is nowhere?

Ctesippus/ Nowhere.

Euthydemus/ And can anyone do anything about that which has no existence, or do to Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere?

Ctesippus/ I think not.

Euthydemus/ Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing?

Ctesippus/ Nay, they do something.

Euthydemus/ And doing is making?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ And speaking is doing and making?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Euthydemus/ Then no one says that which is not, for in saying what is not he would be doing something; and you have already acknowledged that no one can do what is not. And therefore, upon your own showing, no one says what is false; but if Dionysodorus says anything, he says what is true and what is.

Ctesippus/ Yes, Euthydemus; but he speaks of things in a certain way and manner, and not as they really are.

Dionysodorus/ Why, Ctesippus, do you mean to say that anyone speaks of things as they are?

Ctesippus/ Yes, —all gentlemen and truth-speaking persons.

Dionysodorus/ And are not good things good, and evil things evil?

Socrates/ He assented.

Dionysodorus/ And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Dionysodorus/ Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they are?

Ctesippus/ Yes, indeed; and they speak evil of evil men. And if I may give you a piece of advice, you had better take care that they do not speak evil of you, since I can tell you that the good speak evil of the evil.

Dionysodorus/ And do they speak great things of the great and warm things of the warm?

Ctesippus/ To be sure they do; and they speak coldly of the insipid and cold dialectician.

Dionysodorus/ You are abusive, Ctesippus, you are abusive!

Ctesippus/ Indeed, I am not, Dionysodorus; for I love you and am giving you friendly advice, and, if I could, would persuade you not like a boor to say in my presence that I desire my beloved, whom I value above all men, to perish.

Socrates/ I saw that they were getting exasperated with one another, so I made a joke with him and said: O Ctesippus, I think that we must allow the strangers to use language in their own way, and not quarrel with them about words, but be thankful for what they give us. If they know how to destroy men in such a way as to make good and sensible men out of bad and foolish ones—whether this is a discovery of their own, or whether they have learned from someone else this new sort of death and destruction which enables them to get rid of a bad man and turn him into a good one—if they know this (and they do know this—at any rate they said just now that this was the secret of their newly-discovered art)—let them, in their phraseology, destroy the youth and make him wise, and all of us with him. But if you young men do not like to trust yourselves with them, then *fiat experimentum in corpore senis*; I will be the Carian on whom they shall operate. And here I offer my old person to Dionysodorus; he may put me into the pot, like

Medea the Colchian, kill me, boil me, if he will only make me good.

Ctesippus/ And I, Socrates, am ready to commit myself to the strangers; they may skin me alive, if they please (and I am pretty well skinned by them already), if only my skin is made at last, not like that of Marsyas, into a leathern bottle, but into a piece of virtue. And here is Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry with him, when really I am not angry at all; I do but contradict him when I think that he is speaking improperly to me: and you must not confound abuse and contradiction, O illustrious Dionysodorus; for they are quite different things.

Dionysodorus/ Contradiction! Why, there never was such a thing.

Ctesippus/ Certainly there is; there can be no question of that. Do you, Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not?

Dionysodorus/ You will never prove to me, that you have heard anyone contradicting anyone else.

Ctesippus/ Indeed; then now you may hear me contradicting Dionysodorus.

Dionysodorus/ Are you prepared to make that good?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ Well, have not all things words expressive of them?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Dionysodorus/ Of their existence or of their non-existence?

Ctesippus/ Of their existence.

Dionysodorus/ Yes, Ctesippus, and we just now proved, as you may remember, that no man could affirm a negative; for no one could affirm that which is not.

Ctesippus/ And what does that signify? you and I may contradict all the same for that.

Dionysodorus/ But can we contradict one another, when both of us are describing the same thing? Then we must surely be speaking the same thing?

Socrates/ He assented.

Dionysodorus/ Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? For then neither of us says a word about the thing at all?

Socrates/ He granted that proposition also.

Dionysodorus/ But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say something and you say nothing—is there any contradiction? How can he who speaks contradict him who speaks not?

Socrates/ Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said:

What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I have often heard, and have been amazed to hear, this thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples of Protagoras, and others before them, and which to me appears to be quite wonderful, and suicidal as well as destructive, and I think that I am most likely to hear the truth about it from you. The dictum is that there is no such thing as falsehood; a man must either say what is true or say nothing. Is not that your position?

He assented.

But if he cannot speak falsely, may he not think falsely?

Dionysodorus/ No, he cannot.

Socrates/ Then there is no such thing as false opinion?

Dionysodorus/ No.

Socrates/ Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that is impossible?

Dionysodorus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously maintain no man to be ignorant?

Dionysodorus/ Refute me.

Socrates/ But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is impossible?

Euthydemus/ Very true.

Dionysodorus/ Neither did I tell you just now to refute me; for how can I tell you to do that which is not?

Socrates/ O Euthydemus, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties and excellent devices of wisdom; I am afraid that I hardly understand them, and you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid question: if there be no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such thing as erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is acting—that is what you mean?

Euthydemus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now, I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such thing as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of goodness, do you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to anyone who was willing to learn?

Dionysodorus/ And are you such an old fool, Socrates, that you bring up now what I said at first—and if I had said anything last year, I suppose that you would bring that up

too—but are non-plussed at the words which I have just uttered?

Socrates/ Why, they are not easy to answer; for they are the words of wise men: and indeed I know not what to make of this word 'non-plussed' which you used last: what do you mean by it, Dionysodorus? You must mean that I cannot refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other sense.

Dionysodorus/ No, they mean what you say. And now answer.

Socrates/ What, before you, Dionysodorus?

Dionysodorus/ Answer.

Socrates/ And is that fair?

Dionysodorus/ Yes, quite fair.

Socrates/ Upon what principle? I can only suppose that you are a very wise man who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who knows when to answer and when not to answer—and now you will not open your mouth at all, because you know that you ought not.

Dionysodorus/ You prate, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit that I am wise, answer as I tell you.

Socrates/ I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the question.

Dionysodorus/ Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless?

Socrates/ They are alive.

Dionysodorus/ And do you know of any word which is alive?

Socrates/ I cannot say that I do.

Dionysodorus/ Then why did you ask me what sense my words had?

Socrates/ Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a sense; —what do you say, wise man? If I was not in error, even you will not refute me, and all your wisdom will be non-plussed; but if I did fall into error, then again you are wrong in saying that there is no error, —and this remark was made by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument lies where it was and is not very likely to advance: even your skill in the subtleties of logic, which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another and not falling yourself, now any more than of old.

Ctesippus/ Men of Chios, Thurii, or however and whatever you call yourselves, I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to talking nonsense.

Socrates/ Fearing that there would be high words, I again endeavored to soothe Ctesippus, and said to him: To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I said before to Cleinias—that you do not understand the ways of these philosophers from abroad. They are not serious, but, like the Egyptian wizard, Proteus, they take different forms and deceive us by their enchantments: and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until they show themselves to us in earnest. When they begin to be in earnest their full beauty will appear: let us then beg and entreat and beseech them to shine forth. And I think that I had better once more exhibit the form in which I pray to behold them; it might be a guide to them. I will go on therefore where I left off, as well as I can, in the hope that I may touch their hearts and move them to pity, and that when they see me deeply serious and interested, they also may be serious. You, Cleinias, shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we not agree that philosophy should be studied? and was not that our conclusion?

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge?

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what knowledge ought we to acquire? May we not answer with absolute truth—A knowledge which will do us good?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the places where most gold was hidden in the earth?

Clinias/ Perhaps we should.

Socrates/ But have we not already proved, that we should be none the better off, even if without trouble and digging all the gold which there is in the earth were ours? And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the gold? Do you not remember?

Clinias/ I quite remember.

Socrates/ Nor would any other knowledge, whether of money-making, or of medicine, or of any other art which knows only how to make a thing, and not to use it when made, be of any good to us. Am I not right?

He agreed.

And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal, without giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality, neither would there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy of the previous instances?

To all this he agreed.

Then, my dear boy, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as well as makes?

Clinias/ True.

Socrates/ And our desire is not to be skillful lyre-makers, or artists of that sort—far otherwise; for with them the art which makes is one, and the art which uses is another. Although they have to do with the same, they are divided: for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre differ widely from one another. Am I not right?

He agreed.

And clearly we do not want the art of the flute-maker; this is only another of the same sort?

He assented.

But suppose, that we were to learn the art of making speeches—would that be the art which would make us happy?

Clinias/ I should say, no.

Socrates/ And why should you say so?

Clinias/ I see, that there are some composers of speeches who do not know how to use the speeches which they make, just as the makers of lyres do not know how to use the lyres; and also some who are of themselves unable to compose speeches, but are able to use the speeches which the others make for them; and this proves that the art of making speeches is not the same as the art of using them.

Socrates/ Yes; and I take your words to be a sufficient proof that the art of making speeches is not one which will make a man happy. And yet I did think that the art which we have so long been seeking might be discovered in that direction; for the composers of speeches, whenever I meet them, always appear to me to be very extraordinary men, Cleinias, and their art is lofty and divine, and no wonder. For their art is a part of the great art of enchantment, and hardly, if at all, inferior to it: and whereas the art of the enchanter is a mode of charming snakes and spiders and scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art of theirs

acts upon dicasts and ecclesiasts and bodies of men, for the charming and pacifying of them. Do you agree with me?

Clinias/ Yes, I think that you are quite right.

Socrates/ Whither then shall we go, and to what art shall we have recourse?

Clinias/ I do not see my way.

Socrates/ But I think that I do.

Clinias/ And what is your notion?

Socrates/ I think that the art of the general is above all others the one of which the possession is most likely to make a man happy.

Clinias/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ Why not?

Clinias/ The art of the general is surely an art of hunting mankind.

Socrates/ What of that?

Clinias/ Why, no art of hunting extends beyond hunting and capturing; and when the prey is taken the huntsman or fisherman cannot use it; but they hand it over to the cook, and the geometricians and astronomers and calculators (who all belong to the hunting class, for they do not make their diagrams, but only find out that which was previously contained in them)—they, I say, not being able to use but only to catch their prey, hand over their inventions to the dialectician to be applied by him, if they have any sense in them.

Socrates/ Good, fairest and wisest Cleinias. And is this true?

Clinias/ Certainly; just as a general when he takes a city or a camp hands over his new acquisition to the statesman, for he does not know how to use them himself; or as the quail-taker transfers the quails to the keeper of them. If we

are looking for the art which is to make us blessed, and which is able to use that which it makes or takes, the art of the general is not the one, and some other must be found.

Crito/ And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this?

Socrates/ Are you incredulous, Crito?

Crito/ Indeed, I am; for if he did say so, then in my opinion he needs neither Euthydemus nor anyone else to be his instructor.

Socrates/ Perhaps I may have forgotten, and Ctesippus was the real answerer.

Crito/ Ctesippus! nonsense.

Socrates/ All I know is that I heard these words, and that they were not spoken either by Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. I dare say, my good Crito, that they may have been spoken by some superior person: that I heard them I am certain.

Crito/ Yes, indeed, Socrates, by someone a good deal superior, as I should be disposed to think. But did you carry the search any further, and did you find the art which you were seeking?

Socrates/ Find! my dear sir, no indeed. And we cut a poor figure; we were like children after larks, always on the point of catching the art, which was always getting away from us. But why should I repeat the whole story? At last we came to the kingly art, and enquired whether that gave and caused happiness, and then we got into a labyrinth, and when we thought we were at the end, came out again at the beginning, having still to seek as much as ever.

Crito/ How did that happen, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you; the kingly art was identified by us with the political.

Crito/ Well, and what came of that?

Socrates/ To this royal or political art all the arts, including the art of the general, seemed to render up the supremacy, that being the only one which knew how to use what they produce. Here obviously was the very art which we were seeking—the art which is the source of good government, and which may be described, in the language of Aeschylus, as alone sitting at the helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing all things, and utilizing them.

Crito/ And were you not right, Socrates?

Socrates/ You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what followed; for we resumed the enquiry, and a question of this sort was asked: Does the kingly art, having this supreme authority, do anything for us? To be sure, was the answer. And would not you, Crito, say the same?

Crito/ Yes, I should.

Socrates/ And what would you say that the kingly art does? If medicine were supposed to have supreme authority over the subordinate arts, and I were to ask you a similar question about that, you would say—it produces health?

Crito/ I should.

Socrates/ And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have supreme authority over the subject arts—what does that do? Does it not supply us with the fruits of the earth?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme power? Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer?

Crito/ Indeed I am not, Socrates.

Socrates/ No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know that if this is the art which we were seeking, it ought to be useful.

Crito/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And surely it ought to do us some good?

Crito/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ And Cleinias and I had arrived at the conclusion that knowledge of some kind is the only good.

Crito/ Yes, that was what you were saying.

Socrates/ All the other results of politics, and they are many, as for example, wealth, freedom, tranquility, were neither good nor evil in themselves; but the political science ought to make us wise, and impart knowledge to us, if that is the science which is likely to do us good, and make us happy.

Crito/ Yes; that was the conclusion at which you had arrived, according to your report of the conversation.

Socrates/ And does the kingly art make men wise and good?

Crito/ Why not, Socrates?

Socrates/ What, all men, and in every respect? and teach them all the arts, —carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them?

Crito/ I think not, Socrates.

Socrates/ But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it? For it is not the source of any works which are neither good nor evil, and gives no knowledge, but the knowledge of itself; what then can it be, and what are we to do with it? Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge by which we are to make other men good?

Crito/ By all means.

Socrates/ And in what will they be good and useful? Shall we repeat that they will make others good, and that these others will make others again, without ever determining in what they are to be good; for we have put aside the results of politics, as they are called. This is the old, old song over again; and we are just as far as ever, if not farther, from the knowledge of the art or science of happiness.

Crito/ Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great perplexity.

Socrates/ Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck, I lifted up my voice, and earnestly entreated and called upon the strangers to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the argument; they were our Castor and Pollux, and they should be serious, and show us in sober earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us to pass the rest of our lives in happiness.

Crito/ And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge?

Socrates/ Yes, indeed; he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following effect:

Euthydemus/ Would you rather, Socrates, that I should show you this knowledge about which you have been doubting, or shall I prove that you already have it?

Socrates/ What, are you blessed with such a power as this?

Euthydemus/ Indeed I am.

Socrates/ Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a knowledge; at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to learn.

Euthydemus/ Then tell me, do you know anything?

Socrates/ Yes, I know many things, but not anything of much importance.

Euthydemus/ That will do: And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is?

Socrates/ Certainly not.

Euthydemus/ And did you not say that you knew something?

Socrates/ I did.

Euthydemus/ If you know, you are knowing.

Socrates/ Certainly, of the knowledge which I have.

Euthydemus/ That makes no difference and must you not, if you are knowing, know all things?

Socrates/ Certainly not, for there are many other things which I do not know.

Euthydemus/ And if you do not know, you are not knowing.

Socrates/ Yes, friend, of that which I do not know.

Euthydemus/ Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing; and therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to the same things.

Socrates/ A pretty clatter, as men say, Euthydemus, this of yours! and will you explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking? Do you mean to say that the same thing cannot be and also not be; and therefore, since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be knowing and not knowing at the same time, and if I know all things, then I must have the knowledge for which we are seeking—May I assume this to be your ingenious notion?

Euthydemus/ Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are convicted.

Socrates/ Well, but, Euthydemus, has that never happened to you? for if I am only in the same case with you and our beloved Dionysodorus, I cannot complain. Tell me,

then, you two, do you not know some things, and not know others?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ What do you mean; do you know nothing?

Dionysodorus/ Nay, we do know something.

Socrates/ Then, you know all things, if you know anything?

Dionysodorus/ Yes, all things; and that is as true of you as of us.

Socrates/ O, indeed, what a wonderful thing, and what a great blessing! And do all other men know all things or nothing?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly; they cannot know some things, and not know others, and be at the same time knowing and not knowing.

Socrates/ Then what is the inference?

Dionysodorus/ They all know all things, if they know one thing.

Socrates/ O heavens, Dionysodorus, I see now that you are in earnest; hardly have I got you to that point. And do you really and truly know all things, including carpentering and leather-cutting?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do you know stitching?

Dionysodorus/ Yes, by the gods, we do, and cobbling, too.

Socrates/ And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly; did you think we should say *No* to that?

Socrates/ Ctesippus interrupting:

Ctesippus/ By Zeus, I only wish that you would give me some proof which would enable me to know whether you speak truly.

Dionysodorus/ What proof shall I give you?

Ctesippus/ Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? and Euthydemus shall tell how many teeth you have.

Dionysodorus/ Will you not take our word that we know all things?

Ctesippus/ Certainly not: You must further tell us this one thing, and then we shall know that you are speaking the truth; if you tell us the number, and we count them, and you are found to be right, we will believe the rest.

Socrates/ They fancied that Ctesippus was making game of them, and they refused, and they would only say, in answer to each of his questions, that they knew all things. For at last Ctesippus began to throw off all restraint; no question in fact was too bad for him; he would ask them if they knew the foulest things, and they, like wild boars, came rushing on his blows, and fearlessly replied that they did. At last, Crito, I too was carried away by my incredulity, and asked Euthydemus whether Dionysodorus could dance.

Euthydemus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? has he got to such a height of skill as that?

Euthydemus/ He can do anything.

Socrates/ And did you always know this?

Euthydemus/ Always.

Socrates/ When you were children, and at your birth?

They both said that they did. This we could not believe.

Euthydemus/ You are incredulous, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know you to be wise men.

Euthydemus/ But if you will answer, I will make you confess to similar marvels.

Socrates/ Well, there is nothing that I should like better than to be self-convicted of this, for if I am really a wise man, which I never knew before, and you will prove to me that I know and have always known all things, nothing in life would be a greater gain to me.

Euthydemus/ Answer then.

Socrates/ Ask, and I will answer.

Euthydemus/ Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing?

Socrates/ Something.

Euthydemus/ And do you know with what you know, or with something else?

Socrates/ With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul?

Euthydemus/ Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked one?

Socrates/ Well; but then what am I to do? for I will do whatever you bid; when I do not know what you are asking, you tell me to answer nevertheless, and not to ask again.

Euthydemus/ Why, you surely have some notion of my meaning.

Socrates/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Well, then, answer according to your notion of my meaning.

Socrates/ Yes; but if the question which you ask in one sense is understood and answered by me in another, will that please you—if I answer what is not to the point?

Euthydemus/ That will please me very well; but will not please you equally well, as I imagine.

Socrates/ I certainly will not answer unless I understand you.

Euthydemus/ You will not answer, according to your view of the meaning, because you will be prating, and are an ancient.

Socrates/ Now I saw that he was getting angry with me for drawing distinctions, when he wanted to catch me in his springs of words. And I remembered that Connus was always angry with me when I opposed him, and then he neglected me, because he thought that I was stupid; and as I was intending to go to Euthydemus as a pupil, I reflected that I had better let him have his way, as he might think me a blockhead, and refuse to take me. So I said: You are a far better dialectician than myself, Euthydemus, for I have never made a profession of the art, and therefore do as you say; ask your questions once more, and I will answer.

Euthydemus/ Answer then, again, whether you know what you know with something, or with nothing.

Socrates/ Yes; I know with my soul.

Euthydemus/ The man will answer more than the question; for I did not ask you, with what you know, but whether you know with something.

Socrates/ Through ignorance I have answered too much, but I hope that you will forgive me. And now I will answer simply that I always know what I know with something.

Euthydemus/ And is that something always the same, or sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing?

Socrates/ Always, when I know, I know with this.

Euthydemus/ Will you not cease adding to your answers?

Socrates/ My fear is that this word ‘always’ may get us into trouble.

Euthydemus/ You, perhaps, but certainly not us. And now answer: Do you always know with this?

Socrates/ Always; since I am required to withdraw the words ‘when I know.’

Euthydemus/ You always know with this, or, always knowing, do you know some things with this, and some things with something else, or do you know all things with this?

Socrates/ All that I know, I know with this.

Euthydemus/ There again, Socrates, the addition is superfluous.

Socrates/ Well, then, I will take away the words ‘that I know’

Euthydemus/ Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favors of you; but let me ask: Would you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things?

Socrates/ Quite impossible.

Euthydemus/ And now, you may add on whatever you like, for you confess that you know all things.

Socrates/ I suppose that is true, if my qualification implied in the words ‘that I know’ is not allowed to stand; and so I do know all things.

Euthydemus/ And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which you know, whether you make the addition of ‘when you know them’ or not? for you have acknowledged that you have always and at once known all things, that is to say, when you were a child, and at your birth, and when you were growing up, and before you were born, and before the heaven and earth existed, you knew all things, if you always know them; and I swear that you shall

always continue to know all things, if I am of the mind to make you.

Socrates/ But I hope that you will be of that mind, reverend Euthydemus, if you are really speaking the truth, and yet I a little doubt your power to make good your words unless you have the help of your brother Dionysodorus; then you may do it. Tell me now, both of you, for although in the main I cannot doubt that I really do know all things, when I am told so by men of your prodigious wisdom—how can I say that I know such things, Euthydemus, as that the good are unjust; come, do I know that or not?

Euthydemus/ Certainly, you know that.

Socrates/ What do I know?

Euthydemus/ That the good are not unjust.

Socrates/ Quite true; and that I have always known; but the question is, where did I learn that the good are unjust?

Dionysodorus/ Nowhere.

Socrates/ Then, I do not know this.

Euthydemus/ You are ruining the argument!

Socrates/ Said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus;

Euthydemus/ He will be proved not to know, and then after all he will be knowing and not knowing at the same time.

Socrates/ Dionysodorus blushed. I turned to the other, and said;

What do you think, Euthydemus? Does not your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake?

Dionysodorus/ What; am I the brother of Euthydemus?

Socrates/ Please not to interrupt, my good friend, or prevent Euthydemus from proving to me that I know the good to be unjust; such a lesson you might at least allow me to learn.

Dionysodorus/ You are running away, Socrates, and refusing to answer.

Socrates/ No wonder, for I am not a match for one of you, and *a fortiori* I must run away from two. I am no Heracles; and even Heracles could not fight against the Hydra, who was a she-Sophist, and had the wit to shoot up many new heads when one of them was cut off; especially when he saw a second monster of a sea-crab, who was also a Sophist, and appeared to have newly arrived from a sea-voyage, bearing down upon him from the left, opening his mouth and biting. When the monster was growing troublesome he called Iolaus, his nephew, to his help, who ably succored him; but if my Iolaus, who is my brother Patrocles [the statuary], were to come, he would only make a bad business worse.

Dionysodorus/ And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, will you inform me whether Iolaus was the nephew of Heracles any more than he is yours?

Socrates/ I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, for you will insist on asking—that I pretty well know—out of envy, in order to prevent me from learning the wisdom of Euthydemus.

Dionysodorus/ Then answer me.

Socrates/ Well then, I can only reply that Iolaus was not my nephew at all, but the nephew of Heracles; and his father was not my brother Patrocles, but Iphicles, who has a name rather like his, and was the brother of Heracles.

Dionysodorus/ And is Patrocles, your brother?

Socrates/ Yes, he is my half-brother, the son of my mother, but not of my father.

Dionysodorus/ Then he is and is not your brother.

Socrates/ Not by the same father, my good man, for Chaeredemus was his father, and mine was Sophroniscus.

Dionysodorus/ And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also?

Socrates/ Yes; the former was my father, and the latter his.

Dionysodorus/ Then, Chaeredemus is not a father.

Socrates/ He is not my father.

Dionysodorus/ But can a father be other than a father? or are you the same as a stone?

Socrates/ I certainly do not think that I am a stone, though I am afraid that you may prove me to be one.

Dionysodorus/ Are you not other than a stone?

Socrates/ I am.

Dionysodorus/ And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than gold, you are not gold?

Socrates/ Very true.

Dionysodorus/ And so Chaeredemus, being other than a father, is not a father?

Socrates/ I suppose that he is not a father.

Euthydemus, taking up the argument, said;

Euthydemus/ For if Chaeredemus is a father, then Sophroniscus, being other than a father, is not a father; and you, Socrates, are without a father.

Socrates/ Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said:

Ctesippus/ And is not your father in the same case, for he is other than my father?

Euthydemus/ Assuredly not.

Ctesippus/ Then he is the same?

Euthydemus/ He is the same.

Ctesippus/ I cannot say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men?

Euthydemus/ Of all other men. Do you suppose the same person to be a father and not a father?

Ctesippus/ Certainly, I did so imagine.

Euthydemus/ And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man?

Ctesippus/ They are not '*in pari materia*' Euthydemus, and you had better take care, for it is monstrous to suppose that your father is the father of all.

Euthydemus/ But he is.

Ctesippus/ What, of men only, or of horses and of all other animals?

Euthydemus/ Of all.

Ctesippus/ And your mother, too, is the mother of all?

Euthydemus/ Yes, our mother too.

Ctesippus/ Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea-urchins then?

Euthydemus/ Yes; and yours.

Ctesippus/ And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers?

Euthydemus/ And yours too.

Ctesippus/ And your papa is a dog?

Euthydemus/ And so is yours.

Dionysodorus/ If you will answer my questions, I will soon extract the same admissions from you, Ctesippus. You say that you have a dog.

Ctesippus/ Yes, a villain of a one.

Dionysodorus/ And he has puppies?

Ctesippus/ Yes, and they are very like himself.

Dionysodorus/ And the dog is the father of them?

Ctesippus/ Yes, I certainly saw him and the mother of the puppies come together.

Dionysodorus/ And is he not yours?

Ctesippus/ To be sure he is.

Dionysodorus/ Then he is a father, and he is yours; ergo, he is your father, and the puppies are your brothers.

Socrates/ Dionysodorus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word, said;

Dionysodorus/ Let me ask you one little question more: You beat this dog?

Socrates/ Laughing, Ctesippus said;

Ctesippus/ Indeed I do; and I only wish that I could beat you instead of him.

Dionysodorus/ Then you beat your father.

Ctesippus/ I should have far more reason to beat yours; what could he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? much good has this father of you and your brethren the puppies got out of this wisdom of yours.

Dionysodorus/ But neither he nor you, Ctesippus, have any need of much good.

Ctesippus/ And have you no need, Euthydemus?

Euthydemus/ Neither I nor any other man; for tell me now, Ctesippus, if you think it good or evil for a man who is sick to drink medicine when he wants it; or to go to war armed rather than unarmed.

Ctesippus/ Good, I say. And yet I know that I am going to be caught in one of your charming puzzles.

Euthydemus/ That, you will discover, if you answer; since you admit medicine to be good for a man to drink, when wanted, must it not be good for him to drink as much as possible; when he takes his medicine, a cartload of hellebore will not be too much for him?

Ctesippus/ Quite so, Euthydemus, that is to say, if he who drinks is as big as the statue of Delphi.

Euthydemus/ And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as many spears and shields as possible?

Ctesippus/ Very true; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought to have one shield only, and one spear?

Euthydemus/ I do.

Ctesippus/ And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? Considering that you and your companion fight in armor, I thought that you would have known better....

Socrates/ Here Euthydemus held his peace, but Dionysodorus returned to the previous answer of Ctesippus and said: —

Dionysodorus/ Do you not think that the possession of gold is a good thing?

Ctesippus/ Yes, and the more the better.

Dionysodorus/ And to have money everywhere and always is a good?

Ctesippus/ Certainly, a great good.

Dionysodorus/ And you admit gold to be a good?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always, and as much as possible in himself, and may he not be deemed the happiest of men who has three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his pate, and a stater of gold in either eye?

Ctesippus/ Yes, Euthydemus; and the Scythians reckon those who have gold in their own skulls to be the happiest and bravest of men (that is only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and father), and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their own skulls gilt, and see the inside of them, and hold their own head in their hands.

Euthydemus/ And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, or that which has not?

Ctesippus/ That which has the quality of vision clearly.

Euthydemus/ And you also see that which has the quality of vision?

Ctesippus/ Yes, I do.

Euthydemus/ Then do you see our garments?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Then our garments have the quality of vision.

Ctesippus/ They can see to any extent.

Euthydemus/ What can they see?

Ctesippus/ Nothing; but you, my sweet man, may perhaps imagine that they do not see; and certainly, Euthydemus, you do seem to me to have been caught napping when you were not asleep, and that if it be possible to speak and say nothing—you are doing so.

Socrates/ Dionysodorus said;

Dionysodorus/ And may there not be a silence of the speaker?

Ctesippus/ Impossible.

Dionysodorus/ Or a speaking of the silent?

Ctesippus/ That is still more impossible.

Dionysodorus/ But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the silent?

Ctesippus/ Not when I pass a smithy; for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise and outcry if they are touched: so that here your wisdom is strangely mistaken; please, however, to tell me how you can be silent when speaking

Socrates/ (I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because Cleinias was present).

Euthydemus/ When you are silent is there not a silence of all things?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ But if speaking things are included in all things, then the speaking are silent.

Ctesippus/ What; then all things are not silent?

Euthydemus/ Certainly not.

Ctesippus/ Then, my good friend, do they all speak?

Euthydemus/ Yes; those which speak.

Ctesippus/ Nay, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak?

Socrates/ Dionysodorus quickly interposing: —

Dionysodorus/ Neither and both; I am sure that you will be 'non-plussed' at that answer.

Socrates/ Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter; he said;

Ctesippus/ That brother of yours, Euthydemus, has got into a dilemma; all is over with him.

Socrates/ This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus ten times as uproarious; but I cannot help thinking that the rogue must have picked up this answer from them; for there has been no wisdom like theirs in our time.

Socrates/ Why do you laugh, Cleinias, at such solemn and beautiful things?

Dionysodorus/ Why, Socrates, did you ever see a beautiful thing?

Socrates/ Yes, Dionysodorus, I have seen many.

Dionysodorus/ Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful?

Socrates/ Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all:

They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have beauty present with each of them.

Dionysodorus/ And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you?

Socrates/ God forbid.

Dionysodorus/ But how, by reason of one thing being present with another, will one thing be another?

Socrates/ Is that your difficulty? For I was beginning to imitate their skill, on which my heart was set.

Dionysodorus/ Of course, I and all the world are in a difficulty about the non-existent.

Socrates/ What do you mean, Dionysodorus? Is not the honorable honorable and the base base?

Dionysodorus/ That, is as I please.

Socrates/ And do you please?

Dionysodorus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other; for surely the other is not the same; I should imagine that even a child will hardly deny the other to be other. But I think, Dionysodorus, that you must have intentionally missed the last question; for in general you and your brother seem to me to be good workmen in your own department, and to do the dialectician's business excellently well.

Dionysodorus/ What is the business of a good workman? tell me, in the first place, whose business is hammering?

Socrates/ The smith's.

Dionysodorus/ And whose the making of pots?

Socrates/ The potter's.

Dionysodorus/ And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast?

Socrates/ The cook.

Dionysodorus/ And if a man does his business he does rightly?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted that?

Socrates/ Yes, I have admitted that, but you must not be too hard upon me.

Dionysodorus/ Then if someone were to kill, mince, boil, roast the cook, he would do his business, and if he were to hammer the smith, and make a pot of the potter, he would do their business.

Socrates/ Poseidon, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have such wisdom of my own?

Dionysodorus/ And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has become your own?

Socrates/ Certainly, if you will allow me.

Dionysodorus/ What, do you think that you know what is your own?

Socrates/ Yes, I do, subject to your correction; for you are the bottom, and Euthydemus is the top, of all my wisdom.

Dionysodorus/ Is not that which you would deem your own, that which you have in your own power, and which you are able to use as you would desire, for example, an ox or a sheep—would you not think that which you could sell and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased, to be your

own, and that which you could not give or sell or sacrifice you would think not to be in your own power?

Socrates/ Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come out of the questions, which I was impatient to hear); yes, such things, and such things only are mine.

Dionysodorus/ Yes, and you would mean by animals living beings?

Socrates/ Yes.

Dionysodorus/ You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the power to do all these things which I was just naming?

Socrates/ I agree.

Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of something great, he said:

Dionysodorus/ Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus?

Socrates/ Here, anticipating the final move, like a person caught in a net, who gives a desperate twist that he may get away:

No, Dionysodorus, I have not.

Dionysodorus/ What a miserable man you must be then; you are not an Athenian at all if you have no ancestral gods or temples, or any other mark of gentility.

Socrates/ Nay, Dionysodorus, do not be rough; good words, if you please; in the way of religion I have altars and temples, domestic and ancestral, and all that other Athenians have.

Dionysodorus/ And have not other Athenians, an ancestral Zeus?

Socrates/ That name, is not to be found among the Ionians, whether colonists or citizens of Athens; an ancestral Apollo there is, who is the father of Ion, and a family Zeus,

and a Zeus guardian of the phratry, and an Athene guardian of the phratry. But the name of ancestral Zeus is unknown to us.

Dionysodorus/ No matter, for you admit that you have Apollo, Zeus, and Athene.

Socrates/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ And they are your gods.

Socrates/ Yes, my lords and ancestors.

Dionysodorus/ At any rate they are yours, did you not admit that?

Socrates/ I did; what is going to happen to me?

Dionysodorus/ And are not these gods animals? for you admit that all things which have life are animals; and have not these gods life?

Socrates/ They have life.

Dionysodorus/ Then are they not animals?

Socrates/ They are animals.

Dionysodorus/ And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased?

Socrates/ I did admit that, Euthydemus, and I have no way of escape.

Euthydemus/ Well then, if you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours, can you sell them or give them away or do what you will with them, as you would with other animals?

Socrates/ At this I was quite struck dumb, Crito, and lay prostrate. Ctesippus came to the rescue.

Ctesippus/ Bravo, Heracles, brave words.

Dionysodorus/ Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo?

Ctesippus/ Poseidon, what awful distinctions. I will have no more of them; the pair are invincible.

Socrates/ Then, my dear Crito, there was universal applause of the speakers and their words, and what with laughing and clapping of hands and rejoicings the two men were quite overpowered; for hitherto their partisans only had cheered at each successive hit, but now the whole company shouted with delight until the columns of the Lyceum returned the sound, seeming to sympathize in their joy. To such a pitch was I affected myself, that I made a speech, in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like of their wisdom; I was their devoted servant, and fell to praising and admiring of them. What marvelous dexterity of wit, enabled you to acquire this great perfection in such a short time? There is much, indeed, to admire in your words, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, but there is nothing that I admire more than your magnanimous disregard of any opinion—whether of the many, or of the grave and reverend seigniors—you regard only those who are like yourselves. And I do verily believe that there are few who are like you, and who would approve of such arguments; the majority of mankind are so ignorant of their value, that they would be more ashamed of employing them in the refutation of others than of being refuted by them. I must further express my approval of your kind and public-spirited denial of all differences, whether of good and evil, white or black, or any other; the result of which is that, as you say, every mouth is sewn up, not excepting your own, which graciously follows the example of others; and thus all ground of offence is taken away. But what appears to me to be more than all is, that this art and invention of yours has been so admirably contrived by you, that in a very short time it can be imparted to anyone. I observed that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time. Now this quickness of attainment is an excellent

thing; but at the same time I would advise you not to have any more public entertainments; there is a danger that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy an opportunity of acquiring; the exhibition would be best of all, if the discussion were confined to your two selves; but if there must be an audience, let him only be present who is willing to pay a handsome fee; —you should be careful of this; —and if you are wise, you will also bid your disciples discourse with no man but you and themselves. For only what is rare is valuable; and 'water' which, as Pindar says, is the 'best of all things' is also the cheapest. And now I have only to request that you will receive Cleinias and me among your pupils.

Such was the discussion, Crito: and after a few more words had passed between us we went away. I hope that you will come to them with me, since they say that they are able to teach anyone who will give them money; no age or want of capacity is an impediment. And I must repeat one thing which they said, for your especial benefit, —that the learning of their art did not at all interfere with the business of money-making.

Crito/ Truly, Socrates, though I am curious and ready to learn, yet I fear that I am not like-minded with Euthydemus, but one of the other sort, who, as you were saying, would rather be refuted by such arguments than use them in refutation of others. And though I may appear ridiculous in venturing to advise you, I think that you may as well hear what was said to me by a man of very considerable pretensions—he was a professor of legal oratory—who came away from you while I was walking up and down.

Someone/ 'Crito, are you giving no attention to these wise men?'

Crito/ 'No, indeed I could not get within hearing of them—there was such a crowd.'

Someone/ 'You would have heard something worth hearing if you had.'

Crito/ 'What was that?'

Someone/ 'You would have heard the greatest masters of the art of rhetoric discoursing.'

Crito/ 'And what did you think of them?'

Someone/ 'What did I think of them?'—'theirs was the sort of discourse which anybody might hear from men who were playing the fool, and making much ado about nothing.'

Crito/ That was the expression which he used.

'Surely,' I said, 'philosophy is a charming thing.'

Someone/ 'Charming! what simplicity! philosophy is naught; and I think that if you had been present you would have been ashamed of your friend—his conduct was so very strange in placing himself at the mercy of men who care not what they say, and fasten upon every word. And these, as I was telling you, are supposed to be the most eminent professors of their time. But the truth is, Crito, that the study itself and the men themselves are utterly mean and ridiculous.'

Crito/ Now censure of the pursuit, Socrates, whether coming from him or from others, appears to me to be undeserved; but as to the impropriety of holding a public discussion with such men, there, I confess that, in my opinion, he was in the right.

Socrates/ O Crito, they are marvelous men; but what was I going to say? First of all let me know; —What manner of man was he who came up to you and censured philosophy; was he an orator who himself practices in the courts, or an

instructor of orators, who makes the speeches with which they do battle?

Crito/ He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether he had ever been into court; but they say that he knows the business, and is a clever man, and composes wonderful speeches.

Socrates/ Now I understand, Crito; he is one of an amphibious class, whom I was on the point of mentioning—one of those whom Prodicus describes as on the borderground between philosophers and statesmen—they think that they are the wisest of all men, and that they are generally esteemed the wisest; nothing but the rivalry of the philosophers stands in their way; and they are of the opinion that if they can prove the philosophers to be good for nothing, no one will dispute their title to the palm of wisdom, for that they are themselves really the wisest, although they are apt to be mauled by Euthydemus and his friends, when they get hold of them in conversation. This opinion which they entertain of their own wisdom is very natural; for they have a certain amount of philosophy, and a certain amount of political wisdom; there is reason in what they say, for they argue that they have just enough of both, and so they keep out of the way of all risks and conflicts and reap the fruits of their wisdom.

Crito/ What do you say of them, Socrates? There is certainly something specious in that notion of theirs.

Socrates/ Yes, Crito, there is more speciousness than truth; they cannot be made to understand the nature of intermediates. For all persons or things, which are intermediate between two other things, and participate in both of them—if one of these two things is good and the other evil, are better than the one and worse than the other; but if they are in a mean between two good things which do not

tend to the same end, they fall short of either of their component elements in the attainment of their ends. Only in the case when the two component elements which do not tend to the same end are evil is the participant better than either. Now, if philosophy and political action are both good, but tend to different ends, and they participate in both, and are in a mean between them, then they are talking nonsense, for they are worse than either; or, if the one be good and the other evil, they are better than the one and worse than the other; only on the supposition that they are both evil could there be any truth in what they say. I do not think that they will admit that their two pursuits are either wholly or partly evil; but the truth is, that these philosopher-politicians who aim at both fall short of both in the attainment of their respective ends, and are really third, although they would like to stand first. There is no need, however, to be angry at this ambition of theirs—which may be forgiven; for every man ought to be loved who says and manfully pursues and works out anything which is at all like wisdom: at the same time we shall do well to see them as they really are.

Crito/ I have often told you, Socrates, that I am in a constant difficulty about my two sons. What am I to do with them? There is no hurry about the younger one, who is only a child; but the other, Critobulus, is getting on, and needs someone who will improve him. I cannot help thinking, when I hear you talk, that there is a sort of madness in many of our anxieties about our children: —in the first place, about marrying a wife of good family to be the mother of them, and then about heaping up money for them—and yet taking no care about their education. But then again, when I contemplate any of those who pretend to educate others, I am amazed. To me, if I am to confess the truth, they all seem to be such outrageous beings: so that I do not know how I can advise the youth to study philosophy.

Socrates/ Dear Crito, do you not know that in every profession the inferior sort are numerous and good for nothing, and the good are few and beyond all price: for example, are not gymnastic and rhetoric and money-making and the art of the general, noble arts?

Crito/ Certainly they are, in my judgment.

Socrates/ Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are ridiculous performers?

Crito/ Yes, indeed, that is very true.

Socrates/ And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son?

Crito/ That would not be reasonable, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind whether the teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think only of philosophy herself. Try and examine her well and truly, and if she be evil seek to turn away all men from her, and not your sons only; but if she be what I believe that she is, then follow her and serve her, you and your house, as the saying is, and be of good cheer.

Euthydemus.

Translated by W. H. D. Rouse.

Persons of the Dialog.

Crito, Socrates, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus,
Clinias, Ctesippus.

Crito/ Who was it, Socrates, you were talking to yesterday in the Lyceum? There was such a great crowd about you people that I myself, wanting to hear, could not get any nearer or hear anything clearly; however I stretched up and had a look over, and I thought it was a stranger you were talking to. Who was it?

Socrates/ Which do you mean, Crito? There were two of them, not one.

Crito/ The one I mean was sitting third from you on your right, and between you was Axiochus' boy. I thought he had grown quite a lot, Socrates, almost as big as our own Critobulus; but Critobulus is thinnish, and this boy is well-grown and handsome and good-looking.

Socrates/ Euthydemus is the man you ask about, Crito, and the one sitting on my left next to me was his brother Dionysodorus. This man is a partner in the talks.

Crito/ I don't know either of them, Socrates. These are new men again, I suppose Sophists. Where do they come from? And what is their line?

Socrates/ They come from somewhere in these parts, I think, from Chios, and went away and joined the colony at Thurii, but they were turned out and they have spent a good many years since then in this part of the world. You ask their line—it will surprise you, Crito—they simply take every line, they are regular know-alls. I never knew till now what all-round athletes were! These two are quite all-champions!

They surpass the two Acamanian brothers, those all-round athletes, for those could do nothing but fight with their bodies. But these! First of all they are first-rate in fighting with their bodies and battling with all comers—they are themselves masters at fighting in armor, and can make anyone else expert who would pay their fee. Next, in the battle of the law courts they are champions; they can compete themselves and teach others to speak, and they can compose speeches suitable to deliver in court. Well, hitherto this was all they were clever at, but now they have put the finishing touch on their all-round virtuosity, for they have now mastered the only battle left to them, so that no one will dare so much as to put up his hands against them—they have become so skillful in wordy warfare that they can confute with equal success anything which anyone says, whether false or true! So now, my dear Crito, I have it in mind to become their pupil, for they say that in quite a short time they would make anyone else as skillful as they are.

Crito/ I say, Socrates! Aren't you afraid, at your time of life, that you are too old?

Socrates/ Not the least, my dear Crito, I have proof and encouragement enough to make me quite fearless. The two men themselves were what you might call old men before they started at this science, disputation, which I want to acquire; last year or the year before they had not yet got it. The only thing I really do fear is that I may bring discredit on the two strangers, as on poor Connus, Metrobius' son the harpist, who is now still trying to teach me to play the harp; the boys, my school-fellows, look on and laugh at me and call Connus 'old Gaffer-Teacher'! Someone may taunt the two strangers with the same nickname, and quite likely they might refuse me as a pupil for fear of it. But anyhow, my dear Crito, I have persuaded a few other ancients to come with me to learn at Connus', and I will try to do the same

here. What about you—will you be my school-fellow? We will bring your sons with us as a bait. I am sure they will teach us too, because they will want the boys.

Crito/ I'm willing, Socrates, if you wish it. But tell me first what their science is, and then I shall know what we are to learn.

Socrates/ I can do that at once. I can't pretend that I did not pay attention for I certainly did, and I remember it well and will try to tell you the whole story from the beginning.

—I happened providentially to be sitting in the place where you saw me, alone in the undressing room, and had just thought it was time to get up; but as I was getting up, I had my usual divine presentiment.

So I sat down again, and soon after in came these two, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and others with them—a number of pupils I think. The two men came in, and walked round in the cloisters. They had hardly gone round two or three times when Clinias also came in, the one you say has grown so much, and you are quite right; behind him were a great many of his admirers, and among them Ctesippus, from Paeania, a fine handsome young man but rather wild as young men are. Clinias saw me from the entrance, sitting alone, so he came straight to me and sat beside me on my right, just as you say. When Dionysodorus and Euthydemus caught sight of him, first they stood and talked to each other for a time, throwing glance after glance at us—for I watched them carefully—then they came up, and one, Euthydemus, sat down beside the boy, the other by me on my left, and the rest as each happened.

—I said good day to the two, as it was some time since I had seen them; after that I said to Clinias, These two men, Clinias, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, are men of wisdom, and no small wisdom indeed. They know everything about

war, as much as is needed for becoming a general, all about tactics, and how to lead an army, and how to fight in full armor, and moreover they can make a man able to defend himself in the law courts if he is wronged.

They turned up their noses at this; they looked at each other and laughed, and Euthydemus said;

Euthydemus/ We don't trouble about those things now, Socrates, we treat them just as side shows.

Socrates/ That surprised me, and I replied;

Your main show must be a fine one, if such great subjects as those have come to be side shows. Tell me what this fine show is, in heaven's name!

Euthydemus/ Virtue, Socrates! We believe we can impart it—no one in the world so well or so quickly!

Socrates/ O God! What an achievement! Where did you find this godsend? As I said just now, I thought of you two especially as skillful at fighting in full armor, and that is what I said of you; for when you first stayed in this town, I remember this was what you professed. Well, if you now truly have this knowledge, O be gracious! —for I humbly address you as gods, and I pray your pardon for what I said before. But do think, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus—are you quite sure this is the truth? One cannot help feeling doubtful at such a portentous announcement.

Euthydemus/ Be assured, Socrates, that this is true.

Socrates/ Then I felicitate you on your possession, much more than I would congratulate the Great King on his empire! Let me ask you if you have it in mind to demonstrate this wisdom? Or what do you mean to do?

Euthydemus/ That's the very reason why we are here, Socrates, to demonstrate and to teach, if anyone is willing to learn.

Socrates/ I will go bail that all those who have not got it will be willing! First myself, then Clinias here, and no doubt Ctesippus and these others, pointing at the admirers of Clinias—they were all standing around us by this time. For Ctesippus was sitting, so I thought, a good way off from Clinias, but what happened was that Euthydemus as he talked to me, leaning forward, hid Clinias, who was between us, from Ctesippus; so Ctesippus wishing to watch his dear boy and also greedy to hear, had jumped up and came and stood right in front of us; the others seeing him did the same and gathered round us, both the admirers of Clinias and the companions of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. These I pointed to when I said all were ready to learn, and Ctesippus eagerly said yes and so did the others, and they all asked the two brothers to demonstrate the power of their wisdom to all the company.

—So I said, My friends Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I beg you, do all you can to oblige these people, and for my sake also do demonstrate. A great task, if you take it as a complete whole. But please tell me one thing—can you make a man a good man only if he is already convinced that he must learn from you, or can you do it also to one who is not yet convinced, through doubting that the thing, virtue, can be learned at all or that you two can teach it? If you please, for a man in that condition, is it the work of the same art to convince him both that virtue is teachable and that you here are the people from whom one could best learn it? Or are these two different arts?

Dionysodorus/ No, no, Socrates, it is the same art—our art.

Socrates/ So you, Dionysodorus, would be the best people in the world to incline a man toward philosophy and the practice of virtue?

Dionysodorus/ Yes, Socrates, we think so.

Socrates/ Very well, leave the rest of the demonstration for another time, and just demonstrate this one thing. Persuade this young man that he must love wisdom and practice virtue, and you will oblige me and all these. For the truth about this boy is that both I myself and all these anxiously desire that he should become as good as a man can be. This is the son of Axiochus and the grandson of the famous Alcibiades, and cousin of the present Alcibiades; his name is Clinias. He is young, and we are afraid for him, as for other young men, that someone may get in first and turn his mind in some other direction, and ruin him. You have come, then, most fortunately. If you do not mind, please make trial of the lad, and talk with him before us.

—When I had spoken, almost in these very words, Euthydemus answered bravely and boldly, Oh, we don't mind, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer.

Why, he is quite used to that, These people here are always coming and talking with him and asking all sorts of questions, so he is not at all shy in answering.

—What followed, Crito, how could I describe properly? It is not a small business to recall and repeat wisdom ineffably great! So I must begin my description as the poets do, by invoking the Muses and Memory herself!

Well, Euthydemus began something like this, I think.

Euthydemus/ Now Clinias, which of mankind are the learners, the wise or the ignorant?

Socrates/ This was a large question; so the boy blushed, and looked at me in doubt. Seeing that he was troubled I said, My dear Clinias, cheer up and answer like a man, whichever you think, for perhaps it will do you a deal of good.

Just then, Dionysodorus leaned over me, and whispered in my ear, smiling all over his face;

Dionysodorus/ Now look here, Socrates, I prophesy that whichever the lad answers, he will be refuted!

Socrates/ While he spoke, Clinias made his answer, so I had no chance to warn the boy to take care, and he answered that the wise were the learners.

And Euthydemus said;

Euthydemus/ There are people you call teachers, aren't there?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Euthydemus/ The teachers are teachers of master and the grammar master boys, and you were learners?

Clinias/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Of course at the time when the learners; for example, the music were teachers of you and the other you were learning, you did not yet know the things you were learning?

Clinias/ No.

Euthydemus/ Then you were wise when you did not know these things?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Euthydemus/ If not wise, then ignorant?

Clinias/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ So you boys, while learning what you did not know, were ignorant and were learning?

Socrates/ The boy nodded.

Euthydemus/ So the ignorant learn, my dear Clinias, not the wise as you suppose.

Socrates/ When he said this, it was like conductor and chorus—he signaled, and they all cheered and laughed, I mean Dionysodorus and Euthydemus and their followers.

Then before the boy could take one good breath, Dionysodorus took over and said;

Dionysodorus/ What happened, my dear Clinias, when the grammar man dictated to you? Which of the boys learned the things dictated, wise or ignorant?

Clinias/ The wise ones.

Dionysodorus/ Then the wise ones learn and not the ignorant, and you answered wrong just now to my brother.

Socrates/ Then indeed the two men's admirers laughed loud and long, applauding their wisdom, but all the rest of us were dumb-struck and had nothing to say. Euthydemus noticed that we were dumb-struck and wanted us to admire him more; so he would not let the boy alone, but went on asking, doubling and twisting around the same question like a clever dancer. He said;

Euthydemus/ Do the learners learn what they know, or what they don't know?

Socrates/ And Dionysodorus whispered softly to me again;

Dionysodorus/ Here's another, Socrates, just like the first.

Socrates/ Good heavens, really I thought that first one of yours a fine question!

Dionysodorus/ All our questions are like that, Socrates—no escape!

Socrates/ Now, I can see why you have such a reputation among your pupils!

Meanwhile Clinias answered Euthydemus that the learners learned what they did not know, and he went on in the same way as before :

Euthydemus/ Very well; do you not know your letters?

Clinias/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ All of them, eh?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Euthydemus/ And when a teacher dictates anything, does he not dictate letters?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Euthydemus/ Then he dictates a bit of what you know, if you know them all?

Socrates/ He agreed to this too.

Euthydemus/ Very well, *you* do not learn what someone dictates, but only the one who does not know letters learns them? Eh?

Clinias/ No, no, I do learn them.

Euthydemus/ Then you learn what you know, since you know all the letters.

Socrates/ He agreed.

Euthydemus/ Then you did not answer right.

Socrates/ The word had scarcely come out of his mouth, when Dionysodorus caught it like a ball and aimed it again at the boy, saying;

Dionysodorus/ Euthydemus is cheating you, my dear Clinias. Just tell me, is not learning getting knowledge of whatever one learns?

Socrates/ Clinias agreed.

Dionysodorus/ But to know is surely to have knowledge of something already?

Clinias/ Yes.

Dionysodorus/ Then not to know is not yet to have knowledge?

Socrates/ He agreed with this.

Dionysodorus/ Well, are those who get anything, those who have it already, or those who have not?

Clinias/ Those who have not.

Dionysodorus/ Have you not agreed that those who do not know belong also to this class, those who have not?

Socrates/ He nodded.

Dionysodorus/ And the learners are of the class who get, not those who have?

Clinias/ Yes.

Dionysodorus/ Then those who do not know, learn, not those who do.

Socrates/ Now Euthydemus was getting ready to give the young man the third fall in this wrestling match, but I saw the boy was out of his depth, and hoped to give him time to rest that he might not let us down; so I said, to encourage him, My dear Clinias, do not be surprised if the arguments appear strange to you. Perhaps you do not understand what our visitors are doing with you. They are doing the same as the Corybantes do in their initiations, when the one to be initiated is being enthroned. There is dancing and play there also, as you know if you have been initiated; and now these are only dancing round you in play, meaning to initiate you afterward. So consider now that you are hearing the beginnings of the sophistic ritual. For you must learn first of all, as Prodicus says, the right use of words; and this is just what the two visitors are showing to you, because you did not know that people use the word *learn* in two senses—first, when one has no knowledge at the beginning about something, and then afterward gets the knowledge, and second, when one already having the knowledge uses this knowledge to examine this same thing done or spoken. The second is called understanding rather than learning, but sometimes it is also called learning. But you missed this, as these show it; they hold the same word as applying to people in opposite senses, to one who knows and one who does not.

It was much the same in the second question, in which they asked you whether people learn what they know or what they don't. Well, all this is just a little game of learning, and so I say they are playing with you; I call it a game, because if one learned many such things or even all of them, one would be no nearer knowing what the things really are, but would be able to play with people because of the different sense of the words, tripping them up and turning them upside down, just as someone pulls a stool away when someone else is going to sit down, and then people roar with joy when they see him lying on his back. So you must consider that all this was a game on the part of these gentlemen, but I feel sure, Clinias, that from now on this distinguished pair will show you serious things, and I will give them a lead as to what they promised me to provide. You remember they said they would demonstrate their skill in drawing you on, but so far I suppose they thought it better to begin by playing with you.

Then, my dear Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, let your play end here—perhaps we have had enough—but now please demonstrate by attracting the boy and showing him how he must practice wisdom and virtue.

But first I will show to you what my notion of it is, and the sort of thing I should like to hear. If you think I am clumsy and ridiculous in doing this, don't laugh at me; I am only eager to listen to your wisdom, and so I will be daring enough to make a rough sketch before you. Put up with me then, and listen without laughing, both you and your pupils. And as for you, Master Clinias, answer.

—Do we all wish to do well in the world? Or perhaps this is one of the questions which I feared you might laugh at, for it is foolish, no doubt, even to ask such things. Who in the world does not wish to do well?

Clinias/ Not a single one.

Socrates/ Very well. Next then, since we all wish to do well, how could we do well? If we had plenty of good things, eh? Perhaps that is a sillier question than the other. For it is clear, I suppose, that that is true?

—He agreed.

Very well, which shall we say are good for us, of all the things there are? This is an easy question, I think; it needs no solemn person to supply an answer, for everyone would tell us that to be rich is good. What do you say?

Clinias/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ Also to be healthy, and to be handsome, and to have enough of all the other bodily blessings.

—He thought so too.

Again, good birth and power and honor in your own country, these are clearly good?

—He agreed.

Then what good things are left to us? What is it to be temperate and upright and brave? What do you think, in heaven's name, Clinias—if we put these among the good things, shall we be right, or not? For perhaps someone might quarrel with this. What do you think?

Clinias/ They are good.

Socrates/ Very well, where shall we put wisdom in our parade? Among the good things, or where do you say?

Clinias/ Among the good things.

Socrates/ Take care now that we leave out none of the good things worth mentioning.

Clinias/ Oh no, I think there is nothing left out.

Socrates/ Suddenly I remembered one, and said, Upon my word, we are nearly leaving out the greatest good of all!

Clinias/ What is that?

Socrates/ Good fortune, Clinias, which everyone says is the greatest good of all; even the commonest fools say that.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then I thought again for a moment, and said, We have almost made ourselves ridiculous before these visitors, you and I, my dear young gentleman!

Clinias/ What's the matter now?

Socrates/ Because we put good fortune among the first lot, and now here we are talking about the same again!

Clinias/ Well, what is the matter then?

Socrates/ It is ridiculous, I suppose, when something has been lying before us all this time, to lay it before us again and to say the same things twice!

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Wisdom, I suppose, is good fortune; even a child would know that.

—He was astonished, so young and simple he still is. Seeing him wondering I said, Why, Clinias, consider for example doing well with pipe music, don't you think the pipers have the best fortune?

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in the writing and reading of letters the grammar men?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Consider the dangers of the sea. Surely you don't think that anyone has better fortune than wise pilots, as a general rule?

Clinias/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Well then, on a campaign, which would you like better to share danger and fortune with, a wise captain or an ignorant one?

Clinias/ A wise one.

Socrates/ And if you were ill, which would you prefer to run risks with, a wise physician or an ignorant one?

Clinias/ A wise one.

Socrates/ Don't you think, then, that it would be better fortune to do anything along with a wise man, than with an ignorant one?

—He agreed.

Then wisdom everywhere makes men to have good fortune. For wisdom, I suppose, could never make a mistake, but must always do right and have right fortune, or else it would not be wisdom any longer.

We came to an agreement in the end somehow or other, to sum up thus : when wisdom is present, whoever has it needs no more good fortune than that. And when we had come to this agreement, I asked him how our former admissions would stand now. We agreed, that if we had plenty of good things, we should be happy and do well.

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then should we be happy because of the good things we had, if they gave us benefit, or if they did not?

Clinias/ If they gave us benefit.

Socrates/ And would a thing give benefit, if we only had it but did not use it? For example, if we had plenty of food, but ate nothing, and plenty of drink, but drank nothing, should we get any benefit?

Clinias/ No, none.

Socrates/ And all the craftsmen, now, if each of them had everything ready that was necessary for his work, but used

nothing, would these do well just because of having, because they had all the things which the craftsman must have? A carpenter, for instance, if he had provided all his tools and wood enough but did no carpentering, would he get any benefit from just having?

Clinias/ None at all.

Socrates/ Again, if a man were possessed of wealth and all the good things we named lately, but if he did not use them, would he be happy just because he possessed the good things?

Clinias/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Then it is necessary, as it seems, that the one who is to be happy must not only get possession of such good things, but also must use them, or else there is no benefit from having them.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Very well then, Clinias, is that enough now to make a man happy, both to possess the good things and to use them?

Clinias/ I think so.

Socrates/ Is that if he uses them aright, or is it the same if he uses them wrongly?

Clinias/ If he uses them right.

Socrates/ Quite so. It is more harmful, I should think, if one uses anything wrongly than if one leaves it alone—the first is bad; the second is neither bad nor good. Don't you agree?

—He did.

Very well, in the working and the use of woodwork, that which produces the right use is just simply knowledge of carpentry, don't you think so?

Clinias/ It is just that.

Socrates/ Moreover knowledge, I suppose, is what produces right use of equipment?

—He agreed.

Well then, what about the use of the good things which we mentioned at first—wealth and health and good looks—for using all such things right, was knowledge the guide which directed the action, or was it something else?

Clinias/ Knowledge.

Socrates/ Then not only good fortune but good doing, as it seems, is provided by knowledge for mankind in every getting and doing.

—He agreed.

Then in God's name, does any benefit come from the other possessions, without intelligence and wisdom? Could a man get benefit, possessing plenty and doing much, if he had no sense—would he not benefit more by doing little with sense? Just consider. If he did less he would make fewer mistakes, if he made fewer mistakes he would do less badly, if he did less badly he would be less miserable?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Which would be more likely to do less, a poor man or a rich man?

Clinias/ A poor man.

Socrates/ A weak man or a strong man?

Clinias/ A weak man.

Socrates/ A man in high place or in low place?

Clinias/ Low place.

Socrates/ Would a brave and temperate man do less, or a coward?

Clinias/ A coward.

Socrates/ So also an idle rather than an active man?

—He agreed.

And a slow man rather than a quick one, shortsighted and hard of hearing rather than sharp?

In all such comparisons we agreed.

Then to sum up, my dear Clinias, the truth is that in all those things which we said at first were good, the question is not how they are in themselves naturally good, but this is the point, it seems. If ignorance leads them, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more able to serve the leader which is evil; but if intelligence leads, and wisdom, they are greater goods, while in themselves neither kind is worth anything at all.

Clinias/ It seems to be so, as you say.

Socrates/ Then what follows from what has been said? That none of the things is either good or bad, except these two, and of these wisdom is good, and ignorance bad.

—He agreed.

Then let us consider what remains. Since we all desire to be happy, and we have been shown to be happy by using things and using them aright, and rightness and good fortune were provided by knowledge, what seems to be necessary, you see, is that every man in every way shall try to become as wise as possible. Is not that correct?

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And I suppose we think that he should get this from his father much rather than wealth, and from guardians and friends and especially from those who profess to be lovers, native or foreign; he should beg and beseech them to give him some wisdom. For wisdom's sake, Clinias, there is no disgrace, no reproach, in being servant and slave to a lover and to anyone, for a man willing to give honorable service in the passion to become wise. Don't you think so?

Clinias/ I think you are quite right.

Socrates/ Yes, Clinias, if only wisdom can be taught, if only it is not something that comes to men of itself—for that is a point we have not considered, that has not yet been agreed between me and you.

Clinias/ Well, Socrates, I think wisdom can be taught.

Socrates/ I was delighted, and replied.

Well said, admirable boy! I am much obliged to you for sparing me from a long inquiry on just that question, whether wisdom can or cannot be taught. Now, then, since you think it can, and that wisdom alone in the wide world makes a man happy and fortunate, don't you say it is necessary to love wisdom, and don't you mean to do it yourself?

Clinias/ That I do, Socrates, as hard as ever I can!

Socrates/ I was glad to hear it. And I said, There's my specimen, my dear Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, of the sort of thing I wish words of attraction to be; it is clumsy perhaps, and too long, and tedious. Now then let either of you who wishes demonstrate the same thing for us, doing it neatly like an artist. Or if you do not care to do that, then begin where I left off, and show the boy in due order whether he must get every knowledge, or if there is one single knowledge which he must get to be happy and a good man, and what this is. For as I said at the beginning, it would really mean a great deal to us that this young man should become wise and good.

That is what I said, Crito, and I paid particular attention to what should follow, and I watched how they would tackle the argument, and where they would begin, in trying to encourage the young man to practice wisdom and virtue. So Dionysodorus, the elder brother, began first, and we all watched him expecting to hear something wonderful there

and then. As indeed we did, Crito, for it was a wonderful argument which the man was beginning, and it is worth your while to hear what sort of encouragement to virtue it was.

Dionysodorus/ Tell me, Socrates, and all you gentlemen here who say you desire that this young man should become wise, whether you are jesting in saying this, or do you truly and seriously desire it?

Socrates/ This made me suppose that they thought we were jesting before, when we asked them to converse with the young man, and that this was the reason why they jested and did not take it seriously. So I told them still more earnestly that we were really serious about it.

—Then Dionysodorus said;

Dionysodorus/ Take care, Socrates : you may have to deny what you say now.

Socrates/ I have taken care, I shall never deny it.

Dionysodorus/ Very well. You say you want him to become wise.

Socrates/ Most certainly.

Dionysodorus/ But now, is Clinias wise or not?

Socrates/ He says, not yet. He's no boaster, you know.

Dionysodorus/ And you people, want him to become wise, and not to be a dunce?

Socrates/ —We agreed.

Dionysodorus/ Then you wish him to become one that he is not, and no longer to be one that he is.

Socrates/ I was troubled when I heard this, and he, seeing me troubled, took me up :

Dionysodorus/ One further word. Since you want him no longer to be one that he is now, you want him to be destroyed, it seems! Indeed, precious friends and lovers they

must be who would give a great deal to have their darlings done away with!

Socrates/ Ctesippus flew into a rage for his pet when he heard this, and said, Mr. Thurian Visitor, if it weren't too rude I would say, Same be done to you! How could you let yourself tell such a lie about me and the rest of us, something to my mind not decent to repeat, that I would wish this young gentleman to be done away with!

Euthydemus/ My dear Ctesippus, do you really think it is possible to tell a lie?

Ctesippus/ Yes, by heaven, or else I am out of my senses.

Euthydemus/ In making the statement objected to, or not in making it?

Ctesippus/ In making it.

Euthydemus/ In that case, *if* he states it, is he not telling another of the *facts,* differing from what he actually says?

Ctesippus/ How could he?

Euthydemus/ Clearly what he tells is an extra one of the facts, distinct from his other facts.

Ctesippus/ *Quite* so!

Euthydemus/ Therefore in stating *that,* he is stating the extra fact?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Now then, he who states this fact and the other facts is telling the truth; so Dionysodorus, since he states the facts, tells the truth and tells no lie about you.

Ctesippus/ Yes, but he that makes *these* statements, Euthydemus, is not stating the facts—is not saying the things that are.

Socrates/ Then Euthydemus went on;

Euthydemus/ Surely the things that are not, are not?

Ctesippus/ They are not.

Euthydemus/ Surely the things that are not can only be nowhere?

Ctesippus/ Nowhere.

Euthydemus/ Is it possible then that anyone, I don't care who he is, could *do* something about these things that are not, so as to *make* them to *be* the things that are nowhere?

Ctesippus/ I don't think so.

Euthydemus/ Very well. When the orators speak in public, do they do nothing?

Ctesippus/ Oh yes, they do something.

Euthydemus/ Then if they do, they also make?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Then to speak is both to do and to make?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Euthydemus/ Then, no one ever says the things that are not—for he would at once make them something, and you have admitted that no one can make that which is not—so according to what you say, no one tells lies, but since Dionysodorus says it, he says the truth and the things that are.

Ctesippus/ Right, on my word, only he says the things that are in a certain way, but not as they really are.

Dionysodorus/ What, Ctesippus! Are there indeed people who say things as they are?

Ctesippus/ Certainly there are, all gentlemen and those who *speak the truth.*

Dionysodorus/ Very well, are not good things well, and bad things ill?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Dionysodorus/ You agree that gentlemen speak as things are?

Ctesippus/ I do.

Dionysodorus/ Then, Ctesippus, gentlemen speak ill of things ill, since they speak as things are.

Ctesippus/ Yes, upon my word, very much so at least of rude men; you will take care not to be one yourself, if you will listen to me, or the good men may speak ill of *you.* You can be sure that the good speak ill of the ill!

Dionysodorus/ And do they speak bigly of the big, and hotly of the hot?

Ctesippus/ That they do, at least they speak flatly of the flat, like your discussion.

Dionysodorus/ Vulgar abuse, Ctesippus, vulgar abuse.

Ctesippus/ Not a bit of it, Dionysodorus, since I am fond of you, but I am warning you as a friend, and I am trying to persuade you never to say, so rudely to my face, that I want these to be done away with, whom I value most!

Socrates/ As I saw they were getting rather wild with each other, I began to make game of Ctesippus and said, My dear Ctesippus, I think we ought to accept from our visitors what they tell us, if they are kind enough to do us this favor, and we should not quarrel over a word. If they understand how to destroy men so as to make good and sensible ones out of bad and foolish ones, whether this be their own invention, or they learned from someone else a kind of death or destruction, such that they can destroy a bad one and produce a good one instead : if they understand this—and it is clear they do understand it; at least they said that their art newly discovered was to make good men out of bad—let us give them leave : let them destroy the lad and make him sensible, and all the rest of us too! But if you young ones are afraid, make the experiment on me, as your Carian slave; I

am only an old man, so I am ready to run the risk, and I deliver myself to Dionysodorus here as if he were Medea of Colchis. Let him destroy me, boil me too if he likes, only let him turn me out good.

Then Ctesippus said;

Ctesippus/ I'm quite ready, myself, Socrates, to let our visitors take me on, and if they like they may flay me even worse than they do now, so long as my skin shall not end as a leather bottle, like that of Marsyas, but in virtue. You see Dionysodorus here thinks I am angry with him; but I'm not angry, I am only speaking against what I think he is not speaking nicely to me. Look here, Dionysodorus, be generous, don't say that to speak against you is vulgar abuse; that is something quite different, vulgar abuse!

Dionysodorus/ Do you think there is such a thing as 'speaking against' one, Ctesippus, when you say that?

Ctesippus/ Why yes, of course, very much so; do you think there is not, my dear Dionysodorus?

Dionysodorus/ Anyway, you could not show that you had ever heard anyone 'speaking against' anyone else.

Ctesippus/ Indeed? On the contrary, let us hear now whether I can show you Ctesippus speaking against Dionysodorus.

Dionysodorus/ And would you undertake to prove that?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ Well then, are there words describing each of the things that are?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ As each thing is, then, or as it is not?

Ctesippus/ As it is.

Dionysodorus/ Yes, for if you remember, Ctesippus, we showed just now that no one speaks of anything as it is not, for it was made clear that no one speaks what is not.

Ctesippus/ Well, what then? Are you and I speaking against each other any the less?

Dionysodorus/ Then should we be speaking against each other when we both spoke describing the same thing, or should we not in that case be saying the same things?

Socrates/ He admitted it.

Dionysodorus/ But when neither of us speaks the word describing the thing, should we then be speaking against each other? Surely in this case neither of us would be thinking of the thing at all?

Socrates/ He admitted this too.

Dionysodorus/ On the other hand, when I speak the word describing the thing, and you describing something else, are we speaking against each other then? Or am I describing the thing, and you saying nothing about it at all? And how could he that says nothing be speaking against him that is speaking?

Socrates/ Ctesippus was silent, but I was astonished at the whole argument, and said, What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I confess that I have heard this argument from many, and however often I hear it I am always astonished; even Protagoras and his people used it with vigor, and others before them. It was always a wonder to me how it confounded everyone else, and indeed confounded itself—however, I think I shall hear the truth of it best from you. Is it really impossible to tell a lie? For this is what the argument means. Is it? Come, must one tell the truth or say nothing?

—He agreed.

Then is it impossible to tell a lie, but possible to have a false opinion?

Dionysodorus/ Not even that.

Socrates/ Then there is no such thing at all as a false opinion.

Dionysodorus/ No.

Socrates/ And no ignorance, or ignorant people? Would not ignorance, if it did exist, be this—being deceived about things?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But that is not possible.

Dionysodorus/ No.

Socrates/ Are you speaking just for the sake of speaking, Dionysodorus, only to say something odd and strange, or do you really think that no one in the world is ignorant?

Dionysodorus/ Just you refute me.

Socrates/ Is there such a thing as refute, to use your own argument, if no one speaks falsely?

Euthydemus/ There is not.

Socrates/ And so, it seems Dionysodorus did not this moment bid me refute?

Euthydemus/ No, for how could anyone bid what is not? Do you?

Socrates/ My dear Euthydemus, I fear I do not quite understand these clever things and admirable things but my mind is somewhat dense about them, so perhaps I am going to speak like a common or vulgar man, but please forgive me. Look here, if it is impossible to be false, or to think falsely, or to be ignorant, then is it not impossible to make a mistake when one does anything? For in doing, one cannot make a mistake in what one does—is not that what you say?

Euthydemus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then here is my common or vulgar question. For if we make no mistake either in doing or in speaking or in thinking, then what in God's name do you come here to teach, if that is so? Did you not say just now that you could impart virtue better than all the world to one who wanted to learn?

—Here Dionysodorus broke in.

Dionysodorus/ Are you such an old dotard, Socrates, that you remind us now what we said at first, and if I said something last year you will remember that now, but you don't know what to do with what is being said at the present moment?

Socrates/ Because what is being said now is very difficult—naturally, since it is said by very wise men—indeed this last thing is wholly difficult to deal with, as you say. For what do you mean, Dionysodorus, when you say I don't know what to do with it? Isn't it clear you mean that *I* can't refute it? Just tell me, what else is the sense of the phrase, 'I don't know what to do' with what is said?

Dionysodorus/ But as to what *you* say, that is not very difficult to do with. Just answer me.

Socrates/ Before *you* answer *me?*

Dionysodorus/ Won't you answer?

Socrates/ Is that fair?

Dionysodorus/ Quite fair.

Socrates/ On what reasoning? Is not this your reasoning—that you visit us as one all-wise about words, and you know when you are bound to answer and when not, and now you will not answer anything since you perceive that you are not bound?

Dionysodorus/ You just chatter, without troubling to answer. Come, my good man, do as I say and answer, since you yourself admit that I am wise.

Socrates/ Then I must do as you say, and I can't help it, as it seems, for you are master. Ask away.

Dionysodorus/ Is there soul in things which have sense, when they have sense? Or have also the soulless things sense?

Socrates/ Only the things with soul.

Dionysodorus/ Then do you know any phrase which has soul?

Socrates/ No indeed.

Dionysodorus/ Then why did you ask me just now what sense my phrase had?

Socrates/ Oh, it was simply a mistake I made through my stupidity —or perhaps it was not a mistake, and I was right in saying that phrases have sense. Do you say it was a mistake or not? For if it was not a mistake, then you will not refute me although you are wise, and you do not know what to do with my saying; and if it was a mistake, then you do not say right when you declare it is impossible to make a mistake. I am not now speaking of things you said last year. It seems really, my dear Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that our present talk is getting us no further, and is still so to speak the old 'knockdown and tumble down,' and even your skill has not yet found out how to keep it from that, wonderful though it is for exactitude in speaking.

—Then Ctesippus said;

Ctesippus/ Truly amazing things you do say, honorable gentlemen of Thurii or Chios, or whence or however you like to get your names—you don't seem to mind what nonsense you babble!

Socrates/ I was afraid of another bout of rudeness and tried again to calm Ctesippus by saying, My dear Ctesippus, what I said to Clinias a moment ago I say now to you, that you do not know how astonishing is the depth of our visitors' wisdom, only they are not willing to demonstrate it in earnest; they are doing conjuring tricks with us like Proteus, the Egyptian Sophist. So let us follow the example of Menelaus, and not let go of the men until they make clear to us their real serious shape, for I believe that something very fine will appear when they begin to be in earnest. Come, let us pray and beseech them to show themselves. I really think the best thing is for me once more to give them a lead myself, and show them in what shape I beg them to reveal themselves. I will proceed from where I formerly left off, and I will try to follow up what comes next as well as I can, in the hope that I may bring them out, and they may pity my earnest attempt and be themselves in earnest.

—Now then, Clinias, it is your turn. Remind me where we left off. I think it was hereabout. We agreed in the end, didn't we, that one must love wisdom? What do you say?

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And to love wisdom is to get knowledge? Is that right?

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ What knowledge then should we do right to get? Is not the answer simply the knowledge that shall benefit us?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Would it benefit us at all, if we knew how to go about the country and recognize where in the earth the greatest quantity of gold is buried?

Clinias/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ But before that, we had proved that we should gain nothing, even if we got all the gold offhand without digging; so that even if we knew how to turn all the stones into gold, the knowledge would be worth nothing to us; for unless we know also how to use the gold, we saw there was no benefit in it. Don't you remember?

Clinias/ Oh yes, I remember.

Socrates/ In the same way, it seems, there is no benefit in any other knowledge, of business or of physic for example, or anything else which knows how to make something but not how to use what it makes. Is not that so?

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Even if there is a knowledge how to make men immortal, without the knowledge how to use immortality even this seems to bring no benefit, if we are to judge from our former admissions.

—We both agreed about that.

Then, my charming boy, we need such a knowledge as combines both how to make something and how to use what is made.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Then we must be nothing at all like those who make harps, for instance; we do not want to become masters of knowledge like that; for there the making art is one thing, the using art quite another, and each art deals separately with the harp. For the arts of harp making and harp playing are very different. Is not that so?

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor do we want pipe making, clearly; this is another like that.

—He agreed.

Well, if we should learn the art of speechmaking, tell me in heaven's name, is this the art which when got will make us happy?

Clinias/ No, I don't think so.

Socrates/ What's your evidence?

Clinias/ I see certain speechmakers who do not know how to use the speeches which they make themselves, like harp makers with their harps; but here also there are others able to use the speeches which the others have made, some who are themselves unable to make the speeches. It is clear then that, in speeches also, making is one art and using another.

Socrates/ I think you give proof enough, that the art of the speechmakers is not that which if anyone gets he would be happy. However, I did think that somewhere about here would appear the knowledge which we have been seeking so long. For indeed the men who make the speeches, when I meet them, do seem to me to be super-wise, Clinias, and their very art seems to be something divine and lofty. However, that is nothing to wonder at, for it is a portion of the art of enchanters, but falls short a little. For the enchanter's art is the charming of adders and tarantulas and scorpions and other vermin and pests, but this is really the charming and persuasion of juries and parliaments and any sort of crowds. Don't you think it is like that?

Clinias/ Yes, clearly that is just what it is like.

Socrates/ Then where are we to turn to now? What art is there?

Clinias/ I'm sure I can't say.

Socrates/ Why! I think I have found it myself!

Clinias/ What art?

Socrates/ The general's art! That seems to be most certainly the art, which he who gets will be happy!

Clinias/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ Why not?

Clinias/ This art seems to me a sort of hunting men.

Socrates/ What then?

Clinias/ No art of hunting, goes further than to hunt and to capture; but when they have captured what they hunted, they cannot use it; huntsmen and fishermen hand over to the cooks. Geometers and astronomers and calculators—for these are a sort of hunters too, since they are not mere makers of diagrams, but they try to find out the real meanings—so because they do not know how to use them, but only how to hunt, they hand over their discoveries, I take it, to the dialecticians to use up, at least all of them hand over who are not quite without sense.

Socrates/ Good, good. O Clinias, most beautiful boy, most wise reasoner! Is that really so?

Clinias/ Certainly it is so! And the same with the generals. As soon as they have hunted a city or an army. they hand it over to the politicians—for they do not know themselves how to use their captures—just as quail hunters hand over to the quail keepers. If, therefore, went on Clinias, we need that art, which will itself know how to use what it got by making or hunting, and will be such as to make us blessed, then we must seek some other art, instead of the general's.

Crito/ What do you say, Socrates? That young boy said all that?

Socrates/ Don't you think so, Crito?

Crito/ Not a bit of it! I think that if he said it, he did not need Euthydemus or anyone else to educate him!

Socrates/ Heaven preserve us, my dear man, I wonder if Ctesippus was the one who said it! That memory of mine!

Crito/ Ctesippus? Surely not!

Socrates/ Well, I am sure of one thing, it was neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus who said that. Good God, Crito! Can it be that some higher power was there and uttered the words! I heard them, I am sure of it.

Crito/ Oh yes, oh yes, Socrates, it was some higher power. That's what I think, no doubt about it. But after this, did you go on looking for the art? Did you find what you wanted, or didn't you?

Socrates/ Find it, good heavens! No, you would have laughed at us—we were like children after larks. always thought we were going to catch each knowledge by the tail, and the knowledge always got away. Why make a long story of it? We came to the art of kings, and examined that to see if that provided and manufactured happiness. Then it seemed like falling into a labyrinth; we thought we were at the finish, but our way bent round and we found ourselves as it were back at the beginning, and just as far from that which we were seeking at first.

Crito/ How did this happen to you, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you. We thought the art of politics and the art of kings were the same.

Crito/ And what next?

Socrates/ To this art the generals and the rest gave over the control of the works of their own trades, as being the only art knowing how to use them. Thus it seemed clear to us that this was the art we sought, and the cause of doing right in the state, exactly as the verse of Aeschylus describes it, sitting alone at the helm of state, steering all and ruling all, and making all useful.

Crito/ And you thought this a good notion, Socrates?

Socrates/ You shall judge of that, Crito, if you will hear what happened to us next. You see we went on looking at it like this. Pray does this royal art, ruling all, make anything

for us, or not? Certainly it does, we said to each other. Wouldn't you say the same, Crito?

Crito/ Yes, I should.

Socrates/ Then what would you say it makes? Put it in this way. If I should ask you whether the physician's art, ruling all that it rules, makes anything for us, would you not say it makes health?

Crito/ Yes, I should.

Socrates/ And what of your art of agriculture? Ruling all which it rules, what does it make? Wouldn't you say it produces for us the food from the earth?

Crito/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then what of the art of kings, ruling all which it rules? What does it make? Perhaps you cannot say exactly.

Crito/ No indeed, I cannot.

Socrates/ Nor could we, my dear Crito. But I know one thing, that if it is the art we seek, it must be helpful.

Crito/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then surely it must provide something good for us?

Crito/ Obviously, Socrates.

Socrates/ But good, as Clinias and I agreed together, is nothing but some kind of knowledge.

Crito/ Yes, you said so.

Socrates/ Again, all the other 'works of politics' as one might call them—and there are many, for example, to make the people rich and free and without party spirit—all these things turned out to be neither good nor bad, but the necessary thing was to make them wise and to give them a share of knowledge, since knowledge was to be that which profited them and made them happy.

Crito/ That is true, that is what you agreed, according to your report of what was said.

Socrates/ Then does the art of kings make the people wise and good?

Crito/ Why not, Socrates?

Socrates/ But does it make all of them good, and good in all respects? Does it impart every knowledge, shoemaking and carpentry and all the others?

Crito/ I do not think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But what knowledge does it teach? And what are we to do with it? For it must not be a contriver of any of those products which are neither good nor bad; it must impart no knowledge but itself alone. Can we say then what it is, and what we are to do with it? Would you like us to say it is the one by which we shall make other men good?

Crito/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And what shall these be good for, and how useful to us? Shall we say, to make others the same, and they to make others, and so on and on? And good at what? We cannot see, since we have despised what are generally said to be the works of statecraft, and as the proverb goes, it is always 'Corinthus, son of Zeus.' We are just as far from knowing, or farther, what is that knowledge which will make us happy.

Crito/ Yes, indeed, Socrates, it seems you got yourselves into a nice mess.

Socrates/ Well all I could do, my dear man, since I found myself in this mess, was to cry and clamor, praying to the two visitors like a second pair of savior gods [Castor and Polydeuces], to save us, me and the boy, from this tempest of logic, and to play no more but to be serious, and show to us which is the knowledge which once gained would bring us well through the rest of our life.

Crito/ What then? Was Euthydemus willing to show you?

Socrates/ Why, of course! And he began, my good friend, in this magnificent fashion.

Euthydemus/ Which do you prefer, then, my dear Socrates? Shall I teach you this knowledge which has been puzzling you for so long, or shall I show that you have it?

Socrates/ Heaven bless us, my dear man! Can you do that?

Euthydemus/ That I can.

Socrates/ Then show that I have it, I do beseech you, for that is much easier than learning for an old man like me.

Euthydemus/ Very well, just answer. Is there anything you do know?

Socrates/ Oh yes, plenty of things, but only small ones.

Euthydemus/ Quite enough. Then do you think it is possible for anything whatever of the things which are, not to be what it is?

Socrates/ Why no, I don't.

Euthydemus/ You know something then?

Socrates/ I do.

Euthydemus/ Then you are knowing, since you know?

Socrates/ Certainly, in that same something.

Euthydemus/ That makes no difference. Isn't it necessary that you know everything since you are knowing?

Socrates/ Why, no indeed. There are many other things I do not know.

Euthydemus/ Then if you do not know something, you are not knowing.

Socrates/ Not knowing that, my friend.

Euthydemus/ Are you any the less not knowing? But just now you said you were knowing, and so you are really this

very same you, and again not the same, in relation to the same things at the same time!

Socrates/ All right, Euthydemus! As the proverb goes, 'You never say a word amiss, it's always either that or this!' And what then is my understanding of that knowledge we were looking for? I suppose it is this. It is impossible for the same thing both to be and not to be. If I know one thing I know all things, for I could not be knowing and not knowing at the same time. And so since I know everything, I have *that* knowledge too! There you are—isn't that what you tell us, isn't that your word of wisdom?

Euthydemus/ Look here, you are refuting *yourself,* Socrates!

Socrates/ Well, but what about you, Euthydemus? Weren't *you* in this same difficulty? Anyway, so long as I keep with you and with dear old Dionysodorus, I shall not feel at all vexed at any difficulty we get into! Tell me, don't you two know some of the things which are, and not know others of them?

Dionysodorus/ By no means.

Socrates/ What's that! Don't you know anything?

Dionysodorus/ Oh yes.

Socrates/ Then you know everything, since you know something?

Dionysodorus/ Everything, and so do you. If you know one thing, you know all things.

Socrates/ O God! Here's a wonder and a manifest miracle! Can it be that all the other men in the world know everything, or nothing?

Dionysodorus/ Surely, they cannot know some things and not others, or they would be at once knowing and not knowing.

Socrates/ Knowing what?

Dionysodorus/ Everyone, knows everything, if he knows one thing.

Socrates/ Good heavens! Good heavens, Dionysodorus! I see now you are both in earnest, and what a job I had to persuade you to take us in earnest! Do you both really and truly know everything? Carpentry and shoemaking, for instance?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So you are able to stitch leather?

Dionysodorus/ Yes, and to do cobbling too.

Socrates/ And do you know things like these, the number of the stars, and the sand?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly. Do you think we would not admit that too?

Socrates/ Then Ctesippus broke in.

Ctesippus/ Show me a proof, Dionysodorus, for God's sake, by which I may know that you two are telling the truth.

Dionysodorus/ What shall I show you?

Ctesippus/ Do you know how many teeth Euthydemus has, and does he know how many you have?

Dionysodorus/ Is it not enough for you, to be told that we know everything?

Ctesippus/ Not that, please. Just tell us this one thing more and show you are speaking the truth; if you each say how many teeth the other has, and if we count them and prove that you know, we will at once believe all the rest.

Socrates/ They thought he was making fun, so they were unwilling, but they kept on saying they knew everything, as Ctesippus asked them one question after another without the smallest restraint. And he left out nothing, not even the ugliest, but asked them if they knew that. They faced up

boldly against every question maintaining that they did know, like wild boars charging against the spear thrust, so that I also became quite incredulous, Crito, and at last I myself was driven to ask if Dionysodorus knew how to dance.

Dionysodorus/ Oh yes!

Socrates/ Well, I suppose you can't do a sword dance, and roll about on a wheel, at your age? Have you got that far in skill?

Dionysodorus/ There's nothing I can't do.

Socrates/ And do you know everything only now, or have you known it always?

Dionysodorus/ Always.

Socrates/ Even when you were children, and as soon as you were born, did you know everything? —

Yes, they said, both together.

—This seemed incredible to us, and Euthydemus asked;

Euthydemus/ Do you not believe it, Socrates?

Socrates/ I can only say, that you must be a wise pair.

Euthydemus/ But if you will answer me, I will prove that you also admit these surprising things.

Socrates/ Oh, well, I shall be very glad to be shown up like that. For if I have been wise without knowing it myself, and if you will show that I know everything and always did, what greater piece of luck could I have in all my life!

Euthydemus/ Answer then.

Socrates/ All right, ask away. I will answer.

Euthydemus/ Tell me then, Socrates, are you knowing in something or not?

Socrates/ I am.

Euthydemus/ Then do you know by that by which you are knowing, or by something else?

Socrates/ By that by which I am knowing. I suppose you mean the soul, or do you not mean this?

Euthydemus/ Aren't you ashamed, Socrates? When you are asked one question, do you ask another?

Socrates/ Oh dear, what am I to do? I will do just as you tell me. When I am not clear what you are asking, do you tell me to answer all the same, and not to ask anything myself?

Euthydemus/ I suppose you conceive some notion in what I say?

Socrates/ Yes, I do.

Euthydemus/ Then answer according to the notion which you conceive.

Socrates/ Well, what if you mean it in one way when you ask, and I conceive my notion in another way, and then I answer according to my notion—is it enough for you if I answer not at all to the point?

Euthydemus/ Enough for me, but however, not enough for you, as I take it.

Socrates/ Then, Euthydemus, I won't answer, I tell you that, before I find out.

Euthydemus/ You will not answer, according to your notion in each case, because you are more of an old fool than you need be, and *will* go on talking drivel.

Socrates/ Now I saw he was angry with me for picking holes in the phrases used, because he was trying to catch me in his net of words. So I remembered that Connus also is angry whenever I will not give way to him, and now he takes less trouble about me because he thinks me ignorant. And since I had the notion to be a pupil of this other one, I thought I ought to give way to him, or he might think me

stupid and refuse to accept me. So I said, Well, Euthydemus, if you think it proper to do like this, so be it. For anyway you know dialectic far better than I do, who have only the skill of an outsider. Then ask again from the beginning.

Euthydemus/ Very well then, answer again. Do you know what you know by something or not?

Socrates/ Yes, by the soul.

Euthydemus/ There he goes again, answering more than he is asked! I did not ask by what, but whether by something.

Socrates/ Oh well, I answered too much, from want of education. Do forgive me; I will from now on answer simply—I know what I know by something.

Euthydemus/ Is it by this same thing always, or by this thing one time, and by another thing another time?

Socrates/ Always, when I do know, it is by this thing.

Euthydemus/ Oh, do stop putting things in!

Socrates/ But I don't want this 'always' to trip us up!

Euthydemus/ It will not trip *us* up, but *you,* if anybody. But answer. Do you know always by this?

Socrates/ Always, since I must take out the when.

Euthydemus/ Then you know always by this. But knowing always, do you know some things by this and other things by something else, or everything by this?

Socrates/ By this all things—all which I know.

Euthydemus/ Here we are again! The old addition!

Socrates/ Well, I take away that 'which I know.'

Euthydemus/ Oh, don't take away a single thing, I don't ask of you any favors. But answer me. Could you know all things, if you did not know everything?

Socrates/ That would be a miracle!

Euthydemus/ Go on, add what you like, you admit that you know all things.

Socrates/ It seems like it, since the words 'which I know' have been made powerless, and it seems I know everything.

Euthydemus/ Then also you have admitted that you know always by this thing by which you know, whether 'when you do know' or however you like, for you have admitted that you know always, and at the same time everything. It is clear therefore that you knew as a child, and when you were born, and when you were begotten, and that before you came into being, and before heaven and earth came into being, you knew all things, since you always know. And by God, you yourself always will know, and all things, if I choose.

Socrates/ Oh, do choose! O my precious friend Euthydemus, if you are really and truly telling the truth. Only I don't quite believe you can, unless your brother Dionysodorus here would choose too; if so, it may be all right. But tell me, both of you, I would not dare to dispute with men of such miraculous genius and say that I do not know everything when you both say I do, but there are some things which, how can I say that I know, Euthydemus, such as that good men are unjust? If you please, do I know that or not?

Euthydemus/ You know it sure enough.

Socrates/ What?

Euthydemus/ That good men are not unjust.

Socrates/ Oh yes, I knew that long ago, but that is not my question. But where did I learn that good men *are* unjust?

Dionysodorus/ Nowhere.

Socrates/ Then I don't know this.

—Euthydemus said to his brother;

Euthydemus/ You are spoiling the argument, and it will be shown up that this man does not know, and he will be at the same time knowing and not knowing.

Socrates/ Dionysodorus flushed red, and I said, But you, what do you mean, Euthydemus? Do you think your brother who knows everything was not right?

—Dionysodorus quickly broke in with;

Dionysodorus/ Am I brother to Euthydemus?

Socrates/ Let me be, my good man, until Euthydemus has taught me that I know that good men are unjust. Don't grudge me the lesson.

Dionysodorus/ You are running away, Socrates, and don't want to answer.

Socrates/ Naturally, I am not a match for either of you, so it is very likely I should run from the two! I am much weaker of course than Heracles, and he was not able to fight it out with the Hydra, a high-brow clever enough to produce many heads of argument instead of one if somebody cut one off, because another high-brow, just arrived from foreign parts I should think, came ashore out of the sea in the shape of a crab, and kept causing much pain to the hero by talking and biting at him on his left. So Heracles called in his nephew Iolaus to his help, and Iolaus helped him effectively. But if my Iolaus were to come, he would do more harm than good.

Dionysodorus/ Answer now, when you have done this incantation. Was Iolaus anymore the nephew of Heracles than he was yours?

Socrates/ Well, the best thing for me is to answer you, Dionysodorus. For you will never have done with your questions, I am pretty well sure of that, envious and

interfering, to keep Euthydemus from teaching me that bit of wisdom.

Dionysodorus/ Answer now.

Socrates/ I answer now, that Iolaus was the nephew of Heracles, but mine, I think, not one little bit. For my brother Patrocles was not his father, but one with a name something like that, Iphicles, was the brother of Heracles.

Dionysodorus/ And Patrocles was yours?

Socrates/ Yes, we had one mother but not one father.

Dionysodorus/ Then he is your brother and not your brother.

Socrates/ Not on the father's side, my dear man, for his father was Chaeredemus, and mine Sophroniscus.

Dionysodorus/ But Sophroniscus was father and Chaeredemus father?

Socrates/ Certainly, one mine, and one his.

Dionysodorus/ Then, Chaeredemus was other than the father?

Socrates/ Than mine.

Dionysodorus/ Then was a father being other than a father? Are you the same as the stone?

Socrates/ I'm afraid you may prove me so, but I don't think I am.

Dionysodorus/ Then you are other than the stone?

Socrates/ Other to be sure.

Dionysodorus/ Then being other than a stone, you are not a stone? And being other than gold, you are not gold?

Socrates/ That is all true.

Dionysodorus/ So then Chaeredemus, being other than a father, would not be a father.

Socrates/ It seems, that he is not a father.

—Euthydemus now chimed in :

Euthydemus/ I suppose if Chaeredemus is a father, Sophroniscus again being other than a father is not a father, so that you, Socrates, are fatherless.

Socrates/ Ctesippus took it on now, and said;

Ctesippus/ But is not the father of you two in the same case? He is other than my father.

Euthydemus/ Not at all.

Ctesippus/ What! Is he the same?

Euthydemus/ The same to be sure.

Ctesippus/ I hope not. But, Euthydemus, is he only my father or the father of everyone in the world?

Euthydemus/ Father of the others too. Or do you think the same man being a father is not a father?

Ctesippus/ I did not think so.

Euthydemus/ Eh, and that being gold a thing is not gold, or being a man one is not a man?

Ctesippus/ The two threads don't match, as the proverb goes, Euthydemus. You tell a strange thing, if your father is father of all.

Euthydemus/ But he is.

Ctesippus/ Of men and horses and all the other animals?

Euthydemus/ All.

Ctesippus/ And is your mother mother of all?

Euthydemus/ My mother too.

Ctesippus/ Of the sea urchins then, since your mother is mother of the sea animals!

Euthydemus/ So is yours.

Ctesippus/ Then you are brother of gudgeons and puppy dogs and little pigs!

Euthydemus/ So are you.

Ctesippus/ And a boar is your papa, and a dog!

Euthydemus/ Your papa too.

Dionysodorus/ Yes, and in a moment, if you would answer me, you will admit these things yourself, Ctesippus. Just tell me, have you a dog?

Ctesippus/ Yes, and a very bad one.

Dionysodorus/ Has he got puppies?

Ctesippus/ Very much so, as bad as he is.

Dionysodorus/ Then the dog is their father?

Ctesippus/ I have seen him myself, on the job with the bitch.

Dionysodorus/ Very well, isn't the dog yours?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ Then being a father he is yours, so the dog becomes your father and you the puppies' brother.

Socrates/ Dionysodorus quickly broke in again, that Ctesippus might not get in his retort first.

Dionysodorus/ One more little question. Do you beat this dog?

Socrates/ Ctesippus said with a laugh;

Ctesippus/ No mistake, I do, for I can't beat you!

Euthydemus/ Well then, you beat your own father.

Ctesippus/ Well certainly, there would be much better reason for me to beat *your* father. What can have induced him to beget two such clever sons, Euthydemus? I wonder if much good has come from that cleverness of yours, for your father—and the puppy dogs' father —to enjoy!

Euthydemus/ But he does not want a lot of good, Ctesippus, neither he nor you.

Ctesippus/ Nor you yourself, Euthydemus?

Euthydemus/ Nor anyone else in the world. Tell me, Ctesippus, do you think it good for a sick man to drink medicine, or not good, when he needs it? Or that when he goes to war, he had better be armed than unarmed?

Ctesippus/ I certainly do, but I think a bit of your pretty wit is coming!

Euthydemus/ You will soon find out. Just answer. You admitted that medicine is good for a man to drink, when necessary : then surely he needs to drink this good thing as much as he can, and it will have an excellent effect if someone will grind up and mix him a cartload of hellebore!

Ctesippus/ Very good indeed, Euthydemus, provided your drinker is as big as the statue in Delphi!

Euthydemus/ And then again in war, it's good to carry arms; so you must carry as many spears and shields as you can, since it is a good thing!

Ctesippus/ I suppose it is, but I doubt if you think so, Euthydemus. Don't you prefer one shield and one spear?

Euthydemus/ Yes, I do.

Ctesippus/ Then what about Geryon, and old hundred-hand Briareus—would you arm them with only one each? I thought you knew more about it than that, you the heavy-armed fighter, and your comrade too!

Socrates/ Euthydemus fell silent, but Dionysodorus went back to the earlier answer of Ctesippus, and asked him;

Dionysodorus/ Gold too—don't you think it good a to have gold?

Ctesippus/ Yes indeed, and a lot of it!

Dionysodorus/ Very well then, don't you think we ought to have good things always and everywhere?

Ctesippus/ As much as possible!

Dionysodorus/ And you admit gold also to be good?

Ctesippus/ Oh yes, I have admitted that.

Dionysodorus/ Then one ought always to have it everywhere, especially in oneself! And wouldn't a man be happiest if he had three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his skull, and a golden stater in each eye?

Ctesippus/ Well, they do say, Euthydemus, that those are happiest among the Scythians, and the best men, who have a whole lot of gold in their 'own' skulls—as you spoke of '*own*-ing' that father dog —and more astonishing still, that they even drink out of their own gilded skulls, holding each his own head in his hands, and can see the gold inside!

Euthydemus/ They see, yes, and do they see, whether Scythians or anybody else, things possible to see, or things impossible?

Ctesippus/ Possible, I suppose.

Euthydemus/ Then do you too?

Ctesippus/ Yes, I do too.

Euthydemus/ You see our clothes then?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Then these clothes are able to see!

Ctesippus/ Marvelous!

Euthydemus/ And what do they see?

Ctesippus/ They see nothing. But perhaps you don't think they do see? You sweet simple soul! Well then, Euthydemus, I think you are sleeping wide awake, and if it is possible to speak saying nothing, you are doing that!

Dionysodorus/ Isn't a speaking of the silent possible?

Ctesippus/ Quite impossible.

Dionysodorus/ Or a silence of the speaking?

Ctesippus/ Still less.

Dionysodorus/ Well, when you speak of pieces of stone and wood and iron, do you not speak of the silent?

Ctesippus/ I don't if I walk through a smithy; on the contrary the irons there talk with great clangs and booms if anyone handles them; so for this question your wisdom stopped you from noticing that you were saying nothing. Still, go on and demonstrate to me the other thing, how there is a silence of the speaking.

Socrates/ I thought Ctesippus was showing off because of his favorite.

Euthydemus/ When you are silent, are you not silent in everything?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Then you are silent in the speaking things also, for those are part of all things.

Ctesippus/ What? Is not everything silent?

Euthydemus/ I suppose not.

Ctesippus/ Then, my dear sir, is everything speaking?

Euthydemus/ The speaking things, I suppose.

Ctesippus/ But I do not ask that, I ask whether everything is silent or speaking.

Socrates/ Dionysodorus now rushed in.

Dionysodorus/ Neither, and both! I am sure you will not know what to do with that answer!

Socrates/ Ctesippus burst into a great guffaw, as usual, and said;

Ctesippus/ My dear Euthydemus, your brother has 'bebothed' away your argument : it is beaten and done for!

Socrates/ And Clinias was delighted and laughed; so Ctesippus swelled bigger than ten Ctesippuses. But I think that rogue Ctesippus had picked up his skill from these men

themselves, for such cleverness could not come nowadays from anyone else in the world.

Then I said, Why do you laugh, Clinias, at things so serious and beautiful?

Dionysodorus/ What about you, Socrates, have you ever seen a beautiful thing?

Socrates/ Yes, I have, and many of them, Dionysodorus.

Dionysodorus/ Were they different from the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful?

Socrates/ Here I was really in a fix, and I thought I deserved it for my grumbling; however, I said they were different from the beautiful itself, but each of them had some beauty with it.

Dionysodorus/ Then, if you have an ox with you, you are an ox, and because I am with you now, you are Dionysodorus?

Socrates/ Oh stop, don't say that!

Dionysodorus/ But how can it be, that when a different thing is with a different thing, the different thing should be different?

Socrates/ Does that worry you? —I was already trying to imitate the two men's wisdom, which I longed to have.

Dionysodorus/ How can I help being worried, both I and everybody else on earth, about that which is not?

Socrates/ What do you mean, Dionysodorus? Is not the beautiful beautiful, and the ugly ugly?

Dionysodorus/ If I think so.

Socrates/ And don't you think so?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then is not the same the same, and the different different? For I suppose the different is not the same, and I should think even a child would not be worried

about this and think the different is not different. But, my dear Dionysodorus, you passed over that on purpose, for I think you two work out your dialectic perfectly, as good craftsmen do with their jobs proper to each.

Dionysodorus/ Then do you know, what job is proper to each kind of craftsmen? First, who is it whose proper job is to work metal, do you know?

Socrates/ Yes, the smith.

Dionysodorus/ And to make pottery?

Socrates/ The potter.

Dionysodorus/ Well, to slaughter and skin and cut up meat small and then boil and roast it?

Socrates/ The cook.

Dionysodorus/ And if anyone does his proper job, he will do right?

Socrates/ Especially so.

Dionysodorus/ You say that cutting up and skinning is proper for the cook? Did you admit that or not?

Socrates/ I did, but spare me please.

Dionysodorus/ It is clear, then, that if someone butchers the cook and cuts him up and boils and roasts him, he will be doing his proper job, and anyone who forges the smith and pots the potter, he does the proper job too.

Socrates/ O Poseidon! Now you put the finishing touch to your wisdom! Ah, will this never be with me for my very own!

Dionysodorus/ Could you recognize it as your very own, Socrates, if it became yours?

Socrates/ Clearly I could, if you choose.

Dionysodorus/ Well, do you believe that you can recognize your own things?

Socrates/ Unless you tell me that I can't, for I must begin from you, and finish up at Euthydemus here.

Dionysodorus/ Very well, then, do you think those things are yours, which you are master of and you can use as you will—an ox and a sheep, for example, you would think are yours, if you are free to sell and give and sacrifice them to any god you like? But things are not yours, if you cannot use them so?

Socrates/ I knew that something beautiful was going to emerge out of their questions, and besides I wanted to hear it as soon as possible; so I said, Certainly that is right; only such things are mine.

Dionysodorus/ Well, you call animals those which have life?

Socrates/ Yes.

Dionysodorus/ You admit, then, that of the animals those only are yours which you have liberty to deal with as I said just now?

Socrates/ I admit that. —He made a mysterious pause with the air of pondering some mighty problem, and said;

Dionysodorus/ Socrates, have you a family Zeus?

Socrates/ Suspecting that the speech was going to lead to the end which it came to finally, I made a desperate twist to escape, and at once I was like a fish caught wriggling in a net. I said, No, Dionysodorus, I have not.

Dionysodorus/ You must be some wretched outcast then and no Athenian at all, a man without family gods and sacrifices or anything else good and beautiful.

Socrates/ That will do Dionysodorus. Hush now, and don't preach me an unkind sermon. I have my own altars and my own religion and family prayers and all that sort of thing, as much as any other Athenian.

Dionysodorus/ Then the other Athenians have no family Zeus?

Socrates/ None of the Ionians give him that title, neither ourselves nor any of the colonials from the city; ours is family Apollo because of Ion's parentage. Our Zeus is not called family god, but courtyard god and clan god, and Athena is our clan goddess.

Dionysodorus/ Oh, that's quite enough. For it seems you have both Apollo and Zeus, and Athena.

Socrates/ Yes.

Dionysodorus/ Then these would be your gods?

Socrates/ Ancestors, and masters.

Dionysodorus/ Yours, anyway, Did you not admit they were yours?

Socrates/ I did, for how could I help it?

Dionysodorus/ Then, are not these gods also animals? For you admitted that whatever has life is an animal. Have not these gods life?

Socrates/ They have.

Dionysodorus/ Then they are also animals?

Socrates/ Yes, animals.

Dionysodorus/ But you have admitted that of the animals those are yours which you are free to give and sell, and sacrifice to any god you will.

Socrates/ I have admitted that, for there is no way out for me, Euthydemus.

Euthydemus/ Tell me then straight, since you admit that Zeus is yours, and those other gods, are you free to sell them or give them or do what you will with them just as with the other animals?

Socrates/ Well, Crito, I was, so to speak, knocked out now by the argument, and lying speechless. But Ctesippus came

to my help, and shouted, Bravo! O Heracles! What a fine speech!

—And Dionysodorus said;

Dionysodorus/ Is Heracles a bravo or is the bravo Heracles?

Socrates/ Then Ctesippus said;

Ctesippus/ O Poseidon, terribly clever speeches! I give in, the two men are invincible.

Socrates/ Then indeed, my dear Crito, all those present without exception praised them to the skies, the two men and their speech, laughing and clapping and cheering till they nearly wore themselves out. Hitherto there had been a real good noise at each point they made, but only from the admirers of Euthydemus, but now almost the very pillars in the Lyceum resounded with pleasure at the two men. I was ready myself to admit that I had never before in my life seen people so clever; I was altogether enslaved by their skill, and I began to praise and congratulate them myself, saying, O happy pair, blessed are you for your wonderful genius, to have perfected so great a work so quickly and so soon! Your speeches are full of fine things, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; but most magnificent of all is this, that you do not concern yourselves with the multitude of men, nor men of solemn looks or great reputation, but only with those like yourselves. For I am quite sure that there a are very few men like you who would appreciate these arguments, and all the rest know so little of them that they would feel more ashamed to refute others by such ways of speech than to be refuted themselves. Here is another thing in your way of speaking that shows public spirit and kindness. When you say that nothing is beautiful and good, or white or so forth, and there are no differences at all, really and truly you sew up the mouths of people, just as you profess to do; since

however you not only sew up other people's mouths, but seem to sew up your own also, you do a most graceful thing which takes all offense from your words. Chief of all, you have everything so neat and thought out with such art, that in a very short time any man alive can learn it; I myself carefully watched Ctesippus, and I noticed that he too was quickly able to copy you on the spot. One thing about your system it is excellent for putting over quickly, but it is not suitable to exhibit in public. If I dare advise you, take care not to speak before a crowd, or they may learn it quickly and forget to thank you. The best thing would be for you two to argue against each other in private; or if there must be another then let it be one who will give you a fee. Give the same advice to your pupils, if you are prudent, never to argue with anybody else but with you or themselves. What is rare, is dear, Euthydemus; but water, which is best, as Pindar said, is cheapest. If you please, accept me and Clinias here as your pupils.

After this talk, Crito, and a little more, we parted. You must be sure to come with us to be schooled by the two men; they declared, you know, that they were able to teach anyone who would pay the fee, no age and no brains barred—all welcome, all would easily learn their clever system—and it is proper to add, for your benefit especially, they said it did not in any way hinder a man from making money.

Crito/ Oh well, Socrates, I am curious to hear, and always glad to learn something. But the truth is I am one of those not like Euthydemus, one of the others you mentioned yourself, who would prefer to be refuted by such talk rather than to refute. Now it is ridiculous for me to advise you, but I do however wish to report something I heard just now. I must tell you that someone came away from your crowd and met me walking about; he thinks himself to be a man of

ability, one of those who are clever at making speeches for the law courts, and he said;

Someone/ Hullo, Crito, don't you sit at the feet of these wise men?

Crito/ My word, no. I tried to stand close but I could not hear for the crowd.

Someone/ Well, it was worth hearing.

Crito/ What was it?

Someone/ You might have heard men using dialectic who are the cleverest men alive of those engaged in such speaking.

Crito/ What did you think of them?

Someone/ Think of them? What anyone would think who heard such people talking nonsense and making an unworthy fuss about matters worth nothing at all.

Crito/ That is how he put it, word for word. I said then, However, philosophy is a charming thing.

Someone/ Pooh, pooh, charming, bless you! Worth nothing, I tell you! But if you had been there just now, I feel sure you would have been ashamed of your own familiar friend; he was such a fool as to want to put himself in the hands of men who just grapple with every phrase and don't care what they say. And these, as I said, are among the most powerful men of the day. Indeed, Crito, the whole system and the men engaged in the system are contemptible and ridiculous.

Crito/ In my opinion, Socrates, he was not right in blaming the system nor would anyone else be right, but as to being willing to argue with such men before a whole crowd of people, I thought he was right to disapprove of that.

Socrates/ My dear Crito, such men are amazing. But I do not know as yet what I am to say. Which class did the man

belong to who came to you and found fault with philosophy? Was he one of those skilled in contesting cases in court, an orator, or one of those who send such people in, who compose the speeches which the orators deliver?

Crito/ Not an orator, no indeed; I don't think he ever went up into a court of law. But I assure you they say he understands the business—a clever man, composes clever speeches.

Socrates/ Ah, now I know. Those were the ones I was just going to speak of. Those are the men, my dear Crito, whom Prodicus called the frontiersmen between philosophy and politics. They think they themselves are the wisest of men, and that they not only are, but also are thought such by very many, so that the only rivals in the way of their universal fame are the students of philosophy, none else. They believe therefore that if they can reduce the reputation of these, and make them of no account, they will at once win the prize of undisputed victory in public opinion as men of wisdom; they believe they are truly the most wise, but that in informal conversation, whenever they lag behind, they are being cut short by the Euthydemus group. It is quite reasonable if they think themselves wise; they know they are moderately well up in philosophy, and moderately well up in politics, quite reasonably, for they have as much as was wanted in both, and they keep clear of both danger and conflict, while they enjoy the fruits of wisdom.

Crito/ What do you think, then, Socrates? Is there something in what they say? There is no doubt that their account of themselves looks well.

Socrates/ Yes, that's exactly it, Crito, looks well rather than truly is well. For it is not easy to persuade them what is the truth about these borderlands. Both men and things, if they stand between two and have a share of both, when

these two are bad and good, are better than the one and worse than the other; when they stand between two good things which do not aim at the same object, they are worse than both the two components for that for which each is useful; when these two things are bad, but not directed to the same thing, and they are composed of both and stand between them, these alone are better than either of those things of which they have a part. Then if both philosophy and political action are good, but each aims at a different thing, and if these persons are between them and have a part of both, there is nothing in what they say, for they are worse than both; if the things are one good and one bad, they are worse than the one and better than the other; if both are bad, then these people would be speaking some truth, but otherwise not at all. Now I do not think they would admit that the two are both bad, nor that one is good and one bad; but in reality these persons who partake of both are worse than both for each thing which politics and philosophy are important for, and although they are really third, they try to be thought first. We must then not be hard on them, because of their ambition; we must not be angry, but we must believe them to be such as they are. For we ought to be content with every man who says anything which comes near to wisdom, when he bravely follows it up and works it out.

Crito/ Well, you know, Socrates, as I always tell you, I am in perplexity about my sons and what I am to do with them. The younger is quite small still, but Critobulus is already growing up and needs someone to help him on. The fact is, whenever I meet you, I think of all the trouble I have taken, for the sake of the children, about many other things, as about marrying a woman of the best family to be their mother, and about money that they may be as rich as we can manage. And after all that it seems to me to be simple madness to neglect their education. But when I glance at any

one of those who profess to educate people, I am horrified; each one I look at seems to me to be quite unsuitable, to tell you the truth, so I don't see how I am to direct the boy to philosophy.

Socrates/ My dear Crito, don't you know that in every line of life the stupid are many and worthless, the serious are few and worth everything? What about gymnastics? Doesn't that seem a good line to you, and business and oratory, and leadership in war?

Crito/ Most certainly they do.

Socrates/ Very well, don't you see that in each of these professions the many are just laughable at their professional work?

Crito/ Yes, I do. What you say is perfectly true.

Socrates/ Will that be a reason for yourself avoiding all the professions and not giving one to your son?

Crito/ That would not be fair, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, Crito, don't do what you ought not. Do not trouble about those who practice philosophy, whether they are good or bad; but examine the thing itself well and carefully. And if philosophy appears a bad thing to you, turn every man from it, not only your sons; but if it appears to you such as I think it to be, take courage, pursue it, and practice it, as the saying is, 'both you and your house.'

Euthydemus.

Translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague.

Persons of the Dialog.

Crito, Socrates, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus,
Clinias, Ctesippus.

Crito/ Who was it, Socrates, you were talking to in the Lyceum yesterday? There was such a crowd standing around you that when I came up and wanted to listen, I couldn't hear anything distinctly. But by craning my neck I did get a look, and I thought it was some stranger you were talking to. Who was it?

Socrates/ Which one are you asking about, Crito? There was not just one, but two.

Crito/ The person I mean was sitting next but one to you on your right—between you was Axiochus' young son. He seemed to me, Socrates, to have grown tremendously, and to be almost of a size with our Critobulus. But Critobulus is thin, whereas this boy has come on splendidly and is extremely good-looking.

Socrates/ Euthydemus is the man you mean, Crito, and the one sitting next to me on my left was his brother, Dionysodorus—he, too, takes part in the discussions.

Crito/ I don't know either of them, Socrates. They are another new kind of sophist, I suppose. Where do they come from, and what is their particular wisdom?

Socrates/ By birth, I think, they are from this side, from Chios. They went out as colonists to Thurii but were exiled from there and have already spent a good many years in this region. As to your question about the wisdom of the pair, it is marvelous, Crito! The two are absolutely omniscient, so much so that I never knew before what pancratiasts really were.

They are both absolutely all-round fighters, not like the two battling brothers from Acarnania who could only fight with their bodies. These two are first of all completely skilled in body, being highly adept at fighting in armor and able to teach this skill to anyone else who pays them a fee; and then they are the ones best able to fight the battle of the law court and to teach other people both how to deliver and how to compose the sort of speeches suitable for the courts. Previously these were their only skills, but now they have put the finishing touch to pancratistic art. They have now mastered the one form of fighting they had previously left untried; as a result, not a single man can stand up to them, they have become so skilled in fighting in arguments and in refuting whatever may be said, no matter whether it is true or false. So that I, Crito, have a mind to hand myself over to these men, since they say that they can make any other person clever at the same things in a short time.

Crito/ What's that, Socrates? Aren't you afraid that, at your age, you are already too old?

Socrates/ Far from it, Crito—I have enough example and encouragement to keep me from being afraid. The two men themselves were pretty well advanced in years when they made a start on this wisdom I want to get; I mean the eristic sort. Last year or the year before they were not yet wise. My only anxiety is that I may disgrace the two strangers just as I have already disgraced Connus the harpist, Metrobius' son, who is still trying to teach me to play. The boys who take lessons with me laugh at the sight and call Connus the "Old Man's Master." So I am afraid that someone may reproach the strangers on the same score; perhaps they may be unwilling to take me as a pupil for fear that this should happen. So, Crito, I have persuaded some other old men to go along with me as fellow pupils to the harp lessons, and I shall attempt to persuade some others for this project. Why don't you come

along yourself? We will take your sons as bait to catch them—I feel sure that their desire to get the boys will make them give us lessons too.

Crito/ I have no objection, Socrates, if you really think well of the plan. But first explain to me what the wisdom of the two men is, to give me some idea of what we are going to learn.

Socrates/ You shall hear at once, since I can't pretend that I paid no attention to the pair. As a matter of fact, I did just that and remember what was said and will try to recount the whole thing from the beginning. As good luck would have it, I was sitting by myself in the undressing-room just where you saw me and was already thinking of leaving. But when I got up, my customary divine sign put in an appearance. So I sat down again, and in a moment the two of them, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, came in, and some others with them, disciples of theirs, who seemed to me pretty numerous. When the pair came in, they walked around the cloister, and they had not yet made more than two or three turns when in came Clinias, who, as you rightly say, has grown a lot. Following him were a good many others, lovers of his, and among them Ctesippus, a young man from Paeania—he's a well-bred fellow except for a certain youthful brashness. From the doorway Clinias caught sight of me sitting alone and came straight up and sat down on my right, just as you describe it. When Dionysodorus and Euthydemus saw him, at first they stood talking to each other and glancing at us every so often (I was keeping a good eye on them) but after a while they came over and one of them, Euthydemus, sat down next to the boy, and his brother next to me on my left, and the rest found places where they could. Since I hadn't seen the two for quite a time, I gave them a good welcome, and then I said to Clinias, You know, Clinias, that the wisdom of these two men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, has to do with important matters and not mere trivia. They know all about war, that is, the things a man

ought to know who means to be a good general, such as the formations of troops and their command and how to fight in armor; and besides this, they can make a man capable of looking out for himself in court if anyone should do him an injury.

They obviously thought little of me for saying this, because they both laughed and glanced at each other, and Euthydemus said;

Euthydemus/ We are not any longer in earnest about these things, Socrates—we treat them as diversions.

Socrates/ I was astonished and said, Your serious occupation must certainly be splendid if you have important things like these for your diversions! For heaven's sake, tell me what this splendid occupation is!

Euthydemus/ Virtue, Socrates, is what it is, and we think we can teach it better than anyone else and more quickly.

Socrates/ Good heavens, what a claim you make! Wherever did you find this godsend? I was still thinking of you, as I just said, as men particularly skilled in fighting in armor, and so I spoke of you in this way. When you visited us before, I remember that this was what you claimed to be. But now if you really have this other wisdom, be propitious—you see, I am addressing you exactly as though you were gods because I want you to forgive me for what I said earlier. But make sure, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, that you are telling the truth—the magnitude of your claim certainly gives me some cause for disbelief.

Euthydemus/ Rest assured, Socrates, that things are as we say.

Socrates/ Then I count you much happier in your possession of this wisdom than the Great King in that of his empire! But tell me just this: do you plan to give a demonstration of this wisdom, or what do you mean to do?

Euthydemus/ We are here for that very purpose, Socrates: to give a demonstration, and to teach, if anyone wants to learn.

Socrates/ I give you my word that everyone who does not have this wisdom will wish to have it: first myself, then Clinias here, and, in addition to us, this fellow Ctesippus and these others, pointing to the lovers of Clinias who were already grouped around us. This had come about because Ctesippus had taken a seat a long way from Clinias, and when Euthydemus leaned forward in talking to me, he apparently obscured Ctesippus' view of Clinias, who was sitting between us. So Ctesippus, who wanted to look at his darling, as well as being interested in the discussion, sprang up first and stationed himself right in front of us. When the others saw him doing this, they gathered around too, not only Clinias' lovers but the followers of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as well. These were the ones I pointed to when I told Euthydemus that everyone was ready to learn. Then Ctesippus agreed very eagerly and so did all the rest, and all together they besought the pair to demonstrate the power of their wisdom.

So Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, do your absolute best to gratify these people and give a demonstration—and do it for my sake too. To give a complete one would obviously be a lengthy business; but tell me just this: are you able to make only that man good who is already persuaded that he ought to take lessons from you, or can you also make the man good who is not yet persuaded on this point, either because he believes that this thing, virtue, cannot be taught at all, or because he thinks that you two are not its teachers? Come tell me, does the task of persuading a man in this frame of mind both that virtue can be taught, and that you are the ones from whom he could learn it best, belong to this same art or to some other one?

Dionysodorus/ It belongs to this same art, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, Dionysodorus, you and your brother are the men of the present day best able to exhort a man to philosophy and the practice of virtue?

Dionysodorus/ This is exactly what we think, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then put off the rest of your display to another time and give us a demonstration of this one thing: persuade this young man here that he ought to love wisdom and have a care for virtue, and you will oblige both me and all the present company. The boy's situation is this: both I and all these people want him to become as good as possible. He is the son of Axiochus (son of the old Alcibiades) and is cousin to the present Alcibiades—his name is Clinias. He is young, and we are anxious about him, as one naturally is about a boy of his age, for fear that somebody might get in ahead of us and turn his mind to some other interest and ruin him. So you two have arrived at the best possible moment. If you have no objection, make trial of the boy and converse with him in our presence.

When I had spoken, in almost these exact words, Euthydemus answered, with a mixture of bravery and confidence.

Euthydemus/ It makes no difference to us, Socrates, so long as the young man is willing to answer.

Socrates/ As a matter of fact, he is quite used to that, since these people here are always coming to ask him all sorts of questions and to converse with him. So he is pretty brave at answering.

As to what happened next, Crito, how shall I give you an adequate description of it? It is no small task to be able to recall such wisdom in detail, it was so great. So I ought to begin my account as the poets do, by invoking the Muses and Memory. Well, Euthydemus, as I remember, began something like this:

Euthydemus/ Clinias, which are the men who learn, the wise or the ignorant?

Socrates/ Being confronted with this weighty question, the boy blushed and looked at me in doubt. And I, seeing that he was troubled, said, Cheer up, Clinias, and choose bravely whichever seems to you to be the right answer—he may be doing you a very great service.

Just at this moment Dionysodorus leaned a little toward me and, smiling all over his face, whispered in my ear and said;

Dionysodorus/ I may tell you beforehand, Socrates, that whichever way the boy answers he will be refuted.

Socrates/ While he was saying this, Clinias gave his answer, so that I had no chance to advise the boy to be careful; and he answered that the wise were the learners.

Then Euthydemus said;

Euthydemus/ Are there some whom you call teachers, or not?

Socrates/ He agreed that there were.

Euthydemus/ And the teachers are teachers of those who learn, I suppose, in the same way that the music master and the writing master were teachers of you and the other boys when you were pupils?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Euthydemus/ And when you were learning, you did not yet know the things you were learning, did you?

Clinias/ No.

Euthydemus/ And were you wise when you did not know these things?

Clinias/ By no means.

Euthydemus/ Then if not wise, ignorant?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Euthydemus/ Then in the process of learning what you did not know, you learned while you were ignorant?

Socrates/ The boy nodded.

Euthydemus/ Then it is the ignorant who learn, Clinias, and not the wise, as you suppose.

Socrates/ When he said this, the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus broke into applause and laughter, just like a chorus at a sign from their director. And before the boy could well recover his breath, Dionysodorus took up the argument and said;

Dionysodorus/ Well then, Clinias, when the writing master gave you dictation, which of the boys learned the piece, the wise or the ignorant?

Clinias/ The wise.

Dionysodorus/ Then it is the wise who learn, and not the ignorant, and you gave Euthydemus a wrong answer just now.

Socrates/ Whereupon the supporters of the pair laughed and cheered very loudly indeed, in admiration of their cleverness. We, on the other hand, were panic-struck and kept quiet. Euthydemus, observing our distress, and in order to confound us further, would not let the boy go but went on questioning him and, like a skillful dancer, gave a double twist to his questions on the same point, saying;

Euthydemus/ Do those who learn learn the things they know or the things they do not know?

Socrates/ And Dionysodorus again whispered to me in a low voice;

Dionysodorus/ This is another, Socrates, just like the first.

Socrates/ Mercy on us, the first question certainly seemed good enough!

Dionysodorus/ All our questions are of this same inescapable sort, Socrates.

Socrates/ And this, no doubt, is the reason why your pupils admire you so much.

Just then Clinias answered Euthydemus that the learners learned what they do not know, whereupon Euthydemus put him through the same course of questions as before.

Euthydemus/ What then, don't you know your letters?

Clinias/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Then you know them all?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Euthydemus/ Whenever anyone dictates anything, doesn't he dictate letters?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Euthydemus/ Then doesn't he dictate something you know, if you really know them all?

Socrates/ He agreed to this too.

Well then, you are not the one who learns what someone dictates, are you, but the one who doesn't know his letters is the one who learns?

Clinias/ No, I am the one who learns.

Euthydemus/ Then you learn what you know, if you in fact do know all your letters.

Socrates/ He agreed.

Euthydemus/ Then your answer was wrong.

Socrates/ Euthydemus had barely said this when Dionysodorus picked up the argument as though it were a ball and aimed it at the boy again, saying;

Dionysodorus/ Euthydemus is completely deceiving you, Clinias. Tell me, isn't learning the acquisition of the knowledge of what one learns?

Socrates/ Clinias agreed.

Dionysodorus/ And what about knowing? Is it anything except having knowledge already?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Dionysodorus/ Then not knowing is not yet having knowledge?

Socrates/ He agreed with him.

Dionysodorus/ And are those who acquire something those who have it already or those who do not?

Clinias/ Those who do not.

Dionysodorus/ And you have admitted, haven't you, that those who do not know belong to the group of those who do not have something?

Clinias/ He nodded.

Dionysodorus/ Then the learners belong to those who acquire and not to those who have?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Dionysodorus/ Then it is those who do not know who learn, Clinias, and not those who know.

Socrates/ Euthydemus was hastening to throw the young man for the third fall when I, seeing that he was going down and wanting to give him a chance to breathe so that he should not turn coward and disgrace us, encouraged him, saying, Don't be surprised, Clinias, if these arguments seem strange to you, since perhaps you don't take in what the visitors are doing with you. They are doing exactly what people do in the Corybantic mysteries when they enthrone a person they intend to initiate. If you have been initiated you know that there is dancing and sport on these occasions; and now these two are doing nothing except dancing around you and making sportive leaps with a view to initiating you presently. So you must now imagine yourself to be hearing the first part of the sophistic mysteries. In the first place, as Prodicus says, you

must learn about the correct use of words; and our two visitors are pointing out this very thing, that you did not realize that people use the word “learn” not only in the situation in which a person who has no knowledge of a thing in the beginning acquires it later, but also when he who has this knowledge already uses it to inspect the same thing, whether this is something spoken or something done. (As a matter of fact, people call the latter “understand” rather than “learn,” but they do sometimes call it “learn” as well.) Now this, as they are pointing out, had escaped your notice—that the same word is applied to opposite sorts of men, to both the man who knows and the man who does not. There was something similar to this in the second question, when they asked you whether people learn what they know or what they do not know. These things are the frivolous part of study (which is why I also tell you that the men are jesting); and I call these things “frivolity” because even if a man were to learn many or even all such things, he would be none the wiser as to how matters stand but would only be able to make fun of people, tripping them up and overturning them by means of the distinctions in words, just like the people who pull the chair out from under a man who is going to sit down and then laugh gleefully when they see him sprawling on his back. So you must think of their performance as having been mere play. But after this they will doubtless show you serious things, if anyone will, and I shall give them a lead to make sure they hand over what they promised me. They said they would give a demonstration of hortatory skill, but now it seems to me that they must have thought it necessary to make fun of you before beginning. So, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, put an end to this joking; I think we have had enough of it. The next thing to do is to give an exhibition of persuading the young man that he ought to devote himself to wisdom and virtue. But first I shall give you two a demonstration of the way in which I

conceive the undertaking and of the sort of thing I want to hear. And if I seem to you to be doing this in an unprofessional and ridiculous way, don't laugh at me—it is out of a desire to hear your wisdom that I have the audacity to improvise in front of you. Therefore, you and your disciples restrain yourselves and listen without laughing; and you, son of Axiochus, answer me:

Do all men wish to do well? Or is this question one of the ridiculous ones I was afraid of just now? I suppose it is stupid even to raise such a question, since there could hardly be a man who would not wish to do well.

Clinias/ No, there is no such person.

Socrates/ Well then, the next question is, since we wish to do well, how are we to do so? Would it be through having many good things? Or is this question still more simple-minded than the other, since this must obviously be the case too?

He agreed.

Well then, what kinds of existing things are good for us? Or perhaps this isn't a difficult question and we don't need an important personage to supply the answer because everybody would tell us that to be rich is a good—isn't that so?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And so with being healthy, and handsome, and having a sufficient supply of the other things the body needs?

He agreed.

And, again, it is clear that noble birth, and power, and honor in one's country are goods.

He agreed.

Then which goods do we have left? What about being self-controlled and just and brave? For heaven's sake tell me, Clinias, whether you think we will be putting these in the right place if we class them as goods or if we refuse to do so?

Perhaps someone might quarrel with us on this point—how does it seem to you?

Clinias/ They are goods.

Socrates/ Very well. And where in the company shall we station wisdom? Among the goods, or what shall we do with it?

Clinias/ Among the goods.

Socrates/ Now be sure we do not leave out any goods worth mentioning.

Clinias/ I don't think we are leaving out any.

Socrates/ But I remembered one and said, Good heavens, Clinias, we are in danger of leaving out the greatest good of all!

Clinias/ Which one is that?

Socrates/ Good fortune, Clinias, which everybody, even quite worthless people, says is the greatest of the goods.

Clinias/ You are right.

Socrates/ And I reconsidered a second time and said, son of Axiochus, you and I have nearly made ourselves ridiculous in front of our visitors.

Clinias/ How so?

Socrates/ Because in putting good fortune in our previous list we are now saying the same thing all over again.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Surely it is ridiculous, when a thing has already been brought up, to bring it up again and say the same things twice.

Clinias/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ Wisdom is surely good fortune, —this is something even a child would know.

He was amazed—he is still so young and simple-minded.

I noticed his surprise and said, You know, don't you, Clinias, that flute players have the best luck when it comes to success in flute music?

He agreed.

And the writing masters at reading and writing?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What about the perils of the sea—surely you don't think that, as a general rule, any pilots have better luck than the wise ones?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And again, if you were on a campaign, with which general would you prefer to share both the danger and the luck, a wise one or an ignorant one?

Clinias/ With a wise one.

Socrates/ And if you were sick, would you rather take a chance with a wise doctor or with an ignorant one?

Clinias/ With a wise one.

Socrates/ Then it is your opinion, that it is luckier to do things in the company of wise men than ignorant ones?

He agreed.

So wisdom makes men fortunate in every case, since I don't suppose she would ever make any sort of mistake but must necessarily do right and be lucky—otherwise she would no longer be wisdom.

We finally agreed (I don't know quite how) that, in sum, the situation was this: if a man had wisdom, he had no need of any good fortune in addition. When we had settled this point, I went back and asked him how our former statements might be affected. We decided, that if we had many good things, we should be happy and do well.

He agreed.

And would the possession of good things make us happy if they were of no advantage to us, or if they were of some?

Clinias/ If they were of some advantage.

Socrates/ And would they be advantageous to us if we simply had them and did not use them? For instance, if we had a great deal of food but didn't eat any, or plenty to drink but didn't drink any, would we derive any advantage from these things?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well then, if every workman had all the materials necessary for his particular job but never used them, would he do well by reason of possessing all the things a workman requires? For instance, if a carpenter were provided with all his tools and plenty of wood but never did any carpentry, could he be said to benefit from their possession?

Clinias/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Well then, if a man had money and all the good things we were mentioning just now but made no use of them, would he be happy as a result of having these good things?

Clinias/ Clearly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ So it seems, that the man who means to be happy must not only have such goods but must use them too, or else there is no advantage in having them.

Clinias/ You are right.

Socrates/ Then are these two things, the possession of good things and the use of them, enough to make a man happy, Clinias?

Clinias/ They seem so to me, at any rate.

Socrates/ If, he uses them rightly, or if he does not?

Clinias/ If he uses them rightly.

Socrates/ Well spoken. Now I suppose there is more harm done if someone uses a thing wrongly than if he lets it alone—

in the first instance there is evil, but in the second neither evil nor good. Or isn't this what we maintain?

He agreed that it was.

Then what comes next? In working and using wood there is surely nothing else that brings about right use except the knowledge of carpentry, is there?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And, again, I suppose that in making utensils, it is knowledge that produces the right method.

He agreed.

And also, with regard to using the goods we mentioned first—wealth and health and beauty—was it knowledge that ruled and directed our conduct in relation to the right use of all such things as these, or some other thing?

Clinias/ It was knowledge.

Socrates/ Then knowledge seems to provide men not only with good fortune but also with well-doing, in every case of possession or action.

He agreed.

Then in heaven's name, is there any advantage in other possessions without good sense and wisdom? Would a man with no sense profit more if he possessed and did much or if he possessed and did little? Look at it this way: if he did less, would he not make fewer mistakes; and if he made fewer mistakes, would he not do less badly, and if he did less badly, would he not be less miserable?

Clinias/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And in which case would one do less, if one were poor or if one were rich?

Clinias/ Poor.

Socrates/ And if one were weak or strong?

Clinias/ Weak.

Socrates/ If one were held in honor or in dishonor?

Clinias/ In dishonor.

Socrates/ And if one were brave and self-controlled would one do less, or if one were a coward?

Clinias/ A coward.

Socrates/ Then the same would be true if one were lazy rather than industrious?

He agreed.

Socrates/ And slow rather than quick, and dull of sight and hearing rather than keen?

We agreed with each other on all points of this sort.

So, to sum up, Clinias, it seems likely that with respect to all the things we called good in the beginning, the correct account is not that in themselves they are good by nature, but rather as follows: if ignorance controls them, they are greater evils than their opposites, to the extent that they are more capable of complying with a bad master; but if good sense and wisdom are in control, they are greater goods. In themselves, however, neither sort is of any value.

Clinias/ It seems, to be just as you say.

Socrates/ Then what is the result of our conversation? Isn't it that, of the other things, no one of them is either good or bad, but of these two, wisdom is good and ignorance bad?

He agreed.

Then let us consider what follows: since we all wish to be happy, and since we appear to become so by using things and using them rightly, and since knowledge was the source of rightness and good fortune, it seems to be necessary that every man should prepare himself by every means to become as wise as possible—or isn't this the case?

Clinias/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ And for a man who thinks he ought to get this from his father much more than money, and not only from his father but also from his guardians and friends (especially those of his city and elsewhere who claim to be his lovers), and who begs and beseeches them to give him some wisdom, there is nothing shameful, Clinias, nor disgraceful if, for the sake of this, he should become the servant or the slave of a lover or of any man, being willing to perform any honorable service in his desire to become wise. Or don't you think so?

Clinias/ You seem to me to be absolutely right;

Socrates/ But only if wisdom can be taught, Clinias, and does not come to men of its own accord. This point still remains for us to investigate and is not yet settled between you and me.

Clinias/ As far as I am concerned, Socrates, I think it can be taught.

Socrates/ I was pleased and said, I like the way you talk, my fine fellow, and you have done me a good turn by relieving me of a long investigation of this very point, whether or not wisdom can be taught. Now then, since you believe both that it can be taught and that it is the only existing thing which makes a man happy and fortunate, surely you would agree that it is necessary to love wisdom and you mean to do this yourself.

Clinias/ This is just what I mean to do, Socrates, as well as ever I can.

Socrates/ When I heard this I was delighted and said, There, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, is my example of what I want a hortatory argument to be, though amateurish, perhaps, and expressed at length and with some difficulty. Now let either of you who wishes give us a demonstration of the same thing in a professional manner. Or if you do not wish to do that, then start where I left off and show the boy what

follows next: whether he ought to acquire every sort of knowledge, or whether there is one sort that he ought to get in order to be a happy man and a good one, and what it is. As I said in the beginning, it is of great importance to us that this young man should become wise and good.

This is what Crito, and I paid particular attention to what should come next and watched to see just how they would pick up the argument and where they would start persuading the young man to practice wisdom and virtue. The elder of the two, Dionysodorus, took up the argument first and we all gazed at him in expectation of hearing some wonderful words immediately. And this is just what happened, since the man began an argument which was certainly wonderful, in a way, Crito, and worth your while to hear, since it was an incitement to virtue.

Dionysodorus/ Tell me, Socrates, and all you others who say you want this young man to become wise—are you saying this as a joke or do you want it truly and in earnest?

Socrates/ This gave me the idea that they must have thought we were joking earlier when we asked them to talk to the boy, and that this was why they made a joke of it and failed to take it seriously. When this idea occurred to me, I insisted all the more that we were in dead earnest.

And Dionysodorus said;

Dionysodorus/ Well, take care, Socrates, that you don't find yourself denying these words.

Socrates/ I have given thought to the matter, and I shall never come to deny them.

Dionysodorus/ Well then, you say you want him to become wise?

Socrates/ Very much so.

Dionysodorus/ And at the present moment, is Clinias wise or not?

Socrates/ He says he is not yet, at least—he is a modest person.

Dionysodorus/ But you people wish him to become wise, and not to be ignorant?

Socrates/ We agreed.

Dionysodorus/ Therefore, you wish him to become what he is not, and no longer to be what he is now?

Socrates/ When I heard this I was thrown into confusion, and he broke in upon me while I was in this state and said;

Dionysodorus/ Then since you wish him no longer to be what he is now, you apparently wish for nothing else but his death. Such friends and lovers must be worth a lot who desire above all things that their beloved should utterly perish!

When Ctesippus heard this he became angry on his favorite's account and said;

Ctesippus/ Thurian stranger, if it were not a rather rude remark, I would say "perish yourself" for taking it into your head to tell such a lie about me and the rest, which I think is a wicked thing to say—that I could wish this person to die!

Euthydemus/ Why Ctesippus, do you think it possible to tell lies?

Ctesippus/ Good heavens yes, I should be raving if I didn't.

Euthydemus/ When one speaks the thing one is talking about, or when one does not speak it?

Ctesippus/ When one speaks it.

Euthydemus/ So that if he speaks this thing, he speaks no other one of things that are except the very one he speaks?

Ctesippus/ Of course.

Euthydemus/ And the thing he speaks is one of those that are, distinct from the rest?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Euthydemus/ Then the person speaking that thing speaks what is.

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ But surely the person who speaks what is and things that are speaks the truth—so that Dionysodorus, if he speaks things that are, speaks the truth and tells no lies about you.

Ctesippus/ Yes, but a person who speaks these things, Euthydemus, does not speak things that are.

Socrates/ And Euthydemus said;

Euthydemus/ But the things that are not surely do not exist, do they?

Ctesippus/ No, they do not exist.

Euthydemus/ Then there is nowhere that the things that are not are?

Ctesippus/ Nowhere.

Euthydemus/ Then there is no possibility that any person whatsoever could do anything to the things that are not so as to make them be when they are nowhere?

Ctesippus/ It seems unlikely to me.

Euthydemus/ Well then, when the orators speak to the people, do they do nothing?

Ctesippus/ No, they do something.

Euthydemus/ Then if they do something, they also make something?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Speaking, then, is doing and making?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Euthydemus/ Then nobody speaks things that are not, since he would then be making something, and you have admitted that no one is capable of making something that is

not. So according to your own statement, nobody tells lies; but if Dionysodorus really does speak, he speaks the truth and things that are.

Ctesippus/ Yes indeed, Euthydemus, but he speaks things that are only in a certain way and not as really is the case.

Dionysodorus/ What do you mean, Ctesippus? Are there some persons who speak of things as they are?

Ctesippus/ There certainly are, —gentlemen and those who speak the truth.

Dionysodorus/ Now then, are not good things well and bad things ill?

Socrates/ He agreed.

Dionysodorus/ And you admit that gentlemen speak of things as they are?

Ctesippus/ Yes, I do.

Dionysodorus/ Then good men speak ill of bad things, Ctesippus, if they do in fact speak of them as they are.

Ctesippus/ They certainly do, —at any rate they speak ill of bad men. If you take my advice you will take care not to be one of them in case the good speak ill of you. For rest assured that the good speak ill of the bad.

Euthydemus/ And do they speak greatly of the great and hotly of the hot?

Ctesippus/ Very much so, and what is more, they speak coldly of persons who argue in a frigid fashion.

Dionysodorus/ You, Ctesippus, are being abusive, very abusive indeed.

Ctesippus/ I am certainly doing no such thing, Dionysodorus, since I like you, I am merely giving you a piece of friendly advice and endeavoring to persuade you never to say, so rudely and to my face, that I want my most cherished friends to die.

Socrates/ Since they seemed to be getting pretty rough with each other, I started to joke with Ctesippus and said, Ctesippus, I think we ought to accept what the strangers tell us, if they are willing to be generous, and not to quarrel over a word. If they really know how to destroy men so as to make good and sensible people out of bad and stupid ones, and the two of them have either found out for themselves or learned from someone else a kind of ruin or destruction by which they do away with a bad man and render him good, if, as I say, they know how to do this—well, they clearly do, since they specifically claimed that the art they had recently discovered was that of making good men out of bad ones—then let us concede them the point and permit them to destroy the boy for us and make him wise—and do the same to the rest of us as well. And if you young men are afraid, let them "try it on the Carian," as they say, and I will be the victim. Being elderly, I am ready to run the risk, and I surrender myself to Dionysodorus here just as I might to Medea of Colchis. Let him destroy me, or if he likes, boil me, or do whatever else he wants, but he must make me good.

And Ctesippus said;

Ctesippus/ I too, Socrates, am ready to hand myself over to the visitors; and I give them permission to skin me even more thoroughly than they are doing now so long as my hide will in the end become not a wineskin (which is what happened to Marsyas), but a piece of virtue. And yet Dionysodorus here thinks I am cross with him. It's not that I'm cross—I'm simply contradicting the things he said which I find objectionable. So, my fine Dionysodorus, don't call contradiction abuse—abuse is something quite different.

Socrates/ And Dionysodorus answered;

Dionysodorus/ Are you making your speech on the assumption that there exists such a thing as contradiction, Ctesippus?

Ctesippus/ I certainly am, decidedly so. And do you think there is none, Dionysodorus?

Dionysodorus/ Well you, at any rate, could not prove that you have ever heard one person contradicting another.

Ctesippus/ Do you really mean that? Well then, just listen to Ctesippus contradicting Dionysodorus, if you want to hear my proof.

Dionysodorus/ And do you undertake to back that up?

Ctesippus/ I certainly do.

Dionysodorus/ Well then, are there words to describe each thing that exists?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ And do they describe it as it is or as it is not?

Ctesippus/ As it is.

Dionysodorus/ Now if you remember, Ctesippus, we showed a moment ago that no one speaks of things as they are not, since it appeared that no one speaks what does not exist.

Ctesippus/ Well, what about it? Are you and I contradicting each other any the less?

Dionysodorus/ Now would we be contradicting, if we were both to speak the description of the same thing? I suppose we would be saying the same things in that case.

Socrates/ He agreed.

Dionysodorus/ But when neither of us speaks the description of the thing, would we be contradicting then? Or wouldn't it be the case that neither of us had the thing in mind at all?

Socrates/ He agreed to this too.

Dionysodorus/ But when I speak the description of the thing whereas you speak another description of another thing, do we contradict then? Or is it the case that I speak it but that you speak nothing at all? And how would a person who does not speak contradict one who does?

Socrates/ Ctesippus fell silent at this, but I was astonished at the argument and said, How do you mean, Dionysodorus? The fact is that I have heard this particular argument from many persons and at many times, and it never ceases to amaze me. The followers of Protagoras made considerable use of it, and so did some still earlier. It always seems to me to have a wonderful way of upsetting not just other arguments, but itself as well. But I think I shall learn the truth about it better from you than from anyone else. The argument amounts to claiming that there is no such thing as false speaking, doesn't it? And the person speaking must either speak the truth or else not speak?

He agreed.

Now would you say it was impossible to speak what is false, but possible to think it?

Dionysodorus/ No, thinking it is not possible either.

Socrates/ Then there is absolutely no such thing as false opinion.

Dionysodorus/ There is not.

Socrates/ Then is there no ignorance, nor are there any ignorant men? Or isn't this just what ignorance would be, if there should be any—to speak falsely about things?

Dionysodorus/ It certainly would.

Socrates/ And yet there is no such thing.

He said there was not.

Are you making this statement just for the sake of argument, Dionysodorus—to say something startling—or do you honestly believe that there is no such thing as an ignorant man?

Dionysodorus/ Your business is to refute me.

Socrates/ Well, but is there such a thing as refutation if one accepts your thesis that nobody speaks falsely?

Euthydemus/ No, there is not.

Socrates/ Then it can't be that Dionysodorus ordered me to refute him just now, can it?

Euthydemus/ How would anyone order a thing which doesn't exist? Are you in the habit of giving such orders?

Socrates/ The reason I've raised the point, Euthydemus, is that I'm rather thick-witted and don't understand these fine clever things. And perhaps I'm about to ask a rather stupid question, but bear with me. Look at it this way: if it is impossible to speak falsely, or to think falsely, or to be ignorant, then there is no possibility of making a mistake when a man does anything? I mean that it is impossible for a man to be mistaken in his actions—or isn't this what you are saying?

Euthydemus/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ This is just where my stupid question comes in. If no one of us makes mistakes either in action or in speech or in thought—if this really is the case—what in heaven's name do you two come here to teach? Or didn't you say just now that if anyone wanted to learn virtue, you would impart it best?

Dionysodorus/ Really, Socrates, interrupting, are you such an old Cronus as to bring up now what we said in the beginning? I suppose if I said something last year, you will bring that up now and still be helpless in dealing with the present argument.

Socrates/ Well you see, these arguments are very difficult (as is natural, since they come from wise men) and this last one you mention turns out to be particularly difficult to deal with. Whatever in the world do you mean by the expression "be helpless in dealing with," Dionysodorus? Doesn't it clearly mean that I am unable to refute the argument? Just tell me, what else is the sense of this phrase "I am helpless in dealing with the argument"?

Dionysodorus/ But at least it is not very difficult to deal with your phrase, so go ahead and answer.

Socrates/ Before you answer me, Dionysodorus?

Dionysodorus/ You refuse to answer then?

Socrates/ Well, is it fair?

Dionysodorus/ Perfectly fair.

Socrates/ On what principle? Or isn't it clearly on this one, that you have come here on the present occasion as a man who is completely skilled in arguments, and you know when an answer should be given and when it should not? So now you decline to give any answer whatsoever because you realize you ought not to?

Dionysodorus/ You are babbling instead of being concerned about answering. But, my good fellow, follow my instructions and answer, since you admit that I am wise.

Socrates/ I must obey then, and it seems I am forced to do so, since you are in command, so ask away.

Dionysodorus/ Now are the things that have sense those that have soul, or do things without soul have sense too?

Socrates/ It is the ones with soul that have sense.

Dionysodorus/ And do you know any phrase that has soul?

Socrates/ Heavens no, not I.

Dionysodorus/ Then why did you ask me just now what was the sense of my phrase?

Socrates/ I suppose, for no other reason than that I made a mistake on account of being so stupid. Or perhaps I did not make a mistake but was right when I spoke as if phrases had sense? Are you saying that I made a mistake or not? Because if I did not make one you will not refute me no matter how wise you are, and you will be "helpless in dealing with the argument." And if I did make one, you said the wrong thing when you claimed it was impossible to make mistakes—and I'm not talking about things you said last year. So, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, it looks as if this argument has made no progress and still has the old trouble of falling down itself in the process of knocking down others. And your art has not discovered how to prevent this from happening in spite of your wonderful display of precision in words.

And Ctesippus said;

Ctesippus/ Your manner of speech is certainly remarkable, O men of Thurii or Chios, or from wherever and however you like to be styled, because it matters nothing to you if you talk complete nonsense.

Socrates/ I was worried in case there might be hard words, and started to pacify Ctesippus once again, saying, Ctesippus, let me say to you the same things I was just saying to Clinias, that you fail to recognize how remarkable the strangers' wisdom is. It's just that the two of them are unwilling to give us a serious demonstration, but are putting on conjuring tricks in imitation of that Egyptian sophist, Proteus. So let us imitate Menelaus and refuse to release the pair until they have shown us their serious side. I really think some splendid thing in them will appear whenever they begin to be in earnest, so let us beg and exhort and pray them to make it known. As for me, I think I ought once again to take the lead and give an indication of what sort of persons I pray they will show themselves to be. Beginning where I left off earlier, I shall do my best to go through what comes next so as to spur them to

action and in hopes that out of pity and commiseration for my earnest exertions they may be earnest themselves.

So, Clinias, remind me where we left off. As far as I can remember it was just about at the point where we finally agreed that it was necessary to love wisdom, wasn't it?

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now the love of wisdom, or philosophy, is the acquisition of knowledge, isn't that so?

Clinias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, what sort of knowledge would we acquire if we went about it in the right way? Isn't the answer simply this, that it would be one which will benefit us?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And would it benefit us in any way if we knew how to go about and discover where in the earth the greatest quantities of gold are buried?

Clinias/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ But earlier, said, we gave a thorough demonstration of the point that even if all the gold in the world should be ours with no trouble and without digging for it, we should be no better off—no, not even if we knew how to make stones into gold would the knowledge be worth anything. For unless we also knew how to use the gold, there appeared to be no value in it. Or don't you remember?

Clinias/ Yes, I remember very well.

Socrates/ Nor does there seem to be any value in any other sort of knowledge which knows how to make things, whether money making or medicine or any other such thing, unless it knows how to use what it makes—isn't this the case?

He agreed.

And again, if there exists the knowledge of how to make men immortal, but without the knowledge of how to use this

immortality, there seems to be no value in it, if we are to conclude anything from what has already been settled.

We agreed on all this.

Then what we need, my fair friend, is a kind of knowledge which combines making and knowing how to use the thing which it makes.

Clinias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Then it seems not at all needful for us to become lyre makers and skilled in some such knowledge as that. For there the art which makes is one thing and that which uses is another; they are quite distinct although they deal with the same thing. There is a great difference between lyre making and lyre playing, isn't there?

He agreed.

And it is equally obvious that we stand in no need of the art of flute making, since this is another of the same kind.

He said yes.

Seriously then, if we were to learn the art of writing speeches, is this the art which we would have to get if we are going to be happy?

Clinias/ I don't think so.

Socrates/ On what ground do you say this?

Clinias/ Well, I notice that certain speech writers have no idea of how to use the particular speeches they themselves have written, in the same way that the lyre makers have no idea of how to use their lyres. And in the former case too, there are other people who are capable of using what the speech writers have composed but are themselves unable to write. So it is clear that in regard to speeches too, there is one art of making and another of using.

Socrates/ You seem to me, to have sufficient ground for stating that the art of speech writing is not the one a man

would be happy if he acquired. And yet it was in this connection that I expected the very knowledge we have been seeking all this time would put in an appearance. Because, as far as I am concerned, whenever I have any contact with these same men who write speeches, they strike me as being persons of surpassing wisdom, Clinias; and this art of theirs seems to me something marvelous and lofty. Though after all there is nothing remarkable in this, since it is part of the enchanters' art and but slightly inferior to it. For the enchanters' art consists in charming vipers and spiders and scorpions and other wild things, and in curing diseases, while the other art consists in charming and persuading the members of juries and assemblies and other sorts of crowds. Or do you have some other notion of it?

Clinias/ No, it seems to me to be just as you say.

Socrates/ Where should we turn next, then? I asked. To which one of the arts?

Clinias/ I find myself at a loss.

Socrates/ But I think I have discovered it.

Clinias/ Which one is it?

Socrates/ The art of generalship seems to me, to be the one which, more than any other, a man would be happy if he acquired.

Clinias/ It doesn't seem so to me.

Socrates/ How is that?

Clinias/ Well, this art is a kind of man hunting.

Socrates/ What then?

Clinias/ No art of actual hunting, extends any further than pursuing and capturing: whenever the hunters catch what they are pursuing they are incapable of using it, but they and the fishermen hand over their prey to the cooks. And again, geometers and astronomers and calculators (who are hunters

too, in a way, for none of these make their diagrams; they simply discover those which already exist), since they themselves have no idea of how to use their prey but only how to hunt it, hand over the task of using their discoveries to the dialecticians—at least, those of them do so who are not completely senseless.

Socrates/ Well done, most handsome and clever Clinias! And is this really the case?

Clinias/ Very much so. And the same is true of the generals. Whenever they capture some city, or a camp, they hand it over to the statesmen—for they themselves have no idea of how to use the things they have captured—just in the same way, I imagine, that quail hunters hand theirs over to quail keepers. So, if we are in need of that art which will itself know how to use what it acquires through making or capturing, and if it is an art of this sort which will make us happy, then, we must look for some other art besides that of generalship.

Crito/ What do you mean, Socrates? Did that boy utter all this?

Socrates/ You're not convinced of it, Crito?

Crito/ Good heavens no! Because, in my opinion, if he spoke like that, he needs no education, either from Euthydemus or anyone else.

Socrates/ Dear me, then perhaps after all it was Ctesippus who said this, and I am getting absent-minded.

Crito/ Not my idea of Ctesippus!

Socrates/ But I'm sure of one thing at least, that it was neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus who said it. Do you suppose, my good Crito, that some superior being was there and uttered these things—because I am positive I heard them.

Crito/ Yes, by heaven, Socrates, I certainly think it was some superior being, very much so. But after this did you still

go on looking for the art? And did you find the one you were looking for or not?

Socrates/ Find it, my dear man—I should think not! We were really quite ridiculous—just like children running after crested larks; we kept thinking we were about to catch each one of the knowledges, but they always got away. So why should I recount the whole story? When we got to the kingly art and were giving it a thorough inspection to see whether it might be the one which both provided and created happiness, just there we got into a sort of labyrinth: when we thought we had come to the end, we turned round again and reappeared practically at the beginning of our search in just as much trouble as when we started out.

Crito/ And how did this come about, Socrates?

Socrates/ I shall tell you. We had the idea that the statesman's art and the kingly art were the same.

Crito/ And then what?

Socrates/ It was due to this art that generalship and the others handed over the management of the products of which they themselves were the craftsmen, as if this art alone knew how to use them. It seemed clear to us that this was the art we were looking for, and that it was the cause of right action in the state, and, to use the language of Aeschylus, that this art alone sits at the helm of the state, governing all things, ruling all things, and making all things useful.

Crito/ And wasn't your idea a good one, Socrates?

Socrates/ You will form an opinion, Crito, if you like to hear what happened to us next. We took up the question once again in somewhat this fashion: Well, does the kingly art, which rules everything, produce some result for us, or not? Certainly it does, we said to each other. Wouldn't you say so too, Crito?

Crito/ Yes, I would.

Socrates/ Then what would you say its result was? For instance, if I should ask you what result does medicine produce, when it rules over all the things in its control, would you not say that this result was health?

Crito/ Yes, I would.

Socrates/ And what about your own art of farming, when it rules over all the things in its control—what result does it produce? Wouldn't you say that it provides us with nourishment from the earth?

Crito/ Yes, I would.

Socrates/ Now what about the kingly art; when it rules over all the things in its control—what does it produce? Perhaps you won't find the answer quite so easy in this case.

Crito/ No, I certainly don't, Socrates.

Socrates/ Nor did we, Crito. But you are aware of this point at least, that if this is to be the art we are looking for, it must be something useful.

Crito/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ And it certainly must provide us with something good?

Crito/ Necessarily, Socrates.

Socrates/ And Clinias and I of course agreed that nothing is good except some sort of knowledge.

Crito/ Yes, you said that.

Socrates/ Then the other results which a person might attribute to the statesman's art—and these, of course, would be numerous, as for instance, making the citizens rich and free and not disturbed by faction—all these appeared to be neither good nor evil; but this art had to make them wise and to provide them with a share of knowledge if it was to be the one that benefited them and made them happy.

Crito/ True enough. So you agreed on this for the moment at any rate, according to your account.

Socrates/ And does the kingly art make men wise and good?

Crito/ Why not, Socrates?

Socrates/ But does it make all people good, and in every respect? And is it the art which conveys every sort of knowledge, shoe making and carpentry and all the rest?

Crito/ I don't think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then what knowledge does it convey? And what use are we to make of it? It must not be the producer of any of those results which are neither good nor bad, but it must convey a knowledge which is none other than itself. Now shall we try to say what in the world this is, and what use we are to make of it? Is it agreeable to you if we say it is that by which we shall make others good?

Crito/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And in what respect will they be good and in what respect useful, as far as we are concerned? Or shall we go on to say that they will make others good and that these others will do the same to still others? But in what conceivable way they are good is in no way apparent to us, especially since we have discredited what are said to be the results of the statesman's art. It is altogether a case of the proverbial "Corinthus, son of Zeus"; and, as I was saying, we are in just as great difficulties as ever, or even worse, when it comes to finding out what that knowledge is which will make us happy.

Crito/ Mercy on us, Socrates, you seem to have got yourselves into a frightful tangle.

Socrates/ As far as I was concerned, Crito, when I had fallen into this difficulty, I began to exclaim at the top of my lungs and to call upon the two strangers as though they were the Heavenly Twins to rescue both myself and the boy from

the third wave of the argument and to endeavor in every conceivable way to make plain what this knowledge can be which we ought to have if we are going to spend the remainder of our lives in the right way.

Crito/ And what about it? Was Euthydemus willing to reveal anything to you?

Socrates/ Of course! And he began his account, my friend, in this generous manner:

Euthydemus/ Would you prefer, Socrates, to have me teach you this knowledge you have been in difficulties over all this time, or to demonstrate that you possess it?

Socrates/ O marvelous man, is this in your power?

Euthydemus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Then for heaven's sake demonstrate that I possess it! That will be much easier than learning for a man of my age.

Euthydemus/ Then come answer me this: Is there anything you know?

Socrates/ Oh, yes, many things, though trivial ones.

Euthydemus/ That will serve the purpose. Now do you suppose it possible for any existing thing not to be what it is?

Socrates/ Heavens no, not I.

Euthydemus/ And do you know something?

Socrates/ Yes, I do.

Euthydemus/ Then you are knowing, if you really know?

Socrates/ Of course, as far as concerns that particular thing.

Euthydemus/ That doesn't matter, because mustn't you necessarily know everything, if you are knowing?

Socrates/ How in heaven's name can that be, when there are many other things I don't know?

Euthydemus/ Then if there is anything you don't know, you are not knowing.

Socrates/ In just that matter, my friend.

Euthydemus/ Are you any the less not knowing for all that? And just now you said you were knowing, with the result that you are the man you are, and then again you are not, at the same time and in respect to the same things.

Socrates/ Very good, Euthydemus—according to the proverb, "whatever you say is well said." But how do I know that knowledge we were looking for? Since it is impossible both to be and not to be the same thing, if I know one thing I know absolutely everything—because I could not be both knowing and not knowing at the same time—and since I know everything, I also have this knowledge. Is this what you mean, and is this your piece of wisdom?

Euthydemus/ You are refuted out of your own mouth, Socrates.

Socrates/ But Euthydemus, aren't you in the same condition? Because I would not be at all vexed at anything I might suffer in company with you and this dear man Dionysodorus. Tell me, don't you two know some existing things, and aren't there others you don't know?

Dionysodorus/ Far from it, Socrates.

Socrates/ What's that? Do you know nothing at all?

Dionysodorus/ On the contrary.

Socrates/ Then you know everything, since you know something?

Dionysodorus/ Yes, everything, and you also know everything if you really know even one thing.

Socrates/ O heavens, how marvelous! And what a great blessing has come to light! But it can't be true that all the rest of mankind either know everything or nothing?

Dionysodorus/ Well, I don't suppose they know some things and not others and are thus knowing and not knowing at the same time.

Socrates/ But what follows?

Dionysodorus/ Everyone, knows everything, if he really knows something.

Socrates/ By the gods, Dionysodorus, —for I realize that you are both now in earnest, although I have provoked you to it with some difficulty—do you two really know everything? Carpentry and shoe making, for instance?

Euthydemus/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ So you are both able to do leather stitching?

Dionysodorus/ Heavens yes, and we can do cobbling.

Socrates/ And do you also have the sort of information which tells the number of the stars and of the sands?

Dionysodorus/ Of course. Do you think we would fail to agree to that too?

Socrates/ Here Ctesippus interrupted:

Ctesippus/ For goodness' sake, Dionysodorus, give me some evidence of these things which will convince me that you are both telling the truth.

Dionysodorus/ What shall I show you?

Ctesippus/ Do you know how many teeth Euthydemus has, and does he know how many you have?

Dionysodorus/ Aren't you satisfied, with being told that we know everything?

Ctesippus/ Not at all, but tell us just this one thing in addition and prove that you speak the truth. Because if you say how many each of you has, and you turn out to be right when we have made a count, then we shall trust you in everything else.

Socrates/ Well, they weren't willing to do it, since they thought they were being laughed at, but they claimed to know every single thing they were questioned about by Ctesippus. And there was practically nothing Ctesippus did not ask them about in the end, inquiring shamelessly whether they knew the most disgraceful things. The two of them faced his questions very manfully, claiming to know in each case, just like boars when they are driven up to the attack. The result was that even I myself, Crito, was finally compelled, out of sheer disbelief, to ask whether Dionysodorus even knew how to dance, to which he replied that he certainly did.

I don't suppose, that at your age you are so far advanced in wisdom as to somersault over swords or be turned about on a wheel?

Dionysodorus/ There is nothing I cannot do.

Socrates/ And do you know everything just at the present moment, I asked, or is your knowledge also a permanent thing?

Dionysodorus/ It is permanent as well.

Socrates/ And when you were children and had just been born, did you know everything?

They both answered yes at the same moment.

Now the thing struck us as unbelievable; and Euthydemus asked;

Euthydemus/ Are you incredulous, Socrates?

Socrates/ Well, I would be, except for the probability that you are both wise men.

Euthydemus/ But if you are willing to answer my questions, I will prove that you agree to these remarkable things too.

Socrates/ But, there is nothing I would like better than to be refuted on these points. Because if I am unaware of my own

wisdom, but you are going to demonstrate that I know everything and know it forever, what greater godsend than this would I be likely to come across my whole life long?

Euthydemus/ Then answer.

Socrates/ Ask away, I am ready.

Euthydemus/ Well then, Socrates, when you have knowledge, do you have it of something, or not?

Socrates/ I have it of something.

Euthydemus/ And do you know by means of that by which you have knowledge, or by means of something else?

Socrates/ By means of that by which I have knowledge. I suppose you mean the soul, or isn't this what you have in mind?

Euthydemus/ Aren't you ashamed, Socrates, to be asking a question of your own when you ought to be answering?

Socrates/ Very well, but how am I to act? I will do just what you tell me. Now whenever I don't understand your question, do you want me to answer just the same, without inquiring further about it?

Euthydemus/ You surely grasp something of what I say, don't you?

Socrates/ Yes, I do.

Euthydemus/ Then answer in terms of what you understand.

Socrates/ Well then, if you ask a question with one thing in mind and I understand it with another and then answer in terms of the latter, will you be satisfied if I answer nothing to the purpose?

Euthydemus/ I shall be satisfied, although I don't suppose you will.

Socrates/ Then I'm certainly not going to answer, until I understand the question.

Euthydemus/ You are evading a question you understand all along, because you keep talking nonsense and are practically senile.

Socrates/ I realized he was angry with me for making distinctions in his phrases, because he wanted to surround me with words and so hunt me down. Then I remembered that Connus, too, is vexed with me whenever I don't give in to him, and that as a result, he takes fewer pains with me because he thinks I am stupid. And since I had made up my mind to attend this man's classes too, I thought I had better give in for fear he might think me too uncouth to be his pupil. So Well, Euthydemus, if you think this is how to do things, we must do them your way, because you are far more of an expert at discoursing than I, who have merely a layman's knowledge of the art. So go back and ask your questions from the beginning.

Euthydemus/ And you answer again from the beginning. Do you know what you know by means of something, or not?

Socrates/ I know it by means of the soul.

Euthydemus/ There he is again, adding on something to the question! I didn't ask you by what you know, but whether you know by means of something.

Socrates/ Yes, I did give too much of an answer again, because I am so uneducated. Please forgive me and I shall answer simply that I know what I know by means of something.

Euthydemus/ And do you always know by this same means, or is it rather the case that you know sometimes by this means and sometimes by another?

Socrates/ Always, whenever I know, it is by this means.

Euthydemus/ Won't you stop adding things on again?

Socrates/ But I'm afraid that this word "always" may trip us up.

Euthydemus/ It won't do it to us, but to you, if anyone. Come along and answer: do you always know by this means?

Socrates/ Always, since I have to withdraw the "whenever."

Euthydemus/ Then you always know, by this means. And since you are always knowing, the next question is, do you know some things by this means by which you know and others by some other means, or everything by this one?

Socrates/ Absolutely everything by this one, —those that I know, that is.

Euthydemus/ There it is again, —here comes the same qualification.

Socrates/ Well I take back the "those that I know,"

Euthydemus/ No, don't take back a single thing, —I'm not asking you any favors. Just answer me this: would you be capable of knowing "absolutely everything," if you did not know everything?

Socrates/ It would be remarkable if I did.

Euthydemus/ And Then add on everything you like now, because you admit that you know absolutely everything.

Socrates/ It seems I do, especially since my "those that I know" has no effect, and I know everything.

Euthydemus/ And you have also admitted that you always know (by means of that by which you know), whenever you know, or however else you like to put it, because you have admitted that you always know and know all things at the same time. It is obvious that you knew even when you were a child and when you were being born and when you were being conceived. And before you yourself came into being and before the foundation of heaven and earth, you knew absolutely everything, if it is true that you always know. And, by heaven,

you always will know, and will know everything, if I want it that way.

Socrates/ I hope you will want it that way, most honorable Euthydemus, if you are genuinely telling the truth. But I don't quite believe in your ability to bring it off unless your brother Dionysodorus here should lend a helping hand—perhaps the two of you might be able to do it. Tell me, I went on: with respect to other things I see no possibility of disputing with men of such prodigious wisdom by saying that I do not know everything, since you have stated that I do; but what about things of this sort, Euthydemus—how shall I say I know that good men are unjust? Come tell me, do I know this, or not?

Euthydemus/ Oh yes, you know it.

Socrates/ Know what?

Euthydemus/ That the good are not unjust.

Socrates/ Yes, I've always known that. But this isn't my question—what I'm asking is, where did I learn that the good are unjust?

Dionysodorus/ Nowhere.

Socrates/ Then this is something I do not know.

Euthydemus/ You are ruining the argument, and this fellow here will turn out to be not knowing, and then he will be knowing and not knowing at the same time.

Socrates/ And Dionysodorus blushed.

But you, what do you say, Euthydemus? Your all-knowing brother doesn't appear to be making a mistake, does he?

Dionysodorus/ Am I a brother of Euthydemus?

Socrates/ said Dionysodorus, interrupting quickly.

And I said, Let that pass, my good friend, until Euthydemus instructs me as to how I know that good men are unjust, and don't begrudge me this piece of information.

Dionysodorus/ You are running away, Socrates, and refusing to answer.

Socrates/ And with good reason, because I am weaker than either of you, so that I do not hesitate to run away from you both together. I am much more worthless than Heracles, who was unable to fight it out with both the Hydra, a kind of lady-sophist who was so clever that if anyone cut off one of her heads of argument, she put forth many more in its place, and with another sort of sophist, a crab arrived on shore from the sea—rather recently, I think. And when Heracles was in distress because this creature was chattering and biting on his left, he called for his nephew Iolaus to come and help him, which Iolaus successfully did. But if my Iolaus should come, he would do more harm than good.

Dionysodorus/ And when you have finished this song and story, will you tell me whether Iolaus is any more Heracles' nephew than yours?

Socrates/ Well, I suppose it will be best for me if I answer you, Dionysodorus, because you will not stop asking questions—I am quite convinced of that—out of an envious desire to prevent Euthydemus from teaching me that piece of wisdom.

Dionysodorus/ Then answer.

Socrates/ Well, my answer is that Iolaus was the nephew of Heracles, but as for being mine, I don't see that he is, in any way whatsoever. Because my brother, Patrocles, was not his father, although Heracles' brother, Iphicles, does have a name which is somewhat similar.

Dionysodorus/ And Patrocles, is your brother?

Socrates/ Yes indeed, —we have the same mother, though not the same father.

Dionysodorus/ Then he both is and is not your brother.

Socrates/ Not by the same father, my good friend, because his father was Chaeredemus and mine was Sophroniscus.

Dionysodorus/ But Sophroniscus and Chaeredemus were both fathers?

Socrates/ Certainly, —the former was mine and the latter his.

Dionysodorus/ Then was Chaeredemus other than a father?

Socrates/ Other than mine at any rate.

Dionysodorus/ Then he was a father while he was other than a father? Or are you the same as a stone?

Socrates/ I'm afraid you will show that I am, although I don't feel like one.

Dionysodorus/ Then are you other than a stone?

Socrates/ Yes, quite other.

Dionysodorus/ Then isn't it the case that if you are other than a stone, you are not a stone, and if you are other than gold, you are not gold?

Socrates/ That's true.

Dionysodorus/ Then Chaeredemus is not a father if he is other than a father.

Socrates/ So it seems that he is not a father.

Euthydemus/ Because if Chaeredemus is a father;

Socrates/ said Euthydemus, interrupting;

Euthydemus/ then, on the other hand, Sophroniscus, being other than a father, is not a father, so that you, Socrates, are without a father.

Socrates/ Here Ctesippus took up the argument, saying;

Ctesippus/ Well, isn't your father in just the same situation? Isn't he other than my father?

Euthydemus/ Far from it.

Ctesippus/ What! Is he the same?

Euthydemus/ The same, certainly.

Ctesippus/ I should not agree with that. But tell me, Euthydemus, is he just my father, or the father of everyone else as well?

Euthydemus/ Of everyone else as well. Or do you think the same man is both a father and not a father?

Ctesippus/ I was certainly of that opinion.

Euthydemus/ What, —do you think that a thing can be both gold and not gold? Or both a man and not a man?

Ctesippus/ But perhaps, Euthydemus, you are not uniting flax with flax, as the proverb has it. Because you are making an alarming statement if you say your father is the father of all.

Euthydemus/ But he is.

Ctesippus/ Just of men, or of horses and all the other animals?

Euthydemus/ All of them.

Ctesippus/ And is your mother their mother?

Euthydemus/ Yes, she is.

Ctesippus/ And is your mother the mother of sea urchins?

Euthydemus/ Yes, and so is yours.

Ctesippus/ So you are the brother of gudgeons and puppies and piglets.

Euthydemus/ Yes, and so are you.

Ctesippus/ And your father turns out to be a boar and a dog.

Euthydemus/ And so does yours.

Dionysodorus/ You will admit all this in a moment, Ctesippus, if you answer my questions. Tell me, have you got a dog?

Ctesippus/ Yes, and a brute of a one too.

Dionysodorus/ And has he got puppies?

Ctesippus/ Yes indeed, and they are just like him.

Dionysodorus/ And so the dog is their father?

Ctesippus/ Yes, I saw him mounting the bitch myself.

Dionysodorus/ Well then: isn't the dog yours?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ Then since he is a father and is yours, the dog turns out to be your father, and you are the brother of puppies, aren't you?

Socrates/ And again Dionysodorus cut in quickly to keep Ctesippus from making some reply first and said;

Dionysodorus/ Just answer me one more small question: Do you beat this dog of yours?

Socrates/ And Ctesippus laughed and said;

Ctesippus/ Heavens yes, since I can't beat you!

Dionysodorus/ Then do you beat your own father?

Ctesippus/ There would certainly be much more reason for me to beat yours, for taking it into his head to beget such clever sons. But I suppose, Euthydemus, that the father of you and the puppies has benefited greatly from this wisdom of yours!

Euthydemus/ But he has no need of a lot of good things, Ctesippus—he does not, and neither do you.

Ctesippus/ Nor you either, Euthydemus?

Euthydemus/ Nor any other man. Tell me, Ctesippus, do you think it a good thing for a sick man to drink medicine whenever he needs it, or does it seem to you not a good thing? And do you think it good for a man to be armed when he goes to war rather than to go unarmed?

Ctesippus/ It seems good to me. And yet I think you are about to play one of your charming tricks.

Euthydemus/ The best way to find out is to go ahead and answer. Since you admit that it is a good thing for a man to drink medicine whenever he needs it, then oughtn't he to drink as much as possible? And won't it be fine if someone pounds up and mixes him a wagon load of hellebore?

Socrates/ And Ctesippus said;

Ctesippus/ Very true indeed, Euthydemus, if the man drinking is as big as the statue at Delphi!

Euthydemus/ It also follows, that since it is a good thing to be armed in war, a man ought to have as many spears and shields as possible, if it really is a good thing?

Ctesippus/ It really does seem to be so, But surely you don't believe this yourself, Euthydemus? Wouldn't you prefer one shield and one spear?

Euthydemus/ Yes, I would.

Ctesippus/ And would you also arm Geryon and Briareus in this fashion? I thought you and your companion here were cleverer than that, considering that you both fight in armor.

Socrates/ Euthydemus was silent, but Dionysodorus went back to the answers Ctesippus had given earlier and asked;

Dionysodorus/ And what about gold, then? In your opinion is it a good thing to have?

Ctesippus/ Yes indeed, and, in this case, lots of it.

Dionysodorus/ Well then, oughtn't one to have good things always and everywhere?

Ctesippus/ Very much so.

Dionysodorus/ And you admit that gold is also one of the good things?

Ctesippus/ Yes, I have admitted that already.

Dionysodorus/ Then one should have it always and everywhere, and especially in oneself? And wouldn't a man be happiest of all if he had three talents of gold in his stomach, and a talent in his skull, and a stater of gold in each eye?

Ctesippus/ Well, they do say, Euthydemus, that among the Scythians the happiest and best are the men who have a lot of gold in their own skulls (the same way that you were talking a moment ago about the dog being my father); and, what is still more remarkable, the story is that they also drink out of their own gilded skulls and gaze at the insides of them, having their own heads in their hands!

Euthydemus/ Tell me, do the Scythians and the rest of mankind see things capable of sight or incapable?

Ctesippus/ Capable, I suppose.

Euthydemus/ And do you do so too?

Ctesippus/ Yes, so do I.

Euthydemus/ And do you see our cloaks?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Then these same cloaks are capable of sight.

Ctesippus/ Remarkably so.

Euthydemus/ Well, what do they see?

Ctesippus/ Nothing at all. And you, perhaps, don't suppose you see them, you are such a sweet innocent. But you strike me, Euthydemus, as having fallen asleep with your eyes open; and if it is possible to speak and say nothing, you are doing exactly that.

Dionysodorus/ But surely it is not possible for there to be a speaking of the silent.

Ctesippus/ Entirely impossible.

Dionysodorus/ Then neither is there a silence of the speaking?

Ctesippus/ Still less so.

Dionysodorus/ But whenever you mention stones and wood and pieces of iron, are you not speaking of the silent?

Ctesippus/ Not if I go by the blacksmiths' shops, because there the pieces of iron are said to speak out and cry aloud if anyone handles them. So here, thanks to your wisdom, you were talking nonsense without being aware of it. But prove me the other point, how there can be a silence of the speaking.

Socrates/ (I had the notion that Ctesippus was very much keyed up on account of his favorite being there.)

Euthydemus/ Whenever you are silent, are you not silent with respect to all things?

Ctesippus/ Yes, I am.

Euthydemus/ Therefore, you are also silent with respect to the speaking, if "the speaking" is included in all things.

Ctesippus/ What, all things are not silent, are they?

Euthydemus/ I imagine not.

Ctesippus/ Well then, my good friend, do all things speak?

Euthydemus/ All the speaking ones, I suppose.

Ctesippus/ But, this is not my question—I want to know, are all things silent, or do they speak?

Dionysodorus/ Neither and both;

Socrates/ said Dionysodorus, breaking in, and

Dionysodorus/ I'm convinced you will be helpless in dealing with that answer.

Socrates/ Ctesippus gave one of his tremendous laughs and said;

Ctesippus/ Euthydemus, your brother has made the argument sit on both sides of the fence and it is ruined and done for!

Socrates/ Clinias was very pleased and laughed too, which made Ctesippus swell to ten times his normal size. It is my opinion that Ctesippus, who is a bit of a rogue, had picked up these very things by overhearing these very men, because there is no wisdom of a comparable sort among any other person of the present day.

And I said, Clinias, why are you laughing at such serious and beautiful things?

Dionysodorus/ Why Socrates, have you ever yet seen a beautiful thing?

Socrates/ Yes indeed, Dionysodorus, and many of them.

Dionysodorus/ And were they different from the beautiful, or were they the same as the beautiful?

Socrates/ This put me in a terrible fix, which I thought I deserved for my grumbling. All the same I answered that they were different from the beautiful itself, but at the same time there was some beauty present with each of them.

Dionysodorus/ Then if an ox is present with you, you are an ox? And because I am present with you now, you are Dionysodorus?

Socrates/ Heaven forbid.

Dionysodorus/ But in what way, can the different be different just because the different is present with the different?

Socrates/ Are you in difficulties there? (I was so eager to have the wisdom of the pair that I was already trying to copy it.)

Dionysodorus/ How can I not be in difficulties? Not only I but everyone else must be, when a thing is impossible.

Socrates/ What are you saying, Dionysodorus? Isn't the beautiful beautiful and the ugly ugly?

Dionysodorus/ Yes, if I like.

Socrates/ And do you like?

Dionysodorus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then isn't it also the case that the same is the same and the different different? Because I don't imagine that the different is the same, but I thought even a child would hardly doubt that the different is different. But you must have neglected this point deliberately, Dionysodorus, since in every other respect you and your brother strike me as bringing the art of argument to a fine pitch of excellence, like craftsmen who bring to completion whatever work constitutes their proper business.

Dionysodorus/ You know then, what the proper business of each craftsman is? For instance, you know whose business it is to work metal?

Socrates/ Yes, I do—the blacksmith's.

Dionysodorus/ Well then, what about making pots?

Socrates/ The potter's.

Dionysodorus/ And again, to slaughter and skin, and to boil and roast the pieces after cutting them up?

Socrates/ The cook's.

Dionysodorus/ Now if a man does the proper business, he will do rightly?

Socrates/ Very much so.

Dionysodorus/ And the proper business in the case of the cook is, as you say, to cut up and skin? You did agree to that didn't you?

Socrates/ Yes, I did, but forgive me.

Dionysodorus/ Then it is clear, that if someone kills the cook and cuts him up, and then boils him and roasts him, he will be doing the proper business. And if anyone hammers the blacksmith himself, and puts the potter on the wheel, he will also be doing the proper business.

Socrates/ By Poseidon, you are putting the finishing touches on your wisdom! And do you think that such skill will ever be mine?

Dionysodorus/ And would you recognize it, Socrates, if it did become yours?

Socrates/ If only you are willing, I clearly would.

Dionysodorus/ What's that, —do you think you know your own possessions?

Socrates/ Yes, unless you forbid it—for all my hopes must begin with you and end with Euthydemus here.

Dionysodorus/ And do you consider those things to be yours over which you have control and which you are allowed to treat as you please? For instance, an ox or a sheep: do you regard these as yours because you are free to sell them or give them away or sacrifice them to any god you please? And if you could not treat them in this fashion, then they would not be yours?

Socrates/ And because I knew that some fine thing would emerge from their questions, and, at the same time, because I wanted to hear it as quickly as possible, This is exactly the case—it is only things like these which are mine.

Dionysodorus/ Very well. You give the name of living beings to all things that have a soul, don't you?

Socrates/ Yes.

Dionysodorus/ And you admit that only those living beings are yours over which you have power to do all these things I mentioned just now?

Socrates/ I admit it. And he pretended to pause as though he were contemplating some weighty matter, and then said;

Dionysodorus/ Tell me, Socrates, do you have an ancestral Zeus?

Socrates/ I had a suspicion (a correct one as it turned out) of the way in which the argument would end, and I began to make a desperate effort to escape, twisting about as though I were already caught in the net.

No, I have not, Dionysodorus.

Dionysodorus/ Then you are a miserable sort of fellow, and not even an Athenian, if you have no ancestral gods nor shrines, nor any of the other things of this sort which befit a gentleman.

Socrates/ Enough of that, Dionysodorus—mind your tongue and don't give me a lecture which is prematurely harsh. I certainly do have altars; and I have shrines, both domestic and ancestral, and everything else of the kind, just like the other Athenians.

Dionysodorus/ Well, what about the other Athenians? Doesn't each of them have an ancestral Zeus?

Socrates/ None of the Ionians use that expression, neither those who are colonists from the city nor we ourselves. We do have an ancestral Apollo because of Ion's parentage, but Zeus is not given the name of "ancestral" by us. Rather we call him "defender of the house" or "of the tribe," and we also have an Athena "of the tribe."

Dionysodorus/ Oh, that will do, since you do appear to have an Apollo and a Zeus and an Athena.

Socrates/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ Then these would be your gods?

Socrates/ My ancestors, and my masters.

Dionysodorus/ But at any rate they are yours. Or didn't you admit that they were?

Socrates/ Yes, I admitted it. What is going to happen to me?

Dionysodorus/ Then these gods, are also living beings? Because you have admitted that everything which has a soul is a living being. Or don't these gods have a soul?

Socrates/ Oh yes, they do.

Dionysodorus/ Then they are living beings?

Socrates/ Yes, living beings.

Dionysodorus/ And you have agreed that those living beings are yours which you have a right to give away and to sell and to sacrifice to any god you please.

Socrates/ Yes, I agreed to that, —there is no retreat for me, Euthydemus.

Dionysodorus/ Then come tell me straightway, since you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours, then do you have the right to sell them or give them away or treat them in any way you like, as you do with the other living creatures?

Socrates/ Then I, Crito, lay speechless, just as if the argument had struck me a blow. But Ctesippus ran to my aid, saying;

Ctesippus/ Bravo, Heracles, what a fine argument!

Socrates/ And Dionysodorus said;

Dionysodorus/ Is Heracles a bravo, or is a bravo Heracles?

Ctesippus/ By Poseidon, what marvelous arguments! I give up—the pair are unbeatable.

Socrates/ Whereupon, my dear Crito, there was no one there who did not praise to the skies the argument and the two men, laughing and applauding and exulting until they were nearly exhausted. In the case of each and every one of the previous arguments, it was only the admirers of Euthydemus who made such an enthusiastic uproar; but now it almost seemed as if the pillars of the Lyceum applauded the pair and took pleasure in their success. Even I myself was so affected by it as to declare that I had never in my life seen

such wise men; and I was so absolutely captivated by their wisdom that I began to praise and extol them and said, O happy pair, what miraculous endowment you possess to have brought such a thing to perfection in so short a time! Among the many other fine things which belong to your arguments, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, there is one which is the most magnificent of all, that you care nothing for the many, or in fact, for men of consequence or reputation, but only for persons of your own sort. And I am convinced that there are very few men like you who would appreciate these arguments, but that the majority understand them so little that I feel sure they would be more ashamed to refute others with arguments of this sort than to be refuted by them. And then there is this other public-spirited and kindly aspect of your performance; whenever you deny that there is anything beautiful or good or white, and that the different is in any way different, you do in fact completely stitch up men's mouths, as you say. But since you would appear to stitch up your own as well, you are behaving in a charming fashion and the harshness of your words is quite removed. But the greatest thing of all is that your skill is such, and is so skillfully contrived, that anyone can master it in a very short time. I myself found this out by watching Ctesippus and seeing how quickly he was able to imitate you on the spur of the moment. This ability of your technique to be picked up rapidly is a fine thing, but not something which lends itself well to public performance. If you will take my advice, be careful not to talk in front of a large group; the listeners are likely to master it right away and give you no credit. Better just talk to each other in private, or, if you must have an audience, then let no one come unless he gives you money. And if you are sensible you will give your disciples the same advice, never to argue with anyone but yourselves and each other. For it is the rare thing, Euthydemus, which is the precious one, and water is

cheapest, even though, as Pindar said, it is the best. But come, and see to admitting Clinias and me to your classes.

After saying these things, Crito, and making a few other brief remarks, we separated. Now figure out a way to join us in attending their classes, since they claim to be able to instruct anyone who is willing to pay, and say that neither age nor lack of ability prevents anyone whatsoever from learning their wisdom easily. And, what is specially relevant for you to hear, they say that their art is in no way a hindrance to the making of money.

Crito/ Well, Socrates, I am indeed a person who loves listening and who would be glad to learn something; but all the same I am afraid that I also am not one of Euthydemus' sort. Instead I am one of those you mentioned who would rather be refuted by arguments of this kind than use them to refute. Now it seems ridiculous to me to give you advice, but I want to tell you what I heard. When I was taking a walk one of the men who was leaving your discussion came up to me (someone who has a high opinion of himself for wisdom and is one of those clever people who write speeches for the law courts) and

Someone/ Crito, aren't you a disciple of these wise men?

Crito/ Heavens no, —there was such a crowd that I was unable to hear, even though I stood quite close.

Someone/ And yet, it was worth hearing.

Crito/ What was it?

Someone/ You would have heard men conversing who are the wisest of the present day in this kind of argument.

Crito/ What did they show you?

Someone/ Nothing else, than the sort of thing one can hear from such people at any time—chattering and making a worthless fuss about matters of no consequence.

Crito/ (These are his approximate words.) But surely, philosophy is a charming thing.

Someone/ Charming, my innocent friend? —why it is of no value whatsoever! And if you had been present, I think you would have been embarrassed on your friend's account, he acted so strangely in his willingness to put himself at the disposal of men who care nothing about what they say, but just snatch at every word. And these men, as I was just saying, are among the most influential people of the present day. But the fact is, Crito, that both the activity itself and the men who engage in it are worthless and ridiculous. Now as far as I am concerned, Socrates, the man is wrong to criticize the activity and so is anyone else who does so. But to be willing to argue with such people in front of a large crowd does seem to me worthy of reproach.

Socrates/ Crito, men like these are very strange. Still, I don't yet know what to say in return. What sort of man was this who came up and attacked philosophy? Was he one of those clever persons who contend in the law courts, an orator? Or was he one of those who equip such men for battle, a writer of the speeches which the orators use?

Crito/ He was certainly not an orator, no indeed. Nor do I think he has ever appeared in court. But they say he understands the business—very much so—and that he is a clever man and can compose clever speeches.

Socrates/ Now I understand—it was about this sort of person that I was just going to speak myself. These are the persons, Crito, whom Prodicus describes as occupying the no-man's-land between the philosopher and the statesman. They think that they are the wisest of men, and that they not only are but also seem to be so in the eyes of a great many, so that no one else keeps them from enjoying universal esteem except the followers of philosophy. Therefore, they think that if they

place these persons in the position of appearing to be worth nothing, then victory in the contest for the reputation of wisdom will be indisputably and immediately theirs, and in the eyes of all. They think they really are the wisest, and whenever they are cut short in private conversation, they attribute this to Euthydemus and his crew. They regard themselves as very wise, and reasonably so, since they think they are not only pretty well up in philosophy but also in politics. Yes, their conceit of wisdom is quite natural because they think they have as much of each as they need; and, keeping clear of both risk and conflict, they reap the fruits of wisdom.

Crito/ And so, Socrates, do you think there is anything in what they say? For surely it can't be denied that their argument has a certain plausibility.

Socrates/ Plausibility is just what it does have, Crito, rather than truth. It is no easy matter to persuade them that a man or anything else which is between two things and partakes of both is worse than one and better than the other in the case where one of the things is good and the other evil; and that in the case where it partakes of two distinct goods, it is worse than either of them with respect to the end for which each of the two (of which it is composed) is useful. It is only in the case where the thing in the middle partakes of two distinct evils that it is better than either of those of which it has a share. Now if philosophy is a good, and so is the activity of a statesman (and each has a different end), and those partaking of both are in between, then these men are talking nonsense, since they are inferior to both. If one is good and the other bad, then they are better than the practitioners of the latter and worse than those of the former; while if both are bad, there is some truth in what they say, but otherwise none at all. I don't suppose they would agree that both [philosophy and politics] are bad, nor that one is bad and the other good.

The fact of the matter is that, while partaking of both, they are inferior to both with respect to the object for which either politics or philosophy is of value; and that whereas they are actually in the third place, they want to be regarded as being in the first. However, we ought to forgive them their ambition and not feel angry, although we still ought to see these men for what they are. After all, we ought to admire every man who says anything sensible, and who labors bravely in its pursuit.

Crito/ All the same, Socrates, as I keep telling you, I am in doubt about what I ought to do with my sons. The younger one is still quite small, but Critobulus is at an age when he needs someone who will do him good. Now whenever I am in your company your presence has the effect of leading me to think it madness to have taken such pains about my children in various other ways, such as marrying to make sure that they would be of noble birth on the mother's side, and making money so that they would be as well off as possible, and then to give no thought to their education. But on the other hand, whenever I take a look at any of those persons who set up to educate men, I am amazed; and every last one of them strikes me as utterly grotesque, to speak frankly between ourselves. So the result is that I cannot see how I am to persuade the boy to take up philosophy.

Socrates/ My dear Crito, don't you realize that in every pursuit most of the practitioners are paltry and of no account whereas the serious men are few and beyond price? For instance, doesn't gymnastics strike you as a fine thing? And money making and rhetoric and the art of the general?

Crito/ Yes, of course they do.

Socrates/ Well then, in each of these cases don't you notice that the majority give a laughable performance of their respective tasks?

Crito/ Yes indeed—you are speaking the exact truth.

Socrates/ And just because this is so, do you intend to run away from all these pursuits and entrust your son to none of them?

Crito/ No, this would not be reasonable, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then don't do what you ought not to, Crito, but pay no attention to the practitioners of philosophy, whether good or bad. Rather give serious consideration to the thing itself: if it seems to you negligible, then turn everyone from it, not just your sons. But if it seems to you to be what I think it is, then take heart, pursue it, practice it, both you and yours, as the proverb says.

The Euthydemus.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

CRITO, DIONYSODORUS,

SOCRATES, CLINIAS,

[EUTHYDEMUS, CTESIPPUS.]

Crito/ With whom, Socrates, did you yesterday converse in the Lyceum? For you were surrounded with so great a crowd, that though I approached, desirous to hear, yet I could not hear anything clearly. I raised myself indeed on my feet that I might see more distinctly, and it appeared to me that it was a certain stranger with whom you were conversing. Who was this stranger?

Socrates/ You must ask, Crito, which of them it was; for not one only, but two were present.

Crito/ He, of whom I speak, sat the third from your right hand; but in the middle of you was a lad, the son of Axiochus, who appeared to me, Socrates, to have made a great proficiency in learning, and who does not much differ in age from our Critobulus; though he indeed is very slender, but this lad looks older than he is, and is of a fair and engaging aspect.

Socrates/ It is Euthydemus, Socrates, of whom you inquire; but he who sat with me, on my left hand, was his brother Dionysodorus, who also partook of the discourse.

Crito/ I know neither of them, Socrates.

Socrates/ They are recent sophists, as it appears.

Crito/ Whence do they come; and what is the wisdom which they profess?

Socrates/ They are, I think, natives of Chius, but they migrated to the Thurians, and flying from thence, dwelt for many years about these places. But in answer to your inquiry respecting their wisdom, they are indeed very wise, Crito; but I have been hitherto ignorant that they were pancratiasts; for they are skilled in every kind of contest, not after the manner of those brother pancratiasts of Acarnania; since they are only able to contend with the body; but these, in the first place, are most powerful in body, and excel in that contest which consists in vanquishing all men. For they are very skillful in contending with arms, and they know how to impart this skill to another who gives them a reward for it. In the next place, they are most powerful in judicial contests, and are able both to contend themselves, and instruct others, to deliver and compose forensic orations, at first, therefore, they were only skilled in these things, but now they have carried the pancratiastic art to its utmost perfection: for they are now so skilled in that kind of contest, which it remained for them to acquire; that no one is able to resist them; so skillful are they become in verbal contention, and in always confuting whatever is said, whether it be true or false. I therefore, Crito, intend to deliver myself to these men: for they say that, in a short time, they can render another person skilled in the same things.

Crito/ But are you not afraid, Socrates, that you are too old for this purpose?.

Socrates/ By no means, Crito, as I have a sufficient argument and remedy against fear: for these very men, as I may say, who are now old, have entered on the study of this wisdom, which I desire, viz. the art of contending. For last year, or the year before last, they were not in the least skilled in this art. But I am only afraid of one thing, lest I should be a disgrace to these strangers, in the same manner as I am to Connus the harper, the son of Metrobius, who even now

teaches me to play on the harp. The boys, therefore, who are my fellow disciples, on seeing me, laugh, and call Connus the preceptor of old men. Lest therefore someone should reproach these strangers with the same thing, and they dreading this should be unwilling to receive me, I have, Crito, persuaded other elderly men to attend me thither as my fellow disciples, and here also I am persuading others to accompany me. Do you also join us. Perhaps too, as an allurement, we may bring your sons to them: for, in consequence of desiring to have them as their pupils, I know that they will also instruct us.

Crito/ Nothing hinders, Socrates, if you are so disposed. But, in the first place, tell me what this wisdom of these men is, that I may also know what it is which we shall learn.

Socrates/ You will be disappointed, if you think that I am not able to tell you as if I did not attend to them. For I paid great attention, and very well remember what they said: and I will endeavor to relate the whole to you from the beginning. For, by a certain divine allotment, I had seated myself where you saw me, alone, in the Apodyterium: and I then intended to have risen; but as I was about to rise, the dæmon gave me the accustomed signal. I again therefore sat down, and soon after Euthydemus and Dionysodorus entered, and, together with these, many others, who appeared to me to be their disciples; and having entered, they walked in the covered porch of the Gymnasium. But they had not yet walked twice or thrice round this place, when Clinias entered, who you say has made a great proficiency, and in so saying you speak the truth. Behind him there were many lovers and, others, and besides these Ctesippus, a Pæanean youth, very beautiful and naturally very worthy, but wanton in consequence of his youth. Clinias, therefore, as soon as he entered, seeing me sitting alone, came towards me, and sat down on my right hand, as you say. Dionysodorus and

Euthydemus perceiving him, at first stopped and conversed with each other, occasionally looking at us: for I beheld them very attentively. Afterwards approaching nearer, they sat down, Euthydemus indeed by the lad, but Dionysodorus by me, on my left hand. The rest seated themselves just as it happened. These therefore I saluted, because I had not seen them for some time. After this, I said to Clinias, These men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, O Clinias, are not wise in small, but in great things. For they are skilled in everything pertaining to war, in all that a good general ought to know, and in the arrangement and management of an army. They likewise know how to render a man able to defend himself in courts of justice, when he is injured by anyone. For thus speaking however they despised me, and both of them laughed, looking at each other. And Euthydemus indeed said, We no longer engage in these matters seriously, Socrates, but incidentally. And I being surprised said, Your pursuit must indeed be beautiful, if such great affairs are with you incidental. And, by the gods, inform me, what this beautiful study is.

Euthydemus/ We are of opinion, Socrates, that we are able to teach virtue in the best manner, and with the greatest celerity of all men.

Socrates/ O Zeus! What a mighty thing do you announce. Whence was this gain derived? I indeed had hitherto conceived respecting you, as I just now said, that you were very skillful in military contests; and this I had asserted to others. For when you first came hither, I remember that you announced this. But now, if in reality you possess this science, be propitious. For indeed I invoke you, as if you were gods, entreating you to pardon what I have before said. But see, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, if you have spoken the truth: For it is by no means wonderful if the magnitude of the promise should occasion disbelief.

Euthydemus/ Be assured, Socrates, that it is so.

Socrates/ I therefore consider you as much more blessed through this possession, than the great king through his dominion. Thus much however inform me, whether you intend to exhibit this wisdom, or how have you determined to act.

Euthydemus/ We came hither, Socrates, for this very purpose, to demonstrate and to teach, if anyone is willing to learn.

Socrates/ Pointing out to him the lovers of Clinias, by whom we were then surrounded:

But that all men who do not possess wisdom are willing to learn, I readily admit: for, in the first place, I myself am willing, and, in the next place, Clinias here; and besides these Ctesippus, and all the rest that you see.

Ctesippus at that time happened to be sitting at a considerable distance from Clinias. And as it appeared to me, Euthydemus, while he was discoursing with me, prevented, by the inclination of his body, Ctesippus from seeing Clinias, who was seated in the middle of us, Ctesippus therefore wishing to see his familiars, and at the same time being anxious to hear what was said, was the first that rose, and stood opposite to me. Afterwards the rest seeing him, stood round us, viz. the lovers of Clinias, and the companions of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. I therefore introducing these to Euthydemus, informed him that they were all ready to learn. And Ctesippus indeed, and the rest, very readily assented; and all of them in common exhorted him to exhibit the power of his wisdom. I therefore said;

O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, these persons must by all means be gratified, and you must exhibit your wisdom to them for my sake. And it is evident indeed, that to

demonstrate most things pertaining to this subject: will be no small labor; but inform me whether you are able to make him alone a good man, who is already persuaded that he ought to be instructed by you, or him also, who is not yet persuaded in consequence of not believing that virtue is a thing to be taught, or that you are the teachers of it: for, it is the business of the same art, to persuade a man thus affected, that virtue may be taught, and that you are capable of teaching it in the best manner. Or is it not?

Dionysodorus/ It is the business, Socrates, of the same art.

Socrates/ You therefore, O Dionysodorus, can in the best manner, of all the men that now exist, exhort to philosophy and the study of virtue. Is it not so?

Dionysodorus/ We think we can, Socrates.

Socrates/ Of other things, therefore, you will afterwards give us the demonstration, but of this now: and you will persuade this youth that he ought to philosophize, and study virtue; and in so doing you will oblige me, and all that are present: For it so happens that both I, and all these, are desirous that this lad may become the best of men. He is the son of Axiochus, who descended from the ancient Alcibiades, and the cousin of the now-existing Alcibiades; and his name is Clinias. But he is young, and we are fearful, as it is likely we should be concerning one of his age, lest someone previous to our endeavors should turn his dianoëtic part to another study, and thus corrupt it. You therefore are very opportunely come: and if it is the same thing to you, make trial of the lad, and discourse with him before us.

When I had thus nearly said these things, Euthydemus boldly, and at the same time confidently, replied.

Euthydemus/ It makes no difference, Socrates, if the lad is but willing to answer.

Socrates/ But indeed, he is accustomed to do this. For these frequently meeting together ask many questions, and discourse much with each other; so that it is likely that he will answer with confidence.

But how, O Crito, shall I disclose to you, in a proper manner, what follows? For it is no trifling labor to narrate such immense wisdom. So that I, after the manner of the poets, in beginning this narration, find it necessary to invoke the Muses and Mnernosyne. Euthydemus, therefore, as I think, began after this manner.

Euthydemus/ Whether, O Clinias, are those men that learn, wise or unwise?

Socrates/ And the lad through the magnitude of the question blushed, and being dubious, looked at me. But I, perceiving his perturbation said;

Be confident, Clinias, and boldly answer what appears to you to be the truth: for perhaps the greatest advantage will thence ensue.

Upon this Dionysodorus whispering in my ear, and smiling;

Dionysodorus/ Indeed, Socrates, I predict that in whatever manner the lad may answer he will be confuted.

Socrates/ However, while he was thus speaking, Clinias happened to answer, so that it was not possible for me to admonish the lad any further. But he answered, that those that learnt were wise men. Euthydemus, therefore, said;

Euthydemus/ Do you admit that there are certain teachers, or not?

Socrates/ He admitted that there are.

Euthydemus/ Are not therefore preceptors the preceptors of those that learn? As, for instance, a harper and a

grammarian, were the preceptors of you and other boys, but you were their disciples.

Socrates/ He assented to this.

When you learned, therefore, were you not ignorant of these things which you learned?

Clinias/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Were you, therefore, wise, when you were ignorant of these things?

Clinias/ By no means.

Euthydemus/ If, therefore, you were not wise, were you not ignorant?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Euthydemus/ You therefore, when learning things of which you had no knowledge, learned them being ignorant?

Socrates/ The lad assented to this.

Euthydemus/ The ignorant therefore learn, O Clinias, and not the wise, as you thought.

Socrates/ On his speaking in this manner, just like a choir, on a signal given by the master, the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus loudly applauded what was said and laughed. And before the lad could well take breath, Dionysodorus said to, him;

Dionysodorus/ But what, Clinias, when the grammarian recites, whether are the boys who learn what he recites, wise, or unwise?

Clinias/ They are wise.

Dionysodorus/ The wise therefore learn, and not the ignorant; and consequently you did not rightly just now answer Euthydemus.

Socrates/ But on this, the lovers of these men more loudly laughed and applauded, admiring the wisdom of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus; but the rest of us being

astonished were silent. Euthydemus therefore, perceiving our astonishment, that we might yet still more admire him, did not dismiss, the lad, but further interrogated him; and, after the manner of skillful dancers, turned two-fold inquiries about the same thing. For, whether do those who learn, learn the things which they know, or things which they do not know?

And again Dionysodorus said to me whispering;

Dionysodorus/ This also, Socrates, is just such another question as the former.

Socrates/ By Zeus, the former question appeared to me to be beautiful.

Dionysodorus/ We always ask, Socrates, such like inevitable questions.

Socrates/ You appear therefore to me, to possess a great reputation among your disciples. In the meantime Clinias answered Euthydemus, that those who learn, learn that of which they are ignorant. And Euthydemus interrogated him as before.

Euthydemus/ Do you not, know your letters?

Clinias/ I do.

Euthydemus/ Do you not, therefore, know all of them?

Socrates/ He acknowledged that he did.

Euthydemus/ When therefore anyone recites, does he not recite letters?

Socrates/ He confessed it.

Euthydemus/ Hence, he recites things which you know, since you know all the letters.

Socrates/ This also he acknowledged.

Euthydemus/ What then? Do you not learn that which someone recites?

Clinias/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ But do you learn, not knowing your letters?

Clinias/ I do not,, but I learn in consequence of knowing them.

Euthydemus/ Do you not therefore learn the things which you know, since you know all the letters?

Socrates/ He acknowledged that he did.

Euthydemus/ Hence, you have not answered rightly.

Socrates/ Euthydemus had scarcely thus spoken, when Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse as if it had been a ball, again aimed at the lad as a mark, and said;

Dionysodorus/ Euthydemus deceives you, O Clinias. For tell me, is not to learn, to receive the science of that which anyone learns?

Socrates/ Clinias assented.

Dionysodorus/ But,, is to know scientifically anything else than to possess science when thus knowing?

Socrates/ He granted it was nothing else.

Dionysodorus/ Not to know scientifically, therefore, is not yet to possess science.

Socrates/ He assented to this.

Dionysodorus/ Whether, therefore, are those that receive anything, those who now possess it, or those who do not possess it?

Clinias/ Those who do not possess it.

Dionysodorus/ Have you not then confessed that those who have not scientific knowledge, are among the number of those who do not possess?

Socrates/ He acknowledged that he had.

Dionysodorus/ Those that learn, therefore, belong to those that receive, and not to those that possess.

Socrates/ He granted it.

Dionysodorus/ Those therefore, Clinias, learn who have not a scientific knowledge, and not those who have.

Socrates/ After this, again wrestling as it were the third time, Euthydemus attacked the youth. But I, seeing the merged condition of the lad, and wishing to give him some respite, lest he should be afraid of us, said, in order to console him, Do not wonder, Clinias, if these discourses appear to you to be unusual; for perhaps you do not perceive the intention of these strangers. They act however in the same manner as those in the mysteries of the Corybantes, when they place him whom they are about to initiate on a throne: for there also there are dancing and sports, as you know, if you have been initiated in these mysteries. And now they do nothing else than dance, and as it were sportively leap round, as if after this they would initiate you. Now therefore think that you have heard the first part of sophistical sacred rites. For, in the first place, as Prodicus says, it is necessary to learn the proper signification of names; which these strangers also have indicated to you, because you have not perceived that men employ the verb to learn in a thing of this kind, when anyone, at first possessing no science concerning a certain thing, afterwards receives the science of that thing. They also employ this verb, when anyone now possessing science, considers this very thing by this same science, either while the thing is effected or while it is enunciated. Or they rather call this *to apprehend* than to *learn*, though sometimes they call it *to learn*. But of this, as they indicate, you are ignorant, viz. that the same name pertains to men affected in a contrary manner, viz. with respect to him who knows, and him who is ignorant. Similar to this is that which took place in the second question, in which they asked you, whether men learn things which they know, or things of which they are ignorant. These indeed are the sports of disciplines: on which account I say that these

men play with you. But I use the word play on this account, because, though someone should learn many, or all such particulars as these, yet he would not be in any respect wiser with respect to the manner in which things subsist. However, he may sport with men, by supplanting and subverting what they assert, through the difference of names; just as they who draw away the seats from those that are going to sit down rejoice and laugh when they see him whom they have overturned supine. Consider therefore what has happened to you from these men as sport; but what follows will be exhibited to you by them as serious concerns: and I will show them the way that they may fulfill their promise to me. For they promise to exhibit their exhortatory wisdom: but now, as it appears to me, they have thought it was requisite first to sport with you.

Thus far therefore, O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, you have sported and perhaps sufficiently: but in the next place show, exhorting the lad, in what manner it is requisite to pay attention to wisdom and virtue. First of all, however, I will indicate to you my conceptions on this affair, and what I desire to hear concerning it. If, therefore, I shall appear to you to do this, in a foolish and ridiculous manner, do not deride me: for, through a desire of hearing your wisdom, I will venture for a time to speak before you. Endure therefore to hear me, both you and your disciples, without laughing: but do you, O son of Axiochus, answer me.

Do we not all then, wish to do well? Or is this question, of which we were just now afraid, one among those that are ridiculous? For indeed, it is stupid to ask questions of this kind. For who is there that does not wish to do well?

Clinias/ No one.

Socrates/ Be it so. But in the next place, since we wish to do well, in what manner shall we be able to accomplish this?

Shall we say, by having many good things? Or is this answer still more stupid than the former? For it is evident that this also must be the case.

He assented.

But come, what are the things which are good to us? Or does it appear to be a thing neither difficult, nor the province of a venerable man, to discover this? For everyone will tell us that it is good to be rich. Will they not?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is it not also good to be in health, to be beautiful, and to be sufficiently furnished with other things pertaining to the body:

So it appeared to him.

But nobility also, power, and honors, in one's own city, are also good.

He granted that they were.

What then, yet remains for us among things good? What is it to be temperate, just, and brave? Whether, by Zeus, Clinias, do you think that, if we consider these things as good, we shall consider them properly? Or that this will be the case if we consider them not as good? For perhaps this may be disputed by someone. But how does it appear to you?

Clinias/ That these things are good.

Socrates/ Be it so; but in what choir shall we place wisdom? Among things good? Or how do you say?

Clinias/ Among things good.

Socrates/ But consider, lest among things good, we should omit anyone which is worthy to be related.

Clinias/ But, it appears to me that we have not omitted anyone.

Socrates/ However, I then recollecting, said;

But, by Zeus, we appear to have omitted the greatest of goods.

Clinias/ What is that?

Socrates/ Felicity, O Clinias, which all men, and even those that are perfectly depraved, assert to be the greatest of goods.

Clinias/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ And I again, correcting myself, said; We have nearly, O son of Axiochus, rendered ourselves ridiculous to these strangers.

Clinias/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because, having placed felicity in the things which we before enumerated, we now again speak concerning it.

Clinias/ But why is this improper?

Socrates/ Because it is certainly ridiculous again to adduce that which was formerly proposed, and to say the same things twice.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Wisdom, is certainly felicity: this even a boy knows.

He indeed wondered, so young and simple was he. And I perceiving his admiration, said;

Do you not know, Clinias, that in performing well on the pipe, pipers are most happy?

He granted that they were.

Are not therefore, grammarians also most happy in the writing and reading of letters?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what? In dangers of the sea, do you think that any in short are more happy than wise pilots?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Again: In battle, with which will you more pleasantly partake of danger and fortune? with a wise, or with an ignorant general?

Clinias/ With a wise general.

Socrates/ And when you are dangerously ill, with which will you be more pleasantly circumstanced? with a wise, or with an ignorant physician?

Clinias/ With a wise physician.

Socrates/ Is it not therefore, because you think that you will act more prosperously, by acting with one wise, than with one unwise?

He granted it.

Wisdom, therefore, everywhere, renders men happy. For certainly no one can ever err through wisdom; but it is necessary that through this he should act rightly, and obtain his end: for otherwise it would not be wisdom.

At length, but I do not know how, we summarily agreed that this was the case; viz. that when wisdom is present, nothing of felicity is wanting. After we had agreed in this particular, I again asked him how we should be affected with relation to the things which we had formerly granted.

For, we granted that if many good things were present with us we should be happy, and act well.

He assented to this.

Whether, therefore, should we be happy through present good, if it were of no advantage to us, or if it benefited us?

Clinias/ If it benefited us.

Socrates/ Would then anything benefit us, if we alone possessed it, but did not use it? As, for instance, if we possessed much food, but did not eat it, or drink, but did not drink it, should we in any respect be benefited by this?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But what? If all artificers had everything requisite prepared for them, each for his own work, but did not use them when thus procured, would they act well through the possession of these, viz. merely because they possessed everything which an artificer ought to possess? Thus, for instance, if a carpenter had all kinds of instruments and wood prepared for him sufficient for his purpose, but yet should fashion nothing, would he derive any advantage from this possession?

Clinias/ By no means.

Socrates/ But what? If anyone should possess riches, and all such things as we now denominate good, but should not use them, would he be happy through the possession of these goods?

Dionysodorus/ He certainly would not, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is necessary therefore, as it seems, that he who intends to be happy should not only possess good things of this kind, but should likewise use them.

Clinias/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ Is not therefore, O Clinias, the possession and the use of good, sufficient to make anyone happy?

Clinias/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Whether, if anyone uses good things properly, or if he does not?

Clinias/ If he uses them properly.

Socrates/ You speak well. For I think that the improper use of a thing is worse than the neglect of it. For the former is vicious, but the latter is neither good nor bad. Or do we not say so?

He assented.

What then? In the operation and use pertaining to wood, is there anything else which produces a right use than the tectonic science?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Perhaps also, in producing proper apparatus, it is science which produces with rectitude.

He granted that it was.

Whether therefore, with respect to the use of those goods which we first mentioned, viz. riches, health, and beauty, is it science, leading and properly directing the practice, which enables us to use everything of this kind properly, or is it anything else?

Clinias/ It is science.

Socrates/ Science, therefore, imparts to men in every possession and action, not only felicity, as it seems, but likewise success.

He confessed that it was so.

Is there then, by Zeus, any advantage to be derived from other possessions, without prudence and wisdom? Or will a man be benefited who possesses many things, and performs many actions, but without intellect? Or rather will not this be the case, if he possesses and performs but a few things, but is endued with intellect? However, consider thus. Will he not by doing less, err less? And erring less, will he not act less improperly? And acting less improperly, will he not be less miserable?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, will he rather perform fewer things being poor, than being rich?

Clinias/ Being poor.

Socrates/ But whether if he is weak or strong?

Clinias/ If he is weak.

Socrates/ Whether also, if he is honored, or dishonored?

Clinias/ If dishonored.

Socrates/ But whether, if he is brave and temperate, will he do less, or if he is timid?

Clinias/ If he is timid.

Socrates/ Will not this then also be the case, if he is indolent rather than if he is active?

He granted that it would.

And if he is slow rather than if he is quick? And if his sight and hearing are blunt rather than if they are sharp? In everything of this kind we agreed with each other.

But in short, O Clinias, it appears that, with respect to all those things which we first asserted to be good, the discourse about them is not that they are naturally essentially good, but, as it seems, that they subsist in the following manner; viz. that if they are under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their contraries, by how much the more capable they are of becoming subservient to that evil leader; but that if they are led by prudence and wisdom, they are greater goods; but that neither of them, when they are considered by themselves, is of any worth.

Clinias/ It appears, to be as you say.

Socrates/ What then happens to us, from what has been said? Is it anything else than this, that no one of other things is either good or evil? But these being two, that wisdom is good, and ignorance evil?

He assented.

Further still then, let us consider what remains. Since we all of us strive to be happy, and we appear to become such from using things, and from using them rightly, but science affords rectitude and success, it is requisite, as it seems,

that every man should by all possible means endeavor to become most wise. Is it not so?

Clinias/ It is.

Socrates/ And he should think that he ought to receive this from his father, his tutors, his friends, and from others who profess themselves to be his lovers, much more than wealth, and should request and suppliantly implore strangers and his fellow citizens to impart wisdom. Nor is it in any respect base or reprehensible, O Clinias, for the sake of this, to be obsequious and subservient both to a lover and to every man, willingly obeying him in worthy services, through an ardent desire of becoming wise. Or does it not appear so to you?

Clinias/ You entirely, appear to me to speak well.

Socrates/ If, Clinias, wisdom can but be taught, and does not casually subsist among men. For this is yet to be considered by us, and has not yet been assented to by me and you.

Clinias/ But to me, Socrates, it appears that it can be taught.

Socrates/ And I, being delighted, said;

You speak beautifully, O best of men, and you have done well in liberating me from a long speculation about this very thing, whether wisdom can, or cannot be taught. Now, therefore, since it appears to you that it can be taught, and that it is the only thing which can make a man happy and prosperous, do you say anything else than that it is necessary to philosophize? And is it your intention to do this?

Clinias/ Entirely so, Socrates, as much as possible.

Socrates/ And I, rejoicing to hear these things, said;

My example, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, of exhortatory discourses, such as I desired it to be, is of this kind; vulgar perhaps and scarcely unfolded by a multitude of words: but let whichever of you is willing, considering this very thing according to art, render it apparent to us. But if you are unwilling to do this, point out to the lad what follows, from that part in which my discourse ended, viz. whether he ought to procure for himself every science, or whether there is one particular science which, when he receives, he will necessarily be happy and a good man; and what that science is. For, as I said in the beginning, it is of great consequence to us that this youth should become wise and good.

I therefore, Crito, said these things; but I paid very great attention to what followed, and considered after what manner they would discourse, and whence they would begin, while they were exhorting the youth to the study of wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus then, who was the elder of them, first began the conference. And all of us beheld him, as those who were immediately to hear certain very wonderful discourses; which indeed was the case. For the man, O Crito, began a certain admirable discourse, which it is proper you should hear, because it exhorted to virtue.

Dionysodorus/ Tell me, Socrates, and the rest of you who express a desire that this youth should become wise, whether you are jesting when you make this assertion, or truly and seriously desire this?

Socrates/ Then I perceived that they were of opinion that we had, prior to this, been jesting, when we exhorted them to converse with the youth, and that on this account they also jested and had not discoursed seriously with him. Perceiving this therefore to be the case, I further said, that we were serious in a wonderful degree.

Dionysodorus/ See, Socrates, that you do not hereafter deny what you now assert.

Socrates/ I have considered this: for I shall never deny what I have asserted.

Dionysodorus/ What is it then, that you assert? Do you wish that he should become wise?

Socrates/ Entirely so.

Dionysodorus/ But now, whether is Clinias wise or not?

Socrates/ Not yet, according to his own confession: and he does not, speak idly.

Dionysodorus/ But do you, wish that he should become wise, and not be unlearned?

Socrates/ We acknowledged that we did.

Dionysodorus/ Do you not therefore wish him to become that which he is not; and no longer to be that which he now is?

Socrates/ And I, on hearing this, was disturbed. But he, taking advantage of my perturbation;

Dionysodorus/ Since, you wish him to be no longer that which he now is, you wish, as it seems, that he may perish; though those friends and lovers would certainly be but of little worth, who should be desirous above all things that the objects of their love may be destroyed.

Socrates/ Ctesippus on hearing this was indignant, on account of his attachment to the youth, and said;

Ctesippus/ O Thurian stranger, if it were not more rustic than is becoming, I should call you to an account for this assertion, and should ask you why you falsely ascribe to me and the rest a thing of this kind, which I think it is not holy to assert, viz. that I should wish that this youth might perish.

Euthydemus/ But what? O Ctesippus, does it appear to you, that it is possible to speak falsely?

Ctesippus/ By Zeus, it does, unless I were in sane.

Euthydemus/ But whether will this be the case, when asserting a thing which is the subject of discourse, or when not asserting it.

Ctesippus/ When asserting it.

Euthydemus/ When, therefore, he asserts that thing, is it not true, that he does not speak of anything else than that which he asserts?

Ctesippus/ For how should he do otherwise?

Euthydemus/ But that is one of the things which exist, of which he speaks, separate from others.

Ctesippus/ Entirely so.

Euthydemus/ Does he not therefore, when he speaks of that thing, speak of that which has a being?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ But he who speaks of that which is, and of beings, speaks of things which are true. So that if Dionysodorus speaks of beings, he speaks of things which are true, and according to you utters nothing false.

Ctesippus/ He does so. But he who says these things, does not speak, O Euthydemus, of beings.

Euthydemus/ Are non-beings anything else than things which are not?

Ctesippus/ They are not.

Euthydemus/ By no means, therefore, are non-beings, beings.

Ctesippus/ By no means.

Euthydemus/ Can therefore anyone perform any action about these non-beings, so as to make things which in no respect are?

Ctesippus/ It does not appear to me, that he can.

Euthydemus/ What then? Do rhetoricians, when they speak to the people, perform nothing?

Ctesippus/ They do something.

Euthydemus/ If, therefore, they do something, do they not also make something? To speak then is to do and to make.

Socrates/ He assented.

Euthydemus/ No one therefore, speaks of nonentities: for if he did, he would make something. But you acknowledge that no one can make nonentities. So that, according to you, no one can assert things which are false; but if Dionysodorus speaks, he speaks things which are true, and he speaks of beings.

Ctesippus/ By Zeus, it is so, Euthydemus: yet he speaks of beings after a certain manner, though not as they subsist.

Dionysodorus/ How do you say, Ctesippus? Are there some who speak of things as they are?

Ctesippus/ There are indeed; and these are men worthy and good, and who assert things which are true.

Dionysodorus/ What then? Are not things good, well, and things evil, ill-conditioned?

Socrates/ He granted that they were.

Dionysodorus/ And do you not acknowledge that the worthy and the good speak of things as they are?

Ctesippus/ I do.

Dionysodorus/ The good therefore, O Ctesippus, speak of evil things evilly, if they speak of them as they are.

Ctesippus/ Truly, by Zeus, they do very much so of bad men, among which, if you are persuaded by me, you will be careful that you may not be numbered, lest the good should speak evilly of you; because you well know that the good speak evilly of the bad.

Euthydemus/ Do they not also, speak magnificently of great men, and warmly of those that are fervent?

Ctesippus/ Very much so indeed. Of cold men, therefore, they speak coldly, and assert that they speak frigidly.

Dionysodorus/ You revile, O Ctesippus, you revile.

Ctesippus/ Not I, by Zeus, Dionysodorus, for I love you; but I admonish you as my companion, and I endeavor to persuade you, that you should never in my presence make such a rustic assertion, as that I wish the destruction of those whom I very much esteem.

Socrates/ I therefore, as they appeared to me to conduct themselves in a rustic manner towards each other, jested with Ctesippus, and said, it appears to me, Ctesippus, that we ought to receive what is asserted by the strangers, if we wish to impart it to others, and not contend about words. For if they know how to destroy men in such a manner as to make them, from being depraved and unwise, worthy and wise, whether they have discovered this themselves, or have learnt from some other, a corruption and destruction of this kind, so that having destroyed him who is depraved, they afterwards render him worthy; if they know how to effect this (but it is evident that they do possess this knowledge; for they affirm that the art of making men worthy that were depraved, is an art which they have recently invented;) we must therefore permit them to destroy the lad, and to make him and all the rest of us wise. But if you young men are afraid of me, make trial of me, as if, according to the proverb, in Car, since, though an elderly man, I am prepared for

danger: and I deliver myself to this Dionysodorus, as to Medea the Colchian. Let him destroy me, and, if he will, boil me, or do whatever else he pleases with me, if he does but render me worthy.

Ctesippus/ I also, Socrates, am prepared to deliver myself to these strangers, though they should be willing to excoriate more than they do at present, provided my skin does not end in a bladder like that of Marsyas, but in virtue. Indeed Dionysodorus, here, thinks that I am angry with him: I am not however angry, but I contradict those things which, in my opinion, he has not well advanced against me. But do not, O Dionysodorus, call contradiction reviling; for reviling is a different thing.

Dionysodorus/ Do not you, Ctesippus, discourse as if you contradicted?

Ctesippus/ Entirely, and very much so. Or do not you think, that I speak as if I contradicted?

Dionysodorus/ You cannot therefore at any time demonstrate that, if you have heard no one contradicting another.

Ctesippus/ True, but let us now hear whether I can demonstrate to you that Ctesippus contradicts Dionysodorus. Or can you bear a discourse of this kind?

Dionysodorus/ By all means.

Ctesippus/ What then? are there definitions of everything which exists?

Dionysodorus/ Entirely so.

Ctesippus/ Whether, therefore, is there a definition of everything, as it is, or as it is not?

Dionysodorus/ As it is.

Ctesippus/ For if you remember, we have just now shown that no one speaks of a thing as it is not.

Dionysodorus/ For no one appears to speak of that which is not.

Ctesippus/ But why this? Shall you and I, on this account, contradict the less?

Dionysodorus/ Whether therefore,, shall we contradict, if we both of us know the definition of the same thing, or shall we indeed thus say the same things?

Socrates/ He granted that we should.

Dionysodorus/ But, when neither of us gives the definition of that thing, shall we not then contradict? Or, indeed, will it not follow, that thus no mention whatever of that thing will be made by either of us?

Socrates/ He granted this also.

Dionysodorus/ When therefore, I give the definition of that thing, but you of something else, do we then contradict each other? Or do I then speak of that thing, but you do not speak of it in any respect whatever? But how can he who does not speak of a thing contradict him who does?

Socrates/ Ctesippus indeed was then silent; but I, wondering at the discourse, said;

Socrates/ How do you say, Dionysodorus? For, though I have heard this assertion often, and from many, yet I always wondered at it. For it was much used by Protagoras and his followers, and by others more ancient than these; but to me he always appears to be a wonderful person, who both subverts others and himself. I think, however, that I shall especially learn the truth of this assertion from you. Is the assertion then any other than this, that it is not possible to assert things which are false? For this is the force of the argument. Is it not? And that he who speaks, asserts things which are true, or otherwise does not speak:

He granted that it was so.

Whether, therefore, is it not possible to assert things which are false, but to form an opinion of them is possible?

Dionysodorus/ It is not even possible, to form an opinion of them.

Socrates/ Neither therefore, is there any such thing as false opinion.

Dionysodorus/ There is not.

Socrates/ Neither therefore is there ignorance, nor are there unlearned men. Or would not this be ignorance, if there were any such thing, viz. to speak falsely of things?

Dionysodorus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But, this is not possible.

Dionysodorus/ It is not.

Socrates/ Do you make this assertion, O Dionysodorus, for the sake of discourse, that you may speak that which is wonderful; or does it truly appear to you that no man is unlearned?

Dionysodorus/ Confute, the assertion.

Socrates/ Or, according to your assertion, can confutation take place, while no one speaks falsely?

Euthydemus/ It cannot.

Dionysodorus/ Neither therefore do I, order you to confute. For how can anyone order that to be done which is not?

Socrates/ O Euthydemus, I do not well understand these wise and excellent assertions, but I hastily as it were conceive them. Perhaps, therefore, I shall ask something which will be troublesome; but you will pardon me. See then. For if it is neither possible to speak falsely, nor to entertain false opinions, nor to be unlearned, neither is it possible for anyone to err when he does anything. For he who acts cannot err in that which he does. Do you not say so?

Euthydemus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ This, is the troublesome question which I just now mentioned. For if we do not err, neither acting nor speaking, nor thinking, if this be the case, of what, by Zeus, do you come as the teachers? Or did you not just now say, that you could teach him virtue who was willing to learn it, the best of all men?

Dionysodorus/ Are you so dull, Socrates, taking up the discourse, as that you now remember what we first said, and would even now remember anything which I may have said last year, yet do not know how to use what has been said at present?

Socrates/ The things which have been now asserted are difficult: and this very properly; for they have been asserted by wise men. And likewise this last thing which you said cannot be used without extreme difficulty: for what will you say, Dionysodorus, is the meaning of this assertion, There is something which I do not know how to use? Does it not mean this, that I do not know how to confute it? Or tell me, what other conception you form of these words, I do not know how to use these assertions?

Dionysodorus/ Do you affirm, that they mean anything else than this, that it is very difficult to use them? Answer me.

Socrates/ Before you have answered, Dionysodorus?

Dionysodorus/ Will you not answer.

Socrates/ Is it just that I should?

Dionysodorus/ It is certainly just.

Socrates/ After what manner? Is it because you being a person very wise, have now entered into a discussion with us respecting discourse, and because you know when it is proper to answer, and when not; and now will not give any answer, because you know that it is not requisite?

Dionysodorus/ You babble, neglecting when it is proper to answer, and when not. But, good man, be obedient and answer; since you acknowledge that I am a wise man.

Socrates/ We must obey, and as it seems it is necessary: for you are the ruler. Ask, then.

Dionysodorus/ Whether therefore do those that understand, understand having a soul? or do inanimate natures also understand?

Socrates/ They understand having a soul.

Dionysodorus/ Do you know, therefore, any assertion which has a soul?

Socrates/ Not I, by Zeus.

Dionysodorus/ Why, then, did you just now ask me what was the meaning of my assertion?

Socrates/ For what other reason, than that I have erred through indolence: or shall I say, that I have not erred, but that I have also said this rightly, when I asserted that my word, understood? Whether will you say that I erred, or not? For if I have not erred, neither do you confute though you are a wise man, nor have you anything to reply to my assertion: but if I have erred, neither thus do you speak rightly, in saying that it is not possible to err. And I say these things, not in opposition to what you have asserted last year. But this discourse, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, seems to remain in the same condition, and even now as formerly, having thrown down others, to fall itself; nor has your art discovered a method of preventing this, though it is so wonderful with respect to accuracy of arguments.

Ctesippus/ You certainly speak wonderful things, O Thurian or Chian men, or by whatever other name it may delight you to be called, as you are not in the least concerned whether you are delirious or not.

Socrates/ And I, fearing lest defamation should take place, again appeased Ctesippus, and said, O Ctesippus? and now indeed, O Ctesippus, what I have said to Clinias, I also say to you, that you do not know that the wisdom of these strangers is admirable. They are however, unwilling to exhibit it to us seriously, but imitate Proteus the Egyptian sophist, and deceive us by enchantments. Let us, therefore, imitate Menelaus, and not suffer the men to leave us, till they have unfolded to us what it is in which they are serious: for I think that something pertaining to them very beautiful will appear, when they begin to act seriously; but we request, we exhort, and we beseech them to unfold themselves.

I therefore again appear to myself to be about to relate in what manner I beseech them to unfold themselves to me: for I will endeavor to the best of my ability to discuss what I formerly left unfinished, if I can in a certain respect allure them, and induce them to pity and commiserate me thus strenuously and seriously acting, and to act seriously themselves. But do you, Clinias, enable me to recollect whence we at that time discontinued our discourse: for I think we ended there, whence we acknowledged we should philosophize: did we not?

Clinias/ We did.

Socrates/ But philosophy is the possession of science: is it not so?

Clinias/ It is.

Socrates/ By the possession therefore, of what science shall we rightly possess? is not this indeed obvious, that it must be by the possession of that science which will benefit us?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Should we therefore be in any respect benefited, if we scientifically knew, while travelling, in what part of the earth much gold is buried?

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

But formerly, this was our decision, that we should gain nothing, even though without labor, and without digging the earth, all the gold that exists should be ours. So that neither if we knew how to make golden stones would this science be of any worth; for if we knew not how to use gold, no advantage would be apparent from the possession of it. Or do you not remember?

Clinias/ I do very well remember it.

Socrates/ Nor, as it seems, will any advantage be derived from any other science, neither from that which is employed in the negotiation of money, nor from the medicinal science, nor from any others which knows how to make anything, but does not know how to use that which it makes. Is it not so?

He granted that it was.

Nor even, if there were a science by which men could be made immortal, but without knowing how to use immortality, neither from this does it appear that there would be any advantage, if it is proper to argue from what has been previously granted.

To all these particulars we mutually assented.

A certain science, therefore, is requisite for us, O beautiful boy, of such a kind, in which both to make, and to know how to use that which is made, may concur.

Clinias/ It appears to.

Socrates/ It is of much consequence therefore, as it seems, whether we are skillful makers of the lyre, or in possession of a certain science of that kind: for here the art which makes is separated from the art which uses, about

the same thing. For the lyre-making and the harp-making arts differ very much from each other. Is it not so?

He granted that it was.

Nor shall we indeed require the pipe-making art: for this is another such-like art.

He granted that it was.

But, by the gods, if we should learn the art of composing orations, is this the art from the possession of which we should be happy?

Clinias/ I do not think it is.

Socrates/ What argument, do you employ in thinking thus?

Clinias/ I see,, certain framers of orations, who do not know how to use the very orations which they themselves have composed: just as the makers of lyres are unskilled in the use of the lyre; but here others are able to use the orations which these have framed, though they are incapable of framing orations themselves. It is evident, therefore, with respect to orations, that the art of making is separate from the art of using them.

Socrates/ You appear to me, to adduce a sufficient argument that the art of composing orations is not that art by the acquisition of which anyone will be happy; though I thought that here that science would be apparent which we some time since investigated: for to me those very men who compose orations appear, O Clinias, to be transcendently wise, when I am conversant with them; and this very art of theirs also appears to be something divine and elevated. This indeed is by no means wonderful: For it is a portion of the art of enchantments, to which it is but a little inferior; for the art of enchantments is that art by which vipers, spiders called phalangii, and scorpions, are allured; but this allures and soothes judges, those that frequent assemblies, and

other tumultuous affectations. Or are you of a different opinion?

Clinias/ I am not; but it appears to me as you say.

Socrates/ Where then shall we yet further turn ourselves? and to what art?

Clinias/ I do not well know.

Socrates/ But I think, that I have discovered this art.

Clinias/ What is it?

Socrates/ The art of commanding an army, appears to me, more than any other art, to be that which will confer felicity on its possessor.

Clinias/ It does not appear so to me.

Socrates/ Why not?

Clinias/ This is certainly an art of hunting men.

Socrates/ What then?

Clinias/ No part, of the hunting art extends beyond hunting and subjugating; but when they have subjugated that which they have hunted, they are not able to use it. But hunters and fishermen assign this to cocks; while, on the contrary, geometricians, astronomers, and those skilled in the logistic art (for these also are hunters) do not make diagrams, but investigate things themselves. As therefore they do not know how to use these, but are alone skilled in hunting, they deliver their inventions to be used by those who are expert in dialectic; I mean that this is done by such among these as are not entirely stupid.

Socrates/ Be it so, O most beautiful and wise Clinias.

Clinias/ After the same manner, the commanders of armies also, when they have hunted any city or camp, deliver it to the care of politicians; for they know not how to use those things which they have hunted: just, I think, as the hunters of quails deliver them to those by whom quails are

nurtured. If, therefore,, we are in want of that art which its possessor, whether he makes or hunts it, will know how to use, and an art of this kind will render us blessed, some other art, must be investigated instead of that of commanding an army.

Crito/ What do you say, Socrates? Did that lad assert things of this kind?

Socrates/ Do you not think he did, Crito?

Crito/ By Zeus, I do not indeed. For I think if he had said these things, that he would not have required the assistance either of Euthydemus, or any other man, with respect to erudition.

Socrates/ But, by Zeus, was it Ctesippus then that said these things? for I do not remember.

Crito/ What, Ctesippus?

Socrates/ This, indeed, I well know, that neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus said these things. But, O divine Crito, was it not some one of the beings more excellent than man, who being present said these things? For I well know that I heard them.

Crito/ It is so, by Zeus, Socrates; and it appears to me, and indeed very much so, to have been some one of the more excellent order of beings. But after this, what art have you still investigated? And have you discovered that art for the sake of which you engaged in this investigation?

Socrates/ Whence, blessed man, should we have discovered it? But we were perfectly ridiculous, just like boys that pursue larks; for we continually thought that we should immediately apprehend each of the sciences, but they always fled from our view. Why therefore should I speak to you concerning many sciences? But when we came to the royal art, and considered whether it is that art which imparts and produces felicity, here falling as it were into a labyrinth,

when we thought that we had now arrived at the end, we again proceeded in a winding course, as if we appeared to be in the beginning of our inquiry, and were as much distant from the object of our search as when we began the investigation.

Crito/ But how has this happened to you, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you. For the political and the royal art appear to us to be the same.

Crito/ But what then?

Socrates/ The art of commanding an army, and the other arts, appear to impart dominion over those works of which they are the artificers, as alone knowing how to use them. Hence it clearly appeared to us to be the art which we were investigating, and the cause of good conduct in a city, and, in short, according to the Iambic of Æschylus, that it alone is seated in the stern of the city, governing and ruling over all things, and rendering all things useful.

Crito/ Does not this therefore appear to you to be well said respecting this art?

Socrates/ You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what after these things will happen to us. For again, let us nearly consider as follows. What work will that royal art which rules over all things produce for us? Shall we say none? But we have said to each other that it certainly will produce some work. For did not you assert this, Crito?

Crito/ I did.

Socrates/ What then will you say is the work of it? Just as if I should ask you what work the medicinal art produces in all those things over which it rules? Would you not say it is health?

Crito/ I should.

Socrates/ But what? With respect to your art, agriculture, what does it effect in all those things over which it rules? Would you not say that it affords us food from the earth?

Crito/ I should.

Socrates/ But what does the royal art effect while it governs everything over which it has dominion? Perhaps you do not clearly perceive this.

Crito/ I do not, by Zeus, Socrates.

Socrates/ Nor do we, Crito. But thus much indeed you know, that if it is that art which we investigate, it ought to be useful.

Crito/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Ought it not, therefore, to impart to us a certain good?

Crito/ Necessarily so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But we have acknowledged to each other, I and Clinias, that good is nothing else than a certain science.

Crito/ You did indeed say so.

Socrates/ Do not therefore other works, which may be said to belong to the political art, (but these will be many, such as to render the citizens rich, free, and without sedition,) do not all these appear to be neither evil nor good? But it is necessary that this art should make men wise, and impart wisdom, if it is to be that art which will benefit and render men happy.

Crito/ It is so: and thus you accord with each other conformably to your narration.

Socrates/ Does therefore the royal art make men wise and good?

Crito/ What should hinder, Socrates?

Socrates/ Does it therefore make all men to be so, and to be entirely good? And is it that art which imparts every

science, that of the shoe-maker, of the smith, and of all other artificers?

Crito/ I do not think it is, Socrates.

Socrates/ But what science is it? Or to what purpose do we employ it? For it is requisite that it should not be the artificer of any work which is neither good nor evil, and that it should impart no other science than itself. Let us therefore say what it is, or to what purpose we should use it. Are you willing, Crito, we should say it is that by which we make others good?

Crito/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But in what will these be good, and to what purpose will they be useful? Or shall we also say that they will make others good, and that those others will make others to be so? However, it will nowhere appear to us in what they are good, because we have rejected the works which are said to belong to the political science. But in reality, according to the proverb, Corinthian Zeus is present; and as I have said, we are still equally, or more than equally, remote from knowing what that science is which will make us happy.

Crito/ By Zeus, Socrates, you have arrived as it seems at abundant doubting.

Socrates/ I myself, therefore, Crito, since I was fallen into this doubt, with every possible exertion of voice entreated the strangers, and called upon them as if they had been the Dioscuri to save us, viz. me and the lad from the overwhelming billows of this discourse, to be by all means serious, and seriously to show us what that science is, by the possession of which we may pass through life in a becoming manner.

Crito/ What then? was Euthydemus willing to unfold anything to you?

Socrates/ How could he do otherwise? And he began, my friend, the discourse very magnificently thus:

Euthydemus/ Whether, Socrates, shall I teach you this science about which you formerly doubted, or evince that you possess it?

Socrates/ O blessed man, are you able to effect this?

Euthydemus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Show me, therefore, by Zeus, that I possess it for this will be much easier than to instruct a man so far advanced in years.

Euthydemus/ Come then, answer me. Is there anything which you know?

Socrates/ Certainly, there are many things which I know, and these of small importance.

Euthydemus/ It is sufficient. Does it therefore appear to you to be possible, that anything which exists should not be that thing which it is?

Socrates/ It does not, by Zeus.

Euthydemus/ Do you not therefore, know something?

Socrates/ I do.

Euthydemus/ Are you not therefore knowing, if you know?

Socrates/ Entirely so, in this very thing which I know;

Euthydemus/ It is of no consequence. Is it not then necessary that you should know all things, in consequence of possessing knowledge?

Socrates/ It is not, by Zeus, since there are many things which I do not know.

Euthydemus/ Will it not therefore follow, if there is anything which you do not know, that you are not knowing?

Socrates/ It will follow that I am not knowing in that thing, my friend.

Euthydemus/ Will you then, be less destitute of knowledge? For you just now said, that you were knowing: and thus you will be the same person, and again not the same person, according to the same, and at the same time.

Socrates/ Be it so, Euthydemus: for, according to the proverb, you say all things well. How then do I know that science which we investigate? Since it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be: if knowing one thing, I know all things. For I cannot possess, and at the same time be destitute of knowledge. But if I know all things, I also possess that knowledge. Is this then what you say? And is this that wise thing?

Euthydemus/ You yourself, Socrates, confute yourself.

Socrates/ But what? O Euthydemus, does not the very same thing happen to you? For I, whatever I may suffer with you and this Dionysodorus, the beloved head, shall not be very indignant. Tell me, do you not know some things, and are you not ignorant of others?

Dionysodorus/ By no means, Socrates.

Socrates/ How do you say? Do you therefore know nothing?

Dionysodorus/ Very far from it.

Socrates/ Do you then know all things, since you also know anything?

Dionysodorus/ All things. And you likewise, if you know one thing, know all things.

Socrates/ O Zeus! What a wonderful thing you speak of: and a mighty good becomes apparent. But do all other men likewise know all things, or nothing?

Dionysodorus/ They certainly, do not know some things, but are ignorant of others; and are not at the same time scientifically knowing, and deprived of science.

Socrates/ But how is this?

Dionysodorus/ All men,, know all things, if they know one thing.

Socrates/ O, by the gods! Dionysodorus, (For it is now manifest to me that you are serious, though I with difficulty incited you to be so,) do you in reality know all things, such as the carpenter's and the shoe-maker's art?

Dionysodorus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And are you also able to sew shoes, in the same manner as shoe-makers?

Dionysodorus/ I am, by Zeus, and also to mend them.

Socrates/ Do you also know such things as these, viz. the number of the stars and the sands?

Dionysodorus/ Perfectly so. Do you not think, we should confess that we do?

Socrates/ And Ctesippus then taking up the discourse;

Ctesippus/ By Zeus, O Dionysodorus, exhibit to me such a proof of these things, that I may know that you speak the truth.

Dionysodorus/ What shall I exhibit.

Ctesippus/ Do you know how many teeth Euthydemus has, and does Euthydemus know how many you have?

Dionysodorus/ Is it not sufficient for you, to have heard that we know all things?

Ctesippus/ By no means; but only tell us this one thing more, and show that you speak the truth. And if you tell how many teeth each of you have, and you shall appear to know this on our counting them, we shall then also believe you in other things.

Socrates/ Conceiving, therefore, that they were derided, they were unwilling to comply, but they acknowledged that they knew all things, while they were severally interrogated by Ctesippus. For there was not anything at length, which Ctesippus did not ask them without any hesitation, and even asked them, if they knew the most indecent things. They however most bravely advanced to the interrogations, confessing that they knew, like wild boars rushing on the blow; so that I also myself, Crito, was at length compelled, through my incredulity, to ask Euthydemus, whether Dionysodorus knew also how to dance?

Euthydemus/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ However, he certainly does not know how to precipitate himself upon swords, and to be whirled on a wheel, being so much advanced in years as he is. Or is he master of this piece of wisdom also?

Euthydemus/ There is nothing, which he does not know.

Socrates/ But whether, do you now only know all things, or has this always been the case?

Euthydemus/ Always.

Socrates/ And when you were boys, and as soon as you were born, did you know all things?

All things, said both of them together.

And to us, indeed, the thing appeared to be incredible.

Euthydemus/ You do not believe, Socrates.

Socrates/ Except this one thing, that it is likely you are wise men.

Euthydemus/ But, if you are willing to answer me, I will also show you, giving your assent to these wonderful things.

Socrates/ I shall most gladly be confuted in these things. For if it is concealed from me that I am wise, and you demonstrate that I know all things, and that I have always

possessed this knowledge, what greater gain than this shall I be able to discover through the whole of life?

Euthydemus/ Answer then.

Socrates/ Ask me as one that will answer.

Euthydemus/ Whether, therefore, Socrates, do you know anything or not?

Socrates/ I do.

Euthydemus/ Do you then know by that thing through which you are knowing, or by anything else?

Socrates/ By that by which I am knowing: for I think that you speak of the soul. Or do you not speak of this?

Euthydemus/ Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to interrogate when you are interrogated?

Socrates/ Be it so; but what shall I do? Shall I do as you bid me, when I know not what it is you ask me, though at the same time you order me to answer and not to interrogate?

Euthydemus/ You, doubtless, apprehend what I say.

Socrates/ I do.

Euthydemus/ Now therefore answer to that which you apprehend.

Socrates/ What then? if you indeed ask conceiving one thing, but I apprehend another, and afterwards I should answer to this, would it be sufficient for you if I answered nothing to the purpose?

Euthydemus/ To me it would,, but not to you, as I think.

Socrates/ I will not therefore, by Zeus, answer, till I understand.

Euthydemus/ You will not answer, to the things which you always apprehend, because you trifle, and are more simple than is becoming.

Socrates/ And I perceived that he was indignant with me for disputing what was said, he being desirous to catch me by enclosing me with words. I recollected, therefore, that Connus was always indignant with me, when I did not yield to him, and that afterwards he paid less attention to me, as one that was ignorant. As, therefore, I had formed the design of becoming instructed by these men, I thought it was necessary to submit to them, lest, considering me as an illiterate person, they should reject me. Hence I said;

If you are disposed to act in this manner, Euthydemus, let it be done: for you, in every respect, better know how to discourse than I do, you who possess art, than I who am a rude unlettered man. Again, therefore, interrogate from the beginning.

Euthydemus/ Answer then again, whether you know those things which you know, by something or not.

Socrates/ I do; for I know them, by my soul.

Euthydemus/ Again, in his answer, he adds to what he is asked. For I did not ask by what you know, but if you know by anything.

Socrates/ Again, I have answered more than is sufficient, through my want of erudition; but pardon me. For I will now answer simply that I always know by a certain thing what I know.

Euthydemus/ But whether, do you always know by this very same thing? Or do you at one time know by this, and at another by something else?

Socrates/ Always by this, when I know.

Euthydemus/ Again, you will not cease to speak superfluously.

Socrates/ But I am afraid lest this certain something always should deceive us.

Euthydemus/ It will not deceive us; but if at all, it will deceive you. Answer me, however, whether you always know by this.

Socrates/ Always; since it is necessary to take away the when.

Euthydemus/ Do you therefore always know by this? And always knowing, whether do you know some things by this by which you know, but other things by something else? Or do you know all things by this?

Socrates/ All things by this, which I do know.

Euthydemus/ This latter part of your answer, is again superfluous.

Socrates/ But I take away, the words which I do know.

Euthydemus/ You should not, however, take away even one word; for I want none of your assistance. But answer me; would you be able to know all things unless you could know all things? This would be a prodigy.

Euthydemus/ Add now whatever you please: for you confess that you know all things.

Socrates/ I appear to have done so, since the words, the things which I know, possess no power whatever; but I know all things.

Euthydemus/ Have you not therefore also confessed that you always know by this thing by which you know? whether it be when you know, or in whatever way you please: for you have acknowledged that you always know, and at the same time, that you know all things. It is evident therefore that you knew when you was a boy, and when you was begot, and when you was born. Hence, before you was born, and before heaven and earth were produced, you knew all things, if you always possessed knowledge. And by Zeus, you always will know, and will always know all things, if I am willing that you should.

Socrates/ But be willing, O much honored Euthydemus, if you speak the truth in reality. But I cannot entirely believe that you are sufficient to accomplish this, unless this your brother Dionysodorus assists you with his counsel: and thus perhaps what you say may be accomplished. But tell me, I said; for in other things I cannot contend with you, who are endued with such portentous wisdom, nor deny that I know all things, since you say that I do; how shall I say that I know such things as the following, O Euthydemus, viz. that good men are unjust? Come, inform me, do I know this, or do I not know it?

Euthydemus/ You certainly know it.

Socrates/ What, do I know?

Euthydemus/ That good men are not unjust.

Socrates/ This, I perfectly knew a long time ago. But I do not ask this; but where did I learn that good men are unjust?

Dionysodorus/ Nowhere.

Socrates/ I do not therefore, know this.

Euthydemus then said to Dionysodorus;

Euthydemus/ You destroy the conversation; and he will appear to be not knowing, and to possess, and at the same time to be deprived of knowledge.

Socrates/ And Dionysodorus blushed.

But you, Euthydemus, how do you say? Does not your brother appear to you to speak rightly, who knows all things?

Dionysodorus/ But am I the brother of Euthydemus?

Socrates/ Excuse me from answering you, O good man, till Euthydemus has taught me that I know that good men are unjust, and do not envy me the discipline.

Dionysodorus/ You fly, Socrates, and are not willing to answer.

Socrates/ It is reasonable that I should: for I am inferior to either of you, so that there is an abundant necessity that I should fly from two. For I am much more imbecile than Hercules, who was not able to contend with the hydra (a sophist who, by her wisdom, if one head of the discourse was cut off, presented many instead of one), and at the same time with the crab, a certain other sophist, who, as it appears to me, recently drove on shore from the sea); and when Hercules had in a similar manner tormented the crab) by speaking to and biting him on the left-hand side, he called upon Iolaus, the son of his brother, to assist him: and he gave him sufficient aid. But my Iolaus Patrocles, if he should come, would rather effect the very contrary.

Dionysodorus/ Answer then, since these things are celebrated by you, whether Iolaus was more the nephew of Hercules than of you.

Socrates/ It is therefore best for me, O Dionysodorus, to answer you. For you will not desist from interrogating, nearly envying (for this I well know), and hindering Euthydemus from teaching me that wise thing.

Dionysodorus/ Answer, however.

Socrates/ But I will answer, that Iolaus was the son of the brother of Hercules, but, as it appears to me, is by no means my nephew. For Patrocles, who is my brother, was not his father; but Iphicles, who resembles him in name, was the brother of Hercules.

Dionysodorus/ But is Patrocles, your brother?

Socrates/ Certainly; for he had the same mother, though not the same father with me.

Dionysodorus/ He is your brother therefore, and not your brother.

Socrates/ He was not from the same father, O best of men: for his father was Chaeredemus, but mine Sophroniscus.

Dionysodorus/ But the father, was Sophroniscus and Chaeredemus. Was he not?

Socrates/ Certainly; the former was my, and the latter his father.

Dionysodorus/ Was not therefore, Chaeredemus different from the father?

Socrates/ From my father.

Dionysodorus/ Was he therefore a father, being different from a father? Or are you the same thing as a stone?

Socrates/ I am afraid, lest through you I should appear to be the same; but I do not appear to myself to be the same.

Dionysodorus/ Are you not therefore, different from a stone?

Socrates/ Different certainly.

Dionysodorus/ Being different from a stone, therefore, you are something else, and not a stone: and being different from gold, you are not gold.

Socrates/ Granted.

Dionysodorus/ Will not Chaeredemus therefore, since he is different from father, not be a father?

Socrates/ It seems, he is not a father.

Euthydemus, taking up the discourse said;

Euthydemus/ For certainly, if Chæredemus is a father, again Sophroniscus, on the contrary, being different from father, is not a father; so that you, O Socrates, are without a father.

And then Ctesippus, taking up the discourse, said;

Ctesippus/ Does not your father suffer these very same things? for he is different from my father.

Euthydemus/ Very far from it.

Ctesippus/ Is he then the same?

Euthydemus/ The same, indeed.

Ctesippus/ I should not consent to this. But whether, O Euthydemus, is he alone my father, or is he the father also of other men?

Euthydemus/ Of other men also. Or do you think that the same person being father, is not father?

Ctesippus/ I should indeed think so.

Euthydemus/ But what? A thing being gold, is it not gold? Or being man, is it not man?

Ctesippus/ You do not, according to the proverb, connect, O Euthydemus, thread with thread. For you speak of a dire thing, if your father is the father of all men.

Euthydemus/ But he is.

Ctesippus/ Whether is he the father of men, or also of horses? Or likewise of all other animals?

Euthydemus/ Of all others animals.

Ctesippus/ Is a mother also the mother of all animals?

Euthydemus/ And a mother likewise.

Ctesippus/ Your mother therefore, is also the mother of marine hedgehogs.

Euthydemus/ And yours too.

Ctesippus/ Hence then you are the brother of gudgeons, whelps, and pigs.

Euthydemus/ For you also are.

Ctesippus/ And; besides this, your father also is a dog.

Euthydemus/ For your father is likewise.

Dionysodorus/ But, if you answer me, you will in a short time acknowledge these things. For tell me, have you a dog?

Ctesippus/ And a very bad one.

Dionysodorus/ Has he therefore whelps?

Ctesippus/ He has indeed, others very much like himself.

Dionysodorus/ Is not the dog then the father of them?

Ctesippus/ I, saw him having connection with a bitch.

Dionysodorus/ What then? Is he not your dog?

Ctesippus/ Certainly.

Dionysodorus/ Being a father therefore, is he not yours? So that the dog becomes your father, and you are the brother of whelps.

Socrates/ And again, Dionysodorus hastily took up the discourse that Ctesippus might not say anything in reply prior to him; and still further, answer me a trifling particular.

Dionysodorus/ Do you strike this dog?

Socrates/ And Ctesippus laughing;

Ctesippus/ By the gods, I do; for I cannot strike you.

Dionysodorus/ Do you not therefore, strike your father?

Ctesippus/ I should much more justly, strike your father, and ask him what he meant, by begetting such wise sons. But certainly, O Euthydemus, your father and the father of the whelps has obtained the possession of many good things from this your wisdom.

Dionysodorus/ But he is not in want of many good things, O Ctesippus, neither he, nor you.

Ctesippus/ Nor are you, O Euthydemus, in want of them.

Euthydemus/ Neither I nor any other man am in want of them. For tell me, O Ctesippus, whether you think it good for a sick man to drink a medicine, or does it appear to you

to be not good, when it is requisite he should drink it; or when anyone is going to a battle, ought he rather to go armed, or without arms?

Ctesippus/ To me, it appears to be better to do the former of these; though I think that you are about to say something beautiful.

Euthydemus/ You understand most excellently; but answer me. For since you acknowledge that it is good for a man to drink a medicine when it is requisite, it is also necessary to drink abundantly of this good, and it will in this case be well, if someone bruising it, should mingle with it a cart load of hellebore.

Ctesippus/ This would be very proper indeed, O Euthydemus, if he who drank it were as large as the statue in Delphi.

Euthydemus/ As therefore, it is also good to have arms in battle, is it not necessary to have a great number of shields and spears, since it is a good thing?

Ctesippus/ Very much so. But you are not of this opinion, O Euthydemus; for you think that one shield and one spear are sufficient. Or do you not?

Euthydemus/ I do.

Ctesippus/ Would you also, arm Gorgon and Briareus after this manner? But I think that you are more skillful than to act in this manner, as being one who fights with military weapons, as is also the case with this your associate.

Socrates/ And Euthydemus indeed was silent; but Dionysodorus said, in reply to those things which had been before answered by Ctesippus;

Dionysodorus/ Does it not therefore also appear to you to be good to possess gold?

Ctesippus/ Certainly, and also to have a great quantity of it.

Dionysodorus/ What then? Does it not appear to you to be a good thing always to possess riches, and everywhere?

Ctesippus/ Very much so.

Dionysodorus/ Do you not therefore also acknowledge gold to be a good thing?

Ctesippus/ We have acknowledged it.

Dionysodorus/ Is it not then necessary always to possess it, and everywhere, and especially in one's self? And would not a man be most happy, if he had three talents of gold in his belly, a talent in his skull, and a stater of gold in each of his eyes?

Ctesippus/ They say indeed, O Euthydemus, that those among the Scythians are the most happy and the best men, who have much gold in their skulls, just as you lately said, that a dog was your father: and, what is still more wonderful, they say, that they drink out of their own golden skulls, and view the gold within them, having their own head in their hands.

Euthydemus/ But whether, do the Scythians and other men see things which may be seen, or things which cannot be seen?

Ctesippus/ Things which can be seen, certainly.

Euthydemus/ Is this, therefore, also the case with you?

Ctesippus/ It is.

Euthydemus/ Do you therefore see our garments?

Ctesippus/ Yes.

Euthydemus/ Are these then things which may be seen?

Ctesippus/ Transcendently so.

Euthydemus/ But what?

Ctesippus/ Nothing. But you perhaps do not think that they are seen; so pleasant are you. To me however, Euthydemus, you appear, not sleeping to be asleep, and if it were possible for a man when speaking to say nothing, that you also do this.

Dionysodorus/ Is it not therefore possible, for him who is silent to speak?

Ctesippus/ By no means.

Dionysodorus/ Is it also impossible for him who speaks to be silent?

Ctesippus/ This is still less possible.

Dionysodorus/ When therefore you speak of stones, and pieces of wood and iron, do you not speak of things silent?

Ctesippus/ I do not, if I walk in braziers' shops; but the pieces of iron are called things which found, and make the greatest noise, if anyone meddles with them. So that in this particular, it is concealed from you through your wisdom, that you have said nothing. But further still, explain to me the other assertion, how it is possible for one who speaks to be silent.

Socrates/ And Ctesippus appeared to me to contend in a transcendent manner, on account of the youth, the object of his love.

Euthydemus/ When you are silent, are you not silent as to all things?

Ctesippus/ I am.

Euthydemus/ Are you not therefore silent, as to things which are said, if things which are said are among the number of all things?

Ctesippus/ But what? are not all things silent?

Euthydemus/ Certainly not.

Ctesippus/ Do therefore, O best of men, all things speak?

Euthydemus/ Those things certainly do, which do speak.

Ctesippus/ But, I do not ask this; but I ask whether all things are silent, or speak?

Socrates/ Dionysodorus, hastily taking up the discourse:

Dionysodorus/ They do neither, and they do both. For I well know that you have not anything to say to this answer.

Socrates/ And Ctesippus, as was usual with him, laughing very loudly;

Ctesippus/ O Euthydemus, your brother has lost his position in both cases, and his assertion perishes and is vanquished.

Socrates/ And Clinias was very much delighted and laughed; so that Ctesippus became ten times greater than he was. But Ctesippus, as being very crafty, appeared to me to have stolen these things from these very men. For a wisdom of this kind is not now possessed by any other persons.

Why do you laugh, O Clinias, at things so serious and beautiful?

Dionysodorus/ Why have you now, Socrates, ever seen a beautiful thing?

Socrates/ I have, and many such, O Dionysodorus.

Dionysodorus/ Were they therefore, things different from the beautiful, or the same with the beautiful?

Socrates/ And I then became perfectly involved in doubt, and thought I had suffered justly for having granted. At the same time, however; They are different from the beautiful; but a certain beauty is present to each of them.

Dionysodorus/ If, therefore, an ox is present with you, you are an ox; and because I now am present with you, you are Dionysodorus.

Socrates/ Predict better things.

Dionysodorus/ But after what manner; when one thing is present with another, will that which is different be different:

Socrates/ Are you then, dubious respecting this? But I will now endeavor to imitate the wisdom of men, as being one who is desirous of it.

Dionysodorus/ How should I not doubt, both I and all other men, respecting that which is not?

Socrates/ What do you say? O Dionysodorus. Is not the beautiful, beautiful, and the base, base?

Dionysodorus/ If, it appears to be so to me.

Socrates/ Does it not therefore appear to be so to you?

Dionysodorus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is not therefore also the same, same? and is not the different, different? For certainly the different is not the same. But I should not think that even a boy would doubt this, that the different is not different. But, O Dionysodorus, this indeed you willingly pass by; since in other things you appear to me to resemble artists on whom it is incumbent to accomplish certain particulars; for it is proper that you should accomplish the business of discourse in an all-beautiful manner.

Dionysodorus/ Do you know therefore, what is proper to each of the artists? And, in the first place, do you know to whom it belongs to work in brass?

Socrates/ I know that this belongs to copper-smiths.

Dionysodorus/ But to whom does it belong to fashion things from clay?

Socrates/ To a potter.

Dionysodorus/ And whose business is it to cut throats, to excoriate, and cutting off small pieces of flesh to boil and roast them?

Socrates/ It is the business of a cook.

Dionysodorus/ If then, a man does things which are proper, does he not act rightly?

Socrates/ Especially so.

Dionysodorus/ But it is proper, as you say, that a cook should cut and excoriate. Have you assented to these things or not?

Socrates/ I have assented; but pardon me.

Dionysodorus/ It is evident, therefore, that if anyone, cutting the throat of a cook and chopping him into small pieces, should boil and roast him, he would do, what is proper; and that if anyone should work on a coppersmith himself after the manner of braziers, and on a potter after the manner of potters, he also would do what is proper.

Socrates/ O Neptune, now you place a summit on your wisdom. Will it therefore ever be present with me, so as to become familiar to me?

Dionysodorus/ You will know it, Socrates, when it becomes familiar to you.

Socrates/ That is to say, if you are willing that it should.

Dionysodorus/ But what? Do you think you know the things pertaining to yourself?

Socrates/ Unless you say anything to the contrary. For it is necessary to begin from you, but to end in Euthydemus here.

Dionysodorus/ Whether therefore, do you think these things to be yours, over which you have dominion, and which you can use as you please? As, for instance, with respect to oxen and sheep, do you think that such among these are yours as it is lawful for you to sell and give, and sacrifice to whatever god you please? And that those of them over which you have not this power, are not yours?

Socrates/ And I (for I knew that from those questions something beautiful would emerge, and at the same time being desirous to hear very quickly) said, it is perfectly so: things of this kind are alone mine.

Dionysodorus/ But what? Do you not call these things animals, which possess a soul?

Socrates/ Yes.

Dionysodorus/ Do you acknowledge then, that these alone among animals are yours respecting which you have the liberty of doing all these things which I have just now mentioned?

Socrates/ I acknowledge it.

And he pausing, very ironically, as if considering something of great consequence said;

Dionysodorus/ Tell me, Socrates, is Zeus with you *Patrius*?

Socrates/ And I, suspecting that the discourse would come to that place, in which it would end, fled with a certain ambiguous craftiness, and now turned myself as if I had been caught in a net. And I said;

He is not, O Dionysodorus.

Dionysodorus/ You therefore are a miserable man; nor are you an Athenian, since you have neither gods called *Patrii*, nor sacred rights, nor anything else beautiful and good.

Socrates/ Spare me, O Dionysodorus, predict better things and do not instruct me with severity. For I have altars, and domestic sacred concerns, and such as belong to my country, and whatever other things of this kind are possessed by the rest of the Athenians.

Dionysodorus/ In the next place, is not Zeus Patrius to the rest of the Athenians?

Socrates/ That appellation, does not belong to anyone of the Ionians, nor to such as are colonized from this city, nor to us. But Apollo is Patrius, through the nativity of Ion. Zeus, however, is not called by us Patrius, but Herceus and Phratrius; and Minerva also is called Phratria.

Dionysodorus/ This is sufficient, said Dionysodorus; for you have, as it seems, Apollo, Zeus, and Minerva.

Socrates/ Entirely so.

Dionysodorus/ Will not these therefore, be your gods?

Socrates/ My progenitors, and masters.

Dionysodorus/ They will be so then to you. Or have you not confessed that they are yours?

Socrates/ I have confessed it. For what can I do?

Dionysodorus/ Are not therefore, those gods also animals? For you have acknowledged that such things as have a soul are animals. Or have not those gods a soul?

Socrates/ They have.

Dionysodorus/ Are they not therefore also animals?

Socrates/ Animals.

Dionysodorus/ But of animals, you have acknowledged these to be yours, which you can give and sell, and sacrifice to any god you please.

Socrates/ I have acknowledged it. For I do not recant, O Euthydemus.

Dionysodorus/ Come then, tell me immediately, since you acknowledge that Zeus is yours and the other gods, are you therefore permitted to sell them, or give them, or to use them in any other way you please, in the same manner as other animals?

Socrates/ I therefore, O Crito, as if struck by what he said, lay speechless; but Ctesippus coming as it were to my assistance;

Ctesippus/ Pypax, O Herules, a beautiful discourse!

Dionysodorus/ Whether, is Hercules Pypax, or Pypax Hercules?

Ctesippus/ O Neptune, what weighty questions! I yield; the men are unconquerable.

Socrates/ Here indeed, my dear Crito, there was not anyone present, who did not in the highest degree praise what was said; and the men were almost ready to die with laughing, applauding, and exulting. For before this, the lovers alone of Euthydemus applauded everything that was said in a very beautiful manner; but here, not far from the pillars in the Lyceum, they applauded the men, and were delighted with what they said. As to myself, my feelings were such, that I was forced to acknowledge that I had never at any time seen men so wise; and being perfectly enslaved by their wisdom, I applied myself to the praising and passing encomiums on them; and I said, O blessed ye for your admirable genius, who have so rapidly, and in a short time, accomplished a thing of such magnitude! Your arguments indeed, O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, contain many other beautiful things; but this is the most magnificent thing in them, that you pay no attention to the multitude of mankind, nor to things venerable, and which appear to be of some consequence, but only to those who are like yourselves. For I well know, that very few men, and those such as are similar to you, delight in these arguments; but others are so ignorant of them, that I well know, they would be more ashamed to confute others with such like arguments, than to be themselves confuted. This too again is another popular and mild thing in your arguments, that when you say there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, or anything else of this kind, and, in short, that one thing is not different from another, you in reality sew up the mouths of men, as you also acknowledge that you do; but

that you not only sew up the mouths of others, but appear also to sew up your own, this is very polite, and removes that which is oppressive in your arguments. The greatest thing however is, that these arguments subsist in such a manner, and are so artificially invented by you, that anyone may learn them in a very short time. This I have perceived, and I have noticed how rapidly, and indeed immediately, Ctesippus has been able to imitate you. This wisdom therefore of yours, with respect to its being rapidly imparted to another, is beautiful, but is not adapted to be discussed before men. But if you will be persuaded by me, be careful that you do not speak before many, lest rapidly learning, they should not thank you for your instruction. But especially discourse together by yourselves alone: if not, if you discourse before another, let it be before him alone, who gives you silver for what you say. These same things too if you are wise you will also admonish your disciples, viz. That they never discourse with any man, unless with you and themselves. For that which is rare, O Euthydemus, is honorable; but water may be bought for a vile price, being the best of things, as Pindar says. But come, make Clinias and me partakers of your discipline.

Having said these things, O Crito, and a few others, we departed. Consider therefore now, how you will accompany me to these men. For they say that they are able to teach anyone who is willing to give them money; and that they do not exclude any genius or age. They likewise assert that which it is especially proper for you to hear, that an attention to gain does not hinder anyone from easily receiving their wisdom.

Crito/ And indeed, Socrates, I am desirous of hearing them, and would willingly learn something from them; though indeed I also appear to be among the number of those who do not resemble Euthydemus, but those whom,

as you said, would more willingly be confuted by such like arguments than confute them. It seems however to me to be ridiculous to admonish you, at the same time I wish to relate to you what I have heard. Do you not know, that among those that left you, a certain person came to me as I was walking, a man who thought himself to be very wise, and one of those who are skillful in forensic harangues, and that he said to me;

Someone/ O Crito, have you heard nothing of these wise men?

Crito/ By Zeus, I have not said I. For I could not stand before others, so as to hear, on account of the crowd.

Someone/ But, it was worthwhile to have heard them.

Crito/ Why?

Someone/ Because you would have heard men discoursing, who are the wisest of all those who at present engage in such like arguments.

Crito/ And I said, What then do you think of their arguments?

Someone/ What else, than that they are such as you will always hear from such like triflers, who bestow vile attention on things of no worth.

Crito/ For these were his very words.

And I said, But certainly philosophy is an elegant thing.

Someone/ How, elegant, O blessed man! It is indeed a thing of no worth. But if you had been present just now, I think that you would have been very much ashamed on account of your associate, who was so absurd as willingly to put himself in the power of men, who pay no attention to what they say, but adhere to every word. And these men, as I just now said, are among the best of those that exist at

present. But indeed, Crito, both the thing itself, and the men who are conversant with it, are very vile and ridiculous.

Crito/ But to me, Socrates, neither he appears rightly to blame the thing, nor any other who blames it. To be willing, however, to discourse with these men before many appears to me to be rightly blamed.

Socrates/ O Crito, men of this kind are wonderful. But I do not yet know what I am about to say. To what class of men did he belong who came to you, and blamed philosophy? Was he among the number of those who are skillful in contending in courts of justice, a certain orator; or was he one of those who introduce men of this description, a composer of the orations with which orators contend?

Crito/ The least of all, by Zeus, was he an orator; nor do I think that he ever went into a court of justice; but they say that he is knowing in the thing itself, by Zeus, and likewise that he is skillful, and that he compose skillful orations.

Socrates/ I now understand: for I myself was just now about to speak concerning these men. For these are they, O Crito, whom Prodicus says exist in the confines of a philosopher and politician. But they think themselves to be the wisest of men; and besides being such in their own opinion, they also entirely appear to be so among the many. Hence, as they are celebrated by all men, no others are an impediment to them, than those whose conversant with philosophy. They think therefore, if they can establish an opinion, that philosophers are of no worth, they shall obtain the palm of wisdom without contention in the opinion of all men. For they consider themselves to be in reality most wise; but think that their authority is lessened by the followers of Euthydemus, when they are intercepted in their private discourses. But they are very reasonably thought to be wise men: for moderately to possess philosophy, and moderately

to engage in political concerns, is very convenient; since this is to partake of both, as much as is requisite, and to enjoy the fruits of wisdom, secure from dangers and contests.

Crito/ What then? Do they appear to you, O Socrates, to say anything of consequence?

Socrates/ They do not, indeed.

Crito/ But the discourse of the men possesses a certain gracefulness.

Socrates/ For it has in reality, O Crito, gracefulness rather than truth. For it is not easy to persuade them, that men and all other things which subsist between two certain things, and participate of both, viz. such particulars as consist from good and evil, become better than the one, and worse than the other; but that such things as consist from two goods, not tending to the same, are worse than both with respect to that for which each of the things is useful from which they are composed; and that such things as are composed from two evils, not tending to the same, and which are in the middle, are alone better than each of those things, a part of both of which they participate. If, therefore, philosophy and political action are good, but each tends to that which is different, and these men, while they participate of both, are situated in the middle, they say nothing to the purpose; for they are viler than both. But if philosophy and political action are both good and bad, these men are better than some and worse than others. And if both are bad, thus they will assert something which is true, but by no means otherwise. I do not therefore think they will acknowledge, either that both these are bad, or that the one is bad, and the other good; but they in reality partaking of both, are inferior to both with respect to the performing of either, with a view to which both the political science and philosophy are worthy of regard; and though in reality they rank as the

third, they endeavor to appear to be the first. It is requisite, therefore, to pardon their desire, and not to be indignant with them. We should however consider them to be such as they are: For it is requisite to embrace every man who says anything which adheres to intellect, and who valiantly labors in endeavoring to do so.

Crito/ And indeed, Socrates, I also (as I always say to you) am dubious with respect to the management of my own children. For the youngest is yet but a little one; but Critobulus is now an adult, and requires the assistance of someone. I therefore, when I converse with you, am led to think that it is madness to be so much concerned about other things for the sake of children, such as about marriage, that they may be born from the most generous mother, and about riches, that they may become most wealthy, and yet neglect their education. But when I look at any one of those who profess to instruct men, I am struck with astonishment; and, to tell you the truth, every one of them appears to me to be unfit for the purpose; so that I cannot exhort the lad to philosophy.

Socrates/ O, my dear Crito, do you not know that in every pursuit, the many are vile, and of no worth, and that the few are worthy of all regard? For do not the gymnastic art, the art of acquiring money, rhetoric, and the art of commanding an army, appear to you to be beautiful?

Crito/ To me they certainly do, in every respect.

Socrates/ What then? In each of these do you not see that the multitude are ridiculous with respect to the several employments of these arts?

Crito/ Yes, by Zeus; and you speak most truly.

Socrates/ Would you, therefore, on this account avoid all pursuits, and not suffer your son to engage in them?

Crito/ This indeed, Socrates, would not be just.

Socrates/ You must not, therefore, O Crito, do that which ought not to be done; but bidding farewell to those who study philosophy, whether they are good or bad, explore the thing itself, well and properly; and if it should then appear to you to be a vile thing, dissuade every man from it, and not your sons only; but if it should appear to you such as I think it is, confidently pursue and cultivate it, as it is said, both you and your children.

THE END OF THE EUTHYDEMUS.

Gorgias.

or

On Rhetoric.

Translated by Henry Cary.

Persons of the Dialog

Callicles, Socrates, Chærephon,

Gorgias, and Polus.

Callicles/ They say, Socrates, that we should thus take part in war and battle.

Socrates/ Have we then, as the saying is, come after the feast, and are we too late?

Callicles/ And a very elegant feast. For Gorgias has just now exhibited many fine things to us.

Socrates/ Chærephon here, Callicles, is the cause of this, by having compelled us to waste our time in the forum.

Chaerephon/ It's of no consequence, Socrates; for I will also find a remedy; for Gorgias is my friend, so that he will exhibit to us now, if you please, or, if you prefer it, at some future time.

Callicles/ What, Chærephon? is Socrates desirous of hearing Gorgias?

Chaerephon/ We are come for this very purpose.

Callicles/ Whenever you please, then, come to my house; Gorgias lodges with me, and will exhibit to you.

Socrates/ You say well, Callicles. But would he be inclined to converse with us? For I wish to learn from him what is the power of his art, and what it is that he professes and teaches: the rest of the exhibition, as you say, he may make at some other time.

Callicles/ There is nothing like asking him, Socrates: for this is one part of his exhibition: he just now bade all that were in the house ask what question they pleased, and promised to answer everything.

Socrates/ You say well in truth. Ask him, Chaerephon.

Chaerephon/ What shall I ask him?

Socrates/ What he is.

Chaerephon/ How mean you?

Socrates/ Just as, if he happened to be a maker of shoes, he would surely answer you, that he is a shoemaker. Do you not understand what I mean?

Chaerephon/ I understand, and will ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, does Callicles here say truly that you promised to answer whatever anyone should ask you?

Gorgias/ Truly, Chaerephon: for I just now made that very promise: and I affirm that for many years no one has asked me anything new.

Chaerephon/ Without doubt, then, you will answer easily, Gorgias.

Gorgias/ You may make trial of that, Chaerephon.

Polus/ By Zeus, Chærephon, if you please, make trial of me: for Gorgias appears to me to be fatigued; as he has just now been speaking a great deal.

Chaerephon/ What, Polus, do you think you can answer better than Gorgias?

Polus/ What matters that, if I answer well enough for you?

Chaerephon/ Not at all: since you wish it then, answer.

Polus/ Ask.

Chaerephon/ I ask then, If Gorgias happened to be skilled in the same art as his brother Herodicus is skilled, what

name should we rightly give him? Would it not be the same as his brother?

Polus/ Certainly.

Chaerephon/ In calling him a physician, then, we should speak correctly?

Polus/ Yes.

Chaerephon/ But if he were skilled in the same art as Aristophon, son of Aglaophon, or his brother, what should we properly call him?

Polus/ Evidently, a painter.

Chaerephon/ But now, since he is skilled in a certain art, what can we properly call him?

Polus/ Chærephon, there are many arts among men by experience experimentally discovered: for experience causes our life to proceed according to art, but inexperience according to chance. Of each of these different persons partake of different arts, in different manners; but the best of the best; in the number of whom is Gorgias here, who possesses the finest of the arts.

Socrates/ Polus appears, Gorgias, to be very well prepared for speaking: but he does not do what he promised Chærephon.

Gorgias/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ He does not appear to me to answer the question that was asked.

Gorgias/ Do you then, if you please, ask him.

Socrates/ No, but if yourself would be willing to answer me, I would much rather ask you. For it is evident to me that Polus, from what he has said, has studied more what is called rhetoric, than conversation.

Polus/ Why so, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because, Polus, when Chærephon asked you in what art Gorgias was skilled, you praised his art, as if someone had blamed it, but you did not say what the art itself is.

Polus/ Did I not answer, that it was the finest of all arts?

Socrates/ Certainly. But no one asked you what was the quality of the art of Gorgias, but what it was, and by what name we ought to call Gorgias; just as Chærephon proposed the former questions to you, and you answered him well and in few words. Now, therefore, tell me in the same manner, what art Gorgias professes, and what we ought to call him. Or rather, Gorgias, do you tell us yourself what we ought to call you as skilled in what art.

Gorgias/ In rhetoric, Socrates.

Socrates/ Ought we, then, to call you a rhetorician?

Gorgias/ And a good one, Socrates, if you wish to call me, as Homer says, what "I boast myself to be."

Socrates/ But I do wish.

Gorgias/ Call me so, then.

Socrates/ Shall we say too that you are able to make others rhetoricians?

Gorgias/ I profess this not only here but elsewhere.

Socrates/ Are you willing then, Gorgias, to continue, as we are now doing, partly to ask questions and partly to answer, and to defer to some other occasion that prolixity of speech, such as Polus just now began with? But do not belie what you promised, but be willing to answer each question briefly.

Gorgias/ There are some answers, Socrates, which must necessarily be made at length: however, I will endeavor to make them as short as possible. For this is one of the things

which I profess, that no one can say the same things in fewer words than me.

Socrates/ There is need of this now, Gorgias; give me therefore a specimen of this very thing, conciseness of speech, and of prolixity at some other time.

Gorgias/ I will do so; and you will admit that you never heard anyone speak more concisely.

Socrates/ Well then, since you say that you are skilled in the art of rhetoric, and that you can teach another this art, tell me about what is rhetoric employed? just as the art of weaving is employed in the making of garments, is it not so?

Gorgias/ It is.

Socrates/ And is not music also employed in the composing of melodies?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ By Hera, Gorgias, I admire your answers, for you answer as briefly as possible.

Gorgias/ I think, Socrates, that I do this well enough.

Socrates/ You say well. Come then, answer me thus respecting rhetoric, of what is it the science?

Gorgias/ Of words.

Socrates/ What kind of words, Gorgias? Are they such as inform the sick by what kind of diet they may become well?

Gorgias/ No.

Socrates/ Rhetoric, then, is not concerned with all kinds of words?

Gorgias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Yet it makes men able to speak?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does it not enable men to think on the same things on which it enables them to speak?

Gorgias/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Does not, then, the medicinal art, of which we just now spoke, make men able to think and speak about the sick?

Gorgias/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ The medicinal art, then, as it appears, is conversant with words?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And those that concern diseases?

Gorgias/ Just so.

Socrates/ And is not the gymnastic art also conversant with words that relate to the good and bad habit of bodies?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And it is the same with other arts, Gorgias: each of them is conversant with those words that are employed about that particular thing of which each is the art.

Gorgias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Why, then, do you not call other arts rhetorical, as being conversant with words, since you call that rhetoric which is employed about words?

Gorgias/ Because, Socrates, almost the whole science of other arts is conversant with manual operations and such-like actions; in rhetoric, however, there is no such manual operation, but all its activity and efficiency is by means of words. For this reason, I consider that the art of rhetoric is conversant with words, herein speaking correctly, as I affirm.

Socrates/ Do I understand what kind of art you wish to call it? but I shall soon comprehend it more clearly. However, answer me. We have arts, have we not?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Of all the arts, some, I think, consist principally in workmanship, and stand in need of but few words, and others of none at all, but their work may be accomplished in silence, as painting, statuary, and many others. With such arts, you appear to me to say rhetoric has nothing to do? is it not so?

Gorgias/ You apprehend my meaning perfectly, Socrates.

Socrates/ On the other hand, there are other arts which accomplish all by means of words, and require no work at all, or very little, such as theoretical and practical arithmetic, geometry, the game of dice, and many other arts; some of which require almost as many words as actions, and most of them more, so that altogether their whole activity and efficiency is by means of words. You appear to me to say that rhetoric is among arts of this kind.

Gorgias/ You say truly.

Socrates/ However, I do not think you mean to call anyone of these rhetoric, although in the expression you used you so said, that rhetoric has its efficiency by means of words; and any who wished to catch at your words might reply, Do you say then, Gorgias, that arithmetic is rhetoric? But I do not think that you call either arithmetic or geometry rhetoric.

Gorgias/ You think rightly, Socrates, and apprehend my meaning correctly.

Socrates/ Come then, complete the answer to my question. Since rhetoric is one of those arts which make great use of words, and there are others of the same kind, endeavor to tell me in reference to what rhetoric has its efficiency in words. Just as if anyone should ask me respecting any of the arts which I but now mentioned: Socrates, what is the arithmetical art? I should say to him, as you did just now, That it is one of the arts that have their

efficiency in words. And if he should further ask me, In reference to what? I should answer, In reference to the knowledge of even and odd, how many there may be of each. But if again he should ask me, What do you mean by the art of computation? I should answer, that this also is one of those arts whose whole efficiency consists in words. And if he should further ask me, In reference to what? I should answer, as they do who draw up motions in the assemblies of the people, That in other respects computation is the same as arithmetic, for it has reference to the same object, that is to say, the even and the odd; but it differs in this respect, that computation considers what relation even and odd have to themselves and to each other in regard to quantity. And if anyone should ask me about astronomy, and after I had said that its whole efficiency consists in words, should say, But Socrates, to what do words employed about astronomy refer? I should answer, That they are employed about the course of the stars, and of the sun and the moon, how they are related to each other with respect to velocity.

Gorgias/ And you would answer rightly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now then do you answer, Gorgias. For rhetoric is one of those arts which accomplish and effect everything by means of words: is it not so?

Gorgias/ It is so.

Socrates/ Tell me then in reference to what? what is the particular thing about which these words are, which rhetoric uses?

Gorgias/ The greatest of all human concerns, Socrates, and the best.

Socrates/ But, Gorgias, what you say is questionable, and by no means clear. For I think you must have heard at banquets men singing that song in which the singers enumerate that the best thing is health, the second beauty,

and the third, as the author of the song says, riches gained without fraud.

Gorgias/ I have heard it; but with what object do you mention this?

Socrates/ Because the artificers of those things which the author of the song has commended, namely, the physician, the master of gymnastics, and the money-getter, will forthwith present themselves, and the physician will say: Socrates, Gorgias deceives you. For his art is not employed about the greatest good to men, but mine is. If, then, I should ask him, Who are you that say this? he would probably answer, I am a physician. What then do you say? that the object of your art is the greatest good? How can it be otherwise, Socrates, he would probably say, since its object is health? and what greater good can men have than health? And if after him again the master of gymnastics should say, I too should wonder, Socrates, if Gorgias could show you any greater good from his art than I can from mine, I should again say to him, And who are you, Sir, and what is your employment? A master of gymnastics, he would say, and my employment is to make men beautiful and strong in their bodies. After the master of gymnastics, the money-getter would say, as I imagine, despising all others, Consider, I beg, Socrates, whether there is any greater good than riches, either with Gorgias, or anyone else? I should thereupon say to him, What, then, are you the artificer of this good? He would say, I am. Who are you then? A money-getter. What then? Do you consider riches to be the greatest good to men? I shall say. Assuredly, he will answer. However, Gorgias here contends that his art is the cause of greater good than yours. It is clear then that after this he would ask, And what is this good? let Gorgias answer. Come then, Gorgias, suppose that you are asked by them and by me, and answer, What is this,

which you say is the greatest good to men, and of which you are the artificer?

Gorgias/ That which is in reality, Socrates, the greatest good, and is at the same time the cause of liberty to men, and of their being able to rule over others in their several cities.

Socrates/ What then do you say it is?

Gorgias/ I say it is the power of persuading by words judges in a court of justice, senators in the senate-house, and the hearers in a public assembly, and in every other convention of a political nature. Moreover, by this power you will make the physician your slave, and the master of gymnastics your slave, and the money-getter will be found to have gained money, not for himself, but for another, for you who are able to speak, and persuade the multitude.

Socrates/ At length you appear to me, Gorgias, to have shown as nearly as possible what kind of art you consider rhetoric to be; and if I understand you rightly, you say that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, and that its whole employment and the sum of it terminates in this. Can you say that rhetoric has any further power than that of producing persuasion in the minds of the hearers?

Gorgias/ By no means, Socrates; but you appear to me to have defined it sufficiently. For that is the sum of it.

Socrates/ Listen then, Gorgias. Be assured that I, as I persuade myself, if there is anyone, who in conversing with another, wishes to know the very thing about which the conversation is, be assured, I say, that I am such a person; and I think that you are too.

Gorgias/ What then, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will now tell you. The persuasion which you speak of as resulting from rhetoric, what it is, and with what particulars it is conversant, be assured I do not clearly

understand, not but that I have a suspicion of what I suppose you mean, and about what it is employed: yet I will not the less ask you what persuasion you mean results from rhetoric, and with what particulars it is conversant. Why then do I who have a suspicion ask you, and not rather myself speak? Not on your account, but on account of the discussion, that it may proceed in such a manner as to make the subject of the discussion most clear to us. For consider whether I seem to you right in putting the question to you: just as if I should ask you what kind of a painter is Zeuxis? if you were to tell me that he paints animals, might I not justly enquire of you, what kind of animals he paints? is it not so?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And would it not be for this reason, because there are also other painters who paint many other animals?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if no one else but Zeuxis painted them, you would have answered properly.

Gorgias/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Come then, with respect to rhetoric, tell me, whether it appears to you that rhetoric alone produces persuasion, or do other arts produce it likewise? My meaning is this: Does he who teaches anything persuade what he teaches, or not?

Gorgias/ He does certainly persuade, Socrates.

Socrates/ Again, if we speak of the same arts of which we just now made mention, does not arithmetic teach us such things as relate to number? and does not an arithmetician the same?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Does it not also persuade?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Arithmetic, then, is an artificer of persuasion.

Gorgias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ If, then, anyone should ask us, What persuasion it produces, and with respect to what? we should answer, That which teaches about the quantity of even and odd. In like manner we may show, that all the other arts of which we spoke just now, produce persuasion, and what kind of persuasion, and with respect to what: is it not so?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Rhetoric then, is not alone an artificer of persuasion.

Gorgias/ You say truly.

Socrates/ Since then, it does not alone produce this effect, but other arts do the same, we may justly, as in the case of the painter, next enquire of the speaker; of what kind of persuasion, and of persuasion on what subject rhetoric is the art? Does it not appear to you that this question may fairly be asked?

Gorgias/ It does.

Socrates/ Answer then, Gorgias, since this appears to you to be the case.

Gorgias/ I speak then, Socrates, of that persuasion which is produced in courts of justice, and in other public assemblies, as I just now mentioned, and with respect to matters that are just and unjust.

Socrates/ I suspected, Gorgias, that you meant that persuasion, and on such matters. But do not be surprised if I shortly ask you a question that may appear to be evident, but which I shall notwithstanding repeat, for, as I before observed, I ask it for the sake of carrying on the discussion in an orderly manner, and not on your account, but that we

may not be in the habit of catching up each other's words on suspicion; but do you finish what you have to say according to your own plan, just as you please.

Gorgias/ You appear to me to act rightly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Come then, let us examine this too. Do you admit that to learn is anything?

Gorgias/ I do admit it.

Socrates/ Again? to believe?

Gorgias/ I do.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, does it appear to you, that to learn and to believe, and learning and belief are the same, or different?

Gorgias/ I think, Socrates, that they are different.

Socrates/ You think rightly; and you may know from this; if anyone should ask you, Is there, Gorgias, a false and true belief? I think you would say there is.

Gorgias/ I should.

Socrates/ Well then, is there a false and true science?

Gorgias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ It is clear, therefore, that the belief and science are not the same.

Gorgias/ You say truly.

Socrates/ Yet both those who learn are persuaded, and those who believe.

Gorgias/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ Are you willing, therefore, that we lay down two kinds of persuasion, one that produces belief without knowledge, but the other science?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Which kind of persuasion, then, does rhetoric produce in courts of justice and other public assemblies,

respecting what is just and unjust? is it that from which belief springs without knowledge, or that from which knowledge arises?

Gorgias/ It is evident, Socrates, that it is that from which belief springs.

Socrates/ Rhetoric then, as it seems, Gorgias, is the artificer of a persuasion which produces belief, and not of that which teaches respecting the just and unjust.

Gorgias/ It is so.

Socrates/ A rhetorician, therefore, does not profess to teach courts of justice and other public assemblies, respecting things just and unjust, but only to produce belief. For surely he could not teach so great a multitude in a short time things of such great importance.

Gorgias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Come then, let us see now what we ought to say of rhetoric. For I, indeed, am not yet able to understand what I should say. When an assembly is held in a city, for the choice of physicians, or shipwrights, or any other kind of artificer, is it not the case that the rhetorician will refrain from giving his advice? for it is evident that, in each election, the most skillful artist ought to be chosen. Nor *will he be consulted* when the question is respecting the building of walls, or the construction of ports or docks, but architects only. Nor, again, when a deliberation occurs respecting the choice of generals, or the marshalling an army against enemies, or the occupation of posts, —but on such occasions those who are skilled in military affairs will give advice, and not rhetoricians. What do you say, Gorgias, on such points? For since you say that you are a rhetorician, and are able to make others rhetoricians, it is proper to enquire of you what are the things about which your art is concerned. And consider that I am laboring for your benefit. For, perhaps,

someone who is now within the house may wish to become your disciple; for I perceive some, nay several, who probably are ashamed to question you. In being questioned, therefore, by me, consider yourself to be questioned by them, What would be the consequence to us, Gorgias, if we should put ourselves under your instructions? On what subjects shall we be able to give advice to the city? Whether about the just only and the unjust; or on those subjects of which Socrates just now made mention? Endeavor to answer them.

Gorgias/ I will endeavor, Socrates, to develop clearly the whole power of rhetoric: for you have admirably led the way. You doubtless know that these docks and walls of the Athenians, and the structure of the ports, were made partly on the advice of Themistocles, and partly on that of Pericles, but not of artificers.

Socrates/ This is told of Themistocles, Gorgias: and I myself heard Pericles when he gave us his advice respecting the middle wall.

Gorgias/ And when there is an election of any such persons as you mentioned, Socrates, you see that the rhetoricians are the persons who give advice, and whose opinion prevails in such matters.

Socrates/ It is because I wonder at this, Gorgias, that I have been for some time asking you, what is the power of rhetoric. For when I consider it in this manner, it appears to me almost divine in its magnitude.

Gorgias/ If you knew all, Socrates, that it comprehends under itself almost all powers! And I will give you a strong proof of this. For I have often, ere now, gone with my brother and other physicians to various sick persons, who would neither drink their medicine, nor suffer themselves to be cut or cauterized by the physician, and when the physician was unable to persuade them, I have done so by no other art than

rhetoric. I say too, that if a rhetorician and a physician should go to any city you please, and it were necessary to contend by argument in a general assembly, or any other convention, which should be chosen, a rhetorician or a physician, the physician would be held in no account, but he that has the power of speaking would be chosen, if he pleased. And if he should contend with any other artist whatever, the rhetorician would persuade that he himself should be chosen in preference to anyone else. For there is no subject on which a rhetorician will not speak to the multitude more persuasively than any other artist whatever. Such, then, and so great is the power of this art. It is right however, Socrates, to use rhetoric in the same way as any other exercise employed in contests: for it is not right to use other exercises against all men alike; nor, because anyone has learnt pugilism, and the pancratium, and to fight with arms, so as to be superior both to friends and enemies, is it therefore proper to strike, or pierce, or slay one's friends. Nor, by Zeus, if someone who, by having frequented the palæstra, has made his body robust, and become a pugilist, should afterwards strike his father or mother, or any other of his relatives or friends, would, it on that account be proper to hate, and expel from cities, the training masters and those who teach how to fight with arms. For they instructed their pupils in these exercises, in order that they might make a proper use of them against enemies, and those that do wrong, for self-defense, and not for attack; but they contrariwise, use their strength and skill improperly. The teachers, therefore, are not wicked, nor is their art either to be blamed, or for this reason wicked, but they, I think, who do not use it properly. The same may be said of rhetoric. For a rhetorician is able to speak against all men, and on every subject; so that he can best persuade the multitude, in a word, on whatever subject he pleases: but he ought not any

the more on this account to detract from the reputation of physicians, because he is able to do it, nor of other artificers; but he should use rhetoric justly, as well as other exercises. In my opinion, however, if anyone having become a rhetorician abuses this power and art, it is not proper to hate the teacher and expel him from cities, for he imparted the knowledge of it for just purposes, but the other makes a contrary use of it. It is just, therefore, to hate, banish, and slay him who does not make a right use of it, but not the teacher.

Socrates/ I think, Gorgias, that you as well as I, have been present at many discussions, and that you have observed this in them, that it is not easy for men, on whatever subject they undertake to converse, having propounded their ideas to each other, both learning themselves and teaching one another, then to put an end to the conference; but if they have a controversy about anything, and one says that the other does not speak correctly or clearly, they are indignant, and each thinks that the other is speaking out of envy, from a love of contention, and not seeking what was proposed in the discussion; and some, at length, depart in a most disgraceful manner, having reviled each other, and spoken and heard such things that even the bystanders are vexed at themselves for having deigned to listen to such men. But why do I say this? Because you now appear to me to say what does not follow from, or accord with, what you first said respecting rhetoric. I am afraid, therefore, to proceed with my refutation, lest you should suppose that I do not speak with zeal for the subject, that it may be made clear, but out of opposition to you. If, then, you are of that class of men to which I belong, I should gladly question you: but if not, I would forbear to do so. But to what class of men do I belong? To those who are willingly refuted, if they say anything that is not true, and who willingly refute if anyone says anything

that is not true; and who are not less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I consider the former to be the greater good, inasmuch as it is a greater good one's-self to be delivered from the greatest evil than to deliver another. For I think no evil so great to man as false opinion on the subjects we, are now discussing. If, then, you say that you are such a man, let us continue our discussion; but if you think we ought to desist, let us give it up, and put an end to the argument.

Gorgias/ But indeed, Socrates, I profess myself to be such a man as you describe. Perhaps, however, it is right to attend to the wishes of the company who are present. For, some time since, before you came, I explained many things to the present company: and now, perhaps, we shall protract it too far if we continue the discussion. We must, therefore, respect their wishes lest we detain any of them, who have something else to do.

Chaerephon/ You yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, hear the noise these men make, from their anxiety to hear, if you say anything. For my part, may I never have so much business, as to be obliged to leave such a discussion and so conducted, from having anything else more important to do.

Callicles/ By the gods, Chærephon, and I too, though I have been present at many conferences, know not whether I have ever been so delighted as now; so that you will gratify me much, should you even be willing to continue the discussion throughout the whole day.

Socrates/ There is no obstacle on my side, Callicles, if only Gorgias is willing.

Gorgias/ After this, Socrates, it would be shameful in me not to be willing, especially as I myself announced that anyone might ask what he pleased. But, if it is agreeable to

the company, continue the discussion, and ask any question you please.

Socrates/ Hear then, Gorgias, what I wonder at in what you said. For, perhaps, you spoke correctly, and I did not rightly apprehend you. You say that you can make anyone a rhetorician, who is willing to be instructed by you?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So that he can speak persuasively on any subject to the multitude, not teaching, but persuading?

Gorgias/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ You said too, that a rhetorician is able to speak more persuasively than a physician, on the subject of health.

Gorgias/ I did say so, at least to a multitude.

Socrates/ Does not, then, this expression “to a multitude” mean to the ignorant? for, surely, among the well-informed he will not be better able to persuade than the physician.

Gorgias/ You say truly.

Socrates/ If then he shall be better able to persuade than the physician, he is better able to persuade than one who possesses knowledge?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Although he is not a physician? is it not so?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But he who is not a physician must, surely, be unskilled in those things in which a physician is skilled.

Gorgias/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who is ignorant will be more capable than one who possesses knowledge of persuading the ignorant, since a rhetorician is better able to persuade than a physician. Is this the result, or something else?

Gorgias/ That is the result in this instance.

Socrates/ The case therefore is the same as concerns a rhetorician and rhetoric with respect to all other arts: I mean, there is no need for it to know the subjects themselves, how they are circumstanced, but only to discover some means of persuasion, so as to appear to the ignorant to know more than those who possess knowledge.

Gorgias/ Is it not a great advantage, Socrates, without having other arts, but this one only, to be in no respect inferior to artificers?

Socrates/ Whether from this being the case, a rhetorician is inferior, or not inferior to others, we will presently consider, if our argument requires it. But first let us consider this: Whether a rhetorician is in the same condition with reference to the just and the unjust, the base and the honorable, the good and the evil, as he is with reference to health, and other things with which other arts are concerned; I mean, that he does not know them, what is good, or what is evil, what is honorable or what is base, what is just, or what is unjust, but is able to devise some means of persuasion respecting them, so that, though he is ignorant, he appears to the ignorant to know more than one who possesses knowledge; or is it necessary that he should know these, and is it requisite that he who is about to learn rhetoric should have acquired these things before he comes to you; if not, will you, who are a teacher of rhetoric, teach him who comes to you none of these things for it is not your province, but make him appear to the multitude to know these things, though he does not know them, and to seem to be a good man when he is not so? or shall you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows beforehand the truth respecting these things? What is the case in this respect, Gorgias? And, by Zeus, as you just now promised, unfold the whole power of rhetoric.

Gorgias/ I think, Socrates, that anyone, if he did not know, would learn these things from me.

Socrates/ Stay; for you say well. If then you make anyone a rhetorician, it is necessary that he should know what is just and unjust, either before, or afterwards from your instructions.

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What then? Is he who has learnt carpentering, a carpenter, or not?

Gorgias/ He is.

Socrates/ And is not he who has learnt music, a musician?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who has learnt medicine, a physician? And so, in the same way, with regard to other things, is not he who has learnt any particular art such a person as each science respectively makes its proficient?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ By the same reason, then, does it not follow, that he who has learnt just things is just?

Gorgias/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And he who is just surely performs just actions.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, necessary that the just man should wish to do just actions?

Gorgias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ The just man, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly.

Gorgias/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And it follows from the argument that the rhetorician should be just?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ A rhetorician, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly?

Gorgias/ It appears not.

Socrates/ Do you remember that you said a little before that we ought not to accuse the trainers of youth, nor expel them from cities, if a pugilist does not make a good use of the pugilistic art, and acts unjustly? And so, likewise, if a rhetorician make an unjust use of rhetoric, that we should not accuse the teacher, nor expel him from the city, but the person who acts unjustly, and does not make a proper use of rhetoric? Were these things said, or not?

Gorgias/ They were said.

Socrates/ But now this very same rhetorician appears incapable of ever acting unjustly. Is it not so?

Gorgias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And it was said, Gorgias, at the commencement of our discussion, that rhetoric is conversant with words, not those respecting the even and the odd, but those respecting the just and the unjust. Was it not so?

Gorgias/ It was.

Socrates/ When, therefore, you spoke thus, I supposed that rhetoric could never be an unjust thing, since it always discourses concerning justice. But when you said shortly afterwards that a rhetorician might use rhetoric unjustly, then, wondering, and thinking that the two statements did not accord, I made that remark, that if you should think it a gain to be confuted, as I do, it was worthwhile to continue the discussion, but if not, to give it up. Afterwards, however, when we were investigating the matter, you see yourself that it is again allowed to be impossible for a rhetorician to make an unjust use of rhetoric, and to be willing to act unjustly.

How the case really stands, by the dog, Gorgias, requires no little discussion to examine it thoroughly.

Polus/ What then, Socrates? Have you really such an opinion of rhetoric as you now say? or do you not think that Gorgias was ashamed not to acknowledge that the rhetorician knows what is just, beautiful, and good, and that, if anyone should come to him ignorant of these things, he himself would teach them? Then perhaps from this admission some inconsistency in his arguments followed; the very thing which you love, yourself leading the way to such questions. For who do you think will deny that he knows what is just, and can teach it to others? To lead the discussion to such matters is a piece of great rusticity.

Socrates/ Most excellent Polus! we get ourselves friends and sons, for this express purpose, that when we, through being advanced in years, fall into error, you that are younger, being with us, may correct our life both in deeds and words. If, then, Gorgias and I have fallen into any error in our arguments, do you who are present correct us: you ought to do so. And I wish that if any of the things that have been granted appear to you to have been improperly granted, you would retract whatever you please, only I beg you beware of one thing.

Polus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That you would restrain that prolixity of speech which at first you attempted to employ.

Polus/ What? shall I not be allowed to speak as much as I please?

Socrates/ You would indeed be very badly treated, my excellent friend, if, having come to Athens, where of all Greece there is the greatest liberty of speech, you alone should here be deprived of this liberty. But set this against it: if you speak in a prolix manner, and will not answer a

question put to you, should not I be badly treated, if I am not allowed to go away and not listen to you? But if you feel any interest in the discussion that has taken place, and wish to correct it, as I just now said, retract whatever you please, and questioning and being questioned in turn, as Gorgias and I did, confute and be confuted. For you profess, surely, to know the same things as Gorgias; is it not so?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ Will not you, then, also bid anyone ask you what question he pleases, as knowing how to answer him.

Polus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Then do whichever of these you please, ask or answer.

Polus/ I will do so; and do you answer me, Socrates. Since Gorgias appears to you to be in doubt respecting rhetoric, what do you say it is?

Socrates/ Do you ask me what kind of art I say it is?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ To tell you the truth, Polus, it does not appear to me to be an art at all.

Polus/ What, then, does rhetoric appear to you to be?

Socrates/ A thing which you say produced art, in the treatise which I lately read.

Polus/ What do you say this is?

Socrates/ A certain skill.

Polus/ Does rhetoric, then, appear to you to be skill?

Socrates/ To me it does, unless you say otherwise.

Polus/ Of what is it the skill?

Socrates/ Of procuring a certain gratification and pleasure.

Polus/ Does not rhetoric, then, appear to you to be a beautiful thing, since it is able to gratify mankind?

Socrates/ What, Polus? Have you already heard from me what I say it is, that you afterwards ask me, if it does not appear to me to be beautiful?

Polus/ Did I not hear you say that it is a certain skill?

Socrates/ Since, then, you prize giving pleasure, are you willing to give me a little pleasure?

Polus/ I am.

Socrates/ Ask me, then, what kind of art cookery appears to me to be.

Polus/ I do ask you; what kind of an art is cookery?

Socrates/ None at all, Polus.

Polus/ What is it? say.

Socrates/ I say, then, it is a certain skill.

Polus/ Of what? say.

Socrates/ I say, of procuring gratification and pleasure, Polus.

Polus/ Are cookery and rhetoric the same thing?

Socrates/ By no means, but a part of the same study.

Polus/ Of what study are you speaking?

Socrates/ I fear it would be too rude to speak the truth, for I hesitate to speak on account of Gorgias, lest he should think that I ridicule his profession. But I know not whether this is the rhetoric which Gorgias studies: for it was not at all clear from our late discussion what his opinion is. But what I call rhetoric is a part of a certain thing which does not rank among things beautiful.

Gorgias/ Of what thing, Socrates? say, without fear of offending me.

Socrates/ It appears to me, then, Gorgias, to be a certain study, that does not belong to art, but to a soul that is sagacious and manly, and naturally powerful in its intercourse with men. The sum of it I call flattery. Of this study there appears to me to be many other divisions, and one of them is that of cookery; which, indeed, appears to be an art, but, as I maintain, is not an art, but skill and practice. I also call rhetoric a division of this, and personal decoration, and sophistry, these four divisions relating to four particulars. If, therefore, Polus wishes to enquire, let him enquire, for he has not yet heard what division of flattery I assert rhetoric to be: but he did not observe that I had not yet finished my answer, nevertheless he asks me, if I do not think that it is beautiful. But I shall not answer him, whether I think rhetoric is beautiful or base, till I have first answered what it is. For that would not be right, Polus. If then you wish to enquire, ask me what division of flattery I assert rhetoric to be.

Polus/ I ask, then, and do you answer, what division it is.

Socrates/ Will you understand me when I answer? For rhetoric, in my opinion, is a semblance of a division of the political art.

Polus/ What then? Do you say that it is beautiful, or base?

Socrates/ Base, I say; for I call evil things base: since I must answer you, as now knowing what I mean.

Gorgias/ By Zeus, Socrates, but I do not myself understand what you mean.

Socrates/ Very likely, Gorgias: for I have not yet spoken clearly. But Polus here is young and hasty.

Gorgias/ But leave him alone; and tell me in what way you say that rhetoric is a semblance of a division of the political art.

Socrates/ I will endeavor to tell you what rhetoric appears to me to be. And if it is not such as I describe it, Polus here will confute me. Do you not call body something, and soul something?

Gorgias/ How not?

Socrates/ Do you not, then, think that there is a certain good habit of each of these?

Gorgias/ I do.

Socrates/ What then? an apparent good habit, which is not really so? for instance, to explain my meaning, many appear to have a good constitution of body, whom no one but a physician, and a teacher in gymnastics, could easily perceive not to have a good constitution.

Gorgias/ You say truly.

Socrates/ I say that there is something of this kind both in the body and in the soul, which causes the body and the soul to appear to be in a good condition, when they are anything but so.

Gorgias/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ Come now, if I can, I will explain to you more clearly what I mean. As there are two subject matters, I say there are two arts: and that which relates to the soul I call political, but that which relates to the body I am not able to describe to you off-hand by one name; but of the culture of the body, which is one, I say there are two divisions, one gymnastics, the other medicine. But in the political art I lay down legislation, as corresponding to gymnastics, and the judicial to medicine. Now these respectively communicate with each other, as being concerned about the same subject, medicine with gymnastics, and the judicial art with legislation; yet they in some respect differ from each other. These then being four, and always taking the best possible care, the former of the body, and the latter of the soul,

flattery perceiving this, I do not say knowing, but sagaciously guessing it, and having divided itself fourfold, and having stealthily put on the garb of each of these divisions, feigns itself to be that which it has put on; and it is not in the least concerned for what is best; but by means of that which is most pleasant, captivates and seduces ignorance, so as to appear to be of great value. Cookery, therefore, puts on the garb of medicine, and pretends that it knows the aliment best for the body. So that if a cook and a physician had to contend before boys, or before men as foolish as boys, which of the two was acquainted with good and bad aliments, the physician or the cook, the physician would die of hunger. This, then, I call flattery; and I say that a thing of this kind is base, Polus, for I say this to you, because it looks to what is agreeable without regard to what is best; and I affirm that it is not an art, but skill, because it has no knowledge of the things which it employs, what they severally are in their nature, so that it is unable to tell the use of each. But I do not call that an art which is a thing without reason. If you are doubtful about these things, I am willing to give you a reason for them. The flattery, then, pertaining to cookery, as I have said, is concealed under medicine; and in the same manner, under gymnastics, personal decoration, which is mischievous, deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal, deceiving by means of gestures and colors, by smoothness and outward appearance; so as to make men put on an adventitious beauty, and neglect that which is their own, and is acquired by gymnastics. That I may not, then, be prolix, I wish to tell you, after the manner of geometricians, for perhaps you can now follow me, that what personal decoration is to gymnastics, that is cookery to medicine: or rather thus, that what personal decoration is to gymnastics, that is sophistry to legislation, and that what cookery is to medicine, that is rhetoric to justice. As I have

said, they are thus different in their nature: but as they are proximate to each other, sophists and rhetoricians are confounded with *legislators and judges*, and are employed about the same things, and know not what to make of themselves, nor other men of them. For, if the soul did not preside over the body, but the body over itself, and cookery and medicine were not examined into and distinguished by the soul, but the body itself decided, estimating things by its own gratifications, that tenet of Anaxagoras would prevail extensively, friend Polus, for you surely are acquainted with it, that is, all things would be confounded together, things medicinal, and healthy, and pertaining to cookery, being undistinguished from each other. You have heard, therefore, what I consider rhetoric to be, corresponding to cookery in the soul, as that in the body. Perhaps, however, I have acted absurdly, in that, though I do not allow you to make a long speech, I myself have extended mine to a great length. But I deserve to be pardoned: for when I spoke briefly you did not understand me, nor were you able to make use of the answer that I gave you, but required an explanation. If, therefore, when you answer, I in my turn shall not know what to make of it, do you also prolong your discourse: but, if I do know, suffer me to do so; for that is fair. And now, if you can make any use of this answer, do so.

Polus/ What do you say, then? Does rhetoric appear to you to be flattery?

Socrates/ I said, indeed, that it was a division of flattery. But do not you remember, Polus, though so young? What will you do by and by?

Polus/ Does it seem to you, then, that good rhetoricians are to be esteemed as vile flatterers in cities?

Socrates/ Do you ask this as a question, or are you beginning an argument?

Polus/ I ask a question.

Socrates/ They appear to me to be of no estimation at all.

Polus/ How to be of no estimation? Have they not the greatest power in cities?

Socrates/ Not, if you mean that to have power is a good to him who possesses it.

Polus/ But I do say so.

Socrates/ In that case, rhetoricians appear to me to possess the least power of all men in cities.

Polus/ But what? do they not, like tyrants, slay whomever they please, and deprive of their property, and banish from cities whomever they think fit?

Socrates/ By the dog, Polus, I am doubtful with respect to each of the things you say, whether you assert these things yourself, and declare your own opinion, or ask me.

Polus/ I ask you.

Socrates/ Be it so, my friend. Then you ask me two questions at once.

Polus/ How two?

Socrates/ Did you not just now say, that rhetoricians, like tyrants, slay whomever they please, and deprive them of their property, and banish from cities whomever they think fit?

Polus/ I did.

Socrates/ I say, then, that these are two questions, and I will give you an answer to both. For I affirm, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants have very little power in cities, as I just now said: for they do scarcely anything that they wish, though they do what to them appears to be best.

Polus/ Is not this, then, to possess great power?

Socrates/ It is not, at least as Polus says.

Polus/ I say not? On the contrary, I say it is.

Socrates/ By Zeus, not you. For you said that to have great power is a good to him who possesses it.

Polus/ And I repeat it.

Socrates/ Do you think, then, it is a good for anyone to do what appears to him to be best, when he is void of understanding? And do you call this to possess great power?

Polus/ Not I.

Socrates/ Prove, therefore, that rhetoricians are possessed of understanding, and that rhetoric is an art, and not flattery, if you mean to confute me. But, if you will leave me unconfuted, rhetoricians and tyrants, who do in cities whatever they please, will derive no good from thence. Power is, as you say, good; but to do, without understanding, whatever one pleases, you yourself admit is an evil. Is it not so?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ How then can rhetoricians or tyrants have great power in cities, unless Socrates is persuaded by Polus to admit that they do what they wish?

Polus/ What a strange man!

Socrates/ I deny that they do what they wish: but confute me.

Polus/ Did you not just now admit that they do what appears to them to be best?

Socrates/ And I now admit it.

Polus/ They do, therefore, what they wish.

Socrates/ I deny it.

Polus/ But they do what appears best to them?

Socrates/ I grant it.

Polus/ You speak absurdly and monstrously, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do not accuse me, most excellent Polus, that I may address you in your own style; but, if you have any other question to ask me, show that I am deceived; if not, do you answer me.

Polus/ I am willing to answer, in order that I may know what you mean.

Socrates/ Whether, then, do men appear to you to wish the thing that they do from time to time, or that for the sake of which they do the thing that they do? As for instance, do those who drink medicine from physicians appear to you to wish the thing that they do, viz., to drink the medicine, and suffer pain, or do they wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine?

Polus/ It is clear they wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine.

Socrates/ In like manner those who sail on the sea, and those who carry on any other commercial business, do not wish the thing that they do from time to time: for who wishes to sail and to encounter danger, and to be harassed with business; but the object for which they sail is to acquire riches; for they sail for the sake of riches.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not so then in all cases? whosoever does anything for the sake of something else, does not wish the thing that he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is there anything in the world, then, that is not either good or evil, or between these, neither good nor evil?

Polus/ It must needs be so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you not admit then, that wisdom, and health, and riches, and other things of the same kind, are good, but their contraries evil?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ By the things that are neither good nor evil do you not mean such as sometimes partake of good, sometimes of evil, and sometimes of neither, as to sit, to walk, to run, and to sail, and again, stones, wood, and other things of the same kind? Are not these the things that you mean? Or do you call certain other things neither good nor evil?

Polus/ No, but these.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, do men, when they do these intermediate things, do them for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the intermediate.

Polus/ The intermediate, surely, for the sake of the good.

Socrates/ Pursuing the good, therefore, we both walk when we walk, thinking it better, and, on the contrary, we stand when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, viz., the good. Is it not so?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do we not, therefore, if we slay anyone, slay, or banish, or deprive him of his possessions, thinking that it is better for us to do so than not?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ They, therefore, who do these things do them all for the sake of good.

Polus/ I allow it.

Socrates/ Are we not agreed, then, that we do not wish those things which we do for the sake of something else, but that for the sake of which we do them?

Polus/ By all means.

Socrates/ We do not, then, wish simply to slay, or banish from cities, or deprive anyone of his possessions; but if these things are useful we wish to do them, but if they are hurtful

we do not wish to do them. For we wish, as you admit, things that are good, but we do not wish such as are neither good nor evil, nor such as are evil. Is it not so? Do I seem to you, Polus, to speak the truth, or not? Why do you not answer?

Polus/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Since then we are agreed on these things, if anyone slays, banishes from a city, or deprives another of his possessions, whether he is a tyrant or a rhetorician, thinking that it is better for him so to do, though it is really worse, he surely does what seems fit to him: is it not so?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does he, then, do what he wishes, if these things are really evil? Why do you not answer?

Polus/ He does not appear to me to do what he wishes.

Socrates/ Is it possible, then, that such a man can have great power in the supposed city, if, according to your admission, to have great power is a good?

Polus/ It is not possible.

Socrates/ I spoke truly, then, when I said that it is possible for a man to do what he pleases in a city, and yet not have great power, nor do what he wishes.

Polus/ As if, Socrates, you yourself would not like to be allowed to do what you please in a city, rather than not, and would not be envious when you saw anyone either slaying whom he pleased, or taking away his possessions, or putting him in bonds.

Socrates/ Do you mean justly or unjustly?

Polus/ Whichever he should do, is he not in either case to be envied?

Socrates/ Good words, I pray you, Polus.

Polus/ But why?

Socrates/ Because it is not right, either to envy those that are not to be envied, or the wretched; but to pity them.

Polus/ What say you? Does such appear to you to be the case with the men of whom I am speaking?

Socrates/ How can it be otherwise?

Polus/ Does he, then, who slays whom he pleases, slaying him justly, appear to you to be wretched, and an object of pity?

Socrates/ Not at all; nor indeed is he to be envied.

Polus/ Did you not say just now that he was wretched?

Socrates/ I said, my friend, that he is wretched who slays another unjustly, and more than that, to be pitied; but that he who slays another justly is not to be envied.

Polus/ He surely who dies unjustly is to be pitied, and is wretched.

Socrates/ Less so, Polus, than he who slays him; and less than he who dies justly?

Polus/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ Thus; because to act unjustly is the greatest of evils.

Polus/ But is this really the greatest of evils? Is it not a greater evil to suffer unjustly?

Socrates/ By no means.

Polus/ Had you, then, rather suffer unjustly than act unjustly?

Socrates/ I should wish neither of these: but if I must necessarily either act unjustly or suffer unjustly, I should choose rather to suffer unjustly than to act unjustly.

Polus/ Would you not, then, consent to be a tyrant?

Socrates/ I would not, if by being a tyrant you mean the same that I do.

Polus/ I mean by it what I just now said, to have the power to do in a city whatever one pleases; to slay and banish, and do everything according to one's own pleasure.

Socrates/ My excellent friend, attend to what I say, and confute me if you can. If, when the forum is full, I should take a dagger under my arm, and say to you, Polus, a certain wonderful power and tyranny has just now fallen to my lot: for, if it seems fit to me that anyone of these men whom you see ought immediately to die, he shall die; and if it seems fit to me that anyone of them ought to have his head broken, he shall immediately have it broken; or if that his garment should be torn to pieces, it shall be torn to pieces: so great is the power I possess in the city. And if, on your disbelieving me, I should show you the dagger, perhaps, on seeing it, you would say: According to this, Socrates, all men may have great power, since any house that you please might be burnt in this way, and even the dock-yards of the Athenians, and the triremes, and all the shipping, as well public as private. But surely this is not to possess great power, to do whatever one pleases: do you think so?

Polus/ Certainly not in this way.

Socrates/ Can you tell me, then, why you blame a power of this kind?

Polus/ I can.

Socrates/ Why then? tell me.

Polus/ Because it must needs be that one who acts thus should be punished.

Socrates/ But is not the being punished an evil?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Therefore, my excellent friend, to have great power appears to you to be, when advantage attends one's doing what one pleases, and then it is a good; and this, as it seems, is to have great power; but if not, it is an evil, and to

have little power. Let us consider this too. Are we not agreed that it is sometimes better to do the things which we just now spoke of, to slay, to banish men, and deprive them of their property, and sometimes not?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ This, then, as it seems, is agreed on both by you and me?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ When, then, do you say it is better to do these things? Tell me what limit you establish?

Polus/ Do you, Socrates, answer this question.

Socrates/ I say, then, Polus, since it is more agreeable to you to hear it from me, when anyone does these things justly, it is better, but when unjustly, it is worse.

Polus/ Forsooth, it is difficult to confute you, Socrates! but could not even a child convince you that you do not speak the truth?

Socrates/ I should be very much obliged to the child, and equally so to you, if you can confute me, and free me from my extravagances. But be not weary in obliging a man who is your friend, but confute me.

Polus/ However, Socrates, there is no need to confute you by ancient examples. For things that have recently happened are sufficient to confute you, and to prove that many men who have acted unjustly are happy.

Socrates/ What are these?

Polus/ Do you not see, for instance, this Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, ruler of Macedonia?

Socrates/ If not, at all events I hear of him.

Polus/ Does he appear to you to be happy or miserable?

Socrates/ I do not know, Polus: for I have never yet had any intercourse with him.

Polus/ What then? if you had intercourse with him, should you know? And do you not know otherwise, from the circumstances of the case, that he is happy?

Socrates/ By Zeus, certainly not.

Polus/ It is evident then, Socrates, you will say, that you do not even know whether the great king is happy?

Socrates/ And I should say the truth. For I do not know what his state is with regard to enlightenment and justice.

Polus/ What? Does all happiness consist in this?

Socrates/ In my opinion, Polus. For I say that an honest and good man or woman is happy; but an unjust and wicked one is miserable.

Polus/ This Archelaus, then, is miserable, according to your account?

Socrates/ At least, my friend, if he is unjust.

Polus/ But how can he be otherwise than unjust, who had no right to the empire which he now possesses, as he was born of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas, and according to justice was the slave of Alcetas, and, if he had wished to do what is just, would have served Alcetas as a slave, and would have been happy, according to your account? whereas now he has become wonderfully miserable, since he has committed the greatest injustice. For, first of all, having sent for this his master and uncle, as if he would restore the government which Perdiccas had taken from him, and having entertained and intoxicated both him and his son Alexander, his own cousin, and nearly his equal in age, he forced them into a carriage, and having carried them off by night, had their throats cut and made away with them both. And after he had committed these wrongs, he was not aware that he had become most miserable, and did not repent, but shortly afterwards, he did not wish to become happy by nurturing his legitimate

brother, the son of Perdiccas, a child about seven years of age, to whom the government of right belonged, and by restoring it to him; but having thrown him into a well, and suffocated him, he told his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in in pursuing a goose, and so met with his death. Wherefore since he has committed the greatest wrongs of all in Macedonia, he is the most miserable of all the Macedonians, and not the most happy. And perhaps there are some among the Athenians, beginning with you, who would rather be any other of the Macedonians than Archelaus.

Socrates/ At the beginning of our conference, Polus, I praised you, because you appeared to me to be well instructed in rhetoric, though you had neglected the art of dialectics. And now, what else is this reasoning, by which even a child could confute me, and I, as you suppose, am now confuted by this reasoning of yours, when I said that a man who acts unjustly is not happy? How so, my friend? For I do not grant you anyone of the things you assert.

Polus/ Because you are not willing to do so; though it appears to you as I say.

Socrates/ My excellent friend, you attempt to confute me rhetorically, like those who think they confute their adversaries in courts of justice. For there some fancy they confute others when they produce many reputable witnesses in favor of what they say, whereas the adverse party produces someone only, or none at all. But this mode of confutation is worth nothing with reference to truth. For sometimes a man may be borne down by the false testimony of many witnesses who seem to be somewhat. And now, with respect to what you say, almost all the Athenians and strangers will agree with you, and if you wish to produce witnesses against me to prove that I do not speak the truth, there will testify for you, if you wish it, Nicias, son of

Niceratus, and his brothers with him, who gave the tripods that stand in a row in the temple of Bacchus; or again, if you wish it, Aristocrates, son of Scellius, who gave that beautiful offering in the temple of Pythian Apollo; or if you wish it, the whole house of Pericles, or any other family, that you may think proper to choose out of this city. But I, who am but one, do not agree with you. For you do not convince me by arguments, but producing many false witnesses against me, you endeavor to eject me from my substance and the truth. But I, unless I shall be able to adduce you, who are one, as a witness agreeing with what I say, shall think that I have accomplished nothing worthy of mention with respect to the subject of our discussion; nor shall I think that you have done so, unless I, being one, alone testify for you, and you dismiss all those others. This, then, is one mode of refutation, as you and many others think: but there is also another mode, which, on the contrary, I adopt. Let us, therefore, compare them with each other, and consider whether they differ at all from one another. For the matters about which we differ are by no means trifling; but they are indeed such as to know which is most honorable, and not to know most disgraceful, for the sum of them is to know, or to be ignorant, who is happy, and who is not. For instance, in the first place, with respect to the subject of our present discussion, you think it possible that a man may be happy who acts unjustly and is unjust; since you think that Archelaus, though unjust, is happy. Must we not suppose that such is your opinion?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But I say it is impossible. On this one point, then, we differ.

Polus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ But will he who acts unjustly be happy if he meet with justice and is punished?

Polus/ By no means, for in that case he would be most miserable.

Socrates/ If, therefore, he who acts unjustly does not meet with the punishment he deserves, according to your account he will be happy.

Polus/ So I say.

Socrates/ But, according to my opinion, Polus, he who acts unjustly, and is unjust, is in every way miserable; though more miserable if he does not suffer punishment, and does not meet with chastisement for his unjust actions; but less miserable if he suffers punishment, and meets with his just deserts both from gods and men.

Polus/ You attempt, Socrates, to advance strange paradoxes.

Socrates/ Yet I shall endeavor, my friend, to make you say the same things as I do: for I consider you as a friend. Now, then, the things about which we differ are these: and do you also consider. I said in a former part of our discussion, that to commit an injustice is worse than to suffer one.

Polus/ Just so.

Socrates/ But you say it is worse to suffer an injustice.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And I said that they who act unjustly are miserable, and was confuted by you.

Polus/ You were so, by Zeus.

Socrates/ At least as you think, Polus.

Polus/ And I probably thought the truth.

Socrates/ But you, on the contrary, said that they who act unjustly are happy, if they do not suffer punishment.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But I say that they are most miserable; and that they who suffer punishment are less so. Do you wish to refute this also?

Polus/ But this is more difficult to refute than the former, Socrates.

Socrates/ By no means, Polus, but it is impossible; for truth can never be refuted.

Polus/ How say you? If a man should be detected acting unjustly, as in attempting to compass absolute power, and being detected should be put to the torture, be mutilated, and have his eyes burnt out, and after having himself suffered many other great and various torments, and having moreover seen his children and wife suffer the same, should at last be crucified, or covered with pitch and burnt, will he be more happy, than if, having escaped punishment, he should become a tyrant, and ruling in the city, should pass through life doing whatever he pleases, being envied, and accounted happy, both by citizens and strangers? Do you say that it is impossible to refute these things?

Socrates/ You are now trying to terrify me, noble Polus, and do not refute me; but just now you adduced witnesses. However, remind me of a trifling circumstance; did you say, if a person should attempt unjustly to compass absolute power?

Polus/ I did.

Socrates/ In that case, neither of them will ever be happier than the other, neither he who has unjustly acquired absolute power, nor he who has been punished. For, of two miserable persons, one cannot be happier than the other; but he is more miserable who escapes punishment and acquires absolute power. What is this, Polus? do you

laugh? Is this another species of refutation, when anyone asserts anything, to laugh at him, and not refute him?

Polus/ Do you not think you are already refuted, Socrates, when you say such things as no man in the world would assert? for ask anyone of these.

Socrates/ Polus, I am not among the number of politicians: and last year, happening to be chosen a senator, since my tribe held the presidency and it was necessary for me to collect the votes, I occasioned laughter, because I did not know how to collect them. Do not, then, require me to collect the votes of those who are present. But if you have no better mode of refutation than this, as I just now said, give the question up to me in my turn, and make trial of that mode of refutation which I think ought to be adopted. For I know how to procure one witness of what I say, that is, the person with whom I am discoursing, but I let alone the multitude; and I know how to take the vote of one person, but I do not even discourse with the multitude. Consider, then, whether you are willing in your turn to give me an opportunity of refuting by answering the questions I shall put to you. For I think, that you and I, and other men, are of opinion, that to commit injustice is worse than to suffer it; and not to be punished, than to be punished.

Polus/ But I, on the contrary, think that neither myself nor any other man is of this opinion. For would you rather suffer injustice than commit it?

Socrates/ Yes, and you, and all other men.

Polus/ Far from it; neither would you, nor I, nor any other man.

Socrates/ Will you not answer, then?

Polus/ By all means. For I am anxious to know what you will say.

Socrates/ Tell me then, that you may know, as if I asked you from the beginning: whether does it appear to you, Polus, worse to commit an injustice or to suffer one?

Polus/ To suffer one, in my opinion.

Socrates/ What then? whether is it more base to commit an injustice or to suffer one? Answer me.

Polus/ To commit an injustice.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, worse, since it is more base?

Polus/ By no means.

Socrates/ I understand. You do not think, as it seems, that the beautiful and the good, and the evil and the base, are the same?

Polus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But what do you say to this? Beautiful things in general, such as bodies, colors, forms, sounds, and pursuits, do you call them severally beautiful, without reference to anything else? As, for instance, first of all, with respect to beautiful bodies, do you not say that they are beautiful, on account of their usefulness, in reference to the particular thing for which each is useful, or on account of some pleasure, if in being seen they give delight to the beholders? Have you anything else besides this to say respecting beauty of body?

Polus/ I have not.

Socrates/ Do you not, then, denominate all other things in the same manner beautiful, such as forms and colors, either on account of some pleasure, or utility, or both?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ And is not the case the same as to sounds, and everything that relates to music?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And moreover, with respect to laws and pursuits, they surely are beautiful, for no other reason except that they are either useful, or pleasant, or both?

Polus/ So it appears to me.

Socrates/ And is it not the same with the beauty of the sciences?

Polus/ Certainly. And now, Socrates, you define beautifully, in defining the beautiful by pleasure and good.

Socrates/ Must not, therefore, the base be defined by the contrary, by pain and evil?

Polus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ When, therefore, of two beautiful things, one is more beautiful than the other, it is more beautiful because it excels in one or both of these, either in pleasure, or utility, or both.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when of two things one is more base than the other, it must be more base because it exceeds in pain or evil: is not this necessarily so?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Come then; what did we say just now respecting committing injustice and suffering it? Did you not say that to suffer injustice is more evil, but to commit it, more base?

Polus/ I did say so.

Socrates/ Therefore, since it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it, it must be more base because it is more painful and exceeds in pain, or evil, or both. Is not this also necessary?

Polus/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ First, then, let us consider whether to commit injustice exceeds in pain the suffering it; and whether they

who commit injustice feel greater pain than they who suffer it.

Polus/ This is by no means the case, Socrates.

Socrates/ It does not, then, exceed in pain?

Polus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Therefore, if it does not exceed in pain, it will no longer exceed in both.

Polus/ It appears not.

Socrates/ It remains, therefore, that it exceeds in the other.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ In the evil.

Polus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, to commit injustice exceeds in evil, it must be more evil than to suffer injustice.

Polus/ Evidently so.

Socrates/ Was it not admitted by men in general, and by you to me formerly, that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, however, it appears to be worse.

Polus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Would you, then, rather choose that which is worse and more base, than that which is less so? Do not hesitate to answer, Polus, for you will not be injured by so doing, but answer, giving yourself up generously to the discussion as to a physician; and either admit or deny the question I ask.

Polus/ Then I should not rather choose it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Would any other man in the world?

Polus/ To me it appears not, according to what has been said.

Socrates/ I therefore said truly, that neither you, nor I, nor any other man in the world, would rather choose to commit injustice than to suffer it; for it is worse to do so.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ You see then, Polus, that my mode of proof when compared with your mode of proof, does not at all resemble it; but all others agree with you, except myself. For my part you alone are sufficient for my purpose, agreeing with me and testifying for me; and I, having asked your opinion only, disregard that of others. Let this then be settled between us. And next, let us proceed to consider that which we doubted about in the second place, viz. whether it is the greatest of evils for one who has committed injustice to be punished, as you thought, or whether it is not a greater evil not to be punished, as I thought. And let us consider it thus: To suffer punishment and to be justly chastised, when one has committed injustice, do you not call the same thing?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ Can you say, then, that all just things are not beautiful, so far as they are just? When you have well considered, answer me.

Polus/ It appears to me that they are, Socrates.

Socrates/ Consider this also: When a man does anything, must there not necessarily be something which is passive to him as an agent?

Polus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ And does not the patient suffer what the agent does, and just such a thing as the agent does? I mean in this way: If anyone strikes, is it not necessary that something should be struck?

Polus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ And if the striker strikes hard or swiftly, must not the thing struck be stricken accordingly?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ That which is struck, then, undergoes a passion corresponding to that which the striker does.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ In like manner, if anyone burns, is it not necessary that something should be burnt?

Polus/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ And if he burns vehemently or painfully, that which is burnt must be burnt according as the burner burns?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So, if anyone cuts anything, is not the reasoning the same? for something is cut.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if the cut is large or deep, or painful, that which is cut is cut with such a cut as the cutter cuts.

Polus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ In a word, then, see if you grant what I just now said respecting everything, viz., that according as the agent does, so the patient suffers.

Polus/ I do grant it.

Socrates/ These things, then, being agreed on, whether is the being punished, to suffer, or to do something?

Polus/ Necessarily, Socrates, it is to suffer.

Socrates/ Must it not, therefore, be by some agent?

Polus/ Undoubtedly: by him who chastises.

Socrates/ But does not he who chastises rightly, chastise justly?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Doing what is just, or not?

Polus/ What is just.

Socrates/ Then, does not he who is chastised, when he is deservedly punished, suffer justly?

Polus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But what is just has been acknowledged to be beautiful.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Of these, then, the one does, and the other, he that is chastised, suffers that which is beautiful.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if beautiful, then good; for *that which is beautiful* is either pleasant or useful.

Polus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ He therefore who is punished suffers that which is good.

Polus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ He is therefore benefited.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it with such a benefit as I suppose? Does he become better as to his soul, since he is chastised justly?

Polus/ That is probable.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who is punished is freed from a vice of the soul.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is he not freed, then, from the greatest evil? Consider the matter thus: in the condition of a man's property do you perceive any other evil than poverty?

Polus/ No other than poverty.

Socrates/ Well, in the constitution of the body? would you say that weakness, disease, deformity, and the like, are evils?

Polus/ I should.

Socrates/ Do you not think, too, that there is a certain depravity in the soul?

Polus/ How otherwise?

Socrates/ Do you not then call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and the like?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Have you not said, then, that of these three, property, body, and soul, there are three corresponding evils, poverty, disease, injustice?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then which of these evils is the most base? Is it not injustice, and, in a word, the depravity of the soul?

Polus/ By far.

Socrates/ But, if it is most base, then is it not also the worst?

Polus/ How mean you, Socrates?

Socrates/ Thus. In every case, that which is most base is so because, from what has been before admitted, it occasions the greatest pain, or harm, or both.

Polus/ By all means.

Socrates/ But injustice and the whole depravity of the soul, have been just now admitted by us to be most base.

Polus/ They have been so admitted.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, the most troublesome and most base of these *depravities*, because it exceeds either in troublesomeness or hurtfulness, or both?

Polus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Is then the being unjust, intemperate, cowardly, and ignorant, more painful than to be poor and diseased?

Polus/ It does not appear so to me, Socrates, from what has been said.

Socrates/ The depravity of the soul, then, is the most base of all, because it exceeds the others by some extraordinarily great harm and wonderful evil, since, according to your argument, it is not exceeded in painfulness.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But, surely, that which exceeds in the greatest harmfulness must be the greatest evil of all?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then injustice, intemperance, and the other depravities of the soul, are the greatest evils of all.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ What art, then, frees from poverty? Is it not that of money-making?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ What, from disease? Is it not the medicinal?

Polus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ What, from depravity and injustice? If in this way you cannot readily answer, consider it thus: whither, and to whom, do we take those that are diseased in body?

Polus/ To physicians, Socrates.

Socrates/ Whether those who act unjustly, and are intemperate?

Polus/ Do you mean, to the judges?

Socrates/ Is it not, then, that they may be punished?

Polus/ I grant it.

Socrates/ Do not then those who chastise rightly chastise by employing a certain justice?

Polus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ The art of money-making, therefore, frees from poverty, medicine from disease, and justice from intemperance and injustice.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Which of these, therefore, is the most beautiful?

Polus/ Of what are you speaking?

Socrates/ The art of money-making, medicine, and justice.

Polus/ Justice, Socrates, is far superior.

Socrates/ Does it not, then, produce the greatest pleasure, or utility, or both, since it is the most beautiful?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it, then, pleasant to be under the care of a physician? and do they who are under such charge rejoice?

Polus/ It does not appear so to me.

Socrates/ But it is useful. Is it not?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ For they are freed from a great evil; so that it is advantageous to endure pain and be restored to health.

Polus/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ Would the man then, thus be most happy with respect to his body who is under the care of a physician, or who is not diseased at all?

Polus/ Clearly he that is not diseased.

Socrates/ For this is not happiness, as it seems, the being freed from evil; but the never possessing it at all.

Polus/ It is so.

Socrates/ But what? Of two men that have evil, either in body or soul, which is the more miserable, he that is under the care of a physician, and is freed from the evil, or he that is not under the care of a physician, and retains the evil?

Polus/ It appears to me, he that is not under the care of a physician.

Socrates/ And is not punishment the being freed from the greatest evil, depravity?

Polus/ It is.

Socrates/ For justice produces a sound mind, makes men more just, and becomes the medicine of depravity?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ He, then, is most happy who has no vice in his soul, since this is proved to be the greatest of evils.

Polus/ It is evident.

Socrates/ The second, surely, is he who is freed from it.

Polus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But this is he who is admonished, reproved, and punished.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ He, therefore, lives worst, who is afflicted with injustice, and is not freed from it.

Polus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Is not, then, he one who, having committed the greatest injustice, and employing the greatest injustice, contrives that he may be neither admonished, nor chastised, nor punished, as you said was the case with Archelaus, and other tyrants, rhetoricians, and powerful men?

Polus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ For these, my excellent friend, have managed much the same as one who being afflicted with the worst

diseases should contrive not to have his bodily maladies corrected or subjected to medical treatment, fearing, as if he were a child, to be burnt and cut, because these operations are painful. Does it not appear so to you?

Polus/ It does.

Socrates/ Being ignorant, as it seems, of what health is, and a good habit of the body. Now from what we have just agreed on, Polus, those who flee from punishment appear to do something of this kind; they look to the pain attending it, but are blind to its utility, and are ignorant how much more miserable than an unhealthy body it is to dwell with an unhealthy soul, that is corrupt, unjust, and impious. Whence they do everything that they may not be punished, nor freed from the greatest evil, procuring for themselves riches and friends, and the power of speaking as persuasively as possible. But if we have agreed on what is true, Polus, do you perceive what consequences result from our discourse? do you wish that we should draw the conclusions from them?

Polus/ I do, unless you think otherwise.

Socrates/ Does it not follow that injustice and to act unjustly is the greatest evil?

Polus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And to suffer punishment was proved to be a means of freedom from this evil.

Polus/ It appears to be so.

Socrates/ But not to suffer punishment is a continuance of the evil.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ To act unjustly, therefore, is the second of evils in magnitude; but to act unjustly and not to suffer punishment is the greatest and chief of all evils.

Polus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Was not this the point, my friend, with respect to which we differed, you considering Archelaus happy, for that having committed the greatest injustice he suffers no punishment; but I on the contrary thinking, that whether Archelaus, or any other man whatever, is not punished when he commits injustice, he must needs be far more wretched than all other men, and that he who commits injustice is ever more wretched than he who suffers it, and he that is not punished than he that is. Are not these the things that I said?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And has it not been demonstrated that they were said truly?

Polus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Well then, if these things are true, Polus, what is the great utility of rhetoric? For, from what has been now agreed on, everyone ought especially to beware of acting unjustly, for that, if he does so act, he will sustain great evil. Is it not so?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if a man has committed injustice, either himself, or anyone else for whom he has regard, he ought of his own accord to betake himself thither, where as soon as possible he will be punished, to a judge as to a physician, taking every pains lest the disease of injustice becoming inveterate should render the soul corrupt and incurable; or what must we say, Polus, if our former admissions are to stand? Do not these things necessarily harmonize with the former in this, but in no other way?

Polus/ For what else can we say, Socrates?

Socrates/ For the purpose, then, of excusing injustice, our own, or that of our parents, or friends, or children, or

country, when it acts unjustly, rhetoric is of no use to us at all, Polus, unless on the contrary, anyone supposes that he ought especially to accuse himself, and afterwards his relatives, and any other of his friends, who may have acted unjustly, and not conceal the crime, but bring it to light, in order that he may be punished, and restored to health; moreover, that he should compel both himself and the others to lay aside fear, and with his eyes shut, and in a manly way, deliver himself up, as to a physician, to be cut and cauterized, pursuing the good and the beautiful, without paying any regard to what is painful; if he has committed a wrong worthy of stripes, delivering himself up to be beaten, if of bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to pay it, if of exile, to be banished, if of death, to die, being himself the first accuser of himself, and others his relatives, not sparing either himself or them, but employing rhetoric for this very purpose, that, the crimes being exposed, they may be freed from the greatest of evils, injustice. Shall we say thus, Polus, or not?

Polus/ These things appear to me, Socrates, to be absurd; but it must be admitted, they accord with what was before said.

Socrates/ Must not, therefore, either our former conclusions be done away with, or these results necessarily follow?

Polus/ Yes; such is the case.

Socrates/ Contrariwise, if it is requisite to do ill to anyone, whether to an enemy, or any other person, provided only that he is not himself injured by his enemy; for this is to be guarded against; but if an enemy injures another, we should endeavor by all possible means, both by actions and words, that he may not be punished, nor brought before a judge: but, if he is brought before him, we should contrive so that

our enemy may escape, and not suffer punishment: and if he has robbed us of a great quantity of gold, that he should not restore it, but should retain it and spend it on himself and his associates unjustly and impiously; and if he has committed an injustice worthy of death, we should contrive that he may not die, if possible never, but that he may be immortal in depravity, or if this cannot be, that he may live in this state for as long a period as possible. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric appears to me to be useful, since to him who does not intend to act unjustly, its utility does not appear to me to be great, if indeed it is of any utility at all, as in the former part of our discussion it appeared in no respect to be.

Callicles/ Tell me, Chærephon, does Socrates say these things seriously, or is he jesting?

Chaerephon/ He appears to me, Callicles, to speak most seriously; but there is nothing like asking him himself.

Callicles/ You are right, by the gods, and I desire to do it. Tell me, Socrates, whether we must say that you are now speaking seriously, or jesting? For, if you are speaking seriously, and if what you say is true, is not our human life altogether subverted, and are not all our actions, as it seems, contrary to what they ought to be?

Socrates/ If there were not a certain passion, Callicles, common to men, to some, one, to others, another, but each of us had a peculiar passion different from others, it would not be easy for one to make known one's own affection to another. I speak thus because I perceive that you and I are now affected in the same manner; for, being two, we each of us love two things: I, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, and philosophy, you, the Demus of the Athenians, and the son of Pyrilampes. Now I continually perceive that you, eloquent as you are, are unable to contradict the objects of your love,

in whatever they may say, and in whatever manner they may assert a thing takes place, but you are changed by them upwards and downwards. For, in the assembly, if, when you say anything, the Athenian people say that it is not so, you, changing your opinion, say what they wish; and you are affected in the same manner towards that beautiful youth, the son of Pyrilampes; for you cannot bring yourself to oppose the wishes and discourses of the objects of your love: so that, if anyone, when from time to time you say what you do to please them, should wonder at its absurdity, perhaps you would say to him, if you wished to speak the truth, that unless someone shall cause the objects of your love to desist from such discourses, neither can you desist from saying what you do. Think, therefore, that you need to hear the like from me; and do not wonder that I speak thus, but cause philosophy, my favorite, to desist from speaking so. For, my dear friend, she always says what you now hear from me, and is much less fickle than my other loves. For the son of Clinias, here, says different things at different times; but philosophy always the same. And she says the things that you now wonder at; and you have just heard what she said. Either, therefore, confute her, as to what I just now said, and prove that to act unjustly, and when one has acted unjustly not to suffer punishment, is not the worst of all evils; or, if you suffer this to remain unconfuted, then, by the dog, the deity of the Egyptians, Callicles will not agree with you, but will differ from you, Callicles, through the whole of his life. However, I think, my excellent friend, that it would be better for me that my lyre should be out of tune and discordant, and the choir of which I might be the leader, and that most men should not agree with me, but oppose what I say, rather than that I, being one, should be discordant with and contradict myself.

Callicles/ You seem to me, Socrates, to act the boaster in your discourses, as being in truth a mob-orator: and now you thus declaim, since Polus has met with the same treatment as he objected Gorgias met with from you. For he said that Gorgias, when asked by you, whether if one should come to him, washing to learn rhetoric without being acquainted with justice, Gorgias would teach him, was ashamed, and said that he would teach him, on account of the custom among men, because they would be displeased if anyone were to refuse: and that from this admission Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, and you were delighted with this very circumstance; for which he then ridiculed you, as it appeared to me, very properly. And now he himself has in turn been treated the very same way; I, however, in this particular, do not commend Polus, because he has conceded to you, that to commit injustice is more base than to suffer it. For, from this admission, he being entangled by you in the discussion, has been brought to a check, because he was ashamed to say what he thought. For you in reality, Socrates, while you profess to be in search of truth, lead to such vulgar and popular things as these which are not beautiful by nature, but by law. For these are, for the most part, contrary to each other, nature and law. If anyone, therefore, is ashamed, and dares not say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself. And you, having perceived this subtle distinction, deal unfairly in the discussion; for, if anyone speaks of anything according to law, you cunningly ask him about it according to nature, and if he speaks of things according to nature, you ask him about them according to law; as just now in the present discussion, respecting committing injustice and suffering it. when Polus spoke of that which is more base according to nature, you followed up the law *as if it were* according to nature. For, by nature, everything is more base which is also

worse, as to suffer injustice, but by law to commit it. For to submit to injustice is not the condition of a man, but of a slave, to whom it is better to die than to live, since, being injured and disgraced, he is unable to defend himself or anyone else for whom he has regard. But I think, those who make the laws are the weak and the many: they, therefore, make laws with a view to themselves and their own advantage, and with the same view they bestow praise and impute blame; and to terrify such men as are stronger, and who are able to acquire more, that they may not acquire more than themselves, they say that it is base and unjust to obtain a superiority, and that to endeavor to acquire more than others is to commit injustice. For they are content, I think, if they, being weaker, have an equal portion. For this reason, therefore, by law it is said to be unjust and base to endeavor to possess more than the many, and they call this committing an injustice. But nature herself, I think, evinces, on the contrary, that it is just that the better should have more than the worse, and the more powerful than the weaker. And it is evident in many instances that it is so, both in other animals, and in whole cities and races of men, that the just is so settled that the superior should rule over the inferior, and possess more than they. For, with what justice did Xerxes make war upon Greece, or his father on the Scythians? or ten thousand other instances which one might adduce? But I think they do these things according to natural justice, and, by Zeus, according to the law of nature; not, perhaps, according to that law which we have framed, taking the best and strongest amongst us from their youth, like lions, we tame them by incantations and juggleries, telling them that it is right to preserve equality, and that this is the beautiful and the just. But, I think, if there should be a man found with sufficient natural power, having shaken off all these trammels, and broken through, and abandoned,

and trampled underfoot our written ordinances, and quackeries, and incantations, and laws contrary to nature, he, from being our slave, would rise up and prove himself our master; and then natural justice would shine forth. Pindar, too, appears to me to have declared what I now assert, in the ode in which he says that "law is the king of all, both mortals and immortals; and," he adds, "He with most powerful hand makes use of might, calling it right; and this I infer from the deeds of Hercules, since *he drove away the oxen of Geryon* unbought." He speaks pretty much in this manner; for I do not remember the ode by heart. He says, then, that Hercules drove away the oxen of Geryon, without having either bought them, or received them as a gift, as if this were naturally just, that both oxen, and all other possessions, when the property of the worse and inferior, belong to the better and superior. Such, then, is the truth; and you will know that it is so, if, dismissing philosophy, you betake yourself to greater things. For philosophy, Socrates, is an elegant thing, if one handles it moderately in youth; but if one dwells upon it longer than is becoming, it is the ruin of men. For if a man should have excellent abilities, and should study philosophy beyond the period of youth, he must necessarily become unskilled in all things in which he ought to be skilled, who desires to be a worthy, good, and distinguished man. For such men are unskilled in the laws of the city, and in those arguments which anyone must use, who is conversant with the business transactions of men, both privately and publicly: they are likewise altogether unskilled in human pleasures and desires, and, in short, in the manners of men. When, therefore, they engage in any private or public business, they make themselves ridiculous, just as, I think, politicians are ridiculous when they meddle with your disputations and arguments. For that saying of Euripides is verified: "Everyone shines in this, and to this

applies himself, consuming the greater part of the day in whatever he most excels." But that wherein a man is weak he avoids, and abuses it, and praises the other through self-love, thinking thereby to praise himself: but I think the most correct way is to partake of both. Of philosophy, indeed, so far as is requisite for education, it is well to partake, nor is it any disgrace for one who is young to study philosophy: but when a man who has reached an advanced age, still studies philosophy, Socrates, the thing becomes ridiculous; and I have very much the same feeling towards those who study philosophy, as to those who stammer and sport. For when I see a child whom it still becomes to talk thus stammering and sporting, I am delighted, and his conduct appears to me to be graceful and liberal, and suited to the age of a child. But when I hear a little boy talking with precision, it seems a disagreeable thing to me, and offends my ears, and appears to be somewhat servile. When, however, one hears a man stammering, or sees him sporting, it appears to be ridiculous, unmanly, and worthy of stripes. Now I have this same feeling towards those who study philosophy. For, when I see philosophy in a young man, I am delighted, and it appears to me becoming, and I consider such a man to be of a liberal mind, but if he does not study philosophy, I consider him illiberal, and one who will never think himself worthy of any noble or generous action. When, however, I see a man advanced in years still studying philosophy, and not having abandoned it, such a man, Socrates, appears to me to be deserving of stripes. For, as I just now said, such a man, even though he has excellent abilities, must needs become unmanly, by avoiding the public places of the city, and the forum, in which, as the poet says, men acquire celebrity, and by concealing himself from the public view, he passes the remainder of his life with three or four boys, whispering in a corner, but never utters anything liberal,

great, and becoming. But I, Socrates, am very friendly disposed towards you; and I seem to have the same feeling as Zethus towards Amphion in Euripides, whom I just now mentioned; for it occurs to me to say to you the same that he said to his brother: that you neglect, Socrates, what you ought to attend to, and strive to adorn the nature of a soul thus generous by a certain juvenile form; nor in deliberations of justice are you able to advance an argument correctly, nor lay hold of what is probable and persuasive, nor can you suggest vigorous advice for others. However, my dear Socrates, and do not be angry with me, for I speak out of good-will to you, does it not appear to you to be base to be in the state in which I think you are, and others who continually make too great advances in philosophy? For now, if anyone should arrest you, or any other of the same character, and should take you to prison, asserting that you had acted unjustly, when you had not, you are aware you would not know what to do for yourself; but you would lose your head and gape, and not have anything to say; and when you went into a court of justice, having met with a very vile and despicable accuser, you would die, if he chose to charge you capitally. And indeed, Socrates, how can this be wise, if any art meeting with a man of good natural ability renders him worse, and neither able to assist himself, nor preserve either himself or anyone else from the greatest dangers, but suffers him to be plundered of all his substance by enemies, and to live in the city utterly without honor? Such a man, if I may speak somewhat rudely, one may slap on the face with impunity. But, my friend, be persuaded by me, and give up confuting, cultivate harmony of conduct, and employ yourself in what will give you a reputation for wisdom, leaving to others these graceful subtleties, whether it is proper to call them frivolities, or fooleries, “by which you will come to dwell in an empty house and emulate, not men who

are able to confute these trifling things, but those who have wealth, renown, and many other goods.

Socrates/ If I happened to have a golden soul, Callicles, do you not think I should gladly find one of the best of those stones by which they test gold, to which applying it, if it should allow that my soul was well cultivated, I should then know for a certainty that I was in a good state, and that I had no further need of any other test?

Callicles/ Why do you ask this, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will now tell you. I think that in meeting with you, I have met with this good fortune.

Callicles/ Why so?

Socrates/ I well know, that if you agree with me in those things which my soul entertains, such things are the very truth. For I perceive that he who intends to examine sufficiently respecting his soul whether it lives uprightly or not, ought to possess three qualities, all which you do possess, viz., science, benevolence, and freedom of speech. For I meet with many who are not able to test me, through not being wise as you are; but others are wise, indeed, but are not willing to speak the truth to me, because they are not concerned about me as you are. Thus these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are indeed wise, and my friends, but they are deficient in freedom of speech, and are more bashful than is proper. For how should it be otherwise? since they have reached such a pitch of bashfulness that through shamefacedness each of them dares to contradict himself before many persons, and this on the most important subjects. You however possess all these qualities, which the others have not. For you are both well instructed, as many of the Athenians will affirm, and are well-disposed towards me. What proof do I use? I know, Callicles, that you four have studied wisdom together, you, Tisander the

Aphidnsean, Andron son of Androtion, and Nausicydes the Cholargean; and I once heard you deliberating how far wisdom ought to be cultivated, and I know that this opinion prevailed among you, that you should not endeavor to study philosophy with great accuracy; but you advised each other to be cautious, lest, by becoming more wise than is proper, you should destroy yourselves without perceiving it. Since, then, I hear you giving me the very same advice that you gave to your most intimate friends, it is to me a sufficient proof that you are really well-disposed towards me. Moreover, that you are able to speak boldly and not be ashamed, both yourself say, and the speech which you just now made, evinces. The case is evidently this, with reference to our present discussion; if you shall agree with me in anything, in our argument, that point will have been sufficiently examined by you and me, and it will be no longer necessary to put it to another test. For you would never have assented to it, either through deficiency of wisdom, or excess of bashfulness. Nor, again, would you have assented in order to deceive me: for you are my friend, as you have yourself said. In reality, therefore, your and my assent will have reached the perfect truth. But the most beautiful consideration of all, Callicles, with respect to the things about which you have reproved me, is that, viz., what kind of person a man ought to be, what he ought to study, and how far, both when he is advanced in life and when he is young. For, with respect to myself, if I do anything in my life not rightly, be assured that I do not err willingly, but through my own ignorance. Do you, therefore, as you have begun to advise me, not desist, but show me clearly what it is that I ought to study, and in what way I may accomplish it. And if you find me now assenting to you, but in time to come not doing the things to which I have assented, then consider me as utterly stupid, and thenceforth give me no more advice,

as being a man altogether worthless. But repeat it to me again from the beginning, how say you and Pindar is the case with natural justice? is it that the superior should take by force from the inferior, and that the better should rule over the worse, and that the more excellent should have more than the depraved? Do you say that the just is anything else than this? or do I remember rightly?

Callicles/ These things I said then, and I say now.

Socrates/ But do you call the same person better and superior? For I was not able at the time to understand you, what you meant: whether do you call the stronger superior, and must the weaker submit to the stronger; as you seemed to me to intimate when you said, that great cities attack little ones by natural justice, because they are superior and stronger; as if the superior, the stronger, and the better, were the same; or is it possible to be better, and at the same time inferior and weaker, and to be superior, but more depraved? or is there the same definition of the better and the superior? Define this clearly for me, are the superior, the better, and the stronger, the same, or different?

Callicles/ Then I tell you clearly, that they are the same.

Socrates/ Are not, then, the many by nature superior to one? since they establish laws for the one, as you just now said?

Callicles/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ The laws, then, of the many are those of such as are superior?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Therefore, of the better? For, according to your account, the superior are far better.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are not, then, their laws by nature beautiful, since they are superior?

Callicles/ I admit it.

Socrates/ Now do not the many think thus, as you just now said, that it is just to possess the equal, and that it is more base to injure than to be injured? Is this so, or not? And take care that you are not detected here in being shamefaced. Do the many think or not that to possess the equal, but not more, is just? and that it is more base to injure than to be injured? Do not refuse me an answer to this, Callicles, in order that, if you agree with me, I may be confirmed in my opinion by you, seeing that a man competent to decide has agreed with me.

Callicles/ The many, then, do think thus.

Socrates/ Not therefore by law only, but by nature also, it is more base to injure than to be injured, and just to possess the equal. So that you appear not to have spoken the truth before, nor to accuse me rightly, in saying that law and nature are contrary to each other, and that I, knowing this, deal unfairly in the discussion, if anyone speaks according to nature, by leading him to law, and if anyone speaks according to law, by leading him to nature.

Callicles/ This man will not cease trifling. Tell me, Socrates, are you not ashamed, at your age, to catch at words, and, if anyone makes a mistake in an expression to consider it an unexpected gain? For, do you think that by the superior I mean anything else than the better? Did I not tell you long since, that I consider the better and the superior to be the same? Do you suppose I mean, that if a crowd of slaves, and all sorts of men of no worth, except perhaps for bodily strength, should meet together, that what they should say would be legal institutions?

Socrates/ Be it so, most wise Callicles: is that your meaning?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But I, Sir, long since suspected that you meant some such thing by the superior; and therefore I repeat the question, desiring to understand clearly what you do mean; for you surely do not think that two are better than one nor that your slaves are better than you because they are stronger than you. Tell me then from the beginning whom you mean by the better, since you do not mean the stronger. And, my admirable friend, teach me in the outset in a milder manner, that I may not leave you.

Callicles/ You are bantering, Socrates.

Socrates/ By Zethus, no, Callicles, in whose name you just now bantered me a good deal. But come, tell me who do you mean are the better?

Callicles/ I mean the more excellent.

Socrates/ You see, then, that you yourself speak words, but explain nothing. Will you not tell me whether by the better and superior you mean the more wise, or some others?

Callicles/ But, by Zeus, I mean these, certainly.

Socrates/ Often, therefore, according to your account, one wise man is superior to ten thousand that are not wise; and it is right that he should govern, and they be governed, and that the governor should have more than the governed. For you appear to me to wish to say this and I do not catch at expressions, if one man is superior to ten thousand.

Callicles/ That is what I mean. For I think this is just by nature, that the better and the more wise should both govern and have more than the worthless.

Socrates/ Stop there. What then do you now say? If we were in the same place, as we now are, many men together, and had, in common, abundance of meat and drink, and were men of various descriptions, some strong, others weak, and one of us being a physician should happen to be more wise respecting these things, and should be as is likely stronger than some, and weaker than others, will it not follow that this man who is wiser than we are, will be better and superior with respect to these things?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Should he, therefore, have more of these meats than we, because he is better? Or, because he is chief, ought he not to distribute the whole, but, in consuming and using them for his own body, not take more than others, under pain of injury to himself, but should have more than some, and less than others; and if he should happen to be the weakest of all, though the best, he must have least of all, Callicles? Is it not so, my friend?

Callicles/ You speak of meats and drinks, and physicians, and such trifles; but I do not speak of these.

Socrates/ Whether, then, do you say that the more wise is better? Grant or deny.

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you not say that the better ought to have more?

Callicles/ Not of meats and drinks.

Socrates/ I understand. But perhaps of clothes, and the most skillful weaver should have the largest garment, and go about most abundantly and beautifully clad.

Callicles/ What garments do you mean?

Socrates/ And with respect to shoes, it is clear that he who is more skilled and best, should have more than others;

the shoemaker, perhaps, ought to walk about with the largest and greatest number of shoes.

Callicles/ What shoes? Are you still trifling?

Socrates/ But if you do not mean such things, perhaps you do the following: for instance, that a husbandman, wise and skilled in the cultivation of land, should perhaps have more seeds than others, and use as much as possible on his own land.

Callicles/ How constantly you repeat the same things, Socrates.

Socrates/ Not only so, Callicles, but on the same subject.

Callicles/ By the gods, you never cease talking about shoemakers, fullers, cooks, and physicians, as if our discourse were about them.

Socrates/ Will you not tell me, then, with respect to what things a person should be superior and more wise, who having more than others, justly has more? Will you neither permit; me to suggest, nor say yourself?

Callicles/ But I have said some time since. First, by the superior I do not mean shoemakers, or cooks, but those who are skilled in the affairs of a city, in what way they can be well administered, and not only skilled, but also brave, able to accomplish what they have conceived, and who do not fail through effeminacy of soul.

Socrates/ Do you see, most excellent Callicles, that you do not make the same objection to me that I do to you? For you allege that I always say the same things, and blame me for it; and I, on the contrary, complain of you, that you never say the same things on the same subjects; but at one time you defined the better and the superior to be the stronger, and at another time the more wise: and now again you come with something else; and certain persons that are braver are said by you to be the superior and better. But, my friend, tell

me once for all, whom you call the better and superior, and in reference to what.

Callicles/ I have already said that they are such as are wise and brave, with respect to the affairs of a city. For it belongs to them to govern cities, and it is just that they should have more than others, the governors than the governed.

Socrates/ But what? my friend, as governing themselves, or being governed?

Callicles/ What mean you?

Socrates/ I mean that each person governs himself. Is there no occasion for this, that a man should govern himself, but only others?

Callicles/ What do you mean by governing himself?

Socrates/ Nothing uncommon; but as men frequently say, that a man is temperate, and master of himself, controlling the pleasures and desires that are within himself.

Callicles/ How ridiculous you are! By the temperate you mean the foolish.

Socrates/ How otherwise? There is no one but would know that that is my meaning.

Callicles/ Most assuredly, Socrates; since how can a man be happy who is a slave to anyone? But this it is which is beautiful, and just according to nature, and which I now freely tell you, namely, that a man who lives rightly should suffer his desires to be as great as possible, and should not restrain them; but should be able, when they are at their height, to minister to them by his courage and prudence, and satisfy each desire as it springs up. This, however, I think, is not possible for the generality of men; wherefore they blame such persons through shame, to conceal their own impotency, and say that intemperance is base; as I said before, enslaving men of a better nature, and themselves not

being able to satisfy their own pleasures, they praise temperance and justice, on account of their own effeminacy. For to those whom it has befallen from the first either to be the sons of kings, or who are able by nature to procure for themselves a government, or tyranny, or dynasty, what can be more disgraceful and base than temperance? who, when it is in their power to enjoy the good things of this life, and no one hinders them, impose a master on themselves, the law, discourse, and censure of the multitude? Or how should they be otherwise than miserable through the beauty of justice and temperance, while they impart no more to their friends than to their enemies, and this though they have supreme power in their own city? Thus, then, it stands with the truth, Socrates, which you say you are in search of: luxury, intemperance, and liberty, if they have the proper aids, these are virtue and felicity; but all those other fine things, those compacts contrary to nature, are extravagancies of men, and of no value.

Socrates/ Not at all ignobly, Callicles, have you expressed your opinions, speaking freely; for you now plainly say what others think, indeed, but are unwilling to say. I beg of you, therefore, on no account to relax, in order that it may really become evident how we ought to live. Come tell me: do you say that our desires ought not to be checked, if one intends to be such as one ought, and that, suffering them to be as great as possible, one ought to provide for their satisfaction from every possible source, and that this constitutes virtue?

Callicles/ I do say so.

Socrates/ They, therefore, who need nothing, are not rightly said to be happy.

Callicles/ For thus stones and the dead would be most happy.

Socrates/ But, indeed, even as you say, life is grievous. For in truth I should not wonder if Euripides speaks the truth when he says: “Who knows whether to live is not death, and to die, life?” And we, perhaps, are really dead; as I have heard from one of the wise, that we are now dead, and that the body is our sepulcher, and that the part of the soul in which the desires are is of such a nature that it can be persuaded different ways, and change upwards and downwards; and this, some skillful man, perhaps a Sicilian, or Italian, turning into a fable, by a slight change of the word, called a cask, from its being credulous and easily persuaded, but the foolish he called uninitiated. He further compared that part of the soul of the uninitiated in which the desires are, namely, its intemperate and unclosed part, to a pierced cask, on account of its insatiable greediness. This man, too, quite contrary to you, Callicles, shows that of those in Hades meaning thereby the invisible world the most miserable must be the uninitiated, and that they carry water to a perforated cask by a similarly perforated sieve. The sieve, as he who spoke to me said, is the soul. But he likened the soul of the foolish to a sieve, as being perforated and not able to retain anything, through incredulity and forgetfulness. This probably is somewhat absurd, nevertheless it shows that by proof of which I wish, if by any means I can, to persuade you to change your opinion, and to prefer to an insatiable and intemperate life one that is well regulated, and that is satisfied and contented with the things that are from time to time present. But do I persuade you at all, and do you change your opinion, and admit that the moderate are more happy than the intemperate? or have I produced no impression, and though I tell you many such fables, will you not be any the more disposed to change your opinion?

Callicles/ In this you have spoken more truly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Come, then, I will mention to you another similitude from the same school as the preceding. For consider whether you would speak thus of each kind of life, the temperate and the intemperate, as if two men had each many casks; and that those of one were sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, a third of milk, and many others of other things; that the fountains of each were rare and difficult to be obtained, and could only be procured by many and severe toils; the one, then, having filled his casks, pours no more into them, nor is at all concerned about them, but on this score is at ease; that the fountains of the other, as of the former one, are possible to be procured, though with difficulty, that his vessels are perforated arid defective, and he compelled, both night and day, to fill them, or suffer the most extreme pain. When such is the life of each, do you say that of the intemperate is more happy than that of the moderate man? Do I persuade you at all, by relating these things, to grant that a moderate life is better than an intemperate one, or do I not persuade you?

Callicles/ You do not persuade me, Socrates. For he that has filled his casks has no longer any pleasure: but this is, what I just now mentioned, to live like a stone, when he has filled them, neither rejoicing any more nor grieving: but a pleasant life consists in as much flowing in as possible.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, necessary, if much flows in, that much also should go out, and that there should be certain large holes for its flowing out?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ You speak now of the life of a sea-lark, and not of a corpse, or a stone. But tell me, do you mean such a thing as being hungry, and, when hungry, eating?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ And of being thirsty, and, when thirsty, drinking?

Callicles/ I do mean that, and that he who has all other desires, and, having the power to do so, satisfies them, lives a joyful and happy life.

Socrates/ Well done, my excellent friend! Proceed as you have begun, and take care not to be ashamed. But it is right, too, as it seems, that neither should I be ashamed. And first of all, tell me if, when a man, who is scabby and itches, is able to scratch himself without stint, and passes his life in scratching himself, this is to live happily?

Callicles/ How absurd you are, Socrates, and a mere babbler.

Socrates/ Hence it is, Callicles, that I have astonished Polus and Gorgias, and made them ashamed. You, however, will not be astonished nor ashamed, for you are courageous: but only answer me.

Callicles/ I say, then, that he who scratches himself lives pleasantly.

Socrates/ Therefore, if pleasantly, also happily?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Will this be the case if he only itches in his head, or must I ask you still further? Consider, Callicles, what answer you would give, if anyone asks you respecting all the parts of the body in succession. And to take that which is the chief of all, is not the life of catamites dreadful, base, and wretched? Will you dare to call them happy, if they have what they desire, without stint?

Callicles/ Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the discussion to such subjects?

Socrates/ Do I lead it hither, noble Sir, or does he who asserts thus broadly, that such as rejoice, in whatever way

they rejoice, are happy, and does not distinguish between pleasures, what are good and what are bad? But tell me further still, whether do you say that the pleasant and the good are the same: or that there is something pleasant which is not good?

Callicles/ In order that my argument may not contradict itself, if I should say they are different, I say that they are the same.

Socrates/ You subvert your former statements, Callicles, and no longer search for the truth with me properly, if you speak contrary to your real opinion.

Callicles/ And you do the same, Socrates.

Socrates/ Neither, then, do I act rightly, if I do so, nor do you. But, good Sir, consider whether to rejoice in any way be not good. For it is clear that many base consequences, which were just now hinted at, will follow, if this should be the case, and many others besides.

Callicles/ As you think, at least, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you in reality, Callicles, persist in your assertion?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Shall we then enter on the discussion, as if you were in earnest?

Callicles/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Come, then, since you are of that opinion, explain this to me. Do you call science anything?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ And did you not just now say, that there is a certain courage joined with Science?

Callicles/ I did say so.

Socrates/ Did you speak of these two, as if courage was different from science?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what? Are pleasure and science the same, or different?

Callicles/ Different, surely, most wise friend.

Socrates/ Is courage also different from pleasure?

Callicles/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Come, then, let us retain these things in our memory; that Callicles of Acharne said that the pleasant and the good are the same; but that science and courage are different both from each other and the good.

Callicles/ But Socrates of Alopecia does not agree to this; does he agree?

Socrates/ He does not agree: and I think neither will Callicles when he has rightly examined himself. For tell me, do you not think that those who fare well are affected in a manner quite contrary to those who fare ill?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ If these, therefore, are contrary to each other, is it not necessary that the case should be the same with them as it is with health and disease? For, surely, a man is not at the same time well and diseased, nor at the same time separated from health and disease.

Callicles/ How say you?

Socrates/ For instance, take any part of the body you please, and consider. Has not a man sometimes a disease in the eyes, which is called ophthalmia?

Callicles/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And his eyes, surely, are not at the same time well?

Callicles/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But what? When he is freed from the ophthalmia, does he then also lose the health of his eyes, and, in a word, is he at the same time freed from both?

Callicles/ By no means.

Socrates/ For that, I think, would be wonderful and absurd. Would it not?

Callicles/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But I think he, alternately, receives one, and loses the other.

Callicles/ I admit it.

Socrates/ And will it not be the same with regard to strength and weakness?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And swiftness and slowness?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And with respect to things good and happiness, and their contraries, things evil and wretchedness, does he receive and part from each of these alternately?

Callicles/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ If, therefore, we should find certain things which a man at the same time parts from and possesses, it is clear that these would not be both good and evil. Do we agree to this? Consider well and answer me.

Callicles/ I agree entirely.

Socrates/ Let us then recur to what was before agreed on. Did you say that to be hungry is pleasant, or painful? I mean the very fact of being hungry.

Callicles/ I said it was painful: though to eat when hungry is pleasant.

Socrates/ I understand you: but to be hungry of itself is painful; is it not so?

Callicles/ I admit it.

Socrates/ And also to be thirsty?

Callicles/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Whether, then, shall I ask you any more questions? Or do you allow that all want and desire is painful?

Callicles/ I allow it; so do not ask.

Socrates/ Be it so. And do you not say that for a man to drink when he is thirsty is pleasant?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ In the instance then of which you are speaking, to be thirsty is, doubtless, painful?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But to drink is the satisfying of a want, and a pleasure?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Therefore as to drinking you say that the man rejoices?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But as to being thirsty?

Callicles/ I say—

Socrates/ That he suffers pain?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you perceive then what follows? that you say he who is in pain at the same time rejoices, when you say that he who is thirsty drinks. And does not this happen at the same place and time, with respect either to the soul or body, whichever you please? For I think there is no difference. Is this so, or not?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ You admitted, however, that it was impossible for one who fares well at the same time to fare ill.

Callicles/ I allow it.

Socrates/ But you have granted that it is possible for one who is in pain to rejoice.

Callicles/ It appears so.

Socrates/ To rejoice, therefore, is not to fare well, nor to be in pain, ill: so that the pleasant is different from the good?

Callicles/ I know not what subtleties you are using, Socrates.

Socrates/ You know, though you pretend not, Callicles.

Callicles/ Proceed still further, trifling as you are, that you may know how wise you are who take upon yourself to admonish me.

Socrates/ Does not each of us at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to receive pleasure from drinking?

Callicles/ I do not know what you mean.

Gorgias/ Say not so, Callicles; but answer for our sakes, that the discussion may be brought to a conclusion.

Callicles/ But this is always the way with Socrates, Gorgias, he asks trifling questions, and things that are of no consequence, and then refutes them.

Gorgias/ But what difference does that make to you? That is no concern at all of yours: but suffer Socrates to argue in whatever way he pleases.

Callicles/ Ask, then, these trifling and petty questions, since Gorgias thinks proper.

Socrates/ You are happy, Callicles, in that you have been initiated in the great mysteries before you were in the small: but I thought that was not allowed. Answer me, then, from the point where you left off, does not each of us at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to receive pleasure?

Callicles/ I admit it.

Socrates/ And does not one cease to be hungry and to feel other desires and pleasures at the same time?

Callicles/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ Does one not, then, at the same time cease to feel both pains and pleasures?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ However one does not at the same time cease to experience good and evil, as you admitted; but now do you not admit it?

Callicles/ I do. But what then?

Socrates/ It follows, my friend, that good things are not the same with such as are pleasant, nor evil things with such as are painful. For, from these one ceases at the same time, but not from those, because they are different. How, therefore, can pleasant things be the same with such as are good, or painful things with such as are evil? But, if you please, consider it in this way: for I think that you are not even thus agreed with yourself. Consider then. Do you not call the good good, from the presence of good things, just as you call those beautiful to whom beauty is present?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ But what? Do you call foolish men and cowards good men? For you did not just now; but you said the brave and prudent were so. Do you not call these good?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what? Have you ever seen a boy without understanding, rejoicing?

Callicles/ I have.

Socrates/ And have you not also seen a man without understanding, rejoicing?

Callicles/ I think I have. But to what purpose is this?

Socrates/ Nothing: answer however.

Callicles/ I have seen it.

Socrates/ But what? have you seen a man endued with intellect grieving and rejoicing?

Callicles/ I have.

Socrates/ But which rejoice and grieve the more; the wise, or the foolish?

Callicles/ I think there is not much difference.

Socrates/ That is enough. In war have you ever seen a coward?

Callicles/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ What then? On the departure of the enemy which appeared to you to rejoice the more, the cowards or the brave?

Callicles/ Both appeared to me to rejoice more: or, if not, in nearly the same degree.

Socrates/ It is of no consequence. Cowards, then, also rejoice?

Callicles/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And the foolish, as it seems?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But, when the enemy approaches, do cowards only grieve? or do the brave also?

Callicles/ Both.

Socrates/ In an equal degree?

Callicles/ Cowards perhaps more.

Socrates/ But, when the enemy departs, do they not rejoice more?

Callicles/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Do not, therefore, as you say, the foolish and the wise, cowards and the brave, similarly grieve and rejoice, much in the same degree, but cowards more than the brave?

Callicles/ I admit it.

Socrates/ The wise however and the brave are good, but cowards and the foolish bad?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ The good and the bad, therefore, rejoice and grieve equally?

Callicles/ I admit it.

Socrates/ Are, then, the good and the bad, good and bad in an equal degree? or are the bad yet more good and bad?

Callicles/ By Zeus, I do not know what you mean.

Socrates/ Do you not know that you said the good are good, through the presence of good things, and the bad through the presence of evil things? And that pleasures are good things, and pains evil?

Callicles/ I did.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, good things, viz., pleasures, present with those that rejoice, if they do rejoice?

Callicles/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And since good things are present are not they who rejoice good?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what? Are not evil things, viz., pains, present with those that suffer pain?

Callicles/ They are present.

Socrates/ But do you not say that the bad are bad, through the presence of evil things? Or do you say so no longer?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Those, therefore, that rejoice, are good; but those that suffer pain are bad?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And those that are more so, more, but those that are less so, less? and those that are equally so, equally?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you not say, then, that the wise and the foolish, cowards and the brave, rejoice and grieve in an equal degree, or cowards even more?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Now in common with me, draw the inferences that result from these admissions. For, they say, it is beautiful to repeat and consider beautiful things twice, and even thrice. We say, that the prudent and brave man is good; do we not?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But that the foolish man and a coward is bad?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Again, that he who rejoices is good?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that he who suffers pain is bad?

Callicles/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And that the good and the bad suffer pain and rejoice equally, but perhaps the bad more?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Therefore, the bad man becomes equally bad and good, with the good man, or even more good? Do not these results follow, as well as the former ones, if one says that the pleasant and the good are the same? Are not these consequences necessary, Callicles?

Callicles/ I have been long listening to you, Socrates, and making concessions, considering with myself that if anyone grants you anything, even in jest, you seize it eagerly as boys do. And can you suppose that I or any other person in the world does not believe that some pleasures are better, and others worse?

Socrates/ Ho, Ho! Callicles, how cunning you are! You treat me as a child, now asserting that these things are in this manner, and now in another manner; trying to deceive me. Though, at the outset, I did not think that I should be purposely deceived by you, because you are my friend. But now I have been mistaken, and as it seems, must needs, according to the old proverb, make good use of what I have, and receive what you give me. What you now say, as it appears, is this, that some pleasures are good, others bad; is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are not the profitable good, and the noxious bad?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And those which effect a certain good, are profitable, but those which effect a certain evil, bad?

Callicles/ I admit it.

Socrates/ Do you not speak then of such as the following; as for instance, with respect to the body, those pleasures which we just now mentioned of eating and drinking; and if some of these produce in the body health or strength, or some other bodily excellences, are they not good, but those that produce the contraries of these, evil?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are not pains, in like manner, some beneficial, others injurious?

Callicles/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Ought we not, therefore, both to choose and to exercise ourselves in such pleasures and pains as are beneficial?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But not such as are injurious?

Callicles/ That is evident.

Socrates/ For, if you remember, it was agreed between us, Polus and me, that all things should be done for the sake of what is good. And do you agree with us in thinking, that the good is the end of all actions, and that all other things ought to be done for its sake, but not it for the sake of other things? Do you accord with us and make up the third?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ We ought, then, to do both all other things and such as are pleasant, for the sake of things good, but not good things for the sake of such as are pleasant?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is every man, therefore, able to choose among pleasant things such as are good, and such as are evil? or is there need of a person skilled in each case?

Callicles/ Of a person skilled.

Socrates/ Let us then again call to mind what I said to Polus and Gorgias. I said, if you remember, that there are certain occupations which regard pleasure, and are occupied in this alone, but are ignorant of the better and the worse; but that there are others that know both what is good and what is evil. And I have placed among those which have pleasure for their object, cookery, as a skill relating to the body, but not an art; and among those that have the good for their object I placed the medicinal art. And by the god of friendship, Callicles, think not that you ought to jest with

me, nor give any answer that may occur to you contrary to your opinion, nor receive what I say as if I were in jest. For you see that our discourse is on a subject, than which there is none that a man endued even with the smallest understanding would take more pains about, namely in what way we ought to live, whether in such a way as that to which you exhort me, engaging in such employments of a man, as speaking among the people, cultivating rhetoric, and applying oneself to political affairs, in the manner which you now do; or whether we should devote ourselves to a philosophic life, and in what the latter differs from the former. Perhaps, then, it is best, as I just now attempted, to make a distinction; and when we have distinguished and agreed with each other, that these are two kinds of life, then to consider in what they differ from each other, and which of them ought to be pursued. Perhaps, however, you do not yet understand what I mean.

Callicles/ I do not, indeed.

Socrates/ I will explain it to you more clearly. Since we have agreed, you and I, that there is something good, and something pleasant, and that the pleasant is different from the good, and that there is a certain study and preparation for the acquirement of each of them, one being a search after the pleasant, and the other after the good—however, first of all, grant me this, or not; do you grant it?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Come then, concede to me also what I said to these men, if at the time I appeared to you to speak the truth. I said that cookery does not appear to me to be an art, but a skill; and that medicine is an art; for I said that medicine considers the nature of that which it cures, and the cause of the things that it does, and is able to give an account of each of these: but that the other, being concerned about pleasure,

to which its whole attention is directed, proceeds to it without any art at all, neither considering the nature nor the cause of pleasure, altogether without reason, and in a word incapable of giving any account of itself, a mere practice and skill, only preserving the memory of that which usually takes place, by which also it supplies pleasures. First of all, then, consider whether these things appear to you to have been sufficiently established, and that there are also certain other corresponding studies relating to the soul, of which some follow rules of art, and regard what is best for the soul; but others that neglect this, and consider only, as in the former case, the pleasure of the soul, in what way it may be procured; but paying no attention to which pleasure is better or worse, nor caring for anything else than gratification only, whether it be better or worse. For my part, Callicles, there appear to me to be such studies; and I say that such a thing is flattery, as well in relation to the body as the soul, and to anything else the pleasure of which one sedulously attends to, without paying any regard to the better and the worse. But do you entertain the same opinion as we do respecting these things, or do you gainsay it?

Callicles/ No, but I yield this point in order that our discussion may be brought to a close, and that I may gratify Gorgias here.

Socrates/ Does this take place with respect to one soul, but not with respect to two and several?

Callicles/ No; but it takes place with respect to two and several.

Socrates/ Is it not, then, possible to gratify a number of souls collected together, without considering at all what is best?

Callicles/ I think so.

Socrates/ Can you tell me, then, what those studies are which produce this effect? Or rather, if you please, on my asking, whichever appears to you to be one of these, say so, and which not, deny it. And first of all, let us consider flute-playing. Does it not appear to you to be such a thing, Callicles, as pursues only our pleasure, but regards nothing else?

Callicles/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And is it not the case with all such studies, as for instance, harp-playing in the public games?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what as to the representation of choruses and dithyrambic poetry? does it not appear to you to be of the same kind? Do you think that Cinesias son of Meles cares at all to express himself in such a way that his hearers may become better? or rather what will gratify the crowd of spectators?

Callicles/ The latter is clearly the case, Socrates, with respect to Cinesias.

Socrates/ But what as to his father Meles? Did he appear to you to play on the harp, looking to that which is best? or did not he look to what was most pleasant? For in singing he offended the audience. Consider, however; does not all harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry appear to you to have been invented for the sake of pleasure?

Callicles/ It does.

Socrates/ But what of that venerable and wonderful art, tragic poetry, at what does it aim? Do its endeavor and aim appear to you to be only to gratify the spectators? or does it strive, if anything should be pleasing and grateful to them, but mischievous, to avoid saying this, but if it happens to be unpleasant and beneficial, to say and sing this, whether it

gratifies the spectators or not? In which of these two ways do you think tragic poetry is framed?

Callicles/ This is clear, Socrates, that it rather aims at pleasure, and the gratification of the spectators.

Socrates/ Did we not just now say, Callicles, that a thing of this kind is flattery?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, if anyone should take from all poetry, melody, rhythm, and measure, would anything else than words remain?

Callicles/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Are not these words, then, addressed to a great multitude, and to the people?

Callicles/ I admit it.

Socrates/ Poetry, therefore, is a kind of popular speaking.

Callicles/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Therefore it must be a rhetorical method of popular speaking: for do not poets appear to you to employ rhetoric in the theatres?

Callicles/ They do.

Socrates/ Now, therefore, we have found a certain rhetoric among the people, consisting at the same time of boys and women and men, slaves and free-men, of which we do not altogether approve; for we have called it flattery.

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then. But as to the rhetoric addressed to the Athenian people, and the people in other cities consisting of free-men, what shall we say as to that? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to speak with a view to what is best, aiming at this, that the citizens may be made as good as possible by their discourses? or do they, too, endeavor to gratify the citizens, and neglecting the public interest for the

sake of their own private advantage, do they treat the people as children, trying only to gratify them, without being in the least concerned whether they shall become better or worse by these means?

Callicles/ This is not a simple question that you ask me. For there are some who, looking to the interest of the citizens, say what they do; but others are such as you describe.

Socrates/ That is enough. For, if this also is twofold, one part of it will be flattery, and a base popular speaking, but the other will be honorable, namely, that which endeavors to make the souls of the citizens as good as possible, and strives to speak what is best, whether it be pleasant or unpleasant to the hearers. But you have never yet seen this kind of rhetoric. Or, if you can mention anyone of the rhetoricians who is of this stamp, why do you not tell me who he is?

Callicles/ But, by Zeus, I cannot instance to you any of the rhetoricians of the present day.

Socrates/ But what? Can you instance anyone of the ancients through whose means the Athenians have become better, after he had begun to harangue them, when previously they had been worse? For I know not who such a one is.

Callicles/ What? Have you not heard that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades, and Pericles, who died lately, whom you have also heard?

Socrates/ If that is true virtue, Callicles, which you before mentioned as such, namely, for a man to gratify both his own desires and those of others. But if this is not the case, but, as we were afterwards compelled to confess, those desires which, when satisfied, make a man better, ought to be indulged, but those which make him worse, not so, and

if there is a certain art in this, can you say that anyone of these was a man of this kind?

Callicles/ I know not what to say.

Socrates/ But if you seek well, you will find out. Let us however, consider, and see quietly if anyone of these was such. For come, is it not true that a good man, who says what he says with a view to the best, does not speak at random, but looking to some end? just as all other artists, looking each to his own work, does not take at random and employ what he employs in his work, but so that the subject he is at work upon may have a certain form: for instance, if you will look at painters, architects, shipwrights, and any other artists you please, you will see that each places whatever he employs in a certain order, and compels one thing to adapt itself to and harmonize with another, until the whole workmanship is compacted together with order and regularity. And moreover, those other artificers, whom we just now mentioned, who are employed about the body, teachers of gymnastics, and physicians, adorn the body in a way, and dispose it in an orderly manner. Do we allow that this is so or not?

Callicles/ Let it be so.

Socrates/ A house, then, that has acquired order and regularity will be a good house, but when disorder, a bad one.

Callicles/ I admit it.

Socrates/ And a ship in like manner?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do we not say the same with respect to our bodies?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what as to the soul? when in a state of disorder will it be in a good condition, or when it is in a state of order and regularity?

Callicles/ From what has been said, it is necessary to grant that the latter must be the case.

Socrates/ What, then, in the body, is the name of that which results from order and regularity?

Callicles/ You probably mean health and strength.

Socrates/ I do. But what, again, is the name of that which subsists in the soul from order and regularity? Endeavor to discover and mention it, as you did the name of the former.

Callicles/ Why do not you say what it is yourself, Socrates?

Socrates/ If it pleases you better, I will. But do you, if I seem to you to speak well, assent, if not, confute, and do not spare me. To me, then, it appears that the name belonging to the orderly disposition of the body is the healthful, from which health springs, and every other excellence of the body. Is it so, or not?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ But the name belonging to the orderly and regular disposition of the soul is the legitimate and law; whence men become obedient to law and orderly; but these are justice and temperance. Do you admit this or not?

Callicles/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Will not, then, that good rhetorician who follows the rules of art, looking to these things, address the arguments he uses and all his actions to souls, and if he should bestow a gift, will he not bestow it, and, if he should take anything away, will he not take it away *with the same end*, always directing his attention to this, that justice may be produced in the souls of his fellow-citizens, and injustice

banished; that temperance may be produced in them, and intemperance banished; and, in short, that every virtue may be planted in them, but vice driven out. Do you grant this, or not?

Callicles/ I do grant it.

Socrates/ For where is the utility, Callicles, in giving a body diseased, and ill-disposed, abundance of the most agreeable food or drink, or anything else, which will not be more profitable to it than the contrary, but, according to right reason, even less? Is this so?

Callicles/ Be it so.

Socrates/ For I think it is of no advantage for a man to live with a miserable state of body; for thus it would be necessary for him to live miserably: is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do not physicians generally allow a man in health to satisfy his desires, as, for instance, when hungry to eat as much as he pleases, or when thirsty to drink, but when ill, they scarcely ever allow him to satisfy himself with what he desires? Do you grant this too?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ And should not the same method, my excellent friend, be adopted with respect to the soul? So long as it is depraved, as being without understanding, intemperate, unjust and unholy, one ought to restrain it from the indulgence of its desires, and not permit it to do anything except what will render it better? Do you admit this or not?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ For this surely is better for the soul itself.

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not to restrain anyone from what he desires to punish him?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ To be punished, therefore, is better for the soul than intemperance, as you just now thought.

Callicles/ I don't know what you mean, Socrates: ask someone else.

Socrates/ This man will not submit to be benefited and to suffer the very thing of which we are speaking, viz., punishment.

Callicles/ I don't at all heed what you say; I only answered you thus far for the sake of Gorgias.

Socrates/ Be it so. What shall we do then? Shall we break off the discussion in the midst?

Callicles/ You shall determine.

Socrates/ But they say it is not right to leave even fables in the midst, but a head should be placed on them, that they may not wander without a head. Answer, therefore, to what remains, that our discussion may have a head to it.

Callicles/ How importunate you are, Socrates! But, if you will be persuaded by me, you will give up this discussion, or carry it on with someone else.

Socrates/ Who else is willing? for we must not leave the discussion unfinished.

Callicles/ Cannot you go through with it yourself, either speaking by yourself or answering yourself?

Socrates/ That the saying of Epicharmus may be verified in me, "what two men said before, I alone am able to say." But it appears to be very necessary. If, however, we shall do so, I think we ought all of us to strive heartily that we may understand what is true and what false with respect to the subject we are treating of: for it is for the common interest of all that this should become clear. I will, therefore, go through the matter under discussion, as it appears to me to

be: but, if I shall seem to any of you to grant myself what is not true, he must take me up and confute me. for I do not say what I say as knowing it, but I am enquiring in common with you, so that, if he who disputes with me should appear to say anything to the purpose, I shall be the first to give in to him. I say this, however, in case you think the discussion ought to be finished; but if you do not wish it, let us give it up and depart.

Gorgias/ But it appears to me, Socrates, that we should not depart yet, but that you should pursue the argument: and it is evident that the others think so. And I, for my part, wish to hear you go through the remainder of the subject.

Socrates/ But indeed, Gorgias, I would gladly have continued to carry on the discussion with Callicles here, until I had given him back the saying of Amphion for that of Zethus: but since you are not willing, Callicles, to finish the discussion with me, yet listen to me at least, and take me up if I appear to you to say anything incorrectly. And if you shall confute me, I shall not be angry with you, as you are with me, but you shall be recorded by me as my greatest benefactor.

Callicles/ Speak then yourself, my good friend, and finish the argument.

Socrates/ Hear me then repeating the argument from the beginning. Are the pleasant and the good the same? They are not the same, as I and Callicles have agreed. But whether is the pleasant to be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant for the sake of the good. But is the pleasant that, with which when present we are pleased? and the good that, by which when present we are good? Certainly. Now we are good, both ourselves and all other things that are good, when a certain virtue is present? To me this appears to be necessary,

Callicles. But the virtue of each thing, whether instrument, or body, or soul, and moreover of every animal, does not reach a high pitch of perfection by chance, but by order, and rectitude, and the art that is attributed to each of them. Is this so? I admit it. The virtue, then, of everything is regulated and adorned by order? I should say so. A certain order, then, proper to each, becoming inherent in each, makes each thing good? It appears so to me. The soul, therefore, that has its own order, is better than that which is without order? Necessarily so. That, however, which has order is orderly? How should it not? And that which is orderly is temperate? Most necessarily. A temperate soul, then, is good? I am not able to say anything against this, my dear Callicles; but do you, if you can do so, inform me.

Callicles/ Proceed, my good friend.

Socrates/ I say, then, that if a temperate soul is good, that which is affected contrariwise to the temperate is base: and this surely is the foolish and intemperate? Certainly. Moreover, a temperate man would act becomingly both towards gods and towards men? for he would not be temperate if he acted unbecomingly? It must needs be so. Moreover, by acting becomingly towards men he would act justly, and towards the gods piously; but it is necessary that he who acts justly and piously should be just and pious? It must be so. It is moreover necessary that he should be brave? for it is not the part of a temperate man either to pursue or avoid what is not becoming, but to pursue and avoid those things and men, pleasures and pains, which he ought, and to endure patiently wherever he ought. So that it is absolutely necessary, Callicles, that the temperate man, as we have described him, being just, brave, and pious, should be a perfectly good man, and that a good man should do whatever he does well and honorably, and that he who does well should be blessed and happy, but that the wicked,

who does ill, should be wretched: but this latter would be directly contrary to the temperate man, namely, the intemperate, whom you praised. I, therefore, thus lay down these things, and affirm that they are true. But if they are true, as it seems, he who wishes to be happy must pursue and practice temperance, and must avoid intemperance, every one of us with all his might, and must endeavor never to stand in need of punishment, but if he does need it, either he or any of his family, whether it be the case of a private person, or a city, justice must be administered, and punishment inflicted, if he is to be happy. This appears to me to be the mark to which we ought to look for the guidance of our life, and referring all private and public actions to this point, that justice and temperance may be ever present with him who will be blessed, and to act accordingly, not suffering his desires to be intemperate, nor endeavoring to satisfy them, which is an irremediable evil, causing a man to live like a robber. For such an one could neither be dear to any other man, nor to God; for it is impossible there can be any communion between them; and where there is no communion there can be no friendship. The sages too, say, Callicles, that heaven and earth, gods and men, are held together by communion, friendship, order, temperance, and justice, and for this reason, my friend, they call this universe, order, and not disorder or intemperance. You, however, appear to me not to attend to these things, and this though you are wise; but it has escaped your observation that geometrical equality has great power both among gods and among men; on the contrary you think that everyone should strive to get more than others; for you neglect geometry. Well then; either this argument of mine must be confuted, *and it must be shown* that the happy are not happy from the possession of justice and temperance, and the wretched, wretched from vice; or, if the argument is true, we

must consider what are its results. Now, Callicles, all those things before mentioned, with respect to which you asked me if I was speaking in earnest, result from it, to the effect that a man should accuse himself, his son, and his friend, if he committed any injustice, and should employ rhetoric for this purpose. And what you thought Polus granted through shame was therefore true, that by how much it is more base to do an injury than to be injured, by so much is it worse: and that he who would be a good orator ought to be just and skilled in the knowledge of things just; which, again, Polus said Gorgias acknowledged through shame.

This then being the case, let us consider what it is that you find fault with in me, and whether you are right or not in saying that I can neither assist myself, nor any of my friends or domestics, nor save myself from the greatest dangers, but that I am in the power of anyone who chooses, like men marked with infamy, if he pleases, according to that petulant expression of yours, to strike me on the face, or to take away my property, or expel me from the city, or, worst of all, to kill me, and that to be thus circumstanced, is the most disgraceful of all things, according to your opinion. But mine is this, it has indeed been often mentioned, yet nothing prevents its being again repeated; I deny, Callicles, that to be struck in the face unjustly is most disgraceful, or for my body or purse to be cut, but that to strike unjustly and to cut me and mine, is both more disgraceful and worse, and that to rob, enslave, break open a house, and, in short, to injure in any respect me and mine, is both more disgraceful and worse for him who does the injury than for me who am injured. These things, that were proved to be thus in the former part of our discussion, as I affirm, are held and bound though it is somewhat rude to say so in reasons of iron and adamant, as would really appear to be the case, so that unless you or someone stronger than you can break

them, it is not possible that anyone who says otherwise than as I now say can speak correctly; for my statement is always the same, that I know not how these things are, but that of all the persons with whom I have ever conversed, as now with you, no one, who says otherwise, can avoid being ridiculous. I therefore again assert that these things are so. But if this is the case, and injustice is the greatest of evils to him that commits it, and if, great as this evil is, it is still a greater, if possible, for one who acts unjustly not to be punished, what kind of help will that be, which, if a man cannot procure for himself, he would be really ridiculous? will it not be that which would avert from us the greatest harm? But there is an absolute necessity that this should be most disgraceful, for a man not to be able to assist either himself, or his friends and domestics, next to that, an inability to avoid the second evil, and the third, an inability to avoid the third evil, and so on with the rest; in proportion to the magnitude of each evil, so is it beautiful to be able to avoid each of them, and disgraceful not to be able. Is the case thus or otherwise, Callicles?

Callicles/ No otherwise.

Socrates/ Of these two things then, the doing injustice and receiving an injury, we say that to do injustice is a greater evil, but to receive an injury a less one. By recourse to what means, then, could a man so assist himself as to have both these advantages, that of not doing injustice, and that of not receiving an injury? Is it by power, or will? I mean thus: whether, if a man wishes not to be injured, will he not be injured, or, if he has acquired the power of not being injured, will he not be injured?

Callicles/ It is clear that he will not, if he has acquired the power.

Socrates/ But what with respect to doing injustice? Whether, if anyone wishes not to do injustice, is this sufficient, for in that case he will not do it, or, besides this, is it requisite to acquire a certain power and art, so that, unless he has learned and practiced them, he will do injustice? Come then, answer me this question, Callicles; whether do Polus and I appear to you to have been compelled, rightly or not, to make that admission in the former part of our discussion, when we admitted that no one willingly commits injustice, but that all who do commit it do so unwillingly?

Callicles/ Let that point be granted, Socrates, in order that you may bring the argument to a conclusion.

Socrates/ For this purpose, then, as it appears, we must acquire a certain power and art, in order that we may not commit injustice.

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What then is the art by means of which a man will receive no injury at all, or scarcely any? Consider, if it appears to you the same as it does to me. For to me it appears thus; either that he ought to govern in a city or even have absolute power, or be a friend of the existing government.

Callicles/ Do you observe, Socrates, how ready I am to praise you, if you say anything well? This you appear to me to have said remarkably well.

Socrates/ Consider also, whether I appear to you to say this well. Each person seems to me for the most part to be a friend to each, according as the ancient sages say “like to like:” does it not seem so to you?

Callicles/ It does.

Socrates/ Wherever, therefore, a savage and uneducated tyrant governs, if there should be anyone in the city much

better than him, would not the tyrant fear him, and never be able to be cordially his friend.

Callicles/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ Nor yet, if anyone should be much worse than the tyrant, would he become his friend; for the tyrant would despise him, nor ever feel any affection for him as a friend.

Callicles/ This also is true.

Socrates/ It remains, therefore, that he alone would be a friend, worthy of notice, to such a man. who, having a similar disposition, should blame and praise the same things, and be willing to be governed by and submit to his sway. Such a person will have great influence in this city, and no one will injure him with impunity. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ If, therefore, any young man in this city should consider within himself, "How could I obtain influence, and be injured by no one?" this, as it seems, must be his method, he must from his very youth accustom himself to rejoice and grieve at the same things as the despot, and contrive to make himself as like him as possible. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Will not he, then, have managed so as not to be injured, and to have great power in that city, according to your argument?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Will he also manage not to commit injustice? or far from it, since he will be like the governor, who is unjust, and will have great influence with him? I think, for my part, that quite contrariwise he will contrive so as to be able to commit the greatest injustice and not to be punished for it. Will he not?

Callicles/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Will not, then, the greatest evil befall him, in consequence of being depraved in his soul, and tainted through imitation of the despot and his influence with him?

Callicles/ I know not, Socrates, how you always turn the arguments upside down. Do you not know, that he who imitates can kill him who does not imitate *the despot* if he pleases, and deprive him of his property?

Socrates/ I do know it, good Callicles, unless I am deaf, since I have just now heard it often both from you and Polus, and from almost everyone else in the city. But do you in your turn listen to me: he will kill him if he pleases, but a depraved man, one who is upright and good.

Callicles/ And is not this a thing to be indignant at?

Socrates/ Not to a man of sense, as our argument proves. Do you think that a man should aim at this; to live as long as possible, and should study those arts which always preserve us from dangers, as rhetoric which you bid me study, and which saves us in courts of justice?

Callicles/ I do, by Zeus, and therein I advise you well.

Socrates/ What then, my excellent friend, does the science of swimming too appear to you to be very fine?

Callicles/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ And yet this too saves men from death, when they fall into such a danger as requires this science. But if this appears to you to be mean, I will mention to you one more important than this, namely that of piloting a ship, which not only saves lives, but also bodies and property from extreme danger, just as rhetoric does. And this art is moderate and modest, and does not brag and strut as if it accomplished something wonderful, but when it has accomplished the same thing as the forensic art, if it has brought us safe here from Ægina, it demands, I think, two oboli, and if from Egypt or the Pontus, for so great a benefit

in having brought safe what I now mention, ourselves and children, our property and wives, and in having landed them in port, it usually demands two drachms, and the man who possesses this art, and accomplishes these things, when he has disembarked, walks by the sea and his ship, with a modest gait. For he knows, I think, how to reason with himself, that it is uncertain whom of his passengers he has benefited by not allowing them to be drowned, and whom he has injured, knowing that he has not put them ashore in any respect better than they were when they went on board, either as to their souls or bodies. He therefore reasons with himself, that if one who is afflicted in his body with severe and incurable diseases should happen not to be drowned, such a man is indeed miserable for having escaped death, and has received no benefit from him; but if anyone labors under many and incurable diseases in that which is more precious than the body, his soul, such a one ought not to live, nor would he benefit him, if he saved him from the sea, or from a court of justice, or from any other danger, for he knows that it is not better for a depraved man to live, because he must needs live badly. For this reason, it is not usual for a pilot to boast, although he saves our lives; nor, my admirable friend, is it usual for an engineer who is sometimes able to save, no less than a general of an army, not to mention a pilot or any other person; for sometimes he saves whole cities. Does it not appear to you that he is fit to be compared with a forensic orator? though, if he chose to speak, Callicles, as you do, extolling his own art, he would overwhelm you with words, urging and exhorting you to the fitness of your becoming an engineer, for that other things are of no consequence; and he would have enough to say. You, however, would nevertheless despise him and his art, and, by way of reproach would call him an engineer, and would neither give your daughter to his son, nor accept his

daughter for your son. Though, if from the reasons for which you praise your own art, on what just pretext do you despise the engineer, and the others whom I have just now mentioned? I know that you would say you are better, and of a better family. But if that which is better is not what I say it is, but if excellence consists in this, for a man to save himself and his property, whatever kind of man he may be, then your contempt for the engineer and the physician, and for whatever other arts are pursued for the purpose of preservation, is ridiculous.

But, my good friend, consider whether that which is noble and good is not something else than to save and be saved; and whether that principle, that one should live as long as one can, is not to be given up by one who is truly a man, and life not too fondly loved, but that leaving these things to the care of the deity, and believing the women, *who say* that no man can avoid his fate, one should consider this, by what means one may pass the remainder of one's life in the best possible manner, whether by conforming one's-self to the government under which one dwells. And in that case whether it is right that you should resemble as much as possible the Athenian people, if you wish to be dear to them, and to have great influence in their city? Consider whether this is advantageous to you and to me, lest, my admirable friend, we should suffer what they say the Thessalian witches did, who drew down the moon, and our choice of this power in the city should be attended with the loss of what is dearest to us. If, however, you think that any man in the world can teach you any such art, as will cause you to have great power in this city, while you are unlike the character of the people, whether for the better or the worse, as appears to me, Callicles, you are not rightly advised. For you must not only be an imitator of, but like them in your natural disposition, if you mean to do anything effectual towards

gaining the friendship of the Athenian people, and, by Zeus, you must towards that of the son of Pyrilampes. Whoever, therefore, shall make you most like them, will make you a politician and an orator, such as you desire to be. For all men are delighted with arguments suited to their own dispositions, but are angry with such as are strange to them; unless you, my dear friend, have anything to say to the contrary. Have we any objection to make to this, Callicles?

Callicles/ I do not know how it is, Socrates, you appear to me to speak well. Yet that which happens to most happens to me; I am not quite persuaded by you.

Socrates/ For the love of the people, Callicles, dwelling in your soul, resists me; but perhaps, if we should often and more fully examine into these same matters, you would be persuaded. Remember, then, that we said there were two methods for the cultivation of each, both the body and the soul, and that one had reference to pleasure, but the other to that which is best, not by gratifying, but opposing the inclinations. Is not this what we before settled?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The one, then, that looks to pleasure is ignoble, and nothing else than flattery; is it not?

Callicles/ Be it so, if you please.

Socrates/ But the other endeavors that that which we cultivate may be made as excellent as possible, whether it be the body or the soul?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Must we then so endeavor to cultivate the city and the citizens, that we may make the citizens themselves as good as possible? For without this, as we discovered before, it is of no advantage to confer any other benefit upon them, unless the mind of those who are about to receive

either great riches, or dominion or any other power, be upright and good. Shall we lay this down, as being so?

Callicles/ Certainly, if it is more agreeable to you.

Socrates/ If, therefore, Callicles, when setting about some public works, we were to exhort one another to works of architecture, as to very large buildings of walls, or docks or temples, would it be necessary that we should consider and examine ourselves, first, whether we are skilled or not in the art of architecture, and from whom we learnt it? Would this be necessary or not?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then, secondly, we should consider this, whether we have ever constructed any private building, either for anyone of our friends, or for ourselves, and whether this building is beautiful or ugly. And if on examination we found that our masters had been good and famous, and that we have constructed, in conjunction with our masters, many and beautiful buildings, and many privately by ourselves, after we had left our masters: in that case it would become men of sense to undertake public works: but if we were not able to show that we had a master, nor any building at all, or many and those of no account, it would surely in that case be foolish to attempt public works, and to exhort one another to undertake them. Shall we admit that this is well said, or not?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not this the case with all other things, and if, attempting to serve the public in the capacity of physicians, we should exhort each other, as if we were skillful physicians, should not you and I examine each other thus: By the gods, in what state is Socrates with respect to bodily health? Has any other person, whether slave or freeman, been cured by Socrates of any disease? And I too,

I think, should make similar enquiries about you. And if we did not find that anyone, whether stranger or citizen, man or woman, had been improved in health by our means, by Zeus, Callicles, would it not be truly ridiculous, that men should come to such a pitch of folly, as before they had practiced much in private, as best they could, and had succeeded in many cases, and thoroughly exercised the art, to attempt to learn the potter's art in making a pitcher, as the proverb goes, and attempt to serve the public in the capacity of physician, and exhort others to do the same? Does it not appear to you that it would be foolish to act thus?

Callicles/ It does.

Socrates/ But now, O best of men, since you have yourself just now begun to busy yourself in affairs of state, and you exhort and reprove me because I do not busy myself about them, should we not examine each other; Come then, whom of the citizens has Callicles yet made better? Is there anyone who, being before depraved, unjust, intemperate, and foolish, has become upright and good through Callicles, whether stranger or citizen, slave or free-man? Tell me, Callicles, if anyone should ask you these questions, what will you say? Who will you say has been made better by associating with you? Are you ashamed to answer, whether you have done any such work while you were in a private capacity, before you attempted to interfere in public affairs?

Callicles/ You are caviling, Socrates.

Socrates/ I do not ask you from a desire to cavil, but really wishing to know in what way you think public affairs ought to be conducted by us; whether on undertaking the management of affairs of state we ought to attend to anything else than how we may become as good citizens as possible. Have we not already often admitted that a politician ought to do this? Have we admitted it or not? Answer. We

have admitted it; I will answer for you. If, then, a good man ought to endeavor to procure this for his city, now call to mind and say with respect to those men whom you a little before mentioned, whether they still appear to you to have been good citizens, Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles.

Callicles/ To me they do.

Socrates/ If, therefore, they were good citizens, it is evident that each of them made their fellow-citizens better instead of worse. Did they so, or not?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ When Pericles, therefore, began to speak in public, were the Athenians worse than when he addressed them for the last time?

Callicles/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ There is no 'perhaps' in the case, my good friend, but this is a necessary consequence from what has been admitted, if he really was a good citizen.

Callicles/ But what then?

Socrates/ Nothing. But tell me this moreover, whether the Athenians are supposed to have become better through Pericles, or quite the contrary, to have been corrupted by him. For so I hear, that Pericles made the Athenians idle, cowardly, talkative and avaricious, having been the first to give them pay.

Callicles/ You hear this, Socrates, from those whose ears have been bruised.

Socrates/ However, I no longer hear this, but I know well and so do you, that Pericles at first bore a high character, and that the Athenians passed no ignominious sentence upon him, when they were worse, but when by his means they had become upright and good, towards the close of the

life of Pericles, they condemned him for peculation, and were on the point of sentencing him to death, clearly as being a bad citizen.

Callicles/ What then? Was Pericles on this account a bad man?

Socrates/ Such an one, indeed, would be thought a bad manager of asses, horses, and oxen, if having received them, neither kicking, nor butting, nor biting, he should make them do all these things through vice. Does not every trainer of any animal whatever appear to you to be a bad one, who, having received it gentle, has made it more vicious than he received it? Does he appear so, or not?

Callicles/ Certainly, that I may gratify you.

Socrates/ Gratify me, then, by answering this too, whether man is of the class of animals, or not?

Callicles/ How should he not be?

Socrates/ Had not Pericles, then, the care of men?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ What then? Ought they not, as we just now admitted, to have become more just, instead of more unjust, under his management, if he who took charge of them was a good politician?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are not the just gentle, as Homer says? What say you? Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ However, he made them more savage than he received them, and this against himself, which he would least of all have wished.

Callicles/ Do you wish that I should agree with you?

Socrates/ If I seem to you to speak the truth.

Callicles/ Be it so, then.

Socrates/ If, then, he made them more savage, he must have made them more unjust, and worse?

Callicles/ Be it so.

Socrates/ According to this reasoning, then, Pericles was not a good politician?

Callicles/ Not, as you say.

Socrates/ By Zeus, nor as you say either, from what you have admitted. But, again, tell me with respect to Cimon. Did not they whom he took care of pass a sentence of ostracism upon him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? And did they not do the very same to Themistocles, and beside punish him with exile? And did they not sentence Miltiades, the conqueror at Marathon, to be thrown into the Barathrum, and but for the Prytanis, would he not have been thrown into it? These, however, if they had been good men, as you say, would never have suffered these things.

Good drivers, surely, do not at first keep themselves from falling from their cars, but, when they have trained their horses, and have themselves become better drivers, then fall off. This is never the case, either in driving, or in any other employment. Does it appear so to you?

Callicles/ To me it does not.

Socrates/ Our former statements, then, as it appears, are true, that we do not know any man who has been a good politician in this city. You admit that you know of none at present, but you say that formerly there were some, and you have selected these men: but these have appeared to be much the same as those of the present day, so that, if they were orators, they did not make use of the true rhetoric, for in that case they would not have fallen, nor yet did they employ flattery.

Callicles/ However, Socrates, it is far from being the case, that anyone of the present day will ever do such deeds as were done by anyone of those.

Socrates/ Neither, my excellent friend, do I blame these men, as servants of the city, but they appear to me to have been more efficient than those of the present day, and better able to procure for the city what it desired. But in changing and repressing their desires, by persuading and compelling them to such a course as would make the citizens become better, they scarcely differed at all from those of the present day; yet that is the only duty of a good citizen. But, with respect to providing ships, walls, and docks, and many other such things, I agree with you, that they were more able than the men of our day. You and I, however, act ridiculously in our discussion. For during the whole time that we have been conversing we have not ceased to go round and round the same subject, and to misunderstand each what the other says. I think that you have often admitted and acknowledged that there is a twofold method of treatment, both with respect to the body and with respect to the soul: and that the one is ministerial, by which we are enabled to procure food, if our bodies are hungry, drink, if they are thirsty, and if they are cold, garments, coverlids, shoes, and all other things which the body stands in need of. And I purposely speak to you through these images, in order that you may understand me more easily. For when anyone supplies these things, being either a retail tradesman or a merchant, or a manufacturer of any of them, a baker, a cook, a weaver, a shoemaker, or tanner, it is not at all surprising that such a person should appear, both to himself and others, to be concerned in the care of the body, that is, to all who are ignorant that, besides all these, there is a gymnastic and medicinal art, to which the care of the body really belongs, and whose duty it is to rule over all these arts, and to use

their respective productions, through knowing what meats or drinks are good and bad for the health of the body, whereas all those others are ignorant of this; for which reason all those other arts are servile, ministerial, and base, as regards the management of the body, but the gymnastic art and medicine are justly the mistresses of these. That the case is the same with respect to the soul, you, at one time, appeared to me to have understood, and admitted it as if you knew what I meant; but shortly afterwards you went on to say that there have been good and upright men in this city, and when I asked you who they were, you appeared to me to adduce men very similar with respect to politics, as if, on my asking with respect to gymnastics, who have been or are good managers of the body, you had very seriously said to me, Thearion the baker, Mithsecus, who wrote on Sicilian cookery, and Sarambus the tavern-keeper, and that they take wonderful care of the body, the first making admirable bread, the second, made-dishes, and the third, wine. Perhaps, then, you would be angry if I said to you, My friend, you know nothing about gymnastics; you tell me of men who are ministers and purveyors to desires, but who do not understand anything great and good respecting them, and who, it may so happen, having filled men's bodies, and made them gross, and having been praised by them, end by ruining their old flesh. These men, on the other hand, through their ignorance, will not blame those who have pampered their appetites, as being the causes of their diseases, and of the loss of their old flesh, but they who may happen to have been with them, and to have given them some advice, when, after a long time, repletion, having been indulged in without any regard to health, comes bringing disease with it, these they will accuse and blame, and do them some mischief if they can, but those others, who are the causes of their maladies, they will extol. And now you,

Callicles, act in very much the same way; you extol men who have pampered the Athenians by satiating their desires, and who they say have made the city great; and they do not perceive that it is swollen, and unsound through means of those ancient politicians: for, without considering temperance and justice, they have filled the city with harbors and docks, and walls and tributes, and such trifles. When, therefore, the crisis of their weakness comes, they will blame the advisers who are then present, but will extol Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, who were the causes of the mischief: and you perhaps, unless you are on your guard, and my friend Alcibiades, they will seize, when they have lost what they had before in addition to what they have acquired, although you are not the causes of the mischief, but perhaps accomplices. Moreover, I both now see a very foolish thing happening, and I hear of it with respect to men of former times. For I perceive that when a city punishes any of its politicians as guilty of wrong, they are angry, and complain bitterly that they are treated shamefully; and having done the city many good services, they are then unjustly ruined by it, as they allege. But the whole is a falsehood. For no president of a city can ever be unjustly ruined by the very city over which he presides. For the case seems to be the same with such as profess themselves to be politicians, as it is with the sophists. For the sophists, though wise in other things, commit this absurdity; whereas they affirm that they are teachers of virtue, they often accuse their disciples of acting unjustly towards them, by defrauding them of their wages, and not making other requitals for the benefits they have received from them. But what can be more unreasonable than such language as this, that men who have become good and just, who have been freed from injustice by their teacher, and have acquired justice, should yet act unjustly from that very quality which

they have not? Does not this, my friend, appear to you to be absurd? Of a truth, Callicles, you have compelled me to make a speech by your unwillingness to answer me.

Callicles/ But should you not be able to speak unless someone answered you?

Socrates/ It seems as if I could: for now I have carried my discourse to a great length, seeing that you will not answer me. But my good friend, tell me, by Zeus, the guardian of friendship, does it not appear to you unreasonable, that a man who says he has made another person good, should blame that person, because having been made good through his means, and being so, he has afterwards become bad?

Callicles/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ Do you not, then, hear those speak in this manner who profess to instruct men in virtue?

Callicles/ I do. But what can you say of men of no worth?

Socrates/ What then can you say of those, who, while they profess to preside over the city, and to take care that it shall be as good as possible, then accuse it, when it so happens, as being very bad? Do you think that these differ at all from the former? My good man, a sophist and an orator are the same thing, or nearly so, and very like, as I said to Polus. But you, through ignorance, think that rhetoric is something exceedingly beautiful, and despise the other. But, in truth, the sophist's art is as much more beautiful than rhetoric, as the legislative is than the judicial, and the gymnastic art than medicine, But I for my part think that public speakers and sophists alone ought not to complain of the very thing that they teach, as being mischievous to themselves, or that in the very same charge they should at the same time accuse themselves for not having at all benefited those whom they profess to have benefited. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And surely to impart a benefit without a stipulated reward, as is probable, is proper for these men only, if they assert what is true. For one who has received any other kind of benefit, as, for instance, who has acquired swiftness of foot through the instructions of a teacher of gymnastics, perhaps might deprive him of his gratuity, if the teacher of gymnastics had left it to him, without having made an agreement for a fixed price, that he should be paid the money as nearly as possible at the same time that he imparted his skill to him. For men, I think, do not act unjustly through slowness, but through injustice. Do they not?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ If, therefore, anyone should take away this, I mean injustice, there would be no danger of his ever being treated unjustly, but he alone might safely impart this benefit, if in truth he is able to make men good. Is it not so?

Callicles/ I admit it.

Socrates/ For this reason then, as it appears, it is not at all disgraceful to take money for giving advice about other things, as, for instance, about architecture, or other arts.

Callicles/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But with respect to this study, by what means a man may become as good as possible, and may best govern his own family or a city, it is reckoned disgraceful to withhold advice, except one should give him money. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ For it is evident that this is the reason that this alone of all benefits makes the person who has received it desirous of requiting it; so that it appears to be a good sign, if he who has imparted this benefit shall be recompensed in return; but otherwise not. Is this so?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ To which method, then, of taking care of the city do you advise me? explain to me; whether to that of thwarting the Athenians, in order that they may become as good as possible, as if I were a physician, or to that by which I should serve them, and curry favor with them. Tell me the truth, Callicles. For, as you begun to speak freely to me, it is right you should continue to say what you think. And now speak well and nobly.

Callicles/ I say, then, that I advise you to serve them.

Socrates/ You advise me, therefore, most noble Sir, to employ flattery.

Callicles/ Unless you prefer calling him a Mysian, Socrates; for if you will do so—

Socrates/ Do not repeat what you have often said, that anyone who pleases will kill me, lest I too should say again, that a bad man would slay a good one; nor that he will take away my property, if I have any, lest I too should say again, that after he has taken it away he will not be able to make any use of it, but as he has unjustly taken it from me, so having got it, he will make an unjust use of it; and if unjustly, basely; and if basely, wickedly.

Callicles/ How confident you seem to me to be, Socrates, that you will never suffer any of these things, as being one who lives out of harm's way, and who can never be brought before a court of justice by a man, perhaps, utterly depraved and vile!

Socrates/ I should indeed be foolish, Callicles, if I did not think that anyone in this city might suffer anything that might happen. This however I well know, that if I should go before a court of justice, and be exposed to any of the dangers you mention, he who takes me thither will be a bad man. For no good man would accuse one who has not

committed injustice. And it would not be at all wonderful, if I should be condemned to death. Do you wish I should tell you why I expect this?

Callicles/ By all means.

Socrates/ I think that I, in conjunction with a few Athenians, that I may not say alone, apply myself to the true political art, and alone of those of the present day perform the duties of a citizen. Since, then, in the conversations which I enter into from time to time, I do not speak for the purpose of conciliating popular favor, but with a view to that which is best, and not to that which is most agreeable, and as I am not willing to do those fine things that you advise, I shall not have anything to say in a court of justice. And the same illustration occurs to me that I mentioned to Polus. For I should be judged as a physician would be judged by children, with a cook for his accuser. For consider what defense such a man would make when taken before them, if one should accuse him as follows: 'O boys, this man has done you a great deal of mischief, and destroys both you and even the youngest of you, for, by cutting, cauterizing, weakening and choking you, he reduces you to great straits, giving you the bitterest draughts, and compelling you to hunger and thirst; not as I do who feed you with many sweet and various dainties. What do you think a physician when brought to such an extremity would have to say? If he should say the truth, 'I did all these things, boys, for your health,' what a clamor do you think such judges would raise against him? Would it not be loud?

Callicles/ Probably; one must think so, at least.

Socrates/ Do you not think, then, that he would be altogether at a loss what to say?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And I know that I should be treated just in the same way, if I came before a court of justice. For I should not be able to mention any pleasures which I had procured for them, which they consider as benefits and advantages; but I neither envy those who procure them, nor those for whom they are procured. And if anyone should say that I corrupt younger men, by causing them to doubt, or that I revile the elder men, by speaking bitter words, either privately or publicly, I should not be able to say the truth, that "I say and do all these things justly, and for your advantage, judges, and nothing else." So that I should probably suffer whatever might happen.

Callicles/ Does a man, then, appear to you, Socrates, to be well off in a city who is thus circumstanced, and is unable to help himself?

Socrates/ If there is that in him, Callicles, which you have often allowed, namely, if he can assist himself, by neither having said or done anything unjust towards men or towards gods. For this aid has often been acknowledged by us to be the best that a man can have for himself. If, therefore, anyone could convict me of being unable to afford this assistance either to myself or another, I should be ashamed, whether convicted before many or few, or alone by myself, and if I should be put to death for this inability I should be deeply grieved: but if I should die through want of flattering rhetoric, I well know that you would behold me meeting death cheerfully. For death itself no one fears, who is not altogether irrational and cowardly, but he does fear to commit injustice; for to go to Hades with a soul full of crimes is the worst of all evils. But, if you please, I will tell you a story to show that such is the case.

Callicles/ Since you have brought the rest to a conclusion, bring this to a conclusion also.

Socrates/ Hear then, as they say, a very beautiful tale, which you will consider a fable, as I think, but I a tale; for what I am about to tell you, I tell you as being true. As Homer says, then, Zeus, Neptune, and Pluto, divided the government among themselves, after they had received it from their father. This law, then, respecting men was in existence in the time of Saturn, and always was, and still is, established among the gods, that a man who has passed through life justly and piously when he dies should go to the isles of the blessed, and dwell in all perfect happiness free from evil, but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously should go to a prison of punishment and justice, which they call Tartarus. During the reign of Saturn, and even recently when Zeus held the government, there were living judges of the living, who passed sentence on the very day on which anyone was about to die. In consequence of this sentences were awarded badly. Pluto, therefore, and the guardians of the blessed isles, went to Zeus, and informed him that men came to them who did not deserve either sentence. Zeus, therefore, said, I will prevent this in future. For now sentences are badly awarded, because those that are judged are judged clothed, for they are judged while living. Many, therefore, he continued, whose souls are depraved are invested with beautiful bodies, nobility of birth, and riches, and when the judgment takes place, many witnesses come in their behalf, to testify that they have lived justly. Hence the judges are awed by these things, and moreover, they too pass sentence when clothed, for their minds are veiled with eyes and ears, and the whole body. All these things, then, are obstacles to them, as well their own clothing as that of those that are judged. First of all, then, they must no longer be allowed to know beforehand the time of their death: for at present they do know it beforehand. Prometheus, therefore, has orders to deprive them of this power: next they must be

judged divested of all these things; for they must be judged after they are dead: the judge too must be naked and dead, and examine with his soul the soul of each immediately after death, destitute of all his kindred, and leaving all that ornament on the earth, in order that the judgment may be just. Now I had observed these things before you, and accordingly have appointed my sons as judges, two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Eacus. These, then, when they are dead, shall judge in the meadow, at the three roads, of which two lead one to the isles of the blessed, the other to Tartarus. And Rhadamanthus shall judge those from Asia, and Eacus those from Europe. But to Minos I will give the prerogative of deciding in case any doubt occurs to the two others, in order that the judgment respecting the path men are to take may be as just as possible.

These are the things, Callicles, which I have heard, and believe to be true: and from these statements I infer the following results. Death, as it appears to me, is nothing else than the separation of two things, the soul and the body, from each other. But when they are separated from each other, each of them possesses pretty much the same habit that the man had when alive, the body its own nature, culture and affections, all distinct. So that if anyone's body, while living, was large by nature, or food, or both, his corpse when he is dead is also large; and if corpulent, his corpse is corpulent when he is dead; and so with respect to other things. And if again he took pains to make his hair grow long, his corpse also has long hair. Again, if anyone has been well whipped, and while living had scars in his body, the vestiges of blows, either from scourges or other wounds, his dead body also is seen to retain the same marks. And if the limbs of anyone were broken or distorted while he lived, these same defects are distinct when he is dead. In a word, of

whatever character anyone has made his body to be while living, such will it distinctly be, entirely or for the most part, for a certain time after he is dead. The same thing too, Callicles, appears to me to happen with respect to the soul; all things are distinctly manifest in the soul after it is divested of body, as well its natural disposition, as the affections which the man has acquired in his soul, from his various pursuits. When, therefore, they come to the judge, those from Asia to Rhadamanthus, Rhadamanthus, having made them stand before him, examines the soul of each, not knowing whose it is, but often meeting with the soul of the great king, or of some other king or potentate, he sees nothing sound in the soul, but finds it thoroughly marked with scourges and full of scars, through perjuries and injustice, which the actions of each has imprinted on his soul, and he finds all things distorted through falsehood and arrogance, and nothing upright, in consequence of its having been nurtured without truth; he also sees the soul full of disproportion and baseness through power, luxury, wantonness and intemperate conduct. On seeing it he forthwith sends it ignominiously to prison, where on its arrival it will undergo the punishment it deserves. But it is proper that everyone who is punished, if he is rightly punished by another, should either become better, and be benefited by it, or should be an example to others, that they, beholding his sufferings, may be made better through fear. But those that are benefited, at the same time that they suffer punishment both from gods and men, are such as have been guilty of curable offences; their benefit however both here and in Hades, accrues to them through means of pain and torments; for it is not possible to be freed from injustice in any other way. But those who have committed the most extreme injustice, and have become incurable through such crimes, serve as examples to others, and these

are not benefited at all, as being incurable, but others are benefited by beholding them suffering forever the greatest, most bitter, and most dreadful punishments for their sins, being suspended in the prison of Hades altogether as examples, a spectacle and warning to the unjust men who are constantly arriving. Of these, I say, Archelaus will be one, if Polus says true, and every other tyrant that resembles him. I think too, that the most of these examples will consist of tyrants, kings, and potentates, and such as have governed the affairs of cities; for these through their power commit the greatest and most impious crimes. Homer also bears witness to this; for he makes those to be kings and potentates, who are punished for ever in Hades, Tantalus, Sisyphus and Tityus; but Thersites, or any other private man who was depraved, no one has represented as suffering great punishments as if incurable; for I think it was not in his power to commit them; on which account he was more happy than those who had the power. But, Callicles, the most wicked men are amongst the powerful; nothing however hinders but that good men may be found amongst them; and when they are found they deserve the highest admiration: for it is a difficult thing, Callicles, and deserves high praise, when one who has great power of acting unjustly, passes through life justly. There are however a few men of this kind; for they have existed both here and elsewhere, and I think there will be hereafter good and upright men, endued with the virtue of administering justly whatever is committed to their charge. There has been one who is very celebrated among all the Greeks, Aristides, son of Lysimachus. But, my excellent friend, the generality of potentates prove wicked. As I said, then, when Rhadamanthus has got any such person in his power, he knows nothing else about him, neither who he is, nor who are his parents, but only that he is wicked; and on

discerning this, he sends him away to Tartarus, signifying at the same time whether he appears to be curable or incurable; but he arriving thither suffers according to his deserts. Sometimes, Rhadamanthus beholding another soul that has passed through life piously and with truth, whether it be of some private man, or any other, but I say, Callicles, especially of a philosopher, who has attended to his own affairs, and has not made himself very busy during life, he is delighted, and sends it to the isles of the blessed. Æacus too, does the very same things. And each of them passes sentence, holding a rod in his hand. But Minos sits apart looking on, and is the only one that has a golden scepter, as the Ulysses of Homer says he saw him; "bearing a golden scepter, and administering justice to the dead." I therefore, Callicles, am persuaded by these accounts, and consider how I may exhibit my soul before the judge in the most healthy condition. Wherefore, disregarding the honors that most men value, and looking to the truth, I shall endeavor in reality to live as virtuously as I can, and when I die, to die so. And I invite all other men, to the utmost of my power, and you too I in turn invite to this life and this contest, which I affirm surpasses all contests here, and I upbraid you because you will not be able to assist yourself, when you will have to undergo the sentence and judgment which I have just now mentioned; but when you shall come before the judge, the son of Ægina, and when he shall seize you and bring you before his tribunal, you will there gape and become dizzy, no less than I should here, and perhaps someone will strike you ignominiously on the face, and treat you with every species of contumely.

Perhaps, however, these things appear to you to be like an old woman's fable, and you accordingly despise them. And it would not be at all wonderful that we should despise them, if on investigation we could find anything better and

more true than them. But now you see that you three, who are the wisest of the Greeks of this day, you, Polus, and Gorgias, are unable to prove that we ought to live any other life than such as appears to be advantageous hereafter, but among so many arguments, while others have been refuted, this alone remains unshaken, that we ought to beware of committing injustice rather than of being injured, and that above all a man ought to study not to appear good, but to be so, both privately and publicly: and that if anyone is in any respect wicked, he should be punished, and that this is the next good to the being just, to become so, and to submit to the punishment one deserves; and that all flattery, whether of one's-self or others, whether of few or many, must be avoided; and that rhetoric, and every other action, is always to be employed with a view to what is just.

Be persuaded by me then, and follow me to that place, by going to which you will be happy, both living and after you are dead, as your own argument proves. And suffer anyone to despise you as senseless, and to treat you with contumely, if he pleases, and by Zeus, do you cheerfully let him strike that ignominious blow; for you will suffer nothing dreadful, if you are in reality upright and good, and devoted to the practice of virtue. And when we have thus exercised ourselves in common, we will then, if it should appear desirable, apply ourselves to politics, or we will deliberate on whatever we shall think desirable, being better qualified to deliberate than we now are. For it is disgraceful, being in the condition in which we appear to be at present, to pride ourselves, like youths, as if we were something, who yet never retain the same opinion on the same subjects, and these of the greatest moment; to such a pitch of ignorance have we reached! Let us use as our guide, then, the reasoning that has now been made clear to us, which teaches us, that this is the best mode of life, to live and to

die in the exercise of justice and the other virtues. This, then, let us follow, and invite others to do the same, not that, to which you confidently invited me: for it is of no value, Callicles.

Gorgias.

Translated by E. M. Cope.

Persons of the Dialog.

Callicles, Socrates, Chærepho, Gorgias,

And Polus.

Callicles/ This is the time, they say, Socrates, to come in at a fight and a fray.

Socrates/ What? are we come at the tail of a feast, as the saying is, and too late?

Callicles/ Yes indeed, and a very dainty feast it was. For Gorgias has just been treating us to a fine long declamation.

Socrates/ Aye but for that, Callicles, my friend Chærephon here is to blame, because he forced me to stay loitering in the market-place.

Chaerephon/ No matter, Socrates: as I was the cause so I'll find the cure. For Gorgias is a friend of mine, and therefore hell declaim for us, if you like at once, or if you prefer it by and by.

Callicles/ How's that, Chærephon? Is Socrates anxious to hear Gorgias?

Chaerephon/ To be sure, that's precisely the object of our being here.

Callicles/ Well then if you please to come home to my house—For Gorgias is staying with me, and he'll favor you with one of his addresses.

Socrates/ Thank you, Callicles. But do you think he wouldn't mind conversing with us? for I want to learn from the gentleman what is the real meaning of his art, and what it is that he professes to teach. The rest of his address he may deliver, as you say, at some future time.

Callicles/ There's nothing like asking him, Socrates. That in fact was one of the points in the address that he

gave us. At all events he invited just now everyone of the present company to ask him any question he pleased, and he said he was ready to answer them all.

Socrates/ I am so glad to hear it. Ask him, Chærephon.

Chaerephon/ Ask him what?

Socrates/ Who he is.

Chaerephon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Why suppose he had been a maker of shoes, he would have answered, I presume, that he is a shoe-maker. You understand what I mean, don't you?

Chaerephon/ I understand, and will ask him the question. Tell me, Gorgias, is it true, as Callicles here says, that you profess to answer any question that may be put to you?

Gorgias/ Quite true, Chærephon; in fact, that was the very profession that I was making just now, and I tell you that for many years nobody has ever yet asked me any new question.

Chaerephon/ Then I presume you find no difficulty in answering, Gorgias.

Gorgias/ You may try the experiment if you please, Chærephon.

Polus/ Yes, 'egad, and upon me too, if you like, Chærephon. For I am afraid Gorgias must be quite tired by the long speech which he has just been delivering.

Chaerephon/ How say you, Polus? do you think that you can answer better than Gorgias?

Polus/ And pray what does that matter, if I do it well enough for you?

Chaerephon/ Not at all. Well then, since such is your wish, answer me.

Polus/ Ask away.

Chaerephon/ I will. If Gorgias had been master of the same art as his brother Herodicus, what name would it

have been proper to give him? Would it not have been the same as the other?

Polus/ No doubt it would.

Chaerephon/ Then in calling him a physician we should have given him his right name.

Polus/ Yes.

Chaerephon/ And if he had been skilled in the art of Aristophon son of Aglaophon, or his brother (Polygnotus), what would it have been proper to call him?

Polus/ Plainly a painter.

Chaerephon/ And as it is, what is the art in which his skill lies? and what would be the proper name to give him in consequence?

Polus/ Chærephon, there are many arts amongst mankind from experiences experimentally invented: for it is experience that makes our days proceed by rule of art, the want of it by chance: and in each of these men participate various in various variously, the best of them in the best: of whom in fact Gorgias here is one, and so is a member of the noblest of all professions.

Socrates/ Barely indeed to all appearance, Gorgias, is Polus provided for making speeches; still however he is not fulfilling his promise to Chærephon.

Gorgias/ What in particular, Socrates?

Socrates/ He doesn't seem to me exactly to answer the question put to him.

Gorgias/ Well then, if you please, do you ask him.

Socrates/ Not if you wouldn't mind answering yourself, but I should much prefer asking you. For it is plain to me even from what Polus has already said, that he has studied rather what is called the art of rhetoric, than that of (dialectical) conversation.

Polus/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because, Polus, when Chærephon asks you what art Gorgias is master of, you pronounce an eulogium upon his art, just as if anyone found fault with it; without answering what it is.

Polus/ Why, didn't I answer that it was the noblest of all?

Socrates/ Yes indeed you did. But no one asked you what sort of art Gorgias' was, but what, and by what name Gorgias ought to be called; just as Chærephon traced out the line for you before, and you answered him fairly and in few words, so now in the same way tell us what the art is, and what we are to call Gorgias. Or rather, Gorgias, do you tell us yourself what is the art you are master of, and what we are to call you in consequence.

Gorgias/ The art of rhetoric, Socrates.

Socrates/ Are we then to call you a rhetorician?

Gorgias/ Aye a good one, Socrates, if you please to call me what 'I boast myself to be,' as Homer says.

Socrates/ Well, I will with pleasure.

Gorgias/ Then pray do.

Socrates/ So then are we to say that you have the power of making others besides yourself the same?

Gorgias/ Yes, I certainly make this profession, not only here but elsewhere as well.

Socrates/ Would you then be good enough, Gorgias, to finish the conversation in the way in which we are now talking together, in alternate question and answer, and lay aside that lengthy style, in which Polus just began, for a future occasion? Come now, keep your promise, and don't disappoint me; but consent to answer briefly the questions put to you.

Gorgias/ There are some answers, Socrates, which are obliged to express themselves at great length: not but that I will do my best to make them as short as possible. For in fact this again is one of the things that I lay claim to, that

no one could ever express the same meaning in fewer words than myself.

Socrates/ That's exactly what we want, Gorgias. This is precisely what I should like you to give us a specimen of, your short style; your lengthy one you can reserve for some future time.

Gorgias/ Well, I will do so; and you shall say that you never heard anyone use fewer words.

Socrates/ Come then. Since you say that you are master of the art of rhetoric, and can make anyone else an orator—what of all things is it that rhetoric deals with? as weaving for instance is employed upon the production of clothes; isn't it?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And music, again, upon the composition of tunes?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Faith, Gorgias, I do admire your replies. You are indeed answering in the very fewest possible words.

Gorgias/ Yes, and I think I do it very tolerably well, Socrates.

Socrates/ You are perfectly right. Come, then, answer me in the same way about rhetoric again; what are the things to which its knowledge is applied?

Gorgias/ To words.

Socrates/ To what sort of words, Gorgias? Do you mean those that point out by what course of treatment the sick may recover their health?

Gorgias/ No.

Socrates/ Then rhetoric does not deal with all words.

Gorgias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But still it makes men able to speak.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And to understand what they talk about as well?

Gorgias/ Of course it does.

Socrates/ Well, but doesn't the art we were just now speaking of, medicine I mean, make men able to understand as well as to speak about the sick?

Gorgias/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Then medicine too, it seems, deals with words?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Those which are about diseases?

Gorgias/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Well and doesn't the gymnastic art too deal with words, those namely which relate to the good and bad condition of bodies?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And moreover the case is the same, Gorgias, with all other arts besides: each of them deals with words—those, that is, that belong to the thing which is the object of each particular art.

Gorgias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Then why in the world don't you call all the rest of the arts rhetorical, when they are about 'words,' if you give the name of rhetoric to everyone which deals with words?

Gorgias/ Because, Socrates, in all the other arts the knowledge is, so to speak, entirely confined to manual operations and such like actions, whereas in rhetoric there is no such manual process involved; but of all that it does and all that it effects words are the vehicle. That is why I claim on behalf of rhetoric that it is the art that deals with words; and I maintain that I am right.

Socrates/ I wonder whether I quite understand what sort of art you mean to call it? I shall know better by and

by. Pray now answer me. We have such things as arts, haven't we?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But of all these arts, some I believe have production for their chief object, and require few words—some indeed none at all; in fact, the objects of the art might be carried out even in silence; such as painting and sculpture and many others. That is the kind which you seem to have in view, when you say that rhetoric has no connection with them. Isn't it?

Gorgias/ You take my meaning perfectly, Socrates.

Socrates/ But other arts there are which perform all their operations by means of words, and as to acts, require either none at all, as one may say, in addition, or only in a very trifling degree; such as numeration for example, and reckoning, and land-measuring, and draughts, and a number of other arts, some of which have their 'words' pretty nearly equal in amount to their actions, most of them indeed more numerous; or even altogether their processes are carried on and their effects produced entirely by means of words. It is to this class, I believe, that you understand rhetoric to belong.

Gorgias/ Quite true.

Socrates/ But I don't at all suppose that you mean to call anyone of these rhetoric, although this was implied by the expression you used, in saying that the art whose effects are produced by words is rhetoric; and one might suppose if one chose to be captious in arguing, so then you mean arithmetic by rhetoric, do you, Gorgias? But I don't believe you do mean either arithmetic or geometry when you speak of rhetoric.

Gorgias/ And quite right too, Socrates; your supposition is perfectly just.

Socrates/ Then let us begin at once, and do you do your part in dispatching the answer to my question. For as

rhetoric is found to be one of those arts which chiefly employ words, and there are others also of the same kind, try to explain to me what it is in words upon which rhetoric operates in producing its effects; suppose, for instance, anyone were to ask me about anyone you please of the arts I just now mentioned—what is the art of numeration, Socrates? I should tell him, as you said just now, that it is one of those that produce their effects by words. And if he were further to inquire, what are those about? I should say that it is one of those which are about the even and odd, the whole series of each of them, whatever the number may amount to. And if again he were to ask, And reckoning, what art do you call that? I should reply that this likewise is one of those that effects all its operations by words. And if he were to ask still further, what is its object? I should say, in the language of the framers of bills drawn for the assembly, 'in all else' the art of reckoning is 'like the foregoing;' for its object is the same, the even and the odd; but there is just this amount of difference between them, that the art of reckoning or arithmetic takes into consideration the relative as well as the absolute properties and relations of the even and the odd in point of number. And if the same question were repeated about astronomy, and upon my replying, that this again effects all its processes by words, the questioner were to say, And what are the 'words' of astronomy about, Socrates? I should tell him that they are about the motion of the stars and the sun and moon, that is to say, their relative velocities.

Gorgias/ And you would be quite right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Come then, in your turn, Gorgias. It so happens, you see, that rhetoric is one of those arts that effect and give force to all their operations by words. Isn't it?

Gorgias/ It is so.

Socrates/ Then tell me what they deal with. What of all things in the world is that which is the object of the words which rhetoric employs?

Gorgias/ The most important of all human things, Socrates, and the best.

Socrates/ Nay, Gorgias, here again what you say is open to question, and by no means clear as yet. For I think you must have heard at parties after dinner people singing this catch, in which in the words of the song the good things of this life are enumerated, how that health is best of all, the second best thing is to be born handsome, and the third, as the author of the catch says, to be rich without fraud.

Gorgias/ To be sure I have; but what is your object in mentioning this?

Socrates/ Because those whose business lies in all those things that the composer of the catch spoke so highly of would straightway present themselves, physician and training-master and tradesman; and first of all the physician would say, My dear Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you: for it is not his art that is employed upon mankind's greatest good, but mine. If then I were to ask him, And who are you that say this? he would reply probably, A physician. What say you then? Is it your art that has the greatest good for its object? How can health, Socrates, he would say very likely, be anything else? What greater blessing can men have than health?

And if again after him the trainer were to say, I should be surprised too myself, Socrates, if Gorgias can point out to you any greater good in his own art than I in mine; I should make answer to him again as to the other, And who may you be, my friend, I should like to know? and what's your business? A professor of gymnastics, he would say; and my business is to make men strong and handsome in their persons. And next to the training-master the tradesman, I dare say, would tell us with a lofty scorn of

them all, Do pray consider, Socrates, whether you think that there is any blessing superior to wealth, either in the eyes of Gorgias or of anyone else whatsoever. We should say to him accordingly, What's that pray? are you the man that makes that? He would say yes. And what's your name? A man of business. How then? do you judge wealth to be the greatest blessing to mankind? we shall say. Of course I do, he will reply. Aye, but Gorgias here contends that his own art is the source of greater good than yours, we should say. Plainly then his next question would be, And what is this good? let Gorgias make answer. Come then, Gorgias, consider yourself to be questioned by them as well as me, and answer us what is that which you say is the greatest good to mankind, and that you can produce it.

Gorgias/ That, Socrates, which really is the greatest good and the cause at once of freedom to men in general in their own persons, and no less to the individual man of acquiring power over others in his own city.

Socrates/ What name then pray do you give to this?

Gorgias/ The power of persuading by words, I should call it, the judges in a court of law, or the councilors in a council-room, or the assembly men in an assembly, or any other kind of meeting which is convened for a public purpose. And yet by the aid of this talent you may make the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave: and for your famous man of business, it will turn out that he makes his money for somebody else and not for himself, but for you who have the power of speaking and gaining the ear of the multitudes.

Socrates/ Now, Gorgias, I think you have come very near to an explanation of what you understand by the art of rhetoric, and, if I at all enter into your meaning, you define rhetoric to be the artificer of persuasion, and you say that its entire business and the whole sum and substance of it results in this. Or have you any power to

mention that rhetoric possesses beyond that of producing persuasion in the minds of the hearers?

Gorgias/ None at all, Socrates; your definition seems to me to be sufficient; this is no doubt the sum and substance of it.

Socrates/ Then listen to me, Gorgias. I flatter myself, you may be quite sure, that if there be anyone else in the whole world that engages in a discussion from a genuine desire to know just what the argument is about and no more, I too am one of that sort; and I make no doubt that you are another.

Gorgias/ Well, what then, Socrates?

Socrates/ I'll tell you directly. What your view is of the exact nature of the persuasion produced by rhetoric, and of the subjects to which it is applied, I assure you I by no means clearly understand; though at the same time I have a kind of suspicion of what I suppose you to mean by it, and what it deals with. Still I will ask you nevertheless what you do mean by the persuasion that proceeds from rhetoric, and what are the objects on which it is exercised.

Now why when I have a suspicion about the matter myself am I going to ask you instead of myself stating it? It is not on your account, but for the sake of the argument, that it may proceed in such a way as may make the subject of our conversation most clear to us. For see now if you don't think I am right in repeating my question. Take a parallel case. If my question had been, to what class of painters does Zeuxis belong? had you replied, he is a figure-painter, would it not have been quite fair in me to ask you, what sort of figures he paints, and on what occasions?

Gorgias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And is not the reason this, that there are besides him other painters employed upon a number of other figures?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if no one else were a painter but Zeuxis, your answer would have been right enough?

Gorgias/ Of course it would.

Socrates/ Well then tell me about rhetoric in the same way; whether it is your opinion that rhetoric is the only art that produces persuasion, or others besides it. What I mean is something of this sort: when anyone teaches anything, does he persuade in teaching it? or do you think otherwise?

Gorgias/ Certainly not, Socrates; on the contrary, he most assuredly does persuade.

Socrates/ And again, if we apply our question to the same arts as we mentioned just now, does not numeration, or the man conversant with that science, teach us all the properties of number?

Gorgias/ Yes, no doubt.

Socrates/ And so likewise persuades?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then numeration also is an artificer of persuasion?

Gorgias/ It seems so.

Socrates/ So then if we are asked what kind of persuasion and what about, we shall reply I presume, that which conveys instruction, which deals with the amounts of all the odd and even numbers. And we shall be able to show that all the rest of the arts that we were just now referring to are artificers of persuasion, and what that is, and what it is about. Shan't we?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ It follows that rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion.

Gorgias/ True.

Socrates/ Since then it is not the only one that effects this object, but others besides it, we should be entitled next to put a further question to the speaker, as we did in the case of the painter, What sort of persuasion then is it of which rhetoric is the art, and what is that persuasion about? You think it would be fair, don't you, to put such a further question?

Gorgias/ Oh, yes.

Socrates/ Answer me then, Gorgias, since you agree with me in this view.

Gorgias/ Well then I mean that kind of persuasion, Socrates, which is exercised in law-courts and any other great crowds, as indeed I said just now; and it is about everything that is just and unjust.

Socrates/ I had a suspicion myself, to tell you the truth, Gorgias, that that was the kind of persuasion you meant, and that those were its objects: but that you may not be surprised if I ask you by and by some such question as seems to be quite clear, though I repeat it—for, as I say, I do so in order that our argument may be brought regularly to a conclusion; not on your account, but that we may not get into the habit of snatching up an over-hasty conclusion as to one another's meaning founded on a mere guess, but that you may state your views as you think fit according to your own notions.

Gorgias/ Indeed, Socrates, in my opinion you are doing quite right.

Socrates/ Come then, let this be the next thing we examine. There is such a thing as what you call 'to have learnt'?

Gorgias/ There is.

Socrates/ And again 'to have believed'?

Gorgias/ Oh, yes.

Socrates/ Do you think then to have learnt and to have believed, and learning and believing, are the same thing, or something different?

Gorgias/ Different, I should think, Socrates.

Socrates/ And quite right too: and you may be sure of it from this. If you were asked, Is there such a thing, Gorgias, as false as well as true belief? you would say yes, I presume.

Gorgias/ I should.

Socrates/ But again, is there false as well as true knowledge?

Gorgias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ To be sure, because it plainly appears a second time that they are not identical.

Gorgias/ True.

Socrates/ But still those that have learnt are persuaded, as well as those that have believed.

Gorgias/ It is so.

Socrates/ Would you have us then assume two forms of persuasion, the one conveying belief without knowledge, the other knowledge?

Gorgias/ Yes, by all means.

Socrates/ Then which of the two kinds of persuasion is it that rhetoric effects in law-courts or any other large assemblies on the subject of right and wrong? Is it that which gives rise to belief without knowledge, or that from which knowledge springs?

Gorgias/ Plainly, of course, Socrates, that which gives rise to belief.

Socrates/ Rhetoric then, it seems, is an artificer of persuasion productive of belief but not of instruction in matters of right and wrong.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor consequently is the rhetorician qualified to instruct law-courts or any other large masses of people on questions of right and wrong, but only to persuade them. For surely he never could be able to instruct such a great crowd in things of such importance in a few minutes.

Gorgias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Come, then, let us see what we do actually mean by rhetoric: for to tell you the truth, I can't yet distinctly make out even myself what my own opinion is. Whenever the city holds a meeting for the election of state-physicians or shipwrights or any other class of craftsmen, will not on such occasions the rhetorician refrain from offering his advice? plainly because in every election we are bound to choose the most skillful practitioner. Or, again, as to the building of walls, or the construction of harbors or docks, it is not he that will give advice, but the master-builders. Or, again, when advice is to be given upon the election of generals, or the disposition of troops to meet an enemy, or the occupation of military positions, on such occasions it is the military men that will advise, and not the rhetoricians. Or what say you, Gorgias, to such cases? For as you profess to be a speaker yourself and to qualify others for speaking, it is right to learn your opinion upon the matters of your own art. So pray suppose that I am acting now with a view to your interests. For very likely one of the present company here may be desirous of becoming a pupil of yours—as in fact I think I see some, and I dare say a good many—who perhaps might be ashamed to trouble you with repeated questions. And so when I repeat mine, suppose yourself to be questioned by them as well. What good shall we get, Gorgias, by frequenting your society? On what subjects shall we be able to offer advice to the city? is it about right and wrong alone, or all those things besides which Socrates was just now mentioning? Try then to give them an answer.

Gorgias/ Well, Socrates, I will try to reveal to you clearly the entire force and meaning of rhetoric: in fact you pointed out the way very well yourself. You know, I presume, that yonder docks and walls, the pride of your city, and the construction of your harbors, are due to the counsels of Themistocles, and partly to those of Pericles, but not to the masters of the several crafts.

Socrates/ So I am told, Gorgias, of Themistocles; Pericles I heard myself when he gave us his advice about building the 'middle wall.'

Gorgias/ And so you see, Socrates, that wherever there is an election of such officers as you were just speaking of, it is the orators that give advice, and carry their opinions in such matters.

Socrates/ It is exactly because I was so surprised at this that I have been asking ever so long what the virtue of rhetoric can possibly be. For regarded in this light its grandeur and importance appear to me to be something quite supernatural.

Gorgias/ Aye, if you knew all, Socrates, how it embraces under it every kind of power, as one may say. I will give you a convincing proof of it. I myself have often ere now, in company with my brother (Herodicus), or any other physician, gone into the house of one of their patients, and upon his refusing to take their medicines, or to submit to be operated upon either by the knife or the cautery, when the physician failed to persuade him, I succeeded, by the aid of no other art than that of rhetoric. And I maintain too that if a physician and a rhetorician went together into any city you please, supposing they had to argue out the question before a general assembly or any other kind of meeting which of the two was to be elected, orator or physician, the latter would be totally extinguished, and the able speaker elected if he chose. And if the contest lay between him and the master of any other craft you please to name, the rhetorician would carry

his own election sooner than anyone else whatever: for there is no subject in the world on which the rhetorician could not speak more persuasively than the master of any other art whatsoever, before a multitude. Such then is the extent and such the quality of the power of this art. We are bound however, Socrates, to employ rhetoric in the same way as every other kind of exercise. For in fact all other exercises are not to be employed against everybody indiscriminately merely because a man has become such a proficient in boxing and wrestling or the use of arms as to have the advantage over friend and foe: this does not entitle him to knock his friends down or stab or assassinate them. No by my faith, nor again if anyone were to frequent a wrestling-school until he had got his body into prime condition, and become an expert pugilist, and then go and strike his father and his mother or any other of his relations or friends, would that be any reason for conceiving an aversion to trainers and fencing-masters, and expelling them from our cities. For they no doubt gave their lessons to these pupils of theirs with a view to the proper employment of them against enemies and wrong-doers, in self-defense, not aggression: whereas the others pervert their strength and their art to an improper use. Yet it does not follow that the teachers are rogues, nor that their art is either to blame for all this, or bad in itself; but those that misuse it, in my opinion. For it is true that the orator is able to speak against everybody and upon every question in such a way as to find greater acceptance with all large assemblies, on any subject in a word he chooses. But he is none the more entitled on that account to rob either the physicians of their due credit, because he could do it if he liked, or artists of any other kind; but he is bound to use his rhetoric fairly, like skill in any other exercise. But it seems to me that, supposing a man to make himself a rhetorician and then to use this faculty and this art to commit wrong, it is not the teacher that ought to incur odium and to be banished from our cities.

For he gave his lessons to be turned to a fair use, but the other perverts them. It is therefore he that abuses the art that may fairly be held in aversion and banished or put to death, and not the teacher.

Socrates/ I believe, Gorgias, that you like myself have had a good deal of experience in arguments, and in the course of them have arrived at the discovery of something of this sort, that it is no easy matter for people to come to any definite agreement upon any questions they may have undertaken to discuss, and after giving and receiving instruction so to bring the conversation to an end; but on the contrary, if a dispute arises between them upon any point, and the one declares that the other expresses himself either incorrectly or indistinctly, they get angry, and suppose that what is said proceeds from jealousy of themselves, from a spirit of mere rivalry, and not from a wish to sift the question proposed for discussion. And in fact occasionally this results at last in the most indecent scenes, in mutual abuse and recrimination of such a kind that even the bystanders are vexed on their own account that they ever condescended to listen to such a set of fellows. What then is my motive in saying this? It is because your present statements don't seem to me quite consistent or in harmony with what you said at first about rhetoric. Now I am afraid to refute you, for fear you should suppose that I speak with a disputatious object, not with a view to throw light upon the subject under discussion, but aiming at you personally. Now if you are one of the same sort of persons as I am myself, I should be glad to continue my questions, but if not, I would rather let it alone. And what sort of person am I? I am one of those that would be glad to be refuted when I assert anything that is untrue, and glad to refute anyone else supposing he fall into any error; but just as glad to be refuted as to refute, because I consider it a greater benefit, in proportion as the benefit is greater to be delivered oneself from the

greatest evil than to deliver another. For I think that there is no evil that can befall a man so great as a false opinion upon the subjects which we now have under discussion. Now if you as well as myself profess yourself to be one of this sort let us go on with the conversation: but if on the other hand you think we had better drop it, let us at once dismiss it and break off the argument.

Gorgias/ Nay, Socrates, I myself like you pretend to be one of that sort of persons whose character you are sketching: perhaps however we ought also to have consulted the convenience of the company present. For to say the truth, for some time before you came I had been delivering a long address to our friends here, and now again if we go on with our discussion we shall very likely protract it to a considerable length. We ought therefore to consider their inclinations as well as our own, and not to detain them when they may be wanting to do something else.

Chaerephon/ You hear yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, the applause of our friends there, how anxious they are to hear anything you have to say. For my own part however, God forbid that I should ever be so busy as to give up an argument so important and so well treated because I preferred doing anything else.

Callicles/ Yes, by my faith, Chærephon. And indeed for myself, though I have been present ere now at plenty of discussions I don't know that I ever in my life was so much gratified as on the present occasion; and therefore as far as I am concerned, if you choose to go on talking all day long you will do me a favor.

Socrates/ Well you may be sure, Callicles, there is nothing to prevent it on my part, if Gorgias consents.

Gorgias/ After this Socrates, it would indeed be a shame for me to hang back, when I myself challenged the company to ask me any question they pleased. But if our

friends here are of this mind, go on with the conversation and ask me what you like.

Socrates/ Then let me tell you, Gorgias, what surprises me in the words you used: to be sure I dare say you are right and it is I that misunderstand you. You say you are able to qualify anyone for speaking who chooses to become your pupil.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does that mean then that he is qualified to gain the ear of a crowd on any subject, not by way of instruction but persuasion?

Gorgias/ Just so.

Socrates/ You said just now if I mistake not that in sanitary matters too, the orator will be more persuasive than the physician?

Gorgias/ I certainly did, in a crowd that is to say.

Socrates/ Well and doesn't 'a crowd' mean the ignorant? for surely amongst the well-informed he won't carry more weight than the physician?

Gorgias/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And so if he is to be better able to persuade than the physician, he becomes better able to persuade than the man of real knowledge?

Gorgias/ Yes certainly.

Socrates/ Not being a physician though, is he?

Gorgias/ True.

Socrates/ But one who is not a physician is unversed I presume in the art of which the physician is master.

Gorgias/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ It follows then that the ignorant man will be more persuasive among the ignorant than the man of real information, supposing the orator to be more persuasive than the physician. Does this follow, or anything else?

Gorgias/ In this case no doubt it does.

Socrates/ And so likewise in respect of all the rest of the arts the case is the same with the orator and with rhetoric; there is no occasion, that is to say, for them to be acquainted with the things themselves, but it is enough for them to have discovered some instrument of persuasion which may enable them to present the appearance to the ignorant of knowing better than the well informed.

Gorgias/ Well and isn't it a great comfort, Socrates, without learning any of the other arts, but with this one alone, to be at no disadvantage in comparison with the professional people?

Socrates/ Whether the rhetorician is or is not at a disadvantage with the rest of the world by reason of this state of things [or, in consequence of this character, these qualifications of his] we will examine by and by, if we find that our argument requires it; but just at present let us consider this first, whether the rhetorician stands in the same relation to what is just and unjust and base and noble and good and bad, as to what is wholesome and the several objects of all the other arts; that is to say, that he is ignorant of what is good or bad or honorable or disgraceful or just or unjust, in itself, but has devised the means of persuasion about them, so as with ho knowledge at all to get the credit amongst the ignorant of knowing better than the man of real knowledge? Or is this knowledge absolutely required? and must anyone who means to learn rhetoric be prepared with all this before he comes to you? or if not, shall you the master of the art give one who does come no instruction at all in these matters—for it's no business of yours—but make him in the eyes of the vulgar seem to know things of this kind when he doesn't, and seem to be good when he isn't? or will you be altogether unable to teach him rhetoric unless he have a previous acquaintance with the truth in these matters? or what are the real facts of the case, Gorgias? Do in heaven's

name, as you said just now, draw aside the veil and tell us in what the virtue of rhetoric really does consist.

Gorgias/ Well I suppose, Socrates, if he does not know all this already I shall have to teach him this as well.

Socrates/ Hold there, for that is well said. If you make a man a rhetorician he must needs be acquainted with what is just and unjust either beforehand, or afterwards from your instructions.

Gorgias/ Just so.

Socrates/ How then? one who has learnt the art of building is a builder, isn't he?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so one who has learnt music a musician?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And one who has studied medicine a physician? and so on for all the rest upon the same principle; everyone who has studied any particular subject acquires that character which is imparted to him by the knowledge of it?

Gorgias/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And so likewise, by the same rule one that has learnt justice is a just man?

Gorgias/ Most undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But the just man it is to be presumed does just things.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So then must the rhetorician needs be a just man, and the just man desire to act justly?

Gorgias/ Yes, so it appears.

Socrates/ Consequently the just man will never desire to do wrong.

Gorgias/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And it follows from what we said that the rhetorician must be a just man.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Consequently the rhetorician will never desire to do wrong.

Gorgias/ No, it seems not.

Socrates/ Then do you remember saying a little while ago that we have no right to find fault with the training masters nor expel them from our cities if a boxer makes an unfair use of his boxing and does wrong? and so in like manner if an orator employs his rhetoric unfairly, we are not accuse the teacher or expel him from the city, but the man that does the wrong and misuses his rhetoric? was that said or not?

Gorgias/ It was.

Socrates/ But now it appears that that very same person, the rhetorician, never could have been guilty of any wrong at all, doesn't it?

Gorgias/ It does.

Socrates/ And at the beginning of our conversation, Gorgias, it was stated that rhetoric deals with words, not words about even and odd numbers, but about what is just and unjust; wasn't it?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well I supposed at the very time when you made that remark that rhetoric never could be an unjust thing, when all the speeches that it makes are about justice; but, when you told us shortly after that the orator might make an unjust use of his rhetoric, then I was surprised, and thinking that the two assertions did not harmonize with one another I said what I did, that if you thought it like myself an advantage to be refuted it was advisable to continue the conversation, or if not to let it drop: and now that we afterwards come to examine the point, you see yourself that we are come again to the

conclusion that it is impossible for the rhetorician to make an unjust use of his rhetoric or consent to do wrong. Now to sift this matter thoroughly and satisfactorily to make out what the exact truth of it may be, by the dog, Gorgias, is a thing not to be done in a short interview.

Polus/ How's that, Socrates? is that your real opinion about rhetoric that you are now stating? Or do you suppose because Gorgias was ashamed not to admit that the rhetorician is acquainted with justice and honor and good, and if a pupil come to him without knowing all this that he will teach it himself—and then from this admission there followed I dare say some slight inconsistency in the expressions he used—just what you are so fond of, when it was you yourself that turned the conversation upon questions of that sort?

For who do you think is likely to deny either that he is acquainted with justice himself, or can teach it to others? Nay, it is very unmannerly to turn the conversation upon such things as these.

Socrates/ Well to be sure, fairest Polus, it is precisely for this reason that we provide ourselves with friends and children that as soon as the advance of age has made our footing uncertain you youngsters may be there to set our life on its legs again in word as well as in deed. And now if Gorgias and I are making any false step in our argument there you are to set us right again: indeed you are bound to do so. And I on my part am ready if you think any of our conclusions are wrong to retract anyone of them you please, provided only you do me the favor to observe just one thing.

Polus/ What thing do you mean?

Socrates/ To keep that discursive style of yours in check, Polus, which you made the attempt to indulge in at first.

Polus/ How? Mayn't I be allowed to say as much as I please?

Socrates/ It would indeed be hard upon you, my admirable friend, if you were to have come to Athens, where there is the greatest freedom of speech in all Greece, and then you were to be the only person there who was debarred from it. But just set my case against yours. If you make a long speech and refuse to reply to my questions, wouldn't it be equally hard upon me not to be allowed to go away and not listen to you? No, no, if you have any regard for the argument we have been holding and want to set it right again, as I said just now take back anything you please, and in your turn questioning and questioned, like myself and Gorgias, refute or submit to refutation. For you claim to be acquainted with all that Gorgias knows, I believe, don't you?

Polus/ Yes to be sure I do.

Socrates/ Then I suppose you like him invite people on all occasions to put any question to you they like as one that knows how to find an answer?

Polus/ No doubt I do.

Socrates/ Well then now, either put the questions or answer them, whichever you like.

Polus/ Well, so I will. Answer me then, Socrates. Since you seem to think that Gorgias is at a loss about rhetoric, what do you say it is yourself?

Socrates/ Do you ask me what art I say it is?

Polus/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ None at all, it seems to me, Polus, to tell you the exact truth.

Polus/ Well what do you take rhetoric to be then?

Socrates/ A thing which you tell us in the work that I lately read gave rise to art.

Polus/ What thing do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean a kind of acquired habit.

Polus/ So you take rhetoric to be an acquired habit?

Socrates/ Yes I do—if you have no particular objection.

Polus/ A habit of what?

Socrates/ Of the production of a sort of gratification and pleasure.

Polus/ Well and don't you think rhetoric a very fine thing, to be able to oblige one's fellow creatures?

Socrates/ Hallo, Polus, have I told you yet what I say it is, that you think yourself entitled to ask what follows that, whether I don't think it very fine?

Polus/ Why, haven't you told me that you call it a sort of habit?

Socrates/ Will you please then, since you set such a high value on 'obliging,' to oblige me in a trifling matter?

Polus/ To be sure I will.

Socrates/ Ask me now what art I take cookery to be.

Polus/ I ask you then, what art is cookery?

Socrates/ None at all, Polus.

Polus/ Well what is it? tell us.

Socrates/ I tell you then, a sort of habit.

Polus/ Of what? let us hear.

Socrates/ What I say is, of the production of gratification and pleasure, Polus.

Polus/ Do you mean to say then that cookery and rhetoric are the same thing?

Socrates/ Oh dear no, but a branch of the same kind of pursuit.

Polus/ What pursuit do you mean?

Socrates/ I fear it may be somewhat rude to say the truth: for on Gorgias' account I am reluctant to speak out, for fear he should suppose that I am satirizing his professional pursuits. At the same time whether this is the kind of rhetoric that Gorgias practices, I really don't know; for in fact from our argument just now we arrived at no distinct notion of his views on this matter. But what I

mean by rhetoric is a branch of a particular set of things which have nothing 'fine' about them at all.

Gorgias/ What is it, Socrates, pray let us know; don't hesitate on my account.

Socrates/ It seems to me then, Gorgias, to be a sort of pursuit not scientific at all, but of a shrewd and bold spirit, quick and clever in its dealings with the world. And the sum and substance of it I call flattery [coaxing or wheedling]. Amongst a great number of branches of this kind of study one in particular I take to be cookery: which has indeed the appearance of an art, but according to my view is no art, but a habit and a knack. Of this I call the art of rhetoric a branch, as well as that of dressing and adorning oneself and of sophistic, four branches of it applied to four varieties of things. If then Polus wishes to make any inquiry, let him do so: for he has not yet heard which sort of branch of flattery I pronounce rhetoric to be; but without observing that I have not yet answered that question, he goes on to ask further whether I don't think it a very fine thing. But I won't answer him whether I think rhetoric a fine thing or a foul one until I have first made answer what it is. For it is not fair, Polus: but if you want to learn, ask me what kind of branch of flattery I pronounce rhetoric to be.

Polus/ I ask you then, and do you answer me, what kind of branch?

Socrates/ I wonder whether you will understand me when I do answer. Rhetoric is according to my view the unreal image (counterfeit presentment) of a branch of Politics.

Polus/ Well then, do you say it is a fine thing or a foul one?

Socrates/ A foul one, I should say, for all bad things I call foul; since I must answer you as though you already understood my meaning.

Gorgias/ No upon my word, Socrates; why I myself don't understand what you say either.

Socrates/ Like enough, Gorgias, for I have not yet explained myself distinctly; but Polus (Colt) here is so young and hot.

Gorgias/: Well never mind him; but tell me what you mean by saying that rhetoric is the unreal image of a branch of Politics.

Socrates/ Well I will try to tell you what rhetoric appears to me to be: and if I am wrong Polus here will refute me. There is such a thing I presume as what you call body and soul?

Gorgias/ Of course there is.

Socrates/ And in these again you believe that there is a good condition of each?

Gorgias/ To be sure I do.

Socrates/ And again, an apparent but not real good condition? Take a case like the following: there are many that appear to have their bodies in good condition in whom it would not be easy for anyone but a physician or one of your professors of gymnastics to discover that they are not so.

Gorgias/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Something of this sort I say there is in body and in soul, and that is what makes the body and the soul seem to be in good condition when they are not really so nevertheless.

Gorgias/ It is so.

Socrates/ Let me see then if I can explain my meaning more clearly to you. Two classes of things have I say two arts corresponding to them; that which has the soul under its direction I call Politics; and though for that which has charge of the body I can't find you just on the spur of the moment any single name, still the care of the body is one and has as I reckon two divisions, the one gymnastics and

the other medicine. In Politics against gymnastics I set legislation, and as the counterpart to medicine I assign justice. In each of these pairs, however, medicine and gymnastics, justice and legislation, there is a good deal of intercommunication seeing that they deal severally with the same objects; yet still there is a difference between them. Well then of these four, which always have the highest good the one of the body the other of the soul in view in their treatment of them, the art of flattery takes note, and I don't say with a full knowledge but by a shrewd guess divides herself into four branches, and then smuggling herself into the guise of each of those other divisions pretends to be that of which she has assumed the semblance, and cares not one jot for what is best, but with the bait of what is most agreeable for the moment angles for folly and deludes it to such a degree as to get the credit of being something of the highest value. And so I say cookery has assumed the disguise of medicine, and pretends to the knowledge of the kinds of food that are best for the body, so that if a cook and a physician had to go through a contest before a set of boys, or men as silly as boys, to decide which of the two understood the subject of good and bad kinds of food, the physician or the cook, the physician would die of starvation. Now I call it flattery, and I say that such a thing as this is base and contemptible, Polus—for now I am addressing you—because it aims solely at what is agreeable without considering what is best: and an art I do not call it but a habit, because it can render no account of the exact nature of the things which it applies, and so cannot tell the cause of any of them. But to nothing which is irrational can I give the name of art. If you contest any of these points I am ready to stand an examination. Now as I say cookery has taken the disguise of medicine, and the art of dressing in just the same way that of gymnastics, a knavish and cozening and ignoble and illiberal art, cheating people so by the aid of forms and colors and

polish and dress as to make them in the endeavor to assume a borrowed beauty neglect the native and genuine beauty which comes by gymnastics. However not to be tedious, I will state the thing like the geometers—for by this time I dare say you will be prepared to follow me—as the art of dressing is to gymnastics so is cooking to medicine: or rather thus, as dressing to gymnastics so is sophistic to legislation, and as cookery to medicine so is rhetoric to justice. However as I say, though such is the natural distinction between them, still, as these arts are so nearly allied, sophists and rhetoricians and the things with which they deal are a good deal jumbled together, and they don't know either themselves what to make of their own profession, or anybody else what to make of them. For in fact, if it were not the soul that had the control of the body, but the latter were its own master, and so cookery and medicine were not surveyed and distinguished by it, but the body itself were the judge, weighing and estimating them by the gratifications that they procure for it, the state of things described in the saying of Anaxagoras would prevail far and wide, my dear Polus—for you understand these things—everything would be jumbled together in a mass (there would be an universal chaos) and things sanitary and wholesome and the cook's sauces and condiments undistinguishable. You have heard now what I affirm rhetoric to be, the counterpart of cookery in the soul corresponding to that in the body. Now perhaps I have done rather an odd thing in expatiating at such length myself when I refused to let you make a long speech. However I deserve to be excused; for when I spoke in short sentences you didn't understand me, nor could you make any use of the answer I then gave you, but required a detailed explanation. Now if I on my side don't know what to make of any of your answers you may expatiate in your turn, but if I can make good use of it, let me do so: for that is fair. And now if you can make anything of this answer of mine, there it is for you.

Polus/ What say you then? Do you take rhetoric to be a sort of flattery?

Socrates/ Nay I said a branch of flattery. Why, have you no better memory at your age, Polus? What will you do by and by?

Polus/ Then is it your opinion that good orators are esteemed worthless in their cities as flatterers?

Socrates/ Is that a question you are asking, or the beginning of a speech?

Polus/ A question to be sure.

Socrates/ Then I don't think they are esteemed at all.

Polus/ How not esteemed? Are they not all-powerful in their cities?

Socrates/ No, if at least you mean that power is a good to its possessor.

Polus/ Why of course I mean that.

Socrates/ Then it seems to me that the orators have of all citizens the least power.

Polus/ How? Don't they like tyrants put to death anyone they please, or strip of his property or banish from their cities anyone they think proper?

Socrates/ By the dog, Polus, I am really quite in doubt at every word you say whether you are making an assertion yourself and delivering your own opinion, or asking me a question.

Polus/ Why I'm asking you to be sure.

Socrates/ Very good, my friend: and then do you ask me two questions at once?

Polus/ How two?

Socrates/ Didn't you say just now something of this sort, that the orators put anyone they please to death, like the tyrants, or rob of his money, or banish from their cities anyone they think proper?

Polus/ Yes I did.

Socrates/ I tell you then that these questions of yours are two, and I will give you an answer to both. For I maintain, Polus, that the orators and the tyrants have the smallest possible power in their cities, as I said just now; for they don't do anything at all that they desire, so to speak: however I admit that they do anything that they think best.

Polus/ Well and isn't that great power?

Socrates/ No, at least according to what Polus says.

Polus/ I say no? I beg your pardon, I say yes.

Socrates/ No by—indeed you don't, for you said that great power is a good to its possessor.

Polus/ Well and so I do.

Socrates/ Then do you think it a good for a man to do anything he thinks best, supposing he has no understanding? and do you call that great power?

Polus/ No not I.

Socrates/ Then you must prove to me that the orators are men of understanding, and that rhetoric is an art, and not a mere flattery, and so refute me. But if you leave me un-refuted, your orators who do what they think proper in their cities, and your tyrants, will find no advantage in that, if indeed power is as you say a good, and doing what one thinks fit without understanding you too admit to be an evil. You do, don't you?

Polus/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ Then how can orators or tyrants have great power in their cities unless Socrates be forced by Polus to own that they do what they desire?

Polus/ Here's a fellow—

Socrates/ I say they don't do what they desire—There now, refute me.

Polus/ Didn't you admit just before that they do what they think best?

Socrates/ Well and so I do now.

Polus/ Why then they do what they desire.

Socrates/ I say no.

Polus/ What? whilst they do what they think fit?

Socrates/ Yes.

Polus/ This is abominable, Socrates, quite monstrous.

Socrates/ Don't be abusive, most polite Polus, to address you in your own style: but if you have any question to put to me prove that I am wrong, or if not answer yourself.

Polus/ Well I will answer, to find out what really you do mean.

Socrates/ Is it your opinion then that people in doing anything on any occasion desire simply what they do [i.e. the means to their end] or that which is the object of their doing what they do? As in the case of patients for instance who take medicine prescribed by the physicians, think you they desire merely what they do, to swallow the medicine and suffer pain, or that, health to wit, which is the object of their taking it?

Polus/ Plainly health, which is the object in taking it.

Socrates/ And so with foreign merchants or those that are engaged in any other branch of trade, what they desire is not what they are habitually doing; for who desires to incur all the risk and trouble of a voyage? what they desire I presume is that which is the object of their voyage, wealth: for it is for wealth they undertake it.

Polus/ Yes certainly.

Socrates/ And isn't the same true in all other cases? If a man do anything for an object, he doesn't desire that which he does, but that which was his object in doing it?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, is there anything existing that is not either good or bad or indifferent, neither good nor bad?

Polus/ Most decidedly, nothing, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well do you call wisdom and health and wealth and everything else of that sort good, and the opposites of these bad?

Polus/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ And by things neither good nor bad do you mean things like these, such as sometimes partake of the nature of the good and sometimes of the bad and sometimes of neither, as sitting for example and walking and running and sailing, or again things such as stones or sticks or anything else of that sort? These are what you mean, are they not? or is there anything else to which you give the name of neither good nor bad?

Polus/ No, these are what I mean.

Socrates/ Do people then do these indifferent (intermediate) things when they do them for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?

Polus/ The indifferent for the sake of the good to be sure.

Socrates/ Consequently it is in pursuit of good that we either walk, when we do walk, because we think it better for us, or, the contrary, stand still, when we do stand, with the same object, the good, don't we?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so likewise don't we put a man to death if we ever do such a thing, or banish him, or deprive him of his property, because we think it is better for us to do it than not?

Polus/ Yes no doubt.

Socrates/ So then it is for the sake of what is good that people do all these things that do them.

Polus/ I allow it.

Socrates/ Well but didn't we admit that when we do things with an object in view we don't desire those things, but that which is the object of our doing them?

Polus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then we don't desire to massacre people or expel them from our cities or rob them of their money merely in the abstract, but if these things are advantageous we desire to do them, but if mischievous we do not. For we desire what is good, as you allow; but what is neither good nor bad we do not desire, nor what is bad, do we? Do you think what I say is true, Polus, or not? — Why don't you answer?

Polus/ True.

Socrates/ Well then admitting this, if a man puts anyone to death or expels him from the city or strips him of his property, whether he be tyrant or orator that does it, because he thinks it is better for him, when it is really worse, he I presume does what he thinks fit, doesn't he?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But does he also do what he desires, supposing these things to be bad for him? —Why don't you answer?

Polus/ No, I don't think he does what he desires.

Socrates/ Can it be said then that such an one has great power in that city, if great power means something good according to your admission?

Polus/ It cannot.

Socrates/ I spoke the truth then in saying that it is possible for a man to do what he pleases in a city and yet not to have great power nor to do what he desires.

Polus/ Just as if you, Socrates, would not choose to have the liberty of doing what you please in your city rather than not, and don't envy a man when you see one that has either put someone to death or robbed or imprisoned him because he thought proper to do so.

Socrates/ Do you mean justly or unjustly?

Polus/ Whichever it be, is it not enviable either way?

Socrates/ Hush, hush, Polus.

Polus/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because we mustn't envy the unenviable nor the miserable, but pity them.

Polus/ What? Is this your opinion of the condition of the men that I speak of?

Socrates/ How can it be otherwise?

Polus/ Then do you think a man who puts anyone he pleases to death if he does it justly is wretched and an object of pity?

Socrates/ No I don't; but not enviable either.

Polus/ Didn't you say just now that he was wretched?

Socrates/ Nay I said if he did it unjustly, my friend, and an object of pity into the bargain; but if justly, unenviable.

Polus/ Oh no doubt a man who is put to death unjustly is pitiable and wretched.

Socrates/ Less so than the author of his death, Polus, and less so than one who deserves to die.

Polus/ In what way pray, Socrates?

Socrates/ In this, that to do wrong is the greatest of all evils.

Polus/ What? this the greatest? is not to suffer wrong a greater?

Socrates/ No by no means.

Polus/ Would you prefer then suffering wrong to doing it?

Socrates/ I should prefer neither for my own part; but if I were obliged either to do wrong or to suffer it I should choose suffering rather than doing it.

Polus/ Then I suppose you wouldn't accept despotic power?

Socrates/ No, if you mean by despotic power the same as I do.

Polus/ Well I mean what I said just now, to have the liberty of doing anything one pleases in one's city, the

power of death or banishment or, in short, doing anything according to one's own will and pleasure.

Socrates/ My worthy friend, let me tell you something and then when it comes to your turn to speak you may criticize it. If in a crowded market I were to take a dagger under my arm, and whisper to you, Polus, I have just come into possession of quite a despotic power, perfectly amazing; for if I think fit that anyone of those men that you see there should die this instant, he'll be a dead man, anyone of them I please; or if it seems to me that anyone of them ought to have his head broken, it'll be broken on the spot, or to have his coat torn in two, it'll be done: so great is my power in this city—If I say on finding you incredulous I were to show you my dagger, you would say probably when you saw it, why, Socrates, at this rate everybody would have great power, for in this fashion any house too you please might be set on fire, aye and the Athenian docks as well and their men of war and all their other vessels public as well as private. But surely this is not the meaning of having great power, to do anything one pleases. Do you think it is?

Polus/ No certainly not, in that way.

Socrates/ Can you tell me then why you disapprove of power of this kind?

Polus/ Yes I can.

Socrates/ Why is it then? say;

Polus/ Because punishment is the inevitable consequence of doing such things as that.

Socrates/ And is not punishment a bad thing?

Polus/ To be sure it is.

Socrates/ And so, my fine fellow, you have come round again to the opinion that great power is a good provided the doing what one pleases be accompanied by some advantage in doing it, and that this alone really is great power; otherwise it is a bad thing and mere weakness. And

next let us consider this point. We admit, don't we, that it is sometimes better to do such things as we were just speaking of, to put men to death or banish them or deprive them of their property, and sometimes not?

Polus/ Yes certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, it seems, you and I agree in admitting this.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then when do you say it is better to do them? Tell me where you draw your line?

Polus/ Nay, Socrates, do you answer this same question yourself.

Socrates/ Well then I say, Polus, if you prefer hearing it from me, that it is better to do these things when they are done justly, and when unjustly then worse.

Polus/ Very hard indeed it is to refute you, Socrates. Why, couldn't any child prove you to be in the wrong?

Socrates/ Then I shall be very much obliged to the child, and equally so to you, if you refute me and deliver me from my absurdity. Pray now don't shrink from the trouble of doing a friend a kindness, but refute me.

Polus/ Why really, Socrates, there is no occasion to go back to stories of old times to refute you; for the events of only the other day are quite enough to prove you in the wrong and to show that many wrong doers are happy.

Socrates/ What are they?

Polus/ You see I presume that the famous Archelaus son of Perdiccas is king of Macedonia?

Socrates/ Well if I don't, I hear of it at any rate.

Polus/ Do you take him then to be happy or wretched?

Socrates/ I don't know, Polus, for I haven't the honor of his acquaintance.

Polus/ How's that? Do you mean to say you could discover it by making his acquaintance? Don't you know without that at once that he is happy?

Socrates/ No by my faith I don't.

Polus/ Then it's plain, Socrates, that you will say that you don't know that the great king is happy either.

Socrates/ And if I do I shall say the truth: for I don't know what is his condition in respect of his mental cultivation and moral character.

Polus/ How then? does happiness consist solely in this?

Socrates/ Yes according to my view, Polus: for an honest man or woman I say is happy, and one that is unjust and wicked miserable.

Polus/ Then according to your account the great Archelaus is miserable?

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, if he is unjust.

Polus/ Why of course, how can he be otherwise? He had no claim whatever to the throne which he now occupies, being the son of a woman (Simiche) who was the slave of Perdiccas' brother Alcetas, and in strict justice was Alcetas' slave; and if he had desired to do what was right he would have been the slave of Alcetas and happy according to your account. But now it is really amazing how miserable he has become, for he has done the most enormous wrong. First of all he invited this very same master and uncle of his to his court as if he meant to restore to him the dominions of which Perdiccas robbed him, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, his own cousin, about the same age as himself, and making them drunk, he stowed them away in a carriage, carried them off by night, murdered them both and made away with them. And after all this wickedness he never discovered that he had made himself the most miserable of men, nor repented of what he had done, but he did not

choose to make himself happy by bringing up as he was bound to do his brother the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy of about seven years old, to whom the throne came by right, and restoring to him his kingdom, but shortly after he threw him into a well and drowned him, and then told his mother Cleopatra that he had tumbled in as he was running after a goose and so come by his death. Doubtless therefore now as he is the greatest criminal in Macedonia he is the most miserable of all the Macedonians, and not the happiest, and I dare say there are a good many people in Athens; with yourself at their head, who would rather take the place of any other Macedonian whatever than that of Archelaus.

Socrates/ I complimented you before at the beginning of our conversation, Polus, upon your being as it seemed to me so admirably instructed in the art of rhetoric, though at the same time I thought you had somewhat neglected the dialogue. And so now, this is the famous argument, is it, with which any child could refute me? and this is the sort of talk by which in your opinion I now stand convicted when I assert that the wrong doer is not happy? How can that be, my good friend? And yet I don't admit a single word you say.

Polus/ No because you won't; for I'm sure you think as I say.

Socrates/ My dear creature, that's because you try to refute me in rhetorical fashion, as they fancy they do in the law courts. For, there indeed the one party is supposed to refute the other when he brings forward a number of respectable witnesses in support of any statements he happens to make, whilst the opponent produces only a single one or none at all. But refutation of this kind is absolutely worthless for the purpose of ascertaining the truth: for it may even happen sometimes that a man may be overborne by the false witness of numbers and apparent respectability. And now if you want to bring

forward witnesses to prove that I am wrong on the points you speak of, you will find nearly everybody, Athenians and foreigners, agree with you. You may have for witnesses Nicias, if you please, son of Niceratus with his brothers, whose tripods are standing in a row in the Dionysium, or if you please Aristocrates son of Scellias, the donor of that splendid offering again at Delphi, or if you like, the whole house of Pericles or any other family you choose to select out of those of this place. But I, alone as I stand here, refuse to admit it: for you can't convince me, but you try by bringing forward a number of false witnesses against me to dispossess me of my substance and of the truth. But for my part, if I don't produce yourself for one as a witness in confirmation of what I say, I think I have effected nothing of the least importance in advancing the object of our discussion; nor you either I think, unless I singly and alone bear witness in your favor, and you leave all the rest of those people entirely out of the question. This then is one kind of proof, as you and a good many others besides you imagine it to be; and there is also another which I on my side deem to be such. Let us then compare them together and see if we shall find any difference between them. For in truth the subject we are debating is one of by no means slight importance, nay it is one might almost say that on which to know is noblest and not to know most disgraceful: for what it all amounts to is, either to know or to be ignorant who is a happy man and who is not. First of all for instance, to take the particular point we are now discussing, you conceive it possible for a man to be happy in wrong doing and in wickedness, supposing that you think Archelaus to be a wicked man and yet happy. Are we not to suppose that this is your opinion?

Polus/ Yes certainly.

Socrates/ And I say it's impossible. Here is one point on which we differ. So far so good. But will then a man be

happy in wrong doing if he be overtaken by justice and punishment?

Polus/ No, by no means; in that case he would be most miserable.

Socrates/ But if the wrong doer chance to escape justice, according to your account he will be happy?

Polus/ That is my view.

Socrates/ And in my opinion, Polus, the wrong doer and the wicked man is in every case miserable; more miserable however if he escape justice and evade punishment for his iniquity, but less miserable if he pay the penalty of his crimes, and be duly punished by Gods and men.

Polus/ A strange paradox this, Socrates, that you undertake to maintain.

Socrates/ Aye and I will try to make you too maintain the same, my friend, for as a friend I regard you. So now, the points on which we differ are these. Look at them yourself. I told you I believe before that doing wrong is worse than suffering it.

Polus/ No doubt you did.

Socrates/ You on the contrary thought suffering it worse.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And I said that the wrong doers are miserable, and you refuted me.

Polus/ Yes, egad, that I did.

Socrates/ At least in your own opinion, Polus.

Polus/ And my opinion is right I should rather think.

Socrates/ But you said on the other hand that the wicked are happy, provided they escape justice.

Polus/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ And I say they are most miserable, and those that are brought to justice less so. Will you refute that too?

Polus/ Why that's still harder to refute than the other, Socrates.

Socrates/ Not only so, Polus, but impossible; for the truth can never be refuted.

Polus/ How say you? If a man be detected in a criminal design of making himself absolute, and thereupon be put to the torture or mutilated or have his eyes burnt out; or, after having been himself subjected to every possible variety of the severest torments and been forced to look on whilst his own children and wife endured the like, then last of all be crucified or burnt to death in a coat of pitch—will he be a happier man than if he were to escape and make himself tyrant, and pass his life as supreme rider in his city in doing whatsoever he pleases, an object of envy and congratulation to his own citizens and all foreigners to boot? Is this what you say it is impossible to refute?

Socrates/ Now you are trying to scare me with bugbears, my brave Polus, instead of refuting me; just now you were citing witnesses against me. However never mind that, but just refresh my memory a little: "in a criminal design upon the tyranny," you said?

Polus/ Yes I did.

Socrates/ Then neither of them will ever be happier than the other, neither he that has unjustly compassed the tyranny nor he that is punished for his misdeeds: for of two miserable men neither can be said to be happier: still the more miserable is he that remains undiscovered and secures himself on the throne. [Polus smiles.] What does that mean, Polus? Are you laughing? Here's another new kind of refutation; when an assertion is made to refute it by grinning instead of argument.

Polus/ Don't you think, Socrates, you are confuted already, when you assert such things as no human being would maintain? Only ask anyone of the company there.

Socrates/ Polus, I am not one of your public men; in fact only last year when I was elected member of the

Council, and, my tribe having the Presidency, it became my duty to put a question to the vote, I made myself ridiculous by not knowing how to do it. So don't ask me again this time to take the votes of the present company; but, as I said just now, if you have no better argument than those you have used, hand the matter over to me in my turn, and try the sort of proof that I think ought to be employed. For I know how to produce one witness in support of my assertions, and that is the man himself with whom I am arguing, the many I utterly disregard; and there is one whose vote I know how to take, whilst to the multitude I have nothing whatever to say. See then whether you will consent to submit to be refuted in your turn by answering my questions. For I think, you know, that you and I and everyone else believes doing wrong to be worse than suffering it, and escaping punishment for one's transgressions worse than enduring it.

Polus/ And I, that neither I nor anyone else in the world believes it. For would you rather suffer wrong than do it?

Socrates/ Yes, and so would you and everybody else.

Polus/ You are quite wrong; on the contrary neither I nor you nor anyone else.

Socrates/ Then will you answer?

Polus/ By all means, for in fact I am quite curious to know what you can possibly have to say.

Socrates/ Then tell me that you may know, just as if I was beginning my questions all over again, which of the two seems to you to be worse, Polus, doing or suffering wrong?

Polus/ Suffering it to be sure.

Socrates/ But what say you to 'fouler?' Which of the two is that?

Polus/ Wrong doing.

Socrates/ And so likewise worse, if fouler.

Polus/ No by no means.

Socrates/ Oh, I understand: you think fair and good and bad and foul are not the same things.

Polus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But what of this? All fair things, as bodies and colors and figures, and sounds and pursuits—is it with reference to no standard at all that you call them fair every time you use the word? for instance first, when you apply the term fair to fair bodies is it not either in respect of their use, with reference, that is, to the purpose which any of them may be made to serve; or in respect of some kind of pleasure, when they give delight to those that look at them in the act of contemplation? Have you any account to give beyond this of beauty of body?

Polus/ None.

Socrates/ And so with everything else in the same way, figures and colors, is it in virtue of some pleasure or advantage or both that you term them fair?

Polus/ Yes it is.

Socrates/ And with sounds too and everything in music, is it not just the same?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And moreover in all that belongs to laws and habits of life, their beauty I presume is to be found nowhere beyond these limits, that is to say, either the utility or the pleasure that is in them, or both.

Polus/ No, I think not.

Socrates/ And so again with the beauty of studies is it not the same?

Polus/ Yes no doubt; and this time, Socrates, I do really like your definition, when you define what is fair by pleasure and good.

Socrates/ And may I in the same way define what is foul by the opposites, pain and evil?

Polus/ Of course you may.

Socrates/ So then when of two fair things one is fairer, it is so because it surpasses in one of these two or both of them, either in pleasure or utility or both.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when again of two foul things the one is fouler, it will be so by the excess either of pain or mischief. Is not that a necessary consequence?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Come then, what was said just now about doing and suffering wrong? didn't you say that suffering wrong is worse, but doing it fouler?

Polus/ I did.

Socrates/ Well then if doing wrong is fouler than suffering it, it is either more painful, and fouler by excess of pain, or of mischief or both? Does not this also necessarily follow?

Polus/ Of course it does.

Socrates/ First of all then let us consider whether doing wrong exceeds suffering it in pain, whether, that is, those that do wrong feel more pain than those that suffer it?

Polus/ Oh no, Socrates, not that.

Socrates/ So then it is not in pain that it exceeds.

Polus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And accordingly if not in pain, it cannot now exceed in both.

Polus/ It appears not.

Socrates/ It only remains then (that it exceed) in the other.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ In mischief.

Polus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ So it is because it exceeds in mischief that doing wrong is worse than suffering it.

Polus/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ Is it not then admitted by the mass of mankind, as it was in fact by yourself a little while ago, that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now it turns out to be worse.

Polus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Would you then prefer the greater evil and the greater deformity to that which is less? Don't hesitate to reply, Polus, it will do you no harm, but bravely submit yourself to the argument as to a physician, and answer yes or no to my question.

Polus/ Well I should not prefer it, Socrates.

Socrates/ And would anyone else in the world?

Polus/ No I think not, as you put the case now.

Socrates/ Then I spoke the truth in saying that neither you nor I nor anyone else in the world would prefer doing to suffering wrong; because it's worse.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ You see then, Polus, that when the one mode of proof is brought into comparison with the other, there is no resemblance between them; but you have the assent of everyone else except myself, whereas I am satisfied with your own assent and your own evidence single and alone, and I take only your own vote and pay no sort of attention to the rest. And so let this be considered settled between us. And next let us examine the second question on which we differed; whether, namely, for a guilty man to be brought to justice is the greatest of all evils as you thought, or to escape it is a greater as was my opinion. Let us consider it thus. Do you call being brought to justice and being justly chastised for wrong doing the same thing?

Polus/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ Can you deny that all just things are fair, in so far as they are just? Now consider well before you speak.

Polus/ Well I do think so,. Socrates.

Socrates/ Then look at this again. When anyone does an act, is it necessary that there should be a something acted upon by this agent?

Polus/ Yes I think so.

Socrates/ And does that something suffer exactly what the agent does? and receive an impression of the same kind as the action of the agent? To explain my meaning by an example—when anyone strikes a blow, something must necessarily be struck?

Polus/ Just so.

Socrates/ And if the striker strikes hard or quick, the object struck is struck in the same way?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Consequently the effect is of the same kind in the object struck as is the action in the striking agent?

Polus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Or again, when a man burns, something must of necessity be burnt?

Polus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if he burns severely or painfully, the object burnt must be burnt in the same way as the burning agent burns?

Polus/ Yes certainly.

Socrates/ And so when a man cuts, the same rule applies, that is to say something is cut?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if the cut is large or deep or painful, the cut produced in the object cut is precisely of the same kind as the thing cutting cuts it?

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Well then in a word, see if you admit universally the rule I just stated: the effect in the patient is of exactly the same kind as the action in the agent.

Polus/ Well I do.

Socrates/ This then being admitted, is to be punished to suffer something or to do it?

Polus/ To suffer of course, Socrates.

Socrates/ And that too by the hands of some agent?

Polus/ No doubt of it, by the hands of him that inflicts the punishment.

Socrates/ But he that punishes aright punishes justly.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in doing that does he do what is just?

Polus/ What is just.

Socrates/ And again one that atones for his crime by punishment suffers what is just?

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ And what is just I believe we have admitted to be fair?

Polus/ Yes certainly.

Socrates/ Consequently of these two the one does what is fair, and the other, the man who is punished, suffers it.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so if fair then good, for that is either pleasant or useful.

Polus/ Of course.

Socrates/ So then one who is punished for his sins suffers what is good?

Polus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then he receives a benefit?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it that kind of benefit which I suspect? namely that his soul is improved if he is justly punished.

Polus/ Yes probably.

Socrates/ Then is one that is brought to justice relieved from vice of soul?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not that the greatest of all evils that he is relieved from? Look at it in this way. In a man's pecuniary condition do you discern any other evil than poverty?

Polus/ No, only poverty.

Socrates/ Or again in his bodily condition? would you not say the evil is weakness and disease and ugliness and such like?

Polus/ Yes I should.

Socrates/ And so in soul don't you believe that there is some inherent vice?

Polus/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ And don't you call this injustice and ignorance and cowardice and so forth?

Polus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ So then in mind body and estate, these three, you have pointed out three several vices, poverty disease injustice?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then which of these kinds of vice is the foulest? Is it not injustice, or in a word the vice of the soul?

Polus/ Yes by far.

Socrates/ And if foulest then likewise worst?

Polus/ How mean you by that, Socrates?

Socrates/ This. It follows from our previous conclusions that what is most foul is so always by reason of its bringing with it either the greatest pain or bane or both.

Polus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And now we have just admitted injustice and in general vice of soul to be what is foulest?

Polus/ We have no doubt.

Socrates/ So then it is either most painful, or in other words it is because it surpasses in painfulness that it is the foulest of all of them, or banefulness or in both ways?

Polus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Is then to be unjust and licentious and cowardly and ignorant more painful than poverty and sickness?

Polus/ No I think not, Socrates, from what we have been saying.

Socrates/ Prodigious then must be the amount of banefulness and amazing the evil by which the soul's vice exceeds all the rest so as to make it the foulest of them all, since it is not by pain, according to your account.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But further, where the excess consists in the highest degree of banefulness that must I should think be the greatest of all evils.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Injustice then and licentious indulgence and all the rest of the soul's vices are the greatest of all evils.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ What is the art then that delivers us from poverty? Is it not that of trading?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what from disease? Is it not the art of medicine?

Polus/ Beyond all doubt.

Socrates/ And what from wickedness and injustice? If you haven't an answer ready when the question is put in this way, look at it thus: Whither and to whom do we carry those whose bodies are diseased?

Polus/ To the physicians, Socrates.

Socrates/ And whither do we send the evil-doers and licentious?

Polus/ Before the judges do you mean?

Socrates/ To suffer for their crimes, isn't it?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it not then by the application of a sort of justice that those chastise who chastise aright?

Polus/ Plainly.

Socrates/ So then trading delivers us from poverty, medicine from disease, and justice from licentiousness and wickedness.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Which then is fairest of these?

Polus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Trading, medicine, justice.

Polus/ Justice, Socrates, is far superior.

Socrates/ So then, again, if it is fairest it produces either the greatest pleasure or profit or both?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, is medical treatment pleasant, and do those who submit themselves to such treatment like it?

Polus/ No I should think not.

Socrates/ But it is beneficial, isn't it?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Because the patient is rid of a great evil, and therefore it is well worth his while to undergo the pain and be well.

Polus/ Of course it is.

Socrates/ Is this then the happiest condition for a man's body to be in, to be cured by medical treatment, or never to be ill at all?

Polus/ Plainly never to be ill.

Socrates/ For, it seems, this is not what we said happiness consisted in, the deliverance from evil, but in never having had it at all.

Polus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Again. Of two persons that have something wrong in body or soul which is the more miserable? The one who puts himself into the physician's hands and so gets rid of the mischief, or he who does not and retains it?

Polus/ I should suppose the one who does not.

Socrates/ And didn't we say that to be punished for one's faults is a deliverance from the greatest evil, that is wickedness?

Polus/ We did.

Socrates/ Because I suppose justice brings us under control and makes us juster, and so becomes the art by which wickedness is cured.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Happiest of all then is he who is free from vice in his soul, seeing that we proved this to be the greatest of all evils.

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ And in the second degree, I should suppose, he who gets rid of it.

Polus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ And he as we said is one who is admonished and rebuked and punished.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Consequently one who retains injustice and is not delivered from it leads the worst kind of life.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ And is not he that man who in the commission of the greatest crimes and the practice of the greatest iniquity has managed to escape reproof and correction and punishment, as you say Archelaus has contrived to do, and the rest of your tyrants and orators and potentates?

Polus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Because, I should think, my excellent friend, what men of this sort have contrived to do for themselves is very much the same as if a man afflicted with disease of the worst kind were to contrive to escape giving satisfaction to the physicians for the faults of his body, that is, undergoing medical treatment, dreading like a child the pain inflicted by the cautery or the knife. Don't you think so yourself?

Polus/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ In ignorance it would seem of the great advantage of health and soundness of body. For it appears from the ¦conclusions at which we have just arrived that the conduct of those likewise who try to escape the penalty due to their transgressions is very much of this kind, Polus; they discern clearly enough its painfulness but are blind to its benefits, and are not aware how much more miserable than an unsound body it is to be associated with a soul that is not sound but corrupt and unjust and unholy. And hence it is that they strain every nerve to escape punishment and deliverance from the direst evil, by providing themselves either with money or friends or the means of making themselves the most accomplished speakers. But if our conclusions are true, Polus, do you perceive what follows from our argument? or would you like us to reckon it all up together?

Polus/ Yes if you don't object.

Socrates/ Is not one result then that injustice and wrong doing is the worst of evils?

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ And further it appeared that to suffer for one's faults is a deliverance from this evil?

Polus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ And not to be punished for them is an abiding in us of the evil?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Wrong doing then is second of evils in degree; but to do wrong and not suffer for it is the first and greatest of them all.

Polus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Well, my friend, was not this the point in dispute between us, that you pronounced Archelaus, the greatest of all criminals, happy because he enjoyed a complete immunity from punishment for his crimes, whilst I thought on the contrary that if anyone, whether it be Archelaus or anyone else in the world, pay no penalty for the wrong that he does he may justly be called preeminently miserable above all other men; and universally, that he that does wrong is more miserable than he that suffers it, and he that escapes the penalty for his transgressions than he that submits to it? Is not this what I said?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then is it not now proved that what I said was true?

Polus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Very good. If then this is true, Polus, what is the great use of rhetoric? For, you know, it follows from our present conclusions that a man should himself keep the strictest watch over his own conduct to avoid all wrong, seeing that thereby he will bring on himself great evil; should he not?

Polus/ Yes surely.

Socrates/ But if he do commit a wrong, either himself or anyone else he cares for, he must go of his own accord to the place where he may most speedily be punished for it, to the judge as to his physician, striving earnestly that the disease of his iniquity may not become inveterate and so make the ulcer of his soul deep-seated and incurable. Or if not, what are we to say, Polus, supposing our former

admissions are to stand? Can the one be brought into harmony with the other in any other way than this?

Polus/ Why to be sure what else can we say, Socrates?

Socrates/ It follows then that for the purpose of a defense of crime, whether the guilt be in oneself or one's parents or friends or children or country, your rhetoric is of no use to us at all, Polus, unless indeed one were to suppose the very contrary, that it is a man's duty to accuse himself first of all, and in the next degree his relations or anyone else of his friends who may at any time be guilty of a wrong; and instead of concealing the wrong to bring it to light, that the offender may suffer the penalty and so be restored to health; and again to force oneself and others not to flinch out of cowardice, but submit bravely with closed eyes as it were to a physician to be cut or burned, in the pursuit of what is good and fair, not counting the pain; if his crimes have been worthy of stripes submitting to the rod, or if of bonds to imprisonment, or if of a fine to payment of the fine, or if of exile to banishment, or of death to die; himself the first to be his own accuser and of all his friends and relations as well, and to this end employing his rhetoric that they may all by the disclosure of their crimes be delivered from the greatest of all evils, which is unrighteousness. Is this to be our conclusion, or not, Polus?

Polus/ A strange one, Socrates, it seems to me, but still perhaps you do find it in agreement with what you said before.

Socrates/ Well then either the other must be disproved, or this is the inevitable result.

Polus/ Yes, that is certainly so.

Socrates/ And conversely again, if on the contrary one were ever required to do a man a mischief, whether an enemy or anyone else—provided only the wrong be not inflicted by the enemy on oneself, for that we must be very careful to avoid—but supposing the wrong to be done by

him to someone else, we should contrive by every means in our power both by word and deed to secure him impunity and prevent him from appearing before the judge, or if he do, we must devise means that the enemy may effect his escape and not suffer punishment; but if he have stolen large sums of gold we must contrive that he may not refund it, but keep and spend it, on him and his, lawlessly and godlessly; or if again he have committed crimes worthy of death, that he may not die; if possible never, but be immortal in his wickedness, or if not, that he may prolong his life to the utmost being such as he is. Such are the objects as it seems to me, Polus, for which rhetoric is serviceable, for to one who does not intend to do wrong the use of it does not seem to me particularly great—if indeed there be any use in it at all—for to be sure in our preceding discourse it nowhere came to light.

Callicles/ Tell me, Chærephon, is Socrates in earnest in all this, or only joking?

Chaerephon/ I should say, Callicles, prodigiously in earnest. However there's nothing like asking him the question.

Callicles/ In faith, that's just what I am curious to do. Tell me, Socrates, are we to suppose that you are serious now or in jest. For if you are serious and what you say is really true, the life of all of us must have been turned upside down, mustn't it? and we are all doing the exact contrary it seems to what we ought to do.

Socrates/ Callicles, if we men had not certain feelings in common, though they do vary in different individuals, but if one of us had feelings peculiar to himself and so differing from the rest of mankind, it would not be easy for one of us to exhibit to his neighbor any of his own impressions. I make this remark in consequence of having observed that you and I are just now in pretty much the same condition, enamored, that is, the pair of us, of two things apiece, I of Alcibiades son of Clinias and

philosophy, and you of the Athenian Demus and the son of Pyrilampes. Now I remark constantly that with all your cleverness however much your favorite may talk and whatever opinion he may happen to pronounce about anything, you can't contradict him, but are constantly changing backwards and forwards. If it be in the assembly that you are making a speech, and Demus—the Athenian Demus I mean—doesn't agree with you, you veer round at once and say anything it pleases, or when you are talking to that fair youth the son of Pyrilampes, the very same thing happens to you; you can't resist anything that your minion resolves or says, and therefore if anyone were to express surprise at the oddity of what you are constantly saying to oblige them, you would tell him I dare say, if you chose to speak the truth, that unless your favorite can be prevented from talking in that way you too must always go on saying the same. Imagine then that you have to receive precisely the same answer from me, and don't be surprised at my saying this, but make my mistress Philosophy leave off talking in this way. For, my dear friend, she always holds the same language as you hear from me now, and is far less inconstant to me than any other mistress; for that son of Clinias is at the mercy now of this now of that opinion, but Philosophy is ever constant to the same. Her assertions are what you are now so surprised at, though you were present yourself when they were made. So then either refute her, as I said just now, by showing that wrong doing and impunity in guilt is not the extremest of all evils; or if you leave this unrefuted, by the dog, God of the Egyptians, Callicles, Callicles won't agree with you, but there will be a discord between you all your life long. And yet I should think that it were better for me that my lyre should be out of tune and discordant, or any chorus that I had furnished, or that any number of men should disagree with me and say the contrary, than for my own single self to be out of harmony with and contradict myself.

Callicles/ Socrates, you seem to be running riot in your talk like a genuine popular orator; and now you are declaiming in this way because Polus has fallen into just the same error as he was accusing Gorgias of being betrayed into in his argument with you. For he said if I remember right, that when you asked Gorgias, supposing anyone came to him with the intention of studying rhetoric without the knowledge of justice, whether he would teach it him, he turned bashful and said he would, in compliance with the popular prejudice, because people would be indignant if he said no; and so by reason of this admission he was forced to contradict himself; which is exactly what you are so fond of. And he was quite right in my opinion in ridiculing you as he did then. But now this time he has met with the very same disaster himself; and for my own part, what I don't approve of in what Polus said is just this, that he conceded to you that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it; for it was in consequence of this admission that he himself in his turn got completely entangled by you in the argument and had his mouth stopped, because he was ashamed to say what he thought. For, Socrates, you do really divert the argument to such vulgar fallacies and popular claptrap, whilst you pretend all the time to be in the pursuit of truth, to what is 'fair' not by nature but merely by law or convention: whereas in fact for the most part these are opposed to one another, nature and convention: and so if a man is timid and doesn't venture to say what he thinks, he is forced to contradict himself. And this forsooth is your ingenious device that you have discovered to take people in with in your discussions; when a man asserts anything as according to law or convention you slyly substitute 'according to nature' in your questions, and when he is appealing to natural principles you refer to convention. As for instance in the present case, of doing and suffering wrong, when Polus was speaking of what is conventionally 'fouler,' you followed up what he meant 'conventionally' by

arguing upon it in the 'natural' sense. For it is only by custom and convention that doing wrong is fouler; by nature everything is fouler which is likewise worse, as suffering wrong. For in fact the endurance of such a thing as wrong is not a man's part at all, but a poor slave's, for whom death is better than living—as it is indeed for anyone who is unable to help himself when wronged and insulted or anyone else for whom he cares. However the law makers to be sure are the weaker and more numerous part of mankind. It is with a view therefore to themselves and their own interest that they frame their laws and bestow their praises and their censures; and by way of frightening the stronger sort of men who are able to assert their superiority, in order that they mayn't assert it over them, they tell them that self-seeking is foul and unjust, and that this is what wrong doing consists in, trying namely to get the advantage over one's neighbors; for they are quite satisfied no doubt, being the inferiors themselves, to be on an equality with the rest.

Such then is the reason why seeking to get more than the mass of mankind is conventionally styled unjust and foul, and why they call it doing wrong: whereas the truth is, in my opinion, that nature herself shows on the other hand that it is just that the better should have more than the worse, and the abler than the less able. And it is plain in many instances that this is so, not only in all the other animals, but also in mankind in entire states and races, that right I mean is decided to consist in this, that the stronger should bear rule and have the advantage over the weaker. For by what right did Xerxes invade Greece, or his father Scythia? or in any other of the ten thousand similar cases of the kind that might be produced? No, no, these men no doubt follow nature in acting thus, aye by my faith and law too, the law of nature; not however I dare say that which we frame by way of molding the characters of the best and strongest of us, whom we take from infancy, and

taming them like lions by spells and conjuring tricks reduce them to abject slavery, telling them that they must be content with their fair share and that this is the meaning of fairness and justice. But I fancy when there arises a man of ability he flings off all these restraints and bursts them asunder and makes his escape; and trampling under foot all our written enactments and juggleries and spells and laws, clean against nature every one of them, our would-be slave rises up against us and shows himself our master, and then natural justice shines forth in its true light. And it seems to me that Pindar too confirms what I say in the ode in which he says "Law the Lord of all, mortals and immortals:" He, you know, he continues, "inflicts, and justifies, the utmost violence with supreme hand. I appeal in proof to the deeds of Hercules, for unbought—" The words are something like that, for I don't know the ode well. He says however, that he neither purchased nor received as a gift from Geryones the cows that he drove off, as though this were natural right, that cows or any other property of the inferior and weaker should all belong to the superior and stronger.

Such then is the truth in this matter, and you will be convinced of it if at length you leave off your philosophy and pass on to higher things. For to be sure, Socrates, philosophy is a pretty thing enough, if only a man apply himself to it to a moderate extent at the proper age; but if he go on spending his time upon it too long, it's the ruin of a man. For if he be ever so clever and yet carries these studies far on into life he must needs turn out ignorant of everything that one who would be an accomplished and eminent citizen should be conversant with. For in fact people of this sort show themselves ignorant of the laws of their own cities, and of all that a man ought to say in his ordinary dealings with the world, public or private, and of human pleasures and desires, and in short quite unacquainted with the varieties of human character.

Accordingly when they come to undertake any private or public business they make themselves ridiculous—just as no doubt your public men do when they take part in your occupations and discussions. For the fact is, as Euripides says;

> Each shines in that, to that end presses forward,
> Devotes to that the better part o' the day,
> Wherein he chances to surpass himself:

Whereas everything in which a man is weak he shuns, and calls it bad names; but the other he praises, out of regard for himself, thinking in this way to praise himself at the same time. But no doubt the best course is to take advantage of both. Philosophy it is well to cultivate just so far as serves for education, and it is no disgrace for a lad to study it: but when a man already advanced in life still goes on with it, the thing, Socrates, becomes ridiculous; and for my own part the feeling which I have towards students of philosophy is very much the same as that with which I regard those that lisp in a childish way. For whenever I see a little child to whom it is still natural to talk in this way with a childish lisp, I like it, and it strikes me as pretty and a sign of gentle breeding and suitable to the infant's age: but when I hear a little creature talk distinctly it gives me quite a disagreeable impression and offends my ears and seems to me vulgar and only fit for a slave. When on the other hand one hears a man lisp or sees him playing childish tricks it appears unmanly and one would like to give him a good flogging. Just the same is the feeling that I have towards philosophical studies. For when I observe attention to philosophy in a young lad I approve of it, and it strikes me as becoming, and I look upon it as a mark of gentle birth and breeding in him, and one who neglects it I account illiberal, and as one that will never deem himself capable of any fine or generous action: but then when I see one advanced in life still going on with his philosophy, and unable to lay it aside, such a man as

that, Socrates, seems to me to want flogging. For as I said just now a man like that, clever as he may be, cannot fail to become unmanly by avoiding the centers of the city and the market-places which as the poet said are the places where men acquire distinction; his fate is to skulk in a comer and pass the rest of his life whispering with three or four lads, and never give utterance to any free and noble and generous sentiment.

Now, Socrates, I have a great regard for you; and accordingly I seem to be inspired now with the same feeling towards you as Zethus in Euripides, whom I just referred to, has towards Amphion. In fact it occurs to me to say very much the same to you as he says to his brother, that 'you neglect,' Socrates, 'what you ought to pay attention to, and a soul endowed by nature with her noblest gifts you disfigure by a boyish disguise; and neither amid the counsels of justice will you ever deliver an opinion aright, nor find aught probable and persuasive, nor devise any gallant resolution on another's behalf.' And yet, my dear Socrates—and now don't be angry with me, for all that I am about to say is out of regard for you—don't you think it a shame for a man to be in the condition which I consider you to be in, together with all those who are constantly going deeper and deeper into philosophy. For as it is, if a man were to arrest you or anyone else of those like you and drag you off to prison charging you with some crime of which you were entirely innocent, you know very well that you wouldn't know what to do with yourself, but there you would stand with your head swimming and your mouth open not knowing what to say; and when you were brought up before the court, however contemptible and wretched your accuser might be, you would be condemned to die if he chose to lay the penalty at death. And yet how can this be a wise thing, Socrates, 'for an art to find a man highly gifted and make him worse,' unable either to help himself or to rescue from the greatest dangers himself or

anyone else, and liable to be stript by his enemies of all his substance, and to pass his life in the city an absolute outlaw. Why such an one, though the expression is perhaps somewhat coarse, may be slapped in the face with impunity. Come, come, my good friend, 'take my advice, leave off' refuting, 'and cultivate the accomplishment' of business, and cultivate what will gain you the reputation of good sense; leave to others these over-nice frivolities or nonsense or whatever else they should be called, 'which will end in your dwelling in an empty and desolate house'; and emulate, not men who waste their time in such trivial debates, but those whose portion is wealth and fame and many other good things.

Socrates/ If my soul had happened to be made of gold, Callicles, don't you think I should have been delighted to find one of those stones with which they test gold, the best of them, which would enable me by the application of it—provided, that is, it bore me witness that my soul had been duly cared for—to be quite sure that I am in a satisfactory state, and have no need of any other touchstone?

Callicles/ What is the meaning of this question, Socrates?

Socrates/ I'll tell you directly. It seems to me that in meeting you I have met with such a treasure.

Callicles/ Why so?

Socrates/ I am quite convinced that whenever you agree with me in any of the opinions that my soul forms, that must needs be the very truth. For I perceive that one who would put a soul to a sufficient test as to whether she is leading a right life or the reverse, ought for that purpose to be possessed of three things, all of which you have, knowledge and good-will and candor. For I meet with many people who are unable to test me because they are not wise, as you are; others again are wise enough, but don't choose to tell me the truth because they don't care for me, as you do; and our two foreign friends here,

Gorgias and Polus, are no doubt wise and kindly disposed towards me, but they are somewhat deficient in frankness and are rather more shy and bashful than the occasion requires: surely it must be so, when they carried their modesty to such a pitch, that out of sheer modesty each of them ventures to contradict himself in the presence of a large company, and that on subjects of the highest importance. But you have all these qualifications which the others want. For you are sufficiently instructed as many of your countrymen will be ready to allow, and well-disposed to me. What proof have I of that? I will tell you. I know, Callicles, that there are four of you that have set up a partnership for the pursuit of wisdom, yourself, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of Cholarges. And I once heard you deliberating how far the cultivation of wisdom should be carried, and I remember that an opinion something like this was carried in your society; that the study of philosophy was not to be so eagerly pushed forward into all its minutiae, but you recommended one another to be very careful not to make yourselves over wise for fear you should unconsciously get spoiled. So then when I hear you giving me the same advice as you did to your most intimate friends it is a satisfactory proof to me that you really have a kindness for me. And further that you are able to speak out your mind without any superfluous modesty, you not only say yourself, but the speech which you made us no long time ago fully bears out your assertion. Well then, this is plainly the state of the case at present; if there be any point in which you agree with me in our argument that must have been fully tested by both of us, and there will be no further occasion to submit it to any other touchstone; for it cannot have been either want of wisdom or excess of modesty that induced you to make the concession, nor again could it be for the purpose of deceiving me, because you are my friend, as you tell me yourself: and so any argument between you and me must

in reality attain the very perfection of truth. And, Callicles, there can be no nobler subject of inquiry than that on which you just now took me to task, what a man's character ought to be, and what pursuits he should engage in, and to what extent, early or late in life. For of this you may be sure, that if there be anything in my own conduct in life that is wrong, the error on my part is not intentional but is due solely to my ignorance. Pray then don't desist from admonishing me as you did at first, but point out to me clearly what it is that I ought to pursue, and how I may best attain it. And if you find me assenting to you now, and afterwards not acting in conformity with what I agreed to, set me down for an absolute dunce and never give me any advice again as an irreclaimable reprobate. And now pray repeat to me all over again what you and Pindar understand natural justice to consist in. Is it that the superior should carry off by force the property of the inferior, and the better rule the worse, and the nobler have more than the meaner? Is justice anything else according to you, or does my memory serve me right?

Callicles/ No, I said that before, and I say so now.

Socrates/ And do you mean the same thing in calling a man better and superior? For to tell you the truth I was just as unable before as now to make out your precise meaning. Is it the stronger that you call superior, and are the weaker bound to listen to the stronger—as for example I believe you showed us before that it is in pursuance of their natural right that the great states attack the little ones, because they are superior and stronger, on the assumption that what is superior and better and stronger is all the same—or is it possible to be better and at the same time inferior and weaker, and to be superior and yet worse? or is the definition of the better and superior the same? This is precisely the thing that I want you distinctly to determine for me, whether what is superior and what is better and what is stronger are the same thing or different.

Callicles/ Well I tell you distinctly that it is all the same.

Socrates/ Well but are not the many superior by nature to the one? those you know that make the laws to control the one, as you said yourself just now.

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ Consequently the institutions of the many are those of the superior.

Callicles/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And so of the better? for the superior are far better according to your account.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so their institutions are naturally 'fair,' since they are superior?

Callicles/ I allow it.

Socrates/ Is not this then the opinion of the many, as you said just now yourself, that justice consists in having an equal share, and that it is 'fouler' to do wrong than to suffer it? Is that so or not? And mind you don't allow yourself this time to be caught in a fit of modesty. Is it, or is it not, the opinion of the many that to have one's fair share, and not a larger share, is just, and that there is more disgrace in doing than in suffering wrong? Don't grudge me an answer to my question, Callicles; in order that, supposing you agree with me, I may then fairly assure myself of the truth of it as coming from you, when I find it admitted by a man so competent to decide.

Callicles/ Well to be sure the generality of men do think so.

Socrates/ Then it is not by law alone that doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering it, and that justice consists in having one's fair share, but by nature too. And so you seem to be mistaken in what you said before and to find fault with me unjustly in saying that law and nature are opposite to one another, and that I, you know, am perfectly aware of all that, and take an unfair

advantage of it in arguing; when a thing is asserted 'according to nature' recurring to law, and when 'according to law' is meant, to nature.

Callicles/ Here's a fellow that cannot forbear trifling. Tell me, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be word-catching at your age, and if a man happen to trip in an expression to take that for a wonderful piece of luck? For do you suppose I mean anything else by being superior than being better? Haven't I been telling you ever so long that I maintain what is better and superior to be the same thing? Or do you suppose I mean that if a rabble of slaves and all sorts of fellows good for nothing except perhaps in mere bodily strength get together, and they pronounce anything, that this and nothing else is law.

Socrates/ Very good, most sagacious Callicles: that's your opinion, is it?

Callicles/ To be sure it is.

Socrates/ Well, my dear sir, I have been surmising myself ever so long that you meant something of that sort by superior, and I now repeat my questions from a real curiosity to know what your meaning is. For I presume you don't think that two are better than one or that your slaves are better than yourself because they are stronger than you are. Come now tell me all over again, what you really mean by 'the better,' since it is not the stronger. Only, my good friend, do pray be a little milder in your lessons that I may not be obliged to run away from your school.

Callicles/ You are sarcastic, Socrates.

Socrates/ No by Zethus, Callicles, whose character you assumed just now to indulge in a good deal of sarcasm against me; but come, do tell us who you mean by the better.

Callicles/ I mean the more worthy.

Socrates/ There now, you see you are word-catching yourself and explaining nothing. Won't you say whether you mean by the better and superior the wiser or any others?

Callicles/ Why to be sure of course I mean these, most emphatically.

Socrates/ Then according to your account one man of sense is often superior to ten thousand fools, and he ought to be master and the others submit to his authority, and the governor ought to have more than the governed. That is what your words seem to me to imply—and I am not word-catching—if the one is superior to the ten thousand.

Callicles/ Well that is what I mean. For my opinion is that this is what natural justice consists in, and that one that is better and wiser should have power and other advantages over the meaner and inferior.

Socrates/ Stop there now. What is it that you say again this time? Supposing that there are a number of us together, as now, in the same place, and we have in a common stock a quantity of eatables and drinkables, and are people of all sorts, some strong others weak; and one of us, a physician say, be wiser than the rest in such matters, and be as is likely stronger than some of us and weaker than others, will not he, as being wiser than we are, be better and superior in these things?

Callicles/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ Is he then to have a larger share than the rest of us in these provisions because he is better? or ought he in virtue of his authority to have the distribution of them all, but in respect of spending and consuming them upon his own person to have no advantage at all, but only have more than some and less than others? or if he chance to be the weakest of us all, ought he not, Callicles, though the best to have the smallest share of all? Is it not so, my good friend?

Callicles/ You are talking about things to eat and drink and physicians and a parcel of stuff; but that's not what I mean.

Socrates/ Well then, do you call one that is wiser better? say yes or no.

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ But don't you allow that the better ought to have the larger share?

Callicles/ Yes, but not of things to eat and drink.

Socrates/ I understand. Well, of clothes perhaps, and the most skillful weaver ought to have the largest coat and go about dressed in the most extensive assortment of the finest clothes.

Callicles/ Clothes indeed! Nonsense.

Socrates/ Well in shoes then; plainly the wisest in them and the best ought to have the advantage. The shoemaker I dare say ought to walk about in the biggest shoes and the largest stock of them.

Callicles/ Shoes? Stuff. What nonsense you keep talking.

Socrates/ Well if you don't mean that sort of thing, perhaps it is something of this kind: a farmer for instance of knowledge and skill in the cultivation of land; he perhaps ought to have an advantage in seed, and use the largest allowance of seed upon his own land.

Callicles/ How fond you are of perpetually repeating the same things, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, and not only that, Callicles, but on the same subjects too.

Callicles/ Yes by heaven, you absolutely never leave off talking about cobblers and fullers and cooks and physicians, just as if our argument had anything to do with them.

Socrates/ Well then will you tell me what the things are in which the superior and the wiser man has a right to a

larger share? or will you neither tolerate any suggestion of mine nor offer one yourself?

Callicles/ Why I have been telling you ever so long. First of all by 'the superior' I don't mean shoemakers nor cooks, but those who have skill and ability in the administration of the affairs of state, and not only skill but energy and vigor too, able to execute any designs they have conceived and not men to flinch from feebleness of spirit.

Socrates/ Do you observe, most worthy Callicles, that you don't find the same fault with me that I do with you? For you say that I am constantly repeating the same things and reproach me for it, whereas I charge you on the contrary with never saying the same thing on the same subject; but first you defined the better and superior to be the stronger, and next the wiser, and now here you are again with something different; you tell us that superiority and merit consists in a certain manliness and energy. Nay, my good friend, do tell us and have done with it who you really do mean by the better and superior and in what.

Callicles/ Why I have told you already, men of ability and energy in affairs of state. These are the men that ought to be masters in their cities, and justice means this, that these 'should have more than the rest, the governors than the governed.

Socrates/ How's that? Than themselves, my friend?

Callicles/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that every man is his own governor. Or is this governing one's self not required, but only governing others?

Callicles/ What do you mean by governing one's self?

Socrates/ Nothing that need puzzle you, but just what people in general mean; one that is temperate and has the control over himself, master of all the pleasures and desires in himself.

Callicles/ What a charming person you are! you mean those simpletons 'the temperate.'

Socrates/ How should I? everyone knows that I don't mean that.

Callicles/ No indeed I should think not, Socrates. For how can a man be happy if he is a slave to anyone whatever? But this is what is fair and just according to nature, as I tell you now quite frankly, that a man who would lead a right life is bound to let all his desires grow to their full extent and not to repress them, and to be competent to minister to them when they are as great as they can be by his manly energy and wisdom and to satisfy every desire that he may chance to conceive. But this I dare say is for the many impossible. And this is why they find fault with such characters, out of shame, to disguise their own weakness, and say forsooth that unrestrained indulgence is disgraceful, enslaving as I said before the more highly gifted of mankind; and, unable themselves to procure the gratification of their appetites, they commend self-control and justice by reason of their own want of manhood. For to such men as have had the advantage of being either kings' sons or of having abilities of their own adequate to procure for themselves any kind of power or tyranny or despotic authority what in very truth were baser and worse than self-control? if, when they are at liberty to have the enjoyment of all good things and nothing stands in their way, they were of their own accord to invite to be masters over them the laws and notions and censures of the vulgar herd of men? Or how could they fail to have been made miserable by the 'fairness' as you call it of justice and self-control, if they have no more to bestow upon their own friends than their enemies, and that too when they are rulers in their native cities? Nay, in good truth, Socrates, which you profess to seek after, the case stands thus: luxury and self-indulgence and liberty to do as you please, provided they have power to back them,

these are virtue and happiness: and all the rest of these fine-sounding phrases, your conventions in violation of nature, are nothing but people's nonsense and utterly contemptible.

Socrates/ Upon my word, Callicles, there is really something quite noble in the candor with which you follow out your theory: you are indeed stating now distinctly what the rest of the world thinks no doubt, but doesn't choose to express. I beg you therefore by no means to relax your efforts, that it may be made really plain how one ought to live. And now tell me; you say, do you, that the desires are not to be repressed if a man would be what he ought to be, but that he is to let them grow to their fullest extent and procure from some source or other satisfaction for them, and that this is virtue?

Callicles/ Yes, that's what I say.

Socrates/ Then it isn't true as people say that those that want nothing are happy.

Callicles/ Why at that rate stones and corpses would be happy.

Socrates/ Well to be sure, as you say, our life is indeed a strange one. For to say the truth I shouldn't be surprised if Euripides is right when he says;

> Who knoweth if to live is to be dead,
> And to be dead to live?

and we are all really dead—as indeed I once heard from one of our sages, that in our present state we are dead, and the body is our tomb, and that part of the soul in which the desires reside is of a nature liable to be over persuaded and to be swayed continually to and fro. And so some smart clever fellow, a Sicilian I dare say or Italian, turned this into a fable or allegory, and, playing with the word, from its susceptibility to all impressions and capacity for holding belief gave it the name of a jar, and the foolish he called uninitiated: in these uninitiated, that part of the soul where the desires lie, the licentious and

non-retentive portion of it, he compared to a jar full of holes, because there was no possibility of filling or satisfying it. So then he you see, Callicles, takes the opposite view to you, showing that of all those in Hades—meaning you know the invisible—those who are uninitiated will be the most miserable, and have to carry water into their leaky jar in a sieve perforated just like the other. And then by the sieve, as my informant told me, he means the soul: and the soul of the foolish he likened to a sieve because it is full of holes, as incapable of holding anything by reason of its incredulity and forgetfulness. Now all this to be sure is pretty tolerably whimsical; still it represents clearly what I want to prove to you, if I can manage it anyhow, in order to persuade you to change your mind; to choose, that is, in preference to a life of insatiable self-indulgence one that is orderly and regular and ever content and satisfied with what it has for the time being. But now am I making any impression upon you, and are you coming round to my opinion that the regular livers are happier than those who indulge themselves without restraint? or none at all? and will no amount of such fables incline you a bit the more to change your mind?

Callicles/ The latter is nearer the truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, let me give you another comparison from the same school as the preceding. See if you allow something of this sort to be a representation of each of the two lives, the life of self-control and of self-indulgence, as it might be if of two men each had several jars, and those of the one were sound and full, one of wine and another of honey and a third of milk and a number of others full of various things, and of these there were streams scanty and hard to get at and procurable only by many severe toils. Well, the one when he has filled himself draws no more and troubles himself no more about the matter, but as far as this is concerned remains quite at

his ease: but the other finds, like the former, the streams possible though difficult to come at, and his vessels leaky and decayed, and is forced to be constantly filling them all day and all night on pain of suffering the extremity of misery. If such be the nature of each of these two lives do you maintain that that of the self-indulgent man is happier than that of the regular and orderly? Have I moved you at all by what I have said to admit that the life of order is better than that of self-indulgence, or have I not?

Callicles/ You have not, Socrates. For the one who has filled himself has no more pleasure remaining, but that is just what I called a while ago living like a stone after a man is full, no more sensible to pleasure or pain. But the real pleasure of life consists in this, in the influx of as much as possible.

Socrates/ Well but if the amount of the influx be great must not that of what runs away be great too? and must not the holes for these discharges be of large size?

Callicles/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Then it's a plover's life that you are describing this time, and not that of a corpse or a stone. And now tell me, do you mean something of this kind, as for instance to be constantly eating when you are hungry?

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ And to be thirsty, and always drinking when you are thirsty?

Callicles/ That is what I mean, and to have all the other desires, and to be able by the enjoyment one feels in the satisfaction of them to lead a life of happiness.

Socrates/ Bravo, most worthy Callicles; only go on as you have begun, and mind you don't let your modesty balk you. And it seems that I mustn't be deterred by any shyness either. So tell me first of all if a man in a constant state of itching and irritation, provided he have abundant

opportunity of scratching himself, may pass his life happily in continual scratching?

Callicles/ What a strange creature you are, Socrates; and a thoroughpaced declaimer.

Socrates/ Just so, Callicles, and that's how I came to startle Polus and Gorgias before and put them out of countenance; but you never will be either startled or disconcerted, you are such a brave fellow. Come now, just answer my question.

Callicles/ Well then I allow that a man may pass a pleasant life in scratching himself.

Socrates/ And if a pleasant one a happy one too?

Callicles/ Yes certainly.

Socrates/ Is that so if the itching be confined to his head? or what more must I ask you? See, Callicles, what answer you will make if you be asked all that is naturally connected with this theory of yours one after another. And the climax of all things of this sort, the life of those who addict themselves to the indulgence of unnatural appetites, is not that scandalous and shameful and miserable? or will you venture to say that these are happy, provided they are abundantly supplied with what they want?

Callicles/ Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to introduce such abominations into the conversation?

Socrates/ What? is it I that introduce them, my fine fellow, or the man that pronounces so recklessly that all that feel pleasure, whatever that pleasure may be, are happy; and makes no distinction between the good and bad sorts of it? But come now, tell me once more whether you say that pleasure and good are the same thing, or that there is some kind of pleasure which is not good?

Callicles/ Well then in order to avoid the inconsistency of pronouncing them to be different, I say they are the same.

Socrates/ You are spoiling all the professions you made at the outset, Callicles, and you can no longer go along with me satisfactorily in the investigation of the truth, if you say what is contrary to your real opinion.

Callicles/ Why so do you, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then I am quite in the wrong if I do, and so are you. But now, my dear fellow, look whether good be not something entirely different to what you say, that is to pleasure from whatever source derived: for not only those that I have just now hinted at, but a number of other shameful consequences manifestly follow, if this is really so.

Callicles/ Yes in your opinion, Socrates.

Socrates/ And do you really mean to maintain this, Callicles?

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ Then are we to suppose you to be series and so enter upon the discussion of the question?

Callicles/ Oh yes by all means.

Socrates/ Well then since that is your opinion explain me this distinctly. There is something I presume to which you give the name of knowledge?

Callicles/ To be sure there is.

Socrates/ And didn't you say just now that there is such a thing as courage also as well as knowledge?

Callicles/ I did no doubt.

Socrates/ And you meant, didn't you, to speak of them as two things, because the one is distinct from the other?

Callicles/ Yes quite.

Socrates/ Again; pleasure and knowledge, are they the same thing or different?

Callicles/ Different to be sure, you mighty genius.

Socrates/ And courage again, is that distinct from pleasure?

Callicles/ Of course it is.

Socrates/ Come now, mind we don't forget this, that Callicles of Acharnæ pronounced pleasure and good to be the same thing, and knowledge and courage to be different from one another and from the good.

Callicles/ And Socrates of Alopece we can't get to admit it. He doesn't, does he?

Socrates/ He does not; and I think not Callicles either, when he has duly examined himself For tell me this, don't you think that those that are well off are in the opposite condition to those that are ill off?

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ If then these two states are opposite to one another, must not the case be the same with them as with health and disease? For to be sure a man is never well and ill at once, nor is he delivered from health and disease at one and the same time.

Callicles/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Take for instance any part of the body you please separately and look at it. A man we may suppose has that complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?

Callicles/ Of course we may.

Socrates/ Then, it is to be presumed, he can't be sound in those same eyes also at the same time?

Callicles/ By no manner of means.

Socrates/ And again, when he gets rid of his ophthalmia, does he at that same time get rid of the health of his eyes too, and so at last get rid of them both together?

Callicles/ Quite impossible.

Socrates/ Because such a result would be marvelous and unreasonable, wouldn't it?

Callicles/ Very much so.

Socrates/ On the contrary, I should suppose, he acquires and v loses either of them alternately.

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ And so with strength and weakness in the same way?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And speed and slowness?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And likewise good things and happiness, and their opposites, bad things and misery, does a man acquire each of them in turn, and in turn lose it?

Callicles/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Then if we find any things which a man loses and retains simultaneously, it is plain that these cannot be what is good and what is bad. Do we admit this? Now consider very carefully before you answer.

Callicles/ Oh, I admit it to the most unlimited extent.

Socrates/ Then let us pass on to our former admissions. Did you say that hunger is pleasant or painful? hunger I mean in itself.

Callicles/ Painful to be sure; though at the same time eating when one is hungry is pleasant.

Socrates/ I understand: however at all events hunger in itself is painful, is it not?

Callicles/ I allow it.

Socrates/ And so with thirst likewise?

Callicles/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Must I then, ask you any more questions, or do you admit that every kind of want and desire is painful?

Callicles/ I admit it, don't ask me anymore.

Socrates/ Very good. But drinking when one is thirsty, you admit, don't you, to be pleasant?

Callicles/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ And in this phrase of yours the words 'when one is thirsty' imply pain I presume.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But 'drinking' is the supplying of a want, and a pleasure?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ So then in the act of drinking you say a man feels pleasure?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ When he is thirsty?

Callicles/ To be sure.

Socrates/ That is with pain?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you perceive then what follows, that you allow that pleasure and pain are felt at once when you say that a man drinks when he is thirsty? Or does this not take place at once at the same time and place, in the soul or the body, whichever you prefer to call it: for I fancy it makes no difference. Is this so, or not?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ But moreover you said it was impossible to fare well and ill at the same time.

Callicles/ And so I do.

Socrates/ But to feel pleasure in feeling pain you have admitted to be possible.

Callicles/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Consequently to feel pleasure is not to fare well, nor pain ill, so that it follows that what is pleasant is different from what is good.

Callicles/ I don't know what all this quibbling of yours means, Socrates.

Socrates/ Oh yes you do, but you affect ignorance, Callicles. Pray now go on yet a little further, in order that you may learn what a clever fellow you are that take me to task. Bo not in each one of us the thirst and the pleasure conveyed by drinking cease simultaneously?

Callicles/ I don't know what you are talking about.

Gorgias/ Don't do that Callicles, but answer him, if it be only for our sakes, that the argument may be fairly brought to a conclusion.

Callicles/ Oh but Socrates is always like this, Gorgias; he goes on asking over and over again a number of trifling and unimportant questions and so refutes one.

Gorgias/ Well but what does that matter to you? Any how the penalty does not fall upon you, Callicles: come, come, submit yourself to Socrates to refute as he pleases.

Callicles/ Well then go on with your paltry trumpery questions, since Gorgias wishes it.

Socrates/ You are a lucky fellow, Callicles, in having got initiated into the greater mysteries before the lesser; I thought that wasn't allowed. So then let us begin at the point where you left off, and let us know whether each of us doesn't cease to feel thirst and pleasure simultaneously.

Callicles/ I allow it.

Socrates/ And the same with hunger; and in all other cases, doesn't he cease to feel the desires and the pleasures together?

Callicles/ It is so.

Socrates/ So then the pains likewise and the pleasures he ceases to feel together?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the cessation of what is good and bad is not simultaneous in him, as you admitted before—and won't you do so now?

Callicles/ Yes I will; and what then?

Socrates/ Only that it turns out, my friend, that the good is not the same as the pleasant nor the bad as the painful; for the one pair ceases in a man simultaneously and the other does not, because they are distinct. How then can what is pleasant be the same as what is good or

what is painful as what is bad? Or if you please, consider it again in this way; for I dare say even yet you don't admit it. However look at it. In those that you call good, is not that name due to the presence of goodness, just as it is in the handsome to the presence of beauty?

Callicles/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Well; do you give the name of good men to fools and cowards? You didn't just now at any rate, but to the brave and wise. These are the sort of people that you call good, are they not?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well; have you ever seen a silly child pleased?

Callicles/ Yes I have.

Socrates/ And have you never seen a silly man pleased before now?

Callicles/ I should think so; but what has that to do with it?

Socrates/ Oh nothing; only answer the question.

Callicles/ I have.

Socrates/ And again,, a man of sense under the influence of pain or pleasure?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And which of the two are more susceptible of pleasure and pain, wise men or fools?

Callicles/ I should suppose there isn't much difference.

Socrates/ Well even that's enough. And have you ever seen a coward in time of war?

Callicles/ Of course I have.

Socrates/ Well then, upon the enemy's retreat, which of the two seemed to you to feel more pleasure, the cowards or the brave?

Callicles/ Both of them, I thought: or if not more, pretty nearly equal.

Socrates/ That'll do just as well. However, the cowards do feel pleasure?

Callicles/ Oh yes, keenly.

Socrates/ And the fools, it seems.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And upon their approach, do the cowards alone feel pain, or the brave as well?

Callicles/ Both.

Socrates/ In an equal degree.

Callicles/ More perhaps the cowards.

Socrates/ And on their retreat don't they feel more pleasure?

Callicles/ Very likely.

Socrates/ So then according to you the fools and the wise men, and the cowards and the brave feel pain and pleasure in pretty nearly the same degree, or the cowards more than the brave?

Callicles/ That is my opinion.

Socrates/ But further, are the wise and brave good, and the cowards and fools bad?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the good and the bad are susceptible of pain and pleasure pretty nearly in the same degree?

Callicles/ True.

Socrates/ Are then the good and the bad good and bad in pretty nearly the same degree? or the bad even in a higher degree good and bad?

Callicles/ Upon my word I don't know what you mean.

Socrates/ Don't you know that you affirm that it is by the presence of good things that the good are good, and of evil things are bad? and that the good things are the pleasures, and the pains evil things?

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ Accordingly in those that feel pleasure, good, that is pleasure, is present whenever they are pleased?

Callicles/ Doubtless.

Socrates/ And so, since good is present in them, those that feel pleasure are good?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Again, in those that feel pain is not evil present, that is pain?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ And it is by the presence of evil you say that the bad are bad. Or are you no longer of the same mind?

Callicles/ Oh yes, I am.

Socrates/ It follows then that all that feel pleasure are good, and all that feel pain bad?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are they better, the more they feel it, and worse the less, and if in the same degree about the same?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well and you admit don't you that the wise and the fools, the cowards and the brave, are about equally accessible to pleasure and pain, or the cowards even more so?

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ Aid me then in reckoning up the results we obtain from our conclusions. For, to be sure, as the saying is, 'twice yea thrice is it good to repeat fair things' and reconsider them. We say that the wise and brave man is good, don't we?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the fool and coward bad?

Callicles/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And again one that feels pleasure good?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And one that feels pain bad?

Callicles/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And that the good and bad are susceptible of pleasure and pain in the like degree, or perhaps the bad even more?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ So then is the bad man made good or bad in the same degree as the good one, or even good in a greater degree? Does not this follow as well as what we said before from the assertion that pleasure is identical with good? Is not this necessarily the consequence, Callicles?

Callicles/ To tell you the truth, Socrates, all this while that I have been listening to you and assenting to all you say, I have been thinking, if one makes you any concession even in joke, how delighted you are with it, and hold it tight like a child. Just as if you suppose that I or anyone else in the whole world does not believe that some pleasures are better and others worse.

Socrates/ Ho ho! Callicles, what a sly rogue you are. You do indeed use me like a child, sometimes telling me that things are one way sometimes another, trying to mislead me. Why I thought you were my friend, and never would mislead me intentionally: but now I see I was mistaken, and it seems I must needs, as the old saying has it, make the best of what I can get, and accept anything you are pleased to offer me. —Well then what you say now, it seems, is that there are certain pleasures, some good and some bad. Isn't it?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are then those that are beneficial good, and the injurious bad?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are those beneficial which effect something that is good, and injurious something that is bad?

Callicles/ I believe so.

Socrates/ Are then these the sort you mean? To take for instance the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking that we were speaking of a moment ago, if some of them produce in the body health or strength or any other bodily excellence are those good, and those whose effects are contrary bad?

Callicles/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And so with pains in like manner, are some of them good and some bad?

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ Accordingly the good pleasures and pains we are to choose and try to bring about?

Callicles/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And the bad ones not?

Callicles/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Because if you remember, Polus and I decided that all our actions should be done for the sake of what is good. Do you too agree in this view, that good is the end and aim of all our actions and that for the sake of that everything else is to be done, not that for the sake of the rest? Do you vote on our side as well, and make a third?

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ Then it is for the sake of what is good that everything else including what is pleasant is to be done, not the good for the sake of what is pleasant.

Callicles/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Is it then in everybody's power to make the selection amongst things pleasant what are good and what bad, or is professional knowledge required for each case?

Callicles/ Professional knowledge.

Socrates/ Then let us recall to mind what I was saying to Polus and Gorgias. I said, if you recollect, that there

were contrivances some extending only to pleasure, effecting merely that and no more, and ignorant of the distinction between better and worse, and others which distinguish what is good and bad: and I placed amongst those which deal with pleasure, the empirical skill, not art, of the cook, and amongst those which have good for their object the art of medicine. And now, by the God of friendship, Callicles, don't be so ill natured as either to jest with me yourself, or answer at random contrary to your real opinion, or again to take what I say as if I were joking. For you see that this subject on which we are talking is of a nature to engage the most serious attention of every man of the smallest sense, I mean what course of life one ought to follow; whether it be that to which you invite me, taking part in those manly duties you wot of, speaking in the public assemblies and cultivating rhetoric and engaging in public business as you do now a days, or this life of philosophical study; and what it is in which the one differs from the other. Perhaps then it is the best way to distinguish them first, as I attempted to do before, and when we have done that and come to an agreement between ourselves as to whether these two lives really are distinguishable, to consider next what is the difference between them and which of the two ought to be adopted. Perhaps now you don't yet quite understand my meaning.

Callicles/ No indeed I don't.

Socrates/ Well I will explain it more clearly. Now that you and I have agreed that there is such a thing as good and also such a thing as pleasant, and the pleasant different from the good, and that there is a particular mode of pursuit and contrivance for the acquisition of either of them, the one the quest of pleasure, the other of good—but first of all let me know whether you assent to as much as this or not: do you?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Well then to proceed, let us come to an understanding about what I was saying to our friends here, and see whether you think that what I then said was true. What I said was if I remember right, that cookery seems to me to be no art at all but a mere empirical habit; medicine an art; meaning that the one, that is medicine, has inquired into the nature of that which it treats and the causes of what it does, and can give an account of each of them; but the other enters upon the pursuit of the pleasure which is the object of all her care and attention quite unscientifically, without having bestowed any consideration upon either the nature or the cause of pleasure, and proceeds in a manner absolutely irrational, as one may say, without the smallest calculation, a mere knack and routine, simply retaining the recollection of what usually happens, by which you know in fact she provides all her pleasures. Now consider first of all whether you think that this account is so far satisfactory, and that there are in like manner certain other occupations of the same sort which deal with the soul, some of them scientific, exercising some forethought for the soul's best interests; and others that pay no regard to this, but again as in the former case, study merely the soul's pleasure, how, that is, it may be procured for her, neither inquiring which of the pleasures is better or worse, nor concerning themselves with anything else but mere gratification, whether that be better or worse. For to me Callicles, it seems that there are, and this sort of thing I call flattery whether it be applied to body or soul or anything else, when the pleasure alone is studied without any regard to the better and the worse. And you now, do you coincide with us in opinion upon this matter or dissent?

Callicles/ Not I, I assent—in order that you may get through your argument, and I oblige my friend Gorgias here.

Socrates/ And is this true of only one soul, and not of two or many?

Callicles/ Not so, it is true of two and of many.

Socrates/ Then is it possible to gratify them in a mass all at once without taking any thought for what is best?

Callicles/ Yes I suppose so.

Socrates/ Can you tell me then which are the practices that do this? Or rather, if you please, as I ask you, when any of them seems to you to belong to this class say yes, and when not say no. And first of all let us examine the case of flute playing. Don't you think it is one of that sort, Callicles? that it aims only at our gratification and cares for nothing else?

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ And so with all others of the same kind, for example harp playing, as it is practiced in the musical contests?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And again the Choral exhibitions and dithyrambic compositions, don't they appear to you to belong to the same class? Or do you suppose that Cinesias say as if son of Meles ever troubles himself in the least about the improvement of the audience by anything he says, or merely thinks of saying what will please the mob of spectators?

Callicles/ There is no doubt about that, Socrates, in Cinesias' case at least.

Socrates/ And his father Meles again—Did you ever suppose that he looked to what is best in his harp playing? Or rather, his aim perhaps was not what is most agreeable either; for he used to annoy the audience by his performance. But just consider; don't you think that all harp music and dithyrambic composition has been invented for the sake of pleasure?

Callicles/ Yes certainly.

Socrates/ But what say you now to the object of all the efforts of that stately and wonderful Tragic poetry? Are all her efforts and her pains, think you, bestowed merely upon the gratification of the spectators? or does she strive to the uttermost, if 'there be anything that is pleasant and agreeable but bad for them, not to say that, but if there be aught unpleasant but profitable, that to say and to sing whether they like it or not? Which of these two, think you, is the fashion that Tragic poetry assumes?

Callicles/ There can't be any doubt, Socrates, that she is more bent upon pleasure and the gratification of the spectators.

Socrates/ Well but this kind of proceeding, Callicles, we said just now is flattery.

Callicles/ Certainly we did.

Socrates/ Again, if any kind of poetry be stript of its melody and rhythm and meter, is not the residue plain prose?

Callicles/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ And this prose is addressed to great crowds of people.

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ Consequently poetry is a kind of public speaking.

Callicles/ So it appears.

Socrates/ And so it will be a rhetorical address to the public. You do think, don't you, that the poets in the theatres practice rhetoric?

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ So then now we have found a kind of rhetoric addressed to such a popular audience as consists of a mixture of women and children with men, and slaves as well as free, which we don't altogether approve of, because we say it is of the nature of flattery.

Callicles/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Very good. But again, as to the rhetoric that is addressed to the Athenian people or to any other popular assemblies of freemen established in the various cities, what are we to say to that? Think you that the orators always speak with a view to what is best, with the sole aim of improving the citizens as far as possible by their speeches? Or do they too, bent upon gratifying their fellow-citizens, and sacrificing the public weal to their own private interest, deal with these assemblies as with children, trying only to humor them? and whether they will be better or worse in consequence trouble themselves not at all?

Callicles/ Your present question is not a simple one like the preceding; for there are some who show a real regard for their fellow-citizens in saying what they say; others there are again such as you describe.

Socrates/ That's enough. For if this also is two-fold, the one branch of it is, it may be presumed, a trick of flattery and a base kind of popular declamation; the other noble—the attempt, that is, to improve to the utmost the souls of the citizens, and the earnest striving to say what is best, whether that will prove more or less agreeable to the audience. But such rhetoric as this you never yet saw; or if you have anyone of this sort to point out amongst the orators, let me know at once who he is.

Callicles/ No, by my faith, I can't name you anyone, at any rate of the orators of the present day.

Socrates/ Well then, can you name anyone of those of bygone days to whom the Athenians are indebted for any improvement, dating from the commencement of his harangues, from the worse condition in which they were previously? For for my own part I don't know who it is.

Callicles/ What? Haven't you heard of the virtues of Themistocles and Cimon and Miltiades and the famous Pericles who is lately dead, whom you have heard speak yourself?

Socrates/ Yes, Callicles, if that is true virtue which you spoke of just now, the satisfaction namely of one's own and other people's desires; but if this is not so, but the truth is what we were forced to admit in the argument that followed, that those desires only which improve a man's character by their gratification should be fulfilled, and those which deteriorate it not, and that there is an art by which this may be effected—can you affirm that anyone of these men has shown himself such an artist as that?

Callicles/ I really don't know what to say.

Socrates/ Nay if you search well you will find out. So then let us just consider this matter quietly and see whether any of these men has shown himself such—To begin; a good man and one who looks to what is best in everything that he says will not speak at random, will he, but always with some definite object in view? He will proceed in fact just like all other workmen, each with his own proper work in view, selecting anything that he happens to apply towards the forwarding of his work not at random, but for the purpose of giving some particular form to the work that he is engaged upon. Look at the painter for instance, if you please, or the builder or the shipwright, and all other trades and professions, anyone of them you please, how each of these disposes everything in a fixed order, and forces the one part into conformity and harmony with the other, until he has constructed a regular and well-ordered whole; and the same may be said you know of all other artists; and so with those that we were speaking of just now that deal with the body, trainers and physicians, they likewise it would seem introduce order and system into the body. Do we admit that this is so or not?

Callicles/ Let it be as you say.

Socrates/ So then a house in which order and harmony appear will be a good one, and where there is disorder a bad one?

Callicles/ I allow that.

Socrates/ And a vessel again in like manner?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And further in our own bodies do we admit the same principle?

Callicles/ Yes certainly.

Socrates/ And how about the soul? Is it by disorder that it will be made good, or by some kind of order and harmony?

Callicles/ In accordance with our previous conclusions we must needs admit this too.

Socrates/ What name then do we give to that which arises in the body from order and harmony?

Callicles/ Health and strength I dare say you mean.

Socrates/ I do. And what again to that which is engendered in the soul from the same? Try to find the name of it, and tell it me as in the other case.

Callicles/ And why don't you name it yourself, Socrates?

Socrates/ Well if you prefer it I will. And you, if you think what I say is right, say so; or if not, refute it and don't let it pass. For my opinion is that order in the body of every kind bears the name of 'healthy,' whence it is that health is produced in it and every other bodily excellence. Is it so or not?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ And the name of all the orders and harmonies of the soul is lawfulness and law, by which also men are made observant of law and orderly; and these are justice and self-control. Do you allow this or not?

Callicles/ Be it so.

Socrates/ So then it is to this that that genuine orator, the man of science and virtue, will have regard in applying to men's souls whatsoever words he addresses to them,

and will conform all his actions; and if he give any gift he will give it, or if he take aught away he will take it, with his mind always fixed upon this, how to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and eradicate injustice, to engender self-control and extirpate self-indulgence, to engender all other virtue and remove all vice. Do you agree or not?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ To be sure, Callicles, for what can be the advantage of offering to a sick and diseased body a quantity of the nicest things to eat and drink or anything else, when, fairly considered, they will do it no more good sometimes than the contrary, nay less? Is this so?

Callicles/ So be it.

Socrates/ Because I presume it is no advantage to a man to live with his body in a vicious state, since in that case his life also must needs be a vicious one. It is so, isn't it?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so again when a man is in health, the physicians for the most part allow him to gratify his appetite, as for instance to eat as much as he pleases when he is hungry or drink when he is thirsty, but a sick man they never so to speak allow to indulge his appetites to the full Do you agree to this too?

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ And with the soul, my excellent friend, is it not the same? as long as it is in a bad condition, senseless and self-indulgent and unjust and unholy, we must prevent it indulging its appetites, and not suffer it to do anything but what will make it better? Do you assent, or not?

Callicles/ I assent.

Socrates/ For so I presume it is better for the soul itself?

Callicles/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ And is not restraining a man from what he desires correcting him?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then correction or restraint is better for the soul than unrestrained self-indulgence, as you thought just now.

Callicles/ I don't know what you are talking about, Socrates? do pray put your questions to someone else.

Socrates/ Here's a man that can't bear to have a service done him, and to submit to that himself which is the very subject of our conversation, to be corrected.

Callicles/ Well and I don't care a straw for anything that you say, and I only answered you thus far to oblige Gorgias.

Socrates/ Very good. Then what shall we do? Are we to break off our argument in the middle?

Callicles/ You must decide that yourself.

Socrates/ Well they say that we have no right to leave off even one of our stories in the middle, in fact not till we have put a head upon it, that it mayn't wander about like a headless monster. So pray finish your answers, that our argument may have a head too.

Callicles/ What a tyrant you are, Socrates; if you will take my advice, you will let this argument drop, or else carry on the conversation with someone else.

Socrates/ Who else will then? Surely we ought not to leave off the argument before it is finished.

Callicles/ Can't you go through with it by yourself, either continuously in your own person, or answering your own questions?

Socrates/ And so as Epicharmus has it, that 'what two men said before' I may show myself equal to single-handed. Well it seems it must absolutely be so. Still if we are to do this, my own opinion is that we ought all of us to vie with one another in trying to discover what is true and

what is false in this matter that we are discussing, for it is a common benefit to all that it be made plain. Well then I will carry on the discussion of this question as seems to me to be right; but if any of the admissions that I make to myself appear to anyone of you to be untrue, it is his duty to lay hold of it and confute me. For to tell you the truth neither do I myself say what I say as having any certain knowledge, I am only engaged with you all in a search; and therefore if anyone that disputes my assertions appear to have right on his side, I will be the first to admit it. This however I say on the supposition that you think the argument ought to be finished: but if you don't like that, let us drop it and go home.

Gorgias/ Well my opinion is, Socrates, that we ought not to go away yet, but that you should finish your argument: and I believe the rest of the company agree with me. For in fact I am myself desirous of hearing you go through the remainder by yourself.

Socrates/ Well to be sure, Gorgias, I should have been very glad on my own account to have continued the conversation with Callicles here until I had paid him Amphion's speech in return for his Zethus. But since you, Callicles, refuse to join me in bringing the argument to an end, at any rate check me as you listen whenever you think me wrong. And if you refute me I won't be angry with you as you were with me, on the contrary you shall be recorded in my memory as my greatest benefactor.

Callicles/ Go on, my good sir, by yourself, and make an end of it.

Socrates/ Then listen to me whilst I resume the argument from the beginning. Are pleasure and good the same thing? Not the same, as Callicles and I agreed. Is pleasure to be pursued for the sake of the good, or good for the sake of pleasure? Pleasure for the sake of the good. And is that pleasant which brings pleasure by its presence, and that good which by its presence makes us

good? Just so. But further, we ourselves, as well as everything else that is good, have that character by the acquisition of some virtue or other? In my opinion, Callicles, that is necessarily so. But to be sure the virtue of everything, whether it be implement or body, or again soul or any living creature whatsoever, cannot be acquired best by accident; it must be due to that particular order and rightness and art which is assigned severally to each of them. Is that so? That is certainly my opinion. So then the virtue of everything implies order and harmonious arrangement? I should say so. In everything then it is by the introduction of some kind of order, that viz. which is proper to each, that this is in every case made good? I think so. Consequently a soul also when it has its own proper order and harmony is better than one which is devoid of order? Necessarily. But further one which is endowed with order is orderly? Of course it is. And the orderly soul is 'temperate'? Beyond all doubt. Consequently the temperate soul is good. I have nothing to say to the contrary, my dear Callicles: but if you have, pray inform us.

Callicles/ Go on, my good sir.

Socrates/ I proceed then to say, that if the temperate soul is good, that which has the properties contrary to temperance or soundness of mind is bad: and that was one that is devoid of sense and self-control? No doubt. And further the man of sound mind will do what is right towards gods and men? for no man could be sound in mind if he did the contrary? This must needs be so. And again when he does what is right and proper towards men, his actions will be just, and towards the gods pious; but a man who does what is just and pious must needs be a just and pious man? It is so. And to be sure he must be brave too: for certainly temperance or self-control consists not in pursuing or avoiding what one ought not, but in pursuing and avoiding what one ought, whether things or men, or

pleasures or pains, and in steadfast endurance at the call of duty. So that we may be fully convinced, Callicles, that the 'temperate' man, as our argument has shown, being just and brave and pious has attained the perfection of goodness, and that the good man does well and fairly all that he does, and that he that does well is blessed and happy, and the bad man and evil doer wretched. And this must be the man who is in the opposite condition to the temperate, the licentious namely, whom you were applauding.

Such then is the view that I take of these matters, and this I assert to be the truth; and if it be true, that everyone, as it appears, who desires to be happy must seek after and practice self-control, and flee from licentiousness, every one of us as fast as his feet will carry him, and contrive if possible to stand in no need of correction; but if he do require it, either himself or any of those connected with him, be it individual or state, then justice must be applied and correction, if he is to have any chance of happiness. Such seems to me to be the aim which a man should keep in view through life, and so act as to concentrate all his own efforts as well as those of the state upon this one object, that justice and temperance may be essential to the attainment of happiness, not letting his desires grow without restraint, and so in the attempt to satisfy them, a never-ending torment, leading the life of a robber. For neither to any man else can such an one be dear, nor to God; for he is incapable of fellowship, but with one in whom there is no fellowship friendship is impossible. And, Callicles, the heaven and the earth and gods and men, as the wise tell us, are kept together by fellowship and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice, and this is why, my friend, they give the name of 'order' to yonder universe and not of disorder or license. But you it seems have not paid attention to this, clever as you are, but have overlooked the mighty power of geometrical

equality in heaven as well as earth. You suppose that a spirit of inequality, the desire of obtaining more than one's fair share, is what ought to be cultivated; because you don't care for geometry. Well. Either then we must refute this argument that it is by the possession of justice and self-control that the happy are happy, and by that of vice that the wretched are wretched; or if this be true, we must consider what are its consequences. All those former results follow, Callicles, about which you asked me if I was in earnest, when I said that a man should accuse himself or his son or friend if he do wrong, and that this is what rhetoric should be used for. And what you supposed Polus to concede out of mere shame was true after all, that to do wrong is worse than to suffer it in the same proportion as it is baser: and that anyone who means to be a rhetorician in any true sense of the word must after all be a just man, and fully acquainted with the principles of justice, which again Polus said that Gorgias was forced by shame to admit.

This being the case, let us consider what amount of truth there really is in all that you taunt me with; that I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or connections, or to rescue them from the greatest dangers; and that, like the outlaws who are at everyone's mercy, I am in the power of anyone that chooses to slap me in the face, according to your truly spirited expression, or rob me of my property, or expel me from the city, or, worst of all, put me to death: and to be in such a condition is according to your account the very worst of all infamies. But my view you know—and though it has been already repeatedly stated, yet there is no reason why it should not be repeated once more—I deny, Callicles, that to be slapt on the cheek wrongfully is the worst of all disgrace, or to have my purse cut or my person; but I say that to strike or wound me or mine wrongfully is more disgraceful and worse: aye and stealing besides and kidnapping and housebreaking, and

in a word any wrong whatsoever done to me or mine, is worse and more disgraceful to the doer of the wrong than to me who suffer it. All this, which has already been brought before us in an earlier part of our discourse in the way that now I state it, is bound down and fastened—though the expression may appear somewhat too strong—with arguments of iron and adamant, as it would seem at any rate on the face of it; which you, or some still more gallant and enterprising spirit than yourself, must answer, or else you will find it impossible to speak aright upon the subject in any other language than that which I now use. For I for my part always say the same, that I am ignorant of the true nature and bearings of these things, and yet of all that I have ever encountered as now none has ever been able to maintain any other views without making himself ridiculous. Well then I assume again that it is as I say. But if it be so, and injustice is the greatest of all evils to the wrong doer, and still greater than this greatest, if that be possible, to do wrong with impunity, what sort of help is that which a man must be able to render to himself on pain of being really ridiculous? is it not that which will avert from us the greatest mischief? Nay surely this must needs be the kind of help which it is most disgraceful not to be able to render to one's self or one's friends or connections, and second to it the inability to avert the second degree of evil, and the third the third, and so forth; in proportion to the magnitude of each kind of evil, so likewise is the glory of being able to find help against each sort, and the disgrace of failure. Is it so, Callicles, or otherwise?

Callicles/ Not otherwise.

Socrates/ Then of the two, doing and suffering wrong, we pronounce doing wrong to be the greater, and suffering it the lesser evil. What provision then must a man make for helping himself in order to secure both of these advantages, those namely which arise from not doing and

not suffering wrong? Is it power or will? What I mean is this. Will a man escape suffering wrong by merely wishing not to suffer it, or will he escape it by procuring power to avert it?

Callicles/ Oh that's plain enough, by power.

Socrates/ But what say you to doing wrong? Is the mere wish to avoid injustice sufficient for a man, because in that case he won't do it? or again to effect this must some kind of power or art be provided, because if he do not learn and practice it he will do wrong? This is a point on which I particularly want your answer, Callicles, so tell me at once whether you think there was any real necessity or not for Polus and me to admit as we did in the foregoing argument that no one desires to do wrong, but all that do wrong do it against their will.

Callicles/ Let it be as you please, Socrates, that you may get your argument finished.

Socrates/ Then for this purpose again, it seems, we must provide ourselves with some kind of power or art, to avoid doing wrong.

Callicles/ Yes by all means.

Socrates/ Then what may be the art that supplies the means of suffering no wrong at all or as little as possible? See if you agree with me as to what it is. For in my opinion it is this: one must either be a ruler—or indeed a tyrant—in one's state, or else a friend of the existing government.

Callicles/ I hope you observe, Socrates, how ready I am to praise you when you say anything that deserves it This seems to me to be extremely well said.

Socrates/ Then see if you think this well said too. It seems to me that the strongest bond of friendship between man and man is that which the wise men of old tell us of; 'like to like.' Don't you agree with me?

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ And so where a savage and illiterate ruler is lord and master, if there were anyone in the city far better than he, the tyrant it may be presumed would be afraid of him and never could possibly become his friend with his whole heart?

Callicles/ It is so.

Socrates/ Nor again the friend of one who was for inferior to himself, any more than the other; for the tyrant would despise him, and never treat him with the attention due to a friend.

Callicles/ That is true too.

Socrates/ So then the only friend worth speaking of that is left for such an one is the man who resembling him in character, blaming and praising the same things, chooses to submit to his authority, and to be subject to him as his ruler. He it is that will have power in such a state, him none will wrong with impunity. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Accordingly if in such a city as this one of the young men were to reflect within himself—how can I acquire great power and no one do me wrong? —he has the same path it seems to follow, to accustom himself from his very earliest years to feel delight and displeasure in the same things as his master, and to make himself as nearly as possible like the other: hasn't he?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so he will establish for himself a lasting immunity from suffering wrong, and to use your own language, great power in the city.

Callicles/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ And from doing wrong too? or quite the contrary, if he is to resemble the wicked governor and acquire great influence with him? Nay I should think that his efforts will be directed to the exact opposite, to the acquisition that is of the power of doing as much wrong as

possible, and escaping the penalty for all the wrong that he does. Won't they?

Callicles/ It seems so.

Socrates/ So then the greatest of all evils will befall him, to have his soul depraved and deformed by the imitation of his master and the power that he has acquired.

Callicles/ You have the oddest way, Socrates, of twisting arguments every now and then and turning them upside down. Don't you know that this imitator, as you call him, will put to death anyone that does not imitate him if he pleases, or strip him of all he possesses?

Socrates/ Indeed I do, my worthy Callicles, if I am not deaf, so often have I heard it from you and Polus of late, and indeed from nearly everybody else in the city. But now do you in your turn hear what I have to say, that he may kill me if he pleases, but it will be a villain killing an honest man.

Callicles/ Well and isn't this the very thing that arouses one's indignation?

Socrates/ Not in a man of sense, as our argument indicates. You don't think, do you, that the object of all a man's efforts should be to live as long as possible, and to study those arts which preserve us from dangers; like that for instance which you bid me study, the art of rhetoric, which ensures us safety in courts of justice?

Callicles/ Yes indeed I do, and very good advice it is.

Socrates/ Well but, my excellent friend, do you think the art of swimming a very dignified one?

Callicles/ No faith not I.

Socrates/ And yet that too saves men from death when any accident happens to them in which the knowledge of the art is required. But if this appears to you of too trivial a character, I'll mention to you another of more importance than this, the art of navigation, which not only saves men's lives, but their bodies too and goods from the

extremest perils, just like rhetoric. And yet this is modest and sober, and does not give itself airs, and throw itself into attitudes, as if it were performing some very extraordinary feat: but for a service at least equal to that of the art forensic, for conveying one safe home, it may be from Ægina, it asks a fee I dare say of a couple of obols; or if it be from Egypt or the Pontus, at the utmost in return for this important service, for carrying safe as I said just now self and children and goods and women, when it has landed them all in the harbor its fare is a couple of drachmas: and the possessor of the art himself after he has done all this gets out and takes his walk by the shore alongside of his vessel with a perfectly unassuming demeanor. For he knows I dare say how to take into account that it is quite uncertain which of his passengers he has done a service to by saving them from drowning, and which of them he has injured, fully aware that he has landed them not a bit better than they were when they went on board in body or soul. He reflects accordingly that it cannot be that a man who has escaped drowning whilst he labors under the affliction of great and incurable bodily diseases is miserable in that he has been preserved from death, and has received no benefit from him at all—and yet that one who is laden with many incurable diseases in that which is so much more precious than the body—in the soul—that he, I say, should be allowed to live on, and that he did him service in rescuing him whether it be from the sea or a law-court or anywhere else you please—No, he knows that it is better for man in a vicious state not to live, for he must needs live ill.

This is why it is not the fashion for the pilot to give himself airs, though he does save our lives. No nor the engineer either, my worthy friend, though he has sometimes the power of saving lives just as much as a general—to say nothing of a pilot—or anyone else. For sometimes he saves whole cities. Think you he is to be

compared with the lawyer? And yet if he chose to talk and magnify his business as you do, Callicles, he might overwhelm you with his words, arguing and urging upon you the duty of making yourselves engineers, for there is nothing else like it: for he would have plenty to say for himself. Still you none the less look down upon him and his art, and as a term of reproach would nickname him 'the machine maker,' and you wouldn't consent to bestow your daughter upon his son, nor to take his yourself for your own. And yet on the principles upon which you extol your own pursuits, what fair excuse have you for despising the engineer and all the rest that I just now mentioned? I know you would say that you are a better man and better born. But if 'better' does not mean what I say it does; if virtue means this and nothing more, to save one's self and what belongs to one, whatever one's character may chance to be, your contempt for the engineer and the physician and all the other arts which have been invented with the object of saving men's lives becomes ridiculous. Nay, my dear fellow, see to it, whether the noble and the good be not something quite different from saving and being saved.

Consider whether the true man ought not to disregard this, I mean any particular length of life, and to renounce all love of mere life; ought not rather to leave all this to the will of heaven, and, believing what the women say that no one can escape his destiny, consider hereupon how he may best pass his allotted portion of life; whether it be in assimilating himself to any form of government under which he may happen to live, and so now accordingly, whether you are bound to make yourself as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you mean to gain its affections and acquire great power in the city. Consider whether this is really beneficial to you and me, that we mayn't meet with the fate of the Thessalian women who draw down the moon from heaven: upon the choice of this power in the state our dearest interests will be staked. But if you

suppose that anyone in the world can impart to you such an art as will raise you to great power in the state without being like the government either for the better or worse, it seems to me, Callicles, that you are very ill advised: for you must be not a mere imitator but radically like them, if you mean to effect anything genuine in the way of friendship with Demus the Athenian people, aye faith and with Demus the son of Pyrilampes to boot Whoever therefore shall produce in you the nearest possible resemblance to them, he it is that will make you a statesman, in the sense in which you desire to be a statesman, and a rhetorician: for with words accommodated to their own character everybody is pleased, but such as are adapted to a foreign one they dislike—unless you have anything to say to the contrary, my darling. Have we anything to say against all this, Callicles?

Callicles/ Some how or other, Socrates, there seems to me to be truth in what you say. But I feel as most people do, I don't quite believe you.

Socrates/ That's because the love of Demus has planted itself in your soul and resists me, Callicles; but if perhaps we were to examine these same questions often over again and better, you'd be convinced. Remember however that we said that there are two processes which may be adopted in training anything, whether body or soul, one to make its pleasure the object of all our dealings with it; the other what is best for it, not humoring it, but striving against it to the uttermost. This is the distinction that we drew before, is it not?

Callicles/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, the one, that which is directed to pleasure, is ignoble and nothing but flattery, is it not?

Callicles/ Be it so, if you please.

Socrates/ And of the other the object is to make that which we have charge of, whether it be body or soul, as good as possible?

Callicles/ Yes, no doubt.

Socrates/ Ought not then our object to be in undertaking the care of our city and its citizens to make them as good as possible? For without this, you know, as we found in our preceding argument, there is no use in offering any other kind of service, unless, that is, the thoughts and intentions of those who are to acquire either wealth or authority over others or any other kind of power be honest and virtuous. Are we to assume this?

Callicles/ Yes, by all means, if you prefer it.

Socrates/ Supposing then that you and I, Callicles, in the ordinary course of public business, were inviting one another to undertake the building department, the most important structures it may be of walls or docks or temples, would it have been our duty to consider and examine ourselves, first of all whether we are acquainted or not with the art of building, and from whom we learnt it? would it, or not?

Callicles/ Yes no doubt.

Socrates/ And again, in the second place, whether we have ever erected any building for private use, either for one of our friends or ourselves, and whether this building is handsome or ugly? And if we found upon consideration that we had had good and well-reputed masters, and that many handsome buildings had been erected by us under our masters' direction, and many by ourselves of our own, after we had parted from our masters; under such circumstances men of sense might be permitted to undertake public works; but if we had no master of ourselves to produce, and of buildings either none at all, or ever so many and all worthless, surely in this case it would be the height of folly to attempt public works, and

invite one another to undertake them. May we pronounce this to be correct, or not?

Callicles/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And similarly with the rest; supposing for instance we had undertaken the office of state-physicians, and were inviting one another to it as thoroughly well qualified for the task, our first step would be, I presume, to examine one another's qualifications, you mine and I yours. Marry now, let us see, how stands the case with Socrates in regard of the health of his own body? or has anyone else, slave or free man, ever yet been cured of a disease by means of Socrates? And I again, I dare say, should have made exactly similar inquiries about you. And if we found that we had never been the means of making anyone better in his bodily health, citizen or stranger, man or woman, in heaven's name, Callicles, would it not be truly absurd that human beings should ever be brought to such a pitch of folly as to begin with the wine-jar in learning the potter's art, as the saying is, you know, and before they had in their private practice, often failing it may be, and often succeeding, exercised themselves sufficiently in the art, undertake to serve publicly as physicians themselves and invite others like them to do the same? Don't you think it would be folly to act so?

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ And now, my excellent friend, as you yourself are; just beginning to enter into public life, and are urging me to do the same, and reproaching me for not doing it, shall we not examine one another, as thus, Let us see, has Callicles ever yet made any of the citizens better than he was before? Is there anyone of them who was before wicked, unjust and licentious and foolish, and by Callicles' means has been made an honest man, stranger or citizen, bond or free? Tell me, Callicles, if anyone examines you thus, what will you say?

What human creature will you claim to have improved by his intercourse with you? Do you hesitate to answer, if you have anything to show which you have done in your private capacity as a preliminary to engaging in public business?

Callicles/ You are captious, Socrates.

Socrates/ Nay it is not out of captiousness that I put the question but from a real wish to know what you think your duty as a public man is in our city, whether, that is to say, we shall find you concerning yourself about anything else in your administration but making us citizens as good as possible. We have already several times admitted, haven't we, that this is the statesman's proper business? Have we admitted it or not? Answer me. We have; I will answer for you. If then this is what a good man is bound to effect for his native city, now call to mind those men whom you mentioned just now, Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and tell me if you still think that they approved themselves good citizens.

Callicles/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ Well then if they were good, it is plain that every one of them made the citizens better than they were before. Did they do so, or not?

Callicles/ They did.

Socrates/ Accordingly when Pericles began to speak before the People the Athenians were worse than when he made his last speeches?

Callicles/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Not perhaps at all, my very good sir: it follows necessarily from our admissions, if at least he was a good statesman.

Callicles/ Well what then?

Socrates/ Oh nothing. Only just tell me this as well, whether the Athenians are commonly said to have owed any improvement to Pericles, or just the contrary, to have

been corrupted by him. For what I hear is this, that Pericles has made the Athenians lazy and cowardly and talkative and greedy, by establishing first the system of fees.

Callicles/ You hear all that from those broken-nosed gentry, Socrates.

Socrates/ Aye but this I don't hear merely, but know full well, and so do you, that first of all Pericles was popular with the Athenians, who never passed a sentence upon him involving any disgrace as long as they were 'worse;' but as soon as they had been made by him thoroughly honest and good men, at the end of Pericles' life they found him guilty of peculation, and nearly condemned him to death—plainly because they thought him a rogue.

Callicles/ What then? did that make Pericles a bad man?

Socrates/ At all events a herdsman of that sort who had the care of asses or horses or oxen would be thought a bad one, if the animals which he took under his charge free from all propensity to kick or butt or bite turned out under his management given to all these tricks out of mere wildness. You would call, wouldn't you, any keeper of any animal whatsoever a bad one who makes those which he has received under his charge tame and gentle wilder than they were when he took them? Would you do so or not?

Callicles/ Oh yes, by all means, to oblige you.

Socrates/ Then oblige me still further by answering this one question whether man too is one of the animal creation or no?

Callicles/ Of course he is.

Socrates/ And had not Pericles the charge of man?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, ought they not, as we agreed just now, to have been improved by him in justice if they really were under the care of a good statesman.

Callicles/ Yes certainly.

Socrates/ Well and the just are tame and gentle, as Homer said. But what say you? Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But yet he made them wilder and more savage than they were when he took them in hand, and that against himself, the very case in which he would least have desired it.

Callicles/ Do you want me to agree with you?

Socrates/ Yes if you think I speak the truth.

Callicles/ Then let it be as you say.

Socrates/ And accordingly if wilder, more unjust and worse.

Callicles/ Be it so.

Socrates/ So then it follows from what we have said that Pericles was not a good statesman.

Callicles/ So you say.

Socrates/ Faith and so must you say too, after the admissions you just made. And now again about Cimon, tell me; did not those whom he tended ostracize him in order that they mightn't hear the sound of his voice for ten years? And didn't they treat Themistocles in the very same way, and punish him with exile to boot? and Miltiades the hero of Marathon they sentenced to be thrown into the pit, and had it not been for the president into it he would have been thrown. And yet these men had they been good in the way that you describe them, would never have been treated thus. At all events good drivers don't keep their seat in the chariot at the commencement of their career, and then get thrown out after they have trained their horses and improved themselves in driving. This is not the

case either in charioteering or in any other business whatsoever. You don't think so, do you?

Callicles/ No, not I.

Socrates/ So then what we said before was true, that we know no one who has approved himself a good statesman in this city of ours. You admitted this of the men of the present day, but some of those of former times, and to these men you gave the preference. But these now turn out to be on a par with the men of the present day; and therefore if these were orators, they employed neither the genuine art of rhetoric, else they would not have lost the popular favor, nor the flattering sort of it.

Callicles/ But surely, Socrates, none of the present generation has ever done anything like such deeds as one of those others, anyone of them you please.

Socrates/ My dear sir, neither do I find any fault with them, at least as ministers in the state's service, on the contrary I think they have shown themselves more dexterous ministers than the men of our time, and better able to provide the city with all that she desired. However in changing the direction of the citizens' desires instead of giving way to them, leading them by persuasion or compulsion to that which would improve their character, in all this so to speak these were in no respect superior to the others: and yet this is the only business of a good statesman. But as to providing ships and walls and docks and a variety of other such-like things, I grant you myself that these men were cleverer than the others. So it seems you and I are doing an absurd thing in this argument of ours. For during the whole time that our conversation has lasted we have never ceased coming round constantly to the same point and misunderstanding one another's meaning. I at all events believe that you have admitted ever so many times and decided that this business of dealing with either body or soul is two-fold, and that the one of these is ministerial; whereby meat may be provided

for our bodies when they are hungry, and drink when they are thirsty, and when cold clothing, bedding, shoes, or anything else that bodies are led to desire. And I purposely use the same images in my illustration that you may the more easily understand me. For as to being capable of supplying such things, either as a shopkeeper or merchant, or maker of any of the things themselves, baker or cook or weaver or shoemaker or tanner—it is no wonder, I say, that a man being such should fancy himself and be considered by others as one who takes care of the body; by everyone, that is, who is not aware that there is besides all these an art of medicine and gymnastics which really is a training of the body; which has in fact a natural claim to authority over all the arts, and a right to make use of their works, because it knows what is good and bad in meat and drink for promoting a perfect condition of body, of which all those others are ignorant; and so it is that all these are servile and ministerial and illiberal in their treatment of the body, I mean all the rest, and medicine and gymnastics have a fair claim to be their mistresses. That I maintain the very same to be the case with the soul you seem to me at one time to understand, and admit it as though you knew what I meant; and then by and by you come and tell me that men in our city have shown themselves citizens of sterling worth, and when I ask you who, you seem to me to put forward men of exactly the same sort in statecraft, as if when I asked you who are or ever have been good trainers of the body in gymnastics you told me quite seriously, Thearion the baker, and Mithaecus the author of the treatise on Sicilian cookery, and Sarambus the vintner, these are they that have shown marvelous skill in training men's bodies by supplying the one admirable loaves, the second entries, and the third wine. Now perhaps you would have been offended if I had said to you, My friend, you know nothing at all about gymnastics: you tell me of a parcel of fellows, ministers and caterers to men's appetites, with no sound and true

knowledge of them whatever, who, very likely, will first stuff and fatten men's bodies—applauded by them for it all the while—and then make them lose even the flesh they had of old. They in their turn from ignorance will not throw the blame of their diseases and the loss of their old flesh upon those who thus indulge them; but whoever happen to be near them at the time or to offer them any advice, just at the moment when the original stuffing and pampering, carried on as it was without the least regard to what is wholesome, has at length, it may be ever so long after, brought disease upon them, them, they will accuse and find fault with and do them a mischief if they can, whilst they will applaud those earlier advisers, the real authors of the disaster. And you, Callicles, are now doing something precisely similar: you are applauding men who have indulged those charges of theirs with all the good things that they desired. And people say that they have made the city great: but that it is mere swelling and internal ulceration that has been brought about by these famous statesmen of old, they do not perceive. For disregarding temperance and justice they have stuffed the city with harbors and docks and walls and tribute and suchlike nonsense: and so whenever the fit of sickness we spoke of actually comes, they will lay the blame upon their then present advisers, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, the authors of all the mischief: and when besides their subsequent acquisitions they have lost all that they originally had into the bargain, they will probably lay hold of you, if you don't take good care, and my friend Alcibiades, who though not the immediate authors of all the mischief are yet perhaps partly to blame for it. There is however one senseless thing which I see happening now, and hear of the men of the past generation. Whenever, that is, the city takes one of these public men in hand as a wrongdoer, I hear them venting their indignation with loud outcries against such shameful treatment: 'so then after all their long and valuable

services to the city the return she makes is injustice and ruin,' according to their story. But all this is entirely false. For there is no single instance in which the ruler of a city could ever be unjustly brought to ruin by the very city over which he bears rule. For the case appears to be precisely the same with those that pretend to the name of statesmen as with those who profess the sophistical art. The sophists in fact with ail their cleverness in everything else in this one point are guilty of an egregious absurdity: for claiming to be teachers of virtue they often charge their pupils with wronging them by cheating them of their fees and in other respects showing them no gratitude for all the service they have done them. Now what can be more unreasonable than such language? That men after they have been made good and just, after all their injustice has been eradicated by their teacher and justice planted in its stead, should commit injustice by means of that which they have not. Does not this seem to you absurd, my friend? You have really forced me to make quite a speech, Callicles, by refusing to answer.

Callicles/ So you then pretend that you can't speak unless someone answer you?

Socrates/ It seems I can. This time at any rate I have gone on talking a good while, because you won't answer me. Come now, my good fellow, tell me in the name of the god of friendship, don't you think it is unreasonable for a man to profess to have made another good, and then, after he has been made by him and still is good, to find fault with him for being bad?

Callicles/ Yes, I do think so.

Socrates/ Well and you hear, don't you, those that profess to train men in virtue say such things?

Callicles/ Yes I do. But what is to be said [what's the use of talking] of such a worthless set of fellows?

Socrates/ And what is to be said of those who, pretending to control the state and to take care that it be

made as good as possible, turn round upon her when the occasion arises, and accuse her of being as bad as she can be? Think you there is any difference between these and the others? The sophist and the orator, my dear fellow, are the same thing, or as nearly as possible alike, as I said to Polus. But you for want of knowledge think the one, rhetoric, a very fine thing, and the other you despise. Whereas in truth sophistic is a finer thing than rhetoric, in proportion as legislation is superior to the administration of justice, and gymnastics to medicine. In fact for my own part I always thought that public speakers and sophists were the only class of people who have no right to find fault with the thing that they have themselves trained for behaving ill to them; or else they must at the same time by these very same words charge themselves as well with having done no good to those that they pretend to benefit. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes, quite so.

Socrates/ Aye, and they alone might be expected according to all probability to have the power of bestowing their services freely without fee or reward, if what they say were true. For a man when he has received any other benefit, as for instance if he has been taught to run fast by a trainer, might perhaps cheat him of his reward, supposing the trainer gave him his services for nothing, and made no agreement with him for a fee which was to be paid as nearly as possible at the very moment of imparting to him the speed in question: for it is not by slowness of foot I conceive that men do wrong, but by injustice; isn't it?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so if anyone removes from others this particular vice, that is injustice, he need never be afraid of being unjustly treated; but this benefit alone can be bestowed for nothing with security—supposing that is,

that anyone really has the power of making men good. Is it not so?

Callicles/ I allow it.

Socrates/ This then, it appears, is the reason why there is no disgrace in taking money for giving advice of any other kind, as about building or the rest of the arts.

Callicles/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But about this particular process of making a man as good as possible, and enabling him to manage to the best advantage his own household or a state, it is reckoned disgraceful to refuse to give advice without receiving money for it. Isn't it?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ The reason plainly being this, that this is the only kind of service that makes the recipient desire to requite the benefit; and therefore the symptom seems a favorable one [of something having been really taught], when anyone after having performed this particular service is repaid for it; and if not, the contrary [an unfavorable one]. Is this as I say?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ Then tell me definitely which of those two modes of serving the state it is that you invite me to? that of carrying on a constant struggle with the Athenians, like a physician, to make them as good as possible, or as one that would minister to all their humors and deal with them solely with a view to their gratification? Tell me the truth, Callicles: for you are bound, as you began by speaking your mind so freely to me, to go on now and tell me all that you think. So now pray speak out fairly and frankly.

Callicles/ I say then, as one that would minister to them.

Socrates/ Then, my very ingenuous friend, you invite me to play the flatterer.

Callicles/ You may call yourself a Mysian' if you like it better, Socrates; for if you don't do as I say—

Socrates/ Don't repeat what you have said so often, that I am at the mercy of anyone that chooses to put me to death, that I may not be obliged to repeat in my turn, that it will be the case of a rogue putting to death an honest man: nor that anyone can strip me of all that I have, that I may not be obliged to say in my turn, Well, but after he has done so, he won't know how to use what he has got, but as he robbed me wrongfully so in like manner he will employ wrongfully what he has taken; and if wrongfully then basely; and if basely then ill.

Callicles/ It seems to me, Socrates, that you don't believe in the possibility of your meeting with anyone of these calamities, as though you were dwelling far out of harm's way, and never could be dragged into a court of justice by some perhaps utterly wretched and contemptible fellow.

Socrates/ Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I think that in this city of ours anyone whatsoever is exempt from the risk of any possible form of calamity. Of this however I am quite sure, that if I ever am brought before a court of justice and incur any of those risks you speak of, it will be some villain that brings me there: for no honest man would ever prefer a criminal charge against an innocent person. Aye and it were no marvel if I were condemned to death. Would you have me tell you why I expect this?

Callicles/ Yes, by all means.

Socrates/ I think that I am one of very few, not to say the only man in all Athens, that attempts the true art of Politics, and that I am the only man of the present day that performs his public duties at all. Seeing then that the gratification of my hearers is never the object of the discussions that I am in the habit of taking part in, that they aim at what is best, not what is most agreeable, and

because I don't choose to do those fine clever things that you recommend, I shall have not a word to say before the tribunal. And the same case may now be applied to me as I was describing to Polus: for I shall be like a physician tried before a jury of children on a charge brought by a cook. Only consider what defense a man like this would make in such a predicament, if the prosecutor were to open his case thus: My dears, here's a man that has done you all a vast deal of mischief, and even the very youngest of you he maims for life by cutting and burning, and drives you to your wits' end by starving and choking you, administering the bitterest draughts and forcing you to abstain from eating and drinking; not like me, who used to feast you with every variety of nice things in abundance. What think you that a physician reduced to such a strait would find to say for himself? Or supposing he were to say the truth, All this I did, my boys, for your health—how great think you would be the outcry that such judges would set up? a loud one, wouldn't it?

Callicles/ I dare say: one would think so.

Socrates/ Don't you suppose then that he would be utterly at a loss what to say?

Callicles/ Certainly he would.

Socrates/ Such however I well know would be my own fate if I were brought before a court of justice. For I shall have no pleasure to describe that I have provided for them; which they account as benefits and services—whereas I envy neither those that procure them nor those for whom they are procured—and if anyone charges me either with corrupting the juniors by perplexing their minds with doubts, or with reviling the seniors with bitter words either in private or in public, I shall not be able to tell them either the truth, 'all this that I say is right, and it is your interest, alone, O my judges, that I am serving in acting thus,' or indeed anything else. And therefore very likely there is no saying what my fate may be.

Callicles/ Do you think then, Socrates, that a man in such a condition and unable to help himself cuts a good figure in a city?

Socrates/ Yes, Callicles, he would if he had that advantage which you have so often admitted; if he had 'helped himself' by never having said or done any wrong either to men or gods. For this we have repeatedly allowed to be the best of all possible kinds of self-help. Now were I to be convicted of incapacity for rendering help of this kind to myself or another, of such conviction I should be ashamed whether it took place before many or few or by myself alone; and if my death were due to this kind of incapacity I should indeed be vexed. But if it were for want of your 'flattering' rhetoric that I died, I am very sure you would see me meet my death with calmness and composure. For death itself no man fears, unless he be an absolute fool or coward; it is doing wrong that a man fears: for to arrive at the world below with the soul laden with many offences is the uttermost of all evils. And now, if you please, I'll tell you a tale to show you that this is really so.

Callicles/ Well as you have done all the rest, you may as well finish this too.

Socrates/ 'Listen then,' as they say, 'to a very pretty story:' which you, I dare say, will take for a fable, but I regard as a true story: for all that I am about to say I wish to be regarded as true.

Zeus Poseidon and Pluto, as Homer tells us, divided amongst themselves the empire which they derived from their father. Now in the days of Cronus there was a law concerning mankind, which still at the present day as ever prevails in heaven, that every man who has lived a just and holy life departs after death to the Islands of the Blest, and there dwells in perfect happiness beyond the reach of ill; but whosoever has led a life of injustice and impiety is consigned to the dungeon of vengeance and punishment, which, you know, they call Tartarus. Of these there were

in the days of Cronus, and still are in more recent times under the empire of Zeus, living judges of living men, who were appointed to sit in judgment upon every man on the very day on which he was to die. And so the cases were decided amiss. So Pluto and the guardians from the Isles of the Blest came and reported to Zeus how that men undeserving were constantly coming to them as well as to the other place. So spoke Zeus: Nay, said he, I will put an end to this. For true it is that now the cases are ill judged. And this is because they that are brought to trial are tried with their clothes on, seeing that they are tried alive. Now many, said he, whose souls are wicked are clothed with fair bodies and nobility and wealth, and at the judgment many witnesses appear to testify on their behalf that their lives have been passed in justice. So the judges are confounded not only by their evidence, but at the same time because they themselves sit in judgment wrapt in clothes, with the veil of eyes and ears and indeed of the entire body interposed before their own soul. All this therefore stands in their way, their own wrappings as well as those of them that stand before their bar. First of all then, he continued, we must put an end to their foreknowledge of their own death, for now they have this foreknowledge. This however Prometheus has already received my orders to put a stop to. Next they must be stript of all these clothes before they are brought to trial; for they must be tried after death. The Judge too must be naked, dead, with very soul scrutinizing the very soul of each the moment after his death, each man bereft of the aid of all his friends and relations and with all that ornamental furniture left behind him upon earth that the judgment may be just. Knowing all this before yourselves, I have already appointed judges sons of my own, two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Æacus: These three after their death shall sit in judgment in the Meadow at the Cross Roads, whence the two lead, one to the Isles of the Blest, the other to Tartarus.

And the souls from Asia Rhadamanthus shall try, and those from Europe Æacus: and upon Minos I will confer the privilege of deciding in the last resort in case of doubt on the part of the other two, that the judgment upon man's final journey may be perfectly just.

This, Callicles, is what I have heard and believe to be true, and I reckon that from these tales may be drawn some such moral as this. Death, as it seems to me, is nothing but the dissolution, the parting from one another, of two things, the soul and the body. And accordingly after their separation, each of them retains its own state and condition pretty nearly the same as it had when the man was alive, the body retaining its own nature with the results of its training and its accidental affections, all quite visible. For instance, if anyone's body was of great size either naturally or by feeding or both, whilst he was alive, his corpse will be of great size too after he is dead: and if he was fat, it will be just as fat after his death; and so on for the rest. Or if again he adopted the fashion of wearing his hair long, his dead body in like manner will have long hair. Again if anyone had been flogged and bore traces of the stripes in the shape of scars on his body, whether these were left by the scourge or by wounds of any other kind, in life, his body visibly retains the marks of them when the man is dead. And if the limbs of anyone were broken or distorted in life the very same will be visible in death. And in a word, whatever characteristics a man's body presented in life, the same likewise are visible in it after his death, all or most of them, for a certain time. And so, Callicles, it seems to me, the very same is the case with the soul also; when a man's soul is stript of its bodily covering, all its natural properties, as well as those accidental ones which the man's soul contracted from his various habits and pursuits, are visible in it. So as soon as they are arrived at the place of judgment, they of Asia before Rhadamanthus, them Rhadamanthus sets before

him, and examines each man's soul, not knowing whose it is; nay often when he has laid hold upon the Great King himself, or any other prince or potentate, he detects at once the utter unsoundness of his soul, deeply marked by the scourge and covered with wounds inflicted by perjury and iniquity, of which its own acts have left the print on each individual soul; full of distortion arising from falsehood and imposture, and all crooked by reason of its having been reared without truth: or from power and pride and insolence and incontinence finds the soul laden with disproportion and ugliness. When he has found such an one he sends it away in disgrace straight to the place of ward, where on its arrival it is doomed to endure all the sufferings that are its due.

Everyone who undergoes punishment, if that punishment be rightly inflicted by another, ought either to be made better thereby and derive benefit from it, or serve as an example to the rest of mankind, that others seeing the sufferings that he endures may be brought by terror to amendment of life. Now those who derive benefit from the punishment which they receive at the hands of Gods and men are they that have been guilty of remediable offences: yet still the benefit both here and in the world below is conveyed to them through the medium of pain and suffering; for in no other way can the release from iniquity be effected. But all those that have done extreme wrong and by reason of such crimes have become incurable, these are they of whom the examples are made: and these are no longer capable of receiving any benefit themselves, seeing that they are incurable, but others are benefited who behold them for their transgressions enduring the severest most painful and most fearful sufferings in that prison house in the world below, time without end; hung up as signal examples there, a spectacle and a warning to the wicked as they continually arrive. Of whom I say Archelaus too will be one, if what

Polus tells us is true, and every other tyrant that resembles him. And I believe that the majority of these examples is derived from tyrants and kings and potentates and ministers of the affairs of states: for they by reason of the license that they enjoy are usually guilty of the greatest and most impious transgressions. Homer too is a witness to the truth of this; for he has introduced kings and lords, Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus, as those who are suffering everlasting punishment in the lower world. But Thersites or any other private person that was wicked no poet has described as incurable and therefore subjected to any heavy punishment; because no doubt he wanted the power, and therefore was so far happier than those that had it. However, Callicles, be that as it may, it is to the class of the powerful that the men who are distinguished for wickedness actually belong. Still there is nothing to prevent good men being found even amongst these, and eminently worthy of admiration are those that prove themselves such: for it is hard, Callicles, and highly praiseworthy for a man to lead a just life when he has full liberty of doing wrong. But small indeed is the number of such: for true it is that here and elsewhere there have been, and I don't doubt there will be hereafter, men thoroughly accomplished in this virtue, the virtue of administering justly all that has been confided to their care. And one there has been very celebrated indeed, whose fame is spread all over Greece, Aristides son of Lysimachus. But most powerful men, my good friend, turn out bad.

So as I was saying, whenever such an one appears before that Rhadamanthus we spoke of, he knows nothing else about him whatsoever, neither who he is nor whence derived, except that he is a bad man: and as soon as he discovers this he sends him away at once to Tartarus, with a mark set upon him to show whether he is curable or incurable; and upon his arrival there he is submitted to

the sufferings appropriate to his case. And sometimes, when he sets his eyes upon another soul that has lived a holy life in the society of truth, a private man's or any other's, especially as I should say, Callicles, that of a philosopher who has attended to his own business, and not meddled in the affairs of life, he is struck with admiration and sends it off to the Isles of the Blest. Precisely the same is the practice of Æacus. And each of these two sits in judgment with a rod in his hand. But Minos sits alone overlooking the proceedings holding a golden scepter, as Ulysses in Homer says that he saw him;

> 'Wielding a scepter of gold, and judging amongst the Departed.'

Now for my part, Callicles, I am convinced by these stories, and I consider how I may appear before my judge with my soul in its healthiest condition. So renouncing the honors which are the aim of the mass of mankind I shall endeavor in the search after truth really to the utmost of my power to lead a life of virtue and so to meet death when it comes. And all other men I invite likewise to the best of my ability, and you especially I invite in return to this course of life and this conflict, which I say is worth all other conflicts here on earth put together; and I retort your reproach, that you will be unable to help yourself when that trial and that judgment comes upon you of which I was even now speaking; but when you appear before your judge, the son of Ægina, and he lays hold on you to drag you to his bar, you will stand with open mouth and dizzy brain, you there no less than I here, and someone perchance will smite you, yea shamefully slap you in the face, and treat you with every variety of insult.

All this however may perhaps seem to you a mere fable, like an old wife's tale, and you look upon it with contempt. And there would have been no wonder in our despising it, if we could have found by any amount of search anything better and truer. But as it is, you see that you three, three

of the wisest of the Greeks of our time, you and Polus and Gorgias, axe unable to prove that we should lead any other life than this, which appears to be of advantage to us for the other world as well as this; but amidst the multitude of questions that we have been arguing, whilst all the rest were refuted this doctrine alone stands unshaken, that doing wrong is to be more carefully avoided than suffering it; that before all things a man should study not to seem but to be good in his private and public life; that if a man become bad in any respect, he is to be corrected; and that this is good in the second degree, next to being just to become so, and to be corrected by punishment: and that all kinds of 'flattery.' whether of oneself or others, of few or of many, are to be avoided: and that rhetoric, as well as every other kind of action, is to be employed ever for the maintenance of the right, and for that alone.

So take my advice and follow me to that bourn, where when you have attained it, you will be happy in life and after death, as our argument promises, and let anyone look down upon you as a fool and insult you if he pleases—aye, by heaven, and cheerfully submit to endure from him even that blow of infamy: for it will do you no harm if you be really an honest and true man, practicing virtue. And hereafter when we have so practiced it together, then and not till then will we set about politics, if it seem right to do so, or consult then about any other plans we think proper, better prepared for deliberation than we are now. For it is a shame for men in the condition in which we now manifestly are to assume airs of consequence, though we are never of the same mind for two moments together upon the same subjects, and those of the deepest moment; such is the undisciplined state of our minds. Let us then take as a guide the views that have even now declared themselves to us, which point out that this course of life is best, in the practice of justice and of every other virtue to live and to die. These then let us follow and invite all

others thereto; not those you put faith in and invite me to: for they are nothing worth, Callicles.

Gorgias.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Callicles. Socrates. Chaerephon.

Gorgias. Polus.

Scene: The house of Callicles.

Callicles/ The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a feast.

Socrates/ And are we late for a feast?

Callicles/ Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been exhibiting to us many fine things.

Socrates/ It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora.

Chaerephon/ Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, at some other time.

Callicles/ What is the matter, Chaerephon—does Socrates want to hear Gorgias?

Chaerephon/ Yes, that was our intention in coming.

Callicles/ Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and he shall exhibit to you.

Socrates/ Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which he professes and teaches; he may, as you [Chaerephon] suggest, defer the exhibition to some other time.

Callicles/ There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he

was saying only just now, that anyone in my house might put any question to him, and that he would answer.

Socrates/ How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon—?

Chaerephon/ What shall I ask him?

Socrates/ Ask him who he is.

Chaerephon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand?

Chaerephon/ I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our friend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any questions which you are asked?

Gorgias/ Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now; and I may add, that many years have elapsed since anyone has asked me a new one.

Chaerephon/ Then you must be very ready, Gorgias.

Gorgias/ Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.

Polus/ Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of me too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is tired.

Chaerephon/ And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than Gorgias?

Polus/ What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?

Chaerephon/ Not at all: —and you shall answer if you like.

Polus/ Ask: —

Chaerephon/ My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which is given to his brother?

Polus/ Certainly.

Chaerephon/ Then we should be right in calling him a physician?

Polus/ Yes.

Chaerephon/ And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?

Polus/ Clearly, a painter.

Chaerephon/ But now what shall we call him—what is the art in which he is skilled?

Polus/ O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according to chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in different arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest.

Socrates/ Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; but he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.

Gorgias/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he was asked.

Gorgias/ Then why not ask him yourself?

Socrates/ But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer: for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.

Polus/ What makes you say so, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art which Gorgias knows, you praised it as if

you were answering someone who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.

Polus/ Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?

Socrates/ Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by what name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you briefly and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question, —what are we to call you, and what is the art which you profess?

Gorgias/ Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.

Socrates/ Then I am to call you a rhetorician?

Gorgias/ Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that which, in Homeric language, 'I boast myself to be.'

Socrates/ I should wish to do so.

Gorgias/ Then pray do.

Socrates/ And are we to say that you are able to make other men rhetoricians?

Gorgias/ Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at Athens, but in all places.

Socrates/ And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer mode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?

Gorgias/ Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that I can be as short as anyone.

Socrates/ That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and the longer one at some other time.

Gorgias/ Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a man use fewer words.

Socrates/ Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?) with the making of garments?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?

Gorgias/ It is.

Socrates/ By Herè, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers.

Gorgias/ Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.

Socrates/ I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?

Gorgias/ With discourse.

Socrates/ What sort of discourse, Gorgias? —such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?

Gorgias/ No.

Socrates/ Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?

Gorgias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And to understand that about which they speak?

Gorgias/ Of course.

Socrates/ But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then medicine also treats of discourse?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Of discourse concerning diseases?

Gorgias/ Just so.

Socrates/ And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body?

Gorgias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts: —all of them treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to do.

Gorgias/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?

Gorgias/ Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.

Socrates/ I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question: —you would allow that there are arts?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned with doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, and statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and of such arts I suppose you

would say that they do not come within the province of rhetoric.

Gorgias/ You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.

Socrates/ But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of language, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts; in some of these speech is pretty nearly coextensive with action, but in most of them the verbal element is greater—they depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter sort?

Gorgias/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, 'And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.' But I do not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by you.

Gorgias/ You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my meaning.

Socrates/ Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer: —seeing that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned: —Suppose that a person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now; he might say, 'Socrates, what is arithmetic?' and I should reply to him, as you replied to me, that arithmetic is one of those arts which take effect through words. And then he would proceed to ask: 'Words about what?' and I should reply, Words about odd and even numbers, and how many

there are of each. And if he asked again: 'What is the art of calculation?' I should say, That also is one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he further said, 'Concerned with what?' I should say, like the clerks in the assembly, 'as aforesaid' of arithmetic, but with a difference, the difference being that the art of calculation considers not only the quantities of odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations to themselves and to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only words—he would ask, 'Words about what, Socrates?' and I should answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative swiftness.

Gorgias/ You would be quite right, Socrates.

Socrates/ And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which act always and fulfill all their ends through the medium of words?

Gorgias/ True.

Socrates/ Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate?

Gorgias/ To the greatest; Socrates, and the best of human things.

Socrates/ That again, Gorgias, is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honestly obtained.

Gorgias/ Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?

Socrates/ I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will say: 'O Socrates,

Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the greatest good of men and not his.' And when I ask, Who are you? he will reply, 'I am a physician.' What do you mean? I shall say. Do you mean that your art produces the greatest good? 'Certainly,' he will answer, 'for is not health the greatest good? What greater good can men have, Socrates?' And after him the trainer will come and say, 'I too, Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can show of mine.' To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest friend, and what is your business? 'I am a trainer,' he will reply, 'and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in body.' When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I expect, will utterly despise them all. 'Consider, Socrates,' he will say, 'whether Gorgias or anyone else can produce any greater good than wealth.' Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth? 'Yes,' he replies. And who are you? 'A moneymaker.' And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? 'Of course,' will be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, 'What good? Let Gorgias answer.' Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by them and by me; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.

Gorgias/ That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the power of ruling over others in their several states.

Socrates/ And what would you consider this to be?

Gorgias/ What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other

political meeting? —if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

Socrates/ Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?

Gorgias/ No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.

Socrates/ Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you.

Gorgias/ What is coming, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask—what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If I asked, 'What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?' and you said, 'The painter of figures,' should I not be right in asking, 'What kind of figures, and where do you find them?'

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the reason for asking this second question would be, that there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?

Gorgias/ True.

Socrates/ But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you would have answered very well?

Gorgias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way; —is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?

Gorgias/ He persuades, Socrates, —there can be no mistake about that.

Socrates/ Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now speaking: —do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of number?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And therefore persuade us of them?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion?

Gorgias/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And if anyone asks us what sort of persuasion, and about what, —we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about what.

Gorgias/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?

Gorgias/ True.

Socrates/ Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer, and about what? —is not that a fair way of putting the question?

Gorgias/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?

Gorgias/ I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust.

Socrates/ And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute you, but as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another's words; I would have you developed your own views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.

Gorgias/ I think that you are quite right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as 'having learned'?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And there is also 'having believed'?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is the 'having learned' the same as 'having believed,' and are learning and belief the same things?

Gorgias/ In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.

Socrates/ And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way: —If a person were to say to you, 'Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well as a true?'—you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?

Gorgias/ No.

Socrates/ No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ.

Gorgias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are persuaded?

Gorgias/ Just so.

Socrates/ Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion, —one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?

Gorgias/ By all means.

Socrates/ And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge?

Gorgias/ Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.

Socrates/ Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them?

Gorgias/ True.

Socrates/ And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief about them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high matters in a short time?

Gorgias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbors or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a position taken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians: what do you say, Gorgias? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn the nature of your art from you. And here let me assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own. For likely enough someone or other of the young men present might desire to become your pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. 'What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias?' they will say—'about what will you teach us to advise the state? —about the just and unjust only, or about those other things also which Socrates has just mentioned?' How will you answer them?

Gorgias/ I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavor to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the harbor were devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the builders.

Socrates/ Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I myself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall.

Gorgias/ And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the men who win their point.

Socrates/ I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.

Gorgias/ A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would have no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than anyone would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric! And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive art, not against everybody, —the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of fence; —because he has powers which are more than a match either for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends. Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skillful boxer, —he in the fullness of his strength goes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why

the trainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from the city; —surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defense not in aggression, and others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men and upon any subject, —in short, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his instructor.

Socrates/ You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not always terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either party of the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements are apt to arise—somebody says that another has not spoken truly or clearly; and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing from personal feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in the question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever

listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute anyone else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter; —let us make an end of it.

Gorgias/ I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we should consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do something else.

Chaerephon/ You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which shows their desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid that I should have any business on hand which would take me away from a discussion so interesting and so ably maintained.

Callicles/ By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at many discussions, I doubt whether I was ever so

much delighted before, and therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better pleased.

Socrates/ I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is.

Gorgias/ After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused, especially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with the wishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of me any question which you like.

Socrates/ Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your words; though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have misunderstood your meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a rhetorician?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion?

Gorgias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health?

Gorgias/ Yes, with the multitude, —that is.

Socrates/ You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion.

Gorgias/ Very true.

Socrates/ But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Although he is not a physician: —is he?

Gorgias/ No.

Socrates/ And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of what the physician knows.

Gorgias/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge? —is not that the inference?

Gorgias/ In the case supposed: —yes.

Socrates/ And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?

Gorgias/ Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort? —not to have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no way inferior to the professors of them?

Socrates/ Whether the rhetorician is or is not inferior on this account is a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is or is not as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honorable, good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or honorable, just of unjust in them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than someone else who knows? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him—it is not your business; but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good man, when he

is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said about all this? By heaven, Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying that you would.

Gorgias/ Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.

Socrates/ Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust already, or he must be taught by you.

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who has learned music a musician?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? He who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes him.

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?

Gorgias/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And must not the just man always desire to do what is just?

Gorgias/ That is clearly the inference.

Socrates/ Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice?

Gorgias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just man?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?

Gorgias/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of his rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his teacher, who is not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his rhetoric—he is to be banished—was not that said?

Gorgias/ Yes, it was.

Socrates/ But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will never have done injustice at all?

Gorgias/ True.

Socrates/ And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric treated of discourse, not [like arithmetic] about odd and even, but about just and unjust? Was not this said?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be

an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave off.

And in the course of our investigations, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this.

Polus/ And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honorable and the good, and admitted that to anyone who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a contradiction—the thing which you so dearly love, and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your captious questions—[do you seriously believe that there is any truth in all this?] For will anyone ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass.

Socrates/ Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and in our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you who should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any error into which you may think that I have fallen—upon one condition:

Polus/ What condition?

Socrates/ That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you indulged at first.

Polus/ What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?

Socrates/ Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got there, and you alone, should be deprived of the power of speech—that would be hard indeed. But then consider my case shall not I be very hardly used, if, when you are making a long oration, and refusing to answer what you are asked, I am compelled to stay and listen to you, and may not go away? I say rather, if you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set it on its legs, take back any statement which you please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias—refute and be refuted: for I suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias knows—would you not?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you, like him, invite anyone to ask you about anything which he pleases, and you will know how to answer him?

Polus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And now, which will you do, ask or answer?

Polus/ I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric?

Socrates/ Do you mean what sort of an art?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my opinion.

Polus/ Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric?

Socrates/ A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, you say that you have made an art.

Polus/ What thing?

Socrates/ I should say a sort of experience.

Polus/ Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?

Socrates/ That is my view, but you may be of another mind.

Polus/ An experience in what?

Socrates/ An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification.

Polus/ And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing?

Socrates/ What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is?

Polus/ Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience?

Socrates/ Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a slight gratification to me?

Polus/ I will.

Socrates/ Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?

Polus/ What sort of an art is cookery?

Socrates/ Not an art at all, Polus.

Polus/ What then?

Socrates/ I should say an experience.

Polus/ In what? I wish that you would explain to me.

Socrates/ An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification, Polus.

Polus/ Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?

Socrates/ No, they are only different parts of the same profession.

Polus/ Of what profession?

Socrates/ I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I hesitate to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of his own profession. For

whether or not this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practices I really cannot tell: —from what he was just now saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole.

Gorgias/ A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me.

Socrates/ In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word 'flattery;' and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not an art: —another part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first answered, 'What is rhetoric?' For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?

Polus/ I will ask, and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric?

Socrates/ Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.

Polus/ And noble or ignoble?

Socrates/ Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call what is bad ignoble: —though I doubt whether you understand what I was saying before.

Gorgias/ Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself.

Socrates/ I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained myself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt to run away.

Gorgias/ Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics.

Socrates/ I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the existence of bodies and of souls?

Gorgias/ Of course.

Socrates/ You would further admit that there is a good condition of either of them?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good health.

Gorgias/ True.

Socrates/ And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the reality?

Gorgias/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And now I will endeavor to explain to you more clearly what I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the

body, of which I know no single name, but which may be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts run into one another, justice having to do with the same subject as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on the body and two on the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of someone or other of them, and pretends to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for men's highest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be and of an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but only an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art; but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defense of them.

Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of medicine; and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of lines, and colors, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect

a spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic.

I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the manner of the geometricians, (for I think that by this time you will be able to follow,)

as tiring : gymnastic / cookery : medicine;

or rather;

as tiring : gymnastic / sophistry : legislation;

and

as cookery : medicine / rhetoric : justice.

And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled up together; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would prevail far and wide: 'Chaos' would come again, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and could make no use of my answer when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to enter into an explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use of yours, I hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able to understand you,

let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair: And now you may do what you please with my answer.

Polus/ What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery?

Socrates/ Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you cannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older?

Polus/ And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the idea that they are flatterers?

Socrates/ Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?

Polus/ I am asking a question.

Socrates/ Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all.

Polus/ How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states?

Socrates/ Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor.

Polus/ And that is what I do mean to say.

Socrates/ Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the citizens.

Polus/ What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile anyone whom they please.

Socrates/ By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of yours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a question of me.

Polus/ I am asking a question of you.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once.

Polus/ How two questions?

Socrates/ Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile anyone whom they please?

Polus/ I did.

Socrates/ Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I was just now saying; for they do literally nothing which they will, but only what they think best.

Polus/ And is not that a great power?

Socrates/ Polus has already said the reverse.

Polus/ Said the reverse! nay, that is what I assert.

Socrates/ No, by the great—what do you call him? —not you, for you say that great power is a good to him who has the power.

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best, this is a good, and would you call this great power?

Polus/ I should not.

Socrates/ Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery—and so you will have refuted me; but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what they think best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon which to congratulate themselves, if, as you say, power be indeed a good, admitting at the same time that what is done without sense is an evil.

Polus/ Yes; I admit that.

Socrates/ How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as they will?

Polus/ This fellow—

Socrates/ I say that they do not do as they will; —now refute me.

Polus/ Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best?

Socrates/ And I say so still.

Polus/ Then surely they do as they will?

Socrates/ I deny it.

Polus/ But they do what they think best?

Socrates/ Aye.

Polus/ That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd.

Socrates/ Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error or give the answer yourself.

Polus/ Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean.

Socrates/ Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take medicine, for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink?

Polus/ Clearly, the health.

Socrates/ And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business? —But they will, to have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and indifferent?

Polus/ To be sure, Socrates.

Socrates/ Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and their opposites evils?

Polus/ I should.

Socrates/ And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, stones, and the like: — these are the things which you call neither good nor evil?

Polus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?

Polus/ Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.

Socrates/ When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other thing for the sake of which we do them?

Polus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?

Polus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Hence we may infer, that if anyone, whether he be a tyrant or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of his property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not answer?

Polus/ Well, I suppose not.

Socrates/ Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have great power in a state?

Polus/ He will not.

Socrates/ Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?

Polus/ As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when you saw

anyone killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no!

Socrates/ Justly or unjustly, do you mean?

Polus/ In either case is he not equally to be envied?

Socrates/ Forbear, Polus!

Polus/ Why 'forbear'?

Socrates/ Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied, but only to pity them.

Polus/ And are those of whom I spoke wretches?

Socrates/ Yes, certainly they are.

Polus/ And so you think that he who slays anyone whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?

Socrates/ No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is to be envied.

Polus/ Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him justly.

Polus/ At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied?

Socrates/ Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is justly killed.

Polus/ How can that be, Socrates?

Socrates/ That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of evils.

Polus/ But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?

Socrates/ Certainly not.

Polus/ Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?

Socrates/ I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would rather suffer than do.

Polus/ Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?

Socrates/ Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.

Polus/ I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.

Socrates/ Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to kill is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort of way anyone may have great power—he may burn any house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or private—but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best is great power?

Polus/ Certainly not such doing as this.

Socrates/ But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?

Polus/ I can.

Socrates/ Why then?

Polus/ Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished.

Socrates/ And punishment is an evil?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power;

and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another way: —do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ About that you and I may be supposed to agree?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that they are evil—what principle do you lay down?

Polus/ I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask that question.

Socrates/ Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are unjust.

Polus/ You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child refute that statement?

Socrates/ Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness. And I hope that refute me you will, and not weary of doing good to a friend.

Polus/ Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; events which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and to prove that many men who do wrong are happy.

Socrates/ What events?

Polus/ You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler of Macedonia?

Socrates/ At any rate I hear that he is.

Polus/ And do you think that he is happy or miserable?

Socrates/ I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with him.

Polus/ And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with him, whether a man is happy?

Socrates/ Most certainly not.

Polus/ Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether the great king was a happy man?

Socrates/ And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in the matter of education and justice.

Polus/ What! and does all happiness consist in this?

Socrates/ Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil are miserable.

Polus/ Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable?

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, if he is wicked.

Polus/ That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to the throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore in strict right was the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do rightly he would have remained his slave, and then, according to your doctrine, he would have been happy. But now he is unspeakably miserable, for he has been guilty of the greatest crimes: in the first place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, to come to him, under the pretense that he would restore to him the throne which Perdiccas had usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk, he threw them into a wagon and carried them off by night, and slew them, and got both of them out of the way; and when he had done all this wickedness he never discovered that he was the most miserable of all men, and

was very far from repenting: shall I tell you how he showed his remorse? he had a younger brother, a child of seven years old, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, and to him of right the kingdom belonged; Archelaus, however, had no mind to bring him up as he ought and restore the kingdom to him; that was not his notion of happiness; but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned him, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while running after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest criminal of all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the most miserable and not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there are many Athenians, and you would be at the head of them, who would rather be any other Macedonian than Archelaus!

Socrates/ I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather than a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is the refutation? I cannot admit a word which you have been saying.

Polus/ That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I do.

Socrates/ Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me after the manner which rhetoricians practice in courts of law. For there the one party think that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their allegations, and their adversary has only a single one or none at all. But this kind of proof is of no value where truth is the aim; a man may often be sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who have a great air of respectability. And in this argument nearly everyone, Athenian and stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should bring witnesses in disproof of my statement; —you

may, if you will, summon Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who gave the row of tripods which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with him; or you may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that famous offering which is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you choose; —they will all agree with you: I only am left alone and cannot agree, for you do not convince me; although you produce many false witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth speaking of will have been effected by me unless I make you the one witness of my words; nor by you, unless you make me the one witness of yours; no matter about the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one which is yours and that of the world in general; but mine is of another sort—let us compare them, and see in what they differ. For, indeed, we are at issue about matters which to know is honorable and not to know disgraceful; to know or not to know happiness and misery—that is the chief of them. And what knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And therefore I will begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who is unjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think Archelaus unjust, and yet happy? May I assume this to be your opinion?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But I say that this is an impossibility—here is one point about which we are at issue very good. And do you mean to say also that if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?

Polus/ Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.

Socrates/ On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, according to you, he will be happy?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is miserable in any case, —more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and men.

Polus/ You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.

Socrates/ I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us—are they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?

Polus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ And you said the opposite?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?

Polus/ By Zeus I did.

Socrates/ In your own opinion, Polus.

Polus/ Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.

Socrates/ You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be unpunished?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who are punished are less miserable—are you going to refute this proposition also?

Polus/ A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other, Socrates.

Socrates/ Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth?

Polus/ What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his eyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries inflicted on him, and having seen his wife and children suffer the like, is at last impaled or tarred and burned alive, will he be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant, and continue all through life doing what he likes and holding the reins of government, the envy and admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the paradox which, as you say, cannot be refuted?

Socrates/ There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead of refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But please to refresh my memory a little; did you say—'in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant'?

Polus/ Yes, I did.

Socrates/ Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the other, —neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers in the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but that he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation, —when anyone says anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him.

Polus/ But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the company.

Socrates/ O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my tribe were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their president to take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them. And as I failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no better

argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, is required; for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he is the person with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take; but with the many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really believe, that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to be punished.

Polus/ And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for example, suffer rather than do injustice?

Socrates/ Yes, and you, too; I or any man would.

Polus/ Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.

Socrates/ But will you answer?

Polus/ To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you can have to say.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is the worst? —to do injustice or to suffer?

Polus/ I should say that suffering was worst.

Socrates/ And which is the greater disgrace? —Answer.

Polus/ To do.

Socrates/ And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?

Polus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honorable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?

Polus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful things, such as bodies, colors, figures, sounds,

institutions, do you not call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other account of personal beauty?

Polus/ I cannot.

Socrates/ And you would say of figures or colors generally that they were beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of their use, or of both?

Polus/ Yes, I should.

Socrates/ And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same reason?

Polus/ I should.

Socrates/ Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so far as they are useful or pleasant or both?

Polus/ I think not.

Socrates/ And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?

Polus/ To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility.

Socrates/ And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite standard of pain and evil?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to say, in pleasure or utility or both?

Polus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil—must it not be so?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But then again, what was the observation which you just now made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?

Polus/ I did.

Socrates/ Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: does not that also follow?

Polus/ Of course.

Socrates/ First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more than the injured?

Polus/ No, Socrates; certainly not.

Socrates/ Then they do not exceed in pain?

Polus/ No.

Socrates/ But if not in pain, then not in both?

Polus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then they can only exceed in the other?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ That is to say, in evil?

Polus/ True. ‘

Socrates/ Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?

Polus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that is now discovered to be more evil?

Polus/ True.

Socrates/ And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonor to a less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a physician without shrinking, and either say 'Yes' or 'No' to me.

Polus/ I should say 'No.'

Socrates/ Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?

Polus/ No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the two.

Polus/ That is the conclusion.

Socrates/ You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of refutations, how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of myself, are of your way of thinking; but your single assent and witness are enough for me, —I have no need of any other; I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Consider: —You would say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected when you do wrong?

Polus/ I should.

Socrates/ And would you not allow that all just things are honorable in so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion.

Polus/ Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.

Socrates/ Consider again: —Where there is an agent, must there not also be a patient?

Polus/ I should say so.

Socrates/ And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck will be struck violently or quickly?

Polus/ True.

Socrates/ And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the act of him who strikes?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?

Polus/ Truly.

Socrates/ And if he cuts, the same argument holds—there will be something cut?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the cut will be of the same nature?

Polus/ That is evident.

Socrates/ Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers to the act of the agent?

Polus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting?

Polus/ Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.

Socrates/ And suffering implies an agent?

Polus/ Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.

Socrates/ And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And therefore he acts justly?

Polus/ Justly.

Socrates/ Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?

Polus/ That is evident.

Socrates/ And that which is just has been admitted to be honorable?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the punisher does what is honorable, and the punished suffers what is honorable?

Polus/ True.

Socrates/ And if what is honorable, then what is good, for the honorable is either pleasant or useful?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then he who is punished suffers what is good?

Polus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then he is benefited?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term 'benefited'? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is improved.

Polus/ Surely.

Socrates/ Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the matter in this way: —In respect of a man's estate, do you see any greater evil than poverty?

Polus/ There is no greater evil.

Socrates/ Again, in a man's bodily frame, you would say that the evil is weakness and disease and deformity?

Polus/ I should.

Socrates/ And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her own?

Polus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and the like?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed out three corresponding evils—injustice, disease, poverty?

Polus/ True.

Socrates/ And which of the evils is the most disgraceful? —Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?

Polus/ By far the most.

Socrates/ And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?

Polus/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean to say, that what is most disgraceful has been already admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by us to be most disgraceful?

Polus/ It has been admitted.

Socrates/ And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?

Polus/ Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from your premises.

Socrates/ Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil.

Polus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of evils?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the soul, are the greatest of evils?

Polus/ That is evident.

Socrates/ Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not the art of making money?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine?

Polus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them.

Polus/ To the physicians, Socrates.

Socrates/ And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?

Polus/ To the judges, you mean.

Socrates/ —Who are to punish them?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?

Polus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?

Polus/ That is evident.

Socrates/ Which, then, is the best of these three?

Polus/ Will you enumerate them?

Socrates/ Money-making, medicine, and justice.

Polus/ Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.

Socrates/ And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being healed pleased?

Polus/ I think not.

Socrates/ A useful thing, then?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and this is the advantage of enduring the pain—that you get well?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is healed, or who never was out of health?

Polus/ Clearly he who was never out of health.

Socrates/ Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from evils, but in never having had them.

Polus/ True.

Socrates/ And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is not healed, but retains the evil—which of them is the most miserable?

Polus/ Clearly he who is not healed.

Socrates/ And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the greatest of evils, which is vice?

Polus/ True.

Socrates/ And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine of our vice?

Polus/ True.

Socrates/ He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils.

Polus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?

Polus/ True.

Socrates/ That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from injustice?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates?

Polus/ True.

Socrates/ May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut: —Is not that a parallel case?

Polus/ Yes, truly.

Socrates/ He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily vigor; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form?

Polus/ If you please.

Socrates/ Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the greatest of evils?

Polus/ That is quite clear.

Socrates/ And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from this evil?

Polus/ True.

Socrates/ And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?

Polus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who suffers. —Was not that what I said?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And it has been proved to be true?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil?

Polus/ True.

Socrates/ And if he, or anyone about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow this consequence, Polus, if our former admissions are to stand: —is any other inference consistent with them?

Polus/ To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.

Socrates/ Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse his own injustice, or that of his parents or friends, or children or country; but may be of use to anyone who holds that instead of excusing he ought to accuse—himself above all, and in the next degree his family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong; he should

bring to light the iniquity and not conceal it, that so the wrong-doer may suffer and be made whole; and he should even force himself and others not to shrink, but with closed eyes like brave men to let the physician operate with knife or searing iron, not regarding the pain, in the hope of attaining the good and the honorable; let him who has done things worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of death, to die, himself being the first to accuse himself and his own relations, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say 'Yes' or 'No' to that?

Polus/ To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange, though probably in agreement with your premises.

Socrates/ Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven?

Polus/ Yes; it certainly is.

Socrates/ And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty to harm another, whether an enemy or not—I except the case of self-defense—then I have to be upon my guard—but if my enemy injures a third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the judge; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and not suffer punishment: if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep what he has stolen and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion and justice; and if he have done things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of any use to

him who is not intending to commit injustice; at least, there was no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion.

Callicles/ Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking?

Chaerephon/ I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound earnest; but you may as well ask him.

Callicles/ By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest, or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is true, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we not doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we ought to be doing?

Socrates/ O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings among mankind, however varying in different persons—I mean to say, if every man's feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that you and I have a common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us have two loves apiece: —I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, and of philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of Demus the son of Pyrilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your cleverness, do not venture to contradict your favorite in any word or opinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards. When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are saying in the assembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the same with Demus, the fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not the power to resist the words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to express surprise at the strangeness of what you say from time to time when under their influence, you would probably reply to him, if you were honest, that you cannot help saying what your loves say

unless they are prevented; and that you can only be silent when they are. Now you must understand that my words are an echo too, and therefore you need not wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence philosophy, who is my love, for she is always telling me what I am now telling you, my friend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son of Cleinias says one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but philosophy is always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are now wondering, and you have heard her yourself. Her you must refute, and either show, as I was saying, that to do injustice and to escape punishment is not the worst of all evils; or, if you leave her word unrefuted; by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole life will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre should be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus which I provided; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and contradict myself.

Callicles/ O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus has fallen into the same error himself of which he accused Gorgias: —for he said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if someone came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him justice, Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought that mankind in general would be displeased if he answered 'No;' and then in consequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, that being just the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed at you deservedly, as I think; but now he has himself fallen into the same trap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he

conceded to you that to do is more dishonorable than to suffer injustice, for this was the admission which led to his being entangled by you; and because he was too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are generally at variance with one another: and hence, if a person is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself; and you, in your ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined by the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you slip away to custom: as, for instance, you did in this very discussion about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the conventionally dishonorable, you assailed him from the point of view of nature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater disgrace because the greater evil; but conventionally, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the stronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may not get the better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and unjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to have more than his neighbors; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are too glad of equality. And therefore the endeavor to

have more than the many, is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples.) Nay, but these are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and according to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young lions, —charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them, that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honorable and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this; he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws which are against nature: the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of Pindar, when he says in his poem, that

> 'Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals;'

this, as he says;

> 'Makes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand; as I infer from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them—'

—I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is, that without buying them, and without their being given to him, he carried off the oxen of Geryon, according to the law

of natural right, and that the oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the stronger and superior. And this is true, as you may ascertain, if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things: for philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a person of honor ought to know; he is inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which ought to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public, and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of human character in general. And people of this sort, when they betake themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the politicians to be, when they make their appearance in the arena of philosophy. For, as Euripides says;

> 'Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest portion of the day to that in which he most excels,'

but anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks that he will thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them. Philosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there is no disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study; but when he is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridiculous, and I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and imitate children. For I love to see a little child, who is not of an age to speak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of grace and freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years. But when I hear some small creature carefully articulating its words, I

am offended; the sound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of slavery. So when I hear a man lisping, or see him playing like a child, his behavior appears to me ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have the same feeling about students of philosophy; when I see a youth thus engaged, —the study appears to me to be in character, and becoming a man of a liberal education, and him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later life, and not leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates; for, as I was saying, such a one, even though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate. He flies from the busy center and the market-place, in which, as the poet says, men become distinguished; he creeps into a corner for the rest of his life, and talks in a whisper with three or four admiring youths, but never speaks out like a freeman in a satisfactory manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined towards you, and my feeling may be compared with that of Zethus towards Amphion, in the play of Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for I am disposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother, that you, Socrates, are careless about the things of which you ought to be careful; and that you

> 'Who have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior;
> Neither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any reason
> or proof,
> Or offer valiant counsel on another's behalf.'

And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out of good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being thus defenseless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only but of all those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For suppose that

someone were to take you, or anyone of your sort, off to prison, declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no wrong, you must allow that you would not know what to do: —there you would stand giddy and gaping, and not having a word to say; and when you went up before the Court, even if the accuser were a poor creature and not good for much, you would die if he were disposed to claim the penalty of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of

> 'An art which converts a man of sense into a fool'

who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others, when he is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his enemies of all his goods, and has to live, simply deprived of his rights of citizenship? —he being a man who, if I may use the expression, may be boxed on the ears with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice, and refute no more:

> 'Learn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation of wisdom.
> But leave to others these niceties,'

whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities:

> 'For they will only
> Give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.'

Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate only the man of substance and honor, who is well to do.

Socrates/ If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not rejoice to discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and the very best possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if the stone and I agreed in approving of her training, then I should know that I was in a satisfactory state, and that no other test was needed by me.

Callicles/ What is your meaning, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you; I think that I have found in you the desired touchstone.

Callicles/ Why?

Socrates/ Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the opinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. For I consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or evil of the soul, he ought to have three qualities—knowledge, good-will, outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I meet are unable to make trial of me, because they are not wise as you are; others are wise, but they will not tell me the truth, because they have not the same interest in me which you have; and these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good friends, but they are not outspoken enough, and they are too modest. Why, their modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one and then the other of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the highest moment. But you have all the qualities in which these others are deficient, having received an excellent education; to this many Athenians can testify. And you are my friend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that you, Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together: there were four of you, and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent to which the pursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know, you came to the conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much into detail. You were cautioning one another not to be over wise; you were afraid that too much wisdom might unconsciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And now when I hear you giving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most intimate friends, I have a sufficient evidence of your real good-will to me. And of the frankness of your nature and freedom from

modesty I am assured by yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, the inference in the present case clearly is, that if you agree with me in an argument about any point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by us, and will not require to be submitted to any further test. For you could not have agreed with me, either from lack of knowledge or from superfluity of modesty, nor yet from a desire to deceive me, for you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you and I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of perfect truth. Now there is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that which you censure me for making, —What ought the character, of a man to be, and what his pursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth? For be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, but from ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have begun, until I have learned clearly what this is which I am to practice, and how I may acquire it. And if you find me assenting to your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I assented, call me 'dolt,' and deem me unworthy of receiving further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by natural justice: Do you not mean that the superior should take the property of the inferior by force; that the better should rule the worse, the noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my recollection?

Callicles/ Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver.

Socrates/ And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I could not make out what you were saying at the time—whether you meant by the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the stronger, as you seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack small ones in accordance with natural right, because they are superior

and stronger, as though the superior and stronger and better were the same; or whether the better may be also the inferior and weaker, and the superior the worse, or whether better is to be defined in the same way as superior: —this is the point which I want to have cleared up. Are the superior and better and stronger the same or different?

Callicles/ I say unequivocally that they are the same.

Socrates/ Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you were saying, they make the laws?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?

Callicles/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class are far better, as you were saying?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them are by nature good?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, that justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer injustice? —is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no modesty be found to come in the way; do the many think, or do they not think thus? —I must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree with me I may fortify myself by the assent of so competent an authority.

Callicles/ Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say.

Socrates/ Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when accusing me you said that

nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was dishonestly playing between them, appealing to custom when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the argument is about custom?

Callicles/ This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over some verbal slip? do you not see—have I not told you already, that by superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble of slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their physical strength, get together, their ipsissima verba are laws?

Socrates/ Ho! my philosopher, is that your line?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must have been in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question, —What is the superior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely do not think that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are better than you because they are stronger? Then please to begin again, and tell me who the better are, if they are not the stronger; and I will ask you, great Sir, to be a little milder in your instructions, or I shall have to run away from you.

Callicles/ You are ironical.

Socrates/ No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just now saying many ironical things against me, I am not: —tell me, then, whom you mean by the better?

Callicles/ I mean the more excellent.

Socrates/ Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have no meaning and that you are explaining nothing? —will you tell me whether you mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom?

Callicles/ Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser.

Socrates/ Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to ten thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his subjects, and he ought to have more than they should. This is what I believe that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am word-catching,) if you allow that the one is superior to the ten thousand?

Callicles/ Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be natural justice—that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the inferior.

Socrates/ Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this case: Let us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are several of us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks, and there are all sorts of persons in our company having various degrees of strength and weakness, and one of us, being a physician, is wiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and he is probably stronger than some and not so strong as others of us—will he not, being wiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this matter of food?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and drinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all of them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or make use of a larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he will be punished; —his share will exceed that of some, and be less than that of others, and if he be the weakest of all, he being the best of all will have the smallest share of all, Callicles: —am I not right, my friend?

Callicles/ You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other nonsense; I am not speaking of them.

Socrates/ Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer 'Yes' or 'No.'

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And ought not the better to have a larger share?

Callicles/ Not of meats and drinks.

Socrates/ I understand: then, perhaps, of coats—the skillfullest weaver ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go about clothed in the best and finest of them?

Callicles/ Fudge about coats!

Socrates/ Then the skillfullest and best in making shoes ought to have the advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in the largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them?

Callicles/ Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking?

Socrates/ Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own land?

Callicles/ How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates!

Socrates/ Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things.

Callicles/ Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument.

Socrates/ But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a suggestion, nor offer one?

Callicles/ I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by superiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also valiant and able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint from want of soul.

Socrates/ See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying the same about the same things, for at one time you were defining the better and the superior to be the stronger, then again as the wiser, and now you bring forward a new notion; the superior and the better are now declared by you to be the more courageous: I wish, my good friend, that you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to be the better and superior, and in what they are better?

Callicles/ I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and courageous in the administration of a state—they ought to be the rulers of their states, and justice consists in their having more than their subjects.

Socrates/ But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have more than themselves, my friend?

Callicles/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think that there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required to rule others?

Callicles/ What do you mean by his 'ruling over himself'?

Socrates/ A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own pleasures and passions.

Callicles/ What innocence! you mean those fools, —the temperate?

Socrates/ Certainly: —anyone may know that to be my meaning.

Callicles/ Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not

to chastise them; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility. To this however the many cannot attain; and they blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is base. As I have remarked already, they enslave the nobler natures, and being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and justice out of their own cowardice. For if a man had been originally the son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or sovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than temperance—to a man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to stand in his way, and yet has admitted custom and reason and the opinion of other men to be lords over him? —must not he be in a miserable plight whom the reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving more to his friends than to his enemies, even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, Socrates, for you profess to be a votary of the truth, and the truth is this: —that luxury and intemperance and license, if they be provided with means, are virtue and happiness—all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements contrary to nature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth.

Socrates/ There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of approaching the argument; for what you say is what the rest of the world think, but do not like to say. And I must beg of you to persevere, that the true rule of human life may become manifest. Tell me, then: —you say, do you not, that in the rightly-developed man the passions ought not to be controlled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is virtue?

Callicles/ Yes; I do.

Socrates/ Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?

Callicles/ No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the happiest of all.

Socrates/ But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying;

'Who knows if life be not death and death life;'

and that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say that at this moment we are actually dead, and that the body (σῶμα) is our tomb (σῆμα,) and that the part of the soul which is the seat of the desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown up and down; and some ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an Italian, playing with the word, invented a tale in which he called the soul—because of its believing and make-believe nature—a vessel, and the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full of holes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, meaning the invisible world (ἀειδὲς,) these uninitiated or leaky persons are the most miserable, and that they pour water into a vessel which is full of holes out of a colander which is similarly perforated. The colander, as my informer assures me, is the soul, and the soul which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is likewise full of holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad memory and want of faith. These notions are strange enough, but they show the principle which, if I can, I would fain prove to you; that you should change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate life, choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for

daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I fail to persuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the same opinion still?

Callicles/ The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth.

Socrates/ Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the same school: —Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in a figure: —There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the one man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, and a third of milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the streams which fill them are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but when his casks are once filled he has no need to feed them anymore, and has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in like manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling them, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony of pain. Such are their respective lives: —And now would you say that the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince you that the opposite is the truth?

Callicles/ You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled himself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now saying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he is once filled; but the pleasure depends on the superabundance of the influx.

Socrates/ But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the holes must be large for the liquid to escape.

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead man, or of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be hungering and eating?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he is to be thirsting and drinking?

Callicles/ Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.

Socrates/ Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no shame; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of happiness?

Callicles/ What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular mob-orator.

Socrates/ That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and Gorgias, until they were too modest to say what they thought; but you will not be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now, answer my question.

Callicles/ I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly.

Socrates/ And if pleasantly, then also happily?

Callicles/ To be sure.

Socrates/ But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I pursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want?

Callicles/ Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the argument?

Socrates/ Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these topics, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure in whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction between good and bad pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good?

Callicles/ Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they are the same.

Socrates/ You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say what is contrary to your real opinion.

Callicles/ Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others.

Callicles/ That, Socrates, is only your opinion.

Socrates/ And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying?

Callicles/ Indeed I do.

Socrates/ Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument?

Callicles/ By all means.

Socrates/ Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for me: —There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?

Callicles/ There is.

Socrates/ And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied knowledge?

Callicles/ I was.

Socrates/ And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another?

Callicles/ Certainly I was.

Socrates/ And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same?

Callicles/ Not the same, O man of wisdom.

Socrates/ And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good.

Callicles/ And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say—does he assent to this, or not?

Socrates/ He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, at the same time?

Callicles/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Take the case of any bodily affection: —a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?

Callicles/ To be sure.

Socrates/ But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same time?

Callicles/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together?

Callicles/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ That would surely be marvelous and absurd?

Callicles/ Very.

Socrates/ I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Or swiftness and slowness?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And does he have and, not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation?

Callicles/ Certainly he has.

Socrates/ If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we agree? Please not to answer without consideration.

Callicles/ I entirely agree.

Socrates/ Go back now to our former admissions. —Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?

Callicles/ I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant.

Socrates/ I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And thirst, too, is painful?

Callicles/ Yes, very.

Socrates/ Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are painful?

Callicles/ I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances.

Socrates/ Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word 'thirsty' implies pain?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the word 'drinking' is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ There is pleasure in drinking?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ When you are thirsty?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in pain?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you see the inference: —that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body? —which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?

Callicles/ Yes, I did.

Socrates/ But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?

Callicles/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?

Callicles/ I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.

Socrates/ You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.

Callicles/ Well, get on, and don't keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me.

Socrates/ Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?

Callicles/ I do not understand what you are saying.

Gorgias/ Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes; — we should like to hear the argument out.

Callicles/ Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.

Gorgias/ What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his own fashion.

Callicles/ Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.

Socrates/ I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument: —Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment?

Callicles/ True.

Socrates/ And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?

Callicles/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted: —do you still adhere to what you said?

Callicles/ Yes, I do; but what is the inference?

Socrates/ Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant; or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil; for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you not say so?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?

Callicles/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ And a foolish man too?

Callicles/ Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?

Socrates/ Nothing particular, if you will only answer.

Callicles/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish?

Callicles/ They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.

Socrates/ Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?

Callicles/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave?

Callicles/ I should say 'most' of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally.

Socrates/ No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?

Callicles/ Greatly.

Socrates/ And the foolish; so it would seem?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?

Callicles/ Both are pained.

Socrates/ And are they equally pained?

Callicles/ I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.

Socrates/ And are they not better pleased at the enemy's departure?

Callicles/ I dare say.

Socrates/ Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all pleased and pained, as you were

saying, in nearly equal degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i.e. in having more pleasure and more pain.]

Callicles/ I really do not know what you mean.

Socrates/ Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?

Callicles/ Yes, I remember.

Socrates/ And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice—if they do rejoice?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?

Callicles/ I should.

Socrates/ Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?

Callicles/ I should say that he has.

Socrates/ Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And he who has joy is good?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who is in pain is evil?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has more of them?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better? —is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same: —can this be denied, Callicles?

Callicles/ I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you

anything in play, you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?

Socrates/ Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I can get out of you. —Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?

Callicles/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?

Callicles/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But not the evil?

Callicles/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good; —and will you agree with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the sake of them? —will you add a third vote to our two?

Callicles/ I will.

Socrates/ Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the sake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of pleasure?.

Callicles/ To be sure.

Socrates/ But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?

Callicles/ He must have art.

Socrates/ Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better and worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at random and contrary to your real opinion; —for you will observe that we are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense at all, what question can be more serious than this? —whether he should follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call the manly

part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles now in vogue; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy; —and in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?

Callicles/ No, I do not.

Socrates/ Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of the other, which is good—I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with me thus far or not—do you agree?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved what

I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do with the soul—some of them processes of art, making a provision for the soul's highest interest—others despising the interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or whether you differ.

Callicles/ I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias.

Socrates/ And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?

Callicles/ Equally true of two or more.

Socrates/ Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for their true interests?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather, if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?

Callicles/ I assent.

Socrates/ And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic poetry? —are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude?

Callicles/ There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates.

Socrates/ And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure?

Callicles/ That is my notion of them.

Socrates/ And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august personage—what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word and song truths welcome and unwelcome? —which in your judgment is her character?

Callicles/ There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face turned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience.

Socrates/ And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just now describing as flattery?

Callicles/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and meter, there will remain speech?

Callicles/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?

Callicles/ True.

Socrates/ And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves. And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having the nature of flattery.

Callicles/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for this?

Callicles/ I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe.

Socrates/ I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric;

or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, who is he?

Callicles/ But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such among the orators who are at present living.

Socrates/ Well, then, can you mention anyone of a former generation, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for, indeed, I do not know of such a man.

Callicles/ What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard yourself?

Socrates/ Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and those of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and there is an art in distinguishing them, —can you tell me of any of these statesmen who did distinguish them?

Callicles/ No, indeed, I cannot.

Socrates/ Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one. Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at random; just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other look all of them to their own work, and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but strive to give a definite form to it? The artist disposes all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he has constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of all artists,

and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke before, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny this?

Callicles/ No; I am ready to admit it.

Socrates/ Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; that in which there is disorder, evil?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same is true of a ship?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same may be said of the human body?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order?

Callicles/ The latter follows from our previous admissions.

Socrates/ What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in the body?

Callicles/ I suppose that you mean health and strength?

Socrates/ Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for the other.

Callicles/ Why not give the name yourself, Socrates?

Socrates/ Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer me. 'Healthy,' as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular order of the body, in a human body, whence comes health and every other bodily excellence: is that true or not?

Callicles/ True.

Socrates/ And 'lawful' and 'law' are the names which are given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and orderly: —and so we have temperance and justice: have we not?

Callicles/ Granted.

Socrates/ And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you not agree?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even worse if rightly estimated. Is not that true?

Callicles/ I will not say No to it.

Socrates/ For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life if his body is in an evil plight—in that case his life also is evil: am I not right?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires at all: even you will admit that?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir? While she is in a bad state and is

senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own improvement.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Such treatment will be better for the soul herself?

Callicles/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring?

Callicles/ I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would ask someone who does.

Socrates/ Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to subject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks!

Callicles/ I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias.

Socrates/ What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle?

Callicles/ You shall judge for yourself.

Socrates/ Well, but people say that 'a tale should have a head and not break off in the middle' and I should not like to have the argument going about without a head; please then to go on a little longer, and put the head on.

Callicles/ How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your argument would rest, or that you would get someone else to argue with you.

Socrates/ But who else is willing? —I want to finish the argument.

Callicles/ Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight on, or questioning and answering yourself?

Socrates/ Must I then say with Epicharmus, 'Two men spoke before, but now one shall be enough'? I suppose that there is absolutely no help. And if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all remark that not only I but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of the truth is a common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to my own notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions which are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not speak from any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer like yourselves, and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, I shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that the argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us leave off and go our ways.

Gorgias/ I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you have completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of the rest of the company; I myself should very much like to hear what more you have to say.

Socrates/ I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with Callicles, and then I might have given him an 'Amphion' in return for his 'Zethus'; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue, I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the tablets of my soul.

Callicles/ My good fellow, never mind me, but get on.

Socrates/ Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument: —Is the pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good? To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear; have you any?

Callicles/ Go on, my good fellow.

Socrates/ Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul.

Callicles/ Very true.

Socrates/ And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods and to men; —for he would not be temperate if he did not? Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what

is just; and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who does what is just and holy must be just and holy? Very true. And must he not be courageous? for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now this latter is he whom you were applauding—the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position, and these things I affirm to be true. And if they are true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practice temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as not to need punishment; but if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire to satisfy them leading a robber's life. Such a one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or

misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men; you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care about geometry. —Well, then, either the principle that the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance, and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the consequences? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should use his rhetoric—all those consequences are true. And that which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz. that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true.

And now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in the extremity of danger, and that I am in the power of another like an outlaw to whom anyone may do what he likes, —he may box my ears, which was a brave saying of yours; or take away my goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; a condition which, as you say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst evil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut open, but that to smite and slay me and mine

wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil; aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These truths, which have been already set forth as I state them in the previous discussion, would seem now to have been fixed and riveted by us, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, in words which are like bonds of iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still more enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I say. For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant how these things are, but that I have never met anyone who could say otherwise, any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is my position still, and if what I am saying is true, and injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater than this greatest of evils, in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that defense of which the want will make a man truly ridiculous? Must not the defense be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And will not the worst of all defenses be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends? —and next will come that which is unable to avert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the honor of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not right, Callicles?

Callicles/ Yes, quite right.

Socrates/ Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice and the suffering injustice—and we affirm that to do injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil—by what devices can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of not doing and the other of not

suffering injustice? must he have the power, or only the will to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the power?

Callicles/ He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear.

Socrates/ And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he have provided himself with power and art; and if he have not studied and practiced, will he be unjust still? Surely you might say, Callicles, whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting the conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do wrong against their will?

Callicles/ Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done.

Socrates/ Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not wholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with me; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power.

Callicles/ Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to praise you when you talk sense.

Socrates/ Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most like to him—like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not agree to this?

Callicles/ I should.

Socrates/ But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be expected to fear anyone who is his superior in

virtue, and will never be able to be perfectly friendly with him.

Callicles/ That is true.

Socrates/ Neither will he be the friend of anyone who is greatly his inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously regard him as a friend.

Callicles/ That again is true.

Socrates/ Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, will be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and subservient to him; he is the man who will have power in the state, and no one will injure him with impunity: —is not that so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if a young man begins to ask how he may be come great and formidable, this would seem to be the way—he will accustom himself, from his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as his master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your friends would say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering injury?

Callicles/ Very true.

Socrates/ But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very opposite be true, if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and to have influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as possible, and not be punished?

Callicles/ True.

Socrates/ And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he thus acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not this be the greatest evil to him?

Callicles/ You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods?

Socrates/ Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he will kill him if he has a mind—the bad man will kill the good and true.

Callicles/ And is not that just the provoking thing?

Socrates/ Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you think that all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger always; like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and which you advise me to cultivate?

Callicles/ Yes, truly, and very good advice too.

Socrates/ Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an art of any great pretensions?

Callicles/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the pilot, who not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet his art is modest and unpresuming: it has no airs or pretenses of doing anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation which is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us from Aegina to Athens, or for the longer

voyage from Pontus or Egypt, at the utmost two drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just now saying, the passenger and his wife and children and goods, and safely disembarked them at the Piraeus, —this is the payment which he asks in return for so great a boon; and he who is the master of the art, and has done all this, gets out and walks about on the sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is able to reflect and is aware that he cannot tell which of his fellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they are just the same when he has disembarked them as when they embarked, and not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls; and he considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way benefited by him in having been saved from drowning, much less he who has great and incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul, which is the more valuable part of him; neither is life worth having nor of any profit to the bad man, whether he be delivered from the sea, or the law-courts, or any other devourer; —and so he reflects that such a one had better not live, for he cannot live well.

And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our savior, is not usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all behind either the general, or the pilot, or anyone else, in his saving power, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him and the pleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that no other profession is worth thinking about; he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son, or

marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in your refusal? What right have you to despise the engine-maker, and the others whom I was just now mentioning? I know that you will say, 'I am better, and better born.' But if the better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man saving himself and his, whatever may be his character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and of the physician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my friend! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly be something different from saving and being saved: —May not he who is truly a man cease to care about living a certain time? —he knows, as women say, that no man can escape fate, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed term whether by assimilating himself to the constitution under which he lives, as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you mean to be in their good graces, and to have power in the state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is for the interest of either of us; —I would not have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own perdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the art of becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, Callicles; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes' darling who is called after them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make you most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and orator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit,

and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of another mind. What do you say?

Callicles/ Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me to be good words; and yet; like the rest of the world, I am not quite convinced by them.

Socrates/ The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides in your soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to these same matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be convinced for all that. Please, then, to remember that there are two processes of training all things, including body and soul; in the one, as we said, we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist them: was not that the distinction which we drew?

Callicles/ Very true.

Socrates/ And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar flattery: —was not that another of our conclusions?

Callicles/ Be it so, if you will have it.

Socrates/ And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which was ministered to, whether body or soul?

Callicles/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of our city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as possible? For we have already discovered that there is no use in imparting to them any other good, unless the mind of those who are to have the good, whether money, or office, or any other sort of power, be gentle and good. Shall we say that?

Callicles/ Yes, certainly, if you like.

Socrates/ Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were intending to set about some public business, and were advising one another to undertake buildings, such as walls, docks or temples of the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, first, as to whether we know or do not know the art of building, and who taught us? —would not that be necessary, Callicles?

Callicles/ True.

Socrates/ In the second place, we should have to consider whether we had ever constructed any private house, either of our own or for our friends, and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and if upon consideration we found that we had had good and eminent masters, and had been successful in constructing many fine buildings, not only with their assistance, but without them, by our own unaided skill—in that case prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the construction of public works. But if we had no master to show, and only a number of worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely, it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another to undertake them. Is not this true?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I were physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent to practice as state-physicians, should I not ask about you, and would you not ask about me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good health? and was anyone else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or freeman? And I should make the same enquiries about you. And if we arrived at the conclusion that no one, whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better for the medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to think that we or

any human being should be so silly as to set up as state-physicians and advise others like ourselves to do the same, without having first practiced in private, whether successfully or not, and acquired experience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar when you are learning the potter's art; which is a foolish thing?

Callicles/ True.

Socrates/ And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer? Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a private person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not answer?

Callicles/ You are contentious, Socrates.

Socrates/ Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I really want to know in what way you think that affairs should be administered among us—whether, when you come to the administration of them, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have we not already admitted many times over that such is the duty of a public man? Nay, we have surely said so; for if you will not answer for yourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades,

and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think that they were good citizens.

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made the citizens better instead of worse?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?

Callicles/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Nay, my friend, 'likely' is not the word; for if he was a good citizen, the inference is certain.

Callicles/ And what difference does that make?

Socrates/ None; only I should like further to know whether the Athenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the first who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk and of money.

Callicles/ You heard that, Socrates, from the laconizing set who bruise their ears.

Socrates/ But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but well known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious and his character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians—this was during the time when they were not so good—yet afterwards, when they had been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was a malefactor.

Callicles/ Well, but how does that prove Pericles' badness?

Socrates/ Why, surely, you would say that he was a bad manager of asses or horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor butting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you say?

Callicles/ I will do you the favor of saying 'yes.'

Socrates/ And will you also do me the favor of saying whether man is an animal?

Callicles/ Certainly he is.

Socrates/ And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the animals who were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to have become more just, and not more unjust?

Callicles/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And are not just men gentle, as Homer says? —or are you of another mind?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ And yet he really did make them more savage than he received them, and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must have been very far from desiring.

Callicles/ Do you want me to agree with you?

Socrates/ Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth.

Callicles/ Granted then.

Socrates/ And if they were more savage, must they not have been more unjust and inferior?

Callicles/ Granted again.

Socrates/ Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman?

Callicles/ That is, upon your view.

Socrates/ Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take the case of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was serving ostracize him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the penalty of exile; and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should be thrown into the pit of death, and he was only saved by the Prytanis. And yet, if they had been really good men, as you say, these things would never have happened to them. For the good charioteers are not those who at first keep their place, and then, when they have broken-in their horses, and themselves become better charioteers, are thrown out—that is not the way either in charioteering or in any profession. — What do you think?

Callicles/ I should think not.

Socrates/ Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, that in the Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good statesman—you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but not true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet they have turned out to be no better than our present ones; and therefore, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of rhetoric or of flattery, or they would not have fallen out of favor.

Callicles/ But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near anyone of them in his performances.

Socrates/ O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the serving-men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly more serviceable than those who are living now, and better able to gratify the wishes of the State;

but as to transforming those desires and not allowing them to have their way, and using the powers which they had, whether of persuasion or of force, in the improvement of their fellow-citizens, which is the prime object of the truly good citizen, I do not see that in these respects they were a whit superior to our present statesmen, although I do admit that they were more clever at providing ships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I have a ridiculous way, for during the whole time that we are arguing, we are always going round and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding one another. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more than once, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with the body, and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is ministerial, and if our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and if they are thirsty gives them drink, or if they are cold supplies them with garments, blankets, shoes, and all that they crave. I use the same images as before intentionally, in order that you may understand me the better. The purveyor of the articles may provide them either wholesale or retail, or he may be the maker of any of them, —the baker, or the cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the currier; and in so doing, being such as he is, he is naturally supposed by himself and everyone to minister to the body. For none of them know that there is another art—an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true minister of the body, and ought to be the mistress of all the rest, and to use their results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of the real good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. All other arts which have to do with the body are servile and menial and illiberal; and gymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their mistresses. Now, when I say that all this is equally true of the soul, you seem at first to know and understand and

assent to my words, and then a little while afterwards you come repeating, Has not the State had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you reply, seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked, Who are or have been good trainers? —and you had replied, Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner: these are ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the first makes admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the third capital wine; —to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the statesmen whom you mention. Now you would not be altogether pleased if I said to you, My friend, you know nothing of gymnastics; those of whom you are speaking to me are only the ministers and purveyors of luxury, who have no good or noble notions of their art, and may very likely be filling and fattening men's bodies and gaining their approval, although the result is that they lose their original flesh in the long run, and become thinner than they were before; and yet they, in their simplicity, will not attribute their diseases and loss of flesh to their entertainers; but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit brings the attendant penalty of disease, he who happens to be near them at the time, and offers them advice, is accused and blamed by them, and if they could they would do him some harm; while they proceed to eulogize the men who have been the real authors of the mischief. And that, Callicles, is just what you are now doing. You praise the men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires, and people say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the swollen and ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder statesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbors and docks and walls and revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice and temperance. And when the crisis of the disorder comes, the people will blame the advisers of the hour, and applaud Themistocles

and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real authors of their calamities; and if you are not careful they may assail you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only their new acquisitions, but also their original possessions; not that you are the authors of these misfortunes of theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories to them.

A great piece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old, about our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, I observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed wrong which is done to them; 'after all their many services to the State, that they should unjustly perish'—so the tale runs. But the cry is all a lie; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman is, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist; for the sophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them of their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose injustice has been taken away from them, and who have had justice implanted in them by their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in them? Can anything be more irrational, my friend, than this? You, Callicles, compel me to be a mob-orator, because you will not answer.

Callicles/ And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is someone to answer?

Socrates/ I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches which I am making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But I adjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether there does not

appear to you to be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made a man good, and then blaming him for being bad?

Callicles/ Yes, it appears so to me.

Socrates/ Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this inconsistent manner?

Callicles/ Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing?

Socrates/ I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city: —do you think that there is any difference between one and the other? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine. The orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are the only class who cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact?

Callicles/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ If they were right in saying that they make men better, then they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been benefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run by a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer left the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he should receive money as soon as he had given him the

utmost speed; for not because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by reason of injustice.

Callicles/ Very true.

Socrates/ And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being treated unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his pupils, if he be really able to make them good—am I not right?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonor in a man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art?

Callicles/ Yes, we have found the reason.

Socrates/ But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no advice gratis is held to be dishonorable?

Callicles/ True.

Socrates/ And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred when the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is this true?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ Then to which service of the State do you invite me? determine for me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive and struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be the servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again, and tell me your entire mind.

Callicles/ I say then that you should be the servant of the State.

Socrates/ The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation.

Callicles/ The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, the consequences will be—

Socrates/ Do not repeat the old story—that he who likes will kill me and get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that he will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be of no use to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully.

Callicles/ How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to harm! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be brought by some miserable and mean person.

Socrates/ Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am brought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to trial—of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?

Callicles/ By all means.

Socrates/ I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who practices the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time. Now, seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any view of gaining favor, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And you might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus: —I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would he reply under such circumstances, if someone were to accuse him, saying, ‘O my boys, many evil things has this man done

to you: he is the death of you, especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you!' What do you suppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament? If he told the truth he could only say, 'All these evil things, my boys, I did for your health,' and then would there not just be a clamor among a jury like that? How they would cry out!

Callicles/ I dare say.

Socrates/ Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?

Callicles/ He certainly would.

Socrates/ And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, if I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if anyone says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I truly might: —'All this I do for the sake of justice, and with a view to your interest, my judges, and to nothing else.' And therefore there is no saying what may happen to me.

Callicles/ And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus defenseless is in a good position?

Socrates/ Yes, Callicles, if he have that defense, which as you have often acknowledged he should have—if he be his own defense, and have never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; and this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of defense.

And if anyone could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone; and if I died from want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death. For no man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one's soul full of injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story.

Callicles/ Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done.

Socrates/ Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale, which I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only, but which, as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth. Homer tells us, how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the empire which they inherited from their father. Now in the days of Cronos there existed a law respecting the destiny of man, which has always been, and still continues to be in Heaven, —that he who has lived all his life in justice and holiness shall go, when he is dead, to the Islands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect happiness out of the reach of evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall go to the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called Tartarus. And in the time of Cronos, and even quite lately in the reign of Zeus, the judgment was given on the very day on which the men were to die; the judges were alive, and the men were alive; and the consequence was that the judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the authorities from the Islands of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said that the souls found their way to the wrong places. Zeus said: 'I shall put a stop to this;

the judgments are not well given, because the persons who are judged have their clothes on, for they are alive; and there are many who, having evil souls, are appareled in fair bodies, or encased in wealth or rank, and, when the day of judgment arrives, numerous witnesses come forward and testify on their behalf that they have lived righteously. The judges are awed by them, and they themselves too have their clothes on when judging; their eyes and ears and their whole bodies are interposed as a veil before their own souls. All this is a hindrance to them; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes of the judged. —What is to be done? I will tell you: —In the first place, I will deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they possess at present: this power which they have Prometheus has already received my orders to take from them: in the second place, they shall be entirely stripped before they are judged, for they shall be judged when they are dead; and the judge too shall be naked, that is to say, dead—he with his naked soul shall pierce into the other naked souls; and they shall die suddenly and be deprived of all their kindred, and leave their brave attire strewn upon the earth—conducted in this manner, the judgment will be just. I knew all about the matter before any of you, and therefore I have made my sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. And these, when they are dead, shall give judgment in the meadow at the parting of the ways, whence the two roads lead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia, and Aeacus those who come from Europe.

And to Minos I shall give the primacy, and he shall hold a court of appeal, in case either of the two others are in any doubt: —then the judgment respecting the last journey of men will be as just as possible.'

From this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw the following inferences: —Death, if I am right, is in the first place the separation from one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else. And after they are separated they retain their several natures, as in life; the body keeps the same habit, and the results of treatment or accident are distinctly visible in it: for example, he who by nature or training or both, was a tall man while he was alive, will remain as he was, after he is dead; and the fat man will remain fat; and so on; and the dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, will have flowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints of the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the same in the dead body; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when he was alive, the same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in a word, whatever was the habit of the body during life would be distinguishable after death, either perfectly, or in a great measure and for a certain time. And I should imagine that this is equally true of the soul, Callicles; when a man is stripped of the body, all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view. —And when they come to the judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus, he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not knowing whose the soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great king, or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained him, and he is all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no straightness, because he has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by license and luxury and insolence and incontinence, and dispatches him

ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment which he deserves.

Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly punished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to be made an example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers, and fear and become better. Those who are improved when they are punished by gods and men, are those whose sins are curable; and they are improved, as in this world so also in another, by pain and suffering; for there is no other way in which they can be delivered from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as they are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit. They get no good themselves, but others get good when they behold them enduring forever the most terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of their sins—there they are, hanging up as examples, in the prison-house of the world below, a spectacle and a warning to all unrighteous men who come thither. And among them, as I confidently affirm, will be found Archelaus, if Polus truly reports of him, and any other tyrant who is like him. Of these fearful examples, most, as I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants and kings and potentates and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest and most impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses to the truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates whom he has described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below: such were Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites, or any private person who was a villain, as suffering everlasting punishment, or as incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, as I am inclined to think, was not in his power, and he was happier than those who had the power. No, Callicles, the very bad men

come from the class of those who have power. And yet in that very class there may arise good men, and worthy of all admiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to live and to die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and few there are who attain to this. Such good and true men, however, there have been, and will be again, at Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust righteously; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But, in general, great men are also bad, my friend.

As I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad kind, knows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are; he knows only that he has got hold of a villain; and seeing this, he stamps him as curable or incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus, whither he goes and receives his proper recompense. Or, again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not; and I should say, Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other men in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the Islands of the Blessed. Aeacus does the same; and they both have scepters, and judge; but Minos alone has a golden scepter and is seated looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him:

> 'Holding a scepter of gold, and giving laws to the dead.'

Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judge in that day. Renouncing the honors at which the world aims, I desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when I die, to die as well as I can. And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great

combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly conflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not be able to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of which I was speaking, comes upon you; you will go before the judge, the son of Aegina, and, when he has got you in his grip and is carrying you off, you will gape and your head will swim round, just as mine would in the courts of this world, and very likely someone will shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you any sort of insult.

Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife's tale, which you will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, if by searching we could find out anything better or truer: but now you see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all things, as well in public as in private life; and that when anyone has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as well as of others, of the few or of the many: and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him, and all his actions should be done always, with a view to justice.

Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and after death, as the argument shows. And never mind if someone despises you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting blow, for you will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue,

if you are a really good and true man. When we have practiced virtue together, we will apply ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are always changing our minds; so utterly stupid are we! Let us, then, take the argument as our guide, which has revealed to us that the best way of life is to practice justice and every virtue in life and death. This way let us go; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in the way to which you trust and in which you exhort me to follow you; for that way, Callicles, is nothing worth.

The Gorgias.

Translated by Taylor, Thomas.

Persons of the Dialog.

Callicles, Socrates, Chærepho, Gorgias,

And Polus.

Callicles/ In this manner, Socrates, they say it is requisite to engage in war and contention.

Socrates/ But have we not, according to the proverb, come after the festival? and are we not late?

Callicles/ And, indeed, after a very elegant festival. For Gorgias, a little before, exhibited to us many and beautiful things.

Socrates/ But Chærepho, O Callicles, was the cause of our being so late: for he compelled us to waste our time in the forum.

Chaerephon/ It is, however, of no consequence, Socrates: for I can apply a remedy, as Gorgias is my friend, who either now, or at some future time, will, if you please, exhibit the same things to us.

Callicles/ But what, Chærepho, does Socrates desire to hear Gorgias?

Chaerephon/ We are certainly come hither for this very purpose.

Callicles/ Whenever, therefore, you please, come to me at my house: for Gorgias resides with me, and will exhibit to you whatever you desire.

Socrates/ You speak well, Callicles. But will he be willing to discourse with us now? For I wish to inquire of the man what the power of his art is, and what it is he professes and

teaches. But the other things which you speak of, he may show us some other time.

Callicles/ There is nothing like asking him, Socrates: for this is one of the things which he exhibited. He, therefore, just now promised all that are in the house, that he would answer any question that might be asked him.

Socrates/ You certainly speak well. Ask him, therefore, Chærepho.

Chaerephon/ What must I ask him?

Socrates/ What he is.

Chaerephon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ Just as, if he should happen to be an artificer of shoes, he would answer you that he was a shoe-maker. Or do you not understand what I say?

Chaerephon/ I do; and I will ask him. Tell me, O Gorgias, did Callicles here say true, that you promised to answer whatever should be asked you?

Gorgias/ He spoke the truth, Chærepho: for I just now made this promise: and I say that no one has asked me anything new for many years.

Chaerephon/ You will, therefore, answer easily, Gorgias.

Gorgias/ We shall make trial of this, Chærepho.

Polus/ Do so, by Zeus: but if you please, Chærepho, discourse with me: for Gorgias appears to me to be weary; as he has just now discussed many particulars.

Chaerephon/ But what, Polus, do you think that you can answer better than Gorgias?

Polus/ Of what consequence is it, if you are answered sufficiently?

Chaerephon/ It is of no consequence: but, since you are willing, answer me.

Polus/ Ask.

Chaerephon/ I ask you then, if Gorgias were knowing in that art in which his brother Herodicus is skilled, by what name we might justly call him? Might we not call him the same as his brother?

Polus/ Entirely so.

Chaerephon/ Calling him, therefore, a physician, we should rightly denominate him?

Polus/ We should.

Chaerephon/ But if he were skilled in that art in which Aristopho, the son of Aglaophon, is skilled, or his brother, what should we then rightly call him?

Polus/ Evidently, a painter.

Chaerephon/ But now, since he is knowing in a certain art, what can we properly call him?

Polus/ O Chærepho! there are many arts in men which are from skill skillfully discovered. For skill causes our life to proceed according to art; but unskillfulness according to fortune. Of each of these, different persons differently participate: but the best participate of the best; in the number of which is Gorgias here, who participates of the most beautiful of arts.

Socrates/ Polus, Gorgias appears to be very well furnished for discourse; but he does not fulfill his promise to Chærepho.

Gorgias/ In what principally, Socrates?

Socrates/ He does not appear to me altogether to answer what he was asked.

Gorgias/ But do you, if you please, ask him.

Socrates/ Not if you yourself would be willing to answer me; for this would be much more agreeable to me. For it is evident to me that Polus, from what he said, has applied

himself more to what is called the rhetoric art than to the art of discourse.

Polus/ Why do you say so, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because, Polus, when Chærepho asked you in what art Gorgias was skilled, you praised indeed his art, as if anyone had blamed it, but you did not say what the art itself is.

Polus/ Did I not answer, that it was the most beautiful of arts?

Socrates/ Very much so. But no one asked you concerning the quality of the art of Gorgias, but what it was, and what Gorgias ought to be called; in the same manner as Chærepho proposed to you before, and you answered him beautifully, and with brevity. Now, therefore, inform me in the same manner, what the art of Gorgias is, and what we ought to call Gorgias. Or rather, do you, O Gorgias, tell us yourself what we ought to call you, as knowing in a certain art.

Gorgias/ A person skilled in rhetoric.

Socrates/ Ought we, therefore, to call you a rhetorician?

Gorgias/ And a good one, Socrates, if you wish to give me a name; which, as Homer says, I pray may be the case.

Socrates/ But I do wish.

Gorgias/ Denominate me, therefore.

Socrates/ Shall we say too, that you are able to make others rhetoricians?

Gorgias/ I profess this not only here, but elsewhere.

Socrates/ Are you willing therefore, Gorgias, we should proceed in the mode of discourse we just now adopted, viz. by question and answer, employing on some other occasion that prolixity of speech which Polus just now began to use?

But do not deceive me in what you promised, but be willing to answer with brevity what is asked you.

Gorgias/ There are, Socrates, certain answers which must necessarily be prolix: however, I will endeavor to answer you in the shortest manner possible. For this is one of the things which I profess, viz. that no one can say the same things in fewer words than myself.

Socrates/ I have occasion, Gorgias, for this brevity: and I request that you will now give me a specimen of it, reserving prolixity of speech for another time.

Gorgias/ I will give you a specimen; and such a one that you will say you never heard a shorter discourse.

Socrates/ Come, then (for you say that you are knowing in the rhetorical art. and that you can make others rhetoricians), is not rhetoric conversant with a certain thing, in the same manner as the weaving art is employed about the making of garments?

Gorgias/ It is.

Socrates/ And is not music, therefore, conversant with the production of melodies?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ By Hera, Gorgias, I am delighted with your answers, because they are the shortest possible.

Gorgias/ I entirely think, Socrates, that I shall give you satisfaction in this respect.

Socrates/ You speak well. But answer me in this manner respecting the rhetorical art, and inform me of what thing it is the science.

Gorgias/ Of discourses.

Socrates/ Of what discourses, Gorgias? Is it of such discourses as those employ who show the sick by what mode of living they may become well?

Gorgias/ It is not.

Socrates/ The rhetorical art, therefore, is not conversant with all discourses.

Gorgias/ It certainly is not.

Socrates/ But yet it enables men to speak.

Gorgias/ It does.

Socrates/ Does it impart the power of intellection in those things in which it imparts the ability of speaking?

Gorgias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Does not, therefore, the medicinal art, of which we just now spoke, render us able to understand and speak about the maladies of the sick?

Gorgias/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ The medicinal art, therefore, as it appears, is conversant with discourses.

Gorgias/ It is.

Socrates/ And is it not conversant with discourses about diseases?

Gorgias/ Especially so.

Socrates/ The gymnastic art, therefore, is also conversant with discourses about the good and bad habit of bodies.

Gorgias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And, indeed, other arts, O Gorgias, will subsist in this manner. For each of them will be conversant with those discourses which are employed about that particular thing of which each is the art.

Gorgias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Why, therefore, do you not call other arts rhetorical, since they are conversant with discourses, and you call this very thing which is employed about discourses, rhetoric?

Gorgias/ Because, Socrates, all the science of other arts is conversant, as I may say, with manual and such-like operations; but nothing belonging to the rhetorical art is manual, since all its action and authority subsist through discourses. On this account, I think that the rhetorical art is conversant with discourses, and I affirm that in this I speak rightly.

Socrates/ I understand what kind of an art you wish to call it; but perhaps I may comprehend it yet still more clearly. However, answer me. Have we not arts?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ I think that, with respect to all the arts, some are very much employed in operation, and stand very little in need of discourse; but others do not require it at all, but accomplish their design in silence; such as the arts of painting and statuary, and many others. You appear, therefore, to me to say that the rhetorical art is not conversant with such arts as these. Or do you not?

Gorgias/ You apprehend my meaning very well, Socrates.

Socrates/ But there are other arts which accomplish the whole of their intention through discourse, and either require, as I may say, nothing of operation, or very little, such as the arithmetic, logistic, pettutic, and many other arts; some of which have discourses nearly equal to their operations; but with many the discourses surpass the operations: and, universally, all their action and authority subsist through discourses. You appear to me to say that rhetoric ranks among things of this last kind.

Gorgias/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Yet I do not think you are willing to call rhetoric anyone of these, though you said that the rhetorical art was that which possessed its authority through discourse. For someone disposed to be troublesome might ask, Do you

therefore, Gorgias, say that the arithmetical is the rhetorical art? But I do not think that you call either the arithmetical, or the geometrical, the rhetorical art.

Gorgias/ You think rightly, Socrates, and apprehend me perfectly well.

Socrates/ Now, therefore, complete the answer to my question. For, since rhetoric is one of those arts which very much use discourse, and there are other arts of this kind, endeavor to tell us about what particular thing in discourse the authority of rhetoric is exercised. Just as if anyone should ask me respecting the arts which I lately mentioned, O Socrates, what is the arithmetical art, I should say as you did just now, that it is one of the arts which possesses all its power through discourse. And if he should again ask me about what it is conversant, I should answer, About the knowledge of the even and the odd, viz. what the nature is of each. But if he should further ask me, What do you call the logistic art? I should answer, that this also is one of those arts which possess all their authority through discourse. And if he should ask me about what it is conversant, I should answer, like those who write decrees in the Senate-house, that the logistic in other respects subsists in the same manner as the arithmetical art (for each is employed about the even and the odd); but that it differs in this, that it considers the amount of the even and odd, both with respect to themselves and to each other. And if anyone should ask me about what the discourses of astronomy are employed, in consequence of my saying that it ranked among those arts the whole of whose authority consists in discourse, I should say that they are employed about the lation of the stars, of the sun and the moon, viz. how they are related to each other with respect to swiftness.

Gorgias/ And you would answer very properly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now then do you answer, Gorgias. For rhetoric is one of those arts which accomplish everything, and derive all their authority through discourse. Is it not?

Gorgias/ It is.

Socrates/ Tell me then, what that particular thing is, about which the discourses are conversant which rhetoric employs.

Gorgias/ The greatest and the best, Socrates, of human concerns.

Socrates/ But, Gorgias, what you now say is ambiguous, and in no respect clear. For I think you have heard that convivial song, which is sung at banquets in which the singers thus enumerate: that to be well is the best thing; but to be beautiful ranks in the second place; and, as the author of the song says, to be rich without fraud, in the third place.

Gorgias/ I have heard it; but why do you say this?

Socrates/ Because there those artificers will immediately prefer, themselves to you, who are celebrated by the author of this song; viz. the physician, the master of gymnastic, and the collector of wealth. And, in the first place, the physician will say: Gorgias, O Socrates, deceives you. For his art is not employed about that which procures the greatest good to men, but this is the province of my art. If, therefore, I should ask him, What are you who assert these things? he would perhaps say that he is a physician. What then do you say? Or is the employment of your art the greatest good? How is it possible, perhaps he will say, Socrates, it should not, since the work of my art is health? For what can be a greater good to men than health? But if after this the master of gymnastic should say, I should wonder, Socrates, if Gorgias could show you that there is greater good in his art than I can evince there is in mine, I should again say to him, And what are you, O man? and what is your work? he would say, I am a

master of gymnastic, and my employment consists in rendering the bodies of men beautiful and strong. But after the master of gymnastic, the collector of wealth would say, despising all others, as it appears to me, Consider, Socrates, whether there is any greater good than riches, either with Gorgias, or any other person? I should therefore say to him, What then, are you the artificer of this good? He would say that he is. And what are you? A collector of money. What then? Do you think that riches are the greatest good to men? Undoubtedly, he will say. To this we shall reply, Gorgias here contends that his art is the cause of greater good than yours. It is evident, therefore, that after this he will say, And what is this good? Let Gorgias answer. Think then, Gorgias, that you are thus interrogated by them and me, and answer, What is this, which you say is the greatest good to men, and of which you are the artificer?

Gorgias/ That which is in reality, Socrates, the greatest good, and is at the same time the cause of liberty to men, and of their being able to rule over others in their own city.

Socrates/ What then do you say this is?

Gorgias/ The ability of persuading by words in a court of justice judges, in the senate-house senators, and in a public assembly the hearers, and in every other convention of a political nature. Likewise through this art you will make the physician and the master of gymnastic your slaves. And as to the collector of money, it will appear that he exercises his employment, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak, and persuade the multitude.

Socrates/ Now you appear to me, Gorgias, very nearly to evince what kind of an art rhetoric is in your opinion: and if I understand you, you say that the rhetorical art is the artificer of persuasion, and that the whole of its employment and its very summit terminate in this. Or are you able to say

anything further respecting rhetoric, than that it is able to cause persuasion in the souls of the hearers?

Gorgias/ I have nothing further to say, Socrates; but you appear to me to have sufficiently defined it. For this is its summit.

Socrates/ But hear, Gorgias. For I well know, as I persuade myself, that if ever anyone, discoursing with another, wished to know that about which he discoursed, this is my case. And I think that you are likewise affected in the same manner.

Gorgias/ But to what purpose is all this, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will now tell you. I very clearly perceive that I do not know what the rhetorical persuasion is which you speak of, or with what particulars it is conversant: and though I conjecture what I think you say, and about what you speak, yet I do not the less cease to ask you, what you assert rhetorical persuasion to be, and about what it is employed. Though I, therefore, suspect that for the sake of which it subsists, yet I do not ask on your account, but for the sake of discourse, that it may proceed in such a manner as to render apparent in the highest degree the subject of the present discussion. For consider whether I appear to interrogate you justly: just as, if I should ask you what kind of a painter is Zeuxis, and you should answer me that he paints animals, —might I not justly inquire of you, what are the animals which he paints, and how he paints them?

Gorgias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And would not my inquiry be made on this account, because there are many other painters who paint many other animals?

Gorgias/ It would.

Socrates/ But if there were no one besides Zeuxis that painted animals, you would have answered properly.

Gorgias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ This being the case, then, inform me respecting rhetoric, whether it appears to you that the rhetorical art alone produces persuasion, or whether this is effected by other arts? But my meaning is this: Does he who teaches anything persuade that which he teaches, or not?

Gorgias/ He does persuade, Socrates, and the most of all things.

Socrates/ Again, if we should speak respecting the same arts as we did just now, does not the arithmetical art teach us such things as pertain to number; and does not an arithmetician do the same?

Gorgias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Does he not, therefore, also persuade?

Gorgias/ He does.

Socrates/ The arithmetical art, therefore, is the artificer of persuasion.

Gorgias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, anyone should ask us what persuasions it produces, and about what, we should reply, that it produces preceptive persuasions about the quantity of the even and the odd. And in like manner we might show, that the other arts which we just now mentioned are effective of persuasions, and what these persuasions are, and about what they are employed. Or might we not?

Gorgias/ We might.

Socrates/ The rhetorical art, therefore, is not alone effective of persuasion.

Gorgias/ True.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, it does not alone effect this, but likewise other arts accomplish the same thing, we may justly after this make the same inquiry concerning the

rhetorical art as we did about the painter; viz. what kind of persuasion rhetoric produces, and about what its persuasion is employed. Or does it not appear to you to be just to make such inquiry?

Gorgias/ It does.

Socrates/ Answer then, Gorgias, since this appears to you to be the case.

Gorgias/ I say, therefore, Socrates, that rhetoric is the cause of the persuasion which is produced in courts of justice, and in other public associations, as I just now said; and likewise that this persuasion is employed about things just and unjust.

Socrates/ And I likewise did suspect, Gorgias, that you would give this answer respecting rhetorical persuasion. But do not wonder if a little after this I shall ask you a thing of such a kind as indeed appears to be evident, but which I shall notwithstanding repeat. For, as I before observed, I ask not for your sake, but that the discourse may be brought to a conclusion in an orderly manner, that we may not accustom ourselves by conjecture to snatch from each other what is said. But do you finish your hypothesis in such a manner as is most agreeable to you.

Gorgias/ You appear to me to act rightly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Come then, let us also consider this. Do you say that to learn is anything?

Gorgias/ I do.

Socrates/ Again, do you say that to believe is anything?

Gorgias/ I do.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, does it appear to you, that to learn and to believe are the same, and likewise that discipline and faith are the same, or that they differ from each other?

Gorgias/ I think, Socrates, that they differ from each other.

Socrates/ And you think well: but you may know that you do so from hence. For if anyone should ask you, Are there such things, Gorgias, as false and true belief? you would, I think, say there are.

Gorgias/ I should.

Socrates/ But what, is there such a thing as true and false science?

Gorgias/ There is not.

Socrates/ It is evident, therefore, that true and false science are not the same.

Gorgias/ True.

Socrates/ But those that learn, and those that believe, are persuaded.

Gorgias/ They are.

Socrates/ Are you willing, therefore, that we should establish two species of persuasion, one of which produces faith without knowledge, but the other science?

Gorgias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, does the rhetorical art produce persuasion in courts of justice, and other numerous assemblies, respecting things just and unjust? And is it that persuasion from which faith without knowledge is produced, or that from which knowledge arises?

Gorgias/ It is evident, Socrates, that it is that from which faith is produced.

Socrates/ The rhetorical art, therefore, as it seems, is the artificer of the persuasion which produces belief, and not of that which teaches respecting the just and unjust.

Gorgias/ It is so.

Socrates/ A rhetorician, therefore, does not teach courts of justice, and other numerous assemblies, respecting things just and unjust, but only procures belief concerning these. For he, doubtless, is not able to teach so great a multitude in a short time things of such great importance.

Gorgias/ He, doubtless, is not.

Socrates/ But come, let us see what we should say concerning the rhetorical art. For I, indeed, as yet, am not able to understand what I say. When an assembly, then, is held in a city, respecting the choice of physicians, or shipwrights, or any other kind of artists, does the rhetorician then do anything else than refrain from giving his advice? For it is evident that, in each election, he who is the most consummate artist ought to be chosen. Nor in consultations respecting the building of walls, or the construction of ports or docks, will any other advice be attended to but that of architects. Nor, again, in the election of commanders, or any military order, in times of war, or in deliberations respecting the capture of certain places, will rhetoricians be consulted, but those that are skilled in military affairs. Or how do you say, Gorgias, respecting things of this kind? For since you say that you are a rhetorician, and are able to make others rhetoricians, it is very proper to inquire of you about the things pertaining to your art. And believe that I shall benefit you by acting in this manner. For, perhaps, someone who is now within the house may wish to become your disciple: and I nearly perceive a collected multitude who, perhaps, are ashamed to interrogate you. These, therefore, being interrogated by me, think that you also are asked by them What would be the consequence, Gorgias, if we should associate with you? About what particulars shall we be able to give advice to the city? Whether about the just alone and the unjust; or respecting those things which Socrates just now mentioned? Endeavor, therefore, to answer them.

Gorgias/ But I will endeavor, Socrates, clearly to unfold to you all the power of the rhetorical art. For you have beautifully led the way. For you doubtless know that these docks and walls of the Athenians, and the structure of the ports, were partly the consequence of the advice of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, but were not built from the advice of artificers.

Socrates/ These things are said, Gorgias, respecting Themistocles: but I myself heard Pericles when he gave us his advice respecting the middle wall.

Gorgias/ And when an election is made respecting the particulars of which you speak, you see, Socrates, that rhetoricians are the persons that give advice, and whose opinion respecting these things vanquishes.

Socrates/ Wondering, therefore, that this is the case, Gorgias, I some time ago asked you, what the power of the rhetorical art is For, while I consider it in this manner, it appears to me to be something divine with respect to its magnitude.

Gorgias/ If you knew all, Socrates, you would find, as I may say, that it comprehends under itself all powers. But of this I will give you a great example. For I have often, with my brother, and other physicians, visited certain sick persons, who were unwilling either to drink the medicine, or suffer themselves to be cut or burnt by the physician, in consequence of the inability of the physician to persuade them; but these I have persuaded by no other art than the rhetorical. I say further, that if a rhetorician and a physician should in any city verbally contend with each other in a place of disputation, or any other assembly, which ought to be chosen in preference, a rhetorician or a physician, the decision would by no means be given in favor of the physician, but of the rhetorician, if he was willing to be

chosen. And if the rhetorician should contend with any other artist, he would persuade his hearers that he ought to be chosen in preference to any other. For there is not anything about which the rhetorician will not speak more persuasively to the multitude than any other artist. Such, therefore, and so great is the power of this art. Indeed, Socrates, the rhetorical art ought to be used like every other contest. For in other contests it is not proper for anyone to strike, pierce, and slay his friends, because he has learned to contend in boxing, in the pancratium, and with arms, so as to be superior both to friends and enemies. Nor, by Zeus, if someone going to the palestra, whose body is in a flourishing condition, and becoming a pugilist, should afterwards strike his father and mother, or any other of his kindred or friends, it would not on this account be proper to hate, and expel from cities, the masters of gymnastics, and those who instruct men to fight with arms. For they impart these arts to their pupils, in order that they may use them justly against enemies, and those that injure others, defending themselves, but not offering violence to others. But such a one, as I have just mentioned, acting perversely, does not rightly employ his strength and art. The teachers, therefore, are not base characters, nor is art to be blamed, nor is it to be considered as on this account base: but I think those are to be considered so who do not use these arts properly. The same may be said of the rhetorical art. For a rhetorician is able to speak against all men, and about everything; so that, in short, he can persuade the multitude respecting whatever he pleases more than any other: but yet physicians ought not to suffer in our opinion, nor other artificers, because this can be done by rhetoricians. But the rhetorical art, as well as that pertaining to contest, is to be used justly. In my opinion, however, if anyone becoming a rhetorician acts unjustly through this power and art, it is not proper to hate

and expel from cities the teacher of rhetoric; for he imparts the knowledge of it for just purposes, but the other applies it to contrary purposes. It is just, therefore, to hate, banish, and slay him who does not use rhetoric properly, but not him by whom it is taught.

Socrates/ I think, Gorgias, that you are skilled in a multitude of arguments, and that you have perceived this in them that it is not easy for men to dissolve their conference respecting things of which they endeavor to discourse, by mutually defining, learning from others, and teaching themselves: but that, if they contend about anything, and the one says that the other does not speak with rectitude or clearness, they are indignant, and think it is said through envy of themselves, and through a desire of victory, and not in consequence of exploring the thing proposed in the disputation: and that some, indeed, depart in a shameful manner, after they have reviled others, and spoken and heard such things about themselves as cause those that are present to be indignant, that they have deigned to become auditors of such men as these. But on what account do I assert these things? Because you now appear to me to speak not altogether conformably to what you first said respecting the rhetorical art. I am afraid, therefore, to confute you, lest you should think that I do not speak with an ardent desire that the thing itself may become manifest, but that my discourse is directed to you. If, therefore, you are such a man as I am, I shall willingly interrogate you; but if not, I shall cease my interrogations. But among what kind of men do I rank? Among those who are willingly confuted, if they do not speak the truth, and who willingly confute others when they assert what is false; and who are not less pleased when they are confuted than when they confute. For I consider the former to be as much a greater good than the latter, as for a man to liberate himself from the greatest evil rather than

another. For I do not think that any evil happens to men of such a magnitude as false opinion respecting the things which are the subject of our present discourse. If, therefore, you say that you are a man of this kind, let us converse; but if it appears to you that we ought to desist, let us bid farewell to our discussion, and dissolve the discourse.

Gorgias/ But indeed, Socrates, I profess myself to be such a man as you have mentioned. Perhaps, however, it is proper to attend to those that are present. For, some time since, before I came to you, I evinced many things to the persons now present: and now, perhaps, if we discourse, we shall extend our discussion to a great length. Some attention, therefore, ought to be paid to the persons present, lest we should detain any of them when at the same time they wish to do something else.

Chaerephon/ Do but attend, Gorgias and Socrates, to the clamor of these men, who wish to hear if you say anything. As to myself, therefore, I am not so engaged, that, leaving these and the former discourses, I can do anything better.

Callicles/ By the Gods, Chærepho, I also have been present at many conferences; but I do not know that I was ever so delighted as with the present disputation: so that you will gratify me, should you be even willing to discourse the whole day.

Socrates/ But indeed, Callicles, nothing prevents, with respect to myself, if Gorgias is willing.

Gorgias/ After this, Socrates, it would be shameful that I should not be willing, especially as I have announced that anyone might ask what he pleased. But, if it is agreeable to these men, discourse, and ask any question you please.

Socrates/ Hear then, Gorgias, the particulars which I wondered at in the discourse which you just now made. For, perhaps, what you said is right, and I did not rightly

apprehend you. Did you not say that you could make anyone a rhetorician, who was willing to be instructed by you?

Gorgias/ I did.

Socrates/ And, therefore, that you could enable him to speak in a persuasive manner about everything to the multitude, not by teaching but persuading?

Gorgias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ You say, therefore, that a rhetorician is more capable of persuading with respect to what pertains to the health of the body, than a physician.

Gorgias/ I did say that this was the case in a crowd.

Socrates/ Is not, therefore, that which takes place in a crowd the same as that which takes place among the ignorant? For, doubtless, among those endued with knowledge, the rhetorician will not be more capable of persuading than the physician.

Gorgias/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Will it not, therefore, follow, that if the rhetorician is more capable of persuading than the physician, he will be more capable of persuading than one endued with knowledge?

Gorgias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And this, not being a physician?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But he who is not a physician must, doubtless, be ignorant of those things in which a physician is skilled.

Gorgias/ It is evident.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who is ignorant will be more capable of persuading among the ignorant than he who is endued with knowledge, since a rhetorician is more capable of persuading than a physician. Does this happen to be the case, or anything else?

Gorgias/ In this instance this happens to be the case.

Socrates/ Can the same thing, therefore, be said respecting a rhetorician and the rhetorical art, in all the other arts? I mean, that the rhetorical art has no occasion to know how things themselves are circumstanced, but that it discovers a certain device of persuasion, so as that a rhetorician may appear to the ignorant to know more than those endued with knowledge.

Gorgias/ Is there not great facility in this, Socrates, that a man who has not learned the other arts, but has learned this one, may become in no respect inferior to artificers?

Socrates/ Whether, from this being the case, a rhetorician is inferior, or not, to others, we will shortly consider, if it contributes anything to our disputation. But let us now first of all consider this: Whether a rhetorician is affected in the same manner respecting the just and the unjust, the base and the becoming, good and evil, as respecting that which pertains to health, and other things of which there are other arts: I mean, that he does not know what is good, or what is evil, what is becoming, or what is base, what is just, or what is unjust; but is able to devise persuasion respecting them so as among the ignorant to appear more knowing than one endued with knowledge, at the same time that he is himself ignorant? Or is it necessary that he should know these? and is it requisite that he who is about to learn the rhetorical art should, when he comes to you, previously possess a knowledge of these? But if he does not, shall we say that you, who are a teacher of rhetoric, will not instruct such a one in any of these things (For it is not your province), but that you will cause him to appear knowing in such particulars among the multitude, at the same time that he is ignorant of them and to seem to be a good man when he is not good? Or, in short, are you not able to teach him the rhetorical art, unless he previously knows the truth

respecting these things? Or how do such-like particulars take place, Gorgias? And, by Zeus, as you just now said, unfold to me what the power is of the rhetorical art.

Gorgias/ But I think, Socrates, that if such a one should happen to be ignorant, he would learn these things from me.

Socrates/ Granted: for you speak well. And if you make anyone a rhetorician, it is necessary that he should know things just and unjust, either before he is under your tuition, or afterwards, in consequence of being instructed by you.

Gorgias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ What then? Is he who learns things pertaining to building, tectonic, or not?

Gorgias/ He is.

Socrates/ And is he, therefore, who learns things pertaining to music, a musician?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who learns things pertaining to medicine, a physician? And so, according to the same reasoning, in other things, he who learns anything is such as science renders its votaries.

Gorgias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Does it not, therefore, follow from this reasoning, that he who learns just things is just?

Gorgias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But does not he who is just act justly?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, necessary that a rhetorician should be just, and that he who is just should be willing to act justly?

Gorgias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ A just man, therefore, will never be willing to act unjustly.

Gorgias/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ But, from what has been said, it is necessary that a rhetorician should be just.

Gorgias/ It is.

Socrates/ A rhetorician, therefore, will never be willing to act unjustly.

Gorgias/ It does not appear that he will.

Socrates/ Do you remember, therefore, that you said a little before, that the preceptors of youth ought not to be called to account, nor expelled from cities, if a pugilist does not use in a becoming manner the pugilistic art, and acts unjustly? And that, in a similar manner, if a rhetorician unjustly uses the rhetoric art, the preceptor is not to be called to account, nor expelled from the city, but he who acts unjustly, and does not properly use the rhetorical art? Were these things said, or not?

Gorgias/ They were said.

Socrates/ But now it appears that this very same rhetorician will never act unjustly. Or does it not?

Gorgias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And in the former part of our discourse, Gorgias, it was said that the rhetorical art is conversant with discourses, not those respecting the even and the odd, but those respecting the just and the unjust. Was not this asserted?

Gorgias/ It was.

Socrates/ I, therefore, in consequence of your asserting these things, thought that, the rhetorical art could never be an unjust thing, as it always discourses concerning justice. But, since a little after you said that a rhetorician might use

the rhetorical art unjustly, I wondered at the assertion; and thinking that what was said did not accord with itself, I said, that if you should think it a gain to be confuted, as it is in my opinion, then it would be worthwhile to discourse, but; if not, we should bid farewell to discussion. Afterwards, however, while we were considering, you seem to have again confessed that it was impossible a rhetorician could use the rhetorical art unjustly, and be willing to do an injury. To determine, therefore, sufficiently, how these things take place, requires, by the dog, Gorgias, no brief discussion.

Polus/ But what, Socrates? Do you really form such an opinion of the rhetorical art as you now say? Or do you think Gorgias is ashamed that he has not acknowledged to you, that a rhetorician knows things just, beautiful, and good, and that, if anyone goes to him who is ignorant of these things, he will instruct him in them? From this confession, something contrary will, perhaps, take place in the discourse. This, however, is what you love, since you lead interrogations to things of this kind. But what man do you think will deny that he knows things just, and teaches them to others? To bring the discourse, therefore, to things of this kind, is very rustic.

Socrates/ O most excellent Polus! we designedly procure associates and children, that when, through being advanced in years, we fall into error, you that are younger being present may correct our life both in words and deeds. And now, if I and Gorgias err in any respect in what we have asserted, do you who are present correct us: For it is just so to do. And I wish you would retract anything that has been granted, if it appears to you that it has not been properly admitted, if you only take care of one thing for me.

Polus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That you would avoid in future prolixity of discourse, which at first you attempted to use.

Polus/ But what, may I not be permitted to speak as much as I please?

Socrates/ O best of men, you would be used very unworthily, if, having come to Athens, where liberty of speech is permitted more than in any part of Greece, you alone should here be deprived of this liberty. But, on the contrary, consider, if you should speak in a prolix manner, and be unwilling to answer what is asked you, should not I be used unworthily, if it is not permitted me to depart, and not hear you? But if you are at all concerned for what has been said, and wish to correct it (as you just now said), then, retracting whatever you think fit, and alternately asking and being asked, confute in the same manner as I and Gorgias. For, indeed, you say that you know the same things as Gorgias. Or do you not?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ Will not you, therefore, also exhort anyone to ask you whatever he pleases, as knowing how to answer him?

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And now you may do whichever of these you please, viz. either ask or answer.

Polus/ I shall do so. And do you answer me, Socrates. Since Gorgias appears to you to doubt respecting the rhetorical art, what do you say he is?

Socrates/ Do you ask me what his art is?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ It does not appear to me to be any art, that I may speak the truth to you.

Polus/ But what does the rhetorical art appear to you to be?

Socrates/ A thing which you say produces art, in the book which I just now read.

Polus/ What do you call this thing?

Socrates/ A certain skill.

Polus/ Does the rhetorical art, therefore, appear to you to be skill?

Socrates/ To me it does, unless you say otherwise.

Polus/ But of what is it the skill?

Socrates/ Of procuring a certain grace and pleasure.

Polus/ Does not the rhetorical art, therefore, appear to you to be a beautiful thing, since it is capable of imparting delight to mankind?

Socrates/ But what, O Polus? Have you already heard me saying what the rhetorical art is, that you after this ask me, if it does not appear to me to be a beautiful thing?

Polus/ Have I not heard you say that it is a certain skill?

Socrates/ Are you willing, therefore, since you honor gratification, to gratify me in a trifling thing?

Polus/ I am.

Socrates/ Ask me then now, whether cooking appears to me to be an art?

Polus/ I ask you then, what kind of an art is cooking?

Socrates/ It is no art, Polus.

Polus/ But tell me what it is.

Socrates/ I say, then, it is a certain skill.

Polus/ Inform me what skill.

Socrates/ I say it is the skill of procuring grace and pleasure, Polus.

Polus/ But is cooking the same as rhetoric?

Socrates/ By no means, but a part of the same study.

Polus/ Of what study are you speaking?

Socrates/ Lest it should be too rustic to speak the truth, I am averse to speak, on account of Gorgias, lest he should think that I deride his pursuit. But I do not know whether this is that rhetoric which Gorgias studies. For just now, it was by no means apparent to us, from the disputation, what is his opinion. But that which I call rhetoric, is a part of a certain thing which does not rank among things becoming.

Gorgias/ Tell me, Socrates, what this thing is; and do not be in the least ashamed because I am present.

Socrates/ This thing therefore, Gorgias, appears to me to be a certain study, not of a technical nature, but belonging to a soul which sagaciously conjectures, which is virile, and endued with a natural skill of conversing with men. But I call the summit of it adulation. It likewise appears to me that there are many other parts of this study, and that one of these is cookery; which, indeed, appears to be an art, but, according to my doctrine, is not an art, but skill and exercise. I likewise call rhetoric a part of this study, together with the sophistic artifice, and that which pertains to the allurements of outward form. And these four parts belong to four things. If, therefore, Polus wishes to inquire, let him; for he has not yet heard what part of adulation I assert rhetoric to be: but he does not perceive that I have not yet answered, and asks me if I do not think that rhetoric is beautiful. But I shall not answer him, whether I think rhetoric is beautiful or base, till I have first of all answered what rhetoric is. For it will not be just, Polus, to do otherwise. But if you wish to hear, ask me what part of adulation I assert rhetoric to be.

Polus/ I ask, then, and do you answer me what part it is.

Socrates/ Will you, therefore, understand when I have answered: For rhetoric, according to my doctrine, is an image of the politic part.

Polus/ What then? Do you say that it is something beautiful, or that it is something base?

Socrates/ I say that it is something base: for I call things evil base; since it is requisite I should answer you, as now knowing what I assert.

Gorgias/ By Zeus, Socrates, but neither do I myself understand what you say.

Socrates/ It is likely, Gorgias: for I do not yet speak anything clearly. But Polus here is a young man and acute.

Gorgias/ However, dismiss him; and inform me how it is you say that rhetoric is an image of the politic part.

Socrates/ But I will endeavor to tell you what rhetoric appears to me to be. And if it is not what I assert it to be, let Polus here confute me. Do you not call body something, and likewise soul?

Gorgias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Do you not, therefore, think that there is a certain good habit of each of these?

Gorgias/ I do.

Socrates/ But what? Is this only a habit which appears to be good, but which is not in reality? As, for instance, many appear to have their bodies in a good condition, when at the same time no one, except a physician, and someone skilled in gymnastics, can easily perceive that these are not in a good condition.

Gorgias/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ I say that a thing of this kind takes place both in body and soul, which causes both body and soul to appear

to be in a good condition, when at the same time they are not so.

Gorgias/ These things take place.

Socrates/ But come, I will explain to you in a still clearer manner, if I am able, what I say. As there are two things, I say there are two arts: and one of them which pertains to the soul, I call politic; but the other, belonging to the body, I cannot in like manner distinguish by one appellation. But since the culture of the body is one, I call the two parts gymnastic and medicine. But in the politic art I establish legislation, as corresponding to gymnastic, and justice as reciprocating with medicine. These communicate with each other, as subsisting about the same thing, viz. medicine communicates with gymnastic, and justice with legislation; but at the same time they differ in a certain respect from each other. But since these are four, and always procure remedies, looking to that which is best, one part of them curing the body, and the other the soul, the adulatory power perceiving this, I do not say knowing, but conjecturing it, in consequence of giving to itself a four-fold distribution, and entering under each of the parts, it feigns itself to be that under which it enters. And it is not, indeed, in the least concerned for that which is best; but always, through that which is pleasant, hunts after folly, and deceives; so as to appear to be of great worth. Cookery, therefore, enters under medicine, and feigns that it knows the best aliment for the body. So that if a cook and a physician should contend with each other among boys, or among men as stupid as boys, which of them possessed the knowledge of good and bad aliment, the physician would die through hunger. This, therefore, I call adulation; and I say, O Polus, that a thing of this kind is base. For this I say to you, that it looks to the pleasant without regarding that which is best. But I do not call it an art, but skill, because it has no reason by which it

can show what the nature is of the things which it introduces; so that it is unable to tell the cause of each. But I do not call that an art which is an irrational thing. If you are doubtful respecting these things, I am willing to give you a reason for them. The adulation, therefore, pertaining to cookery is, as I have said, placed under medicine; but, after the same manner, the artifice respecting the allurements of outward form is placed under gymnastic: and this artifice is productive of evil, is deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal, deceiving by figures and colors, by smoothness and the senses; so as to cause those who attract to themselves foreign beauty, to neglect that which is properly their own, and which is procured through gymnastic. That I may not, therefore, be prolix, I wish to tell you, after the manner of geometricians (for perhaps you can now follow me), that the artifice respecting the allurements of outward form is to gymnastic as cookery to medicine. Or rather thus, that the artifice respecting the allurements of outward form is to gymnastic as the sophistic to the legislative power: and that cookery is to medicine as rhetoric to justice. As I have said, they are thus distinguished by nature: but as sophists and rhetoricians are proximate to each other, they are mingled in the same, and about the same things, and do not possess anything by which they can benefit themselves, or be benefited by other men. For, if the soul did not preside over the body, but the body over itself, and cookery and medicine were not considered and judged of by the soul, but the body itself judged, estimating things by its own gratifications; then, friend Polus, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would abundantly take place, (for you are skilled in these things,) viz. that all things would be mingled together in the same, things salubrious, medicinal, and pertaining to cookery, subsisting undistinguished from each other. You have heard, therefore, what I assert rhetoric to be, viz. that it is a

thing reciprocating with cookery in the soul, as that in the body. Perhaps, therefore, I have acted absurdly, since, not permitting you to use prolixity of discourse, I myself have made a long oration. I deserve however to be pardoned: for, if I had spoken with brevity, you would not have understood me, nor have been able to make any use of my answer to you, but would have required an exposition. If, therefore, when you answer, I in my turn am not able to reply, do you also extend your discourse: but, if I can, suffer me to reply; for it is just. And now, if you can make any use of this answer, do so.

Polus/ What then do you say? Does rhetoric appear to you to be adulation?

Socrates/ I said, indeed, that it was a part of adulation. But cannot you remember, Polus, though so young? What then will you do when you become advanced in years?

Polus/ Do, therefore, good rhetoricians appear to you to be considered in the same place as vile flatterers in cities?

Socrates/ Do you propose this as a question, or as the beginning of a certain discourse?

Polus/ As a question.

Socrates/ They do not then appear to me to be considered in the same place as vile flatterers in cities.

Polus/ How not to be considered? Are they not able to accomplish the greatest things in cities?

Socrates/ They are not, if you allow that to be endued with power is good to him who is endued with it.

Polus/ But this indeed I do say.

Socrates/ Rhetoricians, therefore, appear to me to possess the least power of all men in cities.

Polus/ But what, do they not like tyrants slay, take away possessions, and banish from cities whomever they please?

Socrates/ By the dog, Polus, I am doubtful with respect to each of the things said by you, whether you assert these things yourself, and exhibit your own opinion, or interrogate me.

Polus/ But I interrogate you.

Socrates/ Be it so, my friend. But do you not ask me two things at once?

Polus/ How two things?

Socrates/ Did you not just now say, that rhetoricians like tyrants slew whomever they pleased, deprived them of their possessions, and expelled them from cities?

Polus/ I did.

Socrates/ I therefore say to you that these are two questions, and I shall give you an answer to both. For I say, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants possess the least power of all men, in cities, as I just now said. For, in short, they accomplish nothing which they wish to accomplish; and yet they do that which appears to them to be best.

Polus/ Is not this, therefore, to possess the power of accomplishing great things?

Socrates/ It is not, as says Polus.

Polus/ Do I say not? On the contrary, I say it is.

Socrates/ By Zeus, not you. For you said that to be able to do great things is good to him who possesses this power.

Polus/ And I now say so.

Socrates/ Do you think, therefore, it is a good thing, if anyone void of intellect does that which appears to him to be best? And do you call this the ability of accomplishing something great?

Polus/ Not I.

Socrates/ Will you not, therefore, evince that rhetoricians are endued with intellect, and, consisting me, show that

rhetoric is an art, and not adulation? For, if you do not confute me, rhetoricians and tyrants, who do in cities whatever they please, will not by so doing obtain anything good. But power is, as you say, good; though, for a man to do without intellect whatever he pleases, you also have acknowledged to be evil. Or have you not?

Polus/ I have.

Socrates/ How then can rhetoricians or tyrants be able to accomplish anything great in cities, unless Polus evinces, against Socrates, that they do whatever they please?

Polus/ Is it possible anyone can speak so absurdly?

Socrates/ I do not say that they accomplish what they wish: but confute me if you can.

Polus/ Did you not just now acknowledge, that they accomplished things which appeared to them to be best?

Socrates/ And I now acknowledge this.

Polus/ Do they not, therefore, do that which they wish to do?

Socrates/ I say they do not.

Polus/ But do they do that which they think fit?

Socrates/ I say they do.

Polus/ You speak importunately and unnaturally.

Socrates/ Do not accuse me, most excellent Polus, that I may speak to you in your own way; but, if you are capable of interrogating me any further, evince in what it is I am deceived; but if not, do you yourself answer.

Polus/ But I am willing to answer, that I may also know what you say.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, do men appear to you to wish this, which every individual accomplices, or that for the sake of which they accomplish this which they accomplish? As for instance, whether do those who take medicines from

a physician appear to you to wish this which they do, viz. to drink the medicine, and suffer pain; or do they wish to be well, for the sake of which they take the medicine?

Polus/ They doubtless wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine.

Socrates/ Does not the like happen to navigators, and to those who are engaged in other employments, viz. that the object of their wishes is not that which each of them does (for who would wish to sail, to encounter dangers, and to be entangled with a multiplicity of affairs?) but, in my opinion, the object, of their wishes is that for the sake of which they venture on the sea, viz. to acquire riches. For they sail for the sake of wealth.

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ In like manner, with respect to all other things, he who does anything for the sake of some particular thing does not wish this which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.

Polus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Is there anything, therefore, in the whole of existence, which is neither good nor evil? Or is there a medium between these, which is neither good nor evil?

Polus/ It is abundantly necessary, Socrates, that there should.

Socrates/ Do you not, therefore, say that wisdom and health, riches, and other things of this kind, are good, but the contraries of these evil?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ But do you say that things which are neither good nor evil are of such a kind, that they sometimes partake of good, sometimes of evil, and sometimes of neither; such as to sit, to run, to walk, and to sail; and again, such things

as stones, wood, and other things of this kind? Are not these the things which you speak of? Or do you denominate other certain things neither good nor evil?

Polus/ I do not: but these are the things.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, do men, when they act, accomplish these things which subsist as media, for the sake of things good, or things good for the sake of these media?

Polus/ Doubtless, the media for the sake of things good.

Socrates/ Pursuing good, therefore, we both walk when we walk, thinking it is better so to do; and, on the contrary, we stand when we stand, for the sake of the same good. Or is it not so?

Polus/ It is.

Socrates/ Do we not, therefore, when we slay, or banish or deprive anyone of his possessions, think that it is better for us to do these things than not to do them?

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Those, therefore, that do all these things do them for the sake of good.

Polus/ I say so.

Socrates/ Do we not, therefore, grant, that we do not wish those things which we do for the sake of something, but that for the sake of which we do these things?

Polus/ We especially admit this.

Socrates/ We do not, therefore, simply wish to slay, exterminate, or deprive anyone of his possessions; but if these things are useful we wish to do them but by no means if they are noxious. For we desire good things, as you say, but not such as are neither good nor evil, nor yet such as are evil. Do I, therefore, Polus, appear to you to speak the truth, or not? Why do you not answer?

Polus/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Does it not follow, therefore, if we assent to these things, that if anyone slays, exterminates from a city, or takes away the possessions of another, whether he is a tyrant or a rhetorician, thinking that it is better for him so to do, though it is worse, —does it not follow, that in so doing he acts in a manner which to him seems fit?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does he, therefore, do the things which he wishes to do, if these things are evil? Why do you not answer?

Polus/ But he does not appear to me to do the things which he wishes.

Socrates/ Will, therefore, a man of this kind be able to accomplish great things in a city, if to be able to accomplish great things is something good, according to your confession?

Polus/ He will not.

Socrates/ I therefore said true, when I said that a man might do that in a city which seemed fit to him, and yet not be able to accomplish great things, nor do that which he wished to do.

Polus/ As if, Socrates, you would not admit, that it is possible for you to do what you please in a city, rather than that it is not possible, and that you would not be envious when you saw anyone slaying or taking away the possessions of another, or confining in bonds whomever he pleased.

Socrates/ Do you speak justly or unjustly?

Polus/ Whichever of these he may do, is he not in each of these actions to be envied?

Socrates/ Good words, I beseech you, Polus.

Polus/ But why?

Socrates/ Because it is not proper, either to envy those that are not to be envied, or the unhappy; but they ought to be pitied.

Polus/ But what? Does this appear to you to be the case respecting the men of whom I speak?

Socrates/ Undoubtedly.

Polus/ Does he, therefore, who justly slays anyone whom he thinks fit, appear to you to be miserable, and an object of pity?

Socrates/ He does not to me, indeed; nor does he appear to me to be an object of envy.

Polus/ Did you not just now say that he was miserable?

Socrates/ I said, my friend, that he was miserable who slew another unjustly, and that, besides this, he was to be pitied; but that he who slew another justly was not to be envied.

Polus/ He indeed who dies unjustly is an object of pity, and is miserable.

Socrates/ But less so, Polus, than he who slays another; and less than he who dies justly.

Polus/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ Thus: because to do an injury is the greatest of evils.

Polus/ But is this really the greatest of evils? Is it not a greater evil to suffer an injury?

Socrates/ By no means.

Polus/ Would you, therefore, rather be injured than do an injury?

Socrates/ I should rather indeed have no concern with either of these. But if it were necessary that I should either

do an injury, or be injured, I should choose the latter in preference to the former.

Polus/ Would you not, therefore, receive the power of a tyrant?

Socrates/ I would not, if you say that to tyrannize is what I say it is.

Polus/ But I say it is that which I just now mentioned, viz. for a man to do in a city whatever he pleases; to slay or banish anyone, and do everything according to his own opinion.

Socrates/ O blessed man, attend to what I say. If in a crowded forum, taking a dagger under my arm, I should say to you, O Polus, a certain wonderful power and tyranny has just now fallen to my lot: for, if it appears so me that anyone of these men whom you see ought immediately to die, he dies; and if it appears to me that anyone of them ought to lose his head, he is immediately beheaded; or if his garment should be torn asunder, it is immediately torn. Such mighty power do I possess in this city. If, therefore, in consequence of your not believing me, I should show you the dagger, perhaps on seeing it you would say: After this manner, Socrates, all men are capable of effecting great things, since thus armed you may burn any house that you please, all the docks and three-banked galleys of the Athenians, together with all their ships as well public as private. But this is not to possess the ability of effecting great things, —I mean, for a man to do whatever he pleases. Or does it appear to you that it is?

Polus/ It does not after this manner.

Socrates/ Can you, therefore, tell me why you blame a power of this kind?

Polus/ I can.

Socrates/ Tell me then.

Polus/ Because it is necessary that he who acts in this manner should be punished.

Socrates/ But is not the being punished an evil?

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will it not, therefore, O wonderful man, again appear to you, on the contrary, that to be able to accomplish great things is good, if acting in a useful manner follows him who does what he pleases? And this, as it appears, is to be able to effect great things: but the contrary to this is evil, and the ability of accomplishing small things. But let us also consider this. Have we not acknowledged that it is sometimes better to do the things which we just now spoke of, viz. to slay, exterminate, and deprive men of their possessions, and sometimes not?

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ This then, as it appears, is acknowledged both by you and me.

Polus/ It is.

Socrates/ When, then, do you say it is better to do these things? Inform me what boundary you establish.

Polus/ Answer yourself, Socrates, to this question.

Socrates/ I say therefore, Polus, if it is more agreeable to you to hear it from me, that it is better when anyone does these things justly, but worse when he does them unjustly.

Polus/ It is difficult to confute you, Socrates; but may not even a boy convince you that you do not speak the truth?

Socrates/ I shall give the boy, therefore, great thanks, and I shall be equally thankful to you if you can confute me, and liberate me from my nugacity. But be not weary in benefiting a man who is your friend, but confute me.

Polus/ But, Socrates, there is no occasion to confute you by ancient examples. For those things which happened

lately, and even but yesterday, are sufficient to convince you, and to show that many unjust men are happy.

Socrates/ Who are these?

Polus/ Do you not see Archelaus here, the son of Perdiccas, governing Macedonia?

Socrates/ If I do not, at least I hear so.

Polus/ Does he, therefore, appear to you to be happy or miserable?

Socrates/ I do not know, Polus: for I have not yet associated with the man.

Polus/ What then? if you associated with him, would you know this? And would you not otherwise immediately know that he is happy?

Socrates/ I should not, by Zeus.

Polus/ It is evident then, Socrates, you would say, that neither do you know that the great king is happy.

Socrates/ And I should say the truth. For I do not know how he is affected with respect to discipline and justice.

Polus/ But what? Is all felicity placed in this?

Socrates/ As I say, it is, Polus. For I say that a worthy and good man and woman are happy; but such as are unjust and base, miserable.

Polus/ This Archelaus, therefore, according to your doctrine, is miserable.

Socrates/ If, my friend, he is unjust.

Polus/ But how is it possible he should not be unjust, to whom nothing of the government which he now possesses belongs? as he was born of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas; who according to justice was himself the slave of Alcetas; and, if he had been willing to act justly, would have served Alcetas in the capacity of a slave; and thus, according to your doctrine, would have been

happy. But now he is become miserable in a wonderful degree, since he has committed the greatest injuries. For, in the first place, sending for his master and uncle, as if he would restore the government which Perdiccas had taken from him, and entertaining and intoxicating both him, and his son Alexander, who was his uncle, and nearly his equal in age, he afterwards hurled them into a cart, and, causing them to be taken away by night, destroyed both of them by cutting their throats. And though he has committed these injuries, he is ignorant that he is become most miserable, and does not repent of his conduct. But, a little after, he was unwilling to nurture and restore the government to his brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy of about seven years of age, and who had a just right to the government, though by so doing he would have been happy: but hurling the youth into a well, and there suffocating him, he told his mother Cleopatra that he fell into the well and died, through pursuing a goose. This man, therefore, as having acted the most unjustly of all in Macedonia, is the most miserable, and not the most blessed, of all the Macedonians. And, perhaps, every one of the Athenians, beginning from you, would rather be any other of the Macedonians than Archelaus.

Socrates/ In the beginning of our conference, Polus, I praised you, because you appeared to me to be well instructed in rhetoric, but to have neglected the art of discourse. And now, without relating anything further, this is a discourse by which even a boy might convince me. And, as you think, I am now convicted, by this narration, of having said that he who acts unjustly is not happy. But whence, good man? For, indeed, I did not grant you any of the particulars which you mention.

Polus/ You are not willing to grant them. For the thing appears to you as I say.

Socrates/ O blessed man! For you endeavor to confute me in a rhetorical manner, like those who in courts of justice are thought to confute. For there some appear to confute others, when they procure many respectable witnesses of what they say; but he who opposes them procures one certain witness, or none at all. But this mode of confutation is of no worth with respect to truth. For sometimes false witness may be given against a man. by many men of great reputation. And now, respecting what you say, nearly all Athenians and strangers accord with you in these things. And if you were willing to procure witnesses against me to prove that I do not speak the truth, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and his brothers with him, would testify for you, by whom there are tripods placed in an orderly succession in the temple of Bacchus. Or, if you wish it, Aristocrates the son of Scellius, of whom there is that beautiful offering in the Pythian temple. Or again, if you wish it, the whole family of Pericles, or any other family, that you may think proper to choose out of this city, will testify for you. But I, who am but one, do not assent to you. For you do not force me, but, procuring many false witnesses against me, you endeavor to eject me from my possessions and the truth. But I, unless I can procure you being one, to testify the truth of what I say, shall think that I have not accomplished anything worthy to be mentioned respecting the things which are the subject of our discourse. Nor shall I think that you have accomplished anything, unless I being one, alone testify for you, and all those others are dismissed by you. This, therefore, is a certain mode of confutation, as you and many others think: but there is also another mode, which I on the contrary adopt. Comparing, therefore, these with each other, we will consider whether they differ in any respect from each other. For the subjects of our controversy are not altogether trifling; but they are nearly something the knowledge of which is

most beautiful, but not to know it most base. For the summit of these things is to know, or to be ignorant, who is happy, and who is not. As, for instance, in the first place, respecting that which is the subject of our present discourse, you think that a man can be blessed who acts unjustly and is unjust; since you are of opinion that Archelaus is, indeed, unjust, but happy. For, unless you say to the contrary, we must consider you as thinking in this manner.

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But I say that this is impossible. And this one thing is the subject of our controversy. Be it so then. But will he who acts unjustly be happy if he is justly punished?

Polus/ In the smallest degree; since he would thus be most miserable.

Socrates/ If, therefore, he who acts unjustly happens not to be punished, according to your opinion he is happy.

Polus/ So I say.

Socrates/ But, according to my opinion, Polus, he who acts unjustly, and is unjust, is miserable. And, indeed, he is more miserable if, when acting unjustly, he is not justly punished; but he is less miserable if he is punished, and justice is inflicted on him both by Gods and men.

Polus/ You endeavor, Socrates, to assert wonderful things.

Socrates/ And I shall also endeavor, my associate, to make you say the same things as I do: for I consider you as a friend. Now, therefore, the things about which we differ are these. But do you also consider. I have already said in some former part of our discourse, that to do an injury is worse than to be injured.

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But you say that it is worse to be injured.

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ And I say that those who do an injury are miserable; and I am confuted by you.

Polus/ You are so, by Zeus.

Socrates/ As you think, Polus.

Polus/ And perhaps I think the truth.

Socrates/ But, on the contrary, you think that those who act unjustly are happy, if they escape punishment.

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But I say that they are most miserable: and that those who suffer punishment for acting unjustly are less miserable. Are you willing to confute this also?

Polus/ But it is more difficult to confute this than that, Socrates.

Socrates/ By no means, Polus: but it is impossible that this should be the case. For that which is true can never be confuted.

Polus/ How do you say? If a man acting unjustly is detected in attempting to acquire absolute power by stratagem, and in consequence of being detected is put on the rack, is castrated, and has his eyes burnt; and after he has suffered many other mighty and all-various torments, sees his wife and children suffering the same, and at last is either crucified, or incrusted with pitch; will he be more happy, than if, having escaped punishment, he obtains despotic power, and passes through life ruling in the city, doing whatever he pleases, and envied, and accounted happy, both by his citizens and strangers? Do you say that these things cannot be confuted?

Socrates/ You terrify, and do not confute us, generous Polus: but just now you testified for us. At the same time

remind me of a small particular, whether you say that such a one endeavors to gain absolute power unjustly?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ By no means, therefore, will either of these be more happy, neither he who has unjustly obtained the tyranny, nor he who is punished. For, of two that are miserable, one cannot be more happy than the other; but he is the more miserable of the two who escapes punishment, and obtains the tyranny. Why do you laugh at this, Polus? Is this another species of confutation, to laugh when anyone asserts something, and not confute him?

Polus/ Do you not think you are confuted, Socrates, when you say such things as no man would say? For only ask any man if he would.

Socrates/ O Polus, I am not among the number of politicians. And last year, when I happened to be elected to the office of a senator, in consequence of my tribe possessing the chief authority, and it was requisite I should give sentence, I excited laughter, through not knowing how to give sentence. Do not, therefore, now order me to pass sentence on those who are present. But if you have no better modes of confutation than these (as I just now said), assign to me a part of the discourse, and make trial of that mode of confutation which I think ought to be adopted. For I know how to procure one witness of what I say, viz. him with whom I discourse; but I bid farewell to the multitude. And I know how to decide with one person, but I do not discourse with the multitude. See, therefore, whether you are willing to give me my part in the argument, by answering to the interrogations. For I think that you and I, and other men, are of opinion, that to do an injury is worse than to be injured; and not to suffer, than to suffer punishment.

Polus/ But I, on the contrary, think that neither myself nor any other man is of this opinion. For would you rather be injured than do an injury?

Socrates/ Yes; and so would you, and all other men.

Polus/ Very far from it: for neither I, nor you, nor any other, would say so.

Socrates/ Will you not, therefore, answer?

Polus/ By all means. For I am anxious to know what you will say.

Socrates/ Tell me then, that you may know, as if I asked you from the beginning: Whether does it appear to you, Polus, worse to do an injury, or to be injured?

Polus/ It appears to me it is worse to be injured.

Socrates/ But which is the more base? To do, or to suffer, an injury? Answer me.

Polus/ To do an injury.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, worse, since it is more base?

Polus/ By no means.

Socrates/ I understand. You do not think, as it seems, that the beautiful and the good are the same, and likewise the evil and the base.

Polus/ I do not.

Socrates/ But what will you say to this? Do you not call all beautiful things, such as bodies, colors, figures, sounds, and pursuits, beautiful, without looking to anything else? As, for instance, in the first place, with respect to beautiful bodies, do you not say that they are beautiful, either according to their usefulness to that particular thing to which each is useful, or according to a certain pleasure, if the view of them gratifies the beholders? Have you anything else besides this to say, respecting the beauty of body?

Polus/ I have not.

Socrates/ Do you not, therefore, denominate other things beautiful after this manner, such as figures and colors, either through a certain pleasure, or utility, or through both?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you not in a similar manner denominate sounds, and everything pertaining to music?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And further still, things which pertain to laws and pursuits are certainly not beautiful, unless they are either advantageous or pleasant, or both.

Polus/ It Does not appear to me that they are.

Socrates/ And Does not the beauty of disciplines subsist in a similar manner?

Polus/ Entirely so. And now, Socrates, you define beautifully, since you define the beautiful by pleasure and good.

Socrates/ Must not, therefore, the base be defined by the contrary, viz. by pain and evil?

Polus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ When, therefore, of two beautiful things, one is more beautiful than the other, or when some other thing transcends in beauty either one or both of these, it must be more beautiful either through pleasure, or advantage, or both.

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And when, of two things, one is more base, it must be more base through transcending either in pain or evil. Or is not this necessary?

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But, in the first place, let us consider whether to do an injury surpasses in pain the being injured; and

whether those suffer greater pain that injure, than those that are injured.

Polus/ This is by no means the case, Socrates.

Socrates/ The former, therefore, does not transcend the latter in pain.

Polus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Will it not therefore follow, that, if it does not transcend in pain, it will no longer transcend in both?

Polus/ It does not appear that this will be the case.

Socrates/ Must it not, therefore, transcend in the other?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ In evil?

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Will it not therefore follow, that to do an injury, since it transcends m evil, is worse than to be injured?

Polus/ Evidently so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, something else were not admitted by the multitude of mankind, and by you formerly, it would follow that to do an injury is worse than to be injured.

Polus/ It would.

Socrates/ Now, however, it appears to be worse.

Polus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Would you, therefore, admit that which is worse and more base, rather than that which is less so? Do not hesitate to answer, Polus (for you will not be injured by so doing), but answer generously, committing yourself to discourse as to a physician; and either admit or reject what I ask.

Polus/ But I should not, Socrates, prefer that which is worse and more base to that which is less so.

Socrates/ But would any other man?

Polus/ It does not appear to me that he would, according to this reasoning.

Socrates/ I therefore spoke the truth when I asserted, that neither I, nor you, nor any other man, would rather do an injury than be injured; for it would be worse to do so.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Do you not therefore see, Polus, that, when argument is compared with argument, they do not in any respect accord? But all others assent to you, except myself. However, you, who are only one, are sufficient for my purpose, both in assenting and testifying; and I, while I ask your opinion alone, bid farewell to others. And thus is this affair circumstanced with respect to us. But, after this, let us consider that which was the occasion of doubt to us in the second place, viz. whether it is the greatest of evils for him to be punished who acts unjustly, as you think, or whether it is not a greater evil not to be punished in this case, as I, on the contrary, think. But let us consider this affair in the following manner: Do you call it the same thing for him to suffer punishment who has acted unjustly, and to be justly punished?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ Can you therefore deny that all just things are beautiful, so far as they are just? Consider the affair, and answer me.

Polus/ It appears to me that they are, Socrates.

Socrates/ Consider also this: When a man performs anything, must there not necessarily be something which is passive to him as an agent?

Polus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Does it, therefore, suffer that which the agent performs, and of the same kind as that which he performs?

But my meaning is this: If anyone strikes, is it not necessary that something should be struck?

Polus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ And if he who strikes, strikes vehemently and swiftly, must not that which is struck be in the same manner struck?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ A passion, therefore, of such a kind is in that which is struck, as the striker produces.

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, anyone burns, is it not necessary that something should be burned?

Polus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And if he burns vehemently, or so as to cause pain, must not that which is burned be burned in such a manner as he who burns burns?

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And will not the same reasoning take place if anyone cuts? For something will be cut.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if the cut is great or deep, or attended with pain, that which is cut will be cut with such a cleft as the cutter cuts.

Polus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ In short, see if you grant what I just now said respecting all things, viz. that such as the agent produces, such does the patient suffer.

Polus/ I do grant it.

Socrates/ These things, therefore, being admitted, whether is the being punished, to suffer, or to do something?

Polus/ Necessarily, Socrates, it is to suffer something.

Socrates/ Must it not, therefore, be by some agent?

Polus/ Undoubtedly. And by him who punishes.

Socrates/ But does not he who rightly punishes, punish justly?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does he act justly, or not, by so doing?

Polus/ Justly.

Socrates/ Must not, therefore, he who is punished, in consequence of being punished, suffer justly?

Polus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But is it not acknowledged that just things are beautiful?

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Of these, therefore, the one does, and the other (who is punished) suffers, that which is beautiful.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if things are beautiful, are they not also good? For they are either pleasant or useful.

Polus/ It is necessary they should.

Socrates/ He therefore who is punished suffers that which is good.

Polus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ He is benefited, therefore.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does it not, therefore, follow (as I understand advantage), that the soul becomes better if it is punished justly?

Polus/ It is probable.

Socrates/ The soul, therefore, of him who is punished is liberated from vice.

Polus/ It is.

Socrates/ And hence it is liberated from the greatest evil. But consider thus: In the acquisition of wealth, do you perceive any other human evil than poverty?

Polus/ No other.

Socrates/ But what, in the constitution of the body? do you call imbecility, disease, deformity, and things of this kind, evils, or not?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you think, therefore, that in the soul also there is a certain depravity?

Polus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Do you not then call this injustice, ignorance, timidity, and the like?

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, riches, body, and soul, are three things, will you not say that there are three depravities, want, disease, injustice?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Which, therefore, of these depravities is the most base? Is it not injustice, and, in short, the depravity of the soul?

Polus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ But, if it is most base, is it not also the worst?

Polus/ How do you say, Socrates?

Socrates/ Thus. That which is most base is always so either by procuring the greatest pain, or injury, or both, from what has been previously acknowledged by us.

Polus/ Especially so.

Socrates/ But is it not at present acknowledged by us, that injustice, and the whole depravity of the soul, are most base?

Polus/ It is.

Socrates/ Are not these, therefore, either most troublesome, and most base, through transcending in molestation, or from the injury which attends them or from both?

Polus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Is therefore to be unjust, intemperate, timid, and unlearned, the cause of greater pain than to be poor and diseased?

Polus/ It does not appear to me, Socrates, to be so, from what has been said.

Socrates/ Another depravity of the soul, therefore, transcending in a certain mighty detriment, and wonderful evil, is the most base of all things; since, according to your assertion, it is not so, from transcending in pain.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But, indeed, that which transcends in the greatest of all detriments must be the greatest evil of all things.

Polus/ It must.

Socrates/ Injustice, therefore, intemperance, and the other depravity of the soul, are each of them the greatest evil of all things.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ What is the art, therefore, which liberates from poverty? Is it not that which procures money?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what is that art which liberates from disease? Is it not the medicinal?

Polus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And what is that which liberates from depravity and injustice? If you cannot answer this question with the

like facility, consider thus: Whither, and to whom, do we conduct those that are diseased in body?

Polus/ To physicians, Socrates.

Socrates/ But whither do we conduct those who act unjustly, and live in temperately?

Polus/ You say, to the judges.

Socrates/ And is it not, therefore, that they may be punished?

Polus/ I say so.

Socrates/ Do not then those that punish rightly punish by employing a certain justice?

Polus/ It is evident they do.

Socrates/ The art, therefore, which procures money liberates from poverty; the medicinal art, from disease; and punishment, from intemperance and injustice.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Which, therefore, of these do you consider as the most beautiful?

Polus/ Of what things are you speaking?

Socrates/ Of the art of procuring money, the medicinal art, and punishment.

Polus/ Punishment, Socrates, excels by far.

Socrates/ Does it not, therefore, again produce either abundant pleasure, or advantage, or both, since it is the most beautiful?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it, therefore, pleasant to be cured by a physician? and do those who are cured rejoice?

Polus/ It does not appear to me that they do.

Socrates/ But it is beneficial to be cured. Is it not?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ For it liberates from a great evil: so that it is advantageous to endure pain, and be well.

Polus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Will the man, therefore, who is cured by a physician be thus most happy with respect to his body, or ought this to be said of him who has never been diseased?

Polus/ Evidently of him who has never been diseased.

Socrates/ For, as it seems, a liberation from disease would not be felicity; but, on the contrary, this is to be asserted of the non-possession of it from the first.

Polus/ It is so.

Socrates/ But what? Which of two men is the more miserable, he who is diseased in body, or he who is diseased in soul? He who is cured by a physician, and liberated from disease, or he who is not cured, and is diseased?

Polus/ He who is not cured, as it appears to me.

Socrates/ Will it not, therefore, follow, that to suffer punishment will be a liberation from the greatest of evils, depravity?

Polus/ It will.

Socrates/ For punishment produces a sound mind, makes men more just, and becomes the medicine of depravity.

Polus/ It does.

Socrates/ He, therefore, is most happy who possesses no vice in his soul, since this appears to be the greatest of evils.

Polus/ It is evident.

Socrates/ But he doubtless ranks in the second degree of felicity, who is liberated from vice.

Polus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ But this is the man who is admonished, reproved, and who suffers punishment.

Polus/ He is.

Socrates/ He, therefore, lives in the worst manner who possesses injustice, and is not liberated from it.

Polus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Is not, therefore, such a one, a man who, having committed the greatest injuries, and employing the greatest injustice, causes it to come to pass, that he is neither admonished, nor restrained in his conduct, nor punished; just as you said was the case with Archelaus, and other tyrants, rhetoricians, and powerful noblemen?

Polus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ For the conduct of these, O best of men, is nearly just as if someone afflicted with the greatest diseases should prevent the physicians from inflicting on him the punishment of his bodily maladies, fearing as if he were a child to be burned and cut, because these operations are attended with pain. Or does it not appear so to you?

Polus/ It does.

Socrates/ And this through being ignorant, as it seems, of the nature of health, and the virtue of the body. For, from what has been now acknowledged by us, those who escape punishment, Polus, appear to do something of this kind; viz. they look to the pain attending punishment, but are blind to its utility; and are ignorant how much more miserable it is to dwell with a soul not healthy, but corrupt, unjust and impious, than to have the body diseased. Hence they do everything that they may escape punishment, but are not liberated from the greatest evil; and procure for themselves riches and friends, and the ability of speaking in the most persuasive manner. But if we have assented to the truth,

Polus, do you perceive what consequences follow from our discourse? Or are you willing that we should collect them?

Polus/ I am, if agreeable to you.

Socrates/ Does it, therefore, happen that injustice and to act unjustly are the greatest evil?

Polus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And it likewise appears that to suffer punishment is a liberation from this evil.

Polus/ It does appear.

Socrates/ But not to suffer punishment is a continuance of the evil.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ To act unjustly, therefore, ranks in the second degree of evils, as to magnitude; but, when acting unjustly, not to suffer punishment is naturally the greatest and the first of all evils.

Polus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Are we not, therefore, my friend, dubious about this thing? you considering Archelaus as happy, who commits the greatest injustice, and suffers no punishment; but I on the contrary thinking, that whether it is Archelaus, or any other man whatever, who when acting unjustly is not punished, it is proper that such a one should surpass in misery other men; and that always he who does an injury should be more wretched than he who is injured, and he who escapes than he who suffers punishment. Are not these the things which were said by me?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, shown that these assertions are true?

Polus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Be it so. If these things then are true, Polus, what is the great utility of rhetoric? For, from what has been now assented to by us, everyone ought especially to guard himself from acting unjustly, as that through which he will possess a sufficiency of evil. Is it not so?

Polus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But if any man acts unjustly himself, or someone committed to his care, he ought willingly to betake himself thither, where with the utmost celerity he may be punished by a judge, just as if he was hastening to a physician; lest, the disease of injustice becoming inveterate, it should render the soul insincere and incurable. Or how must we say, Polus, if the things before acknowledged by us remain? Is it not necessary that these things should after this manner accord with those, but not in any other way?

Polus/ For what else can we say, Socrates?

Socrates/ For the purpose, therefore, of apologizing, either for our own injustice, or that of our parents, or associates, or children, or country, rhetoric; affords us, Polus, no utility. Unless, on the contrary, anyone apprehends that he ought especially to accuse himself, and afterwards his domestic associates, and any other of his friends, whom he may find acting unjustly; and that conduct of this kind ought not to be concealed, but should be led forth into light, that he by whom it is committed may be punished, and restored to health. Likewise, that he should compel both himself and others to lay aside fear, and with his eyes shut, and in a virile manner, deliver himself up, as to a physician, to be cut and burnt, pursuing the good and the beautiful, without paying any regard to pain: delivering himself to be beaten, if he has acted in such a manner as to deserve this chastisement; and in like manner to bonds, to fines, to exile, and even to death; being the first accuser of

himself, and all his familiars, without sparing either himself or them but employing rhetoric for this very purpose; that, the crimes becoming manifest, they may be liberated from the greatest of evils, injustice. Shall we speak in this manner, Polus, or not?

Polus/ These things appear to me, Socrates, to be absurd; but, from what has been before said, they will, perhaps, be assented to by you.

Socrates/ Must not, therefore, either those objections be solved, or these things necessarily follow?

Polus/ This, indeed, must be the case.

Socrates/ But again, let us transfer the affair to the contrary side, if it is requisite that anyone should act basely, whether he is an enemy, or some other person, only admitting that he is not injured by an enemy; for this is to be guarded against. If, then, an enemy injures another, we should endeavor by all possible means, both by actions and words, that he may not be punished, nor brought before a judge: but, if he is brought before him, we should devise some method by which he may escape, and not suffer punishment. And if this enemy has by force taken away a great quantity of gold, he should not restore it, but, possessing, spend it on himself and his associates in an unjust and impious manner. Likewise, if he acts in such a manner as to deserve death, we should be careful that he does not die at any time, but, that being a depraved character, he may be immortal; but, as this is not possible, that he may live being such for an extended period of time. Rhetoric, Polus. appears to me to be useful for purposes of this kind; since to him who has no intention to act unjustly, its utility, if it has any, is not, in my opinion, great: For it certainly has not at all appeared in the former part of our discourse.

Callicles/ Inform me, Chærepho, does Socrates assert these things seriously. or in jest?

Chaerephon/ He appears to me, Callicles, to jest in a transcendent degree: but there is nothing like asking him.

Callicles/ There is not, by the Gods! and I desire to do it. Tell me, Socrates, whether we must say that you are now in earnest, or in jest? For, if you are in earnest, and these things which you say are true, is not our human life subverted, and are not all our actions, as it seems, contrary to what they ought to be?

Socrates/ If there were not a certain passion which, remaining the same, is different in different men, but some one of us should suffer a certain passion different from others, it would not be easy for such a one to exhibit his own passion to another, I speak in this manner from considering, that I and you; now happen to suffer the same thing; for, being two, we each of us love two things: I, indeed, Alcibiades the son of Clinias. and Philosophy; and you likewise two, the Athenian people, and Demus the son of Pyrilampes. I continually, therefore, perceive you, though you are skillful, unable to contradict the objects of your love, however they may oppose you, and in whatever manner they may assert a thing to take place; but you are changed by them upwards and downwards. For, in the convention, if, when you say anything, the Athenian people says it is not so, —changing your own opinion, you speak conformably to theirs: and you are affected in the same manner towards the beautiful son of Pyrilampes; for you cannot oppose the wishes and discourses of the objects of your love. So that, if anyone, in consequence of what you say being the effect of compulsion through these, should wonder at its absurdity, perhaps you would say to him, if you wished to speak the truth, that unless someone causes the objects of your love to desist from such assertions, neither can you desist from them.

Think, therefore, that it is proper to hear other things of this kind from me; and do not wonder that I speak in this manner; but cause Philosophy, the object of my love, to desist from such assertions. For she says, my friend, what you now hear from me; and she is much less insane than the other object of my love. For Clinius, here, says different things at different times; but the assertions of Philosophy are always the same. But she says things which will now cause you to wonder: you have, however, been present at her discourses. Either, therefore, confute her for what I just now said, and evince, that to act unjustly, and when acting unjustly not to suffer punishment, is not the extremity of all evils: or, if you suffer this to remain unconfuted, then, by the dog, one of the deities of the Egyptians, Callicles will not accord with you, O Callicles, but will dissent from you through the whole of life: though I think, O best of men, that it is better for my lyre to be unharmonized and dissonant, and the choir of which I might be the leader (for many men do not assent to but oppose what I say), than that I, being one, should be dissonant with and contradict myself.

Callicles/ You appear, Socrates, to employ a juvenile audacity in your discourses, as being in reality a popular orator: and now you assert these things in a popular manner, suffering that same passion of Polus, which he accused Gorgias of suffering from you. For he said that Gorgias, when asked by you, whether if anyone ignorant of things just, and willing to learn rhetoric, should come to him, he would teach him, was ashamed, and said that he would teach him; and this because men are accustomed to be indignant if anyone denies a thing of this kind. Through this concession, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself. But you were delighted with this very circumstance; for which he then very properly, as it appeared to me, derided you. And now he again suffers the very same thing.

But I, indeed, do not praise Polus for granting you, that to do an injury is more base than to be injured. For, from this concession, he being impeded by you in his discourse, had not anything further to say, being ashamed to mention what he thought. For you in reality, Socrates, lead to these troublesome and popular assertions, while you profess to be in search of truth; assertions which are not naturally, but only legally beautiful. For these for the most part are contrary to each other, viz. nature and law. If anyone, therefore, is ashamed, and dares not say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself. But you, perceiving this subtle artifice, act fraudulently in discourses. For, if anyone asserts that things which are according to nature are according to law, you privately ask him, if things which belong to nature belong to law; as in the present disputation respecting doing an injury and being injured, when Polus spoke of that which is more base according to nature, you pursued that which is more base according to law. For, by nature, everything is more base which is worse, as to be injured; but, by law, it is worse to do an injury. For to be injured is not the passion of a man, but of some slave, to whom to die is better than to live; and who, being injured and disgraced, is incapable of defending either himself or any other person committed to his care. But I think that those who establish laws are imbecile men, and the multitude. Hence they establish laws with a view to themselves and their own advantage, and make some things laudable, and others blamable, with the same intention. They likewise terrify such men as are more robust, and who are able to possess more than others, by asserting that to surpass others in possessions is base and unjust; and that to endeavor to possess more than others is to act unjustly. For, in my opinion, these men are satisfied with possessing an equal portion, in consequence of being of a more abject

nature. Hence, to endeavor to possess more than the multitude is, according to law, unjust and base; and they call this committing an injury. But I think nature herself evinces, that the better should possess more than the worse, and the more powerful than the more imbecile. But she manifests in many places, both in other animals, and in whole cities and families of men, that the just should be established in such a manner, as that, the more excellent may rule over, and possess more than, the less excellent. For, with what kind of justice did Xerxes war upon Greece? or his father on the Scythians? or ten thousand other things of this kind which might be adduced? But I think that they do these things according to the nature of the just, and indeed, by Zeus, according to the law of nature; not, perhaps, according to that law which we establish, while we fashion the best and most robust of our Fellow-citizens, receiving them from their childhood like lions, and enslaving them by incantations and fascination; at the same time asserting that the equal ought to be preserved, and that this is beautiful and just. But, in my opinion, if there should be any man found with sufficient strength of mind, —such a one, shaking off these things, and breaking them in pieces, abandoning and trampling upon your writings, magical allurements, incantations, and laws contrary to nature, will, by rebelling, from being a slave, appear to be our master; and in this case, that which is just according to nature will shine forth. It appears to me that Pindar also evinces the truth of what I assert, in the verses in which he says, that "Law is the king of all mortals and immortals; and that he does that which is most just violently, and with a most lofty hand. And this, he adds, I infer from the deeds of Hercules, who drove away the oxen of Geryon unbought." He nearly speaks in this manner; for I do not perfectly remember the verses. He says then, that Hercules drove away the oxen of

Geryon, without having either purchased them or received them as a gift; as if this was naturally just, that oxen, and all other possessions, when the property of the worse and inferior, should yield to the better and more excellent. Such then is the truth of the case: but you will know that it is so, Is dismissing philosophy, you betake yourself to greater things. For philosophy, Socrates, is an elegant thing, if anyone moderately meddles with it in his youth; but, if he is conversant with it more than is becoming, it corrupts the man. For, if he is naturally of a good disposition, and philosophizes at an advanced period of life, he must necessarily become unskilled in all things in which he ought to be skilled, who designs to be a worthy, good, and illustrious man. For these men are unskilled in the laws of the city, and in those arguments which he ought to use, who is conversant with the compacts of men, both in public and private. They are likewise entirely unskilled in human pleasures and desires, and, in short, in the manners of men. When, therefore, they engage in any private or political undertaking, they become ridiculous. Just as, in my opinion, politicians are ridiculous when they meddle with your disputations and arguments. For that saying of Euripides here takes place: “Everyone shines in this, and to this hastens; consuming the greater part of the day, in order that he may become better than himself.” But that in which a man is inferior he avoids and slanders; and praises that in which he excels, through his benevolence towards himself, thinking that after this manner he praises himself. But I think it is most right to partake of both these. Of philosophy, indeed, it is beautiful to participate, so far as pertains to discipline, nor is it base for anyone to philosophize while he is a youth: but it is a ridiculous thing, Socrates, for a man still to philosophize when he is advanced in years. And I own myself similarly affected towards those who philosophize, as

to those who stammer and sport. For when I see a boy whom it yet becomes to discourse, thus stammering and engaged in play, I rejoice, and his conduct appears to me to be elegant and liberal, and such as is proper to the age of a boy. But when I hear a little boy discoursing with perspicuity, it appears to me to be an unpleasant circumstance, offends my ears, and is, in my opinion, an illiberal thing. And when anyone hears a man stammering, or sees him engaged in play, he appears to be ridiculous, unmanly, and deserving chastisement, I therefore am affected in the same manner towards those who philosophize. For, when I see philosophy in a young man, I am delighted, and it appears to me becoming, and I consider, the young man as liberal; but when I find a youth not philosophizing, such a one appears to me illiberal, and who will never think himself worthy of any beautiful or generous thing. But when I behold a man advanced in years, yet philosophizing, and not liberated from philosophy, such a one, Socrates, appears to me to require chastisement. For to this man, as I just now said, it happens that he becomes effeminate, though born with the best disposition, in consequence of his avoiding the middle of the city, and the forum, in which, as the poet says, men become greatly illustrious; and that, concealing himself from the public view, he passes the remainder of his life with three or four lads, muttering in a corner; but he never utters anything liberal, great, and sufficient. But I, Socrates, am affected in an equitable and friendly manner towards you. For it seems that the same thing now happens to me which happened to Zethus towards Amphion in Euripides, whom I have already mentioned; since it occurs to me to say to you what he said to his brother: that you neglect, Socrates, what you ought to attend to, and destroy the generous nature of your soul, by adorning it with a certain juvenile form; and that in consultations pertaining to justice you do not speak

with rectitude, nor apprehend what is probable and persuasive, nor consult for others in a strenuous manner. Though, friend Socrates, (do not be angry with me, for I speak to you with benevolence,) does it not appear to you shameful, that anyone should be affected in such a manner as I think you are, and others who always make great advances in philosophy? For now, if someone arresting you, or any other, should lead you to prison, asserting that you had acted unjustly, when you had not, you know you would not be able in any respect to benefit yourself; but, being seized with a giddiness, you would yawn, and not have anything to say: and that ascending to a court of justice, and meeting with an accuser perfectly vile and base, you would die, if he wished to punish you with death. And indeed, Socrates, how can that art possess any wisdom, which, when possessed by a man of a naturally good disposition, renders him worse, and neither able to assist himself, nor preserve either himself or any other from the greatest dangers, but causes him to be plundered by enemies of all his possessions, and live in the city devoid of honor? Indeed (if I may speak in a more rustic manner), it may be allowable to slap the face of such a man with impunity. But, good man, be persuaded by me, and desist from confuting. Cultivate an elegant knowledge of things, and employ yourself in studies which will cause you to appear wise, leaving to others these graceful subtitles, whether it is proper to call them deliriums, or mere trifles.

"Which leave you nothing but an empty house."

and emulating, not those men who are able to confute such trifling things as these, but those with whom there are possessions, renown, and many other goods.

Socrates/ If, Callicles, I should happen to have a golden soul, do you not think I should gladly find one of those stones by which they try gold, particularly if it was one of

the best sort; to which if I should introduce my soul, and it should acknowledge to me my soul was well cultivated, should I not then well know that I was sufficiently good, and that it was not necessary any further trial should be made of me?

Callicles/ Why do you ask this, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will now tell you. I think that I, in meeting with you, met with a gain of this kind.

Callicles/ Why so?

Socrates/ I well know that you agree with me in those opinions which my soul entertains of certain particulars, and that you acknowledge them to be true. For I perceive that he who intends sufficiently to explore, whether the soul lives uprightly or not, ought to possess three things, all which you possess, viz. science, benevolence, and freedom of speech. For I meet with many who are not able to make trial of me, through not being wise as you are; but others are wise, indeed, but are unwilling to speak the truth to me, because they are not concerned about me as you are. But these two guests, Gorgias and Polus, are indeed wise, and my friends, but are deficient in freedom of speech, and are more bashful than is becoming. For how should it be otherwise? since they are so very bashful that each dares to contradict himself, before many men, and this too about things of the greatest consequence. But you possess all these requisites, which others have not. And you are both well instructed, as many of the Athenians affirm, and are benevolent to me. I will tell you what argument I use. I know that you four, Callicles, mutually partake of wisdom, viz. you, and Tisander the Aphidnan, Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes the Cholargean. I likewise once heard you deliberating how far wisdom is to be exercised: and I know that this opinion prevailed among you, that we

should not strenuously endeavor to philosophize with accuracy; but you admonished each other to be cautious, lest, through being more wise than is proper, you should be corrupted without perceiving it. Since, therefore, I hear you giving me the very same advice as you gave your most intimate associates, it is to me a sufficient argument, that you are truly benevolent to me. And besides this, that you can use freedom of speech, and not be ashamed, both you yourself say, and the oration, which you a little before made, testifies. But the case is this: If, in the things which are now discussed by us, you in any particular consent with me, this may be considered as sufficiently explored by you and me, and as no longer requiring any further examination. For you would never have assented to such a thing, either through a defect of wisdom, or too much bashfulness. Nor yet, again, would you have assented in order to deceive me: for you are, as you acknowledge, my friend. In reality, therefore, your and my assent has now its true end. But the consideration, Callicles, of those things respecting which you reproved me, is of all things the most beautiful, viz. what kind of person a man ought to be, what he ought to study, and how far he should study, both when an elderly and a young man. For, with respect to myself, if there is anything pertaining to my life in which I do not act rightly, I well know that I do not voluntarily err, but that this happens through my ignorance. Do you, therefore, as you began to admonish me, not desist, but sufficiently show me what this is which I ought to study, and after what manner I may accomplish it. And if you find me now assenting to you, but afterwards not acting conformably to the concessions which I have made, then consider me as perfectly indolent,; and in this case, as being a man of no worth, you should afterwards no longer admonish me. But, resuming the subject from the beginning, inform me how you and Pindar say, that it is

naturally just for the more excellent to take away by force the possessions of the less excellent, and for the better to rule over the worse, and possess more than the depraved. Do you say that the just is anything else than this? Or do I rightly remember?

Callicles/ These things I then said, and I now say.

Socrates/ But whether do you call the same thing better and more excellent? For I could not then understand what you said: whether you call the stronger the more excellent, and say it is requisite that the more imbecile should listen to the more strong; just as you then appeared to show me, that great invaded small cities, according to natural justice, because they are more excellent and strong; (as if the more excellent, the stronger, and the better were the same;) or is it possible that a thing can be better, and at the same time inferior and more imbecile? and that it can be more excellent, and at the same time more depraved? or is there the same definition of the better and the more excellent? Define this for me clearly, whether the more excellent, the better, and the more strong, are the same, or different?

Callicles/ But I clearly say to you, that they are the same.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, the multitude naturally more excellent than one person; since they establish laws for one, as you just now said?

Callicles/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ The laws, therefore, of the multitude are the laws of such as are more excellent.

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Are they not then the laws of such as are better? For the more excellent are, according to your assertion, far better.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, the legal institutions of these naturally beautiful, since those who establish them are more excellent?

Callicles/ I say so.

Socrates/ Do not, therefore, the multitude think (as you just now said) that it is just to possess the equal, and that it is more base to do an injury than to be injured? Are these things so, or not? And here take care that you are not caught through bashfulness. Do the multitude, or not, think that to possess the equal, but not more than others, is just? and that it is more base to do an injury than to be injured? Do not deny me an answer to this, Callicles; that, if you assent to me. I may be confirmed in my opinion by you, as being a man whose assent is sufficient to the clear knowledge of a thing.

Callicles/ The multitude, then, do think in this manner.

Socrates/ Not by law therefore only is it more base to do an injury than to be injured, or just to have equality of possessions, but likewise according to nature. So that you appear not to have spoken the truth above, nor to have rightly accused me, in saying that law and nature are contrary to each other which I also perceiving, I have acted fraudulently in my discourse with you, by leading him to law, who says a thing is according to nature; and to nature, who says a thing is according to law.

Callicles/ This man will not cease to trifle. Tell me, Socrates, are you not ashamed, at your time of life, to hunt after names, and, if anyone errs in a word, to make it an unexpected gain? For, did you think I said anything else than that the more excellent were better? Did I not some time since tell you, that I considered the better and the more excellent as the same? Or did you suppose I said, that if a crowd of slaves, and all sorts of men of no worth, except

perhaps they might possess bodily strength, should be collected together, and establish certain things, that these would be legal institutions?

Socrates/ Be it so, most wise Callicles: do you mean as you say?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But I, O divine man, some time since conjectured that you said something better than this; and therefore I asked you, desiring clearly to know what you said. For you doubtless do not think that two are better than one, nor that your slaves are better than you because they are stronger. But again from the beginning tell me who those are which you say are better, when at the same time they are not stronger. And, O wonderful man, previously instruct me in a milder manner, that I may not leave you.

Callicles/ You speak ironically, Socrates.

Socrates/ By Zethus, Callicles, your familiar, you have now said many things ironically to me. But come, tell me who you say are better.

Callicles/ Those that are more worthy.

Socrates/ You see, therefore, that you yourself mention names, but evince nothing. Will you not tell me whether you say that the better and more excellent are more prudent, or that this is the case with certain others?

Callicles/ But, by Zeus, I say that these are more prudent, and very much so.

Socrates/ Often, therefore, according to your assertion, one wise man is better than ten thousand men that are unwise; and it is proper that he should govern, but the others be governed, and that the governor should possess more than the governed. For you appear to me to wish to say this (for I do not hunt after words), if one man is more excellent than ten thousand.

Callicles/ But these are the things which I say. For I am of opinion that this is the just according to nature, viz. that he who is better and more prudent should rule over and possess more than such as are depraved.

Socrates/ I attend to what you say. But what will you again now say? If we, who are many, were crowded together in the same place as at present, and abundance of food and drink was placed for us in common, but we were men of all-various descriptions, some of us being strong, and others weak, and one of us should happen to be more skillful respecting these things, as being a physician, but at the same time should be (as is likely) stronger than some, and weaker than others, —would not this man, since he excels us in prudence, be better and more excellent with respect to these things?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Ought he, therefore, to have more of this food than us, because he is better? Or is it proper that in governing he should distribute all things; but that, in consuming and using them for his own body, he should not possess more than others, unless with detriment to himself? But that he should possess more than some, and less than others. But if he is the most imbecile of all, then he who is best should possess the least of all. Is it not so, O good man?

Callicles/ You speak of meat and drink, and physicians, and trifles; but I do not speak of these.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, do you say that a more prudent is a better man? Do you say so, or not?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you not say that he who is better than others ought not to possess more than others?

Callicles/ He ought not to possess more of meat and drink.

Socrates/ I understand you. But perhaps he ought of clothes: and it will be proper that he who is most skilled in weaving should have the largest garment, and should walk about invested with garments more numerous and more beautiful than those of others.

Callicles/ What kind of garments do you mean?

Socrates/ But with respect to shoes, indeed, it is requisite that he who is more prudent than others, and is the best of men, should have more of them than others. And a shoe-maker perhaps ought to walk with the largest shoes on his feet, and to have them in the greatest abundance.

Callicles/ About what kind of shoes do you talk in this trifling manner?

Socrates/ But if you will not assert such things as these, perhaps you will the following: for instance, perhaps it will be requisite that a husbandman who in cultivating the land is a prudent, worthy and good man, should possess more seeds than others, and sow them more abundantly in his own ground.

Callicles/ How you always say the same things, Socrates!

Socrates/ Not only the same things, Callicles, but likewise respecting the same things.

Callicles/ Sincerely, by the Gods, you are always speaking about shoe-makers, fullers, cooks, and physicians, as if these were the subject of our discourse.

Socrates/ Will not you, therefore, tell me, what the things are of which he who is better and more prudent than others, by possessing more than others, possesses justly? Or will you neither endure me suggesting, nor speak yourself?

Callicles/ But I said some time since what these particulars are. And in the first place, I do not call those that are better than others shoe-makers, or cooks, but those who are skilled in the affairs of a city, so as to know after what

manner it will be well inhabited, and who are not only prudent but likewise brave, able to accomplish what they conceive to be best, and are not wearied through effeminacy of soul.

Socrates/ You see, most excellent Callicles, that you and I do not reason about the same things. For you say that I always assert the same things; and I, on the contrary, that you never say the same things about the same. But at one time you desire the better and more excellent to be the stronger, but at another time those that are more prudent; and now again you come with something else; for certain persons that are braver are said by you to be better and more excellent characters. But, O good man, tell me at length, who you say those better and more excellent characters are, and about what they are conversant.

Callicles/ But I have said that they are such as are prudent and brave, with respect to the affairs of a city. For it is fit that these should govern cities: and this is the just, that these should have more than others, the governors than the governed.

Socrates/ But what of these governors considered with respect to themselves? Ought they to have more, as governors, or as governed?

Callicles/ How do you say?

Socrates/ I speak of everyone as governing himself. Or is there no occasion for a man to govern himself, but only others?

Callicles/ What do you mean by a man governing himself?

Socrates/ Nothing various, but just as the vulgar call a man who is temperate, and master of himself, one that governs his pleasures and desires.

Callicles/ How pleasant you are! You speak of the foolishly temperate.

Socrates/ How so? There is not anyone who is ignorant that this is not what I say.

Callicles/ But this is very much what you say, Socrates; since how can that man be happy who is a slave to anyone? But this which I now freely tell you, is becoming and just according to nature; viz. that he who intends to live properly, should suffer his desires to be as great as possible, and should not restrain them: but to these, as the greatest possible, it will be sufficient to be subservient, through fortitude and prudence, and always to fill them with such things as they require. This, however, I think, is not possible to the multitude. And hence they blame such persons as I have mentioned, concealing their own impotency through shame; and say that intemperance is base, enslaving, as I said before, men of a better nature than themselves; and in consequence of their inability to satisfy their own pleasures, they praise through their slothfulness temperance and justice. For what in reality can be more base and evil than temperance, to men who from the first happen to be either the sons of kings, or who are naturally sufficient to procure for themselves a tyranny, or a dynasty? who, when it is lawful for them to enjoy good things without any impediment, impose a master on themselves, viz. the law, discourse, and the censure of the multitude? Or how is it possible that they should not become miserable through the beauty of justice and temperance, while they impart no more to their friends than to their enemies; and this while they possess the supreme authority in their own city? But in reality, Socrates, that which you say you pursue subsists in the following manner: Luxury, intemperance, and liberty, if attended with proper assistance, are virtue and felicity; but these other things are nothing more than ornaments, compacts contrary to nature, the nugacities of men, and of no worth.

Socrates/ In no ignoble manner, Callicles, do you freely attack the discourse: for you now clearly say what others think, indeed, but are unwilling to say. I beg, therefore, that you would not by any means relax, that it may in reality become evident how we ought to live. Tell me then: do you say that desires ought not to be repressed, if anyone intends to be that which he ought to be? and that, suffering them to be as great as possible, he ought to procure their full satisfaction from some other person? and that this constitutes virtue?

Callicles/ I do say these things.

Socrates/ Those, therefore, that are not in want of anything are not rightly said to be happy.

Callicles/ For thus stones and dead bodies would be most happy.

Socrates/ But, indeed, as you also say, life is a grievous thing. For I should not wonder if Euripides spoke the truth when he says: "Who knows whether to live is not to die, and to die, is not to live?', And we, perhaps, are in reality dead. For I have heard from one of the wise, that we are now dead; and that the body is our sepulcher; but that the part of the soul in which the desires are contained is of such a nature that it can be persuaded, and hurled upwards and downwards. Hence, a certain elegant man, perhaps a Sicilian, or an Italian, denominated, mythologizing, this part of the soul a tub, by a derivation from the probable and the persuasive; and likewise he called those that are stupid, or deprived of intellect, uninitiated. He further said, that the intemperate and uncovered nature of that part of the soul in which the desires are contained was like a pierced tub, through its insatiable greediness. But this man, Callicles, evinced, directly contrary to you, that of such as were in Hades (which he called *aeides*, or the invisible) those were

most miserable who were not initiated, and that their employment consisted in carrying water to a pierced tub in a similarly pierced sieve. The sieve, therefore, as he who spoke with me said, is the soul. But he assimilated the soul of the unwise to a sieve, because, as this is full of holes, so their soul is unable to contain anything, through incredulity and oblivion. These assertions may, indeed, in a certain respect, be very justly considered as unusual; but they evince what I wish to show you, if I could but persuade you to change your opinion, that, instead of having an insatiable and intemperate life, you would choose one that is moderate, and which is sufficiently and abundantly replete with things perpetually present. But can I in any respect persuade you? And will you, changing your opinion, say that the moderate are more happy than the intemperate? Or shall I not at all persuade you? And will you nothing the more alter your opinion, though I should deliver in fables many things of this kind?

Callicles/ You have spoken this more truly, Socrates.

Socrates/ But come, I will exhibit to you another image from the same Gymnasium, as that which I just now exhibited to you. For consider, whether you would speak in this manner concerning the life of a temperate and in, temperate man, —I mean, as if two men had each of them many tubs; and that the tubs belonging to one of these were entire and full, one of wine, another of honey, a third of milk, and many others of them with a multitude of many other things. Likewise, that each of these various liquors was rare and difficult to be obtained, and was procured with many labors and difficulties. Let us suppose, therefore, that this man whose tubs are thus full neither draws any liquor from them nor is at all concerned about them but, with respect to them is at rest. Let it be possible also to procure liquors for the other, though with difficulty; but let his vessels be

pierced, and defective, and let him always be compelled, both night and day, to fill them or, if he does not, to suffer the most extreme pain. Will you therefore say, since such is the life of each, that the life of the intemperate is more happy than that of the moderate man? Can I in any respect persuade you by these things, that a moderate is better than an intemperate life? Or shall I not persuade you?

Callicles/ You will not persuade me, Socrates. For he whose vessel is full has not any pleasure whatever: but this is, as I just now said, to live like a stone, when once filled, neither rejoicing nor grieving: but living pleasantly consists in an abundant influx.

Socrates/ Is it not therefore necessary, if there is an influx of many things, that there should also be an abundant efflux? and that there should be certain large holes as passages for the effluxions?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ On the contrary, therefore, you speak of a certain life of the bird called Charadrius, and not of that of a dead body, or a stone. But tell me, do you speak of any such thing as the being hungry, and, when hungry, of eating?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ And of the being thirsty, and, when thirsty, of drinking?

Callicles/ I say so; and likewise that he who possesses all other desires, and is able to satisfy them will live rejoicing in a happy manner.

Socrates/ Well done, O best of men! Proceed as you have begun, and do not be hindered by shame. But it is likewise requisite, as it seems, that neither should I be restrained by shame. And, in the first place, inform me whether he who is

scabby, and itches, who has abundantly the power of, and passes his life in, scratching, lives happily?

Callicles/ How absurd you are, Socrates, and perfectly vulgar!

Socrates/ Hence it is, Callicles, that I have astonished Polus and Gorgias, and made them ashamed. But do not you be astonished, nor ashamed: for you are brave: but only answer.

Callicles/ I say, then, that he who scratches himself lives pleasantly.

Socrates/ Does he not, therefore, live happily, if he lives pleasantly?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ I again ask you, whether this will be the case if he only itches in his head, or any other part of the body. See, Callicles, what you should answer, if anyone asks you respecting all the parts of the body in succession. And all the parts being thus affected, would not, in short, this life of catamites be dire, base, and miserable? Or will you also dare to call these happy, if they possess in abundance what they require?

Callicles/ Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to bring the discourse to things of this kind?

Socrates/ Do I bring it hither, O generous man? Or does not he rather, who says in so shameless a manner, that such as rejoice, however they may rejoice, are happy; and does not desire what pleasures are good, and what are evil? But further still, now tell me, whether you say that the pleasant and the good are the same: or that there is something pleasant which is not good?

Callicles/ But my assertion would not dissent from itself, if that which I say is different I should also say is the same.

Socrates/ You subvert, Callicles, what was said in the first part of our discourse; nor can you any longer sufficiently investigate things with me, if you speak contrary to your opinion.

Callicles/ But you, Socrates, do the same.

Socrates/ Neither, therefore, do I, nor you, act rightly in so doing. But, O blessed man, see whether it is not a good thing to rejoice in perfection. For many base consequences, and a multitude of other things, appear to attend the particulars which I just now obscurely signified, if they should take place.

Callicles/ It is as you think, Socrates.

Socrates/ But do you in reality, Callicles, strenuously assert these things?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Let us, therefore, enter on the discussion, as if you were serious.

Callicles/ And extremely so.

Socrates/ Come, then, since it is agreeable to you, divide as follows: Do you call science anything?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ And did you not just now say, that there is a certain fortitude, together with science?

Callicles/ I did say so.

Socrates/ You spoke, therefore, of these two, as if fortitude was something different from science.

Callicles/ Very much so.

Socrates/ But what? Are pleasure and science the same, or different?

Callicles/ They are certainly different, O most wise man.

Socrates/ Is fortitude also different from pleasure?

Callicles/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Come, then, that we may remember these things, viz. that Callicles of Acharne said that the pleasant and the good are the same; but that science and fortitude are both different from each other and the good; and that Socrates of Alopecia did not assent to these things. Or did he assent to them?

Callicles/ He did not assent.

Socrates/ But I think that neither will Callicles when he rightly beholds himself. For tell me, do you not think that those who do well are affected in a manner entirely contrary to those who do ill?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ If these, therefore, are contrary to each other, must they not necessarily subsist in the same manner as health and disease? For, certainly, a man is not at the same time well and diseased, nor at the same time liberated from health and disease.

Callicles/ How do you say?

Socrates/ Taking any part of the body you please, as, for instance, the eyes, consider whether some man is diseased with an ophthalmy.

Callicles/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ He certainly is not, if at the same time his eyes are well.

Callicles/ By no means.

Socrates/ But what? When he is liberated from the ophthalmy, is he then also liberated from the health of his eyes, and, lastly, at the same time liberated from both?

Callicles/ In the least degree.

Socrates/ For I think this would be wonderful and absurd. Or would it not?

Callicles/ Very much so.

Socrates/ But I think he will alternately receive one, and lose the other.

Callicles/ So I say.

Socrates/ And will he not, therefore, in a similar manner receive and lose strength and weakness?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And swiftness and slowness?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And with respect to things good, and felicity, and the contraries of these things, evil and infelicity, will he alternately receive and be liberated from each of these?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, we should find certain things from which a man is at the same time liberated, and which he at the same time possesses, certainly these would not be good and evil. Do we mutually assent to these things? Well consider, and answer me.

Callicles/ But I assent in a transcendent degree.

Socrates/ Let us then recur to what we assented to before. Do you say that to be hungry is pleasant, or troublesome?

Callicles/ I say, to be hungry, that it is troublesome.

Socrates/ But it is pleasant for him who is hungry to eat?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ I understand you: but to be hungry you say is troublesome. Do you not?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ And is it not likewise troublesome to be thirsty?

Callicles/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, shall I ask you any more questions? Or do you acknowledge that all indigence and desire is troublesome?

Callicles/ I do acknowledge it: but do not ask me.

Socrates/ Be it so. But do you say it is anything else than pleasant, for a man who is thirsty to drink?

Callicles/ I say it is nothing else.

Socrates/ In this thing, therefore, which you speak of, to be thirsty is, doubtless, painful. Is it not?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ But is not to drink a repletion of indigence, and a pleasure?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you not therefore say that drinking is attended with joy?

Callicles/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And do you not say that to be thirsty is painful?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, perceive what follows? I mean, that you say he who is in pain at the same time rejoices, when you say that he who is thirsty drinks. Or does not this happen together, according to the same place and time, whether you consider the soul or the body? For I think it is of no consequence which of these you consider. Are these things so, or not?

Callicles/ They are.

Socrates/ But you say it is impossible that he who is happy should at the same time be unhappy.

Callicles/ I do say so.

Socrates/ But you have granted that he who is disquieted may rejoice.

Callicles/ It appears so.

Socrates/ To rejoice, therefore, is not felicity, nor to be disquieted, infelicity? So that the pleasant is something different from the good?

Callicles/ I know not what these particulars are, Socrates, which you sophistically devise.

Socrates/ You know, though you pretend not, Callicles. In consequence of trifling, too, you proceed to what was before said; that you may know how wise you are that admonish me. Does not each of us at the same time cease from being thirsty, and at the same time receive pleasure from drinking?

Callicles/ I do not know what you say.

Gorgias/ By no means, Callicles, act in this manner; but answer at least for our sakes, that the discourse may be brought to a conclusion.

Callicles/ But this is always the way with Socrates, Gorgias, viz. he asks and confutes trifling things, and such as are of no worth.

Gorgias/ But of what consequence is this to you? This is altogether no concern of yours: but suffer Socrates to argue in whatever manner he pleases.

Callicles/ Ask, then, since Gorgias thinks proper, these trifling and vile questions.

Socrates/ You are happy, Callicles, because you are initiated in great mysteries prior to the small: but I do not think this is lawful. Answer me, therefore, the question which you left unanswered, viz. whether each of us does of at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to receive delight?

Callicles/ I say so.

Socrates/ And with respect to hunger, and other desires, do we not at the same time cease to feel them and to receive delight?

Callicles/ We do.

Socrates/ Do we not, therefore, at one and the same time experience a cessation of pains and pleasures?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But we do not at one and the same time experience a cessation of things good and evil, as you did acknowledge: but now do you not acknowledge this?

Callicles/ I do. But what then?

Socrates/ That things good are not the same with such as are pleasant, nor things evil with such as procure molestation. For, from these we are liberated at once, but not from those, because they are different. How, therefore, can things pleasant be the same with such as are good, or things troublesome with such as are evil? But, if you please, consider the affair thus: for I think that neither in this will you accord with yourself. Consider now. Do you not call the good good, from the presence of good things, in the same manner as you call those beautiful to whom beauty is present?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ But what? Do you call those good men who are foolish and timid? For you did not just now; but you said that good men were brave and prudent. Or do you not call the brave and prudent, good?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what? Have you ever seen a stupid boy rejoicing?

Callicles/ I have.

Socrates/ And have you not also seen a stupid man rejoicing?

Callicles/ I think I have. But to what purpose is this?

Socrates/ To none: but answer.

Callicles/ I have seen such a one.

Socrates/ But have you seen a man endued with intellect grieving and rejoicing?

Callicles/ I say I have.

Socrates/ But which rejoice and grieve the more; the wise, or the foolish?

Callicles/ I do not think there is much difference.

Socrates/ This is sufficient. But have you ever in war seen a coward?

Callicles/ Undoubtedly I have.

Socrates/ What then? On the departure of the enemies, which have appeared to you to rejoice the more, cowards or the brave?

Callicles/ Both have appeared to me to rejoice more: or, if not, certainly in nearly the same degree.

Socrates/ It is of no consequence. Cowards, therefore, also rejoice?

Callicles/ And very much so.

Socrates/ And those that are stupid, likewise, as it seems?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But, when enemies approach, do cowards only grieve? or is this also the case with the brave?

Callicles/ With both.

Socrates/ Do they, therefore, similarly grieve?

Callicles/ Perhaps cowards grieve more.

Socrates/ But, when the enemies depart, do they rejoice more?

Callicles/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Do not, therefore, as you say, the stupid and the wise, cowards and the brave, similarly grieve and rejoice, but cowards more than the brave?

Callicles/ I say so.

Socrates/ But the wise and brave are good, but cowards and the stupid, bad?

Callicles/ They are.

Socrates/ The good and the bad, therefore, rejoice and grieve similarly?

Callicles/ I say so.

Socrates/ Are, therefore, the good and the bad similarly good and bad? or are the good yet more good, and the bad more bad?

Callicles/ But, by Zeus, I do not know what you say.

Socrates/ Do you not know that you said the good were good, through the presence of things good, and the bad through the presence of things evil? And that pleasures were good things, and pains bad?

Callicles/ I do know it.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, good things, viz. pleasure present with those that rejoice, if they rejoice?

Callicles/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, those that rejoice good, in consequence of things good being present?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what? Are not things evil, viz. pains, present with those that are disquieted?

Callicles/ They are present.

Socrates/ But do you not say that the evil are evil, through the presence of things evil? Or do you no longer say so?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Those, therefore, that rejoice, are good; but those that are disquieted are evil?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And those that are more so, more, but those that are less so, less? and those that are similarly so, similarly?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you say, therefore, that the wise and the stupid rejoice and grieve similarly; and that this is likewise the case with cowards and the brave? Or that cowards rejoice and grieve more than the brave?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Collect therefore, in common with me, what will be the consequence of what we have assented to. For, as it is said, it is beautiful to speak and consider twice, and even thrice, beautiful things. Do we say, then, that he who is prudent and brave is good, or not?

Callicles/ We do.

Socrates/ But that: he is a bad man who is stupid and a coward?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And again, that he who rejoices is good?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But that he is a bad man who is disquieted?

Callicles/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Likewise, that to be disquieted, and rejoice, are similarly good and evil; but perhaps more evil than good?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does not, therefore, a bad man become similarly bad and good, with the good man, or even more good? Do not these things follow, and likewise those prior things, if anyone says that the same things are pleasant and good? Are not these consequences necessary, Callicles?

Callicles/ A while ago, Socrates, I said that I listened and assented to you, considering that if anyone grants you anything, though in jest, this you gladly lay hold of after the manner of lads. Just as if you could think that either I or any other person did not believe that some pleasures are better, and others worse.

Socrates/ Hey-day, Callicles, how crafty you are! And you use me as if I were a boy; at one time asserting that these things subsist in this manner, and at another in a different manner; and thus deceiving me. Though, from the first, I did not think that I should be voluntarily deceived by you, because you are my friend. But now I am deceived. And now, as it seems, it is necessary, according to the ancient proverb, that I should make good use of the present opportunity, and receive what you give. But it appears that, what you now say is this, that with respect to pleasures some are good, and others bad. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are, therefore, the profitable good, but the noxious evil?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And are those profitable which accomplish a certain good, but those evil, which effect a certain evil?

Callicles/ I say so.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, speak of such things as the following; as, for instance, in the body, those pleasures of eating and drinking which we just now spoke of; and do you

think that if some of these produce in the body health or strength, or some other corporeal virtue, they are good, but that the contraries of these are evil?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And in like manner, with respect to pains, are you of opinion that some are worthy, and others base?

Callicles/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, such pleasures and pains as are worthy, to be chosen and embraced?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But such as are base, not?

Callicles/ It is evident.

Socrates/ For it appeared, if you remember, that all things are done by us, viz. by me and Polus, for the sake of things good. Does it, therefore, appear also to you, that the good is the end of all actions? Likewise, that all other things ought to be done for its sake; but that it is not to be obtained for the sake of other things? Will you then make a third with us in the same opinion?

Callicles/ I will.

Socrates/ Both other things, therefore, and such as are pleasant, ought to be done for the sake of things good, but not things good for the sake of such as are pleasant?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is every man, therefore, able to choose such pleasant things as are good, and likewise such as are evil? Or must this be the province of a man endued with art?

Callicles/ Of a man endued with art.

Socrates/ But let us again recall to our memory what I said to Polus and Gorgias. For I said (if you remember) that there were certain preparations, some as far as pleasure, preparing this alone, but ignorant of the better and the

worse; but others that knew the nature both of good and evil. I likewise placed among the preparations respecting pleasures, cooking as a skill pertaining to the body, but not an art; but among the preparations respecting the good I placed the medicinal art. And, by Zeus, the guardian of friendship, Callicles, do not think that you ought to jest with me, nor answer me casually contrary to your opinion, nor again receive my assertions as if I was in jest. For you see that our discourse is about this, after what manner it is proper to live, than which, what can any man endued with the smallest degree of intellect more seriously discuss? I mean, whether we should adopt that mode of life to which you exhort me, engaging in such employments of a man, as speaking among the people, cultivating rhetoric, and managing political affairs, after the manner which you adopt; or whether we should betake ourselves to a philosophic life, and consider what it is in which it differs from the former life. Perhaps, therefore, as I just now said, it is best to make a division; and after we have divided, and assented to each other, to consider, if these two species of life have an existence, in what they differ from each other, and which of them ought to be pursued. But perhaps you do not yet understand what I say.

Callicles/ I do not.

Socrates/ But I will speak to you still more clearly. Since you and I have agreed that there is something good, and likewise something pleasant, and that the pleasant is different from the good, but that in each of them there is a certain exercise and preparation of acquisition, one being the hunting after the pleasant, and the other of the good; do you, in the first place, grant me this, or do you not grant it?

Callicles/ I do grant it.

Socrates/ But come, consent with me in what I said to these men, if I then appeared to you to speak the truth. But I said that cooking did not appear to me to be an art, but skill; and that medicine is an art. For I said that medicine considers the nature of that which it cures, and the cause of the things which it does, and that it is able to give an account of each of these: but that cooking very inartificially proceeds to pleasure, to which all its attention is directed, neither considering in any respect the nature nor the cause of pleasure, but being entirely irrational, numbering nothing (as I may say), depending wholly on use and skill, and only preserving the memory of that which usually takes place, by which also it may impart pleasures. In the first place, therefore, consider whether these things appear to you to have been sufficiently said, and that there are also certain other studies of this kind respecting the soul, some of which depend on art, and bestow a certain attention to that which is best in the soul; but others neglect this, considering, in the same manner as cooking with respect to the body, only the pleasure of the soul, and in what manner it may be procured; neither considering which is the better or the worse of pleasures, nor attending to anything else than gratification only, whether it is better or worse. For to me, Callicles, these things appear to take place; and I say that a thing of this kind is flattery, both respecting body and soul, and anything else the pleasure of which is sedulously attended to by anyone, without paying any regard to the better and the worse. But whether do you entertain the same opinion respecting these things with us, or do you oppose them?

Callicles/ I do not, but grant them that your discourse may come to an end, and that I may gratify Gorgias here.

Socrates/ But whether does this take place respecting one soul, but not respecting two and many souls?

Callicles/ It does not. But it takes place respecting both two and many souls.

Socrates/ May it not, therefore, be lawful to gratify souls collected together, without paying any attention to what is best?

Callicles/ I think so.

Socrates/ Can you, therefore, tell me what those studies are which effect this? Or rather, if you are willing, on my asking, assent to whichever appears to you to be one of these, but to that which does not do not assent. And, in the first place, let us consider the piper's art. Does it not appear to you to be a thing of this kind, Callicles; viz. which only pursues our pleasure. but cares for nothing else?

Callicles/ It does appear to me.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, all such studies as these like the harper's art in contests?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what? Does not the erudition of choirs, and the dithyrambic poesy, appear to you to be a thing of this kind? Or do you think that Cinesias the son of Meles is in the smallest degree solicitous that he may say anything by which his hearers may become better? Or is he not rather solicitous about that which may gratify the crowd of spectators?

Callicles/ It is evident, Socrates, that this latter is the case respecting Cinesias.

Socrates/ But what with respect to his father Meles? Does he appear to you to play on the harp, looking to that which is best? Or does not he also regard that which is most pleasant? For in singing he pleasingly pains the spectators. But consider, does not the whole of the harper's art, and dithyrambic poesy, appear to you to have been invented for the sake of pleasure?

Callicles/ To me it does.

Socrates/ But what of the venerable and wonderful poesy of tragedy? What does it strive to accomplish? Do its endeavor and study, as appears to you, alone consist in gratifying spectators? or also in striving not to say anything which may be pleasing and grateful so them but at the same time base; and that, if anything happens to be unpleasant and useful, this it may say and sing, whether it gratifies the spectators or not? According to which of these modes does the poesy of tragedy appear to you to consist?

Callicles/ It is evident, Socrates, that it is more impelled to pleasure, and the gratification of the spectators.

Socrates/ Did we not, therefore, Callicles, just now say that a thing of this kind is flattery?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Come then, if anyone should take from all poesy, melody, rhythm, and measure, would anything else than discourses remain?

Callicles/ Necessarily nothing else.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, these discourses delivered to a great multitude of people?

Callicles/ I say so.

Socrates/ Poesy, therefore, is a certain popular speech. Or do not poets appear to you to employ rhetoric in the theatres?

Callicles/ To me they do.

Socrates/ Now, therefore, we have found a certain rhetoric among a people consisting of boys, and at the same time women and men, slaves and the free-born; and which we do not altogether approve. For we said that it was adulation.

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Be it so. But what shall we say that rhetoric is, which subsists among the Athenian people, and the people consisting of free-born men in other cities? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to speak with a view to that which is best, directing their attention to this, that the citizens through their discourses may become the best of men? Or are they also impelled to the gratification of the citizens? and, neglecting public for the sake of private advantage, do they converse with the people as with boys, alone endeavoring to gratify them without being in the least concerned whether through this they become better or worse?

Callicles/ This which you ask is not a simple thing. For some rhetoricians are solicitous in what they say for the good of the citizens: but others are such as you represent them.

Socrates/ It is sufficient. For, if this also is two-fold, one part of it will be adulation, and base harangue; but the other, which causes the souls of the citizens to become most excellent, will be beautiful; and will always strive to speak such things as are best, whether they are more pleasant or more unpleasant to the hearers. But you never have seen this kind of rhetoric. Or, if you can say that some one of the rhetoricians is a character of this kind, why have you not informed me who he is?

Callicles/ But, by Zeus, I cannot instance to you any rhetorician of the present day.

Socrates/ But what? Can you instance anyone of the ancient rhetoricians, who was the means of rendering the Athenians better, after he began to harangue them when previous to this they had been worse? For I do not know who such a one is.

Callicles/ But what? Have you not heard that Themistocles was a good man, and likewise Cimon and Miltiades, and Pericles here, who died lately, and whose harangues you also have heard?

Socrates/ Yes; if that virtue, Callicles, which you before spoke of is true, viz. for a man to replenish both his own desires and those of others. But if this is not the case, but, as we were afterwards compelled to confess, those desires are to be embraced, the replenishing of which renders a man better, but not those which render him worse, and if there is a certain art of this, as we also acknowledged, can you say that anyone of these was a man of this kind?

Callicles/ I have not anything to say.

Socrates/ But if you seek in a becoming manner you will find. Let us however, sedately considering, see if anyone of these was a character of this kind. Is it not true that a good man, who says what he says with a view to the best, does not speak casually, but looking to something? in the same manner as all other artists, each of whom regards his own work, and does not rashly choose what he introduces to his work, but so that the subject of his operation may have a certain form—as, for instance, if you are willing to look to painters, architects, shipwrights, and all other artificers, and to consider how, whichever of them you please, places whatever he places in a certain order, and compels one thing to be adapted to and harmonize with another, until the whole thing is constituted with regularity and ornament. And indeed, both other artificers, and those which I just now mentioned, who are employed about the body, viz. the matters of gymnastic, and physicians adorn in a certain respect; and orderly dispose the body. Do we grant that this is the case, or not?

Callicles/ It is the case.

Socrates/ A house, therefore when it acquires order and ornament, will be a good house, but a bad one, when it is without order?'

Callicles/ I say so.

Socrates/ And will not this in like manner be the case with a ship?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And may we not assert the same things also respecting our bodies?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what with respect to the soul? Will it be in a good condition, when it acquires disorder, or when it acquires a certain order and ornament?

Callicles/ It is necessary, from what has been said, to grant that the latter must be the case;

Socrates/ What then, in the body, is the name of that which subsists from order and ornament? Perhaps you will say it is health and strength.

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ But what again is the name of that which subsists in the soul from order and ornament? Endeavor to find and mention it, in the same manner as the former name.

Callicles/ But why do not you say what it is, Socrates?

Socrates/ If you had rather, I will. But, if I speak well, do you assent to me; if not, confute, and do not indulge me. To me then it appears that the name belonging to the orderly disposition of the body is the healthful, from which health and every other virtue of the body are produced in the body. Is it so, or not?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ But the name belonging to the orderly disposition and ornament of the soul is the legitimate and

law; whence also souls become legitimate and adorned with modest manners: but these are justice and temperance. Do you assent, or not?

Callicles/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Will not, therefore, that good rhetorician who is endued with art, looking to these things, introduce all his orations and actions to souls? and, if he should bestow a gift, bestow it, and, if he should take anything away, take it; always directing his attention to this, that justice may be produced in the souls of his fellow-citizens, and that they may be liberated from injustice: likewise that temperance maybe produced in them and that they may be liberated from intemperance: and, in short, that every virtue may be planted in them but vice expelled? Do you grant this, or not?

Callicles/ I do Grant it.

Socrates/ For where is the utility, Callicles, in giving a body diseased, and in a miserable condition, abundance of the most agreeable food or drink, or anything else, which will not be more profitable to it than the contrary, but even less, according to a just mode of reasoning? Is this the case?

Callicles/ Be it so.

Socrates/ For I think it is not advantageous for a man to live with a miserable body; for thus it would be necessary to live miserably. Or would it not?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do not, therefore, physicians for the most part permit a man in health to satisfy his desires, (as, for instance, when hungry to eat as much as he pleases, or when thirsty to drink,) but never permit, as I may say, a diseased man to be satiated with things which he desires? Do you also grant this?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ But is not the same mode, O most excellent man, to be adopted respecting the soul; viz. that as long as it is depraved, in consequence of being stupid, intemperate, unjust and unholy, it ought to be restrained from desires, and not permitted to do anything else than what will render it better? Do you say so, or not?

Callicles/ I say so.

Socrates/ For such a mode of conduct will indeed be better for the soul.

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is not, therefore, to restrain anyone from what he desires to punish him?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ To be punished, therefore, is better for the soul than intemperance, contrary to what you just now thought.

Callicles/ I do not know what you say, Socrates: but ask something else.

Socrates/ This man will not suffer himself to be benefited by suffering this of which we are speaking, viz. punishment.

Callicles/ I am not at all concerned about anything which you say; and I have answered you these things for the sake of Gorgias.

Socrates/ Be it so. But what then shall we do? Shall we dissolve the conference in the midst?

Callicles/ You know best.

Socrates/ But they say it is not lawful to leave even fables in the midst, but that a head should be placed on them that they may not wander without a head.

Callicles/ How importunate you are, Socrates! But, if you will be persuaded by me, you will bid farewell to this discourse, or carry it on with some other' person.

Socrates/ What other, then, is willing? for we must not leave the discourse unfinished.

Callicles/ Cannot you yourself finish the discourse, by either speaking to yourself, or answering yourself?

Socrates/ In order, I suppose, that the saying of Epicharmus may be verified, viz. I being one am sufficient to accomplish what was before said by two. And it appears most necessary that it should be so. But, if we do this, I think it will be proper that all of us should in a friendly manner strive to understand what is true, and what false, respecting the subjects of our discourse. For it will be a common good to all for this to become manifest. I will, therefore, run over the affair in the manner in which it appears to me to take place. But, if I shall seem to any of you not to grant myself things which truly are, it will be proper that you should apprehend and confute me. For I do not say what I do say as one endued with knowledge, but I investigate in common with you. So that, if he who contends with me appears to say anything to the purpose, I will be the first to concede to him. But I say these things on condition that you think it fit the discourse should be completed: but if you do not assent to this, let us bid farewell to it, and depart.

Gorgias/ But it does not appear to me, Socrates, proper to depart yet, but that you should pursue the discourse. It likewise seems to me that this is the opinion of the rest of the company. For I also am willing to hear you discussing what remains.

Socrates/ But indeed, Gorgias, I should willingly have discoursed still longer with Callicles here, till I had recompensed him with the oration of Amphion, instead of that of Zethus. But as you are not willing, Callicles, to finish the discussion in conjunction with me, at least attend to me,

and expose me if I shall appear to you to assert anything in an unbecoming manner. And if you confute me, I shall not be indignant with you, as you are with me, but you will be considered by me as my greatest benefactor.

Callicles/ Speak then yourself, good man, and finish the discourse.

Socrates/ Hear me then repeating the discourse from the beginning. Are the pleasant and the good the same? —They are not the same, as I and Callicles have mutually agreed. —But whether is the pleasant to be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant? —The pleasant for the sake of the good. —But is the pleasant that, with which when present we are delighted; and the good that, through which when present we are good? —Entirely so. —But we are good, both ourselves, and all other things that are good, when a certain virtue is present. —To me this appears to be necessary, Callicles. —But, indeed, the virtue of each thing, of an instrument, and of the body, and again of the soul, and every animal, does not fortuitously become thus beautiful, but from order, rectitude, and art, which are attributed to each of them. —Are these things, therefore, so? For I say they are. —The virtue of everything, therefore, is disposed and adorned by order. —So, indeed, I say. —Hence, in each thing, a certain order becoming inherent, which is domestic to each, renders each thing good. —It appears so to me. —The soul, therefore, which has a certain order of its own, is better than the soul which is without order. —It is necessary. —But the soul which has order is orderly. —For how is it possible it should not? —But an orderly soul is temperate. —This is very necessary. —A temperate soul, therefore, is good. I, indeed, am not able to say anything besides these things, O friend Callicles. But do you, if you have anything else, teach me.

Callicles/ Proceed, good man.

Socrates/ I say, then, if a temperate soul is good, the soul which is affected in a manner contrary to that of the temperate is vicious. But such a soul will be destitute of intellect, and intemperate, —Entirely so. —And, indeed, a temperate man acts in a proper manner, both towards Gods and men. For he would not be temperate if he acted in an improper manner. —It is necessary that these things should be so. —And besides this, by acting in a proper manner towards men he will act justly, and by a proper conduct towards the Gods he will act piously. But it is necessary that he should be just and holy, who acts in a just and holy manner. —It must be so. —It is likewise necessary that such a one should be brave. For it is not the province of a temperate man either to pursue or avoid things which ought neither to be pursued nor avoided: but it is proper that he should both avoid and pursue things and men, pleasures and pains, and bravely endure when it is requisite. So that there is an abundant necessity, Callicles, that the temperate man, being just, brave, and pious, as we have described him, should be a perfectly good man: likewise, that a good man should do in a becoming and beautiful manner whatever he does; and that he who acts well should be blessed and happy. And lastly, it is necessary that the unworthy man, and who acts ill, should be miserable. But such a man will be one who is directly contrary to the temperate man, viz. he will be the intemperate character which you praised. I, therefore, lay down these things, and assert that they are true. But if they are true, temperance must be pursued and cultivated, as it appears, by him who wishes to be happy, and he must fly from intemperance with the utmost celerity. He must likewise endeavor to live in such a manner as not to require any degree of punishment: but if he does require it, or any other of his family, —or if this is the case with a private person, or a city, —justice must be administered,

and punishment inflicted, if such wish to be happy. This appears to me to be the mark with our eye directed to which it is proper to live: and all concerns, both private and public, should tend to this, viz. if anyone wishes to be happy, to act in such a manner that justice and temperance may be ever present with him; not suffering his desires to be unrestrained, and endeavoring to fill them; which is an infinite evil, and causes a man to live the life of a robber. For a character of this kind can neither be dear to any other man, nor to Divinity. For it is impossible there can be any communion between them: but where there is no communion there can be no friendship. The wise too, Callicles, say that communion, friendship, decorum, temperance, and justice, connectedly comprehend heaven and earth, Gods and men. And on this account, my friend, they call this universe *kosmos*, or order, and not *akosmia*, or disorder, and *akolasia*, or intemperance. However, you appear to me not to attend to these things, and this though you are wise. But you are ignorant that geometric equality is able to accomplish great things, both among Gods and men. On the contrary, you think that everyone should strive to possess more than others: for you neglect geometry. —Be it so, then. —However, this our discourse must either be confuted, viz. it must be shown that those who are happy are not happy from the possession of justice and temperance, and that those who are miserable are not miserable from the possession of vice; or, if our discourse is true, we must consider what consequences result from it. Indeed, Callicles, all those former things are the consequences concerning which you asked me if I was speaking in earnest. For I said that a man should accuse himself, his son, and his friend, if he acted in any respect unjustly, and that rhetoric was to be used for this purpose. Hence, those things which you thought Polus granted

through shame are true, viz. that by how much it is more base to do an injury than to be injured, by so much is it the worse; and that he who would be rightly skilled in rhetoric ought to be just, and endued with a scientific knowledge of things just; which, again, Polus said that Gorgias acknowledged through shame. This then being the case, let us consider what are the things for which you reprove me, and whether they are well said, or not. You assert, then, that I can neither assist myself, nor any of my friends or domestics, nor save myself from the greatest dangers: but that I am obnoxious to the arbitrary will of anyone, like men of infamous characters (though this is nothing more than the juvenile ardor of your discourse), so as either to be struck in the face, or deprived of my property, or expelled from the city, or, which is the extremity of injustice to be slain. And to be thus circumstanced, according to your doctrine, is the most shameful of all things. But, according to my doctrine, (which has indeed been often mentioned, yet nothing hinders but that it may again be repeated,) I do not say, Callicles, that to be struck in the face unjustly is a most shameful thing; nor yet for my body, or my purse, to be cut; but that to strike and cut unjustly me and mine, is a thing more shameful and base. And that to defraud, enslave, break open the house, and, in short, to injure in any respect me and mine, is to him who does the injury more base and shameful than to me who am injured. These things, which appeared to us to subsist in this manner in the former part of our discourse, are contained and bound in adamantine reasons, though it is somewhat rustic to make such an assertion. However, unless you can dissolve these reasons, or someone more robust than yourself, it is impossible that he who speaks otherwise than I now speak can speak in a becoming manner. For I always assert the same thing, viz. that I know not how these things subsist and that no one of

those whom I have ever met with, as at present, if unable to say otherwise, would be ridiculous. I therefore again determine that these things thus subsist. But, if this is the case, and injustice is the greatest of evils to him that acts unjustly; and it is still a greater evil, if possible, though this is the greatest, for him who acts unjustly not to be punished; what assistance will that be, which, when a man is unable to afford himself, he is in reality ridiculous? Will it not be that which averts from us the greatest detriment? But there is an abundant necessity that this should be the most shameful assistance, viz. for a man to be incapable of assisting either himself, or his friends and domestics; that the next to this should be that which pertains to the second evil; and the third, that which pertains to the third evil; and thus in succession, according to the magnitude of each evil. Thus also does the beauty of being able to give assistance, and the deformity of not being able, subsist. Does the thing take place in this manner, or otherwise, Callicles?

Callicles/ No otherwise.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, these things are two, to do an injury, and to be injured, we say that to do an injury is a greater, but to be injured, a less evil. By what means, then, may a man so assist himself as to possess both these advantages—I mean, that which arises from not doing an injury, and that which is the consequence of not being injured? Is it by power, or will? But I say thus: Will a man, if he is unwilling to be injured, not be injured? Or, if he has procured the power of not being injured, will he not be injured?

Callicles/ It is evident that he will not, if he has procured the power.

Socrates/ But what with respect to acting unjustly? Whether, if anyone is unwilling to do an injury, is this

sufficient (for in this case he will not commit an injury), or is it requisite that for this purpose he should procure a certain power and art, as one who will do an injury, unless he has learned and cultivated these? Why do you not answer me this question, Callicles: whether I and Polus appear to you to be rightly compelled to acknowledge this, or not? since we confess that no one is willing to act unjustly, but that those who injure others do it unwillingly.

Callicles/ Let it be so, Socrates, that your discourse may be brought to a conclusion.

Socrates/ For this purpose, therefore, a certain power and art, as it appears, are to be procured, in order that we may not act unjustly.

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ What then is the art which will enable a man not to be injured in any respect, or at least in the smallest degree? Consider, if it appears to you in the same manner as to me. For to me it appears thus: that he ought either to govern in a city, or obtain the tyranny, or be the associate of the most powerful person in a polity.

Callicles/ Do you see, Socrates, how ready I am to praise you, if you say anything beautifully? This you appear to me to have said in a manner entirely beautiful.

Socrates/ Consider also, whether I appear to you to speak well in what follows: Those seem to me to be friends in the highest degree, concerning whom ancient and wise men say, “similar to similar.” Does it not also appear so to you?

Callicles/ To me it does.

Socrates/ Does it not therefore follow, that when a tyrant who is rustic and unlearned governs, if there is anyone in the city much better than him, the tyrant will fear such a one, and will never be able to be cordially his friend?

Callicles/ It does follow.

Socrates/ Nor yet, if anyone in the city should be much worse than the tyrant, would he be able to be his friend. For the tyrant would despise him, nor ever pay attention to him as a friend.

Callicles/ This also is true.

Socrates/ It remains, therefore, that he alone would be a friend to such a one deserving to be mentioned, who, in consequence of being endued with similar manners, would praise and blame him, be willing to be governed, and to be subject to him that governs. Such a one in this city will be able to accomplish great things, and no one will injure him with impunity. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ If, therefore, any young man in this city should thus think with himself, "After what manner may I be able to accomplish great things, and be injured by no one?" this, as it appears, must be the way, viz. he must immediately from his youth be accustomed to rejoice and be afflicted with the same things as his master, and render himself in the highest degree similar to him. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Will it not therefore follow, that such a man will not be injured, and, as you say, that he will be able to accomplish great things in a city?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will he not, therefore, be able to refrain from acting unjustly? Or will this be far from being the case, if, when the governor is unjust, he is similar to him, and is able to accomplish great things with him? But I think that the very contrary will take place, and that such a one will render himself able to act unjustly in the highest degree, without being punished for his unjust conduct. Will he not?

Callicles/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Will not, therefore, the greatest evil be present with him, in consequence of being corrupted and depraved in his soul, through the imitation and power of his master?

Callicles/ I do not know whither you are always turning the discourse, Socrates, upwards and downwards. Or do you not know, that he who is imitated can, if he pleases, slay and take away the possessions of him who is not imitated?

Socrates/ I know it, good Callicles, unless I am deaf; for, a little before, I often heard this from you and Polus, and nearly, indeed, from all in the city. But do you also hear me: for he may indeed slay whom he pleases; but, being a depraved character, he may slay one who is worthy and good.

Callicles/ And is not this a circumstance grievous to be borne?

Socrates/ Not to a man endued with intellect, as the discourse evinces. Or do you think that a man should endeavor to live to a most extended period, and should apply himself to those arts which always preserve us from dangers—in the same manner as that rhetoric which preserves in courts of justice, and which you exhorted me to cultivate?

Callicles/ I do indeed, by Zeus, and I rightly advised you.

Socrates/ But what, O best of men, does the science of swimming also appear to you to be a venerable thing?

Callicles/ By Zeus, it does not.

Socrates/ And, indeed, this also saves men from death, when they fall into such a danger as requires the aid of this science. But if this science appears to you to be a small thing, I will mention to you a greater than this, viz. that of piloting a ship, which not only saves lives, but also bodies and possessions, from extreme danger, in the same manner as rhetoric. And this, indeed, is moderate and modest, and

is not haughty with a grandeur of ornament, as if it accomplished something transcendent. But since it accomplishes the same things as the judicial art, if it saves any from Ægina hither, it demands, I think, two oboli; but if from Egypt, or Pontus, if it demands a great sum, on account of the great benefit it has conferred, through saving those I just now mentioned, viz. ourselves and children, our riches and wives, and conducting them to the port, this sum is usually two drachms. And the man who possesses this art, and accomplishes these things, going out of the ship, walks near the sea and the ship, in a moderate garb. For he knows, I think, how to reason with himself, that it is uncertain whom he may assist of those that sail with him, not suffering them to be merged in the sea, and whom he may injure, as knowing that neither the bodies nor souls of those who depart from his ship are in any respect better than they were when they entered into it. He will, therefore, reason with himself, that the case is not as if someone who is afflicted in his body with great and incurable diseases should happen not to be suffocated, because this man is indeed miserable for having escaped death, and has not derived any advantage from him; but that if anyone labors under many and incurable diseases in that which is more honorable than body, viz. in his soul, such a one ought to live; and that he will benefit him, whether he saves him from the sea, or from a court of justice, or from anything else. But he knows that it is not better for a depraved man to live; because he must necessarily live badly. On this account, it is not usual for a pilot to be arrogant, though he saves us; nor yet, O wonderful man, for an artificer of machines, who is sometimes able to save a multitude in no respect inferior to that which is saved by the general of an army, or a pilot, or any other person. For sometimes he saves whole cities. Does it appear to you that he is to be compared with a

lawyer? Though, if he should wish to speak, Callicles, such things as you are accustomed to speak, extolling his own art, he would overwhelm you with words, asserting and calling on you to consider that you ought to be the artificers of machines, as if other things were of no consequence. For he would have enough to say. But you nevertheless would despise him and his art, and would call him by way of reproach a maker of machines. Nor would you be willing to give your daughter to his son in marriage, nor his daughter to your son. Though, if you consider what the particulars are from which you praise your own profession, with what justice can you despise the artificer of machines, and the rest whom I have just now mentioned? I know you will say that your profession is better, and consists of better things. But if that which is better is not what I say it is, but this very thing is virtue, i.e. for a man to save himself and his possessions, whatever kind of man he may happen to be, then your reprehension of the artificer of machines, of the physician, and of other arts, which are instituted for the sake of preservation, is ridiculous. But, O blessed man, see whether or not the generous and the good are not something else than to save and be saved. For perhaps to live for a period of time however extended, is not to be wished, nor too much sought after, by him who is truly a man; but leaving these things to the care of Divinity, and believing in prophetic women, that no one can avoid fate, he will afterwards consider by what means he may pass the remainder of his life in the most excellent manner. But will this be effected by rendering himself similar to the polity in which he dwells? If this then were the case, it is necessary that you should become most similar to the Athenian people, if you wish to be dear to them and to be able to accomplish great things in the city. But consider whether this is advantageous to you and me; and whether we should not, O

divine man, be exposed to the same misfortune which they say happened to the Thessalian women in drawing down the moon. But, indeed, our choice of this power in the city should be with the most friendly. If however you think that any man whatever is able to deliver a certain art of this kind, which will cause you to possess mighty power in this city, even when you are dissimilar to the polity, and whether this power is for the better, or the worse, —in this case you appear to me, Callicles, not to consider the affair in a proper light. For it is not requisite that you should be a mimic, but that you should be naturally similar to them if you design to effect a genuine friendship with the Athenian people, and, by Zeus, besides this with Demus the son of Pyrilampes. Whoever, therefore, shall render you most similar to these will also render you, since you desire to be skilled in civil affairs, both a politician and a rhetorician. For everyone is delighted with orations adapted to his own manners, but is indignant with such as are foreign from them; unless you, O beloved head, say otherwise. Can we say anything against these things, Callicles?

Callicles/ I do not know how it is, but you appear to me, Socrates, to speak well. But yet that which happens to many happens also to me: for I am not entirely persuaded by you.

Socrates/ For the love of Demus, Callicles, which is resident in your soul, opposes me: but if we should often and in a better manner consider these things, you would perhaps be persuaded. Remember, therefore, that we said there were two preparations, which in everything were subservient to the cultivation both of body and soul: one associating with these with a view to pleasure; but the other with a view to that which is best, not by gratifying, but opposing. Are not these the things which we then, defined?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is not, therefore, the one of these which looks to pleasure ignoble, and nothing else than adulation?

Callicles/ Let it be so, if you please.

Socrates/ But the other endeavors that this which we cultivate may be the best possible, whether it is body or soul.

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, are we after this manner to take upon ourselves the care of a city and its citizens, I mean when the citizens are rendered the best possible? For without this, as we have found in what has been previously said, it is of no use to bestow any other benefit; viz. unless the dianoëtic part of those who are to receive either abundance of riches, or dominion over certain persons, or any other power, is beautiful and good. Shall we lay this down, as being the case?

Callicles/ Entirely so, if it is more agreeable to you.

Socrates/ If, therefore, Callicles, when publicly transacting political affairs, we should publicly exhort each other to the art of building either walls, or docks, or temples, or, in short, buildings of the largest kind, whether would it be necessary that we should consider and examine ourselves, in the first place, if we knew or were ignorant of the art of building, and by whom we were instructed in it? Would this be requisite, or not?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ In the second place, therefore, this ought to be considered, whether we have ever built any private edifice, either for anyone of our friends, or for ourselves; and whether this edifice is beautiful or deformed. And if on considering we find that our masters were good and illustrious, and that we have built, in conjunction with our masters, many beautiful edifices, and many without their assistance, after we left our masters, —if we find this to be

the case, ought we not, if endued with intellect, to betake ourselves to public works? But if we can neither evince that we had a master, and have either raised no buildings, or many of no worth, would it not in this case be stupid in us to attempt public works, and to exhort each other to such an undertaking? Shall we say that these things are rightly asserted, or not?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And is not this the case with all other things? And if we should engage publicly in medical affairs, exhorting each other as if we were skillful physicians, ought not you and I to consider as follows: By the Gods, how is Socrates affected in his body with respect to health? Or is there any other person, whether a slave or free-born, who by the help of Socrates is liberated from disease? And indeed I think I may consider other things of this kind respecting you. And if we do not find anyone, stranger or citizen, man or woman, whose body has been benefited by our assistance, will it not, by Zeus, Callicles, be truly ridiculous, that we should proceed to that degree of folly as to attempt, according to the proverb, to teach a potter in making a tub, before we have transacted many things privately, as they might happen to occur, and have happily accomplished many things, and been sufficiently exercised in the medical art, and should endeavor to exhort others like ourselves to exercise medicine publicly? Does it not appear to you that a conduct of this kind would be stupid?

Callicles/ It does.

Socrates/ But now, O best of men, since you have just begun to transact public affairs, and you exhort me to the same, reproaching me at the same time that I do not engage in them ought we not mutually to consider as follows: What citizen has Callicles made a better man? Is there anyone

who, being before depraved, unjust, intemperate, and unwise, has through Callicles become a worthy and good man, whether he is a stranger or a citizen, a slave or free-born? Tell me, Callicles, if anyone should ask you these things, what would you say? Whom would you assert to be a better man from associating with you? Are you averse to answer, if there is as yet any private work of this kind accomplished by you, before you engage in public affairs?

Callicles/ You are contentious, Socrates.

Socrates/ But I do not ask through a love of contention, but in consequence of really wishing to know, after what manner you think government ought to be conducted by us. Or would you, when applying yourself to public affairs, attend to anything else than that we citizens may be rendered the best of men? Or have we not often acknowledged that this ought to be done by a politician? Have we, or not, acknowledged this? Answer. We have acknowledged it. I will answer for you. If, therefore, a good man ought to procure this for his city, now having recollected, inform me respecting those men whom you a little before mentioned, if they any longer appear to you to have been good citizens, —I mean Pericles and Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles.

Callicles/ To me they do.

Socrates/ If, therefore, they were good men, did not each of them render their fellow-citizens better instead of worse? Did they render them so, or not?

Callicles/ They did.

Socrates/ When Pericles, therefore, began to speak to the people, were they not worse than when he addressed them for the last time?

Callicles/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ It is not proper to say ‘perhaps’, O best of men; but this must be a necessary consequence from what has been granted, if he was a good citizen.

Callicles/ But what then?

Socrates/ Nothing. But besides this inform me, whether the Athenians are said to have become better men through Pericles, or on the contrary were corrupted by him. For I hear that Pericles rendered the Athenians indolent, timid, loquacious, and avaricious, having first of all rendered them mercenary.

Callicles/ You hear these things, Socrates, from those whose ears are broken.

Socrates/ However, I no longer hear these things; but both you and I clearly know that Pericles at first was much celebrated, and was not condemned by the Athenians by any ignominious sentence, at the very time when they were worse; but when he had made them worthy and good, then towards the close of his life they fraudulently condemned him, and were on the point of putting him to death as if he had been an unworthy man.

Callicles/ What then? Was Pericles on this account a bad man?

Socrates/ Indeed, a person of this kind who has the care of asses, horses, and oxen, appears to be a bad character, if, receiving these animals neither kicking backwards, nor pushing with their horns, nor biting, he causes them to do all these things through ferocity of disposition. Or does not every curator of an animal appear to you to be a bad man, who, having received it of a milder nature, renders it more savage than when he received it? Does he appear to you to be so, or not?

Callicles/ Entirely so, that I may gratify you.

Socrates/ Gratify me also in this, by answering whether man is an animal, or not.

Callicles/ Undoubtedly he is.

Socrates/ Did not Pericles, therefore, take care of men?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ What then? Is it not requisite, as we just now acknowledged, that they should become through him more just, instead of more unjust, if he, being a good politician, took care of them?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, the just mild, as Homer says? But what do you say? Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But, indeed, he rendered them more savage than when he received them: and this against himself; which was far from being his intention.

Callicles/ Are you willing I should assent to you?

Socrates/ If I appear to you to speak the truth.

Callicles/ Be it so, then.

Socrates/ If, therefore, he rendered them more savage, must he not also have rendered them more unjust, and worse characters?

Callicles/ Be it so.

Socrates/ From this reasoning, therefore, it follows, that Pericles was not a good politician.

Callicles/ You, indeed, say not.

Socrates/ And, by Zeus, you say so too, from what you have acknowledged. But, again, tell me respecting Cimon. Did not those who were the objects of his care punish him by an ostracism, and so as that for ten years they might not hear his voice? And they acted in a similar manner towards

Themistocles, and, besides this, punished him with exile. But they decreed that Miltiades, who sought at the battle of Marathon, should be hurled into the Barathrum; and unless the Prytanis had defended him, he would have fallen into it. Though these, if they had been good men, as you say they were, would never have suffered these things. Indeed, it can never happen that good charioteers should at first not be thrown from their cars; but, when they have disciplined their horses, and have themselves become better charioteers, that they should then be thrown from them. This is never the case, either in driving a chariot, or in any other employment. Or does it appear to you that it is?

Callicles/ It does not.

Socrates/ Our former assertions, therefore, as it appears, are true, viz. that we do not know any good politician in this city: but you acknowledge that you know of none at present, but that formerly there were some; and the names of these you have mentioned: but these have appeared to be equal to the politicians of the present day. So that, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use rhetoric truly (for otherwise they would not have fallen into disgrace), nor yet did they employ adulation.

Callicles/ But indeed, Socrates, it is far from being the case, that anyone of the present day will ever accomplish such undertakings as were accomplished by anyone of those I mentioned.

Socrates/ Neither, O divine man, do I blame these men, so far as they were servants of the city; but they appear to me to have been more skillful ministers than those of the present day, and more adapted to procure for the city such things as it desired. But in persuading, and at the same time compelling, the citizens to repress their desires, and not indulge them by means of which they would become better

men, in this those former politicians in no respect differed from such as exist at present; for this, indeed, is alone the work of a good citizen. But, with respect to procuring ships, walls, and docks, and many other things of this kind, I also agree with you, that those were more skillful than these. I, therefore, and you, act ridiculously in this disputation. For during the whole time of our conversation we have not ceased to revolve about the same thing, and to be mutually ignorant of what we said. I think, therefore, that you have often acknowledged and known, that there is this two-fold employment, both respecting the body and soul: and that the one is ministrant, by which we are enabled, if hungry, to procure food for our bodies, and, if thirsty, drink; if. cold, garments, coverlids, shoes, and other things which the body requires. And I will designedly speak to you through the same images, that you may more easily understand. If anyone then supplies these things, being either a victualer, or a merchant, or an artificer of some one of them viz. a baker, or a cook, a weaver, shoe-maker, or tanner, it is by no means wonderful that, being a person of this kind, he should appear, both to himself and others, to be a curator of the body; I mean, to all those who are ignorant that, besides all these, there is a certain gymnastic and medicinal art, to which the care of the body in reality pertains; to which it belongs to rule over all these arts, and to use their respective works; in consequence of knowing what is good and bad in solid or liquid aliment, with respect to the virtue of the body, while all the other arts are ignorant of this. On this account, it is necessary that these arts should be servile, ministrant, and illiberal, respecting the concerns of the body; but that gymnastic and medicine should be justly the mistresses of these. That the very same things, likewise, take place in the soul, you appeared at the same time to grant me, as if knowing what I said; but a little after you asserted that there

had been worthy and good citizens in this city. And when I asked you who they were, you appeared to me to exhibit just such men, with respect to political concerns, as if, in consequence of my asking about gymnastic affairs, who have been, or are at present, good curators of bodies, you should seriously answer me, that Thearion the baker, and Mithæcus, who wrote on the Sicilian art of cooking, and Sarambus the victualer, were wonderful curators of bodies; the first of whom made admirable bread; the second procured admirable food; and the third admirable wine. Perhaps, therefore, you will be indignant if I should say to you, O man, you understand nothing respecting gymnastic. You have told me of men who are the ministers and purveyors of desires, but you do not understand anything beautiful and good concerning them; who, if it should so happen, while they fill the bodies of men, and render them gross, and are praised by them for so doing, at the same time destroy their ancient flesh. These, therefore, through their unskillfulness, do not accuse men given to feasting, as the causes of the diseases with which they are infested, and of the loss of their ancient flesh, but those who happen to be then present, and give them some advice. But, after a long time, when repletion introduces disease, in consequence of having taken place without the healthful, then they accuse and blame these advisers, and would injure them if they were able; but praise those ministers of their desires, and the causes of their maladies. And now you, O Callicles, act in a manner most similar to this; for you praise those who delight such-like men with feasting, and who satiate them with the objects of their desire, and say that they make the city great; but who do not perceive that the city is swollen, and inwardly in a bad condition, through those ancient men. For, without temperance and justice, they have filled the city with ports and docks, with walls and tributes, and such-like

trifles. When, therefore, this accession of imbecility arrived, they accused the advisers that were then present, but praised Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, who were the causes of the maladies: but you perhaps, unless you are careful, they will apprehend, together with my associate Alcibiades, since they have destroyed those ancient particulars, besides those which they have acquired; though you are not the causes, but perhaps the concauses, of the evils. Indeed, I perceive that a very stupid affair takes place at present, and I hear that it has taken place with respect to ancient men. For I see that when a city conducts itself towards any political character, as one that acts unjustly, such a one is indignant, and complains as suffering grievously, though he has conferred many benefits on the city. Are, therefore, such unjustly destroyed by the city, according to their assertion? But, indeed, their assertion is entirely false. For he who presides over a city can never be unjustly cut off by the city over which he presides. For those who profess themselves to be politicians, appear to be the same with those that call themselves sophists. For the sophists, though wise in other things, act absurdly in this respect. Proclaiming themselves to be teachers of virtue, they often accuse their disciples of acting unjustly towards them by defrauding them of their wages, and other testimonies of gratitude for the benefits they receive from them. But what can be more irrational than such an accusation? —I mean, that men who have become good and just, being freed from injustice by their preceptor, and having obtained justice, should yet act unjustly from that very thing which they have not? Does not this, my friend, appear to you to be absurd? You compel me in reality, Callicles, to make a public harangue, because you are unwilling to answer me.

Callicles/ But cannot you speak unless someone answers you?

Socrates/ I seem, indeed, as if I could. For now I extend my discourses, since you are not willing to answer me. But, O good man, tell me, by Zeus, the guardian of friendship, does it not appear to you irrational, that he who says he can make another person a good man, should blame this man, that, having become good through his instructions, and being so now, he is, notwithstanding, an unworthy character?

Callicles/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ Do you not, therefore, hear those who profess to instruct men in virtue speaking in this manner?

Callicles/ I do. But why do you speak about men of no worth?

Socrates/ But what will you say respecting those men, who, while they assert that they preside over the city, and are careful that it may be the best possible, again accuse it, when it so happens, as the worst of cities? Do you think that these differ in any respect from those? O blessed man! a sophist and a rhetorician are the same, or they are something near and similar, as I and Polus have said. But you, through ignorance, think that rhetoric is something all-beautiful, and despise the sophistic art. In reality, however, the sophistic art is as much more beautiful than rhetoric, as the legislative than the judicial profession, and gymnastic than medicine. But I think public speakers and sophists alone ought not to complain that the thing which they teach is evil to themselves; or, if they do, that they must accuse themselves at the same time of not having in any respect benefited those whom they profess to have benefited. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And, indeed, it will be proper to impart benefit to these alone, if they asserted what is true. For, if someone should receive any other benefit, as, for instance, the power of running swiftly, through the instructions of a master of gymnastic, perhaps he would be averse to recompense him, if the master of gymnastic benefited him without having made an agreement that he should be paid for his trouble as soon as he had enabled him to run swiftly. For men, I think, do not act unjustly through slowness, but through injustice. Or do they not?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ If, therefore, anyone should take away this, —I mean injustice, —would it not follow, that there would be no occasion to fear lest he should suffer injustice; but that to him alone it would be base to impart this benefit, if anyone is in reality able to form good men? Is it not so?

Callicles/ I say so.

Socrates/ Hence, as it appears, there is nothing base in taking money for giving advice about other things, as, for instance, respecting building, or other arts.

Callicles/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But, with respect to this action, —I mean, how anyone may be rendered the best of men, and may govern his own family, or the city, in the most excellent manner, —it is reckoned base to withhold advice, unless money is given to the adviser. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ For it is evident that the reason is this: that, of all benefits, this alone renders him who is benefited desirous of making a recompense. So that it appears to be a beautiful sign, if he who imparts the benefit is in his turn benefited; but by no means if he is not. Are these things so, or not?

Callicles/ They are.

Socrates/ Define, therefore, to which mode of healing the maladies of a city you exhort me: whether to that of contending with the Athenians, that they may become the best of men, as if I were a physician; or to that by which I may minister to their wants, in order to obtain their favor. Tell me the truth, Callicles. For it is but just, that, as you began to speak to me freely, you should continue to impart your conceptions. And now speak well and generously.

Callicles/ I say, therefore, that I exhort you to act as ministrant to the city.

Socrates/ You exhort me, therefore, most generous man, to employ flattery.

Callicles/ Unless you had rather be the prey of the Mysians; which will be the case, if you do not act in this manner.

Socrates/ Do not say, what you often have said, that anyone who is willing might slay me, lest I again should say, that an unworthy would slay a good man; nor yet that he might take away whatever I possessed, lest I also should again say, that after he has taken away my possessions he would not derive any advantage from them; but that, as he has unjustly deprived me of them he will also, having received them use them unjustly; and if unjustly, basely; and if basely, wickedly.

Callicles/ You appear to me, Socrates, to believe that you shall never suffer any of these things, as being one who lives at a distance, and that you shall never be brought before a court of justice by a man, perhaps, entirely depraved and vile.

Socrates/ I am therefore, O Callicles, in reality stupid, unless I think that anyone in this city may suffer whatever may happen to take place. But this I well know, that if I was brought before a court of justice, and I should be in danger

respecting anyone of these particulars which you mention, he who brings me thither will be a depraved man. For no worthy man will bring one who is innocent before a court of justice. Nor would it be anything wonderful, if in this case I should be condemned to death. Are you willing I should tell you why I should expect these things?

Callicles/ By all means.

Socrates/ I think that I, in conjunction with a few Athenians, (that I may not say alone,) apply myself to the true political art, and alone of those of the present day perform things political. As, therefore, the discourses which I make are not composed for the sake of popular favor, but with a view to that which is best, and not to that which is most pleasant, —and as I am not willing to do those elegant things which you now advise me to do, —I should not have anything to say in a court of justice. But the same discourse occurs to me which I addressed to Polus. For I should be judged in the same manner as a physician would be judged among boys, when accused by a cook. For consider what would be the apology of such a man, when apprehended by these, if anyone should accuse him, as follows: O boys, this man fabricates for you many evils, and corrupts both you and the youngest of you. For, by cutting, burning, emaciating, and almost suffocating you, he makes you desperate; and likewise by giving you the most bitter potions, and compelling you to be hungry and thirsty; not delighting you, as I do, with many pleasant and all-various dainties. What do you think the physician would have to say in such a bad situation? If he spoke the truth, would he not say, I have done all these things, boys, for the sake of health? But, upon this, in what manner do you think these judges would exclaim? Would they not loudly exclaim?

Callicles/ Perhaps it may be proper to think so.

Socrates/ Do you not think, therefore, that he would be perfectly at a loss what to say?

Callicles/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And I also know that I should be affected in the very same manner, on coming into a court of justice. For I should not be able to mention any pleasures which I had imparted to them and which they consider as benefits and advantages. But I neither emulate those that impart them nor those to whom they are imparted. And if anyone should say that I corrupt young men, by causing them to doubt, or accuse elderly men, by employing bitter discourses, either privately or publicly, I should not be able to say that which is the truth, that I assert and do all these things justly; and that it is your province, O judges, to act in this manner, and to do nothing else. So that, perhaps, I should suffer whatever might happen to be the consequence.

Callicles/ Does therefore, Socrates, that man appear to you to be in a good condition in a city who is thus circumstanced, and is unable to help himself?

Socrates/ He does, if he is in that condition, Callicles, which you have often allowed, viz. if he can assist himself, and has not either said or done anything unjustly respecting men or Gods. For it has often been acknowledged by us, that this is the best aid which anyone can impart to himself. If, therefore, anyone can prove that I am incapable of affording this assistance either to myself or another, I shall be ashamed, whether I am convicted of this impotency before many, or a few, or alone, by myself alone. And if I should be punished with death on account of this impotency, I should be indignant. But if I should die through the want of adulatory rhetoric, I Well know that you would behold me bearing death easily. For no one fears to die, who is not entirely irrational and effeminate: but he fears to act

unjustly; since, for the soul to come to Hades full of unjust actions, is the extremity of all evils. But, if you please, I wish to show you by a certain narration that this is the case.

Callicles/ Since you have finished the other things which remained to be completed, finish this also.

Socrates/ Hear then, as they say, a very beautiful narration; which you in, deed will, I think, consider as a fable; but I consider it as a relation of facts. For the particulars of the ensuing narration are true. As Homer says, then, Zeus, Neptune, and Pluto, divided the government among themselves, after they had received it from their father. This law, therefore, respecting men subsisted under Saturn, and always was, and now is, established among the Gods, viz. that the man who has passed through life in a just and holy manner, when he dies, departing to the islands of the blessed, shall dwell in all felicity, removed from evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall go to the prison of punishment and justice, which they call Tartarus. But the judges of these, during the reign of Saturn, and even recently, Zeus possessing the government, were living judges of the living, judging on that very day on which anyone happened to die. In consequence of this they judged badly. On this account, therefore, Pluto, and those to whom the care of the islands of the blessed was committed, went to Zeus, and informed him that men came to them who were unworthy, whether they were accusers or the accused. But Zeus said, I will prevent this in future. For now judgments are badly exercised; because those that are judged are judged clothed; for they are judged while living. Many, therefore, says he, whole souls are depraved are invested with beautiful bodies, are noble by birth, and rich; and when judgment of their conduct takes place, many witnesses appear in their behalf, testifying that they have lived justly. Hence the judges are

astonished at these things, and are at the same time themselves clothed, while judging, as prior to their soul being concealed they have a veil before their eyes and ears, and the whole of their body. All these things, indeed, are placed before them as well their own vestments as the vestments of those that are judged. In the first place, therefore, says he, they must be deprived of the power of foreseeing death: for now they do foresee it. Hence, Prometheus must be ordered to make this faculty in them cease: and afterwards they must be judged diverted of all these things; for it is requisite that they should be judged when dead. It is likewise requisite that the judge should be naked and dead, speculating the soul itself, with the soul itself, everyone dying suddenly, destitute of all his kindred, and leaving all that ornament on the earth, that the judgment may be just. I therefore having known these things before you, have made my sons judges; two indeed from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus; and one from Europe, Æacus. These then, after their death, shall judge in the meadow, in the highway, where two roads extend, the one to the islands of the blessed, and the other to Tartarus. And Rhadamanthus shall judge those from Asia, but Æacus those from Europe. But I will confer this additional dignity upon Minos, that he shall decide whatever may be inscrutable to the other judges, that the judgment respecting the path of men may be most just.

These are the things, O Callicles, which I have heard, and believe to be true: and from this narration I infer that a thing of the following kind must take place. Death, as it appears to me, is nothing else than the dissolution of two things, viz. of the soul and body from each other. But when they are mutually separated, each of them possesses its own habit, not much less than when the man was living; the body conspicuously retaining its own nature, attire, and passions.

So that, for instance, if the body of anyone while living was large by nature, or aliment, or from both, the body of such a one when dead will also be large; and if corpulent, it will be corpulent when dead; and so with respect to other things. And if anyone while living was studious to obtain long hair, the hair also of the dead body of such a one will be long. Again, if anyone while living had been whipped, and retained as vestiges of the blows in his body scars from scourges, or other wounds, his dead body also is seen to preserve the same marks. And if the limbs of anyone were broken or distorted while he lived, these also will be conspicuous when he is dead. And, in short, whatever was the condition of the body of anyone while living, such will be its condition entirely, or for the most part, for a certain time, when dead. The same thing also, Callicles, appears to me to take place respecting the soul; viz. that all things are conspicuous in the soul, after it is diverted of body, As well whatever it possesses from nature, as those passions which the man acquired in his soul, from his various pursuits. When, therefore, they come to the judge, those from Asia to Rhadamanthus, Rhadamanthus stopping them contemplates the soul of each, not knowing to whom it belongs; but often seizing the soul of the great king, or of any other king or potentate, he beholds nothing sound in such a soul, but sees that it has been vehemently whipped, and that it is full of scars, through the perjuries and injustice impressed in it by its several actions; that all things in it are distorted through falsehood and arrogance, and that nothing is right, in consequence of its having been educated without truth. He likewise sees that such a soul through power, luxury, and intemperate conduct, is full of inelegance and baseness. On seeing however a soul in this condition, he directly sends it into custody with disgrace; whither when arrived, it will suffer the punishment which it deserves. But

it is proper that everyone who is punished if he is rightly punished by another, should either become better, and derive advantage from his punishment, or become an example to others, that others perceiving his sufferings may be terrified and made better. But those are benefited and suffer punishment both from Gods and men, who have been guilty of curable offences: but at the same time the advantage which they derive both here and in Hades, takes place through torments and grief: for they cannot by any other means be liberated from injustice. But those who have acted unjustly in the extreme, and have through such crimes become incurable, serve as examples to others. And these no longer derive any advantage, as being incurable: but others are benefited on perceiving these suffering through the whole of time the greatest, most bitter, and most horrid punishments for their guilt, being indeed suspended in the prison of Hades as examples, spectacles, and warnings to the unjust men that come thither. One of whom I say Archelaus will be (if Polus says true), and every other tyrant who resembles him. I think too, that the greatest part of these examples will consist of tyrants; kings, and potentates, and such as have governed the affairs of cities. For these through their power commit the greatest and the most impious crimes. Homer also testifies the truth of these assertions. For he makes those to be kings and potentates, that are punished in Hades through the whole of time, viz. Tantalus, Sisyphus and Tityus; but he does not make Thersites, or any other private unworthy individual, oppressed by the greatest punishments as if incurable: for I do not think he could be guilty of incurable offences; on which account, he was more happy than those who could. But, Callicles, men extremely unworthy are among the number of the powerful: at the same time, nothing hinders but that good men also may subsist among these; and when

this is the case they deserve the greatest admiration. For it is a difficult thing, Callicles, and deserves much praise, for a man who has great power of acting unjustly, to pass through life justly. Yet there are a few men of this kind; for they have existed both here and elsewhere, and I think there will be hereafter worthy and good men, who will be endued with the virtue of administering justly things committed to their trust. A character of this kind, and of great celebrity among the other Greeks, was Aristides the son of Lysimachus. But the greater part, O most excellent man, of potentates are bad men. As I said, therefore, after Rhadamanthus has taken any soul into his custody, he does not know anything else respecting it, neither who it is, nor from whom it originated. But he only knows that it is a depraved soul; and seeing this, he sends it to Tartarus; signifying at the same time whether it appears to be curable or incurable. But the soul arriving thither suffers the punishments due to its offences. Sometimes, too, Rhadamanthus beholding the soul of one who has passed through life with truth, whether it is the soul of a private man, or of any other—but I say, Callicles, especially of a philosopher, who has transacted his own affairs, and has not been engaged in a multiplicity of concerns in life—when this is the case, Rhadamanthus is filled with admiration, and dismisses the soul to the islands of the blessed. The same things also are done by Æacus. And each of them judges, holding a rod in his hand. But Minos, who is the inspector, is the only one that sits having a golden scepter, as the Ulysses of Homer says he saw him:

> A golden scepter in his hand he holds,
> And laws promulgates to the dead.

I therefore, Callicles, am persuaded by these narrations, and consider how I may appear before my judge, with my soul in the most healthy condition. Wherefore, bidding farewell to

the honors of the multitude, and looking to truth, I will endeavor to live in reality in the best manner I am able, and when I die to die so. I likewise call upon all other men, and you also I exhort to this life, and this contest, instead of that which you have adopted, and which I say is to be preferred to all the contests here. And I upbraid you because you will not be able to assist yourself, when that judicial process shall take place of which I have just been speaking. But when you shall come before that judge who is the son of Ægina, and he laying hold of shall examine you, you will there yawn, and be seized with a giddiness, no less than I am here. Someone too, perhaps, will strike you ignominiously on the face, and treat you in a manner perfectly disgraceful. These things, however, perhaps appear to you to be nothing more than the tales of an old woman, and you accordingly despise them. Nor would it be at all wonderful that these things should indeed be despised by us, if by investigation we could find anything better and more true. But now you three, who are the wisest of all the Greeks existing at present, viz. you, Polus, and Gorgias, see it cannot be shown that it is requisite to live any other life than this, which appears also to be advantageous hereafter But among so many arguments, while others are confuted this alone remains unmoved, viz. that we ought to be more afraid of doing an injury than of being injured; and that a man ought more than anything to endeavor not to appear to be good, but to be so in reality, both in private and public. Likewise, that if anyone is in any respect vicious, he should be punished; and that this is the next good to the being just, viz. to become just, and to suffer through chastisement the punishment of guilt. And further, that all adulation, both respecting a man's self and others, and respecting a few and a many, is to be avoided; and that rhetoric, and every other action, is always to be employed with a view to the just.

Being, therefore, persuaded by me, follow me to that place, whither when you arrive you will be happy, both when living and dead, as my discourse evinces. Suffer, too, anyone to despise you as stupid, and to load you with disgrace if he pleases. And, by Zeus, do you, being confident, permit him to strike this ignominious blow. For you will not suffer anything dire, if you are in reality worthy and good, and cultivate virtue: and afterwards, when we have thus exercised ourselves in common, then, if it shall appear to be requisite, we will betake ourselves to political concerns, or deliberate on whatever we please, as we shall then be better qualified to deliberate than now. For it is shameful, in the condition we appear to be in at present, to boast of ourselves with juvenile audacity, as if we were something; we who are never unanimous about the same things, and things of the greatest consequence; at such a degree of unskillfulness have we arrived. Let us employ, therefore, as a leader, the reasoning which now presents itself to the view, —I mean, that which signifies to us that the best mode of life consists in cultivating justice and the other virtues. This, then, let us follow, and exhort others to the same, but not that, in which you consisting exhorted me: For it is, Callicles, of no worth.

THE END OF THE GORGIAS.

Gorgias.

Translated by W. D. Woodhead.

Persons of the Dialog.

Callicles, Socrates, Chærepho, Gorgias,

And Polus.

Callicles/ This is how they say you should take part in warfare and battle, Socrates.

Socrates/ What, have we arrived at the latter end of a feast, as the saying goes?

Callicles/ Yes, and a very charming feast, for Gorgias has just given us a fine and varied display.

Socrates/ Well, Chaerephon here is to blame, Callicles, for he compelled us to loiter in the market place.

Chaerephon/ 'Tis no matter, Socrates, for I can supply the remedy too. Gorgias is a friend of mine, and will treat us to another display, now, if you want, or if not, later.

Callicles/ What, Chaerephon? Is Socrates anxious to hear Gorgias?

Chaerephon/ That is the very reason why we are here.

Callicles/ Any time you like to come home with me, then, for Gorgias is staying with me and will give you an exhibition.

Socrates/ Most kind of you, Callicles, but would he also be willing to converse with us? I want to learn from him what is the scope of his art and just what he professes and teaches. As for the exhibition, let him give us that, as you suggest, on some other occasion.

Callicles/ There's nothing like asking him, Socrates, for that was one feature of his display. He bade anyone of the company present just now ask any questions he pleased, and said he would answer all such questions.

Socrates/ Splendid! Chaerephon, ask him.

Chaerephon/ Ask him what?

Socrates/ Who he is.

Chaerephon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Well, supposing he were a maker of shoes, he would surely answer you that he was a cobbler. You see what I mean, do you not?

Chaerephon/ I see, and I will ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, is Callicles right in saying that you profess to answer any question you are asked?

Gorgias/ He is right, Chaerephon; that is the very statement I made just now, and I assure you that nobody has asked me a new question these many years.

Chaerephon/ You must indeed be ready with your answers, Gorgias.

Gorgias/ You are at liberty to make the experiment, Chaerephon.

Polus/ Yes indeed, and upon me, if you wish, Chaerephon, for Gorgias, I think, is played out; he has already spoken at great length.

Chaerephon/ Why, Polus, do you think you could answer better than Gorgias?

Polus/ What does that matter, if it is well enough for you?

Chaerephon/ Not at all, but since you want to, you may answer.

Polus/ Proceed.

Chaerephon/ I will. If Gorgias were an expert in the same art as his brother Herodicus, what should we rightly call him? By the same professional name as his brother?

Polus/ Assuredly.

Chaerephon/ Then we should be correct in calling him a doctor?

Polus/ Yes.

Chaerephon/ And if he were skilled in the same art as Aristophon, son of Aglaophon, or Aristophon's brother, what should we rightly call him?

Polus/ Obviously a painter.

Chaerephon/ But, as it is, in what craft is he expert, and by what name should we correctly call him?

Polus/ There are many arts, Chaerephon, among mankind experimentally devised by experience, for experience guides our life along the path of art, inexperience along the path of chance. And in each of these different arts different men partake in different ways, the best men following the best arts. And Gorgias here is one of the best and partakes in the noblest of arts.

Socrates/ It is plain, Gorgias, that Polus is well equipped to make speeches, but he fails to accomplish what he promised to Chaerephon.

Gorgias/ Pray, how is that, Socrates?

Socrates/ It seems that he does not quite answer the question asked.

Gorgias/ Well, if you prefer it, you may ask him yourself.

Socrates/ No, not if you are ready to answer instead; I would much rather question you. For it is obvious from what Polus has said that he is much better versed in what is called rhetoric than in dialogue.

Polus/ How is that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Why, Polus, because when Chaerephon asks in what art Gorgias is proficient, you praise his art as though someone were attacking it, but neglect to answer what it is.

Polus/ Did I not answer that it was the noblest of arts?

Socrates/ Certainly. But no one is asking in what kind of art Gorgias is engaged but what it actually is and what we should call Gorgias. On the lines laid down before by Chaerephon, when you answered correctly and briefly, tell us now in similar manner what this art is and what name we must give to Gorgias. Or rather, Gorgias, tell us yourself in what art you are expert and what we should call you.

Gorgias/ The art of rhetoric, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then we must call you a rhetorician?

Gorgias/ Yes, and a good one, Socrates, if you really want to call me what, in Homer's expression, I boast myself to be.

Socrates/ That is what I want.

Gorgias/ Then call me so.

Socrates/ Are we to say that you can make rhetoricians of others also?

Gorgias/ That is the profession I make both here and elsewhere.

Socrates/ Would you be willing, Gorgias, to continue our present method of conversing by question and answer, postponing to some other occasion lengthy discourses of the type begun by Polus? You must not, however, disappoint us in your promise but show yourself ready to answer the question briefly.

Gorgias/ There are certain answers, Socrates, that must necessarily be given at length; however, I will attempt to answer as briefly as possible. For that too is one of the claims I make, that nobody could give the same answers more briefly than I.

Socrates/ That is what I want, Gorgias; give me an exhibition of this brevity of yours, and reserve a lengthy discourse for another time.

Gorgias/ I will do so, and you will admit you have never heard a speaker more concise.

Socrates/ Well then, you claim that you are an expert in the art of rhetoric and that you can make rhetoricians of others. Now just what is the scope of rhetoric? Weaving, for example, has to do with the making of garments. You agree?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And music with composing melodies?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ By Hera, Gorgias, I marvel at your answers; they could not be briefer.

Gorgias/ Yes, I think I succeed pretty well, Socrates.

Socrates/ Good, and now answer in the same way about rhetoric. What is the field of this science?

Gorgias/ Words.

Socrates/ Of what kind, Gorgias? Those that reveal to the sick what treatment will restore their health?

Gorgias/ No.

Socrates/ Then rhetoric is not concerned with every kind of words.

Gorgias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Yet it makes men able to speak.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And able to think also about the matter of their discourse?

Gorgias/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now does not the science of medicine, which we have just mentioned, make men able to think and to speak about their patients?

Gorgias/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Then medicine also, it seems, is concerned with words.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Words about diseases?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not gymnastics concerned with words that relate to good or bad bodily condition?

Gorgias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And so it is with the other arts also, Gorgias. Each of them is concerned with words that have to do with its own subject matter.

Gorgias/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then, as the other arts have to do with words, why do you not call them by the name of 'rhetoric,' since you call rhetoric any art that is concerned with words?

Gorgias/ Because all the knowledge of the other arts is in general, Socrates, concerned with manual crafts and similar activities, whereas rhetoric deals with no such manual product but all its activity and all that it accomplishes is through the medium of words. Therefore I claim that the art of rhetoric has to do with words, and maintain that my claim is correct.

Socrates/ I wonder whether I understand the kind of thing you wish to call it. But I shall soon know more clearly. Answer me this. We admit, do we not, the existence of arts?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Among the various arts there are, I think, some that consist for the most part of action and have little need of words, and some in fact have no need, but their function can be achieved in silence, as for instance painting and sculpture and many others. I fancy it is with such arts that you say rhetoric has no concern, is it not?

Gorgias/ You are entirely right in your opinion, Socrates.

Socrates/ But there are other arts that secure their result entirely through words and have practically no need, or very little need, of action—arithmetic, for instance, and calculation and geometry and the game of draughts and many other arts, some of which involve almost as many words as actions, and many of them far more, their whole achievement and effect in general being due to words. It is to this kind of art, I believe, that you assign rhetoric.

Gorgias/ You are right.

Socrates/ But I do not imagine that you intend to call any of these aforementioned arts rhetoric, though your actual expression was that 'the art which secures its effect through words is rhetoric.' And anyone who wished to make trouble in our debate might object: Then you call arithmetic rhetoric, Gorgias? But I do not think you mean by rhetoric either arithmetic or geometry.

Gorgias/ You are right, Socrates, and your supposition is quite correct.

Socrates/ Come then, and complete for yourself the answer for which I asked. Since rhetoric is one of those arts that for the most part employ words, and since there are other such arts also, try to tell me what is the field of that particular art securing its effect through words which is called rhetoric. Suppose that somebody should ask me about any of the arts recently mentioned: Socrates, what is the art of arithmetic? I should reply, as you did just now, that it is one of the arts which secure their effect through speech. And if he should further inquire in what field, I should reply that of the odd and the even, however great their respective numbers might be. And if he should next inquire, What art do you call calculation? I should say that this art too is one of those that secure their entire effect

through words. And if he should further demand in what field, I should reply, like the mover of an amendment in the Assembly, that in details 'hereinbefore mentioned' the art of calculation resembles arithmetic—for its field is the same, the even and the odd—but that calculation differs in this respect, that it investigates how the odd and the even are related both to themselves and to each other in regard to number. And if anyone should ask about astronomy and, when I said that this science too secures its effect entirely through words, should demand, What is the field of discourses relating to astronomy, Socrates? I should reply, the movement of the stars, the sun, and the moon, and their relative speed.

Gorgias/ Your statement, Socrates, is quite correct.

Socrates/ And now let us have your reply, Gorgias. Rhetoric is one of the arts that achieve and fulfill their function entirely through words, is it not?

Gorgias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Tell me then in what field. What is the subject matter of the words employed by rhetoric?

Gorgias/ The greatest and noblest of human affairs, Socrates.

Socrates/ But, Gorgias, what you are now saying is disputable and not yet clear. I think you must have heard men singing at drinking parties the familiar song in which they enumerate our blessings, health being the first, beauty the second, and third, as the composer of the song claims, wealth obtained without dishonesty.

Gorgias/ I have heard it. But what is the point of your remark?

Socrates/ Suppose the men who produce the blessings praised by the author of that song should suddenly appear, the doctor, the trainer, and the businessman, and the doctor

should speak first and say, Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you. It is not his craft, but mine, that is concerned with the greatest blessing to mankind.

If I were to ask him, Who are you that make such a claim? he would, I suppose, answer that he was a physician.

Then what do you mean? Is the product of your art the greatest blessing of all?

Of course, he would doubtless reply. Health, Socrates! What greater blessing has man than health?

And then suppose that after him the physical trainer should say, I too should be surprised if Gorgias could display to you a blessing greater than mine.

I should say to him in turn, And who are you, my good fellow, and what is your function?

A trainer, he would answer, and my task is to make men strong and beautiful of body.

And after the trainer the businessman would speak, in utter contempt, I imagine, of all others, Pray consider, Socrates, whether you believe there is any greater blessing than wealth, whether in the pocket of Gorgias or of any other man.

What? we should say to him. Is that what you make?

Yes, he would reply.

And who are you?

A businessman.

Then, we shall say, do you judge wealth to be the greatest blessing for man?

Of course, he will answer.

And yet Gorgias here insists that his art produces greater benefits than yours, we shall say.

It is obvious then that he will next inquire, And what is this benefit? Let Gorgias tell us.

And so come. Gorgias, imagine you are questioned by these men and by myself as well, and answer what it is you claim to be the greatest blessing to man, and claim also to produce.

Gorgias/ Something, Socrates, that is in very truth the greatest boon, for it brings freedom to mankind in general and to each man dominion over others in his own country.

Socrates/ And what exactly do you mean by that?

Gorgias/ I mean the power to convince by your words the judges in court, the senators in Council, the people in the Assembly, or in any other gathering of a citizen body. And yet possessed of such power you will make the doctor, you will make the trainer your slave, and your businessman will prove to be making money, not for himself, but for another, for you who can speak and persuade multitudes.

Socrates/ Now at last, Gorgias, you have revealed most precisely, it seems to me, what art do you consider rhetoric to be, and if I understand you aright, you assert that rhetoric is a creator of persuasion, and that all its activity is concerned with this, and this is its sum and substance. Can you state any wider scope for rhetoric than to produce persuasion in the soul of the hearer?

Gorgias/ By no means, Socrates; I think you define it adequately, for that is its sum and substance.

Socrates/ Then listen, Gorgias. I am convinced, you may be sure, that if there is any man who in a discussion with another is anxious to know just what is the real subject under discussion, I am such a man, and I am confident that you are too.

Gorgias/ What then, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you. Just what that persuasion is which you claim is produced by rhetoric, and with what subjects it deals, I assure you, I do not know, but I have a

suspicion as to what persuasion you mean, and its field. Yet I shall ask you nonetheless what you mean by the conviction produced by rhetoric and what is its province. And why shall I ask you instead of speaking myself, when I have this suspicion? Not for your sake, but because I am anxious that the argument should so proceed as to clarify to the utmost the matter under discussion. Consider whether I am right in asking you that further question. If I had asked you what kind of painter Zeuxis was and you had answered, a painter of living creatures, might I not with justice ask you what kind of living creatures, and where they may be found?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the reason is that there are other painters with many other living subjects?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whereas, if Zeuxis had been the only painter, yours would have been a good answer?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then come, tell me about rhetoric. Do you think that rhetoric alone produces persuasion, or do other arts as well? What I mean is this. When a man teaches a subject, does he persuade what he teaches, or not?

Gorgias/ One cannot deny that, Socrates; certainly he persuades.

Socrates/ Let us take once more the same arts as we discussed just now. Arithmetic and the arithmetician teach us, do they not, the properties of a number?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And consequently persuade us?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then arithmetic is also a creator of persuasion?

Gorgias/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Now, if anyone should ask us what kind of persuasion and in what field, we shall answer him, I suppose, that which teaches about the odd and the even in all their quantities, and we shall be able to prove that all the other arts just mentioned are creators of persuasion and name the type and the field, shall we not?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then rhetoric is not the only creator of persuasion.

Gorgias/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then since other arts besides rhetoric produce this result, we should be justified in asking next, as in the case of the painter, Of what kind of persuasion is rhetoric the art, and what is its province? Do you not think that is a fair question to ask next?

Gorgias/ I do.

Socrates/ Then answer, Gorgias, since you share my opinion.

Gorgias/ The kind of persuasion employed in the law courts and other gatherings, Socrates, as I said just now, and concerned with right and wrong.

Socrates/ I suspected too, Gorgias, that you meant this kind of persuasion, with such a province; it is merely that you may not be surprised if a little later I ask you the same kind of question, though the answer seems clear to me. Yet I may repeat it—for, as I said, I am questioning you, not for your own sake, but in order that the argument may be carried forward consecutively, and that we may not form the habit of suspecting and anticipating each other's views, but that you may complete your own statements as you please, in accordance with your initial plan.

Gorgias/ I think your method is right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then let us consider the next point. Is there a state which you call 'having learned'?

Gorgias/ There is.

Socrates/ And such a thing as 'having believed'?

Gorgias/ There is.

Socrates/ Now do you think that to have learned and to have believed, or knowledge and belief, are one and the same or different?

Gorgias/ I consider them different, Socrates.

Socrates/ You are right, and you can prove it thus. If anybody were to say to you, Can there be both a false belief and a true, Gorgias? you would, I think, say that there is.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But can there be both a false and a true knowledge?

Gorgias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then it is obvious that knowledge and belief are not the same.

Gorgias/ You are right.

Socrates/ But both those who have learned and those who believe have been persuaded.

Gorgias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Shall we lay it down then that there are two forms of persuasion, the one producing belief without knowledge, the other knowledge?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now which kind of conviction about right and wrong is produced in the law courts and other gatherings by rhetoric? That which issues in belief without knowledge, or that which issues in knowledge?

Gorgias/ Evidently, Socrates, that which issues in belief.

Socrates/ Then rhetoric apparently is a creator of a conviction that is persuasive but not instructive about right and wrong.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the rhetorician too does not instruct courts and other assemblies about right and wrong, but is able only to persuade them, for surely he could not instruct so large a gathering in a short time about matters so important.

Gorgias/ No indeed.

Socrates/ Well then, let us see just exactly what we are saying about rhetoric, for I cannot myself yet understand what I mean.

Whenever there is a gathering in the city to choose doctors or shipwrights or any other professional group, surely the rhetorician will not then give his advice, for it is obvious that in each such choice it is the real expert who must be selected. And when it is a question about the building of walls or equipment of harbors or dockyards, we consult, not the rhetoricians, but the master builders, and again when we need advice about a choice of generals or some tactical formation against the enemy or the occupation of positions, military experts will advise us, not rhetoricians. Or what do you say, Gorgias. about such matters? Since you claim yourself to be a rhetorician and to make rhetoricians of others, it is right to examine you on the qualities of your art. And so, imagine that my interest is on your behalf, for perhaps some of those present are anxious to become your disciples—there are some, I know, quite a number, in fact—who would be bashful perhaps about questioning you. And so, just imagine that when I inquire, they too are asking, What shall we gain, Gorgias, if we associate with you? On what subjects shall we be able to advise the city, about right

and wrong alone, or the subjects just mentioned by Socrates?

Try to answer them, then.

Gorgias/ Well, Socrates, I will try to reveal to you clearly the full scope of rhetoric, for you have shown me the path excellently. You know, of course, that your dockyards and the walls of Athens and her harbor equipment are due to the advice, partly of Themistocles, partly of Pericles, not to that of architects.

Socrates/ That is what they say, Gorgias, about Themistocles, and Pericles I myself heard when he recommended the building of the middle wall.

Gorgias/ And when any of the choices you mentioned just now is in question, Socrates, you see that it is the orators who give advice and carry their motions.

Socrates/ That is what surprises me, Gorgias, and that is why I asked you long since what is the scope of rhetoric. When so looked at, it seems to me to possess almost superhuman importance.

Gorgias/ Ah, if only you knew all, Socrates, and realized that rhetoric includes practically all other faculties under her control. And I will give you good proof of this. I have often, along with my brother and with other physicians, visited one of their patients who refused to drink his medicine or submit to the surgeon's knife or cautery, and when the doctor was unable to persuade them, I did so, by no other art but rhetoric. And I claim too that, if a rhetorician and a doctor visited any city you like to name and they had to contend in argument before the Assembly or any other gathering as to which of the two should be chosen as doctor, the doctor would be nowhere, but the man who could speak would be chosen, if he so wished. And if he should compete against any other craftsman whatever, the rhetorician rather

than any other would persuade the people to choose him, for there is no subject on which a rhetorician would not speak more persuasively than any other craftsman, before a crowd. Such then is the scope and character of rhetoric, but it should be used, Socrates, like every other competitive art. We must not employ other competitive arts against one and all merely because we have learned boxing or mixed fighting or weapon combat, so that we are stronger than our friends and foes; we must not, I say, for this reason strike our friends or wound or kill them. No indeed, and if a man who is physically sound has attended the wrestling school and has become a good boxer, and then strikes his father or mother or any others of his kinsmen or friends, we must not for this reason detest or banish from our cities the physical trainers or drill instructors. For they imparted this instruction for just employment against enemies or wrongdoers, in self-defense not aggression, but such people perversely employ their strength and skill in the wrong way. And so the teachers are not guilty, and the craft is not for this reason evil or to blame, but rather, in my opinion, those who make improper use of it. And the same argument applies also to rhetoric. The rhetorician is competent to speak against anybody on any subject, and to prove himself more convincing before a crowd on practically every topic he wishes, but he should not any the more rob the doctors—or any other craftsmen either—of their reputation, merely because he has this power. One should make proper use of rhetoric as of athletic gifts. And if a man becomes a rhetorician and makes a wrongful use of this faculty and craft, you must not, in my opinion, detest and banish his teacher from the city. For he imparted it for a good use, but the pupil abuses it. And therefore it is the man who abuses it whom we should rightly detest and banish and put to death, not his instructor.

Socrates/ I think, Gorgias, that, like myself, you have had much experience in discussions and must have observed that speakers can seldom define the topic of debate and after mutual instruction and enlightenment bring the meeting to a close, but if they are in dispute and one insists that the other's statements are incorrect or obscure, they grow angry and imagine their opponent speaks with malice toward them, being more anxious for verbal victory than to investigate the subject under discussion. And finally some of them part in the most disgraceful fashion, after uttering and listening to such abusive language that their audience are disgusted with themselves for having deigned to give ear to such fellows. Now why do I say this? Because, it seems to me, what you are now saying is not quite consistent or in tune with what you said at first about rhetoric. But I am afraid to cross-examine you, for fear you might think my pertinacity is directed against you, and not to the clarification of the matter in question. Now, if you are the same kind of man as I am, I should be glad to question you; if not, I will let you alone. And what kind of man am I? One of those who would gladly be refuted if anything I say is not true, and would gladly refute another who says what is not true, but would be no less happy to be refuted myself than to refute, for I consider that a greater benefit, inasmuch as it is a greater boon to be delivered from the worst of evils oneself than to deliver another. And I believe there is no worse evil for man than a false opinion about the subject of our present discussion. If you then are the same kind of man as I am, let us continue, but if you feel that we should drop the matter, then let us say good-by to the argument and dismiss it.

Gorgias/ No, I claim to be myself the type of man you indicate, but perhaps we ought to have been thinking of our audience. For quite a time ago before your arrival I gave a

long display to the company present, and now, perhaps, if we continue our debate, it will be a prolonged affair. So we should consider the convenience of our audience, in case we are detaining here some who are anxious to be doing something else.

Chaerephon/ You can hear for yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, the protests of the company, who are eager to hear whatever you have to say; as for me, heaven forbid I should have any engagement so pressing as to desert a conversation of such a character and between such interlocutors for however profitable an occupation.

Callicles/ Indeed, Chaerephon, I too have listened to many a debate, but I think I have never enjoyed one so much as this. I shall be delighted in fact if you are ready to talk all day long.

Socrates/ Well, I have no objections to offer, if Gorgias is willing.

Gorgias/ After all this, Socrates, it would be disgraceful of me to refuse, when I personally volunteered to meet any question that might be put. But if those present agree, carry on the conversation and ask what you will.

Socrates/ Then listen, Gorgias, to what surprises me in your statement, for perhaps you were right and I misunderstood you. You claim you can make a rhetorician of any man who wishes to learn from you?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ With the result that he would be convincing about any subject before a crowd, not through instruction but by persuasion?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, you said just now that a rhetorician will be more persuasive than a doctor regarding health.

Gorgias/ Yes, I said so, before a crowd.

Socrates/ And before a crowd means among the ignorant, for surely, among those who know, he will not be more convincing than the doctor.

Gorgias/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Then if he is more persuasive than the doctor, he is more persuasive than the man who knows?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Though not himself a doctor.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who is not a doctor is surely ignorant of what a doctor knows.

Gorgias/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Therefore when the rhetorician is more convincing than the doctor, the ignorant is more convincing among the ignorant than the expert. Is that our conclusion, or is something else?

Gorgias/ That is the conclusion, in this instance.

Socrates/ Is not the position of the rhetorician and of rhetoric the same with respect to other arts also? It has no need to know the truth about things but merely to discover a technique of persuasion, so as to appear among the ignorant to have more knowledge than the expert?

Gorgias/ But is not this a great comfort, Socrates, to be able without learning any other arts but this one to prove in no way inferior to the specialists?

Socrates/ Whether or not the rhetorician is inferior to other craftsmen for this reason, we will consider later, if the question should prove relevant. But now let us first investigate whether the relation of the rhetorician to right and wrong, the noble and the base, the just and the unjust is the same as it is to health and the objects of the other

arts—whether he does not know what is right or wrong, noble or base, just or unjust, but has contrived a technique of persuasion in these matters, so that, though ignorant, he appears among the ignorant to know better than the expert. Or must your prospective pupil in rhetoric have such knowledge and bring it with him when he comes to you? And if he is ignorant, will you, his teacher of rhetoric, teach your pupil none of these things—for that is not your concern—but make him appear before the crowd to have such knowledge, when he has it not, and appear to be a good man, when he is not? Or will you be utterly unable to teach him rhetoric if he does not beforehand know the truth about these matters? How do we stand here, Gorgias? In heaven's name, reveal, as you promised just now, the true power of rhetoric.

Gorgias/ Well, Socrates, I suppose that if he does not possess this knowledge, he can learn these things also from me.

Socrates/ Stop one moment! What you say is right. If you make a rhetorician of any man, he must already have knowledge of right and wrong either by previous acquaintance or by learning it from you.

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now is not the man who has learned the art of carpentry a carpenter?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who has learned the art of music a musician?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who has learned medicine a physician? And so too on the same principle, the man who has learned anything becomes in each case such as his knowledge makes him?

Gorgias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then according to this principle he who has learned justice is just.

Gorgias/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ And the just man, I suppose, does just acts?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now the rhetorician must necessarily be just, and the man must wish to do just actions?

Gorgias/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then the just man will never wish to do injustice?

Gorgias/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And our argument demands that the rhetorician be just?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the rhetorician will never wish to do wrong?

Gorgias/ Evidently not.

Socrates/ Now do you remember saying a short while ago that we should not blame our trainers or expel them from our cities, if a boxer practices his art in a wrongful manner and does injury, and so too if a rhetorician makes wrongful use of his rhetoric, we should not censure or banish his instructor but rather the guilty man who wrongly employs rhetoric? Was this said or not?

Gorgias/ It was said.

Socrates/ But now it is clear that this same rhetorician would never do wrong, is it not?

Gorgias/ It is clear.

Socrates/ And in our earlier discussion, Gorgias, it was stated that rhetoric is concerned with words that deal, not with the odd and even, but with right and wrong. Is that so?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now at the time when you stated this, I considered that rhetoric could never be a thing of evil, since its discourse is always concerned with justice. But when a little later you said that the rhetorician might actually make an evil use of rhetoric, I was surprised, and considering that what was said was inconsistent, I spoke as I did, saying that if, like myself, you thought it of value to be refuted, it was worth while pursuing the conversation, but if not, we should let it drop. And as a result of our subsequent review you can see for yourself it is admitted that the rhetorician is incapable of making a wrong use of rhetoric and unwilling to do wrong. Now, by the dog, Gorgias, it will need no short discussion to settle satisfactorily where the truth lies.

Polus/ What, Socrates? Is what you are saying your true opinion about rhetoric? Or do you imagine just because Gorgias was ashamed not to admit that the rhetorician will know the just also and the honorable and the good, and that, if any man came to him without this knowledge, he himself would instruct him, and then, as result, I suppose, of this admission a contradiction arose in the argument—which is just what you love and you yourself steer the argument in that direction—why, who do you think will deny that he himself knows the right and will teach it to others? But it is the height of bad taste to lead discussions into such channels.

Socrates/ My noble friend Polus, the very reason why we acquire friends and children is that when we ourselves grow old and make slips, you younger people present may set us right both in actions and in words. And now if Gorgias and I

are tripping anywhere in our argument, here you are to lend a helping hand—it is only right that you should do so—and if you think that any of our admissions are at fault, I am willing to retract whatever you desire, provided that you observe one condition.

Polus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That you restrain that exuberance, Polus, which you set out to use at first.

Polus/ What? May I not speak at what length I please?

Socrates/ It would indeed be hard on you, my good friend, if, on coming to Athens, the one spot in Greece where there is the utmost freedom of speech, you alone should be denied it. But look at my side. Would it not be hard on me also, if I may not go away and refuse to listen, when you speak at length and will not answer the question? But if you have any interest in what has been said and wish to set it right, then, as I said just now, retract whatever you please, question and answer in turn, as Gorgias and I did, and refute me and be refuted. For you say, to be sure, that you know what Gorgias knows, do you not?

Polus/ I do.

SOCRATES : And do you not also bid anyone at any time to ask you what he will, since you know how to answer?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then do whichever of the two you choose now, question or answer.

Polus/ Well then, I will do so. Answer me, Socrates. Since Gorgias seems to you at a loss regarding the nature of rhetoric, what do you say it is?

Socrates/ Are you asking what art I hold it to be?

Polus/ I am.

Socrates/ To tell you the truth, Polus, no art at all.

Polus/ But what do you think rhetoric is?

Socrates/ Something of which you claim to have made an art in your treatise which I recently read.

Polus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I call it a kind of routine.

Polus/ Then you think rhetoric is a routine?

Socrates/ Subject to your approval, I do.

Polus/ What kind of routine?

Socrates/ One that produces gratification and pleasure.

Polus/ Then you do not think rhetoric a fine thing, if it can produce gratification among men?

Socrates/ What, Polus? Have you already learned from me what I consider rhetoric to be, that you proceed to ask if I do not think it a fine thing?

Polus/ Have I not learned that you call it a kind of routine?

Socrates/ Well, since you prize gratification so highly, will you gratify me to a small extent?

Polus/ I will.

Socrates/ Then ask me what kind of art I consider cookery.

Polus/ I will. What art is cookery?

Socrates/ No art, Polus.

Polus/ Then what is it? Tell me.

Socrates/ In my opinion, a kind of routine.

Polus/ Tell me, what routine?

Socrates/ One that produces gratification and pleasure, I claim, Polus.

Polus/ Then cookery and rhetoric are identical?

Socrates/ By no means, but each is a part of the same activity.

Polus/ And what is that?

Socrates/ I am afraid it may sound unmannerly to tell the truth, and I hesitate for fear that Gorgias may think I am caricaturing his profession. For my part, I do not know whether this is the rhetoric that Gorgias practices—for we reached no definite conclusion in our recent argument as to his opinion—but what I mean by rhetoric is part of an activity that is not very reputable.

Gorgias/ What is it, Socrates? Tell us and feel no scruples about me.

Socrates/ Well then, Gorgias, the activity as a whole, it seems to me, is not an art, but the occupation of a shrewd and enterprising spirit, and of one naturally skilled in its dealings with men, and in sum and substance I call it 'flattery.' Now it seems to me that there are many other parts of this activity, one of which is cookery. This is considered an art, but in my judgment is no art, only a routine and a knack. And rhetoric I call another part of this general activity, and beautification, and sophistic—four parts with four distinct objects. Now if Polus wishes to question me, let him do so, for he has not yet ascertained what part of flattery I call rhetoric. He does not realize that I have not yet answered him, but proceeds to ask if I do not think it something fine. But I shall not answer whether I consider rhetoric a fine thing or a bad until I have first answered what it is. For that is not right, Polus. Then if you wish to question me, ask me what part of flattery I claim rhetoric to be.

Polus/ I will then; answer, what part?

Socrates/ I wonder whether you will understand my answer. Rhetoric in my opinion is the semblance of a part of politics.

Polus/ Well then, do you call it good or bad?

Socrates/ Bad—for evil things I call bad—if I must answer you as though you already understood what I mean.

Gorgias/ Why, Socrates, even I myself do not grasp your meaning.

Socrates/ Naturally enough, Gorgias, for I have not yet clarified my statement. But Polus here, like a foal, is young and flighty.

Gorgias/ Well, let him alone, and tell me what you mean by saying that rhetoric is the semblance of a part of politics.

Socrates/ I will try to explain to you my conception of rhetoric, and if it is wrong, Polus will refute me. You admit the existence of bodies and souls?

Gorgias/ Of course.

Socrates/ And do you not consider that there is a healthy condition for each?

Gorgias: I do.

Socrates/ And a condition of apparent, but not real health? For example, many people appear to be healthy of body, and no one could perceive they are not so, except a doctor or some physical trainer.

Gorgias/ That is true.

Socrates/ There exists, I maintain, both in body and in soul, a condition which creates an impression of good health in each case, although it is false.

Gorgias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Let me see now if I can explain more clearly what I mean. To the pair, body and soul, there correspond two arts—that concerned with the soul I call the political art; to the single art that relates to the body I cannot give a name offhand. But this single art that cares for the body comprises two parts, gymnastics and medicine, and in the political art what corresponds to gymnastics is legislation, while the

counterpart of medicine is justice. Now in each case the two arts encroach upon each other, since their fields are the same, medicine upon gymnastics, and justice upon legislation; nevertheless there is a difference between them. There are then these four arts which always minister to what is best, one pair for the body, the other for the soul. But flattery perceiving this—I do not say by knowledge but by conjecture—has divided herself also into four branches, and insinuating herself into the guise of each of these parts, pretends to be that which she impersonates. And having no thought for what is best, she regularly uses pleasure as a bait to catch folly and deceives it into believing that she is of supreme worth. Thus it is that cookery has impersonated medicine and pretends to know the best foods for the body, so that, if a cook and a doctor had to contend in the presence of children or of men as senseless as children, which of the two, doctor or cook, was an expert in wholesome and bad food, the doctor would starve to death. This then I call a form of flattery, and I claim that this kind of thing is bad—I am now addressing you, Polus—because it aims at what is pleasant, ignoring the good, and I insist that it is not an art but a routine, because it can produce no principle in virtue of which it offers what it does, nor explain the nature thereof, and consequently is unable to point to the cause of each thing it offers. And I refuse the name of art to anything irrational. But if you have any objections to lodge, I am willing to submit to further examination.

Cookery then, as I say, is a form of flattery that corresponds to medicine, and in the same way gymnastics is personated by beautification, a mischievous, deceitful, mean, and ignoble activity, which cheats us by shapes and colors, by smoothing and draping, thereby causing people to take on an alien charm to the neglect of the natural beauty produced by exercise.

To be brief, then, I will express myself in the language of geometricians—for by now perhaps you may follow me. Sophistic is to legislation what beautification is to gymnastics, and rhetoric to justice what cookery is to medicine. But, as I say, while there is this natural distinction between them, yet because they are closely related, Sophist and rhetorician, working in the same sphere and upon the same subject matter, tend to be confused with each other, and they know not what to make of each other, nor do others know what to make of them. For if the body was under the control, not of the soul, but of itself, and if cookery and medicine were not investigated and distinguished by the soul, but the body instead gave the verdict, weighing them by the bodily pleasures they offered, then the principle of Anaxagoras would everywhere hold good—that is something you know about, my dear Polus—and all things would be mingled in indiscriminate confusion, and medicine and health and cookery would be indistinguishable.

Well, now you have heard my conception of rhetoric. It is the counterpart in the soul of what cookery is to the body. And perhaps I have acted strangely in speaking at such great length after forbidding you a lengthy discourse. But it is only fair that you should excuse me, for when I spoke briefly you did not understand and you were unable to make anything of the answer I gave you but needed an explanation.

If then I cannot follow any answer of yours, you too may speak at length; but if I can, then indulge me by being brief, for that is fair. And now, make what you can of my answer.

Polus/ What is it you say then? Do you hold that rhetoric is flattery?

Socrates/ No, I said ‘a part of flattery.' Can you not remember at your age, Polus? What will you do when you are older?

Polus/ Do you think then that good rhetoricians are considered but poor creatures in the cities because they are flatterers?

Socrates/ Is that a question, or the beginning of a speech?

Polus/ It is a question I am asking.

Socrates/ In my opinion they are not considered at all.

Polus/ How are they not considered? Are they not most powerful in their cities?

Socrates/ No, if by power you mean something good for its possessor.

Polus/ I do indeed mean that.

Socrates/ Then in my opinion rhetoricians have the least power of any in the state.

Polus/ What? Do they not, like tyrants, put to death any man they will, and deprive of their fortunes and banish whomsoever it seems best?

Socrates/ By the dog, at every word you utter, Polus, I am puzzled as to whether you are speaking for yourself and expressing your own views, or questioning me.

Polus/ I am questioning you.

Socrates/ Well, my friend, then you ask me two questions at once.

Polus/ What two questions?

Socrates/ Did you not say just now, Do not the orators put to death whomsoever they will, and deprive of their fortunes and banish from the state whomsoever it seems best?

Polus/ I did.

Socrates/ Then I claim that there are two questions here, and I will answer both. I say, Polus, that orators and tyrants have the very least power of any in our cities, as I stated just

now, for they do practically nothing that they will, but do only what seems best to them.

Polus/ Well, is not that to possess great power?

Socrates/ No indeed, according to Polus.

Polus/ According to me? Indeed I affirm that it is.

Socrates/ By the —, you do not, since you said that great power was a good for its possessor.

Polus/ So I do say.

Socrates/ Do you call it good, then, if a man without intelligence does what seems best to him? And do you call this great power?

Polus/ Not I.

Socrates/ Then refute me and prove that orators have intelligence and that rhetoric is an art, not a form of flattery. But if you leave me unrefuted, then the orators who do what seems good to them in our cities and the tyrants will possess no benefit herein, for power, as you say, is a good, but you too admit that to do what seems good to you without intelligence is an evil, do you not?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ Then how can rhetoricians or tyrants possess great power in our cities, unless Polus proves against Socrates that they do what they will?

Polus/ This fellow—

Socrates/ I deny that they do what they will; now refute me.

Polus/ Did you not just now admit that they do what seems best to them?

Socrates/ Yes, and I still admit it.

Polus/ Then are they not doing what they will?

Socrates/ That I deny.

Polus/ When they do what seems good to them?

Socrates/ Yes.

Polus/ What you say is shocking and fantastic, Socrates.

Socrates/ No need to offend, Polus, my friend—to address you in your own style. But if you have any questions to ask me, prove that my view is false; if not, answer for yourself.

Polus/ Well, I am willing to answer, if only to learn what you mean.

Socrates/ Do you consider, then, that men will what on any occasion they are doing, or rather that for the sake of which they act as they do? For example, do you consider that those who drink medicine at the doctor's orders will what they are doing, namely the drinking of medicine with all its unpleasantness, or the health for the sake of which they drink?

Polus/ Obviously, the health.

Socrates/ So too with those who sail the seas and engage in money-making in general—they do not will what they do on each occasion. For who desires to sail and suffer dangers and troubles? But they will, in my opinion, that for the sake of which they sail, namely wealth, for it is for wealth's sake that they sail.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not this a general truth? If a man acts with some purpose, he does not will the act, but the purpose of the act.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now is there anything in the world that is not either good or bad or intermediate between the two, neither good nor bad?

Polus/ Things must inevitably be so, Socrates.

Socrates/ And by good you mean wisdom and health and wealth and other such things, and by evils their opposites?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ And by neither good nor bad you mean such things as partake now of the one, now of the other, and sometimes of neither, as for example, sitting, walking, running, and sailing, or again such objects as stones and timbers and the like? Is not that what you mean? Or do you mean some other class of objects by what is neither good nor bad?

Polus/ No, I mean these.

Socrates/ Now do men, when they act, perform these indifferent actions for the sake of good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?

Polus/ Surely the indifferent for the sake of the good.

Socrates/ It is in pursuit of the good, then, that we walk when we walk, thinking this the better course, and when on the contrary we stand, we stand for the same reason, for the sake of the good. Is it not so?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do we not kill a man, when we do so, or banish him or confiscate his property, because we think it better so to act than not?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then those who act thus always act for the sake of the good.

Polus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Now did we not admit that when we act with some purpose in view, we do not will the act but the purpose of the act?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then when we slaughter or banish from the city or deprive of property, we do not thus simply will these acts. But if they are advantageous to us, we will them; if harmful, we do not. For as you say, we will the good, not what is neither good nor evil, nor what is evil. Do you think my statement is true or not, Polus? Why do you not answer?

Polus/ It is true.

Socrates/ If we admit this, then if a man, whether tyrant a or rhetorician, kills another or banishes him or confiscates his property, because he thinks it to his advantage, and it proves to be to his harm, the man surely does what seems good to him, does he not?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But is he doing what he wills, if his conduct proves harmful? Why do you not answer?

Polus/ No, it seems to me he is not doing what he wills.

Socrates/ Can such a man possibly possess great power then in his city, if, as you yourself admit, great power is a good thing?

Polus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Then I was right in saying it is possible that a man who does what seems good to him in the state has no great power and does not do what he wills.

Polus/ Just as if you, Socrates, would not like to be at liberty to do whatever seemed good to you in the state rather than not, and are not jealous when you see a man killing or imprisoning or depriving of property as seems good to him!

Socrates/ Do you mean justly or unjustly?

Polus/ Whichever way, is he not to be envied in either case?

Socrates/ Hush, Polus!

Polus/ Why?

Socrates/ Because we should not envy the unenviable and miserable, but pity them.

Polus/ What? Is that your impression of the men of whom I am speaking?

Socrates/ Of course.

Polus/ Then you consider miserable and pitiable him who puts to death any man he pleases, and does so justly?

Socrates/ No, not that, but he is not to be envied either.

Polus/ Did you not call him miserable just now?

Socrates/ The man who puts to death unjustly, my friend, and he is pitiable too, but he who does so justly is not to be envied.

Polus/ Surely it is the man unjustly put to death who is pitiable and wretched.

Socrates/ Less so than his slayer, Polus, and less than he who is put to death justly.

Polus/ How is that Socrates?

Socrates/ In view of the fact that to do wrong is the greatest of evils.

Polus/ Is that the greatest? Is it not a greater to suffer wrong?

Socrates/ Most certainly not.

Polus/ Then you would wish rather to suffer than to do wrong?

Socrates/ I would not wish either, but if I had either to do or to suffer wrong, I would choose rather to suffer than to do it.

Polus/ Then you would not be ready to become a tyrant?

Socrates/ No, if by tyrant you mean what I do.

Polus/ I mean what I said just now, to be at liberty to do what I please in the state—to kill, to exile, and to follow my own pleasure in every act.

Socrates/ Heavens, man I Let me have my say and then attack me with your argument. Supposing I should meet you in the crowded market place with a dagger up my sleeve and say to you, Polus, I have just recently acquired a wondrous power, a tyranny. If I resolve that any of these people you see now should die, he will be dead in an instant. And if I decide that anyone should have his head broken, it will be broken at once, or that his cloak shall be torn, it will be torn. So great is my power in the city.

If then you disbelieve me and I showed you the dagger, you would, I imagine, say on seeing it, Socrates, in this sense anybody might have great power, for in this way one might burn any house he pleased, yes, and the Athenian dockyards too and all the warships and any vessel public or private.

But after all merely to do what one pleases is not to possess great power, do you think so?

Polus/ Not in the circumstances mentioned.

Socrates/ Can you tell me then what fault you find with such power?

Polus/ I can.

Socrates/ What is it? Tell me.

Polus/ It is that a man who thus behaves must surely be punished.

Socrates/ And is not punishment an evil?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Does it not seem to you on the contrary, my strange friend, that when a man does what he pleases, if his action is accompanied by advantage, it is a good thing and this apparently is the meaning of great power, but otherwise,

it is an evil thing and implies small power? Let us examine this point too. Do we not admit that sometimes it is better to do the things we have just mentioned, to kill men and banish and confiscate their property, and sometimes not?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ On this point, then, it seems, both you and I are in agreement.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now when do you say it is better to do these things? Tell me what is your criterion?

Polus/ No, you answer that, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then if you prefer to hear the answer from me, I say it is better so to act, Polus, when it is a just action, worse when it is unjust.

Polus/ It is difficult indeed to refute you, Socrates! Why, even a child could prove you are wrong.

Socrates/ Then I shall be very grateful to that child, and equally so to you, if you refute me and rid me of my nonsense. Be not weary of doing a kindness to a friend, but refute me.

Polus/ Well, there is no need to consult ancient history to refute you, for events that took place yesterday or the day before are sufficient to refute you and prove that many men who do wrong are happy.

Socrates/ What events are these?

Polus/ You see that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, is ruler of Macedonia.

Socrates/ If I do not see it, I at least hear it.

Polus/ Now do you consider him happy or wretched?

Socrates/ I do not know, Polus. I have never met the man.

Polus/ What, must you have met him to know? Can you not judge offhand that he is happy?

Socrates/ No indeed, I cannot.

Polus/ Obviously then you will say that you do not know whether the Great King himself is happy.

Socrates/ And I shall be telling the truth, for I do not know how he stands in education and justice.

Polus/ What? Does happiness rest entirely upon this?

Socrates/ Yes, in my opinion, Polus, for the man and woman who are noble and good I call happy, but the evil and base I call wretched.

Polus/ Then according to you Archelaus is wretched.

Socrates/ If, my friend, he is wicked.

Polus/ Wicked? Of course he is! He had no claim to the power he now enjoys, being the son of a woman who was a slave to Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, and by rights he was the slave of Alcetas. And if he had chosen to act justly, he would still have been his slave and, according to you, would have been happy, but now he has become monstrous unhappy, since he has done the greatest of wrongs. In the first place he sent for this master and uncle of his, ostensibly to restore to him the power of which Perdiccas had deprived him, and then entertained the man and his son, Alexander, who was his own cousin and about his own age, and after making them drunk he flung them into a wagon, took them away by night, and made away with them by murder. And these crimes he committed without realizing that he was the most wretched of men, and felt no regrets. But a little later, so far from wishing to become happy by justly bringing up the rightful heir to the throne, his own brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a child of about seven years, and restoring the throne to him, he threw him into a well and drowned him, and then told the child's mother, Cleopatra, that the boy had fallen in and killed himself while chasing a goose. And so now, after committing greater crimes than any

in Macedonia, he is the most wretched, not the happiest, of all Macedonians, and I suppose there are other Athenians besides yourself who would prefer to be any Macedonian rather than Archelaus.

Socrates/ At the very beginning of our discussion, Polus, I praised you for being in my opinion well trained in rhetoric, though you had neglected dialectic. And now is this the argument whereby even a child might refute me, and have I now, as you imagine, been refuted by it when I claim that the wrongdoer is not happy? How so, my good fellow? Indeed I do not admit a word of what you say.

Polus/ You refuse to, though you really think as I do.

Socrates/ My dear sir, you are trying to refute me orator-fashion, like those who fancy they are refuting in the law courts. For there one group imagines it is refuting the other when it produces many reputable witnesses to support its statements whereas the opposing party produces but one or none. But this method of proof is worthless toward discovering the truth, for at times a man may be the victim of false witness on the part of many people of repute. And now practically all men, Athenians and strangers alike, will support your statements, if you wish to produce them as witnesses that my view is false. If you choose, you may cite as witnesses Nicias, son of Niceratus, and his brothers, who dedicated the long line of tripods in the precinct of Dionysus; or, if you choose, Aristocrates, son of Scellias, who made that splendid offering at the shrine of Apollo; or, if you choose, the whole household of Pericles or any other family you like to select in Athens. Yet I, who am but one, do not agree with you, for you cannot compel me to; you are merely producing many false witnesses against me in your endeavor to drive me out of my property, the truth. But if I cannot produce in you yourself a single witness in agreement with my views, I consider that I have accomplished nothing worth speaking

of in the matter under debate; and the same, I think, is true for you also, if I, one solitary witness, do not testify for you and if you do not leave all these others out of account. Now here is one form of refutation accepted by you and by many others, but there is also another, according to my opinion. Let us compare them, then, and consider whether there is any difference between them. For the questions in dispute are by no means trivial, but are, one might say, matters wherein knowledge is noblest and ignorance most shameful—the sum and substance of them being knowledge or ignorance of who is happy and who is not. For example, to take first the subject of our present discussion, you think it possible for a man to be happy though he is evil and acts wickedly, since you judge Archelaus wicked and yet happy. Are we to consider this is your opinion?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But I say it is impossible. That is one point in dispute. Well, the evildoer will be happy, will he not, if he meets with justice and punishment?

Polus/ Decidedly not. Under those conditions he would be most unhappy.

Socrates/ Then according to you, if the evildoer is not punished, he will be happy.

Polus/ That is what I say.

Socrates/ But according to my opinion, Polus, the wicked man and the doer of evil is in any case unhappy, but more unhappy if he does not meet with justice and suffer punishment, less unhappy if he pays the penalty and suffers punishment from gods and men.

Polus/ That is a preposterous theory you are attempting to uphold, Socrates.

Socrates/ I shall try to make you share it with me, my friend, for I account you a friend. For the moment then,

these are our points of difference—just consider for yourself. I said a short while ago that it was worse to do than to suffer wrong.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But you said it was worse to suffer it.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And I said that evildoers are unhappy and was confuted by you.

Polus/ Yes, unquestionably.

Socrates/ According to your opinion.

Polus/ And my opinion is right.

Socrates/ Possibly so. And you maintain evildoers are happy, if they escape punishment.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But I claim they are the unhappiest of all, and that those who are punished are less so. Do you want to refute that?

Polus/ That of course is more difficult to refute than your first point, Socrates.

Socrates/ Not difficult, Polus, but impossible, for the truth is never refuted.

Polus/ What do you mean? If a man is caught in a criminal plot to make himself tyrant, and when caught is put to the rack and mutilated and has his eyes burned out and after himself suffering and seeing his wife and children suffer many other signal outrages of various kinds is finally impaled or burned in a coat of pitch, will he be happier than if he escaped arrest, established himself as a tyrant, and lived the rest of his life a sovereign in his state, doing what he pleased, an object of envy and felicitation among citizens and strangers alike? Is this what you say is impossible to refute?

Socrates/ Now you are trying to make my flesh creep, my noble friend, instead of refuting me, and just now you were appealing to witnesses. However, refresh my memory a trifle. Did you say ‘criminally plotting to make himself a tyrant'?

Polus/ I did.

Socrates/ In that case neither one will be happier than the other, neither he who by evil means achieves a tyranny nor he who is punished—for of two miserable creatures one cannot be the happier—but he who escapes detection and becomes a tyrant is the more wretched. What is this, Polus? Do you laugh? Is this another form of rebutting, to laugh at a man when he speaks, instead of refuting him?

Polus/ Do you not consider yourself already refuted, Socrates, when you put forward views that nobody would accept? Why, ask anyone present!

Socrates/ I am no politician, Polus, and last year when I became a member of the Council and my tribe was presiding and it was my duty to put the question to the vote, I raised a laugh because I did not know how to. And so do not on this occasion either bid me put the question to those present, but if you can contrive no better refutation than this, then leave it to me in my turn, as I suggested just now, and try out what I consider the proper form of refutation. For I know how to produce one witness to the truth of what I say, the man with whom I am debating, but the others I ignore. I know how to secure one man's vote, but with the many I will not even enter into discussion. Consider then whether you are willing in your turn to submit to the test by answering my questions. For I think that you and all other men as well as myself hold it worse to do than to suffer wrong and worse to escape than to suffer punishment.

Polus/ And I maintain that neither I nor any other man so believes. Why, would you rather suffer than do wrong?

Socrates/ Yes, and so would you and everyone else.

Polus/ Far from it! Neither I nor you nor anyone.

Socrates/ Will you answer then?

Polus/ Certainly, for I am anxious to know what you will say.

Socrates/ If you wish to know then, answer me, as if I were beginning my questions to you. Which do you consider the worse, Polus, to do or to suffer wrong?

Polus/ I? To suffer wrong.

Socrates/ Well, and is it more shameful to do or to suffer wrong?

Polus/ To do wrong.

Socrates/ Is it not worse also, if more shameful?

Polus/ By no means.

Socrates/ I see. Apparently you do not consider the good and the fair to be the same, nor the evil and the shameful.

Polus/ I do not.

Socrates/ And the next point. When you call things fair, such as bodies and colors and figures and sounds and institutions, you must do so surely with reference to some standard. For instance, in the first place do you not call bodies fair either in virtue of the service for which each one is useful, or the pleasure which the sight of them produces in the beholder? Is there any reason outside these which you can give for calling a body fair?

Polus/ I can give none.

Socrates/ Do you not in the same way name all other things also—figures perhaps or colors—fair either because of some pleasure or use they render or for both reasons together?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ And similarly with sounds and all that is concerned with music?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And further, with regard to laws and institutions—the fine ones, I mean—their beauty does not lie outside these limits of the pleasurable, the useful, or both?

Polus/ No, I do not think so.

Socrates/ And it is the same with the beauty of forms of learning.

Polus/ Certainly, and now you are offering a fine definition of the beautiful, Socrates, in defining it by pleasure and the good.

Socrates/ Then you define the base by the opposites, pain and evil?

Polus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Therefore when of two things that are fine one excels the other in beauty, that superior excellence is due to superior pleasure or usefulness or both?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when of two things shameful one exceeds the other in baseness, this excess will be due to an excess either of pain or of evil. Must it not be so?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, what was said just now about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say it is worse to suffer wrong, but more shameful to inflict it?

Polus/ I said so.

Socrates/ Then if it is more shameful to do than to suffer wrong, it is either more painful, and more shameful through excess of pain, or of evil, or of both. Must this not be so?

Polus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now let us first consider whether the infliction of wrong exceeds the suffering of it in pain, and whether wrongdoers suffer more pain than their victims.

Polus/ That can never be, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then the excess is not in pain?

Polus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ And if not in pain, the excess could not be in both?

Polus/ Evidently not.

Socrates/ Then only the other alternative is left?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Namely, evil.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Then to inflict wrong is worse than to suffer it through an excess of evil.

Polus/ That is obvious.

Socrates/ Now were not you and the majority of men in agreement before that it is more shameful to do than to suffer wrong?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now it has been shown to be more evil.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ And would you choose the more evil and shameful in preference to the less? Do not hesitate to answer. Polus, for it will do you no hurt, but submit nobly to the argument as you would to a doctor, and say either yes or no to my question.

Polus/ No, I would not prefer it, Socrates.

Socrates/ And would anyone else?

Polus/ Not according to this argument, I think.

Socrates/ Then I spoke truth when I said that neither I nor you nor any man whatever would rather do than suffer wrong, for to do it is worse.

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ You see then, Polus, that when our proofs are set side by side there is no resemblance. And though all other men except me agree with you, I require no witness to testify for me to save you alone, and putting you alone to the vote I ignore the rest. Well, so much for that. And now let us investigate the second point at issue between us. whether, as you thought, to be punished when guilty is the greatest of evils or, as I thought, it is a greater evil to escape punishment.

Let us consider it in the following way. Would you say that to suffer punishment is the same thing as to be justly chastised when guilty?

Polus/ I would.

Socrates/ Now can you deny that all just things are fine in so far as they are just? Think well before you answer.

Polus/ In my opinion they are, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now consider this further point. When a man acts, must there not always be something acted upon by the agent?

Polus/ I think so.

Socrates/ And does it not experience what the agent does, and is not the quality of the experience and the action the same? I mean, for example, if a man strikes, there must be something stricken.

Polus/ There must.

Socrates/ And if the striker strikes hard or fast, the blow received by the stricken must be of like quality.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the experience of the stricken is of the same quality as the action of the striker?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if a man burns, there must be a thing burned?

Polus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if he burns severely or painfully, the thing burned must be burned in the same way?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the same reasoning applies if a man cuts; there is a thing cut.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if the cut be big or deep or painful, the object cut must be cut in the same way?

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then consider whether you agree to what I said just now as a general rule in every case, namely, that the quality of the patient's experience corresponds to that of the agent's action.

Polus/ I agree.

Socrates/ This being admitted, tell me whether to be punished is to suffer or to act.

Polus/ Necessarily, it is to suffer, Socrates.

Socrates/ At the hands of some agent?

Polus/ Of course, the inflictor of the punishment.

Socrates/ And he who rightly inflicts it punishes justly?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Acting justly or not?

Polus/ Justly.

Socrates/ And so he who is punished suffers justly when he pays the just penalty?

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ And we have agreed that things just are fine or honorable.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then of the two one does, the other, the punished, suffers, what is honorable?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if honorable, good, for the honorable is either pleasant or profitable.

Polus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ So he who is punished justly suffers what is good?

Polus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And is therefore benefited?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it the kind of benefit that I imagine? Is his soul bettered if he is justly punished?

Polus/ It seems probable.

Socrates/ Then he who is punished is rid of evil in the soul?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is he not then freed from the greatest of evils? Look at it in this way. In the fabric of a man's material estate do you see any other evil than poverty?

Polus/ No, only poverty.

Socrates/ And what about his bodily constitution? Would you say its evil is weakness and sickness and ugliness and such things?

Polus/ I would.

Socrates/ And do you consider there is an evil condition of the soul?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do you call this injustice and ignorance and cowardice and the like?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then for these three, material fortune, body, and soul, you have named three evils, poverty, disease, and injustice?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now which of these evils is the most shameful? Is it not injustice and the evil of the soul in general?

Polus/ Yes, by far.

Socrates/ And if the most shameful, then also the worst?

Polus/ How do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean that what is most shameful is so, as we have already admitted, because it produces the greatest pain or harm or both.

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And we have just now agreed that injustice and all evil of the soul is most shameful?

Polus/ We have agreed.

Socrates/ Then it is either most painful, and most shameful through an excess of pain, or else of harm, or of both?

Polus/ That is necessary.

Socrates/ Now are injustice and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance more painful than poverty and sickness?

Polus/ That does not seem to result from our discussion, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then if evil of the soul, by your verdict, does not exceed other evils in painfulness, its superlative

shamefulness must be due to a harm and a viciousness immeasurably and surpassingly great.

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ But that which exceeds most in harm must be the greatest of all possible evils.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then injustice and intemperance and other vices of the soul are the greatest of all evils.

Polus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Now what art rids us of poverty? Is it not the art of making money?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what art frees us from sickness? Is it not medicine?

Polus/ It must be.

Socrates/ And what art from vice and injustice? If this is not so clear to you, look at it like this. Where and to whom do we take the sick in body?

Polus/ To the doctors, Socrates.

Socrates/ And the unjust and intemperate?

Polus/ To the judges, do you mean?

Socrates/ To suffer punishment?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do not those who punish rightly do so with the aid of a certain justice?

Polus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Then money-making rids us of poverty, medicine of sickness, and justice of intemperance and injustice.

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then of these which is the finest?

Polus/ Of which do you mean?

Socrates/ Of money-making, medicine, and justice?

Polus/ Justice is far superior, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then if finest, must it not produce either the greatest pleasure or the greatest profit, or both?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is medical regimen a pleasant thing, and do patients enjoy it?

Polus/ Not in my opinion.

Socrates/ But it is beneficial, is it not?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ For the patient is freed from a great evil, so that it is profitable to submit to the pain and recover health.

Polus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And would a man be happiest about his bodily state if he submitted to healing or if he were never sick at all?

Polus/ Obviously if he were never sick at all.

Socrates/ For happiness, after all, it seems, consists not in a release from evil but in never having contracted it.

Polus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Again, of two who suffer evil either in body or in soul, which is the more wretched, the man who submits to treatment and gets rid of the evil, or he who is not treated but still retains it?

Polus/ Evidently the man who is not treated.

Socrates/ And was not punishment admitted to be a release from the greatest of evils, namely wickedness?

Polus/ It was.

Socrates/ Yes, because a just penalty disciplines us and makes us more just and cures us of evil.

Polus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then the happiest of men is he who has no evil in his soul, since this was shown to be the greatest of evils?

Polus/ That is plain.

Socrates/ And second in order surely is he who is delivered from it.

Polus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And we found this was the man who is admonished and rebuked and punished.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then his life is most unhappy who is afflicted with evil and does not get rid of it.

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ And is not this just the man who does the greatest wrong and indulges in the greatest injustice and yet contrives to escape admonition, correction, or punishment—the very condition you describe as achieved by Archelaus and other tyrants, orators, and potentates?

Polus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ For what these have contrived, my good friend, is pretty much as if a man afflicted with the most grievous ailments should contrive not to pay to the doctors the penalty of his sins against his body by submitting to treatment, because he is afraid, like a child, of the pain of cautery or surgery. Do you not agree?

Polus/ I do.

Socrates/ He is evidently ignorant of the meaning of health and physical fitness. For apparently, as our recent admissions prove, those who escape punishment also act much in the same way, Polus. They see its painfulness but are blind to its benefit and know not how much more miserable than a union with an unhealthy body is a union

with a soul that is not healthy but corrupt and impious and evil, and so they leave nothing undone to avoid being punished and liberated from the greatest of ills, providing themselves with money and friends and the highest attainable powers of persuasive rhetoric. But if we have been right in our admissions, Polus, do you see the results of our argument, or shall we sum them up together?

Polus/ Yes, if you wish.

Socrates/ Is not our conclusion then that injustice and the doing of wrong is the greatest of evils?

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ And it was shown that punishment rids us of this evil?

Polus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And when punishment is evaded, the evil abides?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then wrongdoing itself holds the second place among evils, but first and greatest of all evils is to do wrong and escape punishment.

Polus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Now did we not differ, my friend, about this very point, when you maintained that Archelaus was happy because he remained unpunished despite the enormity of his crimes, whereas I was of the contrary opinion—that Archelaus or any other man who escapes punishment for his misdeeds must be miserable far beyond all other men, and that invariably the doer of wrong is more wretched than his victim, and he who escapes punishment than he who is punished? Was not that what I was saying?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And has it not been proved that it is true?

Polus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Well then, if this is true, Polus, what great use is there in rhetoric? Our recent admissions show, do they not, that a man must take every precaution not to do wrong, since he would thereby suffer great harm?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But if he or anyone of those for whom he cares has done wrong, he ought to go of his own accord where he will most speedily be punished, to the judge as though to a doctor, in his eagerness to prevent the distemper of evil from becoming ingrained and producing a festering and incurable ulcer in his soul. Or what else Can we say, Polus, if our previous admissions hold good? Must it not be true that only in this, and in no other way, can our present views be in harmony with what we said before?

Polus/ What else indeed can we say, Socrates?

Socrates/ Then for the purpose of defending one's own guilt or that of his parents or friends or children, or his country when guilty, Polus, rhetoric is of no use whatever—unless we should on the contrary assume that a man ought to accuse himself first and foremost, and then his kinsfolk and any friend who at any time is guilty of wrongdoing, and that he ought not to hide the evil away but bring it to light in order that the culprit may be punished and regain his health. And he should prevail upon himself and the others not to play the coward but to submit as a patient submits bravely with closed eyes to the knife or cautery of the surgeon, ever pursuing what is good and honorable and heeding not the pain, but if his guilty deeds be worthy of flogging, submitting to the lash; if of imprisonment, to bonds; if of a fine, to the payment thereof; if of exile, to exile; if of death, to death. He should be the first to accuse himself and his kinsmen, and should use rhetoric for the sole

purpose of exposing his own misdeeds and ridding himself of the greatest of all evils, wickedness. Are we to accept this or not, Polus?

Polus/ To me it seems fantastic, Socrates, but I suppose it is consistent with what was said before.

Socrates/ Then surely we must disprove that, or else this view must follow.

Polus/ Yes, that is so.

Socrates/ Then conversely again, if after all it is right to injure anybody, whether it be an enemy or whoever it be—always provided that you have not been yourself the victim of injury by him, for this you must guard against—but if your enemy injures another, you should contrive by every possible means, both by word and by deed, that he escape punishment and come not before the judge. But if he does appear, you must see to it that your enemy be not sentenced and punished, but that, if he has robbed others of a large sum of money, he shall not pay it back but shall keep it and squander it, in defiance of god and man, upon himself and his friends; and, if his crimes are worthy of death, that, if possible, he shall never die but live forever in his wickedness, or, if not this, shall at any rate live as long as possible in this character. Rhetoric is of service for such purposes in my opinion, Polus, but does not seem to be of much use for a man who does not intend to do wrong, if indeed it is of any use at all—and our previous discussion has revealed none.

Callicles/ Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest or joking?

Chaerephon/ In my opinion, Callicles, he is in deadly earnest, but there is nothing like asking him.

Callicles/ By heaven, that is just what I am anxious to do. Tell me, Socrates, are we to consider you serious now or

jesting? For if you are serious and what you say is true, then surely the life of us mortals must be turned upside down and apparently we are everywhere doing the opposite of what we should.

Socrates/ Callicles, if mankind did not share one common emotion which was the same though varying in its different manifestations, but some of us experienced peculiar feelings unshared by the rest, it would not be easy for one of us to reveal his feelings to another. This I say because I have observed that you and I have now undergone much the same experience, for each one of us is in love with two objects—I with Alcibiades, son of Clinias, and philosophy, and you also with two, the Athenian demos and Demos, son of Pyrilampes. Now I notice on every occasion that, clever though you be, whatever your favorite says and however he describes things to be, you cannot contradict him, but constantly shift to and fro. In the Assembly, if any statement of yours is contradicted by the Athenian demos, you change about and say what it wishes, and you behave much the same toward the handsome young son of Pyrilampes. For you are incapable of resisting the words and designs of your favorite, with the result that if anyone should be astonished at the absurdities you utter again and again under their spell, you would probably say, if you were willing to tell the truth, that unless somebody stops your favorites from saying what they do, you yourself too will never stop speaking thus. You must think yourself bound then to hear much the same things from me, and do not be astonished at my speaking thus, but stop my favorite, philosophy, from saying what she does. It is she, my friend, who says what you now hear from me, and she is far less unstable than my other favorite, for the son of Clinias is at the mercy now of one argument, now of another, but philosophy holds always to the same, and she says what now astonishes you, and you were here when

the words were spoken. You must either then prove against her, as I said just now, that to do wrong and evade punishment for wrongdoing is not the worst of all evils; or if you leave this unrefuted, then, by the dog that is god in Egypt, Callicles himself will not agree with you, Callicles, but will be at variance with you throughout your life. And yet I think it better, my good friend, that my lyre should be discordant and out of tune, and any chorus I might train, and that the majority of mankind should disagree with and oppose me, rather than that I, who am but one man, should be out of tune with and contradict myself.

Callicles/ Socrates, it seems to me that you run wild in your talk like a true mob orator, and now you are haranguing us in this way because Polus fell into the very error which he blamed Gorgias for being drawn into by you. Gorgias, he said, was asked by you whether, in case a prospective pupil of rhetoric came to him without a knowledge of justice, he himself would teach him, and he was shamed into saying he would do so, because the general conventional view demanded it and men would be vexed if one refused. It was through this admission that he was forced to contradict himself, and that is just what you like. And Polus, in my opinion, was quite right in laughing at you at the time, but now he himself in turn has been caught in the same way. And I do not think much of Polus for the very reason that he agreed with you that it is more disgraceful to do than to suffer injustice, for it was as a result of this admission that he was caught in the toils of your argument and silenced, because he was ashamed to say what he thought. For, Socrates, though you claim to pursue the truth, you actually drag us into these tiresome popular fallacies, looking to what is fine and noble, not by nature, but by convention. Now, for the most part, these two, nature and convention, are antagonistic to each other. And so, if a

man is ashamed and dares not say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself. And you have discovered this clever trick and do not play fair in your arguments, for if a man speaks on the basis of convention, you slyly question him on the basis of nature, but if he follows nature, you follow convention. For example, in our present discussion of doing and suffering wrong, when Polus spoke of what was conventionally the more shameful, you followed it up by appealing to nature. For by nature everything that is worse is more shameful, suffering wrong for instance, but by convention it is more shameful to do it. For to suffer wrong is not even fit for a man but only for a slave, for whom it is better to be dead than alive, since when wronged and outraged he is unable to help himself or any other for whom he cares. But in my opinion those who framed the laws are the weaker folk, the majority. And accordingly they frame the laws for themselves and their own advantage, and so too with their approval and censure, and to prevent the stronger who are able to overreach them from gaining the advantage over them, they frighten them by saying that to overreach others is shameful and evil, and injustice consists in seeking the advantage over others. For they are satisfied, I suppose, if being inferior they enjoy equality of status. That is the reason why seeking an advantage over the many is by convention said to be wrong and shameful, and they call it injustice. But in my view nature herself makes it plain that it is right for the better to have the advantage over the worse, the more able over the less. And both among all animals and in entire states and races of mankind it is plain that this is the case—that right is recognized to be the sovereignty and advantage of the stronger over the weaker. For what justification had Xerxes in invading Greece or his father in invading Scythia? And there are countless other similar instances one might mention. But I imagine that these men

act in accordance with the true nature of right, yes and, by heaven, according to nature's own law, though not perhaps by the law we frame. We mold the best and strongest among ourselves, catching them young like lion cubs, and by spells and incantations we make slaves of them, saying that they must be content with equality and that this is what is right and fair. But if a man arises endowed with a nature sufficiently strong, he will, I believe, shake off all these controls, burst his fetters, and break loose. And trampling upon our scraps of paper, our spells and incantations, and all our unnatural conventions, he rises up and reveals himself our master who was once our slave, and there shines forth nature's true justice. And it seems to me that Pindar expresses what I am saying in that ode in which he writes;

> Law is the sovereign of all,
> Of mortals and immortals alike.

and it is law, he says, that

> Carries all, justifying the most violent deed
> With victorious hand; this I prove
> By the deeds of Heracles, for without paying the price—

it runs something like that—for I do not know the poem by heart—but it says that he drove off the oxen of Geryon which were neither given to him nor paid for, because this is natural justice, that the cattle and all other possessions of the inferior and weaker belong to the superior and stronger.

This is the truth then, and you will realize it if you will now abandon philosophy and rise to greater things. For philosophy, you know, Socrates, is a pretty thing if you engage in it moderately in your youth; but if you continue in it longer than you should, it is the ruin of any man. For if a man is exceptionally gifted and yet pursues philosophy far on in life, he must prove entirely unacquainted with all_the

accomplishments requisite for a gentleman and a man of distinction. Such men know nothing of the laws in their cities, or of the language they should use in their business associations both public and private with other men, or of human pleasures and appetites, and in a word they are completely without experience of men's characters. And so when they enter upon any activity public or private they appear ridiculous, just as public men, I suppose, appear ridiculous when they take part in your discussions and arguments. For what Euripides says is true :

> All shine in that and eagerly pursue it—
> Giving the better part of the day thereto—
> In which they find themselves most excellent.

but that in which they are inferior they shun and abuse, praising the other out of partiality to themselves, with the idea that they are thus praising themselves. But to my mind the right course is to partake of both. It is a good thing to engage in philosophy just so far as it is an aid to education, and it is no disgrace for a youth to study it, but when a man who is now growing older still studies philosophy, the situation becomes ridiculous, Socrates, and I feel toward philosophers very much as I do toward those who lisp and play the child. When I see a little child, for whom it is still proper enough to speak in this way, lisping and playing, I like it and it seems to me pretty and ingenuous and appropriate to the child's age, and when I hear it talking with precision, it seems to me disagreeable and it vexes my ears and appears to me more fitting for a slave, but when one hears a grown man lisping or sees him playing the child, it look ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of a beating. I feel exactly the same too about students of philosophy. When I see a youth engaged in it, I admire it and it seems to me natural and I consider such a man ingenuous, and the man who does not pursue it I regard as illiberal and one who will

never aspire to any fine or noble deed, but when I see an older man still studying philosophy and not deserting it, that man, Socrates, is actually asking for a whipping. For as I said just now, such a man, even if exceptionally gifted, is doomed to prove less than a man, shunning the city center and market place, in which the poet said that men win distinction, and living the rest of his life sunk in a corner and whispering with three or four boys, and incapable of any utterance that is free and lofty and brilliant. Now I am quite friendly disposed toward you, Socrates, and I suppose I feel much as Zethus, whom I mentioned, felt toward Amphion in Euripides. For I am moved to say to you the same kind of thing as he said to his brother, 'You neglect, Socrates, what you most ought to care for, and pervert a naturally noble spirit by putting on a childlike semblance, and you could neither contribute a useful word in the councils of justice nor seize upon what is plausible and convincing, nor offer any brilliant advice on another's behalf.' And yet, my dear Socrates—and do not be angry with me, for I am saying this out of good will toward you—do you not consider it a disgrace to be in the condition I think you are in, you and the others who advance ever farther into philosophy? For now if anyone should seize you or any others like you and drag you off to prison, claiming you are guilty when you are not, you realize that you would not know what to do, but you would reel to and fro and gape openmouthed, without a word to say, and when you came before the court, even with an utterly mean and rascally accuser, you would be put to death, if he chose to demand the death penalty. And yet what wisdom is there in this, Socrates, in 'an art which finds a man well-gifted and leaves him worse' —able neither to help himself nor to save from the extremes of danger either himself or anybody else, but fated to be robbed by his enemies of all his property and to live literally like one disfranchised in his own city? And

such a man, if I may put it somewhat crudely, one may even box on the ears with impunity. But, my good fellow, 'cease your questioning, and practice the fairer music of affairs' and try something that will win you a name for good sense, and leave to others ‘these dainty devices,' whether we should call them babblings or follies, ‘which will set you to dwell in empty mansions.' You should not emulate those who investigate these trifling matters but those who enjoy a livelihood and a reputation and many other blessings.

Socrates/ If my soul were wrought of gold, Callicles, do you not think I should be delighted to find one of those stones wherewith they test gold—the best of them—which I could apply to it, and if it established that my soul had been well nurtured, I should be assured that I was in good condition and in need of no further test?

Callicles/ What is your point in asking me this, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you. I consider that in meeting you I have encountered such a godsend.

Callicles/ Why?

Socrates/ I am convinced that if you agree with the opinions held by my soul, then at last we have attained the actual truth. For I observe that anyone who is to test adequately a human soul for good or evil living must possess three qualifications, all of which you possess, namely knowledge, good will, and frankness. Now I encounter many who cannot test me because they are not wise like you, and others are wise but are unwilling to tell the truth because they do not care for me as you do, and our two guests here, Gorgias and Polus, while they are wise men and friends of mine, are more deficient than they ought to be in outspokenness and somewhat too bashful. How could it be otherwise, when their bashfulness is so great that out of sheer timidity each of them ventures to contradict himself in

the presence of many people, and that too about matters of supreme importance? But you possess all the qualifications lacking in the others. You have received a good education, as many Athenians would agree, and you are well disposed toward me. What evidence have I of this? I will tell you. I know that you, Callicles, and three others are partners in wisdom—you, and Tisander of Aphidnae, Andron, the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of Cholargeis—and I once overheard you discussing up to what point one should study philosophy. And I know that some such opinion as this prevailed among you, that we should not be zealous to pursue it in the nicest detail, but you advised each other to beware of becoming wiser than you should, for fear of unknowingly becoming corrupted by it. And so when I hear you giving me the same advice as you gave your closest companions, that to me is sufficient proof that you really are well disposed toward me. Moreover, that you are inclined to be frank and not bashful is borne out by your own statement and confirmed by the speech you made a short time ago. Evidently, then, the case at the moment is this. If at any point in our discussion you agree with me, that matter will already have been adequately tested both by you and by me, and there will no longer be any need to refer it to any other touchstone. For you would never have agreed with me through lack of wisdom or excess of modesty, nor again would you agree with me with intent to deceive, for you are my friend, as you yourself claim. In fact, then, any agreement between you and me will have attained the consummation of the truth. And of all inquiries, Callicles, the noblest is that which concerns the very matter with which you have reproached me—namely, what a man should be, and what he should practice and to what extent, both when older and when young. As for me, if I act wrongly at all in the conduct of my life, you may be assured that my error

is not voluntary but due to my ignorance. Now that you have begun to admonish me, therefore, do not give it up, but reveal to me clearly what course I must follow and how I may achieve it; and if you catch me agreeing with you now but later not doing what I agreed to, you may consider me an utter dolt and refuse to admonish me any more as a worthless creature. But please take up the question again from the beginning and tell me what 'natural justice' is according to you and Pindar—that the more powerful carries off by force the property of the weaker, the better rules over the worse, and the nobler takes more than the meaner? Have you any other conception of justice than this, or is my memory right?

Callicles/ No, that is what I said then and still hold to.

Socrates/ And is it the same man whom you call better and more powerful? I could not grasp at the time, you know, just what you meant. Is it the physically stronger that you call more powerful, and must the weaker obey the stronger—as, for example, you seemed to indicate at the time by saying that great cities assail small ones in accordance with natural justice, because they are more powerful and stronger, the more powerful and stronger and better being one and the same thing—or is it possible to be better but weaker and less powerful, or more powerful but more evil? Or have you the same definition for the better and the more powerful? Please make your distinction clear, whether you consider the more powerful, the better, and the stronger as the same thing or different.

Callicles/ Well, I can plainly assure you that they are the same.

Socrates/ Are not the many more powerful by nature than the one? And it is these who, as you yourself said just now, frame their laws to restrain the one.

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then the ordinances of the many are those of the more powerful?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And of the better also? For the more powerful are far better, according to you.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then their ordinances are naturally noble, since they are those of the more powerful.

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ Now do the many hold the opinion, as you just now stated, that justice means equal shares and that it is more shameful to do than to suffer wrong? Is this true or not? And mind that you yourself are not caught this time a victim of modesty. Is it the view of the many, or not, that justice means equal shares, not excess, and that it is more shameful to do than to suffer wrong? Do not grudge me my answer, Callicles; then, if you agree with me, I may now confirm the truth by the admission of one fully competent to decide.

Callicles/ Well, that is the view of the majority.

Socrates/ Then it is not by convention only, but also by nature that it is more shameful to do than to suffer wrong and true justice to share equally; so apparently what you said previously was not true and you were mistaken in attacking me when you said that convention and nature are opposed and that I have recognized this and do not play fairly in debate, but invoke convention if a man refers to nature, or nature, when he refers to convention.

Callicles/ Will this fellow never stop driveling? Tell me, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be captious about words at your age, considering it a godsend if one makes a slip in

an expression? Do you imagine that by the more powerful I mean anything else but the better? Did I not tell you long ago that I identify the better and the more powerful? Do you think I mean that, if a rabble of slaves and nondescripts who are of no earthly use except for their bodily strength are gathered together and make some pronouncement, this is law?

Socrates/ Well, most sage Callicles, is this what you have to say?

Callicles/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Well, my strange friend, I myself guessed long since that you meant something like this by 'the more powerful,' and I repeat my questions only because I am eager to understand clearly what you mean. For surely you do not consider that two are better than one or that your slaves are better than you because they are stronger. But start once again and tell me what you mean by 'the better,' since you do not mean the stronger, and, my admirable friend, lead me on the path of knowledge more gently, that I may not run away from your school.

Callicles/ You are ironical, Socrates.

Socrates/ No indeed, Callicles, by that very Zethus of whom you made use just now to heap your irony upon me, but come, tell me, whom do you mean by 'the better'?

Callicles/ I mean the nobler.

Socrates/ You see then that you yourself are playing with words but revealing nothing. Will you not tell me whether by 'the better' and 'the more powerful' you mean the wiser or some other class?

Callicles/ By heaven, I do mean those, and most emphatically.

Socrates/ Then according to your account one sensible man is often more powerful than ten thousand fools and it

is right that he should rule and they be subjects and that the ruler should have more than his subjects; that, I think, is what you mean to say—and I am not trapping you with words—if the one is more powerful than ten thousand.

Callicles/ That is what I mean, for natural justice I consider to be this, that the better and wiser man should rule over and have more than the inferior.

Socrates/ Hold there a moment! What is it you mean this time? If many of us are gathered together, as now, in the same place, with plenty of food and drink in common, and if we are of various kinds, some strong, some weak, and one of us, being a doctor, is wiser in these matters and, as is likely, is stronger than some, weaker than others, then surely, being wiser than we are, he will be better and more powerful in this field.

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then must he have a larger portion of the food than we do, because he is better, or in virtue of his authority should he do all the distributing, but in the use and expenditure of it ought he to seek no excessive portion for his own body, if he is not to suffer for it, but to receive more than some and less than others? And if he happens to be the weakest of all, then must not the best man get the smallest share of all, Callicles? Is it not so, my good friend?

Callicles/ You keep talking about food and drink and doctors and nonsense. I am not speaking of these things.

Socrates/ Do you not say the wiser man is the better? Yes or no?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ But should not the better have a larger share?

Callicles/ Not of food or drink.

Socrates/ I see. Of clothes perhaps, and the most expert weaver should have the largest cloak and should go around clad in the most numerous and handsome garments?

Callicles/ Garments indeed!

Socrates/ Well then, the best and wisest expert in shoes should obviously have the advantage in them. The cobbler, I suppose, should have the largest and most numerous shoes in which to walk around.

Callicles/ Shoes! You keep talking nonsense.

Socrates/ Well, if that is not what you mean, here it is perhaps. A farmer for instance who is an expert with good sound knowledge about the soil should have a larger share of seed and use the most seed possible on his own land.

Callicles/ How you keep saying the same things, Socrates!

Socrates/ Not only that, Callicles, but about the same matters.

Callicles/ By heaven, you literally never stop talking about cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if we were discussing them.

Socrates/ Then will you not yourself say in what matters a superiority in wisdom and power justly entitles a man to a larger share? Or will you neither put up with my suggestions nor tell me yourself?

Callicles/ But I have been telling you for a long time. First of all I mean by the more powerful, not cobblers or cooks, but those who are wise in affairs of the state and the best methods of administering it, and not only wise but courageous, being competent to accomplish their intentions and not flagging through weakness of soul.

Socrates/ You see, my good Callicles, that you do not find the same fault with me as I with you. For you claim that I

keep saying the same things, and reproach me with it, but I make the opposite statement of you, that you never say the same things about the same subjects. Previously you defined the better and more powerful as the stronger, and next as the wiser, and now you come forward with something else; the better and the more powerful are now described by you as the more courageous. But, my good sir, tell me and have done with it, whom you mean by the better and more powerful, and what is their sphere of action.

Callicles/ But I told you—those who are wise in the affairs of the state and courageous. It is proper that these should govern states, and this is the meaning of justice, that these should have more than the others, the rulers than the subjects.

Socrates/ Tell me, my friend, what is their relation to themselves? Are they rulers or subjects?

Callicles/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that every man is his own master, or is there no need for him to govern himself but only to govern others?

Callicles/ What do you mean by governing himself?

Socrates/ Nothing very subtle, but merely the popular notion of being temperate and in control of oneself, and mastering one's own pleasures and appetites.

Callicles/ What charming innocence! By temperate you mean simpletons.

Socrates/ How could I? Everybody must realize that that is not my meaning.

Callicles/ Most certainly it is, Socrates. Why, how could a man be happy when a slave to anybody at all? No, but the naturally noble and just is what I now describe to you with all frankness—namely that anyone who is to live aright should suffer his appetites to grow to the greatest extent and

not check them, and through courage and intelligence should be competent to minister to them at their greatest and to satisfy every appetite with what it craves. But this, I imagine, is impossible for the many; hence they blame such men through a sense of shame to conceal their own impotence, and, as I remarked before, they claim that intemperance is shameful and they make slaves of those who are naturally better. And because they themselves are unable to procure satisfaction for their pleasures, they are led by their own cowardice to praise temperance and justice. For to those whose lot it has been from the beginning to be the sons of kings or whose natural gifts enable them to acquire some office or tyranny or supreme power, what in truth could be worse and more shameful than temperance and justice? For though at liberty without any hindrance to enjoy their blessings, they would themselves invite the laws, the talk, and the censure of the many to be masters over them. And surely this noble justice and temperance of theirs would make miserable wretches of them, if they could bestow no more upon their friends than on their enemies, and that too when they were rulers in their own states. But the truth, Socrates, which you profess to follow, is this. Luxury and intemperance and license, when they have sufficient backing, are virtue and happiness, and all the rest is tinsel, the unnatural catchwords of mankind, mere nonsense and of no account.

Socrates/ You make a brave attack, Callicles, with so frank an outburst, for clearly you are now saying what others may think but are reluctant to express. I entreat you therefore on no account to weaken, in order that it may really be made plain how life should be lived. And tell me. You say we should not curb our appetites, if we are to be what we should be, but should allow them the fullest possible growth

and procure satisfaction for them from whatever source, and this, you say, is virtue.

Callicles/ That is what I say.

Socrates/ Then those who are in need of nothing are not rightly called happy.

Callicles/ No, in that case stones and corpses would be supremely happy.

Socrates/ Well, life as you describe it is a strange affair. I should not be surprised, you know, if Euripides was right when he said, 'Who knows, if life be death, and death be life?' And perhaps we are actually dead, for I once heard one of our wise men say that we are now dead, and that our body is a tomb, and that that part of the soul in which dwell the desires is of a nature to be swayed and to shift to and fro. And so some clever fellow, a Sicilian perhaps or Italian, writing in allegory, by a slight perversion of language named this part of the soul a jar, because it can be swayed and easily persuaded, and the foolish he called the uninitiate, and that part of the soul in foolish people where the desires reside—the uncontrolled and nonretentive part—he likened to a leaky jar, because it can never be filled. And in opposition to you, Callicles, he shows that of those in Hades—the unseen world he means—these uninitiate must be the most unhappy, for they will carry water to pour into a perforated jar in a similarly perforated sieve. And by the sieve, my informant told me, he means the soul, and the soul of the foolish he compared to a sieve, because it is perforated and through lack of belief and forgetfulness unable to hold anything. These ideas may naturally seem somewhat absurd, but they reveal what I want to put before you, to persuade you, if I can, to retract your view and to choose in place of an insatiable and uncontrolled life the life of order that is satisfied with what at any time it possesses. But do I

persuade you to change and admit that orderly folk are happier than the undisciplined, or even if I offer many other such allegories, will you not withdraw an inch?

Callicles/ That is more like the truth.

Socrates/ Come then, let me offer you another image from the same school as the last. Consider whether you would say this of each type of life, the temperate and the undisciplined. Imagine that each of the two men has several jars, in the one case in sound condition and filled, one with wine, another with honey, another with milk, and many others with a variety of liquids, but that the sources of these liquids are scanty and hard to come by, procured only with much hard labor. Imagine then that the one after filling his vessels does not trouble himself to draw in further supplies but as far as the jars are concerned is free from worry; in the case of the other man the sources, as in the first instance are procurable but difficult to come by, but his vessels are perforated and unsound and he is ever compelled to spend day and night in replenishing them, if he is not to suffer the greatest agony. If this is the character of each of the lives, do you still insist that the life of the uncontrolled man is happier than that of the orderly? Do I or do I not persuade you with this image that the disciplined life is better than the intemperate?

Callicles/ You do not, Socrates. The man who has filled his vessels can no longer find any pleasure, but this is what I just now described as living the life of a stone. Once the vessels are filled, there is neither pleasure nor pain any more. But a life of pleasure demands the largest possible influx.

Socrates/ Then if there is a big influx, must there not also be a great outflow, and must not the holes for the outflow be large?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It is the life of a plover you mean, not that of a corpse or a stone. And now tell me. You are thinking of some such thing as being hungry and, when hungry, eating?

Callicles/ I am.

Socrates/ And being thirsty and, when thirsty, drinking?

Callicles/ Yes, and experiencing all the other appetites and being able to satisfy them and living happily in the enjoyment of them.

Socrates/ Good, my worthy friend, just continue as you began, and mind you do not falter through shame. And I too, it seems, must throw all shame aside. First of all then, tell me whether one who suffers from the itch and longs to scratch himself, if he can scratch himself to his heart's content and continue scratching all his life, can be said to live happily.

Callicles/ How absurd you are, Socrates, a regular mob orator!

Socrates/ That, Callicles, is why I frightened Polus and Gorgias and put them to shame, but you surely will not be dismayed or abashed, for you have courage. Only give me your answer.

Callicles/ Well then, I say that even one who scratches himself would live pleasantly.

Socrates/ And if pleasantly, happily?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If it was only his head that he wanted to scratch—or can I push the question further? Think what you will answer, Callicles, if anyone should ask all the questions that naturally follow. And as a climax of all such cases, the life of a catamite—is not that shocking and shameful and

miserable? Will you dare to say that such people are happy, if they have what they desire in abundance?

Callicles/ Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to drag our discussion into such topics?

Socrates/ Is it I who do this, my noble friend, or the man who says so unequivocally that pleasure, whatever its nature, is the key to happiness, and does not distinguish between pleasures good and evil? But enlighten me further as to whether you say that the pleasant and the good are identical, or that there are some pleasures which are not good.

Callicles/ To avoid inconsistency if I say they are different, I assert they are the same.

Socrates/ Then you ruin your earlier statement, Callicles, and you can no longer properly investigate the truth with me, if you speak contrary to your opinions.

Callicles/ You are doing just the same, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then I am not acting rightly, if I am so doing, nor are you. But my good sir, consider whether pleasures so indiscriminate can after all be the good. For if it is so, then the many shocking things we just now hinted at must evidently result, and many others too.

Callicles/ So *you* think, Socrates.

Socrates/ But do you really maintain this, Callicles?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Then we are to take up the argument in the belief that you are serious?

Callicles/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Well then, since that is agreed, resolve this point for me. Does something exist that you call knowledge?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Did you not speak just now of a certain courage which accompanies knowledge.

Callicles/ I did.

Socrates/ And you spoke of them as two things because courage is different from knowledge?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Again, are pleasure and knowledge the same thing, or different?

Callicles/ Different, I suppose, O paragon of wisdom.

Socrates/ And courage is also different from pleasure?

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ Let us remember this then, that Callicles of Acharnae says pleasure and the good are the same, but that knowledge and courage are different from each other and from the good.

Callicles/ But Socrates of Alopece does not agree with this. Or does he?

Socrates/ He does not, and I think Callicles will not either when he comes to know himself aright. Tell me, do you not think that those who fare well experience the opposite of those who fare ill?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Then if these things are opposites, the same must hold true of them as of health and sickness. A man cannot be both in health and sick at the same time, nor be rid of both conditions at the same time.

Callicles/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Take, for example, any part of the body separately and consider it. A man perhaps has trouble with his eyes, which is called ophthalmia.

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then his eyes are not at the same time sound.

Callicles/ By no means.

Socrates/ And what of when he is rid of ophthalmia? Does he then get rid of the health of his eyes, and is he finally quit of both conditions?

Callicles/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ For that would be miraculous and irrational, would it not?

Callicles/ Very much so.

Socrates/ But, I suppose, he acquires and gets rid of each in turn.

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ And is it not the same with strength and weakness?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And swiftness and slowness?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And good things and happiness, and their opposites, evils and wretchedness—does he possess and get rid of each of these in turn?

Callicles/ Assuredly, I think.

Socrates/ Then if we discover certain things which a man possesses and gets rid of simultaneously, it is obvious that these cannot be the good and the evil. Do we agree on this? Do not answer until you have considered it carefully.

Callicles/ I am in the most complete possible accord.

Socrates/ Back then to our previous admissions. Did you say hunger was pleasant or painful? Actual hunger, I mean.

Callicles/ Painful, but to satisfy hunger by eating is pleasant.

Socrates/ I understand. But hunger itself at least is painful, is it not?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ And thirst too?

Callicles/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Am I to ask any further then, or do you admit that every deficiency and desire is painful?

Callicles/ I admit it; you need not ask.

Socrates/ Very well then, but to drink when thirsty you say is pleasant?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Now in this statement the word ‘thirsty' implies pain, I presume.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And drinking is a satisfaction of the deficiency and a pleasure?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then you say that in drinking there is pleasure?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ When one is thirsty?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ That is, when in pain?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then do you realize the result—that you say a man enjoys pleasure simultaneously with pain, when you say that he drinks when thirsty? Does not this happen at the same time and the same place, whether in body or soul? For I fancy it makes no difference. Is this so or not?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ Yes, but you say also that when one is faring well it is impossible for him at the same time to fare ill.

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ But you have agreed it is possible to experience pleasure at the same time as pain.

Callicles/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Then pleasure is not the same as faring well, nor pain as faring ill, and so the pleasant is different from the good.

Callicles/ I do not understand what your quibbles mean, Socrates.

Socrates/ You understand, Callicles, but you are playing coy. But push on a little further, that you may realize how cunning you are, you who admonish me. Does not each one of us cease at the same time from thirsting and from his pleasure in drinking?

Callicles/ I do not know what you mean.

Gorgias/ Do not behave so, Callicles, but answer for our sakes too, that the arguments may be concluded.

Callicles/ But Socrates is always the same, Gorgias. He asks these trivial and useless questions and then refutes.

Gorgias/ What difference does that make to you? In any case you do not have to pay the price, Callicles, but suffer Socrates to cross-examine you as he will.

Callicles/ Well then, ask these petty little questions, since Gorgias so wishes.

Socrates/ You are lucky, Callicles, in having been initiated in the Great Mysteries before the Little; I did not think it was permitted. Answer then from where you left off, whether thirst and the pleasure of drinking do not cease for each of us at the same time.

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ And does not one cease from hunger and other desires, and from pleasures at the same time?

Callicles/ That is so.

Socrates/ Does he not then cease from pains and pleasures at the same time?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yes, but he does not cease from experiencing the good and the ill simultaneously, as you yourself agreed. Do you not agree now?

Callicles/ I do. What of it?

Socrates/ Only this, that the good is not the same as the pleasant, my friend, nor the evil as the painful. For we cease from the one pair at the same time, but not from the other, because they are distinct. How then could the pleasant be the same as the good, or the painful as the evil? Let us look at it in a different way, if you like, for I think that even here you do not agree. But just consider. Do you not call good people by that name because of the presence in them of things good, just as you call beautiful those in whom beauty is present.

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Again, do you call fools or cowards good men? You did not just now, but it was the brave and the wise, or do you not call these good?

Callicles/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ And have you ever seen a silly child enjoying pleasure?

Callicles/ I have.

Socrates/ And never seen a silly man enjoying pleasure?

Callicles/ Yes, I suppose so, but what of it?

Socrates/ Nothing, just answer.

Callicles/ I have seen.

Socrates/ And a sensible man experiencing pain or pleasure?

Callicles/ I have.

Socrates/ And which feels more pain or pleasure, the sensible or the fool?

Callicles/ I do not think there is much difference.

Socrates/ That is quite enough. And have you ever seen a coward in battle?

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, which of the two seemed more to rejoice, when the enemy retreated, the cowards or the brave?

Callicles/ Both equally, I think, or if not, pretty much so.

Socrates/ It makes no difference. At least cowards too feel pleasure?

Callicles/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And fools too, it appears.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is it cowards only or the brave too that feel pain at the enemy's approach?

Callicles/ Both.

Socrates/ To a like degree?

Callicles/ Cowards, perhaps, more.

Socrates/ And they rejoice more at the enemy's retreat?

Callicles/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Then fools and wise, cowards and brave feel pain like degree, as you say, but the coward more so than and pleasure to a the brave?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ But the wise and the brave are good, cowards and fools bad.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the good and the bad feel pleasure and pain to a like degree.

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ Now are the good and the bad good and evil to a similar degree? Or are the bad even better than the good?

Callicles/ Good heavens, I do not understand what you mean.

Socrates/ Do you not understand that according to you the good are good through the presence of good things, and the bad, of evil things, and that—according to you—pleasures are good things, and pains evil?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Then good things, that is, pleasures, are present to those who rejoice, if they rejoice.

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ And is it not through the presence of good things that those who rejoice are good?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Again, evil things, namely pains, are present for those who suffer pain.

Callicles/ They are present.

Socrates/ And it is through the presence of evil things that you claim the evil are evil. Or do you no longer hold to that?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Then those who feel pleasure are good, those who feel pain, bad.

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ More, less, or equally good or bad, according as they feel these things more, less, or equally?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now do you not say that the wise and the fool, the brave and the coward feel pleasure and pain to a like degree, or the coward even to a greater degree?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Then reckon up along with me what is the result of our admissions, for they say that it is good to repeat and examine twice and once again what is good. We say the wise and the brave man is good, do we not?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the fool and coward is bad?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And he who enjoys pleasure is good?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who suffers pain is bad?

Callicles/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And the good and the bad experience pain and pleasure to a like degree. though perhaps the bad even more so.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the evil man becomes just as bad and good as the good man, or even more good. Is not this the result, along with what we said before, if anyone identifies the pleasant and the good? Must not this be so, Callicles?

Callicles/ I have been listening to you for a long time, Socrates, and agreeing with you, as I reflected that, if one concedes something to you even in play, you gladly seize hold of it like a child. Just as if you really think that I or anyone else does not hold some pleasures to be better and others worse!

Socrates/ Ho, ho, Callicles! What a rascal you are, treating me like a child and deceiving me by saying the same things are now thus, now different. And yet I did not think at the beginning that you would willingly deceive me, since you are my friend. But now I have been misled, and apparently, as the old proverb goes, I must make the best of the circumstances and take just what you give me. What you now say, it seems, is that some pleasures are good, and some bad. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are the good ones the profitable, the bad ones the harmful?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the profitable are those that do some good, the harmful some evil?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ Now is this what you mean? Of the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, for instance, that we mentioned just now, are those that produce health in the body or strength or any other bodily excellence, good pleasures, and those that produce the opposite effects bad?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And similarly with pains, some are good, some bad?

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now should we not choose and practice good pleasures and pains?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And not the bad?

Callicles/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Yes, because Polus and I agreed, if you remember, that all our actions should be for the sake of the

good. Do you too share our opinion, that the good is the end of all actions and that everything else should be done for its sake, not the good for the sake of everything else? Do you of the third part add your vote to ours?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Then the pleasant as well as everything else should be done for the sake of the good, not the good for the sake of the pleasant.

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now can any and every man choose which pleasures are good and which bad, or do we need an expert in each case?

Callicles/ We need an expert.

Socrates/ Let us recapitulate then what I was saying to Polus and Gorgias. I said, if you remember, that there are certain processes aiming at pleasure which secure pleasure alone but know nothing of the better and the worse, and others that know what is good and evil. And among those concerned with pleasures I named cookery, which is a routine, not an art, and among those concerned with the good the medical art. And, by the god of friendship, Callicles, do not fancy that you should play with me, and give me no haphazard answers contrary to your opinion. And do not either take what I say as if I were merely playing, for you see the subject of our discussion—and on what subject should even a man of slight intelligence be more serious? —namely, what kind of life one should live, the life to which you invite me, that of a ‘real man,' speaking in the Assembly and practicing rhetoric and playing the politician according to your present fashion, or the life spent in philosophy, and how the one differs from the other. Perhaps then it is best for us, as I endeavored to do just now, to distinguish between them, and after distinguishing and coming to an agreement

together, then, if there are two such lives distinct, to consider in what way they differ from one another and which one should be lived. Now perhaps you do not yet understand what I mean.

Callicles/ Indeed I do not.

Socrates/ Well, I will tell you more clearly. Since you and I have agreed that there is a good and there is a pleasant, and that the pleasant is different from the good, and that there is a method of studying and contriving to acquire each of them, one method for pursuing pleasure, another for pursuing the good—but first of all you must either agree with or reject this statement. Do you agree?

Callicles/ It is as you state.

Socrates/ Then come, tell me that you agree also with what I said to Gorgias and Polus, if you think that after all I spoke the truth then. I said, I believe, that in my opinion cookery differed from medicine in being, not an art, but a routine, pointing out that the other, that is, medicine, has investigated the nature of the subject it treats and the cause of its actions and can give a rational account of each of them, whereas its counterpart, which is exclusively devoted to cultivating pleasure, approaches it in a thoroughly unscientific way, without once having investigated the nature of pleasure or its cause; and without any pretense whatever to reason and practically no effort to classify, it preserves by mere experience and routine a memory of what usually happens, thereby securing its pleasures. Consider then, first of all whether you are satisfied with this statement and whether you believe that there are certain other occupations relating to the soul also—some of them in the nature of arts, exercising forethought for what is best for the soul, others neglecting this but, as in the case of the body, preoccupied entirely with the soul's pleasure, and how it

may be achieved—but as to which pleasures are better or worse, this they have never considered, their sole concern being to gratify these pleasures, whether for better or for worse. For I believe, Callicles, that there are such processes, and behavior of this kind I call flattery, whether it concerns the body or the soul or whatever the object to whose pleasure it ministers without paying any heed to what is better or worse. Do you subscribe to the same opinion with me, or oppose it?

Callicles/ Oh, not I. I agree, in order that the argument may be finished, and to gratify Gorgias here.

Socrates/ And is this true about one soul, but not about two or many?

Callicles/ No, it is true also of two or many.

Socrates/ Is it not possible to gratify large numbers collectively without any consideration for what is best?

Callicles/ I suppose it is.

Socrates/ Can you tell me then which are the occupations that do this? Or rather, if you prefer it, I will ask and wherever an occupation seems to you to belong to this type, say so, wherever it does not, say no. And first let us look at flute playing. Do you not think, Callicles, that it conforms to this type, pursuing our pleasure only, with no thought for anything else?

Callicles/ I think so.

Socrates/ And is it not the same with all such occupations, as for example playing the lyre at contests?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what about the training of choruses and dithyrambic poetry? Do you not think it similar in character? Do you imagine that Cinesias, son of Meles, is in the slightest concerned with saying anything likely to improve

his bearers, or merely what will gratify the mob of spectators?

Callicles/ That is quite obvious, Socrates, at least in the case of Cinesias.

Socrates/ And what about his father, Meles? Do you think he looked to what is for the best, when he sang to his lyre? He did not even look to what is most pleasant, for his audience found his songs most tiresome. But think it over. Do you not consider that all music for the lyre and dithyrambic poetry were invented to give pleasure?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ And what is the aim of that stately and marvelous creature, tragic drama? Is it her endeavor and ambition, in your opinion, merely to gratify the spectators; or, if there be anything pleasant and charming, but evil, to struggle against uttering it, but to declaim and sing anything that is unwelcome but beneficial, whether they like it or not? For which of these two aims do you think tragic poetry is equipped?

Callicles/ It is indeed quite evident, Socrates, that her impulse is rather toward pleasure and the gratification of the spectators.

Socrates/ And did we not just now describe such an activity as flattery?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well now, if you should strip from all poetry its music, rhythm, and meter, the residue would be nothing else but speech?

Callicles/ That must be so.

Socrates/ And these speeches are addressed to a huge mob of people?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then poetry is a kind of public address?

Callicles/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Must it not be a rhetorical public address? Do you not consider that the poets engage in rhetoric in the theaters?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Then we have now discovered a form of rhetoric addressed to a people composed alike of children and women and men, slaves and free—a form which we cannot much admire, for we describe it as a kind of flattery.

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, but what of the rhetoric addressed to the Athenian people and other free peoples in various cities—what does that mean to us? Do the orators seem to you always to speak with an eye to what is best, their sole aim being to render the citizens as perfect as possible by their speeches, or is their impulse also to gratify the citizens, and do they neglect the common good for their personal interest and treat the people like children, attempting only to please them, with no concern whatever whether such conduct makes them better or worse?

Callicles/ This is not a single question you are asking, for some say what they say in the interest of the citizens, but there are others such as you describe.

Socrates/ That is sufficient for me, for even if there are two sides to this, yet one part of it, I suppose, would be flattery and shameful mob appeal, while the other is something fine—the effort to perfect as far as possible the souls of the citizens and the struggle to say always what is best, whether it be welcome or unwelcome to the hearers. But you yourself have never seen rhetoric of this kind, or if you can mention any such orator, why do you not tell me his name at once?

Callicles/ Well, by heaven, I cannot give you the names of any such orators living today.

Socrates/ Why then, can you name anyone of the orators of old, from the time of whose first appearance to address the public, the citizens, who had previously been worse, are said to have been improved? I do not know of any such man.

Callicles/ What, have you never been told that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades, and Pericles who died recently, and whom you have heard speak yourself?

Socrates/ Yes, if what you previously spoke of as virtue is truly so, namely to satisfy to the full your own appetites and those of others, but if this is not so, but, as in our later argument we were compelled to admit, only those desires, the satisfaction of which makes man better, should be indulged, not those which make us worse, and if for this there is a special art—I cannot admit that any of those mentioned satisfied these demands.

Callicles/ Well, if you make good search, you will find one.

Socrates/ Then let us just quietly consider whether any of them had this quality. Well now, the good man who speaks for the best surely will not say what he says at random but with some purpose in view, just as all other craftsmen do not each choose and apply materials to their work at random, but with the view that each of their productions should have a certain form. Look, for example, if you will, at painters, builders, shipwrights, and all other craftsmen—any of them you choose—and see how each one disposes each element he contributes in a fixed order, and compels one to fit and harmonize with the other until he has combined the whole into something well-ordered and regulated. Other craftsmen in general and those we were speaking of just now, who have to do with the body, physical trainers and doctors, give

order, I think, and discipline to the body. Do we admit the truth of this or not?

Callicles/ Let it be granted.

Socrates/ Then harmony and order will make a building good, but disorder bad.

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ Is it not the same too with a ship?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And with our bodies also, we say?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what about the soul? Will it be good if disordered, or rather if it achieves a certain order and discipline?

Callicles/ Here too our previous argument demands that we agree.

Socrates/ Now what is the name of that bodily quality resulting from order and discipline?

Callicles/ Health and strength, I suppose you mean.

Socrates/ I do. And the effect of order and discipline in the soul? Try to discover and name it, as in the other case.

Callicles/ Why do you not name it yourself, Socrates?

Socrates/ Well, if you prefer that, I will do so, and do you, if you think I am right, agree; if not, refute me and do not let me escape. It seems to me that the word healthy is applied to all regularity in the body, and from this come health and general bodily excellence. Is it so or not?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ And the words lawfulness and law are applied to all order and regularity of the soul, whence men become orderly and law-abiding, and this means justice and temperance. Yes or no?

Callicles/ So be it.

Socrates/ And is it not with his eye on these things that our orator, the good and true artist, will bring to bear upon our souls the words he utters and all his actions too, and give any gift he gives, or take away what he takes—his mind always occupied with one thought, how justice may be implanted in the souls of the citizens and injustice banished, and how temperance may be implanted and indiscipline banished, and how goodness in general may be engendered and wickedness depart? Do you agree or not?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ For what benefit is there, Callicles, when a body is sick and distempered, in giving it abundant food and the most delicious drinks or other such things, which, so far from profiting it, will on the contrary, if the truth be told, do it more harm? Is this true?

Callicles/ So be it.

Socrates/ For it is not worthwhile in my opinion for a man to live with a diseased body; in that case he must live a diseased life. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now when a man is well, do not the doctors generally allow him to satisfy his appetites, eating as much as he wishes when hungry or drinking when thirsty, but when he is sick, practically never allow him to take his fill of what he craves? Do you and I agree upon this?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ And is it not the same, my good friend, with the soul? So long as it is evil, senseless and undisciplined and unjust and impious, it should be restrained from its desires and suffered to do nothing but what will improve it. Do you agree or not?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ For thus, I suppose, it will be better for the soul itself.

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And to restrain it from its desires is to discipline it?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then to be disciplined is better for the soul than indiscipline, which you preferred just now.

Callicles/ I do not know what you are talking about, Socrates; ask someone else.

Socrates/ This fellow will not put up with being improved and experiencing the very treatment now under discussion, the process of discipline.

Callicles/ No, for I have not the slightest interest in what you are saying. I answered you only to gratify Gorgias.

Socrates/ Well, what shall we do then? Break off our discussion in the middle?

Callicles/ You may decide for yourself.

Socrates/ Well, they say it is not right to leave even tales unfinished, but we should fit a head on them, that they may not go about headless. Give us the rest of the answers then, that our discussion may acquire a head.

Callicles/ How importunate you are, Socrates; if you will listen to me, you will bid good-by to this argument, or else debate with somebody else.

Socrates/ Then who else is willing? You know, we must not leave the discussion incomplete.

Callicles/ Could you not carry it through alone, either speaking on your own or answering your own questions?

Socrates/ Just to fulfill the saying of Epicharmus—and prove competent alone for what ‘ere now two men said'? But

it seems as if it must be done that way. However, if we are to do this, I think we should all be contentiously eager to know what is true and what false in the subject under discussion, for it is a common benefit that this be revealed to all alike. I will then carry the argument through in accordance with my own ideas, and if any of you believe that what I admit to myself is not the truth, you must break in upon it and refute me. For I do not speak with any pretense to knowledge, but am searching along with you, and so if there appears to be anything in what my opponent says, I shall be the first to yield to him. But I say this only if you think the debate should be carried through to the end. If you do not wish it, let us drop it now and take our departure.

Gorgias/ Well. I do not think, Socrates, that we ought yet to depart, but you should carry through the discussion, and I think the others too agree with me. I myself am anxious to hear you go through what remains.

Socrates/ I myself too, Gorgias, would have liked to continue the argument with Callicles here, until I had paid him back with the speech of Amphion in reply to that of Zethus. But since you are unwilling, Callicles, to help me finish the argument, you can at least listen and interrupt if at any point you think I am wrong. And if you refute me, I shall not be vexed with you as you are with me, but you shall be enrolled as the greatest of my benefactors.

Callicles/ Go on alone, my dear sir, and finish the argument.

Socrates/ Then listen, but first let me recapitulate the argument from the beginning.

Are the pleasant and the good identical? They are not, as Callicles and I agreed. Should the pleasant be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant for the sake of the good. And is the pleasant

that at whose presence we are pleased, the good that whose presence makes us good? Certainly. But the goodness of ourselves and of all other good things is due to the presence of some excellence? That seems necessarily true, Callicles. But surely the goodness of anything, whether implement or body or soul or any living thing, does not best come to it merely by haphazard, but through a certain rightness and order and through the art that is assigned to each of them. Is this so? I certainly agree. Then the goodness of anything is due to order and arrangement? I should agree. It is then the presence in each thing of the order appropriate to it that makes everything good? So it appears to me. The soul then that has its own appropriate order is better than that which has none? Necessarily. But further, the soul possessed of order is orderly? Of course. And the orderly is the temperate? Most necessarily. Then the temperate soul is the good. I myself can offer no objection to this, my dear Callicles, but if you can, please instruct me.

Callicles/ Go on, my good sir.

Socrates/ I assert then that, if the temperate soul is good, then the soul in the opposite condition to the temperate is evil, and this, we saw, was the foolish and undisciplined. Certainly. Moreover the sound-minded man would do his duty by gods and men, for he would not be sound of mind if he did what was unfitting. That must necessarily be so. And doing his duty by men, he would be acting justly, and doing it by the gods, piously, and the doer of just and pious deeds must be just and pious. That is so. And further, he must be brave, for it is not the part of a man of sound mind to pursue or avoid what he should not, but to pursue or avoid what he should, whether it be things, or people, or pleasures, or pains, and to stand his ground, where duty bids, and remain steadfast. So there is every necessity, Callicles, that the sound-minded and temperate man, being, as we have

demonstrated, just and brave and pious, must be completely good, and the good man must do well and finely whatever he does, and he who does well must be happy and blessed, while the evil man who does ill must be wretched, and he would be the opposite of the temperate man, the undisciplined creature of whom you approve.

This then is the position I take, and I affirm it to be true, and if it is true, then the man who wishes to be happy must, it seems, pursue and practice temperance, and each of us must flee from indiscipline with all the speed in his power and contrive, preferably to have no need of being disciplined, but if he or any of his friends, whether individual or city, has need of it, then he must suffer punishment and be disciplined, if he is to be happy. This I consider to be the mark to which a man should look throughout his life, and all his own endeavors and those of his city he should devote to the single purpose of so acting that justice and temperance shall dwell in him who is to be truly blessed. He should not suffer his appetites to be undisciplined and endeavor to satisfy them by leading the life of a brigand—a mischief without end. For such a man could be dear neither to any other man nor to God, since he is incapable of fellowship, and where there is no fellowship, friendship cannot be. Wise men, Callicles, say that the heavens and the earth, gods and men, are bound together by fellowship and friendship, and order and temperance and justice, and for this reason they call the sum of things the ‘ordered' universe, my friend, not the world of disorder or riot. But it seems to me that you pay no attention to these things in spite of your wisdom, but you are unaware that geometric equality is of great importance among gods and men alike, and you think we should practice overreaching others, for you neglect geometry. Well, either we must refute this argument and prove that happiness does not come to the happy through

the possession of justice and temperance, nor does misery come through the possession of wickedness, or, if my argument is true, we must consider the consequences. And the consequences are all those previously mentioned, about which you asked me, Callicles, if I was speaking seriously when I said that a man should accuse himself and his son and his friend, if guilty of any wrong deed, and should employ rhetoric for this purpose, and what you thought Polus admitted through a sense of shame is true after all—that it is as much more evil as it is more shameful to do than to suffer wrong, and he who is to become a rhetorician in the right way must after all be a just man with a knowledge of what is just—an admission which Gorgias in turn made, according to Polus, through a sense of shame.

This being so, let us consider whether or not you spoke aright in your reproaches to me, when you said that I am not able to help myself or any of my friends and relations, or to save them from the gravest perils, but like outlawed men am at the mercy of anyone, whether he wishes to box my ears, as you so forcefully expressed it, or rob me of my money, or drive me out of the city, or, worst of all, put me to death, and, according to your view, to be in this plight is of all things the most shameful. But as to my own view, though it has often been expressed already, there is no harm in my expressing it once more. I maintain, Callicles, that it is not the most shameful of things to be wrongfully boxed on the ears, nor again to have either my purse or my person cut, but it is both more disgraceful and more wicked to strike or to cut me or what is mine wrongfully, and, further, theft and kidnapping and burglary and in a word any wrong done to me and mine is at once more shameful and worse for the wrongdoer than for me the sufferer. These facts, which were shown to be as I state them some time earlier in our previous discussion, are buckled fast and clamped together—to put it

somewhat crudely—by arguments of steel and adamant—at least so it would appear as matters stand. And unless you or one still more enterprising than yourself can undo them, it is impossible to speak aright except as I am now speaking. For what I say is always the same—that I know not the truth in these affairs, but I do know that of all whom I have ever met either before or now no one who put forward another view has failed to appear ridiculous. And so once more I hold these things to be so, and if they are, and if injustice is the greatest of evils to the wrongdoer and, greatest though it be, it is an even greater evil, if that be possible, to escape punishment when one does wrong, what is that help, the failure to avail himself of which makes a man in very truth ridiculous? Is it not that which will avert from us the greatest harm? This must surely be the help which it is most shameful to be unable to render to oneself and one's friends and relations, and next to this the second most shameful, and after that the third and so with the rest; as is the magnitude of the evil in each case, so too will be the beauty of being able to help oneself to meet such evil and the shame of being unable. Am I right or wrong, Callicles?

Callicles/ You are right.

Socrates/ Of these two then, inflicting and suffering wrong, we say it is a greater evil to inflict it, a lesser to suffer it. Now what provision should a man make for helping himself, so as to achieve both these benefits, that of doing and that of suffering no wrong? Is it a matter of power or of will? What I mean is this. Can a man avoid being wronged if it be his will to avoid it, or only if he acquire power to avoid it?

Callicles/ That is quite evident; he must acquire the power.

Socrates/ And what about doing wrong? Is it quite enough if he does not choose to do wrong—for then he will not do it—or must he equip himself here also with a certain power and an art on the ground that, if he does not learn and practice this, he will do wrong? Why will you not answer me this very question, Callicles—whether you think that Polus and I were or were not rightly compelled in our previous argument to agree in admitting that no one voluntarily does wrong, but that all who do wrong do so against their own will?

Callicles/ Let it be so, Socrates, that you may conclude the argument.

Socrates/ Then it is also for the purpose of avoiding wrongdoing that we must equip ourselves with a certain power and art.

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now what is the art of contriving to suffer no wrong or as little as possible? See whether you agree with my opinion, which is this. You must either be yourself the ruling power or even a tyrant in your city, or else a partisan of the government in power.

Callicles/ You see, Socrates, that I am ready to applaud you, if you speak aright, and now I think you have said something really excellent.

Socrates/ Well, consider whether you think I am right in this point too. The closest friendships, I believe, exist, as the sages of old tell us, between like and like. Do you not agree?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Now where a tyrant is in power who is savage and illiterate, if there should be anyone in his city far better than himself, the tyrant, I presume, would be afraid of him, and the man could never in his heart of hearts be the tyrant's true friend.

Callicles/ That is so.

Socrates/ Nor could one who was much the tyrant's inferior, for the tyrant would despise him and would never feel for him the warmth of a friend.

Callicles/ That also is true.

Socrates/ There remains then only one person as a friend worth reckoning to such a man, namely one of the same character, who agrees with his tastes and dislikes, and is willing to be subject and subservient to the ruler. And he will have great power in the state, and no one will wrong him with impunity. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then if any of the young men in this city should ponder how he might win great power and none could wrong him, this, it seems, is the path for him, to accustom himself from childhood to feel pleasure and annoyance at the same things as his master, and to contrive to be as like him as possible. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now according to your theory he will thus have contrived to suffer no wrong and to possess great power in the state.

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And to do no wrong as well? Or is this far from being the case, if he is to resemble a master who is evil and to possess great influence with him? No, I think that, quite the contrary, he will thus prepare himself to be able to do the greatest possible wrong and to escape punishment for doing it. Will he not?

Callicles/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then the greatest possible evil will dwell in him, for he will be depraved of soul and ruined through his imitation of his master, and through his power.

Callicles/ Somehow or other you keep twisting our arguments this way and that, Socrates. Do you not realize that this imitator of the tyrant will, if he so wishes, put to death the man who refuses to imitate him, or will deprive him of his property?

Socrates/ I know, my good sir, if I am not deaf, for I have heard it often enough from you and Polus recently, and from practically everyone else in the city. But I tell you in turn that though he may kill the other, if he wishes, it will be a villain murdering a good and worthy man.

Callicles/ Is not this the very feature that fills one with indignation?

Socrates/ Not if you are a sensible person, as the argument proves. Or do you imagine that one should bend his efforts to living as long as possible and practice those arts that constantly save us from dangers, such as the rhetoric you bid me practice, which preserves one's life in the law courts?

Callicles/ Yes, by heaven, and it was good advice too.

Socrates/ What now, my good friend? Do you consider the art of swimming to be something particularly wonderful?

Callicles/ No indeed, not I.

Socrates/ And yet even that art saves men from death whenever they fall into some situation where such knowledge is needed. But if this seems to you insignificant, I can tell you of one greater than this, the pilot's art which, like rhetoric, saves not only our lives but also our bodies and our goods from the gravest dangers. And this art is unpretentious and orderly, and does not put on airs or make believe that its accomplishments are astonishing. But, in

return for the same results as those achieved by the advocate, if it brings you here safely from Aegina, it asks but two obols, and if from Egypt or the Black Sea, for this mighty service of bringing home safely all that I mentioned just now, oneself and children and goods and womenfolk and disembarking them in the harbor, it asks two drachmas at the most, and the man who possesses this art and achieves these results goes ashore and walks alongside his ship with modest bearing. For I suppose he is capable of reflecting that it is uncertain which of his passengers he has benefited and which he has harmed by not suffering them to be drowned, knowing as he does that those he has landed are in no way better than when they embarked, either in body or in soul. He knows that if anyone afflicted in the body with serious and incurable diseases has escaped drowning the man is wretched for not having died and has received no benefit from him; he therefore reckons that if any man suffers many incurable diseases in the soul, which is so much more precious than the body, for such a man life is not worthwhile and it will be no benefit to him if he, the pilot, saves him from the sea or from the law court or from any other risk. For he knows it is not better for an evil man to live, for he must needs live ill. This is why the pilot is not accustomed to give himself airs, even though he saves us; no, my strange friend, nor the engineer either, who at times has no less power to save life than the general or anyone else, not to mention the pilot, for at times he preserves entire cities. Do you place him in the same class as the advocate? And yet if he were inclined to speak as you people do, Callicles, making much of his services, he would bury us under the weight of his arguments, urging and exhorting us on the necessity of becoming engineers, since all other professions are valueless, for he can make a good case for himself. But you disdain him and his craft nonetheless, and would call him

‘engineer' as a term of reproach, and you would never be willing to give your daughter to his son or to take his daughter yourself. And yet if we look at the reasons for which you praise your own accomplishments, what just cause have you for disdaining the engineer and the others I mentioned just now? I know you would say you are a better man and of better family. But if by ‘better' you do not mean what I do, but goodness consists merely in saving oneself and one's property, whatever one's character, it is ridiculous to find fault with the engineer and the doctor and the other crafts devised for the purpose of giving safety. But, my good sir, just reflect whether what is good and noble is not something more than saving and being saved. Perhaps the true man should ignore this question of living for a certain span of years and should not be so enamored of life, but should leave these things to God and, trusting the womenfolk who say that no man whatever could escape his destiny, should consider the ensuing question—in what way one can best live the life that is to be his, whether by assimilating himself to the type of government under which he lives—so that now, after all, you must become as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you are to be dear to them and wield great power in the city. Consider, my good friend, whether this is of benefit to you and to me, so that we may not suffer what they say is the fate of the Thessalian witches who draw down the moon from heaven, and find that our choice of such power in the city means the sacrifice of what is dearest to us. But if you imagine that anyone in the world will deliver to you an art which will win you great power in the city, unless either for better or for worse you resemble its government, then in my opinion you are mistaken, Callicles. You must not be a mere imitator, but must bear a natural resemblance, if you are to effect a genuine friendship with the Athenian demos, yes, and, by heaven, the Demos of

Pyrilampes as well. So whoever makes you most resemble these, will make of you the kind of statesman and rhetorician you desire to be, for each takes pleasure in the words that appeal to his own character, but dislikes those that appeal to another's—unless you have any objections to offer, dear heart. What do you say in answer to this, Callicles?

Callicles/ It seems to me, I know not how, that you are right, Socrates, but I feel as the many do. I am not quite convinced by you.

Socrates/ That is because the love of demos dwells in your soul, Callicles, and resists me, but if perchance we investigate these same problems better, you will be persuaded. Remember at least that we said there were two processes that aim in each case at tending body and soul, one that makes pleasure the end of its association, the other, what is best, this latter not indulging in pleasure but battling against it. Are not these the distinctions we made at the time?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now the one of these, that aims at pleasure, is ignoble and just nothing but flattery, is it not so?

Callicles/ So be it, if you wish.

Socrates/ But the aim of the other is that what we tend, whether it happen to be body or soul, shall be as perfect as possible.

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Should we not then take in hand the tending of the city and its citizens with the aim of making the citizens themselves as good as possible? For, as we discovered previously, without this there is no use in rendering any other kindly service, unless, that is to say, the thoughts of those who are to obtain much money and sovereignty or any

other power whatever are good and noble. Are we to say my view is right?

Callicles/ Certainly, if it pleases you.

Socrates/ If then when we contemplated some public undertaking for the state, we were to enlist each other's aid in a task of building, the construction perhaps of important buildings such as walls or dockyards or temples, ought we not to look to ourselves and examine ourselves, to discover first of all whether or not we are experts in the art of building, and from whom we learned it? Ought we to or not?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And then again, secondly, whether we have ever erected a building previously for one of our friends or for ourselves, and whether this building is beautiful or ugly, and if on review we discovered that we had had good and distinguished teachers and that with these teachers we had erected many fine buildings, and then also many on our own account when we had finished with our teachers—if this were our position, we might, as sensible men, aspire to public works, but if we had no master to point to, and either no buildings whatever or many worthless ones, then it would surely be folly to undertake public works and to invite each other thereto. Shall we admit that this is true or not?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So too in every other case. If, for example, we had aspired to public practice and encouraged each other thereto as competent physicians, we would surely have made mutual investigation of each other, and you would have asked, Let me see, in heaven's name, how about Socrates himself in the matter of bodily health? Or has anybody else, slave or free, ever been cured of sickness by Socrates? And I, too, I fancy, should have made the same inquiries about you, and if we could find no one, whether

citizen or stranger, man or woman, whose bodily health has been improved by our means, then surely, Callicles, it would be ridiculous for anyone, before practicing in private often with indifferent results, and often with success, and achieving sufficient experience in the profession, to begin, as the saying goes, his apprenticeship in pottery upon a large vessel, to aspire himself to public practice, and encourage others to do the same. Do you not consider such behavior folly?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ And now, my best of friends, since you are just beginning to enter public life and invite me also and reproach me for not doing so, shall we not examine each other and ask, Come now, has Callicles ever yet improved any of the citizens? Is there any man who previously was evil, unjust, undisciplined, and senseless, and through Callicles has become an upright and worthy man, be he stranger or citizen, slave or free?

Tell me, if anyone should examine you on these points, Callicles, what will you say? What man will you claim to have improved by your company? Do not hesitate, before you aspire to a public career, to answer if you can point to any such achievement of yours as a private citizen.

Callicles/ You are contentious, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is not contentiousness that makes me ask, but a true desire to know what you consider the right standard of public life in our city. Or when you embark upon a public career, pray will you concern yourself with anything else than how we citizens can be made as good as possible? Have we not many times already agreed that this should be the task of a statesman? Have we acknowledged it or not? Answer me. We have; I shall answer on your behalf. If then the good man ought to contrive this for his own city, carry

your mind back to those men of whom you spoke a little earlier, and tell me whether you still think they proved themselves good citizens Pericles and Cimon and Miltiades and Themistocles.

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Then if they were good, obviously each of them made better citizens of those who were worse before. Did he do this or not?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ So when Pericles began to speak before the people, the Athenians were worse than when he spoke for the last time?

Callicles/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ There can be no ‘perhaps' about it, my good friend; it must be so from what we have admitted, if he was really a good citizen.

Callicles/ Well, what then?

Socrates/ Nothing, but tell me next whether the Athenians are said to have been improved by means of Pericles or, quite the contrary, to have been corrupted by him. For I am told that Pericles made the Athenians idle and cowardly and talkative and covetous, because he was the first to establish pay for service among them.

Callicles/ You hear this, Socrates, from the gentlemen with battered ears.

Socrates/ Well, this at least is not a matter of hearsay, but you know it as well as I do, that Pericles enjoyed a good reputation at first and was never convicted on any disgraceful charge by the Athenians, when they were worse. But when he had made good and worthy citizens of them, at the end of his life, he was convicted of theft by them and

narrowly escaped a death sentence, obviously because they held him an evil man.

Callicles/ Well, what about it? Does that make Pericles a villain?

Socrates/ At any rate one who tended asses or horses or cattle would be considered bad if he showed a similar character—if when he assumed charge they did not kick or butt or bite him, but he made them wild enough to do all these things. Or do you not consider any man a poor trainer of any animal whatever, if they are tame when he takes them over, but he makes them wilder than when he assumed charge? Do you agree or not?

Callicles/ Certainly, to please you.

Socrates/ Then please me still further by answering this. Is a man a member of the animal kingdom or not?

Callicles/ Of course he is.

Socrates/ And was it not men of whom Pericles assumed charge?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then ought he not, as we agreed just now, to have made them more just rather than more unjust, if indeed he was a good statesman when he was in charge of them?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now just men are gentle according to Homer. But what do you say? Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But Pericles made them wilder than when he assumed charge of them, and toward himself too, the last person he would have wished to suffer.

Callicles/ Do you want me to agree with you?

Socrates/ If you think I am telling the truth.

Callicles/ Then let it be granted.

Socrates/ And if wilder, more unjust and worse?

Callicles/ Granted.

Socrates/ Then Pericles was no good statesman by this account.

Callicles/ So you say.

Socrates/ Yes, and by what you yourself admit. Tell me about Cimon too in turn. Did not those whom he served ostracize him, that they might not hear his voice for ten years? And Themistocles they treated in the same way and in addition punished him by banishment. And Miltiades, the victor of Marathon, they voted to throw into the pit, and he would have suffered this fate but for the president of the Council. And yet if, as you say, these had been good men, they would never have been so treated. It is not true at any rate that, while good charioteers are not thrown from their chariots in their first contests, they are thrown later, when they have trained their horses and have themselves become better drivers. This is not the case in chariot racing or in any other activity, or do you think it is?

Callicles/ No, not I.

Socrates/ Then, after all, it seems, our previous statement was true, that we do not know of any man who has proved a good statesman in this city. You admitted that there are none of the present day, but claimed some of days gone by, and chose the men just now mentioned, but they have proved to be on a level with those of our time, and so, if they were orators, they did not employ the true rhetoric—else they would not have been driven out—nor the rhetoric of flattery either.

Callicles/ But, Socrates, men of our day are far indeed from having achieved what was accomplished by any you like to name among those others.

Socrates/ My good friend, I too find no fault with them, at least as servants of the city; in fact I consider they were more successful servants than those of today and better able to provide the city with what she desired. But as to giving those desires a different direction instead of allowing them free scope, by persuading and compelling citizens to adopt courses that would improve them—why, therein they were practically in no way superior to the statesmen of today, though this is the only true office of a good citizen. I too agree with you that they were more clever than their successors in providing ships and walls and dockyards and many other such things.

Now you and I are behaving absurdly in this discussion, for throughout the time of our argument we have never ceased returning in circles to the same point in a constant failure to understand each other's meaning. I at least consider you have admitted time and again and realize that we are concerned with a twofold activity related to both body and soul, and that one of these is menial and by it can be provided food, if our bodies are hungry; drink, if they are thirsty; and if they are cold, clothing, bedding, shoes, or anything else that our bodies come to desire—I purposely use the same images, that you may the more quickly understand. For it is no wonder that a purveyor of these things, whether huckster, merchant, or manufacturer of any of them—baker or cook or weaver or cobbler or tanner—should because of his character appear both to himself and to others a true minister to the body—to everyone, that is, who does not know that there is above and beyond all these an art of gymnastics and of medicine, which is the genuine ministry to the body and should properly control all these crafts and employ their products, because it alone knows, while all the others know not, what food or drink is good or bad for the health of the body. And for this reason, while

these other crafts are servile and menial and illiberal in their concern with the body, gymnastics and medicine are by rights their masters. Now when I tell you that the same holds good of the soul, at one time you appear to understand, and you agree as though you grasped my meaning, but a little later you proceed to say that there have been upright and worthy citizens in our state. And when I ask you their names, you seem to put forward the same types in the field of politics as if, when I asked you who in the realm of gymnastics had been or now were good trainers of the body, you should answer with the utmost seriousness, Thearion, the baker, and Mithaecus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery book, and Sarambus, the tavern keeper—for these have proved of wonderful service to the body, the one providing bread, the second dainties, the third wine of marvelous quality. Now perhaps you would be annoyed if I said to you, Fellow, you know nothing about gymnastics. You talk to me of servants who cater to our desires but have no fine or sound views about them, men who, if it so chances, will gorge and fatten men's bodies and win their praises for it, but will finally rob them of what flesh they had before. And their victims in turn, in their ignorance, will not blame for their maladies and for the loss of their original flesh those who feasted them, but any who may happen at the time to be present and give them any advice when the surfeit of the past has some time later brought sickness upon them, because it disregarded the rules of health—these they will blame and abuse and injure, if they can, while they praise the others who were responsible for their troubles.

And you are now doing much the same thing as this, Callicles. You praise those who have banqueted our citizens with all the dainties they desire. And men say it is these who have made our city great, never realizing that it is swollen and festering through these statesmen of old. For they have

paid no heed to discipline and justice, but have filled our city with harbors and dockyards and walls and revenues and similar rubbish, and so, when the crisis of her infirmity comes, they will hold their present advisers responsible and will sing the praises of Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who caused their misfortunes. And if you are not on your guard, they may perhaps lay hands on you and on my friend Alcibiades, when they have lost what they once owned in addition to what they have since acquired, though you are not the authors, but perhaps the collaborators, in their troubles. And yet there is a ridiculous thing that I see taking place today and hear took place with regard to their statesmen of old. I notice that, whenever the city treats any of its statesmen as wrongdoers, they are indignant and violently protest that they are shockingly treated; so, after doing the city many services, they are now being unjustly ruined by her, according to their story. But all this is a fabrication. For there is never a ruler of a city who would unjustly be ruined by the very city he ruled. Conditions, it seems, are much the same for those who pretend to be statesmen and for Sophists. Your Sophists, wise as they are in other matters, are in one point guilty of absurd behavior, for they claim to be teachers of goodness, yet they often accuse their pupils of wronging them by withholding their fees and showing no gratitude either for benefits received from them.

And what could be more illogical than this claim that men who have become good and just, men who have been stripped of injustice by their teacher and have acquired righteousness, should act unjustly by means of an injustice which does not dwell in them? Does not this seem absurd to you, my friend? You really have compelled me to play the orator, Callicles, by refusing to answer.

Callicles/ You could not speak, I suppose, if there were not somebody to answer you.

Socrates/ Apparently I can; at least I am making quite lengthy speeches, since you will not reply to me. But, my good sir, in friendship's name, tell me, does it not seem ridiculous, when you claim to have made a man good, to find fault with him because, though you have made him good and he still is, yet he remains wicked?

Callicles/ It seems so to me.

Socrates/ But do you not hear such language from those who claim to educate men in goodness?

Callicles/ I do, but why speak about worthless people?

Socrates/ But what would you say about those who pretend to govern the city and see to it that she be as good as possible, and then, when occasion serves, accuse her of being most evil? Do you think they are in any way different from those others? Sophist and orator, my good sir, are the same thing, or pretty nearly so, as I said to Polus. But you through ignorance consider the one thing, rhetoric, to be something very fine, and despise the other. In actual fact sophistic is better than rhetoric to the extent that legislation is finer than the administration of justice or gymnastics than medicine. But I always thought myself that political orators and Sophists alone were not entitled to find fault with what received their training for wicked behavior toward them; otherwise the very words they utter are at the same time a condemnation of themselves for having done no good to those whom they claim to benefit. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And further, if their claims were true, they alone, it seems, were at liberty to give their good services freely without pay. For a man who received any other benefit—swiftness of foot, for instance, through a trainer—

might perhaps deny the trainer his due recompense, if he had given him instruction freely without any agreement that he should receive his fee as nearly as possible at the time when he had taught his pupil to be swift-footed. For acts of injustice are due, I suppose, not to slowness of foot, but to injustice. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then if an instructor eliminates this one quality of injustice, there is no danger of his suffering from it, but for him alone is it safe to bestow this kind of service, if in reality a man could make others good. Is this not true?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ For this reason then, there is no disgrace in taking money for giving other advice, about building, for instance, and the other arts.

Callicles/ So it seems, at least.

Socrates/ But when it is a question of how one may become as good as possible and best administer his own home or his city, it is considered disgraceful to refuse advice unless one is paid for it. Is it not so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ The reason obviously is that this is the only kind of service which makes its recipient eager to make a like return, so that it is thought to be a good sign when one who has rendered such a kindness receives a like return; but if he does not, it is not so. Is this the truth of the matter?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ Then distinguish for me what kind of care for the city you recommend to me, that of doing battle with the Athenians, like a doctor, to make them as good as possible, or to serve and minister to their pleasures? Tell me the truth, Callicles, for it is only fair that, as you spoke your mind

frankly to me at first, you should continue to say what you think. And so speak up truly and bravely now.

Callicles/ I say then, to serve and minister.

Socrates/ Then you invite me, my noble friend, to play the flatterer?

Callicles/ Yes, if you prefer the most offensive term, for if you do not—

Socrates/ Please do not say what you have said so often—that anyone who wishes will slay me, only for me to repeat in turn that then a villain will slay a good man, nor that anyone will rob me of anything I possess, only for me to repeat that, once he has robbed me, he will not know what to do with his spoil, but even as he robbed me unjustly, so too he will make an unjust use of it, and if unjust, shameful, and if shameful, wicked.

Callicles/ How confident you seem, Socrates, that you can never experience any of these troubles whatever, as if you dwelt apart and could never be haled into court by, it may be, some utterly mean and vile creature.

Socrates/ Then I must indeed be a senseless person, Callicles, if I do not think that in this city anything whatever may happen to anybody. But this at least I know well, that if I am brought into court to face any such danger as you mention, it will be an evil man who prosecutes me—for no good man would drag a guiltless person into court—and it would not be surprising if I were put to death. Would you like me to tell you why I expect this?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I think that I am one of very few Athenians, not to say the only one, engaged in the true political art, and that of the men of today I alone practice statesmanship. Since therefore when I speak on any occasion it is not with a view to winning favor, but I aim at what is best, not what is most

pleasant, and since I am unwilling to engage in those ‘dainty devices' that you recommend, I shall have nothing to say for myself when in court. And the same figure occurs to me that I used to Polus. My trial will be like that of a doctor prosecuted by a cook before a jury of children. Just consider what kind of defense such a man could offer in such a predicament, if the plaintiff should accuse him in these terms : Children of the jury, this fellow has done all of you abundant harm, and the youngest among you he is ruining by surgery and cautery, and he bewilders you by starving and choking you, giving you bitter draughts and compelling you to hunger and thirst, whereas I used to feast you with plenty of sweetmeats of every kind.

What do you think a doctor could find to say in such a desperate situation? If he spoke the truth and said, All this I did, children, in the interests of health, what a shout do you think such a jury would utter? Would it not be a loud one?

Callicles/ Perhaps; one must suppose so.

Socrates/ Do you not think he would be utterly baffled as to what to say?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, I too know that my experience would be similar, if I were brought into court. For I shall not be able to tell them of pleasures that I have purveyed—pleasures which *they* hold to be benefits and services, but I can envy neither those who purvey them nor those for whom they are provided. And if anyone claims either that I corrupt the young by bewildering them or that I abuse the older in bitter terms either in private or public, I shall neither be able to tell the truth and claim that I am right in saying all that I do and that it is your interests I am serving in this, gentlemen

of the jury, nor shall I be able to say anything else, and so perhaps anything whatever may happen to me.

Callicles/ Do you think then, Socrates, that all is well with a man who is in this plight and is unable to help himself in his own country?

Socrates/ Yes, if he should possess that one means of help which you have so often acknowledged; if he has helped himself by doing no wrong in word or deed either to gods or to men, for this we have often admitted to be the best of all aids to oneself. Now if anyone should convict me of being unable to render this aid to myself or another, I should feel ashamed, whether I was convicted before many or few or man to man, and I should be vexed if I had to die through lack of such power as this. But if I should meet my death owing to a deficiency of flattering rhetoric, I am confident you would find me taking my death calmly. For no one who is not utterly irrational and cowardly is afraid of the mere act of dying; it is evil-doing that he fears. For to arrive in the other world with a soul surcharged with many wicked deeds is the worst of all evils. And if you like, I am ready to tell you a tale which will prove that this is so.

Callicles/ Well, since you have finished all else, you may finish this too.

Socrates/ Give ear then, as they say, to a very fine story, which you, I suppose, will consider fiction, but I consider fact, for what I am going to tell you I shall recount as the actual truth. As Homer says, Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided their kingdom among themselves after inheriting it from their father. Now in the days of Cronus there was this law about mankind, which from then till now has prevailed among the gods, that the man who has led a godly and righteous life departs after death to the Isles of the Blessed and there, lives in all happiness exempt from ill, but the

godless and unrighteous man departs to the prison of vengeance and punishment which they call Tartarus. And in the days of Cronus and even when Zeus was but lately come to power, living men rendered judgment on the living, pronouncing sentence on the very day on which these were to die, and so the verdicts were not well given. Accordingly, Pluto and the stewards from the Isles of the Blessed came and told Zeus that the wrong people were going to both places. Then Zeus said, 'Well, I will put a stop to that. Cases are judged badly now,' said he, 'because those who are tried come to judgment with their clothes on, for they are still alive when judged. And therefore many,' said he, 'who possessed evil souls are invested with fine bodies and lineage and wealth, and when the trial takes place, many witnesses come forward to testify that they have lived righteous lives. So the judges are dazzled by these, and at the same time they are clothed themselves when they give sentence, their eyes, their ears, and their whole bodies acting as a screen before their souls. They have all these hindrances before them, both their own clothing and that of those on trial. First of all then,' said he, 'men must be stopped from foreknowing their deaths, for now they have knowledge beforehand. Prometheus has already been told to stop this foreknowledge. Next they must be stripped naked of all these things before trial, for they must be judged after death. And the judge must be naked too and dead, scanning with his soul itself the souls of all immediately after death, deprived of all his kinsmen and with all that fine attire of his left on earth, that his verdict may be just. Now I had realized all this before you, and I have appointed sons of mine as judges, two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one, Aeacus, from Europe. And when these are dead, they will hold court in the meadow, at the crossroads from which two paths lead, one to the Isles of the Blessed, the other to Tartarus. And

Rhadamanthus will judge those who come from Asia, Aeacus those from Europe, and to Minos I will grant the privileges of court of appeal, if the other two are in doubt, so that the judgment about which path men take may be as just as possible.'

This is what I have heard, Callicles, and I believe it to be true, and from this story I infer the following conclusion. Death, in my opinion, is nothing else but the separation from each other of two things, soul and body, and when therefore they are separated from one another, each of them retains pretty much the same condition as when the man was alive, the body retaining its own nature, with all the marks of treatment or experience plainly visible. For instance if a man's body was large either by nature or through diet or through both causes while he was alive, after death too his corpse will be large, and if fat when living then fat too after death, and so on, and if again he habitually wore his hair long, his corpse too will be long-haired. And further if a man was a jailbird and bore traces of the blows he received when living, in the form of scars on his body inflicted by the lash or from other wounds, you may see the same marks on his body after death too, or if any of his limbs were broken or distorted in his lifetime, the same things are evident in death. And, in a word, of the physical characteristics acquired in life all or the greater part are visible for some time after death. And so I believe that the same thing is true of the soul, Callicles; once it has been stripped of the body, everything in the soul is manifest—its natural characteristics and the experiences which a man's soul has encountered through occupations of various kinds. When therefore they arrive before their judge—those from Asia before Rhadamanthus—he halts them and scans the soul of each, quite unaware whose it is, but he will often lay hold of the Great King or any other king or potentate and see that

there is no sign of health in his soul but that it is torn to ribbons by the scourge and full of scars due to perjuries and crime—the marks branded on the soul by every evil deed—and that everything is crooked through falsehood and imposture, and nothing straight because it has been reared a stranger to truth. And he sees that owing to the license and luxury and presumption and incontinence of its actions the soul is surcharged with disproportion and ugliness, and seeing this he sends it away in ignominy straight to the prison house, where it is doomed on its arrival to endure the sufferings proper to it. And it is proper for everyone who suffers a punishment rightly inflicted by another that he should either be improved and benefited thereby or become a warning to the rest, in order that they may be afraid when they see him suffering what he does and may become better men. Now, those who are benefited through suffering punishment by gods and men are beings whose evil deeds are curable; nevertheless it is from pain and agony that they derive their benefit both here and in the other world, for it is impossible to be rid of evil otherwise. But those who have been guilty of the most heinous crimes and whose misdeeds are past cure—of these warnings are made, and they are no longer capable themselves of receiving any benefit, because they are incurable—but others are benefited who behold them suffering throughout eternity the greatest and most excruciating and terrifying tortures because of their misdeeds, literally suspended as examples there in the prison house in Hades, a spectacle and a warning to any evildoers who from time to time arrive. And one of these, I maintain, is Archelaus, if Polus tells us the truth, and any other tyrant too of like character, and I think that most of these warning examples are chosen from tyrants and kings and potentates and politicians, for these, owing to the

license they enjoy, are guilty of the greatest and most impious crimes.

Now Homer bears me out in this, for he has represented as those who suffer eternal punishment in Hades kings and princes, Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus, but Thersites or any other private person who did wrong has by no one been represented as afflicted with cruel punishment because incurable, for I suppose he had not the power, and therefore was happier than those who had. But, Callicles, it is among the most powerful that you find the superlatively wicked. Still there is nothing to prevent good men from finding a place even among the powerful, and those who do so are deserving of special admiration, for it is difficult, Callicles, and most praiseworthy to pass through life in righteousness when you have every license to do wrong. But men of this kind are few, though both in Athens and elsewhere there have been and, I fancy, will yet be honorable men and true, who possess the virtue of managing justly whatever is entrusted to them, and one of these won great renown even among the rest of the Greeks, Aristides, son of Lysimachus, but most of those in power, my good friend, prove evil.

As I said then, whenever Rhadamanthus receives one of these, he knows nothing else about him, his name or origin, only that he is evil, and when he perceives this, he dispatches him straight to Tartarus after first setting a seal upon him to show whether he appears to him curable or incurable, and on arrival there he undergoes the appropriate punishment. But sometimes he sees another soul, that has lived in piety and truth, that of a private citizen or any other—but in especial, I maintain, Callicles, the soul of a philosopher who has applied himself to his own business and not played the busybody in his life—and he is filled with admiration and sends him forthwith to the Isles of the Blessed. And Aeacus behaves in exactly the same way—each

of the two gives sentence staff in hand—and Minos sits as judge of appeal, and he alone bears a scepter of gold, even as Odysseus in Homer says he saw him, 'holding a scepter of gold, rendering laws to the dead.'

Now I have been convinced by these stories, Callicles, and I am considering how I may present to my judge the healthiest possible soul, and so I renounce the honors sought by most men, and pursuing the truth I shall really endeavor both to live and, when death comes, to die, as good a man as I possibly can be. And I exhort all other men thereto to the best of my power, and you above all I invite in return to share this life and to enlist in this contest which I maintain excels all other contests, and I reproach you in your turn because you will not be able to help yourself when the trial and judgment takes place of which I spoke just now. But when you come before your judge, the son of Aegina, and he seizes hold of you, you will gape and reel to and fro there, no less than I do here, and perhaps someone will humiliate you by boxing your ears and will do you every kind of outrage.

Now perhaps all this seems to you like an old wife's tale and you despise it, and there would be nothing strange in despising it if our searches could discover anywhere a better and truer account, but as it is you see that you three, who are the wisest Greeks of the day, you and Polus and Gorgias, cannot demonstrate that we should live any other life than this, which is plainly of benefit also in the other world. But amid all these arguments, while others were refuted, this alone stands steadfast, that we should be more on our guard against doing than suffering wrong, and that before all things a man should study not to seem but to be good, whether in private or in public life, and that if anyone proves evil in any way, he should be chastised, and next to being good the second-best thing is to become good and to make

amends by punishment, and that we should avoid every form of flattery, whether to ourselves or to others, whether to few or to many, and that rhetoric and every other activity should ever so be employed, to attain justice. If you will listen to me then, you will follow me where on your arrival you will win happiness both in life and after death, as our account reveals. And you may let anyone despise you as a fool and do you outrage, if he wishes, yes, and you may cheerfully let him strike you with that humiliating blow, for you will suffer no harm thereby if you really are a good man and an honorable, and pursue virtue. And after such training in common together, then at last, if we think fit, we may enter public life, or we may take counsel together on whatever course suggests itself, when we are better able to take counsel than now. For it seems to me shameful that, being what apparently at this moment we are, we should consider ourselves to be fine fellows, when we can never hold to the same views about the same questions—and those too the most vital of all—so deplorably uneducated are we! Then let us follow the guidance of the argument now made manifest, which reveals to us that this is the best way of life—to live and die in the pursuit of righteousness and all other virtues. Let us follow this, I say, inviting others to join us, not that which you believe in and commend to me, for it is worthless, dear Callicles.

Gorgias

Translated by Donald J. Zeyl.

Persons of the Dialog.

Callicles, Socrates, Chærepho, Gorgias,

And Polus.

Callicles/ This, they say, is how you're supposed to do your part in a war or a battle, Socrates.

Socrates/ Oh? Did we "arrive when the feast was over," as the saying goes? Are we late?

Callicles/ Yes, and a very urbane one it was! Gorgias gave us an admirable, varied presentation just a short while ago.

Socrates/ But that's Chaerephon's fault, Callicles. He kept us loitering about in the marketplace.

Chaerephon/ That's no problem, Socrates. I'll make up for it, too. Gorgias is a friend of mine, so he'll give us a presentation—now, if you see fit, or else some other time, if you like.

Callicles/ What's this, Chaerephon? Is Socrates eager to hear Gorgias?

Chaerephon/ Yes. That's the very thing we're here for.

Callicles/ Well then, come to my house any time you like. Gorgias is staying with me and will give you a presentation there.

Socrates/ Very good, Callicles. But would he be willing to have a discussion with us? I'd like to find out from the man what his craft can accomplish, and what it is that he both makes claims about and teaches. As for the other thing, the presentation, let him put that on another time, as you suggest.

Callicles/ There's nothing like asking him, Socrates. This was, in fact, one part of his presentation. Just now he invited those inside to ask him any question they liked, and he said that he'd answer them all.

Socrates/ An excellent idea. Ask him, Chaerephon.

Chaerephon/ Ask him what?

Socrates/ What he is.

Chaerephon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Well, if he were a maker of shoes, he'd answer that he was a cobbler, wouldn't he? Or don't you see what I mean?

Chaerephon/ I do. I'll ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, is Callicles right in saying that you make claims about answering any question anyone might put to you?

Gorgias/ He is, Chaerephon. In fact I just now made that very claim, and I say that no one has asked me anything new in many a year.

Chaerephon/ In that case I'm sure you'll answer this one quite easily, Gorgias.

Gorgias/ Here's your chance to try me, Chaerephon.

Polus/ By Zeus, Chaerephon! Try me, if you like! I think Gorgias is quite worn out. He's only just now finished a long discourse.

Chaerephon/ Really, Polus? Do you think you'd give more admirable answers than Gorgias?

Polus/ What does it matter, as long as they're good enough for you?

Chaerephon/ Nothing at all! You answer us then, since that's what you want.

Polus/ Ask your questions.

Chaerephon/ I will. Suppose that Gorgias were knowledgeable in his brother Herodicus' craft. What would be

the right name for us to call him by then? Isn't it the same one as his brother's?

Polus/ Yes, it is.

Chaerephon/ So we'd be right in saying that he's a doctor?

Polus/ Yes.

Chaerephon/ And if he were experienced in the craft of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon or his brother, what would be the correct thing to call him?

Polus/ A painter, obviously.

Chaerephon/ Now then, since he's knowledgeable in a craft, what is it, and what would be the correct thing to call him?

Polus/ Many among men are the crafts experientially devised by experience, Chaerephon. Yes, it is experience that causes our times to march along the way of craft, whereas inexperience causes them to march along the way of chance. Of these various crafts various men partake in various ways, the best men partaking of the best of them. Our Gorgias is indeed in this group; he partakes of the most admirable of the crafts.

Socrates/ Polus certainly appears to have prepared himself admirably for giving speeches, Gorgias. But he's not doing what he promised Chaerephon.

Gorgias/ How exactly isn't he, Socrates?

Socrates/ He hardly seems to me to be answering the question.

Gorgias/ Why don't you question him then, if you like?

Socrates/ No, I won't, not as long as you yourself may want to answer. I'd much rather ask you. It's clear to me, especially from what he has said, that Polus has devoted himself more to what is called oratory than to discussion.

Polus/ Why do you say that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asks you what craft Gorgias is knowledgeable in, you sing its praises as though someone were discrediting it. But you haven't answered what it is.

Polus/ Didn't I answer that it was the most admirable one?

Socrates/ Very much so. No one, however, asked you what Gorgias' craft is like, but what craft it is, and what one ought to call Gorgias. So, just as when Chaerephon put his earlier questions to you and you answered him in such an admirably brief way, tell us now in that way, too, what his craft is, and what we're supposed to call Gorgias. Or rather, Gorgias, why don't you tell us yourself what the craft you're knowledgeable in is, and hence what we're supposed to call you?

Gorgias/ It's oratory, Socrates.

Socrates/ So we're supposed to call you an orator?

Gorgias/ Yes, and a good one, Socrates, if you really want to call me "what I boast myself to be," as Homer puts it.

Socrates/ Of course I do.

Gorgias/ Call me that then.

Socrates/ Aren't we to say that you're capable of making others orators too?

Gorgias/ That's exactly the claim I make. Not only here, but elsewhere, too.

Socrates/ Well now, Gorgias, would you be willing to complete the discussion in the way we're having it right now, that of alternately asking questions and answering them, and to put aside for another time this long style of speechmaking like the one Polus began with? Please don't go back on your promise, but be willing to give a brief answer to what you're asked.

Gorgias/ There are some answers, Socrates, that must be given by way of long speeches. Even so, I'll try to be as brief

as possible. This, too, in fact, is one of my claims. There's no one who can say the same things more briefly than I.

Socrates/ That's what we need, Gorgias! Do give me a presentation of this very thing, the short style of speech, and leave the long style for some other time.

Gorgias/ Very well, I'll do that. You'll say you've never heard anyone make shorter speeches.

Socrates/ Come then. You claim to be knowledgeable in the craft of oratory and to be able to make someone else an orator, too. With which of the things there are is oratory concerned? Weaving, for example, is concerned with the production of clothes, isn't it?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so, too, music is concerned with the composition of tunes?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ By Hera, Gorgias, I do like your answers. They couldn't be shorter!

Gorgias/ Yes, Socrates, I daresay I'm doing it quite nicely.

Socrates/ And so you are. Come and answer me then that way about oratory, too. About which, of the things there are, is it knowledge?

Gorgias/ About speeches.

Socrates/ What sort of speeches, Gorgias? Those that explain how sick people should be treated to get well?

Gorgias/ No.

Socrates/ So oratory isn't concerned with all speeches.

Gorgias/ Oh, no.

Socrates/ But it does make people capable of speaking.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And also to be wise in what they're speaking about?

Gorgias/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now does the medical craft, the one we were talking about just now, make people able both to have wisdom about and to speak about the sick?

Gorgias/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ This craft, then, is evidently concerned with speeches too.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Speeches about diseases, that is?

Gorgias/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Isn't physical training also concerned with speeches, speeches about good and bad physical condition?

Gorgias/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ In fact, Gorgias, the same is true of the other crafts, too. Each of them is concerned with those speeches that are about the object of the particular craft.

Gorgias/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Then why don't you call the other crafts oratory, since you call any craft whatever that's concerned with speeches oratory? They're concerned with speeches, too!

Gorgias/ The reason, Socrates, is that in the case of the other crafts the knowledge consists almost completely in working with your hands and activities of that sort. In the case of oratory, on the other hand, there isn't any such manual work. Its activity and influence depend entirely on speeches. That's the reason I consider the craft of oratory to be concerned with speeches. And I say that I'm right about this.

Socrates/ I'm not sure I understand what sort of craft you want to call it. I'll soon know more clearly. Tell me this. There are crafts for us to practice, aren't there?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Of all the crafts there are, I take it that there are those that consist for the most part of making things and that call for little speech, and some that call for none at all, ones whose task could be done even silently. Take painting, for instance, or sculpture, or many others. When you say that oratory has nothing to do with other crafts, it's crafts of this sort I think you're referring to. Or aren't you?

Gorgias/ Yes, Socrates. You take my meaning very well.

Socrates/ And then there are other crafts, the ones that perform their whole task by means of speeches and that call for practically no physical work besides, or very little of it. Take arithmetic or computation or geometry, even checkers and many other crafts. Some of these involve speeches to just about the same degree as they do activity, while many involve speeches more. All their activity and influence depend entirely on speeches. I think you mean that oratory is a craft of this sort.

Gorgias/ True.

Socrates/ But you certainly don't want to call any of these crafts oratory, do you, even though, as you phrase it, oratory is the craft that exercises its influence through speech. Somebody might take you up, if he wanted to make a fuss in argument, and say, "So you're saying that arithmetic is oratory, are you, Gorgias?" I'm sure, however, that you're not saying that either arithmetic or geometry is oratory.

Gorgias/ Yes, you're quite correct, Socrates. You take my meaning rightly.

Socrates/ Come on, then. Please complete your answer in the terms of my question. Since oratory is one of those crafts which mostly uses speech, and since there are also others of that sort, try to say what it is that oratory, which exercises its influence through speeches, is about. Imagine someone

asking me about any of the crafts I mentioned just now, “Socrates, what is the craft of arithmetic?” I'd tell him, just as you told me, that it’s one of those that exercise their influence by means of speech. And if he continued, “What are they crafts about?” I'd say that they’re about even and odd, however many of each there might be. If he then asked, “What is the craft you call computation?” I'd say that this one, too, is one of those that exercise their influence entirely by speech. And if he then continued, “What is it about?” I'd answer in the style of those who draw up motions in the Assembly that in other respects computation is like arithmetic—for it’s about the same thing, even and odd—yet it differs from arithmetic insofar as computation examines the quantity of odd and even, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other. And if someone asked about astronomy and I replied that it, too, exercises its influence by means of speech, then if he asked, “What are the speeches of astronomy about, Socrates?” I'd say that they’re about the motions of the stars, the sun and the moon, and their relative velocities.

Gorgias/ And you'd be quite right to say so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Come, Gorgias, you take your turn. For oratory is in fact one of those crafts that carry out and exercise their influence entirely by speech, isn’t it?

Gorgias/ That’s right.

Socrates/ Tell us then: what are they crafts about? Of the things there are, which is the one that these speeches used by oratory are concerned with?

Gorgias/ The greatest of human concerns, Socrates, and the best.

Socrates/ But that statement, too, is debatable, Gorgias. It isn’t at all clear yet, either. I’m sure that you’ve heard people at drinking parties singing that song in which they count out as they sing that “to enjoy good health is the best thing;

second is to have turned out good looking; and third"—so the writer of the song puts it—"is to be honestly rich."

Gorgias/ Yes, I've heard it. Why do you mention it?

Socrates/ Suppose that the producers of the things the songwriter praised were here with you right now: a doctor, a physical trainer, and a financial expert. Support that first the doctor said, "Socrates, Gorgias is telling you a lie. It isn't his craft that is concerned with the greatest good for humankind, but mine." If I then asked him, "What are you, to say that?" I suppose he'd say that he's a doctor. "What's this you're saying? Is the product of your craft really the greatest good?" "Of course, Socrates," I suppose he'd say, "seeing that its product is health. What greater good for humankind is there than health?" And suppose that next in his turn the trainer said, "I too would be amazed, Socrates, if Gorgias could present you with a greater good derived from his craft than the one I could provide from mine." I'd ask this man, too, "What are you, sir, and what's your product?" "I'm a physical trainer," he'd say, "and my product is making people physically good-looking and strong." And following the trainer the financial expert would say, I'm sure with an air of considerable scorn for all, "Do consider, Socrates, whether you know of any good, Gorgias' or anyone else's, that's a greater good than wealth." We'd say to him, "Really? Is that what you produce?" He'd say yes. "As what?" "As a financial expert." "Well," we'll say, "is wealth in your judgment the greatest good for humankind?" "Of course," he'll say. "Ah, but Gorgias here disputes that. He claims that his craft is the source of a good that's greater than yours," we'd say. And it's obvious what question he'd ask next. "And what is this good, please? Let Gorgias answer me that!" So come on, Gorgias. Consider yourself questioned by both these men and myself, and give us your answer. What is this thing that you claim is

the greatest good for humankind, a thing you claim to be a producer of?

Gorgias/ The thing that is in actual fact the greatest good, Socrates. It is the source of freedom for humankind itself and at the same time it is for each person the source of rule over others in one's own city.

Socrates/ And what is this thing you're referring to?

Gorgias/ I'm referring to the ability to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councilors in a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in any other political gathering that might take place. In point of fact, with this ability you'll have the doctor for your slave, and the physical trainer, too. As for this financial expert of yours, he'll turn out to be making more money for somebody else instead of himself; for you, in fact, if you've got the ability to speak and to persuade the crowds.

Socrates/ Now I think you've come closest to making clear what craft you take oratory to be, Gorgias. If I follow you at all, you're saying that oratory is a producer of persuasion. Its whole business comes to that, and that's the long and short of it. Or can you mention anything else oratory can do besides instilling persuasion in the souls of an audience?

Gorgias/ None at all, Socrates. I think you're defining it quite adequately. That is indeed the long and short of it.

Socrates/ Listen then, Gorgias. You should know that I'm convinced I'm one of those people who in a discussion with someone else really want to have knowledge of the subject the discussion's about. And I consider you one of them, too.

Gorgias/ Well, what's the point, Socrates?

Socrates/ Let me tell you now. You can know for sure that I don't know what this persuasion derived from oratory that you're talking about is, or what subjects it's persuasion about. Even though I do have my suspicions about which persuasion

I think you mean and what it's about, I'll still ask you just the same what you say this persuasion produced by oratory is, and what it's about. And why, when I have my suspicions, do I ask you and refrain from expressing them myself? It's not you I'm after, it's our discussion, to have it proceed in such a way as to make the thing we're talking about most clear to us. Consider, then, whether you think I'm being fair in resuming my questions to you. Suppose I were to ask you which of the painters Zeuxis is. If you told me that he's the one who paints pictures, wouldn't it be fair for me to ask, "Of what sort of pictures is he the painter, and where?"

Gorgias/ Yes, it would.

Socrates/ And isn't the reason for this the fact that there are other painters, too, who paint many other pictures?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if no one besides Zeuxis were a painter, your answer would have been a good one?

Gorgias/ Of course.

Socrates/ Come then, and tell me about oratory. Do you think that oratory alone instills persuasion, or do other crafts do so too? This is the sort of thing I mean: Does a person who teaches some subject or other persuade people about what he's teaching, or not?

Gorgias/ He certainly does, Socrates. He persuades most of all.

Socrates/ Let's talk once more about the same crafts we were talking about just now. Doesn't arithmetic or the arithmetician teach us everything that pertains to number?

Gorgias/ Yes, he does.

Socrates/ And he also persuades?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So arithmetic is also a producer of persuasion.

Gorgias/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Now if someone asks us what sort of persuasion it produces and what it's persuasion about, I suppose we'd answer him that it's the persuasion through teaching about the extent of even and odd. And we'll be able to show that all the other crafts we were just now talking about are producers of persuasion, as well as what the persuasion is and what it's about. Isn't that right?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So oratory isn't the only producer of persuasion.

Gorgias/ That's true.

Socrates/ In that case, since it's not the only one to produce this product but other crafts do it too, we'd do right to repeat to our speaker the question we put next in the case of the painter: "Of what sort of persuasion is oratory a craft, and what is its persuasion about?" Or don't you think it's right to repeat that question?

Gorgias/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Well then, Gorgias, since you think so too, please answer.

Gorgias/ The persuasion I mean, Socrates, is the kind that takes place in law courts and in those other large gatherings, as I was saying a moment ago. And it's concerned with those matters that are just and unjust.

Socrates/ Yes, Gorgias, I suspected that this was the persuasion you meant, and that these are the matters it's persuasion about. But so you won't be surprised if in a moment I ask you again another question like this, about what seems to be clear, and yet I go on with my questioning—as I say, I'm asking questions so that we can conduct an orderly discussion. It's not you I'm after; it's to prevent our getting in the habit of second-guessing and snatching each

other's statements away ahead of time. It's to allow you to work out your assumption in any way you want to.

Gorgias/ Yes, I think that you're quite right to do this, Socrates.

Socrates/ Come then, and let's examine this point. Is there something you call "to have learned"?

Gorgias/ There is.

Socrates/ Very well. And also something you call "to be convinced"?

Gorgias/ Yes, there is.

Socrates/ Now, do you think that to have learned, and learning, are the same as to be convinced and conviction, or different?

Gorgias/ I certainly suppose that they're different, Socrates.

Socrates/ You suppose rightly. This is how you can tell: If someone asked you, "Is there such a thing as true and false conviction, Gorgias?" you'd say yes, I'm sure.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well now, is there such a thing as true and false knowledge?

Gorgias/ Not at all.

Socrates/ So it's clear that they're not the same.

Gorgias/ That's true.

Socrates/ But surely both those who have learned and those who are convinced have come to be persuaded?

Gorgias/ That's right.

Socrates/ Would you like us then to posit two types of persuasion, one providing conviction without knowledge, the other providing knowledge?

Gorgias/ Yes, I would.

Socrates/ Now which type of persuasion does oratory produce in law courts and other gatherings concerning things that are just and unjust? The one that results in being convinced without knowing or the one that results in knowing?

Gorgias/ It's obvious, surely, that it's the one that results in conviction.

Socrates/ So evidently oratory produces the persuasion that comes from being convinced, and not the persuasion that comes from teaching, concerning what's just and unjust.

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so an orator is not a teacher of law courts and other gatherings about things that are just and unjust, either, but merely a persuader, for I don't suppose that he could teach such a large gathering about matters so important in a short time.

Gorgias/ No, he certainly couldn't.

Socrates/ Well now, let's see what we're really saying about oratory. For, mind you, even I myself can't get clear yet about what I'm saying. When the city holds a meeting to appoint doctors or shipbuilders or some other variety of craftsmen, that's surely not the time when the orator will give advice, is it? For obviously it's the most accomplished craftsman who should be appointed in each case. Nor will the orator be the one to give advice at a meeting that concerns the building of walls or the equipping of harbors or dockyards, but the master builders will be the ones. And when there is a deliberation about the appointment of generals or an arrangement of troops against the enemy or an occupation of territory, it's not the orators but the generals who'll give advice then. What do you say about such cases, Gorgias? Since you yourself claim both to be an orator and to make others orators, we'll do well to find out from you the characteristics of your craft. You must

think of me now as eager to serve your interests, too. Perhaps there's actually someone inside who wants to become your pupil. I notice some, in fact a good many, and they may well be embarrassed to question you. So, while you're being questioned by me, consider yourself being questioned by them as well: "What will we get if we associate with you, Gorgias? What will we be able to advise the city on? Only about what's just and unjust or also about the things Socrates was mentioning just now?" Try to answer them.

Gorgias/ Well, Socrates, I'll try to reveal to you clearly everything oratory can accomplish. You yourself led the way nicely, for you do know, don't you, that these dockyards and walls of the Athenians and the equipping of the harbor came about through the advice of Themistocles and in some cases through that of Pericles, but not through that of the craftsmen?

Socrates/ That's what they say about Themistocles, Gorgias. I myself heard Pericles when he advised us on the middle wall.

Gorgias/ And whenever those craftsmen you were just now speaking of are appointed, Socrates, you see that the orators are the ones who give advice and whose views on these matters prevail.

Socrates/ Yes, Gorgias, my amazement at that led me long ago to ask what it is that oratory can accomplish. For as I look at it, it seems to me to be something supernatural in scope.

Gorgias/ Oh yes, Socrates, if only you knew all of it, that it encompasses and subordinates to itself just about everything that can be accomplished. And I'll give you ample proof. Many a time I've gone with my brother or with other doctors to call on some sick person who refuses to take his medicine or allow the doctor to perform surgery or cauterization on him. And when the doctor failed to persuade him, I succeeded, by

means of no other craft than oratory. And I maintain too that if an orator and a doctor came to any city anywhere you like and had to compete in speaking in the assembly or some other gathering over which of them should be appointed doctor, the doctor wouldn't make any showing at all, but the one who had the ability to speak would be appointed, if he so wished. And if he were to compete with any other craftsman whatever, the orator more than anyone else would persuade them that they should appoint him, for there isn't anything that the orator couldn't speak more persuasively about to a gathering than could any other craftsman whatever. That's how great the accomplishment of this craft is, and the sort of accomplishment it is! One should, however, use oratory like any other competitive skill, Socrates. In other cases, too, one ought not to use a competitive skill against any and everybody, just because he has learned boxing, or boxing and wrestling combined, or fighting in armor, so as to make himself be superior to his friends as well as to his enemies. That's no reason to strike, stab, or kill one's own friends! Imagine someone who after attending wrestling school, getting his body into good shape and becoming a boxer, went on to strike his father and mother or any other family member or friend. By Zeus, that's no reason to hate physical trainers and people who teach fighting in armor, and to exile them from their cities! For while these people imparted their skills to be used justly against enemies and wrongdoers, and in defense, not aggression, their pupils pervert their strength and skill and misuse them. So it's not their teachers who are wicked, nor is this a reason why the craft should be a cause of wickedness; the ones who misuse it are supposedly the wicked ones. And the same is true for oratory as well. The orator has the ability to speak against everyone on every subject, so as in gatherings to be more persuasive, in short, about anything he likes, but the fact that he has the ability to rob doctors or

other craftsmen of their reputations doesn't give him any more of a reason to do it. He should use oratory justly, as he would any competitive skill. And I suppose that if a person who has become an orator goes on with this ability and this craft to commit wrongdoing, we shouldn't hate his teacher and exile him from our cities. For while the teacher imparted it to be used justly, the pupil is making the opposite use of it. So it's the misuser whom it's just to hate and exile or put to death, not the teacher.

Socrates/ Gorgias, I take it that you, like me, have experienced many discussions and that you've observed this sort of thing about them: it's not easy for the participants to define jointly what they're undertaking to discuss, and so, having learned from and taught each other, to conclude their session. Instead, if they're disputing some point and one maintains that the other isn't right or isn't clear, they get irritated, each thinking the other is speaking out of spite. They become eager to win instead of investigating the subject under discussion. In fact, in the end some have a most shameful parting of the ways, abuse heaped upon them, having given and gotten to hear such things that make even the bystanders upset with themselves for having thought it worthwhile to come to listen to such people. What's my point in saying this? It's that I think you're now saying things that aren't very consistent or compatible with what you were first saying about oratory. So, I'm afraid to pursue my examination of you, for fear that you should take me to be speaking with eagerness to win against you, rather than to have our subject become clear. For my part, I'd be pleased to continue questioning you if you're the same kind of man I am, otherwise I would drop it. And what kind of man am I? One of those who would be pleased to be refuted if I say anything untrue, and who would be pleased to refute anyone who says anything untrue; one who, however, wouldn't be any less pleased to be refuted than

to refute. For I count being refuted a greater good, insofar as it is a greater good for oneself to be delivered from the worst thing there is than to deliver someone else from it. I don't suppose there's anything quite so bad for a person as having false belief about the things we're discussing right now. So if you say you're this kind of man, too, let's continue the discussion; but if you think we should drop it, let's be done with it and break it off.

Gorgias/ Oh yes, Socrates, I say that I myself, too, am the sort of person you describe. Still, perhaps we should keep in mind the people who are present here, too. For quite a while ago now, even before you came, I gave them a long presentation, and perhaps we'll stretch things out too long if we continue the discussion. We should think about them, too, so as not to keep any of them who want to do something else.

Chaerephon/ You yourselves hear the commotion these men are making, Gorgias and Socrates. They want to hear anything you have to say. And as for myself, I hope I'll never be so busy that I'd forego discussions such as this, conducted in the way this one is, because I find it more practical to do something else.

Callicles/ By the gods, Chaerephon, as a matter of fact I, too, though I've been present at many a discussion before now, don't know if I've ever been so pleased as I am at the moment. So if you're willing to discuss, even if it's all day long, you'll be gratifying me.

Socrates/ For my part there's nothing stopping me, Callicles, as long as Gorgias is willing.

Gorgias/ It'll be to my shame ever after, Socrates, if I weren't willing, when I myself have made the claim that anyone may ask me anything he wants. All right, if it suits these people, carry on with the discussion, and ask what you want.

Socrates/ Well then, Gorgias, let me tell you what surprises me in the things you've said. It may be that what you said was correct and that I'm not taking your meaning correctly. Do you say that you're able to make an orator out of anyone who wants to study with you?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So that he'll be persuasive in a gathering about all subjects, not by teaching but by persuading?

Gorgias/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ You were saying just now, mind you, that the orator will be more persuasive even about health than a doctor is.

Gorgias/ Yes I was, more persuasive in a gathering, anyhow.

Socrates/ And doesn't "in a gathering" just mean "among those who don't have knowledge"? For, among those who do have it, I don't suppose that he'll be more persuasive than the doctor.

Gorgias/ That's true.

Socrates/ Now if he'll be more persuasive than a doctor, doesn't he prove to be more persuasive than the one who has knowledge?

Gorgias/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ Even though he's not a doctor, right?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And a non-doctor, I take it, isn't knowledgeable in the thing in which a doctor is knowledgeable.

Gorgias/ That's obvious.

Socrates/ So when an orator is more persuasive than a doctor, a non-knower will be more persuasive than a knower among non-knowers. Isn't this exactly what follows?

Gorgias/ Yes it is, at least in this case.

Socrates/ The same is true about the orator and oratory relative to the other crafts, too, then. Oratory doesn't need to have any knowledge of the state of their subject matters; it only needs to have discovered some device to produce persuasion in order to make itself appear to those who don't have knowledge that it knows more than those who actually do have it.

Gorgias/ Well, Socrates, aren't things made very easy when you come off no worse than the craftsmen even though you haven't learned any other craft but this one?

Socrates/ Whether the orator does or does not come off worse than the others because of this being so, we'll examine in a moment if it has any bearing on our argument. For now, let's consider this point first. Is it the case that the orator is in the same position with respect to what's just and unjust, what's shameful and admirable, what's good and bad, as he is about what's healthy and about the subjects of the other crafts? Does he lack knowledge, that is, of what these are, of what is good or what is bad, of what is admirable or what is shameful, or just or unjust? Does he employ devices to produce persuasion about them, so that—even though he doesn't know—he seems, among those who don't know either, to know more than someone who actually does know? Or is it necessary for him to know, and must the prospective student of oratory already be knowledgeable in these things before coming to you? And if he doesn't, will you, the oratory teacher, not teach him any of these things when he comes to you—for that's not your job—and will you make him seem among most people to have knowledge of such things when in fact he doesn't have it, and to seem good when in fact he isn't? Or won't you be able to teach him oratory at all, unless he knows the truth about these things to begin with? How do matters such as these stand, Gorgias? Yes, by Zeus, do give us your

revelation and tell us what oratory can accomplish, just as you just now said you would.

Gorgias/ Well, Socrates, I suppose that if he really doesn't have this knowledge, he'll learn these things from me as well.

Socrates/ Hold it there. You're right to say so. If you make someone an orator, it's necessary for him to know what's just and what's unjust, either beforehand, or by learning it from you afterwards.

Gorgias/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Well? A man who has learned carpentry is a carpenter, isn't he?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And isn't a man who has learned music a musician?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And a man who has learned medicine a doctor? And isn't this so too, by the same reasoning, with the other crafts? Isn't a man who has learned a particular subject the sort of man his knowledge makes him?

Gorgias/ Yes, he is.

Socrates/ And, by this line of reasoning, isn't a man who has learned what's just a just man too?

Gorgias/ Yes, absolutely.

Socrates/ And a just man does just things, I take it?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now isn't an orator necessarily just, and doesn't a just man necessarily want to do just things?

Gorgias/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ Therefore an orator will never want to do what's unjust.

Gorgias/ No, apparently not.

Socrates/ Do you remember saying a little earlier that we shouldn't complain against physical trainers or exile them from our cities if the boxer uses his boxing skill to do what's unjust, and that, similarly, if an orator uses his oratorical skill unjustly we shouldn't complain against his teacher or banish him from the city, but do so to the one who does what's unjust, the one who doesn't use his oratorical skill properly? Was that said or not?

Gorgias/ Yes, it was.

Socrates/ But now it appears that this very man, the orator, would never have done what's unjust, doesn't it?

Gorgias/ Yes, it does.

Socrates/ And at the beginning of our discussion, Gorgias, it was said that oratory would be concerned with speeches, not those about even and odd, but those about what's just and unjust. Right?

Gorgias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, at the time you said that, I took it that oratory would never be an unjust thing, since it always makes its speeches about justice. But when a little later you were saying that the orator could also use oratory unjustly, I was surprised and thought that your statements weren't consistent, and so I made that speech in which I said that if you, like me, think that being refuted is a profitable thing, it would be worthwhile to continue the discussion, but if you don't, to let it drop. But now, as we subsequently examine the question, you see for yourself too that it's agreed that, quite to the contrary, the orator is incapable of using oratory unjustly and of being willing to do what's unjust. By the Dog, Gorgias, it'll take more than a short session to go through an adequate examination of how these matters stand!

Polus/ Really, Socrates? Is what you're now saying about oratory what you actually think of it? Or do you really think,

just because Gorgias was too ashamed not to concede your further claim that the orator also knows what's just, what's admirable, and what's good, and that if he came to him without already having this knowledge to begin with, he said that he would teach him himself, and then from this admission maybe some inconsistency crept into his statements—just the thing that gives you delight, you're the one who leads him on to face such questions—who do you think would deny that he himself knows what's just and would teach others? To lead your arguments to such an outcome is a sign of great rudeness.

Socrates/ Most admirable Polus, it's not for nothing that we get ourselves companions and sons. It's so that, when we ourselves have grown older and stumble, you younger men might be on hand to straighten our lives up again, both in what we do and what we say. And if Gorgias and I are stumbling now in what we say—well, you're on hand, straighten us up again. That's only right. And if you think we were wrong to agree on it, I'm certainly willing to retract any of our agreements you like, provided that you're careful about just one thing.

Polus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ That you curb your long style of speech, Polus, the style you tried using at first.

Polus/ Really? Won't I be free to say as much as I like?

Socrates/ You' certainly be in a terrible way, my good friend, if upon coming to Athens, where there's more freedom of speech than anywhere else in Greece, you alone should miss out on it here. But look at it the other way. If you spoke at length and were unwilling to answer what you're asked, wouldn't I be in a terrible way if I'm not to have the freedom to stop listening to you and leave? But if you care at all about the discussion we've had and want to straighten it up, please

retract whatever you think best, as I was saying just now. Take your turn in asking and being asked questions the way Gorgias and I did, and subject me and yourself to refutation. You say, I take it, that you know the same craft that Gorgias knows? Or don't you?

Polus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ And don't you also invite people to ask you each time whatever they like, because you believe you'll answer as one who has knowledge?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So now please do whichever of these you like: either ask questions or answer them.

Polus/ Very well, I shall. Tell me, Socrates, since you think Gorgias is confused about oratory, what do you say it is?

Socrates/ Are you asking me what craft I say it is?

Polus/ Yes, I am.

Socrates/ To tell you the truth, Polus, I don't think it's a craft at all.

Polus/ Well then, what do you think oratory is?

Socrates/ In the treatise that I read recently, it's the thing that you say has produced craft.

Polus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean a knack.

Polus/ So you think oratory's a knack?

Socrates/ Yes, I do, unless you say it's something else.

Polus/ A knack for what?

Socrates/ For producing a certain gratification and pleasure.

Polus/ Don't you think that oratory's an admirable thing, then, to be able to give gratification to people?

Socrates/ Really, Polus! Have you already discovered from me what I say it is, so that you go on to ask me next whether I don't think it's admirable?

Polus/ Haven't I discovered that you say it's a knack?

Socrates/ Since you value gratification, would you like to gratify me on a small matter?

Polus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Ask me now what craft I think pastry baking is.

Polus/ All right, I will. What craft is pastry baking?

Socrates/ It isn't one at all, Polus. Now say, "What is it then?"

Polus/ All right.

Socrates/ It's a knack. Say, "A knack for what?"

Polus/ All right.

Socrates/ For producing gratification and pleasure, Polus.

Polus/ So oratory is the same thing as pastry baking?

Socrates/ Oh no, not at all, although it is a part of the same practice.

Polus/ What practice do you mean?

Socrates/ I'm afraid it may be rather crude to speak the truth. I hesitate to do so for Gorgias' sake, for fear that he may think I'm satirizing what he practices. I don't know whether this is the kind of oratory that Gorgias practices—in fact in our discussion a while ago we didn't get at all clear on just what he thinks it is. But what I call oratory is a part of some business that isn't admirable at all.

Gorgias/ Which one's that, Socrates? Say it, and don't spare my feelings.

Socrates/ Well then, Gorgias, I think there's a practice that's not craft-like, but one that a mind given to making

hunches takes to, a mind that's bold and naturally clever at dealing with people. I call it flattery, basically. I think that this practice has many other parts as well, and pastry baking, too, is one of them. This part seems to be a craft, but in my account of it it isn't a craft but a knack and a routine. I call oratory a part of this, too, along with cosmetics and sophistry. These are four parts, and they're directed to four objects. So if Polus wants to discover them, let him do so. He hasn't discovered yet what sort of part of flattery I say oratory is. Instead, it's escaped him that I haven't answered that question yet, and so he goes on to ask whether I don't consider it to be admirable. And I won't answer him whether I think it's admirable or shameful until I first tell what it is. That wouldn't be right, Polus. If, however, you do want to discover this, ask me what sort of part of flattery I say oratory is.

Polus/ I shall. Tell me what sort of part it is.

Socrates/ Would you understand my answer? By my reasoning, oratory is an image of a part of politics.

Polus/ Well? Are you saying that it's something admirable or shameful?

Socrates/ I'm saying that it's a shameful thing—I call bad things shameful—since I must answer you as though you already know what I mean.

Gorgias/ By Zeus, Socrates, I myself don't understand what you mean, either!

Socrates/ Reasonably enough, Gorgias. I'm not saying anything clear yet. This colt here is youthful and impulsive.

Gorgias/ Never mind him. Please tell me what you mean by saying that oratory is an image of a part of politics.

Socrates/ All right, I'll try to describe my view of oratory. If this isn't what it actually is, Polus here will refute me. There is, I take it, something you call body and something you call soul?

Gorgias/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ And do you also think that there's a state of fitness for each of these?

Gorgias/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ All right. Is there also an apparent state of fitness, one that isn't real? The sort of thing I mean is this. There are many people who appear to be physically fit, and unless one is a doctor or one of the fitness experts, one wouldn't readily notice that they're not fit.

Gorgias/ That's true.

Socrates/ I'm saying that this sort of thing exists in the case of both the body and the soul, a thing that makes the body and the soul seem fit when in fact they aren't any the more so.

Gorgias/ That's so.

Socrates/ Come then, and I'll show you more clearly what I'm saying, if I can. I'm saying that of this pair of subjects there are two crafts. The one for the soul I call politics; the one for the body, though it is one, I can't give you a name for offhand, but while the care of the body is a single craft, I'm saying it has two parts: gymnastics and medicine. And in politics, the counterpart of gymnastics is legislation, and the part that corresponds to medicine is justice. Each member of these pairs has features in common with the other, medicine with gymnastics and justice with legislation, because they're concerned with the same thing. They do, however, differ in some way from each other. These, then, are the four parts, and they always provide care, in the one case for the body, in the other for the soul, with a view to what's best. Now flattery takes notice of them, and—I won't say by knowing, but only by guessing—divides itself into four, masks itself with each of the parts, and then pretends to be the characters of the masks. It takes no thought at all of whatever is best; with the

lure of what's most pleasant at the moment, it sniffs out folly and hoodwinks it, so that it gives the impression of being most deserving. Pastry baking has put on the mask of medicine, and pretends to know the foods that are best for the body, so that if a pastry baker and a doctor had to compete in front of children, or in front of men just as foolish as children, to determine which of the two, the doctor or the pastry baker, had expert knowledge of good food and bad, the doctor would die of starvation. I call this flattery, and I say that such a thing is shameful, Polus—it's you I'm saying this to—because it guesses at what's pleasant with no consideration for what's best. And I say that it isn't a craft, but a knack, because it has no account of the nature of whatever things it applies by which it applies them, so that it's unable to state the cause of each thing. And I refuse to call anything that lacks such an account a craft. If you have any quarrel with these claims, I'm willing to submit them for discussion.

So pastry baking, as I say, is the flattery that wears the mask of medicine. Cosmetics is the one that wears that of gymnastics in the same way; a mischievous, deceptive, disgraceful and ill-bred thing, one that perpetrates deception by means of shaping and coloring, smoothing out and dressing up, so as to make people assume an alien beauty and neglect their own, which comes through gymnastics. So that I won't make a long-style speech, I'm willing to put it to you the way the geometers do—for perhaps you follow me now—that what cosmetics is to gymnastics, pastry baking is to medicine; or rather, like this: what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation, and what pastry baking is to medicine, oratory is to justice. However, as I was saying, although these activities are naturally distinct in this way, yet because they are so close, sophists and orators tend to be mixed together as people who work in the same area and concern themselves with the same things. They don't know what to do with

themselves, and other people don't know what to do with them. In fact, if the soul didn't govern the body but the body governed itself, and if pastry baking and medicine weren't kept under observation and distinguished by the soul, but the body itself made judgments about them, making its estimates by reference to the gratification it receives, then the world according to Anaxagoras would prevail, Polus my friend—you're familiar with these views—all things would be mixed together in the same place, and there would be no distinction between matters of medicine and health, and matters of pastry baking.

You've now heard what I say oratory is. It's the counterpart in the soul to pastry baking, its counterpart in the body. Perhaps I've done an absurd thing: I wouldn't let you make long speeches, and here I've just composed a lengthy one myself. I deserve to be forgiven, though, for when I made my statements short you didn't understand and didn't know how to deal with the answers I gave you, but you needed a narration. So if I don't know how to deal with your answers either, you must spin out a speech, too. But if I do, just let me deal with them. That's only fair. And if you now know how to deal with my answer, please deal with it.

Polus/ What is it you're saying, then? You think oratory is flattery?

Socrates/ I said that it was a part of flattery. Don't you remember, Polus, young as you are? What's to become of you?

Polus/ So you think that good orators are held in low regard in their cities, as flatterers?

Socrates/ Is this a question you're asking, or some speech you're beginning?

Polus/ I'm asking a question.

Socrates/ I don't think they're held in any regard at all.

Polus/ What do you mean, they're not held in any regard? Don't they have the greatest power in their cities?

Socrates/ No, if by "having power" you mean something that's good for the one who has the power.

Polus/ That's just what I do mean.

Socrates/ In that case I think that orators have the least power of any in the city.

Polus/ Really? Don't they, like tyrants, put to death anyone they want, and confiscate the property and banish from their cities anyone they see fit?

Socrates/ By the Dog, Polus! I can't make out one way or the other with each thing you're saying whether you're saying these things for yourself and revealing your own view, or whether you're questioning me.

Polus/ I'm questioning you.

Socrates/ Very well, my friend. In that case, are you asking me two questions at once?

Polus/ What do you mean, two?

Socrates/ Weren't you just now saying something like "Don't orators, like tyrants, put to death anyone they want, don't they confiscate the property of anyone they see fit, and don't they banish them from their cities?"

Polus/ Yes, I was.

Socrates/ In that case I say that these are two questions, and I'll answer you both of them. I say, Polus, that both orators and tyrants have the least power in their cities, as I was saying just now. For they do just about nothing they want to, though they certainly do whatever they see most fit to do.

Polus/ Well, isn't this having great power?

Socrates/ No; at least Polus says it isn't.

Polus/ I say it isn't? I certainly say it is!

Socrates/ By ..., you certainly don't! since you say that having great power is good for the one who has it.

Polus/ Yes, I do say that.

Socrates/ Do you think it's good, then, if a person does whatever he sees most fit to do when he lacks intelligence? Do you call this "having great power" too?

Polus/ No, I do not.

Socrates/ Will you refute me, then, and prove that orators do have intelligence, and that oratory is a craft, and not flattery? If you leave me unrefuted, then the orators who do what they see fit in their cities, and the tyrants, too, won't have gained any good by this. Power is a good thing, you say, but you agree with me that doing what one sees fit without intelligence is bad. Or don't you?

Polus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ How then could it be that orators or tyrants have great power in their cities, so long as Socrates is not refuted by Polus to show that they do what they want?

Polus/ This fellow—

Socrates/ —denies that they do what they want. Go ahead and refute me.

Polus/ Didn't you just now agree that they do what they see fit?

Socrates/ Yes, and I still do.

Polus/ Don't they do what they want, then?

Socrates/ I say they don't.

Polus/ Even though they do what they see fit?

Socrates/ That's what I say.

Polus/ What an outrageous thing to say, Socrates! Perfectly monstrous!

Socrates/ Don't attack me, my peerless Polus, to address you in your own style. Instead, question me if you can, and prove that I'm wrong. Otherwise you must answer me.

Polus/ All right, I'm willing to answer, to get some idea of what you're saying.

Socrates/ Do you think that when people do something, they want the thing they're doing at the time, or the thing for the sake of which they do what they're doing? Do you think that people who take medicines prescribed by their doctors, for instance, want what they're doing, the act of taking the medicine, with all its discomfort, or do they want to be healthy, the thing for the sake of which they're taking it?

Polus/ Obviously they want their being healthy.

Socrates/ With seafarers, too, and those who make money in other ways, the thing they're doing at the time is not the thing they want—for who wants to make dangerous and troublesome sea voyages? What they want is their being wealthy, the thing for the sake of which, I suppose, they make their voyages. It's for the sake of wealth that they make them.

Polus/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ Isn't it just the same in all cases, in fact? If a person does anything for the sake of something, he doesn't want this thing that he's doing, but the thing for the sake of which he's doing it?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now is there anything that isn't either good, or bad, or, what is between these, neither good nor bad?

Polus/ There can't be, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you say that wisdom, health, wealth and the like are good, and their opposites bad?

Polus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ And by things which are neither good nor bad you mean things which sometimes partake of what's good, sometimes of what's bad, and sometimes of neither, such as sitting or walking, running or making sea voyages, or stones and sticks and the like? Aren't these the ones you mean? Or are there any others that you call things neither good nor bad?

Polus/ No, these are the ones.

Socrates/ Now whenever people do things, do they do these intermediate things for the sake of good ones, or the good things for the sake of the intermediate ones?

Polus/ The intermediate things for the sake of the good ones, surely.

Socrates/ So it's because we pursue what's good that we walk whenever we walk; we suppose that it's better to walk. And conversely, whenever we stand still, we stand still for the sake of the same thing, what's good. Isn't that so?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And don't we also put a person to death, if we do, or banish him and confiscate his property because we suppose that doing these things is better for us than not doing them?

Polus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Hence, it's for the sake of what's good that those who do all these things do them.

Polus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Now didn't we agree that we want, not those things that we do for the sake of something, but that thing for the sake of which we do them?

Polus/ Yes, very much so.

Socrates/ Hence, we don't simply want to slaughter people, or exile them from their cities and confiscate their property as such; we want to do these things if they are beneficial, but if

they're harmful we don't. For we want the things that are good, as you agree, and we don't want those that are neither good nor bad, nor those that are bad. Right? Do you think that what I'm saying is true, Polus, or don't you? Why don't you answer?

Polus/ I think it's true.

Socrates/ Since we're in agreement about that then, if a person who's a tyrant or an orator puts somebody to death or exiles him or confiscates his property because he supposes that doing so is better for himself when actually it's worse, this person, I take it, is doing what he sees fit, isn't he?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is he also doing what he wants, if these things are actually bad? Why don't you answer?

Polus/ All right, I don't think he's doing what he wants.

Socrates/ Can such a man possibly have great power in that city, if in fact having great power is, as you agree, something good?

Polus/ He cannot.

Socrates/ So, what I was saying is true, when I said that it is possible for a man who does in his city what he sees fit not to have great power, nor to be doing what he wants.

Polus/ Really, Socrates! As if you wouldn't welcome being in a position to do what you see fit in the city, rather than not! As if you wouldn't be envious whenever you'd see anyone putting to death some person he saw fit, or confiscating his property or tying him up!

Socrates/ Justly, you mean, or unjustly?

Polus/ Whichever way he does it, isn't he to be envied either way?

Socrates/ Hush, Polus.

Polus/ What for?

Socrates/ Because you're not supposed to envy the unenviable or the miserable. You're supposed to pity them.

Polus/ Really? Is this how you think it is with the people I'm talking about?

Socrates/ Of course.

Polus/ So, you think that a person who puts to death anyone he sees fit, and does so justly, is miserable and to be pitied?

Socrates/ No, I don't, but I don't think he's to be envied either.

Polus/ Weren't you just now saying that he's miserable?

Socrates/ Yes, the one who puts someone to death unjustly is, my friend, and he's to be pitied besides. But the one who does so justly isn't to be envied.

Polus/ Surely the one who's put to death unjustly is the one who's both to be pitied and miserable.

Socrates/ Less so than the one putting him to death, Polus, and less than the one who's justly put to death.

Polus/ How can that be, Socrates?

Socrates/ It's because doing what's unjust is actually the worst thing there is.

Polus/ Really? Is that the worst? Isn't suffering what's unjust still worse?

Socrates/ No, not in the least.

Polus/ So you'd rather want to suffer what's unjust than do it?

Socrates/ For my part, I wouldn't want either, but if it had to be one or the other, I would choose suffering over doing what's unjust.

Polus/ You wouldn't welcome being a tyrant, then?

Socrates/ No, if by being a tyrant you mean what I do.

Polus/ I mean just what I said a while ago, to be in a position to do whatever you see fit in the city, whether it's putting people to death or exiling them, or doing any and everything just as you see fit.

Socrates/ Well, my wonderful fellow! I'll put you a case, and you criticize it. Imagine me in a crowded marketplace, with a dagger up my sleeve, saying to you, "Polus, I've just got myself some marvelous tyrannical power. So, if I see fit to have anyone of these people you see here put to death right on the spot, to death he'll be put. And if I see fit to have one of them have his head bashed in, bashed in it will be, right away. If I see fit to have his coat ripped apart, ripped it will be. That's how great my power in this city is!" Suppose you didn't believe me and I showed you the dagger. On seeing it, you'd be likely to say, "But Socrates, everybody could have great power that way. For this way any house you see fit might be burned down, and so might the dockyards and triremes of the Athenians, and all their ships, both public and private." But then that's not what having great power is, doing what one sees fit. Or do you think it is?

Polus/ No, at least not like that.

Socrates/ Can you then tell me what your reason is for objecting to this sort of power?

Polus/ Yes, I can.

Socrates/ What is it? Tell me.

Polus/ It's that the person who acts this way is necessarily punished.

Socrates/ And isn't being punished a bad thing?

Polus/ Yes, it really is.

Socrates/ Well then, my surprising fellow, here again you take the view that as long as acting as one sees fit coincides with acting beneficially, it is good, and this, evidently, is having great power. Otherwise it is a bad thing, and is having

little power. Let's consider this point, too. Do we agree that sometimes it's better to do those things we were just now talking about, putting people to death and banishing them and confiscating their property, and at other times it isn't?

Polus/ Yes, we do.

Socrates/ This point is evidently agreed upon by you and me both?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ When do you say that it's better to do these things then? Tell me where you draw the line.

Polus/ Why don't you answer that question yourself, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, Polus, if you find it more pleasing to listen to me, I say that when one does these things justly, it's better, but when one does them unjustly, it's worse.

Polus/ How hard it is to refute you, Socrates! Why, even a child could refute you and show that what you're saying isn't true!

Socrates/ In that case, I'll be very grateful to the child, and just as grateful to you if you refute me and rid me of this nonsense. Please don't falter now in doing a friend a good turn. Refute me.

Polus/ Surely, Socrates, we don't need to refer to ancient history to refute you. Why, current events quite suffice to do that, and to prove that many people who behave unjustly are happy.

Socrates/ What sorts of events are these?

Polus/ You can picture this man Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, ruling Macedonia, I take it?

Socrates/ Well, if I can't picture him, I do hear things about him.

Polus/ Do you think he's happy or miserable?

Socrates/ I don't know, Polus. I haven't met the man yet.

Polus/ Really? You' know this if you had met him, but without that you don't know straight off that he's happy?

Socrates/ No, I certainly don't, by Zeus!

Polus/ It's obvious, Socrates, that you won't even claim to know that the Great King is happy.

Socrates/ Yes, and that would be true, for I don't know how he stands in regard to education and justice.

Polus/ Really? Is happiness determined entirely by that?

Socrates/ Yes, Polus, so I say anyway. I say that the admirable and good person, man or woman, is happy, but that the one who's unjust and wicked is miserable.

Polus/ So on your reasoning this man Archelaus is miserable?

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, if he is in fact unjust.

Polus/ Why of course he's unjust! The sovereignty which he now holds doesn't belong to him at all, given the fact that his mother was a slave of Alcetas, Perdiccas' brother. By rights he was a slave of Alcetas, and if he wanted to do what's just, he'd still be a slave to Alcetas, and on your reasoning would be happy. As it is, how marvelously "miserable" he's turned out to be, now that he's committed the most heinous crimes. First he sends for this man, his very own master and uncle, on the pretext of restoring to him the sovereignty that Perdiccas had taken from him. He entertains him, gets him drunk, both him and his son Alexander, his own cousin and a boy about his own age. He then throws them into a wagon, drives it away at night, and slaughters and disposes of them both. And although he's committed these crimes, he remains unaware of how "miserable" he's become, and feels no remorse either. He refuses to become "happy" by justly bringing up his brother and conferring the sovereignty upon him, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy of about seven to whom the

sovereignty was by rights due to come. Instead, not long afterward, he throws him into a well and drowns him, telling the boy's mother Cleopatra that he fell into the well chasing a goose and lost his life. For this very reason now, because he's committed the most terrible of crimes of any in Macedonia, he's the most "miserable" of all Macedonians instead of the happiest, and no doubt there are some in Athens, beginning with yourself, who' prefer being any other Macedonian at all to being Archelaus.

Socrates/ Already at the start of our discussions, Polus, I praised you because I thought you were well educated in oratory. But I also thought that you had neglected the practice of discussion. And now is this all there is to the argument by which even a child could refute me, and do you suppose that when I say that a person who acts unjustly is not happy, I now stand refuted by you by means of this argument? Where did you get that idea, my good man? As a matter of fact, I disagree with every single thing you say!

Polus/ You're just unwilling to admit it. You really do think it's the way I say it is.

Socrates/ My wonderful man, you're trying to refute me in oratorical style, the way people in law courts do when they think they're refuting some claim. There, too, one side thinks it's refuting the other when it produces many reputable witnesses on behalf of the arguments it presents, while the person who asserts the opposite produces only one witness, or none at all. This "refutation" is worthless, as far as truth is concerned, for it might happen sometimes that an individual is brought down by the false testimony of many reputable people. Now too, nearly every Athenian and alien will take your side on the things you're saying, if it's witnesses you want to produce against me to show that what I say isn't true. Nicias the son of Niceratus will testify for you, if you like, and his brothers along with him, the ones whose tripods are standing

in a row in the precinct of Dionysus. Aristocrates the son of Scellias will too, if you like, the one to whom that handsome votive offering in the precinct of Pythian Apollo belongs. And so will the whole house of Pericles, if you like, or any other local family you care to choose. Nevertheless, though I'm only one person, I don't agree with you. You don't compel me; instead you produce many false witnesses against me and try to banish me from my property, the truth. For my part, if I don't produce you as a single witness to agree with what I'm saying, then I suppose I've achieved nothing worth mentioning concerning the things we've been discussing. And I suppose you haven't either, if I don't testify on your side, though I'm just one person, and you disregard all these other people.

There is, then, this style of refutation, the one you and many others accept. There's also another, one that I accept. Let's compare the one with the other and see if they'll differ in any way. It's true, after all, that the matters in dispute between us are not at all insignificant ones, but pretty nearly those it's most admirable to have knowledge about, and most shameful not to. For the heart of the matter is that of recognizing or failing to recognize who is happy and who is not. To take first the immediate question our present discussion's about: you believe that it's possible for a man who behaves unjustly and who is unjust to be happy, since you believe Archaelaus to be both unjust and happy. Are we to understand that this is precisely your view?

Polus/ That's right.

Socrates/ And I say that that's impossible. This is one point in dispute between us. Fair enough. Although he acts unjustly, he'll be happy—that is, if he gets his due punishment?

Polus/ Oh no, certainly not! That's how he'd be the most miserable!

Socrates/ But if a man who acts unjustly doesn't get his due, then, on your reasoning, he'll be happy?

Polus/ That's what I say.

Socrates/ On my view of it, Polus, a man who acts unjustly, a man who is unjust, is thoroughly miserable, the more so if he doesn't get his due punishment for the wrongdoing he commits, the less so if he pays and receives what is due at the hands of both gods and men.

Polus/ What an absurd position you're trying to maintain, Socrates!

Socrates/ Yes, and I'll try to get you to take the same position too, my good man, for I consider you a friend. For now, these are the points we differ on. Please look at them with me. I said earlier, didn't I, that doing what's unjust is worse than suffering it?

Polus/ Yes, you did.

Socrates/ And you said that suffering it is worse.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And I said that those who do what's unjust are miserable, and was "refuted" by you.

Polus/ You certainly were, by Zeus!

Socrates/ So you think, Polus.

Polus/ So I truly think.

Socrates/ Perhaps. And again, you think that those who do what's unjust are happy, so long as they don't pay what is due.

Polus/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ Whereas I say that they're the most miserable, while those who pay their due are less so. Would you like to refute this too?

Polus/ Why, that's even more "difficult" to refute than the other claim, Socrates!

Socrates/ Not difficult, surely, Polus. It's impossible. What's true is never refuted.

Polus/ What do you mean? Take a man who's caught doing something unjust, say, plotting to set himself up as tyrant. Suppose that he's caught, put on the rack, castrated, and has his eyes burned out. Suppose that he's subjected to a host of other abuses of all sorts, and then made to witness his wife and children undergo the same. In the end he's impaled or tarred. Will he be happier than if he hadn't got caught, had set himself up as tyrant, and lived out his life ruling in his city and doing whatever he liked, a person envied and counted happy by fellow citizens and aliens alike? Is this what you say is impossible to refute?

Socrates/ This time you're spooking me, Polus, instead of refuting me. Just before, you were arguing by testimony. Still, refresh my memory on a small point: if the man plots to set himself up as tyrant unjustly, you said?

Polus/ Yes, I did.

Socrates/ In that case neither of them will ever be the happier one, neither the one who gains tyrannical power unjustly, nor the one who pays what is due, for of two miserable people one could not be happier than the other. But the one who avoids getting caught and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable one. What's this, Polus? You're laughing? Is this now some further style of refutation, to laugh when somebody makes a point, instead of refuting him?

Polus/ Don't you think you've been refuted already, Socrates, when you're saying things the likes of which no human being would maintain? Just ask anyone of these people.

Socrates/ Polus, I'm not one of the politicians. Last year I was elected to the Council by lot, and when our tribe was presiding and I had to call for a vote, I came in for a laugh. I

didn't know how to do it. So please don't tell me to call for a vote from the people present here. If you have no better "refutations" than these to offer, do as I suggested just now: let me have my turn, and you try the kind of refutation I think is called for.

For I do know how to produce one witness to whatever I'm saying, and that's the man I'm having a discussion with. The majority I disregard. And I do know how to call for a vote from one man, but I don't even discuss things with the majority. See if you'll be willing to give me a refutation, then, by answering the questions you're asked. For I do believe that you and I and everybody else consider doing what's unjust worse than suffering it, and not paying what is due worse than paying it.

Polus/ And I do believe that I don't, and that no other person does, either. So you'd take suffering what's unjust over doing it, would you?

Socrates/ Yes, and so would you and everyone else.

Polus/ Far from it! I wouldn't, you wouldn't, and nobody else would, either.

Socrates/ Won't you answer, then?

Polus/ I certainly will. I'm eager to know what you'll say, in fact.

Socrates/ So that you'll know, answer me as though this were my first question to you. Which do you think is worse, Polus, doing what's unjust or suffering it?

Polus/ I think suffering it is.

Socrates/ You do? Which do you think is more shameful, doing what's unjust or suffering it? Tell me.

Polus/ Doing it.

Socrates/ Now if doing it is in fact more shameful, isn't it also worse?

Polus/ No, not in the least.

Socrates/ I see. Evidently you don't believe that admirable and good are the same, or that bad and shameful are.

Polus/ No, I certainly don't.

Socrates/ Well, what about this? When you call all admirable things admirable, bodies, for example, or colors, shapes and sounds, or practices, is it with nothing in view that you do so each time? Take admirable bodies first. Don't you call them admirable either in virtue of their usefulness, relative to whatever it is that each is useful for, or else in virtue of some pleasure, if it makes the people who look at them get enjoyment from looking at them? In the case of the admirability of a body, can you mention anything other than these?

Polus/ No, I can't.

Socrates/ Doesn't the same hold for all the other things? Don't you call shapes and colors admirable on account of either some pleasure or benefit or both?

Polus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Doesn't this also hold for sounds and all things musical?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And certainly things that pertain to laws and practices—the admirable ones, that is—don't fall outside the limits of being either pleasant or beneficial, or both, I take it.

Polus/ No, I don't think they do.

Socrates/ Doesn't the same hold for the admirability of the fields of learning, too?

Polus/ Yes indeed. Yes, Socrates, your present definition of the admirable in terms of pleasure and good is an admirable one.

Socrates/ And so is my definition of the shameful in terms of the opposite, pain and bad, isn't it?

Polus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Therefore, whenever one of two admirable things is more admirable than the other, it is so because it surpasses the other either in one of these, pleasure or benefit, or in both.

Polus/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ And whenever one of two shameful things is more shameful than the other, it will be so because it surpasses the other either in pain or in badness. Isn't that necessarily so?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well now, what were we saying a moment ago about doing what's unjust and suffering it? Weren't you saying that suffering it is worse, but doing it more shameful?

Polus/ I was.

Socrates/ Now if doing what's unjust is in fact more shameful than suffering it, wouldn't it be so either because it is more painful and surpasses the other in pain, or because it surpasses it in badness, or both? Isn't that necessarily so, too?

Polus/ Of course it is.

Socrates/ Let's look at this first: does doing what's unjust surpass suffering it in pain, and do people who do it hurt more than people who suffer it?

Polus/ No, Socrates, that's not the case at all!

Socrates/ So it doesn't surpass it in pain, anyhow.

Polus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ So, if it doesn't surpass it in pain, it couldn't at this point surpass it in both.

Polus/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ This leaves it surpassing it only in the other thing.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ In badness.

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ So, because it surpasses it in badness, doing what's unjust would be worse than suffering it.

Polus/ That's clear.

Socrates/ Now didn't the majority of mankind, and you earlier, agree with us that doing what's unjust is more shameful than suffering it?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now, at least, it's turned out to be worse.

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Would you then welcome what's worse and what's more shameful over what is less so? Don't shrink back from answering, Polus. You won't get hurt in any way. Submit yourself nobly to the argument, as you would to a doctor, and answer me. Say yes or no to what I ask you.

Polus/ No, I wouldn't, Socrates.

Socrates/ And would any other person?

Polus/ No, I don't think so, not on this reasoning, anyhow.

Socrates/ I was right, then, when I said that neither you nor I nor any other person would take doing what's unjust over suffering it, for it really is something worse.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ So you see, Polus, that when the one refutation is compared with the other, there is no resemblance at all. Whereas everyone but me agrees with you, you are all I need, although you're just a party of one, for your agreement and testimony. It's you alone whom I call on for a vote; the others

I disregard. Let this be our verdict on this matter, then. Let's next consider the second point in dispute between us, that is whether a wrongdoer's paying what is due is the worst thing there is, as you were supposing, or whether his not paying it is even worse, as I was.

Let's look at it this way. Are you saying that paying what is due and being justly disciplined for wrongdoing are the same thing?

Polus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Can you say, then, that all just things aren't admirable, insofar as they are just? Think carefully and tell me.

Polus/ Yes, I think they are.

Socrates/ Consider this point, too. If somebody acts upon something, there also has to be something that has something done to it by the one acting upon it?

Polus/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ And that it has done to it what the thing acting upon it does, and in the sort of way the thing acting upon it does it? I mean, for example, that if somebody hits, there has to be something that's being hit?

Polus/ There has to be.

Socrates/ And if the hitter hits hard or quickly, the thing being hit is hit that way, too?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So the thing being hit gets acted upon in whatever way the hitting thing acts upon it?

Polus/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ So, too, if somebody performs surgical burning, then there has to be something that's being burned?

Polus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if he burns severely or painfully, the thing that's being burned is burned in whatever way the burning thing burns it?

Polus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Doesn't the same account also hold if a person makes a surgical cut? For something is being cut.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if the cut is large or deep or painful, the thing being cut is cut in whatever way the cutting thing cuts it?

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Summing it up, see if you agree with what I was saying just now, that in all cases, in whatever way the thing acting upon something acts upon it, the thing acted upon is acted upon in just that way.

Polus/ Yes, I do agree.

Socrates/ Taking this as agreed, is paying what is due a case of being acted upon or of acting upon something?

Polus/ It must be a case of being acted upon, Socrates.

Socrates/ By someone who acts?

Polus/ Of course. By the one administering discipline.

Socrates/ Now one who disciplines correctly disciplines justly?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Thereby acting justly, or not?

Polus/ Yes, justly.

Socrates/ So the one being disciplined is being acted upon justly when he pays what is due?

Polus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And it was agreed, I take it, that just things are admirable?

Polus/ That's right.

Socrates/ So one of these men does admirable things, and the other, the one being disciplined, has admirable things done to him.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ If they're admirable, then, aren't they good? For they're either pleasant or beneficial.

Polus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Hence, the one paying what is due has good things being done to him?

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Hence, he's being benefited?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is his benefit the one I take it to be? Does his soul undergo improvement if he's justly disciplined?

Polus/ Yes, that's likely.

Socrates/ Hence, one who pays what is due gets rid of something bad in his soul?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, is the bad thing he gets rid of the most serious one? Consider it this way: in the matter of a person's financial condition, do you detect any bad thing other than poverty?

Polus/ No, just poverty.

Socrates/ What about that of a person's physical condition? Would you say that what is bad here consists of weakness, disease, ugliness, and the like?

Polus/ Yes, I would.

Socrates/ Do you believe that there's also some corrupt condition of the soul?

Polus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And don't you call this condition injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and the like?

Polus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Of these three things, one's finances, one's body, and one's soul, you said there are three states of corruption, namely poverty, disease, and injustice?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Which of these states of corruption is the most shameful? Isn't it injustice, and corruption of one's soul in general?

Polus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And if it's the most shameful, it's also the worst?

Polus/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean this: What we agreed on earlier implies that what's most shameful is so always because it's the source either of the greatest pain, or of harm, or of both.

Polus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And now we've agreed that injustice, and corruption of soul as a whole, is the most shameful thing.

Polus/ So we have.

Socrates/ So either it's most painful and is most shameful because it surpasses the others in pain, or else in harm, or in both?

Polus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Now is being unjust, undisciplined, cowardly, and ignorant more painful than being poor or sick?

Polus/ No, I don't think so, Socrates, given what we've said, anyhow.

Socrates/ So the reason that corruption of one's soul is the most shameful of them all is that it surpasses the others by

some monstrously great harm and astounding badness, since it doesn't surpass them in pain, according to your reasoning.

Polus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But what is surpassing in greatest harm would, I take it, certainly be the worst thing there is.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Injustice, then, lack of discipline and all other forms of corruption of soul are the worst thing there is.

Polus/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ Now, what is the craft that gets rid of poverty? Isn't it that of financial management?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ What's the one that gets rid of disease? Isn't it that of medicine?

Polus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ What's the one that gets rid of corruption and injustice? If you're stuck, look at it this way: where and to whom do we take people who are physically sick?

Polus/ To doctors, Socrates.

Socrates/ Where do we take people who behave unjustly and without discipline?

Polus/ To judges, you mean?

Socrates/ Isn't it so they'll pay what's due?

Polus/ Yes, I agree.

Socrates/ Now don't those who administer discipline correctly employ a kind of justice in doing so?

Polus/ That's clear.

Socrates/ It's financial management, then, that gets rid of poverty, medicine that gets rid of disease, and justice that gets rid of injustice and indiscipline.

Polus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Which of these, now, is the most admirable?

Polus/ Of which, do you mean?

Socrates/ Of financial management, medicine, and justice.

Polus/ Justice is by far, Socrates.

Socrates/ Doesn't it in that case provide either the most pleasure, or benefit, or both, if it really is the most admirable?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, is getting medical treatment something pleasant? Do people who get it enjoy getting it?

Polus/ No, I don't think so.

Socrates/ But it is beneficial, isn't it?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Because they're getting rid of something very bad, so that it's worth their while to endure the pain and so get well.

Polus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, would a man be happiest, as far as his body goes, if he's under treatment, or if he weren't even sick to begin with?

Polus/ If he weren't even sick, obviously.

Socrates/ Because happiness evidently isn't a matter of getting rid of something bad; it's rather a matter of not even contracting it to begin with.

Polus/ That's so.

Socrates/ Very well. Of two people, each of whom has something bad in either body or soul, which is the more miserable one, the one who is treated and gets rid of the bad thing or the one who doesn't but keeps it?

Polus/ The one who isn't treated, it seems to me.

Socrates/ Now, wasn't paying what's due getting rid of the worst thing there is, corruption?

Polus/ It was.

Socrates/ Yes, because such justice makes people self-controlled, I take it, and more just. It proves to be a treatment against corruption.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The happiest man, then, is the one who doesn't have any badness in his soul, now that this has been shown to be the most serious kind of badness.

Polus/ That's clear.

Socrates/ And second, I suppose, is the man who gets rid of it.

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ This is the man who gets lectured and lashed, the one who pays what is due.

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The man who keeps it, then, and who doesn't get rid of it, is the one whose life is the worst.

Polus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Isn't this actually the man who, although he commits the most serious crimes and uses methods that are most unjust, succeeds in avoiding being lectured and disciplined and paying his due, as Archelaus according to you, and the other tyrants, orators, and potentates have put themselves in a position to do?

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Yes, my good man, I take it that these people have managed to accomplish pretty much the same thing as a person who has contracted very serious illnesses, but, by avoiding treatment manages to avoid paying what's due to the doctors for his bodily faults, fearing, as would a child, cauterization or surgery because they're painful. Don't you think so, too?

Polus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ It's because he evidently doesn't know what health and bodily excellence are like. For on the basis of what we're now agreed on, it looks as though those who avoid paying what is due also do the same sort of thing, Polus. They focus on its painfulness, but are blind to its benefit and are ignorant of how much more miserable it is to live with an unhealthy soul than with an unhealthy body, a soul that's rotten with injustice and impiety. This is also the reason they go to any length to avoid paying what is due and getting rid of the worst thing there is. They find themselves funds and friends, and ways to speak as persuasively as possible. Now if what we're agreed on is true, Polus, are you aware of what things follow from our argument? Or would you like us to set them out?

Polus/ Yes, if you think we should anyhow.

Socrates/ Does it follow that injustice, and doing what is unjust, is the worst thing there is?

Polus/ Yes, apparently.

Socrates/ And it has indeed been shown that paying what is due is what gets rid of this bad thing?

Polus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And that if it isn't paid, the bad thing is retained?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, doing what's unjust is the second worst thing. Not paying what's due when one has done what's unjust is by its nature the first worst thing, the very worst of all.

Polus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Now wasn't this the point in dispute between us, my friend? You considered Archelaus happy, a man who committed the gravest crimes without paying what was due, whereas I took the opposite view, that whoever avoids paying

his due for his wrongdoing, whether he's Archelaus or any other man, deserves to be miserable beyond all other men, and that one who does what's unjust is always more miserable than the one who suffers it, and the one who avoids paying what's due always more miserable than the one who does pay it. Weren't these the things I said?

Polus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Hasn't it been proved that what was said is true?

Polus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Fair enough. If these things are true then, Polus, what is the great use of oratory? For on the basis of what we're agreed on now, what a man should guard himself against most of all is doing what's unjust, knowing that he will have trouble enough if he does. Isn't that so?

Polus/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ And if he or anyone else he cares about acts unjustly, he should voluntarily go to the place where he'll pay his due as soon as possible; he should go to the judge as though he were going to a doctor, anxious that the disease of injustice shouldn't be protracted and cause his soul to fester incurably. What else can we say, Polus, if our previous agreements really stand? Aren't these statements necessarily consistent with our earlier ones in only this way?

Polus/ Well yes, Socrates. What else are we to say?

Socrates/ So, if oratory is used to defend injustice, Polus, one's own or that of one's relatives, companions, or children, or that of one's country when it acts unjustly, it is of no use to us at all, unless one takes it to be useful for the opposite purpose: that he should accuse himself first and foremost, and then too his family and anyone else dear to him who happens to behave unjustly at any time; and that he should not keep his wrongdoing hidden but bring it out into the open, so that he may pay his due and get well; and compel himself

and the others not to play the coward, but to grit his teeth and present himself with grace and courage as to a doctor for cauterization and surgery, pursuing what's good and admirable without taking any account of the pain. And if his unjust behavior merits flogging, he should present himself to be whipped; if it merits imprisonment, to be imprisoned; if a fine, to pay it; if exile, to be exiled; and if execution, to be executed. He should be his own chief accuser, and the accuser of other members of his family, and use his oratory for the purpose of getting rid of the worst thing there is, injustice, as the unjust acts are being exposed. Are we to affirm or deny this, Polus?

Polus/ I think these statements are absurd, Socrates, though no doubt you think they agree with those expressed earlier.

Socrates/ Then either we should abandon those, or else these necessarily follow?

Polus/ Yes, that's how it is.

Socrates/ And, on the other hand, to reverse the case, suppose a man had to harm someone, an enemy or anybody at all, provided that he didn't suffer anything unjust from this enemy himself—for this is something to be on guard against—if the enemy did something unjust against another person, then our man should see to it in every way, both in what he does and what he says, that his enemy does not go to the judge and pay his due. And if he does go, he should scheme to get his enemy off without paying what's due. If he's stolen a lot of gold, he should scheme to get him not to return it but to keep it and spend it in an unjust and godless way both on himself and his people. And if his crimes merit the death penalty, he should scheme to keep him from being executed, preferably never to die at all but to live forever in corruption, but failing that, to have him live as long as possible in that condition.

Yes, this is the sort of thing I think oratory is useful for, Polus, since for the person who has no intention of behaving unjustly it doesn't seem to me to have much use—if in fact it has any use at all—since its usefulness hasn't in any way become apparent so far.

Callicles/ Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest about this or is he joking?

Chaerephon/ I think he's in dead earnest about this, Callicles. There's nothing like asking him, though.

Callicles/ By the gods! Just the thing I'm eager to do. Tell me, Socrates, are we to take you as being in earnest now, or joking? For if you are in earnest, and these things you're saying are really true, won't this human life of ours be turned upside down, and won't everything we do evidently be the opposite of what we should do?

Socrates/ Well, Callicles, if human beings didn't share common experiences, some sharing one, others sharing another, but one of us had some unique experience not shared by others, it wouldn't be easy for him to communicate what he experienced to the other. I say this because I realize that you and I are both now actually sharing a common experience: each of the two of us is a lover of two objects, I of Alcibiades, Clinias' son, and of philosophy, and you of the demos [people] of Athens, and the Demos who's the son of Pyrilampes. I notice that in each case you're unable to contradict your beloved, clever though you are, no matter what he says or what he claims is so. You keep shifting back and forth. If you say anything in the Assembly and the Athenian demos denies it, you shift your ground and say what it wants to hear. Other things like this happen to you when you're with that good-looking young man, the son of Pyrilampes. You're unable to oppose what your beloveds say or propose, so that if somebody heard you say what you do on their account and was amazed

at how absurd that is, you'd probably say—if you were minded to tell him the truth—that unless somebody stops your beloveds from saying what they say, you'll never stop saying these things either. In that case you must believe that you're bound to hear me say things like that, too, and instead of being surprised at my saying them, you must stop my beloved, philosophy, from saying them. For she always says what you now hear me say, my dear friend, and she's by far less fickle than my other beloved. As for that son of Clinias, what he says differs from one time to the next, but what philosophy says always stays the same, and she's saying things that now astound you, although you were present when they were said. So, either refute her and show that doing what's unjust without paying what is due for it is not the ultimate of all bad things, as I just now was saying it is, or else, if you leave this unrefuted, then by the Dog, the god of the Egyptians, Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles, but will be dissonant with you all your life long. And yet for my part, my good man, I think it's better to have my lyre or a chorus that I might lead out of tune and dissonant, and have the vast majority of men disagree with me and contradict me, than to be out of harmony with myself, to contradict myself, though I'm only one person.

Callicles/ Socrates, I think you're grandstanding in these speeches, acting like a true crowd pleaser. Here you are, playing to the crowd now that Polus has had the same thing happen to him that he accused Gorgias of letting you do to him. For he said, didn't he, that when Gorgias was asked by you whether he would teach anyone who came to him wanting to learn oratory but without expertise in what's just, Gorgias was ashamed and, out of deference to human custom, since people would take it ill if a person refused, said that he'd teach him. And because Gorgias agreed on this point, he said, he was forced to contradict himself, just the thing you like. He

ridiculed you at the time, and rightly so, as I think anyhow. And now the very same thing has happened to him. And for this same reason I don't approve of Polus: he agreed with you that doing what's unjust is more shameful than suffering it. As a result of this admission he was bound and gagged by you in the discussion, too ashamed to say what he thought. Although you claim to be pursuing the truth, you're in fact bringing the discussion around to the sort of crowd-pleasing vulgarities that are admirable only by law and not by nature. And these, nature and law, are for the most part opposed to each other, so if a person is ashamed and doesn't dare to say what he thinks, he's forced to contradict himself. This is in fact the clever trick you've thought of, with which you work mischief in your discussions: if a person makes a statement in terms of law, you slyly question him in terms of nature; if he makes it in terms of nature, you question him in terms of law. That's just what happened here, on the question of doing what's unjust versus suffering it. While Polus meant that doing it is more shameful by law, you pursued the argument as though he meant by nature. For by nature all that is worse is also more shameful, like suffering what's unjust, whereas by law doing it is more shameful. No, no man would put up with suffering what's unjust; only a slave would do so, one who is better dead than alive, who when he's treated unjustly and abused can't protect himself or anyone else he cares about. I believe that the people who institute our laws are the weak and the many. They do this, and they assign praise and blame with themselves and their own advantage in mind. They're afraid of the more powerful among men, the ones who are capable of having a greater share, and so they say that getting more than one's share is "shameful" and "unjust," and that doing what's unjust is trying to get more than one's share. They do this so that those people won't get a greater share

than they. I think they like getting an equal share, since they are inferior.

These are the reasons why trying to get a greater share than most is said to be unjust and shameful by law and why they call it doing what's unjust. But I believe that nature itself reveals that it's a just thing for the better man and the more capable man to have a greater share than the worse man and the less capable man. Nature shows that this is so in many places; both among the other animals and in whole cities and races of men, it shows that this is what justice has been decided to be: that the superior rule the inferior and have a greater share than they. For what sort of justice did Xerxes go by when he campaigned against Greece, or his father when he campaigned against Scythia? Countless other such examples could be mentioned. I believe that these men do these things in accordance with the nature of what's just—yes, by Zeus, in accordance with the law of nature, and presumably not with the one we institute. We mold the best and the most powerful among us, taking them while they're still young, like lion cubs, and with charms and incantations we subdue them into slavery, telling them that one is supposed to get no more than his fair share, and that that's what's admirable and just. But I believe that if a man whose nature is equal to it were to arise, one who had shaken off, torn apart, and escaped all this, who had trampled underfoot our documents, our tricks and charms, and all our laws that violate nature, he, the slave, would rise up and be revealed as our master, and here the justice of nature would shine forth. I think Pindar, too, refers to what I'm saying in that song in which he says that

> Law, the king of all,
> Of mortals and the immortal gods

—this, he says;

> Brings on and renders just what is most violent
> With towering hand. I take as proof of this

The deeds of Heracles. For he … unbought …

His words are something like that—I don't know the song well—he says that Heracles drove off Geryon's cattle, even though he hadn't paid for them and Geryon hadn't given them to him, on the ground that this is what's just by nature, and that cattle and all the other possessions of those who are worse and inferior belong to the one who's better and superior.

This is the truth of the matter, as you will acknowledge if you abandon philosophy and move on to more important things. Philosophy is no doubt a delightful thing, Socrates, as long as one is exposed to it in moderation at the appropriate time of life. But if one spends more time with it than he should, it's the undoing of mankind. For even if one is naturally well favored but engages in philosophy far beyond that appropriate time of life, he can't help but turn out to be inexperienced in everything a man who's to be admirable and good and well thought of is supposed to be experienced in. Such people turn out to be inexperienced in the laws of their city or in the kind of speech one must use to deal with people on matters of business, whether in public or private, inexperienced also in human pleasures and appetites and, in short, inexperienced in the ways of human beings altogether. So, when they venture into some private or political activity, they become a laughingstock, as I suppose men in politics do when they venture into your pursuits and your kind of speech. What results is Euripides' saying, where he says that "each man shines" in this and "presses on to this;

allotting the greatest part of the day to this,
where he finds himself at his best."

And whatever a man's inferior in, he avoids and rails against, while he praises the other thing, thinking well of himself and supposing that in this way he's praising himself. I believe, however, that it's most appropriate to have a share of both. To partake of as much philosophy as your education requires is

an admirable thing, and it's not shameful to practice philosophy while you're a boy, but when you still do it after you've grown older and become a man, the thing gets to be ridiculous, Socrates! My own reaction to men who philosophize is very much like that to men who speak haltingly and play like children. When I see a child, for whom it's still quite proper to make conversation this way, halting in its speech and playing like a child, I'm delighted. I find it a delightful thing, a sign of good breeding, and appropriate for the child's age. But when I hear a small child speaking clearly, I think it's a harsh thing; it hurts my ears. I think it is something fit for a slave. And when one hears a man speaking haltingly or sees him playing like a child, it strikes me as ridiculous and unmanly, deserving of a flogging. Now, I react in the same way to men who engage in philosophy, too. When I see philosophy in a young boy, I approve of it; I think it's appropriate and consider such a person well-bred, whereas I consider one who doesn't engage in philosophy ill-bred, one who'll never count himself deserving of any admirable or noble thing. But when I see an older man still engaging in philosophy and not giving it up, I think such a man by this time needs a flogging. For, as I was just now saying, it's typical that such a man, even if he's naturally very well favored, becomes unmanly and avoids the centers of his city and the marketplaces—in which, according to the poet, men attain "preeminence"—and, instead, lives the rest of his life in hiding, whispering in a corner with three or four boys, never uttering anything well-bred, important, or apt.

Socrates, I do have a rather warm regard for you. I find myself feeling what Zethus, whose words I recalled just now, felt toward Amphion in Euripides' play. In fact, the sorts of things he said to his brother come to my mind to say to you. "You're neglecting the things you should devote yourself to, Socrates, and though your spirit's nature is so noble, you

show yourself to the world in the shape of a boy. You couldn't put a speech together correctly before councils of justice or utter any plausible or persuasive sound. Nor could you make any bold proposal on behalf of anyone else." And so then, my dear Socrates—please don't be upset with me, for it's with good will toward you that I'll say this—don't you think it's shameful to be the way I take you to be, and others who ever press on too far in philosophy? As it is, if someone got hold of you or of anyone else like you and took you off to prison on the charge that you're doing something unjust when in fact you aren't, be assured that you wouldn't have any use for yourself. You' get dizzy, your mouth would hang open and you wouldn't know what to say. You' come up for trial and face some no good wretch of an accuser and be put to death, if death is what he'd want to condemn you to. And yet, Socrates, "how can this be a wise thing, the craft which took a well-favored man and made him worse," able neither to protect himself nor to rescue himself or anyone else from the gravest dangers, to be robbed of all of his property by his enemies, and to live a life with absolutely no rights in his city? Such a man one could knock on the jaw without paying what's due for it, to put it rather crudely. Listen to me, my good man, and stop this refuting. "Practice the sweet music of an active life and do it where you'll get a reputation for being intelligent. Leave these subtleties to others"—whether we should call them just silly or outright nonsense—"which will cause you to live in empty houses," and envy not those men who refute such trivia, but those who have life and renown, and many other good things as well.

Socrates/ If I actually had a soul made of gold, Callicles, don't you think I'd be pleased to find one of those stones on which they test gold? And if this stone to which I intended to take my soul were the best stone and it agreed that my soul

had been well cared for, don't you think I could know well at that point that I'm in good shape and need no further test?

Callicles/ What's the point of your question, Socrates?

Socrates/ I'll tell you. I believe that by running into you, I've run into just such a piece of luck.

Callicles/ Why do you say that?

Socrates/ I know well that if you concur with what my soul believes, then that is the very truth. I realize that a person who is going to put a soul to an adequate test to see whether it lives rightly or not must have three qualities, all of which you have: knowledge, good will, and frankness.

I run into many people who aren't able to test me because they're not wise like you. Others are wise, but they're not willing to tell me the truth, because they don't care for me the way you do. As for these two visitors, Gorgias and Polus, they're both wise and fond of me, but rather more lacking in frankness, and more ashamed than they should be. No wonder! They've come to such a depth of shame that, because they are ashamed, each of them dares to contradict himself, face to face with many people, and on topics of the greatest importance. You have all these qualities, which the others don't. You're well-enough educated, as many of the Athenians would attest, and you have good will toward me. What's my proof of this? I'll tell you. I know, Callicles, that there are four of you who've become partners in wisdom, you, Teisander of Aphidnae, Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of Cholarges. Once I overheard you deliberating on how far one should cultivate wisdom, and I know that some such opinion as this was winning out among you: you called on each other not to enthusiastically pursue philosophizing to the point of pedantry but to be careful not to become wiser than necessary and so inadvertently bring yourselves to ruin. So, now that I hear you giving me the same advice you gave your closest

companions, I have sufficient proof that you really do have good will toward me. And as to my claim that you're able to speak frankly without being ashamed, you yourself say so and the speech you gave a moment ago bears you out. It's clear, then, that this is how these matters stand at the moment. If there's any point in our discussions on which you agree with me, then that point will have been adequately put to the test by you and me, and it will not be necessary to put it to any further test, for you'd never have conceded the point through lack of wisdom or excess of shame, and you wouldn't do so by lying to me, either. You are my friend, as you yourself say, too. So, our mutual agreement will really lay hold of truth in the end. Most admirable of all, Callicles, is the examination of those issues about which you took me to task, that of what a man is supposed to be like, and of what he's supposed to devote himself to and how far, when he's older and when he's young. For my part, if I engage in anything that's improper in my own life, please know well that I do not make this mistake intentionally but out of my ignorance. So don't leave off lecturing me the way you began, but show me clearly what it is I'm to devote myself to, and in what way I might come by it; if you catch me agreeing with you now but at a later time not doing the very things I've agreed upon, then take me for a very stupid fellow and don't bother ever afterward with lecturing me, on the ground that I'm a worthless fellow.

Please restate your position for me from the beginning. What is it that you and Pindar hold to be true of what's just by nature? That the superior should take by force what belongs to the inferior, that the better should rule the worse and the more worthy have a greater share than the less worthy? You're not saying anything else, are you? I do remember correctly?

Callicles/ Yes, that's what I was saying then, and I still say so now, too.

Socrates/ Is it the same man you call both “better” and “superior”? I wasn’t able then, either, to figure out what you meant. Is it the stronger ones you call superior, and should those who are weaker take orders from the one who’s stronger? That’s what I think you were trying to show then also, when you said that large cities attack small ones according to what’s just by nature, because they’re superior and stronger, assuming that superior, stronger and better are the same. Or is it possible for one to be better and also inferior and weaker, or greater but more wretched? Or do “better” and “superior” have the same definition? Please define this for me clearly. Are superior, better and stronger the same or are they different?

Callicles/ Very well, I’m telling you clearly that they’re the same.

Socrates/ Now aren’t the many superior by nature to the one? They’re the ones who in fact impose the laws upon the one, as you were saying yourself a moment ago.

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ So the rules of the many are the rules of the superior.

Callicles/ Yes, they are.

Socrates/ Aren’t they the rules of the better? For by your reasoning, I take it, the superior are the better.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And aren’t the rules of these people admirable by nature, seeing that they’re the superior ones?

Callicles/ That’s my view.

Socrates/ Now, isn’t it a rule of the many that it’s just to have an equal share and that doing what’s unjust is more shameful than suffering it, as you yourself were saying just now? Is this so or not? Be careful that you in your turn don’t

get caught being ashamed now. Do the many observe or do they not observe the rule that it's just to have an equal and not a greater share, and that doing what's unjust is more shameful than suffering it? Don't grudge me your answer to this, Callicles, so that if you agree with me I may have my confirmation from you, seeing that it's the agreement of a man competent to pass judgment.

Callicles/ All right, the many do have that rule.

Socrates/ It's not only by law, then, that doing what's unjust is more shameful than suffering it, or just to have an equal share, but it's so by nature, too. So it looks as though you weren't saying what's true earlier and weren't right to accuse me when you said that nature and law were opposed to each other and that I, well aware of this, am making mischief in my statements, taking any statement someone makes meant in terms of nature, in terms of law, and any statement meant in terms of law, in terms of nature.

Callicles/ This man will not stop talking nonsense! Tell me, Socrates, aren't you ashamed, at your age, of trying to catch people's words and of making hay out of someone's tripping on a phrase? Do you take me to mean by people being superior anything else than their being better? Haven't I been telling you all along that by "better" and "superior" I mean the same thing? Or do you suppose that I'm saying that if a rubbish heap of slaves and motley men, worthless except perhaps in physical strength, gets together and makes any statements, then these are the rules?

Socrates/ Fair enough, wisest Callicles. Is this what you're saying?

Callicles/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ Well, my marvelous friend, I guessed some time ago that it's some such thing you mean by "superior," and I'm questioning you because I'm intent upon knowing clearly what

you mean. I don't really suppose that you think two are better than one or that your slaves are better than you just because they're stronger than you. Tell me once more from the beginning, what do you mean by the better, seeing that it's not the stronger? And, my wonderful man, go easier on me in your teaching, so that I won't quit your school.

Callicles/ You're being ironic, Socrates.

Socrates/ No I'm not, Callicles, by Zethus—the character you were invoking in being ironic with me so often just now! But come and tell me: whom do you mean by the better?

Callicles/ I mean the worthier.

Socrates/ So do you see that you yourself are uttering words, without making anything clear? Won't you say whether by the better and the superior you mean the more intelligent, or some others?

Callicles/ Yes, by Zeus, they're very much the ones I mean.

Socrates/ So on your reasoning it will often be the case that a single intelligent person is superior to countless unintelligent ones, that this person should rule and they be ruled, and that the one ruling should have a greater share than the ones being ruled. This is the meaning I think you intend—and I'm not trying to catch you with a phrase—if the one is superior to these countless others.

Callicles/ Yes, that's what I do mean. This is what I take the just by nature to be: that the better one, the more intelligent one, that is, both rules over and has a greater share than his inferiors.

Socrates/ Hold it right there! What can your meaning be this time? Suppose we were assembled together in great numbers in the same place, as we are now, and we held in common a great supply of food and drink, and suppose we were a motley group, some strong and some weak, but one of us, being a doctor, was more intelligent about these things.

He would, very likely, be stronger than some and weaker than others. Now this man, being more intelligent than we are, will certainly be better and superior in these matters?

Callicles/ Yes, he will.

Socrates/ So should he have a share of this food greater than ours because he's better? Or should he be the one to distribute everything because he's in charge, but not to get a greater share to consume and use up on his own body if he's to escape being punished for it? Shouldn't he, instead, have a greater share than some and a lesser one than others, and if he should happen to be the weakest of all, shouldn't the best man have the least share of all, Callicles? Isn't this so, my good man?

Callicles/ You keep talking of food and drink and doctors and such nonsense. That's not what I mean!

Socrates/ Don't you mean that the more intelligent one is the better one? Say yes or no.

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ But not that the better should have a greater share?

Callicles/ Not of food or drink, anyhow.

Socrates/ I see. Of clothes, perhaps? Should the weaver have the biggest garment and go about wearing the greatest number and the most beautiful clothes?

Callicles/ What do you mean, clothes?

Socrates/ But when it comes to shoes, obviously the most intelligent, the best man in that area should have the greater share. Perhaps the cobbler should walk around with the largest and greatest number of shoes on.

Callicles/ What do you mean, shoes? You keep on with this nonsense!

Socrates/ Well, if that's not the sort of thing you mean, perhaps it's this. Take a farmer, a man intelligent and admirable and good about land. Perhaps he should have the greater share of seed and use the largest possible quantity of it on his own land.

Callicles/ How you keep on saying the same things, Socrates!

Socrates/ Yes, Callicles, not only the same things, but also about the same subjects.

Callicles/ By the gods! You simply don't let up on your continual talk of shoemakers and cleaners, cooks and doctors, as if our discussion were about them!

Socrates/ Won't you say whom it's about, then? What does the superior, the more intelligent man have a greater share of, and have it justly? Will you neither bear with my promptings nor tell me yourself?

Callicles/ I've been saying it all along. First of all, by the ones who are the superior I don't mean cobblers or cooks, but those who are intelligent about the affairs of the city, about the way it's to be well managed. And not only intelligent, but also brave, competent to accomplish whatever they have in mind, without slackening off because of softness of spirit.

Socrates/ Do you see, my good Callicles, that you and I are not accusing each other of the same thing? You claim that I'm always saying the same things, and you criticize me for it, whereas I, just the opposite of you, claim that you never say the same things about the same subjects. At one time you were defining the better and the superior as the stronger, then again as the more intelligent, and now you've come up with something else again: the superior and the better are now said by you to be the braver. But tell me, my good fellow, once and for all, whom you mean by the better and the superior, and what they're better and superior in.

Callicles/ But I've already said that I mean those who are intelligent in the affairs of the city, and brave, too. It's fitting that they should be the ones who rule their cities, and what's just is that they, as the rulers, should have a greater share than the others, the ruled.

Socrates/ But what of themselves, my friend?

Callicles/ What of what?

Socrates/ Ruling or being ruled?

Callicles/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean each individual ruling himself. Or is there no need at all for him to rule himself, but only to rule others?

Callicles/ What do you mean, rule himself?

Socrates/ Nothing very subtle. Just what the many mean: being self-controlled and master of oneself, ruling the pleasures and appetites within oneself.

Callicles/ How delightful you are! By the self-controlled you mean the stupid ones!

Socrates/ How so? There's no one who' fail to recognize that I mean no such thing.

Callicles/ Yes you do, Socrates, very much so. How could a man prove to be happy if he's enslaved to anyone at all? Rather, this is what's admirable and just by nature—and I'll say it to you now with all frankness—that the man who'll live correctly ought to allow his own appetites to get as large as possible and not restrain them. And when they are as large as possible, he ought to be competent to devote himself to them by virtue of his bravery and intelligence, and to fill them with whatever he may have an appetite for at the time. But this isn't possible for the many, I believe; hence, they become detractors of people like this because of the shame they feel, while they conceal their own impotence. And they say that lack of discipline is shameful, as I was saying earlier, and so

they enslave men who are better by nature, and while they themselves lack the ability to provide for themselves fulfillment for their pleasures, their own lack of courage leads them to praise self-control and justice. As for all those who were either sons of kings to begin with or else naturally competent to secure some position of rule for themselves as tyrants or potentates, what in truth could be more shameful and worse than self-control and justice for these people who, although they are free to enjoy good things without any interference, should bring as master upon themselves the law of the many, their talk, and their criticism? Or how could they exist without becoming miserable under that "admirable" regime of justice and self-control, allotting no greater share to their friends than to their enemies, and in this way "rule" in their cities? Rather, the truth of it, Socrates—the thing you claim to pursue—is like this: wantonness, lack of discipline, and freedom, if available in good supply, are excellence and happiness; as for these other things, these fancy phrases, these contracts of men that go against nature, they're worthless nonsense!

Socrates/ The way you pursue your argument, speaking frankly as you do, certainly does you credit, Callicles. For you are now saying clearly what others are thinking but are unwilling to say. I beg you, then, not to relax in any way, so that it may really become clear how we're to live. Tell me: are you saying that if a person is to be the kind of person he should be, he shouldn't restrain his appetites but let them become as large as possible and then should procure their fulfillment from some source or other, and that this is excellence?

Callicles/ Yes, that's what I'm saying.

Socrates/ So then those who have no need of anything are wrongly said to be happy?

Callicles/ Yes, for in that case stones and corpses would be happiest.

Socrates/ But then the life of those people you call happiest is a strange one, too. I shouldn't be surprised that Euripides' lines are true when he says:

But who knows whether being alive is being dead And being dead is being alive?

Perhaps in reality we're dead. Once I even heard one of the wise men say that we are now dead and that our bodies are our tombs, and that the part of our souls in which our appetites reside is actually the sort of thing to be open to persuasion and to shift back and forth. And hence some clever man, a teller of stories, a Sicilian, perhaps, or an Italian, named this part a jar [pithos], on account of its being a persuadable [pithanon] and suggestible thing, thus slightly changing the name. And fools [anoetoi] he named uninitiated [amuetoi], suggesting that that part of the souls of fools where their appetites are located is their undisciplined part, one not tightly closed, a leaking jar, as it were. He based the image on its insatiability. Now this man, Callicles, quite to the contrary of your view, shows that of the people in Hades—meaning the unseen [aides]—these, the uninitiated ones, would be the most miserable. They would carry water into the leaking jar using another leaky thing, a sieve. That's why by the sieve he means the soul (as the man who talked with me claimed). And because they leak, he likened the souls of fools to sieves; for their untrustworthiness and forgetfulness makes them unable to retain anything. This account is on the whole a bit strange; but now that I've shown it to you, it does make clear what I want to persuade you to change your mind about if I can: to choose the orderly life, the life that is adequate to and satisfied with its circumstances at any given time instead of the insatiable, undisciplined life. Do I persuade you at all, and are you changing your mind to believe that those who are orderly

are happier than those who are undisciplined, or, even if I tell you many other such stories, will you change it none the more for that?

Callicles/ The latter thing you said is the truer, Socrates.

Socrates/ Come then, and let me give you another image, one from the same school as this one. Consider whether what you're saying about each life, the life of the self-controlled man and that of the undisciplined one, is like this: Suppose there are two men, each of whom has many jars. The jars belonging to one of them are sound and full, one with wine, another with honey, a third with milk, and many others with lots of other things. And suppose that the sources of each of these things are scarce and difficult to come by, procurable only with much toil and trouble. Now the one man, having filled up his jars, doesn't pour anything more into them and gives them no further thought. He can relax over them. As for the other one, he too has resources that can be procured, though with difficulty, but his containers are leaky and rotten. He's forced to keep on filling them, day and night, or else he suffers extreme pain. Now since each life is the way I describe it, are you saying that the life of the undisciplined man is happier than that of the orderly man? When I say this, do I at all persuade you to concede that the orderly life is better than the undisciplined one, or do I not?

Callicles/ You do not, Socrates. The man who has filled himself up has no pleasure any more, and when he's been filled up and experiences neither joy nor pain, that's living like a stone, as I was saying just now. Rather, living pleasantly consists in this: having as much as possible flow in.

Socrates/ Isn't it necessary, then, that if there's a lot flowing in, there should also be a lot going out and that there should be big holes for what's passed out?

Callicles/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now you're talking about the life of a stone curlew instead of that of a corpse or a stone. Tell me, do you say that there is such a thing as hunger, and eating when one is hungry?

Callicles/ Yes, there is.

Socrates/ And thirst, and drinking when one is thirsty?

Callicles/ Yes, and also having all other appetites and being able to fill them and enjoy it, and so live happily.

Socrates/ Very good, my good man! Do carry on the way you've begun, and take care not to be ashamed. And I evidently shouldn't shrink from being ashamed, either. Tell me now first whether a man who has an itch and scratches it and can scratch to his heart's content, scratch his whole life long, can also live happily.

Callicles/ What nonsense, Socrates. You're a regular crowd pleaser.

Socrates/ That's just how I shocked Polus and Gorgias and made them be ashamed. You certainly won't be shocked, however, or be ashamed, for you're a brave man. Just answer me, please.

Callicles/ I say that even the man who scratches would have a pleasant life.

Socrates/ And if a pleasant one, a happy one, too?

Callicles/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ What if he scratches only his head—or what am I to ask you further? See what you'll answer if somebody asked you one after the other every question that comes next. And isn't the climax of this sort of thing, the life of a catamite, a frightfully shameful and miserable one? Or will you have the nerve to say that they are happy as long as they have what they need to their hearts' content?

Callicles/ Aren't you ashamed, Socrates, to bring our discussion to such matters?

Socrates/ Is it I who bring them there, my splendid fellow, or is it the man who claims, just like that, that those who enjoy themselves, however they may be doing it, are happy, and doesn't discriminate between good kinds of pleasures and bad? Tell me now too whether you say that the pleasant and the good are the same or whether there is some pleasure that isn't good.

Callicles/ Well, to keep my argument from being inconsistent if I say that they're different, I say they're the same.

Socrates/ You're wrecking your earlier statements, Callicles, and you'd no longer be adequately inquiring into the truth of the matter with me if you speak contrary to what you think.

Callicles/ And you're wrecking yours, too, Socrates.

Socrates/ In that case, it isn't right for me to do it, if it's what I do, or for you either. But consider, my marvelous friend, surely the good isn't just unrestricted enjoyment. For both those many shameful things hinted at just now obviously follow if this is the case, and many others as well.

Callicles/ That's your opinion, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you really assert these things, Callicles?

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ So we're to undertake the discussion on the assumption that you're in earnest?

Callicles/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ All right, since that's what you think, distinguish the following things for me: There is something you call knowledge, I take it?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Weren't you also saying just now that there is such a thing as bravery with knowledge?

Callicles/ Yes, I was.

Socrates/ Was it just on the assumption that bravery is distinct from knowledge that you were speaking of them as two?

Callicles/ Yes, very much so.

Socrates/ Well now, do you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same or different?

Callicles/ Different of course, you wisest of men.

Socrates/ And surely that bravery is different from pleasure, too?

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ All right, let's put this on the record: Callicles from Acharnae says that pleasant and good are the same, and that knowledge and bravery are different both from each other and from what's good.

Callicles/ And Socrates from Alopece doesn't agree with us about this. Or does he?

Socrates/ He does not. And I believe that Callicles doesn't either when he comes to see himself rightly. Tell me: don't you think that those who do well have the opposite experience of those who do badly?

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Now since these experiences are the opposites of each other, isn't it necessary that it's just the same with them as it is with health and disease? For a man isn't both healthy and sick at the same time, I take it, nor does he get rid of both health and disease at the same time.

Callicles/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Take any part of the body you like, for example, and think about it. A man can have a disease of the eyes, can't he, to which we give the name "eye disease"?

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ But then surely his eyes aren't also healthy at the same time?

Callicles/ No, not in any way.

Socrates/ What if he gets rid of his eye disease? Does he then also get rid of his eyes' health and so in the end he's rid of both at the same time?

Callicles/ No, not in the least.

Socrates/ For that, I suppose, is an amazing and unintelligible thing to happen, isn't it?

Callicles/ Yes, it very much is.

Socrates/ But he acquires and loses each of them successively, I suppose.

Callicles/ Yes, I agree.

Socrates/ Isn't it like this with strength and weakness, too?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And with speed and slowness?

Callicles/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ Now, does he acquire and get rid of good things and happiness, and their opposites, bad things and misery, successively too?

Callicles/ No doubt he does.

Socrates/ So if we find things that a man both gets rid of and keeps at the same time, it's clear that these things wouldn't be what's good and what's bad. Are we agreed on that? Think very carefully about it and tell me.

Callicles/ Yes, I agree most emphatically.

Socrates/ Go back, now, to what we've agreed on previously. You mentioned hunger—as a pleasant or a painful thing? I mean the hunger itself.

Callicles/ As a painful thing. But for a hungry man to eat is pleasant.

Socrates/ I agree. I understand. But the hunger itself is painful, isn't it?

Callicles/ So I say.

Socrates/ And thirst is, too?

Callicles/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Am I to ask any further, or do you agree that every deficiency and appetite is painful?

Callicles/ I do. No need to ask.

Socrates/ Fair enough. Wouldn't you say that, for a thirsty person, to drink is something pleasant?

Callicles/ Yes, I would.

Socrates/ And in the case you speak of, "a thirsty person" means "a person who's in pain," I take it?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And drinking is a filling of the deficiency, and is a pleasure?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, don't you mean that insofar as a person is drinking, he's feeling enjoyment?

Callicles/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Even though he's thirsty?

Callicles/ Yes, I agree.

Socrates/ Even though he's in pain?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you observe the result, that when you say that a thirsty person drinks, you're saying that a person who's

in pain simultaneously feels enjoyment? Or doesn't this happen simultaneously in the same place, in the soul or in the body as you like? I don't suppose it makes any difference which. Is this so or not?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ But you do say that it's impossible for a person who's doing well to be doing badly at the same time.

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Yet you did agree that it's possible for a person in pain to feel enjoyment.

Callicles/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So, feeling enjoyment isn't the same as doing well, and being in pain isn't the same as doing badly, and the result is that what's pleasant turns out to be different from what's good.

Callicles/ I don't know what your clever remarks amount to, Socrates.

Socrates/ You do know. You're just pretending you don't, Callicles. Go just a bit further ahead.

Callicles/ Why do you keep up this nonsense?

Socrates/ So you'll know how wise you are in scolding me. Doesn't each of us stop being thirsty and stop feeling pleasure at the same time as a result of drinking?

Callicles/ I don't know what you mean.

Gorgias/ Not at all, Callicles! Answer him for our benefit too, so that the discussion may be carried through.

Callicles/ But Socrates is always like this, Gorgias. He keeps questioning people on matters that are trivial, hardly worthwhile, and refutes them!

Gorgias/ What difference does that make to you? It's none of your business to appraise them, Callicles. You promised Socrates that he could try to refute you in any way he liked.

Callicles/ Go ahead, then, and ask these trivial, petty questions, since that's what pleases Gorgias.

Socrates/ You're a happy man, Callicles, in that you've been initiated into the greater mysteries before the lesser. I didn't think it was permitted. So answer where you left off, and tell me whether each of us stops feeling pleasure at the same time as he stops being thirsty.

Callicles/ That's my view.

Socrates/ And doesn't he also stop having pleasures at the same time as he stops being hungry or stops having the other appetites?

Callicles/ That's so.

Socrates/ Doesn't he then also stop having pains and pleasures at the same time?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But, he certainly doesn't stop having good things and bad things at the same time, as you agree. Don't you still agree?

Callicles/ Yes I do. Why?

Socrates/ Because it turns out that good things are not the same as pleasant ones, and bad things not the same as painful ones. For pleasant and painful things come to a stop simultaneously, whereas good things and bad ones do not, because they are in fact different things. How then could pleasant things be the same as good ones and painful things the same as bad ones?

Look at it this way, too, if you like, for I don't suppose that you agree with that argument, either. Consider this. Don't you call men good because of the presence of good things in them, just as you call them good-looking because of the presence of good looks?

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Well then, do you call foolish and cowardly men good? You didn't a while ago; you were then calling brave and intelligent ones good. Or don't you call these men good?

Callicles/ Oh yes, I do.

Socrates/ Well then, have you ever seen a foolish child feel enjoyment?

Callicles/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ But you've never yet seen a foolish man feel enjoyment?

Callicles/ Yes, I suppose I have. What's the point?

Socrates/ Nothing. Just answer me.

Callicles/ Yes, I've seen it.

Socrates/ Well now, have you ever seen an intelligent man feel pain or enjoyment?

Callicles/ Yes, I daresay I have.

Socrates/ Now who feels pain or enjoyment more, intelligent men or foolish ones?

Callicles/ I don't suppose there's a lot of difference.

Socrates/ Good enough. Have you ever seen a cowardly man in combat?

Callicles/ Of course I have.

Socrates/ Well then, when the enemy retreated, who do you think felt enjoyment more, the cowards or the brave men?

Callicles/ Both felt it, I think; maybe the cowards felt it more. But if not, they felt it to pretty much the same degree.

Socrates/ It makes no difference. So cowards feel enjoyment too?

Callicles/ Oh yes, very much so.

Socrates/ Fools do too, evidently.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now when the enemy advances, are the cowards the only ones to feel pain, or do the brave men do so too?

Callicles/ They both do.

Socrates/ To the same degree?

Callicles/ Maybe the cowards feel it more.

Socrates/ And when the enemy retreats, don't they feel enjoyment more?

Callicles/ Maybe.

Socrates/ So don't foolish men and intelligent ones, and cowardly men and brave ones feel enjoyment and pain to pretty much the same degree, as you say, or cowardly men feel them more than brave ones?

Callicles/ That's my view.

Socrates/ But surely the intelligent and brave men are good and the cowardly and foolish are bad?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Hence the degree of enjoyment and pain that good and bad men feel is pretty much the same.

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ Now are good and bad men pretty much equally both good and bad, or are the bad ones even better?

Callicles/ By Zeus! I don't know what you mean.

Socrates/ Don't you know that you say that the good men are good and the bad men bad because of the presence of good or bad things in them, and that the good things are pleasures and the bad ones pains?

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Aren't good things, pleasures, present in men who feel enjoyment, if in fact they do feel it?

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now aren't men who feel enjoyment good men, because good things are present in them?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, aren't bad things, pains, present in men who feel pain?

Callicles/ They are.

Socrates/ And you do say that it's because of the presence of bad things that bad men are bad. Or don't you say this anymore?

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ So all those who feel enjoyment are good, and all those who feel pain are bad.

Callicles/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ And those feeling them more are more so, those feeling them less are less so, and those feeling them to pretty much the same degree are good or bad to pretty much the same degree.

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now aren't you saying that intelligent men and foolish ones, and cowardly and courageous ones, experience pretty much the same degree of enjoyment and pain, or even that cowardly ones experience more of it?

Callicles/ Yes, I am.

Socrates/ Join me, then, in adding up what follows for us from our agreements. They say it's an admirable thing to speak of and examine what's admirable "twice and even thrice." We say that the intelligent and brave man is good, don't we?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that the foolish and cowardly man is bad?

Callicles/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ And again, that the man who feels enjoyment is good?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the one experiencing pain is bad?

Callicles/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And that the good and the bad man feel pain and enjoyment to the same degree, and that perhaps the bad man feels them even more?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Doesn't it then turn out that the bad man is both good and bad to the same degree as the good man, or even that he's better? Isn't this what follows, along with those earlier statements, if one holds that pleasant things are the same as good things? Isn't this necessarily the case, Callicles?

Callicles/ I've been listening to you for quite some time now, Socrates, and agreeing with you, while thinking that even if a person grants some point to you in jest, you gladly fasten on it, the way boys do. As though you really think that I or anybody else at all don't believe that some pleasures are better and others worse.

Socrates/ Oh, Callicles! What a rascal you are. You treat me like a child. At one time you say that things are one way and at another that the same things are another way, and so you deceive me. And yet I didn't suppose at the beginning that I'd be deceived intentionally by you, because I assumed you were a friend. Now, however, I've been misled, and evidently have no choice but to "make the best with what I have," as the ancient proverb has it, and to accept what I'm given by you. The thing you're saying now, evidently, is that some pleasures are good while others are bad. Is that right?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are the good ones the beneficial ones, and the bad ones the harmful ones?

Callicles/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ And the beneficial ones are the ones that produce something good while the bad ones are those that produce something bad?

Callicles/ That's my view.

Socrates/ Now, do you mean pleasures like the ones we were just now mentioning in connection with the body, those of eating and drinking? Do some of these produce health in the body, or strength, or some other bodily excellence, and are these pleasures good, while those that produce the opposites of these things are bad?

Callicles/ That's right.

Socrates/ And similarly, aren't some pains good and others bad, too?

Callicles/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, shouldn't we both choose and act to have the good pleasures and pains?

Callicles/ Yes, we should.

Socrates/ But not the bad ones?

Callicles/ Obviously.

Socrates/ No, for Polus and I both thought, if you recall, that we should, surely, do all things for the sake of what's good. Do you also think as we do that the end of all action is what's good, and that we should do all other things for its sake, but not it for their sake? Are you voting on our side to make it three?

Callicles/ Yes, I am.

Socrates/ So we should do the other things, including pleasant things, for the sake of good things, and not good things for the sake of pleasant things.

Callicles/ That's right.

Socrates/ Now, is it for every man to pick out which kinds of pleasures are good ones and which are bad ones, or does this require a craftsman in each case?

Callicles/ It requires a craftsman.

Socrates/ Let's recall what I was actually saying to Polus and Gorgias. I was saying, if you remember, that there are some practices that concern themselves with nothing further than pleasure and procure only pleasure, practices that are ignorant about what's better and worse, while there are other practices that do know what's good and what's bad. And I placed the "knack" (not the craft) of pastry baking among those that are concerned with pleasure, and the medical craft among those concerned with what's good. And by Zeus, the god of friendship, Callicles, please don't think that you should jest with me either, or answer anything that comes to mind, contrary to what you really think, and please don't accept what you get from me as though I'm jesting! For you see, don't you, that our discussion's about this (and what would even a man of little intelligence take more seriously than this?) about the way we're supposed to live. Is it the way you urge me toward, to engage in these manly activities, to make speeches among the people, to practice oratory, and to be active in the sort of politics you people engage in these days? Or is it the life spent in philosophy? And in what way does this latter way of life differ from the former? Perhaps it's best to distinguish them, as I just tried to do; having done that and having agreed that these are two distinct lives, it's best to examine how they differ from each other, and which of them is the one we should live. Now perhaps you don't yet know what I'm talking about.

Callicles/ No, I certainly don't.

Socrates/ Well, I'll tell you more clearly. Given that we're agreed, you and I, that there is such a thing as good and such

a thing as pleasant and that the pleasant is different from the good, and that there's a practice of each of them and a procedure for obtaining it, the quest for the pleasant on the one hand and that for the good on the other—give me first your assent to this point or withhold it. Do you assent to it?

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Come then, and agree further with me about what I was saying to them too, if you think that what I said then was true. I was saying, wasn't I, that I didn't think that pastry baking is a craft, but a knack, whereas medicine is a craft. I said that the one, medicine, has investigated both the nature of the object it serves and the cause of the things it does, and is able to give an account of each of these. The other, the one concerned with pleasure, to which the whole of its service is entirely devoted, proceeds toward its object in a quite uncraft-like way, without having at all considered either the nature of pleasure or its cause. It does so completely irrationally, with virtually no discrimination. Through routine and knack it merely preserves the memory of what customarily happens, and that's how it also supplies its pleasures. So, consider first of all whether you think that this account is an adequate one and whether you think that there are also other, similar preoccupations in the case of the soul. Do you think that some of the latter are of the order of crafts and possess forethought about what's best for the soul, while others slight this and have investigated only, as in the other case, the soul's way of getting its pleasure, without considering which of the pleasures is better or worse, and without having any concerns about anything but mere gratification, whether for the better or for the worse? For my part, Callicles, I think there are such preoccupations, and I say that this sort of thing is flattery, both in the case of the body and that of the soul and in any other case in which a person may wait upon a pleasure without any consideration

of what's better or worse. As for you, do you join us in subscribing to the same opinion on these matters or do you dissent from it?

Callicles/ No, I won't dissent. I'm going along with you, both to expedite your argument and to gratify Gorgias here.

Socrates/ Now is this the case with one soul only, and not with two or many?

Callicles/ No, it's also the case with two or many.

Socrates/ Isn't it also possible to gratify a group of souls collectively at one and the same time, without any consideration for what's best?

Callicles/ Yes, I suppose so.

Socrates/ Can you tell me which ones are the practices that do this? Better yet, if you like I'll ask you and you say yes for any which you think falls in this group, and no for any which you think doesn't. Let's look at flute playing first. Don't you think that it's one of this kind, Callicles? That it merely aims at giving us pleasure without giving thought to anything else?

Callicles/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ Don't all such practices do that, too? Lyre playing at competitions, for example?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ What about training choruses and composing dithyrambs? Doesn't that strike you as being something of the same sort? Do you think that Cinesias the son of Meles gives any thought to saying anything of a sort that might lead to the improvement of his audience, or to what is likely to gratify the crowd of spectators?

Callicles/ Clearly the latter, Socrates, at least in Cinesias' case.

Socrates/ What about his father Meles? Do you think he sang to the lyre with a regard for what's best? Or did he fail to

regard even what's most pleasant? For he inflicted pain upon his spectators with his singing. But consider whether you don't think that all singing to the lyre and composing of dithyrambs has been invented for the sake of pleasure.

Callicles/ Yes, I do think so.

Socrates/ And what about that majestic, awe-inspiring practice, the composition of tragedy? What is it after? Is the project, the intent of tragic composition merely the gratification of spectators, as you think, or does it also strive valiantly not to say anything that is corrupt, though it may be pleasant and gratifying to them, and to utter in both speech and song anything that might be unpleasant but beneficial, whether the spectators enjoy it or not? In which of these ways do you think tragedy is being composed?

Callicles/ This much is obvious, Socrates, that it's more bent upon giving pleasure and upon gratifying the spectators.

Socrates/ And weren't we saying just now that this sort of thing is flattery?

Callicles/ Yes, we were.

Socrates/ Well then, if one stripped away from the whole composition both melody, rhythm, and meter, does it turn out that what's left is only speeches?

Callicles/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Aren't these speeches given to a large gathering of people?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ So poetry is a kind of popular harangue.

Callicles/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And such popular harangue would be oratory, then. Or don't you think that poets practice oratory in the theatres?

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ So now we've discovered a popular oratory of a kind that's addressed to men, women, and children, slave and free alike. We don't much like it; we say that it's a flattering sort.

Callicles/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ Very well. What about the oratory addressed to the Athenian people and to those in other cities composed of free men? What is our view of this kind? Do you think that orators always speak with regard to what's best? Do they always set their sights on making the citizens as good as possible through their speeches? Or are they also bent upon the gratification of the citizens and do they slight the common good for the sake of their own private good, and so keep company with the people trying solely to gratify them, without any thought at all for whether this will make them be better or worse?

Callicles/ This issue you're asking about isn't just a simple one, for there are those who say what they do because they do care for the citizens, and there are also those like the ones you're talking about.

Socrates/ That's good enough. For if this matter really has two parts to it, then one part of it would be flattery, I suppose, and shameful public harangue, while the other—that of getting the souls of the citizens to be as good as possible and of striving valiantly to say what is best, whether the audience will find it more pleasant or more unpleasant—is something admirable. But you've never seen this type of oratory—or, if you can mention any orator of this sort, why haven't you let me also know who he is?

Callicles/ No, by Zeus! I certainly can't mention any of our contemporary orators to you.

Socrates/ Well then, can you mention anyone from former times through whom the Athenians are reputed to have

become better after he began his public addresses, when previously they had been worse? I certainly don't know who this could be.

Callicles/ What? Don't they tell you that Themistocles proved to be a good man, and so did Cimon, Miltiades and Pericles who died just recently, and whom you've heard speak, too?

Socrates/ Yes, Callicles, if the excellence you were speaking of earlier, the filling up of appetites, both one's own and those of others, is the true kind. But if this is not, and if what we were compelled to agree on in our subsequent discussion is the true kind instead—that a man should satisfy those of his appetites that, when they are filled up, make him better, and not those that make him worse, and that this is a matter of craft—I don't see how I can say that any of these men has proved to be such a man.

Callicles/ But if you'll look carefully, you'll find that they were.

Socrates/ Let's examine the matter calmly and see whether any of these men has proved to be like that. Well then, won't the good man, the man who speaks with regard to what's best, say whatever he says not randomly but with a view to something, just like the other craftsmen, each of whom keeps his own product in view and so does not select and apply randomly what he applies, but so that he may give his product some shape? Take a look at painters for instance, if you would, or house-builders or shipwrights or any of the other craftsmen you like, and see how each one places what he does into a certain organization, and compels one thing to be suited for another and to fit to it until the entire object is put together in an organized and orderly way. The other craftsmen, too, including the ones we were mentioning just lately, the ones concerned with the body, physical trainers and doctors, no

doubt give order and organization to the body. Do we agree that this is so or not?

Callicles/ Let's take it that way.

Socrates/ So if a house gets to be organized and orderly it would be a good one, and if it gets to be disorganized it would be a terrible one?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ This holds true for a boat, too?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we surely take it to hold true for our bodies, too?

Callicles/ Yes, we do.

Socrates/ What about the soul? Will it be a good one if it gets to be disorganized, or if it gets to have a certain organization and order?

Callicles/ Given what we said before, we must agree that this is so, too.

Socrates/ What name do we give to what comes into being in the body as a result of organization and order?

Callicles/ You mean health and strength, presumably.

Socrates/ Yes, I do. And which one do we give to what comes into being in the soul as a result of organization and order? Try to find and tell me its name, as in the case of the body.

Callicles/ Why don't you say it yourself, Socrates?

Socrates/ All right, if that pleases you more, I'll do so. And if you think I'm right, give your assent. If not, refute me and don't give way. I think that the name for the states of organization of the body is "healthy," as a result of which health and the rest of bodily excellence comes into being in it. Is this so or isn't it?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ And the name for the states of organization and order of the soul is “lawful” and “law,” which lead people to become law-abiding and orderly, and these are justice and self-control. Do you assent to this or not?

Callicles/ Let it be so.

Socrates/ So this is what that skilled and good orator will look to when he applies to people’s souls whatever speeches he makes as well as all of his actions, and any gift he makes or any confiscation he carries out. He will always give his attention to how justice may come to exist in the souls of his fellow citizens and injustice be gotten rid of, how self-control may come to exist there and lack of discipline be gotten rid of, and how the rest of excellence may come into being there and badness may depart. Do you agree or not?

Callicles/ I do.

Socrates/ Yes, for what benefit is there, Callicles, in giving a body that’s sick and in wretched shape lots of very pleasant food or drink or anything else when it won’t do the man a bit more good, or, quite to the contrary, when by a fair reckoning it’ll do him less good? Is that so?

Callicles/ Let it be so.

Socrates/ Yes, for I don’t suppose that it profits a man to be alive with his body in a terrible condition, for this way his life, too, would be necessarily a wretched one. Or wouldn’t it be?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, isn’t it also true that doctors generally allow a person to fill up his appetites, to eat when he’s hungry, for example, or drink when he’s thirsty as much as he wants to when he’s in good health, but when he’s sick they practically never allow him to fill himself with what he has an appetite for? Do you also go along with this point, at least?

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ And isn't it just the same way with the soul, my excellent friend? As long as it's corrupt, in that it's foolish, undisciplined, unjust and impious, it should be kept away from its appetites and not be permitted to do anything other than what will make it better. Do you agree or not?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ For this is no doubt better for the soul itself?

Callicles/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Now isn't keeping it away from what it has an appetite for, disciplining it?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ So to be disciplined is better for the soul than lack of discipline, which is what you yourself were thinking just now.

Callicles/ I don't know what in the world you mean, Socrates. Ask somebody else.

Socrates/ This fellow won't put up with being benefited and with his undergoing the very thing the discussion's about, with being disciplined.

Callicles/ And I couldn't care less about anything you say, either. I gave you these answers just for Gorgias' sake.

Socrates/ Very well. What'll we do now? Are we breaking off in the midst of the discussion?

Callicles/ That's for you to decide.

Socrates/ They say that it isn't permitted to give up in the middle of telling stories, either. A head must be put on it, so that it won't go about headless. Please answer the remaining questions, too, so that our discussion may get its head.

Callicles/ How unrelenting you are, Socrates! If you'll listen to me, you'll drop this discussion or carry it through with someone else.

Socrates/ Who else is willing? Surely we mustn't leave the discussion incomplete.

Callicles/ Couldn't you go through the discussion by yourself, either by speaking in your own person or by answering your own questions?

Socrates/ In that case Epicharmus' saying applies to me: I prove to be sufficient, being "one man, for what two men were saying before." But it looks as though I have no choice at all. Let's by all means do it that way then. I suppose that all of us ought to be contentiously eager to know what's true and what's false about the things we're talking about. That it should become clear is a good common to all. I'll go through the discussion, then, and say how I think it is, and if any of you thinks that what I agree to with myself isn't so, you must object and refute me. For the things I say I certainly don't say with any knowledge at all; no, I'm searching together with you so that if my opponent clearly has a point, I'll be the first to concede it. I'm saying this, however, in case you think the discussion ought to be carried through to the end. If you don't want it to be, then let's drop it now and leave.

Gorgias/ No, Socrates, I don't think we should leave yet. You must finish the discussion. It seems to me that the others think so, too. I myself certainly want to hear you go through the rest of it by yourself.

Socrates/ All right, Gorgias. I myself would have been glad to continue my discussion with Callicles here, until I returned him Amphion's speech for that of Zethus. Well, Callicles, since you're not willing to join me in carrying the discussion through to the end, please do listen to me and interrupt if you think I'm saying anything wrong. And if you refute me, I shan't be upset with you as you were with me; instead you'll go on record as my greatest benefactor.

Callicles/ Speak on, my good friend, and finish it up by yourself.

Socrates/ Listen, then, as I pick up the discussion from the beginning. Is the pleasant the same as the good? —It isn't, as Callicles and I have agreed. —Is the pleasant to be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant? —The pleasant for the sake of the good. —And pleasant is that by which, when it's come to be present in us, we feel pleasure, and good that by which, when it's present in us, we are good? —That's right. —But surely we are good, both we and everything else that's good, when some excellence has come to be present in us? —Yes, I do think that that's necessarily so, Callicles. —But the best way in which the excellence of each thing comes to be present in it, whether it's that of an artifact or of a body or a soul as well, or of any animal, is not just any old way, but is due to whatever organization, correctness, and craftsmanship is bestowed on each of them. Is that right? —Yes, I agree. —So it's due to organization that the excellence of each thing is something which is organized and has order? —Yes, I'd say so. —So it's when a certain order, the proper one for each thing, comes to be present in it that it makes each of the things there are, good? —Yes, I think so. —So also a soul which has its own order is better than a disordered one? —Necessarily so. —But surely one that has order is an orderly one? —Of course it is. —And an orderly soul is a self-controlled one? —Absolutely. —So a self-controlled soul is a good one. I for one can't say anything else beyond that, Callicles my friend; if you can, please teach me.

Callicles/ Say on, my good man.

Socrates/ I say that if the self-controlled soul is a good one, then a soul that's been affected the opposite way of the self-

controlled one is a bad one. And this, it's turned out, is the foolish and undisciplined one. —That's right. —And surely a self-controlled person would do what's appropriate with respect to both gods and human beings. For if he does what's inappropriate, he wouldn't be self-controlled. —That's necessarily how it is. —And of course if he did what's appropriate with respect to human beings, he would be doing what's just, and with respect to gods he would be doing what's pious, and one who does what's just and pious must necessarily be just and pious. —That's so. —Yes, and he would also necessarily be brave, for it's not like a self-controlled man to either pursue or avoid what isn't appropriate, but to avoid and pursue what he should, whether these are things to do, or people, or pleasures and pains, and to stand fast and endure them where he should. So, it's necessarily very much the case, Callicles, that the self-controlled man, because he's just and brave and pious, as we've recounted, is a completely good man, that the good man does well and admirably whatever he does, and that the man who does well is blessed and happy, while the corrupt man, the one who does badly, is miserable. And this would be the one who's in the condition opposite to that of the self-controlled one, the undisciplined one whom you were praising.

So this is how I set down the matter, and I say that this is true. And if it is true, then a person who wants to be happy must evidently pursue and practice self-control. Each of us must flee away from lack of discipline as quickly as his feet will carry him, and must above all make sure that he has no need of being disciplined, but if he does have that need, either he himself or anyone in his house, either a private citizen or a whole city, he must pay his due and must be disciplined, if he's to be happy. This is the target which I think one should look to in living, and in his actions he should direct all of his

own affairs and those of his city to the end that justice and self-control will be present in one who is to be blessed. He should not allow his appetites to be undisciplined or undertake to fill them up—that's interminably bad—and live the life of a marauder. Such a man could not be dear to another man or to a god, for he cannot be a partner, and where there's no partnership there's no friendship. Yes, Callicles, wise men claim that partnership and friendship, orderliness, self-control, and justice hold together heaven and earth, and gods and men, and that is why they call this universe a world order, my friend, and not an undisciplined world-disorder. I believe that you don't pay attention to these facts, even though you're a wise man in these matters. You've failed to notice that proportionate equality has great power among both gods and men, and you suppose that you ought to practice getting the greater share. That's because you neglect geometry.

Very well. We must either refute this argument and show that it's not the possession of justice and self-control that makes happy people happy and the possession of badness that makes miserable people miserable, or else, if this is true, we must consider what the consequences are. These consequences are all those previous things, Callicles, the ones about which you asked me whether I was speaking in earnest when I said that a man should be his own accuser, or his son's or his friend's, if he's done anything unjust, and should use oratory for that purpose. Also what you thought Polus was ashamed to concede is true after all, that doing what's unjust is as much worse than suffering it as it is more shameful, and that a person who is to be an orator the right way should be just and be knowledgeable in what is just, the point Polus in his turn claimed Gorgias to have agreed to out of shame.

That being so, let's examine what it is you're taking me to task for, and whether it's right or not. You say that I'm unable to protect either myself or any of my friends or relatives or

rescue them from the gravest dangers, and that I'm at the mercy of the first comer, just as people without rights are, whether he wants to knock me on the jaw, to use that forceful expression of yours, or confiscate my property, or exile me from the city, or ultimately put me to death. To be in that position is, by your reasoning, the most shameful thing of all. As for what my own reasoning is, that's been told many times by now, but there's nothing to stop its being told once again. I deny, Callicles, that being knocked on the jaw unjustly is the most shameful thing, or that having my body or my purse cut is, and I affirm that to knock or cut me or my possessions unjustly is both more shameful and worse, and at the same time that to rob or enslave me or to break into my house or, to sum up, to commit any unjust act at all against me and my possessions is both worse and more shameful for the one who does these unjust acts than it is for me, the one who suffers them. These conclusions, at which we arrived earlier in our previous discussions are, I'd say, held down and bound by arguments of iron and adamant, even if it's rather rude to say so. So it would seem, anyhow. And if you or someone more forceful than you won't undo them, then anyone who says anything other than what I'm now saying cannot be speaking well. And yet for my part, my account is ever the same: I don't know how these things are, but no one I've ever met, as in this case, can say anything else without being ridiculous. So once more I set it down that these things are so. And if they are—if injustice is the worst thing there is for the person committing it and if that person's failure to pay what's due is something even worse, if possible, than this one that's the greatest—what is the protection which would make a man who's unable to provide it for himself truly ridiculous? Isn't it the one that will turn away what harms us most? Yes, it's necessarily very much the case that this is the most shameful kind of protection not to be able to provide, either for oneself or for

one's friends or relatives. And the second kind's the one that turns away the second worst thing, the third kind the one against the third worst, and so on. The greater by its nature each bad thing is, the more admirable it is to be able to provide protection against it, too, and the more shameful not to be able to. Is this the way it is, Callicles, or is it some other way?

Callicles/ No, it's not any other way.

Socrates/ Of these two things, then, of doing what's unjust and suffering it, we say that doing it is worse and suffering it is less bad. With what, then, might a man provide himself to protect himself so that he has both these benefits, the one that comes from not doing what's unjust and the one that comes from not suffering it? Is it power or wish? What I mean is this: Is it when a person doesn't wish to suffer what's unjust that he will avoid suffering it, or when he procures a power to avoid suffering it?

Callicles/ When he procures a power. That is obvious, at least.

Socrates/ And what about doing what's unjust? Is it when he doesn't wish to do it, is that sufficient—for he won't do it—or should he procure a power and a craft for this, too, so that unless he learns and practices it, he will commit injustice? Why don't you answer at least this question, Callicles? Do you think Polus and I were or were not correct in being compelled to agree in our previous discussion when we agreed that no one does what's unjust because he wants to, but that all who do so do it unwillingly?

Callicles/ Let it be so, Socrates, so you can finish up your argument.

Socrates/ So we should procure a certain power and craft against this too, evidently, so that we won't do what's unjust.

Callicles/ That's right.

Socrates/ What, then, is the craft by which we make sure that we don't suffer anything unjust, or as little as possible? Consider whether you think it's the one I do. This is what I think it is: that one ought either to be a ruler himself in his city or even be a tyrant, or else to be a partisan of the regime in power.

Callicles/ Do you see, Socrates, how ready I am to applaud you whenever you say anything right? I think that this statement of yours is right on the mark.

Socrates/ Well, consider whether you think that the following statement of mine is a good one, too. I think that the one man who's a friend of another most of all is the one whom the men of old and the wise call a friend, the one who's like the other. Don't you think so, too?

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Now, if in the case of a tyrant who's a savage, uneducated ruler, there were in his city someone much better than he, wouldn't the tyrant no doubt be afraid of him and never be able to be a friend to him with all his heart?

Callicles/ That's so.

Socrates/ Nor would he, the tyrant, be a friend to a man much his inferior, if there were such a man, for the tyrant would despise him and would never take a serious interest in him as a friend.

Callicles/ That's true, too.

Socrates/ This leaves only a man of like character, one who approves and disapproves of the same thing and who is willing to be ruled by and be subject to the ruler, to be to such a man a friend worth mentioning. This man will have great power in that city, and no one will do him any wrong and get away with it. Isn't that so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, if some young person in that city were to reflect, “In what way would I be able to have great power and no one treat me unjustly?” this, evidently, would be his way to go: to get himself accustomed from childhood on to like and dislike the same things as the master, and to make sure that he’ll be as like him as possible. Isn’t that so?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now won’t this man have achieved immunity to unjust treatment and great power in his city, as you people say?

Callicles/ Oh, yes.

Socrates/ And also immunity to unjust action? Or is that far from the case, since he’ll be like the ruler who’s unjust, and he’ll have his great power at the ruler’s side? For my part, I think that, quite to the contrary, in this way he’ll be making sure he’ll have the ability to engage in as much unjust action as possible and to avoid paying what’s due for acting so. Right?

Callicles/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So he’ll have incurred the worst thing there is, when his soul is corrupt and mutilated on account of his imitation of the master and on account of his “power.”

Callicles/ I don’t know how you keep twisting our discussion in every direction, Socrates. Or don’t you know that this “imitator” will put to death, if he likes, your “non-imitator,” and confiscate his property?

Socrates/ I do know that, Callicles. I’m not deaf. I hear you say it, and heard Polus just now say it many times, and just about everyone else in the city. But now you listen to me, too. I say that, yes, he’ll kill him, if he likes, but it’ll be a wicked man killing one who’s admirable and good.

Callicles/ And isn’t that just the most irritating thing about it?

Socrates/ No, not for an intelligent person, anyway, as our discussion points out. Or do you think that a man ought to make sure that his life be as long as possible and that he practice those crafts that ever rescue us from dangers, like the oratory that you tell me to practice, the kind that preserves us in the law courts?

Callicles/ Yes, and by Zeus, that's sound advice for you!

Socrates/ Well, my excellent fellow, do you think that expertise in swimming is a grand thing?

Callicles/ No, by Zeus, I don't.

Socrates/ But it certainly does save people from death whenever they fall into the kind of situation that requires this expertise. But if you think this expertise is a trivial one, I'll give you one more important than it, that of helmsmanship, which saves not only souls but also bodies and valuables from the utmost dangers, just as oratory does. This expertise is unassuming and orderly, and does not make itself grand, posturing as though its accomplishment is so magnificent. But while its accomplishment is the same as that of the expertise practiced in the courts, it has earned two obols, I suppose, if it has brought people safely here from Aegina; and if it has brought them here from Egypt or the Pontus, then, for that great service, having given safe passage to those I was mentioning just now, the man himself, his children, valuables, and womenfolk, and setting them ashore in the harbor, it has earned two drachmas, if that much. And the man who possesses the craft and who has accomplished these feats, disembarks and goes for a stroll along the seaside and beside his ship, with a modest air. For he's enough of an expert, I suppose, to conclude that it isn't clear which ones of his fellow voyagers he has benefited by not letting them drown in the deep, and which ones he has harmed, knowing that they were no better in either body or soul when he set them

ashore than they were when they embarked. So he concludes that if a man afflicted with serious incurable physical diseases did not drown, this man is miserable for not dying and has gotten no benefit from him. But if a man has many incurable diseases in what is more valuable than his body, his soul, life for that man is not worth living, and he won't do him any favor if he rescues him from the sea or from prison or from anywhere else. He knows that for a corrupt person it's better not to be alive, for he necessarily lives badly.

That is why it's not the custom for the helmsman to give himself glory even though he preserves us, and not the engineer either, who sometimes can preserve us no less well than a general or anyone else, not to mention a helmsman. For there are times when he preserves entire cities. You don't think that he's on a level with the advocate, do you? And yet if he wanted to say what you people do, Callicles, glorifying his occupation, he would smother you with speeches, telling you urgently that people should become engineers, because nothing else amounts to anything. And the speech would make his point. But you nonetheless despise him and his craft, and you'd call him "engineer" as a term of abuse. You' be unwilling either to give your daughter to his son, or take his daughter yourself. And yet, given your grounds for applauding your own activities, what just reason do you have for despising the engineer and the others whom I was mentioning just now? I know that you'd say that you're a better man, one from better stock. But if "better" does not mean what I take it to mean, and if instead to preserve yourself and what belongs to you, no matter what sort of person you happen to be, is what excellence is, then your reproach against engineer, doctor, and all the other crafts which have been devised to preserve us will prove to be ridiculous. But, my blessed man, please see whether what's noble and what's good isn't something other than preserving

and being preserved. Perhaps one who is truly a man should stop thinking about how long he will live. He should not be attached to life but should commit these concerns to the god and believe the women who say that not one single person can escape fate. He should thereupon give consideration to how he might live the part of his life still before him as well as possible. Should it be by becoming like the regime under which he lives? In that case you should now be making yourself as much like the Athenian people as possible if you expect to endear yourself to them and have great power in the city. Please see whether this profits you and me, my friend, so that what they say happens to the Thessalian witches when they pull down the moon won't happen to us. Our choice of this kind of civic power will cost us what we hold most dear. If you think that some person or other will hand you a craft of the sort that will give you great power in this city while you are unlike the regime, whether for better or for worse, then in my opinion, Callicles, you're not well advised. You mustn't be their imitator but be naturally like them in your own person if you expect to produce any genuine result toward winning the friendship of the Athenian people [demos] and, yes, by Zeus, of Demos the son of Pyrilampes to boot. Whoever then turns you out to be most like these men, he'll make you a politician in the way you desire to be one, and an orator, too. For each group of people takes delight in speeches that are given in its own character, and resents those given in an alien manner—unless you say something else, my dear friend. Can we say anything in reply to this, Callicles?

Callicles/ I don't know how it is that I think you're right, Socrates, but the thing that happens to most people has happened to me: I'm not really persuaded by you.

Socrates/ It's your love for the people, Callicles, existing in your soul, that stands against me. But if we closely examine these same matters often and in a better way, you'll be

persuaded. Please recall that we said that there are two practices for caring for a particular thing, whether it's the body or the soul. One of them deals with pleasure and the other with what's best and doesn't gratify it but struggles against it. Isn't this how we distinguished them then?

Callicles/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ Now one of them, the one dealing with pleasure, is ignoble and is actually nothing but flattery, right?

Callicles/ Let it be so, if you like.

Socrates/ Whereas the other one, the one that aims to make the thing we're caring for, whether it's a body or a soul, as good as possible, is the more noble one?

Callicles/ Yes, that's so.

Socrates/ Shouldn't we then attempt to care for the city and its citizens with the aim of making the citizens themselves as good as possible? For without this, as we discovered earlier, it does no good to provide any other service if the intentions of those who are likely to make a great deal of money or take a position of rule over people or some other position of power aren't admirable and good. Are we to put this down as true?

Callicles/ Certainly, if that pleases you more.

Socrates/ Suppose, then, Callicles, that you and I were about to take up the public business of the city, and we called on each other to carry out building projects—the major works of construction: walls, or ships, or temples—would we have to examine and check ourselves closely, first, to see if we are or are not experts in the building craft, and whom we've learned it from? Would we have to, or wouldn't we?

Callicles/ Yes, we would.

Socrates/ And, second, we'd have to check, wouldn't we, whether we've ever built a work of construction in private business, for a friend of ours, say, or for ourselves, and

whether this structure is admirable or disgraceful. And if we discovered on examination that our teachers have proved to be good and reputable ones, and that the works of construction built by us under their guidance were numerous and admirable, and those built by us on our own after we left our teachers were numerous, too, then, if that were our situation, we'd be wise to proceed to public projects. But if we could point out neither teacher nor construction works, either none at all or else many worthless ones, it would surely be stupid to undertake public projects and to call each other on to them. Shall we say that this point is right, or not?

Callicles/ Yes, we shall.

Socrates/ Isn't it so in all cases, especially if we attempted to take up public practice and called on each other, thinking we were capable doctors? I'd have examined you, and you me, no doubt: "Well now, by the gods! What is Socrates' own physical state of health? Has there ever been anyone else, slave or free man, whose deliverance from illness has been due to Socrates?" And I'd be considering other similar questions about you, I suppose. And if we found no one whose physical improvement has been due to us, among either visitors or townspeople, either a man or a woman, then by Zeus, Callicles, wouldn't it be truly ridiculous that people should advance to such a height of folly that, before producing many mediocre as well as many successful results in private practice and before having had sufficient exercise at the craft, they should attempt to "learn pottery on the big jar," as that saying goes, and attempt both to take up public practice themselves and to call on others like them to do so as well? Don't you think it would be stupid to proceed like that?

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ But now, my most excellent fellow, seeing that you yourself are just now beginning to be engaged in the

business of the city and you call on me and take me to task for not doing so, shall we not examine each other? “Well now, has Callicles ever improved any of the citizens? Is there anyone who was wicked before, unjust, undisciplined, and foolish, a visitor or townsman, a slave or free man, who because of Callicles has turned out admirable and good?” Tell me, Callicles, what will you say if somebody asks you these scrutinizing questions? Whom will you say you’ve made a better person through your association with him? Do you shrink back from answering—if there even is anything you produced while still in private practice before attempting a public career?

Callicles/ You love to win, Socrates.

Socrates/ But it’s not for love of winning that I’m asking you. It’s rather because I really do want to know the way, whatever it is, in which you suppose the city’s business ought to be conducted among us. Now that you’ve advanced to the business of the city, are we to conclude that you’re devoted to some objective other than that we, the citizens, should be as good as possible? Haven’t we agreed many times already that this is what a man active in politics should be doing? Have we or haven’t we? Please answer me. Yes we have. (I’ll answer for you.) So, if this is what a good man should make sure about for his own city, think back now to those men whom you were mentioning a little earlier and tell me whether you still think that Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Themistocles have proved to be good citizens.

Callicles/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ So if they were good ones, each of them was obviously making the citizens better than they were before. Was he or wasn’t he?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ So when Pericles first began giving speeches among the people, the Athenians were worse than when he gave his last ones?

Callicles/ Presumably.

Socrates/ Not "presumably," my good man. It necessarily follows from what we've agreed, if he really was a good citizen.

Callicles/ So what?

Socrates/ Nothing. But tell me this as well. Are the Athenians said to have become better because of Pericles, or, quite to the contrary, are they said to have been corrupted by him? That's what I hear, anyhow, that Pericles made the Athenians idle and cowardly, chatterers and money-grubbers, since he was the first to institute wages for them.

Callicles/ The people you hear say this have cauliflower ears, Socrates.

Socrates/ Here, though, is something I'm not just hearing. I do know clearly and you do, too, that at first Pericles had a good reputation, and when they were worse, the Athenians never voted to convict him in any shameful deposition. But after he had turned them into "admirable and good" people, near the end of his life, they voted to convict Pericles of embezzlement and came close to condemning him to death, because they thought he was a wicked man, obviously.

Callicles/ Well? Did that make Pericles a bad man?

Socrates/ A man like that who cared for donkeys or horses or cattle would at least look bad if he showed these animals kicking, butting, and biting him because of their wildness, when they had been doing none of these things when he took them over. Or don't you think that any caretaker of any animal is a bad one who will show his animals to be wilder than when he took them over, when they were gentler? Do you think so or not?

Callicles/ Oh yes, so I may gratify you.

Socrates/ In that case gratify me now with your answer, too. Is man one of the animals, too?

Callicles/ Of course he is.

Socrates/ Wasn't Pericles a caretaker of men?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well? Shouldn't he, according to what we agreed just now, have turned them out more just instead of more unjust, if while he cared for them he really was good at politics?

Callicles/ Yes, he should have.

Socrates/ Now as Homer says, the just are gentle. What do you say? Don't you say the same?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ But Pericles certainly showed them to be wilder than they were when he took them over, and that toward himself, the person he'd least want this to happen to.

Callicles/ Do you want me to agree with you?

Socrates/ Yes, if you think that what I say is true.

Callicles/ So be it, then.

Socrates/ And if wilder, then both more unjust and worse?

Callicles/ So be it.

Socrates/ So on this reasoning Pericles wasn't good at politics.

Callicles/ You at least deny that he was.

Socrates/ By Zeus, you do, too, given what you were agreeing to. Let's go back to Cimon. Tell me: didn't the people he was serving ostracize him so that they wouldn't hear his voice for ten years? And didn't they do the very same thing to Themistocles, punishing him with exile besides? And didn't they vote to throw Miltiades, of Marathon fame, into the pit, and if it hadn't been for the prytanis he would have been

thrown in? And yet these things would not have happened to these men if they were good men, as you say they were. At least it's not the case that good drivers are the ones who at the start don't fall out of their chariots but who do fall out after they've cared for their horses and become better drivers themselves. This doesn't happen either in driving or in any other work. Or do you think it does?

Callicles/ No, I don't.

Socrates/ So it looks as though our earlier statements were true, that we don't know any man who has proved to be good at politics in this city. You were agreeing that none of our present-day ones has, though you said that some of those of times past had, and you gave preference to these men. But these have been shown to be on equal footing with the men of today. The result is that if these men were orators, they practiced neither the true oratory—for in that case they wouldn't have been thrown out—nor the flattering kind.

Callicles/ But surely, Socrates, any accomplishment that any of our present-day men produces is a far cry from the sorts of accomplishments produced by anyone of the others you choose.

Socrates/ No, my strange friend, I'm not criticizing these men either, insofar as they were servants of the city. I think rather that they proved to be better servants than the men of today, and more capable than they of satisfying the city's appetites. But the truth is that in redirecting its appetites and not giving in to them, using persuasion or constraint to get the citizens to become better, they were really not much different from our contemporaries. That alone is the task of a good citizen. Yes, I too agree with you that they were more clever than our present leaders at supplying ships and walls and dockyards and many other things of the sort.

Now you and I are doing an odd thing in our conversation. The whole time we've been discussing, we constantly keep drifting back to the same point, neither of us recognizing what the other is saying. For my part, I believe you've agreed many times and recognized that after all this subject of ours has two parts, both in the case of the body and the soul. The one part of it is the servient one, enabling us to provide our bodies with food whenever they're hungry or with drink whenever they're thirsty, and whenever they're cold, with clothes, wraps, shoes, and other things our bodies come to have an appetite for. I'm purposely using the same examples in speaking to you, so that you'll understand more easily. For these, I think you agree, are the very things a shopkeeper, importer, or producer can provide, a bread-baker or pastry-chef, a weaver or cobbler or tanner, so it isn't at all surprising that such a person should think himself and be thought by others to be a caretaker of the body—by everyone who doesn't know that over and above all these practices there's a craft, that of gymnastics and medicine, that really does care for the body and is entitled to rule all these crafts and use their products because of its knowledge of what food or drink is good or bad for bodily excellence, a knowledge which all of the others lack. That's why the other crafts are slavish and servient and ill-bred, and why gymnastics and medicine are by rights mistresses over them. Now, when I say that these same things hold true of the soul, too, I think you sometimes understand me, and you agree as one who knows what I'm saying. But then a little later you come along saying that there have been persons who've proved to be admirable and good citizens in the city, and when I ask who they are, you seem to me to produce people who in the area of politics are very much the same sort you would produce if I asked you, "Who have proved to be or are good caretakers of bodies?" and you replied in all seriousness, "Thearion the bread-baker, and Mithaecus the

author of the book on Sicilian pastry baking, and Sarambus the shopkeeper, because these men have proved to be wonderful caretakers of bodies, the first by providing wonderful loaves of bread, the second pastry, and the third wine."

Perhaps you'd be upset if I said to you, "My man, you don't have the slightest understanding of gymnastics. The men you're mentioning to me are servants, satisfiers of appetites! They have no understanding whatever of anything that's admirable and good in these cases. They'll fill and fatten people's bodies, if they get the chance, and besides that, destroy their original flesh as well, all the while receiving their praise! These people, in their turn, thanks to their inexperience, will lay the blame for their illnesses and the destruction of their original flesh not on those who threw the parties, but on any people who happen to be with them at the time giving them advice. Yes, when that earlier stuffing has come bringing sickness in its train much later, then, because it's proved to be unhealthy, they'll blame these people and scold them and do something bad to them if they can, and they'll sing the praises of those earlier people, the ones responsible for their ills. Right now you're operating very much like that, too, Callicles. You sing the praises of those who threw parties for these people, and who feasted them lavishly with what they had an appetite for. And they say that they have made the city great! But that the city is swollen and festering, thanks to those early leaders, that they don't notice. For they filled the city with harbors and dockyards, walls, and tribute payments and such trash as that, but did so without justice and self-control. So, when that fit of sickness comes on, they'll blame their advisers of the moment and sing the praises of Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, the ones who are to blame for their ills. Perhaps, if you're not careful, they'll lay their hands on you, and on my friend Alcibiades, when

they lose not only what they gained but what they had originally as well, even though you aren't responsible for their ills but perhaps accessories to them.

And yet there's a foolish business that I, for one, both see happening now and hear about in connection with our early leaders. For I notice that whenever the city lays its hands on one of its politicians because he does what's unjust, they resent it and complain indignantly that they're suffering terrible things. They've done many good things for the city, and so they're being unjustly brought to ruin by it, so their argument goes. But that's completely false. Not a single city leader could ever be brought to ruin by the very city he's the leader of. It looks as though those who profess to be politicians are just like those who profess to be sophists. For sophists, too, even though they're wise in other matters, do this absurd thing: while they claim to be teachers of excellence, they frequently accuse their students of doing them wrong, depriving them of their fees and withholding other forms of thanks from them, even though the students have been well served by them. Yet what could be a more illogical business than this statement, that people who've become good and just, whose injustice has been removed by their teacher and who have come to possess justice, should wrong him—something they can't do? Don't you think that's absurd, my friend? You've made me deliver a real popular harangue, Callicles, because you aren't willing to answer.

Callicles/ And you couldn't speak unless somebody answered you?

Socrates/ Evidently I could. Anyhow I am stretching my speeches out at length now, since you're unwilling to answer me. But, my good man, tell me, by the god of friendship: don't you think it's illogical that someone who says he's made someone else good should find fault with that person,

charging that he, whom he himself made to become and to be good, is after all wicked?

Callicles/ Yes, I do think so.

Socrates/ Don't you hear people who say they're educating people for excellence saying things like that?

Callicles/ Yes, I do. But why would you mention completely worthless people?

Socrates/ Why would you talk about those people who, although they say they're the city's leaders and devoted to making it as good as possible, turn around and accuse it, when the time comes, of being the most wicked? Do you think they're any different from those others? Yes, my blessed man, they are one and the same, the sophist and the orator, or nearly so and pretty similar, as I was telling Polus. But because you don't see this, you suppose that one of them, oratory, is something wonderful, while you sneer at the other. In actuality, however, sophistry is more to be admired than oratory, insofar as legislation is more admirable than the administration of justice, and gymnastics more than medicine. And I, for one, should have supposed that public speakers and sophists are the only people not in a position to charge the creature they themselves educate with being wicked to them, or else they simultaneously accuse themselves as well, by this same argument, of having entirely failed to benefit those whom they say they benefit. Isn't this so?

Callicles/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ And if what I was saying is true, then they alone, no doubt, are in a position to offer on terms of honor the benefit they provide—without charge, as is reasonable. For somebody who had another benefit conferred on him, one who, for example, had been turned into a fast runner by a physical trainer, could perhaps deprive the man of his

compensation if the trainer offered him that benefit on his honor, instead of agreeing on a fixed fee and taking his money as closely as possible to the time he imparts the speed. For I don't suppose that it's by slowness that people act unjustly, but by injustice. Right?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ So if somebody removes that very thing, injustice, he shouldn't have any fear of being treated unjustly. For him alone is it safe to offer this benefit on terms of honor, if it's really true that one can make people good. Isn't that so?

Callicles/ I agree.

Socrates/ This, then, is evidently why there's nothing shameful in taking money for giving advice concerning other matters such as house-building or the other crafts.

Callicles/ Yes, evidently.

Socrates/ But as for this activity, which is concerned with how a person might be as good as possible and manage his own house or his city in the best possible way, it's considered shameful to refuse to give advice concerning it unless somebody pays you money. Right?

Callicles/ Yes.

Socrates/ For it's clear that what accounts for this is the fact that of all the benefits this one alone makes the one who has had good done to him have the desire to do good in return, so that we think it's a good sign of someone's having done good by conferring this benefit that he'll have good done to him in return, and not a good sign if he won't. Is this how it is?

Callicles/ It is.

Socrates/ Now, please describe for me precisely the type of care for the city to which you are calling me. Is it that of striving valiantly with the Athenians to make them as good as

possible, like a doctor, or is it like one ready to serve them and to associate with them for their gratification? Tell me the truth, Callicles. For just as you began by speaking candidly to me, it's only fair that you should continue speaking your mind. Tell me now, too, well and nobly.

Callicles/ In that case I say it's like one ready to serve.

Socrates/ So, noblest of men, you're calling on me to be ready to flatter.

Callicles/ Yes, if you find it more pleasant not to mince words, Socrates. Because if you don't do this—

Socrates/ I hope you won't say what you've said many times, that anyone who wants to will put me to death. That way I, too, won't repeat my claim that it would be a wicked man doing this to a good man. And don't say that he'll confiscate any of my possessions, either, so I won't reply that when he's done so he won't know how to use them. Rather, just as he unjustly confiscated them from me, so, having gotten them, he'll use them unjustly too, and if unjustly, shamefully, and if shamefully, badly.

Callicles/ How sure you seem to me to be, Socrates, that not even one of these things will happen to you! You think that you live out of their way and that you wouldn't be brought to court perhaps by some very corrupt and mean man.

Socrates/ In that case I really am a fool, Callicles, if I don't suppose that anything might happen to anybody in this city. But I know this well: that if I do come into court involved in one of those perils which you mention, the man who brings me in will be a wicked man—for no good man would bring in a man who is not a wrongdoer—and it wouldn't be at all strange if I were to be put to death. Would you like me to tell you my reason for expecting this?

Callicles/ Yes, I would.

Socrates/ I believe that I'm one of a few Athenians—so as not to say I'm the only one, but the only one among our contemporaries—to take up the true political craft and practice the true politics. This is because the speeches I make on each occasion do not aim at gratification but at what's best. They don't aim at what's most pleasant. And because I'm not willing to do those clever things you recommend, I won't know what to say in court. And the same account I applied to Polus comes back to me. For I'll be judged the way a doctor would be judged by a jury of children if a pastry chef were to bring accusations against him. Think about what a man like that, taken captive among these people, could say in his defense, if somebody were to accuse him and say, "Children, this man has worked many great evils on you, yes, on you. He destroys the youngest among you by cutting and burning them, and by slimming them down and choking them he confuses them. He gives them the most bitter potions to drink and forces hunger and thirst on them. He doesn't feast you on a great variety of sweets the way I do!" What do you think a doctor, caught in such an evil predicament, could say? Or if he should tell them the truth and say, "Yes, children, I was doing all those things in the interest of health," how big an uproar do you think such "judges" would make? Wouldn't it be a loud one?

Callicles/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ I should think so! Don't you think he'd be at a total loss as to what he should say?

Callicles/ Yes, he would be.

Socrates/ That's the sort of thing I know would happen to me, too, if I came into court. For I won't be able to point out any pleasures that I've provided for them, ones they believe to be services and benefits, while I envy neither those who provide them nor the ones for whom they're provided. Nor will I be able to say what's true if someone charges that I ruin

younger people by confusing them or abuse older ones by speaking bitter words against them in public or private. I won't be able to say, that is, "Yes, I say and do all these things in the interest of justice, my 'honored judges'"—to use that expression you people use—nor anything else. So presumably I'll get whatever comes my way.

Callicles/ Do you think, Socrates, that a man in such a position in his city, a man who's unable to protect himself, is to be admired?

Socrates/ Yes, Callicles, as long as he has that one thing that you've often agreed he should have: as long as he has protected himself against having spoken or done anything unjust relating to either men or gods. For this is the self-protection that you and I often have agreed avails the most. Now if someone were to refute me and prove that I am unable to provide this protection for myself or for anyone else, I would feel shame at being refuted, whether this happened in the presence of many or of a few, or just between the two of us; and if I were to be put to death for lack of this ability, I really would be upset. But if I came to my end because of a deficiency in flattering oratory, I know that you'd see me bear my death with ease. For no one who isn't totally bereft of reason and courage is afraid to die; doing what's unjust is what he's afraid of. For to arrive in Hades with one's soul stuffed full of unjust actions is the ultimate of all bad things. If you like, I'm willing to give you an account showing that this is so.

Callicles/ All right, since you've gone through the other things, go through this, too.

Socrates/ Give ear then—as they put it—to a very fine account. You'll think that it's a mere tale, I believe, although I think it's an account, for what I'm about to say I will tell you as true. As Homer tells it, after Zeus, Posidon, and Pluto took

over the sovereignty from their father, they divided it among themselves. Now there was a law concerning human beings during Cronus' time, one that gods even now continue to observe, that when a man who has lived a just and pious life comes to his end, he goes to the Isles of the Blessed, to make his abode in complete happiness, beyond the reach of evils, but when one who has lived in an unjust and godless way dies, he goes to the prison of payment and retribution, the one they call Tartarus. In Cronus' time, and even more recently during Zeus' tenure of sovereignty, these men faced living judges while they were still alive, who judged them on the day they were going to die. Now the cases were badly decided, so Pluto and the keepers from the Isles of the Blessed came to Zeus and told him that people were undeservingly making their way in both directions. So Zeus said, "All right, I'll put a stop to that. The cases are being badly decided at this time because those being judged are judged fully dressed. They're being judged while they're still alive. Many," he said, "whose souls are wicked are dressed in handsome bodies, good stock and wealth, and when the judgment takes place they have many witnesses appear to testify that they have lived just lives. Now the judges are awestruck by these things and pass judgment at a time when they themselves are fully dressed, too, having put their eyes and ears and their whole bodies up as screens in front of their souls. All these things, their own clothing and that of those being judged, have proved to be obstructive to them. What we must do first," he said, "is to stop them from knowing their death ahead of time. Now they do have that knowledge. This is something that Prometheus has already been told to put a stop to. Next, they must be judged when they're stripped naked of all these things, for they should be judged when they're dead. The judge, too, should be naked, and dead, and with only his soul he should study only the soul of each person immediately upon his

death, when he's isolated from all his kinsmen and has left behind on earth all that adornment, so that the judgment may be a just one. Now I, realizing this before you did, have already appointed my sons as judges, two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. After they've died, they'll serve as judges in the meadow, at the three-way crossing from which the two roads go on, the one to the Isles of the Blessed and the other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus will judge the people from Asia and Aeacus those from Europe. I'll give seniority to Minos to render final judgment if the other two are at all perplexed, so that the judgment concerning the passage of humankind may be as just as possible."

This, Callicles, is what I've heard, and I believe that it's true. And on the basis of these accounts I conclude that something like this takes place: Death, I think, is actually nothing but the separation of two things from each other, the soul and the body. So, after they're separated, each of them stays in a condition not much worse than what it was in when the person was alive. The body retains its nature, and the care it had received as well as the things that have happened to it are all evident. If a man had a body, for instance, which was large (either by nature or through nurture, or both) while he was alive, his corpse after he has died is large, too. And if it was fat, so is the corpse of the dead man, and so on. And if a man took care to grow his hair long, his corpse will have long hair, too. And again, if a man had been a criminal whipped for his crime and showed scars, traces of beatings on his body inflicted by whips or other blows while he was alive, his body can be seen to have these marks, too, when he is dead. And if a man's limbs were broken or twisted while he was alive, these very things will be evident, too, when he is dead. In a word, however a man treated his body while he was alive, all the marks of that treatment, or most of them, are evident for some time even after he is dead. And I think that the same thing,

therefore, holds true also for the soul, Callicles. All that's in the soul is evident after it has been stripped naked of the body, both things that are natural to it and things that have happened to it, things that the person came to have in his soul as a result of his pursuit of each objective. So when they arrive before their judge—the people from Asia before Rhadamanthus—Rhadamanthus brings them to a halt and studies each person's soul without knowing whose it is. He's often gotten hold of the Great King, or some other king or potentate, and noticed that there's nothing sound in his soul but that it's been thoroughly whipped and covered with scars, the results of acts of perjury and of injustice, things that each of his actions has stamped upon his soul. Everything was warped as a result of deception and pretense, and nothing was straight, all because the soul had been nurtured without truth. And he saw that the soul was full of distortion and ugliness due to license and luxury, arrogance and incontinence in its actions. And when he had seen it, he dismissed this soul in dishonor straight to the guardhouse, where it went to await suffering its appropriate fate.

It is appropriate for everyone who is subject to punishment rightly inflicted by another either to become better and profit from it, or else to be made an example for others, so that when they see him suffering whatever it is he suffers, they may be afraid and become better. Those who are benefited, who are made to pay their due by gods and men, are the ones whose errors are curable; even so, their benefit comes to them, both here and in Hades, by way of pain and suffering, for there is no other possible way to get rid of injustice. From among those who have committed the ultimate wrongs and who because of such crimes have become incurable come the ones who are made examples of. These persons themselves no longer derive any profit from their punishment, because they're incurable. Others, however, do profit from it when they see them

undergoing for all time the most grievous, intensely painful and frightening sufferings for their errors, simply strung up there in the prison in Hades as examples, visible warnings to unjust men who are ever arriving. I claim that Archelaus, too, will be one of their number, if what Polus says is true, and anyone else who's a tyrant like him. I suppose that in fact the majority of these examples have come from the ranks of tyrants, kings, potentates, and those active in the affairs of cities, for these people commit the most grievous and impious errors because they're in a position to do so. Homer, too, is a witness on these matters, for he has depicted those undergoing eternal punishment in Hades as kings and potentates: Tantalus, Sisyphus and Tityus. As for Thersites and any other private citizen who was wicked, no one has depicted him as surrounded by the most grievous punishments, as though he were incurable; he wasn't in that position, I suppose, and for that reason he's also happier than those who were. The fact is, Callicles, that those persons who become extremely wicked do come from the ranks of the powerful, although there's certainly nothing to stop good men from turning up even among the powerful, and those who do turn up there deserve to be enthusiastically admired. For it's a difficult thing, Callicles, and one that merits much praise, to live your whole life justly when you've found yourself having ample freedom to do what's unjust. Few are those who prove to be like that. But since there have proved to be such people, both here and elsewhere, I suppose that there'll be others, too, men admirable and good in that excellence of justly carrying out whatever is entrusted to them. One of these, Aristides the son of Lysimachus, has proved to be very illustrious indeed, even among the rest of the Greeks. But the majority of our potentates, my good man, prove to be bad.

So as I was saying, when Rhadamanthus the judge gets hold of someone like that, he doesn't know a thing about him,

neither who he is nor who his people are, except that he's somebody wicked. And once he's noticed that, he brands the man as either curable or incurable, as he sees fit, and dismisses the man to Tartarus, and once the man has arrived there, he undergoes the appropriate sufferings. Once in a while he inspects another soul, one who has lived a pious life, one devoted to truth, the soul of a private citizen or someone else, especially—and I at any rate say this, Callicles—that of a philosopher who has minded his own affairs and hasn't been meddlesome in the course of his life. He admires the man and sends him off to the Isles of the Blessed. And Aeacus, too, does the very same things. Each of them with staff in hand renders judgments. And Minos is seated to oversee them. He alone holds the golden scepter the way Homer's Odysseus claims to have seen him, holding his golden scepter, decreeing right among the dead.

For my part, Callicles, I'm convinced by these accounts, and I think about how I'll reveal to the judge a soul that's as healthy as it can be. So I disregard the things held in honor by the majority of people, and by practicing truth I really try, to the best of my ability, to be and to live as a very good man, and when I die, to die like that. And I call on all other people as well, as far as I can—and you especially I call on in response to your call—to this way of life, this contest, that I hold to be worth all the other contests in this life. And I take you to task, because you won't be able to come to protect yourself when you appear at the trial and judgment I was talking about just now. When you come before that judge, the son of Aegina, and he takes hold of you and brings you to trial, your mouth will hang open and you'll get dizzy there just as much as I will here, and maybe somebody'll give you a demeaning knock on the jaw and throw all sorts of dirt at you.

Maybe you think this account is told as an old wives' tale, and you feel contempt for it. And it certainly wouldn't be a

surprising thing to feel contempt for it if we could look for and somehow find one better and truer than it. As it is, you see that there are three of you, the wisest of the Greeks of today—you, Polus, and Gorgias—and you're not able to prove that there's any other life one should live than the one which will clearly turn out to be advantageous in that world, too. But among so many arguments this one alone survives refutation and remains steady: that doing what's unjust is more to be guarded against than suffering it, and that it's not seeming to be good but being good that a man should take care of more than anything, both in his public and his private life; and that if a person proves to be bad in some respect, he's to be disciplined, and that the second best thing after being just is to become just by paying one's due, by being disciplined; and that every form of flattery, both the form concerned with oneself and that concerned with others, whether they're few or many, is to be avoided, and that oratory and every other activity is always to be used in support of what's just.

So, listen to me and follow me to where I am, and when you've come here you'll be happy both during life and at its end, as the account indicates. Let someone despise you as a fool and throw dirt on you, if he likes. And, yes, by Zeus, confidently let him deal you that demeaning blow. Nothing terrible will happen to you if you really are an admirable and good man, one who practices excellence. And then, after we've practiced it together, then at last, if we think we should, we'll turn to politics, or then we'll deliberate about whatever subject we please, when we're better at deliberating than we are now. For it's a shameful thing for us, being in the condition we appear to be in at present—when we never think the same about the same subjects, the most important ones at that—to sound off as though we're somebodies. That's how far behind in education we've fallen. So let's use the account that has now been disclosed to us as our guide, one that indicates to

us that this way of life is the best, to practice justice and the rest of excellence both in life and in death. Let us follow it, then, and call on others to do so, too, and let's not follow the one that you believe in and call on me to follow. For that one is worthless, Callicles.

The Hipparchus.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, and a Friend.

Socrates/ What is the love of gain, and who are its lovers?

Friend/ They seem to me to be those, who think it worthwhile to make a gain from what is nothing worth.

Socrates/ Whether then do they seem to you to do so, while knowing that the things are of no worth, or not knowing? For if they do so not knowing, you call the lovers of gain senseless.

Friend/ Nay, I do not call them senseless, but thorough knaves and villains, the slaves of gain, and who know indeed that the things are worthless, from which they dare to make a gain, but yet through their shamelessness they dare to have a love of gain.

Socrates/ Do you then call a person of this kind a lover of gain? For instance, should a husbandman, while planting, and knowing the plant to be worthless, nevertheless think to make a gain from it when grown up, do you call such a person a lover of gain?

Friend/ The lover of gain, Socrates, thinks he ought to make a gain from everything.

Socrates/ Do not thus answer me at random, like a person injured by someone, but, giving your mind, answer me, as if I were questioning you again from the beginning. Do you not agree with me, that a lover of gain knows the value of that, from which he thinks it worthwhile to make a gain?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Who then is he, that knows the value of plants, and in what time and place it is worthwhile to plant them? that we also may introduce something from the words of the wise, which the clever in law-suits employ for the sake of elegance.

Friend/ A husbandman, I think.

Socrates/ Do you then mean by the expression—It is worthwhile to make a gain—anything else than to think that one ought to make a gain?

Friend/ I mean this.

Socrates/ Now do not you, who are so young, endeavor to deceive me, your elder, by answering as you do at present, what you do not think; but tell me truly, do you think that a husbandman exists, who knows it is not worthwhile to plant a certain plant, and yet fancies he will make a gain by such a plant?

Friend/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ What then, think you that a horse-dealer, who knows that the food which he gives a horse, is of no worth, does not know that it destroys the horse?

Friend/ I do not.

Socrates/ He does not think then that from such worthless food he will make a gain.

Friend/ He does not.

Socrates/ What then, do you think that a pilot, who has furnished his ship with sails and a rudder of no worth, does not know that he will sustain a damage, and be in danger of perishing himself, and of losing the ship and all it carries?

Friend/ I do not.

Socrates/ He will not think then that he will make a gain by worthless articles.

Friend/ He will not.

Socrates/ But does the general, who knows that his army carries worthless arms, think he will make a gain, or that he is worthy to make a gain by them?

Friend/ By no means.

Socrates/ But if a hautboy-player possesses a worthless hautboy, or a lyre-player a lyre, or a bowman a bow, or, in short, any other artist or skilled person possesses instruments or any other apparatus of no value, does he think he will make a gain by these?

Friend/ It appears he will not.

Socrates/ Whom then do you call lovers of gain? For surely they are not those, whom we have already mentioned, who, knowing what are things of no value, think they must make a gain by them. And thus, O wonderful man, according to what you say, no one is a lover of gain.

Friend/ But, Socrates, I mean to say, that those are lovers of gain, who, through insatiable avidity, are perpetually and beyond all measure, greedy after things that are small and worth little or nothing, and thus have a love of gain.

Socrates/ But surely, thou best of men, they do not know this, that they are worthless; for we have proved against ourselves, that this is impossible.

Friend/ So it seems to me.

Socrates/ If then they do so not knowing it, it is evident that, not knowing it, they fancy things of no worth to be of great value.

Friend/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Do not the lovers of gain love gain?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But do you say that gain is contrary to loss?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Is it therefore a good to anyone to suffer a loss?

Friend/ To no one.

Socrates/ But it is an evil?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are men then injured by a damage?

Friend/ They are injured.

Socrates/ Is then damage an evil?

Friend/ It is.

Socrates/ But gain is contrary to damage?

Friend/ Contrary.

Socrates/ Gain is therefore a good?

Friend/ It is.

Socrates/ Do you then call those, who love a good, lovers of gain?

Friend/ It seems so.

Socrates/ You do not then, my friend, call the lovers of gain mad-men. But do you yourself love what is a good, or not love it?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Is there a good which you do not love, but an evil which you do?

Friend/ By Zeus, there is not.

Socrates/ But you love all good things equally?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Ask me, if I also do not. For I also shall acknowledge to you, that I love good things. But besides I and you, do not all the rest of men appear to you to love good things, and to hate evil?

Friend/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ But have we not acknowledged that gain is a good?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ In this way then, all appear to be lovers of gain; but that, in which we before mentioned, no one was a lover of gain. By employing then which assertion, would a person not err?

Friend/ Should, Socrates, one rightly apprehend what a lover of gain is, I think it is right to consider him a lover of gain who earnestly applies himself to, and thinks it worthwhile to make a gain from those things, from which the good do not dare to make a gain.

Socrates/ But do you not see, O sweetest of men, that we just now acknowledged that to make a gain is to be benefited?

Friend/ What then?

Socrates/ Because this also we previously admitted, that all men always wished for good things.

Friend/ We did.

Socrates/ Do not, then, good men wish to possess everything gainful, since such things are good?

Friend/ But not the things, Socrates, by which they are about to be hurt.

Socrates/ By “to be hurt” do you mean “to be damaged”? or something else?

Friend/ No, but I mean “to be damaged.”

Socrates/ Are persons damaged by gain, or by damage?

Friend/ Through both. For they are damaged by damage, and through iniquitous gain.

Socrates/ Does it then appear to you that anything useful and good is iniquitous?

Friend/ To me it does not.

Socrates/ Did we not then a little before acknowledge that gain is contrary to damage, which is an evil?

Friend/ We did.

Socrates/ And that being contrary to evil, it is a good?

Friend/ We granted this.

Socrates/ You endeavor then, you see, to deceive me, by designedly asserting the contrary to what we just now granted.

Friend/ By Zeus, I do not, Socrates; but you, on the contrary, are deceiving me; and I know not how, in your reasonings you turn things topsy-turvy.

Socrates/ Speak fair words. For I should not act correctly, if I were not persuaded by a man good and wise.

Friend/ Who is he? and why particularly say you this?

Socrates/ My fellow-citizen, and likewise yours, Hipparchus, the son of Pisistratus, one of the Philaïdæ, and the eldest and wisest of the sons of Pisistratus; who exhibited many other illustrious acts of wisdom, and was the first who introduced into this land the poems of Homer, and compelled the rhapsodists during the Panathenæa to go through them successively and in order, just as you know they do at present; and having sent for Anacreon, the Teïan, a ship of fifty oars, brought him to this city, and always had about him Simonides of Ceos, having induced him to stay by great rewards and gifts. And this he did, wishing to instruct the citizens, in order that he might rule over them being the best of men; nor thinking, that he ought to begrudge wisdom to any man, as being himself a highly educated person. And when such of the citizens as were living around the town had been educated well, and admired him for his wisdom, he likewise laid down a plan to instruct those in the country; and he set up for them statues of Hermes along the roads, in the middle of the city and of each of the wards; and afterwards selecting from his wisdom, on points he had partly learned, and partly discovered himself, what he

deemed to be the cleverest idea, he put them into elegiac verses, and engraved them on the Hermæ as his poems, and specimens of wisdom; in order that in the first place the citizens might not wonder at those wise inscriptions on the temple at Delphi, "Know thyself," and "Nothing too much," and the rest of that kind, but that they might deem the words of Hipparchus still wiser; and, in the next place, that passing by them, up and down, they might read them, and have a taste of his wisdom, and come from the fields and be instructed in the remaining branches of learning. And there are two epigrams. In some upon the left-hand sides of each of the Hermæ there is sculptured a Hermes, saying that he was standing midway between the city and the ward; and in others upon the right-hand sides he says: —"This is the memorial of Hipparchus. Go on, having just thoughts." There are also many other beautiful poetical descriptions on other Hermæ; and there is this in the Steiriac road, in which he says—"This is the memorial of Hipparchus. Do not deceive your friend." I would not then have dared to deceive you, being my friend, and disobey so great a man; after whose death, the Athenians were tyrannized over by his brother Hippias; and you have heard from all the old men, that only during those years did there exist a tyranny at Athens, and that during all the other period, the Athenians lived nearly as when Saturn reigned. But it is said by rather clever persons, that he did not die in the way which the multitude have thought, through the dishonor done to the sister of Harmodius respecting the carrying the sacred basket—for that is a silly reason—but that Harmodius was the bosom friend and pupil of Aristogeiton, who valued himself highly upon instructing a man, and fancied that Hipparchus would be his rival. But at that time it happened that Harmodius was the lover of one of the handsome and nobly-born youths—whose name persons have mentioned,

but I do not remember—and that this young person did for a time admire Harmodius and Aristogeiton, as wise men; but afterwards associating with Hipparchus, he despised them; and that they, being very much annoyed at the dishonor, slew Hipparchus.

Friend/ You run the risk, Socrates, of either not considering me a friend; or, if you do think me a friend, of not being persuaded by Hipparchus: for I cannot be persuaded that you have not deceived me in I know not what manner, during the discourse.

Socrates/ But indeed, just as in the game of backgammon, I am willing to put back whatever part you please of the assertions already made, in order that you may not think you have been deceived. Whether therefore shall I retract this assertion for you, that all men desire good?

Friend/ Not for me.

Socrates/ But that to be damaged, and damage itself, is not an evil?

Friend/ Not for me.

Socrates/ But that gain, and to make a gain, are not contrary to damage, and to be damaged?

Friend/ Nor this neither.

Socrates/ But that to make a gain, as being contrary to evil, is not a good?

Friend/ Retract nothing of this kind at all for me.

Socrates/ It appears to you then, as it seems, that of gain one part is a good, and another an evil.

Friend/ Yes, to me.

Socrates/ I retract therefore this for you. For let it be, that one kind of gain is a good, and another kind an evil; but that gain itself is not more good than evil. Is it not so?

Friend/ Why do you ask me?

Socrates/ I will tell you. Is there food good, and bad?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is therefore one of them more food than the other? or are both of them similarly food? and does the one differ in no respect from the other, so far as each is food, but so far as one is good, and the other bad?

Friend/ Just so.

Socrates/ And is it not as regards drink, and all other things which are parts of things existing, that some at least are so circumstanced as to be bad, and others, good; and that they differ not at all from each other, in that they are the same; just as one man is good, and another bad?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But one man is, I suppose, neither more nor less a man than another, neither the good than the bad, nor the bad than the good.

Friend/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Shall we not then think in like manner respecting gain, that both the good and the bad are similarly gain?

Friend/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who has a good gain, does not in any respect make a gain more than he, who has a bad gain: for neither of these, as we have granted, appears to be more a gain than the other.

Friend/ True.

Socrates/ For to neither of them is the more or the less present.

Friend/ It is not.

Socrates/ But in a thing of this kind, to which neither of these accidents is present, how can anyone do, or suffer, more or less?

Friend/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Since, then, both are similarly gain and gainful, it is requisite that we should still further consider this—why do you call both of them gain? and what do you see to be in both the same? Just as if you had asked me about the recent question, why I called both good and bad food similarly food, I would have said—Because each is a dry aliment of the body, on this account I called them so. For that this is food, you would surely acknowledge; would you not?

Friend/ I would.

Socrates/ And there will be the same manner of answering respecting drink; that for the moist aliment of the body, whether it is good or bad, the name is drink; and for the rest of things, in like manner. Do you therefore endeavor to imitate me, by answering thus. When you speak of good gain and bad gain, as being both of them gain, what same thing do you perceive in them, that this too is gain? But if you are not able to answer me in this way, reflect, while I am speaking. Do you call a gain every acquisition that a person obtains, when he either spends nothing, or when, after spending less, he receives more?

Friend/ I seem to myself to call the latter gain.

Socrates/ Are you therefore speaking of such things as these? If a person after having been feasted and spending nothing, and indulging in good living, should become diseased?

Friend/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But if he should obtain health after feasting, would he obtain a gain or damage?

Friend/ Gain.

Socrates/ This then is not a gain, to obtain any acquisition whatever.

Friend/ It is not.

Socrates/ Whether will he, who obtains what is an evil, or at least what is not a good, not obtain a gain?

Friend/ It appears so, at least if it be a good.

Socrates/ But if he obtains an evil, will he not obtain a damage?

Friend/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ See then how you are again running round to the same point? For gain appears to be a good, but damage an evil.

Friend/ I really am at a loss what to say.

Socrates/ Nor unjustly are you at a loss. But, answer me still further this. If anyone after having spent less, obtains more, do you say this is a gain?

Friend/ I do not say it is an evil, but if after having spent less of gold or silver money, he receives more.

Socrates/ I too am about to ask you this. For come, tell me, should a person spending half a pound of gold, receive double this weight of silver, would he obtain a gain or a damage?

Friend/ A damage surely, Socrates; for, instead of a value twelve times as much, the silver is only twice as much.

Socrates/ But yet he has received more. Or is not double more than half?

Friend/ But silver is not of the same value as gold.

Socrates/ It is requisite then, as it seems, that this, namely, value, be added to gain; for in this case do you not say that the silver, although being more than the gold, is not of equal value? the gold, although being less, you say, is of equal value.

Friend/ Very much so: for such is the fact.

Socrates/ Value, therefore, is gainful, whether it is small or great; but that which is valueless is gainless.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ By “value,” do you mean anything else than what it is worthy to acquire?

Friend/ I do not.

Socrates/ But by the expression “it is worthy to acquire,” do you mean the useless, or the useful?

Friend/ The useful, certainly.

Socrates/ The useful, therefore, is a good.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Hence, thou most manly of all men, has not the lucrative come to us again a third or a fourth time, as being an acknowledged good?

Friend/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Do you remember, then, from whence this discourse of ours originated?

Friend/ I think I do.

Socrates/ If you do not, I will remind you. You contended that good men are not willing to make every kind of gain, but of gains the good alone but not the iniquitous.

Friend/ It did originate from this.

Socrates/ But has not reason forced us to acknowledge, that all kinds of gain, both small and great, are good?

Friend/ It has forced me, Socrates, rather than persuaded.

Socrates/ But perhaps after this it will also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded, or in whatever manner you may be affected, you agree at least with us, that all kinds of gain are good, both small and great?

Friend/ I do agree.

Socrates/ And do you agree with me, or not, that all good men wish for all things that are good?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ But you said that bad men love gain of every kind, both small and great.

Friend/ I did say so.

Socrates/ According to your assertion, then, all men, both good and bad, would be lovers of gain.

Friend/ It appears so.

Socrates/ If then any person reproaches another with being a lover of gain, he does not correctly reproach him; for the very, person so reproaching happens to be such a character himself.

Hipparchus.

Or Lover Of Gain

[ethical]

Translated by Lamb.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Friend

Socrates/ And what is love of gain? What can it be, and who are the lovers of gain?

Friend/ In my opinion, they are those who think it worthwhile to make gain out of things of no worth.

Socrates/ Is it your opinion that they know those things to be of no worth, or do not know? For if they do not know, you mean that the lovers of gain are fools.

Friend/ No, I do not mean they are fools, but rascals who wickedly yield to gain, because they know that the things out of which they dare to make their gain are worthless, and yet they dare to be lovers of gain from mere shamelessness.

Socrates/ Well now, do you mean by the lover of gain such a man, for instance, as a farmer who plants something which he knows is a worthless herb, and thinks fit to make gain out of it when he has reared it up? Is that the sort of man you mean?

Friend/ The lover of gain, as such, Socrates, thinks he ought to make gain from everything.

Socrates/ Please do not speak so recklessly, as though you had been wronged by someone, but give me your attention and answer just as you would if I were beginning my questions over again. Do you not admit that the lover of gain has knowledge of the worth of the thing from which he thinks it worthwhile to make gain?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Then who has knowledge of the worth of plants, and of the sort of season and soil in which they are worth planting—if we too may throw in one of those artful phrases which adroit pleaders use to trick out their speeches in the law courts?

Friend/ For my part, I should say a farmer.

Socrates/ And by “think it worthwhile to make gain” do you mean aught but " thinking one ought to make gain”?

Friend/ I mean that.

Socrates/ Then do not attempt to deceive me, who am now quite an elderly person, and you so young, by making, as you did just now, an answer that is not even your own thought; but tell me in all truth, do you suppose that any man who was taking up farming and who knew it was a worthless plant that he was planting, could think to make gain from it?

Friend/ Upon my word, I do not.

Socrates/ Or again, take a horseman who knows that he is providing worthless food for his horse; do you suppose he is unaware that he is destroying his horse?

Friend/ I do not.

Socrates/ So he does not think to make gain from that worthless food.

Friend/ No.

Socrates/ Or again, take a navigator who has furnished his ship with worthless spars and ropes; do you think he is unaware that he will suffer for it, and will be in danger of being lost himself, and of losing the ship and all her cargo?

Friend/ I do not.

Socrates/ So he does not think to make gain from that worthless tackle?

Friend/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But does a general, who knows that his army has worthless arms, think to make gain, or think it worthwhile to make gain, from them?

Friend/ By no means.

Socrates/ Or does a flute-player who has worthless flutes, or a harper with a lyre, a bowman with a bow, or anyone else at all, in short, among ordinary craftsmen or sensible men in general, with any implement or other equipment of any sort that is worthless, think to make gain from it?

Friend/ To all appearance, no.

Socrates/ Then whoever can they be, your lovers of gain? For I presume they are not the people whom we have successively mentioned, but people who know their worthless things, and yet think they are to make gain from them. But in that case, by what you say, remarkable sir, no man alive is a lover of gain!

Friend/ Well, Socrates, I should like to call those lovers of gain who from insatiable greed consumedly long for things that are even quite petty and of little or no worth, and so love gain, in each case.

Socrates/ Not knowing, of course, my excellent friend, that the things are worthless; for we have already convinced ourselves by our argument that this is impossible.

Friend/ I agree.

Socrates/ And if not knowing this, clearly they are ignorant of it, but think that those worthless things are worth a great deal.

Friend/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Now, of course lovers of gain must love gain?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by gain you mean the opposite of loss?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ And is it a good thing for anyone to suffer loss?

Friend/ For no one.

Socrates/ Rather an evil?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ So mankind are harmed by loss.

Friend/ They are harmed.

Socrates/ Then loss is an evil.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And gain is the opposite of loss.

Friend/ The opposite.

Socrates/ So that gain is a good.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Hence it is those who love the good that you call lovers of gain.

Friend/ So it seems.

Socrates/ At least there is nothing mad, my friend, about lovers of gain, as you describe them. But tell me, do you yourself love, or not love, whatever is good?

Friend/ I love it.

Socrates/ And is there anything good that you do not love, or must it then be evil?

Friend/ Upon my word, nothing.

Socrates/ In fact, I expect you love all good things.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well now, ask me on my side whether I do not likewise: for I shall agree with you, for my part, that I love good things. But besides you and me, do you not think that all the rest of mankind love good things, and hate evil things?

Friend/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ And we admitted that gain is good?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ On this new showing, everyone appears to be a lover of gain; whereas, by our former way of arguing, no one was a lover of gain. So on which of the two arguments are we to rely, in order to avoid error?

Friend/ What has to be done, I think, Socrates, is to conceive the lover of gain rightly. The right view of the lover of gain is that he is one who concerns himself with, and thinks fit to make gain from, things from which honest men do not dare to make gain.

Socrates/ But you see, my sweet sir, we have just admitted that making gain is being benefited.

Friend/ Well, what of that?

Socrates/ There is the further point we have admitted in addition to this—that all men wish for good things always.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then good men likewise wish to have all gains, if these are good things.

Friend/ Not those gains from which they are bound, Socrates, to suffer harm.

Socrates/ By "suffer harm" do you mean "suffer loss," or something else?

Friend/ No, I mean just "suffer loss."

Socrates/ Well, do men suffer loss from gain or from loss?

Friend/ From both; for they suffer loss from loss and from wicked gain.

Socrates/ Pray now, do you consider that any useful and good thing is wicked?

Friend/ I do not.

Socrates/ And we admitted a little while ago that gain is the opposite of loss, which is an evil.

Friend/ I agree.

Socrates/ And that, being the opposite of an evil, it is good?

Friend/ That was our admission.

Socrates/ So you see, you are attempting to deceive me, for you deliberately contradict what we agreed to just now.

Friend/ No, on my honor, Socrates; on the contrary, it is you who are deceiving me, by twisting this way and that so perplexingly in your talk!

Socrates/ Hush, hush! Why, surely it would be wrong of me not to obey a good and wise person.

Friend/ Who is that? And to what are you referring now?

Socrates/ I mean my and your fellow-citizen, Pisistratus's son Hipparchus, of Philaldae, who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus's sons, and who, among the many goodly proofs of wisdom that he showed, first brought the poems of Homer into this country of ours, and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea to recite them in relay, one man following on another, as they still do now. He dispatched a fifty-oared galley for Anacreon of Teos, and brought him into our city. Simonides of Ceos he always had about him, prevailing on him by plenteous fees and gifts. All this he did from a wish to educate the citizens, in order that he might have subjects of the highest excellence; for he thought it not right to grudge wisdom to any, so noble and good was he. And when his people in the city had been educated and were admiring him for his wisdom, he proceeded next, with the design of educating those of the countryside, to set up figures of Hermes for them along the roads in the midst of the city and every district town; and then, after selecting from his own wise lore, both learnt from

others and discovered for himself, the things that he considered the wisest, he threw these into elegiac form and inscribed them on the figures as verses of his own and testimonies of his wisdom, so that in the first place his people should not admire those wise Delphic legends of Know thyself and Nothing overmuch, and the other sayings of the sort, but should rather regard as wise the utterances of Hipparchus; and that in the second place, through passing up and down and reading his words and acquiring a taste for his wisdom, they might resort hither from the country for the completion of their education. There are two such inscriptions of his: on the left side of each Hermes there is one in which the god says that he stands in the midst of the city or the township, while on the right side he says:

> The memorial of Hipparchus: walk with just intent.

There are many other fine inscriptions from his poems on other figures of Hermes, and this one in particular, on the Steiria road, in which he says:

> The memorial of Hipparchus: deceive not a friend.

I therefore should never dare, I am sure, to deceive you, who are my friend, or disobey the great Hipparchus, after whose death the Athenians were for three years under the despotic rule of his brother Hippias, and you might have heard anyone of the earlier period say that it was only in these years that there was despotism in Athens, and that at all other times the Athenians lived very much as in the reign of Cronos. And the subtler sort of people say that Hipparchus's death was due, not to the cause supposed by most—the disqualification of the assassin's sister from bearing the basket, for that is a silly motive—but because Harmodius had become the favorite of Aristogeiton and had been educated by him. Thus Aristogeiton also prided himself on educating people, and he regarded Hipparchus as a dangerous rival. And at that time, it is said, Harmodius

happened to be himself in love with one of the handsome and well-born youths of the day; they do tell his name, but I cannot remember it. Well, for a while this youth admired both Harmodius and Aristogeiton as wise men, but afterwards, when he associated with Hipparchus, he despised them, and they were so overcome with the pain of this "disqualification" that they slew Hipparchus.

Friend/ It would seem, then, Socrates, either that you do not regard me as your friend, or if you do, that you do not obey Hipparchus. For that you are not deceiving me—though I cannot tell how you contrive it—in your talk, is more than I can believe.

Socrates/ Well now, as though we were playing draughts, I am willing to let you revoke, as you please, anything you have said in carrying on the discussion, in order that you may not think you are being deceived. So tell me, shall I revoke for you the statement that all men desire good things?

Friend/ No, thank you.

Socrates/ Well, that suffering loss, or loss, is an evil?

Friend/ No, thank you.

Socrates/ Well, that gain, or making gain, is the opposite of loss, or suffering loss?

Friend/ Nor that either.

Socrates/ Well, that making gain, as the opposite of evil, is a good?

Friend/ No, not in every case: let me revoke this one.

Socrates/ You think, then, it seems, that some gain is good, and some evil.

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Well then, I revoke so much for you; so let us assume that some gain is good, and some other gain evil. But the good sort is no more gain than the evil sort, is it?

Friend/ What do you mean by this question?

Socrates/ I will explain. Is there both good and evil food?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is the one sort more food than the other, or are they both similarly this same thing, food, and in this respect does the one differ no wise from the other, in being food, but only in the fact of the one being good and the other evil?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so with drink and every other class of things that exist, when some things in any class come to be good, and others evil, one thing does not differ from another in that respect whereby they are the same? For instance, one man, I suppose, is virtuous, and another wicked.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But neither of them, I conceive, is more or less man than the other—neither the virtuous than the wicked, nor the wicked than the virtuous.

Friend/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ Then are we to take the same view of gain also, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort are similarly gain?

Friend/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ So he who has virtuous gain is no whit the more a gainer than he who has wicked gain: neither sort is found to be more gain, as we agree.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ For neither of them has addition of either more or less.

Friend/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And how could one do or suffer anything more or less with a thing of this sort, that had neither of these additions?

Friend/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, both of these are gains and gain-making affairs, we must now consider what it can be that leads you to call both of them gain: what is it that you see to be the same in both? Suppose you were to ask me, in those instances that I gave just now, what it is that leads me to call both good food and evil food alike food, I should tell you—for this reason, because both are a dry sustenance of the body. For that, I am sure you would agree, is what food is, would you not?

Friend/ I would.

Socrates/ And so too about drink the answer would be on the same lines, that the wet sustenance of the body, whether it be wholesome or pernicious, has this name of drink; and likewise with the rest. Try therefore on your part to imitate my method of answering. When you say that virtuous gain and wicked gain are both gain, what is it that you see to be the same in them, judging it to be the actual element of gain? And if again you are yourself unable to answer, just let me put it for your consideration, whether you describe as gain every acquisition that one has acquired either with no expense, or as a profit over and above one's expense.

Friend/ I believe that is what I call gain.

Socrates/ Do you include a case where, after enjoying a banquet at which one has had much good cheer without any expense, one acquires an illness?

Friend/ Upon my word, not I.

Socrates/ And if one acquired health from attending a banquet, would one acquire gain or loss?

Friend/ Gain.

Socrates/ Hence gain is not just acquiring any acquisition.

Friend/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Do you mean, not if it is evil? Or will one acquire no gain even if one acquires something good?

Friend/ Apparently one will, if it is good.

Socrates/ And if it is evil, will not one acquire loss?

Friend/ I think so.

Socrates/ You see, then, how you are running round again to the same old point? Gain is found to be good, and loss evil.

Friend/ For my part, I cannot tell what to say.

Socrates/ And not without good reason, sir. Now answer this further question: you say that if one acquires more than the amount one has spent, it is gain?

Friend/ I do not mean, when it is evil, but if one gets more gold or silver than one has spent.

Socrates/ Now, I am just going to ask you about that. Tell me, if one spends half a pound of gold and gets double that weight in silver, has one got gain or loss?

Friend/ Loss, I presume, Socrates: for one's gold is reduced to twice, instead of twelve times, the value of silver.

Socrates/ But you see, one has got more; or is double not more than half?

Friend/ Not in worth, the one being silver and the other gold.

Socrates/ So gain, it seems, must have this addition of worth. At least, you now say that silver, though more than gold, is not worth as much, and that gold, though less, is of equal worth.

Friend/ Assuredly, for that is the case.

Socrates/ Then the valuable is what produces gain, whether it be small or great, and the valueless produces no gain.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by the valuable you mean simply, valuable to possess?

Friend/ Yes, to possess.

Socrates/ And again, by what is valuable to possess, do you mean the unprofitable or the profitable?

Friend/ The profitable, I presume.

Socrates/ And the profitable is good?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so, most valiant of men, have we not here once more, for the third or fourth time, the admission that what produces gain is good?

Friend/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then do you remember the point from which this discussion of ours arose?

Friend/ I think I do.

Socrates/ In case you do not, I will remind you. You maintained against me that good men do not wish to make all sorts of gain, but only those gains that are good, and not those that are wicked.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now the argument has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains, both small and great, are good?

Friend/ Yes, it has compelled me, at least, Socrates, rather than persuaded me.

Socrates/ Well, later on, perhaps, it might also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded or whatever

is your feeling, you at least agree with me that all gains are good, both small and great ones.

Friend/ Yes, I do admit it.

Socrates/ And you admit that virtuous men all wish for all good things, do you not?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ But, you know, you stated yourself that wicked men love both small and great gains.

Friend/ I did.

Socrates/ And so, by your account, all men will be lovers of gain, whether they be virtuous or wicked.

Friend/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Hence it is not right to reproach anybody with being a lover of gain: for he who makes this reproach is actually such an one himself.

Hipparchus

Translated by Nicholas D. Smith.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, and a Friend.

Socrates/ What is greed? What can it be, and who are greedy people?

Friend/ In my opinion, they're the ones who think it's a good idea to profit from things of no value.

Socrates/ Do you think they know these things are of no value, or do they not know? For if they don't know, you mean that greedy people are stupid.

Friend/ No, I don't mean they're stupid. What I mean is this: they're unscrupulous and wicked people who are overcome by profit, knowing that the things from which they dare to profit are of no value; yet their shamelessness makes them dare to be greedy.

Socrates/ So, then, do you mean that the greedy person is, for example, like a farmer who plants, knowing his plant is of no value, and thinks it's a good idea to profit from the plant when fully grown? Is this the sort of person you mean?

Friend/ The greedy person, at any rate, Socrates, thinks he ought to profit from everything.

Socrates/ Don't let me make you give in like that, as if you had somehow been tricked by something; pay attention and answer as if I were asking again from the beginning. Don't you agree that the greedy person knows about the value of the thing from which he thinks it is a good idea to profit?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ So who knows about the value of plants, in what seasons and soils it's a good idea to plant them—if we may

throw in one of those clever phrases with which legal experts beautify their speeches?

Friend/ The farmer, I think.

Socrates/ By "thinking it's a good idea to profit" do you mean anything but thinking one ought to profit?

Friend/ That's what I mean.

Socrates/ Well then, don't try to deceive me—I'm already an old man and you're so very young—by answering as you did just now, saying what you yourself don't think; tell the truth. Do you think there is any man who takes up farming, and expects to profit from planting crops that he knows to be of no value?

Friend/ By Zeus, I don't!

Socrates/ Well then, do you think that a horseman who knowingly gives his horse food that is of no value is unaware that he is harming his horse?

Friend/ I don't.

Socrates/ So he doesn't expect to profit from food that is of no value.

Friend/ No.

Socrates/ Well then, do you think that a ship's captain who has rigged his ship with sails and rudders that are of no value is unaware that he will suffer loss, and risks being lost himself and losing the ship and all it carries?

Friend/ No, I don't.

Socrates/ So he doesn't expect to profit from equipment that is of no value.

Friend/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Or does a general who knows that his army has arms that are of no value expect to profit, or think it's a good idea to profit from them?

Friend/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or does a flute-player who has flutes that are of no value, or a lyre-player with a lyre, or an archer with a bow, or, in short, does any other craftsman, or any other sensible man who has worthless tools, or any other sort of equipment, expect to profit from them?

Friend/ Obviously not.

Socrates/ Then who do you say the greedy people are? For surely the ones just mentioned are not the ones who expect to profit from what they know has no value. But in that case, my wonderful friend, there aren't any greedy people at all, according to what you say.

Friend/ What I mean, Socrates, is this: greedy people are those whose greed gives them an insatiable desire to profit even from things that are actually quite petty, and of little or no value.

Socrates/ Not, of course, knowing that they are of no value, my very good friend; for we have just proved to ourselves in our argument that this is impossible.

Friend/ I believe so.

Socrates/ And if they don't know this, plainly they're ignorant of it, thinking instead that the things of no value are very valuable.

Friend/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Now, of course, greedy people love to make a profit.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by profit, you mean the opposite of loss?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Is there anyone for whom it is a good thing to suffer loss?

Friend/ No one.

Socrates/ It's a bad thing?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ So people are harmed by loss?

Friend/ Yes, harmed.

Socrates/ So loss is bad?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And profit is the opposite of loss?

Friend/ Yes, the opposite.

Socrates/ So profit is good?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ So it is those who love the good whom you call greedy.

Friend/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Well, my friend, at least you don't call greedy people lunatics. But you yourself, do you or don't you love what's good?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Is there something good that you don't love? Or something bad that you do?

Friend/ By Zeus, no!

Socrates/ So presumably you love all good things?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you can ask me, too, if I'm not the same; for I will also agree with you that I love good things. But besides you and me, don't you believe that all other people love what's good and hate what's bad?

Friend/ So it appears to me.

Socrates/ And we agreed that profit is good?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, then, in this way of looking at it, everyone appears to be greedy; whereas, according to what we said

earlier, no one was greedy. So which of these approaches would it be safe to rely on?

Friend/ I think, Socrates, we have to get the right conception of the greedy person. The right conception is that the greedy person is the one who is concerned with and thinks it's a good idea to profit from things which virtuous people would never dare to profit from.

Socrates/ But you see, my dear sweet fellow, that we have already agreed that to profit is to be benefited.

Friend/ Well, what of it?

Socrates/ We also agreed that everyone always wants good things.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Therefore, even good people want every kind of profit, at least if they're good.

Friend/ But not profits from which they're going to suffer harm, Socrates.

Socrates/ By "suffer harm," do you mean "suffer loss," or something else?

Friend/ No; I mean "suffer loss."

Socrates/ Do people suffer loss from profit, or from loss?

Friend/ From both; for they suffer loss from loss and from wicked profit.

Socrates/ Well, do you believe that anything virtuous and good is wicked?

Friend/ I don't.

Socrates/ And we agreed a little while ago that profit is the opposite of loss, which is bad?

Friend/ I would say so.

Socrates/ And being the opposite of bad, it's good?

Friend/ We agreed to that.

Socrates/ So you see, you're trying to deceive me, deliberately saying the opposite of what we just agreed to.

Friend/ No, by Zeus, Socrates! Quite the opposite: it's you who's deceiving me, and turning me upside down in these arguments—I don't know how you do it!

Socrates/ Be careful what you say; it wouldn't be right for me not to obey a good and wise man.

Friend/ Who is that? What are you talking about?

Socrates/ I mean my and your fellow citizen: Pisistratus' son, Hipparchus, of Philaedae, who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus' children. In addition to the many other fine deeds in which he displayed his wisdom, it was he who first brought the works of Homer to this land, and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea to recite them in relays—one following another—as they still do now. He also sent a fifty-oared ship for Anacreon of Teos, and brought him to the city. He also entreated Simonides of Ceos always to be around, with large fees and gifts. He did these things with a view to educating the citizens, so that he could govern the best possible people; like the gentleman he was, he didn't think it right to begrudge wisdom to anyone.

And when the citizens from the city had been educated by him and were impressed by his wisdom, he decided to educate the country-people, as well, setting up Herms for them along the roads between the middle of the city and each deme. And then, selecting from his store of wisdom—both what he had learned and what he had found out by himself—what he thought were the wisest he put into elegiac verse and inscribed them (his own poetry and examples of his wisdom) on the Herms. He did this in order that, first, his citizens would not be impressed by those wise Delphic inscriptions, "Know Thyself," and "Nothing in Excess," and other things of this sort, but would instead regard the words of Hipparchus

as wiser. And, second, he did this so that when they travelled back and forth they would read and acquire a taste for his wisdom and would come in from the country to complete their education. There are two sides to the inscriptions: on the left side of each Herm, it is inscribed that the Herm stands in the middle of the city or the deme, whereas on the right it says: "This is a monument of Hipparchus: walk with justice in mind." There are many other fine inscriptions of his poetry on other Herms. There is one in particular—on the Stiria road—on which it says: "This is a monument of Hipparchus: do not deceive a friend." So, since I am your friend, I would never dare to deceive you and disobey so great a man.

After his death the Athenians were ruled under tyranny by his brother, Hippias, for three years, and you would have heard from all of those of earlier days that there was tyranny in Athens only for those three years, and that during the other times the Athenians lived almost as when Cronus was King. In fact, the more sophisticated people claim that his death did not come about in the way that the common people think—that it was because his sister was dishonored in the carrying of the basket, for that's silly—but because Harmodius had become the boyfriend of Aristogiton and was educated by him. Aristogiton also prided himself on educating this fellow, and regarded himself as a rival of Hipparchus. At that time, Harmodius himself happened to be a lover of one of the handsome and noble youths of that era. (They say what his name was, but I don't remember it.) In any case, this youth was for a while impressed by Harmodius and Aristogiton as wise men, but later—after associating with Hipparchus—he disdained them, and they were so hurt by this dishonor that they killed Hipparchus for it.

Friend/ Well now, Socrates, it seems likely that either you don't regard me as your friend, or if you do, you don't obey Hipparchus. For you will never be able to persuade me that

you aren't deceiving me in these arguments, though I don't know how you do it.

Socrates/ Very well, just like in a friendly game of checkers, I'm willing to let you take back anything you want of what's been said in the discussion, so you won't think you're being deceived. So should I take this back for you, that all men desire good things?

Friend/ No, not that.

Socrates/ Well, how about that suffering loss, or loss, is bad?

Friend/ No, not that.

Socrates/ Well, how about that profit and profiting are opposite to loss and suffering loss?

Friend/ Not that, either.

Socrates/ Well, how about that profiting, as the opposite of bad, is good?

Friend/ It's not always good; take that back for me.

Socrates/ So you believe, it seems, that some profit is good, and some is bad.

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ All right, I'll take this back for you; let's say that some profit is good and some other profit is bad. And neither one is more profit, the good or the bad. Right?

Friend/ What are you asking me?

Socrates/ I'll explain. Is some food good and some bad?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then is one of them more food than the other, or are they both the same thing, food, and in this respect, at least, the one is no different from the other in so far as being food, but only in so far as one is good, and one is bad?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so with drink and everything else; when some things of the same sort come to be good and others bad, the one does not differ from the other in that respect by which they are the same? For example with people, I suppose: one is virtuous, and one is wicked.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But neither of them is more or less a person than the other, I think—neither the virtuous person more than the wicked, nor vice versa.

Friend/ That's true.

Socrates/ Then are we to think this way about profit, too, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort alike are profit?

Friend/ They have to be.

Socrates/ So, then, one who makes virtuous profit doesn't profit more than one who makes the wicked sort—it appears that neither one is more profit than the other, as we agree.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ For neither "more" nor "less" is added to either of them.

Friend/ Not at all.

Socrates/ And how could one ever do or suffer anything more or less with this sort of thing, to which neither of these things is added?

Friend/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Therefore, because both alike are profits and profitable, we must now investigate what it is in virtue of which you call both of them profit—what do you see that's the same in both of them? For example, if you were to ask me, about the examples I just gave, "what is it, in virtue of which you call both good and bad food alike, 'food'," I would tell you that both are solid nourishment for the body—this is why. For surely you would agree that this is what food is, wouldn't you?

Friend/ I would.

Socrates/ And with regard to drink, the answer would be the same, that the liquid nourishment of the body, whether virtuous or wicked, has this name: “drink,” and similarly in other cases. Try, therefore, to imitate me by answering in this way. When you say that virtuous profit and wicked profit are both profit, what do you see in both that’s the same—that which is actually profit? If you yourself are again unable to answer, consider what I say: do you call a profit every possession that one has acquired either by spending nothing, or by spending less and receiving more?

Friend/ Yes, I believe I'd call that profit.

Socrates/ Do you mean cases like this—when you are given a feast, spending nothing but eating your fill, and getting sick?

Friend/ By Zeus, I do not!

Socrates/ If you became healthy from the feast, would you be profiting or losing?

Friend/ Profiting.

Socrates/ So this, at least, is not profit: acquiring just any possession at all.

Friend/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Not if it’s bad, right? But if one acquires anything good at all, doesn’t one acquire a profit?

Friend/ Apparently, if it’s good.

Socrates/ And if it’s bad, won’t one suffer a loss?

Friend/ I believe so.

Socrates/ Don’t you see that you are coming around back again to the same place? Profit appears to be good, and loss bad.

Friend/ I’m at a loss for what to say.

Socrates/ At least you're not at an unfair loss. But answer this: when one acquires more than one has spent, do you say it's profit?

Friend/ At least I don't mean when it's bad, but if one acquires more gold or silver than one has spent.

Socrates/ I'm just about to ask you that: if someone spends half a measure of gold and gets double that in silver, has he profited or lost?

Friend/ Lost, surely, Socrates, for then his gold is worth only double, instead of twelve times as much as silver.

Socrates/ But still he's acquired more; or isn't double more than half?

Friend/ Not in value, at least, with silver and gold.

Socrates/ So it looks like we must add the notion of value to profit. At least, now you say that silver, though there is more of it than gold, is not as valuable, and that gold, although there's less, is of equal value.

Friend/ Of course, for that is indeed the case.

Socrates/ Value, then, is what brings profit, whether it's small or large, and what has no value brings no profit.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by "value," do you mean anything other than "valuable to possess"?

Friend/ Yes, "valuable to possess."

Socrates/ Moreover, by "valuable to possess," do you mean the unbeneficial or the beneficial?

Friend/ The beneficial, surely.

Socrates/ Well, isn't the beneficial good?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so, my valiant warrior, haven't we once again, for the third or fourth time, come to the agreement that what's profitable is good?

Friend/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Do you remember the point from which this discussion of ours arose?

Friend/ I think so.

Socrates/ If not, I'll remind you. You disagreed with me, claiming that good people do not want to make just any sort of profit, but only those that are good ones, and not the wicked ones.

Friend/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ And doesn't the argument now force us to agree that all gains, small and large, are good?

Friend/ It forces me, Socrates, rather than persuades me.

Socrates/ Well, perhaps later it will also persuade you. But for now, whatever condition you're in—persuaded or not—you do at least agree with us that all profits are good, both small and large.

Friend/ I do agree.

Socrates/ And do you agree that all virtuous people want all good things, or not?

Friend/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well now, you yourself said that wicked people love profits, both small and large.

Friend/ I did.

Socrates/ So according to your argument, all people would be greedy, both the virtuous and the wicked.

Friend/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So, therefore, it is not a correct reproach, if someone reproaches another as being greedy—for it turns out that he who makes this reproach is greedy himself.

The Hipparchus.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and Hipparchus.

Socrates/ What is the love, and who are the lovers of gain?

Friend/ It appears to me that those are lovers of gain, who think it worthwhile to acquire wealth from things of no worth.

Socrates/ Whether therefore do they appear to you to do this in consequence of knowing, or being ignorant that these are things of no worth? For if they do this through ignorance, you call the lovers of gain stupid.

Friend/ But I do not call them stupid, but perfectly crafty and base; men who are vanquished by gain, who know that the things from which they have the boldness to acquire wealth, are of no worth, and yet at the same time, through their impudence, dare to love gain.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, call a character of the following kind a lover of gain? I mean, as if a husbandman, planting a tree or herb, and knowing that it is of no worth, should nevertheless think it worthwhile to enrich himself from the cultivation of such a plant? Do you call such a one as this a lover of gain?

Friend/ A lover of gain, Socrates, thinks he ought to enrich himself from everything.

Socrates/ Do not thus rashly answer me, like a man who has been injured by someone; but, attending to what I say, answer me as if I should again interrogate you from the beginning. Do you agree with me, that a lover of gain knows

the value of that thing whence he thinks it worthwhile to enrich himself?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Who then is he that has a knowledge of the worth of plants; and who likewise knows in what region, and at what time of the year it is worthwhile to plant them? that we also may adopt something from those words of the wise, which lawyers employ for the sake of elegance.

Friend/ A husbandman, I think.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, say that the term, It is worthwhile to acquire wealth, is anything else than to think that it is requisite to acquire wealth?

Friend/ I say it is this very thing.

Socrates/ Do not therefore you, who are so young, endeavor to deceive me, who am now an elderly man, by answering, as you do at present, what you by no means think; but answer me truly, whether you think that the man who is a husbandman, and who knows that it is not worthwhile to set a certain plant, will yet expect to be enriched by such a plant?

Friend/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ What then? Will a jockey who knows that the food which he gives a horse is of no worth, be ignorant that by such food he will destroy the horse?

Friend/ I do not think he will.

Socrates/ He will not, therefore, think that from such aliment as this, which is of no worth, he shall be enriched.

Friend/ He will not.

Socrates/ What then? Do you think that a pilot who furnishes a ship with a rudder and sails, which are of no value, can be ignorant that he shall sustain an injury, be

himself in danger of perishing, and both destroy the ship and all it contains?

Friend/ I do not.

Socrates/ He will not therefore think that he shall be enriched by furniture of no value.

Friend/ He will not.

Socrates/ Will the general of an army, likewise, when he knows that his soldiers have arms which are of no value, think that he shall acquire wealth, or that it is worthwhile to be enriched by these?

Friend/ By no means.

Socrates/ In like manner, if a piper possesses a pipe of no value, a lyrist a lyre, an archer a bow, or in short if any other artist or skillful person possesses instruments, or any other apparatus of no value, will he think that he shall be enriched by these?

Friend/ It appears he will not.

Socrates/ Who then do you call lovers of gain? For they are certainly not those whom we have already mentioned, who expect to be enriched from things which they know are of no value. And thus, O wonderful man, according to what you say, no one is a lover of gain.

Friend/ But I, Socrates, wish to say, that those are lovers of gain, who, through insatiable avidity, transcendently aspire after things very small and trifling, and which are of no value, and this for the sake of gain.

Socrates/ But certainly, O best of men, they do not act in this manner, knowing that they are things of no worth; for we have granted that this is impossible.

Friend/ So it appears to me.

Socrates/ If, therefore, they do not act in this manner knowingly, it is evident that their conduct must be the effect

of ignorance; the consequence of thinking that things which are of no worth are highly valuable.

Friend/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Do the lovers of gain, love anything else than gain?

Friend/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ But do you say that gain is contrary to loss?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Is it therefore good to anyone to suffer a loss?

Friend/ To no one.

Socrates/ Is it then an evil?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are men, therefore, injured by loss?

Friend/ They are injured.

Socrates/ Is then loss an evil?

Friend/ It is.

Socrates/ And is gain contrary to loss?

Friend/ Contrary.

Socrates/ Is gain therefore good?

Friend/ It is.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, call those that love good, lovers of gain?

Friend/ So it seems.

Socrates/ You do not then, my friend, call the lovers of gain insane persons. But with respect to yourself, whether do you love that which is good, or do not love it?

Friend/ I love it.

Socrates/ Is there a certain good which you do not love, but a certain evil which you do?

Friend/ By Zeus, there is not.

Socrates/ But you love all good things equally.

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Ask me, if I also do not. For I also shall acknowledge to you, that I love things good. But besides I and you, do not all other men appear to you to love things good, and hate such as are evil?

Friend/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ But have we not acknowledged that gain is good?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ After this manner, therefore, all lovers of gain appear; but according to that mode which we before mentioned, no one was a lover of gain. By employing which of these two, then, shall we not err?

Friend/ If anyone, Socrates, rightly apprehends what a lover of gain is, I think he will rightly consider him to be a character of this kind, who earnestly applies himself to the acquisition of wealth, and thinks it worthwhile to enrich himself from those things from which good men never dare to enrich themselves.

Socrates/ But do you not see, O sweetest of men, that we just now acknowledged that to be enriched is to be benefited?

Friend/ But what then?

Socrates/ Because this also we previously admitted, that all men always aspired after things good.

Friend/ We did.

Socrates/ Will not, therefore, good men wish to possess everything lucrative, since everything lucrative is good?

Friend/ But they will not, Socrates, desire things lucrative, by which they may be injured.

Socrates/ Do you say that to be injured, is to suffer a loss, or that it is something else?

Friend/ I say it is no other than to suffer a loss.

Socrates/ Do men, therefore, suffer a loss through gain, or through loss?

Friend/ Through both. For they suffer a loss through loss, and through base gain.

Socrates/ Does it therefore appear to you that anything useful and good is base?

Friend/ It does not.

Socrates/ Did we not then, a little before this, acknowledge that gain is contrary to loss, which is an evil?

Friend/ We did.

Socrates/ And that being contrary to evil, it is good?

Friend/ We granted this.

Socrates/ You see therefore that you endeavor to deceive me, and that you designedly assert the contrary to that which we just now granted.

Friend/ I do not, by Zeus, Socrates: but, on the contrary, you deceive me; and I do not know how it is, but in your discourse you turn all things upwards and downwards.

Socrates/ Good words, I beseech you. For indeed I should not act well, if I were not persuaded by a good and wise man.

Friend/ Who is he? and to what purpose is this?

Socrates/ My fellow citizen, and likewise yours, Hipparchus the son of the Philædonic Pisistratus, and the eldest and wisest of the sons of Pisistratus, This man, besides exhibiting many other illustrious works of wisdom, was the first that introduced into this land the writings of Homer, and compelled the rhapsodists to recite them in the Panathenaia, alternately, and in order, just as you know they do at present. He likewise brought back Anacreon, who

was sent to Teium, in a ship of fifty oars: and always had about him Simonides of Chius; persuading him to reside with him, by great rewards and gifts. He did these things, wishing to persuade his citizens, that thus he might rule over the best of men; thinking, that it was not proper to envy any man the possession of wisdom, and this because he himself was a worthy and good man. As, therefore, his fellow citizens were well educated men, and admired him for his wisdom, he likewise endeavored to instruct the husbandmen, and in order to this, placed Hermæ for them in the roads, in the middle of the city, and in each of the towns. Afterwards, from this wisdom of his, which he partly learned, and partly himself discovered, selecting such things as he thought were the wisest, he inserted them in an elegy, and inscribed this work, his poems, and specimens of wisdom. This he did, in the first place, that his citizens might not admire those wise inscriptions in the temple of Delphi, "Know thyself," "Nothing too much," and the rest of this kind, but that they might think the words of Hipparchus were to be preferred for wisdom to these: and, in the next place, that by everywhere reading and receiving a taste of his wisdom, they might come from the fields, and be instructed in the other branches of learning. But there are two epigrams, one on the left hand part of each of the Hermæ, in which, according to the inscription, Hermes says, that the column should stand in the middle of the city, and the people; and the other on the right hand part; which was thus inscribed: "This monument was raised by Hipparchus—Persist in paying attention to justice." There are also many other beautiful inscriptions, on other Hermæ; and the following is to be seen in the Stiriac road: "This monument was raised by Hipparchus—Do not deceive your friend. I therefore, being your friend, dare not deceive you, and oppose the mandate of so great a man; after whose death,

the Athenians were under tyrannic subjection to his brother Hippias. And you must have heard from all old men, that there never was a tyranny in Athens till these three years past, and that during every other time, the Athenians lived somewhat nearly after the same manner, as when Saturn reigned. But it is said by more elegant men, that he did not die in the way which the multitude report, viz. through the ignominy of his sister Canephoria; (For it is absurd to suppose that this was the case;) but that Harmodius was beloved and instructed by Aristogiton, who valued himself very highly on this account, and thought that Hipparchus would be his antagonist, But at that time it happened that Harmodius was the lover of a certain noble and beautiful youth, whose name I have heard, but do not at present remember. This young man then at first admired Harmodius and Aristogiton, as wise men, but afterwards associating with Hipparchus, he despised them; and they being very much afflicted with the disgrace, slew Hipparchus.

Friend/ You appear, therefore, Socrates, either not to consider me as a friend; or, if you do think me a friend, not to be persuaded by Hipparchus for I do not know how to persuade myself that you have not deceived me in the preceding discourse.

Socrates/ But indeed, just as in the game of chess, I am willing to retract whatever you please, that you may not think I have deceived you. Whether therefore shall I retract: this assertion for you, that all men desire good?

Friend/ Not for me.

Socrates/ Shall I retract this then, that neither to sustain a loss nor a loss itself, is an evil?

Friend/ Not for me.

Socrates/ Shall it be this then, that gain, and to acquire gain, are contrary to loss, and to suffer a loss?

Friend/ Nor this neither.

Socrates/ Shall I retract this assertion, that to acquire gain, as being contrary to evil, is good?

Friend/ You shall not retract anything of this.

Socrates/ It appears to you, therefore, as it seems, that of gain one part is good, and another part evil.

Friend/ To me it does appear so.

Socrates/ I will therefore retract this for you. For let it be that one kind of gain is good, and another kind evil: but gain itself is not more good than evil. For Is it?

Friend/ Why do you ask me?

Socrates/ I will tell you. Is there good, and is there likewise bad, food?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is therefore one of them more food than the other? or are both of them similarly food? and does the one in no respect differ from the other, so far as each is food, but so far as one is good, and the other bad?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does it not likewise follow with respect to drink, and all other things which participate of the good and the bad, that they differ in no respect from each other, in that in which they are the same? Just as with respect to our own species, one man is good, and another bad.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But with respect to men, I think that one man is neither more nor less a man than another, neither the good than the bad, nor the bad than the good.

Friend/ True.

Socrates/ Must we not therefore think in the same manner respecting gain, that both the good and the bad are similarly gain?

Friend/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who possesses good gain, is not in any respect more enriched than he who possesses bad gain: for we have granted that neither of these appears to be more gain than the other.

Friend/ True.

Socrates/ For neither the more nor the less is present to either of these.

Friend/ It is not.

Socrates/ But how can anyone do, or suffer, more or less with respect to a thing to which neither of these pertains?

Friend/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, both are similarly gain and lucrative, it is requisite that we should still further consider this; on what account you call both of them gain, and what it is that you discover to be in both the same. Just as if you should ask me why I just now called both good and bad food similarly food, I should say, It is because each is a dry aliment of the body. And this you will also grant. Or will you not?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And there will be the same mode of answering respecting drink, that we give this appellation to the moist aliment of the body, whether it is good or bad: and the reply in other things will be similar. Do you, therefore, endeavor to imitate me, by answering as follows. You say with respect to good and bad gain, that each of them is gain. What same thing is it then which, perceiving in these, you denominate gain? But if you are not able to answer me this question, attend to what I am now going to say. Do you then call every possession which anyone obtains gain, when he either spends nothing, or receives more than he spends?

Friend/ It appears to me that this should be called gain.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, thus denominate such things as follow: If anyone at a feast should spend nothing, but when satiated should become diseased?

Friend/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But if he should obtain health from feasting, would he acquire gain, or suffer a loss?

Friend/ He would acquire gain.

Socrates/ This, therefore, is not gain, to acquire any kind of possession whatever.

Friend/ It is not.

Socrates/ Does it therefore follow that gain is not to be acquired from every kind of possession, whether it be good or bad?

Friend/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And does it likewise follow that loss will not be sustained front everything, whether it be good or bad?

Friend/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, perceive how you again revolve to the same thing? For gain appears to be good, but loss evil.

Friend/ I am dubious what to say.

Socrates/ And this not unjustly. But still further, answer me this: If anyone obtains more than he spends, do you say that this is gain?

Friend/ I do, if his gain is not base, but he receives more than he spends, either of gold or silver.

Socrates/ And I shall also ask you this: If anyone, spending half a pound of gold, should receive double this weight of silver, would he be a gainer, or a loser?

Friend/ A loser, certainly, Socrates: for he would only receive half the value of what he spent.

Socrates/ But yet he would receive more. Or is not double more than half?

Friend/ But silver is not of the same value as gold.

Socrates/ It is requisite therefore, as it seems, to add value to gain: for in this case, though the silver is more than the gold, yet you say it is not of equal value.

Friend/ And very much so: for thus it is.

Socrates/ Value, therefore, is lucrative, whether it is small or great: but that Which is without value is without gain.

Friend/ It is.

Socrates/ Do you say that value is any other value than that which deserve to be acquired?

Friend/ I do not.

Socrates/ But what do you call that which deserves to be acquired? The useless, or the useful.

Friend/ The useful, certainly.

Socrates/ The useful, therefore, is good.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Hence, O most virile of all men, have, we not a third or a fourth: time granted that the lucrative is good?

Friend/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Do you remember, therefore, whence this discourse of ours originated?

Friend/ I think I do.

Socrates/ If you do not, I will remind you. It originated from your denying that good men would be willing to acquire every kind of gain, but that, they would wish to possess good, and not base gain.

Friend/ It did originate from this.

Socrates/ But did not our discourse compel us to acknowledge, that all kinds of gain, both small and great, are good?

Friend/ It did compel, Socrates, rather than persuade me.

Socrates/ But perhaps, after this, it will also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded, or in whatever manner you may be affected, do you agree with us, that all gain is good, both small and great?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you agree with me, or not, that all good men aspire after all things that are good?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ But you said that bad men love gain of every kind, both small and great.

Friend/ I did say so.

Socrates/ According to your assertion, therefore, all men will be lovers of gain, both good and bad men.

Friend/ It appears so.

Socrates/ No one, therefore, who blames the love of gain will blame rightly, since he who does so is himself also a lover of gain.

THE END OF THE HIPPARCHUS.

Hippias Major.

Translated by GEORGE BURGES, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and Hippias.

Socrates/ O thou, the handsome and clever Hippias, after how long a time hast thou now again arrived at Athens!

Hippias/ I have had no leisure time, Socrates. For when Elis wants to transact any business with any other state, she always comes to me the first, selecting me as an ambassador from the citizens, from her conceiving that I am the most competent to be a judge of the arguments urged by each of the states, and to report upon them. Hence I have often gone to other cities as an ambassador, but most frequently and on points the most in number and of greatest importance to Lacedæmon. Hence it is why, as regards your question, I do not often come to these parts.

Socrates/ This it is, Hippias, to be a person truly wise and accomplished. For, as a private individual, you are able to obtain no little money from young men, and to impart more benefit than you receive; and as a public man are able to do your own state good service, as he should do, who would not be held in contempt, but be in good repute with the many. But, Hippias, what is the reason why those men of the olden time, whose names are so renowned for wisdom, Pittacus, and Bias, and Thales of Miletus, and his disciples, and those who come after, down to Anaxagoras, appear all, or most of them, to have kept aloof from public affairs?

Hippias/ What else, Socrates, can you suppose than that they were unable or not sufficiently fit to reach by their intellect to both subjects, public and private?

Socrates/ Shall we then, by Zeus, affirm, that as the other arts have improved, and the operatives of former times were of no mark as compared with those of the present, so the art of you, sophists, has improved likewise; and that those of the ancients, who were engaged in the study of wisdom, were persons of no mark in comparison with you?

Hippias/ You speak perfectly correctly.

Socrates/ If then, Hippias, were Bias to come now to life again, he would be exposed to ridicule, as compared with you; just as our modern statuaries assert that Dædalus, were he alive to execute such works as those from which he gained his great name, would become ridiculous.

Hippias/ It is as you say, Socrates. I am however accustomed myself to praise highly the men of the olden time, or even our immediate predecessors before, and more than the moderns, acting with a feeling of caution as regards the envy of the living, and of fear as regards the anger of the dead.

Socrates/ Correctly, Hippias, as it seems to me, are you thinking upon and considering the matter. And I too can testify that you are speaking the truth, and that your art has in reality improved in enabling you to transact public affairs conjointly with private. For Gorgias, the great sophist of Leontium, came hither on an embassy from his country, as being the man most competent among the Leontines to transact public affairs, and was thought to speak the best before the people here; and at the same time, by making a display of his powers in private, and associating with young men, he gained and carried away great sums of money from this city. Or, if you wish for another instance, our friend, Prodicus himself, has frequently come hither in a public capacity from elsewhere: but on arriving the last time, not long since, publicly from Ceos, and speaking before the

Council, he was held in high repute; and by making a display of his powers in private, and associating with young men, he gained a wonderful heap of money. But of those ancient sages, not one ever thought proper to demand money by way of a fee for making a display of their wisdom before persons of all climes. Such simpletons were they, and so completely did it escape them, that money was a thing of great value. Whereas each of the preceding made more money from his wisdom, than has any operative in whatever trade you will; and even prior to these did Protagoras.

Hippias/ You know nothing, Socrates, about these beautiful things; for if you knew how much money I have made, you would be amazed. The other instances I pass by. But having gone once to Sicily, while Protagoras was residing there in high repute and rather advanced in years, I did, although much younger, gain in a very short time more than 150 minæ: nay, from Inycum, a very small town, I took above 20. This, when I arrived home, I carried and gave to my father, so that it struck him and the rest of the citizens with wonder and astonishment. And I almost think I have made more money than any two sophists together, whom you choose to name.

Socrates/ You bring forward, Hippias, truly a good and great proof, both of your own wisdom, and of the men of the present day, how superior they are as compared with those of the olden time. For of your predecessors, down to Anaxagoras, great is proclaimed the folly, according to your statement. For to Anaxagoras, they say, happened the very opposite to what has befallen you. For of the great wealth left him he took no care, and lost it all; in so silly a manner did he act the sophist. And of the other ancient sages other stories of a similar kind are told. You seem then to produce this as a good proof of the wisdom of the moderns, as compared with the ancients. And many indeed agree with

you, that the wise man should be wise for himself especially; and of such a person this is the one definition—He who can make the most money. Let this then suffice. And now tell me from which of the cities, whither you went, did you gain the greatest money? Is it not plain it was from Sparta, whither you went the oftenest?

Hippias/ Not, by Zeus, from thence, Socrates.

Socrates/ How say you? The least then?

Hippias/ Never anything at all.

Socrates/ A monstrous and marvelous account you are giving, Hippias. But tell me, has not that wisdom of yours the power to make those who associate with you and learn it better as regards virtue.

Hippias/ Yes, very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Were you then able to make the sons of the Inycians better, but unable to make the sons of the Spartans?

Hippias/ Far from it.

Socrates/ Are the Siciliotes desirous of becoming better, but the Spartans not?

Hippias/ The Lacedæmonians are, Socrates, very desirous?

Socrates/ Was it then from their want of money that they shunned your society?

Hippias/ By no means; for they have enough of it.

Socrates/ What then could it be, that although they were desirous of virtue, and had money, and you were able to benefit them to the greatest extent, they did not send you away loaded with wealth? Was it that the Lacedæmonians can educate their sons better than you? Shall we say this? and do you concede it is so?

Hippias/ By no manner of means.

Socrates/ Were you then unable to persuade the young men at Lacedæmon, that by associating with you they would make a greater progress in virtue than by associating with their own people? Or were you unable to persuade their fathers that they ought to hand over their children to you rather than take that care upon themselves, if they had any regard for their children? For surely they did not grudge their sons becoming as virtuous as possible.

Hippias/ I do not think they felt any grudge.

Socrates/ In good truth Lacedæmon is a well-regulated city.

Hippias/ How not?

Socrates/ Now in well-regulated cities virtue is most highly prized.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And to impart this to another you know the best of all men.

Hippias/ By much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now would not the man, who could best impart the art of horsemanship, be the most honored, and acquire the most wealth in Thessaly, or wherever else in Greece this art is cultivated the most?

Hippias/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Will he then, who can impart instruction of the greatest value with respect to virtue, be honored the most, and make the most money if he wishes it, not at Lacedæmon and any other of the well-regulated states in Greece, but in Sicily rather, as you think, my friend, or at Inycum? Shall we, Hippias, give credit to this? for if you command, I must do so.

Hippias/ It is not, Socrates, the custom of the country for the Lacedæmonians to disturb their laws, nor to educate their children contrary to established usages.

Socrates/ How say you? Think you that it is the custom of the country for the Lacedæmonians not to act correctly, but to do wrong?

Hippias/ I would not say so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Would they not do right then to educate their sons in the better way, and not in the worse?

Hippias/ They would do right; but it is not lawful for them to give a foreign education. Since, rest assured that if anyone else ever took away money from thence by teaching, I should have taken by much the most. For they delight greatly in listening to me, and give me praise. But what I am saying is not law.

Socrates/ Say you, Hippias, that the law is an injury or a benefit to a state?

Hippias/ It is enacted, I presume, for a benefit; but sometimes the law, when improperly enacted, does an injury.

Socrates/ What then, do not they who enact a law, lay it down as the greatest good to a state? For without law it is impossible to live in a state of good government.

Hippias/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ When, therefore, they who undertake to frame laws, fail in procuring a good, they have missed what is lawful and law. Or how say you?

Hippias/ Accurately speaking, Socrates, such is the case; but men are not used to give that name.

Socrates/ Do you mean, Hippias, those, who know the truth, or who do not know it?

Hippias/ I mean the many.

Socrates/ Are the many then those, who know the truth?

Hippias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But surely they, who do know it, do in reality conceive that what is to all men more beneficial is more agreeable to law than what is less beneficial. Or do not you grant this?

Hippias/ I grant that they do hold so in reality.

Socrates/ Do not things exist, and are in the state, as those, who are knowing, conceive?

Hippias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Now it is, as you assert, more beneficial for the Lacedæmonians to receive a foreign education under yourself, than after the system of their own country.

Hippias/ And I assert the truth.

Socrates/ Because what is more beneficial is more conformable to law. And this, Hippias, do you say?

Hippias/ I have so said.

Socrates/ According then to your reasoning, it is more conformable to law for the sons of the Lacedæmonians to be instructed by Hippias, and less so by their fathers, if perchance they shall in reality be more benefited under you.

Hippias/ And benefited they would be, Socrates.

Socrates/ The Lacedæmonians then act contrary to law, in not giving you their gold, and committing their sons to your care.

Hippias/ In this I agree with you: for you seem to produce an argument in my favor, and there is no need for me to oppose it.

Socrates/ We find then, my friend, the Lacedæmonians to act contrary to law, and this too in matters of the greatest moment; they who are thought to be most observant of law. And yet, by the gods, did they praise you, and were delighted

at hearing—what? Or is it not evident that the subjects were those which you know the best, relating to the stars and celestial events?

Hippias/ Not at all. Such subjects they cannot endure.

Socrates/ But they delight in hearing something about geometry.

Hippias/ Not at all; for many of them know not, so to say, even how to reckon.

Socrates/ They are then far from enduring you, while making a display on the keeping of accounts.

Hippias/ Very far indeed, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But the subjects then were those, in which you can the most accurately of all men draw distinctions, respecting the powers of letters and syllables, and rhythms and harmonies.

Hippias/ What harmonies, or letters, my good man?

Socrates/ What then are the subjects, which they gladly hear from you, and commend? Tell me yourself, since I cannot find them.

Hippias/ Respecting the genealogies, Socrates, of their heroes and men, and settlements of tribes, and how cities were founded of old, and, in a word, to everything relating to archaeology, they listen with the greatest pleasure; so that I was forced to learn my lesson myself thoroughly for their sakes, and to practice myself well on those points.

Socrates/ By Zeus, Hippias, you were fortunate in that the Lacedæmonians did not take a delight in hearing a man who could reckon up our archons from the time of Solon. For otherwise you would have had some trouble in learning the list.

Hippias/ How so, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names only once, I can repeat them from memory.

Socrates/ You speak the truth; but I did not bear in mind that you had a system of mnemonics; so that I understand why, reasonably enough, the Lacedæmonians are pleased with you, as being a person who knows many things, and they make use of you, as children do of old women, to tell them pretty stories.

Hippias/ And by Zeus, Socrates, I was lately in high repute there by going through a lecture upon the honorable pursuits to which a young person should devote himself. For I have by me a very beautiful discourse upon that subject, well put together in other respects, and in the words. The form and commencement of the discourse is something of this kind. —"After Troy was taken, the story goes, that Neoptolemus inquired of Nestor what were the honorable pursuits a young man should follow to gain a good name. Upon this Nestor is the speaker, and suggests a great many and very excellent precepts laid down by law." Of this dissertation I made a display there; and on the third day hence I intend to display it here and several other pieces of mine, worth the hearing, in the school of Philostratus. For so has Eudicus, the son of Apemantus, requested. See then that you are present yourself, and bring with you others, who on hearing will be competent to decide upon what is then said.

Socrates/ This, if a god is willing, Hippias, shall be. But at present answer me a short question relating to it. For you have opportunely put me in mind of it. A certain person has, thou best of men, very lately, during some conversations, thrown me into a difficulty—when I was finding fault with some things as being ugly, and praising others as being beautiful—by asking me, in a very saucy manner, "From whence do you, Socrates, know, said he, what things are beautiful, and what ugly? Come then, tell me, if you can say a word, what is the beautiful?" And I, through my want of

wit, was at a loss, and had it not in my power to answer him with propriety. So, quitting his company, I grew angry with, and vented reproaches upon, myself, and threatened that the first time I met with any of you wise men, I would hear his opinion and learn it; and after studying it thoroughly, that I would return to my questioner, and fight out again the matter with him. Now, therefore, as I said, you are come opportunely; and do you instruct me sufficiently what is beauty in the abstract, and endeavor to give me as accurately as possible your answers; in order that I may not be confuted a second time, and pay the penalty of a laugh against myself. For assuredly you know it quite clearly, and it would be but a mite of the learning, with which you are conversant on so many points.

Hippias/ By Zeus, a mite indeed, Socrates; and, so to say, of no value at all.

Socrates/ Easily then shall I learn it; and no one will hereafter confute me.

Hippias/ Not one indeed. For otherwise mean would be my profession, and suited to a common person.

Socrates/ By Hera, Hippias, you speak bravely, if we shall get the man into our clutches. But shall I be any hindrance by imitating him, if I lay hold of your arguments, while answering me, in order that you may exercise me the most. For I am nearly skillful in laying hold of arguments. If then it makes no difference to you, I am willing to lay hold of them, in order that I may learn with greater strength.

Hippias/ Take hold then: for, as I said just now, the question is not a great one; and I will teach you to answer questions much more difficult than this, so that not a single person will be ever able to confute you.

Socrates/ Ye gods, how bravely you talk! But come, since you bid me, I will become him, and, as well as I can, try to

question you. Now, if you shall give the lecture you mention, upon beautiful pursuits, he will, after bearing it, when you have ceased speaking, inquire about nothing else except about the beautiful—for such a habit he has—and he will say, “Art not, say thou stranger from Elis, the just just through justness?” Answer now, Hippias, as if he were questioning you.

Hippias/ I answer, through justness.

Socrates/ There is then such a thing as justness?

Hippias/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Are not then the wise wise through wisdom? and all that is good good through goodness?

Hippias/ How not?

Socrates/ By those things existing really; for it is not surely by their non-existing.

Hippias/ By their existing really.

Socrates/ Are not all things, that are beautiful, beautiful through beauty?

Hippias/ Yes, through beauty.

Socrates/ By such a thing existing?

Hippias/ By its existing. For what should it be?

Socrates/ Tell me now, stranger, he will say, what is this beauty?

Hippias/ Does he, who asks this question, want to know what is a beautiful thing?

Socrates/ I think not, Hippias: but what is beauty.

Hippias/ How does this differ from that?

Socrates/ Seems there to you no difference?

Hippias/ There is not any difference.

Socrates/ But, however, it is evident that you know better. Consider, however, good sir, the question well. For he asks you, not what is a beautiful thing, but what is beauty.

Hippias/ I understand you, good sir. And I will answer his question, “What is beauty?” nor shall I ever be confuted. For rest assured, Socrates, if the truth must be told, that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing.

Socrates/ By the dog, you have answered, Hippias, beautifully and gloriously. Shall I then, when I answer thus, have answered the question correctly? and shall I never be refuted?

Hippias/ For how could you be refuted, Socrates, on that point which seems correct to all the world; and where all who hear you will testify in your favor that you are speaking properly?

Socrates/ Be it so then, by all means. But come, Hippias, let me consider again with myself what you are saying. For the man will question me in some such manner as this: “Come, Socrates, answer me, if beauty exists in the abstract, those things which you say are beautiful, would these be beautiful?” And I will then say that, if a beautiful maiden be a beautiful thing, through which the things would be beautiful.”

Hippias/ Think you then that he will still attempt to confute you, by asserting that what you say is beautiful, is not so? or that, should he attempt it, he will not be laughed down?

Socrates/ That he will, thou wondrous man, I am well assured; but whether, after making the attempt, he will be laughed down, the thing itself will show. However, I wish to tell you what he will say.

Hippias/ Tell it then.

Socrates/ What a sweet creature, Socrates! he will say, you are. Is not a beautiful mare, which even a god has praised in an oracle, a beautiful thing? What shall we answer, Hippias? Shall we say aught else than that the mare is beautiful? at least the beautiful. For how should we dare to deny that a beautiful thing is beautiful?

Hippias/ You speak, Socrates, what is true, especially since the god rightly said it; for with us there are mares very beautiful.

Socrates/ Be it so, he will say; but what, is not a beautiful lyre a beautiful thing? Shall we allow it, Hippias?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And after this he will say—as, guessing from his usual manner, I nearly know full well—My excellent fellow, is not a beautiful soup-dish a beautiful thing?

Hippias/ Who is this man, Socrates? What an uneducated fellow! who thus presumes to express himself in words so low in an affair so solemn.

Socrates/ Such is the fellow, Hippias, not a fine gentleman, but a man of the mob, who cares for nothing but truth. He must however have an answer; and I appear speaking for him—If the soup-dish be made by a skillful potter, smooth and round, and well baked, like some of the beautiful soup-dishes with two handles, containing six choes, very beautiful, if he inquires about such a soup-dish, we must confess it to be beautiful. For how could we say that what is beautiful, is not beautiful?

Hippias/ Not at all, Socrates.

Socrates/ Is not a beautiful soup-dish then, he will say, a beautiful thing? Answer.

Hippias/ But, Socrates, the case is, I think, this; even such a vessel, when beautifully made, is a beautiful thing. But this taken as a whole does not deserve to be considered

as beautiful, as compared with a mare, and a maiden, and the other things of beauty.

Socrates/ Be it so. I understand you, Hippias, that we must thus reply to the person who puts such a question. You are ignorant, my man, that correct is the saying of Heracleitus, That the most beautiful ape, as compared with another kind, is ugly; and that the most beautiful of soup-dishes is ugly as compared with the maiden-kind; as says Hippias the wise. Is it not so, Hippias?

Hippias/ You have answered, Socrates, quite correctly.

Socrates/ Hear then—for I know well he will say after this—What then, Socrates, should anyone compare maiden-kind with god-kind, would he not be in the same case, as when the maiden-kind was compared to the soup-dish kind? Would not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly? Or does not Heracleitus, whom you bring forward, say this very same thing, that the wisest of men, when compared with a god, appears an ape in wisdom and beauty, and everything else? Shall we confess, Hippias, the most beautiful maiden is ugly as compared with the god-kind?

Hippias/ Yes; for who, Socrates, would gainsay this at least?

Socrates/ Should however we confess this, he will laugh and say, Do you then remember, Socrates, what you was asked? I shall reply, I do; it was this, What is beauty in the abstract? Whereupon he will rejoin—When you are asked about beauty in the abstract, you answer by mentioning that which happens to be, as you say yourself, not more beautiful than ugly. So, it seems, I shall say. Or what else, my friend, do you advise me to say?

Hippias/ This I advise you; For that the human kind, as compared with the gods, is not beautiful, he will say the truth.

Socrates/ If I had asked you at the outset, he will say, what is a thing beautiful and ugly, had you answered me as you have done just now, would you not have answered correctly? And still does it seem to you that the beautiful itself, by which everything else is decorated, and looks beautiful; whenever that species of beauty is present to it, is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre?

Hippias/ If this, Socrates, he is seeking, it is of all things the easiest for me to tell him in answer what is that beauty, by which all other things are decorated, and by which being present they appear beautiful. The man is the greatest simpleton, and knows nothing about beautiful chattels. For if you tell him in answer, that the beautiful about which he is inquiring, is nothing else than gold; he will be in a difficulty, and not attempt to confute you. For we all surely know that wherever gold is present to a thing, how ugly soever it may have seemed before, it will appear beautiful, when it is decorated at least with gold.

Socrates/ You have no experience of the man, Hippias, how difficult he is, and admitting nothing easily.

Hippias/ What matters it, Socrates? For what is correctly asserted he must admit; or, not admitting it, be laughed at.

Socrates/ And yet he will not only not admit this answer, thou best of men; but he will treat me with derision, and say, O thou, puffed up with conceit, thinkest thou that Phidias was a bad workman? And I shall reply, I think so by no manner of means.

Hippias/ And you will answer rightly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Rightly indeed. Hereupon when I have confessed that Phidias was a good workman, he will say, Do you imagine then that Phidias was ignorant of that, which you call the beautiful? —Why say you this especially? I shall reply. —Because, he will rejoin, if Phidias has made the eyes

of Athene not of gold, nor yet the rest of her face, nor the feet, nor even the hands—since a thing of gold would have looked the most beautiful—but not of ivory, it is evident that he erred in this through ignorance, not knowing that gold is that, which makes all things beautiful, wherever it is present. When he says this, what answer, Hippias, shall we give him?

Hippias/ The answer is not difficult. For we will say that he acted rightly; for ivory is, I presume, beautiful likewise.

Socrates/ Why then, he will rejoin, did he not make the middle part of the eyes of ivory, but of stone? having found in the stone a similarity as great as was possible to ivory. Or is a beautiful stone a beautiful thing? Shall we say so, Hippias?

Hippias/ We will say so, if it be becoming.

Socrates/ But, where it is unbecoming, it is ugly. Shall I confess it, or not?

Hippias/ Confess; at least when it the stone is not becoming.

Socrates/ What then, he will say; do not ivory and gold, thou wiseacre, when they are becoming, cause things to appear beautiful; but when not, ugly? Shall we deny this, or acknowledge the man to be in the right?

Hippias/ We must acknowledge this, at least, that whatever is becoming to any individual thing, causes it to appear beautiful.

Socrates/ When then, he will say, someone shall have cooked the beautiful soup-dish, of which we have been speaking, full of beautiful porridge, whether does a ladle of gold become it, or one of fig-tree wood?

Hippias/ By Hercules! of what kind of fellow, Socrates, are you speaking? Will you not tell me who he is?

Socrates/ No; for you would not know him, should I tell you his name.

Hippias/ But I know already that he is some ignorant fellow.

Socrates/ He is a man of much thought, Hippias. But, however, what shall we say? Which of the two ladles becomes the porridge and the soup-dish? Or is it clearly the one of fig-tree wood; for this makes the porridge of a pleasanter flavor; and at the same time, my friend, it would not by breaking the soup-dish let the porridge run out, and extinguish the fire, and cause the guests, just about to feast on it, to be without a very noble dish. But all this the one of gold would do. So that it seems to me, we ought to say that the one of fig-tree wood is more becoming than the one of gold; unless indeed you say otherwise.

Hippias/ It is indeed, Socrates, more becoming. But, for my part, I would not converse with a fellow, who asked such questions as these.

Socrates/ And rightly so, my friend; for it would not become you to be polluted with such dirty words, you in a dress so beautiful, and with such beautiful sandals, and in such high repute amongst all the Greeks for wisdom. But for me, it is nothing to mix myself up with the dirt of the man. Teach me then beforehand; and for my sake give a reply. For the man will say, If the ladle of fig-tree wood be indeed more becoming than the one of gold, is it not more beautiful? especially since you have confessed that the becoming is more beautiful than the unbecoming. Shall we confess that the ladle of fig-tree wood is more beautiful than the one of gold?

Hippias/ Do you wish me, Socrates, to say that, by saying which, I think, you will free yourself from his much talking?

Socrates/ By all means; but not before you tell me which of the two ladles, that we have been speaking of, is the more becoming and more beautiful.

Hippias/ Well then, if you will, tell him in answer, that it is the one made from the fig-tree.

Socrates/ Now say what you was just about to say. For in this answer, by which I assert that gold is the beautiful, gold will not, as it seems to me, appear to be at all a thing more beautiful than fig-tree wood. But what do you now say is the beautiful?

Hippias/ I will tell you. For you seem to me to seek to answer a question of this kind—what is that beauty, which at no time and in no place will appear ugly to anyone.

Socrates/ By all means, Hippias. And now you understand me perfectly well.

Hippias/ Listen then. For rest assured, that if any man has anything to say against this, I will say that I know nothing whatever.

Socrates/ By the gods, then, tell it as quickly as possible.

Hippias/ I assert then, that it is at all times, and to all persons, and in all places, the most beautiful thing for a man, in wealth, health, and in honor amongst Greeks, and having reached old age, and having laid his deceased parents handsomely in the grave, to be buried himself by his own children in a handsome and splendid manner.

Socrates/ Capital! Hippias. How wondrous well, and gorgeously, and how worthy of yourself, have you spoken! and by Hera I am delighted with you for the good-will with which, as far as you can, you assist me. But we do not as yet reach the man's mind. But he will laugh the most at us, rest assured.

Hippias/ Truly a silly laugh, Socrates. For when he shall have nothing to say against this, and merely laugh, he will

laugh at himself, and be the laughing-stock of all who are present.

Socrates/ Such perhaps will be the case; perhaps, however, after such an answer, there will be a danger, as I prophesy, of his not merely laughing at me.

Hippias/ What then?

Socrates/ That, should he happen to have a staff in his hand, unless I escape from him by flight, he will endeavor to reach me with a smart blow.

Hippias/ How say you? Is the man a master of yours? and will he not, for having done so, be brought to trial, and pay damages? Or is your state not under the laws of justice, and permits the citizens to beat each other unjustly?

Socrates/ By no manner of means does it permit them.

Hippias/ Will he then not suffer punishment, for striking' you unjustly?

Socrates/ I think not, Hippias; not at all; if I gave such an answer; but justly, as it seems to me.

Hippias/ It seems then so to me, Socrates; especially since you are of that opinion yourself.

Socrates/ Shall I then state why I think I should be justly beaten, on giving such an answer? Or will you too beat me without a trial? or will you receive a reason?

Hippias/ It would be hard indeed, Socrates, if I did not receive it. But how say you?

Socrates/ I will speak to you in the same manner as I did just now, when imitating that person, in order that I may not say to you, what he will to me, words both harsh and producing an angry feeling. For rest assured he will say. Tell me, Socrates, do you think a person would receive blows unjustly, who should chant such a long rigmarole, little in unison with, and far distant from, the question proposed? —

How so? I shall reply. How? he will rejoin; cannot you remember that I asked you what is the beauty, that enables everything, to which it is present, to become beautiful, be it stone, or wood, or man, or god, or any act, or any science. For I am asking, man, what is beauty in the abstract; and yet I am no more able to bawl anything into you, than if you were lying by my side a stone, and this too a mill-stone, without ears and brains. Now, Hippias, would not you be annoyed, if I, in a fright, were to say after this abuse, Nay, it was Hippias who said that this was the beautiful; although I asked him, as you do me, what is the beautiful to all persons and things, and at all times? —What say you? will you not be annoyed if I say so?

Hippias/ I am quite certain, Socrates, that what I said is the beautiful in every case, will appear so.

Socrates/ But will it be so? he will say; for surely the beautiful must always be beautiful.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And always was so, he will say.

Hippias/ It was.

Socrates/ Did the Elean stranger assert, he will say, that it was a beautiful thing for Achilles to be buried after his progenitors, and for his grandfather Eacus, and the others born of the gods, and even the gods themselves?

Hippias/ What is this! Hurl him to the blessed land! Such questions as these of the fellow, Socrates, are not to be spoken even, as being of ill omen.

Socrates/ How so? It is surely no very ill-omened speech, when one person asks a question, for the other to say—Such is the fact.

Hippias/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Perhaps then you are the man, he will say, who asserts that it is a beautiful thing for every person, and at all times, to be buried by his descendants, and to bury his parents. Now was not Hercules one of the all? and those to whom we have just now mentioned?

Hippias/ But I did not say it was so for the gods.

Socrates/ Nor for the heroes, as it seems.

Hippias/ Nor for such as were children of the gods.

Socrates/ But for such only as were not.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ According to your reasoning then, it seems, that amongst the heroes it was a grievous and unholy thing for Tantalus, and Dardanus, and Zethus; but to Pelops, and to the others so born, it was a beautiful thing.

Hippias/ So it seems to me.

Socrates/ It seems then to you, he will say, what you have lately denied, that to some persons and at some times, it is not a beautiful thing after burying their progenitors to be buried by their progeny; and further, as it seems, that this cannot take place to all, and be a beautiful thing. So that this very thing is in the same case as those before, namely, the maiden and the soup-dish: and still more ridiculously, to some it is a beautiful thing, but to others it is not beautiful: and even today, he will say, you are unable, Socrates, to answer the question, touching the beautiful, what it is. In these or suchlike terms will he reproach me justly, should I answer him in this manner. For very nearly after this fashion, Hippias, does he for the most part converse. Sometimes, however, as if in pity for my want of skill and learning, he proposes a problem, and asks if such a thing as this seems to be the beautiful; or he talks upon any other subject which he happens to have heard, and about which there is a talk.

Hippias/ How say you, Socrates, this?

Socrates/ I will tell you. —Thou godlike Socrates, says he, do cease to give such answers and on such grounds; for they are very silly, and easily confuted. But consider now, whether the beautiful be something of that kind, which we just now touched upon in the answer, when we said of gold, that where it is becoming it is beautiful; but where not, it is not so, and of all the rest likewise, to which the becoming may be present. On the becoming then itself, and on its nature, do you reflect becomingly, whether this happens to be the beautiful. Now, I am accustomed in such matters to assent on every occasion. For I know not what to object. But does it seem to you that the becoming is the beautiful?

Hippias/ Assuredly, completely so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let us reflect; lest we be cheated like children merely.

Hippias/ It is meet to reflect.

Socrates/ Observe then. Do we call the becoming that which, by its presence, causes each of those things, to which it may be present, to appear beautiful? or that which causes them to be so really? Or neither of these?

Hippias/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Whether that which causes things to appear beautiful? as when a person puts on clothes or shoes, which fit him, he looks more beautiful, although he is a laughingstock. Now, if the becoming causes things to appear more beautiful than they really are, the becoming must be a deception with regard to the beautiful; and it would not be that, which we are seeking, Hippias. For we are in search of that, by which all things beautiful are beautiful; as in the case of the surpassing, by which all things are great. For by this all things are great, and though they may not appear so, yet, if they do surpass, they must of necessity be great. So

we say of the beautiful, by which all things are beautiful, whether they appear to be so or not. Now this cannot be the becoming. For the becoming causes things to appear more beautiful than they really are, as your reasoning says, and does not suffer them to appear as they are. But, as I said just now, that which causes them to be really beautiful, whether they appear so or not, this we must endeavor to tell what it is; for this we are seeking, if we are seeking the beautiful.

Hippias/ But the becoming, Socrates, causes by its presence things both to be and to appear beautiful.

Socrates/ It is impossible then for things really beautiful not to appear to be beautiful; at least when that is present, which causes them to appear so.

Hippias/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Shall we then, Hippias, confess that all things really beautiful, both institutions and pursuits truly beautiful, are reputed to be beautiful, and appear so always to all men? Or, must we say quite the contrary, that they are unknown, and that dissension and contest take place respecting these points most of all, both amongst individuals privately and publicly amongst states?

Hippias/ In this way rather, Socrates, that they are unknown.

Socrates/ This would not have been unknown if the appearing to be beautiful had been added to the reality: and added it would have been, had the becoming been the beautiful, and had caused things not only to be beautiful, but to appear so likewise: so that the becoming, if it were that, which causes things to be beautiful, would be that beauty in the abstract, of which we are in search, and not which causes things to appear beautiful. But if, on the other hand, the becoming merely causes things to appear only

beautiful, it cannot be the beautiful, of which we are in search; for this causes them to be so really. Now to cause things to appear to be beautiful, and to be really so, is not in the power of the same thing, nor of anything else whatever. Let us then choose, whether you think the becoming causes things to appear beautiful, or to be so really.

Hippias/ I think, Socrates, to appear so.

Socrates/ Alas! gone and fled away from us, Hippias, has the knowledge of what the beautiful is; especially since the becoming has been seen to be a thing different from the beautiful.

Hippias/ So, by Zeus, it has, Socrates, and to me at least very unexpectedly.

Socrates/ But let us not, my friend, give up seeking for it. For I have still some hope that what the beautiful is will appear again.

Hippias/ Altogether assuredly, Socrates: for it is not difficult to find. At least I know well that, were I to retire into solitude for a little time and commune with myself, I should describe it to you more accurately than accuracy itself.

Socrates/ Hold! Hippias, talk not so big—you see what trouble it has given us already—lest it should grow angry with us, and run away still further than before. And yet I am saying nothing to the purpose; for you will, I think, easily find it out, when you come to be alone. And do, by the gods, find it out in my presence; but if you are willing, seek it as now with me. And if we find it, it will be the best of all; but, if we do not, I shall be content, I think, with my misfortune; while you going away will find it easily. But if we find it now, depend upon it, I shall not trouble you by inquiring what that was, which you had discovered by yourself. For the present consider it, if it seems to you to be the beautiful. I say that it is. But keep your eye on me, and give me all your

attention, that I may not say anything silly. Let then that which is useful, be for us the beautiful! And this I say from thinking on these points. The eyes, we say, are beautiful, not when they seem to be such, but are unable to see, but when they are able and useful for seeing. Is it not so?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ Say we not then of the whole body thus, that one part of it is beautiful for running, another for wrestling? and further, that all the animal kind, as a beautiful horse, and a cock, and a quail, and all utensils, and vehicles, for land and sea, ships and triremes, and all instruments both for music and the other arts, and pursuits and laws, and nearly everything we call beautiful, are in the same position; and looking to each of them, in what way it has been born, made, or laid down, we speak of a thing which is useful, as being beautiful in what it is useful, and for what it is useful, and when it is useful; but another thing, which is entirely useless, we call not beautiful. Does it not so seem to you, Hippias?

Hippias/ To me it does.

Socrates/ Correctly then do we now say, that the useful happens to be more than all beautiful.

Hippias/ Correctly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now is not each thing, which is able to effect anything, useful, so far as it is able? but that, which is unable, useless?

Hippias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Power then is beautiful, and want of power is not beautiful.

Hippias/ Very much so. And the rest of things, Socrates, testify in our favor that such is the case, but particularly as regards matters of state. For of all things it is the most

beautiful for a person to be powerful in state-affairs, and in his own city; but to be powerless, the least so.

Socrates/ You say well. By the gods then, Hippias, is not wisdom on this account the most beautiful of all things, and ignorance the least so?

Hippias/ What else do you think, Socrates?

Socrates/ Softly, my dear friend; since I have a fear about what I am saying.

Hippias/ What do you fear, Socrates? For your reasoning has proceeded very beautifully at present.

Socrates/ I wish it had. But do you consider this with me. Could a person do anything, of which he knows nothing, and for which he has no power?

Hippias/ By no means. For how could he do that, for which he has no power?

Socrates/ Are then they, who err, and act wrong, and do a thing unwillingly, other than those, who would not have so acted, unless they had possessed the power?

Hippias/ It is evident.

Socrates/ But, however, they who are powerful are powerful through power; for assuredly it is not through want of power.

Hippias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ All then, who do anything, are able to do what they do.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And all men, beginning from boyhood, do many more evil things than good, and err unwillingly.

Hippias/ The fact is so.

Socrates/ What then, shall we say that this power and these means, however useful they may be for the doing evil, are beautiful? or do they want much of being so?

Hippias/ They want much, in my opinion, Socrates.

Socrates/ The powerful then and the useful, Hippias, are not, it seems, the beautiful.

Hippias/ If indeed, Socrates, it has power to do good, or is useful for things of that kind.

Socrates/ Away then has fled that thing, at once the powerful and the useful, as being without exception beautiful. Now this was that very thing, Hippias, which our soul meant to say, that the beautiful consists in utility and the power to produce some good.

Hippias/ So it seems to me.

Socrates/ Now this is the advantageous. Is it not?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ Thus then beautiful bodies, and beautiful institutions, and wisdom, and all these things we just now mentioned, are beautiful, because advantageous.

Hippias/ Evidently so.

Socrates/ The advantageous then appears to be, Hippias, to us, the beautiful.

Hippias/ Entirely so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But the advantageous is that, which effects a good.

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ Now that, which effects, is nothing else than a cause. Is it not?

Hippias/ It is so.

Socrates/ The beautiful therefore is a cause of the good.

Hippias/ It is so.

Socrates/ Now the cause, Hippias, and that of which it is the cause, are different. For the cause cannot surely be a

cause of a cause. Consider it in this way. Did not the cause appear to be a maker?

Hippias/ Clearly.

Socrates/ That, which is made by the maker, is nothing else but the produced; but is not itself the maker.

Hippias/ Such is the fact.

Socrates/ The produced then is one thing, and the producer is another.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ The producer then is not the cause of itself, but of that, which is produced by it.

Hippias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If then the beautiful is the cause of a good, such a good must be produced by the beautiful; and for this reason, as it seems, we attend to intelligence, and all other beautiful things, because their work and issue are worthy of attention, as being the good; and from what we are discovering, the beautiful is near to being in the form as it were of a father to the good.

Hippias/ Entirely so. For you speak beautifully, Socrates.

Socrates/ Say I not this too beautifully, that neither is the father the son, nor is the son the father?

Hippias/ Beautifully indeed.

Socrates/ Nor is the cause the thing produced; nor is, on the other hand, the thing produced the cause.

Hippias/ You say what is true.

Socrates/ By Zeus then, thou best of men, neither is the beautiful the good, nor is the good the beautiful. Or does it seem to you from what has been said, that it is possible?

Hippias/ By Zeus, it appears to me not possible.

Socrates/ Does it then please us, and are we willing to assert, that the beautiful is not good, nor the good beautiful?

Hippias/ By Zeus, it does not please me at all.

Socrates/ And, by Zeus, Hippias, to me too it pleases the least of all the assertions we have made.

Hippias/ And reasonably so.

Socrates/ The assertion then, which just now appeared the most correct of all, that the advantageous and the useful and the powerful to do some good, was the beautiful, runs the risk of not being so; but if possible, of being more ridiculous than the first mentioned, in which we conceived the maiden, and each of the things before mentioned, to be the beautiful.

Hippias/ It seems so, indeed.

Socrates/ And I too, Hippias, have no longer where to turn myself, but am at a loss. Have you anything to say?

Hippias/ Not at least for the present. But, as I said just now, I know well that on reflection I shall find it out.

Socrates/ But, through my eagerness to know, I seem to myself unable to wait your delay. For after being somewhat in doubt, I think I have just now found out a way. For consider, if we call that beautiful, which causes us to be delighted, —I do not mean all pleasures, —but that which arises through the hearing and the sight, how and for what could we contend? For surely beautiful men, Hippias, and embroidery of all kinds, and pictures of animals, and earthenware, do, when they are beautiful, delight us, while we look upon them; and so likewise do beautiful sounds, and music in general, and conversations, and story-telling produce the very same effect. So that should we say in reply to that swaggering fellow—My man of mettle, the beautiful is that, which produces pleasure through the hearing, and the

sight—think you that we should restrain him from his swaggering?

Hippias/ What the beautiful is seems, Socrates, to me at least, to be well defined.

Socrates/ What then shall we say, Hippias, that pursuits and institutions being pleasant through the hearing, or through the sight, are beautiful? or have they some other kind of beauty?

Hippias/ These beautiful things will, perhaps, Socrates, lie hid from the man.

Socrates/ But by the dog, not from the person, Hippias, before whom I should be the most ashamed to trifle, and to pretend to say something to the purpose, when I was saying nothing.

Hippias/ Who is he?

Socrates/ The son of Sophroniscus; who would no more suffer me to say off-hand what has not been investigated, than to speak, as if I knew what I did not know.

Hippias/ To myself too it appears, since you have mentioned it, that the case is different as regards institutions.

Socrates/ Softly, Hippias. For we have fallen into the very same difficulty respecting the beautiful, as we were in just now; and we are in danger of conceiving ourselves to be in a pretty easy road.

Hippias/ How say you so, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will state what to me appears to be beautiful, if indeed I am saying any to the purpose. That which relates to institutions and pursuits would perhaps appear to be not removed from the sensations which arise through the hearing and sight. But let us abide awhile by the definition, that what is through those senses pleasant, is beautiful,

without bringing before us the question relating to institutions. Now should the man I mentioned, or anyone else, ask us—Why have ye, Hippias and Socrates, separated from the pleasant in general that species of it, in which ye say consists the beautiful, and yet deny that what relates to the other sensations connected with food and drink and sexual intercourse, and all the rest of such a kind, are beautiful? Or do ye assert that these are not pleasant, and that there are no pleasures at all in such sensations, nor in anything else except seeing and hearing? What shall we say, Hippias?

Hippias/ We will say by all means, Socrates, that in the other things likewise there are very great pleasures.

Socrates/ Why then, he will say, do ye take away from these pleasures, really existing no less than those, their very name, and deprive them of the property of being beautiful? Because, we will say, there is not one, who would not laugh at us, were we to say that to eat is not a pleasant, but a beautiful thing, and to smell sweet not a pleasant thing, but beautiful. But with regard to sexual intercourse, all would surely admit that it is to us a thing the most pleasant; but it is meet so to carry it on, if a person will do it, as that no one see him; since it is a deed the most disgraceful to behold. On our saying this, Hippias, he will perhaps remark, —I now perceive that you have been of old ashamed to say that these pleasures are beautiful, because they do not seem so to men. Now I did not ask what seems to be beautiful to the multitude, but what is so in reality. Whereupon we shall, I presume, state in reply, that we asserted that this part of the pleasant, arising from the sight and hearing, was a beautiful thing. But have you it in your power to use the reasoning for anything? Or shall we, Hippias, say anything else?

Hippias/ Against what has been urged, Socrates, it is necessary to say no other than this.

Socrates/ Truly do ye say well, he will reply. If then the pleasure, coming through the sight and hearing, be a beautiful thing, that which does not happen to be a part of such pleasant sensations, it is clear cannot be beautiful. Shall we confess it?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is then that which is pleasurable, he will say, through the sight, pleasurable through the sight and hearing conjointly? Or that which is pleasurable through the hearing, pleasurable through the hearing and the sight conjointly? By no means, we shall answer, would that which exists through either, exist through both; for this you seem to us to say; whereas we assert, that each of these pleasurable things would be beautiful, taken by themselves and both together. Should we not answer thus?

Hippias/ By all means.

Socrates/ Does then, he will say, any pleasure whatever differ from any other pleasure whatever in this, namely, in being a pleasure? For I ask not whether any pleasure is greater or less, or more or less; but whether anyone differs by this very thing, in one of the pleasures being a pleasure, but the other not a pleasure. Does it not seem so to us?

Hippias/ For it does not seem so.

Socrates/ For some other reason then, he will say, than because they are pleasures, have ye selected these from all the rest; and having some such view with regard to both, that they differ in some respect from the rest, did ye not, looking to this, say that they are beautiful? For seeing is surely not a beautiful thing on this account, that it is through, seeing. For, if this were the reason of its being beautiful, the other pleasure that through hearing would not be beautiful, as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of seeing. Shall we say, you speak the truth?

Hippias/ We will.

Socrates/ Nor, on the other hand, is the pleasure through the hearing beautiful on this account, that it is through hearing. For then that through seeing would not be beautiful, as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of hearing. Shall we say, Hippias, that the man, in speaking so, speaks correctly?

Hippias/ Yes, correctly.

Socrates/ But both, he will rejoin, are beautiful, as you assert. For so we say.

Hippias/ We do.

Socrates/ They have then something in common and the same, which causes them to be beautiful, and which belongs to both conjointly, and severally to each. For otherwise they would not be beautiful conjointly and severally. Give to me a reply, as if to him.

Hippias/ I answer, that it appears to me as you say.

Socrates/ If then these pleasures, taken conjointly, are affected by any circumstance, but not so, if taken separately, they could not, at least under that circumstance, be beautiful.

Hippias/ How could it be possible, Socrates, that when neither are affected by any circumstance whatever, that both should be affected by that by which neither is affected?

Socrates/ You think it is impossible.

Hippias/ Yes; for a great want of acquaintance with the nature of those things would possess me, and of speaking the present speeches.

Socrates/ You speak pleasantly, Hippias. For I am in danger equally of fancying I see something so circumstanced, as you aver to be impossible; but yet I see nothing clearly.

Hippias/ You are in no danger, Socrates; but you very readily look aside.

Socrates/ And yet many things of such a kind appear to me before my soul. But I distrust them; because they do not present themselves to you, who have made the most money of all now famed for wisdom, but only to myself, who have never made any. And I have an idea, my friend, that you are playing with me, and are willingly deceiving me; such strong and so many.

Hippias/ No one will know better than yourself, Socrates, whether I am playing with you or not, if you will only endeavor to tell me, what are those things that have presented themselves to you. For you will be seen to say nothing to the purpose. For you will never find that both of us have been affected by circumstances together, by which neither you nor I have been separately.

Socrates/ How say you, Hippias? But perhaps you are speaking something to the purpose, and I do not understand it. Do you then hear from me what I wish to state more clearly. For it appears to me, that what neither I have been under the circumstance of being, nor am, nor, on the other hand, what you are under such a circumstance, it is possible for both to be; and on the other hand, that other things, which both of us are under the circumstance of being, neither of us are.

Hippias/ You appear to me, Socrates, to exhibit in your answers again still greater wonders than when you answered before. For just consider, if both of us were just, would not each of us be so? or if each unjust, would not both be so? if both were in health, would not each be so? or if each were wearied, or wounded, or struck, or were affected in any other way whatever, would not both of us be affected in the same way? Still further, if both of us happened to be made of gold,

or silver, or ivory, or if you will, well-born, or wise, or held in honor, or old, or young, or in any state you will, incident to man, is there not a great necessity for each to be so?

Socrates/ Most assuredly.

Hippias/ But neither do you, Socrates, consider things as wholes, nor do they, with whom you are wont to converse. For taking separately the beautiful and each of things existing, you discuss it in your discourses, cutting it into fractions; and hence things of great size, and of continuous length escape your observation. And to such an extent have they escaped you now, that you conceive there is something, either circumstance or being, which, as regards two things taken jointly, does exist, but does not, as regards them taken singly; or on the other hand, does exist, as regards each, taken singly, but not as regards both, taken jointly. So illogically, and inconsiderately, and sillily, and unreflectingly, do you conduct yourselves.

Socrates/ Such is our condition, Hippias. It is not what a man wishes, say the persons using everywhere the proverb, but what he can. But you are always assisting us with your admonitions. Since even now, before I had been thus admonished by you how sillily we conduct ourselves, shall I give you still a plainer proof, by stating what were our thoughts upon those points? or shall I not?

Hippias/ You will speak to one who knows already, Socrates. For I am conversant with each one of those who are engaged in disputations, and how they are situated. Still, if it is more agreeable to yourself, say on.

Socrates/ To me indeed it will be more agreeable. For we were, thou best of men, so silly before you said so of us, as to conceive with regard to myself and you, that each of us was one person, and that both could not be what each was; for we are not one, but two persons. Such a simpleton was

I! But now we have been taught the contrary, that if both together are two persons, each of us also is of necessity two; and that if each of us be one, it is necessary for both of us to be one. For by a continuous argument respecting being, it is not possible, according to Hippias, for it to be otherwise; but now having been persuaded by you, that whatever both of two things are, this too each of them is, I sit down here. But first remind me, Hippias, whether you and I are one, you and I together; or you are two, and I two.

Hippias/ What mean you, Socrates?

Socrates/ What I say. For I am afraid to speak plainly to you, because you are harsh with me, whenever you seem to yourself to speak something to the purpose. But however tell me, is not each of us one? and so affected as to be one?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If then each of us be one, each of us must be also odd. Or think you that one is not an odd number?

Hippias/ I think it is.

Socrates/ Arc we then both odd, being two?

Hippias/ This, Socrates, could not be.

Socrates/ But both together are even. Is it not so?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now, because both together are even, is each of us on this account even?

Hippias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ It is not then necessary, as you said just now, that what we both are together, we should be singly; and that, what each is, we should both be.

Hippias/ Not in these cases, but in those I spoke of before.

Socrates/ These are sufficient, Hippias; for we must be content with these, since it appears that some things are so, but others not. For I stated, if you remember, at the point

from whence this conversation diverged, that the pleasures through the sight, and through hearing, could not be beautiful in that, by which each happened to be affected singly and not both jointly, or both jointly and not each singly, but by what they were affected jointly and singly. And hence you admitted that both together and each singly were beautiful. On this account then I conceived that, by the existence which follows upon both, they ought, if both were beautiful, to be themselves beautiful; but not by the existence wanting to the other. And I think so still. But tell me, as if at the beginning of our inquiry, if the pleasure through the sight and that through hearing are beautiful, both jointly and each singly, does not that, which makes them so, follow on both jointly and each singly.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it then because each singly is a pleasure, and both too jointly, that they are beautiful? Or on this account alone, because all the other pleasures would be in no respect less beautiful? For, if you remember, the latter were shown to be pleasures no less than the former.

Hippias/ I remember it well.

Socrates/ But because these are through the sight and hearing, on that account it was asserted they were beautiful.

Hippias/ It was so asserted.

Socrates/ See now, whether I speak the truth. It was stated, as my memory serves me, not that the pleasurable of every kind was beautiful; but such as was through the sight and hearing.

Hippias/ It is true.

Socrates/ Does not this circumstance then attend on both taken together? but not on each taken singly? For by no means does each of them, as was said before, exist through both, but both through both, and each not. Is it so?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ Each of them is not beautiful through that which does not attend each. For the both does not attend upon the either. So that we can by the hypothesis call both beautiful, but we cannot call either so. Or how say we? Is it not of necessity so?

Hippias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Shall we then say that both are beautiful, but deny that each is so?

Hippias/ What is to prevent it?

Socrates/ This seems to me, my friend, to prevent it; because there were to us some things so appertaining to each, that, if they appertained to both, they would appertain likewise to each; and, if to each, to both likewise—all such you went through. Is it not so?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what I went through, were not so; of which was itself the each and the both. Is it so?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ Of what kind then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you? whether, as you asserted, that if I and you are strong, both are so; and if I and you are just, both are so; and if both, so too is each; and similarly, if I and you are beautiful, both are so; and if both, so too is each? Or is there nothing to prevent it; as in the case of numbers, where some things taken together being even, may be, when taken singly, odd, and perhaps even: or, when each, being taken separately, is perhaps irrational, but taken both together may be rational, or perhaps irrational, and there are other things of this kind infinite in number, which I said presented themselves to me. Now, on which side do you place the beautiful? On that, as it appears to me, or to yourself. For it appears to me a great absurdity, for both of us to be

beautiful, yet each of us not so; or for each to be beautiful, yet both not so; or as regards any other thing whatever of such a kind. Do you choose to say in this way or that?

Hippias/ In this way, Socrates.

Socrates/ And you do wisely, Hippias, in order that we may be freed from a further search. For, if any of these things is the beautiful, the pleasurable, which comes through the sight and hearing, would no longer be the beautiful; for the pleasurable that comes through the sight and hearing, causes both, taken together, to be beautiful; but not either singly. This however cannot be, as I and you, Hippias, have agreed.

Hippias/ We have agreed.

Socrates/ It is impossible then for that, which is pleasurable through the sight and hearing, to be the beautiful; since a thing being produced as beautiful exhibits something of the impossible.

Hippias/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ Say then again from the beginning, he will say, since you have erred in this, what, say you, is that beauty, which attends upon both these pleasures, for the sake of which you honored them before the others, and called them beautiful? To me, Hippias, there seems a necessity to say, that these are of all pleasures the most harmless, and the best, taken together and singly. Or have you to state anything else, by which they are different from other pleasures?

Hippias/ By no means: for they are in reality the best.

Socrates/ This then, he will say, do you now assert the beautiful to be, namely, pleasure that is advantageous? So it seems, I shall answer. But what you?

Hippias/ I too the same.

Socrates/ Is not then, he will say, the advantageous that, which is the efficient of good? Now the efficient, as shown lately, is a thing different from the effect; and the reasoning has now come to you to the former reasoning; for neither would the good be a beautiful thing, nor would the beautiful be a good thing; since each of these is something else. This we shall more than all assert, if, Hippias, we are of sound mind. For it is surely not just not to agree with him, who speaks correctly.

Hippias/ But what, Socrates, do you conceive to be all this, taken together? They are the parings and snippings, as I said just now, of reasonings, separated into little bits. But that is a thing both beautiful and of great worth, to be able to put together well and beautifully a speech before a court of justice, or the Council-Hall, or any other official tribunal, before whom the speech may be addressed; and after producing conviction, to depart, carrying off not the least, but the greatest, of prizes, in the preservation of oneself and one's own property, and that of one's friends. These then you ought to lay hold of, and to bid adieu to such petty disputes, in order that you may not seem to be a simpleton, by taking, as just now, trifles and inanities in hand.

Socrates/ You, my dear Hippias, are a happy man; for you know what pursuits a simpleton should follow, and have followed them, as you say, sufficiently. But the misfortune of an evil genius, as it seems, lays hold of me, who am wandering continually and in doubt. For when I make a display of my doubts before you wise men, I am ever bespattered with dirt by you when I make a display. For ye tell me what you tell me now, that I busy myself about matters foolish, trivial, and worthless. But when, on the other hand, convinced by you, I say as ye do, that it is by far the best thing to be able to put together well and beautifully a speech, and to go through it before a court of justice, or

any other concourse of people, I hear myself ill spoken of in all ways, both by some others here, but especially from that person, who is always confuting me; for he happens to be my nearest of kin, and lives in the same house. Whenever then I enter my dwelling at home, and he hears me talking in this way, he asks me if I do not feel a shame in presuming to converse about beautiful pursuits, after I have been so clearly convicted, that on the subject of the beautiful I do not know what it is in the abstract. And how then, says he, will you know, who has put together a beautiful speech or not, or done any other beautiful act, while knowing nothing of the beautiful? and when you are in such a situation, think you it is better for you to live than to die? Thus it has happened, as I told you, for me to hear myself ill-spoken of, and reproached by you, and to be abused by him. But, perhaps I must endure all this; for nothing is out of place, if only I am benefited; and benefited, Hippias, I think I am by my intercourse with both of you. For I seem to myself to understand what the proverb means, “difficult are the beautiful.”

Greater Hippias.

Translated by Benjamin Jowett.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and Hippias.

Socrates/ It is Hippias, the beautiful and wise! What a long while it is since you came to anchor at Athens!

Hippias/ I have had no time to spare, Socrates. Elis looks on me as her best judge and reporter of anything said by other governments, and so I am always the first choice among her citizens to be her ambassador when she has business to settle with another state. I have gone on many such missions to different states, but to Lacedaemon most often, and on the most numerous and important subjects. That is the answer to your question why I am so seldom in this part of the world.

Socrates/ Still, Hippias, what a thing it is to be a complete man, as well as a wise one! As a private person, your talents earn you a great deal of money from the young, and in return you confer on them even greater benefits; in public affairs, again, you can do good work for your country, which is the way to avoid contempt and win popular esteem. Yet I wonder for what possible reason the great figures of the past who are famous for their wisdom—Pittacus and Bias and the school of Thales of Miletus, and others nearer our own time, down to Anaxagoras—why all or most of them clearly made a habit of taking no active part in politics.

Hippias/ What reason do you suppose except incapacity, the lack of the power to carry their wisdom into both regions of life, the public and the private?

Socrates/ Then we should be right in saying that just as other arts have advanced until the craftsmen of the past

compare ill with those of today, so your art, that of the Sophist, has advanced until the old philosophers cannot stand comparison with you and your fellows?

Hippias/ Perfectly right.

Socrates/ So if Bias were to come to life again for our benefit, by your standard he would be a laughingstock, just as according to the sculptors Daedalus would look a fool if he were to be born now and produce the kind of works that gave him his reputation?

Hippias/ Exactly, Socrates. Nevertheless, I myself habitually praise our predecessors of former generations before and above contemporaries, for while I guard myself against the envy of the living, I fear the wrath of the dead.

Socrates/ Very finely said, Hippias, both in sentiment and in style, and I can support with my own testimony your statement that your art really has made progress toward combining public business with private pursuits. The eminent Gorgias, the Sophist of Leontini, came here from his home on an official mission, selected because he was the ablest statesman of his city. By general consent he spoke most eloquently before the Assembly, and in his private capacity, by giving demonstrations to the young and associating with them, he earned and took away with him a large sum of Athenian money. Or again, there is our distinguished friend Prodicus. He has often been at Athens on public business from Ceos; the last time he came on such a mission, quite lately, he was much admired for his eloquence before the Council, and also as a private person he made an astonishing amount of money by giving demonstrations to the young and admitting them to his society. None of those great men of the past ever saw fit to charge money for his wisdom, or to give demonstrations of it to miscellaneous audiences; they were too simple ever to

realize the enormous importance of money. Either of the two I have mentioned has earned more from his wisdom than any other craftsman from his art, whatever it may have been, and so did Protagoras before them.

Hippias/ Socrates, you know nothing of the real charms of all this business. If you were told how much I have earned, you would be astounded. To take one case only—I went to Sicily once while Protagoras was living there. He had a great reputation and was a far older man than I, and yet in a short time I made more than one hundred and fifty minas. Why, in one place alone, Inycus, a very small place, I took more than twenty minas. When I returned home with the money I gave it to my father, reducing him and his fellow citizens to a condition of stupefied amazement. And I feel pretty sure that I have made more money than any other two Sophists you like to mention, put together.

Socrates/ What honorable, what powerful testimony to your own wisdom and that of our contemporaries, and to their great superiority to the men of the past! According to your account, earlier thinkers were sunk in ignorance; the fate of Anaxagoras is said to have been the exact opposite to yours, for when he inherited a large fortune, he neglected it and lost it all—so mindless was his wisdom—and the same kind of story is told of other great figures of former generations. Your success, I admit, is fine evidence of the wisdom of the present generation as compared with their predecessors, and it is a popular sentiment that the wise man must above all be wise for himself; of such wisdom the criterion is in the end the ability to make the most money. Well, so much for that. Now tell me, in which of all the cities you visit have you made the most money? In Lacedaemon, I take it, which you have visited most often?

Hippias/ Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Really? Did you make least?

Hippias/ I have never made money there at all.

Socrates/ What a truly extraordinary thing! Then is not your wisdom fitted to advance in virtue her pupils and associates?

Hippias/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Then you had the capacity to improve the sons of the Inycites, but not the sons of the Spartans?

Hippias/ No, that is quite wrong.

Socrates/ Well then, is it that Sicilians desire to become better men, and Lacedaemonians do not?

Hippias/ Undoubtedly, Socrates, Lacedaemonians also desire it.

Socrates/ Was it then from want of money that they kept away from your society?

Hippias/ Not at all, they have plenty.

Socrates/ If then they desired it, and had money, and you were able to confer on them the greatest of benefits, what can be the reason why they did not send you away loaded up with cash? A thought strikes me—might it be that the Lacedaemonians would educate their own children better than you would? Is this to be our line, Hippias, and do you agree?

Hippias/ Not in the least.

Socrates/ Then you were unable to convince the Spartan youths that in your society they would make more progress toward virtue than in the society of their own people? Or, alternatively, could you not persuade their fathers that, if they had any solicitude for their sons, they ought to hand them over to you, rather than keep them in their own care? I cannot imagine that they grudged their own children the attainment of the highest virtue possible for them.

Hippias/ No, I do not suppose they begrudged it.

Socrates/ But Lacedaemon has good laws.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And in states with good laws, virtue is held in the highest honor?

Hippias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And you know better than anyone else how to impart it to another?

Hippias/ Emphatically.

Socrates/ Well now, is not Thessaly the part of Greece where the man who best knows how to impart horsemanship would be most highly esteemed, and would make most money—and would not the same apply to any foreign country where that art is zealously pursued?

Hippias/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Then is not Lacedaemon, or any other Greek state that has good laws, the place where the man who can impart the knowledge most valuable for the promotion of virtue would be most highly esteemed, and, if he chose, would make the most money? Do you think that Sicily and Inycus are better? Are we to believe this, Hippias? If you say so, we must believe it.

Hippias/ The ancestral tradition of the Lacedaemonians forbids them to change their laws, or to give their sons an education different from the customary.

Socrates/ What! Does the ancestral tradition of the Lacedaemonians require them to do wrong instead of right?

Hippias/ I should not say that myself, Socrates.

Socrates/ Will they not do right by giving their young men the best education in their power?

Hippias/ Certainly, but it is illegal for them to give them a foreign kind of education. You can be certain that if anyone

had ever made money there by education, I should have made far the most, for they listen to me with enjoyment and applause. But, as I have said, it is not the law.

Socrates/ Would you say that law is an injury to the state, or a benefit?

Hippias/ It is made, I take it, with a view to benefit, but sometimes it does positive harm if it is ill made.

Socrates/ But surely the legislators make the law on the assumption that it is a principal good of the state, and that without good a well-ordered state is impossible?

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ When, therefore, would-be legislators miss the good, they have missed law and legality. What do you say?

Hippias/ Speaking precisely, Socrates, that is so, but mankind are not accustomed to put it that way.

Socrates/ The men who know, or those who do not?

Hippias/ The multitude.

Socrates/ This multitude, is it composed of men who know the truth?

Hippias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But at any rate those who know, I suppose, hold that the more beneficial is in truth more lawful for all men than the less beneficial, or do you not agree?

Hippias/ Yes, I agree. It is so, in truth.

Socrates/ Then the real fact is as those who know hold it to be?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ You maintain that it is more beneficial for Lacedaemonians to be brought up in your education, a foreign one, than in the native form?

Hippias/ Yes, and I am right.

Socrates/ And that what is more beneficial is more lawful—you maintain this also, Hippias?

Hippias/ I said so.

Socrates/ Then on your argument it is more lawful for the sons of Lacedaemonians to be educated by Hippias, and less lawful for them to be educated by their fathers, if they will in fact get more benefit from you?

Hippias/ They certainly will get benefit from me.

Socrates/ Then Lacedaemonians break the law by not entrusting their sons to you, and paying you handsomely for it.

Hippias/ I agree. As you appear to be arguing my own case, I do not see why I should go into opposition.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, the Lacedaemonians prove to be lawbreakers, and lawbreakers in the most vital matters—the very people who are reputed to be the most law-abiding. In heaven's name, Hippias, on what kind of subject do they listen to you with such pleasure and applause? Clearly it must be the one on which you are a great authority, the stars and the celestial phenomena?

Hippias/ Not in the least. They won't tolerate it.

Socrates/ Then they like to hear about geometry?

Hippias/ Not at all. Many of them do not even know how to count, so to speak.

Socrates/ Then they must be a far from appreciative audience when you address them on arithmetic?

Hippias/ Very far indeed.

Socrates/ Well then, what about the problems which you of all men know best how to analyze—the properties of letters and syllables and rhythms and harmonies?

Hippias/ My dear sir! Harmonies and letters indeed!

Socrates/ What then are the subjects on which they listen to you with pleasure and applause? Pray enlighten me; I cannot see.

Hippias/ They delight in the genealogies of heroes and of men and in stories of the foundations of cities in olden times, and, to put it briefly, in all forms of antiquarian lore, so that because of them I have been compelled to acquire a thorough comprehension and mastery of all that branch of learning.

Socrates/ Bless my soul, you have certainly been lucky that the Lacedaemonians do not want to hear a recital of the list of our archons, from Solon downward; you would have had some trouble to learn it.

Hippias/ Why? I can repeat fifty names after hearing them once.

Socrates/ I am sorry, I quite forgot about your mnemonic art. Now I understand how naturally the Lacedaemonians enjoy your multifarious knowledge, and make use of you as children do of old women, to tell them agreeable stories.

Hippias/ Yes, indeed, and, what is more, Socrates, I have lately gained much credit there by setting forth in detail the honorable and beautiful practices to which a young man ought to devote himself. On that subject I have composed a discourse, a beautiful work distinguished by a fine style among its other merits. Its setting and its exordium are like this. After the fall of Troy, Neoptolemus asks Nestor what are the honorable and beautiful practices to which a man should devote himself during his youth in order to win the highest distinction. Then it is Nestor's turn to speak, and he propounds to him a great number of excellent rules of life. This discourse I delivered in Sparta, and at the request of Eudicus, the son of Apemantus, am to deliver it here, as well as much else worth listening to, in the schoolroom of Phidostratus, the day after tomorrow. Please be sure to come

yourself, and bring with you other good critics of such dissertations.

Socrates/ Certainly, Hippias, all being well. But now answer me a trifling question on the subject; you have reminded me of it in the nick of time. Quite lately, my noble friend, when I was condemning as ugly some things in certain compositions, and praising others as beautiful, somebody threw me into confusion by interrogating me in a most offensive manner, rather to this effect. You, Socrates, pray how do you know what things are beautiful and what are ugly? Come now, can you tell me what beauty is?

In my incompetence I was confounded, and could find no proper answer to give him; so, leaving the company, I was filled with anger and reproaches against myself, and promised myself that the first time I met with one of you wise men, I would listen to him and learn, and when I had mastered my lesson thoroughly, I would go back to my questioner and join battle with him again. So you see that you have come at a beautifully appropriate moment, and I ask you to teach me properly what is beauty by itself, answering my questions with the utmost precision you can attain. I do not want to be made to look a fool a second time, by another cross-examination. Of course you know perfectly, and it is only a scrap of your vast learning.

Hippias/ A scrap indeed, Socrates, and of no value, I may add.

Socrates/ Then I shall acquire it without trouble, and nobody will confound me again.

Hippias/ Nobody at all, if I am not a bungling amateur in my profession.

Socrates/ Bravo, Hippias, how splendid, if we do defeat the adversary! Will it be a nuisance to you if I act as his understudy and fasten on your answers with my objections,

so that you may put me through some vigorous practice? I have had a fair amount of experience of his objections. If, therefore, it makes no difference to you, I should like to play the critic. In this way I shall get a firmer grasp of what I learn.

Hippias/ Certainly, put your criticisms. As I said just now, it is not a big question. I might teach you to answer much more difficult ones with such cogency that no human being would be able to confute you.

Socrates/ How magnificent! Well now, on your invitation let me assume his role to the best of my ability, and try to interrogate you. If you were to deliver to him the discourse to which you refer—the discourse about beautiful practices—he would hear you to the end, and when you stopped, the very first question he would put would be about beauty—it is a kind of habit with him. He would say, Stranger from Elis, is it not by justice that the just are just? Would you answer, Hippias, as if he were asking the question?

Hippias/ I shall answer that it is by justice.

Socrates/ Then this, namely justice, is definitely something.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Again, it is by wisdom that the wise are wise, and by goodness that all things are good?

Hippias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ That is, by really existent things—one could scarcely say, by things which have no real existence?

Hippias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then are not all beautiful things beautiful by beauty?

Hippias/ Yes, by beauty.

Socrates/ Which has a real existence?

Hippias/ Yes, what else do you think?

Socrates/ Then tell me, stranger, he would say, what is this thing, beauty?

Hippias/ By putting this question he just wants to find out what is beautiful?

Socrates/ I do not think so, Hippias. He wants to know what is beauty—the beautiful.

Hippias/ What is the difference between them?

Socrates/ You think there is none?

Hippias/ There is no difference.

Socrates/ Obviously you know best. Still, my good sir, look at it again; he asks you not what is beautiful, but what is beauty.

Hippias/ I understand, my good sir, and I will indeed tell him what is beauty, defying anyone to refute me. I assure you, Socrates, if I must speak the truth, that a beautiful maiden is a beauty.

Socrates/ Upon my word, Hippias, a beautiful answer—very creditable. Then if I give that answer I shall have answered the question, and answered it correctly, and I can defy anyone to refute me?

Hippias/ How can you be refuted when everyone thinks the same and everyone who hears you will testify that you are right?

Socrates/ Quite so. Now, Hippias, let me recapitulate to myself what you say. That man will question me something like this. Come, Socrates, give me an answer. Returning to your examples of beauty, tell me what must beauty by itself be in order to explain why we apply the word to them?

And you want me to reply that if a beautiful maiden is a beauty, we have found why they are entitled to that name?

Hippias/ Do you imagine that he will then try to refute you by proving that you have not mentioned a beautiful thing, or that if he does attempt it he will not look a fool?

Socrates/ I am sure, my worthy friend, that he will try to refute me. The event will show whether the attempt will make him look a fool. But allow me to tell you what he will say.

Hippias/ Go on, then.

Socrates/ He will say, How delicious you are, Socrates! Is not a beautiful mare a beauty—the god himself praised mares in his oracle?

How shall we reply, Hippias? Must we not say that the mare, too, or at least a beautiful one, is a beauty? We can hardly be so audacious as to deny that beauty is beautiful.

Hippias/ Quite right. I may add that the god, too, spoke quite correctly; the mares we breed in our country are very beautiful.

Socrates/ He will now say, Very well, but what about a beautiful lyre? Is that not a beauty? Are we to agree, Hippias?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Judging from his character, I feel pretty sure that he will then go on, What about a beautiful pot, my dear sir? Is not that a beauty?

Hippias/ Who is this fellow? What a boor, to dare to introduce such vulgar examples into a grave discussion!

Socrates/ He is that sort of person, Hippias—not at all refined, a common fellow caring for nothing but the truth. Still, he must have his answer and I give my own first. If the pot is the work of a good potter, smooth and round and properly fired, like some very beautiful pots I have seen, the two-handled ones that hold six *choes*—if he were to ask his

question about a pot like that, we should have to admit that it is beautiful. How could we assert that what is a beautiful thing is not a beauty?

Hippias/ No, we could not.

Socrates/ Then even a beautiful pot, he will say, is a beauty? Please answer.

Hippias/ Yes, I suppose so. Even this utensil is beautiful when it is beautifully made, but generically it does not deserve to be judged beautiful in comparison with a mare or a maiden, or all the other things of beauty.

Socrates/ Very well. I understand, Hippias, that when he puts these questions I should answer, Sir, you do not grasp the truth of Heraclitus' saying that the most beautiful of apes is ugly compared with the human race, and the most beautiful of pots is ugly when grouped with maidens—so says Hippias the wise. That is correct?

Hippias/ Quite the right answer.

Socrates/ Now mark my words, I am sure that he will then say, Yes, Socrates, but if maidens are grouped with gods, will not the result be the same as when pots were grouped with maidens? Will not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly? Does not Heraclitus, whom you adduce, employ these very words, 'The wisest of men, when compared to a god, will appear but an ape in wisdom and beauty and all else?'

Shall we admit, Hippias, that the most beautiful maiden is ugly in comparison with the race of gods?

Hippias/ That no one can deny, Socrates.

Socrates/ If then we make this admission, he will laugh and say, Socrates, do you remember what you were asked?

Yes, I shall answer. I was asked what beauty by itself is.

He will rejoin, Then when you are asked for beauty, do you offer in reply that which you yourself acknowledge to be no more beautiful than ugly?

Apparently, I shall say. What do you advise me to reply?

Hippias/ As you do reply, for of course he will be right in saying that in comparison with gods the human race is not beautiful.

Socrates/ He will continue, If I had asked you at the beginning what is both beautiful and ugly, and you had answered me as now, would not your answer have been correct? But do you still think that absolute beauty, by which all other things are ordered in loveliness, and appear beautiful when its form is added—do you think that that is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre?

Hippias/ But still, Socrates, if this is what he wants, it is the easiest thing in the world to tell him what is that beauty which orders all other things in loveliness and makes them appear beautiful when it is added to them. The fellow must be a perfect fool, knowing nothing about things of beauty. If you reply to him that this about which he is asking, beauty, is nothing else than gold, he will be at a loss and will not attempt to refute you. For I suppose we all know that if anything has gold added to it, it will appear beautiful when so adorned even though it appeared ugly before.

Socrates/ You do not know what a ruffian he is. He accepts nothing without making difficulties.

Hippias/ What do you mean? He must accept an accurate statement, on pain of ridicule.

Socrates/ Well, my friend, this answer of yours he will not only refuse to accept, but he will even scoff at me viciously, saying, You blockhead! Do you reckon Phidias a bad artist?

I suppose I shall answer, Not in the least.

Hippias/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Yes, so I think. But when I agree that Phidias is a good artist, he will say, Then do you fancy that Phidias was ignorant of this beauty of which you speak?

I shall reply, What is the point? And he will rejoin, The point is that he did not give his Athena eyes of gold or use gold for the rest of her face, or for her hands, or for her feet, as he would have done if supreme beauty could be given to them only by the use of gold; he made them of ivory. Clearly he made this mistake through ignorance, not knowing that it is really gold that confers beauty on everything to which it is added.

How are we to answer him then, Hippias?

Hippias/ Quite easy. We shall reply that Phidias was artistically right, for ivory too is beautiful, I suppose.

Socrates/ Why then, he will say, did he not also make the eyeballs of ivory? He made them of stone, finding out stone as like as possible to ivory. Or is the stone that is beautiful itself a beauty?

Shall we say that it is?

Hippias/ Yes—it is beautiful, at least, whenever it is appropriate.

Socrates/ But ugly when not appropriate? Am I to agree?

Hippias/ Yes—when not appropriate.

Socrates/ He will go on, Well then, O man of wisdom, do not ivory and gold cause a thing to appear beautiful when they are appropriate, and ugly when they are not?

Shall we deny it or admit that he is right?

Hippias/ We shall at any rate admit that whatever is appropriate to a particular thing makes that thing beautiful.

Socrates/ He will continue, Then when a man boils the pot of which we spoke, the beautiful pot full of beautiful

soup, which is the more appropriate to it—a ladle of gold or a ladle of fig-wood?

Hippias/ Really, Socrates, what a creature! Please tell me who he is.

Socrates/ You would not know him if I told you his name.

Hippias/ I. know enough about him at this moment to know that he is a dolt.

Socrates/ He is a terrible nuisance, Hippias. Still, how shall we answer? Which of the two ladles are we to choose as appropriate to the soup and the pot? Obviously the one of fig-wood? For it gives the soup a better smell, I suppose, and moreover, my friend, it would not break our pot and spill the soup and put out the fire and deprive the guests at our dinner of a truly noble dish, whereas that golden ladle would do all this. And therefore, if you do not object, I think we should say that the wooden ladle is more appropriate than the golden.

Hippias/ Yes, it is more appropriate, but I should not myself go on talking with the fellow while he asks such questions.

Socrates/ Quite right, my friend. It would not be appropriate for you to be contaminated by such language, you who are so well dressed, and wear such good shoes, and are renowned for wisdom throughout the Greek world. But to me it does not matter if I am mixed up with that fellow; so fortify me with your instruction, and for my sake answer the questions.

He will say, If indeed the wooden ladle is more appropriate than the golden, will it not also be more beautiful, since you, Socrates, have admitted that the appropriate is more beautiful than the inappropriate?

Can we then avoid the admission that the wooden ladle is more beautiful than the golden?

Hippias/ Would you like me to give you a definition of beauty by which you can save yourself from prolonged discussion?

Socrates/ Certainly, but first please tell me which of the two ladles I have just mentioned is appropriate, and the more beautiful?

Hippias/ Well, if you like, answer him that it is the one made of fig-wood.

Socrates/ Say now what a moment ago you were proposing to say, for following your answer, if I take the line that beauty is gold, I shall apparently have to face the fact that gold is no more beautiful than fig-wood. Now, once more, what according to you is beauty?

Hippias/ You shall have your answer. You are looking, I think, for a reply ascribing to beauty such a nature that it will never appear ugly to anyone anywhere?

Socrates/ Exactly. You catch my meaning admirably.

Hippias/ Now please attend. If anyone can find any fault with what I say, I give you full leave to call me an imbecile.

Socrates/ I am on tenterhooks.

Hippias/ Then I maintain that always, everywhere, and for every man it is most beautiful to be rich, healthy, honored by the Greeks, to reach old age and, after burying his parents nobly, himself to be borne to the tomb with solemn ceremony by his own children.

Socrates/ Bravo, bravo, Hippias, those are words wonderful, sublime, worthy of you, and you have my grateful admiration for your kindness in bringing all your ability to my assistance. Still, our shafts are not hitting our man, and I warn you that he will now deride us more than ever.

Hippias/ A poor sort of derision, Socrates, for in deriding us when he can find no objection to our view, he will be deriding himself and will be derided by the company.

Socrates/ Perhaps so. Perhaps, however, when he has the answer you suggest he may not be content just to laugh at me. So I forebode.

Hippias/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ If he happens to have a stick with him, he will attempt to get at me with it very forcibly, unless I escape by running away.

Hippias/ What? Is the fellow somehow your lord and master? Surely he will be arrested and punished for such behavior? Or has Athens no system of justice, that she allows her citizens to commit wrongful assaults on one another?

Socrates/ She forbids it absolutely.

Hippias/ Then he will be punished for his wrongful assaults.

Socrates/ I do not think so, Hippias—emphatically not, if that were the answer I gave him. I think his assault would be justified.

Hippias/ Since that is your own opinion, well, I think so too.

Socrates/ But may I go on to explain why, in my own opinion, that answer would justify an assault upon me? Or will you too assault me without trial, refusing me a hearing?

Hippias/ No, such a refusal would be monstrous. But what have you to say?

Socrates/ I will continue on the same plan as a moment ago, pretending to be that fellow but not using to you the kind of offensive and grotesque words he would to me. He will say, I feel sure, Do you not think, Socrates, that you

deserve a thrashing after chanting so badly out of tune a dithyramb so long and so irrelevant to the question you were asked?

What do you mean? I shall say.

What do I mean? Are you incapable of remembering that I asked about beauty itself, that which gives the property of being beautiful to everything to which it is added—to stone and wood, and man, and god, and every action and every branch of learning? I am asking, sir, what is beauty itself, and for all my shouting I cannot make you hear me. You might be a stone sitting beside me, a real millstone with neither ears nor brain.

Would not you, Hippias, be indignant if in terror I were to answer him, But this is what Hippias declared beauty to be, although I kept on asking him, exactly as you do me, for that which is beautiful always and for everyone.

Frankly, will not that answer make you indignant?

Hippias/ I am quite sure, Socrates, that what I specified is beautiful to all, and will so appear to all.

Socrates/ He will reply, And will be so in the future? For beauty, I take it, is always beautiful?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And it was beautiful, too, in the past?

Hippias/ It was.

Socrates/ Then he will go on, So this stranger from Elis asserted that it would have been beautiful for Achilles to be buried after his parents, and similarly for his grandfather Aeacus, and for the other children of gods, and for the gods themselves?

Hippias/ What is this? Tell him to go to—glory! These questions of his are irreverent, Socrates.

Socrates/ Surely it is not exactly irreverent to say that these things are so, when someone else has asked the question?

Hippias/ Well, presumably not.

Socrates/ Presumably he will then say, It is you who affirm that it is beautiful always and for everyone to bury his parents and be buried by his children. Does not ‘everyone' include Heracles and all the others we mentioned a moment ago?

Hippias/ I did not mean to include the gods.

Socrates/ Nor the heroes either, apparently.

Hippias/ Not if they were the children of gods.

Socrates/ But if they were not?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then from your own argument, it now appears that the fate which is terrible and impious and shameful for Tantalus and Dardanus and Zethus is beautiful for Pelops and the other heroes of similar parentage?

Hippias/ I think so.

Socrates/ He will go on, Then you think, contrary to what you said just now, that to bury one's parents and be buried by one's children is sometimes, and for some persons, shameful, and it looks more than ever impossible that it should become, or be, beautiful to everyone. So this definition meets the same fate as those we discussed earlier—the maiden and the pot—it is an even more ludicrous failure, offering us that which is beautiful to some men, and not to others. And to this very day, Socrates, you cannot answer the question you were asked—beauty, what is it?

These and other like reproaches he will hurl at me with some justice, if I give him this answer. For the most part he

talks to me something after this fashion, but sometimes, as if in pity for my inexperience and lack of education, he himself proffers a question, and asks whether I think beauty is such and such, or it may be on some other subject—whatever he happens to be thinking about, and we are discussing.

Hippias/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will explain. My worthy Socrates, he says, don't give answers of that kind, and in that way—they are silly, easily torn to rags—but consider this suggestion. In one of our answers a little while ago we got hold of, and expressed, the idea that gold is beautiful or not beautiful according as it is placed in an appropriate setting, and similarly with everything else to which this qualification can be added. Now consider this appropriateness, and reflect on the general nature of the appropriate, and see whether it might not be beauty.

Myself, I am in the habit of invariably agreeing to such surmises, for I can never think of anything to say, but you, do you think that the appropriate is beautiful?

Hippias/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let us consider, and make sure that there is no deception.

Hippias/ So we ought.

Socrates/ Come on then. Do we define the appropriate as that which by its presence causes the things in which it becomes present to *appear* beautiful, or causes them to *be* beautiful, or neither?

Hippias/ In my own opinion, that which causes things to appear beautiful. For example, a man may be a figure of fun, but when he wears clothes or shoes that fit well he does seem a finer man.

Socrates/ But then if the appropriate really makes things appear more beautiful than they are, the appropriate is a kind of fraud in relation to beauty, and would not be that for which we are looking, would it? We were looking, I think, for that by which all beautiful things are beautiful, corresponding to that by which all great things are great, namely, excess—by this all great things are great, and great they must certainly be if they exceed, even though they do not appear so. Similarly we ask about beauty, by which all beautiful things are beautiful whether they appear so or not—what can that be? It cannot be the appropriate, for on your own view this causes things to appear more beautiful than they are, and does not leave them to appear such as they are in reality. We ought to take that which causes things to be beautiful, as I said just now, whether they appear so or not, and try to define it—this is what we are looking for, if we are looking for beauty.

Hippias/ But, Socrates, the appropriate causes things both to be and to appear beautiful, when it is present.

Socrates/ Then it is impossible for things that are in fact beautiful not to appear beautiful, since by hypothesis that which makes them appear beautiful is present in them?

Hippias/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Then it is our conclusion, Hippias, that all established usages and all practices which are in reality beautiful are regarded as beautiful by all men, and always appear so to them? Or do we think the exact opposite, that ignorance of them is prevalent, and that these are the chief of all objects of contention and fighting, both between individuals and between states?

Hippias/ The latter, I think. Ignorance prevails.

Socrates/ It would not, if the appearance of beauty were but added to them, and it would be added if the appropriate

were beautiful and moreover caused them to *appear* as well as *be* beautiful. It follows that if the appropriate is that which causes things to be in fact beautiful, then it would be that beauty for which we are looking, but still it would not be that which causes them to appear beautiful. If, on the other hand, that which causes things to appear beautiful is the appropriate, it is not that beauty for which we are looking. That for which we are looking makes things beautiful, but the same cause never could make things both appear and be either beautiful or anything else. We have then these alternatives—is the appropriate that which causes things to appear beautiful, or that which causes them to be so?

Hippias/ To appear, I think.

Socrates/ Oh dear! Then the chance of finding out what the beautiful really is has slipped through our fingers and vanished, since the appropriate has proved to be something other than beautiful.

Hippias/ Upon my word, Socrates, I should never have thought it!

Socrates/ But still, my friend, do not let us give up yet. I have still a sort of hope that the nature of beauty will reveal itself.

Hippias/ Yes indeed, it is not hard to discover. I am sure that if I were to retire into solitude for a little while and reflect by myself, I could define it for you with superlative precision.

Socrates/ Hippias, Hippias, don't boast. You know what trouble it has already given us, and I am afraid it may get angry with us and run away more resolutely than ever. But what nonsense I am talking, for you, I suppose, will easily discover it when once you are alone. Still, I beg you most earnestly to discover it with me here, or, if you please, let us look for it together as we are now doing. If we find it, well and good; if not, I imagine I shall resign myself to my fate,

and you will go away and discover it easily. Of course, if we find it now, you will not be annoyed by inquiries from me about the nature of your private discovery. So please look at your conception of beauty by itself.

I define it as—pray give me your whole attention and stop me if I talk nonsense—well, let us assume that whatever is useful is beautiful. My ground for the proposition is as follows. We do not say that eyes are beautiful when they appear to be without the faculty of sight; we do when they have that faculty and so are useful for seeing. Is that correct?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Similarly we say that the whole body is beautifully made, sometimes for running, sometimes for wrestling, and we speak in the same way of all animals. A beautiful horse, or cock, or quail, and all utensils, and means of transport both on land and on sea, merchant vessels and ships of war, and all instruments of music and of the arts generally, and, if you like, practices and laws—we apply the word 'beautiful' to practically all these in the same manner. In each case we take as our criterion the natural constitution or the workmanship or the form of enactment, and whatever is useful we call beautiful, and beautiful in that respect in which it is useful and for the purpose for which and at the time at which it is useful, and we call ugly that which is useless in all these respects. Is not this your view also, Hippias?

Hippias/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Then we are now right in affirming that the useful is pre-eminently beautiful.

Hippias/ We are.

Socrates/ And that which has the power to achieve its specific purpose is useful for the purpose which it has the

power to achieve, and that which is without that power is useless?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then power is a beautiful thing, and the lack of it ugly?

Hippias/ Very much so. We have evidence of that fact from public life, among other sources, for in political affairs generally, and also within a man's own city, power is the most beautiful of things, and lack of it the most ugly and shameful.

Socrates/ Good! Does it then follow—a momentous consequence—that wisdom is the most beautiful, and ignorance the most shameful of all things?

Hippias/ What do you think, Socrates?

Socrates/ A moment's quiet, my dear friend. I have misgivings about the line we are taking now.

Hippias/ Why these misgivings again? This time your argument has proceeded magnificently.

Socrates/ I could wish it were so, but let us consider together this point. Could a man do something which he had neither the knowledge nor the least atom of power to do?

Hippias/ Of course not. How could he do what he had not the power to do?

Socrates/ Then those who by reason of some error contrive and work evil involuntarily—surely they would never do such things if they were without the power to do them?

Hippias/ Obviously not.

Socrates/ And those who have the power to do a thing do it through power, not of course by being powerless?

Hippias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Those who do what they do, all have the power to do it?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And evil is done much more abundantly than good by all men from childhood upward, erring involuntarily?

Hippias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Well then, are we to say that this power, and these useful things—I mean any things useful for working some evil—are we to say that these are beautiful, or that they are far from being so?

Hippias/ Far from it, in my opinion.

Socrates/ Then the powerful and the useful are not, it appears, the beauty we want.

Hippias/ They are, Socrates, if they are powerful for good and are useful for such purposes.

Socrates/ Still the theory that that which is powerful and useful without qualification is beautiful has vanished away. Do you think, however, that what we really had in mind to say was that beauty is that which is both useful and powerful for some good purpose?

Hippias/ I think so.

Socrates/ But this is equivalent to beneficial, is it not?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So we reach the conclusion that beautiful bodies, and beautiful rules of life, and wisdom, and all the things we mentioned just now, are beautiful because they are beneficial?

Hippias/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Then it looks as if beauty is the beneficial, Hippias.

Hippias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Now the beneficial is that which produces good?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which produces is identical with the cause?

Hippias/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then the beautiful is the cause of the good?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ But surely, Hippias, the cause and that of which it is the cause are different, for the cause could scarcely be the cause of the cause. Look at it in this way. The cause was defined as something that produces, was it not?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that which produces, produces only that which is coming into existence; it does not produce that which produces.

Hippias/ That is so.

Socrates/ And that which is coming into existence, and that which produces it, are two different things?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the cause is not the cause of the cause, but of that which is coming into existence through it?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If then beauty is the cause of good, then the good would be brought into existence by beauty, and it would appear that we devote ourselves to the pursuit of wisdom and of all other beautiful things for the reason that their product and offspring, the good, is worthy of devotion. And from our explorations it looks as though beauty is metaphorically a kind of father of the good.

Hippias/ Certainly. You say well, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do I not say this also well, that the father is not his son, nor the son his father?

Hippias/ Quite well.

Socrates/ And that the cause is not that which it brings into existence, nor vice versa?

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ Then most certainly, my good sir, beauty is not good nor the good beautiful. Do you think that possible after our discussion?

Hippias/ No, I most certainly do not.

Socrates/ Then does it please us, and should we be willing to say that the beautiful is not good, nor the good beautiful?

Hippias/ Most certainly not. It does not please me at all.

Socrates/ Most certainly I agree, Hippias. It pleases me least of any of the theories we have discussed.

Hippias/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Then it looks as if the view which a little while ago we thought the finest result of our discussions, the view that the beneficial, and the useful, and the power to produce something good, is beautiful, is in fact wrong, but it is, if possible, more open to ridicule than those first definitions according to which the maiden was the beautiful, and so was a succession of other things.

Hippias/ Apparently.

Socrates/ For myself, Hippias, I don't know where to turn, and am completely at a loss. Have you anything to say?

Hippias/ Not at the moment, but as I said a little while ago, I feel sure I shall find a way out after some reflection.

Socrates/ But I do not feel that I can wait for the issue of your reflection, I am so eager for this knowledge, and indeed, I fancy I have just hit on something. Come now, if we were

to say that whatever we enjoy—I do not mean to include all pleasures, but only what we enjoy through our senses of hearing and sight—if we were to say that this is beautiful, how should we fare in our struggle? Surely beautiful human beings, and all decorative work, and pictures, and plastic art, delight us when we see them if they are beautiful, and beautiful sounds, and music as a whole, and discourses, and tales of imagination, have the same effect, so that if we were to reply to that blustering fellow, My worthy sir, beauty is the pleasant which comes through the senses of hearing and sight, do you not think that we should stop his bluster?

Hippias/ At last, Socrates, I think we have a good definition of beauty.

Socrates/ Well, but are we then to say that those practices which are beautiful, and the laws, are beautiful as giving pleasure through our senses of sight and hearing, or that they are in some other category?

Hippias/ Perhaps these cases might escape our man.

Socrates/ No, Hippias, they would certainly not escape the man by whom I should be most ashamed to be caught talking pretentious nonsense.

Hippias/ Whom do you mean?

Socrates/ The son of Sophroniscus [i.e., Socrates himself], who would no more allow me to hazard these assertions while they are unexplored than to assert what I do not know as though I knew it.

Hippias/ Well, now you have raised the point, I must say that I too think this question about the laws is on a different footing.

Socrates/ Gently, Hippias, we may quite well be imagining that we see our way clearly, when we have really

fallen into the same difficulty about beauty as that in which we were caught a moment ago.

Hippias/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ This is what strikes me—there may be something in it. These matters of law and practice might perhaps prove after all to be within the range of the perceptions of hearing and sight. However, let us hold fast to the statement that the pleasant which comes through these senses is beautiful, leaving the question of the laws altogether on one side. But if we were asked by the person to whom I refer, or by anyone else, Why, Hippias and Socrates, have you picked out within the class of the pleasant that which is pleasant in the way you affirm to be beautiful, while you deny the designation 'beautiful' to that which is pleasant according to the other senses, that is, the senses which have to do with food, and drink, and sexual intercourse, and all such things? Or do you deny that these are pleasant, and claim that in such things there is no pleasure whatever, or in anything except seeing and hearing? What shall we say?

Hippias/ Obviously we shall reply that these other things also offer very great pleasures.

Socrates/ Why then, he will say, do you take away this designation and refuse to allow them beauty when they are pleasures no less than the others?

We shall answer, Because everyone would laugh at us if we said that it is not pleasant to eat, but beautiful, or that a pleasant smell is not pleasant, but beautiful, and as to sexual intercourse, everyone would contend against us that it is most pleasant, while admitting that it ought to be enjoyed only where there is none to see because it is a disgraceful and repulsive sight.

When we say this, Hippias, he would probably rejoin, I too understand that you are and have been ashamed to say that these pleasures are beautiful, because that is not the common view, but my question was, what is beautiful, not what the mass of men think it to be.

I imagine we shall restate our original proposition—in our view that part of the pleasant which comes by sight and hearing is beautiful. However, can you suggest any other way of dealing with the question, or any addition to that reply?

Hippias/ As the argument now stands, we are bound to give that answer, and that only.

Socrates/ Admirable, he will reply. If then the pleasant which comes by sight and hearing is beautiful, is it not obvious that any pleasant thing outside that category could not be beautiful?

Shall we agree?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ He will go on, Then is that which is pleasant through sight, pleasant through sight and through hearing, or is that which is pleasant through hearing, pleasant through hearing and through sight?

We shall reply, By no means. The pleasant which comes by either sense would certainly not be pleasant through both—that seems to be your meaning. Our statement was that either of these pleasant things would be beautiful just by itself, and also both of them together.

Shall that be our answer?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, he will say, does any pleasant thing whatever differ from any other pleasant thing in respect of its pleasantness? The question is not whether a particular

pleasure is greater or smaller, or exists in a higher or lower degree, but whether there can be a difference between pleasures in this particular respect, that one is, and another is not, a pleasure?

We do not think so, do we?

Hippias/ No.

Socrates/ He will continue, It follows that you chose out these from among the other pleasures for some other reason than that they are pleasures. Since there is some difference between them and the others, you saw in both of them some quality capable of providing a criterion by which you judge them to be beautiful, for the pleasure that comes through sight, I take it, is not beautiful just because it comes through sight. If that were the reason why it is beautiful, the other pleasure, the one which comes through hearing, would never be beautiful—it is emphatically not pleasure through sight.

Shall we reply that his reasoning is correct?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor again is the pleasure that comes through hearing beautiful because it is through hearing, for again, in that case the pleasure through sight would never be beautiful since it is emphatically not pleasure through hearing.

Shall we agree that he argues correctly?

Hippias/ He does.

Socrates/ But yet both are beautiful, you affirm?

We do affirm it?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then they have something identical which makes them to be beautiful, a common quality which appertains to both of them in common and to each singly; otherwise they could not, I take it, both of them be beautiful

as a pair, and also each separately? Answer me as though you were answering him.

Hippias/ I answer that what you say is my opinion also.

Socrates/ If then these pleasures are both of them as a pair conditioned in some way, but neither singly is so conditioned, they could not be beautiful by reason of this particular condition?

Hippias/ And how is it possible, Socrates, that when neither of them singly has been conditioned in some way—any way you like to think of—yet both as a pair should be conditioned in the way in which neither singly has been conditioned?

Socrates/ You think it impossible?

Hippias/ I do—not being entirely unacquainted either with the nature of the subject, or with the terminology of our present discussion.

Socrates/ Very nice, Hippias. But still I fancy perchance I see an example of what you say to be impossible, though really I may see nothing.

Hippias/ It is not a case of ‘perchance'—you see wrong, of good set purpose.

Socrates/ Indeed, many such examples rise up before my mind's eye, but I distrust them because they are visible to me, who have never earned a penny by wisdom, while they do not appear to you who have earned more in that way than anyone else alive. And, my friend, I am pondering whether you are not playing with me and deceiving me on purpose, so clearly and in such numbers do I see them.

Hippias/ Nobody will know better than you whether I am playing with you or not, when you start to describe these visions of yours. Your description of them will be plain nonsense. You will never find both of us together conditioned in a way in which neither has been conditioned separately.

Socrates/ What's that, Hippias? You may be talking sense and I do not grasp it, but please let me explain more clearly what I mean. It appears to me that there are attributes which cannot, and do not now, belong to either of us singly, but can belong to both together, and, conversely, that there are attributes of which both together are capable, but neither singly.

Hippias/ Here indeed, Socrates, are absurdities even more monstrous than those of your answer a little while ago. Only consider. If we are both just men, is not each of us individually just? If each of us is unjust, are not both so? If both are well, is not each of us well also? Or if each of us were tired, or were wounded, or struck, or conditioned in any other way, then should we not both of us as a pair be conditioned in that way? Similarly, if both of us were made of gold, or silver, or ivory, or if you prefer it, were noble or wise or honored, or, for that matter, old men or young, or had any other human attribute you like to mention, must it not follow inevitably that each of us singly is that same?

Socrates/ Most certainly.

Hippias/ You see, Socrates, the fact is that you yourself do not consider things as a whole, nor do those with whom you habitually converse; you test beauty and each general concept by taking it separately and mentally dissecting it, with the result that you fail to perceive the magnitude and continuity of the substances of which reality is composed. And now this failure has gone so far that you imagine that there is something, an attribute or substantive nature, which appertains to two of them together but not to each singly, or conversely to each singly but not to the two together; that is the state of mind to which you and your friends are reduced—how unreasoning, and superficial, and stupid, and uncomprehending!

Socrates/ Such is the lot of us mortals, Hippias—a man does what he can, not what he wishes, according to the oft-quoted proverb. However, your constant admonitions are a great help. Just now, before your admonition of our stupidity in these matters, I had some further thoughts about them which perhaps I might explain to you—or shall I refrain?

Hippias/ I know what you are going to say, Socrates; I know the mind of every school of dialecticians. But say your say, if you prefer it.

Socrates/ Well, I do prefer it. Before you said what you did, my honored friend, we were so uninstructed as to hold the opinion that each of us two, you and myself, is one, but that, taken together, we cannot be that which each of us is singly—for we are two and not one. Such was our folly. Now, however, we have been taught by you that if together we are two, each of us singly must also be two, and if each is one, so must we both be, for on the continuous theory of reality according to Hippias it cannot be otherwise—whatever two entities are together, each is singly, and whatever each is, both are. Here I sit, fixed by you in this belief. But first, Hippias, remind me, are you and I both one, or are you two, and I two?

Hippias/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ Exactly what I say. You frighten me out of plain speech, because you get angry with me whenever you think that you have made a good point. Still, let me ask you this further question. Is not each of us two one, possessing the attribute of being one?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then if each of us is one, each is also an odd number. You hold that one is an odd number, do you not?

Hippias/ I do.

Socrates/ Are we then both together an odd number, being two?

Hippias/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Both together would be an even number?

Hippias/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Since then both together are even, does it follow that each of us singly is even?

Hippias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ It is not then absolutely inevitable that, as you said just now, each individual should be what both are together, and that both should be what each is?

Hippias/ Not in such cases, but it is inevitable in the kind of case I mentioned earlier.

Socrates/ That suffices, Hippias. Even that reply is to be accepted, as it is an acknowledgment that sometimes it is so, and sometimes not. If you recall the starting point of our discussion, you will remember that I was arguing that the pleasures which come through sight and hearing are beautiful not because each of them was so conditioned as to be beautiful but not both together, nor because both of them together were similarly conditioned but not each singly; they were beautiful by virtue of something which conditions both together and also each singly, and so you agreed that both together were beautiful and each singly. Accordingly I thought that if both together are beautiful, they must be beautiful because of an essential character belonging to both and not of a character which is lacking in one or the other, and I still think so. But start again as from the beginning. If pleasure through sight and pleasure through hearing are beautiful both together and each singly, does not that which makes them beautiful belong to both together and to each singly?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then can they be beautiful because each singly and both together are pleasures? On this reasoning, would not all other pleasures be beautiful just as much, for, if you remember, they were acknowledged to be just as much pleasures?

Hippias/ Yes, I remember.

Socrates/ These particular ones, however, were stated to be beautiful because they came through sight and hearing.

Hippias/ Yes, that was the statement.

Socrates/ Now consider whether I am right on this point. According to my recollection, it was said that part of the category of the pleasant was beautiful—not every 'pleasant,' but that which comes through hearing and sight.

Hippias/ That is correct.

Socrates/ And this quality belongs to both together but not to each singly, does it not? As we said earlier, each of them singly does not come through both senses; both together come through both but not each singly. Is that so?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then each of them singly is not beautiful by that which does not belong to each, for that which is of both does not belong to each, and it follows that while from our agreed propositions we may rightly say that both together are beautiful, we may not say it of each singly. Is not this the necessary conclusion?

Hippias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Are we to say then that both together are beautiful, but not each?

Hippias/ I see no objection.

Socrates/ I do, my friend. We certainly had examples of attributes appertaining to individual entities in such a way that if they appertained to two together they appertained

also to each singly, and if to each, then to both—all the attributes which were specified by you.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But on the other hand those which I specified did not, and among those were the concept ‘each' and the concept ‘both.' Is that right?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ To which category, Hippias, do you think the beautiful belongs? To the category of those you mentioned? If I am strong and you are too, we are both strong, and if I am just and you too, we are both just, and if both, then each singly. In the same way, if I am beautiful and you too, are we also both beautiful and if both, then each singly? Or may the same principle apply as in mathematics, when for instance the two components of even numbers may severally be odd, but may also be even, and, again, when quantities which are irrational if taken singly may be either rational or irrational if taken together? And there are innumerable other such examples, as indeed I told you occurred to my mind. In which category do you place beauty? Do you take the same view of it as I do? To me it seems a gross absurdity to hold that while both of us together are beautiful, neither is so singly, or that each singly is beautiful but not both together, or anything else of that kind? Do you choose my alternative, or the other?

Hippias/ Yours.

Socrates/ Quite right, if we wish to be spared further inquiry, for if this category includes beauty, it can no longer be maintained that the pleasant which comes through sight and hearing is beautiful; the description ‘which comes through sight and hearing' makes both together beautiful but not each singly—which was impossible, as I think, and you too.

Hippias/ Yes, we think the same.

Socrates/ Then it is impossible for the pleasant which comes through sight and hearing to be beautiful, since when we equate it with beauty an impossible result is produced.

Hippias/ Quite so.

Socrates/ My questioner will say, Now start again from the beginning since you have missed the mark this time. What according to you is this 'beautiful' which appertains to both these pleasures, and by reason of which you have honored them above the others and called them beautiful?

I think, Hippias, we are bound to reply that these are the most harmless of pleasures and the best, both taken together and taken singly. Can you suggest any other reason why they are superior to the others?

Hippias/ None. They really are the best.

Socrates/ This then, he will say, is your definition of beauty—beneficial pleasure.

Apparently, I shall reply. And you?

Hippias/ I too.

Socrates/ He will go on, Well then, is not the beneficial that which produces the good, and that which produces and that which is produced were shown a little while ago to be different, and so our discussion has ended up in the old discussion, has it not? For the good cannot be beautiful, nor beauty good, if the two are not identical with one another.

Nothing is more certain, we shall reply, if we are honest—there can be no justification for demurring to truth.

Hippias/ But I must ask you, Socrates, what do you suppose is the upshot of all this? As I said a little while ago, it is the scrapings and shavings of argument, cut up into little bits. What is both beautiful and most precious is the ability to produce an eloquent and beautiful speech to a law

court or a council meeting or any other official body whom you are addressing, to convince your audience, and to depart with the greatest of all prizes, your own salvation and that of your friends and property. These then are the things to which a man should hold fast, abandoning these pettifogging arguments of yours, unless he wishes to be accounted a complete fool because he occupies himself, as we are now doing, with trumpery nonsense.

Socrates/ You, my dear Hippias, are blissfully fortunate because you know what way of life a man ought to follow, and moreover have followed it with success—so you tell me. I, however, am subject to what appears to be some supernatural ill fortune. I wander about in unending perplexity, and when I lay my perplexity before you wise men, you turn on me and batter me with abuse as soon as I have explained my plight. You all say just what you, Hippias, are now saying, how foolish and petty and worthless are the matters with which I occupy myself, but when in turn I am convinced by you and repeat exactly what you tell me, that the height of excellence is the ability to produce an eloquent and beautiful speech and win the day in a law court or any other assembly, I am called every kind of bad name by some of the audience, including especially that man who is always cross-questioning me. He is a very close relative of mine and lives in the same house, and when I go home and he hears me give utterance to these opinions he asks me whether I am not ashamed of my audacity in talking about a beautiful way of life, when questioning makes it evident that I do not even know the meaning of the word ‘beauty.'

And yet, he goes on, how can you know whose speech is beautiful or the reverse—and the same applies to any action whatsoever—when you have no knowledge of beauty? And so long as you are what you are, don't you think that you might as well be dead?

It is my lot, you see, to be reviled and abused alike by you gentlemen, and by him. However, I suppose all this must be endured. I may get some good from it—stranger things have happened. And indeed, Hippias, I do think I have got some good out of my conversation with the two of you. I think now I appreciate the true meaning of the proverb, ‘All that is beautiful is difficult.'

The Greater Hippias.

Translated by Mr. Sydenham.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and Hippias.

SCENE. —THE LYCEUM.

Socrates/ Hippias, the fine and the wise! what a long time it is since last you touched at Athens!

Hippias/ It is because I have not had leisure, Socrates. For the Eleans, you are to know, whenever they have any public affairs to negotiate with any of the neighboring cities, constantly apply to me, and appoint me their ambassador for that purpose, in preference to all others: because they consider me as a person the ablest to form a right judgment of what is argued and alleged by everyone of the cities, and to make a proper report of it to them. My embassies, therefore, have been frequent to many of those powers; but oftenest, and upon points the most in number, as well as of the highest importance, have I gone to Sparta to treat with the Lacedæmonians, This is the reason, then, in answer to your question, why so seldom I visit these parts.

Socrates/ This it is, Hippias, to be a man truly wise and perfectly accomplished. For, being thus qualified, you have, in your private capacity, great presents made you by the young men of the age; and are able to make them ample amends by the greater advantages which they derive from you: then, in your public character, you are able to do service to your country, as a man ought who would raise himself above contempt, and acquire reputation among the multitude. But, Hippias, what sort of reason can be given, why those in former days, who are so highly famed for wisdom, Pittacus, and Bias, and Thales the Milesian, with

his disciples, successors, and followers, down to Anaxagoras, if not all, yet most of them, are found to have lived the lives of private men, declining to engage in public affairs?

Hippias/ What other reason, Socrates, can you imagine beside this, that they had not a sufficient reach of prudence for the conduct of their own private affairs, and those of the public at the same time?

Socrates/ Tell me then, in the name of Zeus, whether, as all other arts are improved, and the workmen of former times are contemptible and mean in comparison with ours, shall we say that your art, that of the Sophists, hath in like manner received improvement; and that such of the ancients as applied themselves to the study of wisdom were nothing, compared to you of the present age?

Hippias/ Perfectly right: that is the very case.

Socrates/ So that, were Bias to be restored to life again in our days, he would be liable to ridicule, appearing in competition with you Sophists: your case being parallel to that of our modern statuaries, who tell us that Dædalus, were he alive, and to execute such works as those to which he owed his great name, would but expose himself, and become ridiculous.

Hippias/ The truth of the matter, Socrates, exactly is what you say. I myself, however, make it my custom to bestow my commendations rather upon the ancients, and upon all such as flourished in times precedent to our own; giving them the preeminence and precedence above ourselves; in order to escape the envy of the living, and for fear of incurring the resentment of the dead.

Socrates/ In my opinion, Hippias, you see the matter in a just light, and consider it thoroughly well. I myself can witness the truth of what you say. It is indeed certain, that

your art is in this respect really improved, in that you are able to manage the concerns of the public, and at the same time give attention to your own private interests. For Gorgias, that great sophist of Leontium, came hither on a public embassy from his country, as the ablest man among the Leontines to negotiate their affairs of state: and here he acquired glory by his fine harangues in the assembly of the people; at the same time that by his exhibitions before private companies, and his teaching our young men, he collected and raised very considerable sums of money from this city. Or, if you would have another instance, there is my own friend, the famous Prodicus; who has frequently been sent hither on several public embassies: but the last time, not long since, when he came as ambassador from Ceos, his speeches before the council gained him great honor; and his private exhibitions in the meantime, together with the tuition of our young men, procured him an immense heap of money. But not one of those ancient sages ever thought proper to exact money by way of see or reward for his teaching; or ever took it into his head to display his wisdom before a mixed multitude. So simple were they, and so much a secret was it to them, how valuable a thing was money. Whereas each of the others, whom I mentioned, has made more money of his wisdom, than any other, artificer could ever earn from any art whatever: and prior to these Protagoras did the same.

Hippias/ You know nothing, Socrates, of what high advantages belong to our profession. If you knew but how great have been my own gains, you would be amazed. To give you only one instance: Going upon a certain time to Sicily, where Protagoras then resided, high in reputation and reverend in years; I, though at that time in age greatly his inferior, gained in a very short time more than a hundred and fifty minæ: nay, from one place only, and that a very

little one, Inycum, I took above twenty. This when I brought home with me, and presented to my father, it struck him and my other friends in the city with wonder and astonishment. To say the truth, I am inclined to think, that not any two of the sophists, name which you please, taken together, have acquired so much money as myself.

Socrates/ A fair and a notable evidence have you produced, Hippias, proving not only your own wisdom, but how wise the world, too, is become nowadays; and what difference there is between the modern wisdom and the ancient in point of excellence. For of these predecessors, of yours there is reported great folly, according to your account of things; To Anaxagoras, for instance, is said, happened the contrary of that lucky fate which befell you. For, when great wealth had been left him, he through negligence, they say, lost it all: so silly was he with his wisdom. And of other ancient sages they relate stories of the same kind. A clear proof, I think, therefore, this which you exhibit, in what a wise age we live; and what disproportion the wisdom of it bears to that of former times. Many too, I know, are agreed in this opinion, that a wise man ought, in the first place, to be wise to himself. Now the standard of this kind of wisdom is, it seems, he who can get the most money. But so much for this. And now tell me, as to your own gains, from which of the cities whither you have travelled did you collect the largest sums? Undoubtedly it must have been from Sparta, whither you have gone the oftenest.

Hippias/ Not from thence, Socrates, by Zeus.

Socrates/ How say you? What, the least sum from thence?

Hippias/ Never anything at all.

Socrates/ It is a prodigy what you relate: and I am amazed at it, Hippias. But tell me, as to that wisdom of yours, has it

not the power to improve in virtuous excellence all your followers who are conversant with it, and will learn?

Hippias/ In the highest degree, Socrates.

Socrates/ Were you able then to improve the sons of the Inycians, yet wanted such ability with regard to the sons of Sparta?

Hippias/ Far from it.

Socrates/ The Sicilians then, I warrant, have a desire of virtuous improvement; but the Spartans not so.

Hippias/ Strongly so, Socrates, have the Spartans.

Socrates/ Was their want of money then the reason why they followed you not?

Hippias/ By no means; for of money they have plenty.

Socrates/ What account then can be given in such a case as this, when they were desirous of improvement, and in no want of money to purchase it; and you able to furnish them with the highest degrees of it; why they did not send you away loaded with riches? What; certainly the reason of it cannot be this, that the Spartans can educate their sons in a better manner than you could educate them? Or shall we say they can? and do you admit this to be true?

Hippias/ By no means in the world.

Socrates/ Were you not able then to persuade the young men at Sparta that, by the help of your conversation, they might make greater advances in virtue than ever they could hope to do from the company and converse of their fathers? Or could you not persuade those fathers that they would do better to commit the instruction of their sons to your management, than to undertake that care themselves, if they had any affectionate regard for their off-spring? For it could not be that they envied their children the attainment of the highest excellence in virtue.

Hippias/ I have no suspicion of their envying them such an attainment.

Socrates/ Well now; and Sparta is really governed by good laws.

Hippias/ Who makes a doubt of it?

Socrates/ Very well; and in cities governed by good laws the highest value is set on virtue.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And how to teach virtue to others you know best of all men.

Hippias/ By much, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now the man who knows best how to teach and impart to others the art of horsemanship, of all countries in Greece would not such a man meet with most honor, and acquire most wealth, in Thessaly, and wherever else this art was cultivated most?

Hippias/ It is probable he would.

Socrates/ And will not the man who is capable of delivering the most valuable instructions with regard to virtue, meet with most honor, and pick up most money too, if he be that way inclined, in Sparta, and every other Grecian city governed by good laws? But in Sicily, my friend, rather do you suppose, or at Inycum? Ought we, Hippias, to give credit to this? for, if you say it, we must believe.

Hippias/ The truth is, Socrates, that the Spartans hold it sacred to make no innovation in their laws; and to educate their youth in no other way than what is agreeable to their ancient usages.

Socrates/ How say you? Do the Spartans hold it sacred not to do what is right, but to do the contrary?

Hippias/ I would not say any such thing, not I, Socrates.

Socrates/ Would not they do right then to educate their sons in the better way, and not in the worse?

Hippias/ It is true they would: but the laws do not permit them to have their youth educated by foreigners, or after a foreign mode. For, be assured, if any foreigner ever acquired wealth at Sparta by teaching or instructing their youth, much more so should I; since they take great pleasure in hearing my dissertations, and give me high encomiums: but in the affair of education, the law, as I said, does not permit them the benefit of my instructions.

Socrates/ The law, Hippias, do you suppose mischievous to the public, or beneficial?

Hippias/ It is instituted, I presume, for the benefit of the public: but sometimes, where the frame of the law is bad, it proves a public mischief.

Socrates/ Well; but do not legislators always frame the law with a view of procuring for the public the greatest good? and because without law it were impossible to live in a state of order and good government.

Hippias/ Without doubt, they do.

Socrates/ When those, therefore, who undertake the making laws fail of procuring good, they have missed their end, and erred from good government and law. Or how say you otherwise?

Hippias/ Accurately speaking, Socrates, I must own the thing is so; but men, are not used to affix such a meaning to the word *law*.

Socrates/ Do you speak of men who know what law means, or of men who want that knowledge?

Hippias/ I speak of the bulk of mankind, the multitude.

Socrates/ Are these such as know the truth of things, this multitude?

Hippias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But those who have that knowledge, the wise, hold that which is more beneficial, to be in reality, and according to the truth of things, more a law to all men than what is less beneficial. Do not you agree with them in this?

Hippias/ I agree that in reality so it is.

Socrates/ Is not the nature and the condition of everything such as those hold it to be who are really knowing in the thing?

Hippias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Now to the Spartans, you say, an education under you a foreigner, and after a foreign manner, would be more beneficial than to be educated after the manner of their own country.

Hippias/ And I say what is true.

Socrates/ And that which is more beneficial is more a law. This you say likewise, Hippias.

Hippias/ I have admitted it so to be.

Socrates/ According, therefore, to your account, to have the sons of the Spartans educated under Hippias, is more agreeable to law; and their education under their fathers is more repugnant to law; supposing that from you they would receive advantages really greater.

Hippias/ And so indeed would they, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now from hence it follows, that the Spartans violate the law in not making you presents of money, and committing their sons to your care.

Hippias/ Be it so: for you seem to argue thus in my favor; and it is not my business to controvert your argument.

Socrates/ Violators of the law then, my friend, we find these Spartans, and that in the most important article too; these, who are thought to be the greatest observers of it. But,

in the name of the Gods, Hippias, of what kind are those dissertations for which they give you those high encomiums? and upon what topics do they take that great pleasure in hearing you harangue? No doubt, they must be the same in which you have so much excellent knowledge; those which relate to the stars and the phenomena of the sky.

Hippias/ They by no means endure to hear a word upon these subjects.

Socrates/ But they take pleasure in hearing a lecture upon the subject of geometry.

Hippias/ Not at all: for many of the Spartans know not even the common rules of arithmetic; nay, scarcely, I may say, how to reckon.

Socrates/ They are far from enduring then to hear you discourse on the nature of numbers and accounts.

Hippias/ Very far from that, by Zeus.

Socrates/ The subjects, then, I warrant you, are those upon which you are able to dissert, divide, and distinguish, with the greatest accuracy of all men; concerning the power of letters and syllables of harmonies and rhythms.

Hippias/ What harmonies, or what letters, my good man, do they concern themselves about?

Socrates/ Well; what are the subjects, then, upon which they attend to you; with so much pleasure to themselves, and so much commendation of you? Tell me yourself, since I cannot find it out.

Hippias/ Concerning the genealogies, O Socrates, of the heroes and of men; concerning the migration of tribes, and settling of colonies; the antiquity and first foundation of cities; in a word, concerning everything in ancient story, they hearken to me with the utmost pleasure. So that I have been obliged to study those things myself for their sakes, and to perfect myself in all that sort of knowledge.

Socrates/ By Zeus, Hippias, it was fortunate for you that the Spartans take no pleasure in hearing a man reckon up our archons from the time of Solon. For, if they did, the perfecting yourself in such a catalogue would put you to no little trouble.

Hippias/ Why so, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names repeated only once, I will undertake to remember them.

Socrates/ It is true; but I did not consider that you had an excellent memory. So now I conceive the reason why, in all probability, the Spartans are delighted with you: it is because you know such a multitude of things, and are of the same use to them that old women are to children, to entertain them with the recital of pretty fables and old stories.

Hippias/ And by Zeus, Socrates, upon a manly subject too, that of beauty in manners. For, discoursing there lately of a complete rule of manners becoming a young man, I gained much applause. And I take this opportunity to inform you, that I have a dissertation upon this subject extremely beautiful, finely framed in every respect, but particularly admirable for the choice of words. The occasion, or way of introducing my discourse, is this: —After the taking of Troy, Neoptolemus is supposed to ask advice of Nestor, and to inquire of him, what course of life a young man ought to follow in order to acquire renown and glory. Upon this Nestor speaks, and lays down a great many excellent precepts concerning the beauty of manners and a well-regulated life. This dissertation I exhibited at Sparta; and three days hence am to exhibit the same here at Athens, in the school of Phidostratus, together with several other pieces of mine worth the hearing. I do it at the request of Eudicus, the son of Apemantes. You will not fail, I hope, being present at it yourself, and bringing others with you to be of the audience, such as are capable judges of performances of this kind.

Socrates/ We shall do so, Hippias; if so it please God. But at present answer me a short question relating to your dissertation. For you have happily reminded me. You must know, my friend, that a certain person puzzled me lately in a conversation we had together—after I had been inveighing against some things for their baseness and deformity, and praising some other things for their excellence and beauty—by attacking me with these questions in a very insolent manner. —"Whence came you, Socrates, said he, to know what things are beautiful, and what are otherwise? For can you tell me, now, what the beautiful is?" I, through the meanness of my knowledge, found myself at a loss, and had nothing to answer him with any propriety. So, quitting his company, I grew angry with myself, reproached myself, and threatened that, as soon as ever I could meet with anyone of you wise men, I would hear what he had to say upon the subject, and learn and study it thoroughly; and, that, done, would return to my questioner, and battle the point with him over again. Now, therefore, as I said, you are come happily for me. Give me ample information then accordingly concerning the nature of the beautiful itself: and endeavor to be as accurate as possible in your answers to what I shall ask you; that I may not be confuted a second time, and deservedly again laughed at. For you understand the question, no doubt, perfectly well. To you such a piece of knowledge can be but a little one, amongst the multitude of those which you are master of.

Hippias/ Little enough, by Zeus, Socrates; and scarcely of any value at all.

Socrates/ The more easily then shall I learn it; and not be confuted or puzzled any more upon that point by any man.

Hippias/ Not by any man. For otherwise would my skill be mean, and nothing beyond vulgar attainment.

Socrates/ It will be a brave thing, by Hera, Hippias, to get the better of the man, as you promise me we shall. But shall I be any obstacle to the victory if I imitate his manner, and, after you have answered some question of mine, make objections to your answer; for the sake only of more thorough information from you? for I have a tolerable share of experience in the practice of making objections. If it be no difference therefore to you, I should be glad to have the part of an objector allowed me, in order to be made a better master of the subject.

Hippias/ Take the part of an objector, then: for, as I said just now, it is no very knotty point, that which you inquire about. I could teach you to answer questions much more difficult than this, in such a manner that none should ever be able to refute you.

Socrates/ O rare! what good news you tell me! But come, since you bid me yourself, I will put myself in the place of my antagonist, try to be what he is, to the best of my power, and in his person begin to question you. Now, if he were of the audience, when you exhibited that dissertation which you talk of, concerning the beauty of manners, after he had heard it through, and you had done speaking, this point rather than any other would be uppermost in his mind to question you upon, this relating to the beautiful: for he has a certain habit of so doing; and thus would he introduce it. —"Elean stranger! I would ask you, whether it is not by having honesty that honest men are honest?" Answer now, Hippias, as if he proposed the question.

Hippias/ I shall answer—It is by their having honesty.

Socrates/ Is not this some certain thing then, this honesty?

Hippias/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ And is it not likewise by their having wisdom that wise men are wise? and by having good in them that all good things are good?

Hippias/ Without dispute.

Socrates/ And are not these some certain real things? for they are not surely nonentities, by whose intimate presence with other things those things are what they are.

Hippias/ Undoubtedly, real things.

Socrates/ I ask you then, whether all things which are beautiful are not in like manner beautiful by their having beauty?

Hippias/ They are, by their having beauty.

Socrates/ Some certain real thing, this beauty.

Hippias/ A real thing. But what is to come of all this?

Socrates/ Tell me now, friend stranger, will he say, what this thing is, this beauty, or the beautiful.

Hippias/ Does not the proposer of this question desire to have it told him, what is beautiful?

Socrates/ I think not, Hippias: but to have it told him what the beautiful is.

Hippias/ How does this differ from that?

Socrates/ Do you think there is no difference between them?

Hippias/ There is not any.

Socrates/ You certainly know better. Observe, my good friend, what the question is. For he asks you, not what is beautiful, but what is the beautiful.

Hippias/ I apprehend you, honest friend. And to that question, What is the beautiful? I shall give an answer, such a one as can never be confuted. For be assured, Socrates, if the truth must be told, a beautiful maiden is the thing beautiful.

Socrates/ An excellent answer, by the dog, Hippias; and such a one as cannot fail of being applauded. Shall I then, in answering thus, have answered the question asked me? and that so well as not to be refuted?

Hippias/ How should you be refuted, Socrates, in avowing that which is the opinion of all the world; and the truth of which all who hear you will attest?

Socrates/ Be it so then, by all means. But now, Hippias, let me alone to resume the question, with your answer to it, by myself. The man will interrogate me after this manner: "Answer me, Socrates, and tell me, if there be any such thing as the beautiful itself, to whose presence is owing the beauty of all those things which you call beautiful?" Then shall I answer him thus: "A beautiful maiden is that beautiful, to whose presence those other things owe their beauty."

Hippias/ Well. And do you imagine, after this, that he will ever think of resisting you? or attempt to prove your answer concerning the thing beautiful not a just answer? or, if he should attempt it, that he would not be ridiculous?

Socrates/ That he will attempt it, friend, I am well assured: but whether in so doing he will be ridiculous, will appear in the attempt itself. However, I'll tell you what he will say.

Hippias/ Tell me then.

Socrates/ "How pleasant you are, Socrates!" he will say. "Is not a beautiful mare then a thing beautiful? commended as such even by the divine oracle," What shall we answer, Hippias? Shall we not acknowledge, that a mare is beautiful likewise? meaning a beautiful mare. For, indeed, how should we dare deny that a beautiful thing is beautiful?

Hippias/ True, Socrates. And no doubt the God rightly gave that commendation: for with us, too, there are mares exceedingly beautiful.

Socrates/ “Very well now,” will he say: “but what, is not a beautiful lyre too a thing beautiful?” Shall we allow it, Hippias?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ After this he will say, (for with tolerable certainty I can guess he will, from my knowledge of his character,) “But what think you of a beautiful soup-pan, you simpleton you? is not that a thing beautiful then?”

Hippias/ Who is this man, Socrates? I warrant, some unmannerly and ill-bred fellow, to dare to mention things so mean and contemptible, upon a subject so noble and so respectable.

Socrates/ Such is the man, Hippias; not nice and delicate; but a mean shabby fellow, without consideration or regard for aught except this, in every inquiry, —What is true? —The man, however, must have an answer: and in order to it, I thus premise—If the pan be made by a good workman, smooth and round, and well-baked; like some of our handsome soup-pans with two handles, those which hold six coas, exceedingly beautiful in truth; if he mean such a pan as these are, the pan must be confessed beautiful. For how, indeed, could we deny that to be beautiful which has real beauty?

Hippias/ By no means, Socrates.

Socrates/ “Is not a beautiful soup-pan, then,” he will say, “a thing beautiful? Answer.”

Hippias/ Well then, Socrates, my opinion of the case is this: Even this vessel, if well and handsomely made, is a beautiful thing likewise. But nothing of this kind deserves to be mentioned as beautiful, when we are speaking of a mare, and a maiden, or any other thing thus admirable for its beauty.

Socrates/ So; now I apprehend you, Hippias. When the man asks such a question as that, we are thus, it seems, to answer him: —"Honest man! are you ignorant how it was said well by Heraclitus, that the most beautiful ape, in comparison with the human-kind, is a creature far from beautiful?' Just so, the most beautiful soup-pan is a thing far from beautiful in comparison with the maiden kind; as it is said by Hippias the wise." Is it not thus, Hippias, that we must answer?

Hippias/ By all means, Socrates: your answer is perfectly right.

Socrates/ Mind me now: for upon this, I am well assured, he will say to me thus "But suppose, Socrates, the maiden kind were to be set in comparison with the Goddess kind; would not the same accident befall the maidens in that case, which happened to the soup-pans compared with them? Would not the fairest maiden appear far from being beautiful? Does not Heraclitus further teach this very doctrine, which you yourself must, needs infer to be true that, the wisest of men, compared with a God, will appear an ape in wisdom and beauty and every other excellence?" Shall we own, Hippias, the fairest maiden far from beautiful, in comparison with a Goddess?

Hippias/ Who, Socrates, would presume to call this in question?

Socrates/ No sooner then shall I have agreed with him in this, than he will laugh at me, and say, "Do you remember, Socrates, what question you was asked?"—"I do," I shall tell him; "it was this: What kind of thing was the beautiful itself?"—"When the question then," he will say, "concerned the beautiful itself, your answer was concerning that which happens to be far from beautiful, according to your own confession, as beautiful as it is"—"So it seems," shall I say?

Or what other reply, my friend, do you advise me to make him?

Hippias/ I think, for my part, you must reply in those very words. For, when he says that the human kind compared with the divine is far from beautiful, without doubt he will have the truth on his side.

Socrates/ "But were I to have asked you at first this question," will he say, 'What is beautiful, and at the same time far from beautiful?' and you were to have answered me in the manner you did; would not you in that case have answered rightly? And does the beautiful then itself, by which every other thing is ornamented, and looks beautiful, whenever this form of beauty supervenes and invests it, imparting thus the virtue of its presence, —does this still appear to you to be a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre?"

Hippias/ Truly, Socrates, if this be the question which he asks, it is the easiest thing imaginable to answer it; and to tell him what that beautiful thing is, by which other things are ornamented; and which, by supervening and inverting them, makes them look beautiful. So that he must be a very simple fellow, and entirely a stranger to things elegant and fine. For, if you only answer him thus, "that the beautiful, which he inquires after, is nothing else than gold," he will have no more to say, nor attempt ever to refute such an answer. Because none of us can be insensible that, wherever gold be applied or superinduced, let the thing have looked ever so vile and sordid before, yet then it will look beautiful, when it is invested or ornamented with gold.

Socrates/ You have no experience of the man, Hippias, how unyielding he is, and how hard in admitting any assertion.

Hippias/ What signifies that, Socrates? He must of necessity admit what is rightly asserted; or, in not admitting it, expose himself to ridicule.

Socrates/ And yet will he be so far from admitting this answer, my friend, that he will treat me with open derision, and say to me, "You that are so puffed up with the opinion of your own skill and knowledge, do you think Phidias was a bad workman?" And I believe I shall answer, that he was far from being so.

Hippias/ You will answer rightly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Rightly, without dispute. But he, when I have agreed with him that Phidias was a good workman, will say, "Do you imagine, then, that Phidias was ignorant of that which you call the beautiful?"—"To what purpose do you ask this?" I shall say. —"Because Minerva's eyes," will he reply, "Phidias made not of gold, nor yet the rest of her face; nor the feet, nor the hands neither: though she would have looked handsomest, it seems, had she been a golden Goddess: but he made these all of ivory. It is evident that he committed this error through ignorance; not knowing that gold it was which beautified all things, wherever it was applied." When he talks after this manner, what answer shall we make him, Hippias?

Hippias/ There is no difficulty at all in the matter. We shall answer, "Phidias was in the right; for things made of ivory are also, as I presume, beautiful."

Socrates/ "What was the reason, then," will he say, "why Phidias made not the pupil of the eyes out of ivory, but out of stone rather? choosing for that purpose such stone as (in color) most resembled ivory. Is a beautiful stone then a thing beautiful too?" Shall we admit it so to be, Hippias?

Hippias/ We will; in a place where the stone is becoming.

Socrates/ But, where it is unbecoming, shall I allow it to be unhandsome, or not?

Hippias/ Allow it; where the stone becomes not the place.

Socrates/ “Well now; and is it not the same with ivory and gold, you wise man you?” will he say. “Do not these, where they are becoming, make things appear handsome; but far otherwise where they are unbecoming?” Shall we deny this, or acknowledge the man to be in the right?

Hippias/ We must acknowledge this, that whatever is becoming to anything makes it appear handsome.

Socrates/ Upon this, he will say thus: “When that fine soup-pan, then, which we have been speaking of, is set upon the stove full of excellent soup, whether is a golden spoon the most becoming and proper for it, or a sycamore spoon?”

Hippias/ Hercules! what a strange sort of man, Socrates, is he whom you are talking of! Will you not tell me who he is?

Socrates/ Should I tell you his name, you would not know him.

Hippias/ But I know already that he is some ignorant silly fellow.

Socrates/ He is a very troublesome questioner indeed, Hippias. But, however, what shall we answer? Which of the two spoons shall we say is most becoming, and proper for the soup and for the pan? Is it not clearly the sycamore spoon? For this gives a better scent and flavor to the soup; and at the same time, my friend, it would not break the pan, and spill the soup, and put out the fire, and, when the guests were come prepared for feasting, rob them of an excellent dish. But all these mischiefs would be done by that golden spoon. We must, I think, therefore, answer, that the sycamore spoon is more becoming and proper in this case than the golden spoon: unless you say otherwise.

Hippias/ Well, Socrates; more becoming and proper be it then: but, for my part, I would not hold discourse with a fellow who asked such sort of questions.

Socrates/ Right, my dear friend. For it would not be becoming or proper for you to be bespattered with such vile dirty words, so finely dressed as you are from top to toe, and so illustrious for wisdom through all Greece. But for me—it is nothing to dirty myself against the man. Give me my lesson, therefore, what I am to say; and answer in my name. For the man now will say thus: "If the sycamore spoon then be more becoming and proper than the golden one, must it not be handsomer?"

Hippias/ Yes. Since the proper and becoming, Socrates, you have granted to be handsomer than the improper and unbecoming.

Socrates/ What, Hippias; and shall we grant him too, that the sycamore spoon has more beauty in it than the golden spoon?

Hippias/ Shall I tell you, Socrates, what you shall say the beautiful is, so as to prevent him from all further caviling and disputing?

Socrates/ By all means: but not before you tell me whether of the two spoons we have been talking of is the most beautiful, as well as the most proper and becoming.

Hippias/ Well then; if it pleases you, answer him, "It is that made of the sycamore tree."

Socrates/ Now say what you was just going to say. For this answer, in which I pronounce gold to be the beautiful, will be refuted; and gold will be demonstrated, I find, not to be at all more beautiful than sycamore wood. But what, say you, is the beautiful now?

Hippias/ I will tell you. For when you ask me, "What is the beautiful?" you would have me, I perceive, give you for

answer something which shall never, in any place, or to any person, appear otherwise than beautiful.

Socrates/ By all means, Hippias. And now you apprehend me perfectly well. But observe what I say: Be assured, that if any man shall be able to controvert our new answer, I shall vow never more to praise anything for its beauty. Now in the name of the Gods proceed, and tell it me without delay.

Hippias/ I say then, that always, and to every person, and in every place it will appear the most beautiful, lovely, and desirable thing in the world, to be rich, healthy, honored by his country, to arrive at a good old-age, to give his parents an honorable burial, and at length to have the last offices performed for himself honorably and magnificently by his own issue.

Socrates/ O brave! O rare! How admirable, how great, and how worthy of yourself, Hippias, is the speech you have now spoken! By Hera, I receive with much pleasure that hearty willingness of yours to give me all the assistance in your power. But we reach not the point yet. For now will the man laugh at us more than ever, you may be assured.

Hippias/ An ill-timed laugh, Socrates. For in laughing, when he has nothing to object, he will in reality laugh only at himself; and be the ridicule of all who happen to be present.

Socrates/ Perhaps so. But perhaps, also, as soon as I have thus answered, I shall be in danger, if I prophesy aright, of something besides the being laught at.

Hippias/ What besides?

Socrates/ That, if he happens to have a cane in his hand, unless I run away and escape him, he will aim some very serious strokes at me.

Hippias/ How say you? What, is the man some master of yours then? for, otherwise, would he not be punished for the

injury done you? Or, is there no justice in your city? but the citizens are permitted to assault and beat one another injuriously.

Socrates/ By no means are they permitted to do any such thing.

Hippias/ Will he not, therefore, be condemned to punishment, as having beaten you injuriously?

Socrates/ I should think he would not, Hippias; not having beaten me injuriously if I had made him such an answer; but very deservedly, as it seems to me.

Hippias/ It seems so then to me, Socrates; if you are of that opinion yourself.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you, why, in my own opinion, I should have deserved a beating, if I had so answered? —Will you condemn me too without trying the cause? or will you hear what I have to say?

Hippias/ It would be a hard case indeed, Socrates, should I deny you a hearing. But what have you to say then?

Socrates/ I will tell you; but in the same way as I talked with you just now, assuming his character, whilst you personate me. I shall do this, to avoid treating you in your own person with such language as he will use in reprimanding me, with harsh and out of the way terms. For I assure you that he will say thus: —"Tell me, Socrates; think you not that you deserve a beating, for having sung that pompous strain, so foreign to the design of the music; spoiling thus the harmony, and wandering wide of the point proposed to you?"—"How so?" I shall ask him. —"How?" he will reply: "can you not remember that I asked you concerning the beautiful itself, that which makes everything beautiful, wherever it comes and imparts the virtue of its presence; whether it communicates it to stone or wood, to man or God, to actions and manners, or to any part of

science. Beauty itself, man, I ask you what it is: and I can no more beat into your head what I say, than if you were a stone lying by my side, nay a mill-stone too, without ears or brains." Now, Hippias, would not you be angry with me, if I, frightened with this reprimand, should say to him thus: — "Why, Hippias said, this was the beautiful; and I asked him, just as you ask me, what was beautiful to all persons, and at all times."—What say you? will you not be angry if I tell him thus?

Hippias/ That which I described, Socrates, is beautiful, I am very positive, in the eyes of all men.

Socrates/ "And always will it be so?" he will say: "for the beautiful itself must be always beautiful."

Hippias/ To be sure.

Socrates/ "And always was it so in former times?" he will say.

Hippias/ It always was so.

Socrates/ "What? and to Achilles too," he will say, "did the Elean stranger affirm it was a beautiful and desirable thing to survive his progenitors? and that it was the same to his grandfather Æacus, and the rest of those who were the progeny of the Gods? nay, that it was so even to the Gods themselves?"

Hippias/ What a fellow is this! Away with him! Such questions as these are profane, and improper to be asked.

Socrates/ But is it not much more profane for any man, when these questions are asked him, to answer in the affirmative, and to maintain such propositions?

Hippias/ Perhaps it is.

Socrates/ "Perhaps then you are this man," will he say, "who affirm it to be a thing always, and to every person, beautiful and desirable, to be buried by his descendants,

and to bury his parents. Was not Hercules one of these very persons? and those whom we just now mentioned, are not they also to be included in the number?"

Hippias/ But I did not affirm it was so to the Gods.

Socrates/ Nor to the heroes, I presume.

Hippias/ Not to such as were children of the Gods.

Socrates/ But to such only as were not so.

Hippias/ Right.

Socrates/ Amongst the number of heroes then, it seems, according to your account, to Tantalus, and Dardanus, and Zethus, it would have been a sad thing, a horrible profanation of deity, to suppose it, and a fatal blow to their own honor; but to Pelops, and others born of men like him, it was a glorious thing, beautiful and desirable.

Hippias/ So I think it to be.

Socrates/ "You think this then to be true, the contrary of which you maintained just now," will he say, "that to survive their ancestors, and to be buried by their descendants, is, in some cases, and to some persons, a dishonorable and a horrible thing: nay more, it seems not possible that such a thing should be, or ever become, beautiful and desirable to all. So that this which you now hold to be the beautiful, happens to be in the same case with those your former favorites, the maiden and the gold; sometimes it is beautiful, and sometimes otherwise: but a circumstance still more ridiculous attends this; it is beautiful only to some persons, whilst to others it is quite the contrary. And not yet," will he say, "not all this day long, are you able, Socrates, to answer the question which you were asked, —What the beautiful is" In terms such as these will he reproach me justly, should I answer him as you directed me. Much after the manner, Hippias, which I have now represented to you, proceed the conversations usually held between the man and me. But

now and then, as if in pity to my ignorance and want of learning, he proposes to me himself some particular matter of inquiry; and asks me whether I think such or such a thing to be the beautiful; or whatever else be the general subject of the question which he has been pleased to put to me, of upon which the conversation happens at that time to turn.

Hippias/ How mean you, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will explain my meaning to you by an instance in the present subject. —"Friend Socrates," says he, "let us have done with disputing in this way: give me no more answers of this sort; for they are very silly, and easily confuted. But consider now, whether the beautiful be something of this kind; such as in our dispute just now we touched upon, when we said that gold, where it was proper and becoming, was beautiful; but otherwise, where it was improper and unbecoming: and that the beauty of all other things depended on the same principle; that is, they were beautiful only where they were becoming. Now this very thing, the proper and becoming, essential propriety and decorum itself, see whether this may not happen to be the beautiful." Now, for my part, I am used to give my assent, in such matters, to everything proposed to me. For I find in myself nothing to object. But what think you of it? are you of opinion that the becoming is the beautiful?

Hippias/ Entirely am I, Socrates, of that opinion.

Socrates/ Let us consider it, however; for fear we should be guilty of some mistake in this point.

Hippias/ I agree we ought so to do.

Socrates/ Observe then. That which we call the becoming, is it not either something whose presence, wherever it comes, gives all things a beautiful appearance; or something which gives them the reality of beauty; or something which

bestows both, and causes them not only to appear beautiful, but really so to be?

Hippias/ I think it must be one or other of these.

Socrates/ Whether of these then is the becoming? Is it that which only gives a beautiful appearance? as a man whose body is of a deformed make, when he has put on clothes or shoes which fit him, looks handsomer than he really is Now, if the becoming causes everything to look handsomer than it really is, the becoming must then be a kind of fraud or imposition with regard to beauty, and cannot be that which we are in search of, Hippias. For we were inquiring what that was by which all beautiful things are beautiful. As, if we were asked what that was, by which all great things are great, we should answer, "it was by surpassing other things of the same kind." For thus it is, that all things are great: and though they may not all appear great to us, yet, in as much as they surpass others, great of necessity they must be. So is it, we say, with the beautiful; it must be something by which things are beautiful, whether they appear to be so or not. Now this cannot be the becoming: for the becoming causes things to appear more beautiful than they really are, according to your account of it; concealing the truth of things, and not suffering this ever to appear. But that which causes them to be really beautiful, as I just now said, whether they appear to be to or not, this it is our business to find out, and declare the nature of it: for this it is which is the subject of our search, if we are searching for the beautiful.

Hippias/ But the becoming, Socrates, causes things both to be, and to appear beautiful, by virtue of its presence.

Socrates/ If so, then it is impossible for things really beautiful to appear otherwise; inasmuch as there is present with them the cause of beautiful appearance.

Hippias/ Admit it impossible.

Socrates/ Shall we admit this then, Hippias, that all laws, and rules of action, manners, or behavior, truly beautiful, are beautiful in common estimation, and appear so always to all men? Or shall we not rather say quite the reverse, that men are ignorant of their beauty, and that above all things these are the subjects of controversy and contention, not only private but public, not only between man and man, but between different communities and civil states?

Hippias/ Thus indeed rather, Socrates, that in those points men are ignorant of the beautiful.

Socrates/ But this would not be the case if those beautiful things had the appearance of beauty, added to the reality: and this appearance would they have, if the becoming were the beautiful, and caused things, as you say it does, both to be and to appear beautiful, bestowing on them real and apparent beauty at the same time. Hence it follows, that if the becoming should be that by which things are made truly beautiful, then the becoming must be the beautiful which we are in search of, not that by which things are only made beautiful in appearance. But if the becoming should be that by which things are made beautiful only in appearance, it cannot be the beautiful which we are in search of; for this bestows the reality of beauty. Nor is it in the power of the same thing to cause the appearance and the reality, both, not only in the case of beauty, but neither in any other instance whatever. Let us choose now, whether of these two we shall take for the becoming, that which causes the appearance of beauty, or that which causes the reality.

Hippias/ The becoming, Socrates, I take it, must be that which causes the appearance.

Socrates/ Fie upon it, Hippias! Our discovery of the beautiful is fled away, and hath escaped us. For the

becoming has turned out to be a thing different from the beautiful.

Hippias/ So it seems; and very unaccountably too.

Socrates/ But however, my friend, we must not give it up for lost. I have still some hope left, that the nature of the beautiful may come forth into light, and show itself.

Hippias/ With great clearness, Socrates, beyond doubt: For it is by no means difficult to find. I am positive that, if I were to go aside for a little while, and consider by myself, I should describe it to you with an accuracy beyond that of anything ever so accurate.

Socrates/ Ah! talk not, Hippias, in so high a tone. You see what trouble it has given us already; and I fear lest it should grow angry with us, and run away still further than before. But I talk idly: for you, I presume, will easily find it out, when you come to be alone. Yet, in the name of the Gods, I conjure you, make the discovery while I am with you: and, if it be agreeable to you, admit me, as you did before, your companion in the search. If we find it together, it will be best of all: and, if we miss it in this way of joint inquiry, I shall be contented, I hope, with my disappointment, and you will depart and find better success without any difficulty. Besides, if we now find it, I shall not, you know, be troublesome afterwards, teasing you to tell me what was the event of that inquiry by yourself, and what was the great discovery which you had made. Now therefore consider, if you think this to be the beautiful. I say then, that it is. But pray observe, and give me all your attention, for fear I should say anything foolish, or foreign to the purpose. Let this then be in our account the beautiful, that which is useful. I was induced to think it might be so by these considerations. Beautiful, we say, are eyes; not those which look as if they had not the faculty of sight; but such as appear to have that

faculty strong, and to be useful for the purpose of seeing. Do we not?

Hippias/ We do.

Socrates/ And the whole body also, do we not call it beautiful with a view to its utility; one for the race, another for wrestling? So further, through all the animal kind, as a beautiful horse, cock, and quail: in the same manner all sorts of domestic utensils, and all the conveniencies for carriage abroad, be they land vehicles, or ships and barges for the sea; instruments of music likewise, with the tools and instruments subservient to the other arts: to these you may please to add moral rules and laws. Everything almost of any of these kinds we call beautiful upon the same account; respecting the end for which it was born, or framed, or instituted. In whatever way it be useful, to whatever purpose, and upon whatever occasion; agreeably to these circumstances we pronounce it beautiful. But that which is in every respect useless, we declare totally void of beauty. Are not you of this opinion, Hippias?

Hippias/ I am.

Socrates/ We are right, therefore, now in saying, that above all things the useful proves to be the beautiful.

Hippias/ Most certainly right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now that which is able to operate or effect anything, is it not useful so far as it has power, and is able? But that which is powerless and unable, is it not useless?

Hippias/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Power then is beautiful, and want of power is the contrary.

Hippias/ Quite right. And many things there are, Socrates, which evince the truth of this conclusion: but particularly it holds good in politics. For the having ability in public affairs, and power in the state of which we are

members, is of all things the most beautiful: and want of such power, with a total defect of any such ability, has of all things the meanest aspect.

Socrates/ You say well. In the name of the Gods then, Hippias, does it not follow from all this, that skill and knowledge are of all things the most beautiful, and want of them the contrary?

Hippias/ Ay, what think you of this, Socrates?

Socrates/ Softly, my dear friend: for I am under some fears about the rectitude of our present conclusions.

Hippias/ What are you afraid of, Socrates? For the business of our inquiry is now in a fair way, and goes on as we could wish.

Socrates/ I would it were so. But let you and I consider together upon this point. Could any man execute a work, of which he has neither knowledge nor any other kind of abilities for the performance?

Hippias/ By no means. For how should a man do that, for the doing of which he has no abilities?

Socrates/ Those people then who do wrong, and who err in the execution of anything, without erroneous or wrong intention, would they ever have done or executed things wrong, had they not been able to do or execute them in that manner?

Hippias/ Clearly they would not.

Socrates/ But the able are able through their abilities: For it is not inability which any way enables them.

Hippias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And all who do anything are able to do what they do.

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ And all men do many more wrong things than right; and commit errors from their infancy, without intending to do wrong, or to err.

Hippias/ The fact is so.

Socrates/ Well then: those abilities, and those means or instruments, which help and are useful in the doing or executing anything wrong, whether man we say they are beautiful? or are they not rather far from being so?

Hippias/ Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.

Socrates/ The able and useful, therefore, Hippias, in our opinion, it seems, no longer is the beautiful.

Hippias/ Still it is so, Socrates, if it has power to do what is right, or is useful to a good purpose.

Socrates/ That account is then rejected, that the able and useful simply and absolutely is the beautiful. But the thought, Hippias, which our mind labored with, and wanted to express, was this, that the useful and able for the producing of any good, that is the beautiful.

Hippias/ This indeed seems to be the case.

Socrates/ But the thing thus described is the profitable. Is it not?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ From hence then is derived the beauty of bodies, the beauty of moral precepts, of knowledge and wisdom, and of all those things just now enumerated; they are beautiful, because profitable.

Hippias/ Evidently so.

Socrates/ The profitable, therefore, Hippias, should seem to be our beautiful.

Hippias/ Beyond all doubt, Socrates.

Socrates/ But the profitable is that which effects or produces good.

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ And the efficient is no other thing than the cause. Is it?

Hippias/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ The cause of good, therefore, is the beautiful.

Hippias/ Right.

Socrates/ Now the cause, Hippias, is a thing different from that which it causes. For the cause can by no means be the cause of itself. Consider it thus: Did not the cause appear to be the efficient?

Hippias/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And by the efficient no other thing is effected than that which is produced or generated; but this is not the efficient itself.

Hippias/ You are in the right.

Socrates/ Is not that then which is produced or generated one thing, and the efficient a thing different?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ The cause, therefore, is not the cause of itself; but of that which is generated or produced by it.

Hippias/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ If the beautiful be then the cause of good, good itself must: be produced or generated by the beautiful. And for this reason, it should seem, we cultivate and study prudence, and every other fair virtue, because their production and their issue are well worth our study and our care, as being good itself. Thus are we likely to find from our inquiries, that the beautiful, as it stands related to good, has the nature of a kind of father.

Hippias/ The very case, Socrates. You are perfectly right in what you say.

Socrates/ Am I not right also in this, that neither is the father the son, nor is the son the father?

Hippias/ Right in that also.

Socrates/ Nor is the cause the production, nor the production, on the other hand, the cause.

Hippias/ Very right.

Socrates/ By Zeus then, my friend, neither is the beautiful good, nor is the good beautiful. Do you think it is possible it should be so? Is it consistent with what we have said, and are agreed in?

Hippias/ By Zeus, I think not.

Socrates/ Would this opinion please us then, and should we choose to abide by it, that the beautiful is not good, nor the good beautiful?

Hippias/ By Zeus, no; it would not please me at all.

Socrates/ Well said, by Zeus, Hippias: and me it pleases the least of any of those descriptions or accounts which we have hitherto given of the beautiful.

Hippias/ So I perceive.

Socrates/ That definition of it, therefore, which we thought just now the most excellent of all, that the profitable, the useful and able to produce some good or other, was that beautiful, is in danger of losing all its credit with us; and of appearing, if possible, more ridiculous than our former accounts of it, where we reckoned the maiden to be the beautiful, or any other particular whose defect we have before discovered.

Hippias/ It seems so, indeed.

Socrates/ And for my own part, Hippias, I see no way where to turn myself any more, but am absolutely at a loss. Have you anything to say?

Hippias/ Not at present. But, as I said just now, after a little considering I am certain I shall find it out.

Socrates/ But I fear, so extreme is my desire of knowing it, that I shall not be able to wait your time. Besides, I have just met with, as I imagine, a fair kind of opening to the discovery. For consider that which gives us delight and joy, (I speak not of all kinds of pleasure, but of that only which arises in us through the hearing and the sight,) whether we should not call this the beautiful. And how, indeed, could we dispute it? seeing that it is the beautiful of our own species, Hippias, with the sight of whom we are so delighted: that we take pleasure in viewing all beautiful works of the loom or needle; and whatever is well painted, carved, or molded it is the same with the hearing: for well-measured sounds and all musical harmony, the beauties of prosaic composition also, with pretty fables and well-framed stories, have the like effect upon us, to be agreeable, to be delightful, and to charm. Were we to give, therefore, that petulant and saucy fellow this answer—"Noble sir, the beautiful is that which gives us pleasure through the hearing, and through the sight." do you think we should not restrain his insolence?

Hippias/ For my part, Socrates, I think the nature of the beautiful now truly well explained.

Socrates/ But what shall we say of the beauty of manners, and of laws, Hippias? Shall we say it gives us pleasure through the hearing, or through the sight? or is it to be ranked under some other kind?

Hippias/ Perhaps the man may not think of this.

Socrates/ By the Dog, Hippias, but that man would, of whom I stand in awe the most of all men; and before whom I should be most ashamed if I trifled, and pretended to utter something of great importance, when in reality I talked idly, and spoke nothing to the purpose.

Hippias/ Who is he?

Socrates/ Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus; who would no more suffer me to throw out such random speeches, or so readily decide on points which I had not thoroughly sifted, than he would allow me to talk of things which I am ignorant of, as if I knew them.

Hippias/ Why, really, I must own, that to me myself, since you have started the observation, the beauty of laws seems referable to another kind.

Socrates/ Softly, Hippias. For, though we have fallen into fresh difficulties, equal to our former ones, about the nature of the beautiful, we are in a fair way, I think, of extricating ourselves out of them.

Hippias/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you how the matter appears to me: whether or not there be anything material in what I say, you will consider. The beauty then of Laws and of manners, I imagine, may possibly be found not altogether abstracted from that kind of sensation which arises in the soul through the senses of hearing and of sight. But let us abide awhile by this definition, that "what gives us pleasure through these senses is the beautiful," without bringing the beauty of laws the least into question. Suppose then, that either the man of whom I am speaking, or any other, should interrogate us after this manner: "For what reason, Hippias and Socrates, have you separated from the pleasant in general that species of it in which you say consists the beautiful; denying the character of beautiful to those species of pleasure which belong to the other senses, to the pleasures of taste, the joys of Venus, and all others of the same class? Do you refuse them the character of pleasant also, and maintain that no pleasure neither is to be found in these sensations, or in

anything beside seeing and hearing?" Now, Hippias, what shall we say to this?

Hippias/ By all means, Socrates, we must allow pleasure to be found also in these sensations; a pleasure very exquisite.

Socrates/ "Since these sensations then afford pleasure," will he say, "no less than those others, why do you deprive them of the name of beautiful, and rob them of their proper share of beauty:" "Because there is no one who would not laugh at us," we shall answer, "were we to call eating a beautiful thing, instead of a pleasant; or the smelling sweet odors, were we to say, not that it was pleasant, but that it was beautiful. Above all, in amorous enjoyments, all the world would contend, there was the highest degree of the sweet and pleasant; but that whoever was engaged in them should take care not to be seen, the act of love being far from agreeable to the sight, or beautiful." Now, Hippias, when we have thus answered, he may reply, perhaps, in this manner: —"I apprehend perfectly well the reason why you have always been ashamed to call these pleasures beautiful; it is because they seem not so to men. But the question which I asked you was not, What seemed beautiful to the multitude; but, What was so in reality." Then shall we answer, I presume, only by repeating our last hypothesis, that "we ourselves give the name of beautiful to that part only of the pleasant which arises in us by means of our sight and hearing." But have you anything to say which may be of service to our argument? Shall we answer aught besides, Hippias?

Hippias/ To what he has said, Socrates, it is unnecessary to make any further answer.

Socrates/ "Very well now," will he say. "If the pleasant then, arising through the sight and hearing, be the beautiful,

whatever portion of the pleasant happens not to be this, it is clear it cannot be the beautiful." Shall we admit this?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ "Is that portion of the pleasant then," he will say, "which arises through the sight, the same with that which arises through the sight and hearing? Or is that which arises through the hearing, the same with that which arises through the hearing and the sight?" "That which arises in us through either of those senses alone, and not through the other," we shall answer, "is by no means the same with that which arises through them both. For this seems to be the import of your question. But our meaning was, that each of these species of the pleasant was, by itself separately, the beautiful; and that they were also, both of them together, the same beautiful." Should we not answer so?

Hippias/ By all means.

Socrates/ "Does any species of the pleasant then," he will say, "differ from any other, whatever it be, so far as it is pleasant? Observe; I ask you not if one pleasure is greater or less than another, or whether it is more or less a pleasure: but whether there is any difference between the pleasures in this respect, that one of them is pleasure, the other not pleasure." In our opinion there is no difference between them, of this kind. Is there any?

Hippias/ I agree with you, there is not any.

Socrates/ "For some other reason, therefore," he will say it is, "than because they are pleasures, that you have selected these species of pleasure from the rest, and given them the preference. You have discerned that there is something or other in them by which they differ from the rest; with a view to which difference you distinguish them by the epithet of beautiful. Now the pleasure which arises in us through the sense of seeing, derives not its beauty from

anything peculiarly belonging to that sense. For, if this were the cause of its being beautiful, that other pleasure which arises through the hearing never would be beautiful, as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of seeing." "You are in the right," shall we say?

Hippias/ We will.

Socrates/ "So neither, on the other hand, does the pleasure produced in us through the sense of hearing derive its beauty from any circumstance which peculiarly attends the hearing. For, in that case, the pleasure produced through seeing would not be beautiful, as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of hearing." Shall we allow, Hippias, that the man is in the right when he says this?

Hippias/ Allow it.

Socrates/ "But both these pleasures now are beautiful, you say." For so we say: do we not?

Hippias/ We do.

Socrates/ "There is something in them, therefore, the same In both, to which they owe their beauty, a beauty common to them both. There is something, I say, which they have belonging to them both in common, and also in particular to each. For otherwise they would not, both and each of them, be beautiful." Answer now, as if you were speaking to him.

Hippias/ I answer then, that, in my opinion, you give a true account of the matter.

Socrates/ Should there be any circumstance, therefore, attending on both these pleasures of the sight and hearing taken together; yet if the same circumstance attend not on each taken separately; or should any attend on each separately, yet not on both together; they cannot derive their beauty from this circumstance.

Hippias/ How is it possible, Socrates, that any circumstance whatever, which attends on neither of them, should ever attend on both?

Socrates/ Do you think this impossible?

Hippias/ I must be quite ignorant, I own, in things of this sort; as I am quite unused to such kind of disputes.

Socrates/ You jest, Hippias. But I am in danger, perhaps, of fancying that I see something, so circumstanced, as you aver to be impossible.

Hippias/ You are in no danger of any such fancy, Socrates; but are pleased to look asquint purposely: that is all.

Socrates/ Many things, I assure you, of that kind appear to me very evident. But I give no credit to them; because they are not evident to you, who have raised a larger fortune than any man living, by the profession of philosophy; and because they appear only to me, who have never in that way earned a farthing. I have some suspicion, however, that possibly you are not in earnest with me, but design to impose upon me: so many things of that kind do I perceive so plainly.

Hippias/ No one will know better than yourself, Socrates, whether I am in earnest with you or not, if you will but begin and tell me, what those things are which you perceive so plainly. You will soon see that you talk idly. For you will never find a circumstance attending us both together, which attends separately neither you nor me.

Socrates/ How say you, Hippias? But perhaps you have reason on your side, and I may not apprehend it. Let me, therefore, explain to you my meaning more distinctly. To me then it appears, that some circumstance of being, which attends not my individual person, nor yours, something which belongs neither to me, nor to you, may yet possibly belong to both of us, and attend both our persons taken

together: and, on the other hand, that certain circumstances of being, not attending us both taken together, may attend each of our separate and single persons.

Hippias/ You tell me of prodigies still greater, I think, now, Socrates, than those which you told me of just before. For consider: if both of us are honest, man, must not each of us be honest? or, supposing each of us dishonest, must we not both be so? If both are sound and well, is not each also? Or, should each of us now be tired of anything, or come off ill in some combat between us, or be amazed and confounded, or be affected any other way, would not both of us be in the same plight? To go further; in case that we had, both of us, images of ourselves made of gold, or silver, or ivory; or that both of us, if you will give me leave to say it, were generous, or wise, or honorable; did both of us happen to be old or young; or to be possessed of any other human quality; or to be in any condition whatever incident to human life; must not each of us be, of absolute necessity, that very same kind of man, and in those very same circumstances?

Socrates/ Beyond all doubt.

Hippias/ But you, Socrates, with your companions and fellow disputants; consider not things universally, or in the whole. Thus you take the beautiful and chop it into pieces: and everything in nature, which happens to be the subject of your discourse, you serve in the same manner, splitting and dividing it. Hence you are unacquainted with the greatness of things, with bodies of infinite magnitude, through the natural continuity of being. And now so much are you a stranger to the vastness of this view of the universe, as to imagine that anything, whether being or circumstance of being, can possibly belong to both those pleasures which we are speaking of, taken together, yet not belong to each of them; or, on the other hand, may belong to

each, without belonging to both. So void of thought and consideration, so simple, and so narrow-minded are you and your companions.

Socrates/ Such is the lot of our condition, Hippias. It is not what a man will, says the common proverb, but what he can. However, you are always kind in assisting us with your instructions. For but just now, before you had taught me better, how simple my mind was, and how narrow my way of thinking, I shall give you still a plainer proof, by telling you what were my thoughts upon the present subject: —if you will give me leave.

Hippias/ You will tell them to one who knows them already, Socrates. For I am well acquainted with the different ways of thinking, and know the minds of all who philosophize. Notwithstanding, if it will give pleasure to yourself, you may tell me.

Socrates/ To me, I confess, it will. You must know then, my friend, that I was so foolish, till I had received from you better information, as to imagine of myself and you, that each of us was one person; and that this, which each of us was, both of us were not, as not being one, but two persons. —Such a simpleton was I! —But from you have I now learnt, that if both of us are two persons, each of us also by necessity is two; and that, if each of us be but one, it follows by the same necessity, that both of us are no more. For, by reason of the continuity of being, according to Hippias, it is impossible it should be otherwise; each of us being of necessity whatever both of us are, and both whatever each. And now, persuaded by you to believe these things, here I sit me down and rest contented. But first inform me, Hippias, whether we are one person, you and I together; or whether you are two persons, and I two persons.

Hippias/ What mean you, Socrates?

Socrates/ The very thing which I say. For I am afraid of entering with you into a further discussion of the subject, because you fall into a passion with me, whenever you say anything which you take to be important. To venture for once, however; tell me—Is not each of us one? and is not the being one a circumstance attendant upon our being?

Hippias/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ If each of us then be one, each of us must be also odd. Or think you that one is not an odd number?

Hippias/ I think it is.

Socrates/ Are we odd both together then, notwithstanding that we are two?

Hippias/ That is absurd, Socrates.

Socrates/ But both together, we are even. Is it not so?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now, because both of us together we are even, does it follow from thence that each of us singly too is even?

Hippias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ There is not, therefore, such an absolute necessity, as you said just now there was, that, whatever both of us were, each should be the same; and that, whatever each of us was, the same must we be both.

Hippias/ Not in such cases as these, I acknowledge; but still it holds true in such as I enumerated before.

Socrates/ That suffices, Hippias. I am contented with this acknowledgment, that it appears to be so in some cases, but in others otherwise. For, if you remember from whence the present dispute arose, I said, that the pleasures of sight and hearing could not derive their beauty from any circumstance which attended on each, yet not on both; neither from any which attended on both, yet not on each: but that the beauty of them was derived from something which they had

belonging to both of them in common, and in particular to each. And this I said, because you had admitted the beauty of them both together, and of each separately. From which I drew this consequence, that they were indebted for their beauty to some being, whose presence still followed and attended on them both; and not to such as fell short of either. And I continue still in the same mind. But answer me as if we were now beginning this last inquiry afresh. Pleasure through the sight and pleasure through the hearing, then, being supposed beautiful, both of them and each; tell me, does not the cause of their beauty follow and attend on both of them taken together, and upon each also considered separate?

Hippias/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Is it then because they are pleasures, both and each of them, that they are beautiful? Or, if this were the cause, would not the pleasures of the other senses be beautiful, as well as these? For it appeared that they were pleasures as well as these: —if you remember.

Hippias/ I remember it well.

Socrates/ But because these pleasures arise in us through sight and hearing, this we assigned for the cause of their being beautiful.

Hippias/ It was so determined.

Socrates/ Observe now, whether I am right or not: for, as well as I can remember, we agreed that the pleasant was the beautiful; not the pleasant in general, but those species of it only which are produced through sight and hearing.

Hippias/ It is true.

Socrates/ Does not this circumstance then attend on both these pleasures taken together? and is it not wanting to each of them alone? For by no means is either of them alone, as was said before, produced through both those

senses. Both of them are indeed through both, but not so is each. Is this true?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ They are not beautiful, therefore, either of them, from any circumstance which attends on either by itself. For we cannot argue from either to both; nor, from what each is separately, infer what they both are jointly. So that we may assert the joint beauty of both these pleasures, according to our present hypothesis of the beautiful: but this hypothesis will not support us in asserting any beauty separate in either. Or how say we? Is it not of necessity so?

Hippias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Say we then that both are beautiful, but deny that each is so?

Hippias/ What reason is there to the contrary?

Socrates/ This reason, my friend, as it seems to me; because we had supposed certain circumstances attendant upon things with this condition, that, if they appertained to any two things, both together, they appertained at the same time to each; and, if they appertained to each, that they appertained also to both. Of this kind are all such circumstances and attendants of things as were enumerated by you. Are they not?

Hippias/ They are.

Socrates/ But such circumstances or appendages of being, as those related by me, are otherwise: and of this kind are the being each, and the being both. Have not I stated the case rightly?

Hippias/ You have.

Socrates/ Under which kind then, Hippias, do you rank the beautiful? Do you rank it among those mentioned by yourself? as when you inferred that if I was well and hearty,

and you well and hearty, then both of us were well and hearty: or, if I was honest and you honest, then both of us were honest: or, if we both were so, it followed that so was each of us. Does the same kind of inference hold true in this case? If I am beautiful, and you are beautiful, then both of us are beautiful; and if both of us, then each. Or is there no reason why it should not here be as it is in numbers? two of which, taken together, may be even; though each separately is perhaps odd, perhaps even: or, as it is in magnitudes; where two of them, though each is incommensurable with some third, yet both together may perhaps be commensurable with it, perhaps incommensurable. A thousand such other things there are, which I perceived, as I said, with great clearness. Now, to whether of these two orders of being do you refer the beautiful? Does the proper rank of it appear as evident to you as it does to me? For to me it appears highly absurd, to suppose both of us beautiful, yet each of us not so; or each of us beautiful, yet not so both; no less absurd, than it is to suppose the same kind of difference between the natures of both and each In any of the cases put by you. Do you agree with me then in ranking the beautiful among these, or do you refer it to the opposite class of things?

Hippias/ I entirely agree with you, Socrates.

Socrates/ You do well, Hippias: because we shall thus be freed from any further inquiry upon this article. For, if the beautiful be in that class of things where we agree to place it, the pleasant then, which arises in us through sight and hearing, can no longer be supposed the beautiful. Because that which comes through both those senses jointly, may make the pleasures which arise from thence beautiful indeed both taken together; but cannot, make either of them so, considered as separate from the other. But that the beautiful should have such an effect, or communicate itself

in this manner, is absurd to suppose; as you and I have agreed, Hippias.

Hippias/ We agreed it was so, I own.

Socrates/ It is impossible, therefore, that the pleasant, arising in us through sight and hearing, should be the beautiful; because from this hypothesis an absurdity would follow.

Hippias/ You have reason on your side.

Socrates/ "Begin again then, and tell me," will he say, "for you have missed it now, what is that beautiful, the associate of both these pleasures, for the sake of which you give them the preference to all others, by honoring them with the name of beautiful?" It appears to me, Hippias, necessary for us to answer thus; that "these are of all pleasures the most innocent and good, as well both of them taken together, as each taken singly." Or can you tell me of airy circumstance beside, in which they differ from other pleasures?

Hippias/ I know of none beside: for they are indeed the best of all.

Socrates/ "This then," he will say, "do you now maintain to be the beautiful, pleasure profitable?"—"It is so in my opinion," I shall answer. —What answer would you make?

Hippias/ The same.

Socrates/ "Well then," will he say: "the profitable, you know, is that which is the efficient of good. And the efficient, as we agreed lately, is a thing different from the effect. Our reasoning, therefore, has brought us round to the same point again: for thus neither would the good be beautiful, nor would the beautiful be good; each of these being, upon this hypothesis, different from the other. "Most evidently so is the answer we must make, Hippias, if we are of sound mind. For the sacredness of truth will never suffer us to oppose the man who has truth with him on his side.

Hippias/ But now, Socrates, what think you all these matters are which we have been disputing about? They are the shreds and tatters of an argument, cut and torn, as I said before, into a thousand pieces. But the thing which is beautiful, as well as highly valuable, is this: to be able to exhibit a fine speech, in a becoming and handsome manner, before the council, or court of justice, or any other assembly or person in authority, to whom the speech is addressed; such a speech as hath the power of persuasion; and having ended to depart, not with mean and insignificant trophies of victory, but with a prize the noblest, the preservation of ourselves, our fortunes, and our friends. This you ought to be ambitious of, and bid adieu to such petty, and paltry disputes; or you will appear as if you had quite lost your senses, playing with straws and trifles, as you have been now doing.

Socrates/ O friend Hippias! you are happy that you know what course of life it is best for a man to follow, and have followed it, according to your own account, so successfully yourself. But I seem fated to be under the power of a dæmoniacal nature, who keeps me wandering continually in search of truth, and still at a loss where to find it. And whenever I say my difficulties and perplexities before you wise men, I meet with no other answer from you than contumely and reproach. For you all tell me the same thing which you tell me now, "That I busy myself about silly, minute, and insignificant matters." On the other hand, when, upon giving credit to what you all tell me, I say, as you do, "That to be able to exhibit a fine speech in a court of justice, or any other assembly, and to go through it in a proper and handsome manner, is the finest thing in the world; and that no employment is so beautiful, or so well becomes a man; I then meet with censure and obloquy from some who are here present, but especially from that man

who is always reproving me. For he is my nearest of kin, and lives with me in the same house. So, whenever I return home, and am entered in, as soon as he hears me talking in this strain, he asks me if I am not ashamed to pronounce, with so much confidence, what professions and employments are fine, or beautiful, or becoming; when I have plainly shown myself so ignorant with regard to things beautiful, as not to know wherein the nature of beauty consists. —"And how can you judge," says he, "who has spoken a beautiful or fine speech, or done anything else in a handsome manner, and who not, ignorant as you are what the beautiful and handsome is? Such then being the disposition of your mind, is it possible that you can think life more eligible to you than death?" Thus have I had the ill fortune, as I told you, to suffer obloquy and reproach from you, to suffer obloquy also and reproach from him. But, perhaps, it is necessary to endure all this. If I have received benefit or improvement from it, there is no harm done. And I seem to myself, Hippias, improved and benefited by the conversation of you both. For the meaning of the proverb, "Things of beauty are things of difficulty," if I am not mistaken in myself, I know.

THE END OF THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

Greater Hippias

Translated by Paul Woodruff.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and Hippias.

Socrates/ Here comes Hippias, fine and wise! How long it's been since you put in to Athens!

Hippias/ No spare time, Socrates. Whenever Elis has business to work out with another city, they always come first to me when they choose an ambassador. They think I'm the citizen best able to judge and report messages from the various cities. I've often been on missions to other cities, but most often and on the most and greatest affairs to Sparta. That, to answer your question, is why I don't exactly haunt these parts.

Socrates/ That is what it is like to be truly wise, Hippias, a man of complete accomplishments: in private you are able to make a lot of money from young people (and to give still greater benefits to those from whom you take it); while in public you are able to provide your own city with good service (as is proper for one who expects not to be despised, but admired by ordinary people).

But Hippias, how in the world do you explain this: in the old days people who are still famous for wisdom—Pittacus and Bias and the school of Thales of Miletus, and later ones down to Anaxagoras—that all or most of those people, we see, kept away from affairs of state?

Hippias/ What do you think, Socrates? Isn't it that they were weak and unable to carry their good sense successfully into both areas, the public and the private?

Socrates/ Then it's really like the improvements in other skills, isn't it, where early craftsmen are worthless compared

to modern ones? Should we say that your skill—the skill of the sophists—has been improved in the same way, and that the ancients are worthless compared to you in wisdom?

Hippias/ Yes, certainly, you're right.

Socrates/ So if Bias came to life again in our time, Hippias, he would make himself a laughingstock compared with you people, just as Daedalus also, according to the sculptors, would be laughable if he turned up now doing things like the ones that made him famous.

Hippias/ That's right, Socrates, just as you say. However I usually praise the ancients who came before us before and more highly than I praise people of our own day, for while I take care to avoid the envy of the living, I fear the wrath of the dead.

Socrates/ You're putting fine thoughts in fine words, Hippias; that's what I think. I can support the truth of your claim; the skill you people have has really been improved in its ability to handle public business as well as private.

Why, Gorgias of Leontini, the well-known sophist, came here on public business as ambassador from his hometown—because he was best qualified in Leontini to handle community affairs. In the assembly, he won his case, and in private, by giving displays and tutorials to young people, he made a lot of money and took it out of the city. Or, another case, our colleague Prodicus came often enough on public business; but just this last time, when he came on public business from Ceos, he made a great impression with his speech in the council, and in private he earned a wonderful sum of money giving displays and tutoring the young. But none of these early thinkers thought fit to charge a monetary fee or give displays of his wisdom for all comers. They were so simple they didn't realize the great value of money. But Gorgias and Prodicus each made more money from wisdom

than any craftsman of any kind ever made from his skill. And Protagoras did the same even earlier.

Hippias/ Socrates, you haven't the slightest idea how fine this can be. If you knew how much money I've made, you'd be amazed. Take one case: I went to Sicily once, when Protagoras was visiting there (he was famous then, and an older man); though I was younger I made much more than a hundred and fifty minas in a short time—and from one very small place, Inycum, more than twenty minas. When I went home with this I gave it to my father, so that he and the other citizens were amazed and thunderstruck. And I almost think I've made more money than any other two sophists you like put together.

Socrates/ That's a fine thing you say, Hippias, strong evidence of your own and modern wisdom, and of the superiority of men nowadays over the ancients. There was a lot of ignorance among our predecessors down to Anaxagoras, according to you. People say the opposite of what happened to you happened to Anaxagoras: he inherited a large sum, but lost everything through neglect—there was so little intelligence in his wisdom. And they tell stories like that about other early wise men. You make me see there's fine evidence, here, I think, for the superiority of our contemporaries over those who came before; and many will have the same opinion, that a wise man needs to be wise primarily for his own sake. The mark of being wise, I see, is when someone makes the most money. Enough said about that.

Tell me this: from which of the cities you visit did you make the most money? From Sparta, obviously, where you visited most often.

Hippias/ Lord no, Socrates.

Socrates/ Really? Did you make the least?

Hippias/ Nothing at all, ever.

Socrates/ That's weird, Hippias, and amazing! Tell me, isn't the wisdom you have the sort that makes those who study and learn it stronger in virtue?

Hippias/ Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But while you were able to make the sons of Inycans better, you were powerless for the sons of Spartans?

Hippias/ Far from it.

Socrates/ But then do Sicilians want to become better, but not Spartans?

Hippias/ Certainly the Spartans want to, as well, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, did they stay away from you for lack of money?

Hippias/ No. They have enough.

Socrates/ How could it be that they have money and the desire, and you have the ability to give them the greatest benefits, but they didn't send you away loaded with money? Could it be this, that the Spartans educate their own children better than you would? Should we say this is so, do you agree?

Hippias/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Then weren't you able to persuade the young men in Sparta that if they studied with you they would make more progress in virtue than if they stayed with their own teachers? Or couldn't you persuade their fathers they should entrust the matter to you, rather than look after it themselves, if they cared at all for their sons? Surely they didn't enviously begrudge their own sons the chance to become as good as possible.

Hippias/ I don't think they begrudged it.

Socrates/ But Sparta really is law-abiding.

Hippias/ Of course.

Socrates/ And what's most highly prized in law-abiding cities is virtue.

Hippias/ Of course.

Socrates/ And you, you know most finely of men how to pass virtue on to other people.

Hippias/ Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, a man who knew most finely how to teach skill with horses would be most honored, and get the most money, in Thessaly, or wherever else in Greece that skill is seriously studied.

Hippias/ That's likely.

Socrates/ Then won't a man who can teach lessons of the greatest value for virtue be given the highest honor, and make the most money, if he wishes, in Sparta, or in any other law-abiding Greek city? But you think it will be more in Sicily, more in Inycum? Should we believe all this, Hippias? If you give the order, it has to be believed.

Hippias/ An ancestral tradition of the Spartans, Socrates, forbids them to change their laws, or to give their sons any education contrary to established customs.

Socrates/ What do you mean? The Spartans have an ancestral tradition of not doing right, but doing wrong?

Hippias/ I wouldn't say so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But they would do right to educate their young men better, not worse?

Hippias/ Right, indeed. But foreign education is not lawful for them: because, mind you, if anybody else had ever taken money from there for education, I would have taken by far the most—they love my lectures and applaud—but, as I say, it's against the law.

Socrates/ Do you call law harmful or beneficial to the city, Hippias?

Hippias/ I think it is made to be beneficial, but sometimes it does harm, too, if the law is made badly.

Socrates/ But look here. Don't lawmakers make law to be the greatest good to the city? Without that, law-abiding civilized life is impossible.

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ So when people who are trying to make laws fail to make them good, they have failed to make them lawful—indeed, to make them law. What do you say?

Hippias/ In precise speech, Socrates, that is so. But men are not accustomed to use words in that manner.

Socrates/ Do you mean those who know, Hippias, or those who don't?

Hippias/ Ordinary people.

Socrates/ Are they the ones who know the truth—ordinary people?

Hippias/ Of course not.

Socrates/ But I suppose people who know, at least, believe that what is more beneficial is more lawful in truth for all men. Do you agree?

Hippias/ Yes, I grant it's that way in truth.

Socrates/ Then it is and stays just the way those who know believe it to be?

Hippias/ Quite.

Socrates/ But, as you say, it would be more beneficial for the Spartans to be educated by your teaching, though it's foreign—more beneficial than the local education?

Hippias/ And what I say is true.

Socrates/ And that what is more beneficial is more lawful—do you say that too, Hippias?

Hippias/ I did say it.

Socrates/ By your account it is more lawful for the sons of the Spartans to be educated by Hippias and less lawful by their fathers, if they will really be more benefited by you.

Hippias/ They certainly will be benefited, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then the Spartans are breaking the law by not giving you money and entrusting their sons to you.

Hippias/ I grant that. I think you said your say on my behalf, and there's no need for me to oppose it.

Socrates/ So we find the Spartans to be lawbreakers, and that on the most important issue, though they appear to be most lawful. So when they applaud you, really, Hippias, and enjoy your speech, what sort of things have they heard? Surely they're those things you know most finely, things about stars and movements in the sky?

Hippias/ Not at all. They can't stand the subject.

Socrates/ Then do they enjoy hearing about geometry?

Hippias/ No. Many of them can't even, well, count.

Socrates/ Then they're a long way from putting up with your displays of arithmetic.

Hippias/ Good god, yes. A long way.

Socrates/ Well, do they like those things on which you know how to make the sharpest distinctions of anybody—the functions of letters, syllables, rhythms, and harmonies?

Hippias/ Harmonies and letters, indeed!

Socrates/ Well just what is it they love to hear about from you, and applaud? Tell me yourself; I can't figure it out.

Hippias/ The genealogies of heroes and men, Socrates, and the settlements (how cities were founded in ancient times), and in a word all ancient history—that's what they most love to hear about. So because of them I have been forced to learn up on all such things and to study them thoroughly.

Socrates/ Good lord, Hippias, you're lucky the Spartans don't enjoy it when someone lists our archons from the time of Solon. Otherwise, you'd have had a job learning them.

Hippias/ How come, Socrates? Let me hear them once and I'll memorize fifty names.

Socrates/ That's right. I forgot you had the art of memory. So I understand: the Spartans enjoy you, predictably, because you know a lot of things, and they use you the way children use old ladies, to tell stories for pleasure.

Hippias/ Yes—and, good lord, actually about fine activities, Socrates. Just now I made a great impression there speaking about the activities a young man should take up. I have a speech about that I put together really finely, and I put the words particularly well. My setting and the starting point of the speech are something like this: After Troy was taken, the tale is told that Neoptolemus asked Nestor what sort of activities are fine—the sort of activities that would make someone most famous if he adopted them while young. After that the speaker is Nestor, who teaches him a very great many very fine customs. I displayed that there and I expect to display it here the day after tomorrow, in Phidostratus' schoolroom—with many other fine things worth hearing. Eudicus, Apemantus' son, invited me. But why don't you come too, and bring some more people, if they are capable of hearing and judging what is said?

Socrates/ Certainly, Hippias, if all goes well. But now answer me a short question about that; it's a fine thing you reminded me. Just now someone got me badly stuck when I was finding fault with parts of some speeches for being foul, and praising other parts as fine. He questioned me this way, really insultingly: "Socrates, how do you know what sorts of things are fine and foul? Look, would you be able to say what the fine is?" And I, I'm so worthless, I was stuck and I wasn't

able to answer him properly. As I left the gathering I was angry and blamed myself, and I made a threatening resolve, that whomever of you wise men I met first, I would listen and learn and study, then return to the questioner and fight the argument back. So, as I say, it's a fine thing you came now. Teach me enough about what the fine is itself, and try to answer me with the greatest precision possible, so I won't be a laughingstock again for having been refuted a second time. Of course you know it clearly; it would be a pretty small bit of learning out of the many things you know.

Hippias/ Small indeed, Socrates, and not worth a thing, as they say.

Socrates/ Then I'll learn it easily, and no one will ever refute me again.

Hippias/ No one will. Or what I do would be crude and amateurish.

Socrates/ Very well said, Hippias—if we defeat the man! Will it hurt if I act like him and take the other side of the argument when you answer, so that you'll give me the most practice? I have some experience of the other side. So if it's the same to you I'd like to take the other side, to learn more strongly.

Hippias/ Take the other side. And, as I just said, the question is not large. I could teach you to answer much harder things than that so no human being could refute you.

Socrates/ That's amazingly well said! Now, since it's your command, let me become the man as best I can and try to question you. If you displayed that speech to him, the one you mentioned about the fine activities, he'd listen, and when you stopped speaking he'd ask not about anything else but about the fine—that's a sort of habit with him—and he'd say: "O visitor from Elis, is it not by justice that just people are just?" Answer, Hippias, as if he were the questioner.

Hippias/ I shall answer that it is by justice.

Socrates/ “And is this justice something?”

Hippias/ Very much so.

Socrates/ “And by wisdom wise people are wise, and by the good all good things are good?”

Hippias/ How could they be otherwise?

Socrates/ “… by these each being something? Of course, it can’t be that they’re not.”

Hippias/ They are.

Socrates/ “Then all fine things, too, are fine by the fine, isn’t that so?”

Hippias/ Yes, by the fine.

Socrates/ “… by that being something?”

Hippias/ It is. Why not?

Socrates/ “Tell me then, visitor,” he’ll say, “what is that, the fine?”

Hippias/ Doesn’t the person who asks this want to find out what is a fine thing?

Socrates/ I don’t think so, Hippias. What is the fine.

Hippias/ And what’s the difference between the one and the other?

Socrates/ You don’t think there is any?

Hippias/ There’s no difference.

Socrates/ Well, clearly your knowledge is finer. But look here, he’s asking you not what is a fine thing, but what is the fine.

Hippias/ My friend, I understand. I will indeed tell him what the fine is, and never will I be refuted. Listen, Socrates, to tell the truth, a fine girl is a fine thing.

Socrates/ That’s fine, Hippias; by Dog you have a glorious answer. So you really think, if I gave that answer, I'd be

answering what was asked, and correctly, and never will I be refuted?

Hippias/ Socrates, how could you be refuted when you say what everyone thinks, when everyone who hears you will testify that you're right?

Socrates/ Very well. Certainly. Now, look, Hippias, let me go over what you said for myself. He will question me somewhat like this: "Come now, Socrates, give me an answer. All those things you say are fine, will they be fine if the fine itself is what?" Shall I say that if a fine girl is a fine thing, those things will be fine because of that?

Hippias/ Then do you think that man will still try to refute you—that what you say is not a fine thing—or if he does try, he won't be a laughingstock?

Socrates/ You're wonderful! But I'm sure he'll try. Whether trying will make him a laughingstock—we'll see about that. But I want to tell you what he'll say.

Hippias/ Tell me.

Socrates/ "How sweet you are, Socrates," he'll say. "Isn't a fine Elean mare a fine thing? The god praised mares in his oracle." What shall we say, Hippias? Mustn't we say that the mare is a fine thing? At least if it's a fine one. How could we dare deny that the fine thing is a fine thing?

Hippias/ That's true, Socrates. And the god was right to say that too. We breed very fine mares in our country.

Socrates/ "Very well," he'll say. "What about a fine lyre? Isn't it a fine thing?" Shouldn't we say so, Hippias?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then after that he'll ask—I know fairly well, judging from the way he is—"Then what about a fine pot, my good fellow? Isn't it a fine thing?"

Hippias/ Who is the man, Socrates? What a boor he is to dare in an august proceeding to speak such vulgar speech that way!

Socrates/ He's like that, Hippias, not refined. He's garbage, he cares about nothing but the truth. Still the man must have an answer; so here's my first opinion: If the pot should have been turned by a good potter, smooth and round and finely fired, like some of those fine two-handled pots that hold six choes, very fine ones—if he's asking about a pot like that, we have to agree it's fine. How could we say that what is fine is not a fine thing?

Hippias/ We couldn't, Socrates.

Socrates/ "Then is a fine pot a fine thing too? Answer me!" he'll say.

Hippias/ But I think that's so, Socrates. Even that utensil is fine if finely made. But on the whole that's not worth judging fine, compared to a horse and a girl and all the other fine things.

Socrates/ Very well. Then I understand how we'll have to answer him when he asks this question, here: "Don't you know that what Heraclitus said holds good—'the finest of monkeys is foul put together with another class', and the finest of pots is foul put together with the class of girls, so says Hippias the wise." Isn't that so, Hippias?

Hippias/ Of course, Socrates. Your answer's right.

Socrates/ Then listen. I'm sure of what he'll say next. "What? If you put the class of girls together with the class of gods, won't the same thing happen as happened when the class of pots was put together with that of girls? Won't the finest girl be seen to be foul? And didn't Heraclitus (whom you bring in) say the same thing too, that 'the wisest of men is seen to be a monkey compared to god in wisdom and fineness

and everything else?'" Should we agree, Hippias, that the finest girl is foul compared to the class of gods?

Hippias/ Who would object to that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Then if we agreed to that, he'd laugh and say, "Socrates, do you remember what you were asked?" "Yes," I'll say: "Whatever is the fine itself?" "Then," he'll say, "when you were asked for the fine, do you answer with something that turns out to be no more fine than foul, as you say yourself?" "Apparently," I'll say. Or what do you advise me to say, my friend?

Hippias/ That's what I'd say. Because compared to gods, anyway, the human race is not fine—that's true.

Socrates/ He'll say: "If I had asked you from the beginning what is both fine and foul, and you had given me the answer you just gave, then wouldn't you have given the right answer? Do you still think that the fine itself by which everything else is beautified and seen to be fine when that form is added to it—that that is a girl or a horse or a lyre?"

Hippias/ But if that's what he's looking for, it's the easiest thing in the world to answer him and tell him what the fine (thing) is by which everything else is beautified and is seen to be fine when it is added. The man's quite simple; he has no feeling at all for fine possessions. If you answer him that this thing he's asking for, the fine, is just gold, he'll be stuck and won't try to refute you. Because we all know, don't we, that wherever that is added, even if it was seen to be foul before, it will be seen to be fine when it has been beautified with gold.

Socrates/ You have no experience of this man, Hippias. He stops at nothing, and he never accepts anything easily.

Hippias/ So what? He must accept what's said correctly, or, if not, be a laughingstock.

Socrates/ Well, that answer he certainly will not accept, my friend. And what's more, he'll jeer at me, and say, "Are you

crazy? Do you think Phidias is a bad workman?" And I think I'll say, "No, not at all."

Hippias/ And you'll be right about that.

Socrates/ Right enough. Then when I agree that Phidias is a good workman, this person will say, "Next, do you think Phidias didn't know about this fine thing you mention?" "What's the point?" I'll say. "The point is," he'll say, "that Phidias didn't make Athena's eyes out of gold, nor the rest of her face, nor her feet, nor her hands—as he would have done if gold would really have made them be seen to be finest—but he made them out of ivory. Apparently he went wrong through ignorance; he didn't know gold was what made everything fine, wherever it is added." What shall we answer when he says that, Hippias?

Hippias/ It's not hard. We'll say he made the statue right. Ivory's fine too, I think.

Socrates/ "Then why didn't he work the middles of the eyes out of ivory? He used stone, and he found stone that resembled ivory as closely as possible. Isn't a stone a fine thing too, if it's a fine one?" Shall we agree?

Hippias/ Yes, at least when it's appropriate.

Socrates/ "But when it's not appropriate it's foul?" Do I agree or not?

Hippias/ Yes, when it's not appropriate anyway.

Socrates/ "Well," he'll say. "You're a wise man! Don't ivory and gold make things be seen to be fine when they're appropriate, but foul when they're not?" Shall we be negative? Or shall we agree with him that he's right?

Hippias/ We'll agree to this: whatever is appropriate to each thing makes that particular thing fine.

Socrates/ “Then,” he’ll say, “when someone boils the pot we just mentioned, the fine one, full of fine bean soup, is a gold stirring spoon or a fig-wood one more appropriate?”

Hippias/ Heracles! What kind of man is this! Won’t you tell me who he is?

Socrates/ You wouldn’t know him if I told you the name.

Hippias/ But I know right now he’s an ignoramus.

Socrates/ Oh, he’s a real plague, Hippias. Still, what shall we say? Which of the two spoons is appropriate to the soup and the pot? Isn’t it clearly the wooden one? It makes the soup smell better, and at the same time, my friend, it won’t break our pot, spill out the soup, put out the fire, and make us do without a truly noble meal, when we were going to have a banquet. That gold spoon would do all these things; so I think we should say the fig-wood spoon is more appropriate than the gold one, unless you say otherwise.

Hippias/ Yes, it’s more appropriate. But I wouldn’t talk with a man who asked things like that.

Socrates/ Right you are. It wouldn’t be appropriate for you to be filled up with words like that, when you’re so finely dressed, finely shod, and famous for wisdom all over Greece. But it’s nothing much for me to mix with him. So help me get prepared. Answer for my sake. “If the fig-wood is really more appropriate than the gold,” the man will say, “wouldn’t it be finer? Since you agreed, Socrates, that the appropriate is finer than the not appropriate?”

Hippias, don’t we agree that the fig-wood spoon is finer than the gold one?

Hippias/ Would you like me to tell you what you can say the fine is—and save yourself a lot of argument?

Socrates/ Certainly. But not before you tell me how to answer. Which of those two spoons I just mentioned is appropriate and finer?

Hippias/ Answer, if you'd like, that it's the one made of fig.

Socrates/ Now tell me what you were going to say. Because by that answer, if I say the fine is gold, apparently I'll be made to see that gold is no finer than wood from a fig-tree. So what do you say the fine is this time?

Hippias/ I'll tell you. I think you're looking for an answer that says the fine is the sort of thing that will never be seen to be foul for anyone, anywhere, at any time.

Socrates/ Quite right, Hippias. Now you've got a fine grasp of it.

Hippias/ Listen now, if anyone has anything to say against this, you can certainly say I'm not an expert on anything.

Socrates/ Tell me quickly, for god's sake.

Hippias/ I say, then, that it is always finest, both for every man and in every place, to be rich, healthy, and honored by the Greeks, to arrive at old age, to make a fine memorial to his parents when they die, and to have a fine, grand burial from his own children.

Socrates/ Hurray, Hippias! What a wonderful long speech, worthy of yourself! I'm really delighted at the kind way in which—to the best of your ability—you've helped me out. But we didn't hit the enemy, and now he'll certainly laugh at us harder than ever.

Hippias/ That laughter won't do him any good, Socrates. When he has nothing to say in reply, but laughs anyway, he'll be laughing at himself, and he'll be a laughingstock to those around.

Socrates/ That may be so. But maybe, as I suspect, he'll do more than laugh at me for that answer.

Hippias/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ If he happens to have a stick, and I don't run and run away from him, he'll try to give me a thrashing.

Hippias/ What? Is the man your owner or something? Do you mean he could do that and not be arrested and convicted? Or don't you have any laws in this city, but people are allowed to hit each other without any right?

Socrates/ No, that's not allowed at all.

Hippias/ Then he'll be punished for hitting you without any right.

Socrates/ I don't think so, Hippias. No, if I gave that answer he'd have a right—in my opinion anyway.

Hippias/ Then I think so too, seeing that you yourself believe it.

Socrates/ Should I tell you why I believe he'd have a right to hit me if I gave that answer? Or will you hit me without trial too? Will you hear my case?

Hippias/ It would be awful if I wouldn't. What do you have to say?

Socrates/ I'll tell you the same way as before. I'll be acting out his part—so the words I use are not directed against you; they're like what he says to me, harsh and grotesque. "Tell me, Socrates," you can be sure he'll say, "do you think it's wrong for a man to be whipped when he sings such a dithyramb as that, so raucously, way out of tune with the question?" "How?" I'll say. "How!" he'll say. "Aren't you capable of remembering that I asked for the fine itself? For what when added to anything—whether to a stone or a plank or a man or a god or any action or any lesson—anything gets to be fine? I'm asking you to tell me what fineness is itself, my man, and I am no more able to make you hear me than if you were sitting here in stone—and a millstone at that, with no ears and no brain!"

Hippias, wouldn't you be upset if I got scared and came back with this: "But that's what Hippias said the fine was. And I asked him the way you asked me, for that which is fine

always and for everyone." So what do you say? Wouldn't you be upset if I said that?

Hippias/ Socrates, I know perfectly well that what I said is fine for everyone—everyone will think so.

Socrates/ "And will be fine?" he'll ask. "I suppose the fine is always fine."

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ "Then it was fine, too," he'll say.

Hippias/ It was.

Socrates/ "For Achilles as well?" he'll ask. "Does the visitor from Elis say it is fine for him to be buried after his parents? And for his grandfather Aeacus? And for the other children of the gods? And for the gods themselves?"

Hippias/ What's that? Go to blessedness. These questions the man asks, Socrates, they're sacrilegious!

Socrates/ What? Is it a sacrilege to say that's so when someone else asks the question?

Hippias/ Maybe.

Socrates/ "Then maybe you're the one who says that it is fine for everyone, always, to be buried by his children, and to bury his parents? And isn't Heracles included in 'everyone' as well as everybody we mentioned a moment ago?"

Hippias/ But I didn't mean it for the gods.

Socrates/ "Apparently you didn't mean it for the heroes either."

Hippias/ Not if they're children of gods.

Socrates/ "But if they're not?"

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ "Then according to your latest theory, I see, what's awful and unholy and foul for some heroes—Tantalus

and Dardanus and Zethus—is fine for Pelops and those with similar parentage."

Hippias/ That's my opinion.

Socrates/ "Then what you think is what you did not say a moment ago—that being buried by your children and burying your parents is foul sometimes, and for some people. Apparently it's still more impossible for that to become and be fine for everyone; so that has met the same fate as the earlier ones, the girl and the pot, and a more laughable fate besides; it is fine for some, not fine for others. And to this very day, Socrates, you aren't able to answer the question about the fine, what it is."

That's how he'll scold me—and he's right if I give him such an answer.

Most of what he says to me is somewhat like that. But sometimes, as if he took pity on my inexperience and lack of education, he himself makes me a suggestion. He asks if I don't think such and such is the fine, or whatever else he happens to be investigating and the discussion is about.

Hippias/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ I'll show you. "You're a strange man, Socrates," he'll say, "giving answers like that, in that way. You should stop that. They're very simple and easy to refute. But see if you think this sort of answer is fine. We had a grip on it just now when we replied that gold is fine for things it's appropriate to, but not for those it's not. And anything else is fine if this has been added to it: this, the appropriate itself—the nature of the appropriate itself. See if it turns out to be the fine."

I'm used to agreeing with such things every time, because I don't know what to say. What do you think? Is the appropriate fine?

Hippias/ In every way, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let's look it over. We'd better not be deceived.

Hippias/ We have to look it over.

Socrates/ See here, then. What do we say about the appropriate: Is it what makes—by coming to be present—each thing to which it is present be seen to be fine, or be fine, or neither?

Hippias/ I think it's what makes things be seen to be fine. For example, when someone puts on clothes and shoes that suit him, even if he's ridiculous, he is seen to be finer.

Socrates/ Then if the appropriate makes things be seen to be finer than they are, it would be a kind of deceit about the fine, and it wouldn't be what we are looking for, would it, Hippias? I thought we were looking for that by which all fine things are fine. For example, what all large things are large by is the projecting. For by that all large things—even if they are not seen to be so—if they project they are necessarily large. Similarly, we say the fine is what all things are fine by, whether or not they are seen to be fine. What would it be? It wouldn't be the appropriate. Because that makes things be seen to be finer than they are—so you said—and it won't let things be seen to be as they are. We must try to say what it is that makes things fine, whether they are seen to be fine or not, just as I said a moment ago. That's what we're looking for, if we're really looking for the fine.

Hippias/ But Socrates, the appropriate makes things both be fine and be seen to be fine, when it's present.

Socrates/ Is it impossible for things that are really fine not to be seen to be fine, since what makes them be seen is present?

Hippias/ It's impossible.

Socrates/ Then shall we agree to this, Hippias: that everything really fine—customs and activities both—are both thought to be, and seen to be, fine always, by everybody? Or

just the opposite, that they're unknown, and individuals in private and cities in public both have more strife and contention about them than anything?

Hippias/ Much more the latter, Socrates. They are unknown.

Socrates/ They wouldn't be, if "being seen to be" had been added to them. And that would have been added if the appropriate were fine and made things not only be but be seen to be fine. Therefore, if the appropriate is what makes things fine, it would be the fine we're looking for, but it would not be what makes things be seen to be fine. Or, if the appropriate is what makes things be seen to be fine, it wouldn't be the fine we're looking for. Because that makes things be; but by itself it could not make things be seen to be and be, nor could anything else. Let's choose whether we think the appropriate is what makes things be seen to be, or be, fine.

Hippias/ It's what makes things be seen to be, in my opinion, Socrates.

Socrates/ Oh dear! It's gone and escaped from us, our chance to know what the fine is, since the appropriate has been seen to be something other than fine.

Hippias/ God yes, Socrates. And I think that's very strange.

Socrates/ But we shouldn't let it go yet, my friend. I still have some hope that the fine will make itself be seen for what it is.

Hippias/ Of course it will. It's not hard to find. I'm sure if I went off and looked for it by myself—in quiet—I would tell it to you more precisely than any preciseness.

Socrates/ Ah, Hippias! Don't talk big. You see how much trouble it has given us already; and if it gets mad at us I'm afraid it will run away still harder. But that's nonsense. You'll easily find it, I think, when you're alone. But for god's sake, find it in front of me, or look for it with me if you want, as

we've been doing. If we find it, that would be the finest thing; but if not, I will content myself with my fate, while you go away and find it easily. And if we find it now, of course I won't be a nuisance to you later, trying to figure out what it was you found on your own. Now see what you think the fine is: I'm saying that it's—pay attention now, be careful I'm not raving—let this be fine for us: whatever is useful. What I had in mind when I said that was this. We say eyes are fine not when we think they are in such a state they're unable to see, but whenever they are able, and are useful for seeing. Yes?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that's how we call the whole body fine, sometimes for running, sometimes for wrestling. And the same goes for all animals—a fine horse, rooster, or quail—and all utensils and means of transport on land and sea, boats and warships, and the tools of every skill, music and all the others; and, if you want, activities and laws—virtually all these are called fine in the same way. In each case we look at the nature it's got, its manufacture, its condition; then we call what is useful "fine" in respect of the way it is useful, what it is useful for, and when it is useful; but anything useless in all those respects we call "foul." Don't you think that way too, Hippias?

Hippias/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ So then are we right to say now that the useful more than anything turns out to be fine?

Hippias/ Right, Socrates.

Socrates/ So what's able to accomplish a particular thing is useful for that for which it is able; and what's unable is useless.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then is ability fine, but inability foul?

Hippias/ Very much so. Many things give us evidence for the truth of that, especially politics. The finest thing of all is to be able politically in your own city, and to be unable is the foulest of all.

Socrates/ Good! Then doesn't it follow from these points that, by god, wisdom is really the finest thing of all, and ignorance the foulest?

Hippias/ What are you thinking?

Socrates/ Keep quiet, my friend. I'm frightened. What on earth are we saying now?

Hippias/ Why should you be frightened now? The discussion has gone really well for you this time.

Socrates/ I wish it had! Look this over with me: could anyone do something he doesn't know how to do, and isn't at all able to do?

Hippias/ Not at all. How could he do what he isn't able to do?

Socrates/ Then when people make mistakes, do bad work, even when they do it unintentionally—if they aren't able to do things, they wouldn't ever do them, would they?

Hippias/ That's clear.

Socrates/ But people who are able are able by ability? I don't suppose it's by inability.

Hippias/ Of course not.

Socrates/ And everyone who does things is able to do the things he does.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And all men do much more bad work than good, starting from childhood—and make mistakes unintentionally.

Hippias/ That's right.

Socrates/ So? We don't call that ability and that sort of useful thing fine, do we? The sort that's useful for doing some bad piece of work? Far from it.

Hippias/ Far indeed, Socrates. That's what I think.

Socrates/ Then this able and useful of ours is apparently not the fine, Hippias.

Hippias/ It is, Socrates, if it's able to do good, if it's useful for that sort of thing.

Socrates/ Then here's what got away from us: the able-and-useful without qualification is fine. And this is what our mind wanted to say, Hippias: the useful-and-able for making some good—that is the fine.

Hippias/ I think so.

Socrates/ But that is beneficial. Isn't it?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then that's the way fine bodies and fine customs and wisdom and everything we mentioned a moment ago are fine—because they're beneficial.

Hippias/ That's clear.

Socrates/ So the beneficial appears to be the fine we wanted.

Hippias/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ But the beneficial is the maker of good.

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ And the maker is nothing else but the cause, isn't it?

Hippias/ That's so.

Socrates/ Then the fine is a cause of the good.

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ But the cause is different from what it's a cause of. I don't suppose the cause would be a cause of a cause. Look at it this way: isn't the cause seen to be a maker?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then what is made by the maker is the thing that comes to be; it's not the maker.

Hippias/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then the thing that comes to be and the maker are different things.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So the cause isn't a cause of a cause, but of the thing that comes to be because of it.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So if the fine is a cause of the good, the good should come to be from the fine. And apparently this is why we're eager to have intelligence and all the other fine things: because their product, their child—the good—is worth being eager about. It would follow that the fine is a kind of father of the good.

Hippias/ Certainly. You're talking fine, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then see if this is fine as well: the father is not a son and the son is not a father.

Hippias/ Fine.

Socrates/ The cause is not a thing that comes to be, and the thing that comes to be is not a cause.

Hippias/ That's true.

Socrates/ Good god! Then the fine is not good, nor the good fine. Or do you think they could be, from what we've said?

Hippias/ Good god, no. I don't think so.

Socrates/ So are we happy with that? Would you like to say that the fine is not good, nor the good fine?

Hippias/ Good god, no. I'm not at all happy with it.

Socrates/ Good god, yes, Hippias. Nothing we've said so far makes me less happy.

Hippias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then it doesn't turn out to be the finest account, as we thought a moment ago, that the beneficial—the useful and the able for making some good—is fine. It's not that way at all, but if possible it's more laughable than the first accounts, when we thought the girl, or each one of those things mentioned earlier, was the fine.

Hippias/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And I don't know where to turn, Hippias. I'm stuck. Do you have anything to say?

Hippias/ Not at present; but as I said a little while ago, I'm sure I'll find it when I've looked.

Socrates/ But I don't think I can wait for you to do that, I have such a desire to know. And besides I think I just got clear. Look. If whatever makes us be glad, not with all the pleasures, but just through hearing and sight—if we call that fine, how do you suppose we'd do in the contest?

Men, when they're fine anyway—and everything decorative, pictures and sculptures—these all delight us when we see them, if they're fine. Fine sounds and music altogether, and speeches and storytelling have the same effect. So if we answered that tough man, "Your honor, the fine is what is pleasant through hearing and sight," don't you think we'd curb his toughness?

Hippias/ This time, Socrates, I think what the fine is has been well said.

Socrates/ What? shall we say that fine activities and laws are fine by being pleasant through hearing and sight? Or that they have some other form?

Hippias/ Those things might slip right past the man.

Socrates/ By Dog, Hippias, not past the person I'd be most ashamed to babble at, or pretend to say something when I'm not saying anything.

Hippias/ Who's that?

Socrates/ Sophroniscus' son. He wouldn't easily let me say those things without testing them, any more than he'd let me talk as if I knew what I didn't know.

Hippias/ Well for my part, since you say so, I think that's something else in the case of the laws.

Socrates/ Keep quiet, Hippias. We could well be thinking we're in the clear again, when we've gotten stuck on the same point about the fine as we did a moment ago.

Hippias/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I'll show you what's become obvious to me, if I'm saying anything. In the case of laws and activities, those could easily be seen not to be outside the perception we have through hearing and sight. But let's stay with this account, that what is pleasing through them is fine, and not bring that about the laws into the center. But if someone should ask—whether he's the one I mentioned or anyone else—"What, Hippias and Socrates? Are you marking off the sort of pleasant you call fine from the pleasant, and not calling what is pleasant to the other senses fine—food and drink, what goes with making love, and all the rest of that sort of thing? Aren't they pleasant? Do you say there's altogether no pleasure in such things? Not in anything but seeing and hearing?"

What shall we say, Hippias?

Hippias/ Of course we'll say there are very great pleasures in those others, Socrates.

Socrates/ “What?” he’ll say. “Though they’re no less pleasures than these, would you strip them of this word, and deprive them of being fine?”

“Yes,” we’ll say, “because anyone in the world would laugh at us if we called it not pleasant to eat but fine, or if we called a pleasant smell not pleasant but fine. And as for making love, everybody would fight us; they’ say it is most pleasant, but that one should do it, if he does it at all, where no one will see, because it is the foulest thing to be seen.” When we’ve said that, Hippias, he'd probably reply, “I understand that too. You’re ashamed, you’ve been ashamed a long time, to call those pleasures fine, because men don’t think they are. But I didn’t ask for that—what ordinary people think is fine—but for what is fine.”

I think we’ll repeat our hypothesis: “This is what we say is fine, the part of the pleasant that comes by sight and hearing.” What else would you do with the argument? What should we say, Hippias?

Hippias/ We must say that and nothing else, in view of what’s been said.

Socrates/ “That’s fine,” he’ll say. “Then if the pleasant through sight and hearing is fine, whatever is not pleasant in that way clearly would not be fine.”

Shall we agree?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ “Then is the pleasant through sight pleasant through sight and hearing? Or is the pleasant through hearing pleasant through hearing and through sight?”

“By no means,” we’ll say. “In that case what comes through one would be what comes through both—I think that’s what you mean—but we said that each of these pleasant things taken itself by itself is fine, and both are fine as well.”

Isn’t that our answer?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ "Then," he'll say, "does one pleasant thing differ from another in this: in being pleasant? I'm not asking whether one pleasure can be greater or lesser than another, or more or less, but whether one can differ in this very way—in being a pleasure—and one of the pleasures not be a pleasure."

We don't think so, do we?

Hippias/ We don't think so.

Socrates/ "So," he'll say. "You selected those pleasures from the other pleasures because of something different from their being pleasures. You saw some quality in the pair of them, something that differentiates them from the others, and you say they are fine by looking at that. I don't suppose pleasure through sight is fine because of that—that it is through sight. Because if that were the cause of its being fine, the other—the one through hearing—wouldn't ever be fine. It's not a pleasure through sight."

That's true. Shall we say that's true?

Hippias/ We'll say it.

Socrates/ "And again, pleasure through hearing turns out not to be fine because of that—that it is through hearing. Otherwise, pleasure through sight would never be fine, because it is not a pleasure through hearing."

Shall we say that the man who says this is saying the truth, Hippias?

Hippias/ It's true.

Socrates/ "But both are fine, as you say." We do say that.

Hippias/ We do.

Socrates/ "Then they have something that itself makes them be fine, that common thing that belongs to both of them

in common and to each privately. Because I don't suppose there's any other way they would both and each be fine."

Answer me as you would him.

Hippias/ I think it's as he says, and that's my answer.

Socrates/ Then if something is attributed to both pleasures but not to each one, they would not be fine by that attribute.

Hippias/ And how could that be, Socrates? That when neither has an attribute, whatever it may be, this attribute—which belongs to neither—could belong to both?'

Socrates/ Don't you think it could happen?

Hippias/ If it did I'd be in the grip of a lot of inexperience about the nature of these things and the terms of the present terminology.

Socrates/ Pleasantly put, Hippias. But maybe I'm turning out to think I can see something that's the way you say it can't be, or I'm not seeing anything.

Hippias/ It turns out that you're not, Socrates. You're quite readily mis-seeing.

Socrates/ And yet a lot of things like that are seen plainly in my mind; but I don't believe them if they're not imagined in yours, since you're a man who's made the most money by wisdom of anyone alive, and I'm one who never made anything. And I wonder, my friend, if you're not playing with me and deliberately fooling me, so many and so clear are the examples I see.

Hippias/ Socrates, no one will know finer than you whether I'm playing or not, if you try to say what these things are that are seen by you plainly. You'll be seen to be saying nothing. Because never shall you find what is attributed to neither me nor you, but is attributed to both of us.

Socrates/ What do you mean, Hippias? Maybe you're saying something I don't understand. But listen more clearly

to what I want to say. Because I see what is not attributed to me to be, and what neither I am nor you are, and this can be attributed to both of us. And there are others besides, which are attributed to both of us to be, things neither of us is.

Hippias/ Your answers seem weird again, Socrates, more so than the ones you gave a little earlier. Look. If both of us were just, wouldn't each of us be too? Or if each of us were unjust, wouldn't both of us? Or if we were healthy, wouldn't each be? Or if each of us had some sickness or were wounded or stricken or had any other tribulation, again, wouldn't both of us have that attribute? Similarly, if we happened to be gold or silver or ivory, or, if you like, noble or wise or honored or even old or young or anything you like that goes with human beings, isn't it really necessary that each of us be that as well?

Socrates/ Of course.

Hippias/ But Socrates, you don't look at the entireties of things, nor do the people you're used to talking with. You people knock away at the fine and the other beings by taking each separately and cutting it up with words. Because of that you don't realize how great they are—naturally continuous bodies of being. And now you're so far from realizing it that you think there's some attribute or being that is true of these both but not of each, or of each but not of both. That's how unreasonably and unobservantly and foolishly and uncomprehendingly you operate.

Socrates/ That's the way things are for us, Hippias. 'They're not the way a person wants"—so runs the proverb people often quote—"but the way he can get them." But your frequent admonitions are a help to us. This time, for example, before these admonitions from you about the stupid way we operate. … Shall I make a still greater display, and tell you what we had in mind about them? Or not tell?

Hippias/ You're telling someone who already knows, Socrates. I know how everybody who's involved in speeches operates. All the same, if it's more pleasant for you, speak on.

Socrates/ It really is more pleasant. We were so foolish, my friend, before you said what you did, that we had an opinion about me and you that each of us is one, but that we wouldn't both be one (which is what each of us would be) because we're not one but two—we were so stupid-like. But now, we have been instructed by you that if two is what we both are, two is what each of us must be as well; and if each is one, then both must be one as well. The continuous theory of being, according to Hippias, does not allow it to be otherwise; but whatever both are, that each is as well; and whatever each is, both are. Right now I sit here persuaded by you. First, however, remind me, Hippias. Are you and I one? Or are you two and I two?

Hippias/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ Just what I say. I'm afraid of you, afraid to speak clearly, because you get angry at me whenever you think you've said anything. All the same, tell me more. Isn't each of us one, and that—being one—is attributed to him?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then if each of us is one, wouldn't he also be odd-numbered? Or don't you consider one to be odd?

Hippias/ I do.

Socrates/ Then will both of us be odd-numbered, being two?

Hippias/ It couldn't be, Socrates.

Socrates/ But both are even-numbered. Yes?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then because both are even-numbered, on account of that, each of us is even-numbered as well. Right?

Hippias/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Then it's not entirely necessary, as you said it was a moment ago, that whatever is true of both is also true of each, and that whatever is true of each is also true of both.

Hippias/ Not that sort of thing, but the sort I said earlier.

Socrates/ They're enough, Hippias. We have to accept them too, because we see that some are this way, and others are not this way. I said (if you remember how this discussion got started) that pleasure through sight and hearing was not fine by this—that each of them turned out to have an attribute but not both, or that both had it but not each—but by that by which both and each are fine, because you agreed that they are both and each fine. That's why I thought it was by the being that adheres to both, if both are fine—it was by that they had to be fine, and not by what falls off one or the other. And I still think so now. But let's make a fresh start. Tell me, if the pleasure through sight and the one through hearing are both and each fine, doesn't what makes them fine adhere in both and in each of them?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then is it because each and both are pleasure—would they be fine because of that? Or would that make all other pleasures no less fine than these? Remember, we saw that they were no less pleasures.

Hippias/ I remember.

Socrates/ But is it because they are through sight and hearing—are they called fine because of that?

Hippias/ That's the way it was put.

Socrates/ See if this is true. It was said, I'm remembering, that the pleasant was fine this way: not all the pleasant, but whatever is through sight and hearing.

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ Doesn't that attribute adhere in both, but not in each? I don't suppose each of them is through both (as we said earlier), but both through both, not each. Is that right?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then that's not what makes each of them fine; it doesn't adhere in each (because "both" doesn't adhere in each). So the hypothesis lets us call both of them fine, but it doesn't let us call each of them fine.

What else should we say? Isn't it necessarily so?

Hippias/ So we see.

Socrates/ Then should we call both fine, but not call each fine?

Hippias/ What's to stop us?

Socrates/ This stops us, friend, in my opinion. We had things that come to belong to particular things in this way: if they come to belong to both, they do to each also; and if to each, to both—all the examples you gave. Right?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the examples I gave were not that way. Among them were "each" itself and "both." Is that right?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ With which of these do you put the fine, Hippias? With those you mentioned? If I am strong and so are you, we're both strong too; and if I am just and so are you, we both are too. And if both, then each. In the same way, if I am fine and so are you, we both are too; and if both, then each. Or does nothing stop them from being like the things I said I saw clearly: when both of anything are even-numbered, each may be either odd- or possibly even-numbered. And again, when each of them is inexpressible, both together may be expressible, or possibly inexpressible. And millions of things like that. With which do you place the fine? Do you see the

matter the way I do? I think it's a great absurdity for both of us to be fine, but each not; or each fine, but both not, or anything else like that.

Do you choose the way I do, or the other way?

Hippias/ The first way is for me, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well done, Hippias! We've saved ourselves a longer search. Because if the fine is with those, then the pleasant through sight and hearing is not fine anymore. "Through sight and hearing" makes both fine, but not each. But that's impossible, as you and I agree, Hippias.

Hippias/ We do agree.

Socrates/ Then it's impossible for the pleasant through sight and hearing to be fine, since if it becomes fine it presents one of the impossibilities.

Hippias/ That's right.

Socrates/ "Tell me again from the beginning," he'll say; "since you were quite wrong with that. What do you say that is—the fine in both pleasures, which made you value them above the others and call them fine?" Hippias, I think we have to say that they are the most harmless pleasures and the best, both and each as well. Or can you mention something else that distinguishes them from all the others?

Hippias/ Not at all. They really are best.

Socrates/ He'll say, "Then this is what you say is the fine—beneficial pleasure?"

"Apparently so," I'll say. And you?

Hippias/ Me too.

Socrates/ He'll say: 'The maker of good is beneficial, but we just saw that the maker and what is made are different. Your account comes down to the earlier account. The good would not be fine, or the fine good, if each of these were different."

“Absolutely,” we’ll say, if we have any sense. It’s not proper to disagree with a man when he’s right.

Hippias/ But Socrates, really, what do you think of all that? It’s flaking and clippings of speeches, as I told you before, divided up small. But here’s what is fine and worth a lot: to be able to present a speech well and finely, in court or council or any other authority to whom you give the speech, to convince them and go home carrying not the smallest but the greatest of prizes, the successful defense of yourself, your property, and friends. One should stick to that.

He should give up and abandon all that small-talking, so he won’t be thought a complete fool for applying himself, as he is now, to babbling nonsense.

Socrates/ Hippias, my friend, you’re a lucky man, because you know which activities a man should practice, and you’ve practiced them too—successfully, as you say. But I’m apparently held back by my crazy luck. I wander around and I’m always getting stuck. If I make a display of how stuck I am to you wise men, I get mud-spattered by your speeches when I display it. You all say what you just said, that I am spending my time on things that are silly and small and worthless. But when I’m convinced by you and say what you say, that it’s much the most excellent thing to be able to present a speech well and finely, and get things done in court or any other gathering, I hear every insult from that man (among others around here) who has always been refuting me. He happens to be a close relative of mine, and he lives in the same house. So when I go home to my own place and he hears me saying those things, he asks if I’m not ashamed that I dare discuss fine activities when I’ve been so plainly refuted about the fine, and it’s clear I don’t even know at all what that is itself! “Look,” he’ll say. “How will you know whose speech—or any other action—is finely presented or not, when you are ignorant of the fine? And when you’re in a state like that, do you think it’s

any better for you to live than die?" That's what I get, as I said. Insults and blame from you, insults from him. But I suppose it is necessary to bear all that. It wouldn't be strange if it were good for me. I actually think, Hippias, that associating with both of you has done me good. The proverb says, "What's fine is hard"—I think I know that.

Hippias Minor.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Eudicus, Socrates, Hippias.

Eudicus/ Why, Socrates, are you so silent, after Hippias has made such a display? and why do you not either join in the praise of what has been said, or confute it, if he seems to you to have spoken anything not correctly; especially since we are left by ourselves, we, who would lay an especial claim to share in an exercise relating to philosophy.

Socrates/ There are indeed, Eudicus, some things, which I would gladly inquire of Hippias, touching the points, of which he has just now been treating, relating to Homer. For I have heard from your father Apēmantus, that the Iliad of Homer is a more beautiful poem than the Odyssey; and so much the more beautiful, as Achilles is a better man than Ulysses; for each of those poems, he said, was composed, one in honor of Ulysses, and the other in that of Achilles. If then it is agreeable to Hippias, I would gladly inquire on this very point, what he thinks of those two persons, and which of them he says was the better man; especially since he has exhibited a great variety of other matter, relating to other poets, and to Homer likewise.

Eudicus/ Nay, it is evident that Hippias will not grudge you an answer, if you ask him a question. If Socrates puts a question to you, Hippias, will you give him an answer; or how will you act?

Hippias/ I should act in a shocking manner, Eudicus, were I now to fly from a question put by Socrates—I, who, when I go from my home at Elis up to Olympia to the general meeting of the Greeks, at the period of the Olympic games,

constantly offer myself at the temple to speak upon any point that any person may wish, relating to the subject which has been prepared for my display, and to give a reply to anyone upon any question he may put.

Socrates/ Your case, Hippias, is a happy one indeed, if at each Olympic festival you arrive at the temple, so full of hope touching the cleverness connected with the soul. For I should marvel much, if anyone of those engaged in bodily contests came thither to contend in the body with so little fear, and with so much confidence, as you say you do, in the case of intellect.

Hippias/ With reason, Socrates, is such my case. For, from the time when I began to contend at Olympia, I have never met with a person my superior in anything.

Socrates/ A beautiful offering, Hippias, do you proclaim your reputation for wisdom to be to both the Elean state and your own parents likewise. But what were you saying to us about Achilles and Ulysses? Which of the two said you was the better man, and for what? For when many were within, and you were making the display, I missed what was said by you; for I feared to put a question, because the crowd was great, and lest I might by asking be an impediment to the display. But as we are now fewer in number, and Eudicus here commands me to ask, state clearly, and instruct us, what you said about those two men, and how you drew a distinction between them.

Hippias/ Nay, Socrates, I am willing to go through more clearly than I did then, what I said about those men, and others too. I assert then, that Homer has made Achilles the bravest of those who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Ulysses the most versatile.

Socrates/ Ho! ho! Hippias! will you grant me some such favor as this? not to laugh at me, if I apprehend with

difficulty what is said, and ask you frequent questions; and do you endeavor to answer me in a mild and good-tempered manner.

Hippias/ I will do so, for it would be, Socrates, a disgraceful thing if I, who instruct others on these very points, and deem myself worthy to receive money on that very account, should, when I am interrogated by you, not show pardon towards you nor answer mildly.

Socrates/ You speak very fairly. For when you said that Achilles was represented as the bravest, I seemed to understand what you meant; and so I did when you said that Nestor was the wisest; but when you said that the poet had represented Ulysses as the most versatile, by this, to tell the truth, I did not thoroughly know what you meant. Tell me then, if I can better understand from this way. Is not Achilles represented by Homer as being versatile?

Hippias/ The least of all, Socrates, but the most simple. Since in "The Supplications," when he represents Achilles and Ulysses conversing with each other, Achilles says to Ulysses;

> Son of Laertes, progeny of Jove,
> Ulysses, full of many plans, 'tis meet
> Curtly a speech to say, as I will do,
> And to an end I think it will be brought.
> Hateful to me, as are the gates of hell,
> Is he, who one thing in his bosom hiding,
> Another says. What I say, will be done.

Now in these verses he delineates clearly the habit of each hero; how that Achilles was truthful and simple, but Ulysses versatile and false. For he represents Achilles as speaking these verses to Ulysses.

Socrates/ Now indeed, Hippias, I am near to understanding what you mean by versatile. For you call, it seems, such a person false.

Hippias/ Exactly so, Socrates. And such a person has Homer represented Ulysses in many places both of the Iliad and Odyssey.

Socrates/ By Homer then, it seems, the man of truth was considered as one character, and the man of falsehood another; but not both the same.

Hippias/ How should they not, Socrates?

Socrates/ And are you too of the same opinion, Hippias?

Hippias/ Most certainly. For it would be a terrible thing if I were not.

Socrates/ Homer, then, let us dismiss; since it is impossible to inquire of what he was thinking, when he composed those verses. But as you appear to take upon yourself his cause, and, what you assert that Homer meant, seems to you likewise, do you answer for Homer and yourself in common.

Hippias/ So it shall be. Ask then briefly any question you like.

Socrates/ By men of falsehood do you mean such, as are unable to do a certain act, as persons laboring under sickness, or such as are able.

Hippias/ I mean such as are very able to do many other things, and likewise to put upon persons a deceit.

Socrates/ The versatile then it seems, according to your account, are men able to do something. Are they not?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it through silliness and want of intellect that they are versatile and deceivers? or through knavery and a certain kind of intellect?

Hippias/ Through knavery the most of all, and intellect.

Socrates/ They are then men of intellect, it seems.

Hippias/ They are, by Zeus, very much so.

Socrates/ Since they are men of intellect, are they ignorant of what they are doing? or do they know it?

Hippias/ They know it very well. And through this they act wickedly.

Socrates/ Knowing then what they know, are they untaught, or wise?

Hippias/ Wise on this very point, to deceive.

Socrates/ Hold now; let us recollect what you have said. You assert that men of falsehood are men of power, and intellect, and knowledge, and wisdom, on those points where they are men of falsehood.

Hippias/ I assert it.

Socrates/ And that men of truth and men of falsehood are different, and opposed to each other.

Hippias/ This I assert.

Socrates/ Come then, amongst the men of power and wisdom, some, it seems, are men of falsehood, according to your account.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ When you say that men of falsehood are men of power and wisdom as regards those very things, do you mean that they are able to be false, if they wish it? or unable as regards those things, in which they are false?

Hippias/ That they are able.

Socrates/ To sum up the whole then, have men of falsehood the wisdom and power to be false?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ The man, therefore, who is unable, or has not been taught to be false, cannot be a man of falsehood.

Hippias/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ Each person then, who is able to do what he wishes at the time when he wishes, is a person of power. I am not speaking of a person, prevented by some disease or any other thing of that kind; but, I mean, that he is able, as you are, whenever you wish, to write my name. Do you not call the person who is in this state, a person of power?

Hippias/ I do.

Socrates/ Tell me now, Hippias, are you not skilled in numbers and accounts?

Hippias/ Most especially, Socrates.

Socrates/ Were a person then to ask you, "What number is thrice seven hundred," you could, if you would, say of all persons the quickest and truest respecting it.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it because you are the man of the greatest power and wisdom on those points?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are you merely the man of the greatest wisdom and power? or are you the best likewise with respect to those points, in which you are of the greatest power and wisdom?

Hippias/ The best assuredly, Socrates.

Socrates/ You would therefore, upon these subjects, speak the truth with the greatest power possible. Is it not so?

Hippias/ I think so.

Socrates/ But what, are you not equally able to speak untruths upon the very same subject? Answer me now, Hippias, as you did before, nobly and with a high bearing. If then a person were to ask you, "How many are thrice seven hundred?" whether would you be false the most, and say always and according to the same circumstance what is false, if you wished to be false, and never at any time to give

a true answer? Or would a person unskilled in accounts be better able than yourself, if so inclined, to be false? Would not the person unskilled, although desirous of being false, frequently speak the truth unwillingly, by accident, through his knowing nothing? But you, being wise on those points, could, if you were inclined to be false, be ever and according to the same circumstances false.

Hippias/ Yes; the case is as you state it.

Socrates/ Whether then is the person, who is false upon other points, not so in the case of numbers? nor would he be false in numbers?

Hippias/ By Zeus, in numbers too.

Socrates/ Let us then, Hippias, suppose that there is a certain person false upon the subject of numbers and accounts.

Hippias/ Well.

Socrates/ Now what kind of person must he be? Must he not, as you yourself just now acknowledged, possess, if he intends to be false, the power to be false? for it was, if you remember, said by you, that he who wants the power to be false would never be false.

Hippias/ I remember; it was said so.

Socrates/ Were you not just now shown to possess the greatest power to be false in the case of accounts?

Hippias/ Yes; and this too was said.

Socrates/ And do you not possess the greatest power to speak the truth relating to accounts?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The same person then possesses the greatest power to say what is false and true relating to accounts. Now he who is the best on such subjects is the accountant.

Hippias/ It is so.

Socrates/ Who else then, Hippias, is the man of falsehood with regard to accounts, than the good accountant? for he is the person of power, and he too of truth.

Hippias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ You see then that the same person is on these points both false and true; and that he, who is true, is not a better man than he, who is false: for surely he is the same, and has not, as you just now fancied, qualities the most opposite.

Hippias/ It appears so in this case at least.

Socrates/ Are you willing then for us to consider the question on another ground?

Hippias/ Otherwise, if you wish it.

Socrates/ Are not you skilled in geometry likewise?

Hippias/ Yes, I am.

Socrates/ What then, is it not so in geometry likewise? Is not the same person, who has the greatest power to be false and to speak the truth respecting diagrams, the geometrician?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is there any other, who is good at diagrams?

Hippias/ No other.

Socrates/ The good and clever geometrician then has the greatest power in both ways. And, if there be anyone else, who is false on the subject of diagrams, it would be the good one: for he has the power; whereas the bad geometrician wants the power to be false: so that he, who wants the power, could not be false, as has been admitted already.

Hippias/ It is so.

Socrates/ Let us now consider further the third instance, that of an astronomer; in which science you conceive

yourself still more skilled than in those mentioned before. Is it not so, Hippias?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do not the very same things hold good in astronomy?

Hippias/ It is probable, Socrates.

Socrates/ In astronomy likewise, if there be anyone else who is false, the good astronomer will be the man of falsehood, as having the power to be false; for it cannot be the man, who wants the power; for he is unskilled.

Hippias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ The same person therefore in astronomy likewise will be the man of truth and falsehood.

Hippias/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Come then, Hippias, and consider freely in this manner through all sciences, whether the case be otherwise than this. Now you are of all men the most skilled in every way in the greatest number of arts, as I once heard you boasting, when you were detailing your abundant and enviable wisdom in the market-place by the tables of the usurers. For you said you once went to Olympia, having as the work of your own hands all that you wore about your body: first, the ring which you had on your finger—for you began with that—was your own work, proving your skill in cutting rings; and you had another seal of your own workmanship, and a strigil, and an unguent-box, which you had made yourself; moreover the shoes you then had on, you said you had cut out yourself and made; and that you had woven the upper and the under cloak which you then wore. But what seemed the strangest thing to all, and a proof of the greatest cleverness, Was—when you stated that the belt which you wore round your vest—and it was of the costly kind made in Persia—you had plaited yourself; and in

addition to all this, you came there bringing your own poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, and many and various compositions in prose; and that in the arts, which I have just now mentioned, you had reached a pre-eminence in skill above all the rest, and in accuracy on points of rhythm and harmony, and grammar; and in addition to these you spoke of many other things, as I appear to myself to remember. But I had like to have forgotten, it seems, your art of memory, in which you deem yourself to shine the most; and, I presume, I have forgotten very many others. But what I mean is this—Do you, turning your eye upon your own arts—and they are quite enough—and upon those of others, tell me—if perchance you can discover from what has been acknowledged by myself and you—where is the man of falsehood and the man of truth apart and not the same? Consider the matter in any kind you please, of wisdom, or knavery, or whatever else you delight to call it; and you will never find it, my friend; for it does not exist; but if it does, do you mention it.

Hippias/ I am not able, Socrates, thus on the instant, at least.

Socrates/ Nor will you, as I think, ever be able. If then I am speaking what is true, do you remember, Hippias, what results from the reasoning?

Hippias/ I do not very well understand, Socrates, what you mean.

Socrates/ For you do not perhaps at present make use of your art of memory. For it is evident that you think there is no need of it. But I will remind you. You know that you said Achilles was a man of truth, but Ulysses a man of falsehood, and versatile.

Hippias/ I did so.

Socrates/ But you now perceive, that the man of truth and the man of falsehood have been proved to be the same person; so that, if Ulysses is a man of falsehood, he becomes no less a man of truth: and if Achilles is a man of truth, he becomes likewise a man of falsehood; and the men do not differ from, nor are they opposite to, each other, but are similar.

Hippias/ You are always, Socrates, weaving some discourses of this kind, and, cutting off that portion of the argument which is the most difficult, you lay hold of it in the way of something minute; but you do not grapple with the question as a whole, respecting which the debate happens to be. For even now, if you wished it, I could show from many proofs in a satisfactory speech, that Homer has represented Achilles as a man of greater bravery than Ulysses, and free from falsehood, but the latter as crafty, and frequently false, and worse than Achilles. And do you, if you will, place your reasonings opposite to mine, to prove the other is the better man; and thus the persons here will the better know which of us is the better speaker.

Socrates/ I have no doubt, Hippias, of your being cleverer than myself. But I am ever accustomed, when anyone says anything, to give my attention—especially when the speaker seems to be a clever person—as being desirous of learning what he is speaking about, and ask him questions, and I think over the question again, and I put together what has been said, in order that I may understand it. But if the speaker appears to me to be a person of no mark, I neither ask him any questions, nor give myself any thought about what he has been talking. Now by this you may know what persons I consider to be clever. For you will find me solicitous about what has been said by such a person, and making inquiries of him, in order that I may be benefited by learning. Since even now I have been thinking, while you

were speaking, that, in the verses, which you just now recited to show that Achilles was speaking, as if he were a cheat, to Ulysses, something appeared to me to be strange; if, what you assert, is the truth, that the versatile Ulysses nowhere appears to be a man of falsehood, while Achilles appears to be versatile according to your expression; at least he tells a falsehood. For Achilles having spoken those very words, which you have just now recited;

> Hateful to me, as are the gates of hell,
> Is he, who one thing in his bosom hiding,
> Another says—

he states shortly afterwards, that he would not be dissuaded from his purpose by either Ulysses or Agamemnon; nor would he stay at all in the Trojan land; but he says;

> To-morrow, after paying holy rites
> To Zeus and all the gods, I will my ships
> Load well, and drag them to the deep; and then
> Thou'lt see, if such thy wish, and such thy care,
> At dawn of day my vessels sailing o'er
> The Hellespont fish-feeding, and my sailors
> Eager to ply the oar; and should the voyage
> Prosperous the god, for shaking earth renowned,
> Grant, fertile Phthia reach I the third day:

and still before this he says, while abusing Agamemnon;

> But now I'll go to Phthia; since 'tis far
> Better to homeward wend with ships, whose sterns
> Are rounded; nor, myself dishonor'd thus,
> Think I, that here thou'lt yearly riches gain.

Now though he had said this at one time in the face of the whole army, and at another to his friends, he nowhere appears to have made any preparations, or even an attempt, towards dragging down his vessels to the sea, as being about to sail homeward, but very nobly deemed it a little thing to tell the truth. I therefore, Hippias, proposed at the beginning the question, as I was in doubt which of these two had been represented by the poet as the better man; and deeming both

to be very good, it was difficult to decide which was the better, as regards falsehood and truth, and every other virtue; for in that point likewise both seemed to be nearly on a par.

Hippias/ You do not consider the matter, Socrates, correctly. For, though Achilles tells a falsehood, he appears to do so not with any fixed design, but against his inclination; as he was compelled, by the distresses of the army, to remain and give his assistance. But what Ulysses says falsely, is willingly and with a design.

Socrates/ My dearest Hippias, you are deceiving me, and are yourself imitating Ulysses.

Hippias/ By no means, Socrates. But what are you saying, and for what purpose?

Socrates/ Because you assert that Achilles told a falsehood not designedly—he, who was such a juggler, and in addition to his vain-boasting, a plotter, as Homer has represented, that he appears to have a higher notion of himself than of Ulysses to such an extent, with regard to lying hid from him while vain-boasting, as to dare in his presence to contradict himself. And lie hid he did from Ulysses. At least Ulysses does not appear to have said anything to him, as not perceiving that Achilles had said what was false.

Hippias/ What is this that you are speaking of, Socrates?

Socrates/ Know you not that, on saying afterwards to Ulysses, that he would set sail in the morning, he says to Ajax, on the other hand, no such thing, but tells him a quite different story.

Hippias/ Where?

Socrates/ Where he says;

> For of the blood-stain'd war I'll take no thought,
> 'Till god-like Hector, thoughtful Priam's son,

Shall reach of Myrmidons the tents and ships,
And, Argives slaying, set the fleet on fire.
But round my tent and dark ship Hector coming,
And eager for the fight, I guess, will stop.

Now do you imagine, Hippias, that the son of Thetis and the pupil of the most clever Chiron was so forgetful, as that, after previously abusing with the extreme of abuse those, who speak what they do not mean, he would immediately say to Ulysses that he would sail away, and then to Ajax, that he would remain, and this too without a fixed design, or holding Ulysses to be a simpleton, and that he should get the better of him by this very trickery and speaking falsely?

Hippias/ It does not, Socrates, seem so at least to me. But being dissuaded on these points by his own easy temper, he spoke to Ajax in a different manner to what he had done to Ulysses. But Ulysses, whenever he speaks truth, speaks always with a fixed design, and so too, when he speaks a falsehood.

Socrates/ Ulysses then is a better man, it seems, than Achilles.

Hippias/ Surely, Socrates, the least of all.

Socrates/ Why, were not they, who speak false willingly, proved to be better than those who do so unwillingly?

Hippias/ But how, Socrates, can they, who do an injury willingly, and plot against a person willingly, and do mischief, be better men than those, who do so unwillingly; to the latter of whom it seems that pardon is greatly due, should anyone unconsciously do an injury, or tell a falsehood, or do any other wrong. And even the laws are surely more severe against those, who do evil and tell falsehoods willfully, than against those, who act so unwillingly.

Socrates/ You see, Hippias, that I spoke the truth in saying how pressing I am in regard to putting questions to

the clever. And yet I run the risk of possessing this solitary good, the rest that I possess being trifling. For in what manner things are, I am at fault; nor do I know where they are. And of this there is evidence sufficient for myself. For whenever I am in the company of any of you in high repute for your cleverness, and for whom all the Greeks are witnesses of your wisdom, I appear as one knowing nothing; for scarcely on a single point, so to speak, am I of the same opinion with you. And what greater proof can there be of a man's want of instruction, than when he differs from men of wisdom? Yet I have this one wonderful good, which is my preservation; for I am not ashamed to learn; but I make inquiries, and ask questions, and am very thankful to the person, who gives me an answer; nor do I ever deprive anyone of the thanks I owe. For I never deny that I have learnt a thing, by pretending that what I have learnt was a discovery of my own; but I pass encomium upon the person, who has taught me, as being a clever man, by showing forth what I learnt from him. And now I do not agree with what you assert, but differ very greatly. And this, I know well, takes place through myself; because I am such as I am, that I may not speak too highly of myself. To me, Hippias, everything appears the contrary to what you say. They then who hurt other persons, and do an injury, and speak falsehoods, and deceive, and commit a fault willingly, appear to me to be better men than those, who act so unwillingly. Sometimes, however, I am of a contrary opinion; and my mind wanders on these points, evidently through my knowing nothing. But at present there has come around me, as it were, the periodical return of my disorder; and they, who commit an error willingly, seem to me to be better than those, who commit it unwillingly. And for this my present state of mind I blame the previous discussion as the cause; so that for the present it appears that they, who do each of

these things unwillingly, are more wicked than those who do them willingly. Do then indulge me, nor grudge to heal the disorder of my mind. For you will do me a much greater good by causing my mind to cease from its ignorance, than my body from disease. If however you wish to speak a lengthened speech, I tell you beforehand, that you will effect no cure; for I cannot follow you. But if you are willing, as lately, to answer my questions, you will benefit greatly myself; nor do I think you will receive any harm. Justly then do I call upon you, son of Apemantus; for you have urged me to converse with Hippias; and now if Hippias is unwilling to give an answer, do you intercede with him in my behalf.

Eudicus/ There will be, I think, Socrates, no need for my intercession with Hippias. For nothing of such a kind has been previously stated by him; but rather that he never shrunk from the question of any man. Is it not so, Hippias? Was not this what you said?

Hippias/ I did say so, Eudicus. But Socrates is always making a confusion in the arguments; and he is like to a person who is doing wrong.

Socrates/ My very good Hippias, I do it not willingly—for I should then be a clever and terrible fellow according to your account—but unwillingly, so that do you pardon me; for pardon, you say, is due to him who does wrong unwillingly.

Eudicus/ Nay, Hippias, do not act otherwise; but for the sake of me, and of your own words previously spoken, give an answer to whatever Socrates shall ask.

Hippias/ Well, at your entreaty, I will give an answer. Ask, then, what you like.

Socrates/ Truly, Hippias, I am very desirous to consider thoroughly what has been just now mentioned—Which are the better men, they, who err willingly or unwillingly. Now to this inquiry I think we shall arrive by the most direct road

thus—and do you give an answer. Do you speak of a runner as being good?

Hippias/ I do.

Socrates/ And of one as being bad?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is not he, who runs well, good? and bad he, who runs badly?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does not he, who runs slow, run badly? but well he who runs quick?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ In a race then, and in running, swiftness is a good thing; slowness a bad thing.

Hippias/ What else should it be?

Socrates/ Which then is the better runner? he who willingly runs slow, or unwillingly?

Hippias/ He who runs so willingly.

Socrates/ Is not to run to do something?

Hippias/ It is to do something.

Socrates/ And, if to do, is it not to perform some act?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ He then, who runs ill, performs in a race an act bad and unseemly.

Hippias/ Yes, bad; for how not?

Socrates/ Now he who runs badly, runs, you say, slowly.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ The good runner then performs willingly this bad act, and the unseemly: but the bad runner does so unwillingly.

Hippias/ It seems so.

Socrates/ In a race then, he who performs bad actions unwillingly, is worse than he who does so willingly.

Hippias/ Yes, in a race.

Socrates/ And how is it in wrestling? Which is the better wrestler? he who falls willingly, or unwillingly?

Hippias/ Probably he who falls willingly.

Socrates/ Now in wrestling, is it worse and more unseemly to fall, or to throw down?

Hippias/ To fall.

Socrates/ In wrestling then likewise, he who performs willingly bad and unseemly acts, is a better wrestler than he who does so unwillingly?

Hippias/ It is probable.

Socrates/ What then is the case in all the other uses of the body? Is not he, who is stronger and better in his body, able to perform acts both strong or weak, and unseemly and beautiful? So that when one performs acts, which as regards the body are bad, he, who is better in body, performs them willingly, but he, who is worse, unwillingly?

Hippias/ It is probably so as regards at least the strength of the body.

Socrates/ And what as regards a good conformation of the body, Hippias? Does it not belong to the better body, to perform willingly gestures unseemly, and bad; but to the worse, to do so unwillingly? or how does it seem to you?

Hippias/ In this way.

Socrates/ A bad conformation then, when voluntary, is on the side of virtue; when involuntary, on that of vice.

Hippias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And what say you as to the voice? Which do you say is the better? that which sings out of tune willingly, or unwillingly?

Hippias/ That which does so unwillingly.

Socrates/ And you say the more wretched voice is that, which sings out of tune unwillingly.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Would you choose to possess things that are good or bad?

Hippias/ Those that are good.

Socrates/ Would you then choose to have your feet lame willingly, or unwillingly?

Hippias/ Willingly.

Socrates/ Is not lameness in the feet a depravity and a bad conformation?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not indistinct vision a depravity in the eyes?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ Which sort of eyes now would you choose to possess? and with which to live? Those, with which a person willingly sees indistinctly or squints, or unwillingly?

Hippias/ Those with which he does so willingly.

Socrates/ Of the things, then, which are your own, you deem those, that perform depraved actions willingly, better than those, that do so unwillingly.

Hippias/ In things of such kind I do.

Socrates/ One reasoning then embraces all such things, as the ears, and nose, and mouth, and all the senses, namely, that those, which perform what is bad unwillingly, ought not to be possessed, as being bad, but that those, which do so willingly, ought to be possessed, as being good.

Hippias/ So it seems to me.

Socrates/ What then as regards instruments, with which is it better to be familiar? those, with which a man performs badly willingly, or those, with which he performs so unwillingly. Is a rudder, for example, the better, with which a person shall unwillingly steer badly, or that, with which he shall do so willingly?

Hippias/ That, with which he shall do so willingly.

Socrates/ Is it not so with the bow and lyre, and hautboy, and the rest of instruments?

Hippias/ You say the truth.

Socrates/ What then, is it better to have a horse of such a spirit as that one may unwillingly ride him badly, or such as one may ride him so willingly?

Hippias/ Such as one may ride him so willingly.

Socrates/ Such a spirit then is the better.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ With the better spirit of the horse a man would perform the mischievous acts belonging to such a spirit willingly, but unwillingly the similar acts belonging to the worse.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is it not so with respect to a dog? and all other animals?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ What then, as regards the talent of an archer? Is it better to possess that, which misses the mark willingly, or that, which does so unwillingly?

Hippias/ That, which does so willingly.

Socrates/ Such a talent then is the better for the archer's art?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the talent then, which errs unwillingly, is worse than that, which does so willingly.

Hippias/ Yes, in the case of the archer's art.

Socrates/ And how is it in the medical art? Is not the talent, which causes willingly mischiefs to bodies more like the medical art?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Such a talent then, in such an art, is better than that, which is not like the medical art.

Hippias/ It is better.

Socrates/ And how in the case of the talent devoted to playing on the harp and hautboy, and all the other things relating to arts and sciences? Is not that the better talent, which willingly performs what is bad and disgraceful and commits errors, while the worse does so unwillingly?

Hippias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And moreover we should certainly choose to have the possession of slaves with such talents, as would commit faults willingly, rather than such as would do so unwillingly, as the former is better for these things.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What then, would we not desire to have our own soul the best possible?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Will it then not be better, if it did evil willingly, than if it did so unwillingly?

Hippias/ It would be a terrible thing, Socrates, if they, who do an injury willingly, were better than those, who do so unwillingly.

Socrates/ And yet from what has been said it appears so.

Hippias/ But not so to myself at least.

Socrates/ To you, I thought, it had appeared so. Answer me then again—Is not honesty either a kind of power, or knowledge, or both? Is it not necessary that honesty should be one of these?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ If honesty then be a kind of power in the mind, the more powerful the mind the more honest it is. For, my very good man, the mind of such a kind, has surely been shown to be the better.

Hippias/ It did so appear.

Socrates/ What then if it is knowledge? Is not the wiser mind the more honest, but the less instructed the more dishonest?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ What if it is both? Is not the mind, which possesses both knowledge and power, the more honest; but the more uninstructed and powerless the more dishonest? Is it not necessary for such to be the case?

Hippias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Was not the mind of greater power and wisdom shown to be the better, and more able to perform both beautiful and disgraceful doings, relating to every kind of action?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ When therefore it performs the disgraceful, it does so willingly, through its power, and its knowledge. Now these, either both or either, appear to belong to honesty.

Hippias/ Probably.

Socrates/ Now, to do injustice is to do ill; but not to do injustice is to do well.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The mind then which is the more powerful and better, when it does injustice does it willingly; but the worse does so unwillingly.

Hippias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Is not he, who possesses a good mind, a good man; and he who possesses a bad one, a bad man?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It belongs then to the good man, to do injustice willingly, but to the bad man, unwillingly; since the good man possesses a good mind.

Hippias/ This moreover is so.

Socrates/ The man therefore who errs, and does things disgraceful and dishonest, willingly, if there be such a man, Hippias, can be no other than the good man.

Hippias/ I know not, Socrates, how to agree with you in this.

Socrates/ Nor I with myself, Hippias. It must however of necessity appear so to us at present, from the course of the reasoning. But, as I said before, upon these points, I wander up and down, nor do things ever appear to me in the same light. Now that myself or any other unskilled individual should be wandering thus, is not at all to be wondered at. But if you, the wise, wander also, this will be to us a dreadful thing indeed; since we shall never cease from our wanderings, not even by coming to you.

Lesser Hippias.

Translated by Benjamin Jowett.

Persons of the Dialog.

Eudicus, Socrates, Hippias.

Eudicus/ Why are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent display which Hippias has been making? Why do you not either refute his words, if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in commending him? There is the more reason why you should speak, because we are now alone, and the audience is confined to those who may fairly claim to take part in a philosophical discussion.

Socrates/ I should greatly like, Eudicus, to ask Hippias the meaning of what he was saying just now about Homer. I have heard your father, Apemantus, declare that the *Iliad* of Homer is a finer poem than the *Odyssey* in the same degree that Achilles was a better man than Odysseus; Odysseus, he would say, is the central figure of the one poem and Achilles of the other. Now, I should like to know, if Hippias has no objection to tell me, what he thinks about these two heroes, and which of them he maintains to be the better. He has already told us in the course of his exhibition many things of various kinds about Homer and diverse other poets.

Eudicus/ I am sure that Hippias will be delighted to answer anything which you would like to ask. Tell me, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a question, will you answer him?

Hippias/ Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent if I refused to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, as I went up from my house at Elis to the temple of Olympia, where all the Hellenes were assembled, I

continually professed my willingness to perform any of the exhibitions which I had prepared, and to answer any questions which anyone had to ask.

Socrates/ Truly, Hippias, you are to be congratulated, if at every Olympic festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own wisdom when you go up to the temple. I doubt whether any muscular hero would be so fearless and confident in offering his body to the combat at Olympia, as you are in offering your mind.

Hippias/ And with good reason, Socrates, for since the day when I first entered the lists at Olympia I have never found any man who was my superior in anything.

Socrates/ What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your wisdom be to the city of Elis and to your parents! But to return, what say you of Odysseus and Achilles? Which is the better of the two? And in what particular does either surpass the other? For when you were exhibiting and there was company in the room, though I could not follow you, I did not like to ask what you meant, because a crowd of people were present, and I was afraid that the question might interrupt your exhibition. But now that there are not so many of us, and my friend Eudicus bids me ask, I wish you would tell me what you were saying about these two heroes, so that I may clearly understand. How did you distinguish them?

Hippias/ I shall have much pleasure, Socrates, in explaining to you more clearly than I could in public my views about these and also about other heroes. I say that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest of the men who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest.

Socrates/ O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find a difficulty in following you, and repeat my

questions several times over? Please to answer me kindly and gently.

Hippias/ I should be greatly ashamed of myself, Socrates, if I, who teach others and take money of them, could not, when I was asked by you, answer in a civil and agreeable manner.

Socrates/ Thank you. The fact is that I seemed to understand what you meant when you said that the poet intended Achilles to be the bravest of men, and also that he intended Nestor to be the wisest, but when you said that he meant Odysseus to be the wiliest, I must confess that I could not understand what you were saying. Will you tell me, and then I shall perhaps understand you better, has not Homer made Achilles wily?

Hippias/ Certainly not, Socrates. He is the most straightforward of mankind, and when Homer introduces them talking with one another in the passage called 'The Prayers,' Achilles is supposed by the poet to say to Odysseus;

> Son of Laertes, sprung from heaven, crafty Odysseus, I will speak out plainly the word which I intend to carry out in act, and which will, I believe, be accomplished. For I hate him like the gates of death who thinks one thing and says another. But I will speak that which shall be accomplished.

Now, in these verses he clearly indicates the character of the two men. He shows Achilles to be true and simple, and Odysseus to be wily and false, for he supposes Achilles to be addressing Odysseus in these lines.

Socrates/ Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning. When you say that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false?

Hippias/ Exactly so, Socrates. It is the character of Odysseus, as he is represented by Homer in many passages of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey.*

Socrates/ And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is not the same as the false?

Hippias/ Of course, Socrates.

Socrates/ And is that your own opinion, Hippias?

Hippias/ Certainly. How can I have any other?

Socrates/ Well, then, as there is no possibility of asking Homer what he meant in these verses of his, let us leave him, but as you show a willingness to take up his cause, and your opinion agrees with what you declare to be his, will you answer on behalf of yourself and him?

Hippias/ I will. Ask shortly anything which you like.

Socrates/ Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do things, or that they have the power to do things?

Hippias/ I should say that they have power to do many things, and in particular to deceive mankind.

Socrates/ Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are they not?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are they wily, and do they deceive by reason of their simplicity and folly, or by reason of their cunning and a certain sort of prudence?

Hippias/ By reason of their cunning and prudence, most certainly.

Socrates/ Then they are prudent, I suppose?

Hippias/ So they are—very.

Socrates/ And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what they do?

Hippias/ Of course, they know very well, and that is why they do mischief to others.

Socrates/ And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they wise?

Hippias/ Wise, certainly, at least in so far as they can deceive.

Socrates/ Stop, and let us recall to mind what you are saying. Are you not saying that the false are powerful and prudent and knowing and wise in those things about which they are false?

Hippias/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And the true differ from the false—the true and the false are the very opposite of each other?

Hippias/ That is my view.

Socrates/ Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are to be ranked in the class of the powerful and wise?

Hippias/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And when you say that the false are powerful and wise in so far as they are false, do you mean that they have or have not the power of uttering their falsehoods if they like?

Hippias/ I mean to say that they have the power.

Socrates/ In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the power to speak falsely?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is ignorant cannot be false?

Hippias/ You are right.

Socrates/ And every man has power who does that which he wishes at the time when he wishes. I am not speaking of any special case in which he is prevented by disease or something of that sort, but I am speaking generally, as I might say of you that you are able to write my name when you like. Would you not call a man able who could do that?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skillful calculator and arithmetician?

Hippias/ Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am.

Socrates/ And if someone were to ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if you pleased?

Hippias/ Certainly I should.

Socrates/ Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters of calculation, are you not also the best?

Hippias/ To be sure, Socrates. I am the best.

Socrates/ And, therefore, you would be the most able to tell the truth about these matters, would you not?

Hippias/ Yes, I should.

Socrates/ And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well? I must beg. Hippias, that you will answer me with the same frankness and magnanimity which has hitherto characterized you. If a person were to ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, would not you be the best and most consistent teller of a falsehood, having always the power of speaking falsely as you have of speaking truly, about these same matters, if you wanted to tell a falsehood, and not to answer truly? Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters of calculation than you would be, if you chose? Might he not sometimes stumble upon the truth, when he wanted to tell a lie, because he did not know, whereas you who are the wise man, if you wanted to tell a lie would always and consistently lie?

Hippias/ Yes, there you are quite right.

Socrates/ Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about number, or when he is making a calculation?

Hippias/ To be sure, he would tell as many lies about number as about other things.

Socrates/ Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who are false about calculation and number?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Who can they be? For you have already admitted that he who is false must have the ability to be false. You said, as you will remember, that he who is unable to be false will not be false.

Hippias/ Yes, I remember, it was so said.

Socrates/ And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to speak falsely about calculation?

Hippias/ Yes, that was another thing which was said.

Socrates/ And are not you likewise said to speak truly about calculation?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the same person is able to speak both falsely and truly about calculation? And that person is he who is good at calculation—the arithmetician?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation? Is he not the good man? For the good man is the able man, and he is the true man.

Hippias/ That is evident.

Socrates/ Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true about these same matters? And the true man is not a whit better than the false, for indeed he is the same with him and not the very opposite, as you were just now imagining.

Hippias/ Not in that instance, clearly.

Socrates/ Shall we examine other instances?

Hippias/ Certainly, if you are disposed.

Socrates/ Are you not also skilled in geometry?

Hippias/ I am.

Socrates/ Well, and does not the same hold in that science also? Is not the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about diagrams, and he is—the geometrician?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ He and no one else is good at it?

Hippias/ Yes, he and no one else.

Socrates/ Then the good and wise geometer has this double power in the highest degree, and if there be a man who is false about diagrams the good man will be he, for he is able to be false, whereas the bad is unable, and for this reason is not false, as has been admitted.

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ Once more—let us examine a third case, that of the astronomer, in whose art, again, you, Hippias, profess to be a still greater proficient than in the preceding, do you not?

Hippias/ Yes, I am.

Socrates/ And does not the same hold of astronomy?

Hippias/ True, Socrates.

Socrates/ And in astronomy, too, if any man be able to speak falsely it will be the good astronomer, but he who is not able will not speak falsely, for he has no knowledge.

Hippias/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false?

Hippias/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ And now, Hippias, consider the question at large about all the sciences, and see whether the same principle does not always hold. I know that in most arts you are the wisest of men, as I have heard you boasting in the Agora at the tables of the moneychangers, when you were setting forth the great and enviable stores of your wisdom, and you said that upon one occasion, when you went to the Olympic games, all that you had on your person was made by yourself. You began with your ring, which was of your own workmanship, and you said that you could engrave rings, and you had another seal which was also of your own workmanship, and a strigil and an oil flask, which you had made yourself. You said also that you had made the shoes which you had on your feet, and the cloak and the short tunic, but what appeared to us all most extraordinary, and a proof of singular art, was the girdle of your tunic, which, you said, was as fine as the most costly Persian fabric, and of your own weaving. Moreover, you told us that you had brought with you poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, as well as prose writings of the most various kinds, and you said that your skill was also pre-eminent in the arts which I was just now mentioning, and in the true principles of rhythm and harmony and of orthography. And, if I remember rightly, there were a great many other accomplishments in which you excelled. I have forgotten to mention your art of memory, which you regard as your special glory, and I dare say that I have forgotten many other things, but, as I was saying, only look to your own arts—and there are plenty of them—and to those of others, and tell me, having regard to the admissions which you and I have made, whether you discover any department of art or any description of wisdom or cunning, whichever name you use, in which the true and false are different and not the same. Tell me, if you can, of any. But you cannot.

Hippias/ Not without consideration, Socrates.

Socrates/ Nor will consideration help you, Hippias, as I believe, but then if I am right, remember what the consequence will be.

Hippias/ I do not know what you mean, Socrates.

Socrates/ I suppose that you are not using your art of memory, doubtless because you think that such an accomplishment is not needed on the present occasion. I will therefore remind you of what you were saying. Were you not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and wily?

Hippias/ I was.

Socrates/ And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to be false as well as true? If Odysseus is false he is also true, and if Achilles is true he is also false, and so the two men are not opposed to one another, but they are alike.

Hippias/ O Socrates, you are always weaving the meshes of an argument, selecting the most difficult point, and fastening upon details instead of grappling with the matter in hand as a whole. Come now, and I will demonstrate to you, if you will allow me, by many satisfactory proofs, that Homer has made Achilles a better man than Odysseus, and a truthful man too, and that he has made the other crafty, and a teller of many untruths, and inferior to Achilles. And then, if you please, you shall make a speech on the other side, in order to prove that Odysseus is the better man, and this may be compared to mine, and then the company will know which of us is the better speaker.

Socrates/ O Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I am. But I have a way, when anybody else says anything, of giving close attention to him, especially if the speaker appears to me to be a wise man. Having a desire to

understand, I question him, and I examine and analyze and put together what he says, in order that I may understand, but if the speaker appears to me to be a poor hand, I do not interrogate him, or trouble myself about him. And you may know by this who they are whom I deem to be wise men, for you will see that when I am talking with a wise man, I am very attentive to what he says and ask questions of him, in order that I may learn and be improved by him. And I could not help remarking while you were speaking, when you recited the verses in which Achilles, as you argued, attacks Odysseus as a deceiver, that you must be strangely mistaken, because Odysseus, the man of wiles, is never found to tell a lie, but Achilles is found to be wily on your own showing. At any rate he speaks falsely, for first he utters these words, which you just now repeated;

> He is hateful to me even as the gates of death who thinks one thing and says another.

And then he says, a little while afterward, he will not be persuaded by Odysseus and Agamemnon; neither will he remain at Troy, but, says he;

> Tomorrow, when I have offered sacrifices to Zeus and all the gods, having loaded my ships well, I will drag them down into the deep. And then you shall see, if you have a mind, and if such things are a care to you, early in the morning my ships sailing over the fishy Hellespont, and my men eagerly plying the oar, and, if the illustrious shaker of the earth gives me a good voyage, on the third day I shall reach the fertile Phthia.

And before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said;

> And now to Phthia I will go, since to return home in the beaked ships is far better, nor am I inclined to stay here in dishonor and amass wealth and riches for you.

But although on that occasion, in the presence of the whole army, he spoke after this fashion, and on the other occasion

to his companions, he appears never to have made any preparation or attempt to draw down the ships, as if he had the least intention of sailing home—so nobly regardless was he of the truth. Now I, Hippias, originally asked you the question, because I was in doubt as to which of the two heroes was intended by the poet to be the better, and because I thought that both of them were pre-eminent, and that it would be difficult to decide which was the better of them, not only in respect of truth and falsehood, but of virtue generally, for even in this matter of speaking the truth they are much upon a par.

Hippias/ There you are wrong, Socrates, for in so far as Achilles speaks falsely, the falsehood is obviously unintentional. He is compelled against his will to remain and rescue the army in their misfortune. But when Odysseus speaks falsely he is voluntarily and intentionally false.

Socrates/ You, sweet Hippias, like Odysseus, are a deceiver yourself.

Hippias/ Certainly not, Socrates. What makes you say so?

Socrates/ Because you say that Achilles does not speak falsely from design, when he is not only a deceiver, but besides being a braggart, in Homer's description of him is so cunning, and so far superior to Odysseus in lying and pretending, that he dares to contradict himself, and Odysseus does not find him out; at any rate he does not appear to say anything to him which would imply that he perceived his falsehood.

Hippias/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ Did you not observe that afterward, when he is speaking to Odysseus, he says that he will sail away with the early dawn, but to Ajax he tells quite a different story?

Hippias/ Where is that?

Socrates/ Where he says;

> I will not think about bloody war until the son of warlike Priam, illustrious Hector, comes to the tents and ships of the Myrmidons, slaughtering the Argives and burning the ships with fire. And about my tent and dark ship, I suspect that Hector, although eager for the battle, will nevertheless stay his hand.

Now, do you really think, Hippias, that the son of Thetis, who had been the pupil of the sage Chiron, had such a bad memory, or would have carried the art of lying to such an extent—when he had been assailing liars in the most violent terms only the instant before—as to say to Odysseus that he would sail away, and to Ajax that he would remain, and that he was not rather practicing upon the simplicity of Odysseus, whom he regarded as an ancient, and thinking that he would get the better of him by his own cunning and falsehood?

Hippias/ No, I do not agree with you, Socrates, but I believe that Achilles is induced to say one thing to Ajax, and another to Odysseus, in the innocence of his heart, whereas Odysseus, whether he speaks falsely or truly, speaks always with a purpose.

Socrates/ Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than Achilles?

Hippias/ Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be better than the involuntary?

Hippias/ And how, Socrates, can those who intentionally err, and voluntarily and designedly commit iniquities, be better than those who err and do wrong involuntarily? Surely there is a great excuse to be made for a man telling a falsehood or doing an injury or any sort of harm to another, in ignorance. And the laws are obviously far more severe on

those who lie or do evil, voluntarily, than on those who do evil involuntarily.

Socrates/ You see, Hippias, as I have already told you, how pertinacious I am in questioning wise men. And I think that this is the only good point about me, for I am full of defects, and always getting things wrong in some way or other. My deficiency is proved to me by the fact that when I meet one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Hellenes are witnesses, I am found out to know nothing. For speaking generally, I hardly ever have the same opinion about anything which you have, and what proof of ignorance can be greater than to differ from wise men? But I have one singular good quality, which is my salvation. I am not ashamed to learn, and I ask and inquire, and am very grateful to those who answer me, and never fail to give them my grateful thanks. And when I learn a thing I never deny my teacher, or pretend that the lesson is a discovery of my own, but I praise his wisdom, and proclaim what I have learned from him. And now I cannot agree in what you are saying, but I strongly disagree. Well, I know that this is my own fault, and is a defect in my character, but I will not pretend to be more than I am, and my opinion, Hippias, is the very contrary of what you are saying, for I maintain that those who hurt or injure mankind, and speak falsely and deceive, and err voluntarily, are better far than those who do wrong involuntarily. Sometimes, however, I am of the opposite opinion, for I am all abroad in my ideas about this matter, a condition obviously occasioned by ignorance. And just now I happen to be in a crisis of my disorder at which those who err voluntarily appear to me better than those who err involuntarily. My present state of mind is due to our previous argument, which inclines me to believe that in general those who do wrong involuntarily are worse than those who do wrong voluntarily, and therefore I hope that

you will be good to me, and not refuse to heal me, for you will do me a much greater benefit if you cure my soul of ignorance than you would if you were to cure my body of disease. I must, however, tell you beforehand, that if you make a long oration to me you will not cure me, for I shall not be able to follow you; but if you will answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a great deal of good, and I do not think that you will be any the worse yourself. And I have some claim upon you also, O son of Apemantus, for you incited me to converse with Hippias, and now, if Hippias will not answer me, you must entreat him on my behalf.

Eudicus/ But I do not think, Socrates, that Hippias will require any entreaty of mine, for he has already said that he will refuse no man. Did you not say so, Hippias?

Hippias/ Yes, I did, but then, Eudicus, Socrates is always troublesome in an argument, and appears to be dishonest.

Socrates/ Excellent Hippias, I do not do so intentionally—if I did, it would show me to be a wise man and a master of wiles, as you would argue—but unintentionally, and therefore you must pardon me, for, as you say, he who is unintentionally dishonest should be pardoned.

Eudicus/ Yes, Hippias, do as he says, and for our sake, and also that you may not belie your profession, answer whatever Socrates asks you.

Hippias/ I will answer, as you request me, and do you ask whatever you like.

Socrates/ I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to which are the better—those who err voluntarily or involuntarily? And if you will answer me, I think that I can put you in the way of approaching the subject. You would admit, would you not, that there are good runners?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And there are bad runners?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is a bad runner?

Hippias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs well?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, and slowness is an evil quality?

Hippias/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Which of the two then is a better runner? He who runs slowly voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily?

Hippias/ He who runs slowly voluntarily.

Socrates/ And is not running a species of doing?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if a species of doing, a species of action?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonorable action in a race?

Hippias/ Yes, a bad action, certainly.

Socrates/ And he who runs slowly runs badly?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily?

Hippias/ That is to be inferred.

Socrates/ Then he who involuntarily does evil actions is worse in a race than he who does them voluntarily?

Hippias/ Yes, in a race.

Socrates/ Well, but at a wrestling match—which is the better wrestler, he who falls voluntarily or involuntarily?

Hippias/ He who falls voluntarily, doubtless.

Socrates/ And is it worse and more dishonorable at a wrestling match, to fall, or to throw another?

Hippias/ To fall.

Socrates/ Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base and dishonorable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them involuntarily?

Hippias/ That appears to be the truth.

Socrates/ And what would you say of any other bodily exercise—is not he who is better made able to do both that which is strong and that which is weak, that which is fair and that which is foul, so that when he› does bad actions with the body, he who is better made does them voluntarily, and he who is worse made does them involuntarily?

Hippias/ Yes, that appears to be true about strength.

Socrates/ And what do you say about grace, Hippias? Is not he who is better made able to assume evil and disgraceful figures and postures voluntarily, as he who is worse made assumes them involuntarily?

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame?

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ And what would you say of an unmusical voice? Would you prefer the voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune?

Hippias/ That which is voluntarily out of tune.

Socrates/ The involuntary is the worse of the two?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And would you choose to possess goods or evils?

Hippias/ Goods.

Socrates/ And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or involuntarily lame?

Hippias/ Feet which are voluntarily lame.

Socrates/ But is not lameness a defect or deformity?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not blinking a defect of the eyes?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And would you rather always have eyes with which you might voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily blink?

Hippias/ I would rather have eyes which voluntarily blink.

Socrates/ Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts ill better than that which involuntarily acts ill?

Hippias/ Yes, certainly, in cases such as you mention.

Socrates/ And does not the same hold of ears, nostrils, mouth, and of all the senses—those which involuntarily act ill are not to be desired, as being defective, and those which voluntarily act ill are to be desired as being good?

Hippias/ I agree.

Socrates/ And what would you say of instruments—which are the better sort of instruments to have to do with, those with which a man acts ill voluntarily or involuntarily? For example, had a man better have a rudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily?

Hippias/ He had better have a rudder with which he will steer ill voluntarily.

Socrates/ And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute and all other things?

Hippias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you may ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily?

Hippias/ I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily.

Socrates/ That would be the better horse?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be produced voluntarily, and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark?

Hippias/ Of him who voluntarily misses.

Socrates/ This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind which errs voluntarily?

Hippias/ Yes, certainly, in the use of the bow.

Socrates/ And what would you say of the art of medicine—has not the mind which voluntarily works harm to the body more of the healing art?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the involuntary?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, and in lute playing and in flute playing, and in all arts and sciences, is not that mind the better which voluntarily does what is evil and dishonorable, and goes wrong, and is not the worse that which does so involuntarily?

Hippias/ That is evident.

Socrates/ And what would you say of the characters of slaves? Should we not prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes, and are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit them involuntarily?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best state possible?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make mistakes voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hippias/ Oh, Socrates, it would be a monstrous thing to say that those who do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wrong involuntarily!

Socrates/ And yet that appears to be the only inference.

Hippias/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ But I imagined, Hippias, that you did. Please to answer once more. Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? Must not justice, at all events, be one of these?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if justice is a power of the soul, then the soul which has the greater power is also the more just, for that which has the greater power, my good friend, has been proved by us to be the better.

Hippias/ Yes, that has been proved.

Socrates/ And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if justice be power as well as knowledge—then will not the soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and that which is the more ignorant be the more unjust? Must it not be so?

Hippias/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom also better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and art—and these, either one or both of them, are elements of justice?

Hippias/ That seems to be true.

Socrates/ And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is to do well?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And will not the better and abler soul, when it does wrong, do wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily?

Hippias/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man is he who has the bad?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the good man will do wrong voluntarily, and the bad man involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul?

Hippias/ Which he certainly has.

Socrates/ Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things, if there be such a man, will be the good man?

Hippias/ There I cannot agree with you.

Socrates/ Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias, and yet that seems to be the conclusion which, as far as we can see at present. must follow from our argument. As I was saying before, I am all abroad, and being in perplexity am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary man should wander in perplexity is not surprising, but if you wise men also wander, and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering, the matter begins to be serious both to us and to you.

Lesser Hippias

Translated by Nicholas D. Smith.

Persons of the Dialog.

Eudicus, Socrates, Hippias.

Eudicus/ Why are you silent, Socrates, after Hippias has given such an exhibition? Why don't you either join us in praising some point or other in what he said, or else put something to the test, if it seems to you anything was not well said—especially since we who most claim to have a share in the practice of philosophy are now left to ourselves?

Socrates/ Indeed, Eudicus, there are some things in what Hippias said just now about Homer that I'd like to hear more about. For your father Apemantus used to say that the Iliad of Homer is a finer poem than the Odyssey, to just the extent that Achilles is a better man than Odysseus; for, he said, one of these poems is about Odysseus and the other about Achilles. I'd like to ask about that, then, if Hippias is willing. What does he think about these two men? Which of them does he say is the better? For in his exhibition he's told us all sorts of other things both about other poets and about Homer.

Eudicus/ It's plain that Hippias won't object to answering any question you ask him. Right, Hippias? If Socrates asks you something, will you answer, or what will you do?

Hippias/ Well, it would be strange behavior if I didn't, Eudicus. I always go from my home at Elis to the festival of the Greeks at Olympia when it is held and offer myself at the temple to speak on demand about any subject I have prepared for exhibition, and to answer any questions anyone wants to ask. I can hardly flee now from answering the questions of Socrates.

Socrates/ What a godlike state of mind you're in, Hippias, if you go to the temple at every Olympiad so confident about your soul's wisdom! I'd be amazed if any of the athletes of the body goes there to take part in the contests as fearless and trusting about his body as you say you are about your intellect!

Hippias/ It is reasonable for me to be in that state of mind, Socrates. Ever since I began taking part in the contests at the Olympic games, I have never met anyone superior to me in anything.

Socrates/ A fine reply, Hippias. Your fame is a monument for wisdom to the city of Elis and to your parents. But what do you say to us about Achilles and about Odysseus? Which do you say is the better man, and in what respect? When there were many of us inside, and you were giving your exhibition, I couldn't keep up with what you were saying, but I hesitated to keep asking questions. There were so many people inside, and I didn't want to hinder your display by raising questions. But now, since there are fewer of us and Eudicus here urges me to question you, speak, and instruct us clearly. What were you saying about these two men? How were you distinguishing them?

Hippias/ Well, I am glad to explain to you even more clearly than before what I say about these men and others, too. I say that Homer made Achilles the "best and bravest" man of those who went to Troy, and Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest.

Socrates/ What? Hippias, will you do me the favor of not laughing at me if I have difficulty understanding what you are saying and often repeat my questions? But try to answer me gently and in a good-natured way.

Hippias/ It would be shameful, Socrates, if I, who teach others to do that very thing and demand a fee for it, should

not myself be lenient when questioned by you and answer gently.

Socrates/ Finely put. But really, when you said that the poet made Achilles the "best and bravest," and when you said that he made Nestor the wisest, I thought I understood you. But when you said that he made Odysseus the wiliest—well, to tell you the truth, I don't know in the least what you mean by that. But tell me this; maybe it'll make me understand better. Doesn't Homer make Achilles wily?

Hippias/ Not in the least, Socrates, but most simple and truthful; for in the "Prayers," when he has them conversing, he has Achilles say to Odysseus:

> Son of Laertes, sprung from Zeus, resourceful Odysseus,
> I must speak the word bluntly,
> How I will act and how I think it shall be accomplished,
> For as hateful to me as the gates of Hades
> Is he who hides one thing in his mind, and says another.
> As for me, I will speak as it shall also be accomplished.

In these lines he clearly shows the way of each man, that Achilles is truthful and simple, and Odysseus is wily and a liar; for he presents Achilles as saying these words to Odysseus.

Socrates/ Now, Hippias, it may be that I understand what you mean. You mean that the wily person is a liar, or so it appears.

Hippias/ Certainly, Socrates. Homer presents Odysseus as that kind of person in many places, both in the Iliad and in the Odyssey.

Socrates/ So Homer, it seems, thought the truthful man was one kind of person, and the liar another, and not the same.

Hippias/ How could he not, Socrates?

Socrates/ And do you yourself think so, Hippias?

Hippias/ Certainly, Socrates. It would be very strange if it were otherwise.

Socrates/ Let's dismiss Homer, then, since it's impossible to ask him what he had in mind when he wrote these lines. But since you're evidently taking up the cause, and agree with what you say he meant, answer for both Homer and yourself.

Hippias/ So be it. Ask briefly what you wish.

Socrates/ Do you say that liars, like sick people, don't have the power to do anything, or that they do have the power to do something?

Hippias/ I say they very much have the power to do many things, and especially to deceive people.

Socrates/ So according to your argument they are powerful, it would seem, and wily. Right?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are they wily and deceivers from dimwittedness and foolishness, or by cunning and some kind of intelligence?

Hippias/ From cunning, absolutely, and intelligence.

Socrates/ So they are intelligent, it seems.

Hippias/ Yes, by Zeus. Too much so.

Socrates/ And being intelligent, do they not know what they are doing, or do they know?

Hippias/ They know very well. That's how they do their mischief.

Socrates/ And knowing the things that they know, are they ignorant, or wise?

Hippias/ Wise, surely, in just these things: in deception.

Socrates/ Stop. Let us recall what it is that you are saying. You claim that liars are powerful and intelligent and knowledgeable and wise in those matters in which they are liars?

Hippias/ That's what I claim.

Socrates/ And that the truthful and the liars are different, complete opposites of one another?

Hippias/ That's what I say.

Socrates/ Well, then. The liars are among the powerful and wise, according to your argument.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when you say that the liars are powerful and wise in these very matters, do you mean that they have the power to lie if they want, or that they are without power in the matters in which they are liars?

Hippias/ I mean they are powerful.

Socrates/ To put it in a nutshell, then, liars are wise and have the power to lie.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So a person who did not have the power to lie and was ignorant would not be a liar.

Hippias/ That's right.

Socrates/ But each person who can do what he wishes when he wishes is powerful. I mean someone who is not prevented by disease or other such things, someone like you with regard to writing my name. You have the power to do this whenever you wish to. That's what I mean. Or don't you say that one in such a condition is powerful?

Hippias/ I do.

Socrates/ Now tell me, Hippias: aren't you experienced in calculating and arithmetic?

Hippias/ Most experienced of all, Socrates.

Socrates/ So if someone were to ask you what three times seven hundred is, couldn't you tell him the truth about this most quickly and best of all, if you wished?

Hippias/ Of course.

Socrates/ Because you are most powerful and wisest in these matters?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are you, then, merely wisest and most powerful, or are you also best in those things in which you are most powerful and wisest, that is, in arithmetic?

Hippias/ Best also, for sure, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then would you tell the truth most powerfully about these things?

Hippias/ I think so.

Socrates/ But what about falsehoods about these same things? Please answer with the same nobility and grandeur you showed before, Hippias. If someone were to ask you what three times seven hundred is, could you lie the best, always consistently say falsehoods about these things, if you wished to lie and never to tell the truth? Or would one who is ignorant of calculations have more power than you to lie if he wished to? Don't you think the ignorant person would often involuntarily tell the truth when he wished to say falsehoods, if it so happened, because he didn't know; whereas you, the wise person, if you should wish to lie, would always consistently lie?

Hippias/ Yes, it is just as you say.

Socrates/ Is the liar, then, a liar about other things but not about number—he wouldn't lie about numbers?

Hippias/ But yes, by Zeus, about numbers, too.

Socrates/ So we should also maintain this, Hippias, that there is such a person as a liar about calculation and number.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Who would this person be? Mustn't he have the power to lie, as you just now agreed, if he is going to be a liar?

If you remember, you said that one who did not have the power to lie could never become a liar.

Hippias/ I remember. I said that.

Socrates/ And were you not just now shown to have the most power to lie about calculations?

Hippias/ Yes. I said that, too.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, have the most power to tell the truth about calculations?

Hippias/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then the same person has the most power both to say falsehoods and to tell the truth about calculations. And this person is the one who is good with regard to these things, the arithmetician?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then who becomes a liar about calculations, Hippias, other than the good person? For the same person is also powerful, and truthful, as well.

Hippias/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Do you see, then, that the same person is both a liar and truthful about these things, and the truthful person is no better than the liar? For, indeed, he is the same person and the two are not complete opposites, as you supposed just now.

Hippias/ He does not appear to be, at least in this field.

Socrates/ Do you wish to investigate some other field, then?

Hippias/ If you wish.

Socrates/ All right. Are you not also experienced in geometry?

Hippias/ I am.

Socrates/ Well, then. Isn't it the same way in geometry? Doesn't the same person have the most power to lie and to tell the truth about geometrical diagrams, namely, the geometer?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is anyone else good at these things, or the geometer?

Hippias/ No one else.

Socrates/ The good and wise geometer, then, is the most powerful in both respects, isn't he? And if anyone could be a liar about diagrams, it would be this person, the good geometer? For he has the power to lie, but the bad one is powerless; and one who does not have the power to lie cannot become a liar, as you agreed.

Hippias/ That's right.

Socrates/ Let us investigate a third person, the astronomer, whose craft you think you know even better than the preceding ones. Right, Hippias?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Aren't the same things true in astronomy, also?

Hippias/ Probably, Socrates.

Socrates/ In astronomy, too, if anyone is a liar, it will be the good astronomer, he who has the power to lie. Certainly it won't be the one who does not have the power; for he is ignorant.

Hippias/ That's the way it appears.

Socrates/ So the same person will be truthful and a liar in astronomy.

Hippias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Come then, Hippias. Examine all the sciences similarly. Is there any that's different from these, or are they all like this? You are the wisest of people in the greatest number of crafts, as I once heard you boasting. In the

marketplace, next to the tables of the bankers, you told of your great and enviable wisdom. You said that you had once gone to Olympia with everything you had on your body the product of your own work. First, the ring you were wearing—you began with that—was your own work, showing that you knew how to engrave rings. And another signet, too, was your work, and a strigil and an oil bottle, which you had made. Then you said that you yourself had cut from leather the sandals you were wearing, and had woven your cloak and tunic. And what seemed to everyone most unusual and an exhibition of the greatest wisdom was when you said that the belt you wore around your tunic was like the very expensive Persian ones, and that you had plaited it yourself. In addition to these things, you said that you brought poems with you—epic, tragic, and dithyrambs, and many writings of all sorts in prose. You said you came with knowledge that distinguished you from all others on the subjects I was just now speaking of, and also about rhythms, and harmony, and the correctness of letters, and many other things besides, as I seem to remember. But I've forgotten to mention your artful technique (as it seems) of memory, in which you think you are most brilliant. I suppose I have forgotten a great many other things, as well. But, as I say, look both at your own crafts—for they are sufficient—and also those of others, and tell me, in accordance with what you and I have agreed upon, if you find any case in which one person is truthful and another (distinct, not the same) person is a liar. Look for one in whatever sort of wisdom or villainy you like, or whatever you want to call it; but you will not find it, my friend, for none exists. So tell me!

Hippias/ But I can't, Socrates; at least not offhand.

Socrates/ And you never will, I think. But if what I say is true, you will remember what follows from our argument.

Hippias/ I don't entirely understand what you mean, Socrates.

Socrates/ Presumably that's because you are not using your memory technique; plainly, you don't think you need it. But I will remind you. You realize that you said that Achilles was truthful, whereas Odysseus was a liar and wily?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ You are now aware, then, that the same person has been discovered to be a liar and truthful, so that if Odysseus was a liar, he also becomes truthful, and if Achilles was truthful, he also becomes a liar, and these two men are not different from one another, nor opposites, but similar?

Hippias/ Oh, Socrates! You're always weaving arguments of this kind. You pick out whatever is the most difficult part of the argument, and fasten on to it in minute detail, and don't dispute about the whole subject under discussion. So now, if you wish, I'll prove to you by sufficient argument, based upon much evidence, that Homer made Achilles better than Odysseus and not a liar, whereas he made the latter deceitful, a teller of many lies, and worse than Achilles. If you wish, you may then offer counterarguments to mine, to the effect that the other is better. That way, these people here will know more which of us speaks better.

Socrates/ Hippias, I don't dispute that you are wiser than I, but it is always my custom to pay attention when someone is saying something, especially when the speaker seems to me to be wise. And because I desire to learn what he means, I question him thoroughly and examine and place side-by-side the things he says, so I can learn. If the speaker seems to me to be some worthless person, I neither ask questions nor do I care what he says. This is how you'll recognize whom I consider wise. You'll find me being persistent about what's said by this sort of person, questioning him so that I can

benefit by learning something. And so now I noticed as you were speaking, that in the lines you just now recited—to show that Achilles speaks to Odysseus as if Odysseus were a fraud—it seems ridiculous to me, if you speak truly, that Odysseus (the wily one), is nowhere portrayed as lying, whereas Achilles is portrayed as a wily person according to your argument. In any case, he lies. For he begins by saying the lines which you just now recited:

> For as hateful to me as the gates of Hades
> Is he who hides one thing in his mind, and says another.

A little later he says he wouldn't be persuaded by Odysseus and Agamemnon, and wouldn't stay in Troy at all. But, he says;

> Tomorrow, when I have sacrificed to Zeus and all the gods,
> And loaded my ships, having dragged them to the sea,
> You will see, if you want to, and if you care about such things,
> My ships sailing very early on the fish-filled Hellespont,
> And in them, the men eagerly rowing.
> And if the glorious Earth-shaker should grant a fair voyage,
> On the third day I should come to fertile Phthia.

And before that, when he was insulting Agamemnon, he said;

> Now I am going to Phthia, because it is much better
> To go home with my curved ships. I do not think
> I will stay here dishonored, and pile up riches and wealth for you.

Although he said these things—once before the entire army and once before his colleagues—nowhere is he shown to have prepared or tried to drag down the ships to sail home. Rather, he shows quite a noble contempt for telling the truth. So, Hippias, I've been questioning you from the beginning because

I'm confused as to which of these two men was represented as better by the poet, thinking that both were "best and bravest" and that it's hard to discern which is better, with regard both to lying and to truth, and to virtue, as well; for in this, also, the two are quite similar.

Hippias/ That's because you don't look at it right, Socrates. When Achilles lies, he's portrayed as lying not on purpose but involuntarily, forced to stay and help by the misfortune of the army. But the lies of Odysseus are voluntary and on purpose.

Socrates/ You're deceiving me, my dear Hippias, and are yourself imitating Odysseus!

Hippias/ Not at all, Socrates! What do you mean? What are you referring to?

Socrates/ To your saying that Achilles didn't lie on purpose—he, who was also such a cheat and a schemer in addition to his fraudulence, as Homer has represented him. He's shown to be so much more intelligent than Odysseus in easily defrauding him without being noticed, that right in front of the other, he dared to contradict himself and Odysseus didn't notice. In any case, Odysseus isn't portrayed as saying anything to him which shows that he perceived his lying.

Hippias/ What are you talking about, Socrates?

Socrates/ Don't you know that after he said to Odysseus that he would sail away at dawn, he doesn't say again that he's going to sail away when he speaks to Ajax, but says something different?

Hippias/ Where?

Socrates/ In the lines in which he says;

> I will not think of bloody war
> Until the son of thoughtful Priam, noble Hector
> Comes to the tents and the ships of the Myrmidons,
> Killing Argives, and burns the ships with blazing fire.
> But at my tent and my black ship

I think Hector himself, though eager for battle, will stop.

So, Hippias; do you think the son of Thetis, who was taught by the most wise Chiron, was so forgetful that—though a little earlier he had insulted fraudulent people with the most extreme insults—he himself said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away, and to Ajax that he was going to stay? And he wasn't doing this on purpose, supposing that Odysseus was an old fool, and that he himself could get the better of him by precisely such conniving and lying?

Hippias/ It doesn't seem that way to me, Socrates. Rather, in these things, too, it was because of his guilelessness that he was led to say something different to Ajax and to Odysseus. But when Odysseus tells the truth, he always has a purpose, and when he lies, it's the same.

Socrates/ Then it seems that Odysseus is better than Achilles after all.

Hippias/ Not at all, surely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Why not? Didn't it emerge just now that the voluntary liars are better than the involuntary ones?

Hippias/ But Socrates, how could those who are voluntarily unjust, and are voluntary and purposeful evil-doers, be better than those who act that way involuntarily? For these people, there seems to be much lenience, when they act unjustly without knowing, or lie, or do some other evil. The laws, too, are surely much harsher towards those who do evil and lie voluntarily than towards those who do so involuntarily.

Socrates/ You see, Hippias, that I am telling the truth when I say that I'm persistent in questioning wise people? It may be that this is the only good trait I have and that all the others I have are quite worthless. I make mistakes as to the way things are, and don't know how they are—I find it sufficient evidence of this that when I am with one of you who are highly regarded for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Greeks bear witness,

I show myself to know nothing. For I think pretty well none of the same things as you do; yet what greater evidence of ignorance is there than when someone disagrees with wise men? But I have one wonderfully good trait, which saves me: I'm not ashamed to learn. I inquire and ask questions and I'm very grateful to the one who answers, and I've never failed in gratitude to anyone. I've never denied it when I've learned anything, pretending that what I learned was my own discovery. Instead, I sing the praises of the one who taught me as a wise person, and proclaim what I learned from him. So indeed now, I don't agree with what you are saying but disagree very strongly. But I know very well that this is my fault—it's because I'm the sort of person I am, not to say anything better of myself than I deserve. To me, Hippias, it appears entirely the opposite to what you say: those who harm people and commit injustice and lie and cheat and go wrong voluntarily, rather than involuntarily, are better than those who do so involuntarily. However, sometimes I believe the opposite, and I go back and forth about all this—plainly because I don't know. But now at this moment a fit of lightheadedness has come over me, and I think those who voluntarily go wrong regarding something are better than those who do so involuntarily. I blame the preceding arguments for my present condition, making it appear to me now that those who do any of these things involuntarily are more worthless than those who do them voluntarily. So please be nice and don't refuse to cure my soul. You'll do me a much greater good if you give my soul relief from ignorance, than if you gave my body relief from disease. But if you wish to give a long speech, I tell you in advance that you wouldn't cure me, for I couldn't follow you. If you are willing to answer me as you did just now, you'll benefit me a great deal, and I think you yourself won't be harmed. I might justly call for your help, too, son of Apemantus, for you goaded me into a discussion with

Hippias. So now, if Hippias isn't willing to answer me, ask him for me.

Eudicus/ Well, Socrates, I don't think Hippias will need us to plead with him. For that's not what he said earlier; he said that he wouldn't flee from any man's questioning. Right, Hippias? Isn't that what you said?

Hippias/ I did. But Socrates always creates confusion in arguments, and seems to argue unfairly.

Socrates/ Oh excellent Hippias, I don't do that voluntarily, for then I'd be wise and awesome, according to your argument, but involuntarily. So please be lenient with me, for you say that one who acts unfairly involuntarily should be treated leniently.

Eudicus/ By all means don't do otherwise, Hippias. For our sakes and for the sake of what you said earlier, answer what Socrates asks you.

Hippias/ I will answer, then, since you beg me to. Ask whatever you wish.

Socrates/ I want very much, Hippias, to investigate what we were just now saying: whether those who go wrong voluntarily, or those who go wrong involuntarily are better. I think the most correct way to pursue our investigation is as follows. You answer. Do you call one sort of runner a good one?

Hippias/ I do.

Socrates/ And one sort bad?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ You think one who runs well is a good runner; one who runs badly, a bad one?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And one who runs slowly runs badly, and one who runs quickly runs well?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ In a race, then, and in running, quickness is a good thing, and slowness, bad?

Hippias/ What else would it be?

Socrates/ Which one is the better runner, then: the one who runs slowly voluntarily, or the one who does so involuntarily?

Hippias/ The one who does so voluntarily.

Socrates/ And isn't running doing something?

Hippias/ Doing something, of course.

Socrates/ If doing, doesn't it also accomplish something?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So one who runs badly accomplishes something bad and shameful in a race?

Hippias/ Bad; how else?

Socrates/ One who runs slowly runs -badly?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So the good runner voluntarily accomplishes this bad and shameful thing, and the bad runner, involuntarily?

Hippias/ So it seems, at least.

Socrates/ In a race, then, one who accomplishes bad things involuntarily is more worthless than one who does them voluntarily?

Hippias/ In a race, at least.

Socrates/ What about in wrestling? Which is the better wrestler, one who falls down voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hippias/ One who does so voluntarily, it seems.

Socrates/ Is it more worthless and shameful in wrestling to fall down or to knock down the opponent?

Hippias/ To fall down.

Socrates/ So also in wrestling, one who voluntarily has worthless and shameful accomplishments is a better wrestler than one who has them involuntarily.

Hippias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ What about in other physical activities? Isn't the physically better person able to accomplish both sorts of things: the strong and the weak, the shameful and the fine? So whenever he accomplishes worthless physical results, the one who is physically better does them voluntarily, whereas the one who is worse does them involuntarily?

Hippias/ That how it seems to be in matters of strength, also.

Socrates/ What about gracefulness, Hippias? Doesn't the better body strike shameful and worthless poses voluntarily, and the worse body involuntarily? What do you think?

Hippias/ That's right.

Socrates/ So awkwardness, when voluntary, counts toward virtue, but when involuntary, toward worthlessness.

Hippias/ Apparently.

Socrates/ What do you say about the voice? Which do you say is better, one that sings out of tune voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hippias/ One that does so voluntarily.

Socrates/ And the one that does so involuntarily is in a worse condition?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Would you prefer to possess good or bad things?

Hippias/ Good.

Socrates/ Then would you prefer to possess feet that limp voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hippias/ Voluntarily.

Socrates/ But doesn't having a limp mean having worthless and awkward feet?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, again; doesn't dullness of sight mean having worthless eyes?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Which sort of eyes, then, would you wish to possess and live with: those with which you would see dully and incorrectly voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hippias/ Those with which one would do so voluntarily.

Socrates/ So you regard organs that voluntarily accomplish worthless results as better than those that do so involuntarily?

Hippias/ Yes, in these sorts of cases.

Socrates/ So then one statement embraces them all, ears, nose, mouth and all the senses: those that involuntarily accomplish bad results aren't worth having because they're worthless, whereas those that do so voluntarily are worth having because they're good.

Hippias/ I think so.

Socrates/ Well, then. Which tools are better to work with? Those with which one accomplishes bad results voluntarily, or involuntarily? For example, is a rudder with which one will involuntarily steer badly better, or one with which one will do so voluntarily?

Hippias/ One with which one will do so voluntarily.

Socrates/ Isn't it the same with a bow, a lyre, flutes, and all the rest?

Hippias/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ Well, then. Is it better to possess a horse with such a soul that one could ride it badly voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hippias/ Voluntarily.

Socrates/ So that's a better one.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ With the better horse's soul, then, one would voluntarily do the worthless acts of this soul, but with the soul of the worthless mare one would do them involuntarily.

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And so also with a dog and all other animals?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well now, then. For an archer, is it better to possess a soul which voluntarily misses the target, or one which does so involuntarily?

Hippias/ One which does so voluntarily.

Socrates/ So this sort of soul is better also for archery?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ A soul which involuntarily misses the mark is more worthless than one which does so voluntarily.

Hippias/ In archery, anyway.

Socrates/ How about in medicine? Isn't one that voluntarily accomplishes bad things for the body better at medicine?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then this sort of soul is better at this craft than the other.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, then. As to the soul that plays the lyre and the flute better and does everything else better in the crafts and the sciences—doesn't it accomplish bad and shameful things and miss the mark voluntarily, whereas the more worthless does this involuntarily?

Hippias/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And perhaps we would prefer to have slaves with souls that voluntarily miss the mark and act badly, rather than those which do so involuntarily, as being better at these things.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, then. Would we not wish to possess our own soul in the best condition?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, will it be better if it acts badly and misses the mark voluntarily or involuntarily?

Hippias/ But it would be terrible, Socrates, if those who commit injustice voluntarily are to be better than those who do it involuntarily!

Socrates/ But nonetheless they appear to be, at least given what's been said.

Hippias/ Not to me.

Socrates/ But I thought, Hippias, that they appeared to be so to you, too. But answer again: isn't justice either some sort of power or knowledge, or both? Or isn't justice necessarily one of these things?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So if justice is a power of the soul, isn't the more powerful soul the more just? For, my excellent friend, it appeared to us, didn't it, that one of this sort was better?

Hippias/ Yes, it did.

Socrates/ And if it's knowledge? Then isn't the wiser soul more just and the more ignorant more unjust?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if it's both? Then isn't the soul which has both—knowledge and power—more just, and the more ignorant more unjust? Isn't that necessarily so?

Hippias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ This more powerful and wiser soul was seen to be better and to have more power to do both fine and shameful in everything it accomplishes?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whenever it accomplishes shameful results, then, it does so voluntarily, by power and craft, and these things appear to be attributes of justice, either both or one of them.

Hippias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And to do injustice is to do bad, whereas to refrain from injustice is to do something fine.

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ So the more powerful and better soul, when it does injustice, will do injustice voluntarily, and the worthless soul involuntarily?

Hippias/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And isn't the good man the one who has a good soul, and the bad man the one who has a bad soul?

Hippias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Therefore, it's up to the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and the bad man to do it involuntarily; that is, if the good man has a good soul.

Hippias/ But surely he has.

Socrates/ So the one who voluntarily misses the mark and does what is shameful and unjust, Hippias—that is, if there is such a person—would be no other than the good man.

Hippias/ I can't agree with you in that, Socrates.

Socrates/ Nor I with myself, Hippias. But given the argument, we can't help having it look that way to us, now, at any rate. However, as I said before, on these matters I waver back and forth and never believe the same thing. And it's not surprising at all that I or any other ordinary person should

waver. But if you wise men are going to do it, too—that means something terrible for us, if we can't stop our wavering even after we've put ourselves in your company.

The Lesser Hippias.

Translated by Mr. Sydenham.

Persons of the Dialog.

Eudicus, Socrates, Hippias.

SCENE. —THE SCHOOL OF PHIDOSTRATUS.

Eudicus/ Whence comes it, Socrates, that you are so silent; when Hippias here has been exhibiting so finely and so copiously? Why do you not join the rest of the audience in praising his dissertation; or, at least, make some objections to it, if there was anything in it which you disapproved? —All the company too are now departed, and we left by ourselves; we, who would claim an especial right to share in all philosophic exercises.

Socrates/ It would give me pleasure, Eudicus, I assure you, to ask Hippias a question or two, relating to a subject, which he has just now been treating of, taken out of Homer. For I have heard your father Apemantes say, that the Iliad of Homer was a finer poem than his Odyssey; and as far surpassed it in excellence, as the virtue of Achilles surpassed the virtue of Ulysses. For those two poems, he said, were purposely composed in honor of those two heroes: the Odyssey, to show the virtues of Ulysses; the Iliad, those of Achilles. Concerning this very point then, I should be glad, if it pleases Hippias, to ask his opinion; what he thinks of those two persons, and whether of them in his judgment was the better man. For his exhibition, besides containing a great variety of other matters, displayed much learning in the poets, and particularly in Homer.

Eudicus/ There is no doubt but Hippias, if you propose a question to him, will condescend to give an answer. —Will you not, Hippias, answer to any question which Socrates

shall propose to you? or what other course will you take in the affair?

Hippias/ I should take a shameful course indeed, Eudicus, should I decline answering to any question put by Socrates; I, who never fail my attendance at the Olympic games; and, quitting the privacy of home, constantly present myself in the temple there, to dissert, before the general assembly of the Grecians, upon any of the subjects which I have then ready for exhibition, such as shall be chosen by the audience; and to answer to any question which any man shall think fit to ask.

Socrates/ Happy is the situation of your mind, Hippias, that, as often as the Olympic festival returns, you can proceed to the temple with a soul so full of alacrity and hope, through consciousness of wisdom. I should much wonder, if anyone of the athletic combatants, on that occasion, marched to the engagement with half that security and confidence in the powers of his body, which you, according to your own account, have in the abilities of your mind.

Hippias/ I have reason, Socrates, to entertain such confidence. For, since the time when I first contended for a prize in the trials of skill at the Olympics, I have never met with a man my superior in any which I engaged in.

Socrates/ The reputation of your wisdom, Hippias, will be a fair monument of glory to your family and country. —But what say you to our question concerning Achilles and Ulysses? Whether of the two, think you, was the better man; and in what respects? For, amidst the multitude of people, who were within, thronging about you at your exhibition, I missed hearing some part of what you said; and, though desirous of asking you to repeat it over again, I suppressed that desire, on account of the greatness of the crowd, and because I would not interrupt your dissertation. But since

we are reduced to so small a number, and since Eudicus here encourages me to ask you, give me a precise and clear account of what you then said of those two heroes, and what distinction you made between their characters.

Hippias/ Well, Socrates; I am willing to inform you, more precisely and distinctly than I did in my exhibition, what my sentiments are concerning those heroes, and others beside. —I say then, that Homer has made Achilles superior in virtue to all the Grecians who were at the siege of Troy, Nestor superior in wisdom, and Ulysses in cunning.

Socrates/ Ah, Hippias! Will you grant me one favor more? and that is, not to laugh at me, if I am slow in apprehending what you say, and importune you with frequent and repeated questions. Will you endeavor, on the contrary, to give me mild and gentle answers?

Hippias/ Since I profess the instructing others in the knowledge of those very things which are the subjects of your inquiry, and think that knowledge so rare, as to deserve the being well paid for, it would be unfair and dishonorable in me, Socrates, not to pardon your ignorance, and give a mild answer to your questions.

Socrates/ Very fairly and honorably spoken. —You must know then, that when you said Achilles was made by Homer superior in virtue, I seemed to apprehend your meaning: as I also did, when you told me that his Nestor was made superior in wisdom. But when you further said, that the poet had made Ulysses superior in cunning, what you mean by this, to confess to you the truth, I am entirely ignorant of. —Possibly I may apprehend your meaning better by your answer to this question: Is not cunning part of the character of Achilles, as drawn by Homer?

Hippias/ Nothing like it; but the height of simplicity. For in the ninth book of the Iliad, where Achilles and Ulysses are

introduced in conversation together, Achilles, addressing himself to Ulysses, speaks thus;

> Son of Laertes, progeny of Jove!
> Subtle thy wit, Ulysses, and thy brain
> Full of devices various: but to me
> Plain speech belongs; and bluntly to declare
> My mind, my meaning, and my fix'd resolve.
> Not the black gates of Hades are to me
> More hostile or more hateful, than the man
> Whose tongue holds no communion with his heart.
> Thus then the secret purpose of my soul
> I tell thee—in no fruitless words; the deed
> Shall follow. —

In these verses we see the character of each of those heroes: we see Achilles sincere and simple, Ulysses false and cunning. For Achilles is made the speaker of these verses, and to Ulysses are they spoken.

Socrates/ Now, Hippias, I am in some hopes of understanding what you mean. False you call cunning, it seems; and a cunning man, with you, I find, is a man of falsehood.

Hippias/ Exactly so, Socrates. And Homer accordingly has made Ulysses a man of that very character, in many places both of the Iliad and of the Odyssey.

Socrates/ Homer then, it seems, was of opinion, that the man of truth was a man of different character from the man of falsehood.

Hippias/ Certainly, Socrates. How should it be otherwise?

Socrates/ And are you of the same opinion then yourself, Hippias?

Hippias/ Most certainly. For it would be of sad consequence to have those two opposite characters confounded.

Socrates/ Homer then let us leave out of the question: it being impossible for us to ask him, what he had in his mind when he wrote those verses. But, since you appear to second and support his cause, and to entertain the same sentiments with those which you attribute to him, do you answer at the same time for both, for the poet and yourself.

Hippias/ So it shall be. Ask any question then, whatever you think fit; —only let it be brief.

Socrates/ By men of falsehood, do you mean men who are under some such kind of inability to certain actions, as men who are sick labor under? or do you mean men of abilities and powers for some or other performance?

Hippias/ I mean men, who have powers, and those very strong ones too, for many purposes, but particularly to deceive others.

Socrates/ The cunning then, it seems, according to your account, are men of strong powers and abilities. Are they not?

Hippias/ They are.

Socrates/ Is it through folly, and want of understanding, that they are cunning and deceitful? or is it through artfulness and understanding—of a certain kind?

Hippias/ Through artfulness in the highest degree, and depth of understanding.

Socrates/ They are men of good understanding then, it seems.

Hippias/ They are in no want of understanding, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Since they have understanding then, are they ignorant of what they are about? or do they know it?

Hippias/ They know well enough what they do. And through this very knowledge it is that they are so wicked.

Socrates/ With this knowledge then, which they are masters of, can they want discipline or skill? or do they abound in it?

Hippias/ They have discipline and skill very sufficient for their purpose, that is, to deceive.

Socrates/ Hold now: let me recollect all that you have said. You assert, that men of falsehood are men of abilities, understanding, knowledge, and skill that is, in those subjects, in which they deceive.

Hippias/ I do.

Socrates/ And that men of sincerity and men of falsehood are different kinds of men, and of quite opposite characters one to the other.

Hippias/ I own this assertion also.

Socrates/ Weil then; amongst the men of abilities and skill, some, it seems, are men of falsehood, according to your account.

Hippias/ Most true.

Socrates/ When you say now, that men of falsehood are men of abilities and skill in certain respects, do you mean that they are able to deceive, if they are willing so to do? or think you that they want abilities for the purpose of deceiving?

Hippias/ I think they have abilities for that purpose.

Socrates/ To sum up the whole then; men of falsehood are men who have skill and ability to deceive.

Hippias/ Right.

Socrates/ The man therefore, who has no ability or skill to deceive, cannot be a man of falsehood, or a deceiver.

Hippias/ Very right.

Socrates/ Whether is that man able to do what he wills, who can exercise his ability at whatever time he chooses?

that is, supposing him not hindered by some disease or other thing of that kind: but in the same manner, I mean, as you are able, whenever you choose it, to write my name. Say you not, that every such man is able, who has the like power in other cases?

Hippias/ I do.

Socrates/ Tell me now, Hippias; are not you well versed in numbers and accounts?

Hippias/ Perfectly well, Socrates.

Socrates/ Were a man to ask you then, "How many are thrice seven hundred," would you not answer that question, if you chose so to do, perfectly well, and with the utmost readiness?

Hippias/ I certainly should.

Socrates/ And that, because your ability and skill are excellent in subjects of that kind.

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ Do you excel in ability and skill only? or is your virtue equal to your ability and skill—with respect to the same subject; that is, numbers and accounts?

Hippias/ It is, Socrates.

Socrates/ You are perfectly well able, then, upon these subjects, to speak the truth: are you not?

Hippias/ So I imagine.

Socrates/ But what; are you not equally able to speak untruths upon the same subject? Answer me now, Hippias, as you did before, with a generous freedom and openness. Were a man to ask you, then, "How many are thrice seven hundred?" would not you be the best able to impose on others, and always to give answers alike untrue upon that subject, if you had a constant inclination to impose falsehood for truth, and never at any time to give a right

answer? Or would the unskilled in computations be better able to deceive than you are, if they were so inclined? Might not the ignorant, however desirous of persisting in false answers, frequently happen to stumble on such as were true, out of mere ignorance? But you, who have skill, should you also have an inclination to deceive, would you not always invariably answer wrong?

Hippias/ Certainly; the case is as you represent it.

Socrates/ Now the man of thorough falsehood, is he a deceiver in other cases only, but not so in numbering and computing? —Would he not deceive others, when numbers and computations were the points in question?

Hippias/ By Zeus, would he.

Socrates/ Let us suppose, then, Hippias, some certain person to be a false man, or a deceiver, upon the subject of numbers and computations.

Hippias/ Well.

Socrates/ What kind of person must he be? In order to be a deceiver, must he not, as you yourself just now acknowledged, have abilities to deceive? —for, as to any other man, who wanted those abilities, you admitted, if you remember, that such a one would never be a good deceiver.

Hippias/ I remember, we agreed in this.

Socrates/ Was it not proved just now, that you yourself was in the highest degree capable of deceiving others, by false information, upon the subject of numbers and accounts?

Hippias/ In this too we agreed.

Socrates/ And are you not in the highest degree capable of giving true information upon the same subject?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ One and the same person therefore has abilities beyond other men. to give either false or true information upon the subject of numbers and accounts: and a good arithmetician is this person.

Hippias/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Who appears, then, Hippias, to be the man of falsehood, and the deceiver, with regard to numbers and accounts? Is it any other than the good arithmetician? for he it is who is the most able. And the same man is also the true accountant.

Hippias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ You see then that it belongs to the same man to be a man of falsehood and a man of truth on such subjects; and that the man of truth is not a better man in this respect, than the man of falsehood: for indeed he is the same person; so far is he from being one of opposite character, as you just now imagined.

Hippias/ It appears so in this case, I own.

Socrates/ Shall we try how it appears in other cases?

Hippias/ With all my heart; if you choose to go on to others.

Socrates/ Have not you great skill in geometry?

Hippias/ I have.

Socrates/ Well then; is it not so in geometry? Is not one and the same person capable of giving either true or false information concerning diagrams?

Hippias/ I admit he is.

Socrates/ Is any other person beside good at diagrams?

Hippias/ No other.

Socrates/ A good and skillful geometrician, then, is equally capable, in either way, above other persons: and, if there be any excellent deceiver upon the subject of diagrams,

it must be such a man: for he has abilities to deceive; whereas the bad geometrician is wanting in those abilities: so that neither in this case can the man who has no abilities to deceive ever be a deceiver or man of falsehood, as you before admitted.

Hippias/ You are right.

Socrates/ Further now, let us consider a third case, that of astronomy; in which science you have a still deeper knowledge than you have in those mentioned before. Is it not true, Hippias?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ Does not the same thing then hold good in astronomy?

Hippias/ It is probable that it does, Socrates.

Socrates/ In this case, therefore, it is the good astronomer who is, above all others, the man of falsehood; he who is able and well qualified to deceive: For it cannot be the man who is ignorant in astronomy; because such a one is unable and unqualified for that purpose.

Hippias/ It appears so.

Socrates/ One and the same man therefore, in astronomy also, is the man of truth and the man of falsehood.

Hippias/ So it seems to be, I confess.

Socrates/ Now, Hippias, let us proceed to consider, in general and at large, through all the arts and sciences, if there be any case in which that position fails of being true. You must be a competent judge of this, because your knowledge is universal, and you are master of more arts than any man living: as I have heard you yourself declare, at some of the tables in the assembly-hall; where you were setting forth in ample detail, and glorying in, the variety of your valuable and rare knowledge. You there told us that

you went once to the Olympic festival, with your attire, and everything which you had about you; all the making of your own hands: in the first place, that the seal-ring which you wore on your finger, for you began with that, was your own work, proving thus your skill in cutting intaglios. Beside that, you had another seal of your own engraving: a strigil too, and an unguent-box, of your own workmanship. Your father said, that the slippers, which you then had on your feet, were of your own cutting out and making; and that the garments which you then wore, the upper and the under both, were of your own weaving. But, what seemed the strangest thing of all, and a proof of your ingenuity and skill the most surprising, you told us, that the belt or girdle, which you wore round your vest, (and it was of that rare and costly sort, such as they make in Persia,) was entirely your own manufacture. Beside all this, you carried with you thither, on that occasion, poems, you said, of your own composing, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic; together with a great number of your compositions in prose upon various subjects. You assured us, that in the sciences, those we have just now been speaking of, you was superior to every person then at the Olympics; as you also was in the science of rhythm and harmony, and that of grammar. You enumerated, as well as I remember, a multitude of other branches of knowledge which you excelled in. But, I think, I had like to have forgotten your art of memory, for which you are so famous. Many other arts I presume you have, which I cannot recollect at present. But what I mean is this; to put you upon considering those arts and sciences, which you are master of, (and I have mentioned a sufficient number of them,) and all those beside, which are severally professed by others; and then to ask you, if you can think of any, where the man of truth and the man of falsehood, as we have described them, are distinct persons; and where the same

man is not equally fitted for speaking truth and falsehood. Consider the matter in any art you please, in any kind of wisdom, skill, or cunning, or whatever else you choose to name it, and you will never find it so to be; since it is not there to be found. For if you know any, which affords such an instance, tell me what it is.

Hippias/ I am not able, Socrates, thus on the sudden.

Socrates/ Nor ever, as I imagine, will you be able. If I am in the right then, remember, Hippias, what conclusion follows from my reasoning.

Hippias/ It does not readily occur to me, Socrates, what conclusion it is you mean.

Socrates/ You do not perhaps at present exercise your art of memory. No doubt, you think there is at present no occasion for it. I will assist you therefore in recollecting. Do you not remember that you said, Achilles was a man of truth, and Ulysses a man of cunning and falsehood?

Hippias/ I do.

Socrates/ But now you perceive, that the man of truth and the man of falsehood have proved to be the same person. So that, if Ulysses was a man of falsehood, it appears that he was no less a man of truth; and if Achilles was a man of truth, we find he must also have been a man of falsehood. These two characters then are not heterogeneous, one from the other; much less are they opposite, as you imagined; but are similar, and meet in the same man.

Hippias/ Socrates, you are always twisting and winding arguments in this sort of way. In every matter of debate, you always pick out that point in which most difficulty lies; you stick close to that, and handle it with a most minute exactness: but you never meddle with the whole of the subject, considered in one view. For I can produce you now a multitude of proofs, if you are disposed to hear them,

sufficient to convince you, that Homer has made Achilles a man of sincerity, and of greater virtue than Ulysses; whom he has made crafty, false, and deceitful, in fine, a worse man than Achilles. And to oppose my proofs, do you, if you have a mind to it, bring others on your side of the question, to prove Ulysses the better man: by which means our little audience here may be the better enabled to judge which of us speaks the best.

Socrates/ I have no doubt, Hippias, but that your wisdom is superior to mine. But it is a constant rule with me, at the time when any man is speaking, to give him my attention; especially, if I think him a wise man: and, as I am desirous of comprehending perfectly all he means, afterwards I interrogate, and sift him thoroughly concerning all he has said; I consider it over again, and compare it with the account he gives me in his answers, in order to my own better information. But if I think the speaker insignificant, and not worth regarding, after he has done speaking, I ask him no questions, nor give myself any trouble about what he has been talking of. You may know by this, what persons I account wise. You may also find, that I am studious and solicitous about the sayings of such a man; that I am busy and restless in putting questions to him, with a view of being improved by the acquisition of some piece of knowledge. Accordingly, I took particular notice, in my own mind, of something which seemed to me very strange in that passage of Homer, if your interpretation of it be true, that which you repeated just now, to prove that Achilles treated Ulysses as a deceiver. This to me, I say, seemed strange; because Ulysses, your cunning Ulysses, nowhere appears to have spoken untruths: but it is Achilles, whom we find cunning, according to your account, as being a teller of falsities and deceiving others. For having premised that fair profession, which you just now repeated.

Not the black gate, of Hades are to me
More hostile or more hateful, than the man
Whose tongue holds no communion with his heart.

A little afterwards he declares, that he would not be dissuaded from his purpose, not by Ulysses and Agamemnon together; nor would he be by an means prevailed on to stay in the Trojan territories but, says he.

Tomorrow, after sacrifice to Jove
And all that next in nature is divine.
My well-mann'd galleys launch I from the shore
Into the briny waves: and thou shalt see.
(If curious of the sight, or thy concern
Thou mak'st it,) with the dawning hour of day,
My fleet spread o'er the fishy Hellespont;
With many an eager stroke of the brisk oars
Short'ning the passage: and if Neptune grant
Prosperous voyage, the third returning light
Shall view me on rich Pthia's fertile plains.

Besides, long before this, with an air of insult he had said thus to Agamemnon.

And now with my full galleys I depart.
Steering my course for Pthia: —my best course
Is homeward, —here dishonor's. —Nor shalt thou
Meet better fare, I ween: —no more expect
Spoils and rich plunder shall attend thine arms.

Now though he had made this declaration, first in the face of the whole army, and afterwards to such as were intimate with him, it nowhere appears, that he made any preparations for his voyage, or any attempts toward the launching of his ships, in order to his departure homeward; but, on the contrary, with a noble indifference, he disregarded the keeping of his word and the speaking truth. It was for this reason, Hippias, that I proposed my first question to you; because I was at a loss to know, which of those two heroes the poet had made the better man: but I presumed that both were excellent; and that it was difficult

to determine whether was the superior, as well with respect to speaking truth and falsehood, as every other kind of virtue; for in that point, no less than in others, they seemed nearly on a par.

Hippias/ You view not the matter in its true light, Socrates. For, though Achilles breaks his word, it is plain that he had no intention to deceive, nor any dissembled meaning: but, against his inclination, he is obliged, by the distresses of the army, to stay and give them his assistance. But when Ulysses speaks falsely, it is with design, and his falsehood is voluntary.

Socrates/ My dear friend Hippias, you deceive me; and are guilty, yourself, of doing as you say Ulysses did.

Hippias/ Far from it, Socrates. How mean you? and in what respect?

Socrates/ By telling me, that Achilles had no intention to deceive, nor any dissembled meaning: whereas Achilles, in saying through arrogance what he had no serious intention of doing, was so artful an impostor, as Homer has represented him, that he appears confident of outwitting Ulysses, and concealing from him the emptiness of his arrogance; nay, to that degree confident, as to dare in his presence to contradict himself. Accordingly we find Ulysses actually imposed upon: for, as we see from his silence on that head, he discovered not that Achilles had told him any untruth.

Hippias/ Where is all this to be found, Socrates?

Socrates/ Do you not remember, that after he had declared (as he did to Ulysses), that he would set sail early the next day; to Ajax on the other hand he says no such thing, but tells him a quite different story.

Hippias/ In what passage?

Socrates/ In this.

No more in bloody field shall I engage,
I nor my forces; till great Pram's son,
The God-like Hector, worthy of his fire,
Through heaps of slaughter'd Greeks, victorious reach
My myrmidons; or till his hostile flames,
Spreading from ship to ship, approach my own.
Then, —near my vessel, or my tent, I trust,
Shall Hector's fury, though impetuous, meet
A bound impassable.

Now can you imagine, Hippias, that he was so forgetful, this son of the goddess Thetis, this pupil of the sage Chiron, as that, after throwing out the bitterest reproaches upon such as speak what they mean not, he should first tell Ulysses that he would sail away, and then, through forgetfulness, assure Ajax that he would continue where he was? Do you not think that he must have talked in this manner with design, and from a supposal that Ulysses was a plain simple man, and that he should get the better of him that very way, by artifice and lying?

Hippias/ I think quite otherwise, Socrates: I think that he was imposed upon, himself, by his own simplicity and undesigning heart: and that want of reflection made him talk to Ajax in a strain different from that in which he had been talking to Ulysses. But Ulysses, whenever he speaks truth, has always an intention to deceive, no less than when he speaks a falsehood.

Socrates/ Ulysses then is a better man, it seems, than Achilles.

Hippias/ By no means, Socrates, clearly.

Socrates/ Why, was it not proved just now, that the speakers of falsehoods, knowing them so to be, and with intention to deceive, were better men than those, who spoke what was false merely through ignorance, and against their intention?

Hippias/ But how is it possible, Socrates, that such as are guilty of injustice knowingly, such as are deceitful, and insidious, and willfully do mischief, should be better men than those, who, not knowing what they do, lead others into mischiefs or mistakes? To such is due free pardon, should any injustice be done by their means, or if any man be deceived by them, or suffer injury. The laws accordingly are more severe to designing cheats, and to the willfully injurious, than to such as deceive or injure without intention of so doing.

Socrates/ You see, Hippias, that I spoke truth, when I told you, how busy and restless I was in putting questions to the wise. I fear, indeed, that I have no other valuable quality belonging to me; the rest which I have being inconsiderable and mean. For I am apt to be mistaken in the natures of things, and ignorant of what they truly are. A sufficient evidence of which appears, whenever I am in company with any of you celebrated wise men, whose wisdom is acknowledged by the united voices of all the Grecians. It then appears that I know nothing: for scarcely in any point am I of the same opinion with you. And what greater evidence can there be of a man's want of knowledge, than his differing in opinion from the wise. I have this one admirable quality, however, which saves me from the fatal consequences of ignorance and error; this, that I am not ashamed to learn; but am given to inquiry, and to asking questions, I am very thankful also to the person who vouchsafes me an answer: nor ever neglected I to pay him my due acknowledgments. For whenever I had acquired a piece of knowledge, I never denied my having learnt it; nor ever pretended, that it was of my own finding out. On the contrary, I celebrate the wisdom of my teacher, whenever I produce the doctrine which he taught me. Thus at present, for instance, I agree not with you in that position, which you

have laid down for truth; but am strongly of a different opinion. And this, I am convinced, arises from something in me, and must be attributed to my being such a one as I am; to avoid using any term or epithet too high in speaking of myself. To me, Hippias, the truth appears directly contrary to what you say. I think, that those who injure others, who are guilty of injustice, who vent falsehoods, and deceive, or commit any other fault, knowingly and willfully, are better men than such as do the same evils ignorantly and without free choice. Sometimes, however, I am in the opposite way of thinking. In short, my sentiments are ever varying upon this subject, and driven backward and forward continually: the cause of which unsteadiness is clearly want of knowledge. But I now find in myself a fresh accession of my old malady: for the opinion, which prevails in me at present, is this; — that such as commit willful errors in any action whatever, are better men, with respect to actions in that way, than those who err in the same way against their will or intention. This present turn of mind in me is owing, as I imagine, to the preceding part of our conversation: for our reasoning upon the point, then debated, will, in all appearance at present, hold good through all things; and will prove, that the involuntary actors of ill, in any of those instances we have mentioned, are more wicked than those who are guilty of the same bad actions willfully. Be so good therefore as to set my mind right: for in healing the disease of this, and freeing it from ignorance, you will do me a much greater piece of service, than you would in healing any distemper incident to my body. But now, should you have any intention to go through a long harangue, I can assure you beforehand, that you will never that way succeed in the affair: for my thoughts never will be able to keep even pace with you. But if you are disposed to answer to my questions, as you did before, you will highly profit and improve me; and, I

presume, receive no detriment yourself. I have a right, Eudicus, to beg your interest with Hippias on this occasion; for you it was who engaged me in this dispute with him. If he therefore is averse to continuing the conversation in the way which I desire, do you intercede with him to favor my request.

Eudicus/ There will be no occasion, Socrates, I imagine, for my intercession. That is made unnecessary by what Hippias himself said at first, —that he never declined answering to any man's questions. Did you not say so, Hippias?

Hippias/ I own it, Eudicus. But Socrates is always entangling the argument with cunning fallacies; and behaves like a sly deceiver.

Socrates/ My good Hippias! I do it not willfully, I assure you, nor with any intention to deceive: for, if that were the case, I should be a man of great wisdom and abilities, according to your account. But, if I have that fault which you accuse me of, it is wholly involuntary in me. I pray you therefore pardon me: for pardon, you say, is due to involuntary and ignorant deceivers.

Eudicus/ Do so, Hippias; forgive Socrates; and be not angry with him: but for my sake, and out of regard to your own word, answer to whatever questions he shall propose to you.

Hippias/ Well, at your entreaty, I will answer to his questions. —Come then; propose any, which you desire to have an answer to.

Socrates/ Truly, Hippias, I am greatly desirous to have a thorough discussion of that very point just now mentioned; —Which are the better sort of men; those who commit errors knowingly, willfully, and purposely; or those others, who are guilty of the very same without knowing what they do, and

without any will or purpose to err. Now the best way we can take, to have this point well examined, is, in my opinion, by setting out thus; —but observe, and make your answers duly: —Are there not men, who are good at a foot-race?

Hippias/ There are.

Socrates/ And others in the same exercise who are bad?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Are not the good, those who run well? and the bad, those who run ill?

Hippias/ They are.

Socrates/ Do not the slow runners run ill? the swift runners, well?

Hippias/ They do.

Socrates/ In the race therefore, and in running, swiftness is a good thing; slowness, a bad thing.

Hippias/ Without dispute.

Socrates/ Whether of these two then is the better man in the race? One, who runs slow willfully and on purpose; or one, whose slowness in running is involuntary and undesigned?

Hippias/ The first; he, who runs slow on purpose.

Socrates/ Is not running the doing something?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ And if so, is not some action performed in running?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The man, therefore, who runs ill, performs an action which is bad and unseemly in the race.

Hippias/ Undoubtedly so.

Socrates/ And the man runs ill, you say, who runs slowly.

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ He therefore is the good man in the race, who willfully and purposely commits this bad and unseemly action: and he is the bad man, who does it against his will and his intention.

Hippias/ So it seems to be.

Socrates/ In the race therefore, the man, who is guilty of bad actions against his will and his intention, is a worse man than the other, in whom those bad actions are voluntary and intended.

Hippias/ In the race, I grant you, that it is so.

Socrates/ And how is it in wrestling? Whether of the two is the better wrestler? the man who, when he falls, falls designedly, or the man whose falls are involuntary and undesigned?

Hippias/ Probably, the man who falls designedly.

Socrates/ And which is the worse and more unseemly action in wrestling? for a man to fall himself, or to give his antagonist a fall?

Hippias/ To fall himself.

Socrates/ In wrestling then also, the man, who is guilty of bad and unseemly actions with design, is a better man than the other, who is guilty of the same without designing them.

Hippias/ It is probable that he is.

Socrates/ And how does the rule hold with respect to all other actions of the body? Is not the man, whose body is well-framed and fitly disposed, equally able for actions either strong or weak, either seemly and becoming, or unbecoming and awkward? So that the man who has a better habit of body, when he performs any bodily exercise or action ill, does it out of choice; but the man, whose body is in a worse state, performs ill against his inclination.

Hippias/ In actions which depend on strength of body, I admit the truth of, your hypothesis.

Socrates/ And what say you as to those, which depend on gracefulness of the body, Hippias? Does it not belong to that body, which is well formed and well habituated, to exhibit unseemly and bad motions, gestures, and attitudes, only when the mind so wills and directs; but to a body of worse make and worse habits, to behave, move, and carry itself awkwardly without such will and direction? or how think you?

Hippias/ That it is, as you say.

Socrates/ Ungracefulness therefore also, when voluntary, belongs to the body in its better plight; when involuntary, is owing to an ill or depraved state of body.

Hippias/ So indeed it appears.

Socrates/ And how think you as to the voice? Which voice do you suppose the better and more excellent? That which sings out of tune willfully and designedly; or that which does so because it cannot do otherwise?

Hippias/ That which does so designedly.

Socrates/ And that you call a viler voice, which errs from the harmony, and cannot help it.

Hippias/ I do.

Socrates/ Further; the things which are yours, whether would you choose to have them in good condition and order, or to have them bad, depraved, and out of order?

Hippias/ To have them good, and such as they ought to be.

Socrates/ Whether then would you choose to have your feet go lame at your own pleasure, or to have them limp and I stumble against your will?

Hippias/ To go lame at my own pleasure.

Socrates/ Is not lameness in the feet a depravity of the feet; and the going lame an ungraceful way of walking?

Hippias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not squinting a depravity of the eyes?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ Which sort of eyes now would you choose to have, and to see with? Such as would look asquint only when you pleased, or such as could not avoid squinting?

Hippias/ Such as squinted only when I pleased.

Socrates/ Of the things then which are your own, you deem those, whose wrong and depraved actions are voluntary, better than those, the pravity of whose actions is involuntary.

Hippias/ In things of that kind, I admit it to be true.

Socrates/ All such therefore, ears, and nose, and mouth, and all other parts administering to sensation, are to be comprehended in the following general rule; —those, in which the bad performance of their functions is involuntary, a man would be glad not to have, seeing that such are evil; but those, whose wrong action or operation is willful, and according to the intention, are desirable, such being good.

Hippias/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well; and what sort of instruments is it best to have to do with? those, with which a man may execute his work ill through choice and design; or those, with which he cannot work otherwise than ill? For instance: Whether of the two is the best rudder; that, with which the steering ill is unavoidable; or that, with which the pilot, if he steers ill, does it willfully and on purpose?

Hippias/ The latter sort.

Socrates/ Is it not so with the bow and lyre; so with the flute; so with every other kind of tools and instruments?

Hippias/ It is true.

Socrates/ Well; and of which horse is it best to be the owner? Whether of a horse with such a kind of temper and spirit, as may serve his rider in riding ill purposely and through choice only; or of a horse, upon which his rider must of necessity ride ill?

Hippias/ Of the horse, upon which a man may ride ill only through choice.

Socrates/ This horse then is of a better spirit and temper than the other.

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ With this better-tempered horse then a man may, if he has an evil intention, perform such mischievous and evil tricks as this animal is capable of; but with the bad-tempered horse he cannot avoid doing mischief.

Hippias/ Perfectly true.

Socrates/ And is it not equally true with respect to the spirit and temper of a dog? and so of every other species of animals?

Hippias/ I admit it to hold true in the case of every brute animal.

Socrates/ Well now; and how is it in our own species, and with respect to the human soul? Whether is it better to have in our service a bowman, who, if he ever misses the mark, misses willfully; or one who is apt so to do, contrary to his intention and his aim?

Hippias/ One who misses willfully.

Socrates/ Such a one then is a better man at shooting.

Hippias/ Right.

Socrates/ In our own species therefore, and with respect to the human soul, the man, who misses aim or errs without intending so to do, is a worse man than the other, whose

missing of the mark is undesigned, or whose error is involuntary.

Hippias/ In the bowman's art I grant you that it is so.

Socrates/ And how is it in the art of medicine? Is not he the better physician, who, if he hurts or brings any disorder on the bodily frame, does it knowingly and purposely?

Hippias/ He is.

Socrates/ In this art also then, such a one is a better man than one who hurts when he would heal.

Hippias/ True.

Socrates/ And how is it in music, whether of the string or of the wind-kind? how, in all other arts and sciences? Is not he the better man, who purposely performs ill, and commits voluntary errors? and is not he the bad man, who blunders and errs, without designing it?

Hippias/ Probably so.

Socrates/ And we certainly should choose to have under our command such slaves as committed voluntary faults, and were guilty of bad actions purposely, rather than such as could not help blundering, doing wrong, and acting perversely; the former sort being better for our service.

Hippias/ In that also we agree.

Socrates/ Well then; do we not wish to be as good and excellent as possible ourselves?

Hippias/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Would not our own mind, spirit, and temper, be better, if we did evil and committed faults willfully and freely, than if we could not avoid those faults and evil actions?

Hippias/ It would be a strange thing, Socrates, if the willfully unjust and dishonest, were better men than those who unwittingly or unwillingly did a base action.

Socrates/ And yet this appears to be the just conclusion from those premises, in which we are agreed.

Hippias/ It appears not so to me.

Socrates/ To you yourself, I imagined, it must so appear. Let me put to you then a question or two more. —Is not honesty either some certain power in the mind, or some certain knowledge, or both together? Is it not necessary that true inward honesty should be one or other of these?

Hippias/ It is.

Socrates/ If honesty then be some power in the mind, does, not honesty inhabit that mind most which is possessed of the most power? And this corresponds with what appeared true to us before, if you remember, —that the man who had the most abilities and powers within him was the best man in every case that we considered.

Hippias/ It did so appear.

Socrates/ And if honesty be some knowledge in the mind, does not honesty reside most in that mind, which hath the most knowledge, and is the wisest? and is not, in such case, that mind the most dishonest which is the most undisciplined and ignorant? —But if honesty should arise from knowledge and power, meeting both together in the same mind, is not that mind which is the best furnished with both, with knowledge and power, the most filled with honesty? and are not the greatest degrees of ignorance and impotence in the mind parents of the greatest villainy? —Must not these things through necessity be so?

Hippias/ So indeed they appear.

Socrates/ Did it not appear before, that a man of the most knowledge and wisdom, as well as of the most abilities and powers, was the best man, and the most capable of performing either well or ill, at his own pleasure, in every operation?

Hippias/ It did.

Socrates/ Such a man therefore, whenever he performs anything ill, does it with design; does it through his powers and his knowledge. Now it is evident, that on these honesty depends, either on both of them, or at least on one or other.

Hippias/ Probably it does.

Socrates/ It is further evident, that acting dishonestly is doing ill; and that acting honestly is doing well.

Hippias/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Will not that man then, whose mind is the most filled with honesty and virtue, whenever he shall do any dishonest or base action, do it through choice and with design? but the man whose mind is evil and dishonest, will not he be guilty of villainous and base actions through unavoidable necessity?

Hippias/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Is not a good man, one whose mind is good and honest? and is not he a bad man, whose mind is evil and dishonest?

Hippias/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ It belongs to the good man, therefore, to act dishonestly through free choice; to the bad man without free choice, and through unavoidable necessity; if it be true that the mind of a good man is good.

Hippias/ And that certainly is true.

Socrates/ The man, therefore, who does wrong, and is guilty of villainous and base actions willfully and out of free choice, if such a man there be, Hippias, he can be no other than the good man.

Hippias/ I know not, Socrates, how I can grant you this.

Socrates/ Nor can I easily grant it to myself, Hippias. It must however, of necessity, appear true to us both at

present, having been proved by the force of our present argument. But, as I said before, with regard to this point, my mind is driven backward and forward continually, and never remains long in the same opinion. Indeed, there is nothing wonderful in the case that I should wander in uncertainty; or that any other man should, who is only one of the multitude. But if you wise men should run in the same perplexed mazes, this must be to us a heavy misfortune; since we could never in this case, even though we applied to you, be freed from our perplexities.

Ion.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and Ion.

Socrates/ Hail to thee, Ion; from whence have you come to sojourn with us for the present? Is it from your home at Ephesus?

Ion/ By no means, Socrates, but from Epidaurus, from the feast of Æsculapius.

Socrates/ Do the Epidaurians too ordain a contest of rhapsodists, in honor of the god?

Ion/ They do; and other kinds of the muse's art likewise.

Socrates/ What then? did you contend?

Ion/ I do not deny it.

Socrates/ And how did you contend?

Ion/ We carried off, Socrates, the first of the prizes.

Socrates/ You say well, come then, in order that we two may win at the Panathenæa.

Ion/ And this will be if a god is willing.

Socrates/ Often have I indeed, Ion, been envious of the art of you rhapsodists. For that both your body is decorated so as to be always becoming to your art, and to appear the most beautiful, and at the same time that it is necessary for you to be conversant with many other excellent poets, and especially Homer, the best and most divine of all, and to learn thoroughly his meaning, not his words merely, is indeed a thing to be envied. For a man would never be a good rhapsodist, unless he understood what was said by the poet; for a rhapsodist ought to be an interpreter to the audience of the meaning of the poet; but this it is impossible to do

well, without knowing what the poet means. Now worthy is all this to be envied.

Ion/ You say, Socrates, what is true. At least this very portion of my art has given me the greatest trouble. I fancy however I can speak most beautifully about Homer, so that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Thasus, nor Glauco, nor anyone else of those who have ever existed, had it in their power to express so many and such beautiful sentiments as I can do, relating to Homer.

Socrates/ You speak beautifully, Ion. For it is evident that you will not grudge me an exhibition of your talent.

Ion/ Indeed, Socrates, it is well worth your hearing how well I have set off Homer; so that, I conceive, I am worthy to be crowned by the Homeridæ with a golden crown.

Socrates/ I will make for myself still a leisure time to hear you. But for the present, answer me thus much. Are you skilled on the subject of Homer alone, or of Hesiod and Archilochus likewise?

Ion/ By no means; on the subject of Homer alone. This seems to be enough for me.

Socrates/ But there is that, about which Homer and Hesiod say the same things.

Ion/ There are, I think, many such.

Socrates/ Respecting these, can you better explain what Homer says than what Hesiod does?

Ion/ Equally, Socrates, respecting those, where they say the same.

Socrates/ But how, where they do not say the same? For instance, Homer and Hesiod say something about the prophetic art.

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, whatever those two poets say about the prophetic art, either agreeing or disagreeing, could you explain better, or one of the clever prophets?

Ion/ One of the prophets.

Socrates/ But if you were a prophet, would you not know, if you were able to give an explanation where they agree, to explain likewise where they disagree?

Ion/ It is evident I should.

Socrates/ How then are you skilled as regards Homer, but not as regards Hesiod, or any other of the poets? Does Homer speak of other things than what other poets have, taken all together? Has he not gone through the greater part of subjects relating to war, and to the intercourse with each other of men, good and bad, and unskillful and practiced in arts, and relating to the gods, as having an intercourse, such as they have, with one another and with human beings; and to such as relate to celestial events and those in Hades, and the birth of gods and heroes. Are not these the subjects, relating to which Homer has composed his poetry?

Ion/ You say, Socrates, what is true.

Socrates/ Well then, and do not the rest of the poets write about these very things?

Ion/ They do, Socrates; but they have not composed their poetry as Homer has his.

Socrates/ What then, in a worse way?

Ion/ Very much so.

Socrates/ But Homer in a better?

Ion/ Better indeed, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Now, thou dear head, Ion, when many persons are speaking about numbers, and one of them speaks the best, assuredly some person will know who speaks correctly.

Ion/ I admit it.

Socrates/ Will it be the same as he, who knows likewise those speaking incorrectly, or someone else?

Ion/ The same person, certainly.

Socrates/ And is it not he, who knows the science of arithmetic?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ What then, when many persons are speaking about wholesome food, of what kinds they are, and one speaks the best, will one person know that he, who speaks the best, does speak the best, and another know that he, who speaks worse, does speak worse, or will the same person know both?

Ion/ The same person, clearly.

Socrates/ Who is he? What is his name?

Ion/ Physician.

Socrates/ Let us say then universally, that, when many are speaking upon the same subject, the same person will always know who speaks correctly and who incorrectly. For if a person shall not know the party speaking incorrectly, it is evident that he will not know the party speaking correctly, at least upon the same subject.

Ion/ Just so.

Socrates/ The same person then will be skilled respecting both.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Did not you say that Homer, and the rest of the poets, amongst whom there are both Hesiod and Archilochus, write about the same things, though not in the same manner? but that the one does so well, the others worse?

Ion/ And I said what is true.

Socrates/ If then you know the party who speaks well, you will know those likewise, who speak worse, that they do speak worse?

Ion/ It is probable.

Socrates/ In saying then, thou best of men, that Ion is clever on the subject of Homer and all the other poets, we shall not err; since he acknowledges himself that the same person is a competent judge of all such as speak upon the same subjects, and that nearly all poets take the same subjects for their poetry.

Ion/ What can be then the reason, Socrates, that whenever anyone is discoursing upon any other poet, I pay no attention, and am unable to contribute anything whatever to the discussion worth mentioning, and really begin to nod; but when anyone brings Homer to my recollection, I am immediately awake, and give my mind to the subject, and am at no loss what to say.

Socrates/ It is not difficult, my friend, to guess the reason of this. For it is clear to everyone that you are unable to speak about Homer by art or science. For if you were able by art, you would be able to speak about all the other poets; for the whole is surely poetry. Or is it not?

Ion/ It is.

Socrates/ When a man shall have laid hold of any other art whatever as a whole, is there not the same method of viewing it as all the arts? Why I say this, do you, Ion, request to hear from me?

Ion/ Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, I do; for I delight to hear you wise men.

Socrates/ I would wish, Ion, that you were saying what is true; but you surely are the wise men, you the rhapsodists and performers, and those whose poems you recite; whereas I speak nothing but the simple truth, as becomes a mere

unskilled person. Since the question, which I just now asked you, see how trifling it is, and suited to an unskilled person, and for every man to know, namely, that, which I spoke of as presenting the same view, when a person lays hold of the whole of any art. Let us then lay hold in our discourse of painting; for it is an art whole in itself, is it not?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are there not, and have been, many painters good and bad?

Ion/ Very many.

Socrates/ Now then, did you ever see any person who, as regards Polygnotus, the son of Aglaophon, is skilled in showing what he paints well and what ill, but is unable to do so as regards other painters? and whenever any exhibits the works of those other painters, grows drowsy, and is at a loss, and has not what to contribute to the conversation; but when it is necessary to declare his judgment about Polygnotus, or any other painter you please, immediately wakes up and gives all attention, and is at no loss what to say?

Ion/ Not at all, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Well then, in the statuary's art, did you ever see anyone who, as regards Dædalus, the son of Metion, or Epeius, the son to Panopeus, or Theodorus the Samian, or any other single statuary, was skilled in explaining what each had executed well, but as regards the other statuaries, was at a loss, grew drowsy, as having nothing to say?

Ion/ No, by Zeus, I never knew such a person as this.

Socrates/ Nor, as I think, in the case of playing on the hautboy or harp, and in singing to the harp, and in the recitations of the rhapsodists, you never saw a man who, as regards Olympus, or Thamyris, or Orpheus, or Phemius the rhapsodist of Ithaca, is a skillful interpreter, but as regards

Ion the Ephesian, is at a loss and unable to give an opinion whether Ion does well or not as a rhapsodist.

Ion/ I have nothing to say against you upon that point, Socrates, but of this I am conscious to myself, that as regards Homer I speak the best of all men, and am least at a loss, and everybody else says that I do speak well, but not, as regards the rest. Consider then why is this.

Socrates/ I do consider, Ion, and I commence showing you how this seems to me. This faculty of speaking well about Homer is not an art, as I said just now, but a divine power, which moves you, like that in the stone, which Euripides calls the Magnesian, but the common people Heraclean. For this stone not only attracts iron rings, but imparts a power to the rings, so that they are able to do the very same things as the stone does, and to attract other rings, and sometimes a very long series of iron rings, hung as in a chain, one from another; but from that stone depends the power in all of them. Thus too does the Muse herself move men divinely inspired, and through them thus inspired, a chain hangs together of others inspired divinely likewise. For all the good epic poets compose all their beautiful poems, not by art, but by being divinely inspired and possessed by the Muse; and so too the good lyric poets, just as the Corybantes dance, not being in their sound senses, compose their beautiful lyrical poems, when they are not in their sound senses; but when they go on according to the harmony and rhythm, they become mad, possessed by a god, as are the priestesses of Bacchus, who, possessed by a god, draw from rivers honey and milk; but are unable to do so, when in their senses; and the soul of the lyric poets does that, which they say they do. For assuredly they say to us, that drawing from fountains flowing with honey, and gathering flowers from the gardens and glades of the Muses, they bring us their songs, as bees do their honey, and are

ever too on the wing. And they tell us too what is true. For a poet is a thing light, and with wings, and sacred, and unable to compose poetry until he becomes inspired, and is out of his sober senses, and his imagination is no longer under his control. For so long as a person is in complete possession of it, he is unable to compose verses or to speak oracularly. Hence as they compose not by art, they say many beautiful things relating to their subjects, as you do about Homer; but each is able to compose that alone through a divine allotment, to which the Muse has impelled them, one to dithyrambics, another to panegyrics, another to hyporchemata, another to epic verse, and another to iambic; but in the other kinds each makes no figure; for they do not compose by art, but through a divine power; since if they knew how to speak by art upon one subject correctly, they would be able to do so upon all others. And on this account a deity has deprived them of their senses, and employs them as his ministers, and oracle-singers, and divine prophets, in order that when we hear them, we may know it is not they to whom sense is not present, who speak what is valuable, but the god himself who speaks, and through them addresses us. And of this assertion Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords the greatest proof; who never composed any other poem, which anyone would think worth remembering, but the Pasan, which everybody sings, of almost all hymns the most excellent, and as he himself states;

> "An invention of artless Muses"

For in him most especially does the god seem to me to point out to us, that we are not to doubt about those beautiful poems being not human but divine, and the work not of men but of gods; and that poets are nothing else but interpreters of the gods, possessed by whatever deity they may happen to be. And in pointing out this, the deity has through a poet

the most indifferent sung a melody the most beautiful. Or do I not seem to you, Ion, to say what is true?

Ion/ To me at least you do. For you somehow, Socrates, touch my very soul by your arguments; and the good poets seem to me, by a divine allotment, to be in this way to us the interpreters of the gods.

Socrates/ Now do not you rhapsodists interpret, on the other hand, the writings of the poets?

Ion/ And this too you truly assert.

Socrates/ Do you not then become the interpreters of interpreters?

Ion/ By all means.

Socrates/ Mind now, Ion, and tell me this; and do not conceal whatever I shall ask about. Whenever you are spouting well any verses, and astonishing your audience the most, or when you are reciting how Ulysses, leaping on the threshold of his house, appeared manifest to the suitors, and poured out his arrows before their feet; or how Achilles rushed against Hector; or tell any of the tales of pity relating to Andromache, or Hecuba, or Priam; at such times are you quite in your senses, or beside yourself? and does not your soul fancy itself carried away in a state of ecstasy by the deeds you are telling, whether they occur at Ithaca or Troy, or however else the verses may be.

Ion/ How clear a proof have you, Socrates, produced! For so I will say, concealing nothing. For when I am reciting any tale of pity, my eyes are filled with tears; but when anything of horror, my hairs stand erect through fear, and my heart leaps.

Socrates/ What shall we say then, Ion? that the man is in his sound senses, when, decked in a many-tissued garb, and with a crown of gold, he bursts into tears at festivals and feasts, without having lost any of those ornaments? or feels

a fear when he is standing in the midst of twenty thousand men, all friendly to him, and no one is stripping him or doing him an injury?

Ion/ He is not, by Zeus, to confess the truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ Know you that you rhapsodists produce this very same effect upon the majority of your spectators.

Ion/ I know it very well. For I am constantly looking down from my standing-place above upon those, who are weeping, or looking fiercely, or astonished, in unison with what is narrated. For indeed I must pay a great attention to them, in order that, if I set them weeping, I may laugh on receiving their money; but if laughing, that I may weep myself on losing their cash.

Socrates/ Know you not, then, that this spectator of yours is the last of the rings, which, I said, receive their power from one another by means of the Heraclean stone? The middle ring are you the rhapsodist and the actor; but the first ring is the poet himself. By means of all these does the god draw, wherever it pleases him, the souls of men, having suspended from each other the power. And, as if from that stone, there is suspended a very numerous series of chorus-singers and dancers, and under-masters, hang the rings depending from the Muse, hanging sideways. But from one Muse one of the poets hangs; another from another. And this we call by the expression “He is possessed;” for the meaning is very similar; since he is held fast. From these first rings some of the poets hang, some from one, and others from others, and become inspired by them; some, for instance, Orpheus, others by Musæus; but the majority are inspired by Homer, and held fast by him. Of this number, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by Homer. Hence when anyone sings the verses of any other poet, you fall asleep, and are at a loss what to say: but when anyone recites a strain of that poet, you wake

up immediately, and your soul dances with joy, and you are at no loss what to say; for you say, what you say, about Homer, not from art or science, but from a divine allotment, and through being possessed. For the Corybantes have an acute perception of such music only, as belongs to the god by whom they are possessed, and are not wanting either in gestures or words, adapted to that melody; but care not for any other music. So you, Ion, when anyone makes mention of Homer, are not at a loss, but are at a loss when mention is made of other poets. And this is the reason of that, about which you were asking, why as regards Homer you are not at a loss, but are so as regards other poets; because you are not by art, but by a divine allotment, a skillful panegyrist of Homer.

Ion/ You say well, Socrates. I should, however, wonder if you can speak so well as to convince me that I panegyrize Homer through being possessed and mad. Nor, as I fancy, should I appear so to you, if you were to hear me speaking about Homer.

Socrates/ And willing I am indeed to hear you; but not before you shall have answered me this. On which of the subjects about which Homer speaks, do you speak well? For surely it is not about all.

Ion/ Be assured, Socrates, there is nothing but what I speak well about.

Socrates/ Surely you do not speak about those, of which you happen to know nothing, but which Homer mentions.

Ion/ And what are those, which Homer mentions, but which I do not know?

Socrates/ Does not Homer speak much and often of arts; for instance, the art of chariot-driving? If I can remember the verses, I will repeat them to you.

Ion/ I will recite them; for I remember them.

Socrates/ Recite me then what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, when advising him to be careful respecting the turning in the chariot-race, run in honor of Patroclus.

Ion/ His words are these:

> Thyself upon the polish'd chariot bend
> To the left gently; but the right-hand horse
> With goad and voice urge on, and somewhat yield,
> Holding the reins; but let the left-hand steed
> Come near the turn-post grazing, which almost
> Of wheel well-made, let the nut seem to doubt
> If it reach not; but stone to touch avoid.

Socrates/ It is enough. Now whether Homer does or does not, Ion, correctly express himself in these words, who would know the better, a physician or a charioteer?

Ion/ A charioteer, undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Whether because he possesses that art, or for some other reason?

Ion/ For no other than that he possesses the art.

Socrates/ Has not to each of the arts this been granted by the deity, to be able to know a work? for what we know by the pilot's art, we shall not know by the physician's.

Ion/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor what we know by the physician's art, shall we know by the builder's art.

Ion/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Is it not thus then as regards all the arts, that what we know by one art, we shall not know by another? But answer me this previous to that. Do not you admit that there is one art of one kind, and another art of another kind?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do not you make use of the same proof as I do, that when there is a science, one of some things, and

another of other things, I call one by one name, and the other by another; and do not you call them so?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ For surely if of the same things there were some science, why should we call one by one name, and another by another, when it would be possible to know the same things from both? as, for instance, I know that these fingers are five in number; and you know it, respecting them, the same as I do. Now were I to ask you, whether it was by the same art of arithmetic that both you and I know the same things, or by another art, you would surely say, by the same art.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ The question then, which I was lately about to ask you, answer me now. Whether does it seem so to you, as regards all the arts, in this way, that it is necessary for the same art to know the things; and for a different art to know not the same things? but whether, if the art be different, it is necessary for it to know different things?

Ion/ It seems to me, Socrates, in this way.

Socrates/ He therefore, who has not any art, will not be able to know what is said or done well, relating to that art.

Ion/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ As regards the verses, then, which you repeated, will you, or a charioteer, better know whether Homer says well or not?

Ion/ A charioteer.

Socrates/ For you are a rhapsodist. but not a charioteer.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now the art of a rhapsodist is different from that of a charioteer.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ If the science be different, it is conversant likewise about different things.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, when Homer relates how Hecamede, the concubine of Nestor, gave to Machaon, when he was wounded, a potion to drink, he says, composed

> Of Pramnian wine; and into it she grates,
> With brazen grater, cheese from goat's milk made,
> And for the potion onion as a relish;

to know thoroughly and well whether Homer says this correctly or not, does it belong to the physician's, or the rhapsodist's art?

Ion/ To the physician's.

Socrates/ Well then, where Homer says;

> She to the bottom went, just like the lead,
> Which near the horn of bull, in meadows living,
> Is placed upon the line, and rushes eager,
> To fish, on raw flesh feeding, bringing fate—

shall we say that it belongs to the fisher's rather than to the rhapsodist's art, to decide on what he says, and whether correctly or not?

Ion/ It is evident, Socrates, to the fisher's art.

Socrates/ Consider now, you asking, if you asked me, Since then, Socrates, you discover what it is fitting for each of these arts to decide upon in Homer, come, find me out, what as relating to the business of a prophet and the prophet's art, are the things which it is fitting for him to be able to know thoroughly, whether the poet has done well or ill—consider how easily and truly I could reply. For Homer, in the Odyssey, speaks frequently on the subject. For instance, where Theoclymenus the prophet, one of the race of Melampus, says to the suitors—

> Why by doom fated suffer ye this ill?
> Involved in the gloom of night are faces, heads,

And nether limbs; and burns the loud lament
Fiercely, and cheeks with many tears are wet.
Of ghosts the porch is full, and full the hall,
To Erebus in darkness rushing; and the sun
From heaven is lost, and luckless mists come on.

And often too in the Iliad, for example in the fight near the mound-wall of the Greeks. For there too he says:

To them, while eager to pass on, an eagle,
High-flying bird, appear'd upon the left,
And the army check'd. For in its claws it bore
A snake, of size enormous, with blood stain'd,
Alive, and gasping, but of fight not yet
Regardless. For on twisting round, it bit
The breast of the bird, that held it, near the neck;
Who, smarting with the pain, let go its hold,
And sent it to the ground; and midst the throng
It fell; and the bird with the wind screaming flew.

These passages, and others of the same kind, shall I say, it belongs to the prophet to consider, and to judge of?

Ion/ Yes, if you say what is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ And you too, Ion, speak the truth, in this. Come then, and, as I have selected for you from the Odyssey, and the Iliad, such passages as belong to the prophet, and the physician, and the fisherman, so do you select for me, since you are better versed in Homer than I am, such passages, Ion, as belong to the rhapsodist, and to the rhapsodist's art; which it is fitting for the rhapsodist to consider and judge of, better than other men.

Ion/ I say, Socrates, all things.

Socrates/ You did not, Ion, say all. Or are you so forgetful? And yet it ill becomes a man, who is a rhapsodist, to be forgetful.

Ion/ Of what then am I forgetful?

Socrates/ Do you not remember, you said that the rhapsodist's art is different from that of the charioteer?

Ion/ I do remember it.

Socrates/ And did not you confess too, that, being different, it would know things different?

Ion/ Yes, I did.

Socrates/ According to your own account then, the rhapsodist's art will not know all things, nor even the rhapsodist himself.

Ion/ Except, perhaps, Socrates, things of such a kind.

Socrates/ By things of such a kind you mean such as belong nearly to all the other arts. Now what will the rhapsodist know, if he knows not all things.

Ion/ He knows, I presume, what is proper for a man to speak, and what for a woman; and what for a slave, and what for a freeman; and what for him, who is commanded, and for him, who commands.

Socrates/ Do you mean that the rhapsodist will know better than the steersman, what it is proper for the commander of a ship, tost in a storm at sea, to say?

Ion/ No. This at least the steersman will know better.

Socrates/ But what it is proper for a person governing a sick person to say, will the rhapsodist know better than the physician?

Ion/ Not in this case.

Socrates/ But what is it proper for a slave, you say.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ For example, do you assert that, what it is fitting for a slave, who tends cattle, to say, when pacifying cows that are in a savage state, the rhapsodist will know, but not the herdsman?

Ion/ Not I indeed.

Socrates/ But what it is proper for a woman engaged in wool-work to say about working in wool?

Ion/ No.

Socrates/ But he will know what it is proper for an army-leader to say, when exhorting the soldiers?

Ion/ Yes. For such things the rhapsodist will know.

Socrates/ What then, is the rhapsodist's art that of an army-leader?'

Ion/ I should know what it is fitting for an army-leader to say.

Socrates/ Because you have, perhaps, the art of a general, Ion. For if you happened to be skilled in horsemanship and in harp-playing at the same time, you would have known those, who manage horses well and ill. Now if I had asked you—By which of those arts, Ion, do you know those who manage horses well? Is it by that through which you are a horseman, or by that through which you are a harpist? what answer would you make me?

Ion/ I should answer, By that through which I am a horseman.

Socrates/ If then you knew thoroughly those who play well the harp, would you not confess that you knew them by that art, through which you are a harpist, but not through that, by which you are a horseman?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Since then you know the things relating to armies, do you know them by the art, through which you are a general, or by that, through which you are an excellent rhapsodist.?

Ion/ There seems to me no difference.

Socrates/ How say you that there is no difference? Say you that the art of the rhapsodist and of the general is one? Or are they two?

Ion/ They seem to me at least to be one.

Socrates/ Whoever then is a good rhapsodist, he happens to be likewise a good general.

Ion/ By all means, Socrates.

Socrates/ And whoever happens to be a good general, is a good rhapsodist too.

Ion/ This, I think, on the other hand does not seem to be true.

Socrates/ But the other does seem so, that whoever is a good rhapsodist is also a good general.

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now are not you a rhapsodist, the best of the Greeks?

Ion/ Very much, Socrates.

Socrates/ And are you also, Ion, a general, the best of all Greeks?

Ion/ Be well assured, Socrates of this; for I have learnt that too from Homer.

Socrates/ Why then by the gods, Ion, do you, since you are amongst the Greeks the best, both as a general and a rhapsodist, go about acting the part of a rhapsodist before the Greeks, and not of a general. Does there seem to you a great need of a rhapsodist, crowned with a golden crown, but none of a general?

Ion/ Yes. For our city, Socrates, is governed, and our forces commanded by your people, and there is no need of a general. But your city, or that of the Lacedæmonians, would not choose me for a general; for ye both conceive yourselves to be competent for that.

Socrates/ Know you not, Ion, O best of men, Apollodorus of Cyzicum?

Ion/ Who is he?

Socrates/ He whom the Athenians have often selected as their general, although a foreigner, and Phanosthenes too of Andros, and Heraclides of Clazomenæ, whom this state, although they are foreigners, appoints to the command of armies and other offices in the government, through their having shown themselves men worthy of notice. And will she not choose Ion of Ephesus as her general, honor him should he seem worthy of notice? What, are not you Ephesians Athenians of old? and is not Ephesus a city inferior to none? But as to yourself, Ion, if indeed you say truly, that you are able by art and science to praise Homer, you are doing wrong in that, after professing that you know many fine things, relating to Homer, and saying that you would make a display, you are cheating me, and want much from making it; so that, although I have been for a long time earnestly making the request, you are unwilling to mention those things, in which you are so skilled; but you really become, like Proteus, of many forms, turning yourself topsy turvy, until at last you escape me, and start up a general, in order that you may not show how great you are in the wisdom relating to Homer. If then you really are an artist, such as I just now spoke of, and after promising to make a display relating to Homer, you deceive me, you are an unjust man; but if you are not an artist, but are, by a divine allotment, inspired by Homer, and although you know nothing, are saying many fine things about the poet, as I have stated respecting you, you are doing no wrong. Choose then, whether you wish to be deemed by us a man unjust, or divine.

Ion/ Great is the difference, Socrates; for it is much better to be deemed divine.

Socrates/ Now this better thing, Ion, is in your power to obtain at our hands, to be divine, and a praiser of Homer, but not from art.

Ion.

Translated by Lane Cooper.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and Ion.

Socrates/ Welcome, Ion! And whence come you now to pay us a visit? From your home in Ephesus?

Ion/ No, Socrates, I come from Epidaurus and the festival of Asclepius.

Socrates/ What! Do the citizens of Epidaurus, in honoring the god, have a contest between rhapsodes too?

Ion/ Indeed they do. They have every sort of musical competition.

Socrates/ So? And did you compete? And how did you succeed?

Ion/ We carried off first prize, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well done! See to it, now, that we win the Panathenaea also.

Ion/ It shall be so, God willing.

Socrates/ I must say, Ion, I am often envious of you rhapsodists in your profession. Your art requires of you always to go in fine array, and look as beautiful as you can, and meanwhile you must be conversant with many excellent poets, and especially with Homer, the best and most divine of all. You have to understand his thought, and not merely learn his lines. It is an enviable lot! In fact, one never could be a rhapsode if one did not comprehend the utterances of the poet, for the rhapsode must become an interpreter of the poet's thought to those who listen, and to do this well is quite impossible unless one knows just what the poet is saying. All that, of course, will excite one's envy.

Ion/ What you say is true, Socrates; to me, at all events, this aspect of the art has given the most concern. And I judge that I, of all men, have the finest things to say on Homer, that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor anyone else who ever lived, had so many reflections, or such fine ones, to present on Homer as have I.

Socrates/ That is pleasant news, Ion, for obviously you will not begrudge me a display of your talent.

Ion/ Not at all. And, Socrates, it really is worthwhile to hear how well I have embellished Homer. In my opinion I deserve to be crowned with a wreath of gold by the Homeridae.

Socrates/ Another time I shall find leisure to hear your recitation. At the moment do but answer me so far. Are you skilled in Homer only, or in Hesiod and Archilochus as well?

Ion/ No, only in regard to Homer; to me that seems enough.

Socrates/ Is there any point on which both Homer and Hesiod say the same thing?

Ion/ Indeed, I think so; there are many cases of it.

Socrates/ In those cases, then, would you interpret what Homer says better than what Hesiod says?

Ion/ In the cases where they say the same, Socrates, I should do equally well with both.

Socrates/ But what about the cases where they do not say the same? For example, take the art of divination; Homer and Hesiod both speak of it.

Ion/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Well then, where they say the same on the art of divination, and where they differ on it, would you interpret

better what these two poets say, or would one of the diviners, one of the good ones, do so?

Ion/ One of the diviners.

Socrates/ But suppose you were a diviner. If you were competent to explain the passages where they agree, would you not be competent to explain as well the passages where they differ?

Ion/ Manifestly, yes.

Socrates/ How is it, then, that you are skilled in Homer, but not in Hesiod or the other poets? Does Homer treat of matters different from those that all the other poets treat of? Wasn't his subject mainly war, and hasn't he discussed the mutual relations of men good and bad, or the general run as well as special craftsmen, the relations of the gods to one another and to men, as they forgather, the phenomena of the heavens and occurrences in the underworld, and the birth of gods and heroes? Are not these the subjects Homer dealt with in his poetry?

Ion/ What you say is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ And what about the other poets? Haven't they dealt with these same themes?

Ion/ Yes, but, Socrates, not in the same way.

Socrates/ How so? In a worse way than he?

Ion/ Far worse.

Socrates/ He in a better way?

Ion/ Better indeed, I warrant you.

Socrates/ Well now, Ion darling, tell me. When several persons are discussing number, and one of them talks better than the rest, there will be someone who distinguishes the good speaker?

Ion/ I agree.

Socrates/ It will be the same one who distinguishes those who are speaking badly, or will it be another?

Ion/ No doubt the same.

Socrates/ And this will be the one who knows the art of numbers?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Tell me. When several are discussing diet, and what foods are wholesome, and one of them speaks better than the rest, will a given person see the excellence of the best speaker, and another the inferiority of the worse, or will the same man distinguish both?

Ion/ Obviously, I think, the same.

Socrates/ Who is he? What is he called?

Ion/ The doctor.

Socrates/ We may therefore generalize, and say : When several persons are discussing a given subject, the man who can distinguish the one who is talking well on it, and the one who is talking badly, will always be the same. Or, if he does not recognize the one who is talking badly, then, clearly, neither will he recognize the one who is talking well, granted that the subject is the same.

Ion/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then the same man will be skilled with respect to both?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now you assert that Homer and the other poets, among them Hesiod and Archilochus, all treat of the same subjects, yet not all in the same fashion, but the one speaks well, and the rest of them speak worse.

Ion/ And what I say is true.

Socrates/ Then you, if you can recognize the poet who speaks well, could also recognize the poets who speak worse, and see that they speak worse.

Ion/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Well then, my best of friends, when we say that Ion has equal skill in Homer and all other poets, we shall not be mistaken. It must be so, since you yourself admit that the same man will be competent to judge of all who speak of the same matters, and that the poets virtually all deal with the same subjects.

Ion/ Then what can be the reason, Socrates, for my behavior? When anyone discusses any other poet, I pay no attention, and can offer no remark of any value. I frankly doze. But whenever anyone mentions Homer, immediately I am awake, attentive, and full of things to say.

Socrates/ The riddle is not hard to solve, my friend. No, it is plain to everyone that not from art and knowledge comes your power to speak concerning Homer. If it were art that gave you power, then you could speak about all the other poets as well. There is an art of poetry as a whole? Am I not right?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not the case the same with any other art you please, when you take it as a whole? The same method of inquiry holds for all the arts? Do you want some explanation, Ion, of what I mean by that?

Ion/ Yes, Socrates, upon my word I do. It gives me joy to listen to you wise men.

Socrates/ I only wish you were right in saying that, Ion. But 'wise men'! That means you, the rhapsodists and actors, and the men whose poems you chant, while I have nothing else to tell besides the truth, after the fashion of the ordinary man. For example, take the question I just now asked you.

Observe what a trivial and commonplace remark it was that I uttered, something anyone might know, when I said that the inquiry is the same whenever one takes an art in its entirety. Let us reason the matter out. There is an art of painting taken as a whole?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And there are and have been many painters, good and bad?

Ion/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ Now, take Polygnotus, son of Aglaophon. Have you ever seen a man with the skill to point out what is good and what is not in the works of Polygnotus, but without the power to do so in the works of other painters? A man who, when anybody shows the works of other painters, dozes off, is at a loss, has nothing to suggest, but when he has to express a judgment on one particular painter, say Polygnotus or anyone else you choose, wakes up, and is attentive, and is full of things to say?

Ion/ No, on my oath, I never saw the like.

Socrates/ Or, again, take sculpture. Have you ever seen a man with the skill to judge the finer works of Daedalus, son of Metion, or of Epeus, son of Panopeus, or of Theodorus of Samos, or the works of any other single sculptor, but, confronted by the works of other sculptors, is at a loss, and dozes off, without a thing to say?

Ion/ No, on my oath, I never saw one.

Socrates/ Yet further, as I think, the same is true of playing on the flute, and on the harp, and singing to the harp, and rhapsody. You never saw a man with the skill to judge of Olympus, of Thamyras, or of Orpheus, or of Phemius, the rhapsodist at Ithaca, but is at a loss, has no remark to make concerning Ion the Ephesian, and his success or failure in reciting.

Ion/ On that I cannot contradict you, Socrates. But of this thing I am conscious, that I excel all men in speaking about Homer, and on him have much to say, and that everybody else avers I do it well, but on the other poets I do not. Well then, see what that means.

Socrates/ I do see, Ion, and in fact will proceed to show you what to my mind it betokens. As I just now said, this gift you have of speaking well on Homer is not an art; it is a power divine, impelling you like the power in the stone Euripides called the magnet, which most call 'stone of Heraclea.' This stone does not simply attract the iron rings, just by themselves; it also imparts to the rings a force enabling them to do the same thing as the stone itself, that is, to attract another ring, so that sometimes a chain is formed, quite a long one, of iron rings, suspended from one another. For all of them, however, their power depends upon that loadstone. Just so the Muse. She first makes men inspired, and then through these inspired ones others share in the enthusiasm, and a chain is formed, for the epic poets, all the good ones, have their excellence, not from art, but are inspired, possessed, and thus they utter all these admirable poems. So is it also with the good lyric poets; as the worshiping Corybantes are not in their senses when they dance, so the lyric poets are not in their senses when they make these lovely lyric poems. No, when once they launch into harmony and rhythm, they are seized with the Bacchic transport, and are possessed—as the bacchants, when possessed, draw milk and honey from the rivers, but not when in their senses. So the spirit of the lyric poet works, according to their own report. For the poets tell us, don't they, that the melodies they bring us are gathered from rills that run with honey, out of glens and gardens of the Muses, and they bring them as the bees do honey, flying like the bees? And what they say is true, for a poet is a light and

winged thing, and holy, and never able to compose until he has become inspired, and is beside himself, and reason is no longer in him. So long as he has this in his possession, no man is able to make poetry or to chant in prophecy. Therefore, since their making is not by art, when they utter many things and fine about the deeds of men, just as you do about Homer, but is by lot divine—therefore each is able to do well only that to which the Muse has impelled him—one to make dithyrambs, another panegyric odes, another choral songs, another epic poems, another iambs. In all the rest, each one of them is poor, for not by art do they utter these, but by power divine, since if it were by art that they knew
11 how to treat one subject finely, they would know how to deal with all the others too. Herein lies the reason why the deity has bereft them of their senses, and uses them as ministers, along with soothsayers and godly seers; it is in order that we listeners may know that it is not they who utter these precious revelations while their mind is not within them, but that it is the god himself who speaks, and through them becomes articulate to us. The most convincing evidence of this statement is offered by Tynnichus of Chalcis. He never composed a single poem worth recalling, save the song of praise which everyone repeats, well-nigh the finest of all lyrical poems, and absolutely what he called it, an 'Invention of the Muses.' By this example above all, it seems to me, the god would show us, lest we doubt, that these lovely poems are not of man or human workmanship, but are divine and from the gods, and that the poets are nothing but interpreters of the gods, each one possessed by the divinity to whom he is in bondage. And to prove this, the deity on purpose sang the loveliest of all lyrics through the most miserable poet. Isn't it so, Ion? Don't you think that I am right?

Ion/ You are indeed, I vow! Socrates, your words in some way touch my very soul, and it does seem to me that by dispensation from above good poets convey to us these utterances of the gods.

Socrates/ Well, and you rhapsodists, again, interpret the utterances of the poets?

Ion/ There also you are right.

Socrates/ Accordingly, you are interpreters of interpreters?

Ion/ Undeniably.

Socrates/ Wait now, Ion; tell me this. And answer frankly what I ask you. Suppose you are reciting epic poetry well, and thrill the spectators most deeply. You are chanting, say, the story of Odysseus as he leaped up to the dais, unmasked himself to the suitors, and poured the arrows out before his feet, or of Achilles rushing upon Hector, or one of the pitiful passages, about Andromache, or Hecuba, or Priam. When you chant these, are you in your senses? Or are you carried out of yourself, and does not your soul in an ecstasy conceive herself to be engaged in the actions you relate, whether they are in Ithaca, or Troy, or wherever the story puts them?

Ion/ How vivid, Socrates, you make your proof for me! I will tell you frankly that whenever I recite a tale of pity, my eyes are filled with tears, and when it is one of horror or dismay, my hair stands up on end with fear, and my heart goes leaping.

Socrates/ Well now, Ion, what are we to say of a man like that? There he is, at a sacrifice or festival, got up in holiday attire, adorned with golden chaplets, and he weeps, though he has lost nothing of his finery. Or he recoils with fear, standing in the presence of more than twenty thousand friendly people, though nobody is stripping him or doing him damage. Shall we say that the man is in his senses?

Ion/ Never, Socrates, upon my word. That is strictly true.

Socrates/ Now then, are you aware that you produce the same effects in most of the spectators too?

Ion/ Yes, indeed, I know it very well. As I look down at them from the stage above, I see them, every time, weeping, casting terrible glances, stricken with amazement at the deeds recounted. In fact, I have to give them very close attention, for if I set them weeping, I myself shall laugh when I get my money, but if they laugh, it is I who have to weep at losing it.

Socrates/ Well, do you see that the spectator is the last of the rings I spoke of, which receive their force from one another by virtue of the loadstone? You, the rhapsodist and actor, are the middle ring, and the first one is the poet himself. But it is the deity who, through all the series, draws the spirit of men wherever he desires, transmitting the attractive force from one into another. And so, as from the loadstone, a mighty chain hangs down, of choric dancers, masters of the chorus, undermasters, obliquely fastened to the rings which are suspended from the Muse. One poet is suspended from one Muse, another from another; we call it being 'possessed,' but the fact is much the same, since he is held. And from these primary rings, the poets, others are in turn suspended, some attached to this one, some to that, and are filled with inspiration, some by Orpheus, others by Musaeus. But the majority are possessed and held by Homer, and, Ion, you are one of these, and are possessed by Homer. And whenever anyone chants the work of any other poet, you fall asleep, and haven't a thing to say, but when anybody gives tongue to a strain of this one, you are awake at once, your spirit dances, and you have much to say, for not by art or science do you say of Homer what you say, but by dispensation from above and by divine possession. So the worshiping Corybantes have a lively feeling for that strain

alone which is of the deity by whom they are possessed, and for that melody are well supplied with attitudes and utterances, and heed no others. And so it is with you, Ion. When anyone mentions Homer, you are ready, but about the other poets you are at a loss. You ask me why you are ready about Homer and not about the rest. Because it is not by art but by lot divine that you are eloquent in praise of Homer.

Ion/ Well put, I grant you, Socrates. And yet I should be much surprised if by your argument you succeeded in convincing me that I am possessed or mad when I praise Homer. Nor do I think that you yourself would find me so if you heard me speaking upon Homer.

Socrates/ And indeed I wish to hear you, but not until you have answered me as follows. On what point in Homer do you speak well? Not on all points, I take it.

Ion/ I assure you, Socrates, I do it on every point, without exception.

Socrates/ Yet not, I fancy, on those matters of which you happen to be ignorant, but Homer tells of?

Ion/ And the matters Homer tells of, and I do not know, what are they?

Socrates/ Why, does not Homer in many passages speak of arts, and have much to say about them? About driving a chariot, for instance; if I can recollect the lines, I'll repeat them to you.

Ion/ No, let me do it, for I know them.

Socrates/ Then recite for me what Nestor says to Antilochus, his son, where he warns him to be careful at the turning post, in the lay of the horse race in honor of Patroclus.

Ion/

> Thyself lean slightly in the burnished car

To the left of them, then call upon the off horse
With goad and voice; with hand give him free rein.
And at the post let the near horse come so close
That the nave of the well-wrought wheel shall seem
To graze the stone. Which yet beware to strike!

Socrates/ That will do. Now, Ion, in these lines, which will be more capable of judging whether Homer speaks aright or not, a doctor or a charioteer?

Ion/ The charioteer, no doubt.

Socrates/ Because that is his art, or for some other reason?

Ion/ No, because it is his art.

Socrates/ Each separate art, then, has had assigned to it by the deity the power of knowing a particular occupation? I take it that what we know by the pilot's art we do not know by the art of medicine as well.

Ion/ No indeed.

Socrates/ And what we know by medical art we do not know by the builder's art as well.

Ion/ No indeed.

Socrates/ Well, and so it is with all the arts? What we know by one of them, we do not know by another? But before you answer that, just tell me this. Do you allow a distinction between arts? One differs from another?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now with me the mark of differentiation is that one art means the knowledge of one kind of thing, another art the knowledge of another, and so I give them their respective names. Do you do that?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ If they meant simply knowledge of the same things, why should we distinguish one art from another? Why call them different, when both would give us the same knowledge? For example, take these fingers. I know that there are five of them, and you know the same as I about them. Suppose I asked you if we knew this same matter, you and I, by the same art, that of arithmetic, or by different arts. I fancy you would hold that we knew it by the same?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then tell me now what just a little while ago I was on the point of asking you. Does that seem true to you of all the arts—that, necessarily, the same art makes us know the same, another art not the same, but, if it really is another art, it must make us know something else?

Ion/ That is my opinion Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, if one does not possess a given art, one will not be capable of rightly knowing what belongs to it in word or action?

Ion/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then, in the lines which you recited, which will have the better knowledge whether Homer speaks aright or not, you or a charioteer?

Ion/ The charioteer.

Socrates/ Doubtless because you are a rhapsode, and not a charioteer?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ The rhapsode's art is different from the charioteer's?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ If it is another art, then, it is a knowledge also about other matters.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now what about the passage in which Homer tells how Hecamede, Nestor's concubine, gave the wounded Machaon the broth to drink? The passage runs something like this:

> She grated goat's-milk cheese in Pramnian wine,
> With brazen grater, adding onion as a relish to the brew.

On the question whether Homer here speaks properly or not, is it for the art of the physician, or the rhapsode's art, to discriminate aright?

Ion/ The art of the physician.

Socrates/ What of this? The passage in which Homer says:

> She plunged to the, bottom like a leaden sinker
> Which, mounted on the horn tip from a field ox,
> Speeds its way bringing mischief to voracious fish.

What shall we say? Is it rather for the art of fishing, or the rhapsode's art, to decide on what the verses mean, and whether they are good or not?

Ion/ Obviously, Socrates, it is for the art of fishing.

Socrates/ Reflect now. Suppose that you were questioning, and asked me, 'Now, Socrates, you find it is for these several arts to judge in Homer, severally, what appertains to each of them. Come then, pick me out the passages concerning the diviner, and the diviner's art, the kind of things that appertain to him, regarding which he must be able to discern whether the poetry is good or bad?' Observe how easily and truly I can answer you. The poet does, in fact, treat of this matter in the *Odyssey* too—for example, when a scion of Melampus, the diviner Theoclymenus, says to the wooers :

> Ah, wretched men, what bane is this ye suffer?
> Shrouded in night

Are your heads and your faces and your limbs below,
And kindled is the voice of wailing, and cheeks are wet with tears.
And the porch is full of ghosts; the hall is full of them,
Hastening hell-ward beneath the gloom, and the sun
Has perished out of heaven, and an evil mist enfolds the world.

And he treats of it in many places in the *Iliad—for* instance, in the lay of the battle at the wall. There he says :

For, as they were eager to pass over, a bird approached them,
An eagle of lofty flight, skirting the host on the left,
And in its talons bearing a monstrous blood-red serpent,
Still alive and struggling; nor had it yet forgot the joy of battle.
Writhing back, it smote the bird that held it, upon the breast
Beside the neck, and the bird did cast it from him,
In the agony of pain, to the earth,
And dropped it in the middle of the throng.
And, with a cry, himself went flying on the gusty wind.

These passages, I contend, and others like them, appertain to the diviner to examine and to judge.

Ion/ And, Socrates, you are right.

Socrates/ And you are right too, Ion, when you say so. Come now, you do for me what I have done for you. From both the *Odyssey* and *Iliad* I picked out for you the passages belonging to the doctor, the diviner, and the fisherman; now you likewise, since you are better versed than I in Homer, pick out for me the sort of passages, Ion, that concern the rhapsode and the rhapsode's art, the passages it befits the rhapsode, above all other men, to examine and to judge.

Ion/ *All* passages, Socrates, is what I say.

Socrates/ Surely, Ion, you don't mean *all!* Are you really so forgetful? Indeed, it would ill become a man who is a rhapsode to forget.

Ion/ Why? What am I forgetting?

Socrates/ Don't you remember how you stated that the art of the rhapsode was different from the charioteer's?

Ion/ I remember.

Socrates/ Well, and you admitted also that, being different, it had another field of knowledge?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, by your own account the art of rhapsody will not know everything, nor the rhapsode either.

Ion/ The exceptions, Socrates, are doubtless only such matters as that.

Socrates/ In 'such matters' you must include approximately all the other arts. Well, as the rhapsode does not know the subject matter of them all, what sort of matters will he know?

Ion/ The kind of thing, I judge, that a man would say, and a woman would say, and a slave and a free man, a subject and a ruler—the suitable thing for each.

Socrates/ You mean, the rhapsode will know better what the ruler of a ship in a storm at sea should say than will the pilot?

Ion/ No, in that case the pilot will know better.

Socrates/ But suppose it is the ruler of a sick man. Will the rhapsode know better what the ruler should say than will the doctor?

Ion/ No, not in that case, either.

Socrates/ But you say, 'the kind of speech that suits a slave.'

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ You mean, for instance, if the slave is a cowherd, it is not he who will know what one should say to quiet angry cattle, but the rhapsode?

Ion/ Surely not.

Socrates/ Well, 'the kind of speech that suits a woman'—one who spins—about the working up of wool?

Ion/ No.

Socrates/ Well, the rhapsodist will know 'the kind of speech that suits a man'—a general exhorting his soldiers?

Ion/ Yes! That is the sort of thing the rhapsodist will know.

Socrates/ What! Is the rhapsode's art the general's?

Ion/ At all events I ought to know the kind of speech a general should make.

Socrates/ Indeed, you doubtless have the talents of a general, Ion! And suppose you happened to have skill in horsemanship, along with skill in playing on the lyre, you would know when horses were well or badly ridden, but if I asked you, 'By which art, Ion, do you know that horses are well managed—is it because you are a horseman, or because you play the lyre?' What answer would you give me?

Ion/ I should say, 'It is by my skill as horseman.'

Socrates/ Then, too, if you were picking out good players on the lyre, you would admit that you discerned them by your art in playing the lyre, and not by your art as horseman?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ But when you know of military matters, do you know them because you are competent as a general, or as a rhapsode?

Ion/ I cannot see a bit of difference.

Socrates/ What, no difference, you say? You mean to call the art of the rhapsode and the art of the general a single art, or two?

Ion/ To me, there is a single art.

Socrates/ And so, whoever is an able rhapsode is going to be an able general as well?

Ion/ Unquestionably, Socrates.

Socrates/ And then, whoever happens to be an able general is an able rhapsode too.

Ion/ No, I do not think that holds.

Socrates/ But you think the other does? That whoever is an able rhapsode is an able general too?

Ion/ Absolutely!

Socrates/ Well, and you are the ablest rhapsodist in Greece?

Ion/ Yes, Socrates, by far.

Socrates/ And the ablest general, Ion? The ablest one in Greece?

Ion/ You may be sure of it, for, Socrates, I learned this also out of Homer.

Socrates/ Then, Ion, how in heaven's name is this? You are at once the ablest general and ablest rhapsodist among the Greeks, and yet you go about Greece performing as a rhapsode, but not as general. What think you? The Greeks are in great need of a rhapsode adorned with a wreath of gold, and do not need a general at all?

Ion/ It is because my native city, Socrates, is under your dominion, and your military rule, and has no need whatever of a general. As for yours and Lacedaemon, neither would choose me for general; you think yourselves sufficient to yourselves.

Socrates/ Excellent Ion, you know who Apollodorus is, of Cyzicus, don't you?

Ion/ What might he be?

Socrates/ The man whom the Athenians at various times have chosen for their general, although he is an alien. The same is true of Phanosthenes of Andros, and Heraclides of Clazomenae, also aliens, who nevertheless, when they had shown their competence, were raised to the generalship by the city, and put in other high positions. And Ion of Ephesus, will she not elect him general, and accord him honors, if his worth becomes apparent? Why, you inhabitants of Ephesus are originally Athenians, are you not, and Ephesus is a city inferior to none? But the fact is, Ion, that if you are right, if it really is by art and knowledge that you are able to praise Homer, then you do me wrong. You assure me that you have much fine knowledge about Homer, and you keep offering to display it, but you are deceiving me. Far from giving the display, you will not even tell me what subject it is on which you are so able, though all this while I have been entreating you to tell. No, you are just like Proteus; you twist and turn, this way and that, assuming every shape, until finally you elude my grasp and reveal yourself as a general. And all in order not to show how skilled you are in the lore concerning Homer! So if you are an artist, and, as I said just now, if you only promised me a display on Homer in order to deceive me, then you are at fault. But if you are not an artist, if by lot divine you are possessed by Homer, and so, knowing nothing, speak many things and fine about the poet, just as I said you did, then you do no wrong. Choose, therefore, how you will be called by us, whether we shall take you for a man unjust, or for a man divine.

Ion/ The difference, Socrates, is great. It is far lovelier to be deemed divine.

Socrates/ This lovelier title, Ion, shall be yours, to be in our minds divine, and not an artist, in praising Homer.

Ion.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Ion.

Socrates/ Welcome, Ion. Are you from your native city of Ephesus?

Ion/ No, Socrates; but from Epidaurus, where I attended the festival of Asclepius.

Socrates/ And do the Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes at the festival?

Ion/ O yes; and of all sorts of musical performers.

Socrates/ And were you one of the competitors—and did you succeed?

Ion/ I obtained the first prize of all, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well done; and I hope that you will do the same for us at the Panathenaea.

Ion/ And I will, please heaven.

Socrates/ I often envy the profession of a rhapsode, Ion; for you have always to wear fine clothes, and to look as beautiful as you can is a part of your art. Then, again, you are obliged to be continually in the company of many good poets; and especially of Homer, who is the best and most divine of them; and to understand him, and not merely learn his words by rote, is a thing greatly to be envied. And no man can be a rhapsode who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For the rhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers, but how can he interpret him well unless he knows what he means? All this is greatly to be envied.

Ion/ Very true, Socrates; interpretation has certainly been the most laborious part of my art; and I believe myself

able to speak about Homer better than any man; and that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor anyone else who ever was, had as good ideas about Homer as I have, or as many.

Socrates/ I am glad to hear you say so, Ion; I see that you will not refuse to acquaint me with them.

Ion/ Certainly, Socrates; and you really ought to hear how exquisitely I render Homer. I think that the Homeridae should give me a golden crown.

Socrates/ I shall take an opportunity of hearing your embellishments of him at some other time. But just now I should like to ask you a question: Does your art extend to Hesiod and Archilochus, or to Homer only?

Ion/ To Homer only; he is in himself quite enough.

Socrates/ Are there any things about which Homer and Hesiod agree?

Ion/ Yes; in my opinion there are a good many.

Socrates/ And can you interpret better what Homer says, or what Hesiod says, about these matters in which they agree?

Ion/ I can interpret them equally well, Socrates, where they agree.

Socrates/ But what about matters in which they do not agree? —for example, about divination, of which both Homer and Hesiod have something to say, —

Ion/ Very true:

Socrates/ Would you or a good prophet be a better interpreter of what these two poets say about divination, not only when they agree, but when they disagree?

Ion/ A prophet.

Socrates/ And if you were a prophet, would you not be able to interpret them when they disagree as well as when they agree?

Ion/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But how did you come to have this skill about Homer only, and not about Hesiod or the other poets? Does not Homer speak of the same themes which all other poets handle? Is not war his great argument? and does he not speak of human society and of intercourse of men, good and bad, skilled and unskilled, and of the gods conversing with one another and with mankind, and about what happens in heaven and in the world below, and the generations of gods and heroes? Are not these the themes of which Homer sings?

Ion/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ And do not the other poets sing of the same?

Ion/ Yes, Socrates; but not in the same way as Homer.

Socrates/ What, in a worse way?

Ion/ Yes, in a far worse.

Socrates/ And Homer in a better way?

Ion/ He is incomparably better.

Socrates/ And yet surely, my dear friend Ion, in a discussion about arithmetic, where many people are speaking, and one speaks better than the rest, there is somebody who can judge which of them is the good speaker?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who judges of the good will be the same as he who judges of the bad speakers?

Ion/ The same.

Socrates/ And he will be the arithmetician?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, and in discussions about the wholesomeness of food, when many persons are speaking, and one speaks better than the rest, will he who recognizes the better speaker be a different person from him who recognizes the worse, or the same?

Ion/ Clearly the same.

Socrates/ And who is he, and what is his name?

Ion/ The physician.

Socrates/ And speaking generally, in all discussions in which the subject is the same and many men are speaking, will not he who knows the good know the bad speaker also? For if he does not know the bad, neither will he know the good when the same topic is being discussed.

Ion/ True.

Socrates/ Is not the same person skillful in both?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you say that Homer and the other poets, such as Hesiod and Archilochus, speak of the same things, although not in the same way; but the one speaks well and the other not so well?

Ion/ Yes; and I am right in saying so.

Socrates/ And if you knew the good speaker, you would also know the inferior speakers to be inferior?

Ion/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then, my dear friend, can I be mistaken in saying that Ion is equally skilled in Homer and in other poets, since he himself acknowledges that the same person will be a good judge of all those who speak of the same things; and that almost all poets do speak of the same things?

Ion/ Why then, Socrates, do I lose attention and go to sleep and have absolutely no ideas of the least value, when

anyone speaks of any other poet; but when Homer is mentioned, I wake up at once and am all attention and have plenty to say?

Socrates/ The reason, my friend, is obvious. No one can fail to see that you speak of Homer without any art or knowledge. If you were able to speak of him by rules of art, you would have been able to speak of all other poets; for poetry is a whole.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when anyone acquires any other art as a whole, the same may be said of them. Would you like me to explain my meaning, Ion?

Ion/ Yes, indeed, Socrates; I very much wish that you would: for I love to hear you wise men talk.

Socrates/ O that we were wise, Ion, and that you could truly call us so; but you rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose verses you sing, are wise; whereas I am a common man, who only speak the truth. For consider what a very commonplace and trivial thing is this which I have said—a thing which any man might say: that when a man has acquired a knowledge of a whole art, the enquiry into good and bad is one and the same. Let us consider this matter; is not the art of painting a whole?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And there are and have been many painters good and bad?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And did you ever know anyone who was skillful in pointing out the excellences and defects of Polygnotus the son of Aglaophon, but incapable of criticizing other painters; and when the work of any other painter was produced, went to sleep and was at a loss, and had no ideas; but when he had to give his opinion about Polygnotus, or whoever the

painter might be, and about him only, woke up and was attentive and had plenty to say?

Ion/ No indeed, I have never known such a person.

Socrates/ Or did you ever know of anyone in sculpture, who was skillful in expounding the merits of Daedalus the son of Metion, or of Epeius the son of Panopeus, or of Theodorus the Samian, or of any individual sculptor; but when the works of sculptors in general were produced, was at a loss and went to sleep and had nothing to say?

Ion/ No indeed; no more than the other.

Socrates/ And if I am not mistaken, you never met with anyone among flute-players or harp-players or singers to the harp or rhapsodes who was able to discourse of Olympus or Thamyras or Orpheus, or Phemius the rhapsode of Ithaca, but was at a loss when he came to speak of Ion of Ephesus, and had no notion of his merits or defects?

Ion/ I cannot deny what you say, Socrates. Nevertheless I am conscious in my own self, and the world agrees with me in thinking that I do speak better and have more to say about Homer than any other man. But I do not speak equally well about others—tell me the reason of this.

Socrates/ I perceive, Ion; and I will proceed to explain to you what I imagine to be the reason of this. The gift which you possess of speaking excellently about Homer is not an art, but, as I was just saying, an inspiration; there is a divinity moving you, like that contained in the stone which Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly known as the stone of Heraclea. This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original stone. In like manner the Muse first of all

inspires men herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration. For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not by art, but because they are inspired and possessed. And as the Corybantian revelers when they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric poets are not in their right mind when they are composing their beautiful strains: but when falling under the power of music and meter they are inspired and possessed; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers when they are under the influence of Dionysus but not when they are in their right mind. And the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves say; for they tell us that they bring songs from honeyed fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells of the Muses; they, like the bees, winging their way from flower to flower. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles. Many are the noble words in which poets speak concerning the actions of men; but like yourself when speaking about Homer, they do not speak of them by any rules of art: they are simply inspired to utter that to which the Muse impels them, and that only; and when inspired, one of them will make dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral strains, another epic or iambic verses—and he who is good at one is not good at any other kind of verse: for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine. Had he learned by rules of art, he would have known how to speak not of one theme only, but of all; and therefore God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may know them to be speaking

not of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God himself is the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with us. And Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords a striking instance of what I am saying: he wrote nothing that anyone would care to remember but the famous paean which is in everyone's mouth, one of the finest poems ever written, simply an invention of the Muses, as he himself says. For in this way the God would seem to indicate to us and not allow us to doubt that these beautiful poems are not human, or the work of man, but divine and the work of God; and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods by whom they are severally possessed. Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of songs? Am I not right, Ion?

Ion/ Yes, indeed, Socrates, I feel that you are; for your words touch my soul, and I am persuaded that good poets by a divine inspiration interpret the things of the Gods to us.

Socrates/ And you rhapsodists are the interpreters of the poets?

Ion/ There again you are right.

Socrates/ Then you are the interpreters of interpreters?

Ion/ Precisely.

Socrates/ I wish you would frankly tell me, Ion, what I am going to ask of you: When you produce the greatest effect upon the audience in the recitation of some striking passage, such as the apparition of Odysseus leaping forth on the floor, recognized by the suitors and casting his arrows at his feet, or the description of Achilles rushing at Hector, or the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam, —are you in your right mind? Are you not carried out of yourself, and does not your soul in an ecstasy seem to be among the persons or

places of which you are speaking, whether they are in Ithaca or in Troy or whatever may be the scene of the poem?

Ion/ That proof strikes home to me, Socrates. For I must frankly confess that at the tale of pity my eyes are filled with tears, and when I speak of horrors, my hair stands on end and my heart throbs.

Socrates/ Well, Ion, and what are we to say of a man who at a sacrifice or festival, when he is dressed in holiday attire, and has golden crowns upon his head, of which nobody has robbed him, appears weeping or panic-stricken in the presence of more than twenty thousand friendly faces, when there is no one despoiling or wronging him; —is he in his right mind or is he not?

Ion/ No indeed, Socrates, I must say that, strictly speaking, he is not in his right mind.

Socrates/ And are you aware that you produce similar effects on most of the spectators?

Ion/ Only too well; for I look down upon them from the stage, and behold the various emotions of pity, wonder, sternness, stamped upon their countenances when I am speaking: and I am obliged to give my very best attention to them; for if I make them cry I myself shall laugh, and if I make them laugh I myself shall cry when the time of payment arrives.

Socrates/ Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings which, as I am saying, receive the power of the original magnet from one another? The rhapsode like yourself and the actor are intermediate links, and the poet himself is the first of them. Through all these the God sways the souls of men in any direction which he pleases, and makes one man hang down from another. Thus there is a vast chain of dancers and masters and under-masters of choruses, who are suspended, as if from the stone, at the

side of the rings which hang down from the Muse. And every poet has some Muse from whom he is suspended, and by whom he is said to be possessed, which is nearly the same thing; for he is taken hold of. And from these first rings, which are the poets, depend others, some deriving their inspiration from Orpheus, others from Musaeus; but the greater number are possessed and held by Homer. Of whom, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by Homer; and when anyone repeats the words of another poet you go to sleep, and know not what to say; but when anyone recites a strain of Homer you wake up in a moment, and your soul leaps within you, and you have plenty to say; for not by art or knowledge about Homer do you say what you say, but by divine inspiration and by possession; just as the Corybantian revelers too have a quick perception of that strain only which is appropriated to the God by whom they are possessed, and have plenty of dances and words for that, but take no heed of any other. And you, Ion, when the name of Homer is mentioned have plenty to say, and have nothing to say of others. You ask, 'Why is this?' The answer is that you praise Homer not by art but by divine inspiration.

Ion/ That is good, Socrates; and yet I doubt whether you will ever have eloquence enough to persuade me that I praise Homer only when I am mad and possessed; and if you could hear me speak of him I am sure you would never think this to be the case.

Socrates/ I should like very much to hear you, but not until you have answered a question which I have to ask. On what part of Homer do you speak well? —not surely about every part.

Ion/ There is no part, Socrates, about which I do not speak well: of that I can assure you.

Socrates/ Surely not about things in Homer of which you have no knowledge?

Ion/ And what is there in Homer of which I have no knowledge?

Socrates/ Why, does not Homer speak in many passages about arts? For example, about driving; if I can only remember the lines I will repeat them.

Ion/ I remember, and will repeat them.

Socrates/ Tell me then, what Nestor says to Antilochus, his son, where he bids him be careful of the turn at the horserace in honor of Patroclus.

Ion/ 'Bend gently' he says, 'in the polished chariot to the left of them, and urge the horse on the right hand with whip and voice; and slacken the rein. And when you are at the goal, let the left horse draw near, yet so that the nave of the well-wrought wheel may not even seem to touch the extremity; and avoid catching the stone.'

Socrates/ Enough. Now, Ion, will the charioteer or the physician be the better judge of the propriety of these lines?

Ion/ The charioteer, clearly.

Socrates/ And will the reason be that this is his art, or will there be any other reason?

Ion/ No, that will be the reason.

Socrates/ And every art is appointed by God to have knowledge of a certain work; for that which we know by the art of the pilot we do not know by the art of medicine?

Ion/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor do we know by the art of the carpenter that which we know by the art of medicine?

Ion/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And this is true of all the arts; —that which we know with one art we do not know with the other? But let

me ask a prior question: You admit that there are differences of arts?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ You would argue, as I should, that when one art is of one kind of knowledge and another of another, they are different?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yes, surely; for if the subject of knowledge were the same, there would be no meaning in saying that the arts were different, —if they both gave the same knowledge. For example, I know that here are five fingers, and you know the same. And if I were to ask whether I and you became acquainted with this fact by the help of the same art of arithmetic, you would acknowledge that we did?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, what I was intending to ask you, —whether this holds universally? Must the same art have the same subject of knowledge, and different arts other subjects of knowledge?

Ion/ That is my opinion, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then he who has no knowledge of a particular art will have no right judgment of the sayings and doings of that art?

Ion/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then which will be a better judge of the lines which you were reciting from Homer, you or the charioteer?

Ion/ The charioteer.

Socrates/ Why, yes, because you are a rhapsode and not a charioteer.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the art of the rhapsode is different from that of the charioteer?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if a different knowledge, then a knowledge of different matters?

Ion/ True.

Socrates/ You know the passage in which Hecamede, the concubine of Nestor, is described as giving to the wounded Machaon a posset, as he says;

> 'Made with Pramnian wine; and she grated cheese of goat's milk with a grater of bronze, and at his side placed an onion which gives a relish to drink.'

Now would you say that the art of the rhapsode or the art of medicine was better able to judge of the propriety of these lines?

Ion/ The art of medicine.

Socrates/ And when Homer says;

> 'And she descended into the deep like a leaden plummet, which, set in the horn of ox that ranges in the fields, rushes along carrying death among the ravenous fishes,'—

will the art of the fisherman or of the rhapsode be better able to judge whether these lines are rightly expressed or not?

Ion/ Clearly, Socrates, the art of the fisherman.

Socrates/ Come now, suppose that you were to say to me: 'Since you, Socrates, are able to assign different passages in Homer to their corresponding arts, I wish that you would tell me what are the passages of which the excellence ought to be judged by the prophet and prophetic art'; and you will see how readily and truly I shall answer you. For there are many such passages, particularly in the Odyssey; as, for example, the passage in which Theoclymenus the prophet of the house of Melampus says to the suitors: —

> 'Wretched men! what is happening to you? Your heads and your faces and your limbs underneath are

> shrouded in night; and the voice of lamentation bursts forth, and your cheeks are wet with tears. And the vestibule is full, and the court is full, of ghosts descending into the darkness of Erebus, and the sun has perished out of heaven, and an evil mist is spread abroad.'

And there are many such passages in the Iliad also; as for example in the description of the battle near the rampart, where he says: —

> 'As they were eager to pass the ditch, there came to them an omen: a soaring eagle, holding back the people on the left, bore a huge bloody dragon in his talons, still living and panting; nor had he yet resigned the strife, for he bent back and smote the bird which carried him on the breast by the neck, and he in pain let him fall from him to the ground into the midst of the multitude. And the eagle, with a cry, was borne afar on the wings of the wind.'

These are the sort of things which I should say that the prophet ought to consider and determine.

Ion/ And you are quite right, Socrates, in saying so.

Socrates/ Yes, Ion, and you are right also. And as I have selected from the Iliad and Odyssey for you passages which describe the office of the prophet and the physician and the fisherman, do you, who know Homer so much better than I do, Ion, select for me passages which relate to the rhapsode and the rhapsode's art, and which the rhapsode ought to examine and judge of better than other men.

Ion/ All passages, I should say, Socrates.

Socrates/ Not all, Ion, surely. Have you already forgotten what you were saying? A rhapsode ought to have a better memory.

Ion/ Why, what am I forgetting?

Socrates/ Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode to be different from the art of the charioteer?

Ion/ Yes, I remember.

Socrates/ And you admitted that being different they would have different subjects of knowledge?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the rhapsode, will not know everything?

Ion/ I should exclude certain things, Socrates.

Socrates/ You mean to say that you would exclude pretty much the subjects of the other arts. As he does not know all of them, which of them will he know?

Ion/ He will know what a man and what a woman ought to say, and what a freeman and what a slave ought to say, and what a ruler and what a subject.

Socrates/ Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot what the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to say?

Ion/ No; the pilot will know best.

Socrates/ Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the ruler of a sick man ought to say?

Ion/ He will not.

Socrates/ But he will know what a slave ought to say?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Suppose the slave to be a cowherd; the rhapsode will know better than the cowherd what he ought to say in order to soothe the infuriated cows?

Ion/ No, he will not.

Socrates/ But he will know what a spinning-woman ought to say about the working of wool?

Ion/ No.

Socrates/ At any rate he will know what a general ought to say when exhorting his soldiers?

Ion/ Yes, that is the sort of thing which the rhapsode will be sure to know.

Socrates/ Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general?

Ion/ I am sure that I should know what a general ought to say.

Socrates/ Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly have a knowledge of the art of the general as well as of the rhapsode; and you may also have a knowledge of horsemanship as well as of the lyre: and then you would know when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were to ask you: By the help of which art, Ion; do you know whether horses are well managed, by your skill as a horseman or as a performer on the lyre—what would you answer?

Ion/ I should reply, by my skill as a horseman.

Socrates/ And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would admit that you judged of them as a performer on the lyre, and not as a horseman?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in judging of the general's art, do you judge of it as a general or a rhapsode?

Ion/ To me there appears to be no difference between them.

Socrates/ What do you mean? Do you mean to say that the art of the rhapsode and of the general is the same?

Ion/ Yes, one and the same.

Socrates/ Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general?

Ion/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode?

Ion/ No; I do not say that.

Socrates/ But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general.

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes?

Ion/ Far the best, Socrates.

Socrates/ And are you the best general, Ion?

Ion/ To be sure, Socrates; and Homer was my master.

Socrates/ But then, Ion, what in the name of goodness can be the reason why you, who are the best of generals as well as the best of rhapsodes in all Hellas, go about as a rhapsode when you might be a general? Do you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and do not want a general?

Ion/ Why, Socrates, the reason is, that my countrymen, the Ephesians, are the servants and soldiers of Athens, and do not need a general; and you and Sparta are not likely to have me, for you think that you have enough generals of your own.

Socrates/ My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus?

Ion/ Who may he be?

Socrates/ One who, though a foreigner, has often been chosen their general by the Athenians: and there is Phanosthenes of Andros, and Heraclides of Clazomenae, whom they have also appointed to the command of their armies and to other offices, although aliens, after they had shown their merit. And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be their general, and honor him, if he prove himself worthy? Were not the Ephesians originally Athenians, and

Ephesus is no mean city? But, indeed, Ion, if you are correct in saying that by art and knowledge you are able to praise Homer, you do not deal fairly with me, and after all your professions of knowing many glorious things about Homer, and promises that you would exhibit them, you are only a deceiver, and so far from exhibiting the art of which you are a master, will not, even after my repeated entreaties, explain to me the nature of it. You have literally as many forms as Proteus; and now you go all manner of ways, twisting and turning, and, like Proteus, become all manner of people at once, and at last slip away from me in the disguise of a general, in order that you may escape exhibiting your Homeric lore. And if you have art, then, as I was saying, in falsifying your promise that you would exhibit Homer, you are not dealing fairly with me. But if, as I believe, you have no art, but speak all these beautiful words about Homer unconsciously under his inspiring influence, then I acquit you of dishonesty, and shall only say that you are inspired. Which do you prefer to be thought, dishonest or inspired?

Ion/ There is a great difference, Socrates, between the two alternatives; and inspiration is by far the nobler.

Socrates/ Then, Ion, I shall assume the nobler alternative; and attribute to you in your praises of Homer inspiration, and not art.

Ion.

or

of the Iliad

Translated by Percy Bysshe Shelley.

Homeric quotes complements of George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates and Ion

Socrates/ Hail to thee, O Ion! from whence returnest thou amongst us now? —from thine own native Ephesus?

Ion/ No, Socrates; I come from Epidaurus and the feasts in honor of Æsculapius.

Socrates/ Had the Epidaurians instituted a contest of rhapsody in honor of the God?

Ion/ And not in rhapsodies alone; there were contests in every species of music.

Socrates/ And in which did you contend? And what was the success of your efforts?

Ion/ I bore away the first prize at the games, O Socrates.

Socrates/ Well done! You have now only to consider how you shall win the Panathenæa.

Ion/ That may also happen, God willing.

Socrates/ Your profession, O Ion, has often appeared to me an enviable one. For, together with the nicest care of your person, and the most studied elegance of dress, it imposes upon you the necessity of a familiar acquaintance with many and excellent poets, and specially with Homer, the most admirable of them all. Nor is it merely because you can repeat the verses of his great poet, that I envy you, but because you fathom his inmost thoughts. For he is no rhapsodist who does not understand the whole scope and

intention of the poet, and is not capable of interpreting it to his audience. This he cannot do without a full comprehension of the leaning of the author he undertakes to illustrate; and worthy, indeed, of envy are those who can fulfil these conditions.

Ion/ Thou speakest truth, O Socrates. And, indeed, I have expended my study particularly on this part of my profession. I flatter myself that no man living excels me in the interpretation of Homer; neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus the Thasian, nor Glauco, nor any other rhapsodist of the present times can express so many various and beautiful thoughts upon Homer as I can.

Socrates/ I am persuaded of your eminent skill, O Ion. You will not, I hope, refuse me a specimen of it?

Ion/ And, indeed, it would be worth your while to hear me declaim upon Homer. I deserve a golden crown from his admirers.

Socrates/ And I will find leisure some day or other to request you to favor me so far. At present, I will only trouble you with one question. Do you excel in explaining Homer alone, or are you conscious of a similar power with regard to Hesiod and Archilochus?

Ion/ I possess this high degree of skill with regard to Homer alone, and I consider that sufficient.

Socrates/ Are there any subjects upon which Homer and Hesiod say the same things?

Ion/ Many, as it seems to me.

Socrates/ Whether do you demonstrate these things better in Homer or Hesiod?

Ion/ In the same manner, doubtless; inasmuch as they say the same words with regard to the same things.

Socrates/ But with regard to those things in which they differ; —Homer and Hesiod both treat of divination, do they not?

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do you think that you or a diviner would make the best exposition, respecting all that these poets say of divination, both as they agree and as they differ?

Ion/ A diviner, probably.

Socrates/ Suppose you were a diviner, do you not think that you could explain the discrepancies of those poets on the subject of your profession, if you understand their agreement?

Ion/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ How does it happen then that you are possessed of skill to illustrate Homer, and not Hesiod, or any other poet in an equal degree? Is the subject-matter of the poetry of Homer different from all other poets? Does he not principally treat of war and social intercourse, and of the distinct functions and characters of the brave man and the coward, the professional and private person, the mutual relations which subsist between the Gods and men; together with the modes of their intercourse, the phenomena of Heaven, the secrets of Hades, and the origin of Gods and heroes? Are not these the materials from which Homer wrought his poem?

Ion/ Assuredly, O Socrates.

Socrates/ And the other poets, do they not treat of the same matter?

Ion/ Certainly; but not like Homer.

Socrates/ How! Worse?

Ion/ Oh! far worse.

Socrates/ Then Homer treats of them better than they?

Ion/ Oh! Zeus! —how much better!

Socrates/ Amongst a number of persons employed in solving a problem of arithmetic, might not a person know, my dear Ion, which had given the right answer?

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The same person who had been aware of |the false one, or some other?

Ion/ The same, clearly.

Socrates/ That is, someone who understood arithmetic?

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Among a number of persons giving their opinions on the wholesomeness of different foods, whether would one person be capable to pronounce upon the rectitude of the opinions of those who judged rightly, and another on the erroneousness of those which were incorrect, or would the same person be competent to decide respecting them both?

Ion/ The same, evidently.

Socrates/ What would you call that person?

Ion/ A physician.

Socrates/ We may assert then, universally, that the same person who is competent to determine the truth, is competent also to determine the falsehood of whatever assertion is advanced on the same subject; and, it is manifest, that he who cannot judge respecting the falsehood, or unfitness of what is said upon a given subject, is equally incompetent to determine upon its truth or beauty?

Ion/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ The same person would then be competent or incompetent for both?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you not say that Homer and the other poets, and among them Hesiod and Archilochus, speak of the same things, but unequally; one better and the other worse?

Ion/ And I speak truth.

Socrates/ But if you can judge of what is well said by the one, you must also be able to judge of what is ill said by another, inasmuch as it expresses less correctly.

Ion/ It should seem so.

Socrates/ Then, my dear friend, we should not err if we asserted that Ion possessed a like power of illustration respecting Homer and all other poets; especially since he confesses that the same person must be esteemed a competent judge of all those who speak on the same subjects; inasmuch as those subjects are understood by him when spoken of by one, and the subject-matter of almost all the poets is the same.

Ion/ What can be the reason then, O Socrates, that when any other poet is the subject of conversation I cannot compel my attention, and I feel utterly unable to declaim anything worth talking of, and positively go to sleep? But when anyone makes mention of Homer, my mind applies itself without effort to the subject; I awaken as if it were from a trance, and a profusion of eloquent expressions suggest themselves involuntarily?

Socrates/ It is not difficult to suggest the cause of this, my dear friend. You are evidently unable to declaim on Homer according to art and knowledge; for did your art endow you with this faculty, you would be equally capable of exerting it with regard to any other of the poets. Is not poetry, as an art or a faculty, a thing entire and one?

Ion/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ The same mode of consideration must be admitted with respect to all arts which are severally one and

entire. Do you desire to hear what I understand by this, O Ion?

Ion/ Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, I am delighted with listening to you wise men.

Socrates/ It is you who are wise, my dear Ion; you rhapsodists, actors, and the authors of the poems you recite. I, like an unprofessional and private man, can only speak the truth. Observe how common, vulgar, and level to the comprehension of anyone, is the question which I now ask relative to the same consideration! belonging to one entire art. Is not painting an art whole and entire?

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Did you ever know a person competent to judge of the paintings of Polygnotus, the son of Aglaophon, and incompetent to judge of the production of any other painter; who, on the supposition of the works of other painters being exhibited to him, was wholly at a loss, and very much inclined to go to sleep, and lost all faculty of reasoning on the subject; but when his opinion was required of Polygnotus, or anyone single painter you please, awoke, paid attention to the subject, and discoursed on it with great eloquence and sagacity?

Ion/ Never, by Zeus!

Socrates/ Did you ever know anyone very skillful in determining the merits of Daedalus, the son of Metion, Epius, the son of Panopus, Theodorus the Samian, or any other great sculptor, who was immediately at a loss, and felt sleepy the moment any other sculptor was mentioned?

Ion/ I never met with such a person certainly.

Socrates/ Nor, do I think, that you ever met with a man professing himself a judge of poetry and rhapsody, and competent to criticize either Olympus, Thamyris, Orpheus, or Phemius of Ithaca, the rhapsodist, who, the moment he

came to Ion the Ephesian, felt himself quite at a loss, and utterly incompetent to judge whether he rhapsodized well or ill.

Ion/ I cannot refute you, Socrates, but of this I am conscious to myself: that I excel all men in the copiousness and beauty of my illustrations of Homer, as all who have heard me will confess, and with respect to other poets, I am deserted of this power. It is for you to consider what may be the cause of this distinction.

Socrates/ I will tell you, O Ion, what appears to me to be the cause of this inequality of power. It is that you are not master of any art for the illustration of Homer, but it is a divine influence which moves you, like that which resides in the stone called magnet by Euripides, and Heraclea by the people. For not only does this stone possess the power of attracting iron rings, but it can communicate to them the power of attracting other rings; so that you may see sometimes a long chain of rings, and other iron substances, attached and suspended one to the other by this influence. And as the power of the stone circulates through all the links of this series, and attaches each to each, so the Muse, communicating through those whom she has first inspired, to all others capable of sharing in the inspiration, the influence of that first enthusiasm, creates a chain and a succession. For the authors of those great poems which we admire, do not attain to excellence through the rules of any art, but they utter their beautiful melodies of verse in a state of inspiration, and, as it were, possessed by a spirit not their own. Thus the 'composers of lyrical poetry create those admired songs of theirs in a state of divine insanity, like the Corybantes, who lose all control over their reason in the enthusiasm of the sacred dance; and, during this supernatural possession, are excited to the rhythm and harmony which they communicate to men. Like the

Bacchantes, who, when possessed by the God, draw honey and milk from the rivers, in which, when they come to their senses, they find nothing but simple water. For the souls of the poets, as poets tell us, have this peculiar ministration in the world. They tell us that these souls, flying like bees from flower to flower, and wandering over the gardens and the meadows, and the honey-flowing fountains of the Muses, return to us laden with the sweetness of melody; and arrayed as they are in the plumes of rapid imagination, they speak truth. For a Poet is indeed a thing ethereally light, winged, and sacred, nor can he compose anything worth calling poetry until he becomes inspired, and, as it were, mad, or whilst any reason remains in him. For whilst a man retains any portion of the thing called reason, he is utterly incompetent to produce poetry or to vaticinate. Thus, those who declaim various and beautiful poetry upon any subject, as for instance upon Homer, are not enabled to do so by art or study; but every rhapsodist or poet, whether dithyrambic, encomiastic, choral, epic, or iambic, is excellent in proportion to the extent of his participation in the divine influence, and the degree in which the Muse itself has descended on him. In other respects, poets may be sufficiently ignorant and incapable. For they do not compose according- to any art which they have acquired, but from the impulse of the divinity within them; for did they know any rules of criticism according to which they could compose beautiful verses upon one subject, they would be able to exert the same faculty with respect to all or any other. The God seems purposely to have deprived all poets, prophets, and soothsayers of every particle of reason and understanding, the better to adapt them to their employment as his ministers and interpreters; and that we, their auditors, may acknowledge that those who write so beautifully, are possessed, and address us, inspired by the

God. Tynnichus the Chalcidian is a manifest proof of this, for he never before composed any poem worthy to be remembered; and yet, was the author of that Pasan which everybody sings, and which excels almost every other hymn, and which he himself acknowledges to have been inspired by the Muse. And, thus, it appears to me that the God proves beyond a doubt, that these transcendent poems are not human as the work of men, but divine as coming from the God. Poets then are the interpreters of the divinities—each being possessed by someone deity; and to make this apparent, the God designedly inspires the worst poets with the sublimest verse. Does it seem to you that I am in the right, O Ion?

Ion/ Yes, by Zeus! My mind is enlightened by your words, O Socrates, and it appears to me that great poets interpret to us through some divine election of the God.

Socrates/ And do not you rhapsodists interpret poets?

Ion/ We do.

Socrates/ Thus you interpret the interpreters?

Ion/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Remember this, and tell me; and do not conceal that which I ask. When you declaim well, and strike your audience with admiration; whether you sing of Ulysses rushing upon the threshold of his palace, discovering himself to the suitors, and pouring his shafts out at his feet; or of Achilles assailing Hector; or those affecting passages concerning Andromache, or Hecuba, or Priam, are you then self-possessed? or, rather, are you not rapt and filled with such enthusiasm by the deeds you recite, that you fancy yourself in Ithaca or Troy, or wherever else the poem transports you?

Ion/ You speak most truly, Socrates, nor will I deny it; for, when I recite of sorrow my eyes fill with tears; and, when

of fearful or terrible deeds, my hair stands on end, and my heart beats fast.

Socrates/ Tell me, Ion, can we call him in his senses, who weeps while dressed in splendid garments, and crowned with a golden coronal, not losing any of these things? and is filled with fear when surrounded by ten thousand friendly persons, not one among whom desires to despoil or injure him?

Ion/ To say the truth, we could not.

Socrates/ Do you often perceive your audience moved also?

Ion/ Many among them, and frequently. I, standing on the rostrum, see them weeping, with eyes fixed earnestly on me, and overcome by my declamation. I have need so to agitate them; for if they weep, I laugh, taking their money; if they should laugh, I must weep, going without it.

Socrates/ Do you not perceive that your auditor is the last link of that chain which I have described as held together through the power of the magnet? You rhapsodists and actors are the middle links, of which the poet is the first—and through all these the God influences whichever mind he selects, as they conduct this power one to the other; and thus, as rings from the stone, so hangs a long series of chorus-dancers, teachers, and disciples from the Muse. Some poets are influenced by one Muse, some by another; we call them possessed, and this word really expresses the truth, for they are held. Others, who are interpreters, are inspired by the first links, the poets, and are filled with enthusiasm, some by one, some by another; some by Orpheus, some by Musaeus, but the greater number are possessed and inspired by Homer. You, O Ion, are influenced by Homer. If you recite the works of any other poet, you get drowsy, and are at a loss what to say; but when you hear

any of the compositions of that poet you are roused, your thoughts are excited, and you grow eloquent; —for what you say of Homer is not derived from any art or knowledge, but from divine inspiration and possession. As the Corybantes feel acutely the melodies of him by whom they are inspired, and abound with verse and gesture for his songs alone, and care for no other; thus, you, O Ion, are eloquent when you expound Homer, and are barren of words with regard to every other poet. And this explains the question you asked, wherefore Homer, and no other poet, inspires you with eloquence. It is that you are thus excellent in your praise, not through science but from divine inspiration.

Ion/ You say the truth, Socrates. Yet, I am surprised that you should be able to persuade me that I am possessed and insane when I praise Homer. I think I shall not appear such to you when you hear me.

Socrates/ I desire to hear you, but not before you have answered me this one question. What subject does Homer treat best? for, surely, he does not treat all equally.

Ion/ You are aware that he treats of everything.

Socrates/ Does Homer mention subjects on which you are ignorant?

Ion/ What can those be?

Socrates/ Does not Homer frequently dilate on various arts—on chariot-driving, for instance? if I remember the verses I will repeat them.

Ion/ I will repeat them, for I remember them.

Socrates/ Repeat what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, counselling him to be cautious in turning, during the chariot-race at the funeral games of Patroclus.

Ion (repeats).

> Thyself upon the polish'd chariot bend
> To the left gently; but the right-hand horse

> With goad and voice urge on, and somewhat yield,
> Holding the reins; but let the left-hand steed
> Come near the turn-post grazing, which almost
> Of wheel well-made, let the nut seem to doubt
> If it reach not; but stone to touch avoid.

Socrates/ Enough. Now, O Ion, would a physician or a charioteer be the better judge as to Homer's sagacity on this subject?

Ion/ Of course, a charioteer.

Socrates/ Because he understands the art—or from what other reason?

Ion/ From his knowledge of the art.

Socrates/ For one science is not gifted with the power of judging of another—a steersman, for instance, does not understand medicine?

Ion/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Nor a physician, architecture?

Ion/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Is it not thus with every art? If we are adepts in one, we are ignorant of another. But first, tell me, do not all arts differ one from the other?

Ion/ They do.

Socrates/ For you, as well as I, can testify that when we say an art is the knowledge of one thing, we do not mean that it is the knowledge of another.

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For, if each art contained the knowledge of all things, why should we call them by different names? we do so that we may distinguish them one from the other. Thus, you as well as I, know that these are five fingers; and if I asked you whether we both meant the same thing or

another, when we speak of arithmetic—would you not say the same?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And tell me, when we learn one art we must both learn the same things with regard to it; and other things if we learn another?

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And he who is not versed in an art, is not a good judge of what is said or done with respect to it?

Ion/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ To return to the verses which you just recited, do you think that you or a charioteer would be better capable of deciding whether Homer had spoken rightly or not?

Ion/ Doubtless a charioteer.

Socrates/ For you are a rhapsodist, and not a charioteer?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the art of reciting verses is different from that of driving chariots?

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if it is different, it supposes a knowledge of different things?

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when Homer introduces Hecamede, the concubine of Nestor, giving Machaon a posset to drink, and he speaks thus—

> Of Pramnian wine; and into it she grates,
> With brazen grater, cheese from goat's milk made,
> And for the potion onion as a relish;

does it belong to the medical or rhapsodical art, to determine whether Homer speaks rightly on this subject?

Ion/ The medical.

Socrates/ And when he says—

She to the bottom went, just like the lead,
Which near the horn of bull, in meadows living,
Is placed upon the line, and rushes eager,
To fish, on raw flesh feeding, bringing fate—

does it belong to the rhapsodical or the piscatorial art, to determine whether he speaks rightly or not?

Ion/ Manifestly to the piscatorial art.

Socrates/ Consider whether you are not inspired to make some such demand as this to me: —Come, Socrates, since you have found in Homer an accurate description of these arts, assist me also in the inquiry as to his competence on the subject of soothsayers and divination; and how far he speaks well or ill on such subjects; for he often treats of them in the Odyssey, and especially when he introduces Theoclymenus the Soothsayer of the Melampians, prophesying to the Suitors—

Why by doom fated suffer ye this ill?
Involved in the gloom of night are faces, heads,
And nether limbs; and burns the loud lament
Fiercely, and cheeks with many tears are wet.
Of ghosts the porch is full, and full the hall,
To Erebus in darkness rushing; and the sun
From heaven is lost, and luckless mists come on.

I assert, it belongs to a soothsayer both to observe and to judge respecting such appearances as these.

Ion/ And you assert the truth, O Socrates.

Socrates/ And you also, my dear Ion. For we have in our turn recited from the Odyssey and the Iliad, passages relating to vaticination, to medicine and the piscatorial art; and as you are more skilled in Homer than I can be, do you now make mention of whatever relates to the rhapsodist and his art; for a rhapsodist is competent above all other men to consider and pronounce on whatever has relation to his art.

Ion/ Or with respect to everything else mentioned by Homer.

Socrates/ Do not be so forgetful as to say everything. A good memory is particularly necessary for a rhapsodist.

Ion/ And what do I forget?

Socrates/ Do you not remember that you admitted the art of reciting verses was different from that of driving chariots?

Ion/ I remember.

Socrates/ And did you not admit that being different, the subjects of its knowledge must also be different?

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ You will not assert that the art of rhapsody is that of universal knowledge; a rhapsodist may be ignorant of some things.

Ion/ Except, perhaps, such things as we now discuss, O Socrates.

Socrates/ What do you mean by such subjects, besides those which relate to other arts? And with which among them do you profess a competent acquaintance, since not with all?

Ion/ I imagine that the rhapsodist has a perfect knowledge of what it is becoming for a man to speak—what for a woman; what for a slave, what for a free man; what for the ruler, what for him who is governed.

Socrates/ How! do you think that a rhapsodist knows better than a pilot what the captain of a ship in a tempest ought to say?

Ion/ In such a circumstance I allow that the pilot would know best.

Socrates/ Has the rhapsodist or the physician the clearest knowledge of what ought to be said to a sick man?

Ion/ In that case the physician.

Socrates/ But you assert that he knows what a slave ought to say?

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ To take for example, in the driving of cattle; a rhapsodist would know much better than the herdsman what ought to be said to a slave engaged in bringing back a herd of oxen run wild?

Ion/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But what a woman should say concerning spinning wool?

Ion/ Of course not.

Socrates/ He would know, however, what a man, who is a general, should say when exhorting his troops?

Ion/ Yes; a rhapsodist would know that.

Socrates/ How! is rhapsody and strategy the same art?

Ion/ I know what it is fitting for a general to say.

Socrates/ Probably because you are learned in war, O Ion. For if you are equally expert in horsemanship and playing on the harp, you would know whether a man rode well or ill. But if I should ask you which understands riding best, a horseman or a harper, what would you answer?

Ion/ A horseman, of course.

Socrates/ And if you knew a good player on the harp, you would in the same way say that he understood harp-playing and not riding?

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Since you understand strategy, you can tell me which is the most excellent, the art of war or rhapsody?

Ion/ One does not appear to me to excel the other.

Socrates/ One is not better than the other, say you? Do you say that tactics and rhapsody are two arts or one?

Ion/ They appear to me to be the same.

Socrates/ Then a good rhapsodist is also a good general.

Ion/ Of course.

Socrates/ And a good general is a good rhapsodist?

Ion/ I do not say that.

Socrates/ You said that a good rhapsodist was also a good general.

Ion/ I did.

Socrates/ Are you not the best rhapsodist in Greece?

Ion/ By far, O Socrates.

Socrates/ And you are also the most excellent general among the Greeks?

Ion/ I am. I learned the art from Homer.

Socrates/ How is it, then, by Zeus, that being both the best general and the best rhapsodist among us, you continually go about Greece rhapsodizing, and never lead our armies? Does it seem to you that the Greeks greatly need golden-crowned rhapsodists, and have no want of generals?

Ion/ My native town, O Socrates, is ruled by yours, and requires no general for her wars; —and neither will your city nor the Lacedemonians elect me to lead their armies—you think your own generals sufficient.

Socrates/ My good Ion, are you acquainted with Apollodorus the Cyzicenian?

Ion/ Who do you mean?

Socrates/ He whom, though a stranger, the Athenians often elected general; and Phanosthenes the Andrian, and Heraclides the Clazomenian, all foreigners, but whom this city has chosen, as being great men, to lead its armies, and to fill other high offices. Would not, therefore, Ion the Ephesian be elected and honored if he were esteemed capable? Were not the Ephesians originally from Athens,

and is Ephesus the least of cities? But if you spoke true, Ion, and praise Homer according to art and knowledge, you have deceived me, —since you declared that you were learned on the subject of Homer, and would communicate your knowledge to me—but you have disappointed me, and are far from keeping your word. For you will not explain in what you are so excessively clever, though I greatly desire to learn; but, as various as Proteus, you change from one thing to another, and to escape at last, you disappear in the form of a general, without disclosing your Homeric wisdom. If, therefore, you possess the learning which you promised to expound on the subject of Homer, you deceive me and are false. But if you are eloquent on the subject of this Poet, not through knowledge, but by inspiration, being possessed by him, ignorant the while of the wisdom and beauty you display, then I allow that you are no deceiver. Choose then whether you will be considered false or inspired?

Ion/ It is far better, O Socrates, to be thought inspired.

Socrates/ It is better both for you and for us, O Ion, to say that you are the inspired, and not the learned, eulogist of Homer.

The Io.

Translated by Mr. Sydenham.

Persons of the Dialog:

Socrates and Io.

SCENE, ATHENS.

Socrates/ Joy be with Io. Whence come you now? what; do you come directly from home, from Ephesus?

Ion/ Not so, Socrates, I assure you; but from Epidaurus, from the feasts of Æsculapius.

Socrates/ The people of Epidaurus, I think, upon this occasion, propose a trial of skill among the rhapsodists, in honor of the god. Do they not?

Ion/ They do; and a trial of skill in every other branch of the Muse's art.

Socrates/ Well; you, I presume, were one of the competitors: What success had you?

Ion/ We came off, O Socrates, with the chief prize.

Socrates/ You say well: now then let us prepare to win the conquest in the Panathenæa.

Ion/ That we shall accomplish too, if fortune favor us.

Socrates/ Often have I envied you rhapsodists, Io, the great advantages of your profession. For to be always well dressed, and to make the handsomest appearance possible, as becomes a man, no doubt, who speaks in public; to be conversant, besides, in the works of many excellent poets, especially in those of Homer, the best and most divine of them all; and to learn, not merely his verses, but his meaning, as it is necessary you should; these are advantages highly to be envied. For a man could never be a good rhapsodist unless he understood what he recited: because it

is the business of a rhapsodist to explain to his audience the sense and meaning of the poet; but this it is impossible to perform well, without a knowledge of those things, concerning which the poet writes. Now all this certainly merits a high degree of admiration.

Ion/ You are in the right, Socrates. And the learning this I have made my principal business. It has given me indeed more trouble than any other branch of my profession. I presume therefore there is now no man living, who disserts upon Homer so well as myself: nay, that none of those celebrated persons, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Stesimbrotus the Thasian, Glauco, nor any other, whether antient or modern, was ever able to show in the verses of that poet so many and so fine sentiments as I can do.

Socrates/ I am glad, To, to hear you say so: for I am persuaded you will not he so ill-natured as to refuse the exhibiting before me your abilities in this way.

Ion/ My illustrations of Homer are indeed, Socrates, well worth your attention. For they are such as, I think, entitle me to receive from the admirers of that poet the crown of gold.

Socrates/ I shall find an opportunity of hearing you descant on this subject some other time. For the present, I desire only to be informed of this; whether you are so great a master in explaining Homer alone, or whether you shine no less in illustrating Hesiod and Archilochus.

Ion/ By no means: for I own my powers confined to the illustrating Homer. To execute this well, is merit enough, I think, for one man.

Socrates/ But in the writings of Homer and of Hesiod are there no passages in which their sentiments and thoughts agree?

Ion/ There are, I believe, many passages of that kind.

Socrates/ In these cases now, are you better able to explain the words of Homer, than those of Hesiod?

Ion/ Equally well to be sure, Socrates, I can explain the words of both, where they agree.

Socrates/ But how is it with you, where, in writing on the same subject, they differ? For instance, Homer and Hesiod both write of things that relate to divination.

Ion/ True.

Socrates/ Well now; the passages in either of these poets, relating to divination; not only where he agrees with the other, but where he differs from him: who, think you, is capable of interpreting with most skill and judgment, yourself, or some able diviner?

Ion/ An able diviner, I must own.

Socrates/ But suppose you were a diviner, and were able to interpret rightly the similar places in both; would your abilities, do you imagine, fail you, when you came to interpret the places in either of them, where he differed from the other?

Ion/ I should certainly in that case have equal skill to explain both of them.

Socrates/ How comes it to pass then, that you interpret Homer in so masterly a manner, yet not Hesiod, or any other of the poets? Are the subjects of Homer's writings anything different from the subjects of other poems, taken, all together? Are they not, in the first place, war and military affairs; then, the speeches and mutual discourse of all sorts of men, the good as well as the bad, whether they be private persons or public; the converse also of the gods one with another, and their intercourse with men; the celestial bodies, with the various phenomena of the sky and air; the state of souls departed, with the affairs of that lower world;

the generation of the gods, with the descent and race of the heroes? Are not these the subjects of Homer's poetry?

Ion/ They are, Socrates, these very things.

Socrates/ Well; and do not the rest of the Poets write of these very things?

Ion/ They do, Socrates: but their poetry upon these subjects is nothing like the poetry of Homer.

Socrates/ What then, is it worse?

Ion/ Much worse.

Socrates/ The poetry of Homer, you say then, is better and more excellent than that of other poets.

Ion/ Better indeed it is, and much more excellent, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Suppose now, my friend Io, out of several persons, all in their turns haranguing before an audience upon the nature of numbers, someone made a better speech than the rest; might not one of the auditors be capable of finding out that better speaker, and of giving him the preference due, to him?

Ion/ There might be such a one.

Socrates/ Would not the same auditor, think you, be a judge of what was said by the worse speakers? or must he be a different person, who was a proper judge of these?

Ion/ The same person, certainly.

Socrates/ And would not a good arithmetician be such a person, thus equally able in both respects?

Ion/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ To put another case to you: suppose among many persons, severally disserting upon food, what sorts of it were wholesome, there should be one who spoke better than the rest; would it belong, say you, to one of the hearers to distinguish accurately the better speaker, while it was

necessary to look amongst the rest of the audience for a fit judge of the meaner speakers? or would the speeches of them all be examined judiciously, and their different merits and demerits be estimated justly by the same person?

Ion/ By the same person, beyond all doubt.

Socrates/ Of what character must this person be, who is thus qualified? What do you call him?

Ion/ A physician.

Socrates/ And do not you agree with me, that this holds true universally; and that in every case, where several men made discourses upon the same subject, the nature both of the good and of the bad discourses would be discerned by the same person? For if a man was no proper judge of the defects in the meaner performance, is it not evident that he would be incapable of comprehending the beauties of the more excellent?

Ion/ You are in the right.

Socrates/ It belongs to the same person, therefore, to criticize with true judgment upon all of them.

Ion/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Did not you say that Homer, and the rest of the poets, for instance, Hesiod and Archilochus, write concerning the same things, though not in the same manner? the compositions of the one being excellent, you say, while those of the others are comparatively mean.

Ion/ I said nothing more than what is true.

Socrates/ If then you can distinguish and know the compositions which excel, must not you necessarily know those which fall short of that excellence?

Ion/ I own it appears probable, from your argument.

Socrates/ It follows therefore, my good friend, that in affirming Io to be equally capable of explaining Homer and

every other poet, we should not miss the truth: since he acknowledges one and the same person to be an able judge of all such as write concerning the same things; admitting at the same time the subjects of almost all poetical writings to be the same.

Ion/ What can possibly be then the reason, Socrates, that whenever I am present at an harangue upon any other poet, I pay not the least regard to it; nor am able to contribute to the entertainment, or to advance anything upon the subject in my turn, worth the regard of others; but grow downright dull, and fall asleep: yet that as soon as any mention is made of Homer, immediately I am roused, am all attention, and with great facility find enough to say upon this subject?

Socrates/ It is not in the least difficult, my friend to guess the reason, For to every man it must be evident, that you are not capable of explaining Homer on the principles of art, or from real science. For if your ability was of this kind, depending upon your knowledge of any art, you would be as well able to explain every other poet: since the whole, of what they all write, is poetry; is it not?

Ion/ It is.

Socrates/ Well now; when a man comprehends any other art, the whole of it, is not his way of considering and criticizing all the professors of that art, one and the same? and does not his judgment in every case depend on the same principles? Would you have me explain myself upon this point, Io? do you desire to know the meaning of my question?

Ion/ By all means, Socrates. For I take great pleasure in hearing you wise men talk.

Socrates/ I should be glad, Io, could that appellation be justly applied to me; but you are the wise men, you rhapsodists and the players, together with the poets, whose verses you recite to us. For my part, I speak nothing but the

simple truth, as it becomes a mere private man to do. For the question, which I just now asked you, see how mean a matter it concerns, how common, and within the compass of every man's reach to know, that which I called one and the same way of criticizing, when a man comprehends the whole of any art. To give an instance of such comprehensive skill; painting is an art, to be comprehended as one kind of skill, whole and entire; is it not?

Ion/ It is.

Socrates/ Is there not a difference, in degree of merit, between the several professors of that art, whether you consider the ancients or the moderns?

Ion/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Now then, do you know any man who is an able critic in the works of Polygnotus, the son of Aglaophon; and can show, with great judgment, which of his pieces he executed well, and which with less success; yet in the works of other painters hath no critical skill; and whenever their performances are brought upon the carpet to be examined and criticized, grows dull and falls asleep, or is unable to contribute his quota to the conversation: but as soon as occasion calls him to declare his judgment about Polygnotus, or any other particular painter whatever, immediately is roused, is all attention, and finds enough to say upon this subject? Know you any such man?

Ion/ Really I do not.

Socrates/ Well now; in the statuary's art how is it? Did you ever see any man, who upon the works of Dædalus, the son of Metion, or Epeius, son to Panopeus, or Theodorus the Samian, or any other single statuary, was able to display great judgment in showing the excellent performances of so great a master; yet with regard to the works of other

statuaries, was at a loss, grew dull, and fell asleep, because he had nothing to say?

Ion/ I confess I never saw such a man neither.

Socrates/ Nor is it otherwise, I imagine, with regard to music, whether we consider wind-instruments, or those of the siring-kind; and these last, whether alone, or accompanied by the voice; so likewise in rhapsodical recitals; you never, I presume, saw a man, who was a great master in criticizing on Olympus, or on Thamyris, or on Orpheus, or on Phemius the rhapsodist of Ithaca; but as to Io the Ephesian, was at a loss what to say about him, and unable to give any account of Io's good or bad performances.

Ion/ I have nothing to oppose to what you say upon this point, Socrates: but of this I am conscious to myself, that upon Homer I dissert the best of all men, and do it with great ease. Nor is this my own opinion only; for all people agree, that my dissertations of this kind are excellent. But if the subject be any other of the poets, it is quite otherwise with me. Consider then what may be the meaning of this.

Socrates/ I do consider, Io; and proceed to show you how it appears to me. That you are able to discourse well concerning Homer is not owing to any art of which you are master; nor do you explain or illustrate him, as I said before, upon the principles or from the rules of art; but from a divine power, acting upon you, and impelling you: a power resembling that which acts in the stone, called by Euripides the magnet, but known commonly by the name of the load stone. For this stone does not only attract iron rings, but impart to those rings the power of doing that very thing which itself does, enabling them to attract other rings of iron: So that sometimes may be seen a very long series of iron rings; depending, as in a chain, one from another. But from that stone, at the head of them, is derived the virtue

which operates in them all. In the same manner, the Muse, inspiring, moves men herself through her divine impulse. From these men, thus inspired, others, catching the sacred power, form a chain of divine enthusiasts. For the best epic poets, and all such as excel in the composing any kind of verses to be recited, frame not those their admirable poems from the rules of art; but possessed by the Muse, they write from divine inspiration. Nor is it otherwise with the best lyric poets, and all other fine writers of verses to be sung. For as the priests of Cybele perform not their dances, while they have the free use of their intellect so these melody poets pen those beautiful songs of theirs only when they are out of their sober minds. But as soon as they proceed to give voice and motion to those songs, adding to their words the harmony of music and the measure of dance, they are immediately transported; and, possessed by some divine power, are like the priestesses of Bacchus, who, full of the god, no longer draw water, but honey and milk out of the springs and fountains; though unable to do anything like it when they are sober. And in fact there passes in the souls of these poets that very thing which they pretend to do. For they assure us, that out of certain gardens and flowery vales belonging to the Muses, from fountains flowing there with honey, gathering the sweetness of their songs, they bring it to us, like the bees; and in the same manner withal, flying. Nor do they tell us any untruth. For a poet is a thing light and volatile, and sacred; nor is he able to write poetry, till the Mule entering into him, he is transported out of himself, and has no longer the command of his intellect. But so long as a man continues in the possession of intellect, he is unable to sing either odes or oracles; to write any kind: of poetry, or utter any sort of prophecy. Hence it is, that the poets say indeed many fine things, whatever their subject be; just as you do concerning Homer: but each is alone able

to accomplish this through a divine destiny, on that subject to which he is impelled by the Muse; this poet in dithyrambic; that in panegyric; one in chorus songs, another in epic verse another in iambic. In the other kinds every one of them is mean, and makes no figure: and this, because they write not what is taught them by art, but what is suggested to them by some divine power, on whose influence they depend. For if it was their knowledge of the art which enabled them to write good poems upon one subject, they would be able to write poems equally good upon all other subjects. But for this reason it is, that the god, depriving them of the use of their intellect, employs them as his ministers, his oracle singers, and divine prophets; that when we hear them, we may know, it is not these men who deliver things so excellent; these, to whom intellect is not present; but the god himself speaking, and through these men publishing his mind to us. The greatest proof of that which I advance, is Tynnichus the Chalcidian; who never composed any other poem, worth the mention or remembrance, beside that Pæan, which everybody sings, of almost all odes the most excellent, and as he himself tells us.

> Wholly a present from the Muse's hands,
> Some new invention of their own.

For in him does the god seem to give us a convincing evidence, so as to leave no room for doubt, that those beautiful poems are not human, nor the compositions of men; but divine, and the work of gods: and that poets are only interpreters of the gods, inspired and possessed, each of them by that particular deity who corresponds to the peculiar nature of the poet. This, the better to demonstrate to us, did the god purposely choose out a poet of the meanest kind, through whom to sing a melody of the noblest. Do not you think, Io, that I say what is true?

Ion/ Indeed I do: for I feel as it were in my very soul, Socrates, the truth of what you say. To me too such poets, as write finely, appear in their writings to be interpreters of the gods, in proportion to the kind and degree of those divine powers, allotted severally to each poet.

Socrates/ Now you rhapsodists interpret in like manner the writings of the poets. Do you not?

Ion/ So far you still say what is true.

Socrates/ Do you not then become the interpreters of interpreters?

Ion/ Very true.

Socrates/ Mind now, Io, and tell me this; and think not to conceal any part of the truth, in answering to what I am going to ask. At those times, when you perform your rehearsals in the best manner, and strike your audience with uncommon force and efficacy; when you sing, for instance, of Ulysses, hastening to the entrance of his house, appearing in his own proper person to the wooers of his queen, and pouring out his arrows close before him, ready for spreading round him instant death; or represent Achilles rushing upon Hector; or when you rehearse, in a different strain, any of the melancholy mournful circumstances attending Andromache, or Hecuba, or Priam; at such times whether have you the free use of your intellect? or are you not rather in a state of mental alienation? Does not your soul, in an ecstasy, imagine herself present to those very things and actions which you relate? as if you had been hurried away by some divine power to Ithaca, or Troy, or wherever else be said the scene of action.

Ion/ How clear and convincing a proof, Socrates, of your argument is this which you have produced! For, without concealing anything, I shall own the truth. When I am reciting anything pitiable or mournful, my eyes are filled

with tears; when anything dreadful or horrible is the subject, my hairs stand erect, and my heart beats quick, through terror and affright.

Socrates/ What shall we say then, Io? that a man has, at that time, the free use of his intellect, when, clad in a splendid garb, with a crown of gold upon his head, amidst a feast, or at a festival, he falls into tears, without having lost any part of his finery, or of the entertainment? or when he is affrighted and terrified, standing in the midst of twenty thousand men, all well-disposed and friendly to him, none offering to strip him of his ornaments, or do him the least injury?

Ion/ To confess the truth, Socrates, he is not, by Zeus, entirely in the possession of intellect.

Socrates/ Do you know that you produce this very same effect upon many of your auditors?

Ion/ I am, indeed, fully sensible of it. For at every striking passage look down from my pulpit round me, and see the people suitably affected by it: now weeping, then looking as if horror seized them; such emotion and such astonishment are spread through all. And it is my business to observe them with strict attention, that if I see I have set them a weeping, I may be ready to receive their money, and to laugh; but if I find them laughing, that I may prepare myself for a sorrowful exit, disappointed of my expected gain.

Socrates/ Know you not then, that this audience of yours is like the last of those rings, which one to another, as I said, impart their power, derived from that magnet at the top? The middle ring are you the rhapsodist, and so too Is the player: the first ring being the poet himself. By means of all these does the god draw, wherever it pleases him, the souls of men, suspended each on other through attractive virtue. In the same manner too, as from that magnet, is formed a chain of

many rows, where chorus-singers and dancers, masters and under-masters, hang, like the collateral rings, attracted and held together sideways, all depending from the Muse. But upon one Muse one of the poets, upon a different Muse another is suspended; possessed we call him, that is held fast; because he is fast held by the Muse. From these first rings, the poets hang their followers and admirers; some from one, others from another; inspired by them, and fattened on them, by means of the enthusiastic spirit issuing from them; some to Orpheus, others to Musæus; but the most numerous sort is of such, as are possessed by Homer, and held fast by him. Of this number, Io, are you, inspired as you are, and enthusiastically possessed by Homer. Hence it is, that when the verses of any other poet are sung or recited, you grow dull and fall asleep, for want of something to say: but that, as soon as you hear a strain of that poet poured forth, immediately you are roused, your soul recovers her sprightliness, and much to say presents itself to your mind: because, when you harangue upon Homer, you do it not from art or science, but from enthusiasm, of that particular kind which has possessed you by divine allotment. Just as those, who join in the rites of Cybele, have an acute perception of such music only as appertains to that deity by whom they are possessed; and are not wanting either in words or gestures, adapted to a melody of that kind; but have no regard to any other music, nor any feeling of its power. In the same manner you, Io, when any mention is made of Homer, feel a readiness and a facility of speaking; yet with regard to other poets find yourself wanting. That therefore which your question demands, whence you have within you such an ample fund of discourse, upon everything relating to Homer; whilst it is quite otherwise with you, when the subject brought upon the carpet is any other of the poets; the cause is this, that not science, but

enthusiasm, not art, but a divine destiny, has made you so mighty a panegyrist on Homer.

Ion/ You speak well, Socrates, I own. But I should wonder if, with all your fine talk, you could persuade me to think myself possessed, and insane, when I make my panegyrics on Homer. Nor would you, as I imagine, think so yourself, were you but to hear from me a dissertation upon that poet.

Socrates/ And willing am I indeed to hear you; but not till you have answered me this question in the first place, which of his subjects does Homer handle best? for certainly you will not say, that he excels in all things.

Ion/ Be assured, Socrates, there is nothing in which he excels not.

Socrates/ You certainly do not mean to include those things of which Homer writes, and of which you are ignorant.

Ion/ And what things may those be which Homer writes of, and which I am ignorant of?

Socrates/ Does not Homer frequently, and copiously too, treat of the arts; for instance, the art of chariot-driving? If I can remember the verses, I will repeat them to you.

Ion/ I will recite them rather to you, for I well remember them.

Socrates/ Recite me then what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, where he gives him a caution about the turning, in that chariot-race celebrated in honor of Patroclus.

Ion/ His words are these:

> There to the left inclining, easy turn
> The light-built chariot; mindful then to urge
> With pungent whip, and animating voice,
> The right-hand courser, and with hand remiss
> The reins to yield him; hard upon the goal,
> Meantime, his partner bearing; till the wheel
> Skimming the stony lines of that old mark,

Doubt if its nave with point projecting touch
Th' extremest margin: but of those rough stones
Th' encounter rude be careful to decline.

Socrates/ Enough. Now in these verses, Io, whether Homer gives a right account of what ought to be done upon the occasion or not, who must be the ablest judge, a physician, or a charioteer?

Ion/ A charioteer, undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Whether is he thus able, from his having skill in his art, or by some other means?

Ion/ From his skill in his art only, and no other way.

Socrates/ Has not thus every one of the arts an ability, given it by God himself, to judge of certain performances? for the same things, in which we have good judgment from our skill in the art of piloting, by no means shall we be able to judge of well from any skill in the art of medicine.

Ion/ By no means, undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Nor the same things, in which our skill in the art of medicine has given us good judgment would the greatest skill in the art of building qualify us to judge of equally well.

Ion/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Does it not then hold true alike in all the arts, that of whatever things we are good judges by means of our being possessed of one art, we can never judge well of those very things from our skill in any other art? But before you answer to this question, answer me to this other: Do not you admit a diversity between the arts, and call this someone art, and that some other?

Ion/ I admit such a diversity.

Socrates/ Do not you distinguish every art in the same way that I do, inferring a diversity between them from the diversity of their subjects? When one art is attended with

knowledge of one sort of things, another art by knowledge in things of a different nature, do you not from hence conclude, as I do, that this accordingly is one art, and that another?

Ion/ I do.

Socrates/ For If, in any two arts, there was the knowledge of the same things in both, why should we make a distinction, and call this someone art, and that some other different, when both of them were attended by skill in the same sort of things? as I know, for instance, these fingers of mine to be five in number; and you know it as well as I. Now were I to ask you, whether it was by the same art that we know this one and the same thing, by the art of arithmetic, you as well as I, or each of us by a several art; you would certainly answer, it was by the same art.

Ion/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ The question then, which I was about asking you before, answer me now; whether in all the arts, you think it alike necessary that the same things should be judged of by the same art; and that a different art must not pretend to judge of those very things; but that if in reality it be a different art, different things must of course fall under its cognizance?

Ion/ I do think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ No man therefore will be able to judge well of anything said, or done, relating to anyone of the arts in which he has no skill.

Ion/ You say right.

Socrates/ In those verses then, which you repeated, can you best tell whether Homer gives a right account of things or not; or is a charioteer the properest judge of this?

Ion/ A charioteer.

Socrates/ And that for this reason, because you are a rhapsodist and not a charioteer.

Ion/ True.

Socrates/ And because the art of a rhapsodist is different from that of a charioteer.

Ion/ Right.

Socrates/ If then it be a different art, it is attended by skill in a different sort of things.

Ion/ Very right.

Socrates/ Well then; when Homer relates how Hecamede, a damsel of Nestor's, mingled a potion for Machaon to drink, after he had been wounded, giving us this description of it;

> Into rough Pramnian carefully she scrapes,
> With brazen scraper, acrid-tasted cheese,
> Made of thin milk drawn from fallacious goat
> And sets beside the life-reviving bowl
> Strong stimulating onion. —

To form a true judgment in this case, whether Homer be in the right or not, Does it belong to the art of medicine, or to that of rhapsody?

Ion/ To the art of medicine.

Socrates/ Well; and what, where Homer says thus;

> Steep down to the low bottom of the main
> Then plung'd the goddess; rushing, like the lead.
> Pendant from horn of meadow-ranging bull,
> Which falls impetuous, to devouring fish
> Bearing the deathful mischief. —

Whether shall we say it belongs to the art of fishing, or to that of rhapsody, to judge best whether this description be right or wrong?

Ion/ To the art of fishing, Socrates, without doubt.

Socrates/ Consider now, suppose yourself had taken the part of questioner, and were to say to me thus; Since then,

Socrates, you have found what passages in Homer it belongs to each of those arts before mentioned, severally to discern and criticize with good judgment; come, find me out, upon the subject of divination, what passages it is the business of a diviner critically to examine, and to tell us whether the poetical account be right or wrong: consider, how easily I should be able to give you a satisfactory and a proper answer. For Homer has many passages relating to this subject in his Odyssey, particularly one, where Theoclymenus the diviner, one of the race of Melampus, addresses the wooers of Penelope in this manner;

> Mark'd out by Heav'n for great events! What ill
> Is this attends ye! what sad omens point
> Presageful! round ye some dark vapor spreads
> His dusky wings; head, face, and lower limbs
> In shades involving: thick through burden'd air
> Roll hollow sounds lamenting: dropping tears
> Stain of each mourning statue the wet cheeks:
> Crowded the porch, and crowded is the hall
> With specters; down to Pluto's shadowy reign
> Ghosts seem they gliding: the sun's cheery light
> Is lost from heaven: a gloom foreboding falls,
> O'erhanging all things, sadd'ning every heart.

On the same subject: he writes in many places of his Iliad; as, for instance, where he describes that fight, which happened under the Grecian fortifications. For he there gives us this relation of it;

> While eager they prepared to pass the moat.
> And force th, intrenchments; o'er them came a bird
> Tow'ring, an eagle, from the left of heaven.
> Their enterprise forbidding: on he came.
> And in his talons bore a dragon, huge.
> Enormous, glist'ning horrid with red scales.
> Still liv'd the serpent; and though close with death
> He drove, and gasp'd, and panted; yet his rage
> And venom he forgot not; for half round

Wreathing the pliant joints of his high crest.
With backward stroke he piere'd his griping foe:
His breast he piere'd, where close beneath the neck
Soft to the stroke it yielded. Stung with smart.
Loosen'd his gripe the foe, and to the ground
Down dropp'd him. Mid the martial throng the beast
Fell: while the bleeding bird with clangor shrill
Strain'd onward his weak flight, where bore the winds.

These passages, and others of the same kind, shall I say, it belongs to the diviner to consider, and to criticize?

Ion/ So will you say what is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ You speak truth yourself, Io, in this. Come on then, and tell me, as I have selected out for you certain passages from the Odyssey, and from the Iliad, appertaining some of them to the diviner, some to the physician, and others to the fisherman; in return, do you pick out for me (since you are better versed in Homer than I am) such passages, Io, as appertain to the rhapsodist, and relate to the rhapsodical art: such as it becomes the rhapsodist to examine and to criticize, with a judgment and skill superior to that of other men.

Ion/ The whole of Homer I affirm it to be, Socrates.

Socrates/ You denied it, Io, but just now, to be the whole of Homer. What, are you so forgetful? It ill becomes, however, a man, who is a rhapsodist, to be forgetful.

Ion/ But what is it now that I have forgot?

Socrates/ Do you not remember, that you affirmed the art of rhapsody to be an art different from that of chariot-driving?

Ion/ I do remember it.

Socrates/ Did not you allow too, that being a different art, it was accompanied by skill and judgment in a different sort of things?

Ion/ I did allow it.

Socrates/ The art of rhapsody therefore, according to your own account, is not accompanied by skill and judgment in things of every sort; nor will the rhapsodist know all things.

Ion/ With an exception, perhaps, Socrates, of such sort of things.

Socrates/ By such sort of things, which you are pleased to except, you mean such things as belong to nearly all the other arts. But, since the rhapsodist knows not all things, pray what are those things which he does know?

Ion/ He knows, I presume, what is proper for a man to speak, and what for a woman; what for a slave, and what for a free-man; what for those who are under government or command, and what for the governor and the commander.

Socrates/ For the commander, do you mean who has the command of a ship at sea, amidst a tempest, what is proper for him to speak, that the rhapsodist will know better than the master of a ship?

Ion/ Not so; for this indeed the master of a ship will know best.

Socrates/ For the governor then, who has the government of the sick, what is proper for such a one to speak, will the rhapsodist know better than the physician?

Ion/ Not this neither.

Socrates/ But that which is proper for a slave, you say.

Ion/ I do.

Socrates/ For instance now, a slave, whose office it is to keep the cattle, what is proper for him to speak, when the herd grows wild and madding, in order to pacify and tame them; do you say the rhapsodist will know this better than the cow-keeper?

Ion/ No, to be sure.

Socrates/ That, however, which is proper for a woman to speak; for a woman-weaver now, suppose, relating to the fabric of cloth.

Ion/ No, no.

Socrates/ But he will know what is proper for a man to speak, who has the command of an army, in order to animate his men.

Ion/ You have it; such sort of things the rhapsodist will know.

Socrates/ What is the art of rhapsody then the art of commanding armies?

Ion/ Truly I should know what speech is proper for the commander of an army.

Socrates/ Because you have, perhaps, the art of generalship, Io. For suppose you were skilled in the arts of horsemanship and of music, both of them, you would be a good judge of what horses were well-managed, and would be able to distinguish them from such as were managed ill. Now, in that case, were I to ask you this question, by which of your arts, Io, do you know the well-managed horses? do you know them through your skill in horsemanship, or through your skill in music? what answer would you make me?

Ion/ Through my skill in horsemanship, I should answer.

Socrates/ Again; when you distinguished rightly the good performers in music, would not you own, that you distinguished them by your being skilled in music; and not say it was owing to your skill in horsemanship?

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But now that you understand what belongs to the command of armies, whether do you understand this by

means of your skill in the art of general-ship, or as you are an excellent rhapsodist?

Ion/ There appears to me no difference.

Socrates/ What mean you by no difference? Do you mean, that the art of rhapsody and the art of general-ship are one and the same art? or do you admit them to be two different arts?

Ion/ I think they are one art only.

Socrates/ Whoever then happens to be a good rhapsodist, the same man must also be a good general.

Ion/ By all means, Socrates.

Socrates/ And whoever happens to be a good general, must he be a good rhapsodist too?

Ion/ This, I think, does not hold true.

Socrates/ But that other consequence, you think, will hold true, that whoever is a good rhapsodist is also a good general.

Ion/ Beyond all doubt.

Socrates/ Now are not you the most excellent of all the Grecian rhapsodists?

Ion/ Certainly so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you also then, Io, excel the rest of the Grecians in knowing how to command armies?

Ion/ Be assured, Socrates, that I do; for I have acquired that knowledge from the works of Homer.

Socrates/ In the name of the gods then, Io, what can be the meaning that, excellent as you are above the rest of the Grecians, both as a general and as a rhapsodist, you choose to make your appearance only in this latter character; and travel about all over Greece, reciting and expounding, but take not the command of the Grecian armies? Is it because you think the Grecians are in great need of a rhapsodist, or

of a man to repeat verses to them with a golden crown upon his head, but have no occasion at all for a general?

Ion/ The city, which I belong to, Socrates, is under the government of yours, and her forces are commanded by the Athenians: therefore she is in no want of a general. And as to your city, or that of the Lacedæmonians, neither of you would appoint me her general, because you have, both of you, a high opinion of your own sufficiency.

Socrates/ What, my friend Io, do you not know Apollodorus of Cyzicum?

Ion/ Which Apollodorus?

Socrates/ Him, whom the Athenians have often appointed to the command of their armies, though a foreigner. Then there is, besides, Phanosthenes the Andrian, and Heraclides of Clazomenas; upon whom the city, notwithstanding that they are foreigners, yet because they have approved themselves considerable and worthy men, confers the chief command of her army, with other posts of power and government. And will not the city then bestow her honors on Io the Ephesian, and appoint him her general, should he appear a man valuable, and worthy that regard? What, are not you Ephesians originally of Athens? and then, besides, does Ephesus yield the preference to any city in point of greatness? But the question is about your own character, Io; What shall we think of you? For if you speak truth, when you say that you are able to display the excellencies of Homer through your skill in any art or science, you are a man who does not act fairly. For after you had professed to know many fine things, from which you could illustrate the works of Homer, and had undertaken to give me a specimen of that knowledge of yours, you deceive and disappoint me: whilst you are so far from doing as you promised, and giving me such a specimen, that you will not so much as inform

me what those things are in which you have so profound a skill; and this, notwithstanding I have long pressed you to tell me: but absolutely become, like Proteus, all various and multiform, changing backwards and forwards, till at last you escape me, by starting up a general; for fear, I suppose, you should be driven to discover how deep your wisdom is in the works of Homer. If then you really are an artist, and when you had promised to give me a specimen of your art and knowledge in Homer, willfully disappoint me; you act, as I just now said, unfairly. If indeed you are not an artist, but an enthusiast, one of those who from divine allotment are inspired by Homer; and thus, without any real knowledge, are able to utter abundance of fine words about the writings of that poet, agreeably to the opinion which I had of you before; in this case you are not guilty of any unfair dealing. Choose then, whether of these two opinions you would have me entertain of you; whether this, that you are a man, who acts unfairly; or this other, that you are a man under the influence of some divinity.

Ion/ Great is the difference, O Socrates; it is certainly much the better thing to be deemed under divine influence.

Socrates/ This better thing then, Io, is with you, to be deemed by us, in your encomiums upon Homer, an enthusiast, and not an artist.

THE END OF THE IO.

Ion

Translated by Paul Woodruff.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and Ion.

Socrates/ Ion! Hello. Where have you come from to visit us this time? From your home in Ephesus?

Ion/ No, no, Socrates. From Epidaurus, from the festival of Asclepius.

Socrates/ Don't tell me the Epidaurians hold a contest for rhapsodes in honor of the god?

Ion/ They certainly do! They do it for every sort of poetry and music.

Socrates/ Really! Did you enter the contest? And how did it go for you?

Ion/ First prize, Socrates! We carried it off.

Socrates/ That's good to hear. Well, let's see that we win the games at Athens, next.

Ion/ We'll do it, Socrates, god willing.

Socrates/ You know, Ion, many times I've envied you rhapsodes your profession. Physically, it is always fitting for you in your profession to be dressed up to look as beautiful as you can; and at the same time it is necessary for you to be at work with poets—many fine ones, and with Homer above all, who's the best poet and the most divine—and you have to learn his thought, not just his verses! Now that is something to envy! I mean, no one would ever get to be a good rhapsode if he didn't understand what is meant by the poet. A rhapsode must come to present the poet's thought to his audience; and he can't do that beautifully unless he knows what the poet means. So this all deserves to be envied.

Ion/ That's true, Socrates. And that's the part of my profession that took the most work. I think I speak more beautifully than anyone else about Homer; neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus nor Stesimbrotus of Thasos nor Glaucon nor anyone else past or present could offer as many beautiful thoughts about Homer as I can.

Socrates/ That's good to hear, Ion. Surely you won't begrudge me a demonstration?

Ion/ Really, Socrates, it's worth hearing how well I've got Homer dressed up. I think I'm worthy to be crowned by the Sons of Homer with a golden crown.

Socrates/ Really, I shall make time to hear that later. Now I'd just like an answer to this: Are you so wonderfully clever about Homer alone—or also about Hesiod and Archilochus?

Ion/ No, no. Only about Homer. That's good enough, I think.

Socrates/ Is there any subject on which Homer and Hesiod both say the same things?

Ion/ Yes, I think so. A good many.

Socrates/ Then, on those subjects, would you explain Homer's verse better and more beautifully than Hesiod's?

Ion/ Just the same Socrates, on those subjects, anyway, where they say the same things.

Socrates/ And how about the subjects on which they do not say the same things? Divination, for example. Homer says something about it and so does Hesiod.

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well. Take all the places where those two poets speak of divination, both where they agree and where they don't: who would explain those better and more beautifully, you, or one of the diviners if he's good?

Ion/ One of the diviners.

Socrates/ Suppose you were a diviner: if you were really able to explain the places where the two poets agree, wouldn't you also know how to explain the places where they disagree?

Ion/ That's clear.

Socrates/ Then what in the world is it that you're clever about in Homer but not in Hesiod and the other poets? Does Homer speak of any subjects that differ from those of all the other poets? Doesn't he mainly go through tales of war, and of how people deal with each other in society—good people and bad, ordinary folks and craftsmen? And of the gods, how they deal with each other and with men? And doesn't he recount what happens in heaven and in hell, and tell of the births of gods and heroes? Those are the subjects of Homer's poetry-making, aren't they?

Ion/ That's true, Socrates.

Socrates/ And how about the other poets? Did they write on the same subjects?

Ion/ Yes, but Socrates, they didn't do it the way Homer did.

Socrates/ How, then? Worse?

Ion/ Much worse.

Socrates/ And Homer does it better?

Ion/ Really better.

Socrates/ Well now, Ion, dear heart, when a number of people are discussing arithmetic, and one of them speaks best, I suppose someone will know how to pick out the good speaker.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Will it be the same person who can pick out the bad speakers, or someone else?

Ion/ The same, of course.

Socrates/ And that will be someone who has mastered arithmetic, right?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well. Suppose a number of people are discussing healthy nutrition, and one of them speaks best. Will one person know that the best speaker speaks best, and another that an inferior speaker speaks worse? Or will the same man know both?

Ion/ Obviously, the same man.

Socrates/ Who is he? What do we call him?

Ion/ A doctor.

Socrates/ So, to sum it up, this is what we're saying: when a number of people speak on the same subject, it's always the same person who will know how to pick out good speakers and bad speakers. If he doesn't know how to pick out a bad speaker, he certainly won't know a good speaker—on the same subject, anyway.

Ion/ That's so.

Socrates/ Then it turns out that the same person is "wonderfully clever" about both speakers.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now you claim that Homer and the other poets (including Hesiod and Archilochus) speak on the same subjects, but not equally well. He's good, and they're inferior.

Ion/ Yes, and it's true.

Socrates/ Now if you really do know who's speaking well, you'll know that the inferior speakers are speaking worse.

Ion/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ You're superb! So if we say that Ion is equally clever about Homer and the other poets, we'll make no mistake. Because you agree yourself that the same person will be an adequate judge of all who speak on the same subjects, and that almost all the poets do treat the same subjects.

Ion/ Then how in the world do you explain what I do, Socrates? When someone discusses another poet I pay no attention, and I have no power to contribute anything worthwhile: I simply doze off. But let someone mention Homer and right away I'm wide awake and I'm paying attention and I have plenty to say.

Socrates/ That's not hard to figure out, my friend. Anyone can tell that you are powerless to speak about Homer on the basis of knowledge or mastery. Because if your ability came by mastery, you would be able to speak about all the other poets as well. Look, there is an art of poetry as a whole, isn't there?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now take the whole of any other subject: won't it have the same discipline throughout? And this goes for every subject that can be mastered. Do you need me to tell you what I mean by this, Ion?

Ion/ Lord, yes, I do, Socrates. I love to hear you wise men talk.

Socrates/ I wish that were true, Ion. But wise? Surely you are the wise men, you rhapsodes and actors, you and the poets whose work you sing. As for me, I say nothing but the truth, as you'd expect from an ordinary man. I mean, even this question I asked you—look how commonplace and ordinary a matter it is. Anybody could understand what I meant: don't you use the same discipline throughout whenever you master the whole of a subject? Take this for discussion—painting is a subject to be mastered as a whole, isn't it?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And there are many painters, good and bad, and there have been many in the past.

Ion/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Have you ever known anyone who is clever at showing what's well painted and what's not in the work of Polygnotus, but who's powerless to do that for other painters? Someone who dozes off when the work of other painters is displayed, and is lost, and has nothing to contribute—but when he has to give judgment on Polygnotus or any other painter (so long as it's just one), he's wide awake and he's paying attention and he has plenty to say—have you ever known anyone like that?

Ion/ Good lord no, of course not!

Socrates/ Well. Take sculpture. Have you ever known anyone who is clever at explaining which statues are well made in the case of Daedalus, son of Metion, or Epeius, son of Panopeus, or Theodorus of Samos, or any other single sculptor, but who's lost when he's among the products of other sculptors, and he dozes off and has nothing to say?

Ion/ Good lord no. I haven't.

Socrates/ And further, it is my opinion, you've never known anyone ever—not in flute-playing, not in cithara-playing, not in singing to the cithara, and not in rhapsodizing—you've never known a man who is clever at explaining Olympus or Thamyrus or Orpheus or Phemius, the rhapsode from Ithaca, but who has nothing to contribute about Ion, the rhapsode from Ephesus, and cannot tell when he does his work well and when he doesn't—you've never known a man like that.

Ion/ I have nothing to say against you on that point, Socrates. But this I know about myself: I speak about Homer more beautifully than anybody else and I have lots to say; and everybody says I do it well. But about the other poets I do not. Now see what that means.

Socrates/ I do see, Ion, and I'm going to announce to you what I think that is. As I said earlier, that's not a subject you've mastered—speaking well about Homer; it's a divine

power that moves you, as a “Magnetic” stone moves iron rings. (That’s what Euripides called it; most people call it “Heraclean.”) This stone not only pulls those rings, if they’re iron, it also puts power in the rings, so that they in turn can do just what the stone does—pull other rings—so that there’s sometimes a very long chain of iron pieces and rings hanging from one another. And the power in all of them depends on this stone. In the same way, the Muse makes some people inspired herself, and then through those who are inspired a chain of other enthusiasts is suspended. You know, none of the epic poets, if they’re good, are masters of their subject; they are inspired, possessed, and that is how they utter all those beautiful poems. The same goes for lyric poets if they’re good: just as the Corybantes are not in their right minds when they dance, lyric poets, too, are not in their right minds when they make those beautiful lyrics, but as soon as they sail into harmony and rhythm they are possessed by Bacchic frenzy. Just as Bacchus worshippers when they are possessed draw honey and milk from rivers, but not when they are in their right minds—the soul of a lyric poet does this too, as they say themselves. For of course poets tell us that they gather songs at honey-flowing springs, from glades and gardens of the Muses, and that they bear songs to us as bees carry honey, flying like bees. And what they say is true. For a poet is an airy thing, winged and holy, and he is not able to make poetry until he becomes inspired and goes out of his mind and his intellect is no longer in him. As long as a human being has his intellect in his possession he will always lack the power to make poetry or sing prophecy. Therefore because it’s not by mastery that they make poems or say many lovely things about their subjects (as you do about Homer)—but because it’s by a divine gift—each poet is able to compose beautifully only that for which the Muse has aroused him: one can do dithyrambs, another encomia, one can do dance songs,

another, epics, and yet another, iambics; and each of them is worthless for the other types of poetry. You see, it's not mastery that enables them to speak those verses, but a divine power, since if they knew how to speak beautifully on one type of poetry by mastering the subject, they could do so for all the others also. That's why the god takes their intellect away from them when he uses them as his servants, as he does prophets and godly diviners, so that we who hear should know that they are not the ones who speak those verses that are of such high value, for their intellect is not in them: the god himself is the one who speaks, and he gives voice through them to us. The best evidence for this account is Tynnichus from Chalcis, who never made a poem anyone would think worth mentioning, except for the praise-song everyone sings, almost the most beautiful lyric-poem there is, and simply, as he says himself, "an invention of the Muses." In this more than anything, then, I think, the god is showing us, so that we should be in no doubt about it, that these beautiful poems are not human, not even from human beings, but are divine and from gods; that poets are nothing but representatives of the gods, possessed by whoever possesses them. To show that, the god deliberately sang the most beautiful lyric poem through the most worthless poet. Don't you think I'm right, Ion?

Ion/ Lord yes, I certainly do. Somehow you touch my soul with your words, Socrates, and I do think it's by a divine gift that good poets are able to present these poems to us from the gods.

Socrates/ And you rhapsodes in turn present what the poets say.

Ion/ That's true too.

Socrates/ So you turn out to be representatives of representatives.

Ion/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Hold on, Ion; tell me this. Don't keep any secrets from me. When you recite epic poetry well and you have the most stunning effect on your spectators, either when you sing of Odysseus—how he leapt into the doorway, his identity now obvious to the suitors, and he poured out arrows at his feet—or when you sing of Achilles charging at Hector, or when you sing a pitiful episode about Andromache or Hecuba or Priam, are you at that time in your right mind, or do you get beside yourself? And doesn't your soul, in its enthusiasm, believe that it is present at the actions you describe, whether they're in Ithaca or in Troy or wherever the epic actually takes place?

Ion/ What a vivid example you've given me, Socrates! I won't keep secrets from you. Listen, when I tell a sad story, my eyes are full of tears; and when I tell a story that's frightening or awful, my hair stands on end with fear and my heart jumps.

Socrates/ Well, Ion, should we say this man is in his right mind at times like these: when he's at festivals or celebrations, all dressed up in fancy clothes, with golden crowns, and he weeps, though he's lost none of his finery—or when he's standing among millions of friendly people and he's frightened, though no one is undressing him or doing him any harm? Is he in his right mind then?

Ion/ Lord no, Socrates. Not at all, to tell the truth.

Socrates/ And you know that you have the same effects on most of your spectators too, don't you?

Ion/ I know very well that we do. I look down at them every time from up on the rostrum, and they're crying and looking terrified, and as the stories are told they are filled with amazement. You see I must keep my wits and pay close attention to them: if I start them crying, I will laugh as I take their money, but if they laugh, I shall cry at having lost money.

Socrates/ And you know that this spectator is the last of the rings, don't you—the ones that I said take their power from each other by virtue of the Heraclean stone [the magnet]? The middle ring is you, the rhapsode or actor, and the first one is the poet himself. The god pulls people's souls through all these wherever he wants, looping the power down from one to another. And just as if it hung from that stone, there's an enormous chain of choral dancers and dance teachers and assistant teachers hanging off to the sides of the rings that are suspended from the Muse. One poet is attached to one Muse, another to another (we say he is "possessed," and that's near enough, for he is held). From these first rings, from the poets, they are attached in their turn and inspired, some from one poet, some from another: some from Orpheus, some from Musaeus, and many are possessed and held from Homer. You are one of them, Ion, and you are possessed from Homer. And when anyone sings the work of another poet, you're asleep and you're lost about what to say; but when any song of that poet is sounded, you are immediately awake, your soul is dancing, and you have plenty to say. You see it's not because you're a master of knowledge about Homer that you can say what you say, but because of a divine gift, because you are possessed. That's how it is with the Corybantes, who have sharp ears only for the specific song that belongs to whatever god possesses them; they have plenty of words and movements to go with that song; but they are quite lost if the music is different. That's how it is with you, Ion: when anyone mentions Homer, you have plenty to say, but if he mentions the others you are lost; and the explanation of this, for which you ask me—why it is that you have plenty to say about Homer but not about the others—is that it's not mastering the subject, but a divine gift, that makes you a wonderful singer of Homer's praises.

Ion/ You're a good speaker, Socrates. Still, I would be amazed if you could speak well enough to convince me that I am possessed or crazed when I praise Homer. I don't believe you'd think so if you heard me speaking on Homer.

Socrates/ And I really do want to hear you, but not before you answer me this: on which of Homer's subjects do you speak well? I don't suppose you speak well on all of them.

Ion/ I do, Socrates, believe me, on every single one!

Socrates/ Surely not on those subjects you happen to know nothing about, even if Homer does speak of them.

Ion/ And these subjects Homer speaks of, but I don't know about—what are they?

Socrates/ But doesn't Homer speak about professional subjects in many places, and say a great deal? Chariot driving, for example, I'll show you, if I can remember the lines.

Ion/ No, I'll recite them. I do remember.

Socrates/ Then tell me what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, when he advises him to take care at the turning post in the horse race they held for Patroclus' funeral.

Ion/ "Lean," he says;

> Lean yourself over on the smooth-planed chariot
> Just to the left of the pair. Then the horse on the right—
> Goad him, shout him on, easing the reins with your hands.
> At the post let your horse on the left stick tight to the turn
> So you seem to come right to the edge, with the hub
> Of your welded wheel. But escape cropping the stone …

Socrates/ That's enough. Who would know better, Ion, whether Homer speaks correctly or not in these particular verses—a doctor or a charioteer?

Ion/ A charioteer, of course.

Socrates/ Is that because he is a master of that profession, or for some other reason?

Ion/ No. It's because he's a master of it.

Socrates/ Then to each profession a god has granted the ability to know a certain function. I mean, the things navigation teaches us—we won't learn them from medicine as well, will we?

Ion/ Of course not.

Socrates/ And the things medicine teaches us we won't learn from architecture.

Ion/ Of course not.

Socrates/ And so it is for every other profession: what we learn by mastering one profession we won't learn by mastering another, right? But first, answer me this. Do you agree that there are different professions—that one is different from another?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is this how you determine which ones are different? When I find that the knowledge [involved in one case] deals with different subjects from the knowledge [in another case], then I claim that one is a different profession from the other. Is that what you do?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ I mean if there is some knowledge of the same subjects, then why should we say there are two different professions? —Especially when each of them would allow us to know the same subjects! Take these fingers: I know there are five of them, and you know the same thing about them that I do. Now suppose I asked you whether it's the same profession—arithmetic—that teaches you and me the same things, or whether it's two different ones. Of course you'd say it's the same one.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then tell me now what I was going to ask you earlier. Do you think it's the same way for every profession—the same profession must teach the same subjects, and a different profession, if it is different, must teach not the same subjects, but different ones?

Ion/ That's how I think it is, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then a person who has not mastered a given profession will not be able to be a good judge of the things which belong to that profession, whether they are things said or things done.

Ion/ That's true.

Socrates/ Then who will know better whether or not Homer speaks beautifully and well in the lines you quoted? You, or a charioteer?

Ion/ A charioteer.

Socrates/ That's because you're a rhapsode, of course, and not a charioteer.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the rhapsode's profession is different from the charioteer's.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ If it's different, then its knowledge is of different subjects also.

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then what about the time Homer tells how Hecamede, Nestor's woman, gave barley-medicine to Machaon to drink? He says something like this—

> Over wine of Pramnos she grated goat's milk cheese
> With a brazen grater. ...And onion relish for the drink...

Is Homer right or not: would a fine diagnosis here come from a doctor's profession or a rhapsode's?

Ion/ A doctor's.

Socrates/ And what about the time Homer says:

> Leaden she plunged to the floor of the sea like a weight
> That is fixed to a field cow's horn. Given to the hunt
> It goes among ravenous fish, carrying death.

Should we say it's for a fisherman's profession or a rhapsode's to tell whether or not he describes this beautifully and well?

Ion/ That's obvious, Socrates. It's for a fisherman's.

Socrates/ All right, look. Suppose you were the one asking questions, and you asked me, "Socrates, since you're finding out which passages belong to each of the professions Homer treats—which are the passages that each profession should judge—come tell me this: which are the passages that belong to a diviner and to divination, passages he should be able to judge as to whether they're well or badly composed?" Look how easily I can give you a true answer. Often, in the Odyssey, he says things like what Theoclymenus says—the prophet of the sons of Melampus:

> Are you mad? What evil is this that's upon you? Night
> Has enshrouded your hands, your faces, and down to your knees.
> Wailing spreads like fire, tears wash your cheeks.
> Ghosts fill the dooryard, ghosts fill the hall, they rush
> To the black gate of hell, they drop below darkness. Sunlight
> Has died from a sky run over with evil mist

And often in the Iliad, as in the battle at the wall. There he says:

> There came to them a bird as they hungered to cross over.
> An eagle, a high-flier, circled the army's left
> With a blood-red serpent carried in its talons, a monster,
> Alive, still breathing, it has not yet forgotten its war lust,

> For it struck its captor on the breast, by the neck;
> It was writhing back, but the eagle shot it groundwards
> In agony of pain, and dropped it in the midst of the throng,
> Then itself, with a scream, soared on a breath of the wind.

I shall say that these passages and those like them belong to a diviner. They are for him to examine and judge.

Ion/ That's a true answer, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, your answers are true, too, Ion. Now you tell me—just as I picked out for you, from the Odyssey and the Iliad, passages that belong to a diviner and ones that belong to a doctor and ones that belong to a fisherman—in the same way, Ion, since you have more experience with Homer's work than I do, you pick out for me the passages that belong to the rhapsode and to his profession, the passages a rhapsode should be able to examine and to judge better than anyone else.

Ion/ My answer, Socrates, is "all of them."

Socrates/ That's not your answer, Ion. Not "all of them." Or are you really so forgetful? But no, it would not befit a rhapsode to be forgetful.

Ion/ What do you think I'm forgetting?

Socrates/ Don't you remember you said that a rhapsode's profession is different from a charioteer's?

Ion/ I remember.

Socrates/ And didn't you agree that because they are different they will know different subjects?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ So a rhapsode's profession, on your view, will not know everything, and neither will a rhapsode.

Ion/ But things like that are exceptions, Socrates.

Socrates/ By “things like that” you mean that almost all the subjects of the other professions are exceptions, don’t you? But then what sort of thing will a rhapsode know, if not everything?

Ion/ My opinion, anyhow, is that he’ll know what it’s fitting for a man or a woman to say—or for a slave or a freeman, or for a follower or a leader.

Socrates/ So—what should a leader say when he’s at sea and his ship is hit by a storm—do you mean a rhapsode will know better than a navigator?

Ion/ No, no. A navigator will know that.

Socrates/ And when he is in charge of a sick man, what should a leader say—will a rhapsode know better than a doctor?

Ion/ Not that, either.

Socrates/ But he will know what a slave should say. Is that what you mean?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ For example, what should a slave who’s a cowherd say to calm down his cattle when they’re going wild—will a rhapsode know what a cowherd does not?

Ion/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And what a woman who spins yarn should say about working with wool?

Ion/ No.

Socrates/ And what a man should say, if he’s a general, to encourage his troops?

Ion/ Yes! That’s the sort of thing a rhapsode will know.

Socrates/ What? Is a rhapsode’s profession the same as a general’s?

Ion/ Well, I certainly would know what a general should say.

Socrates/ Perhaps that's because you're also a general by profession, Ion. I mean, if you were somehow both a horseman and a cithara-player at the same time, you would know good riders from bad. But suppose I asked you: "Which profession teaches you good horsemanship—the one that makes you a horseman, or the one that makes you a cithara-player?"

Ion/ The horseman, I'd say.

Socrates/ Then if you also knew good cithara-players from bad, the profession that taught you that would be the one which made you a cithara-player, not the one that made you a horseman. Wouldn't you agree?

Ion/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, since you know the business of a general, do you know this by being a general or by being a good rhapsode?

Ion/ I don't think there's any difference.

Socrates/ What? Are you saying there's no difference? On your view is there one profession for rhapsodes and generals, or two?

Ion/ One, I think.

Socrates/ So anyone who is a good rhapsode turns out to be a good general too.

Ion/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ It also follows that anyone who turns out to be a good general is a good rhapsode too.

Ion/ No. This time I don't agree.

Socrates/ But you do agree to this: anyone who is a good rhapsode is a good general too.

Ion/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ And aren't you the best rhapsode in Greece?

Ion/ By far, Socrates.

Socrates/ Are you also a general, Ion? Are you the best in Greece?

Ion/ Certainly, Socrates. That, too, I learned from Homer's poetry.

Socrates/ Then why in heaven's name, Ion, when you're both the best general and the best rhapsode in Greece, do you go around the country giving rhapsodies but not commanding troops? Do you think Greece really needs a rhapsode who is crowned with a golden crown? And does not need a general?

Ion/ Socrates, my city is governed and commanded by you [by Athens]; we don't need a general. Besides, neither your city nor Sparta would choose me for a general. You think you're good enough for that yourselves.

Socrates/ Ion, you're superb. Don't you know Apollodorus of Cyzicus?

Ion/ What does he do?

Socrates/ He's a foreigner who has often been chosen by Athens to be their general. And Phanosthenes of Andros and Heraclides of Clazomenae—they're also foreigners; they've demonstrated that they are worth noticing, and Athens appoints them to be generals or other sorts of officials. And do you think that this city, that makes such appointments, would not select Ion of Ephesus and honor him, if they thought he was worth noticing? Why? Aren't you people from Ephesus Athenians of long standing? And isn't Ephesus a city that is second to none?

But you, Ion, you're doing me wrong, if what you say is true that what enables you to praise Homer is knowledge or mastery of a profession. You assured me that you knew many lovely things about Homer, you promised to give a demonstration; but you're cheating me, you're a long way from giving a demonstration. You aren't even willing to tell me what it is that you're so wonderfully clever about, though I've been

begging you for ages. Really, you're just like Proteus, you twist up and down and take many different shapes, till finally you've escaped me altogether by turning yourself into a general, so as to avoid proving how wonderfully wise you are about Homer.

If you're really a master of your subject, and if, as I said earlier, you're cheating me of the demonstration you promised about Homer, then you're doing me wrong. But if you're not a master of your subject, if you're possessed by a divine gift from Homer, so that you make many lovely speeches about the poet without knowing anything—as I said about you—then you're not doing me wrong. So choose, how do you want us to think of you—as a man who does wrong, or as someone divine?

Ion/ There's a great difference, Socrates. It's much lovelier to be thought divine.

Socrates/ Then that is how we think of you, Ion, the lovelier way: it's as someone divine, and not as master of a profession, that you are a singer of Homer's praises.

On Justice

Translated by Andrew S. Becker.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and a Friend.

Socrates/ Can you tell us what the just is, or don't you think it's worthwhile to discuss this?

Friend/ I think it would be very worthwhile.

Socrates/ What is the just, then?

Friend/ Well, what could it be, if not what's established as just by custom?

Socrates/ That's not the way to answer. If you were to ask me what an eye is, I'd tell you it's what we see with; and if you demand that I prove it, I'll prove it. And if you ask me what "soul" is the name of, I'll tell you it's what we think with. And if, again, you ask me what voice is, I'll answer that it's what we converse with. In this same way, now tell me what the just is, by referring to how we use it, like I've now done with these other things.

Friend/ I can't possibly answer you that way.

Socrates/ Well, since you can't do it that way, would it perhaps be easier for us to discover it in this sort of way? Now, when we want to distinguish what's longer and what's shorter, with what do we examine them? Isn't it with a measuring-stick?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Besides the measuring-stick, what skill do we use? Isn't it skill in measuring?

Friend/ Right, skill in measuring.

Socrates/ And what about distinguishing what's light and what's heavy? Don't we do that with a scale?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Besides the scale, what skill do we use? Isn't it skill in weighing?

Friend/ Definitely.

Socrates/ Well, then, when we want to distinguish what's just and what's unjust, what instrument do we use to examine them? And, besides this instrument, what skill do we use in dealing with them? Or doesn't this way make it clear to you either?

Friend/ No.

Socrates/ Well, let's start again. Whenever we disagree about what's larger and what's smaller, who are the ones who decide between us? Aren't they the ones who measure?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And whenever we disagree about number, about many and few, who are the ones who decide? Aren't they the ones who count?

Friend/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Whenever we disagree with each other about what's just and what's unjust, to whom do we go? Who are those who decide between us in each case? Tell me.

Friend/ Are you talking about judges, Socrates?

Socrates/ Well done! Now go on and try to tell me this: What are the measurers doing when they decide about what's large and what's small? They're measuring, aren't they?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when the weighers decide about what's heavy and what's light, aren't they weighing?

Friend/ Of course they're weighing.

Socrates/ And when the counters decide about many and few, they're counting, aren't they?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when the judges decide about what's just and what's unjust, what are they doing? Answer me.

Friend/ I can't.

Socrates/ Say "they're speaking."

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then is it by speaking that they decide between us, whenever the judges decide about what's just and what's unjust?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And it was by measuring that the measurers decided about what's small and what's large, since it was with a measuring-stick that these things were decided.

Friend/ That's right.

Socrates/ Again, it was by weighing that the weighers decided about what's heavy and what's light, since it was with a scale that these things were decided.

Friend/ It was.

Socrates/ Again, it was by counting that the counters decided about many and few, since it was by number that these things were decided.

Friend/ That's right.

Socrates/ Yes, and, as we agreed a moment ago, it's by speaking that the judges decide between us about what's just and what's unjust, since it was with speech that these things were decided.

Friend/ Well said, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, because it was truly said: speech, as it seems, decides what's just and what's unjust.

Friend/ It certainly seems so.

Socrates/ What could the just and the unjust possibly be? Suppose someone asked us: “Since a measuring-stick, skill in measuring, and a measurer decide what’s larger and what’s smaller, what are “larger” and “smaller”? We might tell him that “larger” is what exceeds and “smaller” is what’s exceeded. Or: “Since a scale, skill in weighing, and a weigher decide what’s heavy and what’s light, what are “heavy” and “light”? We might tell him that “heavy” is what sinks down in the balance, and “light” is what rises up. In this way, then, if someone should ask us: “Since speech, skill in judging, and a judge decide what’s just and what’s unjust for us, what could “just” and “unjust” possibly be?” How can we answer him? Are we still unable to tell him?

Friend/ We’re unable.

Socrates/ Do you think people do unjustice willingly or unwillingly? What I mean is this: Do you think that people act unjustly and are unjust willingly or unwillingly?

Friend/ Willingly, I'd say, Socrates, for they’re wicked.

Socrates/ Then do you think that people are wicked and unjust willingly?

Friend/ Definitely. Don’t you?

Socrates/ No, at least not if we’re to trust the poet.

Friend/ What poet?

Socrates/ The one who said: “No one is willingly wicked, nor unwillingly blessed.”

Friend/ But, you know, Socrates, the old saying holds true, that singers tell many lies.

Socrates/ But I'd be surprised if this singer lied about this. If you have the time, let’s consider whether he tells the truth, or lies.

Friend/ Well, I do have the time.

Socrates/ Then which do you think is just, lying or telling the truth?

Friend/ Telling the truth, obviously.

Socrates/ Lying, then, is unjust?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And which do you think is just, deceiving or not deceiving?

Friend/ Not deceiving, certainly.

Socrates/ Deceiving, then, is unjust?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, then, which is just, harming or helping?

Friend/ Helping.

Socrates/ Harming, then, is unjust?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, telling the truth, not deceiving, and helping are just, but lying, harming, and deceiving are unjust.

Friend/ Yes, by Zeus, definitely.

Socrates/ Even in the case of enemies?

Friend/ Certainly not!

Socrates/ Then is harming enemies just, and helping them unjust?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And isn't harming enemies just, even if you deceive them?

Friend/ It must be.

Socrates/ What about lying to deceive and harm them? Isn't this just?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, then, you say that helping friends is just, don't you?

Friend/ Definitely.

Socrates/ By not deceiving them, or by deceiving them, if it's for their benefit?

Friend/ Even deceiving them, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But, while it's just to help people by deceiving them, certainly it's not just to help them by lying? What if we help them by lying?

Friend/ It would be just even if we lied.

Socrates/ Then, as it seems, both lying and telling the truth are just and unjust.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And not deceiving and deceiving are just and unjust.

Friend/ I guess so.

Socrates/ Both harming and helping are just and unjust.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ So all these sorts of things, it appears, are both just and unjust.

Friend/ So it seems to me.

Socrates/ Listen, then. I have a right and a left eye, don't I, just like other people?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ A right and a left nostril?

Friend/ Definitely.

Socrates/ And a right and a left hand?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Although you call these by the same name, you say some are right and some are left. If I ask you which is which, wouldn't you be able to say that these on this side are right and these on the other are left?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then let's get back to our point. Although you call those acts by the same name, you say that some are just and some are unjust. Can you say which are just and which are unjust?

Friend/ Well, I suppose that each of these acts turns out to be just if and when we should do them, but unjust if we shouldn't.

Socrates/ Good for you! Then does the person who does each of these acts, when he should, do what's just, while the person who does them, when he shouldn't, does what's unjust?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And isn't he himself just, the one who does what's just, but the one who does what's unjust is himself unjust?

Friend/ That's right.

Socrates/ Now, who can perform surgery and cauterize and reduce swelling, if and when he should?

Friend/ A doctor.

Socrates/ Because he knows how, or for some other reason?

Friend/ Because he knows how.

Socrates/ And who can cultivate and plow and plant when he should?

Friend/ A farmer.

Socrates/ Because he knows how, or because he doesn't?

Friend/ Because he knows how.

Socrates/ Isn't this true for the other cases as well? The one who knows how can do what he should, if and when he should, but the one who doesn't know how can't?

Friend/ So it is.

Socrates/ And what about lying and deceiving and giving help? Can the one who knows how do each of these acts when he should and at the right time, but the one who doesn't know how can't?

Friend/ That's true.

Socrates/ But the person who does them when he should is just?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he does them because of his knowledge.

Friend/ How else?

Socrates/ Then a just person is just because of his knowledge.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Isn't the unjust person unjust for the opposite reason?

Friend/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And the just person is just because of his wisdom.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ The unjust person is unjust, then, because of his ignorance.

Friend/ I guess so.

Socrates/ So it looks like justice is what our ancestors handed down to us as wisdom, and injustice is what they handed down to us as ignorance.

Friend/ I guess so.

Socrates/ Are people ignorant willingly or unwillingly?

Friend/ Unwillingly.

Socrates/ So they're also unjust unwillingly?

Friend/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Are unjust people wicked?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ So they're wicked and unjust unwillingly?

Friend/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And they act unjustly because they're unjust?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, unwillingly?

Friend/ Of course.

Socrates/ Clearly what's done willingly doesn't happen unwillingly.

Friend/ It couldn't.

Socrates/ And acting unjustly comes about because there is injustice.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And injustice is unwilled.

Friend/ Unwilled, yes.

Socrates/ Then they act unjustly and are unjust and wicked unwillingly.

Friend/ Unwillingly, it seems.

Socrates/ Then in that case the singer didn't lie.

Friend/ I guess not.

On Justice.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and a Friend.

Socrates/ Can you tell us what is justice? or does it seem to you not worth entering into a discourse about it?

Friend/ To me at least it seems very much so.

Socrates/ What is it then?

Friend/ What else than the things considered just.

Socrates/ Do not speak to me in this way; but, as if you had asked me—What is the eye? I should have said to you—It is that, by which we see; and if you should bid me to prove it, I would prove it. And if you should ask—To what is given the name of soul? I would say—To that, by which we know something. And if again—What is the voice? I would answer—That, by which we converse. In this way then do you tell me that justice is that, which we use for something, as are the things, of which I was just now asking.

Friend/ I have it not in my power to reply in this way at all.

Socrates/ But, since such is the case, perhaps we shall discover it more easily in this way. Come then, say, by what do we, on consideration, distinguish the greater and the less? Is it not by a measure?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And together with a measure by what art? Is it not by that of measurement?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And how things light and heavy? Is it not by weight?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And together with a weight by what art? Is it not that of weighing?

Friend/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, by what instrument do we, on consideration, distinguish what is just and unjust? and together with the instrument, by what art previously? Is it not somehow manifest to you thus?

Friend/ No.

Socrates/ But let us consider it again in this way. When we are disputing about things greater and less, who decides between us? Is it not the measurers?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when about things many and few, who are the persons to decide? Is it not the numberers? But what, when we are disputing with each other about things just and unjust, to whom do we come? and who are the persons to decide on each occasion between us? Say.

Friend/ Do you not, Socrates, mean the judges?

Socrates/ You have correctly made the discovery. Come then and try to tell this likewise. By doing what do the measurers decide respecting things large and small? Is it not by measuring?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And respecting things heavy and light? Is it not by weighing?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And respecting things many and few? Is it not by numbering?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But how, respecting things just and unjust? Answer me.

Friend/ I cannot say.

Socrates/ Say, by speaking.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ By speaking then do judges decide between us, when they are forming a judgment respecting things just and unjust.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by measuring, those skilled in measuring things small and great? for a measure is that, by which these things are judged.

Friend/ It is so.

Socrates/ And by weighing, those skilled in weighing things heavy and light? for a weight is that, by which these things are judged.

Friend/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ And again by numbering, those skilled in numbering things many and few? for number is that by which these things are judged.

Friend/ It is so.

Socrates/ But by speaking, as we just now agreed, the judges decide respecting things just and unjust.

Friend/ You speak correctly, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is true then; and speech is that, it seems, by which things just and unjust are judged.

What then are things just and unjust? As if a person had asked us—Since a measure, and the measuring art, and the person skilled in measuring, decide which is the greater and the less, what is the greater and the less? Shall we say to him that the greater exceeds, and the less is exceeded? and since a weight and the weighing art and the person skilled in weighing decide the heavy and the light, shall we say to him, that the thing going downwards in the scales is heavy,

but the thing going upwards is light? In like manner if he should ask us—Since speech and the art of judging and the judge is the party who decides what is just and unjust, what is the just and unjust? What answer shall we have to give him? Or have we not a single word to say?

Friend/ We have not.

Socrates/ Whether willingly or unwillingly do men, think you, have this injustice? I mean in this way. Think you that they do injustice and are unjust willingly or unwillingly?

Friend/ Willingly, I imagine, Socrates; for they are wicked.

Socrates/ You conceive then that men are willingly wicked and unjust.

Friend/ I do; and do not you?

Socrates/ No; at least if we are to be persuaded by the poet.

Friend/ What kind of poet?

Socrates/ He who said—

> Not one is wicked willingly, nor blest
> Unwillingly.

Friend/ But still on the other hand, Socrates, well is the old proverb, that

> Poets do many falsehoods sing.

Socrates/ But I should marvel, if this poet has told a falsehood. Come then, if you are at leisure, let us consider, whether he is saying what is false or true.

Friend/ Nay, I am at leisure.

Socrates/ Come then, say, do you deem it just to tell a falsehood, or to tell the truth?

Friend/ To tell the truth.

Socrates/ To tell a falsehood then is unjust?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But whether to deceive or to not deceive?

Friend/ To not deceive, assuredly.

Socrates/ To deceive then is unjust?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what, is it just to hurt, or to benefit?

Friend/ To benefit.

Socrates/ To hurt then is unjust?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is just then to tell the truth, and to not deceive, and to benefit; but to tell a falsehood, and to hurt, and to deceive, unjust.

Friend/ Yes, by Zeus, and greatly so.

Socrates/ What, to do so to enemies?

Friend/ By no means.

Socrates/ But it is just to do a hurt to enemies, but to do a benefit, unjust.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is then just by deceiving enemies to do them a hurt?

Friend/ How not?

Socrates/ Well then, to tell a falsehood in order that we may deceive and do a hurt to enemies, is it not just?

Friend/ It is.

Socrates/ But what, do you not say that it is just to do a benefit to friends?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Whether by not deceiving or by deceiving for their benefit?

Friend/ By deceiving even, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But is it just to do a benefit by deceiving, and yet not by telling a falsehood? or by telling a falsehood?

Friend/ It is just by telling even a falsehood.

Socrates/ To tell a falsehood and to tell the truth is, as it seems both just and unjust.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And to not deceive and to deceive is both just and unjust.

Friend/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And to do a hurt and to do a benefit is just and unjust.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ All things of this kind are it seems the same, both just and unjust.

Friend/ To me at least they appear so.

Socrates/ Hear then. I have, like other men, a right eye and a left.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And a right nostril and a left.

Friend/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And a right hand and a left.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Hence, since after giving the same name, you say that some of my members are on the right side, and others on the left, would you not be able to say, if I asked you, on which side they were, that some on one side are the right, and others on the other side the left?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Come then, likewise, to that point, since after giving the same name, you say that some acts are just, and

some unjust, can you tell which are the just, and which the unjust?

Friend/ To me then it now appears that each of these acts, taking place at a proper time, are just; but at not a proper one, unjust.

Socrates/ And correctly does it appear to you. He then, who does each of these acts at a proper time, does what is just; but he, who does not at a proper time, does what is unjust.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ He then, who does what is just, is just; but he-who does what is unjust, is unjust.

Friend/ It is so.

Socrates/ Who then at a proper time is able to cut and burn and to make lean?

Friend/ The medical man.

Socrates/ Because he knows, or for some other reason?

Friend/ Because he knows.

Socrates/ And who is able at a proper time to dig, and to plough, and to plant?

Friend/ The land-tiller.

Socrates/ Because he knows, or because he does not?

Friend/ Because he knows.

Socrates/ And in this way as regards other matters, he who knows, is able to do what is proper at a proper time; but he who does not know, is not.

Friend/ Thus it is.

Socrates/ And he who knows how to tell falsehoods, and to deceive, and to do a benefit, is able to do each of these things at a proper time; but he who does not know, is not.

Friend/ You say what is true.

Socrates/ And he who does these acts at a fitting time is just.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ He does them then through knowledge.

Friend/ How not?

Socrates/ The just man then is just through knowledge.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ The unjust man then is unjust through what is opposite to what is just.

Friend/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Now the just man is just through wisdom.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the unjust man is unjust through the want of instruction.

Friend/ It seems so.

Socrates/ That, which our ancestors left us, as wisdom, seems near to being justice; but that, which they left as want of instruction, to be injustice.

Friend/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Are men uninstructed willingly, or unwillingly?

Friend/ Unwillingly.

Socrates/ Unwillingly then they are unjust.

Friend/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But the unjust are wicked.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Unwillingly then persons are wicked and unjust.

Friend/ By all means.

Socrates/ But they act unjustly through there being the unjust.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Through an act of unwillingness.

Friend/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But that, which is willing, does not take place through what is unwilling.

Friend/ It does not.

Socrates/ But the doing of injustice takes place through the existence of injustice.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now injustice is an involuntary act.

Friend/ Involuntary.

Socrates/ Unwillingly then persons do an injustice, and are unjust and wicked.

Friend/ Unwillingly, as it appears.

Socrates/ The poet then did not in this case tell a falsehood.

Friend/ It seems not.

Laches.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Lysimachus, Melesias, Nicias, Laches, and
the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias, and Socrates.

Lysimachus/ You have seen, Nicias and Laches, the man fighting in armor; but on what account I and Melesias here invited you to see him with us, we did not then tell you; but now we will mention it; for we think it is proper to speak freely to you. There are, indeed, some who laugh at things of this kind; and if anyone consults with them, they will not say what they think; but making a guess about the views of the persons consulting them, they speak what is contrary to their own opinion. Thinking however that you are sufficiently qualified to know, and that knowing you would state simply what you think, we have thus taken you as our associates in the consultation respecting the matters we are about to communicate. Now the question, about which I have made this lengthy preface is this. These are our sons. That youth, the son of Melesias here, is called Thucydides, bearing his grandfather's name; and this one here, Aristides, is mine, and bears my father's name; for we call him Aristides. It has been determined therefore by us to pay all the attention to them in our power, and not to act as the many do who, when their children become lads, suffer them to do as they please, but to begin already to take care of them as far as we can. Knowing then that you also have children, we have thought that there has been a care respecting them to you, if to anyone else, how they might become the best by being attended to. If however you have not frequently paid attention to this matter, we will now remind you, that you ought not to neglect it; and we call upon you to take upon

yourselves, in common with us, the charge of your sons. But from whence we have so determined, it is requisite for you, Nicias and Laches, to hear, although the narration be rather long.

I and Melesias here take our meals together, and these lads have their food at our side. As I stated then at the commencement of the discourse, we shall speak freely to you. For both of us are able to relate to the youths many beautiful feats of our fathers, which they did both in war and peace, while they were administering the affairs of our allies and of the state here. But neither of us have to relate deeds of our own. For this we feel, in the presence of these youths, a shame, and we find fault with our fathers because they permitted us to live the life of rakes when we became lads, and they were busily employed about the affairs of others. These very things we point out to these youths, and tell them that if they neglect themselves, and do not obey us, they will be in disrepute; but that, if they pay attention to themselves, they will perhaps be worthy of the name they bear. They say indeed they will obey us; but we are considering, by learning what and pursuing it steadily they will become the best of men. Now someone has introduced to us this kind of instruction, and said that it would be well for a young person to learn to fight in armor; and he praised the party whom you have just now seen exhibiting, and invited us to see him likewise. We determined then that it was requisite for us to come ourselves, and take you along with us to the sight, in order that you might not only be fellow-spectators, but fellow-counselors and co-partners, if you were willing, in the matter relating to the care to be paid to children. These are the subjects on which we wish to communicate with you. It is now, therefore, your part to advise about this kind of instruction, whether it appears they ought to learn it or not, and about the rest, if indeed you are able to praise any kind

of discipline or study for a young man, and to state what you will do touching this matter in common.

Nicias/ For myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud your notion, and am prepared to do this in common, and so I think is Laches here.

Laches/ You think with truth, Nicias. And what Lysimachus has just now said about his father, and the father of Melesias, appears to me to have been very well said, both against them and us, and all such as engage in political affairs. For, there nearly happens to them, what he says, both with respect to their children and the rest of private concerns, that they are considered of little account and treated negligently. On these points, therefore, Lysimachus, you have spoken correctly. But I marvel that you should call upon us to be fellow-counselors about the education of youth, and not call upon Socrates here, who is, in the first place, of the same demus; and secondly, has ever his haunts there, where there is anything connected with the points you are in search of, relating to young persons, either of instruction or an honorable pursuit.

Lysimachus/ How say you, Laches? Does Socrates here make anything of this kind his study?

Laches/ Very much so, Lysimachus.

Nicias/ I too can assert this not less than Laches. For he lately introduced a stranger to me, as the instructor of my son in music, Damon, the disciple of Agathocles, a man most deserving of favor, not only for his skill in music, but in other respects worth what you will for young men such as these to pass their time with.

Lysimachus/ No longer, Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, do I and my equals in age have any acquaintance with younger persons, inasmuch as we for the most part pass the time with our family on account of our period of life. But if, son

of Sophroniscus, you have anything to advise for the good of this your fellow-wardsman, you ought to communicate it: and you are justified in doing so; for you happen to be a friend on your father's side; for I and your father were always associates and friends; and he ended his days before he had any difference with me: and some recollection came round me as these persons were speaking; for these lads, while talking with each other at home, made frequent mention of Socrates, and very much praised him; but I never have asked them whether they spoke of Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus. Tell me now, children, is this the Socrates of whom you so often made mention?

Sons/ Yes, father, it is the same.

Lysimachus/ It is well, by Hera, Socrates, that you give a support to your father, who was the best of men, in other respects, and this too, that your interests shall be mine, and mine yours.

Laches/ And, moreover, Lysimachus, do not omit the acts of the man; for I have elsewhere beheld him, not only giving a support to his father, but to his country likewise. For, in the flight from Delium, he retired along with me; and I tell you, that if the rest had been willing to be such as he was, our city would have stood erect, nor would so great a disaster have befallen it.

Lysimachus/ This, Socrates, is indeed honorable praise, with which you are extolled by men worthy to be believed, and to be praised for those very things, for which they praise you. Rest assured, then, that in hearing this, I am right glad that you are in high repute; and do you consider me amongst those the most kindly disposed towards you. You should therefore have been the first to visit me, and to believe me your familiar friend, as it was just for you to be. Now therefore, from this very day, since we have recognized each

other, do not do otherwise, but be with me, and become the acquaintance of myself and these youngsters, in order that you may preserve our friendship. You then will do this, and we will again recall it to your memory. But with respect to the matters about which we commenced, what say you? What, does it appear to you that this instruction is suited to lads, or not? the learning to fight in armor.

Socrates/ Nay then about these matters, Lysimachus, I will endeavor to advise, if I am able; and moreover to do all that you invite me to. It seems however to me to be the most just for myself, as being the younger, and the less experienced in these matters, to hear first what these persons say, and learn from them. And if I have anything to say contrary to what has been stated by them, then indeed to teach and persuade both you and them. But, Nicias, why do not one of you speak the first?

Nicias/ There is nothing to prevent it, Socrates; for it appears to me that this kind of instruction is on many accounts useful for youths. For it is well to pass the time not in another place and in the pursuits, in which young men are wont to make for themselves an occupation, when they are at leisure, but in this, from whence they necessarily have the body in a better condition; for it is not inferior to any of the gymnastic exercises, nor has it less labor; and at the same time both the exercise and equestrian skill are especially proper for a liberally educated man. For where we are the combatants in a contest, and in those exercises in which a contest is proposed to us, they alone contend who are exercised in these very instruments relating to war. In the next place, this instruction will be of advantage in battle itself, when it is necessary to fight in a rank with many others. But it is the most useful, when the ranks are broken, and when it is necessary in single combat either in pursuit to attack a person defending himself, or in flight to defend

oneself, while another is making an attack. For he who is skilled in this art, will suffer nothing at the hands of one, and, perhaps, not at the hands of many; but will everywhere through this come off the best. And still further, a thing of this kind incites to the desire of another honorable kind of instruction. For everyone who has learnt to fight in armor, will also desire the instruction respecting the arrangements of an army; and having obtained this, he will, through the love of honor in these points, press forward to everything connected with generalship. And it is already evident that he will attend to all instructions and studies connected with them, both honorable and well worthwhile for a man to learn and attend to, and to which this instruction has been the leader. And we will add to this, a no trifling addition, that this very science will make every man in no small degree more daring and brave in battle than he was before. Nor let us hold it in dishonor to say, although it may appear to anyone a rather small matter, that it gives a man a graceful bearing, where a man should appear the most graceful; and where through this graceful bearing he will at the same time appear more terrible to his enemies. To me then, Lysimachus, it appears that, as I have said, we ought to teach young men these things; and I have stated why it appears so. But if Laches has anything to say contrary to this, I shall hear him with pleasure.

Laches/ It is difficult, Nicias, to assert respecting any instruction whatever, that one ought not to learn it; for it appears to be good to know all things; and especially this science of arms; if it is a thing to be learnt, as those say who teach it, and such as Nicias speaks of, one ought to learn; but if it is not a thing to be learnt, and those are deceiving us who promise to teach it, or if, being a thing to be learnt, it is not of much worth, why should one learn it? this I say concerning it, through looking to these points, that, if it were

of any value, I think it would not have lain hid from the Lacedæmonians, who have no other care in life than to seek and study that, by which they may surpass others in war. Now if this art were concealed from them, yet this fact would not have been concealed from the teachers of it, that the Lacedæmonians do, the most of all the Greeks, pay attention to things of this kind; and by them he would be honored for it, and beyond all others he would make the most money, just as a tragic poet is honored by us. For he, who thinks that he composes tragedies well, does not go about to other cities at a distance from, and in a circle round, Attica, and make an exhibition there; but he straightway comes hither, and exhibits himself to the people here, for a very good reason. But I see that the persons who fight in armor, consider Lacedæmon as sacred ground, not to be trodden; and do not walk upon it even on tip-toe; but they go round it, and rather exhibit themselves to all, and especially to those who would acknowledge that many are before them in warlike matters. In the next place, Lysimachus, I have been acquainted with not a few of these men during the work itself, and I have seen what kind of men they are. And we may form a judgment of them from this circumstance. For, as if with a fixed design, not one of those, who has applied himself to the science of arms, has ever become illustrious in war; although in all other cases men have become celebrated from among those, who have paid attention to each science. But these men, as it seems, have been, as compared with the rest, in this respect so very unfortunate. For this very same Stesileus, whom you beheld together with me exhibiting himself in so great a crowd, and saying the great things in truth which he said of himself, I have seen him truly displaying himself elsewhere, in a far better manner, though unwillingly. For when the ship, on which he was aboard as a marine, fell upon a merchant vessel, he

fought with a spear headed with a scythe, a weapon as different from other weapons as he was himself from the rest of the combatants. Other particulars respecting the man do not deserve to be related; but how his plan of the spear in addition to the scythe turned out must not be passed over in silence; for while he was fighting, the weapon became somehow entangled in the tackling of the enemy's ship; Stesileus therefore pulled in order to disengage it, but he was not able to effect his purpose; and the one ship passed by the other. In the meantime he followed the course of the ship holding by his spear. But when the enemy's ship had sheared off, and was drawing him in, as he was still holding by his spear, he let the spear down towards his hands, until he had only hold of it by the stump. Hereupon there arose a laughter and shout from those on board the merchant vessel, at the figure he made; and someone having pelted him with a stone that fell just at his feet, he threw himself from the spear upon the deck. And then indeed they who were in the trireme were no longer able to restrain their laughter on seeing the spear headed with a scythe hanging from the ship. Perhaps therefore this art may be of some use, as Nicias says; such however are the circumstances which I met with myself. Hence, what I said at first, if it be a thing to be learnt, it possesses but little utility; and if it be not, and persons say and pretend it is a thing to be learnt, it is not worthwhile to endeavor to learn it. For it appears to me, that if anyone being a coward should think he ought to learn it, and through it become more bold, it would become only more apparent what he is; but if a brave man learnt it, he would through being watched by everyone have to endure, if he erred but little, calumnies of a grievous kind. For the pretension to this science is exposed to envy; so that unless he surpasses others in velour to a wonderful degree, it is not possible for him, who asserts that he possesses this science,

to avoid becoming ridiculous. Of such value, Lysimachus, does the pursuit of this kind of instruction appear to be to myself. But it is requisite, as I said at first, not to let this Socrates go away, but to request him to give his opinion as to the view in which the matter appears to him.

Lysimachus/ And I do indeed request you, Socrates: for it appears to me that the consultation requires a person to decide. For had these agreed, there would have been no need of such a person. But now—for you see that Laches has given an opposite vote to Nicias—it will be well to hear from you with which of the men you are a fellow-voter.

Socrates/ What then, Lysimachus, are you about to make use of that, which the majority of us shall praise?

Lysimachus/ What else, Socrates, can anyone do?

Socrates/ And will you too, Melesias, act in this manner? And if the consultation were about the contending art for your son, what he ought to practice, would you rather obey the many than one, who happened to have been instructed under a skillful teacher, and had practiced himself.

Melesias/ It is reasonable, Socrates, to obey him.

Socrates/ You would therefore obey him rather than us four?

Melesias/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ For that which is about to be judged correctly ought, I think, to be judged by science, and not by a multitude.

Melesias/ How not?

Socrates/ It is meet therefore to consider now this very thing in the first place, whether anyone of us is an artist in the matter about which we are consulting, or not. And if any of us is, we should obey him, although he is but one, and dismiss the rest. But if not, we must seek some other person.

Or, do you and Lysimachus think that a hazard is run respecting a trifling thing, and not respecting that very possession, which is the greatest of all belonging to you? For by the sons being good, or the contrary, the whole of their father's house will be regulated in such a manner, as the children may turn out.

Melesias/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ One must therefore have much forethought on this point.

Melesias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ How then, what I just now stated, should we have considered, if we had wished to inquire which of us is most expert in the contending art? Is not he, who had learned and studied, and to whom there had been good teachers of this very thing?

Melesias/ To me at least it appears so.

Socrates/ And prior to this, should we not have considered what the thing is, of which we are seeking the teachers?

Melesias/ How say you?

Socrates/ In this way, perhaps, it will be more manifest. It does not seem to me to have been conceded by us at first, what is the thing about which we are consulting and considering, which of us is the most skilled, and for the sake of this has taken masters, and which of us is not.

Nicias/ Were we not considering, Socrates, about fighting in armor, whether it was proper lads should learn it or not?

Socrates/ Entirely so, Nicias. But when anyone considers about a remedy for the eyes, whether it ought to be applied or not, whether think you should the consultation be about the remedy, or about the eyes.

Nicias/ About the eyes.

Socrates/ Hence too when anyone is considering about a bridle for a horse, whether it should be applied or not, and when, he will then consult about the horse, and not about the bridle.

Nicias/ True.

Socrates/ In one word then, when anyone is considering anything for the sake of anything, his consultation is about that thing for the sake of which he is considering, and not about that, which he was seeking for the sake of something else.

Nicias/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ It is necessary therefore to consider whether the fellow-counselor is skilled in that thing, for the sake of which we are considering what we are considering.

Melesias/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Are we not saying then, that we are inquiring about a thing to be learnt for the sake of the soul of the young man?

Nicias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whether then anyone of us is skilled in the art of attending to the soul, and is able to well perform this attendance, and who has had good teachers, must be considered.

Laches/ What then, Socrates, have you never seen persons become more skillful in some things without teachers than with them?

Socrates/ I have, Laches; to whom however you would not be willing to trust, if they said they were good artists, unless they could show you some well-finished work of their art, both one and many.

Nicias/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ And for us too, Laches and Nicias, it is requisite, since Lysimachus and Melesias have invited us to a consultation with them respecting their sons, through their being desirous that their souls should become the best possible, that we, if we say we have had masters, should show who they were, who in the first place being themselves good teachers, and having attended to the souls of many youths, appear in the next place to have instructed us likewise. Or, if anyone of us shall say that he has had no teacher, he ought at least to be able to speak of his own works, and to show what Athenians or foreigners, what slaves or freemen, have become good confessedly through him. But if neither of these is in our power, we must be ordered to seek after others, and not run the risk in the case of the sons of persons our friends, of incurring the greatest blame from their nearest relatives for doing them a mischief. Now with respect to myself, I am the first to say, Lysimachus and Melesias, that I have had no teacher in this matter; although, beginning from my youth, I have felt a desire for such a thing. But I am not able to pay the sophists their fees, who alone profess themselves able to make me a man beautiful in body and mind; and by myself even now I am unable to discover the art. If however Nicias or Laches have either discovered or learned it, I should not wonder; for they have a more money power than myself, so as to be able to learn from others; and they are at the same time older, so that they may have already discovered it themselves. And they appear to me to be able to instruct a grown man; for they would never have so fearlessly expressed their opinions about pursuits good and bad for a young person, unless they believed they had a sufficient knowledge of them. Now as to the other things, I do indeed believe them; but I have wondered that they differ from each other. Hence, as Laches just now bade you not dismiss but interrogate me, so now I

make a request in turn for you not to dismiss Laches and Nicias, but to interrogate them; at the same time telling them, that Socrates says he has no knowledge of the thing, nor is he competent to decide which of you speaks the truth; for he is neither the inventor nor the teacher of anything relating to such matters. But do you, Laches and Nicias, one or the other, tell us what man you have met with most skilled in the bringing up of youth; and whether you have learnt from anyone, or discovered yourselves; and, if you have learnt, who was the teacher to each of you, and what others are their fellow-artists, in order that if amidst the affairs of the city you have no leisure, we may go to them, and induce, either by gifts or caresses, or both, to take care of our children and yours, that they may not become depraved, and a disgrace to their ancestors. But if you yourselves are the discoverers of such a thing, give us an instance of what other persons you have had the care, and whom from being depraved you have made beautiful and good. For if you will now begin to give instruction for the first time, you must reflect that the risk is run not in the case of a Carian, but in that of your own sons, and the sons of your friends; and truly will it happen to you, according to the proverb, for a pottery to be in a tub. State then which of these matters ye say or deny is in our power and suited to you. This, Lysimachus, inquire of them, and do not let them off.

Lysimachus/ Socrates seems, my friends, to me to speak well. But whether it is agreeable to you to be interrogated about such matters, and to give reasons, it is meet for you, Nicias and Laches, to know; for to myself and Melesias here it will clearly be very agreeable, if you are willing to go through in a discussion all that Socrates may ask. For at the commencement I began speaking from that point, that we had invited you to a consultation on this account, because we thought, as was likely, that you had paid attention to

these things, especially since your sons, as well as ours, are arrived at an age to be instructed. If, therefore, it makes no difference to you, speak, and consider the affair in common with Socrates, giving and receiving reasons from each other: for he says this very properly, that we are now consulting about the most important of our concerns. See, therefore, whether it appears to you that we ought to act thus.

Nicias/ You seem to me, Lysimachus, to know in good truth Socrates only from his father, and not to have associated with him yourself; unless, perhaps, when he was a boy, he came near you, while following his father, amongst his wardsmen, or in a temple, or some other congregation of the people; but since he has grown older, it is evident that you have never fallen in with him.

Lysimachus/ Why say you this especially, Nicias?

Nicias/ You seem to me not to know that for him, who happens to be near to Socrates, through a conversation, as if through a family alliance, and approaches towards him by conversing, it is a matter of necessity that, even if he shall have previously begun to converse about anything else, he will not cease to be led about by the person here during the conversation, until he falls into giving an account of himself, in what manner he lives now, and what is the life he has previously lived. And when he shall have so fallen, Socrates will not dismiss him, until he has tried, as by a touchstone, all these points well and truly. But I am accustomed to him, and I know that it is necessary for me to suffer thus at his hands; and I further know well that I shall suffer now. For I am delighted, Lysimachus, to draw near to the man; and I think it is no bad thing to be reminded of what we have done or are doing not correctly; and that for the subsequent period of life it is necessary for the person to be more thoughtful, who does not fly from such an examination, but is willing and thinks it worthwhile, according to the saying of Solon,

to learn as long as he lives, and by not imagining that age itself will come bringing intellect along with it. To me, therefore, it is neither unusual nor unpleasant to be tested by Socrates. But I have for some time known almost that our discourse, as Socrates is present, would not be about the lads, but about ourselves. Hence, as I said before, nothing as regards myself prevents me from passing the time in discourse with Socrates in the manner he wishes. But see how Laches here is disposed about a thing of this kind.

Laches/ With respect to conversations, Nicias, my state is simple, or, if you will, is not simple, but double; for to a person I should appear to be now a lover of talk, but again a hater. For when I hear a man talking about virtue, or concerning wisdom, if he be truly a man, and worthy the arguments which he uses, I am delighted beyond all bounds, perceiving at the same time both the speaker and what is spoken, how they become and suit each other. And, really, such a man appears to me to be a musician, who composes the most beautiful harmony, not through the lyre, or instruments of play, but by living in reality correctly, after having skillfully made his life to accord by words to deeds like the Dorian strain, but not the Ionic, nor I conceive the Phrygian or Lydian, but that which alone is the Hellenic. Such a man, therefore, when he speaks, makes me to be glad, and to appear to anyone whatever a lover of talk, with such avidity do I receive what is spoken by him. But he, who acts in a manner contrary to this man, gives me pain; and by how much the better he seems to speak, by so much the more does he pain me, and make me on the other hand to appear a hater of talk. Of the discourses of Socrates I have not yet, indeed, had any experience; but of his deeds, as it seems, I have formerly had a trial, and there I found him a man worthy of beautiful words and all liberty of speech. If then he possesses these properties, I agree with the party

here; and I shall with the greatest pleasure be examined by such a person; nor shall I feel annoyed at being a learner. But though I assent to the saying of Solon, I will add just one thing, for I wish to be taught many things as I grow old, but by the good alone. Let this then be granted, that the teacher is himself a good man, that I may not appear hard to learn, when I learn without pleasure. But whether the teacher be younger, or not as yet in repute, or possesses anything else of such a kind, I take no thought. I state then, as it were by the crier, to you, Socrates, that you may teach and confute me in whatever point you please; and to learn on the other hand what I know; for so you are laid up in my thoughts, from the day in which you were my companion in danger, and gave such a proof of your virtue, as it is meet for man to give, who is about to give it justly. Say then whatever you please, and take no account of our age.

Socrates/ We cannot then blame, as it seems, your feelings, as being not ready to consult and investigate with us conjointly.

Lysimachus/ This then is our business, Socrates. For I put you down as one of us. Do you therefore consider, instead of me, in behalf of the youths, what we ought to inquire of them; and do you by conversing consult for them. For, through my age, I have forgotten the majority of things which I had intended to ask them; and moreover, I do not very well remember what I hear, if any other conversation intervenes. Do you therefore speak about, and discuss among yourselves, the things which we have laid before you; and I shall afterwards hear the result; and having heard, I will, with Melesias here, do whatever shall seem good to you.

Socrates/ We must, Nicias and Laches, obey Lysimachus and Melesias. The points then, which we just now endeavored to consider, namely, who had been our teachers in such kind of instruction, or what other persons we had

made better, it will not be improper, perhaps, to examine amongst ourselves. But I think that a consideration of this kind tends to the same point, and would be almost and more from a beginning. For if we happen to know respecting anything, that, when it is present to anything, it renders that thing better, to which it is present; and, moreover, if we are able to cause that thing to be present to the other, respecting which we may be the fellow-counselors, so that a person might acquire it in the easiest and best manner—Perhaps you do not understand what I am saying; but in this way you will more easily understand it. If we happen to know that the sense of sight, when present to the eyes, makes those eyes to which it is present better; and, moreover, if we are able to cause the sense of sight to be present to the eyes, it is evident that we know what the sense of sight is, respecting which we may be the fellow-counselors, so that a person may acquire it in the easiest and best manner. For if we did not know this very thing, what the sense of sight is, or what that of hearing is, we should be not at all counselors or physicians worthy of any account, respecting either the eyes or the ears, and as regards the manner in which a person might acquire in the best manner the sense of hearing or of sight.

Lysimachus/ You speak the truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do not then these persons, Laches, now invite us to consult with them respecting the manner by which virtue, being present to the souls of their sons, may make them better?

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Ought there not then to be at hand the power, namely, to know what virtue is? For if we do not know at all what virtue happens to be, in what way can we become fellow-counselors to anyone, so that he may in the best manner acquire it?

Laches/ In no way, it appears to me, Socrates.

Socrates/ Say we then, Laches, that we know what it is?

Laches/ Yes, we say so.

Socrates/ What we know then, cannot we also tell, what it is?

Laches/ How not?

Socrates/ Let us not, however, thou best of men, speculate forthwith about the whole of virtue—for that perhaps would be a rather great undertaking; but let us first see about a certain part of it, if we are sufficiently able to know it; and thus, it is probable, the speculation will be more easy to us.

Laches/ Let us do so, Socrates, since you wish it.

Socrates/ Which of the parts of virtue then shall we select? Or is it not evident that it is that, to which the instruction in arms seems to tend? Now it seems to the many to tend to fortitude. Is it not so?

Laches/ It seems very much so.

Socrates/ Let us then in the first place, Laches, endeavor to state what fortitude is; and in the next place, we will consider by what means it can be present to young men so far as it is possible for it to be present by study and instruction. But do you endeavor to state what fortitude is.

Laches/ By Zeus, Socrates, it is not difficult to state. For if anyone is willing to remain in his place, and defend himself from the enemy, and does not fly, rest assured that he would be a brave man.

Socrates/ You speak well, Laches; but perhaps from not speaking clearly myself, I am the cause of your not answering what I intended to ask, but something else.

Laches/ How say you this, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you, if I am able. A brave man, as you say, is one who, remaining in his place, fights with the foe.

Laches/ So I say.

Socrates/ And I also. But what on the other hand is he, who, while flying, fights with the foe, and does not remain in his place?

Laches/ How flying?

Socrates/ Just as the Scythians surely are said to fight, no less while flying than pursuing. And Homer somewhere, praising the horses of Æneas, says;

> Hither and thither swiftly to pursue
> And fly they know;

and for this very thing he praises Æneas himself, and calls him, through his skill in flying, "in flight expert."

Laches/ And very properly, Socrates: for he is there speaking of chariots; but you are speaking about the Scythian cavalry; for so they fight; but the heavy-armed infantry of Greece fight as I say.

Socrates/ Except perhaps the Lacedæmonians, Laches. For they say that the Lacedæmonians, when they engaged with the Gerrophori at Platæa, were not willing to remain and fight against them, but fled; but when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they rallied and fought like cavalry, and thus won the battle.

Laches/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ This then I meant as the reason for saying, that I was the cause of your not answering correctly, because I did not put the question correctly. For wishing to ask you not only about those, who are brave amongst the heavy-armed, but also about those in the cavalry, and in every form of war, and not only about those brave in battle, but also those in the dangers of the sea, and such as act a manly part in diseases, in poverty, and in political affairs, and still

further, not only such as bear themselves bravely up against pain or fear, but also bear themselves up against desires or pleasures, both by remaining, or turning their backs—for there are surely some men, Laches, brave in things of this kind likewise.

Laches/ And very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ All these, therefore, are brave; but some of them possess fortitude in pleasures, others in pains, others in desires, and others in fears; and others, I think, possess timidity in these very same things.

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ What then is each of these? This is what I was asking. Try then again to tell me, in the first place, what is that fortitude, which is the same in all these. Or do you not yet understand what I mean?

Laches/ Not very well.

Socrates/ But I will speak in this way; just as if I had asked, What is the swiftness, which happens to be present with us in running, in playing on the harp, and in speaking, and in learning, and in many other things, and we nearly possess that, about which it is worthwhile to say anything, in the acts of the hands or feet, or mouth or voice, or mind. Or do not you also say so?

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, anyone should ask me—What, Socrates, do you call that, which you denominate swiftness in all things? I should say to him, that I call by the name of swiftness that power, which accomplishes many things in a short time, as regards the voice, and running, and all other things.

Laches/ And you would say rightly.

Socrates/ Do you then endeavor, Laches, in like manner, to define fortitude. What is that power, which is the same in pleasure and in pain, and in all the things in which we just now said it is, and is afterwards called fortitude.

Laches/ It appears then to me to be a certain endurance of the soul, if one must speak of that, which exists connected with fortitude taken universally.

Socrates/ And this must be, if we are to reply to the question asked by ourselves. This then appears to me, that you do not consider every kind of endurance to be fortitude. And I too infer it from hence; for I nearly know, Laches, that you think fortitude to belong to the things which are very beautiful.

Laches/ Rest assured that it does belong to things the most beautiful.

Socrates/ Is not, therefore, that endurance, which subsists in conjunction with prudence, beautiful and good?

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what of that endurance, which subsists with folly? Is it not, on the contrary, hurtful and evil-working?

Laches/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you then say that a thing of this kind is beautiful, though it is evil-working and hurtful?

Laches/ This, Socrates, would be not just.

Socrates/ You do not then acknowledge such an endurance as this to be fortitude, since it is not beautiful; but fortitude is beautiful.

Laches/ You say true.

Socrates/ Prudent endurance therefore, according to your assertion, would be fortitude.

Laches/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Let us see then in what it is prudent; or whether it is prudent in all things both great and small. Thus, for instance, if someone endures to spend his money prudently, knowing that, by thus spending it, he should obtain more, would you call him a brave man?

Laches/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ Or if someone, being a physician, while his son or anyone else is attacked with an inflammation in the lungs, and requests him to give something to eat or drink, should be inflexible and persist in denying. Is this fortitude?

Laches/ Not even this at all.

Socrates/ But in the case of war, where a man is enduring and willing to fight, and reasoning prudently with himself, through knowing that others will give him assistance, or that he shall fight against foes fewer and of less account than those on his own side, and, further still, that he has the advantage of the ground, would you say that this man, enduring with such like prudence and preparation, is braver than him in the opposite army, who is willing to stand his ground and endure?

Laches/ The man in the opposing army seems to me, Socrates, to be the braver.

Socrates/ And yet the endurance of the latter is more imprudent than that of the former.

Laches/ You say true.

Socrates/ And will you say that the man, who endures in a cavalry engagement, with a knowledge of horses, is less brave than him, who endures without science?

Laches/ To me at least it appears that he is.

Socrates/ And he too, who with the art of a slinger, or archer, or of any other kind, is enduring?

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And will you say, that such as are willing to descend into a tank, and there to endure swimming, although not skilled in that exercise, or in anything else of that kind, are braver than those who are skilled in them?

Laches/ What else, Socrates, could one say?

Socrates/ Nothing, if indeed he think so.

Laches/ But I do indeed think so.

Socrates/ And yet, Laches, such persons encounter danger and endure more imprudently than those, who do this with art.

Laches/ So they appear.

Socrates/ Did not then unseemly and imprudent boldness and endurance formerly appear to us to be hurtful likewise?

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But fortitude was acknowledged to be something beautiful.

Laches/ It was acknowledged.

Socrates/ But now on the other hand we say that the unseemly thing, namely, imprudent endurance, is fortitude.

Laches/ We seem so.

Socrates/ Do we then appear to you to speak well?

Laches/ By Zeus, Socrates, not to me.

Socrates/ In your own language, then, Laches, you and I are not Dorically harmonized; for our works do not accord with our words. For someone, as it seems, would say in deed that we have a share of fortitude; but he would not say in word, as I think, if he should hear us now discoursing.

Laches/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ What then, does it appear to you to be beautiful for us to be in this condition?

Laches/ By no means.

Socrates/ Are you willing then for us to yield to what we said, to this extent?

Laches/ To what extent, and to what assertion?

Socrates/ To that which orders us to endure. If then you are willing, let us persist in the inquiry, and endure, lest fortitude itself should deride us for not bravely searching it out; if, perchance, endurance itself is fortitude.

Laches/ I indeed, Socrates, am prepared not to previously stand aloof, although I am unaccustomed to such like conversations. But a certain love of contention against what has been said has laid hold of me, and I am truly indignant that I am so unable to tell what I have in my mind. For I seem to myself to conceive what fortitude is; but I know not how it has just now escaped me, so that I cannot comprehend it in words and say what it is.

Socrates/ But ought not a good huntsman, my friend, to keep running in pursuit, and not to give up.

Laches/ By all means.

Socrates/ Are you then willing for us to invite Nicias also to the hunting, if perchance he is at all more ready to find a path than we are?

Laches/ I am willing; for how not?

Socrates/ Come then, Nicias, and if you possess any power, assist your friends, tossed, as it were, in a storm of words and in doubt; for you see how pathless are our affairs. Do you then state what you think fortitude is, and free us from this doubt, and confirm by reason what you conceive it to be.

Nicias/ You appear to me, Socrates, for some time past, not to have well defined fortitude; for of that, which I have heard you correctly asserting, you make no use.

Socrates/ What is that, Nicias?

Nicias/ I have often heard you asserting that each of us is good, as regards the things in which he is wise, but bad, as regards those of which he is ignorant.

Socrates/ By Zeus, Nicias, you speak the truth.

Nicias/ If, therefore, the brave is a good man, he is clearly a wise man.

Socrates/ Do you hear, Laches?

Laches/ I do; but I do not very well understand what he means.

Socrates/ But I seem to understand; and the man seems to me to call fortitude a certain wisdom.

Laches/ What kind of wisdom, Socrates?

Socrates/ Why do you not ask this of him?

Laches/ I do.

Socrates/ Come then, Nicias, tell him what kind of wisdom fortitude would be according to your reasoning; for it is surely not that belonging to the hautboy.

Nicias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Nor yet that belonging to the harp.

Nicias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But what is it then, or of what is it the science?

Laches/ You very rightly interrogate him, Socrates; and let him tell us what he says wisdom is.

Nicias/ I say then, Laches, that it is the science relating to things of dread and daring, both in war and in all other things.

Laches/ How absurdly, Socrates, he talks!

Socrates/ Looking to what do you say this, Laches?

Laches/ To what? Wisdom is surely separate from fortitude.

Socrates/ Nicias does not say so.

Laches/ He does not, by Zeus; and therefore he is a trifler.

Socrates/ Let us then teach, but not revile him.

Nicias/ It is not so. But Laches seems to me, Socrates, to be desirous for me likewise to appear to say nothing to the purpose, because he too appeared just now to be such a kind of person.

Laches/ Entirely so, Nicias; and I will endeavor to show this. For you do say nothing to the purpose; since, for example, in diseases do not physicians know things of dread? Or do brave men seem to you to know this? Or do you call physicians brave men?

Nicias/ By no means.

Laches/ Neither do you give that name, I think, to husbandmen, although they know things of dread in agriculture; and all other artificers know things of dread and daring in their own arts; and yet they are not in any respect the more brave for this.

Socrates/ What, Nicias, does Laches appear to you to say? He appears, however, to say something.

Nicias/ He does indeed say something, and yet not what is true.

Socrates/ How so?

Nicias/ Because he thinks that physicians know something more about the sick than the being able to say that a thing is healthful or unhealthful. Now they do know only so much as this. But whether to be well is a thing of dread to anyone rather than to be ill, think you, Laches, that physicians know this? Or do you not think that it is better for many not to recover from disease than to recover? For tell me this. Do you say that it is better for all men to live, and that it is not better for many to die?

Laches/ I think that the latter is the case.

Nicias/ To those then, to whom it is an advantage to die, do you think the same things are dreadful, as to those to whom it is an advantage to live?

Laches/ Not I.

Nicias/ But do you grant physicians to know this, or to any other artificer beside the man, who knows what are things of dread, and what are not, whom I call a brave man?

Socrates/ Do you understand, Laches, what he says?

Laches/ I do; and I perceive that he calls prophets brave men: for who else knows to whom it is better to live than to die? And yet, Nicias, do you acknowledge yourself to be a prophet, or to be neither a prophet nor a brave man?

Nicias/ What then, do you think it belongs to a prophet to know things of dread and daring?

Laches/ I do; for to whom else does it?

Nicias/ Much more, thou best of men, to him of whom I was speaking; since it is necessary for a prophet to know merely the signs of future events, whether there will be to anyone death, or disease, or the loss of property, or victory, or defeat, either in battle or in any other contest. But which of these things it is better for anyone to suffer or not to suffer, how does it belong to a prophet, more than to any other person, to judge of?

Laches/ I do not understand, Socrates, what he means to say. For he does not show whom he calls brave, either a prophet, or a physician, or any other person, unless he says that this brave person is a certain god. To me then Nicias appears to be unwilling to ingenuously confess that he is saying nothing to the purpose; but he turns himself upwards and downwards, concealing his perplexity; and both you and I would have been able to turn ourselves in this way, had we wished not to appear to contradict ourselves. If, indeed, our

speeches had been in a court of justice, he would have had some reason to act in this manner; but now in such a conference as this, why should you vainly deck yourself with empty words?

Socrates/ For no reason, as it appears to me, Laches. But let us see, lest Nicias thinks he is saying something to the purpose, and does not assert this merely for the sake of talking. Let us then inquire of him more clearly what he means; and if it shall appear that he says anything pertinent, let us assent to him; if not, we will teach him better.

Laches/ Do you then, Socrates, if you will, question him; for I have questioned him enough.

Socrates/ Nothing prevents me, for the questioning will be in common, both on my account and yours.

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Tell me then, Nicias—for I and Laches unite in the speech—do you say that fortitude is the science of things of dread and daring?

Nicias/ I do.

Socrates/ But it does not belong to every man to know this; since neither a physician nor a prophet knows it, nor will a man be brave, unless he acquires this science. Did you not say so?

Nicias/ I do.

Socrates/ According to the proverb then, in reality every sow would not know this, nor would it become valiant.

Nicias/ It does not seem to me it would.

Socrates/ It is then evident, Nicias, that you do not believe that even the Cromyonian sow was brave. I do not say this in jest; but I think it is necessary for him, who asserts this, to admit that no wild beast is brave; or to grant

that any wild beast, a lion, or a leopard, or any boar, is so wise, as to be born to know what few men, through the difficulty of knowing, do. But he who lays down fortitude to be, what you lay it down, must necessarily say that a lion and a stag and a bull and an ape, are similarly formed by nature with respect to fortitude.

Laches/ By the gods, Socrates, you speak well; and do you, Nicias, truly answer us. Do you say that these wild beasts, which we all of us acknowledge to be brave, are wiser than we are? or, in opposition to all, dare you to call them not brave?

Nicias/ Indeed, Laches, I do not call either a wild beast or anything else brave, which through ignorance has no fear of things of dread, but I call it fearless and stupid. Or, do you think, that I call children brave, who through ignorance, fear nothing? But I am of opinion, "the fearless" is not the same with "the brave." For, I think, that of fortitude and forethought very few have a share; but of confidence and boldness, and fearlessness, together with the want of forethought, very many men and women and boys and wild beasts have. Those acts therefore which you and the many call courageous, I call rash, but the brave are the prudent, about whom I am now speaking.

Laches/ Behold, Socrates, how well this man bedecks himself, as he thinks, with fine words; for those, whom all men acknowledge to be brave, he endeavors to deprive of this honor.

Nicias/ Not I indeed, Laches; but take courage. For I say that you and Lamachus are wise, if you are brave, and many others of the Athenians likewise.

Laches/ Against this I will say nothing; although I could say something, lest you should say that I am in reality an Aixōnean.

Socrates/ Say nothing, Laches; for you seem to me to have not at all perceived that Nicias here received this wisdom from our friend Damon; and Damon is very intimate with Prodicus, who appears indeed to distinguish the best of the sophists' such kind of terms.

Laches/ For it becomes a sophist, Socrates, to be ingenious on such kind of subjects, rather than the man, whom the city thinks fit to place in a post of pre-eminence.

Socrates/ It does, thou blessed man, indeed become him, who presides over things of the greatest consequence, to have the greatest share of wisdom. But it appears to me a thing worthy of consideration, with a view to what does Nicias thus define fortitude.

Laches/ Consider, Socrates, this yourself.

Socrates/ This I intend to do, thou best of men. Do not, however, imagine that I shall dismiss you from your share in the conversation; but do you apply your mind, and ponder with me upon what has been stated.

Laches/ Let it be so, if it seems to you to be necessary.

Socrates/ Nay, but it does seem. And do you, Nicias, tell us again from the beginning. You know that at the beginning of our conference we considered fortitude as a part of virtue.

Nicias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Did not you answer also, that it was a part, there being likewise other parts, which, taken together, are called virtue?

Nicias/ How not?

Socrates/ Are you then speaking of the same parts as I am? For in addition to fortitude, I call temperance, and justice, and certain other things of such kind, parts of virtue. Do not you too?

Nicias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Hold, then. For in these we agree. But let us consider about things of dread and daring, that you may not think some of them one thing, and we another. What then we consider such, we will state; and do you, if you do not agree with us, instruct us. We consider then those to be things of dread, which occasion fear; but those to be things of daring, which do not occasion fear. Now neither evils past, nor present, occasion fear; but those which are expected: for fear is the expectation of a future evil. Or does it not appear so to you, Laches, likewise?

Laches/ Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ You hear then, Nicias, our assertions, that future evils are things of dread; but future things, either not evil or good, are things of daring. On these points say you in this way or in another?

Nicias/ In this.

Socrates/ But do you call the science of these things fortitude?

Nicias/ I do.

Socrates/ Let us then still further consider, whether, on the third point, you think with us.

Nicias/ What is that?

Socrates/ I will tell you. For it appears to me and to Laches here, that of whatever things there is a science, there is not one science of a thing past, so as to know how it has been, another of things present, to know how they are, and another to know how that, which has not yet been, may be and will be in the most beautiful manner; but the science is the same. For instance, with respect to healthiness at all times, there is no other than medical science, which, being one, sees what is, and has been, and will be healthy, and how it will be so. And with respect to things constantly growing out of the earth, agriculture is in a similar state. So

too, in warlike concerns, you yourselves would testify that the science of a general thinks beforehand in the most beautiful manner of other things and of what is about to be; nor does it think it ought to be subservient to the prophet's art, but to rule over it, as knowing better what does and will take place in war. And the law enjoins this; not that the prophet shall rule over the general, but the general over the prophet, Shall we say so, Laches?

Laches/ We will say so.

Socrates/ What then, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the same science has a knowledge of the same things, future, and present, and past?

Nicias/ I do; for so it appears to me, Socrates.

Socrates/ Is not then fortitude, as thou, the best of men, sayest, the science of things of dread and daring?

Nicias/ It is.

Socrates/ But things of dread and daring have been confessed to relate, the latter to future good, the former to future evil.

Nicias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But the same science is relating to the same things, and to those about to be, and existing in every way.

Nicias/ It is so.

Socrates/ Fortitude, then, is not the science of things of dread and daring alone; for it not only has a knowledge of future good and evil, but also of things present and past, and existing in every way like the other sciences.

Nicias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ You have therefore, Nicias, given us in your answer some third part nearly of fortitude. And yet we asked you what the whole of fortitude is. And now, as it seems, according to your former assertion, fortitude is not only the

science of things of dread and daring, but, as your present reasoning on the other hand shows, fortitude would be that which nearly relates to all things good and evil, and existing in every way. To change again thus, or how say you, Nicias?

Nicias/ To me, Socrates, it seems good.

Socrates/ Does then such a person as this appear to you, blessed man, to be deficient at all in virtue, if he knows every good, and how in every point they are, and will be, and have been, and every evil in the same manner? And do you think that he is wanting in temperance, or justice, or holiness, to whom alone it belongs in matters relating to gods and men to practice caution touching the things of dread and not, and to obtain for himself what is good by knowing how to associate in a proper manner with others?

Nicias/ You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose.

Socrates/ That then which is now, Nicias, adduced by you, would not be a part of virtue, but virtue in general.

Nicias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And yet we said that fortitude is one of the parts of virtue.

Nicias/ We said so.

Socrates/ But that which is now said, does not appear to be so.

Nicias/ It seems not.

Socrates/ We have not therefore, Nicias, discovered what fortitude is.

Nicias/ We do not appear to have done so.

Laches/ And yet I thought, friend Nicias, that you would have discovered it, since you had a contempt for myself, when I answered Socrates; and I had very great hope that

you would discover it by the wisdom, which has come from Damon.

Nicias/ It is an excellent thing indeed, Laches, for you to think it a matter of no moment, that just now you appeared to know nothing about fortitude, and that you are looking to this, whether I shall appear to be another such ignorant person; and it will be, as it seems, of no consequence for you together with myself to know nothing of things, which it is fitting for a man to have a knowledge of, who thinks himself something. You therefore appear to me to act in reality after the general manner of men, in looking not to yourself, but to others. I think, however, on the points which he have spoken about, there has been said something in reason; and, if anything has not been stated sufficiently, it shall be afterwards set to rights, with the assistance both of Damon, whom you somehow fancy you are ridiculing—and this too, although you have never seen him—and of others also; and, when I shall have fortified these assertions, I will instruct you too without grudging; for you appear to me to be in very great need of instruction.

Laches/ You are, Nicias, wise indeed; but, however, I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to bid farewell to you and me concerning the education of youth; but not to dismiss this Socrates, as I said from the first: for I would do the very same thing, if my children were of a proper age.

Nicias/ I too agree with you in this, to seek no other person, if Socrates is willing to take the lads under his care; since most gladly would I entrust Niceratus to him, if he is willing; but when I put him in mind at all on this subject, he recommends others to me, and is unwilling to do aught himself. But see, Lysimachus, whether Socrates will hearken more to you.

Lysimachus/ This at least, Nicias, is just; since I should be willing to do many things for him, which I would not be very willing to do for many others. How say you then, Socrates? Will you hearken to me and make an effort with us for these lads to become the very best.

Socrates/ It would certainly be a dreadful thing, Lysimachus, not to be willing to make an effort for any to become the best. If, therefore, in the conversations just now held, I have appeared to know something, but these not to know, it would be just to invite me especially to this employment; but now not; for we are all similarly in a doubt. Why then should anyone select any of us? To me indeed it seems that he should select none. And since this is the case, consider whether I appear to advise you rightly. Now, men, I say it is requisite—for there will be a carrying out into public of our discourse—that we should all of us in common inquire, in the first place, after the best master for ourselves—for we need one—and in the next place for these lads, sparing neither money nor anything else; but to let ourselves be in the condition we now are, I do not advise. And if anyone ridicules us, because at this time of life we think proper to frequent a school, it seems to me that it will be meet to bring forward Homer in our defense, who says;

"Shame ill is present to a man in need."

We therefore, bidding a person go hang, if he says a word against us, let us take care in common of ourselves and the lads.

Lysimachus/ To me indeed, Socrates, what you say is very agreeable; and by how much the older I am, by so much the more willing am I to learn together with the youths. Do you then act in this way. Come to-morrow morning early to my house, and do not do otherwise, in order that we may

consult about these very things. For the present let us break up the meeting.

Socrates/ This, Lysimachus, I will do; and, god willing, I will come to you to-morrow morning.

Laches.

Translated by Benjamin Jowett.

Persons of the Dialog
Socrates, Lysimachus, Nicias,
Melesias, Laches, Sons

Lysimachus/ You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armor, Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him. I think that we may as well confess what this was, for we certainly ought not to have any reserve with you. Some laugh at the very notion of consulting others, and when they are asked will not say what they think. They guess at the wishes of the person who asks them, and answer according to his, and not according to their own, opinion. But as we know that you are good judges, and will say exactly what you think, we have taken you into our counsels. The matter about which I am making all this preface is as follows. Melesias and I have each a son. That is his son, and he is named Thucydides, after his grandfather, and this is mine, who is also called after his grandfather, my father, Aristides. Now, we are resolved to take the greatest care of the youths, and not, like most fathers, to let them do as they please when they are no longer children, but we mean to begin at once and do the utmost that we can for them. And knowing you to have sons of your own, we thought that you of all men were most likely to have attended to their training and improvement, and, if perchance you have seldom given any thought to the subject, we may remind you that you ought to have done so, and would invite you to assist us in the fulfillment of a common duty. I will tell you, Nicias and Laches, even at the risk of being tedious, how we came to think of this.

Melesias and I live together, and our sons live with us. And now, as I was saying at first, we are going to be open with you. Both of us often talk to the lads about the many noble deeds which our own fathers did in war and peace—in managing the affairs of the allies, and those of the city—but neither of us has any deeds of his own which he can show. The truth is that we are ashamed of this contrast being seen by them, and we blame our fathers for letting us be spoiled in the days of our youth, while they were occupied with the concerns of others. And we urge all this upon the lads, pointing out to them that they will not grow up to honor if they are rebellious and take no pains about themselves, but that if they take pains they may, perhaps, become worthy of the names which they bear. They, on their part, promise to comply with our wishes, and our care is to discover what studies or pursuits are likely to be most improving to them.

Someone commended to us the art of fighting in armor, which he thought an excellent accomplishment for a young man to learn, and he praised the man whose exhibition you have seen, and told us to go and see him. And we determined that we would go, and get you to accompany us to see the sight—intending at the same time to ask you to advise us, and, if you wish, to share in our project for the education of our sons. That is the matter which we wanted to talk over with you, and we hope that you will give us your opinion about this art of fighting in armor, and about any other studies or pursuits which you would or would not recommend for a young man, and will tell us whether you would like to join in our proposal.

Nicias/ As far as I am concerned, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud your purpose and will gladly join with you, and I believe that you, Laches, will be equally glad.

Laches/ Certainly, Nicias, and I quite approve of the remark which Lysimachus made about his own father and

the father of Melesias, and which is applicable, not only to them, but to us, and to everyone who is occupied with public affairs. As he says, such persons are too apt to be negligent and careless of their own children and their private concerns. There is much truth in that remark of yours, Lysimachus. But why, besides consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socrates about the education of the youths? He is of the same deme with you, and is always passing his time in places where the youth have any noble study or pursuit, such as you are inquiring after.

Lysimachus/ Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this sort?

Laches/ Certainly, Lysimachus.

Nicias/ That I have the means of knowing as well as Laches, for quite lately he supplied me with a teacher of music for my son—Damon, the pupil of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way, as well as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for young men at their age.

Lysimachus/ Those who have reached my time of life, Socrates and Nicias and Laches, fall out of acquaintance with the young, because they are generally detained at home by old age, but you, O son of Sophroniscus, should let your fellow demesman have the benefit of any advice which you are able to give. Moreover, I have a claim upon you as an old friend of your father, for he and I were always companions and friends, and to the hour of his death there never was a difference between us. And now it comes back to me, at the mention of your name, that I have heard these lads talking to one another at home, and often speaking of Socrates in terms of the highest praise, but I have never thought to ask them whether the son of Sophroniscus was the person whom

they meant. Tell me, my boys, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken?

Sons/ Certainly, father, this is he.

Lysimachus/ I am delighted to hear, Socrates, that you maintain the name of your father, who was a most excellent man, and I further rejoice at the prospect of our family ties being renewed.

Laches/ Indeed, Lysimachus, you ought not to give him up, for I can assure you that I have seen him maintaining, not only his father's, but also his country's name. He was my companion in the retreat from Delium, and I can tell you that if others had only been like him, the honor of our country would have been upheld, and the great defeat would never have occurred.

Lysimachus/ That praise is truly honorable to you, Socrates, given as it is by witnesses entitled to all credit and for such qualities as those which they ascribe to you. Let me tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame, and I hope that you will regard me as one of your warmest friends. You ought to have visited us long ago, and made yourself at home with us, but now, from this day forward, as we have at last found one another out, do as I say—come and make acquaintance with me, and with these young men, that you and yours may continue as my friends. I shall expect you to do so, and shall venture at some future time to remind you of your duty. But what say you all of the matter of which we were beginning to speak—the art of fighting in armor? Is that a practice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed?

Socrates/ I will endeavor to advise you, Lysimachus, as far as I can in this matter, and also in every way will comply with your wishes; but as I am younger and not so experienced, I think that I ought certainly to hear first what

my elders have to say, and to learn of them, and if I have anything to add, then I may venture to give my opinion and advice to them as well as to you. Suppose, Nicias, that one or other of you begin.

Nicias/ I have no objection, Socrates, and my opinion is that the acquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men. It is an advantage to them that instead of the favorite amusements of their leisure hours they should have one which tends to improve their bodily health. No gymnastics could be better or harder exercise, and this, and the art of riding, are of all arts most befitting to a free man, for they who are thus exercised in the use of arms are the only persons being trained for the contest in which we are engaged, and in the accomplishments which it requires. Moreover in actual battle, when you have to fight in a line with a number of others, such an acquirement will be of some use, and will be of the greatest service whenever the ranks are broken and you have to fight singly, either in pursuit, when you are attacking someone who is defending himself, or in flight, when you have to defend yourself against an assailant. Certainly he who possessed the art could not meet with any harm at the hands of a single person, or perhaps of several, and in every case he would have a great advantage. Further, this sort of skill inclines a man to the love of other noble lessons, for every man who has learned how to fight in armor will desire to learn the proper arrangement of an army, which is the sequel of the lesson. And when he has learned this, and his ambition is once fired, he will go on to learn the complete art of the general. There is no difficulty in seeing that the knowledge and practice of other military arts will be honorable and valuable to a man, and this lesson may be the beginning of them.

Let me add a further advantage, which is by no means a slight one—that this science will make any man a great deal more daring and resolute in the field. And I will not disdain to mention, what by some may be thought to be a small matter—he will have a more impressive appearance at the right time, that is to say, at the time when his appearance will strike terror into his enemies. My opinion then, Lysimachus, is, as I say, that the youths should be instructed in this art, and for the reasons which I have given. But Laches may take a different view, and I shall be very glad to hear what he has to say.

Laches/ I should not like to maintain, Nicias, that any kind of knowledge is not to be learned, for all knowledge appears to be a good. And if, as the teachers of the art affirm, this use of arms is really a species of knowledge, and if it is such as Nicias describes, then it ought to be learned, but if not, and if those who profess to teach it are deceivers only, or if it be knowledge, but not of a valuable sort, then what is the use of learning it? I say this, because I think that if it had been really valuable, the Lacedaemonians, whose whole life is passed in finding out and practicing the arts which give them an advantage over other nations in war, would have discovered this one. And even if they have not, still these professors of the art cannot have failed to discover that of all the Hellenes the Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest in such matters, and that a master of the art who was honored among them would be sure to make his fortune among other nations, just as a tragic poet would who is honored among ourselves—which is the reason why he who fancies that he can write a tragedy does not go about exhibiting in the states outside Attica, but rushes hither straight, and exhibits at Athens, and this is natural. Whereas I perceive that these fighters in armor regard Lacedaemon as a sacred inviolable territory, which they do

not touch with the point of their foot, but they make a circuit of the neighboring states, and would rather exhibit to any others than to the Spartans—and particularly to those who would themselves acknowledge that they are by no means first-rate in the arts of war.

Further, Lysimachus, I have encountered a good many of these gentlemen in actual service, and have taken their measure, which I can give you at once, for none of these masters of fence have ever been distinguished in war—there has been a sort of fatality about them; while in all other arts the men of note have been always those who have practiced the art, these appear to be a most unfortunate exception. For example, this very Stesilaus, whom you and I have just witnessed exhibiting in all that crowd and making such great professions of his powers, I had a better opportunity of seeing at another time making in actual battle a real exhibition of himself involuntarily. He was a marine on board a ship which charged a transport vessel, and was armed with a weapon, half spear, half scythe; the weapon was as singular as its owner. To make a long story short, I will only tell you what happened to this notable invention of the scythe-spear. He was fighting, and the scythe was caught in the rigging of the other ship, and stuck fast, and he tugged, but was unable to get his weapon free. The two ships were passing one another. He first ran along his own ship holding on to the spear, but as the other ship passed by and drew him after as he was holding on to the spear, he let it slip through his hand until he retained only the end of the handle. The people in the transport clapped their hands, and laughed at his ridiculous figure, and when someone threw a stone, which fell on the deck at his feet, and he quitted his hold of the scythe-spear, the crew of his own trireme also burst out laughing; they could not refrain when

they beheld the weapon waving in the air, suspended from the transport.

Now I do not deny that there may be something in such an art, as Nicias asserts, but I tell you my experience, and, as I said at first, whether this be an art of which the advantage is so slight, or not an art at all but only an imposition, in either case such an acquirement is not worth having. For my opinion is that if the professor of this art be a coward, he will be likely to become rash, and his character will be only more clearly revealed, or if he be brave, and fail ever so little, other men will be on the watch, and he will be greatly traduced. For there is a jealousy of such pretenders, and unless a man be pre-eminent in valor, he cannot help being ridiculous, if he says that he has this sort of skill. Such is my judgment, Lysimachus, on the study of this art, but, as I said at first, ask Socrates, and do not let him go until he has given you his opinion of the matter.

Lysimachus/ I am going to ask this favor of you, Socrates, as is the more necessary because the two counselors disagree, and someone is in a manner still needed who will decide between them. Had they agreed, no arbiter would have been required. But as Laches has voted one way and Nicias another, I should like to hear with which of our two friends you agree.

Socrates/ What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the majority?

Lysimachus/ Why, yes, Socrates. What else am I to do?

Socrates/ And would you do so too, Melesias? If you were deliberating about the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the advice of the majority of us, or the opinion of the one who had been trained and exercised under a skillful master?

Melesias/ The latter, Socrates, as would surely be reasonable.

Socrates/ His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?

Melesias/ Presumably.

Socrates/ And for this reason, as I imagine—because a good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers?

Melesias/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Now too, then, must we not first of all ask whether there is anyone of us who is an expert in that about which we are deliberating? If there is, let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not mind the rest; if there is not, let us seek further counsel. Is this a trifle which you and Lysimachus have at stake? Are you not risking the greatest of your possessions? For children are your riches, and upon their turning out well or ill depends the whole order of their father's house.

Melesias/ That is true.

Socrates/ Great care, then, is required in this matter?

Melesias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Suppose, as I was just now saying, that we were considering, or wanting to consider, which of us had the best knowledge of gymnastics. Should we not select him who had learned and practiced the art, and had good teachers?

Melesias/ I think that we should.

Socrates/ But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of the art of which we want to find the teachers?

Melesias/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Let me try to make my meaning plainer then. I do not think that we have as yet decided what that is about which we are consulting, when we ask which of us is or is

not skilled in the art, and has or has not had teachers of the art.

Nicias/ Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or ought not to learn the art of fighting in armor?

Socrates/ Yes, Nicias, but there is also a prior question, which I may illustrate in this way. When a person considers about applying a medicine to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the medicine or about the eyes?

Nicias/ About the eyes.

Socrates/ And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horse and at what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle?

Nicias/ True.

Socrates/ And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?

Nicias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he too is skillful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view?

Nicias/ Most true.

Socrates/ And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which the end is the soul of youth?

Nicias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we must inquire whether any of us is skillful or successful in the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?

Laches/ Well but, Socrates, did you never observe that some persons who have had no teachers are more skillful than those who have, in some things?

Socrates/ Yes, Laches, I have observed that, but you would not be very willing to trust them if they professed to

be masters of their art, unless they could show some proof of their skill or excellence in one or more works.

Laches/ That is true.

Socrates/ And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and Melesias, in their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked our advice about them, we likewise should tell them, if we can, what teachers we know of who were in the first place men of merit and experienced trainers of the minds of youth, and then taught also ourselves. Or if any of us says that he has had no teacher but that he has works of his own to show, then he should point out to them what Athenians or strangers, bond or free, he is generally acknowledged to have improved. But if we can show neither teachers nor works, then we should tell them to look out for other advisers; we should not run the risk of spoiling the children of friends, and thereby incurring the most formidable accusation which can be brought against anyone by those nearest to him.

As for myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I am the first to confess that I have never had a teacher of the art of virtue, although I have always from my earliest youth desired to have one. But I am too poor to give money to the Sophists, who are the only professors of moral improvement, and to this day I have never been able to discover the art myself, though I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches has discovered or learned it; for they are far wealthier than I am, and may therefore have learned of others, and they are older too, so that they have had more time to make the discovery. And I really believe that they are able to educate a man, for unless they had been confident in their own knowledge, they would never have spoken thus unhesitatingly of the pursuits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. I repose confidence in both of them, but I am surprised to find that they differ from one another. And therefore, Lysimachus, as

Laches suggested that you should detain me, and not let me go until I answered, I in turn earnestly beseech and advise you to detain Laches and Nicias, and question them. I would have you say to them, Socrates avers that he has no knowledge of the matter—he is unable to decide which of you speaks truly—neither discoverer nor student is he of anything of the kind. But you, Laches and Nicias, should each of you tell us who is the most skillful educator whom you have ever known, and whether you invented the art yourselves, or learned of another, and if you learned, who were your respective teachers, and who were their brothers in the art. And then, if you are too much occupied in politics to teach us yourselves, let us go to them, and present them with gifts, or make interest with them, or both, in the hope that they may be induced to take charge of our children and of yours, and then they will not grow up to be worthless, and disgrace their ancestors. But if you are yourselves original discoverers in that field, give us some proof of your skill. Who are they who, having been worthless persons, have become under your care good and noble? For if this is your first attempt at education, there is a danger that you may be trying the experiment, not on the *vile corpus* of a Carian slave, but on your own sons or the sons of your friends, and, as the proverb says, 'break the large vessel in learning to make pots.' Tell us then, what qualifications you claim or do not claim.

Make them tell you that, Lysimachus, and do not let them off.

Lysimachus/ I very much approve of the words of Socrates, my friends, but you, Nicias and Laches, must determine whether you will be questioned, and give an explanation about matters of this sort. Assuredly, Melesias and I would be greatly pleased to hear you answer the questions which Socrates asks, if you will, for I began by

saying that we took you into our counsels because we thought that no doubt you had attended to the subject, especially as you have children who, like our own, are nearly of an age to be educated. Well then, if you have no objection, suppose that you take Socrates into partnership, and do you and he ask and answer one another's questions, for, as he has well said, we are deliberating about the most important of our concerns. I hope that you will see fit to comply with our request.

Nicias/ I see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you have only known Socrates' father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself—at least, you can only have known him when he was a child, and may have met him among his fellow demesman, in company with his father, at a sacrifice or at some other gathering. You clearly show that you have never known him since he arrived at manhood.

Lysimachus/ Why do you say that, Nicias?

Nicias/ Because you seem not to be aware that anyone who is close to Socrates and enters into conversation with him is liable to be drawn into an argument, and whatever subject he may start, he will be continually carried round and round by him, until at last he finds that he has to give an account both of his present and past life, and when he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him go until he has completely and thoroughly sifted him. Now I am used to his ways, and I know that he will certainly do as I say, and also that I myself shall be the sufferer, for I am fond of his conversation, Lysimachus. And I think that there is no harm in being reminded of any wrong thing which we are, or have been, doing; he who does not fly from reproof will be sure to take more heed of his afterlife. As Solon says, he will wish and desire to be learning so long as he lives, and will not think that old age of itself brings wisdom.' To me, to be cross-examined by Socrates is neither unusual nor

unpleasant. Indeed, I was fairly certain all along that where Socrates was, the subject of discussion would soon be ourselves, not our sons, and therefore, I say for my part, I am quite willing to discourse with Socrates in his own manner. But you had better ask our friend Laches what his feeling may be.

Laches/ I have but one feeling, Nicias, or shall I say two feelings, about discussions? Some would think that I am a lover, and to others I may seem to be a hater, of discourse. For when I hear a man discoursing of virtue, or of any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of his theme, I am delighted beyond measure, and I compare the man and his words, and note the harmony and correspondence of them. And such a one I deem to be the true musician, attuned to a fairer harmony than that of the lyre, or any pleasant instrument of music, for he truly has in his own life a harmony of words and deeds arranged—not in the Ionian, or in the Phrygian mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic mode, which is the Dorian, and no other. Such a one makes me merry with the sound of his voice, and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse; so eager am I in drinking in his words. But a man whose actions do not agree with his words is an annoyance to me, and the better he speaks the more I hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of discourse.

As to Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old, as appears, I have had experience of his deeds, and his deeds show that he is entitled to noble sentiments and complete freedom of speech. And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with him, and shall be delighted to be interrogated by a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at having to learn of him, for I too agree with Solon, ‘that I would fain grow old, learning many things.' But I must be allowed to add ‘from the good only.' Socrates must be

willing to allow that the teacher himself is a good man, or I shall be a dull and reluctant pupil, but that the teacher is rather young, or not as yet in repute—anything of that sort is of no account with me. And therefore, Socrates, I invite you to teach and confute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me anything which I know. So high is the opinion which have entertained of you ever since the day on which you were my companion in danger, and gave a proof of your valor such as only the man of merit can give. Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ages.

Socrates/ I cannot say that either of you shows any reluctance to take counsel and advise with me.

Lysimachus/ But this is our proper business, and yours as well as ours, for I reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find out from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the youths, and talk and consult with them, for I am old, and my memory is bad, and I do not remember the questions which I intend to ask, or the answers to them, and if there is any digression I lose the thread. I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by yourselves, and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your conclusions.

Socrates/ Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of Lysimachus and Melesias. There will be no harm in asking ourselves the question which was proposed to us just now. Who have been our own instructors in this sort of training, or whom have we ourselves made better? But another mode of carrying on the inquiry will bring us equally to the same point, and perhaps starts nearer to first principles. For if we know that the addition of something would improve some other thing, and are able to make the addition, then, clearly, we must know how that about which we are advising may be best and most easily attained.

Perhaps you do not understand what I mean. Then let me make my meaning plainer in this way. Suppose we know that the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this gift, and also are able to impart sight to the eyes; then, clearly, we know the nature of sight, and should be able to advise how this gift of sight may be best and most easily attained. But if we knew neither what sight is, nor what hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers about the eyes or the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and hearing to them.

Laches/ That is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment inviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to their sons for the improvement of their minds?

Laches/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how can we advise anyone about the best mode of attaining something of whose nature we are wholly ignorant?

Laches/ I do not think that we can, Socrates.

Socrates/ We say then, Laches, that we know the nature of virtue.

Laches/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?

Laches/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I would not have us begin, my friend, with inquiring about the whole of virtue, for that may be more than we can accomplish. Let us first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part; the inquiry will thus probably be made easier to us.

Laches/ Let us do as you wish, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we not select that to which the art of fighting in armor is supposed to conduce? And is not that generally thought to be courage?

Laches/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the nature of courage, and in the second place proceed to inquire how the young men may attain this quality by the help of studies and pursuits. Tell me, if you can, what is courage.

Laches/ Indeed, Socrates, I see no difficulty in answering. He is a man of courage who does not run away, but remains at his post and fights against the enemy. There can be no mistake about that.

Socrates/ Very good, Laches, and yet I fear that I did not express myself clearly, and therefore you have answered not the question which I intended to ask, but another.

Laches/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will endeavor to explain. You would call a man courageous who remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?

Laches/ Certainly I should.

Socrates/ And so should I, but what would you say of another man, who fights flying, instead of remaining?

Laches/ How flying?

Socrates/ Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as pursuing, and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that they knew ‘how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither,' and he passes an encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge of fear or flight, and calls him ‘a deviser of fear or flight.'

Laches/ Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right, for he was speaking of chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry. Now cavalry have that way of fighting, but the heavy-armed soldier fights, as I say, remaining in his rank.

Socrates/ And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians at Plataea, who, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, are said not to have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled. But when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like Cavalry, and won the Battle of Plataea.

Laches/ That is true.

Socrates/ That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having put my question badly, and that this was the reason of your answering badly. For I meant to ask you not only about the courage of the heavy-armed soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every other style of soldier—and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous in perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again in politics, are courageous, and not only who are courageous against pain or fear, but mighty to contend against

desires and pleasures, either fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy. There is this sort of courage—is there not, Laches?

Laches/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now all these are courageous, but some have courage in pleasures and some in pains, some in desires and some in fears. And some are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine.

Laches/ Very true.

Socrates/ I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. And I will begin with courage, and once more ask what is that common quality, which is the same in all these

cases, and which is called courage? Do you now understand what I mean?

Laches/ Not over-well.

Socrates/ I mean this. As I might ask what is that quality which is called quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the lyre, in speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions, or rather which we possess in nearly every action that is worth mentioning of arms, legs, mouth, voice, mind—would you not apply the term quickness to all of them?

Laches/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And suppose I were to be asked by someone, What is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these activities, you call quickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a little time—whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of action.

Laches/ You would be quite correct.

Socrates/ And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What is that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and in all the cases to which I was just now referring?

Laches/ I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.

Socrates/ But that is what we must do if we are to answer our own question. And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be deemed courage. Hear my reason. I am sure, Laches, that you would consider courage to be a very noble quality.

Laches/ Most noble, certainly.

Socrates/ And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?

Laches/ Very noble.

Socrates/ But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?

Laches/ True.

Socrates/ And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?

Laches/ I ought not to say that, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage—for it is not noble, but courage is noble?

Laches/ You are right.

Socrates/ Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?

Laches/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But as to the epithet 'wise'—wise in what? In all things small as well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality of endurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire more in the end, do you call him courageous?

Laches/ Assuredly not.

Socrates/ Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or some patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he may be allowed to eat or drink something, and the other is inflexible and refuses, is that courage?

Laches/ No, that is not courage at all, any more than the last.

Socrates/ Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willing to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that

others will help him, and that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there are with him, and suppose that he has also advantages in position—would you say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation that he or some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite circumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his post is the braver?

Laches/ I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.

Socrates/ But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the other?

Laches/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry endures, having a knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as he who endures, having no such knowledge?

Laches/ So I should say.

Socrates/ And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling, or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who endures, not having such a knowledge?

Laches/ True.

Socrates/ And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in this or any similar action, having no skill in diving or the like, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this skill?

Laches/ Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?

Socrates/ Nothing, if that be what he thinks.

Laches/ But that is what I do think.

Socrates/ And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish, Laches, in comparison with those who do the same things, having the skill to do them.

Laches/ That is true.

Socrates/ But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base and hurtful to us?

Laches/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.

Laches/ True.

Socrates/ And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish endurance, which was before held in dishonor, is courage.

Laches/ So we are.

Socrates/ And are we right in saying so?

Laches/ Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.

Socrates/ Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds, for our deeds are not in accordance with our words. Anyone would say that we had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us talking about courage just now.

Laches/ That is most true.

Socrates/ And is this condition of ours satisfactory?

Laches/ Quite the reverse.

Socrates/ Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are speaking to a certain extent?

Laches/ To what extent and what principle do you mean?

Socrates/ The principle of endurance. If you agree, we too must endure and persevere in the inquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faintheartedness in searching for courage, which after all may frequently be endurance.

Laches/ I am ready to go on, Socrates, and yet I am unused to investigations of this sort. But the spirit of

controversy has been aroused in me by what has been said, and I am really grieved at being thus unable to express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know the nature of courage, but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and I cannot get hold of her and tell her nature.

Socrates/ But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the track, and not give up?

Laches/ Certainly, he should.

Socrates/ Shall we then invite Nicias to join us? He may be better at the sport than we are. What do you say?

Laches/ I should like that.

Socrates/ Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends, who are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp. You see our extremity, and may save us and also settle your own opinion, if you tell us what you think about courage.

Nicias/ I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not defining courage in the right way, for you have forgotten an excellent saying which I have heard from your own lips.

Socrates/ What is it, Nicias?

Nicias/ I have often heard you say that 'Every man is good in that in which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise.'

Socrates/ That is certainly true, Nicias.

Nicias/ And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise.

Socrates/ Do you hear him, Laches?

Laches/ Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him.

Socrates/ I think that I understand him, and he appears to me to mean that courage is a sort of wisdom.

Laches/ What sort of wisdom, Socrates?

Socrates/ That is a question which you must ask of him.

Laches/ Yes.

Socrates/ Tell him then, Nicias, what sort of wisdom you think courage to be, for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?

Nicias/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?

Nicias/ No.

Socrates/ But what is this knowledge then, and of what?

Laches/ I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates, and I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom.

Nicias/ I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything.

Laches/ How strangely he is talking, Socrates.

Socrates/ Why do you say so, Laches?

Laches/ Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another.

Socrates/ That is just what Nicias denies.

Laches/ Yes, that is what he denies; that is where he is so silly.

Socrates/ Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?

Nicias/ Certainly, Socrates, but having been proved to be talking nonsense himself, Laches wants to prove that I have been doing the same.

Laches/ Very true, Nicias, and you are talking nonsense, as I shall endeavor to show. Let me ask you a question. Do not physicians know the dangers of disease? Or do the

courageous know them? Or are the physicians the same as the courageous?

Nicias/ Not at all.

Laches/ No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry, or than other craftsmen, who have a knowledge of that which inspires them with fear or confidence in their own arts, and yet they are not courageous a whit the more for that.

Socrates/ What do you think of Laches' argument, Nicias? He appears to be saying something of importance.

Nicias/ Yes, he is saying something, but it is not true.

Socrates/ How so?

Nicias/ Why, because he thinks that the physician's knowledge of illness extends beyond the nature of health and disease. But in fact the physician knows no more than this. Do you imagine, Laches, that he knows whether health or illness is the more terrible to a man? Had not many a man better never get up from a sickbed? I should like to know whether you think that life is always better than death. May not death often be the better of the two?

Laches/ Yes, certainly so in my opinion.

Nicias/ And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who had better die, and to those who had better live?

Laches/ Certainly not.

Nicias/ And do you suppose that the physician knows this, or indeed any other specialist, except the man who is skilled in the grounds of fear and hope? And him I call the courageous.

Socrates/ Do you understand his meaning, Laches?

Laches/ Yes, I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are the courageous men. For who but one of

them can know to whom to die or to live is better? And yet, Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a soothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?

Nicias/ What! Do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the grounds of hope or fear?

Laches/ Indeed I do. Who but he?

Nicias/ Much rather I should say he of whom I speak, for the soothsayer ought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass, whether it be death or disease, or loss of property, or victory, or defeat in war or in any sort of contest. But whether the suffering or not-suffering of these things will be best for a man is a question which is no more for a soothsayer to decide than for anyone else.

Laches/ I cannot understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates, for he represents the courageous as neither a soothsayer, nor a physician, nor in any other character—unless he means to say that he is a god. My opinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talking nonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal the difficulty into which he has got himself. You and I, Socrates, might have practiced a similar shuffle just now, if we had only wanted to avoid the appearance of inconsistency. And if we had been arguing in a court of law there might have been reason in so doing, but why should a man deck himself out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as this?

Socrates/ I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But perhaps Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of talking. Let us ask him just to explain what he means, and if he has reason on his side we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.

Laches/ Do you ask him, Socrates, if you will. I think that I have asked enough.

Socrates/ I do not see why I should not, and my questioning will do for both of us.

Laches/ Very good.

Socrates/ Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I are partners in the argument, do you mean to affirm that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?

Nicias/ I do.

Socrates/ And not every man has this knowledge; the physician and the soothsayer have it not, and they will not be courageous unless they acquire it—that is what you were saying?

Nicias/ I was.

Socrates/ Then this is certainly not a thing which every sow would know, as the proverb says, and therefore she could not be courageous.

Nicias/ I think not.

Socrates/ Clearly not, Nicias, not even the sow of Crommyon would be called by you courageous. And this I say not as a joke, but because I think that he who assents to your doctrine cannot allow that any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a leopard, or perhaps a boar, has such a degree of wisdom that he knows things which but a few human beings ever know by reason of their difficulty. He who takes your view of courage must affirm that a lion is not naturally more disposed to courage than a stag, nor a bull than a monkey.

Laches/ Capital, Socrates. Upon my word, that is truly good. And I hope, Nicias, that you will tell us whether you really mean that those animals which we all admit to be courageous are in fact wiser than mankind, or whether you will have the boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny their courage.

Nicias/ Why, Laches, I do not describe as courageous animals or any other creatures which have no fear of dangers because they are devoid of understanding, but only as fearless and senseless. Do you imagine that I should call all little children courageous who fear no dangers because they have no understanding? There is a difference, to my way of thinking, between fearlessness and courage. I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few, but that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness which has no forethought, are very common qualities possessed by many men, many women, many children, many animals. And you, and men in general, call by the term 'courageous' actions which I call rash—my courageous actions are wise actions.

Laches/ Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses himself out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honor of courage those whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous.

Nicias/ Not you, Laches, so do not be alarmed. I am quite willing to say of you, and also of Lamachus and of many other Athenians, that you are wise, being courageous.

Laches/ I could answer that, but I would not have you cast in my teeth that I am a haughty Aexonian.

Socrates/ Do not answer him, Laches. I rather fancy that you are not aware of the source from which his wisdom is derived. He has got all this from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of all the Sophists, is considered to be the best at analyzing the meaning of words of this sort.

Laches/ Yes, Socrates, and the examination of such niceties is a much more proper employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city chooses to preside over her affairs.

Socrates/ Yes, my sweet friend, but great affairs and great minds properly go together. And I think that Nicias deserves that we should see what he has in view when he so defines courage.

Laches/ Then see for yourself, Socrates.

Socrates/ That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not, however, suppose I shall let you out of the partnership, for I shall expect you to apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of the question.

Laches/ I will if you think that I ought.

Socrates/ Yes, I do, but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue.

Nicias/ Very true.

Socrates/ And you yourself said that it was a part, and there were many other parts, all of which taken together are called virtue.

Nicias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice, temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as courage. Would you not say the same?

Nicias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, so far we are agreed. And now let us proceed a step, and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the hopeful. I do not want you to be thinking one thing and us another. Let me then tell you our opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set us right. In our opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which do and do not create fear, and fear is not of the present nor of the past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that, Laches?

Laches/ Yes, Socrates, entirely.

Socrates/ That is our view, Nicias. The terrible things, as I should say, are the evils which are future, and the hopeful are the good or not-evil things which are future. Do you or do you not agree with me?

Nicias/ I agree.

Socrates/ And the knowledge of these things you call courage?

Nicias/ Precisely.

Socrates/ And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself as to a third point.

Nicias/ What is that?

Socrates/ I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of what may and will be best in the future, but that of all three there is one science only. For example, there is one science of medicine which is concerned with the superintendence of health equally in all times, present, past, and future, and one science of husbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of the earth in all times. As to the military art, you yourselves will be my witnesses that it makes excellent provision for the future as well as the present, and that the general claims to be the master and not the servant of the soothsayer, because he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war, and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the soothsayer. Am I not correct in saying so, Laches?

Laches/ Quite correct.

Socrates/ And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?

Nicias/ Yes, indeed, Socrates, that is my opinion.

Socrates/ And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful?

Nicias/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future goods and future evils?

Nicias/ True.

Socrates/ And the same science has to do with the same things in the future or at any time?

Nicias/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then courage is a science which is concerned not only with the fearful and hopeful, for they are future only. Courage, like the other sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of the present and past, and of any time.

Nicias/ That, as I suppose, is true.

Socrates/ Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a third part of courage, but our question extended to the whole nature of courage. And according to your view—that is, according to your present view—courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time. What do you say to that alteration in your statement?

Nicias/ I agree, Socrates.

Socrates/ But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and how they are and have been and will be produced, would he not be perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice or temperance or holiness? He alone would be competent to distinguish between what is to be feared and what is not, whether it be supernatural or natural, and would take the proper precautions to secure that all shall be

well, for he would know how to deal aright both with gods and with men.

Nicias/ I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you say.

Socrates/ But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of yours, instead of being only a part of virtue, will be all virtue?

Nicias/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?

Nicias/ Yes, that was what we were saying.

Socrates/ And that is in contradiction with our present view?

Nicias/ That appears to be the case.

Socrates/ Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is.

Nicias/ It seems not.

Laches/ And yet, friend Nicias, I imagined that you would have made the discovery, when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been led to it by the wisdom of Damon.

Nicias/ I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayed your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see whether I have not made a similar display. And if we are both equally ignorant of the things which a man with any self-respect should know, that, I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly appear to me very like the rest of the world, looking at your neighbor and not at yourself. I am of opinion that enough has been said on the subject which we have been discussing, and if the treatment has been in any way inadequate, that may be

hereafter corrected with the help of Damon, whom you think to laugh down although you have never seen him, and of others. And when I am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I think that you are very much in want of knowledge.

Laches/ You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware. Nevertheless I would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you and me as advisers about the education of their children, but, as I said at first, they should ask Socrates and not let him off; if my own sons were old enough, I should do the same.

Nicias/ To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them under his charge. I should not wish for anyone else to be the tutor of Niceratus. But I observe that whenever I mention the matter to him he recommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he may be more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus.

Lysimachus/ He ought, Nicias, for certainly I would do things for him which I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates—will you comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the youths?

Socrates/ Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid in the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation that I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty, but as we are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred to another? I certainly think that no one should, and under these circumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice—and this need not go farther than ourselves. I maintain, my friends, that everyone of us should seek out the best teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves who are greatly in need of one, and then for the youths, regardless of expense or

anything. But I cannot advise that we remain as we are. And if anyone laughs at us for going to school at our age, I would quote to them the authority of Homer, who says, 'Modesty is not good for a needy man." Let us then, regardless of what may be said of us, concern ourselves both with our own education and that of the youths, together.

Lysimachus/ I like your proposal, Socrates, and as I am the oldest, I am also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favor of you. Come to my house tomorrow at dawn, and we will advise about these matters. For the present, let us make an end of the conversation.

Socrates/ I will come to you tomorrow, Lysimachus : as you propose, God willing.

Laches

Translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague.

Persons of the Dialog.

Lysimachus, Melesias, Nicias, Laches, and
the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias, and Socrates.

Lysimachus/ You have seen the man fighting in armor, Nicias and Laches. When Melesias and I invited you to see him with us, we neglected to give the reason why, but now we shall explain, because we think it especially right to be frank with you. Now there are some people who make fun of frankness and if anyone asks their advice, they don't say what they think, but they make a shot at what the other man would like to hear and say something different from their own opinion. But you we considered capable not only of forming a judgment but also, having formed one, of saying exactly what you think, and this is why we have taken you into our confidence about what we are going to communicate to you. Now the matter about which I have been making such a long preamble is this: we have these two sons here—this one is the son of my friend Melesias here, and he is called Thucydides after his grandfather, and this one is my son, who also goes by his grandfather's name—we call him Aristides after my father. We have made up our minds to take as good care of them as we possibly can and not to behave like most parents, who, when their children start to grow up, permit them to do whatever they wish. No, we think that now is the time to make a real beginning, so far as we can. Since we knew that both of you had sons too, we thought that you, if anyone, would have been concerned about the sort of training that would make the best men of them. And if by any chance you have not turned your attention to this kind of thing very often, let us remind you that you ought not to neglect it, and let us invite you to care

for your sons along with ours. How we reached this conclusion, Nicias and Laches, you must hear, even if it means my talking a bit longer. Now you must know that Melesias and I take our meals together, and the boys eat with us. We shall be frank with you, exactly as I said in the beginning: each of us has a great many fine things to say to the young men about his own father, things they achieved both in war and in peace in their management of the affairs both of their allies and of the city here. But neither of us has a word to say about his own accomplishments. This is what shames us in front of them, and we blame our fathers for allowing us to take things easy when we were growing up, while they were busy with other peoples' affairs. And we point these same things out to the young people here, saying that if they are careless of themselves and disobedient to us, they will turn out to be nobodies, but if they take pains, perhaps they may become worthy of the names they bear. Now the boys promise to be obedient, so we are looking into the question what form of instruction or practice would make them turn out best. Somebody suggested this form of instruction to us, saying that it would be a fine thing for a young man to learn fighting in armor. And he praised this particular man whom you have just seen giving a display and proceeded to encourage us to see him. So we thought we ought to go to see the man and to take you with us, not only as fellow spectators but also as fellow counselors and partners, if you should be willing, in the care of our sons. This is what we wanted to share with you. So now is the time for you to give us your advice, not only about this form of instruction—whether you think it should be learned or not—but also about any other sort of study or pursuit for a young man which you admire. Tell us too, what part you will take in our joint enterprise.

Nicias/ I, for one, Lysimachus and Melesias, applaud your plan and am ready to take part in it. And I think Laches here is ready too.

Laches/ You are quite right, Nicias. As for what Lysimachus said just now about his father and Melesias' father, I think that what he said applied very well to them and to us and to everyone engaged in public affairs, because this is pretty generally what happens to them—that they neglect their private affairs, children as well as everything else, and manage them carelessly. So you were right on this point, Lysimachus. But I am astonished that you are inviting us to be your fellow counselors in the education of the young men and are not inviting Socrates here! In the first place, he comes from your own deme, and in the second, he is always spending his time in places where the young men engage in any study or noble pursuit of the sort you are looking for.

Lysimachus/ What do you mean, Laches? Has our friend Socrates concerned himself with any things of this kind?

Laches/ Certainly, Lysimachus.

Nicias/ This is a point I can vouch for no less than Laches, since he only recently recommended a man to me as music teacher for my son. The man's name is Damon, a pupil of Agathocles, and he is the most accomplished of men, not only in music, but in all the other pursuits in which you would think it worthwhile for boys of his age to spend their time.

Lysimachus/ People at my time of life, Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, are no longer familiar with the young because our advancing years keep us at home so much of the time. But if you, son of Sophroniscus, have any good advice to give your fellow demesman, you ought to give it. And you have a duty to do so, because you are my friend through your father. He and I were always comrades and friends, and he died without our ever having had a single difference. And this present

conversation reminds me of something—when the boys here are talking to each other at home, they often mention Socrates and praise him highly, but I've never thought to ask if they were speaking of the son of Sophroniscus. Tell me, boys, is this the Socrates you spoke of on those occasions?

Sons/ Certainly, father, this is the one.

Lysimachus/ I am delighted, Socrates, that you keep up your father's good reputation, for he was the best of men, and I am especially pleased at the idea that the close ties between your family and mine will be renewed.

Laches/ Don't under any circumstances let the man get away, Lysimachus—because I have seen him elsewhere keeping up not only his father's reputation but that of his country. He marched with me in the retreat from Delium, and I can tell you that if the rest had been willing to behave in the same manner, our city would be safe and we would not then have suffered a disaster of that kind.

Lysimachus/ Socrates, the praise you are receiving is certainly of a high order, both because it comes from men who are to be trusted and because of the qualities for which they praise you. Be assured that I am delighted to hear that you are held in such esteem, and please consider me among those most kindly disposed towards you. You yourself ought to have visited us long before and considered us your friends—that would have been the right thing to do. Well, since we have recognized each other, resolve now, starting today, to associate both with us and the young men here and to make our acquaintance, so that you may preserve the family friendship. So do what I ask, and we in turn shall keep you in mind of your promise. But what have you all to say about our original question? What is your opinion? Is fighting in armor a useful subject for young men to learn or not?

Socrates/ Well, I shall try to advise you about these things as best I can, Lysimachus, in addition to performing all the things to which you call my attention. However, it seems to me to be more suitable, since I am younger than the others and more inexperienced in these matters, for me to listen first to what they have to say and to learn from them. But if I should have something to add to what they say, then will be the time for me to teach and persuade both you and the others. Come, Nicias, why doesn't one of you two begin?

Nicias/ Well, there is no reason why not, Socrates. I think that knowledge of this branch of study is beneficial for the young in all sorts of ways. For one thing, it is a good idea for the young not to spend their time in the pursuits in which they normally do like to spend it when they are at leisure, but rather in this one, which necessarily improves their bodies, since it is in no way inferior to gymnastics exercises and no less strenuous, and, at the same time, this and horsemanship are forms of exercise especially suited to a free citizen. For in the contest in which we are the contestants and in the matters on which our struggle depends, only those are practiced who know how to use the instruments of war. And again, there is a certain advantage in this form of instruction even in an actual battle, whenever one has to fight in line with a number of others. But the greatest advantage of it comes when the ranks are broken and it then becomes necessary for a man to fight in single combat, either in pursuit when he has to attack a man who is defending himself, or in flight, when he has to defend himself against another person who is attacking him. A man who has this skill would suffer no harm at the hands of a single opponent, nor even perhaps at the hands of a larger number, but he would have the advantage in every way. Then again, such a study arouses in us the desire for another fine form of instruction, since every man who learns to fight in armor will want to learn the subject that comes next, that is,

the science of tactics; and when he has mastered this and taken pride in it, he will press on to the whole art of the general. So it has already become clear that what is connected with this latter art, all the studies and pursuits which are fine and of great value for a man to learn and to practice, have this study as a starting point. And we shall add to this an advantage which is not at all negligible, that this knowledge will make every man much bolder and braver in war than he was before. And let us not omit to mention, even if to some it might seem a point not worth making, that this art will give a man a finer-looking appearance at the very moment when he needs to have it, and when he will appear more frightening to the enemy because of the way he looks. So my opinion, Lysimachus, is just as I say, that young men should be taught these things, and I have given the reasons why I think so. But if Laches has anything to say on the other side, I would be glad to hear it.

Laches/ But the fact is, Nicias, that it is difficult to maintain of any study whatsoever that it ought not to be learned, because it seems to be a good idea to learn everything. So as far as this fighting in armor is concerned, if it is a genuine branch of study, as those who teach it claim, and as Nicias says, then it ought to be learned, but if it is not a real subject and the people who propose to teach it are deceiving us, or if it is a real subject but not a very important one, what need is there to learn it? The reason I say these things about it is that I consider that, if there were anything in it, it would not have escaped the attention of the Lacedaemonians, who have no other concern in life than to look for and engage in whatever studies and pursuits will increase their superiority in war. And if the Lacedaemonians had overlooked the art, the teachers of it would certainly not have overlooked this fact, that the Lacedaemonians are the most concerned with such matters of any of the Greeks and

that anyone who was honored among them in these matters would make a great deal of money just as is the case when a tragic poet is honored among us. The result is that whenever anyone fancies himself as a good writer of tragedy, he does not go about exhibiting his plays in the other cities round about Athens but comes straight here and shows his work to our people, as is the natural thing to do. But I observe that those who fight in armor regard Lacedaemon as forbidden ground and keep from setting foot in it. They give it a wide berth and prefer to exhibit to anyone rather than the Spartans—in fact they take pains to select people who themselves admit that plenty of others surpass them in warfare. Then again, Lysimachus, I have encountered quite a few of these gentlemen on the actual field of battle and I have seen what they are like. This makes it possible for us to consider the matter at first hand. In a manner which seems almost deliberate, not a single practitioner of the art of fighting in armor has ever become renowned in war. And yet in all the other arts, those who are well-known in each are those who have practiced the various ones. But the men who practice this art seem to be those who have the worst luck at it. For instance, this very man Stesilaus, whom you and I have witnessed giving a display before such a large crowd and praising himself the way he did, I once saw in the quite different circumstances of actual warfare giving a much finer demonstration against his will. On an occasion when a ship on which he was serving as a marine rammed a transport-vessel, he was armed with a combination scythe and spear, as singular a weapon as he was singular a man. His other peculiarities are not worth relating, but let me tell you how his invention of a scythe plus a spear turned out. In the course of the fight it somehow got entangled in the rigging of the other ship and there it stuck. So Stesilaus dragged at the weapon in an attempt to free it, but he could not, and meanwhile his ship

was going by the other ship. For a time he kept running along the deck holding fast to the spear. But when the other ship was actually passing his and was dragging him after it while he still held onto the weapon, he let it slide through his hand until he just had hold of the ferule at the end. There was laughter and applause from the men on the transport at the sight of him, and when somebody hit the deck at his feet with a stone and he let go the shaft, then even the men on the trireme could no longer keep from laughing when they saw that remarkable scythe-spear dangling from the transport. Now perhaps these things may be of value, as Nicias maintains, but my own experience has been of the sort I describe. So, as I said in the beginning, either it is an art but has little value, or it is not an art but people say and pretend that it is, but in any case it is not worth trying to learn. And then it seems to me that ii a cowardly man should imagine he had mastered the art, he would, because of his increasing rashness, show up more clearly the sort of man he was, whereas in the case of a brave man, everyone would be watching him and if he made the smallest mistake, he would incur a great deal of criticism. The reason for this is that a man who pretends to knowledge of this sort is the object of envy, so that unless he is outstandingly superior to the rest, there is no way in which he can possibly avoid becoming a laughingstock when he claims to have this knowledge. So the study of this art seems to me to be of this sort, Lysimachus. But, as I said before, we ought not to let Socrates here escape, but we ought to consult him as to his opinion on the matter in hand.

Lysimachus/ Well, I do ask your opinion, Socrates, since what might be called our council seems to me to be still in need of someone to cast the deciding vote. If these two had agreed, there would be less necessity of such a procedure, but as it is, you perceive that Laches has voted in opposition to

Nicias. So we would do well to hear from you too, and find out with which of them you plan to vote.

Socrates/ What's that, Lysimachus? Do you intend to cast your vote for whatever position is approved by the majority of us?

Lysimachus/ Why, what else could a person do, Socrates?

Socrates/ And do you, Melesias, plan to act in the same way? Suppose there should be a council to decide whether your son ought to practice a particular kind of gymnastic exercise, would you be persuaded by the greater number or by whoever has been educated and exercised under a good trainer?

Melesias/ Probably by the latter, Socrates.

Socrates/ And you would be persuaded by him rather than by the four of us?

Melesias/ Probably.

Socrates/ So I think it is by knowledge that one ought to make decisions, if one is to make them well, and not by majority rule.

Melesias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So in this present case it is also necessary to investigate first of all whether anyone of us is an expert in the subject we are debating, or not. And if one of us is, then we should listen to him even if he is only one, and disregard the others. But if no one of us is an expert, then we must look for someone who is. Or do you and Lysimachus suppose that the subject in question is some small thing and not the greatest of all our possessions? The question is really, I suppose, that of whether your sons turn out to be worthwhile persons or the opposite—and the father's whole estate will be managed in accordance with the way the sons turn out.

Melesias/ You are right.

Socrates/ So we ought to exercise great forethought in the matter.

Melesias/ Yes, we should.

Socrates/ Then, in keeping with what I said just now, how would we investigate if we wanted to find out which of us was the most expert with regard to gymnastics? Wouldn't it be the man who had studied and practiced the art and who had had good teachers in that particular subject?

Melesias/ I should think so.

Socrates/ And even before that, oughtn't we to investigate what art it is of which we are looking for the teachers?

Melesias/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Perhaps it will be more clear if I put it this way: I do not think we have reached any preliminary agreement as to what in the world we are consulting about and investigating when we ask which of us is expert in it and has acquired teachers for this purpose, and which of us is not.

Nicias/ But, Socrates, aren't we investigating the art of fighting in armor and discussing whether young men ought to learn it or not?

Socrates/ Quite so, Nicias. But when a man considers whether or not he should use a certain medicine to anoint his eyes, do you think he is at that moment taking counsel about the medicine or about the eyes?

Nicias/ About the eyes.

Socrates/ Then too, whenever a man considers whether or not and when he should put a bridle on a horse, I suppose he is at that moment taking counsel about the horse and not about the bridle?

Nicias/ That is true.

Socrates/ So, in a word, whenever a man considers a thing for the sake of another thing, he is taking counsel about that

thing for the sake of which he was considering, and not about what he was investigating for the sake of something else.

Nicias/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Then the question we ought to ask with respect to the man who gives us advice, is whether he is expert in the care of that thing for the sake of which we are considering when we consider.

Nicias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So do we now declare that we are considering a form of study for the sake of the souls of young men?

Nicias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the question whether anyone of us is expert in the care of the soul and is capable of caring for it well, and has had good teachers, is the one we ought to investigate.

Laches/ What's that, Socrates? Haven't you ever noticed that in some matters people become more expert without teachers than with them?

Socrates/ Yes, I have, Laches, but you would not want to trust them when they said they were good craftsmen unless they should have some well-executed product of their art to show you—and not just one but more than one.

Laches/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ Then what we ought to do, Laches and Nicias, since Lysimachus and Melesias called us in to give them advice about their two sons out of a desire that the boys' souls should become as good as possible—if we say we have teachers to show, is to point out to them the ones who in the first place are good themselves and have tended the souls of many young men, and in the second place have manifestly taught us. Or, if anyone of us says that he himself has had no teacher but has works of his own to tell of, then he ought to show which of the Athenians or foreigners, whether slave or

free, is recognized to have become good through his influence. But if this is not the case with any of us, we should give orders that a search be made for others and should not run the risk of ruining the sons of our friends and thus incurring the greatest reproach from their nearest relatives. Now I, Lysimachus and Melesias, am the first to say, concerning myself, that I have had no teacher in this subject. And yet I have longed after it from my youth up. But I did not have any money to give the sophists, who were the only ones who professed to be able to make a cultivated man of me, and I myself, on the other hand, am unable to discover the art even now. If Nicias or Laches had discovered it or learned it, I would not be surprised, because they are richer than I and so may have learned it from others, and also older, so they may have discovered it already. Thus they seem to me to be capable of educating a man, because they would never have given their opinions so fearlessly on the subject of pursuits which are beneficial and harmful for the young if they had not believed themselves to be sufficiently informed on the subject. In other matters I have confidence in them, but that they should differ with each other surprises me. So I make this counter-request of you, Lysimachus: just as Laches was urging you just now not to let me go but to ask me questions, so I now call on you not to let Laches go, or Nicias, but to question them, saying that Socrates denies having any knowledge of the matter or being competent to decide which of you speaks the truth, because he denies having been a discoverer of such things or having been anyone's pupil in them. So, Laches and Nicias, each of you tell us who is the cleverest person with whom you have associated in this matter of educating young men, and whether you acquired your knowledge of the art from another person or found it out for yourselves, and, if you learned it from someone, who were your respective teachers, and what other persons share the same art with them. My reason for

saying all this is that, if you are too busy because of your civic responsibilities, we can go to these men and persuade them, either by means of gifts or favors or both, to look after both our boys and yours too so that they won't put their ancestors to shame by turning out to be worthless. But if you yourselves have been the discoverers of such an art, give us an example of what other persons you have already made into fine men by your care when they were originally worthless. Because if you are about to begin educating people now for the first time, you ought to watch out in case the risk is being run, not by a guinea-pig, but by your own sons and the children of your friends, and you should keep from doing just what the proverb says not to do—to begin pottery on a wine jar. So state which of these alternatives you would select as being appropriate and fitting for you and which you would reject. Find out these things from them, Lysimachus, and don't let the men escape.

Lysimachus/ I like what Socrates has said, gentlemen. But whether you are willing to be questioned about such matters and to give account of them, you must decide for yourselves, Nicias and Laches. As far as Melesias here and I are concerned, we would certainly be pleased if the two of you were willing to give complete answers to all of Socrates' questions. Because, as I started to say right at the beginning, the reason we invited you to advise us on these matters was that we supposed that you would naturally have given some thought to such things—especially so since your sons, like ours, are very nearly of an age to be educated. So, if you have no objection, speak up and look into the subject along with Socrates, exchanging arguments with each other. Because he is right in saying that it is about the most important of our affairs that we are consulting. So decide if you think this is what ought to be done.

Nicias/ It is quite clear to me, Lysimachus, that your knowledge of Socrates is limited to your acquaintance with his

father and that you have had no contact with the man himself, except when he was a child—I suppose he may have mingled with you and your fellow demesman, following along with his father at the temple or at some other public gathering. But you are obviously still unacquainted with the man as he is now he has grown up.

Lysimachus/ What exactly do you mean, Nicias?

Nicias/ You don't appear to me to know that whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and associates with him in conversation must necessarily, even if he began by conversing about something quite different in the first place, keep on being led about by the man's arguments until he submits to answering questions about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life he has lived hitherto. And when he does submit to this questioning, you don't realize that Socrates will not let him go before he has well and truly tested every last detail. I personally am accustomed to the man and know that one has to put up with this kind of treatment from him, and further, I know perfectly well that I myself will have to submit to it. I take pleasure in the man's company, Lysimachus, and don't regard it as at all a bad thing to have it brought to our attention that we have done or are doing wrong. Rather I think that a man who does not run away from such treatment but is willing, according to the saying of Solon, to value learning as long as he lives, not supposing that old age brings him wisdom of itself, will necessarily pay more attention to the rest of his life. For me there is nothing unusual or unpleasant in being examined by Socrates, but I realized some time ago that the conversation would not be about the boys but about ourselves, if Socrates were present. As I say, I don't myself mind talking with Socrates in whatever way he likes—but find out how Laches here feels about such things.

Laches/ I have just one feeling about discussions, Nicias, or, if you like, not one but two, because to some I might seem to be a discussion-lover and to others a discussion-hater. Whenever I hear a man discussing virtue or some kind of wisdom, then, if he really is a man and worthy of the words he utters, I am completely delighted to see the appropriateness and harmony existing between the speaker and his words. And such a man seems to me to be genuinely musical, producing the most beautiful harmony, not on the lyre or some other pleasurable instrument, but actually rendering his own life harmonious by fitting his deeds to his words in a truly Dorian mode, not in the Ionian, nor even, I think, in the Phrygian or Lydian, but in the only harmony that is genuinely Greek. The discourse of such a man gladdens my heart and makes everyone think that I am a discussion-lover because of the enthusiastic way in which I welcome what is said; but the man who acts in the opposite way distresses me, and the better he speaks, the worse I feel, so that his discourse makes me look like a discussion-hater. Now I have no acquaintance with the words of Socrates, but before now, I believe, I have had experience of his deeds, and there I found him a person privileged to speak fair words and to indulge in every kind of frankness. So if he possesses this ability too, I am in sympathy with the man, and I would submit to being examined by such a person with the greatest pleasure, nor would I find learning burdensome, because I too agree with Solon, though with one reservation—I wish to grow old learning many things, but from good men only. Let Solon grant me this point, that the teacher should himself be good, so that I may not show myself a stupid pupil taking no delight in learning. Whether my teacher is to be younger than I am or not yet famous or has any other such peculiarity troubles me not at all. To you then, Socrates, I present myself as someone for you to teach and to refute in whatever manner you please,

and, on the other hand, you are welcome to any knowledge I have myself. Because this has been my opinion of your character since that day on which we shared a common danger and you gave me a sample of your valor—the sort a man must give if he is to render a good account of himself. So say whatever you like and don't let the difference in our ages concern you at all.

Socrates/ We certainly can't find fault with you for not being ready both to give advice and to join in the common search.

Lysimachus/ But the task is clearly ours, Socrates (for I count you as one of ourselves), so take my place and find out on behalf of the young men what we need to learn from these people, and then, by talking to the boys, join us in giving them advice. Because, on account of my age, I very often forget what questions I was going to ask, and I forget the answers as well. Then, if fresh arguments start up in the middle, my memory is not exactly good. So you do the talking and examine among yourselves the topics we proposed. And I will listen, and when I have heard your conversation, I will do whatever you people think best and so will Melesias here.

Socrates/ Let us do what Lysimachus and Melesias suggest, Nicias and Laches. Perhaps it won't be a bad idea to ask ourselves the sort of question which we proposed to investigate just now: what teachers have we had in this sort of instruction, and what other persons have we made better? However, I think there is another sort of inquiry that will bring us to the same point and is perhaps one that begins somewhat more nearly from the beginning. Suppose we know, about anything whatsoever, that if it is added to another thing, it makes that thing better, and furthermore, we are able to make the addition, then clearly we know the very thing about which we should be consulting as to how one might obtain it most easily and best. Perhaps you don't understand what I mean,

but will do so more easily this way: suppose we know that sight, when added to the eyes, makes better those eyes to which it is added, and furthermore, we are able to add it to the eyes, then clearly we know what this very thing sight is, about which we should be consulting as to how one might obtain it most easily and best. Because if we didn't know what sight in itself was, nor hearing, we would hardly be worthy counselors and doctors about either the eyes or the ears as to the manner in which either sight or hearing might best be obtained.

Laches/ You are right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, Laches, aren't these two now asking our advice as to the manner in which virtue might be added to the souls of their sons to make them better?

Laches/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Then isn't it necessary for us to start out knowing what virtue is? Because if we are not absolutely certain what it is, how are we going to advise anyone as to the best method of obtaining it?

Laches/ I do not think that there is any way in which we can do this, Socrates.

Socrates/ We say then, Laches, that we know what it is.

Laches/ Yes, we do say so.

Socrates/ And what we know, we must, I suppose, be able to state?

Laches/ Of course.

Socrates/ Let us not, O best of men, begin straightaway with an investigation of the whole of virtue—that would perhaps be too great a task—but let us first see if we have a sufficient knowledge of a part. Then it is likely that the investigation will be easier for us.

Laches/ Yes, let's do it the way you want, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, which one of the parts of virtue should we choose? Or isn't it obvious that we ought to take the one to which the technique of fighting in armor appears to lead? I suppose everyone would think it leads to courage, wouldn't they?

Laches/ I think they certainly would.

Socrates/ Then let us undertake first of all, Laches, to state what courage is. Then after this we will go on to investigate in what way it could be added to the young, to the extent that the addition can be made through occupations and studies. But try to state what I ask, namely, what courage is.

Laches/ Good heavens, Socrates, there is no difficulty about that: if a man is willing to remain at his post and to defend himself against the enemy without running away, then you may rest assured that he is a man of courage.

Socrates/ Well spoken, Laches. But perhaps I am to blame for not making myself clear; the result is that you did not answer the question I had in mind but a different one.

Laches/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you if I can. That man, I suppose, is courageous whom you yourself mention, that is, the man who fights the enemy while remaining at his post?

Laches/ Yes, that is my view.

Socrates/ And I agree. But what about this man, the one who fights with the enemy, not holding his ground, but in retreat?

Laches/ What did you mean, in retreat?

Socrates/ Why, I mean the way the Scythians are said to fight, as much retreating as pursuing; and then I imagine that Homer is praising the horses of Aeneas when he says they know how "to pursue and fly quickly this way and that," and

he praises Aeneas himself for his knowledge of fear and he calls him “counselor of fright.”

Laches/ And Homer is right, Socrates, because he was speaking of chariots, and it was the Scythian horsemen to which you referred. Now cavalry do fight in this fashion, but the hoplites in the manner I describe.

Socrates/ Except perhaps the Spartan hoplites, Laches. Because they say that at Plataea the Spartans, when they were up against the soldiers carrying wicker shields, were not willing to stand their ground and fight against them but ran away. Then when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned and fought, just like cavalrymen, and so won that particular battle.

Laches/ You are right.

Socrates/ So as I said just now, my poor questioning is to blame for your poor answer, because I wanted to learn from you not only what constitutes courage for a hoplite but for a horseman as well and for every sort of warrior. And I wanted to include not only those who are courageous in warfare but also those who are brave in dangers at sea, and the ones who show courage in illness and poverty and affairs of state; and then again I wanted to include not only those who are brave in the face of pain and fear but also those who are clever at fighting desire and pleasure, whether by standing their ground or running away—because there are some men, aren’t there, Laches, who are brave in matters like these?

Laches/ Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ So all these men are brave, but some possess courage in pleasures, some in pains, some in desires, and some in fears. And others, I think, show cowardice in the same respects.

Laches/ Yes, they do.

Socrates/ Then what are courage and cowardice? This is what I wanted to find out. So try again to state first what is the courage that is the same in all these cases. Or don't you yet have a clear understanding of what I mean?

Laches/ Not exactly.

Socrates/ Well, I mean something like this: suppose I asked what speed was, which we find in running and in playing the lyre and in speaking and in learning and in many other instances—in fact we may say we display the quality, so far as it is worth mentioning, in movements of the arms or legs or tongue or voice or thought? Or isn't this the way you too would express it?

Laches/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Then if anyone should ask me, "Socrates, what do you say it is which you call swiftness in all these cases," I would answer him that what I call swiftness is the power of accomplishing a great deal in a short time, whether in speech or in running or all the other cases.

Laches/ And you would be right.

Socrates/ Then make an effort yourself, Laches, to speak in the same way about courage. What power is it which, because it is the same in pleasure and in pain and in all the other cases in which we were just saying it occurred, is therefore called courage?

Laches/ Well then, I think it is a sort of endurance of the soul, if it is necessary to say what its nature is in all these cases.

Socrates/ But it is necessary, at any rate if we are to give an answer to our question. Now this is what appears to me: I think that you don't regard every kind of endurance as courage. The reason I think so is this: I am fairly sure, Laches, that you regard courage as a very fine thing.

Laches/ One of the finest, you may be sure.

Socrates/ And you would say that endurance accompanied by wisdom is a fine and noble thing?

Laches/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Suppose it is accompanied by folly? Isn't it just the opposite, harmful and injurious?

Laches/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you are going to call a thing fine which is of the injurious and harmful sort?

Laches/ No, that wouldn't be right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then you won't allow this kind of endurance to be courage, since it is not fine, whereas courage is fine.

Laches/ You are right.

Socrates/ Then, according to your view, it would be wise endurance which would be courage.

Laches/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Let us see then in what respect it is wise—is it so with respect to everything both great and small? For instance, if a man were to show endurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending it he would get more, would you call this man courageous?

Laches/ Heavens no, not I.

Socrates/ Well, suppose a man is a doctor, and his son or some other patient is ill with inflammation of the lungs and begs him for something to eat or drink, and the man doesn't give in but perseveres in refusing?

Laches/ No, this would certainly not be courage either, not at all.

Socrates/ Well, suppose a man endures in battle, and his willingness to fight is based on wise calculation because he knows that others are coming to his aid and that he will be fighting men who are fewer than those on his side, and inferior to them, and in addition his position is stronger: would you

say that this man, with his kind of wisdom and preparation, endures more courageously or a man in the opposite camp who is willing to remain and hold out?

Laches/ The one in the opposite camp, Socrates, I should say.

Socrates/ But surely the endurance of this man is more foolish than that of the other.

Laches/ You are right.

Socrates/ And you would say that the man who shows endurance in a cavalry attack and has knowledge of horsemanship is less courageous than the man who lacks this knowledge.

Laches/ Yes, I would.

Socrates/ And the one who endures with knowledge of slinging or archery or some other art is the less courageous.

Laches/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ And as many as would be willing to endure in diving down into wells without being skilled, or to endure in any other similar situation, you say are braver than those who are skilled in these things.

Laches/ Why, what else would anyone say, Socrates?

Socrates/ Nothing, if that is what he thought.

Laches/ Well, this is what I think at any rate.

Socrates/ And certainly, Laches, such people run risks and endure more foolishly than those who do a thing with art.

Laches/ They clearly do.

Socrates/ Now foolish daring and endurance was found by us to be not only disgraceful but harmful, in what we said earlier.

Laches/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But courage was agreed to be a noble thing.

Laches/ Yes, it was.

Socrates/ But now, on the contrary, we are saying that a disgraceful thing, foolish endurance, is courage.

Laches/ Yes, we seem to be.

Socrates/ And do you think we are talking sense?

Laches/ Heavens no, Socrates, I certainly don't.

Socrates/ Then I don't suppose, Laches, that according to your statement you and I are tuned to the Dorian mode, because our deeds are not harmonizing with our words. In deeds I think anyone would say that we partook of courage, but in words I don't suppose he would, if he were to listen to our present discussion.

Laches/ You are absolutely right.

Socrates/ Well then: is it good for us to be in such a state?

Laches/ Certainly not, in no way whatsoever.

Socrates/ But are you willing that we should agree with our statement to a certain extent?

Laches/ To what extent and with what statement?

Socrates/ With the one that commands us to endure. If you are willing, let us hold our ground in the search and let us endure, so that courage itself won't make fun of us for not searching for it courageously—if endurance should perhaps be courage after all.

Laches/ I am ready not to give up, Socrates, although I am not really accustomed to arguments of this kind. But an absolute desire for victory has seized me with respect to our conversation, and I am really getting annoyed at being unable to express what I think in this fashion. I still think I know what courage is, but I can't understand how it has escaped me just now so that I can't pin it down in words and say what it is.

Socrates/ Well, my friend, a good hunter ought to pursue the trail and not give up.

Laches/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Then, if you agree, let's also summon Nicias here to the hunt—he might get on much better.

Laches/ I am willing—why not?

Socrates/ Come along then, Nicias, and, if you can, rescue your friends who are storm-tossed by the argument and find themselves in trouble. You see, of course, that our affairs are in a bad way, so state what you think courage is and get us out of our difficulties as well as confirming your own view by putting it into words.

Nicias/ I have been thinking for some time that you are not defining courage in the right way, Socrates. And you are not employing the excellent observation I have heard you make before now.

Socrates/ What one was that, Nicias?

Nicias/ I have often heard you say that everyone of us is good with respect to that in which he is wise and bad in respect to that in which he is ignorant.

Socrates/ By heaven, you are right, Nicias.

Nicias/ Therefore, if a man is really courageous, it is clear that he is wise.

Socrates/ You hear that, Laches?

Laches/ I do, but I don't understand exactly what he means.

Socrates/ Well, I think I understand him, and the man seems to me to be saying that courage is some kind of wisdom.

Laches/ Why, what sort of wisdom is he talking about, Socrates?

Socrates/ Why don't you ask him?

Laches/ All right.

Socrates/ Come, Nicias, tell him what sort of wisdom courage would be according to your view. I don't suppose it is skill in flute playing.

Nicias/ Of course not.

Socrates/ And not in lyre playing either.

Nicias/ Far from it.

Socrates/ But what is this knowledge and of what?

Laches/ You are questioning him in just the right way.

Socrates/ Let him state what kind of knowledge it is.

Nicias/ What I say, Laches, is that it is the knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful in war and in every other situation.

Laches/ How strangely he talks, Socrates.

Socrates/ What do you have in mind when you say this, Laches?

Laches/ What do I have in mind? Why, I take wisdom to be quite a different thing from courage.

Socrates/ Well, Nicias, at any rate, says it isn't.

Laches/ He certainly does—that's the nonsense he talks.

Socrates/ Well, let's instruct him instead of making fun of him.

Nicias/ Very well, but it strikes me, Socrates, that Laches wants to prove that I am talking nonsense simply because he was shown to be that sort of person himself a moment ago.

Laches/ Quite so, Nicias, and I shall try to demonstrate that very thing, because you are talking nonsense. Take an immediate example: in cases of illness, aren't the doctors the ones who know what is to be feared? Or do you think the courageous are the people who know? Perhaps you call the doctors the courageous?

Nicias/ No, of course not.

Laches/ And I don't imagine you mean the farmers either, even though I do suppose they are the ones who know what is to be feared in farming. And all the other craftsmen know what is to be feared and hoped for in their particular arts. But these people are in no way courageous all the same.

Socrates/ What does Laches mean, Nicias? Because he does seem to be saying something.

Nicias/ Yes, he is saying something, but what he says is not true.

Socrates/ How so?

Nicias/ He thinks a doctor's knowledge of the sick amounts to something more than being able to describe health and disease whereas I think their knowledge is restricted to just this. Do you suppose, Laches, that when a man's recovery is more to be feared than his illness, the doctors know this? Or don't you think there are many cases in which it would be better not to get up from an illness? Tell me this: do you maintain that in all cases to live is preferable? In many cases, is it not better to die?

Laches/ Well, I agree with you on this point at least.

Nicias/ And do you suppose that the same things are to be feared by those for whom it is an advantage to die as by those for whom it is an advantage to live?

Laches/ No, I don't.

Nicias/ But do you grant this knowledge to the doctors or to any other craftsmen except the one who knows what is and what is not to be feared, who is the one I call courageous?

Socrates/ Do you understand what he is saying, Laches?

Laches/ Yes I do—he is calling the seers the courageous. Because who else will know for whom it is better to live than to die? What about you, Nicias—do you admit to being a seer, or, if you are not a seer, to not being courageous?

Nicias/ Well, what of it? Don't you, for your part, think it is appropriate for a seer to know what is to be feared and what is to be hoped?

Laches/ Yes, I do, because I don't see for what other person it would be.

Nicias/ Much more for the man I am talking about, my friend, because the seer needs to know only the signs of what is to be, whether a man will experience death or illness or loss of property, or will experience victory or defeat, in battle or in any other sort of contest. But why is it more suitable for the seer than for anyone else to judge for whom it is better to suffer or not to suffer these things?

Laches/ It isn't clear to me from this, Socrates, what he is trying to say. Because he doesn't select either the seer or the doctor or anyone else as the man he calls courageous, unless some god is the person he means. Nicias appears to me unwilling to make a gentlemanly admission that he is talking nonsense, but he twists this way and that in an attempt to cover up his difficulty. Even you and I could have executed a similar twist just now if we had wanted to avoid the appearance of contradicting ourselves. If we were making speeches in a court of law, there might be some point in doing this, but as things are, why should anyone adorn himself senselessly with empty words in a gathering like this?

Socrates/ I see no reason why he should, Laches. But let us see if Nicias thinks he is saying something and is not just talking for the sake of talking. Let us find out from him more clearly what it is he means, and if he is really saying something, we will agree with him, but if not, we will instruct him.

Laches/ You go ahead and question him, Socrates, if you want to find out. I think perhaps I have asked enough.

Socrates/ I have no objection, since the inquiry will be a joint effort on behalf of us both.

Laches/ Very well.

Socrates/ Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, because Laches and I are sharing the argument: you say that courage is knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope?

Nicias/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Then this knowledge is something possessed by very few indeed if, as you say, neither the doctor nor the seer will have it and won't be courageous without acquiring this particular knowledge. Isn't that what you're saying?

Nicias/ Just so.

Socrates/ Then, as the proverb says, it is true that this is not something "every sow would know," and she would not be courageous?

Nicias/ I don't think so.

Socrates/ Then it is obvious, Nicias, that you do not regard the Crommyon sow as having been courageous. I say this not as a joke, but because I think that anyone taking this position must necessarily deny courage to any wild beast or else admit that some wild beast, a lion or a leopard or some sort of wild boar, is wise enough to know what is so difficult that very few men understand it. And the man who defines courage as you define it would have to assert that a lion and a stag, a bull and a monkey are all equally courageous by nature.

Laches/ By heaven, you talk well, Socrates. Give us an honest answer to this, Nicias—whether you say that these wild beasts, whom we all admit to be courageous, are wiser than we in these respects, or whether you dare to oppose the general view and say that they are not courageous.

Nicias/ By no means, Laches, do I call courageous wild beasts or anything else that, for lack of understanding, does

not fear what should be feared. Rather, I would call them rash and mad. Or do you really suppose I call all children courageous, who fear nothing because they have no sense? On the contrary, I think that rashness and courage are not the same thing. My view is that very few have a share of courage and foresight, but that a great many, men and women and children and wild animals, partake in boldness and audacity and rashness and lack of foresight. These cases, which you and the man in the street call courageous, I call rash, whereas the courageous ones are the sensible people I was talking about.

Laches/ You see, Socrates, how the man decks himself out in words and does it well in his own opinion. Those whom everyone agrees to be courageous he attempts to deprive of that distinction.

Nicias/ I'm not depriving you of it, Laches, so cheer up. I declare that you are wise, and Lamachus too, so long as you are courageous, and I say the same of a great many other Athenians.

Laches/ I shan't say anything about that—though I could—in case you should call me a typical Aexonian.

Socrates/ Never mind him, Laches, I don't think you realize that he has procured this wisdom from our friend Damon, and Damon spends most of his time with Prodicus, who has the reputation of being best among the sophists at making such verbal distinctions.

Laches/ Well, Socrates, it is certainly more fitting for a sophist to make such clever distinctions than for a man the city thinks worthy to be its leader.

Socrates/ Well, I suppose it would be fitting, my good friend, for the man in charge of the greatest affairs to have the greatest share of wisdom. But I think it worthwhile to ask

Nicias what he has in mind when he defines courage in this way.

Laches/ Well then, you ask him, Socrates.

Socrates/ This is just what I intend to do, my good friend. But don't therefore suppose that I shall let you out of your share of the argument. Pay attention and join me in examining what is being said.

Laches/ Very well, if that seems necessary.

Socrates/ Yes, it does. And you, Nicias, tell me again from the beginning—you know that when we were investigating courage at the beginning of the argument, we were investigating it as a part of virtue?

Nicias/ Yes, we were.

Socrates/ And didn't you give your answer supposing that it was a part, and, as such, one among a number of other parts, all of which taken together were called virtue?

Nicias/ Yes, why not?

Socrates/ And do you also speak of the same parts that I do? In addition to courage, I call temperance and justice and everything else of this kind parts of virtue. Don't you?

Nicias/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Stop there. We are in agreement on these points, but let us investigate the grounds of fear and confidence to make sure that you don't regard them in one way and we in another. We will tell you what we think about them, and if you do not agree, you shall instruct us. We regard as fearful things those that produce fear, and as hopeful things those that do not produce fear; and fear is produced not by evils which have happened or are happening but by those which are anticipated. Because fear is the expectation of a future evil—or isn't this your opinion too, Laches?

Laches/ Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ You hear what we have to say, Nicias: that fearful things are future evils, and the ones inspiring hope are either future non-evils or future goods. Do you agree with this or have you some other view on the subject?

Nicias/ I agree with this one.

Socrates/ And you declare that knowledge of just these things is courage?

Nicias/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Let us find out if we all agree on still a third point.

Nicias/ What one is that?

Socrates/ I will explain. It seems to me and my friend here that of the various things with which knowledge is concerned, there is not one kind of knowledge by which we know how things have happened in the past, and another by which we know how they are happening at the present time, and still another by which we know how what has not yet happened might best come to be in the future, but that the knowledge is the same in each case. For instance, in the case of health, there is no other art related to the past, the present, and the future except that of medicine, which, although it is a single art, surveys what is, what was, and what is likely to be in the future. Again, in the case of the fruits of the earth, the art of farming conforms to the same pattern. And I suppose that both of you could bear witness that, in the case of the affairs of war, the art of generalship is that which best foresees the future and the other times—nor does this art consider it necessary to be ruled by the art of the seer, but to rule it, as being better acquainted with both present and future in the affairs of war.

In fact, the law decrees, not that the seer should command the general, but that the general should command the seer. Is this what we shall say, Laches?

Laches/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Well then, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the same knowledge has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?

Nicias/ Yes, that is how it seems to me, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now, my good friend, you say that courage is the knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful, isn't that so?

Nicias/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ And it was agreed that fearful and hopeful things were future goods and future evils.

Nicias/ Yes, it was.

Socrates/ And that the same knowledge is of the same things—future ones and all other kinds.

Nicias/ Yes, that is the case.

Socrates/ Then courage is not knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful only, because it understands not simply future goods and evils, but those of the present and the past and all times, just as is the case with the other kinds of knowledge.

Nicias/ So it seems, at any rate.

Socrates/ Then you have told us about what amounts to a third part of courage, Nicias, whereas we asked you what the whole of courage was. And now it appears, according to your view, that courage is the knowledge not just of the fearful and the hopeful, but in your own opinion, it would be the knowledge of practically all goods and evils put together. Do you agree to this new change, Nicias, or what do you say?

Nicias/ That seems right to me, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then does a man with this kind of knowledge seem to depart from virtue in any respect if he really knows, in the case of all goods whatsoever, what they are and will be and have been, and similarly in the case of evils? And do you regard that man as lacking in temperance or justice and

holiness to whom alone belongs the ability to deal circumspectly with both gods and men with respect to both the fearful and its opposite, and to provide himself with good things through his knowledge of how to associate with them correctly?

Nicias/ I think you have a point, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then the thing you are now talking about, Nicias, would not be a part of virtue but rather virtue entire.

Nicias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And we have certainly stated that courage is one of the parts of virtue.

Nicias/ Yes, we have.

Socrates/ Then what we are saying now does not appear to hold good.

Nicias/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Then we have not discovered, Nicias, what courage is.

Nicias/ We don't appear to.

Laches/ But I, my dear Nicias, felt sure you would make the discovery after you were so scornful of me while I was answering Socrates. In fact, I had great hopes that with the help of Damon's wisdom you would solve the whole problem.

Nicias/ That's a fine attitude of yours, Laches, to think it no longer to be of any importance that you yourself were just now shown to be a person who knows nothing about courage. What interests you is whether I will turn out to be a person of the same kind. Apparently it will make no difference to you to be ignorant of those things which a man of any pretensions ought to know, so long as you include me in your ignorance. Well, you seem to me to be acting in a thoroughly human fashion by noticing everybody except yourself. As far as I am concerned I think enough has been said on the topic for the

present, and if any point has not been covered sufficiently, then later on I think we can correct it both with the help of Damon—whom you think it right to laugh at, though you have never seen the man—and with that of others. And when I feel secure on these points, I will instruct you too and won't begrudge the effort—because you seem to me to be sadly in need of learning.

Laches/ You are a clever man, Nicias, I know. All the same, I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to say good-bye to you and me as teachers of the young men and to retain the services of this man Socrates, as I said in the beginning. If my boys were the same age, this is what I would do.

Nicias/ And I agree: if Socrates is really willing to undertake the supervision of the boys, then don't look for anyone else. In fact I would gladly entrust Niceratus to him, if he is willing. But whenever I bring up the subject in any way, he always recommends other people to me but is unwilling to take on the job himself. But see if Socrates might be more willing to listen to you, Lysimachus.

Lysimachus/ Well, he should, Nicias, since I myself would be willing to do a great many things for him which I would not be willing to do for practically anyone else. What do you say, Socrates? Will you comply with our request and take an active part with us in helping the young men to become as good as possible?

Socrates/ Well, it would be a terrible thing, Lysimachus, to be unwilling to join in assisting any man to become as good as possible. If in the conversations we have just had I had seemed to be knowing and the other two had not, then it would be right to issue a special invitation to me to perform this task; but as the matter stands, we were all in the same difficulty. Why then should anybody choose one of us in preference to another? What I think is that he ought to choose

none of us. But as things are, see whether the suggestion I am about to make may not be a good one: what I say we ought to do, my friends—since this is just between ourselves—is to join in searching for the best possible teacher, first for ourselves—we really need one—and then for the young men, sparing neither money nor anything else. What I don't advise is that we remain as we are. And if anyone laughs at us because we think it worthwhile to spend our time in school at our age, then I think we should confront him with the saying of Homer, "Modesty is not a good mate for a needy man." And, not paying any attention to what anyone may say, let us join together in looking after both our own interests and those of the boys.

Lysimachus/ I like what you say, Socrates, and the fact that I am the oldest makes me the most eager to go to school along with the boys. Just do this for me: come to my house early tomorrow—don't refuse—so that we may make plans about these matters, but let us make an end of our present conversation.

Socrates/ I shall do what you say, Lysimachus, and come to you tomorrow, God willing.

The Laches.

Translated by Taylor, Thomas.

Persons of the Dialog

Lysimachus, Nicias, Melesias, Laches,

The Sons of Lysimachus and Melesias, and Socrates.

Lysimachus/ You have seen, O Nicias and Laches, this man fighting in armor: and indeed we did not then tell you on what account I and Melesias here called you to see him; but now we will tell you; for we think it is proper to speak freely to you. There are, indeed, some who laugh at things of this kind; and if anyone consults them, they will not tell you what they think; but conjecturing the thing about which their advice is asked, they speak contrary to their own opinion. Thinking, however, that you are sufficiently qualified to know, and that knowing you will in short say what you think, we have made you our associates in the subject of our deliberation. The thing, therefore, about which I have for a long time prefaced so much is this: —These are our sons. That youth, the son of Melesias, is called Thucydides, by his grandfather's name; and this which is mine, is called Aristides, after my father. It has appeared therefore to us, that we should pay all the attention to them in our power, and that we should not act in the same manner as many do, who, when their children become lads, suffer them to do as they please, but we now begin to take all the care of them we are able. Seeing, therefore, that you also have children, we thought that you especially must have considered how they may be educated so as to become the best of men. If, however, you have not frequently paid much attention to this thing, we now remind you that it is not proper to be negligent of it, and we call upon you to

deliberate, in common with us, concerning the education of children. But whence we have been led to think in this manner, O Nicias and Laches, it is proper you should hear, though the narration may be somewhat prolix.

I and Melesias, here, have but one table, and these lads eat with us. As I told you therefore at first, we shall speak freely to you. For both of us are able to relate to the youths many beautiful deeds of our fathers, both in war and peace, during the time that they managed the affairs of their allies and of the city; but we cannot relate to them any deeds of our own. This covers us with shame, and we accuse our fathers for suffering us to live delicately when we became lads, while they in the meantime were busily employed about the affairs of others. These very things we point out to these youths, telling them that if they neglect themselves, and are not persuaded by us, they will become ignoble; but that, if they pay attention to themselves, they may quickly become worthy of the name which they bear. They therefore say that they will obey us; but we consider what that is through which they by learning or studying may become the best of men. Hence, a certain person recommended to us, that the young men should learn to fight in armor, and said that this was a beautiful discipline. He also praised him, whom you have just now beheld exhibiting, and advised us likewise to see him. It appeared to us, therefore, proper to come and take you along with us, that you might not only be spectators together with us, but might also assist us with your advice, if you were willing, concerning the attention which should be paid to children. These are the things which we wish to consider in common with you. It is now, therefore, your part to consult about this discipline, whether it appears proper to learn it or not; and with respect to other things, whether you have any discipline or study for the youths worthy of

praise; and in short to tell us, what mode of conduct you intend to adopt for your own children.

Nicias/ I indeed, O Lysimachus and Melesias, praise your conception, and am prepared to join with you in this deliberation, and I think that Laches here is prepared for the same purpose also.

Laches/ You think with truth, O Nicias. And what Lysimachus just now said about his father, and the father of Melesias, appears to me to have been very well said, both against: them and us, and all such as engage in political affairs: for those things nearly happen to them which he said, both with respect to children and other domestic concerns, viz. that they are neglected and despised by them. These things, therefore, O Lysimachus, you have well said. But I am surprised that you should call us to join with you in consulting about the education of youth, and should not call Socrates here: for, in the first place, he is our fellow-citizen; and in the next place, he is always busily employed in considering that which is the object of your investigation, viz. what discipline or pursuit is proper for youth.

Lysimachus/ How do you say, O Laches? Does Socrates here pay attention to anything of this kind?

Laches/ Entirely so, Lysimachus.

Nicias/ I also can assert this with no less confidence than Laches. For he lately introduced as a stranger to me, for the sake of instructing my son in music, Damon the disciple of Agathocles, a man most acceptable not only for his skill in music, but also for other things which qualify a man to associate with such youths as these.

Lysimachus/ Indeed, O Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, I, and such as are my equals in age, have no longer any acquaintance with younger persons, because we for the most part keep within doors on account of our age. But, O son of

Sophroniscus, if you have anything to advise for the good of this your fellow-citizen, it is proper that you should communicate it: For it is just that you should; since you are a paternal friend to us; for I and your father were always associates and friends; and our friendship lasted till his death without interruption. At present I have some recollection of the name of Socrates: for these lads, when discoursing with each other at home, frequently make mention of Socrates, and very much praise him; but I never have yet asked them whether they spoke of Socrates the son of Sophroniscus. Tell me, however, O boys, whether this is that Socrates of whom you so often make mention?

Sons/ Yes, O Father, it is the same.

Lysimachus/ It is well, by Hera, Socrates, that you do credit to your father, who was the best of men; and henceforward your interests shall be mine, and mine yours.

Laches/ And, indeed, O Lysimachus, you must not let this man go: for I have elsewhere seen him, not only doing credit to his father, but also to his country. For, at the defeat at Delium, he retired along with me; and I can assure you, that if the rest had conducted themselves as he did, our city would have stood firm, and would not then have suffered such a ruin.

Lysimachus/ O Socrates, this indeed is a beautiful praise, which is now given to you by men who are worthy to be believed, and who deserve to be celebrated for the same things for which they praise you. Be well assured, therefore, that I, hearing these things, rejoice that you are renowned; and think that I am among the number of those who are most benevolently disposed towards you. Hence it is requisite that you should first come to us, and believe that we are your familiars as it is just you should. Now, therefore, from this very day, since we have recognized each other, you

should not do otherwise but be familiar with us and these youths, that mutual friendship may be preserved between us, Do you therefore do these things, and we will again recall them to your memory. But with respect to the things which we began to inquire into, what do you say? Does it appear to you that this discipline is adapted to lads, or not; I mean the learning to fight in amour?

Socrates/ Concerning these things, O Lysimachus, I will endeavor to give you what advice I am able; and again, to do all that you request. It appears indeed to me to be most just, that I being the younger, and less experienced in these things, should first hear what these persons say, and learn from them. And if I should have anything to say different from their opinion, then I will declare my sentiments, and endeavor to persuade you and them of their truth, But, O Nicias, why do not you speak the first?

Nicias/ Nothing hinders, Socrates; for it appears to me that the knowledge of this discipline is very generally useful to youth. For it is well not to be busily employed about those things with which young men love to be conversant when they are at leisure, but to engage in this whence the body necessarily acquires a better condition. For it is not inferior to any of the exercises, nor has it less labor; and at the same time this exercise and equestrian skill are especially proper for a liberal man. Indeed, in the contest in which we are athletæ, and in those exercises in which a contest is proposed to us, those alone contend who are exercised in these warlike instruments. In the next place, this discipline is of advantage in battle itself, when it is necessary to fight in rank with many others. But it is most beneficial when the ranks are broken, and when it is necessary, in single combat, either to pursue one resisting, or in flight to repel one attacking. For he who is skilled in this art, will not be vanquished by one, nor perhaps by many enemies, but will

everywhere through this be superior to his opponent. Further still, a thing of this kind incites a desire of another beautiful discipline. For everyone who has learnt to fight in armor, will also desire the discipline consequent to this, viz. that concerning the ranks of an army; and having received these disciplines, and being ambitious of excelling in them, he will be impelled to everything which concerns the command of an army. And this being the case, it is evident that he will apply himself to those beautiful disciplines and studies consequent to these, which it is well worthwhile for a man to learn and study, and of which this discipline is the leader. We may also add to it this, which is no trifling addition, that this science will make every man in no small degree more daring and brave in battle than he was before. Nor is this also to be passed over in silence (though it may appear to be very trifling), that it gives a man a graceful carriage, in those places where it is proper he should appear to possess it; and where also through this gracefulness of carriage he will at the same time appear more terrible to his enemies. To me therefore, O Lysimachus, as I have said, it appears to be necessary to teach young men these things, and for the reasons which I have assigned. But I shall be glad to hear if Laches has anything to say in opposition to what I have advanced.

Laches/ But it is difficult, O Nicias, to say with respect to any discipline, that it is not proper to learn it: For it appears to be good to know all things. And indeed, as to this art respecting arms, if it is a discipline, (as those say it is who teach it, and if it is such as Nicias asserts it to be,) it is necessary to learn it; but if it is not a discipline, and those deceive us who promise to teach it us as such, or if being a discipline, it is not of much worth, why is it necessary to learn it? But I say these things concerning it, looking to this circumstance, viz. that if it were of any value, I think it would

not have been concealed from the Lacedæmonians, who are concerned for nothing else in life than to seek and study that by which they may surpass others in war. And if this art were concealed from them, yet it could not be concealed from the teachers of it, that the Lacedæmonians, the most of all the Greeks, pay attention to things of this kind, and that he who is renowned for these things, will accumulate much wealth both from them and from others, just as a tragic poet when he is renowned among us. For indeed, he who thinks that he can compose excellent tragedies, does not, wandering out of Attica, make the circuit of other cities, in order to attract notice, but immediately comes hither, and very properly exhibits himself to our citizens. But I see that those who fight in armor consider Lacedæmon as an inaccessible temple, and do not enter into it even on tiptoe, but they wander round it, and rather exhibit themselves to others, and especially to those who acknowledge themselves to be inferior to many others in warlike concerns. In the next place, O Lysimachus, I have been present with not a few of these men in the work itself, and I have seen what kind of men they are. But we may form a judgment of them from this circumstance, that no man who has applied himself to armorial concerns has ever become illustrious in war; though in all other things men have been celebrated for their skill in their respective professions. But these men, as it seems, are particularly unfortunate in this respect beyond others. For this very same Stesileus, whom you beheld together with me exhibiting himself in so great a crowd, I have seen truly displaying himself elsewhere, in a far better manner, though unwillingly. For when the ship he was in attacked a merchantman, he fought with a spear headed with a scythe that his arms might be as different as himself was from the rest of the combatants. Other particulars therefore respecting the man do not deserve to be related;

but the success of this stratagem of heading a spear with a scythe must not be passed over in silence: for while he was fighting, his scythe became entangled in the tackling of the enemy's ship; Stesileus therefore pulled in order to disengage it, but was not able to effect his purpose; and the one ship passed by the other. In the meantime he followed the course of the ship holding his spear. But when the enemy's ship steered off, and was drawing him in, as he was still holding his spear, he suffered it to slip through his hands, till he had only hold of it by the small end. The crew of the merchantman laughed and shouted at this circumstance of his being drawn by his spear, and at the figure which he made. At length some. one having thrown a stone that fell just at his feet, on one of the rowers' seats, he quitted his spear. Then, indeed, those that were in the three-banked galley were no longer able to restrain their laughter on seeing that spear headed with a scythe hanging from the ship. Perhaps therefore, this art may be of some use, as Nicias says; such however are the particulars of which I was a spectator. Hence, as I said at first, if it be a discipline, it possesses but little utility; and if it be not, but they dissemble who say it is, it is not worthwhile to endeavor to learn it. For it appears to me, that if any coward should think he ought to learn this art, acquiring confidence through it, his cowardice would become more apparent; but that if a brave man should learn it, in consequence of being observed by everyone, if he erred but in a small degree he must, endure great calumnies, For the profession of this science is attended with envy; so that unless he surpasses others in virtue in a wonderful degree, he who acknowledges that he possesses this science cannot avoid becoming ridiculous. Such, O Lysimachus, does the pursuit of this discipline appear to me. But it is requisite, as I said at first, not to

dismiss this Socrates, but to request him to give his opinion on this subject.

Lysimachus/ But I indeed request, O Socrates, that you will do so: For it appears to me that we want an umpire to decide the difference. Had these indeed agreed in opinion, a thing of this kind would have been less necessary. But now (for you see that Laches dissents from Nicias) it will be well to hear from you to which of the men you give your suffrage.

Socrates/ But what, O Lysimachus? If many praise us, will you make use of them?

Lysimachus/ What else can anyone do, O Socrates?

Socrates/ And will you also, O Melesias, act in this manner? And if it were necessary for you to consult about exercise for your son, would you rather be persuaded by the many, than by one who had learned under a skillful master, and who had exercised himself?

Melesias/ It is fit, Socrates, I should be persuaded by the latter.

Socrates/ You would rather, therefore, be persuaded by him than, by us four?

Melesias/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ For it is necessary, I think, to judge by science, and not by multitude, if a man intends to judge well.

Melesias/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Now, therefore, it is necessary to consider this very thing in the first place, viz. whether anyone of us is an artist, in the thing about which we consult, or not. And if any of us is, we should be persuaded by him, being one, dismissing the rest. But if no one of us is an artist in this particular, we must seek after some other person. Or, do you and Lysimachus think, that this is an affair of small consequence, and that it is not concerning that which is the

greatest of all your possessions? For the government of the whole paternal house will be according as the children are worthy, or the contrary.

Melesias/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ It is necessary, therefore, to pay much attention to this subject.

Melesias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ How then should we consider that which I just now mentioned, if we wished to find which of us is most expert in contest? Should we not consult him who had learned and studied this art of contending, and who had been instructed in it by good masters?

Melesias/ To me it appears that we should.

Socrates/ Should we not, therefore, prior to this, consider what this thing is in which we seek for masters?

Melesias/ How do you say?

Socrates/ Thus, perhaps, what I say will be more manifest. It does not appear to me, to have been acknowledged by us at first what that is about which we consult and speculate, in order to know which of us is most skilled in it, and has had masters for the sake of this, and which of us is not.

Nicias/ Did we not, O Socrates, consider about fighting in armor, whether it was proper lads should learn it or not?

Socrates/ Entirely so, O Nicias: but when anyone considers about a remedy for the eyes, whether it is proper to apply it or not, whether do you think the consultation should then be about the remedy, or about the eyes?

Nicias/ About the eyes.

Socrates/ Hence also, when anyone considers about a bridle for a horse, whether it should be used or not, and

when it should be used, he will then consult about the horse, and not about the bridle.

Nicias/ True.

Socrates/ In one word, therefore, when anyone considers a certain thing for the sake of something, his consultation will be about that thing for the sake of which he speculates, and not about that which he seeks for the sake of something else.

Nicias/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether the person whose advice we ask is skilled in that thing for the sake of which we engage in the present inquiry.

Melesias/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do we not therefore say, that we now inquire concerning discipline for the sake of the soul of youth?

Nicias/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, anyone of us is skilled in the art of taking care of the soul, and is able to accomplish this employment well, and has had good masters in this art himself, must be considered.

Laches/ But what, O Socrates, have you never yet seen some persons become more skillful in a certain thing without than with masters?

Socrates/ I have, O. Laches; whom, however, you would not be willing to believe, if they said that they were good artists, unless they could show you some excellent production of their art, and not only one but many.

Nicias/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ It is necessary, therefore, O Laches and Nicias, since Lysimachus and Melesias have called upon us to consult with them concerning their sons, in consequence of being anxious that their souls may become most excellent,

—I say, it is necessary that we, if we acknowledge that we have had masters, should show who they were, they in the first place being good masters, and having cultivated the souls of many youths; and in the next place, who shall appear to have also instructed us. Or, if anyone of us shall say that he has had no master, he ought to be able to speak of the works which he has performed, and to show what Athenians or foreigners, what slaves or freemen, have acknowledged themselves to have been benefited by him. But if we can do neither of these, we must order them to seek for advice from others, and not subject ourselves to the danger of corrupting the sons of other men, and thus be exposed to the greatest reproach from those with whom we are most familiar. I therefore, O Lysimachus and Melesias, in the first place, say concerning myself, that I have had no preceptor of this thing, though my desire has always tended to it from my youth. But I am not able to give a reward to the sophists, who alone profess themselves to be capable of making me a worthy man; and even now I am unable to discover this art myself. If, however, Nicias or Laches shall have either discovered or learned it, I shall not wonder: for they are richer than I am, so that they might learn it from others; and they are at the same time older, so that they may now have discovered it. But they appear to me to be able to instruct a man: for they never would so intrepidly have decided concerning worthy and base pursuits, unless they had believed that they had a sufficient knowledge of them. I believe them, therefore, as to other things; but I wonder that they differ from each other. Hence, as Laches just now ordered that you should not dismiss but interrogate me; in like manner I now call upon you not to dismiss Laches and Nicias, but to interrogate them; at the same time telling them, that Socrates says he has no knowledge of the thing, and is not qualified to judge which of you speaks the truth;

for he is neither the inventor nor the disciple of anyone about things of this kind. But do you, O Laches and Nicias, tell us what man you have met with most skilled in the education of youth; and whether you know these things in consequence of having learnt them from someone, or from having discovered them yourselves. And, if you have learnt them, tell us who was your master, and who those are that are similar artists; that if the affairs of the city should not afford you leisure sufficient to attend to us, we may go to those masters, and may persuade them, either by gifts or caresses, or both, to take care of our children and yours, that they may not, through becoming depraved characters, be a disgrace to their ancestors. But if you yourselves discovered this art, give us instances of those who by your care have, from being depraved, become worthy characters. For if you now begin to give instruction for the first time, it is requisite to consider that you will be exposed to the danger, not of making trial in Car, but upon your sons, and the sons of your friends, and, in short, according to the proverb, that you will teach a potter in a tub. Tell us, then, what you can do, and what not. Inquire these things of them, O Lysimachus, and do not dismiss the men till they have answered.

Lysimachus/ Socrates, my friends, appears to me to speak well; wherefore, O Nicias and Laches, consider whether it will be agreeable to you to be interrogated about, and reply to such like particulars. For to me and Melesias here, it will certainly be very agreeable, if you are willing to discuss all that Socrates may ask. For I said from the first, that we called upon you for advice, because we thought that you would pay attention to these things in a becoming manner, and because your sons, as well as ours, are now nearly arrived at that age in which they ought to be instructed. If, therefore, it makes no difference to you, speak,

and consider the affair in common with Socrates, giving and receiving arguments from each other: for this was well said by him, that we are now consulting about the most important of our concerns. See, therefore, whether it appears to you that this ought to be done.

Nicias/ O Lysimachus, you seem to me to know Socrates only from his father, and not to have associated with him; unless, perhaps, when he was a boy, you may have met with him in public assemblies following his father, or in a temple, or some other convention of the people; but it is evident that you never had any correspondence with him since he came to be a man.

Lysimachus/ Why do you say this, O Nicias?

Nicias/ You seem to me not to know that whoever draws near to Socrates by discourse, as if by family alliance, and converses with him, although he may begin to discourse about something else, will not cease to be led about by his arguments, till he falls on the necessity of giving an account of his present mode of life, and the manner in which his past life has been spent. And when he has fallen on this necessity, Socrates will not dismiss him till he has well and properly examined all these particulars. But I am accustomed to his manner, and I know that it is necessary to suffer these things from him; and I also well know that I must suffer them now: for I rejoice, O Lysimachus, to draw near to the man; and I think it is no bad thing to be reminded that we have acted or shall act in an improper manner. But, indeed, he who is not averse to this must necessarily be more cautious in future, being willing and thinking it worthwhile, according to the saying of Solon, to learn as long as he lives, and not expecting that age, when it comes, will bring intellect along with it. To me, therefore, it is neither unusual nor unpleasant to be examined by Socrates; but, indeed, I have nearly for some time perceived that our discourse, as

Socrates is present, would not be about the lads, but about ourselves. As I said, therefore, as to myself nothing hinders me from discoursing with Socrates in whatever manner he pleases. But see how Laches here is disposed about a thing of this kind.

Laches/ The manner in which I am affected, O Nicias, with respect to discourse, is simple, or, if you will, is not simple, but double; for to someone I may appear to be a philologist, and not a misologist. For when I hear a man discoursing concerning virtue, or concerning a certain wisdom, he being one who is truly a man, and worthy of the arguments which he uses, I rejoice transcendently, contemplating at the same time him who speaks and what is said, how they fit and harmonize with each other. And, indeed, such a man appears to me to be a musician, and one who produces the most beautiful harmony; not that he is harmonized according to the melody of the lyre, or instruments of sport; but in reality he attunes his life. Such a one too lives in concord with himself both in words and deeds, not indeed according to the Ionic, or Phrygian, or Lydian harmony, but according to the Dorian, which is alone the Grecian harmony. Such a man, therefore, when he speaks, causes me to rejoice, and to seem to be a lover of words, with such avidity do I receive what he says. But he who acts in a manner contrary to this man pains me, and by how much the better he appears to speak, by so much the more does he make me seem to be a hater of words. I have not yet, indeed, had any experience of the words of Socrates; but of his works, as it seems, I formerly have; and there I found him a man worthy of beautiful assertions and of all liberty of speech. If, therefore, he is such a man, I will consult him, and most willingly shall I be interrogated by, and not be averse to learn from him. I also assent to the saying of Solon, with the addition only of one thing: for I wish

to learn as I grow old, but from the worthy alone. Let this then be granted to me that he is a worthy preceptor, lest while I learn unpleasantly, I should appear to be indocile. For it is with me a thing of no consequence, if he who teaches me should be younger than I am, or should not yet be renowned, and the like. I announce to you, therefore, O Socrates, that you may confute and teach me whatever you please: for I am favorably disposed towards you from that day, in which you was my companion in danger, and in which you gave such a specimen of your virtue, as it became a just man to give. Say therefore whatever you please, and pay no attention to our age.

Socrates/ We cannot then accuse you, as it seems, that you are not ready jointly to consult and investigate with us.

Lysimachus/ This is our business, Socrates; for I regard you as one of us. Consider, therefore, instead of me, for the sake of the youths, what we ought to inquire of them, and consult by conversing with them. For I have forgotten many things, through my age, which I had intended to ask them; and again, I do not very well remember what I hear, if any other conversation intervenes. Do you therefore speak about, and discuss among yourselves, the things which we have proposed to be investigated; and when I have heard what you have to say, I will do, together with Melesias here, whatever shall appear to you proper to be done.

Socrates/ O Nicias and Laches, we must obey Lysimachus and Melesias. The things then which we just now endeavored to consider, viz. who were our masters in a discipline of this kind, or what other persons we had made better, it will not perhaps be improper to investigate among ourselves. But I think that such a consideration as this tends to the same thing; or nearly it will be something which rather flows as from a principle. For if we have a scientific knowledge of anything, which when communicated to

another renders him better, and if we are also able to communicate it to another, it is evident that we know the thing itself, and also how it may be acquired in the easiest and best manner. Perhaps you do not understand what I say, but thus you will easily comprehend my meaning. If we know that sight, when present to the eyes, makes those eyes to which it is present better, and if besides this we have the power of making it present to the eyes, it is evident that we know what the sight is, and can inform him who consults us for this purpose how it may be acquired in the easiest and best manner. For if we have no knowledge of this very thing, what the sight is, or what the hearing is, we cannot be counselors or physicians worthy of any regard, either about the eyes or the ears, with respect to the manner in which either the hearing or the sight may be most beautifully obtained.

Lysimachus/ You speak the truth, O Socrates.

Socrates/ Do not therefore these persons, O Laches, now call upon us to consult with them after what manner virtue, being present to the souls of their sons, may render them better?

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, essentially necessary to know this, what virtue is? For if we are entirely ignorant what virtue is, how can we become advisers to anyone, so as that he may be able to acquire it in the most beautiful manner?

Laches/ By no means can we, as it appears to me, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we say then, O Laches, that we know what virtue is?

Laches/ We shall certainly say so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, we know, cannot we also tell what it is?

Laches/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ We will not, therefore, O best of men, immediately speculate concerning the whole of virtue (for that perhaps would be a very laborious work); but let us first see with respect to a certain part of it, if we are sufficiently able to know it, and thus, as it is probable, the speculation will be easy to us.

Laches/ Let us do so, Socrates, since it is agreeable to you.

Socrates/ Which of the parts of virtue then shall we select? Is it not evident that it must be this, to which the discipline of arms appears to tend? But it appears to the many to tend to fortitude. Or does it not?

Laches/ And very much does it appear so.

Socrates/ In the first place, therefore, O Laches, let us endeavor to say what fortitude is; and in the next place let us after this consider how it may be acquired by youth, so far as it is possible for it to be acquired by studies and disciplines. But endeavor to say what fortitude is.

Laches/ By Zeus, Socrates, it is not difficult to say what it is. For if anyone is willing, keeping in his rank, to oppose the enemy, and does not fly, I well know that he will be a brave man.

Socrates/ You speak well, O Laches; but perhaps I, from not speaking clearly, am the cause of my perceiving that you do not answer that which I asked, but something else.

Laches/ Why do you say this, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you, if I am able. A brave man, as you say, is one who, keeping in his rank, fights the enemy.

Laches/ So I say.

Socrates/ And I also. But is not he likewise a brave man, who flying and nor keeping in his rank fights the enemy?

Laches/ How flying?

Socrates/ Just as the Scythians are said to fight no less flying than pursuing. And Homer, praising the horses of Æneas, says.

Swiftly they everywhere pursue and fly.

And for this very thing he praises Æneas himself, viz. for his being skilled: in flying, and says, that he was expert in retreating.

Laches/ And very properly, Socrates: for he there speaks concerning chariots; but you speak concerning the horse of the Scythians. For their cavalry fight in this manner; but the infantry of Greece fight as I said.

Socrates/ Except perhaps the Lacedæmonians, O Laches. For they say that the Lacedæmonians, in the battle of Platæa, when they were engaged with the Gerrophori, were not willing to fight standing their ground against them, but fled; but that after the ranks of the Persians were broken, they rallied and fought like cavalry, and thus became conquerors in that battle.

Laches/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ On this account, therefore, I said that I was the cause that you did not answer well, because I did not interrogate you well. For I wished to ask you not only concerning those who are brave in the infantry, but also concerning those who are brave in the cavalry, and in all the forms of war; and not only concerning those that are brave in battle, but also concerning those that are brave in dangers on the sea, —in diseases, —in poverty, —and in political affairs: and again, not only concerning those who are brave in pains or fears, but also concerning those who are powerful in contending against desires or pleasures, both by standing

their attacks, or retreating from them: for some men, O Laches, are also brave in things of this kind.

Laches/ And very much so, O Socrates.

Socrates/ All those, therefore, are brave; but some of them possess fortitude; in pleasures, others in pains, others in desires, and others in fears; and: Others, I think, possess timidity in these very same things.

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ What then each of these is, this is the thing which I ask. Again, therefore, endeavor to tell me, in the first place, what fortitude is which is the same in all these. Or do you not yet understand what I say?

Laches/ Not very much.

Socrates/ But I say, just as if I should ask what swiftness is, which is present with us in running, in playing on the harp, in speaking, in learning, and in many other things. For we nearly possess it in such things as the following, which it is worthwhile to mention, viz. either in the actions of the hands or feet, or mouth and voice, or in those of the dianoëtic part. Or do not you also say so?

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, anyone should ask me, O Socrates, What do you call this thing which you denominate swiftness in all things? I should say to him, that I call that power swiftness which accomplishes many things in a short time, about the voice, and about the course, and about all other things.

Laches/ And you would say rightly.

Socrates/ Do you also endeavor, O Laches, thus to desire fortitude, and tell us what that power is which is the same in pleasure and in pain, and in all the above-mentioned cases, and which in all these is called fortitude.

Laches/ It appears, therefore, to me to be a certain endurance of the soul, if it is necessary to speak of that which accords with fortitude in all things.

Socrates/ But this indeed is necessary, if we are to reply to the question that was asked us. This therefore appears to me, that you do not consider every kind of endurance to be fortitude. But I infer this from hence: for I nearly know, O Laches, that you think fortitude to be among the number of things which are very beautiful.

Laches/ I do indeed, and I also think that it ranks among things the most beautiful.

Socrates/ Is not, therefore, that endurance which subsists in conjunction with prudence beautiful and good?

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what of that endurance which subsists with folly? Is it not on the contrary bad and pernicious?

Laches/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you then say that a thing of this kind is beautiful, though it is bad and pernicious?

Laches/ This would not be just, O Socrates.

Socrates/ You do not, therefore, acknowledge such an endurance as this to be fortitude, since it is not beautiful; but fortitude is beautiful.

Laches/ That is true.

Socrates/ Prudent endurance, therefore, according to your assertion, will be fortitude.

Laches/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Let us see then in what this endurance is prudent; or whether it is prudent in all things both great and small. Thus, for instance, if someone endures to spend his money prudently, knowing that he shall be enriched by thus spending it, would you call him a brave man?

Laches/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ And if someone, being a physician, had a son or some other patient ill with an inflammation in his breast, and this patient should request him to give him something to eat or drink, but the physician should inflexibly persist in denying his request, would you call this endurance fortitude?

Laches/ I should not.

Socrates/ But in war; here is a man of endurance who is willing to fight; and he prudently reasons with himself, that others will give him assistance, and that he fights against those who are fewer and more despicable than those of his own party, and still further that he has the advantage of the ground: will you say that this man, enduring with such like prudence and advantage, is braver than him in the contrary army who is willing to stand his ground and endure?

Laches/ The man in the contrary army, O Socrates, appears to me to be the braver.

Socrates/ And yet the endurance of the one is more imprudent than that of the other.

Laches/ That is true.

Socrates/ Will you, therefore, say that a man who endures in an equestrian contest with equestrian science, is less brave than him who endures without science?

Laches/ To me it appears that he is.

Socrates/ And will you also say the same of a slinger, or an archer, or of any other who endures in any other art?

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And with respect to such as are willing to descend into a well, and there to endure swimming in it, though they are not skilled in this employment, or in

anything else of this kind, —will you say that such men are braver than those that are skilled in these things?

Laches/ What else can one say, O Socrates?

Socrates/ Nothing, if he thinks so.

Laches/ But I, indeed, do think so.

Socrates/ And yet, O Laches, such men encounter danger, and endure more imprudently than those who do this in conjunction with art.

Laches/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Did not, therefore, base and imprudent boldness and endurance appear to us to be noxious in our former conclusions?

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But fortitude was acknowledged by us to be something beautiful.

Laches/ It was acknowledged.

Socrates/ But now again we say that that base and imprudent endurance is fortitude.

Laches/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Do we therefore appear to you to speak well?

Laches/ By Zeus, Socrates, to me we do not.

Socrates/ In your own language, therefore, O Laches, you and I are not Dorically harmonized: for our works do not accord with our words. For someone, as it seems, may say that we participate of fortitude in our deeds; but not, as I think, in our words, if he should hear us now discoursing.

Laches/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ What then? Does it appear to you to be beautiful that we should be in this condition?

Laches/ By no means.

Socrates/ Are you willing, therefore, that we should yield our assent to what we said?

Laches/ To what assertion of ours do you allude?

Socrates/ To that which ordered us to endure. If you are willing, therefore, let us persevere in our inquiry, and endure, lest fortitude itself should deride us for not bravely investigating what it is; if, indeed, endurance itself is often fortitude.

Laches/ I, indeed, O Socrates, am ready to stand my ground, though I am unaccustomed to such like conferences. But a certain pertinacity instigates me against what has been said, and I am in reality indignant that I am so incapable of telling my conceptions. For I seem to myself to know what fortitude is; but I know not how it just now fled from me, so that I cannot comprehend in words and say what it is.

Socrates/ But a good huntsman, my friend, ought to run after the beast he hunts, and not remit his pursuit.

Laches/ By all means he ought.

Socrates/ Are you willing, therefore, that we call Nicias also to this hunting, that we may try if he is in any respect more sagacious than us?

Laches/ I am willing: for why should I not?

Socrates/ Come then, O Nicias, gratify your friends, and assist them in their doubts in this conference, if you possess any power; for you see how we are embarrassed. Do you, therefore, tell us what you think fortitude is, free us from this doubt, and confirm by argument what you conceive it to be.

Nicias/ You have appeared to me, for some time past, Socrates, not to have well defined fortitude; for you make no use of that which I have heard you so well assert.

Socrates/ What is that, O Nicias?

Nicias/ I have often heard you assert that everyone of us is good with respect to those things in which he is wise, but bad with respect to those of which he is ignorant.

Socrates/ By Zeus, what you say is true, O Nicias.

Nicias/ If, therefore, a brave is a good man, he is clearly a wise man.

Socrates/ Do you hear, O Laches?

Laches/ I do, but I do not very much understand what he says.

Socrates/ But I seem to understand him, and he appears to me to call fortitude a certain wisdom.

Laches/ What kind of wisdom, O Socrates?

Socrates/ Will you not therefore inquire this of him?

Laches/ I will.

Socrates/ Come then, O Nicias, tell him what kind of wisdom fortitude will be according to you: For it is not that which belongs to the pipe.

Nicias/ By no means.

Socrates/ Nor yet that which belongs to the harp.

Nicias/ It is not.

Socrates/ But what is it then, or of what is it the science?

Laches/ You very rightly interrogate him, Socrates; and let him tell us what wisdom it is.

Nicias/ I say then, O Laches, that it is the science of things dreadful and daring, both in war and in all other things.

Laches/ How absurdly he speaks, Socrates!

Socrates/ Looking to what do you say this, O Laches?

Laches/ To what? Why wisdom is separate from fortitude.

Socrates/ Nicias does not say so.

Laches/ He does not, by Zeus; and: therefore he raves.

Socrates/ Let us therefore teach and not revile him.

Nicias/ He does not revile me; but it seems to me, O Socrates, that Laches is desirous that I also may appear to say nothing, because this was just now the case with him.

Laches/ Entirely so, O Nicias; and I will endeavor to evince this: for you say nothing. Without going any further, in diseases do not physicians know things that are dreadful? Or do brave men appear to you to know this? Or do you call physicians brave men?

Nicias/ By no means.

Laches/ Neither do you give that name, I think, to husbandmen, though they know things that are dreadful in agriculture; and all other artificers know things that are dreadful and daring in their own arts, and yet they are not in any respect the more brave for this.

Socrates/ What does Laches, O Nicias, appear to you to say? for he certainly appears to say something.

Nicias/ He does indeed say something, and yet not what is true.

Socrates/ How so.?

Nicias/ Because he thinks that physicians know something more about the sick than the being able to say that a thing is healthful or unhealthful; but they alone know this. But whether to be well is a thing dreadful to anyone rather than to be ill; do you think, O Laches, that physicians have any knowledge of this? Or do you not think that it is better to many for them not to recover from disease than to recover? For tell me this: Do you say that it is better to all men to live, and that it is not more advantageous to many to die?

Laches/ I do say this.

Nicias/ To those, therefore, to whom it is advantageous to die, do you think the same things are dreadful, as to those to whom it is better to live?

Laches/ Not I.

Nicias/ But do you allow that physicians know this, or that it is known by any other artificer than the man who is skilled in things dreadful, and whom I call a brave man?

Socrates/ Do you understand, O Laches, what he says?

Laches/ I do; and I perceive that he calls prophets brave men: for who else knows to whom it is better to live than to die? And I ask you, O Nicias, whether you acknowledge yourself to be a prophet, or to be neither a prophet nor a brave man?

Nicias/ But what? Do you think it belongs to a prophet to know things dreadful and daring?

Laches/ I do; for to whom else does it belong?

Nicias/ Much more, O best of men, to him of whom I speak; since it is necessary that a prophet should only know the signs of future events, whether they portend death to anyone, or disease, or the loss of riches, or victory, or the being vanquished in battle or in any other contest. But, why does it rather belong to a prophet, than any other, to judge for whom it is better to suffer or not suffer anyone of these things?

Laches/ I do not understand, Socrates, what he means to say: for he does not render it manifest that it is either a prophet, or a physician, or any other person, whom he calls brave, unless he says that this brave person is a certain god. Nicias, therefore, appears to me to be unwilling ingenuously to confess that he says nothing, but he is rolled upwards and downwards, concealing his perplexity; though you and I might have been similarly rolled, if we had wished not to appear to contradict ourselves. If, indeed, we were pleading

in a court of justice, it might be reasonable to act in this manner; but now in such a conference as this, why should anyone vainly adorn himself with empty words?

Socrates/ For no reason, as it appears to me, O Laches. But let us see; perhaps Nicias thinks that he says something to the purpose, and does not assert these things merely for the sake of speaking. Let us, therefore, inquire of him more clearly what he means; and if it shall appear that he says anything pertinent, let us assent to him; if not, we will teach him better.

Laches/ Do you, therefore, O Socrates, if you will, ask him; for I have interrogated him sufficiently.

Socrates/ Nothing will hinder me: for the interrogation will be in common to me and you.

Laches/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Tell me then, O Nicias, (for I and Laches unite in this question,) Do you say that fortitude is rather the science of things dreadful and daring, than of anything else?

Nicias/ I do.

Socrates/ But it is not the province of every man to know this, since neither a physician nor a prophet possesses this knowledge; nor will a man be brave, unless he acquires this science. Do you not say so?

Nicias/ I do.

Socrates/ According to the proverb, therefore, in reality, every hog does not know this, nor will every hog be valiant.

Nicias/ It does not appear to me that it will.

Socrates/ It is evident, therefore, O Nicias, that neither do you believe that the Cromyonian sow was brave. But I do not say this in jest: for I think it is necessary that he who asserts these things should admit that no brute is brave; nor ought he to grant that any wild beast is so wise, that what

few men know through the difficulty of acquiring knowledge, that a lion, or a leopard, or a certain boar knows. But he who defines fortitude, as you have done, must necessarily say that a lion and a stag, a bull and an ape, are similarly formed by nature with respect to fortitude.

Laches/ By the gods, Socrates, you speak well: and in reality inform us, O Nicias, whether you say that these wild beasts, which we all of us acknowledge to be brave, are wiser than we are, or, contrary to the opinion of all men, will you dare to deny that they are brave?

Nicias/ Indeed, Laches, I do not call either a wild beast, or anything else brave, which through ignorance is not terrified at things dreadful, but is fearless and stupid. Or, do you think, that I call all boys brave, who through ignorance fear nothing? But I am of opinion, that the fearless is not the same with the brave. For, I think, that fortitude and fore thought are to be found in very few; but that confidence and boldness, and a privation of fear, together with the want of forethought, may be seen in very many men and women, boys and wild beasts. That, therefore, which you and the many call fortitude, I call rashness; but I call the brave, the prudent and the wise, about whom I now speak.

Laches/ You see, Socrates, how well this man decorates himself, as he thinks, with words; but those whom all men acknowledge to be brave he endeavors to deprive of this honor.

Nicias/ Not I indeed, Laches; but take courage. For I say that you and Lammachus are wise, if you are brave; and that this is also true of many others of the Athenians.

Laches/ I say nothing against these things, though I could reply to them, lest you should say that I am in reality a slanderer.

Socrates/ Nor should you speak against them, O Laches; for you appear to me not to have perceived that Nicias here received this wisdom from our associate Damon; and Damon is very intimate with Prodicus, who appears to distinguish appellations of this kind in a manner superior to the other sophists.

Laches/ For it rather becomes a sophist, O Socrates, to think highly of himself on account of things of this kind, than a man whom the city thinks worthy to be its governor.

Socrates/ It becomes indeed him, O blessed man, who presides over things of the greatest consequence, to participate of the greatest wisdom. But it appears to me to be worthwhile to consider with a view to what Nicias thus defines fortitude.

Laches/ Consider this then, Socrates, yourself.

Socrates/ I shall do this, O best of men. Do not, however, think that you are to be excluded from this conference, but attend and consider what is said.

Laches/ Let these things be so if it appears to be proper.

Socrates/ But it does appear to be so. And do you, Nicias, tell us again from the beginning; for you know that at the beginning of our conference we considered fortitude as a part of virtue.

Nicias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Did not you, therefore, also answer, that it was a part of virtue, there being likewise other parts, all which are called virtue?

Nicias/ For how is it possible I should not?

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, call the same things the parts of virtue as I do? For I, besides fortitude, call temperance and justice, and certain other such like things, parts of virtue. And do not you also?.

Nicias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Attend then: for these things are granted by us. But let us consider concerning things terrible and daring, lest you should form one opinion of them, and we another. For we will tell you what we think concerning them; and do you, if you do not accord with us, teach us better. We then think those things to be dreadful which occasion fear, and that those things are daring, or may be dared, which do not occasion fear. Neither, however, past nor present evils occasion fear, but those which are expected: for fear is the expectation of a future evil. Or does it not likewise appear so to you, O Laches?

Laches/ Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, O Nicias, hear our assertions, that things dreadful are future evils; but that things which may be dared are future goods, or at least are not evils. Do you say this, or something else about these things?

Nicias/ I say this.

Socrates/ But do you call the science of these things fortitude?

Nicias/ I do.

Socrates/ Let us then still further consider whether a third thing appears the same to you as to us.

Nicias/ What is that?

Socrates/ I will tell you. For it appears to me and Laches, that of whatever things there is science, there is not one science of a thing which is past, by which we know that it was made, another concerning things present, by which we know that they are made, and another concerning that which is not yet made, by which we know that it may and will be made in the most beautiful manner; but to know all these is the province of the same science. Thus, for instance,

with respect to that which is salubrious at all times, there is no other science than medicine, which being one and the same, sees what has been, what is, and what will be salubrious. And agriculture subsists in a similar manner with respect to things which grow out of the earth. Thus too, in warlike concerns, you yourselves can testify that the science of commanding an army, provides in the most beautiful manner for other things and for what will happen in future. For this art does not think it fit that it should be subservient to divination, but preside over it, as better knowing things which do and will take place about wars. And the law also orders this, not that the diviner shall command the general, but that the general shall command the diviner. Shall we assert these things, O Laches?

Laches/ We must assert them.

Socrates/ But what? Do you agree with us, O Nicias, that it is the province of the same science to possess a knowledge of the same things, whether they be considered as past, or as present, or as future?

Nicias/ I do: for thus it appears to me, O Socrates.

Socrates/ Is not, therefore, O best of men, fortitude, as you say, the science of things dreadful and daring?

Nicias/ It is.

Socrates/ But it has been acknowledged that things dreadful are future evils and things daring future goods.

Nicias/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But the same science has a knowledge of things past, present, and future.

Nicias/ It has.

Socrates/ Fortitude, therefore, is not only the science of things dreadful and daring: For it not only has a knowledge of future goods and evils, but also of such as are past and

present and in short it surveys all things like the other sciences.

Nicias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ You have, therefore, O Nicias, only defined to us in your answer the third part of fortitude, though we asked you what the whole of fortitude is And now, as it seems, according to your assertion, fortitude is not only the science of things dreadful and daring, but nearly of all good and evil, and in short of all things, from your argument, in whatever manner they may subsist. Do you thus determine, or how do you say, O Nicias?

Nicias/ To me it appears to be so, O Socrates.

Socrates/ Does then such a virtue as this appear to you, O blessed man, to be deficient in any respect, if it knows all goods, and in what manner they have been, are, and will be produced, and in the same manner as to evils? And do you think that he is indigent of temperance, or justice, or piety, to whom alone it belongs to be cautious with respect to such things as are dreadful and such as are not, both concerning gods and men; who also knows how to obtain what is good, and to associate in a proper manner with others?

Nicias/ You appear to me, O Socrates, to say something.

Socrates/ That therefore, O Nicias, which is now adduced by you, will not be a part of virtue, but all virtue.

Nicias/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Nevertheless we said that fortitude is one of the parts of virtue.

Nicias/ We did say so.

Socrates/ But that which is now said does not appear to be a part of virtue.

Nicias/ It does not.

Socrates/ We have not, therefore, O Nicias, discovered what fortitude is.

Nicias/ It does not appear that we have.

Laches/ And yet I should have thought, my dear Nicias, that you would have discovered it, by your contempt of me when I answered Socrates. And therefore I had very great hope that you would have discovered it from the wisdom of Damon.

Nicias/ Excellent indeed, O Laches, that you should think it a thing of no consequence, that you just now appeared to know nothing about fortitude; but should be alone concerned that I also may appear to be as ignorant as yourself: and as it seems you are satisfied, if I as well as you am ignorant of things, of which it becomes him to have a knowledge who wither to be a man of any consequence. You therefore appear to me to act in reality after the manner of men, because you do not at all look to yourself but to others. I think, however, that I have spoken tolerably well on this subject; and if anything that I have asserted is defective, I shall afterwards correct it, and this with the assistance of Damon, whom you think proper to deride, though you have never seen him. I shall also do this by calling in the aid of others: and when I have obtained a firm conviction of these things, I will likewise instruct you without envy; for you appear to me to be in very great want of instruction.

Laches/ You are indeed wise, O Nicias: but, at the same time, I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to bid farewell to you and me concerning the education of youth; but not to dismiss this Socrates, as I said from the first: for I would thus act, if my children were of a proper age.

Nicias/ I also grant you, that if Socrates is willing to take the lads under his care, no other person should be sought after. Indeed, I should most gladly send Niceratus to him, if

he were willing; but when I say anything to him on this subject, he recommends others to me, and is unwilling to undertake this office himself. But see, O Lysimachus, whether Socrates will more willingly comply with your request.

Lysimachus/ It is just, O Nicias, since I also am willing to do many things for him, which I should not be very willing to do for many others. What then do you say, O Socrates? Will you comply with our request, and will you take charge of these lads, so that they may become most excellent characters?

Socrates/ It would certainly be a dreadful thing, O Lysimachus, not to be willing to endeavor that they may become most worthy. If, therefore, in the preceding conference, I have appeared to be skillful, but the other persons of the dialogue not, it will be just to call me especially to this employment; but now, since we are all similarly involved in doubt, which of us ought to be preferred? To me indeed it seems that no one of us should have the preference. And since this is the case, consider whether I appear to advise you rightly: for I say it is requisite, O men, (since our conference is only among ourselves,) that we should all of us in common inquire, in the first place, after the best master for ourselves, for we stand in need of one; and in the next place for these lads, sparing neither money nor anything else; but I shall not advise our continuing in the condition in which we now are. And if anyone should deride us for applying to teachers at these years, it appears to me that it will be proper to adduce Homer, who says.

“Shame ill-accompanies a man in need.”

We therefore, bidding farewell to reproach, will pay attention in common, to ourselves and the lads.

Lysimachus/ What you say, Socrates, pleases me; and by how much the older I am, by so much the more readily shall I desire to learn together with the youths. Do then as you have said: come tomorrow morning early to my house without fail, that we may consult about these very things: For it is now time that we should dissolve this conference.

Socrates/ I will do these things, O Lysimachus; and, if it please God, I will be with you tomorrow morning.

The End Of The Laches.

Lysis.

or

On Friendship.

Translated by Henry Cary.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Hippothales,

Ctesippus, Menexenus, and Lysis.

Socrates/ I was going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum on the road outside the wall close to the wall itself, but when I reached the little gate, where is the fountain of the Panops, I there met with Hippothales son of Hieronymus, Ctesippus the Pæanian, and other young men with them standing together in a group. And Hippothales seeing me approach said;

Hippothales/ "Socrates, whither are you going, and whence come you?"

Socrates/ "From the Academy, And am going straight to the Lyceum."

Hippothales/ "Hither, then, straight to us. Won't you come here? it is worthwhile."

Socrates/ "Where do you mean. And whom do you mean by 'you'?"

Hippothales/ "Hither."

Socrates/ he replied, showing me an enclosure opposite the wall and an open gate;

Hippothales/ "there we are passing away our time, we and a good many other fine fellows."

Socrates/ "And what is this, and what your occupation?"

Hippothales/ “A palæstra, lately built; our occupation consists chiefly in conversation, which we would gladly share with you.”

Socrates/ “You do well. But who teaches there?”

Hippothales/ “Your friend and encomiast, Miccus.”

Socrates/ “By Zeus, he is no mean person, but an apt sophist.”

Hippothales/ “Will you follow us then, that you may see those that are there?”

Socrates/ “I should be glad to hear this first, and on that condition I enter, who is the beauty?”

Hippothales/ “To some of us, Socrates, one appears so, to some, another.”

Socrates/ “But who appears so to you, encomiast? Tell me this.” Then he blushed at the question. And I said, “Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, you need no longer tell me this, whether you are in love with anyone or not: for I know that you are not only in love, but are already pretty far gone in love. I, for my part, am in other matters poor and useless, but this somehow has been given me by the deity, to be able quickly to discern both a lover, and one that is beloved.”

On hearing this, he blushed still more. Whereupon Ctesippus said;

Ctesippus/ “It is a fine thing in you to blush, Hippothales, and hesitate to tell Socrates the name, though if he were to stay here with you even for a short time he would be tired to death with hearing you frequently telling it. He has certainly deafened our ears, Socrates, and filled them with the name of Lysis: and if he is somewhat tipsy, it is easy for us, even when we awake out of sleep, to fancy that we hear the name of Lysis. And what he tells of him in his ordinary talk, though wearisome, is not so very much so; but when he attempts to overwhelm us with his poems and set-speeches! and what is

still more wearisome than these, is that he sings about his favorite with a wonderful voice, which we must endure to listen to. But now when questioned by you, he blushes."

Socrates/ "This Lysis, then, is a youth, as it seems. I conjecture this, because on hearing the name I did not know it."

Ctesippus/ "They don't often call him by his own name, but he still goes by his father's name, because his father is so very well known. For I am very sure, that you are far from being unacquainted with the form of the youth; for he may be sufficiently known from this only."

Socrates/ "Tell me then, whose son he is."

Ctesippus/ "The eldest son of Democrates, of Æxone."

Socrates/ "Well done, Hippothales, what a noble and in every way admirable love is this you have met with! Come then, display to me what you display to these also, that I may discover whether you know what a lover ought to say about his favorite, either to himself or to others."

Hippothales/ "Do you really put any weight, Socrates, on anything that he says?"

Socrates/ "Do you deny, that you are in love with the person whom he speaks of?"

Hippothales/ "I do not, but I do deny that I make verses on my favorite or compose speeches."

Ctesippus/ "He is not in his right senses, but is delirious and mad."

Socrates/ "Hippothales, I do not wish to hear your verses, nor any song that you may have made on the youth, but their meaning, that I may know in what way you behave towards your favorite."

Hippothales/ “He doubtless will tell you, for he knows and remembers it well, since, as he says, he has been stunned by constantly hearing it from me.”

Ctesippus/ “By the gods, assuredly I do; and ridiculous it is too, Socrates. For that being a lover, and devoting himself to the youth beyond all others, he should have nothing of his own to say, that even a boy might not say, how can it be otherwise than ridiculous? For what the whole city resounds with about Democrates and Lysis the boy’s grandfather, and all his ancestors, their wealth, their breed of horses, and their victories in the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean games, with four horses and with one, these things he puts into poems and speeches, and besides these, things still more absurd: for he lately described to us in a poem, the entertainment of Hercules, how an ancestor of theirs received Hercules on account of his relationship to him, being himself sprung from Zeus and the daughter of the founder of his borough, such things as old women sing, and many others of the same kind, Socrates. These are the things that he speaks of and sings and compels us to listen to.”

Socrates/ “O ridiculous Hippothales, before you have gained the victory do you compose and sing an encomium on yourself?”

Hippothales/ “But I neither compose nor sing on myself, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “You do not think so.”

Hippothales/ “How is that?”

Socrates/ “These songs, most of all relate to you. For it you gain your favorite being such as you describe, what you have said and sung will be an honor to you, and in reality an encomium on yourself as victorious in having won such a favorite. But if he should escape you, by how much greater

the encomiums are which you uttered on your favorite, by so much the more ridiculous will you appear in being deprived of greater blessings. Whoever therefore, my friend, is skilled in matters of love, does not praise his beloved before he has caught him, fearing how the event will turn out. Moreover such as are beautiful when anyone praises and extols them, are filled with pride and arrogance. Do you not think so?"

Hippothales/ "I do."

Socrates/ "And by how much the more arrogant they are, are they not more difficult to be caught?"

Hippothales/ "That is probable at least."

Socrates/ "What sort of huntsman, then, would he appear to you to be, who in hunting should scare away his prey, and make it more difficult to be caught?"

Hippothales/ "Without doubt, a bad one."

Socrates/ "And by speeches and songs not to soothe but exasperate, shows a great want of skill; does it not?"

Hippothales/ "It appears so to me."

Socrates/ "Consider then, Hippothales, whether you will not expose yourself to all these charges by your poetry. Though I think you would not be willing to allow that a man who harms himself by his poetry can be a good poet, in that he harms himself."

Hippothales/ "No, by Zeus, for that would be a great piece of folly. But on this very account, Socrates, I communicate the matter to you, and if you have anything else to suggest, advise me, by saying what or by doing what one may win the affections of one's favorite."

Socrates/ "It is not easy to say, but if you will make Lysis himself converse with me, I could perhaps show you what

you ought to say to him, instead of the things which your friends allege that you say and sing."

Hippothales/ "There is no difficulty in that,. For if you will enter with Ctesippus here, and sit down and converse, I think that he will join you of his own accord, for he is exceedingly fond of listening, Socrates, and moreover, as they are celebrating the Hermæa, young men and boys are all mixed up together. He will therefore join you: but if not, he is intimate with Ctesippus, through his cousin Menexenus; for Menexenus is his most particular friend. Let him call him, therefore, if he does not join you of his own accord."

Socrates/ "This, we must do." And at the same time, laying hold of Ctesippus, I entered the palaestra, and the others came after us.

On entering there, we found that the boys had finished their sacrifices, and, the ceremonies being now nearly ended, playing at dice, and all full dressed. Many of them were playing in the court outside, but some in a corner of the dressing-room were playing at odd and even with a great number of dice which they drew out of certain little baskets. Others stood round these, looking on; and among them was Lysis, and he stood in the midst of the boys and youths, crowned, and surpassing them in form, so as not only to deserve to be called beautiful, but beautiful and noble. Then we withdrawing to the opposite side sat down, for it was quiet there, and entered into conversation with each other. Lysis, thereupon, turning round, frequently looked at us, and was evidently anxious to come to us; but for some time he hesitated, and was averse to approach alone. Then, Menexenus comes in, in the midst of his game from the court, and as soon as he saw me and Ctesippus, came and seated himself by us. Lysis, therefore, seeing him, followed, and sat down by the side of Menexenus. Others likewise

came up, and moreover Hippothales, when he saw a good many standing round, concealing himself behind them, took up a position where he thought Lysis could not see him, fearing lest he should give him offence, and in this position he listened to our discourse. And I, looking towards Menexenus, said, “Son of Demophon, which of you is the elder?”

Menexenus/ “We are in doubt.”

Socrates/ “Should you not also contend which of you is the more noble?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “And in like manner, which of you is the more beautiful?”

Hereupon they both laughed. “However, I will not ask which of you is the more rich, for you are friends; are you not?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Now the property of friends is said to be common, so that in this respect there will be no difference between you if what you say about friendship is true.”

They assented.

After this, I was purposing to ask, which of them was the more just and the more wise; but in the meanwhile someone came and made Menexenus get up, saying that the master of the palaestra called him; for he appeared to me to be one concerned in the sacrifices. He therefore left us; and I questioned Lysis: “Doubtless, Lysis, your father and mother love you very much?”

Lysis/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Would they not, then, wish you to be as happy as possible?”

Lysis/ “How not?”

Socrates/ “Does a man appear to you to be happy who is a slave, and who is not permitted to do anything he desires?”

Lysis/ “By Zeus, no.”

Socrates/ “If, therefore, your father and mother love you and wish that you may be happy, this is quite evident, that they endeavor to make you happy?”

Lysis/ “How should they not?”

Socrates/ “Do they, therefore, permit you to do what you please, and in no respect find fault with you or hinder you from doing whatever you desire?”

Lysis/ “By Zeus, Socrates, they do indeed hinder me in very many things.”

Socrates/ “How say you? wishing you to be happy do they hinder you from doing whatever you please? Answer me thus; If you should desire to mount on one of your father’s chariots, and to take the reins when a race is to be run, would he not allow you, but hinder you?”

Lysis/ “By Zeus, He would not allow me.”

Socrates/ “Whom would he then?”

Lysis/ “There is a charioteer who receives pay from my father.”

Socrates/ “How say you? Do they suffer a hired servant rather than you to do what he pleases with the horses, and moreover pay him money for so doing?”

Lysis/ “Why not?”

Socrates/ “But I suppose they suffer you to drive the pair of mules and, if you wish to take the whip and beat them, they would allow you.”

Lysis/ “Why allow me?”

Socrates/ “But what? Is no one allowed to beat them?”

Lysis/ “Certainly, the mule-driver.”

Socrates/ “Is he a slave, or free?”

Lysis/ “A slave.”

Socrates/ “They think more of a slave then, as it seems, than of you, their son, and commit their property to him rather than to you, and allow him to do what he pleases, but you they hinder. Tell me this too. Do they allow you to govern yourself; or do they not even suffer this?”

Lysis/ “How should they suffer it?

Socrates/ “Who then governs you?”

Lysis/ “My pædagogue here.”

Socrates/ “Is he a slave?”

Lysis/ “How should he be otherwise? ours though.”

Socrates/ “It is shameful, surely, that a freeman should be governed by a slave. And by doing what does this pædagogue govern you?”

Lysis/ “Of course, He conducts me to my masters.”

Socrates/ “And do they too govern you, the masters?

Lysis/ “Assuredly.”

Socrates/ “Your father, then, voluntarily sets over you many rulers and governors. But when you return home to your mother, does she allow you to do whatever you please, that you may be happy as far as she is concerned, either with her wool or her loom when she is spinning? She surely does not hinder you from touching the comb or the shuttle, or any other of her spinning instruments.”

Whereupon, he laughing replied;

Lysis/ “By Zeus, Socrates, she not only hinders me, but I should be beaten too if I touched them.”

Socrates/ “By Hercules, Have you in any way injured your father or your mother?”

Lysis/ “By Zeus, not I.”

Socrates/ “For what reason, then, do they so shamefully hinder you from being happy and doing what you please, and bring you up throughout the whole day in subjection to someone, and in a word let you do scarcely anything that you wish? So that, as it seems, neither have you any advantage from such great riches, but anyone manages them rather than you, nor from your person, which is so noble, but this too another tends and takes care of: but you, Lysis, neither govern anything, nor do anything that you wish.”

Lysis/ “For I am not yet old enough, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “That should not hinder you, son of Democrates: since thus far, I think, both your father and mother permit you and do not wait till you are old enough: for when they wish anything to be read to or written for them, they appoint you, I think, first of all in the house to this office; do they not?”

Lysis/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Are you allowed then, in this case, to write whichever letter you please first, and which second, and are you allowed to read in like manner? And when you take the lyre, I think, neither your father nor your mother hinder you from tightening and loosening any string you please, and from twanging and striking them with the quill; do they hinder you?”

Lysis/ “By no means.”

Socrates/ “What then can be the cause, Lysis, that in these cases they do not hinder you, but do hinder you in those that we just now mentioned?”

Lysis/ “Because, I think, I know the one, but not the other.”

Socrates/ “Be it so, my excellent youth; your father, then, is not waiting for your being old enough to entrust everything

to you, but on the very day that he shall think you are wiser than he is, he will entrust to you both himself and his property?"

Lysis/ "I think he will."

Socrates/ "Be it so, what then? Will not your neighbor follow the same rule as your father respecting you? Do you think he will entrust you with the management of his household when he thinks you are wiser than himself with respect to household-management, or will he preside over it himself?"

Lysis/ "I think he will entrust it to me."

Socrates/ "But what? do you think the Athenians will entrust their affairs to you, when they perceive that you are wise enough?"

Lysis/ "I do."

Socrates/ "By Zeus, what then as to the great king? Would he suffer his eldest son, who will succeed to the government of Asia, when his meat is being cooked, to throw into the sauce whatever he pleases, rather than us, if we should go to him and show that we are more skilled in the preparation of dishes than his son?"

Lysis/ "Us, clearly."

Socrates/ "And he would not allow him to throw anything in, however trifling, but us he would allow, even if we wished to throw in salt by the handful."

Lysis/ "How not?"

Socrates/ "But what if his son should be diseased in his eyes would he allow him to touch his own eyes, not considering him a physician, or would he hinder him?"

Lysis/ "He would hinder him."

Socrates/ "But if he supposed we were good physicians, even if we wished to open his eyes and sprinkle them with

ashes, I think he would not hinder us, considering we judged rightly."

Lysis/ "You say true."

Socrates/ "Would he not entrust everything else to us rather than to himself or his son, with respect to which we appeared to him to be wiser than either of them?"

Lysis/ "Necessarily so, Socrates."

Socrates/ "This, then, is the case, my dear Lysis, all persons, both Greeks and barbarians, men and women, will entrust us with those things with respect to which we are found to be wise, and we shall do in them whatever we please, nor will anyone purposely hinder us, but we shall both be free ourselves in these matters, and governors over others, and these things will be our own, for we shall derive benefit from them. But those things about which we have no knowledge no one will suffer us to do as we think proper, but all men will hinder us as much as they are able, not only strangers, but even our own father and mother, and anyone else who is more nearly related to us than them, and in these matters we ourselves shall be subject to others, and they will be strange to us, for we shall derive no benefit from them. Do you admit that this is the case?"

Lysis/ "I do."

Socrates/ "Shall we, then, be friends to anyone, and will anyone love us in those things in which we are of no use?"

Lysis/ "No, surely."

Socrates/ "Now, then, neither does your father love you, nor does anyone else love another person, in so far as he is useless?"

Lysis/ "It appears not."

Socrates/ "If, then, you become wise, my boy, all men will be your friends, and all men will be attached to you, for you

will be useful and good. But if not, neither will anyone else, nor your father be a friend to you, nor your mother, nor any of your kindred. Is it possible, then, Lysis, that anyone can deem himself wise in those things of which as yet he has no knowledge at all?"

Lysis/ "How can he?"

Socrates/ "If, then, you require a teacher, you are not yet wise?"

Lysis/ "True."

Socrates/ "Neither, then, are you very wise, if you are still unwise?"

Lysis/ "By Zeus, Socrates, I do not think that I can be."

Socrates/ Then I, upon hearing this, looked at Hippothales, and almost committed a blunder, for it occurred to me to say, "Thus, Hippothales, we ought to converse with favorites, humbling and checking them, and not, as you do, puffing them up and filling them with vanity." However, perceiving him anxious and disturbed at what was said, I recollected that, although he was standing near, he wished to escape the observation of Lysis; I therefore recovered myself, and restrained my speech.

At this moment Menexenus came again, and sat down by Lysis, whence he had risen before. Lysis, then, in a very boyish and affectionate manner, unobserved by Menexenus, talking to me a little while, said;

Lysis/ "Socrates, say over again to Menexenus what you have been saying to me."

Socrates/ "Do you tell it him, Lysis, for you paid very great attention."

Lysis/ "I certainly did."

Socrates/ “Endeavor, then, to remember it as well as you can, that you may tell him all clearly; but if you forget anything, ask me again the first time you meet me.”

Lysis/ “I will most certainly do so, Socrates, be well assured. But say something else to him, that I too may hear, until it is time for me to go home.”

Socrates/ “I must do so, since you bid me; but take care that you assist me, if Menexenus should attempt to confute me. Do you not know that he is fond of disputing?”

Lysis/ “By Zeus, very much so; and for this reason I wish you to converse with him.”

Socrates/ “That I may make myself ridiculous?”

Lysis/ “No, by Zeus, but that you may punish him.”

Socrates/ “How so, that’s not an easy matter, for the man is clever, a disciple of Ctesippus. And besides, he is here in person, do not you see Ctesippus?”

Ctesippus/ “Don’t concern yourself about that, Socrates, but come, converse with him.”

Socrates/ “We must converse, then.”

While we were speaking thus to each other, Ctesippus said;

Ctesippus/ “What are you two feasting on by yourselves, without letting us share in the conversation?”

Socrates/ “But indeed, you shall have a share, for Lysis here does not understand something that I have said, but says he thinks Menexenus knows it, and bids me ask him.”

Ctesippus/ “Why then, do you not ask him?”

Socrates/ “But I will ask him. Answer me, then, Menexenus, what I shall ask you; for from my childhood I happen to have had a desire for a certain thing, as another person may have of something else: for one desires to possess horses, another dogs, another gold, and another

honors; but I, for my part, am indifferent about these things, but have a fond desire for the possession of friends, and I had rather have a good friend than the best quail or cock in the world; and, by Zeus, than the best horse or dog, and I think, by the dog, that I should much rather prefer the possession of an intimate, than the gold of Darius, or even than Darius himself, so fond am I of intimate friends. Seeing you, therefore, and Lysis, I was amazed, and pronounced you happy, because, young as you are, you have been able so quickly and easily to acquire this possession, and you have so quickly and sincerely acquired him for your friend, and again he you. But I am so far from making this acquisition, that I do not even know in what way one man becomes the friend of another; but I wish to ask this very thing of you, as being an experienced person. Tell me, then, when anyone loves another, which of the two becomes a friend, the lover of the beloved, or the beloved of the lover? or is there no difference?"

Menexenus/ "It appears to me, that there is no difference."

Socrates/ "How say you? Do both then become friends of each other, if one alone loves the other?"

Menexenus/ "To me it appears so."

Socrates/ "But what? Is it not possible for one who loves not to be loved in turn by the object of his love?"

Menexenus/ "It is."

Socrates/ "But what? is it not possible, then, for one who loves ever to be hated? as lovers surely sometimes seem to be treated by their favorites: for though they love most ardently, some of them think that they are not loved in turn, and some even that they are hated. Does not this appear to you to be true?"

Menexenus/ "Quite true."

Socrates/ “In such a case, then, does one love, and is the other loved?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Which then of these is the friend of the other? the lover of the beloved, whether he is loved in turn, or even if he is hated, or the beloved of the lover? or again, in such a case, is neither the friend of neither, unless both love each other?”

Menexenus/ “It seems indeed to be so.”

Socrates/ “Now, then, it appears to us otherwise than it appeared before. For then if one loved, both appeared to be friends; but now, unless both love neither is a friend.”

Menexenus/ “It appears so.”

Socrates/ “Nothing, therefore, is a friend to that which loves unless it loves in turn.”

Menexenus/ “It seems not.”

Socrates/ “Neither, then, are they friends of horses, whom horses do not love in turn, nor friends of quails, nor again friends of dogs, and friends of wine, and friends of gymnastics, and of wisdom, unless wisdom loves them in turn: or do they severally love these things although they are not friends, and does the poet speak falsely who says, ‘Happy the man who has boys for his friends, and solid-hoofed horses, and hunting dogs, and a foreign guest?”

Menexenus/ “It does not seem so to me.”

Socrates/ “But does he appear to you to speak the truth?”

Menexenus/ “Yes”

Socrates/ “The beloved, then, is a friend to that which loves, as it seems, Menexenus, whether it loves or whether it hates; just as children newly born, who partly do not yet love, and partly even hate, when they are punished by their mother or their father, nevertheless, at the very time when

they hate, are in the highest degree beloved by their parents."

Menexenus/ "It appears to me, that this is the case."

Socrates/ "The lover, therefore, from this reasoning, is not the friend, but the beloved."

Menexenus/ "It seems so."

Socrates/ "And he who is hated, therefore, is an enemy, but not he who hates."

Menexenus/ "So it appears."

Socrates/ "Many, therefore, are beloved by their enemies and hated by their friends; and are friends to their enemies, but enemies to their friends, if the beloved is a friend, and not the lover. Though it is very absurd, my dear friend, or rather, I think, impossible, to be an enemy to a friend, and a friend to an enemy."

Menexenus/ "You seem to speak truly, Socrates."

Socrates/ "If, therefore, this is impossible, the lover will be a friend of the beloved."

Menexenus/ "So it appears."

Socrates/ "Again, therefore, that which hates must be the enemy of that which is hated."

Menexenus/ "Necessarily so."

Socrates/ "Therefore, the result will be that we must of necessity admit the very things that we did before, that a man is often a friend of that which is not a friend, and often even of that which is an enemy, when either anyone loves that which does not love, or even loves that which hates, and is often an enemy of that which is not an enemy, or is even a friend, when either anyone loves that which does not hate, or even hates that which loves."

Menexenus/ "It appears so."

Socrates/ “What shall we do, then, if neither those who love are to be friends, nor those who are loved, nor yet those who both love and are loved? Shall we say that some others besides these become friends to each other?”

Menexenus/ “By Zeus, Socrates, I don’t well know what answer to make.”

Socrates/ “Have we not, then, Menexenus, conducted our enquiries altogether right?”

Lysis/ “To me it appears not, Socrates,”

Socrates/ said Lysis; and as he said this he blushed: for his remark appeared to me to escape from him involuntarily through his earnest attention to the conversation: and he was plainly most attentive while he was listening.

I then, wishing that Menexenus should cease speaking, and being delighted with the other’s love of wisdom, accordingly turned round and directed my discourse to Lysis, and said, “Lysis, you seem to me to say truly, that if we had conducted our enquiries properly, we should never have wandered in this manner. But let us proceed no longer in this way, for the investigation appears to me to be difficult as if it were a road, but it seems to me that we should proceed by the road to which we turned aside, and conduct our enquiries after the poets; for they are to us, as it were, fathers of wisdom and guides. They speak however, I imagine, so as not to give a mean account of such as happen to be friends, but they say that God himself makes them friends, by conducting them to each other. They express themselves as I think somehow as follows: ‘God ever conducts like to like,’ and makes them known; have you not met with this verse?”

Lysis/ “I have.”

Socrates/ “Have you not met, too, with the writings of the wisest of men that say the very same things, that like must

ever needs be friendly to like? But these are they who discourse and write about nature and the universe."

Lysis/ "You say truly."

Socrates/ "Whether, then, do they say well?"

Lysis/ "Perhaps so."

Socrates/ "Perhaps, the half is true, and perhaps the whole, but we do not understand it: for the wicked man, by how much nearer he approaches, and is more intimate with a wicked man, seems to us to become so much the more hostile to him; for he injures him; but, surely, it is impossible for those who injure and are injured to be friends: is it not so?"

Lysis/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "Thus, then, the half of this saying will not be true, since the wicked are like each other?"

Lysis/ "You say true."

Socrates/ "But they seem to me to say that the good are like each other and friends, but that the bad, as it is said of them, are never alike even to themselves, but are inconstant and unstable. But that which is unlike and at variance with itself, can scarcely be like or friendly to another; does it not seem so to you too?"

Lysis/ "To me it does."

Socrates/ "They intimate this, then, my friend, as it seems to me, when they say that like is friendly to like, that the good man only is a friend to the good man only, but that the bad man never arrives at true friendship, either with a good or a bad man: does it seem so to you also?"

He nodded assent.

"We have now discovered, then, who are friends, for our argument shows that it must be those who are good."

Lysis/ "It certainly seems so."

Socrates/ “And I think so too. Nevertheless, I find some difficulty in it. Come then, by Zeus, let us see what it is I suspect. The like, in so far as he is like, is a friend to the like, and such an one is useful to such an one: or rather thus: can anything that is like confer any benefit on or do any harm to anything that is like, which it cannot also do to itself; or suffer anything which it cannot also suffer from itself? But how can such things be held in regard by each other when they are unable to afford any assistance to each other? is it possible?”

Lysis/ “It is not possible.”

Socrates/ “But how can that which is not held in regard be a friend?”

Lysis/ “In no way.”

Socrates/ “The like, then, is not a friend to the like: but will the good be a friend to the good, so far as he is good, and not so far as he is like?”

Lysis/ “Perhaps so.”

Socrates/ “But what? Will not the good man, so far as he is good, be sufficient for himself?”

Lysis/ “Yes‘”

Socrates/ “But he who is sufficient stands in need of nothing, so far as sufficiency is concerned?”

Lysis/ “How can it be otherwise?”

Socrates/ “And he who stands in need of nothing will not regard anything?”

Lysis/ “He will not.”

Socrates/ “But he who does not feel a regard cannot love?”

Lysis/ “Surely not.”

Socrates/ “How, then, will the good be in any respect friends to the good, who neither when absent regret each

other, for they are sufficient for themselves when apart, nor when present stand in need of each other? By what contrivance can such persons value each other very highly?"

Lysis/ "By none at all."

Socrates/ "But they will not be friends who do not value each other very highly?"

Lysis/ "True."

Socrates/ "Observe then, Lysis, how we are deceived. Are we, then, deceived in the whole?"

Lysis/ "How so?"

Socrates/ "I once heard a person say, and I just now call it to mind, that like is most hostile to like, and the good to the good. And moreover, he adduced Hesiod as a witness, saying that 'potter is angry with potter, bard with bard, and beggar with beggar.' And so, he said, with regard to all other things, that as a matter of absolute necessity, things most like each other are most full of envy, strife, and hatred; but such as are most unlike, of friendship; for that the poor man is compelled to be a friend to the rich, and the weak to the strong, for the sake of assistance, and the sick man to the physician; and that everyone who is ignorant must regard and love him that has knowledge. Moreover, he carried on the subject in a more lofty style, saying that the like is so far from being friendly to the like, that the very contrary to this takes place. For that the most contrary is in the highest degree friendly to the most contrary; for everything desires its contrary, and not its like. Thus the dry desires the moist, the cold heat, the bitter sweet, the sharp blunt, the empty fullness, and the full emptiness; and all other things in the same way. For the contrary is food to the contrary, but the like can derive no enjoyment from the like. And indeed, my friend, he who said this seemed to be an accomplished man, for he spoke well. But how does he seem to you to speak?"

Menexenus/ “Well, as it seems on first hearing.”

Socrates/ “Shall we say, then, that the contrary is most friendly to the contrary?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Be it so, but is it not monstrous, Menexenus, and will not those perfectly wise men, the disputants, immediately spring upon us exultingly, and ask, if friendship is not most contrary to enmity? What answer shall we give them? Must we not of necessity admit that they say truly?”

Menexenus/ “Of necessity.”

Socrates/ “‘Well then, they will ask, ‘is an enemy a friend to a friend, or is a friend a friend to an enemy?”

Menexenus/ “Neither the one nor the other.”

Socrates/ “But is the just a friend to the unjust, or the temperate to the intemperate, or the good to the bad?”

Menexenus/ “It does not appear to me to be so.”

Socrates/ “However, if one thing is a friend to another by reason of contrariety, these things must also of necessity be friendly?”

Menexenus/ “Of necessity.”

Socrates/ “Neither, therefore, is the like friendly to the like, nor the contrary to the contrary?”

Menexenus/ “It appears not.”

Socrates/ “Further, let us consider this, whether it still more escapes our observation, that a friend is in reality none of these, but that what is neither good nor evil may sometimes become the friend of the good.”

Menexenus/ “How mean you?”

Socrates/ “By Zeus, I don’t know; for I am in reality myself dizzy with the perplexity of the argument. It appears, however, according to the ancient proverb, that the beautiful is friendly. It certainly resembles something soft, smooth,

and plump; on which account perhaps it slips away from us and escapes us, because it is a thing of this kind. For I say that the good is beautiful: do you not think so?"

Menexenus/ "I do."

Socrates/ "I say, therefore, prophetically, that that which is neither good nor evil is friendly to the beautiful and the good. But hear why I thus prophesy. There appear to me to be as it were three several classes, one good, a second evil, a third neither good nor evil. What think you?"

Menexenus/ "It seems so to me also."

Socrates/ "Now that the good is friendly to the good, or the evil to the evil, or the good to the evil, our former argument does not allow us to say. It remains therefore, if anything is friendly to anything, that that which is neither good nor evil, must be friendly either to the good, or to that which is such as itself; for nothing surely can become friendly to the evil."

Menexenus/ "True."

Socrates/ "Neither is like friendly to like, we just now said; did we not?"

Menexenus/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "Therefore to that which is neither good nor evil, that which resembles it will not be friendly?"

Menexenus/ "It appears not."

Socrates/ "The result then is, that that which is neither good nor evil alone becomes friendly to the good alone?"

Menexenus/ "Necessarily so, as it seems."

Socrates/ "Well then, my boys, does what is now said lead us in the right direction? Surely if we will consider, a healthy body has no need of the medicinal art, or of any assistance; for it is sufficient for itself; so that no healthy person is a friend to a physician on account of health; is it not so?"

Menexenus/ “No one.”

Socrates/ “But the sick man I think is, on account of disease?”

Menexenus/ “How not?”

Socrates/ “But disease is an evil, and the medicinal art beneficial and good.”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “But a body surely, so far as it is body, is neither good nor evil.”

Menexenus/ “Just so.”

Socrates/ “But a body is compelled, on account of disease, to embrace and love the medicinal art.”

Menexenus/ “It seems so to me.”

Socrates/ “That, therefore, which is neither evil nor good, becomes friendly to the good, on account of the presence of evil.”

Menexenus/ “So it seems.”

Socrates/ “But it is evident that it becomes so, prior to its becoming evil through the evil which it contains; for when it has once become evil, it will no longer desire the good, and be friendly to it: for we have said that it is impossible for the evil to be friendly to the good.”

Menexenus/ “It is impossible.”

Socrates/ “Consider, then, what I say. For I say that some things are themselves such as that which is present with them, and some not. Thus, if anyone wishes to dye anything with any color, the color that is dyed in is surely present in the thing that is dyed.”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Is then, that which is dyed, afterwards, the same as to color, as that which is on it?”

Menexenus/ “I don’t understand you.”

Socrates/ “But thus. If anyone should dye your hairs, which are yellow, with white lead, would they then be white, or appear so?”

Menexenus/ “They would appear so.”

Socrates/ “Though whiteness would be present with them.”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And yet your hairs would not be at all the more white, but though whiteness is present, they are neither white nor black.”

Menexenus/ “True.”

Socrates/ “But when, my friend, old age has brought this color on them, then they become such as that which is present with them, white by the presence of white.”

Menexenus/ “How can it be otherwise?”

Socrates/ “This then I now ask, if a thing be present in anything, will that which contains it be such as that which is present with it, or if it be present after a certain manner, will it be such, but otherwise not?”

Menexenus/ “Thus, rather.”

Socrates/ “That then which is neither evil nor good, sometimes when evil is present, is not yet evil, but sometimes it has already become such.”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “When, therefore, it is not yet evil, though evil be present, this very presence of evil makes it desirous of good, but this presence which makes it evil, deprives it at the same time of the desire and friendship for the good. For it is now no longer neither evil nor good, but evil; evil however we saw, is not friendly to good.”

Menexenus/ “It is not.”

Socrates/ “On this account we must say, that those who are already wise no longer love wisdom, whether they are gods or men; nor again do they love wisdom who have so much ignorance, as to be evil: for no evil and foolish person loves wisdom. They therefore are left, who possess indeed this evil, ignorance, but are not yet thereby stupid or foolish, but still think that they do not know the things that they do not know. Wherefore they who are not yet either good or evil are lovers of wisdom; but such as are evil do not love wisdom, nor do the good: for we have seen in a former part of our discussion, that neither is the contrary friendly to the contrary, nor the like to the like: do you not remember this?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Lysis/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Now then Lysis and Menexenus, we have certainly discovered what it is that is friendly and what not. For we say, that with respect to the soul, and with respect to the body, and everything else, that which is neither evil nor good, is friendly to the good on account of the presence of evil.”

They quite admitted and agreed that such was the case. And I for my part was rejoicing exceedingly, like any hunter, in having just caught the prey that I was in chase of. And then, I know not from what quarter, a most strange suspicion came into my mind, that what we had assented to was not true. And immediately being distressed, I said, “Alas, Lysis and Menexenus, we seem to have grown rich in a dream.”

Menexenus/ “Why so?”

Socrates/ “I am afraid, that as if with braggart men, we have fallen in with some such false reasonings respecting a friend.”

Menexenus/ “How so?”

Socrates/ “Let us consider it thus, whether is he who is a friend, a friend to someone or not?”

Menexenus/ “Necessarily so.”

Socrates/ “Whether, therefore, for the sake of nothing, and on account of nothing, or for the sake of something, and on account of something?”

Menexenus/ “For the sake of something and on account of something.”

Socrates/ “Whether is that thing friendly for the sake of which a friend is a friend to a friend, or is it neither friendly nor hostile?”

Menexenus/ “I do not quite follow you.”

Socrates/ “Probably. But thus perhaps you will be able to follow me; and I think that I too shall better understand what I say. The sick man, we just now said, is a friend to the physician; is it not so?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Is he not, then, a friend to the physician on account of disease, for the sake of health?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “But disease is an evil?”

Menexenus/ “How not?”

Socrates/ “But what is health? Is it good or evil, or neither?”

Menexenus/ “Good.”

Socrates/ “We stated, then, as it seems, that the body, which is neither good, nor evil, on account of disease, that is on account of evil, is friendly to the medicinal art: but the medicinal art is a good; and the medicinal art acquires the friendship for the sake of health; and health is good: is it not?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “But is health a friend, or not a friend?”

Menexenus/ “A friend.”

Socrates/ “And is disease an enemy?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “That then which is neither evil nor good, on account of what is evil and an enemy, is a friend to the good, for the sake of what is good and a friend.”

Menexenus/ “It appears so.”

Socrates/ “The friendly therefore is a friend for the sake of the friend, on account of that which is an enemy.”

Menexenus/ “So it seems.”

Socrates/ “Well then, since we have reached this point, my boys, let us pay every attention that we be not deceived. For that a friend becomes a friend to a friend, and that like becomes a friend to like, which we said is impossible, I give up. However let us consider this, that what is now asserted may not deceive us. The medicinal art, we say, is a friend for the sake of health?”

Menexenus/ “Yes”

Socrates/ “Is not, then, health also a friend?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ ‘If, then, it is a friend, it must be so for the sake of something?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And indeed of something friendly, if we will keep to our former admission?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Will not, therefore, that again be a friend, for the sake of something friendly?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Must we not, then, necessarily be tired out with going on thus, and arrive at some principle, which will not have to be referred to another friend, but will arrive at that which is the first friend, for the sake of which we say that all other things are friendly?”

Menexenus/ “Necessarily so.”

Socrates/ “This, then, is what I say, we must take care that all those other things which we said were friendly for the sake of that, do not, as being certain images of it, deceive us, but that that may be the first which is truly a friend. For let us consider it thus. If anyone values anything very highly, as, for instance, sometimes a father prizes a son above all other things, will not such an one, because he esteems his son above everything, also value something else very highly? For instance, if he were to hear that he had drunk hemlock, would he not value wine very highly, if he thought this would save his son?”

Menexenus/ “How should he not?”

Socrates/ “And the vessel too that contained the wine?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Will he then set the same value on an earthenware cup as he does upon his son, or three measures of wine as on his son? or is the case thus? all such anxiety is employed not about those things that are procured for the sake of something else, but about that for the sake of which all such things are procured: for although we often say that we value gold and silver very highly, yet we may observe that the truth is not at all the more thus; but what we value so very highly is that, whatever it may prove to be, for the sake of which gold and all other provisions are procured. Shall we not say so?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “May not the same thing also be said of a friend? for whatever things we say are friendly to us, for the sake of some friendly thing, we appear to describe by a name that belongs to another, but that very thing seems in reality to be friendly in which all those so-called friendships terminate?”

Menexenus/ “This seems to be the case.”

Socrates/ “That, then, which is in reality friendly is not friendly for the sake of any other friendly thing?”

Menexenus/ “True.”

Socrates/ “This, then, is settled, that what is friendly is not friendly for the sake of any other friendly thing. Is the good, then, friendly?”

Menexenus/ “It seems so to me.”

Socrates/ “Is the good, then, loved on account of evil, and is the case thus? If of the three things which we just now mentioned, good, evil, and that which is neither good nor evil, two only were to be left, but evil were to depart altogether, and not come in contact with anything, either with body, or soul, or any other of the things which we say in themselves are neither evil nor good, in that case would not good be of no use to us, but become useless? For if there were nothing to hurt us any more, we should stand in need of no assistance whatever. And thus it would then become evident that we had a regard for and loved the good on account of evil, since good is a medicine for evil, but evil is a disease. But when there is no disease, there is no need of medicine. Is this, then, the nature of good, and is it loved on account of evil, by us who are placed between evil and good, and is it of no use itself, for the sake of itself?”

Menexenus/ “Such seems to be the case.”

Socrates/ “That which is friendly, therefore, to us, is that in which terminate all other things, which we said are

friendly for the sake of some other friendly thing, but in no respect resembles them? For these are called friendly for the sake of a friendly thing; but that which is in reality friendly appears to be of a nature quite contrary to this; for we have found it to be friendly for the sake of that which is hostile: but if that which is hostile should depart, it would no longer, as it seems, be friendly to us."

Menexenus/ "It seems to me that it would not, according to what is now said."

Socrates/ "Whether, by Zeus, if evil were to be destroyed, would there no longer be any hunger or thirst, or anything else of the kind? or would there be hunger, if men and other animals existed, yet not so as to be hurtful? and thirst, and other desires, yet not be evil, since evil is destroyed? or is the question ridiculous, what would then be the case or not be the case? for who knows? This, however, we know, that at present it is possible to be harmed by being hungry, and it is also possible to be benefited; is it not so?"

Menexenus/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Therefore it is possible that one who thirsts, or is affected by any other similar desire, may sometimes be affected by it beneficially, and sometimes harmfully, and sometimes neither?"

Menexenus/ "Assuredly."

Socrates/ "If, therefore, evil were destroyed, must things that are not evil be destroyed together with the evil?"

Menexenus/ "Not at all."

Socrates/ "There will be, then, such desires as are neither good nor evil, even if evils were destroyed?"

Menexenus/ "It appears so."

Socrates/ “Is it, then, possible, that one who desires and is fond of anything, should not love that which he desires and is fond off”

Menexenus/ “It does not appear so to me.”

Socrates/ “When evils, then, are destroyed, there will remain, as it seems, certain friendly things?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Not so; at least if evil were the cause of anything being friendly, for, when that is destroyed, one thing could not be friendly to another: for when the cause is destroyed, it is surely impossible that that of which it was the cause should any longer exist?”

Menexenus/ “You say rightly.”

Socrates/ “Did we not admit that the friendly loved something, and on account of something, and did we not then think that, on account of evil, that which is neither good nor evil loved the good?”

Menexenus/ ‘True.”

Socrates/ “But now, as it seems, there appears to be some other cause of loving and being loved?”

Menexenus/ “So it seems.”

Socrates/ “Whether, then, in reality, as we just now said, is desire the cause of friendship, and is that which desires friendly to that which it desires, and at the time when it desires, but is what we before said was friendly mere trifling, like a poem heedlessly composed?”

Menexenus/ “It seems so.”

Socrates/ “However, that which desires desires that which it stands in need of; does it not?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And is that which stands in need friendly to that of which it stands in need?”

Menexenus/ “It seems so to me.”

Socrates/ “And it stands in need of that which is taken from it?”

Menexenus/ “How should it not?”

Socrates/ “As it seems, then, love, friendship, and desire, respect that which belongs to a man; so it appears, Menexenus and Lysis?”

They both assented.

“If, therefore, you two are friends to each other, you must, in a manner, by nature belong to each other?”

Menexenus/ “Assuredly.”

Lysis/ “Assuredly.”

Socrates/ “If, then, anyone desires or is fond of another, my boys, he could never desire, or be fond of, or be a friend, unless he, in a manner, belonged to the object of his love, either as to his soul, or as to some habit of the soul, or disposition, or form?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ said Menexenus, but Lysis was silent.

“Well, then, it has proved necessary for us to love that which by nature belongs to us?”

Menexenus/ “It seems so.”

Socrates/ “It is necessary, then, for a genuine, and not a pretended lover, to be beloved by his favorite?”

To this Lysis and Menexenus scarcely nodded assent, but Hippothales, through delight, exhibited all sorts of colors. And I, being willing to examine the matter, said, “If there is any difference between that which belongs to us and that which is like, we shall be able to say, as it seems to me, Lysis and Menexenus, respecting a friend, what he is, but if the like and that which belongs are the same, it is not easy to get rid of our former conclusion, that the like is useless to

the like, as regards similitude; but to admit that what is useless can be friendly is absurd. Are you willing, then, since we are, as it were, intoxicated by the discussion, that we should grant and affirm that that which belongs is different from that which is like?"

Menexenus/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Whether, then, shall we admit that good belongs to everything, but that evil is foreign? or that evil belongs to evil, good to good, and that which is neither good nor evil, to that which is neither good nor evil?"

They both said, that so it appeared to them, that each belongs to each.

"Again, therefore, my boys, we have fallen upon those conclusions which we at first rejected respecting friendship. For the unjust will be no less a friend to the unjust, and the evil to the evil, than the good to the good."

Menexenus/ "So it seems."

Socrates/ "But what? if we should say that the good and that which belongs are the same, will not the good only be a friend to the good?"

Menexenus/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "But in this too we thought we had confuted ourselves; do you not remember?

Menexenus/ "We do remember."

Socrates/ "In what way, then, can we still deal with the subject; is it not clear, in no way at all? I require, then, like skillful pleaders in the law courts, to sum up all that has been said; for if neither those that are loved, nor those that love, nor the like, nor the unlike, nor the good, nor those that belong to us, nor any others that we have described, for I do not remember them any further, on account of their

number, but if no one of these is a friend, I have nothing more to say."

When I had said this, I purposed to stir up some one of the older men; but just then, like evil spirits, the pedagogues of Lysis and Menexenus approaching us, having hold of their brothers by their hand, called to them, and bade them go home, for it was already late. At first, then, both we and the bystanders drove them away; but when they paid no attention to us, but murmured in their barbarous dialect, and desisted not from calling them, and seemed to us, from having drunk too much at the Hermæan festival, to be difficult to manage, we yielded to them, and dissolved the conference. However, as they were just going away, I said, Lysis and Menexenus, we have made ourselves ridiculous, both I, an old man, and you; for those who are now leaving us will say, that we think ourselves to be each other's friends, for I reckon myself among you, but that we have not yet been able to discover what a friend is.

Lysis

or Friendship.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Menexenus, Hippothales.

Lysis, Ctesippus.

SCENE: —A newly-erected Palaestra outside the walls of Athens.

Socrates/ I was going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, intending to take the outer road, which is close under the wall. When I came to the postern gate of the city, which is by the fountain of Panops, I fell in with Hippothales, the son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus the Paeanian, and a company of young men who were standing with them. Hippothales, seeing me approach, asked whence I came and whither I was going.

I am going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum.

Hippothales/ Then come straight to us and put in here; you may as well.

Socrates/ Who are you and where am I to come?

He showed me an enclosed space and an open door over against the wall.

Hippothales/ There is the building at which we all meet: and a goodly company we are.

Socrates/ And what is this building, and what sort of entertainment have you?

Hippothales/ The building is a newly-erected Palaestra; and the entertainment is generally conversation, to which you are welcome.

Socrates/ Thank you; and is there any teacher there?

Hippothales/ Yes, your old friend and admirer, Miccus.

Socrates/ Indeed; he is a very eminent professor.

Hippothales/ Are you disposed to go with me and see them?

Socrates/ Yes; but I should like to know first, what is expected of me, and who is the favorite among you?

Hippothales/ Some persons have one favorite, Socrates, and some another.

Socrates/ And who is yours? Tell me that, Hippothales.

At this he blushed; and I said to him, O Hippothales, thou son of Hieronymus! do not say that you are, or that you are not, in love; the confession is too late; for I see that you are not only in love, but are already far gone in your love. Simple and foolish as I am, the Gods have given me the power of understanding affections of this kind.

Whereupon he blushed more and more.

Ctesippus/ I like to see you blushing, Hippothales, and hesitating to tell Socrates the name; when, if he were with you but for a very short time, you would have plagued him to death by talking about nothing else. Indeed, Socrates, he has literally deafened us, and stopped our ears with the praises of Lysis; and if he is a little intoxicated, there is every likelihood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of Lysis. His performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing at all in comparison with his verse; and when he drenches us with his poems and other compositions, it is really too bad; and worse still is his manner of singing them to his love; he has a voice which is truly appalling, and we cannot help hearing him: and now having a question put to him by you, behold he is blushing.

Socrates/ Who is Lysis? I suppose that he must be young; for the name does not recall anyone to me.

Ctesippus/ Why, his father being a very well-known man, he retains his patronymic, and is not as yet commonly called by his own name; but, although you do not know his name, I am sure that you must know his face, for that is quite enough to distinguish him.

Socrates/ But tell me whose son he is.

Ctesippus/ He is the eldest son of Democrates, of the deme of Aexonè.

Socrates/ Ah, Hippothales; what a noble and really perfect love you have found! I wish that you would favor me with the exhibition which you have been making to the rest of the company, and then I shall be able to judge whether you know what a lover ought to say about his love, either to the youth himself, or to others.

Hippothales/ Nay, Socrates; you surely do not attach any importance to what he is saying.

Socrates/ Do you mean that you disown the love of the person whom he says that you love?

Hippothales/ No; but I deny that I make verses or address compositions to him.

Ctesippus/ He is not in his right mind; he is talking nonsense, and is stark mad.

Socrates/ O Hippothales, if you have ever made any verses or songs in honor of your favorite, I do not want to hear them; but I want to know the purport of them, that I may be able to judge of your mode of approaching your fair one.

Hippothales/ Ctesippus will be able to tell you; for if, as he avers, the sound of my words is always dinning in his ears, he must have a very accurate knowledge and recollection of them.

Ctesippus/ Yes, indeed; I know only too well; and very ridiculous the tale is: for although he is a lover, and very devotedly in love, he has nothing particular to talk about to his beloved which a child might not say. Now is not that ridiculous? He can only speak of the wealth of Democrates, which the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and the other ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses, and their victory at the Pythian games, and at the Isthmus, and at Nemea with four horses and single horses—these are the tales which he composes and repeats. And there is greater twaddle still. Only the day before yesterday he made a poem in which he described the entertainment of Heracles, who was a connection of the family, setting forth how in virtue of this relationship he was hospitably received by an ancestor of Lysis; this ancestor was himself begotten of Zeus by the daughter of the founder of the deme. And these are the sort of old wives' tales which he sings and recites to us, and we are obliged to listen to him.

Socrates/ When I heard this, I said: O ridiculous Hippothales! how can you be making and singing hymns in honor of yourself before you have won?

Hippothales/ But my songs and verses are not in honor of myself, Socrates.

Socrates/ You think not?

Hippothales/ Nay, but what do you think?

Socrates/ Most assuredly. Those songs are all in your own honor; for if you win your beautiful love, your discourses and songs will be a glory to you, and may be truly regarded as hymns of praise composed in honor of you who have conquered and won such a love; but if he slips away from you, the more you have praised him, the more ridiculous you will look at having lost this fairest and best of blessings; and therefore the wise lover does not praise his

beloved until he has won him, because he is afraid of accidents. There is also another danger; the fair, when anyone praises or magnifies them, are filled with the spirit of pride and vainglory. Do you not agree with me?

Hippothales/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the more vain-glorious they are, the more difficult is the capture of them?

Hippothales/ I believe you.

Socrates/ What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey, and made the capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult?

Hippothales/ He would be a bad hunter, undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Yes; and if, instead of soothing them, he were to infuriate them with words and songs, that would show a great want of wit: do you not agree?

Hippothales/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now reflect Hippothales, and see whether you are not guilty of all these errors in writing poetry. For I can hardly suppose that you will affirm a man to be a good poet who injures himself by his poetry.

Hippothales/ Assuredly not; such a poet would be a fool. And this is the reason why I take you into my counsels, Socrates, and I shall be glad of any further advice which you may have to offer. Will you tell me by what words or actions I may become endeared to my love?

Socrates/ That is not easy to determine; but if you will bring your love to me, and will let me talk with him, I may perhaps be able to show you how to converse with him, instead of singing and reciting in the fashion of which you are accused.

Hippothales/ There will be no difficulty in bringing him; if you will only go with Ctesippus into the Palaestra, and sit

down and talk, I believe that he will come of his own accord; for he is fond of listening, Socrates. And as this is the festival of the Hermaea, the young men and boys are all together, and there is no separation between them. He will be sure to come: but if he does not, Ctesippus with whom he is familiar, and whose relation Menexenus is his great friend, shall call him.

Socrates/ That will be the way.

Thereupon I led Ctesippus into the Palaestra, and the rest followed.

Upon entering we found that the boys had just been sacrificing; and this part of the festival was nearly at an end. They were all in their white array, and games at dice were going on among them. Most of them were in the outer court amusing themselves; but some were in a corner of the Apodyterium playing at odd and even with a number of dice, which they took out of little wicker baskets. There was also a circle of lookers-on; among them was Lysis. He was standing with the other boys and youths, having a crown upon his head, like a fair vision, and not less worthy of praise for his goodness than for his beauty. We left them, and went over to the opposite side of the room, where, finding a quiet place, we sat down; and then we began to talk. This attracted Lysis, who was constantly turning round to look at us—he was evidently wanting to come to us. For a time he hesitated and had not the courage to come alone; but first of all, his friend Menexenus, leaving his play, entered the Palaestra from the court, and when he saw Ctesippus and myself, was going to take a seat by us; and then Lysis, seeing him, followed, and sat down by his side; and the other boys joined. I should observe that Hippothales, when he saw the crowd, got behind them, where he thought that he would be out of sight of Lysis, lest he should anger him; and there he stood and listened.

I turned to Menexenus, and said: Son of Demophon, which of you two youths is the elder?

Menexenus/ That is a matter of dispute between us.

Socrates/ And which is the nobler? Is that also a matter of dispute?

Menexenus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And another disputed point is, which is the fairer?

The two boys laughed.

Socrates/ I shall not ask which is the richer of the two, I said; for you are friends, are you not?

Menexenus/ Certainly.

Lysis/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And friends have all things in common, so that one of you can be no richer than the other, if you say truly that you are friends.

They assented.

I was about to ask which was the juster of the two, and which was the wiser of the two; but at this moment Menexenus was called away by someone who came and said that the gymnastic-master wanted him. I supposed that he had to offer sacrifice. So he went away, and I asked Lysis some more questions. I dare say, Lysis, I said, that your father and mother love you very much.

Lysis/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And they would wish you to be perfectly happy.

Lysis/ Yes.

Socrates/ But do you think that anyone is happy who is in the condition of a slave, and who cannot do what he likes?

Lysis/ I should think not indeed.

Socrates/ And if your father and mother love you, and desire that you should be happy, no one can doubt that they are very ready to promote your happiness.

Lysis/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do they then permit you to do what you like, and never rebuke you or hinder you from doing what you desire?

Lysis/ Yes, indeed, Socrates; there are a great many things which they hinder me from doing.

Socrates/ What do you mean? Do they want you to be happy, and yet hinder you from doing what you like? for example, if you want to mount one of your father's chariots, and take the reins at a race, they will not allow you to do so—they will prevent you?

Lysis/ Certainly, they will not allow me to do so.

Socrates/ Whom then will they allow?

Lysis/ There is a charioteer, whom my father pays for driving.

Socrates/ And do they trust a hireling more than you? and may he do what he likes with the horses? and do they pay him for this?

Lysis/ They do.

Socrates/ But I dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule-cart if you like; —they will permit that?

Lysis/ Permit me! indeed they will not.

Socrates/ Then, may no one use the whip to the mules?

Lysis/ Yes, the muleteer.

Socrates/ And is he a slave or a free man?

Lysis/ A slave.

Socrates/ And do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son? And do they entrust their property to

him rather than to you? and allow him to do what he likes, when they prohibit you? Answer me now: Are you your own master, or do they not even allow that?

Lysis/ Nay; of course they do not allow it.

Socrates/ Then you have a master?

Lysis/ Yes, my tutor; there he is.

Socrates/ And is he a slave?

Lysis/ To be sure; he is our slave.

Socrates/ Surely, this is a strange thing, that a free man should be governed by a slave. And what does he do with you?

Lysis/ He takes me to my teachers.

Socrates/ You do not mean to say that your teachers also rule over you?

Lysis/ Of course they do.

Socrates/ Then I must say that your father is pleased to inflict many lords and masters on you. But at any rate when you go home to your mother, she will let you have your own way, and will not interfere with your happiness; her wool, or the piece of cloth which she is weaving, are at your disposal: I am sure that there is nothing to hinder you from touching her wooden spathe, or her comb, or any other of her spinning implements.

Lysis/ Nay, Socrates!

Socrates/ he replied, laughing;

Lysis/ Not only does she hinder me, but I should be beaten, if I were to touch one of them.

Socrates/ Well, I said, this is amazing. And did you ever behave ill to your father or your mother?

Lysis/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But why then are they so terribly anxious to prevent you from being happy, and doing as you like? — keeping you all day long in subjection to another, and, in a word, doing nothing which you desire; so that you have no good, as would appear, out of their great possessions, which are under the control of anybody rather than of you, and have no use of your own fair person, which is tended and taken care of by another; while you, Lysis, are master of nobody, and can do nothing?

Lysis/ Why, Socrates, the reason is that I am not of age.

Socrates/ I doubt whether that is the real reason; for I should imagine that your father Democrates, and your mother, do permit you to do many things already, and do not wait until you are of age: for example, if they want anything read or written, you, I presume, would be the first person in the house who is summoned by them.

Lysis/ Very true.

Socrates/ And you would be allowed to write or read the letters in any order which you please, or to take up the lyre and tune the notes, and play with the fingers, or strike with the plectrum, exactly as you please, and neither father nor mother would interfere with you.

Lysis/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then what can be the reason, Lysis, why they allow you to do the one and not the other?

Lysis/ I suppose, because I understand the one, and not the other.

Socrates/ Yes, my dear youth, the reason is not any deficiency of years, but a deficiency of knowledge; and whenever your father thinks that you are wiser than he is, he will instantly commit himself and his possessions to you.

Lysis/ I think so.

Socrates/ Aye; and about your neighbor, too, does not the same rule hold as about your father? If he is satisfied that you know more of housekeeping than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs himself, or will he commit them to you?

Lysis/ I think that he will commit them to me.

Socrates/ Will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when they see that you have wisdom enough to manage them?

Lysis/ Yes.

Socrates/ And oh! let me put another case: There is the great king, and he has an eldest son, who is the Prince of Asia; —suppose that you and I go to him and establish to his satisfaction that we are better cooks than his son, will he not entrust to us the prerogative of making soup, and putting in anything that we like while the pot is boiling, rather than to the Prince of Asia, who is his son?

Lysis/ To us, clearly.

Socrates/ And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls, whereas the son will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his fingers?

Lysis/ Of course.

Socrates/ Or suppose again that the son has bad eyes, will he allow him, or will he not allow him, to touch his own eyes if he thinks that he has no knowledge of medicine?

Lysis/ He will not allow him.

Socrates/ Whereas, if he supposes us to have a knowledge of medicine, he will allow us to do what we like with him—even to open the eyes wide and sprinkle ashes upon them, because he supposes that we know what is best?

Lysis/ That is true.

Socrates/ And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his son he will commit to us?

Lysis/ That is very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then now, my dear Lysis, you perceive that in things which we know everyone will trust us, —Hellenes and barbarians, men and women, —and we may do as we please about them, and no one will like to interfere with us; we shall be free, and masters of others; and these things will be really ours, for we shall be benefited by them. But in things of which we have no understanding, no one will trust us to do as seems good to us—they will hinder us as far as they can; and not only strangers, but father and mother, and the friend, if there be one, who is dearer still, will also hinder us; and we shall be subject to others; and these things will not be ours, for we shall not be benefited by them. Do you agree?

He assented.

And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in as far as we are useless to them?

Lysis/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anybody love anybody else, in so far as they are useless to them?

Lysis/ No.

Socrates/ And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, all men will be your friends and kindred, for you will be useful and good; but if you are not wise, neither father, nor mother, nor kindred, nor anyone else, will be your friends. And in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge, can you have any conceit of knowledge?

Lysis/ That is impossible.

Socrates/ And you, Lysis, if you require a teacher, have not yet attained to wisdom.

Lysis/ True.

Socrates/ And therefore you are not conceited, having nothing of which to be conceited.

Lysis/ Indeed, Socrates, I think not.

Socrates/ When I heard him say this, I turned to Hippothales, and was very nearly making a blunder, for I was going to say to him: That is the way, Hippothales, in which you should talk to your beloved, humbling and lowering him, and not as you do, puffing him up and spoiling him. But I saw that he was in great excitement and confusion at what had been said, and I remembered that, although he was in the neighborhood, he did not want to be seen by Lysis; so upon second thoughts I refrained.

In the meantime Menexenus came back and sat down in his place by Lysis; and Lysis, in a childish and affectionate manner, whispered privately in my ear, so that Menexenus should not hear:

Lysis/ Do, Socrates, tell Menexenus what you have been telling me.

Socrates/ Suppose that you tell him yourself, Lysis; for I am sure that you were attending.

Lysis/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Try, then, to remember the words, and be as exact as you can in repeating them to him, and if you have forgotten anything, ask me again the next time that you see me.

Lysis/ I will be sure to do so, Socrates; but go on telling him something new, and let me hear, as long as I am allowed to stay.

Socrates/ I certainly cannot refuse, since you ask me; but then, as you know, Menexenus is very pugnacious, and

therefore you must come to the rescue if he attempts to upset me.

Lysis/ Yes, indeed; he is very pugnacious, and that is the reason why I want you to argue with him.

Socrates/ That I may make a fool of myself?

Lysis/ No, indeed; but I want you to put him down.

Socrates/ That is no easy matter; for he is a terrible fellow—a pupil of Ctesippus. And there is Ctesippus himself: do you see him?

Lysis/ Never mind, Socrates, you shall argue with him.

Socrates/ Well, I suppose that I must.

Hereupon Ctesippus complained that we were talking in secret, and keeping the feast to ourselves.

I shall be happy to let you have a share. Here is Lysis, who does not understand something that I was saying, and wants me to ask Menexenus, who, as he thinks, is likely to know.

Ctesippus/ And why do you not ask him?

Socrates/ Very well, I will; and do you, Menexenus, answer. But first I must tell you that I am one who from my childhood upward have set my heart upon a certain thing. All people have their fancies; some desire horses, and others dogs; and some are fond of gold, and others of honor. Now, I have no violent desire of any of these things; but I have a passion for friends; and I would rather have a good friend than the best cock or quail in the world: I would even go further, and say the best horse or dog. Yea, by the dog of Egypt, I should greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold of Darius, or even to Darius himself: I am such a lover of friends as that. And when I see you and Lysis, at your early age, so easily possessed of this treasure, and so soon, he of you, and you of him, I am amazed and delighted, seeing that

I myself, although I am now advanced in years, am so far from having made a similar acquisition, that I do not even know in what way a friend is acquired. But I want to ask you a question about this, for you have experience: tell me then, when one loves another, is the lover or the beloved the friend; or may either be the friend?

Menexenus/ Either may, I should think, be the friend of either.

Socrates/ Do you mean that if only one of them loves the other, they are mutual friends?

Menexenus/ Yes; that is my meaning.

Socrates/ But what if the lover is not loved in return? Which is a very possible case.

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Or is, perhaps, even hated? which is a fancy which sometimes is entertained by lovers respecting their beloved. Nothing can exceed their love; and yet they imagine either that they are not loved in return, or that they are hated. Is not that true?

Menexenus/ Yes, quite true.

Socrates/ In that case, the one loves, and the other is loved?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then which is the friend of which? Is the lover the friend of the beloved, whether he be loved in return, or hated; or is the beloved the friend; or is there no friendship at all on either side, unless they both love one another?

Menexenus/ There would seem to be none at all.

Socrates/ Then this notion is not in accordance with our previous one. We were saying that both were friends, if one only loved; but now, unless they both love, neither is a friend.

Menexenus/ That appears to be true.

Socrates/ Then nothing which does not love in return is beloved by a lover?

Menexenus/ I think not.

Socrates/ Then they are not lovers of horses, whom the horses do not love in return; nor lovers of quails, nor of dogs, nor of wine, nor of gymnastic exercises, who have no return of love; no, nor of wisdom, unless wisdom loves them in return. Or shall we say that they do love them, although they are not beloved by them; and that the poet was wrong who sings—

'Happy the man to whom his children are dear, and steeds having single hoofs, and dogs of chase, and the stranger of another land'?

Menexenus/ I do not think that he was wrong.

Socrates/ You think that he is right?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, Menexenus, the conclusion is, that what is beloved, whether loving or hating, may be dear to the lover of it: for example, very young children, too young to love, or even hating their father or mother when they are punished by them, are never dearer to them than at the time when they are being hated by them.

Menexenus/ I think that what you say is true.

Socrates/ And, if so, not the lover, but the beloved, is the friend or dear one?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the hated one, and not the hater, is the enemy?

Menexenus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then many men are loved by their enemies, and hated by their friends, and are the friends of their

enemies, and the enemies of their friends. Yet how absurd, my dear friend, or indeed impossible is this paradox of a man being an enemy to his friend or a friend to his enemy.

Menexenus/ I quite agree, Socrates, in what you say.

Socrates/ But if this cannot be, the lover will be the friend of that which is loved?

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated?

Menexenus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Yet we must acknowledge in this, as in the preceding instance, that a man may be the friend of one who is not his friend, or who may be his enemy, when he loves that which does not love him or which even hates him. And he may be the enemy of one who is not his enemy, and is even his friend: for example, when he hates that which does not hate him, or which even loves him.

Menexenus/ That appears to be true.

Socrates/ But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both together, what are we to say? Whom are we to call friends to one another? Do any remain?

Menexenus/ Indeed, Socrates, I cannot find any.

Socrates/ But, O Menexenus! May we not have been altogether wrong in our conclusions?

Lysis/ I am sure that we have been wrong, Socrates.

Socrates/ And he blushed as he spoke, the words seeming to come from his lips involuntarily, because his whole mind was taken up with the argument; there was no mistaking his attentive look while he was listening.

I was pleased at the interest which was shown by Lysis, and I wanted to give Menexenus a rest, so I turned to him and said, I think, Lysis, that what you say is true, and that,

if we had been right, we should never have gone so far wrong; let us proceed no further in this direction (for the road seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other path into which we turned, and see what the poets have to say; for they are to us in a manner the fathers and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends in no light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, makes them and draws them to one another; and this they express, if I am not mistaken, in the following words: —

'God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted.'

I dare say that you have heard those words.

Lysis/ Yes; I have.

Socrates/ And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say that like must love like? they are the people who argue and write about nature and the universe.

Lysis/ Very true.

Socrates/ And are they right in saying this?

Lysis/ They may be.

Socrates/ Perhaps, about half, or possibly, altogether, right, if their meaning were rightly apprehended by us. For the more a bad man has to do with a bad man, and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him, the more he will be likely to hate him, for he injures him; and injurer and injured cannot be friends. Is not that true?

Lysis/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one another?

Lysis/ That is true.

Socrates/ But the real meaning of the saying, as I imagine, is, that the good are like one another, and friends to one another; and that the bad, as is often said of them,

are never at unity with one another or with themselves; for they are passionate and restless, and anything which is at variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or harmony with any other thing. Do you not agree?

Lysis/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, those who say that the like is friendly to the like mean to intimate, if I rightly apprehend them, that the good only is the friend of the good, and of him only; but that the evil never attains to any real friendship, either with good or evil. Do you agree?

He nodded assent.

Then now we know how to answer the question 'Who are friends?' for the argument declares 'That the good are friends.'

Lysis/ Yes, that is true.

Socrates/ Yes; and yet I am not quite satisfied with this answer. By heaven, and shall I tell you what I suspect? I will. Assuming that like, inasmuch as he is like, is the friend of like, and useful to him—or rather let me try another way of putting the matter: Can like do any good or harm to like which he could not do to himself, or suffer anything from his like which he would not suffer from himself? And if neither can be of any use to the other, how can they be loved by one another? Can they now?

Lysis/ They cannot.

Socrates/ And can he who is not loved be a friend?

Lysis/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is like; still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is good?

Lysis/ True.

Socrates/ But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be sufficient for himself?

Lysis/ Certainly he will.

Socrates/ And he who is sufficient wants nothing—that is implied in the word sufficient.

Lysis/ Of course not.

Socrates/ And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?

Lysis/ He will not.

Socrates/ Neither can he love that which he does not desire?

Lysis/ He cannot.

Socrates/ And he who loves not is not a lover or friend?

Lysis/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ What place then is there for friendship, if, when absent, good men have no need of one another (for even when alone they are sufficient for themselves), and when present have no use of one another? How can such persons ever be induced to value one another?

Lysis/ They cannot.

Socrates/ And friends they cannot be, unless they value one another?

Lysis/ Very true.

Socrates/ But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this—are we not indeed entirely wrong?

Lysis/ How so?

Socrates/ Have I not heard someone say, as I just now recollect, that the like is the greatest enemy of the like, the good of the good? —Yes, and he quoted the authority of Hesiod, who says:

> 'Potter quarrels with potter, bard with bard,
> Beggar with beggar;'

and of all other things he affirmed, in like manner, 'That of necessity the most like are most full of envy, strife, and hatred of one another, and the most unlike, of friendship. For the poor man is compelled to be the friend of the rich, and the weak requires the aid of the strong, and the sick man of the physician; and everyone who is ignorant, has to love and court him who knows.' And indeed he went on to say in grandiloquent language, that the idea of friendship existing between similars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth, and that the most opposed are the most friendly; for that everything desires not like but that which is most unlike: for example, the dry desires the moist, the cold the hot, the bitter the sweet, the sharp the blunt, the void the full, the full the void, and so of all other things; for the opposite is the food of the opposite, whereas like receives nothing from like. And I thought that he who said this was a charming man, and that he spoke well. What do the rest of you say?

Menexenus/ I should say, at first hearing, that he is right.

Socrates/ Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?

Menexenus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will not the all-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph, and ask, fairly enough, whether love is not the very opposite of hate; and what answer shall we make to them—must we not admit that they speak the truth?

Menexenus/ We must.

Socrates/ They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?

Menexenus/ Neither.

Socrates/ Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of the intemperate, or the good of the bad?

Menexenus/ I do not see how that is possible.

Socrates/ And yet, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must be friends.

Menexenus/ They must.

Socrates/ Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends.

Menexenus/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of friendship be erroneous? but may not that which is neither good nor evil still in some cases be the friend of the good?

Menexenus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Why really, the truth is that I do not know; but my head is dizzy with thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the conjecture, that 'the beautiful is the friend,' as the old proverb says. Beauty is certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and therefore of a nature which easily slips in and permeates our souls. For I affirm that the good is the beautiful. You will agree to that?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good nor evil is the friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will tell you why I am inclined to think so: I assume that there are three principles—the good, the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad. You would agree—would you not?

Menexenus/ I agree.

Socrates/ And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the evil, nor the good of the evil; —these alternatives are excluded by the previous argument; and

therefore, if there be such a thing as friendship or love at all, we must infer that what is neither good nor evil must be the friend, either of the good, or of that which is neither good nor evil, for nothing can be the friend of the bad.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ But neither can like be the friend of like, as we were just now saying.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ And if so, that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which is neither good nor evil.

Menexenus/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ Then the good alone is the friend of that only which is neither good nor evil.

Menexenus/ That may be assumed to be certain.

Socrates/ And does not this seem to put us in the right way? Just remark, that the body which is in health requires neither medical nor any other aid, but is well enough; and the healthy man has no love of the physician, because he is in health.

Menexenus/ He has none.

Socrates/ But the sick loves him, because he is sick?

Menexenus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful thing?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the human body, regarded as a body, is neither good nor evil?

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends of the art of medicine?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by reason of the presence of evil?

Menexenus/ So we may infer.

Socrates/ And clearly this must have happened before that which was neither good nor evil had become altogether corrupted with the element of evil—if itself had become evil it would not still desire and love the good; for, as we were saying, the evil cannot be the friend of the good.

Menexenus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Further, I must observe that some substances are assimilated when others are present with them; and there are some which are not assimilated: take, for example, the case of an ointment or color which is put on another substance.

Menexenus/ Very good.

Socrates/ In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the color or ointment?

Menexenus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ This is what I mean: Suppose that I were to cover your auburn locks with white lead, would they be really white, or would they only appear to be white?

Menexenus/ They would only appear to be white.

Socrates/ And yet whiteness would be present in them?

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the presence of white in them—they would not be white any more than black?

Menexenus/ No.

Socrates/ But when old age infuses whiteness into them, then they become assimilated, and are white by the presence of white.

Menexenus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated by the presence of another substance; or must the presence be after a peculiar sort?

Menexenus/ The latter.

Socrates/ Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil, but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when anything is in the presence of evil, not being as yet evil, the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing; but the presence of evil, which makes a thing evil, takes away the desire and friendship of the good; for that which was once both good and evil has now become evil only, and the good was supposed to have no friendship with the evil?

Menexenus/ None.

Socrates/ And therefore we say that those who are already wise, whether Gods or men, are no longer lovers of wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom who are ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or ignorant person is a lover of wisdom. There remain those who have the misfortune to be ignorant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what they do not know: and therefore those who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet neither good nor bad. But the bad do not love wisdom any more than the good; for, as we have already seen, neither is unlike the friend of unlike, nor like of like. You remember that?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Lysis/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered the nature of friendship—there can be no doubt of it: Friendship is the love which by reason of the presence

of evil the neither good nor evil has of the good, either in the soul, or in the body, or anywhere.

They both agreed and entirely assented, and for a moment I rejoiced and was satisfied like a huntsman just holding fast his prey. But then a most unaccountable suspicion came across me, and I felt that the conclusion was untrue. I was pained, and said, Alas! Lysis and Menexenus, I am afraid that we have been grasping at a shadow only.

Menexenus/ Why do you say so?

Socrates/ I am afraid, that the argument about friendship is false: arguments, like men, are often pretenders.

Menexenus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Well; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend of someone; is he not?

Menexenus/ Certainly he is.

Socrates/ And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive and object?

Menexenus/ He has a motive and object.

Socrates/ And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, or neither dear nor hateful to him?

Menexenus/ I do not quite follow you.

Socrates/ I do not wonder at that. But perhaps, if I put the matter in another way, you will be able to follow me, and my own meaning will be clearer to myself. The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend of the physician—is he not?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the sake of health?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And disease is an evil?

Menexenus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what of health? Is that good or evil, or neither?

Menexenus/ Good.

Socrates/ And we were saying, I believe, that the body being neither good nor evil, because of disease, that is to say because of evil, is the friend of medicine, and medicine is a good: and medicine has entered into this friendship for the sake of health, and health is a good.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ And is health a friend, or not a friend?

Menexenus/ A friend.

Socrates/ And disease is an enemy?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good because of the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the friend?

Menexenus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of the enemy?

Menexenus/ That is to be inferred.

Socrates/ Then at this point, my boys, let us take heed, and be on our guard against deceptions. I will not again repeat that the friend is the friend of the friend, and the like of the like, which has been declared by us to be an impossibility; but, in order that this new statement may not delude us, let us attentively examine another point, which I will proceed to explain: Medicine, as we were saying, is a friend, or dear to us for the sake of health?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And health is also dear?

Menexenus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if dear, then dear for the sake of something?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previous admissions?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that something dear involves something else dear?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But then, proceeding in this way, shall we not arrive at some first principle of friendship or dearness which is not capable of being referred to any other, for the sake of which, as we maintain, all other things are dear, and, having there arrived, we shall stop?

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ My fear is that all those other things, which, as we say, are dear for the sake of another, are illusions and deceptions only, but where that first principle is, there is the true ideal of friendship. Let me put the matter thus: Suppose the case of a great treasure (this may be a son, who is more precious to his father than all his other treasures); would not the father, who values his son above all things, value other things also for the sake of his son? I mean, for instance, if he knew that his son had drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would save him, he would value the wine?

Menexenus/ He would.

Socrates/ And also the vessel which contains the wine?

Menexenus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen vessel which contains them, equally

with his son? Is not this rather the true state of the case? All his anxiety has regard not to the means which are provided for the sake of an object, but to the object for the sake of which they are provided. And although we may often say that gold and silver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth; for there is a further object, whatever it may be, which we value most of all, and for the sake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by us. Am I not right?

Menexenus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And may not the same be said of the friend? That which is only dear to us for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but the truly dear is that in which all these so-called dear friendships terminate.

Menexenus/ That appears to be true.

Socrates/ And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the sake of any other or further dear.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further object. May we then infer that the good is the friend?

Menexenus/ I think so.

Socrates/ And the good is loved for the sake of the evil? Let me put the case in this way: Suppose that of the three principles, good, evil, and that which is neither good nor evil, there remained only the good and the neutral, and that evil went far away, and in no way affected soul or body, nor ever at all that class of things which, as we say, are neither good nor evil in themselves; —would the good be of any use, or other than useless to us? For if there were nothing to hurt us any longer, we should have no need of anything that would do us good. Then would be clearly seen that we did but love and desire the good because of the evil, and as the remedy of the evil, which was the disease; but if there had

been no disease, there would have been no need of a remedy. Is not this the nature of the good—to be loved by us who are placed between the two, because of the evil? but there is no use in the good for its own sake.

Menexenus/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ Then the final principle of friendship, in which all other friendships terminated, those, I mean, which are relatively dear and for the sake of something else, is of another and a different nature from them. For they are called dear because of another dear or friend. But with the true friend or dear, the case is quite the reverse; for that is proved to be dear because of the hated, and if the hated were away it would be no longer dear.

Menexenus/ Very true: at any rate not if our present view holds good.

Socrates/ But, oh! will you tell me whether if evil were to perish, we should hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar desire? Or may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain, but not so as to be hurtful? And the same of thirst and the other desires, —that they will remain, but will not be evil because evil has perished? Or rather shall I say, that to ask what either will be then or will not be is ridiculous, for who knows? This we do know, that in our present condition hunger may injure us, and may also benefit us: —Is not that true?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good and sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the other?

Menexenus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not evil should perish with it?

Menexenus/ None.

Socrates/ Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor evil will remain?

Menexenus/ Clearly they will.

Socrates/ And must not a man love that which he desires and affects?

Menexenus/ He must.

Socrates/ Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of love or friendship?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But not if evil is the cause of friendship: for in that case nothing will be the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil; for the effect cannot remain when the cause is destroyed.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a reason? and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion that the neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil?

Menexenus/ Very true.

Socrates/ But now our view is changed, and we conceive that there must be some other cause of friendship?

Menexenus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ May not the truth be rather, as we were saying just now, that desire is the cause of friendship; for that which desires is dear to that which is desired at the time of desiring it? and may not the other theory have been only a long story about nothing?

Menexenus/ Likely enough.

Socrates/ But surely, he who desires, desires that of which he is in want?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that of which he is in want is dear to him?

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ And he is in want of that of which he is deprived?

Menexenus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then love, and desire, and friendship would appear to be of the natural or congenial. Such, Lysis and Menexenus, is the inference.

They assented.

Then if you are friends, you must have natures which are congenial to one another?

Menexenus/ Certainly.

Lysis/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And I say, my boys, that no one who loves or desires another would ever have loved or desired or affected him, if he had not been in some way congenial to him, either in his soul, or in his character, or in his manners, or in his form.

Menexenus/ Yes, yes.

Socrates/ Lysis was silent.

Then, the conclusion is, that what is of a congenial nature must be loved.

Menexenus/ It follows.

Socrates/ Then the lover, who is true and no counterfeit, must of necessity be loved by his love.

Lysis and Menexenus gave a faint assent to this; and Hippothales changed into all manner of colors with delight.

Here, intending to revise the argument, I said: Can we point out any difference between the congenial and the like? For if that is possible, then I think, Lysis and Menexenus, there may be some sense in our argument about friendship.

But if the congenial is only the like, how will you get rid of the other argument, of the uselessness of like to like in as far as they are like; for to say that what is useless is dear, would be absurd? Suppose, then, that we agree to distinguish between the congenial and the like—in the intoxication of argument, that may perhaps be allowed.

Menexenus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And shall we further say that the good is congenial, and the evil uncongenial to everyone? Or again that the evil is congenial to the evil, and the good to the good; and that which is neither good nor evil to that which is neither good nor evil?

They agreed to the latter alternative.

Then, my boys, we have again fallen into the old discarded error; for the unjust will be the friend of the unjust, and the bad of the bad, as well as the good of the good.

Menexenus/ That appears to be the result.

Socrates/ But again, if we say that the congenial is the same as the good, in that case the good and he only will be the friend of the good.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ But that too was a position of ours which, as you will remember, has been already refuted by ourselves.

Menexenus/ We remember.

Socrates/ Then what is to be done? Or rather is there anything to be done? I can only, like the wise men who argue in courts, sum up the arguments: —If neither the beloved, nor the lover, nor the like, nor the unlike, nor the good, nor the congenial, nor any other of whom we spoke—for there were such a number of them that I cannot remember all—if none of these are friends, I know not what remains to be said.

Here I was going to invite the opinion of some older person, when suddenly we were interrupted by the tutors of Lysis and Menexenus, who came upon us like an evil apparition with their brothers, and bade them go home, as it was getting late. At first, we and the by-standers drove them off; but afterwards, as they would not mind, and only went on shouting in their barbarous dialect, and got angry, and kept calling the boys—they appeared to us to have been drinking rather too much at the Hermaea, which made them difficult to manage—we fairly gave way and broke up the company.

I said, however, a few words to the boys at parting: O Menexenus and Lysis, how ridiculous that you two boys, and I, an old boy, who would fain be one of you, should imagine ourselves to be friends—this is what the by-standers will go away and say—and as yet we have not been able to discover what is a friend!

Lysis

Translated by Stanley Lombardo.

Persons of the Dialog
Socrates, Menexenus,
Hippothales, Lysis, Ctesippus

Socrates/ I was on my way from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, following the road just outside and beneath the wall; and when I got to the little gate by Panops spring, I happened to meet Hippothales, Hieronymus' son, and Ctesippus of Paeania, and with them some other young men standing together in a group. Seeing me coming, Hippothales said;

Hippothales/ "Hey, Socrates, where are you coming from and where are you going?"

Socrates/ "From the Academy, straight to the Lyceum."

Hippothales/ "Well, come straight over here to us, why don't you? You won't come? It's worth your while, I assure you."

Socrates/ "Where do you mean, and who all are you?"

Hippothales/ "Over here.

Socrates/ Showing me an open door and an enclosed area just facing the wall.

Hippothales/ "A lot of us spend our time here. There are quite a few besides ourselves—and they're all good-looking."

Socrates/ "What is this, and what do you do here?"

Hippothales/ "This is a new wrestling-school, "just built. But we spend most of our time discussing things, and we'd be glad to have you join in."

Socrates/ "How very nice. And who is the teacher here?"

Hippothales/ "Your old friend and admirer, Mikkos."

Socrates/ “Well, God knows, he’s a serious person and a competent instructor.”

Hippothales/ “Well, then, won’t you please come in and see who’s here?”

Socrates/ “First I'd like to hear what I’m coming in for—and the name of the best-looking member.”

Hippothales/ “Each of us has a different opinion on who that is, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “So tell me, Hippothales, who do you think it is?”

He blushed at the question, so I said, “Aha! You don’t have to answer that, Hippothales, for me to tell whether you’re in love with any of these boys or not—I can see that you are not only in love but pretty far gone too. I may not be much good at anything else, but I have this god-given ability to tell pretty quickly when someone is in love, and who he’s in love with.”

When he heard this he really blushed, which made Ctesippus say;

Ctesippus/ “O very cute, Hippothales, blushing and too embarrassed to tell Socrates the name. But if he spends any time at all with you he’ll be driven to distraction hearing you say it so often. We’re all just about deaf, Socrates, from all the ‘Lysis’ he’s poured into our ears. And if he’s been drinking, odds are we’ll wake up in the middle of the night thinking we hear Lysis’ name. As bad as all this is in normal conversation, it’s nothing compared to when he drowns us with his poems and prose pieces. And worst of all, he actually sings odes to his beloved in a weird voice, which we have to put up with listening to. And now when you ask him the name he blushes!”

Socrates/ “Lysis must be pretty young. I say that because the name doesn’t register with me.”

Ctesippus/ “That’s because they don’t call him by his own name much. He still goes by his father’s name, because his

father is so famous. I'm sure you know what the boy looks like; his looks are enough to know him by."

Socrates/ "Tell me whose son he is.

Ctesippus/ "He's the oldest son of Democrates of Aexone."

Socrates/ "Well, congratulations, Hippothales, on finding someone so spirited and noble to love! Now come on and perform for me what you've performed for your friends here, so that I can see if you know what a lover ought to say about his boyfriend to his face, or to others."

Hippothales/ "Do you think what he says really counts for anything, Socrates?"

Socrates/ "Are you denying that you are in love with the one he says you are?"

Hippothales/ "No, but I am denying that I write love poems about him and all."

Ctesippus/ "The man's not well, he's raving."

Socrates/ "O.K., Hippothales. I don't need to hear any poems or songs you may or may not have composed about the boy. Just give me the general sense, so I'll know how you deal with him."

Hippothales/ "Well why don't you ask Ctesippus? He must have total recall of it all, from what he says about it being drummed into his head from listening to me."

Ctesippus/ "You bet I do, and it's pretty ridiculous too, Socrates. I mean, here he is, completely fixated on this boy and totally unable to say anything more original to him than any child could say. How ridiculous can you get? All he can think of to say or write is stuff the whole city goes around singing—poems about Democrates and the boy's grandfather Lysis and all his ancestors, their wealth and their stables and their victories at the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean Games in the chariot races and the horseback races. And then he gets

into the really ancient history. Just the day before yesterday he was reciting some poem to us about Heracles being entertained by one of their ancestors because he was related to the hero—something about him being a son of Zeus and the daughter of their deme's founding father—old women's spinning-songs, really. This is the sort of thing he recites and sings, Socrates, and forces us to listen to."

Socrates/ When I heard that I said, "Hippothales, you deserve to be ridiculed. Do you really compose and sing your own victory-ode before you've won?"

Hippothales/ "I don't compose or sing victory-odes for myself, Socrates."

Socrates/ "You only think you don't."

Hippothales/ "How is that?"

Socrates/ "You are really what these songs are all about. If you make a conquest of a boy like this, then everything you've said and sung turns out to eulogize yourself as victor in having won such a boyfriend. But if he gets away, then the greater your praise of his beauty and goodness, the more you will seem to have lost and the more you will be ridiculed. This is why the skilled lover doesn't praise his beloved until he has him: he fears how the future may turn out. And besides, these good-looking boys, if anybody praises them, get swelled heads and start to think they're really somebody. Doesn't it seem that way to you?"

Hippothales/ "It certainly does."

Socrates/ "And the more swell-headed they get, the harder they are to catch."

Hippothales/ "So it seems."

Socrates/ "Well, what do you think of a hunter who scares off his game and makes it harder to catch?"

Hippothales/ "He's pretty poor."

Socrates/ “And isn’t it a gross misuse of language and music to drive things wild rather than to soothe and charm?”

Hippothales/ “Well, yes.”

Socrates/ “Then be careful, Hippothales, that you don’t make yourself guilty of all these things through your poetry. I don’t imagine you would say that a man who hurts himself, by his poetry, is at all a good poet—after all, he does hurt himself.”

Hippothales/ “No, of course not.” “That wouldn’t make any sense at all. But that’s just why I’m telling you all this, Socrates. What different advice can you give me about what one should say or do so his prospective boyfriend will like him?”

Socrates/ “That’s not easy to say. But if you’re willing to have him talk with me, I might be able to give you a demonstration of how to carry on a conversation with him instead of talking and singing the way your friends here say you’ve been doing.”

Hippothales/ “That’s easy enough.” “If you go in with Ctesippus here and sit down and start a conversation, I think he will come up to you by himself. He really likes to listen, Socrates. And besides, they’re celebrating the festival of Hermes, so the younger and older boys are mingled together. Anyway, he’ll probably come up to you; but if he doesn’t, he and Ctesippus know one another because Ctesippus’ nephew is Menexenus, and Menexenus is Lysis’ closest companion. So have Ctesippus call him if he doesn’t come by himself.”

Socrates/ “That’s what I’ll have to do,” I said, and, taking Ctesippus with me, I went into the wrestling-school, followed by the others. When we got inside we found that the boys had finished the sacrifice and the ritual and, still all dressed up, were starting to play knucklebones. Most of them were playing in the courtyard outside, but some of them were over in a

corner of the dressing-room playing with a great many knucklebones, which they drew from little baskets. Still others were standing around watching this group, and among them was Lysis. He stood out among the boys and older youths, a garland on his head, and deserved to be called not only a beautiful boy but a well-bred young gentleman. We went over to the other side of the room, where it was quiet, sat down, and started up a conversation among ourselves. Lysis kept turning around and looking at us, obviously wanting to come over, but too shy to do so alone. After a while Menexenus, taking a break from his game in the court, came in, and, when he saw Ctesippus and me, he came to take a seat beside us. Lysis saw him and followed over, sitting down together with Menexenus next to him, and then all the others came too. When Hippothales (let's not forget about him) saw that a small crowd had gathered, he took up a position in the rear where he thought Lysis wouldn't see him—afraid he might annoy him—and listened from his outpost.

Then I looked at Menexenus and asked him, "Son of Demophon, which of you two is older?"

Menexenus/ "We argue about that."

Socrates/ "Then you probably disagree about which one has the nobler family too.

Menexenus/ "Very much so."

Socrates/ "And likewise about which one is better looking." They both laughed.

"Naturally, I won't ask which of you two is richer. For you two are friends, isn't that so?"

Menexenus/ "Definitely."

Socrates/ "And friends have everything in common, as the saying goes; so in this respect the two of you won't differ, that is, if what you said about being friends is true."

They agreed.

I was about to ask them next which of them was juster and wiser when somebody came in to get Menexenus, saying that the trainer was calling him. It seemed he still had some part to play in the ceremony, and so off he went. I asked Lysis then, "Am I right in assuming, Lysis, that your father and mother love you very much?"

Lysis/ "Oh, yes."

Socrates/ "Then they would like you to be as happy as possible, right?"

Lysis/ "Naturally."

Socrates/ "Well, do you think a man is happy if he's a slave and is not permitted to do whatever he likes?"

Lysis/ "No, by Zeus, I don't think so."

Socrates/ "Well, then, if your father and mother love you and want you to be happy, it's clear that they must be extremely concerned to make sure that you are happy."

Lysis/ "Well, of course."

Socrates/ "So they allow you to do as you please, and they never scold you or stop you from doing whatever you want to do."

Lysis/ "Not true, Socrates. There are a whole lot of things they don't let me do."

Socrates/ "What do you mean? They want you to be happy but they stop you from doing what you want? Well, tell me this. Suppose you have your heart set on driving one of your father's chariots and holding the reins in a race. You mean they won't let you?"

Lysis/ "That's right. They won't let me."

Socrates/ "Well, whom do they let drive it?"

Lysis/ "There's a charioteer who gets a salary from my father."

Socrates/ “What? They trust a hired hand instead of you to do whatever he likes with the horses, and they actually pay him for doing that?”

Lysis/ “Well, yes.”

Socrates/ “But I suppose they trust you to drive the mule-team, and if you wanted to take the whip and lash them, they would let you?”

Lysis/ “Why ever would they?”

Socrates/ “Is anyone allowed to whip them?”

Lysis/ “Sure, “the muleteer.”

Socrates/ “A slave or free?”

Lysis/ “A slave.”

Socrates/ “It seems, then, that your parents think more even of a slave than their own son and trust him rather than you with their property and let him do what he wants, but prevent you. But tell me one more thing. Do they allow you to be in charge of your own life, or do they not trust you even that far?”

Lysis/ “Are you kidding?”

Socrates/ “Who is in charge of you, then?”

Lysis/ “My guardian here.”

Socrates/ “He’s a slave, isn’t he?”

Lysis/ “What else? He’s ours, anyway.”

Socrates/ “Pretty strange, a free man directed by a slave. How does this guardian direct you; I mean, what does he do?”

Lysis/ “Mostly he takes me to school.”

Socrates/ “And your schoolteachers, they’re not in charge of you too, are they?”

Lysis/ “They sure are!”

Socrates/ “It looks like your father has decided to put quite a few masters and dictators over you. But what about when

you come home to your mother, does she let you do whatever it takes to make you happy, like playing with her wool or her loom when she's weaving? She doesn't stop you from touching the blade or the comb or any of her other wool-working tools, does she?"

Lysis/ "Stop me? She would beat me if I laid a finger on them."

Socrates/ "Good gracious! You must have committed some kind of terrible offense against your father or mother."

Lysis/ "No, I swear!"

Socrates/ "Then why in the world do they so strangely prevent you from being happy and doing what you like? And why are they raising you in a perpetual condition of servitude to someone or other, day in and day out? Why do you hardly ever get to do what you want to do? The upshot is, it seems, that your many and varied possessions do you no good at all. Everybody but you has charge of them, and this extends to your own person, which, well-born though it is, somebody else tends and takes care of—while you, Lysis, control nothing, and get to do nothing you want to do."

Lysis/ "Well, Socrates, that's because I haven't come of age yet."

Socrates/ "That can't be it, son of Democrates, since there are some things, I imagine, that your father and mother trust you with without waiting for you to come of age. For instance, when they want someone to read or write for them, I'll bet that you, of everyone in the household, are their first choice for the job. Right?"

Lysis/ "Right."

Socrates/ "And nobody tells you which letter to write first and which second, and the same goes for reading. And when you take up your lyre, I'll bet neither your father nor mother

stop you from tightening or loosening whatever string you wish, or from using a plectrum or just your fingers to play."

Lysis/ "No, they don't."

Socrates/ "Then what's going on? What's the reason they let you have your way here, but not in all the cases we've been talking about?"

Lysis/ "I suppose it's because I understand these things but not those."

Socrates/ "Aha! So your father isn't waiting for you to come of age before he trusts you with everything; but come the day when he thinks that you know more than he does, he'll trust you with himself and everything that belongs to him."

Lysis/ "I guess so."

Socrates/ "Well, then, what about your neighbor? Would he use the same rule of thumb as your father about you? When he thinks you know more about managing his estate than he does, will he trust you to do it, or will he manage it himself?"

Lysis/ "I suppose he will trust me to do it."

Socrates/ "And how about the Athenians? Do you think they will trust you with their affairs when they perceive that you know enough?"

Lysis/ "I sure do."

Socrates/ "Well, by Zeus, let's not stop here. What about the Great King? Would he trust his eldest son, crown prince of Asia, to add whatever he likes to the royal stew, or would he trust us, provided we went before him and gave him a convincing demonstration of our superior culinary acumen?"

Lysis/ "Why, us, of course."

Socrates/ "And he wouldn't let his son put the least little bit into the pot, but we could throw in fistfuls of salt if we wanted to."

Lysis/ “Right.”

Socrates/ “What about if his son had something wrong with his eyes, would he let him treat his own eyes, knowing he wasn’t a doctor, or would he prevent him?”

Lysis/ “Prevent him.”

Socrates/ “But, if he thought we were doctors, he wouldn’t stop us even if we pried his eyes open and smeared ashes in them, because he would think we knew what we were doing.”

Lysis/ “True.”

Socrates/ “So … he would trust us, rather than himself or his son, with all his business, as long as we seemed to him more skilled than either of them.”

Lysis/ “He would have to, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Then this is the way it is, my dear Lysis: in those areas where we really understand something everybody—Greeks and barbarians, men and women—will trust us, and there we will act just as we choose, and nobody will want to get in our way. There we will be free ourselves, and in control of others. There things will belong to us, because we will derive some advantage from them. But in areas where we haven’t got any understanding, no one will trust us to act as we judge best, but everybody will do their best to stop us, and not only strangers, but also our mother and father and anyone else even more intimate. And there we are going to be subject to the orders of others; there things are not going to be ours because we are not going to derive any advantage from them. Do you agree this is how it is?”

Lysis/ “I agree.”

Socrates/ “Well, then, are we going to be anyone’s friend, or is anyone going to love us as a friend in those areas in which we are good for nothing?”

Lysis/ “Not at all.”

Socrates/ “So it turns out that your father does not love you, nor does anyone love anyone else, so far as that person is useless.”

Lysis/ “It doesn’t look like it.”

Socrates/ “But if you become wise, my boy, then everybody will be your friend, everybody will feel close to you, because you will be useful and good. If you don’t become wise, though, nobody will be your friend, not even your father or mother or your close relatives.”

“Now, tell me, Lysis, is it possible to be high-minded in areas where one hasn’t yet had one’s mind trained?”

Menexenus/ “How could anyone?”

Socrates/ “And if you need a teacher, your mind is not yet trained.”

Lysis/ “True.”

Socrates/ “Then you’re not high-minded either—since you don’t have a mind of your own.”

Lysis/ “You’ve got me there, Socrates!”

Socrates/ Hearing his last answer I glanced over at Hippothales and almost made the mistake of saying: “This is how you should talk with your boyfriends, Hippothales, cutting them down to size and putting them in their place, instead of swelling them up and spoiling them, as you do.” But when I saw how anxious and upset he was over what we were saying, I remembered how he had positioned himself so as to escape Lysis’ notice, so I bit my tongue. In the middle of all this, Menexenus came back and sat down next to Lysis, where he had been before. Then Lysis turned to me with a good deal of boyish friendliness and, unnoticed by Menexenus, whispered in my ear:

Lysis/ “Socrates, tell Menexenus what you’ve been saying to me.”

Socrates/ “Why don’t you tell him yourself, Lysis? You gave it your complete attention.”

Lysis/ “I certainly did.”

Socrates/ “Then try as hard as you can to remember it, so that you can tell it all to him clearly. But if you forget any of it, ask me about it again the next time you run into me.”

Lysis/ “I will, Socrates; you can count on it. But talk to him about something else, so I can listen too until it’s time to go home.”

Socrates/ “Well, I guess I’ll have to, since it’s you who ask. But you’ve got to come to my rescue if he tries to refute me. Or don’t you know what a debater he is?”

Lysis/ “Sure I do—he’s very much one. That’s why I want you to have a discussion with him.”

Socrates/ “So that I can make a fool of myself?”

Lysis/ “No, so you can teach him a lesson!”

Socrates/ “What are you talking about? He’s very clever, and Ctesippus’ student at that. And look, Ctesippus himself is here!”

Lysis/ “Never mind about anybody else, Socrates. Just go on and start discussing with him.”

Socrates/ “Discuss we shall.

Our little tete-a-tete was interrupted by Ctesippus’ asking:

Ctesippus/ “Is this a private party between you two, or do we get a share of the conversation?”

Socrates/ “Of course you get a share! Lysis here doesn’t quite understand something I’ve been saying, but he says he thinks Menexenus knows and wants me to ask him.”

Ctesippus/ “Why don’t you ask him then?”

Socrates/ “That’s just what I’m going to do. So, Menexenus, tell me something. Ever since I was a boy there’s a certain thing I’ve always wanted to possess. You know how it is,

everybody is different: one person wants to own horses, another dogs, another wants money, and another fame. Well, I'm pretty lukewarm about those things, but when it comes to having friends I'm absolutely passionate, and I would rather have a good friend than the best quail or gamecock known to man, and, I swear by Zeus above, more than any horse or dog. There's no doubt in my mind, by the Dog, that I would rather possess a friend than all Darius' gold, or even than Darius himself. That's how much I value friends and companions. And that's why, when I see you and Lysis together, I'm really amazed; I think it's wonderful that you two have been able to acquire this possession so quickly and easily while you're still so young. Because you have in fact, each of you, gotten the other as a true friend—and quickly too. And here I am, so far from having this possession that I don't even know how one person becomes the friend of another, which is exactly what I want to question you about, since you have experience of it.

"So tell me: when someone loves someone else, which of the two becomes the friend of the other, the one who loves or the one who is loved? Or is there no difference?"

Menexenus/ "I don't see any difference."

Socrates/ "Do you mean, that they both become each other's friend when only one of them loves the other?"

Menexenus/ "It seems so to me."

Socrates/ "Well, what about this: Isn't it possible for someone who loves somebody not to be loved by him in return?"

Menexenus/ "Yes, it's possible."

Socrates/ "And isn't it possible for him even to be hated? Isn't this how men are often treated by the young boys they are in love with? They are deeply in love, but they feel that they are not loved back, or even that they are hated. Don't you think this is true?"

Menexenus/ “Very true.”

Socrates/ “In a case like this, one person loves and the other is loved. Right?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Then which is the friend of the other? Is the lover the friend of the loved, whether he is loved in return or not, or is even hated? Or is the loved the friend of the lover? Or in a case like this, when the two do not both love each other, is neither the friend of the other?”

Menexenus/ “That’s what it looks like anyway.”

Socrates/ “So our opinion now is different from what it was before. First we thought that if one person loved another, they were both friends. But now, unless they both love each other, neither is a friend.”

Menexenus/ “Perhaps.”

Socrates/ “So nothing is a friend of the lover unless it loves him in return.”

Menexenus/ “It doesn’t look like it.”

Socrates/ “So there are no horse-lovers unless the horses love them back, and no quail-lovers, dog-lovers, wine-lovers, or exercise-lovers. And no lovers of wisdom, unless wisdom loves them in return. But do people really love them even though these things are not their friends, making a liar of the poet who said;

> Happy the man who has as friends his children and
> solid-hoofed horses,
> his hunting hounds and a host abroad?”

Menexenus/ “I don’t think so.”

Socrates/ “Then you think he spoke the truth?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “So what is loved is a friend to the person who loves it, or so it seems, Menexenus, whether it loves him or

hates him. Babies, for example, who are too young to show love but not too young to hate, when they are disciplined by their mother or father, are at that moment, even though they hate their parents then, their very dearest friends."

Menexenus/ "It seems so to me."

Socrates/ "So by this line of reasoning it is not the lover who is a friend, but the loved."

Menexenus/ "It looks like it."

Socrates/ "And so the hated is the enemy, not the hater."

Menexenus/ "Apparently so."

Socrates/ "Then many people are loved by their enemies and hated by their friends, and are friends to their enemies and enemies to their friends—if the object of love rather than the lover is a friend. But this doesn't make any sense at all, my dear friend, in fact I think it is simply impossible to be an enemy to one's friend and a friend to one's enemy."

Menexenus/ "True, Socrates, I think you're right."

Socrates/ "Then if this is impossible, that would make the lover the friend of the loved."

Menexenus/ "Apparently so."

Socrates/ "And the hater the enemy of the hated."

Menexenus/ "That must be."

Socrates/ "Then we are going to be forced to agree to our previous statement, that one is frequently a friend of a nonfriend, and even of an enemy. This is the case when you love someone who does not love you, or even hates you. And frequently one is an enemy to a nonenemy, or even to a friend, as happens when you hate someone who does not hate you, or even loves you."

Menexenus/ "Perhaps."

Socrates/ "Then what are we going to do, if friends are not those who love, nor those who are loved, nor those who love

and are loved? Are there any other besides these of whom we can say that they become each other's friends?"

Menexenus/ "By Zeus, "I certainly can't think of any, Socrates."

Socrates/ "Do you think, Menexenus, that we may have been going about our inquiry in entirely the wrong way?"

Menexenus/ "I certainly think so, Socrates,"

Socrates/ said Lysis. And as he said it, he blushed. I had the impression that the words just slipped out unintentionally because he was paying such close attention to what was being said, which he clearly had been all along.

Well, I wanted to give Menexenus a break anyway, and I was pleased with the other's fondness for philosophy, so I turned the conversation towards Lysis, and said: "I think you're right, Lysis, to say that if we were looking at things in the right way, we wouldn't be so far off course. Let's not go in that direction any longer. That line of inquiry looks like a rough road to me. I think we'd better go back to where we turned off, and look for guidance to the poets, the ancestral voices of human wisdom. What they say about who friends are is by no means trivial: that God himself makes people friends, by drawing them together. What they say goes something like this:

God always draws the like unto the like and makes them acquainted. Or haven't you come across these lines?"

He said he had.

"And haven't you also come across writings of very wise men saying the same thing, that the like must always be friend to the like? You know, the authors who reason and write about Nature and the Universe?"

Lysis/ "Yes, I have."

Socrates/ "And do you think what they say is right?

Lysis/ “Maybe.”

Socrates/ “Maybe half of it, maybe even all of it, but we don’t understand it. To our way of thinking, the closer a wicked man comes to a wicked man and the more he associates with him, the more he becomes his enemy. Because he does him an injustice. And it’s impossible for those who do an injustice and those who suffer it to be friends. Isn’t that so?”

Lysis/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Then that would make half the saying untrue, if we assume the wicked are like each other.”

Lysis/ “You’re right.”

Socrates/ “But what I think they’re saying is that the good are like each other and are friends, while the bad—as another saying goes—are never alike, not even to themselves. They are out of kilter and unstable. And when something is not even like itself and is inconsistent with itself, it can hardly be like something else and be a friend to it. Don’t you agree?”

Lysis/ “Oh, I do.”

Socrates/ “Well, my friend, it seems to me that the hidden meaning of those who say ‘like is a friend to like’ is that only the good is a friend, and only to the good, while the bad never enters into true friendship with either the good or the bad. Do you agree?”

He nodded yes.

“So now we’ve got it. We know what friends are. Our discussion indicates to us that whoever are good are friends.”

Lysis/ “That seems altogether true to me.”

Socrates/ “To me also. But I’m still a little uneasy with it. By Zeus, let’s see why I’m still suspicious. Is like friend to like insofar as he is like, and as such is he useful to his counterpart? I can put it better this way: When something,

anything at all, is like something else, how can it benefit or harm its like in a way that it could not benefit or harm itself? Or what could be done to it by its like that could not be done to it by itself? Can such things be prized by each other when they cannot give each other assistance? Is there any way?"

Lysis/ "No, there isn't."

Socrates/ "And how can anything be a friend if it is not prized?"

Lysis/ "It can't."

Socrates/ "All right, then, like is not friend to like. But couldn't the good still be friend to the good insofar as he is good, not insofar as he is like?"

Lysis/ "Maybe."

Socrates/ "What about this, though? Isn't a good person, insofar as he is good, sufficient to himself?"

Lysis/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "And a self-sufficient person has no need of anything, just because of his self-sufficiency?"

Lysis/ "How could he?"

Socrates/ "And the person who needs nothing wouldn't prize anything."

Lysis/ "No, he wouldn't."

Socrates/ "What he didn't prize he wouldn't love."

Lysis/ "Definitely not."

Socrates/ "And whoever doesn't love is not a friend."

Lysis/ "It appears not."

Socrates/ "Then how in the world are the good going to be friends to the good? They don't yearn for one another when apart, because even then they are sufficient to themselves, and when together they have no need of one another. Is there any way people like that can possibly value each other?"

Lysis/ “No.”

Socrates/ “But people who don’t place much value on each other couldn’t be friends.”

Lysis/ “True.”

Socrates/ “Now, Lysis, consider how we have been knocked off course. Are we somehow completely mistaken here?”

Lysis/ “How?”

Socrates/ “Once I heard someone say—I just now remembered this—that like is most hostile to like, and good men to good men. And he cited Hesiod as evidence:

> Potter is angry with potter, poet with poet
> And beggar with beggar.

And he said that it had to be the same with everything else: things that are most like are filled with envy, contentiousness, and hatred for each other, and things most unlike with friendship. The poor man is forced to be friends with the rich, and the weak with the strong—for the sake of assistance—and the sick man with the doctor, and in general every ignorant person has to prize the man who knows and love him. Then he went on to make a very impressive point indeed, saying that the like is totally unqualified to be friend to the like; that just the opposite is true; that things that are completely in opposition to each other are friends in the highest degree, since everything desires its opposite and not its like. Dry desires wet, cold hot, bitter sweet, sharp blunt, empty full, full empty, and so forth on the same principle. For the opposite, he said, is food for its opposite, whereas the like has no enjoyment of its like. Well, my friend, I thought he was quite clever as he said this, for he put it all so well. But you two, what do you think of what he said?”

Menexenus/ “It sounds fine, at least when you hear it put like that.”

Socrates/ “Then should we say that the opposite is its opposite’s best friend?”

Menexenus/ “Absolutely.”

Socrates/ “But Menexenus, this is absurd. In no time at all those virtuosos, the contradiction mongers, are going to jump on us gleefully and ask us whether enmity is not the thing most opposite to friendship. How are we going to answer them? Won’t we have to admit that what they say is true?”

Menexenus/ “Yes, we will.”

Socrates/ “So then, they will continue, is the enemy a friend to the friend, or the friend a friend to the enemy?”

Menexenus/ “Neither”

Socrates/ “Is the just a friend to the unjust, or the temperate to the licentious, or the good to the bad?”

Menexenus/ “I don’t think so.”

Socrates/ “But if, something is a friend to something because it is its opposite, then these things must be friends.”

Menexenus/ “You’re right, they must.”

Socrates/ “So like is not friend to like, nor is opposite friend to opposite.”

Menexenus/ “Apparently not.”

Socrates/ “But there’s this too we still ought to consider. We may have overlooked something else, the possibility that the friend is none of these things, but something that is neither bad nor good but becomes the friend of the good just for that reason.”

Menexenus/ “What do you mean?”

Socrates/ “By Zeus, I hardly know myself. I’m getting downright dizzy with the perplexities of our argument. Maybe the old proverb is right, and the beautiful is a friend. It bears a resemblance, at any rate, to something soft and smooth and sleek, and maybe that’s why it slides and sinks into us so

easily, because it's something like that. Now I maintain that the good is beautiful. What do you think?"

Menexenus/ "I agree."

Socrates/ "All right, now, I'm going to wax prophetic and say that what is neither good nor bad is a friend of the beautiful and the good. Listen to the motive for my mantic utterance. It seems to me that there are three kinds of things: the good, the bad, and the neither good nor bad. What about you?"

Menexenus/ "It seems so to me too."

Socrates/ "And the good is not a friend to the good, nor the bad to the bad, nor the good to the bad. Our previous argument disallows it. Only one possibility remains. If anything is a friend to anything, what is neither good nor bad is a friend either to the good or to something like itself. For I don't suppose anything could be a friend to the bad."

Menexenus/ "True."

Socrates/ "But we just said that like is not friend to like."

Menexenus/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "So what is neither good nor bad cannot be a friend to something like itself."

Menexenus/ "Apparently not."

Socrates/ "So it turns out that only what is neither good nor bad is friend to the good, and only to the good."

Menexenus/ "It seems it must be so."

Socrates/ "Well, then, boys, are we on the right track with our present statement? Suppose we consider a healthy body. It has no need of a doctor's help. It's fine just as it is. So no one in good health is friend to a doctor, on account of his good health. Right?"

Menexenus/ "Right."

Socrates/ “But a sick man is, I imagine, on account of his disease.”

Menexenus/ “Naturally.”

Socrates/ “Now, disease is a bad thing, and medicine is beneficial and good.”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And the body, as body, is neither good nor bad.”

Menexenus/ “True.”

Socrates/ “And because of disease, a body is forced to welcome and love medicine.”

Menexenus/ “I think so.”

Socrates/ “So what is neither good nor bad becomes a friend of the good because of the presence of something bad.”

Menexenus/ “It looks like it.”

Socrates/ “But clearly this is before it becomes bad itself by the bad it is in contact with. Because once it has become bad, it can no longer desire the good or be its friend. Remember we said it was impossible for the bad to befriend the good.”

Menexenus/ “It is impossible.”

Socrates/ “Now consider what I’m going to say. I say that some things are of the same sort as what is present with them, and some are not. For example, if you paint something a certain color, the paint is somehow present with the thing painted.”

Menexenus/ “Definitely.”

Socrates/ “Then is the thing painted of the same sort, as far as color goes, as the applied paint?”

Menexenus/ “I don’t understand.”

Socrates/ “Look at it this way. If someone smeared your blond hair with white lead, would your hair then be white or appear white?”

Menexenus/ “Appear white.”

Socrates/ “And yet whiteness would surely be present with it.”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “But all the same your hair would not yet be white. Though whiteness would be present, your hair would not be white any more than it is black.”

Menexenus/ “True.”

Socrates/ “But when, my friend, old age introduces this same color to your hair, then it will become of the same sort as what is present, white by the presence of white.”

Menexenus/ “Naturally.”

Socrates/ “Here at last is my question, then. When a thing has something present with it, will it be of the same sort as what is present? Or only when that thing is present in a certain way?”

Menexenus/ “Only then.”

Socrates/ “And what is neither good nor bad sometimes has not yet become bad by the presence with it of bad, but sometimes it has.”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “And when it is not yet bad although bad is present, that presence makes it desire the good. But the presence that makes it be bad deprives it of its desire as well as its love for the good. For it is no longer neither good nor bad, but bad. And the bad can’t be friend to the good.”

Menexenus/ “No, it can’t.”

Socrates/ “From this we may infer that those who are already wise no longer love wisdom, whether they are gods or

men. Nor do those love it who are so ignorant that they are bad, for no bad and stupid man loves wisdom. There remain only those who have this bad thing, ignorance, but have not yet been made ignorant and stupid by it. They are conscious of not knowing what they don't know. The upshot is that those who are as yet neither good nor bad love wisdom, while all those who are bad do not, and neither do those who are good. For our earlier discussion made it clear that the opposite is not friend to the opposite, nor is like friend to like. Remember?"

Menexenus/ "Of course."

Lysis/ "Of course."

Socrates/ "So now, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered for sure what is a friend and what it is friend to. For we maintain that in the soul and in the body and everywhere, that which is neither good nor bad itself is, by the presence of evil, a friend of the good."

The two of them heartily agreed that this was the case, and I was pretty happy myself. I had the satisfied feeling of a successful hunter and was basking in it, when a very strange suspicion, from where I don't know, came over me. Maybe what we had all agreed to wasn't true after all. What an awful thought. "Oh, no!" I screamed out. "Lysis and Menexenus, our wealth has all been a dream!"

Menexenus/ "But why?"

Socrates/ "I'm afraid we've fallen in with arguments about friendship that are no better than con artists."

Menexenus/ "How?"

Socrates/ "Let's look at it this way. Whoever is a friend, is he a friend to someone or not?"

Menexenus/ "He has to be a friend to someone."

Socrates/ “For the sake of nothing and on account of nothing, or for the sake of something and on account of something?”

Menexenus/ “For the sake of something and on account of something.”

Socrates/ “And that something for the sake of which he is a friend, is it a friend, or is it neither friend nor foe?”

Menexenus/ “I don’t get it.”

Socrates/ “Naturally enough. But perhaps you will if we try it this way—and I think I might better understand what I am saying myself. A sick man, we were just now saying, is a friend to the doctor. Right?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And isn’t he a friend on account of disease and for the sake of health?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And disease is a bad thing?”

Menexenus/ “Of course.”

Socrates/ “And what about health? Is it a good thing or a bad thing or neither?”

Menexenus/ “A good thing.”

Socrates/ “I believe we also said that the body, which is neither good nor bad, is a friend of medicine on account of disease, that is, on account of something bad. And medicine is a good thing. It is for the sake of health that medicine has received the friendship. And health is a good thing. All right so far?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Is health a friend or not a friend?”

Menexenus/ “A friend.”

Socrates/ “And disease is an enemy?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “So what is neither good nor bad is friend of the good on account of what is bad and an enemy, for the sake of what is good and a friend.”

Menexenus/ “It appears so.”

Socrates/ “So the friend is friend of its friend for the sake of a friend, on account of its enemy.”

Menexenus/ “It looks like it.”

Socrates/ “Well, then, since we have come this far, boys, let’s pay close attention so that we won’t be deceived. The fact that the friend has become friend of the friend, and so like has become friend of like, which we said was impossible—I’m going to let that pass by. But there is another point that we must examine, so that what is now being said won’t deceive us. Medicine, we say, is a friend for the sake of health.”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Health, then, is also a friend?”

Menexenus/ “Very much a friend.”

Socrates/ “If, therefore, it is a friend, it is for the sake of something.”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And that something is a friend, if it is going to accord with our previous agreement.”

Menexenus/ “Very much so.”

Socrates/ “Will that too, then, also be a friend for the sake of a friend?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Aren’t we going to have to give up going on like this? Don’t we have to arrive at some first principle which will no longer bring us back to another friend, something that goes back to the first friend, something for the sake of which we say that all the rest are friends too?”

Menexenus/ “We have to.”

Socrates/ “This is what I am talking about, the possibility that all the other things that we have called friends for the sake of that thing may be deceiving us, like so many phantoms of it, and that it is that first thing which is truly a friend. Let’s think of it in this way. Suppose a man places great value on something, say, a father who values his son more highly than all his other possessions. Would such a man, for the sake of his supreme regard for his son, also value something else? If, for example, he learned that his son had drunk hemlock, would he value wine if he thought it could save his son?”

Menexenus/ “Why, certainly.”

Socrates/ “And also the container the wine was in?”

Menexenus/ “Very much.”

Socrates/ “At that time would he place the same value on the ceramic cup or the three pints of wine as on his son? Or is it the case that all such concern is expended not for things that are provided for the sake of something else, but for that something else for whose sake all the other things are provided? Not that we don’t often talk about how much we value gold and silver. But that’s not so and gets us no closer to the truth, which is that we value above all else that for which gold and all other provisions are provided, whatever it may turn out to be. Shall we put it like that?”

Menexenus/ “Most certainly.”

Socrates/ “And isn’t the same account true of the friend? When we talk about all the things that are our friends for the sake of another friend, it is clear that we are merely using the word ‘friend’. The real friend is surely that in which all these so-called friendships terminate.”

Menexenus/ “Yes, surely.”

Socrates/ “Then the real friend is not a friend for the sake of a friend.”

Menexenus/ “True.”

Socrates/ “So much, then, for the notion that it is for the sake of some friend that the friend is a friend. But then is the good a friend?”

Menexenus/ “It seems so to me.”

Socrates/ “And it is on account of the bad that the good is loved. Look, this is how it stands. There are three things of which we have just been speaking—good, bad, and what is neither good nor bad. Suppose there remained only two, and bad were eliminated and could affect no one in body or soul or anything else that we say is neither good nor bad in and of itself. Would the good then be of any use to us, or would it have become useless? For if nothing could still harm us, we would have no need of any assistance, and it would be perfectly clear to us that it was on account of the bad that we prized and loved the good—as if the good is a drug against the bad, and the bad is a disease, so that without the disease there is no need for the drug. Isn’t the good by nature loved on account of the bad by those of us who are midway between good and bad, but by itself and for its own sake it has no use at all?”

Menexenus/ “It looks like that’s how it is.”

Socrates/ “Then that friend of ours, the one which was the terminal point for all the other things that we called ‘friends for the sake of another friend,’ does not resemble them at all. For they are called friends for the sake of a friend, but the real friend appears to have a nature completely the opposite of this. It has become clear to us that it was a friend for the sake of an enemy. Take away the enemy and it seems it is no longer a friend.”

Menexenus/ “It seems it isn’t, “not, at least, by what we are saying now.”

Socrates/ “By Zeus, I wonder, if the bad is eliminated, whether it will be possible to be hungry or thirsty or anything like that. Or if there will be hunger as long as human beings and other animals exist, but it won’t do harm. Thirst, too, and all the other desires, but they won’t be bad, because the bad will have been abolished. Or is it ridiculous to ask what will be then and what will not? Who knows? But we do know this: that it is possible for hunger to do harm, and also possible for it to help. Right?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “And isn’t it true that thirst or any other such desires can be felt sometimes to one’s benefit, sometimes to one’s harm, and sometimes to neither?”

Menexenus/ “Absolutely.”

Socrates/ “And if bad things are abolished, does this have anything to do with things that aren’t bad being abolished along with them?”

Menexenus/ “No.”

Socrates/ “So the desires that are neither good nor bad will continue to exist, even if bad things are abolished.”

Menexenus/ “It appears so.”

Socrates/ “And is it possible to desire and love something passionately without feeling friendly towards it?

Menexenus/ “It doesn’t seem so to me.”

Socrates/ “So there will still be some friendly things even if the bad is abolished.”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “It is impossible, if bad were the cause of something’s being a friend, that with the bad abolished one thing could be another’s friend. When a cause is abolished, the thing that it was the cause of can no longer exist.”

Menexenus/ “That makes sense.”

Socrates/ “Haven’t we agreed that the friend loves something, and loves it on account of something, and didn’t we think then that it was on account of bad that what was neither good nor bad loved the good?”

Menexenus/ “True.”

Socrates/ “But now it looks like some other cause of loving and being loved has appeared.”

Menexenus/ “It does look like it.”

Socrates/ “Then can it really be, as we were just saying, that desire is the cause of friendship, and that what desires is a friend to that which it desires, and is so whenever it does so? And that what we were saying earlier about being a friend was all just chatter, like a poem that trails on too long?”

Menexenus/ “There’s a good chance.”

Socrates/ “But still, a thing desires what it is deficient in. Right?”

Menexenus/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And the deficient is a friend to that in which it is deficient.”

Menexenus/ “I think so.”

Socrates/ “And it becomes deficient where something is taken away from it.”

Menexenus/ “How couldn’t it?”

Socrates/ “Then it is what belongs to oneself, it seems, that passionate love and friendship and desire are directed towards, Menexenus and Lysis.”

They both agreed.

Socrates/ “And if you two are friends with each other, then in some way you naturally belong to each other.”

Menexenus/ “Absolutely,”

Socrates/ they said together.

“And if one person desires another, my boys, or loves him passionately, he would not desire him or love him passionately or as a friend unless he somehow belonged to his beloved either in his soul or in some characteristic, habit, or aspect of his soul.”

Menexenus/ “Certainly,”

Socrates/ said Menexenus, but Lysis was silent.

“All right, what belongs to us by nature has shown itself to us as something we must love.”

Menexenus/ “It looks like it.”

Socrates/ “Then the genuine and not the pretended lover must be befriended by his boy.”

Lysis and Menexenus just managed a nod of assent, but Hippothales beamed every color in the rainbow in his delight.

Wanting to review the argument, I said, “It seems to me, Lysis and Menexenus, that if there is some difference between belonging and being like, then we might have something to say about what a friend is. But if belonging and being like turn out to be the same thing, it won’t be easy to toss out our former argument that like is useless to like insofar as they are alike. And to admit that the useless is a friend would strike a sour note. So if it’s all right with you, since we are a little groggy from this discussion, why don’t we agree to say that what belongs is something different from what is like?”

Menexenus/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “And shall we suppose that the good belongs to everyone, while the bad is alien? Or does the bad belong to the bad, the good to the good, and what is neither good nor bad to what is neither good nor bad?”

They both said they liked this latter correlation.

“Well, here we are again, boys. We have fallen into the same arguments about friendship that we rejected at first. For the

unjust will be no less a friend to the unjust, and the bad to the bad, as the good will be to the good."

Menexenus/ "So it seems."

Socrates/ "Then what? If we say that the good is the same as belonging, is there any alternative to the good being a friend only to the good?"

Menexenus/ "No."

Socrates/ "But we thought we had refuted ourselves on this point. Or don't you remember?"

Menexenus/ "We remember."

Socrates/ "So what can we still do with our argument? Or is it clear that there is nothing left? I do ask, like the able speakers in the law courts, that you think over everything that has been said. If neither the loved nor the loving, nor the like nor the unlike, nor the good, nor the belonging, nor any of the others we have gone through—well, there have been so many I certainly don't remember them all anymore, but if none of these is a friend, then I have nothing left to say."

Having said that, I had a mind to get something going with one of the older men there. But just then, like some kind of divine intermediaries, the guardians of Menexenus and Lysis were on the scene. They had the boys' brothers with them and called out to them that it was time to go home. It actually was late by now. At first our group tried to drive them off, but they didn't pay any attention to us and just got riled up and went on calling in their foreign accents. We thought they had been drinking too much at the Hermaea and might be difficult to handle, so we capitulated and broke up our party. But just as they were leaving I said, "Now we've done it, Lysis and Menexenus—made fools of ourselves, I, an old man, and you as well. These people here will go away saying that we are friends of one another—for I count myself in with you—but what a friend is we have not yet been able to find out."

The Lysis.

Translated by Taylor, Thomas.

Persons of the Dialog.
Socrates, Ctesippus.
Hippothales, Menexenus,
And Lysis.

Socrates/ On going from the Academy, in a straight line to the Lyceum, which is indeed out of the walls, but close to them, when I arrived at the gate, where there is the fountain Panopis, I met with Hippothales the son of Hicronymus, and Ctesippus Pæanæus, and other young men who were assembled together with these. And Hippothales, on seeing me approaching;

Hippothales/ O Socrates, whither are you going, and whence do you come?

Socrates/ I came from the Academy, and am going in a direct road to the Lyceum.

Hippothales/ But will you not come to us? For it is worthwhile.

Socrates/ Whither do you wish me to go, and to whom among you?

Hippothales/ Hither.

Socrates/ Showing me a certain enclosure, and an open gate, opposite to the wall.

Hippothales/ Here we, and many other very worthy persons, pass away our time.

Socrates/ What is this place, and what do you employ yourselves about?

Hippothales/ It is a Palæstra, newly built: but we spend our time for the most part in discourse, which we shall gladly communicate to you.

Socrates/ You do well. But who is the preceptor in that place?

Hippothales/ Your associate and encomiast, Miccus.

Socrates/ By Zeus, he is not a vulgar man, but a sufficiently great sophist.

Hippothales/ Are you willing therefore, to follow me, that you may see those that are assembled in that place?

Socrates/ But I should first of all gladly hear for what purpose I am to enter, and who that beautiful person is.

Hippothales/ To some of us, Socrates, he does not appear to be beautiful.

Socrates/ But what does he appear to you to be, O Hippothales? Tell me this.

But he being thus interrogated, blushed.

And I said, O Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, you need no longer inform me whether you love or not: for I know that you not only love, but that you are far advanced in love. For, with respect to other things, I am vile and useless, but divinity has given me the ability of very rapidly knowing a lover, and the person beloved.

And on hearing this, he blushed in a still greater degree than before. Ctesippus therefore said;

Ctesippus/ You are polite, Hippothales, because you blush, and refuse to tell Socrates the name of your beloved. But you will do nothing but commend him, if Socrates stays only a short time with you. As to our ears, Socrates, they are perfectly filled and rendered deaf with the name of Lysis: and when Hippothales has drunk largely, it is easy for us to think, when we are roused from sleep, that we hear the name

of Lysis. And the things which he relates concerning him in prose, though dire, are not altogether so, except when he robs us of our poems, and other writings; and what is still more dire, when he sings his loves with a wonderful voice, which we are under the necessity of enduring to hear. But now being asked by you, he blushes.

Socrates/ This youth then, it seems, is Lysis. But I conjecture this; for I do not know it, from having heard his name.

Ctesippus/ They very seldom call him by his own name, but he is yet called by the name of his father, because he is a man very much known. But I well know, that you are far from being unacquainted with the form of the youth: for he may be sufficiently known from this alone.

Socrates/ Tell me whose son he is?

Ctesippus/ He is the son of Democrates, who is the eldest son of Æxoncus.

Socrates/ Be it so then, O Hippothales, that you have found this generous and juvenile love. But come, evince to me the things which you have shown to these persons. that I may see whether you know what a lover ought to say respecting the objects of his love, either to himself or to others.

Hippothales/ Do you examine, Socrates, anything that he asserts?

Socrates/ But do you deny that you love him, as he says?

Hippothales/ I do not. But I affirm that I do not compose anything, either in prose or verse, with a view to my amours.

Ctesippus/ He is not: well, but is delirious and insane.

Socrates/ O Hippothales, I neither request to hear any verses, nor any song, which you may have composed on the young man, but I desire to become acquainted with your

thoughts, that I may know in what manner you conduct yourself in your amours.

Hippothales/ Ctesippus here, will tell you: for he accurately knows and remembers; since, as he says, he has beard me continually talking about him.

Ctesippus/ Entirely so, by the gods. Though indeed it is very ridiculous that he being a lover, and paying far more attention to the youth than others, should have nothing of his own to say. Would not even a boy say that this is ridiculous? For what the whole city proclaims about Democrates, and Lysis the grandfather of the youth, and about all his ancestors, his wealth, his store of horses, his victories in the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean games, and his contests with four horses, and with one horse, these are the very things which he celebrates. And besides these, he speaks of things still more common: for he lately related to us, in a certain poem, the reception of Hercules as a guest, viz. how an ancestor of Democrates and Lysis entertained Hercules on account of his alliance to him, through being also the offspring of Zeus and the daughter of the prince of the people; a circumstance, indeed, which even old women sing. He likewise celebrates, Socrates, many other such like particulars. And these are the things which he compels us to hear him relating and singing.

Socrates/ O ridiculous Hippothales. before you have vanquished you make and sing an encomium on yourself.

Hippothales/ But I neither make nor sing these things for myself, Socrates.

Socrates/ You do not think that you do.

Hippothales/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ These odes tend to you the most of all things. For if you should find a beloved person of this kind, your assertions and songs will be an ornament to you, and an

encomium on yourself as a conqueror, for having made such an acquisition. But if you are deceived in this respect, by how much greater the encomiums are which you make on your beloved, by so much the more you will appear to be deprived of things beautiful and good, and become ridiculous. Whoever therefore, my friend, is wise in amatory affairs, will not praise his beloved till he is well acquainted with him, in consequence of being fearful of the event. For at the same time it must be observed, that such as are beautiful are filled with pride and ostentation when anyone praises and extols them. Or do you not think this is the case?

Hippothales/ I do.

Socrates/ Does it not therefore follow, that by how much the more insolent they are, by so much the more difficult it is to catch them?

Hippothales/ It is likely.

Socrates/ What kind of a hunter, therefore, would he appear to you to be, who should drive wild beasts out of their lurking places, and increase the difficulty of taking them?

Hippothales/ Doubtless, a vile one.

Socrates/ And is it not a mark of great unskillfulness, to exasperate men, instead of alluring them by discourse and songs?

Hippothales/ To me it appears to be so.

Socrates/ But consider, O Hippothales, whether you do not render yourself obnoxious to all these things through your poesy. Indeed, I think you are not willing to acknowledge that a man who injures himself in his poems can be a good poet.

Hippothales/ I am not, by Zeus: for this would be very absurd. But on account of these things, Socrates, I communicate my thoughts to you. And consult with yourself, whether you have anything else to offer, by which

it may appear how a man by speaking and acting may become acceptable to the objects of his love.

Socrates/ This is not easy to relate: but if you are willing to make Lysis join us in discourse, perhaps I may be able to show you what ought to be said to him, instead of those things which they say you have asserted and sung.

Hippothales/ There is nothing difficult in this. For if you enter this place together with Ctesippus, and sitting down discourse, I think that he will join us: for he is remarkably fond, Socrates, of hearing others converse. Observe too, that both young men and boys are mingled together in this place, as being engaged in Mercurial contests. He will therefore come to you: and if he does not, since he is familiar with Ctesippus, through Menexenus the cousin of Ctesippus, (for he is in the highest degree of intimacy with Menexenus,) let him call him, if he does not join us of his own accord.

Socrates/ It is proper to act in this manner: and at the same time, laying hold of Ctesippus, I entered the Palæstra, and the others came after us. But on entering, we found that the boys were sacrificing, and that the particulars pertaining to the victims were nearly finished: but all of them were playing at dice, and properly dressed. Many of them, therefore, were playing out of the Palæstra in the porch; but some of them in a corner of the place, where they put off their clothes, were playing with a great multitude of dice, and selecting them from certain little baskets. But others stood round these, beholding them among whom was Lysis, who was standing crowned, among the boys and young men, and transcending all of them in the beauty of his person. Nor did he alone deserve to be heard for his beauty, but because he was worthy and good. But we, withdrawing from the crowd, seated ourselves opposite to him: for the place where we sat was quiet; and we there entered into conversation with each other. Lysis, therefore, turning round, often looked

at us; and it was evident that he desired to join us; but, in the meantime he hesitated, and was averse to come to us alone. Afterwards Menexenus came from the porch, in the midst of the games, and as soon as he saw me and Ctesippus, came and seated himself by us. Lysis, therefore, seeing him, followed, and sat down with Menexenus. Others likewise came; but Hippothales, after he saw that many were assembled in this place, desiring to be concealed, betook himself to a part where he thought he should not be seen by Lysis, fearing lest he should be offended with him, and, standing in this manner, he heard the discourse. And I, beholding Menexenus, said, O son of Demophon, which of you is the elder?

Menexenus/ We are not certain.

Socrates/ Do you therefore contend which of you is the more generous?

Menexenus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And in a similar manner, likewise, which of you is the more beautiful?

At this question both of them laughed.

Socrates/ But, I do not also ask you which of you is the more rich, for you are friends: are you not?

They replied, entirely so.

The possessions of friends, therefore, are said to be common; so that about this you will not, in any respect, disagree, if this assertion about friendship is true.

To this they assented.

But after this, as I was endeavoring to ask, which of them was the more just and wise, a certain person interrupted us, by telling Menexenus that he was called by the master of the Gymnasium. But it appeared to me that he was called by the

sacrificer. Menexenus therefore left us; and I thus interrogated Lysis:

Inform me, O Lysis, if your father and your mother very much love you?

Lysis/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Do they not, therefore, wish you to be most happy?

Lysis/ Undoubtedly they do.

Socrates/ Does that man appear to you to be happy who is in a state of subjection, and who is not permitted to do anything which he desires to do?

Lysis/ By Zeus, to me he does not.

Socrates/ If, therefore, your father and your mother love you, and wish that you may be happy, they will certainly, by every possible means, endeavor that you may become so.

Lysis/ How is it possible they should not.

Socrates/ Do they, therefore, permit you to do what you please, and in no respect oppose your desires?

Lysis/ By Zeus, Socrates, they oppose me in very many things.

Socrates/ How do you say? At the same time that they wish you to be blessed, do they prevent you from acting as you please? But answer me this question; If you should desire to ride in some one of your father's chariots, and for this purpose should take the reins, when he is going to contend in the games, would he not suffer you? or would he prevent you?

Lysis/ By Zeus, he would not suffer me.

Socrates/ But would he not permit someone to do this?

Lysis/ There is a certain charioteer who is hired for this purpose by my father.

Socrates/ How do you say? Would your father rather suffer a mercenary to do what he pleases to the horses than you, and, besides this, pay him for so doing?

Lysis/ But what then?

Socrates/ But I think he would permit you to drive the yoked mules, and, if you were willing, to take the whip and strike them.

Lysis/ Why should he permit me to do this?

Socrates/ Why not? Is no one permitted to strike them?

Lysis/ Yes, the muleteer, very much so.

Socrates/ Is he a slave, or free-born?

Lysis/ A slave.

Socrates/ It seems, therefore, that your parents think more highly of a slave than of you who are their son, and commit their affairs to him rather than to you, and that they permit him to do what he pleases, but do not give this liberty to you. And farther still, answer me this question, Do they suffer you to govern yourself? or neither do they permit you to do this?

Lysis/ For how should they permit me?

Socrates/ Who then governs you?

Lysis/ The pædagogue.

Socrates/ Does he do this, being a slave?

Lysis/ But what then? he is our slave.

Socrates/ Is it not a dire thing for one who is free-born to be governed by a slave? And what does this pædagogue when he governs you do?

Lysis/ He leads me to my master.

Socrates/ And do not these masters also govern you?

Lysis/ Certainly, entirely so.

Socrates/ Your father, therefore, voluntarily places over you many despots and governors. But when you return home to your mother, does she suffer you to do what you please, that you may be, blessed, either about the wool or the web, when she weaves? For she doubtless does not prevent you from touching the two-handed sword, or the shuttle, or any other instrument subservient to the working of wool.

But he laughing replied;

Lysis/ By Zeus, Socrates, she not only prevents me, but beats me if I touch them.

Socrates/ By Hercules, have you in any respect injured your father or your mother?

Lysis/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ On what account then do they in so dire a manner prevent you from being happy, and from doing what you please? And why every day do they educate you so as to be in subjection to someone, and, in one word, do not in the least suffer you to gratify your desires? So that, as it seems, neither are such great riches of any advantage to you (since everyone has dominion over them rather than you), nor even your body, though it is so noble, but this also is fed and taken care of by another. But you, O Lysis, have no authority over anyone, nor do you do anything that you desire to do.

Lysis/ For I am not yet old enough, Socrates.

Socrates/ But see whether it is not this which prevents you, O son of Democrates. For thus much I think both your father and mother will concede to you, and will not wait till you are more advanced in years. I mean, when they wish anything to be read to or written for them, they will, I think, order you to do this the first in the house, or will they not?

Lysis/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Are you therefore allowed, in this case, to write which of the letters you please first, and which second? And are you allowed to read in the same manner? And again, when you take up a lyre, does neither your father nor your mother prevent you from stretching and relaxing the chords as much as you please, and from gently touching and striking them with the plectrum? or do they prevent you?

Lysis/ They certainly do not.

Socrates/ What then is the cause, Lysis, that they do not prevent you in these things, but prevent you in those which we just now mentioned?

Lysis/ Because, I think, I know the one, but am ignorant of the other.

Socrates/ Be it so, O most excellent youth. Your father, therefore, does not wait for age, to give you permission to do as you please in all things; but on whatever day it shall appear to him that you are become more prudent, on this day he will permit you to govern yourself, and your own affairs.

Lysis/ I think he will.

Socrates/ Be it so. But what? Will not a neighbor conduct himself towards you in the same manner as your father? Whether do you think he will commit to you the government of his family, when he is of opinion that you are more skilled in economics than himself, or in this case govern it himself?

Lysis/ I think he will commit the government of it to me.

Socrates/ But what with respect. to the Athenians? Do you not think that they will commit to you the management of their affairs, when they perceive that you are sufficiently wise?

Lysis/ I do.

Socrates/ But what with respect to the great king? Would he suffer his eldest son, who will succeed to the government of all Asia, to throw into broth whatever he pleases, rather than us, if going to him we should convince him that we were more skilled in the preparation of a banquet than his son?

Lysis/ It is evident he would rather suffer us.

Socrates/ Is it not also clear that he would not permit his son to throw anything, however trifling, into the broth, but that he would permit us, if we wished to throw in a quantity of salt, to do so?

Lysis/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But what if his son should be diseased in his eyes? Would he therefore suffer him to meddle with his own eyes, at the same time that he thinks he is not a physician, or would he prohibit him?

Lysis/ He would prohibit him.

Socrates/ But if he considered us as good physicians, I think he would not prevent us, even though we should wish to open his eyelids and scatter ashes on his eyes.

Lysis/ True.

Socrates/ Would he not, therefore, rather commit to us than to himself or his son everything else in which we appeared to be more wise than either of them?

Lysis/ It is necessary, Socrates.

Socrates/ This then, is the case, friend Lysis, that all persons, both Greeks and Barbarians, men and women, will permit us to act as we please with respect to things in, which we are skilled, nor will anyone voluntarily hinder us from so acting; but in these particulars we shall be free, and the governors of others. And these things will be ours, for we shall be benefited by them. But no one will permit us to act as we please respecting things of which we are ignorant; but

all men will hinder us as much as they are able, not only strangers, but our parents, and whatever else may be more allied to us than these. And in these we shall become the servants of others, and they will be things foreign to us, for we shall derive no benefit from them. Do you agree that this will be the case?

Lysis/ I do.

Socrates/ Shall we, therefore, be friends to anyone, and will anyone love us in those things in which we are useless?

Lysis/ By no means

Socrates/ Now, therefore, neither your father nor any other person will ever love you, so far as you are useless.

Lysis/ It does not appear he will.

Socrates/ If then, you become wise, O boy, all men will be your friends, and will be familiar with you; for in this case you will be useful and good. But if you do not, neither will any other person, nor your father nor mother, nor any of your kindred, be your friend, or be familiar with you. Is it possible, therefore, that anyone can think highly of himself with respect to things in which he has not yet acquired any skill?

Lysis/ How can he?

Socrates/ If, therefore, you require a master, you are not yet wise.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ And hence you are not magnanimous, if you are yet unwise.

Lysis/ By Zeus, Socrates, I do not appear to myself to be so.

Socrates/ Upon hearing him say this, I looked at Hippothales, and was very near committing an error; for it occurred to me to say, after this manner, O Hippothales, it

is requisite to discourse with those of a puerile age, viz. humbling and repressing them, and not, as you do, flattering and rendering them effeminate. But perceiving him anxious and disturbed, on account of what had been said, I recollected that, a little while since, he wished to conceal himself from Lysis; I therefore recovered myself, and was silent. In the meantime Menexenus came again, and seated himself near Lysis, in the place whence he rose before. Lysis, therefore, in a very playful and friendly manner, but without Menexenus observing him, said to me;

Lysis/ O Socrates, tell Menexenus what you have told me.

Socrates/ You should relate these things yourself to Menexenus, for you have heard me with very great attention.

Lysis/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Endeavor, therefore, to recollect these particulars as much as possible, that you may clearly tell him the whole. But if you should happen to forget anyone of them, you may again inquire of me the first. time that you meet with me.

Lysis/ I will by all means do so, Socrates; of this you may be well assured. But you should say something else to him, that I also may hear, till it is time to return home.

Socrates/ This must, be done, since you command: but see how you will be able to defend me, if Menexenus should endeavor to confute me. Or do you not know that he is contentious?

Lysis/ Very much so, by Zeus; and on this account I wish to hear you discourse with him.

Socrates/ Do you desire this, in order that I may become ridiculous?

Lysis/ By Zeus I do not, but in order that you may punish him.

Socrates/ This is a thing not easy to accomplish: for he is a skillful man, and the disciple of Ctesippus. And besides, do not you see Ctesippus himself is present?

Lysis/ Be not at all concerned at this, Socrates; but come, discourse with him.

Socrates/ We will discourse.

As, therefore, we were thus speaking to each other, Ctesippus said;

Ctesippus/ Why are you thus feasting alone, and do not impart your discourse to us?

Socrates/ But indeed, we shall impart it; for Lysis here does not understand something which I have said, but thinks that Menexenus will understand it, and therefore orders me to interrogate him.

Ctesippus/ Why then, do you not interrogate him?

Socrates/ But I will. Give me an answer, then, Menexenus, to that which I shall ask you; for from my childhood I have had a desire of a certain possession, just as another person may have had of a different thing; for one man desires to possess horses, another dogs, another gold, and another honors; but I was indifferent with respect to these things, but was affected in a very amatory manner with respect to the possession of friends. Hence I was more desirous of finding a good friend than the most excellent quail or cock; and, by Zeus, I preferred this to the best horse or, dog. I likewise think, by the dog, that I should prefer the possession of an associate far beyond the wealth of Darius, or even Darius himself: such a lover of an associate am I. Perceiving, therefore, you and Lysis, I was immediately struck, and proclaimed you happy, because, young as you are you have so rapidly and easily acquired this possession; you with such celerity having made him so much your friend, and he you. But I am so far from this possession, that

I do not even know after what manner one man becomes the friend of another. But in this I wish to be informed by you, who are a skillful person: Tell me, therefore, when anyone loves another, which of the two becomes the friend of the other? Whether the lover becomes the friend of the beloved, or the beloved of the lover? Or is there in this case no difference?

Menexenus/ It does not appear to me that there is any difference.

Socrates/ How do you say? Do both therefore become friends of each other, if one alone loves the other?

Menexenus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ But what? May there not be a lover who is not in his turn beloved by the object of his love?

Menexenus/ There may.

Socrates/ Is it not possible, therefore, that a lover may be hated? which lovers sometimes appear to suffer from the objects of their love: for though they most ardently love, they are not beloved in return, but, on the contrary, are sometimes hated. Or does not this appear to you to be true?

Menexenus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ In a case of this kind, therefore, does not the one love, and is not the other beloved?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Which, then of these is the friend of the other? Is the lover the friend of the beloved whether he is loved in return, or hated, or the beloved of the lover? Or in this case, is neither the friend of neither, since a mutual love does not subsist between them?

Menexenus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Now, therefore, the case appears to us; to be otherwise than what it appeared to us before. For then it

seemed, that if one alone loved, both were friends; but now, that neither is a friend, unless both mutually love.

Menexenus/ This appears to be the case.

Socrates/ No one, therefore, is a friend to the object of his love, unless he is beloved in return.

Menexenus/ It does not appear that anyone is.

Socrates/ Neither, therefore, are those the friends of horses, whom horses do not love in return; nor are those the friends of quails and dogs, of wine and gymnastic, who are not mutually beloved by these; nor are those friends of wisdom, whom wisdom does not love in return: for each of these is a lover without being a friend. The poet therefore speaks falsely who says, "Happy the man that possesses beautiful boys, horses with solid hoofs, hunting dogs, and a foreign guest." Does he appear to you to speak the truth?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The beloved, therefore, is the friend of the lover, as it seems, O Menexenus, whether he loves or whether he hates; just as children recently born, partly do not yet love, and partly hate when they are chastised by their mother or father; and at the very time in which they hate, they are in the highest degree beloved by their parents.

Menexenus/ It appears to me that this is the case.

Socrates/ The lover, therefore, from this reasoning, will not be the friend, but the beloved.

Menexenus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Hence too, he who is hated is an enemy, but not he who hates.

Menexenus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Many, therefore, are beloved by their enemies and hated by their friends; and are friends to their enemies, but enemies to their friends; if the beloved is a friend, and

not the lover. Though it is very absurd, my friend, or rather, I think, impossible, to be an enemy to a friend, and a friend to an enemy.

Menexenus/ You seem to speak the truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ If, therefore, this is impossible, the lover will be the friend of the beloved.

Menexenus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, he who hates will be the enemy of him who is hated.

Menexenus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ It happens, therefore, that it is necessary for us to acknowledge the same things as we assented to before, that a man is often the friend of one who is not his friend, and that he is often the friend of his enemy, when either he loves and is not beloved, or loves one by whom he is hated. It likewise often happens that a man is an enemy to one who is not his enemy, or even to one who is his friend; when anyone loves him by whom he is hated, or hates him by whom he is loved.

Menexenus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ What then shall we say, if neither lovers, nor those that are beloved, are friends, nor yet lovers and the beloved? Shall we say that certain others besides these become friends to each other?

Menexenus/ By Zeus, Socrates, I do not well know what to reply.

Socrates/ Consider, therefore, Menexenus, whether our investigation has been perfectly right.

Lysis/ To me it appears so, Socrates;

Socrates/ and at the same time that he said this he blushed: for he appeared to me unwilling to avoid what was

said, through the very great attention which he paid to the discourse.

I, therefore, being willing that Menexenus should cease from speaking, and being delighted with his philosophy, thus transferred my discourse to Lysis, and said, O Lysis, what you have asserted appears to me to be true; I mean that if we have rightly considered, we shall not in any respect have wandered from the truth. But we will proceed no further in this way: for that consideration appears to me to be difficult like a rough road. But it seems to me requisite to proceed in the path in which we have now entered, speculating the assertions of the poets: for these are, with respect to us, as the fathers and leaders of wisdom. They say, therefore, not badly, with reference to such as are friends, that divinity makes them to be friends, by conducting them to each other. But I think they thus speak:

> Likeness to likeness, God for ever leads,
> And makes it known.

Or have you not met with these verses?

Lysis/ I have.

Socrates/ Have you, therefore, likewise met with the writings of the wisest of men, in which it is said, that the similar is always necessarily a friend to the similar? But these men are those that discourse and write about nature and the universe.

Lysis/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ Whether or no, therefore, do they speak well?

Lysis/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Perhaps the half of this is true, and perhaps also the whole. But we do not understand them: For it seems to us, that by how much nearer a depraved man approaches to one depraved, and by how much the more frequently he converses with him, by so much the more inimical will he

become: for he will act unjustly. But it is impossible that those can be friends who injure, and are injured. Is it not so?

Lysis/ It is.

Socrates/ On this account, the half of this saying will not be true, since the depraved are similar to each other.

Lysis/ True.

Socrates/ But they appear to me to say, that the good are similar and friends to each other; but that the wicked, (as it is said concerning them,) are never similar, not even to themselves, but are stupid and unstable. But he who is dissimilar to, and dissents from himself, can never be similar to, or become the friend of another. Or does it not appear so to you?

Lysis/ To me it does.

Socrates/ It seems to me, therefore, my friend, that those who say the similar is a friend to the similar, obscurely signify this, that he alone who is good, is a friend to the good, but that he who is wicked can never arrive at true friendship, either with the good or the wicked. Does this also appear to you to be the case?

Lysis/ It does.

Socrates/ We now, therefore, have those that are friends: for our discourse now signifies to us, that those are friends that are worthy.

Lysis/ It appears entirely so to me.

Socrates/ And to me also. But, notwithstanding this, there is something difficult in the affair. Come then, by Zeus, and see what I suspect to be the case. He who is similar, so far as he is similar, is a friend to the similar, and such a one is useful to such a one. Or rather thus: Is any kind of the similar, of any advantage to any kind of the similar? Or is it

able to do any injury to the similar, which it does not do to itself? Or to suffer anything which it does not also suffer from itself? But how can such things as these, which are not able to afford any assistance to each other be loved by each other?

Lysis/ They cannot.

Socrates/ But how can he who does not love be a friend?

Lysis/ By no means.

Socrates/ But perhaps the similar is not a friend to the similar; but the good is a friend to the good, so far as he is good, and not so far as he is similar.

Lysis/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ But what? Is not he who is good, so far as he is good, sufficient to himself?

Lysis/ Yes.

Socrates/ But he who is sufficient to himself, is not indigent of anything, so far as he possesses sufficiency.

Lysis/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And he who is not indigent of anything, will not love anything.

Lysis/ He will not.

Socrates/ But he who does not love, will not be a friend.

Lysis/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ How then will the good be friends to the good, who neither when absent desire each other (for they are sufficient to themselves when apart), nor when present are indigent of each other? By what artifice can these possess a great esteem for each other?

Lysis/ By none.

Socrates/ But those will not be friends who do not very much esteem each other.

Lysis/ True.

Socrates/ Consider then, O Lysis, in what respect we are deceived. Are we therefore deceived in a certain whole?

Lysis/ But how?

Socrates/ I once heard a person assert, and I now very well remember it, that the similar was hostile to the similar, and the good to the good. And he who asserted this, produced Hesiod as a witness, who says, "The potter is hostile to the potter, the finger to the finger, and the mendicant to the mendicant." And it appeared to him that all other things necessarily subsist in this manner; and that things most similar to each other, were in the highest degree filled with envy, emulation, and hatred; but such as are most dissimilar with friendship. For he was of opinion that the poor man was necessarily a friend to the rich, and the weak to the strong, for the sake of help: that in like manner the sick man was a friend to the physician; and that everyone who was ignorant, loved and was a friend to the man endued with knowledge. He likewise added something still more magnificent, that the similar is so far from being a friend to the similar, that the very contrary to this takes place. For that which is most contrary, is especially a friend to that which is most contrary. For everything desires a nature of this kind, but not that which is similar. Thus the dry desires the moist; the cold, the hot; the bitter, the sweet; the acute, the obtuse; the void, the full; and the full, the void; and the like takes place in other things. For the contrary is aliment to the contrary, but the similar does not in any respect enjoy the similar. And indeed, my friend, he who asserted these things appeared to be an elegant man: for he spoke well. But how does he appear to us to have spoken?

Menexenus/ Well, as it seems on the first view.

Socrates/ Shall we say, therefore, that the contrary is especially a friend to the contrary?

Menexenus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Be it so, O Menexenus: but is not this prodigious? And will not those all-wise men, who are skilled in contradicting, gladly rise up against us immediately, and ask, if friendship is not most contrary to hatred? What shall we say, in answer to them? Is it not necessary to acknowledge that their assertion is true?

Menexenus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Will they therefore say, that an enemy is a friend to a friend, or that a friend is a friend to an enemy?

Menexenus/ They will say neither of these things.

Socrates/ But is the just a friend to the unjust, or the temperate to the intemperate, or the good to the bad?

Menexenus/ It does not appear to me that this is the case.

Socrates/ But,, if anyone is a friend to anyone, according to contrariety, it is necessary that these also should be friends.

Menexenus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Neither, therefore, is the similar a friend to the similar, nor that which is contrary to that which is contrary.

Menexenus/ It does not appear that it is.

Socrates/ Further still, let us also consider this, lest we should be still more deceived; I mean that a friend in reality is none of these, but that what is neither good nor evil may sometimes become the friend of the good.

Menexenus/ How do you say?

Socrates/ By Zeus, I do not know; for I am in reality staggered by the ambiguity of the discourse. And it appears, according to the ancient proverb, that a friend is a beautiful thing. It resembles, however, something soft, smooth, and

fat; on which account perhaps it easily eludes us, and glides away, as being a thing of this kind. For I say that the good is beautiful. Do you not think so?

Menexenus/ I do.

Socrates/ I say therefore, prophesying, that that which is neither good nor evil, is the friend of the beautiful and the good. But hear what it is that induces me thus to prophesy. There appear to me to be three certain genera of things, the good, the evil, and that which is neither good nor evil. But how does it appear to you?

Menexenus/ The same; and that neither the good is a friend to the good, nor the evil to the evil, nor the good to the evil; as neither did our former discourse suffer us to say.

Socrates/ It remains, therefore, if anything is a friend to another, that that which is neither good nor evil, must be a friend either to the good, or to something which resembles itself. For nothing can become a friend to the evil.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ And we just now said, that neither is the similar a friend to the similar. Did we not?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Hence to that which is neither good nor evil, that will not be a friend, which is itself neither good nor evil.

Menexenus/ It does not appear that it will.

Socrates/ That which is neither good nor evil, therefore, alone happens to become a friend to the good alone.

Menexenus/ It is necessary, as it seems.

Socrates/ Is therefore that which we have now said. O boys, well explained? If then we wish to understand, a healthy body has not any occasion for the medicinal art, nor does it require any assistance: For it possesses sufficiency.

So that no healthy person is a friend to the physician through health. Or is he?

Menexenus/ No one.

Socrates/ But the diseased, I think, is a friend to the physician through disease.

Menexenus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But disease is an evil; and the medicinal art is useful and good.

Menexenus/ It is.

Socrates/ But the body, so far as body, is neither good nor bad.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ But through disease, the body is compelled to embrace and love the medicinal art.

Menexenus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ That, therefore, which is neither evil nor good, becomes a friend to the good, through the presence of evil.

Menexenus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But it is evident that it becomes a friend to the good, prior to its becoming evil through the evil which it possesses. For it does not become evil, instead of the good which it desires, and of which it is the friend. For we have said it is impossible, that the evil can be a friend to the good.

Menexenus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ But consider what I say. For I say that some things are such as that which is present to them; but that this is not the case with other things. Thus, if anyone wishes to be anointed with a certain color, the inunction is after a manner present to him who is anointed.

Menexenus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Whether therefore, after being anointed with the color, does he remain the same as he was before?

Menexenus/ I do not understand you.

Socrates/ Consider thus. If anyone should besmear your hairs which are yellow with white lead, would they then be white, or only appear to be so?

Menexenus/ They would only appear to be so.

Socrates/ But whiteness would be present with them.

Menexenus/ It would.

Socrates/ And yet at the same time your hairs would not be in any respect more white than they were before; but though whiteness is present, they will neither be white nor black.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ But when, my friend, old-age causes them to be of this color, then they will become such as the color which is present to them, viz. white through the presence of whiteness.

Menexenus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ This then is what I now ask, Whether that to which anything is present, is, by possession, such as the thing which is present? Or whether this is the case, if the thing is present after a certain manner, but otherwise not?

Menexenus/ Thus, rather.

Socrates/ In like manner, that which is neither evil nor good, sometimes when evil is present, is not yet evil; but there is a time when it becomes so.

Menexenus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ When, therefore, it is not yet evil, though evil is present, this very presence of evil causes it to desire good; but this presence which causes it to be evil, deprives it of the desire, and at the same time friendship of good. For it is now

no longer neither evil nor good, but is evil. But it was shown that the good is not a friend to the evil.

Menexenus/ It is not.

Socrates/ Hence we must say, that those who are wise must no longer philosophize, whether they are gods or men; nor again, those who are so ignorant, that they are vicious. For no one who is vicious and void of discipline can philosophize. Those therefore remain, who possess indeed this evil, ignorance, but are not yet stupid and void of all discipline, but who yet think they do not know those things of which they are ignorant. On which account, in a certain respect, those that are neither good, nor bad, philosophize: for such as are bad do not philosophize, nor such as are good. For it has appeared to us, that neither is the contrary a friend to the contrary, nor the similar to the similar. Or do you not remember that this was asserted by us above?

Menexenus/ I perfectly remember.

Socrates/ Have we not therefore, O Lysis and Menexenus, more than anything discovered what is a friend, and what is not? For we have said, that both according to the soul, and according to the body, and everywhere, that which is neither evil nor good, is a friend to the good through the presence of evil.

They in every respect admitted that these things were so. And I indeed was very glad, like a hunter having gladly obtained that of which I was in search. But afterwards, I know not how, a most absurd suspicion came into my mind, that the things which we had assented to were not true. And being immediately uneasy on this account, I said, It is strange, Lysis and Menexenus, but we seem to be enriched with a dream.

Menexenus/ Why so?

Socrates/ I am afraid lest we have met with false assertions, as with arrogant men, in our inquiry about friendship.

Menexenus/ How?

Socrates/ Let us consider thus. Is he who is a friend, a friend to anyone or not?

Menexenus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, is he a friend for the sake of nothing, and through nothing, or for the sake of something, and through something?

Menexenus/ The latter.

Socrates/ Is that thing then a friend, for the sake of which a friend is a friend to a friend, or is it neither a friend nor an enemy?

Menexenus/ I do not perfectly apprehend you.

Socrates/ It is likely. But thus perhaps you will follow me; and I think that I also shall better understand what I say. We have just now said that the sick is a friend to the physician. Did we not?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is he not therefore through disease, and for the sake of health, a friend to the physician?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not disease an evil?

Menexenus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But what of health? Is it good or evil, or neither?

Menexenus/ It is good.

Socrates/ We have therefore said, as it seems, that the body is neither good, nor bad, through disease; but that through disease it is a friend to the medicinal art. We have

likewise asserted that the medicinal art is good; but that it obtains friendship for the sake of health: and that health is good. Is it not?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But is health a friend, or not a friend?

Menexenus/ A friend.

Socrates/ And is not disease an enemy?

Menexenus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Hence that which is neither evil nor good, through evil and an enemy, is the friend of good, for the sake of good and a friend.

Menexenus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ A friend therefore is a friend for the sake of a friend, through an enemy.

Menexenus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Be it so. But since, O boys, we have arrived thus far, let us diligently attend lest we should be deceived. For we shall bid farewell to the assertion, that a friend becomes the friend of a friend, and that the similar is a friend to the similar; for this we have said is impossible. But at the same time, let us consider as follows, lest what is now asserted should deceive us. Do we not say, that the medicinal art is a friend for the sake of health?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And therefore that health is a friend?

Menexenus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If then it is a friend, it is for the sake of something.

Menexenus/ It is.

Socrates/ But it is the friend of something, from what we have assented to before.

Menexenus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will not therefore that again be a friend, for the sake of a friend?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it not therefore necessary that thus proceeding, we should reject what we have said, and arrive at a certain principle, which is not referred to another friend, but brings us to that which is the first friend, and for the sake of which we say all other things are friends?

Menexenus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ This then is what I say, that we should be cautious lest we are deceived by all those other particulars which we assert to be friends for the sake of the first friend, and which are as it were certain images of it; while, in the meantime, this first friend is truly a friend. For we should thus consider: That which anyone very much esteems, (as, for instance, a father sometimes his son,) he honors before all other things. But a man of this kind, on account of thus highly esteeming his son, will also, on his account, highly esteem something else. Thus, for instance, if he perceives that he drinks hemlock, he will very much esteem wine, because he thinks that this will save his son. Or will he not?

Menexenus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Will he not therefore also highly value the vessel which contains the wine?

Menexenus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But will he then no less esteem the earthen cup, or three cups of wine, than his son? Or is the case thus? The whole of the endeavor, in an affair of this kind, does not regard those things which are procured for the sake of something else, but that for the sake of which all such things are procured. Nor is the assertion which we frequently make true, that we very much esteem gold and silver; but in this

case, that which we highly esteem, is that for the sake of which gold, and all other preparatives, are procured. Shall we not say so?

Menexenus/ By all means.

Socrates/ The same thing therefore may be said respecting a friend: for such things as we say are friends to us, when they subsist for the sake of a friend, we improperly denominate. But that appears to be a friend in reality, in which all those that are called friendships end.

Menexenus/ This seems to be the case.

Socrates/ Hence that which is in reality a friend, is not a friend, for the sake of a certain friend.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ The assertion therefore is to be rejected, that a friend is a friend, for the sake of a certain friend. But is a friend, therefore, a good thing?

Menexenus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Is the good then beloved though evil? And is the case thus? Since the things of which we now speak are three, good, evil, and that which is neither good nor evil, if two of these are received, but evil entirely departs, and has not any connection either with body, or soul, or anything else, which we say is in itself neither good nor evil, in this case will good be perfectly useless to us? For if nothing any longer injures us, we shall not be indigent of any assistance whatever. And thus it will then become manifest that we have sought after, and loved good on account of evil; good being the medicine of evil; but evil being a disease. But when there is no disease, there will be no occasion for medicine. Does good thus naturally subsist, and is it thus beloved, on account of evil, by us who are situated between evil and good? And is it of no use itself, for its own sake?

Menexenus/ It seems to subsist in this manner.

Socrates/ That friend, therefore, in which all other things end, which we say are friends for the sake of another friend, is not in any respect similar to these. For these are called friends for the sake of a friend; but that which is in reality a friend, appears to be naturally in every respect contrary to this: for we have seen that this is a friend for the sake of an enemy. But if an enemy should be present, it would no longer as it seems be a friend to us.

Menexenus/ It does not appear to me that it would, as it is now said.

Socrates/ But, by Zeus, if evil should be extirpated, would there no longer be any hunger or thirst, or anything else of the like kind? Or would there be hunger, but yet not noxious, since there would be men and other animals? and thirst, and other appetites, but without being evil, in consequence of evil being abolished? Or shall we say that the inquiry is ridiculous, what would then be, or would not be? For who knows? This however we know, that at present it is possible to be injured by being hungry, and it is also possible to be benefited. Or is it not?

Menexenus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Does it not therefore follow, that when we are hungry, or desire the gratification of any other appetite, our desire may be sometimes beneficial, and sometimes noxious, and sometimes neither?

Menexenus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, evils were destroyed, what would be the advantage, if things which are not evil, were destroyed together with such as are evil?

Menexenus/ There would be none.

Socrates/ There would be appetites, therefore, which are neither good nor evil, even if evils were destroyed.

Menexenus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Is it therefore possible, that he who desires and loves anything, should not be the friend of that which he desires and loves?

Menexenus/ It does not appear to me that it is.

Socrates/ When evils therefore are destroyed, certain friendly persons, as it seems, will still remain.

Menexenus/ They will.

Socrates/ But if evil were the cause of friendship, no one would be a friend to another, when evil is destroyed. For the cause being taken away, that of which it was the cause can no longer have an existence.

Menexenus/ Right.

Socrates/ Was it not therefore acknowledged by us, that a friend loved something, and on account of something? And did we not then think, that through evil, that which is neither good nor evil loves good?

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ But now, as it seems, something else appears to be the cause of loving and being beloved.

Menexenus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Is then, in reality, desire, as we said, the cause of friendship? And is that which desires, the friend of that which it desires, and then, when it desires? And is he whom we before asserted to be a friend, a mere trifle, like a very prolix poem?

Menexenus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But, he who desires, desires that of which he is indigent. Or does he not?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is not then that which is indigent, the friend of that of which it is indigent?

Menexenus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ But everyone becomes indigent of that of which he is deprived.

Menexenus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Hence, as it seems, love, friendship, and desire, respect that which is domestic and allied to them. This appears to be the case, O Menexenus and Lysis.

They admitted it was so.

You, therefore, if you were friends to each other, would be naturally mutually allied.

Menexenus/ And very much so.

Lysis/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And hence, if anyone person desires or loves another, O boys, he can never either desire, or love, or be a friend, unless he is allied to the object of his love, either according to his soul, or a certain custom of his soul, or according to manners, or according to species.

Menexenus/ Entirely so;

Socrates/ Lysis was silent.

It appears to be necessary for us, to love that which is naturally allied to us.

Menexenus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ It is necessary therefore, that he who is a genuine, and not a pretended lover, should be beloved by the objects of his love.

To this Lysis and Menexenus scarcely assented: but Hippothales, through the pleasure which he experienced, exhibited all-various colors. And I being willing to consider the assertion, said, If that which is domestic and allied differs from that which is similar, we have declared, as it appears to me, O Lysis and Menexenus what a friend is: but if the similar and the allied are the same, it is not easy to reject the former assertion, that the similar is not useless to

the similar, according to similitude; but to acknowledge that a friend is useless, is inelegant. Are you willing therefore, I added, since we are as it were intoxicated by discourse, that we should grant and say that the allied is something different from the similar?

Menexenus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, shall we admit that good is allied, but evil foreign to everyone? Or shall we say that evil is allied to evil, but good to good? and that a thing which is neither good nor evil, is allied to that which is neither good nor evil?

Each of these appeared to us to be allied to each.

Again therefore, O boys, we have fallen upon those assertions which we first made respecting friendship; for an unjust man will be no less a friend to the unjust, and the vicious to the vicious, than the good to the good.

Menexenus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But what? if we should say the good and the allied are the same, will anything else follow, than that the good alone is a friend to the good?

Menexenus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ But this assertion also we thought was confuted by us. Or do you not remember?

Menexenus/ We do remember.

Socrates/ What further then can we employ in our discourse?

Menexenus/ It is evident nothing further.

Socrates/ Like wise men, therefore, in courts of justice, we ought to repeat all that has been said: for if neither those that are beloved, nor lovers, nor the similar, nor the dissimilar, nor the good, nor the allied, nor any other such particulars as we have discussed, (for I do not remember any

further, on account of their multitude), —if then no one of these is a friend, I have not anything more to say. When I had thus said; intending afterwards to excite someone who was more advanced in years, the pedagogues of Lysis and Menexenus approaching like certain dæmons, together with the brothers of these two, called to them, and ordered them to return home: For it was then late. At first, therefore, both we, and those that surrounded us, drove them away: but they paid no attention to us, but speaking in a barbaric manner were indignant and continued no less calling to the boys. Being vanquished therefore by their importunity, and it appearing to us, that as they had been subdued in the Mercurial feast, they would not have anything else to offer, we dissolved the conference. At the same time, after they had departed, I said to Lysis and Menexenus, We are become ridiculous, I who am an old man, and you who are boys. For they, now they have left us, will say, that we think ourselves to be friends to each other (for I rank myself among you), though at the same time we have not yet been able to find what a friend is.

THE END OF THE LYSIS.

Lysis.

Translated by J. Wright.

Persons of the Dialog
Socrates, Menexenus,
Hippothales, Lysis, Ctesippus

Socrates/ I was walking straight from the Academy to the Lyceum, by the road which skirts the outside of the walls, and had reached the little gate where is the source of the Panops, when I fell in with Hippothales, the son of Hieronymus, Ctesippus the Paeanian, and some more young men, standing together in a group.

Hippothales, seeing me approach, called out;

Hippothales/ Ha, Socrates, whither and whence?

Socrates/ From the Academy, and I am going straight to the Lyceum.

Hippothales/ Straight to us, I hope. Won't you turn in? It will be worth your while.

Socrates/ Turn in where? And whom do you mean by us?

Hippothales/ There.

Socrates/ pointing out to me an enclosure facing the wall, with a door open.

Hippothales/ There we are passing our time, we whom you see, and a great many other fine fellows too.

Socrates/ And what's all this, pray? And how are you passing your time?

Hippothales/ This is a palaestra that has been lately erected, and we are passing our time principally in conversations, of which we should be very glad to give you a share.

Socrates/ You are very kind. And who is your teacher there?

Hippothales/ A friend and admirer of yours, Miccus.

Socrates/ And no ordinary man either, a most competent Sophist.

Hippothales/ Won't you come with us, then, to see both him and all our party there too?

Socrates/ Here, where I am, I should like first to be informed, what I am to enter for, and who is your prime beauty?

Hippothales/ Some think one, and some another, Socrates.

Socrates/ But whom do you think, Hippothales? Tell me this.

He answered only with a blush. So I added, Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, there is no longer any need for you to tell me whether you are in love or not, since I am sure you are not only in love, but pretty far gone in it too by this time. For though in most matters I am a poor useless creature, yet by some means or other I have received from heaven the gift of being able to detect at a glance both a lover and a beloved.

On hearing this, he blushed still more deeply than before. Whereupon Ctesippus broke in.

Ctesippus/ It is very fine of you, Hippothales, turning red in this way, and making such a fuss about telling Socrates the name, when he is quite sure, if he stays ever so short a time in your company, to be bored to death by hearing it always repeated. At any rate, Socrates, he has deafened *our* ears for us, and filled them full of Lysis. Nay, if he be but a little tipsy when he talks of him, we can easily fancy, on waking, even the next morning, that we are still hearing the name of Lysis. But his constant talk about him, bad as it is, is not the worst—nothing like so bad as when he begins to

deluge us with his poems and speeches, and, worse and worse, to sing a song on his darling in a portentous voice, which we are compelled to listen to with patience.

Socrates/ Your Lysis must be quite a juvenile, I conjecture this from my not knowing the name when you mentioned it.

Hippothales/ Why, they don't often call him by his own name, Socrates; he still goes by his father's, the latter being so well known. Still, I am sure, you cannot be a stranger to the boy's appearance; that's quite enough to know him by.

Socrates/ Say, then, whose son he is.

Hippothales/ Democrates' of Aexone, his eldest.

Socrates/ Well done, Hippothales. A noble, and in every way a brilliant choice is this which you have made. But come now, go on about him with me, just as you do with your friends here, that I may know what language a lover ought to hold with regard to his favorite, either to his face or before others.

Hippothales/ And do you really, Socrates, set any value on what this fellow says?

Socrates/ Do you mean absolutely to deny being in love with the person he mentions?

Hippothales/ No, not that, but I do the making verses or speeches on him.

Ctesippus/ He is out of his senses, doting, mad.

Socrates/ But, I don't want to hear any of your verses, Hippothales, nor any song either that you may have composed upon your darling, but I should like to have an idea of their sense, that I may know how you behave toward your favorite.

Hippothales/ Ctesippus will tell you all about it, Socrates, I don't doubt. He must remember it well enough, if it be true, as he says, that I dinned it into his ears till he was deaf.

Ctesippus/ Oh, I know it, right thoroughly too. It is such a joke, Socrates. The idea of a lover devoting himself exclusively to the object of his love, and yet having nothing of a personal interest to say to him that any child might not say—isn't it absurd? But stories that all the city rings with, about Democrates, and Lysis, the boy's grandfather, and all his ancestors—their wealth, their breeds of horses, their victories at the Pythian, Isthmian, Nemean with four steeds and single—all these he works into poem and speech, aye, and stories too, still further out-of-date than these. For in a sort of poem the other day, he gave us the whole account of Heracles' entertainment, telling us how their ancestor received that hero into his house on the strength of his relationship, being himself son of Zeus, by the daughter of the founder of Aexone. Yes, Socrates, such, among others, are the old wives' tales that our lover here is ever singing and reciting, and condemning us moreover to listen to.

Socrates/ On hearing this, I said to the lover, You ridiculous Hippothales, before you have gained the victory, you compose and sing a hymn of praise on yourself.

Hippothales/ It isn't on myself, Socrates, that I either make or sing it.

Socrates/ You fancy no.

Hippothales/ How is it so?

Socrates/ In every way, these songs have reference to you. If you succeed in winning such a youth as you describe, all that you have said and sung will redound to your honor, and be in fact your hymn of triumph, as if you had gained a victory in obtaining such a favorite. But if he escape your grasp, then the higher the eulogium you have passed on

him, the greater will be the blessings which you will seem to have missed, and the greater consequently the ridicule you will incur. All connoisseurs, therefore, in matters of love, are careful of praising their favorites before they have won them, from their doubts as to the result of the affair. Moreover, your beauties, when lauded and made much of, become gorged with pride and arrogance. Don't you think so?

Hippothales/ I do.

Socrates/ And the more arrogant they are, the harder they become to be caught?

Hippothales/ It is to be expected, at any rate.

Socrates/ Well, what should you say to a huntsman that frightened the prey he was in chase of, and rendered it harder to be caught?

Hippothales/ That he was a very sorry one, certainly.

Socrates/ And if by speech and song he renders it wild instead of luring it, he can be no favorite of the Muses, can he?

Hippothales/ I think not.

Socrates/ Have a care then, Hippothales, that you do not lay yourself open with your poetry to all these reproaches. And yet I am sure, that to a man who injured himself by his poetry, you would not be willing to accord the title of a good poet, so long as he did himself harm.

Hippothales/ No, indeed, that would be too unreasonable. But it is on this very account, Socrates, that I put myself in your hands, and beg you to give me any advice you may have to bestow, as to the course of conduct or conversation that a lover ought to adopt in order to render himself agreeable to the object of his affection.

Socrates/ That were no such easy matter. But if you would bring me to speak with Lysis, perhaps I could give you

a specimen of what you ought to say to him, in place of the speeches and songs which you are in the habit of treating him with, according to your friends here.

Hippothales/ Well, there is no difficulty in that. If you will only go into the palaestra with Ctesippus, and sit down and begin to talk, I have little doubt that he will come to you of his own accord, for he is singularly fond of listening. And, moreover, as they are keeping the Hermaea, boys and men are all mixed up together today. So he is pretty certain to join you. But if he does not, Ctesippus knows him, through his cousin Menexenus, who is Lysis' particular friend. You can get Ctesippus, therefore, to summon him, in case he does not come of himself.

Socrates/ This be our plan. And taking Ctesippus with me, I walked toward the palaestra, the rest following.

On entering we found that the boys had finished their sacrifices, and, the ceremony being now pretty well over, were playing together at knucklebones, all in their holiday dress. The greater part were carrying on their game in the court outside, but some of them were in a corner of the dressing room, playing at odd and even with a number of bones which they drew out of small baskets. Round these were stationed others looking on, among whom was Lysis, and he stood in the midst of boys and youths with a chaplet on his head, unmatched in face or form. You would say he was not beautiful merely, but even of a noble mien. For ourselves, we withdrew to the opposite part of the room, and sitting down, as nothing was going on there, began to talk. While thus engaged, Lysis kept turning round and eyeing us, evidently wishing to join us. For some time though he remained in doubt, not liking to walk up alone. But when Menexenus looked in from his game in the court and on seeing Ctesippus and me came to sit down with us, Lysis

also followed at sight of his friend, and took a seat by his side.

There came up, moreover, the rest of our party, among them Hippothales, who, seeing them form into a good-sized group, screened himself behind them in a position where he did not think he could be seen by Lysis—so fearful was he of giving him offense. And thus placed near him, he listened to our conversation.

I began it by turning my eyes on Menexenus, and saying, Son of Demophon, which of you two is the elder?

Menexenus/ It is a disputed point.

Socrates/ And do you dispute, too, which is the better fellow?

Menexenus/ Right heartily.

Socrates/ And so too, I suppose, which is the more beautiful?

At this they both laughed.

I will not ask you, I added, which is the wealthier, for you are friends, are you not?

Hippothales/ Oh dear, yes!

Socrates/ And friends, they tell us, share and share alike; so in this respect, at any rate, there will be no difference between you, if only you give me a true account of your friendship.

To this they both assented.

I was then proceeding to inquire which of the two excelled in justice, and which in wisdom, when someone came up and carried off Menexenus, telling him that the master of the palaestra wanted him—I presume, on business connected with the sacrifice. Accordingly he left us, and I went on questioning Lysis.

Lysis, I suppose your father and mother love you very dearly?

Lysis/ *Very* dearly.

Socrates/ They would wish you then to be as happy as possible.

Lysis/ Of course.

Socrates/ Do you think a man happy if he is a slave, and may not do anything he wants?

Lysis/ No, that indeed I don't.

Socrates/ Well, if your father and mother love you, and wish you to become happy, it is clear that they try in every way to make you happy.

Lysis/ To be sure they do.

Socrates/ They allow you then, I suppose, to do what you wish, and never scold you, or hinder you from doing what you want to do?

Lysis/ Yes, but they do though, Socrates, and pretty frequently too.

Socrates/ How? They wish you to be happy, and yet hinder you from doing what you want. But tell me this. If you wanted to ride on one of your father's chariots, and take the reins during a race, would they not allow you?

Lysis/ No, most assuredly they would not.

Socrates/ Whom would they then?

Lysis/ There is a charioteer paid by my father.

Socrates/ Paid! Do they allow a paid servant in preference to you to do what he pleases with the horses, and, what is more, give him money for so doing?

Lysis/ Not a doubt about it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, but your pair of mules I am sure they let you drive, and even if you wished to take the whip and whip them, they would allow you.

Lysis/ Allow me, would they?

Socrates/ Would they not? Is there no one allowed to whip them?

Lysis/ Of course there is—the mule driver.

Socrates/ Is he a slave or free?

Lysis/ A slave.

Socrates/ A slave then, it appears, they think of more account than you, their son; they entrust their property to him rather than to you, and they allow him to do what he pleases, while you they hinder. But answer me further. Do they let you rule yourself, or not even allow you this?

Lysis/ Rule myself! I should think not.

Socrates/ You have someone to rule you, then?

Lysis/ Yes, my governor here.

Socrates/ Not a slave?

Lysis/ Yes, but he is, though, ours.

Socrates/ Shocking! A free man to be ruled by a slave. But how, pray, does this governor exercise his authority?

Lysis/ He takes me to school, of course.

Socrates/ And do you mean to say that they rule you there, too—the schoolmasters?

Lysis/ Most certainly they do.

Socrates/ Very many then, it appears, are the masters and rulers whom your father sets over you on purpose. But come now, when you go home to your mother, she, I am sure, lets you do what you please—that you may be as happy as she can make you—either with her wool or her loom, when she is spinning. It cannot possibly be that she hinders

you from touching her comb or her shuttle, or any other of her spinning implements.

He burst out laughing.

Lysis/ I can assure you, Socrates, she not only hinders me, but would get me a good beating if I did touch them.

Socrates/ Beating!. You haven't done your father or mother any wrong, have you?

Lysis/ Not I.

Socrates/ Whatever is the reason, then, that they hinder you, in this shocking manner, from being happy, and acting as you please, and keep you, all the day long, in a state of bondage to someone or other—and, in a word, of doing hardly anything at all you want to do? So that it seems you get no good whatever from your fortune, large as it is, but all have control over it, rather than you, nor, again, from that beautiful person of yours, for it, too, is under the care and charge of other people, while you, poor Lysis, have control over nothing at all, nor do a single thing you wish.

Lysis/ Because I'm not old enough yet, Socrates.

Socrates/ That should be no hindrance, son of Democrates, since there are things, I fancy, which both your father and mother allow you to do, without waiting for you to be old enough. When they wish, for example, to have anything written or read, it is you, I conceive, whom they appoint to the office, before anyone else in the house. Isn't it?

Lysis/ Beyond a question.

Socrates/ In these matters, then, you are allowed to do as you please; you may write whichever letter you like first, and whichever you like second. And in reading you enjoy the same liberty. And when you take up your lyre, neither father nor mother, I imagine, hinders you from tightening or loosening such strings as you choose, or from playing with

your fingers or stick, as you may think proper. Or do they hinder you in such matters?

Lysis/ Oh dear, no!

Socrates/ What in the world, then, can be the reason, Lysis, that in these matters they don't hinder you, while in the former they do?

Lysis/ I suppose it is, Socrates, because I understand the one, and don't understand the other.

Socrates/ Oh! That's it, is it, my fine fellow? It is not, then, for you to be old enough that your father is waiting in all cases, but on the very day that he thinks you are wiser than he is, he will hand over to you himself and his property.

Lysis/ I shouldn't wonder.

Socrates/ Nor I. But again. Does your neighbor follow the same rule that your father does with regard to you? Do you expect he will hand over to you his house to manage, as soon as he thinks you have a better idea of the management of a house than he has himself, or will he keep it in his own hands?

Lysis/ Hand it over to me, I should think.

Socrates/ And the Athenians? Will they, do you imagine, hand over to you their matters directly they perceive that you are wise enough to manage them?

Lysis/ Yes, I expect so.

Socrates/ But come now, what will the Great King do? When his meat is cooking, will he allow his eldest son, heir to the throne of Asia, to throw into the gravy whatever he chooses, or us, rather, if we come before him, and prove that we have a better idea than his son has of dressing a dish?

Lysis/ Us, to be sure.

Socrates/ And the prince he won't allow to put in the least morsel even, while with us he would make no difficulty, though we wished to throw in salt by handfuls?

Lysis/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Once more. If his son had something the matter with his eyes, would he allow him to touch them himself, if he thought him ignorant of the healing art, or rather hinder him?

Lysis/ Hinder him.

Socrates/ But against us, on the other hand, if he conceived us to be skilled in the art, he would, I imagine, make no objection, even though we wished to force open the eyes, and sprinkle in ashes, as he would suppose us to be rightly advised.

Lysis/ True, he would not.

Socrates/ And so, with everything else whatsoever, he would entrust it to us rather than to himself or his son, if he believed that we knew more about it than either of them did.

Lysis/ Necessarily he would, Socrates.

Socrates/ You see, then, how the case stands, dear Lysis. All matters of which we have a good idea will be put into our hands by all people, whether Greeks or barbarians, men or women. We shall act, with regard to them, exactly as we please; no one will intentionally stand in our way. And not only shall we be free ourselves in these matters, but we shall be lords over others, and they will be in fact our property, as we shall have the enjoyment of them. With regard to matters, on the other hand, into which we have acquired no insight, no one will ever allow us to act as we think proper, but all persons, to the best of their power, will hinder us from meddling with them—not only strangers, but even our own father and mother, and if we possess any nearer relation. And we ourselves, in these matters, shall be

subject to others, and they will be, in fact, the property of others, as we shall derive no advantage from them. Do you allow this to be the case?

Lysis/ I do.

Socrates/ Will anyone, then, count us his friends, will anyone love us in those matters in which we are of no use?

Lysis/ Indeed no.

Socrates/ According to this, then, not even you are loved by your own father, nor is anyone else by anyone else in the world, in so far as you or he is useless?

Lysis/ So it would appear.

Socrates/ If, therefore, you acquire knowledge, my son, all men will be friendly to you, all men will be attached to you, for you will be useful and good. If not, you will have no friend in anyone, not even in your father or mother, or any of your own family. Now is it possible, Lysis, for a man to have a great idea of himself in those matters of which he has yet no idea?

Lysis/ How can he possibly?

Socrates/ And if you still require, as you do, an instructor, you are still without ideas.

Lysis/ True.

Socrates/ It cannot be, then, that you have a great idea of yourself, if as yet you have no idea.

Lysis/ No, really, Socrates, I don't see how I can.

Socrates/ On receiving this reply from Lysis, I turned my eyes on Hippothales, and was on the point of making a great blunder. For it came into my head to say, This is the way, Hippothales, that you should talk to your favorite, humbling and checking, instead of puffing him up and pampering him, as you now do. However, on seeing him writhing with agitation at the turn the conversation was taking, I

recollected that though standing so near, he didn't wish to be seen by Lysis. So I recovered myself in time, and forbore to address him.

At this moment, too, Menexenus returned and took the seat by Lysis, from which he had previously arisen.

Whereupon Lysis, in a boyish fondling way, said to me in a low voice, so that Menexenus couldn't hear;

Lysis/ I say, Socrates, say over again to Menexenus what you have been saying to me.

Socrates/ No, Lysis, *you* must tell him that; you were certainly attending.

Lysis/ I should think I was too.

Socrates/ Try to remember it then, as well as you can, that you may give him a clear account of the whole, and if there's anything you forget, ask me about it some other day—the first time you meet me.

Lysis/ Well, I'll do as you tell me, Socrates, with all my heart; you may rely upon that. But say something else to him now, will you, that I, too, may hear it, till it's time for me to go home.

Socrates/ Well, I must do so, since it's you who bid me. But mind you come to my aid, if Menexenus tries to baffle me. You know, don't you, that he's fond of a dispute?

Lysis/ Oh yes, desperately, I know. And that's the very reason I want you to talk with him.

Socrates/ That I may make myself ridiculous, eh?

Lysis/ Oh dear, no, Socrates, but that you may put him down.

Socrates/ Put him down, indeed. That's no such easy matter. He's a redoubtable man, this, a scholar of Ctesippus'. And here's his master too, himself, to help him—don't you see? —Ctesippus.

Lysis/ Trouble yourself about no one, Socrates, but begin, attack him.

Socrates/ As you will.

At this point of our byplay Ctesippus cried out;

Ctesippus/ What's that you two there are feasting on by yourselves, without giving us a share?

Socrates/ Never fear, you shall have a share. There's something I've said that Lysis here doesn't understand. He says, though, he thinks Menexenus knows, and bids me ask him.

Ctesippus/ Why don't you ask him then?

Socrates/ Just what I mean to do. Answer, Menexenus, the questions I ask. From my earliest childhood I have had a particular fancy; everyone has. One longs for horses, another for dogs, a third for money, a fourth for office. For my part, I look on these matters with equanimity, but on the acquisition of friends, with all a lover's passion, and I would choose to obtain a good friend rather than the best quail or cock in the world; I should prefer one to both horse and dog—nay, I fully believe, that I would far sooner acquire a friend and companion, than all the gold of Darius, aye, or than Darius himself. So fond am I of friendship. On seeing, therefore, you and Lysis, I am lost in wonder, while I count you most happy, at your being able, at your years, to acquire this treasure with such readiness and ease—in that you, Menexenus, have gained so early and true a friend in Lysis, and he the same in you—while I, on the contrary, am so far from making the acquisition, that I do not even know how one man becomes the friend of another, but wish on this very point to appeal to you as a connoisseur. Answer me this. As soon as one man loves another, which of the two becomes the friend—the lover of the loved, or the loved of the lover? Or does it make no difference?

Menexenus/ None in the world, that I can see.

Socrates/ How? Are both friends, if only one loves?

Menexenus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Indeed! Is it not possible for one who loves, not to be loved in return by the object of his love?

Menexenus/ It is.

Socrates/ Nay, is it not possible for him even to be hated—treatment, if I mistake not, which lovers frequently fancy they receive at the hands of their favorites? Though they love their darlings as dearly as possible, they often imagine that they are not loved in return, often that they are even hated. Don't you believe this to be true?

Menexenus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Well, in such a case as this, the one loves, the other is loved.

Menexenus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Which of the two, then, is the friend of the other—the lover of the loved, whether or no he be loved in return, and even if he be hated, or the loved of the lover? Or is neither the friend of the other, unless both love each other?

Menexenus/ The latter certainly seems to be the case, Socrates.

Socrates/ If so, we think differently now from what we did before. Then it appeared that if one loved, both were friends, but now, that unless both love, neither are friends.

Menexenus/ Yes, I'm afraid we have contradicted ourselves.

Socrates/ This being the case then, the lover is not a friend to anything that does not love him in return.

Menexenus/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ People, then, are not friends to horses, unless their horses love them in return, nor friends to quails or to dogs, nor again, to wine or to gymnastics, unless their love be returned—nor friends to wisdom, unless wisdom loves them in return. But in each of these cases, the individual loves the object, but is not a friend to it, and the poet is wrong who says;

> Happy the man who, to whom he's a friend, has children, and horses
> Mettlesome, dogs of the chase, guest in a faraway land.

Menexenus/ I don't think he is wrong, Socrates.

Socrates/ But do you think he's right?

Menexenus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ The lover then, it appears, Menexenus, is a friend to the object of his love, whether the object love, or even hate him. Just as to quite young children, who are either not yet old enough to love, or who are old enough to feel hatred when punished by father or mother, their parents, all the time even that they are being hated, are friends in the very highest degree.

Menexenus/ Yes, such appears to be the case.

Socrates/ By this reasoning, then, it is not the object of love that is the friend, but the lover.

Menexenus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And so, not the object of hatred that is the enemy, but the hater.

Menexenus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ It frequently happens, then, that people are enemies to those who love them, and friends to those who hate them—that is, are enemies to their friends, and friends to their enemies—if it be true that the lover is the friend, but not the loved. But surely. my dear friend, it were grossly

unreasonable, nay, rather, I think altogether impossible, for a man to be a friend to his enemy, and an enemy to his friend.

Menexenus/ Yes, Socrates, it does seem impossible.

Socrates/ Well, then, if this be impossible, it must be the object of the love that is the friend to the lover.

Menexenus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And so again, the object of the hatred that is the enemy to the hater.

Menexenus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ But if this be true, we cannot help arriving at the same conclusion as we did in the former case—namely, that it often happens that a man is not a friend, but even an enemy to a friend, as often, that is, as he is not loved, but even hated by the man whom he loves—and often again, that he is not an enemy, but even a friend to an enemy, as often, in fact, as he is not hated, but even loved by the man whom he hates.

Menexenus/ No, I'm afraid we can't.

Socrates/ What are we to do, then, if neither those who love are to be friends, nor those who are loved, nor, again, those who both love and are loved? Are there any other people besides these that we can say become friends to each other?

Menexenus/ To tell you the truth, Socrates, I don't see my way at all.

Socrates/ Is it possible, Menexenus, that from first to last we have been conducting our search improperly?

Lysis/ I am sure I think it is, Socrates.

Socrates/ And he blushed as he said so. For the words seemed to burst from him against his will in the intensity of the interest he was paying to the conversation—an interest

which his countenance had evinced all the time we were talking.

I then, wishing to relieve Menexenus, and charmed with the other's intelligence, turned to Lysis, and directing my discourse to him, observed, Yes, Lysis, you are quite right, I think, in saying that if we had conducted our search properly, we should never have lost ourselves in this manner. Let us proceed, however, on this line of inquiry no longer—for I look upon it as a very difficult sort of road—but let us go back again to that point at which we turned aside, and follow in the steps of the poets. For poets, I conceive, are as good as fathers and guides to us in matters of wisdom. Well, the poets, if I mistake not, put forward no slight claims for those who happen to be friends, but tell us that it is God himself who makes them friends, by leading them one to another. They express, if I remember right, their opinion thus : 'Like men, I trow, to like, God ever leads,' and makes them known. You have met with the verse, have you not?

Lysis/ Oh, yes.

Socrates/ And also with the writings of those learned sages which tell the same story—namely, that like must of necessity be ever friendly with like. And these are they, if I mistake not, who talk and write on nature and the universe.

Lysis/ True, they are.

Socrates/ Well, do you think they are right in what they say?

Lysis/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Perhaps in half—perhaps, too, even in all—only we don't understand. For, as it appears to us, the nearer wicked men come to each other, and the more they see of each other, the greater enemies they become. For they injure each other. And it is impossible, I take it, for men to be friends, if they injure and are injured in turn.

Lysis/ So it is.

Socrates/ By this, then, it would appear, that half of their assertion cannot be true, if we suppose them to mean that wicked men are like one another.

Lysis/ So it would.

Socrates/ But they mean to say, I imagine, that the good are like and friendly with the good, but that the bad, as is remarked of them in another place, are not ever even like themselves, but are variable and not to be reckoned upon. And if a thing be unlike and at variance with a itself, it will be long, I take it, before it becomes like to or friendly with anything else. Don't you think so too?

Lysis/ I do.

Socrates/ When, therefore, my friend, our authors assert that like is friendly with like, they mean, I imagine, to intimate, though obscurely enough, that the good man is a friend to the good man only, but that the bad man never engages in a true friendship either with a good or a bad man. Do you agree?

He nodded assent.

We know then now who it is that are friends, for our argument shows us that it must be those who are good.

Lysis/ Quite clearly too, I think.

Socrates/ And so do I. Still there is a something in the way that troubles me; so let us, with the help of heaven, see what it is that I suspect. Like men are friendly with like men, in so far as they are like, and such a man is useful to such a man. Or rather, let us put it in this way. Is there any good or harm that a like thing can do to a like thing, which it cannot also do to itself? Is there any that can be done to it, which cannot also be done to it by itself? And if not, how can such things be held in regard by each other, when they

have no means of assisting one another? Can this possibly be?

Lysis/ No, not possibly.

Socrates/ And if a thing be not held in regard, can it be a friend?

Lysis/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But, you will say, the like man is not a friend to the like man, but the good will be a friend to the good, in so far as he is good, not in so far as he is like.

Lysis/ Perhaps I may.

Socrates/ And I should rejoin, Will not the good man, in so far as he is good, be found to be sufficient for himself?

Lysis/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if sufficient, he will want nothing so far as his sufficiency goes.

Lysis/ Of course not.

Socrates/ And if he does not want anything he won't feel regard for anything either.

Lysis/ To be sure not.

Socrates/ And what he does not feel regard for, he cannot love.

Lysis/ Not he.

Socrates/ And if he does not love, he won't be a friend.

Lysis/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ How then, I wonder, will the good be ever friends at all with the good, when neither in absence do they feel regret for each other, being sufficient for themselves apart, nor when present together have they any need of one another? Is there any possible way by which such people can be brought to care for each other?

Lysis/ None whatever.

Socrates/ And if they do not care for each other, they cannot possibly be friends.

Lysis/ True, they cannot.

Socrates/ Look and see then, Lysis, how we have been led into error. If I mistake not, we are deceived in the whole, and not only in the half.

Lysis/ How so?

Socrates/ Once upon a time, I heard a statement made which has just this moment flashed across my mind. It was that nothing is so hostile to like as like, none so hostile to the good as the good. And among other arguments, my informant adduced the authority of Hesiod, telling me that, according to him, 'Potter ever jars with potter, bard with bard, and poor with poor.' And so, he added, by a universal and infallible law the nearer any two things resemble one another, the fuller do they become of envy, strife, and hatred—and the greater the dissimilarity, the greater the friendship. For the poor are obliged to make themselves friends of the rich, and the weak of the strong, for the sake of their assistance; the sick man also must be friendly with the physician, and, in short, everyone who is without knowledge must feel regard and affection for those who possess it. Nay, he proceeded with increased magnificence of position to assert that the like was so far from being friendly with the like, that the exact opposite was the case; the more any two things were contrary, the more were they friendly to each other. For everything, he says, craves for its contrary, and not for its like—the dry craves for moisture, the cold for heat, the bitter for sweetness, the sharp for bluntness, the empty to be filled, the full to be emptied. And everything else follows the same rule. For the contrary, he added, is food to the contrary; the like can derive no advantage from the like. And I can assure you I thought

him extremely clever as he said all this. He stated his case so well. But you, my friends, what do you think of it?

Menexenus/ Oh, it seems very fair at first hearing.

Socrates/ Shall we admit then that nothing is so friendly to a thing as its contrary?

Menexenus/ By all means.

Socrates/ But if we do, Menexenus, will there not spring upon us suddenly and uncouthly and exultingly those universal-knowledge men, the masters of dispute, and ask us, whether there is anything in the world so contrary to enmity as friendship? And if they do, what must be our answer? Can we possibly help admitting that they are right?

Menexenus/ No we cannot.

Socrates/ Well then, they will say, is friendship a friend to enmity, or enmity to friendship?

Menexenus/ Neither one nor the other.

Socrates/ But justice, I suppose, is a friend to injustice, temperance to intemperance, good to evil.

Menexenus/ No, I don't think this can be the case.

Socrates/ Well but, I rejoined, if one thing is friend to another thing in virtue of being its contrary, these things must of necessity be friendly.

Menexenus/ So they must.

Socrates/ It follows then, I think, that neither like is friendly with like, nor contrary with contrary.

Menexenus/ Apparently it does.

Socrates/ Well, then, let us look again, and see whether we be not still as far as ever from finding friendship, since it is clearly none of these things I have mentioned, but whether that which is neither good nor evil may not possibly turn out, however late, to be friendly with the good.

Menexenus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Why, to tell you the truth, I don't know myself, being quite dizzied by the entanglement of the subject. I am inclined though to think that, in the words of the old proverb, the beautiful is friendly. Certainly the friendly has the appearance of being something soft and smooth and slippery, and probably it is from being of this character that it slides and slips through our fingers so easily. Now I am of this opinion, because the good, I assert, is beautiful. Don't you think so?

Menexenus/ I do.

Socrates/ I further assert, with a diviner's foresight, that to the beautiful and good that which is neither good nor evil is friendly. And my reasons for divining this I will tell you. I conceive I recognize three distinct classes, good, evil, and, thirdly, that which is neither good nor evil. Do you allow this distinction?

Menexenus/ I do.

Socrates/ Now that good is friendly with good, or evil with evil, or good with evil, we are hindered by our previous arguments from believing. It remains then that, if there be anything friendly with anything, that which is neither good nor evil must be friendly either with the good or with that which resembles itself. For nothing, I am sure, can be friendly with evil.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ But neither can like be friendly with like; this we also said, did we not?

Menexenus/ We did.

Socrates/ That then which is neither good nor evil will not be friendly with that which resembles itself.

Menexenus/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ It follows then, I conceive, that friendship can only exist between good and that which is neither evil nor good.

Menexenus/ Necessarily, as it appears.

Socrates/ What think you then, my children? I proceeded to say. Is our present position guiding us in a right direction? If we look attentively, we perceive that a body which is in health has no need whatever of the medical art or of any assistance, for it is sufficient in itself. And therefore no one in health is friendly with a physician on account of his health.

Menexenus/ Just so.

Socrates/ But the sick man is, I imagine, on account of his sickness.

Menexenus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Sickness, you will allow, is an evil, the art of medicine, both useful and good.

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But a body, if I mistake not, in so far as it is a body, is neither good nor evil.

Menexenus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ A body though is compelled, on account of sickness, to embrace and love the medical art.

Menexenus/ I think so.

Socrates/ That, then, which is neither evil nor good becomes friendly with good, on account of the presence of evil.

Menexenus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ But evidently it becomes so before it is itself made evil by the evil which it contains. For, once become evil, it can no longer, you will allow, be desirous of or friendly

with good, for evil, we said, cannot possibly be friendly with good.

Menexenus/ No, it cannot possibly.

Socrates/ Now mark what I say. I say that some things are themselves such as that which is present with them, some things are not such. For example, if you dye a substance with any color, the color which is dyed in is present, I imagine, with the substance which is dyed.

Menexenus/ To be sure it is.

Socrates/ After the process then, is the dyed substance such, in point of color, as that which is applied?

Menexenus/ I don't understand.

Socrates/ But you will thus. If anyone were to dye your locks of gold with white lead, would they, after the dyeing, be, or appear, white?

Menexenus/ Appear.

Socrates/ And yet whiteness would, at any rate, be present with them.

Menexenus/ True.

Socrates/ But still they would not, as yet, be at all the more white on that account, but though whiteness is present with them, they are neither white nor black.

Menexenus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ But when, my dear Lysis, old age has brought upon them this same color, then they become really such as that which is present with them, white by the presence of white.

Menexenus/ Yes, indeed they do.

Socrates/ This, then, is the question I want to ask. If a thing be present in a substance, will the substance be such as that which is present with it, or will it be such, if the thing

is present under certain conditions, under certain conditions not?

Menexenus/ The latter rather.

Socrates/ That then which is neither evil nor good is, in some cases, when evil is present with it, not evil as yet; in other cases it has already become such.

Menexenus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Well then, when it is not evil as yet, though evil be present with it, this very presence of evil makes it desirous of good, but the presence which makes it evil deprives it, at the same time, of its desire and friendship for good. For it is no longer a thing neither evil nor good, but already evil, and evil, we said, cannot be friendly with good.

Menexenus/ True it cannot be.

Socrates/ On the same ground then we may further assert that those who are already wise are no longer friends to wisdom, be they gods, or be they men, nor, again, are those friends to wisdom who are so possessed of foolishness as to be evil, for no evil and ignorant man is a friend to wisdom. There remain then those who possess indeed this evil, the evil of foolishness, but who are not, as yet, in consequence of it, foolish or ignorant, but still understand that they do not know the things they do not know. And thus, you see, it is those who are neither good nor evil, as yet, that are friends to wisdom [philosophers], but those who are evil are not friends, nor again are the good. For that contrary is not friendly with contrary, nor like with like, was made apparent in the former part of our discourse. Do you remember?

Lysis/ Oh perfectly.

Menexenus/ Oh perfectly.

Socrates/ Now then, Lysis and Menexenus, we have, as it appears, discovered, beyond a dispute, what it is that is

friendly, and not friendly. Whether in respect of the soul, or of the body, or of anything else whatsoever, that, we pronounce, which is neither evil nor good is friendly with good on account of the presence of evil.

To this conclusion they both yielded a hearty and entire assent.

For myself, I was rejoicing, with all a hunter's delight, at just grasping the prey I had been so long in chase of, when presently there came into my mind, from what quarter I cannot tell, the strangest sort of suspicion. It was that the conclusions to which we had arrived were not true, and, sorely discomfited, I cried, Alackaday, Lysis, alack, Menexenus, we have, I fear me, but dreamed our treasure.

Menexenus/ Why so?

Socrates/ I am afraid that, just as if with lying men, we have fallen in with some such false reasonings in our search after friendship.

Menexenus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Look here. If a man be a friend, is he a friend to someone, or not?

Menexenus/ To someone, of course.

Socrates/ For the sake of nothing, and on account of nothing, or for the sake and on account of something?

Menexenus/ For the sake of and on account of something.

Socrates/ Is he a friend to that thing, for the sake of which he is a friend to his friend, or is he to it neither friend nor foe?

Menexenus/ I don't quite follow.

Socrates/ No wonder, but perhaps you will if we take this course, and I too, I think, shall better understand what I am

saying. The sick man, as we just now said, is a friend to the physician. Is he not?

Menexenus/ He is.

Socrates/ On account of sickness, for the sake of health?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Sickness is an evil?

Menexenus/ Beyond a doubt.

Socrates/ But what is health? A good, an evil, or neither one nor the other?

Menexenus/ A good.

Socrates/ We further stated, I think, that the body, a thing neither good nor evil, is, on account of sickness—that is to say, on account of an evil—a friend to the medical art. And the medical art is a good, and it is for the sake of health that the medical art has received the friendship, and health is a good, is it not?

Menexenus/ It is.

Socrates/ Is the body a friend, or not a friend, to health?

Menexenus/ A friend.

Socrates/ And a foe to sickness?

Menexenus/ Most decidedly.

Socrates/ That, then, it appears, which is neither good nor evil is a friend to good on account of an evil to which it is a foe, for the sake of a good to which it is a friend?

Menexenus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ The friendly, then, is a friend for the sake of that to which it is a friend, on account of that to which it is a foe?

Menexenus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Very well. But arrived as we are, I added, at this point, let us pay all heed, my children, that we be not misled.

That friend is become friend to friend—that is to say, that like is become friend to like, which we declared to be impossible—is a matter I will allow to pass, but there is another point which we must attentively consider, in order that we may not be deceived by our present position. A man is a friend, we said, to the medical art for the sake of health.

Menexenus/ We did.

Socrates/ Is he a friend to health too?

Menexenus/ To be sure he is.

Socrates/ For the sake of something?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ For the sake of something, then, to which he is friendly, if this, too, is to follow our previous admission?

Menexenus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But is he not again a friend to that thing for the sake of some other thing to which he is a friend?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Can we possibly help, then, being weary of going on in this manner, and is it not necessary that we advance at once to a beginning, which will not again refer us to friend upon friend, but arrive at that to which we are in the first instance friends, and for the sake of which we say we are friends to all the rest?

Menexenus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ This, then, is what I say we must consider, in order that all those other things, to which we said we were friendly, for the sake of that one thing, may not, like so many shadows of it, lead us into error. but that we may establish that thing as the first, to which we are really and truly friends. For let us view the matter thus. If a man sets a high value upon a thing—for instance, if, as is frequently the case, a father prizes a son above everything else he has in the

world—may such a father be led by the extreme regard he has for his son to set a high value upon other things also? Suppose, for example, he were to hear of his having drunk some hemlock; would he set a high value on wine, if he believed that wine would cure his son?

Menexenus/ Of course he would.

Socrates/ And on the vessel also which contained the wine?

Menexenus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do you mean to say, then, that he sets an equal value on both, on a cup of earthenware and his own son, on his own son and a quart of wine? Or is the truth rather thus? All such value as this is set not on those things which are procured for the sake of another thing, but on that for the sake of which all such things are procured. We often talk, I do not deny, about setting a high value on gold and silver, but is the truth on this account at all the more so? No, what we value supremely is that, whatever it may be found to be, for the sake of which gold. and all other subsidiaries, are procured. Shall we not say so?

Menexenus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ And does not the same reasoning hold with regard to friendship? When we say we are friendly to things for the sake of a thing to which we are friendly, do we not clearly use a term with regard to them which belongs to another? And do we not appear to be in reality friendly only with that in which all these so-called friendships terminate?

Menexenus/ Yes, this would appear to be the truth.

Socrates/ With that, then, to which we are truly friendly, we are not friendly for the sake of any other thing to which we are friendly.

Menexenus/ True, we are not.

Socrates/ This point, then, we dismiss, as sufficiently proved. But, to proceed, are we friends to good?

Menexenus/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ And good is loved on account of evil, and the case stands thus. If, of the three classes that we just now distinguished, good, evil, and that which is neither evil nor good, two only were to be left to us, but evil were to be removed out of our path, and were never again to come in contact either with body or soul, or any other of these things, which in themselves we say are neither good nor evil, would it not come to pass that good would no longer be useful to us, but have become useless? For if there were nothing any more to hurt us, we should have no need whatever of any assistance. And thus you see it would then be made apparent that it was only on account of evil that we felt regard and affection for good, as we considered good to be a medicine for evil, and evil to be a disease. But where there is no disease, there is, we are aware, no need of medicine. This, then, it appears, is the nature of good. It is loved on account of evil by us who are intermediate between evil and good, but in itself, and for itself, it is of no use.

Menexenus/ Yes, such would seem to be the case.

Socrates/ It follows, then, I think, that the original thing to which we are friendly, that wherein all those other things terminate to which we said we were friendly for the sake of another thing, bears to these things no resemblance at all. For to these things we called ourselves friendly for the sake of another thing to which we were friendly, but that to which we are really friendly appears to be of a nature exactly the reverse of this, since we found that we were friendly to it for the sake of a thing to which we were unfriendly, and, if this latter be removed, we are, it seems, friendly to it no longer.

Menexenus/ Apparently not, according at least to our present position.

Socrates/ But tell me this. If evil be extinguished, will it no longer be possible to feel hunger or thirst, or any similar desire? Or will hunger exist, as long as man and the whole animal creation exist, but exist without being hurtful? And will thirst, too, and all other desires exist, but not be evil, inasmuch as evil is extinct? It is ridiculous though, to ask what will exist or not exist, in such a case, for who can know? But this, at any rate, we do know, that even at present it is possible for a man to be injured by the sensation of hunger, and possible for him also to be profited. Is it not?

Menexenus/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ And so, too, a man who feels thirst, or any similar desire, may feel it in some cases with profit to himself, in other cases with hurt, and in other cases again, with neither one nor the other.

Menexenus/ Assuredly he may.

Socrates/ Well, if evil is being extinguished, is there any reason in the world for things that are not evil to be extinguished with it?

Menexenus/ None whatever.

Socrates/ There will exist, then, those desires which are neither evil nor good, even if evil be extinct.

Menexenus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Is it possible for a man who is desirous and enamored not to love that of which he is desirous and enamored?

Menexenus/ I think not.

Socrates/ There will exist then, it appears, even if evil be extinct, certain things to which we are friendly.

Menexenus/ Yes, there will.

Socrates/ But if evil were the cause of our being friendly to anything, it would not be possible, when evil was extinct, for any man to be friendly to anything. For if a cause be extinct, surely it is no longer possible for that to exist of which it was the cause.

Menexenus/ True, it is not.

Socrates/ But earlier we agreed that the friendly loved something, and on account of something, and at the same time we were of opinion that it was on account of evil that that which is neither good nor evil loved the good.

Menexenus/ So we were.

Socrates/ But now, it appears, we have discovered some other cause of loving and being loved.

Menexenus/ So it does.

Socrates/ Is it true, then, as we were just now saying, that desire is the cause of friendship, and that whatever desires is friendly to that which it desires, and friendly at the time of its feeling the desire? And was all that, which we previously said about being friendly, mere idle talk, put together after the fashion of a lengthy poem?

Menexenus/ I am afraid it was.

Socrates/ But that which feels desire, feels desire for that of which it is in want. Does it not?

Menexenus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which is in want is friendly with that of which it is in want.

Menexenus/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ And becomes in want of that which is taken from it?

Menexenus/ Of course.

Socrates/ That then which belongs to a man, is found, it seems, Lysis and Menexenus, to be the object of his love, and friendship, and desire.

They both assented.

If, then, you two are friendly to each other, by some tie of nature you belong to each other?

Lysis/ To be sure we do.

Menexenus/ To be sure we do.

Socrates/ And so, in general, if one man, my children, is desirous and enamored of another, he can never have conceived his desire, or love, or friendship, without in some way belonging to the object of his love, either in his soul, or in some quality of his soul, or in disposition, or in form.

Menexenus/ I quite believe you.

Socrates/ —but Lysis said not a word.

Well, then, that which by nature belongs to us, it has been found necessary for us to love.

Menexenus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ It cannot possibly be then, but that a true and genuine lover is loved in return by the object of his love.

To this conclusion Lysis and Menexenus nodded a sort of reluctant assent, while Hippothales in his rapture kept changing from color to color.

I, however, with a view of reconsidering the subject, proceeded to say, Well, if there is a difference between that which belongs to us and that which is like, we are now, I conceive, in a condition to say what is meant by a friend. But if they happen to be the same, it's no such easy matter to get rid of our former assertion, that like was useless to like, in so far as it was like, for to admit ourselves friendly with that which is useless were outrageous. What say you then, since we are, as it were, intoxicated by our talk, to our allowing

that there is a difference between that which belongs and that which is like?

Menexenus/ Let us do so by all means.

Socrates/ Shall we further say that good belongs to everyone and that to everyone evil is a stranger, or rather, that good belongs to good, evil to evil, and that which is neither evil nor good, to that which is of the same nature?

They both agreed that the latter was their opinion in each particular.

It appears then, that we have fallen again into positions, with regard to friendship, which we previously rejected. For, according to our present admission, the unjust will be no less friendly to the unjust, and the evil no less friendly to the evil, than the good to the good.

Menexenus/ So it would appear.

Socrates/ And again, if we assert that what is good and what belongs to us are one and the same, will it not result that none are friendly with the good but the good? And this, too, I think, is a position in which we imagined that we proved ourselves wrong. Don't you remember?

Hippothales/ Oh, yes.

Lysis/ Oh, yes.

Socrates/ What other way then is left us of treating the subject? Clearly none. I therefore, like our clever pleaders at the bar, request you to reckon up all that I have said. If neither those who love or are loved, neither the like nor the unlike, nor the good, nor those who belong to us, nor any other of all the suppositions which we passed in review — they are so numerous that I can remember no more—if, I say, not one of them is the object of friendship, I no longer know what I am to say.

With this confession, I was just on the point of rousing to my aid one of the elders of our party, when all of a sudden, like beings of another world, there came down upon us the attendants of Menexenus and Lysis, holding their brothers by the hand, and calling out to the young gentlemen to come home, as it was already late. At first, both we and the bystanders were for driving them off, but finding that they did not mind us at all, but grumbled at us in sad Greek, and persisted in calling the boys—fancying, moreover, that from having tippled at the feast, they would prove awkward people to deal with—we owned ourselves vanquished, and broke up the party.

However, just as they were leaving, I managed to call out, Well, Lysis and Menexenus, we have made ourselves rather ridiculous today, I, an old man, and you children. For our hearers here will carry away the report that though we conceive ourselves to be friends with each other—you see I class myself with you—we have not as yet been able to discover what we mean by a friend.

Meno.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog

Meno, Socrates, Boy, Anytus.

Meno/ Can you tell me, Socrates, is virtue to be taught? or is it to be not taught, but acquired by mental exercise? or does it come to man neither by mental exercise, nor teaching, but by nature, or some other means?

Socrates/ The Thessalians, Meno, have been of old in great repute among the Grecians, and admired for their skill in horsemanship, and for their wealth; and now, I think, they are no less so for their wisdom. And not the least so, are the fellow-citizens of your friend Aristippus of Larissa. Now of this Gorgias is the cause. For when he came to the city of Larissa, he so captivated the chiefs of the Aleuadæ, one of whom is your friend Aristippus, and those of the other Thessalian families, that they fell in love with him for his wisdom. And in truth this custom has habituated you to answer fearlessly and with a high bearing, if anyone asks a question; as indeed becomes those who know a subject thoroughly. Since he too offered himself for any of the Greeks to interrogate him on any matter he might think proper; and there was not one, to whom he did not give an answer. But here, friend Meno, the very reverse has occurred. There is, as it were, a dearth of wisdom; and there is a danger, that wisdom has departed from this country, and has fled to yours. Should you then be willing to put this question to anyone here, there is not a man who would not laugh and say, “I run the risk, stranger, of seeming to you to be one of the blessed, in knowing whether virtue is to be taught, or comes by any other means whatever; since I am so far from knowing whether it is to be taught or not, that I happen not

to know what virtue is at all." Now this, Meno, is my own case. I am in the same poverty of knowledge as my fellow-citizens in this affair; and I blame myself for being totally ignorant of virtue. How then can I know the quality of that, of which I know nothing? Or do you think it possible for a man, wholly ignorant, who Meno is, to know whether Meno is a handsome, or rich, or generous spirit, or the reverse of all these characters? Do you think it possible?

Meno/ I do not. But in good sooth, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? and shall I send home this report of you?

Socrates/ Not only that, my friend, but this further—that I never met anywhere with any person who, as I think, did know.

Meno/ Did you never then meet with Gorgias, when he was here?

Socrates/ I did.

Meno/ And did he not seem to you to know?

Socrates/ I do not perfectly remember, Meno; so that I am not able to say at present what I then thought of him. But perhaps both he knew himself, and you too, what he said. Do you then bring to my recollection what he said; or, if you would rather, tell it in your own words; for surely you agree with him in opinion.

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ Let us then put him aside; especially as he is absent. But, by the gods, do you, Meno, tell me yourself what you assert virtue to be; and do not grudge me the knowledge of it, in order that I may have uttered a most fortunate untruth, should both you and Gorgias appear to know, what I said I had never met with a person who did know.

Meno/ Nay, Socrates, it is by no means difficult to tell. In the first place, if you wish me to tell the virtue of a man, it is

easy to say that a man's virtue consists in his being competent to manage the affairs of the state, and, managing them, to do good to its friends, evil to its enemies, and to take care that he suffers himself nothing of that kind. Then, if you wish to know the virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to go through the particulars: that it is to manage well the affairs of her family, to keep safe the things in the house, and to hearken to her husband. Another kind of virtue is that of a child, either a girl or boy; and of a man advanced in years; and, if you choose to go on, of a free-man and of a slave. Many more virtues are there, of all kinds; so that there is no want of power to tell concerning virtue, what it is. For in every action, and in every age of life, and for every kind of business, there is a peculiar virtue to each person: and similarly, Socrates, I think, there is a peculiar vice.

Socrates/ I think myself greatly indeed favored by fortune, Meno. For, when I was only in quest of one virtue, I have found, it seems, a whole swarm of virtues hiving with you. But with regard to this simile, taken from bees, had I, Meno, asked you respecting the nature of a bee, and you had told me that bees were many and various, what answer would you have given me, had I demanded of you further—Do you call them many and various, and differing one from another, in respect of their being bees; or do they differ not in this respect, but with regard to something else, as beauty, or size, or any other thing of a like kind? Tell me, what answer would you have made, had you been so questioned?

Meno/ I would have answered thus; that so far as they are bees, they differ not at all one from another.

Socrates/ Had I then afterwards said—Tell me now, Meno, concerning this very thing, in respect of which they do not differ, but are all the same; what say you is this? Would you have had anything to say?

Meno/ I should.

Socrates/ Just so it is with the virtues. Although they are many indeed, and of various kinds, yet they all agree in one and the same idea, through which they are virtues; and to which it is well for him to look, who by his answer would point out to the inquirer what virtue happens to be. Do you not comprehend what I am saying?

Meno/ I think I do. But I do not grasp, as I could wish, the question.

Socrates/ Do you think only after this manner concerning virtue, that the virtue of a man is one thing, the virtue of a woman another thing, and so of the other virtues, that they are all different? or have you the same way of thinking as regards health, size, and strength? Do you consider the health of a man to be one thing, the health of a woman to be another? or is the same kind of health everywhere, wherever health is, whether it be in a man, or in any other subject whatever?

Meno/ The health of a man and of a woman, I think, is the same thing.

Socrates/ The same then applies to size and strength. A woman, if she be strong, is strong according to the same idea, and with the same strength, as applies to a strong man. By the same strength I mean this. That whether strength be in a man, or in a woman, as regards the existence of strength, there is no difference; or do you think there is a difference?

Meno/ I think there is not.

Socrates/ Will there be any difference in virtue, with respect to its being virtue, whether it be in a child or in an aged person, in a woman or in a man?

Meno/ This case, Socrates, seems to me somehow to be not quite similar to the other.

Socrates/ Why? Did you not tell me that the virtue of a man consisted in his well managing a state, and that of a woman, in well managing a household?

Meno/ I did.

Socrates/ Is it, then, possible to manage well a state or household, or anything else whatever, without justice and prudence.

Meno/ By no means.

Socrates/ If then the management be just and prudent, will not the managers manage with justice and with prudence?

Meno/ They will of necessity.

Socrates/ Both of them, therefore, the woman and the man, have need of the same things, namely, justice and prudence, if they are about to be good managers.

Meno/ It appears so.

Socrates/ What then, can a child, or an old man, ever be good, if dissolute and dishonest?

Meno/ By no means.

Socrates/ But only if sober and honest?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ All persons, surely, are good in the same way; for they are good by possessing the same qualities.

Meno/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Now, if virtue were not the same in them all, they surely would not be good in the same way.

Meno/ They would not.

Socrates/ Since then the virtue is the same in them all, endeavor to recollect and tell me, what says Gorgias of it, and you with him.

Meno/ What else is it than to be able to govern men? If you are in search of one thing, applicable to all persons.

Socrates/ It is the very thing I am in search of. But is this then the same virtue of a child, Meno, and of a slave, to be able to govern their master? Do you think that he who rules would be still a slave?

Meno/ I do not think he would, Socrates, at all.

Socrates/ For it is not reasonable, my very good friend. Consider this again. You say it is virtue to be able to govern. Shall we not subjoin the word justly, but not, unjustly.

Meno/ I think so. For justice, Socrates, is virtue.

Socrates/ Is it, Meno, virtue, or some virtue?

Meno/ How say you this?

Socrates/ As respecting anything else whatever. For instance, if you please, respecting roundness, I would say that it is a figure, and not thus absolutely that it is figure. And I should say so for this reason, because there are other figures.

Meno/ You would thus speak rightly. Since I too myself not only say that justice is a virtue, but that there are other virtues.

Socrates/ Say what these other virtues are; as I would, were you to bid me, tell you other figures beside the round. Do you then likewise mention to me other virtues beside justice.

Meno/ Well then, courage, I think, is a virtue, and temperance, and wisdom, and a lofty bearing, and a great many other qualities.

Socrates/ Again, Meno, we have met with the same thing as before. We have again found many virtues, while in search of only one, but in a different way from that just now: but

the one virtue, which pervades all these, we are not able to find.

Meno/ For I am not able as yet, Socrates, to lay hold of one such virtue as you are seeking, applicable to all, as in the other instances.

Socrates/ Probably so; but I will show a readiness to urge ourselves onward, if I can. Already you apprehend, in some measure, that thus matters stand as regards everything. For had any person asked you, what was figure, the thing I just now mentioned, and you had said it was roundness, had he then said to you, as I did, Is roundness figure, or a figure? you would surely have said, It is a figure.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And for this reason, because there are other figures?

Meno/ For that very reason.

Socrates/ And had he asked you further, of what sort those other figures were, you would have told them.

Meno/ I should.

Socrates/ And had he asked you in the same manner concerning color, what it is? If you had answered, It is whiteness; would not the interrogator have taken you immediately up with this question—Is whiteness color, or a color? and you would have said, A color; because there happen to be other colors.

Meno/ I should.

Socrates/ And if he had bidden you to enumerate such other colors, you would have mentioned those, which happen to be colors no less than white.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If then he had pursued the argument as I do, and said—We are always getting into a multitude. Do not

speak thus to me. But since you call all this multitude by one name, and assert that there is none of them which is not figure; and this too, notwithstanding they are contrary to one another; what is this thing which comprehends the round as well as the straight, this to which you give the name of figure; and yet you say that the round is figure not more than the straight? or do you not say this?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ When you speak thus, do you mean that the round is not more round than is the straight? and that the straight is not more straight than is the round?

Meno/ I do not mean this, Socrates.

Socrates/ But you mean that the round is not more a figure than is the straight, nor is this than the other.

Meno/ You say what is true.

Socrates/ Endeavor then to tell me—What is that thing which is called by the name of figure? Now if to an inquirer in this way concerning figure, or color, you had said, I do not comprehend what it is you would have, man, nor do I know what it is you mean: he perhaps would have wondered, and said, Do you not comprehend that I am inquiring what is the same in all these? Would you have had nothing to say even after this, Meno, had one inquired—What is that applicable to the round, and to the straight, and to the other things which you call figures, being the same for all? Endeavor to tell me what it is, in order that you may be ready, by practice, to give a reply to the question respecting virtue.

Meno/ Not so, Socrates; but do you yourself rather say what figure is.

Socrates/ Would you have me oblige you in this point?

Meno/ By all means.

Socrates/ Shall you then be willing to tell me what virtue is?

Meno/ I shall.

Socrates/ Let me then show my readiness; for the cause is worthy of it.

Meno/ Without all doubt.

Socrates/ Come then; let us try if we can tell you what figure is. See if you can accept it, as being this. Let then figure be that which of all things is the only one, that always happens to accompany color. Does this suffice you? or do you seek for anything further? For I should be thus content, if you would tell me virtue.

Meno/ But, Socrates, this surely is silly.

Socrates/ How so?

Meno/ According to your account, figure is that which always accompanies color.

Socrates/ Be it so.

Meno/ But should any person assert, that he knew not what color was, and was equally at a loss concerning color and concerning figure, what answer do you think you would have given him?

Socrates/ That I had answered with truth. And if the questioner happened to be one of the wise men, fond of dispute and contention, I would tell him—"I had spoken; and that, if I had not spoken rightly, it was your business to take up the discourse, and to refute me." But if two parties, such as you and I here, were inclined to have a discourse together, as friends, they ought to answer each other in a milder and more conversational manner. Now it is perhaps more conversational to answer not only truthfully, but in terms which the party questioned confesses he understands. Accordingly, I shall now attempt to make you such a kind of

answer. For tell me; do you call a certain thing by the name of end? I mean such a thing as bound or extreme? For by all these words I mean the same thing. Prodicus, indeed, might possibly differ from us; but you at least would say, that a thing has been bounded, or, has had an end. This is what I mean to say; nothing many-colored.

Meno/ Well, I do call something end: and I think I understand what you mean.

Socrates/ And do you not call something a superficies? and another thing a solid? such as are in geometry.

Meno/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Now then, from these premises you can understand what I mean by figure. For in every figure, that which bounds the solid, I say, is figure; which idea I would concisely express by saying that figure is the bound of solid.

Meno/ And what say you color is?

Socrates/ You are a saucy fellow, Meno. You impose upon an old man the task of answering; yet are unwilling yourself to recollect and tell me what Gorgias said that virtue was.

Meno/ But I will tell, after you have told me this, what color is.

Socrates/ A man with his eyes hoodwinked might perceive from your way of conversing, Meno, that you are handsome, and still have your admirers.

Meno/ How so?

Socrates/ Because you do nothing but command in conversation; as foppish fellows do, as being lordlings, so long as they are in the prime of beauty; and at the same time you have perhaps convicted me, as being subdued by beauty. I will therefore gratify you and give an answer.

Meno/ By all means do gratify me.

Socrates/ Do you wish me to answer like Gorgias, so that you may most easily follow me?

Meno/ I do wish it. How not?

Socrates/ Do not you and Gorgias say, according to Empedocles, that certain effluvia proceed from bodies?

Meno/ We do so firmly.

Socrates/ And that there are certain pores, to which and through which those effluvia pass?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that of those effluvia, some are fitted to some of these pores, but that others are less or greater?

Meno/ It is so.

Socrates/ And do you not call something sight?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ From these premises "Understand," as Pindar has said, "what I am saying." Color then is the flowing off from figures, agreeing with the sight, and by it perceived.

Meno/ In this answer, Socrates, I think you have spoken as well as possible.

Socrates/ You say so perhaps because this has been said according to your habits; and because at the same time you perceive, I imagine, that you are able from thence to state what is sound, and smell, and many other things of the like kind.

Meno/ It really is so.

Socrates/ The answer, Meno, was tragical; and so it was more agreeable to you than that relating to figure.

Meno/ To me it was.

Socrates/ And yet, son of Alexidemus, I persuade myself, that not this, but that, was the better answer. I conceive too, that you would not have thought thus, unless, as you said

yesterday, there was necessity for you to go away before the mysteries. But if you could stay and be initiated, * * *

Meno/ But if you would tell me many such things, I would certainly stay.

Socrates/ In my best endeavors to say such things I shall not be wanting, for my own sake as well as yours. But I fear I shall not be able to say much in that way. But come now, and try yourself to perform your promise, by speaking of virtue, what it is in general: and cease making many out of one; as persons say perpetually, when bantering those, who pound anything to pieces; but leaving virtue whole and entire, tell me what it is. Patterns of such a definition you have had from me.

Meno/ I think then, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says;

> In what is fair, to feel a joy,
> And o'er it to have power——

and this, I say, is virtue—for him who has a desire for beautiful things, to be able to obtain them.

Socrates/ Do you mean that the person, who desires beautiful things, has a desire for good things?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it that there are some who have a desire for evil things, and others, who have a desire for good things? Do you not think, my good friend, that all men desire good things?

Meno/ I do not.

Socrates/ But that some desire evil things?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ Say you that these men desire evil things, conceiving them to be good? or, knowing them to be evil, do they still desire them?

Meno/ Both these events, I think, occur.

Socrates/ Is there any man, think you, who, knowing evil things to be evil, yet nevertheless desires them?

Meno/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ What do you mean, by desiring them? Is it not that he may have them?

Meno/ To have them. For what else can I mean?

Socrates/ Does he imagine that evil things profit the person who has them, or does he know that evil things are hurtful, to whomsoever they are present?

Meno/ There are those who think that evil things are profitable; and those who know them to be hurtful.

Socrates/ Do you think that they know evil things to be evil, who imagine such evil things to be profitable?

Meno/ By no means do I think that.

Socrates/ Is it not then evident, that those who do not desire evil things know not the nature of the things they desire; but rather, that they desire things which they imagine to be good, but which are in reality evil? So that they, who are ignorant of them, and imagine them to be good, do, it is plain, desire good things. Do they not?

Meno/ They seem to be.

Socrates/ But they who desire evil things, as you say, conceiving at the same time that evil things are hurtful to the possessor, surely know that they will be harmed by those evil things.

Meno/ This must be.

Socrates/ But do they not think, that such as are harmed are in an evil plight, so far as they are harmed?

Meno/ This also must be.

Socrates/ And that those in evil plight are unhappy?

Meno/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Is there a man, then, who wishes to be in evil plight, and to be unhappy?

Meno/ I think not any, Socrates.

Socrates/ No man then, Meno, wishes for evils; unless he wishes to be such. For what else is it to be unhappy, than to desire evil things, and to possess them?

Meno/ You are saying, Socrates, what is nearly true. For no man wishes evil things.

Socrates/ Did you not say just now, that virtue consisted in the wishing for, and having a power over, good things?

Meno/ I did say so.

Socrates/ From what has been said, is not this a wish to all men? and in this respect one man is not better than another?

Meno/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But it is clear, that if one man is better than another, he would be so in respect of his power.

Meno/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ This then, as it seems, according to your account, is virtue, the power of obtaining good things.

Meno/ The case seems to me, Socrates, to be entirely so, as you now understand it.

Socrates/ Let us see then if this too you say truly: for perhaps you will say well. You say, that to be able to gain good things is virtue.

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you not call good things such as health and wealth? And I say, to possess gold and silver, and honors in the state, and magistracies? You do not speak of any other things as good, except things of this kind?

Meno/ No other; I mean all such sort of things.

Socrates/ Well then, to get money is virtue; as Meno says, the hereditary guest of the great king. But do you add to this idea of getting, the ideas of honesty and holiness? or is this a matter of indifference to you; but that, even if a person acquires them unjustly, you call the act equally virtue?

Meno/ By no means, Socrates; but I call the act wickedness.

Socrates/ By all means then there ought, as it appears, to be added to the act of acquisition justice, or prudence, or sanctity, or some other part of virtue; for otherwise, it will not be virtue, notwithstanding it procures for us good things.

Meno/ For without those how could it be virtue?

Socrates/ And to not obtain gold and silver, whether for himself or others, when the act is not just, is not this non-attainment likewise virtue?

Meno/ It appears so.

Socrates/ The attainment then of these good things, is not more virtue than the non-attainment; but, as it seems, that which is combined with honesty, is virtue; and that which is separated from all such things, is wickedness.

Meno/ I think it must of necessity be as you say.

Socrates/ Did we not say a little while since, that honesty, and prudence, and everything of that kind, was a part of virtue?

Meno/ We did.

Socrates/ Then, Meno, you are playing with me.

Meno/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because, when I just now desired you not to break down nor split virtue into fractions, and gave you patterns, by which you ought to answer, you have paid no regard to them, but you tell me that virtue is the power of

gaining good things with justice; yet this, you say, is only a part of virtue.

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ It follows then, from what you confess yourself, that to do whatever one does with a part of virtue, this is virtue. For you say that justice, and each of those things above-mentioned is a part of virtue.

Meno/ What then? granting that I say this.

Socrates/ Truly that, having been requested to tell me what the whole of virtue is, you are far from stating what it is; but you say, that every act is virtue, if it is performed with a part of virtue; as though you had already told me what virtue was in the whole, and that I should now know it, when you split it into fractions. You have need therefore, as it seems to me, of the same question again from the beginning, friend Meno—What is virtue? Or can every act, accompanied with a part of virtue, be said to be virtue itself? For it is to say this, when one says that every act accompanied with justice is virtue. Or do you think there is no need to you of the same question; but do you think that one may know a part of virtue, what it is, without knowing virtue itself?

Meno/ I think he cannot.

Socrates/ For, if you remember, when I gave an answer just now respecting figure, we rejected such a kind of answer, as attempted to reply by terms still the subject of inquiry, and not as yet confessedly understood.

Meno/ And we did rightly reject, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do not then imagine, my very good friend, while we are as yet inquiring what virtue is in the whole, that, by answering in terms relating to its parts, you will show clearly to anyone virtue itself; or, by speaking of anything else in this very same manner; but that there will be still need again of the same question—Respecting virtue—as being what, do

you speak, what you speak? Or do you think that I am saying nothing to the purpose?

Meno/ I think you are speaking correctly.

Socrates/ Answer then again, as from the beginning, — What do you and your friend say that virtue is?

Meno/ I heard, Socrates, before I came together with you, that you do nothing else than doubt yourself, and cause others to doubt. And you seem to be now playing a wizard's tricks, and to drug me, and really use incantations so as to fill me with doubts. And, if I too must banter a little, I think you resemble exactly, both in form and in other respects also, that broad sea-fish, called the torpedo; for that too produces a numbness in the person whoever approaches and touches it. You seem to have done some such thing at present to me, to benumb me. For in very truth I am benumbed, both in mind and mouth, and I have not what reply to give you. And yet I have spoken very many discourses ten thousand times about virtue, and to many persons, and extremely well too, as I thought myself; but now I have it not in my power at all to tell what virtue is. I think that you have consulted well for yourself in never sailing out from hence nor travelling abroad. For if you were as a stranger to act in this manner in another city, you would perhaps be driven thence as a wizard.

Socrates/ You are full of craftiness, Meno, and you have nearly put a cheat upon me.

Meno/ How particularly so, Socrates?

Socrates/ I know why you brought a simile against me.

Meno/ Why think you?

Socrates/ That I might bring a simile against you in return. For this I know respecting all handsome persons, that they love to have likenesses made of them. For it is to their interest; since of handsome persons the pictures too

are handsome. But I will not draw your likeness in return. As to myself, if the torpedo be thus numb itself, and produces a numbness in others also, then am I like to it; but if otherwise, I am not. For I do not, when not doubting myself, cause others to doubt; but rather when I am in doubt myself, I in like manner cause others to doubt. And now respecting virtue, what it is, I know not: you, however, knew it formerly; perhaps, before you had touched me. But now you are like one, who knows nothing of the matter. I am desirous, however, of looking into the matter with you, and of searching out jointly, what virtue is.

Meno/ But in what way, Socrates, will you search for a thing, which you do not know at all, what it is? For by placing before you what of the things, which you do not know, will you seek it? Or, if you should fall in with it, how will you know that this is the thing, of which you were ignorant?

Socrates/ I understand, Meno, what you mean to say. See you, how captious a method of reasoning you introduce? That it is impossible for a man to seek, either what he does know, or does not know. For no man would seek what he knows; because he knows it already; and for such a person there is no need of seeking. Nor would any man seek what he knows not; because he does not know what he would seek.

Meno/ Do you then, Socrates, think that this way of reasoning is not fair?

Socrates/ I think it not fair.

Meno/ Can you say in what way?

Socrates/ I can. For I have heard men and women wise in divine matters—

Meno/ Saying what?

Socrates/ Things, I think, true and fair.

Meno/ What were they? and who said them?

Socrates/ They, who said them, were belonging to the priests and priestesses; whose business it is, and who are able to give a reason for the things to which they put their hands. Pindar, too, and many other of the poets, such as are divine, say them; and what they say is this. But do you consider whether you think they speak the truth. For they say that the soul of man is immortal; and at one time it ends, which they call dying; and that another it exists again; but is never destroyed; and that for this reason we ought to live throughout our lives as holy as possible. "To them, from whom has Proserpine received the payment for an ancient act of grief, she in the ninth year does give back their souls to the upper sun; and from them kings in splendor, and through their strength swift-footed, and in wisdom men mightiest increase, and heroes are called holy by mankind in future times."

The soul then, as being immortal, and born frequently, and having seen both the things here, and those in Hades, and all things, there is nothing it has not learned; so that it is no wonder that it is able to recollect, with regard to virtue and other things, what it formerly knew. For the whole of nature being of one kindred, and the soul having heretofore known all things, there is nothing to prevent a person, who remembers—what men call learning—only one thing, from discovering again all the rest; if he has but courage, and seeking faints not. For to search and to learn is reminiscence all. We must not, therefore, submit to that captious way of reasoning, for it would make us idle; since to persons of a soft nature it is pleasant to hear it; whereas this makes men active and inquiring; and which I believing to be true, I am willing with you to seek out what virtue is.

Meno/ With all my heart, Socrates. But how say you this, that we do not learn, but that what we call learning is

reminiscence? Have you it in your power to teach me that this is so?

Socrates/ Even just now I said, Meno, that you are very crafty. Since now you ask me, if I have the power to teach you; I, who say there is no teaching, but only reminiscence; so that I may appear directly to contradict myself.

Meno/ Not so, Socrates, by Zeus. I did not say so with an eye to this; but merely from habit. But if any way you can prove to me that things are as you assert, prove it.

Socrates/ This is no easy task. However, for your sake, I am willing to show my readiness. Call hither to me then one of your numerous attendants here, whomever you please, that through him I may give you the proof.

Meno/ Most readily. Come hither, you.

Socrates/ Is he a Greek, and speaks he Greek?

Meno/ Perfectly well, as he was born in the family.

Socrates/ Now then pay attention, and mark whether he appears to recollect himself, or to learn from me.

Meno/ I will be attentive.

Socrates/ Tell me, boy, do you know that a four-angled space is such as this?

Boy/ I do.

Socrates/ A four-angled space then has all these lines, being four equal.

Boy/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Has it not also these lines through the middle of it equal?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Could there be a space like this, larger and less?

Boy/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now if this side were two feet, and this two, how many feet would there be in the whole? Consider it in this manner. If, on this side the space were two feet, and on this only one foot, would the space be other than of two feet once told?

Boy/ It would not.

Socrates/ But since it is two feet on this side likewise, is it any other space than of twice two feet?

Boy/ No.

Socrates/ It is then a space of twice two feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ How many feet are twice two? reckon, and tell me.

Boy/ Four feet, Socrates.

Socrates/ Cannot there be another space, the double of this in size, but of the same kind, having, like this, all its sides equal?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Of how many feet will it be?

Boy/ Eight.

Socrates/ Come now, endeavor to tell me, how long will each line of this space be? Now of this space the line is two feet. What will be the length of the line of the space double the size?

Boy/ It is plain, Socrates, that it will be double the length.

Socrates/ You see, Meno, that I teach this boy nothing, but only question him about all. And now this boy thinks he knows of what length is the line from which a space of eight feet is produced. Do you not think he does?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ And does he really know?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But he thinks he does from the idea of a doubled quantity.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ View him now recollecting in order things as he should recollect. Now speak to me, boy. You say that from a line, double in length, there is produced a space double in size: I mean a space of this kind; not one side long, the other short; but let it be equal on every side, like this, but twice the size of eight feet. See now, whether you still think this will be from the doubled line.

Boy/ I do.

Socrates/ Does not this become the double of that, if we add another from this point?

Boy/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ Now, from this line, you say that there will be a space of eight feet, if there be four such lines?

Boy/ I do.

Socrates/ Let us then draw from it four equal lines. Would this space be any other than that which you say is of eight feet?

Boy/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Are there not in this space these four spaces, each of which is equal to that of four feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ How large is become the whole space? Is it not four times as large?

Boy/ How not?

Socrates/ Is that two-fold which is taken four times?

Boy/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ How many fold?

Boy/ Four-fold.

Socrates/ From a line, therefore, double in length, there is produced a space, not two-fold, but four-fold.

Boy/ You say true.

Socrates/ Four times four is sixteen: is it not?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ But from what line is to be drawn a space of eight square feet? Is it not from this four-fold?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And from the half of this line there is drawn this space of four feet square.

Boy/ There is.

Socrates/ Well; but is not that square of eight feet twice as large as this, and half as large as that?

Boy/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Will it not be from a line longer than this, and shorter than that?

Boy/ So at least it appears to me.

Socrates/ You say correctly; for answer only what appears to you. And tell me this too. Was not this line two feet, and that four?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ The line therefore of the eight-foot space must be greater than this of two feet, but less than that of four feet.

Boy/ It must be.

Socrates/ Try now, and tell me how long you think it is.

Boy/ Three feet long.

Socrates/ If then it be three feet, we will add the half of this line, and now this will be three feet. For these are two feet, and this is one foot: and in the same manner, these are

two feet, and this is one; and this space becomes such as you say.

Boy/ It is so.

Socrates/ If then this line here be three feet, and that here three feet, the whole space becomes thrice three feet.

Boy/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And how many feet are thrice three?

Boy/ Nine.

Socrates/ But how many feet ought the doubled space above mentioned to be?

Boy/ Eight.

Socrates/ Hence from a line three feet long there is not to be drawn the space above mentioned of eight feet.

Boy/ There is not.

Socrates/ But from how long a line? Endeavor to tell me exactly. Or, if you do not like to give it in numbers, at least point out from what line it may be drawn.

Boy/ By Jove, Socrates, I do not know.

Socrates/ Do you observe again, Meno, whither this boy is proceeding in the road to recollection? since at first he knew not what is the line of the above-mentioned space of eight feet; as, indeed, he does not yet know; but he then fancied he knew it, and answered boldly, as a knowing person would, nor did he think he should be at a loss. But he now deems himself at a loss, and, as he knows not, does not even think he knows.

Meno/ You say what is true.

Socrates/ Is he not then in a better state now as regards the matter of which he was ignorant?

Meno/ This too appears to me.

Socrates/ In causing him then to be at a loss, and to be benumbed, as is the torpedo, have we done him any harm?

Meno/ None, I think.

Socrates/ We have at least made some progress, as it seems, towards his finding out where he is. For now, knowing nothing, he would readily search. But he then fancied he could readily, before many persons and often, say respecting the above-mentioned doubled space, that it ought to have a line twice as long.

Meno/ So it seemed.

Socrates/ Think you, then, that he would have attempted to seek or learn that, of which, though ignorant, he fancied he knew it, before he had fallen into a difficulty, by conceiving he did not know, and had felt a desire to know?

Meno/ I do not think, Socrates, he would.

Socrates/ He was benefited, then, by being benumbed.

Meno/ I think so.

Socrates/ Now mark what, after this difficulty, he will discover by searching with me, doing nothing else but asking questions, and not teaching. And watch me, if any where you can discover me teaching or telling him anything, and not asking him rather his own opinions. Now, boy, tell me, is not this space four feet? Do you comprehend?

Boy/ I do.

Socrates/ Now we will apply to it this other space equal to it.

Boy/ Well.

Socrates/ And this a third space equal to either of these?

Boy/ Very well.

Socrates/ What if we add this space, likewise equal, to fill up the corner here.

Boy/ Very well.

Socrates/ Will these be anything else than these four equal spaces?

Boy/ No.

Socrates/ Well then, how much larger is this whole space than that?

Boy/ Four times.

Socrates/ But we wanted one only twice as large. Or do you not remember?

Boy/ I remember it very well.

Socrates/ Does not this line from corner to some corner, cut each of these spaces in half?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are not therefore these four lines equal, which enclose this space?

Boy/ They are.

Socrates/ Consider then, how large is this space.

Boy/ I do not comprehend.

Socrates/ Has not each line of each space cut off within it half of these four spaces? or not?

Boy/ They have.

Socrates/ How many such spaces then are there in this figure?

Boy/ Four.

Socrates/ And how many in this figure?

Boy/ Two.

Socrates/ How much of two is four?

Boy/ Twice as much.

Socrates/ How many feet then does this space become?

Boy/ Eight.

Socrates/ Drawn from what line?

Boy/ From this here.

Socrates/ From the line reaching from corner to corner of the space of feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now the sophists call such a line the diameter; so that, if the diameter be its name, from the diameter, as you, Meno's boy, assert, there can be produced a space twice as large.

Boy/ Assuredly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, what think you, Meno? Is there an opinion, which he has given in his answers, that is not his own?

Meno/ None, but his own.

Socrates/ And yet, as we said a little before, he knew nothing.

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ Yet these very opinions existed in him. Or did they not?

Meno/ They did.

Socrates/ In a man, therefore, who is ignorant, there exist true opinions concerning those very things of which he is ignorant.

Meno/ So it appears.

Socrates/ These very opinions then have been lately stirred up afresh in him, as if it were a dream. And should anyone put questions to him respecting these same matters at many times and in many places, be assured he will at length know them not less accurately than any man.

Meno/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Will he not then, without anyone having taught him, and by someone putting questions, recover, himself through himself, his former knowledge?

Meno/ He will.

Socrates/ Now for a person to recover knowledge, himself through himself, is not this to recollect?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And this knowledge, which he now possesses, he has either at some time acquired, or has possessed it always?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ If then he was always possessed of it, he was always a person of knowledge. But if he acquired it at any time, he would not have got it in the present life; or has some one taught him geometry? For he will act in the very same manner with regard to the whole of geometry, and all other matters of learning. Is there anyone then who has taught the boy all this? I ask you; for you ought to know, especially since he was born and bred up in your family.

Meno/ I know well that no person has ever taught him.

Socrates/ And yet he entertains these very opinions; does he not?

Meno/ There appears, Socrates, the necessity.

Socrates/ If, having got this knowledge, not in this present life, he did not know this, it is plain that he possessed it in some other time and had learnt it.

Meno/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And is not then that the time, when he was not a man?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If then, during the time when he is, and during the time when he is not a man, true opinions exist in him, which, roused up by questioning, become knowledge, will not his soul have learnt through eternity? for it is plain, that during all time he either is, or is not a man.

Meno/ It appears so.

Socrates/ If then the truth of things, that are, exists always in the soul, the soul would be immortal; so that, whatever you happen now not to know, that is, not to remember, you ought to attempt with confidence to seek, and to recollect.

Meno/ You seem to me, Socrates, I know not how, to speak rightly.

Socrates/ And I seem to myself too, Meno. And yet in other respects I would not contend very strenuously in defense of my argument; but that in thinking we ought to seek the things which one does not know, we should become better and more manly, and less idle, than if we supposed it impossible for us to find out, and that it did not behoove us to inquire into what we know not; for this I would, if I were able, violently contest both by word and deed.

Meno/ In this also, Socrates, you seem to me to say well.

Socrates/ Since then we are of one mind, that a person ought to inquire after what he does not know, are you willing for us to attempt jointly to inquire what is virtue?

Meno/ By all means. Not but that I should with the greatest pleasure take into consideration, and hear you on the question I first asked you, whether we must put our hand to the inquiry about virtue as a thing to be taught, or as coming by nature, or by some other means to man.

Socrates/ Had I been master not only of myself, but of you too, Meno, we would not have considered whether virtue is a thing to be taught or not, before we had ascertained what is the first inquiry, what virtue is. But since you do not even attempt to master yourself in order that you may be a free-man, and yet undertake to govern me, and actually do govern me, I shall yield to you. For what must I do? We are to consider then, it seems, what belongs to a certain thing,

whilst yet we know not what the thing is. But do you relax if not some, yet a little, the strictness of your rule, and agree to consider hypothetically, whether virtue can be taught to a man, or how otherwise it is to be attained. I say hypothetically as geometricians often do in treating a question; when one asks them, as it were, about a space, whether it is possible for this space to be placed triangularly within this, a geometrician would answer, —I know not as yet, of what kind the triangle is; but I think I have, as it were, an hypothesis, that may be of use for the matter in hand of this kind. —If the space be of such a kind, as that by stretching along the line given there, it would be deficient by such a space as would be the space itself stretched along, there would, I think, be one result; but another, if this hypothesis were impossible to occur. Laying down then an hypothesis, I am willing to tell you what will happen respecting the placing of it the space within the circle, whether it be impossible or not. —And thus too concerning virtue, since we know not, either what it is, or what is its quality, we will lay down an hypothesis, and consider whether it is to be taught or not, by stating the question thus. If virtue be in its quality one of things, which belongs to the soul, is it to be taught, or not to be taught? In the first place, if it is either different from knowledge, or of the same kind with it, is virtue or is it not to be taught, or as we said just now to be recollected; for whichever of these expressions we use, let it make no difference to us. Is then virtue to be taught? Now is it not evident to everyone, that a man is taught no other thing than knowledge?

Meno/ To me it seems so.

Socrates/ If then virtue be a kind of knowledge, it is evident that virtue is to be taught.

Meno/ For how not?

Socrates/ From this question then we have been quickly relieved, that, if virtue be such a kind of thing as knowledge, it is to be taught; but not, if it be not such a kind of thing.

Meno/ Very true.

Socrates/ Next after this, it seems, we must consider whether virtue be knowledge or apart from knowledge.

Meno/ We must, I think, consider this in the next place.

Socrates/ Well now; say we that virtue is anything else but a good; and shall we abide by this hypothesis, that virtue is a good?

Meno/ By all means.

Socrates/ Now if there be also any other good apart from knowledge, then perhaps virtue may not be a kind of knowledge. But if there be no good which knowledge does not comprehend, then in suspecting virtue to be a kind of knowledge we should suspect justly.

Meno/ It is so.

Socrates/ And yet through virtue at least we are good.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if good, then useful. For all things that are good are useful: are they not?

Meno/ They are.

Socrates/ Virtue then is a thing useful.

Meno/ It must needs be, from what has been admitted.

Socrates/ Now let us consider what sort of things, taking each by itself, are useful to us: health, we say, and strength, and beauty, and wealth. These things and others of a like kind we call useful: do we not?

Meno/ We do.

Socrates/ And say we not that these very things are sometimes hurtful to us? or do you say otherwise? or thus?

Meno/ Not otherwise; but thus.

Socrates/ Consider now, at what time is anyone of each of these things, when it leads, useful to us; and at what time is it hurtful. Is it not, when a right use leads, it is useful to us, but when not, it is hurtful?

Meno/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ Further then let us consider the things belonging to the soul. You call something by the name of temperance, and of justice, and of fortitude, and of docility, and of memory, and of high bearing, and of all such things.

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ Now consider such of these things, as you think to be not knowledge, but apart from knowledge, whether they are not sometimes hurtful, and sometimes useful? for instance, unless prudence is present, fortitude is only a kind of boldness. Is not a man hurt, when he is bold without reason? but when he is bold with reason, is he not benefited?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it not so with temperance, and docility? Are not things learnt and prepared for use with understanding useful, but without understanding hurtful?

Meno/ Very much so.

Socrates/ In a word, do not all the endeavors and endurings of the soul, when prudence leads, tend to happiness; but if imprudence leads, to the reverse?

Meno/ It seems so.

Socrates/ If virtue then be one of those things belonging to the soul, and if it is necessary, as you say, for it to be useful, it must be prudence: since all the things belonging to the soul are of themselves neither useful nor hurtful; but imprudence or prudence being added, they become hurtful

or useful. Now according to this reasoning it must needs be that virtue, being useful, is a kind of prudence.

Meno/ So it seems to me.

Socrates/ Now then as to the other things, which we said just now were sometimes beneficial and sometimes hurtful, both wealth and the things of that kind: does not prudence, when leading the rest of the soul, make the things belonging to the soul useful, but imprudence hurtful? and in like manner does not the soul, by rightly using and leading them, render them useful, but by using wrongly, hurtful?

Meno/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And does not a prudent soul rightly lead, but an imprudent one, incorrectly?

Meno/ Such is the fact.

Socrates/ Thus then we may say universally, that in the case of man all the other things depend on his soul; but the things belonging to the soul itself depend on prudence, if they are to be beneficial. And by this reasoning prudence would be the useful. But we said that virtue was useful.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We assert therefore that prudence is virtue, either wholly, or in part.

Meno/ What has been said seems to me, Socrates, to have been well said.

Socrates/ If then it be so, the good are not good by nature.

Meno/ It seems to me, they are not.

Socrates/ For then this too would follow. If the good were good by nature we should have some where persons, who knew of our youths the naturally good; over whom, when those had shown them to us, we should place a guard in the citadel, putting a seal on them, rather than on gold, so that

no person might corrupt them, and that, when they arrived at manhood, they might become useful to the state.

Meno/ It were reasonable to do so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Since then the good are not good by nature, are they by learning?

Meno/ I think this is of necessity so. And it is plain, Socrates, that if, according to the hypothesis, virtue is a science, it is to be taught.

Socrates/ Perhaps so, by Jove. But did we admit that correctly?

Meno/ And yet it lately seemed to be fairly said.

Socrates/ But I suspect, it ought not only to have seemed lately to be said fairly, but to seem so at present, and hereafter too, if there be anything sound in it.

Meno/ What is the matter now? looking to what are you dissatisfied with it? and why doubt that virtue is a science?

Socrates/ I will tell you, Meno. That virtue is to be taught, if it be a science, is a position I do not retract, so to say that it has not been correctly asserted. But consider whether I appear to reasonably doubt, that virtue is a science. For tell me this. If anything is to be taught, not virtue only, must there not be of necessity both teachers and scholars?

Meno/ I think there must.

Socrates/ Hence, on the contrary, that, of which there are neither teachers nor scholars, should we conjecture rightly, in conjecturing it is not to be taught?

Meno/ Such is the fact. But do you not think that there are teachers of virtue?

Socrates/ After a lengthened inquiry, whether there were any teachers of virtue, I cannot, with all my efforts, discover any. And yet do I make the search with many, and those, too, whom I think would be the most skilled in the matter.

And just now, Meno, in happy time has Anytus sat down here by us, to whom we can give a share in the search. And with reason should we give him a share. For, in the first place, he is the son of the wealthy and the wise Anthemion, a man who has become rich, not by accident, nor yet by a gift from anyone, as Ismenias of Thebes has done, who has lately obtained the property of Polycrates, but having acquired his wealth by his own wisdom and carefulness; and secondly, as regards his other qualities, he is a citizen deemed to be neither haughty nor puffed up, nor overbearing, but to conduct himself like a decent and well-behaved man; and then, he has brought up and educated his son here very well, in the opinion of the Athenian multitude; for they elect him to the highest offices in the state. With such men it is right then to make a search after teachers of virtue, whether there are any or not, and who they are. Do you then, Anytus, unite with me, and Meno here, your guest, in our search after this very thing, as to who are the teachers of it. Now consider the matter in this way. If we wished this Meno to become a good physician, to what teachers should we send him? Should we not send him to the physicians?

Anytus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And if we wished to make him a good currier, should we not send him to the curriers?

Anytus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And so as regards the rest of subjects?

Anytus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ But concerning the same things tell me again this. In sending him to the physicians we say we should do well, if we wished to make him a good physician. Now when we say this, do we not mean, that we should act with prudence in sending him to those, who make that art their

profession, rather than to those who do not; and who making for themselves a remuneration for this very thing, put themselves forth as the teachers of anyone willing to go and learn. Is it not from looking to these matters that we should do well in sending him?

Anytus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Hence in the case of music, and the other arts, the same things take place. And it is a great folly for us, if we wish to make anyone a flute-player, to be willing to send him not to such as profess to teach the art, and to make money by it; but, to give trouble to some other persons, and to look for his learning from those, who do not profess to be teachers, and have not one pupil in that branch of instruction, which we think proper that the person, whom we send, should learn. Does not this seem to you to be very unreasonable?

Anytus/ Yes, by Zeus, and ignorance to boot.

Socrates/ You say well. Now then you may consult in common with me about this guest of yours, Meno here. For he told me some while ago, Anytus, that he had a longing for that wisdom and virtue, through which men govern well both their household and the state, and pay attention to their parents, and know how to receive both their countrymen and foreigners, and to send them away in a manner worthy of a good man. Consider then, to what persons about to teach this virtue, should we in sending him correctly send. Is it not clear that, according to the reasons detailed just now, we should send him to those who profess to be teachers of virtue, and publicly proffer themselves common to anyone of the Greeks desirous to learn; after fixing the price, and making it a matter of business.

Anytus/ Of what persons, Socrates, are you speaking?

Socrates/ You surely know that these are they whom men call sophists.

Anytus/ O Hercules! speak fair words, Socrates. On none of my relations, or family, or friends, or fellow-citizens, or foreign guests, may ever such a madness seize, as to go and be spoiled by them. For those fellows are clearly the bane and corruption of their associates.

Socrates/ How say you, Anytus? Are they the only men among those who, so widely different from all the rest, profess the knowledge of doing something beneficial, and yet do not only not improve, as others do, what one puts into their hands, but on the contrary, spoil it? and do they think fit openly to make money for themselves for this? For my part, I know not how to believe you. For I know that one man, Protagoras by name, has acquired singly more wealth from this wisdom, than both Phidias, who has produced works so conspicuously beautiful, and ten other statuaries besides. Indeed it is a prodigy you are telling me; if when the menders of old shoes and the patchers of old clothes could not escape for thirty days from being publicly known, if they returned the clothes or shoes in a worse condition than they received them, and if they did so, they would soon perish by hunger; yet, that Protagoras should undiscovered corrupt the whole of Greece by sending away his associates even worse men than he received them, and this for above forty years. For I think he was near seventy years of age when he died, after having passed forty in his profession. And during all that time he never ceased being in high repute, even to this day; and not only Protagoras met with this success, but very many others, some born prior to him, and some still living. Shall we then say, according to your account, that they knowingly deceived and corrupted the youth, or that they did so unconscious of it to themselves? Shall we deem those

to be so much out of their senses, who, some say, were the wisest of mankind?

Anytus/ They are far from being out of their senses, Socrates. Much rather so are those youths, who give them money; and still more so than the youths are their relations in committing them to such men; but most so of all are the states that suffer them to come thither, and do not drive out a person, whether foreigner or citizen, who endeavors to do any such thing.

Socrates/ Has any of the sophists done you, Anytus, any injury? or why are you so hard upon them?

Anytus/ I have never, by Zeus, associated with one of them myself; nor would I suffer any person who belonged to me to do so.

Socrates/ You have no experience at all then of those men.

Anytus/ And never may I have.

Socrates/ How then should you know, O happy man, respecting this matter, whether it has any good or harm, when you have no experience of it at all?

Anytus/ Easily enough. For I know what sort of fellows they are, whether I have any experience or not of them.

Socrates/ Perhaps you are a prophet, Anytus. Since how otherwise you could know respecting them, I should, from what you say yourself, much wonder. But we were not inquiring, what the persons are, to whom Meno might go, and become a bad man. For let these, if you will, be the sophists. But now speak to us of those others; and do an act of kindness to this hereditary friend of yours, by telling him to what persons in this great city he may go and become worthy of note for that virtue which I was just now detailing.

Anytus/ But why did you not tell him yourself?

Socrates/ What persons I conceived to be the teachers of these things I have told already. But I happen to have said nothing to the purpose, as you inform me. And perhaps there is something in what you say. Now, therefore, do you in your turn tell him to whom of the Athenians he should go. Mention the name of whomsoever you like.

Anytus/ What need is there of hearing the name of anyone man? For whomsoever of the men of honor and virtue among the Athenians he may meet, there is not one of them who would not make him a better man, than the sophists would, if he will be but persuaded.

Socrates/ But did these men of honor and virtue become such spontaneously, and without having learnt from any man to be so? and are they able to teach others, what they were never taught themselves?

Anytus/ They, I presume, learnt from their predecessors, being men of honor and virtue. Or think you that many excellent men have not been produced in this city?

Socrates/ I think, Anytus, that there are in this city men excellent in political affairs, and that there have been still not less so than there are. But were they good teachers of their own virtue? For it is this, about which our present discourse happens to be; not whether good men are at present here or not; nor whether such have been produced formerly; but whether virtue is to be taught or not, we have been for a long time considering: and in considering that question, we are come to consider this, whether those excellent men, either of the present or former day, knew how to hand over to another that virtue, by which they themselves were good; or whether this cannot be handed over to, or received by, one man from another. This it is, which we have been long examining, I and Meno. Consider then the question in this manner, according to your own

argument. Would you not say that Themistocles was a good man?

Anytus/ Yes, the best of all.

Socrates/ And would you not then say, that, if ever any other man was the teacher of his own virtue, he was one?

Anytus/ I suppose so, if he wished it.

Socrates/ But would he not have wished, think you, for some others to become men of honor and virtue, and especially his own son? Or do you think that he envied his son, and did designedly not hand over to him that virtue, in which he himself was excellent? Have you not heard that Themistocles caused his son Cleophantus to be taught to be a good horseman? For example, he remained standing upright upon horses, and upright too upon horses he threw a javelin, and performed many other surprising feats, in which his father had caused him to be instructed; and that he made him skilled in such accomplishments as are connected with the having good teachers? Have you not heard this from the elderly people?

Anytus/ I have heard it.

Socrates/ No one then would have accused his son of being of an evil nature.

Anytus/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ But what is this? That Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, became a good and a wise man, as did his father, have you ever heard this from any person, either young or old?

Anytus/ No indeed.

Socrates/ Do we imagine then that he wished to bring up his own son in such studies, and yet, in the wisdom where he himself was wise, not to make his son at all better than his neighbors, if virtue could be taught?

Anytus/ By Jove, perhaps not.

Socrates/ Such a teacher of virtue then is this one of yours, whom you yourself acknowledge to have been amongst the best men of former times. And now let us consider another, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. Do you not confess that he was a good man?

Anytus/ I do entirely.

Socrates/ And did not he too give his son Lysimachus the best education at Athens, so far as depended on teachers? and do you think he made him a better man than anyone whatsoever? For you have associated with him, and you see what sort of a man he is. But if you wish another, you know that Pericles, a man of such lofty bearing and wisdom, bred up his two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.

Anytus/ I do.

Socrates/ These, as you know yourself, he taught to be horsemen not inferior to any of the Athenians; and he instructed them in music and gymnastics, and the rest of accomplishments that depend on art, so as to be inferior to none. But had he no wish to make them good men? I believe he had the wish; but I suspect it to be impossible to teach virtue. And that you may not think that a few persons, and the most humble in means of the Athenians, were incompetent for such an affair, consider that Thucydides likewise brought up his two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, and educated them well in other respects, and particularly in wrestling the best of the Athenians. For he entrusted one to Xanthias, and the other to Eudorus; and these two were thought to be the best wrestlers of that time. Do you not remember this?

Anytus/ I do by hearsay.

Socrates/ Is it not plain then, that he would never have taught his children those things, in the teaching of which he

must have been put to expense, and not have taught them to be good men, which would have required, him to spend nothing, if such a thing could be taught? But Thucydides perhaps was of very humble means, and had not very many friends among the Athenians and their allies. It was not so. For he was of a noble family, and had great influence in the city and in the other Grecian states; so that if this could be taught, he might have found out a person, either one of his own countrymen or a foreigner, who might have made his sons virtuous, if, through his superintendence of the state, he had no leisure himself. But I fear, friend Anytus, that virtue is a thing not to be taught.

Anytus/ You seem to me, Socrates, to speak ill of persons with great facility. But I would advise you, if you are willing to hearken to me, to be on your guard. For in another city too it is perhaps more easy to do a man mischief than good; but in this it is especially so; and I think you are sensible of it yourself.

Socrates/ Anytus seems to me to be angry, Meno. And I am not at all surprised at it. For, in the first place, he thinks I am speaking ill of those very persons; and then he considers himself to be one of them. But if he should ever know what it is to speak ill of others, he will cease to be angry; but at present he is ignorant of it. Do you then tell me, are there not amongst us men of honor and virtue?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are these men willing to offer themselves to youths as teachers? and to confess both that they are teachers and that virtue is to be taught?

Meno/ By Zeus, Socrates, they do not. But you may hear them saying at one time that it is to be taught at another, not.

Socrates/ Shall we say then that these men are teachers of that thing, about which they are not agreed?

Meno/ I think not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well; but do those sophists, who alone proclaim themselves teachers, appear to you to be so?

Meno/ It is for this, Socrates, that I especially admire Gorgias, because you would never hear him making such professions. On the contrary, he laughs at the others, whenever he hears them making such a promise; and conceives that he ought to make men powerful in speaking.

Socrates/ Do not then the sophists seem to you to be teachers of virtue?

Meno/ I know not, Socrates, what to say. For I have suffered myself, what the many do. Sometimes I think they are, and sometimes, not.

Socrates/ But you know, that not only to yourself and the others versed in civil affairs, it seems at one time that this is to be taught, and at another, not; and you know that the poet Theognis says the very same thing.

Meno/ In what verses?

Socrates/ In his Elegiacs; where he says;

> With some drink thou and eat, and with some sit,
> And pleasant be to those, whose power's far known:
> Good from the good thou'lt learn; but with the bad
> Mixing, thou'lt lose the good thoughts once thine own.

Do you perceive that in these verses he speaks of virtue as a thing to be taught?

Meno/ So it appears.

Socrates/ And yet in other verses he says, passing on a little further, that

> If wisdom could be made and placed in man;

they, who could accomplish this;

Many and great rewards would carry off;

and

From a good sire no bad son e'er would come,
To words of wisdom listening; but thou'lt ne'er
By teaching make the bad a virtuous man.

Do you observe, that in speaking upon the same subjects, he contradicts himself?

Meno/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Can you tell me then of any other thing whatever, of which they, who profess to be teachers, are not only not held by others to be teachers, but who confess to be ignorant of it themselves, and who act like knaves in that very thing, which they profess to teach; and where they, who are allowed to be men of honor and virtue themselves, at one time say it is to be taught, and at another, it is not? Those then, who are so tossed about in mind about any subject whatever, would you say are the master-teachers of it?

Meno/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ If then neither the sophists, nor they who are men of honor and virtue themselves, are teachers of this thing, it is plain there can be no others beside.

Meno/ I think there can be none.

Socrates/ But if no teachers, then no scholars.

Meno/ I think the matter is as you say.

Socrates/ But we have agreed that the thing, of which there are neither teachers nor scholars, is not to be taught.

Meno/ We have agreed.

Socrates/ Of virtue then there appear nowhere any teachers.

Meno/ It is so.

Socrates/ And if no teachers, then no scholars.

Meno/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Virtue therefore cannot be taught.

Meno/ It seems so, if we have considered the matter rightly; so that, Socrates, I am led to wonder whether there are any men really good; and if there are, what can be the manner of producing good men.

Socrates/ We are in danger, O Meno! of being, both you and I, men of no mark; and that Gorgias has not taught you sufficiently, nor Prodicus me. Above all things therefore we ought to apply our minds to ourselves, and to seek a person, who by one way at least would make us better men. I say this with an eye to the inquiry lately made; since it has escaped us ridiculously, that it is not only under the guidance of science, that affairs are administered by men rightly and well; or, if we should not grant that, namely, that it is not under the conduct of science only, but of some other thing also, perhaps the knowledge of the means, by which men become good, has escaped us.

Meno/ How, Socrates, say you this?

Socrates/ In this way. Because, since we have rightly agreed that good men must be useful to us, this cannot be otherwise. Is it not so?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that they will be useful, should they conduct affairs rightly, did we not well admit this?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ But are we like persons that have not rightly agreed, in saying that unless one is prudent, it is not possible to conduct affairs rightly?

Meno/ How say you rightly?

Socrates/ I will tell you. If a man, who knew the way to Larissa, or wherever else you please, were to walk, and act

as a guide to others, would he not conduct them well and rightly?

Meno/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ What if one had only a correct opinion about the way, but had never gone it himself, nor had any certain knowledge of it, would not he also conduct others rightly?

Meno/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And so long as he had anyhow a correct opinion of things, of which the other man had a certain knowledge, he would not be at all a worse guide, though only surmising justly, and not knowing clearly, than the other with his perfect knowledge?

Meno/ Not at all worse.

Socrates/ Correct opinion, therefore, with regard to correct action, is not at all a worse guide than perfect knowledge.

And this it is, which we omitted just now in considering of what kind is the nature of virtue, when we said that prudence only led to right action; now this is correct opinion.

Meno/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Correct opinion therefore is not at all less beneficial to man than certain knowledge.

Meno/ In this respect, however, Socrates, it is; because he, who has a perfect knowledge, would always attain his object; but he, who had only a correct opinion, would sometimes attain it, and sometimes not.

Socrates/ How say you? would not the man who has always a correct opinion, always attain his object so long as he had a correct opinion?

Meno/ It appears to me that he must; so that, this being the case, I wonder, Socrates, on what account it is that science is so much more valuable than correct opinion; and

in what respect it is that one is this thing, and the other another.

Socrates/ Do you know why you wonder? or shall I tell you?

Meno/ By all means tell me.

Socrates/ It is because you never directed your mind to the images made by Dædalus. But perhaps you have none of them amongst you.

Meno/ With what view do you say this?

Socrates/ Because, if they are not fastened, they run away and become fugitives; but if they are fastened, they stay.

Meno/ And what then?

Socrates/ To possess one of his works unfastened, is, like the possessing a runaway slave, a matter of little value, because it does not remain. But fastened, it is of great value; for indeed they are works of great beauty. But why do I thus speak of them? It is with reference to true opinions. For true opinions likewise, so long as they abide by us, are a valuable possession, and procure for us all good things; but they are not willing to abide a long time, for they run away from the soul of a man; so that they are of little value, until one has fastened them down by the reasoning respecting their cause. And this, friend Meno, is reminiscence, as we before agreed. But when they are fastened down, in the first place they become perfect knowledge, and subsequently abiding. Now it is on this very account that perfect knowledge is a thing more valuable than correct opinion; and it is by this binding that perfect knowledge differs from correct opinion.

Meno/ By Zeus, Socrates, it seems like to some such thing.

Socrates/ And yet I speak thus, not as one knowing, but only from conjecture. But that correct opinion and science

are two different things, this I seem to myself not to conjecture; but if I should say I knew anything else, and there are but few things I would say I know, I would set down this as one of those I do know.

Meno/ And you say rightly, Socrates.

Socrates/ What then, say I not rightly this too, that correct opinion, having the conduct of any work of action whatever, executes her office not at all worse than perfect knowledge?

Meno/ And this too I think you say rightly.

Socrates/ Correct opinion therefore is a thing not at all inferior to perfect knowledge, nor less beneficial with regard to action: nor is the man, who has a correct opinion, inferior to the man of perfect knowledge.

Meno/ It is so.

Socrates/ And it has been agreed, that a good man is useful.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Since then it is not through perfect knowledge alone that men can be good and useful to their country, if there are any such men, but by correct opinion likewise; and since neither of these exists to men by nature, neither science nor correct opinion; or do you think that either of them comes by nature?

Meno/ Not I.

Socrates/ Since then they are not by nature, neither is it by nature that men could have been virtuous.

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Since then virtue comes not by nature, we inquired, in the next place, whether it is to be taught.

Meno/ Just so.

Socrates/ Did it not appear to us both, that it was to be taught, if virtue were wisdom?

Meno/ It did.

Socrates/ And that if it were to be taught, then virtue would be wisdom?

Meno/ Very true.

Socrates/ And that, if there were any teachers, it could be a thing to be taught; otherwise, not?

Meno/ Just so.

Socrates/ But we have agreed that there are no teachers of it.

Meno/ It is so.

Socrates/ We are agreed, therefore, that it is not to be taught, nor is it wisdom.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But we agreed besides, that it was something good.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that whatever conducted affairs rightly was a thing beneficial.

Meno/ We did clearly.

Socrates/ And that affairs are conducted rightly by these two things only, correct opinion and perfect knowledge; by possessing which a man is a good guide. For what comes from fortune is not the effect of human guidance. But where a man is the guide to right, there are these two, correct opinion and perfect knowledge.

Meno/ I think so.

Socrates/ Now since virtue is not to be taught, it is not the effect of perfect knowledge.

Meno/ It appears it is not.

Socrates/ Of the two things then, good and serviceable, one has been set loose, nor can perfect knowledge be a guide in the administration of civil affairs.

Meno/ I think it cannot.

Socrates/ Not therefore as being wise in any wisdom, did such men take the lead in the state, as Themistocles, and the rest, of whom Anytus here has just now spoken. And for this very reason they were not able to make others such as themselves; because it was not through perfect knowledge they were such.

Meno/ The case, O Socrates, seems to be as you represent it.

Socrates/ If then it is not by perfect knowledge, it follows it is by correct opinion; of which politicians making an use, regulate states, being men not at all superior in wisdom to oracle singers and divine prophets; for these also utter many true sayings, but know nothing of what they utter.

Meno/ This seem to be very near the fact.

Socrates/ Is it not meet then, O Meno, to call these men divine, who, without possessing a mind concerning what they do and say, direct many and great things aright?

Meno/ By all means.

Socrates/ Rightly then should we call those men divine, whom we just now mentioned, the oracle-singers and the prophets, and all poetical persons. And not the least divine of such persons should we say that statesmen are, and no less enthusiasts, being inspired divinely, and possessed by the divinity, when in their speeches they direct aright many and great affairs, without knowing anything of what they are saying.

Meno/ Certainly we should.

Socrates/ And even women, Meno, call good men divine; and the Lacedæmonians, when they celebrate with encomiums any brave man, say, “This is a divine man.”

Meno/ And they appear, O Socrates, to speak justly too. And yet, perhaps, Anytus here is offended at what you say.

Socrates/ I care not. With him, Meno, we shall have some discourse at another time. But if we, during all this conversation, have inquired and spoken correctly, virtue can neither come by nature, nor yet be taught, but by a divine fate is present to those, with whom it is present, without intelligence; unless amongst statesmen there be such a person as is able to make another man a statesman; and if there be, he might almost be said to be such among the living, as Homer tells us Tiresias is among the dead; where, speaking of him, he says, that he alone, of those in Hades, was intelligent; but the rest, like shadows, flitted. The same thing would forthwith such a man be, with respect to virtue, as a true thing is compared with shadows.

Meno/ You seem to me, Socrates, to speak most beautifully.

Socrates/ From this reasoning then, Meno, it appears to us that to whom virtue is present, it is present by a divine fate. But on this point we shall then know the truth, when, previous to our inquiries by what means is virtue present to men, we set about searching first, what virtue is by itself. But it is now time for me to go somewhere else. And do you, since you are persuaded yourself on these points, persuade also your guest Anytus here, in order that he may thus become more mild; so that, should you persuade him, it is possible for you to do some service to the Athenians likewise.

Meno

Translated by G.M.A. Grube.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Meno, Boy, Anytus

Meno/ Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught? Or is it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature or in some other way?

Socrates/ Before now, Meno, Thessalians had a high reputation among the Greeks and were admired for their horsemanship and their wealth, but now, it seems to me, they are also admired for their wisdom, not least the fellow citizens of your friend Aristippus of Larissa. The responsibility for this reputation of yours lies with Gorgias, for when he came to your city he found that the leading Aleuadae, your lover Aristippus among them, loved him for his wisdom, and so did the other leading Thessalians. In particular, he accustomed you to give a bold and grand answer to any question you may be asked, as experts are likely to do. Indeed, he himself was ready to answer any Greek who wished to question him, and every question was answered. But here in Athens, my dear Meno, the opposite is the case, as if there were a dearth of wisdom, and wisdom seems to have departed hence to go to you. If then you want to ask one of us that sort of question, everyone will laugh and say: "Good stranger, you must think me happy indeed if you think I know whether virtue can be taught or how it comes to be; I am so far from knowing whether virtue can be taught or not that I do not even have any knowledge of what virtue itself is."

I myself, Meno, am as poor as my fellow citizens in this matter, and I blame myself for my complete ignorance about virtue. If I do not know what something is, how could I know

what qualities it possesses? Or do you think that someone who does not know at all who Meno is could know whether he is good-looking or rich or well-born, or the opposite of these? Do you think that is possible?

Meno/ I do not; but, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? Are we to report this to the folk back home about you?

Socrates/ Not only that, my friend, but also that, as I believe, I have never yet met anyone else who did know.

Meno/ How so? Did you not meet Gorgias when he was here?

Socrates/ I did.

Meno/ Did you then not think that he knew?

Socrates/ I do not altogether remember, Meno, so that I cannot tell you now what I thought then. Perhaps he does know; you know what he used to say, so you remind me of what he said. You tell me yourself, if you are willing, for surely you share his views.

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ Let us leave Gorgias out of it, since he is not here. But Meno, by the gods, what do you yourself say that virtue is? Speak and do not begrudge us, so that I may have spoken a most unfortunate untruth when I said that I had never met anyone who knew, if you and Gorgias are shown to know.

Meno/ It is not hard to tell you, Socrates. First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man's virtue consists of being able to manage public affairs and in so doing to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to himself; if you want the virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, preserve its possessions, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether male or female, is different again, and so is that of an elderly man, if you want

that, or if you want that of a free man or a slave. And there are very many other virtues, so that one is not at a loss to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and every age, for every task of ours and every one of us—and Socrates, the same is true for wickedness.

Socrates/ I seem to be in great luck, Meno; while I am looking for one virtue, I have found you to have a whole swarm of them. But, Meno, to follow up the image of swarms, if I were asking you what is the nature of bees, and you said that they are many and of all kinds, what would you answer if I asked you: "Do you mean that they are many and varied and different from one another in so far as they are bees? Or are they no different in that regard, but in some other respect, in their beauty, for example, or their size or in some other such way?" Tell me, what would you answer if thus questioned?

Meno/ I would say that they do not differ from one another in being bees.

Socrates/ If I went on to say: "Tell me, what is this very thing, Meno, in which they are all the same and do not differ from one another?" Would you be able to tell me?

Meno/ I would.

Socrates/ The same is true in the case of the virtues. Even if they are many and various, all of them have one and the same form which makes them virtues, and it is right to look to this when one is asked to make clear what virtue is. Or do you not understand what I mean?

Meno/ I think I understand, but I certainly do not grasp the meaning of the question as fully as I want to.

Socrates/ I am asking whether you think it is only in the case of virtue that there is one for man, another for woman and so on, or is the same true in the case of health and size and strength? Do you think that there is one health for man and another for woman? Or, if it is health, does it have the

same form everywhere, whether in man or in anything else whatever?

Meno/ The health of a man seems to me the same as that of a woman.

Socrates/ And so with size and strength? If a woman is strong, that strength will be the same and have the same form, for by “the same” I mean that strength is no different as far as being strength, whether in a man or a woman. Or do you think there is a difference?

Meno/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ And will there be any difference in the case of virtue, as far as being virtue is concerned, whether it be in a child or an old man, in a woman or in a man?

Meno/ I think, Socrates, that somehow this is no longer like those other cases.

Socrates/ How so? Did you not say that the virtue of a man consists of managing the city well, and that of a woman of managing the household?

Meno/ I did.

Socrates/ Is it possible to manage a city well, or a household, or anything else, while not managing it moderately and justly?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then if they manage justly and moderately, they must do so with justice and moderation?

Meno/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ So both the man and the woman, if they are to be good, need the same things, justice and moderation.

Meno/ So it seems.

Socrates/ What about a child and an old man? Can they possibly be good if they are intemperate and unjust?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But if they are moderate and just?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ So all human beings are good in the same way, for they become good by acquiring the same qualities.

Meno/ It seems so.

Socrates/ And they would not be good in the same way if they did not have the same virtue.

Meno/ They certainly would not be.

Socrates/ Since then the virtue of all is the same, try to tell me and to remember what Gorgias, and you with him, said that that same thing is.

Meno/ What else but to be able to rule over people, if you are seeking one description to fit them all.

Socrates/ That is indeed what I am seeking, but Meno, is virtue the same in the case of a child or a slave, namely, for them to be able to rule over a master, and do you think that he who rules is still a slave?

Meno/ I do not think so at all, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is not likely, my good man. Consider this further point: you say that virtue is to be able to rule. Shall we not add to this justly and not unjustly?

Meno/ I think so, Socrates, for justice is virtue.

Socrates/ Is it virtue, Meno, or a virtue?

Meno/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ As with anything else. For example, if you wish, take roundness, about which I would say that it is a shape, but not simply that it is shape. I would not so speak of it because there are other shapes.

Meno/ You are quite right. So I too say that not only justice is a virtue but there are many other virtues.

Socrates/ What are they? Tell me, as I could mention other shapes to you if you bade me do so, so do you mention other virtues.

Meno/ I think courage is a virtue, and moderation, wisdom, and munificence, and very many others.

Socrates/ We are having the same trouble again, Meno, though in another way; we have found many virtues while looking for one, but we cannot find the one which covers all the others.

Meno/ I cannot yet find, Socrates, what you are looking for, one virtue for them all, as in the other cases.

Socrates/ That is likely, but I am eager, if I can, that we should make progress, for you understand that the same applies to everything. If someone asked you what I mentioned just now: "What is shape, Meno?" and you told him that it was roundness, and if then he said to you what I did: "Is roundness shape or a shape?" you would surely tell him that it is a shape?

Meno/ I certainly would.

Socrates/ That would be because there are other shapes?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if he asked you further what they were, you would tell him?

Meno/ I would.

Socrates/ So too, if he asked you what color is, and you said it is white, and your questioner interrupted you, "Is white color or a color?" you would say that it is a color, because there are also other colors?

Meno/ I would.

Socrates/ And if he bade you mention other colors, you would mention—others that are no less colors than white is?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then if he pursued the argument as I did and said: “We always arrive at the many; do not talk to me in that way, but since you call all these many by one name, and say that no one of them is not a shape even though they are opposites, tell me what this is which applies as much to the round as to the straight and which you call shape, as you say the round is as much a shape as the straight.” Do you not say that?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ When you speak like that, do you assert that the round is no more round than it is straight, and that the straight is no more straight than it is round?

Meno/ Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yet you say that the round is no more a shape than the straight is, nor the one more than the other.

Meno/ That is true.

Socrates/ What then is this to which the name shape applies? Try to tell me. If then you answered the man who was questioning about shape or color: “I do not understand what you want, my man, nor what you mean,” he would probably wonder and say: “You do not understand that I am seeking that which is the same in all these cases?” Would you still have nothing to say, Meno, if one asked you: “What is this which applies to the round and the straight and the other things which you call shapes and which is the same in them all?” Try to say, that you may practice for your answer about virtue.

Meno/ No, Socrates, but you tell me.

Socrates/ Do you want me to do you this favor?

Meno/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ And you will then be willing to tell me about virtue?

Meno/ I will.

Socrates/ We must certainly press on. The subject is worth it.

Meno/ It surely is.

Socrates/ Come then, let us try to tell you what shape is. See whether you will accept that it is this: Let us say that shape is that which alone of existing things always follows color. Is that satisfactory to you, or do you look for it in some other way? I should be satisfied if you defined virtue in this way.

Meno/ But that is foolish, Socrates.

Socrates/ How do you mean?

Meno/ That shape, you say, always follows color. Well then, if someone were to say that he did not know what color is, but that he had the same difficulty as he had about shape, what do you think your answer would be?

Socrates/ A true one, surely, and if my questioner was one of those clever and disputatious debaters, I would say to him: "I have given my answer; if it is wrong, it is your job to refute it." Then, if they are friends as you and I are, and want to discuss with each other, they must answer in a manner more gentle and more proper to discussion. By this I mean that the answers must not only be true, but in terms admittedly known to the questioner. I too will try to speak in these terms. Do you call something "the end?" I mean such a thing as a limit or boundary, for all those are, I say, the same thing. Prodicus might disagree with us, but you surely call something "finished" or "completed"—that is what I want to express, nothing elaborate.

Meno/ I do, and I think I understand what you mean.

Socrates/ Further, you call something a plane, and something else a solid, as in geometry?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ From this you may understand what I mean by shape, for I say this of every shape, that a shape is that which limits a solid; in a word, a shape is the limit of a solid.

Meno/ And what do you say color is, Socrates?

Socrates/ You are outrageous, Meno. You bother an old man to answer questions, but you yourself are not willing to recall and to tell me what Gorgias says that virtue is.

Meno/ After you have answered this, Socrates, I will tell you.

Socrates/ Even someone who was blindfolded would know from your conversation that you are handsome and still have lovers.

Meno/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because you are forever giving orders in a discussion, as spoiled people do, who behave like tyrants as long as they are young. And perhaps you have recognized that I am at a disadvantage with handsome people, so I will do you the favor of an answer.

Meno/ By all means do me that favor.

Socrates/ Do you want me to answer after the manner of Gorgias, which you would most easily follow?

Meno/ Of course I want that.

Socrates/ Do you both say there are effluvia of things, as Empedocles does?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that there are channels through which the effluvia make their way?

Meno/ Definitely.

Socrates/ And some effluvia fit some of the channels, while others are too small or too big?

Meno/ That is so.

Socrates/ And there is something which you call sight?

Meno/ There is.

Socrates/ From this, “comprehend what I state,” as Pindar said; for color is an effluvium from shapes which fits the sight and is perceived.

Meno/ That seems to me to be an excellent answer, Socrates.

Socrates/ Perhaps it was given in the manner to which you are accustomed. At the same time I think that you can deduce from this answer what sound is, and smell, and many such things.

Meno/ Quite so.

Socrates/ It is a theatrical answer so it pleases you, Meno, more than that about shape.

Meno/ It does.

Socrates/ It is not better, son of Alexidemus, but I am convinced that the other is, and I think you would agree, if you did not have to go away before the mysteries as you told me yesterday, but could remain and be initiated.

Meno/ I would stay, Socrates, if you could tell me many things like these.

Socrates/ I shall certainly not be lacking in eagerness to tell you such things, both for your sake and my own, but I may not be able to tell you many. Come now, you too try to fulfill your promise to me and tell me the nature of virtue as a whole and stop making many out of one, as jokers say whenever someone breaks something; but allow virtue to remain whole and sound, and tell me what it is, for I have given you examples.

Meno/ I think, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says, “to find joy in beautiful things and have power.” So I say that

virtue is to desire beautiful things and have the power to acquire them.

Socrates/ Do you mean that the man who desires beautiful things desires good things?

Meno/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Do you assume that there are people who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Do you not think, my good man, that all men desire good things?

Meno/ I do not.

Socrates/ But some desire bad things?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you mean that they believe the bad things to be good, or that they know they are bad and nevertheless desire them?

Meno/ I think there are both kinds.

Socrates/ Do you think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, nevertheless desires them?

Meno/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ What do you mean by desiring? Is it to secure for oneself?

Meno/ What else?

Socrates/ Does he think that the bad things benefit him who possesses them, or does he know they harm him?

Meno/ There are some who believe that the bad things benefit them, others who know that the bad things harm them.

Socrates/ And do you think that those who believe that bad things benefit them know that they are bad?

Meno/ No, that I cannot altogether believe.

Socrates/ It is clear then that those who do not know things to be bad do not desire what is bad, but they desire those

things that they believe to be good but that are in fact bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge of these things and believe them to be good clearly desire good things. Is that not so?

Meno/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Well then, those who you say desire bad things, believing that bad things harm their possessor, know that they will be harmed by them?

Meno/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And do they not think that those who are harmed are miserable to the extent that they are harmed?

Meno/ That too is inevitable.

Socrates/ And that those who are miserable are unhappy?

Meno/ I think so.

Socrates/ Does anyone wish to be miserable and unhappy?

Meno/ I do not think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ No one then wants what is bad, Meno, unless he wants to be such. For what else is being miserable but to desire bad things and secure them?

Meno/ You are probably right, Socrates, and no one wants what is bad.

Socrates/ Were you not saying just now that virtue is to desire good things and have the power to secure them?

Meno/ Yes, I was.

Socrates/ The desiring part of this statement is common to everybody, and one man is no better than another in this?

Meno/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Clearly then, if one man is better than another, he must be better at securing them.

Meno/ Quite so.

Socrates/ This then is virtue according to your argument, the power of securing good things.

Meno/ I think, Socrates, that the case is altogether as you now understand it.

Socrates/ Let us see then whether what you say is true, for you may well be right. You say that the capacity to acquire good things is virtue?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ And by good things you mean, for example, health and wealth?

Meno/ Yes, and also to acquire gold and silver, also honors and offices in the city.

Socrates/ By good things you do not mean other goods than these?

Meno/ No, but I mean all things of this kind.

Socrates/ Very well. According to Meno, the hereditary guest friend of the Great King, virtue is the acquisition of gold and silver. Do you add to this acquiring, Meno, the words justly and piously, or does it make no difference to you but even if one secures these things unjustly, you call it virtue none the less?

Meno/ Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ You would then call it wickedness?

Meno/ Indeed I would.

Socrates/ It seems then that the acquisition must be accompanied by justice or moderation or piety or some other part of virtue; if it is not, it will not be virtue, even though it provides good things.

Meno/ How could there be virtue without these?

Socrates/ Then failing to secure gold and silver, whenever it would not be just to do so, either for oneself or another, is not this failure to secure them also virtue?

Meno/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then to provide these goods would not be virtue any more than not to provide them, but apparently whatever is done with justice will be virtue, and what is done without anything of the kind is wickedness.

Meno/ I think it must necessarily be as you say.

Socrates/ We said a little while ago that each of these things was a part of virtue, namely, justice and moderation and all such things?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then you are playing with me, Meno.

Meno/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because I begged you just now not to break up or fragment virtue, and I gave examples of how you should answer. You paid no attention, but you tell me that virtue is to be able to secure good things with justice, and this, you say, is a part of virtue.

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ It follows then from what you agree to, that to act in whatever you do with a part of virtue is virtue, for you say that justice is a part of virtue, as are all such qualities. Why do I say this? Because when I begged you to tell me about virtue as a whole, you are far from telling me what it is. Rather, you say that every action is virtue if it is performed with a part of virtue, as if you had told me what virtue as a whole is, and I would already know that, even if you fragment it into parts. I think you must face the same question from the beginning, my dear Meno, namely, what is virtue, if every action performed with a part of virtue is virtue? For that is what one is saying when he says that every action performed with justice is virtue. Do you not think you should face the same question again, or do you think one knows what a part of virtue is if one does not know virtue itself?

Meno/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ If you remember, when I was answering you about shape, we rejected the kind of answer that tried to answer in terms still being the subject of inquiry and not yet agreed upon.

Meno/ And we were right to reject them.

Socrates/ Then surely, my good sir, you must not think, while the nature of virtue as a whole is still under inquiry, that by answering in terms of the parts of virtue you can make its nature clear to anyone or make anything else clear by speaking in this way, but only that the same question must be put to you again—what do you take the nature of virtue to be when you say what you say? Or do you think there is no point in what I am saying?

Meno/ I think what you say is right.

Socrates/ Answer me again then from the beginning: What do you and your friend say that virtue is?

Meno/ Socrates, before I even met you I used to hear that you are always in a state of perplexity and that you bring others to the same state, and now I think you are bewitching and beguiling me, simply putting me under a spell, so that I am quite perplexed. Indeed, if a joke is in order, you seem, in appearance and in every other way, to be like the broad torpedo fish, for it too makes anyone who comes close and touches it feel numb, and you now seem to have had that kind of effect on me, for both my mind and my tongue are numb, and I have no answer to give you. Yet I have made many speeches about virtue before large audiences on a thousand occasions, very good speeches as I thought, but now I cannot even say what it is. I think you are wise not to sail away from Athens to go and stay elsewhere, for if you were to behave like this as a stranger in another city, you would be driven away for practicing sorcery.

Socrates/ You are a rascal, Meno, and you nearly deceived me.

Meno/ Why so particularly, Socrates?

Socrates/ I know why you drew this image of me.

Meno/ Why do you think I did?

Socrates/ So that I should draw an image of you in return. I know that all handsome men rejoice in images of themselves; it is to their advantage, for I think that the images of beautiful people are also beautiful, but I will draw no image of you in turn. Now if the torpedo fish is itself numb and so makes others numb, then I resemble it, but not otherwise, for I myself do not have the answer when I perplex others, but I am more perplexed than anyone when I cause perplexity in others. So now I do not know what virtue is; perhaps you knew before you contacted me, but now you are certainly like one who does not know. Nevertheless, I want to examine and seek together with you what it may be.

Meno/ How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?

Socrates/ I know what you want to say, Meno. Do you realize what a debater's argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for.

Meno/ Does that argument not seem sound to you, Socrates?

Socrates/ Not to me.

Meno/ Can you tell me why?

Socrates/ I can. I have heard wise men and women talk about divine matters …

Meno/ What did they say?

Socrates/ What was, I thought, both true and beautiful.

Meno/ What was it, and who were they?

Socrates/ The speakers were among the priests and priestesses whose care it is to be able to give an account of their practices. Pindar too says it, and many others of the divine among our poets. What they say is this; see whether you think they speak the truth: They say that the human soul is immortal; at times it comes to an end, which they call dying, at times it is reborn, but it is never destroyed, and one must therefore live one's life as piously as possible:

> Persephone will return to the sun above in the ninth year
> the souls of those from whom
> she will exact punishment for old miseries,
> and from these come noble kings,
> mighty in strength and greatest in wisdom,
> and for the rest of time men will call them sacred heroes

As the soul is immortal, has been born often and has seen all things here and in the underworld, there is nothing which it has not learned; so it is in no way surprising that it can recollect the things it knew before, both about virtue and other things. As the whole of nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, nothing prevents a man, after recalling one thing only—a process men call learning—discovering everything else for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search, for searching and learning are, as a whole, recollection. We must, therefore, not believe that debater's argument, for it would make us idle, and fainthearted men like to hear it, whereas my argument makes them energetic and keen on the search. I trust that this is true, and I want to inquire along with you into the nature of virtue.

Meno/ Yes, Socrates, but how do you mean that we do not learn, but that what we call learning is recollection? Can you teach me that this is so?

Socrates/ As I said just now, Meno, you are a rascal. You now ask me if I can teach you, when I say there is no teaching but recollection, in order to show me up at once as contradicting myself.

Meno/ No, by Zeus, Socrates, that was not my intention when I spoke, but just a habit. If you can somehow show me that things are as you say, please do so.

Socrates/ It is not easy, but I am nevertheless willing to do my best for your sake. Call one of these many attendants of yours, whichever you like, that I may prove it to you in his case.

Meno/ Certainly. You there come forward.

Socrates/ Is he a Greek? Does he speak Greek?

Meno/ Very much so. He was born in my household.

Socrates/ Pay attention then whether you think he is recollecting or learning from me.

Meno/ I will pay attention.

Socrates/ Tell me now, boy, you know that a square figure is like this?

Boy/ I do.

Socrates/ A square then is a figure in which all these four sides are equal?

Boy/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ And it also has these lines through the middle equal?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And such a figure could be larger or smaller?

Boy/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If then this side were two feet, and this other side two feet, how many feet would the whole be? Consider it this way: if it were two feet this way, and only one foot that way, the figure would be once two feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if it is two feet also that way, it would surely be twice two feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ How many feet is twice two feet? Work it out and tell me.

Boy/ Four, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now we could have another figure twice the size of this one, with the four sides equal like this one.

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ How many feet will that be?

Boy/ Eight.

Socrates/ Come now, try to tell me how long each side of this will be. The side of this is two feet. What about each side of the one which is its double?

Boy/ Obviously, Socrates, it will be twice the length.

Socrates/ You see, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but all I do is question him. And now he thinks he knows the length of the line on which an eight-foot figure is based. Do you agree?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ And does he know?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ He thinks it is a line twice the length?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Watch him now recollecting things in order, as one must recollect. Tell me, boy, do you say that a figure

double the size is based on a line double the length? Now I mean such a figure as this, not long on one side and short on the other, but equal in every direction like this one, and double the size, that is, eight feet. See whether you still believe that it will be based on a line double the length.

Boy/ I do.

Socrates/ Now the line becomes double its length if we add another of the same length here?

Boy/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ And the eight-foot square will be based on it, if there are four lines of that length?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, let us draw from it four equal lines, and surely that is what you say is the eight-foot square?

Boy/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And within this figure are four squares, each of which is equal to the four-foot square?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ How big is it then? Is it not four times as big?

Boy/ Of course.

Socrates/ Is this square then, which is four times as big, its double?

Boy/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ How many times bigger is it?

Boy/ Four times.

Socrates/ Then, my boy, the figure based on a line twice the length is not double but four times as big?

Boy/ You are right.

Socrates/ And four times four is sixteen, is it not?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ On how long a line should the eight-foot square be based? On this line we have a square that is four times bigger, do we not?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now this four-foot square is based on this line here, half the length?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Very well. Is the eight-foot square not double this one and half that one?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Will it not be based on a line longer than this one and shorter than that one? Is that not so?

Boy/ I think so.

Socrates/ Good, you answer what you think. And tell me, was this one not two-feet long, and that one four feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ The line on which the eight-foot square is based must then be longer than this one of two feet, and shorter than that one of four feet?

Boy/ It must be.

Socrates/ Try to tell me then how long a line you say it is.

Boy/ Three feet.

Socrates/ Then if it is three feet, let us add the half of this one, and it will be three feet? For these are two feet, and the other is one. And here, similarly, these are two feet and that one is one foot, and so the figure you mention comes to be?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now if it is three feet this way and three feet that way, will the whole figure be three times three feet?

Boy/ So it seems.

Socrates/ How much is three times three feet?

Boy/ Nine feet.

Socrates/ And the double square was to be how many feet?

Boy/ Eight.

Socrates/ So the eight-foot figure cannot be based on the three-foot line?

Boy/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ But on how long a line? Try to tell us exactly, and if you do not want to work it out, show me from what line.

Boy/ By Zeus, Socrates, I do not know.

Socrates/ You realize, Meno, what point he has reached in his recollection. At first he did not know what the basic line of the eight-foot square was; even now he does not yet know, but then he thought he knew, and answered confidently as if he did know, and he did not think himself at a loss, but now he does think himself at a loss, and as he does not know, neither does he think he knows.

Meno/ That is true.

Socrates/ So he is now in a better position with regard to the matter he does not know?

Meno/ I agree with that too.

Socrates/ Have we done him any harm by making him perplexed and numb as the torpedo fish does?

Meno/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ Indeed, we have probably achieved something relevant to finding out how matters stand, for now, as he does not know, he would be glad to find out, whereas before he thought he could easily make many fine speeches to large audiences about the square of double size and said that it must have a base twice as long.

Meno/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Do you think that before he would have tried to find out that which he thought he knew though he did not,

before he fell into perplexity and realized he did not know and longed to know?

Meno/ I do not think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Has he then benefitted from being numbed?

Meno/ I think so.

Socrates/ Look then how he will come out of his perplexity while searching along with me. I shall do nothing more than ask questions and not teach him. Watch whether you find me teaching and explaining things to him instead of asking for his opinion.

Socrates/ You tell me, is this not a four-foot figure? You understand?

Boy/ I do.

Socrates/ We add to it this figure which is equal to it?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we add this third figure equal to each of them?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Could we then fill in the space in the corner?

Boy/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So we have these four equal figures?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, how many times is the whole figure larger than this one?

Boy/ Four times.

Socrates/ But we should have had one that was twice as large, or do you not remember?

Boy/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ Does not this line from one corner to the other cut each of these figures in two?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ So these are four equal lines which enclose this figure?

Boy/ They are.

Socrates/ Consider now: how large is the figure?

Boy/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Within these four figures, each line cuts off half of each, does it not?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ How many of this size are there in this figure?

Boy/ Four.

Socrates/ How many in this

Boy/ Two.

Socrates/ What is the relation of four to two?

Boy/ Double.

Socrates/ How many feet in this?

Boy/ Eight.

Socrates/ Based on what line?

Boy/ This one.

Socrates/ That is, on the line that stretches from corner to corner of the four-foot figure?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Clever men call this the diagonal, so that if diagonal is its name, you say that the double figure would be that based on the diagonal?

Boy/ Most certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ What do you think, Meno? Has he, in his answers, expressed any opinion that was not his own?

Meno/ No, they were all his own.

Socrates/ And yet, as we said a short time ago, he did not know?

Meno/ That is true.

Socrates/ So these opinions were in him, were they not?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ So the man who does not know has within himself true opinions about the things that he does not know?

Meno/ So it appears.

Socrates/ These opinions have now just been stirred up like a dream, but if he were repeatedly asked these same questions in various ways, you know that in the end his knowledge about these things would be as accurate as anyone's.

Meno/ It is likely.

Socrates/ And he will know it without having been taught but only questioned, and find the knowledge within himself?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not finding knowledge within oneself recollection?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Must he not either have at some time acquired the knowledge he now possesses, or else have always possessed it?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ If he always had it, he would always have known. If he acquired it, he cannot have done so in his present life. Or has someone taught him geometry? For he will perform in the same way about all geometry, and all other knowledge. Has someone taught him everything? You should know, especially as he has been born and brought up in your house.

Meno/ But I know that no one has taught him.

Socrates/ Yet he has these opinions, or doesn't he?

Meno/ That seems indisputable, Socrates.

Socrates/ If he has not acquired them in his present life, is it not clear that he had them and had learned them at some other time?

Meno/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then that was the time when he was not a human being?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ If then, during the time he exists and is not a human being he will have true opinions which, when stirred by questioning, become knowledge, will not his soul have learned during all time? For it is clear that during all time he exists, either as a man or not.

Meno/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the soul would be immortal so that you should always confidently try to seek out and recollect what you do not know at present—that is, what you do not recollect?

Meno/ Somehow, Socrates, I think that what you say is right.

Socrates/ I think so too, Meno. I do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but I would contend at all costs both in word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know and that we must not look for it.

Meno/ In this too I think you are right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Since we are of one mind that one should seek to find out what one does not know, shall we try to find out together what virtue is?

Meno/ Certainly. But Socrates, I should be most pleased to investigate and hear your answer to my original question,

whether we should try on the assumption that virtue is something teachable, or is a natural gift, or in whatever way it comes to men.

Socrates/ If I were directing you, Meno, and not only myself, we would not have investigated whether virtue is teachable or not before we had investigated what virtue itself is. But because you do not even attempt to rule yourself, in order that you may be free, but you try to rule me and do so, I will agree with you—for what can I do? So we must, it appears, inquire into the qualities of something the nature of which we do not yet know. However, please relax your rule a little bit for me and agree to investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of a hypothesis. I mean the way geometers often carry on their investigations. For example, if they are asked whether a specific area can be inscribed in the form of a triangle within a given circle, one of them might say: "I do not yet know whether that area has that property, but I think I have, as it were, a hypothesis that is of use for the problem, namely this: If that area is such that when one has applied it as a rectangle to the given straight line in the circle it is deficient by a figure similar to the very figure which is applied, then I think one alternative results, whereas another results if it is impossible for this to happen. So, by using this hypothesis, I am willing to tell you what results with regard to inscribing it in the circle—that is, whether it is impossible or not." So let us speak about virtue also, since we do not know either what it is or what qualities it possesses, and let us investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of a hypothesis, and say this: Among the things existing in the soul, of what sort is virtue, that it should be teachable or not? First, if it is another sort than knowledge, is it teachable or not, or, as we were just saying, recollectable? Let it make no difference to us which term we use: is it teachable? Or is it

plain to anyone that men cannot be taught anything but knowledge?

Meno/ I think so.

Socrates/ But, if virtue is a kind of knowledge, it is clear that it could be taught.

Meno/ Of course.

Socrates/ We have dealt with that question quickly, that if it is of one kind it can be taught, if it is of a different kind, it cannot.

Meno/ We have indeed.

Socrates/ The next point to consider seems to be whether virtue is knowledge or something else.

Meno/ That does seem to be the next point to consider.

Socrates/ Well now, do we say that virtue is itself something good, and will this hypothesis stand firm for us, that it is something good?

Meno/ Of course.

Socrates/ If then there is anything else good that is different and separate from knowledge, virtue might well not be a kind of knowledge; but if there is nothing good that knowledge does not encompass, we would be right to suspect that it is a kind of knowledge.

Meno/ That is so.

Socrates/ Surely virtue makes us good?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if we are good, we are beneficent, for all that is good is beneficial. Is that not so?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ So virtue is something beneficial?

Meno/ That necessarily follows from what has been agreed.

Socrates/ Let us then examine what kinds of things benefit us, taking them up one by one: health, we say, and strength, and beauty, and also wealth. We say that these things, and others of the same kind, benefit us, do we not?

Meno/ We do.

Socrates/ Yet we say that these same things also sometimes harm one. Do you agree or not?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ Look then, what directing factor determines in each case whether these things benefit or harm us? Is it not the right use of them that benefits us, and the wrong use that harms us?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us now look at the qualities of the soul. There is something you call moderation, and justice, courage, intelligence, memory, munificence, and all such things?

Meno/ There is.

Socrates/ Consider whichever of these you believe not to be knowledge but different from it; do they not at times harm us, at other times benefit us? Courage, for example, when it is not wisdom but like a kind of recklessness: when a man is reckless without understanding, he is harmed; when with understanding, he is benefitted.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ The same is true of moderation and mental quickness; when they are learned and disciplined with understanding they are beneficial, but without understanding they are harmful?

Meno/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Therefore, in a word, all that the soul undertakes and endures, if directed by wisdom, ends in happiness, but if directed by ignorance, it ends in the opposite?

Meno/ That is likely.

Socrates/ If then virtue is something in the soul and it must be beneficial, it must be knowledge, since all the qualities of the soul are in themselves neither beneficial nor harmful, but accompanied by wisdom or folly they become harmful or beneficial. This argument shows that virtue, being beneficial, must be a kind of wisdom.

Meno/ I agree.

Socrates/ Furthermore, those other things we were mentioning just now, wealth and the like, are at times good and at times harmful. Just as for the rest of the soul the direction of wisdom makes things beneficial, but harmful if directed by folly, so in these cases, if the soul uses and directs them right it makes them beneficial, but bad use makes them harmful?

Meno/ Quite so.

Socrates/ The wise soul directs them right, the foolish soul wrongly?

Meno/ That is so.

Socrates/ So one may say this about everything; all other human activities depend on the soul, and those of the soul itself depend on wisdom if they are to be good. According to this argument the beneficial would be wisdom, and we say that virtue is beneficial?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Virtue then, as a whole or in part, is wisdom?

Meno/ What you say, Socrates, seems to me quite right.

Socrates/ Then, if that is so, the good are not so by nature?

Meno/ I do not think they are.

Socrates/ For if they were, this would follow: if the good were so by nature, we would have people who knew which among the young were by nature good; we would take those

whom they had pointed out and guard them in the Acropolis, sealing them up there much more carefully than gold so that no one could corrupt them, and when they reached maturity they would be useful to their cities.

Meno/ Reasonable enough, Socrates.

Socrates/ Since the good are not good by nature, does learning make them so?

Meno/ Necessarily, as I now think, Socrates, and clearly, on our hypothesis, if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught.

Socrates/ Perhaps, by Zeus, but may it be that we were not right to agree to this?

Meno/ Yet it seemed to be right at the time.

Socrates/ We should not only think it right at the time, but also now and in the future if it is to be at all sound.

Meno/ What is the difficulty? What do you have in mind that you do not like about it and doubt that virtue is knowledge?

Socrates/ I will tell you, Meno. I am not saying that it is wrong to say that virtue is teachable if it is knowledge, but look whether it is reasonable of me to doubt whether it is knowledge. Tell me this: if not only virtue but anything whatever can be taught, should there not be of necessity people who teach it and people who learn it?

Meno/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then again, if on the contrary there are no teachers or learners of something, we should be right to assume that the subject cannot be taught?

Meno/ Quite so, but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?

Socrates/ I have often tried to find out whether there were any teachers of it, but in spite of all my efforts I cannot find any. And yet I have searched for them with the help of many

people, especially those whom I believed to be most experienced in this matter. And now, Meno, Anytus here has opportunely come to sit down by us. Let us share our search with him. It would be reasonable for us to do so, for Anytus, in the first place, is the son of Anthemion, a man of wealth and wisdom, who did not become rich automatically or as the result of a gift like Ismenias the Theban, who recently acquired the possessions of Polycrates, but through his own wisdom and efforts. Further, he did not seem to be an arrogant or puffed up or offensive citizen in other ways, but he was a well-mannered and well-behaved man. Also he gave our friend here a good upbringing and education, as the majority of Athenians believe, for they are electing him to the highest offices. It is right then to look for the teachers of virtue with the help of men such as he, whether there are any and if so who they are. Therefore, Anytus, please join me and your guest friend Meno here, in our inquiry as to who are the teachers of virtue. Look at it in this way: if we wanted Meno to become a good physician, to what teachers would we send him? Would we not send him to the physicians?

Anytus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if we wanted him to be a good shoemaker, to shoemakers?

Anytus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so with other pursuits?

Anytus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Tell me again on this same topic, like this: we say that we would be right to send him to the physicians if we want him to become a physician; whenever we say that, we mean that it would be reasonable to send him to those who practice the craft rather than to those who do not, and to those who exact fees for this very practice and have shown themselves to be teachers of anyone who wishes to come to

them and learn. Is it not with this in mind that we would be right to send him?

Anytus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same is true about flute-playing and the other crafts? It would be very foolish for those who want to make someone a flute-player to refuse to send him to those who profess to teach the craft and make money at it, but to send him to make trouble for others by seeking to learn from those who do not claim to be teachers or have a single pupil in that subject which we want the one we send to learn from them? Do you not think it very unreasonable to do so?

Anytus/ By Zeus I do, and also very ignorant.

Socrates/ Quite right. However, you can now deliberate with me about our guest friend Meno here. He has been telling me for some time, Anytus, that he longs to acquire that wisdom and virtue which enables men to manage their households and their cities well, to take care of their parents, to know how to welcome and to send away both citizens and strangers as a good man should. Consider to whom we should be right to send him to learn this virtue. Or is it obvious in view of what was said just now that we should send him to those who profess to be teachers of virtue and have shown themselves to be available to any Greek who wishes to learn, and for this fix a fee and exact it?

Anytus/ And who do you say these are, Socrates?

Socrates/ You surely know yourself that they are those whom men call sophists.

Anytus/ By Heracles, hush, Socrates. May no one of my household or friends, whether citizen or stranger, be mad enough to go to these people and be harmed by them, for they clearly cause the ruin and corruption of their followers.

Socrates/ How do you mean, Anytus? Are these people, alone of those who claim the knowledge to benefit one, so

different from the others that they not only do not benefit what one entrusts to them but on the contrary corrupt it, even though they obviously expect to make money from the process? I find I cannot believe you, for I know that one man, Protagoras, made more money from this knowledge of his than Phidias who made such notably fine works, and ten other sculptors. Surely what you say is extraordinary, if those who mend old sandals and restore clothes would be found out within the month if they returned the clothes and sandals in a worse state than they received them; if they did this they would soon die of starvation, but the whole of Greece has not noticed for forty years that Protagoras corrupts those who frequent him and sends them away in a worse moral condition than he received them. I believe that he was nearly seventy when he died and had practiced his craft for forty years. During all that time to this very day his reputation has stood high; and not only Protagoras but a great many others, some born before him and some still alive today. Are we to say that you maintain that they deceive and harm the young knowingly, or that they themselves are not aware of it? Are we to deem those whom some people consider the wisest of men to be so mad as that?

Anytus/ They are far from being mad, Socrates. It is much rather those among the young who pay their fees who are mad, and even more the relatives who entrust their young to them and most of all the cities who allow them to come in and do not drive out any citizen or stranger who attempts to behave in this manner.

Socrates/ Has some sophist wronged you, Anytus, or why are you so hard on them?

Anytus/ No, by Zeus, I have never met one of them, nor would I allow anyone of my people to do so.

Socrates/ Are you then altogether without any experience of these men?

Anytus/ And may I remain so.

Socrates/ How then, my good sir, can you know whether there is any good in their instruction or not, if you are altogether without experience of it?

Anytus/ Easily, for I know who they are, whether I have experience of them or not.

Socrates/ Perhaps you are a wizard, Anytus, for I wonder, from what you yourself say, how else you know about these things. However, let us not try to find out who the men are whose company would make Meno wicked—let them be the sophists if you like—but tell us, and benefit your family friend here by telling him, to whom he should go in so large a city to acquire, to any worthwhile degree, the virtue I was just now describing.

Anytus/ Why did you not tell him yourself?

Socrates/ I did mention those whom I thought to be teachers of it, but you say I am wrong, and perhaps you are right. You tell him in your turn to whom among the Athenians he should go. Tell him the name of anyone you want.

Anytus/ Why give him the name of one individual? Any Athenian gentleman he may meet, if he is willing to be persuaded, will make him a better man than the sophists would.

Socrates/ And have these gentlemen become virtuous automatically, without learning from anyone, and are they able to teach others what they themselves never learned?

Anytus/ I believe that these men have learned from those who were gentlemen before them; or do you not think that there are many good men in this city?

Socrates/ I believe, Anytus, that there are many men here who are good at public affairs, and that there have been as many in the past, but have they been good teachers of their own virtue? That is the point we are discussing, not whether there are good men here or not, or whether there have been in the past, but we have been investigating for some time whether virtue can be taught. And in the course of that investigation we are inquiring whether the good men of today and of the past knew how to pass on to another the virtue they themselves possessed, or whether a man cannot pass it on or receive it from another. This is what Meno and I have been investigating for some time. Look at it this way, from what you yourself have said. Would you not say that Themistocles was a good man?

Anytus/ Yes. Even the best of men.

Socrates/ And therefore a good teacher of his own virtue if anyone was?

Anytus/ I think so, if he wanted to be.

Socrates/ But do you think he did not want some other people to be worthy men, and especially his own son? Or do you think he begrudged him this, and deliberately did not pass on to him his own virtue? Have you not heard that Themistocles taught his son Cleophantus to be a good horseman? He could remain standing upright on horseback and shoot javelins from that position and do many other remarkable things which his father had him taught and made skillful at, all of which required good teachers. Have you not heard this from your elders?

Anytus/ I have.

Socrates/ So one could not blame the poor natural talents of the son for his failure in virtue?

Anytus/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ But have you ever heard anyone, young or old, say that Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, was a good and wise man at the same pursuits as his father?

Anytus/ Never.

Socrates/ Are we to believe that he wanted to educate his son in those other things but not to do better than his neighbors in that skill which he himself possessed, if indeed virtue can be taught?

Anytus/ Perhaps not, by Zeus.

Socrates/ And yet he was, as you yourself agree, among the best teachers of virtue in the past. Let us consider another man, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. Do you not agree that he was good?

Anytus/ I very definitely do.

Socrates/ He too gave his own son Lysimachus the best Athenian education in matters which are the business of teachers, and do you think he made him a better man than anyone else? For you have been in his company and seen the kind of man he is. Or take Pericles, a man of such magnificent wisdom. You know that he brought up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus?

Anytus/ I know.

Socrates/ You also know that he taught them to be as good horsemen as any Athenian, that he educated them in the arts, in gymnastics, and in all else that was a matter of skill not to be inferior to anyone, but did he not want to make them good men? I think he did, but this could not be taught. And lest you think that only a few most inferior Athenians are incapable in this respect, reflect that Thucydides too brought up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, that he educated them well in all other things. They were the best wrestlers in Athens—he entrusted the one to Xanthias and the other to

Eudorus, who were thought to be the best wrestlers of the day, or do you not remember?

Anytus/ I remember I have heard that said.

Socrates/ It is surely clear that he would not have taught his boys what it costs money to teach, but have failed to teach them what costs nothing—making them good men—if that could be taught? Or was Thucydides perhaps an inferior person who had not many friends among the Athenians and the allies? He belonged to a great house; he had great influence in the city and among the other Greeks, so that if virtue could be taught he would have found the man who could make his sons good men, be it a citizen or a stranger, if he himself did not have the time because of his public concerns. But, friend Anytus, virtue can certainly not be taught.

Anytus/ I think, Socrates, that you easily speak ill of people. I would advise you, if you will listen to me, to be careful. Perhaps also in another city, and certainly here, it is easier to injure people than to benefit them. I think you know that yourself.

Socrates/ I think, Meno, that Anytus is angry, and I am not at all surprised. He thinks, to begin with, that I am slandering those men, and then he believes himself to be one of them. If he ever realizes what slander is, he will cease from anger, but he does not know it now. You tell me, are there not worthy men among your people?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well now, are they willing to offer themselves to the young as teachers? Do they agree they are teachers, and that virtue can be taught?

Meno/ No, by Zeus, Socrates, but sometimes you would hear them say that it can be taught, at other times, that it cannot.

Socrates/ Should we say that they are teachers of this subject, when they do not even agree on this point?

Meno/ I do not think so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Further, do you think that these sophists, who alone profess to be so, are teachers of virtue?

Meno/ I admire this most in Gorgias, Socrates, that you would never hear him promising this. Indeed, he ridicules the others when he hears them making this claim. He thinks one should make people clever speakers.

Socrates/ You do not think then that the sophists are teachers?

Meno/ I cannot tell, Socrates; like most people, at times I think they are, at other times I think that they are not.

Socrates/ Do you know that not only you and the other public men at times think that it can be taught, at other times that it cannot, but that the poet Theognis says the same thing?

Meno/ Where?

Socrates/ In his elegiacs: "Eat and drink with these men, and keep their company. Please those whose power is great, for you will learn goodness from the good. If you mingle with bad men you will lose even what wit you possess." You see that here he speaks as if virtue can be taught?

Meno/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Elsewhere, he changes somewhat: "if this could be done" he says, "and intelligence could be instilled," somehow those who could do this "would collect large and numerous fees," and further: "Never would a bad son be born of a good father, for he would be persuaded by wise words, but you will never make a bad man good by teaching." You realize that the poet is contradicting himself on the same subject?

Meno/ He seems to be.

Socrates/ Can you mention any other subject of which those who claim to be teachers not only are not recognized to be teachers of others but are not recognized to have knowledge of it themselves, and are thought to be poor in the very matter which they profess to teach? Or any other subject of which those who are recognized as worthy teachers at one time say it can be taught and at other times that it cannot? Would you say that people who are so confused about a subject can be effective teachers of it?

Meno/ No, by Zeus, I would not.

Socrates/ If then neither the sophists nor the worthy people themselves are teachers of this subject, clearly there would be no others?

Meno/ I do not think there are.

Socrates/ If there are no teachers, neither are there pupils?

Meno/ As you say.

Socrates/ And we agreed that a subject that has neither teachers nor pupils is not teachable?

Meno/ We have so agreed.

Socrates/ Now there seem to be no teachers of virtue anywhere?

Meno/ That is so.

Socrates/ If there are no teachers, there are no learners?

Meno/ That seems so.

Socrates/ Then virtue cannot be taught?

Meno/ Apparently not, if we have investigated this correctly. I certainly wonder, Socrates, whether there are no good men either, or in what way good men come to be.

Socrates/ We are probably poor specimens, you and I, Meno. Gorgias has not adequately educated you, nor Prodicus me. We must then at all costs turn our attention to ourselves and find someone who will in some way make us better. I say

this in view of our recent investigation, for it is ridiculous that we failed to see that it is not only under the guidance of knowledge that men succeed in their affairs, and that is perhaps why the knowledge of how good men come to be escapes us.

Meno/ How do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean this: we were right to agree that good men must be beneficent, and that this could not be otherwise. Is that not so?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that they will be beneficent if they give us correct guidance in our affairs. To this too we were right to agree?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ But that one cannot guide correctly if one does not have knowledge; to this our agreement is likely to be incorrect.

Meno/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ I will tell you. A man who knew the way to Larissa, or anywhere else you like, and went there and guided others would surely lead them well and correctly?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What if someone had had a correct opinion as to which was the way but had not gone there nor indeed had knowledge of it, would he not also lead correctly?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And as long as he has the right opinion about that of which the other has knowledge, he will not be a worse guide than the one who knows, as he has a true opinion, though not knowledge.

Meno/ In no way worse.

Socrates/ So true opinion is in no way a worse guide to correct action than knowledge. It is this that we omitted in our investigation of the nature of virtue, when we said that only knowledge can lead to correct action, for true opinion can do so also.

Meno/ So it seems.

Socrates/ So correct opinion is no less useful than knowledge?

Meno/ Yes, to this extent, Socrates. But the man who has knowledge will always succeed, whereas he who has true opinion will only succeed at times.

Socrates/ How do you mean? Will he who has the right opinion not always succeed, as long as his opinion is right?

Meno/ That appears to be so of necessity, and it makes me wonder, Socrates, this being the case, why knowledge is prized far more highly than right opinion, and why they are different.

Socrates/ Do you know why you wonder, or shall I tell you?

Meno/ By all means tell me.

Socrates/ It is because you have paid no attention to the statues of Daedalus, but perhaps there are none in Thessaly.

Meno/ What do you have in mind when you say this?

Socrates/ That they too run away and escape if one does not tie them down but remain in place if tied down.

Meno/ So what?

Socrates/ To acquire an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like acquiring a runaway slave, for it does not remain, but it is worth much if tied down, for his works are very beautiful. What am I thinking of when I say this? True opinions. For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man's mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account

of the reason why. And that, Meno my friend, is recollection, as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down.

Meno/ Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, it seems to be something like that.

Socrates/ Indeed, I too speak as one who does not have knowledge but is guessing. However, I certainly do not think I am guessing that right opinion is a different thing from knowledge. If I claim to know anything else—and I would make that claim about few things—I would put this down as one of the things I know.

Meno/ Rightly so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, is it not correct that when true opinion guides the course of every action, it does no worse than knowledge?

Meno/ I think you are right in this too.

Socrates/ Correct opinion is then neither inferior to knowledge nor less useful in directing actions, nor is the man who has it less so than he who has knowledge.

Meno/ That is so.

Socrates/ And we agreed that the good man is beneficent.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Since then it is not only through knowledge but also through right opinion that men are good, and beneficial to their cities when they are, and neither knowledge nor true opinion come to men by nature but are acquired—or do you think either of these comes by nature?

Meno/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ Then if they do not come by nature, men are not so by nature either.

Meno/ Surely not.

Socrates/ As goodness does not come by nature, we inquired next whether it could be taught.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ We thought it could be taught, if it was knowledge?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that it was knowledge if it could be taught?

Meno/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And that if there were teachers of it, it could be taught, but if there were not, it was not teachable?

Meno/ That is so.

Socrates/ And then we agreed that there were no teachers of it?

Meno/ We did.

Socrates/ So we agreed that it was neither teachable nor knowledge?

Meno/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But we certainly agree that virtue is a good thing?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which guides correctly is both useful and good?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that only these two things, true belief and knowledge, guide correctly, and that if a man possesses these he gives correct guidance. The things that turn out right by some chance are not due to human guidance, but where there is correct human guidance it is due to two things, true belief or knowledge.

Meno/ I think that is so.

Socrates/ Now because it cannot be taught, virtue no longer seems to be knowledge?

Meno/ It seems not.

Socrates/ So one of the two good and useful things has been excluded, and knowledge is not the guide in public affairs.

Meno/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ So it is not by some kind of wisdom, or by being wise, that such men lead their cities, those such as Themistocles and those mentioned by Anytus just now? That is the reason why they cannot make others be like themselves, because it is not knowledge which makes them what they are.

Meno/ It is likely to be as you say, Socrates.

Socrates/ Therefore, if it is not through knowledge, the only alternative is that it is through right opinion that statesmen follow the right course for their cities. As regards knowledge, they are no different from soothsayers and prophets. They too say many true things when inspired, but they have no knowledge of what they are saying.

Meno/ That is probably so.

Socrates/ And so, Meno, is it right to call divine these men who, without any understanding, are right in much that is of importance in what they say and do?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We should be right to call divine also those soothsayers and prophets whom we just mentioned, and all the poets, and we should call no less divine and inspired those public men who are no less under the gods' influence and possession, as their speeches lead to success in many important matters, though they have no knowledge of what they are saying.

Meno/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Women too, Meno, call good men divine, and the Spartans, when they eulogize someone, say "This man is divine."

Meno/ And they appear to be right, Socrates, though perhaps Anytus here will be annoyed with you for saying so.

Socrates/ I do not mind that; we shall talk to him again, but if we were right in the way in which we spoke and investigated in this whole discussion, virtue would be neither an inborn quality nor taught, but comes to those who possess it as a gift from the gods which is not accompanied by understanding, unless there is someone among our statesmen who can make another into a statesman. If there were one, he could be said to be among the living as Homer said Tiresias was among the dead, namely, that "he alone retained his wits while the others flitted about like shadows." In the same manner such a man would, as far as virtue is concerned, here also be the only true reality compared, as it were, with shadows.

Meno/ I think that is an excellent way to put it, Socrates.

Socrates/ It follows from this reasoning, Meno, that virtue appears to be present in those of us who may possess it as a gift from the gods. We shall have clear knowledge of this when, before we investigate how it comes to be present in men, we first try to find out what virtue in itself is. But now the time has come for me to go. You convince your guest friend Anytus here of these very things of which you have yourself been convinced, in order that he may be more amenable. If you succeed, you will also confer a benefit upon the Athenians.

Meno.

Translated by W. K. C. Guthrie.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Meno, Boy, Anytus

Meno/ Can you tell me, Socrates—is virtue something that can be taught? Or does it come by practice? Or is it neither teaching nor practice that gives it to a man but natural aptitude or something else?

Socrates/ Well, Meno, in the old days the Thessalians had a great reputation among the Greeks for their wealth and their horsemanship. Now it seems they are philosophers as well—especially the men of Larissa, where your friend Aristippus comes from. It is Gorgias who has done it. He went to that city and captured the hearts of the foremost of the Aleuadae for his wisdom—among them your own admirer Aristippus—not to speak of other leading Thessalians. In particular he got you into the habit of answering any question you might be asked, with the confidence and dignity appropriate to those who know the answers, just as he himself invites questions of every kind from anyone in the Greek world who wishes to ask, and never fails to answer them. But here at Athens, my dear Meno, it is just the reverse. There is a dearth of wisdom, and it looks as if it had migrated from our part of the country to yours. At any rate if you put your question to any of our people, they will all alike laugh and say, You must think I am singularly fortunate, to know whether virtue can be taught or how it is acquired. The fact is that far from knowing whether it can be taught, I have no idea what virtue itself is.

That is my own case. I share the poverty of my fellow countrymen in this respect, and confess to my shame that I have no knowledge about virtue at all. And how can I know a property of something when I don't even know what it is? Do you suppose that somebody entirely ignorant who Meno is could say whether he is handsome and rich and wellborn or the reverse? Is that possible, do you think?

Meno/ No. But is this true about yourself, Socrates, that you don't even know what virtue is? Is this the report that we are to take home about you?

Socrates/ Not only that, you may say also that, to the best of my belief, I have never yet met anyone who did know.

Meno/ What! Didn't you meet Gorgias when he was here?

Socrates/ Yes.

Meno/ And you still didn't think he knew?

Socrates/ I'm a forgetful sort of person, and I can't say just now what I thought at the time. Probably he did know, and I expect you know what he used to say about it. So remind me what it was, or tell me yourself if you will. No doubt you agree with him.

Meno/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Then let's leave him out of it, since after all he isn't here. What do you yourself say virtue is? I do ask you in all earnestness not to refuse me, but to speak out. I shall be only too happy to be proved wrong if you and Gorgias turn out to know this, although I said I had never met anyone who did.

Meno/ But there is no difficulty about it. First of all, if it is manly virtue you are after, it is easy to see that the virtue of a man consists in managing the city's affairs capably, and so that he will help his friends and injure his foes while taking care to come to no harm himself. Or if you want a woman's virtue, that is easily described. She must be a good

housewife, careful with her stores and obedient to her husband. Then there is another virtue for a child, male or female, and another for an old man, free or slave as you like, and a great many more kinds of virtue, so that no one need be at a loss to say what it is. For every act and every time of life, with reference to each separate function, there is a virtue for each one of us, and similarly, I should say, a vice.

Socrates/ I seem to be in luck. I wanted one virtue and I find that you have a whole swarm of virtues to offer. But seriously, to carry on this metaphor of the swarm, suppose I asked you what a bee is, what is its essential nature, and you replied that bees were of many different kinds. What would you say if I went on to ask, And is it in being bees that they are many and various and different from one another? Or would you agree that it is not in this respect that they differ, but in something else, some other quality like size or beauty?

Meno/ I should say that in so far as they are bees, they don't differ from one another at all.

Socrates/ Suppose I then continued, Well, this is just what I want you to tell me. What is that character in respect of which they don't differ at all, but are all the same? I presume you would have something to say?

Meno/ I should.

Socrates/ Then do the same with the virtues. Even if they are many and various, yet at least they all have some common character which makes them virtues. That is what ought to be kept in view by anyone who answers the question, What is virtue? Do you follow me?

Meno/ I think I do, but I don't yet really grasp the question as I should wish.

Socrates/ Well, does this apply in your mind only to virtue, that there is a different one for a man and a woman

and the rest? Is it the same with health and size and strength, or has health the same character everywhere, if it is health, whether it be in a man or any other creature?

Meno/ I agree that health is the same in a man or in a woman.

Socrates/ And what about size and strength? If a woman is strong, will it be the same thing, the same strength, that makes her strong? My meaning is that in its character as strength, it is no different, whether it be in a man or in a woman. Or do you think it is?

Meno/ No.

Socrates/ And will virtue differ, in its character as virtue, whether it be in a child or an old man, a woman or a man?

Meno/ I somehow feel that this is not on the same level as the other cases.

Socrates/ Well then, didn't you say that a man's virtue lay in directing the city well, and a woman's in directing her household well?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is it possible to direct anything well—city or household or anything else—if not temperately and justly?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And that means with temperance and justice?

Meno/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then both man and woman need the same qualities, justice and temperance, if they are going to be good.

Meno/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ And what about your child and old man? Could they be good if they were incontinent and unjust?

Meno/ Of course not.

Socrates/ They must be temperate and just?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ So everyone is good in the same way, since they become good by possessing the same qualities.

Meno/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And if they did not share the same virtue, they would not be good in the same way.

Meno/ No.

Socrates/ Seeing then that they all have the same virtue, try to remember and tell me what Gorgias and you, who share his opinion, say it is.

Meno/ It must be simply the capacity to govern men, if you are looking for one quality to cover all the instances.

Socrates/ Indeed I am. But does this virtue apply to a child or a slave? Should a slave be capable of governing his master, and if he does, is he still a slave?

Meno/ I hardly think so.

Socrates/ It certainly doesn't sound likely. And here is another point. You speak of 'capacity to govern.' Shall we not add, 'justly but not otherwise'?

Meno/ I think we should, for justice is virtue.

Socrates/ Virtue, do you say, or *a* virtue?

Meno/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Something quite general. Take roundness, for instance. I should say that it is a shape, not simply that it is shape, my reason being that there are other shapes as well.

Meno/ I see your point, and I agree that there are other virtues besides justice.

Socrates/ Tell me what they are. Just as I could name other shapes if you told me to, in the same way mention some other virtues.

Meno/ In my opinion then courage is a virtue and temperance and wisdom and dignity and many other things.

Socrates/ This puts us back where we were. In a different way we have discovered a number of virtues when we were looking for one only. This single virtue, which permeates each of them, we cannot find.

Meno/ No, I cannot yet grasp it as you want, a single virtue covering them all, as I do in other instances.

Socrates/ I'm not surprised, but I shall do my best to get us a bit further if I can. You understand, I expect, that the question applies to everything. If someone took the example I mentioned just now, and asked you, 'What is shape?' and you replied that roundness is shape, and he then asked you as I did, 'Do you mean it is shape or a shape?' you would reply of course that it is *a* shape.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Your reason being that there are other shapes as well.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if he went on to ask you what they were, you would tell him.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same with color—if he asked you what it is, and on your replying, 'White,' took you up with, 'Is white color or *a* color?' you would say that it is *a* color, because there are other colors as well.

Meno/ I should.

Socrates/ And if he asked you to, you would mention other colors which are just as much colors as white is.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Suppose then he pursued the question as I did, and objected, 'We always arrive at a plurality, but that is not

the kind of answer I want. Seeing that you call these many particulars by one and the same name, and say that every one of them is a shape, even though they are the contrary of each other, tell me what this is which embraces round as well as straight, and what you mean by shape when you say that straightness is a shape as much as roundness. You do say that?'

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ 'And in saying it, do you mean that roundness is no more round than straight, and straightness no more straight than round?'

Meno/ Of course not.

Socrates/ 'Yet you do say that roundness is no more a shape than straightness, and the other way about.'

Meno/ Quite true.

Socrates/ 'Then what is this thing which is called "shape"? Try to tell me.' If when asked this question either about shape or color you said, 'But I don't understand what you want, or what you mean,' your questioner would perhaps be surprised and say, 'Don't you see that I am looking for what is the same in all of them?' Would you even so be unable to reply, if the question was, 'What is it that is common to roundness and straightness and the other things which you call shapes?' Do your best to answer, as practice for the question about virtue.

Meno/ No, you do it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you want me to give in to you?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And will you in your turn give me an answer about virtue?

Meno/ I will.

Socrates/ In that case I must do my best. It's in a good cause.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well now, let's try to tell you what shape is. See if you accept this definition. Let us define it as the only thing which always accompanies color. Does that satisfy you, or do you want it in some other way? I should be content if your definition of virtue were on similar lines.

Meno/ But that's a naive sort of definition, Socrates.

Socrates/ How?

Meno/ Shape, if I understand what you say, is what always accompanies color. Well and good—but if somebody says that he doesn't know what color is, but is no better off with it than he is with shape, what sort of answer have you given him, do you think?

Socrates/ A true one, and if my questioner were one of the clever, disputatious, and quarrelsome kind, I should say to him, 'You have heard my answer. If it is wrong, it is for you to take up the argument and refute it.' However, when friendly people, like you and me, want to converse with each other, one's reply must be milder and more conducive to discussion. By that I mean that it must not only be true, but must employ terms with which the questioner admits he is familiar. So I will try to answer you like that. Tell me, therefore, whether you recognize the term 'end' : I mean limit or boundary—all these words I use in the same sense. Prodicus might perhaps quarrel with us, but I assume you speak of something being bounded or coming to an end. That is all I mean, nothing subtle.

Meno/ I admit the notion, and believe I understand your meaning.

Socrates/ And again, you recognize 'surface' and 'solid,' as they are used in geometry?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then with these you should by this time understand my definition of shape. To cover all its instances, I say that shape is that in which a solid terminates, or more briefly, it is the limit of a solid.

Meno/ And how do you define color?

Socrates/ What a shameless fellow you are, Meno. You keep bothering an old man to answer, but refuse to exercise your memory and tell me what was Gorgias' definition of virtue.

Meno/ I will, Socrates, as soon as you tell me this.

Socrates/ Anyone talking to you could tell blindfold that you are a handsome man and still have your admirers.

Meno/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because you are forever laying down the law as spoiled boys do, who act the tyrant as long as their youth lasts. No doubt you have discovered that I can never resist good looks. Well, I will give in and let you have your answer.

Meno/ Do by all means.

Socrates/ Would you like an answer a la Gorgias, such as you would most readily follow?

Meno/ Of course I Should.

Socrates/ You and he believe in Empedocles' theory of effluences, do you not?

Meno/ Wholeheartedly.

Socrates/ And passages to which and through which the effluences make their way?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Some of the effluences fit into some of the passages, whereas others are too coarse or too fine.

Meno/ That is right.

Socrates/ Now you recognize the term ‘sight’?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ From these notions, then, ‘grasp what I would tell,’ as Pindar says. Color is an effluence from shapes commensurate with sight and perceptible by it.

Meno/ That seems to me an excellent answer.

Socrates/ No doubt it is the sort you are used to. And you probably see that it provides a way to define sound and smell and many similar things.

Meno/ So it does.

Socrates/ Yes, it’s a high-sounding answer, so you like it better than the one on shape.

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ Nevertheless, son of Alexidemus, I am convinced that the other is better, and I believe you would agree with me if you had not, as you told me yesterday, to leave before the Mysteries, could stay and be initiated.

Meno/ I would stay, Socrates, if you gave me more answers like this.

Socrates/ You may be sure I shan’t be lacking in keenness to do so, both for your sake and mine, but I’m afraid I may not be able to do it often. However, now it is your turn to do as you promised, and try to tell me the general nature of virtue. Stop making many out of one, as the humorists say when somebody breaks a plate. Just leave virtue whole and sound and tell me what it is, as in the examples I have given you.

Meno/ It seems to me then, Socrates, that virtue is, in the words of the poet, ‘to rejoice in the fine and have power,’ and I define it as desiring fine things and being able to acquire them.

Socrates/ When you speak of a man desiring fine things, do you mean it is good things he desires?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then do you think some men desire evil and others good? Doesn't everyone, in your opinion, desire good things?

Meno/ No.

Socrates/ And would you say that the others suppose evils to be good, or do they still desire them although they recognize them as evil?

Meno/ Both, I should say.

Socrates/ What? Do you really think that anyone who recognizes evils for what they are, nevertheless desires them?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Desires in what way? To possess them?

Meno/ Of course.

Socrates/ In the belief that evil things bring advantage to their possessor, or harm?

Meno/ Some in the first belief, but some also in the second.

Socrates/ And do you believe that those who suppose evil things bring advantage understand that they are evil?

Meno/ No, that I can't really believe.

Socrates/ Isn't it clear then that this class, who don't recognize evils for what they are, don't desire evil but what they think is good, though in fact it is evil; those who through ignorance mistake bad things for good obviously desire the good?

Meno/ For them I suppose that is true.

Socrates/ Now as for those whom you speak of as desiring evils in the belief that they do harm to their possessor, these presumably know that they will be injured by them?

Meno/ They must.

Socrates/ And don't they believe that whoever is injured is, in so far as he is injured, unhappy?

Meno/ That too they must believe.

Socrates/ And unfortunate?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, does anybody want to be unhappy and unfortunate?

Meno/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ Then if not, nobody desires what is evil, for what else is unhappiness but desiring evil things and getting them?

Meno/ It looks as if you are right, Socrates, and nobody desires what is evil.

Socrates/ Now you have just said that virtue consists in a wish for good things plus the power to acquire them. In this definition the wish is common to everyone, and in that respect no one is better than his neighbor.

Meno/ So it appears.

Socrates/ So if one man is better than another, it must evidently be in respect of the power, and virtue, according to your account, is the power of acquiring good things.

Meno/ Yes, my opinion is exactly as you now express it.

Socrates/ Let us see whether you have hit the truth this time. You may well be right. The power of acquiring good things, you say, is virtue?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by good do you mean such things as health and wealth?

Meno/ I include the gaining both of gold and silver and of high and honorable office in the state.

Socrates/ Are these the only classes of goods that you recognize?

Meno/ Yes, I mean everything of that sort.

Socrates/ Right. In the definition of Meno, hereditary guest-friend of the Great King, the acquisition of gold and silver is virtue. Do you add 'just and righteous' to the word 'acquisition,' or doesn't it make any difference to you? Do you call it virtue all the same even if they are unjustly acquired?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Vice then?

Meno/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ So it seems that justice or temperance or piety, or some other part of virtue, must attach to the acquisition. Otherwise, although it is a means to good things, it will not be virtue.

Meno/ No, how could you have virtue without these?

Socrates/ In fact lack of gold and silver, if it results from failure to acquire it—either for oneself or another—in circumstances which would have made its acquisition unjust, is itself virtue.

Meno/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ Then to have such goods is no more virtue than to lack them. Rather we may say that whatever is accompanied by justice is virtue, whatever is without qualities of that sort is vice.

Meno/ I agree that your conclusion seems inescapable.

Socrates/ But a few minutes ago we called each of these—justice, temperance, and the rest—a part of virtue?

Meno/ Yes, we did.

Socrates/ So it seems you are making a fool of me.

Meno/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ I have just asked you not to break virtue up into fragments, and given you models of the type of answer I wanted, but taking no notice of this you tell me that virtue consists in the acquisition of good things with justice, and justice, you agree, is a part of virtue.

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ So it follows from your own statements that to act with a part of virtue is virtue, if you call justice and all the rest parts of virtue. The point I want to make is that whereas I asked you to give me an account of virtue as a whole, far from telling me what it is itself you say that every action is virtue which exhibits a part of virtue, as if you had already told me what the whole is, so that I should recognize it even if you chop it up into bits. It seems to me that we must put the same old question to you, my dear Meno—the question, What is virtue? —if every act becomes virtue when combined with a part of virtue. That is, after all, what it means to say that every act performed with justice is virtue. Don't you agree that the same question needs to be put? Does anyone know what a part of virtue is, without knowing the whole?

Meno/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ No, and if you remember, when I replied to you about shape just now, I believe we rejected the type of answer that employs terms which are still in question and not yet agreed upon.

Meno/ We did, and rightly.

Socrates/ Then please do the same. While the nature of virtue as a whole is still under question, don't suppose that you can explain it to anyone in terms of its parts, or by any similar type of explanation. Understand rather that the same question remains to be answered : you say this and that about virtue, but what is it? Does this seem nonsense to you?

Meno/ No, to me it seems right enough.

Socrates/ Then go back to the beginning and answer my question. What do you and your friend say that virtue is?

Meno/ Socrates, even before I met you they told me that in plain truth you are a perplexed man yourself and reduce others to perplexity. At this moment I feel you are exercising magic and witchcraft upon me and positively laying me under your spell until I am just a mass of helplessness. If I may be flippant, I think that not only in outward appearance but in other respects as well you are exactly like the flat sting ray that one meets in the sea. Whenever anyone comes into contact with it, it numbs him, and that is the sort of thing that you seem to be doing to me now. My mind and my lips are literally numb, and I have nothing to reply to you. Yet I have spoken about virtue hundreds of times, held forth often on the subject in front of large audiences, and very well too, or so I thought. Now I can't even say what it is. In my opinion you are well advised not to leave Athens and live abroad. If you behaved like this as a foreigner in another country, you would most likely be arrested as a wizard.

Socrates/ You're a real rascal, Meno. You nearly took me in.

Meno/ Just what do you mean?

Socrates/ I see why you used a simile about me.

Meno/ Why do you think?

Socrates/ To be compared to something in return. All good-looking people, I know perfectly well, enjoy a game of comparisons. They get the best of it, for naturally handsome folk provoke handsome similes. But I'm not going to oblige you. As for myself, if the sting ray paralyzes others only through being paralyzed itself, then the comparison is just, but not otherwise. It isn't that, knowing the answers myself, I perplex other people. The truth is rather that I infect them also with the perplexity I feel myself. So with virtue now. I don't know what it is. You may have known before you came into contact with me, but now you look as if you don't. Nevertheless I am ready to carry out, together with you, a joint investigation and inquiry into what it is.

Meno/ But how will you look for something when you don't in the least know what it is? How on earth are you going to set up something you don't know as the object of your search? To put it another way, even if you come right up against it, how will you know that what you have found is the thing you didn't know?

Socrates/ I know what you mean. Do you realize that what you are bringing up is the trick argument that a man cannot try to discover either what he knows or what he does not know? He would not seek what he knows, for since he knows it there is no need of the inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case he does not even know what he is to look for.

Meno/ Well, do you think it a good argument?

Socrates/ No.

Meno/ Can you explain how it fails?

Socrates/ I can. I have heard from men and women who understand the truths of religion—

Meno/ What did they say?

Socrates/ Something true, I thought, and fine.

Meno/ What was it, and who were they?

Socrates/ Those who tell it are priests and priestesses of the sort who make it their business to be able to account for the functions which they perform. Pindar speaks of it too, and many another of the poets who are divinely inspired. What they say is this—see whether you think they are speaking the truth. They say that the soul of man is immortal. At one time it comes to an end—that which is called death—and at another is born again, but is never finally exterminated. On these grounds a man must live all his days as righteously as possible. For those from whom

> Persephone receives requital for ancient doom, In the ninth year she restores again Their souls to the sun above. From whom rise noble kings And the swift in strength and greatest in wisdom, And for the rest of time They are called heroes and sanctified by men.'

Thus the soul, since it is immortal and has been born many times, and has seen all things both here and in the other world, has learned everything that is. So we need not be surprised if it can recall the knowledge of virtue or anything else which, as we see, it once possessed. All nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, so that when a man has recalled a single piece of knowledge—learned it, in ordinary language—there is no reason why he should not find out all the rest, if he keeps a stout heart and does not grow weary of the search, for seeking and learning are in fact nothing but recollection.

We ought not then to be led astray by the contentious argument you quoted. It would make us lazy, and is music in the ears of weaklings. The other doctrine produces energetic seekers after knowledge, and being convinced of its truth, I am ready, with your help, to inquire into the nature of virtue.

Meno/ I see, Socrates. But what do you mean when you say that we don't learn anything, but that what we call learning is recollection? Can you teach me that it is so?

Socrates/ I have just said that you're a rascal, and now you ask me if I can teach you, when I say there is no such thing as teaching, only recollection. Evidently you want to catch me contradicting myself straightaway.

Meno/ No, honestly, Socrates, I wasn't thinking of that. It was just habit. If you can in any way make clear to me that what you say is true, please do.

Socrates/ It isn't an easy thing, but still I should like to do what I can since you ask me. I see you have a large number of retainers here. Call one of them, anyone you like, and I will use him to demonstrate it to you.

Meno/ Certainly. Come here.

Socrates/ He is a Greek and speaks our language?

Meno/ Indeed yes—born and bred in the house.

Socrates/ Listen carefully then, and see whether it seems to you that he is learning from me or simply being reminded.

Meno/ I will.

Socrates/ Now boy, you know that a square is a figure like this?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ It has all these four sides equal?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And these lines which go through the middle of it are also equal?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Such a figure could be either larger or smaller, could it not?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now if this side is two feet long, and this side the same, how many feet will the whole be? Put it this way. If it were two feet in this direction and only one in that, must not the area be two feet taken once?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ But since it is two feet this way also, does it not become twice two feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And how many feet is twice two? Work it out and tell me.

Boy/ Four.

Socrates/ Now could one draw another figure double the size of this, but similar, that is, with all its sides equal like this one?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ How many feet will its area be?

Boy/ Eight.

Socrates/ Now then, try to tell me how long each of its sides will be. The present figure has a side of two feet. What will be the side of the double-sized one?

Boy/ It will be double, Socrates, obviously.

Socrates/ You see, Meno, that I am not teaching him anything, only asking. Now he thinks he knows the length of the side of the eight-foot square.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ But does he?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ He thinks it is twice the length of the other.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now watch how he recollects things in order—the proper way to recollect.

You say that the side of double length produces the double-sized figure? Like this I mean, not long this way and short that. It must be equal on all sides like the first figure, only twice its size, that is, eight feet. Think a moment whether you still expect to get it from doubling the side.

Boy/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Well now, shall we have a line double the length of this if we add another the same length at this end?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is on this line then, according to you, that we shall make the eight-foot square, by taking four of the same length?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us draw in four equal lines, using the first as a base. Does this not give us what you call the eight-foot figure?

Boy/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But does it contain these four squares, each equal to the original four-foot one?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ How big is it then? Won't it be four times as big?

Boy/ Of course.

Socrates/ And is four times the same as twice?

Boy/ Of course not.

Socrates/ So doubling the side has given us not a double but a fourfold figure?

Boy/ True.

Socrates/ And four times four are sixteen, are they not?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then how big is the side of the eight-foot figure? This one has given us four times the original area, hasn't it?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And a side half the length gave us a square of four feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Good. And isn't a square of eight feet double this one and half that?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Will it not have a side greater than this one but less than that?

Boy/ I think it will.

Socrates/ Right. Always answer what you think. Now tell me. Was not this side two feet long, and this one four?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the side of the eight-foot figure must be longer than two feet but shorter than four?

Boy/ It must.

Socrates/ Try to say how long you think it is.

Boy/ Three feet.

Socrates/ If so, shall we add half of this bit and make it three feet? Here are two, and this is one, and on this side similarly we have two plus one, and here is the figure you want.

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ If it is three feet this way and three that, will the whole area be three times three feet?

Boy/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ And that is how many?

Boy/ Nine.

Socrates/ Whereas the square double our first square had to be how many?

Boy/ Eight.

Socrates/ But we haven't yet got the square of eight feet even from a three-foot side?

Boy/ No.

Socrates/ Then what length will give it? Try to tell us exactly. If you don't want to count it up, just show us on the diagram.

Boy/ It's no use, Socrates, I just don't know.

Socrates/ Observe, Meno, the stage he has reached on the path of recollection. At the beginning he did not know the side of the square of eight feet. Nor indeed does he know it now, but then he thought he knew it and answered boldly, as was appropriate—he felt no perplexity. Now however he does feel perplexed. Not only does he not know the answer; he doesn't even think he knows.

Meno/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Isn't he in a better position now in relation to what he didn't know?

Meno/ I admit that too.

Socrates/ So in perplexing him and numbing him like the sting ray, have we done him any harm?

Meno/ I think not.

Socrates/ In fact we have helped him to some extent toward finding out the right answer, for now not only is he ignorant of it but he will be quite glad to look for it. Up to now, he thought he could speak well and fluently, on many occasions and before large audiences, on the subject of a square double the size of a given square, maintaining that it must have a side of double the length.

Meno/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Do you suppose then that he would have attempted to look for, or learn, what he thought he knew, though he did not, before he was thrown into perplexity, became aware of his ignorance, and felt a desire to know?

Meno/ No.

Socrates/ Then the numbing process was good for him?

Meno/ I agree.

Socrates/ Now notice what, starting from this state of perplexity, he will discover by seeking the truth in company with me, though I simply ask him questions without teaching him. Be ready to catch me if I give him any instruction or explanation instead of simply interrogating him on his own opinions.

Tell me, boy, is not this our square of four feet? You understand?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now we can add another equal to it like this?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And a third here, equal to each of the others?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And then we can fill in this one in the corner?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then here we have four equal squares?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And how many times the size of the first square is the whole?

Boy/ Four times.

Socrates/ And we want one double the size. You remember?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now does this line going from corner to corner cut each of these squares in half?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And these are four equal lines enclosing this area?

Boy/ They are.

Socrates/ Now think. How big is this area?

Boy/ I don't understand.

Socrates/ Here are four squares. Has not each line cut off the inner half of each of them?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And how many such halves are there in this figure?

Boy/ Four.

Socrates/ And how many in this one?

Boy/ Two.

Socrates/ And what is the relation of four to two?

Boy/ Double.

Socrates/ How big is this figure then?

Boy/ Eight feet.

Socrates/ On what base?

Boy/ This one.

Socrates/ The line which goes from corner to corner of the square of four feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ The technical name for it is 'diagonal' so if we use that name, it is your personal opinion that the square on the diagonal of the original square is double its area.

Boy/ That is so, Socrates.

Socrates/ What do you think, Meno? Has he answered with any opinions that were not his own?

Meno/ No, they were all his.

Socrates/ Yet he did not know, as we agreed a few minutes ago.

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ But these opinions were somewhere in him, were they not?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ So a man who does not know has in himself true opinions on a subject without having knowledge.

Meno/ It would appear so.

Socrates/ At present these opinions, being newly aroused, have a dreamlike quality. But if the same questions are put to him on many occasions and in different ways, you can see that in the end he will have a knowledge on the subject as accurate as anybody's.

Meno/ Probably.

Socrates/ This knowledge will not come from teaching but from questioning. He will recover it for himself.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the spontaneous recovery of knowledge that is in him is recollection, isn't it?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Either then he has at some time acquired the knowledge which he now has, or he has always possessed it. If he always possessed it, he must always have known; if on the other hand he acquired it at some previous time, it cannot have been in this life, unless somebody has taught him geometry. He will behave in the same way with all geometric knowledge, and every other subject. Has anyone

taught him all these? You ought to know, especially as he has been brought up in your household.

Meno/ Yes, I know that no one ever taught him.

Socrates/ And has he these opinions, or hasn't he?

Meno/ It seems we can't deny it.

Socrates/ Then if he did not acquire them in this life, isn't it immediately clear that he possessed and had learned them during some other period?

Meno/ It seems so.

Socrates/ When he was not in human shape?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ If then there are going to exist in him, both while he is and while he is not a man, true opinions which can be aroused by questioning and turned into knowledge, may we say that his soul has been forever in a state of knowledge? Clearly he always either is or is not a man.

Meno/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the soul must be immortal, and one must take courage and try to discover—that is, to recollect—what one doesn't happen to know, or, more correctly, remember, at the moment.

Meno/ Somehow or other I believe you are right.

Socrates/ I think I am. I shouldn't like to take my oath on the whole story, but one thing I am ready to fight for as long as I can, in word and act—that is, that we shall be better, braver, and more active men if we believe it right to look for what we don't know than if we believe there is no point in looking because what we don't know we can never discover.

Meno/ There too I am sure you are right.

Socrates/ Then since we are agreed that it is right to inquire into something that one does not know, are you ready to face with me the question, 'What is virtue?'

Meno/ Quite ready. All the same, I would rather consider the question as I put it at the beginning, and hear your views on it—that is, are we to pursue virtue as something that can be taught, or do men have it as a gift of nature or how?

Socrates/ If I were your master as well as my own, Meno, we should not have inquired whether or not virtue can be taught until we had first asked the main question—what it is. But not only do you make no attempt to govern your own actions—you prize your freedom, I suppose—but you attempt to govern mine. And you succeed too, so I shall let you have your way. There's nothing else for it, and it seems we must inquire into a single property of something about whose essential nature we are still in the dark. Just grant me one small relaxation of your sway, and allow me, in considering whether or not it can be taught, to make use of a hypothesis—the sort of thing, I mean, that geometers often use in their inquiries. When they are asked, for example, about a given area, whether it is possible for this area to be inscribed as a triangle in a given circle, they will probably reply, 'I don't know yet whether it fulfills the conditions, but I think I have a hypothesis which will help us in the matter. It is this. If the area is such that, when one has applied it to the given line of the circle, it is deficient by another rectangle similar to the one which is applied, then, I should say, one result follows; if not, the result is different. If you ask me, then, about the inscription of the figure in the circle—whether it is possible or not—I am ready to answer you in this hypothetical way.'

Let us do the same about virtue. Since we don't know what it is or what it resembles, let us use a hypothesis in investigating whether it is teachable or not. We shall say,

'What attribute of the soul must virtue be, if it is to be teachable or otherwise?' Well, in the first place, if it is anything else but knowledge, is there a possibility of anyone teaching it—or, in the language we used just now, reminding someone of it? We needn't worry about which name we are to give to the process, but simply ask, Will it be teachable? Isn't it plain to everyone that a man is not taught anything except knowledge?

Meno/ That would be my view.

Socrates/ If on the other hand virtue is some sort of knowledge, clearly it could be taught.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So that question is easily settled—I mean, on what condition virtue would be teachable.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ The next point then, I suppose, is to find out whether virtue is knowledge or something different.

Meno/ That is the next question, I agree.

Socrates/ Well then, do we assert that virtue is something good? Is that assumption a firm one for us?

Meno/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ That being so, if there exists any good thing different from, and not associated with, knowledge, virtue will not necessarily be any form of knowledge. If on the other hand knowledge embraces everything that is good, we shall be right to suspect that virtue is knowledge.

Meno/ Agreed.

Socrates/ First then, is it virtue which makes us good?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if good then advantageous. All good things are advantageous, are they not?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ So virtue itself must be something advantageous?

Meno/ That follows also.

Socrates/ Now suppose we consider what are the sorts of things that profit us. Take them in a list. Health, we may say, and strength and good looks, and wealth—these and their like we call advantageous, you agree?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yet we also speak of these things as sometimes doing harm. Would you object to that statement?

Meno/ No, it is so.

Socrates/ Now look here. What is the controlling factor which determines whether each of these is advantageous or harmful? Isn't it right use which makes them advantageous, and lack of it, harmful?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We must also take spiritual qualities into consideration. You recognize such things as temperance, justice, courage, quickness of mind, memory, nobility of character, and others?

Meno/ Yes, of course I do.

Socrates/ Then take any such qualities which in your view are not knowledge but something different. Don't you think they may be harmful as well as advantageous? Courage, for instance, if it is something thoughtless, just a sort of confidence. Isn't it true that to be confident without reason does a man harm, whereas a reasoned confidence profits him?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Temperance and quickness of mind are no different. Learning and discipline are profitable in conjunction with wisdom, but without it harmful.

Meno/ That is emphatically true.

Socrates/ In short, everything that the human spirit undertakes or suffers will lead to happiness when it is guided by wisdom, but to the opposite, when guided by folly.

Meno/ A reasonable conclusion.

Socrates/ If then virtue is an attribute of the spirit, and one which cannot fail to be beneficial, it must be wisdom, for all spiritual qualities in and by themselves are neither advantageous nor harmful, but become advantageous or harmful by the presence with them of wisdom or folly. If we accept this argument, then virtue, to be something advantageous, must be a sort of wisdom.

Meno/ I agree.

Socrates/ To go back to the other class of things, wealth and the like, of which we said just now that they are sometimes good and sometimes harmful, isn't it the same with them? Just as wisdom when it governs our other psychological impulses turns them to advantage, and folly turns them to harm, so the mind by its right use and control of these material assets makes them profitable, and by wrong use renders them harmful.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the right user is the mind of the wise man, the wrong user the mind of the foolish.

Meno/ That is so.

Socrates/ So we may say in general that the goodness of non-spiritual assets depends on our spiritual character, and the goodness of that on wisdom. This argument shows that the advantageous element must be wisdom, and virtue, we agree, is advantageous; so that amounts to saying that virtue, either in whole or in part, is wisdom.

Meno/ The argument seems to me fair enough.

Socrates/ If so, good men cannot be good by nature.

Meno/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ There is another point. If they were, there would probably be experts among us who could recognize the naturally good at an early stage. They would point them out to us and we should take them and shut them away safely in the Acropolis, sealing them up more carefully than bullion to protect them from corruption and ensure that when they came to maturity they would be of use to the state.

Meno/ It would be likely enough.

Socrates/ Since then goodness does not come by nature, is it got by learning?

Meno/ I don't see how we can escape the conclusion. Indeed it is obvious on our assumption that, if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable.

Socrates/ I suppose so. But I wonder if we were right to bind ourselves to that.

Meno/ Well, it seemed all right just now.

Socrates/ Yes, but to be sound it has got to seem all right not only 'just now' but at this moment and in the future.

Meno/ Of course. But what has occurred to you to make you turn against it and suspect that virtue may not be knowledge?

Socrates/ I'll tell you. I don't withdraw from the position that if it is knowledge, it must be teachable, but as for its being knowledge, see whether you think my doubts on this point are well founded. If anything—not virtue only—is a possible subject of instruction, must there not be teachers and students of it?

Meno/ Surely.

Socrates/ And what of the converse, that if there are neither teachers nor students of a subject, we may safely infer that it cannot be taught?

Meno/ That is true. But don't you think there are teachers of virtue?

Socrates/ All I can say is that I have often looked to see if there are any, and in spite of all my efforts I cannot find them, though I have had plenty of fellow searchers, the kind of men especially whom I believe to have most experience in such matters. But look, Meno, here's a piece of luck. Anytus has just sat down beside us. We couldn't do better than make him a partner in our inquiry. In the first place he is the son of Anthemion, a man of property and good sense, who didn't get his money out of the blue or as a gift—like Ismenias of Thebes who has just come into the fortune of a Croesus—but earned it by his own brains and hard work. Besides this he shows himself a decent, modest citizen with no arrogance or bombast or offensiveness about him. Also he brought up his son well and had him properly educated, as the Athenian people appreciate. Look how they elect him into the highest offices in the state. This is certainly the right sort of man with whom to inquire whether there are any teachers of virtue, and if so who they are.

Please help us, Anytus—Meno, who is a friend of your family, and myself—to find out who may be the teachers of this subject. Look at it like this. If we wanted Meno to become a good doctor, shouldn't we send him to the doctors to be taught?

Anytus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if we wanted him to become a shoemaker, to the shoemakers?

Anytus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so on with other trades?

Anytus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now another relevant question. When we say that to make Meno a doctor we should be right in sending him to the doctors, have we in mind that the sensible thing is to send him to those who profess the subject rather than to those who don't, men who charge a fee as professionals, having announced that they are prepared to teach whoever likes to come and learn?

Anytus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The same is surely true of flute playing and other accomplishments. If you want to make someone a performer on the flute it would be very foolish to refuse to send him to those who undertake to teach the art and are paid for it, but to go and bother other people instead and have him try to learn from them—people who don't set up to be teachers or take any pupils in the subject which we want our young man to learn. Doesn't that sound very unreasonable?

Anytus/ Sheer stupidity, I should say.

Socrates/ I agree. And now we can both consult together about our visitor Meno. He has been telling me all this while that he longs to acquire the kind of wisdom and virtue which fits men to manage an estate or govern a city, to look after their parents, and to entertain and send off guests in proper style, both their own countrymen and foreigners. With this in mind, to whom would it be right to send him? What we have just said seems to show that the right people are those who profess to be teachers of virtue and offer their services freely to any Greek who wishes to learn, charging a fixed fee for their instruction.

Anytus/ Whom do you mean by that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Surely you know yourself that they are the men called Sophists.

Anytus/ Good heavens, what a thing to say! I hope no relative of mine or any of my friends, Athenian or foreign, would be so mad as to go and let himself be ruined by those people. That's what they are, the manifest ruin and corruption of anyone who comes into contact with them.

Socrates/ What, Anytus? Can they be so different from other claimants to useful knowledge that they not only don't do good, like the rest, to the material that one puts in their charge, but on the contrary spoil it—and have the effrontery to take money for doing so? I for one find it difficult to believe you. I know that one of them alone, Protagoras, earned more money from being a Sophist than an outstandingly fine craftsman like Phidias and ten other sculptors put together. A man who mends old shoes or restores coats couldn't get away with it for a month if he gave them back in worse condition than he received them; he would soon find himself starving. Surely it is incredible that Protagoras took in the whole of Greece, corrupting his pupils and sending them away worse than when they came to him, for more than forty years. I believe he was nearly seventy when he died, and had been practicing for forty years, and all that time—indeed to this very day—his reputation has been consistently high, and there are plenty of others besides Protagoras, some before his time and others still alive. Are we to suppose from your remark that they consciously deceive and ruin young men, or are they unaware of it themselves? Can these remarkably clever men—as some regard them—be mad enough for that?

Anytus/ Far from it, Socrates. It isn't they who are mad, but rather the young men who hand over their money, and those responsible for them, who let them get into the Sophists' hands, are even worse. Worst of all are the cities who allow them in, or don't expel them, whether it be a foreigner or one of themselves who tries that sort of game.

Socrates/ Has one of the Sophists done you a personal injury, or why are you so hard on them?

Anytus/ Heavens, no! I've never in my life had anything to do with a single one of them, nor would I hear of any of my family doing so.

Socrates/ So you've had no experience of them at all?

Anytus/ And don't want any either.

Socrates/ You surprise me. How can you know what is good or bad in something when you have no experience of it?

Anytus/ Quite easily. At any rate I know *their* kind, whether I've had experience or not.

Socrates/ It must be second sight, I suppose, for how else you know about them, judging from what you tell me yourself, I can't imagine. However, we are not asking whose instruction it is that would ruin Meno's character. Let us say that those are the Sophists, if you like, and tell us instead about the ones we want. You can do a good turn to a friend of your father's house if you will let him know to whom in our great city he should apply for proficiency in the kind of virtue I have just described.

Anytus/ Why not tell him yourself?

Socrates/ Well, I did mention the men who in my opinion teach these things, but apparently I was talking nonsense. So you say, and you may well be right. Now it is your turn to direct him; mention the name of any Athenian you like.

Anytus/ But why mention a particular individual? Any decent Athenian gentleman whom he happens to meet, if he follows his advice, will make him a better man than the Sophists would.

Socrates/ And did these gentlemen get their fine qualities spontaneously—self-taught, as it were, and yet able to teach this untaught virtue to others?

Anytus/ I suppose they in their turn learned it from forebears who were gentlemen like themselves. Would you deny that there have been many good men in our city?

Socrates/ On the contrary, there are plenty of good statesmen here in Athens and have been as good in the past. The question is, have they also been good teachers of their own virtue? That is the point we are discussing now—not whether or not there are good men in Athens or whether there have been in past times, but whether virtue can be taught. It amounts to the question whether the good men of this and former times have known how to hand on to someone else the goodness that was in themselves, or whether on the contrary it is not something that can be handed over, or that one man can receive from another. That is what Meno and I have long been puzzling over. Look at it from your own point of view. You would say that Themistocles was a good man?

Anytus/ Yes, none better.

Socrates/ And that he, if anyone, must have been a good teacher of his own virtue?

Anytus/ I suppose so, if he wanted to be.

Socrates/ But don't you think he must have wanted others to become worthy men—above all, surely, his own son? Do you suppose he grudged him this and purposely didn't pass on his own virtue to him? You must have heard that he had his son Cleophantus so well trained in horsemanship that he could stand upright on horseback and throw a javelin from that position, and many other wonderful accomplishments the young man had, for his father had him taught and made expert in every skill that a

good instructor could impart. You must have heard this from older people?

Anytus/ Yes.

Socrates/ No one, then, could say that there was anything wrong with the boy's natural powers?

Anytus/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ But have you ever heard anyone, young or old, say that Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, was a good and wise man in the way that his father was?

Anytus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Must we conclude then that Themistocles' aim was to educate his son in other accomplishments, but not to make him any better than his neighbors in his own type of wisdom—that is, supposing that virtue could be taught?

Anytus/ I hardly think we can.

Socrates/ So much then for Themistocles as a teacher of virtue, whom you yourself agree to have been one of the best men of former times. Take another example, Aristides, son of Lysimachus.

You accept him as a good man?

Anytus/ Surely.

Socrates/ He too gave his son Lysimachus the best education in Athens, in all subjects where a teacher could help, but did he make him a better man than his neighbor? You know him, I think, and can say what he is like. Or again there is Pericles, that great and wise man. He brought up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus, and had them taught riding, music, athletics, and all the other skilled pursuits till they were as good as any in Athens. Did he then not want to make them good men? Yes, he wanted that, no doubt, but I am afraid it is something that cannot be done by teaching. And in case you should think that only very few, and those

the most insignificant, lacked this power, consider that Thucydides also had two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, to whom he gave an excellent education. Among other things they were the best wrestlers in Athens, for he gave one to Xanthias to train and the other to Eudoxus—the two who, I understand, were considered the finest wrestlers of their time. You remember?

Anytus/ I have heard of them.

Socrates/ Surely then he would never have had his children taught these expensive pursuits and yet refused to teach them to be good men—which would have cost nothing at all—if virtue could have been taught? You are not going to tell me that Thucydides was a man of no account, or that he had not plenty of friends both at Athens and among the allies? He came of an influential family and was a great power both here and in the rest of Greece. If virtue could have been taught, he would have found the man to make his sons good, either among our own citizens or abroad, supposing his political duties left him no time to do it himself. No, my dear Anytus, it looks as if it cannot be taught.

Anytus/ You seem to me, Socrates, to be too ready to run people down. My advice to you, if you will listen to it, is to be careful. I dare say that in all cities it is easier to do a man harm than good, and it is certainly so here, as I expect you know yourself.

Socrates/ Anytus seems angry, Meno, and I am not surprised. He thinks I am slandering our statesmen, and moreover he believes himself to be one of them. He doesn't know what slander really is; if he ever finds out he will forgive me.

However, tell me this yourself. Are there not similar fine characters in your country?

Meno/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Do they come forward of their own accord to teach the young? Do they agree that they are teachers and that virtue can be taught?

Meno/ No indeed, they don't agree on it at all. Sometimes you will hear them say that it can be taught, sometimes that it cannot.

Socrates/ Ought we then to class as teachers of it men who are not even agreed that it can be taught?

Meno/ Hardly, I think.

Socrates/ And what about the Sophists, the only people who profess to teach it? Do you think they do?

Meno/ The thing I particularly admire about Gorgias, Socrates, is that you will never hear him make this claim; indeed he laughs at the others when he hears them do so. In his view his job is to make clever speakers.

Socrates/ So you too don't think the Sophists are teachers?

Meno/ I really can't say. Like most people I waver—sometimes I think they are and sometimes I think they are not.

Socrates/ Has it ever occurred to you that you and our statesmen are not alone in this? The poet Theognis likewise says in one place that virtue is teachable and in another that it is not.

Meno/ Really? Where?

Socrates/ In the elegiacs in which he writes:

> Eat, drink, and sit with men of power and weight,
> Nor scorn to gain the favor of the great.
> For fine men's teaching to fine ways will win thee;
> Low company destroys what wit is in thee.

There he speaks as if virtue can be taught, doesn't he?

Meno/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But elsewhere he changes his ground a little.

> Were mind by art created and instilled
> Immense rewards had soon the pockets filled

of the people who could do this. Moreover;

> No good man's son would ever worthless be,
> Taught by wise counsel. But no teacher's skill
> Can turn to good what is created ill.

Do you see how he contradicts himself?

Meno/ Plainly.

Socrates/ Can you name any other subject, in which the professed teachers are not only not recognized as teachers of others, but are thought to have no understanding of it themselves, and to be no good at the very subject they profess to teach, whereas those who are acknowledged to be the best at it are in two minds whether it can be taught or not? When people are so confused about a subject, can you say that they are in a true sense teachers?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well, if neither the Sophists nor those who display fine qualities themselves are teachers of virtue, I am sure no one else can be, and if there are no teachers, there can be no students either.

Meno/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ And we have also agreed that a subject of which there were neither teachers nor students was not one which could be taught.

Meno/ That is so.

Socrates/ Now there turn out to be neither teachers nor students of virtue, so it would appear that virtue cannot be taught.

Meno/ So it seems, if we have made no mistake, and it makes me wonder, Socrates, whether there are in fact no good men at all, or how they are produced when they do appear.

Socrates/ I have a suspicion, Meno, that you and I are not much good. Our masters Gorgias and Prodicus have not trained us properly. We must certainly take ourselves in hand, and try to find someone who will improve us by hook or by crook. I say this with our recent discussion in mind, for absurdly enough we failed to perceive that it is not only under the guidance of knowledge that human action is well and rightly conducted. I believe that may be what prevents us from seeing how it is that men are made good.

Meno/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ This. We were correct, were we not, in agreeing that good men must be profitable or useful? It cannot be otherwise, can it?

Meno/ No.

Socrates/ And again that they will be of some use if they conduct our affairs aright—that also was correct?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ But in insisting that knowledge was a *sine qua non* for right leadership, we look like being mistaken.

Meno/ How so?

Socrates/ Let me explain. If someone knows the way to Larissa, or anywhere else you like, then when he goes there and takes others with him he will be a good and capable guide, you would agree?

Meno/ Of course.

Socrates/ But if a man judges correctly which is the road, though he has never been there and doesn't know it, will he not also guide others aright?

Meno/ Yes, he will.

Socrates/ And as long as he has a correct opinion on the points about which the other has knowledge, he will be just as good a guide, believing the truth but not knowing it.

Meno/ Just as good.

Socrates/ Therefore true opinion is as good a guide as knowledge for the purpose of acting rightly. That is what we left out just now in our discussion of the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge is the only guide to right action. There was also, it seems, true opinion.

Meno/ It seems so.

Socrates/ So right opinion is something no less useful than knowledge.

Meno/ Except that the man with knowledge will always be successful, and the man with right opinion only sometimes.

Socrates/ What? Will he not always be successful so long as he has the right opinion?

Meno/ That must be so, I suppose. In that case, I wonder why knowledge should be so much more prized than right opinion, and indeed how there is any difference between them.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you the reason for your surprise, or do you know it?

Meno/ No, tell me.

Socrates/ It is because you have not observed the statues of Daedalus. Perhaps you don't have them in your country.

Meno/ What makes you say that?

Socrates/ They too, if no one ties them down, run away and escape. If tied, they stay where they are put.

Meno/ What of it?

Socrates/ If you have one of his works untethered, it is not worth much; it gives you the slip like a runaway slave. But a tethered specimen is very valuable, for they are magnificent creations. And that, I may say, has a bearing on the matter of true opinions. True opinions are a fine thing and do all sorts of good so long as they stay in their place, but they will not stay long. They run away from a man's mind; so they are not worth much until you tether them by working out the reason. That process, my dear Meno, is recollection, as we agreed earlier. Once they are tied down, they become knowledge, and are stable. That is why knowledge is something more valuable than right opinion. What distinguishes one from the other is the tether.

Meno/ It does seem something like that, certainly.

Socrates/ Well of course, I have only been using an analogy myself, not knowledge. But it is not, I am sure, a mere guess to say that right opinion and knowledge are different. There are few things that I should claim to know, but that at least is among them, whatever else is.

Meno/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ And is this right too, that true opinion when it governs any course of action produces as good a result as knowledge?

Meno/ Yes, that too is right, I think.

Socrates/ So that for practical purposes right opinion is no less useful than knowledge, and the man who has it is no less useful than the one who knows.

Meno/ That is so.

Socrates/ Now we have agreed that the good man is useful.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ To recapitulate then, assuming that there are men good and useful to the community, it is not only knowledge that makes them so, but also right opinion, and neither of these comes by nature but both are acquired—or do you think either of them is natural?

Meno/ No.

Socrates/ So if both are acquired, good men themselves are not good by nature.

Meno/ No.

Socrates/ That being so, the next thing we inquired was whether their goodness was a matter of teaching, and we decided that it would be, if virtue were knowledge, and conversely, that if it could be taught, it would be knowledge.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Next, that if there were teachers of it, it could be taught, but not if there were none.

Meno/ That was so.

Socrates/ But we have agreed that there are no teachers of it, and so that it cannot be taught and is not knowledge.

Meno/ We did.

Socrates/ At the same time we agreed that it is something good, and that to be useful and good consists in giving right guidance.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that these two, true opinion and knowledge, are the only things which direct us aright and the possession of which makes a man a true guide. We may except chance, because what turns out right by chance is not due to human direction, and say that where human control leads to right ends, these two principles are directive, true opinion and knowledge.

Meno/ Yes, I agree.

Socrates/ Now since virtue cannot be taught, we can no longer believe it to be knowledge, so that one of our two good and useful principles is excluded, and knowledge is not the guide in public life.

Meno/ No.

Socrates/ It is not then by the possession of any wisdom that such men as Themistocles, and the others whom Anytus mentioned just now, became leaders in their cities. This fact, that they do not owe their eminence to knowledge, will explain why they are unable to make others like themselves.

Meno/ No doubt it is as you say.

Socrates/ That leaves us with the other alternative, that it is well-aimed conjecture which statesmen employ in upholding their countries' welfare. Their position in relation to knowledge is no different from that of prophets and tellers of oracles, who under divine inspiration utter many truths, but have no knowledge of what they are saying.

Meno/ It must be something like that.

Socrates/ And ought we not to reckon those men divine who with no conscious thought are repeatedly and outstandingly successful in what they do or say?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We are right therefore to give this title to the oracular priests and the prophets that I mentioned, and to poets of every description. Statesmen too, when by their speeches they get great things done yet know nothing of what they are saying, are to be considered as acting no less under divine influence, inspired and possessed by the divinity.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Women, you know, Meno, do call good men 'divine,' and the Spartans too, when they are singing a good man's praises, say, 'He is divine.'

Meno/ And it looks as if they are right—though our friend Anytus may be annoyed with you for saying so.

Socrates/ I can't help that. We will talk to him some other time. If all we have said in this discussion, and the questions we have asked, have been right, virtue will be acquired neither by nature nor by teaching. Whoever has it gets it by divine dispensation without taking thought, unless he be the kind of statesman who can create another like himself. Should there be such a man, he would be among the living practically what Homer said Tiresias was among the dead, when he described him as the only one in the underworld who kept his wits—'the others are mere flitting shades.' Where virtue is concerned such a man would be just like that, a solid reality among shadows.

Meno/ That is finely put, Socrates.

Socrates/ On our present reasoning then, whoever has virtue gets it by divine dispensation. But we shall not understand the truth of the matter until, before asking how men get virtue, we try to discover what virtue is in and by itself. Now it is time for me to go, and my request to you is that you will allay the anger of your friend Anytus by convincing him that what you now believe is true. If you succeed, the Athenians may have cause to thank you.

Meno.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Meno. Boy.

Socrates. Anytus.

Meno/ Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?

Socrates/ O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus. And this is Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, and say: 'Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.' And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the rest of the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not know the 'quid' of anything how can I know the 'quale'? How, if I knew

nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could?

Meno/ No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to Thessaly?

Socrates/ Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have never known of anyone else who did, in my judgment.

Meno/ Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?

Socrates/ Yes, I have.

Meno/ And did you not think that he knew?

Socrates/ I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect that you and he think much alike.

Meno/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying that I have never found anybody who had.

Meno/ There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Let us take first the virtue of a man—he should know how to administer the state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself. A woman's virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described: her duty is to order her house,

and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates.

Socrates/ How fortunate I am; Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you present me with a swarm of them, which are in your keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer me?

Meno/ I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees.

Socrates/ And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno; tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike; —would you be able to answer?

Meno/ I should.

Socrates/ And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to have his eye fixed: Do you understand?

Meno/ I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish.

Socrates/ When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?

Meno/ I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman.

Socrates/ And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference?

Meno/ I think not.

Socrates/ And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man?

Meno/ I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from the others.

Socrates/ But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?

Meno/ I did say so.

Socrates/ And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are intemperate and unjust?

Meno/ They cannot.

Socrates/ They must be temperate and just?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in the same virtues?

Meno/ Such is the inference.

Socrates/ And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless their virtue had been the same?

Meno/ They would not.

Socrates/ Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.

Meno/ Will you have one definition of them all?

Socrates/ That is what I am seeking.

Meno/ If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.

Socrates/ And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave?

Meno/ I think not, Socrates.

Socrates/ No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is 'the power of governing;' but do you not add 'justly and not unjustly'?

Meno/ Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.

Socrates/ Would you say 'virtue,' Meno, or 'a virtue'?

Meno/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example, is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,' and

I should adopt this mode of speaking, because there are other figures.

Meno/ Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue—that there are other virtues as well as justice.

Socrates/ What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you the names of the other figures if you asked me.

Meno/ Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and there are many others.

Socrates/ Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before; but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them all.

Meno/ Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.

Socrates/ No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that someone asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure? And if you answered 'roundness,' he would reply to you, in my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is 'figure' or 'a figure;' and you would answer 'a figure.'

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And for this reason—that there are other figures?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you would have told him.

Meno/ I should.

Socrates/ And if he similarly asked what color is, and you answered whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you

say that whiteness is color or a color? you would reply, A color, because there are other colors as well.

Meno/ I should.

Socrates/ And if he had said, Tell me what they are? — you would have told him of other colors which are colors just as much as whiteness.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that common nature which you designate as figure—which contains straight as well as round, and is no more one than the other—that would be your mode of speaking?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round?

Meno/ Very true.

Socrates/ To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or color, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not understand that I am looking for the 'simile in multis'? And then he might put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that 'simile in multis' which you call

figure, and which includes not only round and straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue.

Meno/ I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall I indulge you?

Meno/ By all means.

Socrates/ And then you will tell me about virtue?

Meno/ I will.

Socrates/ Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you say to this answer? —Figure is the only thing which always follows color. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue?

Meno/ But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer.

Socrates/ Why simple?

Meno/ Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows color.

Socrates/ Granted.

Meno/ But if a person were to say that he does not know what color is, any more than what figure is—what sort of answer would you have given him?

Socrates/ I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I

should make use of premises which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And this is the way in which I shall endeavor to approach you. You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or termination, or extremity? —all which words I use in the same sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated—that is all which I am saying—not anything very difficult.

Meno/ Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.

Socrates/ And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for example in geometry.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; or, more concisely, the limit of solid.

Meno/ And now, Socrates, what is color?

Socrates/ You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what is Gorgias' definition of virtue.

Meno/ When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.

Socrates/ A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers.

Meno/ Why do you think so?

Socrates/ Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect, you have found out that I

have a weakness for the fair, and therefore to humor you I must answer.

Meno/ Please do.

Socrates/ Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, which is familiar to you?

Meno/ I should like nothing better.

Socrates/ Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain effluences of existence?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?

Meno/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of them are too small or too large?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ And there is such a thing as sight?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning:'—color is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense.

Meno/ That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.

Socrates/ Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect, that you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many other similar phenomena.

Meno/ Quite true.

Socrates/ The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion, if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries.

Meno/ But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers.

Socrates/ Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfill your promise, and tell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I have given you the pattern.

Meno/ Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires the honorable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I say too—

> 'Virtue is the desire of things honorable and the power of attaining them.'

Socrates/ And does he who desires the honorable also desire the good.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?

Meno/ I think not.

Socrates/ There are some who desire evil?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?

Meno/ Both, I think.

Socrates/ And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?

Meno/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ And desire is of possession?

Meno/ Yes, of possession.

Socrates/ And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?

Meno/ There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm.

Socrates/ And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be goods they really desire goods?

Meno/ Yes, in that case.

Socrates/ Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by them?

Meno/ They must know it.

Socrates/ And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?

Meno/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ But are not the miserable ill-fated?

Meno/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And does anyone desire to be miserable and ill-fated?

Meno/ I should say not, Socrates.

Socrates/ But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and possession of evil?

Meno/ That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody desires evil.

Socrates/ And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power of attaining good?

Meno/ Yes, I did say so.

Socrates/ But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be better in the power of attaining it?

Meno/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good?

Meno/ I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view this matter.

Socrates/ Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point of view; for very likely you may be right: —You affirm virtue to be the power of attaining goods?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and the possession of gold and silver, and

having office and honor in the state—those are what you would call goods?

Meno/ Yes, I should include all those.

Socrates/ Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust or dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?

Meno/ Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.

Socrates/ Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.

Meno/ Why, how can there be virtue without these?

Socrates/ And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be equally virtue?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice.

Meno/ It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.

Socrates/ And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and the like, were each of them a part of virtue?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.

Meno/ Why do you say that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern

according to which you were to frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by you to be parts of virtue.

Meno/ What of that?

Socrates/ What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can anyone who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?

Meno/ No; I do not say that he can.

Socrates/ Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?

Meno/ Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so.

Socrates/ But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to anyone the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask over again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?

Meno/ I believe that you are.

Socrates/ Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?

Meno/ O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and to many persons—and very good ones they were, as I thought—at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that you are very wise in not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as you do in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician.

Socrates/ You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me.

Meno/ What do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I can tell why you made a simile about me.

Meno/ Why?

Socrates/ In order that I might make another simile about you. For I know that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about them—as well they may—but I shall not return the compliment. As to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself. And now I know not what virtue is,

and you seem to be in the same case, although you did once perhaps know before you touched me. However, I have no objection to join with you in the enquiry.

Meno/ And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know?

Socrates/ I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire.

Meno/ Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?

Socrates/ I think not.

Meno/ Why not?

Socrates/ I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and women who spoke of things divine that—

Meno/ What did they say?

Socrates/ They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.

Meno/ What was it? and who were they?

Socrates/ Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and many others who were inspired. And they say—mark, now, and see whether their words are true—they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in perfect holiness. '*For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime*

back again from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly heroes in after ages.' The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle, and is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the nature of virtue.

Meno/ Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you teach me how this is?

Socrates/ I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching, but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in a contradiction.

Meno/ Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you say is true, I wish that you would.

Socrates/ It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants, that I may demonstrate on him.

Meno/ Certainly. Come hither, boy.

Socrates/ He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not?

Meno/ Yes, indeed; he was born in the house.

Socrates/ Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether he learns of me or only remembers.

Meno/ I will.

Socrates/ Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square?

Boy/ I do.

Socrates/ And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal?

Boy/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ A square may be of any size?

Boy/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two feet?

Boy/ There are.

Socrates/ Then the square is of twice two feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me.

Boy/ Four, Socrates.

Socrates/ And might there not be another square twice as large as this, and having like this the lines equal?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And of how many feet will that be?

Boy/ Of eight feet.

Socrates/ And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the side of that double square: this is two feet—what will that be?

Boy/ Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.

Socrates/ Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does he not?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does he really know?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is double.

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To the Boy.) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure equal every way, and twice the size of this—that is to say of eight feet; and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from a double line?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line here?

Boy/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say Meno. that this is the figure of eight feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of four feet?



Boy/ True.

Socrates/ And is not that four times four?

Boy/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And four times is not double?

Boy/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But how much?

Boy/ Four times as much.

Socrates/ Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, but four times as much.

Boy/ True.

Socrates/ Four times four are sixteen—are they not?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives one of sixteen feet; —do you see?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the space of four feet is made from this half line?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, and half the size of the other?

Boy/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this one, and less than that one?

Boy/ Yes; I think so.

Socrates/ Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet?

Boy/ It ought.

Socrates/ Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be.

Boy/ Three feet.

Socrates/ Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the line of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, the whole space will be three times three feet?

Boy/ That is evident.

Socrates/ And how much are three times three feet?.

Boy/ Nine.

Socrates/ And how much is the double of four?

Boy/ Eight.

Socrates/ Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three?

Boy/ No.

Socrates/ But from what line? —tell me exactly; and if you would rather not reckon, try and show me the line.

Boy/ Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.

Socrates/ Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what is the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew, and answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows.

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?

Meno/ I think that he is.

Socrates/ If we have made him doubt, and given him the 'torpedo's shock,' have we done him any harm?

Meno/ I think not.

Socrates/ We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree to the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again and again that the double space should have a double side.

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know, and had desired to know?

Meno/ I think not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch?

Meno/ I think so.

Socrates/ Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and not teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do you watch and see if you find me telling or

explaining anything to him, instead of eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet which I have drawn?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now I add another square equal to the former one?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And a third, which is equal to either of them?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner?

Boy/ Very good.

Socrates/ Here, then, there are four equal spaces?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And how many times larger is this space than this other?

Boy/ Four times.

Socrates/ But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember.

Boy/ True.

Socrates/ And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect each of these spaces?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are there not here four equal lines which contain this space?

Boy/ There are.

Socrates/ Look and see how much this space is.

Boy/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And how many such spaces are there in this section?

Boy/ Four.

Socrates/ And how many in this?

Boy/ Two.

Socrates/ And four is how many times two?

Boy/ Twice.

Socrates/ And this space is of how many feet?

Boy/ Of eight feet.

Socrates/ And from what line do you get this figure?

Boy/ From this.

Socrates/ That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of the figure of four feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal?

Boy/ Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers given out of his own head?

Meno/ Yes, they were all his own.

Socrates/ And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ But still he had in him those notions of his—had he not?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that which he does not know?

Meno/ He has.

Socrates/ And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him, as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in different forms, he would know as well as anyone at last?

Meno/ I dare say.

Socrates/ Without anyone teaching him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is recollection?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have acquired or always possessed?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it in this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to do the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now, has anyone ever taught him all this? You must know about him, if, as you say, he was born and bred in your house.

Meno/ And I am certain that no one ever did teach him.

Socrates/ And yet he has the knowledge?

Meno/ The fact, Socrates, is undeniable.

Socrates/ But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he must have had and learned it at some other time?

Meno/ Clearly he must.

Socrates/ Which must have been the time when he was not a man?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man?

Meno/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember.

Meno/ I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying.

Socrates/ And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know; —that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.

Meno/ There again, Socrates, your words seem to me excellent.

Socrates/ Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire together into the nature of virtue?

Meno/ By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my original question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men in some other way?

Socrates/ Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained 'what it is.' But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself, —such being your notion

of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question 'Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way,' to be argued upon hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked whether a certain triangle is capable of being inscribed in a certain circle, will reply: 'I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it, the given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the part produced, then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle:'—that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge, —in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, 'remembered'? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not everyone see that knowledge alone is taught?

Meno/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species?

Meno/ Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order.

Socrates/ Do we not say that virtue is a good? —This is a hypothesis which is not set aside.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ And virtue makes us good?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then virtue is profitable?

Meno/ That is the only inference.

Socrates/ Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth—these, and the like of these, we call profitable?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you not think so?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like?

Meno/ Surely.

Socrates/ And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful?

Meno/ Very true.

Socrates/ And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite?

Meno/ That appears to be true.

Socrates/ If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence?

Meno/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses

them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul wrongly?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not this universally true of human nature? All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits—and virtue, as we say, is profitable?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?

Meno/ I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true.

Socrates/ But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good?

Meno/ I think not.

Socrates/ If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of characters among us who would have known our future great men; and on their showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one might tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have been useful to the state?

Meno/ Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way.

Socrates/ But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction?

Meno/ There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is taught.

Socrates/ Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous?

Meno/ I certainly thought just now that we were right.

Socrates/ Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand firm not only just now, but always.

Meno/ Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue?

Socrates/ I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that I have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider now and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught, must not have teachers and disciples?

Meno/ Surely.

Socrates/ And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught?

Meno/ True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?

Socrates/ I have certainly often enquired whether there were any, and taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; and many have assisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the most likely to know.

Here at the moment when he is wanted we fortunately have sitting by us Anytus, the very person of whom we should make enquiry; to him then let us repair. In the first place, he is the son of a wealthy and wise father, Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not by accident or gift, like

Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made himself as rich as Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and who is a well-conditioned, modest man, not insolent, or overbearing, or annoying; moreover, this son of his has received a good education, as the Athenian people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to fill the highest offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you are likely to learn whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who they are. Please, Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are the teachers? Consider the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good physician, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him to the physicians?

Anytus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send him to the cobblers?

Anytus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so forth?

Anytus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say that we should be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him to be a physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to those who profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who demand payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it to anyone who will come and learn? And if these were our reasons, should we not be right in sending him?

Anytus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and of the other arts? Would a man who wanted to make another a flute-player refuse to send him to those who profess to teach the art for money, and be plaguing other persons to give him instruction, who are not professed

teachers and who never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge which he wishes him to acquire—would not such conduct be the height of folly?

Anytus/ Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too.

Socrates/ Very good. And now you are in a position to advise with me about my friend Meno. He has been telling me, Anytus, that he desires to attain that kind of wisdom and virtue by which men order the state or the house, and honor their parents, and know when to receive and when to send away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to whom should he go in order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the previous argument imply clearly that we should send him to those who profess and avouch that they are the common teachers of all Hellas, and are ready to impart instruction to anyone who likes, at a fixed price?

Anytus/ Whom do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people whom mankind call Sophists?

Anytus/ By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever be so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them; for they are a manifest pest and corrupting influence to those who have to do with them.

Socrates/ What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they know how to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not only do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to them, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money? Indeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man, Protagoras, who made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who created such noble works, or any ten other statuaries. How could that be? A mender of old shoes, or patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes or

clothes worse than he received them, could not have remained thirty days undetected, and would very soon have starved; whereas during more than forty years, Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas, and sending his disciples from him worse than he received them, and he was never found out. For, if I am not mistaken, he was about seventy years old at his death, forty of which were spent in the practice of his profession; and during all that time he had a good reputation, which to this day he retains: and not only Protagoras, but many others are well spoken of; some who lived before him, and others who are still living. Now, when you say that they deceived and corrupted the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them consciously or unconsciously? Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of Hellas have been out of their minds?

Anytus/ Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men who gave their money to them were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians who entrusted their youth to the care of these men were still more out of their minds, and most of all, the cities who allowed them to come in, and did not drive them out, citizen and stranger alike.

Socrates/ Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? What makes you so angry with them?

Anytus/ No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has ever had, nor would I suffer them to have, anything to do with them.

Socrates/ Then you are entirely unacquainted with them?

Anytus/ And I have no wish to be acquainted.

Socrates/ Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good or bad of which you are wholly ignorant?

Anytus/ Quite well; I am sure that I know what manner of men these are, whether I am acquainted with them or not.

Socrates/ You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot make out, judging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with them, you know about them. But I am not enquiring of you who are the teachers who will corrupt Meno (let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I only ask you to tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him how to become eminent in the virtues which I was just now describing. He is the friend of your family, and you will oblige him.

Anytus/ Why do you not tell him yourself?

Socrates/ I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers of these things; but I learn from you that I am utterly at fault, and I dare say that you are right. And now I wish that you, on your part, would tell me to whom among the Athenians he should go. Whom would you name?

Anytus/ Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, taken at random, if he will mind him, will do far more good to him than the Sophists.

Socrates/ And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and without having been taught by anyone, were they nevertheless able to teach others that which they had never learned themselves?

Anytus/ I imagine that they learned of the previous generation of gentlemen. Have there not been many good men in this city?

Socrates/ Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there always have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But the question is whether they were also good teachers of their own virtue; —not whether there are, or have been, good men in this part of the world, but whether virtue can be taught, is the question which we have been discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good men of our own and of other times knew how to impart to others

that virtue which they had themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being communicated or imparted by one man to another? That is the question which I and Meno have been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way: Would you not admit that Themistocles was a good man?

Anytus/ Certainly; no man better.

Socrates/ And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue?

Anytus/ Yes, certainly, —if he wanted to be so.

Socrates/ But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have desired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not have been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from imparting to him his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made his son Cleophantus a famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright on horseback and hurl a javelin, and to do many other marvelous things; and in anything which could be learned from a master he was well trained? Have you not heard from our elders of him?

Anytus/ I have.

Socrates/ Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity?

Anytus/ Very likely not.

Socrates/ But did anyone, old or young, ever say in your hearing that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father was?

Anytus/ I have certainly never heard anyone say so.

Socrates/ And if virtue could have been taught, would his father Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments, and allowed him who, as you must

remember, was his own son, to be no better than his neighbors in those qualities in which he himself excelled?

Anytus/ Indeed, indeed, I think not.

Socrates/ Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be among the best men of the past. Let us take another, —Aristides, the son of Lysimachus: would you not acknowledge that he was a good man?

Anytus/ To be sure I should.

Socrates/ And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? But what has been the result? Is he a bit better than any other mortal? He is an acquaintance of yours, and you see what he is like. There is Pericles, again, magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you are aware, had two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.

Anytus/ I know.

Socrates/ And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled horsemen, and had them trained in music and gymnastics and all sorts of arts—in these respects they were on a level with the best—and had he no wish to make good men of them? Nay, he must have wished it. But virtue, as I suspect, could not be taught. And that you may not suppose the incompetent teachers to be only the meaner sort of Athenians and few in number, remember again that Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, whom, besides giving them a good education in other things, he trained in wrestling, and they were the best wrestlers in Athens: one of them he committed to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus, who had the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of that day. Do you remember them?

Anytus/ I have heard of them.

Socrates/ Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, whose children were taught things for which he had to spend money, would have taught them to be good men, which would have cost him nothing, if virtue could have been taught? Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great family, and a man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas, and, if virtue could have been taught, he would have found out some Athenian or foreigner who would have made good men of his sons, if he could not himself spare the time from cares of state. Once more, I suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is not a thing which can be taught?

Anytus/ Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men: and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful. Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than to do them good, and this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe that you know.

Socrates/ O Meno, I think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be in a rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these gentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one of them himself. But some day he will know what is the meaning of defamation, and if he ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too?

Meno/ Certainly there are.

Socrates/ And are they willing to teach the young? and do they profess to be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught?

Meno/ No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; you may hear them saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the reverse.

Socrates/ Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the possibility of their own vocation?

Meno/ I think not, Socrates.

Socrates/ And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue?

Meno/ I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to teach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them; but he thinks that men should be taught to speak.

Socrates/ Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?

Meno/ I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not.

Socrates/ And are you aware that not you only and other politicians have doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet says the very same thing?

Meno/ Where does he say so?

Socrates/ In these elegiac verses: —

> 'Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to them; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with the bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have.'

Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught?

Meno/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But in some other verses he shifts about and says: —

> 'If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they' [who were able to perform this feat] 'would have obtained great rewards.'

And again: —

> 'Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have heard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a bad man into a good one.'

And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other.

Meno/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And is there anything else of which the professors are affirmed not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant themselves, and bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing to teach? or is there anything about which even the acknowledged 'gentlemen' are sometimes saying that 'this thing can be taught' and sometimes the opposite? Can you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such confusion?

Meno/ I should say, certainly not.

Socrates/ But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers?

Meno/ No.

Socrates/ And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples?

Meno/ Agreed.

Socrates/ And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which there are neither teachers nor disciples?

Meno/ We have.

Socrates/ And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?

Meno/ There are not.

Socrates/ And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?

Meno/ That, I think, is true.

Socrates/ Then virtue cannot be taught?

Meno/ Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates, that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into existence?

Socrates/ I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find someone who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη); —and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how there can be any good men at all.

Meno/ How do you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable. Were we not right in admitting this? It must be so.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides to us of action—there we were also right?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he have knowledge (φρόνησις), in this we were wrong.

Meno/ What do you mean by the word 'right'?

Socrates/ I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and good guide?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the truth?

Meno/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of right action; whereas there is also right opinion.

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?

Meno/ The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not.

Socrates/ What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion?

Meno/ I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion—or why they should ever differ.

Socrates/ And shall I explain this wonder to you?

Meno/ Do tell me.

Socrates/ You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus; but perhaps you have not got them in your country?

Meno/ What have they to do with the question?

Socrates/ Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.

Meno/ Well, what of that?

Socrates/ I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honorable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.

Meno/ What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.

Socrates/ I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them.

Meno/ Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.

Socrates/ And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?

Meno/ There again, Socrates, I think that you are right.

Socrates/ Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by him—(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature?

Meno/ Not I.)

Socrates/ Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ If virtue was wisdom [or knowledge], then, as we thought, it was taught?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if it was taught it was wisdom?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And yet we admitted that it was a good?

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the right guide is useful and good?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion—these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge.

Meno/ I think so too.

Socrates/ But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.

Meno/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life.

Meno/ I think not.

Socrates/ And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. This was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves—because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge.

Meno/ That is probably true, Socrates.

Socrates/ But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but they know not what they say.

Meno/ So I believe.

Socrates/ And may we not, Meno, truly call those men 'divine' who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine and illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say many grand things, not knowing what they say.

Meno/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the women too, Meno, call good men divine—do they not? and the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say 'that he is a divine man.'

Meno/ And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely our friend Anytus may take offence at the word.

Socrates/ I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another opportunity of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry—the result seems to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen someone who is capable of educating statesmen. And if there be such an one, he may be said to be among the living what Homer says that Tiresias was among the dead, 'he alone has understanding; but the rest are flitting shades;' and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among shadows.

Meno/ That is excellent, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth until, before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual nature of virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him be so exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done good service to the Athenian people.

Meno.

Translated by Mackay.

Persons of the Dialog

Meno, Socrates, A Boy, Anytus.

Meno/ —Can you tell, Socrates, if virtue be teachable, or, if not teachable, attainable by exercise and habit; and if not to be had by either of these means, whether it be given by nature or in some other way?

Socrates/ —O Meno, the men of Thessaly have long been noted and admired among the Greeks for their skill in horsemanship and their opulence, and now they seem to be no less so for their wisdom, especially the Larissæan fellow-citizens of your friend Aristippus. For this you have to thank Gorgias, whose wisdom on his arrival in your city captivated the foremost of the family of the Alcnadæ, your friend Aristippus among the number, and many others of the Thessalians. To him, too, you owe the custom of answering when appealed to as to wise men and sound authorities in free and dignified terms, the questioner being himself also open to be interrogated on any subject by anyone wishing to do so. But here in Athens, my dear Meno, the case is very different; here there is a dearth of wisdom, which seems to have taken its departure hence to establish itself with you. So that if you ask anyone here the question you have just addressed to me, he will laugh in your face, and reply—ff You seem, stranger, to take me for something more than human in assuming me to know whether virtue can be taught or otherwise acquired; whereas I am so far from being able to tell this that I don't even know what virtue is." Now this is precisely my condition, Meno; I feel the same difficulty us my fellow citizens, and blame myself for knowing nothing

whatever about virtue; and not knowing what it is, how can I know any of its qualities; or do you think it possible that anyone knowing nothing at all about Meno should be able to tell whether he is handsome, rich, or noble, or the contrary? Think you he could?

Meno/ —Certainly not. But come, Socrates, tell me candidly, is it true you don't even know what virtue is, and am I to carry back this account of you when return home?

Socrates/ —Too true, my friend; and not only so, but I never yet met with anyone who did know, so far as I could judge.

Meno/ —How I Bid you never' fall in with Gorgias when he was here

Socrates/ —Oh, yes.

Meno/ —And did he not seem to you to know?

Socrates/ —I have a bad memory, Meno, and I can't now exactly say how it then appeared to me; but perhaps he did know, and you are acquainted with his views. Let me then beg you to recall what he said, or rather tell it as coming from yourself; for your opinions on the subject are, I think, the same as his.

Meno/- They are so.

Socrates/ —Suppose, then, we put him aside, as to is not here to speak for himself; and do you, Meno, tell me, in heaven's name, what you deem virtue to be | speak freely, that I may seem to have uttered a most fortunate untruth, when although acquainted with you and Gorgias, I said I never yet found anyone who knew this.

Meno/ —Nay, Socrates, there is no great difficulty in answering this question. If, for example, you want to know the virtue of man, I should say that this consists ill ability to conduct the business of the state, while in the meantime

benefiting friends, damaging opponents, and taking care to avoid any damage oneself. Or if you ask the virtue of woman, it is easy to say that this is of one who knows how to keep house, to look well after the gear, and to be obedient to her husband. So again there is one virtue of a child, male or female, another of a grown person, of slave or free. 'And many other sorts of virtue are there, so that there can be no difficulty whatever in saying what virtue is—each age, avocation, work, and individual has its peculiar virtue, and also its special vice.

Socrates/ —Indeed! Meno, it seems I am quite in luck, sine© enquiring about virtue I am at once supplied by you with a whole swarm of virtues; but—to follow up the analogy of a swarm—suppose I were to ask you what a bee is, and on your replying that bees are many and various, I were further to enquire—are they many and various as being bees—or being alike as bees, do they differ only in size, beauty, or other quality? What answer would you make to this?

Meno/ —I should say that as bees they differ not from one another.

Socrates/ —And if I further ask, in what then consists their agreement, would you be able to tell me?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —Very well then, do the same with the virtues; for although they be many and various, still they must all as being virtues possess some one form or quality, which he who would answer the question what virtue is must needs consider; do I make my meaning clear to you?

Meno/ —I think I understand you, but do not yet apprehend the question as clearly as I could wish.

Socrates/ —Does the variety which you assign to virtue, when distinguishing the virtue of man, woman, and so forth, apply to virtue only, or does it hold good of other things, as for instance of health, size, and strength? Does the health of man differ from that of woman; or is it not rather one kind so far as it is health, whether in men or anything else?

Meno/ —The health of mail and that of woman seem to me to be of one kind.

Socrates/ —And how as to size and strength. If m woman be strong, does her strength differ in kind, so far as it is strength, from man's strength, or is not rather strength alike strength, whether in one or the other?

Meno/ —Certainly it is.

Socrates/ —And does virtue differ, so far as it is virtue, in child or man, man or woman?

Meno/ —There seems to me, Socrates, to be a difference in this case, though not in the others.

Socrates/ —But did you not say that man's virtue consisted in managing a city well, and woman's in managing a house well?

Meno/ —So I say still.

Socrates/ —And can house or city or anything else be managed well if not discreetly and justly managed?

Meno/ —Certainly not.

Socrates/ —In both cases then discreet and just management implies the presence of justice and discretion?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —Both then in order to be good whether man or woman require the same qualities, namely justice and discretion?

Meno/ —So it appears.

Socrates/ —But can young or old be said to be good if intemperate and unjust?

Meno/ —Certainly not.

Socrates/ —But if temperate and just they are so?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —All men are then in one and the same way good, namely in partaking the same good qualities?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —But if their virtue were not one and the same they could not be in the same way good?

Meno/ —No, they could not.

Socrates/ —Since then virtue is one and the same in all, try and recall in what Gorgias and you also say that it consists.

Meno/ —What can it be except ability to rule men, if you want its universal characteristic?

Socrates/ —This is precisely what do want. But do you think, Meno, that the characteristic you have just named applies to the virtue of a child or slave, that the latter, for instance, should be able to rule his master? Will the ruder continue to remain a slave?

Meno/ —No, indeed, Socrates.

Socrates/ —No, it is not likely. But consider this too, —you define virtue as ability to rule, —must we not add justly?

Meno/ —Certainly I think so, Socrates; for justice is virtue.

Socrates/ —Do you mean virtue, or one of the virtues?

Meno/ —How am I to understand this?

Socrates/ —Just like any similar case. For instance, may speak of roundness as a certain figure, but not as figure generally. The reason is became there are other figures.

Meno/ —And you would be right in so saying; and so I say that there are other virtues besides justice.

Socrates/ —Which are they? tell me, as I, if desired, would also tell you other figures; what are those other virtues?

Meno/ —Well, courage seems to me to be one; then there are discretion, wisdom, magnificence, and a host of others.

Socrates/ —There again, Meno, we are in the same predicament as before; in our search for virtue we have found many virtues, though of a kind different from those before enumerated; but the one general form extending through all virtues we cannot find.

Meno/ —I am certainly as yet unable, Socrates, to discover one universal form of virtue extending throughout, such as you now seek.

Socrates/ —Very likely will however try, if possible, to come nearer to the mark. You observe that the case is the same in all things; if anyone asked you about what I just now named, what is figure? and on your replying roundness, were to rejoin, do you mean figure or one kind of figure, you would say the latter of course?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —Because there are other kinds of figure?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And if he proceeded to ask which, you would tell?

Meno/ —Doubtless.

Socrates/ —So again, if questioned about color, you. replied whiteness, you would have to admit that whiteness is not color, but one sort of color, because there are other odors?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —And if asked you would enumerate other colors having quite as much title to be so called is whiteness has?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —If then be were to follow up the argument, like myself, with the complaint that we are always getting to a multitude, and should say, Don't answer so, but since you have one name for all this multitude of different and even contradictory figures, namely figure, tell me what figure is, including the straight as well as round; for this, I presume, is your meaning?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —Not that round is no more round than, straight, or straight no more straight than round, but that both equally share the property of figure?

Meno/ —Just so.

Socrates/ —What then is the thing called figure! try and tell me. For if, in answer to the inquiry about figure and color, you were to say, I don't understand what you want or mean, the interlocutor would probably rejoin with no little surprise | don't you see that I am inquiring about that which is one and the same in all figures or colors? or do you confess yourself unable to tell that which is common to round and straight, and all figure? Try and tell me, by way of a preparatory exercise for answering about virtue.

Meno/ —-Nay, Socrates, do you rather say yourself what figure is.

Socrates/ —Must I oblige you in this?

Meno/ —By all means.

Socrates/ —And will you in return tell me what virtue is?

Meno/ —I will.

Socrates/ —Then will I use my best exertions, for it is well worth while.

Meno/ —Doubtless.

Socrates/ —Come, then, suppose I try to tell you what figure is. Consider if this will do: Suppose we call figure that which alone of all things ever accompanies color. Are you satisfied? or must we toy again? Though I should be satisfied if you were to describe virtue as well even as this.

Meno/ —But surely this is silly, Socrates.

Socrates/ —Why so?

Meno/ —You say figure is that which always accompanies color; very well: but if met with the reply what is color, what would you say then?

Socrates/ —That I had answered truly. And if the questioner were one of our wise disputatious reasoners, I should say—I have done; if I say not well, 'tis your part to answer and refute me. But if conversing with a friend, as with you on the present occasion, I should proceed more gently and dialectically, meaning by this answering not truthfully only, but in terms agreed upon and admitted by the interlocutor. And so will now toy to proceed with you. Tell me, then, do you recognize anything as an end, boundary, or limit? By all these terms mean the same thing, though Prodicus would doubtless find a difference. But you perhaps admit the terms end and boundary in the same sense—there is no great difficulty in this?

Meno/-—No, indeed; and I think I understand you.

Socrates/ —Very well, then; you speak of a superficies and a solid, and other similar things in geometry?

Meno/ —Doubtless.

Socrates/ —You may then already understand what I mean by figure. In all cases I call that which bounds a solid, figure, which may be summarized by saying that figure is the boundary of a solid.

Meno/ —But what do you say that color is, Socrates?

Socrates/ —You are too bad, Meno; thus imposing on a poor old man the labor of answering, while declining yourself to give us the benefit of your recollection as to what Gorgias said virtue is.

Meno/ —Nay, promise to tell, after you have answered this one question, Socrates.

Socrates/ —Ah! Meno, even one blindfolded could tell front listening to you that you are handsome, and have admirers.

Meno/ —Why so?

Socrates/ —Because you do nothing but issue your commands, as the fine fellows do, who play the braggart so long as they are young; perhaps, too, you see that I am peculiarly sensitive in regard to beauty. I will therefore do my best to gratify you.

Meno/ —Do so by all means.

Socrates/ —Shall I then answer after the manner of Gorgias, which you can most readily follow?

Meno/ —Of course I prefer this.

Socrates/ —Do you not follow Empedocles in admitting certain effluences or emanations from bodies?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —Also certain passages or pores through which the emanations enter and pass?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —Also that some of the emanations it certain pores, while others are too small or too great?

Meno/ —So it is.

Socrates/ —From these data, "understand what am saying"—as Pindar has it—Color is an emanation from figure commensurate with the faculty of sight and so perceived.

Meno/ —Admirably well, Socrates, in my opinion!

Socrates/ —You approve it probably as agreeing with, what you are used to hear; perceiving also at the same time how sound, smell, and the other senses may be accounted for from the other hypothesis??

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —Yes, the answer given sounds magniloquently, and is therefore perhaps more to your taste than that about figures?

Meno/ —No doubt it is.

Socrates/ —And you, O son of Alexidemus, the other is in my opinion the better of the two. I think too you would be of the same opinion, if not obliged, as yesterday intimated, to leave us before the mysteries; were you to remain longer you would be fully initiated.

Meno/ —Certainly, Socrates, I would remain, and gladly—if you would tell me many things like this.

Socrates/ —Assuredly I shall not fail in point of zeal—both for my sake and yours; but I fear I may not be able to say many things like this. But come now, do you try to keep promise by telling me what virtue is; and cease making many out of one, as people jeeringly say of those who pound a thing

to pieces; —leaving virtue sound and entire, tell me what it is. I have already given you examples of the sort of definitions I want.

Meno/ —Well, then, Socrates, virtue seems to me to be as the poet says;

> "To joy in what is fair and good,
> And joying have the power—"

and this I too say is virtue, namely, to desire the fair and to be able to attain it.

Socrates/ —Do you mean that desire for the fair implies desire for the good?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —On the supposition that some desire evil things and some good? Do not all, my good friend, desire what is good?

Meno/ —No, I think not; some seem to desire evil things.

Socrates/ —Do they so knowing them to be evil, or in a mistaken opinion that they are good?

Meno/ —Both these cases, I think, occur.

Socrates/ —Do you really think, Meno, that anyone knowingly desires evil?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —What mean you by desire? Is it not the wish that something may be acquired or added to us?

Meno/ —Of course it is.

Socrates/ —Do we, when desiring, suppose evil to be useful to those it happens to, or on the contrary hurtful?

Meno/ —There are some who on such occasions think evil useful, others who know it to be injurious.

Socrates/ —But those thinking evil to be useful, can they be said to know or to be aware of its real nature

Meno/ —This certainly seems impossible.

Socrates/ —Clearly then they desire not the evil of whose nature they are ignorant, but the seeming good in what is really evil; so that in the midst of their ignorance and mistake they are really desirous of good; —is it not so?

Meno/ —Indeed it seems so.

Socrates/ —But do they who, as you suppose, desire evil, while believing evil to be injurious, actually know that they will be injured by it?

Meno/ —Necessarily.

Socrates/ —Surely them such persons cannot know that injured persons are miserable so far as they are injured?

Meno/ —Yes, they must know it.

Socrates/ —And that the miserable are wretched?

Meno/ —Yes, think so.

Socrates/ —Are there them any who wish to be wretched and miserable?

Meno/ —No, Socrates.

Socrates/ —No one then, Meno, wishes for evil, for none wish to be wretched; and what can be more wretched than to desire evil and to obtain it?

Meno/ —You seem to say truly, Socrates; none wish for evil.

Socrates/ —But said you not just now that virtue consists in wishing the good and having power?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —So much of the definition then as requires good wishes is present to all, and in this respect one is not better than another?

Meno/ —So it seems.

Socrates/ —If then one be really better than another it must be in consequence of his capability or power.

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —It follows that, according to your definition, virtue consists in power to obtain good?

Meno/ —Assuredly, Socrates, so it seems, according to your present supposition.

Socrates/ —Well, Meno, let us consider whether you are right. Perhaps you are. Virtue, you say, consists in being able to obtain good things?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And by good things I presume you to mean health, riches, gold and silver, honorable dignities and offices in the state; you are not thinking of any other kind of goods?

Meno/ —No. I mean such as you have named.

Socrates/ —Well: virtue then consists in acquiring gold and silver, according to the judgment of Meno, the hereditary friend of the Great Persian King, But, Meno, ought you not to add the condition of just and equitable acquisition? or is there no difference, and the mere acquisition, even though unjustly made, is in your nomenclature virtue?

Meno/ —No, Socrates; this last kind of acquisition would be vice.

Socrates/ —It appears them to be absolutely necessary to add to the bare acquisition justice, discretion, piety, or some

other part of virtue; without such addition it cannot be virtue, although procuring goods.

Meno/ —Certainly, there can be no virtue without these.

Socrates/ —Moreover, to avoid acquiring gold and silver, either for oneself or another, when justice does not sanction it, is not this abstinence too virtue?'

Meno/ —So it seems.

Socrates/ —It follows there is no more virtue in acquisition than non-acquisition; but that either if accompanied by justice, will, be virtue, without justice?

Meno/ —It seems a necessary consequence.

Socrates/ —But did we not just now speak of each of these qualities—such justice, discretion, and the like, as parts of virtue?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/-—Why then, Meno, you are amusing yourself at my expense.

Meno/ —Why so, Socrates?

Socrates/ —Because in spite of my request not to break virtue in pieces or make mince-meat of it, and moreover my giving samples of the kind of answer wanted, you now tell me, in entire disregard of what has passed, that virtue consists in acquiring good things justly, justice being, as you say, a part of virtue.

Meno/ —So I say still.

Socrates/ —It follows then that virtue consists in doing whatever a man happens to do with a part of virtue; for justice and the other qualities named you consider as parts of virtue.

Meno/ —Well, what then?

Socrates/ —Why this, that having been requested to describe virtue as a whole, you, far from doing this, assert every action to be virtue which is performed with part of virtue; as if you had already defined virtue as a whole, so that I could recognize it again when you spit it into fractions. It seems then, friend Meno, that the original interrogatory most be repeated, namely, what is virtue? else any action will be virtue if done with a part of virtue—this being implied by saying that any act done with justice is virtue. Or do you think such repetition superfluous, and that one may know a part of virtue without knowing what virtue itself is?

Meno/ —No, indeed!

Socrates/ —Moreover you may remember that when I just now answered about figure, we agreed to reject answers involving terms still open to inquiry and not yet understood.

Meno/ —And we were right in so doing, Socrates.

Socrates/ —Well then, my good friend, do not you, while virtue as a whole is still the subject of inquiry, think that you resolve the problem by answering in terms witting to its parts, or indeed that on any subject a satisfactory conclusion can be arrived at in this kind of way; you would still have to answer the original inquiry—'What is that virtue to whose parts you refer; do you not think so?

Meno/ —You seem to speak reasonably.

Socrates/ —Answer then the original question—'What is virtue?

Meno/ —Ah! Socrates, before being in your company I heard of your way, how you do nothing but doubt yourself and make others doubt. And now, in fact, you seem to be a sort of wizard overpowering me with spells and enchantments, so that I feel entirely bewildered. And, if you will allow the jest, you seem to no altogether to resemble in

form and manner the flat fish called the torpedo or numbing ray—for this creature always benumbs anything which nears or touches it, and you seem now to have produced the same effect on me, that is, to have benumbed me—I feel benumbed—both in thought and speech—and know not how to answer. And yet many a time and at great length have I publicly discoursed upon virtue, and right well too, as I thought; but now I can't even tell what it is. And I think you do well to stay at home and not to travel; for if a stranger in another city you were to act as you do now, you would certainly be taken up as a wizard.

Socrates/-—You are a rogue, Meno, and had nearly taken me in.

Meno/ —Why so, Socrates?

Socrates/ —I see why you made a simile of me.

Meno/ —Why, think you?

Socrates/ —That I might in return make a similitude of you. For this is the way with all handsome people, they rejoice in being told what they are like; they have their advantage in it, for the likenesses of the beautiful are beautiful. But I will not gratify you. For myself I may say that if the torpedo benumbs others being itself benumbed, I am like it; if not, not. For it is not that seeing my own way clearly I make others doubt, but that being in the greatest perplexity myself I bring others into the same predicament. And so now in regard to virtue, —what it is I know not; —you perhaps knew before coming in contact with me, but now much resemble one who knows not. But I am quite willing to consider and inquire with you as to what it is.

Meno/ —But how, Socrates, do you propose to proceed in the inquiry, if you know not at all what it is? How seek that of whose qualities you have no notion, and which, even if you stumble on it, you have no means of recognizing?

Socrates/ —I understand you, Meno; but see what captious difficulty you introduce Into the discussion Namely that a man cannot seek either what he knows or does not know. —For what he knows he seeks not, being under no necessity of doing so; nor will he seek what he knows not, for he knows not what to seek or look for.

Meno/ —And do you not think this a good argument! Socrates?

Socrates/ —Not I.

Meno/ —Can you state any objection?

Socrates/ —'Yes, I can, for I have heard from men and women deeply versed in divine matters—

Meno/ —How, to what effect?

Socrates/ —A true, methinks, and noble tale.

Meno/ —What tale, and who the vouchers for it?

Socrates/ —The authorities are priests and priestesses who have taken pains to qualify themselves to explain matters which they take in hand; moreover Pindar, and other truly inspired poets; and what they say is this: —consider if its purport be credible. They say then that man's soul is immortal, that sometimes it ceases, causing what is called death; and then again revives, but is never destroyed, and that therefore our lives should be holy—

> "Those for whom Persephone accepts
> A ransom for their ancient woe.
> In the ninth year she gives again
> Their spirits to the upper sun;
> From whom great kings and mighty men
> And deep-learned sages rise;
> They ever after among men
> Are sacred heroes called."

Thus the soul being immortal, and having experienced repeated births, and witnessed the things of this world and the other—everything in short, has learned all things, so that no wonder if it recollects what it knew before, both about virtue and other things. For since all nature is connected, and the soul has learned everything, there is no reason why recollecting, (or a men say, learning,) one thing, it may not go on to discover everything else, if only one have sufficient courage and perseverance; for all seeking and learning is, as before said, merely recollecting.

We must not, then, allow ourselves to be misled by the captious dilemma just stated; for that would incline us to be idle, and is just what indolent men like to listen to; whereas this doctrine will make us inquisitive and energetic, and so, confiding in its truth, wish now to inquire with you into the nature of virtue.

Meno/ —Very well, Socrates; but do you simply assert this, that all learning is recollecting, or can you teach and prove to me that it is so?

Socrates/ —I have already said, Meno, that you are a rogue, and now it appears so by your asking whether I can teach you; I who just now said that all learning is recollecting, so that I may instantly seem to be contradicting myself.

Meno/ —No, on my honor, Socrates, I had no inch thought; I only used the term from habit. But if any way you can make it plain to me that the fact is as you say, pray do so.

Socrates/ —The thing is not easy, but will do my best to oblige you. Please to call hither one of your many attendants, whichever you please, that I may show it you in him.

Meno/ —Certainly. Boy, come here.

Socrates/ —Is he a Greek? and can he speak Greek?

Meno/ —Perfectly; he was born in the family.

Socrates/ —Attend now, and see whether he appears to be learning from me or remembering.

Meno/ —I am all attention.

Socrates/ —Tell me, boy, do you know that a space (or figure) like this is called a square?

Boy/ —Yes, I do.

Socrates/ —A square space then is one having all its four lines equal, these four?

Boy/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —-And these two lines which I draw from corner to corner, are not these two equal?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And may there not be a like figure of greater or smaller size than this?

Boy/ —Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ —If then this one side be supposed to be two feet, and this other also two, how many feet would there be in the whole? Consider it thus: if it were two feet this way, and this only one, would the space be other than two feet?

Boy/ —No.

Socrates/ —But since it is two feet on this side also, can it be any other than twice two?

Boy/ —No.

Socrates/ —Then it is two feet twice told?

Boy/ —Yes!

Socrates/ —Now, how many are twice two feet? consider and tell me.

Boy/ —Four, Socrates.

Socrates/ —But may there not be a figure double the size of this, —yet still of like kind, having like this all its lines equal?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And how many feet will it be?

Boy/ —Eight.

Socrates/ —Try now to tell me how long each line of that figure will be. The line of this is two feet; what will be the line of the double figure?

Boy/ —Clearly, Socrates, it must be double.

Socrates/ —You see, Meno, that I teach him nothing, but only ask questions; and now he thinks he knows the length of the line from which the square of eight feet comes—is it not so?

Meno/ —It seems so.

Socrates/ —And does he know?

Meno/ —Certainly not.

Socrates/ —He thinks, however, that it comes from the double line?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —Now attend to him, as he recollects himself a little more and better.

Now, boy, you say the double space comes from the double line; —in a figure of this kind I mean, not long one way and short another—but a figure equal every way but double of this, and containing eight feet. Consider whether you still hold that a figure drawn from the double line fulfils these conditions?

Boy/ —Yes, I think it may.

Socrates/ —Well, will not the line be doubled, if we add on another similar line on this side thus?

Boy/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —From this then, you say, will come the eight foot space, if four such lines be drawn?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —Well then, let us draw four such equal lines. Will not this be the figure of eight feet you speak off

Boy/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —But does it not contain these four spaces, each of which equals our first space of four feet?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —How much will it be then? Must it not be four times as much?

Boy/ —Of course.

Socrates/ —Is then the double space the fourfold space?

Boy/ —Certainly not.

Socrates/ —How many fold then?

Boy/ —Fourfold.

Socrates/ —You see then, boy, that from a double line there comes not a double but a fourfold space.

Boy/ —Very true.

Socrates/ —And four times four is sixteen, is it not?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —But now, from what line does the eight feet space come? The space (or square) drawn from this long line is fourfold?

Boy/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —And that from the short line, the half of the other, this space, namely, is four feet?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —Very well; must not then the eight feet space be double of this and half the other?

Boy/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —Must it not then be drawn from a longer one than this, and a shorter than this?

Boy/ —It seems so to me.

Socrates/ —Right! answer according to what seems to you, and tell me; is not this short line two feet, and the other four?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —Then the line of the eight feet space must be greater than that of two feet, and smaller than the four feet line?

Boy/ —It must.

Socrates/ —Try now to tell me how great it will be?

Boy/ —Three feet.

Socrates/ —Well, if it is to be three feet we most add to the two feet line half as much again, thus making three—two and one more added on each side—and so here is the space you speak of.

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —But if it be three feet this way and three that, the entire space mast be three times three?

Boy/ —So it appears.

Socrates/ —And how many are three times three feet?

Boy/ —Nine.

Socrates/ —But how many was the double space we spoke of to be?

Boy/ —Eight.

Socrates/ —Then the eight feet space does not come from the three feet line?

Boy/ —Certainly not.

Socrates/ —But from what line then? Try and tell us exactly; and if you cannot tell the number of feet, show us the line it must be.

Boy/ —Indeed, Socrates, I really don't know.

Socrates/ —You observe, Meno, how far he has got on the way of recollecting. At first he did not know the line giving the eight feet space, as indeed he does not yet know; but then he thought that he knew and spoke confidently as knowing, having no misgiving; whereas now he is aware of his ignorance, and not knowing does not think he knows.

Meno/ —True.

Socrates/ —And is he not now in a better condition in regard to the matter which he knows not?

Meno/ —Yes, I think he is.

Socrates/ —In bringing him then to a state of perplexity, and benumbing him as you call it, have we done him any harm?

Meno/ —No, I don't think we have.

Socrates/ —We have I think at least done something in the way of preparation towards a solution of the problem; for now he would willingly investigate what confessedly he knows not, but in his former condition he would have readily and resolutely maintained before a numerous audience that the double space must originate from the double line.

Meno/ —So it seems.

Socrates/ —Do you then think he would have set about trying to seek or learn what he thought he already knew, until, having fallen into perplexity, he became conscious of his ignorance, and so desirous to know?

Meno/ —No, I think not, Socrates.

Socrates/ —He was then benefited by being benumbed?

Meno/ —It seems so.

Socrates/ —Observe now, bow investigating the matter with me and starting from this perplexity he will make a discovery, I in the meantime teaching him nothing but only questioning him; and watch well whether I teach and instruct him, or only elicit his answers. Tell me, boy, this is our square of four feet, is it not?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And we can add to it here another equal square, can we not?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And here a third equal to the others?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And then shall we fill up this space in the corner?

Boy/ —Very well.

Socrates/ —And so we get these four equal spaces?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —Now this whole—how many fold is it of one of the spaces?

Boy/ —Fourfold.

Socrates/ —But what we wanted was twofold, or double—do you recollect?

Boy/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —Well, I draw here a line from corner to corner of each of the squares; is not each of them cut by it into two halves?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —Shall we not have then these four lines equal, surrounding this space?

Boy/ —We shall.

Socrates/ —Consider now, How large is this space?

Boy/ —I don't know.

Socrates/ —Has not the line cut off half of each of the squares, so as to include this space?

Boy/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —How many such halves are included in this space?

Boy/ —Four.

Socrates/ —And how many in this one space?

Boy/ —Two.

Socrates/ —And how many times of four is two?

Boy/ —Twofold.

Socrates/ —Then how many feet is this included space?

Boy/ —Eight feet.

Socrates/ —From what line?

Boy/ —From this line.

Socrates/ —The line extending from corner to corner of the square?

Boy/ —'Yes.

Socrates/ —This line the learned people call a diagonal; if so, we may, according to your statement, boy, conclude that the double space comes from the diagonal.

Boy/ —Certainly, Socrates.

Socrates/ —What think you, Meno; has the boy in his answers uttered anything but his own opinions?

Meno/ —No, only his own.

Socrates/ —Ami yet a little before he did not know.

Meno/ —True.

Socrates/ —And were these opinions in him then, or not?

Meno/ —They were so.

Socrates/ —So that a man who does not know has within him true opinions about that which he does not know?

Meno/ —So it seems.

Socrates/ —And now these opinions are called up within him as a dream; but if anyone were to go on questioning him variously and repeatedly about the same things, he would at last come to know about them as accurately as anyone; would he not?

Meno/ —It seems so.

Socrates/ —So that without being taught, —but merely questioned, —he will come to know, that is to recall certain knowledge out of himself?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —But to get back knowledge out of ones-self is remembering; is it not?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —But this knowledge which he now has, must he not either have obtained it at a certain time, or have always had it?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —But if he always had it he always knew; and if he ever acquired it, he could not have done so during his present life. Or has anyone taught him geometry? For what he has done in this instance he will do in the whole of geometry and the other sciences. Now has anyone taught him all this? You ought to know, especially as he was born and brought up in your house.

Meno/ —I am quite sure no one has taught him.

Socrates/ —And yet he has these opinions, has he not?

Meno/ —Certainly, Socrates; it appears so.

Socrates/ —But if he did not acquire them during his present life, must he not have acquired and learned them at some other time?

Meno/ —it seems so.

Socrates/ —And must it not have been at the time when he was not yet man?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —If then during the time when he was, and also when he was not man, there were in him true opinions, which, roused up by questioning, become science, must not his soul have been ever learning through all time? Since all time is included within his being, or not being, man.

Meno/ —So it seems.

Socrates/ —If then the truth of things be ever in our souls, the soul must be immortal, so that you may with confidence try to recollect or to know what at present you do not recollect or know.

Meno/ —You seem, Socrates, to speak rightly, though I scarcely know how.

Socrates/ —I think I am right, Meno; though as to the other things I would not be understood as asserting them very positively; but that to think we ought to seek what we do not know is better, more courageous, and less indolent; than to fancy it to be neither right to seek nor possible to find it, this I would insist on and maintain by word and deed to the utmost of my ability.

Meno/ —In this too, Socrates, you seem to me to be quite right.

Socrates/ —Being agreed, then, that we ought to inquire and seek out what we do not yet know, shall we inquire together what virtue is?

Meno/ —Certainly, And yet, Socrates, I would prefer having an answer to my original question, and would rather seek and hear whether we ought to deal with it as a thing obtainable by teaching, or as given by nature, or in some other way?

Socrates/ —If, Meno, I were not only my own master, but yours, I would not embark in the inquiry as to virtue being teachable before having first sought out what it is. But since making no effort of self-mastery (being of course determined to exercise your prerogative) you try to be my master, and in fact are so, yield; for what else can do? and we must try to determine the qualities of a thing before knowing its essence. But pray concede so far as to permit me to reply about the teachableness hypothetically. By "hypothetically" I mean something of this kind—for example, the custom with geometers, when asked whether it be possible to inscribe such a triangle in such a circle, is to answer—"I do not yet know, but this hypothesis may help as to a solution; if the triangle be of such a nature as that the deficiency of the

produced line here equals the excess here, a certain consequence will follow, which on a different supposition will not follow,"—and the answer must depend on the issues of the supposition. And so now in regard to virtue! since we know not yet what or of what nature it is, let us consider the question of its teachableness, saying hypothetically thus: if belonging to such and such a class of spiritual things, it is teachable, if not, not; if, for instance, it be science or knowledge or other than science or knowledge, it will be or not be teachable, or as we before said, rememberable; —for we may now use either word at pleasure. Well, if it be knowledge, is it not teachable? For is not this at least clear that a man can only be taught that which is science or knowledge?

Meno/ —So it seems to me.

Socrates/ —If then virtue be a kind of science or knowledge, it may be taught?

Meno/ —Of course.

Socrates/ —We are then -quickly at the end of this hypothetical inquiry, —if virtue be of such a nature it is teachable, if not, not.

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —But then we must go on to inquire whether virtue be science or something differing from science?

Meno/ —I suppose we must.

Socrates/ —But what! Do we not assume virtue to be good, and must we not stand by this hypothesis?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —If then there be any good separate from science, possibly virtue may not be science; but if there be

no good which science does not comprehend, we may perhaps be justified in supposing it to be a kind of science?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —It is through virtue that men are good, is it not?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And if good, useful; for all good things are useful, are they not?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —Virtue then is a useful thing?

Meno/ —This follows from what has been already granted.

Socrates/ —Let us then consider in detail what are useful things—health, certainly, and wealth, strength, beauty—may be reckoned among the number, may they not?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —But are not these very things sometimes said to be hurtful? or do you deny this?

Meno/ —No, I agree to it.

Socrates/ —Consider now, what guidance is necessary in order to make each of these useful, and what other influence causes them to be hurtful; is it not the right use which makes them useful, the wrong hurtful?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —Let us also consider the things of the soul. Do you not call temperance or sobriety something, also justice, courage, intelligence, memory, magnanimity, and such like?

Meno/ —Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ —Consider now whether some of these which appear not as science, but different, do not turn out sometimes useful, sometimes hurtful; courage, for instance, when appearing not as wisdom but mere daring; is not a men whose daring is untempered with intelligence injured thereby, whereas when wisely daring he is benefited

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And so of temperance and quickness of apprehension; —what we intelligently and wisely learn or refrain from benefits us, whereas injudicious learning or abstinence injures, does it not?

Meno/ —Most assuredly.

Socrates/ —And generally, all the undertakings and endurances of the soul when prudently and wisely directed lead to happiness, and the contrary if imprudently?

Meno/ —So it seems.

Socrates/ —If then virtue be one of the things of the soul, and be always necessarily useful, it must be wisdom or prudence, since the things of the soul generally are in themselves neither useful or hurtful, but by the addition of wisdom or folly become one or the other. And so virtue, as being always beneficial, must be a kind of wisdom.

Meno/ —So it seems.

Socrates/ —The other things toil which we just now spoke of—wealth and the like—as being sometimes useful sometimes hurtful, is it not the same wisdom which was found needful to regulate the soul, here also again to enable the soul to render these things useful by making a right use of them?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —That is, the wise soul will use them rightly, the foolish perversely.

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —So that it may be said generally that all other things must be subject to the direction of man's soul, and the things of the soul itself must be directed by wisdom, if they men to be considered good; according to this wisdom would be the truly useful thing; and we assumed virtue to be useful, did we not?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —Then wisdom must be virtue, either the whole or part of it.

Meno/ —I think you are right, Socrates.

Socrates/ —Well, if so, men cannot be good by nature.

Meno/ —No, think not.

Socrates/ —For if they were so, this would follow—we should have among us a class of persons who would know how to distinguish young persons of good disposition, whom at their indication we should take and guard in the Acropolis, sealing and stamping them more carefully than if they were gold, in order to prevent anyone from debasing or corrupting them; so that when they came of age, they would be made useful to the State.

Meno/ —Very naturally, Socrates.

Socrates/ —Since then men are not good by nature, do they become so by teaching?

Meno/ —This now appears to be the inevitable conclusion; and it is clear, Socrates, that, according to our hypothesis, if virtue be science, it may be taught.

Socrates/ —By heaven, perhaps so; but what if we were not justified in making the supposition?

Meno/ —And yet it appeared at the time to be reasonable.

Socrates/ —But then we want an inference which shall not only seem to have been reasonable formerly, but one which shall appear so now and for all time, if it is to be a reliable and sound one.

Meno/ —Why, what's the matter now? What makes you dissatisfied and distrustful as to virtue being science?

Socrates/ —I will tell you: —I don't deny that virtue is teachable if it be really science; but now consider whether I have not good ground for doubting the fact as to its being so; if a thing be teachable, whether virtue or anything else, does it not follow that there will be teachers and learners?

Meno/ —Yes; I think so.

Socrates/ —And on the other hand, if there be no teachers or learners, may we not infer with some plausibility that the thing is not teachable?

Meno/ —Certainly; but do you really think there are no teachers of virtue?

Socrates/ —I have repeatedly looked for such teachers, and yet—do all I may—I never succeed in finding them. I am not alone in the inquiry, pursue it along with many others, whom I deem to be best versed in the matter fund most likely to succeed in making the discovery). And here most opportunely, Meno, comes Anytus, the son of Anthemion, whom I propose we should request to take part in our inquiry. He is a very fit person to consult, being the son of a wealthy and wise father, —the already named Anthemion, —who became rich through his own exertions, —not like Ismenias the Theban, who lately inherited the wealth of Polycrates, but having earned it by his own address and industry; being besides a courteous and affable person, not haughty and pompous and supercilious; and he gave his

son, who now joins us, an excellent education, at least such is the opinion of the Athenian people, for they appoint him to the highest offices in the state. It seems just the thing to inquire with such men about teachers of virtue, and who and what they me. Pray, Anytus, help us in our inquiry, me and your friend Meno here, to find out who are teachers of this matter. Consider it thus: —If we wished to make Meno here a good physician, to whom should we send him as a pupil; would it not be to the physicians?

Anytus/ —Of course it would.

Socrates/ —And if we wished to make him a good shoemaker, should we not apprentice him to a shoemaker?

Anytus/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And so of other things?

Anytus/ —Of course.

Socrates/ —But tell me again; —we said it would be right to send him to a physician, if wishing to make a physician of him; is not our meaning here that it is wise to send him to those professing the art rather than those not professing it, persons taking payment for this very thing, as having announced themselves as teachers to anyone desirous to learn; is it not such considerations to which we refer when speaking of a judicious choice?

Anytus/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And so of flute-playing and other arts; it would surely be foolish, if wishing to make anyone a flute-player, not to send him to those undertaking to teach the art, and taking payment for doing so, but instead of this to trouble other persons who neither profess the art in question nor receive pupils; would not this be highly absurd?

Anytus/ —Very foolish, no doubt, and very ignorant.

Socrates/ —Very well! Now then I may ask you to assist me in considering the case of our friend Meno. He tells me he wants to acquire the virtue and wisdom by which men become enabled to manage their domestic affairs properly, and those of the State; that which teaches them their duty to parents, and how honorably and hospitably to entertain both citizens and strangers; now, in order to learn such accomplishments, to whom must we send him? Must we not, according to the admission just made, send him to those publicly offering themselves as teachers of virtue, receiving a fixed price for so doing?

Anytus/ —And who are these persons of whom you are speaking, Socrates?

Socrates/ —Surely you must know that they are those whom men call "Sophists."

Anytus/ —Hercules! say no more of them, Socrates; may no intimate relative of mine, citizen or stranger, be seized with the madness of exposing himself to be corrupted by persons like these persons sure to pervert and ruin all who go near them.

Socrates/ —How, Anytus? Are these men alone so different from all others professing to benefit their fellow-men, that they not only do not benefit those resorting to them, but; on the contrary, ruin and destroy them, moreover publicly demanding money for doing this? Really? I can't bring myself to believe you; for I know one named Protagoras, who made more money through this profession than even Phidias, the author of no many noble and celebrated works; and you may add ten more sculptors into the bargain. It seems monstrous that while cobblers and menders of old clothes could not escape detection for thirty days if they returned shoes and clothes in a worse condition than before, but would assuredly be left to die of starvation,

Protagoras escaped undetected for more than forty years while corrupting those resorting to him, and sending them away in a worse condition than that in which they came. For he was seventy when he died, and had been practicing his art for forty years; and during the whole of this period his reputation continued unimpaired, and still remains so to this day. And this is true, not of Protagoras only, but of many others also, some older than he, some still living; but what shall we say of these people; shall we hold with you that they knowingly deceived and corrupted the youth, or that they did. so inadvertently and ignorantly; and thus treat as crazy and insane those whom some deem to be the wisest of men?

Anytus/ —No, Socrates, they are far from being insane; it is rather the young men who give them so much money who are insane, and still more their guardians and relatives; and most of all the cities and communities which allow them to come among them, instead of unceremoniously expelling them, whether natives or foreigners.

Socrates/ —But, Anytus, has any of these Sophists done you an injury, that you are so hard upon them?

Anytus/ —Me? No, truly, I was never in their company, and would certainly never allow anyone belonging to me to be so.

Socrates/ —Then you really don't know anything about these men?

Anytus/ —And trust I may never know.

Socrates/ —But then, if you know nothing whatever about the matter, how can you possibly tell whether it has any good in it or any bad?

Anytus/ —Easily! I know well what these people are, whether personally conversant with them or not.

Socrates/ —Then you must be a prophet, Anytus, for according to your own words I can't conceive how you can have come to know about them in any other way. However, we did not propose to inquire by whose instrumentality Meno would be made bad, —let these, if you will have it so, be supposed to be the Sophists; but tell us, and oblige your hereditary friend here by pointing out where and to what teachers he must go, in order to become a proficient in the virtue just described?

Anytus/ —Why not yourself tell him?

Socrates/ —But I have already named those whom I thought to be sufficient teachers, though from what you now say it appears that I was wrong; and perhaps I was so; —but do you in turn tell him where to go, and to which of the Athenians he should apply name anyone you please.

Anytus/ —What need to mention names? If he takes my advice, any worthy and respectable Athenian he meets with will be of far more use to him than the Sophists.

Socrates/ —But then these worthy and respectable men, —did they become such without teaching, and will they be able to teach others what they never learned themselves?

Anytus/ —I presume them to have learned from the worthy and respectable men before them; —or do you not think that there have always been plenty of good and worthy men in this city?

Socrates/ —Yes, Anytus; I do think that we have many able and worthy men, and that in time past we had them no less than now. But what I want to know is, were these worthy men able to teach their worth and goodness to others? For this is the point of our inquiry, —not whether there are now or have been in former times good men in this city, but whether virtue is teachable or not? which now becomes

reduced to this—were those good men, whether of the present or former times, —able to communicate their virtue to others, or were they not; —and must we conclude that virtue is not a thing which can be conveyed from man to man? This is what we were considering, I and Meno here, when you came. Now tell me, according to what you have just said—I presume you would call Themistocles a good man?

Anytus/ —Certainly I do, one of the foremost rank.

Socrates/ —And a good teacher also; —you would admit that if any could teach the virtue which he possessed, he could?

Anytus/ —No doubt he could if he wished to do so.

Socrates/ —But do you think it was not his wish to make others good, and especially his own son—or that from envy he purposely withheld from his son the virtue in which he excelled himself? Have you not heard how Themistocles had his son Cleophantus taught to be a skillful equestrian, so that he could stand upright on horseback, and throw a javelin in that position, and perform other marvelous feats in which his father caused him to be instructed—availing himself in this of good teachers to the utmost—did you never hear this from the older men?

Anytus/ —Yes, I have heard.

Socrates/ —But no one could accuse his son of having a bad disposition?

Anytus/ —Perhaps not.

Socrates/ —But how now, did you ever hear from young or old that this Cleophantus turned out a good and wise man like his father?

Anytus/ —Certainly not.

Socrates/ —Are we then to infer that Themistocles, wishing his son to be instructed in such accomplishments, would yet have been content to leave him in vulgar ignorance in regard to those things in which he was wise himself, if virtue could be taught?

Anytus/ —By Zeus, perhaps not.

Socrates/ —Such a teacher of virtue then was this eminent man whom you yourself admit to have been among the best of former times. Let us now consider another, Aristides the son of Lysimachus. Do you not admit him to be a good man?

Anytus/ —Certainly I do.

Socrates/ —And did he not give his own son Lysimachus the best education to be got in Athens, so far as teachers went, without succeeding in making him at all a better man? You have associated with him, and know what sort of man he is. Well! and there is Pericles, that super-eminently clever man, he, you know, brought up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus?

Anytus/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —Well, he taught them, as you well know, to be excellent horsemen, and had them instructed in music, gymnastics, and other artistic accomplishments, so as to be inferior to none; and was it not also his wish to make them good men? Certainly, I think he wished it, but it is to be feared that this teaching is impossible. And to prevent your supposing that only a few inferior Athenians were powerless in this matter, recollect how Thucydides likewise brought up two sons, Milesias mid Stephanus, educating, them well in other respects, and especially in wrestling, in which they came to exceed all others; for he entrusted one to Xanthias,

and the other to Eudoxus, who were esteemed the best wrestlers of the time. Do you remember?

Anytus/ —I have heard it so reported.

Socrates/ —Is it not then clear that he would never have taught his children these very expensive accomplishments while omitting to teach them the goodness which would have cost him nothing, (since he could himself have taught it), if goodness were susceptible of being taught? or perhaps Thucydides too was a person of inferior means, having no rich following of friends among the Athenians and their allies; —whereas on the contrary he was, no rich "following of friends' among the Athenians and their allies; —whereas on the contrary he was, as you know, of illustrious family, and exercised great influence both at home and abroad; so that had virtue been teachable, he would assuredly have found out some one, native or foreign, to teach it to his sons, in case of his being too much occupied with public affairs to do it himself. The truth, I apprehend, must be, friend Anytus, that virtue is not teachable.

Anytus/ —You seem, Socrates, to make light of speaking disparagingly of other men. If you will be advised by me, I would recommend you to take care what you are about; for in most cities it is easier to do a man an ill turn than a good, and more especially in this city; —this I think you are already yourself aware of.

Socrates/ —So! Meno, Anytus seems to be out of humor with me, nor am surprised at it; for he supposes me to be bringing an accusation against these eminent men, and moreover considers himself one of them. But if he should ever come to know what it is to be ill-spoken of, —he will no longer be angry; —now, however, he does not know. But tell me, are there not also good and worthy people among you?

Meno/ —Certainly there are.

Socrates/ —And are they willing to come forward as teachers of the young, and to admit that virtue is teachable?

Meno/ —No, indeed, Socrates; they vary in opinion about it; sometimes they say it is teachable, some-times the contrary.

Socrates/ —Can we then call those teachers of a thing who do not even admit the thing in question to be teachable?

Meno/ —I think not, Socrates.

Socrates/ —But how about the Sophists, the only professed teachers, do they appear to you real teachers of virtue?

Meno/ —There is one thing, Socrates, which I especially admire in Gorgias, namely that you never hear him profess this; on the contrary he laughs at those professing to make men virtuous; he thinks the aim of tuition should be to make powerful speakers.

Socrates/ —Then you too hold the Sophists to be no teachers of virtue?

Meno/ —really can't say, Socrates; I am like the rest; sometimes I think they can teach it, sometimes not.

Socrates/ —Well, you are not alone in this uncertainly, you and other public men; the poet Theognis himself hesitates between two opinions, as when he says in his Elegiacs: —

> "Sit at the feasts of the great, and court the goodwill of the strongest.
>
> For good is still learned from the good; whereas if you mix with the wicked.
>
> You in all probability loose the good disposition you had once—"

and then, after here seemingly speaking of virtue as teachable, says a little further on: —

> "Could a good disposition be artificially communicated to man, many and great would be the rewards which would be given for such an endowment"—

and again: —

> "Ne'er from good sire would evil offspring come
> To words of wisdom listening: but by art
> Ne'er wilt thou make the bad a virtuous man."

You observe here how one and the same authority contradicts himself?

Meno/ —So it seems.

Socrates/ —Now can you name any other thing whatever whose professed teachers not only fail to make good their right to teach, but openly admit their ignorance and incapacity as to the matter in question; while on the other hand those generally admitted to be good and worthy, and so well qualified in regard to it, hesitate and contradict themselves as to its teachableness, sometimes saying it is teachable, sometimes not; can you say of men whose opinions are in such a state of confusion about a thing, that they are proper teachers of it?

Meno/ —No, indeed!

Socrates/ —If, then, neither the Sophists nor those who are themselves good and worthy, are adequate teachers of goodness and virtue, it seems clear there can be no teachers of it?

Meno/ —I think not.

Socrates/ —And if no teachers, there can be no learners?

Meno/ —So it would seem.

Socrates/ —But we agreed that a matter, of which there are neither teachers nor learners, is not teachable?

Meno/ —We did so.

Socrates/ —There seem then to be nowhere teachers of virtue?

Meno/ —None.

Socrates/ —And if no teachers, there can be no learners?

Meno/ —No

Socrates/ —Virtue, then, is not teachable!

Meno/ —It seems not, if our reasoning has boon correct; so that I am left in doubt whether, after all, there are any good men, and if there are, what is the manner or method by which they became so.

Socrates/ —We seem, Meno, to be in danger of appearing two foolish fellows, —doing little credit to our respective teachers, you to Gorgias and to Prodicus. We mast then before all things look to ourselves, and seek someone who will find some way of bettering as. Maw, looking back to the steps of our inquiry, I find we have made an important omission, absurdly forgetting that it is not trader direction of science alone that men manage affairs rightly; —so that perhaps here may be discovered the way in which men become good?

Meno/ —How mean you, Socrates?

Socrates/ —Thus: —we were justified, think, in admitting that good men must needs be useful, were we not?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And that they are useful whom they conduct public affairs properly, this too was a proper admission?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —But possibly we were not right in holding it to be impossible to conduct them well without knowledge or insight?

Meno/ —How out that be?

Socrates/ —I will tell you. Supposing a man, knowing the way to Larissa or elsewhere, were to offer to act as guide to others, he would of course be qualified and sufficient for the purpose—would he not?

Meno/ —Of course.

Socrates/ —But what if not knowing, but only rightly, conjecturing the way, would he not under these circumstances too be a good guide?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —And as long as holding a right opinion about the matter which the other knows, he will for the purpose of practical direction not be inferior to the other?

Meno/ —Not in the least.

Socrates/ —Right opinion then is practically no worse a guide than scientific knowledge; and here is the oversight we made in our inquiry about virtue, namely in treating wisdom as the sole guide to right conduct, and omitting right opinion.

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —In point of usefulness then right opinion quite equals knowledge?

Meno/ —No, Socrates, not quite; he who has knowledge will always be right; he who has only opinion will sometimes hit the mark, sometimes miss.

Socrates/ —How? Will not the man of right opinions always hit the mark, as long as his opinions are right?

Meno/ —Such seems to be the necessary inference, and under these circumstances I wonder, Socrates, why science should be thought better than right opinion, or indeed how one should differ from the other.

Socrates/ —Do you see the cause of your wonder, or would you have me explain it to you?

Meno/ —Pray explain.

Socrates/ —Did you ever notice the Dædalean images? possibly in your country there are none of them.

Meno/ —Why ask the question

Socrates/ —Because these images, if not tied and chained, are apt to run away; but if tied they remain.

Meno/ —What then?

Socrates/ —On the above supposition it is obvious that a Dædalean image unchained is of little worth, as having no continuance; but if chained it is valuable, for these images are really beautiful works. The same holds good of right opinions; these, so long as they remain, are beautiful and highly serviceable, but are apt to run away, as having no hold on the mind of the possessor, until bound by a chain of reasoning formed out of their causal interconnection. And this chain, friend Meno, as we before agreed, is memory or recollecting. When opinions are so chained they become science, and so steadfast and enduring. This is the reason why science is more valuable than right opinion, and it is this tie or character of fixity which makes the difference between them.

Meno/ —By Jove, Socrates, this seems to be near the truth.

Socrates/ —I don't mean to assert this positively as a certainty, but only conjecturing the fact to be so; but one thing I do feel certain about, namely that science and right opinion are different in their nature; there are few things I profess to know, but if I may pretend to know anything, it is this.

Meno/ —You say well, Socrates.

Socrates/ —Is not this too well said, that right opinion accomplishes its work in individual cases as well as science

Meno/ —In this too you seem to say truly.

Socrates/ —Practically then right opinion is not inferior or less useful than science, nor a man possessing the former to one having the latter?

Meno/ —So it is.

Socrates/ —And we agreed that the good man is useful?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —Since then it is not through science alone that men are good and useful, but also through right opinion, while at the same time neither of these can be said to be either naturally given or acquired, —or do you suppose either to be naturally given?

Meno/ —Certainly not.

Socrates/ —Well, if not naturally given, men are not good by nature?

Meno/ —No.

Socrates/ —And since not by nature, oar next inquiry was whether they become so by teaching?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And we found this to be the case, if virtue consisted in wisdom or insight.

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And that if teachable it must be wisdom.

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —And that if there be teachers of it, it is teachable, if not, not.

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —And we came to the conclusion that there are no such teachers, —implying that it is not teachable, and also that it does not consist in wisdom?

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —But we admitted it to be good, —and that right direction is good and useful?

Meno/ —Yes.

Socrates/ —Also that the only right guidance comes from science or true opinion, through possession of which man is rightly directed. For that which happens by chance is beyond human control; —the only means by which man leads aright are right opinion and science.

Meno/ —So it seems.

Socrates/ —Since then virtue is not teachable nor a science, —one of two good and useful things is dismissed, and science is not leader in political affairs?

Meno/ —No, it seems not.

Socrates/ —It was not then through wisdom or science that great men, like Themistocles and others just alluded to by Anytus, directed the State, and hence, not being themselves scientifically qualified, they were not competent to convey their own qualifications to others.

Meno/ —It seems to be, Socrates, as you say.

Socrates/ —And if not by science, it remains only to suppose that it was by a sort of right opinion that statesmen governed the city well, persons holding the same relation to wisdom or science as prophets or diviners; for these too say many true things, but understand nothing of what they utter.

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —These sort of persons, namely soothsayers, diviners, and poets, —may well be called divine; and no less than these we may say of statesmen that they acted under a sort of enthusiasm and divine inspiration, when by their eloquence they directed important affairs rightly without any distinct consciousness of what they were saying.

Meno/ —Certainly.

Socrates/ —Also the women, Meno, call good men divine; the Lacedaemonians too, when they want to extol some object of their admiration, say—oh, the godlike man!

Meno/ —And they are right, Socrates; but perhaps Anytus here is displeased at your saying so.

Socrates/ —It is a matter of indifference to me. With him, Meno, I shall have other opportunities of speaking. But if we have been right in the course of our present long inquiry, it would appear that virtue comes neither by nature nor teaching, but is conveyed to those possessing it by a sort of divine accident in which reason does not operate; unless indeed there be among the political men or statesmen one able to make others political. If such there be, he may almost be said to stand among the living, as Homer says Tiresias did among the dead, —

> "He alone has a conscious soul—the rest are flitting ghosts."

Just so would such a man be in respect of virtue, as a real existence among shadows.

Meno/ —You seem to me, Socrates, to speak admirably.

Socrates/-—It follows from our course of reasoning, Meno, that virtue comes to those possessing it by divine allotment; —but we shall better know the truth about it when, —instead of considering how men come to attain virtue, we endeavor to meet the previous question what

virtue essentially is. It is now time for me to go elsewhere; — but do you try to impress your own convictions on your friend Anytus, that he may become of milder temper; if you prevail, you will not only benefit him, but may be doing the Athenians a service.

The Meno.

Translated by Mr. Sydenham.

Persons of the Dialog.

Meno, Socrates,

Boy, Anytus.

scene. —the Lycæum.

Meno/ Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is to be taught; or whether it is acquired, not through teaching, but through exercise and habit; or whether it comes neither by exercise, nor yet by teaching, but is by nature with those who are possessed of it; or comes it to them by some other way?

Socrates/ You Thessalians, Meno, have been of old eminent among the Grecians. You have been long admired for your superior skill in horsemanship, and famed for the great wealth you are possessed of. But I think you have now acquired no less same for wisdom. And amongst others of you, the Fellow-citizens of your friend Aristippus of Larissa have distinguished themselves not a little in this respect. Now this is entirely the work of Gorgias. For in his travels, when he came to their city, he drew the chiefs of the Aleuadian family (one of whom is your friend Aristippus), and indeed all of highest quality in the other states of Thessaly, to be the admirers of his wisdom. From him you Thessalians learned the habit of answering to any question whatever with an undaunted and a noble confidence, such indeed as becomes those who have a thorough knowledge of the subject proposed to them. For he in the same manner offered himself to be freely interrogated by anyone of the Grecians, whom it should please to ask him, concerning any point which the party questioning might choose: and to no

question of any person did he ever refuse an answer. But we in this place, my friend Meno, are in a condition quite the contrary. Amongst us there is a dearth, as it were, of wisdom; which seems to have forsaken our country, and to have fled to yours. So that if you should take it into your head to propose to anyone here the question you have proposed to me, there is not a man of us who would not laugh and say, "Friend stranger, you must think me wonderfully wise, to know whether virtue is a thing which can be taught, or by what other means it is attained: when I am so far from knowing whether it can be taught or not, that I have not the good fortune to know so much as what virtue is." Now this, Meno, is exactly my own case. I am in the same poverty of knowledge as to this affair, and confess myself to be totally ignorant concerning the essence of virtue. How then should I be able to say what qualities are to be attributed to that which is utterly unknown to me? Or do you think it possible for a man, wholly ignorant who Meno is, to know whether Meno is a man of honor, a man of fortune, a man of a generous spirit, or whether he is the reverse of all these characters? Do you think it possible?

Meno/ I do not. But in good earnest, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? and do you give me leave to carry home such a character of you, and to make this report of you in my country?

Socrates/ Not only that, my friend, but this further—that I never met anywhere with a man whom I thought master of such a piece of knowledge.

Meno/ Did you never then meet with Gorgias, during his stay in this city?

Socrates/ I did.

Meno/ And did you think that he knew nothing of the matter?

Socrates/ I do not perfectly remember, Meno, and therefore am not able to say directly what I then thought of him. But perhaps not only was he himself knowing in the nature of virtue, but what he used to say on that subject you also know. Do you then remind me what account he gave of virtue; or, if you are unwilling so to do, give me an account of it yourself; for I suppose you agree with him in opinion.

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ Let us leave him, therefore, out of the question, especially considering that he is absent. But what you yourself think virtue to be, tell me, Meno, and freely communicate your knowledge of it, that I may be happy in being convicted of having uttered what is so happily an untruth, when I said that I never anywhere met with a man who knew what virtue was; when, at the same time, both yourself and Gorgias shall appear to have been so well acquainted with the nature of it.

Meno/ Whatever you may imagine, Socrates, it is by no means difficult to tell what you desire to know. In the first place, to instance in the virtue of a man, nothing is easier to tell than that a man's virtue consists in his ability to manage affairs of state, and, in managing them, to be of service to the public and to its friends, to distress its enemies, and to guard, at the same time, with vigilance and circumspection, against any harm that might arise from those enemies in their turn. Then, if you would know what is the virtue of a woman, it is easy enough to run over the particulars: it is to manage well the affairs of her family, carefully to keep safe all that is in the house, and to hearken with due observance to her husband. Another kind of virtue belongs to a child, different too in a girl from what it is in a boy, so is it likewise of the aged. And if you choose to proceed further, the virtue of a free man is one thing, that of a slave is another thing. Many more virtues are there, of all sorts; so that one cannot

be at a loss to tell, concerning virtue, what it is. For in every action, and in every age of life, with reference to every kind of business, some peculiar virtue belongs to each person: and in vice also, I suppose, Socrates, there is the same respective difference, and the same variety.

Socrates/ I think myself much favored by Fortune, Meno; for, when I was only in quest of one virtue, I have found, it seems, a whole swarm of virtues hiving in your mind. But, to pursue this similitude, taken from bees: —Supposing, Meno, I had asked you what was the nature of a bee, and you had told me that bees were many and various, what would you have answered me if I had demanded of you further, whether you called them many and various, and differing one from another, in respect of their being bees; or whether you thought they differed not in this respect, but with regard to something else, as beauty, or size, or other thing of like kind, accidental? What answer would you have made to such a question?

Meno/ I should have answered thus; that so far as they were bees, and in this respect, they differed not at all one from another.

Socrates/ Suppose, then, that I had afterwards said, Tell me, therefore, Meno, concerning this very nature of bees, in respect of which they do not differ, but all agree and are alike; what say you that it is? Should you have had any answer to have given me to this question?

Meno/ I should.

Socrates/ Just so is it with the virtues. Many indeed are they, and of various kinds: but they all agree in one and the same idea; through their agreement in which they are, all of them alike, virtues. This idea the man, who is asked the question which I have asked of you, ought to have in his eye when he answers it; and, copying from this idea, to draw a

description of virtue. Do you not apprehend the meaning of what I say?

Meno/ Tolerably well, I think I do. But I am not in the possession of it so fully as I could wish.

Socrates/ Take it thus then do you think after this manner concerning virtue only, that the virtue of a man is one thing, the virtue of a woman another thing, and so of other respective virtues, that they are all different? or have you the same way of thinking as to the health, size, and strength of the body? Do you think the health of a man to be one thing, the health of a woman to be a thing different? or is the same idea of health everywhere, wherever health is, whether it be in a man, or in whatever subject it be found?

Meno/ The health of a man and the health of a woman, I think, are equally and alike health, one and the same thing.

Socrates/ Do you not think after the same manner with regard to size and strength; that a woman, if she be strong, is strong according to the same idea, and with the same strength, which gives a strong man the denomination of strong? By the same strength I mean this, that whether strength be in a man, or in a woman, considering it as strength, there is no difference; or do you think that there is any difference between strength and strength?

Meno/ I think there is not any.

Socrates/ And will any difference, think you then, be found in virtue, with respect to its being virtue, whether it be in a child or in an aged person, in a woman or in a man?

Meno/ This case of virtue, Socrates, seems somehow to be not exactly parallel with those other instances.

Socrates/ Why? Did you not tell me that the virtue of a man consisted in his well-managing of civil affairs, and that of a woman in the well-managing of her household?

Meno/ I did.

Socrates/ I ask you, then, whether it is possible to manage any affairs well, whether civil or domestic, or any other affairs whatever, without a prudent and a just management?

Meno/ By no means.

Socrates/ If then the management be just and prudent, must not the managers manage with justice and with prudence?

Meno/ They must.

Socrates/ Both of them, therefore, have occasion for the same things, to qualify them for being good managers, both the woman and the man, namely, justice and prudence.

Meno/ It appears they have.

Socrates/ And how is it in the case of a child, or that of an old man? Can these ever be good, if they are dissolute and dishonest?

Meno/ By no means.

Socrates/ But only by their being sober and honest?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ All persons, therefore, who are good, are good in the same way; for they are good by being possessed of the same qualities.

Meno/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Now if virtue were not the same thing in them all, they would not be good in the same way.

Meno/ They would not.

Socrates/ Seeing, therefore, that virtue is the same thing in all of them, endeavor to recollect and tell me, what was the account given of it by Gorgias, which was the same, it seems, with the account you would give of it yourself?

Meno/ What else is it than to be able to govern men? If you are in search of that, which is one and the same thing in all persons who have virtue.

Socrates/ It is the very thing I am in search of. But is this then the virtue of a child, Meno? And is it the virtue of a slave, to be able to govern his master? Do you think him to be any longer a slave, when he can govern?

Meno/ I think he is then by no means a slave indeed, Socrates.

Socrates/ Neither is it proper, my friend, that he should be so. Consider this also further. You say it is virtue to be able to govern. Should we not immediately subjoin the word justly, and say, to govern justly? For you would not say, that to govern unjustly is virtue.

Meno/ I think we should. For justice, Socrates, is virtue.

Socrates/ Virtue is it, Meno, or some certain virtue?

Meno/ How mean you by this distinction?

Socrates/ I mean no otherwise than as everything else whatever is distinguished: to instance, if you please, in roundness. Of this I should say that it is some certain figure, and not thus simply and absolutely that it is figure. And for this reason should I express myself in that manner, because there are other figures beside the round.

Meno/ You would thus speak rightly. And indeed, to say the truth, I myself not only call justice a virtue, but say that other virtues there are beside.

Socrates/ Say, what these other virtues are. As I would recount to you, were you to bid me, other figures beside the round; do you recount to me, in like manner, other virtues beside justice.

Meno/ Well then; courage I think to be a virtue, and temperance another, and wisdom, and magnanimity, and a great many more.

Socrates/ Again, Meno, we have met with the same accident as before; we have again found many virtues, while in search of one only; though then indeed in a different way from that in which we have now alighted on them: but the one virtue, which is the same through all these, we are not able to find.

Meno/ For I am not able as yet, Socrates, to apprehend such virtue as you are inquiring after, that one in all, as in other things I am able.

Socrates/ Probably so; but I will do the best I can to help us onward in our inquiry. Already you apprehend, in some measure, that thus it is in everything. For should any person have asked you what was figure, the thing I just now mentioned, and you had said it was roundness; were he then to ask you, according to the same distinction which I made concerning justice, whether roundness was figure, or some certain figure; you would answer, it was some certain figure.

Meno/ Without all doubt.

Socrates/ And would you not answer thus for this reason, because there are other figures beside the round?

Meno/ For that very reason.

Socrates/ And were he to ask you further, of what sort those other figures were, you would tell him?

Meno/ I should.

Socrates/ Again; questioned in the same manner concerning color, what it is? had you answered, It is whiteness; should the questioner immediately proceed to this further question, whether whiteness is color, or some certain color? you would say, Some certain color; because there happen to be other colors.

Meno/ I should.

Socrates/ And if he were to bid you enumerate those other colors, you would speak of colors, which happen to be colors no less than the white.

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If then he were to prosecute the argument, as I do, he would say, We are always getting into multitude; deal not with me in this manner: but since to all this multitude you give one common name; since you tell me there is none of them which is not figure; and that, notwithstanding, they are contrary some to others; what is this which comprehends the round as well as the straight, this thing to which you give the name of figure, and tell me that the round is figure not more than is the straight? or do you not say this?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ I ask you, then, whether when you say this, you mean it in respect of roundness, and that the round is not more round than is the straight? or with regard to straightness, and that the straight is not more straight than is the round?

Meno/ I mean not thus, Socrates.

Socrates/ But it is with a view to figure, that you assert the round not more to be figure than is the straight, nor the straight more than is the round.

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ Try then if you can tell me, what that thing is which is called by this general name of figure. Now suppose, that to an inquirer in this way concerning figure, or concerning color, you were to say, I do not comprehend what it is you would have, man; nor do I know what it is you mean: he perhaps would wonder; and would say, Do you not comprehend that I am inquiring, what is the same in all

these? Would you have nothing to say neither after this, Meno, were you to be asked, what that was in the round, in the straight, and in the other things you call figures, in all of them the same? Endeavor to find out and tell me what it is; that you may the better afterwards consider of, and answer to, the like kind of question concerning virtue.

Meno/ Not so, Socrates; but do you yourself rather say what figure is.

Socrates/ Would you have me oblige you in this point?

Meno/ By all means.

Socrates/ Shall you then be willing to tell me what virtue is?

Meno/ I shall.

Socrates/ Let us then do our best; for the cause deserves it.

Meno/ Without all doubt.

Socrates/ Come then; let us try if we can tell you what figure is. See if you can accept the following account of figure. Let us say, figure is that which of all things is the only one that always accompanies color. Are you satisfied with this account? or do you inquire any further? For my part, I should be well contented if you would give me but as good an account of virtue.

Meno/ But, Socrates, this is weak and silly.

Socrates/ How so?

Meno/ According to your account, that is figure which always accompanies color.

Socrates/ Well.

Meno/ But should any person now reply, that he knew not what color was, and was equally at a loss concerning color and concerning figure, what could you think of the answer that you had given to his question?

Socrates/ I? —that I had answered with truth. And if my questioner happened to be one of your wise men, your disputers and contenders, I would tell him, that I had spoken; and that, if I had not spoken rightly, it was his business to take up the argument, and to refute what I had said. But if two parties, such as you and I here, as friends, and in a friendly way, were inclined to have discourse together, their answers to each other's questions ought to be made in a milder manner, and to be more rational. Now it is perhaps more rational, that an answer should not only be agreeable to truth, but besides, should be conceived in terms confessedly understood by the party questioning. Accordingly, I shall now attempt to make you such a kind of answer. For tell me; do you not call some certain thing by the name of end, speaking of such a thing as bound or extreme? For by all these words I mean the same thing. Prodicus, indeed, might possibly dispute it with us: but you would use these expressions indifferently, that such or such a thing is bounded, or, that it has an end. This is all I mean; nothing of subtle disquisition, or nice distinction.

Meno/ Well; there is something which I call end: and I think I understand what you mean.

Socrates/ And is there not something which you call superficies? another, which you call solid? such as those, I mean, which are the subjects of geometry.

Meno/ I call certain things by the names you mention.

Socrates/ Now then, from these premises which you admit, you may understand what I mean by figure in general. In every figure, that which bounds the solid, I call figure. And to express this in one short proposition, I should say that figure is the bound of solid.

Meno/ And what say you color is?

Socrates/ You use me ill now.

Meno/ You put an old man to the task of answering, yet are unwilling yourself to take the trouble only of recollecting and telling me what Gorgias said that virtue was.

Meno/ But I will; after you have told me what color is.

Socrates/ A man with his eyes hoodwinked might perceive from your way of converting, Meno, that you are handsome, and still have your admirers.

Meno/ How so?

Socrates/ Because you do nothing but command in conversation, as fine ladies do, that are used to have their wills in all things; for they tyrannize so long as their beauty lasts. At the same time too, perhaps, you have discovered me, how easy I am to be subdued by beauty, and how apt to stoop to it, I shall do therefore as you would have me, and shall answer to your question.

Meno/ By all means do, and gratify my request.

Socrates/ Do you choose that I should make my answer in the style of Gorgias, that by this means you may apprehend it the more easily?

Meno/ I should be glad that you would do so, most undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Do you not hold, you and Gorgias, that certain effluvia flow forth from bodies, agreeably to the doctrine of Empedocles?

Meno/ We hold that doctrine strongly.

Socrates/ And do you not hold certain pores, into which and through which those effluvia pass?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that some of those effluvia are adapted to some of these pores, but are either less or greater than other pores?

Meno/ Things are so framed.

Socrates/ And do you not admit of something which you call sight?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ These premises being granted, “Now let your mind accompany my words.” as Pindar says. Color then is the flowing off from figures, commensurate with the sight, and by that sense perceived.

Meno/ In this answer, Socrates, I think you have answered as well as possible.

Socrates/ It may be that you think so, because you are accustomed to a language of this kind; and because at the same time you perceive yourself, as I imagine, able from thence to account in the same way for sound, and smell, and many other things of like kind.

Meno/ It really is so.

Socrates/ The answer, Meno, was theatrical and pompous; and so it pleased you more than that which I gave you concerning figure.

Meno/ Indeed it did.

Socrates/ And yet I persuade myself, O son of Alexidemus, that not this, but that other, was the better answer. I think too, that you yourself would be of the same opinion, if you are not, as you said you were yesterday, under a necessity of going away before the mysteries, but could stay and be initiated.

Meno/ But if you would tell me many other things such as this, I would certainly stay and hear them.

Socrates/ My best endeavors to say other such things shall certainly not be wanting, for my own sake as well as yours. But I fear I shall not be able to utter many sentences of that kind. But now it comes to your turn to try if you can perform your part of the engagement, in giving me an

account of what virtue is, virtue in general, the same in all particular virtues. And do not go on, making many out of one; as is often said jocosely of those who pound or beat anything to pieces. But leaving virtue as it is, whole and entire, desire the nature of it, and tell me what it is Patterns of such a definition you have had from me.

Meno/ I think then, Socrates, that virtue is agreeably to that of the poet.

> To feel a joy from what is fair,
> And [over it] to have power—

and accordingly I say, that virtue is this; having the desire of things that are fair, to have it in our power to gain them.

Socrates/ I ask you then, whether you suppose the persons who desire things that are fair, to desire things that are good?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ In giving that definition of virtue then, did you suppose that some men there were who desire things which are evil, others who desire things which are good? Do you not think, my friend, that all men desire things which are good?

Meno/ I do not.

Socrates/ But that some desire things which are evil?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ Think you that these men desire things evil, with an opinion of their being good? or that, knowing them to be evil, yet they nevertheless desire them?

Meno/ I answer Yes to both those questions.

Socrates/ Is there any man then, do you imagine, who knowing the things which are evil to be what they are, that is, evil, yet nevertheless desires them?

Meno/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ What do you mean, when you say he desires them? Do you not mean, that he desires to have them?

Meno/ To have them. For what can I mean besides?

Socrates/ Does he desire them, think you, imagining that evil things are advantageous to the person who has them, or knowing that evil things are hurtful wherever they are?

Meno/ There are persons who imagine of things which are indeed evil, that they are advantageous; and there are who know them to be hurtful.

Socrates/ Do you think that they know the evil things to be evil, those who imagine such evil things to be advantageous?

Meno/ By no means do I think that.

Socrates/ Is it not then evident, that such persons desire not things evil, such as know not the nature of those things which they desire; but rather, that they desire things which they imagine to be good, but which in reality are evil? So that those who are ignorant of them, and falsely imagine them to be good, plainly desire good things. Do they not?

Meno/ Such sort of persons, I must own, seem to be desirous of good things.

Socrates/ But those others, those who desire things which are evil, as you say, and who at the same time know that evil things are hurtful to the possessor, do they know that they themselves shall receive harm from those evil things in their having them?

Meno/ It is clear that they must know it.

Socrates/ But know they not, that such as receive harm are in evil plight, so far as harm has befallen them?

Meno/ This also must they know.

Socrates/ And know they not besides, that such as are in evil plight are unhappy too?

Meno/ I presume they do.

Socrates/ Is there any man then, who chooses to be in evil plight, and to be unhappy?

Meno/ I suppose there is not any, Socrates.

Socrates/ No man, therefore, O Meno, wills or chooses anything evil; if it be true, that no man wills or chooses to be in evil plight, or to be unhappy. For indeed what else is it to be thoroughly unhappy, than to desire things which are evil, and to have them our own?

Meno/ I suspect that what you say, Socrates, is true. And no man wills or chooses anything evil.

Socrates/ Did you not say just now, that virtue consisted in the willing or desiring things which are good, and in the having it in our power to gain them?

Meno/ I did say so; it is true.

Socrates/ Is not this will or desire according to what has been said in all men? so that, in this respect, one man is not at all better than another man.

Meno/ It appears so.

Socrates/ It appears, therefore, that if one man is better than another, he must be so in respect of his power.

Meno/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ This therefore, as it seems, according to your account, is virtue, the power of gaining things which are good.

Meno/ The case seems to me, Socrates, to be entirely so, as you now state it.

Socrates/ Let us examine then if this account of yours be true: for perhaps it may be so. You say, that to be able to gain good things is virtue.

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ Good things do you not call such things as health and riches, that is, the possession of gold and silver, honors also in the state, and offices in the government? You do not speak of any other things as good, beside things of this kind?

Meno/ No other; I mean all such sort of things.

Socrates/ Well then, to get money is virtue; as says Meno, the hereditary guest of the great king. But let me ask you a question concerning this point; whether you would choose to add something to this account of virtue, and to say that virtue is to get money honestly and religiously? or whether this addition makes no difference in your account; but that, however unjustly it be acquired, you call the mere acquisition of money, equally in any way, virtue?

Meno/ By no means; for, to acquire it unjustly, I call vice and wickedness.

Socrates/ By all means, therefore, as it appears, this acquisition of money ought to be accompanied by honesty, or prudence, or sanctity, or some other part of virtue; for otherwise it will not be virtue, notwithstanding it procures for us good things.

Meno/ For without that how should it be virtue?

Socrates/ And if a man forbear to gain money, whether for himself or others, when he cannot gain it without dishonesty, is not the forbearance of this gain also virtue?

Meno/ It is apparent.

Socrates/ Not the gaining of these good things, therefore, must be virtue, more than the forbearance of that gain; but, as it seems, that which comes accompanied by honesty is virtue; that which is without anything of that kind is vice and wickedness.

Meno/ I think it must of necessity be as you say.

Socrates/ Did we not say, a little while since, that honesty and prudence, and everything of that kind, was a part of virtue?

Meno/ We did.

Socrates/ Then, Meno, you are in jest with me.

Meno/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because, when I had desired you, as I did just now, not to split virtue into pieces, and had given you patterns to copy after, that you might answer as you ought; you, without paying any regard to them, tell me that virtue is the power of gaining good things with honesty or justice; yet this, you say, is only a part of virtue.

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ It is to be collected then, from your own concessions, that with a part of virtue, to do whatever one does, this is virtue. For justice, you say, is but a part of virtue, and so of every other thing of like kind.

Meno/ What then? granting that I say this.

Socrates/ It follows that, having been requested to tell me what the whole of virtue is, you are far from giving such a complete account of it: for you say, that every action is virtue which is performed with a part of virtue; as though you had already told me what virtue was in the whole, and that I should now know it when you come to split it into parts. We must therefore, as it seems to me, take the matter again from the beginning, and recur to this question, What is virtue? Or should every action, accompanied with a part of virtue, be said to be virtue itself? For it is saying this, to say that every action, accompanied with justice, is virtue do you think there is no occasion for us to resume the same question; but that a man may know a part of virtue, what it is, without knowing what virtue is itself?

Meno/ I think he cannot.

Socrates/ For, if you remember, when I answered just now your question concerning figure, we rejected such a kind of answer as aimed at explaining the proposed subject in terms not as yet confessedly understood, but whose meaning was still the subject of inquiry.

Meno/ And we did right, Socrates, in rejecting such an answer.

Socrates/ I would not have you imagine then, while we are as yet inquiring what virtue is, the whole of it, that by answering in terms which signify the parts of virtue, you will be able to explain to any man the nature of virtue; or, indeed, that the nature of any other thing can be explained in such a way, but that still there will be need of repeating the same question what virtue is, that which is the subject of our conversation. Or do you think that I speak idly and nothing to the purpose?

Meno/ I think you speak rightly.

Socrates/ Begin again, therefore, and tell me what it is you hold virtue to be, you and your friend Gorgias?

Meno/ Socrates, I heard, before I had conversed with you, that the only part you take in conversation is this: —You pretend to be at a loss and doubtful yourself upon all subjects, and make others too no less to be at a loss what to think and say. You seem to be now playing the same conjurers tricks upon me; you manifestly use incantations to bewitch me, and to fill me with such perplexity that I know not what to say. If you will allow me to joke a little, I think you resemble exactly, not only in form but in other respects also, that broad sea-fish called the cramp-fish; for that too never fails to give a numbness to every person who either touches or approaches it. You seem to have done some such thing at present to me, and to have benumbed me. For I actually suffer a kind of numbness and stupidity, both in

mind and body, and find myself disabled from giving you any answer; and yet have I a thousand times discoursed much about virtue, and to many persons, and extremely well too, as I thought; but I am now not in the least able to tell so much as what virtue is, I think that you have acted very prudently in never going out of your own country either by sea or land. For if you was to behave in this manner in any other city where you are a stranger, you would run a risk of being driven thence as a magician or enchanter.

Socrates/ You are full of craftiness, Meno; and I was very near being deceived by you.

Meno/ Tell me how, Socrates, I pray you?

Socrates/ I know with what design you brought a simile to which you likened me.

Meno/ With what design now, do you imagine?

Socrates/ That I, on my part, might bring some simile or resemblance of you. For this I know to be true of all handsome persons, they love to have images and pictures made of them. And indeed it is their interest; for of handsome persons the pictures are handsome too. But I shall forbear the drawing of your picture in return. And as to that which you have produced of me, if the cramp-fish be itself numb, and through its numbness benumb others also, then am I like to it, but otherwise I am not. For I do not lead others into doubtfulness on any subject, and make them be at a loss what to say; when it the same time I can easily explain the matter in hand, and have no doubts at all within my own mind: but as I am entirely distressed for true definitions of things myself; in this condition I involve in the same distresses those with whom I am converting. Thus at present concerning the nature of virtue; what it is, I, for my part, know not: you indeed knew formerly, perhaps, before that you had touched me; but now you are like one who

knows nothing of the matter. I am desirous, however, of considering it together with you, and of our searching out jointly what kind of a thing virtue is.

Meno/ But in what way, Socrates, will you search for a thing of which you are entirely ignorant? For by what mark which may discover it will you look for it when you know none of the marks that distinguish it? Or, if you should not fail of meeting with it, how will you discern it, when met with, to be the very thing you was in search of, and knew nothing of before?

Socrates/ I apprehend, Meno, what it is you mean. Do you observe how captious a way of reasoning you introduce? For it follows from hence, that it is impossible for a man to seek, either for that which he knows, or for that of which he is ignorant. For no man would seek to know what he knows, because he has the knowledge of it already, and has no need of seeking for what he has. Nor could any man seek for what he is ignorant of, because he would not know what he was seeking for.

Meno/ Do you not think then, Socrates, that this way of reasoning is fair and right?

Socrates/ Not I, for my part.

Meno/ Can you say in what respect it is wrong?

Socrates/ I can. For I have heard the sayings of men and women who were wise, and knowing in divine things?

Meno/ What sayings?

Socrates/ Such as I think true, as well as beautiful.

Meno/ But what sayings were they? and by whom were they uttered?

Socrates/ Those who uttered them were of the priests and priestesses, such as made it their business to be able to give a rational account of those things in which they were

employed. The same sayings are delivered also by Pindar, and many other of the poets, as many as are divine. The sayings are these; but do you consider with yourself whether you think them true. These persons then tell us that the soul of man is immortal; that sometimes it ends, which is called dying; and that afterwards it begins again, but never is dissolved; and that for this reason we ought to live, throughout our lives, with all sanctity. For

STROPHE.

When guilt of lesser crimes the soul hath stained.
Not meriting sharp pains for aye;
And eight dark dreary years the hath remained
In Hades, barred from gladdening day;
Preserving all that time her sense
Of good, lamenting her lost innocence;
With sorrow if her guilt she rue,
And Proserpine should deem that sorrow true,
She accepts in full atonement such repentance due.

ANTTSTRPOHE.

Then the ninth year fends back the soul to light,
And former objects here on earth:
Of these, thro, death, again she loses sight;
Again to life renews her birth.
At length, two trials well endured,
The soul, to lesser virtues well inured,
Is born some king, for good renowned;
Or sage, well learned in wisdom's lore profound;
Or hero, by his prowess spreading peace around.

EPODE.

Thro' goodness, wisdom, virtue, truly great;
And greatly meriting advancement high;
Loosened from body, winged and fleet,
Freely she mounts to purest sky;
Ne'er more on earth to live, never more to die.
Amongst the gods in starry sheen,

Far often and wide through Nature seen.
She fixes her abode;
Assuming her celestial throne,
To godlike state of being grown,
A deathless demi-god.
Thence thro, the rest of time,
In hymns religious and in holy rhyme,
Mortals below shall list their lays,
The deathless demi-god to praise;
Who, freed from earthy dross,
And every element of body gross,
To intellectual bliss in heavenly seat could climb.

The soul then being immortal, having been often born, having beheld the things which are here, the things which are in Hades, and all things, there is nothing of which she has not gained the knowledge. No wonder, therefore, that she is able to recollect, with regard to virtue as well as to other things, what formerly she knew. For all things in nature being linked together in relationship, and the soul having heretofore known all things, nothing hinders but that any man, who has recalled to mind, or, according to the common phrase, who has learnt, one thing only, should of himself recover all his ancient knowledge, and find out again all the rest of things; if he has but courage, and faints not in the midst of his researches. For inquiry and learning is reminiscence all. We therefore ought not to hearken to that sophistical way of reasoning aforementioned; for our believing it to be true would make us idle. And, accordingly, the indolent, and such as are averse to taking pains, delight to hear it. But this other way of thinking, which I have just now given you an account of, makes men diligent, sets them at work, and puts them upon inquiry. And as I believe it to be true, I am willing, with your assistance, to inquire into the nature of virtue.

Meno/ With all my heart, Socrates, But say you this absolutely, that we do not learn anything; and that all, which we call learning, is only reminiscence? Can you teach me to know this doctrine to be true?

Socrates/ I observed to you before how full you are of craftiness, O Meno. And, to confirm my observation, you now all; me if I can teach you; I, who say that there is no inch thing as teaching, but that all our knowledge is reminiscence; that I may appear directly to contradict myself.

Meno/ Not so, Socrates, by Zeus. I did not express myself in those terms with any such design; but merely from habit, and the common usage of that expression. But if any way you can prove to me that your doctrine is true, do so.

Socrates/ This is by no means an easy task. However, for your sake, I am willing to try and do my utmost. Call hither to me then one of those your numerous attendants, whichever you please, that I may prove in him the truth of what I say.

Meno/ I will, gladly. Come hither, you.

Socrates/ Is he a Grecian, and speaks he the Greek language?

Meno/ Perfectly well. He was born in my own family.



Socrates/ Be attentive now, and observe whether he appears to recollect within himself, or to learn anything from me.

Meno/ I shall.

Socrates/ Tell me, boy; do you know what a square space is? Is it of such a figure as this?

Boy/ It is.



Socrates/ A square space then is that which has all these lines equal, AB, BC, CD, DA, four in number.



Boy/ It is so truly.

Socrates/ Has it not also these lines, which are drawn through the middle of it, AC and BD, equal each to the other?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ Cannot you imagine a space, square like this, but larger; and another such, but lesser?

Boy/ Yes, for certain.

Socrates/ Now if the side AB should be two feet long, and the side AD should be two feet long also, how many feet square will the whole space contain? Consider it in this manner. If, in the side AB, the space should be two feet long, and in the side AD it should be but one foot; would not the square be that of two feet once told?

Boy/ It would.

Socrates/ But since it is two feet this way as well as the other way, is it not a space of two feet twice told?

Boy/ Just so.

Socrates/ It is then a space of two feet?

Boy/ So it is.

Socrates/ How many feet are twice two? reckon them, and tell me.



Boy/ Four feet, Socrates.

Socrates/ May not a space be made, E, F, G, H, double to that other in size, but of the same kind, having, like that, all its sides equal?

Boy/ Yes, sure.

Socrates/ How many square feet then will this space be of?

Boy/ Eight.

Socrates/ Come now, try and tell me, of what length is each of the sides in this square space. Now the sides of that square, you know, we have supposed to be two feet long. Of what length then are the sides of this square, which is double in largeness to that other?

Boy/ It is plain, Socrates, that they are twice as long.

Socrates/ You see, Meno, that I teach him none of these things which he asserts; I only ask him questions. And now this boy imagines that he knows of what length the lines are which contain a space of eight square feet. Do you not think he does?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ And does he really know?

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But he imagines them to be twice as long as the lines, which contain a space of four square feet.

Meno/ He does.



Socrates/ I now view him ready to recollect, from this time forward, rightly and as he ought. Now hear me, boy. You say that lines, double in length to the sides of the square ABCD, contain a space double to it in largeness: I mean a space of the same kind; not one way long, the other way short; but

every way of equal length, like the space ABCD, only twice as large, that is, a space of eight square feet. Consider now whether you still think this square EFGH to be measured by a line twice as long as the line which measures the square ABCD.



Boy/ I do.

Socrates/ Suppose we add to the line AB, from hence, from the point B, another line of equal length, the line BI. Is not the line AI of a length double to that of the line AB?

Boy/ Yes, sure.

Socrates/ Now, from the line AI, do you say that a space will be made of eight square feet, if four lines, each of them as long as the line AI, be drawn so as to contain space?

Boy/ I do.

Socrates/ Let us then draw these four equal lines so as to contain space, AI, IK, KL, LA. Is this space now any other than that which you say is of eight square feet?

Boy/ No; it is the very same.

Socrates/ Are there not in this space AIKL these four spaces, ABMO, BIPM, MPKN, NLOM, each of which is equal to that space of four square feet, ABCD?

Boy/ So there be.



Socrates/ How large is the whole space AIKL? Is it not four times as large as the space ABCD?

Boy/ To be sure it is.

Socrates/ Is it only double now to the space ABCD, when it is four times as large?

Boy/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ What proportion then has it to the space ABCD?

Boy/ A quadruple one.

Socrates/ From a line, therefore, double in length, is drawn a square space, not double, but quadruple, in largeness.

Boy/ Why, it is very true.

Socrates/ Four times four make sixteen: do they not?

Boy/ They do.



Socrates/ But from a line of what length is to be drawn a square, such a one as we suppose the square EFGH to be, that is a space of eight square feet? You see that from the line AI is drawn a square, quadruple in largeness to the square ABCD.

Boy/ I see it.

Socrates/ And from the line AB, which is half of the line AI, a square, you see, is drawn, which is but the fourth part of the square AK.

Boy/ It is.



Socrates/ Well; but that square of eight feet EFGH, is it not twice as large as the square ABCD, and half as large as the square AIKL?

Boy/ It is so, to be sure.

Socrates/ Must it not then be drawn from a line longer than the line AB, and shorter than the line AI?

Boy/ I think it must.

Socrates/ You say well; for speak that only which you think. And tell me, was not the line AB supposed to be two feet long, and the line AI four feet long?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ The side therefore of the square EFGH must be shorter than a line of four feet, and longer than a line of two feet.

Boy/ It must so.

Socrates/ Try now, and tell me how long you think it is.

Boy/ Three feet long.

Socrates/ If then it be so, let us take half of the line BI, namely, BQ, and add it to the line AB; and now this line AQ will be such a line as you speak of, a line three feet long. For the lines AB, BI, are each of them two feet long, and the line BQ is half of the line BI, and therefore is one foot long. In the same manner, let us take half of the line OL, namely OR, and add it to the line AO; and thus the line AR will be three feet long also. For the lines AO, OL, are each of them two feet long, and the line OR is one foot long. From these two lines, AQ, AR, let us complete the square AQSR; and it is such a square as you was speaking of, the square of a line three feet long.

Boy/ It is so.

Socrates/ If then the whole space be three feet long and three feet broad, it is a space of thrice three feet.



Boy/ It appears so to be.

Socrates/ And how many feet are thrice three?

Boy/ Nine.

Socrates/ But how many feet were there to be in a square twice as large as the square ABCD?

Boy/ Eight.

Socrates/ It is not true then that from a line three feet long is to be drawn a square containing only eight square feet.

Boy/ It is not.

Socrates/ Try and tell us then exactly how long the line must be from which such a square is to be drawn. Or, if you choose not to tell us the measure of it in numbers, at least point out to us from what line it may be drawn.

Boy/ Now, by Jove, Socrates, I do not know.

Socrates/ Do you observe, Meno, what progress this boy has already made, and whereabouts he is, in the way to recollection? You see that, from the beginning of his examination, he knew not from what line a square eight feet large was to be drawn; as indeed neither does he yet know; but he then fancied that he knew, and answered boldly as a knowing person would, without suspecting that he should ever be at a loss for a true answer. But he now finds himself at a loss, and thinks himself as ignorant as he really is.

Meno/ You say what is true.

Socrates/ Is he not then in a better disposition with regard to the matter which he was ignorant of?

Meno/ I agree with you in this too.

Socrates/ In making him therefore to be at a loss what to answer, and in benumbing him after the manner of the cramp-fish, have we done him any harm?

Meno/ I think, we have not.

Socrates/ And more than this, we have advanced him a little, as it seems, in the way of finding out the truth in the subject laid before him. For, being now sensible of his ignorance, he is prepared to seek and to inquire. But he then fancied, that he could readily, at any time, and in the presence of any number of people, show with certainty, that

a square, twice as large as some other square, was produced from a line twice as long.

Meno/ So it seemed.

Socrates/ Think you then, that he would have set about seeking or learning that, which, however ignorant of it, he fancied that he knew; till he had found himself at a loss, and felt his ignorance; and was become therefore desirous of finding it out?

Meno/ I think, Socrates, that he never would.

Socrates/ The benumbing him then was of advantage to him.

Meno/ I think it was.



Socrates/ Now observe how, from this sense of his ignorance, he will find out the truth in searching For it with me; though the part which I shall bear in the inquiry will be merely to ask questions, and not to teach. But be sure to mind, if any where you can catch me teaching or telling him anything, instead of asking him his own opinions. Now, boy, tell me, is not this space ABCD our square, four feet large? Do you apprehend me?

Boy/ I do.



Socrates/ Suppose we add to it this other square BTUC, equal to it in largeness?

Boy/ Well.

Socrates/ And a third square too, this, DCWX, equal in largeness to either of the others?

Boy/ Very well.

Socrates/ What, if we add another square of equal size, to fill up the corner here, this, UCWY?



Boy/ Very well, and so it does.

Socrates/ Are not then these four squares equal all, ABCD, BTUC, CDXW, WYUC?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ This whole large square then, ATYX, how much larger is it than the square ABCD?

Boy/ Four times as big.

Socrates/ But we wanted a square only twice as big. Do you not remember?

Boy/ I remember it very well.

Socrates/ Do not these lines, which I draw from corner to corner in each of these squares, BD, BU, DW, WU, cut each square in half?

Boy/ They do.

Socrates/ Are not these four lines drawn of equal length, these, which enclose the square space, BDWU?

Boy/ They be so.

Socrates/ Now consider, how large this square is which is enclosed by those four lines.

Boy/ Why, I do not know.



Socrates/ Are not those four squares, ABCD, BTUC, CDXW, WYUC, cut each of them in half by these four lines, BD, BU, DW, WU, drawn within them; or are they not?

Boy/ They be.

Socrates/ In the square, ATYX, how many spaces are there then, as large as the space ABCD?

Boy/ Four.

Socrates/ And how many such in the square, BDWU, from which half the other is cut off?

Boy/ Two.

Socrates/ How many more are four than two?



Boy/ Twice as many.

Socrates/ How many square feet then doth this square, BDWU, contain?

Boy/ Eight.

Socrates/ From what line is it drawn?

Boy/ From this here.

Socrates/ From the line BD, do you say, reaching from corner to corner of the square ABCD, which contains four square feet?

Boy/ Yes.

Socrates/ The sophists call such a line the diameter. If the diameter then be its name, from the diameter of a square, as you say, you boy of Meno's, may be drawn a square twice as large as the square of which it is the diameter.

Boy/ It is so, Socrates, for certain.

Socrates/ Well; what think you, Meno? Has this boy, in his answers, given any other opinion than his own?

Meno/ None other: he has given his own opinion only.

Socrates/ And yet, but a little before, as we both observed, he had no knowledge of the matter proposed, and knew not how to give a right answer.

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ But those very opinions, which you acknowledge to be his own, were in him all the time: were they not?

Meno/ They were.

Socrates/ In a man therefore, who is ignorant, there are true opinions concerning those very things of which he is ignorant.

Meno/ It appears there are.

Socrates/ Those opinions then are stirred up afresh in the mind of that boy, as fancies are in dreaming. And if he should frequently be questioned of these things, and by many different persons, you may be assured he will at length know them with as much certainty as any man.

Meno/ Indeed, it seems so.

Socrates/ Will he not then know them without being taught them, having only been asked questions, and recovering of himself from within himself his lost knowledge?

Meno/ He will.

Socrates/ But our recovery of knowledge from within ourselves, is not this what we call reminiscence?

Meno/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ And this knowledge, which he now has, must he not at some time or other have acquired it, or else have always been possessed of it?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now if he was always possessed of it, he was always a person of knowledge. But if at any time he first received it, was it not in this present life? unless some person has taught him the science of geometry. For he will make his answers with no less certainty in every part of geometry, and indeed in all the other mathematical sciences. Is there anyone, then, who has taught the boy all this? I ask

you; because you ought to know, since he was born and bred up in your family.

Meno/ I am certain that no person has ever taught him those sciences.

Socrates/ And yet he entertains those opinions, which he has just now declared: does he not?

Meno/ It appears, Socrates, that he must.

Socrates/ If then he had this knowledge within him, not having acquired it in this present life, it is plain that in some other time he had learnt it and actually possessed it.

Meno/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And was not that time then, when he was not a man?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If true opinions then are in him, at both these times, the time when he is, and the time when he is not a man; opinions which, awakened and roused by questions, rise up into science; must not his soul be well furnished with this discipline throughout all ages? For it is plain, that in every age he either is, or is not a man.

Meno/ In all appearance it must be so.

Socrates/ If the truth of things therefore is always in the soul, the soul should be immortal. So that whatever you happen now not to know, that is, not to remember, you ought to undertake with confidence to seek within yourself, and recall it to your mind.

Meno/ You seem to me, Socrates, somehow or other to speak rightly.

Socrates/ As to my own part, Meno, I would not contend very strenuously for the truth of my argument in other respects; but that in thinking it our duty to seek after the knowledge of things we are at present ignorant of, we should

become better men, more manly, and less idle, than if we suppose it not possible for us to find out, nor our duty to inquire into, what we know not; this I would, if I was able, strongly, both by word and deed, maintain.

Meno/ In this also, Socrates, you seem to me to say well.

Socrates/ Since then we are agreed in this point, that what a man knows not, he ought to inquire after and seek to know, are you willing that we attempt jointly to inquire into the nature of virtue?

Meno/ By all means, willing. Not but that I should have most pleasure in taking into consideration, and hearing what you have to say on the question I first asked you, whether, in setting about our inquiries concerning virtue, we should consider it as a thing that may be taught, or as being by nature with those who have it, or as attainable by some other means, and what they are.



Socrates/ Were I to govern not only myself, Meno, but you too, we would not consider whether virtue could be taught or not, before we had inquired, in the first place, what virtue was. But since you, without so much as attempting to govern yourself, for fear (I suppose) of being less free and less a gentleman, undertake however to govern me, and actually do govern me, I shall yield to you. For indeed how can I help myself? or what is to be done without it? We are to consider then, it seems, what belongs to some certain thing, whilst yet we know not what the thing is. But if you still persist, however relax a little the strictness of your command, and suffer the question, whether virtue can be taught a man, or how otherwise it is attained, to be considered hypothetically. By hypothetically I mean in the same manner as geometricians often treat a question; for

instance, when they are asked concerning some geometrical figure, whether it is possible for such a particular triangle to be inscribed a in such a particular circle. A geometrician would answer, —I know not as yet, of what kind this triangle is. But I can make a supposition, which I think may be of use in answering your question, —this; —Supposing the triangle to be of such a kind, as that a circle being drawn about a given side of it, the whole space of the triangle be included within the circular space described around it, the consequence will then be one thing; but quite another consequence will follow, if it cannot be so included. Laying down therefore these two hypotheses distinctly, I can tell you what will follow, in each of these cases, as to the inscribing that triangle within the circle, whether it be impossible or possible. Now the same way shall we take in our inquiry concerning virtue: since we know not, either what it is, or what is to be attributed to it, we shall lay down an hypothesis concerning it; and, on that footing of that hypothesis, shall consider whether it is to be taught or not, Let us then state the question thus: Supposing virtue to be in that order of things which belongs to the soul, is virtue, on this hypothesis, to be taught, or not to be taught? In the first place, it is either a different kind of thing from knowledge, or a thing of the same kind with knowledge: and on each, of these hypotheses lest us inquire, whether virtue is or is not to be taught, or (as we lately expressed it) recalled to mind; for whichever of these expressions we use, let it make no difference to us. The question is then, whether virtue is to be taught. Now is it not evident to everyone, that man is taught no other thing than knowledge?

Meno/ To me it seems so.

Socrates/ If virtue, therefore, be a certain kind of knowledge, it is evident that virtue is to be taught.

Meno/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ We have quickly then dispatched this part of the inquiry; and are fairly come to this conclusion, that if virtue be a thing of the same kind with knowledge, it is to be taught; otherwise not.

Meno/ Very true.

Socrates/ Next after this, it seems, that we should consider whether virtue be knowledge or of a kind different from knowledge.

Meno/ We ought, I think, in the next place to consider this.

Socrates/ Well now; shall we suppose that virtue is a thing which is good; and shall we abide by this hypothesis laying it down for certain that virtue is something good?

Meno/ By all means.

Socrates/ Now if there be also any other good separated from knowledge, then perhaps virtue may not be a certain kind of knowledge. But if there be no sort of good which is not comprehended under knowledge, then a suspicion that virtue was knowledge of a certain kind would be a just suspicion.

Meno/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ But further; is it not through virtue that we are good?

Meno/ It is.

Socrates/ And if good, then advantageous. For all things that are good are advantageous: are they not?

Meno/ They are.

Socrates/ Virtue then is a thing advantageous too.

Meno/ It follows of necessity from what we just now granted.

Socrates/ Now let us consider what sort of things those are which profit and are advantageous to us; enumerating

the particulars: health, we all say, and strength, and beauty, and riches. These things and others of like kind we call advantageous: do we not?

Meno/ We do.

Socrates/ And say we not, that these very things are sometimes hurtful to us? or do you pronounce otherwise?

Meno/ No otherwise; I say the same.

Socrates/ Consider now, what is the leading cause when any of these things profit us; and what when they hurt us. Is it not, when right use presides in the management of them, that they profit us, and when right use is wanting, that they hurt us?

Meno/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ Further then, let us consider things belonging to the soul. Do you admit that temperance is something in the soul; and so of justice, and fortitude, and docility, and memory, and magnanimity, and all things of like kind?

Meno/ I do.

Socrates/ Now consider such of these things, as you think not to consist in knowledge, but to be of a kind different from knowledge. Do not these procure us sometimes hurt, and sometimes advantage? for instance, fortitude; unless fortitude is not where prudence is wanting: let our instance then be boldness. When a man is bold without reason or understanding, does he not incur mischief? And when he is bold rationally and wisely, does he not gain advantage?

Meno/ It is true.

Socrates/ Is it not true of temperance also, and docility, that to a man who has learnt and is provided with them, if his soul at the same time be fraught with understanding, they are advantageous; but, if he wants understanding, they are hurtful?

Meno/ Most undoubtedly.

Socrates/ In a word, all the abilities of the soul, whether they be of the active kind or of the passive, under the conduct of prudence, do they not tend to happiness; but managed with imprudence, do they not produce the contrary effect?

Meno/ It is probable they do.

Socrates/ If virtue then be one of those things belonging to the soul, and if it be of necessity, as you say, always advantageous, virtue must be prudence: for we see, that all other things belonging to the soul are of themselves neither advantageous nor hurtful; but let there be added to them imprudence or prudence, and they thus become either hurtful or advantageous. Now according to this reasoning, virtue being always advantageous, must be some kind of prudence.

Meno/ To me it seems so.

Socrates/ Now then as to those other things, which we said just now were sometimes beneficial and sometimes hurtful, riches, and the rest of external goods; I ask whether or no as prudence, presiding in the soul, and governing her other powers and possessions, applies them to our advantage; and as imprudence, having the lead, turns them all to mischief; whether in the same manner the soul, rightly using and administering those outward things, employs them for our benefit, but by a wrong use renders them prejudicial and pernicious?

Meno/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And are not things administered and used rightly by a soul possessed of prudence; but amiss and ill by a soul possessed with folly?

Meno/ They are.

Socrates/ Thus then we may pronounce it to hold good universally: to man all external things depend on his soul; and all things belonging to the soul itself depend on prudence for their being good and beneficial to him. Now it follows from this reasoning, that prudence is always advantageous. But did we not just now say the same of virtue too?

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ We conclude, therefore, that prudence is virtue; either the whole of virtue, or some part at least.

Meno/ What has been said seems to me, Socrates, to have been well said.

Socrates/ If then it be so, the good are not good by nature.

Meno/ It seems to me, they are not.

Socrates/ For then, this too would follow. If the good were good by nature we should have, somewhere or other, persons who knew which of our youth were good and virtuous in their natures; and these, when they had discovered them to us, we should take and guard in the citadel, putting our seal on them more carefully than we should on gold; that no person might corrupt them, and that when they arrived at the age of manhood, they might become useful to the state.

Meno/ It is likely, Socrates, that in that case this would be done.

Socrates/ Since the good, therefore, are not good by nature, whether are they good by teaching or not?

Meno/ I think it now necessary to hold this in the affirmative. And it is plain, Socrates, that if virtue be knowledge, according to our hypothesis before, then it may be taught.

Socrates/ Perhaps so, by Jove. But I fear we did amiss in admitting that hypothesis.

Meno/ And yet very lately it seemed to be maintained fairly.

Socrates/ But I suspect, it ought not only to have lately seemed to be maintained fairly, but to seem so at present, and hereafter too, if there be anything in it found or faultless.

Meno/ What is the matter now? in what respect do you find fault with it? and why doubt of its being true, that virtue is a kind of knowledge?

Socrates/ I will tell you, Meno. That virtue is to be taught, supposing it to be a science, or some kind of knowledge, this position of ours I call not into question, nor have any doubt of its being true. But consider whether I appear not to have reason for doubting the truth of the supposition, that, virtue is a kind of knowledge. For answer me to this question; whatever is taught, I speak not of virtue only, but of every other subject of discipline or teaching, must there not be of necessity both teachers of it and scholars?

Meno/ I think there must.

Socrates/ That thing, therefore, on the contrary, of which there are neither teachers no, scholars to be found, should we not think rightly, in thinking it probable that it is not the subject of teaching?

Meno/ True. But do you really think that no masters are to be found who teach virtue?

Socrates/ Though I have often sought about, and inquired if there were any teachers of virtue, with my utmost endeavors I cannot find any. And yet I invite many persons to join with me in the search, especially such as I might presume to have the most experience in that affair. And just now, Meno, in happy time, is this man sat down by us, who may be a party in our inquiry. And it should seem reasonable

for us to make him a party: for, in the first place, he is the son of the wealthy and the wise Anthemion, a man who is become rich, not by accident, nor yet by legacy, as he has done to whom the riches of Polycrates are now of late devolved, Ismenias of Thebes, but having acquired his wealth through his own wisdom and industry; and then as to his other good qualities, he is a citizen who is thought neither contemptuous and insolent nor ostentatious and giving trouble to all about him, but behaves decently and conducts himself like a modest and frugal man. And besides all this, he has educated and instructed his son here excellently well, in the opinion of the Athenian multitude; for they elect him to the highest offices in the state. Such men it is right to make of our party, when we are inquiring after masters who teach virtue, whether any are to be found and who they are. Join yourself therefore, Anytus, to us, to me, and Meno here, your guest at Athens, in our inquiry concerning virtue, who are the teachers of it. And consider the question thus; Suppose this Meno had an inclination to be made a good physician, and applied to us for our advice in the affair, to what masters should we send him? should we not send him to the physicians?

Anytus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And to make him a good currier, should we not send him to the curriers?

Anytus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And in all other subjects of instruction, should we not take the same way?

Anytus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ But concerning this point, let me ask you another question. In sending him to the physicians, we say we should do well, if we intended the making him a good physician. Now when we say this, do we not mean, that we

should act with prudence in sending him, not to any who profess not the art of healing, but to those who make it their profession; and who, besides, are paid for teaching it to others; and thus, by this very acceptance of pay, take upon themselves to teach anyone who is willing to come and learn; I ask you whether it is not from these considerations that we should do well in sending him to the physicians?

Anytus/ I answer, yes.

Socrates/ In the learning music too, and every other art, are not the same considerations just? Surely it is great want of understanding in us, if we are desirous of having some person taught music, not to choose for his masters such as profess the teaching of the art, and the taking of money too for their teaching; but, instead of this, to give trouble to other people, expecting him to learn from those who do not pretend to be teachers, and have not one scholar in that learning in which we expect our student should be by them instructed. Think you not that such an expectation would be very unreasonable?

Anytus/ I do, by Zeus; and a great sign of ignorance too, besides.

Socrates/ You say well. Now then you have an opportunity of considering together with me, and giving your advice about this guest of yours, Meno here. For he has often told me long ago, Anytus, that he wished to acquire that wisdom and virtue, through which men govern well both their families and the commonwealth; through which also they behave respectfully to their parents; and know how to entertain both their countrymen and foreigners, and what presents to make them at their departure, in such a manner as becomes a good man. Were we then to recommend to him any persons from whom he might learn this virtue, consider whom we should do right in recommending. Is it not clear

that, agreeably to what we have just now said in other cases, they would be those persons who profess to be teachers of virtue, and publicly through all Greece offer themselves to teach it to anyone who desires to learn; fixing the price of this their teaching, and demanding it as their just fee?

Anytus/ And what persons, Socrates, do you mean?

Socrates/ You cannot be ignorant that I speak of those who are called sophists.

Anytus/ O Hercules! speak not so shamefully, Socrates. May none of my relations, friends, or acquaintance, Fellow-citizens, or foreign guests, ever be seized with such a madness as to go and be spoiled by those men. For the bane and corruption those men are of all who follow them.

Socrates/ How say you, Anytus? Are these the only men among those who profess the knowledge of something beneficial to human kind, so widely different from all the rest, as not only not to improve and make better what is put into their hands as the others do, but on the contrary to corrupt and spoil it? and do they think fit openly to demand fees to be paid them for so doing? I cannot tell how I should give credit to this account of yours. For I know one man in particular, Protagoras, to have acquired singly more riches from having this wisdom, than Phidias has from his works so celebrated for their beauty, together with any ten other statuaries besides. It is a prodigy what you tell me; when the menders of old shoes and of old clothes could not escape a month from being publicly known, if they returned the clothes or shoes in a worse condition than they received them; but doing so would be soon reduced to starving; yet, that Protagoras should corrupt and spoil his followers, and send them home worse men than when they first came to him, without being discovered by all Greece, and this for above forty years. For I think he was near seventy years of

age when he died, after having spent forty of them in the practice of his profession. And during all that time he maintained a high reputation, which continues even to this day. And not only Protagoras met with this success, but very many others: some of whom were prior to him in time, and some flourish at present. Now shall we suppose that they deceived and corrupted the youth, as you say they did, knowingly? or shall we suppose they did so unconscious of it to themselves? Shall we deem them to be so much out of their senses, such men, who are said by some to be the wisest of mankind?

Anytus/ They are far from being out of their senses, Socrates, rather so are those of the youth, who give them money for corrupting them; and still more so than these youths are their relations in committing them to the guidance of such men; but most of all so are those cities which suffer such men to come in amongst them, and drive not away and banish every man, whether foreigner or citizen, who sets up in any such profession.

Socrates/ Has any of the sophists done you any injury, Anytus? or why else are you so angry with them?

Anytus/ I have never, by Zeus, conversed with one of them myself; nor would I suffer so to do any person who belonged to me.

Socrates/ You have no experience at all then of those men.

Anytus/ And never desire to have any.

Socrates/ How then should you know if there is any good or any harm in their teaching, when you have no experience of it at all?

Anytus/ Easily enough. For I know what sort of fellows they are, whether I have had any experience or not of them and of their teaching.

Socrates/ You have the gift of divination perhaps, Anytus. For how otherwise you could know what they are, according to your own account, I should much wonder. But we were not inquiring to what persons Meno might go, and be made a bad man. As to these, if you will, let them be the sophists. But now tell us of those others: and do an act of kindness to this hereditary friend of yours, in directing him to what persons in this great city he may go and be made eminent in that virtue which I gave you a description of just now.

Anytus/ But why did not you direct him to such persons yourself?

Socrates/ What persons I had imagined were the teachers of these duties I have told you. But I happen to have said nothing to the purpose, as you inform me.

Anytus/ There is some truth however in that perhaps.

Socrates/ Now, therefore, do you in your turn tell him to whom of the Athenians he should go. Name anyone you choose.

Anytus/ What occasion has he to hear anyone man's name? For of the men of honor and virtue among the Athenians, there is not one, the first he meets with, who would not make him a better man than the sophists would, if he will but hearken and be observant.

Socrates/ But did these men of honor and virtue become such spontaneously, and without having learnt from any man to be what they are? and are they able to teach others what they were never taught themselves?

Anytus/ They, I presume, learnt from those who went before them, men of like honor and virtue. Or think you not that our city has produced many excellent men?

Socrates/ I think, Anytus, that in this city there are men excellent in political affairs, and that there have been others no less excellent before them. But were they good teachers

of that political excellence? For it is this which happens to be the subject of our present debate: not whether men of honor and virtue are to be found at present in this city or not; nor whether such were to be found here formerly: but whether virtue is to be taught or not. This we have been of a long time considering and inquiring; and in prosecuting the inquiry, we are fallen upon this question, whether those excellent men, either of these or of former days, knew how to impart, or to deliver down to others, that virtue in which they themselves are so excellent; or whether it be impossible for man to deliver down or to impart virtue, and for men to receive it one from another. This it is which we have been long examining, I and Meno. Consider the question now in this manner, on the footing of your own argument. Would you not say that Themistocles was a man of virtue?

Anytus/ I would; and that he was so the most of all men too.

Socrates/ And would you not then say, that if ever any man could teach his own virtue to another, Themistocles was a good teacher?

Anytus/ I suppose he was, had he had a mind to teach.

Socrates/ But do you suppose that he had no mind to have some others made men of honor and virtue, and especially his own son? or do you imagine that he maliciously and designedly withheld from him that virtue in which he himself was excellent? Did you never hear that Themistocles taught his son Cleophantus to be an excellent horseman? and that his son attained to such a pitch of excellence, that he would keep himself for a long time standing upright upon horses in full speed, and in this situation would throw his javelin; and performed many other surprising feats of horsemanship, in which his father had him instructed; and that he made him skilled in all other

accomplishments, such as depend on having had good masters? Have you heard all this from elderly people who remember it?

Anytus/ I have.

Socrates/ The disposition of his son therefore is not to be found fault with as untowardly and unteachable.

Anytus/ Perhaps it is not.

Socrates/ But what say you to this? That Cleophantus the son of Themistocles was a skillful and an excellent man in the same way as his father was, have you ever heard this from any man, either young or old?

Anytus/ No, truly.

Socrates/ Do we imagine then that he chose to breed him up in such studies and exercises as he did; and yet, in that wisdom and skill in which he himself excelled, to make him, his own son, not at all better man than his neighbors, if virtue could be taught?

Anytus/ That indeed is, perhaps, not to be supposed.

Socrates/ Such a teacher of virtue now is this teacher of yours, a man whom you yourself acknowledge to have, been one of the best men of the last age. And now let us consider another, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. Do you not agree that he was a man of virtue?

Anytus/ I do entirely.

Socrates/ And did he not give his son Lysimachus the best education to be had at Athens, so far as depended on masters and teachers? and do you think he has made him a better man than common? You have had some acquaintance with him, and you see what sort of a man he is. Let another instance, if you please, be Pericles, a man so magnanimously wise. You know that he bred up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.

Anytus/ I do.

Socrates/ These, as you know also, he taught horsemanship so as to make them equal in that skill to any of the Athenians. In music too, and gymnastic, and all other accomplishments which depend on art, he instructed them so well that none excelled them. But had he no mind to make them good men? I believe he wanted not inclination so to do; but I suspect it to be impossible to teach virtue. And that you may not imagine that I speak only of a few, and those of the meanest birth among the Athenians, and such as wanted abilities for such an affair, consider that Thucydides also bred up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, giving them a good education in all other respects, and particularly in the exercise of wrestling, in which they excelled all their countrymen. For he had one of his sons instructed by Xanthius, the other by Eudorus; and these two masters, in the art of wrestling, were thought to be the best of the age. Do you not remember this?

Anytus/ I remember that I have heard so.

Socrates/ Is it not evident then, that he would never have taught his children those things, the teaching of which must have put him to expense, and, at the same time, have neglected what would have cost him nothing, the teaching them to be good men, if such a thing was possible to be taught? But Thucydides, perhaps it may be imagined, was a mean inconsiderable person, who had but few friends among the Athenians or their allies. It was not so. For he was of a noble house, and had great power in Athens, and much weight in the other Grecian states. So that, if his sons could have made good men by teaching, he might easily have found out some person to make them so, either one of his own countrymen, or a foreigner, if he himself wanted leisure, on account of his public employments and his

administration of the state. But I fear, friend Anytus, that virtue is a thing impossible to be taught.

Anytus/ You seem to me, Socrates, to be ready at abuse, and to speak ill of others with great facility. But I would advise you, if you choose to hearken to me, to be more cautious, and to take care of yourself. For that, in other cities too, it is perhaps an easy matter to do a man a mischief, as well as a piece of service; but here, at Athens, it is so more especially; and, if I mistake not, you are sensible of it yourself.

Socrates/ Anytus seems to me to be angry, Meno. And I am not at all surprised at it. For, in the first place, he supposes that I spoke ill of those persons I mentioned: and then he takes himself to be such another as they were. Now if this man should ever come to know what it is for speak ill of others, he will cease to be angry: but at present he is ignorant of it. Do you therefore answer now, and tell me; are there not amongst us men of honor and virtue?

Meno/ Certainly there are.

Socrates/ But are these men willing to offer themselves to the youth to teach them virtue? do they profess the teaching of it? or do they agree that virtue is a thing which can be taught?

Meno/ No, by Zeus, Socrates, they do not. For you may hear them sometimes maintaining that it may be taught, at other times that it cannot be taught.

Socrates/ Shall we say then that these men are teachers of virtue, when they have not settled so much as this point, whether virtue can be taught or not?

Meno/ I think we should not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well; but what say you of those sophists, the only persons who profess to teach virtue, think you that they are the teachers?

Meno/ It is for this, O Socrates, that I especially admire Gorgias; for that one shall never hear him making any such professions, or taking upon himself an office of that kind. On the contrary, he laughs at those others whenever he hears them engaging to teach men to be virtuous; and thinks it the office of a sophist only to make men great orators and powerful in speaking.

Socrates/ You do not think then that the sophists neither are the teachers of virtue?

Meno/ I know not what to say, Socrates, to this point. They have the same effect on me as they have on most other people; sometimes I think they are, and sometimes that they are not.

Socrates/ Do you know, that not only yourself and those others, who are versed in civil affairs, sometimes think that virtue is acquired through teaching, and sometimes that it is not; do you know that Theognis the poet is of the same mind, and speaks exactly in the same manner?

Meno/ In what verses of his?

Socrates/ In his Elegiacs; where he says.

> Mix evermore with men, through virtue, great;
> And near to theirs be placed thy happy seat:
> Still be companion of their board and bowl,
> And still to what delights them bend thy soul.
> For good through sweet contagion shall be caught,
> And virtue be by living manners taught.
> But converse of bad men is folly's school;
> Where sense, taught backward, sinks into a fool.

Do you perceive, that in these verses he speaks of virtue as if it might be acquired through teaching?

Meno/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ And yet in other verses a little farther on he says.

> To fools their wisdom could the wise impart;
> Could understanding be infused by art;
> Or could right thought into the mind be driven;
> For this how oft would great rewards be given?

That is, to those men who were complete matters in this skill. And again, he says.

> Ne'er did bad son from virtuous father rise.
> If duly nurtured by his precepts wise.
> But whate'er culture careful we bellow,
> Ne'er in bad soil can seed of virtue grow.

Do you observe, that in speaking again upon the same subject, he contradicts himself, and says the very reverse of what he had said before?

Meno/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Can you tell me now of any other thing, where they who profess to be teachers are held by all men to be so far from teaching it to others, as to be ignorant of it themselves, and to have no merit in that very thing which they pretend to teach; and where those who are by all men allowed to be excellent themselves, sometimes say it may be taught, and sometimes that it cannot? Those who are so unsettled and perplexed about any subject whatever, would you say that they are the proper masters and teachers of it?

Meno/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ If then neither the sophists, nor those who are themselves excellent men, are teachers of virtue, it is plain there can be no others beside.

Meno/ I think there can be none.

Socrates/ And if no teachers, then no scholars neither.

Meno/ I think what you say is true.

Socrates/ But we agreed before, that a thing in which neither teachers of it nor scholars are to be found, is not the subject of teaching, and cannot be taught.

Meno/ We were agreed in this.

Socrates/ Of virtue now there appear nowhere any teachers.

Meno/ Very true.

Socrates/ And if no teachers of it, then no scholars in it neither.

Meno/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Virtue therefore must be a thing which cannot be taught.

Meno/ It seems so, if we have considered the matter rightly. And hence, Socrates, I am led to wonder, whether any men really good are ever to be found or not; and if there are, by what means they became such.

Socrates/ We are in danger, O Meno! of being found, you and I, both of us, very insufficient reasoners on the point in question; and you not to have been fully instructed by Gorgias, nor I by Prodicus. Above all things therefore ought we to apply our minds to ourselves; and to search out a person who by some certain means would make us better men. I say this with regard to the inquiry now before us; in which we have been so foolish as not to consider, that it is not under the conduct of science that the affairs of men are administered rightly and well; or, if we should not choose to grant that, at least that it is not under the conduct of science only, but of some other thing also which is different from science; and perhaps the knowledge of the means by which men become good hath escaped us.

Meno/ How so, Socrates?

Socrates/ I will tell you how. That those men who are good and virtuous must also be advantageous to us we have agreed rightly; and that it is impossible it should be otherwise. Is not this true?

Meno/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that they are advantageous to us on this account, because they conduct our affairs rightly, should we not do well in admitting this?

Meno/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ But we seem not to have done well in granting, that unless a man be prudent, it is not possible for him to conduct affairs rightly.

Meno/ What mean you now by the word rightly?

Socrates/ I will tell you what I mean. If a man who knew the way to Larissa, or wherever else you please, were to walk at the head of others whom he had undertaken to conduct thither, would he not conduct them well and rightly?

Meno/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ And how would it be were a man to undertake this who had only a right opinion about the way, but had never gone thither himself, nor had any certain knowledge of the way, would not he also conduct them rightly?

Meno/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And so long as he had any how a right opinion of the way, which the other man knew with certainty, he would not in the least be a worse guide, though only surmising justly, and not knowing clearly, than the other with all his perfect knowledge?

Meno/ Not at all worse.

Socrates/ Right opinion, therefore, with regard to right action, is not at all a worse guide than science or perfect knowledge. And this it is which we omitted just now in

considering the nature of virtue; when we said that prudence only or knowledge led to right action; it is this, right opinion.

Meno/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Right opinion therefore is not at all of less advantage to man than certain knowledge.

Meno/ In this respect, however, Socrates, it is; in that he who has a perfect knowledge of his end, would always attain to it; but the man who had only a right opinion of it, sometimes would attain to it, and sometimes would not.

Socrates/ How say you? would not the man, who had a right opinion of it, always attain to it, so long as he entertained that right opinion?

Meno/ It appears to me that he must. And therefore I wonder, Socrates, this being the case, on what account it is that science is so much more valuable than right opinion; and indeed in what respect it is that they differ at all one from the other.

Socrates/ Do you know now why you wonder? or shall I tell you?

Meno/ By all means tell me.

Socrates/ It is because you never considered attentively those images made by Dædalus. But perhaps you have none of them in your country.

Meno/ With what view is it now that you speak of these images?

Socrates/ Because these, if they are not fastened, run away from us, and become fugitives: but if they are fastened, they abide by us.

Meno/ Well; and what then?

Socrates/ To have in one's possession any of these works of his loose and unfastened, is like to the being master of a runaway slave, a matter of little value, because not

permanent: but when fastened and secured, they are things of great value; for indeed they are works of great beauty. But you ask, with what view it is that I speak of these images. I answer, —It is with a view to true opinions. For true opinions also, so long as they abide by us, are valuable goods, and procure for us all good things: but they are not disposed to abide with us a long time; for they soon slip away out of our souls, and become fugitives. Hence are they of small value to a man, until he has fastened and bound them down, by deducing them rationally from their cause. And this, my friend Meno, is reminiscence, as we before agreed. But when they are thus bound and fastened, in the first place they become truly known, and in consequence of this they become stable and abide with us. Now it is on this very account that science is a thing more valuable than right opinion; and in this respect it is they differ, in that the parts of science only are fastened one to another, and bound down together.

Meno/ By Zeus, Socrates, they are similar to some such things as those to which you resemble them.

Socrates/ Nay, for my part, I speak thus not from knowledge; but only from conjecture. But that right opinion and science are two different things, this, as it appears to me, I do not merely imagine or conjecture. For if I were to profess the knowledge of any things whatever (and there are but a few things which I could profess to know), this I would set down for one of them.

Meno/ You are entirely right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well; and am I not right in this also, that true opinion, having the conduct of any work or action whatever, executes her office full as well as science?

Meno/ In this too I think you are in the right.

Socrates/ Right opinion, therefore, is a thing not at all inferior to science, nor less beneficial with regard to the execution of any work, or the performance of any action: nor is the man, who has right opinions, inferior (in this respect) to the man of science.

Meno/ Very true.

Socrates/ And we agreed before, that a good man was beneficial or advantageous to others.

Meno/ We did.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, it is not through science only that men have been good and beneficial to their country (if any such men there may have been), but also by means of right opinion; and since neither of these is with men by nature, neither science nor right opinion; or you think that either of them comes by nature?

Meno/ Not I.

Socrates/ Since then, they are not by nature, by nature neither is it that men could have been good and virtuous.

Meno/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Seeing now, that virtue comes not by nature, we should, in the next place, after this consider if it comes through teaching.

Meno/ To be sure we should.

Socrates/ Did it not appear to us both, that if virtue was wisdom, then it came through teaching?

Meno/ It did.

Socrates/ And that if virtue came through teaching, then virtue would be wisdom?

Meno/ Very true.

Socrates/ And that if there were any teachers of virtue, virtue would in that case be a thing that came through teaching; otherwise not?

Meno/ Just so.

Socrates/ But we have agreed that there were no teachers of it.

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ We are agreed, therefore, that virtue comes not through teaching; and that virtue is not wisdom.

Meno/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ But we agreed besides, that virtue was something good.

Meno/ True.

Socrates/ And that whatever conducted affairs rightly was a thing good and serviceable to us.

Meno/ We did clearly.

Socrates/ And that affairs are conducted rightly by these two things only, true opinion and science; possessed of either of which two, a man makes a good leader and guide. Whatever comes from fortune is not the effect of human conduct. But so far as man has to do in conducting rightly, it is only through one of these means, true opinion and science.

Meno/ I think so.

Socrates/ Now since virtue comes not through teaching, it is not the effect of science.

Meno/ It appears that it is not.

Socrates/ Of the two only things then, which are good and serviceable to man's right conduct, we have thrown one out of the question; having agreed that science is not the thing through which civil affairs are administered and conducted rightly.

Meno/ I think it is not.

Socrates/ Not therefore through any wisdom, nor as being wise, did such men govern in the state; such as

Themistocles, and the rest, whom Anytus here just now recounted. And for this very reason they were not capable of making others to be such men as themselves; because it was not science that made them what they were.

Meno/ The case, O Socrates, seems to be as you represent it.

Socrates/ If then it is not science, it follows that it must be the other thing which remains of the two, namely, right opinion, through which public affairs are administered rightly by our statesmen and politicians; men who, 'in point of wisdom, are not at all superior to the oracle singers and divine prophets. For these also utter many true sayings, but have no real knowledge of anyone thing they utter.

Meno/ I suspect this to be the case.

Socrates/ Now do not those men, O Meno, deserve the character of divine men, who either speak or act aright in many things of great importance, without any intellectual knowledge of the subjects concerning which they speak or act?

Meno/ By all means do they.

Socrates/ Rightly then should we call those men divine, whom we just now mentioned, the oracle singers and the prophets, and all who are inspired by the Muses. Nor at all less divine men than these should we say that the politicians are, no less enthusiasts, inspired divinely, and possessed by the Divinity, when in their speeches they direct aright many and great affairs, without any real knowledge of the subjects they are speaking of.

Meno/ Certainly we should.

Socrates/ And accordingly the women, you know, Meno, call men of virtue by the name of divine men. And the Lacedæmonians, when they celebrate with encomiums any man of virtue, are used to say of him that he is a divine man.

Meno/ And they appear, O Socrates, to speak justly too. And yet, perhaps, Anytus here is offended at what you say.

Socrates/ I give myself no manner of concern about it. With him, Meno, we shall have some discourse at another time. But if we, at this time, during all this conversation, have pursued our inquiries and reasonings aright, virtue can neither come by nature, nor yet through teaching; but to those with whom it is, it must come by a divine portion or allotment, without the intelligence or true knowledge of it; unless amongst the politicians there should be found some person capable of making another man a good politician. But if there should, he might almost be said to be such a one amongst the living, as Homer tells us that Tiresias is amongst the dead; where, speaking of him and of the rest who are in Hades, he says;

> Filled is he only with discerning mind;
> The rest flit, empty shadows, dark and blind.

Exactly the same preeminence hath such a man; being as it were the truth and substance of things, compared with shadows, in respect of virtue.

Meno/ What you say, O Socrates, seems to me to be in the highest degree just.

Socrates/ From this reasoning then, Meno, it appears to us, that such as are possessed of virtue, have it as a divine portion or allotment to them. But on this point we shall then arrive at certainty, when, previous to our inquiries by what means it is that virtue comes to men, we set about searching first, what the essence is of virtue. —But it is now time for me to go somewhere else. And do you, since you are persuaded yourself of the truth of those conclusions, the result of our inquiries, persuade your friend Anytus to believe them also. For he may thus be softened and become

milder; and you, by thus persuading him, may possibly do a piece of service to your country.

The Minos.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and a Friend.

Socrates/ What thing is law with us?

Friend/ Of what kind is the law are you asking about?

Socrates/ What, is it that law differs from law, according to this very thing, in being law? For consider what I happen to be asking you. For I am asking, as if I should inquire what is gold? and if you should in a similar manner ask me, about what kind of gold am I speaking, I should think you would not rightly ask. For neither does gold differ in anything from gold, so far as it is gold, nor a stone from a stone, so far as it is a stone. And in like manner, neither does law differ in anything from law; but all laws are as laws the same. For each of them exists similarly as law; nor is one more, and another less so. I ask you, therefore, this very thing as a whole, what is law? and if you have an answer at hand, state it.

Friend/ What else, Socrates, can law be, than the things established by law?

Socrates/ Does speech too appear to you to be the things which are spoken? or sight, the things which are seen? or hearing, the things which are heard? Or is not speech one thing, and the things spoken another? Is not sight one thing, and the things seen another? Is not hearing one thing, and the things heard another? And is not law one thing, and the things established by law another? Does it appear to you in this way? Or how?

Friend/ It now appears to be another thing.

Socrates/ Law therefore is not the things established by law.

Friend/ It does not appear to me that it is.

Socrates/ What then can law be? Let us consider it thus. If someone had asked us respecting the things just now spoken of—Since you say that things seen are seen by the sight, by the sight being what, are they seen? we should have answered—by that sense, which through the eyes manifests colors to us. And if he had asked us again—Since things heard are heard by hearing, by the hearing being what, are they heard? we should have answered—by a sense, which through the ears manifests sounds to us. In like manner, if he had asked us, —Since things are established by law, by the law being what, are they thus established? Is it by a certain sense, or manifestation, in the same manner as things learnt are learnt by some art rendering them manifest through some discovery? just as things discovered are discovered; as, for instance, things salubrious and noxious are discovered through the medical art; and what the gods have in their thoughts, as the diviners say, through the divining art. For art is with us the discovery of things: or is it not?

Friend/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Which of these then may we especially understand law to be?

Friend/ Decrees and votes, as it seems to me. For what else can anyone say law is? So that it nearly appears that law, about which you were asking, is, taken as a whole, the decree of a state.

Socrates/ You call, as it seems, law, a state-opinion.

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ And perhaps you speak well; but perhaps we shall know better in the following manner. You call some persons wise?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Are not then the wise, wise by wisdom?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what, are the just, just by justice?

Friend/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Are not then the lawful, lawful by law?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the lawless, lawless by an absence of law?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the lawful are just?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the lawless unjust?

Friend/ Unjust.

Socrates/ Are not justice and law therefore things most beautiful?

Friend/ They are.

Socrates/ And are not injustice and lawlessness the least beautiful?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does not the former preserve cities and everything else, but the latter destroy and overturn them?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is necessary then to consider the law as something beautiful, and to seek it as a good.

Friend/ How not?

Socrates/ Now have we not said that law is a decree of the city?

Friend/ We have said so.

Socrates/ What then, are not some decrees good, and some evil?

Friend/ They are.

Socrates/ Law however is not evil.

Friend/ It is not.

Socrates/ It is not correct then to answer thus simply, that law is a decree of the city.

Friend/ It appears to me it is not.

Socrates/ Nor is it suited to reason for an evil decree to be law.

Friend/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Law however appears to me too to be a certain opinion. And since an opinion is not evil, is not this evident, that it is a good one, if law is opinion?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what is a good opinion? Is it not a true one?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is then a true opinion the discovery of that which is?

Friend/ It is.

Socrates/ Law therefore would be the discovery of that which is.

Friend/ How then, Socrates, if law is the discovery of that which is, do we not always use the same laws about the same things? since things that are have been discovered by us.

Socrates/ The law nevertheless would be the discovery of that which is. But if men do not always, as we think, use the same laws, they are not always able to discover that which law wishes, namely, that which is. But come, let us see if it

will hence become evident to us, whether we always use the same laws, or some at one time, and others at another; and if all use the same laws, or different persons different laws.

Friend/ But this, Socrates, it is not difficult to know, that neither do the same persons always use the same laws, nor different persons always different laws. Thus, for example, it is not a law with us to sacrifice human beings, but it is an unholy act; but the Carthaginians sacrifice them, as being a holy and a lawful act with them; so that some of them sacrifice their sons to Kronos, as perhaps you too have heard; and not only do Barbarians use law's different from ours, but also those fellows in Lycæa, and the progeny of Athamas, what sacrifices do they perform, although they are Greeks! In like manner you surely know by hearsay yourself what laws we formerly used concerning the dead, by cutting the throats of the victims before the dead body was carried out, and sending for the women who collect the bones of the dead in jars; and those, who still, antecedent to them, buried the dead at home; but we do none of these things. Ten thousand instances of this kind one might mention; for wide is the field of demonstration, that neither do we always have customs in the same manner amongst ourselves, nor do men amongst each other.

Socrates/ It is by no means wonderful, O best of men, if you are speaking correctly, this has lain hid from me. But as long as you by yourself declare what appears to you in a long discourse, and I again do the same, we shall never, as I think, come to an agreement. But if the inquiry be laid down in common, we shall perhaps think alike. If then you are willing, ask me some question, and consider with me in common. Or, if you wish it, give an answer.

Friend/ Nay, I am willing, Socrates, to answer whatever you choose to ask.

Socrates/ Come then, do you think that what is just is unjust, and what is unjust is just? Or that what is just is just, and what is unjust is unjust?

Friend/ I indeed think that what is just is just, and what is unjust is unjust.

Socrates/ Is it not so held by all persons as it is here?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Among the Persians also?

Friend/ And among the Persians too.

Socrates/ But is it really always so?

Friend/ Always.

Socrates/ Whether are things, that draw the greater weight, thought by us here to be the heavier, but those that draw the less, lighter? or the contrary?

Friend/ No; but those that draw the greater weight, are the heavier, and those that draw the less, are lighter.

Socrates/ Is this the case, therefore, in Carthage and in Lycia?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Things beautiful, as it seems, are everywhere held to be beautiful, and things ugly to be ugly; but things ugly are not thought to be beautiful, nor things beautiful to be ugly.

Friend/ It is so.

Socrates/ In the case of all things, so to say, the things, that exist, are held to be, not the things that do not exist, both with us and with all others.

Friend/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who errs in that which is, errs in that which is lawful.

Friend/ Thus, Socrates, as you say, the same things always appear lawful both to us and to others. But when I consider, that we never cease altering the laws up and down, I cannot be persuaded.

Socrates/ For perhaps you do not bear in mind that these things, being put into a changed place, are the same. But look at them thus with me. Have you ever met with any book relating to the health of the sick?

Friend/ I have.

Socrates/ Do you know then to what art that book belongs?

Friend/ I know it belongs to the medical art.

Socrates/ Do you then not call those skilled in these matters physicians?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Do then the skilled think the same about the same, or do some think one thing and others another?

Friend/ They seem to me to think the same.

Socrates/ Do then Greeks alone think the same with Greeks about things of which they know? or do Barbarians likewise do so with each other, and with Greeks?

Friend/ There is a great necessity for both Greeks and Barbarians, who know, to think the same with themselves and each other.

Socrates/ You have answered correctly. Do they not then always do so?

Friend/ Yes, always.

Socrates/ Do not physicians also write about health what they think to be true?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Things relating to medicine and medical laws are the writings of physicians.

Friend/ Things relating to medicine, certainly.

Socrates/ Are not then the writings relating to agriculture agricultural laws?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Of whom then are the writings and institutes relating to gardening?

Friend/ Of gardeners.

Socrates/ These then are the laws about gardening.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Of those, who know how to manage gardens?

Friend/ How not?

Socrates/ But gardeners possess this knowledge.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And of whom are the writings and institutes relating to the dressing of savory food?

Friend/ Of cooks.

Socrates/ These, therefore, are the laws of cookery.

Friend/ Of cookery.

Socrates/ Of those, as it seems, who know how to manage the dressing of savory food.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But cooks, as they say, know.

Friend/ They do know.

Socrates/ Be it so. And of whom are the writings and institutes concerning the administration of a state? Are they not of those, who know how to govern states?

Friend/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ But do any others than statesmen and kings know?

Friend/ They alone.

Socrates/ Those writings then relating to a state, which men call laws, are the writings of kings and good men.

Friend/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Will then they, who know, write one thing at one time, and another at another, about the same things?

Friend/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ If then we see certain persons doing this at any place whatever, shall we say that those, who do so, are skilled or unskilled?

Friend/ Unskilled.

Socrates/ Shall we then say that what is right is in each case lawful, whether it relate to medicine, or cooking, or gardening?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But that, which is not right, we shall no longer assert to be lawful.

Friend/ No longer.

Socrates/ It therefore becomes lawless.

Friend/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Hence, in writings concerning things just and unjust, and, in short, concerning the orderly arrangement of a city, and the manner in which one ought to administer it, that, which is right, is a royal law; but that, which is not right, is not a royal law, because science is wanting: for it is.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ We have rightly therefore acknowledged that the law is the invention of that which is.

Friend/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Let us still further consider it in this way likewise. Who is skilled in distributing the seeds to the earth?

Friend/ The husbandman.

Socrates/ Does he then distribute seeds proper for each soil?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ The husbandman therefore is a good distributer of these things, and his laws and distributions in these particulars are right.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And who is a good distributer of pulsations for tunes, and distributes such as are proper? And whose laws are right?

Friend/ Those of the piper and the harper.

Socrates/ He then, who acts most according to law in these things, is, in the greatest degree, a piper.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But who is the best to distribute nutriment to the bodies of men? Is it not he, who distributes the proper?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ The distributions therefore and the laws of this man are the best; and he, who acts the most according to law in these things, is the best distributer.

Friend/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Who is he?

Friend/ The training-master.

Socrates/ Does he know how to feed the flock of the human body in the best manner?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And who is the best to tend a flock of sheep? What is his name?

Friend/ Shepherd.

Socrates/ The laws therefore of the shepherd are the best for the sheep.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And those of the herdsman for oxen.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And whose laws are the best for the minds of men? Are they not those of a king? Tell me.

Friend/ I say so.

Socrates/ You speak well. Can you therefore tell me, who among the ancients was a good maker of the laws relating to pipes? Perhaps you have him not in your thoughts. Are you then willing that I should remind you?

Friend/ By all means.

Socrates/ Was not Marsyas said to be so, and his loved Olympus the Phrygian.

Friend/ True.

Socrates/ The pipe-playing of these men is most divine, and alone excites and shows forth those who are in need of the gods; and it alone remains to the present time as being divine.

Friend/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ And who amongst the ancient kings is said to have been a good law-maker, and whose institutions remain even now as being divine?

Friend/ I do not recollect.

Socrates/ Do you not know, which of the Greeks are making use of laws the most ancient?

Friend/ Are you speaking of the Lacedæmonians, and of Lycurgus the law-giver?

Socrates/ These institutions, however, are perhaps not three hundred years old, or a little more. But do you know from whence came the best of their laws?

Friend/ They say, from Crete.

Socrates/ Do not they of all the Greeks make use of laws the most ancient?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you know then who among these were good kings? Were they not Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa, by whom those laws were made?

Friend/ They say, Socrates, that Rhadamanthus was a just man, but that Minos was rustic, morose, and unjust.

Socrates/ You are telling, O best of men, a tale of Attica, and of tragedy.

Friend/ What, are not such things told of Minos?

Socrates/ Not by Homer, at least, and Hesiod; and they are more trust-worthy than all the tragic poets, from whom you have heard what you are saying.

Friend/ But what do they say about Minos?

Socrates/ I will tell you, that you may not, like the many, be guilty of impiety. For there is not anything more impious than this, nor of what we ought to be more cautious, than of sinning against the gods, either in word or in deed; and next, against divine men. But you ought to take ever a very great care, when you are about to praise or blame any man, that you speak correctly; and for the sake of this, it is meet to learn how to distinguish good and bad men. For the deity feels indignant when anyone blames a person similar to himself, or praises one dissimilar; for this is the good man. For think not that stones, and wood, and birds, and serpents are sacred, but that men are not so; for a good man is the most sacred, and a depraved man the most defiled of all

things. Now then, since Homer and Hesiod pass an encomium on Minos, on this account I will speak, in order that you, being a man sprung from a man, may not sin in word against a hero the son of Zeus. For Homer, speaking of Crete, says, there are many men, and ninety cities in it;

> Amongst them Knossus, a great city, where
> Reigned Minos, who each ninth year converse held
> With mighty Zeus.

This then is Homer's praise of Minos, expressed in few words, such as he has not given to even one of his heroes. For that Zeus is a sophist, and that the art itself is all-beautiful, he shows in many other places, and here likewise. For he says that Minos conversed in the ninth year with Zeus, and went to be instructed by him, as if Zeus were a sophist. That Homer, then, does not bestow the honor of being instructed by Zeus upon any other hero, than Minos, is praise indeed to be wondered at. In the scene of the Odyssey, too, relating to the Dead, Homer has represented Minos as a judge, and holding a golden scepter; but not Rhadamanthus as judging there, or conversing with Zeus anywhere. On this account I say that Minos is extolled by Homer beyond all other heroes. For to have been instructed merely by Zeus, when he was the son of Zeus, carries with it no excess of praise. For the verse—He reigned, and each ninth year conversed with Zeus—means that he was the associate of Zeus; for by ὅαροι is meant "discourses," and by ὀαριστὴς, "an associate in discourse." Hence at each ninth year, Minos went to the cavern of Zeus, to learn some things, and to show forth others; which, during the preceding period of nine years, he had learnt from Zeus. There are, however, some who understand by ὀαριστὴς, "the associate" of Zeus in drinking and sport; although anyone may make use of this as a proof to show that they, who thus understand the word, say nothing to the purpose; for although both the Greeks

and Barbarians are numerous, there are none, who abstain from banquets, and the sport to which wine belongs, except the Cretans, and next the Lacedæmonians, who were instructed by the Cretans. But in Crete this is one of the other laws, which Minos laid down, "not to drink with each other to intoxication." And it is evident, that what he deemed to be beautiful institutions, these he laid down for his own citizens. For Minos did not, like a knave, think one thing, and do another, contrary to what he thought; but his intercourse with Zeus was, as I assert, through discourses for the attainment of virtue. Hence he laid down those laws for his citizens, through which Crete has been for all time prosperous, and Lacedæmon likewise, from the time when it began to make use of those laws, as being divine. But Rhadamanthus was indeed a good man; for he was instructed by Minos. He did not however learn the whole of the royal art, but that part of it, which ministers to the royal, as far as presiding over courts of justice; from whence he was said to be a good judge. For Minos employed him as a guardian of the laws in the city; but Talus for those through the rest of Crete. For Talus thrice every year went through the villages in order to preserve the laws in them, and carried with him the laws written in tables of brass; from whence he was called "brazen." Hesiod too asserts respecting Minos, what is closely related to this. For, having mentioned his name, he says;

> Most regal was he of all mortal kings,
> And o'er the most of neighboring people ruled,
> Of Zeus the scepter holding, king like him;

and he too means by the scepter of Zeus, nothing else than the instruction of Zeus, by which he regulated Crete.

Friend/ On what account then, Socrates, was the report spread against Minos, of his being an unlearned and morose man?

Socrates/ On that account, through which you, O best of men, if you are prudent, and every other person to whom it is a care to be in good repute, will be cautious never to incur the anger of a poet. For poets are able to effect much as regards reputation, in whatever way they may represent acts, by praising men and blaming them. On which ground Minos erred, when he made war upon this city; where there is much of other wisdom, and poets in every other kind of poetry, and in tragedy likewise. Now tragedy here is of an old date, not beginning as persons fancy from Thespis, nor from Phrynichus; but, if you are willing to turn your thoughts to it, you will find it is a very ancient invention of this city. Now, of poetry in general, the most pleasing to the vulgar and the most soul-alluring is tragedy; to which we, applying our minds, have revenged ourselves upon Minos, for the tribute he compelled us to pay. In this then Minos erred, by incurring our anger; from whence, in reply to your question, he became in rather bad repute. For that he was a good man, a friend to law, and a good shepherd of the people, as I have before observed, this is the greatest proof, that his laws have been unchanged, in consequence of his having discovered correctly the truth of what is, with reference to the administration of a state.

Friend/ You appear to me, Socrates, to have stated a probable reason.

Socrates/ If then I am speaking the truth, do not the Cretans, the citizens of Minos and Rhadamanthus, appear to you to have made use of laws the most ancient?

Friend/ They appear so.

Socrates/ These therefore were the best lawgivers of the ancients, and distributors and shepherds of men; just as Homer likewise says, that a good general is “a shepherd of the people.”

Friend/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Come then, by Zeus, who presides over friendship, if anyone, who is a good lawgiver and shepherd of the body, should ask us—What are those things, which a person by distributing to the body will make it better? we should well and briefly answer, that they are nutriment and labor, by the former increasing, and by the latter exercising and knitting together the body.

Friend/ Right.

Socrates/ If then he should after this ask us—What are those things which a good law-giver and shepherd will, by distributing to the soul, make it better? —by making what answer, should we be not ashamed of ourselves, and of our age?

Friend/ This I am no longer able to say.

Socrates/ It is however disgraceful to the soul of each of us, to seem not to know the things pertaining to them, and in which their good and evil consist, but to have considered those pertaining to the body, and to other things.

The Minos.

or

On Law

[POLITICAL]

Translated by Lamb.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Companion

Socrates/ Tell me, what is law?

Friend/ To what kind of law does your question refer?

Socrates/ What! Is there any difference between law and law, in this particular point of being law? For just consider what is the actual question I am putting to you. It is as though I had asked, what is gold: if you had asked me in the same manner, to what kind of gold I refer, I think your question would have been incorrect. For I presume there is no difference between gold and gold, or between stone and stone, in point of being gold or stone; and so neither does law differ at all from law, I suppose, but they are all the same thing. For each of them is law alike, not one more so, and another less. That is the particular point of my question—what is law as a whole? So if you are ready, tell me.

Friend/ Well, what else should law be, Socrates, but things loyally accepted?

Socrates/ And so speech, you think, is the things that are spoken, or sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard? Or is speech something distinct from the things spoken, sight something distinct from the things seen, and hearing something distinct from the things heard; and so law is something distinct from things loyally accepted? Is this so, or what is your view?

Friend/ I find it now to be something distinct.

Socrates/ Then law is not things loyally accepted.

Friend/ I think not.

Socrates/ Now what can law be? Let us consider it in this way. Suppose someone had asked us about what was stated just now: Since you say it is by sight that things seen are seen, what is this sight whereby they are seen? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows objects by means of the eyes. And if he had asked us again: Well then, since it is by hearing that things heard are heard, what is hearing? Our answer to him would have been: That sensation which shows us sounds by means of the ears. In the same way then, suppose he should also ask us: Since it is by law that loyally accepted things are so accepted, what is this law whereby they are so accepted? Is it some sensation or showing, as when things learnt are learnt by knowledge showing them, or some discovery, as when things discovered are discovered—for instance, the causes of health and sickness by medicine, or the designs of the gods, as the prophets say, by prophecy; for art is surely our discovery of things, is it not?

Friend/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then what thing especially of this sort shall we surmise law to be?

Friend/ Our resolutions and decrees, I imagine: for how else can one describe law? So that apparently the whole thing, law, as you put it in your question, is a city's resolution.

Socrates/ State opinion, it seems, is what you call law.

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ And perhaps you are right: but I fancy we shall get a better knowledge in this way. You call some men wise?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ And the wise are wise by wisdom?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And again, the just are just by justice?

Friend/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And so the law-abiding are law-abiding by law?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the lawless are lawless by lawlessness?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the law-abiding are just?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the lawless are unjust?

Friend/ Unjust.

Socrates/ And justice and law are most noble?

Friend/ That is so.

Socrates/ And injustice and lawlessness most base?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the former preserve cities and everything else, while the latter destroy and overturn them?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Hence we must regard law as something noble, and seek after it as a good.

Friend/ Undeniably.

Socrates/ And we said that law is a city's resolution?

Friend/ So we did.

Socrates/ Well now, are not some resolutions good, and others evil?

Friend/ Yes, to be sure.

Socrates/ And, you know, law was not evil.

Friend/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ So it is not right to reply, in such downright fashion, that law is a city's resolution.

Friend/ I agree that it is not.

Socrates/ An evil resolution, you see, cannot properly be a law.

Friend/ No, to be sure.

Socrates/ But still, I am quite clear myself that law is some sort of opinion; and since it is not evil opinion, is it not manifest by this time that it is good opinion, granting that law is opinion?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what is good opinion? Is it not true opinion?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And true opinion is discovery of reality?

Friend/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ So law tends to be discovery of reality.

Friend/ Then how is it, Socrates, if law is discovery of reality, that we do not use always the same laws on the same matters, if we have thus got realities discovered?

Socrates/ Law tends none the less to be discovery of reality: but men, who do not use always the same laws, as we observe, are not always able to discover what the law is intent on—reality. For come now, let us see if from this point onward we can get it clear whether we use always the same laws or different ones at different times, and whether we all use the same, or some of us use some, and others, others.

Friend/ Why, that, Socrates, is no difficult matter to determine—that the same men do not use always the same laws, and also that different men use different ones. With us, for instance, human sacrifice is not legal, but unholy, whereas the Carthaginians perform it as a thing they

account holy and legal, and that too when some of them sacrifice even their own sons to Cronos, as I daresay you yourself have heard. And not merely is it foreign peoples who use different laws from ours, but our neighbors in Lycaea and the descendants of Athamas—you know their sacrifices, Greeks though they be. And as to ourselves too, you know, of course, from what you have heard yourself, the kind of laws we formerly used in regard to our dead, when we slaughtered sacred victims before the funeral procession, and engaged urn-women to collect the bones from the ashes. Then again, a yet earlier generation used to bury the dead where they were, in the house: but we do none of these things. One might give thousands of other instances; for there is ample means of proving that neither we copy ourselves nor mankind each other always in laws and customs.

Socrates/ And it is no wonder, my excellent friend, if what you say is correct, and I have overlooked it. But if you continue to express your views after your own fashion in lengthy speeches, and I speak likewise, we shall never come to any agreement, in my opinion: but if we study the matter jointly, we may perhaps concur. Well now, if you like, hold a joint inquiry with me by asking me questions; or if you prefer, by answering them.

Friend/ Why, I am willing, Socrates, to answer anything you like.

Socrates/ Come then, do you consider just things to be unjust and unjust things just; or just things to be just and unjust things unjust?

Friend/ I consider just things to be just, and unjust things unjust.

Socrates/ And are they so considered among all men elsewhere as they are here?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And among the Persians also?

Friend/ Among the Persians also.

Socrates/ Always, I presume?

Friend/ Always.

Socrates/ Are things that weigh more considered heavier here, and things that weigh less lighter, or the contrary?

Friend/ No, those that weigh more are considered heavier, and those that weigh less lighter.

Socrates/ And is it so in Carthage also, and in Lycaea?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Noble things, it would seem, are everywhere considered noble, and base things base; not base things noble or noble things base.

Friend/ That is so.

Socrates/ And thus, as a universal rule, realities, and not unrealities, are accepted as real, both among us and among all other men.

Friend/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then whoever fails to attain reality, fails to attain accepted law.

Friend/ In your present way of putting it, Socrates, the same things appear to be accepted as lawful both by us and by the rest of the world, always: but when I reflect that we are continually changing our laws in all sorts of ways, I cannot bring myself to assent.

Socrates/ Perhaps it is because you do not reflect that when we change our pieces at draughts they are the same pieces. But look at it, as I do, in this way. Have you in your time come across a treatise on healing the sick?

Friend/ I have.

Socrates/ Then do you know to what art such a treatise belongs?

Friend/ I do: medicine.

Socrates/ And you give the name of doctors to those who have knowledge of these matters?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then do those who have knowledge accept the same views on the same things, or do they accept different views?

Friend/ The same, in my opinion.

Socrates/ Do Greeks only accept the same views as Greeks on what they know, or do foreigners also agree on these matters, both among themselves and with Greeks?

Friend/ It is quite inevitable, I should say, that those who know should agree in accepting the same views, whether Greeks or foreigners.

Socrates/ Well answered. And do they so always?

Friend/ Yes, it is so always.

Socrates/ And do doctors on their part, in their treatises on health, write what they accept as real?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then these treatises of the doctors are medical, and medical laws.

Friend/ Medical, to be sure.

Socrates/ And are agricultural treatises likewise agricultural laws?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about garden-work?

Friend/ Gardeners'.

Socrates/ So these are our gardening laws.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Of people who know how to control gardens?

Friend/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And it is the gardeners who know.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the confection of tasty dishes?

Friend/ Cooks'.

Socrates/ Then there are laws of cookery?

Friend/ Of cookery.

Socrates/ Of people who know, it would seem, how to control the confection of tasty dishes?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And it is the cooks, they say, who know?

Friend/ Yes, it is they who know.

Socrates/ Very well; and now, whose are the treatises and accepted rules about the government of a state? Of the people who know how to control states, are they not?

Friend/ I agree.

Socrates/ And is it anyone else than statesmen and royal persons who know?

Friend/ It is they, to be sure.

Socrates/ Then what people call "laws" are treatises of state, —writings of kings and good men.

Friend/ That is true.

Socrates/ And must it not be that those who know will not write differently at different times on the same matters?

Friend/ They will not.

Socrates/ Nor will they ever change one set of accepted rules for another in respect of the same matters.

Friend/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ So if we see some persons anywhere doing this, shall we say that those who do so have knowledge, or have none?

Friend/ That they have no knowledge.

Socrates/ And again, whatever is right, we shall say is lawful for each person, whether in medicine or in cookery or in gardening?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And whatever is not right we shall decline to call lawful?

Friend/ We shall decline.

Socrates/ Then it becomes unlawful.

Friend/ It must.

Socrates/ And again, in writings about what is just and unjust, and generally about the government of a state and the proper way of governing it, that which is right is the king's law, but not so that which is not right, though it seems to be law to those who do not know; for it is unlawful.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we rightly admitted that law is discovery of reality.

Friend/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Now let us observe this further point about it. Who has knowledge of distributing seed over land?

Friend/ A farmer.

Socrates/ And does he distribute the suitable seed to each sort of land?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the farmer is a good apportioner of it, and his laws and distributions are right in this matter?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And who is a good apportioner of notes struck for a tune, skilled in distributing suitable notes, and who is it whose laws are right here?

Friend/ The flute-player and the harp-player.

Socrates/ Then he who is the best lawyer in these matters is the best flute-player.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And who is most skilled in distributing food to human bodies? Is it not he who assigns suitable food?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then his distributions and laws are best, and whoever is the best lawyer in this matter is also the best apportioner.

Friend/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Who is he?

Friend/ A trainer.

Socrates/ He is the best man to pasture the human herd of the body?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And who is the best man to pasture a flock of sheep? What is his name?

Friend/ A shepherd.

Socrates/ Then the shepherd's laws are best for sheep.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the herdsman's for oxen.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And whose laws are best for the souls of men? The king's, are they not? Say if you agree.

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Then you are quite right. Now can you tell me who, in former times, has proved himself a good lawgiver in regard to the laws of flute-playing? Perhaps you cannot think of him: would you like me to remind you?

Friend/ Do by all means.

Socrates/ Then is it Marsyas, by tradition, and his beloved Olympus, the Phrygian?

Friend/ That is true.

Socrates/ And their flute-tunes also are most divine, and alone stir and make manifest those who are in need of the gods; and to this day they only remain, as being divine.

Friend/ That is so.

Socrates/ And who by tradition has shown himself a good law giver among the ancient kings, so that to this day his ordinances remain, as being divine?

Friend/ I cannot think.

Socrates/ Do you not know which of the Greeks use the most ancient laws?

Friend/ Do you mean the Spartans, and Lycurgus the lawgiver?

Socrates/ Why, that is a matter, I daresay, of less than three hundred years ago, or but a little more. But whence is it that the best of those ordinances come? Do you know?

Friend/ From Crete, so they say.

Socrates/ Then the people there use the most ancient laws in Greece?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then do you know who were their good kings? Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa; those laws were theirs.

Friend/ Rhadamanthus, they do say, Socrates, was a just man; but Minos was a savage sort of person, harsh and unjust.

Socrates/ Your tale, my excellent friend, is a fiction of Attic tragedy.

Friend/ What! Is not this the tradition about Minos?

Socrates/ Not in Homer and Hesiod; and yet they are more to be believed than all the tragedians together, from whom you heard your tale.

Friend/ Well, and what, pray, is their tale about Minos?

Socrates/ I will tell you, in order that you may not share the impiety of the multitude: for there cannot conceivably be anything more impious or more to be guarded against than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to the gods, and after them, with regard to divine men; you must take very great precaution, whenever you are about to blame or praise a man, so as not to speak incorrectly. For this reason you must learn to distinguish honest and dishonest men: for God feels resentment when one blames a man who is like himself, or praises a man who is the opposite; and the former is the good man. For you must not suppose that while stocks and stones and birds and snakes are sacred, men are not; nay. the good man is the most sacred of all these things, and the wicked man is the most defiled.

So if I now proceed to relate how Minos is eulogized by Homer and Hesiod, my purpose is to prevent you, a man sprung from a man, from making a mistake in regard to a hero who was the son of Zeus. For Homer, in telling of Crete that there were in it many men and “ninety cities,” says:

And amongst them is the mighty city of Cnossos, where Minos was king, having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year.

Now here in Homer we have a eulogy of Minos, briefly expressed, such as the poet never composed for a single one of the heroes. For that Zeus is a sophist, and that sophistry is a highly honorable art, he makes plain in many other places, and particularly here. For he says that Minos consorted and discoursed with Zeus in the ninth year, and went regularly to be educated by Zeus as though he were a sophist. And the fact that Homer assigned this privilege of having been educated by Zeus to no one among the heroes but Minos makes this a marvelous piece of praise. And in the Ghost-raising in the Odyssey he has described Minos as judging with a golden scepter in his hand, but not Rhadamanthus: Rhadamanthus he has neither described here as judging nor anywhere as consorting with Zeus; wherefore I say that Minos above all persons has been eulogized by Homer. For to have been the son of Zeus, and to have been the only one who was educated by Zeus, is praise unsurpassable.

For the meaning of the verse—"was king having colloquy with mighty Zeus in the ninth year"—is that Minos was a disciple of Zeus. For colloquies are discourses, and he who has colloquy is a disciple by means of discourse. So every ninth year Minos repaired to the cave of Zeus, to learn some things, and to show his knowledge of others that he had learnt from Zeus in the preceding nine years. Some there are who suppose that he who has colloquy is a cup-companion and fellow-jester of Zeus: but one may take the following as a proof that they who suppose so are babblers. For of all the many nations of men, both Greek and foreign, the only people who refrain from drinking-bouts and the jesting that occurs where there is wine, are the Cretans, and after them the Spartans, who learnt it from the Cretans. In Crete it is one of their laws which Minos ordained that they are not to drink with each other to intoxication. And yet it is evident

that the things he thought honorable were what he ordained as lawful for his people as well. For surely Minos did not, like an inferior person, think one thing and do another, different from what he thought: no, this intercourse, as I say, was held by means of discussion for education in virtue. Wherefore he ordained for his people these very laws, which have made Crete happy through the length of time, and Sparta happy also, since she began to use them; for they are divine.

Rhadamanthus was a good man indeed, for he had been educated by Minos; he had, however, been educated, not in the whole of the kingly art, but in one subsidiary to the kingly, enough for presiding in law courts; so that he was spoken of as a good judge. For Minos used him as guardian of the law in the city, and Talos as the same for the rest of Crete. For Talos thrice a year made a round of the villages, guarding the laws in them, by holding their laws inscribed on brazen tablets, which gave him his name of "brazen." And what Hesiod also has said of Minos is akin to this. For after mentioning him by name he remarks—

Who was most kingly of mortal kings, and lorded it over more neighboring folk than any, holding the scepter of Zeus: therewith it was that he ruled the cities as king.

And by the scepter of Zeus he means nothing else than the education that he had of Zeus, whereby he directed Crete.

Friend/ Then how has it ever come about, Socrates, that this report is spread abroad of Minos, as an uneducated and harsh-tempered person?

Socrates/ Because of something that will make both you, if you are wise, my excellent friend, and everybody else who cares to have a good reputation, beware of ever quarrelling with any man of a poetic turn. For poets have great influence

over opinion, according as they create it in the minds of men by either commending or vilifying. And this was the mistake that Minos made, in waging war on this city of ours, which besides all its various culture has poets of every kind, and especially those who write tragedy. Now tragedy is a thing of ancient standing here; it did not begin, as people suppose, from Thespis or from Phrynichus, but if you will reflect, you will find it is a very ancient invention of our city. Tragedy is the most popularly delightful and soul-enthralling branch of poetry: in it, accordingly, we get Minos on the rack of verse, and thus avenge ourselves for that tribute which he compelled us to pay. This, then, was the mistake that Minos made—his quarrel with us—and hence it is that, as you said in your question, he has fallen more and more into evil repute. For that he was a good and law-abiding person, as we stated in what went before—a good apportioner—is most convincingly shown by the fact that his laws are unshaken, since they were made by one who discovered aright the truth of reality in regard to the management of a state.

Friend/ In my opinion, Socrates, your statement is a probable one.

Socrates/ Then if what I say is true, do you consider that the Cretan people of Minos and Rhadamanthus use the most ancient laws?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ So these have shown themselves the best lawgivers among men of ancient times—apportioners and shepherds of men; just as Homer called the good genera] a “shepherd of the folk.”

Friend/ Quite so, indeed.

Socrates/ Come then, in good friendship's name: if someone should ask us what it is that the good lawgiver and apportioner for the body distributes to it when he makes it

better, we should say, if we were to make a correct and brief answer, that it was food and labor; the former to strengthen, and the latter to exercise and brace it.

Friend/ And we should be right.

Socrates/ And if he then proceeded to ask us—And what might that be which the good lawgiver and apportioner distributes to the soul to make it better? —what would be our answer if we would avoid being ashamed of ourselves and our years?

Friend/ This time I am unable to say.

Socrates/ But indeed it is shameful for the soul of either of us to be found ignorant of those things within it on which its good and abject states depend, while it has studied those that pertain to the body and the rest.

Minos

Translated by Malcolm Schofield.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Friend

Socrates/ Law—in our view, what is it?

Friend/ What sort of laws are you asking about?

Socrates/ Well, now! Is it possible that law differs from law in this very respect of being law? Think about the question I'm actually asking you. If I had asked: "What is gold?" then if you had asked me in the same way: "What sort of gold am I referring to?," I reckon that your question would have been incorrect. For surely gold does not differ at all from gold nor stone from stone in respect of being stone or in respect of being gold. And so law too, I suppose, does not differ at all from law—they are all the same thing. Each of them is law alike, not one more, another less. What I am asking, then, is just this—the global question: what is law? If you have an answer to hand, say it.

Friend/ What else would law be, Socrates, but what is accepted?

Socrates/ And so speech, in your view, is what is spoken, or sight what is seen, or hearing what is heard? Or is speech one thing, what is spoken another, sight one thing, what is seen another, hearing one thing, what is heard another—and so law one thing, what is accepted another? Is that so, or what is your view?

Friend/ They are two different things, as it now seems to me.

Socrates/ Law, then, is not what is accepted.

Friend/ I don't think so.

Socrates/ So what can law be? Let's investigate the question as follows. Suppose someone had asked us about what we said just now: "Since you say it is by sight that what is seen is seen, what is this sight by which such things are seen?" We would have replied to him: "That form of sense perception which reveals such things through the eyes." And if he had asked us another question: "Well, now: since it is by hearing that what is heard is heard, what is this hearing?," we would have replied to him: "That form of sense perception which reveals sounds to us through our ears." So, then, if he were to ask us: "Since it is by law that what is accepted is accepted, what is this law by which such things are accepted? Is it a form of perception or revealing, as what is learned is learned by the revelations of knowledge? Or is it a form of discovery, as what is discovered is discovered—for example, facts about health and sickness by medicine, or the intentions of the gods (as the diviners say) by divination: for a skill is surely in our view a discovery of things, is it not?

Friend/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Which among these alternatives, then, would we be most inclined to suppose law to be?

Friend/ The resolutions and decrees themselves, in my own view. What else could one say that law is? So it looks as though the answer to your global question about law has to be: resolution of a city.

Socrates/ Political judgment, it appears, is what you call law.

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ And perhaps this is a good answer. But maybe we'll get a better one in the following way. Do you call certain people wise?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Aren't the wise, wise in virtue of wisdom?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, aren't the just, just in virtue of justice?

Friend/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And aren't the law-abiding, law-abiding in virtue of law?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the lawless, lawless by virtue of lawlessness?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the law-abiding are just?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the lawless unjust?

Friend/ Unjust.

Socrates/ Aren't justice and law something very fine?

Friend/ That is so.

Socrates/ But injustice and lawlessness are something very shameful?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the one preserves cities and everything else, but the other destroys and subverts them?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we must think about law as something that is fine, and seek it as something good.

Friend/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Now we said that law is resolution of a city?

Friend/ We did say so.

Socrates/ Well, now: is it not the case that some resolutions are admirable, others wicked?

Friend/ It is.

Socrates/ Yet law was not wicked?

Friend/ No.

Socrates/ It is not correct, then, to reply in such unqualified terms that law is resolution of a city.

Friend/ Not in my view.

Socrates/ It would not be in order, then, to take it that a wicked resolution is law.

Friend/ No indeed.

Socrates/ But still, it is quite apparent to me for my part that law is a kind of judgment. And since it is not the wicked judgment, is it not quite obvious by now that it is the admirable, given that law is judgment?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what is admirable judgment? Is it not true judgment?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now isn't true judgment discovery of reality?

Friend/ It is.

Socrates/ Then ideally law is discovery of reality.

Friend/ How is it, Socrates, if law is discovery of reality, that we do not always make use of the same laws on the same matters, assuming we have discovered reality?

Socrates/ Ideally, nevertheless, law is discovery of reality. So it must be that any human beings who do not always make use of the same laws, as appears to be the case with us, are not always capable of discovering what ideally the law does discover—reality. Let's have a look and see whether it actually does become quite clear to us from our inquiry whether we always make use of the same laws, or different ones at different times, and whether all make use of the same laws, or different people different ones.

Friend/ That's not difficult to determine, Socrates: the same people do not always make use of the same laws, and different people make use of different ones. For example, with us there is no law providing for human sacrifice—indeed it is unholy, whereas the Carthaginians make such sacrifices as something that is holy and lawful for them, and in fact some of them sacrifice even their own sons to Cronus, as perhaps you have heard yourself. And it is not just foreigners who make use of different laws from us, but those people in Lycia and the descendants of Athamas perform the sacrifices they perform even though they are Greeks. You know about ourselves too, I imagine, from what you have heard yourself, the sorts of laws we made use of in the past with regard to those who died, slaughtering sacred victims before the corpse was carried out and sending for urn women. Again, those who lived in still earlier times used to bury their dead right there in the house. We do none of these things. One could give thousands of such examples—there is ample room to prove that we do not always make use of the same laws as we ourselves recognize, nor do people make use of the same laws as one another.

Socrates/ Look, my friend, it wouldn't be at all surprising if what you say was correct but went over my head. So long as you express your views in lengthy speeches in your own style and I do too in my turn, I don't think we'll ever reach any agreement. But if the inquiry is made a common enterprise, maybe we would agree. So join in a common inquiry with me, asking questions of me if you like, or answering them if you would rather.

Friend/ Socrates, I'm willing to answer whatever you like.

Socrates/ Right, then: do you accept that just things are unjust and unjust things just, or that the just are just and the unjust, unjust?

Friend/ I accept that the just are just and the unjust, unjust.

Socrates/ Now are they accepted as such among all people as they are here?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ So among the Persians as well?

Friend/ Among the Persians as well.

Socrates/ Always, I suppose.

Friend/ Always.

Socrates/ Are things which pull down the scale more accepted here as heavier, and those which pull it down less as lighter, or the opposite?

Friend/ No, those which pull it down more as heavier, those less as lighter.

Socrates/ And is this the case in Carthage and in Lycia as well?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Things that are fine are accepted as fine everywhere, it appears, and things that are shameful as shameful, and not the shameful as fine or the fine as shameful.

Friend/ That is so.

Socrates/ Therefore, to generalize to all cases, what is so is accepted as being so, not what is not so, both among us and among all other people.

Friend/ That is my view.

Socrates/ Then anyone who mistakes what is so mistakes what is accepted.

Friend/ When you express things this way, Socrates, these things do seem to be accepted always both by us and by the

others. But when I consider that we are constantly turning the laws upside down, I cannot be persuaded.

Socrates/ Perhaps you do not take into consideration that when we move the pieces at checkers they remain the same pieces. But look at the question with me in the following way. Have you ever come across a treatise on health for the sick?

Friend/ I have.

Socrates/ Then you know what skill it is that this is the treatise of?

Friend/ I do know—medicine.

Socrates/ Don't you call those who possess knowledge of these matters doctors?

Friend/ I agree.

Socrates/ Do people who possess knowledge accept the same things on the same matters, or do different people accept different things?

Friend/ The same things, in my view.

Socrates/ Is it simply that the Greeks accept the same things as the Greeks on the matters they know about, or do foreigners too, accept the same things, agreeing among themselves and with the Greeks?

Friend/ I would suppose it definitely has to be the case that those who know agree in accepting the same things, both Greeks and foreigners.

Socrates/ Well answered. And won't they always agree?

Friend/ Yes, always.

Socrates/ And don't the doctors in their treatises on health write what they accept as being so?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then these treatises of the doctors are medical, and laws of medicine.

Friend/ Medical, to be sure.

Socrates/ So farming treatises too are laws of farming?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And whose are the treatises and accepted ideas on working a garden?

Friend/ Gardeners.

Socrates/ Then these are our laws of gardening.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Formulated by people who know how to manage a garden?

Friend/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And it is the gardeners who have the knowledge?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And whose are the treatises and accepted ideas on preparing a meal?

Friend/ Cooks.

Socrates/ Then these are the laws of cookery?

Friend/ Cookery.

Socrates/ Formulated, as it appears, by people who know how to manage the preparation of a meal?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And it is the cooks who have the knowledge, as they claim?

Friend/ Yes, they have the knowledge.

Socrates/ Very well. But then, whose are the treatises and accepted ideas on administration of a city? Isn't it those who know how to manage cities?

Friend/ In my view it is.

Socrates/ And does anyone possess this knowledge except those who are skilled in politics and kingship?

Friend/ Those it is.

Socrates/ Then these writings which people call laws are treatises on politics—treatises by kings and good men.

Friend/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ Then surely those who possess knowledge will not write different things at different times on the same matters?

Friend/ No.

Socrates/ Nor yet will they ever change one set of accepted ideas for another on the same matters?

Friend/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ So if we see anyone doing this anywhere, shall we say that those who do it are in possession of knowledge, or not in possession?

Friend/ Not in possession.

Socrates/ And won't we also say that whatever is correct is the accepted idea in each sphere, whether in medicine or in cookery or in gardening?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And whatever is not correct, we shall never again say that it is the accepted idea?

Friend/ Never again.

Socrates/ Then it proves to be unlawful.

Friend/ It must be.

Socrates/ And in treatises on what is just and unjust and in general on the organization of a city and on how one should administer a city, isn't what is correct a law of royal skill? But not what is not correct, although it is taken to be law by those who don't know. That is unlawful.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we were correct in agreeing that law is discovery of reality.

Friend/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Now to a further point that we need to note carefully on the topic. Who has knowledge of how to distribute seed over land?

Friend/ A farmer.

Socrates/ Does he distribute appropriate seed for each sort of land?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the farmer is a good apportioner of it, and his laws and distributions are correct in this sphere?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And who is a good apportioner of notes in songs? Whose laws are correct here?

Friend/ The laws of the flautist and the lute-player.

Socrates/ Then the person whose laws are most authoritative in this sphere is the person whose command of flute-playing is best.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And who is best at distributing nourishment for human bodies? Is it not the person who distributes it appropriately?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then his distributions and laws are best, and the person whose laws are most authoritative in this sphere is also the best apportioner.

Friend/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Who is this person?

Friend/ A trainer.

Socrates/ He is supreme at driving a human herd?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And who is supreme at driving a herd of sheep? What is his name?

Friend/ A shepherd.

Socrates/ Then it is the laws of the shepherd that are best for the sheep.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the laws of the cowherd for cattle?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And whose laws are best for human souls? Isn't it those of the king? Agreed?

Friend/ I do agree.

Socrates/ You're doing well in your answers. Can you now say who in antiquity proved himself a good lawgiver in the sphere of laws of flute-playing? Perhaps you don't call him to mind—would you like me to remind you?

Friend/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Isn't it said to be Marsyas, and his boyfriend Olympus the Phrygian?

Friend/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ Now their flute tunes are absolutely divine, and alone stir and make manifest those who are in need of the gods—and to this day there are still only these, because they are divine.

Friend/ That is so.

Socrates/ And who among the ancient kings is said to have proved himself to be a good lawgiver, so that even to this day his accepted provisions remain in force, because they are divine?

Friend/ I cannot call him to mind.

Socrates/ Don't you know which of the Greeks make use of the most ancient laws?

Friend/ Are you referring to the Spartans, and Lycurgus the law-giver?

Socrates/ But that is not yet three hundred years ago, perhaps, or a little more than that. Where do the best of their accepted provisions come from? Do you know?

Friend/ People say from Crete.

Socrates/ So among the Greeks it is the Cretans who make use of the most ancient laws?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then do you know who were their good kings? Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa: these laws were theirs.

Friend/ People certainly claim that Rhadamanthus was a just man, Socrates; but they say Minos was savage and harsh and unjust.

Socrates/ My good friend, you are telling a theatrical Attic version of the story.

Friend/ Well, isn't that what they say about Minos?

Socrates/ Not Homer and Hesiod. Yet they are more persuasive than all the tragedians put together—who are the people you are listening to if this is what you are saying.

Friend/ And what is it that Homer and Hesiod say about Minos?

Socrates/ I will tell you, so that you won't commit impiety along with the mass of people. There cannot be anything more impious than this, nor anything over which one should take more precautions, than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to gods, and in second place, with regard to divine humans. You should always exercise very great forethought, when you are about to criticize or praise a man, to ensure that

you don't speak incorrectly. This is why you should learn to distinguish admirable from wicked men. For god vents his anger when anyone criticizes someone similar to himself, or praises someone whose condition is opposite to his own; the former is the good man. For you really mustn't think that there are sacred stones and pieces of wood and birds and snakes, but not humans. A good human being is the most sacred of all of these, and one who is wicked the most defiled.

So now I will speak about Minos, and how Homer and Hesiod sing his praises, with this purpose in mind: that you, as a human and the son of a human, may not be mistaken in what you say about a hero who is son of Zeus. Homer when telling us about Crete and how there are many men in it and "ninety cities," says:

Among them is Cnossus, a great city, where Minos was King in the ninth season, having converse with great Zeus.

This, then, is how Homer sings the praises of Minos: briefly expressed—but Homer composed nothing like it for any of the heroes. That Zeus is a sophist and that this art of his is something altogether excellent, he makes clear here as well as in many other places. For he means that during the ninth year Minos got together with Zeus to discuss things, and went regularly to be educated by Zeus as though he were a sophist. So the fact that Homer assigns this privilege of being educated by Zeus to no one among the heroes but to Minos is extraordinary praise. And in the book of the dead in the Odyssey he represents Minos, not Rhadamanthus, as giving judgment with a golden scepter. He does not represent Rhadamanthus as giving judgment in this passage, nor as associated with Zeus in any passage. For this reason I say that Minos beyond all others has had his praises sung by Homer.

To be the son of Zeus and then to be the only one educated by Zeus is praise that cannot be exceeded. For this verse, "was

king in the ninth season, having converse with great Zeus" indicates that Minos was an associate of Zeus. "Converses" are discussions, and someone who "has converse" is an associate in discussions. In other words, every nine years Minos would go into the Cave of Zeus, partly to learn and partly to demonstrate what he had learned from Zeus in the preceding ninth year. There are those who suppose that someone who "has converse" is a drinking and partying companion of Zeus, but one may use the following as evidence that those who make this supposition talk nonsense. Of all the many human beings there are, Greeks and foreigners, none abstain from drinking sessions and the sort of partying there is when wine is present except Cretans and in second place Spartans, who have learned it from the Cretans. In Crete it is one of the laws Minos laid down that people are not to drink together to the point of drunkenness. And indeed it is clear that what he accepted as admirable he laid down as accepted practice also for his own citizens. For Minos would surely not have accepted one thing but done something different from what he accepted, like a dishonest person. His form of association was as I say, through discourses for education into virtue. This is why he laid down for his own citizens those laws which have made Crete happy for all time, and Sparta from when she began to make use of them, because they are divine.

Rhadamanthus was a good man: he had been educated by Minos. But he had been educated not in the art of kingship as a whole, but in one subsidiary to it, confined to presiding in law courts; that is why he was said to be a good judge. Minos used him as watcher over the law in the town, but Talos in the rest of Crete. Talos used to tour the villages three times a year, preserving a watch over the law in them by having the laws written on bronze tablets: this is why he was called "bronze."

Hesiod too has said some things akin to these with regard to Minos. After making mention of his name he says

> Who proved to be most kingly of mortal kings, and ruled over most of the people in the countryside, holding the scepter of Zeus—with which he exercised kingship also over cities.

He means by "the scepter of Zeus" nothing other than the education he received from Zeus, by means of which he governed Crete.

Friend/ Why, then, Socrates, has this rumor about Minos as someone who was uneducated and harsh ever been spread about?

Socrates/ Because of something over which you, my good friend, will take precautions, if you are sensible, and so will anyone else who cares for a good reputation: never to fall out with any man who is skilled in poetry. The poets have great power where reputation is concerned, whichever mode—eulogy or abuse—they adopt in writing about people. Which was the mistake Minos made in waging war on this city, where as well as many other forms of wisdom there are poets of every kind, who compose tragedy as well as every other kind of poetry. Tragedy is an ancient form here, not beginning with Thespis as some suppose nor with Phrynichus: if you care to consider the matter you will find it to be a very ancient discovery, made in this very city. Tragedy is that form of poetry which most delights the populace and which most seduces the soul. So it is in tragedy that we torture Minos and take vengeance upon him for that tribute he compelled us to pay. This, then, was the mistake Minos made, in falling out with us. And that is why, to answer your question, he has come to have a worse and worse reputation. He was good and law abiding, as we said at the outset, a good apportioner. And the greatest indication of this is that his laws are unaltered: that

shows how well he did at discovering reality as regards habitation of a city.

Friend/ In my view, Socrates, the account you have given is a likely one.

Socrates/ Now if what I say is true, is it your view that the Cretans, who are citizens of Minos and Rhadamanthus, make use of the most ancient laws?

Friend/ They seem to.

Socrates/ Then these two have proved to be the best lawgivers among the ancients, apportioners and shepherds of men, just as Homer said that the good general was "shepherd of the people."

Friend/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Please, now, by Zeus god of friendship: if someone were to ask us what are these things that the good lawgiver and apportioner for the body distributes to the body to make it better, we would say if we were to reply well and briefly: food and hard work, building it up with the one, and exercising and constituting the body itself with the other.

Friend/ Quite correct.

Socrates/ If then after this he were to ask us: "Whatever then are those things that the good lawgiver and apportioner distributes to the soul to make it better?" what reply would we make if we are not to be ashamed both of ourselves and of our mature years?

Friend/ I don't anymore know what to say.

Socrates/ Yet it really is a disgrace to the soul in each of us that it plainly doesn't know what in it constitutes goodness and badness for it, whereas what constitutes goodness and badness for the body, and for other things, is something it has already considered.

The Minos.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and Minos.

Socrates/ What is law with us?

Friend/ About what kind of law do you interrogate?

Socrates/ What is that by which law differs from law, according to this very thing, the being law? For consider what I ask you. For I ask as if I should inquire what gold is; and if you in a similar manner should ask me, about what kind of gold I inquire, I should think you would not rightly interrogate. For neither does gold differ in anything from gold, so far as it is gold, nor a stone from a stone, so far as it is a stone. And in like manner, neither does law differ in anything from law; but all laws are the same. For each of them is similarly law; nor is one more, but the other less so. I ask you, therefore, the whole of this very thing, what law is; and if you have an answer at hand give it me.

Friend/ What else, Socrates, will law be than things established by law?

Socrates/ Does speech also appear to you to be things which are spoken? or sight things which are seen? or hearing things which are heard? Or is speech one thing, and are things spoken another? Is sight one thing, and are things seen another? Is hearing one thing, and are things heard another? And, is law one thing, and are things established by law another? Is this the case, or how does it appear to you?

Friend/ This now appears to me to be the case.

Socrates/ Law, therefore, is not things established by law.

Friend/ It does not appear to me that it is.

Socrates/ What law, therefore, may be, let us thus consider. If someone should ask us respecting those things of which we have just now spoken, since you say that things visible are seen by the sight, what the sight is by which they are seen? we should answer him, that it is a sense which through, the eyes manifests colors to us. And if he should again ask us what the hearing is by which things are heard? we should reply, that it is a sense which through the ears manifests to us sounds. In like manner, if he should ask us, since legal institutions are legally established by law, what is law by which they are thus established? whether is it a certain sense, or manifestation? in the same manner as things which are learnt, are learnt by science rendering them manifest. Or is it a certain invention? just as things which are discovered are invented: as, for instance, things salubrious and noxious are, discovered by medicine; but the conceptions of the Gods, as prophets say, by divination. For the divining art is with us an invention of such like things: Or is it not?

Friend/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Which of these, therefore, may we especially presume law to be?, Shall we say it is these dogmas and decrees?

Friend/ It appears so to me. For what else can anyone say law is? So that it appears the whole of this which you ask, viz. law, is the dogma of the city.

Socrates/ You call, as it seems, law, political opinion.

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ And perhaps you speak well; but perhaps we may know better in the following manner. Do you say that some men are wise?

Friend/ I do.

Socrates/ Are not the wise, therefore, wise by wisdom?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what? are the just, just by justice?

Friend/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Are the legitimate, therefore, also legitimate by law?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the illegitimate, illegitimate by a privation of law?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are the legitimate just?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the illegitimate unjust?

Friend/ Unjust.

Socrates/ Are not justice and law, therefore, things most beautiful?

Friend/ They are.

Socrates/ And are not injustice and illegality most base?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does not one of these preserve cities and everything else, but the other destroy and subvert them?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is necessary, therefore, dianoëtically to consider law as something beautiful, and to investigate it as good.

Friend/ How should we not?

Socrates/ Have we not, therefore, said that law is the dogma of the city?

Friend/ We have said so.

Socrates/ What then? Are not some dogmas good, and others bad?

Friend/ They are.

Socrates/ Law however is not bad.

Friend/ It is not.

Socrates/ It is not, therefore, right simply to determine that law is the dogma of the city.

Friend/ It does not appear to me that it is.

Socrates/ The assertion, therefore, does not accord with the truth, that law is a base dogma.

Friend/ It does not.

Socrates/ Law however appears also to me to be a certain opinion. And since it is not a base opinion, is not this, therefore, evident, that it is a good opinion, if law is opinion?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But is not a certain good, a true, opinion?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is, therefore, true opinion the discovery of being?

Friend/ It is.

Socrates/ Law, therefore, is the discovery of being.

Friend/ But, Socrates, if law is the discovery of being, how is it that we do not always use the same laws about the same things, since beings are discovered by us?

Socrates/ Nevertheless law wishes to be the discovery of being; but men, as it seems, not always using the same laws, are not always able to discover that which law wishes, viz. being. But come, let us see if it will hence become evident to us, whether we always use the same laws, or different laws at different times; and if all of us use the same laws, or different persons different laws.

Friend/ But this, Socrates, is not difficult to know, that neither do the same persons always use the same laws, nor

different persons always different laws. Thus, for example, it is not a law with us to sacrifice men, but this is considered as unholy; but the Carthaginians sacrifice men, this being holy and legal with them; so that some of them sacrifice their sons to Saturn, as perhaps you have heard. And not only do Barbarian men use laws different from ours, but also those in Lycia. And as to the progeny of Athamas, what sacrifices do they perform, though they are Greeks? You also know and have heard what laws we formerly used concerning the dead, cutting the throats of the victims before the dead body was carried out, and calling those that carry the sacrifices to the dead. And those still prior to these buried the dead at home; but we do none of these. Ten thousand instances likewise of this might be adduced. For the field of demonstration is very wide, that neither we always think invariably the same with ourselves, nor men with each other.

Socrates/ It is by no means wonderful, O best of men, if you speak rightly, and this should be concealed from me. But till you by yourself declare what appears to you, in a long discourse, and I again do the same, we shall never, as I think, agree. If however a common subject of speculation is proposed, we shall perhaps accord. If, therefore, you are willing, interrogating me, consider together with me in common. Or, if it is more agreeable to you, instead of interrogating, answer.

Friend/ But I wish, Socrates, to reply to any question you may propose.

Socrates/ Come then. Whether do you think that just things are unjust, and unjust things just? Or that just things are just, and unjust things unjust?

Friend/ I indeed think that just things are just, and unjust things unjust.

Socrates/ Is this opinion, therefore, entertained among all men, as well as here?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Among the Persians also?

Friend/ And among the Persians too.

Socrates/ But is this opinion always entertained?

Friend/ Always.

Socrates/ Whether are things which attract more, thought by us to be heavier, but things which attract less, lighter? or the contrary?

Friend/ Not the contrary: but things which attract more are heavier, and things which attract less are lighter.

Socrates/ Is this the case, therefore, in Carthage and in Lycia?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Things beautiful, as it seems, are everywhere thought to be beautiful; and things base to be base: but things base are not thought to be beautiful, nor things beautiful base.

Friend/ It is so.

Socrates/ As we may say, therefore, in all things, beings are thought to be, and not non-beings, both with us and with all others.

Friend/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who wanders from being wanders from that which is legitimate.

Friend/ Thus, Socrates, as you say, these things always appear legitimate both to us and to others. But when I consider that we never cease transposing laws upwards and downwards, I cannot be persuaded by what you say.

Socrates/ Perhaps you do not perceive that these things thus transposed continue to be the same. But thus consider them together with me. Did you ever meet with any book concerning the health of the sick?

Friend/ I have.

Socrates/ Do you know, therefore, to what art this book belongs?

Friend/ I know that it belongs to the art of medicine.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, call those who are scientifically skilled about these things, physicians?

Friend/ I call them so.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, do those that have a scientific knowledge think the same things about the same, or do some of these think differently from others about the same things?

Friend/ They appear to me to think the same things.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, do the Greeks alone accord with the Greeks about things of which they have a scientific knowledge, or do the Barbarians also both accord with each other about such things, and with the Greeks?

Friend/ There is an abundant necessity that both Greeks and Barbarians who possess a scientific knowledge should accord in opinion with each other.

Socrates/ You answer well. Do they not, therefore, always accord?

Friend/ Yes, always.

Socrates/ Do not physicians also write those things about health which they think to be true?

Friend/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Things medicinal, therefore, and medicinal laws, these are the writings of physicians.

Friend/ Things medicinal, certainly.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, are geometrical writings also geometrical laws?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Of whom, therefore, are the writings and legitimate institutions concerning gardening?

Friend/ Of gardeners.

Socrates/ Those laws, therefore, pertain to gardening.

Friend/ They do.

Socrates/ Are they not, therefore, the laws of those who know how to manage gardens?

Friend/ How should they not?

Socrates/ But gardeners possess this knowledge.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But of whom are the writings and legitimate institutions concerning food?

Friend/ Of cooks.

Socrates/ Those, therefore, are cooking laws.

Friend/ Cooking.

Socrates/ And of those, as it seems, who know how to manage the preparation of food.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But cooks, as they say, possess this knowledge.

Friend/ They do possess it.

Socrates/ Be it so. But of whom are the writings and legal institutions concerning the government of a city? Are they not of those who scientifically know how to govern cities?

Friend/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ But do any others than politicians and kings possess this knowledge?

Friend/ They alone possess it.

Socrates/ These writings, therefore, are political, which men call the writings of kings and good men.

Friend/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Those, therefore, who possess a scientific knowledge do not at different times write differently about the same things.

Friend/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ If, therefore, we see certain persons doing this, whether shall we say that those who act in this manner are scientific or unscientific?

Friend/ Unscientific.

Socrates/ Shall we, therefore, say that what is right in every particular is legitimate, whether it be medicinal, or pertain to cooking, or to gardening?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But with respect to what is not right, this we no longer assert to be legitimate.

Friend/ No longer.

Socrates/ It, therefore, becomes illegitimate.

Friend/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Hence, in writings concerning things just and unjust, and, in short, concerning the orderly distribution of a city, and the manner in which it ought to be governed, that which is right is a royal law; but that which is not right does not appear to be a royal law, because science is wanting: for it is illegal.

Friend/ It is.

Socrates/ We have rightly, therefore, acknowledged that law is the invention of being.

Friend/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Further still, this also we should consider in it: who is it that scientifically knows how to sow seeds in the earth?

Friend/ The husbandman.

Socrates/ Does he then sow fit seeds in each soil?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ The husbandman, therefore, is a good distributor of these things, and his laws and distributions in these particulars are right.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But who is a good dispensator of pulsations for melodies, and distributes such things as are fit? And whose laws also, if he has any, are right?

Friend/ The laws of the piper, and those of the harper.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who is most legitimate in these things is in the most eminent degree a piper.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But who in the best manner distributes nutriment to the bodies of men? Does not he do this who distributes that which is fit?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ The distributions, therefore, and the laws of this man are the best; and he who is most legitimate about these things is the most excellent distributor.

Friend/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Who is he?

Friend/ The instructor of children.

Socrates/ Does he know how to feed the flock of the human body in the best manner?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But who is he that feeds in the best manner a flock of sheep? What is his name?

Friend/ A shepherd.

Socrates/ The laws, therefore, of the shepherd are the best for the sheep.

Friend/ They are.

Socrates/ And those of the herdsman for oxen.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ But whose laws are the best for the souls of men? Are they not those of a king?

Friend/ They are.

Socrates/ You speak well. Can you, therefore, tell me who among the ancients was a good legislator in the laws pertaining to pipes? Perhaps you do not recollect. Are you, therefore, willing that I should remind you?

Friend/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ Marsyas, then, and his beloved Olympus the Phrygian were of this description.

Friend/ True.

Socrates/ The harmony produced by the pipes of these men is most divine, and alone excites and unfolds those that stand in need of the Gods. It likewise alone remains to the present time as being divine.

Friend/ These things are so.

Socrates/ But who among the antient kings is said to have been a good legislator, and whose legal institutions even now remain as being divine?

Friend/ I do not recollect.

Socrates/ Do you not know who they were that used the most antient laws of the Greeks?

Friend/ Do you speak of the Lacedæmonians, and Lycurgus the legislator?

Socrates/ These institutions, however, have not perhaps been established three hundred years, or very little more than this. But do you know whence the best of their laws were derived?

Friend/ They say, from Crete.

Socrates/ Do they, therefore, of all the Greeks use the most antient laws?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you know then who among these were good kings? I mean Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa, by whom these laws were framed.

Friend/ They say, Socrates, that Rhadamanthus was a just man, but that Minos was rustic, morose and unjust.

Socrates/ You relate, O best of men, an Attic and tragical fable.

Friend/ Are not these things reported of Minos?

Socrates/ They are not by Homer and Hesiod, whose authority is greater than that of all the tragic poets from whom you assert these things.

Friend/ But what do they say about Minos?

Socrates/ I will tell you, lest you as well as the many should be guilty of impiety. For there is not anything which is more impious than this; *nor is there anything of which we ought to be more afraid, than of offending against* THE GODS *either in word or in deed*. And next to this we should be fearful of offending against divine men. We should however be very cautious, when we praise or blame any man, that we do not speak erroneously; and for the sake of this it is necessary that we should learn to know good and bad men. For divinity is indignant when anyone blames a man similar

to himself, or praises one dissimilar to him: but the former of these is the good man. Nor ought you to think that stones, pieces of wood, birds and serpents are sacred, but that men are not so: for a good man is the most sacred, and a depraved man the most defiled, of all things. Now, therefore, since Homer and Hesiod pass an encomium on Minos, on this account I thus speak, *lest you, being a man sprung from a man, should sin in what you say against a hero the son of Zeus*. For Homer, speaking of Crete, that there are many men and ninety cities in it, says that among these is Gnossus, a great city in which Minos reigned, who for nine years conversed with the mighty Zeus. This then is Homer's encomium of Minos, which though short is such as he does not give to anyone of his heroes. For that Zeus is a sophist, and that the art itself is all-beautiful, he evinces as well in many other places as here. For he says that Minos conversed nine years with Zeus, and went to be instructed by him, as if Zeus were a sophist. That Homer, therefore, does not bestow this honor of being instructed by Zeus on any other hero than Minos alone, must be considered as a wonderful praise. Ulysses also, in speaking of the dead, represents Minos judging with a golden scepter in his hand but neither here nor in any other place does he speak of Rhadamanthus as judging, or as converting with Zeus, On this account I say that Minos is extolled by Homer beyond all other heroes. For that being the son of Zeus, he was only instructed by Zeus, contains no transcendency of praise. For the verse which says that Minos reigned nine years, and conversed with the mighty Zeus, signifies that he was the associate of Zeus; since ομιλοι are discourses, and ομιλιστης is an associate in discourse. Hence, for nine years Minos went to the cavern of Zeus, learning some things, and teaching others, which during these nine years he had received from Zeus. There are however some who conceive ομιλιστης to signify the

associate of Zeus in drinking and sport. But that those who thus conceive say nothing to the purpose, may be inferred from this, that, as both the Greeks and Barbarians are numerous, there are none among these who abstain from banquets, and that sport to which wine belongs, except the Cretans and the Lacedæmonians, who were instructed by the Cretans. In Crete, too, this is one of the other laws which Minos established, that men should not drink with each other to intoxication. And this indeed is evident, that he made those things to be laws for his citizens which he thought to be beautiful. For Minos did not, like a base man, think one thing, and do another different from what he thought; but his association with Zeus was as I have said through discourse, in order to be instructed in virtue. Hence he established these laws for his citizens through which Crete is perpetually happy, and also Lacedæmon, from the time in which it began to use these laws, in consequence of their being divine. But Rhadamanthus was indeed a good man; for he was instructed by Minos. He did not however learn the whole of the royal art, but that part of it which is of the ministrant kind, and which possesses authority in Courts of judicature; and hence he is said to have been a good judge. For Minos employed him as a guardian of the laws in the city; but he used Talus for this purpose through the rest of Crete. For Talus thrice every year went through the villages in order to preserve the laws in them, and carried with him the laws written in tables of brass; whence also he was called brazen. Hesiod also asserts things similar to these of Minos. For, having mentioned his name, he says that he was the most royal of mortal kings, and that he reigned over many neighboring men, having the scepter of Zeus, with which also, he governed cities. And he calls the scepter of Zeus nothing else than the discipline of Zeus, by which he governed Crete.

Friend/ On what account then, Socrates, came the report to be spread that Minos was an unlearned and morose man?

Socrates/ On that account through which you, O best of men, if you are prudent, and every other man who intends to be celebrated, will be cautious never to offend a poet. For poets are able to effect much with respect to opinion, both in praising men and blaming them. In this particular, therefore, Minos erred when he warred on this city, in which there is much other wisdom, together with tragic and other poets of every description. But the tragedy here is antient, not originating, as is generally thought, from Thespis, nor from Phrynicus; but, if you consider, you will find that it is a very antient invention of this city. Tragedy indeed is of all poetry the most pleasing to the vulgar, and the most alluring; to which applying ourselves we have taken vengeance on Minos, for which he has compelled us to pay those tributes. In offending us, therefore, Minos erred; whence, in reply to your question, he became infamous. For that he was a good man, a friend to law, and a good shepherd of the people, as I have before observed, this is the greatest token, that his laws are immutable, in consequence of having well discovered the truth concerning the government of a city.

Friend/ You appear to me, Socrates, to have discovered a probable reason.

Socrates/ If, therefore, I speak the truth, do not the Cretans, the citizens of Minos and Rhadamnathus, appear to you to have used the most antient laws?

Friend/ They do.

Socrates/ These, therefore, were the best legislators of the ancients, and were also shepherds of men; just as Homer likewise says, that a good general is the shepherd of the people.

Friend/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Come then, by Zeus, who presides over friendship, if anyone who is a good legislator and shepherd of the body should ask us what those things are which when distributed to the body will make it better, we should well and briefly answer, that they are nutriment and labor, the former of which by increasing, and the latter by exercising, give stability to the body.

Friend/ Right.

Socrates/ If, therefore, after this, that good legislator and shepherd should also ask us what those things are which being distributed to the soul make it better, what shall we answer, that we may not be ashamed of ourselves and of our age?

Friend/ I am no longer able to answer this question.

Socrates/ It is however disgraceful to the soul of each of us, if we should appear to be ignorant of things pertaining to our souls, in which good and evil are contained, but to be knowing in particulars pertaining to the body, and to other things.

THE END OF THE MINOS.

Phaedrus.

Translated by Henry Cary.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates. Phædrus.

Socrates/ My dear Phædrus, whither are you going, and from whence come you?

Phaedrus/ From Lysias, son of Cephalus, Socrates; but I am going for a walk outside the walls; for I have spent a long time there, sitting from very early in the morning; but in obedience to your and my friend Acumenus, I take my walks in the open roads; for he says that they are more refreshing than those in the course.

Socrates/ He says rightly, my friend: Lysias then, as it seems, was in the city?

Phaedrus/ Yes, with Epicrates in the Morychian house here, near the Olympium.

Socrates/ What was your employment there? Without doubt Lysias feasted you with speeches?

Phaedrus/ You shall hear, if you have leisure to go on with me and listen.

Socrates/ What then? do you not think that, according to Pindar, I should consider it a matter above all want and leisure, to listen to the conversation between you and Lysias?

Phaedrus/ Proceed then.

Socrates/ Do you begin your story.

Phaedrus/ And indeed, Socrates, the subject is suited to you. For the question, in which we spent our time, I know not how, was amatory. For Lysias had written a speech in which he described a beautiful youth as being courted, but

not by a lover; and on this very point he argued with great subtlety; for he maintains that favor ought to be shown to one who is not in love, rather than to one who is in love.

Socrates/ Generous man! I wish he had written that favor should be shown to a poor man rather than a rich one, and to an old than a young, and so on with respect to such things as happen to me and the most of us; for then his discourses would be charming and of general usefulness. I, for my part, am so very desirous to hear his speech, that even if you prolong your walk to Megara, and, after Herodicus, when you have reached the wall, turn back again, I shall on no account lag behind you.

Phaedrus/ How say you, most excellent Socrates? Do you think, that what Lysias, the most able writer of the day, composed at his leisure in a long space of time, I who am but a novice could repeat from memory in a manner worthy of him? Far from it; though I would rather be able to do so than be the possessor of a large sum of gold.

Socrates/ Phædrus, if I know not Phædrus, I have also forgotten myself; but neither of these is the case; for I know well that on hearing Lysias's speech he not only heard it once, but urged him to read it repeatedly, and he readily complied; neither was this sufficient for Phædrus, but at length having got hold of the book, he examined the parts he liked best; and having done this, sitting from very early in the morning, he was fatigued and went out for a walk, as I believe, by the dog, having learnt the whole speech by heart, if it is not a very long one. And he was going outside the walls, that he might con it over, and, meeting with one who has a desire for hearing speeches, was delighted at seeing him approach, because he would have one to share his enthusiasm, and bade him accompany him in his walk. But when that lover of speeches begged him to recite it, he affected shyness, as if he did not wish to repeat it, though at

length he would have compelled one to listen to it even though one was not willing to do so. Do you then, Phædrus, entreat him to do now what he will soon do at all events.

Phaedrus/ It is, in truth, far best for me to repeat it as well as I can; for I see you are determined not to let me go, until I have delivered it somehow or another.

Socrates/ You think perfectly right.

Phaedrus/ I will do it then; but in truth, Socrates, I have by no means learnt the words of this oration by heart, though the general outline of all the several parts, in which he said the claims of one who is in love and one who is not differ from each other, I can go through summarily and in order, beginning from the first.

Socrates/ But show me first, my dear friend, what you have got there in your left hand, under your cloak; for I suspect that you have got the speech itself: and if this is the case, think thus of me, that I love you very much, but that, when Lysias is present, I have by no means made up my mind to lend myself to you to practice upon. Come then, show it me.

Phaedrus/ Stop, you have dashed down the hope I had, Socrates, of practicing upon you. But where do you wish we should sit down and read?

Socrates/ Let us turn down here, and go near the Ilissus, then we will sit down quietly, wherever you please.

Phaedrus/ Very seasonably, as it appears, I happen to be without shoes, for you are always so. It will be easiest for us then to walk by the shallow stream, wetting our feet, and it will not be unpleasant, especially at this season of the year, and this time of the day.

Socrates/ Lead on then, and at the same time look out for a place where we may sit down.

Phaedrus/ Do you see that lofty plane-tree?

Socrates/ How should I not.

Phaedrus/ There, there is both shade and a gentle breeze, and grass to sit down upon, or, if we prefer it, to lie down on.

Socrates/ Lead on, then.

Phaedrus/ But tell me, Socrates, is not Boreas reported to have carried off Orithya from somewhere about this part of the Ilissus?

Socrates/ So it is said.

Phaedrus/ Must it not have been from this spot? for the water hereabouts appears beautiful, clear and transparent, and well suited for damsels to sport about.

Socrates/ No, but lower down, as much as two or three stadia, where we cross over to the temple of the Huntress, and where there is, on the very spot, a kind of altar sacred to Boreas.

Phaedrus/ I never noticed it. But tell me, by Zeus, Socrates, do you believe that this fabulous account is true?

Socrates/ If I disbelieved it, as the wise do, I should not be guilty of any absurdity: then having recourse to subtleties, I should say that a blast of Boreas threw her down from the neighboring cliffs, as she was sporting with Pharmacea, and that having thus met her death she was said to have been carried off by Boreas, or from Mars' hill; for there is also another report that she was carried off from thence and not from this spot. But I, for my part, Phædrus, consider such things as pretty enough, but as the province of a very curious, painstaking, and not very happy man, and for no other reason than this, that after this he must set us right as to the form of the Hippocentaurs, and then as to that of the Chimæra; besides there pours in upon him a crowd of similar monsters, Gorgons and Pegasuses, and other monstrous creatures, incredible in number and absurdity, which if anyone were to disbelieve and endeavor

to reconcile each with probability, employing for this purpose a kind of vulgar cleverness, he will stand in need of abundant leisure. But I have not leisure at all for such matters; and the cause of it, my friend, is this; I am not yet able, according to the Delphic precept, to know myself. But it appears to me to be ridiculous, while I am still ignorant of this, to busy myself about matters that do not concern me. Wherefore dismissing these matters, and receiving the popular opinion respecting them, as I just now said, I do not enquire about them, but about myself, whether I happen to be a beast, with more folds and more furious than Typhon, or whether I am a more mild and simple animal, naturally partaking of a certain divine and modest condition. But, my friend, to interrupt our conversation, is not this the tree to which you were leading me?

Phaedrus/ This is the very one.

Socrates/ By Hera, a beautiful retreat. For this plane-tree is very wide-spreading and lofty, and the height and shadiness of this agnus castus are very beautiful, and as it is now at the perfection of its flowering, it makes the spot as fragrant as possible. Moreover, a most agreeable fountain flows under the plane-tree, of very cold water, to judge from its effect on the foot. It appears from these images and statues to be sacred to certain nymphs, and to Acheloüs. Observe again the freshness of the spot how charming and very delightful it is, and how summer-like and shrill it sounds from the choir of grasshoppers. But the most delightful of all is the grass, which with its gentle slope is naturally adapted to give an easy support to the head, as one reclines. So that, my dear Phædrus, you make an admirable stranger's guide.

Phaedrus/ And you, my wonderful friend, appear to be a most surprising being: for as you say, you are just like a stranger who is being shown the sights, and not a native or

the place. This comes from your never quitting the city, or going beyond the boundaries, nor do you seem to me ever to go outside the walls.

Socrates/ Pardon me, my excellent friend; for I am a lover of learning: now the fields and trees will not teach me anything, but men in the city do. You, however, appear to me to have discovered a charm to entice me out. For as those, who, by shaking leaves or some fruit before them, lead their hungry flocks, so do you, by holding out written speeches before me, seem as if you could lead me about all Attica, and wherever else you please. But now, for the present, since I am come here, I am resolved to lay me down, and do you in whatever posture you think you can read most conveniently, take this and read.

Phaedrus/ Listen then. "You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and I think you have heard that it would be for our advantage if this took place. And I claim, not for this reason to fail in my request, because I do not happen to be one of your lovers: for they repent of the benefits they have conferred, as soon as their desires cease; but the others have no time at which it is convenient for them to repent; since not from necessity, but voluntarily, they confer benefits according to their ability, so as but to consult their own interests. Besides, lovers consider what of their affairs they have managed badly by reason of their love, and what benefits they have conferred, and adding thereto what labor they have undergone, they think that they have long since conferred sufficient favors on the objects of their love. But those who do not love have no pretense to make of the neglect of their own affairs on this score, nor can they take into account the labors they have undergone, nor make differences with their friends a pretext: so that, all such evils being removed, nothing remains for them but to do cheerfully whatever they think they will gratify them by

doing. Besides, if for this reason it is right to make much of those who love, because they say they are most devotedly attached to those whom they love, and are always ready, both in words and deeds, to incur the enmity of others, so that they can but gratify the objects of their love, it is easy to discover whether they speak the truth, because those whom they afterwards fall in love with they will prize more highly than the former, and it is evident that if the latter require it, they will behave ill to the former. And how is it reasonable to lavish such a treasure on one afflicted with such a calamity, as no experienced person would ever attempt to avert? for they themselves confess that they are rather diseased than in their right minds, and that they know that they are out of their senses, but are unable to control themselves. How therefore, when they recover their senses, can they think that those things were right about which they were so anxious when in that state of mind? Moreover, if you should choose the best from among your lovers, your choice must be made from a few; but if from among all others the one most suited to you, from many: so that there is much more hope that among the many there is one worthy of your affection. If, therefore, you respect the established usages of mankind, and are afraid lest, when men discover it, it should be a disgrace to you, it is probable that lovers, thinking that they are envied by others in the same way that they envy each other, should be so elated as to talk, and, out of ambition, publish to the world that they have not bestowed their labor in vain; but that such as are not in love, having a control over themselves, should prefer what is best to celebrity amongst men. Besides, it must needs happen that many should hear of and see lovers following the objects of their affection, and doing this sedulously, so that when they are seen conversing with one another men think that they are together on account of

desire already indulged or about to be so: but they do not attempt to blame those who do not love, on account of their familiarity, being aware that it is necessary to converse with someone, either on account of friendship or some other pleasure. Moreover, if you have experienced uneasiness from the consideration that it is difficult for friendship to last, but that when a difference takes place under other circumstances a common calamity happens to both; but that when you have lavished what you prize most highly great injury would befall you, you would with good reason be more afraid of those who love. For there are many things that grieve them, and they think that everything is done to their detriment. Wherefore they prohibit the objects of their love from associating with others, fearing those who possess wealth, lest they should get the better of them by means of their riches, and the well-educated, lest they should surpass them in intelligence; and they are apprehensive of the influence of everyone who possesses any other advantage. By persuading you, then, to keep aloof from such as these, they cause you to be destitute of friends. If, therefore, regarding your own interest, you pursue a wiser course than they recommend, you are sure to quarrel with them. But such as are not in love, but have obtained the accomplishment of their wishes through merit, will not envy your associating with others, but will rather hate those who will not associate with you, thinking that you are despised by them, and are benefited by those who associate with you. So that there is much more reason to hope that friendship will be produced between these by this means, than enmity. Moreover, most lovers conceive a desire for the person before they know their habits or are acquainted with their own qualities, so that it is uncertain whether they will still wish to be their friends when their desire has ceased; but with those who are not in love, and who have done this, having

been friends with each other before, it is not probable that acts of kindness will make their friendship less, but that they will be left as monuments of future services. Besides, it will tend to your improvement if you are persuaded by me rather than by a lover. For they, contrary to your best interests, praise all that you say and do, partly fearing lest they should offend you, partly being themselves depraved in their judgment, through desire, for love shows itself in such things: it makes the unsuccessful consider as distressing things which occasion no pain to others, and compels the successful to praise things which are not worthy the name of pleasures; so that it is much more proper to pity than envy those that are loved. But if you will be persuaded by me, first of all I will associate with you, not attending to present pleasure, but future advantage, not overcome by love, but controlling myself, not conceiving violent enmities for trifling offences, but slowly indulging slight anger for great offences, pardoning involuntary faults, and endeavoring to divert you from such as are voluntary; for these are the marks of a friendship that will endure for a long time. If, however, it has occurred to you that it is not possible for affection to be strong unless one is in love, you should consider that in that case we should not be very fond of our children or our fathers and mothers, nor acquire faithful friends, who have become such not from desire of this kind, but from other useful qualities. Moreover, if it is right to gratify those most who most need it, it is right also with respect to others to benefit, not the best men, but the most needy; for, being delivered from the greatest evils, they will feel the deepest gratitude towards us. And besides this, in private entertainments it will not be proper to invite our friends, but mendicants and those who are in need of a hearty meal; for these will greet and follow us, and will come to our doors, and be highly delighted, and feel the utmost gratitude, and

pray for many blessings upon us. But surely it is right to gratify those not who are exceedingly needy, but who are best able to repay a kindness, nor those who love only, but those who deserve this favor; nor such as will enjoy the bloom of your youth, but who, when you are old, will share their own fortune with you; nor those who, when they have effected their object, will boast of it to others, but who, out of modesty, will be silent towards all men; nor those who are devoted to you for a short time, but who will be greatly attached to you throughout life; nor who, when their desire has ceased, will seek a pretext for quarrelling, but who, when your bloom is gone, will then exhibit their own excellence. Do you, then, remember what I have said, and consider this, that friends admonish lovers that their course of life is a bad one, but no one ever yet found fault with those who are not in love, as if, on that account, they consulted ill for their own interests. Perhaps, however, you may ask me whether I advise you to gratify all who are not in love. But I think that not even a lover would exhort you to be thus affected towards all your lovers: for neither if one considers the matter reasonably is such a course deserving of equal gratitude, nor if you wished it, is it equally possible to keep it secret from others; but it is requisite that no harm should result from the business; on the contrary, advantage to both. I, for my part, think that enough has been said, but if you require anything more, under the impression that it has been omitted, question me."

What do you think of the speech, Socrates? Does it not appear to you to be wonderfully composed in other respects, and especially as to the language?

Socrates/ Divinely indeed, my friend, so much so that I am amazed. And I had this feeling through you, Phædrus, by looking at you, for you appeared to me to be enraptured with the speech while you were reading it. For supposing you

to understand such matters better than I do, I followed you, and, in following you, I felt the same enthusiasm with you, my inspired friend.

Phaedrus/ Well; do you think proper to jest in this manner?

Socrates/ Do I appear to you to jest, and not to be in earnest?

Phaedrus/ Don't, Socrates! But tell me truly, by Zeus the god of friendship, do you think that any other man in Greece could speak more ably and fully than this on the same subject?

Socrates/ But what? ought the speech to be praised by you and me for this reason, that its composer has said what he ought, and not only because every word is clear, and rounded, and accurately polished off? For, if it ought, it may be granted for your sake, since it escaped me by reason of my nothingness: for I attended only to its rhetoric, but this I did not think that even Lysias himself would think sufficient. And to me, indeed, it seemed, Phædrus, unless you say otherwise, that he has repeated the same things twice and thrice, as if he had not the faculty of saying much on the same subject, or perhaps he did not care about this. Moreover he appeared to me to make a wanton display of his ability to express these things in different ways, and both ways most elegantly.

Phaedrus/ You say nothing to the purpose, Socrates: for the speech has this very merit in the highest degree. For he has omitted nothing belonging to his subject, which was worthy to be mentioned: so that, beyond what has been said by him, no one could ever say more things or of greater weight.

Socrates/ On this point I am no longer able to agree with you; for the ancient and wise, both men and women, who

have spoken and written on this subject, would confute me, if I were to admit this out of compliment to you.

Phaedrus/ Who are they? and where have you heard better things than these?

Socrates/ I am unable to say on the moment; but I am sure that I have heard them from someone or other, either from the beautiful Sappho, or the wise Anacreon, or some other writer. Whence do I form this conjecture? somehow or other, my divine friend, my breast is full, and I feel that I could say other things in addition to those and not inferior to them. That I understand none of them of myself, I am well aware, being conscious of my ignorance. It remains then, I think, that I must have filled myself, like a vessel, by means of hearing, from some foreign source; but owing to my stupidity I have forgotten even this, both how and from whom I heard it.

Phaedrus/ You have told me excellent news, my noble friend. For though you cannot tell me from whom and how you heard it, even if I bid you, yet do the very thing that you say; promise that you will say other things better and not less in quality than those contained in the book, without making use of anything in it. And I promise you, after the manner of the nine Archons, that I will dedicate at Delphi, a golden statue as large as life, not only of myself, but also of you.

Socrates/ You are very kind, Phædrus, and really worth your weight in gold, if you suppose I mean that Lysias was entirely wrong, and that it is possible to say something altogether different from what he has said; for I do not think that this could happen even to the poorest writer. For instance with respect to the subject in hand; do you think that anyone who was maintaining that favors ought to be shown to one who is not in love rather than to one who is, if

he neglected to extol the prudence of the former and to blame the folly of the latter, these being obvious points, could have anything else to say? But I think that such points are to be allowed and granted to a speaker, and that of such things not the invention but the method of handling is to be praised, but of things which are obvious, and which are not difficult to discover, the invention as well as the method of handling.

Phaedrus/ I grant what you say; for you appear to me to have spoken fairly. I will therefore do thus; I will allow you to suppose that one who is in love is more diseased than one who is not, but for the rest if you say other things more fully and of greater weight than Lysias, you shall stand in Olympia, of solid gold, near the offering of the Cypselidæ.

Socrates/ You are quite serious, Phædrus, because in teasing you I have attacked your favorite, and you think that I shall really attempt to say something more skillfully wrought than his wisdom has produced.

Phaedrus/ For that matter, my friend, you have given me as good a hold on you; for you must speak, at all events, as well as you are able. And take care that we are not compelled to have recourse to that troublesome method of comedians, of retorting upon one another, and do not compel me to say, "If I, Socrates! know not Socrates, I have also forgotten myself," and, "He longed to speak, but affected shyness." But make up your mind that we shall not leave this spot before you have given utterance to what you said you have in your breast. For we two are by ourselves, in a lonely place, and I am both stronger and younger; from all this understand what I mean, and on no account prefer speaking by compulsion rather than willingly.

Socrates/ But, my excellent Phædrus, it would be ridiculous in me, who am but a novice in comparison with

an experienced author, to attempt to speak extempore on the same subject.

Phaedrus/ Do you know how the case stands? Let me have no more of your airs; for I have that to say which will force you to speak.

Socrates/ On no account say it then.

Phaedrus/ Nay, but I will say it. And what I have to say is an oath. For I swear to you, by whom, by what god? shall it be by this plane-tree? that unless you make a speech to me before this very tree, I will never again either show or repeat to you another speech by anyone whomsoever.

Socrates/ All, wicked one! how well have you found out how to compel a lover of speeches to do whatever you bid him.

Phaedrus/ Why then do you hesitate?

Socrates/ I shall not any longer, since you have sworn this oath. For how should I ever be able to debar myself of such a feast?

Phaedrus/ Begin then.

Socrates/ Do you know then, what I mean to do?

Phaedrus/ About what?

Socrates/ I shall speak with my face covered, that I may run through my speech as quickly as possible, and that I may not, by looking at you, be put out through shame.

Phaedrus/ Do but speak; and as to the rest, do as you please.

Socrates/ Come then, ye Muses, whether from the character of your song, ye are called tuneful, or whether ye derive this appellation from the musical race of the Ligyans, assist me in the tale which this best of men compels me to relate, that so his friend, who heretofore appeared to him to be wise, may now appear still more so.

There was once a boy, or rather a youth, of exceeding beauty; and he had very many lovers. One of them was a cunning fellow; who though he was no less in love than the rest, persuaded the boy that he was not in love. And once, as he was courting him, he endeavored to persuade him that favor ought to be shown to one who was not in love, in preference to one who was. And he spoke as follows.

On every subject, my boy, there is one method of beginning, for those who mean to deliberate well; they must know what the thing is about which the deliberation is to be, or else of necessity go altogether astray. But it has escaped the notice of most men that they do not know the essence of each several thing. As if they did know, then, they do not agree with each other at the outset of the enquiry, and as they proceed they pay the probable penalty, for they agree neither with themselves nor with each other. Let not you and I, then, fall into the error which we condemn in others, but since the question proposed to us is, whether we ought rather to enter into a friendship with one who is in love or not, having by mutual agreement settled on a definition of love, what it is, and what power it has, and looking back and referring to this, let us prosecute our enquiry whether it occasions advantage or detriment. That love, then, is a kind of desire, is clear to everyone; and we know that they who are not in love, desire beautiful things. How then shall we distinguish a lover from one who is not in love? Here it is necessary to observe, that in each of us there are two ruling and leading principles, which we follow wherever they lead, one being an innate desire of pleasures, the other an acquired opinion, which aims at what is most excellent. These sometimes agree in us, and sometimes are at variance; and sometimes one gets the upper hand, at other times the other. When opinion therefore with the aid of reason leads to that which is best, and gets the upper hand,

we give the name of temperance to this power; but when desire drags us irrationally to pleasures and rules within us, this ruling power takes the name of excess. But excess has many names; for it has many limbs and many forms. And of these principles whichever happens to get the predominance gives its own designation to the person who possesses it, and that neither honorable nor worth acquiring. For instance with respect to food, desire that gets the better of the highest reason, and of the other desires, will be called gluttony, and will cause the person who possesses it to be called by the same name; again with respect to drinking, when it has usurped dominion, by leading its possessor in this direction, it is clear what designation it will acquire: and with respect to other things akin to these, and the names of kindred desires, it is manifest how they ought to be called, according as each for the time being happens to be dominant. Why all this has been said is already pretty evident, but everything becomes in a manner more clear by being mentioned than if not mentioned. For desire without reason having got the upper hand of opinion that tends to what is right, and being driven towards the pleasure derived from beauty, and being strongly impelled by its kindred desires to corporeal beauty, receives its name from this very strength and is called love. But, my dear Phædrus, do I appear to you, as I do to myself, to be moved by some divine influence?

Phaedrus/ Assuredly, Socrates, an unusual fluency has got possession of you.

Socrates/ Listen to me then in silence. For in truth the place appears to be divine. If, therefore, in the progress of my speech I should be frequently entranced by the genius of the spot, you must not be surprised. For what I utter now is not very far removed from dithyrambics.

Phaedrus/ You say most truly.

Socrates/ Of this, however, you are the cause. But hear the rest; for perhaps the attack of the trance may be averted: though this will be the care of the deity, but let us again direct our discourse to the boy.

Well then, my excellent boy, what that is, about which we are to deliberate, has been declared and defined. Keeping this in view, then, let us proceed to consider what advantage or detriment will probably accrue from one who is in love and one who is not, to him that shows favor to them.

He that is ruled by desire and is a slave to pleasure, must necessarily, I think, endeavor to make the object of his love as agreeable to himself as possible. But to one diseased everything is pleasant that does not oppose his wishes; but that which is superior and equal is hateful to him. A lover therefore will never willingly allow his favorite to be either superior to or on an equality with himself, but is always endeavoring to make him inferior and more deficient. An ignorant person is inferior to a wise one, a coward to a brave one, one who is unable to speak to a rhetorician, a dull to a clever one. Since so many evils, and even more than these, are engendered or naturally exist in the mind of the beloved object, the lover must of necessity rejoice at the existence of the one sort and endeavor to introduce the others, or be deprived of immediate pleasure. He must therefore needs be envious, and by debarring his favorite from much other and that profitable society, whence he might become most manly, he is the occasion of great harm, and of the greatest by debarring him of that by means of which he would become most wise; and this is divine philosophy, from which a lover must needs keep his favorite at a distance, through the fear of being despised; and must so manage everything else, that he may be ignorant of everything, and look to the lover for everything, thus being most agreeable to him, but most detrimental to himself. As concerns the mind, then, a

man that is in love is in no respect a profitable guardian and companion.

But as to the habit and care of the body, what it will be and how he will attend to it, of which a man has become the lord, who is compelled to pursue the pleasant in preference to the good, is next to be considered. He will be seen pursuing some delicate and not hardy youth, not reared in the open air but under the shade of mingled trees, a stranger to manly toil, and dry sweats, but no stranger to a delicate and effeminate mode of life, adorned with foreign colors and ornaments, through want of such as are natural, and studious of all such other things as accompany these: what they are, is clear, and it is not worthwhile to enter into further detail; but having summed them up under one head, we will proceed to another part of our subject. Such a body both in battle and other great emergencies, enemies will look upon with confidence, but friends and lovers themselves will fear for. This, however, as sufficiently evident, may be dismissed. In the next place we must declare what advantage or what detriment, with respect to our possessions, the society and guardianship of one in love will occasion. But this indeed is manifest to everyone, and especially to a lover, that he would desire above all things that the object of his love should be bereft of his dearest, fondest, and holiest treasures: for he would have him gladly deprived of father and mother, kindred and friends, thinking that they are an hindrance to, and blamers of the sweetest intercourse with him. Moreover if he has abundance of gold, or any other property, he will think that he cannot be so easily caught, nor when caught easily managed. Wherefore it must of necessity happen that a lover should grudge his favorite possession of abundance, and should rejoice at its loss. Further still, a lover will wish his favorite to continue as long as possible without a wife, without child, and without

home, from a desire to enjoy his own delights for as long a time as possible. There are, indeed, other evils besides these, but some deity has mingled present pleasure with most of them: with a flatterer, for instance, a dreadful beast and great bane, nature has nevertheless mingled a kind of pleasure that is by no means inelegant. And some one perhaps may blame a mistress as detrimental, and many other similar creatures and pursuits, which for the day, however, afford the greatest enjoyment; but to a favorite, a lover besides being detrimental, is the most disagreeable of all for daily intercourse. For the ancient proverb says, that equal delights in equal; I suppose, because an equality of age leading to equal pleasures produces friendship by similarity of tastes. But still the intercourse even of these brings satiety: and moreover, necessity is said to be irksome to everyone in everything; and this in addition to their dissimilarity is especially the case with a lover towards his favorite. For an old man who associates with a young one, does not willingly leave him, either by day or night, but is driven on by necessity and frenzy, which leads him on by constantly giving him pleasure, through seeing, hearing, touching, and by every sense feeling the presence of the beloved object, so that he would with pleasure cling constantly to him: but by giving what solace or what pleasures to the object of his love, can he prevent him during an intercourse of equal duration, from feeling the utmost disgust, while he sees a face old and no longer in its bloom, with the other things that accompany it, which are unpleasant even to hear spoken of, much more so to have actually to do with from an ever-pressing necessity; when he has too to keep a suspicious watch over himself at all times and in all company, and has to listen to unreasonable and extravagant praises, and reproaches as well, which when the lover is sober are intolerable, and when he is drunk, are not

only intolerable but disgraceful from the loathsome and undisguised freedom of his language. Thus he that is in love is detrimental and disgusting, but when he ceases to love, he is thenceforth unfaithful towards him who by many promises and with many oaths and entreaties he could hardly prevail on at that time to endure his troublesome familiarity in the hope of advantage. But now, when payment ought to be made, having received within himself another ruler and master, reason and prudence, instead of love and madness, he has become another man unknown to his favorite. He then demands a return for former favors, reminding him of what was done and said, as if he was talking to the same person; but the other through shame, dares neither say that he has become another man, nor is he able to adhere to the oaths and promises of the former insensate reign, now that he has got possession of his senses and has become prudent, fearing lest, by doing the same things as before, he should become like what he was, and the same thing again. Hence he becomes a runaway, and of necessity a defrauder, who was before a lover, and the shell being turned, he changes from pursuit to flight; but the other is forced to pursue him with indignation and curses, having been ignorant from the very beginning that he ought never to have granted favors to one that is in love and of necessity out of his senses, but much rather to one who is not in love, and in his right mind; otherwise he must necessarily give himself up to one that is unfaithful, morose, envious, disgusting, detrimental to his property, detrimental to his bodily habit, but far more detrimental to the cultivation of his soul, than which in truth there neither is nor ever will be anything more precious in the sight of gods and men. It is right, therefore, my boy, to reflect on these things, and to know that the attachment of a lover is not

united with good will, but like food for the sake of repletion, “as wolves love a lamb, so lovers love a boy.”

This is it, Phædrus; you must not expect to hear me say another word, but must let my speech end here.

Phaedrus/ But I thought it was only in the middle, and that it would say as much about one who is not in love, that he ought rather to be favored, mentioning in turn what advantages he has. Why then, Socrates, do you stop short now?

Socrates/ Did you not observe, my excellent friend, that I was now uttering epics, and no longer dithyrambics, and this while giving expression to blame? If then I should begin to praise the other, what do you think would become of me? Do you not know that I shall be thrown into an ecstasy by the Nymphs, to whom you have purposely exposed me? I say then, in one word, that whatever vices I have attributed to the one, to the other the contrary advantages belong. What need then is there for a long speech? for enough has been said about both. Thus the story will be treated as it ought to be treated: I will, therefore, cross over the river and go home, before I am compelled by you to do something more difficult.

Phaedrus/ Not yet, Socrates, before the heat has passed away. Do you not see that it is now nearly high-noon, as it is called? Let us, then, remain here, and converse together about what has been said, and as soon as it grows cool, we will go home.

Socrates/ You are a strange man for speeches, Phædrus, and really wonderful. For I think that of all the speeches made during your life-time no one has been the occasion of more being made than yourself, whether by speaking them yourself, or in some way or other compelling others. I except Simmias of Thebes; but you far surpass all the rest. And now

again you appear to me to be the occasion of another speech being made.

Phaedrus/ You do not announce war indeed. But how and what speech is this?

Socrates/ When I was about to cross the river, my good friend, the divine and wonted signal was given me, it always deters me from what I am about to do, and I seemed to hear a voice from this very spot, which would not suffer me to depart before I had purified myself, as if I had committed some offence against the deity. Now I am a prophet, though not a very good one, but like bad writers, am good enough for my own purposes. Accordingly, I clearly perceive my offence: for, my friend, the soul is in some measure prophetic; and mine troubled me some time since as I was delivering the speech, and somehow I was cast down, as Ibycus says, for fear I should offend the gods, and gain honor from men in exchange. But now I perceive my offence.

Phaedrus/ What do you say it is?

Socrates/ A dreadful, dreadful speech, Phædrus, you both brought here yourself, and compelled me to utter.

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ Foolish, and in some sort impious: and can anything be more dreadful than this?

Phaedrus/ Nothing, if you say truly.

Socrates/ What then? Do you not think that Love is son of Venus, and a god?

Phaedrus/ So it is said.

Socrates/ Yet not by Lysias, nor by that speech of yours which was uttered through my mouth when bewitched by you. But if Love be, as indeed he is, a god, or something divine, he cannot be in any respect evil; yet both our late speeches spoke of him as such. In this therefore they

committed an offence against Love, besides their silliness was very amusing, in that they said nothing sound or true, yet they prided themselves as if they were something, because they might perhaps impose on some simpletons and gain their approbation. It is necessary, therefore, my friend, that I should purify myself. But there is an ancient purification for those who offend in matters relating to mythology, which Homer was not acquainted with, but Stesichorus was. For, being deprived of sight for defaming Helen, he was not ignorant like Homer, but as a friend of the Muses, knew the cause, and immediately composed the following lines: "This tale is not true, thou didst not go on board the well-benched ships, nor reach the towers of Troy." Thus having composed this entire recantation as it is called, he immediately recovered his sight. I however, will be wiser than them in this respect; for before I suffer any harm for defaming Love, I will endeavor to present him my recantation, with my head bare, and not, as before, covered through shame.

Phaedrus/ There is nothing, Socrates, that you could say to me more agreeable than this.

Socrates/ For, my good Phædrus, you must be sensible how shamelessly both our speeches were composed, as well mine as that which was read from the book. For, if any generous man, and of mild disposition, who is either now in love with, or has formerly been enamored of another like himself, had happened to hear us say that lovers contract violent enmities for trifling causes, and are envious of, and detrimental to, their favorites, can you suppose that he would do otherwise than think he was listening to men brought up among sailors, and who had never witnessed an ingenuous love, and would be far from assenting to the censures we cast upon Love?

Phaedrus/ Probably he would, by Zeus, Socrates.

Socrates/ Out of respect to him, then, and fear of Love himself, I am anxious to wash out as it were the brackish taste by a sweet speech. And I advise Lysias, too, to write as soon as possible, that it is proper, under similar circumstances, to favor a lover rather than one who is not in love.

Phaedrus/ You may be well assured that this will be done; for, when you have spoken in praise of the lover, Lysias must needs be compelled by me to write another speech on the same subject.

Socrates/ This I believe, while you continue the man you are.

Phaedrus/ Speak then with confidence.

Socrates/ But where is my boy, to whom I spoke? that he may hear this too, and may not, from not hearing it, hastily grant favors to one who is not in love.

Phaedrus/ Here he is always very near to you, whenever you want him.

Socrates/ Understand then, my beautiful boy, that the former speech was that of Phædrus, son of Pythocles, a man of Myrrhinus; but that which I am now about to deliver is the speech of Stesichorus, son of Euphemus, of Himera. It must begin thus:

"The assertion is not true which declares that when a lover is present favor ought rather to be shown to one who is not in love, because the one is mad and the other in his sober senses. For if it were universally true that madness is evil, the assertion would be correct. But now the greatest blessings we have spring from madness, when granted by divine bounty. For the prophetess at Delphi, and the priestesses at Dodona, have, when mad, done many and noble services for Greece, both privately and publicly, but in their sober senses, little or nothing. And if we were to speak

of the Sybil and others, who, employing prophetic inspiration, have correctly predicted many things to many persons respecting the future, we should be too prolix in relating what is known to everyone. This, however, deserves to be adduced by way of testimony, that such of the ancients as gave names to things did not consider madness as disgraceful or a cause of reproach: for they would not have attached this very name to that most noble art by which the future is discerned, and have called it a mad art; but considering it noble when it happens by the divine decree, they gave it this name; but the men of the present day, by ignorantly inserting the letter τ, have called it the prophetic art. Since also with respect to the investigation of the future by people in their senses, which is made by means of birds and other signs, inasmuch as men by means of reflection, furnished themselves by human thought with intelligence and information, they gave it the name of prognostication, which the moderns, by using the emphatic long ō, now call augury. But how much more perfect and valuable, then, prophecy is than augury, one name than the other, and one effect than the other, by so much did the ancients testify that madness is more noble than sound sense, that which comes from God than that which proceeds from men. Moreover, for those dire diseases and afflictions, which continued in some families in consequence of ancient crimes committed by some or other of them, madness springing up and prophesying to those to whom it was proper, discovered a remedy, fleeing for refuge to prayers and services of the gods, whence obtaining purifications and atoning rites, it made him who possessed it sound, both for the present and the future, by discovering to him, who was rightly mad and possessed, a release from present evils. There is a third possession and madness proceeding from the Muses, which seizing upon a tender and chaste soul, and rousing and

inspiring it to the composition of odes and other species of poetry, by adorning the countless deeds of antiquity, instructs posterity. But he who without the madness of the Muses approaches the gates of poesy under the persuasion that by means of art he can become an efficient poet, both himself fails in his purpose, and his poetry, being that of a sane man, is thrown into the shade by the poetry of such as are mad.

So great and even more noble effects of madness proceeding from the gods I am able to mention to you. Let us not, therefore, be afraid of this, nor let any argument disturb and frighten us so as to persuade us that we ought to prefer a sane man as our friend in preference to one who is under the influence of a divine impulse; but let him carry all the victory when he was shown this in addition, that love is sent by the gods for no benefit to the lover and the beloved. But we, on the other hand, must prove that such madness is given by the gods, for the purpose of producing the highest happiness. Now the proof will be incredible to the subtle, but credible to the wise. It is necessary, therefore, first of all to understand the truth with respect to the nature of the soul both divine and human, by observing its affections and operations. This then is the beginning of the demonstration.

Every soul is immortal: for whatever is continually moved is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. Therefore that only which moves itself, since it does not quit itself, never ceases to be moved, but is also the source and beginning of motion to all other things that are moved. But a beginning is uncreate: for everything that is created must necessarily be created from a beginning, but a beginning itself from nothing whatever; for if a beginning were created from anything, it would not be a beginning. Since then it is uncreate it must also of necessity be indestructible; for

should a beginning perish, it could neither itself be ever created from anything, nor anything else from it, since all things must be created from a beginning. Thus then the beginning of motion is that which moves itself: and this can neither perish nor be created, or all heaven and all creation must collapse and come to a stand-still, and never again have any means whereby it may be moved and created. Since then it appears that that which is moved by itself is immortal, no one will be ashamed to say that this is the very essence and true notion of soul. For everybody which is moved from without, is soulless, but that which is moved from within of itself, possesses a soul, since this is the very nature of soul. But if this be the case, that there is nothing else which moves itself except soul, soul must necessarily be both uncreate and immortal. This then may suffice for its immortality.

But respecting its idea we must speak as follows: what it is, would in every way require a divine and lengthened exposition to tell, but what it is like, a human and a shorter one: in this way then we will describe it. Let it then be likened to the combined power of a pair of winged steeds and a charioteer. Now the horses and charioteers of the gods are all both good themselves and of good extraction, but all others are mixed. In the first place, then, our ruling power drives a pair of steeds, in the next place, of these horses it has one that is beautiful and noble, and of similar extraction, but the other is of opposite extraction, and opposite character; our driving therefore is necessarily difficult and troublesome. But we must endeavor to explain in what respect an animal is called mortal or immortal. All soul takes care of all that is without soul, and goes about all heaven, appearing at different times in different forms. While it is perfect, then, and winged, it soars aloft and governs the universe: but when it has lost its wings it is

borne downward, until it meets with something solid, in which having taken up its abode, by assuming an earthly body, which appears to move itself by means of its own power, the whole together is called an animal, soul and body compounded, and takes the appellation of mortal. But the immortal derives its name from no deduction of reasoning, but as we neither see, nor sufficiently understand God, we represent him as an immortal animal possessed of soul, and possessed of body, and these united together throughout all time. Let these things, however, so be and be described as God pleases. But let us now discover the cause of the loss of the wings, why they fall off from the soul. It is something of the following kind:

The natural power of a wing, is to carry up heavy substances by raising them aloft to the regions where the race of the gods dwells; and of the parts connected with the body, it probably partakes most largely of that which is divine. But that which is divine is beautiful, wise, good, and everything of that kind. By these then the wings of the soul are chiefly nourished and increased, but by what is base and vile, and other similar contraries, it falls to decay and perishes. Now the mighty chief in heaven, Zeus, goes first, driving a winged chariot, ordering and taking care of all things; and there follows him a host of gods and demons, distributed into eleven divisions, for Vesta remains alone in the dwelling of the gods: but of the others all that have been assigned a station as chief gods in the number of the twelve, lead in the order to which they have been severally appointed. But there are many delightful sights and paths within heaven among which the race of the blessed gods move, each performing his own proper work; and whoso has both will and power accompanies them; for envy stands aloof from the heavenly choir. But when they proceed to a banquet and feast, they now ascend by an up-hill path to the highest

arch of heaven: and the chariots of the gods, which from being equally poised are obedient to the rein, move easily, but all others with difficulty; for the horse that partakes of vice weighs them down, leaning and pressing heavily towards the earth, if he happens not to have been well trained by his charioteer. Here then the severest toil and trial is laid upon the soul. For those that are called immortal, when they reach the summit, proceeding outside, stand on the back of heaven, and while they are stationed here, its revolution carries them round, and they behold the external regions of heaven. But the region above heaven no poet here has ever yet sung of, nor ever will sing of, as it deserves. It is, however, as follows: for surely I may venture to speak the truth, especially as my subject is truth. For essence, that really exists, colorless, formless and intangible, is visible only to intelligence that guides the soul, and around it the family of true science have this for their abode. As then the mind of deity is nourished by intelligence and pure science, so the mind of every soul that is about to receive what properly belongs to it, when it sees after a long time that which is, is delighted, and by contemplating the truth, is nourished and thrives, until the revolution of heaven brings it round again to the same point And during this circuit it beholds justice herself, it beholds temperance, it beholds science, not that to which creation is annexed, nor that which is different in different things of those which we call real, but that which is science in what really is. And in like manner, having beheld all other things that really are, and having feasted on them, it again enters into the interior of heaven, and returns home. And on its return, the charioteer having taken his horses to the manger, sets ambrosia before them, and afterwards gives them nectar to drink. And this is the life of the gods.

But, with respect to other souls, that which best follows and imitates a god, raises the head of its charioteer to the outer region, and is carried round with the rest in the revolution, yet is confused by its horses, and scarcely able to behold real existences; but another at one time rises, at another sinks, and owing to the violence of the horses, partly sees, and partly not. The rest follow, all eager for the upper region, but being unable to reach it they are carried round sunk beneath the surface, trampling on and striking against each other, in endeavoring to get one before another. Hence the tumult, and struggling, and sweating is extreme; and here through the fault of the charioteers many are maimed, and many break many of their feathers; and all of them having undergone much toil depart without having succeeded in getting a view of that which is, and after their departure they make use of the food of mere opinion. And this is the reason for the great anxiety to behold the field of truth, where it is; the proper pasture for the best part of the soul happens to be in the meadow there, and it is the nature of the wing by which the soul is borne aloft, to be nourished by it; and this is a law of Adrastia, that whatever soul, in accompanying a deity, has beheld any of the true essences, it shall be free from harm until the next revolution, and if it can always accomplish this, it shall be always free from harm: but whenever from inability to keep up it has not seen any of them, and from meeting with some misfortune, has been filled with oblivion and vice, and so weighed down, and from being weighed down has lost its wings, and fallen to the earth, then there is a law that this soul should not be implanted in any brutal nature in its first generation, but that the soul which has seen most, should enter into the germ of a man who will become a philosopher or a lover of the beautiful, or a votary of the Muses and Love; but that the second should enter into the form of a constitutional

king, or a warrior and commander, the third into that of a statesman, or economist, or merchant, the fourth into one who loves the toil of gymnastic exercises, or who will be employed in healing the body, the fifth will have a prophetic life or one connected with the mysteries, to the sixth the poetic life or some other of those employed in imitation will be best adapted, to the seventh a mechanical or agricultural life, to the eighth the life of a sophist or mob-courtier, to the ninth that of a tyrant. But among all these, whosoever passes his life justly afterwards obtains a better lot, but who unjustly, a worse one. For to the same place, whence each soul comes, it does not return till the expiration of ten thousand years; for it does not recover its wings for so long a period, except it is the soul of a sincere lover of wisdom, or of one who has made philosophy his favorite. But these in the third period of a thousand years, if they have chosen this life thrice in succession, thereupon depart, with their wings restored in the three thousandth year. But the others, when they have ended their first life, are brought to trial; and being sentenced, some go to places of punishment beneath the earth and there suffer for their sins, but others, being borne upwards by their sentence some region in heaven, pass their time in a manner worthy of the life they have lived in human form. But in the thousandth year, both kinds coming back again for the allotment and choice of their second life, choose that which they severally please. And here a human soul passes into the life of a beast, and from a beast he who was once a man passes again into a man. For the soul which has never seen the truth, cannot come into this form: for it is necessary that a man should understand according to a generic form, as it is called, which proceeding from many perceptions is by reasoning combined into one. And this is a recollection of those things which our soul formerly saw when journeying with deity, despising the things which we

now say are, and looking up to that which really is. Wherefore, with justice, the mind of the philosopher is alone furnished with wings; for, to the best of his power, his memory dwells on those things, by the contemplation of which even deity is divine. But a man who makes a right use of such memorials as these, by constantly perfecting himself in perfect mysteries, alone becomes truly perfect. And by keeping aloof from human pursuits, and dwelling on that which is divine, he is found fault with by the multitude as out of his senses, but it escapes the notice of the multitude that he is inspired.

To this then comes our whole argument respecting the fourth kind of madness, on account of which anyone, who, on seeing beauty in this lower world, being reminded of the true, begins to recover his wings, and, having recovered them, longs to soar aloft, but being unable to do it, looks upwards like a bird, and despising things below, is deemed to be affected with madness. Our argument comes to this then, that this is the best of all enthusiasms, and of the best origin, both for him who possesses and for him who partakes of it, and that he who loves beautiful objects, by having a share of this madness, is called a lover. For, as we have mentioned, every soul of man has, from its very nature, beheld real existences, or it would not have entered into this human form; for it is not easy for everyone to call to mind former things from the present, neither for those who then had but a brief view of the things there, nor for those who after their fall hither, were so unfortunate as to be turned aside by evil associations to injustice, and so to have forgotten the sacred things they formerly beheld. Few therefore are left who have sufficient memory. But these, when they see any resemblance of the things there, are amazed and no longer masters of themselves, and they know not what this affection is, because they do not thoroughly

perceive it. Now of justice and temperance and whatever else souls deem precious, there is no brightness in the resemblances here, but by means of dull instruments with difficulty a few only, on approaching the images, are able to discern the character of that which is represented. But beauty was then splendid to look on, when with that happy choir, we in company with Zeus, and others with some other of the gods, beheld that blissful sight and spectacle, and were initiated into that which may be rightly called the most blessed of all mysteries, which we celebrated when we were whole and unaffected by the evils that awaited us in time to come, and moreover when we were initiated in, and beheld in the pure light, perfect, simple, calm, and blessed visions, being ourselves pure, and as yet unmasked with this which we now carry about with us and call the body, fettered to it like an oyster to its shell.

Let this much be said out of regard to memory, on account of which, from a longing for former things, I have now spoken at greater length than I ought. But with respect to beauty, as we observed, she both shone among things there, and on our coming hither we found her, through the clearest of our senses, shining most clearly. For sight is the keenest of our bodily senses, though wisdom is not seen by it. For vehement would be the love she would inspire, if she came before our sight and showed us any such clear image of herself, and so would all other loveable things; but now beauty only has this privilege of being most manifest and most lovely.

He, then, who has not been recently initiated, or who has become corrupted, is not speedily carried hence thither to beauty itself, by beholding here that which takes its name from it. So that he does not reverence it when he beholds it, but, giving himself up to pleasure, like a beast he attempts to mount it and to have intercourse with it, and in his

wanton advances he is neither afraid nor ashamed of this unnatural pursuit of pleasure. But he who has been recently initiated, and who formerly beheld many things, when he sees a godlike countenance, or some bodily form that presents a good imitation of beauty, at first shudders and some of the former terrors come over him, then as he looks steadfastly at it, he reverences it as a god, and if he did not dread the imputation of excessive madness, he would sacrifice to his favorite, as to a statue or a god. But after he has beheld it, as commonly happens, after shuddering, a change, a sweating and unusual heat comes over him. For having received the emanation of beauty through his eyes, he has become heated, so that the wings that are natural to him are refreshed; and by his being heated, the parts where they grow are softened, which having been long closed up through hardness prevented them from shooting out. But when this nutriment flows in, the quill of the wing begins to swell, and makes an effort to burst from the root, beneath the whole form of the soul; for of old it was all winged. In this state, then, the whole boils and throbs violently, and as is the case with infants cutting their teeth, when they are just growing out there is a pricking and soreness of the gums, in the same way the soul is affected of one who is beginning to put forth his wings, it boils and is sore, and itches as it puts them forth. When, therefore, by beholding the beauty of a boy, and receiving particles that proceed and flow from thence, which are for that reason called desire, it becomes refreshed and heated; it is relieved from pain and filled with joy: but when it is separated and becomes parched, the orifices of the passages through which the wing shoots forth, become closed through drought and shut up the germ of the wing. But it being shut in together with desire, leaping like throbbing veins, strikes against each passage that is shut against it, so that the whole soul, being pricked all round, is

frantic and in agony; but again retaining the memory of the beautiful one, it is filled with joy. And from both these mingled together, it is tormented by the strangeness of the affection, and not knowing what to do becomes frenzied, and being in this frantic state it can neither sleep at night, nor remain quiet by day, but runs about with longing wherever it may hope to see the possessor of the beauty. And on beholding him and drawing in fresh supplies of desire, it loosens the parts that were closed up, and recovering breath has a respite from stings and throes, and again for the present enjoys this most exquisite pleasure. Wherefore, it never willingly leaves him, nor values anyone more than the beautiful one, but forgets mothers and brothers and friends all alike, and if its substance is wasting through neglect, it reckons that as of no consequence, and despising all customs and decorums in which it formerly prided itself, it is ready to be a slave and to lie down wherever anyone will allow it as near as possible to the object of its longing. For in addition to its reverence for the possessor of beauty, it has found that he is the only physician for its severest troubles.

Now this affection, my beautiful boy, you I mean to whom I am speaking, men call love, but when you hear what the gods designate it, you will probably laugh, on account of your youth. Some Homerics, I think, adduce out of their secret poems two verses on love, of which the second is very insolent, and not altogether delicate: they sing as follows: "Him mortals indeed call winged Eros, but immortals Pteros Flyer for his flighty nature."

These verses then, you are at liberty to believe, or not; however, this assuredly is the cause and the condition of lovers. Now when one of the attendants upon Zeus is seized, he is able to bear with greater firmness the burden of the wing-named god; but such as are in the service of Mars and went round heaven with him, when they are caught by Love,

and think that they are at all injured by the object of their love, are blood-thirsty, and ready to immolate both themselves and their favorite. And so with respect to each several god, whose choir each followed, he spends his life in honoring and imitating him to the best of his power, so long as he remains free from corruption, and is living here his first generation; and in this way he associates with and behaves to his beloved and all others. Everyone, therefore, chooses his love out of the objects of beauty according to his own taste, and, as if he were a god to him, he fashions and adorns him like a statue, as if for the purpose of reverencing him and celebrating orgies in his honor. They then that are followers of Zeus seek for someone who resembles Zeus in his soul, to be the object of his love. They therefore consider whether he is by nature a lover of wisdom, and fitted to command; and when, on finding one, they have become enamored of him, they do everything in their power to make him such. If, then, they have not already entered upon this study, they now set about it, and learn it from whatever source they can, and themselves pursue it; and by endeavoring to discover of themselves the nature of their own deity, they succeed by being compelled to look steadfastly on their god, and when they grasp him with their memory, being inspired by him, they receive from him their manners and pursuits, as far it is possible for man to participate of deity.

And considering the object of their love as the cause of all this, they love him still more, and if they have drawn their inspiration from Zeus, like the Bacchanals, they pour it into the soul of their beloved, and make him as much as possible resemble their own god. But such as attended Hera seek after a royal favorite, and when they have found one, they act towards him in precisely the same manner. And such as attended Apollo, and each of the other gods, following the

example of their several deities, desire that their favorite may have a corresponding character, and when they have gained such an one, both by imitation on their own part, and by persuading and alluring their favorite, they lead him to the peculiar pursuit and character of that god; not, indeed, by employing envy or illiberal severity towards their favorite, but endeavoring by every means in their power to lead him to a perfect resemblance of themselves and their god, they act accordingly. A zeal, then, on the part of those who truly love, and an initiation, as I call it, if they succeed in what they desire, so beautiful and blessed, falls to the lot of the beloved one at the hands of him that is maddened by love, if only he be won. But he that is won, is won in the following manner.

As in the beginning of this account I divided each soul into three parts, two of them having the form of horses, and the third that of a charioteer, so let us still maintain that division: but of the horses, one, we said, was good and the other not: what however is the virtue of the good one, or the vice of the bad one, we have not yet explained, but must now declare. That one of them, then, which is in the nobler condition, is in form erect, finely-molded, high-necked, hook-nosed, white-colored, black-eyed, a lover of honor, with temperance and modesty, and a companion of true glory, without the whip is driven by word of command and voice only: the other, on the other hand, is crooked, thick set. clumsily put together, strong-necked, short-throated, flat-faced, black-colored, gray-eyed, hot-blooded, a companion of insolence and swaggering, shaggy about the ears, deaf, scarcely obedient to whip and spur together. When, therefore, the charioteer beholds the love-inspiring sight, his whole soul becoming heated by sensation, he is filled with irritation and the stings of desire, the horse that is obedient to the charioteer, then as ever, overpowered by shame

restrains himself from leaping on the beloved object: but the other, no longer heeds either the whip or the spurs of the charioteer, but bounding forward is carried violently along, and giving every kind of trouble to his yoke-fellow and the charioteer, compels them to hurry to the favorite, and to indulge in the delights of love. They at first resist from indignation at being compelled to such a dreadful and lawless course: but at length, when there is no end to the evil, they go on as they are led, having submitted and consented to do what they are ordered; and now they come up to him and behold the gleaming countenance of the favorite. But the memory of the charioteer when he beholds him is carried back to the nature of absolute beauty, and again sees her together with temperance standing on a chaste pedestal. And, on beholding, it shudders, and awe-struck falls down backward, and at the same time is compelled to draw back the reins so violently, as to throw both the horses on their haunches, the one indeed willingly, from his not resisting, but the insolent one very much against his will. When they have withdrawn to some distance, the former through shame and amazement drenches the whole soul with sweat, but the other, having got rid of the pain which he suffered from the bit and the fall, when he has scarcely recovered his breath, bursts out into passionate reviling, vehemently reproaches the charioteer and his yoke-fellow, for having abandoned their station and compact from cowardice and effeminacy. And again compelling them against their wills to approach, he with difficulty yields to their entreaties to defer it to a future time. But when the time agreed on comes, reminding them who pretend to forget it, plunging, neighing, and dragging forward, he compels them again to approach the favorite for the same purpose. And when they are near, bending down his head and extending his spear, he champs the bit and

drags them on with wantonness. But the charioteer being affected as before, though more strongly, as if he were falling back from the starting rope, pulls back the bit with still greater violence from the teeth of the insolent horse, and covers his railing tongue and jaws with blood, and forcing his legs and haunches to the ground, tortures him with pain. But when by being often treated in the same way, the vicious horse has laid aside his insolence, being humbled he henceforth follows the directions of the charioteer, and when he beholds the beautiful object, he swoons through fear. So that it comes to pass, that thenceforth the soul of the lover follows its favorite with reverence and awe. Since then he is worshipped with all observance as if he were a god, not by a lover who feigns the passion, but who really feels it, and since he is by nature inclined to friendship, he directs his affection to accord with that of his worshipper, even though in past times he may have been misled by his associates or some others, who told him that it was disgraceful to allow a lover to approach him, and he may for this reason have rejected his lover, yet in process of time his age and destiny induce him to admit his lover to familiarity. For surely it was never decreed by fate, that the evil should be a friend to the evil, or the good not a friend to the good. When, therefore, he has admitted him and accepted his conversation and society, the benevolence of the lover being brought into close contact astonishes the beloved, when he perceives that all his other friends and relatives together exhibited no friendship at all towards him in comparison with his inspired friend. But when he has spent some time in doing this, and has approached so near as to come in contact in the gymnastic schools and other places of social intercourse, then the fountain of that stream to which Zeus, when in love with Ganymede, gave the name of desire, streaming in great abundance upon the lover, partly sinks into him, and partly

flows out from him when he is full. And as a wind or any sound rebounding from smooth and hard substances, is borne back again to the place from whence it proceeded, so this stream of beauty, flowing back again to the beautiful one through the eyes, by which way it naturally enters the soul, and having returned thither and fledged itself anew, refreshes the outlets of the feathers, and moves him to put forth wings, and in turn fills the soul of the beloved one with love. Accordingly he is in love, but with whom he knows not; neither is he aware nor is he able to tell what has happened to him, but like a person who has caught a disease in the eyes from another, he is unable to assign the cause, and is not aware that he beholds himself in his lover, as in a mirror. And when the lover is present, be is freed from pain in the same way as the lover is; but, when he is absent, he in turn longs for him in the same manner that he is longed for, possessing love's image, love returned; but he calls it and considers it to be not love but friendship. And he desires, in the same way as the lover, though more feebly, to see, to touch, to kiss, to lie down with him; and, as is probable, he soon afterwards does all this. In this lying down together, then, the unbridled horse of the lover has something to say to its charioteer, and begs to be allowed some small enjoyment in recompense for his many toils, but the same horse of the favorite has nothing to say, but swelling with love and in doubt, embraces the lover, and kisses him as he would kiss a very dear friend, and when they are laid down together, he is unable to refuse, as far as in his power, to gratify his lover in whatever he requires. But his yoke-fellow, together with the charioteer, resists this familiarity with shame and reason. If, then, the better parts of their mind have prevailed so as to lead them to a well-regulated mode of living and philosophy, they pass their life here in bliss and concord, having- obtained the mastery over themselves, and

being orderly, through having brought into subjection that part of the soul in which vice was engendered, and having set free that in which was virtue: and when they depart this life, becoming winged and light, they have been victorious in one of the three truly Olympic contests, a greater good than which neither human prudence nor divine madness can possibly bestow on man. If, however, they have adopted a coarser and less philosophic mode of living, yet still honorable, but perhaps in a fit of drunkenness or some other thoughtless moment, their two unbridled beasts finding their souls unguarded, and bringing them together to one place, have made and consummated that choice which most men deem blissful; and having once consummated it they continue to practice it for the future, though rarely, in that they are doing what is not approved by their whole mind. These too, then, pass their life dear to each other, but less so than the others, both during the period of love and after it, thinking that they have both given to and received from each other the strongest pledges, which it were impious to violate, and so at any time become alienated. But in the end, without wings indeed, yet making an effort to become winged, they quit the body, so as to carry off no trifling prize of impassioned madness: for there is a law that those who have already set out in the heavenward path should never again enter on darkness and the paths beneath the earth, but that, passing a splendid life, they should be happy walking with each other, and that, for their love's sake, whenever they become winged, they should be winged together.

These so great and divine things, my boy, will the affection of a lover confer on you. But the familiarity of one who is not in love, being mingled with mortal prudence, and dispensing mortal and niggardly gifts, generating in the beloved soul an illiberality which is praised by the multitude as virtue, will

cause it to be tossed about the earth and beneath the earth for nine thousand years, devoid of intelligence. To thee, beloved Love, this recantation, the most beautiful and the best, according to my ability, is presented and duly paid, both in other respects and by certain poetical phrases, of necessity, adorned for the sake of Phædrus. But do thou, pardoning my former speech, and graciously accepting this, propitiously and benignly, neither take from me the art of love which thou hast given me, nor maim it in thy wrath, but grant that even more than now I may be honored by the beautiful. And if, in our former speech, Phædrus and I have said anything offensive to thee, blaming Lysias as the author of the speech, make him desist from such speeches in future, and convert him to philosophy, as his brother Polemarchus has been converted, so that this lover of his may no longer remain neutral as now, but may wholly devote his life to love, in conjunction with philosophic discourses.

Phaedrus/ I join with you in praying, Socrates, that if this is better for us, so it may be. But I have been long wondering at your speech, how much more beautiful you have made it than the former one; so that I am afraid that Lysias will appear to me but poor, even if he should be willing to produce another in opposition to it. For only the other day, my admirable friend, one of our public men, as he was attacking him, upbraided him with this very thing, and throughout the whole of his attack called him a writer of speeches. Perhaps, therefore, for ambition's sake he will refrain from writing any more.

Socrates/ The opinion you express, my youth, is ridiculous; and you very much mistake your friend, if you imagine him to be so easily frightened. Perhaps, too, you think that his assailant really meant what he said.

Phaedrus/ He seemed to do so, Socrates; and you are doubtless yourself aware, that the most powerful and

considerable men in a city are ashamed to write speeches, and to leave their own compositions behind them, through fear of the opinion of posterity, lest they should be called sophists.

Socrates/ It has escaped your notice, Phædrus, that the proverb “a sweet bend” is derived from that long bend in the Nile: and as well as the bend, it escapes your notice, that these public men who think most highly of themselves are most fond of writing speeches, and of leaving their compositions behind them; and moreover, whenever they write a speech, they so love its supporters, that they prefix their names who on each occasion commend them.

Phaedrus/ How do you mean? for I don’t understand you.

Socrates/ Don’t you understand, that at the beginning of a statesman’s writing, the name of its supporter is written first.

Phaedrus/ How?

Socrates/ “Approved,” I think the writing itself says, “by the council, or the people, or both,” and he who proposed it, speaking very pompously of and extolling himself, namely the composer, after this makes a speech so as to display his own wisdom to his supporters, sometimes making a very long composition. Does this appear to you to be anything else than a written speech?

Phaedrus/ It does not to me.

Socrates/ If, then, it happens to be approved, the composer goes home from the theatre delighted. But if it should be rubbed out, and he debarred from writing speeches, and from the dignity of an author, both he and his friends take it greatly to heart.

Phaedrus/ Just so.

Socrates/ It is clear, then, that they do not despise this practice, but admire it exceedingly.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What then, when an orator or a king has proved himself competent to assume the power of a Lycurgus, or a Solon, or a Darius, and to become immortal as a speech-writer in a state, does he not deem himself godlike, while he is yet alive, and do not posterity think the very same of his writings?

Phaedrus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Do you think then that any person of this sort, however ill-disposed he may be towards Lysias, would upbraid him merely because he is a writer?

Phaedrus/ It does not seem probable from what you say; for in that case, as it appears, he would upbraid his own passion.

Socrates/ This, then, must be clear to everyone, that the mere writing of speeches is not disgraceful.

Phaedrus/ Why should it be?

Socrates/ But this I think now is disgraceful, not to express and write them well, but shamefully and ill.

Phaedrus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ What then is the method of writing well or ill? Have we not occasion, Phædrus, to enquire about this from Lysias or someone else, who has at some time or other written or means to write, either a political or private composition, in meter as a poet, or without meter as a prose-writer?

Phaedrus/ Do you ask, if we have occasion? For what purpose in the world should anyone live, but for the sake of pleasures of this kind? Not, surely, for those which cannot even be enjoyed unless they are preceded by pain, which is the case with nearly all the pleasures connected with the body; on which account they are justly called servile.

Socrates/ We have leisure, however, as it seems: and moreover the grasshoppers, while, as is their wont in the heat of the day, they are singing over our heads and talking with one another, appear to me to be looking down upon us. If, then, they should see us too, like most men, not conversing at mid-day, but falling asleep and lulled by them, through indolence of mind, they would justly laugh us to scorn, thinking that some slaves or other had come to them in this retreat, in order like sheep to take a mid-day sleep by the side of the fountain. But if they see us conversing, and sailing by them, as if they were Sirens unenchanted, the boon which they have from the gods to confer upon men, they will perhaps out of admiration bestow upon us.

Phaedrus/ But what is this that they have? For I happen not to have heard of it, as it seems.

Socrates/ Yet it is not proper that a lover of the Muses should not have heard of things of this kind. It is said, then, that these grasshoppers were men before the Muses were born; but that when the Muses were born, and song appeared, some of the men of that time were so overcome by pleasure, that through singing they neglected to eat and drink, until they died unawares. From these the race of grasshoppers afterwards sprung, having received this boon from the Muses, that they should need no nourishment from the time of their birth, but should continue singing without food and without drink till they died, and that after that they should go to the Muses and inform them who of those here honored each of them. Therefore by informing Terpsichore of those who honor her in the dance they make them dearer to her; and Erato they inform of her votaries in love; and so all the rest in a similar manner, according to the kind of honor belonging to each. But the eldest, Calliope, and next to her Urania, they tell of those who pass their lives in philosophy, and honor their music; and these most of all the Muses,

being conversant with heaven, and discourse both divine and human, pour forth the most beautiful strains. For many reasons, therefore, we should converse and not sleep at mid-day.

Phaedrus/ We should converse, indeed.

Socrates/ Therefore, as we lately proposed to consider, we should enquire in what consists a correct method of speaking and writing, and in what not.

Phaedrus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Is it not, then, essential, in order to a good and beautiful speech being made, that the mind of the speaker should know the truth of the subject on which he is about to speak?

Phaedrus/ I have heard say on this subject, my dear Socrates, that it is not necessary for one who purposes to be an orator to learn what is really just, but what would appear so to the multitude, who will have to judge; nor what is really good or beautiful, but what will appear so: for that persuasion proceeds from these, and not from truth.

Socrates/ We ought not to reject a saying, which wise men utter, but should consider whether they say anything worth attending to. Wherefore we must not pass by what you have now said.

Phaedrus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Let us then consider it as follows.

Phaedrus/ How?

Socrates/ Suppose I should persuade you to purchase a horse for the purpose of repelling enemies, but both of us should be ignorant what a horse is, suppose, however, I did happen to know this much, that Phædrus believes a horse to be that tame animal which has the longest ears.

Phaedrus/ That would be ridiculous indeed, Socrates.

Socrates/ Wait a moment: if I should earnestly persuade you, by composing a speech in praise of the ass, calling him a horse, and asserting that it is well worthwhile to purchase this beast both for domestic purposes and for military service, that he is useful to fight from, and able to carry baggage, and serviceable in many other respects.

Phaedrus/ This, now, would be perfectly ridiculous.

Socrates/ But is it not better that a friend should be ridiculous, than dangerous and mischievous?

Phaedrus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ When an orator, therefore, who is ignorant of good and evil, having found a city that is likewise so, endeavors to persuade it, not by celebrating the praises of an ass's shadow, as if it were a horse, but of evil, as if it were good, and having studied the opinions of the multitude should persuade them to do evil instead of good, what kind of fruit do you suppose rhetoric will afterwards reap from such a sowing?

Phaedrus/ By no means a good one.

Socrates/ But have we not, my good friend, reviled the art of speaking more roughly than is proper? for she may, perhaps, say: "Why, sirs, do you talk so foolishly? For I compel no one who is ignorant of the truth to learn how to speak: but if my advice is worth anything, when he has acquired that, he then has recourse to me. This, then, I insist on, that without me one who knows the truth will not for all that be able to persuade by art."

Phaedrus/ Will she not speak justly, in asserting this?

Socrates/ I admit it, at least if the arguments that assail her testify that she is an art. For I think I have heard some arguments coming up and insisting that she lies and is not an art, but an inartistic trick. But a genuine art of speaking,

says the Spartan, without laying hold of truth, neither exists, nor ever can exist hereafter.

Phaedrus/ We must have these arguments, Socrates; so bring them forward and examine what they say, and in what manner.

Socrates/ Come hither then, ye noble creatures, and persuade Phædrus with the beautiful children, that, unless he has sufficiently studied philosophy, he will never be competent to speak on any subject whatever. Let Phædrus answer then.

Phaedrus/ Put your questions.

Socrates/ Must not then rhetoric in general be an art that leads the soul by means of argument, not only in courts of justice, and other public assemblies, but also in private, equally with respect to trivial and important matters? and is its right use at all more valued when employed about grave than about trifling things? What have you heard said about this?

Phaedrus/ By Zeus, nothing at all of this kind; but it is for the most part spoken and written according to art in judicial trials, and it is spoken also in popular assemblies; but I have never heard anything further.

Socrates/ What, have you heard only of the rhetorical arts of Nestor and Ulysses, which they composed during their leisure in Ilium, and have you never heard of those by Palamedes?

Phaedrus/ And, by Zeus, I have not even heard of those by Nestor, unless you make Gorgias a Nestor, or Thrasymachus and Theodorus a Ulysses.

Socrates/ Perhaps I do. But let us pass over these; do you say however; in courts of justice what do adversaries do? do they not contradict each other? or what shall we say?

Phaedrus/ That very thing.

Socrates/ And respecting the just and unjust?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Will not he, then, who accomplishes this by art, make the same thing appear to the same persons, at one time just, and, when he pleases, unjust?

Phaedrus/ How not?

Socrates/ And in a popular assembly the same things seem to the state at one time good, and at another the contrary?

Phaedrus/ Just so.

Socrates/ And do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes spoke by art in such a manner that the same things appeared to his hearers similar and dissimilar, one and many, at rest and in motion?

Phaedrus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ The art, then, of arguing on both sides has not only to do with courts of justice and popular assemblies, but as it seems, it must be one and the same art, if it is an art, with respect to all subjects of discourse, by which a man is able to make all things appear similar to each other so far as they are capable of being made appear so, and to drag them to light, when another attempts to make them appear similar and conceals his attempt.

Phaedrus/ What mean you by this?

Socrates/ I think it will be evident if we enquire as follows: Does deception more frequently occur in things that differ much or little?

Phaedrus/ In things that differ little.

Socrates/ But by changing your position gradually, you will more easily escape detection in going to the opposite side, than by doing so rapidly.

Phaedrus/ How not?

Socrates/ It is necessary, then, that he who means to deceive another, but not be deceived himself, should be able to distinguish with accuracy the similarity and dissimilarity of things.

Phaedrus/ It is indeed necessary.

Socrates/ Will he be able, then, if ignorant of the truth of each particular thing, to discern the smaller or greater similarity of the thing of which he is ignorant, in other things?

Phaedrus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ It is clear, therefore, that in the case of those who have formed opinions contrary to the truth and are deceived, this error has found its way in by means of certain resemblances.

Phaedrus/ It doubtlessly does happen so.

Socrates/ Is it possible, then, that one, who is ignorant of what is the nature of each particular thing, should have sufficient art to bring over anyone by degrees by leading him through means of resemblances, from each several truth to its opposite, or himself to escape from being so led?

Phaedrus/ Never.

Socrates/ He therefore, my friend, who does not know the truth, but hunts after opinions, will, as it appears, produce but a ridiculous and inartistic art of speaking.

Phaedrus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Are you willing, then, in the speech of Lysias, which you have with you, and in those which I delivered, to look for instances of what I assert is inartistic and artistic?

Phaedrus/ I should like it of all things; for now we are speaking in a bald sort of way, for want of sufficient examples.

Socrates/ And, indeed, by some lucky chance, as it seems, two speeches have been made which furnish examples, of how one who is acquainted with the truth, while he is jesting in his arguments, can lead his hearers astray. And for my part, Phædrus, I attribute that to the deities of the spot. Perhaps, also, the interpreters of the Muses, the songsters overhead, have inspired us with this gift; for I at least have no part in any art of speaking.

Phaedrus/ Be it as you say, only make your meaning clear.

Socrates/ Come then, read out to me the beginning of Lysias's speech.

Phaedrus/ "You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and I think you have heard that it would be for our advantage if this took place. And I claim, not for this reason to fail in my request, because I do not happen to be one of your lovers: for they repent"—

Socrates/ Stop. We are to say, then, in what he errs, and acts inartistically: are we not?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now is it not plain to everyone, that in some things of this kind we are agreed, on others at variance?

Phaedrus/ I think I understand what you mean; but explain yourself still more clearly.

Socrates/ When anyone pronounces the word iron or silver, do we not all understand the same thing?

Phaedrus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But what when anyone pronounces the word just, or good? are we not carried different ways, and do we not differ both with one another and with ourselves?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ In some things, therefore, we agree, in others not.

Phaedrus/ Just so.

Socrates/ In which class of things, then, are we more easily deceived? and in which of the two has rhetoric greater power?

Phaedrus/ Clearly in that in which we are easily led astray.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who means to pursue the art of rhetoric, ought first of all to have distinguished these methodically, and to have discovered a certain character of each species, both of that in which the generality of men must necessarily be led astray, and of that in which that is not the case.

Phaedrus/ He who has attained to this, Socrates, will have devised a noble classification of species.

Socrates/ Then, I think, when he comes to each particular case, he ought not to be at a loss, but should perceive quickly to which of the two classes the subject, on which he is going to speak, belongs.

Phaedrus/ How not?

Socrates/ What then with respect to Love? shall we say that he belongs to things doubtful, or to such as are not so?

Phaedrus/ To things doubtful, surely; otherwise do you think he would have allowed you to say what you just now said about him, that he is both a mischief to the beloved and the lover, and again, that he is the greatest of blessings?

Socrates/ You speak admirably. But tell me this too, for from being carried away by enthusiasm, I do not quite remember whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech.

Phaedrus/ By Zeus you did, and with wonderful accuracy.

Socrates/ Alas; how much more artistic in speech-making do you say the nymphs of Acheloüs and Pan son of Mercury are than Lysias son of Cephalus! Or am I wrong, and did Lysias too, in the beginning of his love-speech, compel us to conceive of Love, as some one particular thing, which he wished it to be, and then complete all the rest of his speech in accordance with this? Are you willing that we should read over again the beginning of his speech?

Phaedrus/ If you wish it; though what you seek is not there.

Socrates/ Read, however, that I may hear him in person.

Phaedrus/ "You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and I think you have heard, that it would be for our advantage if this took place. And I claim, not for this reason to fail in my request, because I do not happen to be one of your lovers: for they repent of the benefits they have conferred, as soon as their desires cease."

Socrates/ He seems to be far indeed from doing what we are seeking for, since in making his speech he attempts to swim backwards, with his face uppermost, not setting out from the beginning, but from the end, and he begins with what the lover would say to his favorite at the close of his speech. Have I said nothing to the purpose, Phædrus, my dear friend?

Phaedrus/ It is indeed, Socrates, the end of the subject about which he is speaking.

Socrates/ But what as to the rest? do not the other parts of the speech appear to have been put together at random? or does it appear that what is said in the second place ought from any necessity to have been placed second, or anything else that he said? For it seems to me, who however know

nothing about the matter, that the writer has without any scruple said whatever came uppermost. But do you know of any rule in speech-writing, in conformity to which he disposed his sentences in the order he has done one after another?

Phaedrus/ You are pleasant, in supposing that I am able to see through his compositions so accurately.

Socrates/ But this at least I think you will allow, that every speech ought to be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own, so as to be neither without head, nor without feet, but to have both a middle and extremities, described proportionately to each other and to the whole.

Phaedrus/ How not?

Socrates/ Consider, then, your friend's speech, whether it is so or otherwise; and you will find that it is in no respect different from the epigram which some say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.

Phaedrus/ What is it, and what is there remarkable in it?

Socrates/ It is as follows;

> "I am a maiden of brass and I lie on Midas's sepulcher,
> So long as water flows and tall trees flourish,
> Remaining here on the tomb of Midas,
> I will tell all passers by, that Midas is buried here."

That it makes no difference which line is put first or last, you must perceive, I think.

Phaedrus/ You are jesting at our speech, Socrates.

Socrates/ That you may not be angry, then, we will have done with this; though it appears to me to contain very many examples, which anyone might examine with advantage, so long as he does not at all attempt to imitate them; and let us proceed to the two other speeches; for there was something

in them, I think, fit to be looked into by those who wish to examine into the subject of speeches.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ They were in a manner opposed to each other. For one said that favor ought to be shown to a person that is in love, the other to a person that is not in love.

Phaedrus/ And this, most strenuously.

Socrates/ I thought you were going to say, with truth, madly. However, this is the very thing I was seeking for. For we said that love was a kind of madness, did we not?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But there are two kinds of madness, one arising from human diseases, the other from an inspired deviation from established customs.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But dividing the divine mania of the four deities into four parts, and assigning prophetic inspiration to Apollo, mystic to Bacchus, poetic to the Muses, and the fourth to Venus and Love, we said that the madness of Love is the best, and I know not how representing the passion of love, probably lighting on some truth and perhaps carried off elsewhere, we compounded a speech not altogether improbable, and sang a kind of mythical hymn, in a seemly and devotional manner, in honor of my lord and thine, Phædrus, Love, the guardian of beautiful boys.

Phaedrus/ And one by no means unpleasant to me to hear.

Socrates/ Let us endeavor to find out, then, from the speech itself, how it was able to pass from censure to praise.

Phaedrus/ What mean you by this?

Socrates/ To me it appears that in all other respects we have really been jesting; but as regards the two methods that

are seen in these casually uttered speeches, if anyone could apprehend their power by art, it would be by no means an unwelcome circumstance.

Phaedrus/ What methods are these?

Socrates/ The one is to see under one aspect and to bring together under one general idea, many things scattered in various places, that, by defining each, a person may make it clear what the subject is that he wishes to discuss, as just now with respect to love, its nature being defined, whether it was well or ill described; at all events for that reason my speech was able to attain perspicuity and consistency.

Phaedrus/ And what is the other method you speak of, Socrates?

Socrates/ The being able, on the other hand, to separate that general idea into species, by joints, as nature points out, and not to attempt to break any part, after the manner of an unskillful cook; but as, just now, my two speeches comprehended mental derangement under one common class. But as from one body there spring two sets of members bearing the same name, one called the left the other the right, so my speeches having considered mental derangement as naturally one class in us, then the speech that had to divide the left part, did not leave off dividing this again until having found in its members a kind of left-handed love, it reviled it deservedly: but the other taking us to the right hand side of madness, and having found a kind of love bearing the same name as the former, but divine, brought it to light and commended it as the cause of the greatest blessings to us.

Phaedrus/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ For my part, Phædrus, I am not only myself a lover of these divisions and generalizations, in order that I may be able both to speak and think; but if I perceive anyone

else able to comprehend the one and the many, as they are in nature, him “I follow behind as in the footsteps of a god.” But whether I designate those who are able to do this, rightly or not, God knows, however I have hitherto called them dialecticians. But now, tell me by what name ought we to call those who take lessons from you and Lysias? is this that art of speaking, by the use of which Thrasymachus and others have become able speakers themselves, and make others so who are willing to bring presents to them, as to kings?

Phaedrus/ They are indeed royal men, yet not skilled in the particulars about which you enquire. However you appear to me to call this method rightly, in calling it dialectical; but the rhetorical appears to me still to escape us.

Socrates/ How say you? A fine thing indeed that must be, which is destitute of this and yet can be apprehended by art. It must on no account be neglected by you and me; but we must consider what is the remaining part of rhetoric.

Phaedrus/ There are indeed very many things, Socrates, which you will find in the books written on the art of speaking.

Socrates/ You have reminded me very opportunely. The exordium, I think, must first be spoken at the beginning of the speech. You mean these, do you not? the refinements of the art?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And secondly a kind of narration, and evidence to support it; thirdly, proofs; fourthly, probabilities; and I think that a famous Byzantian tricker-out of speeches mentions confirmation and after-confirmation.

Phaedrus/ Do you mean the excellent Theodorus?

Socrates/ I do. He says, too, that refutation and after-refutation must be employed both in accusation and defense. And must we not adduce the most illustrious Parian, Evenus, who first discovered subordinate intimations and bye-praises? and some say that he put into meter bye-censures, to assist the memory: for he is a wise man. But shall we suffer Tisias and Gorgias to sleep, who found out that probabilities were more to be valued than truths, and who by force of words make small things appear great, and great things small, and new things old, and the contrary new, and who discovered a concise method of speaking and an infinite prolixity on all subjects? When Prodicus once heard me tell this, he laughed, and said that he alone had discovered what speeches are required by art; that we require them neither long nor short, but of a moderate length.

Phaedrus/ Most wisely, Prodicus.

Socrates/ But do we not mention Hippias? for I think our Elean friend was of the same opinion with him.

Phaedrus/ Why not?

Socrates/ But how shall we describe Polus's new-fangled method of speaking, as his reduplication of words, his sentences, his similitudes, and the words which Licymnius made him a present of, in order to produce a graceful diction.

Phaedrus/ But was not the system of Protagoras, Socrates, something of this kind?

Socrates/ His was a correctness of diction, my boy, and many other fine things besides, but in the art of dragging in speeches to excite commiseration for old age and poverty, the Chalcedonian hero appears to me to have carried off the palm. He was moreover a powerful man to rouse the anger of the multitude, and again, when enraged, to soothe them by enchantment, as he used to say; he was most skillful in

raising and removing calumnies, on any ground whatever. But all seem to agree in the same opinion with respect to the conclusion of speeches, to which some have given the name of recapitulation, others a different name.

Phaedrus/ You mean the summarily reminding the hearers, at the conclusion, of the several things that have been said.

Socrates/ I mean that, and now consider if you have anything else to say about the art of speaking.

Phaedrus/ Only some trifling things, and not worth mentioning.

Socrates/ Let us pass over trifles; and rather examine these things in the clear light, and see what influence they have in art, and on what occasion.

Phaedrus/ A very powerful influence, Socrates, at least in assemblies of the people.

Socrates/ They have indeed. But, my admirable friend, do you also observe whether their web does not appear to you to be very wide as it does to me.

Phaedrus/ Explain what you mean.

Socrates/ Tell me then: If anyone should go to your friend Eryximachus, or his father Acumenus, and should say, “I know how to apply such things to the body, as will make it warm or cold, as I please, and if I think proper, I can produce vomiting, and again purging, and many other things of the kind, and as I know these things I consider myself a physician, and that I can make anyone else so, to whom I impart the knowledge of these particulars:” what do you think they would say on hearing this?

Phaedrus/ What else, but ask him if he knew besides to what persons, and when, and how far, he ought to do each of these things?

Socrates/ If then, he should say, “Not in the least; but I expect that he who should learn these things from me, would be able to do what you ask?”

Phaedrus/ He would say, I think, that the man is mad; and that, having heard from some book or other, or having met with certain drugs, he fancies that he has become a physician, though he knows nothing at all about the art.

Socrates/ But what if anyone were to go to Sophocles and Euripides, and tell them, that he knew how to make very long speeches on a trifling subject, and very short ones on a great subject, and whenever he pleased, piteous and contrariwise, terrible and threatening speeches, and other things of the kind, and that by teaching these he thought he could impart the power of writing tragedy?

Phaedrus/ They too, I think, Socrates, would laugh, if anyone should suppose that tragedy was anything else than the composition of all these, so disposed as to be consistent with each other and the whole.

Socrates/ But, I think, they would not upbraid him rudely, but as a musician, who happened to meet with a man who believes himself to be skilled in harmony, because he knows how to make the highest and lowest note, would not harshly say to him, “Miserable fellow, you are stark mad;” but, being a musician, he would speak more mildly; “My excellent man, it is indeed necessary for one who means to be skilled in harmony, to know these things, but at the same time there is nothing to hinder a person from possessing the knowledge you have without his understanding harmony in the least; for you know what is necessary to be learnt before harmony, but not harmony itself.”

Phaedrus/ Most correctly.

Socrates/ In like manner, Sophocles might reply to the person who displayed his learning to them, that he knew the

things before tragedy, but not tragedy itself; and Acumenus, that the medical pretender knew things before medicine, but not medicine itself.

Phaedrus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ But what must we think the sweet-voiced Adrastus, or even Pericles would do, if they were to hear of the beautiful contrivances which we have just now enumerated, the short sentences and similitudes, and all the rest, which when we went through them, we said must be examined by the clear light, whether they, as you and I did, would rudely make some ill-mannered remark against those who had written and who teach such things as if they constituted the art of rhetoric, or, as being wiser than we are, would they not reprove us, saying, "Phædrus and Socrates, you ought not to be angry with, but rather to excuse those who, through being ignorant of dialectics, are unable to define what rhetoric is, and who, in consequence of this ignorance, possessing the things necessary to be learnt preparatory to the art, think that they have discovered rhetoric itself, and, suppose that by teaching these things to others, they can teach them rhetoric in perfection; but how each of them is to be used persuasively, and the whole combined together, this, as being of no consequence in the world, they think their pupils ought to acquire for themselves in composing their speeches."

Phaedrus/ Such indeed, Socrates, appears to be the case with the art which these men teach and write about as rhetoric; and you seem to me to have spoken the truth: but how and from whence can one acquire the art of true rhetoric and persuasion?

Socrates/ The ability, Phædrus, to become a perfect proficient, probably, or rather necessarily, depends on the same things as in other cases: for, if you naturally possess

rhetorical abilities, you will be a distinguished orator by adding science and practice; but in whichever of these you are deficient, in that respect you will be imperfect. But so far as it is an art, its method, I think, will not be found in the way that Lysias and Thrasymachus are proceeding.

Phaedrus/ In what way then?

Socrates/ Pericles, my excellent friend, appears, with good reason, to have been the most perfect of all men in rhetoric.

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ All the great arts require a subtle and speculative research into the law of nature: for that loftiness of thought and perfect mastery over every subject seems to be derived from some such source as this; which Pericles possessed in addition to a great natural genius. For meeting, I think, with Anaxagoras, who was a person of this kind, and being filled with speculative research, and having arrived at the nature of intelligence and want of intelligence, about which Anaxagoras made that long discourse, he drew from thence to the art of speaking whatever could contribute to its advantage.

Phaedrus/ What mean you by this?

Socrates/ The method of the art of rhetoric is, in a manner, the same as that of medicine.

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ In both it is requisite that nature should be thoroughly investigated, the nature of the body in the one, and the soul in the other, if you mean not only by practice and experience, but by art, to give health and strength to the former by applying medicine and diet, and to impart such persuasion as you please and virtue to the latter, by means of speeches and legitimate employments.

Phaedrus/ This indeed seems probable, Socrates.

Socrates/ But do you think it possible rightly to understand the nature of the soul, without understanding the nature of the universe?

Phaedrus/ If we are to believe Hippocrates, of the family of Æsculapius, we cannot understand even the nature of body without this method.

Socrates/ For he says well, my friend. But it is necessary, in addition to the authority of Hippocrates, to examine our argument, and consider whether it is consistent.

Phaedrus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Consider, then, with respect to nature, what Hippocrates and true reason say. Is it not thus necessary to examine into the nature of anything? In the first place, whether that is simple or manifold about which we are desirous, both ourselves to be skilled, and to be able to make others so; and, in the next place, if it be simple, to examine the power it naturally possesses of acting on each particular thing, or of being acted upon by each particular thing? And if it possesses several species, having enumerated these, as in the case of the one, ought we not to consider this in each of them, what active and passive power they naturally have?

Phaedrus/ It seems so, Socrates.

Socrates/ The method, then, that neglected these, would resemble the walk of a blind man. He however who proceeds by art, ought on no account to be compared either to a blind or a deaf man; but it is clear that whosoever teaches another speaking by art, should accurately show the real nature of the things to which he will have to apply his speeches; and this surely is the soul.

Phaedrus/ How not?

Socrates/ His whole endeavor, therefore, must be directed to this; for in this he attempts to produce persuasion. Is it not so?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is clear, therefore, that Thrasymachus, and anyone else who seriously endeavors to teach the art of rhetoric, will in the first place describe with all possible accuracy, and make it be seen whether the soul is naturally one and similar, or, like the form of the body, composed of different elements; for this we say is to make known nature.

Phaedrus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ And, in the second place, in what respect it naturally acts or is acted upon by anything.

Phaedrus/ How not?

Socrates/ In the third place, having set in order the different kinds of speech and of soul, and the different manners in which these are affected, he will go through the several causes, adapting each to each, and teaching what kind of soul is necessarily persuaded, and what not persuaded, by particular kinds of speech, and for what reason.

Phaedrus/ It will assuredly be best done in this way, as it seems.

Socrates/ Never then, my dear friend, will anything that is otherwise explained or spoken, be spoken or written by art, either in any other case or in this. But the modern writers on the art of speech-making, whom you yourself have heard, are dissemblers, and conceal the very admirable knowledge they have of the soul. Until, then, they both speak and write according to this method, let us never be persuaded that they write artistically.

Phaedrus/ What method is this?

Socrates/ It is not easy to mention the very words themselves; but how it is proper to write, if a man means to be as artistic as he possibly can, I am willing to tell you.

Phaedrus/ Tell me then.

Socrates/ Since the power of speech is that of leading the soul, it is necessary that he who means to be an orator should know how many kinds of soul there are: but they are so many, and of such and such kinds; whence some men are of this character and some of that character. These then being thus divided, there are again so many kinds of speech, each of a certain character. Now men of such a character are for this particular reason easily persuaded by certain speeches, and persons of a different character are for these reasons with difficulty persuaded. It is necessary, therefore, that he, after having sufficiently understood all this, when he afterwards perceives these very things taking place in actions, and being done, should be able to follow them rapidly by perception, otherwise he will know nothing more than the very things which he formerly heard from his preceptor. But when he is sufficiently competent to say, what kind of person is persuaded by what kind of speeches, and is able, when he sees him before him, to point out to himself that this is the person and this the nature for which those speeches were formerly made now actually present before me, and to which these particular speeches are to be addressed, in order to persuade him to these particular things, —when he has acquired all this, and has learnt moreover the proper seasons for speaking and being silent, and again has made himself master of the seasonable and unseasonable occasions for brevity, plaintiveness, and vehemence, and all the other several kinds of speech which he has learnt, then his art will be beautifully and perfectly accomplished, but not before. But whoever is deficient in any of these particulars, either in speaking, or teaching, or writing, and yet asserts that he speaks by art, is overcome by the person who will not be persuaded. "What then," perhaps the writer on rhetoric will say, "does it appear to

you, Phædrus and Socrates, that the art of speaking, as it is called, must be obtained in this or some other way?"

Phaedrus/ It is impossible, Socrates, that it should be obtained in any other way; though it seems to be a work of no small labor.

Socrates/ You say truly. And on this account we ought to turn over all speeches again and again, and consider whether any easier and shorter way to it can be found, in order that we may not in vain go by a long and rough one, when we might have taken a short and smooth one. If, therefore, you have heard of anything that will assist us, from Lysias or anyone else, endeavor to call it to mind, and tell it me.

Phaedrus/ If the endeavor were enough I should be able to do so, but just at present I cannot.

Socrates/ Are you willing, then, that I should repeat to you a statement which I heard from persons who take an interest in such matters.

Phaedrus/ How not?

Socrates/ It is said, however, Phædrus, to be right to state even the wolf's case.

Phaedrus/ And do you do so.

Socrates/ They say, then, that there is no occasion to treat these matters so solemnly, nor to carry them back so far, by such long windings. For as we said in the beginning of our discussion, there is no need at all for one who wishes to become a competent orator to have anything to do with the truth respecting actions just or good, or men who are such, either by nature or education. For that in courts of justice no attention whatever is paid to the truth of these things, but only to what is plausible, and that it is probability to which one who wishes to speak by art ought to apply himself. And that sometimes even facts that have

actually happened must not be stated, unless they are probable, but probabilities both in accusation and defense: and, in short, that a speaker should pursue the probable, and pay no regard at all to truth. For that when this method is observed throughout the whole speech, it constitutes the perfection of the art.

Phaedrus/ You have described the very things, Socrates, which they say who profess to be skilled in speech-making; and I remember that we touched briefly upon this in a former part of our discussion; but this appears to be matter of the utmost consequence to those who study these things.

Socrates/ However you have thoroughly fumbled Tisias himself.

Let Tisias then tell us this, whether he means anything else by the probable than that which accords with the opinion of the multitude.

Phaedrus/ What else can it be?

Socrates/ Having made, then, as it seems, this wise and artistic discovery, he has written, that if a weak but brave man should be brought to trial for having knocked down a strong and cowardly one, and for having robbed him of his clothes or anything else, then that neither of them ought to speak the truth, but the coward should say that he was not knocked down by the brave man alone, and the latter should prove this, that they were alone, and then urge this; “How could a man like me ever attack a man like him?” But the other will not admit his own cowardice, but, in attempting to tell some other falsehood, will perhaps supply his adversary with the means of refuting him. And in other cases, such things as these are said according to art. Is it not so, Phædrus?

Phaedrus/ How not?

Socrates/ Wonderfully clever seems to have been the inventor of this abstruse art, whether Tisias or whoever else he was, and by whatever name he delights to be called. But, my friend, shall we say to him or not?

Phaedrus/ What?

Socrates/ Tisias, long since before your arrival, we happened to say, that this probability of yours derives its influence with the multitude from its resemblance to truth; and we just now concluded that in all cases he knows best how to discover resemblances who is best acquainted with the truth. So that, if you have anything else to say about the art of speaking, we will listen to you; but if not, we shall hold to the conclusions we have lately come to, that unless a man has reckoned up the different natures of those who will have to hear him, and is able to divide things themselves into species, and to comprehend the several particulars under one general idea, he will never be skilled in the art of speaking so far as it is possible for a man to be so. But this he can never acquire without great labor, which a wise man ought not to bestow for the purpose of speaking and acting amongst men, but that he may be able to speak such things as are acceptable to the gods, and act acceptably to them, to the utmost of his power. For, as wiser men than we say, Tisias, a man of understanding ought not to make it his principal study to gratify his fellow-servants, except by the way, but good masters and of good extraction. If therefore the circuit be long, wonder not; for it is to be undertaken for the sake of great ends, not such as you think. And even these, as our argument proves, if anyone is willing, will be best attained by those means.

Phaedrus/ This appears to me, Socrates, to be very finely said, if only a man could attain to it.

Socrates/ But when one is attempting noble things, it is surely noble also to suffer whatever it may befall us to suffer.

Phaedrus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ As regards, then, the art and want of art in speaking, let this suffice.

Phaedrus/ How should it not?

Socrates/ But as regards elegance and inelegance in writing, in what way it may be done well, and in what way inelegantly, remains to be considered. Does it not?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you know, then, how you may best please God with regard to speeches, both acting and speaking?

Phaedrus/ Not at all. Do you?

Socrates/ I can tell a story I have heard of the ancients, its truth they know. But if we ourselves could discover this, do you think we should any longer pay any regard to the opinions of men?

Phaedrus/ Your question is ridiculous; but relate what you say you have heard.

Socrates/ I have heard then, that at Naucratis, in Egypt, there was one of the ancient gods of that country, to whom was consecrated the bird, which they call Ibis; but the name of the deity himself was Theuth. That he was the first to invent numbers and arithmetic, and geometry and astronomy, and moreover draughts and dice, and especially letters, at the time when Thamus was king of all Egypt, and dwelt in the great city of the upper region which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes, but the god they call Ammon; to him Theuth went and showed him his arts, and told him that they ought to be distributed amongst the rest of the Egyptians. Thamus asked him what was the use of each,

and as he explained it, according as he appeared to say well or ill, he either blamed or praised them.

Now Thamus is reported to have said many things to Theuth respecting each art, both for and against it, which it would be tedious to relate. But when they came to the letters, "This knowledge, O king," said Theuth, "will make the 'Egyptians wiser, and better able to remember; for it has been invented as a medicine for memory and wisdom." But he replied, "Most ingenious Theuth, one person is able to give birth to art, another to judge of what amount of detriment or advantage it will be to those who are to use it, and now you, as being the father of letters, out of fondness have attributed to them just the contrary effect to that which they will have. For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn it through the neglect of memory, for that through trusting to writing, they will remember outwardly by means of foreign marks, and not inwardly by means of their own faculties. So that you have not discovered a medicine for memory, but for recollection. And you are providing for your disciples the appearance and not the reality of wisdom. For hearing many things through your means without instruction, they will appear to know a great deal, although they are for the most part ignorant, and will become troublesome associates, through thinking themselves wise instead of being so."

Phaedrus/ Socrates, you easily make Egyptian and any other country's tales you please.

Socrates/ But, my friend, those who dwell in the temple of Dodonæan Zeus said that the first prophetic words issued from an oak. It was sufficient for the men of those days, seeing they were not wise like you moderns, in their simplicity, to listen to an oak and a stone, if only they spoke the truth: and does it make any difference to you, forsooth, who the speaker is, and to what country he belongs? For you

do not consider that only, whether the case is so or otherwise.

Phaedrus/ You have very properly reproved me; and the case with regard to letters appears to me just as the Theban says.

Socrates/ He therefore, who thinks to leave an art in writing, and again, he who receives it, as if something clear and solid would result from the writing, must be full of simplicity, and in reality ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon, since he thinks that written words are of further value than to remind one who already knows the subject of which the writings treat.

Phaedrus/ Most correct.

Socrates/ For writings indeed, Phædrus, has this inconvenience, and truly resembles painting. For its productions stand out as if they were alive, but, if you ask them any question, they observe a solemn silence. And so it is with written discourses; you would think that they spoke as though they possessed some wisdom, but if you ask them about anything they say, from a desire to understand it, they give only one and the self-same answer. And when it is once written, every discourse is tossed about everywhere, equally among those who understand it, and among those whom it in no wise concerns, and it knows not to whom it ought to speak, and to whom not. And when it is ill-treated and unjustly reviled, it always needs its father to help it; for, of itself, it can neither defend nor help itself.

Phaedrus/ This, too, you have said most correctly.

Socrates/ But what? shall we consider another discourse, this one's legitimate brother, in what manner it is produced, and how far better and more powerful it naturally is than this?

Phaedrus/ What is that, and how do you say it is produced?

Socrates/ That which is written with science in the learner's soul, which is able to defend itself, and knows before whom it ought to speak and be silent.

Phaedrus/ You mean the discourse of a man endued with knowledge that has life and soul, of which the written may be justly called an image.

Socrates/ Assuredly. But tell me this. Would an intelligent husbandman, who has seeds that he cares for and which he wishes to be fruitful, seriously sow them in summer-time in the gardens of Adonis, and rejoice at seeing them growing up beautifully within eight days, or would he do this, if he did it at all, for the sake of sport or pastime; but the seed which he treats seriously, availing himself of the husbandman's skill and sowing it in its proper soil, would he be content that what he has sown shall come to maturity in the eighth month?

Phaedrus/ Just so, Socrates, he would do the one seriously, and the other, as you say, for amusement.

Socrates/ But shall we say that he who possesses a knowledge of what is just, beautiful and good, shows less intelligence than a husbandman in the management of his own seeds?

Phaedrus/ By no means.

Socrates/ He will not, then, seriously write them in water, sowing them with ink by means of a pen, with words that are unable to defend themselves by speech, and unable adequately to teach the truth.

Phaedrus/ In all probability he will not.

Socrates/ Surely not. But, as it seems, he will sow and write, when he does write, in the gardens of letters for the sake of diversion, treasuring up memoranda for himself,

when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for all who are going on the same track, and he will be delighted at seeing them in their tender growth, and while other men pursue other diversions, refreshing themselves with banquets, and other pleasures akin to these, he, as it appears, instead of these, will pass his time in the diversions I have mentioned.

Phaedrus/ You speak of a very noble in comparison of a mean diversion, Socrates, when a man is able to divert himself with discourses, telling stories about justice and the other things you mention.

Socrates/ It is so indeed, my dear Phædrus. But, in my opinion, a far more noble employment results from this, when a man availing himself of dialectic art, on meeting with a congenial soul, plants and sows scientific discourses which are able to aid both themselves and him that planted them, and are not unfruitful but contain seed within themselves, from whence others springing up in other minds are able to make this seed immortal, and make their possessor happy as far as it is possible for man to be so.

Phaedrus/ This that you mention is far more noble.

Socrates/ Now then, Phædrus, since this is agreed on, we are able to determine our former questions.

Phaedrus/ What are they?

Socrates/ Those which, in our desire to consider them, led us to the present point: namely, that we might examine into the reproach cast on Lysias for writing speeches, and then speeches themselves, which are written by art or without art. Now that which is artistic and that which is not appeals to me to have been tolerably well explained.

Phaedrus/ It appears so. But remind me of it again, in what way.

Socrates/ Before a man knows the truth of each subject on which he speaks or writes, and is able to define the whole of a thing, and when he has defined it again knows how to divide into species until he comes to the indivisible; and in like manner, having distinguished the nature of the soul, and having found out what kind of speech is adapted to the nature of each, he so disposes and adorns his speech, applying to a soul of varied powers speeches that are various and all-harmonious, and simple ones to a simple soul, before this is done, he will not be able to manage speech with art, as far as it might be done, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading, as the whole of our former argument has proved.

Phaedrus/ This is exactly how it appeared.

Socrates/ But what as to its being honorable or disgraceful to speak and write speeches, and under what circumstances it may be called a reproach or not, has not what we have said a little before sufficed to prove?

Phaedrus/ What was that?

Socrates/ That if either Lysias, or anyone else, has ever written, or shall hereafter write, privately or publicly, writing a state document in proposing a law, and thinks that there is in it great stability and clearness, this is a reproach to the writer, whether anyone says so or not. For to be utterly ignorant of what is just and unjust, evil and good, cannot be otherwise than truly disgraceful, though the whole mass of mankind should unite in its praise.

Phaedrus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But he who thinks that in a written discourse, on whatever subject, there must necessarily be much that is sportive, and that no discourse, in prose or verse, deserving of much study, has ever been written or spoken, as those declamations used to be spoken without discrimination and

instructive method, for the sake of persuasion, but that in truth the best of them were for the purpose of reminding those who already know, but that only in discourses taught and spoken for the sake of instruction, and really written in the soul about things just, and beautiful, and good, there is found what is clear and perfect and worthy of study; and that such discourses ought to be called as it were their author's legitimate offspring; first of all that which is in himself, if it is there by his own invention, then any children or brothers of the former that have at the same time worthily sprung up in the souls of others; whoever thinks thus and dismisses all others, that man, Phædrus, appears to be such a one as you and I should pray that we might become.

Phaedrus/ I, for my part, entirely wish and pray for what you mention.

Socrates/ Be we then content with having thus far amused ourselves with the subject of speeches; and do you go and tell Lysias that we, having descended to the fountain of the nymphs, have heard words which charged us to tell Lysias and anyone else who composes speeches, and Homer and anyone else who is in the habit of composing poetry, epic or lyric, and thirdly, Solon and whosoever commits political discourses to writing under the name of laws, if they composed their works knowing how the truth stands, and able to defend them when brought to account for what they have written, and being themselves capable by speaking to show that their writings are poor, then they ought not to be named from these works, but from those to which they have seriously applied themselves.

Phaedrus/ What name, then, do you assign them?

Socrates/ To call them wise, Phædrus, appears to me to be a great matter, and proper for God alone; but lovers of

wisdom, or some such name, would suit them better, and be in better taste.

Phaedrus/ And it would be nothing out of the way.

Socrates/ Him, therefore, who has nothing more valuable than what he has written, by turning it upwards and downwards for a long time, patching and clipping it bit by bit, may you not justly designate a poet, or a compiler of speeches, or a writer of laws?

Phaedrus/ How not?

Socrates/ Tell this, then, to your friend.

Phaedrus/ But you? what will you do? For we must not pass over your friend.

Socrates/ Whom do you mean?

Phaedrus/ The beautiful Isocrates. What news will you take him, Socrates? what shall we say he is?

Socrates/ Isocrates is still young, Phædrus; but what I prophesy of him I am willing to say.

Phaedrus/ What?

Socrates/ He appears to me to have better natural endowments than to be compared with the speeches of Lysias, and moreover to be endued with a nobler disposition, so that it would not be at all wonderful if, as he advances in age, he should in this very pursuit of speech-making, to which he is now applying himself, surpass all who have ever attempted speeches, as if they were boys, and besides, if he should not be content with this, that a more divine impulse may lead him to greater things; for, my friend, there is a natural love of wisdom in the mind of the man. This message, then, I will take from the gods of this spot to Isocrates my favorite, and do you take the other to Lysias as yours.

Phaedrus/ This shall be done. But let us depart, since the heat has become less oppressive.

Socrates/ Ought we not to go after we have prayed to these gods?

Phaedrus/ How not?

Socrates/ O beloved Pan, and all ye other gods of this place, grant me to become beautiful in the inner man, and that whatever outward things I have may be at peace with those within. May I deem the wise man rich, and may I have such a portion of gold as none but a prudent man can either bear or employ.

Do we need anything else, Phædrus? for myself I have prayed enough.

Phaedrus/ Make the same prayer for me, too; for the possessions of friends are common.

Socrates/ Let us depart.

Phaedrus.

[OR ON THE BEAUTIFUL, ETHICAL]

Translated by H. N. Fowler.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Phaedrus

Socrates/ Dear Phaedrus, whither away, and where do you come from?

Phaedrus/ From Lysias, Socrates, the son of Cephalus; and I am going for a walk outside the wall. For I spent a long time there with Lysias, sitting since early morning; and on the advice of your friend and mine, Acumenus, I am taking my walk on the roads; for he says they are less fatiguing than the streets.

Socrates/ He is right, my friend. Then Lysias, it seems, was in the city?

Phaedrus/ Yes, at Epicrates house, the one that belonged to Morychus, near the Olympieum.

Socrates/ What was your conversation? But it is obvious that Lysias entertained you with his speeches.

Phaedrus/ You shall hear, if you have leisure to walk along and listen.

Socrates/ What? Don't you believe that I consider hearing your conversation with Lysias n greater thing-even than business, as Pindar says?

Phaedrus/ Lead on, then.

Socrates/ Speak.

Phaedrus/ Indeed, Socrates, you are just the man to hear it. For the discourse about which we conversed, was in a way, a love-speech. For Lysias has represented one of the beauties being tempted, but not by a lover;

this is just the clever thing about it; for lie says that favors should be granted rather to the one who is not in love than to the lover.

Socrates/ O noble Lysias! I wish he would write that they should be granted to the poor rather than to the rich, to the old rather than to the young, and so of all the other qualities that I and most of us have; for truly his discourse would be witty and of general utility. I am so determined to hear you, that I will not leave you, even if you extend your walk to Megara, and, as Herodicus says, go to the wall and back again.

Phaedrus/ What are you saying, my dear Socrates? Do you suppose that I, who am a mere ordinary man, can tell from memory, in a way that is worthy of Lysias, what he, the cleverest writer of our day, composed at his leisure and took a long time for?

Far from it; and yet I would rather have that ability than a good sum of money.

Socrates/ O Phaedrus! If I don't know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself. But since neither of these things is true, I know very well that when listening to Lysias he did not hear once only, but often urged him to repeat; and he gladly obeyed. Yet even that was not enough for Phaedrus, but at last he borrowed the book and read what he especially wished, and doing this he sat from early morning. Then, when he grew tired, he went for a walk, with the speech, as I believe, by the Dog, learned by heart, unless it was very long. And he was going outside the wall to practice it. And meeting the man who is sick with the love of discourse, he was glad when he saw him, because he would have someone to share his revel, and told him to lead on. But when the lover of discourse asked him to speak, he feigned coyness, as if

he did not yearn to speak; at last, however, even if no one would listen willingly, he was bound to speak whether or no. So, Phaedrus, ask him to do now what he will presently do anyway.

Phaedrus/ Truly it is best for me to speak as I may; since it is clear that you will not let me go until I speak somehow or other.

Socrates/ You have a very correct idea about me.

Phaedrus/ Then this is what I will do. Really, Socrates, I have not at all learned the words by heart; but I will repeat the general sense of the whole, the points in which he said the lover was superior to the non-lover, giving them in summary, one after the other, beginning with the first.

Socrates/ Yes, my dear, when you have first shown me what you have in your left hand, under your cloak. For I suspect you have the actual discourse. And if that is the case, believe this of me, that I am very fond of you, but when Lysias is here I have not the slightest intention of lending you my ears to practice on. Come now, show it.

Phaedrus/ Stop. You have robbed me of the hope I had of practicing on you. But where shall we sit and read?

Socrates/ Let us turn aside here and go along the Ilissus; then we can sit down quietly wherever we please.

Phaedrus/ I am fortunate, it seems, in being barefoot; you are so always. It is easiest then for us to go along the brook with our feet in the water, and it is not unpleasant, especially at this time of the year and the day.

Socrates/ Lead on then, and look out for a good place where we may sit.

Phaedrus/ Do you see that very tall plane tree?

Socrates/ What of it?

Phaedrus/ There is shade there and a moderate breeze and grass to sit on, or, if we like, to lie down on.

Socrates/ Lead the way.

Phaedrus/ Tell me, Socrates, is it not from some place along here by the Ilissus that Boreas is said to have carried off Oreithyia?

Socrates/ Yes, that is the story.

Phaedrus/ Well, is it from here? The streamlet looks very pretty and pure and clear and fit for girls to play by.

Socrates/ No, the place is about two or three furlongs farther down, where you cross over to the precinct of Agra; and there is an altar of Boreas somewhere thereabouts.

Phaedrus/ I have never noticed it. But, for Heaven's sake, Socrates, tell me; do you believe this tale is true?

Socrates/ If I disbelieved, as the wise men do, I should not be extraordinary; then I might give a rational explanation, that a blast of Boreas, the north wind, pushed her off the neighboring rocks as she was playing with Pharmacea, and that when she had died in this manner she was said to have been carried off by Boreas. But I, Phaedrus, think such explanations are very pretty in general, but are the inventions of a very clever and laborious and not altogether enviable man, for no other reason than because after this he must explain the forms of the Centaurs, and then that of the Chimaera, and there presses in upon him a whole crowd

of such creatures, Gorgons and Pegas, and multitudes of strange, inconceivable, portentous natures. If anyone disbelieves in these, and with a rustic sort of wisdom, undertakes to explain each in accordance with probability, he will need a great deal of leisure. But I have no leisure for them at all; and the reason, my friend, is this; I am not yet able, as the Delphic inscription has it, to know myself; so it seems to me ridiculous, when I do not yet know that, to investigate irrelevant things. And so I dismiss these matters and accepting the customary belief about them, as I was saying just now, I investigate not these things, but myself, to know whether I am a monster more complicated and more furious than Typhon or a gentler and simpler creature, to whom a divine and quiet lot is given by nature. But, my friend, while we were talking, is not this the tree to which you were leading us?

Phaedrus/ Yes, this is it.

Socrates/ By Hera, it is a charming resting place. For this plane tree is very spreading and lofty, and the tall and shady willow is very beautiful, and it is in full bloom, so as to make the place most fragrant; then, too, the spring is very pretty as it flows under the plane tree, and its water is very cool, to judge by my foot. And it seems to be a sacred place of some nymphs and of Achelous, judging by the figurines and statues. Then again, if you please, how lovely and perfectly charming the breeziness of the place is! and it resounds with the shrill summer music of the chorus of cicadas. But the most delightful thing of all is the grass, as it grows on the gentle slope, thick enough to be just right when you lay your head on it. So you have guided the stranger most excellently, dear Phaedrus.

Phaedrus/ You are an amazing and most remarkable person. For you really do seem exactly like a stranger who is being guided about, and not like a native. You don't go away from the city out over the border, and it seems to me you don't go outside the walls at all.

Socrates/ Forgive me, my dear friend. You see, I am fond of learning. Now the country places and the trees wont teach me anything, and the people in the city do. But you seem to have found the charm to bring me out. For as people lead hungry animals by shaking in front of them a branch of leaves or some fruit, just so, I think, you, by holding before me discourses in books, will lead me all over Attica and wherever else you please. So now that I have come here, I intend to lie down, and do you choose the position in which you think you can read most easily, and read.

Phaedrus/ Hear then.

You know what my condition is, and you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your lover. For lovers repent of the kindnesses they have done when their passion ceases; but there is no time when non-lovers naturally repent. For they do kindnesses to the best of their ability, not under compulsion, but of their free will, according to their view of their own best interest. And besides, lovers consider the injury they have done to their own concerns on account of their love, and the benefits they have conferred, and they add the trouble they have had, and so they think they have long ago made sufficient return to the beloved; but non-lovers cannot aver neglect of their own affairs because of their condition, nor can they take account of the pains they have been at in the past, nor lay any blame for quarrels

with their relatives; and so, since all these evils are removed, there is nothing left for them but to do eagerly what they think will please the beloved. And besides, if lovers ought to be highly esteemed because they say they have the greatest love for the objects of their passion, since both by word and deed they are ready to make themselves hated by others to please the beloved, it is easy to see that, if what they say is true, whenever they fall in love afterwards, they will care for the new love more than for the old and will certainly injure the old love, if that pleases the new. And how can one reasonably entrust matters of such importance to one who is afflicted with a disease such that no one of any experience would even try to cure it? For they themselves confess that they are insane, rather than in their right mind, and that they know they are foolish, but cannot control themselves; and so, how could they, when they have come to their senses, think those acts were good which they determined upon when in such a condition? And if you were to choose the best from among your lovers, your choice would be limited to a few; whereas it would be made from a great number, if you chose the most congenial from non-lovers, so that you would have a better chance, in choosing among many, of finding the one most worthy of your affection.

Now if you are afraid of public opinion, and fear that if people find out your love affair you will be disgraced, consider that lovers, believing that others would be as envious of them as they are of others, are likely to be excited by possession and in their pride to show everybody that they have not toiled in vain; but the non-lovers, since they have control of their feelings, are likely to choose what is really best, rather than to court the opinion of mankind. Moreover, many are sure to notice

and see the lovers going about with their beloved ones and making that their chief business, and so, when they are seen talking with each other, people think they are met in connection with some love-matter either past or future; but no one ever thinks of finding fault with non-lovers because they meet, since everyone knows that one must converse with somebody, either because of friendship or because it is pleasant for some other reason. And then, too, if you are frightened by the thought that it is hard for friendship to last, and that under other circumstances any quarrel would be an equal misfortune to both, but that when you have surrendered what you prize most highly you would be the chief sufferer, it would be reasonable for you to be more afraid of the lovers; for they are pained by many things and they think everything that happens is done for the sake of hurting them. Therefore they prevent their loves from associating with other men, for they fear the wealthy, lest their money give them an advantage, and the educated, lest they prove superior in intellect; and they are on their guard against the influence of everyone who possesses any other good thing. If now they persuade you to incur the dislike of all these, they involve you in a dearth of friends, and if you consider your own interest and are more sensible than they, you will have to quarrel with them. But those who are not in love, but who have gained the satisfaction of their desires because of their merit, would not be jealous of those who associated with you, but would hate those who did not wish to do so, thinking that you are slighted by these last and benefited by the former, so that there is much more likelihood that they will gain friendship than enmity from their love-affair with you.

And then, too, many lovers are moved by physical passion before they know the character or have become acquainted with the connections of the beloved, so that it is uncertain whether they will wish to be your friends after their passion has ceased. But in the case of those who are not in love, who were your friends before entering into the closer relation, the favors received are not likely to make the friendship less, but will remain as pledges of future joys. And then, too, it will be better for your character to yield to me than to a lover. For lovers praise your words and acts beyond due measure, partly through fear of incurring your displeasure, and partly because their own judgment is obscured by their passion. For such are the exhibitions of the power of Love; he makes the unsuccessful lovers think that things are grievous which cause no pain to others, and he compels the successful to praise what ought not to give pleasure; therefore those whom they love are more to be pitied than envied. But if you yield to me, I shall consort with you, not with a view to present pleasure only, but to future advantage also, not being overcome by passion but in full control of myself, and not taking up violent enmity because of small matters, but slowly gathering little anger when the transgressions are great, forgiving involuntary wrongs and trying to prevent intentional ones; for these are the proofs of a friendship that will endure for a long time. But if you have a notion that friendship cannot be firm unless one is in love, you should bear in mind that in that case we should not have great affection for sons or for fathers and mothers, nor should we possess faithful friends who have been gained not through passion but through associations of a different kind.

Besides, if you ought to grant favors to those who ask for them most eagerly, you ought in other matters also to confer benefits, not on the best, but on the most needy; for they will be most grateful, since they are relieved of the greatest ills. And then, too, at private entertainments you ought not to invite your friends, but beggars and those who need a meal; for they will love you and attend you and come to your doors and be most pleased and grateful, and will call down many blessings upon your head. Perhaps, however, you ought not to grant favors to those who beg for them, but to those who are most able to repay you; and not to those who ask merely, but to the most deserving; and not to those who will enjoy your youthful beauty, but to those who will share their good things with you when you are older; and not to those who, when they have succeeded, will boast to others of their success, but to those who will modestly keep it a secret from all; and not to those who will be enamored for a little while, but to those who will be your friends for life; and not to those who will seek a pretext for a quarrel when their passion has died out, but to those who will show their own merit when your youth is passed. Do you, then, remember what I have said, and bear this also in mind, that lovers are admonished by their friends, who think their way of life is bad, but no relative ever blamed a non-lover for bad management of his own interests on account of that condition.

Perhaps you may ask me if I advise you to grant favors to all non-lovers. But I think the lover would not urge you to be so disposed toward all lovers either; for the favor, if scattered broadcast, is not so highly prized by the rational recipient, nor can you, if you wish, keep your relations with one hidden from the rest. But from

love no harm ought to come, but benefit to both parties. Now I think I have said enough. But if you feel any lack, or think anything has been omitted, ask questions.

What do you think of the discourse, Socrates? Is it not wonderful, especially in diction?

Socrates/ More than that, it is miraculous, my friend; I am quite overcome by it. And this is due to you, Phaedrus, because as I looked at you, I saw that you were delighted by the speech as you read. So, thinking that you know more than I about such matters, I followed in your train and joined you in the divine frenzy.

Phaedrus/ Indeed! So you see fit to make fun of it?

Socrates/ Do I seem to you to be joking and not to be in earnest?

Phaedrus/ Do not jest, Socrates, but, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, tell me truly, do you think any other of the Greeks could speak better or more copiously than this on the same subject?

Socrates/ What? Are you and I to praise the discourse because the author has said what he ought, and not merely because all the expressions are clear and well-rounded and finely turned? For if that is expected, I must grant it for your sake, since, because of my stupidity, I did not notice it. I was attending only to the rhetorical manner, and I thought even Lysias himself would not think that satisfactory. It seemed to me, Phaedrus, unless you disagree, that he said the same thing two or three times, as if he did not find it easy to say many things about one subject, or perhaps he did not care about such a detail; and he appeared to me in youthful fashion to be exhibiting his ability to say

the same thing in two different ways and in both ways excellently.

Phaedrus/ Nonsense, Socrates! Why that is the especial merit of the discourse. He has omitted none of the points that belong to the subject, so that nobody could ever speak about it more exhaustively or worthily than he has done.

Socrates/ There I must cease to agree with you; for the wise men and women of old, who have spoken and written about these matters, will rise up to confute me, if, to please you, I assent.

Phaedrus/ Who are they? and where have you heard anything better than this?

Socrates/ I cannot say, just at this moment; but I certainly must have heard something, either from the lovely Sappho or the wise Anacreon, or perhaps from some prose writers. What ground have I for saying so? Why, my dear friend, I feel that my own bosom is full, and that I could make another speech, different from this and quite as good. Now I am conscious of my own ignorance, and I know very well that I have never invented these things myself, so the only alternative is that I have been filled through the ears, like a pitcher, from the well springs of another; but, again because of my stupidity, I have forgotten how and from whom I heard it.

Phaedrus/ Most noble Socrates, that is splendid! Don't tell, even if I beg you, how or from whom you heard it; only do as you say; promise to make another speech better than that in the book and no shorter and quite different. Then I promise, like the nine archons, to set up at Delphi a statue as large as life, not only of myself, but of you also.

Socrates/ You are a darling and truly golden, Phaedrus, if you think I mean that Lysias has failed in every respect and that I can compose a discourse containing nothing that he has said. That, I fancy, could not happen even to the worst writer. For example, to take the subject of his speech, who do you suppose, in arguing that the non-lover ought to be more favored than the lover, could omit praise of the non-lovers calm sense and blame of the lovers unreason, which are inevitable arguments, and then say something else instead? No, such arguments, I think, must be allowed and excused; and in these the arrangement, not the invention, is to be praised; but in the case of arguments which are not inevitable and are hard to discover, the invention deserves praise as well as the arrangement.

Phaedrus/ I concede your point, for I think what you say is reasonable. So I will make this concession; I will allow you to begin with the premise that the lover is more distraught than the non-lover; and if you speak on the remaining points more copiously and better than Lysias, without saying the same things, your statue of beaten metal shall stand at Olympia beside the offering of the Cypselids.

Socrates/ Have you taken my jest in earnest, Phaedrus, because, to tease you, I laid hands on your beloved, and do you really suppose I am going to try to surpass the rhetoric of Lysias and make a speech more ingenious than his?

Phaedrus/ Now, my friend, yon have given me a fair hold; for you certainly must speak as best you can, lest we be compelled to resort to the comic you're another; be careful and do not force me to say O Socrates, if I don't know Socrates, I have forgotten myself, and he yearned to speak, but feigned coyness. Just make up

your mind that we are not going away from here until you speak out what you said you had in your breast. We are alone in a solitary spot, and I am stronger and younger than you; so, under these circumstances, take my meaning, and speak voluntarily, rather than under compulsion.

Socrates/ But, my dear Phaedrus, I shall make myself ridiculous if I, a mere amateur, try without preparation to speak on the same subject in competition with a master of his art.

Phaedrus/ Now listen to me. Stop trying to fool me; for I can say something which will force you to speak.

Socrates/ Then pray don't say it.

Phaedrus/ Yes, but I will. And my saying shall be an oath. I swear to you by, by what god? By this plane tree? I take my solemn oath that unless you produce the discourse in the very presence of this plane tree, I will never read you another or tell you of another.

Socrates/ Oh! Oh! You wretch! How well you found out how to make a lover of discourse do your will!

Phaedrus/ Then why do you try to get out of it?

Socrates/ I won't any more, since you have taken this oath; for how could I give up such pleasures?

Phaedrus/ Speak then.

Socrates/ Do you know what I'm going to do?

Phaedrus/ About what?

Socrates/ I'm going to keep my head wrapped up while I talk, that I may get through my discourse as quickly as possible and that I may not look at you and become embarrassed.

Phaedrus/ Only speak, and in other matters suit yourself.

Socrates/ Come then, O tuneful Muses, whether ye receive this name from the quality of your song or from the musical race of the Ligyans, grant me your aid in the tale this most excellent man compels me to relate, that his friend whom he has hitherto considered wise, may seem to him wiser still.

Now there was once upon a time a boy, or rather a stripling, of great beauty; and he had many lovers. And among these was one of peculiar craftiness, who was as much in love with the boy as anyone, but had made him believe that he was not in love; and once in wooing him, he tried to persuade him of this very thing, that favors ought to be granted rather to the non-lover than to the lover; and his words were as follows;

There is only one way, dear boy, for those to begin who are to take counsel wisely about anything. One must know what the counsel is about, or it is sure to be utterly futile, but most people are ignorant of the fact that they do not know the nature of things. So, supposing that they do know it, they come to no agreement in the beginning of their enquiry, and as they go on they reach the natural result, they agree neither with themselves nor with each other. Now you and I must not fall into the error which we condemn in others, but, since we are to discuss the question, whether the lover or the non-lover is to be preferred let us first agree on a definition of love, its nature and its power, and then, keeping this definition in view and making constant reference to it, let us enquire whether love brings advantage or harm. Now everyone sees that love is a desire; and we know too that non-lovers also desire the beautiful. How then are we to distinguish the lover

from the non-lover? We must observe that in each one of us there are two ruling and leading principles, which we follow whithersoever they lead; one is the innate desire for pleasures, the other an acquired opinion which strives for the best. These two sometimes agree within us and are sometimes in strife; and sometimes one, and sometimes the other has the greater power. Now when opinion leads through reason toward the best and is more powerful, its power is called self-restraint, but when desire irrationally drags us toward pleasures and rules within us, its rule is called excess. Now excess has many names, for it has many members and many forms; and whichever of these forms is most marked gives its own name, neither beautiful nor honorable, to him who possesses it. For example, if the desire for food prevails over the higher reason and the other desires, it is called gluttony, and he who possesses it will be called by the corresponding name of glutton, and again, if the desire for drink becomes the tyrant and leads him who possesses it toward drink, we know what he is called; and it is quite clear what fitting names of the same sort will be given when any desire akin to these acquires the rule. The reason for what I have said hitherto is pretty clear by this time, but everything is plainer when spoken than when unspoken; so I say that the desire which overcomes the rational opinion that strives toward the right, and which is led away toward the enjoyment of beauty and again is strongly forced by the desires that are kindred to itself toward personal beauty, when it gains the victory, takes its name from that very force, and is called love.

Well, my dear Phaedrus, does it seem to you, as it does to me, that I am inspired?

Phaedrus/ Certainly, Socrates, you have an unusual fluency.

Socrates/ Then listen to me in silence; for truly the place seems filled with a divine presence; so do not be surprised if I often seem to be in a frenzy as my discourse progresses, for I am already almost uttering dithyrambics.

Phaedrus/ That is very true.

Socrates/ You are responsible for that; but hear what follows; for perhaps the attack may be averted.

That, however, is in the hands of God; we must return to our boy.

Well then, my dearest, what the subject is, about which we are to take counsel, has been said and defined, and now let us continue, keeping our attention fixed upon that definition, and tell what advantage or harm will naturally come from the lover or the non-lover to him who grants them his favors.

He who is ruled by desire and is a slave to pleasure will inevitably desire to make his beloved as pleasing to himself as possible. Now to one who is of unsound mind everything is pleasant which does not oppose him, but everything that is better or equal is hateful. So the lover will not, if he can help it, endure a beloved who is better than himself or his equal, but always makes him weaker and inferior; but the ignorant is inferior to the wise, the coward to the brave, the poor speaker to the eloquent, the slow of wit to the clever. Such mental defects, and still greater than these, in the beloved will necessarily please the lover, if they are implanted by Nature, and if they are not, he must implant them or be deprived of his immediate enjoyment. And he is of necessity jealous and will do him great harm by keeping him from many

advantageous associations, which would most tend to make a man of him, especially from that which would do most to make him wise. This is divine philosophy, and from it the lover will certainly keep his beloved away, through fear of being despised; and he will contrive to keep him ignorant of everything else and make him look to his lover for everything, so that he will be most agreeable to him and most harmful to himself. In respect to the intellect, then, a man in love is by no means a profitable guardian or associate.

We must next consider how he who is forced to follow pleasure and not good will keep the body of him whose master he is, and what care he will give to it. He will plainly court a beloved who is effeminate, not virile, not brought up in the pure sunshine, but in mingled shade, unused to manly toils and the sweat of exertion, but accustomed to a delicate and unmanly mode of life, adorned with a bright complexion of artificial origin, since he has none by nature, and in general living a life such as all this indicates, which it is certainly not worthwhile to describe further. We can sum it all up briefly and pass on. A person with such a body, in war and in all important crises, gives courage to his enemies, and fills his friends, and even his lovers themselves, with fear.

This may be passed over as self-evident, but the next question, what advantage or harm the intercourse and guardianship of the lover will bring to his beloved in the matter of his property, must be discussed. Now it is clear to everyone, and especially to the lover, that he would desire above all things to have his beloved bereft of the dearest and kindest and holiest possessions; for he would wish him to be deprived of father, mother, relatives and friends, thinking that they would hinder

and censure his most sweet intercourse with him. But he will also think that one who has property in money or other possessions will be less easy to catch and when caught will be less manageable; wherefore the lover must necessarily begrudge his beloved the possession of property and rejoice at its loss. Moreover the lover would wish his beloved to be as long as possible unmarried, childless, and homeless, since he wishes to enjoy as long as possible what is pleasant to himself. Now there are also other evils, but God has mingled with most of them some temporary pleasure; so, for instance, a flatterer is a horrid creature and does great harm, yet Nature has combined with him a kind of pleasure that is not without charm, and one might find fault with a courtesan as an injurious thing, and there are many other such creatures and practices which are yet for the time being very pleasant; but a lover is not only harmful to his beloved but extremely disagreeable to live with as well. The old proverb says, birds of a feather flock together; that is, I suppose, equality of age leads them to similar pleasures and through similarity begets friendship; and yet even they grow tired of each other's society. Now compulsion of every kind is said to be oppressive to everyone, and the lover not only is unlike his beloved, but he exercises the strongest compulsion. For he is old while his love is young, and he does not leave him day or night, if he can help it, but is driven by the sting of necessity, which urges him on, always giving him pleasure in seeing, hearing, touching, and by all his senses perceiving his beloved, so that he is glad to serve him constantly. But what consolation or what pleasure can he give the beloved? Must not this protracted intercourse bring him to the uttermost disgust, as he looks at the old, unlovely face, and other

things to match, which it is not pleasant even to hear about, to say nothing of being constantly compelled to come into contact with them? And he is suspiciously guarded in all ways against everybody, and has to listen to untimely and exaggerated praises and to reproaches which are unendurable when the man is sober, and when he is in his cups and indulges in wearisome and unrestrained freedom of speech become not only unendurable but disgusting.

And while he is in love he is harmful and disagreeable, but when his love has ceased he is thereafter false to him whom he formerly hardly induced to endure his wearisome companionship through the hope of future benefits by making promises with many prayers and oaths. But now that the time of payment has come he has a new ruler and governor within him, sense and reason in place of love and madness, and has become a different person; but of this his beloved knows nothing. He asks of him a return for former favors, reminding him of past sayings and doings, as if he were speaking to the same man; but the lover is ashamed to say that he has changed, and yet he cannot keep the oaths and promises he made when he was ruled by his former folly, now that he has regained his reason and come to his senses, lest by doing what he formerly did he become again what he was. He runs away from these things, and the former lover is compelled to become a defaulter. The shell has fallen with the other side up; and he changes his part and runs away; and the other is forced to run after him in anger and with imprecations, he who did not know at the start that he ought never to have accepted a lover who was necessarily without reason, but rather a reasonable non-lover; for otherwise he would have to surrender

himself to one who was faithless, irritable, jealous, and disagreeable, harmful to his property, harmful to his physical condition, and most harmful by far to the cultivation of his soul, than which there neither is nor ever will be anything of higher importance in truth either in heaven or on earth. These things, dear boy, you must bear in mind, and you must know that the fondness of the lover is not a matter of goodwill, but of appetite which he wishes to satisfy;

Just as the wolf loves the lamb, so the lover adores his beloved.

There it is, Phaedrus! Do not listen to me any longer; let my speech end here.

Phaedrus/ But I thought you were in the middle of it, and would say as much about the non-lover as you have said about the lover, to set forth all his good points and show that he ought to be favored. So now, Socrates, why do you stop?

Socrates/ Did you not notice, my friend, that I am already speaking in hexameters, not mere dithyrambics, even though I am finding fault with the lover? But if I begin to praise the non-lover, what kind of hymn do you suppose I shall raise? I shall surely be possessed of the nymphs to whom you purposely exposed me. So, in a word, I say that the non-lover possesses all the advantages that are opposed to the disadvantages we found in the lover. Why make a long speech? I have said enough about both of them. And so my tale shall fare as it may; I shall cross this stream and go away before you put some further compulsion upon me.

Phaedrus/ Not yet, Socrates, till the heat is past. Don't you see that it is already almost noon? Let us stay

and talk over what has been said, and then, when it is cooler, we will go away.

Socrates/ Phaedrus, you are simply a superhuman wonder as regards discourses! I believe no one of all those who have been born in your lifetime has produced more discourses than you, either by speaking them yourself or compelling others to do so. I except Simmias the Theban; but you are far ahead of all the rest. And now I think you have become the cause of another, spoken by me.

Phaedrus/ That is not exactly a declaration of war! But how is this, and what is the discourse?

Socrates/ My good friend, when I was about to cross the stream, the spirit and the sign that usually comes to me came it always holds me back from something I am about to do and I thought I heard a voice from it which forbade my going away before clearing my conscience, as if I had committed some sin against deity. Now I am a seer, not a very good one, but, as the bad writers say, good enough for my own purposes; so now I understand my error. How prophetic the soul is, my friend! For all along, while I was speaking my discourse, something troubled me, and I was distressed, as Ibycus says, lest I be buying honor among men by sinning against the gods. But now I have seen my error.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Phaedrus, a dreadful speech it was, a dreadful speech, the one you brought with you, and the one you made me speak.

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ It was foolish, and somewhat impious. What could be more dreadful than that?

Phaedrus/ Nothing, if you are right about it.

Socrates/ Well, do you not believe that Love is the son of Aphrodite and is a god?

Phaedrus/ So it is said.

Socrates/ Yes, but not by Lysias, nor by your speech which was spoken by you through my mouth that you bewitched. If Love is, as indeed he is, a god or something divine, he can be nothing evil; but the two speeches just now said that he was evil. So then they sinned against Love; but their foolishness was really very funny besides, for while they were saying nothing sound or true, they put on airs as though they amounted to something, if they could cheat some mere manikins and gain honor among them. Now I, my friend, must purify myself; and for those who have sinned in matters of mythology there is an ancient purification, unknown to Homer, but known to Stesichoms. For when he was stricken with blindness for speaking ill of Helen, he was not, like Homer, ignorant of the reason, but since he was educated, he knew it and straightway he writes the poem;

That saying is not true; thou didst not go within the well-oared ships, nor didst thou come to the walls of Troy; and when he had written all the poem, which is called the recantation, he saw again at once. Now I will be wiser than they in just this point; before suffering any punishment for speaking ill of Love, I will try to atone by my recantation, with my head bare this time, not, as before, covered through shame.

Phaedrus/ This indeed, Socrates, is the most delightful thing you could say.

Socrates/ Just consider, my good Phaedrus, how shameless the two speeches were, both this of mine and

the one you read out of the book. For if any man of noble and gentle nature, one who was himself in love with another of the same sort, or who had ever been loved by such a one, had happened to hear us saying that lovers take up violent enmity because of small matters and are jealously disposed and harmful to the beloved, don't you think he would imagine he was listening to people brought up among low sailors, who had never seen a generous love? Would he not refuse utterly to assent to our censure of Love?

Phaedrus/ I declare, Socrates, perhaps he would.

Socrates/ I therefore, because I am ashamed at the thought of this man and am afraid of Love himself, wish to wash out the brine from my ears with the water of a sweet discourse. And I advise Lysias also to write as soon as he can, that other things being equal, the lover should be favored rather than the non-lover.

Phaedrus/ Be assured that he will do so; for when you have spoken the praise of the lover, Lysias must of course be compelled by me to write another discourse on the same subject.

Socrates/ I believe you, so long as you are what you are.

Phaedrus/ Speak then without fear.

Socrates/ Where is the youth to whom I was speaking? He must hear this also, lest if he do not hear it, he accept a non-lover before we can stop him.

Phaedrus/ Here he is, always close at hand whenever you want him.

Socrates/ Understand then, fair youth, that the former discourse was by Phaedrus, the son of Pythocles (Eager for Fame) of Myrrhinus (Myrrhtown); but this which I shall speak is by Stesichorus, son of Euphemus

(Man of pious Speech) of Himera (Town of Desire). And I must say that this saying is not true, which teaches that when a lover is at hand the non-lover should be more favored, because the lover is insane, and the other sane. For if it were a simple fact that insanity is an evil, the saying would be true; but in reality the greatest of blessings come to us through madness, when it is sent as a gift of the gods. For the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when they have been mad have conferred many splendid benefits upon Greece both in private and in public affairs, but few or none when they have been in their right minds; and if we should speak of the Sibyl and all the others who by prophetic inspiration have foretold many things to many persons and thereby made them fortunate afterwards, anyone can see that we should speak a long time. And it is worthwhile to adduce also the fact that those men of old who invented names thought that madness was neither shameful nor disgraceful; otherwise they would not have connected the very word mania with the noblest of arts, that which foretells the future, by calling it the manic art. No, they gave this name thinking that mania, when it comes by gift of the gods, is a noble thing, but nowadays people call prophecy the mantic art, tastelessly inserting a T in the word. So also, when they gave a name to the investigation of the future which rational persons conduct through observation of birds and by other signs, since they furnish mind (nous) and information (historia) to human thought (oiesis) from the intellect (dianoia) they called it the oionoistic (oionoistike) art, which modern folk now call oionistic, making it more high-sounding by introducing the long O. The ancients, then testify that in proportion as prophecy (mantike) is

superior to augury, both in name and in fact, in the same proportion madness, which comes from god, is superior to sanity, which is of human origin. Moreover, when diseases and the greatest troubles have been visited upon certain families through some ancient guilt, madness has entered in and by oracular power has found a way of release for those in need, taking refuge in prayers and the service of the gods, and so, by purifications and sacred rites, he who has this madness is made safe for the present and the after time, and for him who is rightly possessed of madness a release from present ills is found. And a third kind of possession and madness comes from the Muses. This takes hold upon a gentle and pure soul, arouses it and inspires it to songs and other poetry, and thus by adorning countless deeds of the ancients educates later generations. But he who without the divine madness comes to the doors of the Muses, confident that he will be a good poet by art, meets with no success, and the poetry of the sane man vanishes into nothingness before that of the inspired madmen.

All these noble results of inspired madness I can mention, and many more. Therefore let us not be afraid on that point, and let no one disturb and frighten us by saying that the reasonable friend should be preferred to him who is in a frenzy. Let him show in addition that love is not sent from heaven for the advantage of lover and beloved alike, and we will grant him the prize of victory. We, on our part, must prove that such madness is given by the gods for our greatest happiness; and our proof will not be believed by the merely clever, but will be accepted by the truly wise. First, then, we must learn the truth about the soul divine and human by observing

how it acts and is acted upon. And the beginning of our proof is as follows;

Every soul is immortal. For that which is ever moving is immortal; but that which moves something else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. Only that which moves itself, since it does not leave itself, never ceases to move, and this is also the source and beginning of motion for all other things which have motion. But the beginning is ungenerated. For everything that is generated must be generated from a beginning, but the beginning is not generated from anything; for if the beginning were generated from anything, it would not be generated from a beginning. And since it is ungenerated, it must be also indestructible; for if the beginning were destroyed, it could never be generated from anything nor anything else from it, since all things must be generated from a beginning. Thus that which moves itself must be the beginning of motion. And this can be neither destroyed nor generated, otherwise all the heavens and all generation must fall in ruin and stop and never again have any source of motion or origin. But since that which is moved by itself has been seen to be immortal, one who says that this self-motion is the essence and the very idea of the soul, will not be disgraced. For everybody which derives motion from without is soulless, but that which has its motion within itself has a soul, since that is the nature of the soul; but if this is true, that that which moves itself is nothing else than the soul, then the soul would necessarily be ungenerated and immortal.

Concerning the immortality of the soul this is enough; but about its form we must speak in the following manner. To tell what it really is would be a

matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse, but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure; let us therefore speak in that way. We will liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the horses and charioteers of the gods are all good and of good descent, but those of other races are mixed; and first the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair, and secondly one of the horses is noble and of noble breed, but the other quite the opposite in breed and character. Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome. Now we must try to tell why a living being is called mortal or immortal. Soul, considered collectively, has the care of all that which is soulless, and it traverses the whole heaven, appearing sometimes in one form and sometimes in another; now when it is perfect and fully winged, it mounts upward and governs the whole world; but the soul which has lost its wings is borne along until it gets hold of something solid, when it settles down, taking upon itself an earthly body, which seems to be self-moving, because of the power of the soul within it; and the whole, compounded of soul and body, is called a living being, and is further designated as mortal. It is not immortal by any reasonable supposition, but we, though we have never seen or rightly conceived a god, imagine an immortal being which has both a soul and a body which are united for all time. Let that, however, and our words concerning it, be as is pleasing to God; we will now consider the reason why the soul loses its wings. It is something like this.

Socrates/ The natural function of the wing is to soar upwards and carry that which is heavy up to the place where dwells the race of the gods. More than any other

thing that pertains to the body it partakes of the nature of the divine. But the divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and all such qualities; by these then the wings of the soul are nourished and grow, but by the opposite qualities, such as vileness and evil, they are wasted away and destroyed. Now the great leader in heaven, Zeus, driving a winged chariot, goes first, arranging all things and caring for all things. He is followed by an army of gods and spirits, arrayed in eleven squadrons; Hestia alone remains in the house of the gods. Of the rest, those who are included among the twelve great gods and are accounted leaders, are assigned each to his place in the army. There are many blessed sights and many ways hither and thither within the heaven, along which the blessed gods go to and fro attending each to his own duties; and whoever wishes, and is able, follows, for jealousy is excluded from the celestial band. But when they go to a feast and a banquet, they proceed steeply upward to the top of the vault of heaven, where the chariots of the gods, whose well matched horses obey the rein, advance easily, but the others with difficulty; for the horse of evil nature weighs the chariot down, making it heavy and pulling toward the earth the charioteer whose horse is not well trained. There the utmost toil and struggle await the soul. For those that are called immortal, when they reach the top, pass outside and take their place on the outer surface of the heaven, and when they have taken their stand, the revolution carries them round and they behold the things outside of the heaven.

But the region above the heaven was never worthily sung by any earthly poet, nor will it ever be. It is, however, as I shall tell; for I must dare to speak the truth, especially as truth is my theme. For the colorless,

formless, and intangible truly existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region and is visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul. Now the divine intelligence, since it is nurtured on mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving that which befits it, rejoices in seeing reality for a space of time and by gazing upon truth is nourished and made happy until the revolution brings it again to the same place. In the revolution it beholds absolute justice, temperance, and knowledge, not such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with one or another of the things we call realities, but that which abides in the real eternal absolute; and in the same way it beholds and feeds upon the other eternal verities, after which, passing down again within the heaven, it goes home, and there the charioteer puts up the horses at the manger and feeds them with ambrosia and then gives them nectar to drink.

Such is the life of the gods; but of the other souls, that which best follows after God and is most like him, raises the head of the charioteer up into the outer region and is carried round in the revolution, troubled by the horses and hardly beholding the realities; and another sometimes rises and sometimes sinks, and, because its horses are unruly, it sees some things and fails to see others. The other souls follow after, all yearning for the upper region but unable to reach it, and are carried round beneath, trampling upon and colliding with one another, each striving to pass its neighbor. So there is the greatest confusion and sweat of rivalry, wherein many are lamed, and many wings are broken through the incompetence of the drivers; and after much toil they all go away without gaining a view of reality, and

when they have gone away they feed upon opinion. But the reason of the great eagerness to see where the plain of truth is, lies in the fact that the fitting pasturage for the best part of the soul is in the meadow there, and the wing on which the soul is raised up is nourished by this. And this is a law of Destiny, that the soul which follows after God and obtains a view of any of the truths is free from harm until the next period, and if it can always attain this, is always unharmed; but when, through inability to follow, it fails to see, and through some mischance is filled with forgetfulness and evil and grows heavy, and when it has grown heavy, loses its wings and falls to the earth, then it is the law that this soul shall never pass into any beast at its first birth, but the soul that has seen the most shall enter into the birth of a man who is to be a philosopher or a lover of beauty, or one of a musical or loving nature, and the second soul into that of a lawful king or a warlike ruler, and the third into that of a politician or a man of business or a financier, the fourth into that of a hard-working gymnast or one who will be concerned with the cure of the body, and the fifth will lead the life of a prophet or someone who conducts mystic rites; to the sixth, a poet or some other imitative artist will be united, to the seventh, a craftsman or a husbandman, to the eighth, a sophist or a demagogue, to the ninth, a tyrant.

Now in all these states, whoever lives justly obtains a better lot, and whoever lives unjustly, a worse. For each soul returns to the place whence it came in ten thousand years; for it does not regain its wings before that time has elapsed, except the soul of him who has been a guileless philosopher or a philosophical lover; these, when for three successive periods of a thousand years they have chosen such a life, after the third period

of a thousand years become winged in the three thousandth year and go their way; but the rest, when they have finished their first life, receive judgment, and after the judgment some go to the places of correction under the earth and pay their penalty, while the others, made light and raised up into a heavenly place by justice, live in a manner worthy of the life they led in human form. But in the thousandth year both come to draw lots and choose their second life, each choosing whatever it wishes. Then a human soul may pass into the life of a beast, and a soul which was once human, may pass again from a beast into a man. For the soul which has never seen the truth can never pass into human form. For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being. And therefore it is just that the mind of the philosopher only has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in communion through memory with those things the communion with which causes God to be divine. Now a man who employs such memories rightly is always being initiated into perfect mysteries and he alone becomes truly perfect; but since he separates himself from human interests and turns his attention toward the divine, he is rebuked by the vulgar, who consider him mad and do not know that he is inspired.

All my discourse so far has been about the fourth kind of madness, which causes him to be regarded as mad, who, when he sees the beauty on earth, remembering the true beauty, feels his wings growing and longs to stretch them for an upward flight, but

cannot do so, and, like a bird, gazes upward and neglects the things below. My discourse has shown that this is, of all inspirations, the best and of the highest origin to him who has it or who shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful, partaking in this madness, is called a lover. For, as has been said, every soul of man has by the law of nature beheld the realities, otherwise it would not have entered into a human being, but it is not easy for all souls to gain from earthly things a recollection of those realities, either for those which had but a brief view of them at that earlier time, or for those which, after falling to earth, were so unfortunate as to be turned toward unrighteousness through some evil communications and to have forgotten the holy sights they once saw. Few then are left which retain an adequate recollection of them; but these when they see here any likeness of the things of that other world, are stricken with amazement and can no longer control themselves; but they do not understand their condition, because they do not clearly perceive. Now in the earthly copies of justice and temperance and the other ideas which are precious to souls there is no light, but only a few, approaching the images through the darkling organs of sense, behold in them the nature of that which they imitate, and these few do this with difficulty. But at that former time they saw beauty shining in brightness, when, with a blessed company we following in the train of Zeus, and others in that of some other god they saw the blessed sight and vision and were initiated into that which is rightly called the most blessed of mysteries, which we celebrated in a state of perfection, when we were without experience of the evils which awaited us in the time to come, being permitted as initiates to the sight of perfect and simple and calm

and happy apparitions, which we saw in the pure light, being ourselves pure and not entombed in this which we carry about with us and call the body, in which we are imprisoned like an oyster in its shell.

So much, then, in honor of memory, on account of which I have now spoken at some length, through yearning for the joys of that other time. But beauty, as I said before, shone in brilliance among those visions; and since we came to earth we have found it shining most clearly through the clearest of our senses; for sight is the sharpest of the physical senses, though wisdom is not seen by it, for wisdom would arouse terrible love, if such a clear image of it were granted as would come through sight, and the same is true of the other lovely realities; but beauty alone has this privilege, and therefore it is most clearly seen and loveliest.

Now he who is not newly initiated, or has been corrupted, does not quickly rise from this world to that other world and to absolute beauty when he sees its namesake here, and so he does not revere it when he looks upon it, but gives himself up to pleasure and like a beast proceeds to lust and begetting; he makes license his companion and is not afraid or ashamed to pursue pleasure in violation of nature. But he who is newly initiated, who beheld many of those realities, when he sees a godlike face or form which is a good image of beauty, shudders at first, and something of the old awe comes over him, then, as he gazes, he reveres the beautiful one as a god, and if he did not fear to be thought stark mad, he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to an idol or a god. And as he looks upon him, a reaction from his shuddering comes over him, with sweat and unwonted heat; for as the effluence of beauty enters him through the eyes, he is warmed; the

effluence moistens the germ of the feathers, and as he grows warm, the parts from which the feathers grow, which were before hard and choked, and prevented the feathers from sprouting, become soft, and as the nourishment streams upon him, the quills of the feathers swell and begin to grow from the roots over all the form of the soul; for it was once all feathered.

Now in this process the whole soul throbs and palpitates, and as in those who are cutting teeth there is an irritation and discomfort in the gums, when the teeth begin to grow, just so the soul suffers when the growth of the feathers begins; it is feverish and is uncomfortable and itches when they begin to grow. Then when it gazes upon the beauty of the boy and receives the particles which flow thence to it (for which reason they are called yearning), it is moistened and warmed, ceases from its pain and is filled with joy; but when it is alone and grows dry, the mouths of the passages in which the feathers begin to grow become dry and close up, shutting in the sprouting feathers, and the sprouts within, shut in with the yearning, throb like pulsing arteries, and each sprout pricks the passage in which it is, so that the whole soul, stung in every part, rages with pain; and then again, remembering the beautiful one, it rejoices. So, because of these two mingled sensations, it is greatly troubled by its strange condition; it is perplexed and maddened, and in its madness it cannot sleep at night or stay in anyone place by day, but it is filled with longing and hastens wherever it hopes to see the beautiful one. And when it sees him and is bathed with the waters of yearning, the passages that were sealed are opened, the soul has respite from the stings and is eased of its pain, and this pleasure which it enjoys is the sweetest of

pleasures at the time. Therefore the soul will not, if it can help it, be left alone by the beautiful one, but esteems him above all others, forgets for hum mother and brothers and all friends, neglects property and cares not for its loss, and despising all the customs and proprieties in which it formerly took pride, it is ready to be a slave and to sleep wherever it is allowed, as near as possible to the beloved; for it not only reveres him who possesses beauty, but finds in him the only healer of its greatest woes. Now this condition, fair boy, about which I am speaking, is called Love by men, but when you hear what the gods call it, perhaps because of your youth you will laugh. But some of the Homeridae, I believe, repeat two verses on Love from the spurious poems of Homer, one of which is very outrageous and not perfectly metrical. They sing them as follows;

Mortals call him winged Love, but the immortals call him The Winged One, because he must needs grow wings.

You may believe this, or not; but the condition of lovers and the cause of it are just as I have said.

Now he who is a follower of Zeus, when seized by Love can bear a heavier burden of the winged god; but those who are servants of Ares and followed in his train, when they have been seized by Love and think they have been wronged in any way by the beloved, become murderous and are ready to sacrifice themselves and the beloved. And so it is with the follower of each of the other gods; he lives, so far as he is able, honoring and imitating that god, so long as he is uncorrupted, and is living his first life on earth, and in that way he behaves and conducts himself toward his beloved and toward all others. Now each one chooses his love from the ranks of the beautiful according to his character, and he fashions

him and adorns him like a statue, as though he were his god, to honor and worship him. The followers of Zeus desire that the soul of him whom they love be like Zeus; so they seek for one of philosophical and lordly nature, and when they find him and love him, they do all they can to give him such a character.

If they have not previously had experience, they learn then from all who can teach them anything; they seek after information themselves, and when they search eagerly within themselves to find the nature of their god, they are successful, because they have been compelled to keep their eyes fixed upon the god, and as they reach and grasp him by memory they are inspired and receive from him character and habits, so far as it is possible for a man to have part in God. Now they consider the beloved the cause of all this, so they love him more than before, and if they draw the waters of their inspiration from Zeus, like the bacchantes, they pour it out upon the beloved and make him, so far as possible, like their god. And those who followed after Hera seek a kingly nature, and when they have found such an one, they act in a corresponding manner toward him in all respects; and likewise the followers of Apollo, and of each of the gods, go out and seek for their beloved a youth whose nature accords with that of the god, and when they have gained his affection, by imitating the god themselves and by persuasion and education they lead the beloved to the conduct and nature of the god, so far as each of them can do so; they exhibit no jealousy or meanness toward the loved one, but endeavor by every means in their power to lead him to the likeness of the god whom they honor. Thus the desire of the true lovers, and the initiation into the mysteries of love, which they teach, if they accomplish

what they desire in the way I describe, is beautiful and brings happiness from the inspired lover to the loved one, if he be captured; and the fair one who is captured is caught in the following manner;

In the beginning of this tale I divided each soul into three parts, two of which had the form of horses, the third that of a charioteer. Let us retain this division. Now of the horses we say one is good and the other bad; but we did not define what the goodness of the one and the badness of the other was. That we must now do. The horse that stands at the right hand is upright and has clean limbs; he carries his neck high, has an aquiline nose, is white in color, and has dark eyes; he is a friend of honor joined with temperance and modesty, and a follower of true glory; he needs no whip, but is guided only by the word of command and by reason. The other, however, is crooked, heavy, ill put together, his neck is short and thick, his nose flat, his color dark, his eyes grey and bloodshot; he is the friend of insolence and pride, is shaggy-eared and deaf, hardly obedient to whip and spurs. Now when the charioteer beholds the love-inspiring vision, and his whole soul is warmed by the sight, and is full of the tickling and prickings of yearning, the horse that is obedient to the charioteer, constrained then as always by modesty, controls himself and does not leap upon the beloved; but the other no longer heeds the pricks or the whip of the charioteer, but springs wildly forward, causing all possible trouble to his mate and to the charioteer, and forcing them to approach the beloved and propose the joys of love. And they at first pull back indignantly and will not be forced to do terrible and unlawful deeds; but finally, as the trouble has no end, they go forward with

him, yielding and agreeing to do his bidding. And they come to the beloved and behold his radiant face.

And as the charioteer looks upon him, his memory is borne back to the true nature of beauty, and he sees it standing with modesty upon a pedestal of chastity, and when he sees this he is afraid and falls backward in reverence, and in falling he is forced to pull the reins so violently backward as to bring both horses upon their haunches, the one quite willing, since he does not oppose him, but the unruly beast very unwilling. And as they go away, one horse in his shame and wonder wets all the soul with sweat, but the other, as soon as he is recovered from the pain of the bit and the fall, before he has fairly taken breath, breaks forth into angry reproaches, bitterly reviling his mate and the charioteer for their cowardice and lack of manhood in deserting their post and breaking their agreement; and again, in spite of their unwillingness, he urges them forward and hardly yields to their prayer that he postpone the matter to another time. Then when the time comes which they have agreed upon, they pretend that they have forgotten it, but he reminds them; struggling, and neighing, and pulling he forces them again with the same purpose to approach the beloved one, and when they are near him, he lowers his head, raises his tail, takes the bit in his teeth, and pulls shamelessly. The effect upon the charioteer is the same as before, but more pronounced; he falls back like a racer from the starting-rope, pulls the bit backward even more violently than before from the teeth of the unruly horse, covers his scurrilous tongue and jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches to the ground, causing him much pain. Now when the bad horse has gone through the same experience many

times and has ceased from his unruliness, he is humbled and follows henceforth the wisdom of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one, he is overwhelmed with fear; and so from that time on the soul of the lover follows the beloved in reverence and awe.

Now the beloved, since he receives all service from his lover, as if he were a god, and since the lover is not feigning, but is really in love, and since the beloved himself is by nature friendly to him who serves him, although he may at some earlier time have been prejudiced by his schoolfellows or others, who said that it was a disgrace to yield to a lover, and may for that reason have repulsed his lover, yet, as time goes on, his youth and destiny cause him to admit him to his society. For it is the law of fate that evil can never be a friend to evil and that good must always be friend to good. And when the lover is thus admitted, and the privilege of conversation and intimacy has been granted him, his good will, as it shows itself in close intimacy, astonishes the beloved, who discovers that the friendship of all his other friends and relatives is as nothing when compared with that of his inspired lover. And as this intimacy continues and the lover comes near and touches the beloved in the gymnasia and in their general intercourse, then the fountain of that stream which Zeus, when he was in love with Ganymede, called desire flows copiously upon the lover; and some of it flows into him, and some, when he is filled, overflows outside; and just as the wind or an echo rebounds from smooth, hard surfaces and returns whence it came, so the stream of beauty passes back into the beautiful one through the eyes, the natural inlet to the soul, where it reanimates the passages of the

feathers, waters them and makes the feathers begin to grow, filling the soul of the loved one with love. So he is in love, but he knows not with whom; he does not understand his own condition and cannot explain it; like one who has caught a disease of the eyes from another, he can give no reason for it; he sees himself in his lover as in a mirror, but is not conscious of the fact. And in the lovers presence, like him he ceases from his pain, and in his absence, like him he is filled with yearning such as he inspires, and loves image, requited love, dwells within him; but he calls it, and believes it to be, not love, but friendship. Like the lover, though less strongly, he desires to see his friend, to touch him, kiss him, and lie down by him; and naturally these things are soon brought about. Now as they lie together, the unruly horse of the lover has something to say to the charioteer, and demands a little enjoyment in return for his many troubles; and the unruly horse of the beloved says nothing, but teeming with passion and confused emotions he embraces and kisses his lover, caressing him as his best friend; and when they lie together, he would not refuse his lover any favor, if he asked it; but the other horse and the charioteer oppose all this with modesty and reason.

If now the better elements of the mind, which lead to a well ordered life and to philosophy, prevail, they live a life of happiness and harmony here on earth, self-controlled and orderly, holding in subjection that which causes evil in the soul and giving freedom to that which makes for virtue; and when this life is ended they are light and winged, for they have conquered in one of the three truly Olympic contests. Neither human wisdom nor divine inspiration can confer upon man any greater blessing than this. If however they live a life less noble

and without philosophy, but yet ruled by the love of honor, probably, when they have been drinking, or in some other moment of carelessness, the two unruly horses, taking the souls off their guard, will bring them together and seize upon and accomplish that which is by the many accounted blissful; and when this has once been done, they continue the practice, but infrequently, since what they are doing is not approved by the whole mind. So these two pass through life as friends, though not such friends as the others, both at the time of their love and afterwards, believing that they have exchanged the most binding pledges of love, and that they can never break them and fall into enmity. And at last, when they depart from the body, they are not winged, to be sure, but their wings have begun to grow, so that the madness of love brings them no small reward; for it is the law that those who have once begun their upward progress shall never again pass into darkness and the journey under the earth, but shall live a happy life in the light as they journey together, and because of their love shall be alike in their plumage when they receive their wings.

Socrates/ These blessings, so great and so divine, the friendship of a lover will confer upon you, dear boy; but the affection of the non-lover, which is alloyed with mortal prudence and follows mortal and parsimonious rules of conduct, will beget in the beloved soul the narrowness which the common folk praise as virtue; it will cause the soul to be a wanderer upon the earth for nine thousand years and a fool below the earth at last. There, dear Love, thou hast my recantation, which I have offered and paid as beautifully and as well as I could, especially in the poetical expressions which I was

forced to employ on account of Phaedrus. Pardon, I pray, my former words and accept these words with favor; be kind and gracious to me; do not in anger take from me the art of love which thou didst give me, and deprive me not of sight, but grant unto me to be even more than now esteemed by the beautiful. And if in our former discourse Phaedrus and I said anything harsh against thee, blame Lysias, the father of that discourse, make him to cease from such speeches, and turn him, as his brother Polemarchus is turned, toward philosophy, that his lover Phaedrus may no longer hesitate, as he does now, between two ways, but may direct his life with all singleness of purpose toward love and philosophical discourses.

Phaedrus/ I join in your prayer, Socrates, and pray that this may come to pass, if this is best for us. But all along I have been wondering at your discourse, you made it so much more beautiful than the first; so that I am afraid Lysias will make a poor showing, if he consents to compete with it. Indeed, lately one of the politicians was abusing him for this very thing, and through all his abusive speech kept calling him a speech-writer; so perhaps out of pride he may refrain from writing.

Socrates/ That is an absurd idea, young man, and you are greatly mistaken in your friend if you think he is so much afraid of noise. Perhaps, too, you-think the man who abused him believed what he was saying.

Phaedrus/ He seemed to believe, Socrates; and you know yourself that the most influential and important men in our cities are ashamed to write speeches and leave writings behind them, through fear of being called sophists by posterity.

Socrates/ You seem to be unacquainted with the sweet elbow Phaedrus, and besides the elbow, you seem not to know that the proudest of the statesmen are most fond of writing and of leaving writings behind them, since they care so much for praise that when they write a speech they add at the beginning the names of those who praise them in each instance.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean? I don't understand.

Socrates/ You don't understand that the name of the approver is written first in the writings of statesmen.

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ The writer says, It was voted by the senate (or the people, or both), and so-and-so moved, mentioning his own name with great dignity and praise, then after that he goes on, displaying his own wisdom to his approvers, and sometimes making a very long document. Does it seem to you that a thing of that sort is anything else than a written speech?

Phaedrus/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ Then if this speech is approved, the writer leaves the theatre in great delight; but if it is not recorded and he is not granted the privilege of speech-writing and is not considered worthy to be an author, he is grieved, and his friends with him.

Phaedrus/ Decidedly.

Socrates/ Evidently not because they despise the profession, but because they admire it.

Phaedrus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Well then, when an orator or a king is able to rival the greatness of Lycurgus or Solon or Darius and attain immortality as a writer in the state, does he not while living think himself equal to the gods, and has

not posterity the same opinion of him, when they see his writings?

Phaedrus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Do you think, then, that any of the statesmen, no matter how ill-disposed toward Lysias, reproaches him for being a writer?

Phaedrus/ It is not likely, according to what you say; for he would be casting reproach upon that which he himself desires to be.

Socrates/ Then that is clear to all, that writing speeches is not in itself a disgrace.

Phaedrus/ How can it be?

Socrates/ But the disgrace, I fancy, consists in speaking or writing not well, but disgracefully and badly.

Phaedrus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ What, then, is the method of writing well or badly? Do we want to question Lysias about this, and anyone else who ever has written or will write anything, whether a public or private document, in verse or in prose, be he poet or ordinary man?

Phaedrus/ You ask if we want to question them? What else should one live for, so to speak, but for such pleasures? Certainly not for those which cannot be enjoyed without previous pain, which is the case with nearly all bodily pleasures and causes them to be justly called slavish.

Socrates/ We have plenty of time, apparently; and besides, the locusts seem to be looking down upon us as they sing and talk with each other in the heat. Now if they should see us not conversing at mid-day, but, like most people, dozing, lulled to sleep by their song

because of our mental indolence, they would quite justly laugh at us, thinking that some slaves had come to their resort and were slumbering about the fountain at noon like sheep. But if they see us conversing and sailing past them unmoved by the charm of their Siren voices, perhaps they will be pleased and give us the gift which the gods bestowed on them to give to men.

Phaedrus/ What is this gift? I don't seem to have heard of it.

Socrates/ It is quite improper for a lover of the Muses never to have heard of such things. The story goes that these locusts were once men, before the birth of the Muses, and when the Muses were born and song appeared, some of the men were so overcome with delight that they sang and sang, forgetting food and drink, until at last unconsciously they died. From them the locust tribe afterwards arose, and they have this gift from the Muses, that from the time of their birth they need no sustenance, but sing continually, without food or drink, until they die, when they go to the Muses and report who honors each of them on earth. They tell Terpsichore of those who have honored her in dances, and make them dearer to her; they gain the favor of Erato for the poets of love, and that of the other Muses for their votaries, according to their various ways of honoring them; and to Calliope, the eldest of the Muses, and to Urania who is next to her, they make report of those who pass their lives in philosophy and who worship these Muses who are most concerned with heaven and with thought divine and human and whose music is the sweetest. So for many reasons we ought to talk and not sleep in the noontime.

Phaedrus/ Yes, we ought to talk.

Socrates/ We should, then, as we were proposing just now, discuss the theory of good (or bad) speaking and writing.

Phaedrus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ If a speech is to be good, must not the mind of the speaker know the truth about the matters of which he is to speak?

Phaedrus/ On that point, Socrates, I have heard that one who is to be an orator does not need to know what is really just, but what would seem just to the multitude who are to pass judgment, and not what is really good or noble, but what will seem to be so; for they say that persuasion comes from what seems to be true, not from the truth.

Socrates/ The word Phaedrus, which the wise speak must not be rejected, but we must see if they are right; so we must not pass by this which you just said.

Phaedrus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Let us then examine it in this way.

Phaedrus/ How?

Socrates/ If I should urge you to buy a horse and fight against the invaders, and neither of us knew what a horse was, but I merely knew this about you, that Phaedrus thinks a horse is the one of the tame animals which has the longest ears.

Phaedrus/ It would be ridiculous, Socrates.

Socrates/ No, not yet; but if I tried to persuade you in all seriousness, composing a speech in praise of the ass, which I called a horse, and saying that the beast was a most valuable possession at home and in war, that you could use him as a mount in battle, and that

he was able to carry baggage and was useful for many other purposes.

Phaedrus/ Then it would be supremely ridiculous.

Socrates/ But is it not better to be ridiculous than to be clever and an enemy?

Phaedrus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Then when the orator who does not know what good and evil are undertakes to persuade a state which is equally ignorant, not by praising the shadow of an ass under the name of a horse, but by praising evil under the name of good, and having studied the opinions of the multitude persuades them to do evil instead of good, what harvest do you suppose his oratory will reap thereafter from the seed he has sown?

Phaedrus/ No very good harvest.

Socrates/ Well, do you think we have reproached the art of speaking too harshly? Perhaps she might say; Why do you talk such nonsense, you strange men? I do not compel anyone to learn to speak without knowing the truth, but if my advice is of any value, he learns that first and then acquires me. So what I claim is this, that without my help the knowledge of the truth does not give the art of persuasion.

Phaedrus/ And will she be right in saying this?

Socrates/ Yes, if the arguments that are coming against her testify that she is an art. For I seem, as it were, to hear some arguments approaching and protesting that she is lying and is not an art, but a craft devoid of art. A real art of speaking, says the Laconian, which does not seize hold of truth, does not exist and never will.

Phaedrus/ We have need of these arguments, Socrates. Bring them here and examine their words and their meaning.

Socrates/ Come here, then, noble creatures, and persuade the fair young Phaedrus that unless he pay proper attention to philosophy he will never be able to speak properly about anything. And let Phaedrus answer.

Phaedrus/ Ask your questions.

Socrates/ Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an art which leads the soul by means of words, not only in law courts and the various other public assemblages, but in private companies as well? And is it not the same when concerned with small things as with great, and, properly speaking, no more to be esteemed in important than in trifling matters? Is this what you have heard?

Phaedrus/ No, by Zeus, not that exactly; but the art of speaking and writing is exercised chiefly in lawsuits, and that of speaking also in public assemblies; and I never heard of any further uses.

Socrates/ Then you have heard only of the treatises on rhetoric by Nestor and Odysseus, which they wrote when they had nothing to do at Troy, and you have not heard of that by Palamedes?

Phaedrus/ Nor of Nestors either, unless you are disguising Gorgias under the name of Nestor and Thrasymachus or Theodorus under that of Odysseus.

Socrates/ Perhaps I am. However, never mind them; but tell me, what do the parties in a lawsuit do in court? Do they not contend in speech, or what shall we say they do?

Phaedrus/ Exactly that.

Socrates/ About the just and the unjust?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then he whose speaking is an art will make the same thing appear to the same persons at one time just and at another, if he wishes, unjust?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And in political speaking he will make the same things seem to the State at one time good and at another the opposite?

Phaedrus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno) has such an art of speaking that the same things appear to his hearers to be alike and unlike, one and many, stationary and in motion?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the art of contention in speech is not confined to courts and political gatherings, but apparently, if it is an art at all, it would be one and the same in all kinds of speaking, the art by which a man will be able to produce a resemblance between all things between which it can be produced, and to bring to the light the resemblances produced and disguised by anyone else.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ I think it will be plain if we examine the matter in this way. Is deception easier when there is much difference between things or when there is little?

Phaedrus/ When there is little.

Socrates/ And if you make a transition by small steps from anything to its opposite you will be more likely to escape detection than if you proceed by leaps and bounds.

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then he who is to deceive another, and is not to be deceived himself, must know accurately the similarity and dissimilarity of things.

Phaedrus/ Yes, he must.

Socrates/ Now will he be able, not knowing the truth about a given thing, to recognize in other things the great or small degree of likeness to that which he does not know?

Phaedrus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ In the case, then, of those whose opinions are at variance with facts and who are deceived, this error evidently slips in through some resemblances.

Phaedrus/ It does happen in that way.

Socrates/ Then he who does not understand the real nature of things will not possess the art of making his hearers pass from one thing to its opposite by leading them through the intervening resemblances, or of avoiding such deception himself?

Phaedrus/ Never in the world.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, he who knows not the truth, but pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an art at all.

Phaedrus/ Probably.

Socrates/ Shall we look in the speech of Lysias, which you have with you, and in what I said, for something which we think shows art and the lack of art?

Phaedrus/ By all means, for now our talk is too abstract, since we lack sufficient examples.

Socrates/ And by some special good fortune, as it seems, the two discourses contain an example of the way in which one who knows the truth may lead his

hearers on with sportive words; and I, Phaedrus, think the divinities of the place are the cause thereof; and perhaps, too, the prophets of the Muses, who are singing above our heads, may have granted this boon to us by inspiration; at any rate, I possess no art of speaking.

Phaedrus/ So be it; only make your meaning clear.

Socrates/ Read me the beginning of Lysias discourse.

Phaedrus/ You know what my condition is, and you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your lover. For lovers repent of…

Socrates/ Stop. Now we must tell what there is in this that is faulty and lacks art, must we not?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is clear to everyone that we are in accord about some matters of this kind and at variance about others, is it not?

Phaedrus/ I think I understand your meaning, but express it still more clearly.

Socrates/ When one says iron or silver, we all understand the same thing, do we not?

Phaedrus/ Surely.

Socrates/ What if he says justice or goodness ? Do we not part company, and disagree with each other and with ourselves?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then in some things we agree and in others we do not.

Phaedrus/ True.

Socrates/ Then in which of the two are we more easy to deceive, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?

Phaedrus/ Evidently in the class of doubtful things.

Socrates/ Then he who is to develop an art of rhetoric must first make a methodical division and acquire a clear impression of each class, that in which people must be in doubt and that in which they are not.

Phaedrus/ He who has acquired that would have conceived an excellent principle.

Socrates/ Then I think when he has to do with a particular case, he will not be ignorant, but will know clearly to which of the two classes the thing belongs about which he is to speak.

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well then, to which does Love belong? To the doubtful things or the others?

Phaedrus/ To the doubtful, surely; if he did not, do you think he would have let you say what you said just now about him, that he is an injury to the beloved and to the lover, and again that he is the greatest of blessings?

Socrates/ Excellent. But tell me this for I was in such an ecstasy that I have quite forgotten whether I defined love in the beginning of my discourse.

Phaedrus/ Yes, by Zeus, and wonderfully well.

Socrates/ Oh, how much more versed the nymphs, daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are in the art of speech than Lysias, son of Cephalus! Or am I wrong, and did Lysias also, in the beginning of his discourse on Love, compel us to suppose Love to be some one thing which he chose to consider it, and did

he then compose and finish his discourse with that in view? Shall we read the beginning of it again?

Phaedrus/ If you like; but what you seek is not in it.

Socrates/ Read, that I may hear Lysias himself.

Phaedrus/ You know what my condition is, and you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your lover. For lovers repent of the kindnesses they have done when their passion ceases.

Socrates/ He certainly does not at all seem to do what we demand, for he does not even begin at the beginning, but undertakes to swim on his back up the current of his discourse from its end, and begins with what the lover would say at the end to his beloved. Am I not right, Phaedrus my dear?

Phaedrus/ Certainly that of which he speaks is an ending.

Socrates/ And how about the rest? Don't you think the parts of the discourse are thrown out helter-skelter? Or does it seem to you that the second topic had to be put second for any cogent reason, or that any of the other things he says are so placed? It seemed to me, who am wholly ignorant, that the writer uttered boldly whatever occurred to him. Do you know any rhetorical reason why he arranged his topics in this order?

Phaedrus/ You flatter me in thinking that I can discern his motives so accurately.

Socrates/ But I do think you will agree to this, that every discourse must be organized, like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members,

composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ See then whether this is the case with your friends discourse, or not. You will find that it is very like the inscription that some say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.

Phaedrus/ What sort of inscription is that, and what is the matter with it?

Socrates/ This is it;

> A bronze maiden am I; and I am placed upon the tomb of Midas.
>
> So long as water runs and tall trees put forth leaves,
>
> Remaining in this very spot upon a much lamented tomb,
>
> I shall declare to passers by that Midas is buried here;

and you perceive, I fancy, that it makes no difference whether any line of it is put first or last.

Phaedrus/ You are making fun of our discourse, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, to spare your feelings, let us say no more of this discourse and yet I think there were many things in it which would be useful examples to consider, though not exactly to imitate and let us turn to the other discourses; for there was in them, I think, something which those who wish to investigate rhetoric might well examine.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ The two discourses were opposites; for one maintained that the lover, and the other that the non-lover, should be favored.

Phaedrus/ And they did it right manfully.

Socrates/ I thought you were going to speak the truth and say madly; however, that is just what I had in mind. We said that love was a kind of madness, did we not?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that there are two kinds of madness, one arising from human diseases, and the other from a divine release from the customary habits.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And we made four divisions of the divine madness, ascribing them to four gods, saying that prophecy was inspired by Apollo, the mystic madness by Dionysus, the poetic by the Muses, and the madness of love, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros, we said was the best. We described the passion of love in some sort of figurative manner, expressing some truth, perhaps, and perhaps being led away in another direction, and after composing a somewhat plausible discourse, we chanted a sportive and mythic hymn in meet and pious strain to the honor of your lord and mine, Phaedrus, Love, the guardian of beautiful boys.

Phaedrus/ Yes, and I found it very pleasant to hear.

Socrates/ Here let us take up this point and see how the discourse succeeded in passing from blame to praise.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ It seems to me that the discourse was, as a whole, really sportive jest; but in these chance utterances were involved two principles, the essence of

which it would be gratifying to learn, if art could teach it.

Phaedrus/ What principles?

Socrates/ That of perceiving and bringing together in one idea the scattered particulars, that one may make clear by definition the particular thing which he wishes to explain; just as now, in speaking of Love, we said what he is and defined it, whether well or ill. Certainly by this means the discourse acquired clearness and consistency.

Phaedrus/ And what is the other principle, Socrates?

Socrates/ That of dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver. As our two discourses just now assumed one common principle, unreason, and then, just as the body, which is one, is naturally divisible into two, right and left, with parts called by the same names, so our two discourses conceived of madness as naturally one principle within us, and one discourse, cutting off the left-hand part, continued to divide this until it found among its parts a sort of left-handed love, which it very justly reviled, but the other discourse, leading us to the right-hand part of madness, found a love having the same name as the first, but divine, which it held up to view and praised as the author of our greatest blessings.

Phaedrus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and bringing together, as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and walk in his footsteps as if he were a god. And whether the

name I give to those who can do this is right or wrong, God knows, but I have called them hitherto dialecticians. But tell me now what name to give to those who are taught by you and Lysias, or is this that art of speech by means of which Thrasymachus and the rest have become able speakers themselves, and make others so, if they are willing to pay them royal tribute?

Phaedrus/ They are royal men, but not trained in the matters about which you ask. I think you give this method the right name when you call it dialectic; but it seems to me that rhetoric still escapes us.

Socrates/ What do you mean? Can there be anything of importance, which is not included in these processes and yet comes under the head of art? Certainly you and I must not neglect it, but must say what it is that remains of rhetoric.

Phaedrus/ A great many things remain, Socrates, the things that are written in the books on rhetoric.

Socrates/ Thank you for reminding me. You mean that there must be an introduction first, at the beginning of the discourse; these are the things you mean, are they not? the niceties of the art.

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the narrative must come second with the testimony after it, and third the proofs, and fourth the probabilities; and confirmation and further confirmation are mentioned, I believe, by the man from Byzantium, that most excellent artist in words.

Phaedrus/ You mean the worthy Theodorus?

Socrates/ Of course. And he tells how refutation and further refutation must be accomplished, both in accusation and in defense. Shall we not bring the illustrious Parian, Evenus, into our discussion, who

invented covert allusion and indirect praises? And some say that he also wrote indirect censures, composing them in verse as an aid to memory; for he is a clever man. And shall we leave Gorgias and Tisias undisturbed, who saw that probabilities are more to be esteemed than truths, who make small things seem great and great things small by the power of their words, and new things old and old things the reverse, and who invented conciseness of speech and measureless length on all subjects? And once when Prodicus heard these inventions, he laughed, and said that he alone had discovered the art of proper speech, that discourses should be neither long nor short, but of reasonable length.

Phaedrus/ O Prodicus! How clever!

Socrates/ And shall we not mention Hippias, our friend from Elis? I think he would agree with him.

Phaedrus/ Oh yes.

Socrates/ And what shall we say of Polus and his shrines of learned speech, such as duplication and sententiousness and figurativeness, and what of the names with which Licymnius presented him to effect beautiful diction?

Phaedrus/ Were there not some similar inventions of Protagoras, Socrates?

Socrates/ Yes, my boy, correctness of diction, and many other fine things. For tearful speeches, to arouse pity for old age and poverty, I think the precepts of the mighty Chalcedonian hold the palm, and he is also a genius, as he said, at rousing large companies to wrath, and soothing them again by his charms when they are angry, and most powerful in devising and abolishing calumnies on any grounds whatsoever. But all seem to

be in agreement concerning the conclusion of discourses, which some call recapitulation, while others give it some other name.

Phaedrus/ You mean making a summary of the points of the speech at the end of it, so as to remind the hearers of what has been said?

Socrates/ These are the things I mean, these and anything else you can mention concerned with the art of rhetoric.

Phaedrus/ There are only little things, not worth mentioning.

Socrates/ Never mind the little things; let us bring these other things more under the light and see what force of art they have and when.

Phaedrus/ They have a very powerful force, at least in large assemblies.

Socrates/ They have; but my friend, see if you agree with me in thinking that their warp has gaps in it.

Phaedrus/ Go on and show them.

Socrates/ Tell me; if anyone should go to your friend Eryximachus or to his father Acumenus and should say I know how to apply various drugs to people, so as to make them warm or, if I wish, cold, and I can make them vomit, if I like, or can make their bowels move, and all that sort of thing; and because of this knowledge I claim that I am a physician and can make any other man a physician, to whom I impart the knowledge of these things; what do you think they would say?

Phaedrus/ They would ask him, of course, whether he knew also whom he ought to cause to do these things, and when, and how much.

Socrates/ If then he should say; No, not at all; but I think that he who has learned these things from me will be able to do by himself the things you ask about?

Phaedrus/ They would say, I fancy, that the man was crazy and, because he had read something in a book or had stumbled upon some medicines, imagined that he was a physician when he really, had no knowledge of the art.

Socrates/ And what if someone should go to Sophocles or Euripides and should say that he knew how to make very long speeches about a small matter, and very short ones about a great affair, and pitiful utterances, if he wished, and again terrible and threatening ones, and all that sort of thing, and that he thought by imparting those things he could teach the art of writing tragedies?

Phaedrus/ They also, I fancy, Socrates, would laugh at him, if he imagined that tragedy was anything else than the proper combination of these details in such a way that they harmonize with each other and with the whole composition.

Socrates/ But they would not, I suppose, rebuke him harshly, but they would behave as a musician would, if he met a man who thought he understood harmony because he could strike the highest and lowest notes. He would not say roughly, You wretch, you are mad, but being a musician, he would say in gentler tones, My friend, he who is to be a harmonist must know these things you mention, but nothing prevents one who is at your stage of knowledge from being quite ignorant of harmony. You know the necessary preliminaries of harmony, but not harmony itself.

Phaedrus/ Quite correct.

Socrates/ So Sophocles would say that the man exhibited the preliminaries of tragedy, not tragedy itself, and Acumenus that he knew the preliminaries of medicine, not medicine itself.

Phaedrus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Well then, if the mellifluous Adrastus or Pericles heard of the excellent accomplishments which we just enumerated, brachylogies and figurative speech and all the other things we said we must bring to the light and examine, do we suppose they would, like you and me, be so ill-bred as to speak discourteously of those who have written and taught these things as the art of rhetoric? Would they not, since they are wiser than we, censure us also and say, Phaedrus and Socrates, we ought not to be angry, but lenient, if certain persons who are ignorant of dialectics have been unable to define the nature of rhetoric and on this account have thought, when they possessed the knowledge that is a necessary preliminary to rhetoric, that they had discovered rhetoric, and believe that by teaching these preliminaries to others they have taught them rhetoric completely, and that the persuasive use of these details and the composition of the whole discourse is a small matter which their pupils must supply of themselves in their writings or speeches.

Phaedrus/ Well, Socrates, it does seem as if that which those men teach and write about as the art of rhetoric were such as you describe. I think you are right. But how and from whom is the truly rhetorical and persuasive art to be acquired?

Socrates/ Whether one can acquire it, so as to become a perfect orator, Phaedrus, is probably, and perhaps must be, dependent on conditions, like

everything else. If you are naturally rhetorical, you will become a notable orator, when to your natural endowments you have added knowledge and practice; at whatever point you are deficient in these, you will be incomplete. But so far as the art is concerned, I do not think the quest of it lies along the path of Lysias and Thrasymachus.

Phaedrus/ Where then?

Socrates/ I suppose, my friend, Pericles is the most perfect orator in existence.

Phaedrus/ Well?

Socrates/ All great arts demand discussion and high speculation about nature; for this loftiness of mind and effectiveness in all directions seem somehow to come from such pursuits. This was in Pericles added to his great natural abilities; for it was, I think, his falling in with Anaxagoras, who was just such a man, that filled him with high thoughts and taught him the nature of mind and of lack of mind, subjects about which Anaxagoras used chiefly to discourse, and from these speculations he drew and applied to the art of speaking what is of use to it.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ The method of the art of healing is much the same as that of rhetoric.

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ In both cases you must analyze a nature, in one that of the body and in the other that of the soul, if you are to proceed in a scientific manner, not merely by practice and routine, to impart health and strength to the body by prescribing medicine and diet, or by proper discourses and training to give to the soul the desired belief and virtue.

Phaedrus/ That, Socrates, is probably true.

Socrates/ Now do you think one can acquire any appreciable knowledge of the nature of the soul without knowing the nature of the whole man?

Phaedrus/ If Hippocrates the Asclepiad is to be trusted, one cannot know the nature of the body, either, except in that way.

Socrates/ He is right, my friend; however, we ought not to be content with the authority of Hippocrates, but to see also if our reason agrees with him on examination.

Phaedrus/ I assent.

Socrates/ Then see what Hippocrates and true reason say about nature. In considering the nature of anything, must we not consider first, whether that in respect to which we wish to be learned ourselves and to make others learned is simple or multiform, and then, if it is simple, enquire what power of acting it possesses, or of being acted upon, and by what, and if it has many forms, number them, and then see in the case of each form, as we did in the case of the simple nature, what its action is and how it is acted upon and by what?

Phaedrus/ Very likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ At any rate, any other mode of procedure would be like the progress of a blind man. Yet surely he who pursues any study scientifically ought not to be comparable to a blind or a deaf man, but evidently the man whose rhetorical teaching is a real art will explain accurately the nature of that to which his words are to be addressed, and that is the soul, is it not?

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then this is the goal of all his effort; he tries to produce conviction in the soul. Is not that so?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So it is clear that Thrasymachus, or anyone else who seriously teaches the art of rhetoric, will first describe the soul with perfect accuracy and make us see whether it is one and all alike, or, like the body, of multiform aspect; for this is what we call explaining its nature.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And secondly he will say what its action is and toward what it is directed, or how it is acted upon and by what.

Phaedrus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Thirdly, he will classify the speeches and the souls and will adapt each to the other, showing the causes of the effects produced and why one kind of soul is necessarily persuaded by certain classes of speeches, and another is not.

Phaedrus/ That would, I think, be excellent.

Socrates/ By no other method of exposition or speech will this, or anything else, ever be written or spoken with real art. But those whom you have heard, who write treatises on the art of speech nowadays, are deceivers and conceal the nature of the soul, though they know it very well. Until they write and speak by this method we cannot believe that they write by the rules of art.

Phaedrus/ What is this method?

Socrates/ It is not easy to tell the exact expressions to be used; but I will tell how one must write, if one is to do it, so far as possible, in a truly artistic way.

Phaedrus/ Speak then.

Socrates/ Since it is the function of speech to lead souls by persuasion, he who is to be a rhetorician must know the various forms of soul. Now they are so and so many and of such and such kinds, wherefore men also are of different kinds; these we must classify. Then there are also various classes of speeches, to one of which every speech belongs. So men of a certain sort are easily persuaded by speeches of a certain sort for a certain reason to actions or beliefs of a certain sort, and men of another sort cannot be so persuaded. The student of rhetoric must, accordingly, acquire a proper knowledge of these classes and then be able to follow them accurately with his senses when he sees them in the practical affairs of life; otherwise he can never have any profit from the lectures he may have heard. But when he has learned to tell what sort of man is influenced by what sort of speech, and is able, if he comes upon such a man, to recognize him and to convince himself that this is the man and this now actually before him is the nature spoken of in a certain lecture, to which he must now make a practical application of a certain kind of speech in a certain way to persuade his hearer to a certain action or belief when he has acquired all this, and has added thereto a knowledge of the times for speaking and for keeping silence, and has also distinguished the favorable occasions for brief speech or pitiful speech or intensity and all the classes of speech which he has learned, then, and not till then, will his art be fully and completely finished; and if anyone who omits any of these points in his speaking or writing claims to speak by the rules of art, the one who disbelieves him is the better man. Now then perhaps the writer of our treatise will say, Phaedrus and Socrates, do you agree to all

this? Or must the art of speech be described in some other way?

Phaedrus/ No other way is possible, Socrates. But it seems a great task to attain to it.

Socrates/ Very true. Therefore you must examine all that has been said from every point of view, to see if no shorter and easier road to the art appears, that one may not take a long and rough road, when there is a short and smooth one. If you have heard from Lysias or anyone else anything that can help us, try to remember it and tell it.

Phaedrus/ If it depended on trying, I might, but just now I have nothing to say.

Socrates/ Then shall I tell something that I have heard some of those say who make these matters their business?

Phaedrus/ Pray do.

Socrates/ Even the wolf, you know, Phaedrus, has a right to an advocate, as they say.

Phaedrus/ Do you be his advocate.

Socrates/ Very well. They say that there is no need of treating these matters with such gravity and carrying them back so far to first principles with many words; for, as we said in the beginning of this discussion, he who is to be a competent rhetorician need have nothing at all to do, they say, with truth in considering things which are just or good, or men who are so, whether by nature or by education. For in the courts, they say, nobody cares for truth about these matters, but for that which is convincing; and that is probability, so that he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention upon probability. For sometimes one must not even tell what was actually done, if it was not likely to be done,

but what was probable, whether in accusation or defense; and in brief, a speaker must always aim at probability, paying no attention to truth; for this method, if pursued throughout the whole speech, provides us with the entire art.

Phaedrus/ You have stated just what those say who pretend to possess the art of speech, Socrates. I remember that we touched upon this matter briefly before, but the professional rhetoricians think it is of great importance.

Socrates/ Well, there is Tisias whom you have studied carefully; now let Tisias himself tell us if he does not say that probability is that which most people think.

Phaedrus/ That is just what he says.

Socrates/ Apparently after he had invented this clever scientific definition, he wrote that if a feeble and brave man assaulted a strong coward, robbed him of his cloak or something, and was brought to trial for it, neither party ought to speak the truth; the coward should say that he had not been assaulted by the brave man alone, whereas the other should prove that only they two were present and should use the well-known argument, How could a little man like me assault such a man as he is? The coward will not acknowledge his cowardice, but will perhaps try to invent some other lie, and thus give his opponent a chance to confute him. And in other cases there are other similar rules of art. Is that not so, Phaedrus?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Oh, a wonderfully hidden art it seems to be which Tisias has brought to light, or some other, whoever he may be and whatever country he is proud

to call his own! But, my friend, shall we say in reply to this, or shall we not…

Phaedrus/ What?

Socrates/ Tisias, some time ago, before you came along, we were saying that this probability of yours was accepted by the people because of its likeness to truth; and we just stated that he who knows the truth is always best able to discover likenesses. And so, if you have anything else to say about the art of speech, we will listen to you; but if not, we will put our trust in what we said just now, that unless a man take account of the characters of his hearers and is able to divide things by classes and to comprehend particulars under a general idea, he will never attain the highest human perfection in the art of speech. But this ability he will not gain without much diligent toil, which a wise man ought not to undergo for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but that he may be able to speak and to do everything, so far as possible, in a manner pleasing to the gods. For those who are wiser than we, Tisias, say that a man of sense should surely practice to please not his fellow slaves, except as a secondary consideration, but his good and noble masters. Therefore, if the path is long, be not astonished; for it must be trodden for great ends, not for those you have in mind. Yet your ends also, as our argument says, will be best gained in this way, if one so desires.

Phaedrus/ I think what you have said is admirable, if one could only do it.

Socrates/ But it is noble to strive after noble objects, no matter what happens to us.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We have, then, said enough about the art of speaking and that which is no art.

Phaedrus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But we have still to speak of propriety and impropriety in writing, how it should be done and how it is improper, have we not?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you know how you can act or speak about rhetoric so as to please God best?

Phaedrus/ Not at all; do you?

Socrates/ I can tell something I have heard of the ancients; but whether it is true, they only know. But if we ourselves should find it out, should we care any longer for human opinions?

Phaedrus/ A ridiculous question! But tell me what you say you have heard.

Socrates/ I heard, then, that at Naucratis, in Egypt, was one of the ancient gods of that country, the one whose sacred bird is called the ibis, and the name of the god himself was Theuth. He it was who invented numbers and arithmetic and geometry and astronomy, also draughts and dice, and, most important of all, letters. Now the king of all Egypt at that time was the god Thamus, who lived in the great city of the upper region, which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and they call the god himself Ammon. To him came Theuth to show his inventions, saying that they ought to be imparted to the other Egyptians. But Thamus asked what use there was in each, and as Theuth enumerated their uses, expressed praise or blame, according as he approved or disapproved. The story goes that Thamus said many things to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts, which it would take too long to repeat; but

when they came to the letters, This invention, O king, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories; for it is an elixir of memory and wisdom that I have discovered. But Thamus replied, Most ingenious Theuth, one man has the ability to beget arts, but the ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another; and now you, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that which they really possess. For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practice their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory within them. You have invented an elixir not of memory, but of reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, for they will read many things without instruction and will therefore seem to know many things, when they are for the most part ignorant and hard to get along with, since they are not wise, but only appear wise.

Phaedrus/ Socrates, you easily make up stories of Egypt or any country you please.

Socrates/ They used to say, my friend, that the words of the oak in the holy place of Zeus at Dodona were the first prophetic utterances. The people of that time, not being so wise as you young folks, were content in their simplicity to hear an oak or a rock, provided only it spoke the truth; but to you, perhaps, it makes a difference who the speaker is and where he comes from, for you do not consider only whether his words are true or not.

Phaedrus/ Your rebuke is just; and I think the Theban is right in what he says about letters.

Socrates/ He who thinks, then, that he has left behind him any art in writing, and he who receives it in the belief that anything in writing will be clear and certain, would be an utterly simple person, and in truth ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon, if he thinks written words are of any use except to remind him who knows the matter about which they are written.

Phaedrus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very like painting; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with written words; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question them, wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one and the same thing. And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about, alike among those who understand and those who have no interest in it, and it knows no to whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help itself.

Phaedrus/ You are quite right about that, too.

Socrates/ Now tell me; is there not another kind of speech, or word, which shows itself to be the legitimate brother of this bastard one, both in the manner of its begetting and in its better and more powerful nature?

Phaedrus/ What is this word and how is it begotten, as you say?

Socrates/ The word which is written with intelligence in the mind of the learner, which is able to defend itself and knows to whom it should speak, and before whom to be silent.

Phaedrus/ You mean the living and breathing word of him who knows, of which the written word may justly be called the image.

Socrates/ Exactly. Now tell me this. Would a sensible husbandman, who has seeds which he cares for and which he wishes to bear fruit, plant them with serious purpose in the heat of summer in some garden of Adonis, and delight in seeing them appear in beauty in eight days, or would he do that sort of thing, when he did it at all, only in play and for amusement? Would he not, when he was in earnest, follow the rules of husbandry, plant his seeds in fitting ground, and be pleased when those which he had sowed reached their perfection in the eighth month?

Phaedrus/ Yes, Socrates, he would, as you say, act in that way when in earnest and in the other way only for amusement.

Socrates/ And shall we suppose that he who has knowledge of the just and the good and beautiful has less sense about his seeds than the husbandman?

Phaedrus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then he will not, when in earnest, write them in ink, sowing them through a pen with words which cannot defend themselves by argument and cannot teach the truth effectually.

Phaedrus/ No, at least, probably not.

Socrates/ No. The gardens of letters he will, it seems, plant for amusement, and will write, when he writes, to treasure up reminders for himself, when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for others who follow the same path, and he will be pleased when he sees them putting forth tender leaves. When others engage in other amusements, refreshing themselves with

banquets and kindred entertainments, he will pass the time in such pleasures as I have suggested.

Phaedrus/ A noble pastime, Socrates, and a contrast to those base pleasures, the pastime of the man who can find amusement in discourse, telling stories about justice, and the other subjects of which you speak.

Socrates/ Yes, Phaedrus, so it is; but, in my opinion, serious discourse about them is far nobler, when one employs the dialectic method and plants and sows in a fitting soul intelligent words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed from which there spring up in other minds other words capable of continuing the process forever, and which make their possessor happy, to the farthest possible limit of human happiness.

Phaedrus/ Yes, that is far nobler.

Socrates/ And now, Phaedrus, since we have agreed about these matters, we can decide the others.

Phaedrus/ What others?

Socrates/ Those which brought us to this point through our desire to investigate them, for we wished to examine into the reproach against Lysias as a speech-writer, and also to discuss the speeches themselves and see which were the products of art and which were not. I think we have shown pretty clearly what is and what is not a work of art.

Phaedrus/ Yes, I thought so, too; but please recall to my mind what was said.

Socrates/ A man must know the truth about all the particular things of which he speaks or writes, and must be able to define everything separately; then when he has defined them, he must know how to divide them by classes until further division is impossible; and in

the same way he must understand the nature of the soul, must find out the class of speech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his discourse accordingly, offering to the complex soul elaborate and harmonious discourses, and simple talks to the simple soul. Until he has attained to all this, he will not be able to speak by the method of art, so far as speech can be controlled by method, either for purposes of instruction or of persuasion. This has been taught by our whole preceding discussion.

Phaedrus/ Yes, certainly, that is just about our result.

Socrates/ How about the question whether it is a fine or a disgraceful thing to be a speaker or writer and under what circumstances the profession might properly be called a disgrace or not? Was that made clear a little while ago when we said…

Phaedrus/ What?

Socrates/ That if Lysias or anyone else ever wrote or ever shall write, in private, or in public as lawgiver, a political document, and in writing it believes that it possesses great certainty and clearness, then it is a disgrace to the writer, whether anyone says so, or not. For whether one be awake or asleep, ignorance of right and wrong and good and bad is in truth inevitably a disgrace, even if the whole mob applaud it.

Phaedrus/ That is true.

Socrates/ But the man who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much that is playful, and that no written discourse, whether in meter or in prose, deserves to be treated very seriously (and this applies also to the recitations of the rhapsodes, delivered to sway people's minds, without opportunity for

questioning and teaching), but that the best of them really serve only to remind us of what we know; and who thinks that only in words about justice and beauty and goodness spoken by teachers for the sake of instruction and really written in a soul is clearness and perfection and serious value, that such words should be considered the speakers own legitimate offspring, first the word within himself, if it be found there, and secondly its descendants or brothers which may have sprung up in worthy manner in the souls of others, and who pays no attention to the other words, that man, Phaedrus, is likely to be such as you and I might pray that we ourselves may become.

Phaedrus/ By all means that is what I wish and pray for.

Socrates/ We have amused ourselves with talk about words long enough. Go and tell Lysias that you and I came down to the fountain and sacred place of the nymphs, and heard words which they told us to repeat to Lysias and anyone else who composed speeches, and to Homer or any other who has composed poetry with or without musical accompaniment, and third to Solon and whoever has written political compositions which he calls laws; If he has composed his writings with knowledge of the truth, and is able to support them by discussion of that which he has written, and has the power to show by his own speech that the written words are of little worth, such a man ought not to derive his title from such writings, but from the serious pursuit which underlies them.

Phaedrus/ What titles do you grant them then?

Socrates/ I think, Phaedrus, that the epithet wise is too great and befits God alone; but the name

philosopher, that is, lover of wisdom, or something of the sort would be more fitting and modest for such a man.

Phaedrus/ And quite appropriate.

Socrates/ On the other hand, he who has nothing more valuable than the things he has composed or written, turning his words up and down at his leisure, adding this phrase and taking that away, will you not properly address him as poet or writer of speeches or of laws?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Tell this then to your friend.

Phaedrus/ But what will you do? For your friend ought not to be passed by.

Socrates/ What friend?

Phaedrus/ The fair Isocrates. What message will you give him? What shall we say that he is?

Socrates/ Isocrates is young yet, Phaedrus; however, I am willing to say what I prophesy for him.

Phaedrus/ What is it?

Socrates/ I think he has a nature above the speeches of Lysias and possesses a nobler character; so that I should not be surprised if, as he grows older, he should so excel in his present studies that all who have ever treated of rhetoric shall seem less than children; and I suspect that these studies will not satisfy him, but a more divine impulse will lead him to greater things; for my friend, something of philosophy is inborn in his mind. This is the message that I carry from these deities to my favorite Isocrates, and do you carry the other to Lysias, your favorite.

Phaedrus/ It shall be done; but now let us go, since the heat has grown gentler.

Socrates/ Is it not well to pray to the deities here before we go?

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant to me that I be made beautiful in my soul within, and that all external possessions be in harmony with my inner man. May I consider the wise man rich; and may I have such wealth as only the self-restrained man can bear or endure. Do we need anything more, Phaedrus? For me that prayer is enough.

Phaedrus/ Let me also share in this prayer; for friends have all things in common.

Socrates/ Let us go.

Phaedrus.

Translated by R. Hackforth.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Phaedrus

Socrates/ Where do you come from, Phaedrus my friend, and where are you going?

Phaedrus/ I've been with Lysias, Socrates, the son of Cephalus, and I'm off for a walk outside the wall, after a long morning's sitting there. On the instructions of our common friend Acumenus I take my walks on the open roads; he tells me that is more invigorating than walking in the colonnades.

Socrates/ Yes, he's right in saying so. But Lysias, I take it, was in town.

Phaedrus/ Yes, staying with Epicrates, in that house where Morychus used to live, close to the temple of Olympian Zeus.

Socrates/ Well, how were you occupied? No doubt Lysias was giving the company a feast of eloquence.

Phaedrus/ I'll tell you, if you can spare time to come along with me and listen.

Socrates/ What? Don't you realize that I should account it, in Pindar's words, ‘above all business' to hear how you and Lysias passed your time?

Phaedrus/ Lead on then.

Socrates/ Please tell me.

Phaedrus/ As a matter of fact the topic is appropriate for your ears, Socrates, for the discussion that engaged us may be said to have concerned love. Lysias, you must know, has described how a handsome boy was tempted, but not by a lover—that's the clever part of it. He maintains that

surrender should be to one who is not in love rather than to one who is.

Socrates/ Splendid! I wish he would add that it should be to a poor man rather than a rich one, an elderly man rather than a young one, and, in general. to ordinary folk like myself. What an attractive democratic theory that would be! However, I'm so eager to hear about it that I vow I won't leave you even if you extend your walk as far as Megara, up to the walls and back again as recommended by Herodicus.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean, my good man? Do you expect an amateur like me to repeat by heart, without disgracing its author, the work of the ablest writer of our day, which it took him weeks to compose at his leisure? That is far beyond me, though I'd rather have had the ability than come into a fortune.

Socrates/ I know my Phaedrus. Yes indeed, I'm as sure of him as of my own identity. I'm certain that the said Phaedrus didn't listen just once to Lysias' speech; time after time he asked him to repeat it to him, and Lysias was very ready to comply. Even that would not content him. In the end he secured the script and began poring over the parts that specially attracted him, and thus engaged he sat there the whole morning, until he grew weary and went for a walk. Upon my word, I believe he had learned the whole speech by heart, unless it was a very long one, and he was going into the country to practice declaiming it. Then he fell in with one who has a passion for listening to discourses, and when he saw him he was delighted to think he would have someone to share his frenzied enthusiasm; so he asked him to join him on his way. But when the lover of discourses begged him to discourse, he became difficult, pretending he didn't want to, though he meant to do so ultimately, even if he had to force himself on a reluctant listener. So beg him, Phaedrus, to do straightway what he will soon do in any case.

Phaedrus/ Doubtless it will be much my best course to deliver myself to the best of my ability, for I fancy you will never let me go until I have given you some sort of a speech.

Socrates/ You are quite right about my intention.

Phaedrus/ Then here's what I will do. It really is perfectly true, Socrates, that I have not got the words by heart, but I will sketch the general purport of the several points in which the lover and the nonlover were contrasted, taking them in order one by one, and beginning at the beginning.

Socrates/ Very well, my dear fellow, but you must first show me what it is that you have in your left hand under your cloak, for I surmise that it is the actual discourse. If that is so, let me assure you of this, that much as I love you I am not altogether inclined to let you practice your oratory on me when Lysias himself is here present. Come now, show it me.

Phaedrus/ Say no more, Socrates; you have dashed my hope of trying out my powers on you. Well, where would you like us to sit for our reading?

Socrates/ Let us turn off here and walk along the Ilissus; then we can sit down in any quiet spot you choose.

Phaedrus/ It's convenient, isn't it, that I chance to be barefoot; you of course always are so. There will be no trouble in wading in the stream, which is especially delightful at this hour of a summer's day.

Socrates/ Lead on then, and look out for a place to sit down.

Phaedrus/ You see that tall plane tree over there?

Socrates/ To be sure.

Phaedrus/ There's some shade, and a little breeze, and grass to sit down on, or lie down if we like.

Socrates/ Then make for it.

Phaedrus/ Tell me, Socrates, isn't it somewhere about here that they say Boreas seized Orithyia from the river?

Socrates/ Yes, that is the story.

Phaedrus/ Was this the actual spot? Certainly the water looks charmingly pure and clear; it's just the place for girls to be playing beside the stream.

Socrates/ No, it was about a quarter of a mile lower down. where you cross to the sanctuary of Agra; there is, I believe, an altar dedicated to Boreas close by.

Phaedrus/ I have never really noticed it, but pray tell me, Socrates, do you believe that story to be true?

Socrates/ I should be quite in the fashion if I disbelieved it. as the men of science do. I might proceed to give a scientific account of how the maiden, while at play with Pharmacia, was blown by a gust of Boreas down from the rocks hard by, and having thus met her death was said to have been seized by Boreas, though it may have happened on the Areopagus, according to another version of the occurrence. For my part, Phaedrus, I regard such theories as no doubt attractive, but as the invention of clever, industrious people who are not exactly to be envied, for the simple reason that they must then go on and tell us the real truth about the appearance of centaurs and the Chimera, not to mention a whole host of such creatures, Gorgons and Pegasuses and countless other remarkable monsters of legend flocking in on them. If our skeptic, with his somewhat crude science, means to reduce every one of them to the standard of probability, he'll need a deal of time for it. I myself have certainly no time for the business, and I'll tell you why, my friend. I can't as yet 'know myself,' as the inscription at Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters. Consequently I don't bother about such things, but

accept the current beliefs about them, and direct my inquiries, as I have just said, rather to myself, to discover whether I really am a more complex creature and more puffed up with pride than Typhon, or a simpler, gentler being whom heaven has blessed with a quiet, un-Typhonic nature. By the way, isn't this the tree we were making for?

Phaedrus/ Yes, that's the one.

Socrates/ Upon my word, a delightful resting place, with this tall, spreading plane, and a lovely shade from the high branches of the *agnos.* Now that it's in full flower, it will make the place ever so fragrant. And what a lovely stream under the plane tree, and how cool to the feet! Judging by the statuettes and images I should say it's consecrated to Achelous and some of the nymphs. And then too, isn't the freshness of the air most welcome and pleasant, and the shrill summery music of the cicada choir! And as crowning delight the grass, thick enough on a gentle slope to rest your head on most comfortably. In fact, my dear Phaedrus, you have been the stranger's perfect guide.

Phaedrus/ Whereas you, my excellent friend, strike me as the oddest of men. Anyone would take you, as you say, for a stranger being shown the country by a guide instead of a native—never leaving town to cross the frontier nor even, I believe, so much as setting foot outside the walls.

Socrates/ You must forgive me, dear friend; I'm a lover of learning, and trees and open country won't teach me anything, whereas men in the town do. Yet you seem to have discovered a recipe for getting me out. A hungry animal can be driven by dangling a carrot or a bit of green-stuff in front of it; similarly if you proffer me volumes of speeches I don't doubt you can cart me all round Attica, and anywhere else you please. Anyhow, now that we've got here I propose for

the time being to lie down, and you can choose whatever posture you think most convenient for reading, and proceed.

Phaedrus/ Here you are then.

You know how I am situated, and I have told you that I think it to our advantage that this should happen. Now I claim that I should not be refused what I ask simply because I am not your lover. Lovers, when their craving is at an end, repent of such benefits as they have conferred, but for the other sort no occasion arises for regretting what has passed. For being free agents under no constraint, they regulate their services by the scale of their means, with an eye to their own personal interest. Again, lovers weigh up profit and loss accruing to their account by reason of their passion, and with the extra item of labor expended decide that they have long since made full payment for favors received, whereas the nonlovers cannot allege any consequential neglect of their personal affairs, nor record any past exertions on the debit side, nor yet complain of having quarreled with their relatives; hence, with all these troubles removed, all they have left to do is to devote their energies to such conduct as they conceive likely to gratify the other party.

Again, it is argued that a lover ought to be highly valued because he professes to be especially kind toward the loved one, and ready to gratify him in words and deeds while arousing the dislike of everyone else. If this is true, however, it is obvious that he will set greater store by the loved one of tomorrow than by that of today, and will doubtless do an injury to the old love if required by the new.

And really, what sense is there in lavishing what is so precious upon one laboring under an affliction which nobody who knew anything of it would even attempt to remove? Why, the man himself admits that he is not sound, but sick, that he is aware of his folly, but cannot control himself. How

then, when he comes to his senses, is he likely to approve of the intentions that he formed in his aberration?

And observe this. If you are to choose the best of a number of lovers, your choice will be only among a few, whereas a general choice of the person who most commends himself to you gives you a wide field, so that in that wide field you have a much better prospect of finding someone worthy of your friendship.

Now maybe you respect established conventions, and anticipate odium if people get to hear about you; if so, it may be expected that a lover, conceiving that everyone will admire him as he admires himself, will be proud to talk about it and flatter his vanity by declaring to all and sundry that his enterprise has been successful, whereas the other type, who can control themselves, will prefer to do what is best rather than shine in the eyes of their neighbors.

Again, a lover is bound to be heard about and seen by many people, consorting with his beloved and caring about little else, so that when they are observed talking to one another, the meeting is taken to imply the satisfaction, actual or prospective, of their desires, whereas, with the other sort, no one ever thinks of putting a bad construction on their association, realizing that a man must have someone to talk to by way of friendship or gratification of one sort or another.

And observe this. Perhaps you feel troubled by the reflection that it is hard for friendship to be preserved, and that whereas a quarrel arising from other sources will be a calamity shared by both parties, one that follows the sacrifice of your all will involve a grievous hurt to yourself; in that case it is doubtless the lover who should cause you the more alarm, for he is very ready to take offense, and thinks the whole affair is to his own hurt. Hence he

discourages his beloved from consorting with anyone else, fearing that a wealthy rival may overreach him with his money, or a cultured one outdo him with his intelligence, and he is perpetually on guard against the influence of those who possess other advantages. So by persuading you to become estranged from such rivals he leaves you without a friend in the world; alternatively, if you look to your own interest and show more good sense than your lover, you will find yourself quarreling with him. On the other hand, one who is not a lover, but has achieved what he asked of you by reason of his merit, will not be jealous of others who seek your society, but will rather detest those who avoid it, in the belief that the latter look down on him, whereas the former are serving his turn. Consequently the object of his attentions is far more likely to make friends than enemies out of the affair.

And observe this. A lover more often than not wants to possess you before he has come to know your character or become familiar with your general personality, and that makes it uncertain whether he will still want to be your friend when his desires have waned, whereas in the other case, the fact that the pair were already friends before the affair took place makes it probable that instead of friendship diminishing as the result of favors received, these favors will abide as a memory and promise of more to come.

And observe this. It ought to be for your betterment to listen to me rather than to a lover, for a lover commends anything you say or do even when it is amiss, partly from fear that he may offend you, partly because his passion impairs his own judgment. For the record of Love's achievement is, first, that when things go badly, he makes a man count that an affliction which normally causes no distress; secondly, that when things go well, he compels his subjects to extol things that ought not to gratify them, which

makes it fitting that they should be pitied far more than admired by the objects of their passion. On the other hand, if you listen to me, my intercourse with you will be a matter of ministering not to your immediate pleasure but to your future advantage, for I am the master of myself, rather than the victim of love; I do not bring bitter enmity upon myself by resenting trifling offenses. On the contrary, it is only on account of serious wrongs that I am moved, and that but slowly, to mild indignation, pardoning what is done unintentionally, and endeavoring to hinder what is done of intent, for these are the tokens of lasting friendship. If however you are disposed to think that there can be no firm friendship save with a lover, you should reflect that in that case we should a not set store by sons, or fathers, or mothers, nor should we possess any trustworthy friends. No, it is not to erotic passion that we owe these, but to conduct of a different order.

Again, if we ought to favor those who press us most strongly, then in other matters too we should give our good offices not to the worthiest people but to the most destitute, for since their distress is the greatest, they will be the most thankful to us for relieving them. And observe this further consequence. When we give private banquets, the right people to invite will be not our friends but beggars and those in need of a good meal, for it is they that will be fond of us and attend upon us and flock to our doors; it is they that will be most delighted and most grateful and call down blessings on our heads. No, the proper course, surely, is to show favor not to the most importunate but to those most able to make us a return—not to mere beggars, but to the deserving; not to those who will regale themselves with your youthful beauty, but to those who will let you share their prosperity when you are older; not to those who, when they have had their will of you, will flatter their vanity by telling

the world, but to those who will keep a strict and modest silence; not to those who are devoted to you for a brief period, but to those who will continue to be your friends as long as you live; not to those who, when their passion is spent, will look for an excuse to turn against you, but to those who, when your beauty is past, will make that the time for displaying their own goodness.

Do you therefore be mindful of what I have said and reflect that, while lovers are admonished by their friends and relatives for the wrongness of their conduct, the other sort have never been reproached by one of their family on the score of behaving to the detriment of their own interest.

Perhaps you will ask me whether I recommend you to accord your favors to all and sundry of this sort. Well, I do not suppose that even a lover would bid you to be favorable toward all and sundry lovers; in the first place a recipient would not regard it as meriting so much gratitude, and in the second you would find it more difficult if you wished to keep your affairs concealed, and what is wanted is that the business should involve no harm, but mutual advantage.

And now I think I have said all that is needed; if you think I have neglected anything, and want more, let me know.

What do you think of the speech, Socrates? Isn't it extraordinarily fine, especially in point of language?

Socrates/ Amazingly fine indeed, my friend. I was thrilled by it. And it was you, Phaedrus, that made me feel as I did. I watched your apparent delight in the words as you read. And as I'm sure that you understand such matters better than I do, I took my cue from you, arid therefore joined in the ecstasy of my right worshipful companion.

Phaedrus/ Come, come! Do you mean to make a joke of it?

Socrates/ Do you think I am joking, and don't mean it seriously?

Phaedrus/ No more of that, Socrates. Tell me truly, as one friend to another, do you think there is anyone in Greece who could make a finer and more exhaustive speech on the same subject?

Socrates/ What? Are you and I required to extol the speech not merely on the score of its author's lucidity and terseness of expression, and his consistently precise and well-polished vocabulary, but also for his having said what he ought? If we are, we shall have to allow it only on your account, for my feeble intelligence failed to appreciate it; I was only attending to it as a piece of rhetoric, and as such I couldn't think that even Lysias himself would deem it adequate. Perhaps you won't agree with me, Phaedrus, but really it seemed to me that he said the same things several times over. Maybe he's not very clever at expatiating at length on a single theme, or possibly he has no interest in such topics. In fact it struck me as an extravagant performance, to demonstrate his ability to say the same thing twice, in different words but with equal success.

Phaedrus/ Not a bit of it, Socrates. The outstanding feature of the discourse is just this, that it has not overlooked any important aspect of the subject, so making it impossible for anyone else to outdo what he has said with a fuller or more satisfactory oration.

Socrates/ If you go as far as that I shall find it impossible to agree with you; if I were to assent out of politeness, I should be confuted by the wise men and women who in past ages have spoken and written on this theme.

Phaedrus/ To whom do you refer? Where have you heard anything better than this?

Socrates/ I can't tell you offhand, but I'm sure I have heard something better, from the fair Sappho maybe, or the wise Anacreon, or perhaps some prose writer. What ground, you may ask, have I for saying so? Good sir, there is something welling up within my breast, which makes me feel that I could find something different, and something better, to say. I am of course well aware it can't be anything originating in my own mind, for I know my own ignorance; so I suppose it can only be that it has been poured into me, through my ears, as into a vessel, from some external source, though in my stupid fashion I have actually forgotten how, and from whom, I heard it.

Phaedrus/ Well said! You move me to admiration. I don't mind your not telling me, even though I should press you, from whom and how you heard it, provided you do just what you say. You have undertaken to make a better speech than that in the book here and one of not less length which shall owe nothing to it; I in my turn undertake like the nine Archons to set up at Delphi a golden life-sized statue, not only of myself but of you also.

Socrates/ How kind you are, Phaedrus, and what a pattern of golden-age simplicity, in supposing me to mean that Lysias has wholly missed the mark and that another speech could avoid all his points! Surely that couldn't be so even with the most worthless of writers. Thus, as regards the subject of the speech, do you imagine that anybody could argue that the nonlover should be favored, rather than the lover, without praising the wisdom of the one and censuring the folly of the other? That he could dispense with these essential points, and then bring up something different? No, no, surely we must allow such arguments, and forgive the orator for using them, and in that sort of field what merits praise is not invention, but arrangement; but when it comes

to nonessential points, that are difficult to invent, we should praise arrangement and invention too.

Phaedrus/ I agree. What you say seems fair enough. For my part, this is what I will do. I will allow you to take it for granted that the lover is less sane than the nonlover, and for the rest, if you can replace what we have here by a fuller speech of superior merit, up with your statue in wrought gold beside the offering of the Cypselids at Olympia.

Socrates/ Have you taken me seriously, Phaedrus, for teasing you with an attack on your darling Lysias? Can you possibly suppose that I shall make a real attempt to rival his cleverness with something more ornate?

Phaedrus/ As to that, my friend, I've got you where I can return your fire. Assuredly you must do what you can in the way of a speech, or else we shall be driven, like vulgar comedians, to capping each other's remarks. Beware. Do not deliberately compel me to utter the words, ‘Don't I know my Socrates? If not, I've forgotten my own identity,' or ‘He wanted to speak, but made difficulties about it.' No, make up your mind that we're not going to leave this spot until you have delivered yourself of what you told me you had within your breast. We are by ourselves in a lonely place, and I am stronger and younger than you, for all which reasons ‘mistake not thou my bidding' and please don't make me use force to open your lips.

Socrates/ But, my dear good Phaedrus, it will be courting ridicule for an amateur like me to improvise on the same theme as an accomplished writer.

Phaedrus/ Look here, I'll have no more of this affectation, for I'm pretty sure I have something to say which will compel you to speak.

Socrates/ Then please don't say it.

Phaedrus/ Oh, but I shall, here and now, and what I say will be on oath. I swear to you by—but by whom, by what god? Or shall it be by this plane tree? I swear that unless you deliver your speech here in its very presence, I will assuredly never again declaim nor report any other speech by any author whatsoever.

Socrates/ Aha, you rogue! How clever of you to discover the means of compelling a lover of discourse to do your bidding!

Phaedrus/ Then why all this twisting?

Socrates/ I give it up, in view of what you've sworn. For how could I possibly do without such entertainment?

Phaedrus/ Then proceed.

Socrates/ Well, do you know what I'm going to do?

Phaedrus/ Do about what?

Socrates/ I shall cover my head before I begin; then I can rush through my speech at top speed without looking at you and breaking down for shame.

Phaedrus/ You can do anything else you like, provided you make your speech.

Socrates/ Come then, ye clear-voiced Muses, whether it be from the nature of your song, or from the musical people of Liguria that ye came to be so styled, ‘assist the tale I tell' under compulsion by my good friend here, to the end that he may think yet more highly of one dear to him, whom he already accounts a man of wisdom.

Well then, once upon a time there was a very handsome boy, or rather young man, who had a host of lovers, and one of them was wily, and had persuaded the boy that he was not in love with him, though really he was, quite as much as the others. And on one occasion, in pressing his suit he actually sought to convince him that he ought to favor a

nonlover rather than a lover. And this is the purport of what he said.

My boy, if anyone means to deliberate successfully about anything, there is one thing he must do at the outset. He must know what it is he is deliberating about; otherwise he is bound to go utterly astray. Now most people fail to realize that they don't know what this or that really is; consequently when they start discussing something, they dispense with any agreed definition, assuming that they know the thing; then later on they naturally find, to their cost, that they agree neither with each other nor with themselves. That being so, you and I would do well to avoid what we charge against other people, and as the question before us is whether one should preferably consort with a lover or a nonlover, we ought to agree upon a definition of love which shows its nature and its effects. so that we may have it before our minds as something to refer to while we discuss whether love is beneficial or injurious.

Well now, it is plain to everyone that love is some sort of desire, and further we know that men desire that which is fair without being lovers. How then are we to distinguish one who loves from one who does not? We must go on to observe that within each one of us there are two sorts of ruling or guiding principle that we follow. One is an innate desire for pleasure, the other an acquired judgment that aims at what is best. Sometimes these internal guides are in accord, sometimes at variance; now one gains the mastery, now the other. And when judgment guides us rationally toward what is best, and has the mastery, that mastery is called temperance, but when desire drags us irrationally toward pleasure, and has come to rule within us, the name given to that rule is wantonness. But in truth wantonness itself has many names, as it has many branches or forms, and when one of these forms is conspicuously present in a man it

makes that man bear its name, a name that it is no credit or distinction to possess. If it be in the matter of food that desire has the mastery over judgment of what is for the best, and over all other desires, it is called gluttony, and the person in question will be called a glutton, or again if desire has achieved domination in the matter of drink, it is plain what term we shall apply to its subject who is led down that path, and no less plain what are the appropriate names in the case of other such persons and of other such desires, according as this one or that holds sway.

Now the reason for saying all this can hardly remain in doubt; yet even so a statement of it will be illuminating. When irrational desire, pursuing the enjoyment of beauty, has gained the mastery over judgment that prompts to right conduct, and has acquired from other desires, akin to it, fresh strength to strain toward bodily beauty, that very strength provides it with its name—it is the strong passion called love.

Well, Phaedrus my friend, do you think, as I do, that I am divinely inspired?

Phaedrus/ Undoubtedly, Socrates, you have been vouchsafed a quite unusual eloquence.

Socrates/ Then listen to me in silence. For truly there seems to be a divine presence in this spot, so that you must not be surprised if, as my speech proceeds, I become as one possessed; already my style is not far from dithyrambic.

Phaedrus/ Very true.

Socrates/ But for that you are responsible. Still, let me continue; possibly the menace may be averted. However, that must be as God wills, our business is to resume our address to the boy.

Very well then, my good friend, the true nature of that on which we have to deliberate has been stated and defined,

and so, with that definition in mind, we may go on to say what advantage or detriment may be expected to result to one who accords his favor to a lover and a nonlover, respectively.

Now a man who is dominated by desire and enslaved to pleasure is of course bound to aim at getting the greatest possible pleasure out of his beloved, and what pleases a sick man is anything that does not thwart him, whereas anything that is as strong as, or stronger than, himself gives him offense. Hence he will not, if he can avoid it, put up with a favorite that matches or outdoes him in strength, but will always seek to make him weaker and feebler, and weakness is found in the ignorant, the cowardly, the poor speaker, the slow thinker, as against the wise, the brave, the eloquent, the quick-minded. All these defects of mind and more in the beloved are bound to be a source of pleasure to the lover; if they do not exist already as innate qualities, he will cultivate them, for not to do so means depriving himself of immediate pleasure. And of course he is bound to be jealous, constantly debarring the boy not only, to his great injury, from the advantages of consorting with others, which would make a real man of him, but, greatest injury of all, from consorting with that which would most increase his wisdom—by which I mean divine philosophy. No access to that can possibly be permitted by the lover, for he dreads becoming thereby an object of contempt. And in general he must aim at making the boy totally ignorant and totally dependent on his lover, by way of securing the maximum of pleasure for himself, and the maximum of damage to the other.

Hence in respect of the boy's mind it is anything but a profitable investment to have as guardian or partner a man in love.

After the mind, the body; we must see what sort of physical condition will be fostered, and how it will be

fostered, in the boy that has become the possession of one who is under compulsion to pursue pleasure instead of goodness. We shall find him, of course, pursuing a weakling rather than a sturdy boy, one who has had a cozy, sheltered upbringing instead of being exposed to the open air, who has given himself up to a soft unmanly life instead of the toil and sweat of manly exercise, who for lack of natural charm tricks himself out a with artificial cosmetics, and resorts to all sorts of other similar practices which are too obvious to need further enumeration. Yet before leaving the topic we may sum it up in a sentence. The boy will be of that physical type which in wartime, and other times that try a man's mettle, inspires confidence in his enemies and alarm in his friends, aye and in his very lovers too.

And now let us pass from these obvious considerations and raise the next question. What advantage or detriment in respect of property and possessions shall we find resulting from the society and guardianship of a lover? Well, one thing is plain enough to anyone, and especially to the lover, namely that his foremost wish will be for the boy to be bereft of his dearest possessions, his treasury of kindness and ideal affection—father and mother, kinsmen and friends—he will want him to be robbed of them all, as likely to make difficulties and raise objections to the intercourse which he finds so pleasant. If however the boy possesses property, in money or whatever it may be, he will reckon that he will not be so easy to capture, or if captured to manage; hence a lover is bound to nurse a grudge against one who possesses property, and to rejoice when he loses it. Furthermore he will want his beloved to remain as long as possible without wife or child or home, so as to enjoy for as long as may be his own delights.

There are, to be sure, other evils in life, but with most of them heaven has mixed some momentary pleasure. Thus in

the parasite, a fearsome and most pernicious creature, nature has mingled a dash of pleasing wit or charm; a courtesan may well be branded as pernicious, not to mention many other similar creatures with their respective callings; yet in everyday life they can be very agreeable, but a lover, besides being pernicious, is the most disagreeable of all men for a boy to spend his days with. There's an old saying about ‘not matching May with December,' based, I suppose, on the idea that similarity of age tends to similarity of pleasures and consequently makes a couple good friends; still even with such a couple the association is apt to pall. Then again, in addition to the dissimilarity of age, there is that compulsion which is burdensome for anybody in any circumstances, but especially so in the relations of such a pair.

The elderly lover will not, if he can help it, suffer any desertion by his beloved by day or by night; he is driven on by a compelling, goading power, lured by the continual promise of pleasure in the sight, hearing, touching, or other physical experience of the beloved; to minister unfailingly to the boy's needs is his delight. But what pleasure or what solace will he have to offer to the beloved? How will he save him from experiencing the extremity of discomfort in those long hours at his lover's side, as he looks upon a face which years have robbed of its beauty, together with other consequences which it is unpleasant even to hear mentioned, let alone to have continually to cope with in stark reality. And what of the suspicious precautions with which he is incessantly guarded, with whomsoever he associates, the unseasonable fulsome compliments to which he has to listen, alternating with reproaches which when uttered in soberness are hard to endure, but coming from one in his cups, in language of unlimited, undisguised coarseness, are both intolerable and disgusting?

To continue, if while his love lasts he is harmful and offensive, in later days, when it is spent, he will show his bad faith. He was lavish with promises, interspersed among his vows and entreaties, regarding those later days, contriving with some difficulty to secure his partner's endurance of an intercourse which even then was burdensome, by holding out hopes of benefits to come. But when the time comes for fulfilling the promises, a new authority takes the place within him of the former ruler; love and passion are replaced by wisdom and temperance; he has become a different person. But the boy does not realize it, and demands a return for what he gave in the past, reminding him of what had been done and said, as though he were talking to the same person, while the erstwhile lover, who has now acquired wisdom and temperance, cannot for very shame bring himself to declare that he has become a new man, nor yet see his way to redeeming the solemn assurances and promises made under the old regime of folly; he fears that if he were to go on acting as before he would revert to his old character, his former self. So he runs away from his obligations as one compelled to default; it's 'tails' this time instead of 'heads,' and he has to turn tail and rush away. But the boy must needs run after him, crying indignantly to high heaven, though from start to finish he has never understood that he ought not to have yielded to a lover inevitably devoid of reason, but far rather to one possessed of reason and not in love. He should have known that the wrong choice must mean surrendering himself to a faithless, peevish, jealous, and offensive captor, to one who would ruin his property, ruin his physique, and above all ruin his spiritual development, which is assuredly and ever will be of supreme value in the sight of gods and men alike.

Let that then, my boy, be your lesson. Be sure that the attentions of a lover carry no good will; they are no more

than a glutting of his appetite, for ‘As wolf to lamb, so lover to his lad.'

There, I knew I should [break out into verse], Phaedrus. Not a word more shall you have from me; let that be the end of my discourse.

Phaedrus/ Why, I thought you were only halfway through and would have an equal amount to say about the nonlover, enumerating his good points and showing that he should be the favored suitor. Why is it, Socrates, that instead of that you break off?

Socrates/ My dear good man, haven't you noticed that I've got beyond dithyramb, and am breaking out into epic verse, despite my faultfinding? What do you suppose I shall do if I start extolling the other type? Don't you see that I shall clearly be possessed by those nymphs into whose clutches you deliberately threw me? I therefore tell you, in one short sentence, that to each evil for which I have abused the one party there is a corresponding good belonging to the other. So why waste words? All has been said that needs saying about them both. And that being so, my story can be left to the fate appropriate to it, and I will take myself off across the river here before you drive me to greater lengths.

Phaedrus/ Oh, but you must wait until it gets cooler, Socrates. Don't you realize that it's just about the hour of ‘scorching noonday,' as the phrase goes? Let us wait and discuss what we've heard; when it has got cool perhaps we will go.

Socrates/ Phaedrus, your enthusiasm for discourse is sublime, and really moves me to admiration. Of the discourses pronounced during your lifetime no one, I fancy, has been responsible for more than you, whether by delivering them yourself or by compelling others to do so by one means or another—with one exception, Simmias of

Thebes; you are well ahead of all the rest. And now it seems that once more you are the cause of my having to deliver myself.

Phaedrus/ It might be a lot worse! But how so? To what do you refer?

Socrates/ At the moment when I was about to cross the river, dear friend, there came to me my familiar divine sign—which always checks me when on the point of doing something or other—and all at once I seemed to hear a voice, forbidding me to leave the spot until I had made atonement for some offense to heaven. Now, you must know, I am a seer—not a very good one, it's true, but, like a poor scholar, good enough for my own purposes—hence I understand already well enough what my offense was. The fact is, you know, Phaedrus, the mind itself has a kind of divining power, for I felt disturbed some while ago as I was delivering that speech, and had a misgiving lest I might, in the words of Ibycus, 'By sinning in the sight of God win high renown from man.' But now I realize my sin.

Phaedrus/ And what is it?

Socrates/ That was a terrible theory, Phaedrus, a terrible theory that you introduced and compelled me to expound.

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ It was foolish, and somewhat blasphemous, and what could be more terrible than that?

Phaedrus/ I agree, if it merits your description.

Socrates/ Well, do you not hold Love to be a god, the child of Aphrodite?

Phaedrus/ He is certainly said to be.

Socrates/ But not according to Lysias, and not according to that discourse of yours which you caused my lips to utter by putting a spell on them. If Love is, as he is indeed, a god

or a divine being, he cannot be an evil thing; yet this pair of speeches treated him as evil. That then was their offense toward Love, to which was added the most exquisite folly of parading their pernicious rubbish as though it were good sense because it might deceive a few miserable people and win their applause.

And so, my friend, I have to purify myself. Now for such as offend in speaking of gods and heroes there is an ancient mode of purification, which was known to Stesichorus, though not to Homer. When Stesichorus lost the sight of his eyes because of his defamation of Helen, he was not, like Homer, at a loss to know why. As a true artist he understood the reason, and promptly wrote the lines :

> False, false the tale. Thou never didst sail in the well-decked ships Nor come to the towers of Troy.

And after finishing the composition of his so-called palinode he straightway recovered his sight. Now it's here that I shall show greater wisdom than these poets. I shall attempt to make my due palinode to Love before any harm comes to me for my defamation of him, and no longer veiling my head for shame, but uncovered.

Phaedrus/ Nothing you could say, Socrates, would please me more.

Socrates/ Yes, dear Phaedrus, you understand how irreverent the two speeches were, the one in the book and that which followed. Suppose we were being listened to by a man of generous and humane character, who loved or had once loved another such as himself. Suppose he heard us saying that for some trifling cause lovers conceive bitter hatred and a spirit of malice and injury toward their loved ones. Wouldn't he be sure to think that we had been brought up among the scum of the people and had never seen a case

of noble love? Wouldn't he utterly refuse to accept our vilification of Love?

Phaedrus/ Indeed, Socrates, he well might.

Socrates/ Then out of respect for him, and in awe of Love himself, I should like to wash the bitter taste out of my mouth with a draught of wholesome discourse, and my advice to Lysias is that he should lose no time in telling us that, other things being equal, favor should be accorded to the lover rather than to the nonlover.

Phaedrus/ Rest assured; that will be done. When you have delivered your encomium of the lover, I shall most certainly make Lysias compose a new speech to the same purport.

Socrates/ I'm sure of that, so long as you continue to be the man you are.

Phaedrus/ Then you may confidently proceed.

Socrates/ Where is that boy I was talking to? He must listen to me once more, and not rush off to yield to his nonlover before he hears what I have to say.

Phaedrus/ Here he is, quite close beside you, whenever you want him.

Socrates/ Now you must understand, fair boy, that whereas the preceding discourse was by Phaedrus, son of Pythocles, of Myrrhinus, that which I shall now pronounce is by Stesichorus, son of Euphemus, of Himera. This then is how it must run.

'False is the tale' that when a lover is at hand favor ought rather to be accorded to one who does not love, on the ground that the former is mad, and the latter sound of mind. That would be right if it were an invariable truth that madness is an evil, but in reality, the greatest blessings come by way of madness, indeed of madness that is heaven-sent. It was when they were mad that the prophetess at

Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona achieved so much for which both states and individuals in Greece are thankful; when sane they did little or nothing. As for the Sibyl and others who by the power of inspired prophecy have so often foretold the future to so many, and guided them aright, I need not dwell on what is obvious to everyone. Yet it is in place to appeal to the fact that madness was accounted no shame nor disgrace by the men of old who gave things their names; otherwise they would not have connected that greatest of arts, whereby the future is discerned, with this very word 'madness,' and named it accordingly. No, it was because they held madness to be a valuable gift, when due to divine dispensation, that they named that art as they did, though the men of today, having no sense of values, have put in an extra letter, making it not *manic* but *mantic*. That is borne out by the name they gave to the art of those sane prophets who inquire into the future by means of birds and other signs; the name was '*oionoistic*,' which by its components indicated that the prophet attained understanding and information by a purely human activity of thought belonging to his own intelligence, though a younger generation has come to call it '*oionistic*,' lengthening the quantity of the o to make it sound impressive. You see then what this ancient evidence attests. Corresponding to the superior perfection and value of the prophecy of inspiration over that of omen reading, both in name and in fact, is the superiority of heaven-sent madness over man-made sanity.

And in the second place, when grievous maladies and afflictions have beset certain families by reason of some ancient sin, madness has appeared among them, and breaking out into prophecy has secured relief by finding the means thereto, namely by recourse to prayer and worship, and in consequence thereof rites and means of purification

were established, and the sufferer was brought out of danger, alike for the present and for the future. Thus did madness secure, for him that was maddened aright and possessed, deliverance from his troubles.

There is a third form of possession or madness, of which the Muses are the source. This seizes a tender, virgin soul and stimulates it to rapt passionate expression, especially in lyric poetry, glorifying the countless mighty deeds of ancient times for the instruction of posterity. But if any man come to the gates of poetry without the madness of the Muses, persuaded that skill alone will make him a good poet, then shall he and his works of sanity with him be brought to naught by the poetry of madness, and behold, their place is nowhere to be found.

Such then is the tale, though I have not told it fully, of the achievements wrought by madness that comes from the gods. So let us have no fears simply on that score; let us not be disturbed by an argument that seeks to scare us into preferring the friendship of the sane to that of the passionate. For there is something more that it must prove if it is to carry the day, namely that love is not a thing sent from heaven for the advantage both of lover and beloved. What we have to prove is the opposite, namely that this sort of madness is a gift of the gods, fraught with the highest bliss. And our proof assuredly will prevail with the wise, though not with the learned.

Now our first step toward attaining the truth of the matter is to discern the nature of soul, divine and human, its experiences, and its activities. Here then our proof begins.

All soul is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal. But that which while imparting motion is itself moved by something else can cease to be in motion, and therefore can cease to live; it is only that which moves itself

that never intermits its motion, inasmuch as it cannot abandon its own nature; moreover this self-mover is the source and first principle of motion for all other things that are moved. Now a first principle cannot come into being, for while anything that comes to be must come to be from a first principle, the latter itself cannot come to be from anything whatsoever; if it did, it would cease any longer to be a first principle. Furthermore, since it does not come into being, it must be imperishable, for assuredly if a first principle were to be destroyed, nothing could come to be out of it, nor could anything bring the principle itself back into existence, seeing that a first principle is needed for anything to come into being.

The self-mover, then, is the first principle of motion, and it is as impossible that it should be destroyed as that it should come into being : were it otherwise, the whole universe, the whole of that which comes to be, would collapse into immobility, and never find another source of motion to bring it back into being.

And now that we have seen that that which is moved by itself is immortal, we shall feel no scruple in affirming that precisely that is the essence and definition of soul, to wit, self-motion. Anybody that has an external source of motion is soulless, but a body deriving its motion from a source within itself is animate or *besouled,* which implies that the nature of soul is what has been said.

And if this last assertion is correct, namely that 'that which moves itself' is precisely identifiable with soul, it must follow that soul is not born and does not die.

As to soul's immortality then we have said enough, but as to its nature there is this that must be said. What manner of thing it is would be a long tale to tell, and most assuredly a god alone could tell it, but what it resembles, that a man

might tell in briefer compass. Let this therefore be our manner of discourse. Let it be likened to the union of powers in a team of winged steeds and their winged charioteer. Now all the gods' steeds and all their charioteers are good, and of good stock, but with other beings it is not wholly so. With us men, in the first place, it is a pair of steeds that the charioteer controls; moreover one of them is noble and good, and of good stock, while the other has the opposite character, and his stock is opposite. Hence the task of our charioteer is difficult and troublesome.

And now we must essay to tell how it is that living beings are called mortal and immortal. All soul has the care of all that is inanimate, and traverses the whole universe, though in ever-changing forms. Thus when it is perfect and winged it journeys on high and controls the whole world, but one that has shed its wings sinks down until it can fasten on something solid, and settling there it takes to itself an earthy body which seems by reason of the soul's power to move itself. This composite structure of soul and body is called a living being, and is further termed ‘mortal'; ‘immortal' is a term applied on no basis of reasoned argument at all, but our fancy pictures the god whom we have never seen, nor fully conceived, as an immortal living being, possessed of a soul and a body united for all time. Howbeit, let these matters, and our account thereof, be as God pleases; what we must understand is the reason why the soul's wings fall from it, and are lost. It is on this wise.

The natural property of a wing is to raise that which is heavy and carry it aloft to the region where the gods dwell, and more than any other bodily part it shares in the divine nature, which is fair, wise, and good, and possessed of all other such excellences. Now by these excellences especially is the soul's plumage nourished and fostered, while by their opposites, even by ugliness and evil, it is wasted and

destroyed. And behold, there in the heaven Zeus, mighty leader, drives his winged team. First of the host of gods and daemons he proceeds, ordering all things and caring therefore, and the host follows after him, marshaled in eleven companies. For Hestia abides alone in the gods' dwelling place, but for the rest, all such as are ranked in the number of the twelve as ruler gods lead their several companies, each according to his rank.

Now within the heavens are many spectacles of bliss upon the highways whereon the blessed gods pass to and fro, each doing his own work, and with them are all such as will and can follow them, for jealousy has no place in the choir divine. But at such times as they go to their feasting and banquet, behold they climb the steep ascent even unto the summit of the arch that supports the heavens, and easy is that ascent for the chariots of the gods, for they are well balanced and readily guided. But for the others it is hard, by reason of the heaviness of the steed of wickedness, which pulls down his driver with his weight, except that driver have schooled him well.

And now there awaits the soul the extreme of her toil and struggling. For the souls that are called immortal, so soon as they are at the summit, come forth and stand upon the back of the world, and straightway the revolving heaven carries them round, and they look upon the regions without.

Of that place beyond the heavens none of our earthly poets has yet sung, and none shall sing worthily. But this is the manner of it, for assuredly we must be bold to speak what is true, above all when our discourse is upon truth. It is there that true being dwells, without color or shape, that cannot be touched; reason alone, the soul's pilot, can behold it, and all true knowledge is knowledge thereof. Now even as the mind of a god is nourished by reason and knowledge, so also is it with every soul that has a care to receive her proper

food; wherefore when at last she has beheld being she is well content, and contemplating truth she is nourished and prospers, until the heaven's revolution brings her back full circle. And while she is borne round she discerns justice, its very self, and likewise temperance, and knowledge, not the knowledge that is neighbor to becoming and varies with the various objects to which we commonly ascribe being, but the veritable knowledge of being that veritably is. And when she has contemplated likewise and feasted upon all else that has true being, she descends again within the heavens and comes back home. And having so come, her charioteer sets his steeds at their manger, and puts ambrosia before them and draught of nectar to drink withal.

Such is the life of gods. Of the other souls that which best follows a god and becomes most like thereunto raises her charioteer's head into the outer region. and is carried round with the gods in the revolution, but being confounded by her steeds she has much ado to discern the things that are; another now rises, and now sinks, and by reason of her unruly steeds sees in part, but in part sees not. As for the rest, though all are eager to reach the heights and seek to follow, they are not able; sucked down as they travel they trample and tread upon one another, this one striving to outstrip that. Thus confusion ensues, and conflict and grievous sweat. Whereupon, with their charioteers powerless, many are lamed, and many have their wings all broken, and for all their toiling they are balked, everyone, of the full vision of being, and departing therefrom, they feed upon the food of semblance.

Now the reason wherefore the souls are fain and eager to behold the plain of Truth, and discover it, lies herein—to wit, that the pasturage that is proper to their noblest part comes from that meadow, and the plumage by which they are borne aloft is nourished thereby.

Hear now the ordinance of Necessity. Whatsoever soul has followed in the train of a god, and discerned something of truth, shall be kept from sorrow until a new revolution shall begin, and if she can do this always, she shall remain always free from hurt. But when she is not able so to follow, and sees none of it, but meeting with some mischance comes to be burdened with a load of forgetfulness and wrongdoing, and because of that burden sheds her wings and falls to the earth, then thus runs the law. In her first birth she shall not be planted in any brute beast, but the soul that hath seen the most of being shall enter into the human babe that shall grow into a seeker after wisdom or beauty, a follower of the Muses and a lover; the next, having seen less, shall dwell in a king that abides by law, or a warrior and ruler; the third in a statesman, a man of business, or a trader; the fourth in an athlete, or physical trainer, or physician; the fifth shall have the life of a prophet or a Mystery priest; to the sixth that of a poet or other imitative artist shall be fittingly given; the seventh shall live in an artisan or farmer; the eighth in a Sophist or demagogue; the ninth in a tyrant.

Now in all these incarnations he who lives righteously has a better lot for his portion, and he who lives unrighteously a worse. For a soul does not return to the place whence she came for ten thousand years, since in no lesser time can she regain her wings, save only his soul who has sought after wisdom unfeignedly, or has conjoined his passion for a loved one with that seeking. Such a soul, if with three revolutions of a thousand years she has thrice chosen this philosophical life, regains thereby her wings, and speeds away after three thousand years; but the rest, when they have accomplished their first life, are brought to judgment, and after the judgment some are taken to be punished in places of chastisement beneath the earth, while others are borne aloft by Justice to a certain region of the heavens. there to live in

such manner as is merited by their past life in the flesh. And after a thousand years these and those alike come to the allotment and choice of their second life, each choosing according to her will; then does the soul of a man enter into the life of a beast, and the beast's soul that was aforetime in a man goes back to a man again. For only the soul that has beheld truth may enter into this our human form—seeing that man must needs understand the language of forms, passing from a plurality of perceptions to a unity gathered together by reasoning—and such understanding is a recollection of those things which our souls beheld aforetime as they journeyed with their god, looking down upon the things which now we suppose to be, and gazing up to that which truly is.

Therefore is it meet and right that the soul of the philosopher alone should recover her wings, for she, so far as may be, is ever near in memory to those things a god's nearness whereunto makes him truly god. Wherefore if a man makes right use of such means of remembrance, and ever approaches to the full vision of the perfect mysteries, he and he alone becomes truly perfect. Standing aside from the busy doings of mankind, and drawing nigh to the divine, he is rebuked by the multitude as being out of his wits, for they know not that he is possessed by a deity.

Mark therefore the sum and substance of all our discourse touching the fourth sort of madness—to wit, that this is the best of all forms of divine possession, both in itself and in its sources, both for him that has it and for him that shares therein—and when he that loves beauty is touched by such madness he is called a lover. Such a one, as soon as he beholds the beauty of this world, is reminded of true beauty, and his wings begin to grow; then is he fain to lift his wings and fly upward; yet he has not the power, but inasmuch as he gazes upward like a bird, and cares nothing

for the world beneath, men charge it upon him that he is demented.

Now, as we have said, every human soul has, by reason of her nature, had contemplation of true being; else would she never have entered into this human creature; but to be put in mind thereof by things here is not easy for every soul. Some, when they had the vision, had it but for a moment; some when they had fallen to earth consorted unhappily with such as led them to deeds of unrighteousness, wherefore they forgot the holy objects of their vision. Few indeed are left that can still remember much, but when these discern some likeness of the things yonder, they are amazed, and no longer masters of themselves, and know not what is come upon them by reason of their perception being dim.

Now in the earthly likenesses of justice and temperance and all other prized possessions of the soul there dwells no luster; nay, so dull are the organs wherewith men approach their images that hardly can a few behold that which is imaged, but with beauty it is otherwise. Beauty it was ours to see in all its brightness in those days when, amidst that happy company, we beheld with our eyes that blessed vision, ourselves in the train of Zeus, others following some other god; then were we all initiated into that mystery which is rightly accounted blessed beyond all others; whole and unblemished were we that did celebrate it, untouched by the evils that awaited us in days to come; whole and unblemished likewise, free from all alloy, steadfast and blissful were the spectacles on which we gazed in the moment of final revelation; pure was the light that shone around us, and pure were we, without taint of that prison house which now we are encompassed withal, and call a body, fast bound therein as an oyster in its shell.

There let it rest then, our tribute to a memory that has stirred us to linger awhile on those former joys for which we

yearn. Now beauty, as we said, shone bright amidst these visions, and in this world below we apprehend it through the clearest of our senses, clear and resplendent. For sight is the keenest mode of perception vouchsafed us through the body; wisdom, indeed, we cannot see thereby—how passionate had been our desire for her, if she had granted us so clear an image of herself to gaze upon—nor yet any other of those beloved objects, save only beauty; for beauty alone this has been ordained, to be most manifest to sense and most lovely of them all.

Now he whose vision of the mystery is long past, or whose purity has been sullied, cannot pass swiftly hence to see beauty's self, yonder, when he beholds that which is called beautiful here; wherefore he looks upon it with no reverence, and surrendering to pleasure he essays to go after the fashion of a four-footed beast, and to beget offspring of the flesh, or consorting with wantonness he has no fear, nor shame in running after unnatural pleasure. But when one who is fresh from the mystery, and saw much of the vision, beholds a godlike face or bodily form that truly expresses beauty, first there come upon him a shuddering and a measure of that awe which the vision inspired, and then reverence as at the sight of a god, and but for fear of being deemed a very madman he would offer sacrifice to his beloved, as to a holy image of deity. Next, with the passing of the shudder, a strange sweating and fever seizes him. For by reason of the stream of beauty entering in through his eyes there comes a warmth, whereby his soul's plumage is fostered, and with that warmth the roots of the wings are melted, which for long had been so hardened and closed up that nothing could grow; then as the nourishment is poured in, the stump of the wing swells and hastens to grow from the root over the whole substance of the soul, for aforetime the whole soul was furnished with wings. Meanwhile she

throbs with ferment in every part, and even as a teething child feels an aching and pain in its gums when a tooth has just come through, so does the soul of him who is beginning to grow his wings feel a ferment and painful irritation. Wherefore as she gazes upon the boy's beauty, she admits a flood of particles streaming therefrom—that is why we speak of a ‘flood of passion'—whereby she is warmed and fostered; then has she respite from her anguish, and is filled with joy. But when she has been parted from him and become parched, the openings of those outlets at which the wings are sprouting dry up likewise and are closed, so that the wing's germ is barred off. And behind its bars, together with the flood aforesaid, it throbs like a fevered pulse, and pricks at its proper outlet, and there at the whole soul round about is stung and goaded into anguish; howbeit she remembers the beauty of her beloved, and rejoices again. So between joy and anguish she is distraught at being in such strange case, perplexed and frenzied; with madness upon her she can neither sleep by night nor keep still by day, but runs hither and thither, yearning for him in whom beauty dwells, if haply she may behold him. At last she does behold him, and lets the flood pour in upon her, releasing the imprisoned waters; then has she refreshment and respite from her stings and sufferings, and at that moment tastes a pleasure that is sweet beyond compare. Nor will she willingly give it up. Above all others does she esteem her beloved in his beauty; mother, brother, friends, she forgets them all. Naught does she reck of losing worldly possessions through neglect. All the rules of conduct. all the graces of life, of which aforetime she was proud, she now disdains, welcoming a slave's estate and any couch where she may be suffered to lie down close beside her darling, for besides her reverence for the possessor of beauty she has found in him the only physician for her grievous suffering.

Hearken, fair boy to whom I speak. This is the experience that men term love (ερως), but when you hear what the gods call it, you will probably smile at its strangeness. There are a couple of verses on love quoted by certain Homeric scholars from the unpublished works, the second of which is remarkably bold and a trifle astray in its quantities. They run as follows :

> Eros, cleaver of air, in mortals' speech is he named,
> But, since he must grow wings, Pteros the celestials call him.

You may believe that or not, as you please; at all events the cause and the nature of the lover's experience are in fact what I have said.

Now if he whom Love has caught be among the followers of Zeus, he is able to bear the burden of the winged one with some constancy, but they that attend upon Ares, and did range the heavens in his train, when they are caught by Love and fancy that their beloved is doing them some injury, will shed blood and not scruple to offer both themselves and their loved ones in sacrifice. And so does each lover live, after the manner of the god in whose company he once was, honoring him and copying him so far as may be, so long as he remains uncorrupt and is still living in his first earthly period, and in like manner does he comport himself toward his beloved and all his other associates. And so each selects a fair one for his love after his disposition, and even as if the beloved himself were a god he fashions for himself as it were an image, and adorns it to be the object of his veneration and worship.

Thus the followers of Zeus seek a beloved who is Zeus-like in soul; wherefore they look for one who is by nature disposed to the love of wisdom and the leading of men, and when they have found him and come to love him they do all in their power to foster that disposition. And if they have not

aforetime trodden this path, they now set out upon it, learning the way from any source that may offer or finding it for themselves, and as they follow up the trace within themselves of the nature of their own god their task is made easier, inasmuch as they are constrained to fix their gaze upon him, and reaching out after him in memory they are possessed by him, and from him they take their ways and manners of life, in so far as a man can partake of a god. But all this, mark you, they attribute to the beloved, and the draughts which they draw from Zeus they pour out, like bacchants, into the soul of the beloved, thus creating in him the closest possible likeness to the god they worship.

Those who were in the train of Hera look for a royal nature, and when they have found him they do unto him all things in like fashion. And so it is with the followers of Apollo and each other god. Every lover is fain that his beloved should be of a nature like to his own god, and when he has won him, he leads him on to walk in the ways of their god, and after his likeness, patterning himself thereupon and giving counsel and discipline to the boy. There is no jealousy nor petty spitefulness in his dealings, but his every act is aimed at bringing the beloved to be every whit like unto himself and unto the god of their worship.

So therefore glorious and blissful is the endeavor of true lovers in that mystery rite, if they accomplish that which they endeavor after the fashion of which I speak, when mutual affection arises through the madness inspired by love. But the beloved must needs be captured, and the manner of that capture I will now tell.

In the beginning of our story we divided each soul into three parts, two being like steeds and the third like a charioteer. Well and good. Now of the steeds, so we declare, one is good and the other is not, but we have not described the excellence of the one nor the badness of the other, and

that is what must now be done. He that is on the more honorable side is upright and clean-limbed, carrying his neck high, with something of a hooked nose; in color he is white, with black eyes; a lover of glory, but with temperance and modesty; one that consorts with genuine renown, and needs no whip, being driven by the word of command alone. The other is crooked of frame, a massive jumble of a creature, with thick short neck, snub nose, black skin, and gray eyes; hot-blooded, consorting with wantonness and vainglory; shaggy of ear, deaf, and hard to control with whip and goad.

Now when the driver beholds the person of the beloved, and causes a sensation of warmth to suffuse the whole soul, he begins to experience a tickling or pricking of desire, and the obedient steed, constrained now as always by modesty, refrains from leaping upon the beloved. But his fellow, heeding no more the driver's goad or whip, leaps and dashes on, sorely troubling his companion and his driver, and forcing them to approach the loved one and remind him of the delights of love's commerce. For a while they struggle, indignant that he should force them to a monstrous and forbidden act, but at last, finding no end to their evil plight, they yield and agree to do his bidding. And so he draws them on, and now they are quite close and behold the spectacle of the beloved flashing upon them. At that sight the driver's memory goes back to that form of beauty, and he sees her once again enthroned by the side of temperance upon her holy seat; then in awe and reverence he falls upon his back, and therewith is compelled to pull the reins so violently that he brings both steeds down on their haunches, the good one willing and unresistant, but the wanton sore against his will. Now that they are a little way off, the good horse in shame and horror drenches the whole soul with sweat, while the other, contriving to recover his wind after the pain of the bit

and his fall, bursts into angry abuse, railing at the charioteer and his yokefellow as cowardly treacherous deserters. Once again he tries to force them to advance, and when they beg him to delay awhile he grudgingly consents. But when the time appointed is come, and they feign to have forgotten, he reminds them of it—struggling and neighing and pulling until he compels them a second time to approach the beloved and renew their offer—and when they have come close, with head down and tail stretched out he takes the bit between his teeth and shamelessly plunges on. But the driver, with resentment even stronger than before, like a racer recoiling from the starting rope, jerks back the bit in the mouth of the wanton horse with an even stronger pull, bespatters his railing tongue and his jaws with blood, and forcing him down on legs and haunches delivers him over to anguish.

And so it happens time and again, until the evil steed casts off his wantonness; humbled in the end, he obeys the counsel of his driver, and when he sees the fair beloved is like to die of fear. Wherefore at long last the soul of the lover follows after the beloved with reverence and awe.

Thus the loved one receives all manner of service, as peer of the gods, from a lover that is no pretender but loves in all sincerity; of his own nature, too, he is kindly disposed to him who pays such service. Now it may be that in time past he has been misled, by his schoolfellows or others, who told him that it is shameful to have commerce with a lover, and by reason of this he may repel his advances. Nevertheless as time goes on ripening age and the ordinance of destiny together lead him to welcome the other's society, for assuredly fate does not suffer one evil man to be friend to another, nor yet one good man to lack the friendship of another.

And now that he has come to welcome his lover and to take pleasure in his company and converse, it comes home

to him what a depth of kindliness he has found, and he is filled with amazement, for he perceives that all his other friends and kinsmen have nothing to offer in comparison with this friend in whom there dwells a god. So as he continues in this converse and society, and comes close to his lover in the gymnasium and elsewhere, that flowing stream which Zeus, as the lover of Ganymede, called the 'flood of passion,' pours in upon the lover. And part of it is absorbed within him, but when he can contain no more the rest flows away outside him, and as a breath of wind or an echo, rebounding from a smooth hard surface, goes back to its place of origin, even so the stream of beauty turns back and reenters the eyes of the fair beloved. And so by the natural channel it reaches his soul and gives it fresh vigor, watering the roots of the wings and quickening them to growth, whereby the soul of the beloved, in its turn, is filled with love. So he loves, yet knows not what he loves; he does not understand, he cannot tell what has come upon him; like one that has caught a disease of the eye from another, he cannot account for it, not realizing that his lover is as it were a mirror in which he beholds himself. And when the other is beside him, he shares his respite from anguish; when he is absent, he likewise shares his longing and being longed for, since he possesses that counter love which is the image of love, though he supposes it to be friendship rather than love, and calls it by that name. He feels a desire—like the lover's, yet not so strong—to behold, to touch, to kiss him, to share his couch, and now ere long the desire, as one might guess, leads to the act.

So when they lie side by side, the wanton horse of the lover's soul would have a word with the charioteer, claiming a little guerdon for all his trouble. The like steed in the soul of the beloved has no word to say, but, swelling with desire for he knows not what, embraces and kisses the lover, in

grateful acknowledgment of all his kindness. And when they lie by one another, he is minded not to refuse to do his part in gratifying his lover's entreaties : yet his yokefellow in turn, being moved by reverence and heedfulness, joins with the driver in resisting. And so, if the victory be won by the higher elements of mind guiding them into the ordered rule of the philosophical life, their days on earth will be blessed with happiness and concord, for the power of evil in the soul has been subjected, and the power of goodness liberated; they have won self-mastery and inward peace. And when life is over, with burden shed and wings recovered they stand victorious in the first of the three rounds in that truly Olympic struggle; nor can any nobler prize be secured whether by the wisdom that is of man or by the madness that is of god.

But if they turn to a way of life more ignoble and unphilosophical, yet covetous of honor, then mayhap in a careless hour, or when the wine is flowing, the wanton horses in their two souls will catch them off their guard, bring the pair together, and choosing that part which the multitude account blissful achieve their full desire. And this once done, they continue therein, albeit but rarely, seeing that their minds are not wholly set thereupon. Such a pair as this also are dear friends, but not so dear as that other pair, one to another, both in the time of their love and when love is past, for they feel that they have exchanged the most binding pledges, which it were a sin to break by becoming enemies. When death comes they quit the body wingless indeed, yet eager to be winged, and therefore they carry off no mean reward for their lovers' madness, for it is ordained that all such as have taken the first steps on the celestial highway shall no more return to the dark pathways beneath the earth, but shall walk together in a life of shining bliss,

and be furnished in due time with like plumage the one to the other, because of their love.

These then, my boy, are the blessings great and glorious which will come to you from the friendship of a lover. He who is not a lover can offer a mere acquaintance flavored with worldly wisdom, dispensing a niggardly measure of worldly goods; in the soul to which he is attached he will engender an ignoble quality extolled by the multitude as virtue, and condemn it to float for nine thousand years hither and thither, around the earth and beneath it, bereft of understanding.

Thus then, dear god of love, I have offered the fairest recantation and fullest atonement that my powers could compass; some of its language, in particular, was perforce poetical, to please Phaedrus. Grant me thy pardon for what went before, and thy favor for what ensued; be merciful and gracious, and take not from me the lover's talent wherewith thou hast blessed me; neither let it wither by reason of thy displeasure, but grant me still to increase in the esteem of the fair. And if anything that Phaedrus and I said earlier sounded discordant to thy ear, set it down to Lysias, the only begetter of that discourse, and staying him from discourses after this fashion turn him toward the love of wisdom, even as his brother Polemarchus has been turned. Then will his loving disciple here present no longer halt between two opinions, as now he does, but live for Love in singleness of purpose with the aid of philosophical discourse.

Phaedrus/ If that be for our good, Socrates, I join in your prayer for it. And I have this long while been filled with admiration for your speech as a far finer achievement than the one you made before. It makes me afraid that I shall find Lysias cutting a poor figure, if he proves to be willing to compete with another speech of his own. The fact is that only the other day, my dear good sir, one of our politicians was

railing at him and reproaching him on this very score, constantly dubbing him a 'speech writer'; so possibly we shall find him desisting from further composition to preserve his reputation.

Socrates/ What a ridiculous line to take, young man! And how utterly you misjudge our friend, if you suppose him to be such a timid creature! Am I to believe you really do think that the person you speak of meant his raillery as a reproach?

Phaedrus/ He gave me that impression, Socrates, and of course you know as well as I do that the men of greatest influence and dignity in political life are reluctant to write speeches and bequeath to posterity compositions of their own, for fear of the verdict of later ages, which might pronounce them Sophists.

Socrates/ Phaedrus, you are unaware that the expression 'Pleasant Bend' comes from the long bend in the Nile, and besides the matter of the Bend you are unaware that the proudest of politicians have the strongest desire to write speeches and bequeath compositions why, whenever they write a speech, they are so pleased to have admirers that they put in a special clause at the beginning with the names of the persons who admire the speech in question.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean? I don't understand.

Socrates/ You don't understand that when a politician begins a composition the first thing he writes is the name of his admirer.

Phaedrus/ Is it?

Socrates/ Yes, he says maybe, 'Resolved by the Council' or 'by the people' or by both, and then 'Proposed by so-and-so'—a pompous piece of self-advertisement on the part of the author—after which he proceeds with what he has to say, showing off his own wisdom to his admirers, sometimes in a

very lengthy composition. This sort of thing amounts, don't you think, to composing a speech?

Phaedrus/ Yes, I think it does.

Socrates/ Then if the speech holds its ground, the author quits the scene rejoicing. but if it is blotted out, and he loses his status as a recognized speech writer, he goes into mourning, and his friends with him.

Phaedrus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Which clearly implies that their attitude to the profession is not one of disdain, but of admiration.

Phaedrus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Tell me then, when an orator, or a king, succeeds in acquiring the power of a Lycurgus, a Solon, or a Darius, and so winning immortality among his people as a speech writer, doesn't he deem himself a peer of the gods while still living, and do not people of later ages hold the same opinion of him when they contemplate his writings?

Phaedrus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Then do you suppose that anyone of that type, whoever he might be, and whatever his animosity toward Lysias, could reproach him simply on the ground that he writes?

Phaedrus/ What you say certainly makes that improbable, for apparently he would be reproaching what he wanted to do himself.

Socrates/ Then the conclusion is obvious, that there is nothing shameful in the mere writing of speeches.

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But in speaking and writing shamefully and badly, instead of as one should, that is where the shame comes in, I take it.

Phaedrus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then what is the nature of good writing and bad? Is it incumbent on us, Phaedrus, to examine Lysias on this point, and all such as have written or mean to write anything at all, whether in the field of public affairs or private, whether in the verse of the poet or the plain speech of prose?

Phaedrus/ Is it incumbent! Why, life itself would hardly be worth living save for pleasures like this—certainly not for those pleasures that involve previous pain, as do almost all concerned with the body, which for that reason are rightly called slavish.

Socrates/ Well, I suppose we can spare the time, and I think too that the cicadas overhead, singing after their wont in the hot sun and conversing with one another, don't fail to observe us as well. So if they were to see us two behaving like ordinary folk at midday, not conversing but dozing lazy-minded under their spell, they would very properly have the laugh of us, taking us for a pair of slaves that had invaded their retreat like sheep, to have their midday sleep beside the spring. If however they see us conversing and steering clear of their bewitching Siren song, they might feel respect for us and grant us that boon which heaven permits them to confer upon mortals.

Phaedrus/ Oh, what is that? I don't think I have heard of it.

Socrates/ Surely it is unbecoming in a devotee of the Muses not to have heard of a thing like that! The story is that once upon a time these creatures were men—men of an age before there were any Muses—and that when the latter came into the world, and music made its appearance, some of the people of those days were so thrilled with pleasure that they went on singing, and quite forgot to eat and drink until they actually died without noticing it. From them in due course

sprang the race of cicadas, to which the Muses have granted the boon of needing no sustenance right from their birth, but of singing from the very first, without food or drink, until the day of their death, after which they go and report to the Muses how they severally are paid honor among mankind, and by whom. So for those whom they report as having honored Terpsichore in the dance they win that Muse's favor, for those that have worshiped in the rites of love the favor of Erato, and so with all the others, according to the nature of the worship paid to each. To the eldest, Calliope, and to her next sister, Urania, they tell of those who live a life of philosophy and so do honor to the music of those twain whose theme is the heavens and all the story of gods and men, and whose song is the noblest of them all.

Thus there is every reason for us not to yield to slumber in the noontide, but to pursue our talk.

Phaedrus/ Of course we must pursue it.

Socrates/ Well, the subject we proposed for inquiry just now was the nature of good and bad speaking and writing; so we are to inquire into that.

Phaedrus/ Plainly.

Socrates/ Then does not a good and successful discourse presuppose a knowledge in the mind of the speaker of the truth about his subject?

Phaedrus/ As to that, dear Socrates, what I have heard is that the intending orator is under no necessity of understanding what is truly just, but only what is likely to be thought just by the body of men who are to give judgment; nor need he know what is truly good or noble, but what will be thought so, since it is on the latter, not the former, that persuasion depends.

Socrates/ Not to be lightly rejected,' Phaedrus, is any word of the wise. Perhaps they are right; one has to see. And in particular this present assertion must not be dismissed.

Phaedrus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well, here is my suggestion for discussion.

Phaedrus/ Yes?

Socrates/ Suppose I tried to persuade you to acquire a horse to use in battle against the enemy, and suppose that neither of us knew what a horse was, but I knew this much about you, that Phaedrus believes a horse to be that tame animal which possesses the largest ears.

Phaedrus/ A ridiculous thing to suppose, Socrates.

Socrates/ Wait a moment. Suppose I continued to urge upon you in all seriousness, with a studied encomium of a donkey, that it was what I called it, a horse, that it was highly important for you to possess the creature, both at home and in the field, that it was just the animal to ride on into battle, and that it was handy, into the bargain, for carrying your equipment and so forth.

Phaedrus/ To go to that length would be utterly ridiculous.

Socrates/ Well, isn't it better to be a ridiculous friend than a clever enemy?

Phaedrus/ I suppose it is.

Socrates/ Then when a master of oratory, who is ignorant of good and evil, employs his power of persuasion on a community as ignorant as himself, not by extolling a miserable donkey as being really a horse, but by extolling evil as being really good, and when by studying the beliefs of the masses he persuades them to do evil instead of good, what kind of crop do you think his oratory is likely to reap from the seed thus sown?

Phaedrus/ A pretty poor one.

Socrates/ Well now, my good friend, have we been too scurrilous in our abuse of the art of speech? Might it not retort, 'Why do you extraordinary people talk such nonsense? I never insist on ignorance of the truth on the part of one who would learn to speak; on the contrary, if my advice goes for anything, it is that he should only resort to me after he has come into possession of truth; what I do however pride myself on is that without my aid knowledge of what is true will get a man no nearer to mastering the art of persuasion.'

Phaedrus/ And will not such a retort be just?

Socrates/ Yes, if the arguments advanced against oratory sustain its claim to be an art. In point of fact, I fancy I can hear certain arguments advancing, and protesting that the claim is false, that it is no art, but a knack that has nothing to do with art, inasmuch as there is, as the Spartans put it, no 'soothfast' art of speech, nor assuredly will there ever be one, without a grasp of truth.

Phaedrus/ We must have these arguments, Socrates. Come, bring them up before us, and examine their purport.

Socrates/ Come hither then, you worthy creatures, and impress upon Phaedrus, who is so blessed in his offspring, that unless he gets on with his philosophy he will never get on as a speaker on any subject, and let Phaedrus be your respondent.

Phaedrus/ I await their questions.

Socrates/ Must not the art of rhetoric, taken as a whole, be a kind of influencing of the mind by means of words, not only in courts of law and other public gatherings, but in private places also? And must it not be the same art that is concerned with great issues and small, its right employment commanding no more respect when dealing with important

matters than with unimportant? Is that what you have been told about it?

Phaedrus/ No indeed, not exactly that. It is principally, I should say, to lawsuits that an art of speaking and writing is applied—and of course to public harangues also. I know of no wider application.

Socrates/ What? Are you acquainted only with the 'Arts' or manuals of oratory by Nestor and Odysseus, which they composed in their leisure hours at Troy? Have you never heard of the work of Palamedes?

Phaedrus/ No, upon my word, nor of Nestor either, unless you are casting Gorgias for the role of Nestor, with Odysseus played by Thrasymachus, or maybe Theodorus.

Socrates/ Perhaps I am. But anyway we may let them be, and do you tell me, what is it that the contending parties in law courts do? Do they not in fact contend with words, or how else should we put it?

Phaedrus/ That is just what they do.

Socrates/ About what is just and unjust?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And he who possesses the art of doing this can make the same thing appear to the same people now just, now unjust, at will?

Phaedrus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And in public harangues, no doubt, he can make the same things seem to the community now good, and now the reverse of good?

Phaedrus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Then can we fail to see that the Palamedes of Elea has an art of speaking, such that he can make the same things appear to his audience like and unlike, or one and many, or again at rest and in motion?

Phaedrus/ Indeed he can.

Socrates/ So contending with words is a practice found not only in lawsuits and public harangues but, it seems, wherever men speak we find this single art, if indeed it is an art, which enables people to make out everything to be like everything else, within the limits of possible comparison, and to expose the corresponding attempts of others who disguise what they are doing.

Phaedrus/ How so, pray?

Socrates/ I think that will become clear if we put the following question. Are we misled when the difference between two things is wide, or narrow?

Phaedrus/ When it is narrow.

Socrates/ Well then, if you shift your ground little by little, you are more likely to pass undetected from so-and-so to its opposite than if you do so at one bound.

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ It follows that anyone who intends to mislead another, without being misled himself, must discern precisely the degree of resemblance and dissimilarity between this and that.

Phaedrus/ Yes, that is essential.

Socrates/ Then if he does not know the truth about a given thing, how is he going to discern the degree of resemblance between that unknown thing and other things?

Phaedrus/ It will be impossible.

Socrates/ Well now, when people hold beliefs contrary to fact, and are misled, it is plain that the error has crept into their minds through the suggestion of some similarity or other.

Phaedrus/ That certainly does happen.

Socrates/ But can anyone possibly master the art of using similarities for the purpose of bringing people round, and leading them away from the truth about this or that to the opposite of the truth, or again can anyone possibly avoid this happening to himself, unless he has knowledge of what the thing in question really is?

Phaedrus/ No, never.

Socrates/ It would seem to follow, my friend, that the art of speech displayed by one who has gone chasing after beliefs, instead of knowing the truth, will be a comical sort of art, in fact no art at all.

Phaedrus/ I dare say.

Socrates/ Then would you like to observe some instances of what I call the presence and absence of art in that speech of Lysias which you are carrying, and in those which I have delivered?

Phaedrus/ Yes, by all means. At present our discussion is somewhat abstract, for want of adequate illustrations.

Socrates/ Why, as to that it seems a stroke of luck that in the two speeches we have a sort of illustration of the way in which one who knows the truth can mislead his audience by playing an oratorical joke on them. I myself, Phaedrus, put that down to the local deities, or perhaps those mouthpieces of the Muses that are chirping over our heads have vouchsafed us their inspiration, for of course I don't lay claim to any oratorical skill myself.

Phaedrus/ I dare say that is so, but please explain your point.

Socrates/ Well, come along, read the beginning of Lysias' speech.

Phaedrus/ 'You know how I am situated, and I have told you that I think it to our advantage that the thing should be

done. Now I claim that I should not be refused what I ask simply because I am not your lover. Lovers repent when…

Socrates/ Stop. Our business is to indicate where the speaker is at fault, and shows absence of art, isn't it?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well now, is not the following assertion obviously true—that there are some words about which we all agree, and others about which we are at variance?

Phaedrus/ I think I grasp your meaning, but you might make it still plainer.

Socrates/ When someone utters the word 'iron' or 'silver,' we all have the same object before our minds, haven't we?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what about the words 'just' and 'good'? Don't we diverge, and dispute not only with one another but with our own selves?

Phaedrus/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ So in some cases we agree, and in others we don't.

Phaedrus/ Quite So.

Socrates/ Now in which of the cases are we more apt to be misled, and in which is rhetoric more effective?

Phaedrus/ Plainly in the case where we fluctuate.

Socrates/ Then the intending student of the art of rhetoric ought, in the first place, to make a systematic division of words, and get hold of some mark distinguishing the two kinds of words, those namely in the use of which the multitude are bound to fluctuate, and those in which they are not.

Phaedrus/ To grasp that, Socrates, would certainly be an excellent piece of discernment.

Socrates/ And secondly, I take it, when he comes across a particular word he must realize what it is, and be swift to perceive which of the two kinds the thing he proposes to discuss really belongs to.

Phaedrus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Well then, shall we reckon love as one of the disputed terms, or as one of the other sort?

Phaedrus/ As a disputed term, surely. Otherwise can you suppose it would have been possible for you to say of it what you said just now, namely that it is harmful both to the beloved and the lover, and then to turn round and say that it is really the greatest of goods?

Socrates/ An excellent point. But now tell me this, for thanks to my inspired condition I can't quite remember. Did I define love at the beginning of my speech?

Phaedrus/ Yes indeed, and immensely thorough you were about it.

Socrates/ Upon my word, you rate the nymphs of Achelous and Pan, son of Hermes, much higher as artists in oratory than Lysias, son of Cephalus. Or am I quite wrong? Did Lysias at the beginning of his discourse on love compel us to conceive of it as a certain definite entity, with a meaning he had himself decided upon? And did he proceed to bring all his subsequent remarks, from first to last, into line with that meaning? Shall we read his first words once again?

Phaedrus/ If you like, but what you are looking for isn't there.

Socrates/ Read it out. so that I can listen to the author himself.

Phaedrus/ 'You know how I am situated, and I have told you that I think it to our advantage that the thing should be done. Now I claim that I should not be refused what I ask

simply because I am not your lover. Lovers, when their craving is at an end, repent of such benefits as they have conferred.'

Socrates/ No, he doesn't seem to get anywhere near what we are looking for; he goes about it like a man swimming on his back, in reverse, and starts from the end instead of the beginning; his opening words are what the lover would naturally say to his boy only when he had finished. Or am I quite wrong, dear Phaedrus?

Phaedrus/ I grant you, Socrates, that the substance of his address is really a peroration.

Socrates/ And to pass to other points, doesn't his matter strike you as thrown out at haphazard? Do you find any cogent reason for his next remark, or indeed any of his remarks, occupying the place it does? I myself, in my ignorance, thought that the writer, with a fine abandon, put down just what came into his head. Can you find any cogent principle of composition which he observed in setting down his observations in this particular order?

Phaedrus/ You flatter me in supposing that I am competent to see into his mind with all that accuracy.

Socrates/ Well, there is one point at least which I think you will admit, namely that any discourse ought to be constructed like a living creature, with its own body, as it were; it must not lack either head or feet; it must have a middle and extremities so composed as to suit each other and the whole work.

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then ask yourself whether that is or is not the case with your friend's speech. You will find that it is just like the epitaph said to have been carved on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.

Phaedrus/ What is that, and what's wrong with it?

Socrates/ It runs like this :

A maid of bronze I stand on Midas' tomb,
So long as waters flow and trees grow tall,
Abiding here on his lamented grave,
I tell the traveler Midas here is laid.

I expect you notice that it makes no difference what order the lines come in.

Phaedrus/ Socrates, you are making a joke of our speech!

Socrates/ Well, to avoid distressing you, let us say no more of that—though indeed I think it provides many examples which it would be profitable to notice, provided one were chary of imitating them—and let us pass to the other speeches, for they, I think, presented a certain feature which everyone desirous of examining oratory would do well to observe.

Phaedrus/ To what do you refer?

Socrates/ They were of opposite purport, one maintaining that the lover should be favored, the other the nonlover.

Phaedrus/ Yes, they did so very manfully.

Socrates/ I thought you were going to say—and with truth—madly, but that reminds me of what I was about to ask. We said, did we not, that love is a sort of madness?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that there are two kinds of madness, one resulting from human ailments, the other from a divine disturbance of our conventions of conduct.

Phaedrus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And in the divine kind we distinguished four types, ascribing them to four gods : the inspiration of the prophet to Apollo. that of the mystic to Dionysus, that of the poet to the Muses, and a fourth type which we declared to be the highest, the madness of the lover, to Aphrodite and

Eros. Moreover we painted, after a fashion, a picture of the lover's experience, in which perhaps we attained some degree of truth, though we may well have sometimes gone astray—the blend resulting in a discourse which had some claim to plausibility, or shall we say a mythical hymn of praise, in due religious language, a festal celebration of my master and yours too, Phaedrus, that god of love who watches over the young and fair.

Phaedrus/ It certainly gave me great pleasure to listen to it.

Socrates/ Then let us take one feature of it, the way in which the discourse contrived to pass from censure to encomium.

Phaedrus/ Well now, what do you make of that?

Socrates/ For the most part I think our festal hymn has really been just a festive entertainment, but we did casually allude to a certain pair of procedures, and it would be very agreeable if we could seize their significance in a scientific fashion.

Phaedrus/ What procedures do you mean?

Socrates/ The first is that in which we bring a dispersed plurality under a single form, seeing it all together—the purpose being to define so-and-so, and thus to make plain whatever may be chosen as the topic for exposition. For example, take the definition given just now of love. Whether it was right or wrong, at all events it was that which enabled our discourse to achieve lucidity and consistency.

Phaedrus/ And what is the second procedure you speak of, Socrates?

Socrates/ The reverse of the other, whereby we are enabled to divide into forms, following the objective articulation; we are not to attempt to hack off parts like a clumsy butcher, but to take example from our two recent

speeches. The single general form which they postulated was irrationality; next, on the analogy of a single natural body with its pairs of like-named members, right arm or leg, as we say, and left, they conceived of madness as a single objective form existing in human beings. Wherefore the first speech divided off a part on the left, and continued to make divisions, never desisting until it discovered one particular part bearing the name of 'sinister' love, on which it very properly poured abuse. The other speech conducted us to the forms of madness which lay on the right-hand side, and upon discovering a type of love that shared its name with the other but was divine, displayed it to our view and extolled it as the source of the greatest goods that can befall us.

Phaedrus/ That is perfectly true.

Socrates/ Believe me, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover of these divisions and collections, that I may gain the power to speak and to think, and whenever I deem another man able to discern an objective unity and plurality, I follow 'in his footsteps where he leadeth as a god.' Furthermore—whether I am right or wrong in doing so, God alone knows—it is those that have this ability whom for the present I call dialecticians.

But now tell me what we ought to call them if we take instruction from Lysias and yourself. Or is what I have been describing precisely that art of oratory thanks to which Thrasymachus and the rest of them have not only made themselves masterly orators, but can do the same for anyone else who cares to bring offerings to these princes among men?

Phaedrus/ Doubtless they behave like princes, but assuredly they do not possess the kind of knowledge to which you refer. No, I think you are right in calling the

procedure that you have described dialectic, but we still seem to be in the dark about rhetoric.

Socrates/ What? Can there really be anything of value that admits of scientific acquisition despite the lack of that procedure? If so, you and I should certainly not disdain it, but should explain what this residuum of rhetoric actually consists in.

Phaedrus/ Well, Socrates, of course there is plenty of matter in the rhetorical manuals.

Socrates/ Thank you for the reminder. The first point, I suppose, is that a speech must begin with a preamble. You are referring, are you not, to such niceties of the art?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And next comes exposition accompanied by direct evidence; thirdly, indirect evidence; fourthly, probabilities; besides which there are the proof and supplementary proof mentioned by the Byzantine master of rhetorical artifice.

Phaedrus/ You mean the worthy Theodorus?

Socrates/ Of course. And we are to have a refutation and supplementary refutation both for prosecution and defense. And can we leave the admirable Evenus of Paros out of the picture, the inventor of covert allusion and indirect compliment and, according to some accounts, of the indirect censure in mnemonic verse? A real master, that. But we won't disturb the rest of Tisias and Gorgias, who realized that probability deserves more respect than truth, who could make trifles seem important and important points trifles by the force of their language, who dressed up novelties as antiques and vice versa, and found out how to argue concisely or at interminable length about anything and everything. This last accomplishment provoked Prodicus once to mirth when he heard me mention it; he remarked

that he and he alone had discovered what sort of speeches the art demands—to wit, neither long ones nor short, but of fitting length.

Phaedrus/ Masterly, Prodicus!

Socrates/ Are we forgetting Hippias? I think Prodicus' view would be supported by the man of Elis.

Phaedrus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And then Polus. What are we to say of his *Muses' Treasury of Phrases* with its reduplications and maxims and similes, and of words a la Licymnius which that master made him a present of as a contribution to his fine writing?

Phaedrus/ But didn't Protagoras in point of fact produce some such works, Socrates?

Socrates/ Yes, my young friend, there is his *Correct Diction,* and many other excellent works. But to pass now to the application of pathetic language to the poor and aged, the master in that style seems to me to be the mighty man of Chalcedon, who was also expert at rousing a crowd to anger and then soothing them down again with a his spells, to quote his own saying, while at casting aspersions and dissipating them, whatever their source, he was unbeatable.

But to resume, on the way to conclude a speech there seems to be general agreement, though some call it recapitulation and others by some other name.

Phaedrus/ You mean the practice of reminding the audience toward the end of a speech of its main points?

Socrates/ Yes. And now if you have anything further to add about the art of rhetoric—

Phaedrus/ Only a few unimportant points.

Socrates/ If they are unimportant, we may pass them over. But let us look at what we have got in a clearer light, to see what power the art possesses, and when.

Phaedrus/ A very substantial power, Socrates, at all events in large assemblies.

Socrates/ Yes indeed. But have a look at it, my good sir, and see whether you discern some holes in the fabric, as I do.

Phaedrus/ Do show them me.

Socrates/ Well, look here. Suppose someone went up to your friend Eryximachus, or his father Acumenus, and said, 'I know how to apply such treatment to a patient's body as will induce warmth or coolness, as I choose; I can make him vomit, if I see fit, or go to stool, and so on and so forth. And on the strength of this knowledge I claim to be a competent physician, and to make a competent physician of anyone to whom I communicate this knowledge.' What do you imagine they would have to say to that?

Phaedrus/ They would ask him, of course, whether he also knew which patients ought to be given the various treatments, and when, and for how long.

Socrates/ Then what if he said, 'Oh. no, but I expect my pupils to manage what you refer to by themselves'?

Phaedrus/ I expect they would say, 'The man is mad; he thinks he has made himself a doctor by picking up something out of a book, or coming across some common drug or other, without any real knowledge of medicine.'

Socrates/ Now suppose someone went up to Sophocles or Euripides and said he knew how to compose lengthy dramatic speeches about a trifling matter, and quite short ones about a matter of moment, that he could write pathetic passages when he chose, or again passages of intimidation and menace, and so forth, and that he considered that by

teaching these accomplishments he could turn a pupil into a tragic poet.

Phaedrus/ I imagine that they too would laugh at anyone who supposed that you could make a tragedy otherwise than by so arranging such passages as to exhibit a proper relation to one another and to the whole of which they are parts.

Socrates/ Still I don't think they would abuse him rudely, but rather treat him as a musician would treat a man who fancied himself to be a master of harmony simply because he knew how to produce the highest possible note and the lowest possible on his strings.

The musician would not be so rude as to say, 'You miserable fellow, you're off your head,' but rather, in the gentler language befitting his profession. 'My good sir, it is true that one who proposes to become a master of harmony must know the things you speak of, but it is perfectly possible for one who has got as far as yourself to have not the slightest real knowledge of harmony. You are acquainted with what has to be learned before studying harmony, but of harmony itself you know nothing.'

Phaedrus/ Perfectly true.

Socrates/ Similarly then Sophocles would tell the man who sought to show off to himself and Euripides that what he knew was not tragic composition but its antecedents, and Acumenus would make the same distinction between medicine and the antecedents of medicine.

Phaedrus/ I entirely agree.

Socrates/ And if 'mellifluous' Adrastus, or shall we say Pericles, were to hear of those admirable artifices that we were referring to just now—the brachylogies and imageries and all the rest of them, which we enumerated and deemed it necessary to examine in a clear light—are we to suppose that they would address those who practice and teach this

sort of thing, under the name of the art of rhetoric, with the severity you and I displayed, and in rude, coarse language? Or would they, in their ampler wisdom, actually reproach us and say, 'Phaedrus and Socrates, you ought not to get angry, but to make allowances for such people; it is because they are ignorant of dialectic that they are incapable of properly defining rhetoric, and that in turn leads them to imagine that by possessing themselves of the requisite antecedent learning they have discovered the art itself. And so they teach these antecedents to their pupils, and believe that that constitutes a complete instruction in rhetoric; they don't bother about employing the various artifices in such a way that they will be effective, or about organizing a work as a whole; that is for the pupils to see to for themselves when they come to make speeches.'

Phaedrus/ Well yes, Socrates, I dare say that does more or less describe what the teachers and writers in question regard as the art of rhetoric; personally I think what you say is true. But now by what means and from what source can one attain the art of the true rhetorician. the real master of persuasion?

Socrates/ If you mean how can one become a finished performer, then probably—indeed I might say undoubtedly—it is the same as with anything else. If you have an innate capacity for rhetoric, you will become a famous rhetorician, provided you also acquire knowledge and practice, but if you lack any of these three you will be correspondingly unfinished. As regards the art itself, as distinct from the artist, I fancy that the line of approach adopted by Lysias and Thrasymachus is not the one I have in view.

Phaedrus/ Then what is?

Socrates/ I am inclined to think, my good friend, that it was not surprising that Pericles became the most finished exponent of rhetoric there has ever been.

Phaedrus/ Why so?

Socrates/ All the great arts need supplementing by a study of nature; your artist must cultivate garrulity and high-flown speculation; from that source alone can come the mental elevation and thoroughly finished execution of which you are thinking, and that is what Pericles acquired to supplement his inborn capacity. He came across the right sort of man, I fancy, in Anaxagoras, and by enriching himself with high speculation and coming to recognize the nature of wisdom and folly—on which topics of course Anaxagoras was always discoursing—he drew from that source and applied to the art of rhetoric what was suitable thereto.

Phaedrus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Rhetoric is in the same case as medicine, don't you think?

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ In both cases there is a nature that we have to determine, the nature of body in the one, and of soul in the other, if we mean to be scientific and not content with mere empirical routine when we apply medicine and diet to induce health and strength, or words and rules of conduct to implant such convictions and virtues as we desire.

Phaedrus/ You are probably right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then do you think it possible to understand the nature of the soul satisfactorily without taking it as a whole?

Phaedrus/ If we are to believe Hippocrates, the Asclepiad, we can't understand even the body without such a procedure.

Socrates/ No, my friend, and he is right. But we must not just rely on Hippocrates; we must examine the assertion and see whether it accords with the truth.

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then what is it that Hippocrates and the truth have to say on this matter of nature? I suggest that the way to reflect about the nature of anything is as follows : first, to decide whether the object in respect of which we desire to have scientific knowledge, and to be able to impart it to others, is simple or complex; secondly, if it is simple, to inquire what natural capacity it has of acting upon another thing, and through what means; or by what other thing, and through what means, it can be acted upon; or, if it is complex, to enumerate its parts and observe in respect of each what we observe in the case of the simple object, to wit what its natural capacity, active or passive, consists in.

Phaedrus/ Perhaps so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, at all events, to pursue an inquiry without doing so would be like a blind man's progress. Surely we mustn't make out that any sort of scientific inquirer resembles a blind or deaf person. No, it is plain that if we are to address people scientifically, we shall show them precisely what is the real and true nature of that object on which our discourse is brought to bear. And that object, I take it, is the soul.

Phaedrus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Hence the speaker's whole effort is concentrated on that, for it is there that he is attempting to implant conviction. Isn't that so?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then it is plain that Thrasymachus, or anyone else who seriously proffers a scientific rhetoric, will, in the first place, describe the soul very precisely, and let us see

whether it is single and uniform in nature or, analogously to the body, complex. For to do that is, we maintain, to show a thing's nature.

Phaedrus/ Yes, undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And secondly he will describe what natural capacity it has to act upon what, and through what means, or by what it can be acted upon.

Phaedrus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Thirdly, he will classify the types of discourse and the types of soul, and the various ways in which souls are affected, explaining the reasons in each case, suggesting the type of speech appropriate to each type of soul, and showing what kind of speech can be relied on to create belief in one soul and disbelief in another, and why.

Phaedrus/ I certainly think that would be an excellent procedure.

Socrates/ Yes, in fact I can assure you, my friend, that no other scientific method of treating either our present subject or any other will ever be found, whether in the models of the schools or in speeches actually delivered. But the present-day authors of manuals of rhetoric, of whom you have heard, are cunning folk who know all about the soul but keep their knowledge out of sight. So don't let us admit their claim to write scientifically until they compose their speeches and writings in the way we have indicated.

Phaedrus/ And what way is that?

Socrates/ To give the actual words would be troublesome, but I am quite ready to say how one ought to compose if he means to be as scientific as possible.

Phaedrus/ Then please do.

Socrates/ Since the function of oratory is in fact to influence men's souls, the intending orator must know what

types of soul there are. Now these are of a determinate number, and their variety results in a variety of individuals. To the types of soul thus discriminated there corresponds a determinate number of types of discourse. Hence a certain type of hearer will be easy to persuade by a certain type of speech to take such and such action for such and such reason, while another type will be hard to persuade. All this the orator must fully understand, and next he must watch it actually occurring, exemplified in men's conduct, and must cultivate a keenness of perception in following it, if he is going to get any advantage out of the previous instruction that he was given in the school. And when he is competent to say what type of man is susceptible to what kind of discourse; when, further, he can, on catching sight of so-and-so, tell himself, 'That is the man, that character now actually before me is the one I heard about in school, and in order to persuade him of so-and-so I have to apply *these* arguments in *this* fashion'; and when, on top of all this, he has further grasped the right occasions for speaking and for keeping quiet, and has come to recognize the right and the wrong time for the brachylogy, the pathetic passage, the exacerbation, and all the rest of his accomplishments—then and not till then has he well and truly achieved the art. But if in his speaking or teaching or writing he fails in any of these requirements, he may tell you that he has the art of speech, but one mustn't believe all one is told.

And now maybe our author will say, 'Well, what of it, Phaedrus and Socrates? Do you agree with me, or should we accept some other account of the art of speech?'

Phaedrus/ Surely we can't accept any other, Socrates; still it does seem a considerable business.

Socrates/ You are right. and that makes it necessary thoroughly to overhaul all our arguments, and see whether there is some easier and shorter way of arriving at the art;

we don't want to waste effort in going off on a long rough road, when we might take a short smooth one. But if you can help us at all through what you have heard from Lysias or anyone else, do try to recall it.

Phaedrus/ As far as trying goes, I might, but I can suggest nothing on the spur of the moment.

Socrates/ Then would you like me to tell you something I have heard from those concerned with these matters?

Phaedrus/ Why, yes.

Socrates/ Anyhow, Phaedrus, we are told that even the devil's advocate ought to be heard.

Phaedrus/ Then you can put his case.

Socrates/ Well, they tell us that there is no need to make such a solemn business of it, or fetch such a long compass on an uphill road. As we remarked at the beginning of this discussion, there is, they maintain, absolutely no need for the budding orator to concern himself with the truth about what is just or good conduct, nor indeed about who are just and good men whether by nature or education. In the law courts nobody cares a rap for the truth about these matters, but only about what is plausible. And that is the same as what is probable, and is what must occupy the attention of the would-be master of the art of speech. Even actual facts ought sometimes not be stated, if they don't tally with probability; they should be replaced by what is probable, whether in prosecution or defense; whatever you say, you simply must pursue this probability they talk of, and can say good-by to the truth forever. Stick to that all through your speech, and you are equipped with the art complete.

Phaedrus/ Your account, Socrates, precisely reproduces what is said by those who claim to be experts in the art of speech. I remember that we did touch briefly on this sort of

contention a while ago, and the professionals regard it as a highly important point.

Socrates/ Very well then, take Tisias himself; you have thumbed him carefully, so let Tisias tell us this. Does he maintain that the probable is anything other than that which commends itself to the multitude?

Phaedrus/ How could it be anything else?

Socrates/ Then in consequence, it would seem, of that profound scientific discovery he laid down that if a weak but brave man is arrested for assaulting a strong but cowardly one, whom he has robbed of his cloak or some other garment, neither of them ought to state the true facts; the coward should say that the brave man didn't assault him singlehanded, and the brave man should contend that there were only the two of them, and then have recourse to the famous plea, 'How could a little fellow like me have attacked a big fellow like him?' Upon which the big fellow will not avow his own poltroonery but will try to invent some fresh lie which will probably supply his opponent with a means of refuting him. And similar 'scientific' rules are given for other cases of the kind. Isn't that so, Phaedrus?

Phaedrus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Bless my soul! It appears that he made a brilliant discovery of a buried art, your Tisias, or whoever it really was and whatever he is pleased to be called after. But, my friend, shall we or shall we not say to him—

Phaedrus/ Say what?

Socrates/ This. 'In point of fact, Tisias, we have for some time before you came on the scene been saying that the multitude get their notion of probability as the result of a likeness to truth, and we explained just now that these likenesses can always be best discovered by one who knows the truth. Therefore if you have anything else to say about

the art of speech, we should be glad to hear it, but if not we shall adhere to the point we made just now, namely that unless the aspirant to oratory can on the one hand list the various natures among his prospective audiences, and on the other divide things into their kinds and embrace each individual thing under a single form, he will never attain such success as is within the grasp of mankind. Yet he will assuredly never acquire such competence without considerable diligence, which the wise man should exert not for the sake of speaking to and dealing with his fellow men, but that he may be able to speak what is pleasing to the gods, and in all his dealings to do their pleasure to the best of his ability. For you see, Tisias, what we are told by those wiser than ourselves is true, that a man of sense ought never to study the gratification of his fellow slaves, save as a minor consideration, but that of his most excellent masters. So don't be surprised that we have to make a long detour; it is because the goal is glorious, though not the goal you think of.' Not but what those lesser objects also, if you would have them, can best be attained, so our argument assures us, as a consequence of the greater.

Phaedrus/ Your project seems to be excellent, Socrates, if only one could carry it out.

Socrates/ Well, when a man sets his hand to something good, it is good that he should take what comes to him.

Phaedrus/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ Then we may feel that we have said enough about the art of speech, both the true art and the false?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But there remains the question of propriety and impropriety in writing, that is to say the conditions which make it proper or improper. Isn't that so?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now do you know how we may best please God, in practice and in theory, in this matter of words?

Phaedrus/ No indeed. Do you?

Socrates/ I can tell you the tradition that has come down from our forefathers, but they alone know the truth of it. However, if we could discover that for ourselves, should we still be concerned with the fancies of mankind?

Phaedrus/ What a ridiculous question! But tell me the tradition you speak of.

Socrates/ Very well. The story is that in the region of Naucratis in Egypt there dwelt one of the old gods of the country, the god to whom the bird called Ibis is sacred, his own name being Theuth. He it was that invented number and calculation, geometry and astronomy, not to speak of draughts and dice, and above all writing. Now the king of the whole country at that time was Thamus, who dwelt in the great city of Upper Egypt which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes, while Thamus they call Ammon. To him came Theuth, and revealed his arts, saying that they ought to be passed on to the Egyptians in general. Thamus asked what was the use of them all, and when Theuth explained, he condemned what he thought the bad points and praised what he thought the good. On each art, we are told, Thamus had plenty of views both for and against; it would take too long to give them in detail. But when it came to writing Theuth said, 'Here, O king, is a branch of learning that will make the people of Egypt wiser and improve their memories; my discovery provides a recipe for memory and wisdom.' But the king answered and said, 'O man full of arts, to one it is given to create the things of art, and to another to judge what measure of harm and of profit they have for those that shall employ them. And so it is that you, by reason of your tender regard for the writing that is your offspring, have declared

the very opposite of its true effect. If men learn this, it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks. What you have discovered is a recipe not for memory, but for reminder. And it is no true wisdom that you offer your disciples, but only its semblance, for by telling them of many things without teaching them you will make them seem to know much, while for the most part they know nothing, and as men filled, not with wisdom, but with the conceit of wisdom, they will be a burden to their fellows.'

Phaedrus/ It is easy for you, Socrates, to make up tales from Egypt or anywhere else you fancy.

Socrates/ Oh, but the authorities of the temple of Zeus at Dodona, my friend, said that the first prophetic utterances came from an oak tree. In fact the people of those days, lacking the wisdom of you young people, were content in their simplicity to listen to trees or rocks, provided these told the truth. For you apparently it makes a difference who the speaker is, and what country he comes from; you don't merely ask whether what he says is true or false.

Phaedrus/ I deserve your rebuke, and I agree that the man of Thebes is right in what he said about writing.

Socrates/ Then anyone who leaves behind him a written manual, and likewise anyone who takes it over from him, on the supposition that such writing will provide something reliable and permanent, must be exceedingly simple-minded; he must really be ignorant of Ammon's utterance, if he imagines that written words can do anything more than remind one who knows that which the writing is concerned with.

Phaedrus/ Very true.

Socrates/ You know, Phaedrus, that's the strange thing about writing, which makes it truly analogous to painting. The painter's products stand before us as though they were alive, but if you question them, they maintain a most majestic silence. It is the same with written words; they seem to talk to you as though they were intelligent, but if you ask them anything about what they say, from a desire to be instructed, they go on telling you just the same thing forever. And once a thing is put in writing, the composition, whatever it may be, drifts all over the place, getting into the hands not only of those who understand it, but equally of those who have no business with it; it doesn't know how to address the right people, and not address the wrong. And when it is ill-treated and unfairly abused it always needs its parent to come to its help, being unable to defend or help itself.

Phaedrus/ Once again you are perfectly right.

Socrates/ But now tell me, is there another sort of discourse, that is brother to the written speech, but of unquestioned legitimacy? Can we see how it originates, and how much better and more effective it is than the other?

Phaedrus/ What sort of discourse have you now in mind, and what is its origin?

Socrates/ The sort that goes together with knowledge, and is written in the soul of the learner, that can defend itself, and knows to whom it should speak and to whom it should say nothing.

Phaedrus/ You mean no dead discourse, but the living speech, the original of which the written discourse may fairly be called a kind of image.

Socrates/ Precisely. And now tell me this. If a sensible farmer had some seeds to look after and wanted them to bear fruit, would he with serious intent plant them during the summer in a garden of Adonis, and enjoy watching it

producing fine fruit within eight days? If he did so at all, wouldn't it be in a holiday spirit, just by way of pastime? For serious purposes wouldn't he behave like a scientific farmer, sow his seeds in suitable soil, and be well content if they came to maturity within eight months?

Phaedrus/ I think we may distinguish as you say, Socrates, between what the farmer would do seriously and what he would do in a different spirit.

Socrates/ And are we to maintain that he who has knowledge of what is just, honorable, and good has less sense than the farmer in dealing with his seeds?

Phaedrus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Then it won't be with serious intent that he writes them in water' or that black fluid we call ink, using his pen to sow words that can't either speak in their own defense or present the truth adequately.

Phaedrus/ It certainly isn't likely.

Socrates/ No, it is not. He will sow his seed in literary gardens, I take it, and write when he does write by way of pastime, collecting a store of refreshment both for his own memory, against the day 'when age oblivious comes,' and for all such as tread in his footsteps, and he will take pleasure in watching the tender plants grow up. And when other men resort to other pastimes, regaling themselves with drinking parties and suchlike, he will doubtless prefer to indulge in the recreation I refer to.

Phaedrus/ And what an excellent one it is, Socrates! How far superior to the other sort is the recreation that a man finds in words, when he discourses about justice and the other topics you speak of.

Socrates/ Yes indeed, dear Phaedrus. But far more excellent, I think, is the serious treatment of them, which employs the art of dialectic. The dialectician selects a soul of

the right type, and in it he plants and sows his words founded on knowledge, words which can defend both themselves and him who planted them, words which instead of remaining barren contain a seed whence new words grow up in new characters, whereby the seed is vouchsafed immortality, and its possessor the fullest measure of blessedness that man can attain unto.

Phaedrus/ Yes, that is a far more excellent way.

Socrates/ Then now that that has been settled, Phaedrus, we can proceed to the other point.

Phaedrus/ What is that?

Socrates/ The point that we wanted to look into before we arrived at our present conclusion. Our intention was to examine the reproach leveled against Lysias on the score of speech writing, and there with the general question of speech writing and what does and does not make it an art. Now I think we have pretty well cleared up the question of art.

Phaedrus/ Yes, we did think so, but please remind me how we did it.

Socrates/ The conditions to be fulfilled are these. First, you must know the truth about the subject that you speak or write about; that is to say, you must be able to isolate it in definition, and having so defined it you must next understand how to divide it into kinds, until you reach the limit of division; secondly, you must have a corresponding discernment of the nature of the soul, discover the type of speech appropriate to each nature, and order and arrange your discourse accordingly, addressing a variegated soul in a variegated style that ranges over the whole gamut of tones, and a simple soul in a simple style. All this must be done if you are to become competent, within human limits, as a scientific practitioner of speech, whether you propose to

expound or to persuade. Such is the clear purport of all our foregoing discussion.

Phaedrus/ Yes, that was undoubtedly how we came to see the matter.

Socrates/ And now to revert to our other question, whether the delivery and composition of speeches is honorable or base, and in what circumstances they may properly become a matter of reproach, our earlier conclusions have, I think, shown—

Phaedrus/ Which conclusions?

Socrates/ They have shown that any work, in the past or in the future, whether by Lysias or anyone else, whether composed in a private capacity or in the role of a public man who by proposing a law becomes the author of a political composition, is a matter of reproach to its author—whether or no the reproach is actually voiced—if he regards it as containing important truth of permanent validity. For ignorance of what is a waking vision and what is a mere dream image of justice and injustice, good and evil, cannot truly be acquitted of involving reproach, even if the mass of men extol it.

Phaedrus/ No indeed.

Socrates/ On the other hand, if a man believes that a written discourse on any subject is bound to contain much that is fanciful, that nothing that has ever been written whether in verse or prose merits much serious attention—and for that matter nothing that has ever been spoken in the declamatory fashion which aims at mere persuasion without any questioning or exposition—that in reality such compositions are, at the best, a means of reminding those who know the truth, that lucidity and completeness and serious importance belong only to those lessons on justice and honor and goodness that are expounded and set forth

for the sake of instruction, and are veritably written in the soul of the listener, and that such discourses as these ought to be accounted a man's own legitimate children—a title to be applied primarily to such as originate within the man himself, and secondarily to such of their sons and brothers as have grown up aright in the souls of other men—the man, I say, who believes this, and disdains all manner of discourse other than this, is, I would venture to affirm, the man whose example you and I would pray that we might follow.

Phaedrus/ My own wishes and prayers are most certainly to that effect.

Socrates/ Then we may regard our literary pastime as having reached a satisfactory conclusion. Do you now go and tell Lysias that we two went down to the stream where is the holy place of the nymphs, and there listened to words which charged us to deliver a message, first to Lysias and all other composers of discourses, secondly to Homer and all others who have written poetry whether to be read or sung, and thirdly to Solon and all such as are authors of political compositions under the name of laws—to wit, that if any of them has done his work with a knowledge of the truth, can defend his statements when challenged, and can demonstrate the inferiority of his writings out of his own mouth, he ought not to be designated by a name drawn from those writings, but by one that indicates his serious pursuit.

Phaedrus/ Then what names would you assign him?

Socrates/ To call him wise, Phaedrus, would, I think be going too far; the epithet is proper only to a god. A name that would fit him better, and have more seemliness, would be 'lover of wisdom,' or something similar.

Phaedrus/ Yes, that would be quite in keeping.

Socrates/ On the other hand, one who has nothing to show of more value than the literary works on whose phrases

he spends hours, twisting them this way and that, pasting them together and pulling them apart, will rightly, I suggest, be called a poet or speech writer or law writer.

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then that is what you must tell your friend.

Phaedrus/ But what about yourself? What are you going to do? You too have a friend who should not be passed over.

Socrates/ Who is that?

Phaedrus/ The fair Isocrates. What will be your message to him, Socrates, and what shall we call him?

Socrates/ Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus, but I don't mind telling you the future I prophesy for him.

Phaedrus/ Oh, what is that?

Socrates/ It seems to me that his natural powers give him a superiority over anything that Lysias has achieved in literature, and also that in point of character he is of a nobler composition; hence it would not surprise me if with advancing years he made all his literary predecessors look like very small-fry—that is, supposing him to persist in the actual type of writing in which he engages at present—still more so, if he should become dissatisfied with such work, and a sublimer impulse lead him to do greater things. For that mind of his, Phaedrus, contains an innate tincture of philosophy.

Well then, there's the report I convey from the gods of this place to Isocrates my beloved, and there's yours for your beloved Lysias.

Phaedrus/ So be it. But let us be going, now that it has become less oppressively hot.

Socrates/ Oughtn't *we* first to offer a prayer to the divinities here?

Phaedrus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Dear Pan, and all ye other gods that dwell in this place, grant that I may become fair within, and that such outward things as I have may not war against the spirit within me. May I count him rich who is wise, and as for gold, may I possess so much of it as only a temperate man might bear and carry with him.

Is there anything more we can ask for, Phaedrus? The prayer contents me.

Phaedrus/ Make it a prayer for me too, since friends have all things in common.

Socrates/ Let us be going.

Phaedrus.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Phaedrus.

Scene: —Under a plane-tree, by the banks of the Ilissus.

Socrates/ My dear Phaedrus, whence come you, and whither are you going?

Phaedrus/ I have come from Lysias the son of Cephalus, and I am going to take a walk outside the wall, for I have been sitting with him the whole morning; and our common friend Acumenus tells me that it is much more refreshing to walk in the open air than to be shut up in a cloister.

Socrates/ There he is right. Lysias then, I suppose, was in the town?

Phaedrus/ Yes, he was staying with Epicrates, here at the house of Morychus; that house which is near the temple of Olympian Zeus.

Socrates/ And how did he entertain you? Can I be wrong in supposing that Lysias gave you a feast of discourse?

Phaedrus/ You shall hear, if you can spare time to accompany me.

Socrates/ And should I not deem the conversation of you and Lysias 'a thing of higher import,' as I may say in the words of Pindar, 'than any business'?

Phaedrus/ Will you go on?

Socrates/ And will you go on with the narration?

Phaedrus/ My tale, Socrates, is one of your sort, for love was the theme which occupied us—love after a fashion: Lysias has been writing about a fair youth who was being tempted, but not by a lover; and this was the point: he

ingeniously proved that the non-lover should be accepted rather than the lover.

Socrates/ O that is noble of him! I wish that he would say the poor man rather than the rich, and the old man rather than the young one; —then he would meet the case of me and of many a man; his words would be quite refreshing, and he would be a public benefactor. For my part, I do so long to hear his speech, that if you walk all the way to Megara, and when you have reached the wall come back, as Herodicus recommends, without going in, I will keep you company.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean, my good Socrates? How can you imagine that my unpracticed memory can do justice to an elaborate work, which the greatest rhetorician of the age spent a long time in composing. Indeed, I cannot; I would give a great deal if I could.

Socrates/ I believe that I know Phaedrus about as well as I know myself, and I am very sure that the speech of Lysias was repeated to him, not once only, but again and again; —he insisted on hearing it many times over and Lysias was very willing to gratify him; at last, when nothing else would do, he got hold of the book, and looked at what he most wanted to see, —this occupied him during the whole morning; —and then when he was tired with sitting, he went out to take a walk, not until, by the dog, as I believe, he had simply learned by heart the entire discourse, unless it was unusually long, and he went to a place outside the wall that he might practice his lesson. There he saw a certain lover of discourse who had a similar weakness; —he saw and rejoiced; now thought he, 'I shall have a partner in my revels.' And he invited him to come and walk with him. But when the lover of discourse begged that he would repeat the tale, he gave himself airs and said, 'No I cannot,' as if he were indisposed; although, if the hearer had refused, he would

sooner or later have been compelled by him to listen whether he would or no. Therefore, Phaedrus, bid him do at once what he will soon do whether bidden or not.

Phaedrus/ I see that you will not let me off until I speak in some fashion or other; verily therefore my best plan is to speak as I best can.

Socrates/ A very true remark, that of yours.

Phaedrus/ I will do as I say; but believe me, Socrates, I did not learn the very words—O no; nevertheless I have a general notion of what he said, and will give you a summary of the points in which the lover differed from the non-lover. Let me begin at the beginning.

Socrates/ Yes, my sweet one; but you must first of all show what you have in your left hand under your cloak, for that roll, as I suspect, is the actual discourse. Now, much as I love you, I would not have you suppose that I am going to have your memory exercised at my expense, if you have Lysias himself here.

Phaedrus/ Enough; I see that I have no hope of practicing my art upon you. But if I am to read, where would you please to sit?

Socrates/ Let us turn aside and go by the Ilissus; we will sit down at some quiet spot.

Phaedrus/ I am fortunate in not having my sandals, and as you never have any, I think that we may go along the brook and cool our feet in the water; this will be the easiest way, and at midday and in the summer is far from being unpleasant.

Socrates/ Lead on, and look out for a place in which we can sit down.

Phaedrus/ Do you see that tallest plane-tree in the distance?

Socrates/ Yes.

Phaedrus/ There are shade and gentle breezes, and grass on which we may either sit or lie down.

Socrates/ Move forward.

Phaedrus/ I should like to know, Socrates, whether the place is not somewhere here at which Boreas is said to have carried off Orithyia from the banks of the Ilissus?

Socrates/ Such is the tradition.

Phaedrus/ And is this the exact spot? The little stream is delightfully clear and bright; I can fancy that there might be maidens playing near.

Socrates/ I believe that the spot is not exactly here, but about a quarter of a mile lower down, where you cross to the temple of Artemis, and there is, I think, some sort of an altar of Boreas at the place.

Phaedrus/ I have never noticed it; but I beseech you to tell me, Socrates, do you believe this tale?

Socrates/ The wise are doubtful, and I should not be singular if, like them, I too doubted. I might have a rational explanation that Orithyia was playing with Pharmacia, when a northern gust carried her over the neighboring rocks; and this being the manner of her death, she was said to have been carried away by Boreas. There is a discrepancy, however, about the locality; according to another version of the story she was taken from the Areopagus, and not from this place. Now I quite acknowledge that these allegories are very nice, but he is not to be envied who has to invent them; much labor and ingenuity will be required of him; and when he has once begun, he must go on and rehabilitate Hippocentaurs and chimeras dire. Gorgons and winged steeds flow in apace, and numberless other inconceivable and portentous natures. And if he is skeptical about them, and would fain reduce them one after another to the rules of

probability, this sort of crude philosophy will take up a great deal of time. Now I have no leisure for such enquiries; shall I tell you why? I must first know myself, as the Delphian inscription says; to be curious about that which is not my concern, while I am still in ignorance of my own self, would be ridiculous. And therefore I bid farewell to all this; the common opinion is enough for me. For, as I was saying, I want to know not about this, but about myself: am I a monster more complicated and swollen with passion than the serpent Typho, or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort, to whom Nature has given a diviner and lowlier destiny? But let me ask you, friend: have we not reached the plane-tree to which you were conducting us?

Phaedrus/ Yes, this is the tree.

Socrates/ By Herè, a fair resting-place, full of summer sounds and scents. Here is this lofty and spreading plane-tree, and the agnus castus high and clustering, in the fullest blossom and the greatest fragrance; and the stream which flows beneath the plane-tree is deliciously cold to the feet. Judging from the ornaments and images, this must be a spot sacred to Achelous and the Nymphs. How delightful is the breeze: —so very sweet; and there is a sound in the air shrill and summerlike which makes answer to the chorus of the cicadae. But the greatest charm of all is the grass, like a pillow gently sloping to the head. My dear Phaedrus, you have been an admirable guide.

Phaedrus/ What an incomprehensible being you are, Socrates: when you are in the country, as you say, you really are like some stranger who is led about by a guide. Do you ever cross the border? I rather think that you never venture even outside the gates.

Socrates/ Very true, my good friend; and I hope that you will excuse me when you hear the reason, which is, that I

am a lover of knowledge, and the men who dwell in the city are my teachers, and not the trees or the country. Though I do indeed believe that you have found a spell with which to draw me out of the city into the country, like a hungry cow before whom a bough or a bunch of fruit is waved. For only hold up before me in like manner a book, and you may lead me all round Attica, and over the wide world. And now having arrived, I intend to lie down, and do you choose any posture in which you can read best. Begin.

Phaedrus/ Listen. You know how matters stand with me; and how, as I conceive, this affair may be arranged for the advantage of both of us. And I maintain that I ought not to fail in my suit, because I am not your lover: for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown when their passion ceases, but to the non-lovers who are free and not under any compulsion, no time of repentance ever comes; for they confer their benefits according to the measure of their ability, in the way which is most conducive to their own interest. Then again, lovers consider how by reason of their love they have neglected their own concerns and rendered service to others: and when to these benefits conferred they add on the troubles which they have endured, they think that they have long ago made to the beloved a very ample return. But the non-lover has no such tormenting recollections; he has never neglected his affairs or quarreled with his relations; he has no troubles to add up or excuses to invent; and being well rid of all these evils, why should he not freely do what will gratify the beloved? If you say that the lover is more to be esteemed, because his love is thought to be greater; for he is willing to say and do what is hateful to other men, in order to please his beloved; —that, if true, is only a proof that he will prefer any future love to his present, and will injure his old love at the pleasure of the new. And how, in a matter of such infinite importance, can a man be

right in trusting himself to one who is afflicted with a malady which no experienced person would attempt to cure, for the patient himself admits that he is not in his right mind, and acknowledges that he is wrong in his mind, but says that he is unable to control himself? And if he came to his right mind, would he ever imagine that the desires were good which he conceived when in his wrong mind? Once more, there are many more non-lovers than lovers; and if you choose the best of the lovers, you will not have many to choose from; but if from the non-lovers, the choice will be larger, and you will be far more likely to find among them a person who is worthy of your friendship. If public opinion be your dread, and you would avoid reproach, in all probability the lover, who is always thinking that other men are as emulous of him as he is of them, will boast to some one of his successes, and make a show of them openly in the pride of his heart; —he wants others to know that his labor has not been lost; but the non-lover is more his own master, and is desirous of solid good, and not of the opinion of mankind. Again, the lover may be generally noted or seen following the beloved (this is his regular occupation), and whenever they are observed to exchange two words they are supposed to meet about some affair of love either past or in contemplation; but when non-lovers meet, no one asks the reason why, because people know that talking to another is natural, whether friendship or mere pleasure be the motive. Once more, if you fear the fickleness of friendship, consider that in any other case a quarrel might be a mutual calamity; but now, when you have given up what is most precious to you, you will be the greater loser, and therefore, you will have more reason in being afraid of the lover, for his vexations are many, and he is always fancying that everyone is leagued against him. Wherefore also he debars his beloved from society; he will not have you intimate with the wealthy,

lest they should exceed him in wealth, or with men of education, lest they should be his superiors in understanding; and he is equally afraid of anybody's influence who has any other advantage over himself. If he can persuade you to break with them, you are left without a friend in the world; or if, out of a regard to your own interest, you have more sense than to comply with his desire, you will have to quarrel with him. But those who are non-lovers, and whose success in love is the reward of their merit, will not be jealous of the companions of their beloved, and will rather hate those who refuse to be his associates, thinking that their favorite is slighted by the latter and benefited by the former; for more love than hatred may be expected to come to him out of his friendship with others. Many lovers too have loved the person of a youth before they knew his character or his belongings; so that when their passion has passed away, there is no knowing whether they will continue to be his friends; whereas, in the case of non-lovers who were always friends, the friendship is not lessened by the favors granted; but the recollection of these remains with them, and is an earnest of good things to come. Further, I say that you are likely to be improved by me, whereas the lover will spoil you. For they praise your words and actions in a wrong way; partly, because they are afraid of offending you, and also, their judgment is weakened by passion. Such are the feats which love exhibits; he makes things painful to the disappointed which give no pain to others; he compels the successful lover to praise what ought not to give him pleasure, and therefore the beloved is to be pitied rather than envied. But if you listen to me, in the first place, I, in my intercourse with you, shall not merely regard present enjoyment, but also future advantage, being not mastered by love, but my own master; nor for small causes taking violent dislikes, but even when the cause is great, slowly

laying up little wrath—unintentional offences I shall forgive, and intentional ones I shall try to prevent; and these are the marks of a friendship which will last. Do you think that a lover only can be a firm friend? reflect: —if this were true, we should set small value on sons, or fathers, or mothers; nor should we ever have loyal friends, for our love of them arises not from passion, but from other associations. Further, if we ought to shower favors on those who are the most eager suitors, —on that principle, we ought always to do good, not to the most virtuous, but to the most needy; for they are the persons who will be most relieved, and will therefore be the most grateful; and when you make a feast you should invite not your friend, but the beggar and the empty soul; for they will love you, and attend you, and come about your doors, and will be the best pleased, and the most grateful, and will invoke many a blessing on your head. Yet surely you ought not to be granting favors to those who besiege you with prayer, but to those who are best able to reward you; nor to the lover only, but to those who are worthy of love; nor to those who will enjoy the bloom of your youth, but to those who will share their possessions with you in age; nor to those who, having succeeded, will glory in their success to others, but to those who will be modest and tell no tales; nor to those who care about you for a moment only, but to those who will continue your friends through life; nor to those who, when their passion is over, will pick a quarrel with you, but rather to those who, when the charm of youth has left you, will show their own virtue. Remember what I have said; and consider yet this further point: friends admonish the lover under the idea that his way of life is bad, but no one of his kindred ever yet censured the non-lover, or thought that he was ill-advised about his own interests.

'Perhaps you will ask me whether I propose that you should indulge every non-lover. To which I reply that not

even the lover would advise you to indulge all lovers, for the indiscriminate favor is less esteemed by the rational recipient, and less easily hidden by him who would escape the censure of the world. Now love ought to be for the advantage of both parties, and for the injury of neither.

'I believe that I have said enough; but if there is anything more which you desire or which in your opinion needs to be supplied, ask and I will answer'

Now, Socrates, what do you think? Is not the discourse excellent, more especially in the matter of the language?

Socrates/ Yes, quite admirable; the effect on me was ravishing. And this I owe to you, Phaedrus, for I observed you while reading to be in an ecstasy, and thinking that you are more experienced in these matters than I am, I followed your example, and, like you, my divine darling, I became inspired with a frenzy.

Phaedrus/ Indeed, you are pleased to be merry.

Socrates/ Do you mean that I am not in earnest?

Phaedrus/ Now don't talk in that way, Socrates, but let me have your real opinion; I adjure you, by Zeus, the god of friendship, to tell me whether you think that any Hellene could have said more or spoken better on the same subject.

Socrates/ Well, but are you and I expected to praise the sentiments of the author, or only the clearness, and roundness, and finish, and tournure of the language? As to the first I willingly submit to your better judgment, for I am not worthy to form an opinion, having only attended to the rhetorical manner; and I was doubting whether this could have been defended even by Lysias himself; I thought, though I speak under correction, that he repeated himself two or three times, either from want of words or from want of pains; and also, he appeared to me ostentatiously to exult

in showing how well he could say the same thing in two or three ways.

Phaedrus/ Nonsense, Socrates; what you call repetition was the especial merit of the speech; for he omitted no topic of which the subject rightly allowed, and I do not think that anyone could have spoken better or more exhaustively.

Socrates/ There I cannot go along with you. Ancient sages, men and women, who have spoken and written of these things, would rise up in judgment against me, if out of complaisance I assented to you.

Phaedrus/ Who are they, and where did you hear anything better than this?

Socrates/ I am sure that I must have heard; but at this moment I do not remember from whom; perhaps from Sappho the fair, or Anacreon the wise; or, possibly, from a prose writer. Why do I say so? Why, because I perceive that my bosom is full, and that I could make another speech as good as that of Lysias, and different. Now I am certain that this is not an invention of my own, who am well aware that I know nothing, and therefore I can only infer that I have been filled through the ears, like a pitcher, from the waters of another, though I have actually forgotten in my stupidity who was my informant.

Phaedrus/ That is grand: —but never mind where you heard the discourse or from whom; let that be a mystery not to be divulged even at my earnest desire. Only, as you say, promise to make another and better oration, equal in length and entirely new, on the same subject; and I, like the nine Archons, will promise to set up a golden image at Delphi, not only of myself, but of you, and as large as life.

Socrates/ You are a dear golden ass if you suppose me to mean that Lysias has altogether missed the mark, and that I can make a speech from which all his arguments are to be

excluded. The worst of authors will say something which is to the point. Who, for example, could speak on this thesis of yours without praising the discretion of the non-lover and blaming the indiscretion of the lover? These are the commonplaces of the subject which must come in (for what else is there to be said?) and must be allowed and excused; the only merit is in the arrangement of them, for there can be none in the invention; but when you leave the commonplaces, then there may be some originality.

Phaedrus/ I admit that there is reason in what you say, and I too will be reasonable, and will allow you to start with the premise that the lover is more disordered in his wits than the non-lover; if in what remains you make a longer and better speech than Lysias, and use other arguments, then I say again, that a statue you shall have of beaten gold, and take your place by the colossal offerings of the Cypselids at Olympia.

Socrates/ How profoundly in earnest is the lover, because to tease him I lay a finger upon his love! And so, Phaedrus, you really imagine that I am going to improve upon the ingenuity of Lysias?

Phaedrus/ There I have you as you had me, and you must just speak 'as you best can.' Do not let us exchange 'tu quoque' as in a farce, or compel me to say to you as you said to me, 'I know Socrates as well as I know myself, and he was wanting to speak, but he gave himself airs.' Rather I would have you consider that from this place we stir not until you have embosomed yourself of the speech; for here are we all alone, and I am stronger, remember, and younger than you: —Wherefore perpend, and do not compel me to use violence.

Socrates/ But, my sweet Phaedrus, how ridiculous it would be of me to compete with Lysias in an extempore speech! He is a master in his art and I am an untaught man.

Phaedrus/ You see how matters stand; and therefore let there be no more pretenses; for, indeed, I know the word that is irresistible.

Socrates/ Then don't say it.

Phaedrus/ Yes, but I will; and my word shall be an oath. 'I say, or rather swear'—but what god will be the witness of my oath? —'By this plane-tree I swear, that unless you repeat the discourse here in the face of this very plane-tree, I will never tell you another; never let you have word of another!'

Socrates/ Villain! I am conquered; the poor lover of discourse has no more to say.

Phaedrus/ Then why are you still at your tricks?

Socrates/ I am not going to play tricks now that you have taken the oath, for I cannot allow myself to be starved.

Phaedrus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you what I will do?

Phaedrus/ What?

Socrates/ I will veil my face and gallop through the discourse as fast as I can, for if I see you I shall feel ashamed and not know what to say.

Phaedrus/ Only go on and you may do anything else which you please.

Socrates/ Come, O ye Muses, melodious, as ye are called, whether you have received this name from the character of your strains, or because the Melians are a musical race, help, O help me in the tale which my good friend here desires me to rehearse, in order that his friend whom he always deemed wise may seem to him to be wiser now than ever.

Once upon a time there was a fair boy, or, more properly speaking, a youth; he was very fair and had a great many lovers; and there was one special cunning one, who had

persuaded the youth that he did not love him, but he really loved him all the same; and one day when he was paying his addresses to him, he used this very argument—that he ought to accept the non-lover rather than the lover; his words were as follows: —

'All good counsel begins in the same way; a man should know what he is advising about, or his counsel will all come to naught. But people imagine that they know about the nature of things, when they don't know about them, and, not having come to an understanding at first because they think that they know, they end, as might be expected, in contradicting one another and themselves. Now you and I must not be guilty of this fundamental error which we condemn in others; but as our question is whether the lover or non-lover is to be preferred, let us first of all agree in defining the nature and power of love, and then, keeping our eyes upon the definition and to this appealing, let us further enquire whether love brings advantage or disadvantage.

'Everyone sees that love is a desire, and we know also that non-lovers desire the beautiful and good. Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non-lover? Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will; one is the natural desire of pleasure, the other is an acquired opinion which aspires after the best; and these two are sometimes in harmony and then again at war, and sometimes the one, sometimes the other conquers. When opinion by the help of reason leads us to the best, the conquering principle is called temperance; but when desire, which is devoid of reason, rules in us and drags us to pleasure, that power of misrule is called excess. Now excess has many names, and many members, and many forms, and any of these forms when very marked gives a name, neither honorable nor creditable, to the bearer of the name. The desire of eating, for example,

which gets the better of the higher reason and the other desires, is called gluttony, and he who is possessed by it is called a glutton; the tyrannical desire of drink, which inclines the possessor of the desire to drink, has a name which is only too obvious, and there can be as little doubt by what name any other appetite of the same family would be called; —it will be the name of that which happens to be dominant. And now I think that you will perceive the drift of my discourse; but as every spoken word is in a manner plainer than the unspoken, I had better say further that the irrational desire which overcomes the tendency of opinion towards right, and is led away to the enjoyment of beauty, and especially of personal beauty, by the desires which are her own kindred—that supreme desire, I say, which by leading conquers and by the force of passion is reinforced, from this very force, receiving a name, is called love (ἐρρωμένως ἔρως).'

And now, dear Phaedrus, I shall pause for an instant to ask whether you do not think me, as I appear to myself, inspired?

Phaedrus/ Yes, Socrates, you seem to have a very unusual flow of words.

Socrates/ Listen to me, then, in silence; for surely the place is holy; so that you must not wonder, if, as I proceed, I appear to be in a divine fury, for already I am getting into dithyrambics.

Phaedrus/ Nothing can be truer.

Socrates/ The responsibility rests with you. But hear what follows, and perhaps the fit may be averted; all is in their hands above. I will go on talking to my youth. Listen: —

Thus, my friend, we have declared and defined the nature of the subject. Keeping the definition in view, let us now

enquire what advantage or disadvantage is likely to ensue from the lover or the non-lover to him who accepts their advances.

He who is the victim of his passions and the slave of pleasure will of course desire to make his beloved as agreeable to himself as possible. Now to him who has a mind diseased anything is agreeable which is not opposed to him, but that which is equal or superior is hateful to him, and therefore the lover will not brook any superiority or equality on the part of his beloved; he is always employed in reducing him to inferiority. And the ignorant is the inferior of the wise, the coward of the brave, the slow of speech of the speaker, the dull of the clever. These, and not these only, are the mental defects of the beloved; —defects which, when implanted by nature, are necessarily a delight to the lover, and, when not implanted, he must contrive to implant them in him, if he would not be deprived of his fleeting joy. And therefore he cannot help being jealous, and will debar his beloved from the advantages of society which would make a man of him, and especially from that society which would have given him wisdom, and thereby he cannot fail to do him great harm. That is to say, in his excessive fear lest he should come to be despised in his eyes he will be compelled to banish from him divine philosophy; and there is no greater injury which he can inflict upon him than this. He will contrive that his beloved shall be wholly ignorant, and in everything shall look to him; he is to be the delight of the lover's heart, and a curse to himself. Verily, a lover is a profitable guardian and associate for him in all that relates to his mind.

Let us next see how his master, whose law of life is pleasure and not good, will keep and train the body of his servant. Will he not choose a beloved who is delicate rather than sturdy and strong? One brought up in shady bowers

and not in the bright sun, a stranger to manly exercises and the sweat of toil, accustomed only to a soft and luxurious diet, instead of the hues of health having the colors of paint and ornament, and the rest of a piece? —such a life as anyone can imagine and which I need not detail at length. But I may sum up all that I have to say in a word, and pass on. Such a person in war, or in any of the great crises of life, will be the anxiety of his friends and also of his lover, and certainly not the terror of his enemies; which nobody can deny.

And now let us tell what advantage or disadvantage the beloved will receive from the guardianship and society of his lover in the matter of his property; this is the next point to be considered. The lover will be the first to see what, indeed, will be sufficiently evident to all men, that he desires above all things to deprive his beloved of his dearest and best and holiest possessions, father, mother, kindred, friends, of all whom he thinks may be hinderers or reprovers of their most sweet converse; he will even cast a jealous eye upon his gold and silver or other property, because these make him a less easy prey, and when caught less manageable; hence he is of necessity displeased at his possession of them and rejoices at their loss; and he would like him to be wifeless, childless, homeless, as well; and the longer the better, for the longer he is all this, the longer he will enjoy him.

There are some sort of animals, such as flatterers, who are dangerous and mischievous enough, and yet nature has mingled a temporary pleasure and grace in their composition. You may say that a courtesan is hurtful, and disapprove of such creatures and their practices, and yet for the time they are very pleasant. But the lover is not only hurtful to his love; he is also an extremely disagreeable companion. The old proverb says that 'birds of a feather flock together'; I suppose that equality of years inclines them to

the same pleasures, and similarity begets friendship; yet you may have more than enough even of this; and verily constraint is always said to be grievous. Now the lover is not only unlike his beloved, but he forces himself upon him. For he is old and his love is young, and neither day nor night will he leave him if he can help; necessity and the sting of desire drive him on, and allure him with the pleasure which he receives from seeing, hearing, touching, perceiving him in every way. And therefore he is delighted to fasten upon him and to minister to him. But what pleasure or consolation can the beloved be receiving all this time? Must he not feel the extremity of disgust when he looks at an old shriveled face and the remainder to match, which even in a description is disagreeable, and quite detestable when he is forced into daily contact with his lover; moreover he is jealously watched and guarded against everything and everybody, and has to hear misplaced and exaggerated praises of himself, and censures equally inappropriate, which are intolerable when the man is sober, and, besides being intolerable, are published all over the world in all their indelicacy and wearisomeness when he is drunk.

And not only while his love continues is he mischievous and unpleasant, but when his love ceases he becomes a perfidious enemy of him on whom he showered his oaths and prayers and promises, and yet could hardly prevail upon him to tolerate the tedium of his company even from motives of interest. The hour of payment arrives, and now he is the servant of another master; instead of love and infatuation, wisdom and temperance are his bosom's lords; but the beloved has not discovered the change which has taken place in him, when he asks for a return and recalls to his recollection former sayings and doings; he believes himself to be speaking to the same person, and the other, not having the courage to confess the truth, and not knowing how to

fulfill the oaths and promises which he made when under the dominion of folly, and having now grown wise and temperate, does not want to do as he did or to be as he was before. And so he runs away and is constrained to be a defaulter; the oyster-shell has fallen with the other side uppermost—he changes pursuit into flight, while the other is compelled to follow him with passion and imprecation, not knowing that he ought never from the first to have accepted a demented lover instead of a sensible non-lover; and that in making such a choice he was giving himself up to a faithless, morose, envious, disagreeable being, hurtful to his estate, hurtful to his bodily health, and still more hurtful to the cultivation of his mind, than which there neither is nor ever will be anything more honored in the eyes both of gods and men. Consider this, fair youth, and know that in the friendship of the lover there is no real kindness; he has an appetite and wants to feed upon you:

'As wolves love lambs so lovers love their loves.'

But I told you so, I am speaking in verse, and therefore I had better make an end; enough.

Phaedrus/ I thought that you were only half-way and were going to make a similar speech about all the advantages of accepting the non-lover. Why do you not proceed?

Socrates/ Does not your simplicity observe that I have got out of dithyrambics into heroics, when only uttering a censure on the lover? And if I am to add the praises of the non-lover what will become of me? Do you not perceive that I am already overtaken by the Nymphs to whom you have mischievously exposed me? And therefore I will only add that the non-lover has all the advantages in which the lover is accused of being deficient. And now I will say no more; there has been enough of both of them. Leaving the tale to its fate,

I will cross the river and make the best of my way home, lest a worse thing be inflicted upon me by you.

Phaedrus/ Not yet, Socrates; not until the heat of the day has passed; do you not see that the hour is almost noon? there is the midday sun standing still, as people say, in the meridian. Let us rather stay and talk over what has been said, and then return in the cool.

Socrates/ Your love of discourse, Phaedrus, is superhuman, simply marvelous, and I do not believe that there is anyone of your contemporaries who has either made or in one way or another has compelled others to make an equal number of speeches. I would except Simmias the Theban, but all the rest are far behind you. And now I do verily believe that you have been the cause of another.

Phaedrus/ That is good news. But what do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean to say that as I was about to cross the stream the usual sign was given to me, —that sign which always forbids, but never bids, me to do anything which I am going to do; and I thought that I heard a voice saying in my ear that I had been guilty of impiety, and that I must not go away until I had made an atonement. Now I am a diviner, though not a very good one, but I have enough religion for my own use, as you might say of a bad writer—his writing is good enough for him; and I am beginning to see that I was in error. O my friend, how prophetic is the human soul! At the time I had a sort of misgiving, and, like Ibycus, 'I was troubled; I feared that I might be buying honor from men at the price of sinning against the gods.' Now I recognize my error.

Phaedrus/ What error?

Socrates/ That was a dreadful speech which you brought with you, and you made me utter one as bad.

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ It was foolish, I say, —to a certain extent, impious; can anything be more dreadful?

Phaedrus/ Nothing, if the speech was really such as you describe.

Socrates/ Well, and is not Eros the son of Aphrodite, and a god?

Phaedrus/ So men say.

Socrates/ But that was not acknowledged by Lysias in his speech, nor by you in that other speech which you by a charm drew from my lips. For if love be, as he surely is, a divinity, he cannot be evil. Yet this was the error of both the speeches. There was also a simplicity about them which was refreshing; having no truth or honesty in them, nevertheless they pretended to be something, hoping to succeed in deceiving the manikins of earth and gain celebrity among them. Wherefore I must have a purgation. And I bethink me of an ancient purgation of mythological error which was devised, not by Homer, for he never had the wit to discover why he was blind, but by Stesichorus, who was a philosopher and knew the reason why; and therefore, when he lost his eyes, for that was the penalty which was inflicted upon him for reviling the lovely Helen, he at once purged himself. And the purgation was a recantation, which began thus, —

> 'False is that word of mine—the truth is that thou didst not embark in ships, nor ever go to the walls of Troy;'

and when he had completed his poem, which is called 'the recantation' immediately his sight returned to him. Now I will be wiser than either Stesichorus or Homer, in that I am going to make my recantation for reviling love before I suffer; and this I will attempt, not as before, veiled and ashamed, but with forehead bold and bare.

Phaedrus/ Nothing could be more agreeable to me than to hear you say so.

Socrates/ Only think, my good Phaedrus, what an utter want of delicacy was shown in the two discourses; I mean, in my own and in that which you recited out of the book. Would not anyone who was himself of a noble and gentle nature, and who loved or ever had loved a nature like his own, when we tell of the petty causes of lovers' jealousies, and of their exceeding animosities, and of the injuries which they do to their beloved, have imagined that our ideas of love were taken from some haunt of sailors to which good manners were unknown—he would certainly never have admitted the justice of our censure?

Phaedrus/ I dare say not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Therefore, because I blush at the thought of this person, and also because I am afraid of Love himself, I desire to wash the brine out of my ears with water from the spring; and I would counsel Lysias not to delay, but to write another discourse, which shall prove that 'ceteris paribus' the lover ought to be accepted rather than the non-lover.

Phaedrus/ Be assured that he shall. You shall speak the praises of the lover, and Lysias shall be compelled by me to write another discourse on the same theme.

Socrates/ You will be true to your nature in that, and therefore I believe you.

Phaedrus/ Speak, and fear not.

Socrates/ But where is the fair youth whom I was addressing before, and who ought to listen now; lest, if he hear me not, he should accept a non-lover before he knows what he is doing?

Phaedrus/ He is close at hand, and always at your service.

Socrates/ Know then, fair youth, that the former discourse was the word of Phaedrus, the son of Vain Man, who dwells in the city of Myrrhina (Myrrhinusius). And this which I am about to utter is the recantation of Stesichorus the son of Godly Man (Euphemus), who comes from the town of Desire (Himera), and is to the following effect: 'I told a lie when I said' that the beloved ought to accept the non-lover when he might have the lover, because the one is sane, and the other mad. It might be so if madness were simply an evil; but there is also a madness which is a divine gift, and the source of the chiefest blessings granted to men. For prophecy is a madness, and the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when out of their senses have conferred great benefits on Hellas, both in public and private life, but when in their senses few or none. And I might also tell you how the Sibyl and other inspired persons have given to many an one many an intimation of the future which has saved them from falling. But it would be tedious to speak of what everyone knows.

There will be more reason in appealing to the ancient inventors of names, who would never have connected prophecy (μαντικὴ), which foretells the future and is the noblest of arts, with madness (μανικὴ), or called them both by the same name, if they had deemed madness to be a disgrace or dishonor; —they must have thought that there was an inspired madness which was a noble thing; for the two words, μαντικὴ and μανικὴ, are really the same, and the letter τ is only a modern and tasteless insertion. And this is confirmed by the name which was given by them to the rational investigation of futurity, whether made by the help of birds or of other signs—this, for as much as it is an art which supplies from the reasoning faculty mind (νοῦς) and information (ἱστορία) to human thought (οἴησις), they originally termed οἰονοιστικὴ, but the word has been lately

altered and made sonorous by the modern introduction of the letter Omega (οἰονοιστικὴ and οἰωνιστικὴ) and in proportion as prophecy (μαντικὴ) is more perfect and august than augury, both in name and fact, in the same proportion, as the ancients testify, is madness superior to a sane mind (σωφροσύνη), for the one is only of human, but the other of divine origin. Again, where plagues and mightiest woes have bred in certain families, owing to some ancient blood-guiltiness, there madness has entered with holy prayers and rites, and by inspired utterances found a way of deliverance for those who are in need; and he who has part in this gift, and is truly possessed and duly out of his mind, is by the use of purifications and mysteries made whole and exempt from evil, future as well as present, and has a release from the calamity which was afflicting him. The third kind is the madness of those who are possessed by the Muses; which taking hold of a delicate and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyrical and all other numbers; with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity. But he who, having no touch of the Muses' madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art—he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted; the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters into rivalry with the madman.

I might tell of many other noble deeds which have sprung from inspired madness. And therefore, let no one frighten or flutter us by saying that the temperate friend is to be chosen rather than the inspired, but let him further show that love is not sent by the gods for any good to lover or beloved; if he can do so we will allow him to carry off the palm. And we, on our part, will prove in answer to him that the madness of love is the greatest of heaven's blessings, and the proof shall be one which the wise will receive, and the witling disbelieve.

But first of all, let us view the affections and actions of the soul divine and human, and try to ascertain the truth about them. The beginning of our proof is as follows: —

The soul through all her being is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. Only the self-moving, never leaving self, never ceases to move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that moves besides. Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that which is begotten has a beginning; but the beginning is begotten of nothing, for if it were begotten of something, then the begotten would not come from a beginning. But if unbegotten, it must also be indestructible; for if beginning were destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, nor anything out of a beginning; and all things must have a beginning. And therefore the self-moving is the beginning of motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten, else the whole heavens and all creation would collapse and stand still, and never again have motion or birth. But if the self-moving is proved to be immortal, he who affirms that self-motion is the very idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion. For the body which is moved from without is soulless; but that which is moved from within has a soul, for such is the nature of the soul. But if this be true, must not the soul be the self-moving, and therefore of necessity unbegotten and immortal? Enough of the soul's immortality.

Of the nature of the soul, though her true form be ever a theme of large and more than mortal discourse, let me speak briefly, and in a figure. And let the figure be composite—a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the winged horses and the charioteers of the gods are all of them noble and of noble descent, but those of other races are mixed; the human charioteer drives his in a pair; and one of them is noble and of noble breed, and the other is ignoble and of

ignoble breed; and the driving of them of necessity gives a great deal of trouble to him. I will endeavor to explain to you in what way the mortal differs from the immortal creature. The soul in her totality has the care of inanimate being everywhere, and traverses the whole heaven in divers forms appearing; —when perfect and fully winged she soars upward, and orders the whole world; whereas the imperfect soul, losing her wings and drooping in her flight at last settles on the solid ground—there, finding a home, she receives an earthly frame which appears to be self-moved, but is really moved by her power; and this composition of soul and body is called a living and mortal creature. For immortal no such union can be reasonably believed to be; although fancy, not having seen nor surely known the nature of God, may imagine an immortal creature having both a body and also a soul which are united throughout all time. Let that, however, be as God wills, and be spoken of acceptably to him. And now let us ask the reason why the soul loses her wings!

The wing is the corporeal element which is most akin to the divine, and which by nature tends to soar aloft and carry that which gravitates downwards into the upper region, which is the habitation of the gods. The divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the like; and by these the wing of the soul is nourished, and grows apace; but when fed upon evil and foulness and the opposite of good, wastes and falls away. Zeus, the mighty lord, holding the reins of a winged chariot, leads the way in heaven, ordering all and taking care of all; and there follows him the array of gods and demi-gods, marshaled in eleven bands; Hestia alone abides at home in the house of heaven; of the rest they who are reckoned among the princely twelve march in their appointed order. They see many blessed sights in the inner heaven, and there are many ways to and fro, along which the blessed gods are

passing, everyone doing his own work; he may follow who will and can, for jealousy has no place in the celestial choir. But when they go to banquet and festival, then they move up the steep to the top of the vault of heaven. The chariots of the gods in even poise, obeying the rein, glide rapidly; but the others labor, for the vicious steed goes heavily, weighing down the charioteer to the earth when his steed has not been thoroughly trained: —and this is the hour of agony and extremest conflict for the soul. For the immortals, when they are at the end of their course, go forth and stand upon the outside of heaven, and the revolution of the spheres carries them round, and they behold the things beyond. But of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet ever did or ever will sing worthily? It is such as I will describe; for I must dare to speak the truth, when truth is my theme. There abides the very being with which true knowledge is concerned; the colorless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to mind, the pilot of the soul. The divine intelligence, being Nurtured upon mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving the food proper to it, rejoices at beholding reality, and once more gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad, until the revolution of the worlds brings her round again to the same place. In the revolution she beholds justice, and temperance, and knowledge absolute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute; and beholding the other true existences in like manner, and feasting upon them, she passes down into the interior of the heavens and returns home; and there the charioteer putting up his horses at the stall, gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar to drink.

Such is the life of the gods; but of other souls, that which follows God best and is likest to him lifts the head of the

charioteer into the outer world, and is carried round in the revolution, troubled indeed by the steeds, and with difficulty beholding true being; while another only rises and falls, and sees, and again fails to see by reason of the unruliness of the steeds. The rest of the souls are also longing after the upper world and they all follow, but not being strong enough they are carried round below the surface, plunging, treading on one another, each striving to be first; and there is confusion and perspiration and the extremity of effort; and many of them are lamed or have their wings broken through the ill-driving of the charioteers; and all of them after a fruitless toil, not having attained to the mysteries of true being, go away, and feed upon opinion. The reason why the souls exhibit this exceeding eagerness to behold the plain of truth is that pasturage is found there, which is suited to the highest part of the soul; and the wing on which the soul soars is nourished with this. And there is a law of Destiny, that the soul which attains any vision of truth in company with a god is preserved from harm until the next period, and if attaining always is always unharmed. But when she is unable to follow, and fails to behold the truth, and through some ill-hap sinks beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice, and her wings fall from her and she drops to the ground, then the law ordains that this soul shall at her first birth pass, not into any other animal, but only into man; and the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as a philosopher, or artist, or some musical and loving nature; that which has seen truth in the second degree shall be some righteous king or warrior chief; the soul which is of the third class shall be a politician, or economist, or trader; the fourth shall be a lover of gymnastic toils, or a physician; the fifth shall lead the life of a prophet or hierophant; to the sixth the character of a poet or some other imitative artist will be assigned; to the seventh the life of an artisan or

husbandman; to the eighth that of a sophist or demagogue; to the ninth that of a tyrant; —all these are states of probation, in which he who does righteously improves, and he who does unrighteously, deteriorates his lot.

Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul of each one can return to the place from whence she came, for she cannot grow her wings in less; only the soul of a philosopher, guileless and true, or the soul of a lover, who is not devoid of philosophy, may acquire wings in the third of the recurring periods of a thousand years; he is distinguished from the ordinary good man who gains wings in three thousand years: —and they who choose this life three times in succession have wings given them, and go away at the end of three thousand years. But the others receive judgment when they have completed their first life, and after the judgment they go, some of them to the houses of correction which are under the earth, and are punished; others to some place in heaven whither they are lightly borne by justice, and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may take any which they please. The soul of a man may pass into the life of a beast, or from the beast return again into the man. But the soul which has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form. For a man must have intelligence of universals, and be able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one conception of reason; —this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following God—when regardless of that which we now call being she raised her head up towards the true being. And therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings; and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in recollection to those things in which God

abides, and in beholding which He is what He is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; they do not see that he is inspired.

Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty; he would like to fly away, but he cannot; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below; and he is therefore thought to be mad. And I have shown this of all inspirations to be the noblest and highest and the offspring of the highest to him who has or shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it. For, as has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her passing into the form of man. But all souls do not easily recall the things of the other world; they may have seen them for a short time only, or they may have been unfortunate in their earthly lot, and, having had their hearts turned to unrighteousness through some corrupting influence, they may have lost the memory of the holy things which once they saw. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them; and they, when they behold here any image of that other world, are rapt in amazement; but they are ignorant of what this rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no light of justice or temperance or any of the higher ideas which are precious to souls in the earthly copies of them: they are seen through a glass dimly; and there are few who, going to the images, behold in them the realities, and these only with difficulty. There was a time when with the rest of the happy band they saw beauty shining in brightness, —we philosophers

following in the train of Zeus, others in company with other gods; and then we beheld the beatific vision and were initiated into a mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, which we beheld shining in pure light, pure ourselves and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell. Let me linger over the memory of scenes which have passed away.

But of beauty, I repeat again that we saw her there shining in company with the celestial forms; and coming to earth we find her here too, shining in clearness through the clearest aperture of sense. For sight is the most piercing of our bodily senses; though not by that is wisdom seen; her loveliness would have been transporting if there had been a visible image of her, and the other ideas, if they had visible counterparts, would be equally lovely. But this is the privilege of beauty, that being the loveliest she is also the most palpable to sight. Now he who is not newly initiated or who has become corrupted, does not easily rise out of this world to the sight of true beauty in the other; he looks only at her earthly namesake, and instead of being awed at the sight of her, he is given over to pleasure, and like a brutish beast he rushes on to enjoy and beget; he consorts with wantonness, and is not afraid or ashamed of pursuing pleasure in violation of nature. But he whose initiation is recent, and who has been the spectator of many glories in the other world, is amazed when he sees anyone having a godlike face or form, which is the expression of divine beauty; and at first a shudder runs through him, and again the old awe steals over him; then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if he were not

afraid of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god; then while he gazes on him there is a sort of reaction, and the shudder passes into an unusual heat and perspiration; for, as he receives the effluence of beauty through the eyes, the wing moistens and he warms. And as he warms, the parts out of which the wing grew, and which had been hitherto closed and rigid, and had prevented the wing from shooting forth, are melted, and as nourishment streams upon him, the lower end of the wing begins to swell and grow from the root upwards; and the growth extends under the whole soul—for once the whole was winged. During this process the whole soul is all in a state of ebullition and effervescence, —which may be compared to the irritation and uneasiness in the gums at the time of cutting teeth, —bubbles up, and has a feeling of uneasiness and tickling; but when in like manner the soul is beginning to grow wings, the beauty of the beloved meets her eye and she receives the sensible warm motion of particles which flow towards her, therefore called emotion (ἵμερος), and is refreshed and warmed by them, and then she ceases from her pain with joy. But when she is parted from her beloved and her moisture fails, then the orifices of the passage out of which the wing shoots dry up and close, and intercept the germ of the wing; which, being shut up with the emotion, throbbing as with the pulsations of an artery, pricks the aperture which is nearest, until at length the entire soul is pierced and maddened and pained, and at the recollection of beauty is again delighted. And from both of them together the soul is oppressed at the strangeness of her condition, and is in a great strait and excitement, and in her madness can neither sleep by night nor abide in her place by day. And wherever she thinks that she will behold the beautiful one, thither in her desire she runs. And when she has seen him, and bathed herself in the waters of

beauty, her constraint is loosened, and she is refreshed, and has no more pangs and pains; and this is the sweetest of all pleasures at the time, and is the reason why the soul of the lover will never forsake his beautiful one, whom he esteems above all; he has forgotten mother and brethren and companions, and he thinks nothing of the neglect and loss of his property; the rules and proprieties of life, on which he formerly prided himself, he now despises, and is ready to sleep like a servant, wherever he is allowed, as near as he can to his desired one, who is the object of his worship, and the physician who can alone assuage the greatness of his pain. And this state, my dear imaginary youth to whom I am talking, is by men called love, and among the gods has a name at which you, in your simplicity, may be inclined to mock; there are two lines in the apocryphal writings of Homer in which the name occurs. One of them is rather outrageous, and not altogether metrical. They are as follows: —

> 'Mortals call him fluttering love,
> But the immortals call him winged one.
> Because the growing of wings is a necessity to him.'

You may believe this, but not unless you like. At any rate the loves of lovers and their causes are such as I have described.

Now the lover who is taken to be the attendant of Zeus is better able to bear the winged god, and can endure a heavier burden; but the attendants and companions of Ares, when under the influence of love, if they fancy that they have been at all wronged, are ready to kill and put an end to themselves and their beloved. And he who follows in the train of any other god, while he is unspoiled and the impression lasts, honors and imitates him, as far as he is able; and after the manner of his God he behaves in his intercourse with his beloved and with the rest of the world during the first period of his earthly existence. Everyone chooses his love from the

ranks of beauty according to his character, and this he makes his god, and fashions and adorns as a sort of image which he is to fall down and worship. The followers of Zeus desire that their beloved should have a soul like him; and therefore they seek out some one of a philosophical and imperial nature, and when they have found him and loved him, they do all they can to confirm such a nature in him, and if they have no experience of such a disposition hitherto, they learn of anyone who can teach them, and themselves follow in the same way. And they have the less difficulty in finding the nature of their own god in themselves, because they have been compelled to gaze intensely on him; their recollection clings to him, and they become possessed of him, and receive from him their character and disposition, so far as man can participate in God. The qualities of their god they attribute to the beloved, wherefore they love him all the more, and if, like the Bacchic Nymphs, they draw inspiration from Zeus, they pour out their own fountain upon him, wanting to make him as like as possible to their own god. But those who are the followers of Here seek a royal love, and when they have found him they do just the same with him; and in like manner the followers of Apollo, and of every other god walking in the ways of their god, seek a love who is to be made like him whom they serve, and when they have found him, they themselves imitate their god, and persuade their love to do the same, and educate him into the manner and nature of the god as far as they each can; for no feelings of envy or jealousy are entertained by them towards their beloved, but they do their utmost to create in him the greatest likeness of themselves and of the god whom they honor. Thus fair and blissful to the beloved is the desire of the inspired lover, and the initiation of which I speak into the mysteries of true love, if he be captured by the lover and

their purpose is effected. Now the beloved is taken captive in the following manner: —

As I said at the beginning of this tale, I divided each soul into three—two horses and a charioteer; and one of the horses was good and the other bad: the division may remain, but I have not yet explained in what the goodness or badness of either consists, and to that I will now proceed. The right-hand horse is upright and cleanly made; he has a lofty neck and an aquiline nose; his color is white, and his eyes dark; he is a lover of honor and modesty and temperance, and the follower of true glory; he needs no touch of the whip, but is guided by word and admonition only. The other is a crooked lumbering animal, put together anyhow; he has a short thick neck; he is flat-faced and of a dark color, with grey eyes and blood-red complexion; the mate of insolence and pride, shag-eared and deaf, hardly yielding to whip and spur. Now when the charioteer beholds the vision of love, and has his whole soul warmed through sense, and is full of the prickings and ticklings of desire, the obedient steed, then as always under the government of shame, refrains from leaping on the beloved; but the other, heedless of the pricks and of the blows of the whip, plunges and runs away, giving all manner of trouble to his companion and the charioteer, whom he forces to approach the beloved and to remember the joys of love. They at first indignantly oppose him and will not be urged on to do terrible and unlawful deeds; but at last, when he persists in plaguing them, they yield and agree to do as he bids them. And now they are at the spot and behold the flashing beauty of the beloved; which when the charioteer sees, his memory is carried to the true beauty, whom he beholds in company with Modesty like an image placed upon a holy pedestal. He sees her, but he is afraid and falls backwards in adoration, and by his fall is compelled to pull back the reins with such violence as to bring both the steeds

on their haunches, the one willing and unresisting, the unruly one very unwilling; and when they have gone back a little, the one is overcome with shame and wonder, and his whole soul is bathed in perspiration; the other, when the pain is over which the bridle and the fall had given him, having with difficulty taken breath, is full of wrath and reproaches, which he heaps upon the charioteer and his fellow-steed, for want of courage and manhood, declaring that they have been false to their agreement and guilty of desertion. Again they refuse, and again he urges them on, and will scarce yield to their prayer that he would wait until another time. When the appointed hour comes, they make as if they had forgotten, and he reminds them, fighting and neighing and dragging them on, until at length he on the same thoughts intent, forces them to draw near again. And when they are near, he stoops his head and puts up his tail, and takes the bit in his teeth and pulls shamelessly. Then the charioteer is worse off than ever; he falls back like a racer at the barrier, and with a still more violent wrench drags the bit out of the teeth of the wild steed and covers his abusive tongue and jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches to the ground and punishes him sorely. And when this has happened several times and the villain has ceased from his wanton way, he is tamed and humbled, and follows the will of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one he is ready to die of fear. And from that time forward the soul of the lover follows the beloved in modesty and holy fear.

And so the beloved who, like a god, has received every true and loyal service from his lover, not in pretense but in reality, being also himself of a nature friendly to his admirer, if in former days he has blushed to own his passion and turned away his lover, because his youthful companions or others slanderously told him that he would be disgraced, now as years advance, at the appointed age and time, is led

to receive him into communion. For fate which has ordained that there shall be no friendship among the evil has also ordained that there shall ever be friendship among the good. And the beloved when he has received him into communion and intimacy, is quite amazed at the good-will of the lover; he recognizes that the inspired friend is worth all other friends or kinsmen; they have nothing of friendship in them worthy to be compared with his. And when this feeling continues and he is nearer to him and embraces him, in gymnastic exercises and at other times of meeting, then the fountain of that stream, which Zeus when he was in love with Ganymede named Desire, overflows upon the lover, and some enters into his soul, and some when he is filled flows out again; and as a breeze or an echo rebounds from the smooth rocks and returns whence it came, so does the stream of beauty, passing through the eyes which are the windows of the soul, come back to the beautiful one; there arriving and quickening the passages of the wings, watering them and inclining them to grow, and filling the soul of the beloved also with love. And thus he loves, but he knows not what; he does not understand and cannot explain his own state; he appears to have caught the infection of blindness from another; the lover is his mirror in whom he is beholding himself, but he is not aware of this. When he is with the lover, both cease from their pain, but when he is away then he longs as he is longed for, and has love's image, love for love (Anteros) lodging in his breast, which he calls and believes to be not love but friendship only, and his desire is as the desire of the other, but weaker; he wants to see him, touch him, kiss, embrace him, and probably not long afterwards his desire is accomplished. When they meet, the wanton steed of the lover has a word to say to the charioteer; he would like to have a little pleasure in return for many pains, but the wanton steed of the beloved says not a word,

for he is bursting with passion which he understands not;—he throws his arms round the lover and embraces him as his dearest friend; and, when they are side by side, he is not in a state in which he can refuse the lover anything, if he ask him; although his fellow-steed and the charioteer oppose him with the arguments of shame and reason. After this their happiness depends upon their self-control; if the better elements of the mind which lead to order and philosophy prevail, then they pass their life here in happiness and harmony—masters of themselves and orderly—enslaving the vicious and emancipating the virtuous elements of the soul; and when the end comes, they are light and winged for flight, having conquered in one of the three heavenly or truly Olympian victories; nor can human discipline or divine inspiration confer any greater blessing on man than this. If, on the other hand, they leave philosophy and lead the lower life of ambition, then probably, after wine or in some other careless hour, the two wanton animals take the two souls when off their guard and bring them together, and they accomplish that desire of their hearts which to the many is bliss; and this having once enjoyed they continue to enjoy, yet rarely because they have not the approval of the whole soul. They too are dear, but not so dear to one another as the others, either at the time of their love or afterwards. They consider that they have given and taken from each other the most sacred pledges, and they may not break them and fall into enmity. At last they pass out of the body, unwinged, but eager to soar, and thus obtain no mean reward of love and madness. For those who have once begun the heavenward pilgrimage may not go down again to darkness and the journey beneath the earth, but they live in light always; happy companions in their pilgrimage, and when the time comes at which they receive their wings they have the same plumage because of their love.

Thus great are the heavenly blessings which the friendship of a lover will confer upon you, my youth. Whereas the attachment of the non-lover, which is alloyed with a worldly prudence and has worldly and niggardly ways of doling out benefits, will breed in your soul those vulgar qualities which the populace applaud, will send you bowling round the earth during a period of nine thousand years, and leave you a fool in the world below.

And thus, dear Eros, I have made and paid my recantation, as well and as fairly as I could; more especially in the matter of the poetical figures which I was compelled to use, because Phaedrus would have them. And now forgive the past and accept the present, and be gracious and merciful to me, and do not in thine anger deprive me of sight, or take from me the art of love which thou hast given me, but grant that I may be yet more esteemed in the eyes of the fair. And if Phaedrus or I myself said anything rude in our first speeches, blame Lysias, who is the father of the brat, and let us have no more of his progeny; bid him study philosophy, like his brother Polemarchus; and then his lover Phaedrus will no longer halt between two opinions, but will dedicate himself wholly to love and to philosophical discourses.

Phaedrus/ I join in the prayer, Socrates, and say with you, if this be for my good, may your words come to pass. But why did you make your second oration so much finer than the first? I wonder why. And I begin to be afraid that I shall lose conceit of Lysias, and that he will appear tame in comparison, even if he be willing to put another as fine and as long as yours into the field, which I doubt. For quite lately one of your politicians was abusing him on this very account; and called him a 'speech-writer' again and again. So that a feeling of pride may probably induce him to give up writing speeches.

Socrates/ What a very amusing notion! But I think, my young man, that you are much mistaken in your friend if you imagine that he is frightened at a little noise; and, possibly, you think that his assailant was in earnest?

Phaedrus/ I thought, Socrates, that he was. And you are aware that the greatest and most influential statesmen are ashamed of writing speeches and leaving them in a written form, lest they should be called Sophists by posterity.

Socrates/ You seem to be unconscious, Phaedrus, that the 'sweet elbow' of the proverb is really the long arm of the Nile. And you appear to be equally unaware of the fact that this sweet elbow of theirs is also a long arm. For there is nothing of which our great politicians are so fond as of writing speeches and bequeathing them to posterity. And they add their admirers' names at the top of the writing, out of gratitude to them.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean? I do not understand.

Socrates/ Why, do you not know that when a politician writes, he begins with the names of his approvers?

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, he begins in this manner: 'Be it enacted by the senate, the people, or both, on the motion of a certain person,' who is our author; and so putting on a serious face, he proceeds to display his own wisdom to his admirers in what is often a long and tedious composition. Now what is that sort of thing but a regular piece of authorship?

Phaedrus/ True.

Socrates/ And if the law is finally approved, then the author leaves the theatre in high delight; but if the law is rejected and he is done out of his speech-making, and not thought good enough to write, then he and his party are in mourning.

Phaedrus/ Very true.

Socrates/ So far are they from despising, or rather so highly do they value the practice of writing.

Phaedrus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And when the king or orator has the power, as Lycurgus or Solon or Darius had, of attaining an immortality of authorship in a state, is he not thought by posterity, when they see his compositions, and does he not think himself, while he is yet alive, to be a god?

Phaedrus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then do you think that anyone of this class, however ill-disposed, would reproach Lysias with being an author?

Phaedrus/ Not upon your view; for according to you he would be casting a slur upon his own favorite pursuit.

Socrates/ Anyone may see that there is no disgrace in the mere fact of writing.

Phaedrus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ The disgrace begins when a man writes not well, but badly.

Phaedrus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And what is well and what is badly—need we ask Lysias, or any other poet or orator, whoever wrote or will write either a political or any other work, in meter or out of meter, poet or prose writer, to teach us this?

Phaedrus/ Need we? For what should a man live if not for the pleasures of discourse? Surely not for the sake of bodily pleasures, which almost always have previous pain as a condition of them, and therefore are rightly called slavish.

Socrates/ There is time enough. And I believe that the grasshoppers chirruping after their manner in the heat of the sun over our heads are talking to one another and looking down at us. What would they say if they saw that

we, like the many, are not conversing, but slumbering at mid-day, lulled by their voices, too indolent to think? Would they not have a right to laugh at us? They might imagine that we were slaves, who, coming to rest at a place of resort of theirs, like sheep lie asleep at noon around the well. But if they see us discoursing, and like Odysseus sailing past them, deaf to their siren voices, they may perhaps, out of respect, give us of the gifts which they receive from the gods that they may impart them to men.

Phaedrus/ What gifts do you mean? I never heard of any.

Socrates/ A lover of music like yourself ought surely to have heard the story of the grasshoppers, who are said to have been human beings in an age before the Muses. And when the Muses came and song appeared they were ravished with delight; and singing always, never thought of eating and drinking, until at last in their forgetfulness they died. And now they live again in the grasshoppers; and this is the return which the Muses make to them—they neither hunger, nor thirst, but from the hour of their birth are always singing, and never eating or drinking; and when they die they go and inform the Muses in heaven who honors them on earth. They win the love of Terpsichore for the dancers by their report of them; of Erato for the lovers, and of the other Muses for those who do them honor, according to the several ways of honoring them; —of Calliope the eldest Muse and of Urania who is next to her, for the philosophers, of whose music the grasshoppers make report to them; for these are the Muses who are chiefly concerned with heaven and thought, divine as well as human, and they have the sweetest utterance. For many reasons, then, we ought always to talk and not to sleep at mid-day.

Phaedrus/ Let us talk.

Socrates/ Shall we discuss the rules of writing and speech as we were proposing?

Phaedrus/ Very good.

Socrates/ In good speaking should not the mind of the speaker know the truth of the matter about which he is going to speak?

Phaedrus/ And yet, Socrates, I have heard that he who would be an orator has nothing to do with true justice, but only with that which is likely to be approved by the many have who sit in judgment; nor with the truly good or honorable, but only with opinion about them, and that from opinion comes persuasion, and not from the truth.

Socrates/ The words of the wise are not to be set aside; for there is probably something in them; and therefore the meaning of this saying is not hastily to be dismissed.

Phaedrus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Let us put the matter thus: —Suppose that I persuaded you to buy a horse and go to the wars. Neither of us knew what a horse was like, but I knew that you believed a horse to be of tame animals the one which has the longest ears.

Phaedrus/ That would be ridiculous.

Socrates/ There is something more ridiculous coming: —Suppose, further, that in sober earnest I, having persuaded you of this, went and composed a speech in honor of an ass, whom I entitled a horse, beginning: 'A noble animal and a most useful possession, especially in war, and you may get on his back and fight, and he will carry baggage or anything.'

Phaedrus/ How ridiculous!

Socrates/ Ridiculous! Yes; but is not even a ridiculous friend better that a cunning enemy?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when the orator instead of putting an ass in the place of a horse, puts good for evil, being himself as ignorant of their true nature as the city on which he imposes is ignorant; and having studied the notions of the multitude, falsely persuades them not about 'the shadow of an ass' which he confounds with a horse, but about good which he confounds with evil, —what will be the harvest which rhetoric will be likely to gather after the sowing of that seed?

Phaedrus/ The reverse of good.

Socrates/ But perhaps rhetoric has been getting too roughly handled by us, and she might answer: What amazing nonsense you are talking! As if I forced any man to learn to speak in ignorance of the truth! Whatever my advice may be worth, I should have told him to arrive at the truth first, and then come to me. At the same time I boldly assert that mere knowledge of the truth will not give you the art of persuasion.

Phaedrus/ There is reason in the lady's defense of herself.

Socrates/ Quite true; if only the other arguments which remain to be brought up bear her witness that she is an art at all. But I seem to hear them arraying themselves on the opposite side, declaring that she speaks falsely, and that rhetoric is a mere routine and trick, not an art. Lo! a Spartan appears, and says that there never is nor ever will be a real art of speaking which is divorced from the truth.

Phaedrus/ And what are these arguments, Socrates? Bring them out that we may examine them.

Socrates/ Come out, fair children, and convince Phaedrus, who is the father of similar beauties, that he will never be able to speak about anything as he ought to speak unless he have a knowledge of philosophy. And let Phaedrus answer you.

Phaedrus/ Put the question.

Socrates/ Is not rhetoric, taken generally, a universal art of enchanting the mind by arguments; which is practiced not only in courts and public assemblies, but in private houses also, having to do with all matters, great as well as small, good and bad alike, and is in all equally right, and equally to be esteemed—that is what you have heard?

Phaedrus/ Nay, not exactly that; I should say rather that I have heard the art confined to speaking and writing in lawsuits, and to speaking in public assemblies—not extended farther.

Socrates/ Then I suppose that you have only heard of the rhetoric of Nestor and Odysseus, which they composed in their leisure hours when at Troy, and never of the rhetoric of Palamedes?

Phaedrus/ No more than of Nestor and Odysseus, unless Gorgias is your Nestor, and Thrasymachus or Theodorus your Odysseus.

Socrates/ Perhaps that is my meaning. But let us leave them. And do you tell me, instead, what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law-court—are they not contending?

Phaedrus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ About the just and unjust—that is the matter in dispute?

Phaedrus/ Yes. ‘

Socrates/ And a professor of the art will make the same thing appear to the same persons to be at one time just, at another time, if he is so inclined, to be unjust?

Phaedrus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And when he speaks in the assembly, he will make the same things seem good to the city at one time, and at another time the reverse of good?

Phaedrus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Have we not heard of the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno), who has an art of speaking by which he makes the same things appear to his hearers like and unlike, one and many, at rest and in motion?

Phaedrus/ Very true.

Socrates/ The art of disputation, then, is not confined to the courts and the assembly, but is one and the same in every use of language; this is the art, if there be such an art, which is able to find a likeness of everything to which a likeness can be found, and draws into the light of day the likenesses and disguises which are used by others?

Phaedrus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Let me put the matter thus: When will there be more chance of deception—when the difference is large or small?

Phaedrus/ When the difference is small.

Socrates/ And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at once?

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ He, then, who would deceive others, and not be deceived, must exactly know the real likenesses and differences of things?

Phaedrus/ He must.

Socrates/ And if he is ignorant of the true nature of any subject, how can he detect the greater or less degree of likeness in other things to that of which by the hypothesis he is ignorant?

Phaedrus/ He cannot.

Socrates/ And when men are deceived and their notions are at variance with realities, it is clear that the error slips in through resemblances?

Phaedrus/ Yes, that is the way.

Socrates/ Then he who would be a master of the art must understand the real nature of everything; or he will never know either how to make the gradual departure from truth into the opposite of truth which is effected by the help of resemblances, or how to avoid it?

Phaedrus/ He will not.

Socrates/ He then, who being ignorant of the truth aims at appearances, will only attain an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous and is not an art at all?

Phaedrus/ That may be expected.

Socrates/ Shall I propose that we look for examples of art and want of art, according to our notion of them, in the speech of Lysias which you have in your hand, and in my own speech?

Phaedrus/ Nothing could be better; and indeed I think that our previous argument has been too abstract and wanting in illustrations.

Socrates/ Yes; and the two speeches happen to afford a very good example of the way in which the speaker who knows the truth may, without any serious purpose, steal away the hearts of his hearers. This piece of good-fortune I attribute to the local deities; and, perhaps, the prophets of the Muses who are singing over our heads may have imparted their inspiration to me. For I do not imagine that I have any rhetorical art of my own.

Phaedrus/ Granted; if you will only please to get on.

Socrates/ Suppose that you read me the first words of Lysias' speech.

Phaedrus/ 'You know how matters stand with me, and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged for our common

interest; and I maintain that I ought not to fail in my suit, because I am not your lover. For lovers repent——'

Socrates/ Enough: —Now, shall I point out the rhetorical error of those words?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Everyone is aware that about some things we are agreed, whereas about other things we differ.

Phaedrus/ I think that I understand you; but will you explain yourself?

Socrates/ When anyone speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing present in the minds of all?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But when anyone speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves?

Phaedrus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Then in some things we agree, but not in others?

Phaedrus/ That is true.

Socrates/ In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?

Phaedrus/ Clearly, in the uncertain class.

Socrates/ Then the rhetorician ought to make a regular division, and acquire a distinct notion of both classes, as well of that in which the many err, as of that in which they do not err?

Phaedrus/ He who made such a distinction would have an excellent principle.

Socrates/ Yes; and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the observation of particulars in speaking, and not make a mistake about the class to which they are to be referred.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now to which class does love belong—to the debatable or to the undisputed class?

Phaedrus/ To the debatable, clearly; for if not, do you think that love would have allowed you to say as you did, that he is an evil both to the lover and the beloved, and also the greatest possible good?

Socrates/ Capital. But will you tell me whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech? for, having been in an ecstasy, I cannot well remember.

Phaedrus/ Yes, indeed; that you did, and no mistake.

Socrates/ Then I perceive that the Nymphs of Achelous and Pan the son of Hermes, who inspired me, were far better rhetoricians than Lysias the son of Cephalus. Alas! how inferior to them he is! But perhaps I am mistaken; and Lysias at the commencement of his lover's speech did insist on our supposing love to be something or other which he fancied him to be, and according to this model he fashioned and framed the remainder of his discourse. Suppose we read his beginning over again:

Phaedrus/ If you please; but you will not find what you want.

Socrates/ Read, that I may have his exact words.

Phaedrus/ 'You know how matters stand with me, and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged for our common interest; and I maintain I ought not to fail in my suit because I am not your lover, for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown, when their love is over.'

Socrates/ Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought; for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting. His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended. Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus?

Phaedrus/ Yes, indeed, Socrates; he does begin at the end.

Socrates/ Then as to the other topics—are they not thrown down anyhow? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic? I cannot help fancying in my ignorance that he wrote off boldly just what came into his head, but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition?

Phaedrus/ You have too good an opinion of me if you think that I have any such insight into his principles of composition.

Socrates/ At any rate, you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning, and end, adapted to one another and to the whole?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias? See whether you can find any more connection in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian.

Phaedrus/ What is there remarkable in the epitaph?

Socrates/ It is as follows: —

> 'I am a maiden of bronze and lie on the tomb of Midas;
> So long as water flows and tall trees grow,
> So long here on this spot by his sad tomb abiding,
> I shall declare to passers-by that Midas sleeps below.'

Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, as you will perceive, makes no difference.

Phaedrus/ You are making fun of that oration of ours.

Socrates/ Well, I will say no more about your friend's speech lest I should give offence to you; although I think that

it might furnish many other examples of what a man ought rather to avoid. But I will proceed to the other speech, which, as I think, is also suggestive to students of rhetoric.

Phaedrus/ In what way?

Socrates/ The two speeches, as you may remember, were unlike; the one argued that the lover and the other that the non-lover ought to be accepted.

Phaedrus/ And right manfully.

Socrates/ You should rather say 'madly;' and madness was the argument of them, for, as I said, 'love is a madness.'

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And of madness there were two kinds; one produced by human infirmity, the other was a divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention.

Phaedrus/ True.

Socrates/ The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four gods presiding over them; the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that of Aphrodite and Eros. In the description of the last kind of madness, which was also said to be the best, we spoke of the affection of love in a figure, into which we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring myth, which was also a hymn in honor of Love, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn strain.

Phaedrus/ I know that I had great pleasure in listening to you.

Socrates/ Let us take this instance and note how the transition was made from blame to praise.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean to say that the composition was mostly playful. Yet in these chance fancies of the hour were involved two principles of which we should be too glad to have a clearer description if art could give us one.

Phaedrus/ What are they?

Socrates/ First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea; as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse, the speaker should define his several notions and so make his meaning clear.

Phaedrus/ What is the other principle, Socrates?

Socrates/ The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might. Just as our two discourses, alike assumed, first of all, a single form of unreason; and then, as the body which from being one becomes double and may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left of the same name—after this manner the speaker proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled; and the other discourse leading us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, also having the same name, but divine, which the speaker held up before us and applauded and affirmed to be the author of the greatest benefits.

Phaedrus/ Most true.

Socrates/ I am myself a great lover of these processes of division and generalization; they help me to speak and to think. And if I find any man who is able to see 'a One and Many' in nature, him I follow, and 'walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.' And those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of calling dialecticians; but God knows whether the name is right or not. And I should like to know

what name you would give to your or to Lysias' disciples, and whether this may not be that famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others teach and practice? Skillful speakers they are, and impart their skill to any who is willing to make kings of them and to bring gifts to them.

Phaedrus/ Yes, they are royal men; but their art is not the same with the art of those whom you call, and rightly, in my opinion, dialecticians: —Still we are in the dark about rhetoric.

Socrates/ What do you mean? The remains of it, if there be anything remaining which can be brought under rules of art, must be a fine thing; and, at any rate, is not to be despised by you and me. But how much is left?

Phaedrus/ There is a great deal surely to be found in books of rhetoric?

Socrates/ Yes; thank you for reminding me: —There is the exordium, showing how the speech should begin, if I remember rightly; that is what you mean—the niceties of the art?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then follows the statement of facts, and upon that witnesses; thirdly, proofs; fourthly, probabilities are to come; the great Byzantian word-maker also speaks, if I am not mistaken, of confirmation and further confirmation.

Phaedrus/ You mean the excellent Theodorus.

Socrates/ Yes; and he tells how refutation or further refutation is to be managed, whether in accusation or defense. I ought also to mention the illustrious Parian, Evenus, who first invented insinuations and indirect praises; and also indirect censures, which according to some he put into verse to help the memory. But shall I 'to dumb forgetfulness consign' Tisias and Gorgias, who are not ignorant that probability is superior to truth, and who by

force of argument make the little appear great and the great little, disguise the new in old fashions and the old in new fashions, and have discovered forms for everything, either short or going on to infinity. I remember Prodicus laughing when I told him of this; he said that he had himself discovered the true rule of art, which was to be neither long nor short, but of a convenient length.

Phaedrus/ Well done, Prodicus!

Socrates/ Then there is Hippias the Elean stranger, who probably agrees with him.

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And there is also Polus, who has treasuries of diplasiology, and gnomology, and eikonology, and who teaches in them the names of which Licymnius made him a present; they were to give a polish.

Phaedrus/ Had not Protagoras something of the same sort?

Socrates/ Yes, rules of correct diction and many other fine precepts; for the 'sorrows of a poor old man,' or any other pathetic case, no one is better than the Chalcedonian giant; he can put a whole company of people into a passion and out of one again by his mighty magic, and is first-rate at inventing or disposing of any sort of calumny on any grounds or none. All of them agree in asserting that a speech should end in a recapitulation, though they do not all agree to use the same word.

Phaedrus/ You mean that there should be a summing up of the arguments in order to remind the hearers of them.

Socrates/ I have now said all that I have to say of the art of rhetoric: have you anything to add?

Phaedrus/ Not much; nothing very important.

Socrates/ Leave the unimportant and let us bring the really important question into the light of day, which is: What power has this art of rhetoric, and when?

Phaedrus/ A very great power in public meetings.

Socrates/ It has. But I should like to know whether you have the same feeling as I have about the rhetoricians? To me there seem to be a great many holes in their web.

Phaedrus/ Give an example.

Socrates/ I will. Suppose a person to come to your friend Eryximachus, or to his father Acumenus, and to say to him: 'I know how to apply drugs which shall have either a heating or a cooling effect, and I can give a vomit and also a purge, and all that sort of thing; and knowing all this, as I do, I claim to be a physician and to make physicians by imparting this knowledge to others'—what do you suppose that they would say?

Phaedrus/ They would be sure to ask him whether he knew 'to whom' he would give his medicines, and 'when,' and 'how much.'

Socrates/ And suppose that he were to reply: 'No; I know nothing of all that; I expect the patient who consults me to be able to do these things for himself'?

Phaedrus/ They would say in reply that he is a madman or a pedant who fancies that he is a physician because he has read something in a book, or has stumbled on a prescription or two, although he has no real understanding of the art of medicine.

Socrates/ And suppose a person were to come to Sophocles or Euripides and say that he knows how to make a very long speech about a small matter, and a short speech about a great matter, and also a sorrowful speech, or a terrible, or threatening speech, or any other kind of speech,

and in teaching this fancies that he is teaching the art of tragedy—?

Phaedrus/ They too would surely laugh at him if he fancies that tragedy is anything but the arranging of these elements in a manner which will be suitable to one another and to the whole.

Socrates/ But I do not suppose that they would be rude or abusive to him: Would they not treat him as a musician would a man who thinks that he is a harmonist because he knows how to pitch the highest and lowest note; happening to meet such an one he would not say to him savagely, 'Fool, you are mad!' But like a musician, in a gentle and harmonious tone of voice, he would answer: 'My good friend, he who would be a harmonist must certainly know this, and yet he may understand nothing of harmony if he has not got beyond your stage of knowledge, for you only know the preliminaries of harmony and not harmony itself.'

Phaedrus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And will not Sophocles say to the display of the would-be tragedian, that this is not tragedy but the preliminaries of tragedy? and will not Acumenus say the same of medicine to the would-be physician?

Phaedrus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And if Adrastus the mellifluous or Pericles heard of these wonderful arts, brachylogies and eikonologies and all the hard names which we have been endeavoring to draw into the light of day, what would they say? Instead of losing temper and applying uncomplimentary epithets, as you and I have been doing, to the authors of such an imaginary art, their superior wisdom would rather censure us, as well as them. 'Have a little patience, Phaedrus and Socrates, they would say; you should not be in such a passion with those who from some want of dialectical skill

are unable to define the nature of rhetoric, and consequently suppose that they have found the art in the preliminary conditions of it, and when these have been taught by them to others, fancy that the whole art of rhetoric has been taught by them; but as to using the several instruments of the art effectively, or making the composition a whole, —an application of it such as this is they regard as an easy thing which their disciples may make for themselves.'

Phaedrus/ I quite admit, Socrates, that the art of rhetoric which these men teach and of which they write is such as you describe—there I agree with you. But I still want to know where and how the true art of rhetoric and persuasion is to be acquired.

Socrates/ The perfection which is required of the finished orator is, or rather must be, like the perfection of anything else, partly given by nature, but may also be assisted by art. If you have the natural power and add to it knowledge and practice, you will be a distinguished speaker; if you fall short in either of these, you will be to that extent defective. But the art, as far as there is an art, of rhetoric does not lie in the direction of Lysias or Thrasymachus.

Phaedrus/ In what direction then?

Socrates/ I conceive Pericles to have been the most accomplished of rhetoricians.

Phaedrus/ What of that?

Socrates/ All the great arts require discussion and high speculation about the truths of nature; hence come loftiness of thought and completeness of execution. And this, as I conceive, was the quality which, in addition to his natural gifts, Pericles acquired from his intercourse with Anaxagoras whom he happened to know. He was thus imbued with the higher philosophy, and attained the knowledge of Mind and the negative of Mind, which were favorite themes of

Anaxagoras, and applied what suited his purpose to the art of speaking.

Phaedrus/ Explain.

Socrates/ Rhetoric is like medicine.

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, because medicine has to define the nature of the body and rhetoric of the soul—if we would proceed, not empirically but scientifically, in the one case to impart health and strength by giving medicine and food, in the other to implant the conviction or virtue which you desire, by the right application of words and training.

Phaedrus/ There, Socrates, I suspect that you are right.

Socrates/ And do you think that you can know the nature of the soul intelligently without knowing the nature of the whole?

Phaedrus/ Hippocrates the Asclepiad says that the nature even of the body can only be understood as a whole.

Socrates/ Yes, friend, and he was right: —still, we ought not to be content with the name of Hippocrates, but to examine and see whether his argument agrees with his conception of nature.

Phaedrus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then consider what truth as well as Hippocrates says about this or about any other nature. Ought we not to consider first whether that which we wish to learn and to teach is a simple or multiform thing, and if simple, then to enquire what power it has of acting or being acted upon in relation to other things, and if multiform, then to number the forms; and see first in the case of one of them, and then in the case of all of them, what is that power of acting or being acted upon which makes each and all of them to be what they are?

Phaedrus/ You may very likely be right, Socrates.

Socrates/ The method which proceeds without analysis is like the groping of a blind man. Yet, surely, he who is an artist ought not to admit of a comparison with the blind, or deaf. The rhetorician, who teaches his pupil to speak scientifically, will particularly set forth the nature of that being to which he addresses his speeches; and this, I conceive, to be the soul.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ His whole effort is directed to the soul; for in that he seeks to produce conviction.

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then clearly, Thrasymachus or anyone else who teaches rhetoric in earnest will give an exact description of the nature of the soul; which will enable us to see whether she be single and same, or, like the body, multiform. That is what we should call showing the nature of the soul.

Phaedrus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ He will explain, secondly, the mode in which she acts or is acted upon.

Phaedrus/ True.

Socrates/ Thirdly, having classified men and speeches, and their kinds and affections, and adapted them to one another, he will tell the reasons of his arrangement, and show why one soul is persuaded by a particular form of argument, and another not.

Phaedrus/ You have hit upon a very good way.

Socrates/ Yes, that is the true and only way in which any subject can be set forth or treated by rules of art, whether in speaking or writing. But the writers of the present day, at whose feet you have sat, craftily conceal the nature of the soul which they know quite well. Nor, until they adopt our

method of reading and writing, can we admit that they write by rules of art?

Phaedrus/ What is our method?

Socrates/ I cannot give you the exact details; but I should like to tell you generally, as far as is in my power, how a man ought to proceed according to rules of art.

Phaedrus/ Let me hear.

Socrates/ Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls—they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he will next divide speeches into their different classes: —'Such and such persons,' he will say, 'are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way,' and he will tell you why. The pupil must have a good theoretical notion of them first, and then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about him, or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But when he understands what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and sees the person about whom he was speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows that it is he, and can say to himself, 'This is the man or this is the character who ought to have a certain argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion;'—he who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain, and when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other modes of speech which he has learned; —when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art; but if he fail in any of these points, whether in speaking or teaching or writing them, and yet declares that he speaks by rules of

art, he who says 'I don't believe you' has the better of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this, Phaedrus and Socrates, your account of the so-called art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another?

Phaedrus/ He must take this, Socrates, for there is no possibility of another, and yet the creation of such an art is not easy.

Socrates/ Very true; and therefore let us consider this matter in every light, and see whether we cannot find a shorter and easier road; there is no use in taking a long rough roundabout way if there be a shorter and easier one. And I wish that you would try and remember whether you have heard from Lysias' or anyone else anything which might be of service to us.

Phaedrus/ If trying would avail, then I might; but at the moment I can think of nothing.

Socrates/ Suppose I tell you something which somebody who knows told me.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ May not 'the wolf,' as the proverb says, 'claim a hearing'?

Phaedrus/ Do you say what can be said for him.

Socrates/ He will argue that there is no use in putting a solemn face on these matters, or in going round and round, until you arrive at first principles; for, as I said at first, when the question is of justice and good, or is a question in which men are concerned who are just and good, either by nature or habit, he who would be a skillful rhetorician has no need of truth—for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about truth, but only about conviction: and this is based on probability, to which he who would be a skillful orator should therefore give his whole attention. And they say also that there are cases in which the actual facts, if they are

improbable, ought to be withheld, and only the probabilities should be told either in accusation or defense, and that always in speaking, the orator should keep probability in view, and say good-bye to the truth. And the observance of this principle throughout a speech furnishes the whole art.

Phaedrus/ That is what the professors of rhetoric do actually say, Socrates. I have not forgotten that we have quite briefly touched upon this matter already; with them the point is all-important.

Socrates/ I dare say that you are familiar with Tisias. Does he not define probability to be that which the many think?

Phaedrus/ Certainly, he does.

Socrates/ I believe that he has a clever and ingenious case of this sort: —He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a strong and cowardly one, and to have robbed him of his coat or of something or other; he is brought into court, and then Tisias says that both parties should tell lies: the coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one; the other should prove that they were alone, and should argue thus: 'How could a weak man like me have assaulted a strong man like him?' The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice, and will therefore invent some other lie which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting. And there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in the system. Am I not right, Phaedrus?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Bless me, what a wonderfully mysterious art is this which Tisias or some other gentleman, in whatever name or country he rejoices, has discovered. Shall we say a word to him or not?

Phaedrus/ What shall we say to him?

Socrates/ Let us tell him that, before he appeared, you and I were saying that the probability of which he speaks was engendered in the minds of the many by the likeness of the truth, and we had just been affirming that he who knew the truth would always know best how to discover the resemblances of the truth. If he has anything else to say about the art of speaking we should like to hear him; but if not, we are satisfied with our own view, that unless a man estimates the various characters of his hearers and is able to divide all things into classes and to comprehend them under single ideas, he will never be a skillful rhetorician even within the limits of human power. And this skill he will not attain without a great deal of trouble, which a good man ought to undergo, not for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable to God and always to act acceptably to Him as far as in him lies; for there is a saying of wiser men than ourselves, that a man of sense should not try to please his fellow-servants (at least this should not be his first object) but his good and noble masters; and therefore if the way is long and circuitous, marvel not at this, for, where the end is great, there we may take the longer road, but not for lesser ends such as yours. Truly, the argument may say, Tisias, that if you do not mind going so far, rhetoric has a fair beginning here.

Phaedrus/ I think, Socrates, that this is admirable, if only practicable.

Socrates/ But even to fail in an honorable object is honorable.

Phaedrus/ True.

Socrates/ Enough appears to have been said by us of a true and false art of speaking.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But there is something yet to be said of propriety and impropriety of writing.

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to God?

Phaedrus/ No, indeed. Do you?

Socrates/ I have heard a tradition of the ancients, whether true or not they only know; although if we had found the truth ourselves, do you think that we should care much about the opinions of men?

Phaedrus/ Your question needs no answer; but I wish that you would tell me what you say that you have heard.

Socrates/ At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which is called the Ibis is sacred to him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was the use of letters. Now in those days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt; and he dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call Egyptian Thebes, and the god himself is called by them Ammon. To him came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them; he enumerated them, and Thamus enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. It would take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts. But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the memory and for the wit. Thamus replied: O most ingenious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own

inventions to the users of them. And in this instance, you who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality.

Phaedrus/ Yes, Socrates, you can easily invent tales of Egypt, or of any other country.

Socrates/ There was a tradition in the temple of Dodona that oaks first gave prophetic utterances. The men of old, unlike in their simplicity to young philosophy, deemed that if they heard the truth even from 'oak or rock' it was enough for them; whereas you seem to consider not whether a thing is or is not true, but who the speaker is and from what country the tale comes.

Phaedrus/ I acknowledge the justice of your rebuke; and I think that the Theban is right in his view about letters.

Socrates/ He would be a very simple person, and quite a stranger to the oracles of Thamus or Ammon, who should leave in writing or receive in writing any art under the idea that the written word would be intelligible or certain; or who deemed that writing was at all better than knowledge and recollection of the same matters?

Phaedrus/ That is most true.

Socrates/ I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is unfortunately like painting; for the creations of the painter have the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence. And the same may be said of speeches. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but if you want to know anything and put a question to one of them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And when they have been once written down they are tumbled about anywhere among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not: and, if they are maltreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them; and they cannot protect or defend themselves.

Phaedrus/ That again is most true.

Socrates/ Is there not another kind of word or speech far better than this, and having far greater power—a son of the same family, but lawfully begotten?

Phaedrus/ Whom do you mean, and what is his origin?

Socrates/ I mean an intelligent word graven in the soul of the learner, which can defend itself, and knows when to speak and when to be silent.

Phaedrus/ You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image?

Socrates/ Yes, of course that is what I mean. And now may I be allowed to ask you a question: Would a husbandman, who is a man of sense, take the seeds, which he values and which he wishes to bear fruit, and in sober seriousness plant them during the heat of summer, in some garden of Adonis, that he may rejoice when he sees them in eight days appearing in beauty? at least he would do so, if at all, only for the sake of amusement and pastime. But when he is in earnest he sows in fitting soil, and practices

husbandry, and is satisfied if in eight months the seeds which he has sown arrive at perfection?

Phaedrus/ Yes, Socrates, that will be his way when he is in earnest; he will do the other, as you say, only in play.

Socrates/ And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honorable has less understanding, than the husbandman, about his own seeds?

Phaedrus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then he will not seriously incline to 'write' his thoughts 'in water' with pen and ink, sowing words which can neither speak for themselves nor teach the truth adequately to others?

Phaedrus/ No, that is not likely.

Socrates/ No, that is not likely—in the garden of letters he will sow and plant, but only for the sake of recreation and amusement; he will write them down as memorials to be treasured against the forgetfulness of old age, by himself, or by any other old man who is treading the same path. He will rejoice in beholding their tender growth; and while others are refreshing their souls with banqueting and the like, this will be the pastime in which his days are spent.

Phaedrus/ A pastime, Socrates, as noble as the other is ignoble, the pastime of a man who can be amused by serious talk, and can discourse merrily about justice and the like.

Socrates/ True, Phaedrus. But nobler far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who, finding a congenial soul, by the help of science sows and plants therein words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, and are not unfruitful, but have in them a seed which others brought up in different soils render immortal, making the possessors of it happy to the utmost extent of human happiness.

Phaedrus/ Far nobler, certainly.

Socrates/ And now, Phaedrus, having agreed upon the premises we may decide about the conclusion.

Phaedrus/ About what conclusion?

Socrates/ About Lysias, whom we censured, and his art of writing, and his discourses, and the rhetorical skill or want of skill which was shown in them—these are the questions which we sought to determine, and they brought us to this point. And I think that we are now pretty well informed about the nature of art and its opposite.

Phaedrus/ Yes, I think with you; but I wish that you would repeat what was said.

Socrates/ Until a man knows the truth of the several particulars of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define them as they are, and having defined them again to divide them until they can be no longer divided, and until in like manner he is able to discern the nature of the soul, and discover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to different natures, and to arrange and dispose them in such a way that the simple form of speech may be addressed to the simpler nature, and the complex and composite to the more complex nature—until he has accomplished all this, he will be unable to handle arguments according to rules of art, as far as their nature allows them to be subjected to art, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading; —such is the view which is implied in the whole preceding argument.

Phaedrus/ Yes, that was our view, certainly.

Socrates/ Secondly, as to the censure which was passed on the speaking or writing of discourses, and how they might be rightly or wrongly censured—did not our previous argument show—?

Phaedrus/ Show what?

Socrates/ That whether Lysias or any other writer that ever was or will be, whether private man or statesman,

proposes laws and so becomes the author of a political treatise, fancying that there is any great certainty and clearness in his performance, the fact of his so writing is only a disgrace to him, whatever men may say. For not to know the nature of justice and injustice, and good and evil, and not to be able to distinguish the dream from the reality, cannot in truth be otherwise than disgraceful to him, even though he have the applause of the whole world.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But he who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much which is not serious, and that neither poetry nor prose, spoken or written, is of any great value, if, like the compositions of the rhapsodes, they are only recited in order to be believed, and not with any view to criticism or instruction; and who thinks that even the best of writings are but a reminiscence of what we know, and that only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility taught and communicated orally for the sake of instruction and graven in the soul, which is the true way of writing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness, and that such principles are a man's own and his legitimate offspring; —being, in the first place, the word which he finds in his own bosom; secondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of his idea which have been duly implanted by him in the souls of others; —and who cares for them and no others—this is the right sort of man; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray that we may become like him.

Phaedrus/ That is most assuredly my desire and prayer.

Socrates/ And now the play is played out; and of rhetoric enough. Go and tell Lysias that to the fountain and school of the Nymphs we went down, and were bidden by them to convey a message to him and to other composers of speeches—to Homer and other writers of poems, whether set

to music or not; and to Solon and others who have composed writings in the form of political discourses which they would term laws—to all of them we are to say that if their compositions are based on knowledge of the truth, and they can defend or prove them, when they are put to the test, by spoken arguments, which leave their writings poor in comparison of them, then they are to be called, not only poets, orators, legislators, but are worthy of a higher name, befitting the serious pursuit of their life.

Phaedrus/ What name would you assign to them?

Socrates/ Wise, I may not call them; for that is a great name which belongs to God alone, —lovers of wisdom or philosophers is their modest and befitting title.

Phaedrus/ Very suitable.

Socrates/ And he who cannot rise above his own compilations and compositions, which he has been long patching and piecing, adding some and taking away some, may be justly called poet or speech-maker or law-maker.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now go and tell this to your companion.

Phaedrus/ But there is also a friend of yours who ought not to be forgotten.

Socrates/ Who is he?

Phaedrus/ Isocrates the fair: —What message will you send to him, and how shall we describe him?

Socrates/ Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus; but I am willing to hazard a prophecy concerning him.

Phaedrus/ What would you prophesy?

Socrates/ I think that he has a genius which soars above the orations of Lysias, and that his character is cast in a finer mold. My impression of him is that he will marvelously improve as he grows older, and that all former rhetoricians

will be as children in comparison of him. And I believe that he will not be satisfied with rhetoric, but that there is in him a divine inspiration which will lead him to things higher still. For he has an element of philosophy in his nature. This is the message of the gods dwelling in this place, and which I will myself deliver to Isocrates, who is my delight; and do you give the other to Lysias, who is yours.

Phaedrus/ I will; and now as the heat is abated let us depart.

Socrates/ Should we not offer up a prayer first of all to the local deities?

Phaedrus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry. —Anything more? The prayer, I think, is enough for me.

Phaedrus/ Ask the same for me, for friends should have all things in common.

Socrates/ Let us go.

Phaedrus

Translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Phaedrus

Socrates/ Phaedrus, my friend! Where have you been? And where are you going?

Phaedrus/ I was with Lysias, the son of Cephalus, Socrates, and I am going for a walk outside the city walls because I was with him for a long time, sitting there the whole morning. You see, I'm keeping in mind the advice of our mutual friend Acumenus, who says it's more refreshing to walk along country roads than city streets.

Socrates/ He is quite right, too, my friend. So Lysias, I take it, is in the city?

Phaedrus/ Yes, at the house of Epicrates, which used to belong to Morychus, near the temple of the Olympian Zeus.

Socrates/ What were you doing there? Oh, I know: Lysias must have been entertaining you with a feast of eloquence.

Phaedrus/ You'll hear about it, if you are free to come along and listen.

Socrates/ What? Don't you think I would consider it "more important than the most pressing engagement," as Pindar says, to hear how you and Lysias spent your time?

Phaedrus/ Lead the way, then.

Socrates/ If only you will tell me.

Phaedrus/ In fact, Socrates, you're just the right person to hear the speech that occupied us, since, in a roundabout way, it was about love. It is aimed at seducing a beautiful boy, but the speaker is not in love with him—this is actually what is so clever and elegant about it: Lysias argues that it is better to

give your favors to someone who does not love you than to someone who does.

Socrates/ What a wonderful man! I wish he would write that you should give your favors to a poor rather than to a rich man, to an older rather than to a younger one—that is, to someone like me and most other people: then his speeches would be really sophisticated, and they' contribute to the public good besides! In any case, I am so eager to hear it that I would follow you even if you were walking all the way to Megara, as Herodicus recommends, to touch the wall and come back again.

Phaedrus/ What on earth do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that a mere dilettante like me could recite from memory in a manner worthy of him a speech that Lysias, the best of our writers, took such time and trouble to compose? Far from it—though actually I would rather be able to do that than come into a large fortune!

Socrates/ Oh, Phaedrus, if I don't know my Phaedrus I must be forgetting who I am myself—and neither is the case. I know very well that he did not hear Lysias' speech only once: he asked him to repeat it over and over again, and Lysias was eager to oblige. But not even that was enough for him. In the end, he took the book himself and pored over the parts he liked best. He sat reading all morning long, and when he got tired, he went for a walk, having learned—I am quite sure—the whole speech by heart, unless it was extraordinarily long. So he started for the country, where he could practice reciting it. And running into a man who is sick with passion for hearing speeches, seeing him—just seeing him—he was filled with delight: he had found a partner for his frenzied dance, and he urged him to lead the way. But when that lover of speeches asked him to recite it, he played coy and pretended that he did not want to. In the end, of course, he was going to recite it even if he had to force an unwilling audience to listen.

So, please, Phaedrus, beg him to do it right now. He'll do it soon enough anyway.

Phaedrus/ Well, I'd better try to recite it as best I can: you'll obviously not leave me in peace until I do so one way or another.

Socrates/ You are absolutely right.

Phaedrus/ That's what I'll do, then. But, Socrates, it really is true that I did not memorize the speech word for word; instead, I will give a careful summary of its general sense, listing all the ways he said the lover differs from the non-lover, in the proper order.

Socrates/ Only if you first show me what you are holding in your left hand under your cloak, my friend. I strongly suspect you have the speech itself. And if I'm right, you can be sure that, though I love you dearly, I'll never, as long as Lysias himself is present, allow you to practice your own speechmaking on me. Come on, then, show me.

Phaedrus/ Enough, enough. You've dashed my hopes of using you as my training partner, Socrates. All right, where do you want to sit while we read?

Socrates/ Let's leave the path here and walk along the Ilisus; then we can sit quietly wherever we find the right spot.

Phaedrus/ How lucky, then, that I am barefoot today—you, of course, are always so. The easiest thing to do is to walk right in the stream; this way, we'll also get our feet wet, which is very pleasant, especially at this hour and season.

Socrates/ Lead the way, then, and find us a place to sit.

Phaedrus/ Do you see that very tall plane tree?

Socrates/ Of course.

Phaedrus/ It's shady, with a light breeze; we can sit or, if we prefer, lie down on the grass there.

Socrates/ Lead on, then.

Phaedrus/ Tell me, Socrates, isn't it from somewhere near this stretch of the Ilisus that people say Boreas carried Orithuia away?

Socrates/ So they say.

Phaedrus/ Couldn't this be the very spot? The stream is lovely, pure and clear: just right for girls to be playing nearby.

Socrates/ No, it is two or three hundred yards farther downstream, where one crosses to get to the district of Agra. I think there is even an altar to Boreas there.

Phaedrus/ I hadn't noticed it. But tell me, Socrates, in the name of Zeus, do you really believe that that legend is true?

Socrates/ Actually, it would not be out of place for me to reject it, as our intellectuals do. I could then tell a clever story: I could claim that a gust of the North Wind blew her over the rocks where she was playing with Pharmaceia; and once she was killed that way people said she had been carried off by Boreas—or was it, perhaps, from the Areopagus? The story is also told that she was carried away from there instead. Now, Phaedrus, such explanations are amusing enough, but they are a job for a man I cannot envy at all. He'd have to be far too ingenious and work too hard—mainly because after that he will have to go on and give a rational account of the form of the Hippocentaurs, and then of the Chimera; and a whole flood of Gorgons and Pegasuses and other monsters, in large numbers and absurd forms, will overwhelm him. Anyone who does not believe in them, who wants to explain them away and make them plausible by means of some sort of rough ingenuity, will need a great deal of time.

But I have no time for such things; and the reason, my friend, is this. I am still unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that. This is why I do not concern myself with them. I accept what is

generally believed, and, as I was just saying, I look not into them but into my own self: Am I a beast more complicated and savage than Typhon, or am I a tamer, simpler animal with a share in a divine and gentle nature? But look, my friend—while we were talking, haven't we reached the tree you were taking us to?

Phaedrus/ That's the one.

Socrates/ By Hera, it really is a beautiful resting place. The plane tree is tall and very broad; the chaste-tree, high as it is, is wonderfully shady, and since it is in full bloom, the whole place is filled with its fragrance. From under the plane tree the loveliest spring runs with very cool water—our feet can testify to that. The place appears to be dedicated to Achelous and some of the Nymphs, if we can judge from the statues and votive offerings. Feel the freshness of the air; how pretty and pleasant it is; how it echoes with the summery, sweet song of the cicadas' chorus! The most exquisite thing of all, of course, is the grassy slope: it rises so gently that you can rest your head perfectly when you lie down on it. You've really been the most marvelous guide, my dear Phaedrus.

Phaedrus/ And you, my remarkable friend, appear to be totally out of place. Really, just as you say, you seem to need a guide, not to be one of the locals. Not only do you never travel abroad—as far as I can tell, you never even set foot beyond the city walls.

Socrates/ Forgive me, my friend. I am devoted to learning; landscapes and trees have nothing to teach me—only the people in the city can do that. But you, I think, have found a potion to charm me into leaving. For just as people lead hungry animals forward by shaking branches of fruit before them, you can lead me all over Attica or anywhere else you like simply by waving in front of me the leaves of a book containing a speech. But now, having gotten as far as this

place this time around, I intend to lie down; so choose whatever position you think will be most comfortable for you, and read on.

Phaedrus/ Listen, then:

"You understand my situation: I've told you how good it would be for us, in my opinion, if this worked out. In any case, I don't think I should lose the chance to get what I am asking for, merely because I don't happen to be in love with you.

"A man in love will wish he had not done you any favors once his desire dies down, but the time will never come for a man who's not in love to change his mind. That is because the favors he does for you are not forced but voluntary; and he does the best that he possibly can for you, just as he would for his own business.

"Besides, a lover keeps his eye on the balance sheet—where his interests have suffered from love, and where he has done well; and when he adds up all the trouble he has taken, he thinks he's long since given the boy he loved a fair return. A non-lover, on the other hand, can't complain about love's making him neglect his own business; he can't keep a tab on the trouble he's been through, or blame you for the quarrels he's had with his relatives. Take away all those headaches and there's nothing left for him to do but put his heart into whatever he thinks will give pleasure.

"Besides, suppose a lover does deserve to be honored because, as they say, he is the best friend his loved one will ever have, and he stands ready to please his boy with all those words and deeds that are so annoying to everyone else. It's easy to see (if he is telling the truth) that the next time he falls in love he will care more for his new love than for the old one, and it's clear he'll treat the old one shabbily whenever that will please the new one.

“And anyway, what sense does it make to throw away something like that on a person who has fallen into such a miserable condition that those who have suffered it don’t even try to defend themselves against it? A lover will admit that he’s more sick than sound in the head. He’s well aware that he is not thinking straight; but he’ll say he can’t get himself under control. So when he does start thinking straight, why would he stand by decisions he had made when he was sick?

“Another point: if you were to choose the best of those who are in love with you, you'd have a pretty small group to pick from; but you’ll have a large group if you don’t care whether he loves you or not and just pick the one who suits you best; and in that larger pool you’ll have a much better hope of finding someone who deserves your friendship.

“Now suppose you’re afraid of conventional standards and the stigma that will come to you if people find out about this. Well, it stands to reason that a lover—thinking that everyone else will admire him for his success as much as he admires himself—will fly into words and proudly declare to all and sundry that his labors were not in vain. Someone who does not love you, on the other hand, can control himself and will choose to do what is best, rather than seek the glory that comes from popular reputation.

“Besides, it’s inevitable that a lover will be found out: many people will see that he devotes his life to following the boy he loves. The result is that whenever people see you talking with him they’ll think you are spending time together just before or just after giving way to desire. But they won’t even begin to find fault with people for spending time together if they are not lovers; they know one has to talk to someone, either out of friendship or to obtain some other pleasure.

“Another point: have you been alarmed by the thought that it is hard for friendships to last? Or that when people break

up, it's ordinarily just as awful for one side as it is for the other, but when you've given up what is most important to you already, then your loss is greater than his? If so, it would make more sense for you to be afraid of lovers. For a lover is easily annoyed, and whatever happens, he'll think it was designed to hurt him. That is why a lover prevents the boy he loves from spending time with other people. He's afraid that wealthy men will outshine him with their money, while men of education will turn out to have the advantage of greater intelligence. And he watches like a hawk everyone who may have any other advantage over him! Once he's persuaded you to turn those people away, he'll have you completely isolated from friends; and if you show more sense than he does in looking after your own interests, you'll come to quarrel with him.

"But if a man really does not love you, if it is only because of his excellence that he got what he asked for, then he won't be jealous of the people who spend time with you. Quite the contrary! He'll hate anyone who does not want to be with you; he'll think they look down on him while those who spend time with you do him good; so you should expect friendship, rather than enmity, to result from this affair.

"Another point: lovers generally start to desire your body before they know your character or have any experience of your other traits, with the result that even they can't tell whether they'll still want to be friends with you after their desire has passed. Non-lovers, on the other hand, are friends with you even before they achieve their goal, and you've no reason to expect that benefits received will ever detract from their friendship for you. No, those things will stand as reminders of more to come.

"Another point: you can expect to become a better person if you are won over by me, rather than by a lover. A lover will praise what you say and what you do far beyond what is best,

partly because he is afraid of being disliked, and partly because desire has impaired his judgment. Here is how love draws conclusions: When a lover suffers a reverse that would cause no pain to anyone else, love makes him think he's accursed! And when he has a stroke of luck that's not worth a moment's pleasure, love compels him to sing its praises. The result is, you should feel sorry for lovers, not admire them.

"If my argument wins you over, I will, first of all, give you my time with no thought of immediate pleasure; I will plan instead for the benefits that are to come, since I am master of myself and have not been overwhelmed by love. Small problems will not make me very hostile, and big ones will make me only gradually, and only a little, angry. I will forgive you for unintentional errors and do my best to keep you from going wrong intentionally. All this, you see, is the proof of a friendship that will last a long time.

"Have you been thinking that there can be no strong friendship in the absence of erotic love? Then you ought to remember that we would not care so much about our children if that were so, or about our fathers and mothers. And we wouldn't have had any trustworthy friends, since those relationships did not come from such a desire but from doing quite different things.

"Besides, if it were true that we ought to give the biggest favor to those who need it most, then we should all be helping out the very poorest people, not the best ones, because people we've saved from the worst troubles will give us the most thanks. For instance, the right people to invite to a dinner party would be beggars and people who need to sate their hunger, because they're the ones who'll be fond of us, follow us, knock on our doors, take the most pleasure with the deepest gratitude, and pray for our success. No, it's proper, I suppose, to grant your favors to those who are best able to return them, not to those in the direst need—that is, not to

those who merely desire the thing, but to those who really deserve it—not to people who will take pleasure in the bloom of your youth, but to those who will share their goods with you when you are older; not to people who achieve their goal and then boast about it in public, but to those who will keep a modest silence with everyone; not to people whose devotion is short-lived, but to those who will be steady friends their whole lives; not to the people who look for an excuse to quarrel as soon as their desire has passed, but to those who will prove their worth when the bloom of your youth has faded. Now, remember what I said and keep this in mind: friends often criticize a lover for bad behavior; but no one close to a non-lover ever thinks that desire has led him into bad judgment about his interests.

"And now I suppose you'll ask me whether I'm urging you to give your favors to everyone who is not in love with you. No. As I see it, a lover would not ask you to give in to all your lovers either. You would not, in that case, earn as much gratitude from each recipient, and you would not be able to keep one affair secret from the others in the same way. But this sort of thing is not supposed to cause any harm, and really should work to the benefit of both sides.

"Well, I think this speech is long enough. If you are still longing for more, if you think I have passed over something, just ask."

How does the speech strike you, Socrates? Don't you think it's simply superb, especially in its choice of words?

Socrates/ It's a miracle, my friend; I'm in ecstasy. And it's all your doing, Phaedrus: I was looking at you while you were reading and it seemed to me the speech had made you radiant with delight; and since I believe you understand these matters better than I do, I followed your lead, and following you I shared your Bacchic frenzy.

Phaedrus/ Come, Socrates, do you think you should joke about this?

Socrates/ Do you really think I am joking, that I am not serious?

Phaedrus/ You are not at all serious, Socrates. But now tell me the truth, in the name of Zeus, god of friendship: Do you think that any other Greek could say anything more impressive or more complete on this same subject?

Socrates/ What? Must we praise the speech even on the ground that its author has said what the situation demanded, and not instead simply on the ground that he has spoken in a clear and concise manner, with a precise turn of phrase? If we must, I will have to go along for your sake, since—surely because I am so ignorant—that passed me by. I paid attention only to the speech's style. As to the other part, I wouldn't even think that Lysias himself could be satisfied with it. For it seemed to me, Phaedrus—unless, of course, you disagree—that he said the same things two or even three times, as if he really didn't have much to say about the subject, almost as if he just weren't very interested in it. In fact, he seemed to me to be showing off, trying to demonstrate that he could say the same thing in two different ways, and say it just as well both times.

Phaedrus/ You are absolutely wrong, Socrates. That is in fact the best thing about the speech: He has omitted nothing worth mentioning about the subject, so that no one will ever be able to add anything of value to complete what he has already said himself.

Socrates/ You go too far: I can't agree with you about that. If, as a favor to you, I accept your view, I will stand refuted by all the wise men and women of old who have spoken or written about this subject.

Phaedrus/ Who are these people? And where have you heard anything better than this?

Socrates/ I can't tell you offhand, but I'm sure I've heard better somewhere; perhaps it was the lovely Sappho or the wise Anacreon or even some writer of prose. So, what's my evidence? The fact, my dear friend, that my breast is full and I feel I can make a different speech, even better than Lysias'. Now I am well aware that none of these ideas can have come from me—I know my own ignorance. The only other possibility, I think, is that I was filled, like an empty jar, by the words of other people streaming in through my ears, though I'm so stupid that I've even forgotten where and from whom I heard them.

Phaedrus/ But, my dear friend, you couldn't have said a better thing! Don't bother telling me when and from whom you've heard this, even if I ask you—instead, do exactly what you said: You've just promised to make another speech making more points, and better ones, without repeating a word from my book. And I promise you that, like the Nine Archons, I shall set up in return a life-sized golden statue at Delphi, not only of myself but also of you.

Socrates/ You're a real friend, Phaedrus, good as gold, to think I'm claiming that Lysias failed in absolutely every respect and that I can make a speech that is different on every point from his. I am sure that that couldn't happen even to the worst possible author. In our own case, for example, do you think that anyone could argue that one should favor the non-lover rather than the lover without praising the former for keeping his wits about him or condemning the latter for losing his points that are essential to make and still have something left to say? I believe we must allow these points, and concede them to the speaker. In their case, we cannot praise their novelty but only their skillful arrangement; but we can praise

both the arrangement and the novelty of the nonessential points that are harder to think up.

Phaedrus/ I agree with you; I think that's reasonable. This, then, is what I shall do. I will allow you to presuppose that the lover is less sane than the non-lover—and if you are able to add anything of value to complete what we already have in hand, you will stand in hammered gold beside the offering of the Cypselids in Olympia.

Socrates/ Oh, Phaedrus, I was only criticizing your beloved in order to tease you—did you take me seriously? Do you think I'd really try to match the product of his wisdom with a fancier speech?

Phaedrus/ Well, as far as that goes, my friend, you've fallen into your own trap. You have no choice but to give your speech as best you can: otherwise you will force us into trading vulgar jibes the way they do in comedy. Don't make me say what you said: "Socrates, if I don't know my Socrates, I must be forgetting who I am myself," or "He wanted to speak, but he was being coy." Get it into your head that we shall not leave here until you recite what you claimed to have "in your breast." We are alone, in a deserted place, and I am younger and stronger. From all this, "take my meaning" and don't make me force you to speak when you can do so willingly.

Socrates/ But, my dear Phaedrus, I'll be ridiculous—a mere dilettante, improvising on the same topics as a seasoned professional!

Phaedrus/ Do you understand the situation? Stop playing hard to get! I know what I can say to make you give your speech.

Socrates/ Then please don't say it!

Phaedrus/ Oh, yes, I will. And what I say will be an oath. I swear to you—by which god, I wonder? How about this very plane tree? —I swear in all truth that, if you don't make your

speech right next to this tree here, I shall never, never again recite another speech for you—I shall never utter another word about speeches to you!

Socrates/ My oh my, what a horrible man you are! You've really found the way to force a lover of speeches to do just as you say!

Phaedrus/ So why are you still twisting and turning like that?

Socrates/ I'll stop—now that you've taken this oath. How could I possibly give up such treats?

Phaedrus/ Speak, then.

Socrates/ Do you know what I'll do?

Phaedrus/ What?

Socrates/ I'll cover my head while I'm speaking. In that way, as I'm going through the speech as fast as I can, I won't get embarrassed by having to look at you and lose the thread of my argument.

Phaedrus/ Just give your speech! You can do anything else you like.

Socrates/ Come to me, O you clear-voiced Muses, whether you are called so because of the quality of your song or from the musical people of Liguria, "come, take up my burden" in telling the tale that this fine fellow forces upon me so that his companion may now seem to him even more clever than he did before:

There once was a boy, a youth rather, and he was very beautiful, and had very many lovers. One of them was wily and had persuaded him that he was not in love, though he loved the lad no less than the others. And once in pressing his suit to him, he tried to persuade him that he ought to give his favors to a man who did not love him rather than to one who did. And this is what he said:

“If you wish to reach a good decision on any topic, my boy, there is only one way to begin: You must know what the decision is about, or else you are bound to miss your target altogether. Ordinary people cannot see that they do not know the true nature of a particular subject, so they proceed as if they did; and because they do not work out an agreement at the start of the inquiry, they wind up as you would expect—in conflict with themselves and each other. Now you and I had better not let this happen to us, since we criticize it in others. Because you and I are about to discuss whether a boy should make friends with a man who loves him rather than with one who does not, we should agree on defining what love is and what effects it has. Then we can look back and refer to that as we try to find out whether to expect benefit or harm from love. Now, as everyone plainly knows, love is some kind of desire; but we also know that even men who are not in love have a desire for what is beautiful. So how shall we distinguish between a man who is in love and one who is not? We must realize that each of us is ruled by two principles which we follow wherever they lead: one is our inborn desire for pleasures, the other is our acquired judgment that pursues what is best. Sometimes these two are in agreement; but there are times when they quarrel inside us, and then sometimes one of them gains control, sometimes the other. Now when judgment is in control and leads us by reasoning toward what is best, that sort of self-control is called ‘being in your right mind’; but when desire takes command in us and drags us without reasoning toward pleasure, then its command is known as ‘outrageousness’. Now outrageousness has as many names as the forms it can take, and these are quite diverse. Whichever form stands out in a particular case gives its name to the person who has it—and that is not a pretty name to be called, not worth earning at all. If it is desire for food that overpowers a person’s reasoning about what is best and

suppresses his other desires, it is called gluttony and it gives him the name of a glutton, while if it is desire for drink that plays the tyrant and leads the man in that direction, we all know what name we'll call him then! And now it should be clear how to describe someone appropriately in the other cases: call the man by that name—sister to these others—that derives from the sister of these desires that controls him at the time. As for the desire that has led us to say all this, it should be obvious already, but I suppose things said are always better understood than things unsaid: The unreasoning desire that overpowers a person's considered impulse to do right and is driven to take pleasure in beauty, its force reinforced by its kindred desires for beauty in human bodies—this desire, all-conquering in its forceful drive, takes its name from the word for force (rhōmē) and is called erōs."

There, Phaedrus my friend, don't you think, as I do, that I'm in the grip of something divine?

Phaedrus/ This is certainly an unusual flow of words for you, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then be quiet and listen. There's something really divine about this place, so don't be surprised if I'm quite taken by the Nymphs' madness as I go on with the speech. I'm on the edge of speaking in dithyrambs as it is.

Phaedrus/ Very true!

Socrates/ Yes, and you're the cause of it. But hear me out; the attack may yet be prevented. That, however, is up to the god; what we must do is face the boy again in the speech:

"All right then, my brave friend, now we have a definition for the subject of our decision; now we have said what it really is; so let us keep that in view as we complete our discussion. What benefit or harm is likely to come from the lover or the non-lover to the boy who gives him favors? It is surely necessary that a man who is ruled by desire and is a slave to

pleasure will turn his boy into whatever is most pleasing to himself. Now a sick man takes pleasure in anything that does not resist him, but sees anyone who is equal or superior to him as an enemy. That is why a lover will not willingly put up with a boyfriend who is his equal or superior, but is always working to make the boy he loves weaker and inferior to himself. Now, the ignorant man is inferior to the wise one, the coward to the brave, the ineffective speaker to the trained orator, the slow-witted to the quick. By necessity, a lover will be delighted to find all these mental defects and more, whether acquired or innate in his boy; and if he does not, he will have to supply them or else lose the pleasure of the moment. The necessary consequence is that he will be jealous and keep the boy away from the good company of anyone who would make a better man of him; and that will cause him a great deal of harm, especially if he keeps him away from what would most improve his mind—and that is, in fact, divine philosophy, from which it is necessary for a lover to keep his boy a great distance away, out of fear the boy will eventually come to look down on him. He will have to invent other ways, too, of keeping the boy in total ignorance and so in total dependence on himself. That way the boy will give his lover the most pleasure, though the harm to himself will be severe. So it will not be of any use to your intellectual development to have as your mentor and companion a man who is in love.

"Now let's turn to your physical development. If a man is bound by necessity to chase pleasure at the expense of the good, what sort of shape will he want you to be in? How will he train you, if he is in charge? You will see that what he wants is someone who is soft, not muscular, and not trained in full sunlight but in dappled shade—someone who has never worked out like a man, never touched hard, sweaty exercise. Instead, he goes for a boy who has known only a soft unmanly style of life, who makes himself pretty with cosmetics because

he has no natural color at all. There is no point in going on with this description: it is perfectly obvious what other sorts of behavior follow from this. We can take up our next topic after drawing all this to a head: the sort of body a lover wants in his boy is one that will give confidence to the enemy in a war or other great crisis while causing alarm to friends and even to his lovers. Enough of that; the point is obvious.

"Our next topic is the benefit or harm to your possessions that will come from a lover's care and company. Everyone knows the answer, especially a lover: His first wish will be for a boy who has lost his dearest, kindliest and godliest possessions—his mother and father and other close relatives. He would be happy to see the boy deprived of them, since he would expect them either to block him from the sweet pleasure of the boy's company or to criticize him severely for taking it. What is more, a lover would think any money or other wealth the boy owns would only make him harder to snare and, once snared, harder to handle. It follows by absolute necessity that wealth in a boyfriend will cause his lover to envy him, while his poverty will be a delight. Furthermore, he will wish for the boy to stay wifeless, childless, and homeless for as long as possible, since that's how long he desires to go on plucking his sweet fruit.

"There are other troubles in life, of course, but some divinity has mixed most of them with a dash of immediate pleasure. A flatterer, for example, may be an awful beast and a dreadful nuisance, but nature makes flattery rather pleasant by mixing in a little culture with its words. So it is with a mistress—for all the harm we accuse her of causing—and with many other creatures of that character, and their callings: at least they are delightful company for a day. But besides being harmful to his boyfriend, a lover is simply disgusting to spend the day with. 'Youth delights youth,' as the old proverb runs—because, I suppose, friendship grows

from similarity, as boys of the same age go after the same pleasures. But you can even have too much of people your own age. Besides, as they say, it is miserable for anyone to be forced into anything by necessity—and this (to say nothing of the age difference) is most true for a boy with his lover. The older man clings to the younger day and night, never willing to leave him, driven by necessity and goaded on by the sting that gives him pleasure every time he sees, hears, touches, or perceives his boy in any way at all, so that he follows him around like a servant, with pleasure.

"As for the boy, however, what comfort or pleasure will the lover give to him during all the time they spend together? Won't it be disgusting in the extreme to see the face of that older man who's lost his looks? And everything that goes with that face—why, it is a misery even to hear them mentioned, let alone actually handle them, as you would constantly be forced to do! To be watched and guarded suspiciously all the time, with everyone! To hear praise of yourself that is out of place and excessive! And then to be falsely accused—which is unbearable when the man is sober and not only unbearable but positively shameful when he is drunk and lays into you with a pack of wild barefaced insults!

"While he is still in love he is harmful and disgusting, but after his love fades he breaks his trust with you for the future, in spite of all the promises he has made with all those oaths and entreaties which just barely kept you in a relationship that was troublesome at the time, in hope of future benefits. So, then, by the time he should pay up, he has made a change and installed a new ruling government in himself: right-minded reason in place of the madness of love. The boy does not even realize that his lover is a different man. He insists on his reward for past favors and reminds him of what they had done and said before—as if he were still talking to the same man! The lover, however, is so ashamed that he does not dare

tell the boy how much he has changed or that there is no way, now that he is in his right mind and under control again, that he can stand by the promises he had sworn to uphold when he was under that old mindless regime. He is afraid that if he acted as he had before he would turn out the same and revert to his old self. So now he is a refugee, fleeing from those old promises on which he must default by necessity; he, the former lover, has to switch roles and flee, since the coin has fallen the other way, while the boy must chase after him, angry and cursing. All along he has been completely unaware that he should never have given his favors to a man who was in love—and who therefore had by necessity lost his mind. He should much rather have done it for a man who was not in love and had his wits about him. Otherwise it follows necessarily that he'd be giving himself to a man who is deceitful, irritable, jealous, disgusting, harmful to his property, harmful to his physical fitness, and absolutely devastating to the cultivation of his soul, which truly is, and will always be, the most valuable thing to gods and men.

"These are the points you should bear in mind, my boy. You should know that the friendship of a lover arises without any good will at all. No, like food, its purpose is to sate hunger. 'Do wolves love lambs? That's how lovers befriend a boy!'"

That's it, Phaedrus. You won't hear another word from me, and you'll have to accept this as the end of the speech.

Phaedrus/ But I thought you were right in the middle—I thought you were about to speak at the same length about the non-lover, to list his good points and argue that it's better to give one's favors to him. So why are you stopping now, Socrates?

Socrates/ Didn't you notice, my friend, that even though I am criticizing the lover, I have passed beyond lyric into epic poetry? What do you suppose will happen to me if I begin to

praise his opposite? Don't you realize that the Nymphs to whom you so cleverly exposed me will take complete possession of me? So I say instead, in a word, that every shortcoming for which we blamed the lover has its contrary advantage, and the non-lover possesses it. Why make a long speech of it? That's enough about them both. This way my story will meet the end it deserves, and I will cross the river and leave before you make me do something even worse.

Phaedrus/ Not yet, Socrates, not until this heat is over. Don't you see that it is almost exactly noon, "straight-up" as they say? Let's wait and discuss the speeches, and go as soon as it turns cooler.

Socrates/ You're really superhuman when it comes to speeches, Phaedrus; you're truly amazing. I'm sure you've brought into being more of the speeches that have been given during your lifetime than anyone else, whether you composed them yourself or in one way or another forced others to make them; with the single exception of Simmias the Theban, you are far ahead of the rest. Even as we speak, I think, you're managing to cause me to produce yet another one.

Phaedrus/ Oh, how wonderful! But what do you mean? What speech?

Socrates/ My friend, just as I was about to cross the river, the familiar divine sign came to me which, whenever it occurs, holds me back from something I am about to do. I thought I heard a voice coming from this very spot, forbidding me to leave until I made atonement for some offense against the gods. In effect, you see, I am a seer, and though I am not particularly good at it, still—like people who are just barely able to read and write—I am good enough for my own purposes. I recognize my offense clearly now. In fact, the soul too, my friend, is itself a sort of seer; that's why, almost from the beginning of my speech, I was disturbed by a very uneasy

feeling, as Ibycus puts it, that "for offending the gods I am honored by men." But now I understand exactly what my offense has been.

Phaedrus/ Tell me, what is it?

Socrates/ Phaedrus, that speech you carried with you here—it was horrible, as horrible as the speech you made me give.

Phaedrus/ How could that be?

Socrates/ It was foolish, and close to being impious. What could be more horrible than that?

Phaedrus/ Nothing—if, of course, what you say is right.

Socrates/ Well, then? Don't you believe that Love is the son of Aphrodite? Isn't he one of the gods?

Phaedrus/ This is certainly what people say.

Socrates/ Well, Lysias certainly doesn't and neither does your speech, which you charmed me through your potion into delivering myself. But if Love is a god or something divine—which he is—he can't be bad in any way; and yet our speeches just now spoke of him as if he were. That is their offense against Love. And they've compounded it with their utter foolishness in parading their dangerous falsehoods and preening themselves over perhaps deceiving a few silly people and coming to be admired by them.

And so, my friend, I must purify myself. Now for those whose offense lies in telling false stories about matters divine, there is an ancient rite of purification—Homer did not know it, but Stesichorus did. When he lost his sight for speaking ill of Helen, he did not, like Homer, remain in the dark about the reason why. On the contrary, true follower of the Muses that he was, he understood it and immediately composed these lines:

There's no truth to that story:

You never sailed that lovely ship,
You never reached the tower of Troy.

And as soon as he completed the poem we call the Palinode, he immediately regained his sight. Now I will prove to be wiser than Homer and Stesichorus to this small extent: I will try to offer my Palinode to Love before I am punished for speaking ill of him—with my head bare, no longer covered in shame.

Phaedrus/ No words could be sweeter to my ears, Socrates.

Socrates/ You see, my dear Phaedrus, you understand how shameless the speeches were, my own as well as the one in your book. Suppose a noble and gentle man, who was (or had once been) in love with a boy of similar character, were to hear us say that lovers start serious quarrels for trivial reasons and that, jealous of their beloved, they do him harm—don't you think that man would think we had been brought up among the most vulgar of sailors, totally ignorant of love among the freeborn? Wouldn't he most certainly refuse to acknowledge the flaws we attributed to Love?

Phaedrus/ Most probably, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, that man makes me feel ashamed, and as I'm also afraid of Love himself, I want to wash out the bitterness of what we've heard with a more tasteful speech. And my advice to Lysias, too, is to write as soon as possible a speech urging one to give similar favors to a lover rather than to a non-lover.

Phaedrus/ You can be sure he will. For once you have spoken in praise of the lover, I will most definitely make Lysias write a speech on the same topic.

Socrates/ I do believe you will, so long as you are who you are.

Phaedrus/ Speak on, then, in full confidence.

Socrates/ Where, then, is the boy to whom I was speaking? Let him hear this speech, too. Otherwise he may be too quick to give his favors to the non-lover.

Phaedrus/ He is here, always right by your side, whenever you want him.

Socrates/ You'll have to understand, beautiful boy, that the previous speech was by Phaedrus, Pythocles' son, from Myrrhinus, while the one I am about to deliver is by Stesichorus, Euphemus' son, from Himera. And here is how the speech should go:

"There's no truth to that story'—that when a lover is available you should give your favors to a man who doesn't love you instead, because he is in control of himself while the lover has lost his head. That would have been fine to say if madness were bad, pure and simple; but in fact the best things we have come from madness, when it is given as a gift of the god.

"The prophetess of Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona are out of their minds when they perform that fine work of theirs for all of Greece, either for an individual person or for a whole city, but they accomplish little or nothing when they are in control of themselves. We will not mention the Sybil or the others who foretell many things by means of god-inspired prophetic trances and give sound guidance to many people—that would take too much time for a point that's obvious to everyone. But here's some evidence worth adding to our case: The people who designed our language in the old days never thought of madness as something to be ashamed of or worthy of blame; otherwise they would not have used the word 'manic' for the finest experts of all—the ones who tell the future—thereby weaving insanity into prophecy. They thought it was wonderful when it came as a gift of the god, and that's why

they gave its name to prophecy; but nowadays people don't know the fine points, so they stick in a 't' and call it 'mantic.' Similarly, the clear-headed study of the future, which uses birds and other signs, was originally called oionoïstic, since it uses reasoning to bring intelligence (nous) and learning (historia) into human thought; but now modern speakers call it oiōnistic, putting on airs with their long 'o'. To the extent, then, that prophecy, mantic, is more perfect and more admirable than sign-based prediction, oiōnistic, in both name and achievement, madness (mania) from a god is finer than self-control of human origin, according to the testimony of the ancient language givers.

"Next, madness can provide relief from the greatest plagues of trouble that beset certain families because of their guilt for ancient crimes: it turns up among those who need a way out; it gives prophecies and takes refuge in prayers to the gods and in worship, discovering mystic rites and purifications that bring the man it touches through to safety for this and all time to come. So it is that the right sort of madness finds relief from present hardships for a man it has possessed.

"Third comes the kind of madness that is possession by the Muses, which takes a tender virgin soul and awakens it to a Bacchic frenzy of songs and poetry that glorifies the achievements of the past and teaches them to future generations. If anyone comes to the gates of poetry and expects to become an adequate poet by acquiring expert knowledge of the subject without the Muses' madness, he will fail, and his self-controlled verses will be eclipsed by the poetry of men who have been driven out of their minds.

"There you have some of the fine achievements—and I could tell you even more—that are due to god-sent madness. We must not have any fear on this particular point, then, and we must not let anyone disturb us or frighten us with the claim that you should prefer a friend who is in control of

himself to one who is disturbed. Besides proving that point, if he is to win his case, our opponent must show that love is not sent by the gods as a benefit to a lover and his boy. And we, for our part, must prove the opposite, that this sort of madness is given us by the gods to ensure our greatest good fortune. It will be a proof that convinces the wise if not the clever.

"Now we must first understand the truth about the nature of the soul, divine or human, by examining what it does and what is done to it. Here begins the proof:

"Every soul is immortal. That is because whatever is always in motion is immortal, while what moves, and is moved by, something else stops living when it stops moving. So it is only what moves itself that never desists from motion, since it does not leave off being itself. In fact, this self-mover is also the source and spring of motion in everything else that moves; and a source has no beginning. That is because anything that has a beginning comes from some source, but there is no source for this, since a source that got its start from something else would no longer be the source. And since it cannot have a beginning, then necessarily it cannot be destroyed. That is because if a source were destroyed it could never get started again from anything else and nothing else could get started from it—that is, if everything gets started from a source. This then is why a self-mover is a source of motion. And that is incapable of being destroyed or starting up; otherwise all heaven and everything that has been started up would collapse, come to a stop, and never have cause to start moving again. But since we have found that a self-mover is immortal, we should have no qualms about declaring that this is the very essence and principle of a soul, for every bodily object that is moved from outside has no soul, while a body whose motion comes from within, from itself, does have a soul, that being the nature of a soul; and if this is so—that whatever

moves itself is essentially a soul—then it follows necessarily that soul should have neither birth nor death.

"That, then, is enough about the soul's immortality. Now here is what we must say about its structure. To describe what the soul actually is would require a very long account, altogether a task for a god in every way; but to say what it is like is humanly possible and takes less time. So let us do the second in our speech. Let us then liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer. The gods have horses and charioteers that are themselves all good and come from good stock besides, while everyone else has a mixture. To begin with, our driver is in charge of a pair of horses; second, one of his horses is beautiful and good and from stock of the same sort, while the other is the opposite and has the opposite sort of bloodline. This means that chariot-driving in our case is inevitably a painfully difficult business.

"And now I should try to tell you why living things are said to include both mortal and immortal beings. All soul looks after all that lacks a soul, and patrols all of heaven, taking different shapes at different times. So long as its wings are in perfect condition it flies high, and the entire universe is its dominion; but a soul that sheds its wings wanders until it lights on something solid, where it settles and takes on an earthly body, which then, owing to the power of this soul, seems to move itself. The whole combination of soul and body is called a living thing, or animal, and has the designation 'mortal' as well. Such a combination cannot be immortal, not on any reasonable account. In fact it is pure fiction, based neither on observation nor on adequate reasoning, that a god is an immortal living thing which has a body and a soul, and that these are bound together by nature for all time—but of course we must let this be as it may please the gods, and speak accordingly.

“Let us turn to what causes the shedding of the wings, what makes them fall away from a soul. It is something of this sort: By their nature wings have the power to lift up heavy things and raise them aloft where the gods all dwell, and so, more than anything that pertains to the body, they are akin to the divine, which has beauty, wisdom, goodness, and everything of that sort. These nourish the soul’s wings, which grow best in their presence; but foulness and ugliness make the wings shrink and disappear.

“Now Zeus, the great commander in heaven, drives his winged chariot first in the procession, looking after everything and putting all things in order. Following him is an army of gods and spirits arranged in eleven sections. Hestia is the only one who remains at the home of the gods; all the rest of the twelve are lined up in formation, each god in command of the unit to which he is assigned. Inside heaven are many wonderful places from which to look and many aisles which the blessed gods take up and back, each seeing to his own work, while anyone who is able and wishes to do so follows along, since jealousy has no place in the gods’ chorus. When they go to feast at the banquet they have a steep climb to the high tier at the rim of heaven; on this slope the gods’ chariots move easily, since they are balanced and well under control, but the other chariots barely make it. The heaviness of the bad horse drags its charioteer toward the earth and weighs him down if he has failed to train it well, and this causes the most extreme toil and struggle that a soul will face. But when the souls we call immortals reach the top, they move outward and take their stand on the high ridge of heaven, where its circular motion carries them around as they stand while they gaze upon what is outside heaven.

“The place beyond heaven—none of our earthly poets has ever sung or ever will sing its praises enough! Still, this is the way it is—risky as it may be, you see, I must attempt to speak

the truth, especially since the truth is my subject. What is in this place is without color and without shape and without solidity, a being that really is what it is, the subject of all true knowledge, visible only to intelligence, the soul's steersman. Now a god's mind is nourished by intelligence and pure knowledge, as is the mind of any soul that is concerned to take in what is appropriate to it, and so it is delighted at last to be seeing what is real and watching what is true, feeding on all this and feeling wonderful, until the circular motion brings it around to where it started. On the way around it has a view of Justice as it is; it has a view of Self-control; it has a view of Knowledge—not the knowledge that is close to change, that becomes different as it knows the different things which we consider real down here. No, it is the knowledge of what really is what it is. And when the soul has seen all the things that are as they are and feasted on them, it sinks back inside heaven and goes home. On its arrival, the charioteer stables the horses by the manger, throws in ambrosia, and gives them nectar to drink besides.

"Now that is the life of the gods. As for the other souls, one that follows a god most closely, making itself most like that god, raises the head of its charioteer up to the place outside and is carried around in the circular motion with the others. Although distracted by the horses, this soul does have a view of Reality, just barely. Another soul rises at one time and falls at another, and because its horses pull it violently in different directions, it sees some real things and misses others. The remaining souls are all eagerly straining to keep up, but are unable to rise; they are carried around below the surface, trampling and striking one another as each tries to get ahead of the others. The result is terribly noisy, very sweaty, and disorderly. Many souls are crippled by the incompetence of the drivers, and many wings break much of their plumage. After so much trouble, they all leave the sight of reality

unsatisfied, and when they have gone they will depend on what they think is nourishment—their own opinions.

"The reason there is so much eagerness to see the plain where truth stands is that this pasture has the grass that is the right food for the best part of the soul, and it is the nature of the wings that lift up the soul to be nourished by it. Besides, the law of Destiny is this: If any soul becomes a companion to a god and catches sight of any true thing, it will be unharmed until the next circuit; and if it is able to do this every time, it will always be safe. If, on the other hand, it does not see anything true because it could not keep up, and by some accident takes on a burden of forgetfulness and wrongdoing, then it is weighed down, sheds its wings and falls to earth. At that point, according to the law, the soul is not born into a wild animal in its first incarnation; but a soul that has seen the most will be planted in the seed of a man who will become a lover of wisdom or of beauty, or who will be cultivated in the arts and prone to erotic love. The second sort of soul will be put into someone who will be a lawful king or warlike commander; the third, a statesman, a manager of a household, or a financier; the fourth will be a trainer who loves exercise or a doctor who cures the body; the fifth will lead the life of a prophet or priest of the mysteries. To the sixth the life of a poet or some other representational artist is properly assigned; to the seventh the life of a manual laborer or farmer; to the eighth the career of a sophist or demagogue, and to the ninth a tyrant.

"Of all these, any who have led their lives with justice will change to a better fate, and any who have led theirs with injustice, to a worse one. In fact, no soul returns to the place from which it came for ten thousand years, since its wings will not grow before then, except for the soul of a man who practices philosophy without guile or who loves boys philosophically. If, after the third cycle of one thousand years,

the last-mentioned souls have chosen such a life three times in a row, they grow their wings back, and they depart in the three-thousandth year. As for the rest, once their first life is over, they come to judgment; and, once judged, some are condemned to go to places of punishment beneath the earth and pay the full penalty for their injustice, while the others are lifted up by justice to a place in heaven where they live in the manner the life they led in human form has earned them. In the thousandth year both groups arrive at a choice and allotment of second lives, and each soul chooses the life it wants. From there, a human soul can enter a wild animal, and a soul that was once human can move from an animal to a human being again. But a soul that never saw the truth cannot take a human shape, since a human being must understand speech in terms of general forms, proceeding to bring many perceptions together into a reasoned unity. That process is the recollection of the things our soul saw when it was traveling with god, when it disregarded the things we now call real and lifted up its head to what is truly real instead.

'Tor just this reason it is fair that only a philosopher's mind grows wings, since its memory always keeps it as close as possible to those realities by being close to which the gods are divine. A man who uses reminders of these things correctly is always at the highest, most perfect level of initiation, and he is the only one who is perfect as perfect can be. He stands outside human concerns and draws close to the divine; ordinary people think he is disturbed and rebuke him for this, unaware that he is possessed by god. Now this takes me to the whole point of my discussion of the fourth kind of madness—that which someone shows when he sees the beauty we have down here and is reminded of true beauty; then he takes wing and flutters in his eagerness to rise up, but is unable to do so; and he gazes aloft, like a bird, paying no attention to what is down below—and that is what brings

on him the charge that he has gone mad. This is the best and noblest of all the forms that possession by god can take for anyone who has it or is connected to it, and when someone who loves beautiful boys is touched by this madness he is called a lover. As I said, nature requires that the soul of every human being has seen reality; otherwise, no soul could have entered this sort of living thing. But not every soul is easily reminded of the reality there by what it finds here—not souls that got only a brief glance at the reality there, not souls who had such bad luck when they fell down here that they were twisted by bad company into lives of injustice so that they forgot the sacred objects they had seen before. Only a few remain whose memory is good enough; and they are startled when they see an image of what they saw up there. Then they are beside themselves, and their experience is beyond their comprehension because they cannot fully grasp what it is that they are seeing.

"Justice and self-control do not shine out through their images down here, and neither do the other objects of the soul's admiration; the senses are so murky that only a few people are able to make out, with difficulty, the original of the likenesses they encounter here. But beauty was radiant to see at that time when the souls, along with the glorious chorus (we were with Zeus, while others followed other gods), saw that blessed and spectacular vision and were ushered into the mystery that we may rightly call the most blessed of all. And we who celebrated it were wholly perfect and free of all the troubles that awaited us in time to come, and we gazed in rapture at sacred revealed objects that were perfect, and simple, and unshakeable and blissful. That was the ultimate vision, and we saw it in pure light because we were pure ourselves, not buried in this thing we are carrying around now, which we call a body, locked in it like an oyster in its shell.

“Well, all that was for love of a memory that made me stretch out my speech in longing for the past. Now beauty, as I said, was radiant among the other objects; and now that we have come down here we grasp it sparkling through the clearest of our senses. Vision, of course, is the sharpest of our bodily senses, although it does not see wisdom. It would awaken a terribly powerful love if an image of wisdom came through our sight as clearly as beauty does, and the same goes for the other objects of inspired love. But now beauty alone has this privilege, to be the most clearly visible and the most loved. Of course a man who was initiated long ago or who has become defiled is not to be moved abruptly from here to a vision of Beauty itself when he sees what we call beauty here; so instead of gazing at the latter reverently, he surrenders to pleasure and sets out in the manner of a four-footed beast, eager to make babies; and, wallowing in vice, he goes after unnatural pleasure too, without a trace of fear or shame. A recent initiate, however, one who has seen much in heaven—when he sees a godlike face or bodily form that has captured Beauty well, first he shudders and a fear comes over him like those he felt at the earlier time; then he gazes at him with the reverence due a god, and if he weren’t afraid people would think him completely mad, he'd even sacrifice to his boy as if he were the image of a god. Once he has looked at him, his chill gives way to sweating and a high fever, because the stream of beauty that pours into him through his eyes warms him up and waters the growth of his wings. Meanwhile, the heat warms him and melts the places where the wings once grew, places that were long ago closed off with hard scabs to keep the sprouts from coming back; but as nourishment flows in, the feather shafts swell and rush to grow from their roots beneath every part of the soul (long ago, you see, the entire soul had wings). Now the whole soul seethes and throbs in this condition. Like a child whose teeth are just starting to

grow in, and its gums are all aching and itching—that is exactly how the soul feels when it begins to grow wings. It swells up and aches and tingles as it grows them. But when it looks upon the beauty of the boy and takes in the stream of particles flowing into it from his beauty (that is why this is called 'desire'), when it is watered and warmed by this, then all its pain subsides and is replaced by joy. When, however, it is separated from the boy and runs dry, then the openings of the passages in which the feathers grow are dried shut and keep the wings from sprouting. Then the stump of each feather is blocked in its desire and it throbs like a pulsing artery while the feather pricks at its passageway, with the result that the whole soul is stung all around, and the pain simply drives it wild—but then, when it remembers the boy in his beauty, it recovers its joy. From the outlandish mix of these two feelings—pain and joy—comes anguish and helpless raving: in its madness the lover's soul cannot sleep at night or stay put by day; it rushes, yearning, wherever it expects to see the person who has that beauty. When it does see him, it opens the sluicegates of desire and sets free the parts that were blocked up before. And now that the pain and the goading have stopped, it can catch its breath and once more suck in, for the moment, this sweetest of all pleasures. This it is not at all willing to give up, and no one is more important to it than the beautiful boy. It forgets mother and brothers and friends entirely and doesn't care at all if it loses its wealth through neglect. And as for proper and decorous behavior, in which it used to take pride, the soul despises the whole business. Why, it is even willing to sleep like a slave, anywhere, as near to the object of its longing as it is allowed to get! That is because in addition to its reverence for one who has such beauty, the soul has discovered that the boy is the only doctor for all that terrible pain.

“This is the experience we humans call love, you beautiful boy (I mean the one to whom I am making this speech). You are so young that what the gods call it is likely to strike you as funny. Some of the successors of Homer, I believe, report two lines from the less well known poems, of which the second is quite indecent and does not scan very well. They praise love this way:

Yes, mortals call him powerful winged ‘Love’;

But because of his need to thrust out the wings, the gods call him ‘Shove.’

You may believe this or not as you like. But, seriously, the cause of love is as I have said, and this is how lovers really feel.

“If the man who is taken by love used to be an attendant on Zeus, he will be able to bear the burden of this feathered force with dignity. But if it is one of Ares’ troops who has fallen prisoner of love—if that is the god with whom he took the circuit—then if he has the slightest suspicion that the boy he loves has done him wrong, he turns murderous, and he is ready to make a sacrifice of himself as well as the boy.

“So it is with each of the gods: everyone spends his life honoring the god in whose chorus he danced, and emulates that god in every way he can, so long as he remains undefiled and in his first life down here. And that is how he behaves with everyone at every turn, not just with those he loves. Everyone chooses his love after his own fashion from among those who are beautiful, and then treats the boy like his very own god, building him up and adorning him as an image to honor and worship. Those who followed Zeus, for example, choose someone to love who is a Zeus himself in the nobility of his soul. So they make sure he has a talent for philosophy and the guidance of others, and once they have found him and are in love with him they do everything to develop that talent.

If any lovers have not yet embarked on this practice, then they start to learn, using any source they can and also making progress on their own. They are well equipped to track down their god's true nature with their own resources because of their driving need to gaze at the god, and as they are in touch with the god by memory they are inspired by him and adopt his customs and practices, so far as a human being can share a god's life. For all of this they know they have the boy to thank, and so they love him all the more; and if they draw their inspiration from Zeus, then, like the Bacchants, they pour it into the soul of the one they love in order to help him take on as much of their own god's qualities as possible. Hera's followers look for a kingly character, and once they have found him they do all the same things for him. And so it is for followers of Apollo or any other god: They take their god's path and seek for their own a boy whose nature is like the god's; and when they have got him they emulate the god, convincing the boy they love and training him to follow their god's pattern and way of life, so far as is possible in each case. They show no envy, no mean-spirited lack of generosity, toward the boy, but make every possible effort to draw him into being totally like themselves and the god to whom they are devoted. This, then, is any true lover's heart's desire: if he follows that desire in the manner I described, this friend who has been driven mad by love will secure a consummation for the one he has befriended that is as beautiful and blissful as I said—if, of course, he captures him. Here, then, is how the captive is caught:

"Remember how we divided each soul in three at the beginning of our story—two parts in the form of horses and the third in that of a charioteer? Let us continue with that. One of the horses, we said, is good, the other not; but we did not go into the details of the goodness of the good horse or the badness of the bad. Let us do that now. The horse that is on

the right, or nobler, side is upright in frame and well jointed, with a high neck and a regal nose; his coat is white, his eyes are black, and he is a lover of honor with modesty and self-control; companion to true glory, he needs no whip, and is guided by verbal commands alone. The other horse is a crooked great jumble of limbs with a short bull-neck, a pug nose, black skin, and bloodshot white eyes; companion to wild boasts and indecency, he is shaggy around the ears—deaf as a post—and just barely yields to horsewhip and goad combined. Now when the charioteer looks in the eye of love, his entire soul is suffused with a sense of warmth and starts to fill with tingles and the goading of desire. As for the horses, the one who is obedient to the charioteer is still controlled, then as always, by its sense of shame, and so prevents itself from jumping on the boy. The other one, however, no longer responds to the whip or the goad of the charioteer; it leaps violently forward and does everything to aggravate its yokemate and its charioteer, trying to make them go up to the boy and suggest to him the pleasures of sex. At first the other two resist, angry in their belief that they are being made to do things that are dreadfully wrong. At last, however, when they see no end to their trouble, they are led forward, reluctantly agreeing to do as they have been told. So they are close to him now, and they are struck by the boy's face as if by a bolt of lightning. When the charioteer sees that face, his memory is carried back to the real nature of Beauty, and he sees it again where it stands on the sacred pedestal next to Self-control. At the sight he is frightened, falls over backwards awestruck, and at the same time has to pull the reins back so fiercely that both horses are set on their haunches, one falling back voluntarily with no resistance, but the other insolent and quite unwilling. They pull back a little further; and while one horse drenches the whole soul with sweat out of shame and awe, the other—once it has recovered from the pain caused by

the bit and its fall—bursts into a torrent of insults as soon as it has caught its breath, accusing its charioteer and yokemate of all sorts of cowardice and unmanliness for abandoning their position and their agreement. Now once more it tries to make its unwilling partners advance, and gives in grudgingly only when they beg it to wait till later. Then, when the promised time arrives, and they are pretending to have forgotten, it reminds them; it struggles, it neighs, it pulls them forward and forces them to approach the boy again with the same proposition; and as soon as they are near, it drops its head, straightens its tail, bites the bit, and pulls without any shame at all. The charioteer is now struck with the same feelings as before, only worse, and he's falling back as he would from a starting gate; and he violently yanks the bit back out of the teeth of the insolent horse, only harder this time, so that he bloodies its foul-speaking tongue and jaws, sets its legs and haunches firmly on the ground, and 'gives it over to pain.' When the bad horse has suffered this same thing time after time, it stops being so insolent; now it is humble enough to follow the charioteer's warnings, and when it sees the beautiful boy it dies of fright, with the result that now at last the lover's soul follows its boy in reverence and awe.

"And because he is served with all the attentions due a god by a lover who is not pretending otherwise but is truly in the throes of love, and because he is by nature disposed to be a friend of the man who is serving him (even if he has already been set against love by school-friends or others who say that it is shameful to associate with a lover, and initially rejects the lover in consequence), as time goes forward he is brought by his ripening age and a sense of what must be to a point where he lets the man spend time with him. It is a decree of fate, you see, that bad is never friends with bad, while good cannot fail to be friends with good. Now that he allows his lover to talk and spend time with him, and the man's good will is close at

hand, the boy is amazed by it as he realizes that all the friendship he has from his other friends and relatives put together is nothing compared to that of this friend who is inspired by a god.

"After the lover has spent some time doing this, staying near the boy (and even touching him during sports and on other occasions), then the spring that feeds the stream Zeus named 'Desire' when he was in love with Ganymede begins to flow mightily in the lover and is partly absorbed by him, and when he is filled it overflows and runs away outside him. Think how a breeze or an echo bounces back from a smooth solid object to its source; that is how the stream of beauty goes back to the beautiful boy and sets him aflutter. It enters through his eyes, which are its natural route to the soul; there it waters the passages for the wings, starts the wings growing, and fills the soul of the loved one with love in return. Then the boy is in love, but has no idea what he loves. He does not understand, and cannot explain, what has happened to him. It is as if he had caught an eye disease from someone else, but could not identify the cause; he does not realize that he is seeing himself in the lover as in a mirror. So when the lover is near, the boy's pain is relieved just as the lover's is, and when they are apart he yearns as much as he is yearned for, because he has a mirror image of love in him—'back-love'—though he neither speaks nor thinks of it as love, but as friendship. Still, his desire is nearly the same as the lover's, though weaker: he wants to see, touch, kiss, and lie down with him; and of course, as you might expect, he acts on these desires soon after they occur.

"When they are in bed, the lover's undisciplined horse has a word to say to the charioteer—that after all its sufferings it is entitled to a little fun. Meanwhile, the boy's bad horse has nothing to say, but swelling with desire, confused, it hugs the lover and kisses him in delight at his great good will. And

whenever they are lying together it is completely unable, for its own part, to deny the lover any favor he might beg to have. Its yokemate, however, along with its charioteer, resists such requests with modesty and reason. Now if the victory goes to the better elements in both their minds, which lead them to follow the assigned regimen of philosophy, their life here below is one of bliss and shared understanding. They are modest and fully in control of themselves now that they have enslaved the part that brought trouble into the soul and set free the part that gave it virtue. After death, when they have grown wings and become weightless, they have won the first of three rounds in these, the true Olympic Contests. There is no greater good than this that either human self-control or divine madness can offer a man. If, on the other hand, they adopt a lower way of living, with ambition in place of philosophy, then pretty soon when they are careless because they have been drinking or for some other reason, the pair's undisciplined horses will catch their souls off guard and together bring them to commit that act which ordinary people would take to be the happiest choice of all; and when they have consummated it once, they go on doing this for the rest of their lives, but sparingly, since they have not approved of what they are doing with their whole minds. So these two also live in mutual friendship (though weaker than that of the philosophical pair), both while they are in love and after they have passed beyond it, because they realize they have exchanged such firm vows that it would be forbidden for them ever to break them and become enemies. In death they are wingless when they leave the body, but their wings are bursting to sprout, so the prize they have won from the madness of love is considerable, because those who have begun the sacred journey in lower heaven may not by law be sent into darkness for the journey under the earth; their lives are bright and happy as they travel

together, and thanks to their love they will grow wings together when the time comes.

"These are the rewards you will have from a lover's friendship, my boy, and they are as great as divine gifts should be. A non-lover's companionship, on the other hand, is diluted by human self-control; all it pays are cheap, human dividends, and though the slavish attitude it engenders in a friend's soul is widely praised as virtue, it tosses the soul around for nine thousand years on the earth and leads it, mindless, beneath it.

"So now, dear Love, this is the best and most beautiful palinode we could offer as payment for our debt, especially in view of the rather poetical choice of words Phaedrus made me use. Forgive us our earlier speeches in return for this one; be kind and gracious toward my expertise at love, which is your own gift to me: do not, out of anger, take it away or disable it; and grant that I may be held in higher esteem than ever by those who are beautiful. If Phaedrus and I said anything that shocked you in our earlier speech, blame it on Lysias, who was its father, and put a stop to his making speeches of this sort; convert him to philosophy like his brother Polemarchus so that his lover here may no longer play both sides as he does now, but simply devote his life to Love through philosophical discussions."

Phaedrus/ I join you in your prayer, Socrates. If this is really best for us, may it come to pass. As to your speech, I admired it from the moment you began: You managed it much better than your first one. I'm afraid that Lysias' effort to match it is bound to fall flat, if of course he even dares to try to offer a speech of his own. In fact, my marvelous friend, a politician I know was only recently taking Lysias to task for just that reason: All through his invective, he kept calling him a "speech writer." So perhaps his pride will keep him from writing this speech for us.

Socrates/ Ah, what a foolish thing to say, young man. How wrong you are about your friend: he can't be intimidated so easily! But perhaps you thought the man who was taking him to task meant what he said as a reproach?

Phaedrus/ He certainly seemed to, Socrates. In any case, you are surely aware yourself that the most powerful and renowned politicians are ashamed to compose speeches or leave any writings behind; they are afraid that in later times they may come to be known as "sophists."

Socrates/ Phaedrus, you don't understand the expression "Pleasant Bend"—it originally referred to the long bend of the Nile. And, besides the bend, you also don't understand that the most ambitious politicians love speechwriting and long for their writings to survive. In fact, when they write one of their speeches, they are so pleased when people praise it that they add at the beginning a list of its admirers everywhere.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean? I don't understand.

Socrates/ Don't you know that the first thing politicians put in their writings is the names of their admirers?

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ "Resolved," the author often begins, "by the Council" or "by the People" or by both, and "So-and-so said"—meaning himself, the writer, with great solemnity and self-importance. Only then does he go on with what he has to say, showing off his wisdom to his admirers, often composing a very long document. Do you think there's any difference between that and a written speech?

Phaedrus/ No, I don't.

Socrates/ Well, then, if it remains on the books, he is delighted and leaves the stage a poet. But if it is struck down, if he fails as a speech writer and isn't considered worthy of having his work written down, he goes into deep mourning, and his friends along with him.

Phaedrus/ He certainly does.

Socrates/ Clearly, then, they don't feel contempt for speechwriting; on the contrary, they are in awe of it.

Phaedrus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ There's this too. What of an orator or a king who acquires enough power to match Lycurgus, Solon, or Darius as a lawgiver and acquires immortal fame as a speech writer in his city? Doesn't he think that he is equal to the gods while he is still alive? And don't those who live in later times believe just the same about him when they behold his writings?

Phaedrus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Do you really believe then that anyone of these people, whoever he is and however much he hates Lysias, would reproach him for being a writer?

Phaedrus/ It certainly isn't likely in view of what you said, for he would probably be reproaching his own ambition as well.

Socrates/ This, then, is quite clear: Writing speeches is not in itself a shameful thing.

Phaedrus/ How could it be?

Socrates/ It's not speaking or writing well that's shameful; what's really shameful is to engage in either of them shamefully or badly.

Phaedrus/ That is clear.

Socrates/ So what distinguishes good from bad writing? Do we need to ask this question of Lysias or anyone else who ever did or will write anything—whether a public or a private document, poetic verse or plain prose?

Phaedrus/ You ask if we need to? Why else should one live, I say, if not for pleasures of this sort? Certainly not for those you cannot feel unless you are first in pain, like most of the

pleasures of the body, and which for this reason we call the pleasures of slaves.

Socrates/ It seems we clearly have the time. Besides, I think that the cicadas, who are singing and carrying on conversations with one another in the heat of the day above our heads, are also watching us. And if they saw the two of us avoiding conversation at midday like most people, diverted by their song and, sluggish of mind, nodding off, they would have every right to laugh at us, convinced that a pair of slaves had come to their resting place to sleep like sheep gathering around the spring in the afternoon. But if they see us in conversation, steadfastly navigating around them as if they were the Sirens, they will be very pleased and immediately give us the gift from the gods they are able to give to mortals.

Phaedrus/ What is this gift? I don't think I have heard of it.

Socrates/ Everyone who loves the Muses should have heard of this. The story goes that the cicadas used to be human beings who lived before the birth of the Muses. When the Muses were born and song was created for the first time, some of the people of that time were so overwhelmed with the pleasure of singing that they forgot to eat or drink; so they died without even realizing it. It is from them that the race of the cicadas came into being; and, as a gift from the Muses, they have no need of nourishment once they are born. Instead, they immediately burst into song, without food or drink, until it is time for them to die. After they die, they go to the Muses and tell each one of them which mortals have honored her. To Terpsichore they report those who have honored her by their devotion to the dance and thus make them dearer to her. To Erato, they report those who honored her by dedicating themselves to the affairs of love, and so too with the other Muses, according to the activity that honors each. And to Calliope, the oldest among them, and Urania, the next after

her, who preside over the heavens and all discourse, human and divine, and sing with the sweetest voice, they report those who honor their special kind of music by leading a philosophical life.

There are many reasons, then, why we should talk and not waste our afternoon in sleep.

Phaedrus/ By all means, let's talk.

Socrates/ Well, then, we ought to examine the topic we proposed just now: When is a speech well written and delivered, and when is it not?

Phaedrus/ Plainly.

Socrates/ Won't someone who is to speak well and nobly have to have in mind the truth about the subject he is going to discuss?

Phaedrus/ What I have actually heard about this, Socrates, my friend, is that it is not necessary for the intending orator to learn what is really just, but only what will seem just to the crowd who will act as judges. Nor again what is really good or noble, but only what will seem so. For that is what persuasion proceeds from, not truth.

Socrates/ Anything that wise men say, Phaedrus, "is not lightly to be cast aside"; we must consider whether it might be right. And what you just said, in particular, must not be dismissed.

Phaedrus/ You're right.

Socrates/ Let's look at it this way, then.

Phaedrus/ How?

Socrates/ Suppose I were trying to convince you that you should fight your enemies on horseback, and neither one of us knew what a horse is, but I happened to know this much about you, that Phaedrus believes a horse is the tame animal with the longest ears—

Phaedrus/ But that would be ridiculous, Socrates.

Socrates/ Not quite yet, actually. But if I were seriously trying to convince you, having composed a speech in praise of the donkey in which I called it a horse and claimed that having such an animal is of immense value both at home and in military service, that it is good for fighting and for carrying your baggage and that it is useful for much else besides—

Phaedrus/ Well, that would be totally ridiculous.

Socrates/ Well, which is better? To be ridiculous and a friend? Or clever and an enemy?

Phaedrus/ The former.

Socrates/ And so, when a rhetorician who does not know good from bad addresses a city which knows no better and attempts to sway it, not praising a miserable donkey as if it were a horse, but bad as if it were good, and, having studied what the people believe, persuades them to do something bad instead of good—with that as its seed, what sort of crop do you think rhetoric can harvest?

Phaedrus/ A crop of really poor quality.

Socrates/ But could it be, my friend, that we have mocked the art of speaking more rudely than it deserves? For it might perhaps reply, "What bizarre nonsense! Look, I am not forcing anyone to learn how to make speeches without knowing the truth; on the contrary, my advice, for what it is worth, is to take me up only after mastering the truth. But I do make this boast: even someone who knows the truth couldn't produce conviction on the basis of a systematic art without me."

Phaedrus/ Well, is that a fair reply?

Socrates/ Yes, it is—if, that is, the arguments now advancing upon rhetoric testify that it is an art. For it seems to me as if I hear certain arguments approaching and protesting that that is a lie and that rhetoric is not an art but an artless practice. As the Spartan said, there is no genuine

art of speaking without a grasp of truth, and there never will be.

Phaedrus/ We need to hear these arguments, Socrates. Come, produce them, and examine them: What is their point? How do they make it?

Socrates/ Come to us, then, noble creatures; convince Phaedrus, him of the beautiful offspring, that unless he pursues philosophy properly he will never be able to make a proper speech on any subject either. And let Phaedrus be the one to answer.

Phaedrus/ Let them put their questions.

Socrates/ Well, then, isn't the rhetorical art, taken as a whole, a way of directing the soul by means of speech, not only in the law courts and on other public occasions but also in private? Isn't it one and the same art whether its subject is great or small, and no more to be held in esteem—if it is followed correctly—when its questions are serious than when they are trivial? Or what have you heard about all this?

Phaedrus/ Well, certainly not what you have! Artful speaking and writing is found mainly in the law courts; also perhaps in the Assembly. That's all I've heard.

Socrates/ Well, have you only heard of the rhetorical treatises of Nestor and Odysseus—those they wrote in their spare time in Troy? Haven't you also heard of the works of Palamedes?

Phaedrus/ No, by Zeus, I haven't even heard of Nestor's—unless by Nestor you mean Gorgias, and by Odysseus, Thrasymachus or Theodorus.

Socrates/ Perhaps. But let's leave these people aside. Answer this question yourself: What do adversaries do in the law courts? Don't they speak on opposite sides? What else can we call what they do?

Phaedrus/ That's it, exactly.

Socrates/ About what is just and what is unjust?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And won't whoever does this artfully make the same thing appear to the same people sometimes just and sometimes, when he prefers, unjust?

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And when he addresses the Assembly, he will make the city approve a policy at one time as a good one, and reject it—the very same policy—as just the opposite at another.

Phaedrus/ Right.

Socrates/ Now, don't we know that the Eleatic Palamedes is such an artful speaker that his listeners will perceive the same things to be both similar and dissimilar, both one and many, both at rest and also in motion?

Phaedrus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ We can therefore find the practice of speaking on opposite sides not only in the law courts and in the Assembly. Rather, it seems that one single art—if, of course, it is an art in the first place—governs all speaking. By means of it one can make out as similar anything that can be so assimilated, to everything to which it can be made similar, and expose anyone who tries to hide the fact that that is what he is doing.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ I think it will become clear if we look at it this way. Where is deception most likely to occur—regarding things that differ much or things that differ little from one another?

Phaedrus/ Regarding those that differ little.

Socrates/ At any rate, you are more likely to escape detection, as you shift from one thing to its opposite, if you proceed in small steps rather than in large ones.

Phaedrus/ Without a doubt.

Socrates/ Therefore, if you are to deceive someone else and to avoid deception yourself, you must know precisely the respects in which things are similar and dissimilar to one another.

Phaedrus/ Yes, you must.

Socrates/ And is it really possible for someone who doesn't know what each thing truly is to detect a similarity—whether large or small—between something he doesn't know and anything else?

Phaedrus/ That is impossible.

Socrates/ Clearly, therefore, the state of being deceived and holding beliefs contrary to what is the case comes upon people by reason of certain similarities.

Phaedrus/ That is how it happens.

Socrates/ Could someone, then, who doesn't know what each thing is ever have the art to lead others little by little through similarities away from what is the case on each occasion to its opposite? Or could he escape this being done to himself?

Phaedrus/ Never.

Socrates/ Therefore, my friend, the art of a speaker who doesn't know the truth and chases opinions instead is likely to be a ridiculous thing—not an art at all!

Phaedrus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ So, shall we look for instances of what we called the artful and the artless in the speech of Lysias you carried here and in our own speeches?

Phaedrus/ That's the best thing to do—because, as it is, we are talking quite abstractly, without enough examples.

Socrates/ In fact, by some chance the two speeches do, as it seems, contain an example of the way in which someone who knows the truth can toy with his audience and mislead them. For my part, Phaedrus, I hold the local gods responsible for this—also, perhaps, the messengers of the Muses who are singing over our heads may have inspired me with this gift: certainly I don't possess any art of speaking.

Phaedrus/ Fine, fine. But explain what you mean.

Socrates/ Come, then—read me the beginning of Lysias' speech.

Phaedrus/ "You understand my situation: I've told you how good it would be for us, in my opinion, if we could work this out. In any case, I don't think I should lose the chance to get what I am asking for, merely because I don't happen to be in love with you. A man in love will wish he had not done you any favors—"

Socrates/ Stop. Our task is to say how he fails and writes artlessly. Right?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now isn't this much absolutely clear: We are in accord with one another about some of the things we discourse about and in discord about others?

Phaedrus/ I think I understand what you are saying; but, please, can you make it a little clearer?

Socrates/ When someone utters the word "iron" or "silver," don't we all think of the same thing?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what happens when we say "just" or "good"? Doesn't each one of us go in a different direction? Don't we differ with one another and even with ourselves?

Phaedrus/ We certainly do.

Socrates/ Therefore, we agree about the former and disagree about the latter.

Phaedrus/ Right.

Socrates/ Now in which of these two cases are we more easily deceived? And when does rhetoric have greater power?

Phaedrus/ Clearly, when we wander in different directions.

Socrates/ It follows that whoever wants to acquire the art of rhetoric must first make a systematic division and grasp the particular character of each of these two kinds of thing, both the kind where most people wander in different directions and the kind where they do not.

Phaedrus/ What a splendid thing, Socrates, he will have understood if he grasps that!

Socrates/ Second, I think, he must not be mistaken about his subject; he must have a sharp eye for the class to which whatever he is about to discuss belongs.

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, now, what shall we say about love? Does it belong to the class where people differ or to that where they don't?

Phaedrus/ Oh, surely the class where they differ. Otherwise, do you think you could have spoken of it as you did a few minutes ago, first saying that it is harmful both to lover and beloved and then immediately afterward that it is the greatest good?

Socrates/ Very well put. But now tell me this—I can't remember at all because I was completely possessed by the gods: Did I define love at the beginning of my speech?

Phaedrus/ Oh, absolutely, by Zeus, you most certainly did.

Socrates/ Alas, how much more artful with speeches the Nymphs, daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are,

according to what you say, than Lysias, son of Cephalus! Or am I wrong? Did Lysias too, at the start of his love-speech, compel us to assume that love is the single thing that he himself wanted it to be? Did he then complete his speech by arranging everything in relation to that? Will you read its opening once again?

Phaedrus/ If you like. But what you are looking for is not there.

Socrates/ Read it, so that I can hear it in his own words.

Phaedrus/ "You understand my situation: I've told you how good it would be for us, in my opinion, if we could work this out. In any case, I don't think I should lose the chance to get what I am asking for, merely because I don't happen to be in love with you. A man in love will wish he had not done you any favors, once his desire dies down—"

Socrates/ He certainly seems a long way from doing what we wanted. He doesn't even start from the beginning but from the end, making his speech swim upstream on its back. His first words are what a lover would say to his boy as he was concluding his speech. Am I wrong, Phaedrus, dear heart?

Phaedrus/ Well, Socrates, that was the end for which he gave the speech!

Socrates/ And what about the rest? Don't the parts of the speech appear to have been thrown together at random? Is it evident that the second point had to be made second for some compelling reason? Is that so for any of the parts? I at least—of course I know nothing about such matters—thought the author said just whatever came to mind next, though not without a certain noble willfulness. But you, do you know any principle of speech-composition compelling him to place these things one after another in this order?

Phaedrus/ It's very generous of you to think that I can understand his reasons so clearly.

Socrates/ But surely you will admit at least this much: Every speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own; it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole work.

Phaedrus/ How could it be otherwise?

Socrates/ But look at your friend's speech: Is it like that or is it otherwise? Actually, you'll find that it's just like the epigram people say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.

Phaedrus/ What epigram is that? And what's the matter with it?

Socrates/ It goes like this:

A maid of bronze am I, on Midas' tomb I lie As long as water flows, and trees grow tall Shielding the grave where many come to cry That Midas rests here I say to one and all I'm sure you notice that it makes no difference at all which of its verses comes first, and which last.

Phaedrus/ You are making fun of our speech, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, then, if that upsets you, let's leave that speech aside—even though I think it has plenty of very useful examples, provided one tries to emulate them as little as possible—and turn to the others. I think it is important for students of speechmaking to pay attention to one of their features.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ They were in a way opposite to one another. One claimed that one should give one's favors to the lover; the other, to the non-lover.

Phaedrus/ Most manfully, too.

Socrates/ I thought you were going to say “madly,” which would have been the truth, and is also just what I was looking for: We did say, didn’t we, that love is a kind of madness?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that there are two kinds of madness, one produced by human illness, the other by a divinely inspired release from normally accepted behavior?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We also distinguished four parts within the divine kind and connected them to four gods. Having attributed the inspiration of the prophet to Apollo, of the mystic to Dionysus, of the poet to the Muses, and the fourth part of madness to Aphrodite and to Love, we said that the madness of love is the best. We used a certain sort of image to describe love’s passion; perhaps it had a measure of truth in it, though it may also have led us astray. And having whipped up a not altogether implausible speech, we sang playfully, but also appropriately and respectfully, a story-like hymn to my master and yours, Phaedrus—to Love, who watches over beautiful boys.

Phaedrus/ And I listened to it with the greatest pleasure.

Socrates/ Let’s take up this point about it right away: How was the speech able to proceed from censure to praise?

Phaedrus/ What exactly do you mean by that?

Socrates/ Well, everything else in it really does appear to me to have been spoken in play. But part of it was given with Fortune’s guidance, and there were in it two kinds of things the nature of which it would be quite wonderful to grasp by means of a systematic art.

Phaedrus/ Which things?

Socrates/ The first consists in seeing together things that are scattered about everywhere and collecting them into one

kind, so that by defining each thing we can make clear the subject of any instruction we wish to give. Just so with our discussion of love: Whether its definition was or was not correct, at least it allowed the speech to proceed clearly and consistently with itself.

Phaedrus/ And what is the other thing you are talking about, Socrates?

Socrates/ This, in turn, is to be able to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do. In just this way, our two speeches placed all mental derangements into one common kind. Then, just as each single body has parts that naturally come in pairs of the same name (one of them being called the right-hand and the other the left-hand one), so the speeches, having considered unsoundness of mind to be by nature one single kind within us, proceeded to cut it up—the first speech cut its left-hand part, and continued to cut until it discovered among these parts a sort of love that can be called "left-handed," which it correctly denounced; the second speech, in turn, led us to the right-hand part of madness; discovered a love that shares its name with the other but is actually divine; set it out before us, and praised it as the cause of our greatest goods.

Phaedrus/ You are absolutely right.

Socrates/ Well, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover of these divisions and collections, so that I may be able to think and to speak; and if I believe that someone else is capable of discerning a single thing that is also by nature capable of encompassing many, I follow "straight behind, in his tracks, as if he were a god." God knows whether this is the right name for those who can do this correctly or not, but so far I have always called them "dialecticians." But tell me what I must call them now that we have learned all this from Lysias and

you. Or is it just that art of speaking that Thrasymachus and the rest of them use, which has made them masters of speechmaking and capable of producing others like them—anyhow those who are willing to bring them gifts and to treat them as if they were kings?

Phaedrus/ They may behave like kings, but they certainly lack the knowledge you're talking about. No, it seems to me that you are right in calling the sort of thing you mentioned dialectic; but, it seems to me, rhetoric still eludes us.

Socrates/ What are you saying? Could there be anything valuable which is independent of the methods I mentioned and is still grasped by art? If there is, you and I must certainly honor it, and we must say what part of rhetoric it is that has been left out.

Phaedrus/ Well, there's quite a lot, Socrates: everything, at any rate, written up in the books on the art of speaking.

Socrates/ You were quite right to remind me. First, I believe, there is the Preamble with which a speech must begin. This is what you mean, isn't it—the fine points of the art?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Second come the Statement of Facts and the Evidence of Witnesses concerning it; third, Indirect Evidence; fourth, Claims to Plausibility. And I believe at least that excellent Byzantine word-wizard adds Confirmation and Supplementary Confirmation.

Phaedrus/ You mean the worthy Theodorus?

Socrates/ Quite. And he also adds Refutation and Supplementary Refutation, to be used both in prosecution and in defense. Nor must we forget the most excellent Evenus of Paros, who was the first to discover Covert Implication and Indirect Praise and who—some say—has even arranged Indirect Censures in verse as an aid to memory: a wise man indeed! And Tisias and Gorgias? How can we leave them out

when it is they who realized that what is likely must be held in higher honor than what is true; they who, by the power of their language, make small things appear great and great things small; they who express modern ideas in ancient garb, and ancient ones in modern dress; they who have discovered how to argue both concisely and at infinite length about any subject? Actually, when I told Prodicus this last, he laughed and said that only he had discovered the art of proper speeches: What we need are speeches that are neither long nor short but of the right length.

Phaedrus/ Brilliantly done, Prodicus!

Socrates/ And what about Hippias? How can we omit him? I am sure our friend from Elis would cast his vote with Prodicus.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what shall we say of the whole gallery of terms Polus set up—speaking with Reduplication, Speaking in Maxims, Speaking in Images—and of the terms Licymnius gave him as a present to help him explain Good Diction?

Phaedrus/ But didn't Protagoras actually use similar terms?

Socrates/ Yes, Correct Diction, my boy, and other wonderful things. As to the art of making speeches bewailing the evils of poverty and old age, the prize, in my judgment, goes to the mighty Chalcedonian. He it is also who knows best how to inflame a crowd and, once they are inflamed, how to hush them again with his words' magic spell, as he says himself. And let's not forget that he is as good at producing slander as he is at refuting it, whatever its source may be.

As to the way of ending a speech, everyone seems to be in agreement, though some call it Recapitulation and others by some other name.

Phaedrus/ You mean, summarizing everything at the end and reminding the audience of what they've heard?

Socrates/ That's what I mean. And if you have anything else to add about the art of speaking—

Phaedrus/ Only minor points, not worth making.

Socrates/ Well, let's leave minor points aside. Let's hold what we do have closer to the light so that we can see precisely the power of the art these things produce.

Phaedrus/ A very great power, Socrates, especially in front of a crowd.

Socrates/ Quite right. But now, my friend, look closely: Do you think, as I do, that its fabric is a little threadbare?

Phaedrus/ Can you show me?

Socrates/ All right, tell me this. Suppose someone came to your friend Eryximachus or his father Acumenus and said: "I know treatments to raise or lower (whichever I prefer) the temperature of people's bodies; if I decide to, I can make them vomit or make their bowels move, and all sorts of things. On the basis of this knowledge, I claim to be a physician; and I claim to be able to make others physicians as well by imparting it to them." What do you think they would say when they heard that?

Phaedrus/ What could they say? They would ask him if he also knew to whom he should apply such treatments, when, and to what extent.

Socrates/ What if he replied, "I have no idea. My claim is that whoever learns from me will manage to do what you ask on his own"?

Phaedrus/ I think they' say the man's mad if he thinks he's a doctor just because he read a book or happened to come across a few potions; he knows nothing of the art.

Socrates/ And suppose someone approached Sophocles and Euripides and claimed to know how to compose the longest passages on trivial topics and the briefest ones on topics of great importance, that he could make them pitiful if he wanted, or again, by contrast, terrifying and menacing, and so on. Suppose further that he believed that by teaching this he was imparting the knowledge of composing tragedies—

Phaedrus/ Oh, I am sure they too would laugh at anyone who thought a tragedy was anything other than the proper arrangement of these things: They have to fit with one another and with the whole work.

Socrates/ But I am sure they wouldn't reproach him rudely. They would react more like a musician confronted by a man who thought he had mastered harmony because he was able to produce the highest and lowest notes on his strings. The musician would not say fiercely, "You stupid man, you are out of your mind!" As befits his calling, he would speak more gently: "My friend, though that too is necessary for understanding harmony, someone who has gotten as far as you have may still know absolutely nothing about the subject. What you know is what it's necessary to learn before you study harmony, but not harmony itself."

Phaedrus/ That's certainly right.

Socrates/ So Sophocles would also tell the man who was showing off to them that he knew the preliminaries of tragedy, but not the art of tragedy itself. And Acumenus would say his man knew the preliminaries of medicine, but not medicine itself.

Phaedrus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And what if the "honey-tongued Adrastus" (or perhaps Pericles) were to hear of all the marvelous techniques we just discussed—Speaking Concisely and Speaking in Images and all the rest we listed and proposed to examine

under the light? Would he be angry or rude, as you and I were, with those who write of those techniques and teach them as if they are rhetoric itself, and say something coarse to them? Wouldn't he—being wiser than we are—reproach us as well and say, "Phaedrus and Socrates, you should not be angry with these people—you should be sorry for them. The reason they cannot define rhetoric is that they are ignorant of dialectic. It is their ignorance that makes them think they have discovered what rhetoric is when they have mastered only what it is necessary to learn as preliminaries. So they teach these preliminaries and imagine their pupils have received a full course in rhetoric, thinking the task of using each of them persuasively and putting them together into a whole speech is a minor matter, to be worked out by the pupils from their own resources"?

Phaedrus/ Really, Socrates, the art these men present as rhetoric in their courses and handbooks is no more than what you say. In my judgment, at least, your point is well taken. But how, from what source, could one acquire the art of the true rhetorician, the really persuasive speaker?

Socrates/ Well, Phaedrus, becoming good enough to be an accomplished competitor is probably—perhaps necessarily—like everything else. If you have a natural ability for rhetoric, you will become a famous rhetorician, provided you supplement your ability with knowledge and practice. To the extent that you lack anyone of them, to that extent you will be less than perfect. But, insofar as there is an art of rhetoric, I don't believe the right method for acquiring it is to be found in the direction Lysias and Thrasymachus have followed.

Phaedrus/ Where can we find it then?

Socrates/ My dear friend, maybe we can see now why Pericles was in all likelihood the greatest rhetorician of all.

Phaedrus/ How is that?

Socrates/ All the great arts require endless talk and ethereal speculation about nature: This seems to be what gives them their lofty point of view and universal applicability. That's just what Pericles mastered—besides having natural ability. He came across Anaxagoras, who was just that sort of man, got his full dose of ethereal speculation, and understood the nature of mind and mindlessness—just the subject on which Anaxagoras had the most to say. From this, I think, he drew for the art of rhetoric what was useful to it.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ Well, isn't the method of medicine in a way the same as the method of rhetoric?

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ In both cases we need to determine the nature of something—of the body in medicine, of the soul in rhetoric. Otherwise, all we'll have will be an empirical and artless practice. We won't be able to supply, on the basis of an art, a body with the medicines and diet that will make it healthy and strong, or a soul with the reasons and customary rules for conduct that will impart to it the convictions and virtues we want.

Phaedrus/ That is most likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you think, then, that it is possible to reach a serious understanding of the nature of the soul without understanding the nature of the world as a whole?

Phaedrus/ Well, if we're to listen to Hippocrates, Asclepius' descendant, we won't even understand the body if we don't follow that method.

Socrates/ He speaks well, my friend. Still, Hippocrates aside, we must consider whether argument supports that view.

Phaedrus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Consider, then, what both Hippocrates and true argument say about nature. Isn't this the way to think systematically about the nature of anything? First, we must consider whether the object regarding which we intend to become experts and capable of transmitting our expertise is simple or complex. Then, if it is simple, we must investigate its power: What things does it have what natural power of acting upon? By what things does it have what natural disposition to be acted upon? If, on the other hand, it takes many forms, we must enumerate them all and, as we did in the simple case, investigate how each is naturally able to act upon what and how it has a natural disposition to be acted upon by what.

Phaedrus/ It seems so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Proceeding by any other method would be like walking with the blind. Conversely, whoever studies anything on the basis of an art must never be compared to the blind or the deaf. On the contrary, it is clear that someone who teaches another to make speeches as an art will demonstrate precisely the essential nature of that to which speeches are to be applied. And that, surely, is the soul.

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ This is therefore the object toward which the speaker's whole effort is directed, since it is in the soul that he attempts to produce conviction. Isn't that so?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Clearly, therefore, Thrasymachus and anyone else who teaches the art of rhetoric seriously will, first, describe the soul with absolute precision and enable us to understand what it is: whether it is one and homogeneous by nature or takes many forms, like the shape of bodies, since, as we said, that's what it is to demonstrate the nature of something.

Phaedrus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Second, he will explain how, in virtue of its nature, it acts and is acted upon by certain things.

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Third, he will classify the kinds of speech and of soul there are, as well as the various ways in which they are affected, and explain what causes each. He will then coordinate each kind of soul with the kind of speech appropriate to it. And he will give instructions concerning the reasons why one kind of soul is necessarily convinced by one kind of speech while another necessarily remains unconvinced.

Phaedrus/ This, I think, would certainly be the best way.

Socrates/ In fact, my friend, no speech will ever be a product of art, whether it is a model or one actually given, if it is delivered or written in any other way—on this or on any other subject. But those who now write Arts of Rhetoric—we were just discussing them—are cunning people: they hide the fact that they know very well everything about the soul. Well, then, until they begin to speak and write in this way, we mustn't allow ourselves to be convinced that they write on the basis of the art.

Phaedrus/ What way is that?

Socrates/ It's very difficult to speak the actual words, but as to how one should write in order to be as artful as possible—that I am willing to tell you.

Phaedrus/ Please do.

Socrates/ Since the nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul, whoever intends to be a rhetorician must know how many kinds of soul there are. Their number is so-and-so many; each is of such-and-such a sort; hence some people have such-and-such a character and others have such-and-such. Those distinctions established, there are, in turn, so-

and-so many kinds of speech, each of such-and-such a sort. People of such-and-such a character are easy to persuade by speeches of such-and-such a sort in connection with such-and-such an issue for this particular reason, while people of such-and-such another sort are difficult to persuade for those particular reasons.

The orator must learn all this well, then put his theory into practice and develop the ability to discern each kind clearly as it occurs in the actions of real life. Otherwise he won't be any better off than he was when he was still listening to those discussions in school. He will now not only be able to say what kind of person is convinced by what kind of speech; on meeting someone he will be able to discern what he is like and make clear to himself that the person actually standing in front of him is of just this particular sort of character he had learned about in school—to that he must now apply speeches of such-and-such a kind in this particular way in order to secure conviction about such-and-such an issue. When he has learned all this—when, in addition, he has grasped the right occasions for speaking and for holding back; and when he has also understood when the time is right for Speaking Concisely or Appealing to Pity or Exaggeration or for any other of the kinds of speech he has learned and when it is not—then, and only then, will he have finally mastered the art well and completely. But if his speaking, his teaching, or his writing lacks anyone of these elements and he still claims to be speaking with art, you'll be better off if you don't believe him.

"Well, Socrates and Phaedrus," the author of this discourse might say, "do you agree? Could we accept an art of speaking presented in any other terms?"

Phaedrus/ That would be impossible, Socrates. Still, it's evidently rather a major undertaking.

Socrates/ You're right. And that's why we must turn all our arguments every which way and try to find some easier and shorter route to the art: we don't want to follow a long rough path for no good reason when we can choose a short smooth one instead.

Now, try to remember if you've heard anything helpful from Lysias or anybody else. Speak up.

Phaedrus/ It's not for lack of trying, but nothing comes to mind right now.

Socrates/ Well, then, shall I tell you something I've heard people say who care about this topic?

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ We do claim, after all, Phaedrus, that it is fair to give the wolf's side of the story as well.

Phaedrus/ That's just what you should do.

Socrates/ Well, these people say that there is no need to be so solemn about all this and stretch it out to such lengths. For the fact is, as we said ourselves at the beginning of this discussion, that one who intends to be an able rhetorician has no need to know the truth about the things that are just or good or yet about the people who are such either by nature or upbringing. No one in a law court, you see, cares at all about the truth of such matters. They only care about what is convincing. This is called "the likely," and that is what a man who intends to speak according to art should concentrate on. Sometimes, in fact, whether you are prosecuting or defending a case, you must not even say what actually happened, if it was not likely to have happened—you must say something that is likely instead. Whatever you say, you should pursue what is likely and leave the truth aside: the whole art consists in cleaving to that throughout your speech.

Phaedrus/ That's an excellent presentation of what people say who profess to be expert in speeches, Socrates. I recall

that we raised this issue briefly earlier on, but it seems to be their single most important point.

Socrates/ No doubt you've churned through Tisias' book quite carefully. Then let Tisias tell us this also: By "the likely" does he mean anything but what is accepted by the crowd?

Phaedrus/ What else?

Socrates/ And it's likely it was when he discovered this clever and artful technique that Tisias wrote that if a weak but spunky man is taken to court because he beat up a strong but cowardly one and stole his cloak or something else, neither one should tell the truth. The coward must say that the spunky man didn't beat him up all by himself, while the latter must rebut this by saying that only the two of them were there, and fall back on that well-worn plea, "How could a man like me attack a man like him?" The strong man, naturally, will not admit his cowardice, but will try to invent some other lie, and may thus give his opponent the chance to refute him. And in other cases, speaking as the art dictates will take similar forms. Isn't that so, Phaedrus?

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Phew! Tisias—or whoever else it was and whatever name he pleases to use for himself—seems to have discovered an art which he has disguised very well! But now, my friend, shall we or shall we not say to him—

Phaedrus/ What?

Socrates/ This: "Tisias, some time ago, before you came into the picture, we were saying that people get the idea of what is likely through its similarity to the truth. And we just explained that in every case the person who knows the truth knows best how to determine similarities. So, if you have something new to say about the art of speaking, we shall listen. But if you don't, we shall remain convinced by the explanations we gave just before: No one will ever possess the

art of speaking, to the extent that any human being can, unless he acquires the ability to enumerate the sorts of characters to be found in any audience, to divide everything according to its kinds, and to grasp each single thing firmly by means of one form. And no one can acquire these abilities without great effort—a laborious effort a sensible man will make not in order to speak and act among human beings, but so as to be able to speak and act in a way that pleases the gods as much as possible. Wiser people than ourselves, Tisias, say that a reasonable man must put his mind to being pleasant not to his fellow slaves (though this may happen as a side effect) but to his masters, who are wholly good. So, if the way round is long, don't be astonished: we must make this detour for the sake of things that are very important, not for what you have in mind. Still, as our argument asserts, if that is what you want, you'll get it best as a result of pursuing our own goal.

Phaedrus/ What you've said is wonderful, Socrates—if only it could be done!

Socrates/ Yet surely whatever one must go through on the way to an honorable goal is itself honorable.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, that's enough about artfulness and artlessness in connection with speaking.

Phaedrus/ Quite.

Socrates/ What's left, then, is aptness and ineptness in connection with writing: What feature makes writing good, and what inept? Right?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, do you know how best to please god when you either use words or discuss them in general?

Phaedrus/ Not at all. Do you?

Socrates/ I can tell you what I've heard the ancients said, though they alone know the truth. However, if we could discover that ourselves, would we still care about the speculations of other people?

Phaedrus/ That's a silly question. Still, tell me what you say you've heard.

Socrates/ Well, this is what I've heard. Among the ancient gods of Naucratis in Egypt there was one to whom the bird called the ibis is sacred. The name of that divinity was Theuth, and it was he who first discovered number and calculation, geometry and astronomy, as well as the games of checkers and dice, and, above all else, writing.

Now the king of all Egypt at that time was Thamus, who lived in the great city in the upper region that the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes; Thamus they call Ammon. Theuth came to exhibit his arts to him and urged him to disseminate them to all the Egyptians. Thamus asked him about the usefulness of each art, and while Theuth was explaining it, Thamus praised him for whatever he thought was right in his explanations and criticized him for whatever he thought was wrong.

The story goes that Thamus said much to Theuth, both for and against each art, which it would take too long to repeat. But when they came to writing, Theuth said: "O King, here is something that, once learned, will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memory; I have discovered a potion for memory and for wisdom." Thamus, however, replied: "O most expert Theuth, one man can give birth to the elements of an art, but only another can judge how they can benefit or harm those who will use them. And now, since you are the father of writing, your affection for it has made you describe its effects as the opposite of what they really are. In fact, it will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it: they will not practice using their memory because they will put their trust

in writing, which is external and depends on signs that belong to others, instead of trying to remember from the inside, completely on their own. You have not discovered a potion for remembering, but for reminding; you provide your students with the appearance of wisdom, not with its reality. Your invention will enable them to hear many things without being properly taught, and they will imagine that they have come to know much while for the most part they will know nothing. And they will be difficult to get along with, since they will merely appear to be wise instead of really being so."

Phaedrus/ Socrates, you're very good at making up stories from Egypt or wherever else you want!

Socrates/ But, my friend, the priests of the temple of Zeus at Dodona say that the first prophecies were the words of an oak. Everyone who lived at that time, not being as wise as you young ones are today, found it rewarding enough in their simplicity to listen to an oak or even a stone, so long as it was telling the truth, while it seems to make a difference to you, Phaedrus, who is speaking and where he comes from. Why, though, don't you just consider whether what he says is right or wrong?

Phaedrus/ I deserved that, Socrates. And I agree that the Theban king was correct about writing.

Socrates/ Well, then, those who think they can leave written instructions for an art, as well as those who accept them, thinking that writing can yield results that are clear or certain, must be quite naive and truly ignorant of Ammon's prophetic judgment: otherwise, how could they possibly think that words that have been written down can do more than remind those who already know what the writing is about?

Phaedrus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ You know, Phaedrus, writing shares a strange feature with painting. The offspring of painting stand there as

if they are alive, but if anyone asks them anything, they remain most solemnly silent. The same is true of written words. You' think they were speaking as if they had some understanding, but if you question anything that has been said because you want to learn more, it continues to signify just that very same thing forever. When it has once been written down, every discourse roams about everywhere, reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no business with it, and it doesn't know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not. And when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, it always needs its father's support; alone, it can neither defend itself nor come to its own support.

Phaedrus/ You are absolutely right about that, too.

Socrates/ Now tell me, can we discern another kind of discourse, a legitimate brother of this one? Can we say how it comes about, and how it is by nature better and more capable?

Phaedrus/ Which one is that? How do you think it comes about?

Socrates/ It is a discourse that is written down, with knowledge, in the soul of the listener; it can defend itself, and it knows for whom it should speak and for whom it should remain silent.

Phaedrus/ You mean the living, breathing discourse of the man who knows, of which the written one can be fairly called an image.

Socrates/ Absolutely right. And tell me this. Would a sensible farmer, who cared about his seeds and wanted them to yield fruit, plant them in all seriousness in the gardens of Adonis in the middle of the summer and enjoy watching them bear fruit within seven days? Or would he do this as an amusement and in honor of the holiday, if he did it at all?

Wouldn't he use his knowledge of farming to plant the seeds he cared for when it was appropriate and be content if they bore fruit seven months later?

Phaedrus/ That's how he would handle those he was serious about, Socrates, quite differently from the others, as you say.

Socrates/ Now what about the man who knows what is just, noble, and good? Shall we say that he is less sensible with his seeds than the farmer is with his?

Phaedrus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Therefore, he won't be serious about writing them in ink, sowing them, through a pen, with words that are as incapable of speaking in their own defense as they are of teaching the truth adequately.

Phaedrus/ That wouldn't be likely.

Socrates/ Certainly not. When he writes, it's likely he will sow gardens of letters for the sake of amusing himself, storing up reminders for himself "when he reaches forgetful old age" and for everyone who wants to follow in his footsteps, and will enjoy seeing them sweetly blooming. And when others turn to different amusements, watering themselves with drinking parties and everything else that goes along with them, he will rather spend his time amusing himself with the things I have just described.

Phaedrus/ Socrates, you are contrasting a vulgar amusement with the very noblest—with the amusement of a man who can while away his time telling stories of justice and the other matters you mentioned.

Socrates/ That's just how it is, Phaedrus. But it is much nobler to be serious about these matters, and use the art of dialectic. The dialectician chooses a proper soul and plants and sows within it discourse accompanied by knowledge—discourse capable of helping itself as well as the man who

planted it, which is not barren but produces a seed from which more discourse grows in the character of others. Such discourse makes the seed forever immortal and renders the man who has it as happy as any human being can be.

Phaedrus/ What you describe is really much nobler still.

Socrates/ And now that we have agreed about this, Phaedrus, we are finally able to decide the issue.

Phaedrus/ What issue is that?

Socrates/ The issue which brought us to this point in the first place: We wanted to examine the attack made on Lysias on account of his writing speeches, and to ask which speeches are written artfully and which not. Now, I think that we have answered that question clearly enough.

Phaedrus/ So it seemed; but remind me again how we did it.

Socrates/ First, you must know the truth concerning everything you are speaking or writing about; you must learn how to define each thing in itself; and, having defined it, you must know how to divide it into kinds until you reach something indivisible. Second, you must understand the nature of the soul, along the same lines; you must determine which kind of speech is appropriate to each kind of soul, prepare and arrange your speech accordingly, and offer a complex and elaborate speech to a complex soul and a simple speech to a simple one. Then, and only then, will you be able to use speech artfully, to the extent that its nature allows it to be used that way, either in order to teach or in order to persuade. This is the whole point of the argument we have been making.

Phaedrus/ Absolutely. That is exactly how it seemed to us.

Socrates/ Now how about whether it's noble or shameful to give or write a speech—when it could be fairly said to be

grounds for reproach, and when not? Didn't what we said just a little while ago make it clear—

Phaedrus/ What was that?

Socrates/ That if Lysias or anybody else ever did or ever does write—privately or for the public, in the course of proposing some law—a political document which he believes to embody clear knowledge of lasting importance, then this writer deserves reproach, whether anyone says so or not. For to be unaware of the difference between a dream-image and the reality of what is just and unjust, good and bad, must truly be grounds for reproach even if the crowd praises it with one voice.

Phaedrus/ It certainly must be.

Socrates/ On the other hand, take a man who thinks that a written discourse on any subject can only be a great amusement, that no discourse worth serious attention has ever been written in verse or prose, and that those that are recited in public without questioning and explanation, in the manner of the rhapsodes, are given only in order to produce conviction. He believes that at their very best these can only serve as reminders to those who already know. And he also thinks that only what is said for the sake of understanding and learning, what is truly written in the soul concerning what is just, noble, and good can be clear, perfect, and worth serious attention: Such discourses should be called his own legitimate children, first the discourse he may have discovered already within himself and then its sons and brothers who may have grown naturally in other souls insofar as these are worthy; to the rest, he turns his back. Such a man, Phaedrus, would be just what you and I both would pray to become.

Phaedrus/ I wish and pray for things to be just as you say.

Socrates/ Well, then: our playful amusement regarding discourse is complete. Now you go and tell Lysias that we

came to the spring which is sacred to the Nymphs and heard words charging us to deliver a message to Lysias and anyone else who composes speeches, as well as to Homer and anyone else who has composed poetry either spoken or sung, and third, to Solon and anyone else who writes political documents that he calls laws: If anyone of you has composed these things with a knowledge of the truth, if you can defend your writing when you are challenged, and if you can yourself make the argument that your writing is of little worth, then you must be called by a name derived not from these writings but rather from those things that you are seriously pursuing.

Phaedrus/ What name, then, would you give such a man?

Socrates/ To call him wise, Phaedrus, seems to me too much, and proper only for a god. To call him wisdom's lover—a philosopher—or something similar would fit him better and be more seemly.

Phaedrus/ That would be quite appropriate.

Socrates/ On the other hand, if a man has nothing more valuable than what he has composed or written, spending long hours twisting it around, pasting parts together and taking them apart—wouldn't you be right to call him a poet or a speech writer or an author of laws?

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Tell that, then, to your friend.

Phaedrus/ And what about you? What shall you do? We must surely not forget your own friend.

Socrates/ Whom do you mean?

Phaedrus/ The beautiful Isocrates. What are you going to tell him, Socrates? What shall we say he is?

Socrates/ Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus. But I want to tell you what I foresee for him.

Phaedrus/ What is that?

Socrates/ It seems to me that by his nature he can outdo anything that Lysias has accomplished in his speeches; and he also has a nobler character. So I wouldn't be at all surprised if, as he gets older and continues writing speeches of the sort he is composing now, he makes everyone who has ever attempted to compose a speech seem like a child in comparison. Even more so if such work no longer satisfies him and a higher, divine impulse leads him to more important things. For nature, my friend, has placed the love of wisdom in his mind.

That is the message I will carry to my beloved, Isocrates, from the gods of this place; and you have your own message for your Lysias.

Phaedrus/ So it shall be. But let's be off, since the heat has died down a bit.

Socrates/ Shouldn't we offer a prayer to the gods here before we leave?

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ O dear Pan and all the other gods of this place, grant that I may be beautiful inside. Let all my external possessions be in friendly harmony with what is within. May I consider the wise man rich. As for gold, let me have as much as a moderate man could bear and carry with him.

Do we need anything else, Phaedrus? I believe my prayer is enough for me.

Phaedrus/ Make it a prayer for me as well. Friends have everything in common.

Socrates/ Let's be off.

The Phaedrus.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates AND Phædrus.

Scene, —the banks of the Ilissus.

Socrates/ Whither are you going, my dear Phædrus, and from whence came you?

Phaedrus/ From Lysias, the son of Cephalus, Socrates; but I am going, for the sake of walking, beyond the walls of the city. For I have been sitting with him a long time, indeed from very early in the morning till now. But being persuaded by Acumenus, who is your associate as well as mine, to take some exercise, I determined upon that of walking. For he said that this kind of exercise was not so laborious, and at the same time was more healthful, than that of the course.

Socrates/ He speaks well, my friend, on this subject: and so Lysias then, as it seems, was in the city.

Phaedrus/ He was. For he dwells with Epicrates in this house of Morychus, which is next to that of Olympius.

Socrates/ But what was his employment there? Or did not Lysias treat you with a banquet of orations?

Phaedrus/ You shall hear, if you have but leisure to walk along with me, and attend.

Socrates/ But what, do you not think that I, according to Pindar, would consider as a thing superior to business, the relation of your conversation with Lysias?

Phaedrus/ Go on then.

Socrates/ Begin the relation then.

Phaedrus/ And indeed, Socrates, the hearing of this is proper for you. For I do not know how it happened so, but

our discourse was amatory. For Lysias, through the persuasion of some beautiful person, though not one of his lovers, had composed an oration on love, and this in a very elegant manner: in the course of which he asserts that one who does not love ought to be gratified rather than a lover.

Socrates/ Generous man! I wish he had likewise asserted that this should be the case with the poor rather than the rich, the old than the young, and so in all the rest, that thus I myself, and many more of us, might be gratified: for then his discourse would have been both polite and publicly useful. I am therefore so desirous of hearing his oration, that if you should even walk as far as to Megara, and, like Herodicus, when you had reached the walls, immediately turn back again, I should not leave you.

Phaedrus/ What do you say, most excellent Socrates? Do you think me so much of an idiot as to suppose myself capable of relating, in such a manner as it deserves, a discourse which Lysias, the most skillful writer of the present age, was a long time in composing at his leisure? I am certainly very far from entertaining such a supposition: though I would rather be able to do this than be the possessor of a great quantity of gold.

Socrates/ O Phædrus, if I do not know Phædrus, I am likewise forgetful of myself; but neither of these happens to be the case. For I well know that he has not only heard the discourse of Lysias once, but that he has desired him to repeat it often: and that Lysias willingly complied with his request. But neither was this sufficient for Phædrus; but having at length obtained the book, he considered that which he mostly desired to see. And sitting down to peruse it very early in the morning, he continued his employment, till being fatigued, he went out for a walk; and, by the dog, as it appears to me committed it to memory, unless perhaps it was too long for this purpose. But he directed his course

beyond the walls, that he might meditate on this oration. Meeting, however, with one who was madly fond of discourse, he rejoiced on beholding him, because he should have a partner in his corybantic fury; and desired him to walk on. But when that lover of discourse requested him to repeat the oration, he feigned as if he was unwilling to comply; but though he was unwilling that anyone should hear him voluntarily, he was at length compelled to the relation. I therefore entreat, Phædrus, that you will quickly accomplish all I desire.

Phaedrus/ Well then, I will endeavor to satisfy you in the best manner I am able; for I see you will not dismiss me till I have exerted my utmost abilities to please you.

Socrates/ You perfectly apprehend the truth respecting me.

Phaedrus/ I will therefore gratify you; but, in reality, Socrates, I have not learned by heart the words of this oration, though I nearly retain the sense of all the arguments by which he shows the difference between a lover and one who does not love; and these I will summarily relate to you in order, beginning from the first.

Socrates/ But show me first, my friend, what you have got there in your left hand, under your cloak: for I suspect that you have got the oration itself. And if this be the case, think thus with yourself respecting me, that I perfectly esteem you; but that, when Lysias is present, it is by no means my intention to listen to you. And therefore show it me.

Phaedrus/ You ought to desist: for you have destroyed those hopes, Socrates, which I entertained respecting you; the hopes I mean of contesting with you. But where are you willing we should sit, while we read?

Socrates/ Let us, turning hither, direct our steps towards the river Ilissus: and afterwards, when you shall think proper to rest, we will sit down.

Phaedrus/ And this will be very seasonable, as it appears, for I am at present without shoes; but this is always the case with you. It will be easy, therefore, for us to walk by the side of the brook, moistening our feet; nor will it be unpleasant, especially at this season of the year, and this time of the day.

Socrates/ Go on then, and at the same time look out for a place where we may sit down.

Phaedrus/ Do you see that most lofty plane tree?

Socrates/ Why, what then?

Phaedrus/ For there, there is a cool shade, moderate breezes of wind, and soft grass, upon which we may either sit, or, if you are so disposed, lie down.

Socrates/ Let us go then.

Phaedrus/ But inform me, Socrates, whether this is not the place in which Boreas is reported to have ravished Orithya from Ilissus.

Socrates/ It is reported so indeed.

Phaedrus/ Was it not just here then? for the brooks hereabouts appear to be grateful to the view, pure and transparent, and very well adapted to the sports of virgins.

Socrates/ It was not, but two or three stadia lower down, where we meet with the temple of Diana, and in that very place there is a certain altar sacred to Boreas.

Phaedrus/ I did not perfectly know this. But tell me, by Zeus, Socrates, are you persuaded that this fabulous narration is true?

Socrates/ If I should not believe in it, as is the case with the wise, I should not be absurd: and afterwards, speaking sophistically, I should say that the wind Boreas hurled from

the neighboring rocks Orithya, sporting with Pharmacia; and that she dying in consequence of this, was said to have been ravished by Boreas, or from the hill of Mars. There is also another report that she was not ravished from this place, but from that. But for my own part, Phædrus, I consider interpretations of this kind as pleasant enough, but at the same time, as the province of a man vehemently curious and laborious, and not entirely happy; and this for no other reason, than because after such an explanation, it is necessary for him to correct the shape of the Centaurs and Chimæra. And, besides this, a crowd of Gorgons and Pegasuses will pour upon him for an exposition of his kind, and of certain other prodigious natures, immense both in multitude and novelty. All which, if anyone, not believing in their literal meaning, should draw to a probable sense, employing for this purpose a certain rustic wisdom, he will stand in need of most abundant leisure. With respect to myself indeed, I have not leisure for such an undertaking; and this because I am not yet able, according to the Delphic precept, to know myself. But it appears to me to be ridiculous, while I am yet ignorant of this, to speculate things foreign from the knowledge of myself. Hence, bidding farewell to these, and being persuaded in the opinion which I have just now mentioned respecting them, I do not contemplate these, but myself, considering whether I am not a wild beast, possessing more folds than Typhon, and far more raging and fierce; or whether I am a more mild and simple animal, naturally participating of a certain divine and modest condition. But are we not, my friend, in the midst of our discourse arrived at our destined seat? and is not yonder the oak to which you was to lead us?

Phaedrus/ That indeed is it.

Socrates/ By Hera, a beautiful retreat. For the plane-tree very widely spreads its shady branches, and is remarkably

tall; and the height and opacity of the willow, are perfectly beautiful, being now in the vigor of its vegetation, and, on this account, filling all the place with the most agreeable odor. Add too, that a most pleasant fountain of extreme cool water flows under the plane-tree, as may be inferred from its effect on our feet, and which appears to be sacred to certain nymphs, and to Achelous, from the virgins and statues with which it is adorned. Then again, if you are so disposed, take notice how lovely and very agreeable the air of the place is, and what a summer-like and sonorous singing resounds from the choir of grasshoppers. But the most elegant prospect of all is that of the grass, which in a manner so extremely beautiful, naturally adapts itself to receive on the gradual steep the reclining head. So that, my dear Phædrus, you have led me hither as a guest in the most excellent manner.

Phaedrus/ But you, O wonderful man, appear to act most absurdly; for by your discourse one might judge you to be some stranger and not a native of the place. And, indeed, one might conclude that you had never passed beyond the bounds of the city, nor ever deserted its walls.

Socrates/ Pardon me, most excellent Phædrus, for I am a lover of learning: and, hence I consider that fields and trees are not willing to teach me anything; but that this can be effected by men residing in the city. You indeed appear to me to have discovered an enchantment capable of causing my departure from hence. For as they lead famished animals whither they please, by extending to them leaves or certain fruits; so you, by extending to me the discourses contained in books, may lead me about through all Attica, and indeed wherever you please. But now, for the present, since we are arrived hither, I for my part am disposed to lie down; but do you, assuming whatever position you think most convenient, begin to read.

Phaedrus/ Hear then. —"You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and you have heard, I think, that it is most conducive to my advantage for them to subsist in this manner. But if appears to me that I am not unworthy to be deprived of what I wish to obtain, because I am not one of your lovers: for lovers, when their desires cease, repent themselves of the benefits which they have bestowed; but there is no time in which it is proper for those void of love to repent their beneficence; since they do not consult from necessity, but voluntarily, and in the best manner about their own affairs, and do good as far as their circumstances will admit. Besides, lovers sometimes reflect, how negligently they have attended, through love, to their own concerns, what benefits they have bestowed, to their own loss, and what labors they have undergone; and therefore think they have conferred favors worthy the objects of their love. But those void of love, neither blame themselves for neglecting their affairs, nor complain of past labors, or disagreement with their familiars, as produced by some beloved object. So that such mighty evils being removed, nothing else remains for them than to perform with willingness and alacrity whatever they think will be acceptable to the objects of their beneficent exertions. Besides, if it is said that lovers make much of the party beloved, because they love in the most eminent degree, and are always prepared, both in words and actions, to comply with the desires of their beloved, though they should offend others by so doing; it is easy to know that this is not the truth, because lovers far more esteem the posterior than the prior objects of their love; and if the more recently beloved party thinks fit, they are even willing to treat injuriously the former subjects of their regard. But to what else is it proper to ascribe such a conduct, except that calamity, love; a conduct which he who had never experienced this passion would never suppose possible to

exist. And besides this, lovers themselves confess that they are rather diseased than prudent, and that they know their ill condition with respect to prudence, but are unable to subdue it. But how can such as are properly prudent approve the desires of such as are thus diseased? Besides, if you should wish to choose among lovers the best associate, your choice must be confined to a few; but if you desire to find among others one most accommodated to yourself, you may choose out of many, And there are much more hopes of finding one worthy of your friendship among a many than a few. If, therefore, you reverence the established law, and are afraid lest the infamy of offenders should be your portion, it is proper to remember that lovers, who consider themselves as loved with a mutual regard, are accustomed to boast that they have not bestowed their labor in vain; but that such as are not infected with love, being better than these, content themselves with enjoying that which is best rather than the opinion of men. But still further, when the multitude perceive lovers following the objects of their affection, and bellowing all possible assiduity in this employment, they are necessarily persuaded that when they perceive them discoursing with each other, the desire of coition has either then taken place, or is about to do so: but they do not attempt to reproach the familiarity of such as are without love, as they know it is necessary that they must either discourse through friendship, or some other pleasure unconnected with coition. And, indeed, if in consequence of this doctrine you are afraid that it will be difficult for friendship to remain, and that disagreements, by some means or other arising, will become a common destruction to both; at the same time premising that you shall thus suffer a great injury in most of your transactions; if this is the case, you ought with much greater reason to be afraid of lovers. For there are many things afflictive to these, and they

consider everything as happening to their disadvantage. Hence, they prohibit the objects of their regard from associating with other lovers, dreading lest the wealthy should surpass them in wealth, and the learned in knowledge; and, as far as they are able, preserve them from the company of those who possess anything good. And thus, by persuading them to abstain from such as these, they cause them to abandon their friends. If, therefore, you consider your own advantage, you will be wiser than these, and will entirely disagree with them in opinion. But such as are not your lovers, but who act in a becoming manner through virtue, will not envy your association with others, but will rather hate those who are unwilling to be your familiars; thinking that you are despised by such as these, but that you are benefited by your associates. So that there is much more reason to hope that friendship will be produced by this means, than that enmity will arise from such a connection. Add to this, that the most part of lovers desire the possession of the body before they know the manners, or have made trial of anything else belonging to the beloved object: so that it is uncertain whether they will still wish to be friends to them, when the desire produced by love is no more. But it is probable that such as are without love, since from the commencement of their friendship they acted without regarding venereal delight, —it is probable that they will act with less ardor, but that they will leave their actions as monuments of their conduct in futurity. Besides, it will be more advantageous to you to be persuaded by me than by a lover. For lovers will praise both your sayings and actions beyond all measure; some through fear, lest they should offend you; but others, in consequence of being depraved in their judgment, through desire. For love will point you out to be such. It likewise compels the unfortunate to consider as calamitous things which cause

no molestation to others, and obliges the fortunate to celebrate as pleasant, things which are not deserving of delight: so that it is much more proper to commiserate than emulate lovers. But if you will be persuaded by me, in the first place I will associate with you, without caring for present pleasure, but for the sake of future advantage; not vanquished by love, but subduing myself; nor for mere trifles exciting severe enmity, but indulging a very little anger, and this but slowly even for great offences: pardoning, indeed, involuntary faults, and endeavoring to turn you from the commission of such as are voluntary. For these are the marks of a friendship likely to endure for a very extended period of time. However, if it should appear to you that friendship cannot be firm unless it is united with the lover, you should consider that, according to this, we ought not to be very fond of our children or parents, nor reckon those friends faithful, who became such, not from desire, but from studies of a different kind. But further still, if it is requisite to gratify in the most eminent degree those who are in want, it is proper to benefit, not the best of men, but the most needy: for, being liberated from the greatest evils, they will render them the most abundant thanks. And besides this, in the exertions of your own private benevolence, it is not proper to call your friends, but mendicants and those who stand in need of alimentary supplies. For these will delight in you, and follow you; will stand before your doors, and testify the most abundant satisfaction; render you the greatest thanks, and pray for your prosperity. But, perhaps, it is proper not to be pleased with those who are vehemently needy, but rather with those who are able to repay you with thanks, nor with lovers only but with those deserving your attention. Nor again, with those who enjoy the beauty of your youth, but with such as may participate your kindness when you are old. Nor with those who, when their desire is

accomplished, are ambitious of obtaining others, but with those who through modesty are silent towards all men. Nor with those who officiously attend upon you for a short time, but with those who are similarly your friends through the whole of life. Nor, lastly, with those who, when desire is extinguished, seek after occasions of enmity; but with those who, when the flower of your beauty is decayed, will then exhibit their virtue and regard. Do you, therefore, remember what I have said, and consider that friends admonish lovers, that they are engaged in a base pursuit; but that those void of love are never blamed by any of their familiars, as improperly consulting about themselves, through a privation of love. Perhaps you will ask me whether I persuade you to gratify all who are not lovers. But I think that even a lover would not exhort you to be equally affected towards all your lovers: for neither would this deserve equal thanks from the receiver; nor would you, who are desirous to conceal yourself from others, be able to accomplish this with equal facility towards all. It is, however, necessary that you should receive no injury from your lover; but that some advantage should accrue to both. To me it appears, therefore, that I have said sufficient; but if you think anything should be added, inform me what it is."

How does this discourse appear to you, Socrates? Is not the oration composed in a transcendent manner, both as to the sentiments and the structure of the words?

Socrates/ Divinely indeed, my friend, so as that I am astonished. And in the same transcendent manner am I affected towards you, Phædrus, while I behold you, because you appeared to me in the course of reading the oration to be transported with delight. As I considered, therefore, that you was more skillful in such affairs than myself, I followed you; and, in following, was agitated together with you, O divine head! with Bacchic fury.

Phaedrus/ Are you disposed to jest in this manner?

Socrates/ Do I appear then to you to jest, and not to speak seriously?

Phaedrus/ You by no means appear to be serious, Socrates. But, by Zeus, who presides over friendship, tell me whether you think that anyone of the Greeks could say anything greater and more copiously on this subject?

Socrates/ But what, do you think that a discourse ought to be praised by you and me, because its composer has said what is sufficient? and not for this alone, that he has artificially fashioned every word clear, and round, and accurate? For, if it is necessary, this must be granted for your sake: For it is concealed from me, through my nothingness. Hence, I only attended to the eloquence of the composer; for, as to the other particular, I do not believe that even Lysias will think himself sufficient. And indeed to me, Phædrus, it appears (unless you say otherwise) that he has twice and thrice repeated the same things, as if he did not possess a great copiousness of discourse upon the same subject: or, perhaps, he took no great care about a thing of this kind. And besides this, he seems to me to act in a juvenile manner, by showing that he can express the same thing in different ways, and yet at the same time, according to each mode, in the best manner possible.

Phaedrus/ You speak nothing to the purpose, Socrates: for this oration possesses a copiousness of sentiment in the most eminent degree. For he has omitted nothing belonging to his subject, which he could with propriety introduce: so that, besides what has been said by him, no one could ever be able to discourse, either more abundantly or more to the purpose, on the same subject, than he has done.

Socrates/ I cannot grant you this: for the wise of old, both men and women, who have discoursed and written on this

subject, would confute me, if I should admit this for the sake of gratifying you.

Phaedrus/ Who are those ancients? and where have you heard better things than these?

Socrates/ I do not sufficiently remember at present; but it is manifest that I have somewhere heard of some of these, such as the beautiful Sappho, or the wise Anacreon, or certain other writers. But from whence do I derive this conjecture? Because, O divine man! finding my breast full of conceptions, I perceive that I have something to say in addition to what has been already delivered, and this not of an inferior nature. I well know, indeed, that I understand nothing about such things from myself, as I am conscious of my own ignorance. It remains therefore, I think, that I myself, like a vessel, should be filled with knowledge, through hearing, from the fountains of others; but that, through my dullness of apprehension, I should again forget how, and from whom, I received the information.

Phaedrus/ You speak, most generous man, in the most excellent manner. For you cannot inform me, though I should command you to do so, how, and from whom, you derived your knowledge; but this which you speak of you are able to accomplish, since you possess more abundant and more excellent conceptions than those contained in the oration of Lysias. And if you are but able to accomplish this, I promise you, after the manner of the nine Archons, to place a golden statue of an equal measure at Delphi, not of myself only, but likewise of you.

Socrates/ You are of a most friendly disposition, Phædrus, and truly golden, if you suppose me to have asserted that Lysias was perfectly faulty, and that something better might have been said than the whole of this: for I do not think that this can ever happen, even to the worst of

writers. But to the point in hand, about this oration: Do you think that anyone who asserts that it is more proper to gratify one who does not love than a lover can have anything to say besides his assertion, if he omits to prove that he who is void of love is prudent, but the lover is not so; and praises the one, but blames the other? But I think that omissions of this kind are to be suffered, and even pardoned, in a writer; and that it is not the invention of these discourses, but the elegance of the composition, which ought to be praised. But in things which are not necessary, and which are difficult to discover, I think that not only the composition, but likewise the invention, should be praised.

Phaedrus/ I assent to what you say: for you appear to me to speak modestly. I will therefore allow you to suppose that a lover is more diseased than one who is void of love; but, if in what remains you speak more copiously and more to the purpose than Lysias, you shall stand in Olympia, artificially fabricated, near the Cypselidæ.

Socrates/ You are serious, Phædrus, because I have found fault with a man who is exceedingly beloved by you; and you think that I have in reality attempted to speak something more copious than what his wisdom has produced.

Phaedrus/ In this affair, my friend, you have afforded me a similar handle to that which I some time since afforded you, and it is necessary for you to speak upon this subject in the best manner you are able. And that we may not be compelled to adopt that troublesome method of comedians, by answering one another, take care of yourself; and do not oblige me to retort upon you "If I, O Socrates! am ignorant of Socrates, I am also forgetful of myself." And, "that he desires to speak, indeed, but feigns to be unwilling." In short, assure yourself that we shall not depart from hence before you have disclosed to me that which you keep concealed in your

breast. For there is none but us two; we are in a solitary place; and I am both stronger and younger than you. From all this, then, understand what I say; and by no means dispose yourself to be forced to speak, rather than to discourse of your own accord.

Socrates/ But, O blessed Phædrus! it would certainly be ridiculous in me, who am but an idiot, to contend with that excellent writer, and this too extemporary.

Phaedrus/ Do you know how the case stands? Cease your boasting before me: for I have nearly got a secret in my possession, which, when told, will force you to speak.

Socrates/ Do not tell it, therefore, I beseech you.

Phaedrus/ Not tell it? But indeed I shall. For my secret is an oath. And therefore I swear to you, by some one of the Gods, or, if you will, be this plane-tree, that unless you deliver to me a discourse the very contrary to that of Lysias, I will never at any time either show or read to you another oration.

Socrates/ O you wicked man! how well have you found out a method of compelling a lover of literature to act as you please!

Phaedrus/ Why then, since it is so, do you hesitate about complying?

Socrates/ I shall not indeed any longer, since you have sworn in this manner. For how is it possible for anyone to abstain from such feasts as you are capable of supplying?

Phaedrus/ Begin then.

Socrates/ Do you know what I mean to do?

Phaedrus/ About what?

Socrates/ Why, I mean to speak covered with my garment, that I may rapidly run through my discourse, and

that, by not looking at you, I may not be hindered through shame.

Phaedrus/ Do but speak; and as to the rest, you may act as you please.

Socrates/ Inspire me then, O ye Muses? whether you are so called from the melody of singing, or from the musical tribe of shrill sounds; and so assist me in the discourse which this best of men compels me to deliver, that his associate, who formerly appeared to him to be wise, may now appear to him to be still more so.

There was a certain youth, or rather a delicate young man, extremely beautiful, and who possessed a multitude of lovers. Among these there was one of a fraudulent disposition; who, though he did not love less than the rest, yet persuaded the youth that he was not one of his lovers. And asking him on a certain time to satisfy his desire, he endeavored to convince him that one who was not a lover ought to be gratified before one who was. But he spoke to this effect: In everything, young man, one principle, to those who are about to consult in a becoming manner, is, to know that about which they consult, or else it is necessary that they should perfectly wander from the truth. But the multitude are ignorant that they do not know the essence of every particular. Hence in the beginning of their disquisitions, they do not trouble themselves to declare what the essence of a thing is, as if they were very knowing in matters of this kind; but in the course of their inquiry they exhibit nothing more than probable reasons; and thus they are neither consistent with themselves, nor with others. With respect to you and me, therefore, lest we should suffer that which we condemn in others, in our inquiry, whether the engagement of friendship ought to be entered upon with one who does not love, rather than with one who does, we ought to know what love is, and what power it possesses,

mutually agreeing in our definition respecting it; and looking towards, and referring our discourse to this, we should consider whether it is the cause of advantage or detriment. That love, therefore, is a certain desire, is manifest to everyone; and we are not ignorant that those who are void of love, are desirous of beautiful things. That we may be able, therefore, to distinguish a lover from one who is not so, it is requisite to know that there are two certain ideas in each of us, endued with a ruling and leading power, and which we follow wherever they conduct us. One of these is the innate desire of pleasures; but the other an acquired opinion, desirous of that which is best. But these sometimes subsist in us in a state of amity, and sometimes in a state of opposition and discord. And sometimes the one conquers, and sometimes the other. When opinion, therefore, is led by reason to that which is best, and vanquishes, it is denominated, from its vanquishing, temperance. But when desire irrationally allures to pleasure, and rules within us, it is called from its dominion, injury. But injury possesses a multitude of appellations: For it is multiform, and consists of many species. And of these ideas that which subsists in the most remarkable degree, causes that in which it resides to receive its appellation, and does not suffer it to be denominated anything graceful or worthy. For when, with respect to food, desire of eating vanquishes the reason of that which is best, and rules over the other desires, then this desire is called gluttony; which likewise subjects its possessor to the same appellation. But that which tyrannizes about intoxication, and which through this leads its possessor wherever it pleases, evidently confers on him its own appellation. And it is sufficiently manifest. how the sisters of these, and the names of the filter-desires when they rule with absolute sway, ought to be called. But that for the sake of which all this has been said is now nearly

evident: though it will certainly be in every respect more clear if enunciated, than if not. For the desire which without reason rules over opinion tending to that which is right, which draws it down towards the pleasure of beauty, and being vehemently invigorated by its kindred desires about the beauty of body, leads and subdues it: this desire, receiving an appellation from its strength, is called love. But, my dear Phædrus, do I appear to you, as I do to myself, to suffer a certain divine passion?

Phaedrus/ Indeed, Socrates, you possess a certain fluency of expression, beyond what is usual to you.

Socrates/ Hear me then in silence. For in reality the place appears to be divine. If, therefore, during my discourse, I should be often hurried away by the inspiring influence of the Nymphs, you must not be surprised. For the words which burst from me at present are not very remote from dithyrambic verse.

Phaedrus/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ But of this you are the cause. However, hear the rest; for perhaps that which now possesses me may depart. But this will be taken care of by divinity. Let us, therefore, again direct our discourse to the young man. What that is then, which was the object of consultation, has been, declared and defined. But looking towards this, let us consider with respect to what remains, what assistance or detriment will very properly happen to him who is gratified by a lover, and to him who is gratified by one who is not so.

It is necessary then that a man who is enslaved by desire, or who is in subjection to pleasure, should render the object of his love as agreeable to himself as possible. But to one diseased everything is pleasant which does not oppose his disease; but that which is better and equal is troublesome. Hence the lover is never willing that the object of his love

should possess anything more excellent than himself, or anything approaching to an equality with himself; but that, as much as possible, he should be inferior to, and more indigent than himself. Thus, he is desirous that through ignorance he may become inferior to the wise, through timidity inferior to the bold, through inability to speak, to rhetoricians, and through dullness, to the acute. And when these, and far more numerous ills than these, according to the conceptions of the lover, are naturally inherent, or are produced in the beloved object, the lover rejoices, and even endeavors to introduce others, that he may not be deprived of his desired pleasure. Hence it is necessary that the lover should be envious of his beloved, and should endeavor by all possible means to exclude him from an association with others, through whom he may become a most excellent man; and thus in reality he is the cause of a mighty injury to his beloved. But the greatest injury, which he is the cause of, is that of depriving his beloved of the means of becoming eminently prudent. But he becomes most prudent through divine philosophy, from which the lover is necessarily compelled to withdraw his beloved, through the fear of being despised. And besides this, he is obliged to a variety of other artifices, that his beloved, by becoming ignorant of everything, may place all his admiration upon him; and may thus become most acceptable to his lover, but most pernicious to himself. And thus with respect to things relating to the rational part, an association with a lover is by no means advantageous, but prejudicial to the party beloved. But after this it is necessary to consider how he, who is compelled to prefer the pleasant to the good, would take care of the body of his beloved, if it was committed to his charge. Indeed he would endeavor that it should not become firm and vigorous, but effeminate and soft; and that it should not be nourished in the pure light of the sun, but

under the mingled shade; and that he should be educated without having any experience of manly labors and dry sweats; but on the contrary should be continually accustomed to a delicate and effeminate mode of living, and be adorned with foreign colors and ornaments, through the want of his own proper decorations: and that he should be studious of everything else, which is consequent to cares of this kind. All which, as they are unworthy of a longer narration, having summarily defined, we shall proceed to what remains of our discourse. Enemies, therefore, in battle, and other mighty necessities, will confidently assault such a body, but friends and lovers will be in fear for its safety. But this, as sufficiently evident, we shall dismiss. Let us then, in the next place, declare what advantage or detriment, with respect to possessions, arises to us from the familiarity and guardianship of a lover. But this indeed is manifest to everyone, but especially to a lover, that he desires above all things that his beloved may be deprived of the most friendly, most dear, and divine possessions: for he wishes to receive him destitute of parents, kindred and friends, thinking that these will impede and reprehend his most pleasant association with his beloved. Besides, he considers that the object of his love, if rich in gold, or any other possession, cannot be easily taken, and, if taken, will not be tractable to his desires. From all which it is necessary that a lover should envy his beloved the possession of abundance, and should rejoice in his adversity. Further yet, he will wish the youth to live for a long time without a wife, without children, and without a proper home, desiring for a very extended period to enjoy those pleasures which he is capable of affording. There are, indeed, other evils besides these, but a certain dæmon immediately mingles pleasure with most of them: as in that dreadful beast, and mighty detriment, a flatterer, nature at the same time mingles a pleasure by no means

inelegant and rude. And, indeed, someone may revile a harlot, and other cattle, and studies of this kind, which we are daily accustomed to delight in, as noxious; but he who is a lover of young men, besides his being detrimental, is in his familiar converse the most unpleasant of all men. For equal, according to the proverb, rejoices in equal. For, as it appears to me, since equality of time leads to equal pleasures, it produces also friendship, through similitude. But at the same time, the association of these is connected with satiety; and necessity is said to be grievous to everyone in every concern. But this is most eminently the case in the dissimilitude of a lover towards his beloved. For an old man adhering to a young one, does not willingly leave him, either by night or by day, but is agitated by necessity and fury, which always affording him pleasure, lead him about, through seeing, hearing, touching, and in any manner apprehending his beloved; so that he assiduously follows him with unceasing delight. But what solace or pleasures can he afford his beloved, so as to prevent him, during the period of mutual converse, from suffering the most extreme molestation? And this when he beholds his countenance aged and deformed, together with other particulars consequent to this, which are not only unpleasant to be engaged with, but even to hear; necessity always proposing to him such a survey. For in order to oblige him to this, he is always watched by suspicious guards in all his actions; and is under a necessity of hearing the unseasonable and immoderate praises and reproaches of his lover; which when he is sober, are indeed intolerable, but when he is intoxicated, are not only intolerable, but base, through his employing confidence, satiety, and repetition in his discourse. Besides, while he loves, he is pernicious and importunate. But when he ceases to love, he is afterwards unfaithful to the former object of his love, whom he had

persuaded to comply with his request, by employing many oaths, prayers, and promises; and whom, after all, he had scarcely been able to induce, by the hope of advantage, to bear with his troublesome familiarity. And, lastly, when he ought to repay him for his kindness, then receiving another ruler and patron in himself, viz. intellect and temperance, instead of love and fury, and thus becoming entirely changed, he deceives his once beloved object. And then the beloved calling to mind the former actions and discourses of his lover, desires to be thanked for his kindness, as if he was discoursing with the same person as before. But the other, through shame, dares not say that he is changed, nor does he know how to free himself from the oaths and promises which his former stupid dominion over him produced, now he has acquired the possession of intellect and temperance; fearing lest, if he should act as formerly, he should again become such as he was before. Hence it necessarily comes to pass that he flies from the former object of his love, the shell being turned; but the other is compelled to pursue him, grievously enduring his change, and loading him with imprecations, as being ignorant from the beginning that a lover, and one who is necessarily insane, ought not to be gratified, but much rather one who does not love, and who is endued with intellect. For otherwise it would be necessary that he should give himself up to a man unfaithful, morose, envious, and unpleasant; detrimental with respect to the possession of things, and the habit of the body, but much more pernicious with respect to the discipline of the soul, than which nothing really is, or ever will be more venerable, both among Gods and men. It is necessary, therefore, my young friend, to consider all this, and to know that the friendship of a lover does not subsist with benevolence, but, like one who is hungry, is exerted only for the sake of being full. For;

The eager lover to the boy aspires,
Just as the wolf the tender lamb desires.

This is that which I predicted to you, O Phædrus, nor will you hear, me speak any further; for my discourse to you has now arrived at its conclusion.

Phaedrus/ But to me it appears that you have accomplished no more than the half, and that you should speak equally as much concerning one who is not a lover; that he of the two ought rather to be gratified; and that, for this purpose, the advantages which he possesses should be enumerated. Why, therefore, Socrates, do you now desist from speaking?

Socrates/ Have you not taken notice, blessed man, that I now speak in verse, but that it is no longer dithyrambic; and that I have done this, though my discourse has been full of reproach? But what do you think I should be able to accomplish, if I should begin to praise the other? Do you not perceive that, being then urged by you, and assisted by Providence, I should be most evidently agitated by the fury of the Nymphs? I say then, in one word, that as many goods are inherent in the one as we have numbered evils in the other. But what occasion is there of a long discourse? for enough has been said concerning both. And everything proper to the oration has been introduced. I will, therefore, cross over the river and depart, before I am compelled by you to accomplish something greater than this.

Phaedrus/ Not yet, Socrates, till the heat is over. Do you not see that mid-day, as it is called, stably remains almost, even now? Let us, therefore, stay here, and discourse together about what has been said, and immediately as it begins to grow cool we will depart.

Socrates/ You are divine, Phædrus, with respect to discourse, and sincerely admirable. For I think that no one

has been the occasion of more, of the orations which exist at present, than yourself; whether by speaking of your own accord, or in some way or other by compelling others. I except only Simmias the Theban. For you far surpass all the rest. And now you appear to be the cause of my commencing another discourse, though you did not announce war, as the consequence of my refusal.

Phaedrus/ But how have I been the cause? and what new discourse is this?

Socrates/ When I was about to pass over the river, excellent man, a dæmoniacal and usual signal was given me; and whenever this takes place, it always prohibits me from accomplishing what I was about to do. And in the present instance I seemed to hear a certain voice, which would not suffer me to depart till I had made an expiation, as if I had offended in some particular a divine nature. I am therefore a prophet, indeed, but not such a one as is perfectly worthy; but just as those who know their letters in a very indifferent manner, alone sufficient for what concerns myself. I clearly, therefore, now understand my offence: for even yet, my friend, there is something prophetic in my soul, which disturbed me during my former discourse. And this caused me to fear lest, perhaps, according to Ibycus, I should offend the Gods, but acquire glory among men. But now I perceive in what I have offended.

Phaedrus/ Will you not inform me what it is?

Socrates/ You, O Phædrus, have repeated a dire, dire discourse, and have Compelled me to utter the same.

Phaedrus/ But how?

Socrates/ The discourse has been foolish, and in a certain respect impious. And can anything be more dire, than this?

Phaedrus/ Nothing, if you speak the truth.

Socrates/ What then? Do you not think that Love is the son of Venus and a certain God?

Phaedrus/ So it is said.

Socrates/ Yet this was neither acknowledged by Lysias, nor in your discourse, which was deduced by you, as by a certain charm, through my mouth. But if Love, as is really the case, is a God, or a certain something divine, he cannot, be in any respect evil: and yet in our discourse about him he has been spoken of as evil. In this, therefore, we have offended against Love. But, besides this, our disputations, though polite, appear to have been very foolish: for though they asserted nothing sound or true, yet they boasted as if they did, and as if they should accomplish something considerable, by gaining the approbation of some trifling deluded men. It is necessary, therefore, my friend, that I should purify myself. But there is an ancient purification for those who offend in matters respecting mythology, which Homer did not perceive, but which was known to Stesichorus. For, being deprived of his eyes through his accusation of Helen, he was not like Homer, ignorant of the cause of his blindness, but knew it, as being a musician. So that he immediately composed the following lines:

> False was my tale; thou ne'er across the main
> In beauteous ships didst fly, Troy's lofty towers to gain.

And thus having composed a poem directly contrary to what he had before published, and which is called a recantation, he immediately recovered his lost sight. I am, therefore, in the present instance wiser than both these: for before I suffer any damage through my accusation of love, I will endeavor to present him with my recantation, and this with my head uncovered, and not as before veiled through shame.

Phaedrus/ You cannot, Socrates, say anything which will be more pleasing to me than this.

Socrates/ For, my good friend, you must be sensible how imprudent the oration was which you repeated, and how shamefully I myself also spoke concerning a lover. For, if anyone of a generous disposition and elegant manners, who either loves, or had formerly loved, such a one as himself, had heard us, when we said that lovers often excited the greatest enmities for the most trifling occasions, and that they were envious of, and injurious to, their beloved, would he not have thought that he was hearing men educated in ships, and who were perfectly unacquainted with liberal love? or do you think that he would by any means have assented to our accusation of love?

Phaedrus/ By Zeus, Socrates, perhaps he would not.

Socrates/ Reverencing, therefore, such a man as this, and fearing Love himself, I desire, as it were with a potable oration, to wash away that salt and bitter discourse which we have lately heard. And I would advise Lysias himself, for similar reasons, to write as soon as possible that a lover ought rather to be gratified than one who is without love.

Phaedrus/ You may be well assured that he will do so; for, after you have spoken in praise of a lover, it will be necessary that Lysias should be compelled by me to do the same.

Socrates/ This indeed I believe, while you remain affected as you are at present.

Phaedrus/ Speak then confidently.

Socrates/ But will you not permit me to suppose that the same young man is present, to whom I addressed my former discourse, lest, in consequence of not hearing my recantation, he should rashly gratify one who is not a lover?

Phaedrus/ He will always be very nearly present with you, when you are willing he should be so.

Socrates/ In this manner then, O beautiful young man, understand that the former discourse was that of Phædrus the Myrrhinusian, the offspring of Pythocles; but that this which I am now about to deliver is the discourse of Stesichorus the Imeræan, and the son of Euphemus. But he began his oration as follows:

"The discourse is not true which asserts that, though a lover should be present, one who is not a lover ought to be gratified before him, because the one is agitated with fury, but the other is prudent in his conduct. For if it was simply true that mania is evil, this would be beautifully asserted. But now the greatest goods are produced for us through mania, and are assigned to as by a divine gift. For the predicting prophetess at Delphi, and the priestesses in Dodona have, when insane procured many advantages, both privately and publicly, to the Greeks; but when they have been in a prudent state, they have been the cause of very trifling benefits, or indeed of none at all. And if we should speak of the Sibyl, and others who have employed deific prophecy, rightly predicting many things to many respecting futurity, we should be too prolix, and at the same time only speak of that which is manifest to everyone. This indeed is worthy of being testified, that such of the ancients as gave names to things, did not consider mania as either base or disgraceful. For they did not connect the appellation of mania with that most beautiful art, by which we are enabled to judge of the future, as if it was something noxious; but they gave it a name of this kind, as something beneficial, when it subsists through a divine allotment. But men of the present day, being ignorant of what is becoming, by the insertion of the letter τ, call it μαντικη, or the art of divining. Indeed the investigations of futurity, by prudent men, which take place through birds, and a variety of other tokens, as proceeding from the dianoëtic part through human

intelligence, they denominated intellect and *intellective opinion*; which the moderns, through a reverence of the ω, denominate *augurial*, or pertaining to augury. By how much more perfect and honorable, therefore, prophecy is than augury, and the name and operation of the one than the name and operation of the other, by so much did the ancients testify that mania proceeding from divinity is more beautiful than prudence which, proceeds from men. But indeed, in the greatest diseases and labors to which certain persons are sometimes subject through the indignation of the Gods in consequence of guilt, mania when it takes place, predicting what they stand in need of, discovers a liberation from such evils, by flying to prayer and the worship of the Gods. Hence, obtaining by this means purifications and the advantages of initiation, it renders him who possesses it free from disasters, both for the present and future time, by discovering to him who is properly insane and possessed by divinity a solution of his present evils. But the third species is a possession and mania descending from the Muses, which receiving a soul tender and solitary, rouses and agitates it with Bacchic fury, according to odes and other species of poetry; in consequence of which, by adorning the infinite actions of antiquity, it becomes, the means of instructing posterity. But he who approaches to the poetic gates without the mania of the Muses, persuading himself that he can become a poet, in a manner perfectly sufficient from art alone, will, both as to himself and his poetry, be imperfect; since the poetry which is produced by prudence vanishes before that which is the progeny of mania. So many then are the beautiful works arising from divine mania, and still more than these, which, if it was requisite, I should relate. So that we ought not to be afraid of mania; nor should any reason disturb us, which endeavors to evince that we ought to prefer a prudent friend to one who is divinely

agitated: for he who asserts this, ought likewise to show, in order to gain the victory, that love was not sent from the Gods for the utility of the lover and his beloved. But, on the contrary, it must now be shown by us that a mania of this kind was sent by the Gods, for the purpose of producing the greatest felicity. The demonstration, indeed, will be to the unworthy incredible, but to the wise, an object of belief. It is necessary, therefore, in the first place, that, beholding the passions and operations of the divine and human soul, we should understand the truth concerning the nature of each. Let this then be the beginning of the demonstration:

Every soul is immortal: for that which is perpetually moved is eternal. But that which moves another and is moved by another, when it has a cessation of motion, has also a cessation of life. Hence that alone which moves itself, because it does not desert itself, never ceases to be moved; but this also is the fountain and principle of motion to other things which are moved. But a principle is unbegotten: for everything which is generated, is necessarily generated from a principle, while the principle itself is incapable of being generated. For neither could it any longer be a principle, if it was generated from an external cause. Since then it is unbegotten, it is also necessary that it should be incorruptible: for, should the principle become extinct, it could neither renew its being from another, nor generate another from itself, since it is necessary that all things should be generated from that which is the principle. And thus the beginning of motion is derived from that which moves itself: and this can neither be destroyed nor generated. For, if this were admitted, all heaven and earth falling together must stop; nor could any force be found, whence being moved, they would be again generated. Since then it appears that a self-motive nature is immortal, he who asserts that this is the very essence and definition of soul,

will have no occasion to blush. For everybody to which motion externally accedes, is inanimate. But that to which motion is inherent from itself, is animated; as if this was the very nature of soul. And if there is nothing else which moves itself except soul, soul is necessarily without generation, and immortal. And thus much may suffice, concerning the immortality of the soul.

But respecting its idea we must: speak after the following manner: To give a perfect description of its nature, would indeed be the employment of a narration every way prolix and divine; but to describe a certain similitude of this idea is the business of a human and shorter discourse. Let it then be similar to the kindred power of a winged chariot and charioteer. All the horses and chariots of the Gods are indeed good, and composed from things good; but those of other natures are mixed. And, in the first place, our principal part governs the reins of its two-yoked car. In the next place, one of the horses is good and beautiful, and is composed from things of this kind; but the other is of a contrary nature, and is composed of contrary qualities: and on this account our course is necessarily difficult and hard. But we must endeavor to explain why it is called in a certain respect a mortal and immortal animal. Every soul takes care of everything which is inanimate, and revolves about the whole of heaven, becoming situated at different times in different forms. While it is perfect, indeed, and winged, its course is sublime, and it governs the universe. But the soul whose wings suffer a defluxion verges downward, till something solid terminates its descent; whence it receives a terrene body, as its destined receptacle, which appears to move itself through the power of the soul: and the whole is called an animal composed from soul and body, and is surnamed a mortal animal. But that which is immortal is perceived by no rational deduction, except that which is hypothetical and

feigned: since we neither see, nor sufficiently understand, that a God is a certain immortal animal endued with a soul, and possessing a body naturally conjoined with soul, through the whole of time. These things however are asserted, and may exist, as it pleases divinity. But let us now declare the cause through which the wings were cast aside, and fell from the soul. And this is of the following kind: There is a natural power in the wings of the soul, to raise that which is weighty on high, where the genus of the Gods resides. But of everything subsisting about body, the soul most participates of that which is divine. But that which is divine is beautiful, wise, and good, and whatever can be asserted of a similar kind. And with these indeed the winged nature of the soul is especially nourished and increased: but it departs from its integrity, and perishes, through that which is evil and base, and from contraries of a similar kind. Likewise Zeus, the mighty leader in the heavens, driving his winged chariot, begins the divine procession, adorning and disposing all things with providential care. The army of Gods and dæmons, distributed into eleven parts, follows his course: but Vesta alone remains in the habitation of the Gods. But each of the other Gods belonging to the twelve, presides over the office committed to his charge. There are many, therefore, and blessed spectacles and processions within the heavens, to which the genus of the blessed Gods is converted as each accomplices the proper employment of his nature. But will and power are the perpetual attendants of their processions: for envy is far distant from the divine choir of Gods. But when they proceed to the banquet, and the enjoyment of delicious food, they sublimely ascend in their progression to the subcelestial arch. And, indeed, the vehicles of the Gods being properly adapted to the guiding reins, and equally balanced, proceed with an easy motion: but the vehicles of other natures are attended in their

progressions with difficulty and labor. For the horse, participating of depravity, becomes heavy; and when he has not been properly disciplined by the charioteers, verges and gravitates to the earth. And in this case labor, and an extreme contest, are proposed to the soul. But those who are denominated immortals, when they arrive at the summit, proceeding beyond the extremity of heaven, stand on its back: and while they are established in this eminence, the circumference carries them round, and they behold what the region beyond the heavens contains. But the supercelestial place has not yet been celebrated by any of our poets, nor will it ever be praised according to its dignity and worth. It subsists, however, in the following manner; for we should dare to affirm the truth, especially when speaking concerning the truth: without color, without figure, and without contact, subsisting as true essence, it alone uses contemplative intellect, the governor of the soul; about which essence, the genus of true science, resides. As the dianoëtic power, therefore, of divinity revolves with intellect and immaculate science, so likewise the dianoëtic power of every soul, when it receives a condition accommodated to its nature, perceiving being through time, it becomes enamored with it, and contemplating truth, is nourished and filled with joy, till the circumference by a circular revolution brings it back again to its pristine situation. But in this circuit it beholds justice herself, it beholds temperance, and science herself: not that with which generation is present, nor in which one thing has a particular local residence in another, and to which we give the appellation of beings; but that which is science in *true being*. And, besides this, contemplating and banqueting on other true beings in the same manner, again entering within the heavens, it returns to its proper home. But, when it returns, the charioteer, stopping his horses at the manger, presents them with

ambrosia, and together with it, nectar for drink. And this is the life of the Gods.

But, with respect to other souls, such as follow divinity in the best manner, and become similar to its nature, raise the head of the charioteer into the supercelestial place; where he is borne along with the circumference; but is disturbed by the course of the horses, and scarcely obtains the vision of perfect realities. But other souls at one time raise, and at another time depress, the head of the charioteer: and, through the violence of the horses, they partly see indeed, and are partly destitute of vision. And again, other souls follow, all of them affecting the vision of this superior place: but from being unable to accomplish this design; they are carried round in a merged condition, spurning against and rushing on each other, through a contention of precedency in their course. Hence the tumult, contest, and perspiration, are extreme. And here, indeed, many become same through the fault of the charioteers, many break many of their wings, and all of them, involved in mighty labor, depart destitute of the perception of reality; but after their departure they use an aliment composed from opinion; through which there is a great endeavor to behold where the plain of truth is situated. For, from a meadow of this kind, that which is best in the soul receives convenient nutriment; and from this the nature of the wing is nourished, by which the soul is enabled to ascend. And this is the law of Adrastia, that whatever soul attending on divinity has beheld anything of reality shall be free from damage, till another period takes place: and that if she is always able to accomplish this, she shall be perpetually free from the incursions of evil. But if, through an impotency of accomplishing this end, she has not perceived reality, and from some misfortune, and being filled with oblivion and depravity, she becomes heavy and drowsy, breaks her wings, and falls again on the earth, then this law

prevents her in her first generation from being implanted in some brutal nature, but commands the soul which has seen the most, to inform the body of a philosopher, or of one desirous of beauty; of a musician, or of one devoted to love. But it orders the soul, whose perceptions rank in the second class, to descend into a legitimate king, or a man studious of empire and war. But it distributes a soul of the third order into the governor of a republic, or the ruler of a family, or the master of a trade. And again, it distributes a soul of the fourth rank into one engaged in gymnastic exercise, or in procuring remedies, and taking care of the body: but souls of the fifth order it distributes into prophets and mystics. In the sixth, it makes a distribution into a poetic life. In the seventh, into a geometrician or artificer. In the eighth, into a sophist or popular character. And in the ninth, into a tyrant. But in all these, he who passes his life justly will afterwards obtain a better condition of being: but he who acts unjustly will pass into a worse state of existence. For no soul will return to its pristine condition till the expiration of ten thousand years: since it will not recover the use of its wings before this period; except it is the soul of one who has philosophized sincerely, or together with philosophy has loved beautiful forms. These, indeed, in the third period of a thousand years, if they have thrice chosen this mode of life in succession, and have thus restored their wings to their natural vigor, shall in the three thousandth year, fly away to their pristine abode. But other souls, having arrived at the end of their first life, shall be judged. And of those who are judged, some proceeding to a subterranean place of judgment, shall there sustain the punishments they have deserved. But others, in consequence of a favorable judgment, being elevated into a certain celestial place, shall pass their time in a manner becoming the life they have lived in a human shape. And in the thousandth year, both the

kinds of those who have been judged, returning to the lot and election of a second life, shall each of them receive a life agreeable to his desire. Here also the human soul shall pass into the life of a beast, and from that of a beast again into a man, if it has first been the soul of a man. For the soul which has never perceived the truth, cannot pass into the human form. Indeed it is necessary to understand man, denominated according to species, as a being proceeding from the information of many senses to a perception contracted into one by the reasoning power. But this is a recollection of what our soul formerly saw with divinity, when in a perfect condition of being; and when she despised what we now consider as realities, and was supernally elevated to the contemplation of that which is true. On this account, the dianoëtic power alone of the philosopher is justly winged. For the philosophic memory perpetually adheres as much as possible to those concerns, by an application to which even a God becomes divine. But he who properly uses meditations of this kind, being always initiated in perfect mysteries, alone acquires true perfection. And such a one being separated from human studies and pursuits, and adhering to that which is divine, is accused by the multitude as insane, while in the meantime, from being filled with divine enthusiasm, he is concealed from the multitude. This whole discourse, therefore, which respects the fourth kind of fury, tends to the means by which anyone, on perceiving a portion of terrene beauty, from a reminiscence of that which is true, may recover his wings, and, when he has recovered them, may struggle to fly away. But since he cannot accomplish this according to his wish, like a bird looking on high and despising inferior concerns, he is accused as one insanely affected. This enthusiasm, therefore, is of all enthusiasms the best, and is composed from the best, both to the possessor and the participant: and

he who is under the influence of this mania when he loves beautiful objects, is denominated a lover. For, as we have before observed, the soul of every man has from its nature perceived realities, or it could not have entered into the human form. But to recollect superior natures from objects of sense, is not easy to all men; neither to those who then were engaged but a short time in the contemplation of those divine objects; nor to those who descending hither have been unfortunate; nor to such as, turning to injustice from certain associations, have become oblivious of the sacred mysteries which they once beheld. And hence but a few remain whose memory is sufficient for this exalted purpose. But these, when they behold any similitude of supernal forms, they are astonished, and as it were rapt above themselves: and at the same time they are ignorant what this passion may be, because they are not endued with a sufficient perception. Indeed, we behold no splendor in similitudes which are here, of justice, temperance, and whatever else is precious in the soul; but very few are able, and even to these it is difficult, through certain dark instruments, to perceive from these images the genus of that which is represented. But we then saw splendid beauty, when we obtained together with that happy choir, this blessed vision and contemplation. And we indeed beheld it together with Zeus, but others in conjunction with some other God; at the same time being initiated in those mysteries which it is lawful to call the most blessed of all mysteries. And these divine orgies were celebrated by us while we were perfect, and free from those evils which awaited us in a succeeding period of time. We likewise were initiated in, and became spectators of, entire, simple, quietly stable, and blessed visions, resident in a pure light; being ourselves pure, and liberated from this surrounding vestment, which we denominate body, and to which we are now bound, like an oyster to its shell.

With these speculations, therefore, we should gratify our memory; for the sake of which, and through a desire of those realities which we once be held, I have given such an extent to my discourse. But beauty, as we have said, shone upon us during our progressions with the Gods; but on our arrival hither we possessed the power of perceiving it, shining most perspicuously, through the clearest of our senses. For sight is the most acute of all our corporeal senses; though even through this wisdom cannot be perceived. If indeed it could, what vehement love would it excite, by presenting to the eye some perspicuous image of itself! And the same may be said of everything else which is the object of love. But now beauty alone is allotted the privilege of being the most apparent and lovely of all things. He, therefore, who has not recently descended hither, or whose manners are depraved, will not very swiftly be excited from hence thither to a survey of the beautiful itself, by beholding that among sensible objects which receives the same appellation. Hence, he will not reverence it while he beholds it; but, giving himself up to pleasure, he will endeavor to walk about and generate after the manner of a quadruped: and, injuriously converting with others, he will neither be afraid nor ashamed of pursuing pleasure contrary to nature. But he who has been recently initiated, and who formerly was a spectator of many blessed visions, when he beholds some deiform countenance, elegantly imitative of beauty, or some incorporeal idea, at first indeed he is struck with horror, and feels something of that terror which formerly invaded him; but, from all after survey, he venerates it as a God: and if it was not for the dread of being thought vehemently insane, he would sacrifice to his beloved, as to a statue and a God. But, in consequence of surveying this beautiful object, he experiences a mutation in his feelings, a perspiration and unaccustomed heat, such as horror produces. For, receiving

the influx of beauty through his eyes, he becomes hot, and this irrigates the nature of his wings; but when heated, whatever belongs to the germinating of his pinions liquefies, and which formerly being compressed through hardness restrained the vigor of their shoots. But an influx of nutriment taking place, the quill of the wing swells, and endeavors to burst forth, through the whole form of the soul: for the whole was formerly winged. The whole, therefore, in this case, becomes fervid, and leaps upward. And as infants, during the growth of their teeth, are tormented with the friction and pain of their gums, in the same manner is the soul affected with respect to the mooting forth of its wings: For it becomes subject to an immoderate heat, titillation, and torment. When, therefore, it beholds the beauty of some human form, then imbibing the parts which flow from thence, and which is on this account called desire, it becomes irrigated and heated, ceases to be in pain, and rejoices. But when it is separated from this vision of beauty, and becomes dry through heat, then the orifices of the passages through which the feathers endeavored to shoot forth, being closed, impede the offspring of the wing. But these being shut in together with desire, and leaping about like things subject to palpitation strike against the avenues of their progression. Hence, the whole soul, becoming pierced on all sides in a circle, is agitated with fury, and tormented; but, through the memory of the beautiful, again exults with delight. But, from the mixture of both these, it is grievously tormented, through the novelty of the passion, and becomes dubious and raging; and, while it is thus furious, can neither sleep by night, nor abide anywhere by day; but runs about agitated by desire, wherever there is any probability of obtaining the vision of beauty. But beholding the beloved beautiful object, and deducing desire, as through a channel, it now frees from confinement what was

before enclosed; and, by this means enjoying the benefit of respiration, is liberated from its incitements and parturitions. For the present, therefore, it reaps the advantage of this most delicious pleasure; by which it is so charmed, that it would never voluntarily depart from its allurements, nor does it esteem anything so much as this beloved beauty, but delivers over to oblivion its parents, brethren, and friends; and, besides this, considers the dissipation of its possessions through negligence as a thing of no consequence, and perfectly despises those legal institutions and decencies in which it formerly gloried; and is always prepared for every kind of servitude and subjection, so that it may be near to the object of its desire. For, besides reverencing that which possesses beauty, it finds that this alone is the physician of its greatest diseases.

This passion therefore, O beautiful youth, which is the subject of my present discourse, is called, by men Love: but if you should hear how it is denominated by the Gods, you would probably laugh, on account of your youth. But I think that certain Homerics assert, from some recondite verses, that there are two poems upon Love, one of which calls him perfectly injurious, and not very elegant; but they celebrate him as follows:

> By men Love's flying called; but, forced to fly,
> He's named the winged, by the powers on high.

In these it is partly lawful to believe, and partly not. This however is the cause, and the passion of lovers. When anyone, therefore, of the attendants upon Zeus is taken captive, such a one is able to bear with greater firmness the burthen of this winged God: but such as are subservient to Mar's, and revolve in conjunction with that deity, when they are ensnared by love, and think that they are in any respect treated unjustly by their beloved, they are easily incited to slaughter, and are ready to destroy both themselves and the

objects of their regard. And thus everyone honors the God, round whom he harmoniously revolves, and imitates his life as much as possible, and as long as he remains free from corruption: and after this manner he lives here his first: generation, and associates with, and conducts himself towards, his beloved and others. Everyone, therefore, chooses the love of beauty after his own fashion, and, as if he considered it with respect to himself a God, he fabricates and adorns it like a statue, and as that which is the object of his adoration and sacrifice. Such, therefore, as are the followers of Zeus seek after a soul belonging to this God for the object of their affection. Hence, they consider whether he is naturally philosophic, and adapted to command; and when they find their beloved with' such dispositions, they endeavor by all possible means to render him completely such. If, therefore, they have not already endeavored to obtain what they desire, then, through the incitements of love, they anxiously strive for its possession; learning by what means it may be acquired; and investigating by themselves how to discover the nature of their proper deity, they at length find it, through being compelled to look with vehemence towards their presiding God. But when they become connected with him through memory, and are agitated by a divine influence, they receive from him manners and pursuits, as far it is possible for man to participate of divinity. And as they consider the object of their love as the cause of all this, their love becomes still more vehement. If, too, they draw their afflatus from Zeus, then, like the female priestesses of Bacchus, they pour their enthusiasm into the soul of their beloved, and by this means become as much as possible most similar to their ruling God. But such as follow Hera seek after a royal soul; which when they have discovered, they act in every respect towards it in a manner similar to the attendant on Zeus. But the

followers of Apollo, and of each of the other Gods, imitating their several deities, seek after a beloved object who is naturally affected like themselves. This when they have obtained, both by imitation, persuasion, and elegant manners, they endeavor by all means to lead their beloved to the pursuits and idea of their peculiar God; not, indeed, by employing envy and illiberal malevolence towards the objects of their affection, but by endeavoring to conduct them to a perfect similitude to the God whom they particularly adore. The willing desire, therefore, and end of true lovers, if they obtain the object of their pursuit, is such as I have described: and thus they become illustrious and blessed, through the fury of love towards the beloved, when the beloved object is once obtained.

But everyone who is allured is captivated in the following manner. In the beginning of this fable, we aligned a triple division to every soul; and we established two certain species as belonging to the form of the horses, and considered the charioteer as the third species. Let this division, therefore, remain the same for us at present. But one of the horses, we said, was good, and the other not. But we have not yet declared what the virtue is of the good horse, or the vice of the bad one; it is therefore proper that we should now declare it. The good horse, therefore, subsists in a more beautiful condition, is erect, well-articulated, has its neck lofty, its nose somewhat aquiline, its color white, and its eyes black. It is likewise a lover of honor, together with temperance and modesty; is the companion of true opinion, is not whipped, and is only to be governed by exhortation and reason. But the bad one is crooked, various, rash in its motions, stiff and short-necked, flat-nosed, of a black color, having its eyes gray, and being full of blood; is the companion of injury and arrogance, has its ears hasty and deaf, and is scarcely obedient to the whip and the spur.

When, therefore, the charioteer beholds the amatory eye inflaming all the soul, through sensible perception, and filling it with the incentives of titillation and desire, then, as always, the horse which is obedient to the charioteer, violently checking its motions, through shame restrains itself from leaping on the beloved object. But the other cannot be held back, either by the spur or whip of the charioteer; but hurries along violently, leaping and exulting, and, fully employing the charioteer and its associate, compels both of them to rush along with it to venereal delight. Both these, however, resist its violence from the beginning, and indignantly endure to be thus compelled to such dire and lawless conduct. But at length, when there is no end of the malady, in consequence of being borne along by compulsion, they now give way, content to do what they are ordered, and deliver themselves up to the survey of the splendid aspect of the beloved. But the charioteer, from a vision of this kind, recovers the memory of the nature of beauty, and again perceives it firmly established, together with temperance, in a pure, and holy seat. In consequence, however, of such a perception he is terrified, and through reverence falls supine, and at the same time is compelled to draw back the reins with such vehemence, that both the horses fall upon their hips; the one indeed willingly, through his not making any resistance; but the other with arrogant opposition, through his extreme unwillingness to comply. But when they have departed to a greater distance in their course, the one, through shame and astonishment, moistens all the soul with sweat; but the other, being liberated from the pain which he had suffered through the bridle and the fall, is scarcely able to breathe, and, full of anger, reviles the charioteer and his partner in the course, as deserting order and the compact through effeminacy and fear; and again compelling them to proceed, though perfectly

unwilling, he scarcely complies with them, requesting some delay. But when the appointed time for which the delay was granted arrives, and which they feign themselves to have forgotten, then the vicious horse, violently urging, neighing, and hurrying them away, compels them to address the beloved again in the same language as before. When, therefore, they approach near, then bending and extending his tail, and champing the bridle, he draws them along with importunate impudence. But the charioteer, being still more affected in this manner, and falling down as it were from the goal, pulls back the reins with still greater violence from the teeth of the injurious horse, represses his reviling tongue and bloody jaws, fixes his legs and hips on the ground, and thus torments him for his behavior. But when the vicious horse has often endured a punishment of this kind, he is at length rendered humble and submissive, and follows the providential directions of the charioteer; so that he is lost as it were on seeing a beautiful object. Hence it sometimes happens, that the soul of a lover follows its beloved with reverence and fear, and that the lover pays it every kind of observance and attention as if it was equal to a God; and this not with any dissimulation, but in consequence of being really thus affected: so that, when the beloved happens to be naturally a friend, then his friendship conspires into one with that of his obsequious lover.

If, therefore, in some former period of time, he has been deceived by his associates, or by some other persons, asserting that it was base to be familiar with a lover, and has on this account rejected his lover; yet advancing age, and the wants of nature, lead him to the converse of love. For it was never decreed by fate, either that the evil should be a friend to the evil, or that the good should not be a friend to the good. When, therefore, the youth admits his lover to an intimate familiarity with him, then the benevolence of the

lover astonishes the beloved, in consequence of perceiving that all other friends and associates exhibit no portion of friendship which can be compared with that of a friend divinely inspired. But when the lover continues to act in this manner for a long space of time, living with his beloved in high familiarity, frequently touching him in gymnastics and other associations, then the fountain of that effluxion which Zeus, when enamored with Ganymedes, denominated *desire*, streaming abundantly towards the lover, is partly infused into him, and partly through its exuberance flows forth externally. And as air, or a certain echo, when received by smooth and solid bodies, is again impelled to the place from whence it proceeded; so this effluxion of beauty, flowing back again to the beautiful through the eyes, as it is naturally adapted to penetrate into the soul, and stimulate the avenues of the wings, now irrigates, and excites them to moot forth their feathers, and fills the soul of the beloved with love. Hence he loves, but is doubtful concerning what he loves; and neither knows what he suffers, nor is able to relate it: but just like an eye infected with the vision of another eye which is diseased, he is unable to assign the cause of his malady, and is ignorant that he beholds himself in his lover, as in a mirror. Hence, when his lover is present, he, like him, ceases to be in pain; but, when he is absent, he desires in the same manner as he is desired, possessing, instead of love, nothing more than an image of love; and he denominates it, and thinks that it is not love, but friendship. He desires, therefore, in a manner similar to his lover, though more feebly, to see, to touch, to love, to sit together; and, as it is reasonable to suppose, he performs all this afterwards with the greatest celerity. Hence, in their most intimate associations, the intemperate horse of the lover calls on the charioteer, and tells him that he ought to be gratified with a small degree of pleasure, as the reward of

such mighty labors: but the same horse of the beloved has, indeed, nothing to say; but, distended and dubious, it embraces the lover, full of vehement benevolence towards him, and is prepared to comply in every respect with the desires of the beloved. But the conjoined horse, together with the charioteer, resists this familiarity through reason and shame. If, therefore, the better parts of the dianoëtic power obtaining the victory lead the lovers to an orderly and philosophic mode of conduct, then they pass through the present life with felicity and concord, subduing themselves, and adorned with modest manners; the vicious part of the soul being in subjection, and the virtuous, free. But, arriving at the end of the present life, they become winged and light, in consequence of being victors in one of the truly Olympic contests; a greater good than which, neither human temperance, nor divine fury, can extend to man. But if they lead a more arrogant and unphilosophic life, but at the same time united with ambition, their intemperate horse will perhaps lead their unguarded souls into intoxication, or some other indolent habits; cause them to embrace those delights which the multitude consider as the most blessed of all pleasures; and will fix them in continual endeavors to gain the object of their desire. They will, therefore, exercise themselves in these delights, but this, however, rarely; because the whole of the dianoëtic nature does not consent to such enjoyments. These too will live in friendship with each other, as well as the former, through the external effluxion of love, but in a less fervent degree; thinking that they ought both to give and receive from each other the greatest confidence, which it is unlawful to dissolve, and by this means become enemies instead of friends. But, in their exit from the present body, they will not be winged indeed, but will be excited to emit their pinions; so that they will carry with them no small reward of amatory fury. For the

law forbids those who are now beginning the celestial progression, to enter into darkness, and the subterranean journey; but orders them, in consequence of leading a splendid life, to be happy with each other during their progressions; and that, when they are similarly winged, this shall take place for the sake of love. Such then, O young man, so numerous, and so divine are the benefits which the friendship of a lover will confer on you. But the familiarity of one who is void of love, being mingled with mortal temperance, and dispensing mortal and niggardly concerns, will generate in the soul of its friendly associate that illiberality which is considered as virtue by the vulgar, and will cause it to wander for nine thousand years with a rolling motion upon and under the earth.

And thus, O beloved Love, through the impulse of Phædrus, we have rendered and extended to thee a recantation, clothed in poetic figures and expressions, in the most beautiful and best manner we are able to accomplish. Wherefore, pardoning what we before asserted, and gratefully receiving our present discourse, continue benignantly and propitiously the amatory art which you have conferred on me, neither taking away nor diminishing its possession through avenging anger. But grant, that among such as are beautiful I may yet be more honored than at present. And if Phædrus and I have formerly said anything severe against thy divinity, grant that, accusing Lysias as the author of such a discourse, we may desist from all such assertions in future; and besides this, graciously convert him to the study of philosophy, like his brother Polemarchus, so that this lover of his may no longer tend hither and thither, without any stability, as is the case at present, but may ingenuously pass his life in future, in conjunction with love and philosophic discourses.

Phaedrus/ I unite with you in prayer, Socrates, if it is better that all this should happen to us. But I have some time since wondered at your discourse; as it so far surpasses that which was formerly delivered, that I am afraid, lest Lysias himself should appear but mean, if he is desirous to enter the lists against another. And, indeed, but lately a very principal person in the commonwealth branded him with this very epithet; calling him, through the whole of his accusation, nothing more than a composer of orations. Perhaps, therefore, he will desist through ambition from writing any more.

Socrates/ You assert, O young man, a ridiculous opinion; and you very much wander from the intention of your associate, if you think him so extremely timid: but perhaps you think that his reviler has spoken the truth in what he has said against him.

Phaedrus/ To me it appears so indeed, Socrates: and you yourself know, that the most powerful and venerable in a city are ashamed to compose orations, and to leave their writings behind them, dreading the opinion of posterity, lest they should be called sophists.

Socrates/ You are ignorant, Phædrus, that the proverb, *A couch is pleasant*, is derived from that long curvature which is about the Nile: and, besides this, you are ignorant that the most prudent of politicians particularly love to compose orations, and to leave their writings behind them; and are so fond of those who extol their works, as to give the first place in their writings to such as celebrate their productions everywhere.

Phaedrus/ How do you mean? For I do not understand you.

Socrates/ What, do not you know that, in the beginning of a politician's book, the very first thing that makes its appearance is the person by whom the book is praised?

Phaedrus/ How?

Socrates/ Why, it says, that it is approved by the council, or the people, or by both. And he who says this, says it, at the same time extremely reverencing and celebrating himself as the author. But after this he speaks in such a manner as to show his wisdom to his admirers, and sometimes accomplishes this in a very long discourse. Does this, therefore, appear to you to be anything else than a written oration?

Phaedrus/ It does not.

Socrates/ If, therefore, this happens to be approved, he departs rejoicing from the theatre, like a poet. But if it should be rejected, and he should be excluded from composing orations, and should be considered as unworthy to be an author, both he and his friends are afflicted on the account.

Phaedrus/ And, indeed, very much so.

Socrates/ In this, therefore, it is sufficiently evident, that they do not despise a study of this kind, but hold it in the highest estimation.

Phaedrus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what, when a rhetorician, or a king, acquires an ability like that of Lycurgus, or Solon, or Darius, so as to be reckoned an immortal writer by the city, will he not think himself equal to a God, while he is yet alive? and will not posterity entertain the same opinion respecting him, upon surveying his writings?

Phaedrus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Do you think then that any such person, however malevolent he may be, would revile Lysias, merely because he is a writer?

Phaedrus/ It does not seem probable from what you have said: for he would revile, as it appears, his own pursuit.

Socrates/ From hence, therefore, it must be evident to everyone, that no one is scandalous merely from composing orations.

Phaedrus/ For how should he?

Socrates/ But this I think is in reality shameful, not to write and speak in a becoming manner, but shamefully and viciously.

Phaedrus/ Evidently so. What then is the mode of writing well and ill?

Socrates/ Have we not occasion, Phædrus, to inquire this of Lysias or of some other, who has either at any time written anything, or is about to write; whether his composition is political, or on private subjects; whether it is in measure like the works of a poet, or without measure like those of a private person?

Phaedrus/ Do you ask, if we have not occasion? For what purpose, as I may say, is our very life, but for the sake of pleasures of this kind? For, certainly, it is not for the sake of those pleasures which pain must, necessarily antecede, or else no pleasure would subsist; which is nearly the case with all pleasures respecting the body. And, on this account, they are very justly denominated servile.

Socrates/ But we have leisure, as it appears: and the grasshoppers seem to me singing over our heads, as in the heat, and, discoursing with one another, to look also upon us. If, therefore, they should behold us, like the multitude, not discoursing in mid-day, but sleeping and allured by their singing, through the indolence of our dianoëtic power, they

might very justly deride us; thinking that certain slaves had taken up their abode with them, in order to sleep like cattle by the side of the fountain during the fervor of the meridian sun. But if they perceive us engaged in discourse, and not captivated by their allurements as if they were Sirens, but sailing by them to our destined port, perhaps they will rejoice to bestow upon us that gift which, by the consent of the Gods, they are able to deliver to men.

Phaedrus/ But what gift is this which they possess? For I do not recollect that I ever heard what it is.

Socrates/ And yet it is not proper that a man studious of the Muses should be ignorant of things of this kind. But it is said that these insects were formerly men, before the Muses had a being; that when the Muses made their appearance, and had given birth to the song, some of these were so ensnared by the pleasure which it produced, that through singing they neglected the proper sustenance of the body, and, thus wasting away, at length perished: but that from these the race of grasshoppers was produced, who received this gift from the Muses, that they should never want nutriment, but should continue singing without meat or drink till they died; and that after death they should depart to the Muses, and inform them what Muse was honored by some particular person among us. Hence that, by acquainting Terpsichore with those who reverence her in the dance, they render her propitious to such. By informing Erato of her votaries, they render her favorable in amatory concerns; and the rest in a similar manner, according to the species of veneration belonging to each. But that they announce to the most ancient Calliope, and after her to Urania, those who have lived in the exercise of philosophy, and have cultivated the music over which they preside; these Muses more than all the rest being conversant with the heavens, and with both divine and human discourse; and

sending forth the most beautiful voice. On many accounts, therefore, it is necessary to say something, and not to sleep in mid-day.

Phaedrus/ It is necessary, indeed.

Socrates/ Let us, therefore, consider what we lately spoke of, viz. after what manner anyone may both speak and write properly, or improperly.

Phaedrus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, necessary, that he who is about to speak with propriety should possess a true dianoëtic perception of that which is the subject of his discourse?

Phaedrus/ I have heard, my dear Socrates, that it is not necessary that he who engages in the profession of an orator should learn what is truly just, but only that which appears so to the multitude, who undertake to judge; nor, again, what is truly good or beautiful, but only what appears to be so: for that persuasion is derived from these, and not from truth.

Socrates/ The sayings of the wise, Phædrus, are by no means to be despised, but we should rather consider the meaning of their assertions; and, consequently, we must not pass by what you have now said.

Phaedrus/ You speak properly.

Socrates/ Let us then consider this matter as follows.

Phaedrus/ How?

Socrates/ Suppose I should persuade you to fight your enemies on horse-back, but at the same time both of us should be ignorant what a horse is; and that I only should know respecting you, that Phædrus thinks a horse is an animal which has the greatest ears of all domestic animals.

Phaedrus/ This would be ridiculous indeed, Socrates.

Socrates/ Not yet; but when I should earnestly persuade you to do this by a discourse composed in praise of an ass, calling him a horse, and asserting that he is a most excellent animal, useful for domestic and military purposes, able to carry burdens, and adapted for a variety of other employments.

Phaedrus/ This, indeed, would be perfectly ridiculous.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, better that a friend should be ridiculous, than that he should be wicked, and an enemy?

Phaedrus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ When an orator, therefore, who is ignorant of good and evil, endeavors to persuade a city in a like condition, not indeed by praising the shadow of an ass, as if it was that of a horse, but by praising evil, as if it was good, being anxiously solicitous about the opinion of the multitude, and thus persuades them to do evil instead of good; what crop do you think the orator can reap after such a semination?

Phaedrus/ Not a very good one.

Socrates/ Have we not therefore, my friend, reviled the art of speaking in a more rustic manner than is becoming? For the art itself will, perhaps, thus address us: "What delirium, O wonderful men, has invaded you? For I compel no one who is ignorant of truth to learn how to speak: but if anyone will take my advice, he will then only employ me, when he has acquired the possession of truth. This, then, I assert as a thing of great consequence, that without me even he who knows realities will not, for all this, be able to procure persuasion." Will not the art, therefore, speak justly, by making such a declaration?

Phaedrus/ I confess it, if our subsequent reasons evince that rhetoric is an art. For I think I have heard some arguments, which assert that it deceives, and that it is not

an art, but an unartificial exercise. But the true art of speaking, says Laco, never was, nor ever will be unaccompanied by truth. This then is what they say, Socrates. But, bringing them hither, let us inquire of them what they assert, and in what manner.

Socrates/ Be present then, ye generous animals, and persuade the beautiful youth, Phædrus, that unless he philosophizes sufficiently, he will never sufficiently speak about anything. But let Phædrus answer to the interrogations. Is not the whole rhetorical art that which leads the soul by discourses, not in judicial matters only, and other public concerns, but also in private affairs, and these whether trifling or important? And is there anything more honorable than to act according to the true rules of this art, both in important and inconsiderable affairs? Or have you not heard that this is the case?

Phaedrus/ I am not, by Zeus, perfectly acquainted with all this. But it is spoken of, and written about, as an art for the most part conversant with judicial matters and speeches; but I have not heard that it extends any further.

Socrates/ What, have you heard of the rhetorical art which Nestor and Ulysses exercised at Troy, but have never heard about that of Palamedes?

Phaedrus/ I have indeed, by Zeus, heard about the orations of Nestor: unless you will prove that Gorgias is a certain Nestor, or Thrasymachus and Theodorus a certain Ulysses.

Socrates/ Perhaps they may be so; but let us drop any further discourse about these. And do you inform me what litigators do in judicial matters: do they not contradict? Or shall we say they do anything else?

Phaedrus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ But are not their contradictions about just and unjust?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But does not he who accomplishes this by art, cause the same thing to appear to the same persons, whenever he pleases, at one time just, and at another time unjust?

Phaedrus/ But what then?

Socrates/ And in his oration does he not cause the same things to appear to the city at one time good, and at another time just the contrary?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes is reported to have been able by his art to cause the same things to appear to his hearers, both similar and dissimilar, one and many, abiding and borne along?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The contradictory art, therefore, takes place, not only in judicial matters and orations, but, as it appears, about everything which is the subject of discourse; since it is one art, enabling us to assimilate everything to everything, both such things as are capable of assimilation, and those to which they are able to be assimilated; and, besides this, to lead them into light, notwithstanding their being assimilated and concealed by something else.

Phaedrus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ My meaning will appear in the following inquiries: Does deception subsist in things which differ much, or but a little, from each other?

Phaedrus/ In things which differ but a little.

Socrates/ But, by making a transition according to small advances, you will effect a greater concealment, while

passing on to that which is contrary, than you will by a transition according to great advances.

Phaedrus/ How should it not be so?

Socrates/ It is necessary, therefore, that he who is about to deceive another should accurately know the similitude and dissimilitude of things.

Phaedrus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Is it possible, therefore, that he who is ignorant of the truth of everything can judge concerning the similitude, whether great or small, which subsists in other things?

Phaedrus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ It is evident, therefore, that such as conceive opinions contrary to the truth of things, and who are deceived, are thus affected through certain similitudes.

Phaedrus/ The case is so.

Socrates/ Can, therefore, he who is ignorant about the nature of each particular, artificially deliver anything, by pairing according to small advances into its contrary, through similitudes? Or can such a one avoid falling into error?

Phaedrus/ He cannot.

Socrates/ Hence then, my friend, he who is ignorant of truth, and is led by opinion, will, as it appears, exhibit a ridiculous and inartificial rhetoric.

Phaedrus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Are you willing, therefore, both in the oration of Lysias, which you now carry about you, and in that which we delivered, to see what we have asserted without art, and what is agreeable to art?

Phaedrus/ I am above all things willing. For we speak at present in a trifling manner, as we are without sufficient examples.

Socrates/ But, indeed, as it appears, some reasons have been given, through the assistance of a certain fortune, which have all the force of examples, evincing that he who knows the truth will, even while he jests in his discourse, attract his auditors. And I consider, O Phædrus, the local Gods as the cause of this. Perhaps, also, the interpreters of the Muses, singing over our heads, have inspired us with this ability: for I myself participate of no art belonging to discourse.

Phaedrus/ Let it be as you say; only render what you assert evident.

Socrates/ Come then, read over the beginning of Lysias's oration.

Phaedrus/ "You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs; and you have heard, I think, that it is most conducive to my advantage for them to subsist in this manner. But it appears to me, that I am not unworthy to be deprived of what I wish to obtain, because I am not one of your lovers: for lovers, when their desires cease, repent themselves of the benefits which they have bestowed."

Socrates/ Stop there: are we not then to show, in what he is faulty, and in what respect he has acted without art?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not, therefore, manifest to everyone, that when we speak upon certain subjects we are unanimous in our conceptions; but when upon others, that we are discordant in our opinions?

Phaedrus/ I seem to understand what you say; but, notwithstanding this, speak more plainly.

Socrates/ When anyone pronounces the name of iron or silver, do we not all understand the same thing?

Phaedrus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But when we pronounce that of the just, or the good, are we not of different opinions? and do we not doubt both with others and ourselves?

Phaedrus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ In some things, therefore, we agree in sentiments, and in others not.

Phaedrus/ We do so.

Socrates/ Where, then, are we more easily deceived? And in which of these is rhetoric able to accomplish the most?

Phaedrus/ Evidently in those about which we are dubious.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who is about to pursue the rhetorical art, ought first of all to distinguish these in order; to consider the character of each species; and to perceive in what the multitude must necessarily be dubious, and in what not.

Phaedrus/ He who is able to accomplish this, Socrates, will understand a beautiful species.

Socrates/ Afterwards, I think, he ought not to be ignorant when he comes to particulars, but to perceive acutely to what genus the subject of his future discourse belongs.

Phaedrus/ What then?

Socrates/ With respect to Love, shall we say that it belongs to things dubious, or to such as are not so?

Phaedrus/ To things dubious, certainly.

Socrates/ Do you think he would permit you to assert that respecting him which you have now asserted, that he is pernicious both to the beloved and the lover; and again, that he is the greatest of all goods?

Phaedrus/ You speak in the best manner possible.

Socrates/ But inform me also of this (for, through the enthusiastic energy, I do not perfectly remember), whether I defined love in the beginning of my discourse.

Phaedrus/ By Zeus you did, and that in a most wonderful manner.

Socrates/ O how much more sagacious do you declare the Nymphs of Achelous, and Pan the son of Mercury, to be, than Lysias the son of Cephalus, with respect to orations! Or do I say nothing to the purpose? But did not Lysias, in the beginning of his discourse, compel us to conceive of love, as a certain something such as he wished it to be, and, referring what followed to this, complete in this manner the whole of his oration? Are you willing that we should again read over the beginning of his oration?

Phaedrus/ If you are so disposed; though you will not find what you seek for there.

Socrates/ Read, however, that I may again hear it.

Phaedrus/ "You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and you have heard, I think, that it is most conducive to my advantage for them to subsist in this manner. But it appears to me, that I am not unworthy to be deprived of what I wish to obtain, because I am not one of your lovers: for lovers, when their desires cease, repent themselves of the benefits which they have bestowed."

Socrates/ He seems here to have been very far from accomplishing what we are now seeking after; since he endeavors to pass through his discourse, not commencing from the beginning, but from the end, after a certain contrary and resupine mode of proceeding; and begins from what the lover, now ceasing to be such, says to his once beloved. Or perhaps, my dear Phædrus, I say nothing to the purpose.

Phaedrus/ But it is the end, Socrates, which is the subject of his discourse.

Socrates/ But what, do not all the other parts of the discourse appear to be promiscuously scattered? Or does it appear to you, that what is asserted in the second place ought to rank as second from a certain necessity; or anything else which he says? For to me, as a person ignorant of everything, it appears, that nothing ought to be carelessly asserted by a writer. But do you not possess a certain necessary method of composing orations, according to which he thus disposed the parts of his oration in succession to each other?

Phaedrus/ You are pleasant, Socrates, in supposing that I am sufficient to judge concerning compositions so accurate as his.

Socrates/ But I think this is evident to you, that every discourse ought in its structure to resemble an animal, and should have something which can be called its body; so that it may be neither without a head, nor be destitute of feet, but may possess a middle and extremes, adapted to each other, and to the whole.

Phaedrus/ How should it not be so?

Socrates/ Consider, therefore, the discourse of your associate, whether it subsists with these conditions, or otherwise; and you will find, that it is in no respect different from that epigram which certain persons report was composed on the Phrygian Midas.

Phaedrus/ What was the epigram, and what are its peculiarities?

Socrates/ It was as follows;

A brazen virgin traveler am I.
Whom fate decrees in Midas' tomb to lie:
And while streams flow, and trees luxuriant bloom,

I here shall stay within the mournful tomb;
And this to every passenger attest.
That here the ashes of king Midas rest.

But that it is of no consequence as to the connection, which part of it is read first or last, you yourself, I doubt not, perceive.

Phaedrus/ You deride our oration, Socrates.

Socrates/ Lest you should be angry, therefore, let us drop it; though it appears that many examples might be found in it, from an inspection of which we might derive the advantage of not attempting to imitate them. But let us proceed to the discussion of other orations: for they contain something, as it appears to me, which it is proper for those to perceive who are willing to speculate about orations.

Phaedrus/ But what is this something?

Socrates/ That they are in a certain respect contrary to each other. For one kind asserts that the lover, and the other that he who is void of love, ought to be gratified.

Phaedrus/ And it asserts this, indeed, most strenuously.

Socrates/ I should have thought that you would have answered more truly, "and indeed furiously so." But what I inquire after is this—Do we say that love is a certain mania, or not?

Phaedrus/ A mania, certainly.

Socrates/ But there are two species of mania; the one arising from human diseases; but the other from a divine mutation, taking place in a manner different from established customs.

Phaedrus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But there are four parts of the divine mania, distributed according to the four divinities which preside over these parts. For we assign prophetic inspiration to

Apollo, telestic or mystic to Bacchus, poetic to the Muses; and the fourth or amatory mania, which we assert to be the best of all, to Venus and Love. And I know not how, while we are representing by images the amatory passion, we perhaps touch upon a certain truth; and perhaps we are at the same time hurried away elsewhere. Hence, mingling together an oration not perfectly improbable, we have produced a certain fabulous hymn, and have with moderate abilities celebrated your lord and mine, Phædrus, viz. Love, who is the inspective guardian of beautiful youths.

Phaedrus/ And this, indeed, so as to have rendered it far from unpleasant to me your auditor.

Socrates/ Let us, therefore, from this endeavor to understand how our discourse has passed from censure to praise.

Phaedrus/ What do you mean by this?

Socrates/ To me we seem to have really been at play with respect to the other parts of our discourse: but I think that if anyone is able to comprehend, according to art, these two species which we have spoken of, through a certain fortune, he will not be an ungraceful person.

Phaedrus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ By looking to one idea, to bring together things every way dispersed; that, by thus defining each, he may always render manifest that which he is desirous to teach: just as we acted at present with respect to our definition of Love, whether good or bad. For certainly our discourse by this means became more clear, and more confident with itself.

Phaedrus/ But what do you say respecting the other species, Socrates?

Socrates/ That this again should be cut into species according to members, naturally; not by breaking any

member, like an unskillful cook, but, as in the above discourse, receiving the foam of the dianoëtic energy, as one common species. But as, in one body, members which are double and synonymous are called right or left, so our discourse considered the species of delirium within us as naturally one. And dividing the one part into that which is on the left hand, and giving this another distribution, it did not cease till it there found a certain sinister Love, and, when found, reviled it, as it deserves. But the other part conducted us to the right hand of mania, where we found a certain divine Love synonymous to the former; and, extending our praise, we celebrated him as the cause of the greatest good to us.

Phaedrus/ You speak most true.

Socrates/ But I, O Phædrus, am a lover of such divisions and compositions as may enable me both to speak and understand. And if I think that any other is able to behold the one and the many, according to the nature of things, this man I follow, pursuing his footsteps as if he were a God. But whether or not I properly denominate those who are able to accomplish this, Divinity knows. But I have hitherto called them men conversant with dialectic. Tell me, therefore, by what name it is proper to call them, according to your opinion and that of Lysias. Or is this that art of speaking, which Thrasymachus and others employing, became themselves wise in oratory, and rendered others such, who were willing to bestow gifts on them, as if they had been kings?

Phaedrus/ Those were indeed royal men, but yet not skilled in the particulars about which you inquire. But you appear to me to have properly denominated this species in calling it dialectic; but the rhetorical art appears as yet to have escaped us.

Socrates/ How do you say? Can there be anything beautiful which is destitute of these particulars, and yet be comprehended by art? If this be the case, it is by no means to be despised by me and you; but we must relate what remains of the rhetorical art.

Phaedrus/ And there are many things, Socrates, which are delivered in books about the art of speaking.

Socrates/ You have very opportunely reminded me. For I think you would say that the proœmium ought to be called the first part of the oration; and that things of this kind are the ornaments of the art.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And, in the second place, a certain narration; and this accompanied with testimonies. In the third place, the reasoning. In the fourth, probable arguments: and besides this, I think that a certain Byzantine, the best artificer of orations, introduces confirmation and approbation.

Phaedrus/ Do you not mean the illustrious Theodorus?

Socrates/ I do. For he discovered how confutation, both in accusation and defense, might not only take place, but also be increased. But why should we not introduce the most excellent Evenus, the Parian? For he first discovered sub-declarations, and the art of praising: and, according to the reports of some persons, he delivered his reprehensions in verse for the sake of assisting the memory. For he is a wise man. But shall we suffer Tisias and Gorgias to sleep, who placed probabilities before realities; and, through the strength of their discourse, caused small things to appear large, and the large small; likewise old things new, and the new old; and who besides this discovered a concise method of speaking, and, again, an infinite prolixity of words? All which when Prodicus once heard me relate, he laughed, and

asserted that he alone had discovered what words this art required; and that it required neither few nor many, but a moderate quantity.

Phaedrus/ You was, therefore, most wise, O Prodicus.

Socrates/ But shall we not speak of Hippias? for I think that he will be of the same opinion with the Elean guest.

Phaedrus/ Why should we not?

Socrates/ But what shall we say of the musical composition of Polus, who employed the doubling of words, a collection of sentences, similitudes, and elegance of appellations, in order to give splendor to his orations, according to the instruction which he had received from Lycimnion?

Phaedrus/ But were not the orations of Protagoras, Socrates, of this kind?

Socrates/ His diction was indeed proper, and contained besides this many other beautiful properties: but the Chalcedonian orator excelled in exciting commiseration from the distresses of poverty, and the infirmities of old-age. He was besides most skillful in rousing the multitude to anger, and when enraged appearing them, as he said, by enchantment; and highly excelled in framing and dissolving calumnies, from whence the greatest advantage might be derived. But all seem to agree in opinion with respect to the conclusion of the oration, which some call the repetition, but others give it a different denomination.

Phaedrus/ Do you say that the conclusion summarily recalls into the memory of the auditors all that had been said before?

Socrates/ I do, and anything else besides, which you may have to say about this art.

Phaedrus/ What I have to say is but trifling, and not worth mentioning.

Socrates/ Let us, therefore, dismiss trifling observations, and rather behold in the clear light, in what particulars the power of this art prevails, and when it does so.

Phaedrus/ Its power, Socrates, is most prevalent in the association of the multitude.

Socrates/ It is so. But, O dæmoniacal man, do you also see, whether their web appears to you, as it does to me, to have its parts separated from each other?

Phaedrus/ Show me how you mean.

Socrates/ Tell me then: If anyone addressing your associate Eryximachus, or his father Acumenus, should say, I know how to introduce certain things to the body, by which I can heat and cool it when I please; and besides this, when I think proper I can produce vomiting, and downward ejection, and a variety of other things of this kind, through the knowledge of which I profess myself a physician, and able to make anyone else so, to whom I deliver the knowledge of these particulars; —what do you think he who heard him ought to reply?

Phaedrus/ What else, than inquiring whether he knows to whom, when, and how far, each of these ought to be applied?

Socrates/ If, therefore, he should say that he by no means understands all this, but that he who is instructed by him ought to do so and so; what then would be his answer?

Phaedrus/ He would answer, I think, that the man was mad; and that, having heard from some book about things of this kind, or met with some remedies, he thought he might become a physician without knowing anything about the art.

Socrates/ But what if anyone, addressing Sophocles and Euripides, should say that he knew how to compose a prolix discourse on a very trifling subject, and a very short one on a great occasion; and that when he pleased he could excite

pity, and its contrary, horror and threats, and other things of this kind; and that by teaching these he thought that he delivered the art of tragic poetry?

Phaedrus/ And these also, I think, Socrates, would deride him, who should fancy that a tragedy was anything else than the composition of all these, so disposed as to be adapted to each other, and to the whole.

Socrates/ And I think they would not rustically accuse him; but, just as if a musician should meet with a man who believes himself skilled in harmony, because he knows how to make a chord sound sharp and flat, he would not fiercely say to him, O miserable creature, you are mad; but, as being a musician, he would thus address him more mildly: O excellent man! it is necessary that he who is to be a musician should indeed know such things as these; but at the same time nothing hinders us from concluding, that a man affected as you are may not understand the least of harmony: for you may know what is necessary to be learned prior to harmony, without understanding harmony itself.

Phaedrus/ Most right.

Socrates/ In like manner, Sophocles would reply to the person who addressed him, that he possessed things previous to tragedy, rather than tragedy itself: and Acumenus, that the medical pretender understood things previous to medicine, and not medicine itself.

Phaedrus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what if the mellifluous Adrastus, or Pericles, should hear those all-beautiful artificial inventions, concise discourses, similitudes, and other things which we said should be discussed in the light, do you think that they would be angry, as we were through our rusticity, with those who wrote about and taught such things as if they were the same with rhetoric? Or rather, as being wiser than us, would

they not thus reprove us? It is not proper, Phædrus and Socrates, to be angry with such characters; but you ought rather to pardon those who, being ignorant of oratory, are unable to desire what rhetoric is, and who in consequence of this passion, from possessing a knowledge of things previous to the art, think that they have discovered rhetoric itself; and, by teaching these to others, imagine that they teach rhetoric in perfection: but who at the same time leave to the proper industry of their disciples the art of disposing each of these, so as to produce persuasion, and of composing the whole oration, as if nothing of this kind was necessary for them to accomplish.

Phaedrus/ Such indeed, Socrates, does that art appear to be which these men teach and write about as rhetoric; and you seem to me to have spoken the truth: but how and from whence shall we be able to acquire the art of true rhetoric and persuasion?

Socrates/ It is probable, Phædrus, and perhaps also necessary, that the perfect may be obtained in this as in other contests. For, if you naturally possess rhetorical abilities, you will become a celebrated orator, by the assistance of science and exercise: but if you are destitute of anyone of these, you will be imperfect through this deficiency. But the method employed by Lysias and Thrasymachus does not appear to me to evince the magnitude of this art.

Phaedrus/ But what method then does?

Socrates/ Pericles, most excellent man, appears with great propriety to have been the most perfect of all in the rhetorical art.

Phaedrus/ Why?

Socrates/ All the great arts require continual meditation, and a discourse about the sublime parts of nature. For an

elevation of intellect, and a perfectly efficacious power, appear in a certain respect to proceed from hence; which Pericles possessed in conjunction with his naturally good disposition. For meeting, I think, with Anaxagoras, who had these requisites, he was filled with elevated discourse, and comprehended the nature of intellect and folly, which Anaxagoras diffusely discussed: and from hence he transferred to the art of discourse whatever could contribute to its advantage.

Phaedrus/ How Is this?

Socrates/ In a certain respect the method of the rhetorical and medicinal art is the same.

Phaedrus/ But how?

Socrates/ In both it is requisite that a distribution should be made, in one of the nature of body, in the other of the foal, if you are desirous in the first instance of giving health and strength by introducing medicine and nutriment according to art, and not by exercise and experience alone; and in the second instance, if you wish to introduce persuasion and virtue into the soul, by reason and legitimate institutions.

Phaedrus/ It is probable it should be so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But do you think that the nature of the soul can be sufficiently known without the nature of the universe?

Phaedrus/ If it is proper to be persuaded by Hippocrates, the successor of Æsculapius, even the nature of body cannot be known without this method.

Socrates/ He speaks in a becoming manner, my friend. But it is necessary, besides the authority of Hippocrates, to examine our discourse, and consider whether it is consistent.

Phaedrus/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ Consider, then, what Hippocrates and true reason assert concerning nature. Is it not, therefore, necessary to think respecting the nature of everything, in the first place, whether that is simple or multiform about which we are desirous, both that we ourselves should be artists, and that we should be able to render others so? And, in the next place, if it is simple, ought we not to investigate its power, with respect to producing anything naturally, or being naturally passive? And if it possesses many species, having numbered these, ought we not to speculate in each, as in one, its natural power of becoming active and passive?

Phaedrus/ It appears we should, Socrates.

Socrates/ The method, therefore, which proceeds without these, is similar to the progression of one blind. But he who operates according to art, ought not to be assimilated either to the blind or the deaf; but it is evident that whoever accommodates his discourses to any art, ought accurately to exhibit the essence of that nature to which he introduces discourses and this is doubtless the soul.

Phaedrus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Will not, therefore, all the attention of such a one be directed to this end, that he may produce persuasion in the soul?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It is evident, therefore, that Thrasymachus, and any other person who applies himself to the study of the rhetorical art, ought first, with all possible accuracy, to describe, and cause the soul to perceive whether she is naturally one and similar, or multiform according to the form of body: for this is what we call evincing its nature.

Phaedrus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But, in the second place, he ought to show what it is naturally capable of either acting or suffering.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ In the third place, having orderly distinguished the genera of discourses and of the soul, and the passions of these, he should pass through all the causes, harmonizing each to each, and teaching what kind of soul will be necessarily persuaded by such particular discourses, and through what cause; and again, what kind of soul such discourses will be unable to persuade.

Phaedrus/ Such a method of proceeding will, as it appears, be most beautiful.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who acts in a different manner will neither artificially write nor discourse upon this or any other subject. But writers on the art of rhetoric of the present day (whom you yourself have heard) are crafty, and conceal from us that their knowledge of the soul is most beautiful. However, till they both speak and write according to this method, we shall never be persuaded that they write according to art.

Phaedrus/ What method do you mean?

Socrates/ It will not be easy to mention the very words themselves which ought to be employed on this occasion; but as far as I am able I am willing to tell you how it is proper to write, if we desire to write according to art.

Phaedrus/ Tell me then.

Socrates/ Since the power of discourse is attractive of the soul, it is necessary that the future orator should know how many species soul contains: but these are various, and souls possess their variety from these. Souls, therefore, of such a particular nature, in consequence of certain discourses, and through a certain cause, are easily persuaded to such and such particular? But such as are differently affected are with difficulty persuaded through these means. It is necessary, therefore, that he who sufficiently understands all this,

when he afterwards perceives these particulars taking place in actions, should be able to follow them with great celerity through sensible inspection; or otherwise he will retain nothing more than the words which he once heard from his preceptor. But when he is sufficiently able to say, who will be persuaded by such and such discourses, and sagaciously perceives that the person present is such by nature as was spoken of before, and that he may be incited by certain discourses to certain actions; then, at length, such a one will be a perfect master of this art, when to his former attainments he adds the knowledge of opportunely speaking, or being silent, the use or abuse of concise, discourse, of language plaintive and vehement, and of the other parts of rhetoric delivered by his masters; but never till this is accomplished. But he who fails in any of these particulars, either in speaking, teaching, or writing, and yet asserts that he speaks according to art, is vanquished by the person he is unable to persuade. But what then (perhaps a writer of orations will say to us); does it appear to you, Phædrus and Socrates, that the art of speaking is to be obtained by this method, or otherwise?

Phaedrus/ It is impossible, Socrates, that it should be obtained otherwise, though the acquisition seems to be attended with no small labor.

Socrates/ You speak the truth. And, for the sake of this, it is necessary, by tossing upwards and downwards all discourses, to consider whether any easier and shorter way will present itself to our view for this purpose; lest we should in vain wander through a long and rough road, when we might have walked through one short and smooth. If, therefore, you can afford any assistance, in consequence of what you have heard from Lysias, or any other, endeavor to tell it me, by recalling it into your mind.

Phaedrus/ I might indeed do this for the sake of experiment, but I cannot at present.

Socrates/ Are you willing, therefore, that I should relate to you the discourse which I once heard concerning things of this kind?

Phaedrus/ How should I not?

Socrates/ It is said therefore, Phædrus, to be just, to tell what is reported of the wolf.

Phaedrus/ Do you therefore act in the same manner.

Socrates/ They say, then, that there is no occasion to extol and magnify these particulars in such a manner, nor to deduce our discourse from on high, and afar of. For, as we said in the beginning of this discourse, he who intends to be sufficiently skillful in rhetoric ought not to participate the truth respecting things just and good, or men who are such, either from nature or education. For, in judicial matters, no attention whatever is paid to the truth of these, but to persuasion alone; and that this is the probable, which ought to be studied by him who is to speak according to art. For he ought never to speak of transactions, unless they are probable; but both in accusation and defense probabilities should always be introduced: and, in short, he who speaks should pursue the probable, and, if he speaks much, should bid farewell to truth. For, when this method is observed through the whole of a discourse, it causes all the perfection of the art.

Phaedrus/ You have related those particulars, Socrates, which are asserted by the skillful in rhetoric; for I remember that we briefly touched upon this in the former part of our discourse. But to such as are conversant with these matters, this appears to be a thing of great consequence: but you have indeed severely reviled Tisias himself.

Socrates/ Let then Tisias himself tell us, whether he calls the probable anything else than that which is apparent to the multitude.

Phaedrus/ What else can he call it?

Socrates/ He also appears to have discovered and written about the following crafty and artificial method: that if some imbecile but bold man should knock down one who is robust but timid, taking from him at the same time a garment, or something else, and should be tried for the assault, then neither of these ought to speak the truth; but that the coward should say, the bold man was not alone when he gave the assault; and that the bold man should deny this, by asserting that he was alone when the pretended assault was given, and should at the same time artfully ask, How is it possible that a man so weak as I am could attack one so robust as he is? That then the other should not acknowledge his cowardice, but should endeavor, by deviling some false allegation, to accuse his opponent. And in other instances, things of this kind must be said according to art. Is not this the case, Phædrus?

Phaedrus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ O how craftily does Tisias appear to have discovered an abstruse art, or whoever else was the inventor, and in whatever other name he delights! But shall we, my friend, say this or not?

Phaedrus/ What?

Socrates/ This: O Tisias, some time since, before your arrival, we affirmed that the probable, with which the multitude are conversant, subsisted through its similitude to truth: and we just now determined that similitudes might everywhere be found in the most beautiful manner, by him who was acquainted with truth. So that, if you assert anything else about the art of discourse, we shall readily

listen to you; but if not, we shall be persuaded by our present determinations, that unless a person enumerates the different dispositions of his auditors, and distributes things themselves into their species, and again is able to comprehend the several particulars in one idea, he will never be skilled in the art of speaking to that degree which it is possible for man to attain. But this degree of excellence can never be obtained without much labor and study; and a prudent man will not toil For its acquisition, that he may speak and act so as to be pleasing to men; but rather that, to the utmost of his ability, he may speak and act in such a manner as may be acceptable to the Gods. For men wiser than us, O Tisias, say that he who is endued with intellect ought not to make it the principal object of his study how he may gratify his fellow servants, but how he may please good masters, and this from good means. So that, if the circuit is long, you ought not to wonder: For it is not to be undertaken in the manner which seems proper to you, but for the sake of mighty concerns. And these, if anyone is so disposed, will be most beautifully effected by this mean, as reason herself evinces.

Phaedrus/ This appears to me, Socrates, to be most beautifully said, if there is but a possibility that anyone can accomplish the arduous undertaking.

Socrates/ But to endeavor after beautiful attainments is beautiful, as likewise to endure whatever may happen to be the result of our endeavors.

Phaedrus/ very much so.

Socrates/ And thus much may suffice concerning a knowledge and ignorance of the art of rhetoric.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Does it not therefore remain, that we should speak concerning the elegance and inelegance of writing?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do you know how you may in the highest degree please the divinity of discourse both in speaking and acting?

Phaedrus/ Not at all. Do you?

Socrates/ I have heard certain particulars delivered by the ancients, who were truly knowing. But if we ourselves should discover this, do you think we should afterwards be at all solicitous about human opinions?

Phaedrus/ Your question is ridiculous; but relate what you say you have heard.

Socrates/ I have heard then, that about Naucratis, in Egypt, there was one of their ancient Gods, to whom a bird was sacred, which they call This; but the name of the dæmon himself was Theuth. According to tradition, this God first discovered number and the art of reckoning, geometry and astronomy, the games of chess and hazard, and likewise letters. But Thamus was at that time king of all Egypt, and resided in that great city of the Upper Egypt which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes; but the God himself they denominate Ammon. Theuth, therefore, departing to Thamus, showed him his arts, and told him that he ought to distribute them amongst the other Egyptians. But Thamus asked him concerning the utility of each; and upon his informing him, he approved what appeared to him to be will said, but blamed that which had a contrary aspect. But Theuth is reported to have fully unfolded to Thamus many particulars respecting each art, which it would be too prolix to mention. But when they came to discourse upon letters, This discipline, O king, says Theuth, will render the Egyptians wiser, and increase their powers of memory. For this invention is the medicine of memory and wisdom. To this Thamus replied, O most artificial Theuth, one person is

more adapted to artificial operations, but another to judging what detriment or advantage will arise from the use of these productions of art: and now you who are the father of letters, through the benevolence of your disposition, have affirmed just the contrary of what letters are able to effect. For these, through the negligence of recollection, will produce oblivion in the soul of the learner; because, through trusting to the external and foreign marks of writing, they will not exercise the internal powers of recollection. So that you have not discovered the medicine of memory, but of admonition. You will likewise deliver to your disciples an opinion of wisdom, and not truth. For, in consequence of having many readers without the instruction of a master, the multitude will appear to be knowing in many things of which they are at the same time ignorant; and will become troublesome associates, in consequence of possessing an opinion of wisdom, instead of wisdom itself.

Phaedrus/ You with great facility, Socrates, compose Egyptian discourses, and those of any other nation, when you are so disposed.

Socrates/ But, my friend, those who reside in the temple of Dodonean Zeus assert that the first prophetic discourses issued from the oak. It was sufficient, therefore, for those ancients, as they were not so wise as you moderns, to listen to oaks and rocks, through their simplicity, if these inanimate things did but utter the truth. But you perhaps think it makes a difference who speaks, and to what country he belongs. For you do not alone consider, whether what is asserted is true or false.

Phaedrus/ You have very properly reproved me; and I think the case with respect to letters is just as the Theban Thamus has stated it.

Socrates/ Hence, he who thinks to commit an art to writing, or to receive it, when delivered by this mean, so that something clear and firm may result from the letters, is endued with great simplicity, and is truly ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon; since he is of opinion, that something more is contained in the writing than what the things themselves contained in the letters admonish the scientific reader.

Phaedrus/ Most right.

Socrates/ For that which is committed to writing contains something very weighty, and truly similar to a picture. For the offspring of a picture project as if they were alive; but, if you ask them any question, they are silent in a perfectly venerable manner. Just so with respect to written discourses, you would think that they spoke as if they possessed some portion of wisdom. But if, desirous to be instructed, you interrogate them about anything which they assert, they signify one thing only, and this always the same. And every discourse, when it is once written, is everywhere similarly rolled among its auditors, and even among those by whom it ought not to be heard; and is perfectly ignorant, to whom it is proper to address itself, and to whom not. But when it is faulty or unjustly reviled, it always requires the assistance of its father. For, as to itself, it can neither resist its adversary, nor defend itself.

Phaedrus/ And this, also, you appear to have most rightly asserted.

Socrates/ But what, shall we not consider another discourse, which is the genuine brother of this, how legitimate it is, and how much better and more powerful it is born than this?

Phaedrus/ What is this? and how do you say it is produced?

Socrates/ That which, in conjunction with science, is written in the soul of the learner, which is able to defend itself, and which knows to whom it ought to speak, and before whom it ought to be silent.

Phaedrus/ You speak of the living and animated discourse of one endued with knowledge; of which written discourse may be justly called a certain image.

Socrates/ Entirely so. But answer me with respect to this also: Will the husbandman, who is endued with intellect, scatter such seeds as are most dear to him, and from which he wishes fruit should arise? Will he scatter them in summer in the gardens of Adonis, with the greatest diligence and attention, rejoicing to behold them in beautiful perfection within the space of eight days? Or rather, when he acts in this manner, will he not do so for the sake of some festive day, or sport? But, when seriously applying himself to the business of agriculture, will he not sow where it is proper, and be sufficiently pleased, if his sowing receives its consummation within the space of eight months?

Phaedrus/ He would doubtless act in this manner, Socrates, at one time sowing seriously, and at another time for diversion.

Socrates/ But shall we say that the man who possesses the science of things just, beautiful and good, is endued with less intellect than a husbandman, with respect to the seeds which he sows?

Phaedrus/ By no means.

Socrates/ He will not, therefore, with anxious and hasty diligence write them in black water, sowing them by this mean with his pen in conjunction with discourses; since it is thus impossible to assist them through speech, and impossible sufficiently to exhibit the truth.

Phaedrus/ This, therefore, is not proper.

Socrates/ Certainly not. He will, therefore, sow and write in the gardens which letters contain for the sake of sport, as it appears; and when he has written, having raised monuments as treasures to himself, with a view to the oblivion of old-age, if he should arrive to it, and for the like benefit of others who tread in the same steps, he is delighted on beholding his delicate progeny of fruits; and while other men pursue other diversions, irrigating themselves with banquets, and other entertainments which are the sisters of these, he on the contrary passes his time in the delights which conversation produces.

Phaedrus/ You speak, Socrates, of a most beautiful diversion, and not of a vile amusement, as the portion of him who is able to sport with discourse, and who can mythologize about justice, and other particulars which you speak of.

Socrates/ For it is indeed so, my dear Phædrus. But, in my opinion, a much more beautiful study will result from discourses, when someone employing the dialectic art, and receiving a soul properly adapted for his purpose, plants and sows in it discourses, in conjunction with science; discourses which are sufficiently able to assist both themselves and their planter, and which are not barren, but abound with seed; from whence others springing up in different manners, are always sufficient to extend this immortal benefit, and to render their possessor blessed in as high a degree as is possible to man.

Phaedrus/ This which you speak of is still far more beautiful.

Socrates/ But now, Phædrus, this being granted, are we able to distinguish and judge about what follows?

Phaedrus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Those particulars for the sake of knowing which we came hither; that we might inquire into the

disgrace of Lysias in the art of writing; and that we might investigate those discourses which are either written with or without art. To me, therefore, it appears that we have moderately evinced that which is artificial, and that which is not so.

Phaedrus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But again we ought to remember that no one can acquire perfection in the art of speaking, either with respect to teaching or persuading, till he is well acquainted with the truth of the particulars about which he either speaks or writes: till he is able to define the whole of a thing; and when defined, again knows how to divide it according to species, as far as to an indivisible: and, according to this method, contemplating the soul, and discovering a species adapted to the nature of each, he thus disposes and adorns his discourse; accommodating various and all-harmonious discourses to a soul characterized by variety; but such as are simple, to one of a simple disposition.

Phaedrus/ It appears to be so in every respect.

Socrates/ But what shall we say to the question, whether it is beautiful or base to speak and write orations; and in what respect this employment may be blamable or not? unless what we have said a little before is sufficient for this purpose.

Phaedrus/ What was that?

Socrates/ That whether Lysias, or any other, has at any time written, or now writes, so as to establish laws, either privately or publicly, composing a political work, and thinking that it contains great stability and clearness; this is base in a writer, whether anyone says so or not. For to be ignorant of the difference between true visions and the delusions of sleep, between just and unjust, evil and good,

cannot fail of being really base, though the whole rout of the vulgar should unite in its praise.

Phaedrus/ It cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ But he who in a written oration thinks that there is a great necessity for amusement, and who considers no discourse, whether in prose or verse. deserving of much study in its composition or recital, like those rhapsodists, who without judgment and learning recite verses for the sake of persuasion, while in reality the best of those discourses were written for the sake of admonishing the skillful; but who thinks, that the clear, the perfect, and the serious, ought only to take place in discourses which teach and are delivered for the sake of learning, and which are truly written in the soul, about the just, the beautiful and the good; and who judges that discourses of this kind ought to be called his legitimate offspring; that, in the first place, which is inherent in himself, if he should find it there, and afterwards whatever offspring, or brethren, spring in a becoming manner from this progeny of his own soul in the souls of others, bidding at the same time farewell to all others; —a man of this kind, Phædrus, appears to be such a one as you and I should pray that we may be.

Phaedrus/ I perfectly desire and pray for the possession of what you speak of.

Socrates/ We have, therefore, moderately spoken thus much about discourses, as it were in play: it only remains that you tell Lysias, that, descending with intellect to the stream of the Nymphs and Muses, we heard certain discourses, which they ordered us to acquaint Lysias with, and every other writer of orations, likewise Homer, and any other who may compose either naked poetry, or that which is adorned with the song; and in the third place Solon, and all who may commit political institutions to writing; —that if

their compositions result from knowing the truth, and if they are able to defend their writings against the objections of adversaries who declare that they can evince the improbity of their discourses, —then, they ought not to be denominated from works of this kind, but from what they have seriously written.

Phaedrus/ What appellations, then, will you assign them?

Socrates/ To call them wise, Phædrus, appears to me to be a mighty appellation, and adapted to a God alone; but to denominate them philosophers, or something of this kind, seems to be more convenient and proper.

Phaedrus/ There is nothing indeed unbecoming in such an epithet.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who cannot exhibit anything more honorable than what he has written, and who turns upwards and downwards his composition, for a considerable space of time, adding and taking away, —may not such a one be justly called a poet, or a writer of orations or laws?

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Relate these particulars, therefore, to your associate.

Phaedrus/ But what will you do? For it is not proper that your companion should be neglected.

Socrates/ Who is he?

Phaedrus/ The worthy Isocrates. What will you tell him, Socrates? and what character shall we assign him?

Socrates/ Isocrates as yet, Phædrus, is but a young man; but I am willing to tell you what I prophesy concerning him.

Phaedrus/ What?

Socrates/ He appears to me to possess such excellent natural endowments, that his productions ought not to be

compared with the orations of Lysias. Besides this, his manners are more generous; so that it will be by no means wonderful, if, when he is more advanced in age, he should far surpass, in those orations which are now the objects of his study, all the other boys who ever meddled with orations; or, if he should not be content with a pursuit of this kind, I think that a more divine impulse will lead him to greater attainments: for there is naturally, my friend, a certain philosophy in the dianoëtic part of this man. Tell, therefore, my beloved Isocrates this, as a piece of information which I have received from the Gods of this place; and do you likewise acquaint Lysias with the particulars which respect his character and pursuits, as a person who is the object of your warmed attachment.

Phaedrus/ Be it so; but let us depart, since the heat has now abated its fervor.

Socrates/ But it is proper we should pray before we depart.

Phaedrus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ O beloved Pan, and all ye other Gods, who are residents of this place, grant that I may become beautiful within, and that whatever I possess externally may be friendly to my inward attainments! Grant, also, that I may consider the wise man as one who abounds in wealth; and that I may enjoy that portion of gold, which no other than a prudent man is able either to bear, or properly manage! Do we require anything else, Phædrus? for to me it appears that I have prayed tolerably well.

Phaedrus/ Pray also in the same manner for me: for the possessions of friends are common.

Socrates/ Let us then depart.

THE END OF THE PHÆDRUS.

Phaedrus

Translated by J. Wright.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Phaedrus

Socrates/ Whence come you, friend Phaedrus, and whither are you bound?

Phaedrus/ I come from Lysias, the son of Cephalus; and I am going for a walk outside the walls, as I have been sitting with him a long time, in fact ever since daybreak. And it is by the advice, Socrates, of our common friend Acumenus, that I take my walks in the open roads; for he tells me they are more refreshing than the covered promenades.

Socrates/ And he's right there, my good friend. So Lysias, it appears, was in the city.

Phaedrus/ Yes, staying with Epicrates at the Morychian mansion yonder, close by the Olympian.

Socrates/ Well, how did you pass your time there? though I can hardly doubt that Lysias regaled you with his speeches.

Phaedrus/ You shall hear, if you are not too much engaged to join me in my walk.

Socrates/ Engaged, indeed? don't you believe that in the words of Pindar I would count it a matter far above all engagement to hear what passed between you and Lysias?

Phaedrus/ Come on then.

Socrates/ If you will begin your tale.

Phaedrus/ I will; and I can assure you, Socrates, you will find it very much in your way. For the speech which

engaged our attention was in a certain fashion of an amatory character; that is to say, Lysias introduced one of our beautiful boys as being courted, but not by a lover; in fact, this is the very point on which he has displayed his ingenuity, as he maintains that favor ought to be shown to one who is not in love, rather than to one who is.

Socrates/ What a generous man! I wish he would maintain that poverty has a better claim than wealth, and age than youth; and in short, that the preference ought to be given to all the other properties that belong to myself in common with the bulk of mankind. In that case his speeches would indeed be delightful, and a public boon. But whether he does so or not, I have conceived such a desire to hear what he says, that even if you extend your walk to Megara, and, as Herodicus prescribes, go close up to the wall and then turn back again, you will not shake me off, I can promise you.

Phaedrus/ What are you talking about, my good friend Socrates? It took Lysias, the cleverest writer of the day, a long while to compose this speech at his leisure; and do you imagine that a novice like myself could repeat it from memory without doing injustice to the author?

No, that I am very sure I could not; and yet I would sooner be able to do so than come into the possession of a large sum of money.

Socrates/ My good friend Phaedrus, if I do not know Phaedrus, I do not know myself any longer. But neither the one nor the other is the case; I do know Phaedrus; I know full well that on hearing Lysias read the speech, he was not content with hearing it once only, but kept urging him to repeat it again and again; and Lysias was

quite as eager to comply. Phaedrus however was not satisfied even with this, but at last took the book from the other's hands, and looked over again the parts he especially fancied. And being wearied with sitting all the morning thus engaged, he set out for a walk, though not, I fully believe, till he had learnt the entire speech by heart, unless it was a very long one. And he was going outside the walls to con it over by himself. But on his way he met with a man who is afflicted with a weakness for listening to speeches, and when he saw him he was charmed (oh so charmed) at the sight, for says he, I shall now have a friend to share in my raptures. So he requested his friend to join him in his walk. When however this lover of speeches asked him to commence, he began to be coy, as though disinclined, albeit determined I am sure, if he could get no willing hearer, to speak out at last even to unwilling ears. Do you therefore, Phaedrus, request him to do at once what at all events he is sure to do presently.

Phaedrus/ My wisest plan, there seems little doubt, is to repeat the speech as well as I am able; for I believe you have made up your mind on no account to let me go, till I have given it you in some way or other.

Socrates/ You have defined my intentions to a nicety.

Phaedrus/ Well then I'll do my best, though really, Socrates, I can assure you that I have not learnt the words by heart; but if you are content with a general view of the points of difference, as Lysias laid them down, between the claims of the impassioned and unimpassioned suitor, I am ready to go through them in order under their several heads, beginning where he began.

Socrates/ Thank you, my obliging friend; not till you have shown me though, what it is you have got there in your left hand beneath your cloak, as I have a shrewd suspicion that it is the speech itself. If so, I must beg you to understand that, fond as I am of you, I have yet no intention at all of lending myself for you to practice upon, while Lysias is also present. So let us see what you have got.

Phaedrus/ Enough, Socrates, I confess; you have dashed down the hope I entertained of practicing my memory on you. But where would you like us to sit down and read the speech?

Socrates/ Let us turn aside here, and go down by the Ilissus, and then wherever we find a spot to our taste we will sit down and rest.

Phaedrus/ How lucky that I happened to come out without my shoes and you, Socrates, we know never wear them. Our easiest plan then is to walk along the streamlet with our feet in the water, and we shall find it by no means disagreeable, considering the season of the year, and the hour of the day.

Socrates/ Come on then, and keep at the same time a look-out for a seat.

Phaedrus/ Do you see that towering plane-tree yonder?

Socrates/ Of course I do.

Phaedrus/ Well, there we shall find shade and a gentle breeze, and grass enough for a seat, or if we prefer it, for a bed.

Socrates/ Let us walk towards it.

Phaedrus/ Tell me, Socrates, was it not from somewhere hereabouts on the Ilissus that Boreas is said to have carried off Orithyia?

Socrates/ So the tale goes.

Phaedrus/ Must it not have been from this very spot? So beautiful is the water here, so clear and transparent, and just such as one can fancy maidens loving to play by.

Socrates/ No, not here, but about a quarter of a mile lower down, just where we cross over to the temple of the Huntress. And if I am not mistaken, there is an altar on the spot to Boreas.

Phaedrus/ I have never noticed it. But tell me honestly, Socrates, do you believe this tale of mythology to be true?

Socrates/ Why, I should do nothing strangely out of the way if I were to refuse it credit, as the learned do; and go on in their rationalizing method to say that as the girl was playing with Pharmaesea she was blown over the ad joining cliffs by a blast of the wind Boreas; and that, having met with her death in this manner, she was fabled to have been carried off by the god Boreas either from this place, or if you like from Mars's hill, which, according to another account, was the scene of her adventure. But for my part, Phaedrus, though I consider such explanations sufficiently pretty, yet I esteem them the peculiar province of a very subtle, painstaking, and by no means particularly enviable person; if for no other reason than that he will be called upon, as soon as he has finished this subject, to set us right as to the form of the Hippocentaurs, and again as to that of the Chimaera, and then he will have pouring in upon him a like crowd of Gorgons and Pegasuses, and such a wondrous host of portentous and impossible creations, that if he were to disbelieve them all, and, with a kind of vulgar acuteness, apply to each

successively the test of probability, he would require no small amount of time and labor for the task. But I have no leisure for such studies and the reason, my friend, is this; I cannot as yet obey the Delphic inscription, which bids me know myself; and it seems to me ridiculous for one who is still destitute of this knowledge to busy himself with matters which in no wise concern him. I therefore leave these subjects alone, and acquiescing in the received opinion regarding them I devote myself, as I just now said, to the study, not of fables, but of my own self, that I may see whether I am really a more complicated and a more furious monster than Typhon, or a creature of a gentler and a simpler sort, the born heir of a divine and tranquil nature. But by the bye, Phaedrus, was not this the tree to which you were leading me?

Phaedrus/ The very one.

Socrates/ Well, really, this is a glorious resting place. For the plane-tree I find is thick and spreading, as well as tall, and the size and shadiness of the agnus castus here is very beautiful, and being at the height of its flower it must render our retreat most fragrant. How delicious too is this spring trickling under the plane-tree, and how cold its water, to judge by the foot! It would seem from these images and votive offerings that the place is sacred to some nymphs and river-god. Again, how lovely and enjoyable above measure is the airiness of the spot! summer-like and clear there rings an answer to the choir of the cicadas. But the most charming thing of all is this abundant grass, with its gentle slope just made for the head to fall back on luxuriously. Really, Phaedrus, you make a most admirable guide.

Phaedrus/ And you, Socrates, are a most unaccountable being. In fact, as you say, you are just like a stranger who is being shown the beauties of the place, and not like a native of the country; the consequence this of your never leaving the city either to cross the frontier, or even, I do believe, for so much as a walk outside the walls.

Socrates/ You must bear with me, dear Phaedrus I am so fond of learning. Now trees, you know, and fields won't teach me anything, but men in the city will. You, however, would appear to have discovered the charm that can entice me out. For as shepherds draw after them their hungry flocks by shaking branches or grain up and down before their eyes, so could you, I believe, make me follow you, not only all round Attica, but also wherever else you might wish to lead, by simply holding out to me a written speech as a bait. And since we have reached this spot on the present occasion, I cannot do better than lay me down to listen, and do you choose that posture which you think most convenient for reading in, and begin the speech.

Phaedrus/ Attend then;

With the state of my affairs you are acquainted, and that I expect advantage to us both from this arrangement you have heard. Now I claim not to be disappointed in my suit on the ground of my not belonging to the number of your lovers. For they repent of the benefits they have conferred the moment that their desire ceases; but for us, who never love, there is no particular time at which we may be expected to change our minds. For it is not under the influence of a resistless passion, but of our own free choice, that we do you a kindness, consulting what our means will allow, and what is best for our interests to bestow.

Again, lovers take into consideration the derangement of their private affairs which their love has occasioned, and the services they have rendered their favorites; and adding all the trouble they have taken to the reckoning, they conceive that by all this they have long ago paid the return which is due to the object of their affection. We, on the other hand, are not able to pretend that we have neglected our fortunes for love; we cannot take into account the labors we have endured, nor plead the domestic quarrels which have resulted from our devotion; so that, as our suit is divested of all such evils as these, we have nothing left us but cheerfully to do whatever we may think we shall please you by per forming. Again, if it be a fair reason for set ting store on a lover, that he professes greater attachment for his favorite than for anyone else, and is ready both by word and deed to incur the enmity of all the world beside, if he can but gratify the object of his passion, it is easy to perceive that, if his profession be a true one, all of whom he may hereafter become enamored will be held of greater account than his earlier love; and it is clear that, if the former wish it, he will not hesitate to do even harm to the latter. And how can you think it reasonable to lavish so costly a treasure on one suffering under a fatal infliction, which no man acquainted with its nature would even attempt to avert; when even the sufferer himself owns that his mind is diseased, and that he knows his own folly, but cannot control himself? And when this man is restored to his senses, how can he possibly judge that to be well done about which he was so desirous when in such a state of mind? And further, if you were to select the best from among your lovers, your choice would be made from a small number; but if from the rest of the world you were to select the man

who is most suit able to yourself, it would be made from a large number; so that there is far more reason to expect that in the larger number exists the one who is deserving of your attachment. If, moreover, you stand in awe of public opinion, and dread its reproaches on the affair being discovered, it is but natural to suppose that lovers, from an idea that others will deem them as happy as they esteem themselves, will be so elated as to talk of their intimacy, and with ostentatious vanity give all men to know that their labor has not been spent in vain; but that we on the other hand, who by never loving never lose the dominion over ourselves, should prefer what is truly advantageous to any celebrity that is to be had in the world. Again, men cannot help hearing and seeing how lovers run after their favorites, and that too with elaborate parade; so that the mere fact of their being seen talking together is sufficient to give rise to suspicion; whereas no one would think of suspecting us for holding conversation with you, as they know that people cannot help talking with someone or other, either from friendship or for some other pleasure. And further, if you have ever conceived an alarm from remembering how difficult it is for a friendship to last, and from the reflection that in ordinary cases, when a quarrel has taken place, the misfortune is felt equally on both sides; but that in love, as it is you who have lavished what you prize most highly, so it is you who will suffer most deeply by a rupture; let me remind you that here again it is those who are in love that you have most reason to look upon with terror. For many are the causes that irritate lovers, and they think that everything is done to hurt and annoy them. For which reason also they are anxious to deter you from associating with the world, fearing those who are possessed of substance, lest they

outbid them with money, and those who are educated, lest they outshine them in ability; and so, whatever may be the advantage a man possesses, they look with suspicion on his influence in that particular. If then they succeed in persuading you to abstain from society, they leave you at last without a friend in the world; but if, with an eye to your own interests, you adopt a different and wiser course, a quarrel will be the inevitable result. By us, on the other hand, who are not in love, but owe to our merit the accomplishment of our desires, no jealousy would be entertained for those who cultivate your acquaintance, but rather dislike for such as avoid it; as we should consider ourselves slighted by the neglect of the latter, but benefited by the intimacy of the former. And such being our feelings, surely you have reason to expect that friendship rather than hatred will result from our intercourse. And further, lovers frequently conceive a desire for the person before they have discovered the character or become acquainted with the other circumstances of their favorites, so that it is impossible for you to tell whether their disposition for friendship will outlast the continuance of their desire. But when passion has never existed, when your favors have been obtained by those who were your friends before, it is not likely that this friendship will be lessened by what has been the source of so much delight rather will the memory of the past be an earnest of future attachment. And further, you must not forget the superior opportunities of improvement which will be afforded you by favoring my suit. Lovers are so neglectful of your best interests, that they praise everything you say and do, partly for fear of giving offence, and partly because their own judgment is debased by their passion. For such are the caprices of

love if its victim be unsuccessful, it makes trifles which trouble no one else seem distressing to him; if successful, it exacts-from him admiration for what contains no cause of satisfaction. So that I consider pity to be far more suitable than congratulation for the objects of such an attachment. I on the other hand, if you yield to my wishes, will associate with you on the following terms. Not consulting our present gratification so much as our future advantage; not enslaved by passion, but master of myself; not ready to contract a violent animosity on slight provocation, but slow to conceive a moderate displeasure for serious offences, I will freely pardon all in voluntary faults, while such as are intentional I will endeavor to correct. For such conduct is a sure sign of a friendship that will long endure. But if the thought, as is not unlikely, has suggested itself to you, that it is impossible for attachment to be strong if unaccompanied by passion, you ought to bear in mind, that in that case we should care but little either for our sons or for our fathers and mothers, nor should we ever possess faithful friends on any other footing than an amatory connection. Again, if it is proper to bestow favors most on those who need them most, it follows that from the world in general you ought to select, not the best, but the neediest as the objects of your charity for the greater the misery they are rescued from, the greater is the debt of gratitude they will owe you. Nay, further, when you give an entertainment, you will be expected to ask not friends to your board, but those who beg an invitation and require a meal; for they will be charmed with your kindness, and will follow in your train and throng your doors, and express themselves highly delighted and deeply grateful, and invoke countless blessings on your

head. It may be though that this is not the true ground of selection; it may be that you ought to bestow your favors, not on those who need them most, but on those who are best able to repay them; not on lovers merely, but on those who are worthy of the favor in question; not on men who will enjoy the flower of your youth, but on those who in your more advanced years will share with you their fortunes; not on such as when they have achieved their purpose will parade their success to the world, but on such as from feelings of delicacy will never open their mouths on the subject; not on suitors who sue you with a short lived enthusiasm, but on friends who will continue friends all your life long; not on men who, when they are released from their passion, will seek some pretext for a quarrel, but on those who, when your bloom is faded, will then display their own true excellence. Remember now, I pray you, all I have said; and also bear in mind that lovers are taken to task by their friends on the score that their course of life is a bad one; whereas never have those who do not love been reproached by any of their relatives with neglecting on that account their private affairs. You may perhaps ask me whether I recommend you to bestow your favors on all who do not love you. But neither, I imagine, would a lover bid you entertain such sentiments towards all your lovers alike. No, if you view the matter reasonably, you cannot consider such conduct deserving of equal gratitude, nor, however you might wish it, would you be equally able to preserve the affair secret from the world. And harm, you must remember, ought to accrue to neither from the transaction; advantage should rather result to both.

My suit has now been urged with arguments which for my part I deem convincing should you see in them

any defect or omission, they are open to any questions you may choose to ask.

Well, Socrates, what do you think of the speech? Is it not wonderfully fine, especially in point of language?

Socrates/ Nay, divinely, my good friend; it quite threw me into an ecstasy. And this sensation I owe to you, Phaedrus; for all the time you were reading, I kept my eye on your face, and saw it glow with rapture under the influence of the speech. And esteeming you a better judge in such matters than myself, I thought I could not do better than follow your example, and so I have shared with you in all your transports, my god-inspired friend.

Phaedrus/ Nay, Socrates, always so bent on jesting?

Socrates/ Jesting! don't you believe I am in earnest?

Phaedrus/ Oh, no more of this, Socrates; but tell me honestly, as you love me, do you believe that any man in Greece could write more ably and fully on the same subject?

Socrates/ How do you mean, Phaedrus? Are we required to praise the speech for the fitness of its subject-matter, or merely on the ground that every word in it is clear, and rounded and polished off with a nice precision? If on the former ground as well, it is only to please you that I can comply; since for my part my incapacity is such, that I observed no excellence of the kind. For I was merely directing my attention to its rhetorical merit, though this I did not imagine even Lysias himself would consider sufficient. In fact, I thought, Phaedrus please correct me if I am wrong that he repeated the same things two or three times over, as though he found it no such easy matter to say much on

one subject. Perhaps, though, it was that he did not mind this sort of thing; nay, I could even fancy that he was showing off with a young man's display the power he possessed of expressing his ideas in two different ways, and in both with the finest possible language.

Phaedrus/ You are quite wrong, Socrates; the very merit which you deny is to be found in the speech in even an eminent degree. Of all appropriate topics which the subject contained, it has not omitted a single one; so that I am sure, that after what he has said no one could ever support the same position at greater length, or with arguments of greater value.

Socrates/ On this point, Phaedrus, it will be no longer in my power to agree with you. For wise men and women of old time, who have written and spoken on the subject, will rise up and bear witness against me, if out of complaisance to you I make this concession.

Phaedrus/ Whom do you mean? where have you ever heard the subject better treated?

Socrates/ I cannot say just at the moment, though I am sure I have heard it somewhere, either perhaps by the fair Sappho, or the sage Anacreon, or may be by some prose writer or other. What leads me, you will ask, to this conclusion? The fact is, my worthy Phaedrus, that my breast, I know not how, is full of matter, and I feel that I could be delivered of a speech different from, and in no wise inferior to this. Now that I have invented none of it myself, I am confident, as I am no stranger to my own stupidity. It remains then, I think, that like a pitcher I have been filled, through my ears, from some foreign springs; but here again so stupid am I, that I have quite for gotten both how and where I gained my information.

Phaedrus/ Never mind, Socrates, you have told me most excellent tidings; don't trouble yourself about telling me how or from whom you heard it, but just do the very thing that you say. Undertake to produce a speech of equal length and merit with that which I have got written here, without availing yourself of any of its arguments, and for my part I promise you, after the fashion of the nine archons, that I will dedicate to the god at Delphi a golden statue as large as life, not only of myself, but also of you.

Socrates/ You are very kind, Phaedrus, and quite deserve the statue of gold, if you understand me to mean that Lysias missed his mark altogether, and that it is possible to produce a speech which shall contain nothing that he said. No, I do not think this could be done with even the most worthless writer. Since, to take our present subject, do you suppose that any man who was maintaining the superior claims of the unimpassioned to those of the impassioned suitor, would be able to proceed with his arguments if he were to omit lauding the sanity of the one, and blaming the insanity of the other? these being topics which are necessarily inherent in the proposition. No, such arguments ought, I think, to be allowed and conceded to the author; and in all such it is not the invention, but the arrangement that should be admired; whereas in those which, instead of being impossible to miss, are difficult to find, the invention as well as the arrangement may claim our approval.

Phaedrus/ I admit the distinction, as it appears to me to be fairly stated. And what is more, I will act up to it. I will allow you to assume that a man in love is in a more diseased condition than one who is not in love, and if, when this point is put out of the question on both

sides, you surpass Lysias in the number and value of your arguments, you may expect to figure in massive gold at Olympia by the side of the offering of the Cypselidas.

Socrates/ You have taken it quite to heart, Phaedrus, that in teasing you I have laid hold upon your favorite; and I see you expect that I shall really attempt, in emulation of his skill, to produce something still more skillfully wrought.

Phaedrus/ For that matter, my friend, you have given me quite as good a hold on you. For speak you must as well as you are able; there is no help for it. But do take care that we are not compelled to have recourse to the vulgar stage-trick of retorting upon each other; pray don't force me to say as you did just now; My good Socrates, if I don't know Socrates, I don't know Phaedrus any longer; and again, Socrates is dying to speak, but affects to be coy. No, make up your mind that we will not stir from this spot, till you have disclosed what you said you had in your breast. For here we are by ourselves in a retired place, and I am the younger and stronger man of the two. All which things being considered, you had better mind what I say, and determine to speak of your own free will rather than by compulsion.

Socrates/ But really, Phaedrus, it would be ludicrous in a novice like me to set myself in comparison with an experienced author, and extemporize on a subject which he has discussed.

Phaedrus/ I'll tell you what it is, Socrates; you must let me have no more of this coquetting, as I am pretty sure I have that to say which will compel you to speak.

Socrates/ Pray don't say it then.

Phaedrus/ Nay, but I will, and here it is. And it shall be in the form of an oath. I swear to you by whom, by what god shall I swear? Shall it be by this plane-tree? Yes, by this plane I swear, that if you do not produce your speech here before her, I will never again either report or recite to you the speech of any author whatsoever.

Socrates/ Ah, wretch, well have you discovered the means of compelling a speech-enamored man to do your bidding, whatever it be!

Phaedrus/ What makes you hang back, then?

Socrates/ I will do so no more, since you, Phaedrus, have sworn this oath. For how could I ever have the heart to exclude myself from such a feast?

Phaedrus/ Begin then.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you what I mean to do?

Phaedrus/ About what?

Socrates/ I mean to speak with my face covered, that I may hurry through the speech as quickly as possible, and not break down for shame, by looking at you.

Phaedrus/ Well, do but speak, and you may settle everything else as you like.

Socrates/ Come now, ye Muses called Ligaean, whether it be to the nature of your song, or to the music-loving race of the Ligyans that ye owe the name, come help me in the tale which my kind friend here is forcing me to tell, in order that his favorite, who even heretofore seemed to him to be wise, may now seem wiser than ever.

There was once upon a time a boy, say rather a youth, of surpassing beauty. Now this youth had very many lovers; but one of them was a cunning fellow, who

though he loved him no less warmly than his rivals, had made the youth believe that he loved him not.

And one day as he was urging his suit, he undertook to prove this very point, that the dispassionate suitor had a better claim on his favor than the impassioned lover. And here is his proof.

On every subject, my friend, there is but one mode of beginning for those who would deliberate well. They must know what the thing is on which they are deliberating, or else of necessity go altogether astray. Most men, however, are blind to the fact that they are ignorant of the essential character of each individual thing. Fancying therefore that they possess this knowledge, they come to no mutual understanding at the outset of their inquiry; and in the sequel they exhibit the natural consequence, an inconsistency with themselves and each other. Let not you and me then fall into the error which we condemn in others; but since the question before us is, whether love or the absence of love is desirable in friendship, let us first establish by mutual consent a definition of love that will explain its nature and its powers; and then, with this to look back upon and refer to, let us proceed to consider whether it is profitable or injurious in its results. Now that love is a kind of desire is clear to everyone, and equally clear is it on the other hand, that without being in love we desire beautiful objects. How then are we to mark the lover? We should further observe, that in every one of us there are two ruling and directing principles, whose guidance we follow wherever they may lead; the one being an innate desire of pleasure; the other, an acquired judgment which aspires after excellence. Now these two principles at one time maintain harmony; while at another they are at feud within us, and now one and

now the other obtains the mastery. When judgment leads us with sound reason to virtue, and asserts its authority, we assign to that authority the name of temperance; but when desire drags us irrationally to pleasures, and has established its sway within us, that sway is denominated excess. Now excess, you must know, is a thing of many names, as it is of many parts and many forms. And of these forms, that which may happen to have obtained the predominance brands its possessor with its own name, and that one neither honorable nor worth possessing. For instance, when desire in regard of eating gets the better of the highest reason and the other desires, it will be termed gluttony, and cause its possessor to be called a glutton. If again it has usurped dominion in the matter of drinking, and drags the individual affected by it in this direction, I need not say what designation it will acquire. And since in general names akin to these names are applied to desires akin to these desires, it is sufficiently clear what is the proper appellation of the desire which for the time being happens to be dominant. Now my motive for introducing these previous remarks must by this time be pretty well evident; but nothing is so clear that it does not admit of becoming clearer by being spoken. When desire, having rejected reason and overpowered judgment which leads to right, is set in the direction of the pleasure which beauty can inspire, and when again under the influence of its kindred desires it is moved with violent motion towards the beauty of corporeal forms, it acquires a surname from this very violent motion, and is called love. But by the way, my dear Phaedrus, do I appear to you, as I do to myself, to have been speaking under some influence divine?

Phaedrus/ There certainly can be no doubt, Socrates, that an unusual kind of fluency has come upon you.

Socrates/ Hearken then in silence to my words, for in very truth the place where we are sitting seems holy ground. So that if haply in the course of my oration I become entranced by the spirits of the spot, you must not marvel thereat; for my present utterance falls no longer far short of a dithyrambic strain.

Phaedrus/ Most true; it does not.

Socrates/ And for this, Phaedrus, you are answer able. But listen to the remainder of my speech, for it may be that I shall escape the trance. This, however, will be as Heaven pleases; for ourselves, we must return in our discourse to the beautiful boy.

Come then, my excellent youth. Since the definition of the subject under discussion has been stated and accurately marked, let us now keep this in our view, while we proceed to consider what advantage or injury is likely to result to you from favoring the wishes of an impassioned and unimpassioned suitor respectively. If a man be governed by desire and the slave of pleasure, he must of necessity, I think, endeavor to render his beloved the source of as much pleasure to himself as he possibly can. Now, to a sick man everything gives pleasure that does not oppose itself to his wishes, but whatever asserts a superiority or even an equality, excites his dislike. A lover, therefore, if he can help it, will not bear his favorite to be either superior to or on a level with himself, but is always striving to lower him and make him inferior. Now ignorance is inferior to learning, cowardice to courage, incapacity as a speaker to oratorical skill, heaviness of intellect to a ready wit.

Such, among many others, are the mental defects which a lover must needs rejoice to find in his loved one if they are naturally inherent, and which, if they result from education, he must endeavor to instill, or else forfeit his immediate gratification. The consequence is, that your lover will regard you with a jealous eye, and by debarring you from many valuable acquaintances, the cultivation of which would be most conducive to your growth in manliness, he will do you serious harm, and the greatest harm of all by excluding you from that which would make you most truly wise; I mean the study of Divine Philosophy, from which your lover will be sure to keep you as far as possible asunder, for fear of your there learning to despise him. And not content with this, he will so scheme as to leave you in total ignorance of every subject whatever, so that on every subject you may be compelled to look to him for information; as this is the condition for you to be in that will cause him the keenest delight, but yourself the most ruinous harm. So far then as mental improvement is concerned, you cannot have a less profitable guide and companion than a suitor who is under the influence of love.

Let us now proceed to consider what will be your corporeal habit, and what your course of bodily discipline, if you have for your lord and master a man who cannot help pursuing plea sure in preference to virtue. Such a person will be seen running after a delicate stripling, not hardy in frame nor reared beneath a scorching sun, but fondled under the shade of blending trees; a stranger to manly toil and healthful sweating, but no stranger to the softness of a woman's life, decking his person with false colors and ornaments, in lack of nature s graces, and given in short to all such

practices as are the natural concomitants of these. What they are, you know so well that I need not dilate on them further; but, summing them up under one general head, I will proceed to another branch of my subject. They are such that the youth whose body is trained in them will not fail in time of battle and all serious emergencies to inspire his enemies with confidence, but his friends and even his lovers with alarm.

To pass from these obvious reflections, let us in the next place examine what advantage or what injury to your fortune we may expect to find resulting from the companionship and management of a lover. Clear it must be to everyone, and to the lover himself most of all, that there is nothing he would pray for so earnestly as for the object of his attachment to be deprived of his dearest, fondest, and holiest treasures. Gladly would he see him bereft of father and mother, of relations and friends, as in them he views only so many censors and obstacles in the way of that commerce with his beloved which he loves most dearly. Moreover, if a youth be possessed of property in gold or other kind of substance, he will not appear so ready a prey, nor so easy of management when caught in the toils. And thus it cannot possibly be but that a lover will grudge his favorite the possession of fortune, and rejoice sincerely in its loss. Nay more, he would fain have him remain as long as possible without wife, or child, or home, in his desire of reaping for the longest time he can the full enjoyment of his own delights.

There are, I am aware, other evils beside this in the world, though few with which some deity has not mingled a temporary gratification. A parasite, for instance, is a shocking and a baneful monster, yet still

nature has infused into his blandishments a not unpolished charm. A mistress moreover may be condemned as a dangerous evil; and the same objection may be made to a variety of similar creatures and pursuits, which are yet capable of affording, for the passing hour at least, the keenest enjoyment. But a lover, beside being detrimental to his favorite, is of all distasteful things the most distasteful in daily intercourse. We are told by an ancient saying, that youth is pleased with youth, and age with age; I suppose because a similarity of years, leading to a similarity of pleasures, by virtue of resemblance engenders friendship. But yet the intercourse even of equals is not unattended by satiety. And further, in every transaction everyone, it is said, finds compulsion irksome; and this is an evil which, in addition to their want of sympathy, is felt in the highest degree by the favorite in the society of his lover. For an old man is the companion of a young one, never leaving him if he can help it by day or by night, but driven onward by a resistless frenzy, which is all the while ministering to him indeed exquisite pleasure as long as by his sight, his hearing, his touch, his every sense, he is made aware of the presence of the beautiful boy, so that he would love nothing better than to cling to his side unceasingly; but as for the object of that attachment, what kind of solace, I ask, or what pleasure, can he possibly receive in return to save him during all that long companionship from reaching the very extremity of disgust; when he has ever before his eyes the bloomless countenance of age, and that too with all those accompaniments which we cannot hear even spoken of without repugnance, much less feel actually forced upon us by an ever-pressing necessity; when he has, moreover, on every occasion, and in all

company, to be on his guard against censorious observation; when he has to listen either to unseasonable and extravagant praises, or, with equal probability, to unendurable reproaches from his lovers sober caprice, while from his drunken excess he may expect an unveiled and loathsome licentiousness of speech, which is not only intolerable, but infamous to hear.

And if, during the continuance of his passion, a lover is at once hurtful and disgusting, as surely, when his passion is over, will he be for the remainder of his life a traitor to one whom with many promises, aye and many an oath and prayer, he could scarcely prevail on to endure the present burden of his society in hope of future advantage. Yes, I say, at the time when payment should be made, he finds that he has received within his breast a new ruler and a new lord, to wit, wisdom and temperance, in the stead of passion and madness, and that he is become a new man, without his favorite being conscious of the change. So the youth demands a return for former favors, and reminds him of all that has passed between them in word and deed, under the impression that he is speaking to the same person. But the other, for very shame, dares neither avow the alteration that has come upon him, nor can he bring himself to fulfill the oaths and promises of that former insensate reign, now that wisdom and temperance have set their throne in his heart, for fear that, if he should act as he did before, he might become like what he was before, and return back again to his old condition. And thus it is that he is a run away, and of necessity a defrauder, where once he was a lover, and in the turning of a potsherd is changed from pursuer into pursued; for the youth is compelled to give chase with indignation

and curses, having alas! been ignorant from the very first, that he ought not to bestow his favors on one who was in love, and of consequence a madman, but much rather on one who did not love and retained his senses; as in the former case he would have to surrender himself to a faithless, peevish, jealous wretch, who would do harm to his substance, and harm to his bodily habit, but far the greatest harm to the cultivation of his soul, than which in the eyes both of gods and men there neither is nor ever will be aught more dearly prized. Think deeply, my beautiful boy, on the words I have spoken, and remember that a lovers friendship is no attachment of good will, but that with an appetite which lusts for repletion;

As wolves love lambs, so lovers love their loves.

Ah Phaedrus, the very thing I dreaded! You must not expect to hear another word from me, but be content that my speech should terminate here.

Phaedrus/ Why, Socrates, I thought it was only half finished, and that it would have quite as much to say in supporting the claim of the unimpassioned suitor, and enumerating the advantages which he has to offer in opposition. How is it then that you are leaving off now?

Socrates/ Did you not observe, my learned friend, that I had already got beyond dithyrambics, and was giving utterance to epics, and that too, while engaged in blaming? Pray what do you imagine will become of me, if I commence a panegyric? don't you know that of a certainty I shall be lifted into ecstasy by the nymphs to whose influence you have designedly exposed me? For fear then of such a fate, I tell you in a single word, that for all the evil I have spoken of the one, I attribute just the opposite good to the other. And what need of a

protracted discourse, when enough has been said upon both sides? And thus my tale will meet with that reception which it deserves; and for myself I will cross the stream, and go home before you force me into something more serious still.

Phaedrus/ Not yet, Socrates, not till the heat of the day is past. Don't you see that the sun is already near standing still at high noon, as they phrase it? so pray wait, and let us talk over together what has been said, and return home as soon as it becomes cool.

Socrates/ You are a strange person with your speeches, Phaedrus; you quite amaze me. I do believe, that of all the speeches that have been composed during your lifetime, a greater number owe their existence to you than to any other person in the world, whether they be of your own composition, or extorted from someone else by fair means or foul. If we except Simmias of Thebes, there is no one who will bear competition with you. And now again I believe we shall find another speech which will have to thank you for its delivery.

Phaedrus/ No bad tidings these, certainly; but how is this the case, and what speech do you mean?

Socrates/ Just as I was about to cross the river, I was made aware of my divine monitor s wonted sign now it never occurs save to deter me from something or other I am in tending to do and methought therefrom I heard voice from this very spot, forbidding me to depart hence till I had purified myself, as though I had been guilty of some offence against Heaven. Now, you must know, I possess something of prophetic skill, though no very great amount, but, like indifferent writers, just enough for my own purposes. And thus it is that I have

now at last a clear perception of my error. I say at last, because I can assure you, my good friend, that the soul too is in some sort prophetic. For mine pricked me some time ago, as I was uttering that speech, and my face, as Ibycus says, was darkened for fear lest I might be purchasing honor on earth by some offence at the high court of heaven. But now I have discovered my sin.

Phaedrus/ And pray what was it?

Socrates/ That was a shocking, shocking speech which you brought here yourself, Phaedrus, and so was the one you forced me to utter.

Phaedrus/ In what way were they shocking?

Socrates/ They were foolish, and somewhat impious withal; and what can be more shocking than this?

Phaedrus/ Nothing, if your charge be a true one.

Socrates/ And is it not? Don't you believe Love to be the son of Aphrodite, and a god?

Phaedrus/ He is said to be so, certainly.

Socrates/ Certainly not by Lysias, nor by that speech of yours which found utterance through my lips after they had been bewitched by you. No, if Love be, as indeed he is, a god, or of godly sort, he cannot be aught that is evil; yet as such he is represented in both our speeches. This, therefore, is the offence they were guilty of with regard to Love; and not only this, but with a naïveté that is highly amusing, though they do not utter a single sound or true word throughout, they yet talk as gravely as if they were of consequence, on the strength, it may be, of expecting to impose upon some poor simpletons, and win a fair name among them. I therefore, for my part, Phaedrus, must of necessity purify myself. And for all who sin in matter of legends, there is an ancient form of purification with which

Stesichorus was acquainted, though Homer was not. For when he was deprived of his eyesight for maligning Helen, he was not ignorant, like Homer, of the cause, but a true votary of the Muses, he learnt his fault, and straightway sang

> False was my tale unpassed the rolling sea,
> And Troy's proud turrets never viewed by thee.

And so, having composed all his palinode, as it is called, he immediately recovered his sight. I, however, will be wiser than either of those bards in one particular. Ere any evil befall me for my defamation of Love, I will offer him my palinode by way of atonement, with my head bare, and no longer, as before, muffled up for shame.

Phaedrus/ You could not have said anything that would give me greater pleasure than this.

Socrates/ I believe you, my good friend; for you feel as well as I do, how shameless was the tone of both our speeches. For just conceive their being overheard by some gentleman of mild and generous feeling, who is either now, or has at some past time of his life been, enamored of a youth of congenial disposition. If, for instance, he were to hear us maintaining that on slight provocation lovers contract violent animosities, and make both jealous and dangerous companions to their favorites, do you think it possible that he could help fancying himself listening to persons who had been bred among sailors, and had never witnessed an ingenuous passion, and would he not, think you, be very far from admitting the justice of our censures on love?

Phaedrus/ I don't doubt it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Out of delicacy then to such a lover as this, and for fear of the god of love himself, I desire by a fresh and sweet discourse to wash out, so to speak, the

brackish taste of the stuff we have just heard. And I would recommend Lysias too to make all the haste he can to prove that, under similar circumstances, the suit of a lover should be preferred to that of one who is not in love.

Phaedrus/ You need have no doubt of this being done, Socrates. If you deliver your panegyric on love, Lysias most certainly shall not escape composing another on the same side.

Socrates/ Well, I can trust you for this, so long as you are the man you are.

Phaedrus/ Speak on then with confidence.

Socrates/ But where, I want to know, is the boy to whom I addressed my former speech, as I should be sorry for him to run away without hearing this as well, and favor in his haste the suit of an unimpassioned wooer.

Phaedrus/ Here he is by your side, quite ready for you when you want him.

Socrates/ You must understand then, my beautiful boy, that my late speech was the production of the gay Phaedrus, son of the fame-loving Pythocles, the nursling of the myrtle-beds of Myrrhinus; but that I am indebted for the one I am now about to deliver to the inspired bard Stesichorus, son of the holy Euphemus, bred at Himera in the mysteries of love. Now, it must begin on this wise;

False is the tale which says that when a lover is present, favor ought rather to be shown to one, who is no lover, on the score, forsooth, of the one being mad and the other sane. For if it were true, without exception, that madness is an evil, there would be no harm in the assertion; but, as it is, we owe our greatest

blessings to madness, if only it be granted by Heavens bounty. For the prophetess at Delphi, you are well aware, and the priestesses of Dodona, have in their moments of madness done great and glorious service to the men and the cities of Greece, but little or none in their sober mood. And if we were to speak of the Sibyl and all others, that by exercise of inspired divination have told beforehand many things to many men, and thereby guided them aright in their future courses, we should run to a great length in telling only what everyone knows. There is one fact, however, to which it would be worth our while solemnly to appeal; I mean that, in the opinion of the name-givers of ancient times, madness was no disgrace or reproach; else they would never have attached this very name to that most glorious art whereby the future is discerned. No, it was because they judged of it as a glorious thing when inspired by Heaven s grace, that they gave it the name of μανικήj; it is only the vulgar taste of a later age, that by inserting the tau has made it μαντική instead. Since you will find, in like manner, that the investigation of the future, which is carried on by people in their senses through the medium of birds and other signs, received at first the name of οἰονοϊστική, inasmuch as by means of thought, men furnished themselves out of their own minds with intelligence and information; but moderns, not content with this word, gave it dignity with their long ο, and called it οιωνιστική. As much then as divination is a more perfect and a more precious thing than augury both in name and efficiency, so much more glorious, by the testimony of the ancients, is madness than sober sense, the inspiration of Heaven than the creation of men. Again, for those sore plagues and dire afflictions, which you are aware lingered in certain

families as the wraith of some old ancestral guilt, madness devised a remedy, after it had entered into the heart of the proper persons, and to the proper persons revealed its secrets; for it fled for refuge to prayer and services of the gods, and thence obtaining purifications and atoning rites made its possessor whole for time present and time to come, by showing him the way of escape from the evils that encompassed him, if only he were rightly frenzied and possessed. And thirdly, there is a possession and a madness inspired by the Muses, which seizes upon a tender and a virgin soul, and, stirring it up to rapturous frenzy, adorns in ode and other verse the countless deeds of elder time for the instruction of after ages. But whosoever without the madness of the Muses comes to knock at the doors of poesy, from the conceit that haply by force of art he will become an efficient poet, departs with blasted hopes, and his poetry, the poetry of sense, fades into obscurity before the poetry of madness.

Such, and yet more, are the glorious results I can tell you of as proceeding from a madness inspired by the gods. Let us not therefore regard with apprehension the particular result we are considering, nor be perplexed and frightened by any arguments into the belief that we ought to select the sensible rather than the enraptured man as our friend. No, our opponent must not carry off the palm of victory till he has likewise made it evident, that for no good is love sent from heaven to lover and beloved. With us, on the other hand, rests the proof that such a madness as this is given by God to man for his highest possible happiness. Now my proof, I am aware, will meet with no credit from the subtle disputant, but in the eyes of the truly wise it will be convincing. First of all then I must investigate the truth with regard to

the nature of the soul, both human and divine, by observing its conditions and powers. And thus do I begin my demonstration.

Every soul is immortal for whatever is in perpetual motion is immortal. Now the thing which moves another and is by another moved, as it may cease to be moved, may cease also to live; it is only that which moves itself, inasmuch as it never quits itself, that never ceases moving, but is to everything else that is moved a source and beginning of motion. Now a beginning is uncreate; for everything that is created must be created from a beginning, but a beginning itself from nothing whatever; for if a beginning were created from anything, it would not be a beginning. Again, since it is uncreate, it must also of necessity be indestructible. For if a beginning be destroyed, it can neither itself be at any time created from anything, nor can anything else be created from it, if, as is evidently true, everything must be created from a beginning. Thus we see then that that which is self-moved is the beginning of motion, and as being such can neither be created nor destroyed; else must all the universe and all creation collapse and come to a standstill, and never at any time find that whereby they may be again set in motion and come into being. And now that that which is moved by itself has been found to be immortal, none will hesitate to assert that this power of self-motion is implied in the very essence and definition of a soul. For everybody which receives motion from without we call soulless; but that, which receives motion from within of itself, we say is possessed of soul, as though in this lay the souls very nature. And if it be true, that that which is self-moved is nothing else than the soul, it follows of necessity that the soul must

be a thing both uncreate and immortal. For its immortality let this suffice.

In considering its form let us proceed in the following manner. To explain what the soul is, would be a long and most assuredly a god like labor; to say what it resembles, is a shorter and a human task. Let us attempt then the latter; let us say that the soul resembles the combined efficacy of a pair of winged steeds and a charioteer! Now the horses and drivers of the gods are all both good themselves and of good extraction, but the character and breed of all others is mixed. In the first place, with us men the supreme ruler has a pair of horses to manage, and then of these horses he finds one generous and of generous breed, the other of opposite descent and opposite character. And thus it necessarily follows that driving in our case is no easy or agreeable work. We must at this point endeavor to express what we mean respectively by a mortal and an immortal animal. All that is soul presides over all that is without soul, and patrols all heaven, now appearing in one form and now in another. When it is perfect and fully feathered, it roams in upper air, and regulates the entire universe; but the soul that has lost its feathers is carried down till it finds some solid resting-place; and when it has settled there, when it has taken to itself, that is, an earthly body, which seems capable of self-motion, owing to the power of its new inmate, the name of animal is given to the whole; to this compound, I mean, of soul and body, with the addition of the epithet mortal. The immortal, on the other hand, has received its name from the conclusion of no human reasoning; but without having either seen or formed any adequate conception of a god, we picture him to ourselves as an immortal animal, possessed of soul and possessed of

body, and of both in intimate conjunction from all eternity. But this matter I leave to be and to be told as Heaven pleases my task is to discover what is the cause that makes the feathers fall off the soul. It is something, I conceive, of the following kind.

The natural efficacy of a wing is to lift up heavy substances, and bear them aloft to those upper regions which are inhabited by the race of the gods. And of all the parts connected with the body it has perhaps shared most largely (with the soul) in the divine nature. Now of this nature are beauty, wisdom, virtue, and all similar qualities. By these then the plumage of the soul is chiefly fostered and increased; by ugliness, vice, and all such contraries, it is wasted and destroyed. Zeus, the great chieftain in heaven, driving a winged car, travels first, arranging and presiding over all things; and after him comes a host of gods and inferior deities, marshaled in eleven divisions, for Hestia stays at home alone in the mansion of the gods; but all the other ruling powers, that have their place in the number of the twelve, march at the head of a troop in the order to which they have been severally appointed. Now there are, it is true, many ravishing views and opening paths within the bounds of heaven, whereon the family of the blessed gods go to and fro, each in performance of his own proper work; and they are followed by all who from time to time possess both will and power; for envy has no place in the celestial choir. But whenever they go to feast and revel, they forthwith journey by an uphill path to the summit of the heavenly vault. Now the chariots of the gods being of equal poise, and obedient to the rein, move easily, but all others with difficulty; for they are burdened by the horse of vicious temper, which sways and sinks them towards the earth, if haply he has

received no good training from his charioteer. Where upon there awaits the soul a crowning pain and agony. For those which we called immortal go outside when they are come to the topmost height, and stand on the outer surface of heaven, and as they stand they are borne round by its revolution, and gaze on the external scene. Now of that region beyond the sky no earthly bard has ever yet sung or ever will sing in worthy strains. But this is the fashion of it; for sure I must venture to speak the truth, especially as truth is my theme. Real existence, colorless, formless, and in tangible, visible only to the intelligence which sits at the helm of the soul, and with which the family of true science is concerned, has its abode in this region. The mind then of deity, as it is fed by intelligence and pure science, and the mind of every soul that is destined to receive its due inheritance, is delighted at seeing the essence to which it has been so long a stranger, and by the light of truth is fostered and made to thrive, until, by the revolution of the heaven, it is brought round again to the same point. And during the circuit it sees distinctly absolute justice, and absolute temperance, and absolute science; not such as they appear in creation, nor under the variety of forms to which we nowadays give the name of realities, but the justice, the temperance, the science, which exist in that which is real and essential being. And when in like manner it has seen all the rest of the world of essence, and feasted on the sight, it sinks down again into the interior of heaven, and returns to its own home. And on its arrival, the charioteer takes his horses to the manger, and sets before them ambrosia, and gives them nectar to drink with it. Such is the life of the gods; but of the other souls, that which follows a god most closely and

resembles him most nearly, succeeds in raising the head of its charioteer into the outer region, and is carried round with the immortals in their revolution, though sore encumbered by its horses, and barely able to contemplate the real existences; while another rises and sinks by turns, his horses plunging so violently that he can discern no more than a part of these existences. But the common herd follow at a distance, all of them indeed burning with desire for the upper world, but, failing to reach it, they make the revolution in the moisture of the lower element, trampling on one another, and striking against one another, in their efforts to rush one before the other. Hence ensues the extremest turmoil and struggling and sweating; and herein, by the awkwardness of the drivers, many souls are maimed, and many lose many feathers in the crush; and all after painful labor go away without being blessed by admission to the spectacle of truth, and thenceforth live on the food of mere opinion.

And now will I tell you the motives of this great anxiety to behold the fields of truth. The suitable pasturage for the noblest portion of the soul is grown on the meadows there, and it is the nature of the wing, which bears aloft the soul, to be fostered thereby; and moreover, there is an irrevocable decree, that if any soul has followed a god in close companionship and discerned any of the true essences, it shall continue free from harm till the next revolution, and if it be ever thus successful, it shall be ever thus unharmed; but whenever, from inability to follow, it has missed that glorious sight, and, through some mishap it may have encountered, has become charged with forgetfulness and vice, and been thereby so burdened as to shed its feathers and fall to the earth, in that case there is a law

that the soul thus fallen be not planted in any bestial nature during the first generation, but that if it has seen more than others of essential verity, it pass into the germ of a man who is to become a lover of wisdom, or a lover of beauty, or some votary of the Muses and Love; if it be of second rank, it is to enter the form of a constitutional ruler, a warrior, or a man fitted for command; the third will belong to a politician, or economist, or merchant; the fourth, to a laborious professor of gymnastics, or some disciple of the healing art; the fifth will be possessed by a soothsayer, or some person connected with mysteries; the sixth will be best suited by the life of a poet or some other imitative artist; the seventh, by the labor of an artisan or a farmer; the eighth, by the trade of a sophist or a demagogue; and the ninth, by the lot of an absolute monarch. And in all these various conditions those who have lived justly receive afterwards a better lot; those who have lived unjustly, a worse. For to that same place from which each soul set out, it does not return for ten thousand years; so long is it before it recovers its plumage, unless it has belonged to a guileless lover of philosophy, or a philosophic lover of boys. But these souls, during their third millennium, if only they have chosen thrice in succession this form of existence, do in this case regain their feathers, and at its conclusion wing their departure. But all the rest are, on the termination of their first life, brought to trial; and, according to their sentence, some go to the prison-houses beneath the earth, to suffer for their sins; while others, by virtue of their trial, are borne lightly up wards to some celestial spot, where they pass their days in a manner worthy of the life they have lived in their mortal form. But in the thousandth year both divisions come back again to

share and choose their second life, and they select that which they severally please. And then it is that a human soul passes into the life of a beast, and from a beast who was once a man the soul comes back into a man again. For the soul which has never seen the truth at all can never enter into the human form; it being a necessary condition of a man that he should apprehend according to that which is called a generic form, which, proceeding from a variety of perceptions, is by reflection combined into unity. And this is nothing more nor less than a recollection of those things which in time past our soul beheld when it travelled with a god, and, looking high over what we now call real, lifted up its head into the region of eternal essence. And thus you see it is with justice that the mind of the philosopher alone recovers its plumage, for to the best of its power it is ever fixed in memory on that glorious spectacle, by the contemplation of which the godhead is divine. And it is only by the right use of such memorials as these, and by ever perfecting himself in perfect mysteries, that a man becomes really perfect. But because such an one stands aloof from human interests, and is rapt in contemplation of the divine, he is taken to task by the multitude as a man demented, because the multitude do not see that he is by God inspired.

Socrates/ It will now appear what conclusion the whole course of our argument has reached with regard to the fourth kind of madness, with which a man is inspired whenever, by the sight of beauty in this lower world, the true beauty of the world above is so brought to his remembrance that he begins to recover his plumage, and feeling new wings longs to soar aloft; but the power failing him gazes upward like a bird, and

becomes heedless of all lower matters, thereby exposing himself to the imputation of being crazed. And the conclusion is this, that of all kinds of enthusiasm this is the best, as well in character as in origin, for those who possess it, whether fully or in part; and further, that he who loves beautiful objects must partake of this madness before he can deserve the name of lover. For though, as I said before, every man's soul has by the law of his birth been a spectator of eternal truth, or it would never have passed into this our mortal frame, yet still it is no easy matter for all to be reminded of their past by their present existence. It is hot easy either for those who, during that struggle I told you of, caught but a brief glimpse of upper glories, nor for those who, after their fall to this world, were so unfortunate as to be turned aside by evil associations into the paths of wickedness, and so made to forget that holy spectacle. Few, few only are there left, with whom the world of memory is duly present. And these few, whenever they see here any resemblance of what they witnessed there, are struck with wonder, and can no longer contain themselves, though what it is that thus affects them they know not, for want of sufficient discernment. Now in the likenesses existing here of justice, and temperance, and all else which souls hold precious, there is no brightness; but through the medium of dull dim instruments it is but seldom and with difficulty that people are enabled on meeting with the copies to recognize the character of the original. But beauty not only shone brightly on our view at the time when in the heavenly choir we, for our part, followed in the band of Zeus, as others in the bands of other gods, and saw that blissful sight and spectacle, and were initiated into that mystery which I fear not to pronounce the most blessed

of all mysteries; for we who celebrated it were perfect and untainted by the evil that awaited us in time to come, and perfect too, and simple, and calm, and blissful were the visions which we were solemnly admitted to gaze upon in the purest light, ourselves being no less pure, nor as yet entombed in that which we now drag about with us and call the body, being fettered to it as an oyster to his shell. Excuse my, so far indulging, memory, which has carried me to a greater length than I intended, in my yearning for a happiness that is past. I return to beauty. Not only, as I said before, did she shine brightly among her fellows there, but when we came hither we found her, through the medium of our clearest sense, gleaming far more clearly than them all. For sight is the keenest of our bodily senses, though it fails of distinguishing wisdom. For terrible would be the passion inspired by her, or by any other of those lovely realities, if they exhibited to the eye of sense any such clear resemblance of themselves as is the image afforded by beauty. No, to beauty alone is the privilege given of being at once most conspicuous and most lovely. The man, it is true, whose initiation is of ancient date, or who has lost his purity here, is slow in being carried hence to the essential beauty of the upper world, when he sees that which bears its name in this. Accordingly, he feels no reverence as he gazes on the beautiful object, but, abandoning himself to lust, attempts like a brute beast to gratify his appetite, and in his wanton approaches knows nor fear nor shame at this unnatural pursuit of pleasure But whenever one who is fresh from those mysteries, who saw much of that heavenly vision, beholds in any godlike face or form a successful copy of original beauty, he first of all feels a shuddering chill, and there creep over him some of

those terrors that assailed him in that dire struggle; then, as he continues to gaze, he is inspired with a reverential awe, and did he not fear the repute of exceeding madness, he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god. Afterwards follow the natural results of his chill, a sudden change, a sweating and glow of unwonted heat. For he has received through his eyes the emanation of beauty, and has been warmed thereby, and his native plumage is watered. And by the warmth the parts where the feathers sprout are softened, after having been long so closed up by their hardness as to hinder the feathers from growing. But as soon as this nourishing shower pours in, the quill of the feather begins to swell, and struggles to-start up from the root, and spread beneath the whole surface of the soul; for in old time the soul was entirely feathered.

In this process therefore it boils and throbs all over, and exactly the same sensation which is experienced by children when cutting their teeth, a sensation of itching and soreness about their gums, is experienced by the soul of one who is beginning to put forth new wings; it boils and is sore and tingles as it shoots its feathers. Whenever indeed by gazing on the beauty of the beloved object, and receiving from that beauty particles which fall and flow in upon it (and which are therefore called ἵμερος, desire), the soul is watered and warmed, it is relieved from its pain, and is glad; but as soon as it is parted from its love, and for lack of that moisture is parched, the mouths of the outlets, by which the feathers start, become so closed up by drought, that they obstruct the shooting germs; and the germs being thus confined underneath, in company of the desire which has been infused, leap like throbbing arteries, and prick each at the outlet which is shut against it; so

that the soul, being stung all over, is frantic with pain. But then again it calls to mind the beautiful one, and rejoices. And both these feelings being combined, it is sore perplexed by the strangeness of its condition, and not knowing what to do with itself becomes frenzied, and in its frenzy can neither sleep by night, nor by day remain at rest, but runs to and fro with wistful look wherever it may expect to see the possessor of the beauty. And after it has seen him, and drunk in fresh streams of desire, it succeeds in opening the stoppages which absence had made, and taking breath it enjoys a respite from sting and throe, and now again delights itself for the time being in that most delicious pleasure. And therefore, if it can help, it never quits the side of its beloved, nor holds anyone of more account than him, but forgets mother, and brothers, and friends, and though its substance be wasting by neglect, it regards that as nothing, and of all observances and decorums, on which it prided itself once, it now thinks scorn, and is ready to be a slave and lie down as closely as may be allowed to the object of its yearnings; for, besides its reverence for the possessor of beauty, it has found in him the sole physician for its bitterest pains. Now this affection, my beautiful boy you I mean to whom my speech is addressed is called by mortals Eros (Love); on hearing its name among the gods, your young wit will naturally laugh. There are put forth, if I mistake not, by certain Homerids, out of their secret poems, two verses on Eros, of which the second is quite outrageous, and not at all particularly metrical. Thus they sing;

> Him mortals indeed call winged Eros,
> But immortals Pteros (Flyer), for his flighty nature.

Now these verses you may believe or not believe, as you think proper; but whatever is thought of them the cause of love, and the condition of lovers, is all the same, just such as has been here stated.

Now, if it be one of the former followers of Zeus who is seized by love, he is able to bear in greater weight than others the burden of the wing-named god. But all who were in the service of Ares, and patrolled the heavens in his company, when they are taken captive by Love, and fancy themselves in aught injured by the object of their love, are thirsty of blood, and ready to immolate both themselves and their favorites. And so it is with the follower of the other gods. Every man spends his life in honoring and imitating to the best of his power that particular god of whose choir he was a member, so long as he is exempt from decay, and living his first generation here; and in keeping with the bent thus acquired, he conducts his intercourse and behavior towards the beloved object, as well as all the world. Accordingly, each man chooses himself his love out of the ranks of beauty to suit his peculiar turn; and then, as though his choice were his god, he builds him up for himself, and attires him like a holy image, for the purpose of doing him reverence, and worshipping him with ecstatic festival. They then that belong to Zeus seek to have for their beloved one who resembles Zeus in his soul. And so they look for a youth who is by nature a lover of wisdom, and fitted for command; and when they have found one, and become enamored of him, they strive all they can to make him truly such. And if they have never previously entered upon this task, they now apply themselves to it, both seeking instruction from every possible quarter, and searching in their own souls. And this endeavor to discover the nature of their

patron god, by following the track in themselves, is attended with success, by reason of their being ever constrained to gaze upon their god unflinchingly; and when they grasp him with their memory, they are inspired with his inspiration, and take from him their character and habits, so far as it is possible for man to partake of god. And attributing these blessings to their beloved, they love him still more dearly than ever; and whatever streams they may have drawn from Zeus, like the inspired draughts of the Bacchanals, they pour into their darlings soul, thereby making him resemble, as far as possible, the god whom they resemble themselves. Those again who followed in the train of Hera, search out a youth of kingly mold, and when he is found, act towards him in exactly the same manner as the former. And so it is with the adherents of Apollo, and all other gods. Walking themselves in the steps of their own proper god, they look for the youth whom they are to love to be of kindred nature; and when they have gained such an one, both by imitation on their own part, and by urging and attuning the soul of their beloved, they guide him into the particular pursuit and character of that god, so far as they are severally able, not treating him with jealous or illiberal harshness, but using every endeavor to bring him into all possible conformity with themselves and the god whom they adore. So beautiful is the desire of those who truly love; and if they accomplish their desire, so beautiful is the initiation, as I call it, into their holy mystery, and so fraught with blessing at the hand of the friend, whom love has maddened, to the object of the friendship, if he be but won. Now he who is won, is won in the following manner.

As at the commencement of this account I divided every soul into three parts, two of them resembling horses, and the third a charioteer, so let us here still keep to that division. Now of the horses one, if you remember, we said, was good, and the other bad; but wherein consists the goodness of the one, and the badness of the other, is a point which, not distinguished then, must be stated now. That horse of the two which occupies the nobler rank, is in form erect and firmly knit, high necked, hook-nosed, white-colored, black-eyed; he loves honor with temperance and modesty, and, a votary of genuine glory, he is driven without stroke of the whip by voice and reason alone. The bad horse, on the other hand, is crooked, bulky, clumsily put together, with thick neck, short throat, flat face, black coat, gray and bloodshot eyes, a friend to all riot and insolence, shaggy about the ears, dull of hearing, scarce yielding to lash and goad united. Whenever therefore the driver sees the sight which inspires love, and his whole soul being thoroughly heated by sense, is surcharged with irritation and the stings of desire, the obedient horse, yielding then as ever to the check of shame, restrains himself from springing on the loved one; but the other pays heed no longer to his drivers goad or lash, but struggles on with unruly bounds, and doing all violence to his yoke-fellow and master, forces them to approach the beautiful youth, and bethink themselves of the joys of dalliance. And though at first they resist him with indignation at the lawless and fearful crime he is urging, yet at last, when there, is no end to the evil, they move onward as he leads them, having yielded him submission and agreed to do his bidding. So they come up to the beautiful boy, and see his face all gleaming with beauty. But at the sight the

driver s memory is carried back to the essence of beauty, and again he sees her by the side of Continence standing on a holy pedestal. And at the sight he shudders, and with a holy awe falls backward to the ground, and falling cannot help pulling back the reins so violently that he brings both the horses on their haunches, the one indeed willingly, because he is not resisting, but the rebel in spite of struggling. And when they are withdrawn to some distance, the former in his shame and ravishment drenches all the soul with sweat; but the other, when he is recovered from the pain which the bit and the fall inflicted, and has with difficulty regained his breath, breaks out into passionate reviling, vehemently railing at his master and his comrade for their treacherous cowardice in deserting their ranks and agreement. And again he urges them, again refusing, to approach, and barely yields a reluctant consent when they beg to defer the attempt to another time. But soon as the covenanted time is come, though they affect forgetfulness, he reminds them of their engagement, and plunging and neighing and dragging, he again obliges them to approach the beautiful youth to make the same proposals. And when they are near, he stoops his head and gets the bit between his teeth, and drags them on incontinently. But the driver experiences, though still more strongly, the same sensation as at first; backward he falls like racers at the barrier, and with a wrench still more violent than before pulls back the bit from between the teeth of the riotous horse, thereby drenching his jaws and railing tongue with blood; and bruising against the ground his legs and haunches, consigns him to anguish. But as soon as by this treatment oft repeated the evil horse is recovered from his vice, he follows with humbled steps

the guidance of his driver, and at sight of the fair one is consumed with terror. So that then, and not till then, does it happen that the soul of the lover follows his beloved with reverence and awe. And the consequence is, that the youth being now worshipped with all the worship of a god by a lover who does not feign the passion, but feels it in his soul, and being himself by nature fondly inclined to his worshipper, even though haply in time past he may have been set against lovers by the remarks of his school fellows or others on the scandal of allowing their approaches, and is therefore disposed to reject his present wooer, yet now that the latter is thus changed he is led in course of time, by the instinct of his years, and the law of destiny, to admit him to familiarity. For surely it was never destined for the bad to be friends of the bad, or the good aught but friendly to the good. But when the advances have been accepted and speech and intercourse allowed, the affection of the lover being brought into near connection with the loved one, strikes him with wonder, as it compels him to feel that the friendship shown him by all the rest of his friends and relations put together is as nothing beside the love of his god-inspired friend. And if he continues long thus to indulge him, and allows him the closest contact both in gymnastic schools and other places of meeting, then it is that the stream of that effluence, to which Zeus when enamored of Ganymedes gave the name of desire, pours upon the lover in a plenteous flood, and partly sinks within him, partly flows off him when he is full; and just as a wind or a noise rebounds from smooth and hard substances and is carried back again to the place from which it came; so the tide of beauty passes back into the beautiful boy through his eyes, the natural channel into his soul; and

when it is come there and has fledged it anew, it waters the outlets of the feathers, and forcing them to shoot up afresh fills the soul of the loved one as well as that of his lover with love. He is in love therefore, but with whom he cannot say; nay, what it is that is come over him he knows not, neither can he tell, but like one who has caught a disease in the eye from the diseased gaze of another, he can assign no reason for the affection, but sees himself in his lover, as in a glass, without knowing who it is that he sees. And when they are together, he enjoys the same respite that his lover does from his anguish; but when they are parted, he yearns for him as he himself is yearned for, since he holds in his bosom love s reflected image, love returned. He calls it, however, and believes it to be not love but friendship, albeit, he feels the same desire as the other does, though in a feebler degree, for the sight, the touch, the kiss, the embrace. And consequently, as might be expected, his conduct henceforward is as follows. When they are lying side by side, the lovers unbridled horse has much to say to its driver, and claims as the recompense of many labors a short enjoyment; but the vicious horse of the other has nothing to say, but burning and restless clasps the lover and kisses him as he would kiss a dear friend, and when they are folded in each other's embrace, is just of such a temper as not for his part to refuse indulging the lover in any pleasure he might request to enjoy; but his yoke-fellow, on the other hand, joins the driver in struggling against him with chastity and reason. Should it appear then that the better part of their nature has succeeded in bringing both the lover and loved into a life of order and philosophy, and established its own ascendency, in bliss and harmony they live out their existence here,

being masters of themselves and decorous before the world, having enslaved that portion of the soul wherein vice is contained, and liberated that where virtue dwells; and at last when they come to die, being winged and lightened, they have in one of their three truly Olympic combats achieved the prize, than which no greater good can either human prudence or godly madness be stow on man. But if they have given in to a coarser habit of life, and one unfriendly to wisdom, though not to honor, it may well happen that in a moment of drunkenness or like abandonment, those two unruly beasts will surprise the souls off their guard, and bringing them together into one place will choose and consummate that practice which the world deems happy, and once consummated will for the future indulge in it, though sparingly, as doing what is not approved by all their mind. Dear, therefore, to each other, though not so dear as the former two, do these continue both while their love is burning and when it is extinct; for they conceive themselves to have given and received the strongest pledges, which it were impious at any time to violate by becoming alienated. And in the end, without their wings it is true, but not without having started feathers, they go forth from the body, so that they carry off no paltry prize for their impassioned madness; for there is a law that the paths of darkness beneath the earth shall never again be trodden by those who have so much as set their foot on the heaven word road, but that walking hand in hand they shall live a bright and blessed life, and when they recover their wings, recover them together for their loves sake.

So great and so godly, my beautiful boy, are the blessings which the affection of a lover will bestow. But the commerce of one who does not love, being alloyed

with mortal prudence, and dispensing only mortal and niggardly gifts, will breed in the soul of the loved one a sordidness which the vulgar laud as virtue, and doom it for nine thousand years to be tossed about the earth and under the earth without reason.

Here, to thee, beloved Eros, fair and good as I can make it, I offer and duly pay a recantation, composed perforce for sake of Phaedrus, both in phrase and other points, in a poetic strain. But oh vouchsafe me pardon for my former speech and indulgence for this, and of thy tender mercy neither take from me the art of love, which thou hast given me, nor cripple it in thy wrath, but grant that still more than ever I may find favor in the eyes of the fair. And, if in our former speech, Phaedrus and I said aught offensive to thee, set it to the account of Lysias as the father of the speech, and make him to cease from speeches of this sort, and turn him to philosophy, even as his brother Polemarchus is turned, in order that his lover also here before thee may no longer halt, as now, between two opinions, but heart and soul devote his life to love with philosophic talk.

Phaedrus/ I join with you, Socrates, in praying that, if this lot be better for us, so it may be fall us. With regard to the speech, however, it has been long exciting my admiration, so much more beautiful have you made it than your former one; so much more indeed that I am afraid I shall find Lysias making but a poor figure, if indeed he be willing to match it with another of his own. Which I have my doubts about. For it was only the other day that one of our public men in an attack he was making upon him, reproached him on this very score, and throughout his attack kept calling him a speech-writer. So that perhaps he may be led by a care for his own reputation to desist from the practice.

Socrates/ Your notion is an absurd one, my young gentleman, and you are greatly mistaken in your favorite, if you imagine him to be a person so readily scared. Perhaps too you believe that his assailant meant what he said.

Phaedrus/ He certainly seemed to do so, Socrates; and besides, you must know as well as I do, that men of the greatest influence and consideration in a state are ashamed of writing speeches, and leaving behind them compositions of their own, for fear of obtaining with posterity the reputation and name of sophists.

Socrates/ It has escaped you, Phaedrus, that the phrase A charming bend, is derived from that long and wearisome bend in the Nile; and so it escapes you that under this affected dislike, our most self-satisfied statesmen are especially fond of composing speeches, and leaving behind them writings; so much so in deed, that whenever they write a speech, they conceive such an affection for its supporters, that they write down in an additional clause at its head the names of those who on each occasion accord it their approval.

Phaedrus/ How do you mean? I don't understand you.

Socrates/ Don't you understand that at the beginning of a statesman's writing the name of its supporter is written first?

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ Approved. Thus, if I am not mistaken, runs the writing; Approved by the council, or people, or both. And the proposer, our speech-writer to wit, naming his worthy self with all pomp and panegyric, proceeds to make a speech, and to show off his wisdom to his

supporters, not infrequently by the composition of a very long writing. Or, do you conceive such a production as this to be something different from a written speech?

Phaedrus/ No, certainly I don't.

Socrates/ Well, if the speech stands, our poet goes home from his theatre rejoicing; but if it be erased, and he debarred from speech-writing, and the dignity of authorship, he goes into mourning, himself and his friends.

Phaedrus/ So they do.

Socrates/ Obviously not as disdaining the practice, but as viewing it with admiration.

Phaedrus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Again, whenever an orator or a monarch has been found equal to the task of assuming the authority of a Lycurgus, or a Solon, or a Darius, and becoming a speechwriter for immortality in a state, does not both he himself, during his lifetime, look upon himself in the light of a god, and do not after ages conceive the same opinion of him, from a survey of his written works?

Phaedrus/ To be sure they do.

Socrates/ Do you believe then that a person of this sort, however strong his antipathy to Lysias, would attack him simply on the score of being a writer?

Phaedrus/ It is not at any rate to be expected that he would from what you say; for in so doing he would to all appearance be attacking his own particular fancy.

Socrates/ It must then, I think, be universally acknowledged, that there is no disgrace in the mere fact of writing speeches.

Phaedrus/ How can there be?

Socrates/ But the disgrace, I imagine, commences when they are composed not well, but awkwardly and ill.

Phaedrus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ What then is the character of good and bad writing? Ought we, think you, Phaedrus, to take on this matter the evidence of Lysias, and of everyone else who has either written or means to write a work, political or otherwise, either in meter as a poet, or without meter as a prose-writer?

Phaedrus/ Do you ask if we ought? Why what other object can a man be said to live for, than the enjoyment of such pleasures as these? Surely not for those which must be preceded by pain, before they can be so much as enjoyed, which is the case you know with most of our bodily pleasures, so that they have been justly denominated servile.

Socrates/ Well, we have time it seems to spare; and moreover I cannot help fancying that the cicadas, while chirping and talking together over our heads, as is their wont in the heat of the day, have their eyes upon you and me. Should they see us then, like common men, falling asleep instead of conversing in the middle of the day, and abandoning ourselves in laziness of soul to their lulling music, they would regard us with merited scorn, and fancy themselves looking upon some poor slaves, who had sought the refuge of their retreat, to take like sheep a mid-day nap by the waters of their well. But if they see us proceeding with our conversation, and sailing past them unenchanted by their siren strains, they may perhaps in their admiration confer on us that boon, which they have from the gods to bestow upon men.

Phaedrus/ What boon is that? I do not remember to have heard of it.

Socrates/ A lover of the Muses is the last person who should be ignorant of such matters as this. The story goes, that once upon a time these cicadas were men, of a race that lived before the birth of the Muses. But when the Muses were born, and song appeared, it came to pass that some of that race were so transported with pleasure, that as they sang they forgot to eat and drink, till death came upon them unawares. From them it is that the race of the cicadas are sprung, having received the boon from the Muses, that they should need no nourishment after they were come into the world, but spend their time in singing, without food or drink, from the moment of their birth to the day of their death, when they are to repair to the Muses, and tell each of them of their worshippers here below. Terpsichore they tell of those who have honored her in the dance, and thus make them dearer to her than before; Erato they tell of her votaries in love, and so to each of the other sisters they make their report according to the character of her proper worship. But to Calliope the eldest, and Urania the second of the nine, they bear tidings of those who pass their lives in philosophic study and observance of their peculiar music, these we know being the Muses who, having heaven for their special sphere, and words both divine and human, pour forth the gladdest strains. You see therefore, Phaedrus, there are many reasons why we should talk and not slumber in the middle of the day.

Phaedrus/ Indeed there are.

Socrates/ Let us then, resuming the subject which we proposed to ourselves for consideration, examine in

what consists a good or a bad discourse, whether spoken or written.

Phaedrus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not an essential condition of a good and fine speech being made, that the mind of the speaker be acquainted with the truth of the matter he is going to discuss?

Phaedrus/ Why, I have heard men say on this subject, Socrates, that there is no need at all for the intended orator to learn what is really just, but only what is likely to be considered f just by the multitude who are to sit as judges; nor, again, what is really good and honorable, but only what will appear so; for by such appearances, they add, is persuasion effected, and not by truth.

Socrates/ Sure we must not cast away a saying, Phaedrus, which wise men have uttered, but rather examine whether there be anything in it or not. And so we must not refuse a hearing to your present remark.

Phaedrus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Let us consider it then in the following point of view. Suppose I were to set about persuading you to buy a horse for the purposes of war, but neither of us knew what a horse was; only this much I did happen to know, that my friend Phaedrus believed a horse to be that domestic animal which has the longest ears.

Phaedrus/ Why, it would be absurd, Socrates.

Socrates/ Wait a moment. What if I were to proceed in a tone of serious persuasion, and compose a panegyric on the ass, all the while calling him a horse, and saying that he was a creature of infinite value, not only for domestic purposes, but also on military service,

as he was both convenient to fight from, and capable of bringing up baggage, and of being made useful in a thousand other ways?

Phaedrus/ Well, there can be no doubt of its being utterly absurd now, at any rate.

Socrates/ Is it not better though to. be absurd, than a dangerous and malevolent friend?

Phaedrus/ Doubtless it is.

Socrates/ Whenever then an orator, who is ignorant of good and evil, finds a people in a state of similar ignorance, and takes upon himself to persuade them by passing an eulogium, not upon a poor ass as though it were a horse, but upon evil as though it were good; and when, by having studied and learned the popular opinions, he has succeeded in persuading them to do that which is evil instead of that which is good, what kind of fruit do you imagine his oratory will hereafter reap as the harvest of the seed she has sown?

Phaedrus/ No very good one, certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not possible though, my good Phaedrus, that we have been somewhat too rough in our attack on rhetoric? may she not turn upon us and say, What's all this trifling, ye wondrous wise? I force no man to learn speaking without a knowledge of the truth; on the contrary, if my advice be worth anything, he will acquire the truth before he comes to me. But what I do insist on is this, that without my aid he will not be a whit the better able, for all his knowledge of truth, to persuade according to art.

Phaedrus/ And do not you admit the justice of her plea?

Socrates/ I do, provided only the arguments which are coming up to attack her testify to her being an art.

For methinks I hear the rustle of certain arguments approaching, and protesting that she is an impostor, and no art at all, but an inartistic knack. But of speaking, says the Spartan, there neither is, nor ever shall be, genuine art without the grasp of truth.

Phaedrus/ We must have your arguments, Socrates; bring them here into court, and examine what it is they say, and how they say it.

Socrates/ Hither then, fine creatures, and persuade Phaedrus, father of a fair progeny like you, that if he be not a competent philosopher, neither at any time will he be a competent speaker on any subject at all. And let Phaedrus reply.

Phaedrus/ Put your questions.

Socrates/ May not rhetoric in general be considered as a method of winning men's souls by means of words, not only in courts of law, and other public assemblies, but also in private conversation indifferently on matters great and small; and is not its correct use held in equal honor whether the subject to which it is applied be trivial or important? Or what have you heard say on the matter?

Phaedrus/ Why nothing at all of this kind, I can assure you. No, the courts of law are the especial sphere of rhetorical art, and it is also employed in addressing deliberative assemblies; but I never heard of its extending further.

Socrates/ What, have you only heard of the arts of speaking composed by Nestor and Ulysses, to while away their leisure before Troy? and have you never heard of those by Palamedes?

Phaedrus/ No, nor of Nestors either, unless you are making a Nestor of Gorgias, and a Ulysses of Thrasymachus or Theodorus.

Socrates/ Possibly I am. However, to leave these gentlemen for the present, answer me this. In a court of justice, what is it that the contending parties do? Contradict each other, do they not?

Phaedrus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ On points of right and wrong?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if a man does this by rule of art, he will make the same thing appear to the v same people to be at one time right, and at another, if he pleases, wrong.

Phaedrus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And so in a popular harangue he will make the public believe the same line of conduct to be at one time for their advantage, and at another time just the reverse.

Phaedrus/ Certainly he will.

Socrates/ But do we not also hear of the Eleatic Palamedes speaking by aid of art in such a manner that his hearers believed the same things to be at once like and unlike, one and many, at rest and in motion?

Phaedrus/ Undoubtedly we do.

Socrates/ It appears, then, that the art of debate is not confined either to courts of law or popular assemblies, but that to everything that is said we are able to apply this single art, if art it is, by which we shall be enabled to make all things appear similar that are capable of so appearing, and to drag to the light all such attempts in others, however dexterously concealed.

Phaedrus/ I don't quite understand what you mean by this.

Socrates/ My meaning will, I think, be apparent, if we conduct our inquiry thus. Is deception more generally practiced in things which differ much or little?

Phaedrus/ In those which differ little.

Socrates/ And you will get round, I conceive, from one side to the other, with less chance of detection, by taking short steps than long ones.

Phaedrus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ If one man, then, would fain deceive another, without being deceived himself, he ought to be able to discriminate accurately the resemblances and differences of things.

Phaedrus/ Nay, he must be able.

Socrates/ But if he be ignorant of the true nature of a particular, thing, will he be in a condition to distinguish between a greater and less resemblance to it in other things?

Phaedrus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Whenever, therefore, people are deceived, and form opinions wide of the truth, it is clear that the error has slid into their minds through the medium of certain resemblances to that truth.

Phaedrus/ Such no doubt is generally the case.

Socrates/ Is it possible, then, for a man ever to possess the art of bringing over the mind of another from truth to falsehood, by leading it from link to link in the chain of resemblances, or to escape such delusion himself, without having first arrived at an

understanding of the true nature of each particular thing?

Phaedrus/ No, never.

Socrates/ An art of speaking then, composed by one, who, without a knowledge of the truth, has entrapped men's opinions, will present, I conceive, but a sorry and inartistic appearance.

Phaedrus/ I apprehend so.

Socrates/ Now, Phaedrus, what say you to our taking the speech of Lysias, which you have got in your hand, together with those of mine which followed, and looking for instances in them of what we maintain to be in accordance with, or in violation of, art?

Phaedrus/ I should like it of all things; since there is a sort of baldness in our present way of treating the subject, arising from a want of proper examples.

Socrates/ True, and by some lucky chance, as I take it, both the speeches were made to afford an example of the manner in which an author, who is himself acquainted with the truth, may for mere amusement lead his hearers away from it in discourse. And for my part, Phaedrus, I set this to the account of the deities of the spot; or it may be that the ministers of the Muses, our songsters overhead, have breathed into us this happy gift. For sure I am that I at least am innocent of any art of speaking.

Phaedrus/ Be it as you will only make your meaning clear.

Socrates/ Well, then, read me out the beginning of Lysias's speech.

Phaedrus/ With the state of my affairs you are acquainted, and how I expect advantage to us both from this arrangement you have heard. Now I claim not to be

disappointed in my suit on the ground of my not happening to be your lover. For lovers repent.

Socrates/ Stop we are to notice, are we not, any error or violation of art that our author commits?

Phaedrus/ We are.

Socrates/ Well, then, is it not obvious to all the world, that on certain points of this kind we are all agreed, on others all at variance?

Phaedrus/ I think I know what you mean; but explain yourself more clearly.

Socrates/ When a man uses the words iron or silver, do we not all understand by them the same things?

Phaedrus/ To be sure we do.

Socrates/ But what happens when he talks of justice or virtue? Do we not all start off at once in different directions, and quarrel both with one another and ourselves?

Phaedrus/ Too true.

Socrates/ On some things, then, you allow we are agreed, in others not?

Phaedrus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Now in which of these two classes of things is deception more easily practiced; and in which has rhetoric greater power?

Phaedrus/ Clearly in that in which we are liable to go wrong.

Socrates/ Before handling, then, an art of rhetoric, a man ought in the first instance to have methodically distinguished between these two classes, and discovered some characteristic mark of each, of that in which men in general are of necessity in error, and of that where no such necessity exists.

Phaedrus/ A fine generalization certainly, Socrates, would he have devised who had seized on this distinction.

Socrates/ And secondly, I imagine, when he comes to any particular case, he must not be at fault, but perceive with rapidity in which of the two classes the subject of his intended remarks is contained.

Phaedrus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Now what do you say to Love? Are we to rank him in the debatable, or certain class?

Phaedrus/ In the debatable, without a doubt. For how else do you think he would have allowed you to say all that you have just now said about him, making him out at one time to be a curse both to the lover and his favorite; and then again their chiefest blessing?

Socrates/ Admirably said; but tell me this too for I, you must know, was in such an ecstatic state, that I do not quite remember did I give a definition of Love at the beginning of my speech?

Phaedrus/ Ay, that you did, and a wonderfully thorough one too.

Socrates/ Alas for Lysias, son of Cephalus! far less skilled do you make him in the art of speech-writing than the nymphs of our river and Pan the son of Hermes; or am I altogether wrong, and did Lysias also, at the commencement of his love-speech, compel us to form someone definite conception of love the conception that he himself preferred and then proceed, in strict accordance with this conception, to arrange all the subsequent parts of his discourse till he brought it to a fitting conclusion? Just let us read the opening sentence again.

Phaedrus/ I will if you wish it, though what you are looking for is not there.

Socrates/ Let us hear it, that we may take his own evidence on the point.

Phaedrus/ 1 With the state of my affairs you are acquainted, and that I expect advantage to us both from this arrangement, you have heard. Now I claim not to be disappointed in my suit on the ground of my not belonging to the number of your lovers; for they, indeed, repent of the benefits they have conferred as soon as they are released from their passion.

Socrates/ Yes, we seem to be far indeed from discovering here what we are looking for, when we find our author not even starting from the beginning, but from the end of his subject, and essaying to get through his discourse like a swimmer on his back the wrong way foremost; for you see he commences with what the lover might be supposed to say to his favorite at the end, and not before the end, of his address. Or do you see nothing in my objection, Phaedrus, noble friend?

Phaedrus/ Yes, I must confess, Socrates, that what he is talking about is a natural conclusion of the subject.

Socrates/ And what do you say to the rest? Do not the several parts of his discourse appear to have been thrown together at random? or do you see some necessity for the second sentence occupying the second place, or any other sentence appearing in the position he has assigned it? For my part, I must confess that he seems to me, in my ignorance, to have put down on paper, with a gentlemanly independence, whatever came first into his head; but you, perhaps, are aware of

some law of composition which guided his sentences into that particular order.

Phaedrus/ You are too good to suppose me capable of seeing through the design of a Lysias with so critical an eye.

Socrates/ But this I think you will allow, that every speech ought to be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own, lacking neither head nor foot, but having both a middle and extremities in perfect keeping with one another and the whole.

Phaedrus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Examine, then, whether your friends speech be composed on this principle or not, and you will find it just like the epigram which people say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas, the Phrygian.

Phaedrus/ What is the epigram, and what is there peculiar about it?

Socrates/ It runs thus; I am a maiden of brass, and I lie upon Midas's tomb;

> Ever while water shall flow, and the trees of the forest shall bloom,
> Here will I stay on a grave that is watered with many a tear,
> Telling to all who pass by me that Midas is sepulchered here.

Now, that it is utterly immaterial whether any line of this epigram be put first or last, you must, I should think, have observed.

Phaedrus/ You make very merry with our speech, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, Phaedrus, to spare your feelings, suppose we pass it by; not but that I conceive it to contain a crowd of examples, which a man might study

with advantage to himself, provided only he does not at all attempt to imitate them; and let us proceed to the other two speeches, for there was something in them, I imagine, well worthy the attention of those who wish to consider the subject of speaking.

Phaedrus/ What sort of thing do you mean?

Socrates/ If I remember right, they were opposed to each other; the one supporting the claims of the impassioned; and the other, those of the unimpassioned suitor.

Phaedrus/ And right manfully they did their work.

Socrates/ I thought you were going to say, as the truth would warrant, right madly. However, this is the very point I was in quest of. We said that love was a madness, did we not?

Phaedrus/ We did.

Socrates/ And that madness was of two kinds, the one produced by human disease, the other by an inspired departure from established usages.

Phaedrus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And the inspired we divided into four parts, and distributing them among four heavenly powers, we set down the madness of prophecy to the inspiration of Apollo; of mysteries, to the inspiration of Dionysus; to the Muses again we ascribed the madness of poesy; and the fourth, to Aphrodite and Eros. And this last, the madness of love, we said was the best of all the four; and expressing the affection of love by a strange kind of similitude, wherein we kept, I doubt not, some true principle in our sight, though haply we swerved into error on our path, we compounded a discourse not altogether without plausibility, and sang a mythic hymn in seemly and pious adoration of my lord

and thine, Phaedrus of Eros, the patron of beautiful boys.

Phaedrus/ And one, I can assure you, which afforded me no slight pleasure to hear.

Socrates/ Let us now, by an examination of the speech itself, discover how it was that it found means of passing from censure to praise.

Phaedrus/ Well, and how was it?

Socrates/ You must know that I consider speech itself, in its general character, to be nothing more than a sportive effusion; but throughout all that was thus casually uttered, there are two forms of method apparent which would well repay our attention, if we could but obtain a systematic view of their respective efficiency.

Phaedrus/ What are they, pray?

Socrates/ The first consists in comprehending at a glance, whenever a subject is proposed, all the widely scattered particulars connected with it, and bringing them together under one general idea, in order that, by a precise definition, we may make everyone understand what is that at the time we are intending to discuss And this plan we just now, as you remember, adopted with regard to love; we defined its nature; and whatever be the merit of the performance, certain it is that to that definition my speech owes its clearness and consistency.

Phaedrus/ And what is your other method, Socrates?

Socrates/ That, on the other hand, enables us to separate a general idea into its subordinate elements, by dividing it at the joints, as nature directs, and not attempting to break any limb in half, after the fashion of a bungling carver. And this plan was followed in my

two speeches with regard to mental derangement. Just as from one body there proceed two sets of members, called by the same name, but distinguished as right and left, so when my speeches had formed the general conception of mental derangement, as constituting by nature one class within us, the speech which had to divide the left-hand portion desisted not from dividing it into smaller, and again smaller parts, till it found among them a kind of left-handed love, which it railed at with well-deserved severity; while the other led us to the right-hand side of madness, where it discovered a love bearing indeed the same name as the former, but of an opposite and a godly sort, which it held up to be gazed at and lauded as the author of our greatest blessings.

Phaedrus/ Perfectly true.

Socrates/ Now, not only do I pursue myself, with all a lovers assiduity, these methods of decomposing and combining, but if ever I find anyone else whom I judge capable of apprehending the one and the many as they are in nature, that man I follow behind, as though in the track of a god. And to all who are possessed of this power I have been in the habit of giving, whether rightly or wrongly, heaven knows, the name of dialecticians. But tell me, what is the proper name for the disciples of your school and Lysias's? is yours that identical art of words by the use of which Thrasymachus and his compeers have not only become clever speakers themselves, but make such of all their pupils, who are willing to bring them presents, as though they were kings?

Phaedrus/ And men of kingly mold they are, though certainly not acquainted with that about which you are now inquiring. However, you appear to me to be quite

right in calling this kind of method dialectical; but the rhetorical, I take it, still eludes our grasp.

Socrates/ Indeed! a fine thing truly that must be which, not comprised in this, is yet apprehended by art. On no account must it be slighted by you and me come now, let us consider what it is that is left to rhetoric.

Phaedrus/ Oh, you'll find plenty of it, I doubt not, Socrates, if you'll only look in the books written on the art of speech-making.

Socrates/ True, and I am obliged to you for reminding me. We must have, in the first place, I think, an exordium delivered at the opening of the speech. This is what you mean is it not? the refinements of the art?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And next we must have narration, they say, and evidence to back it, and thirdly proofs, and fourthly probabilities; and there's confirmation, if I remember right, and after confirmation to boot, according to that prime tricker out of speeches who comes from Byzantium.

Phaedrus/ Worthy Theodorus, eh?

Socrates/ Exactly. He gives us rules too for refutation and after-refutation, both in charge and defense. But the Parian wonder, Evenus, we must not leave in the background, who was the first to discover sub-intimation and by panegyric; nay, they tell me he repeats his by censures in verse, to aid the memory. So clever is he. Can we pass over in silence either Tisias and Gorgias, who were enabled to see that the probable ought to be more highly prized than the true; who make small things appear great, and great things small, by force of words; who talk of what is new as though it were old, and of what is old as though it were new; and who

have invented for every subject a terse brevity and illimitable prolixity? Once though, when I told Prodicus of this, he burst out a-laughing, and said that none. but himself had discovered what kind of speeches were required by art. We must have them, says he, neither long nor short, but of moderate length.

Phaedrus/ Cleverly said, Prodicus.

Socrates/ But we must not forget Hippias; for I fancy our friend from Elis would be on the same side with him of Ceos.

Phaedrus/ Doubtless.

Socrates/ But where shall we find words for all Polus's museum of ornaments his jingle-making, maxim-making, image-making, and all the pretty expressions which he borrowed from his master Licymnius, to create a harmonious diction?

Phaedrus/ Was not this though, Socrates, something in the style of Protagoras?

Socrates/ A correctness of diction, young sir, was what he taught, and a great many other fine things too. But in the art of dragging in piteous whining on poverty and age, there never was, I believe, such a master as the hero of Chalcedon. He was a terrible man, too for rousing the passions of a crowd, and lulling them again when roused, by the magic of his song, as he used to say; and at raising or rebutting a calumny on any ground whatsoever, he was eminently expert. To come, however to the conclusion of the speech, that is, I imagine, a point on which all men are agreed, though some call it recapitulation, and. by some different title.

Phaedrus/ You mean, the summarily reminding the hearers at the end of the speech of all that has been said in the course of it.

Socrates/ Yes; and now have you anything else to tell me about the art of speaking?

Phaedrus/ Only a few trifling matters not worth mentioning.

Socrates/ Well, if they are trifling, let us pass them by, and rather hold up these we have got to the light, that we may discern the character and sphere of their efficiency in art.

Phaedrus/ There is no doubt of its being a very powerful one, Socrates; in popular assemblies, at any rate.

Socrates/ None, I am aware; but look at them, my good sir, and see whether you do not observe, as I do, some flaw in their texture.

Phaedrus/ Point it out, will you?

Socrates/ Well, answer me this. Suppose a man were to call upon your friend Eryximachus, or his father Actimenus, and say, I know how to make such applications to the body as will create either heat or cold, as I please; and if I think proper, I can produce vomiting and purging, and a great variety of similar effects. And, on the strength of this knowledge, I flatter myself that I am a physician, and able to make a physician of anyone to whom I may communicate the knowledge of these matters. What do you think would be their answer on hearing this?

Phaedrus/ Why, they would, of course, ask him whether he also knew to what objects, at what times, and to what extent, these modes of treatment ought severally to be applied.

Socrates/ And if he were to answer, Oh, I know nothing of the kind; but I expect that my pupil will be

able to act in all these matters for himself, as soon as he has learnt the secrets I mentioned.

Phaedrus/ Why then they would doubtless say. The man is mad; he has been hearing some book read, or he has fallen in with some nostrum or other, and fancies himself in consequence a made physician, while in reality he knows nothing at all about the art.

Socrates/ And what if a man were to go up to Sophocles and Euripides, and tell them that he knew how to make a very long harangue on a small matter, and again, a very short harangue on a great matter; that he could write at will in a pathetic or in a bold and menacing tone; that he possessed a variety of similar accomplishments, and that by giving lessons in such he conceived himself to be imparting the power of writing tragedy?

Phaedrus/ Well, they too, I imagine, Socrates, would burst into a laugh at the notion of tragedy being made up of these elements, without regard being paid to their consistency with one another and the whole in the combination.

Socrates/ True, but they would not, I conceive, rail at him coarsely, but would rather adopt the tone a musician would use on meeting with a man who esteemed himself a harmonist, because, as he said, he happened to know how to draw from a chord the highest and lowest possible notes. For the musician, I imagine, would not fiercely say to such a person, You wretched fellow, you are stark mad; but, with the gentleness that music inspires, would reply, It is doubtless necessary, my excellent friend, for these matters to be understood by the intended harmonist, but there is nothing in the

world to necessary preliminaries to harmony, and not harmony itself.

Phaedrus/ And a very proper answer too.

Socrates/ And in like manner, Sophocles might reply to the tragic pretender, that he knew the preliminaries to tragedy, but not tragedy itself; and Acumenus to the medical pretender, that he knew the preliminaries to medicine, but not medicine itself.

Phaedrus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ And lastly, what answer might we expect from the honeyed tones of our Athenian Adrastus, or from the great Pericles himself, were they to hear of the splendid devices which we have just now enumerated, of the maxim-making, image-makings, and all the other makings, of which we concluded the list by remarking they deserved to be scrutinized in a clearer light? Would they follow, do you imagine our rude example, and be so boorish as to give vent to ill-mannered expressions against those who have written on, and give lessons in these artifices, as though they constituted the art of rhetoric: or would they, as being wiser than we, turn upon us reprovingly, and say, Phaedrus and Socrates, you do not well to be angry but should rather make all allowance, if people ignorant of dialectics have been found unable to define what rhetoric is, and, as the natural result of this ignorance have conceived themselves inventors of an art of rhetoric because they happen to possess the acquirements which must of necessity precede the art; and if, again, they believe that by teaching these acquirements to others they have imparted to them rhetoric in perfection, while they say nothing about the power of using each of them persuasively, or of combining them into one general

whole, but leave it, as a trifling matter, to the pupils themselves, to furnish, out of their own unaided resources, in the speeches they may have to compose.

Phaedrus/ Well, certainly, Socrates, I am afraid that such is very much the character of the art which these people teach both in lecture and writing; and I must confess I think you have spoken the truth. But do now tell me by what means, and from what source, we may acquire the real art of rhetorical persuasion.

Socrates/ The power, Phaedrus, of becoming a consummate workman therein, is probably, or I should rather say, is of necessity, subject to a universal law. If you are endowed by nature with a genius for speaking, you will be a distinguished speaker, if you add thereto science and practice; but in whichever of these three requisites you are wanting, you will by so much fall short of perfection. However, for all of it that is art, the true method will not, I think, be found on the road whereon Tisias and Thrasymachus are travelling.

Phaedrus/ On what road then?

Socrates/ Pericles would seem, my good friend, not without reason, to have become the most perfect orator that ever lived.

Phaedrus/ How so?

Socrates/ All the higher arts require, over and above their immediate discipline, a subtle and speculative acquaintance with physical science; it being, I imagine, by some such door as this that there enters that elevation of thought and universal mastery over the subject in hand. Now Pericles added these advantages to that of great natural genius. For he fell into the hands, if I mistake not, of Anaxagoras, a teacher of such studies, and being by him stored with abstruse

speculation, and led to penetrate into the nature of the intelligent and unintelligent principle subjects which occupied, you are aware, the main place in his master's discourse he drafted from those researches into the art of speaking the investigations suit able for it.

Phaedrus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ The case, I imagine, is the same with the art of rhetoric as it is with that of medicine.

Phaedrus/ In what way?

Socrates/ In both it is necessary to investigate nature; the nature of the body in the one, and of the soul in the other, if you intend to follow a scientific principle, and not a mere empirical routine, in the application of such medicine and diet to the former as will produce in it health and strength, and of such words and rightful culture to the latter as will impart to it the desired persuasion and virtue.

Phaedrus/ This seems reasonable at any rate, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now, do you conceive it possible to comprehend satisfactorily the nature of the soul without comprehending the nature of the universe?

Phaedrus/ Why, if credit is to be given to Hippo crates, of the line of Aesculapius, the nature of the body even cannot be comprehended without this investigation.

Socrates/ He says well, Phaedrus. However, we must not be content with the evidence of Hippocrates, but, interrogating the argument itself, observe if it be consistent.

Phaedrus/ True.

Socrates/ Observe, then, with regard to nature what is maintained by Hippocrates and the truth. Is it not thus that they bid us examine into a things nature? In the first place, we are to inquire whether that is simple or manifold in which we wish to be scientifically proficient ourselves, and able to render others such also; secondly, if it be simple, we are to examine what power it possesses by nature of acting, and of acting upon what, or what susceptibility of being acted upon, and what it is that acts upon it; if it comprise a number of kinds, we are to enumerate these kinds, and observe with regard to each of them, as in the simple case, its properties, whether active or passive.

Phaedrus/ Yes, this seems to be the way, Socrates.

Socrates/ At any rate, the method which neglected these investigations would be no better than a blind man's walk. But surely we must never compare the scientific follower of any pursuit to a blind or a deaf man. No; it is evident that whosoever teaches speaking on scientific principles, will accurately explain the essential nature of that to which his pupil will have to address his speeches. And this, if I mistake not, will be the soul.

Phaedrus/ Indisputably.

Socrates/ Against this then all his battle is directed; for in this it is that he endeavors to effect persuasion. Is it not so?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is obvious, therefore, that Thrasymachus and everyone else who seriously communicates an art of rhetoric, will, in the first place, with all accuracy notice and make apparent whether the soul be single and uniform by nature, or, like the body,

of many different kinds this being the process which we maintain to be; revealing a nature.

Phaedrus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Secondly, he will explain in what part it is active, and upon what it acts; in what part passive, and by what it is acted upon.

Phaedrus/ To be sure he will.

Socrates/ And thirdly, when he has ranged in order, the different kinds of speech and different kinds of soul, and their different conditions, he will enumerate all causes that act, and suiting kind by kind, will show what sort of soul is of necessity persuaded, or not persuaded, by what sort of speech, and for what reason, in either case.

Phaedrus/ At any rate, his work would to all appearance be best done by this method.

Socrates/ Never, I can assure you, my friend, will aught spoken or explained on a different method be spoken or explained on a scientific method, either in this case or any other. But our modern authors, whom you wot of, of arts of rhetoric, are crafty dissemblers, and manage to keep out of view their exquisite insight into the nature of the soul. Till, then, they both speak and write in this manner, let us not accord to them that they speak and write scientifically.

Phaedrus/ What manner do you mean by this?

Socrates/ To dictate the exact forms of expression were no easy task; but the general course that a speaker ought to pursue, if he means to perform his work as scientifically as possible, I am prepared to explain.

Phaedrus/ Do so.

Socrates/ It being admitted that the efficacy of speech is to win men's souls, it follows of necessity that the intended speaker must be acquainted with all kinds of soul that exist. Now of these kinds there are a certain number, each being of a certain sort; whence result different characters in different individuals. And this division being established, there are again a certain number of kinds of speeches, each of a certain character. Persons, therefore, of a certain character are by speeches of a certain character easily persuaded for certain reasons into certain things, while persons of a different character are under the same circumstances hard to be persuaded. These distinctions, then, must be competently understood; but even when understood, our speaker must be able to follow them rapidly with his perceptive faculties, as they fall under his notice in the course and operation of daily life, or as yet he knows no more of his art than the mere speeches he used to hear from his master at school. But when he is in a condition to say what sort of man is likely to be persuaded by what sort of speech, and on meeting with an individual in the world, is able to read his character at a glance, and say to himself, Here is the man, and here the nature, for which I heard those speeches from my master, now actually present before me; him, therefore, I must address with this sort of speech, in this sort of manner, if I mean to persuade him to this sort of thing when, I say, he is possessed of all this know ledge, and has learnt, moreover, the proper time for speaking, and the proper time for being silent, and has further learnt to distinguish between the seasonable and unseasonable use of the style sententious, the style pathetic, the style indignant, and all your other styles of speaking in which he has been instructed, then, I maintain, and not till

then, is his art wrought into a beautiful and a perfect work. But if he omit any of these requisites, whether in writing, or teaching, or speaking, while he professes to be performing his work scientifically, the hearer who refuses to be persuaded achieves a victory over him. But, Phaedrus, but, Socrates we shall doubtless hear from our friend the treatise-writer is this to be your sole art of speaking, or may we put up with one conducted on somewhat different principles?

Phaedrus/ None other, I take it, Socrates, can possibly be allowed, and yet this of yours appears no slight undertaking.

Socrates/ True, Phaedrus, it is not slight. And for this reason we ought to turn over all their writings again and again, to see whether there be found anywhere an easier and a briefer road to the art, in order that we may not uselessly travel on a long and rough one when we might go by one both smooth and short. So if you have ever heard of anything available for our purpose, either from Lysias, or any other teacher, make an effort to remember and tell it me.

Phaedrus/ If the effort were sufficient, Socrates, I should be able to do so; as it is, I can remember nothing at the moment.

Socrates/ What say you then to my repeating a statement which I have heard from certain gentlemen who handle the subject?

Phaedrus/ I should like it of all things.

Socrates/ Well, the saying is, you know, Phaedrus, that its fair to state even the wolfs cause.

Phaedrus/ It is, and do you comply with it.

Socrates/ I will. They tell me there is no need in the world to treat the matter so solemnly, or to carry it back

to so remote a source, by such long meanderings. For there is not the slightest occasion this we also mentioned at the beginning of our argument for people, intending to be competent speakers, to have anything at all to do with the truth, about actions just or good, or about men who are such either by nature or education. For in courts of justice, they say, no one troubles himself in the least degree with the truth of these matters, but only with what is plausible, that is to say, with what is likely; to this, therefore, you must give all your attention if you mean to speak by rule of art. Nay, there are occasions when you must not even state facts as they have actually happened, if the story be improbable, but only such as are likely, whether in accusation or defense. And, in short, in whatever you say, it is the probable that you must chiefly aim at, and pay no regard at all to the true. For the observance of this, throughout your speech, will supply you with the entire art.

Phaedrus/ Yes, Socrates, this is exactly the language employed by our professed masters in the art of speaking. I remember, that in the early part of our conversation, we did slightly touch upon this sort of principle, and that this is held to be of paramount importance by the gentlemen of the profession.

Socrates/ Nay, Phaedrus, I'm sure you have read over and over again the great Tisias himself. So let Tisias tell us in person whether he means anything else by the probable, than what accords with the opinion of the many.

Phaedrus/ What else can I? answers Tisias.

Socrates/ On the strength then, I suppose, of this sapient and scientific discovery, he proceeds to

announce, that if a weak, but courageous man, is brought to trial for having knocked down and robbed of his clothes, or purse, a strong and cowardly one, neither accuser nor accused is to tell the truth to the judges, but the coward is to say that the other had assistance when he knocked him down; while the brave man must first prove the fact of their being alone, and then appealing to their favorite probable, exclaim, Why, how could a man like myself have ever thought of attacking a man like that? But the other, you may be sure, is not to plead his own cowardice, but rather essay some fresh false hood, which will, perhaps, supply his adversary with the means of refuting the accusation. And so, whatever be the matter on hand, this, he says, is the style of pleading warranted by art. Is it not so, Phaedrus?

Phaedrus/ It is.

Socrates/ Recondite truly is the art, and wonderful the skill of its inventor, be he Tisias, or who he may, and whatever be the name he delights to be called by. But, Phaedrus, shall we answer him or not?

Phaedrus/ With what?

Socrates/ With this. Long before you joined our conversation, Tisias, we chanced to observe, that this vaunted probability of yours only made itself felt in the minds of the many, by virtue of its resemblance to the truth. And we have since proved, that in all cases the various shades of resemblance are best detected by the man who is best acquainted with the truth in question. So that, if you have anything else to say on the art of speaking, we shall be delighted to hear it; if not, we will abide by our previous position, that unless a speaker has reckoned up the different natures of his hearers,

and is able both to separate things into their several kinds, and embrace particulars under one general idea, he will never reach that highest point of excellence in the art which is attainable by the power of man. But this knowledge he can never possibly acquire without great labor; labor which the wise man ought to bestow, not with a view to speaking and acting before the world, but for the sake of making himself able, both by word and deed to please the gods as best he can. For verily, Tisias, so speak wiser men than you or I, it behooves not the reasonable man to study pleasing fellow-bondsmen, save only if he may in passing, but masters good, and of good descent. If, therefore, our circuit be a long one, marvel not; for it is for the sake of high ends that we have to make it, and not for such as you conceive. Still, even yours, as our argument proves, may be best attained, if you choose to derive them from our source.

Phaedrus/ The ends you speak of, Socrates, are very glorious, I know, if a man could but attain to them.

Socrates/ But surely, my friend, if the ends be glorious, all that befalls us in seeking them is glorious also.

Phaedrus/ Indeed it is.

Socrates/ So far, then, as regards the scientific and unscientific treatment of discourse; let this suffice.

Phaedrus/ And well it may.

Socrates/ But the question of propriety and impropriety in writing, and how to make a composition graceful or inelegant, remains to be considered. Does it not?

Phaedrus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are you aware, Phaedrus, by what conduct or language, with respect to speaking, a man will please God best?

Phaedrus/ Not at all; are you?

Socrates/ At any rate I can tell you a story of the ancients on the subject. Whether it be true or not, they know themselves; but if haply we could find the truth, could we possibly, think you, pay heed any longer to the opinions of men?

Phaedrus/ That would be indeed ridiculous; but pray tell me the story you say you have heard.

Socrates/ Well, I heard that in the neighborhood of Naucratis, in Egypt, there lived one of the ancient gods of that country; the same to whom that holy bird is consecrated which they call, as you know, Ibis, and whose own name was Theuth. He, they proceed, was the first to invent numbers and arithmetic, and geometry and astronomy; draughts more over, and dice, and, above all, letters. Now the whole of Egypt was at that time under the sway of the god Thamus, who resided near the capital city of the upper region, which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes. The god himself they call Ammon. To him, therefore, Theuth repaired; and, displaying his inventions, recommended their general diffusion among the Egyptians. The king asked him the use of each, and received his explanations, as he thought them good or bad, with praise or censure. Now on each of the arts Thamus is reported to have said a great deal to Theuth, both in its favor and disfavor. It would take a long story to repeat it all. But when they came to the letters, Theuth began; This invention, O king, will make the Egyptians wiser, and better able to remember, it being a medicine which I have discovered

both for memory and wisdom. The king replied; Most ingenious Theuth, one man is capable of giving birth to an art, another of estimating the amount of good or harm it will do to those who are intended to use it. And so now you, as being the father of letters, have ascribed to them, in your fondness, exactly the reverse of their real effects. For this invention of yours will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn it, by causing them to neglect their memory, inasmuch as, from their confidence in writing, they will recollect by the external aid of foreign symbols, and not by the internal use of their own faculties. Your discovery, therefore, is a medicine not for memory, but for recollection, for recalling to, not for keeping in mind. And you are providing for your disciples a show of wisdom without the reality. For, acquiring by your means much information unaided by instruction, they will appear to possess much knowledge, while, in fact, they will, for the most part, know nothing at all; and, moreover, be disagreeable people to deal with, as having become wise in their own conceit, instead of truly wise.

Phaedrus/ You possess a facility, Socrates, for making up tales of Egypt, or any other strange country you please.

Socrates/ We are told, my friend, that the voice of an oak, in the holy ground of Zeus of Dodona, was the first ever gifted with prophecy. The men of those days, not being clever like you moderns, were content, in their simplicity, to listen to an oak or a stone, if only it spoke the truth. But to you, it seems, it makes a difference who the speaker is, and from what country he comes; you do not merely consider whether the fact be, or be not, as he states it.

Phaedrus/ Your reproof is just. And I believe the truth, with regard to letters, to be as the Theban pronounces.

Socrates/ He, therefore, who leaves behind him, and he again who receives an art in writing, with the idea that anything clear or fixed is to proceed from the writing, must be altogether a foolish-minded person, and, in truth, ignorant of Ammons prediction, as he must suppose that written words can do something more than recall the things of which they treat to the mind of one who knows them already.

Phaedrus/ Most true.

Socrates/ For this, I conceive, Phaedrus, is the evil of writing, and herein it closely resembles painting. The creatures of the latter art stand before you as if they were alive, but if you ask them a question, they look very solemn, and say not a word. And so it is with written discourses. You could fancy they speak as though they were possessed of sense, but if you wish to understand something they say, and question them about it, you find them ever repeating but one and the self-same story. Moreover, every discourse, once written, is tossed about from hand to hand, equally among those who understand it, and those for whom it is in no wise fitted; and it does not know to whom it ought, and to whom it ought not, to speak. And when misunderstood and unjustly attacked, it always needs its father to help it; for, unaided, it can neither retaliate, nor defend itself.

Phaedrus/ This again is most true.

Socrates/ But, hold! Is there not another kind of discourse, this one's legitimate brother? Let us see both

how it arises, and how far more excellent and efficient than the other it grows.

Phaedrus/ What discourse do you mean, and how does it take its rise?

Socrates/ I mean that which is written with in sight in the learners mind, which is at once able to defend itself, and knows before whom to speak, and before whom to be silent.

Phaedrus/ You mean the wise man's discourse, which is possessed both of life and soul, and of which the written one may fairly be called a shadow.

Socrates/ Most assuredly I do. But come now, answer me this. If a prudent husbandman had seeds which he cared for, and wished to come to fruit, would he seriously sow them in summer-time, in the gardens of Adonis, and delight to behold them growing up finely in eight days or, if he did this at all, would he not do it as the mere pastime of a holiday; but, with all the aid of his husbandman's art, sow the seeds, on which he set serious store, in their proper soil, and be content to see them in the eighth month arrived at their maturity?

Phaedrus/ Yes, of course, Socrates; he would do the one seriously, and the other, as you say, by way of amusement.

Socrates/ And shall we say that he who has an insight into the just, the beautiful, and the good, shows less wisdom in the treatment of his seeds than the husbandman?

Phaedrus/ God forbid.

Socrates/ He will not then seriously set himself to write them in water, sowing them with ink by means of a pen, with the aid of words that are unable to defend

themselves by speaking, and unable adequately to teach the truth.

Phaedrus/ Certainly, we may expect he will not.

Socrates/ Indeed we may. But in the gardens of letters he will sow his seeds, I imagine, and write, when he does write, for mere amusement, treasuring up aids to the memory both for himself, when he comes to the years of forgetfulness, and for all who are following on the same road. And he will please himself with watching his plants in their tender growth And while others are indulging in other recreations refreshing themselves it may be with feast and kindred pleasure, he, if I mistake not will in place of such amusements be spending his holiday m the pastime I mention.

Phaedrus/ And a noble pastime it is, Socrates, by the side of but a poor one, when a man who can make discourses his play diverts himself with telling stories about justice and virtue.

Socrates/ Yes, my dear Phaedrus, it is noble but far nobler, I imagine, is a man's work on these matters, when finding a congenial soul he avails himself of the dialectical art to sow and plant therein scientific words, which are competent to defend themselves, and him who planted them, and are not unfruitful, but bear seed in their turn, from which other words springing up in other minds are capable of preserving this precious seed ever undecaying, and making their possessor ever happy, so far as happiness is possible for man.

Phaedrus/ Yes, Socrates, this is indeed far nobler than the other.

Socrates/ Now then, Phaedrus, that this point is settled, we are in a condition, you will observe, to decide on our former questions.

Phaedrus/ Which do you mean?

Socrates/ Those which led us in our desire to solve them to the point where we are at present arrived; one being to examine the deservedness of the reproach cast on Lysias for writing speeches; the other, to discover, with regard to speeches themselves, what were written according to, and what without, rule of art. Now this distinction appears to me to have been marked with sufficient clearness.

Phaedrus/ And so it did to me; but I should be glad to be reminded of it again.

Socrates/ Before a speaker is acquainted with the true nature of each subject on which he speaks or writes, and is become able to give it a general definition, and then again knows how to divide it into kinds till he reaches the indivisible; before he has investigated in like manner the nature of the soul, and finding the kind of discourse suitable for each kind of soul, orders and embellishes his discourse accordingly; offering to complex souls discourses of complex structure and rich in every harmony; but simple discourses to simple souls; before, I say, he is able to understand and do all this, he cannot possibly handle discourse with the art of which it admits, whether his object be to instruct or persuade, as the whole of our previous argument has tended to prove.

Phaedrus/ Yes, this is pretty nearly just as I thought it was.

Socrates/ But what are we to say with respect to the honor or disgrace of writing and speaking, and the conditions under which they may justly incur or avoid reproach? Have not our late arguments sufficed to show?

Phaedrus/ What?

Socrates/ That if Lysias or anyone else has ever written, or means to write, either a private book, or a public document in the shape of a law, with the idea that his writing contains a great certainty and clearness in this case reproach attaches to the writer, whether people say so or not. For a total blindness with regard to justice and injustice, to virtue and vice, escapes not in sooth the charge of being truly disgraceful, even though it has been lauded by all the world.

Phaedrus/ No; indeed it does not.

Socrates/ But whoever believes that in a written discourse, whatever be the subject, there must of necessity be much that is sportive; and that no discourse worthy of serious attention has ever, either in verse or prose, been written or spoken if spoken in the way that our declamations are recited, by rote, without examination or instruction, merely to persuade but that the very best of them are nothing else than reminders to knowledge; whoever believes this, and believes on the other hand, that in discourses, and only in discourses taught, and for the sake of instruction spoken and really written in the soul of the hearer, about things just and beautiful and good, there is found what is clear and perfect, and worthy of attention; and that such discourses ought to be accounted his own legitimate offspring; first, the one in his own mind, if it be there by his own discovery; then those which children or brothers of the former have either after or at the same time sprung up worthily in the minds of others; whoever, I say, thinks this of these discourses, and cares for none beside, will go near, Phaedrus, to be such a man as you and I would pray we might both become.

Phaedrus/ Yes, Socrates, with all my heart I wish and pray for such a lot.

Socrates/ Be we then content to have amused ourselves thus far with the subject of speaking; and go you now, Phaedrus, and tell Lysias, that you and I went down together to the spring and favored haunt of the nymphs, where we heard words which bade us tell Lysias and all writers of speeches; Homer, and all makers of poetry, without music or with; Solon, and all framers of political writings under the name of laws; that if they composed their works with a knowledge of the truth, and with ability to defend them if brought to account, and with the power, moreover, of making by the words of their mouth the writings of their pen appear but poor, they ought not to be named from these holiday productions, but from those which formed their earnest work.

Phaedrus/ What are the names then that you accord them?

Socrates/ To call them wise, Phaedrus, seems to me indeed to be a great matter, and beseeming God alone. Lovers of wisdom (philosophers), or some name of this kind, would both suit them better and be in better taste.

Phaedrus/ And nothing at all out of the way either.

Socrates/ But the man, on the other hand, who has nothing more precious to show than what he long tortured his brain to write or compose with elaborate patching and careful retrenching that man, I conceive, you may justly denominate either poet, or speech-writer, or writer of laws.

Phaedrus/ Justly indeed.

Socrates/ Go then, tell this to your friend.

Phaedrus/ But you, Socrates, what will you do? We must not pass over your friend either.

Socrates/ Whom do you mean?

Phaedrus/ Isocrates the fair. What message will you take him, Socrates? What shall we say that he is?

Socrates/ Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus; what I augur of him, however, I am willing to tell you.

Phaedrus/ What is that, pray?

Socrates/ I think better of his genius than to compare it with the speech-writing of Lysias. Moreover, I account him endued with a nobler nature. So that there will be nothing surprising if, as he advances in years, he will in the art of speaking even, to which he is now applying himself, leave all who have hitherto handled it, far as children behind him; and nothing surprising either if he be not content with such achievements, but be led by a godlier impulse to holier and higher things. For nature, my friend, has implanted a love of wisdom in the mind of the man. This then is the message I will take from the gods of the spot to Isocrates as my favorite, and do you take the one I gave you to Lysias, as yours.

Phaedrus/ It shall be done but let us depart, the rather as the heat of the day is over.

Socrates/ Were it not better to offer up a prayer to these gods before we go?

Phaedrus/ Oh yes.

Socrates/ Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who here abide, grant me to be beautiful in the inner man, and all I have of outer things to be at peace with those within. May I count the wise man only rich. And may my store of gold be such as none but the good can bear.

Phaedrus, need we anything more? For myself I have prayed enough.

Phaedrus/ For me too pray the same. Friends share and share alike.

Socrates/ Let us go.

Protagoras.

or

The Sophists.

Translated by Henry Cary.

Persons of the Dialog

A Friend, Socrates, Hippocrates, Protagoras, Alcibiades, Callias, Critias, Prodicus, and Hippias.

Friend/ Whence come you, Socrates? can there be any doubt but that it is from a chase after the beauty of Alcibiades? and to me, indeed, when I saw him lately, the man appeared still beautiful, though between ourselves, Socrates, he is a man and is now getting a pretty thick beard.

Socrates/ But what of that? Do you not approve of Homer, then, who says, that the most graceful age is that of a youth with his first beard, which is now the age of Alcibiades?

Friend/ What have we to do with that now? Do you come from him? And how is the youth disposed towards you?

Socrates/ Very well, I think, and not least so to-day; for he has said many things in my favor, assisting me, and indeed I have just now come from him. However, I have something strange to tell you: for though he was present I paid no attention to him, and even frequently forgot him.

Friend/ But what great affair can have happened between you and him? for surely you have not met with anyone else more beautiful, in this city at least?

Socrates/ By far.

Friend/ What say you? A citizen, or a stranger?

Socrates/ A stranger.

Friend/ From whence?

Socrates/ From Abdera.

Friend/ And did this stranger appear to you so beautiful that you thought him more beautiful than the son of Clinias?

Socrates/ But how, my dear friend, can the wisest be thought otherwise than more beautiful?

Friend/ Have you come then, Socrates, from meeting one of our wise men?

Socrates/ Yes, and from the wisest of the present day, if you think Protagoras is the wisest.

Friend/ Ha! What say you? Is Protagoras here?

Socrates/ And has been, these three days.

Friend/ And are you just now come from his company?

Socrates/ I have, and from a very long conversation with him.

Friend/ Why then should you not relate this conversation to us, unless something hinders you, having made this boy rise up, and seating yourself in his place?

Socrates/ Certainly; and I shall be obliged to you if you will listen to me.

Friend/ And we to you, if you will tell us.

Socrates/ The obligation will be mutual. Listen then. This morning, while it was yet dark, Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus and brother of Phason, knocked very hard at my gate with his stick, and as soon as it was opened to him he came in, in great haste, and calling out with a loud voice, said;

Hippocrates/ “Socrates, are you awake or asleep?”

Socrates/ And I, knowing his voice, said, “Hippocrates is here: do you bring any news?”

Hippocrates/ “None, but what is good.”

Socrates/ “You say well, but what is it? and why have you come so early?”

He, standing by my side said;

Hippocrates/ “Protagoras is come.”

Socrates/ “He came the day before yesterday, and have you only just heard of it?”

Hippocrates/ “By the gods, only yesterday evening,”

Socrates/ At the same time feeling about my bed, he sat down at my feet.

Hippocrates/ “Yesterday evening, very late, on my return from the village of Œnoe, for my slave Satyrus ran away, and I was purposing to tell you that I was going in pursuit of him, but something else put it out of my head; but when I had returned, and we had supped, and were going to bed, then my brother told me that Protagoras was arrived, and my first thought was to come immediately to you, but afterwards it appeared to me too late at night. As soon, however, as sleep had refreshed me after my fatigue, I immediately arose and came here.”

Socrates/ And I, knowing his earnestness and excitability, said, “What is this to you? Does Protagoras do you any harm?”

And he, laughing, said;

Hippocrates/ “By the gods, Socrates, he does, because he alone is wise, and does not make me so.”

Socrates/ “But, by Zeus, if you give him money and persuade him, he will make you wise too.”

Hippocrates/ “Would that, O Zeus and ye gods, it depended on that, for I would spare nothing of my own or of my friend’s property either, and I have now come to you for this very purpose, that you may speak to him in my behalf. For besides that I am too young, I have never yet seen Protagoras or heard him speak, for I was but a boy when he came here before. However, Socrates, all men praise him,

and say that he is the wisest man to speak. But why do we not go to him that we may find him within? He is staying, as I have heard, with Callias son of Hipponicus. Let us go then."

Socrates/ "We will not go there yet my friend, it is too early; but let us rise up and go into our court, and spend the time there walking about, until it is light; then we will go. For Protagoras stays mostly within; therefore cheer up, we shall probably find him at home."

After this we rose and walked about the court, and I in order to try the strength of Hippocrates, examined and questioned him; "Tell me," said I, "Hippocrates, you are now purposing to go to Protagoras, and to pay him money as a fee for teaching you something; to what kind of person do you think you are going, and what do you expect to become? Just as if you thought of going to your own namesake, Hippocrates of Cos, one of the Asclepiads, and were to pay him money as a fee for teaching you, if anyone asked you, 'Tell me, Hippocrates, you are about to pay a fee to Hippocrates, in what capacity? what should you answer?"

Hippocrates/ "I should say, in that of a physician."

Socrates/ "And what do you expect to become?"

Hippocrates/ "A physician."

Socrates/ "But if you thought of going to Polycletus the Argive, or Phidias the Athenian, and were to pay them a fee for teaching you, if anyone asked you, 'In what capacity do you intend to pay this money to Polycletus and Phidias? what should you answer?"

Hippocrates/ I should say, in that of statuaries."

Socrates/ "And what do you expect to become yourself?"

Hippocrates/ "Clearly, a statuary."

Socrates/ "Be it so. But we are now going, you and I, to Protagoras, and we are prepared to pay him money as a fee

for teaching you, if our money is sufficient for the purpose, and we can persuade him by it; but if not, we mean to borrow from our friends. If, then, someone seeing us thus earnestly bent on this, should ask; 'Tell me, Socrates and Hippocrates, in what capacity do you intend to pay money to Protagoras? what answer should we give him? What other name do we hear given to Protagoras, as that of statuary is given to Phidias, and that of poet to Homer? What name of this kind do we hear given to Protagoras?"

Hippocrates/ "They call him a sophist, Socrates."

Socrates/ "As to a sophist, then, we are going to pay him money?"

Hippocrates/ "Assuredly."

Socrates/ "If, then, anyone should ask you this further question, 'What do you expect to become yourself by going to Protagoras?"

Upon which he said, blushing, for the day was now beginning to dawn, so that I could see him;

Hippocrates/ "If this case is at all like the former, it is evident that I expect to become a sophist."

Socrates/ "But, by the gods, should you not be ashamed to show yourself as a sophist before the Greeks?"

Hippocrates/ "By Zeus, I should, Socrates, if I must say what I think."

Socrates/ "Do you suppose, then, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras will not be of this kind, but such as you received from a grammarian, a musician, or a teacher of gymnastics? for you were not instructed in each of these for the sake of the art, meaning to become a professor yourself, but by way of accomplishment, as is proper for a private person and a free-man."

Hippocrates/ “Just so, such rather appears to me to be the instruction given by Protagoras!”

Socrates/ “Do you know, then, what you are about to do, or does it escape you?”

Hippocrates/ “About what?”

Socrates/ “That you are about to entrust your soul to the care of a man, who, as you admit, is a sophist; and yet I should wonder if you know what a sophist is. Though, if you are ignorant of this, neither do you know to what you are confiding your soul, whether to a good or a bad thing.”

Hippocrates/ “But I think I know.”

Socrates/ “Tell me, then, what you think a sophist is.”

Hippocrates/ “I think, as the name imports, that he is one learned in wisdom.”

Socrates/ “This, however, may be said of painters and architects, that they too are learned in wisdom. And if anyone should ask us in what wisdom painters are learned, we should surely say to him, in that which relates to the production of pictures, and so on with respect to the rest. But if anyone should ask this question, ‘In what wisdom is a sophist learned? what answer should we give him? of what production is he a master?”

Hippocrates/ “What else should we say he is, Socrates, but a master of the art that makes men able speakers?”

Socrates/ “Perhaps, we should say truly, yet not sufficiently. For this answer requires from us another question, about what a sophist makes men able speakers; just as the musician, surely, makes a man speak ably on the subject in which he is learned, on music. Is it not so?”

Hippocrates/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Well; on what subject, then, does a sophist make a man an able speaker? clearly on that in which he is learned?”

Hippocrates/ “Apparently.”

Socrates/ “What then is that in which the sophist is both learned himself and makes his pupil learned?”

Hippocrates/ “By Zeus, I am unable to tell you.”

Socrates/ “What then? are you aware to what danger you are going to expose your soul? if you had occasion to entrust your body to someone, on the risk of its becoming healthy or diseased, should you not consider very carefully whether you ought to entrust it or not, and would you not summon your friends and relations to a consultation, and deliberate many days? But that which you esteem far more than the body, your soul, and on which your all depends, either to fare well or ill, according as it becomes healthy or diseased, concerning this do you neither communicate with your father nor your brother, nor with any of us your friends, whether or not you should commit your soul to this stranger who has arrived here, but having heard of his arrival yesterday evening, as you say, do you come before day-break, and take no thought or advice on the matter, whether it is proper or not to entrust yourself to him, but are ready to spend both your own and your friends’ property, as having already resolved that you must in any event associate with Protagoras, whom you neither know, as you admit, nor have ever spoken to; but you call him a sophist, though what a sophist is, to whom you are about to entrust yourself, you are evidently ignorant?”

And he having heard me, replied;

Hippocrates/ “It seems so, Socrates, from what you say.”

Socrates/ “Is not a sophist, then, Hippocrates, a kind of merchant or retailer of commodities by which the soul is nourished? To me, at least, he appears to be so.”

Hippocrates/ “But by what is the soul nourished, Socrates?”

Socrates/ “By learning, But we must take care, my friend, that the sophist does not deceive us by praising what he sells, as those others do with respect to nutriment for the body, the merchant and the retailer. For neither do they themselves know which of the commodities in which they traffic are good or bad for the body, though they praise all that they sell, nor do those who buy from them, unless one happens to be a professor of gymnastics or a physician. In like manner, those who hawk about learning through cities, and who sell and retail it to everyone that desires it, praise all that they sell, though perhaps some of these too, my excellent friend, may be ignorant which of the things they sell is good or bad for the soul; and this also may be the case with those that buy from them, unless someone happen to be skilled in the medicine of the soul. If then you happen to know which of these is good or bad, you may safely buy learning from Protagoras or anyone else; but if not, beware my good friend, that you do not hazard and imperil that which is most precious. For there is much greater danger in the purchase of learning than in that of food. For when one has purchased meat and drink from a retailer or merchant one may take them away in different vessels, and, before receiving them into one’s body by eating or drinking, one may set them down at home, and calling in some person who understands the matter, consult him as to what may be eaten and drunk, and what not, and how much and when; so that in this purchase there is no great danger. But it is not possible to carry away learning in a different vessel; but it is necessary, when one has paid the price, having received

instruction in the soul itself and learnt it, to depart either injured or benefited. Let us therefore consider these things with persons older than we are: for we are too young to decide on a matter of such importance. Now however, since we have made up our minds, let us go and hear the man, and after we have heard him, let us communicate with others. For not only is Protagoras there, but Hippias of Elis, and I think also Prodicus of Ceos, and many other wise men."

This resolution taken, we set out. When we arrived at the front door, we stopped and discussed a question that had fallen out between us on the way; in order therefore that it might not be left unfinished, but that we might bring it to a conclusion and then enter the house, we stood at the front door talking together until we had agreed with each other. Now it appears to me that the porter, who was a eunuch, overheard us, and he seems from the number of sophists to be out of humor with all who come to the house. For when we had knocked at the door, he having opened it and seeing us, said;

Eunuch/ "Ha, more sophists: he is not at leisure."

Socrates/ And at the same time with both his hands, he slammed to the door with all his might. Thereupon we knocked again, and he answering with the door shut, said;

Eunuch/ "Sirs, did not you hear me say that he is not at leisure?"

Socrates/ "But, my good friend, we are not come to Callias, nor are we sophists; cheer up then: for we are come wanting to see Protagoras: so announce us."

At length, with difficulty the fellow opened the door to us. When we entered, we found Protagoras walking up and down in the portico, and in a line with him, there walked on one side Callias son of Hipponicus, and his brother by the

mother's side, Paralus son of Pericles, and Charmides son of Glaucon, and on the other side Xanthippus, the other son of Pericles, and Philippides son of Philomelus, and Antimoerus of Mende, who is the most famous of all the pupils of Protagoras, and who is learning professionally, meaning to become a sophist himself. Behind these there followed others who listened to what was said, the greater part appeared to be strangers, whom Protagoras brings with him from the several cities through which he passes, bewitching them by his voice like Orpheus, and they follow his voice, bewitched. Some of our countrymen also were in the band. I was particularly pleased in observing this band, how well they took care never to be in the way of Protagoras by getting before him, but whenever he and those with him turned round, these listeners, in a good and regular manner, opened to the right and left, and wheeling round, always ranged themselves behind him in admirable order.

"After him I perceived," as Homer says, Hippias of Elis sitting on a high seat in the opposite side of the portico, and round him on benches sat Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, Phædrus of Myrrhine, Andron son of Androtion, and some strangers partly his fellow citizens and others. They appeared to be asking Hippias questions on physics and astronomy; but he, sitting on a high seat, gave answers to each of them and resolved their questions. "Moreover I saw Tantalus;" for Prodicus of Ceos had lately arrived, but he was in a building which Hipponicus had before used as a storeroom, but now, owing to the multitude of guests, Callias had emptied it and turned it into a lodging for strangers. Now Prodicus was still in bed wrapt up in a great number of skins and bed-clothes, as it appeared; and there were seated near him on sofas Pausanias of Ceramis, and with Pausanias a youth, quite a lad, as I thought of an excellent disposition, and of a very beautiful form. I thought I heard

them call him Agathon, and I should not wonder if he was Pausanias's favorite. This lad then was there, and the two Adimantuses, the one the son of Cepis, and the other of Leucolophides, and some others. But I was not able to learn from the outside what they were talking about, although I was exceedingly anxious to hear Prodicus; for he appears to me to be a very wise, nay a divine man, but owing to the harshness of his voice a kind of humming in the room made what he said indistinct.

We had just entered, and immediately after us there came in Alcibiades, the beautiful as you say, and as I am persuaded he is, and Critias, son of Callæschrus.

After we had entered, then, and waited a little while and observed what was going on, we went up to Protagoras, and I said;

"Protagoras, I and Hippocrates here have come to see you."

Protagoras/ "Do you wish to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the rest?"

Socrates/ "To us, it makes no difference, but when you have heard on what account we have come, you can determine yourself."

Protagoras/ "What is it then, that you are come for?"

Socrates/ "Hippocrates here is a native of this country, son of Apollodorus, of a great and wealthy family; in natural ability he seems to be a match for the youth of his age; and he appears to me to be desirous of becoming a person of note in the city; and he thinks that he shall most readily become so, if he associates with you. Do you then determine, whether we ought to converse apart with you on this subject, or in the presence of others."

Protagoras/ "You very properly take precautions on my behalf, Socrates. For a stranger who visits powerful cities,

and persuades the most distinguished of the youth in them to quit the society of others, both kindred and not kindred, both old and young, and associate with him, in the expectation of being improved by his society, ought in doing this to be very cautious, for things of this kind are attended with no slight jealousies and enmities, and even plots. For my part, I say that the art of a Sophist is ancient, but the men who professed it in ancient times, fearing the odium attached to it, sought to conceal it, and veiled it over, some under the garb of poetry, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, and others under that of the mysteries and prophecies, such as Orpheus and Musseus, and their followers, and some I perceive have veiled it under the gymnastic art, as Iccus of Tarentum, and one of the present day who is a sophist, inferior to none, Herodicus of Selymbria, who was originally of Megara. But your own Agathocles, who was a great sophist, concealed it under the garb of music, as did Pythoclides of Ceos, and many others. All these, as I say, through fear of jealousies, employed these arts as veils. I, however, in this respect, do not agree with any of them; for I think that they did not by any means effect the object they wished; for they did not escape the observation of men of authority in the cities, on whose account they had recourse to these disguises, for the multitude perceive scarcely anything at all, but whatever the former give out, that they sing. Now to try to escape and not to be able to do so, but to be detected, both shows great folly in the attempt, and necessarily makes men much more hostile: for they think that such a man is moreover an impostor. I therefore have taken a path quite contrary to them, and I acknowledge that I am a sophist and teach men, and I think that this precaution is better than the other, to confess rather than to deny: I have also planned other precautions besides this; so that by God's help I have suffered no harm through

confessing that I am a sophist; though I have exercised this art now many years; for my age is very great, and there is not one amongst you all whose father I am not old enough to be. So that it will be by far the most agreeable to me, if you are willing, to discuss this matter in the presence of all who are in the house."

Socrates/ I then, for I suspected that he wished to show and make a display of himself before Prodicus and Hippias, that we had come as his admirers—"Why then, do we not summon Prodicus and Hippias, and their party, to listen to us?"

Protagoras/ "By all means."

Callias/ "Would you wish us to prepare seats, that you may sit down and converse?"

Socrates/ It was agreed that this should be done. And we all of us, in great delight, as being about to listen to wise men, laid hold of the stools, and benches, and couches, and placed them in order near Hippias; for the stools were there already; meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades brought Prodicus and his party with them, having made him get out of bed.

When, therefore, we were all seated;

Protagoras/ "Now Socrates, since they are all here, you may repeat what you just now mentioned to me respecting this youth."

Socrates/ "My commencement, Protagoras, is the same as it was just now, namely, with what design we came to you. Hippocrates here is very desirous of your society, and says he shall be glad to hear what advantage he may expect to derive from associating with you. Such is our errand."

Protagoras/ "Young man, the advantage which you will derive from associating with me is this, that on the very day of your being with me you will go home a better man than

you were before, and the same on the second day, and on each succeeding day you will make some further progress."

Socrates/ "Protagoras, this is nothing wonderful that you say, but very natural, since you too, old and wise as you are, would become better, if anyone should teach you what you do not happen to know. But that is not what we require, but just as if Hippocrates here should on the instant change his mind, and desire to associate with the youth who has lately arrived, Zeuxippus of Heraclea, and coming to him as he now does to you, should be told by him the very same things that he has been by you, that by associating with him he would every day become better, and make further progress; if he should further ask him, 'In what do you mean I shall become better, and in what make further progress? Zeuxippus would answer him, 'In the art of painting.' And if he were to attach himself to Orthagoras of Thebes, and being told by him the very same things that he has been by you, should further ask him in what he would daily become better by associating with him, he would reply, 'In flute-playing.' In like manner do you also reply to the youth, and to me who ask for him: Hippocrates here, by associating with Protagoras, on the very day in which he associates will go home a better man, and on each succeeding day will in like manner make further progress; in what Protagoras, and with respect to what?"

Protagoras/ "You put the question fairly, Socrates, and I delight in answering those who put their questions well. For Hippocrates, if he comes to me, will not be treated as he would be treated if he were to attach himself to any other of the sophists. For others injure youth; for when they have shown an aversion to the arts they drag them back again and force them to study the arts by teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music;

Socrates/ and at the same time he looked aside at Hippias:

Protagoras/ but if he comes to me, he will not learn anything else than that for which he came. The instruction that he will receive is this, the method of consulting well about his domestic affairs, in what way he may best govern his own house, and with respect to public affairs, how he may be best able to act and speak on affairs of state."

Socrates/ "Do I follow your meaning? For you appear to me to mean the political art, and to promise to make men good citizens."

Protagoras/ "That, Socrates, is the very profession that I do make."

Socrates/ "What an admirable skill you possess, if you really do possess it; for I will say nothing else to you but what I think. For I imagined, Protagoras, that this could not be taught, yet since you say so, I know not how to disbelieve you. It is right, however, that I should tell you why I think it cannot be taught, nor acquired by men from men. For I, as well as the other Greeks, say that the Athenians are wise. I see, then, when we are met in the assembly, and when it is necessary for the city to settle anything respecting architecture, that the architects are sent for and consulted about the buildings, and when respecting ship-building, ship-builders; and so with all other things which they think can be taught and learnt. But should anyone else, whom they think is not an artist, attempt to give them advice, even though he may be very honorable, and rich and noble, they pay no more attention to him on this account, but laugh at him and make an uproar, until either he of his own accord desists from speaking, through being hooted down, or the archers drag him away or remove him by order of the prytanes. Thus they proceed with respect to matters which they think pertain to art. But when it is necessary to consult on any matter which relates to the government of the city, anyone rises up and gives his advice on such subjects,

whether he be a builder, a brazier, a shoemaker, a merchant, a ship's captain, rich, poor, noble or ignoble, and no one objects to them, as to the others, that without having received any instruction, or had any preceptor, they yet attempt to give advice; for it is clear that they think this cannot be taught. And not only are the public in general of this opinion, but privately, the wisest and best of our citizens are unable to impart to others the excellence which they possess: for Pericles, the father of these youths, as far as depended on masters, had them educated liberally and well; but in those things in which he is wise, he neither instructs them himself, nor entrusts them to anyone else to be instructed; but they, roaming about, feed as it were without restraint, if by chance they may of themselves light on virtue. If you will too, this very same Pericles, being guardian to Clinias the younger brother of this Alcibiades, and fearing lest he might be corrupted by Alcibiades, separated him from him and sent him to be educated by Ariphron; however, before six months had elapsed, Ariphron, being unable to do anything with him, returned him to Pericles. I could also mention very many others to you, who being good themselves, have never made anyone else better, either of their own kindred or others. I therefore, Protagoras, looking to these things, think that virtue cannot be taught. When, however, I hear you saying what you do, I waver, and am of opinion that there is something in what you say, because I think that you are a man of great experience, and that you have learnt many things and discovered some yourself. If, therefore, you can prove to us, more clearly, that virtue can be taught, do not grudge doing so, but prove it."

Protagoras/ "Indeed, Socrates, I shall not grudge it. But whether shall I prove it by relating a fable to you, as an older to younger men, or shall I discuss it by way of argument?"

Socrates/ Thereupon many of those who sat with him, answered, that he might explain it in any way he pleased. “It appears to me, then,” said he, “more agreeable to relate a fable to you.

Protagoras/ “There was once a time, when gods were, but mortal races were not. But when also their destined time of creation came, the gods fashioned them within the earth, composing them of earth and fire, and such things as are mingled with fire and earth. And when they were about to bring them into light, they commanded Prometheus and Epimetheus to adorn them and to distribute to each such faculties as were proper for them. But Epimetheus besought Prometheus that he might make this distribution. ‘And,’ he said, ‘when I have made it, do you examine it.’ Having thus persuaded him, he made the distribution, But in his distribution, to some he assigned strength without swiftness, and the weaker he adorned with swiftness; some he armed, but giving to others an unarmed nature, he devised some other faculty for their security: for to such of them as he clad with littleness, he assigned wings to fly with, or a subterranean abode; but such as he increased in magnitude he preserved by this very means; and thus he made the distribution, equalizing all things; he adapted these contrivances taking care that no race should be destroyed.

“When he had supplied them with the means of avoiding mutual destruction, he contrived means to defend them against the seasons, by clothing them with thick hairs and solid skins, sufficient to keep off cold and capable of averting heat, and so that, when they went to rest, these very things might serve each of them as his proper and natural bed; and under their feet he furnished some with hoofs, and some with hairs and solid and bloodless skins. After that he provided different food for different animals, for some, herbs

from the earth, for others, the fruit of trees, for others, roots; and to some he gave the flesh of other animals as food: and to these he attached the property of producing few offspring, but to those that are consumed by them, fecundity, providing for the preservation of the race. However, as Epimetheus was not very wise, he ignorantly exhausted all the faculties at his disposal on irrational animals. The human race, therefore, still remained to him unadorned, and he was in doubt what to do. While he is doubting, Prometheus comes to examine the distribution, and sees other animals provided with everything suitable for them, but man naked and unshod, unbedded and unarmed. But now the destined day was at hand, on which it was necessary that man should go forth from earth to light. Prometheus, therefore, being in doubt what safety he can find for man, steals the artificial wisdom of Vulcan and Minerva, together with fire, for it was impossible that it could be acquired or used by anyone without fire, and accordingly he presents it to man. Thus, then, man became possessed of the wisdom pertaining to life, he had not, however, political wisdom; for that was with Zeus; and Prometheus was no longer permitted to enter the citadel, the habitation of Zeus; moreover the guards of Zeus were terrible; but he secretly enters the common abode of Minerva and Vulcan, in which they practiced their arts, and having stolen the fiery art of Vulcan, and the other that belonged to Minerva, he gives them to man, and from this man derives the means of sustenance, but afterwards, as it is said, through Epimetheus, punishment for the theft overtook Prometheus.

"When, therefore, man had become partaker of a divine condition, first of all through this relationship to deity, he alone of all animals acknowledged gods, and set about building altars and statues of gods: next, by art, he soon articulated sounds and words, and devised houses and

garments, and shoes and beds, and food from the earth. Thus provided however, at first men lived dispersed; for cities were not: wherefore they were destroyed by wild beasts, through being everywhere weaker than them; and the mechanical art was indeed sufficient aid for their support, but was inadequate to the war with wild beasts; for they did not yet possess the political art, of which the military is a part. They sought therefore to collect themselves together, and to preserve themselves by building cities. When, however, they were thus collected, they injured one another, from not possessing the political art; so that, being again dispersed, they were destroyed. Zeus, therefore, fearing for our race, lest it should entirely perish, sends Hermes to carry shame and justice to men, that they might be ornaments of cities, and bonds to cement friendship. Hermes, therefore, asked Zeus in what manner he was to give shame and justice to men. 'Whether, as the arts have been distributed, so shall I distribute these also? for they have been distributed thus: one man who possesses the medicinal art is sufficient for many not skilled in it, and so with other craftsmen. Shall I thus dispense shame and justice among men, or distribute them to all? 'To all,' said Zeus, 'and let all partake of them: for there would be no cities, if a few only were to partake of them, as of other arts. Moreover enact a law in my name, that whosoever is unable to partake of shame and justice shall be put to death as a pest of a city.'

"Thus, then, Socrates, and for these reasons, as well others as the Athenians, when a question arises about excellence in building, or any other mechanical art, think that few only should give their advice; and if anyone, who is not of the number of the few, should offer to give advice, they do not allow him, as you say; and properly, as I say: but when they proceed to a consultation respecting political

excellence, which ought to depend entirely on justice and temperance, they very properly allow every man to speak, because it is the duty of everyone to partake of this excellence, otherwise there can be no cities. This, Socrates, is the cause of this fact.

"And that you may not think that you are deceived, *when you are told* that in reality all men are of opinion that everyone partakes of justice, and of the other political excellences, take this additional proof. For in other kinds of excellence, as you say, if anyone asserts that he is a good flute-player, or skilled in any other art, of which he is ignorant, they either ridicule him, or are indignant, and his friends go to him and admonish him as a madman; but in justice and other political virtues, even though they know of any man that he is unjust, yet if he himself tells the truth of himself in the presence of many persons, what in the other case they considered prudence, to speak the truth, in this case *they consider* madness; and they say that all men ought to say they are just, whether they are so or not, or that he is mad who does not lay claim to justice, because it is necessary that everyone should, in some respect, partake of it, or no longer be a man.

"I say these things to show that they very properly permit every man to give advice concerning this virtue, because they think that everyone partakes of it. But that men think that it exists not naturally or spontaneously, but that it is taught and acquired by study, by whomsoever it is acquired, this I will in the next place endeavor to show. For whatever evils men think others respectively have by nature or fortune no one is angry with, nor admonishes, or teaches, or punishes the possessors of them, in order to make them otherwise than they are, but pity them. For instance, who would be so foolish as to attempt to do any of these things to the deformed, or the little, or the weak? For they know, I think,

that these things, such as are beautiful and the contraries, happen to men by nature and fortune: but such advantages as they think result to men from study, practice, and instruction, if anyone does not possess them but their contrary evils, for these things anger, and punishment, and admonition, are had recourse to: of these one is injustice, and so is impiety, and in short, everything that is contrary to political virtue. Here, then, every man is angry with and admonishes every other, clearly because he thinks it may be acquired by study and instruction. For if you will consider, Socrates, of what avail it is to punish those who act unjustly, this very thing will teach you that men think virtue is to be acquired. For no one punishes those who act unjustly, merely attending to this and for this reason, that anyone has so acted, unless it be one who like a brute avenges himself irrationally; but he who endeavors to punish with reason, does not exact vengeance for the sake of past offence, for what has been done he cannot make undone, but for the sake of the future, that neither this man himself, nor any other who sees him punished, may again act unjustly. And he who entertains such a thought must think that virtue may be taught; he punishes certainly for the sake of deterring from wickedness. All, therefore, have this opinion who inflict punishment, either privately or publicly. Now all other men, and especially the Athenians, your fellow-citizens, inflict punishment on and correct those who they think act unjustly; so that, according to this reasoning, the Athenians also are among the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. That your fellow-citizens, therefore, very properly allow a brazier and a shoemaker to give advice in political affairs, and that they think that virtue may be taught and acquired, has been sufficiently demonstrated to you, Socrates, at least as it appears to me.

“There still, however, remains a doubt which you entertain respecting those good men, why, in the world they have their sons instructed in such things as depend on masters, and make them wise, but in the virtue which they themselves possess do not make them better than others. With respect to this, then, Socrates, I shall no longer speak to you in fable, but argument. For consider the matter thus. Whether is there some one thing or not, of which it is necessary all the citizens should partake, if a city is to be? for in this or in no other way, the doubt which you entertain is solved. For if there is, and if this one thing is neither the art of a builder, nor of a brazier, nor of a potter, but is justice, and temperance, and holiness, and in a word I call it by one name, the virtue of a man; if this be the thing, of which all must partake, and with which every man if he wishes to learn or do anything else, must learn or do it, but not without this, or if one who does not partake of it must be taught and punished, whether boy, or man, or woman, till through being punished he becomes better, and he who is not obedient, when punished or taught, is to be banished from cities, or put to death as incurable; if this is the case, and if, notwithstanding this, good men teach their children other things, but not this, consider what strange people those good men are: for we have shown that they think it may be taught, both privately and publicly. But since it may be taught, and acquired by study, do they teach their children other things, for which death is not imposed as a penalty, if they do not know them; but where the penalty of death or exile is imposed on their children, if they are not instructed or exercised in virtue, and besides death, the confiscation of their property, and in short the ruin of their families, *do you think that* they do not teach them these things nor bestow their whole care upon them? We must think they do, Socrates.

“Beginning from childhood they both teach and admonish them as long as they live. For as soon as anyone understands what is said, nurse, mother, pedagogue, and the father himself, vie with each other in this, how the boy may become as good as possible; in every word and deed teaching and pointing out to him that this is just, and that unjust, this is honorable and that base, this is holy and that unholy, and this you must do and that you must not do. And if the boy obeys willingly, it is well: but if not, like a tree twisted and bent they make him straight by threats and blows. After this they send him to masters, and give them much more strict injunctions to attend to the children’s morals than to their reading and music: and the masters do attend to this, and when the boys have learnt their letters, and are able to understand what is written, as before words spoken, they place before them on their benches to read, and compel them to learn by heart the compositions of good poets, in which there are many admonitions, and many details, and praises, and encomiums, of good men of former times, in order that the boy may imitate them through emulation, and strive to become such himself. Again, the music-masters, in the same way, pay attention to sobriety of behavior, and take care that the boys commit no evil: besides this, when they have learnt to play on the harp, they teach them the compositions of other good poets, and those lyric, setting them to music, and they compel rhythm and harmony to become familiar to the boys’ souls, in order that they may become more gentle, and being themselves more rhythmical and harmonious, they may be able both to speak and act; for the whole life of man requires rhythm and harmony. Moreover, besides this, they send them to a teacher of gymnastics, that having their bodies in a better state, they may be subservient to their well-regulated mind, and not be compelled to cowardice, through bodily infirmity,

either in war or other actions. And these things they do who are most able; but the richest are the most able, and their sons beginning to frequent masters at the earliest time of life leave them the latest. And when they are set free from masters, the state still further compels them to learn the laws, and to live by them as a pattern, that they may not act at random after their own inclinations, but exactly as writing masters having ruled lines with a pen for those boys who have not yet learnt to write well, so give them the copy-book, and compel them to write according to the direction of the lines, so the state having prescribed laws which were the inventions of good and ancient legislators, compels them both to govern and be governed according to these, but whoso transgresses them, it punishes; and the name given to this chastisement, both among you, and in many other places, is correction, since punishment corrects. So great therefore being the attention paid to virtue, privately and publicly, do you wonder and doubt, Socrates, whether virtue may be taught? There is no need, however, to wonder, but much more if it could not be taught.

"Why then are there many bad sons of good fathers? Learn again the reason of this; for it is not at all wonderful, if what I have before said is true, that, if a state is to subsist, no one must be unskilled in this thing, virtue. For if what I say is the case, and it assuredly is, consider the matter by selecting any other study and subject of instruction whatever. For instance, suppose that a city could not subsist unless we were all of us flute-players, each according to his capacity, and suppose everyone should teach his neighbor, both privately and publicly, and should chide anyone who did not play well, and should not grudge doing this, as now no one grudges a knowledge of what is just and legal, or conceals it, as is the case in other arts, for mutual justice and virtue are, I think, advantageous to us; and for

this reason everyone most willingly tells and teaches others what is just and legal. If then in the same way, in flute-playing, we had a perfectly willing and ungrudging disposition to teach each other, do you think, Socrates," said he, "that the sons of good flute-players would become good players, rather than the sons of bad ones? I indeed think not; but the man's son who happened to have the best natural talent for flute-playing, would rise to distinction; and the man's son who had no such natural talent, would be undistinguished; and the son of a good flute-player would often turn out a bad one, and the son of a bad one would often turn out a good one. However, all would be sufficiently good flute-players, compared with those who are untaught, and who know nothing of flute-playing. In like manner think that the man who appears to you to be the most unjust of those who are trained in the laws, and among civilized men, is just and a proficient in justice, when compared with men, who have neither instruction nor courts of justice, nor laws, nor any necessity that constantly compels them to attend to virtue, but may be considered as savages, such as those whom the poet Pherecrates represented last year, at the Lenaean festival. Assuredly, if you should chance to be thrown among such men as the misanthropes in that play, you would rejoice if you met with a Eurybates and a Phrynondas, and you would deplore with regret the depravity of the men here. But now you are fastidious, Socrates, because all are teachers of virtue as far as they are severally able, though no one appears to you to be so. Again, if you were to enquire for a teacher of the Greek language, not one would be found: nor, I think, if you were to enquire for one who could instruct the sons of our artificers in the very art which they have learnt from their father, so far as the father and the father's friends who follow the same art are able to teach it, *if*, *I say*, *you were to enquire* for one who

could instruct them, I think, Socrates, that a teacher would not easily be found for them, but for those who are utterly unskilled, a teacher would easily be found, and so with respect to virtue and everything else. But if there is anyone who excels us even but a little in advancing others in the road to virtue, we ought to be content. Of these, then, I think I am one, and that far above other men I know certain things by which a man will be made upright and good, and that worth the remuneration which I demand, and even more, as also my pupils think. Therefore I adopt the following method in my demand for remuneration; when anyone has learnt from me, if he is willing, he pays the sum that I demand; but if not, having gone to a temple and sworn how much my instructions are worth, he pays that sum.

"Thus much, Socrates, I have said by way of fable and argument, to prove that virtue may be taught, and that the Athenians are of that opinion, and that it is not at all wonderful that the sons of good fathers should turn out bad, or of bad fathers, good, since even the sons of Polycletus, who are of the same age with Paralus and Xanthippus here, are nothing compared with their father, and so with respect to the sons of Other artists; these youths, however, do not yet deserve to be blamed in this respect; for we have still hopes in them, as they are young."

Socrates/ Protagoras having made such and so long a display, ceased speaking; and I, having continued for a long time enchanted, still looked at him, expecting that he would say something more, and desiring to hear him. But when I perceived that he had in reality ceased, I with difficulty collected myself, and looking towards Hippocrates, said, "O son of Apollodorus, how thankful I am to you for having urged me to come hither; for I esteem it a great privilege to have heard what I have heard from Protagoras; for before this, I thought it was no human care by which good men

become good, but now I am persuaded that it is. However, I feel a slight difficulty, which, doubtless, Protagoras will easily explain, since he has explained so much. For if anyone should converse with anyone of the popular orators on these subjects, he would perhaps hear similar arguments, as from Pericles, for instance, or some other able speaker; but if he should ask them any further questions, like books they are unable either to give an answer or to ask any question themselves. And if one should put any trifling question to them respecting what has been said, as brass when struck sounds for a long time, and prolongs its sound, unless someone lays hold of it, so these orators, when asked some trifling question, answer in a speech drawn out to a great length. But Protagoras here is able to make long and beautiful speeches, as the fact proves, and is also able, when asked a question, to answer briefly, and when questioning, to wait and receive the answer, which are qualities possessed but by a few. Now then, Protagoras, I need a trifle only, so that I shall have all I want if you will answer me this. You say that virtue may be taught; and I, if I could be persuaded by any man, should be persuaded by you. But, what I wondered at your saying, satisfy my mind as to that. For you said that Zeus sent justice and shame to men; and afterwards, in many parts of your discourse, justice, temperance, holiness, and all qualities of that kind, were spoken of by you, as if they were collectively one thing, virtue. Therefore explain this accurately to me, whether virtue is one thing, and justice, temperance, and holiness, parts of it; or whether these that I have now mentioned are all names of one and the same thing. This is what I still want to know."

Protagoras/ "But it is easy, Socrates, to answer this question, that the qualities about which you ask are parts of virtue, which is one thing."

Socrates/ “Whether, are they parts like the parts of a face, the mouth, nose, eyes, and ears; or like the parts of gold, which in no respect differ from each other and from the whole, except in magnitude and littleness?”

Protagoras/ “Like the former, it appears to me Socrates, as the parts of the face are to the whole face.”

Socrates/ “Whether, then, do men possess these parts of virtue, someone and others another part? or is it necessary that he who has received one should have all?”

Protagoras/ “By no means, since many men are brave, but unjust, and again just, but not wise.”

Socrates/ “Are these, then, parts of virtue, wisdom and courage?”

Protagoras/ “Most assuredly. And wisdom is chief of all the parts.”

Socrates/ “And is every one of them different from every other?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And has each of them its proper function, like the parts of the face? For instance, an eye is not like the ears, nor is its function the same; nor is anyone of the others like any other, either as to its function, or in any other respect. Thus, then, with the parts of virtue, is not anyone like any other, either in itself, or in its function? Is it not clear that such is the case, since it resembles our example?”

Protagoras/ “Such is the case, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Therefore none of the other parts of virtue are like science, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness.”

Protagoras/ “No.”

Socrates/ “Come then, let us examine together what the character of each of them is. And first of all, thus; is justice

a thing, or not a thing? to me it appears to be a thing; but what does it appear to you to be?"

Protagoras/ "To me also it appears to be a thing."

Socrates/ "What then? If someone were to ask you and me, 'Protagoras and Socrates, tell me with respect to this very thing which you have just now named, justice, whether is it in itself just or unjust? I should answer him that it is just: but what decision would you give? the same as mine, or different?"

Protagoras/ "The same."

Socrates/ "Justice, then, is precisely similar to being just, I should say in answer to one who asked the question. And would not you, too?"

Protagoras/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "If, then, after this, he should ask us, 'Do you not also say that holiness is something? we should reply, I think that we do?"

Protagoras/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "'Do you not say that this too is a thing?' should we say it is, or not?"

He allowed that we should say it is.

"'But whether do you say that this very thing is of such a nature as to be unholy, or holy? I for my part, should be indignant at the question, and should say, 'Speak properly, my good sir, for scarcely could anything else be holy, if holiness itself be not holy. But what should you say? should not you give the same answer?"

Protagoras/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "If, then, after this, he should ask us, and say, 'What then did you mean a little while ago? Or did I not hear you aright? For you appeared to me to say that the parts of virtue are so disposed to each other, that no one of them

resembles any other; I, for my part should reply, In other respects you heard aright, but in thinking that I too said this, you were mistaken; for Protagoras gave this answer, and I put the question. If then he should say, 'Does he speak the truth, Protagoras; do you say that no one part of virtue is like any other of its parts? Is this your assertion? what answer would you give him?"

Protagoras/ "I must needs admit it, Socrates."

Socrates/ "After admitting this, Protagoras, what answer should we give him, if he further asked us, 'Is not holiness then of such a nature as to be a just thing, nor justice such as to be a holy thing, but such as to be not holy; and holiness such as to be not just, but unjust, and the former unholy? What answer should we give him? I, for myself, should say both that justice is holy, and holiness just. And for you, if you would permit me, I should make the very same answer, that justice is the same with holiness, or very like it, and that justice bears the nearest possible resemblance to holiness, and holiness to justice. But consider whether you would forbid me to give this answer, or does it seem so to you also?"

Protagoras/ "It does not altogether appear to me, Socrates, to be so absolutely true, that I can grant that justice is holy, and holiness just; but there appears to me to be a difference between them. However what matters that? if you wish it, let it be admitted between us that justice is holy, and holiness just."

Socrates/ "Not so, for I do not require to examine into an 'If you wish it,' and 'If you think so,' but into what I think and what you think; but in saying 'what I think and what you think,' I mean this, I am of opinion that our argument will be best discussed if we put it out of the question altogether."

Protagoras/ “Well then, justice has some resemblance to holiness, for everything resembles every other thing in some respect, for white in some sort resembles black, and hard, soft, and so with respect to other things which appear to be most contrary to each other; and the things which we just now said have different functions, and are not the one like the other, as the parts of the face do in a certain respect resemble each other; so that in this way you could prove this, if you pleased, that all things are similar to each other; yet it is not right to call things that have a certain similarity, similar, nor things that have a certain dissimilarity, dissimilar, though the similarity is very trifling.”

Socrates/ And I, wondering, said to him, “Do you think then that the just and the holy are so related to each other, that they have but a trifling similarity to one another?”

Protagoras/ “Not quite so, nor on the other hand do I consider them in the same way as you appear to me to do.”

Socrates/ “However, since you appear to me to be vexed at this, we will dismiss it, and consider this of the other things that you said. Do you call folly anything?”

He admitted he did.

“And is not wisdom the direct contrary to this thing?”

Protagoras/ “It appears so to me.”

Socrates/ “But when men act rightly and profitably, do they then appear to you to act temperately, in so acting, or the contrary?”

Protagoras/ “To act temperately.”

Socrates/ “And are they not temperate by temperance?”

Protagoras/ “Necessarily so.”

Socrates/ “Do not they, then, who act wrongly, act foolishly, and are they not intemperate in so acting?”

Protagoras/ “I agree with you.”

Socrates/ “Acting foolishly, then, is the contrary to acting temperately.”

He said it was.

“Are not, therefore, things which are done foolishly, done through folly, and things done temperately through temperance?”

He agreed.

“If then anything is done through strength, is it not done strongly, and if through weakness, weakly?”

Protagoras/ “It appears so.”

Socrates/ “And if anything is done with swiftness, swiftly, and if with slowness, slowly?”

He said it was.

“And if anything is done in the same manner, is it not done by the same means, and if in a contrary manner by the contrary means?”

He granted it.

“Come then, is there anything beautiful?”

He admitted there was.

“Is anything contrary to this except the ugly?”

Protagoras/ “There is not.”

Socrates/ “But what? Is there anything good?”

Protagoras/ “There is.”

Socrates/ “And is anything contrary to this except evil?”

Protagoras/ “There is not.”

Socrates/ “What? is there anything high in voice?”

He said there is.

“And is anything contrary to this except the low?”

Protagoras/ “There is not.”

Socrates/ “Therefore, to each several contrary there is only one contrary, and not many.”

He granted it.

“Come then, let us reckon up our admissions. We have admitted that one thing only is contrary to one, but not more?”

Protagoras/ “We have.”

Socrates/ “And that what is done contrariwise, is done by contraries?”

He assented.

“We admitted also that what is done foolishly is done contrariwise to that which is done temperately?”

He assented.

“And that what is done temperately is done by temperance, and what foolishly, by folly?”

He agreed.

“If therefore it is done contrariwise, must it not be done by a contrary?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And the one is done by temperance, and the other by folly?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Contrariwise?”

Protagoras/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Through contraries therefore?”

Protagoras/ “It appears so.”

Socrates/ “Folly therefore is contrary to temperance?”

Protagoras/ “So it appears.”

Socrates/ “Do you remember, however, that we before admitted that folly is contrary to wisdom?”

He allowed it.

“And that one thing only is contrary to one?”

Protagoras/ “I grant it.”

Socrates/ “Which, then, of these positions must we retract, Protagoras? That which says, that one thing only is contrary to one, or that in which it was asserted, that wisdom is different from temperance, but that each is a part of virtue, and that besides being different, both they and their functions are dissimilar, in the same manner as the parts of the face? Which of these, then, must we retract? for these two positions taken together are not set down in a very musical manner; for they neither accord, nor harmonize with each other. For how can they accord, since it is necessary that one thing only should be contrary to one, but not to more, but wisdom and temperance are found to be contrary to folly, which is one. Is it so, Protagoras, or otherwise?”

He admitted that it was so, though very unwillingly.

“Must not, then, temperance and wisdom be one and the same thing? Before, moreover, justice and holiness were found to be nearly the same. Come, however,” said I, “Protagoras, let us not be disheartened, but examine the rest. Does a man who acts unjustly, appear to you to be prudent, because he acts unjustly?”

Protagoras/ “I should be ashamed, Socrates, to acknowledge this, though many men do say so.”

Socrates/ “Whether, then, shall I address my argument to them or to you?”

Protagoras/ “If you please, discuss this statement first, the statement of the many.”

Socrates/ “But it makes no difference to me, if only you will answer, whether these things appear so to you or not: for I am most anxious to sift the statement itself, though it

may possibly happen, that both I who question, and you who answer, may ourselves be sifted."

At first, then, Protagoras began to give himself airs, for he objected that the subject was difficult; afterwards however, he agreed to answer.

"Come then, answer me from the beginning. Do persons who act unjustly, appear to you to be prudent?"

Protagoras/ "Be it so."

Socrates/ "And by being prudent, do you mean thinking rightly?"

He assented.

"And by thinking rightly that they are well advised when they act unjustly?"

Protagoras/ "Be it so."

Socrates/ "Is this the case, if they fare well in acting unjustly, or if they fare ill?"

Protagoras/ "If they fare well."

Socrates/ "Do you say then that certain things are good?"

Protagoras/ "I do."

Socrates/ "Are those things good, then, which are advantageous to men?"

Protagoras/ "By Zeus, and some things though they are not advantageous to men I call good."

Socrates/ Protagoras now appeared to me to be ruffled and annoyed, and to be set against answering any more: when, therefore, I saw him in this state, I was cautious, and asked him gently: "Whether," said I, "Protagoras, do you mean things that are advantageous to no man, or things that are advantageous in no respect whatever? and do you call such things good?"

Protagoras/ "By no means, but I know many things which are useless to men, meats and drinks, and drugs, and ten

thousand other things, and some things that are advantageous; and some things that are neither the one nor the other to men, but are to horses, and some to oxen only, and others to dogs, others again to neither of these, but to trees, and others that are good for the roots of trees, but pernicious to their buds, for instance, dung is good when applied to the roots of all plants, but if you were to put it on their branches and young shoots, it destroys the whole. Oil too is very injurious to all plants, and is most destructive to the hairs of all animals except man, but it is of service to the hairs of man, and to the rest of his body. So various and diversified a thing is good, that this very thing is good for the external parts of the human body, but most pernicious to the inward parts. And on this account all physicians forbid the sick to use oil, except only a very small quantity in what they are going to eat, just sufficient to overcome the disagreeable smell of the food and seasoning."

Socrates/ Protagoras having said this, those that were present loudly applauded him, for that he spoke well. And I said, "Protagoras, I happen to be a forgetful sort of man, and if anyone makes me a long speech, I forget what the discussion is about. As, therefore, if I happened to be deaf, you would have thought it necessary, if you were about to converse with me, to speak louder than you do to others, so now, since you have met with a forgetful person, curtail your answers for me, and make them briefer, if I am to follow you."

Protagoras/ "How do you bid me answer briefly? Must I answer you more briefly than is requisite?"

Socrates/ "By no means."

Protagoras/ "But at such length as is requisite?"

Socrates/ "Yes."

Protagoras/ "Whether, then, must I answer at such length as I think requisite, or as you?"

Socrates/ “I have heard, that you are both yourself able, and can teach others to make a long speech on the same subject if you please, so as never to be in want of words, and again to speak so briefly, that no one can express himself in fewer words than you. If, therefore, you mean to converse with me, use the other method with me, that of brevity.”

Protagoras/ “Socrates, I have ere this entered into discussion with many men, and if I had done what you bid me, that is, had conversed as my antagonist bade me converse, I should not have appeared to excel anyone, nor would the name of Protagoras have been celebrated in Greece.”

Socrates/ Then I for I perceived that he was not pleased with his former answers, and that he would not willingly carry on the conversation by answering my questions thinking that I had no longer any business to be present at the conference, said, “Protagoras, I am not anxious to continue our conference contrary to your wish; but whenever you are willing to converse in such a manner that I can follow you, I will then converse with you. For you, as is reported of you, and as you admit yourself, are able to carry on a conference both with prolixity and brevity; for you are wise; but I am unable to follow these long speeches; though I wish that I could. But it was fitting, that you, who are capable of doing both, should yield to me, in order that the conference might continue: now however, since you are not willing and I have business to attend to, and am unable to stay while you are extending your speeches to a great length for I have somewhere to go to, I will take my departure; though otherwise perhaps I might have listened to these things with pleasure.”

And as I spoke thus, I rose to depart. And as I was rising, Callias takes hold of me with his right hand, and with his left seized my cloak, and said;

Callias/ “We shall not let you go, Socrates; for if you go away, our conversation will no longer be the same. I beseech you, therefore, stay with us; for there is no one I would more gladly hear than you and Protagoras conversing together; therefore oblige us all.”

Socrates/ —I already stood up ready to go—“Son of Hipponicus, I always admire your love of wisdom; but I now both praise and love it; so that I should wish to gratify you, if you asked me what was possible. But now it is as if you should ask me to keep up with Crison of Himera, a runner in his prime, or to run a race and keep up with one of the long-distance runners or day-couriers; I should say to you, that I wish much more than you do that I could keep pace with these runners, but I cannot, but if you wish to see me and Crison running together, you must request him to slacken his pace; for I am not able to run swiftly, but he is able to run slowly. So if you desire to hear me and Protagoras, you must request him to continue to answer as he did at first, briefly and to the question. But if not, what kind of conversation will arise? I for my part thought that it is one thing to converse together, and another to harangue.”

Callias/ “But you see, Socrates, Protagoras appears to ask what is just, in requiring that he may be allowed to converse as he pleases, and you as you please.”

Socrates/ Alcibiades, thereupon, taking up the discourse, said;

Alcibiades/ “You do not speak fairly, Callias; for Socrates here admits that he has not the faculty of making long speeches, and yields to Protagoras, but in the power of conversing, and knowing how to give and receive a reason, I should wonder if he yielded to any man. If then, Protagoras confesses that he is inferior to Socrates in conversing, that is enough for Socrates; but if he pretends to rival him, let

him carry on the conversation by question and answer, not making a long speech in answer to each question, evading the argument and not choosing to give a reason, but prolonging his speech until most of the hearers forget what the question was about. For as for Socrates, I will be his surety that he will not forget, notwithstanding he jests and says he is forgetful. To me, therefore, Socrates appears to make the fairer proposition; for it is right that everyone should declare his own opinion."

Socrates/ After Alcibiades, it was Critias, I think, who said;

Critias/ "Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be very much on the side of Protagoras; but Alcibiades is always fond of contention, to whatever he applies himself. We, however, ought not to contend with each other, either for Socrates or Protagoras, but we should join in requesting them both not to break up the conference in the middle."

Socrates/ When he had spoken thus, Prodicus said;

Prodicus/ "You seem to me to say well, Critias: for it is right that those who are present at discussions of this kind should be common, but not equal hearers of both speakers. For it is not the same thing: for it is requisite to hear both in common, but not to give equal attention to each of them, but to the wiser more, and to the less learned less. I too, Protagoras and Socrates, beg of you to make concessions to each other, and to argue with one another, but not to wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of good will, but adversaries and enemies wrangle with one another. And thus the conference will be most admirably conducted. For you, the speakers, will thus be highly approved, not praised, by us the hearers; for approbation is felt in the mind of the hearers, and is without deception; but praise is bestowed in words, by persons often who speak untruly, contrary to their

real opinion; again, we, the hearers, shall thus be highly delighted, not pleased, for delight takes place when one learns something and acquires wisdom in one's mind, but pleasure when one eats something, or experiences some other agreeable sensation in one's body."

Socrates/ When Prodicus had thus spoken, many of those that were present approved of what he said. But after Prodicus, Hippias the wise spoke:

Hippias/ "My friends who are here present, I regard you all as kinsmen, relatives, and fellow-citizens by nature, though not by law; for like is by nature akin to like, but law being a tyrant over men, compels many things to be done contrary to nature. It were disgraceful, then, for us to know the nature of things, to be the wisest of the Greeks, and in this very character to have met together in the city of Greece, which is the very prytaneum of wisdom, and in the noblest and wealthiest house in this city, and then to exhibit nothing worthy of this high rank, but like the lowest of men to disagree with each other. I therefore both entreat and advise you, Protagoras and Socrates, to come to terms under our authority, who as arbitrators will bring you to an agreement; and neither do you, Socrates, require that exact form of dialogue, which is so very concise, unless it is agreeable to Protagoras, but relax somewhat and give the reins to your discourse, that it may appear to us with more majesty and grace; nor on the other hand, do you, Protagoras, stretching every rope, and carrying all sail, scud to an ocean of words out of sight of land, but both of you keep a middle course. Do thus then, and be persuaded by me to choose a moderator, president, and prytanis, who will oblige you to keep within moderate bounds on either side."

Socrates/ This pleased those that were present, and all approved, and Callias said that he would not let me go, and they urged me to choose a president. I said therefore;

Socrates/ “that it would be a shame to choose an umpire for our arguments; for if the person chosen should be our inferior, it would not be right that the inferior should preside over his superiors, nor if he should be equal, would this be right; for one that is equal will act the same as we do, so that the choice will be superfluous. But you will choose someone better than we are; in reality I think it impossible for you to choose anyone wiser than Protagoras here: but if you should choose one in no respect superior, though you shall affirm that he is, this also will be a disgrace to him, to have a president chosen for him, as if he were a common person: for as to myself it makes no difference. I am willing, then, to act as follows, that our conference and conversation may continue, which you so earnestly desire: if Protagoras is not willing to answer, let him ask questions, and I will answer; and at the same time I will endeavor to show him, how I say one who answers ought to answer. But when I have answered all the questions that he chooses to ask, let him in his turn, in like manner, reply to me. If, however, he should not appear disposed to answer the exact question put to him, both you and I will join in entreating of him, as you now do of me, not to destroy the conversation. And for this purpose there is no occasion for one president to be appointed, but you will all be presidents in common.”

It appeared to all that this was what ought to be done. And though Protagoras was not very willing to comply, yet he was compelled to consent to ask questions, and when he had asked enough in his turn to reply to my questions with brevity. He began therefore pretty nearly as follows:

Protagoras/ “I think, Socrates, that the most important part of a man’s education consists in being skilled in poetical composition; that is, to be able to understand what has been said by the poets, both what has been correctly composed and what incorrectly, and to know how to distinguish and to

give a reason when asked about them. And now the question shall be on the very subject about which you and I have been conversing, virtue, but it shall be transferred to poetry. For Simonides somewhere says to Scopas, son of Creon the Thessalian, 'That to become a good man is truly difficult, square as to his hands and feet and mind, fashioned without fault. Do you know the ode, or shall I repeat the whole to you?"

Socrates/ "There is no necessity, for I know it, and have studied the ode with great attention."

Protagoras/ "You say well. Whether, does it appear to you to have been composed beautifully and correctly or not?"

Socrates/ "Certainly, both beautifully and correctly."

Protagoras/ "But does it appear to you to have been composed beautifully if the poet contradicts himself?"

Socrates/ "Not beautifully."

Protagoras/ "Consider it, then, more attentively."

Socrates/ "But my good friend, I have examined it sufficiently."

Protagoras/ "You know, then, that in the course of the ode he says somewhere, 'That saying of Pittacus does not please me, though uttered by a wise man, wherein he says, it is difficult to continue to be good. Do you observe, that the same person makes both this and the former remark?"

Socrates/ "I know it."

Protagoras/ "Does it appear to you then, that the one agrees with the other?"

Socrates/ "It appears so to me." And at the same time I was afraid lest there should be something in what he said. "But, does not it appear so to you?"

Protagoras/ "How can he who made both these assertions agree with himself, who first of all laid it down in his own

person, that it is truly difficult to become a good man, and a little further on this person forgets himself and blames Pittacus for saying the same thing that he had said himself, 'that it is difficult to be good,' and asserts that he cannot approve of his saying the very same thing as himself. Surely in blaming a man who says the same things as himself, it is clear that he blames himself, so that in the former or the latter place he does not speak correctly."

Socrates/ In saying this he elicited applause and praise from many of the hearers. And I, at first, as if I had been hit by a skillful boxer, was blinded, and made giddy, by his saying this, and by the applause of the others; but afterwards, to tell you the truth, that I might have time to consider what the poet meant, I turned to Prodicus, and calling out to him, said, "Prodicus, Simonides was your fellow-citizen; you are bound to assist the man. I seem then, to call upon you, in the same manner as Homer says Scamander, when assailed by Achilles, called upon Simois, saying, 'Dear brother, let us unite to repel the prowess of this man. So I call upon you, let not Protagoras overthrow Simonides. For the defense of Simonides requires that exquisite skill of yours, by which you distinguish between to will and to desire, as not being the same, and by which you just now established many and beautiful distinctions. And now consider, whether your opinion agrees with mine: for Simonides does not appear to me to contradict himself. But do you, Prodicus, first declare your opinion. Does it appear to you that to become and to be are the same or different?"

Prodicus/ "Different by Zeus."

Socrates/ "Has not Simonides himself then, in the first passage, declared his own opinion, that it is in truth difficult to become a good man?"

Prodicus/ "You say truly."

Socrates/ “But he blames Pittacus, not as Protagoras thinks, for saying the same thing that he had said, but something different. For Pittacus does not say that this is the difficulty, to become a good man, as Simonides does, but this, to be so; but Protagoras, as Prodicus here says, to be and to become are not the same; and if to be and to become are not the same, Simonides does not contradict himself. And perhaps Prodicus here, and many others, may say with Hesiod, ‘that it is difficult to become good; for that the gods have placed sweat before virtue; but when anyone has reached its summit it is then easy to acquire, though before it was difficult.’”

Prodicus, on hearing this, commended me; but Protagoras said;

Protagoras/ “Your defense, Socrates, is more erroneous than the passage which you defend.”

Socrates/ “Then I have done ill, as it seems, Protagoras, and I am an absurd physician; in attempting to cure, I make the disease worse.”

Protagoras/ “So it is however.”

Socrates/ “But how?”

Protagoras/ “Great must have been the poet’s ignorance, if he asserts that virtue is so easy a thing to be acquired, whereas it is the most difficult of all, as all men think.”

Socrates/ “By Zeus, Prodicus here is very opportunely present at our discussion. For the wisdom of Prodicus appears, O Protagoras, to have been of old divine, whether it began with Simonides, or is even still more ancient. But you, who are skilled in many other things, appear to be unskilled in this, and not skilled in it as I am, from being the disciple of this Prodicus. And now you appear to me not to be aware that Simonides probably did not understand this word ‘difficult,’ in the same sense as you understand it; but as

with the word δεινὸς, terrible and clever, Prodicus here is continually taking me to task, when in praising you, or anyone else, I say, that Protagoras is a wise and terrible man, he asks if I am not ashamed of calling good things terrible, for what is terrible, he says, is evil; hence no one ever speaks of terrible riches, or terrible peace, or terrible health, but everyone says terrible disease, and terrible war, and terrible poverty, since whatever is terrible is evil. Perhaps, therefore, the Ceans and Simonides understand by the word difficult either that which is bad, or something else that you are not aware of. Let us then ask Prodicus; for it is right to enquire of him the meaning of words used by Simonides; what, Prodicus, does Simonides mean by the word difficult?"

Prodicus/ "Evil."

Socrates/ "For this reason, then, Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying that it is difficult to be good, as if he had heard him say that it is evil to be good."

Prodicus/ "But what else but this, Socrates, do you think Simonides meant and found fault with in Pittacus, that he did not know how to distinguish terms rightly, as being a Lesbian, and educated in a barbarous dialect?"

Socrates/ "Do you hear Prodicus, Protagoras? And have you any objection to make to this?"

Protagoras/ "This is far from being the case, Prodicus; for I am very sure that Simonides meant by the word difficult the same that we all do, not what is evil, but that which is not easy, but is accomplished by much toil."

Socrates/ "And I too think, Protagoras, that Simonides meant this, and that Prodicus here knows he did, but he is jesting, and is willing to try whether you are able to maintain your own assertion. For that Simonides does not by the word difficult mean evil, is strongly confirmed by the expression

immediately after this; for he says, that 'God alone possesses this privilege, not surely meaning that it is evil to be good; then he adds that God alone possesses this, and he attributes this privilege to God alone; for in that case Prodicus would call Simonides a profligate, and by no means a Cean. But I am willing to tell you what appears to me to have been the design of Simonides in this ode, if you think proper to make trial of my poetical skill, as you call it; or if you prefer it, I will listen to you."

Protagoras, therefore, hearing me speak thus, said;

Protagoras/ "If you please, Socrates;"

Socrates/ but Prodicus, Hippias, and the rest, urged me very much.

"I will endeavor, then, to explain to you what I think of this ode. Philosophy is most ancient and most prevalent in Crete and Lacedæmon of all Greece, and sophists are more numerous there than anywhere else. They deny it, however, and pretend to be ignorant, in order that they may not be discovered to surpass the rest of the Greeks in wisdom, like those sophists whom Protagoras mentioned, but that they may appear to excel in fighting and courage, thinking that, if it were known in what they excel, all men would engage in the same pursuit. But now, concealing this, they deceive those who affect Spartan manners in other cities, for some, in imitation of them, have their ears bruised, and bind their arms with the thongs of the cestus, and devote themselves to gymnastic exercises, and wear short garments, as if in these things the Lacedaemonians excelled the other Greeks. But the Lacedæmonians, now that they wish to converse without restraint with the sophists among them, and are wearied with conversing with them in secret, expelling these imitators of Spartan manners, and any other stranger that is living in their country, converse with the sophists

unknown to all strangers; and they do not suffer any of their young men to go out to other cities, as neither do the Cretans, lest they should unlearn what they have taught them. And in these cities there are not only men that pride themselves on their learning, but women also. And you may know, that in this I speak truly, and that the Lacedaemonians are admirably instructed in philosophy and the art of speaking, from the following circumstance: for if anyone wishes to converse with the meanest of the Lacedaemonians, he will find him, for the most part, apparently an ordinary person in conversation, but afterwards, when a proper opportunity presents itself, he sends forth, like a skillful lancer, a notable saying, brief and pointed, so that he who converses with him will appear to be nothing better than a boy. Accordingly some persons, both of the present day and of former times, have observed this very thing, that to imitate Spartan manners consists much more in studying philosophy, than devoting one's-self to gymnastic exercises, since they know that to be able to utter such sayings is a proof of a highly educated man. Among these were Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, our own Solon, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chene, and the seventh among them was reckoned the Lacedæmonian Chilo. These all were emulators, lovers, and disciples of the Lacedæmonian education, and anyone may discover that their wisdom was of this kind, brief and memorable sayings uttered by each of them. These men also, having met together, consecrated the first-fruits of their wisdom to Apollo in the temple at Delphi, inscribing those sentences which all men have in their mouths: 'Know thyself, and 'Nothing in extremes.

"But why do I mention these things? To show that this was the mode of philosophy among the ancients, a certain laconic brevity of diction. Amongst the rest this particular

saying of Pittacus was noised abroad, being extolled by the wise men: 'It is difficult to be good. Simonides, therefore, as being ambitious of a reputation for wisdom, knew that if he could overthrow this saying, as if it were a famous wrestler, and could master it, he himself would become famous amongst the men of his own time. In opposition to this sentence, therefore, and with this object, designing to put it down, he composed the whole of this ode, as it appears to me.

"Let all of us, however, examine it together, to see whether what I say is true. For the very commencement of the ode would appear to be insane, if, wishing to say that it is difficult to become a good man, he had afterwards inserted the particle 'indeed.' For this appears to have been inserted for no purpose whatever, unless we suppose that Simonides is speaking as if he were quarrelling with the saying of Pittacus; and that when Pittacus says, that 'it is difficult to be good,' he, disputing this, says, 'Not so, but it is indeed difficult, Pittacus, to become good in very truth; not 'truly good.' For he does not use the word truly in this way, as if some men were truly good, and others good indeed, but not truly so, for this would have been silly, and not worthy of Simonides; but it is necessary to transpose the word 'truly' in the ode, understanding the saying of Pittacus somewhat as follows, as if we were to make Pittacus himself speak, and Simonides answer, saying, 'O men, it is difficult to be good, but the latter answers, 'Pittacus, your assertion is not true: for not to be, but to become indeed a good man, square as to one's hands and feet, and mind, fashioned without blame, is truly difficult. Thus it appears that the particle 'indeed' is inserted with good reason, and that the word 'truly' is rightly placed at the end. And all that follows bears witness to this, that such is the meaning. Many things might be said to prove with respect to each several passage in this ode, that

it is well composed; for it is very elegant and elaborate; but it would be too long to go through the whole of it in this way. Let us then consider its whole outline and design, which is nothing else than a refutation of the saying of Pittacus throughout the ode. For he says shortly after this, proceeding as if he would say, to become a good man is truly difficult, it is possible however for a certain time: but having become to continue in this condition, and to be a good man, as you say, Pittacus, is impossible and more than human, but God alone possesses this privilege; 'but it cannot be that a man should be otherwise than evil, whomsoever irresistible calamity prostrates.' Whom, then, does irresistible calamity prostrate in the command of a ship? Clearly not a private person, for the private person is always prostrate; as therefore no one can throw down a man who is lying on the ground, but sometimes one may throw down one who is standing upright, so as to make him lie on the ground, but not one already lying there, so an irresistible calamity may sometimes prostrate a skillful man, but never one who is always unskillful; and a violent storm bursting on a pilot may make his skill of no avail, and a bad season befalling a farmer may make his skill of no avail, and the same with a physician: for it befalls a good man to become evil, as is also testified by another poet, who says, 'A good man is sometimes evil, and sometimes good:' but it does not befall the evil to become so, but he must needs always be so. So that when an irresistible calamity prostrates a skillful, wise, and good man, it is not possible for him not to be evil; but you say, Pittacus, that it is difficult to be good; but the difficulty is to become good, though it is possible, but impossible to be so. 'For every man who fares well is good, but evil if he fares ill.' What then is faring well with respect to literature? and what makes a man good in literature? Clearly the being instructed in it. What faring well makes a

good physician? Clearly the being instructed in the art of curing the sick. 'And evil if he fares ill.' Who then would become an evil physician? Clearly he to whom it happens first to be a physician, and then a good physician; for he may become an evil physician. But we who are ignorant of the medical art, can never by faring ill become either physicians, or builders, or anything else of the kind; but whoever cannot become a physician by faring ill, clearly cannot become an evil physician. Thus also a good man may sometime or other become evil, either from length of time, or labor, or disease, or some other accident, for this alone is a faring ill, to be deprived of knowledge, but the evil man can never become evil, for he is always so; but if he is to become evil, it is necessary for him first to become good. So that this part of the ode tends to this, that it is not possible to be a good man, so as to continue good; but that it is possible to become good, and for the same person to become evil: 'and they are for the longest time best whom the gods love.'

"All these things therefore are said against Pittacus, and the following parts of the ode show this still more clearly. For he says, 'Wherefore I shall never, searching for that which cannot be, throw away a portion of my life on an empty impracticable hope, searching for an all-blameless man among us who feed on the fruits of the wide earth. When I have found one, I will inform you;' he adds. So vehemently, and through the whole of the ode, does he attack the saying of Pittacus. 'But I praise and willingly love all who do nothing base; but with necessity not even gods contend.' And this is spoken against that same saying. For Simonides was not so ill informed as to say that he praised those who did no evil willingly, as if there were some who did evil willingly. For I am pretty much of this opinion, that no wise man thinks that any man errs willingly, nor willingly commits base and evil actions, but they well know that all those who do base

and evil things, do them unwillingly. Moreover Simonides does not say, that he praises those who do not willingly do evil, but he uses this word 'willingly' of himself. For he thought that a good and upright man is frequently compelled to love and praise a certain person; for instance, it often happens to a man to have a perverse mother or father, or country, or something else of the kind. Now depraved men, when any such thing happens to them, are as it were glad to see it, and blaming make known and divulge the depravity of their parents or country, that when they neglect them, men may not accuse or reproach them for their neglect, so that they blame them still more *than they deserve*, and add voluntary to necessary enmity. But the good conceal the faults and compel themselves to praise, and if they are angry with their parents or country from having been injured by them, they pacify themselves and become reconciled, compelling themselves to love and praise their own connections. And I think Simonides also himself frequently considered it right to praise and extol a tyrant, or someone else of the kind, not willingly, but by compulsion. This, too, he says to Pittacus; I, Pittacus, do not blame you on this account, because I am fond of blaming; for 'it is enough for me if a man is not evil or too helpless, a sane man, acquainted with justice that benefits the state; I will not censure him, for I am not a lover of censure; for the race of fools is infinite;' so that he who delights in blaming may satiate himself in censuring them. 'All things are beautiful with which base things are not mingled.' His meaning in this, is not as if he had said, all things are white with which black is not mingled, for this would be in many ways ridiculous, but that he himself admits of a mean, so as not to blame it. 'And I do not seek,' he adds, 'an all-blameless man, among us who feed on the fruits of the wide earth; when I have found him, I will inform you.' For this reason,

therefore, I shall praise no one, but it is enough for me if a man be moderate, and does no evil, for I 'love and praise all.' Here too he uses the language of the Mitylenreans, as speaking to Pittacus, 'I praise and love all willingly, here it is necessary after 'willingly' to distinguish in the pronunciation, 'who do nothing base,' but there are some whom I praise and love unwillingly. Thee therefore, Pittacus, if thou had spoken with moderate reason and truth, I should never have blamed, but now, since you lie excessively and in matters of the greatest moment, while you think you are speaking the truth, for this reason I blame you. Such appears to me, Prodicus and Protagoras, to have been the design of Simonides in the composition of this ode."

Upon this Hippias said;

Hippias/ "You seem to me, Socrates, to have given a good explanation of this ode, and I too, have some pretty good remarks to make on it, which I will communicate to you, if you please."

Alcibiades/ "Do so, Hippias, but at another time; but now it is right to carry out the agreement which Protagoras and Socrates made with each other, and, if Protagoras wishes to ask any more questions, for Socrates to answer, but if he wishes to answer Socrates, then for the latter to ask questions."

Socrates/ "I leave it to Protagoras to choose whichever is more agreeable to him; but if he is willing, let us have done with odes and poems, but I would gladly, Protagoras, examine with you and come to a conclusion on the subject about which I first questioned you. For a discussion about poetry appears to me very like the festivities of mean and uneducated men; for they, through not being able to converse with one another over their cups, with their own voices and their own words, in consequence of deficiency of

education, enhance the pay of female flute-players, and hiring at a great price the foreign voices of flutes, converse with each other through their voices. But when worthy, good, and well educated men meet together at a banquet you will see neither flute-playing women, nor dancing-girls, nor harpists, but you will find that they are able to converse with themselves, without these trifles and pastimes, by means of their own voices, both speaking and listening to each other in turn, in good order, even though they have drunk a great deal of wine. In like manner, such meetings as the present, when they are composed of such men as most of us profess ourselves to be, have no need of foreign voices, or of poets, of whom it is not possible to ask the meaning of what they say, and most of those who introduce them in their arguments say that the poet means some one thing and some another, disputing about a matter which they can never determine. But they dismiss such topics of conversation as these, and converse with each other through their own resources, and in their discussions receive and give proof of each other's capacity. It appears to me, that you and I ought rather to imitate such persons as these, and setting aside the poets should discourse with each other, from our own resources, and receive proof of the truth and of ourselves. And if you still wish to question me, I am ready to offer myself to answer you; but if you do not wish it, do you offer yourself to me, so that we may bring to a conclusion the subject that we broke off in the middle."

On my saying these and other things of the same kind, Protagoras did not distinctly declare which of the two he would do. Alcibiades, therefore, looking to Callias, said;

Alcibiades/ "Callias, does Protagoras appear to you to act rightly now, in not being willing to declare whether he will answer or not? For to me he does not. But let him either continue the conversation, or say that he is not willing to

continue it, that we may know this from him, and that Socrates may converse with someone else, or whoever else wishes to do so with some other."

Socrates/ And Protagoras, being ashamed, as it seemed to me, when Alcibiades spoke thus and Callias and nearly all who were present entreated him, was with great difficulty prevailed on to renew the conversation and bade me question him, for that he would answer.

I then said to him, "Protagoras, think not that I converse with you with any other design, than to examine thoroughly into things about which I am continually in doubt. For I think that Homer speaks very much to the purpose, when he says, 'When two come together, one apprehends before the other. For all of us men are thus more prompt in every deed, and word, and thought, but when anyone apprehends alone, he immediately goes about and searches for someone to whom he may communicate it, and with whom he may establish it, until he finds him. So I too, for this reason, am better pleased to converse with you than with anyone else, thinking that you are best able to investigate both other subjects which a good man is likely to examine into, and especially virtue. For who else can do it but you? Since you not only think yourself to be a good and worthy man, as some others also are virtuous, but are not able to make others so; you however are both good yourself, and are able to make others good, and you have such confidence in yourself, that while others conceal this art, you openly proclaim yourself to all the Greeks designating yourself a sophist, publishing yourself as a professor of erudition and virtue, and you are the first that has thought fit to receive pay for this. How then, is it not right to call upon you to the examination of these matters, and to question and communicate with you respecting them? It cannot be otherwise. Now therefore I am desirous that the questions

which I first asked you on these subjects, should, from the commencement, be partly called to mind by you, and partly to consider them with you. The question, I think, was this; whether these, wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and holiness, which are five names, belong to one thing, or whether a certain peculiar essence is attached to each of these names, and each thing has its own function, and no one of them is the same as any other? You said, then, that these were not names belonging to one thing, but that each of these names was applied to a distinct thing, and that all these are parts of virtue, not in the same manner as the parts of gold are similar to each other, and to the whole of which they are parts, but just as the parts of the face are dissimilar to the whole of which they are parts, and to each other, each possessing its peculiar function. If these things still appear to you as they did then, say so; if otherwise, explain the difference, since I shall not think you in any way accountable, if you happen to speak differently; for I should not wonder if you said these things before for the purpose of trying me."

Protagoras/ "But I, tell you, Socrates, that all these are parts of virtue, and four of them are very like each other, but courage is very different from all these. And thus you will know that I speak the truth; for you will find many men who are most unjust, most unholy, most intemperate, and most ignorant, yet eminently courageous."

Socrates/ "Hold, for what you say is worth examining. Do you mean that courageous men are daring, or something else?"

Protagoras/ "I do. And bold to rush headlong on dangers which most men are afraid to encounter."

Socrates/ “Come then; do you say, that virtue is something beautiful? and as being a beautiful thing do you offer to teach it?”

Protagoras/ “Most beautiful, unless I am out of my senses.”

Socrates/ “Whether then, is one part of it base, and another beautiful, or, is it all beautiful?”

Protagoras/ “All beautiful, surely, in the highest degree.”

Socrates/ “Do you know, then, who boldly dive into wells?”

Protagoras/ “I do, divers.”

Socrates/ “Whether because they know how to do it, or for some other reason?”

Protagoras/ “Because they know how to do it.”

Socrates/ “But who are they that light boldly on horseback? whether good riders or bad?”

Protagoras/ “Good riders.”

Socrates/ “And who with targets? those that are targeteers, or those that are not?”

Protagoras/ “Those that are targeteers. And in everything else, if this is what you are enquiring about, you will find that those who are skilled, are bolder than the unskilled, and the same men, after they have learnt are bolder than they were before they learnt.”

Socrates/ “But did you ever see any, who, though unskilled in all these things, were yet bold with respect to each of them?”

Protagoras/ “I have. And very bold.”

Socrates/ “Are those bold persons, then, courageous also?”

Protagoras/ “If they were, courage would be a base thing; for these men are mad.”

Socrates/ “How then, do you describe the courageous? did you not say that they are the bold?”

Protagoras/ “And I say so now.”

Socrates/ “Do not those then, who are thus bold appear to be not courageous, but mad? And again, in the former instances, the wise are the boldest, and being the boldest, are most courageous? And according to this reasoning, will not wisdom be courage?”

Protagoras/ “You do not rightly remember, Socrates, what I said, and what answer I gave you? For when asked by you if the courageous were bold, I admitted that they were; but I was not asked, whether the bold also were courageous; for if you had asked me this, I should have said not all. But that the courageous are bold, which was my admission, you have nowhere shown that I made that admission improperly. In the next place, you show that men, who have skill, surpass themselves in boldness, and others who are unskilled, and from this, you conclude that courage and wisdom are the same. By proceeding in this way, you might also come to the conclusion that strength is wisdom. For, first of all, if proceeding thus you should ask me, whether the strong are powerful. I should say they are; and in the next place, whether those who are skilled in wrestling are more powerful than those who are unskilled, and they than themselves, after they have learnt, than before they learnt, I should say they are; and on my admitting this, by using the same argument, you might allege, that according to my own admission, wisdom is strength: I however, do not here or anywhere admit that the powerful are strong, but I do that the strong are powerful, for power and strength are not the same; but the one arises from skill, and from madness too, and passion, but strength from nature, and good nurture of the body. In like manner, boldness and courage are not the same; so that it happens that the courageous are bold, but

the bold are not all courageous. For boldness, like power, arises in men from skill, and from passion too and madness, but courage arises from nature, and the good culture of the soul."

Socrates/ "Do you allow, Protagoras, that some men live well, and others ill?"

He said he did.

"Does a man, then, appear to you to live well, if he lives in grief and pain?"

He said not.

"But what, if he should die after having passed his life pleasantly, would he not in that case appear to you to have lived well?"

Protagoras/ "To me he would."

Socrates/ "To live pleasantly, then, is a good, but unpleasantly an evil thing."

Protagoras/ "Yes, if he has lived taking pleasure in honest things."

Socrates/ "What then, Protagoras, do you, like the multitude, call some pleasant things evil, and some painful things good? I mean, as far as they are pleasant are they not so far good, unless something else results from them? And again, in the same way with regard to things painful; are they not evil so far as they are painful?"

Protagoras/ "I know not, Socrates, whether I should answer you as absolutely as you ask me, that pleasant things are all good, and painful things all evil; but it appears to me, not only with reference to the present answer, but also with reference to all the rest of my life, to be more safe to answer, that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and again, that there are some painful things which

are not evil, and there are some which are a third sort, and which are neither the one nor the other, neither good or evil."

Socrates/ "But do you not call those things pleasant, which partake of pleasure, or occasion pleasure?"

Protagoras/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "I ask this, then, whether they are not good, so far as they are pleasant, meaning to ask whether pleasure itself is not a good thing."

Protagoras/ "As you frequently say, Socrates, we must examine this, and if the examination shall appear to be connected with our subject, and the same thing shall appear to be both pleasant and good, we must grant it; but if not, we must controvert it."

Socrates/ "Whether, then, do you wish to take the lead in the examination, or shall I?"

Protagoras/ "You ought to take the lead, for you began the discussion."

Socrates/ "Do you think, then, that it will become clear to us in the following manner? just as if anyone, examining a man from his form either with reference to his health, or any other operations of his body, on beholding his face and hands, should say, Come, strip, and show me your breast and back, that I may examine you more closely; so I require something of the kind in reference to the present enquiry; perceiving that you are so affected as you say you are, with reference to the good and the pleasant, I have need to say some such thing as this, Come, Protagoras, lay your mind open to me on this point, how are you affected with respect to knowledge? Does it appear to you as it does to most men, or otherwise? Most men think of knowledge in some such way as this; that it is not a strong, nor a guiding, nor a governing thing; nor do they conceive of it as being anything of the kind; but though knowledge is often found in a man,

they do not think that knowledge governs him, but something else, at one time passion, at another pleasure, at another pain, sometimes love, and frequently fear, absolutely forming their conceptions of knowledge, as of a slave dragged about by all the rest. Is such your opinion of it, or do you think that knowledge is a noble thing, and able to govern man, and that if a man knows good and evil he can never be overcome by anything, so as to do anything else than what knowledge bids him, and that wisdom is sufficient to protect mankind?"

Protagoras/ "It appears to me, as you say, Socrates: and moreover, if for any man, it would be disgraceful for me not to assert that wisdom and knowledge are the most powerful of all human things."

Socrates/ "You say well and with truth. You are aware, however, that most men do not believe you and me, but say that many who know what is best are unwilling to do it, when it is in their power, but do other things. And all of whom I have asked what is the cause of this, have replied, that being overcome by pleasure, or mastered by pain, or someone of the things which I have just now mentioned, those who do these things are led to do them."

Protagoras/ "I think, Socrates, that men say many other things incorrectly."

Socrates/ "Come then, join me in endeavoring to persuade men, and to teach them what that affection of theirs is which they call being overcome by pleasures, and on that account not doing what is best, though they know it. For, perhaps, on our saying, 'You do not speak correctly, my friends, but are deceived, they would ask us, 'Protagoras and Socrates, if this affection is not the being overcome by pleasure, what is it then, and what do you say it is, tell us?"

Protagoras/ “But why, Socrates, need we consider the opinion of the generality of men, who say anything that occurs to them?”

Socrates/ “I think, that this will be of some service to us towards discovering with respect to courage how it is related to the other parts of virtue. If, therefore, you are willing to abide by what we just now agreed on, that I should take the lead, follow me where I think the matter will become exceedingly clear; but if you had rather not, I will dismiss it, if you please.”

Protagoras/ “You say rightly, finish then, as you have begun.”

Socrates/ “Again, then, if they were to ask us, ‘What do you say this is, which we call being overcome by pleasures?’ I, for my part, should answer them as follows: ‘Hear then, for Protagoras and I will endeavor to tell you. Do you not say, friends, that this happens to you under the following circumstances? for instance, being often mastered by meats and drinks, and the delights of love, which are pleasant things, though you know that they are baneful, yet do you not indulge in them?’ They would say that such is the case. You and I should then ask them again, ‘In what respect do you say that they are baneful? Is it because they afford pleasure, and each of them is pleasant, for the moment? or because they occasion diseases for the future, and make way for poverty, and many other things of the kind? or if they make way for none of these things for the future, but only occasion a man to rejoice, are they nevertheless evil, because they make a man rejoice in any way whatever? Can we suppose, Protagoras, that they will give any other answer than that they are not evil from the momentary pleasure which they produce, but on account of the after results, diseases and other things?”

Protagoras/ “I think, that the many would answer thus.”

Socrates/ “‘Do they not, then, by occasioning diseases, occasion pain, and by occasioning poverty, occasion pain? They would admit this, I think.”

Protagoras assented.

“‘Does it not appear to you then, my friends, as Protagoras and I say, that these things are evil, for no other reason than because they end in pain, and deprive you of other pleasures? Would they admit this?”

We both assented.

“If, again, we should reverse the question, In saying, friends, that good things are painful, do you not mean such things as gymnastic exercises, military service, and treatment of diseases by physicians, by cautery, the knife, physic, and starving, that these things are good, but painful? They would say they did.”

He assented.

“Whether, then, do you call them good, because, at the moment, they give extreme pain and torture; or because afterwards health results from them, and a good habit of body, and the safety of cities, and dominion over others, and wealth? They would say, I think, because of the latter.”

He assented.

“‘But are these things good for any other reason than because they end in pleasures, and deliverance from and prevention of pains? or can you mention any other end, to which you look when you call them good, except pleasures and pains? They would say not, I think.”

Protagoras/ “I think so too.”

Socrates/ “‘Do you not, then, pursue pleasure as being good, and avoid pain as evil?”

He assented.

"'This, then, you esteem to be evil, pain, and pleasure, good, since you say that enjoyment itself is then evil when it deprives of greater pleasures than those it brings with it, or when it makes way for pains greater than the pleasures contained in it: for if you call enjoyment itself evil on any other account, and looking to any other end, you would be able to tell us; but you cannot."

Protagoras/ "Nor do I think they can."

Socrates/ "Again, is not the case precisely the same with respect to pain itself? do you not then call pain itself a good, when it delivers from greater pains than those contained in it, or makes way for pleasures greater than the pains? for if you look to any other end than to that which I mention, when you call pain itself a good, you can tell us; but you cannot."

Protagoras/ "You speak truly."

Socrates/ "Again, therefore, if you should ask me, my friends, 'Why in the world do you speak so much and so frequently about this, 'Pardon me, I should say. For, in the first place, it is not easy to prove what this is which you call being overcome by pleasures; and, in the next place, the whole proof depends on this. But even now you are at liberty to retract, if you are able to say that good is anything else than pleasure, or evil anything else than pain; or is it enough for you to pass your life pleasantly without pain? If it is enough, and you cannot mention anything else that is good or evil, which does not end in these, hear what follows: for I say to you, that if this be the case, the assertion is ridiculous, when you say that frequently, a man who knows that evil things are evil, nevertheless does them, when it is in his power not to do them, in consequence of being led away and overpowered by pleasures; and again, when you say that a man who knows what is good, is not willing to do it in consequence of immediate pleasures, by which he is

overcome. For it will be manifest that these things are ridiculous, if we do not make use of many names, such as pleasant and painful, good and evil, but, since these things appear to be two, call them also by two names, first, good and evil, next, pleasant and painful. Having settled this, let us say, that a man knowing evil to be evil, nevertheless does it. If, then, anyone should ask us, 'why? we shall answer, 'because he is overcome. 'By what? he will ask us. But we are no longer at liberty to say, 'by pleasure for it has assumed another name instead of pleasure, namely, good. We must, however, answer him, and say, 'because he is overcome. 'By what? he will ask. 'By good, we shall answer, by Zeus. Now if he who questions should happen to be somewhat insolent, he will laugh at us and say, 'A ridiculous thing is this you mention, if a man does evil, knowing that it is evil, when he ought not to do it, because he is overcome by good. 'Is it, he will ask, 'because the good is not worthy to overcome the evil in you, or because it is worthy? We shall clearly say in answer, that it is because it is not worthy; for otherwise he would not err whom we say is overcome by pleasures. But perhaps he will ask, 'in what respect are good things unworthy to overcome the evil, or evil to overcome the good? Is it in any other respect than that the one is greater and the other less? or that the one is more, and the other fewer in number? We shall not be able to say anything else than this. 'It is clear then. he will say, 'that by being overcome you mean to receive greater evil instead of less good. And thus much for this part of the question.

"Let us now change the names, and again apply the words pleasant and painful to these same things, and let us say, that a man does things, we before called them evil, but let us now call them painful, knowing that they are painful, being overcome by pleasant things, clearly such as are unworthy to prevail. And what other value is there of

pleasure in comparison with pain, except that of excess or defect in one or the other? that is, of their being greater or less, more or fewer in number, stronger or weaker than one another. For if anyone should say, 'But Socrates, immediate pleasure is very different from future pleasure or pain. 'Is it.' I should ask, 'in anything else than in pleasure and pain?' for it cannot differ in anything else. But like a man expert at weighing, having put together the pleasant things, and having put together the painful, and having placed those which are near, and those which are remote, in the scales, say which are the more numerous. For if you weigh pleasures with pleasures, the greater and more numerous are always to be chosen, and if pains with pains, the less and the fewer in number. But if you weigh pleasures with pains, if the pains are exceeded by the pleasures, whether those that are nearby those that are remote, or those that are remote by those that are near, the same course must be pursued, in whichever the excess is; but if the pleasures are exceeded by the pains, it must not be pursued. 'Can these things be settled in any other way, my friends, I should ask? I know that they could not mention any other."

It seemed so to him likewise.

"Since then, this is the case, I shall say 'Answer me this, do the same magnitudes appear to your sight greater when near, and less when at a distance, or not?' They will say they do. 'And things bulky, and things numerous, in like manner? and are not equal sounds greater when near, but less when at a distance?' They would say they are. If then, our wellbeing consisted in this, in making and choosing great masses, but in avoiding and not making little ones, what means of safety should we seem to have in life? Would it be the art of mensuration, or the faculty of judging by appearances? or would the latter lead us into error, and often cause us? to vary in our choice of the same thing, now

choosing one and now another, and to repent both in our actions and our selections of things great and little, but would the art of mensuration do away with this outward show, and making manifest the truth, cause the soul to be at ease, abiding in the truth, and preserve our life? Would the men upon this admit that the art of mensuration preserves us, or some other art?"

Protagoras/ "The art of mensuration."

Socrates/ "'But what, if the safety of our life consisted in the choice of even and odd, when more ought properly to be chosen, and when less, each with reference to itself, or one with reference to the other, whether they might be near or distant, what, in this case, would preserve our life? Would it not be a science? and would it not be one of mensuration, since it is an art of excess and defect? But since it has relation to even and odd, can it be any other than arithmetic? Would the men grant us this, or not?"

It appeared also to Protagoras that they would.

"'Be it so, my friends; but since the safety of our life has appeared to consist in the right choice of pleasure and pain, and of more and fewer, greater and smaller, more distant and nearer; does it not first of all appear to be an art of mensuration, since it is a consideration of excess and defect and equality of these with respect to each other? 'Necessarily so.' 'But since it has to do with mensuration, it must of necessity be an art and a science.' They will assent to this. What then this art and science may be, we will consider hereafter; but that it is a science is sufficient for the proof of that which Protagoras and I had to make good in answer to the question you asked us. You asked, if you remember, when we agreed with each other that nothing is more powerful than knowledge, but that it always gets the mastery, wherever it may be, both of pleasure and everything

else; but you said that pleasure often gets the mastery, even of a man possessed of knowledge, and when we did not agree with you, you thereupon asked us, 'Protagoras and Socrates, if this affection is not the being overcome by pleasure, what is it then, and what do you say it is? tell us.' If, then, we had immediately said to you, that it is ignorance, you would have laughed at us. But now if you laugh at us, you will also laugh at yourselves. For you have admitted that they err through want of knowledge, who err in the choice of pleasures and pains; but these are things good and evil; and not only through want of knowledge, but as you afterwards further admitted, a knowledge of mensuration. Now an erroneous action done without knowledge, as you must yourselves know, is done through ignorance: so that to be overcome by pleasure is the greatest ignorance; of which Protagoras here says he is a physician, and so do Prodicus and Hippias. But you, because you think it is something else than ignorance, neither go yourselves, nor send your children to the teachers of these things, the sophists, as if this knowledge could not be taught, but by saving your money, and not giving it to these men, you fare badly, both in private and public. Such is the answer we should give to the many. But I ask you, Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras, for let the conversation be common to you all, whether I appear to you to speak the truth, or to speak falsely?"

What had been said appeared to all to be eminently true.

"You admit, then, that the pleasant is good, but the painful evil. But I deprecate Prodicus's verbal distinctions: for whether you call it pleasant, or delightful, or enjoyable, or from whatever derivation or in whatever way you please to denominate such things, most excellent Prodicus, use your own word and answer what I wish."

Prodicus, therefore, laughing, agreed with me, as did the others.

“But what, my friends, do you say to this? All actions that tend to this, that we may live without pain and pleasantly, are they not beautiful? and is not a beautiful action good and profitable?”

They agreed.

“If then, the pleasant is good, no one who either knows or thinks that other things are better than what he is doing, and that they are possible, still continues to do the same, when it is in his power to do the better; nor is to be overcome by one’s-self anything else than ignorance, nor to be master of one’s-self anything else than wisdom.”

All agreed to this.

“What then? Do you say that ignorance is a thing of this kind, to have a false opinion, and to be deceived about matters of great importance?”

To this, likewise, all agreed.

“Is it not the case then, that no one willingly sets about things evil, or things which he thinks are evil, nor is this, as it seems, in the nature of man willingly to engage in things which he thinks are evil, instead of such as are good; and when of two evils he is compelled to choose one, no one will choose the greater, when it is in his power to choose the less.”

All these things were assented to by us all.

“What then, do you call dread and fear something? and the same that I do, I address myself to you, Prodicus, I mean by it a certain expectation of evil, whether you call it fear or dread.”

It appeared to Protagoras and Hippias that dread and fear were of this nature, but to Prodicus that dread was, but fear not.

“But, it is of no consequence, Prodicus; but this is; if what we before said is true, will any man deliberately engage in things which he dreads, when it is in his power to engage in things which he does not dread? or is not this impossible from our former admissions? for it has been admitted that what he dreads he considers to be evil; and what he considers to be evil, no one either engages in or willingly receives.”

These things, likewise, were agreed to by all.

“These points, then, being established, Prodicus and Hippias, let Protagoras here defend himself and show us how his first answer is correct, no, not quite the first, for he then said, that there being five parts of virtue, no one of them was like any other, but that each had a peculiar function of its own. I do not however mean this, but what he said afterwards. For afterwards he said, that four of them very much resembled each other, but that one was altogether different from the rest, namely courage. And he said I should know it by the following proof. ‘You will find men, Socrates, who are most unholy, most unjust, most intemperate, and most ignorant, who are yet most courageous; by which you will know that courage differs much from the other parts of virtue. And I indeed, at the moment, was very much astonished at the answer, and I have been still more so since I have discussed these things with you. I therefore asked him if he meant that courageous men are bold? He said he did, and ready to rush headlong. Do you remember, Protagoras, that you gave this answer?”

He admitted it.

“Come then, tell us on what you say the courageous are ready to rush headlong? Is it on the same things as cowards?”

He said not.

“On different things, therefore.”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “But whether do cowards attempt things which they can venture on with confidence, but the courageous on such as are dreadful?”

Protagoras/ “It is said so, Socrates, by the generality of men.”

Socrates/ “You say truly. I do not, however, ask this: but on what do you say courageous men are ready to rush headlong, on dreadful things, thinking that they are dreadful, or on such as are not dreadful?”

Protagoras/ “But this, in the arguments which you just now used, was shown to be impossible.”

Socrates/ “And in this, you say truly. So that if this point was proved correctly, no one attempts things which he considers to be dreadful, since to be overcome by one’s-self was found to be ignorance.”

He admitted it.

“All men, however, attempt things in which they have confidence, both the cowardly and the courageous, and thus both the cowardly and the courageous attempt the same things.”

Protagoras/ “But indeed, Socrates, the things which the cowardly and the courageous attempt are quite contrary to each other; for instance, the latter are willing to engage in war, but the former are unwilling.”

Socrates/ “Whether, is it honorable to engage in it, or base?”

Protagoras/ “Honorable.”

Socrates/ “If, therefore, it is honorable, have we not already admitted that it is good, for we have admitted that all honorable actions are good.”

Protagoras/ “You say truly, and I am always of this opinion.”

Socrates/ “Right. But which of the two do you say are unwilling to engage in war, though it is honorable and good?”

Protagoras/ “Cowards.”

Socrates/ “If therefore, it be honorable and good, is it not also pleasant?”

Protagoras/ “That has been granted.”

Socrates/ “Are the cowardly, then, unwilling to attempt what they know to be more honorable and better, and more pleasant?”

Protagoras/ “But, if we admitted this, we should destroy our former admissions.”

Socrates/ “But what with respect to the brave man? Does he not engage in what is more honorable, better, and more pleasant?”

Protagoras/ “It is necessary to admit that he does.”

Socrates/ “On the whole, then, is it not the case, that the courageous when they are afraid, have no base fear, nor are they inspired with base confidence.”

Protagoras/ “True.”

Socrates/ “But if not base, are they not honorable?”

He assented.

“And if honorable, also good?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And are not the cowardly, and the bold, and the mad, on the contrary, influenced by base fears, and inspired with base confidence?”

He admitted that they are.

“And are they bold in what is base and evil, through anything else than ignorance and want of knowledge?”

Protagoras/ “So it is.”

Socrates/ “What then? Do you call this, through which cowards are cowardly, cowardice or courage?”

Protagoras/ “Cowardice.”

Socrates/ “But have not cowards appeared to be what they are, through not knowing what is dreadful?”

Protagoras/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “They are cowardly then, through this want of knowledge?”

He admitted it.

“But that through which they are cowardly, you have admitted is cowardice?”

He assented.

“Must not, then, the not knowing what is dreadful, and not dreadful, be cowardice?”

He nodded assent.

“However, courage is contrary to cowardice.”

He said it was.

“Is not then the knowledge of what is dreadful, and not dreadful, contrary to a want of knowledge of these things?”

And here he still nodded assent.

“But is not the want of knowing these things cowardice?”

He, here, with great difficulty, nodded assent.

“Is not the knowledge therefore, of what is dreadful, and not dreadful, courage, being contrary to a want of knowledge of these things?”

Here he would no longer nod assent, but was silent.

“Why, Protagoras, do you neither admit nor deny what I ask?”

Protagoras/ “Do you conclude the subject.”

Socrates/ “I have only one more question to ask you, whether some men still appear to you as at first, to be most ignorant, and yet most courageous.”

Protagoras/ “You seem to be very anxious, Socrates, that I should be the person to answer. I will therefore indulge you, and I say, that from what has been granted, it appears to me to be impossible.”

Socrates/ “I ask all these questions, on no other account, than because I wish to examine how the case stands with respect to things pertaining to virtue, and what virtue itself is. For I know that when this is discovered, that other will be clearly ascertained, about which you and I have both of us held so long a discussion, I maintaining that virtue cannot be taught, but you that it can. And the present issue of our discussion appears to me, as if it were a man, to accuse and laugh at us, and if it had a voice, it would say, Absurd men ye are, Socrates and Protagoras; you, who at the outset maintained that virtue cannot be taught, are now contending in opposition to yourself, and endeavoring to show that all things are knowledge, as justice, temperance, and courage, according to which method of proceeding it will certainly appear that virtue may be taught. For if virtue were anything else than knowledge, as Protagoras endeavors to maintain, it clearly could not be taught; but now, if it shall appear to be altogether knowledge, as you contend, Socrates, it will be wonderful if it cannot be taught. Protagoras on the other hand, who at first insisted that it could be taught, now seems to contend for the contrary, that it may appear to be almost anything else rather than knowledge; and so can on no account be taught. I therefore, Protagoras, seeing all these things terribly confused, this way and that, am exceedingly anxious that they should be made clear, and should wish, now we have discussed these

things, to proceed to enquire what virtue is, and to examine again respecting it, whether it can be taught, or not, lest by chance that Epimetheus of yours should treacherously deceive us in our enquiry, just as he neglected us in the distribution which he made, as you say. Now in the fable, Prometheus pleased me more than Epimetheus, and making use of him, and looking forward with forethought to my whole life, I diligently attend to all these matters; and if you are willing, as I said at the beginning, I would most gladly join with you in examining them thoroughly."

Protagoras/ "I, Socrates, praise your zeal, and your method of unfolding arguments. For I am not in other respects, I think, a bad man, and least of all men envious: indeed I have often said of you to many, that I admire you more than all whom I am in the habit of meeting, and far above those of your own age: and I add, that I should not wonder if you were to rank among men renowned for wisdom. And these matters we will further discuss hereafter, when you please; but it is now time for me to attend to other business."

Socrates/ "It is right so to do, if you think fit. For I too ought long since to have gone where I had to go, but I staid to oblige the beautiful Callias."

Having said and heard these things, we departed.

Protagoras.

Translated by W. K. C. Guthrie.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Friend, Hippocrates, Alcibiades, Critias, Callias, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Eunuch

Friend/ Where have you come from, Socrates? No doubt from pursuit of the captivating Alcibiades. Certainly, when I saw him only a day or two ago, he seemed to be still a handsome man, but between ourselves, Socrates, 'man' is the word. He's actually growing a beard.

Socrates/ What of it? Aren't you an enthusiast for Homer, who says that the most charming age is that of the youth with his first beard, just the age of Alcibiades now?

Friend/ Well what's the news? Have you just left the young man, and how is he disposed toward you?

Socrates/ Very well, I think, particularly today, since he came to my assistance and spoke up for me at some length. For as you guessed, I have only just left him. But I will tell you a surprising thing. Although he was present, I had no thought for him, and often forgot him altogether.

Friend/ Why, what can have happened between you and him to make such a difference? You surely can't have met someone more handsome—not in Athens at least?

Socrates/ Yes, much more.

Friend/ Really? An Athenian or a foreigner?

Socrates/ A foreigner.

Friend/ Where from?

Socrates/ Abdera.

Friend/ And this stranger struck you as such a handsome person that you put him above the son of Clinias in that respect?

Socrates/ Yes. Must not perfect wisdom take the palm for handsomeness?

Friend/ You mean you have just been meeting some wise man?

Socrates/ Say rather the wisest man now living, if you agree that that description fits Protagoras.

Friend/ What? Protagoras is in Athens?

Socrates/ And has been for two days.

Friend/ And you have just now come from seeing him?

Socrates/ Yes, we had a long talk together.

Friend/ Then lose no time in telling me about your conversation, if you are free. Sit down here; the slave will make room for you.

Socrates/ Certainly I shall, and be grateful to you for listening.

Friend/ And I to you for your story.

Socrates/ That means a favor on both sides. Listen then. Last night, a little before daybreak, Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus, Phason's brother, knocked violently on my door with his stick, and when it was opened, came straight in, in a great hurry and shouted out;

Hippocrates/ Socrates, are you awake or asleep?

Socrates/ I recognized his voice and said, That will be Hippocrates. No bad news I hope?

Hippocrates/ Nothing but good.

Socrates/ I'm glad to hear it. What is it then, and what brings you here at such an hour?

Hippocrates/ Protagoras has arrived;

Socrates/ he said, taking his stand beside me.

Socrates/ The day before yesterday. Have you only just found out?

Hippocrates/ Only last evening.

Socrates/ As he said this he felt for the bed and sat by my feet, adding;

Hippocrates/ Yes, yesterday evening, when I got back late from Oenoe. My slave Satyrus had run away from me. I meant to let you know that I was going after him, but something put it out of my head. When I got back and we had had dinner and were just going to bed, my brother mentioned to me that Protagoras had come. Late as it was, I nearly came to see you straightaway; then I decided it was really too far into the night, but as soon as I had slept off my tiredness, I got up at once and came here as you see.

Socrates/ I recognized his determination and the state of excitement he was in, and asked him, What is your concern in this? Has Protagoras done you any harm?

Hippocrates/ Of course he has, Socrates.

Socrates/ replied Hippocrates laughing.

Hippocrates/ He keeps his wisdom to himself instead of sharing it with me.

Socrates/ Not at all. If you pay him sufficient to persuade him, he will make you wise too.

Hippocrates/ If it were only a question of that!

Socrates/ he said despairingly.

Hippocrates/ I shouldn't keep back a penny of my own money, or my friends' money either. But this is just the reason why I have come to you, to persuade you to speak to him on my behalf. For one thing I am too young, and for another I have never seen nor heard Protagoras. Last time he came to Athens I was still a child. But you know,

Socrates, everyone is singing his praises and saying that he is the cleverest of speakers. Do let's pay him a visit at once, to make sure of finding him in. He's staying, so I'm told, with Callias, son of Hipponicus. Come on.

Socrates/ My dear Hippocrates, we can't go there at this early hour. Let's come out here into the courtyard and walk around it to pass the time until it gets light. Then we can go. Protagoras spends most of his time indoors, so don't worry; we are pretty sure to catch him there. So then we got up and walked about in the courtyard, and to try Hippocrates' mettle I began to examine and question him. Tell me this, Hippocrates. It is your present intention to go to Protagoras and pay him money as a fee on your behalf. Now whom do you think you are going to, and what will he make of you? Suppose for instance you had it in mind to go to your namesake Hippocrates of Cos, the doctor, and pay him a fee on your own behalf, and someone asked you in what capacity you thought of Hippocrates with the intention of paying him, what would you answer?

Hippocrates/ I should say, in his capacity as a doctor.

Socrates/ And what would you hope to become?

Hippocrates/ A doctor.

Socrates/ And suppose your idea was to go to Polyclitus of Argos or Phidias of Athens and pay them fees for your own benefit, and someone asked you in what capacity you thought of paying this money to them, what would you answer?

Hippocrates/ I should say, in their capacity as sculptors.

Socrates/ To make you what?

Hippocrates/ A sculptor, obviously.

Socrates/ Right. Now here are you and I going to Protagoras prepared to pay him money as a fee for you—our own if it is enough to satisfy him, or if not, our friends'

resources thrown in as well. If then, seeing us so full of enthusiasm, someone should ask, Tell me, Socrates and Hippocrates, what do you suppose Protagoras is, that you intend to pay him money? what should we answer him? What particular name do we hear attached to Protagoras in the sort of way that Phidias is called a sculptor and Homer a poet?

Hippocrates/ Well, Sophist, I suppose, Socrates, is the name generally given to him.

Socrates/ Then it is as a Sophist that we will go to him and pay him?

Hippocrates/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if you had to face the further question, What do you yourself hope to become by your association with Protagoras?

He blushed at this—there was already a streak of daylight to betray him—and replied;

Hippocrates/ If this is like the other cases, I must say 'to become a Sophist.'

Socrates/ But wouldn't a man like you be ashamed, to face your fellow countrymen as a Sophist?

Hippocrates/ If I am to speak my real mind, I certainly should.

Socrates/ Perhaps then this is not the kind of instruction you expect to get from Protagoras, but rather the kind you got from the schoolmasters who taught you letters and music and gymnastics. You didn't learn these for professional purposes, to become a practitioner, but in the way of liberal education, as a layman and a gentleman should.

Hippocrates/ That exactly describes, the sort of instruction I expect from Protagoras.

Socrates/ Well then, do you understand what you are now going to do, or not?

Hippocrates/ In what respect?

Socrates/ I mean that you are going to entrust the care of your soul to a man who is, in your own words, a Sophist, though I should be surprised if you know just what a Sophist is. And yet if you don't know that, you don't know to whom you are entrusting your soul, nor whether he represents something good or bad.

Hippocrates/ I think I know.

Socrates/ Tell me then, what do you think a Sophist is?

Hippocrates/ I suppose, as the name implies, one who has knowledge of wise things.

Socrates/ One could say the same, of painters and builders, that they are those who have knowledge of wise things. But if we were asked what *sort* of wisdom painters understand, we should reply, wisdom concerned with the making of likenesses, and so on with the others. If then we were asked what sort of wise things the Sophist has knowledge of, what should we answer? Of what is he the master?

Hippocrates/ The only answer we could give is that he is master of the art of making clever speakers.

Socrates/ Well, our answer might be true, but would hardly be sufficient. It invites the further question, On what matter does the Sophist make one a clever speaker? For example, the teacher of lyre playing I suppose makes people clever at speaking on his own subject, namely lyre playing, doesn't he?

Hippocrates/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, on what subject does the Sophist make clever speakers? Obviously on the subject of which he imparts knowledge.

Hippocrates/ Very probably.

Socrates/ And what is this subject on which the Sophist is both an expert himself and can make his pupil expert?

Hippocrates/ I give up. I can't tell you.

Socrates/ Well then, do you realize the sort of danger to which you are going to expose your soul? If it were a case of putting your body into the hands of someone and risking the treatment's turning out beneficial or the reverse, you would ponder deeply whether to entrust it to him or not, and would spend many days over the question, calling on the counsel of your friends and relations. But when it comes to something which you value more highly than your body, namely your soul—something on whose beneficial or harmful treatment your whole welfare depends—you have not consulted either your father or your brother or any of us who are your friends on the question whether or not to entrust your soul to this stranger who has arrived among us. On the contrary, having heard the news in the evening, so you tell me, here you come at dawn, not to discuss or consult me on this question of whether or not to entrust yourself to Protagoras, but ready to spend both your own money and that of your friends as if you had already made up your mind that you must at all costs associate with this man—whom you say you do not know and have never spoken to, but call a Sophist, and then turn out not to know what a Sophist is though you intend to put yourself into his hands.

When he heard this he said;

Hippocrates/ It looks like it, Socrates, from what you say.

Socrates/ Can we say then, Hippocrates, that a Sophist is really a merchant or peddler of the goods by which a soul is nourished? To me he appears to be something like that.

Hippocrates/ But what is it that nourishes a soul?

Socrates/ What it learns, presumably. And we must see that the Sophist in commending his wares does not deceive us, like the wholesaler and the retailer who deal in food for the body. These people do not know themselves which of the wares they offer is good or bad for the body, but in selling them praise all alike, and those who buy from them don't know either, unless one of them happens to be a trainer or a doctor. So too those who take the various subjects of knowledge from city to city, and offer them for sale retail to whoever wants them, commend everything that they have for sale, but it may be, my dear Hippocrates, that some of these men also are ignorant of the beneficial or harmful effects on the soul of what they have for sale, and so too are those who buy from them, unless one of them happens to be a physician of the soul. If then you chance to be an expert in discerning which of them is good or bad, it is safe for you to buy knowledge from Protagoras or anyone else, but if not, take care you don't find yourself gambling dangerously with all of you that is dearest to you. Indeed the risk you run in purchasing knowledge is much greater than that in buying provisions. When you buy food and drink, you can carry it away from the shop or warehouse in a receptacle, and before you receive it into your body by eating or drinking you can store it away at home and take the advice of an expert as to what you should eat and drink and what not, and how much you should consume and when; so there is not much risk in the actual purchase. But knowledge cannot be taken away in a parcel. When you have paid for it you must receive it straight into the soul. You go away having learned it and are benefited or harmed accordingly. So I suggest we give this

matter some thought, not only by ourselves, but also with those who are older than we, for we are still rather young to examine such a large problem. However, now let us carry out our plan to go and hear the man, and when we have heard him we can bring others into our consultations also, for Protagoras is not here by himself. There is Hippias of Elis, and I think Prodicus of Ceos too, and many other wise men.

Having agreed on this we started out. When we found ourselves in the doorway, we stood there and continued a discussion which had arisen between us on the way. So that we might not leave it unfinished, but have it out before we went in, we were standing in the doorway talking until we should reach agreement. I believe the porter, eunuch, overheard us, and it seems likely that the crowd of Sophists had put him in a bad temper with visitors. At any rate when we knocked at the door he opened it, saw us and said;

Eunuch/ Ha, Sophists! He's busy.

Socrates/ And thereupon he slammed the door as hard as he could with both hands. We knocked again, and he answered through the closed door;

Eunuch/ Didn't you hear me say he's busy?

Socrates/ My good man, we have not come to see Callias and we are not Sophists. Cheer up. It is Protagoras we want to see, so announce us. So at last the fellow reluctantly opened the door to us.

When we were inside, we came upon Protagoras walking in the portico, and walking with him in a long line were, on one side Callias, son of Hipponicus; his stepbrother Paralus, the son of Pericles; and Charmides, son of Glaucon; and on the other side Pericles' other son, Xanthippus; Philippides, son of Philomelus; and Antimoerus of Mende, the most eminent of Protagoras' pupils, who is studying professionally, to become a Sophist. Those who followed

behind listening to their conversation seemed to be for the most part foreigners—Protagoras draws them from every city that he passes through, charming them with his voice like Orpheus, and they follow spellbound—but there were some Athenians in the band as well. As I looked at the party I was delighted to notice what special care they took never to get in front or to be in Protagoras' way. When he and those with him turned round, the listeners divided this way and that in perfect order, and executing a circular movement took their places each time in the rear. It was beautiful.

'After that I recognized,' as Homer says, Hippias of Elis, sitting on a seat of honor in the opposite portico, and around him were seated on benches Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus of Myrrhinus and Andron, son of Androtion, with some fellow citizens of his and other foreigners. They appeared to be asking him questions on natural science, particularly astronomy, while he gave each his explanation ex cathedra and held forth on their problems.

'And there too spied I Tantalus'—for Prodicus of Ceos was also in town, and was occupying a room which Hipponicus used to use for storage, but now owing to the number of people staying in the house Callias had cleared it out and made it into a guest room. Prodicus was still in bed, wrapped up in rugs and blankets, and plenty of them, as far as one could see, and beside him on the neighboring couches sat Pausanias from Cerameis and with him someone who was still a young boy—a lad of fine character I think, and certainly very good-looking. I think I heard that his name is Agathon, and I shouldn't be surprised if Pausanias is particularly attached to him. Well, there was this boy and the two Adimantuses—the son of Cepis and the son of Leucolophides—and a few others. But what they were talking about I couldn't discover from outside, although I

was very keen to hear Prodicus, whom I regard as a man of inspired genius. You see, he has such a deep voice that there was a kind of booming noise in the room which drowned the words. Just after we had come in, there entered close on our heels the handsome Alcibiades as you call him—and I quite agree—and Critias, son of Callaeschrus.

When we entered, then, we paused for a few moments to drink in the scene and then approached Protagoras, and I said, Protagoras, this is Hippocrates, and it is you that we have come to see.

Protagoras/ Do you wish to speak to me alone, or with the others?

Socrates/ It is all the same to us. Hear what we have come for and then decide for yourself.

Protagoras/ And what have you come for?

Socrates/ Hippocrates here is one of our citizens, son of Apollodorus. He comes of a great and prosperous family, and is considered the equal of any of his contemporaries in natural gifts. I think he is anxious to make a name for himself in the city, and he believes that the most likely way to success is to become a pupil of yours. So now it is for you to decide whether you think this calls for a conversation between ourselves or with others.

Protagoras/ I appreciate your forethought on my behalf, Socrates. A man has to be careful when he visits powerful cities as a foreigner, and induces their most promising young men to forsake the company of others, relatives or acquaintances, older or younger, and consort with him on the grounds that his conversation will improve them. Such conduct arouses no small resentment and various forms of hostility and intrigue. Personally I hold that the Sophist's art is an ancient one, but that those who put their hand to it in former times, fearing the odium which it brings, adopted a

disguise and worked under cover. Some used poetry as a screen, for instance Homer and Hesiod and Simonides; others religious rites and prophecy, like Orpheus and Musaeus and their school; some even—so I have noticed—physical training, like Iccus of Tarentum and in our own day Herodicus of Selymbria, the former Megarian, as great a Sophist as any. Music was used as cover by your own Agathocles, a great Sophist. and Pythoclides of Ceos and many others. All of them, as I say, used these arts as a screen to escape malice. I myself, however, am not of their mind in this. I don't believe they accomplished their purpose, for they did not pass unobserved by the men who held the reins of power in their cities, though it is on their account that these disguises are adopted; the mass of people notice nothing, but simply echo what the leaders tell them. Now to run away and fail to escape, but be discovered instead, turns the attempt into sheer folly, and cannot fail to arouse even greater hostility, for people think that the man who behaves like this is in addition to his other faults an unprincipled rogue. I therefore have always gone the opposite way to my predecessors'. I admit to being a Sophist and an educator, and I consider this a better precaution than the other—admission rather than denial. I have devised other precautions as well, so that, if heaven will forgive the boast, I come to no harm through being a confessed Sophist, though I have been many years in the profession. Indeed I am getting on in life now—so far as age goes I might be the father of anyone of you—so if there is anything you want of me, I should much prefer to say my say in front of the whole company.

Socrates/ Thereupon, suspecting that he wanted to display his skill to Prodicus and Hippias and get some glory from the fact that we had come as his professed admirers, I

remarked, Then why should we not call Prodicus and Hippias, and the people who are with them, to listen to us?

Protagoras/ By all means.

Callias/ Would you like to make a regular circle, so that you can talk sitting down?

Socrates/ Everyone agreed that this was the thing to do, and at the prospect of listening to wise men we all eagerly took hold of the benches and couches with our own hands and arranged them beside Hippias, where the benches were. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades got Prodicus out of bed and fetched him along with his companions.

When we were all seated, Protagoras began;

Protagoras/ Now that these gentlemen are present, Socrates, perhaps you will say something about the matter you mentioned to me just now on this young man's behalf.

Socrates/ I can only begin as I did before, by telling you of our purpose in coming. Hippocrates has a feeling that he would like to become one of your followers. He says therefore that he would be glad to be told what effect it will have on him. That is all we have to say.

Then Protagoras replied;

Protagoras/ Young man, if you come to me, your gain will be this. The very day you join me, you will go home a better man, and the same the next day. Each day you will make progress toward a better state.

Socrates/ On hearing this I said, Protagoras, what you say is not at all surprising, but very natural. Even you, for all your years and wisdom, would become better, if someone were to teach you something that you didn't happen to know. Please don't answer like this, but give us the kind of reply that Hippocrates would get if he suddenly changed his mind and took a fancy to study with that young man who has just lately come to live at Athens, Zeuxippus of Heraclea.

Suppose he went to him, just as he has come to you, and heard him say the same thing, that each day he spent with him he would get better and make progress, and asked him the further question, 'What shall I get better at, and where shall I make progress?' Zeuxippus would say, 'In painting.' Or if he were with Orthagoras of Thebes, and having heard the same reply as he got from you, went on to ask in what respect he would get daily better by being with him, Orthagoras would say, 'In playing the flute.' Now give a similar answer to the lad and to me who am putting the question for him. Hippocrates, by becoming a pupil of Protagoras, will, on the very day he joins him, go home a better man, and on each successive day will make similar progress—toward what, Protagoras, and better at what?

Protagoras heard me out and said;

Protagoras/ You put your questions well, and I enjoy answering good questioners. When he comes to me, Hippocrates will not be put through the same things that another Sophist would inflict on him. The others treat their pupils badly; these young men, who have deliberately turned their backs on specialization, they take and plunge into special studies again, teaching them arithmetic and astronomy and geometry and music

Socrates/ —here he glanced at Hippias—

but from me he will learn only what he has come to learn. What is that subject? The proper care of his personal affairs, so that he may best manage his own household, and also of the state's affairs, so as to become a real power in the city, both as speaker and man of action.

Socrates/ Do I follow you? I take you to be describing the art of politics, and promising to make men good citizens.

Protagoras/ That, is exactly what I profess to do.

Socrates/ Then it is a truly splendid accomplishment that you have mastered, if indeed you have mastered it. I warn you that you will hear nothing from me but my real mind. The fact is, I did not think this was something that could be taught, though when you say otherwise I cannot doubt your word. But it is up to me to say why I believe it cannot be taught nor furnished by one man to another. I hold that the Athenians, like the rest of the Hellenes, are sensible people. Now when we meet in the Assembly, then if the state is faced with some building project, I observe that the architects are sent for and consulted about the proposed structures, and when it is a matter of shipbuilding, the naval designers, and so on with everything which the Assembly regards as a subject for learning and teaching. If anyone else tries to give advice, whom they do not consider an expert, however handsome or wealthy or nobly born he may be, it makes no difference; the members reject him noisily and with contempt, until either he is shouted down and desists, or else he is dragged off or ejected by the police on the orders of the presiding magistrates. That is how they behave over subjects they consider technical. But when it is something to do with the government of the country that is to be debated, the man who gets up to advise them may be a builder or equally well a blacksmith or a shoemaker, merchant or ship-owner, rich or poor, of good family or none. No one brings it up against any of these, as against those I have just mentioned, that here is a man who without any technical qualifications, unable to point to anybody as his teacher, is yet trying to give advice. The reason must be that they do not think this is a subject that can be taught.

And you must not suppose that this is true only of the community at large. Individually also the wisest and best of our countrymen are unable to hand on to others the virtue which they possess. Pericles, for instance, the father of these

two boys, gave them the very best education in everything that depends on teaching, but in his own special kind of wisdom he neither trains them himself nor hands them over to any other instructor; they simply browse around on their own like sacred cattle, on the chance of picking up virtue automatically. To take a different example, Clinias, the younger brother of Alcibiades here, is a ward of that same Pericles, who for fear that Alcibiades would corrupt him, took him away and tried to give him a better upbringing by placing him in the household of Ariphron. Before six months were out, Ariphron gave him back; he could make nothing of him. I could mention plenty of others too, excellent men themselves, who never made anyone else better, either their own relatives or others.

With these facts in mind, Protagoras, I do not believe that virtue can be taught. But when I hear you speaking as I do, my skepticism is shaken and I suppose there is truth in what you say, for I regard you as a man of wide experience, deep learning, and original thought. If then you can demonstrate more plainly to us that virtue is something that can be taught, please don't hoard your wisdom but explain.

Protagoras/ I shall not be a miser, Socrates. Now shall I, as an old man speaking to his juniors, put my explanation in the form of a story, or give it as a reasoned argument?

Socrates/ Many of the audience answered that he should relate it in whichever form he pleased.

Protagoras/ Then I think, it will be pleasanter to tell you a story.

Once upon a time, there existed gods but no mortal creatures. When the appointed time came for these also to be born, the gods formed them within the earth out of a mixture of earth and fire and the substances which are compounded from earth and fire. And when they were ready

to bring them to the light, they charged Prometheus and Epimetheus with the task of equipping them and allotting suitable powers to each kind. Now Epimetheus begged Prometheus to allow him to do the distribution himself—'and when I have done it,' he said, 'you can review it.' So he persuaded him and set to work. In his allotment he gave to some creatures strength without speed, and equipped the weaker kinds with speed. Some he armed with weapons, while to the unarmed he gave some other faculty and so contrived means for their preservation. To those that he endowed with smallness, he granted winged flight or a dwelling underground; to those which he increased in stature, their size itself was a protection. Thus he made his whole distribution on a principle of compensation, being careful by these devices that no species should be destroyed.

When he had sufficiently provided means of escape from mutual slaughter, he contrived their comfort against the seasons sent from Zeus, clothing them with thick hair or hard skins sufficient to ward off the winter's cold, and effective also against heat, and he planned that when they went to bed, the same coverings should serve as proper and natural bedclothes for each species. He shod them also, some with hoofs, others with hard and bloodless skin.

Next he appointed different sorts of food for them—to some the grass of the earth, to others the fruit of trees, to others roots. Some he allowed to gain their nourishment by devouring other animals, and these he made less prolific, while he bestowed fertility on their victims, and so preserved the species.

Now Epimetheus was not a particularly clever person, and before he realized it he had used up all the available powers on the brute beasts, and being left with the human race on his hands unprovided for, did not know what to do with them. While he was puzzling about this, Prometheus

came to inspect the work, and found the other animals well off for everything, but man naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed, and already the appointed day had come, when man too was to emerge from within the earth into the daylight. Prometheus therefore, being at a loss to provide any means of salvation for man, stole from Hephaestus and Athena the gift of skill in the arts, together with fire—for without fire it was impossible for anyone to possess or use this skill—and bestowed it on man. In this way man acquired sufficient resources to keep himself alive, but had no political wisdom. This was in the keeping of Zeus, and Prometheus no longer had the right of entry to the citadel where Zeus dwelt; moreover the sentinels of Zeus were terrible. But into the dwelling shared by Athena and Hephaestus, in which they practiced their art, he penetrated by stealth, and carrying off Hephaestus' art of working with fire, and the art of Athena as well, he gave them to man. Through this gift man had the means of life, but Prometheus, so the story says, thanks to Epimetheus, had later on to stand his trial for theft.

Since, then, man had a share in the portion of the gods, in the first place because of his divine kinship he alone among living creatures believed in gods, and set to work to erect altars and images of them. Secondly, by the art which they possessed, men soon discovered articulate speech and names, and invented houses and clothes and shoes and bedding and got food from the earth.

Thus provided for, they lived at first in scattered groups; there were no cities. Consequently they were devoured by wild beasts, since they were in every respect the weaker, and their technical skill, though a sufficient aid to their nurture, did not extend to making war on the beasts, for they had not the art of politics, of which the art of war is a part. They sought therefore to save themselves by coming together and

founding fortified cities, but when they gathered in communities they injured one another for want of political skill, and so scattered again and continued to be devoured. Zeus therefore, fearing the total destruction of our race, sent Hermes to impart to men the qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice, so as to bring order into our cities and create a bond of friendship and union.

Hermes asked Zeus in what manner he was to bestow these gifts on men. 'Shall I distribute them as the arts were distributed—that is, on the principle that one trained doctor suffices for many laymen, and so with the other experts? Shall I distribute justice and respect for their fellows in this way, or to all alike?'

'To all,' said Zeus. let all have their share. There could never be cities if only a few shared in these virtues, as in the arts. Moreover, you must lay it down as my law that if anyone is incapable of acquiring his share of these two virtues he shall be put to death as a plague to the city.'

Thus it is, Socrates, and from this cause, that in a debate involving skill in building, or in any other craft, the Athenians, like other men, believe that few are capable of giving advice, and if someone outside those few volunteers to advise them, then as you say, they do not tolerate it—rightly so, in my submission. But when the subject of their counsel involves political wisdom, which must always follow the path of justice and moderation, they listen to every man's opinion, for they think that everyone must share in this kind of virtue; otherwise the state could not exist. That, Socrates, is the reason for this.

Here is another proof that I am not deceiving you in saying that all men do in fact believe that everyone shares a sense of justice and civic virtue. In specialized skills, as you say, if a man claims to be good at the flute or at some other art

when he is not, people either laugh at him or are annoyed, and his family restrain him as if he were crazy. But when it comes to justice and civic virtue as a whole, even if someone is known to be wicked, yet if he publicly tells the truth about himself, his truthfulness, which in the other case was counted a virtue, is here considered madness. Everyone, it is said, ought to say he is good, whether he is or not, and whoever does not make such a claim is out of his mind, for a man cannot be without some share in justice, or he would not be human.

So much then for the point that men rightly take all alike into their counsels concerning virtue of this sort, because they believe that all have a share in it. I shall next try to demonstrate to you that they do not regard it as innate or automatic, but as acquired by instruction and taking thought. No one is angered by the faults which are believed to be due to nature or chance, nor do people rebuke or teach or punish those who exhibit them, in the hope of curing them; they simply pity them. Who would be so foolish as to treat in that way the ugly or dwarfish or weak? Everyone knows that it is nature or chance which gives this kind of characteristics to a man, both the good and the bad. But it is otherwise with the good qualities which are thought to be acquired through care and practice and instruction. It is the absence of these, surely, and the presence of the corresponding vices, that call forth indignation and punishment and admonition. Among these faults are to be put injustice and irreligion and in general everything that is contrary to civic virtue. In this field indignation and admonition are universal, evidently because of a belief that such virtue can be acquired by taking thought or by instruction. Just consider the function of punishment, Socrates, in relation to the wrongdoer. That will be enough to show you that men believe it possible to impart goodness.

In punishing wrongdoers, no one concentrates on the fact that a man has done wrong in the past, or punishes him on that account, unless taking blind vengeance like a beast. No, punishment is not inflicted by a rational man for the sake of the crime that has been committed—after all one cannot undo what is past—but for the sake of the future, to prevent either the same man or, by the spectacle of his punishment, someone else, from doing wrong again. But to hold such a view amounts to holding that virtue can be instilled by education; at all events the punishment is inflicted as a deterrent. This then is the view held by all who inflict it whether privately or publicly. And your fellow countrymen, the Athenians, certainly do inflict punishment and correction on supposed wrongdoers, as do others also. This argument therefore shows that they too think it possible to impart and teach goodness.

I think that I have now sufficiently demonstrated to you, first that your countrymen act reasonably in accepting the advice of smith and shoemaker on political matters, and secondly, that they do believe goodness to be something imparted by teaching. There remains the question which troubles you about good men—why it is that whereas they teach their sons the subjects that depend on instruction, and make them expert in these things, yet in their own brand of goodness they do not make them any better than others. On this, Socrates, I will offer you a plain argument rather than a parable as I did before. Think of it like this. Is there or is there not some one thing in which all citizens must share, if a state is to exist at all? In the answer to this question, if anywhere, lies the solution of your difficulty. If there is, and this one essential is not the art of building or forging or pottery but justice and moderation and holiness of life, or to concentrate it into a single whole, manly virtue—if, I say, it is this in which all must share and which must

enter into every man's actions whatever other occupation he chooses to learn and practice; if the one who lacks it, man, woman, or child, must be instructed and corrected until by punishment he is reformed, and whoever does not respond to punishment and instruction must be expelled from the state or put to death as incurable—if all this is true, and in these circumstances our good men teach their sons other accomplishments but not this one thing, then think what extraordinary people good men must be! We have already shown that they believe it can be taught, both publicly and privately. But although virtue can be taught and cultivated, yet it seems they have their sons instructed in other arts, ignorance of which is no matter for capital punishment, but although if they are left ignorant of virtue and morally uncultivated they may be punished by death or exile—and not only death but alienation of property and in a word the ruin of their estates—are we to suppose that they neglect this side of their education? Don't they rather bestow every care and attention upon it? Of course they do, Socrates. They teach and admonish them from earliest childhood and throughout their lives. As soon as a child can understand what is said to him, nurse, mother, tutor, and the father himself vie with each other to make him as good as possible, instructing him through everything he does or says, pointing out, 'This is right and that is wrong, this honorable and that disgraceful, this holy, that impious; do this, don't do that.' If he is obedient, well and good. If not, they straighten him with threats and beatings, like a warped and twisted plank.

Later on when they send the children to school, their instructions to the masters lay much more emphasis on good behavior than on letters or music. The teachers take good care of this, and when boys have learned their letters and are ready to understand the written word as formerly the spoken, they set the works of good poets before them on

their desks to read and make them learn them by heart, poems containing much admonition and many stories, eulogies, and panegyrics of the good men of old, so that the child may be inspired to imitate them and long to be like them.

The music masters by analogous methods instill self-control and deter the young from evil-doing. Arid when they have learned to play the lyre, they teach them the works of good poets of another sort, namely the lyrical, which they accompany on the lyre, familiarizing the minds of the children with the rhythms and melodies. By this means they become more civilized, more balanced, and better adjusted in themselves and so more capable in whatever they say or do, for rhythm and harmonious adjustment are essential to the whole of human life.

Over and above this, they are sent to a trainer, so that a good mind may have a good body to serve it, and no one be forced by physical weakness to play the coward in war and other ordeals.

All this is done by those best able to do it—that is, by the wealthy—and it is their sons who start their education at the earliest age and continue it the longest. When they have finished with teachers, the state compels them to learn the laws and use them as a pattern for their life, lest left to themselves they should drift aimlessly. You know how, when children are not yet good at writing, the writing master traces outlines with the pencil before giving them the slate, and makes them follow the lines as a guide in their own writing; well, similarly the state sets up the laws, which are inventions of good lawgivers of ancient times, and compels the citizens to rule and be ruled in accordance with them. Whoever strays outside the lines, it punishes, and the name given to this punishment both among yourselves and in

many other places is correction, intimating that the penalty corrects or guides.

Seeing then that all this care is taken over virtue, both individually and by the state, are you surprised that virtue should be teachable, and puzzled to know whether it is? There is nothing to be surprised at. The wonder would be if it were not teachable.

Why then, you ask, do many sons of good men turn out worthless? I will tell you this too. It is nothing surprising, if what I said earlier was true, that this faculty, virtue, is something in which no one may be a layman if a state is to exist at all. If it is as I say—and most assuredly it is—consider the matter with the substitution of any art you like. Suppose a state could not exist unless we were all flute players to the best of our ability, and everyone taught everyone else that art both privately and publicly, and scolded the bad flute player, and no one held back on this subject any more than anyone now begrudges information on what is right and lawful or makes a secret of it as of certain other techniques. After all, it is to our advantage that our neighbor should be just and virtuous, and therefore everyone gladly talks about it to everyone else and instructs him in justice and the law. If then, as I say, it were so with flute playing, and we all showed equal eagerness and willingness to teach one another, do you think, Socrates, that the sons of good players would become good players in their turn any more than the sons of bad ones? Not so, I think, but whoever had a son with the greatest natural talent for the flute, his son would rise to fame, and a son without this talent would remain in obscurity. The son of a good performer would often be a poor one, and vice versa, but at any rate all would be good enough in comparison with someone who knew nothing of flute playing at all.

Now apply this analogy to our present condition. The man who in a civilized and humane society appears to you the most wicked must be thought just—a practitioner, as one might say, of justice—if one has to judge him in comparison with men who have neither education nor courts of justice nor laws nor any constraint compelling them to be continually heedful of virtue—savages in fact like those whom the playwright Pherecrates brought onto the stage at last year's Lenaea. If you found yourself among such people—people like the man-haters of his chorus—you would be only too glad to meet a Eurybatus and a Phrynondas, and would bitterly regret the very depravity of our own society. But as it is you are spoiled, Socrates, in that all are teachers of virtue to the best of their ability, and so you think that no one is. In the same way if you asked who teaches the Greek language you would not find anyone, and again if you looked for a teacher of the sons of our artisans in the craft which they have in fact learned from their father to the best of their ability, and from his friends in the same trade, there again I don't think it would be easy to point to a master, though in the case of a complete tyro it would be easy enough. Thus it is with virtue and everything else, so that if we can find someone only a little better than the others at advancing us on the road to virtue, we must be content.

My claim is that I am one of these, rather better than anyone else at helping a man to acquire a good and noble character, worthy indeed of the fee which I charge and even more, as my pupils themselves agree. On this account I have adopted the following method of assessing my payment. Anyone who comes to learn from me may either pay the fee I ask for or, if he prefers, go to a temple, state on oath what he believes to be the worth of my instruction, and deposit that amount.

There, Socrates, you have both the parable and the argument by which I have sought to show that virtue is teachable and that the Athenians believe it to be so, and that at the same time it is quite natural for the sons of good fathers to turn out good for nothing, and vice versa. Why, even the sons of Polyclitus, who are contemporaries of Paralus and Xanthippus here, cannot hold a candle to their father, nor can the sons of many other craftsmen. But it is too early to bring such a charge against these two; they are young, and there is still promise in them.

Socrates/ Here Protagoras brought to an end his long and magnificent display of eloquence. For a long time I gazed at him spellbound, eager to catch any further word that he might utter. When I saw that he had really finished, I collected myself with an effort and said, turning to Hippocrates: Son of Apollodorus, how grateful I am to you for inducing me to come here. To have heard what Protagoras has just said is something I value very highly. I used to think that it was by no human diligence that good men acquired their goodness, but now I am convinced. There is just one small thing holding me back, which Protagoras I know will easily explain, now that he has instructed us on so many points. It is true that if a man talked on these matters with any of our popular orators, he might possibly hear similar discourses from Pericles or some other proficient speaker, but if one asks any of them an additional question, like books they cannot either answer or ask a question on their own account. Ask them the smallest thing supplementary to what they have said, and like a gong which booms out when you strike it and goes on until you lay a hand on it, so our orators at a tiny question spin out a regular Marathon of speech. Protagoras on the other hand, though he is perfectly capable of long and splendid speeches as we have seen, has also the faculty of answering a question

briefly, and when he asks one himself, of waiting and listening to the answer—a rare accomplishment.

Now then, Protagoras, there is just one small question left, your answer to which will give me all I want. You say that virtue is teachable, and there is no one I would believe sooner than you. But there is one thing which took me by surprise in your speech, and I should like you to fill this gap in my mind. You said that Zeus bestowed on men justice and respect for their fellows, and again at several points in your discourse justice and self-control and holiness and the rest were mentioned as if together they made up one thing, virtue. This is the point I want you to state for me with more precision. Is virtue a single whole, and are justice and self-control and holiness parts of it, or are these latter all names for one and the same thing? That is what I still want to know.

Protagoras/ Well, that is easy to answer. Virtue is one, and the qualities you ask about are parts of it.

Socrates/ Do you mean, as the parts of a face are parts—mouth, nose, eyes, and ears—or like the parts of a piece of gold, which do not differ from one another or from the whole except in size?

Protagoras/ In the first way, I should say—that is, they are in the relation of the parts of a face to the whole.

Socrates/ Then do men so share in these parts of virtue that some have one and some another, or must a man who possesses one of them possess them all?

Protagoras/ By no means. Many men are brave but unjust, and others are just but not wise.

Socrates/ Are these also parts of virtue. Wisdom, I mean, and courage?

Protagoras/ Most emphatically. Wisdom indeed is the greatest of the parts.

Socrates/ And each of them is different from the others?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Has each also its own function? In a face, the eye is not like the ear nor has it the same function. Nor do the other parts resemble one another in function any more than in other respects. Is this how the parts of virtue differ, both in themselves and in their function? It must be so, I suppose, if the parallel holds good.

Protagoras/ Yes it is so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then no other part of virtue resembles knowledge or justice or courage or temperance or holiness.

He agreed.

Now let us consider together what sort of thing each is. First of all, is there such a thing as justice or not? I think there is.

Protagoras/ So do I.

Socrates/ Well, if someone asked you and me, 'Tell me, you two, this thing that you mentioned a moment ago—justice—is it itself just or unjust?' I myself should answer that it was just. Which way would you vote?

Protagoras/ The same as you.

Socrates/ Then we would both answer that justice is of such a nature as to be just?

He agreed.

If he next asked, 'You say that there is also such a thing as holiness?' we should agree I suppose?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ 'Meaning that holiness too is a thing?' We should still assent?

He agreed again.

'Do you then say that this thing is of a nature to be holy or unholy?' Personally I should be annoyed at this, and say, 'What a blasphemous question! Nothing else could well be

holy if we won't allow holiness itself to be so.' What about you? Wouldn't that be your answer?

Protagoras/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Suppose now he went on to ask us, 'But what did you say a few minutes ago? Didn't I hear you rightly? I thought you said that the parts of virtue are so related that one does not resemble the other.' For my part I should reply, 'You have got most of it right, but your ears deceived you if you think I said that myself. It was Protagoras' answer to a question I put.' Now if he asks you, 'Is this true, Protagoras? Is it you who say that one part of virtue does not resemble another? Is this your statement?'—what would you answer?

Protagoras/ I should have to admit it.

Socrates/ Then having agreed about this, what shall we say if he goes on to ask, 'Then it is not the nature of holiness to be something just, nor of justice to be holy; it will be not-holy, and holiness will be not-just—that is, unjust, and justice unholy?' What shall we answer? I should say on my own behalf that justice is holy and holiness just, and on your behalf, if you would allow me, I should make the same reply, that justice is either the same thing as holiness or very like it, and that justice unquestionably resembles holiness and holiness justice. Are you going to prevent me from making this answer, or do you agree with me?

Protagoras/ I don't think it is quite so simple, Socrates. I can't really admit that justice is holy and holiness just; I think there is some difference there. However, what does it matter? If you like, let us assume that justice is holy and holiness just.

Socrates/ Excuse me. It isn't this 'if you like' and 'if that's what you think' that I want us to examine, but you and me ourselves. What I mean is, I think the argument will be most fairly tested, if we take the 'if' out of it.

Protagoras/ Well of course, justice does have some resemblance to holiness. After all, everything resembles everything else up to a point. There is a sense in which white resembles black, and hard soft, and so on with all other things that present the most contrary appearances. Even the parts of the face, which we described earlier as having different functions and not being like each other, have a certain resemblance and are like each other in some way. So by your method you can prove, if you want to, that they too all resemble one another. But it is not right to call things similar because they someone point of similarity, even when the resemblance is very slight, any more than to call things dissimilar that have some point of dissimilarity.

Socrates/ At this I said in some surprise, And is this how you suppose justice to be related to holiness, that there is only a slight resemblance between them?

Protagoras/ Not quite that, but not on the other hand in the way that you seem to believe.

Socrates/ Well, this line of argument doesn't seem to be agreeable to you, so let us drop it and look at something else that you said. You recognize the existence of folly?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is not wisdom altogether contrary to it?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when men act rightly and advantageously, do you regard them as acting temperately or not?

Protagoras/ Temperately.

Socrates/ That is to say with temperance?

Protagoras/ Of course.

Socrates/ And those who act wrongly act foolishly, and in doing so do not behave temperately?

He agreed.

Then foolish behavior is the opposite of temperate?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And foolish behavior is the outcome of folly, and temperate of temperance?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ If something is done with strength, it is done strongly, and if with weakness weakly, if with speed quickly, and if with slowness slowly?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ What is done in the same manner is done by the same agency, and if contrariwise, by the contrary?

He agreed.

Again, you recognize the existence of the fair?

He did.

Has it any contrary except the foul?

Protagoras/ No.

Socrates/ And the good too you recognize?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Has it any contrary except the bad?

Protagoras/ No.

Socrates/ And also high pitch in sound? And has it any other contrary but low?

Protagoras/ No.

Socrates/ In short, to everything that admits of a contrary there is one contrary and no more.

He conceded the point.

Socrates/ Now, let us recapitulate our points of agreement. We agreed that each thing has one contrary and no more, that what is done in a contrary manner is done by a contrary agency, that a foolish action is contrary to a

temperate one, and that a temperate action is performed with temperance and a foolish one with folly.

He admitted all this.

If then what is done in a contrary manner is done by a contrary agency, and one action is performed with temperance and the other with folly—in a contrary manner and so by contrary agencies—then folly is the contrary of temperance.

Protagoras/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Now you remember our earlier agreement that folly was the contrary of wisdom?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that one thing has one contrary?

Protagoras/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then which statement are we to give up? The dictum ‘one thing one contrary' or the statement that wisdom is a distinct thing from temperance, both being parts of virtue, and that in addition to each being distinct they are dissimilar both in themselves and in their functions, like the parts of a face? Which shall we renounce? The two statements are not very harmonious. They don't chime well together or fit in with each other. How could they, if one thing can have only one opposite, and yet though folly is only one thing, temperance as well as wisdom appears to be contrary to it? Isn't that the way of it, Protagoras?

He agreed, though most reluctantly.

Then must not temperance and wisdom be the same, just as earlier justice and holiness turned out to be much the same? Come now, Protagoras, we must not falter, but complete our inquiry. Do you think that a man who commits an injustice acts temperately in committing it?

Protagoras/ For my part I should be ashamed to agree to that. Of course many people do.

Socrates/ Well, shall I direct my argument against them or against you?

Protagoras/ If you wish, argue first against the proposition of the many.

Socrates/ It is all the same to me, provided you make the replies, whether it is your own opinion or not. It is the argument itself that I wish to probe, though it may turn out that both I who question and you who answer are equally under scrutiny.

At first Protagoras began to make difficulties, alleging that it would be hard to conduct a discussion on these terms, but in the end he agreed to answer.

Good. Now let us start from the beginning. You believe that some people show temperance in doing wrong?

Protagoras/ We will suppose so.

Socrates/ And to show temperance is to show good sense?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Which means that in doing wrong they have planned well?

Protagoras/ So be it.

Socrates/ If their wrongdoing is successful or unsuccessful?

Protagoras/ If it is successful.

Socrates/ You agree that some things are good?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do you mean by good those things which are beneficial to men?

Protagoras/ Not only those. Even if they are not beneficial to me, I still call them good.

Socrates/ At this point I thought Protagoras was beginning to bristle, ready for a quarrel and preparing to do battle with his answers. Seeing this I became more cautious and proceeded gently with my questioning : Do you mean things which are beneficial to no human being, or things that are not beneficial at all? Do you call them good also?

Protagoras/ Of course no. But I know plenty of things—foods, drinks, drugs, and many others—which are harmful to men, and others which are beneficial, and others again which, so far as men are concerned, are neither, but are harmful or beneficial to horses, and others only to cattle or dogs. Some have no effect on animals, but only on trees, and some again are good for the roots of trees but injurious to the young growths. Manure, for instance, is good for all plants when applied to their roots, but utterly destructive if put on the shoots or young branches. Or take olive oil. It is very bad for plants, and most inimical to the hair of all animals except man, whereas men find it of service both to the hair and to the rest of the body. So diverse and multiform is goodness that even with us the same thing is good when applied externally but deadly when taken internally. Thus all doctors forbid the sick to use oil in preparing their food, except in the very smallest quantities, just enough to counteract the disagreeable smell which food and sauces may have for them.

Socrates/ The audience vigorously applauded this speech. Then said I, I'm a forgetful sort of man, Protagoras, and if someone speaks at length, I lose the thread of the argument. If I were a little deaf, you would recognize the necessity of raising your voice if you wanted to talk to me; so now since you find me forgetful, cut down your answers and make them shorter if I am to follow you.

Protagoras/ What do you mean by ‘make my answers short'? Am I to make them shorter than the subject demands?

Socrates/ Of course not.

Protagoras/ As long as is necessary then?

Socrates/ Yes.

Protagoras/ As long a reply as *I* think necessary, or *you*?

Socrates/ What they told me, is that you have the gift both of speaking yourself and of teaching others to speak, just as you prefer—either at length, so that you never run dry, or so shortly that no one could beat you for brevity. If then you are going to talk to me, please use the second method and be brief.

Protagoras/ Frankly, Socrates, I have fought many a contest of words, and if I had done as you bid me, that is, adopted the method chosen by my opponent, I should have proved no better than anyone else, nor would the name of Protagoras have been heard of in Greece.

Socrates/ I saw that he was dissatisfied with his own performance in the answers he had given, and would not of his own free will continue in the role of answerer, and it seemed to me that it was not my business to remain any longer in the discussions. Well, I said, I have no wish myself to insist on continuing our conversation in a way that you don't approve. I will talk with you another time, when you are willing to converse so that I can follow. You for your part, as others say and you say for yourself, can carry on a discussion both in long and short speeches, for you are a gifted man. I on the other hand cannot manage these long speeches—I wish I could. It was for you, who can do both, to indulge me and so make our discussion possible. But since you would rather not, and I have something to do and could not stay while you spin out your long speeches, I will leave

you. I really ought to be going. Otherwise I should probably be glad to hear them.

With these words I got up to leave. As I did so Callias caught my hand with his right hand, and with his left took hold of this old coat of mine and said;

Callias/ We shan't let you go, Socrates. Our talk won't be the same without you. Please stay with us. There is nothing that I would rather listen to than a conversation between you and Protagoras. You will be doing us all a kindness.

Socrates/ I was already standing up to go, and answered, Son of Hipponicus, I have always admired your enthusiasm for wisdom. Believe me. I praise and love you for it now, and would gladly do what you wish, if your request were within my power to fulfill. But it's as if you were to ask me to keep up with Crison, the runner from Himera, when he was in his prime, or to run a race against some three-miler or Marathon champion. I would say that to run with them would please me even more than it would please you, but I can't do it. If you want to see me and Crison running together, you must ask him to lower his standards, for I can't run fast, but he can run slowly. So if you want to hear Protagoras and me, ask him to go on answering me as he did at first, briefly and keeping to the point of my questions. How can we have a discussion otherwise? Personally I thought that companionable talk was one thing, and public speaking another.

Callias/ But don't you see, Socrates? Protagoras is surely right in thinking that he is entitled to talk in the way that suits him, just as much as you are.

Socrates/ Here Alcibiades broke in.

Alcibiades/ No, no, Callias. Socrates admits frankly that long speeches are beyond him and that Protagoras has the better of him there, but in discussion and the intelligent

give-and-take of arguments I doubt if he would give any man best. If Protagoras in his turn admits that Socrates beats him in discussion, Socrates will be satisfied. But if he maintains his claim, let him continue the discussion with question and answer, not meeting every question with a long oration, eluding the arguments and refusing to meet them properly, spinning it out until most of his hearers have forgotten what the question was about—not that Socrates will be the one to forget it. I'll guarantee that, in spite of his little joke about being forgetful. I hold then that what Socrates proposes is the more reasonable, and I suppose it's right for each of us to say what he thinks.

Socrates/ After Alcibiades, so far as I remember, it was Critias who spoke, addressing his remarks to Prodicus and Hippias.

Critias/ Callias, seems to me to be very much on the side of Protagoras, and Alcibiades is always out to win when he takes up a cause. But it is not for us to be partisans either of Socrates or of Protagoras. Let us implore them both alike not to break up the discussion in mid-career.

Socrates/ Hearing this, Prodicus began;

Prodicus/ You are quite right, Critias. Those who are present at discussions of this kind must divide their attention between the speakers impartially, but not equally. The two things are not the same. They must hear both alike, but not give equal weight to each. More should be given to the wiser, and less to the other. I add my plea, Protagoras and Socrates, that you should be reconciled. Let your conversation be a discussion, not a dispute. A discussion is carried on among friends with good will, but a dispute is between rivals and enemies. In this way our meeting will be best conducted. You, the speakers, will be esteemed by us—esteemed, I say, not praised, for esteem is a genuine feeling

in the hearts of the audience, whereas praise is often on the lips of men belying their true conviction—and we who listen will experience enjoyment rather than pleasure. Enjoyment can result from learning and partaking in the intellectual activity of the mind alone, but pleasure arises rather from eating or other forms of physical indulgence.

Socrates/ So said Prodicus, and a large number of those present expressed agreement. After him the wise Hippias spoke up.

Hippias/ Gentlemen, I count you all my kinsmen and family and fellow citizens—by nature, not by convention. By nature like is kin to like, but custom, the tyrant of mankind, does much violence to nature. For us then who understand the nature of things, who are the intellectual leaders of Greece and in virtue of that very fact are now assembled in Athens, the center and shrine of Greek wisdom, and in this the finest house of that city, it would be a disgrace if we produced nothing worthy of our fame but fell to bickering like the lowest of mankind.

And so my request and my advice to you, Protagoras and Socrates, is to be reconciled, allowing us to act as mediators and bring you together in a compromise. Socrates should not insist on the strict forms of discussion, carried on through the briefest of exchanges, if it is unwelcome to Protagoras, but should give way and slacken the reins of his discourse, so that it may wear for us a more dignified and elegant air, and Protagoras should refrain from shaking out every reef and running before the wind, launching out on a sea of words till he is out of sight of land. Let both take a middle course. Do this, take my advice, and appoint an arbitrator, referee, or president to preserve a moderate length in the speeches of both of you.

Socrates/ This counsel won general consent and a round of applause. Callias refused to let me go and they told us to choose an overseer. But I said that it would be unfitting to choose an arbitrator over our words. If he were a man of lesser attainments, it would be wrong to set him over his betters, and if he were someone like ourselves it would still not be proper, for in resembling us he would act like us, and his appointment would be superfluous.

Well then, you will say, we will choose someone superior. But the fact is, in my opinion, that it would be impossible for you to choose anyone wiser than Protagoras, and if you choose some lesser man and pretend he is better, this again would be to insult him, appointing someone over him as if he were a nobody. For myself I am indifferent. I have another proposal to enable our discussion to proceed as you wish it to. If Protagoras is unwilling to give replies, let him be the questioner and I will answer, and at the same time try to show him how, in my submission, the respondent should speak. When I have answered as many questions as he likes to put, let him in return render similar account to me. Then if he does not seem to wish to answer a question as put, you and I will appeal to him jointly, as you did to me, not to spoil the discussion. For this purpose we have no need of a single arbitrator; you will all keep watch on us together.

Everyone thought this was the right way to proceed. Protagoras was most unwilling, but he had to agree to be the questioner, and then when he had questioned me sufficiently, to submit himself to me in turn and make brief replies.

He began his questions something like this.

Protagoras/ In my view, Socrates, the most important part of a man's education is to become an authority on poetry. This means being able to criticize the good and bad

points of a poem with understanding, to know how to distinguish them, and give one's reasons when asked. My question to you therefore will concern the subject of our present discussion, namely virtue, but transferred to the realm of poetry. That will be the only difference. Simonides in one of his poems says to Scopas, son of Creon of Thessaly;

> Hard is it on the one hand to become
> A good man truly, hands and feet and mind
> Foursquare, wrought without blame.

Do you know the piece, or should I recite it all to you?

Socrates/ There is no need, I know it and have given it quite a lot of study.

Protagoras/ Good. Now do you think it a beautiful and well-written poem?

Socrates/ Yes, both beautiful and well written.

Protagoras/ And do you think a poem beautifully written if the poet contradicts himself?

Socrates/ No.

Protagoras/ Then look at it more closely.

Socrates/ But really I have given it enough thought.

Protagoras/ Then you must know that as the poem proceeds he says :

> Nor do I count as sure the oft-quoted word
> Of Pittacus, though wise indeed he was
> Who spoke it. To be noble, said the sage,
> Is hard.

You understand that this is the same poet as wrote the previous lines?

Socrates/ Yes.

Protagoras/ Then you think the two passages are consistent?

Socrates/ For my part I do, though not without a fear that he might be right. Don't you?

Protagoras/ How can a man be thought consistent when he says both these things? First he lays it down himself that it is hard for a man to become truly good; then when he is a little further on in the poem he forgets. He finds fault with Pittacus, who said the same thing as he did himself, that it is hard to be noble, and refuses to accept it from him; but in censuring the man who said the same as he does, he obviously censures himself. Either his first or his second statement is wrong.

Socrates/ This sally evoked praise and applause from many of the audience, and at first I was like a man who has been hit by a good boxer; at his words and the applause things went dark and I felt giddy. Then I turned to Prodicus—and to tell you the truth, this was a move to gain time to consider what the poet meant—and appealed to him by name. Prodicus, I said, Simonides is of course your fellow citizen; you ought to come to his aid. I think I will call on you as the river Scamander in Homer called on the Simois when hard pressed by Achilles, with the words :

> Dear brother, let us both together stem the hero's might.

So I appeal to you lest our Simonides be sacked by Protagoras like another Troy, since truly to justify Simonides calls for that art of yours whereby you discern the difference between 'wish' and 'desire' and make all those other elegant distinctions which we heard just now. So see whether you agree with me. I don't believe Simonides contradicts himself. Now let us have your opinion first. Do you think 'to become' and 'to be' are the same, or different?

Prodicus/ Different, most certainly.

Socrates/ Well, at the beginning Simonides gave his own view, that it is difficult to become a good man, didn't he?

Prodicus/ True.

Socrates/ But as for Pittacus, he censures him not, as Protagoras thinks, for saying the same thing, but something different. According to Pittacus, the difficulty is not to *become* noble, as Simonides said it was, but to *be.* As Prodicus says, Protagoras, to be and to become are not the same; and if to be is not the same as to become, Simonides is not contradicting himself. I shouldn't be surprised if Prodicus and many others would agree with Hesiod that it is difficult to *become* good—he says, you remember;

> The gods have put sweat on the path to virtue;

but when

> The summit's reached,
> Hard though it was, thenceforth the task is light
> To keep it.

Prodicus commended my explanation, but Protagoras said;

Protagoras/ Your justification, Socrates, involves a greater error than the one it sets out to defend.

Socrates/ It seems then, that I have done harm, and am a contemptible physician, whose cure inflames the disease.

Protagoras/ Well, it is so.

Socrates/ Explain.

Protagoras/ The poet must be very stupid, if he says that it is such a light matter to hold on to virtue, when everyone agrees that there is nothing more difficult.

Socrates/ To this I rejoined, It's a remarkably lucky thing that our friend Prodicus happens to be present at this discussion. I have a notion that his branch of wisdom is an old and god-given one, beginning perhaps with Simonides or

going even further back. Your learning covers many things but not, it appears, this. You are not acquainted with it as I have become through being a pupil of Prodicus. So now I don't think you understand that Simonides may not have taken this word 'hard' as you do. It may be like the word 'terrible which Prodicus is always scolding me about, when in praising you or someone else I say, Protagoras is a terribly clever person.' He asks me if I'm not ashamed to call good things terrible. What is terrible, he says, is bad. No one speaks of 'terrible wealth' or 'terrible peace,' but rather of 'a terrible disease,' 'a terrible war,' 'terrible poverty.' Perhaps then the Ceans and Simonides understand 'hard' as connoting something bad, or something else which you don't know. Let's ask Prodicus, for he is the right man to ask about the dialect of Simonides. Prodicus, what does Simonides mean by 'hard'?

Prodicus/ Bad.

Socrates/ Then that is why he blames Pittacus for saying, 'It is hard to be noble,' just as if he had heard him saying that it was bad to be noble.

Prodicus/ What else do you suppose Simonides means? He is reproaching Pittacus with not knowing how to distinguish meanings properly, being a Lesbian and brought up in a barbarous dialect.

Socrates/ Do you hear that, Protagoras? Have you anything to say to it?

Protagoras/ It is not at all like that. I know very well that by 'hard' Simonides meant what the rest of us mean—not 'bad,' but what is not easy, only accomplished with much effort.

Socrates/ I believe myself that that is what Simonides meant, and I am sure Prodicus knew it. He is joking, and wants to test your ability to stand up for your own opinion.

Actually the very next words provide ample proof that Simonides did not equate 'hard' with 'bad.' He goes on;

A god alone can have this privilege;

and presumably he does not first say 'it is bad to be noble' and then add that only a god could achieve it, and allot it as a privilege entirely divine. That would mean that Prodicus is calling Simonides quite unprincipled and no true Cean. However, I am ready to tell you my own opinion of Simonides' meaning in this song, if you wish to test my skill in poetry, as you call it, but if you prefer it I will listen to you.

Protagoras/ Please speak if you will;

Socrates/ said Protagoras when he heard this, and Prodicus, Hippias, and the others urged me strongly.

Well then, I will try to expound to you the view that I take. The most ancient and fertile homes of philosophy among the Greeks are Crete and Sparta, where are to be found more Sophists than anywhere on earth. But they conceal their wisdom like the Sophists Protagoras spoke of, and pretend to be fools, so that their superiority over the rest of Greece may not be known to lie in wisdom, but seem to consist in fighting and courage. Their idea is that if their real excellence became known, everyone would set to work to become wise. By this disguise they have taken in the pro-Spartans in other cities, who to emulate them go about with bruised ears, bind their hands with thongs, take to physical training, and wear short cloaks, under the impression that these are the practices which have made the Spartans a great power in Greece; whereas the Spartans, when they want to resort freely to their wise men and are tired of meeting them in secret, expel all resident aliens, whether they be sympathizers with the Spartan way of life or not, and converse with the Sophists unbeknown to any foreigners. Conversely they don't allow any of their youths to go abroad,

for fear they should forget what they have learned at home. No more do the Cretans. And in these states there are not only men but also women who are proud of their intellectual culture.

Now this is how you may know that I am telling the truth and that the Spartans are the best educated in philosophy and speaking. If you talk to the most ordinary Spartan, you will find that for most of the time he shows himself a quite unimpressive speaker. But then, at some chance point in the conversation, like a brilliant marksman he shoots in a telling phrase, brief and taut, showing up whoever is talking to him to be as helpless as a child.

Now there are some, both at the present day and in the past, who have tumbled to this fact, namely that to be Spartan implies a taste for intellectual rather than physical exercise, for they realize that to frame such utterances is a mark of the highest culture. Of these were Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, our own Solon, Cleobulus of Lindus, and Myson of Chen, and the seventh of their company, we are told, was a Spartan, Chilon. All these were emulators, admirers, and disciples of Spartan culture, and their wisdom may be recognized as belonging to the same category, consisting of pithy and memorable dicta uttered by each. Moreover they met together and dedicated the first fruits of their wisdom to Apollo in his temple at Delphi, inscribing those words which are on everyone's lips, ‘Know thyself' and ‘Nothing too much.'

I mention these facts to make the point that, among the ancients, this Laconic brevity was the characteristic expression of philosophy. In particular this saying of Pittacus, ‘Hard is it to be noble,' got into circulation privately and earned the approval of the wise. It occurred therefore to Simonides, with his philosophical ambitions, that if he could floor this favorite maxim with a triumphant knockout, he

would become the favorite of his own day. In my judgment he wrote the whole poem against the saying of Pittacus and on its account, in a deliberate effort to damage its fame.

Now let us all examine it together, to see whether I am right. At the very beginning of the poem, it seems crazy, if he wished to say that it is hard to become a good man, that he should then insert 'on the one hand.' The insertion seems to make no sense, except on the supposition that Simonides is speaking polemically against the saying of Pittacus. Pittacus said, 'Hard is it to be noble,' and Simonides replied, disputing the point, 'No, to *become* a good man is hard truly'—not, by the way, 'to become truly good'—he does not refer the 'truly' to that, as if some men were truly good and others good but not truly so. That would strike people as silly and unlike Simonides. We must transpose the word 'truly' in the poem, thus as it were implying the saying of Pittacus before it, as if he spoke first and Simonides were answering his words. Thus, 'O men, hard is it to be noble,' and Simonides replies, 'That is not true, Pittacus; not to *be* but to *become* a good man, foursquare in hands and feet and mind, wrought without blame, that is hard truly.'

On this view we find that 'on the one hand' comes in reasonably, and that 'truly' finds its proper place at the end. Everything that follows bears out my opinion that this is the sense. Much could be said about each phrase in the poem to testify to the excellence of its composition—it is indeed an elegant and well-thought-out production—but to go through it in such detail would take too long. Nevertheless let us review its general character and intention, which is undoubtedly to constitute, throughout its length, a refutation of the saying of Pittacus.

A little further on Simonides says, as if he were developing an argument, that although to become a good man is truly difficult, yet it is possible, for a while at least, 'but having

become good, to remain in this state and *be* a good man—which is what you were speaking of, Pittacus—is impossible and superhuman. This is the privilege of a god alone, whereas

> He cannot but be bad, whom once
> Misfortune irredeemable casts down.'

Now who is cast down by irredeemable misfortune in the management of a ship? Clearly not the passenger, for he has *been* down all the time. You cannot knock down a man who is lying on the ground; you can only knock him down if he is standing, and put him on the ground. In the same way irredeemable misfortune may cast down the resourceful, but not the man who is helpless all the time. The steersman may be reduced to helplessness by the onset of a great storm, the farmer by a bad season, and the doctor from some analogous misfortune. For the good may become bad, as another poet has testified in the line;

> The good are sometimes bad and sometimes noble;

but the bad man cannot become bad, but is so of necessity. So it is that the resourceful and wise and good, when irredeemable disaster brings him to naught, cannot but be bad.

You say, Pittacus, 'Hard is it to be noble,' whereas to *become* noble is hard, though possible, but to *be* so is impossible;

> For when he fares well every man is good,
> But in ill faring, evil.

Now what is faring well in letters, and what makes a man good at them? Clearly the learning of them. And what is the faring well that makes a good doctor? Clearly it is learning how to heal the sick. 'But in ill faring, evil.' Who is it who becomes a bad doctor? Clearly a man who is both a doctor and a good doctor; he might become a bad doctor also. But

we who are laymen in medicine could never by faring ill become doctors or builders or any other kind of technician, and he who cannot by faring badly become a doctor cannot, obviously, become a bad doctor. Even so the good man may as easily be made bad, by lapse of time or fatigue or illness or some other accident, seeing that this is the only real ill faring, to be deprived of knowledge. But the bad man cannot be made bad, for he is so all the time. If he is to *become* bad, he must first become good. Thus this part of the poem also teaches the same lesson, that to be a good man—continuing good—is not possible, but a man may *become* good, and the same man bad, and those are best for the longest time whom the gods love.

All this, then, is aimed at Pittacus, and the next bit even more plainly so, for he goes on;

> Then never shall I vainly cast away
> In hopeless search my little share of life,
> Seeking a thing impossible to be,
> A man all blameless, among those who reap
> The fruit of the broad earth.
> But should I find him
> I'll send you word.

See how violently, throughout the poem, he attacks the saying of Pittacus—

> But all who do no baseness willingly
> I praise and love. The gods themselves strive not
> Against necessity.

This is all to the same purpose. Simonides was not so ignorant as to say that he praised all who did no evil voluntarily, as if there were any who did evil voluntarily. For myself I am fairly certain that no wise man believes anyone sins willingly or willingly perpetrates any evil or base act. They know very well that all evil or base action is

involuntary. So here Simonides is not saying that he praises whoever does no evil willingly. The word 'willingly' applies to himself. His view was that a good man often forces himself into love and praise, as when someone's mother or father or native land is unsympathetic to him. The less worthy, when they find themselves in such a position, seem to accept it happily and expose the unworthiness of parents or country with reproaches and denunciations, so that they may neglect their duty toward them without thereby incurring the blame or reproaches of others. They even exaggerate their censure and add gratuitous hostility to that which cannot be helped. Good men on the other hand conceal such faults and are constrained to praise, and if they feel anger at some wrong done to them by parents or country, they calm themselves and seek reconciliation, compelling themselves to love and praise their own kin. No doubt Simonides had in mind that he himself had often eulogized a tyrant or someone of that stamp not of his own free will but under compulsion.

This then is addressed to Pittacus in particular, as if to say, My reason for blaming you, Pittacus, is not that I am a faultfinder, for

> to me that man suffices Who is not bad nor overweak, but sound In heart and knowing righteousness, the weal Of nations. I shall find no fault with him

I am not, he says, a censorious man

> For beyond number is the tribe of fools.

So, he implies, if anyone takes pleasure in faultfinding, he may have his fill in censuring them.

> All is fair that is unmixed with foul.

He does not say this in the sense in which he might say, 'all is white that is unmixed with black'—that would be ridiculous on many counts —but meaning that for his part

he accepts without censure the middle state. I do not seek, he has said;

> A man all blameless, among those who reap
> The fruit of the broad earth.
> But should I find him I'll send you word.

If I wait for perfection I shall praise no one. For me it is enough if he reach the mean and do no evil, since

> I praise and love all—

note that he uses the Lesbian dialect here because he is addressing Pittacus—

> I praise and love all willingly

—this is where the pause is to be made in speaking it, at 'willingly'—

> Who do no baseness;

though there are those whom I praise and love against my will. If then you spoke with an even moderate degree of reasonableness and truth, Pittacus, I should never blame you. But as it is you have made an utterly false statement about something of the highest import, and it passes for true. For that I do blame you.

That, gentlemen, I concluded, is my interpretation of the mind of Simonides in writing this poem.

Hippias/ This exposition of yours, seems to me highly meritorious. However, I also have an interesting thesis on the poem, which I will expound to you if you wish.

Alcibiades/ Yes, another time, Hippias. But at present Socrates and Protagoras must carry out their agreement. Let Socrates reply if Protagoras wants to ask further questions, or if he prefers to answer Socrates, then let Socrates do the questioning.

Socrates/ Then, I leave it to Protagoras to do whichever pleases him. But if he is agreeable, I suggest we leave the subject of songs and poems, for I should be glad to reach a

conclusion, Protagoras, in a joint investigation with you, on the matters about which I asked you at the beginning. Conversation about poetry reminds me too much of the wine parties of second-rate and commonplace people. Such men, being too uneducated to entertain themselves as they drink by using their own voices and conversational resources, put up the price of female musicians, paying well for the hire of an extraneous voice—that of the pipe—and find their entertainment in its warblings. But where the drinkers are men of worth and culture, you will find no girls piping or dancing or harping. They are quite capable of enjoying their own company without such frivolous nonsense, using their own voices in sober discussion and each taking his turn to speak or listen—even if the drinking is really heavy. In the same way gatherings like our own, if they consist of men such as most of us claim to be, call for no extraneous voices—not even of poets. No one can interrogate poets about what they say, and most often when they are introduced into the discussion some say the poet's meaning is one thing and some another, for the topic is one on which nobody can produce a conclusive argument. The best people avoid such discussions, and entertain each other from their own resources, testing one another's mettle in what they have to say themselves. These are the people, in my opinion, whom you and I should follow, setting the poets aside and conducting the conversation on the basis of our own ideas. It is the truth, and our own minds, that we should be testing. If you want to go on with your questions, I am ready to offer myself as an answerer, or, if you prefer, be my respondent, to bring to its conclusion the discussion which we broke off in the middle.

When I said this, and more to the same effect, Protagoras gave no clear indication of which he would do. Alcibiades then glanced at Callias and said;

Alcibiades/ Do you still approve of what Protagoras is doing, refusing to say whether or not he will be the answerer? I don't. Let him either continue the discussion or tell us that he is unwilling, so that we may know where we are with him, and Socrates can talk to someone else, or any of the rest of us start a conversation.

Socrates/ These words of Alcibiades, and requests from Callias and almost all those present, made Protagoras feel ashamed, or so I thought, and induced him to return reluctantly to the discussion. He said therefore that he would answer and told me to put my questions.

Protagoras, please don't think that I have any other purpose in this discussion than to investigate questions which continually baffle me. I believe Homer hit a nail on the head when he said, If two go together, one perceives before the other.' Somehow we all feel a better fortified in this way for any action or speech or thought. But to continue the quotation, 'If one alone perceive'—why he goes off at once looking for someone to whom he can show his idea and with whom he can confirm it, and will not rest till he finds him. That is why I would rather talk to you than to anyone else, because I think you are the most capable of elucidating the kind of questions that a good man gives his mind to, and in particular the question of virtue. After all, whom else should I look for? Not only are you, as you believe, an excellent member of society yourself—there are some men very good in themselves who cannot pass on their good qualities to others—but you have also the ability to make others good, and with such confidence that although some have made a secret of their art you openly announce yourself to the Greeks by the name of Sophist and set up as a teacher of culture and virtue, the first to claim payment for this service. Naturally I must call on you for assistance in pondering

these subjects and enlist you with me by asking you questions. It could not be otherwise.

I want, then, to go back to the beginning, to my first questions to you on this subject. Some things I want you to remind me of, and others I want to investigate with your help. The question, if I am not mistaken, was this. Wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and holiness are five terms. Do they stand for a single reality, or has each term a particular entity underlying it, a reality with its own separate function, each different from the other? Your answer was that they are not names for the same thing, but that each of these terms applies to its own separate reality, and that all these things are parts of virtue, not like the parts of a lump of gold all homogeneous with each other and with the whole of which they are parts, but like the parts of a face, resembling neither the whole nor each other and each having a separate function. If you are still of the same mind, say so, but if not, then declare yourself. I certainly shall not hold you to your words if you now express yourself differently. Very likely you spoke as you did to test me.

Protagoras/ No. My view is that all these are parts of virtue, and that four of them resemble each other fairly closely, but courage is very different from all the rest. The proof of what I say is that you can find many men who are quite unjust, unholy, intemperate, and ignorant, yet outstandingly courageous.

Socrates/ Stop. What you say merits investigation. Do you qualify the courageous as confident, or in any other way?

Protagoras/ As confident, yes, and keen to meet dangers from which most men shrink in fear.

Socrates/ Then again, you consider virtue an honorable thing, and it is on the assumption that it is honorable that you offer to teach it?

Protagoras/ Unless I am quite mad, it is the most honorable of all things.

Socrates/ Part base and part honorable, or all honorable?

Protagoras/ All honorable, as honorable as can be.

Socrates/ Now do you know which men plunge fearlessly into tanks?

Protagoras/ Yes, divers.

Socrates/ Is that because they know their job or for some other reason?

Protagoras/ Because they know their job.

Socrates/ And what men feel confidence in a cavalry engagement—trained or untrained riders?

Protagoras/ Trained.

Socrates/ And in fighting with the light shield—peltasts or nonpeltasts?

Protagoras/ Peltasts. And this holds good generally, if that is what you are after. Those with the relevant knowledge have more confidence than those without it, and more when they have learned the job than they themselves had before.

Socrates/ But, have you ever seen men with no understanding of any of these dangerous occupations who yet plunge into them with confidence?

Protagoras/ Indeed yes, with only too much confidence.

Socrates/ Then does not their confidence involve courage too?

Protagoras/ No, for if so, courage would be something to be ashamed of. Such men are mad.

Socrates/ How then do you define the courageous? Did you not say they were the confident?

Protagoras/ Yes, I still maintain it.

Socrates/ Well, those who are thus ignorantly confident show themselves not courageous but mad, and conversely, in the other case it is the wisest that are also most confident, and therefore most courageous? On this argument it is their knowledge that must be courage.

Protagoras/ No, Socrates. You have not remembered rightly what I said in my reply. When you asked me whether the courageous are confident, I agreed, but I was not asked whether the confident are also courageous—if you had asked me that at the time, I should have said 'not all of them'—and you have nowhere disproved my admission by showing that the courageous are not confident. Further, when you argue that those who have knowledge are more confident than they were before, and also than others who are ignorant, and thereupon conclude that courage and wisdom are the same thing, you might as well go on and conclude that physical strength is knowledge. First of all you would proceed to ask me whether the strong are powerful, and I should agree. Next, whether those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who do not, and more powerful after they have learned than before; again I should agree, and it would then be open to you to say, adducing the same proofs, that on my own admission wisdom is physical strength. But here again I nowhere admit that the powerful are strong, only that the strong are powerful. Power and strength are not the same. Power can result from knowledge, and also from madness or passion, whereas strength is a matter of natural constitution and bodily nurture. Similarly in our present discussion, I deny that confidence and courage are the same, and it follows that the courageous are confident but not all the confident are courageous. Confidence, like

power, may be born of skill, or equally of madness or passion, but courage is a matter of nature and the proper nurture of the soul.

Socrates/ Well, you speak of some men living well, and others badly?

He agreed.

Socrates/ Do you think then that a man would be living well who passed his life in pain and vexation?

Protagoras/ No.

Socrates/ But if he lived it out to the end with enjoyment, you would count him as having lived well?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then to live pleasurably is good, to live painfully bad?

Protagoras/ Yes, if one's pleasure is in what is honorable.

Socrates/ What's this, Protagoras? Surely you don't follow the common opinion that some pleasures are bad and some pains good? I mean to say, in so far as they are pleasant, are they not also good, leaving aside any consequence that they may entail? And in the same way pains, in so far as they are painful, are bad?

Protagoras/ I'm not sure Socrates, whether I ought to give an answer as unqualified as your question suggests, and say that everything pleasant is good, and everything painful evil. But with a view not only to my present answer but to the whole of the rest of my life, I believe it is safest to reply that there are some pleasures which are not good, and some pains which are not evil, others on the other hand which are, and a third class which are neither evil nor good.

Socrates/ Meaning by pleasures, what partakes of pleasure or gives it?

Protagoras/ Certainly.

Socrates/ My question then is, whether they are not, qua pleasant, good. I am asking in fact whether pleasure itself is not a good thing.

Protagoras/ Let us, as you are so fond of saying yourself, investigate the question; then if the proposition we are examining seems reasonable, and pleasant and good appear identical, we shall agree on it. If not, that will be the time to differ.

Socrates/ Good. Will you lead the inquiry or should I?

Protagoras/ It is for you to take the lead, since you introduced the subject.

Socrates/ I wonder then, if we can make it clear to ourselves like this. If a man were trying to judge, by external appearance, of another's health or some particular physical function, he might look at his face and hands and then say, 'Let me see your chest and back too, so that I may make a more satisfactory examination.' Something like this is what I want for our present inquiry. Observing that your attitude to the good and the pleasant is what you say, I want to go on something like this. Now uncover another part of your mind, Protagoras. What is your attitude to knowledge? Do you share the common view about that also? Most people think, in general terms, that it is nothing strong, no leading or ruling element. They don't see it like that. They hold that it is not the knowledge that a man possesses which governs him, but something else—now passion, now pleasure. now pain, sometimes love, and frequently fear. They just think of knowledge as a slave, pushed around by all the other affections. Is this your view too, or would you rather say that knowledge is a fine thing quite capable of ruling a man, and that if he can distinguish good from evil, nothing will force him to act otherwise than as knowledge dictates, since wisdom is all the reinforcement he needs?

Protagoras/ Not only is this my view, but I above all men should think it shame to speak of wisdom and knowledge as anything but the most powerful elements in human life.

Socrates/ Well and truly answered. But I expect you know that most men don't believe us. They maintain that there are many who recognize the best but are unwilling to act on it. It may be open to them, but they do otherwise. Whenever I ask what can be the reason for this, they answer that those who act in this way are overcome by pleasure or pain or some other of the things I mentioned just now.

Protagoras/ Well, Socrates. it's by no means uncommon for people to say what is not correct.

Socrates/ Then come with me and try to convince them, and show what really happens when they speak of being overcome by pleasure and therefore, though recognizing what is best, failing to do it. If we simply declare, 'You are wrong, and what you say is false,' they will ask us, 'If it is not being overcome by pleasure, what can it be? What do you two say it is? Tell us.'

Protagoras/ But why must we look into the opinions of the common man, who says whatever comes into his head?

Socrates/ I believe, that it will help us to find out how courage is related to the other parts of virtue. So if you are content to keep to our decision, that I should lead the way in whatever direction I think we shall best see the light, then follow me. Otherwise, if you wish, I shall give it up.

Protagoras/ No, you are right. Carry on as you have begun.

Socrates/ To return then, If they should ask us, 'What is your name for what we called being worsted by pleasure?' I should reply, 'Listen. Protagoras and I will try to explain it to you. We take it that you say this happens to you when, for example, you are overcome by the desire of food or drink or

sex—which are pleasant things—and though you recognize them as evil, nevertheless indulge in them.' They would agree. Then we should ask them, 'In what respect do you call them evil? Is it because for the moment each of them provides its pleasure and is pleasant, or because they lay up for the future disease or poverty or suchlike? If they led to none of these things, but produced pure enjoyment, would they nevertheless be evils—no matter why or how they give enjoyment?' Can we expect any other answer than this, that they are not evil on account of the actual momentary pleasure which they produce. but on account of their consequences, disease and the rest?

Protagoras/ I believe that would be their answer.

Socrates/ 'Well, to cause disease and poverty is to cause pain.' They would agree, I think?

He nodded.

'So the only reason why these pleasures seem to you to be evil is, we suggest, that they result in pains and deprive us of future pleasures.' Would they agree?

We both thought they would.

Now suppose we asked them the converse question. 'You say also that pains may be good. You mean, I take it, such things as physical training, military campaigns, doctors' treatment involving cautery or the knife or drugs or starvation diet? These, you say, are good but painful?' Would they agree?

Protagoras/ They would.

Socrates/ 'Do you then call them good in virtue of the fact that at the time they cause extreme pain and agony, or because in the future there result from them health, bodily well-being, the safety of one's country, dominion over others, wealth?' The latter, I think they would agree.

Protagoras thought so too.

‘And are they good for any other reason than that their outcome is pleasure and the cessation or prevention of pain? Can you say that you have any other end in mind, when you call them good, than pleasures or pains?' I think they would say no.

Protagoras/ I too.

Socrates/ ‘So you pursue pleasure as being good, and shun pain as evil?'

He agreed.

‘Then your idea of evil is pain, and of good is pleasure. Even enjoying yourself you call evil whenever it leads to the loss of a pleasure greater than its own, or lays up pains that outweigh its pleasures.

If it is in any other sense, or without anything else in mind, that you call enjoyment evil, no doubt you could tell us what it is, but you cannot.'

Protagoras/ I agree that they cannot.

Socrates/ ‘Isn't it the same when we turn back to pain? To suffer pain you call good when it either rids us of greater pains than its own or leads to pleasures that outweigh them. If you have anything else in mind when you call the actual suffering of pain a good thing, you could tell us what it is, but you cannot.'

Protagoras/ True.

Socrates/ ‘Now my good people,' ‘if you ask me what is the point of all this rigmarole, I beg your indulgence. It isn't easy to explain the real meaning of what you call being overcome by pleasure, and any explanation is bound up with this point. You may still change your minds, if you can say that the good is anything other than pleasure, or evil other than pain. Is it sufficient for you to live life through with pleasure and without pain? If so, and you can mention no

good or evil which cannot in the last resort be reduced to these, then listen to my next point.

'This position makes your argument ridiculous. You say that a man often recognizes evil actions as evil, yet commits them, under no compulsion, because he is led on and distracted by pleasure, and on the other hand that, recognizing the good, he refrains from following it because he is overcome by the pleasures of the moment. The absurdity of this will become evident if we stop using all these names together—pleasant, painful, good, and evil—and since they have turned out to be only two. call them by only two names—first of all good and evil, and only at a different stage pleasure and pain. Having agreed on this, suppose we now say that a man does evil though he recognizes it as evil. Why? Because he is overcome. By what? We can no longer say by pleasure, because it has changed its name to good. Overcome, we say. By what, we are asked. By the good, I suppose we shall say. I fear that if our questioner is ill-mannered, he will laugh and retort, What ridiculous nonsense, for a man to do evil, knowing it is evil and that he ought not to do it, because he is overcome by good. Am Ito suppose that the good in you is or is not a match for the evil? Clearly we shall reply that the good is not a match; otherwise the man whom we speak of as being overcome by pleasure would not have done wrong. And in what way, he may say, does good fail to be a match for evil, or evil for good? Is it not by being greater or smaller, more or less than the other? We shall have to agree. Then by being overcome you must mean taking greater evil in exchange for lesser good.

'Having noted this result, suppose we reinstate the names pleasant and painful for the same phenomena, thus : A man does—*evil* we said before, but now we shall say *painful* actions, knowing them to be painful, because overcome by

pleasures—pleasures, obviously, which were not a match for the pains. And what meaning can we attach to the phrase *not a match for,* when used of pleasure in relation to pain, except the excess or deficiency of one as compared with the other? It depends on whether one is greater or smaller, more or less intense than the other. If anyone objects that there is a great difference between present pleasure and pleasure or pain in the future, I shall reply that the difference cannot be one of anything else but pleasure and pain. So like an expert in weighing, put the pleasures and the pains together, set both the near and distant in the balance, and say which is the greater quantity. In weighing pleasures against pleasures, one must always choose the greater and the more; in weighing pains against pains, the smaller and the less; whereas in weighing pleasures against pains, if the pleasures exceed the pains, whether the distant, the near, or vice versa, one must take the course which brings those pleasures; but if the pains outweigh the pleasures, avoid it. Is this not so, good people?' I should say, and I am sure they could not deny it.

Protagoras agreed.

'That being so then, answer me this,' I shall go on. 'The same magnitudes seem greater to the eye from near at hand than they do from a distance. This is true of thickness and also of number, and sounds of equal loudness seem greater near at hand than at a distance.

If now our happiness consisted in doing, I mean in choosing, greater lengths and avoiding smaller, where would lie salvation? In the art of measurement or in the impression made by appearances? Haven't we seen that the appearance leads us astray and throws us into confusion so that in our actions and our choices between great and small we are constantly accepting and rejecting the same things, whereas the metric art would have canceled the effect of the

impression, and by revealing the true state of affairs would have caused the soul to live in peace and quiet and abide in the truth, thus saving our life?' Faced with these considerations, would people agree that our salvation would lie in the art of measurement?

He agreed that they would.

'Again, what if our welfare lay in the choice of odd and even numbers, in knowing when the greater number must rightly be chosen and when the less, whether each sort in relation to itself or one in relation to the other, and whether they were near or distant? What would assure us a good life then? Surely knowledge, and specifically a science of measurement, since the required skill lies in the estimation of excess and defect—or to be more precise, arithmetic, since it deals with odd and even numbers.' Would people agree with us?

Protagoras thought they would.

'Well then,' I shall say, 'since our salvation in life has turned out to lie in the correct choice of pleasure and pain—more or less, greater or smaller, nearer or more distant—is it not in the first place a question of measurement, consisting as it does in a consideration of relative excess, defect, or equality?'

Protagoras/ It must be.

Socrates/ 'And if so, it must be a special skill or branch of knowledge.'

Protagoras/ Yes, they will agree.

Socrates/ 'What skill, or what branch of knowledge it is, we shall leave till later; the fact itself is enough for the purposes of the explanation which you have asked for from Protagoras and me. To remind you of your question, it arose because we two agreed that there was nothing more powerful than knowledge, but that wherever it is found it always has

the mastery over pleasure and everything else. You on the other hand, who maintain that pleasure often masters even the man who knows, asked us to say what this experience really is, if it is not being mastered by pleasure. If we had answered you straight off that it is ignorance, you would have laughed at us, but if you laugh at us now, you will be laughing at yourselves as well, for you have agreed that when people make a wrong choice of pleasures and pains—that is, of good and evil—the cause of their mistake is lack of knowledge. We can go further, and call it, as you have already agreed, a science of measurement, and you know yourselves that a wrong action which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. So that is what being mastered by pleasure really is—ignorance, and most serious ignorance, the fault which Protagoras. Prodicus, and Hippias profess to cure. You on the other hand, because you believe it to be something else, neither go nor send your children to these Sophists, who are the experts in such matters. Holding that it is nothing that can be taught, you are careful with your money and withhold it from them—a bad policy both for yourselves and for the community.'

That then is the answer we should make to the ordinary run of people, and I ask you—Hippias and Prodicus as well as Protagoras, for I want you to share our discussion—whether you think what I say is true.

They all agreed most emphatically that it was true.

You agree then, that the pleasant is good and the painful bad. I ask exemption from Prodicus' precise verbal distinctions. Whether you call it pleasant, agreeable, or enjoyable, my dear Prodicus, or whatever name you like to apply to it, please answer in the sense of my request.

Prodicus laughed and assented, and so did the others.

Well, here is another point, I continued. All actions aimed at this end, namely a pleasant and painless life, must be fine actions, that is, good and beneficial.

They agreed.

Then if the pleasant is the good, no one who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of action, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course when he might choose the better. To 'act beneath yourself' is the result of pure ignorance; to 'be your own master' is wisdom.

All agreed.

And may we define ignorance as having a false opinion and being mistaken on matters of great moment?

They approved this too.

Then it must follow that no one willingly goes to meet evil or what he thinks to be evil. To make for what one believes to be evil, instead of making for the good, is not, it seems, in human nature, and when faced with the choice of two evils no one will choose the greater when he might choose the less.

General agreement again.

Now you recognize the emotion of fear or terror. I wonder if you conceive it as I do? I say this to you, Prodicus. Whether you call it fear or terror, I define it as expectation of evil.

Protagoras and Hippias thought this covered both fear and terror, but Prodicus said it applied to fear but not to terror.

Well, Prodicus, it makes no difference. This is the point. If what I have said is true. will anyone be willing to go to meet what he fears, when it is open to him to go in the opposite direction? Do not our agreed conclusions make this impossible? It is admitted that what he fears he regards as

evil, and that no one willingly meets or accepts what he thinks evil.

They all assented.

On this agreed basis, let Protagoras make his defense and show us how his original answer can be right. I don't mean what he said at the very beginning, when he maintained that there were five parts of virtue none of which resembled any other, and that each had its separate function, but what he said later, that four of them are fairly similar, but one, namely courage, is quite different from the rest. This, he said, the following evidence would show me : 'You will find, Socrates, men who are utterly impious, unjust, licentious, and ignorant, yet very brave, which will show you that courage is quite different from the other parts of virtue.' I was much surprised by this answer at the time, and now that we have had this discussion it surprises me even more. Anyway, I asked him if he described the brave as confident, and he replied, 'Yes, and eager.' Do you remember saying this, Protagoras?

He admitted it.

Tell me then, in what direction are the brave eager to go? Toward the same things as cowards?

Protagoras/ No.

Socrates/ Toward something else then?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it that cowards go to meet what inspires confidence, and brave men to what is terrible?

Protagoras/ So men say, Socrates.

Socrates/ I know they do, but that was not my question. What do you say brave men go eagerly to meet? Is it what is terrible, knowing it to be terrible?

Protagoras/ Your own argument has shown that to be impossible.

Socrates/ True again, so that if my argument was sound, no one goes to meet what he believes to be terrible, since not being one's own master was shown to be due to ignorance.

He admitted this.

But as for what inspires confidence, everyone makes for that, cowards and brave men alike, and thus cowards and brave men make for the same things.

Protagoras/ Whatever you say. What the coward makes for is precisely the opposite of what the brave man makes for. For instance, the brave are willing to enter battle; the others are not.

Socrates/ Is this willingness an honorable thing, or disgraceful?

Protagoras/ Honorable.

Socrates/ Then if honorable, we agreed earlier that it is good, for we agreed that all honorable actions are good.

Protagoras/ That is true, and I still think so.

Socrates/ Quite rightly too. But which class did you say were unwilling to enter battle although that is a fine and good thing to do?

Protagoras/ The cowards.

Socrates/ Well, if it is honorable and good, it is also pleasant.

Protagoras/ We certainly agreed to that.

Socrates/ Then do the cowards act with knowledge when they refuse to approach what is the more honorable and better and pleasanter thing?

Protagoras/ If we say so, we shall confound our former conclusions.

Socrates/ Now take the brave man. He makes for what is more honorable, better, and pleasanter?

Protagoras/ I cannot deny it.

Socrates/ And in general when the brave feel fear, there is no disgrace in their fears, nor in their confidence when they are confident?

Protagoras/ True.

Socrates/ So both are honorable, and if honorable then good?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Cowards on the other hand, and likewise the rash and the mad, feel fears or confidence which are discreditable, and can they exhibit discreditable fear or confidence from any other cause than ignorance?

Protagoras/ No.

Socrates/ Well then, is it cowardice or courage that makes a man a coward?

Protagoras/ Cowardice.

Socrates/ Yet we have seen that it is ignorance of what is to be feared that makes them cowards; and if this ignorance makes them cowards, and you agree that what makes them cowards is cowardice, ignorance of what is and is not to be feared must be cowardice.

He nodded.

Well, courage is the opposite of cowardice.

He agreed.

And knowledge of what is and is not to be feared is the opposite of ignorance of these things.

He nodded again.

Which is cowardice.

Here he assented with great reluctance.

Therefore knowledge of what is and is not to be feared is courage.

At this point he could no longer bring himself to assent, but was silent; so I said, What, Protagoras, won't you say either yes or no to my questions?

Protagoras/ Finish it yourself.

Socrates/ Just one more question first. Do you still believe, as you did at first, that men can be utterly ignorant yet very brave?

Protagoras/ You seem to be bent on having your own way, Socrates, and getting me to give the answers; so to humor you, I will say that on our agreed assumptions it seems to be impossible.

Socrates/ I assure you, that in asking all these questions I have nothing else in view but my desire to learn the truth about virtue and what it is in itself. I know that if we could be clear about that, it would throw the fullest light on the question over which you and I have spun such a coil of argument, I maintaining that virtue was not teachable and you that it was. It seems to me that the present outcome of our talk is pointing at us, like a human adversary, the finger of accusation and scorn. If it had a voice it would say, 'What an absurd pair you are, Socrates and Protagoras. One of you, having said at the beginning that virtue is not teachable, now is bent upon contradicting himself by trying to demonstrate that everything is knowledge—justice, temperance, and courage alike—which is the best way to prove that virtue is teachable. If virtue were something other than knowledge, as Protagoras tried to prove, obviously it could not be taught. But if it turns out to be, as a single whole, knowledge—which is what you are urging, Socrates—then it will be most surprising if it cannot be taught. Protagoras on the other hand, who at the beginning

supposed it to be teachable, now on the contrary seems to be bent on showing that it is almost anything rather than knowledge, and this would make it least likely to be teachable.'

For my part, Protagoras, when I see the subject in such utter confusion I feel the liveliest desire to clear it up. I should like to follow up our present talk with a determined attack on virtue itself and its essential nature. Then we could return to the question whether or not it can be taught, thus guarding against the possibility that your Epimetheus might trip us up and cheat us in our inquiry, just as according to the story he overlooked us in the distribution. I liked Prometheus in the myth better than Epimetheus; so I follow his lead and spend my time on all these matters as a means of taking forethought for my whole life. If you should be willing, then as I said at the beginning, you are the one with whom I would most gladly share the inquiry.

Protagoras/ I congratulate you on your keenness, Socrates, and your skill in exposition. I hope I am not too bad a character, and I am the last man to be jealous. I have told a great many people that I never met anyone I admire nearly as much as you, certainly not among your contemporaries, and I say now that I should not be surprised if you became one of our leading philosophers. Well, we will talk of these matters at some future meeting, whenever you like, but now it is time to turn to other things.

Socrates/ So be it, if that is your wish. Indeed I ought long ago to have kept the appointment I mentioned. I only stayed as a concession to the blandishments of Callias.

That was the end of the conversation, and we went away.

Protagoras.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Friend, Hippocrates, Alcibiades, Critias, Callias, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Eunuch

Scene: —The House of Callias.

Friend/ Where do you come from, Socrates? And yet I need hardly ask the question, for I know that you have been in chase of the fair Alcibiades. I saw him the day before yesterday; and he had got a beard like a man, —and he is a man, as I may tell you in your ear. But I thought that he was still very charming.

Socrates/ What of his beard? Are you not of Homer's opinion, who says

'Youth is most charming when the beard first appears'?

And that is now the charm of Alcibiades.

Friend/ Well, and how do matters proceed? Have you been visiting him, and was he gracious to you?

Socrates/ Yes, I thought that he was very gracious; and especially to-day, for I have just come from him, and he has been helping me in an argument. But shall I tell you a strange thing? I paid no attention to him, and several times I quite forgot that he was present.

Friend/ What is the meaning of this? Has anything happened between you and him? For surely you cannot have discovered a fairer love than he is; certainly not in this city of Athens.

Socrates/ Yes, much fairer.

Friend/ What do you mean—a citizen or a foreigner?

Socrates/ A foreigner.

Friend/ Of what country?

Socrates/ Of Abdera.

Friend/ And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love than the son of Cleinias?

Socrates/ And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend?

Friend/ But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one?

Socrates/ Say rather, with the wisest of all living men, if you are willing to accord that title to Protagoras.

Friend/ What! Is Protagoras in Athens?

Socrates/ Yes; he has been here two days.

Friend/ And do you just come from an interview with him?

Socrates/ Yes; and I have heard and said many things.

Friend/ Then, if you have no engagement, suppose that you sit down and tell me what passed, and my attendant here shall give up his place to you.

Socrates/ To be sure; and I shall be grateful to you for listening.

Friend/ Thank you, too, for telling us.

Socrates/ That is thank you twice over. Listen then: —

Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his staff at my door; someone opened to him, and he came rushing in and bawled out:

Hippocrates/ Socrates, are you awake or asleep?

Socrates/ I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring any news?

Hippocrates/ Good news; nothing but good.

Socrates/ Delightful; but what is the news? and why have you come hither at this unearthly hour?

He drew nearer to me and said:

Hippocrates/ Protagoras is come.

Socrates/ Yes; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his arrival?

Hippocrates/ Yes, by the gods; but not until yesterday evening.

Socrates/ At the same time he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, and then he said:

Hippocrates/ Yesterday quite late in the evening, on my return from Oenoe whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave Satyrus, as I meant to have told you, if some other matter had not come in the way; —on my return, when we had done supper and were about to retire to rest, my brother said to me: Protagoras is come. I was going to you at once, and then I thought that the night was far spent. But the moment sleep left me after my fatigue, I got up and came hither direct.

Socrates/ I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the matter? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything?

He replied, laughing:

Hippocrates/ Yes, indeed he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which he keeps from me.

Socrates/ But, surely, if you give him money, and make friends with him, he will make you as wise as he is himself.

Hippocrates/ Would to heaven, that this were the case! He might take all that I have, and all that my friends have, if he pleased. But that is why I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my behalf; for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him; (when he visited Athens before I was but a child;) and all men praise him, Socrates; he is reputed to be the most accomplished of

speakers. There is no reason why we should not go to him at once, and then we shall find him at home. He lodges, as I hear, with Callias the son of Hipponicus: let us start.

Socrates/ Not yet, my good friend; the hour is too early. But let us rise and take a turn in the court and wait about there until day-break; when the day breaks, then we will go. For Protagoras is generally at home, and we shall be sure to find him; never fear.

Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that I would make trial of the strength of his resolution. So I examined him and put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, as you are going to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you are going? and what will he make of you? If, for example, you had thought of going to Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and were about to give him your money, and someone had said to you: You are paying money to your namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates; tell me, what is he that you give him money? how would you have answered?

Hippocrates/ I should say that I gave money to him as a physician.

Socrates/ And what will he make of you?

Hippocrates/ A physician.

Socrates/ And if you were resolved to go to Polycleitus the Argive, or Pheidias the Athenian, and were intending to give them money, and someone had asked you: What are Polycleitus and Pheidias? and why do you give them this money? —how would you have answered?

Hippocrates/ I should have answered, that they were statuaries.

Socrates/ And what will they make of you?

Hippocrates/ A statuary, of course.

Socrates/ Well now you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready to pay him money on your behalf. If our own means are sufficient, and we can gain him with these, we shall be only too glad; but if not, then we are to spend the money of your friends as well. Now suppose, that while we are thus enthusiastically pursuing our object someone were to say to us: Tell me, Socrates, and you Hippocrates, what is Protagoras, and why are you going to pay him money, —how should we answer? I know that Pheidias is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what appellation is given to Protagoras? how is he designated?

Hippocrates/ They call him a Sophist, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist?

Hippocrates/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about yourself? What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him?

He answered, with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning to dawn, so that I could see him):

Hippocrates/ Unless this differs in some way from the former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me.

Socrates/ By the gods, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist?

Hippocrates/ Indeed, Socrates, to confess the truth, I am.

Socrates/ But you should not assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras is of this nature: may you not learn of him in the same way that you learned the arts of the grammarian, or musician, or trainer, not with the view of making any of them a profession, but only as a part of

education, and because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know them?

Hippocrates/ Just so; and that, in my opinion, is a far truer account of the teaching of Protagoras.

Socrates/ I wonder whether you know what you are doing?

Hippocrates/ And what am I doing?

Socrates/ You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know what a Sophist is; and if not, then you do not even of the know to whom you are committing your soul and whether the thing to which you commit yourself be good or evil.

Hippocrates/ I certainly think that I do know.

Socrates/ Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is?

Hippocrates/ I take him to be one who knows wise things, as his name implies.

Socrates/ And might you not affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter also: Do not they, too, know wise things? But suppose a person were to ask us: In what are the painters wise? We should answer: In what relates to the making of likenesses, and similarly of other things. And if he were further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what is the manufacture over which he presides? —how should we answer him?

Hippocrates/ How should we answer him, Socrates? What other answer could there be but that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent?

Socrates/ Yes, that is very likely true, but not enough; for in the answer a further question is involved: Of what does the Sophist make a man talk eloquently? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a man talk eloquently about

that which he makes him understand, that is about playing the lyre. Is not that true?

Hippocrates/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? Must not he make him eloquent in that which he understands?

Hippocrates/ Yes, that may be assumed.

Socrates/ And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know?

Hippocrates/ Indeed, I cannot tell.

Socrates/ Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you are incurring? If you were going to commit your body to someone, who might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider and ask the opinion of your friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to whether you should give him the care of your body? But when the soul is in question, which you hold to be of far more value than the body, and upon the good or evil of which depends the well-being of your all, —about this you never consulted either with your father or with your brother or with anyone of us who are your companions. But no sooner does this foreigner appear, than you instantly commit your soul to his keeping. In the evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in the morning you go to him, never deliberating or taking the opinion of anyone as to whether you ought to entrust yourself to him or not; —you have quite made up your mind that you will at all hazards be a pupil of Protagoras, and are prepared to expend all the property of yourself and of your friends in carrying out at any price this determination, although, as you admit, you do not know him, and have never spoken with him: and you call him a Sophist, but are manifestly ignorant of what a Sophist is; and yet you are going to commit yourself to his keeping.

When he heard me say this, he replied:

Hippocrates/ No other inference, Socrates, can be drawn from your words.

Socrates/ Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul? To me that appears to be his nature.

Hippocrates/ And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul?

Socrates/ Surely, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body; for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their customers know, with the exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy of them. In like manner those who carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail them to any customer who is in want of them, praise them all alike; though I should not wonder, O my friend, if many of them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul; and their customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them happens to be a physician of the soul. If, therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of anyone; but if not, then, O my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and drink: the one you purchase of the wholesale or retail dealer, and carry them away in other vessels, and before you receive them into the body as food, you may deposit them at home and call in any experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken, and what not, and how much, and when; and then the danger of purchasing them is not so great. But you

cannot buy the wares of knowledge and carry them away in another vessel; when you have paid for them you must receive them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or greatly benefited; and therefore we should deliberate and take counsel with our elders; for we are still young—too young to determine such a matter. And now let us go, as we were intending, and hear Protagoras; and when we have heard what he has to say, we may take counsel of others; for not only is Protagoras at the house of Callias, but there is Hippias of Elis, and, if I am not mistaken, Prodicus of Ceos, and several other wise men.

To this we agreed, and proceeded on our way until we reached the vestibule of the house; and there we stopped in order to conclude a discussion which had arisen between us as we were going along; and we stood talking in the vestibule until we had finished and come to an understanding. And I think that the door-keeper, who was a eunuch, and who was probably annoyed at the great inroad of the Sophists, must have heard us talking. At any rate, when we knocked at the door, and he opened and saw us, he grumbled:

Eunuch/ They are Sophists—he is not at home;

Socrates/ and instantly gave the door a hearty bang with both his hands. Again we knocked, and he answered without opening:

Eunuch/ Did you not hear me say that he is not at home, fellows?

Socrates/ But, my friend, you need not be alarmed; for we are not Sophists, and we are not come to see Callias, but we want to see Protagoras; and I must request you to announce us. At last, after a good deal of difficulty, the man was persuaded to open the door.

When we entered, we found Protagoras taking a walk in the cloister; and next to him, on one side, were walking

Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and Paralus, the son of Pericles, who, by the mother's side, is his half-brother, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon. On the other side of him were Xanthippus, the other son of Pericles, Philippides, the son of Philomelus; also Antimoerus of Mende, who of all the disciples of Protagoras is the most famous, and intends to make sophistry his profession. A train of listeners followed him; the greater part of them appeared to be foreigners, whom Protagoras had brought with him out of the various cities visited by him in his journeys, he, like Orpheus, attracting them by his voice, and they following. I should mention also that there were some Athenians in the company. Nothing delighted me more than the precision of their movements: they never got into his way at all; but when he and those who were with him turned back, then the band of listeners parted regularly on either side; he was always in front, and they wheeled round and took their places behind him in perfect order.

After him, as Homer says, 'I lifted up my eyes and saw' Hippias the Elean sitting in the opposite cloister on a chair of state, and around him were seated on benches Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and Andron the son of Androtion, and there were strangers whom he had brought with him from his native city of Elis, and some others: they were putting to Hippias certain physical and astronomical questions, and he, *ex cathedrâ*, was determining their several questions to them, and discoursing of them.

Also, 'my eyes beheld Tantalus;' for Prodicus the Cean was at Athens: he had been lodged in a room which, in the days of Hipponicus, was a storehouse; but, as the house was full, Callias had cleared this out and made the room into a guest-chamber. Now Prodicus was still in bed, wrapped up in sheepskins and bedclothes, of which there seemed to be

a great heap; and there was sitting by him on the couches near, Pausanias of the deme of Cerameis, and with Pausanias was a youth quite young, who is certainly remarkable for his good looks, and, if I am not mistaken, is also of a fair and gentle nature. I thought that I heard him called Agathon, and my suspicion is that he is the beloved of Pausanias. There was this youth, and also there were the two Adeimantuses, one the son of Cepis, and the other of Leucolophides, and some others. I was very anxious to hear what Prodicus was saying, for he seems to me to be an all-wise and inspired man; but I was not able to get into the inner circle, and his fine deep voice made an echo in the room which rendered his words inaudible.

No sooner had we entered than there followed us Alcibiades the beautiful, as you say, and I believe you; and also Critias the son of Callaeschrus.

On entering we stopped a little, in order to look about us, and then walked up to Protagoras, and I said: Protagoras, my friend Hippocrates and I have come to see you.

Protagoras/ Do you wish to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the company?

Socrates/ Whichever you please; you shall determine when you have heard the purpose of our visit.

Protagoras/ And what is your purpose?

Socrates/ I must explain, that my friend Hippocrates is a native Athenian; he is the son of Apollodorus, and of a great and prosperous house, and he is himself in natural ability quite a match for anybody of his own age. I believe that he aspires to political eminence; and this he thinks that conversation with you is most likely to procure for him. And now you can determine whether you would wish to speak to him of your teaching alone or in the presence of the company.

Protagoras/ Thank you, Socrates, for your consideration of me. For certainly a stranger finding his way into great cities, and persuading the flower of the youth in them to leave the company of their kinsmen or any other acquaintances, old or young, and live with him, under the idea that they will be improved by his conversation, ought to be very cautious; great jealousies are aroused by his proceedings, and he is the subject of many enmities and conspiracies. Now the art of the Sophist is, as I believe, of great antiquity; but in ancient times those who practiced it, fearing this odium, veiled and disguised themselves under various names, some under that of poets, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, some, of hierophants and prophets, as Orpheus and Musaeus, and some, as I observe, even under the name of gymnastic-masters, like Iccus of Tarentum, or the more recently celebrated Herodicus, now of Selymbria and formerly of Megara, who is a first-rate Sophist. Your own Agathocles pretended to be a musician, but was really an eminent Sophist; also Pythocleides the Cean; and there were many others; and all of them, as I was saying, adopted these arts as veils or disguises because they were afraid of the odium which they would incur. But that is not my way, for I do not believe that they effected their purpose, which was to deceive the government, who were not blinded by them; and as to the people, they have no understanding, and only repeat what their rulers are pleased to tell them. Now to run away, and to be caught in running away, is the very height of folly, and also greatly increases the exasperation of mankind; for they regard him who runs away as a rogue, in addition to any other objections which they have to him; and therefore I take an entirely opposite course, and acknowledge myself to be a Sophist and instructor of mankind; such an open acknowledgment appears to me to be a better sort of caution than concealment. Nor do I neglect

other precautions, and therefore I hope, as I may say, by the favor of heaven that no harm will come of the acknowledgment that I am a Sophist. And I have been now many years in the profession—for all my years when added up are many: there is no one here present of whom I might not be the father. Wherefore I should much prefer conversing with you, if you want to speak with me, in the presence of the company.

Socrates/ As I suspected that he would like to have a little display and glorification in the presence of Prodicus and Hippias, and would gladly show us to them in the light of his admirers, I said: But why should we not summon Prodicus and Hippias and their friends to hear us?

Protagoras/ Very good.

Callias/ Suppose, that we hold a council in which you may sit and discuss. —

Socrates/ This was agreed upon, and great delight was felt at the prospect of hearing wise men talk; we ourselves took the chairs and benches, and arranged them by Hippias, where the other benches had been already placed. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades got Prodicus out of bed and brought in him and his companions.

When we were all seated, Protagoras said:

Protagoras/ Now that the company are assembled, Socrates, tell me about the young man of whom you were just now speaking.

Socrates/ I will begin again at the same point, Protagoras, and tell you once more the purport of my visit: this is my friend Hippocrates, who is desirous of making your acquaintance; he would like to know what will happen to him if he associates with you. I have no more to say.

Protagoras/ Young man, if you associate with me, on the very first day you will return home a better man than you

came, and better on the second day than on the first, and better every day than you were on the day before.

Socrates/ Protagoras, I do not at all wonder at hearing you say this; even at your age, and with all your wisdom, if anyone were to teach you what you did not know before, you would become better no doubt: but please to answer in a different way—I will explain how by an example. Let me suppose that Hippocrates, instead of desiring your acquaintance, wished to become acquainted with the young man Zeuxippus of Heraclea, who has lately been in Athens, and he had come to him as he has come to you, and had heard him say, as he has heard you say, that every day he would grow and become better if he associated with him: and then suppose that he were to ask him, 'In what shall I become better, and in what shall I grow?'—Zeuxippus would answer, 'In painting.' And suppose that he went to Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the same thing, and asked him, (In what shall I become better day by day?' he would reply, 'In flute-playing' Now I want you to make the same sort of answer to this young man and to me, who am asking questions on his account. When you say that on the first day on which he associates with you he will return home a better man, and on every day will grow in like manner, — in what, Protagoras, will he be better? and about what?

When Protagoras heard me say this, he replied:

Protagoras/ You ask questions fairly, and I like to answer a question which is fairly put. If Hippocrates comes to me he will not experience the sort of drudgery with which other Sophists are in the habit of insulting their pupils; who, when they have just escaped from the arts, are taken and driven back into them by these teachers, and made to learn calculation, and astronomy, and geometry, and music.

Socrates/ He gave a look at Hippias as he said this;

Protagoras/ But if he comes to me, he will learn that which he comes to learn. And this is prudence in affairs private as well as public; he will learn to order his own house in the best manner, and he will be able to speak and act for the best in the affairs of the state.

Socrates/ Do I understand you; and is your meaning that you teach the art of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens?

Protagoras/ That, Socrates, is exactly the profession which I make.

Socrates/ Then, you do indeed possess a noble art, if there is no mistake about this; for I will freely confess to you, Protagoras, that I have a doubt whether this art is capable of being taught, and yet I know not how to disbelieve your assertion. And I ought to tell you why I am of opinion that this art cannot be taught or communicated by man to man. I say that the Athenians are an understanding people, and indeed they are esteemed to be such by the other Hellenes. Now I observe that when we are met together in the assembly, and the matter in hand relates to building, the builders are summoned as advisers; when the question is one of ship-building, then the ship-wrights; and the like of other arts which they think capable of being taught and learned. And if some person offers to give them advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art, even though he be good-looking, and rich, and noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh and hoot at him, until either he is clamored down and retires of himself; or if he persist, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at the command of the prytanes. This is their way of behaving about professors of the arts. But when the question is an affair of state, then everybody is free to have a say—carpenter, tinker, cobbler, sailor, passenger; rich and poor, high and low—anyone who likes gets up, and no one reproaches him,

as in the former case, with not having learned, and having no teacher, and yet giving advice; evidently because they are under the impression that this sort of knowledge cannot be taught. And not only is this true of the state, but of individuals; the best and wisest of our citizens are unable to impart their political wisdom to others: as for example, Pericles, the father of these young men, who gave them excellent instruction in all that could be learned from masters, in his own department of politics neither taught them, nor gave them teachers; but they were allowed to wander at their own free will in a sort of hope that they would light upon virtue of their own accord. Or take another example: there was Cleinias the younger brother of our friend Alcibiades, of whom this very same Pericles was the guardian; and he being in fact under the apprehension that Cleinias would be corrupted by Alcibiades, took him away, and placed him in the house of Ariphron to be educated; but before six months had elapsed, Ariphron sent him back, not knowing what to do with him. And I could mention numberless other instances of persons who were good themselves, and never yet made anyone else good, whether friend or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, having these examples before me, am inclined to think that virtue cannot be taught. But then again, when I listen to your words, I waver; and am disposed to think that there must be something in what you say, because I know that you have great experience, and learning, and invention. And I wish that you would, if possible, show me a little more clearly that virtue can be taught. Will you be so good?

Protagoras/ That I will, Socrates, and gladly. But what would you like? Shall I, as an elder, speak to you as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I argue out the question?

Socrates/ To this several of the company answered that he should choose for himself.

Protagoras/ Well, I think that the myth will be more interesting.

Once upon a time there were gods only, and no mortal creatures. But when the time came that these also should be created, the gods fashioned them out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both elements in the interior of the earth; and when they were about to bring them into the light of day, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them, and to distribute to them severally their proper qualities. Epimetheus said to Prometheus: 'Let me distribute, and do you inspect.' This was agreed, and Epimetheus made the distribution. There were some to whom he gave strength without swiftness, while he equipped the weaker with swiftness; some he armed, and others he left unarmed; and devised for the latter some other means of preservation, making some large, and having their size as a protection, and others small, whose nature was to fly in the air or burrow in the ground; this was to be their way of escape. Thus did he compensate them with the view of preventing any race from becoming extinct. And when he had provided against their destruction by one another, he contrived also a means of protecting them against the seasons of heaven; clothing them with close hair and thick skins sufficient to defend them against the winter cold and able to resist the summer heat, so that they might have a natural bed of their own when they wanted to rest; also he furnished them with hoofs and hair and hard and callous skins under their feet. Then he gave them varieties of food, —herb of the soil to some, to others fruits of trees, and to others roots, and to some again he gave other animals as food. And some he made to have few young ones, while those who were their prey were very prolific; and in this manner

the race was preserved. Thus did Epimetheus, who, not being very wise, forgot that he had distributed among the brute animals all the qualities which he had to give, —and when he came to man, who was still unprovided, he was terribly perplexed. Now while he was in this perplexity, Prometheus came to inspect the distribution, and he found that the other animals were suitably furnished, but that man alone was naked and shoeless, and had neither bed nor arms of defense. The appointed hour was approaching when man in his turn was to go forth into the light of day; and Prometheus, not knowing how he could devise his salvation, stole the mechanical arts of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them (they could neither have been acquired nor used without fire), and gave them to man. Thus man had the wisdom necessary to the support of life, but political wisdom he had not; for that was in the keeping of Zeus, and the power of Prometheus did not extend to entering into the citadel of heaven, where Zeus dwelt, who moreover had terrible sentinels; but he did enter by stealth into the common workshop of Athene and Hephaestus, in which they used to practice their favorite arts, and carried off Hephaestus' art of working by fire, and also the art of Athene, and gave them to man. And in this way man was supplied with the means of life. But Prometheus is said to have been afterwards prosecuted for theft, owing to the blunder of Epimetheus.

Now man, having a share of the divine attributes, was at first the only one of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their kindred; and he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long in inventing articulate speech and names; and he also constructed houses and clothes and shoes and beds, and drew sustenance from the earth. Thus provided, mankind at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities. But the consequence was that they were

destroyed by the wild beasts, for they were utterly weak in comparison of them, and their art was only sufficient to provide them with the means of life, and did not enable them to carry on war against the animals: food they had, but not as yet the art of government, of which the art of war is a part. After a while the desire of self-preservation gathered them into cities; but when they were gathered together, having no art of government, they evil entreated one another, and were again in process of dispersion and destruction. Zeus feared that the entire race would be exterminated, and so he sent Hermes to them, bearing reverence and justice to be the ordering principles of cities and the bonds of friendship and conciliation. Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart justice and reverence among men: —Should he distribute them as the arts are distributed; that is to say, to a favored few only, one skilled individual having enough of medicine or of any other art for many unskilled ones? 'Shall this be the manner in which I am to distribute justice and reverence among men, or shall I give them to all?' 'To all' said Zeus; 'I should like them all to have a share; for cities cannot exist, if a few only share in the virtues, as in the arts. And further, make a law by my order, that he who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death, for he is a plague of the state.'

And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and mankind in general, when the question relates to carpentering or any other mechanical art, allow but a few to share in their deliberations; and when anyone else interferes, then, as you say, they object, if he be not of the favored few; which, as I reply, is very natural. But when they meet to deliberate about political virtue, which proceeds only by way of justice and wisdom, they are patient enough of any man who speaks of them, as is also natural, because they think that every man ought to share in this sort of virtue,

and that states could not exist if this were otherwise. I have explained to you, Socrates, the reason of this phenomenon.

And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in thinking that all men regard every man as having a share of justice or honesty and of every other political virtue, let me give you a further proof, which is this. In other cases, as you are aware, if a man says that he is a good flute-player, or skillful in any other art in which he has no skill, people either laugh at him or are angry with him, and his relations think that he is mad and go and admonish him; but when honesty is in question, or some other political virtue, even if they know that he is dishonest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells the truth about his dishonesty, then, what in the other case was held by them to be good sense, they now deem to be madness. They say that all men ought to profess honesty whether they are honest or not, and that a man is out of his mind who says anything else. Their notion is, that a man must have some degree of honesty; and that if he has none at all he ought not to be in the world.

I have been showing that they are right in admitting every man as a counselor about this sort of virtue, as they are of opinion that every man is a partaker of it. And I will now endeavor to show further that they do not conceive this virtue to be given by nature, or to grow spontaneously, but to be a thing which may be taught; and which comes to a man by taking pains. No one would instruct, no one would rebuke, or be angry with those whose calamities they suppose to be due to nature or chance; they do not try to punish or to prevent them from being what they are; they do but pity them. Who is so foolish as to chastise or instruct the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble? And for this reason. Because he knows that good and evil of this kind is the work of nature and of chance; whereas if a man is wanting in those good qualities which are attained by study

and exercise and teaching, and has only the contrary evil qualities, other men are angry with him, and punish and reprove him—of these evil qualities one is impiety, another injustice, and they may be described generally as the very opposite of political virtue. In such cases any man will be angry with another, and reprimand him, —clearly because he thinks that by study and learning, the virtue in which the other is deficient may be acquired. If you will think, Socrates, of the nature of punishment, you will see at once that in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong, —only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention, thereby clearly implying that virtue is capable of being taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others either privately or publicly. And the Athenians, too, your own citizens, like other men, punish and take vengeance on all whom they regard as evil doers; and hence, we may infer them to be of the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Thus far, Socrates, I have shown you clearly enough, if I am not mistaken, that your countrymen are right in admitting the tinker and the cobbler to advise about politics, and also that they deem virtue to be capable of being taught and acquired.

There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by you about the sons of good men. What is the reason why good men teach their sons the knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that, but do nothing towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish themselves? And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue

and resume the argument. Please to consider: Is there or is there not someone quality of which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city at all? In the answer to this question is contained the only solution of your difficulty; there is no other. For if there be any such quality, and this quality or unity is not the art of the carpenter, or the smith, or the potter, but justice and temperance and holiness and, in a word, manly virtue—if this is the quality of which all men must be partakers, and which is the very condition of their learning or doing anything else, and if he who is wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a grown-up man or woman, must be taught and punished, until by punishment he becomes better, and he who rebels against instruction and punishment is either exiled or condemned to death under the idea that he is incurable—if what I am saying be true, good men have their sons taught other things and not this, do consider how extraordinary their conduct would appear to be. For we have shown that they think virtue capable of being taught and cultivated both in private and public; and, notwithstanding, they have their sons taught lesser matters, ignorance of which does not involve the punishment of death: but greater things, of which the ignorance may cause death and exile to those who have no training or knowledge of them—aye, and confiscation as well as death, and, in a word, may be the ruin of families—those things, I say, they are supposed not to teach them, —not to take the utmost care that they should learn. How improbable is this, Socrates!

Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood, and last to the very end of life. Mother and nurse and father and tutor are vying with one another about the improvement of the child as soon as ever he is able to understand what is being said to him: he cannot say or do anything without their setting forth to him that this is just

and that is unjust; this is honorable, that is dishonorable; this is holy, that is unholy; do this and abstain from that. And if he obeys, well and good; if not, he is straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of bent or warped wood. At a later stage they send him to teachers, and enjoin them to see to his manners even more than to his reading and music; and the teachers do as they are desired. And when the boy has learned his letters and is beginning to understand what is written, as before he understood only what was spoken, they put into his hands the works of great poets, which he reads sitting on a bench at school; in these are contained many admonitions, and many tales, and praises, and encomia of ancient famous men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like them. Then, again, the teachers of the lyre take similar care that their young disciple is temperate and gets into no mischief; and when they have taught him the use of the lyre, they introduce him to the poems of other excellent poets, who are the lyric poets; and these they set to music, and make their harmonies and rhythms quite familiar to the children's souls, in order that they may learn to be more gentle, and harmonious, and rhythmical, and so more fitted for speech and action; for the life of man in every part has need of harmony and rhythm. Then they send them to the master of gymnastic, in order that their bodies may better minister to the virtuous mind, and that they may not be compelled through bodily weakness to play the coward in war or on any other occasion. This is what is done by those who have the means, and those who have the means are the rich; their children begin to go to school soonest and leave off latest. When they have done with masters, the state again compels them to learn the laws, and live after the pattern which they furnish, and not after their own fancies; and just as in learning to

write, the writing-master first draws lines with a style for the use of the young beginner, and gives him the tablet and makes him follow the lines, so the city draws the laws, which were the invention of good lawgivers living in the olden time; these are given to the young man, in order to guide him in his conduct whether he is commanding or obeying; and he who transgresses them is to be corrected, or, in other words, called to account, which is a term used not only in your Country, but also in many others, seeing that justice calls men to account. Now when there is all this care about virtue private and public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether virtue can be taught? Cease to wonder, for the opposite would be far more surprising.

But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill? There is nothing very wonderful in this; for, as I have been saying, the existence of a state implies that virtue is not any man's private possession. If so—and nothing can be truer—then I will further ask you to imagine, as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of knowledge which may be assumed equally to be the condition of the existence of a state. Suppose that there could be no state unless we were all flute-players, as far as each had the capacity, and everybody was freely teaching everybody the art, both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely and openly as every man now teaches justice and the laws, not concealing them as he would conceal the other arts, but imparting them—for all of us have a mutual interest in the justice and virtue of one another, and this is the reason why everyone is so ready to teach justice and the laws; —suppose, I say, that there were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching one another flute-playing, do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones? I think not. Would not their sons grow up to be

distinguished or undistinguished according to their own natural capacities as flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, and the son of a bad player to be a good one, and all flute-players would be good enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and unacquainted with the art of flute-playing? In like manner I would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just man and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon them which compelled them to practice virtue—with the savages, for example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the stage at the last year's Lenaean festival. If you were living among men such as the man-haters in his Chorus, you would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the rascality of this part of the world. And you, Socrates, are discontented, and why? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability; and you say Where are the teachers? You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek? For of that too there will not be any teachers found. Or you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they have learned of their fathers? He and his fellow-workmen have taught them to the best of their ability, —but who will carry them further in their arts? And you would certainly have a difficulty, Socrates, in finding a teacher of them; but there would be no difficulty in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true of virtue or of anything else; if a man is better able than we are to promote virtue ever so little, we must be content with the result. A teacher of this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other men to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and good; and I give my pupils their money's-worth,

and even more, as they themselves confess. And therefore I have introduced the following mode of payment: —When a man has been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no compulsion; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions, and he pays no more than he declares to be their value.

Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by which I endeavor to show that virtue may be taught, and that this is the opinion of the Athenians. And I have also attempted to show that you are not to wonder at good fathers having bad sons, or at good sons having bad fathers, of which the sons of Polycleitus afford an example, who are the companions of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are nothing in comparison with their father; and this is true of the sons of many other artists. As yet I ought not to say the same of Paralus and Xanthippus themselves, for they are young and there is still hope of them.

Socrates/ Protagoras ended, and in my ear

> 'So charming left his voice, that I the while
> Thought him still speaking; still stood fixed to hear.'

At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had really finished, not without difficulty I began to collect myself, and looking at Hippocrates, I said to him: O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for having brought me hither; I would not have missed the speech of Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no human care could make men good; but I know better now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am sure that Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already explained so much. If a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of our great speakers about these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse; but then when one has a question

to ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask; and if anyone challenges the least particular of their speech, they go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound unless someone puts his hand upon them; whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has already shown, but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly; and when he asks he will wait and hear the answer; and this is a very rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, want to ask of you a little question, which if you will only answer, I shall be quite satisfied. You were saying that virtue can be taught; —that I will take upon your authority, and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust. But I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest. You were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men; and several times while you were speaking, justice, and temperance, and holiness, and all these qualities, were described by you as if together they made up virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing: that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind.

Protagoras/ There is no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that the qualities of which you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one.

Socrates/ And are they parts in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and eyes, and ears, are the parts of a face; or are they like the parts of gold, which differ from the whole and from one another only in being larger or smaller?

Protagoras/ I should say that they differed, Socrates, in the first way; they are related to one another as the parts of a face are related to the whole face.

Socrates/ And do men have someone part and some another part of virtue? Or if a man has one part, must he also have all the others?

Protagoras/ By no means; for many a man is brave and not just, or just and not wise.

Socrates/ You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue?

Protagoras/ Most undoubtedly they are; and wisdom is the noblest of the parts.

Socrates/ And they are all different from one another?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the face; —the eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same functions; and the other parts are none of them like one another, either in their functions, or in any other way? I want to know whether the comparison holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ from one another in themselves and in their functions? For that is clearly what the simile would imply.

Protagoras/ Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ.

Socrates/ Then, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness?

Protagoras/ No.

Socrates/ Well then, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures. And first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing, would you not? That is my opinion: would it not be yours also?

Protagoras/ Mine also.

Socrates/ And suppose that someone were to ask us, saying, 'O Protagoras, and you, Socrates, what about this

thing which you were calling justice, is it just or unjust?'—and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me or against me?

Protagoras/ With you.

Socrates/ Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the nature of the just: would not you?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And suppose that he went on to say: 'Well now, is there also such a thing as holiness?'—we should answer, 'Yes,' if I am not mistaken?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing—should we not say so?

He assented.

'And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the nature of the unholy?' I should be angry at his putting such a question, and should say, 'Peace, man; nothing can be holy if holiness is not holy.' What would you say? Would you not answer in the same way?

Protagoras/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, 'What were you saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one another.' I should reply, 'You certainly heard that said, but not, as you imagine, by me; for I only asked the question; Protagoras gave the answer.' And suppose that he turned to you and said, 'Is this true, Protagoras? and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is this your position?'—how would you answer him?

Protagoras/ I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this; and now supposing that he proceeded to say further, 'Then holiness is not of the nature of justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of unholiness; and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and the unjust is the unholy:' how shall we answer him? I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that holiness is just; and I would say in like manner on your behalf also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with holiness, or very nearly the same; and above all I would assert that justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice; and I wish that you would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would agree with me.

Protagoras/ I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be a difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please; and let us assume, if you will, that justice is holy, and that holiness is just.

Socrates/ Pardon me; I do not want this 'if you wish' or 'if you will' sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven: I mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no 'if.'

Protagoras/ Well, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness, for there is always some point of view in which everything is like every other thing; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like soft, and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common; even the parts of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one of them is like another of them. And you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another; and yet things which are alike in some particular ought not to be called

alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike.

Socrates/ I said in a tone of surprise, And do you think, that justice and holiness have but a small degree of likeness?

Protagoras/ Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your view.

Socrates/ Well as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the existence of folly?

Protagoras/ I do.

Socrates/ And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly?

Protagoras/ That is true.

Socrates/ And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be temperate?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And temperance makes them temperate?

Protagoras/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are not temperate?

Protagoras/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately?

He assented.

And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by temperance?

He agreed.

And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is weakly done, by weakness?

He assented.

And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is done with slowness, slowly?

He assented again.

And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite?

He agreed.

Once more, is there anything beautiful?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ To which the only opposite is the ugly?

Protagoras/ There is no other.

Socrates/ And is there anything good?

Protagoras/ There is.

Socrates/ To which the only opposite is the evil?

Protagoras/ There is no other.

Socrates/ And there is the acute in sound?

Protagoras/ True.

Socrates/ To which the only opposite is the grave?

Protagoras/ There is no other but that.

Socrates/ Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more?

He assented.

Then now, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one?

Protagoras/ We did so.

Socrates/ And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by opposites?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in the opposite way to that which was done temperately?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that which was done foolishly by folly?

He agreed.

And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in opposite ways?

Protagoras/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And therefore by opposites: —then folly is the opposite of temperance?

Protagoras/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of wisdom?

He assented.

And we said that everything has only one opposite?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves and in their functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they do not accord or agree: for how can they be said to agree if everything is assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has clearly the two opposites—wisdom and

temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What else would you say?

He assented, but with great reluctance.

Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice?

Protagoras/ I should be ashamed, Socrates, to acknowledge this, which nevertheless many may be found to assert.

Socrates/ And shall I argue with them or with you?

Protagoras/ I would rather that you should argue with the many first, if you will.

Socrates/ Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are of their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of the argument; and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may both be put on our trial.

Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer.

Begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that some men are temperate, and yet unjust?

Protagoras/ Yes; let that be admitted.

Socrates/ And temperance is good sense?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?

Protagoras/ Granted.

Socrates/ If they succeed or if they do not succeed?

Protagoras/ If they succeed.

Socrates/ And you would admit the existence of goods?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is the good that which is expedient for man?

Protagoras/ Yes, indeed: and there are some things which may be inexpedient, and yet I call them good.

Socrates/ I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded my business, and gently said: —

When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, do you mean inexpedient for man only, or inexpedient altogether? and do you call the latter good?

Protagoras/ Certainly not the last; for I know of many things, —meats, drinks, medicines, and ten thousand other things, which are inexpedient for man, and some which are expedient: and some which are neither expedient nor inexpedient for man, but only for horses; and some for oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots of a tree, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with the exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally; and even in this application (so various and changeable is the nature of the benefit), that which is the greatest good to the outward parts of a man, is a very great evil to his inward parts: and for this reason physicians always forbid their patients the use of oil in their food, except in very small quantities, just enough to

extinguish the disagreeable sensation of smell in meats and sauces.

Socrates/ When he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said: Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when anyone makes a long speech to me I never remember what he is talking about. As then, if I had been deaf, and you were going to converse with me, you would have had to raise your voice; so now, having such a bad memory, I will ask you to cut your answers shorter, if you would take me with you.

Protagoras/ What do you mean? How am I to shorten my answers? shall I make them too short?

Socrates/ Certainly not.

Prodicus/ But short enough?

Socrates/ Yes.

Protagoras/ Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to you to be short enough?

Socrates/ I have heard that you can speak and teach others to speak about the same things at such length that words never seemed to fail, or with such brevity that no one could use fewer of them. Please therefore, if you talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method.

Protagoras/ Socrates, many a battle of words have I fought, and if I had followed the method of disputation which my adversaries desired, as you want me to do, I should have been no better than another, and the name of Protagoras would have been nowhere.

Socrates/ I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help; and I considered that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation; so I said: Protagoras, I do not wish to force the conversation upon you if you had rather not, but when you are willing to argue with

me in such a way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as is said of you by others and as you say of yourself, are able to have discussions in shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for you are a master of wisdom; but I cannot manage these long speeches: I only wish that I could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying to hear you at greater length (for I have to be in another place), I will depart; although I should have liked to have heard you.

Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the right hand, and in his left hand caught hold of this old cloak of mine. He said:

Callias/ We cannot let you go, Socrates, for if you leave us there will be an end of our discussions: I must therefore beg you to remain, as there is nothing in the world that I should like better than to hear you and Protagoras discourse. Do not deny the company this pleasure.

Socrates/ Now I had got up, and was in the act of departure. Son of Hipponicus, I have always admired, and do now heartily applaud and love your philosophical spirit, and I would gladly comply with your request, if I could. But the truth is that I cannot. And what you ask is as great an impossibility to me, as if you bade me run a race with Crison of Himera, when in his prime, or with some one of the long or day course runners. To such a request I should reply that I would fain ask the same of my own legs; but they refuse to comply. And therefore if you want to see Crison and me in the same stadium, you must bid him slacken his speed to mine, for I cannot run quickly, and he can run slowly. And in like manner if you want to hear me and Protagoras discoursing, you must ask him to shorten his answers, and keep to the point, as he did at first; if not, how can there be

any discussion? For discussion is one thing, and making an oration is quite another, in my humble opinion.

Callias/ But you see, Socrates, that Protagoras may fairly claim to speak in his own way, just as you claim to speak in yours.

Socrates/ Here Alcibiades interposed, and said:

Alcibiades/ That, Callias, is not a true statement of the case. For our friend Socrates admits that he cannot make a speech—in this he yields the palm to Protagoras: but I should be greatly surprised if he yielded to any living man in the power of holding and apprehending an argument. Now if Protagoras will make a similar admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in argumentative skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a superiority in argument as well, let him ask and answer—not, when a question is asked, slipping away from the point, and instead of answering, making a speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget—I will be bound for that, although he may pretend in fun that he has a bad memory). And Socrates appears to me to be more in the right than Protagoras; that is my view, and every man ought to say what he thinks.

Socrates/ When Alcibiades had done speaking, someone—Critias, I believe—went on to say:

Critias/ O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be a partisan of Protagoras: and this Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side. But we should not be partisans either of Socrates or of Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up the discussion.

Prodicus/ That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, for those who are present at such discussions ought to be impartial hearers of both the speakers; remembering,

however, that impartiality is not the same as equality, for both sides should be impartially heard, and yet an equal meed should not be assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well as Critias would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of good-will, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this way you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and not praise only, among us who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers' souls, but praise is often an insincere expression of men uttering falsehoods contrary to their conviction. And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased; for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight.

Socrates/ Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of the company applauded his words.

Hippias the sage spoke next. He said:

Hippias/ All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens, by nature and not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against nature. How great would be the disgrace then, if we, who know the nature of things, and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and as such are met together in this city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the greatest and most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to show worthy of this height of dignity, but should only quarrel with one another like the meanest of mankind! I do pray and advise you, Protagoras, and you, Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be your peacemakers. And do not you,

Socrates, aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse, if Protagoras objects, but loosen and let go the reins of speech, that your words may be grander and more becoming to you. Neither do you, Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into an ocean of words, but let there be a mean observed by both of you. Do as I say. And let me also persuade you to choose an arbiter or overseer or president; he will keep watch over your words and will prescribe their proper length.

Socrates/ This proposal was received by the company with universal approval; Callias said that he would not let me off, and they begged me to choose an arbiter. But I said; To choose an umpire of discourse would be unseemly; for if the person chosen was inferior, then the inferior or worse ought not to preside over the better; or if he was equal, neither would that be well; for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what will be the use of choosing him? And if you say, 'Let us have a better then'—to that I answer that you cannot have anyone who is wiser than Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and whom you only say is better, to put another over him as though he were an inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him; not that, as far as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you desire. If Protagoras is not disposed to answer, let him ask and I will answer; and I will endeavor to show at the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer: and when I have answered as many questions as he likes to ask, let him in like manner answer me; and if he seems to be not very ready at answering the precise question asked of him, you and I will unite in entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. And this will require no special arbiter—all of you shall be arbiters.

This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions; and when he had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those which he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions as follows: —

Protagoras/ I am of opinion, Socrates, that skill in poetry is the principal part of education; and this I conceive to be the power of knowing what compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not, and how they are to be distinguished, and of explaining when asked the reason of the difference. And I propose to transfer the question which you and I have been discussing to the domain of poetry; we will speak as before of virtue, but in reference to a passage of a poet. Now Simonides says to Scopas the son of Creon the Thessalian: —

> 'Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good, built four-square in hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw.'

Do you know the poem? or shall I repeat the whole?

Socrates/ There is no need; for I am perfectly well acquainted with the ode, —I have made a careful study of it.

Protagoras/ Very well. And do you think that the ode is a good composition, and true?

Socrates/ Yes, both good and true.

Protagoras/ But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true?

Socrates/ No, not in that case

Protagoras/ And is there not a contradiction? Reflect.

Socrates/ Well, my friend, I have reflected.

Protagoras/ And does not the poet proceed to say, 'I do not agree with the word of Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a

wise man: Hardly can a man be good?' Now you will observe that this is said by the same poet.

Socrates/ I know it.

Protagoras/ And do you think that the two sayings are consistent?

Socrates/ Yes, I think so (at the same time I could not help fearing that there might be something in what he said). And you think otherwise?

Protagoras/ Why, how can he be consistent in both? First of all, premising as his own thought, 'Hardly can a man become truly good;' and then a little further on in the poem, forgetting, and blaming Pittacus and refusing to agree with him, when he says, 'Hardly can a man be good' which is the very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the same with himself, he blames himself; so that he must be wrong either in his first or his second assertion.

Socrates/ Many of the audience cheered and applauded this. And I felt at first giddy and faint, as if I had received a blow from the hand of an expert boxer, when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to confess the truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of the poet really was. So I turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus, Simonides is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his aid. I must appeal to you, like the river Scamander in Homer, who, when beleaguered by Achilles, summons the Simoïs to aid him, saying:

> 'Brother dear, let us both together stay the force of the hero.'

And I summon you, for I am afraid that Protagoras will make an end of Simonides. Now is the time to rehabilitate Simonides, by the application of your philosophy of synonyms, which enables you to distinguish 'will' and 'wish' and make other charming distinctions like those which you

drew just now. And I should like to know whether you would agree with me; for I am of opinion that there is no contradiction in the words of Simonides. And first of all I wish that you would say whether, in your opinion, Prodicus, 'being' is the same as 'becoming.'

Prodicus/ Not the same, certainly.

Socrates/ Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that 'Hardly can a man become truly good'?

Prodicus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ And then he blames Pittacus, not, as Protagoras imagines, for repeating that which he says himself, but for saying something different from himself. Pittacus does not say as Simonides says, that hardly can a man become good, but hardly can a man be good: and our friend Prodicus would maintain that being, Protagoras, is not the same as becoming; and if they are not the same, then Simonides is not inconsistent with himself. I dare say that Prodicus and many others would say, as Hesiod says;

> 'On the one hand, hardly can a man become good,
> For the gods have made virtue the reward of toil;
> But on the other hand, when you have climbed the height,
> Then, to retain virtue, however difficult the acquisition, is easy.'

Prodicus heard and approved; but Protagoras said:

Protagoras/ Your correction, Socrates, involves a greater error than is contained in the sentence which you are correcting.

Socrates/ Alas! Protagoras; then I am a sorry physician, and do but aggravate a disorder which I am seeking to cure.

Protagoras/ Such is the fact.

Socrates/ How so?

Protagoras/ The poet could never have made such a mistake as to say that virtue, which in the opinion of all men is the hardest of all things, can be easily retained.

Socrates/ Well, and how fortunate are we in having Prodicus among us, at the right moment; for he has a wisdom, Protagoras, which, as I imagine, is more than human and of very ancient date, and may be as old as Simonides or even older. Learned as you are in many things, you appear to know nothing of this; but I know, for I am a disciple of his. And now, if I am not mistaken, you do not understand the word 'hard' (χαλεπόν) in the sense which Simonides intended; and I must correct you, as Prodicus corrects me when I use the word 'awful' (δεινόν) as a term of praise. If I say that Protagoras or anyone else is an 'awfully' wise man, he asks me if I am not ashamed of calling that which is good 'awful'; and then he explains to me that the term 'awful' is always taken in a bad sense, and that no one speaks of being 'awfully' healthy or wealthy, or of 'awful' peace, but of 'awful' disease, 'awful' war, 'awful' poverty, meaning by the term 'awful,' evil. And I think that Simonides and his countrymen the Ceans, when they spoke of 'hard' meant 'evil,' or something which you do not understand. Let us ask Prodicus, for he ought to be able to answer questions about the dialect of Simonides. What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term 'hard'?

Prodicus/ Evil.

Socrates/ And therefore, Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying, 'Hard is the good,' just as if that were equivalent to saying, Evil is the good.

Prodicus/ Yes, that was certainly his meaning; and he is twitting Pittacus with ignorance of the use of terms, which in a Lesbian, who has been accustomed to speak a barbarous language, is natural.

Socrates/ Do you hear, Protagoras, what our friend Prodicus is saying? And have you an answer for him?

Protagoras/ You are entirely mistaken, Prodicus; and I know very well that Simonides in using the word 'hard' meant what all of us mean, not evil, but that which is not easy—that which takes a great deal of trouble: of this I am positive.

Socrates/ I also incline to believe, Protagoras, that this was the meaning of Simonides, of which our friend Prodicus was very well aware, but he thought that he would make fun, and try if you could maintain your thesis; for that Simonides could never have meant the other is clearly proved by the context, in which he says that God only has this gift. Now he cannot surely mean to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards proceeds to say that God only has this gift, and that this is the attribute of him and of no other. For if this be his meaning, Prodicus would impute to Simonides a character of recklessness which is very unlike his countrymen. And I should like to tell you what I imagine to be the real meaning of Simonides in this poem, if you will test what, in your way of speaking, would be called my skill in poetry; or if you would rather, I will be the listener.

To this proposal Protagoras replied:

Protagoras/ As you please;

Socrates/ —and Hippias, Prodicus, and the others told me by all means to do as I proposed.

Then now, I will endeavor to explain to you my opinion about this poem of Simonides. There is a very ancient philosophy which is more cultivated in Crete and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Hellas, and there are more philosophers in those countries than anywhere else in the world. This, however, is a secret which the Lacedaemonians deny; and they pretend to be ignorant, just

because they do not wish to have it thought that they rule the world by wisdom, like the Sophists of whom Protagoras was speaking, and not by velour of arms; considering that if the reason of their superiority were disclosed, all men would be practicing their wisdom. And this secret of theirs has never been discovered by the imitators of Lacedaemonian fashions in other cities, who go about with their ears bruised in imitation of them, and have the caestus bound on their arms, and are always in training, and wear short cloaks; for they imagine that these are the practices which have enabled the Lacedaemonians to conquer the other Hellenes. Now when the Lacedaemonians want to unbend and hold free conversation with their wise men, and are no longer satisfied with mere secret intercourse, they drive out all these laconizers, and any other foreigners who may happen to be in their country, and they hold a philosophical *séance* unknown to strangers; and they themselves forbid their young men to go out into other cities—in this they are like the Cretans—in order that they may not unlearn the lessons which they have taught them. And in Lacedaemon and Crete not only men but also women have a pride in their high cultivation. And hereby you may know that I am right in attributing to the Lacedaemonians this excellence in philosophy and speculation: If a man converses with the most ordinary Lacedaemonian, he will find him seldom good for much in general conversation, but at any point in the discourse he will be darting out some notable saying, terse and full of meaning, with unerring aim; and the person with whom he is talking seems to be like a child in his hands. And many of our own age and of former ages have noted that the true Lacedaemonian type of character has the love of philosophy even stronger than the love of gymnastics; they are conscious that only a perfectly educated man is capable of uttering such expressions. Such were Thales of Miletus,

and Pittacus of Mitylene, and Bias of Priene, and our own Solon, and Cleobulus the Lindian, and Myson the Chenian; and seventh in the catalogue of wise men was the Lacedaemonian Chilo. All these were lovers and emulators and disciples of the culture of the Lacedaemonians, and anyone may perceive that their wisdom was of this character; consisting of short memorable sentences, which they severally uttered. And they met together and dedicated in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, as the first-fruits of their wisdom, the far-famed inscriptions, which are in all men's mouths, —'Know thyself' and 'Nothing too much.'

Why do I say all this? I am explaining that this Lacedaemonian brevity was the style of primitive philosophy. Now there was a saying of Pittacus which was privately circulated and received the approbation of the wise, 'Hard is it to be good.' And Simonides, who was ambitious of the fame of wisdom, was aware that if he could overthrow this saying, then, as if he had won a victory over some famous athlete, he would carry off the palm among his contemporaries. And if I am not mistaken, he composed the entire poem with the secret intention of damaging Pittacus and his saying.

Let us all unite in examining his words, and see whether I am speaking the truth. Simonides must have been a lunatic, if, in the very first words of the poem, wanting to say only that to become good is hard, he inserted μέν, 'on the one hand' ['on the one hand to become good is hard']; there would be no reason for the introduction of μέν, unless you suppose him to speak with a hostile reference to the words of Pittacus. Pittacus is saying 'Hard is it to be good' and he, in refutation of this thesis, rejoins that the truly hard thing, Pittacus, is to become good, not joining 'truly' with 'good' but with 'hard.' Not, that the hard thing is to be truly good, as though there were some truly good men, and there were others who were good but not truly good (this would be a

very simple observation, and quite unworthy of Simonides); but you must suppose him to make a trajection of the word 'truly' (ἀλαθέως), construing the saying of Pittacus thus (and let us imagine Pittacus to be speaking and Simonides answering him): 'O my friends' says Pittacus, 'hard is it to be good' and Simonides answers, 'In that, Pittacus, you are mistaken; the difficulty is not to be good, but on the one hand, to become good, four-square in hands and feet and mind, without a flaw—that is hard truly.' This way of reading the passage accounts for the insertion of μέν, 'on the one hand' and for the position at the end of the clause of the word 'truly' and all that follows shows this to be the meaning. A great deal might be said in praise of the details of the poem, which is a charming piece of workmanship, and very finished, but such minutiae would be tedious. I should like, however, to point out the general intention of the poem, which is certainly designed in every part to be a refutation of the saying of Pittacus. For he speaks in what follows a little further on as if he meant to argue that although there is a difficulty in becoming good, yet this is possible for a time, and only for a time. But having become good, to remain in a good state and be good, as you, Pittacus, affirm, is not possible, and is not granted to man; God only has this blessing; 'but man cannot help being bad when the force of circumstances overpowers him.' Now whom does the force of circumstance overpower in the command of a vessel? —not the private individual, for he is always overpowered; and as one who is already prostrate cannot be overthrown, and only he who is standing upright but not he who is prostrate can be laid prostrate, so the force of circumstances can only overpower him who, at some time or other, has resources, and not him who is at all times helpless. The descent of a great storm may make the pilot helpless, or the severity of

the season the husbandman or the physician; for the good may become bad, as another poet witnesses: —

> 'The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad.'

But the bad does not become bad; he is always bad. So that when the force of circumstances overpowers the man of resources and skill and virtue, then he cannot help being bad. And you, Pittacus, are saying, 'Hard is it to be good.' Now there is a difficulty in becoming good; and yet this is possible: but to be good is an impossibility—

> 'For he who does well is the good man, and he who does ill is the bad'

But what sort of doing is good in letters? and what sort of doing makes a man good in letters? Clearly the knowing of them. And what sort of well-doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowledge of the art of healing the sick. 'But he who does ill is the bad.' Now who becomes a bad physician? Clearly he who is in the first place a physician, and in the second place a good physician; for he may become a bad one also: but none of us unskilled individuals can by any amount of doing ill become physicians, any more than we can become carpenters or anything of that sort; and he who by doing ill cannot become a physician at all, clearly cannot become a bad physician. In like manner the good may become deteriorated by time, or toil, or disease, or other accident (the only real doing ill is to be deprived of knowledge), but the bad man will never become bad, for he is always bad; and if he were to become bad, he must previously have been good. Thus the words of the poem tend to show that on the one hand a man cannot be continuously good, but that he may become good and may also become bad; and again that

> 'They are the best for the longest time whom the gods love.'

All this relates to Pittacus, as is further proved by the sequel. For he adds: —

> 'Therefore I will not throw away my span of life to no purpose in searching after the impossible, hoping in vain to find a perfectly faultless man among those who partake of the fruit of the broad-bosomed earth: if I find him, I will send you word.'

(this is the vehement way in which he pursues his attack upon Pittacus throughout the whole poem):

> 'But him who does no evil, voluntarily I praise and love; —not even the gods war against necessity.'

All this has a similar drift, for Simonides was not so ignorant as to say that he praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there were some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise man, as I believe, will allow that any human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil and dishonorable actions; but they are very well aware that all who do evil and dishonorable things do them against their will. And Simonides never says that he praises him who does no evil voluntarily; the word 'voluntarily' applies to himself. For he was under the impression that a good man might often compel himself to love and praise another, and to be the friend and approver of another; and that there might be an involuntary love, such as a man might feel to an unnatural father or mother, or country, or the like. Now bad men, when their parents or country have any defects, look on them with malignant joy, and find fault with them and expose and denounce them to others, under the idea that the rest of mankind will be less likely to take themselves to task and accuse them of neglect; and they blame their defects far more than they deserve, in order that the odium which is necessarily incurred by them may be increased: but the good man dissembles his feelings, and constrains himself to praise them; and if they have wronged him and he is angry,

he pacifies his anger and is reconciled, and compels himself to love and praise his own flesh and blood. And Simonides, as is probable, considered that he himself had often had to praise and magnify a tyrant or the like, much against his will, and he also wishes to imply to Pittacus that he does not censure him because he is censorious.

> 'For I am satisfied,' he says, 'when a man is neither bad nor very stupid; and when he knows justice (which is the health of states), and is of sound mind, I will find no fault with him, for I am not given to finding fault, and there are innumerable fools'

(implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant opportunity of finding fault).

> 'All things are good with which evil is unmingled.'

In these latter words he does not mean to say that all things are good which have no evil in them, as you might say 'All things are white which have no black in them' for that would be ridiculous; but he means to say that he accepts and finds no fault with the moderate or intermediate state.

> ['I do not hope' he says, 'to find a perfectly blameless man among those who partake of the fruits of the broad-bosomed earth (if I find him, I will send you word); in this sense I praise no man. But he who is moderately good, and does no evil, is good enough for me, who love and approve everyone']

(and here observe that he uses a Lesbian word, ἐπαίνημι (approve), because he is addressing Pittacus, —

> 'Who love and approve everyone voluntarily, who does no evil:'

and that the stop should be put after 'voluntarily'); 'but there are some whom I involuntarily praise and love. And you, Pittacus, I would never have blamed, if you had spoken what was moderately good and true; but I do blame you because, putting on the appearance of truth, you are speaking falsely

about the highest matters'—And this, I said, Prodicus and Protagoras, I take to be the meaning of Simonides in this poem.

Hippias/ I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good explanation of the poem; but I have also an excellent interpretation of my own which I will propound to you, if you will allow me.

Alcibiades/ Nay, Hippias; not now, but at some other time. At present we must abide by the compact which was made between Socrates and Protagoras, to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to ask, Socrates should answer; or that if he would rather answer, then that Socrates should ask.

Socrates/ I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined; but I would rather have done with poems and odes, if he does not object, and come back to the question about which I was asking you at first, Protagoras, and by your help make an end of that. The talk about the poets seems to me like a commonplace entertainment to which a vulgar company have recourse; who, because they are not able to converse or amuse one another, while they are drinking, with the sound of their own voices and conversation, by reason of their stupidity, raise the price of flute-girls in the market, hiring for a great sum the voice of a the poets flute instead of their own breath, to be the medium of intercourse among them: but where the company are real gentlemen and men of education, you will see no flute-girls, nor dancing-girls, nor harp-girls; and they have no nonsense or games, but are contented with one another's conversation, of which their own voices are the medium, and which they carry on by turns and in an orderly manner, even though they are very liberal in their potations. And a company like this of ours, and men such as we profess to be, do not require the help of another's voice, or of the poets

whom you cannot interrogate about the meaning of what they are saying; people who cite them declaring, some that the poet has one meaning, and others that he has another, and the point which is in dispute can never be decided. This sort of entertainment they decline, and prefer to talk with one another, and put one another to the proof in conversation. And these are the models which I desire that you and I should imitate. Leaving the poets, and keeping to ourselves, let us try the mettle of one another and make proof of the truth in conversation. If you have a mind to ask, I am ready to answer; or if you would rather, do you answer, and give me the opportunity of resuming and completing our unfinished argument.

I made these and some similar observations; but Protagoras would not distinctly say which he would do. Thereupon Alcibiades turned to Callias, and said: —

Alcibiades/ Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in refusing to say whether he will or will not answer? for I certainly think that he is unfair; he ought either to proceed with the argument, or distinctly to refuse to proceed, that we may know his intention; and then Socrates will be able to discourse with someone else, and the rest of the company will be free to talk with one another.

Socrates/ I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and the company were superadded, he was at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask and he would answer.

Socrates/ Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own difficulties. For I think that Homer was very right in saying that

> 'When two go together, one sees before the other,'

for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought; but if a man

> 'Sees a thing when he is alone,'

he goes about straightway seeking until he finds someone to whom he may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would rather hold discourse with you than with anyone, because I think that no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there, but you? —who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many are this, and yet have not the power of making others good—whereas you are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others. Moreover such confidence have you in yourself, that although other Sophists conceal their profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are the first who demanded pay in return. How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and consult with you? I must, indeed. And I should like once more to have my memory refreshed by you about the questions which I was asking you at first, and also to have your help in considering them. If I am not mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same thing? or has each of the names a separate underlying essence and corresponding thing having a peculiar function, no one of them being like any other of them? And you replied that the five names were not the names of the same thing, but that each of them had a separate object, and that all these objects were parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts of gold are like virtues one each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another, and have

each of them a distinct function. I should like to know whether this is still your opinion; or if not, I will ask you to define your meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in order to make trial of me.

Protagoras/ I answer, Socrates that all these qualities are parts of virtue, and that four out of the five are to some other extent similar, and that the fifth of them, which is courage, is very different from the other four, as I prove in this way: You may observe that many men are utterly unrighteous, unholy, intemperate, ignorant, who are nevertheless remarkable for their courage.

Socrates/ Stop. I should like to think about that. When you speak of brave men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature?

Protagoras/ Yes; I mean the impetuous, ready to go at that which others are afraid to approach.

Socrates/ In the next place, you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher.

Protagoras/ Yes; I should say the best of all things, if I am in my right mind.

Socrates/ And is it partly good and partly bad, or wholly good?

Protagoras/ Wholly good, and in the highest degree.

Socrates/ Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well?

Protagoras/ I should say, the divers.

Socrates/ And the reason of this is that they have knowledge?

Protagoras/ Yes, that is the reason.

Socrates/ And who have confidence when fighting on horseback—the skilled horseman or the unskilled?

Protagoras/ The skilled.

Socrates/ And who when fighting with light shields—the peltasts or the nonpeltasts?

Protagoras/ The peltasts. And that is true of all other things, if that is your point: those who have knowledge are more confident than those who have no knowledge, and they are more confident after they have learned than before.

Socrates/ And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant of these things, and yet confident about them?

Protagoras/ Yes, I have seen such persons far too confident.

Socrates/ And are not these confident persons also courageous?

Protagoras/ In that case, courage would be a base thing, for the men of whom we are speaking are surely madmen.

Socrates/ Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident?

Protagoras/ Yes; to that statement I adhere.

Socrates/ And those who are thus confident without knowledge are really not courageous, but mad; and in that case the wisest are also the most confident, and being the most confident are also the bravest, and upon that view again wisdom will be courage.

Protagoras/ Nay, Socrates, you are mistaken in your remembrance of what was said by me. When you asked me, I certainly did say that the courageous are the confident; but I was never asked whether the confident are the courageous; if you had asked me, I should have answered 'Not all of them:' and what I did answer you have not proved to be false, although you proceeded to show that those who have

knowledge are more courageous than they were before they had knowledge, and more courageous than others who have no knowledge, and were then led on to think that courage is the same as wisdom. But in this way of arguing you might come to imagine that strength is wisdom. You might begin by asking whether the strong are able, and I should say 'Yes;' and then whether those who know how to wrestle are not more able to wrestle than those who do not know how to wrestle, and more able after than before they had learned, and I should assent. And when I had admitted this, you might use my admissions in such a way as to prove that upon my view wisdom is strength; whereas in that case I should not have admitted, any more than in the other, that the able are strong, although I have admitted that the strong are able. For there is a difference between ability and strength; the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or rage, but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body. And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that they are not the same; and I argue that the courageous are confident, but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may be given to men by art, and also, like ability, by madness and rage; but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy state of the soul.

Socrates/ You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others ill?

He assented.

And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?

Protagoras/ He does not.

Socrates/ But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he not in that case have lived well?

Protagoras/ He will.

Socrates/ Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil?

Protagoras/ Yes, if the pleasure be good and honorable.

Socrates/ And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant things evil and some painful things good? —for I am rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another the sort, and in as far as they are painful they are bad.

Protagoras/ I do not know, Socrates, whether I can venture to assert in that unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the painful the evil. Having regard not only to my present answer, but also to the whole of my life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and that there are some painful things which are good, and some which are not good, and that there are some which are neither good nor evil.

Socrates/ And you would call pleasant, the things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure?

Protagoras/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they are good; and my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself.

Protagoras/ According to your favorite mode of speech, Socrates, 'let us reflect about this'; and if the reflection is to the point, and the result proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will agree; but if not, then we will argue.

Socrates/ And would you wish to begin the enquiry? Or shall I begin?

Protagoras/ You ought to take the lead; for you are the author of the discussion.

Socrates/ May I employ an illustration? Suppose someone who is enquiring into the health or some other bodily quality of another: —he looks at his face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your chest and back to me that I may have a better view: —that is the sort of thing which I desire in this speculation. Having seen what your opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you: Uncover your mind to me, Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or of rule, or of command: their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear, —just as if knowledge were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view? or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him?

Prodicus/ I agree with you, Socrates; and not only so, but I, above all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things.

Socrates/ Good, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world are of another mind; and that men are commonly supposed to know the things which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most persons whom I have asked the reason of this have said that when men act contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of those affections which I was just now mentioning.

Protagoras/ Yes, Socrates; and that is not the only point about which mankind are in error.

Socrates/ Suppose, then, that you and I endeavor to instruct and inform them what is the nature of this affection which they call 'being overcome by pleasure' and which they affirm to be the reason why they do not always do what is best. When we say to them: Friends, you are mistaken, and are saying what is not true, they would probably reply: Socrates and Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be called 'being overcome by pleasure' pray, what is it, and by what name would you describe it?

Protagoras/ But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them?

Socrates/ I believe, that they may be of use in helping us to discover how courage is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to abide by our agreement, that I should show the way in which, as I think, our recent difficulty is most likely to be cleared up, do you follow; but if not, never mind.

Protagoras/ You are quite right; and I would have you proceed as you have begun.

Socrates/ Well then, let me suppose that they repeat their question, What account do you give of that which, in our way of speaking, is termed being overcome by pleasure? I should answer thus: Listen, and Protagoras and I will endeavor to show you. When men are overcome by eating and drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that they were overcome by pleasure? They will not deny this. And suppose that you and I were to go on and ask them again: 'In what way do you say that they are evil, —in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the moment, or because they cause disease and poverty and other like evils in the future? Would they still be evil, if they had no

attendant evil consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature?'—Would they not answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on account of the after consequences—diseases and the like?

Protagoras/ I believe, that the world in general would answer as you do.

Socrates/ And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty do they not cause pain; —they would agree to that also, if I am not mistaken?

Protagoras assented.

Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil for any other reason, except because they end in pain and rob us of other pleasures: —there again they would agree?

We both of us thought that they would.

And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and say: 'Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you not mean remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises, and military service, and the physician's use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are these the things which are good but painful?'—they would assent to me?

He agreed.

'And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate suffering and pain; or because, afterwards, they bring health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states and power over others and wealth?'—they would agree to the latter alternative, if I am not mistaken?

He assented.

‘Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?’—they would acknowledge that they were not?

Protagoras/ I think so.

Socrates/ ‘And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil?’

He assented.

‘Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good: and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it gives, or causes pains greater than the pleasure. If, however, you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.’

Protagoras/ I do not think that they have.

Socrates/ ‘And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives pleasures greater than the pains: then if you have some standard other than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a good, you can show what that is. But you cannot.’

Protagoras/ True.

Socrates/ Suppose again, that the world says to me: ‘Why do you spend many words and speak in many ways on this subject?’ Excuse me, friends, I should reply; but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining the meaning of the expression ‘overcome by pleasure;’ and the whole argument turns upon this. And even now, if you see any possible way in which evil can be explained as other than by a lesser pain, or good as other than pleasure, you may still retract. Are you satisfied, then, at having a life of pleasure which is without pain? If you are, and if you are unable to show any good or

evil which does not end in pleasure and pain, hear the consequences: —If what you say is true, then the argument is absurd which affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might abstain, because he is seduced and overpowered by pleasure; or again, when you say that a man knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is overcome at the moment by pleasure. And that this is ridiculous will be evident if only we give up the use of various names, such as pleasant and painful, and good and evil. As there are two things, let us call them by two names—first, good and evil, and then pleasant and painful. Assuming this, let us go on to say that a man does evil knowing that he does evil. But someone will ask, Why? Because he is overcome, is the first answer. And by what is he overcome? the enquirer will proceed to ask. And we shall not be able to reply 'By pleasure' for the name of pleasure has been exchanged for that of good. In our answer, then, we shall only say that he is overcome. 'By what?' he will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply; indeed we shall. Nay, but our questioner will rejoin with a laugh, if he be one of the swaggering sort, 'That is too ridiculous, that a man should do what he knows to be evil when he ought not, because he is overcome by good. Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil'? And in answer to that we shall clearly reply, Because it was not worthy; for if it had been worthy, then he who, as we say, was overcome by pleasure, would not have been wrong. 'But how' he will reply, 'can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good'? Is not the real explanation that they are out of proportion to one another, either as greater and smaller, or more and fewer? This we cannot deny. And when you speak of being overcome—'what do you mean' he will say, 'but that you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good'? Admitted. And now substitute the names of pleasure and

pain for good and evil, and say, not as before, that a man does what is evil knowingly, but that he does what is painful knowingly, and because he is overcome by pleasure, which is unworthy to overcome. What measure is there of the relations of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect, which means that they become greater and smaller, and more and fewer, and differ in degree? For if anyone says: 'Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future pleasure and pain'—To that I should reply: And do they differ in anything but in pleasure and pain? There can be no other measure of them. And do you, like a skillful weigher, put into the balance the pleasures and the pains, and their nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, you of course take the more and greater; or if you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and the less; or if pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of action in which the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near or the near by the distant; and you avoid that course of action in which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not admit, my friends, that this is true? I am confident that they cannot deny this.

He agreed with me.

Well then, I shall say, if you agree so far, be so good as to answer me a question: Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when near, and smaller when at a distance? They will acknowledge that. And the same holds of thickness and number; also sounds, which are in themselves equal, are greater when near, and lesser when at a distance. They will grant that also. Now suppose that is, happiness to consist in doing or choosing the greater, and in not doing or in avoiding the less, what would be the saving principle of human life? Would not the art of measuring be

the saving principle; or would the power of appearance? Is not the latter that deceiving art which makes us wander up and down and take the things at one time of which we repent at another, both in our actions and in our choice of things great and small? But the art of measurement would do away with the effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would fain teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth, and would thus save our life. Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes this result is the art of measurement?

Protagoras/ Yes, the art of measurement.

Socrates/ Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of odd and even, and on the knowledge of when a man ought to choose the greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other, and whether near or at a distance; what would be the saving principle of our lives? Would not knowledge? —a knowledge of measuring, when laws of the question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the question is of odd and even? The world will assent, will they not?

Protagoras himself thought that they would.

Well then, my friends, I say to them; seeing that the salvation of human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains, —in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater and the less, and the nearer and remoter, must not this measuring be a consideration of their excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?

Protagoras/ This is undeniably true.

Socrates/ And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and science?

Protagoras/ They will agree.

Socrates/ The nature of that art or science will be a matter of future consideration; but the existence of such a science furnishes a demonstrative answer to the question which you asked of me and Protagoras. At the time when you asked the question, if you remember, both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things; and then you said that pleasure often got the advantage even over a man who has knowledge; and we refused to allow this, and you rejoined: O Protagoras and Socrates, what is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure if not this? —tell us what you call such a state: —if we had immediately and at the time answered 'Ignorance' you would have laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you will be laughing at yourselves: for you also admitted that men err in their choice of pleasures and pains; that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further, that they err, not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure; —ignorance, and that the greatest. And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias declare that they are the physicians of ignorance; but you, who are under the mistaken impression that ignorance is not the cause, and that the art of which I am speaking cannot be taught, neither go yourselves, nor send your children, to the Sophists, who are the teachers of these things—you take care of your money and give them none; and the result is, that you are the worse off both in public and private life: —Let us suppose this to be our answer to the world in general: And now I should like to ask you, Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for

the argument is to be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I am speaking the truth or not?

They all thought that what I said was entirely true.

Then you agree that the pleasant is the good, and the painful evil. And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his distinction of names, whether he is disposed to say pleasurable, delightful, joyful. However, by whatever name he prefers to call them, I will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer in my sense of the words.

Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others.

Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions honorable and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant? The honorable work is also useful and good?

This was admitted.

Then, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a man to himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself is wisdom.

They all assented.

And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about important matters?

To this also they unanimously assented.

Then, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have the less.

All of us agreed to every word of this.

Well, there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and here, Prodicus, I should particularly like to know whether

you would agree with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil.

Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and not terror.

Never mind, Prodicus; but let me ask whether, if our former assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears when he is not compelled? Would not this be in flat contradiction to the admission which has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears to be evil; and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he thinks to be evil?

That also was universally admitted.

Then, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premises; and I would beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can be right in what he said at first. I do not mean in what he said quite at first, for his first statement, as you may remember, was that whereas there were five parts of virtue none of them was like any other of them; each of them had a separate function. To this, however, I am not referring, but to the assertion which he afterwards made that of the five virtues four were nearly akin to each other, but that the fifth, which was courage, differed greatly from the others. And of this he gave me the following proof. He said: You will find, Socrates, that some of the most impious, and unrighteous, and intemperate, and ignorant of men are among the most courageous; which proves that courage is very different from the other parts of virtue. I was surprised at his saying this at the time, and I am still more surprised now that I have discussed the matter with you. So I asked him whether by the brave he meant the confident. Yes, he replied, and the impetuous or goers. (You may remember, Protagoras, that this was your answer.)

He assented.

Well then, tell us against what are the courageous ready to go—against the same dangers as the cowards?

Protagoras/ No.

Socrates/ Then against something different?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there is danger?

Protagoras/ Yes, Socrates, so men say.

Socrates/ Very true. But I want to know against what do you say that the courageous are ready to go—against dangers, believing them to be dangers, or not against dangers?

Protagoras/ No; the former case has been proved by you in the previous argument to be impossible.

Socrates/ That, again, is quite true. And if this has been rightly proven, then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers, since the want of self-control, which makes men rush into dangers, has been shown to be ignorance.

He assented.

And yet the courageous man and the coward alike go to meet that about which they are confident; so that, in this point of view, the cowardly and the courageous go to meet the same things.

Protagoras/ And yet, Socrates, that to which the coward goes is the opposite of that to which the courageous goes; the one, for example, is ready to go to battle, and the other is not ready.

Socrates/ And is going to battle honorable or disgraceful?

Protagoras/ Honorable.

Socrates/ And if honorable, then already admitted by us to be good; for all honorable actions we have admitted to be good.

Protagoras/ That is true; and to that opinion I shall always adhere.

Socrates/ True. But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling to go to war, which is a good and honorable thing?

Protagoras/ The cowards.

Socrates/ And what is good and honorable is also pleasant?

Protagoras/ It has certainly been acknowledged to be so.

Socrates/ And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, and better?

Protagoras/ The admission of that, would belie our former admissions.

Socrates/ But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and pleasanter, and nobler?

Protagoras/ That must be admitted.

Socrates/ And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence?

Protagoras/ True.

Socrates/ And if not base, then honorable?

He admitted this.

And if honorable, then good?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the contrary, are base?

He assented.

And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and uninstructedness?

Protagoras/ True.

Socrates/ Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it cowardice or courage?

Protagoras/ I should say cowardice.

Socrates/ And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of dangers?

Protagoras/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And because of that ignorance they are cowards?

He assented.

And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?

He again assented.

Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice?

He nodded assent.

But surely courage is opposed to cowardice?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to the ignorance of them?

To that again he nodded assent.

And the ignorance of them is cowardice?

To that he very reluctantly nodded assent.

And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and is opposed to the ignorance of these things?

At this point he would no longer nod assent, but was silent.

And why do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras?

Protagoras/ Finish the argument by yourself.

Socrates/ I only want to ask one more question. I want to know whether you still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most courageous?

Protagoras/ You seem to have a great ambition to make me answer, Socrates, and therefore I will gratify you, and

say, that this appears to me to be impossible consistently with the argument.

Socrates/ My only object in continuing the discussion, has been the desire to ascertain the nature and relations of virtue; for if this were clear, I am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried on at great length by both of us—you affirming and I denying that virtue can be taught—would also become clear. The result of our discussion appears to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human voice, that voice would be heard laughing at us and saying: 'Protagoras and Socrates, you are strange beings; there are you, Socrates, who were saying that virtue cannot be taught, contradicting yourself now by your attempt to prove that all things are knowledge, including justice, and temperance, and courage, —which tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught; for if virtue were other than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to prove, then clearly virtue cannot be taught; but if virtue is entirely knowledge, as you are seeking to show, then I cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught. Protagoras, on the other hand, who started by saying that it might be taught, is now eager to prove it to be anything rather than knowledge; and if this is true, it must be quite incapable of being taught.' Now I, Protagoras, perceiving this terrible confusion of our ideas, have a great desire that they should be cleared up. And I should like to carry on the discussion until we ascertain what virtue is, and whether capable of being taught or not, lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive us in the argument, as he forgot us in the story; I prefer your Prometheus to your Epimetheus, for of him I make use, whenever I am busy about these questions, in Promethean care of my own life. And if you have no objection, as I said at first, I should like to have your help in the enquiry.

Protagoras/ Socrates, I am not of a base nature, and I am the last man in the world to be envious. I cannot but applaud your energy and your conduct of an argument. As I have often said, I admire you above all men whom I know, and far above all men of your age; and I believe that you will become very eminent in philosophy. Let us come back to the subject at some future time; at present we had better turn to something else.

Socrates/ By all means, if that is your wish; for I too ought long since to have kept the engagement of which I spoke before, and only tarried because I could not refuse the request of the noble Callias.

So the conversation ended, and we went our way.

Protagoras

Translated by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Friend, Hippocrates, Alcibiades, Critias, Callias, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Eunuch

Friend/ Where have you just come from, Socrates? No, don't tell me. It's pretty obvious that you've been hunting the ripe and ready Alcibiades. Well, I saw him just the other day, and he is certainly still a beautiful man—and just between the two of us, 'man' is the proper word, Socrates: his beard is already filling out.

Socrates/ Well, what of it? I thought you were an admirer of Homer, who says that youth is most charming when the beard is first blooming—which is just the stage Alcibiades is at.

Friend/ So what's up? Were you just with him? And how is the young man disposed towards you?

Socrates/ Pretty well, I think, especially today, since he rallied to my side and said a great many things to support me. You're right, of course: I was just with him. But there's something really strange I want to tell you about. Although we were together, I didn't pay him any mind; in fact, I forgot all about him most of the time.

Friend/ How could anything like that have happened to the two of you? You surely haven't met someone else more beautiful, at least not in this city.

Socrates/ Much more beautiful.

Friend/ What are you saying? A citizen or a foreigner?

Socrates/ A foreigner.

Friend/ From where?

Socrates/ Abdera.

Friend/ And this foreigner seems to you more beautiful than the son of Clinias?

Socrates/ How could superlative wisdom not seem surpassingly beautiful?

Friend/ What! Have you been in the company of some wise man, Socrates?

Socrates/ The wisest man alive, if you think the wisest man is Protagoras.

Friend/ What are you saying? Is Protagoras in town?

Socrates/ And has been for two days.

Friend/ And you've just now come from being with him?

Socrates/ That's right, and took part in quite a long conversation.

Friend/ Well, sit right down, if you're free now, and tell us all about it. Let the boy make room for you here.

Socrates/ By all means. I'd count it a favor if you'd listen.

Friend/ And vice versa, if you'd tell us.

Socrates/ That would make it a double favor then. Well, here's the story.

This morning just before daybreak, while it was still dark, Hippocrates, son of Apollodoros and Phason's brother, banged on my door with his stick, and when it was opened for him he barged right in and yelled in that voice of his;

Hippocrates/ "Socrates, are you awake or asleep?"

Socrates/ Recognizing his voice, "Is that Hippocrates? No bad news, I hope."

Hippocrates/ "Nothing but good news."

Socrates/ "I'd like to hear it, What brings you here at such an hour?" Standing next to me, Hippocrates replied:

Hippocrates/ "Protagoras has arrived."

Socrates/ “Day before yesterday, Did you just find out?”

Hippocrates/ “Yes! Just last evening.”

Socrates/ As he said this he felt around for the bed and sat at my feet and continued:

Hippocrates/ “That’s right, late yesterday evening, after I got back from Oenoe. My slave Satyrus had run away from me. I meant to tell you that I was going after him, but something else came up and made me forget. After I got back and we had eaten dinner and were about to get some rest, then my brother tells me Protagoras has arrived. I was getting ready to come right over to see you even then, until I realized it was just too late at night. But as soon as I had slept some and wasn’t dead-tired any more, I got up and came over here right away.”

Socrates/ Recognizing his fighting spirit and his excitement, I asked him: “So what’s it to you? Has Protagoras done anything wrong to you?”

He laughed and said;

Hippocrates/ “You bet he has, Socrates. He has a monopoly on wisdom and won’t give me any.”

Socrates/ “But look, if you meet his price he’ll make you wise too.”

Hippocrates/ “If only it were as simple as that, I'd bankrupt myself and my friends too. But that’s why I’m coming to you, so you will talk to him for me. I’m too young myself, and besides, I’ve never even seen Protagoras or heard him speak. I was still just a child the last time he was in town. He’s such a celebrity, Socrates, and everyone says he’s a terribly clever speaker. Why don’t we walk over now, to be sure to catch him in? I’ve heard he’s staying with Callias, son of Hipponicus. Come on, let’s go.”

Socrates/ “Let’s not go there just yet, It’s too early. Why don’t we go out here into the courtyard and stroll around until

it's light? Then we can go. Protagoras spends most of his time indoors, so don't worry; we're likely to catch him in."

So we got up and walked around the courtyard. I wanted to see what Hippocrates was made of, so I started to examine him with a few questions. "Tell me, Hippocrates, You're trying to get access to Protagoras, prepared to pay him a cash fee for his services to you. But what is he, and what do you expect to become? I mean, suppose you had your mind set on going to your namesake, Hippocrates of Cos, the famous physician, to pay him a fee for his services to you, and if someone asked you what this Hippocrates is that you were going to pay him, what would you say?"

Hippocrates/ "I would say a physician."

Socrates/ "And what would you expect to become?"

Hippocrates/ "A physician."

Socrates/ "And if you had a mind to go to Polyclitus of Argos or Phidias of Athens to pay them a fee, and if somebody were to ask you what kind of professionals you had in mind paying, what would you say?"

Hippocrates/ "I would say sculptors."

Socrates/ "And what would you expect to become?"

Hippocrates/ "A sculptor, obviously."

Socrates/ "All right, Here we are, you and I, on our way to Protagoras, prepared to pay him cash as a fee on your behalf, spending our own money, and if that's not enough to persuade him, our friends' money as well. Suppose someone notices our enthusiasm and asks us: Tell me, Socrates and Hippocrates, what is your idea in paying Protagoras? What is he?' What would we say to him? What other name do we hear in reference to Protagoras? Phidias is called a sculptor and Homer a poet. What do we hear Protagoras called?"

Hippocrates/ “A sophist is what they call him, anyway, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Then it is as a sophist that we are going to pay him?”

Hippocrates/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And if somebody asks you what you expect to become in going to Protagoras?”

He blushed in response—there was just enough daylight now to show him up—and said;

Hippocrates/ “If this is at all like the previous cases, then, obviously, to become a sophist.”

Socrates/ “What? You? Wouldn’t you be ashamed to present yourself to the Greek world as a sophist?”

Hippocrates/ “Yes, I would, Socrates, to be perfectly honest.”

Socrates/ “Well, look, Hippocrates, maybe this isn’t the sort of education you expect to get from Protagoras. Maybe you expect to get the kind of lessons you got from your grammar instructor or music teacher or wrestling coach. You didn’t get from them technical instruction to become a professional, but a general education suitable for a gentleman.”

Hippocrates/ “That’s it exactly! That’s just the sort of education you get from Protagoras.”

Socrates/ “Then do you know what you are about to do now, or does it escape you?”

Hippocrates/ “What do you mean?”

Socrates/ “That you are about to hand over your soul for treatment to a man who is, as you say, a sophist. As to what exactly a sophist is, I would be surprised if you really knew. And yet, if you are ignorant of this, you don’t know whether you are entrusting your soul to something good or bad.”

Hippocrates/ “But I think I do know.”

Socrates/ “Then tell me what you think a sophist is.”

Hippocrates/ “I think, that, as the name suggests, he is someone who has an understanding of wise things.”

Socrates/ “Well, you could say the same thing about painters and carpenters, that they understand wise things. But if someone asked us ‘wise in what respect?’ we would probably answer, for painters, ‘wise as far as making images is concerned,’ and so on for the other cases. And if someone asked, ‘What about sophists? What wise things do they understand?’—what would we answer? What are they expert at making?”

Hippocrates/ “What else, Socrates, should we say a sophist is expert at than making people clever speakers?”

Socrates/ “Our answer would then be true, but not sufficient, for it requires another question: On what subject does the sophist make you a clever speaker? For example, a lyre-player makes you a clever speaker on his subject of expertise, the lyre. Right?”

Hippocrates/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “All right then. On what subject does a sophist make you a clever speaker?”

Hippocrates/ “It’s clear that it’s the same subject that he understands.”

Socrates/ “Likely enough. And what is this subject that the sophist understands and makes his student understand?”

Hippocrates/ “By God, I really don’t know what to say.”

Socrates/ I went on to my next point: “Do you see what kind of danger you are about to put your soul in? If you had to entrust your body to someone and risk its becoming healthy or ill, you would consider carefully whether you should entrust it or not, and you would confer with your family and friends for days on end. But when it comes to something you

value more than your body, namely your soul, and when everything concerning whether you do well or ill in your life depends on whether it becomes worthy or worthless, I don't see you getting together with your father or brother or a single one of your friends to consider whether or not to entrust your soul to this recently arrived foreigner. No, you hear about him in the evening—right? —and the next morning, here you are, not to talk about whether it's a good idea to entrust yourself to him or not, but ready to spend your own money and your friends' as well, as if you had thought it all through already and, no matter what, you had to be with Protagoras, a man whom you admit you don't know and have never conversed with, and whom you call a sophist although you obviously have no idea what this sophist is to whom you are about to entrust yourself."

Hippocrates/ "I guess so, Socrates, from what you say."

Socrates/ "Am I right, then, Hippocrates, that a sophist is a kind of merchant who peddles provisions upon which the soul is nourished? That's what he seems like to me."

Hippocrates/ "But what is the soul nourished on, Socrates?"

Socrates/ "Teachings, I would say. And watch, or the sophist might deceive us in advertising what he sells, the way merchants who market food for the body do. In general, those who market provisions don't know what is good or bad for the body—they just recommend everything they sell—nor do those who buy (unless one happens to be a trainer or doctor). In the same way, those who take their teachings from town to town and sell them wholesale or retail to anybody who wants them recommend all their products, but I wouldn't be surprised, my friend, if some of these people did not know which of their products are beneficial and which detrimental to the soul. Likewise those who buy from them, unless one

happens to be a physician of the soul. So if you are a knowledgeable consumer, you can buy teachings safely from Protagoras or anyone else. But if you're not, please don't risk what is most dear to you on a roll of the dice, for there is a far greater risk in buying teachings than in buying food. When you buy food and drink from the merchant you can take each item back home from the store in its own container and before you ingest it into your body you can lay it all out and call in an expert for consultation as to what should be eaten or drunk and what not, and how much and when. So there's not much risk in your purchase. But you cannot carry teachings away in a separate container. You put down your money and take the teaching away in your soul by having learned it, and off you go, either helped or injured. Anyway, these are the questions we should look into, with the help of our elders. You and I are still a little too young to get to the bottom of such a great matter. Well, let's do what we had started out to do and go hear this man; and after we have heard him, we can talk with some others also. Protagoras isn't the only one there. There's Hippias of Elis too, and also Prodicus of Ceos, I believe. And many others as well, wise men all."

Having agreed on this, we set out. When we got to the doorway we stood there discussing some point which had come up along the road and which we didn't want to leave unsettled before we went in. So we were standing there in the doorway discussing it until we reached an agreement, and I think the doorman, a eunuch, overheard us. He must have been annoyed with all the traffic of sophists in and out of the house, because when we knocked he opened the door, took one look at us and said;

Eunuch/ "Ha! More sophists! He's busy."

Socrates/ Then he slammed the door in our faces with both hands as hard as he could. We knocked again, and he answered through the locked door;

Eunuch/ “Didn’t you hear me say he’s busy?”

Socrates/ “My good man, we haven’t come to see Callias, and we are not sophists. Calm down. We want to see Protagoras. That’s why we’ve come. So please announce us.” Eventually he opened the door for us.

When we went in we found Protagoras walking in the portico flanked by two groups. On one side were Hipponicus and his brother on his mother’s side, Paralus, son of Pericles, and Charmides, son of Glaucon. On the other side were Pericles’ other son, Xanthippus, Philippides, son of Philomelus, and Antimoerus of Mende, Protagoras’ star pupil who is studying professionally to become a sophist. Following behind and trying to listen to what was being said were a group of what seemed to be mostly foreigners, men whom Protagoras collects from the various cities he travels through. He enchants them with his voice like Orpheus, and they follow the sound of his voice in a trance. There were some locals also in this chorus, whose dance simply delighted me when I saw how beautifully they took care never to get in Protagoras’ way. When he turned around with his flanking groups, the audience to the rear would split into two in a very orderly way and then circle around to either side and form up again behind him. It was quite lovely.

And then I perceived (as Homer says) Hippias of Elis, on a high seat in the other side of the colonnade. Seated on benches around him were Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, Phaedrus of Myrrhinus, Andron, son of Androtion, a number of Elians and a few other foreigners. They seemed to be asking Hippias questions on astronomy and physics, and he, from his high seat, was answering each of their questions point by point.

And not only that, but I saw Tantalus too, for Prodicus of Ceos was also in town. He was in a room which Hipponicus

had formerly used for storage, but because of the number of visitors Callias had cleared it out and made it into a guest room. Prodicus was still in bed and looked to be bundled up in a pile of sheepskin fleeces and blankets. Seated on couches next to him were Pausanias from Cerames, and with Pausanias a fairly young boy, well-bred I would say, and certainly good-looking. I think I heard his name is Agathon, and I wouldn't be surprised if he were Pausanias' young love. So this boy was there, and the two Adeimantuses, sons of Cepis and Leucolophides, and there seemed to be some others. What they were talking about I couldn't tell from outside, even though I really wanted to hear Prodicus, a man who in my opinion is godlike in his universal knowledge. But his voice is so deep that it set up a reverberation in the room that blurred what was being said.

We had just arrived when along came Alcibiades the Beautiful (as you call him, and I'm not arguing) and Critias son of Callaeschrus. So when we were inside and had spent a little more time looking at everything, we went up to Protagoras, and "Protagoras, Hippocrates here and I have come to see you."

Protagoras/ "Do you want to talk with me alone or with others present?"

Socrates/ "It doesn't make any difference to us, Listen to what we've come for, and decide for yourself."

Protagoras/ "Well, then, what have you come for?"

Socrates/ "Hippocrates is from here, a son of Apollodoros and a member of a great and well-to-do family. His own natural ability ranks him with the best of anyone his age. It's my impression that he wants to be a man of respect in the city, and he thinks this is most likely to happen if he associates himself with you. So now you must decide. Should we talk about this alone or in the presence of others?"

Protagoras/ “Your discretion on my behalf is appropriate, Socrates. Caution is in order for a foreigner who goes into the great cities and tries to persuade the best of the young men in them to abandon their associations with others, relatives and acquaintances, young and old alike, and to associate with him instead on the grounds that they will be improved by this association. Jealousy, hostility, and intrigue on a large scale are aroused by such activity. Now, I maintain that the sophist’s art is an ancient one, but that the men who practiced it in ancient times, fearing the odium attached to it, disguised it, masking it sometimes as poetry, as Homer and Hesiod and Simonides did, or as mystery religions and prophecy, witness Orpheus and Musaeus, and occasionally, I’ve noticed, even as athletics, as with Iccus of Tarentum and, in our own time, Herodicus of Selymbria (originally of Megara), as great a sophist as any. Your own Agathocles, a great sophist, used music as a front, as did Pythoclides of Ceos, and many others. All of them, as I say, used these various arts as screens out of fear of ill will. And this is where I part company with them all, for I do not believe that they accomplished their end; I believe they failed, in fact, to conceal from the powerful men in the cities the true purpose of their disguises. The masses, needless to say, perceive nothing, but merely sing the tune their leaders announce. Now, for a runaway not to succeed in running away, but to be caught in the open, is sheer folly from the start and inevitably makes men even more hostile than they were before, for on top of everything else they perceive him as a real rogue. So I have come down the completely opposite road. I admit that I am a sophist and that I educate men, and I consider this admission to be a better precaution than denial. And I have given thought to other precautions as well, so as to avoid, God willing, suffering any ill from admitting I am a sophist. I have been in the profession many years now, and I’m old enough to be the father of any of you

here. So, if you do have a request, it would give me the greatest pleasure by far to deliver my lecture in the presence of everyone in the house."

Socrates/ It looked to me that he wanted to show off in front of Prodicus and Hippias, and to bask in glory because we had come as his admirers, so I said, "Well, why don't we call Prodicus and Hippias over, and their companions, so that they can listen to us?"

Protagoras/ "By all means!"

Callias/ "Then you want to make this a general session and have everyone take seats for a discussion?"

Socrates/ Callias proposed this, and it seemed like the only thing to do. We were all overjoyed at the prospect of listening to wise men, and we laid hold of the benches and couches ourselves and arranged them over by Hippias, since that's where the benches were already. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades had gotten Prodicus up and brought him over with his group.

When we had all taken our seats, Protagoras said;

Protagoras/ "Now, then, Socrates, since these gentlemen also are present, would you please say what it was you brought up to me a little while ago on the young man's behalf."

Socrates/ "Well, Protagoras, as to why we have come, I'll begin as I did before. Hippocrates here has gotten to the point where he wants to be your student, and, quite naturally, he would like to know what he will get out of it if he does study with you. That's really all we have to say."

Protagoras took it from there and said;

Protagoras/ "Young man, this is what you will get if you study with me: The very day you start, you will go home a better man, and the same thing will happen the day after. Every day, day after day, you will get better and better."

Socrates/ When I heard this I said, “What you’re saying, Protagoras, isn’t very surprising, but quite likely. Why, even you, though you are so old and wise, would get better if someone taught you something you didn’t happen to know already. But what if the situation were a little different, and Hippocrates here all of a sudden changed his mind and set his heart on studying with this young fellow who has just come into town, Zeuxippus of Heraclea, and came to him, as he now comes to you, and heard from him the very same thing as from you—that each day he spent with him he would become better and make progress. If Hippocrates asked him in what way he would become better, and toward what he would be making progress, Zeuxippus would say at painting. And if he were studying with Orthagoras of Thebes and he heard from him the same thing as he hears from you and asked him in what he would be getting better every day he studied with him, Orthagoras would say at flute-playing. It is in this way that you must tell me and the young man on whose behalf I am asking the answer to this question: If Hippocrates studies with Protagoras, exactly how will he go away a better man and in what will he make progress each and every day he spends with you?”

Protagoras heard me out and then said;

Protagoras/ “You put your question well, Socrates, and I am only too glad to answer those who pose questions well. If Hippocrates comes to me he will not experience what he would if he studied with some other sophist. The others abuse young men, steering them back again, against their will, into subjects the likes of which they have escaped from at school, teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, music, and poetry.”

Socrates/ —at this point he gave Hippias a significant look—

Protagoras/ “But if he comes to me he will learn only what he has come for. What I teach is sound deliberation, both in domestic matters—how best to manage one’s household, and in public affairs—how to realize one’s maximum potential for success in political debate and action.”

Socrates/ “Am I following what you are saying? You appear to be talking about the art of citizenship, and to be promising to make men good citizens.”

Protagoras/ “This is exactly what I claim, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “Well, this is truly an admirable technique you have developed, if indeed you have. There is no point in my saying to you anything other than exactly what I think. The truth is, Protagoras, I have never thought that this could be taught, but when you say it can be, I can’t very well doubt it. It’s only right that I explain where I got the idea that this is not teachable, not something that can be imparted from one human being to another. I maintain, along with the rest of the Greek world, that the Athenians are wise. And I observe that when we convene in the Assembly and the city has to take some action on a building project, we send for builders to advise us; if it has to do with the construction of ships, we send for shipwrights; and so forth for everything that is considered learnable and teachable. But if anyone else, a person not regarded as a craftsman, tries to advise them, no matter how handsome and rich and well-born he might be, they just don’t accept him. They laugh at him and shout him down until he either gives up trying to speak and steps down himself, or the archer-police remove him forcibly by order of the board. This is how they proceed in matters which they consider technical. But when it is a matter of deliberating on city management, anyone can stand up and advise them, carpenter, blacksmith, shoemaker, merchant, ship-captain, rich man, poor man, well-born, low-born—it doesn’t matter—and nobody blasts him for presuming to give counsel without

any prior training under a teacher. The reason for this is clear: They do not think that this can be taught. Public life aside, the same principle holds also in private life, where the wisest and best of our citizens are unable to transmit to others the virtues that they possess. Look at Pericles, the father of these young men here. He gave them a superb education in everything that teachers can teach, but as for what he himself is really wise in, he neither teaches them that himself nor has anyone else teach them either, and his sons have to browse like stray sacred cattle and pick up virtue on their own wherever they might find it. Take a good look at Clinias, the younger brother of Alcibiades here. When Pericles became his guardian he was afraid that he would be corrupted, no less, by Alcibiades. So he separated them and placed Clinias in Ariphron's house and tried to educate him there. Six months later he gave him back to Alcibiades because he couldn't do anything with him. I could mention a great many more, men who are good themselves but have never succeeded in making anyone else better, whether family members or total strangers. Looking at these things, Protagoras, I just don't think that virtue can be taught. But when I hear what you have to say, I waver; I think there must be something in what you are talking about. I consider you to be a person of enormous experience who has learned much from others and thought through a great many things for himself. So if you can clarify for us how virtue is teachable, please don't begrudge us your explanation."

Protagoras/ "I wouldn't think of begrudging you an explanation, Socrates, But would you rather that I explain by telling you a story, as an older man to a younger audience, or by developing an argument?"

Socrates/ The consensus was that he should proceed in whichever way he wished.

Protagoras/ “I think it would be more pleasant, if I told you a story.

“There once was a time when the gods existed but mortal races did not. When the time came for their appointed genesis, the gods molded them inside the earth, blending together earth and fire and various compounds of earth and fire. When they were ready to bring them to light the gods put Prometheus and Epimetheus in charge of decking them out and assigning to each its appropriate powers and abilities.

“Epimetheus begged Prometheus for the privilege of assigning the abilities himself. ‘When I’ve completed the distribution,’ ‘you can inspect it.’ Prometheus agreed, and Epimetheus started distributing abilities.

“To some he assigned strength without quickness; the weaker ones he made quick. Some he armed; others he left unarmed but devised for them some other means for preserving themselves. He compensated for small size by issuing wings for flight or an underground habitat. Size was itself a safeguard for those he made large. And so on down the line, balancing his distribution, making adjustments, and taking precautions against the possible extinction of any of the races.

“After supplying them with defenses against mutual destruction, he devised for them protection against the weather. He clothed them with thick pelts and tough hides capable of warding off winter storms, effective against heat, and serving also as built-in, natural bedding when they went to sleep. He also shod them, some with hooves, others with thick pads of bloodless skin. Then he provided them with various forms of nourishment, plants for some, fruit from trees for others, roots for still others. And there were some to whom he gave the consumption of other animals as their sustenance. To some he gave the capacity for few births; to

others, ravaged by the former, he gave the capacity for multiple births, and so ensured the survival of their kind.

"But Epimetheus was not very wise, and he absentmindedly used up all the powers and abilities on the nonreasoning animals; he was left with the human race, completely unequipped. While he was floundering about at a loss, Prometheus arrived to inspect the distribution and saw that while the other animals were well provided with everything, the human race was naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed, and it was already the day on which all of them, human beings included, were destined to emerge from the earth into the light. It was then that Prometheus, desperate to find some means of survival for the human race, stole from Hephaestus and Athena wisdom in the practical arts together with fire (without which this kind of wisdom is effectively useless) and gave them outright to the human race. The wisdom it acquired was for staying alive; wisdom for living together in society, political wisdom, it did not acquire, because that was in the keeping of Zeus. Prometheus no longer had free access to the high citadel that is the house of Zeus, and besides this, the guards there were terrifying. But he did sneak into the building that Athena and Hephaestus shared to practice their arts, and he stole from Hephaestus the art of fire and from Athena her arts, and he gave them to the human race. And it is from this origin that the resources human beings needed to stay alive came into being. Later, the story goes, Prometheus was charged with theft, all on account of Epimetheus.

"It is because humans had a share of the divine dispensation that they alone among animals worshipped the gods, with whom they had a kind of kinship, and erected altars and sacred images. It wasn't long before they were articulating speech and words and had invented houses, clothes, shoes, and blankets, and were nourished by food from

the earth. Thus equipped, human beings at first lived in scattered isolation; there were no cities. They were being destroyed by wild beasts because they were weaker in every way, and although their technology was adequate to obtain food, it was deficient when it came to fighting wild animals. This was because they did not yet possess the art of politics, of which the art of war is a part. They did indeed try to band together and survive by founding cities. The outcome when they did so was that they wronged each other, because they did not possess the art of politics, and so they would scatter and again be destroyed. Zeus was afraid that our whole race might be wiped out, so he sent Hermes to bring justice and a sense of shame to humans, so that there would be order within cities and bonds of friendship to unite them. Hermes asked Zeus how he should distribute shame and justice to humans. 'Should I distribute them as the other arts were? This is how the others were distributed: one person practicing the art of medicine suffices for many ordinary people; and so forth with the other practitioners. Should I establish justice and shame among humans in this way, or distribute it to all?' To all,' said Zeus, 'and let all have a share. For cities would never come to be if only a few possessed these, as is the case with the other arts. And establish this law as coming from me: Death to him who cannot partake of shame and justice, for he is a pestilence to the city.'

"And so it is, Socrates, that when the Athenians (and others as well) are debating architectural excellence, or the virtue proper to any other professional specialty, they think that only a few individuals have the right to advise them, and they do not accept advice from anyone outside these select few. You've made this point yourself, and with good reason, I might add. But when the debate involves political excellence, which must proceed entirely from justice and temperance, they accept advice from anyone, and with good reason, for they think that

this particular virtue, political or civic virtue, is shared by all, or there wouldn't be any cities. This must be the explanation for it, Socrates.

"And so you won't think you've been deceived, consider this as further evidence for the universal belief that all humans have a share of justice and the rest of civic virtue. In the other arts, as you have said, if someone claims to be a good flute-player or whatever, but is not, people laugh at him or get angry with him, and his family comes round and remonstrates with him as if he were mad. But when it comes to justice or any other social virtue, even if they know someone is unjust, if that person publicly confesses the truth about himself, they will call this truthfulness madness, whereas in the previous case they would have called it a sense of decency. They will say that everyone ought to claim to be just, whether they are or not, and that it is madness not to pretend to justice, since one must have some trace of it or not be human.

"This, then, is my first point: It is reasonable to admit everyone as an adviser on this virtue, on the grounds that everyone has some share of it. Next I will attempt to show that people do not regard this virtue as natural or self-generated, but as something taught and carefully developed in those in whom it is developed.

"In the case of evils that men universally regard as afflictions due to nature or bad luck, no one ever gets angry with anyone so afflicted or reproves, admonishes, punishes, or tries to correct them. We simply pity them. No one in his right mind would try to do anything like this to someone who is ugly, for example, or scrawny or weak. The reason is, I assume, that they know that these things happen to people as a natural process or by chance, both these ills and their opposites. But in the case of the good things that accrue to men through practice and training and teaching, if someone does not possess these goods but rather their corresponding

evils, he finds himself the object of anger, punishment, and reproof. Among these evils are injustice, impiety, and in general everything that is opposed to civic virtue. Offenses in this area are always met with anger and reproof, and the reason is clearly that this virtue is regarded as something acquired through practice and teaching. The key, Socrates, to the true significance of punishment lies in the fact that human beings consider virtue to be something acquired through training. For no one punishes a wrong-doer in consideration of the simple fact that he has done wrong, unless one is exercising the mindless vindictiveness of a beast. Reasonable punishment is not vengeance for a past wrong—for one cannot undo what has been done—but is undertaken with a view to the future, to deter both the wrong-doer and whoever sees him being punished from repeating the crime. This attitude towards punishment as deterrence implies that virtue is learned, and this is the attitude of all those who seek requital in public or in private. All human beings seek requital from and punish those who they think have wronged them, and the Athenians, your fellow citizens, especially do so. Therefore, by my argument, the Athenians are among those who think that virtue is acquired and taught. So it is with good reason that your fellow citizens accept a blacksmith's or a cobbler's advice in political affairs. And they do think that virtue is acquired and taught. It appears to me that both these propositions have been sufficiently proved, Socrates.

"Now, on to your remaining difficulty, the problem you raise about good men teaching their sons everything that can be taught and making them wise in these subjects, but not making them better than anyone else in the particular virtue in which they themselves excel. On this subject, Socrates, I will abandon story for argument. Consider this: Does there or does there not exist one thing which all citizens must have for there to be a city? Here and nowhere else lies the solution to

your problem. For if such a thing exists, and this one thing is not the art of the carpenter, the blacksmith, or the potter, but justice, and temperance, and piety—what I may collectively term the virtue of a man, and if this is the thing which everyone should share in and with which every man should act whenever he wants to learn anything or do anything, but should not act without it, and if we should instruct and punish those who do not share in it, man, woman, and child, until their punishment makes them better, and should exile from our cities or execute whoever doesn't respond to punishment and instruction; if this is the case, if such is the nature of this thing, and good men give their sons an education in everything but this, then we have to be amazed at how strangely our good men behave. For we have shown that they regard this thing as teachable both in private and public life. Since it is something that can be taught and nurtured, is it possible that they have their sons taught everything in which there is no death penalty for not understanding it, but when their children are faced with the death penalty or exile if they fail to learn virtue and be nurtured in it—and not only death but confiscation of property and, practically speaking, complete familial catastrophe—do you think they do not have them taught this or give them all the attention possible? We must think that they do, Socrates.

"Starting when they are little children and continuing as long as they live, they teach them and correct them. As soon as a child understands what is said to him, the nurse, mother, tutor, and the father himself fight for him to be as good as he possibly can, seizing on every action and word to teach him and show him that this is just, that is unjust, this is noble, that is. ugly, this is pious, that is impious, he should do this, he should not do that. If he obeys willingly, fine; if not, they straighten him out with threats and blows as if he were a

twisted, bent piece of wood. After this they send him to school and tell his teachers to pay more attention to his good conduct than to his grammar or music lessons. The teacher's pay attention to these things, and when the children have learned their letters and are getting to understand writing as well as the spoken language, they are given the works of good poets to read at their desks and have to learn them by heart, works that contain numerous exhortations, many passages describing in glowing terms good men of old, so that the child is inspired to imitate them and become like them. In a similar vein, the music teachers too foster in their young pupils a sense of moral decency and restraint, and when they learn to play the lyre they are taught the works of still more good poets, the lyric and choral poets. The teachers arrange the scores and drill the rhythms and scales into the children's souls, so that they become gentler, and their speech and movements become more rhythmical and harmonious. For all of human life requires a high degree of rhythm and harmony. On top of all this, they send their children to an athletic trainer so that they may have sound bodies in the service of their now fit minds and will not be forced to cowardice in war or other activities through physical deficiencies.

"This is what the most able, i.e., the richest, do. Their sons start going to school at the earliest age and quit at the latest age. And when they quit school, the city in turn compels them to learn the laws and to model their lives on them. They are not to act as they please. An analogy might be drawn from the practice of writing-teachers, who sketch the letters faintly with a pen in workbooks for their beginning students and have them write the letters over the patterns they have drawn. In the same way the city has drawn up laws invented by the great lawgivers in the past and compels them to govern and be governed by them. She punishes anyone who goes beyond

these laws, and the term for this punishment in your city and others is, because it is a corrective legal action, 'correction.'

"When so much care and attention is paid to virtue, Socrates, both in public and private, are you still puzzled about virtue being teachable? The wonder would be if it were not teachable.

"Why, then, do many sons of good fathers never amount to anything? I want you to understand this too, and in fact it's no great wonder, if what I've just been saying is true about virtue being something in which no one can be a layman if there is to be a city. For if what I am saying is true—and nothing could be more true: Pick any other pursuit or study and reflect upon it. Suppose, for instance, there could be no city unless we were all flute-players, each to the best of his ability, and everybody were teaching everybody else this art in public and private and reprimanding the poor players and doing all this unstintingly, just as now no one begrudges or conceals his expertise in what is just and lawful as he does his other professional expertise. For it is to our collective advantage that we each possess justice and virtue, and so we all gladly tell and teach each other what is just and lawful. Well, if we all had the same eagerness and generosity in teaching each other flute-playing, do you think, Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more likely to be good flute-players than the sons of poor flute-players? I don't think so at all. When a son happened to be naturally disposed toward flute-playing, he would progress and become famous; otherwise, he would remain obscure. In many cases the son of a good player would turn out to be a poor one, and the son of a poor player would turn out to be good. But as flute-players, they would all turn out to be capable when compared with ordinary people who had never studied the flute. Likewise you must regard the most unjust person ever reared in a human society under law as a paragon of justice compared

with people lacking education and law courts and the pervasive pressure to cultivate virtue, savages such as the playwright Pherecrates brought on stage at last year's Lenaean festival. There's no doubt that if you found yourself among such people, as did the misanthropes in that play's chorus, you would be delighted to meet up with the likes of Eurybatus and Phrynondas and would sorely miss the immorality of the people here. As it is, Socrates, you affect delicate sensibilities, because everyone here is a teacher of virtue, to the best of his ability, and you can't see a single one. You might as well look for a teacher of Greek; you wouldn't find a single one of those either. Nor would you be any more successful if you asked who could teach the sons of our craftsmen the very arts which they of course learned from their fathers, to the extent that their fathers were competent, and their friends in the trade. It would be difficult to produce someone who could continue their education, whereas it would be easy to find a teacher for the totally unskilled. It is the same with virtue and everything else. If there is someone who is the least bit more advanced in virtue than ourselves, he is to be cherished.

"I consider myself to be such a person, uniquely qualified to assist others in becoming noble and good, and worth the fee that I charge and even more, so much so that even my students agree. This is why I charge according to the following system: a student pays the full price only if he wishes to; otherwise, he goes into a temple, states under oath how much he thinks my lessons are worth, and pays that amount.

"There you have it, Socrates, my mythic story and my argument that virtue is teachable and that the Athenians consider it to be so, and that it is no wonder that worthless sons are born of good fathers and good sons of worthless fathers, since even the sons of Polyclitus, of the same age as Paralus and Xanthippus here, are nothing compared to their

father, and the same is true for the sons of other artisans. But it is not fair to accuse these two yet; there is still hope for them, for they are young."

Socrates/ Protagoras ended his virtuoso performance here and stopped speaking. I was entranced and just looked at him for a long time as if he were going to say more. I was still eager to listen, but when I perceived that he had really stopped I pulled myself together and, looking at Hippocrates, barely managed to say: "Son of Apollodorus, how grateful I am to you for suggesting that I come here. It is marvelous to have heard from Protagoras what I have just heard. Formerly I used to think there was no human practice by which the good become good, but now I am persuaded that there is, except for one small obstacle which Protagoras will explain away, I am sure, since he has explained away so much already. Now, you could hear a speech similar to this from Pericles or some other competent orator if you happened to be present when one of them was speaking on this subject. But try asking one of them something, and they will be as unable to answer your question or to ask one of their own as a book would be. Question the least little thing in their speeches and they will go on like bronze bowls that keep ringing for a long time after they have been struck and prolong the sound indefinitely unless you dampen them. That's how these orators are: Ask them one little question and they're off on another long-distance speech. But Protagoras here, while perfectly capable of delivering a beautiful long speech, as we have just seen, is also able to reply briefly when questioned, and to put a question and then wait for and accept the answer—rare accomplishments these.

"Now, then, Protagoras, I need one little thing, and then I'll have it all, if you'll just answer me this. You say that virtue is teachable, and if there's any human being who could persuade me of this, it's you. But there is one thing you said

that troubles me, and maybe you can satisfy my soul. You said that Zeus sent justice and a sense of shame to the human race. You also said, at many points in your speech, that justice and temperance and piety and all these things were somehow collectively one thing: virtue. Could you go through this again and be more precise? Is virtue a single thing, with justice and temperance and piety its parts, or are the things I have just listed all names for a single entity? This is what still intrigues me."

Protagoras/ "This is an easy question to answer, Socrates, Virtue is a single entity, and the things you are asking about are its parts."

Socrates/ "Parts as in the parts of a face: mouth, nose, eyes, and ears? Or parts as in the parts of gold, where there is no difference, except for size, between parts or between the parts and the whole?"

Protagoras/ "In the former sense, I would think, Socrates: as the parts of the face are to the whole face."

Socrates/ "Then tell me this. Do some people have one part and some another, or do you necessarily have all the parts if you have anyone of them?"

Protagoras/ "By no means, since many are courageous but unjust, and many again are just but not wise."

Socrates/ "Then these also are parts of virtue—wisdom and courage?"

Protagoras/ "Absolutely, and wisdom is the greatest part."

Socrates/ "Is each of them different from the others?"

Protagoras/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "And does each also have its own unique power or function? In the analogy to the parts of the face, the eye is not like the ear, nor is its power or function the same, and this applies to the other parts as well: They are not like each other

in power or function or in any other way. Is this how it is with the parts of virtue? Are they unlike each other, both in themselves and in their powers or functions? Is it not clear that this must be the case, if our analogy is valid?"

Protagoras/ "Yes, it must be the case, Socrates."

Socrates/ "Then, none of the other parts of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like piety?"

Protagoras/ "Agreed."

Socrates/ "Come on, then, and let's consider together what kind of thing each of these is. Here's a good first question: Is justice a thing or is it not a thing? I think it is. What about you?"

Protagoras/ "I think so too."

Socrates/ "The next step, then: Suppose someone asked us, 'Protagoras and Socrates, tell me about this thing you just named, justice. Is it itself just or unjust?' My answer would be that it is just. What would your verdict be? The same as mine or different?"

Protagoras/ "The same."

Socrates/ "Then justice is the sort of thing that is just. That's how I would reply to the questioner. Would you also?"

Protagoras/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "Suppose he questioned us further: 'Do you also say there is a thing called piety?' We would say we do, right?"

Protagoras/ "Right."

Socrates/ "'Do you say this too is a thing?' We would say we do, wouldn't we?"

Protagoras/ "That too."

Socrates/ "Do you say that this thing is by nature impious or pious?' Myself, I would be irritated with this question and would say, 'Quiet, man! How could anything else be pious if

piety itself is not?' What about you? "Wouldn't you answer in the same way?"

Protagoras/ "Absolutely."

Socrates/ "Suppose he asked us next: 'Then what about what you said a little while ago? Maybe I didn't hear you right. I thought you two said that the parts of virtue are related to each other in such a way that no part resembles any other.' I would answer, 'There's nothing wrong with your hearing, except that I didn't say that. Protagoras here said that in answer to my question.' If he were to say then, 'Is he telling the truth, Protagoras? Are you the one who says that one part of virtue is not like another? Is this dictum yours?' how would you answer him?"

Protagoras/ "I would have to admit it, Socrates."

Socrates/ "Well, if we accept that, Protagoras, what are we going to say if he asks next, 'Isn't piety the sort of thing that is just, and isn't justice the sort of thing that is pious? Or is it the sort of thing which is not pious? Is piety the sort of thing to be not just, and therefore unjust, and justice impious?' What are we going to say to him? Personally, I would answer both that justice is pious and piety is just, and I would give the same answer on your behalf (if you would let me), that justice is the same thing as piety, or very similar, and, most emphatically, that justice is the same kind of thing as piety, and piety as justice. What do you think? Will you veto this answer, or are you in agreement with it?"

Protagoras/ "It's not so absolutely clear a case to me, Socrates, as to make me grant that justice is pious, and piety just. It seems a distinction is in order here. But what's the difference? If you want, we'll let justice be pious and piety just."

Socrates/ "Don't do that to me! It's not this 'if you want' or 'if you agree' business I want to test. It's you and me I want to

put on the line, and I think the argument will be tested best if we take the 'if' out."

Protagoras/ "Well, all right. Justice does have some resemblance to piety. Anything at all resembles any other thing in some way. There is a certain way in which white resembles black, and hard soft, and so on for all the usual polar opposites. And the things we were just talking about as having different powers or functions and not being the same kinds of things—the parts of the face—these resemble each other in a certain way, and they are like each other. So by this method you could prove, if you wanted to, that these things too are all like each other. But it's not right to call things similar because they resemble each other in some way, however slight, or to call them dissimilar because there is some slight point of dissimilarity."

Socrates/ I was taken aback, and said to him, "Do you consider the relationship between justice and piety really only one of some slight similarity?"

Protagoras/ "Not exactly, but not what you seem to think it is either."

Socrates/ "Well, then, since you seem to me to be annoyed about this, let's drop it and consider another point that you raised. Do you acknowledge that there is such a thing as folly?"

Protagoras/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "And diametrically opposed to it is wisdom?"

Protagoras/ "It seems so to me."

Socrates/ "And when people act correctly and beneficially, do they seem to you to be acting temperately or the opposite?"

Protagoras/ "Temperately."

Socrates/ "Then it is by virtue of temperance that they are temperate?"

Protagoras/ “It has to be.”

Socrates/ “And those who do not act correctly act foolishly, and those who act this way are not temperate?”

Protagoras/ “I agree.”

Socrates/ “And the opposite of acting foolishly is acting temperately?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And foolish behavior comes from folly, just as temperate behavior comes from temperance?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And if something is done with strength, it is done strongly; if done with weakness, it is done weakly?”

Protagoras/ “I agree.”

Socrates/ “If it is done with quickness, it is done quickly, and if with slowness, slowly?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “So whatever is done in a certain way is done through the agency of a certain quality, and whatever is done in the opposite way is done through the agency of its opposite?”

Protagoras/ “I agree.”

Socrates/ “Then let’s go. Is there such a thing as beauty?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Is there any opposite to it except ugliness?”

Protagoras/ “There is not.”

Socrates/ “Is there such a thing as goodness?”

Protagoras/ “There is.”

Socrates/ “Is there any opposite to it except badness?”

Protagoras/ “There is not.”

Socrates/ “Is there such a thing as a shrill tone?”

Protagoras/ “There is.”

Socrates/ “Is there any opposite to it except a deep tone?”

Protagoras/ “No, there is not.”

Socrates/ “So for each thing that can have an opposite, there is only one opposite, not many?”

Protagoras/ “I agree.”

Socrates/ “Suppose we now count up our points of agreement. Have we agreed that there is one opposite for one thing, and no more?”

Protagoras/ “Yes, we have.”

Socrates/ “And that what is done in an opposite way is done through the agency of opposites?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And have we agreed that what is done foolishly is done in a way opposite to what is done temperately?”

Protagoras/ “We have.”

Socrates/ “And that what is done temperately is done through temperance, and what is done foolishly is done through folly?”

Protagoras/ “Agreed.”

Socrates/ “And it’s true that if it’s done in an opposite way, it is done through the agency of an opposite?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And one is done through temperance, the other through folly?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “In an opposite way?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Through opposing agencies?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Then folly is the opposite of temperance?”

Protagoras/ “It seems so.”

Socrates/ “Well, then, do you recall our previous agreement that folly is the opposite of wisdom?”

Protagoras/ “Yes, I do.”

Socrates/ “And that one thing has only one opposite?”

Protagoras/ “Of course.”

Socrates/ “Then which of these propositions should we abandon, Protagoras? The proposition that for one thing there is only one opposite, or the one stating that wisdom is different from temperance and that each is a part of virtue, and that in addition to being distinct they are dissimilar, both in themselves and in their powers or functions, just like the parts of a face? Which should we abandon? The two statements are dissonant; they are not in harmony with one another. How could they be, if there is one and only one opposite for each single thing, while folly, which is a single thing, evidently has two opposites, wisdom and temperance? Isn’t this how it stands, Protagoras?”

He assented, although very grudgingly, and I continued:

“Wouldn’t that make wisdom and temperance one thing? And a little while ago it looked like justice and piety were nearly the same thing. Come on, Protagoras, we can’t quit now, not before we’ve tied up these loose ends. So, does someone who acts unjustly seem temperate to you in that he acts unjustly?”

Protagoras/ “I would be ashamed to say that is so, Socrates, although many people do say it.”

Socrates/ “Then shall I address myself to them or to you?”

Protagoras/ “If you like, why don’t you debate the majority position first?”

Socrates/ “It makes no difference to me, provided you give the answers, whether it is your own opinion or not. I am

primarily interested in testing the argument, although it may happen both that the questioner, myself, and my respondent wind up being tested."

At first Protagoras played it coy, claiming the argument was too hard for him to handle, but after a while he consented to answer.

"Let's start all over, then, with this question. Do you think some people are being sensible when they act unjustly?"

Protagoras/ "Let us grant it."

Socrates/ "And by 'sensible' you mean having good sense?"

Protagoras/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "And having good sense means having good judgment in acting unjustly?"

Protagoras/ "Granted."

Socrates/ "Whether or not they get good results by acting unjustly?"

Protagoras/ "Only if they get good results."

Socrates/ "Are you saying, then, that there are things that are good?"

Protagoras/ "I am."

Socrates/ "These good things constitute what is advantageous to people?"

Protagoras/ "Good God, yes! And even if they are not advantageous to people, I can still call them good."

Socrates/ I could see that Protagoras was really worked up and struggling by now and that he was dead set against answering any more. Accordingly, I carefully modified the tone of my questions.

"Do you mean things that are advantageous to no human being, Protagoras, or things that are of no advantage whatsoever? Do you call things like that good?"

Protagoras/ “Of course not, But I know of many things that are disadvantageous to humans, foods and drinks and drugs and many other things, and some that are advantageous; some that are neither to humans but one or the other to horses; some that are advantageous only to cattle; some only to dogs; some that are advantageous to none of these but are so to trees; some that are good for the roots of a tree, but bad for its shoots, such as manure, which is good spread on the roots of any plant but absolutely ruinous if applied to the new stems and branches. Or take olive oil, which is extremely bad for all plants and is the worst enemy of the hair of all animals except humans, for whose hair it is beneficial, as it is for the rest of their bodies. But the good is such a multifaceted and variable thing that, in the case of oil, it is good for the external parts of the human body but very bad for the internal parts, which is why doctors universally forbid their sick patients to use oil in their diets except for the least bit, just enough to dispel a prepared meal’s unappetizing aroma.”

Socrates/ When the applause for this speech of Protagoras had died down, I said, “Protagoras, I tend to be a forgetful sort of person, and if someone speaks to me at length I tend to forget the subject of the speech. Now, if I happened to be hard of hearing and you were going to converse with me, you would think you had better speak louder to me than to others. In the same way, now that you have fallen in with a forgetful person, you will have to cut your answers short if I am going to follow you.”

Protagoras/ “How short are you ordering me to make my answers? Shorter than necessary?”

Socrates/ “By no means.”

Protagoras/ “As long as necessary?”

Socrates/ “Yes.”

Protagoras/ “Then should I answer at the length I think necessary or the length you think necessary?”

Socrates/ “Well, I have heard, anyway, that when you are instructing someone in a certain subject, you are able to speak at length, if you choose, and never get off the subject, or to speak so briefly that no one could be briefer. So if you are going to converse with me, please use the latter form of expression, brevity.”

Protagoras/ “Socrates, I have had verbal contests with many people, and if I were to accede to your request and do as my opponent demanded, I would not be thought superior to anyone, nor would Protagoras be a name to be reckoned with among the Greeks.”

Socrates/ I could see he was uncomfortable with his previous answers and that he would no longer be willing to go on answering in a dialectical discussion, so I considered my work with him to be finished, and I said so: “You know, Protagoras, I’m not exactly pleased myself that our session has not gone the way you think it should. But if you are ever willing to hold a discussion in such a way that I can follow, I will participate in it with you. People say of you—and you say yourself—that you are able to discuss things speaking either at length or briefly. You are a wise man, after all. But I don’t have the ability to make those long speeches: I only wish I did. It was up to you, who have the ability to do both, to make this concession, so that the discussion could have had a chance. But since you’re not willing, and I’m somewhat busy and unable to stay for your extended speeches—there’s somewhere I have to go—I’ll be leaving now. Although I’m sure it would be rather nice to hear them.”

Having had my say, I stood up as if to go, but as I was getting up, Callias took hold of my wrist with his right hand and grasped this cloak I’m wearing with his left.

Callias/ “We won’t let you go, Socrates, Our discussions wouldn’t be the same without you, so please stay here with us, I beg you. There’s nothing I would rather hear than you and Protagoras in debate. Please do us all a favor.”

Socrates/ By now I was on my feet and really making as if to leave. I said, “Son of Hipponicus, I have always admired your love of wisdom, and I especially honor and hold it dear now. I would be more than willing to gratify you, if you would ask me something that is possible for me. As it is, you might as well be asking me to keep up with Crison of Himera, the champion sprinter, or to compete with the distance runners, or match strides with the couriers who run all day long. What could I say, except that I want it for myself more than you want it for me, but I simply cannot match these runners’ pace, and if you want to watch me running in the same race with Crison, you must ask him to slow down to my speed, since I am not able to run fast, but he is able to run slowly. So if you have your heart set on hearing me and Protagoras, you must ask him to answer my questions now as he did at the outset—briefly. If he doesn’t, what turn will our dialogue take? To me, the mutual exchange of a dialogue is something quite distinct from a public address.”

Callias/ “But you see, Socrates, Protagoras has a point when he says that he ought to be allowed, no less then you, to conduct the discussion as he sees fit.”

Socrates/ At this point Alcibiades jumped in and said:

Alcibiades/ “You’re not making sense, Callias. Socrates admits that long speeches are beyond him and concedes to Protagoras on that score. But when it comes to dialectical discussion and understanding the give and take of argument, I would be surprised if he yields to anyone. Now, if Protagoras admits that he is Socrates’ inferior in dialectic, that should be enough for Socrates. But if he contests the point, let him

engage in a question-and-answer dialogue and not spin out a long speech every time he answers, fending off the issues because he doesn't want to be accountable, and going on and on until most of the listeners have forgotten what the question was about, although I guarantee you Socrates won't forget, no matter how he jokes about his memory. So I think that Socrates has a stronger case. Each of us ought to make clear his own opinion."

Socrates/ After Alcibiades it was Critias, I think, who spoke next:

Critias/ "Well, Prodicus and Hippias, it seems to be that Callias is very much on Protagoras' side, while Alcibiades as usual wants to be on the winning side of a good fight. But there's no need for any of us to lend partisan support to either Socrates or Protagoras. We should instead join in requesting them both not to break up our meeting prematurely."

Socrates/ Prodicus spoke up next:

Prodicus/ "That's well said, Critias. Those who attend discussions such as this ought to listen impartially, but not equally, to both interlocutors. There is a distinction here. We ought to listen impartially but not divide our attention equally: More should go to the wiser speaker and less to the more unlearned. For my part, I think that the two of you ought to debate the issues, but dispense with eristics. Friends debate each other on good terms; eristics are for enemies at odds. In this way our meeting would take a most attractive turn, for you, the speakers, would then most surely earn the respect, rather than the praise, of those of us listening to you. For respect is guilelessly inherent in the souls of the listeners, but praise is all too often merely a deceitful verbal expression. And then, too, we, your audience, would be most cheered, but not pleased, for to be cheered is to learn something, to participate in some intellectual activity, and is a mental state; but to be

pleased has to do with eating or experiencing some other pleasure in one's body."

Socrates/ Prodicus' remarks were enthusiastically received by the majority of us, and then the wise Hippias spoke:

Hippias/ "Gentlemen, I regard all of you here present as kinsmen, intimates, and fellow citizens by nature, not by convention. For like is akin to like by nature, but convention, which tyrannizes the human race, often constrains us contrary to nature. Therefore it would be disgraceful for us to understand the nature of things and not—being as we are the wisest of the Greeks and gathered here together in this veritable hall of wisdom, in this greatest and most august house of the city itself—not, I say, produce anything worthy of all this dignity, but bicker with each other as if we were the dregs of society. I therefore implore and counsel you, Protagoras and Socrates, to be reconciled and to compromise, under our arbitration, as it were, on some middle course. You, Socrates, must not insist on that precise, excessively brief form of discussion if it does not suit Protagoras, but rather allow free rein to the speeches, so that they might communicate to us more impressively and elegantly. And you, Protagoras, must not let out full sail in the wind and leave the land behind to disappear into the Sea of Rhetoric. Both of you must steer a middle course. So that's what you shall do, and take my advice and choose a referee or moderator or supervisor who will monitor for you the length of your speeches."

Socrates/ Everyone there thought this was a fine idea and gave it their approval. Callias said he wouldn't let me go, and they requested me to choose a moderator. I said it would be unseemly to choose someone to umpire our speeches. "If the person chosen is going to be our inferior, it is not right for an inferior to supervise his superiors. If he's our peer that's no good either, because he will do the same as we would and be

superfluous. Choose someone who's our superior? I honestly think it's impossible for you to choose someone wiser than Protagoras. And if you choose someone who is not his superior but claim that he is, then you're insulting him. Protagoras is just not the insignificant sort of person for whom you appoint a supervisor. For myself, I don't care one way or another. But you have your heart set on this conference and these discussions proceeding, and if that's going to happen, this is what I want to do. If Protagoras is not willing to answer questions, let him ask them, and I will answer, and at the same time I will try to show him how I think the answerer ought to answer. When I've answered all the questions he wishes to ask, then it's his turn to be accountable to me in the same way. So if he doesn't seem ready and willing to answer the actual question asked, you and I will unite in urgently requesting him, as you have requested me, not to ruin our conference. This will not require anyone supervisor, since you will all supervise together."

Everyone agreed this was the thing to do. Protagoras wanted no part of it, but he had to agree to ask questions, and when he had asked enough, to respond in turn with short answers.

So he began to ask questions something like this:

Protagoras/ "I consider, Socrates, that the greatest part of a man's education is to be in command of poetry, by which I mean the ability to understand the words of the poets, to know when a poem is correctly composed and when not, and to know how to analyze a poem and to respond to questions about it. So my line of questioning now will still concern the subject of our present discussion, namely virtue, but translated into the sphere of poetry. Now, Simonides somewhere says to Scopas, the son of Creon of Thessaly:

For a man to become good truly is hard,

> in hands and feet and mind foursquare,
> blamelessly built …

Do you know this lyric ode, or shall I recite it all for you?"

Socrates/ I told him there was no need, for I knew the poem, and it happened to be one to which I had given especially careful attention.

Protagoras/ "Good, So, do you think it's well made or not?"

Socrates/ "Very well made."

Protagoras/ "And do you think it's well made if the poet contradicts himself?"

Socrates/ "No."

Protagoras/ "Take a better look then."

Socrates/ "As I've said, I'm already familiar enough with it."

Protagoras/ "Then you must know that at some point later in the ode he says:

> Nor is Pittacus' proverb in tune
> however wise a man he was.
> Hard it is to be good.

"You do recognize that both these things are said by the same person?"

Socrates/ "I do."

Protagoras/ "Well, do you think that the latter is consistent with the former?"

Socrates/ "It seems so to me." I said (but as I said it I was afraid he had a point there). "Doesn't it seem so to you?"

Protagoras/ "How can anyone who says both these things be consistent? First, he asserts himself that it is hard for a man truly to become good, and then, a little further on in his poem he forgets and criticizes Pittacus for saying the same thing as he did, that it is hard for a man to be good, and refuses to accept from him the same thing that he himself said. And yet, when he criticizes him for saying the same thing

as himself, he obviously criticizes himself as well, so either the earlier or the later must not be right."

Socrates/ Protagoras got a noisy round of applause for this speech. At first I felt as if I had been hit by a good boxer. Everything went black and I was reeling from Protagoras' oratory and the others' clamor. Then, to tell you the truth, to stall for time to consider what the poet meant, I turned to Prodicus and, calling on him, "Prodicus, Simonides was from your hometown, wasn't he? It's your duty to come to the man's rescue, so I don't mind calling for your help, just as Homer says Scamander called Simois to help him when he was besieged by Achilles:

> Dear brother, let's buck this hero's strength together.

So also do I summon your aid, lest to our dismay Protagoras destroy Simonides. But really, Prodicus, Simonides' rehabilitation does require your special art, by which you distinguish 'wanting' from 'desiring' and make all the other fine distinctions that you did just a while ago. So tell me if you agree with me, because it's not clear to me that Simonides does in fact contradict himself. Just give us your offhand opinion. Are becoming and being the same or different?"

Prodicus/ "Good heavens, different."

Socrates/ "All right. Now, in the first passage, Simonides declared as his own opinion that it is hard for a man truly to become good."

Protagoras/ "That's right."

Socrates/ "Then he criticizes Pittacus not for saying the same thing as himself, as Protagoras thinks, but for saying something different. Because Pittacus did not say that it is hard to become good, as Simonides said, but to be good. As Prodicus here says, being and becoming are not the same thing, Protagoras. And if being is not the same as becoming, Simonides does not contradict himself. Perhaps Prodicus and

many others might agree with Hesiod that it is difficult to become good:

> The gods put Goodness where we have to sweat
> To get at her. But once you reach the top
> She's as easy to have as she was hard at first."

Prodicus applauded me when he heard this, but Protagoras said;

Protagoras/ "Your rehabilitation, Socrates, has a crippling error greater than the one you are correcting."

Socrates/ "Then I've done my work badly, and I am the ridiculous sort of physician whose cure is worse than the disease."

Protagoras/ "That's exactly right."

Socrates/ "How so?"

Protagoras/ "The poet's ignorance would be monumental if he says the possession of virtue is so trivial when everyone agrees it is the hardest thing in the world."

Socrates/ Then I said, "By heaven, Prodicus' participation in our discussion couldn't be more timely. It may well be, Protagoras, that Prodicus' wisdom is of ancient and divine origin, dating back to the time of Simonides or even earlier. But although your experience is very broad, it does not seem to extend to this branch of wisdom, which I have been schooled in as a pupil of Prodicus. And now it appears that you do not understand that Simonides may well have not conceived of the word 'hard' as you do. In much the same way Prodicus corrects me each time I use the word 'terrible' to praise you or someone else, as, for example, 'Protagoras is a terribly wise man.' When I say that, he asks me if I am not ashamed to call good things terrible. For terrible, he says, is bad. No one ever speaks of terrible wealth, or terrible peace, or terrible well-being, but we do hear of terrible disease, terrible war, and terrible poverty, 'terrible' here being 'bad.' So

perhaps the Ceans and Simonides conceived of 'hard' as 'bad' or something else that you do not understand. Let's ask Prodicus. He's just the right person to consult on Simonides' dialect. Prodicus, what did Simonides mean by 'hard'?"

Prodicus/ "Bad."

Socrates/ "Then this is why he criticizes Pittacus for saying it is hard to be good, just as if he had heard him say it is bad to be good. Right, Prodicus?"

Prodicus/ "What else do you think Simonides meant, Socrates? He was censuring Pittacus, a man from Lesbos brought up in a barbarous dialect, for not distinguishing words correctly."

Socrates/ "Well, Protagoras, you hear Prodicus. Do you have anything to say in response?"

Protagoras/ "You've got it all wrong, Prodicus, I am positive that Simonides meant by 'hard' the same thing we do: not bad,' but whatever is not easy and takes a lot of effort."

Socrates/ "Oh, but I think so too, Protagoras, This is what Simonides meant, and Prodicus knows it. He was joking and thought he would test your ability to defend your own statement. The best proof that Simonides did not mean that 'hard' is 'bad' is found in the very next phrase, which says:

> God alone can have this privilege.

He cannot very well mean that it is bad to be good if he then says that God alone has this privilege. Prodicus would call Simonides a reprobate for that and no Cean at all. But I would like to tell you what I think Simonides' purpose is in this ode, if you would like to test my command (to use your term) of poetry. If you'd rather, though, I'll listen to you."

Protagoras heard me out and said;

Protagoras/ "If you please, Socrates."

Socrates/ and then Prodicus, Hippias, and the others urged me on.

"All right, then, I will try to explain to you what I think this poem is about. Philosophy, first of all, has its most ancient roots and is most widespread among the Greeks in Crete and Lacedaemon, and those regions have the highest concentration of sophists in the world. But the natives deny it and pretend to be ignorant in order to conceal the fact that it is by their wisdom that they are the leaders of the Greek world, something like those sophists Protagoras was talking about. Their public image is that they owe their superiority to their brave fighting men, and their reason for promoting this image is that if the real basis for their superiority were discovered, i.e., wisdom, everyone else would start cultivating it. This is top secret; not even the Spartanizing cults in the other cities know about it, and so you have all these people getting their ears mangled aping the Spartans, lacing on leather gloves, exercising fanatically and wearing short capes, as if Sparta's political power depended on these things. And when the citizens in Sparta want some privacy to have free and open discussions with their sophists, they pass alien acts against any Spartanizers and other foreigners in town, and conceal their meetings from the rest of the world. And so that their young men won't unlearn what they are taught, they do not permit any of them to travel to other cities (the Cretans don't either). Crete and Sparta are places where there are not only men but women also who take pride in their education. You know how to test the truth of my contention that the Spartans have the best education in philosophy and debate? Pick any ordinary Spartan and talk with him for a while. At first you will find he can barely hold up his end of the conversation, but at some point he will pick his spot with deadly skill and shoot back a terse remark you'll never forget, something that will make the person he's talking with (in this case you) look

like a child. Acute observers have known this for a long time now: To be a Spartan is to be a philosopher much more than to be an athlete. They know that to be able to say something like that is the mark of a perfectly educated man. We're talking about men like Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, our own Solon, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chen, and, the seventh in the list, Chilon of Sparta. All of these emulated, loved, and studied Spartan culture. You can see that distinctive kind of Spartan wisdom in their pithy, memorable sayings, which they jointly dedicated as the first fruits of their wisdom to Apollo in his temple at Delphi, inscribing there the maxims now on everyone's lips: 'Know thyself' and 'Nothing in excess.'

"What is my point? That the characteristic style of ancient philosophy was laconic brevity. It was in this context that the saying of Pittacus—It is hard to be good—was privately circulated with approval among the sages. Then Simonides, ambitious for philosophical fame, saw that if he could score a takedown against this saying, as if it were a famous wrestler, and get the better of it, he would himself become famous in his own lifetime. So he composed this poem as a deliberate attack against this maxim. That's how it seems to me.

"Let's test my hypothesis together, to see whether what I say is true. If all the poet wanted to say was that it is hard to become good, then the beginning of the poem would be crazy, for he inserted there an antithetical particle. It doesn't make any sense to insert this unless one supposes that Simonides is addressing the Pittacus maxim as an opponent. Pittacus says it is hard to be good; Simonides rebuts this by saying, 'No, but it is hard for a man to become good, Pittacus, truly.' Notice that he does not say truly good; he is not talking about truth in the context of some things being truly good and other things being good but not truly so. This would create an impression of naïveté very unlike Simonides. The position of

‘truly’ in the verse must be a case of hyperbaton. We have to approach this maxim of Pittacus by imagining him speaking and Simonides replying, something like this: Pittacus: ‘Gentlemen, it is hard to be good.’ Simonides: ‘What you say is not true, Pittacus, for it is not being but becoming good, in hands and feet and mind foursquare, blamelessly built—that is hard truly.’ This way the insertion of the antithetical particle makes sense, and the ‘truly’ feels correct in its position at the end. Everything that comes after is evidence for this interpretation. The poem is full of details that testify to its excellent composition; indeed, it is a lovely and exquisitely crafted piece, but it would take a long time to go through it from that point of view. Let’s review instead the overall structure and intention of the ode, which is from beginning to end a refutation of Pittacus’ maxim.

“A few lines later he states (imagine he is making a speech): ‘To become good truly is hard, and although it may be possible for a short period of time, to persist in that state and to be a good man, as you put it, Pittacus, is not humanly possible. God alone can have this privilege;

> But that man inevitably is bad
> whom incapacitating misfortune throws down.

“Whom does incapacitating misfortune throw down when it comes to, say, the command of a ship? Clearly not the ordinary passenger, who is always susceptible. You can’t knock down someone already supine; you can only knock down someone standing up an’ render him supine. In the same way, incapacitating misfortune would overthrow only someone who is capable, not the chronically incapable. A hurricane striking a pilot would incapacitate him, a bad season will do it to a farmer, and the same thing applies to a doctor. For the good is susceptible to becoming bad, as another poet testifies:

> The good man is at times bad, at times good.

“But the bad is not susceptible to becoming; it must always be. So that when incapacitating misfortune throws down a man who is capable, wise, and good, he must inevitably be bad. You say, Pittacus, that it is hard to be good; in fact, to become good is hard, though possible, but to be good is impossible.

> Faring well, every man is good;
> Bad, faring ill.

“What does it mean to fare well in letters; what makes a man good at them? Clearly, the learning of letters. What kind of faring well makes a good doctor? Clearly, learning how to cure the sick. ‘Bad, faring ill’: who could become a bad doctor? Clearly, someone who is, first, a doctor and, second, a good doctor. He could in fact become a bad doctor, but we who are medical laymen could never by faring ill become doctors or carpenters or any other kind of professional. And if one cannot become a doctor by faring ill, clearly one cannot become a bad one either. In the same way a good man may eventually become bad with the passage of time, or through hardship, disease, or some other circumstance that involves the only real kind of faring ill, which is the loss of knowledge. But the bad man can never become bad, for he is so all the time. If he is to become bad, he must first become good. So the tenor of this part of the poem is that it is impossible to be a good man and continue to be good, but possible for one and the same person to become good and also bad, and those are best for the longest time whom the gods love.’

“All this is directed at Pittacus, as the next few lines of the poem make even clearer:

> Therefore never shall I seek for the impossible,
> cast away my life’s lot on empty hope, a quixotic quest
> for a blameless man among those who reap the broad earth’s fruit,
> but if I find him you will have my report.

This is strong language, and he keeps up his attack on Pittacus' maxim throughout the poem:

> All who do no wrong willingly
> I praise and love.
> Necessity not even the gods resist.

Socrates/ This is spoken to the same end. For Simonides was not so uneducated as to say that he praised all who did nothing bad willingly, as if there were anyone who willingly did bad things. I am pretty sure that none of the wise men thinks that any human being willingly makes a mistake or willingly does anything wrong or bad. They know very well that anyone who does anything wrong or bad does so involuntarily. So also Simonides, who does not say that he praises those who willingly do nothing bad; rather he applies the term 'willingly' to himself. He perceived that a good man, an honorable man, often forces himself to love and praise someone utterly different from himself, one's alienated father perhaps, or mother, or country. Scoundrels in a similar situation are almost happy to see their parents' or country's trouble and viciously point it out and denounce it so that their own dereliction of duty toward them will not be called into question. They actually exaggerate their complaints and add gratuitous to unavoidable hostility, whereas good men conceal the trouble and force themselves to give praise, and if they are angry because their parents or country wronged them, they calm themselves down and reconcile themselves to it, and they force themselves to love and praise their own people. I think that Simonides reflected that on more than one occasion he himself had eulogized some tyrant or other such person, not willingly but because he had to. So he is saying to Pittacus: Pittacus, it is not because I am an overcritical person that I am criticizing you, since;

> enough for me a man who is not bad
> nor too intractable, who knows civic Right, a sound man.

I shall not blame him, for I am not fond of blame.
Infinite the tribe of fools.'

the implication being that a censorious person would have his hands full blaming them.

'All is fair in which foul is not mixed.'

The sense here is not that all is white in which black is not mixed, which would be ludicrous in many ways, but rather that he himself accepts without any objection what is in between. 'I do not seek.' he says;

'for a blameless man among those who reap the broad earth's fruit,
but if I find him you will have my report.'

The meaning is that 'on those terms I will never praise anyone, but I am happy with an average man who does no wrong, since I willingly

praise and love all'—

—note the Lesbian dialect form of the verb 'praise,' since he is addressing Pittacus—

'all who do no wrong'

(this is where the pause should be, before 'willingly')

'willingly
I praise and love

but there are some whom I praise and love unwillingly. So if you spoke something even moderately reasonable and true, Pittacus, I would never censure you. But the fact is that you have lied blatantly yet with verisimilitude about extremely important issues, and for that I do censure you.'

"And that, Prodicus and Protagoras, is what I think was going through Simonides' mind when he composed this ode."

Then Hippias said:

Hippias/ "I am favorably impressed by your analysis of this ode, Socrates. I have quite a nice talk on it myself, which I will present to you if you wish."

Alcibiades/ “Yes, Hippias, some other time, though. What should be done now is what Socrates and Protagoras agreed upon, which is for Socrates to answer any questions Protagoras may still have to ask, or if he so chooses, to answer Socrates’ questions.”

Socrates/ “I leave it up to Protagoras, but if it’s all right with him, why don’t we say good-bye to odes and poetry and get back to what I first asked him, a question, Protagoras, which I would be glad to settle in a joint investigation with you. Discussing poetry strikes me as no different from the second-rate drinking parties of the agora crowd. These people, largely uneducated and unable to entertain themselves over their wine by using their own voices to generate conversation, pay premium prices for flute-girls and rely on the extraneous voice of the reed flute as background music for their parties. But when well-educated gentlemen drink together, you will not see girls playing the flute or the lyre or dancing, but a group that knows how to get together without these childish frivolities, conversing civilly no matter how heavily they are drinking. Ours is such a group, if indeed it consists of men such as most of us claim to be, and it should require no extraneous voices, not even of poets, who cannot be questioned on what they say. When a poet is brought up in a discussion, almost everyone has a different opinion about what he means, and they wind up arguing about something they can never finally decide. The best people avoid such discussions and rely on their own powers of speech to entertain themselves and test each other. These people should be our models. We should put the poets aside and converse directly with each other, testing the truth and our own ideas. If you have more questions to ask, I am ready to answer them; or, if you prefer, you can render the same service to me, and we can resume where we broke off and try to reach a conclusion.”

I went on in this vein, but Protagoras would not state clearly which alternative he preferred. So Alcibiades looked over at Callias and said;

Alcibiades/ "Callias, do you think Protagoras is behaving well in not making it clear whether he will participate in the discussion or not? I certainly don't. He should either participate or say he is not going to, so we will know how he stands, and Socrates, or whoever, can start a discussion with someone else."

Socrates/ It looked to me that Protagoras was embarrassed by Alcibiades' words, not to mention the insistence of Callias and practically the whole company. In the end he reluctantly brought himself to resume our dialogue and indicated he was ready to be asked questions.

"Protagoras, I don't want you to think that my motive in talking with you is anything else than to take a good hard look at things that continually perplex me. I think that Homer said it all in the line;

> Going in tandem, one perceives before the other.

Human beings are simply more resourceful this way in action, speech, and thought. If someone has a private perception, he immediately starts going around and looking until he finds somebody he can show it to and have it corroborated. And there is a particular reason why I would rather talk with you than anyone else: I think you are the best qualified to investigate the sort of things that decent and respectable individuals ought to examine, and virtue especially. Who else but you? Not only do you consider yourself to be noble and good but, unlike others who are themselves decent and respectable individuals yet unable to make others so, you are not only good yourself but able to make others good as well, and you have so much self-confidence that instead of concealing this skill, as others do, you advertise it openly to

the whole Greek world, calling yourself a sophist, highlighting yourself as a teacher of virtue, the first ever to have deemed it appropriate to charge a fee for this. How could I not solicit your help in a joint investigation of these questions? There is no way I could not.

"So right now I want you to remind me of some of the questions I first asked, starting from the beginning. Then I want to proceed together to take a good hard look at some other questions. I believe the first question was this: Wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and piety—are these five names for the same thing, or is there underlying each of these names a unique thing, a thing with its own power or function, each one unlike any of the others? You said that they are not names for the same thing, that each of these names refers to a unique thing, and that all these are parts of virtue, not like the parts of gold, which are similar to each other and to the whole of which they are parts, but like the parts of a face, dissimilar to the whole of which they are parts and to each other, and each one having its own unique power or function. If this is still your view, say so; if it's changed in any way, make your new position clear, for I am certainly not going to hold you accountable for what you said before if you want to say something at all different now. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if you were just trying out something on me before."

Protagoras/ "What I am saying to you, Socrates, is that all these are parts of virtue, and that while four of them are reasonably close to each other, courage is completely different from all the rest. The proof that what I am saying is true is that you will find many people who are extremely unjust, impious, intemperate, and ignorant, and yet exceptionally courageous."

Socrates/ "Hold it right there, This is worth looking into. Would you say courageous men are confident, or something else?"

Protagoras/ “Confident, yes, and ready for action where most men would be afraid.”

Socrates/ “Well, then, do you agree that virtue is something fine, and that you offer yourself as a teacher of it because it is fine?”

Protagoras/ “The finest thing of all, unless I am quite out of my mind.”

Socrates/ “Then is part of it worthless and part of it fine, or all of it fine?”

Protagoras/ “Surely it is all as fine as can be.”

Socrates/ “Do you know who dives confidently into wells?”

Protagoras/ “Of course, divers.”

Socrates/ “Is this because they know what they are doing, or for some other reason?”

Protagoras/ “Because they know what they are doing.”

Socrates/ “Who are confident in fighting from horseback? Riders or nonriders?”

Protagoras/ “Riders.”

Socrates/ “And in fighting with shields? Shieldmen or nonshieldmen?”

Protagoras/ “Shieldmen, and so on down the line, if that’s what you’re getting at. Those with the right kind of knowledge are always more confident than those without it, and a given individual is more confident after he acquires it than he was before.”

Socrates/ “But haven’t you ever seen men lacking knowledge of all of these occupations yet confident in each of them?”

Protagoras/ “I have, all too confident.”

Socrates/ “Is their confidence courage?”

Protagoras/ “No, because courage would then be contemptible. These men are out of their minds.”

Socrates/ “Then what do you mean by courageous men? Aren’t they those who are confident?”

Protagoras/ “I still hold by that.”

Socrates/ “Then these men who are so confident turn out to be not courageous but mad? And, on the other side, the wisest are the most confident and the most confident are the most courageous? And the logical conclusion would be that wisdom is courage?”

Protagoras/ “You are doing a poor job of remembering what I said when I answered your questions, Socrates. When I was asked if the courageous are confident, I agreed. I was not asked if the confident are courageous. If you had asked me that, I would have said, ‘Not all of them.’ You have nowhere shown that my assent to the proposition that the courageous are confident was in error. What you did show next was that knowledge increases one’s confidence and makes one more confident than those without knowledge. In consequence of this you conclude that courage and wisdom are the same thing. But by following this line of reasoning you could conclude that strength and wisdom are the same thing. First you would ask me if the strong are powerful, and I would say yes. Then, if those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who do not, and if individual wrestlers became more powerful after they learn than they were before.

Again I would say yes. After I had agreed to these things, it would be open to you to use precisely these points of agreement to prove that wisdom is strength. But nowhere in this process do I agree that the powerful are strong, only that the strong are powerful. Strength and power are not the same thing. Power derives from knowledge and also from madness and passionate emotion. Strength comes from nature and

proper nurture of the body. So also confidence and courage are not the same thing, with the consequence that the courageous are confident, but not all those who are confident are courageous. For confidence, like power, comes from skill (and from passionate emotion and madness as well); courage, from nature and the proper nurture of the soul."

Socrates/ "Would you say, Protagoras, that some people live well and others live badly?"

Protagoras/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "But does it seem to you that a person lives well, if he lives distressed and in pain?"

Protagoras/ "No, indeed."

Socrates/ "Now, if he completed his life, having lived pleasantly, does he not seem to you to have lived well?"

Protagoras/ "It seems that way to me."

Socrates/ "So, then, to live pleasantly is good, and unpleasantly, bad?"

Protagoras/ "Yes, so long as he lived having taken pleasure in honorable things."

Socrates/ "What, Protagoras?" Surely you don't, like most people, call some pleasant things bad and some painful things good? I mean, isn't a pleasant thing good just insofar as it is pleasant, that is, if it results in nothing other than pleasure; and, on the other hand, aren't painful things bad in the same way, just insofar as they are painful?"

Protagoras/ "I don't know, Socrates, if I should answer as simply as you put the question—that everything pleasant is good and everything painful is bad. It seems to me to be safer to respond not merely with my present answer in mind but from the point of view of my life overall, that on the one hand, there are pleasurable things which are not good, and on the other hand, there are painful things which are not bad but

some which are, and a third class which is neutral—neither bad or good."

Socrates/ "You call pleasant things those which partake of pleasure or produce pleasure?"

Protagoras/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "So my question is this: Just insofar as things are pleasurable are they good? I am asking whether pleasure itself is not a good."

Protagoras/ "Just as you always say, Socrates, let us inquire into this matter, and if your claim seems reasonable and it is established that pleasure and the good are the same, then we will come to agreement; otherwise we will disagree."

Socrates/ "Do you wish to lead this inquiry, or shall I?"

Protagoras/ "It is fitting for you to lead, for it is you who brought up the idea."

Socrates/ "All right, will this help to make it clear? When someone evaluates a man's health or other functions of the body through his appearance, he looks at the face and extremities, and might say: 'Show me your chest and back too, so that I can make a better examination.' That's the kind of investigation I want to make. Having seen how you stand on the good and the pleasant, I need to say something like this to you: Come now, Protagoras, and reveal this about your mind: What do you think about knowledge? Do you go along with the majority or not? Most people think this way about it, that it is not a powerful thing, neither a leader nor a ruler. They do not think of it in that way at all; but rather in this way: while knowledge is often present in a man, what rules him is not knowledge but rather anything else—sometimes desire, sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain, at other times love, often fear; they think of his knowledge as being utterly dragged around by all these other things as if it were a slave. Now, does the matter seem like that to you, or does it seem to

you that knowledge is a fine thing capable of ruling a person, and if someone were to know what is good and bad, then he would not be forced by anything to act otherwise than knowledge dictates, and intelligence would be sufficient to save a person?"

Protagoras/ "Not only does it seem just as you say, Socrates, but further, it would be shameful indeed for me above all people to say that wisdom and knowledge are anything but the most powerful forces in human activity."

Socrates/ "Right you are. You realize that most people aren't going to be convinced by us. They maintain that most people are unwilling to do what is best, even though they know what it is and are able to do it. And when I have asked them the reason for this, they say that those who act that way do so because they are overcome by pleasure or pain or are being ruled by one of the things I referred to just now."

Protagoras/ "I think people say a lot of other things erroneously too, Socrates."

Socrates/ "Come with me, then, and let's try to persuade people and to teach them what is this experience which they call being overcome by pleasure, because of which they fail to do the best thing when they know what it is. For perhaps if we told them that what they were saying isn't true, but is demonstrably false, they would ask us: 'Protagoras and Socrates, if this is not the experience of being overcome by pleasure, but something other than that, what do you two say it is? Tell us.'"

Protagoras/ "Socrates, why is it necessary for us to investigate the opinion of ordinary people, who will say whatever occurs to them?"

Socrates/ "I think this will help us find out about courage, how it is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are willing to go along with what we agreed just now, that I will lead us

toward what I think will turn out to be the best way to make things clear, then fine; if you are not willing, I will give it up."

Protagoras/ "No, you are right; proceed as you have begun."

Socrates/ "Going back, then; if they should ask us: 'We have been speaking of "being overcome by pleasure." What do you say this is?' I would reply to them this way: 'Listen. Protagoras and I will try to explain it to you. Do you hold, gentlemen, that this happens to you in circumstances like these—you are often overcome by pleasant things like food or drink or sex, and you do those things all the while knowing they are ruinous?' They would say yes. Then you and I would ask them again: In what sense do you call these things ruinous? Is it that each of them is pleasant in itself and produces immediate pleasure, or is it that later they bring about diseases and poverty and many other things of that sort? Or even if it doesn't bring about these things later, but gives only enjoyment, would it still be a bad thing, just because it gives enjoyment in whatever way?' Can we suppose then, Protagoras, that they would make any other answer than that bad things are bad not because they bring about immediate pleasure, but rather because of what happens later, disease and things like that?"

Protagoras/ "I think that is how most people would answer."

Socrates/ "And in bringing about diseases and poverty, do they bring about pain?' I think they would agree."

Protagoras/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "Does it not seem to you, my good people, as Protagoras and I maintain, that these things are bad on account of nothing other than the fact that they result in pain and deprive us of other pleasures?' Would they agree?"

Protagoras concurred.

“Then again, suppose we were to ask them the opposite question: ‘You who say that some painful things are good, do you not say that such things as athletics and military training and treatments by doctors such as cautery, surgery, medicines, and starvation diet are good things even though painful?’ Would they say so?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Would you call these things good for the reason that they bring about intense pain and suffering, or because they ultimately bring about health and good condition of bodies and preservation of cities and power over others and wealth?’ Would they agree?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “These things are good only because they result in pleasure and in the relief and avoidance of pain? Or do you have some other criterion in view, other than pleasure and pain, on the basis of which you would call these things good?’ They say no, I think.”

Protagoras/ “And I would agree with you.”

Socrates/ “So then you pursue pleasure as being good and avoid pain as bad?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “So this you regard as bad, pain, and pleasure, you regard as good, since you call the very enjoying of something bad whenever it deprives us of greater pleasures than it itself provides, or brings about greater pains than the very pleasures inherent in it? But if you call the very enjoying of something bad for some other reason and with some other criterion in view than the one I have suggested, you could tell us what it is; but you won’t be able to.”

Protagoras/ “I don’t think they’ll be able to either.”

Socrates/ "And likewise concerning the actual state of being in pain? Do you call the actual condition of being in pain good, whenever it relieves pains greater than the ones it contains or brings about greater pleasures than its attendant pains? Now, if you are using some other criterion than the one I have suggested, when you call the very condition of being pained good, you can tell us what it is; but you won't be able to.'"

Protagoras/ "Truly spoken."

Socrates/ "Now, again, gentlemen, if you asked me: 'Why are you going on so much about this and in so much detail?' I would reply, forgive me. First of all, it is not easy to show what it is that you call 'being overcome by pleasure,' and then, it is upon this very point that all the arguments rest. But even now it is still possible to withdraw, if you are able to say that the good is anything other than pleasure or that the bad is anything other than pain. Or is it enough for you to live life pleasantly without pain? If it is enough, and you are not able to say anything else than that the good and the bad are that which result in pleasure and pain, listen to this. For I say to you that if this is so, your position will become absurd, when you say that frequently a man, knowing the bad to be bad, nevertheless does that very thing, when he is able not to do it, having been driven and overwhelmed by pleasure; and again when you say that a man knowing the good is not willing to do it, on account of immediate pleasure, having been overcome by it. Just how absurd this is will become very clear, if we do not use so many names at the same time, 'pleasant' and 'painful,' 'good' and 'bad'; but since these turned out to be only two things, let us instead call them by two names, first, 'good' and 'bad,' then later, 'pleasant' and 'painful.' On that basis, then, let us say that a man knowing bad things to be bad, does them all the same. If then someone asks us: 'Why?' 'Having been overcome,' we shall reply. 'By what?' 'By

what?' he will ask us. We are no longer able to say 'by pleasure,'—for it has taken on its other name, 'the good' instead of 'pleasure'—so we will say and reply that 'he is overcome.' 'By what?' he will ask. 'By the good,' we will say, 'for heaven's sake!' If by chance the questioner is rude he might burst out laughing and say: 'What you're saying is ridiculous—someone does what is bad, knowing that it is bad, when it is not necessary to do it, having been overcome by the good. So,' he will say, 'within yourself, does the good outweigh the bad or not?' We will clearly say in reply that it does not; for if it did, the person whom we say is overcome by pleasure would not have made any mistake. 'In virtue of what,' he might say, 'does the good outweigh the bad or the bad the good? Only in that one is greater and one is smaller, or more and less.' We could not help but agree. 'So clearly then' he will say, 'by "being overcome" you mean getting more bad things for the sake of fewer good things.' That settles that, then.

"So let's now go back and apply the names 'the pleasant' and 'the painful' to these very same things. Now let us say that a man does what before we called 'bad' things and now shall call 'painful' ones, knowing they are painful things, but being overcome by pleasant things, although it is clear that they do not outweigh them. But how else does pleasure outweigh pain, except in relative excess or deficiency? Isn't it a matter (to use other terms) of larger and smaller, more or fewer, greater or lesser degree?

"For if someone were to say: 'But Socrates, the immediate pleasure is very much different from the pleasant and the painful at a later time,' I would reply, 'They are not different in any other way than by pleasure and pain, for there is no other way that they could differ. Weighing is a good analogy; you put the pleasures together and the pains together, both the near and the remote, on the balance scale, and then say which of the two is more. For if you weigh pleasant things

against pleasant, the greater and the more must always be taken; if painful things against painful, the fewer and the smaller. And if you weigh pleasant things against painful, and the painful is exceeded by the pleasant—whether the near by the remote or the remote by the near—you have to perform that action in which the pleasant prevails; on the other hand, if the pleasant is exceeded by the painful, you have to refrain from doing that. Does it seem any different to you, my friends?' I know that they would not say otherwise."

Protagoras assented.

"Since this is so, I will say to them: 'Answer me this: Do things of the same size appear to you larger when seen near at hand and smaller when seen from a distance, or not?' They would say they do. 'And similarly for thicknesses and pluralities? And equal sounds seem louder when near at hand, softer when farther away?' They would agree. 'If then our wellbeing depended upon this, doing and choosing large things, avoiding and not doing the small ones, what would we see as our salvation in life? Would it be the art of measurement or the power of appearance? While the power of appearance often makes us wander all over the place in confusion, often changing our minds about the same things and regretting our actions and choices with respect to things large and small, the art of measurement in contrast, would make the appearances lose their power by showing us the truth, would give us peace of mind firmly rooted in the truth and would save our life.' Therefore, would these men agree, with this in mind, that the art of measurement would save us, or some other art?"

Protagoras/ "I agree, the art of measurement would."

Socrates/ "What if our salvation in life depended on our choices of odd and even, when the greater and the lesser had to be counted correctly, either the same kind against itself or

one kind against the other, whether it be near or remote? What then would save our life? Surely nothing other than knowledge, specifically some kind of measurement, since that is the art of the greater and the lesser? In fact, nothing other than arithmetic, since it's a question of the odd and even? Would these men agree with us or not?"

Protagoras thought they would agree.

"Well, then, my good people: Since it has turned out that our salvation in life depends on the right choice of pleasures and pains, be they more or fewer, greater or lesser, farther or nearer, doesn't our salvation seem, first of all, to be measurement, which is the study of relative excess and deficiency and equality?"

Protagoras/ "It must be."

Socrates/ "And since it is measurement, it must definitely be an art, and knowledge."

Protagoras/ "They will agree."

Socrates/ "What exactly this art, this knowledge is, we can inquire into later; that it is knowledge of some sort is enough for the demonstration which Protagoras and I have to give in order to answer the question you asked us. You asked it, if you remember, when we were agreeing that nothing was stronger or better than knowledge, which always prevails, whenever it is present, over pleasure and everything else. At that point you said that pleasure often rules even the man who knows; since we disagreed, you went on to ask us this: 'Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not being overcome by pleasure, what is it then; what do you say it is? Tell us.' If immediately we had said to you 'ignorance,' you might have laughed at us, but if you laugh at us now, you will be laughing at yourselves. For you agreed with us that those who make mistakes with regard to the choice of pleasure and pain, in other words, with regard to good and bad, do so

because of a lack of knowledge, and not merely a lack of knowledge but a lack of that knowledge you agreed was measurement. And the mistaken act done without knowledge you must know is one done from ignorance. So this is what "being overcome by pleasure" is—ignorance in the highest degree, and it is this which Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias claim to cure. But you, thinking it to be something other than ignorance, do not go to sophists yourselves, nor do you send your children to them for instruction, believing as you do that we are dealing with something unteachable. By worrying about your money and not giving it to them, you all do badly in both private and public life.'

"This is how we would have answered the many. Now, I ask you, Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras—this is your conversation also—to say whether you think what I say is true or false." They all thought that what I said was marvelously true.

"So you agree that the pleasant is good, the painful bad. I beg indulgence of Prodicus who distinguishes among words; for whether you call it 'pleasant' or 'delightful' or 'enjoyable,' or whatever way or manner you please to name this sort of thing, my excellent Prodicus, please respond to the intent of my question." Prodicus, laughing, agreed, as did the others.

"Well, then, men, what about this? Are not all actions leading toward living painlessly and pleasantly honorable and beneficial? And isn't honorable activity good and beneficial?"

They agreed.

"Then if the pleasant is the good, no one who knows or believes there is something else better than what he is doing, something possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he could be doing what is better. To give in to oneself is nothing other than ignorance, and to control oneself is nothing other than wisdom."

They all agreed.

"Well, then, do you say that ignorance is to have a false belief and to be deceived about matters of importance?"

They all agreed on this.

"Now, no one goes willingly toward the bad or what he believes to be bad; neither is it in human nature, so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of to the good. And when he is forced to choose between one of two bad things, no one will choose the greater if he is able to choose the lesser."

They agreed with all of that too.

"Well, then, is there something you call dread or fear? And I address this to you, Prodicus. I say that whether you call it fear or dread, it is an expectation of something bad."

Protagoras and Hippias thought that this was true of both dread and fear, but Prodicus thought it applied to dread, but not to fear.

"Well, it does not really matter, Prodicus. This is the point. If what I have said up to now is true, then would anyone be willing to go toward what he dreads, when he can go toward what he does not? Or is this impossible from what we have agreed? For it was agreed that what one fears one holds to be bad; no one goes toward those things which he holds to be bad, or chooses those things willingly."

They all agreed.

"Well, Prodicus and Hippias, with this established, let Protagoras defend for us the truth of his first answer. I don't mean his very first answer, for then he said that while there are five parts of virtue, none is like any other, but each one has its own unique power or function. I'm not talking about this now, but about what he said later. For later he said that four of them are very similar to each other, but one differs very much from the others, namely courage. And he said that I

would know this by the following evidence: 'You will find, Socrates, many people who are extremely impious, unjust, intemperate, and ignorant, and yet exceptionally courageous; by this you will recognize that courage differs very much from all the other parts of virtue.' I was very surprised at his answer then, and even more so now that I have gone over these things with you. I asked him then if he said that the courageous were confident. And he said, 'Yes, and ready for action too.' Do you remember giving this answer?"

He said he did.

"Well, then, tell us, for what actions are the courageous ready? The same actions as the cowardly?"

Protagoras/ "No."

Socrates/ "Different actions?"

Protagoras/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "Do the cowardly go forward to things which are easily ventured, and the courageous toward things to be feared?"

Protagoras/ "So it is said by most people."

Socrates/ "Right, but I am not asking that. Rather, what do you say the courageous go toward with daring: toward things to be feared, believing them to be fearsome, or toward things not to be feared?"

Protagoras/ "By what you have just said, the former is impossible."

Socrates/ "Right again; so, if our demonstration has been correct, then no one goes toward those things he considers to be fearsome, since not to be in control of oneself was found to be ignorance."

He agreed.

“But all people, both the courageous and the cowardly, go toward that about which they are confident; both the cowardly and the courageous go toward the same things.”

Protagoras/ “But, Socrates, what the cowardly go toward is completely opposite to what the courageous go toward. For example, the courageous are willing to go to war, but the cowardly are not.”

Socrates/ “Is going to war honorable or is it disgraceful?”

Protagoras/ “Honorable.”

Socrates/ “Then, if it is honorable, we have agreed before, it is also good, for we agreed that all honorable actions were good.”

Protagoras/ “Very true, and I always believed this.”

Socrates/ “And rightly; but who would you say are not willing to go to war, war being honorable and good?”

Protagoras/ “The cowardly.”

Socrates/ “If a thing is noble and good, is it also pleasant?”

Protagoras/ “That was definitely agreed upon.”

Socrates/ “So, the cowardly, with full knowledge, are not willing to go toward the more honorable, the better, and more pleasant?”

Protagoras/ “If we agree to that, we will undermine what we agreed on earlier.”

Socrates/ “What about the courageous man: Does he go toward the more honorable, the better, and more pleasant?”

Protagoras/ “We must agree to that.”

Socrates/ “So, generally, when the courageous fear, their fear is not disgraceful; nor when they are confident is their confidence disgraceful.”

Protagoras/ “True.”

Socrates/ “If not disgraceful, is it honorable?”

He agreed.

“If honorable, then also good?”

Protagoras/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Whereas the fear and confidence of the cowardly, the foolhardy, and madmen are disgraceful?”

He agreed.

“Is their confidence disgraceful and bad for any reason other than ignorance and stupidity?”

Protagoras/ “No, it isn’t.”

Socrates/ “Now then; that through which cowardly people are cowardly, do you call it cowardice or courage?”

Protagoras/ “Cowardice.”

Socrates/ “And aren’t cowards shown to be so through their ignorance of what is to be feared?”

Protagoras/ “Absolutely.”

Socrates/ “So they are cowards because of that ignorance?”

He agreed.

Socrates/ “You agreed that it is through cowardice that they are cowards?”

He said he did.

“So, can we conclude that cowardice is ignorance of what is and is not to be feared?”

He nodded.

Socrates/ “Now, courage is the opposite of cowardice.”

He said yes.

“So then, wisdom about what is and is not to be feared is the opposite of this ignorance?”

He nodded again.

“And this ignorance is cowardice?”

He nodded again, very reluctantly.

“So the wisdom about what is and is not to be feared is courage and is the opposite of this ignorance?”

He would not even nod at this; he remained silent.

And I said, “What’s this, Protagoras? Will you not say yes or no to my question?”

Protagoras/ “Answer it yourself.”

Socrates/ “I have only one more question to ask you. Do you still believe, as you did at first, that some men are extremely ignorant and yet still very courageous?”

Protagoras/ “I think that you just want to win the argument, Socrates, and that is why you are forcing me to answer. So I will gratify you and say that, on the basis of what we have agreed upon, it seems to me to be impossible.”

Socrates/ “I have no other reason for asking these things than my desire to answer these questions about virtue, especially what virtue is in itself. For I know that if we could get clear on that, then we would be able to settle the question about which we both have had much to say, I—that virtue cannot be taught, you—that it can.

“It seems to me that our discussion has turned on us, and if it had a voice of its own, it would say, mockingly, ‘Socrates and Protagoras, how ridiculous you are, both of you. Socrates, you said earlier that virtue cannot be taught, but now you are arguing the very opposite and have attempted to show that everything is knowledge—justice, temperance, courage—in which case, virtue would appear to be eminently teachable. On the other hand, if virtue is anything other than knowledge, as Protagoras has been trying to say, then it would clearly be unteachable. But, if it turns out to be wholly knowledge, as you now urge, Socrates, it would be very surprising indeed if virtue could not be taught. Now, Protagoras maintained at first that it could be taught, but now he thinks the opposite,

urging that hardly any of the virtues turn out to be knowledge. On that view, virtue could hardly be taught at all.'

"Now, Protagoras, seeing that we have gotten this topsy-turvy and terribly confused, I am most eager to clear it all up, and I would like us, having come this far, to continue until we come through to what virtue is in itself, and then to return to inquire about whether it can or cannot be taught, so that Epimetheus might not frustrate us a second time in this inquiry, as he neglected us in the distribution of powers and abilities in your story. I liked the Prometheus character in your story better than Epimetheus. Since I take promethean forethought over my life as a whole, I pay attention to these things, and if you are willing, as I said at the beginning, I would be pleased to investigate them along with you."

Protagoras/ "Socrates, I commend your enthusiasm and the way you find your way through an argument. I really don't think I am a bad man, certainly the last man to harbor ill will. Indeed, I have told many people that I admire you more than anyone I have met, certainly more than anyone in your generation. And I say that I would not be surprised if you gain among men high repute for wisdom. We will examine these things later, whenever you wish; now it is time to turn our attention elsewhere."

Socrates/ "That is what we should do, if it seems right to you. It is long since time for me to keep that appointment I mentioned. I stayed only as a favor to our noble colleague Callias."

Our conversation was over, and so we left.

The Protagoras.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.
An Associate, Alcibiades.
Socrates, Callias.
Hippocrates, Critias.
Protagoras, Prodicus.
And Hippias.

Friend/ Whence come you, Socrates? or is it not evident that you come from hunting about the beauty of Alcibiades? For to me, as I lately beheld him, the man appeared to be beautiful. I say the man: for between ourselves, Socrates, he may be called so, since his beard begins now to make its appearance.

Socrates/ But what then? Do you not indeed praise Homer, who says, that the age of a young man when he begins to have a beard is most agreeable? And this is now the age of Alcibiades.

Friend/ But do you not at present come from him? And how is the young man disposed towards you?

Socrates/ He appears to be well affected towards me, and especially so today; for he said many things in defense of me; and I am just now come from him. However, I wish to tell you something very strange: though he was present I did not attend to him, and even forgot to look at him.

Friend/ What great affair then happened to both of you? for you could not meet with any other beautiful person in this city.

Socrates/ I did, however, and with one far more beautiful.

Friend/ What do you say? Was he a citizen or a stranger?

Socrates/ A stranger.

Friend/ Whence came he.

Socrates/ From Abdera.

Friend/ And did this stranger appear to you so beautiful as to surpass in beauty the son of Clinias?

Socrates/ How can it be otherwise, O blessed man, but that the wisest must appear to be the more beautiful person?

Friend/ Do you come to us then, Socrates, from a certain wise man?

Socrates/ I do, and from the wisest indeed of those that exist at present; if Protagoras appears to you to be most wise.

Friend/ What do you say? Is Protagoras arrived hither?

Socrates/ He has been here these three days.

Friend/ And have you then just now been with him?

Socrates/ I have; and I have also both spoken and heard many things.

Friend/ Will you not therefore relate this conversation to us? For if nothing hinders, you may sit here, since this boy will give you his place.

Socrates/ I will certainly relate it to you: and I shall also thank you for attending to it.

Friend/ And we shall thank you for the narration.

Socrates/ There will then be reciprocal thanks. Hear therefore: —This morning, while it was yet dark, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, knocked very hard at my gate with his stick, and as soon as it was opened he hastily came to my bedchamber, crying with a loud voice;

Hippocrates/ Socrates, are you asleep?

Socrates/ And I, knowing his voice, said, This is Hippocrates, do you bring any news:

Hippocrates/ None, but what is good.

Socrates/ You speak well, but what is it? and what brought you hither?

Hippocrates/ Protagoras, is come, and dwells near me.

Socrates/ He has been here for some time; and have you only just heard it?

Hippocrates/ I only heard it, by the gods, this evening;

Socrates/ And at the same time, taking a couch, he sat down at my feet, and said;

Hippocrates/ I returned last night very late from the village of Oinoe; for my boy Satyrus had made his escape from me, and being desirous to tell you that I should pursue him, something else occurring, I forgot it. But after I had returned, supped, and was going to bed, then my brother told me Protagoras was come. On hearing this, I immediately attempted to go to you; but afterwards it appeared to me that the night was already far advanced. Soon therefore falling asleep from weariness, when I awoke, I came hither.

Socrates/ And I knowing the fortitude of Hippocrates, and seeing his astonishment, said, What is this to you? Has Protagoras injured you in any respect?

Laughing he said;

Hippocrates/ By the gods, he has, because he alone is wise, and has not made me to be so.

Socrates/ But, by Zeus, if you had given him money, and had persuaded him, he would have made you also wise.

Hippocrates/ O Zeus, and the other gods, I should neither spare my own property, nor that of my friends, to accomplish this, and I now come to you, that you may speak to him in my behalf. For I am younger than you, and at the same time I never either saw or heard Protagoras; for I was a boy when he first came to this place. However, Socrates, all men praise

him, and say that his discourses are most wise. But why do we not go to him that we may find him within? And he resides, as I have heard, with Callias the son of Hipponicus. Let us then go.

Socrates/ We will not yet go thither, O good man, For it is too early; but let us go into our court, where we will walk and converse till it is light; and afterwards we will pay a visit to Protagoras. For, as he stays very much at home, we shall most probably find him within.

After this we rose and went into the court, and I, in order to try the strength of Hippocrates, looked at him attentively, and said, Tell me, O Hippocrates, do you now endeavor to go to Protagoras, that by giving him money he may teach you something? What kind of man do you suppose him to be? and what kind of a man would you wish him to make you? Just as if you should go to your namesake, Hippocrates of Cos, who is a defendant of Æsculapius, and should offer him money on your own account, if anyone should ask you, O Hippocrates, to what kind of man do you give money, and on what account? what would you answer?

Hippocrates/ I should say, that I give it as to a physician.

Socrates/ And with what view would you give it?

Hippocrates/ That I might become a physician.

Socrates/ But if you went to the Argive Polycletus, or the Athenian Phidias, and gave them a reward on your own account, should anyone ask you to what kind of men, and for what purpose, you offered money to Polycletus and Phidias, what would you answer?

Hippocrates/ I should answer that I gave it as to statuaries, and in order that I myself might become a statuary.

Socrates/ Be it so. But we are now going, I and you, to Protagoras, and we are prepared to give him money on your

account, if we have sufficient for this purpose, and can persuade him by this mean; but if it be not sufficient, we must borrow from our friends. If therefore someone, on perceiving our great eagerness about these particulars, should say, Tell me, O Socrates and Hippocrates, to what kind of man, and for what purpose do you intend to give money in offering it to Protagoras? what answer should we give him? What other appellation have we heard respecting Protagoras, as with respect to Phidias we have heard him called a statuary, and with respect to Homer, a poet? What thing of this kind have we heard concerning Protagoras?

Hippocrates/ They call this man a sophist, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we go therefore, and offer money as to a sophist?

Hippocrates/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If then someone should ask you what do you design to become by going to Protagoras?

He replied, blushing (for there was now daylight sufficient for me to see him);

Hippocrates/ From what we have already admitted, it is evident that my design is to become a sophist.

Socrates/ But, by the gods, will you not be ashamed to proclaim yourself a sophist among the Greeks?

Hippocrates/ I shall, by Zeus, if it is requisite to speak what I think.

Socrates/ Your design then, Hippocrates, in acquiring the discipline of Protagoras, is not to become a sophist, but you have the same intention as when you went to the school of a grammarian, or that of a musician, or of a master of gymnastic: for you went not to those masters to learn their art, that you might become a professor yourself, but for the sake of acquiring such instruction as becomes a private and a free man.

Hippocrates/ The discipline which I shall receive from Protagoras, perfectly appears to me to be rather a thing of this kind.

Socrates/ Do you know therefore, what you now intend to do? or is it concealed from you?

Hippocrates/ About what?

Socrates/ That you are about to commit your soul to the care of a man, who, as you say, is a sophist; and yet I should wonder if you know what a sophist is. Though if you are ignorant of this, neither do you know to whom you deliver your soul, nor if to a good or a bad thing.

Hippocrates/ But I think, that I know.

Socrates/ Tell me then what you think a sophist is?

Hippocrates/ I think, as the name implies, that he is one knowing in things pertaining to wisdom.

Socrates/ But, the same thing may also be said of painters and architects, that they also are knowing in things pertaining to wisdom. And if anyone should ask us in what wise particulars painters are knowing, we should answer him, that their wisdom consisted in the production of images; and we should reply in a similar manner with respect to the rest. But if someone should ask in what particulars is a sophist wise; what should we answer? Of what art is he the master?

Hippocrates/ He is master, Socrates, of the art which enables men to speak eloquently.

Socrates/ Perhaps, we speak the truth, yet we do not speak sufficiently. For this answer demands from us another interrogation, viz. in what a sophist renders men eloquent. For does not a harper also enable those that are instructed by him, to speak about that in which he is knowing, viz. the playing on the harp? Is it not so?

Hippocrates/ It is.

Socrates/ Be it so then. But about what does a sophist render men eloquent? For it is evident, that it must be about things of which he has a knowledge.

Hippocrates/ It is likely.

Socrates/ What then is that thing about which the sophist is knowing, and which he teaches to others?

Hippocrates/ By Zeus, I can no longer tell you.

Socrates/ Do you know therefore to what danger you are going to expose your soul? or if you were going to subject your body to the hazard of becoming in a good or a bad condition, would you not diligently consider whether you should expose it to this danger or not? Would you not call your friends and relations to consult with them? And would you not take more than one day to deliberate on the affair? But though you esteem your soul far more than your body, and upon it depends your happiness or unhappiness, according as it is well or ill disposed, yet, concerning this, you neither ask advice of your father nor brother, nor of anyone of us your associates, whether you should commit your soul to this stranger. But having heard of his arrival yesterday evening, you come next morning before break of day, without considering whether it is proper to commit yourself to him or not, and are prepared to employ not only all your own riches for that purpose, but also those of your friends, as if you already knew that you must by all means associate with Protagoras, whom, as you say, you neither know nor have ever spoken to. But you call him a sophist, though what a sophist is, to which you are about to deliver yourself, you are evidently ignorant.

Hippocrates/ What you say, Socrates, appears to be the truth.

Socrates/ Whether or not, therefore, O Hippocrates, is a sophist a certain merchant and retailer of things by which the soul is nourished?

Hippocrates/ He appears to me, Socrates, to be a character of this kind; but with what is the soul nourished?

Socrates/ By disciplines. But we must take care, my friend, lest the sophist, while he praises what he sells, deceive us, just as those merchants and retailers do respecting the food of the body. For they are ignorant whether the articles of their traffic are salubrious or noxious to the body, but at the same time they praise all that they sell. Those also that buy these articles are alike ignorant in this respect, unless the purchaser should happen to be a master of gymnastic, or a physician. In like manner, those who carry about disciplines in cities, and who hawk and sell them to those that desire to buy them, praise indeed all that they sell, though perhaps some of these also, O most excellent youth, may be ignorant whether what they sell is beneficial or noxious to the soul. And this also may be the case with those that buy of them, unless the purchaser should happen to be a physician of the soul. If therefore you scientifically know what among these is good or bad, you may securely buy disciplines from Protagoras, or any other; but if not, see, O blessed youth, whether you will not be in extreme danger with respect to your dearest concerns. For there is much greater danger in the buying of disciplines than in that of food; since he who buys meats and drinks of a victualer or merchant may take them away in other vessels, and, before he receives them into his body, may place them in his house, and calling in some person skilled in these things, may consult what should be eaten and drank, and what should not, and how much and when it is proper to eat and drink; so that there is no great danger in buying provisions. Disciplines, however, cannot be taken

away in another vessel; but it is necessary that he who buys a discipline, receiving and learning it in his soul, should depart either injured or benefited. Let us therefore consider these things with those that are older than we are: for we are too young to discuss an affair of such great importance. Let us now, however, go whither we intended, and hear the man; and after we have heard him, let us also communicate with others. For not only Protagoras is there, but Hippias the Elean, and Prodicus too, I think, and many other wise men.

This being agreed upon by us, we go on; but when we entered the porch, we stopt to discuss something which had occurred to us in the way. That it might not therefore be unfinished, but that being terminated we might thus enter the house, we stood discoursing in the porch, until we agreed with each other. It appears therefore to me that the porter, who was a eunuch, heard us; and that on account of the multitude of the sophists he was enraged with those that came to the house. When therefore we had knocked at the gate he opened it, and seeing us;

Eunuch/ Ha, ha certain sophists. He is not at leisure.

Socrates/ And at the same time taking the gate with both his hands, he shut it with all his force. We then knocked again, and he, without opening the gate, said;

Eunuch/ Did not you hear me tell you that he is not at leisure?

Socrates/ But, my good man, we are not come to Callias, nor are we sophists. Take courage, therefore, for we come requesting to see Protagoras. Announce this to him. Notwithstanding this the man would scarcely open the gate to us. However, he opened it at length, and when we entered, we met with Protagoras walking in the vestibule of the porch. Many followed him; on one side Callias the son of Hipponicus, and his brother by the mother; Paralus the son

of Pericles; and Charmides the son of Glauco. On the other side of him were Xanthippus the other son of Pericles, and Philippides the son of Philomelus, and Antimocrus the Mendæan, who was the most illustrious of all the disciples of Protagoras, and who is instructed in his art that he may become a sophist. Of those behind these, who followed them listening to what was said, the greater part appeared to be strangers, whom Protagoras brings with him from the several cities through which he passes, and whom he charms by his voice like another Orpheus: and they, allured by voice, follow him. Some of our countrymen also were in the choir. On seeing this choir I was very much delighted in observing how well they took care not to be an impediment to Protagoras in walking before him; but when he turned, and his company with him, these his auditors that followed him opened to the right and left in a becoming and orderly manner, and always beautifully ranged themselves behind him. After Protagoras, as Homer says, I saw Hippias the Elean seated on a throne in the opposite vestibule of the porch, and round him on benches sat Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, Phædrus the Myrrhinusian, Andron the son of Androtion, and some others, partly strangers and partly his fellow citizens. They appeared, too, to be interrogating Hippias concerning the sublime parts of nature, and certain astronomical particulars; but he, sitting on a throne, considered and resolved their questions. I likewise saw Tantalus: for Prodicus the Cean was there; but he was in a certain building which Hipponicus had before used for an office, but which Callias, on account of the multitude that came to his house, had given to the strangers, after having prepared it for their reception. Prodicus therefore was still in bed wrapt up in skins and coverings, and Pausanias of Ceramis was seated by his bedside; and with Pausanias there was a youth, who appeared to me to be of a beautiful

and excellent disposition. His form indeed was perfectly beautiful; and his name, as I have heard, was Agatho. Nor did I wonder that he was beloved by Pausanias. There were also the two Adimantes, the one the son of Cephis, and the other the son of Leucolophides, and many others. But as I was without, I was not able to learn what was the subject of their discourse, though I very much desired to hear Prodicus: for he appears to me to be a man perfectly wise and divine. But a certain humming found being produced in the chamber through the grave tone of his voice, prevented me from hearing distinctly what he said. Just as we had entered, Alcibiades, the beautiful as you say, and as I am persuaded he is, and Critias the son of Callaischrus, came after us.

After we had entered therefore, and had discussed certain trifling particulars, and considered what passed, we went to Protagoras; and I said, O Protagoras, I and Hippocrates are come to see you.

Protagoras/ Would you wish to speak with me alone, or in the presence of others?

Socrates/ It makes no difference to us; but when you hear on what account we come, you yourself shall determine this.

Protagoras/ What is it then that hath brought you?

Socrates/ Hippocrates here is our countryman, the son of Apollodorus, and is of a great and happy family, and seems to contend with his equals in age for natural endowments. But he desires to become illustrious in the city; and he thinks that he shall especially effect this if he associates with you, Consider, therefore, whether it is proper for him to converse alone with you about these particulars, or in conjunction with others.

Protagoras/ Your forethought, Socrates, with respect to me is right. For a stranger who goes to great cities, and

persuades young people of the greatest quality to leave the associations both of their kindred and others, both the young and the old, and adhere to him alone, that they may become better men by his conversation, ought in doing this to be cautious. For things of this kind are attended with no small envy, together with much malevolence and many stratagems. I say indeed that the sophistic art is ancient, but that those men who first professed it, fearing the hatred to which it would be exposed, sought to conceal it, some with the veil of poetry, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, and others with that of the mysteries and prophecy, as Orpheus and Musæus, and their followers. I perceive also, that some have called this art gymnastic, as Iccus of Tarentum, and as a sophist at present does who is inferior to none, viz. Herodicus the Selymbrianian, who was originally of Megara. But your Agathocles, who was a great sophist, Pythoclides of Ceos, and many others, concealed it under the veil of music. All these, as I said, being afraid of envy, employed these arts as veils. I however, in this particular, do not accord with all these: for I think they did not effect anything which they wished to accomplish; since these concealments are understood by men of great authority in cities. The vulgar indeed do not perceive them; but praise certain things which they hear from the sophists. This subterfuge therefore, not being attended with any effect, but becoming apparent, necessarily shows the great folly of him that attempts it, and makes men much more inimical: for they think that a man of this kind is crafty in everything. I therefore have taken an opposite path: for I acknowledge myself to be a sophist, and a teacher of men: and I think that by this ingenuous confession I avoid envy more safely than by dissimulation. I also direct my attention to other things besides this; so that, as I may say, with the assistance of Divinity, I have suffered nothing dire through confessing

that I am a sophist; though I have exercised this art many years: for my age is very great, and I am old enough to be the father of anyone of you. So that it will be by far the most pleasant to me, if you discourse with me concerning these particulars in the presence of all those that are in the house.

Socrates/ I then, suspecting that he wished to exhibit himself to Prodicus and Hippias, and to boast that we came to him as being enamored of his wisdom, said, Why may not Prodicus and Hippias be called, and those that are with him, that they may hear us?

Socrates/ By all means let them be called.

Callias/ Shall we prepare seats for you, that you may discourse sitting?

Socrates/ It was agreed to be proper so to do. And at the same time all of us being pleased, as those that were to hear wise men converse, took hold of the benches and couches, and disposed them near to Hippias; for the benches had been there previously placed. In the interim came Callias and Alcibiades, bringing with them Prodicus, who had then risen from his bed, and those that were with him. When therefore we were all seated.

Protagoras/ Now, Socrates, you may tell me before all this company what you a little before mentioned to me about this youth.

Socrates/ My exordium, O Protagoras, is that which I employed before, viz. with what design we came to you. Hippocrates then, here, is desirous of your converse; and says he shall gladly hear what advantage he shall derive from associating with you. This is all we have to say to you.

Protagoras/ O young man, the advantage which you will derive from associating with me is this, that on the day in which you come to me you will go home better than you was before; you will also be more improved on the second than

on the first day, and you will always find that you have every day advanced in improvement.

Socrates/ O Protagoras, this is by no means wonderful, but it is fit that it should be so; since you also, though so old and so wise, would become better, if anyone should teach you what you do not know. But that is not what we require. But just as if Hippocrates here should immediately change his mind, and should desire to associate with the youth lately arrived at this place, Zeuxippus the son of Heracletus, and coming to him in the same manner as he is now come to you, should hear from him the same things as he has heard from you, that every day by associating with him he would become better, and advance in improvement; if he should ask him, In what do you say I shall become better, and advance in proficiency, Zeuxippus would answer him, In the art of painting. And if he were to associate with the Theban Orthagoras, and should hear from him the same things as he has heard from you, and should ask him in what he would daily become better by associating with him, he would reply, In the art of playing on the pipe. In like manner do you also reply to the youth, and to me asking for him: for you say that Hippocrates here, by associating with Protagoras, will daily become better and advance in improvement; tell us then, O Protagoras, in what he will make this proficiency?

Protagoras/ You interrogate well, Socrates, and I rejoice to answer those who ask in a becoming manner. For Hippocrates, if he comes to me, will not suffer that which he would suffer by associating with any other of the sophists. Other sophists indeed injure youth: for they force them to apply to arts which they are unwilling to learn, by teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music.

Socrates/ And at the same time looking at Hippias, he added;

Protagoras/ But he who comes to me, will not learn anything else than that for the sake of which he came. The discipline too which he acquires from me is the ability of consulting well about his domestic affairs, so that he may govern his house in the best manner, and so that he may be capable of saying and doing all that is advantageous for his country.

Socrates/ I understand you: for you appear to me to speak of the political art, and to profess to make men good citizens.

Protagoras/ This is the profession which I announce.

Socrates/ What a beautiful artifice you possess! if you do possess it. For nothing else is to be said to you than that which I conceive. For I, O Protagoras, do not think that this can be taught, and yet I cannot disbelieve what you say. It is just, however, that I should inform you whence I think it cannot be taught, nor by men be procured for men. For I, as well as the other Greeks, say that the Athenians are wise. I see, therefore, when we are collected in the assembly, and when it is necessary to do something respecting the building of houses, that the architects being sent for, are consulted about the business; but that when something is to be done concerning the building of ships, shipwrights are consulted; and in a similar manner with respect to other things which they think may be taught and learnt. But if any other person whom they do not think to be an artist attempts to give them advice in these particulars, though he may be very fine and rich and noble, they pay no more attention to him on this account, but laugh and make a noise, until he either desists from speaking through the disturbance, or till the archers, by order of the magistrates, lead or carry him out. In this manner therefore they act respecting things which pertain to art. But when it is requisite to consult about anything which relates to the government of the city, then the builder,

the brazier, the shoe-maker, the merchant, and the sailor, the rich and the poor, the noble and the ignoble, rise, and similarly give their advice, and no one disturbs them, as was the case with the others, as persons who, though they have never learnt nor have had a preceptor, yet attempt to give advice. For it is evident that they do not think this can be taught. Nor does this take place only in public affairs, but in private concerns also; the wisest and best of the citizens are not able to impart to others the virtue which they possess. For Pericles, the father of these youths, has beautifully and well instructed them in those things which are taught by masters; but in those things in which he is wise, he has neither himself instructed them, nor has he sent them to another to be instructed; but they, feeding as it were without restraint, wander about, to see if they can casually meet with virtue. If you will too, this very same man Pericles, being the tutor of Clinias the younger brother of this Alcibiades, separated them, fearing the former should be corrupted by the latter, and sent Clinias to be educated by Ariphron. Before, however, six months had elapsed, Ariphron, not knowing what to do with him, returned him to Pericles. I could also mention many others to you, who being themselves good men, never made any other man better, neither of their kindred nor strangers. I therefore, O Protagoras, looking to these things, do not think that virtue can be taught. When, however, I hear you asserting these things, I waver, and am of opinion that you speak to the purpose, because I think that you are skilled in many things, and that you have learned many and discovered some things yourself. If, therefore, you can more clearly show us, that virtue may be taught, do not be envious, but demonstrate this to us.

Protagoras/ Indeed, Socrates, I shall not be envious. But whether shall I show you this by relating a fable, as an older to younger men, or shall I discuss it by argument?

Socrates/ Many, therefore, of those that sat with him, left it to his choice.

Protagoras/ It appears, therefore, to me that it will be more agreeable to you to relate a fable.

"There was a time, then, when the gods were alone, but the mortal genera did not exist. But when the destined time of generation came to these, the, gods fashioned them within the earth, by mixing earth and fire together; and such things as are mingled with these two elements. And when they were about to lead them into light, they commanded Prometheus and Epimetheus to distribute to and adorn each with those powers which were adapted to their nature. But Epimetheus requested Prometheus that he might distribute these powers: And, said he, do you attend to my distribution. And having thus persuaded him, he distributed. But in his distributing, he gave to some strength without swiftness, and adorned with swiftness the more imbecile. Some he also armed; but giving to others an unarmed nature, he devised a certain other power for their security. For those whom he had invested with a small body, he either enabled to fly away through wings, or distributed them in a subterranean habitation; but those whom he had increased in magnitude he preserved by their bulk. And thus equalizing, he distributed other things, taking care that no genus should be deprived of the means of preservation.

"After, then, he had secured them from mutual destruction, he took care to defend them against the injuries of the air and seasons, by clothing them with thick hairs and solid skins, so that they might be sufficiently protected in the winter frosts and summer heats; and so that these very

things might become appropriate and spontaneous beds to each when they went to rest. Under their feet, likewise, he partly added arms, and partly hairs and solid and bloodless skins. He also imparted to different animals different nutriment; to some, indeed, herbs from the earth, to others the fruits of trees, and to others roots. There were some also whom he permitted to feed on the flesh of other animals: and to some, indeed, he gave the power of generating but a few of their own species, but to those that are devoured by these he imparted fecundity, thus extending safety to the race. However, as Epimetheus was not very wise, he ignorantly bestowed all his powers on irrational animals; but the human race still remained unadorned by him. Prometheus, therefore, came to him while he was doubting, and considered the distribution which he had made. And he saw that other animals were well provided for, but that man was naked, without shoes, without a bed, and unarmed. But now the fatal day was arrived, in which it was necessary that man should emerge from the earth into light. Prometheus, therefore, being dubious what safety he could find for man, stole the artificial wisdom of Vulcan and Minerva, together with fire; since it was impossible that the possession of this wisdom could be useful without fire; and thus he imparted it to man. By these means, therefore, man possessed the wisdom pertaining to life. He had not, however, political wisdom. For this was with Zeus; and Prometheus was no longer permitted to ascend to the citadel, the habitation of Zeus. To which we may add, that the guards of Zeus were terrible. Prometheus, therefore, secretly entered into the common habitation of Minerva and Vulcan, in which the arts were exercised; and stealing the fiery art from Vulcan, and the other from Minerva, he gave them to man: and from this arises the fertility of human life. But Prometheus afterwards, as it is said, through Epimetheus, was punished for his

theft. Since, however, man became a partaker of a divine allotment, in the first place through this alliance with divinity, he alone of the other animals believed that there were gods, and endeavored that the altars and statues of the gods should be established. In the next place he articulately distinguished by art, voice and names, and invented houses and garments, shoes and beds, and nourishment from the earth. But men, being thus provided for in the beginning, lived dispersed; for cities were not: hence they were destroyed by wild beasts, through being everywhere more imbecile than them; and the fabricating art was indeed a sufficient aid to them for nutriment, but was inadequate to the war with wild beasts: for they had not yet the political art, of which the military is a part. They sought therefore to collect themselves together, and to save themselves, building for this purpose cities. When, however, they were thus collected in a body, they injured each other, as not possessing the political art; so that, again being dispersed, they were destroyed by the beasts. Zeus, therefore, fearing for our race, lest it should entirely perish, sent Hermes, and ordered him to bring Shame and Justice to men, that these two might be the ornaments and the bonds of cities, and the conciliators of friendship. Hermes, therefore, asked after what manner he should give Shame and Justice to men. Whether, said he, as the arts are distributed, so also shall I distribute these? for they are distributed as follows: —One man who possesses the medicinal art is sufficient for many private persons; and in a similar manner other artificers. Shall I, therefore, thus insert Shame and Justice in men? or shall I distribute them to all? —To all, said Zeus, and let all be partakers of them: for cities will not subsist, if a few only participate of these, as of the other arts. Publish also this law in my name, that he who is incapable of partaking of Shame and Justice shall be punished as the pest of the city."

Thus, Socrates, and on this account, both others and the Athenians, when they discourse concerning building, or any other fabricative art, think that a few only should be consulted; and if anyone unskilled in these affairs offers to give advice, they do not allow him, as you say; and it is reasonable, as I say, that they should not. But when they proceed to a consultation concerning political virtue, the whole of which consists from justice and temperance, they very properly permit every man to speak; because it is fit that everyone should partake of this virtue, or there can be no cities. This, Socrates, is the cause of that which was doubted. And that you may not think I deceive you in asserting that all men in reality think that every man participates of justice, and of the rest of politic virtue, take this as an argument: in other arts, as you say, if anyone asserts that he is a good piper, or skilled in any other art of which he is ignorant, those that hear him either laugh at, or are indignant with him, and his friends admonish him as one insane; but in justice and the other political virtue, though it be known that a certain person is unjust, yet if he asserts the truth of himself before the multitude, they think that he is insane, and that he should not unfold his iniquity; and they say that all men should acknowledge themselves to be just, whether they are or not; or that he who does not pretend that he is just must be mad; as if it were necessary that everyone should, in a certain respect, partake of justice, or no longer be a man. I say these things, to show that every man is very properly permitted to give his advice concerning this virtue, because everyone is thought to be a partaker of it. But that men do not think that it subsists from nature, nor from chance, but that it may be taught and obtained by study, this I will in the next place endeavor to show you. No one is enraged with another on account of those evils which he thinks arise either from nature or art; nor does he

admonish, or teach, or punish the possessors of these evils in order to make them otherwise than they are; but, on the contrary, he pities them. Thus, for instance, who would be so mad as to reprehend the deformed, or the little, or the diseased? For I think they know that these things, viz. such as are beautiful and the contrary, happen to men from nature and fortune. On the contrary, when they think that anyone possesses certain evils from study, custom, and learning, then they are indignant, admonish, and punish; among the number of which evils are injustice and impiety, and in short everything which is contrary to political virtue. And as this species of virtue is obtained by study and discipline, they are on this account indignant with and admonish everyone who neglects to acquire it. For if you are willing, O Socrates, to consider what the punishment of the unjust is able to effect, this very thing will teach you that men think virtue is to be acquired. For no one endued with intellect punishes him who has acted unjustly, merely because he has so acted; for he who acts in this manner punishes like a wild beast, irrationally. But he who endeavors to punish with reason, does not punish for the sake of past guilt (for that which has been done cannot be undone), but for the sake of future injustice, that neither this offender himself, nor any other who sees him punished, may again act unjustly. And he who has this conception must he persuaded that virtue may be taught: for punishment is inflicted for the sake of turning others from guilt. All, therefore, that punish, as well privately as publicly, have this opinion. And both other men, and especially the Athenians your fellow citizens, take vengeance on and punish those whom they think have acted unjustly; so that, according to this reasoning, the Athenians also are among the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Very properly, therefore, do your fellow citizens

admit the brazier and shoe-maker to give advice in political concerns; and, as it appears to me, Socrates, it has been sufficiently demonstrated to you that they consider virtue as a thing which may be taught and acquired.

There still, however, remains the doubt which you introduced concerning illustrious men, viz. on what account they teach their sons, and make them wise in things which may be obtained from preceptors, but do not render them better than others in the virtue for which they themselves are renowned. In order to remove this doubt, Socrates, I shall no longer employ a fable, but argument. For thus conceive: whether is there anyone thing or not, of which it is necessary all the citizens should partake, or a city cannot subsist? In this thing your doubt is solved, but by no means otherwise. For if there is this one thing, which is neither the art of the architect, nor of the brazier, nor potter, but is justice, and temperance, and holiness, and in short the virtue of man; if this be the thing, of which it is necessary all should partake, and together with which every man should learn and perform whatever else he wishes to learn or do, but by no means without this; or if he does not partake of it, that he should be taught and punished, whether boy, or man, or woman, till through punishment he becomes better; and he who is not obedient, when punished or taught, is banished from the city, or put to death as one incurable; if this then be the case, and those illustrious men teach their children other things, but not this, consider in how wonderful a manner they become excellent men: for we have shown that they think virtue may be taught both privately and publicly. But since it may be taught, do you think that fathers teach their children other things, the ignorance of which is neither attended with death nor a penalty; but that in other things in which a penalty, death, and exile are the punishments attendant on their children, when they are not

instructed nor exercised in virtue, and besides death, the confiscation of their goods, and in short the ruin of their families, they neither teach them these things. nor use their utmost endeavors that they may acquire them? It is necessary to think, Socrates, that fathers, beginning with their children when they are very young, will teach and admonish them as long as they live. For as soon as a boy understands what is said to him, his nurse, mother, pædagogue, and the father himself, drive to the utmost that the boy may become a most excellent character; teaching and pointing out to him, in every word and deed, that this is just, and that unjust; that this is beautiful and that base; and that this is holy, and that unholy: likewise that he should do these things, and not those. And if the boy is willingly persuaded, they think they have done well; but if not, they form him to rectitude by threats and blows, as if he were a distorted and bent piece of wood. In the next place they send him to masters, and these they much more enjoin to pay attention to the morals of the boys, than to the teaching them to read and play on the harp. The preceptors likewise take care of the children; and when the boys have learnt their letters, and their attention is directed to the meaning of what they read, instead of oral precepts, the masters give them the compositions of the best poets to read, and compel them to commit them to memory; because in these there are many admonitions, and many transactions, and praises, and encomiums, of ancient illustrious men, that the boy may be zealous to imitate them, and may desire to become a similar character. The masters of the harp also do other things of a like kind; for they pay attention to temperance, and take care that the boys do not commit any vice. Besides this too, when they have learnt to play on the harp, they teach them the compositions of other good lyric poets, singing them to the harp; and they compel rhythms

and harmonies to become familiar to the souls of the boys, that becoming milder, more orderly, and more harmonious, they may be more able both to speak and act: for every life of man requires rhythm and harmony. Further still, besides these things, they send them to masters of exercise, that their bodies being rendered better, may be usefully subservient to the rational part of the soul, and that they may not be compelled to cowardice, through the depravity of their bodies, in war and other actions. And these things are done by those who are most able to do them: but the most able are the most wealthy; and the sons of these begin their exercises the earliest, and continue them the longest. But when they leave their masters, the city compels them to learn the laws, and to live according to the paradigm of these, that they may not act casually from themselves; but in reality, just as writing masters give their scholars, who have not yet learnt to write well, letters to be traced over by them which they have written, and thus compel them to write conformably to their copy; so the city prescribing laws which were the inventions of illustrious and ancient legislators, compels them to govern and to be governed according to these. But it punishes him who transgresses these; and the name which is given to this punishment, both by you, and in many other places, is ευθυαι, corrections, as if it were justice correcting depravity.

As so much attention therefore is paid, both privately and publicly, to virtue, can you still wonder and doubt, O Socrates, whether virtue may be taught? It is not, however, proper to wonder that it can be taught, but it would be much more wonderful if this were not the case. But why then are unworthy sons frequently the offspring of worthy fathers? Learn again the reason of this. For this is not wonderful, if what I have before said is true, that this thing virtue ought not to be peculiar to anyone person, in order to the existence

of a city. For if this be the case, as I say (and it is so the most of all things), consider and select any other study and discipline whatever. Thus, for instance, suppose that this city could not subsist unless we were all of us players on the pipe, should we not all apply ourselves to this instrument? and would not everyone, teach everyone, both privately and publicly, to play on it. and would he not reprove him who played unskillfully, and this without any envy? Just as now, no one envies or conceals things just and legal, as is the case in other arts. For mutual justice and virtue are, I think, advantageous to us: and on this account everyone most willingly discourses about and teaches things just and legal. If then in playing on the pipe we are thus disposed, with all alacrity and without reserve, to teach each other, do you think, Socrates, that the sons of the most excellent players on the pipe would become good pipers, rather than the sons of bad players on this instrument? I indeed think not; but the boy most happily born for that art would be found to be him who made the greatest proficiency; and he who was not naturally adapted for it would pursue it without glory. And the son of an excellent piper would often be unskilled in that art; and again, a good piper would frequently be the offspring of a bad one. However, they would be all sufficiently excellent, if compared with the unskillful, and with those who know nothing of the piper's art. In like manner think that the man who appears to you to be the most unjust of those who are nurtured by the laws, and among men, is just and the artificer of this thing (justice), if he is compared with men, who have neither discipline, nor courts of justice, nor laws, nor any necessity which compels them to pay every attention to virtue, but are mere savages, such as those which Pherecrates the poet caused to be acted last year, during the festivals of Bacchus. And if you should chance to be among such men as the misanthropes in that play, you

would rejoice if you met with Eurybates and Phrynendas, and deploring your fortune, you would desire the depravity of our men. But now you are delicate, Socrates, because all men are teachers of virtue to the utmost of their abilities, though no one appears to you to be so. For if you should search for the man who taught us to speak the Greek tongue, he would be nowhere to be found: nor, if you were to inquire who it is that can teach the sons of manual artificers this very art which they have learnt from their father, and which both the father and the fellow artists his friends exercise, you would not, I think, O Socrates, easily find the preceptor of these; but it is everywhere easy to find teachers of the ignorant. And thus it is also with respect to virtue and everything else. We should likewise rejoice, if he who surpasses us causes us to advance in virtue, though but in a small degree, among the number of which I think I am one, and that I know in a manner, superior to other men, what will contribute to the beautiful and the good, and that I am worthy of the reward which I receive for my instruction, and indeed of more than I receive, as is also the opinion of my disciples. Hence this is the bargain which I usually make: when anyone has learnt from me, if he is willing, he pays me the sum of money which I require; but if not, going to a temple and swearing how much the disciplines which I teach are worth, he deposits the sum which he is to pay me. And thus much, O Socrates, I, and the fable, and argument have asserted, to prove that virtue may be taught; and the Athenians also are of the same opinion. We have likewise shown that it is not in any respect wonderful that depraved sons should be the offspring of excellent fathers, since the sons of Polycletus, who are of the same age with Paralus and Xanthippus, are nothing when compared with their father; and in like manner with respect to the sons of other artists. These, however, are not yet to be condemned; for they are

young, and hope may be yet entertained of their making a proficiency.

Socrates/ Protagoras therefore, having pointed out these and similar things, ceased to speak; and I having been for a long time charmed, looked still at him, as desiring to hear him still speak. But when I perceived that he had in reality finished his discourse, and when I had with difficulty collected myself, looking to Hippocrates I said, O son of Apollodorus, how much do I thank you for having brought me hither! For I make much of what I have heard from Protagoras; since before this, I thought that it was not human care by which worthy men become worthy, but now I am persuaded that it is. There is however a small impediment to my belief, which Protagoras will doubtless easily remove, since he has unfolded so much. For if someone should discourse with anyone of the popular orators, perhaps he would hear arguments of this kind, such as Pericles delivered, or some other eloquent man; but if someone should ask them concerning anything, they like a book would have nothing to reply, nor anything to say. And if a man should ask them any trifling particular respecting what was said, they would resemble brass when struck, which keeps and extends its found for a long time, unless someone lays hold of it. For thus rhetoricians, when asked some trifling thing, reply in an extended speech. But Protagoras here is sufficient to deliver both long and beautiful discourses, as he has just now made it appear; and he is also sufficient, when interrogated, to answer with brevity, and interrogating, to wait for and receive an answer; which can be asserted but of a few. Now then, O Protagoras, I am in want of a certain trifling particular, and if you answer me this, I shall have all that I want. You say that virtue may be taught; and I, if I could be persuaded by any man, should be persuaded by you. But I beseech you to remove the

wonder which you excited in my mind while you were speaking. For you say that Zeus sent justice and shame to men; and afterwards, in many parts of your discourse, you speak of justice, temperance, and sanctity, and of all these collectively, as if virtue were but one thing. Accurately explain to me, therefore, this very thing, whether virtue is one certain thing, but the parts of it are justice, temperance, and sanctity; or whether all these which I have just now mentioned are names of one and the same thing. This it is which I still desire to know.

Protagoras/ But it is easy, Socrates, to answer this question, that virtue being one thing, the particulars which you have adduced are the parts of it.

Socrates/ But whether are they parts, in the same manner as the mouth, nostrils, eyes and ears are parts of the face? or are they parts like the parts of gold, which do not differ from each other and the whole, except in magnitude and parvitude?

Protagoras/ It appears to me, Socrates, that the parts of virtue have the same relation to the whole, as the parts of the face to the whole face.

Socrates/ Whether then, do different men receive a different part of virtue? or is it necessary that he who receives one part should possess all the parts of virtue?

Protagoras/ By no means; since many men are brave, but unjust; and others again are just, but not wise.

Socrates/ But are these parts of virtue, viz. wisdom and fortitude?

Protagoras/ Certainly, the most of all things; and the greatest of all the parts, is wisdom.

Socrates/ But of these parts, is this one thing, and that another?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Has each of them also its proper power, in the same manner as each of the parts of the face? As for instance, the eye is not similar to the ears, nor is the power of it the same; nor do any of the other parts resemble each other, nor are their powers the same, nor are they mutually similar in any other respect. Is it therefore thus also with the parts of virtue, so that the one does not resemble the other, neither in itself, nor in its power? Or is it not evident that it is so, since it is similar to the paradigm which we have introduced?

Protagoras/ But it does thus subsist, Socrates.

Socrates/ No other part of virtue therefore, is such as science, nor such as justice, nor such as fortitude, nor such as temperance, nor such as sanctity.

Protagoras/ It is not.

Socrates/ But come, let us consider in common what kind of a thing each of these is And, in the first place, is justice a certain thing, or is it nothing? For to me it appears to be something. But what does it appear to you to be?

Protagoras/ That it is also something.

Socrates/ What then? If someone should ask you and me, O Protagoras and Socrates, tell me with respect to this very thing which you have just now named justice, whether it is just or unjust? I indeed should answer him that it is just. But what would you say? would your answer be the same with mine or not?

Protagoras/ The same.

Socrates/ I therefore should say that justice is a thing similar to the being just, in reply to the interrogator. And would not you also assert the same?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ If then, after this, he should ask us, Do you also say that sanctity is something? we should reply, I think, that we do.

Protagoras/ We should.

Socrates/ But whether do you say that this very thing sanctity is actually adapted to be unholy, or to be holy? For my part, I should be indignant with this question, and should say, Predict better things, O man: for by no means will anything else be holy unless holiness itself be holy. But what do you say? would not you thus answer?

Protagoras/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If then, after this he should say, asking us, How then have ye spoken a little before? Or have I not rightly understood you? For you appear to me to assert that the parts of virtue subsisted in such a manner with respect to each other, that one of them does not resemble the other; I should reply, that as to other things, you have understood rightly, but you are mistaken in thinking that I also have said this: for Protagoras gave this answer, but I interrogated him. If then he should say, he speaks the truth, Protagoras: for you say that one part of virtue does not resemble another. This is your assertion. What would be your answer to him?

Protagoras/ It is necessary, Socrates, to acknowledge it.

Socrates/ What then, O Protagoras, assenting to these things, shall we answer him, if he should add, holiness therefore is not of such a nature as to be a just thing, nor is justice such as a holy thing, but such as that which is not holy; and holiness is such as that which is not just. So that what is just is unholy. What shall we say to him in reply? For I, for my own part, should say that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. And for you, if you will permit me, I should reply this very thing, that either justice is the same with holiness, or that it is most similar to it; and that the

most of all things, justice is such as holiness, and holiness such as justice. But see whether you hinder me from giving this answer; or does this also appear to you to be the case?

Protagoras/ It does not entirely, Socrates, appear to me to be simply thus, so as to grant that justice is holy, and holiness just; but there appears to me to be a certain difference between them. However, of what consequence is this? For, if you will, let justice be holy, and let holiness be just.

Socrates/ I have nothing to do with *I will*; and *if it is agreeable to you*, let it be reprobated. And let us also be persuaded that the subject of our conversation will be discussed in the best manner, when the particle *if* is removed from it.

Protagoras/ But indeed, justice has something similar to holiness. For one thing always resembles another in a certain respect, contraries alone excepted: for white has no similitude to black, nor hard to soft; and so with respect to other things which appear to be most contrary to each other, and which, as we before observed, possess another power, and of which one does not resemble the other. But there are other things, such as the parts of the face, in which the one is similar to the other. So that although you should confute these things after this manner, if you are of opinion that all things are similar to each other, yet it is not just to call those things similar which possess a certain similitude to each other; as neither is it just to call those things which possess a certain dissimilitude, dissimilars, though they have but very little of the similar.

Socrates/ And I wondering, said to him, do the just and the holy appear to you to be so mutually related, as to possess but a small degree of similitude to each other?

Protagoras/ Not entirely so; nor yet again, do I consider them in the same way as you appear to me to consider them.

Socrates/ But, since these things do not seem to be agreeable to you, we will dismiss them, and consider this other thing which you say. What do you call folly? Do you not say that wisdom is perfectly contrary to it?

Protagoras/ To me it appears to be so.

Socrates/ But when men act rightly and profitably, do they then appear to you to act temperately; or when they act in a contrary manner?

Protagoras/ They appear to me to act temperately, when they act rightly and profitably.

Socrates/ —And do they not act temperately by temperance?

Protagoras/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Do not therefore those that act wrongly, act foolishly, and thus acting, not act by temperance?

Protagoras/ I agree with you that they do.

Socrates/ The acting foolishly, therefore, is the contrary to acting temperately.

He said it was.

Are not, therefore, things which are done foolishly, so done by folly, but by temperance things which are done temperately?

He granted it.

If then anything is done by strength, is it not done strongly, and if by weakness, weakly.

Protagoras/ So it appears.

Socrates/ And if anything is done with swiftness, is it not done swiftly, and if with slowness, slowly?

He said it was.

And if anything is done after the same manner, is it not done by the same, and if in a contrary manner by the contrary?

He granted it.

Come then, is there something beautiful?

He admitted there was.

And is anything contrary to this except the base?

Protagoras/ There is not.

Socrates/ But what? Is there something good? And is anything contrary to this except evil?

Protagoras/ There is not.

Socrates/ Is there also something acute in voice?

He said there is.

And is anything contrary to this except the grave?

Protagoras/ There is not.

Socrates/ To everyone of contraries therefore, there is only one contrary, and not many.

He granted it.

Let us then, repeat the particulars to which we have assented. We have acknowledged that there is only one contrary to one thing, but not more than one.

Protagoras/ We have.

Socrates/ But that which is done contrarily is done by things contrary.

He admitted it.

We also granted that what is done foolishly is done in a manner contrary to that which is done temperately.

He said we did.

But that which is done temperately is done by temperance, and that which is done foolishly, by folly.

He granted it.

But if a thing is done contrarily, is it not done by a contrary?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the one is done by temperance, and the other by folly.

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are they not done contrarily?

Protagoras/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Are they not therefore done by contraries?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Folly therefore is contrary to temperance.

Protagoras/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Do you remember, then, that it was before acknowledged by us, that folly is contrary to wisdom?

He agreed that it was.

And did we not also say, that there is only one contrary to one thing.

Protagoras/ We did.

Socrates/ Which therefore of these positions, O Protagoras, shall we reject? That which says there is only one contrary to one thing, or that in which it is asserted, that wisdom is different from temperance? but that each is a part of virtue? And that besides being different, both they and their powers are dissimilar, in the same manner as the parts of the face? Which therefore of these shall we reject? for both of them are not very musically asserted; since they do not accord, nor coharmonize with each other. For how can they accord, if it be necessary that there should only be one contrary to one thing, but not to more than one? But to folly, which is one thing, wisdom and temperance have appeared to be contrary. Is it so, O Protagoras, or not?

He acknowledged that it was so, but very unwillingly.

Will not, therefore, temperance and wisdom be one thing? And again, prior to this, it appeared to us that justice and sanctity were nearly the same thing. But come, said I, Protagoras, let us not be weary, but consider what remains. Does it then appear to you that a man who acts unjustly is wise, because he acts unjustly?

Protagoras/ I, Socrates, should be ashamed to acknowledge this, though it is asserted by many men.

Socrates/ Whether then shall we address ourselves to them, or to you?

Protagoras/ If you are willing, speak first to this assertion of the many.

Socrates/ But it makes no difference to me, if you only answer, whether these things appear to you or not; for I especially direct my attention to the assertion. It may, however, perhaps happen, that I shall both explore myself interrogating, and him who answers.

At first, therefore, Protagoras began to assume some consequence (for he was averse to discuss this affair, and said it was difficult); but afterwards he submitted to answer.

Come then, answer me from the beginning: Do certain persons who act unjustly, appear to you to be wise?

Protagoras/ Let them be so.

Socrates/ And does not the being wise consist in consulting well, even when they act unjustly?

Protagoras/ Be it so.

Socrates/ But whether does this take place if they do well, acting unjustly, or if they do ill?

Protagoras/ If they do well.

Socrates/ Do you then say that certain things are good?

Protagoras/ I do.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, are those things good which are advantageous to men?

Protagoras/ By Zeus, they are; and I also call some things good, though they are not advantageous to men.

Socrates/ And Protagoras, when he said this, appeared to me to be ruffled, afraid, and averse to answer. Seeing him, therefore, in this condition, I cautiously and gradually interrogated him; and I said, Whether, O Protagoras, do you speak of things which are advantageous to no man, or of those which are in no respect advantageous? And do you call such things as these good?

Protagoras/ By no means; but I know many things which are useless to men, meats and drinks, and medical potions, and ten thousand other things; and I also know some things which are advantageous to them. There are likewise some things which are by no means profitable to men, but are beneficial to horses; some which are advantageous to oxen only; and others to dogs: others again which are beneficial to no one of these, but to trees; and others which are good to the roots of trees, but pernicious to their blossoms. Thus, for instance, dung is beneficial to the roots of all trees when thrown upon them; but if you were to throw it on their branches and shoots, you would destroy them all. Thus too, oil is a very excellent thing for all plants: but is most hostile to the hairs of all animals except man. For it is beneficial to the hairs of man, and to the rest of his body. And so diversified and all-various a thing is good, that this very thing, oil, is good to the external parts of the body of man, but is most pernicious to his inward parts. And on this account all physicians forbid the diseased the use of oil; or at least only permit them to use it in a very small degree, and just sufficient to correct the bad smell of the food which they take.

Socrates/ Protagoras having thus spoken, those that were present loudly applauded him as one that had made a good speech. And I said, O Protagoras, I am a man naturally forgetful, and if anyone makes, a long discourse to me, I forget what was the subject of his discourse. As, therefore, if I were deaf, and you intended to discourse with me, it would be necessary for you to speak a little louder to me than to others; so now, since you happen to have met with a forgetful man, cut your answers for me, and make them shorter, if you wish that I should follow you.

Protagoras/ How would you have me shorten my answers? Must I answer you shorter than is necessary?

Socrates/ By no means.

Protagoras/ But as much as is proper?

Socrates/ Yes.

Protagoras/ Whether, therefore, must my reply be such as appears to me to be necessary, or such as appears to be so to you?

Socrates/ I have heard that you can both speak with prolixity yourself about the same things, and teach another to do the same, so as never to be in want of words; and again, that you can speak with brevity, so that no one can deliver himself in fewer words than you. If, therefore, you intend to discourse with me, use the other method, that of speaking with brevity.

Protagoras/ O Socrates, I have had verbal contests with many men, and if I had done this which you urge me to do, viz. if I had spoken as my antagonist ordered me to speak, I should not have appeared to excel anyone, nor would the name of Protagoras have been celebrated in Greece.

Socrates/ And I (for I knew that the former answers did not please him, and that he would not be willing to answer my interrogations) thought that I had no longer any business

in the conference. I therefore said, O Protagoras, I do not desire you to discourse with me contrary to your will; but if you are disposed to converse so that I can follow you, then I will discourse with you. For you, according to report, and as you yourself say, are able to speak both with prolixity and brevity: for you are wise. But I am unable to make these long speeches; though I wish that I had the ability. It is fit, however, that you, who are capable of doing both, should yield to my inability, in order that conversation may take place. But now, as you are not willing to do this, and a certain business prevents me from staying to hear your long speeches, I must depart whither it is requisite I should go; though perhaps it would not be unpleasant to me to hear these things from you.

And at the same time having thus spoken, I rose in order to go. But as I was rising, Callias taking hold of me with his right hand, and of my cloak with his left, said;

Callias/ We shall not dismiss you, Socrates: for if you depart, our conversation will be at an end. I beseech you, therefore, stay with us: for there is not anyone thing which I would more willingly hear than you and Protagoras discoursing together. Gratify all of us therefore.

Socrates/ (I was now standing as being ready to go), O son of Hipponicus, I have always admired your philosophy; but I now both praise and love it; so that I should wish to gratify you, if you request of me possibilities. But at present, it is just as if you should desire me to run a race with Criso the Himeræan, who is now in the vigor of youth, or with one of those who run and accomplish the longest course, or with some diurnal courier; I should say to you, that I wish much more than you do that I could keep pace with these runners, but that I cannot. If, therefore, you would see me and Criso running a race together, you must request him to keep pace with me: for I am not able to run swiftly, but he is able to

run slowly. In like manner, if you desire to hear me and Protagoras, you must request him, that as he at first answered me with brevity the, questions that were asked, he will now also answer me in the same manner: for if he does not, what will be the mode of our discourse? I indeed thought that it is one thing to converse together, and another to harangue.

Callias/ But you see Socrates, that Protagoras appears to speak justly when he says that he ought to be permitted to speak as he pleases, and you as you please.

Socrates/ Alcibiades, therefore taking up the discourse, said;

Alcibiades/ You do not speak well Callias: for Socrates here acknowledges that he cannot make a long speech, and in this yields to Protagoras. But in the ability of discoursing, and knowing how to question and answer, I should wonder if he yielded to any man. If, therefore, Protagoras confesses that he is inferior to Socrates in disputation, it is sufficient for Socrates; but if he denies it, let him dispute, both by questioning and answering without making a long speech to every interrogation, and without deviating from the subject so as to prevent another from speaking. and lengthening his discourse till the greater part of the auditors forget what was the subject of investigation. For as for Socrates, I will be security for him that he will not forget anything: since he only jests when he says he is forgetful. To me, therefore, Socrates appears to be more, reasonable in what he demands: For it is fit that everyone should declare his own opinion.

Socrates/ But after Alcibiades, it was Critias, I think, who said;

Critias/ O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias indeed appears some to be very much for Protagoras; but Alcibiades is

always fond of contention in everything to which he applies himself. We, however, ought not to contend with each other, either for Socrates or Protagoras, but we should request both of them in common not to dissolve the conference in the middle.

Prodicus/ You appear to me, Critias, to speak well: for it is requisite that those who are present at these conferences should be the common, but by no means equal, auditors of both speakers. For these two are not the same: For it is requisite to hear both in common, but not to distribute equally to either; but to the wiser more, and to the more unlearned less. I indeed, O Protagoras and Socrates, think that you ought to concede something to each other, and to contend together, but not to quarrel: for friends contend with friends through benevolence; but adversaries and enemies quarrel with each other. And thus this conference will be conducted in the most beautiful manner. For you, the speakers, will be especially approved, I do not say praised, by us the hearers: for auditors approve from their soul without deception; but praise is frequently bestowed in words, falsely, contrary to the real opinion. And thus again, we, the hearers, shall be especially delighted, but not pleasurably affected: for he is delighted who learns anything and participates of wisdom in his dianoëtic part; but he is pleasurably affected who eats something, or is passive to some other pleasant sensation in his body.

Socrates/ Prodicus having thus spoken, many of those that were present approved what he said. But after Prodicus, Hippias the wise thus addressed them:

Hippias/ I consider all ye that are present as kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens by nature, and not by law: for the similar is naturally allied to the similar, But law being the tyrant of men, compels many things to be done contrary to nature. It would be disgraceful, therefore, if we who know

the nature of things, who are the wisest of the Greeks, and who are now come for the purpose of displaying our knowledge into the very prytaneum itself of wisdom, and into this house, which is the greatest and most fortunate in the city, should exhibit nothing worthy of this dignity, but disagree with each other like the vilest of men. I therefore both request and advise you, O Protagoras and Socrates, to submit yourselves to us, as if we were arbitrators assembled for the purpose of bringing you to an agreement. Nor do you, Socrates, pursue this accurate form of dialogue, which is so very concise, unless it is agreeable to Protagoras; but give up the reins to discourse, that it may appear to us to be more magnificent and elegant. Nor do you, Protagoras, extending all your ropes, fly with swelling sails into the wide sea of discourse, and lose sight of shore: but let both endeavor to preserve a middle course. Be persuaded also by me, and let some moderator and president be chosen, who shall oblige each of you to keep within bounds.

Socrates/ This expedient pleased those that were present, and all of them praised it. And Callias said, that he would not suffer me to go, and required me to choose a moderator. I therefore said;

Socrates/ It would be disgraceful to select a judge of our discourses: for if he be our inferior, it will not be right that the subordinate should preside over the more excellent; and if he be our equal, neither thus will it be right. For he who is just such a one as we are, will act similarly to us; so that the choice will be vain. But to choose one better than we are, is, I think, in reality impossible: since one wiser than Protagoras here, cannot be chosen. And if you should choose a man in no respect more able, but whom you assert however to be so, this also will be disgraceful to Protagoras, by subjecting him to a president, as if he were some contemptible person: For it makes no difference as to myself.

I am willing, therefore, to act as follows, that conversation and dialogue may take place between us, which are the objects of your desire: If Protagoras is not willing to answer, let him interrogate, and I will answer; and at the same time I will endeavor to show him in what manner I say he who is interrogated ought to answer. But when I reply to that which he may be willing to ask, he again in a similar manner shall reply to me. If, therefore, he shall appear not to be cheerfully disposed to answer the interrogation, both you and I in common must demand of him, that which you now demand of me, not to dissolve the conversation. Nor for the sake of this is there any occasion to appoint a president: for all of you will be presidents in common.

It appeared to all that this was what ought to be done. And Protagoras, indeed, was not very willing to comply; but at the same time he was compelled to consent to interrogate; and that when he had sufficiently interrogated, he would in his turn answer with brevity. He began therefore as follows:

Protagoras/ I think, O Socrates, that the greatest part of a man's erudition consists in being skilled in poetical compositions. But this is the ability of knowing what is well or ill said by the poets, so as to be capable of assigning a reason when interrogated concerning their poems. And now indeed let the question be respecting virtue, the subject of our present discourse; differing only in this, that the disquisition is transferred to poetry. Simonides then says to Scopas, the son of Creon the Thessalonian, "That it is difficult to become a truly good man, so as in hands, feet, and intellect, to be fashioned a blameless square." Do you know the verse, or shall I repeat the whole passage to you?

Socrates/ There is no necessity for this; for I know, and have paid great attention to the verse.

Protagoras/ You speak well. Whether, therefore, does Simonides appear to you to have done well and rightly, or not?

Socrates/ Very well and rightly.

Protagoras/ But does the poet appear to you to have done well if he contradicts himself?

Socrates/ By no means.

Protagoras/ Consider more attentively.

Socrates/ But, my good man, I have sufficiently considered it.

Protagoras/ You know therefore, that in the course of the poem he says, “The assertion of Pittacus does not please me, though it was delivered by a wise man, viz. that it is difficult to continue to be a good man,” Do you understand that the same person made this and the former assertion?

Socrates/ I do.

Protagoras/ Does it therefore, appear to you that these things accord with those?

Socrates/ To me they do appear to accord. And at the same time fearing lest he should say anything in addition, I said, But do they not appear to do so to you?

Protagoras/ How can he who made both these assertions accord with himself, when he first says, that it is difficult to become a truly good man, and a little after, forgetting what he had asserted, he blames Pittacus for saying the same thing that he had said, viz. that it is difficult to continue to be a good man, though it is evident that in blaming him who said this, he also blames himself? So that either the former or the latter assertion is not right.

Socrates/ Protagoras having thus spoken, many of the auditors made a noise, and applauded him. And I indeed at first, as if I had been struck by a skillful pugilist, was

incapable of seeing, and became giddy, on his saying these things, and the rest making a tumult; but afterwards (to tell you the truth), that I might have time to consider what the poet said, I turned myself to Prodicus, and calling him, I said, Simonides, O Prodicus, was your fellow-citizen, and it is just that you should assist the man, I appear therefore to myself to call upon you, in the same manner as Homer says Scamander called upon Simois when besieged by Achilles, "Dear brother, let us both join to repel the prowess of this man," For I say the same to you, let us take care that Simonides be not subdued by Protagoras. For in order to assist Simonides, that elegant device of yours is requisite, by which you distinguish between, to will and to desire, as not being the same, and by which you have just now said many and beautiful things. And now consider whether the same thing appears to you as to me: for I do not think that Simonides contradicts himself. But do you, Prodicus, first declare your opinion. Does it appear to you that to become is the same as to be, or that it is something different?

Prodicus/ Something, different, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Does not Simonides then, in the first assertion, declare his own opinion, that it is difficult to become a truly good man?

Prodicus/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ But he blames Pittacus not as Protagoras thinks, for saying the same thing that he had said, but for asserting something different from it. For Pittacus does not say this, that it is difficult to become a good man, as Simonides does, but that it is difficult to continue to be so. But as Prodicus says, *to be* is not the same as to *become*, And if this be the case, Simonides does not contradict himself. And perhaps Prodicus here, and many others, may say with Hesiod, "It is difficult to become good: for the gods

have placed sweat before virtue. But he who has arrived at the summit will find that to be easy, which it was difficult to acquire."

Prodicus therefore having heard these things, praised me; but Protagoras said;

Protagoras/ Your emendation, Socrates, is more erroneous than that which you correct.

Socrates/ Then I have done ill, as it seems, O Protagoras, and I am a ridiculous physician; since by attempting to cure, I increase the disease.

Protagoras/ Thus however it is.

Socrates/ But how?

Protagoras/ The poet would have been very ignorant, if he had asserted that virtue is so vile a thing that it may be easily acquired, though, as it appears to all men, its possession is the most difficult of all things.

Socrates/ By Zeus, Prodicus, here, is opportunely present at our conference. For the wisdom of Prodicus appears, O Protagoras, to be of great antiquity, whether it originated from Simonides, or from a source still more ancient. But you, who are skilled in many other things, appear to be unskilled in this, and not skilled in it as I am, in consequence of being the disciple of this Prodicus. And now you appear to me not to understand that this thing which is said to be difficult, was not perhaps so apprehended by Simonides, as you apprehend it; but it is with that as with the word δεινος, *deinos*, concerning which Prodicus continually admonishes me, when in praising you, or any other, I say, that Protagoras is a wise and *skillful* (δεινος) man, by asking me if I am not ashamed to call things excellent *dreadful* (δεινος). For το δεινον says he, signifies something bad. Hence no one says *dreadful* riches, nor *dreadful* peace, nor dreadful health; but everyone says dreadful disease, and dreadful war, and

dreadful poverty, as if that which is (δεινον) *deinon*, is bad. Perhaps, therefore, the inhabitants of Ceos and Simonides apprehended by the word difficult (χαλεπον) either that which is bad, or something different from what you conceive it to mean. Let us therefore inquire of Prodicus (For it is just to ask him the signification of words employed by Simonides); What, O Prodicus, does Simonides mean by the word difficult?

Prodicus/ He meant, bad.

Socrates/ He blames Pittacus for saying that it is difficult to continue to be good, just as if he had heard him saying, that it is bad to continue to be good.

Prodicus/ But what else, Socrates, do you think Simonides intended, than to blame Pittacus because he did not know how to distinguish terms rightly, as being a Lesbian, and educated in a barbarous language?

Socrates/ Do you hear Prodicus, O Protagoras? And have you anything to say to these things?

Protagoras/ This is very far, O Prodicus, from being the case; for I well know that Simonides meant by the word difficult, not that which is bad, but that which we and others mean by it, viz. a thing which is not easy, but is accomplished through many labors.

Socrates/ But I also think that Simonides meant this, and that Prodicus knows that he did; but he jests, and it willing to try whether you can defend your assertion. For that Simonides did not by the word difficult mean anything bad, is very much confirmed by what he adds immediately after: for he says, that Divinity alone possesses this honorable gift. He does not indeed say, that it is bad to continue to be good, and afterwards add that Divinity alone possesses this, and attribute this honor to Divinity alone: for if this were the case, Prodicus should have called Simonides a profligate,

and not a divine man. But I wish to tell you what Simonides appears to me to have understood in this verse, if you think proper to make trial of my poetical skill. Or, if it is agreeable to you, I will hear you Protagoras.

Protagoras/ Do so, if you please, Socrates:

Socrates/ But Prodicus, Hippias, and the rest, very much urged me to do it.

I will endeavor, then, to explain to you my conceptions, respecting this verse.

Philosophy is very ancient among the Greeks, and particularly in Crete and Lacedæmon; and there are more sophists there than in any other country. They dissemble, however, and pretend that they are unlearned, in order that it may not be manifest that they surpass the rest of the Greeks in wisdom (just as Protagoras has said respecting the sophists); but that they may appear to excel in military skill and fortitude; thinking if their real character were known, that all men would engage in the same pursuit. But now, concealing this, they deceive those who laconize in other cities. For there are some that in imitation of them cut their ears, have a cord for their girdle, are lovers of severe exercise, and use short garments, as if the Lacedæmonians surpassed in these things the other Greeks. But the Lacedæmonians, when they wish to speak freely with their own sophists, and are weary of converging with them privately, expel these laconic imitators, and then discourse with their sophists, without admitting any strangers to be present at their conversations. Neither do they suffer any of their young men to travel into other cities, as neither do the Cretans, lest they should unlearn what they have learnt. But in these cities, there are not only men of profound erudition, but women also. And that I assert these things with truth, and that the Lacedæmonians are disciplined in the best manner in

philosophy and discourse, you may know from the following circumstance: For if anyone wishes to converse with the meanest of the Lacedæmonians, he will at first find him, for the most part apparently despicable in conversation, but afterwards, when a proper opportunity presents itself, this same mean person, like a skillful jaculator, will hurl a sentence worthy of attention, short, and contorted; so that he who converses with him will appear to be in no respect superior to a boy. That to laconize, therefore, consists much more in philosophizing, than in the love of exercise, is understood by some of the present age, and was known to the ancients; they being persuaded that the ability of uttering such sentences as these is the province of a man perfectly learned. Among the number of those who were thus persuaded, were Thales the Milesian, Pittacus the Mitylenæan, Bias the Prienean, our Solon, Cleobulus the Lindian, Miso the Chenean, and the seventh of these is said to be the Lacedæmonian Chilo. All these were emulators, lovers, and disciples of the Lacedæmonian erudition. And anyone may learn that their wisdom was a thing of this kind, viz. short sentences uttered by each and worthy to be remembered. These men also assembling together, consecrated to Apollo the first fruits of their wisdom, writing in the Temple of Apollo at Delphi those sentences which are celebrated by all men, viz. “Know thyself,” and “Nothing too much.” But on what account do I mention these things? To show that the mode of philosophy among the ancients was a certain laconic brevity of diction. But the sentence which is ascribed to Pittacus in particular, and which is celebrated by the wise, is this: “It is difficult to continue to be good.” Simonides, therefore, as being ambitious of wisdom, knew that if he could overthrow this sentence, and triumph over it like a renowned athletic, he himself would be celebrated by the men of his own time. In opposition to this sentence,

therefore, and with a view to renown, he composed the whole of this poem, as it appears to me. Let all of us, however, in common, consider whether what I assert is true.

In the first place, then, the very beginning of the poem would indicate that its author was insane, if he, wishing to say that it is difficult to become a good man, had afterwards inserted the particle (μεν) *indeed*. For this would appear to have been inserted for no purpose. Unless it should be said, that Simonides in what he says contends as it were against the sentence of Pittacus: and that Pittacus, having asserted that it is difficult to continue to be good, Simonides disputing this, says it is not difficult; but it is difficult *indeed*, O Pittacus, to become a good man, and to be truly good. For he does not use the word truly, as if there were some men that are truly good, and others that are good indeed, but not truly so (for this would have been stupid and unworthy of Simonides); but it is necessary to consider the word truly as an hyperbaton in the verse; and we must suppose Pittacus speaking, as if there was a dialogue between him and Simonides, and saying, O men, it is difficult to continue to be good; but Simonides answering, O Pittacus, your assertion is not true: For it is not difficult to be truly good, but to become so, in hands and feet, and intellect, being fashioned a blameless square. And thus it appears that the particle *indeed* is introduced with reason, and that the word truly is rightly added in the last place. All that follows likewise testifies that this is the meaning of the passage. There are also many sentences in this poem, each of which might be proved to be well written; for it is very elegantly and accurately composed. To evince this, however, would take up too much time; but let us summarily consider the whole form and intention of the poem, that we may show that the design of it throughout is more than anything to confute that sentence of Pittacus. For a little after he says, as follows: “It

is indeed truly difficult to become a good man; yet for a certain time it is possible to be so. But having become a good man, to continue in this habit, and to be a good man, (as you say, O Pittacus,) is impossible. for this is not human, but Divinity alone possesses this honorable gift. For man, who may be overwhelmed by unexpected calamity, cannot continue free from vice.

Whom, then, does an unexpected calamity overwhelm in the government of a ship? Evidently not an idiot; for the idiot is always overwhelmed. As therefore no one throws to the ground him who is lying on it, but sometimes he who stands upright is thrown down, so as to be prostrate; but this is never the case with him who is already prostrate; so an unexpected calamity may sometimes overwhelm a skillful man, but never him who is always unskillful. And a mighty storm bursting on the head of the pilot may render him unskillful; bad seasons may confound the husbandman; and things similar to these may be applied to the physician: for a good may indeed become a bad man. And this is also testified by another poet, who says, "A good man is sometimes bad, and sometimes worthy." But it is not possible for a bad man to become bad, but it is always necessary that he should be so. So that when an unexpected calamity overwhelms a skillful, wise, and good man, it is not possible for him not to be wicked. But you, O Pittacus, say, that it is difficult to continue to be good. The truth however is this, that it is difficult indeed, but possible, to become good; but impossible to continue to be good. For every man who acts well is good; but bad if he acts ill, What then is a good action with respect to literature? and what makes a man excellent in literature? Evidently the being disciplined in it. What good action likewise makes a good physician? Evidently the learning the art of curing the sick. For a good physician cures properly, but a bad one improperly. Who is

it then that becomes a bad physician? Evidently the man to whom it belongs in the first place to be a physician, and in the next place to be a good physician; for he may become a bad physician. But we who are ignorant of the medicinal art, can never by acting ill become bad physicians; nor being ignorant of architecture can we become bad architects, or anything else of this kind. But whoever does not become a physician by acting ill, it is evident that neither is he a bad physician. Thus also a good man may sometimes become a bad man, either from time, or labor, or disease, or from some other circumstance (for this alone is a bad action to be deprived of science); but a bad man can never become bad (for he is always so); but if he is to become bad, it is necessary that prior to this he should have been good. So that to this also the verses of Simonides tend, that it is not possible to be a good man, so as to be perseveringly good; but that it is possible to become a good man, and for this same good to become a bad man. And also that for the most part, those are the best men whom the gods love. All these things therefore are said against Pittacus, which the verses following these still more clearly evince. For he says, "Wherefore I shall not explore in vain and hope for that which cannot be found, viz. a man nourished by the fruits of the earth, who lives a blameless life and is perpetually good." Afterwards he adds, "I will tell you when I have found him." So vehemently, and through the whole of the poem, does he attack the saying of Pittacus. He also adds, "I willingly praise and love the man, who does nothing base; and the gods themselves are not able to contend with necessity." And this likewise is said in opposition to Pittacus. For Simonides was not so unlearned as to say that he praised him who willingly did nothing bad, as if there were some who committed base actions willingly. For I nearly think this, that no wise man considers any man as erring

voluntarily, and as acting basely and wickedly with the concurrence of his will; but he well knows that all those who act basely and wickedly, do so involuntarily. But Simonides does not speak as if he said, that he praises the man who does not willingly do wrong, but he says this word willingly of himself. For he thought that a worthy and good man is frequently compelled to love and praise a certain person. Thus, for instance, it often happens that a man has a monstrous father, or mother, or country, or something else of this kind. Depraved characters, therefore, when anything of this nature happens to them, are in the first place glad to see it, and in the next place blame and everywhere divulge the depravity of their parents or country, that they may not be accused of having neglected these, nor fall into disgrace for their neglect. Hence they blame their parents or country in a still greater degree, and add voluntary to necessary enmity. But the worthy man conceals the faults of his parents or country, and if any unjust conduct has led him to be enraged with them, he is their mediator to himself, and compels them to love and praise their own offspring. I also think that Simonides himself frequently praised and was the encomiast of a tyrant, or some other character of this kind; and this not willingly, but by compulsion. This, then, is what he says to Pittacus; "I, O Pittacus, do not blame you, from being myself one who loves to blame: for I am satisfied if a man is not wicked, nor very indolent, as knowing that a sane man benefits his country. Nor will I find fault; since I am not a lover of detraction. For the race of fools is infinite; so that he who delights in blaming will be satiated with it. All things, indeed, are beautiful with which such as are base are not mingled." His meaning however in this, is not as if he had said, all things are white with which black is not mingled (for this would be very ridiculous), but he intends to signify that he admits mediocrity, so as not to blame it. "And I do not

seek," says he, "a man perfectly blameless, or expect to find him among such as gather the fruits of the wide-bosomed earth: for I will tell you when I find such a one. So that on this account I shall praise no one as perfect. But I am satisfied with a man of moderate excellence, and who does no ill: and all such as these I both love and praise." Here too he uses the language of the Mitylenæans as speaking to Pittacus, and saying, "I willingly praise and love all these." But here it is necessary to consider the word willingly as connected with the words "Who does nothing base," and to separate it from the verse in which he says, "There are also those whom I unwillingly praise and love. You therefore, O Pittacus, I should never have blamed, if you had spoken of that equitable and true mediocrity; but now, though you are very much mistaken about things of the greatest moment, yet you appear to speak the truth, and on this account I blame you."

It appears to me, O Prodicus and Protagoras, that Simonides composed this poem in consequence of these conceptions.

Hippias/ You seem to me, Socrates, to have well explained these verses: and I also have something pertinent to say concerning them, which, if you please, I will point out to you.

Alcibiades/ Do so, O Hippias, but let it be at another time; for now it is just to attend to the coincidence in opinion of Protagoras and Socrates with each other. And indeed, if Protagoras wishes still to interrogate, Socrates should answer; but if he wishes to reply to Socrates, then Socrates should interrogate.

Socrates/ I leave it to Protagoras to do whichever of the two is more agreeable to him: but if he is willing, let us dismiss any further consideration about the verses. And I would gladly, O Protagoras, complete with you the

discussion of those things, concerning which I at first interrogated you. For it appears to me, that a discourse about poetry is most similar to the banquets of vile and rustic men; since these, not being able, through the want of education, to converse with each other while they are drinking, in their own language, and with their own words, introduce the players on the flute as honorable persons, hire at a great expense a foreign voice, viz. that of flutes, and through the sound of these associate with each other. But when worthy, good, and well-educated men feast together, you will see neither pipers, nor dancers, nor singers, but they being sufficient to converse with themselves, without these trifles and sportive amusements, speak in their own language, and in a becoming manner reciprocally hear each other, even though they have drank a considerable quantity of wine. In like manner, such conversations as the present, when they are between men such as most of us assert ourselves to be, require no foreign voice, nor poets, of whom it is impossible to ask the meaning of what they say, and to whom most of those by whom they are cited attribute different conceptions, without being able to explain their real meaning. Wise men, therefore, bid farewell to such conferences as these, but converse with each other through themselves, and in their discourses make trial of each other's skill. It appears to me, that you and I ought rather to imitate conferences of this kind, laying aside the poets, and discoursing with each other through ourselves, make trial of the truth of ourselves. And if you wish still to interrogate, I am prepared to answer you; but if you do not wish it, impart yourself to me, and assist me in giving completion to those things, the discussion of which we left unfinished.

When I had said these and other such like things, Protagoras did not clearly signify what part he would take. Alcibiades, therefore, looking to Callias, said;

Alcibiades/ Does Protagoras, O Callias, appear to you to do well, in not now being willing to say clearly, whether he will answer or not? For to me he does not; but let him say, whether he is willing or not willing to converse, that we may know this from him, and that Socrates may converse with some other person, or that some one of the company who is so disposed may discourse with some other.

Socrates/ And Protagoras, as it seemed to me, being ashamed in consequence of Alcibiades thus speaking, and Callias, and nearly all those that were present, soliciting him, scarcely at length agreed to dispute, and desired me to interrogate him that he might answer.

Socrates/ O Protagoras, do not think that I shall converse with you with any other design, than that those things may be discussed of which I am continually in doubt. For I think that Homer speaks very much to the purpose, when he says, "When two come together, the one apprehends prior to the other." For with respect to us men, we are all of us more prompt in every deed, and word, and conception, when collected together. But he who thinks of anything by himself alone, immediately searches for someone to whom he may communicate it, and from whom he may derive stability till he meets with the object of his search. Just as I, also, for the sake of this, more willingly converse with you than with any other, thinking that you discriminate the best of all men, both about other things which it is likely a worthy man would make the object of his consideration, and also concerning virtue. For what other person can do this besides you? Since you not only think yourself to be a worthy and good man, as some others also are indeed themselves worthy, but are not able to make others so; but you are both worthy yourself, and are able to make others good. And you have such confidence in yourself, that while others conceal this art, you openly proclaim yourself to all the Greeks to be

a sophist, declare that you are a master of erudition and virtue, and you are the first that has thought fit to set a price on his instructions. Is it not proper, therefore, to call upon you to the consideration of these things, and to interrogate and communicate with you concerning them?

Protagoras/ There is no reason why this should not be done.

Socrates/ And now, with respect to those things which were the subject of my former interrogations, I again desire from the beginning, partly to be reminded of them by you, and partly to consider them in conjunction with you. But the question, I think, was this, whether wisdom, temperance, fortitude, justice, and sanctity, which are five names, belong to one thing, or whether a certain proper essence pertains to each of these names, so that each is a thing having a power of its own, and no one of them possesses a quality similar to the other. You said, therefore, that these were not names belonging to one thing, but that each of these names pertained to a proper thing. You likewise observed, that all these are parts of virtue, not in the same manner as the parts of gold are similar to each other, and to the whole of which they are parts, but just as the parts of the face are dissimilar to the whole of which they are parts, and to each other, and each possesses a proper power of its own. Inform me if these things still appear to you as they did then; or if you think otherwise concerning them. For I shall not accuse you, if you now speak differently; since I should not wonder if you said these things for the purpose of trying me.

Protagoras/ But, Socrates, I say that all these are parts of virtue; and that four of them may justly be considered as similar to each other, but that fortitude very much differs from all these. By the following circumstance you may know that I speak the truth. You will find men who are most

unjust, most unholy, most intemperate, and most unlearned, who are notwithstanding remarkably brave.

Socrates/ Stop; for what you say deserves to be considered. Whether do you call brave men, daring men, or anything else?

Protagoras/ I do, and I likewise say that they rush headlong on things, which the multitude are afraid to approach.

Socrates/ Come then; Do you say, that virtue is something beautiful; and that you are a teacher of it, as of a thing beautiful?

Protagoras/ Yes and a thing most beautiful, unless I am insane.

Socrates/ Whether then is one thing belonging to it base, and another beautiful? Or, is the whole beautiful?

Protagoras/ The whole is as much as possible beautiful.

Socrates/ Do you not know, then, that there are some who boldly merge themselves in wells?

Protagoras/ I know that divers do.

Socrates/ Whether do they do this in consequence of possessing knowledge, or on account of something else?

Protagoras/ In consequence of possessing knowledge.

Socrates/ But who are they that fight boldly on horse-back? Are they horsemen, or those that are unskilled in horsemanship?

Protagoras/ They are horsemen.

Socrates/ And who are they that fight boldly with short shields? Are they those that are skilled in the use of such shields, or those that are not skilled?

Protagoras/ Those that are skilled. And in everything else you will find that those who possess knowledge, are bolder

than the ignorant; and the same men after they have been disciplined are bolder than they were before.

Socrates/ But did you ever see any who being ignorant of all these things, were yet daring with respect to each of these?

Protagoras/ I have and such as were very daring.

Socrates/ Are, therefore, those daring persons brave also?

Protagoras/ If they were fortitude would be a base thing, since these men are insane.

Socrates/ What then, have you asserted of the brave? Is it not that they are bold?

Protagoras/ I have and now also I assert the same.

Socrates/ But, do not those who are thus bold appear, not to be brave, but insane? And again, did not the most wise appear to us to be also the most daring? And being most daring, were they not also most brave? And according to this reasoning, will not wisdom be fortitude?

Protagoras/ You do not well remember, Socrates, what I said, and what was my answer to you? For being asked by you if the brave were bold, I acknowledged that they were; but you did not also ask me if the bold were brave. For if you had asked me this, I should have said that all the bold were not brave. But you have by no means shown that I was not right in granting that the brave are bold. In the next place, you show that men, when they possess knowledge, are bolder than when they were ignorant, and than others who are ignorant; and in consequence of this, you think that fortitude and wisdom are the same. But from this mode of reasoning, you may also think that strength is wisdom. For in the first place, if you should in like manner inquire of me, if the strong are powerful, I should say that they are; and in the next place, if you should ask me, if those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who do not possess

this knowledge, and if they are more powerful after they have learnt than before, I should say that they are. But from my acknowledging these things, it will be possible for you, by using the same arguments, to say that, by my own confession, wisdom is strength. I, however, shall by no means here acknowledge that the powerful are strong; but I shall admit, indeed, that the strong are powerful; since power and strength are not the same. For, indeed, power may be produced from insanity, and from anger; but strength derives its subsistence from nature, and the proper nutrition of bodies, In like manner, boldness and fortitude are not the same; so that it will happen, that the brave are bold, but not that all the bold are brave. For boldness is produced in men from anger, and from insanity, in the same manner as we observed of power; but fortitude arises from nature, and the proper nutrition of souls.

Socrates/ But do you say, O Protagoras, that some men live well, and others ill?

Protagoras/ I do.

Socrates/ Does, therefore, a man appear to you to live well, if he lives in molestation and sorrow?

Protagoras/ He does not.

Socrates/ But what, if he has lived pleasantly to the end of life, will he not thus appear to you to have lived well?

Protagoras/ To me he will.

Socrates/ To live pleasantly, therefore, is a good, but unpleasantly a bad thing.

Protagoras/ If he has lived delighted with worthy things.

Socrates/ But what, O Protagoras, Do you, like the multitude, call certain things that are pleasant bad, and some things that are disagreeable good?

Protagoras/ I do. How do you say?

Socrates/ So far as they are agreeable, are these things according to this not good, unless something else happens from them? And again, is this also the case with things disagreeable?

Protagoras/ It is.

Socrates/ Are they not then bad so far as they are disagreeable?

Protagoras/ I do not know, Socrates, whether I should simply answer as you ask me, that all pleasant things are good, and all disagreeable things evil; but it appears to me to be more base to answer, not only to the present question, but also to every other during the rest of my life, that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and again, that there are some disagreeable things which are not evil; and that there are also a third sort, which are neither good nor evil.

Socrates/ But do you not call those things pleasant, which either participate of pleasure, or produce pleasure?

Protagoras/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ I ask, therefore, whether they are not good, so far as they are pleasant; asking with respect to pleasure itself, if it is not good?

Protagoras/ Just as you continually say, Socrates, we must examine it, and if it shall seem to be conformable to reason, and the same thing shall appear to be pleasant and good, we must acquiesce in it; but if not, we must controvert it.

Socrates/ Whether, therefore, are you willing to be the leader of the inquiry? or shall I lead?

Protagoras/ It is just that you should lead: for you began the conference.

Socrates/ Perhaps then, that which we investigate will become manifest after the following manner: for just as if anyone, directing his attention to the form or health of a man, or any other of the works of his body, on beholding his countenance and his hands, should say, Come, strip yourself, and show me your breast and back, that I may see more clearly; I also desire something of this kind in the present inquiry, perceiving that you being so affected as you say you are, with respect to the good and the pleasant, it is requisite I should say to you some such thing as this, Come, Protagoras, lay your mind open to me, and inform me what are your conceptions with respect to science. Does the same thing appear to you concerning it as to other men, or not? But a thing of this kind appears to the many concerning science; that it is not strong, and that it neither possesses a leading nor a governing power; nor is it conceived to be a thing of this kind: but science being frequently inherent in man, they are of opinion, that it is not science that governs him, but something else; at one time anger at another pleasure, and at another pain: and that he is sometimes governed by love, and frequently by fear. And, in short, their conceptions of science are, as if it were a slave dragged about by everything else. Does, therefore, a thing of this kind appear to you also respecting it? Or, do you think that science is something beautiful, and as it were the governor of man? And, that he who knows good and evil, will never be subdued by anything, so as to act contrary to the mandates of science, but that intellectual prudence will be a sufficient aid to such a man?

Protagoras/ It appears to me also, Socrates, as you say: and it would be base in me, if it ever were so in any man, not to assert that wisdom and science are the most powerful of all human affairs.

Socrates/ You speak well, and with truth. You know, therefore, that the multitude of men are not persuaded by you and me, but say that many who know what is best, are unwilling to do it, when they have the power of acting in the best manner, but do other things. And such as I have asked what is the cause of this, have replied, that being vanquished by pleasure or pain, or some one of the things which I have just now mentioned, they have acted in this manner.

Protagoras/ For I think, Socrates, that men assert many other things erroneously.

Socrates/ Come then, endeavor with me to persuade and teach men what this passion is, which they call the being vanquished by pleasures, and through which they do not perform the most excellent things, though they have a knowledge of them. For, perhaps, if we should say, you speak erroneously, O men, and are deceived, they would ask us, O Protagoras and Socrates, if this passion is not the being vanquished by pleasure, but something else, tell us what you say it is?

Protagoras/ But, why is it necessary, Socrates, that we should consider the opinion of the multitude, who speak that which casually presents itself?

Socrates/ But I think that this will contribute to our discovering how fortitude is related to the other parts of virtue. If, therefore, you are willing to abide by that which was just now agreed upon by us, that I should be the leader, follow me in that in which I think this thing will become most beautifully apparent; but if you are not willing, dismiss it, if you think fit.

Protagoras/ You speak well; but proceed as you begun.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, if the multitude should ask us, What then do you assert this thing to be, which we call

the being vanquished by pleasures? I should answer them as follows: Hear then, for I and Protagoras shall endeavor to tell you, Do you, O men, say that anything else happens to you in this case, than that which often happens to those who are subdued by meats and drinks, and venereal pleasures; who, though they know that these things are baneful, yet at the same time they do them because they are pleasant? They will say, that nothing else happens. You and I, therefore, will again ask them, Do you say that these things are baneful? Whether, therefore, is it because they immediately impart pleasure, and each of them is pleasant? Or is it because that in some future time they produce diseases and poverty, and procure many other things of this kind? Or, though they should be followed by nothing of this kind, are they bad in consequence of causing men to rejoice? Shall we think, O Protagoras, that they will answer anything else than that they are not evil from the immediate pleasure which they produce, but from the diseases and other things with which they are followed?

Protagoras/ I indeed think that the multitude would thus answer.

Socrates/ If they cause diseases, therefore, and poverty, do they not also cause sorrow? I think they would acknowledge that they did.

Protagoras assented.

Socrates/ It appears, therefore, O men, as I and Protagoras say, that these things are bad, for no other reason than because they end in sorrow, and deprive their votaries of other pleasures.

It appeared to both of us, that they would acknowledge this to be the case.

Again, therefore, if, taking the contrary side, we should ask them, O men! ye who say that disagreeable things are

good, do you not speak of such things as gymnastic exercises, military labors, and things which are effected through burnings, and incisions, and medicines, and fasting? And do you not say, that these things are indeed good, but disagreeable? They would say so.

It also appeared to Protagoras, that they would.

Whether, therefore, do you call these things good, because they immediately impart extreme pain and torment; or because they are followed by health, and a good habit of body, together with the safety of cities, dominion and wealth. They would say, because of the latter consequence.

And to this also Protagoras assented.

But are these things good through anything else, than because they end in pleasures, and liberations from pain? Or can you mention any other end than pleasures and pains to which looking they call these things good? They will say, I think, that they cannot.

Protagoras/ So, likewise, it appears to me.

Socrates/ Do you, therefore, pursue pleasure as being good, and avoid pain as an evil? They will say, that they do.

And to this also Protagoras assented.

You, therefore, are of opinion, that this thing is evil, viz. pain, and that pleasure is good; since delight also is then said to be evil, when it deprives us of greater pleasures than it possesses, or when it procures pains greater than the pleasures which it contains. For if you call delight an evil on any other account, and look to any other end, you would also be able to inform us; but you cannot.

Protagoras/ Nor do they appear to me to regard any other end.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, after the same manner with respect to pain, do you not then call the being in pain a good,

when it liberates from pains greater than those which it contains, or when it procures pleasures greater than the pains? For if you looked to any other end, when you call the being in pain a good, than that which I have mentioned, you would be able to inform us; but you cannot.

Protagoras/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ Again, therefore, if you should ask me, O men, on what account I speak so much and so frequently about this, I should say, Pardon me. For, in the first place, it is not easy to show what this thing is which you call the being subdued by pleasures; and, in the next place, all demonstrations are contained in this. But now, also, you are at liberty to inform me, if you have anything else which you assert to be good besides pleasure, or anything else besides pain, which you call evil. Or are you satisfied with passing your life pleasantly without pain? For if you are satisfied with this, and if you cannot mention any good or evil which does not end in these things, hear what follows: I say, then, that, if this be the case, the assertion is ridiculous when you say that frequently, though a man knows that evil things are evil, he at the same time does them (though he has the power of not doing them), in consequence of being led and astonished by pleasure: and again, when you say that a man, knowing what is good, is not willing to do it, in consequence of being vanquished by immediate pleasure. For it will be manifest that these things are ridiculous, unless we employ a multitude of names; such as pleasant and disagreeable, good and evil. But since it appears that there are these two things, we must also call them by two names; in the first place by good and evil, and in the next place by pleasant and disagreeable. These things, therefore, being admitted, we will say that a man, knowing things evil to be evil, at the same time does them. If, then, someone should ask us why he does them, We must say, because he

is vanquished. By what? he will say to us. But we are no longer permitted to say, by pleasure; for it assumes another name in the place of pleasure, viz. good. We must, however, answer him, and say that he does it because he is vanquished. By what? he will say. By good, we must say, by Zeus. If it should happen, therefore, that he who interrogates us is an insolent man, he will laugh and say, You speak of a ridiculous thing when you assert that anyone does evil, knowing that it is evil (and it is not proper to do it), in consequence of being vanquished by good. For he will say, Is such a one vanquished because the good in him is not worthy to vanquish the evil? Or is it because it is worthy? We shall evidently say in reply, that it is because it is not worthy. For otherwise he would not err whom we say is subdued by pleasure. But perhaps he will say, Why is the good in such a one unworthy to vanquish the evil? Or the evil to vanquish the good? Is it for any other reason than because the one is greater, and the other lesser? or because the one is more, and the other fewer in number? Have we any other cause to assign than this? It is evident, therefore, he will say, that this thing which is called the being vanquished, is to receive greater evils instead of lesser goods. And thus much for these particulars.

Let us then again change the names, and introduce in these very same things the pleasant and disagreeable, as follows: We formerly said that a man does evil, let us now say that he does things disagreeable, knowing that they are disagreeable, in consequence of being vanquished by pleasures, viz. by such as are unworthy to conquer. And what other unworthiness is there in pleasure with respect to pain, than the excess and defect of each other; that is, when they become greater and lesser, more or less numerous? For if anyone should say, Immediate pleasure, O Socrates, very much differs from future pleasure and pain, I indeed should

reply by asking, Whether it differs in anything else than in pleasure and pain? For it cannot differ in anything else. But it is just as if a man who is skillful in weighing, having collected together things pleasant and painful, and placed those which are near, and those which are remote, in the balance, should say which are the more numerous. For if you weigh pleasures with pleasures, the greater and more numerous must always be chosen; but, if you weigh pains with pains, the fewer and the smaller must be selected. If likewise you weigh pleasures with pains, if the disagreeables are surpassed by the pleasures, those that are near by those that are remote, or those that are remote by those that are near, we must yield to the more weighty; but if the pleasures are surpassed by the disagreeables, this conduct must not be adopted. Is it not so, O men, with respect to these things? I know that they will not be able to say otherwise. It also appeared to Protagoras that they would not. Since, therefore, this is the case, I will thus interrogate them, Do the same magnitudes appear to your sight greater when near, but lesser when at a distance? They will say, that they do. And is not this the case also with things bulky, and with things numerous? And are not equal voices greater when near, but lesser when at a distance? They will say that they are. If therefore our acting well consisted in this, viz. in making and receiving great masses, but rejecting and not making such as are small, what would appear to be the safety of our life? Would it be the art of measuring, or the power of sight which judges of that which is apparent? Or rather would not the latter deceive us, and involving us in error, often compel us to judge differently at different times of the same thing, and change our opinion in the actions and elections of things great and small? But the art of measuring would make this phantasm void, and manifesting the truth, would cause the soul, by abiding in reality, to be at rest, and would preserve

our life. Would the men assent to these things, and acknowledge that the art of measuring preserves us, or that this is effected by any other art? They would acknowledge that we should be preserved by the measuring art. But what, if the safety of our life consisted in choosing the even and the odd, so as to know when more ought to be rightly chosen, and when less, either one of these with respect to itself, or one with respect to the other, whether they be near or at a distance, what is it that in this case would preserve our life? Is it not science? For it would no longer be the art of measuring, since this is the art of excess and defect. But since that of which we are speaking is the art of the even and the odd, is it anything else than arithmetic? The men would acknowledge that it is nothing else: or would they not? It appeared also to Protagoras that they would. Be it so, O men; but since the safety of our life has appeared to consist in the right choice of pleasure and pain, and in the choice of the more and the less, of the greater and the smaller, of the more distant and the nearer; of these, in the first place, does not the art of measuring appear to be the consideration of the excess and defect, and also of the equality of these to each other? Necessarily so. But since it is conversant with measuring, it is necessary that it should be both an art and a science. They will agree to this. What then this art and science may be, we will consider hereafter; but that it is a science is sufficient to the demonstration which it is necessary that Protagoras and I should give to your question. And, if you remember, when we mutually agreed that nothing is superior to science, but that this always governs, wherever it may be, both pleasure and everything else, then you said that pleasure frequently subdues a man, even though he possesses science. But as we did not agree with you, after this you asked us, O Protagoras and Socrates, if this passion is not to be vanquished by pleasure,

tell us what it is, and what you assert it to be? If, therefore, we then had immediately said to you that it is ignorance, you would have derided us. For ye have acknowledged that those that err in the choice of pleasures and pains (and these are things good and evil) err through the want of science; and not only through the want of science, but, ye have also added, of the science of measuring. But an erroneous action without science, is, as ye also know, performed through ignorance. So that to be vanquished by pleasure is the greatest ignorance; of which Protagoras here, Prodicus and Hippias, say they are the physician. But ye, because ye think this is something else than ignorance, neither go yourselves, nor send your children to the sophists, the teachers of these things, as if this science of measuring could not he taught: and by giving your money, and not giving it to these men, ye act badly both in private and public. And in this manner we, should answer the multitude.

Together with Protagoras, however, I ask you, O Hippias, and you, O Prodicus (for let my discourse be in common to you), whether I appear to speak the truth, or that which is false?

It appeared to all that what had been said was transcendently true.

You confess, therefore, that the pleasant is good, but the disagreeable evil. But I request Prodicus to excuse my adopting his division of names. For whether you call it pleasant, or delightful, or joyful, or in whatever way you may think fit to denominate things of this kind, O most excellent Prodicus, only answer what I wish to ask you.

Prodicus therefore laughing assented, and so likewise did the rest.

But what, my friends, as to this particular, are not all actions which contribute to the living well and pleasantly,

beautiful and profitable? And is not a beautiful deed good and profitable?

They granted this.

If, therefore, the pleasant is good, no one either knowing or thinking that other things are better than those which he does, and is able to do, will afterwards do these things, when he has the power of doing those that are better. Nor when a man is inferior to himself, is it anything else than ignorance; nor, when he is superior to himself, is it anything else than wisdom.

To this all of them assented.

But what? Do you say that ignorance is a thing of this kind, viz. to have a false opinion, and to be deceived about things of great importance?

And to this, likewise, all of them assented.

Does it not then follow that no one willingly betakes himself to things evil, or to those things which he thinks are evil? For, as it appears, it is not in the nature of man to betake himself to things which he considers as evil, instead of applying himself to such as are good. And when it is necessary to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater if he has it in his power to choose the lesser.

All these things were assented to by all of us.

What then, do you call dread and fear? Is it that which I say it is to you, O Prodicus, viz. a certain expectation of evil, whether you call it fear or dread?

It appeared to Protagoras and Hippias that dread and fear were this; but to Prodicus it appeared that dread was this, but not fear.

It is, however, O Prodicus, of no consequence; but this is of importance, whether what has been formerly asserted is true. Is, therefore, any man willing to betake himself to those

things which he dreads, when he has the power of betaking himself to things which he does not dread? Or is not this impossible from what we have granted? For we have granted that he thinks those things to be evil which he dreads; and that no one betakes himself to, or willingly receives things which he considers as evil.

These things, likewise, were assented to by all of them.

This, then, being admitted, O Prodicus and Hippias, let Protagoras, here, defend to us the rectitude of his first answer. For then, there being five parts of virtue, he said that no one of them resembled the other, but that each had a peculiar power of its own. I do not, however, urge this at present, but I speak of that which he afterwards said, viz. that four of the parts might justly be considered as similar to each other, but that one of them, fortitude, very much differed from the rest. He also said that this might be known from the following circumstance. You will find, Socrates, men that are most unholy, most unjust, most intemperate, and most undisciplined, but who are, at the same time, most brave; by which you may know that fortitude very much differs from the other parts of virtue. And I indeed, at that time, immediately very much wondered at the answer, and my surprise has been greatly increased since I have discussed these things with you. I therefore asked him this, If he called brave men bold men, He said he did, and likewise impetuous. Do you remember, Protagoras, that this was your answer?

Protagoras/ I do.

Socrates/ Tell us, then, in what, according to you, the brave are impetuous? Is it in things which the timid attempt?

Protagoras/ It is not.

Socrates/ In other things, therefore.

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ But whether do the timid engage in bold attempts, but the brave in such as are dreadful?

Protagoras/ It is so said, Socrates, by the multitude.

Socrates/ You speak the truth. I do not, however, ask this: but in what do you say the brave are impetuous? Is it in dreadful things, thinking that they are dreadful, or in things that are not dreadful?

Protagoras/ But, this, in what you just now said, has been shown to be impossible.

Socrates/ And in this, also, you speak the truth. So that if this is rightly demonstrated, no one betakes himself to things which he thinks are dreadful, since it has been found that it is ignorance for a man to be inferior to himself.

He acknowledged it.

All men, however, both the timid and the brave, engage in things in which they boldly confide; and, in consequence of this, both the timid and the brave engage in the same things.

Protagoras/ But indeed, Socrates, the things in which the timid and the brave engage are perfectly contrary to each other; for the latter wish, but the former are unwilling to engage in war.

Socrates/ But whether, is it a beautiful, or a base thing to engage in war?

Protagoras/ A beautiful thing.

Socrates/ If, therefore, it is a beautiful thing, we have above agreed that it is a good thing. For we have acknowledged that all beautiful are good actions.

Protagoras/ You speak the truth, and to me this has always appeared to be the case.

Socrates/ Right. But which of the two do you say is unwilling to engage in war, though it is a beautiful and good thing.

Protagoras/ The timid.

Socrates/ If, therefore, it be beautiful and good, is it not also pleasant?

Protagoras/ It is granted.

Socrates/ Are the timid, therefore, unwilling to proceed to that which is beautiful, better, and more pleasant, knowing it to be such?

Protagoras/ But, if we assented to this, we should destroy what we have before acknowledged.

Socrates/ But what with respect to the brave man? Does he not engage in that which is more beautiful, more excellent, and more pleasant?

Protagoras/ It is necessary, to acknowledge that he does.

Socrates/ Hence, in short, the brave have not any base fears when they are afraid; nor when they are bold, are they basely daring.

Protagoras/ True.

Socrates/ But if they are not basely, does it not follow that they are beautifully daring?

He assented.

And if their boldness is beautiful, is it not also good?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are not, therefore, the timid, and the rash, and the insane, on the contrary, basely afraid, and basely bold?

He agreed they were.

But are they basely and wickedly bold, through anything else than ignorance and the want of discipline?

Protagoras/ It is so.

Socrates/ What then? Do you then call this thing, through which the timid are timid, timidity or fortitude?

Protagoras/ Timidity.

Socrates/ But have not the timid appeared to be what they are, through the ignorance of things dreadful?

Protagoras/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ They are timid, therefore, through this ignorance.

He acknowledged it.

But that through which they are timid, you have granted to be timidity.

He said, he had.

Will not, therefore, the ignorance of things dreadful, and not dreadful, be timidity?

He assented.

But, fortitude is contrary to timidity.

Protagoras/ It is.

Socrates/ Will not then the wisdom of things dreadful, and not dreadful, be contrary to the ignorance of these things?

To this also he assented.

But is not the ignorance of these things timidity?

He, with great difficulty, assented to this.

The wisdom, therefore, of things dreadful, and not dreadful, is fortitude, being contrary to the ignorance of these.

Here, however, he was no longer willing to assent, but was silent.

Socrates/ Why, O Protagoras, do you neither assent to, nor deny what I say?

Protagoras/ Come to a conclusion.

Socrates/ let me only first ask you, if it still appears to you as it did before, that there are certain men who are most ignorant, and yet most brave?

Protagoras/ You still, Socrates, seem to be very anxious that I should answer you. I will therefore gratify you; and I say, that from what has been granted, it appears to me impossible that this should be the case.

Socrates/ I do not ask you all these particulars on any other account, than because I wish to consider how the things pertaining to virtue subsist, and what virtue itself is. For I know that this becoming apparent, that which has been the subject of a long discussion to you and me will be made manifest; I indeed, asserting, that virtue cannot be taught, but you that it can. And it seems to me, that the conclusion of our arguments, as if it were a man, reviles and derides us; and that if it had a voice, it would thus address us:

You are absurd, O Socrates, and Protagoras; you indeed, in asserting in the former part of your discourse, that virtue cannot be taught, and now, being anxious to contradict yourself, by endeavoring to show that all these things, viz. justice, temperance, and fortitude, are science; by which mode of proceeding virtue will especially appear to be a thing which may be taught. For if virtue were anything else than science, as Protagoras endeavors to evince it is, it clearly could not be taught; but now, if it should appear that it is science, as you, Socrates, are anxious to infer, it will be wonderful if it cannot be taught. Again, Protagoras at first admitted that it could be taught, but now, on the contrary, he seems earnestly to endeavor that virtue may appear to be anything else rather than science; and thus it will be a thing in the smallest degree capable of being taught. I therefore, O Protagoras, seeing all these things agitated upwards and downwards with, such dire confusion, am in the highest degree anxious that they may become apparent. And I could

wish that we, in consequence of discussing these things, might discover what virtue is: and again, that we might speculate concerning it, whether it can be taught, or whether it cannot. For I fear that your Epimetheus has frequently deceived us in our inquiry, just as you say he neglected us in the distribution which he made. I am more pleased, therefore, with Prometheus in the fable, than with Epimetheus. Hence, following his example, and paying a providential attention to the whole of my life, I diligently consider all these things. And if you are willing, as I said at the beginning, I would most gladly examine these particulars with you.

Protagoras/ —I, O Socrates, praise your alacrity, and the evolution of your discourse. For I am not, in other respects, I think, a bad man, and I am envious the least of all men: indeed I have often said respecting you to many, that I admire you by far the most of those with whom I associate, and consider you as greatly surpassing your equals in age. And I say, that I shall not wonder if you rank among the men renowned for wisdom. And, with respect to these things, we will again discuss them when you please; but it is now time for me to betake myself to something else.

Socrates/ It is requisite so to do, if it seems fit to you. For I ought to have gone elsewhere some time ago; but I stayed in order to gratify the beautiful Callias.

Having spoken and heard these things, we departed.

THE END OF THE PROTAGORAS.

Protagoras.

Translated by J. Wright.

Persons of the Dialog

A Friend, Socrates, Hippocrates, Protagoras, Alcibiades, Callias, Critias, Prodicus, and Hippias.

Friend/ Ha, Socrates, where do you appear from? though I can hardly doubt that it's from a chase after the fair Alcibiades. Well, I saw the man only the other day, and I can assure you I thought him looking still beautiful; though between ourselves, Socrates, he is a man by this time, and his chin is getting pretty well covered with beard.

Socrates/ And what of that? Sure you don't disapprove of Homers assertion, that no age is so graceful as the beardlings prime. And this is just the age of Alcibiades.

Friend/ Be that as it may, Socrates, I want to know about matters now. Is it from him that you make your appearance, and how is the youth disposed towards you?

Socrates/ Very well, I think, and never better than to-day. For he has been taking my side, and saying a great deal in my favor. And in point of fact, I have only just left him. I have, however, something strange to tell you. Though he was in the room all the while, he was so far from engrossing my attention, that I frequently forgot his existence altogether.

Friend/ Why, whatever can have happened between you and him, to produce such an effect as this? You surely don't mean to say that you have met with anyone more beautiful here in Athens?

Socrates/ Yes I do, much more beautiful.

Friend/ More beautiful! a citizen or a foreigner?

Socrates/ A foreigner.

Friend/ From what country?

Socrates/ Abdera.

Friend/ And did this stranger really appear to you so beautiful a person, that you accounted him more beautiful than the son of Clinias?

Socrates/ Indeed I do. For how, my good friend, can the supremely wise fail of being accounted more beautiful?

Friend/ Ho, ho, Socrates, you have just left one of our wise men, have you?

Socrates/ Say, rather, the wisest man of the present day, unless you would refuse this title to Protagoras.

Friend/ Protagoras, do you say? is he in Athens?

Socrates/ He is, and has been here now two days.

Friend/ And you are just come, I suppose, from his company?

Socrates/ Yes, and from a very long conversation with him.

Friend/ Oh pray repeat it to us then, unless you have something to hinder you. Just turn out this boy, and sit down in his place.

Socrates/ With all my heart; and I shall be much obliged to you for listening.

Friend/ And I am sure we shall be so to you for speaking.

Socrates/ The obligation then will be mutual. I will therefore begin.

Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus, and brother of Phason, came and knocked very violently at my door with his stick; and, as soon as they opened to him, rushed into the house in the greatest haste, calling out with a loud voice;

Hippocrates/ Socrates, are you awake or asleep?

Socrates/ Recognizing his voice, I said to myself, Ho, Hippocrates here; turning to him, Have you any news?

Hippocrates/ None but what is good.

Socrates/ So much the better. But what is the matter; what has made you come here so early?

Hippocrates/ Protagoras is arrived.

Socrates/ Yes, the day before yesterday; have you only just heard it?

Hippocrates/ Only just, I assure you, only last night.

Socrates/ While thus speaking, he felt about the bed on which I lay, and sitting down at my feet, continued;

Hippocrates/ Only yesterday evening, on my return at a very late hour from Oenoe. For my slave Satyrus ran away; and I was just going to tell you that I meant to pursue him, when something else came into my head, and I forgot it. And when I came back, it was not till we had supped and were going to bed, that my brother informed me of the arrival of Protagoras. Whereupon, late as it was, I started up with the intention of coming immediately to you, but on second thoughts it seemed too far gone in the night. As soon, however, as sleep released me after my fatigue, I rose up at once and hurried here.

Socrates/ On hearing this, being well acquainted with my friends vehement and excitable nature, I said to him, Well, what does this matter to you? does Protagoras do you any harm?

Hippocrates/ Yes, that he does; he keeps his wisdom to himself, and does not make me wise.

Socrates/ —said he with a laugh—

But I have no doubt, that if you only give him money enough, he will make you wise too.

Hippocrates/ I would, ye gods! it only depended on this; if it did, I would not spare the last farthing of my own fortune, or of my friends either. But in point of fact, Socrates, the very object I have in coming here now is to ask you to speak to him on my behalf. For, to say nothing of my being so young, I have never even seen Protagoras in my life, or heard him speak; for I was quite a boy when he was here before. However, all the world applaud the man, and say that he is wonderfully clever in discourse. So pray let us go to him at once, that we may find him in doors. He is staying, I am told, with Callias, the son of Hipponicus. Let us start.

Socrates/ Not yet, it is too early. Rather let us turn into the court here, and walk about and talk, till it is light. And then we can go. For Protagoras seldom stirs out; so that you need not be afraid, we shall in all probability find him at home. —

After this we rose up from the bed, and went out into the court. And while we were walking up and down, with a view of trying the strength of Hippocrates, I sifted him with the following questions. —

Hippocrates, you are now proposing to call upon Protagoras, and pay him a sum of money as a fee for your attendance. Now tell me; in what capacity, on his part, do you mean to visit him, and what do you expect to become yourself by so doing? Take a similar case. If you had conceived the idea of going to your namesake Hippocrates of Cos, of the house of the Asclepiads, and paying him a sum of money as a fee for your tuition; and if you were to be asked what Hippocrates was, that you meant to pay him this money, what should you answer?

Hippocrates/ I should say, a physician.

Socrates/ And what do you expect to become?

Hippocrates/ A physician.

Socrates/ Again, if you had taken it into your head to go to Polyclitus of Argos or our Athenian Phidias, and pay them a fee for your tuition, and you were to be asked, what Polyclitus and Phidias were, that you intended to pay them this money, what should you reply?

Hippocrates/ Statuaries, of course.

Socrates/ And what do you expect to become yourself?

Hippocrates/ A statuary, to be sure.

Socrates/ Well, here are you and I now going to Protagoras; and when arrived there we shall be prepared to pay him a sum of money as a fee for your tuition. If our own funds prove adequate to his demand, so much the better; if they are deficient, we shall not hesitate to drain the purses of our friends. Now, suppose some man were to see us thus earnestly bent on the matter, and to say, My good friends, Socrates and Hippocrates, what do you mean to pay Protagoras as? Tell me, what would be our answer to this question? What distinct name is currently given to Protagoras, in the same way that the name of statuary is given to Phidias, and of poet to Homer? what analogous designation do we hear applied to Protagoras?

Hippocrates/ Well, there is no denying, that men do call our friend a sophist.

Socrates/ It is then, I suppose, as a sophist that we are going to pay him our monies.

Hippocrates/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, suppose you were further asked, And what do you expect to become yourself, that you go to Protagoras? At this he blushed. By this time there was just a glimpse of day, so that I could see his face.

Hippocrates/ Why, if this be at all like the two former cases, it is clear that I must expect to become a sophist.

Socrates/ And should not you, be ashamed of showing yourself as a sophist in the eyes of Greece?

Hippocrates/ Yes, Socrates, I certainly should, if I must speak what I really think.

Socrates/ But possibly, Hippocrates, you are of opinion that the instructions to be afforded by Protagoras will not be given on this sort of principle, but rather resemble those you received from your masters in writing and music and gymnastics. For you were instructed in each of these latter professions, not with a view of becoming a craftsman therein yourself, but of obtaining the education which is deemed proper for an unprofessional gentleman.

Hippocrates/ Yes, Socrates, I am quite of opinion that this is rather the character of Protagoras's instructions.

Socrates/ Are you aware then, what you are now about to do, or are you blind?

Hippocrates/ To what?

Socrates/ Blind to the fact, that you are about to consign your soul to the care of a man, who is, you say, a sophist, while what in the world such sophist is, you know not, or I am much surprised. And yet, if you know not this, neither do you know to what you are abandoning your soul, whether it be to a good or an evil thing.

Hippocrates/ I think I know.

Socrates/ Well, what do you think a sophist means?

Hippocrates/ I think, as the name imports, that it means a man who is learned in wisdom.

Socrates/ Yes, but as much may be said for painters and architects; they also may be described as men learned in wisdom. But if we were asked, what the wisdom is in which painters are learned, we should doubtless say, In that which relates to the production of pictures. And so for the rest. But

if we were to be further asked, What is the wisdom in which a sophist is learned? what is the production that he superintends? what would be our reply?

Hippocrates/ Why, what else should it be, Socrates, but I that he superintends the production of an able speaker?

Socrates/ If so, our answer might possibly be true, but certainly not sufficient. For it would draw on us the further inquiry, But what is the subject on which the sophist makes a man able to speak? The musician makes his pupil able to speak on the subject in which it makes him learned; in music, that is; does he not?

Hippocrates/ He does.

Socrates/ Well, what is the subject on which the sophist makes a man able to speak? obviously on that in which he makes him learned, is it not?

Hippocrates/ One would expect so, at any rate.

Socrates/ What then, is that, in which the sophist is both learned himself, and makes his pupil learned also?

Hippocrates/ This, Socrates, I confess, I cannot tell you.

Socrates/ Young man, what are you doing? are you aware of the danger to which you are about to expose your soul? If you had had occasion to entrust your body to anyone's care, at the risk of its becoming either healthy or depraved, frequent would have been your deliberations on the propriety of the measure; you would have summoned both friends and relatives to a consultation, and taken many days to consider the matter; yet now, when your soul is concerned, your soul, which you prize far more highly than your body, and whereon your all depends for good or ill, according as it turns out healthy or depraved; when this, I say, is at stake, you communicate neither with your father, nor your brother, nor with any of us your friends; you ask none of us whether or no you ought to entrust your soul to

this stranger who is come to Athens; but having heard of his arrival only last evening, as you tell me, you come here early in the morning, not to take thought or counsel on the matter, but prepared to spend both your own fortune and your friends, as if you had already made up your mind that, come what might, you must be the pupil of Protagoras; a man whom, as you admit, you are neither acquainted with, nor have even so much as spoken to in your life, but whom you call a sophist; while what this sophist is, to whom you are about to entrust yourself, you are plainly ignorant.

Hippocrates/ Yes, Socrates, such would appear, from what you say, to be the case.

Socrates/ Hippocrates, is not a sophist a sort of merchant, or retail dealer, in the wares upon which the soul subsists? for myself, I esteem him something of the kind.

Hippocrates/ And what does the soul subsist upon, Socrates?

Socrates/ Instruction, of course, and let us be careful, my dear friend, that the sophist does not impose upon us, by praising the quality of his wares, just as is done by those who traffic in food for the body, by the merchant, that is, and the tradesman. For these dealers are ignorant, if I mistake not, of the commodities which they supply; they cannot tell which article is good or bad for the body though they praise them all alike in the sale any more than their customers can, unless they happen to be versed in the gymnastic or medical art. And, exactly in the same way, those who hawk about their instructions from city to city, selling wholesale and retail to all who bid, are in the habit of praising their whole stock alike; yet some of these too, my good friend, may very likely be unable to tell us which of their wares is good, and which bad for the soul, while their customers will be equally ignorant, unless here again there chance to be among them

some skilled in the medicine of the soul. If then you happen to be a judge of these matters, and can say which is good, and which is bad, there is no danger in your buying instructions from Protagoras, or any other person whatever; but if not, then have a care, my good Hippocrates, that you do not stake and imperil your dearest treasure. For, I can assure you, there is a far greater risk in the purchase of instruction than in that of food. When you buy meat and drink from the trades man or merchant, you may carry them away in other vessels; and before admitting them into your body, by eating or drinking, you may lay them down in your house, and, calling in qualified advisers, consult what is fit to be eaten or drunk, and what to be rejected; what, moreover, is the proper quantity that may be taken, and what the proper time for taking it. So that in this purchase the danger is not great. But instruction you cannot possibly carry away in another vessel; as soon as you have paid down the price, you must of necessity receive the instruction in your soul itself; and when you have learnt it, go home a worse, or a better man. Let us, therefore, take advice on this question with our elders, for we are still too young to settle so great a matter. Since, however, we have started the plan, let us go and hear our sophist, and afterwards confer with others on what we have heard; for, beside Protagoras, we shall find there Hippias of Elis, and, I think, also Prodicus of Ceos, and many other learned professors. —

This resolution taken, we set out on our expedition. When arrived at the porch, we stopped to discuss a question which had fallen out between us on the road, and which we wished to bring to a satisfactory conclusion before entering the house. Accordingly we stood talking in the porch till we had settled the matter. Now the porter, an eunuch, must, I imagine, have overheard us; and I am inclined to think that, on account of the multitude of sophist-callers, he feels

disgust for all who come to the house. At any rate, when we had knocked at the door, and he had opened it, and caught sight of us;

Eunuch/ Bah! more sophists, I declare. My masters engaged.

Socrates/ At the same time, with both his hands, he slammed the door in our faces, with all the will in the world. So we knocked again; but our friend, without opening, called out;

Eunuch/ Sirs, have you not heard that my master is engaged?

Socrates/ But, good porter, we are neither come to call upon Callias, nor are we sophists; so cheer up. It is Protagoras that we want to see, take in our names. At length, with the greatest difficulty, we prevailed on the fellow to open us the door.

On entering, we found Protagoras walking up and down one of the porticoes. And, in the same line with him, there walked on one side Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and his half-brother Paralus, the son of Pericles, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon; on the other there was Pericles other son, Xanthippus, and Philippides, the son of Philomelus; and, moreover, Antimcerus of Mende, who enjoys the greatest reputation of all Protagoras's pupils, and is taking lessons professionally, with the view of becoming a sophist himself. Behind these distinguished individuals there followed a crowd of listeners, composed principally, as it appeared to me, of the foreigners whom Protagoras sweeps with him from the several cities he passes through, luring them, like an Orpheus, with his voice, and they follow at the sound, enchanted. There were, however, among them some of our own countrymen as well. On looking at this attendant band, I was particularly charmed to observe the excel lent care they

took never to get into the way of Protagoras. The moment the great master and his party turned, deftly and daintily did these gentlemen file off to the right and left, and, wheeling round, take their places, on each occasion, behind him, in the prettiest order.

Next after him my eyes observed, as Homer has it, Hippias of Elis, sitting in the opposite portico on a high chair; and on stools around him I remarked Eryximachus the son of Acumenus, Phaedrus of Myrrhine, and Andron the son of Androtion, beside a number of foreigners from his own town of Elis and other cities. And they appeared to be plying him with questions on natural science, and especially on astronomy, while he, sitting aloft on his throne, was dispensing to them their several answers, and explaining all their difficulties.

There too, moreover, I beheld a Tantalus; for Prodicus of Ceos had lately come to Athens. Now this professor was established in a small room which Hipponicus had been in the habit of using as a store closet. On the present occasion, however, Callias has been forced, by the influx of guests, to empty it of its contents and turn it into a spare bedchamber. Here then was Prodicus, still in bed, and wrapped up in what appeared to be a great quantity of sheepskins and blankets. On sofas near him were sitting Pausanias of Ceramis, and close by the side of Pausanias a young lad of a noble disposition, as far as I could judge, and certainly of a most beautiful form. I thought I heard his name was Agathon, and I should not be surprised if he turns out to be Pausanias' favorite. Beside this stripling there were the two Adimantuses, sons of Cepis and Leucolophides, and some others. But what they were talking about I was unable to catch from the outside, notwithstanding my intense anxiety to hear Prodicus, so supremely, nay divinely, clever do I account the man; for the gruffness of his voice caused a kind

of buzzing in the room, which rendered all he said indistinct. We had not been long in the house, when there came in after us Alcibiades the fair, as you call him with my full assent, and Critias the son of Callaeschrus.

After we had spent a few minutes in noticing the particulars I have mentioned, we walked up to Protagoras, and I said;

Socrates/ Protagoras, it is to see you that I and my friend Hippocrates here have called.

Protagoras/ Would you like, to speak with me alone, or before the rest?

Socrates/ To us, it makes no difference in the world; when you have heard our object in coming, you can judge for yourself.

Protagoras/ Well, what is your object?

Socrates/ Hippocrates, presenting him, is a native of Athens, son of Apollodorus, of a great and wealthy house. For himself, he is considered in point of natural ability a fair match for the youth of his age; and he is desirous, I believe, of making a figure in the state, a result which he expects more readily to attain by attaching himself to you. Now then that you have heard our errand, consider whether it ought to be discussed between ourselves alone, or in public.

Protagoras/ You do well, Socrates, to take these precautions in my behalf. When a stranger visits powerful cities, and in each of them calls upon the flower of the youth to abandon the society of their countrymen, both related and not related, both old and young, and attach themselves solely to him, in the hope of becoming better by such intercourse; when he does this, I say, he cannot take too many precautions; for his course is attended by no slight jealousy, by ill-will, moreover, and actual plots. Now the trade of sophist is, I maintain, of ancient date; but its

professors in ancient times were so afraid of this odium ever attaching to it, that they uniformly covered it with an assumed disguise. Some among them veiled it under poetry, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides; others, again, under mystic rites and prophetic inspiration, like Orpheus, Musceus, and their followers. I have heard of others putting forward even the gymnastic art, as a screen; Iccus of Tarentum, for instance, and that sophist of the present day, who is inferior to none of his contemporaries, Herodicus of Selymbria, and formerly of Megara. Music, again, was the cover assumed by your own countryman, Agathocles, a very eminent sophist, by Pythoclides of Ceos, and a number of others. Now it was, I repeat, for fear of becoming generally odious, that all these distinguished sophists shrouded their one trade beneath the veil of the several arts I have mentioned. But I, for my part, differ from them all, so far as this concealment is concerned. For I conceive that they were very far from attaining the object they desired, inasmuch as their secret was discovered by men of authority in their respective states, that is to say, by the very men to deceive whom these disguises were assumed; since the vulgar herd may be said to perceive nothing at all of themselves, but merely to echo the opinions which the former promulgate. Now, whenever a man attempts to escape, and instead of succeeding is caught in the act, he is not only thought a great fool for his pains, but necessarily renders himself still more obnoxious than before; for men consider that such a person adds knavery to his other delinquencies. On such grounds, then, the course I have pursued has been exactly the opposite to this. I have ever avowed myself a sophist and a teacher of youth; and I esteem this precaution of mine to be more effectual than theirs, avowal, that is to say, I esteem safer than denial. Added to this, I have devised other precautions, so that, thanks be to Heaven, no harm has ever

come to me from avowing my profession. Yet I have now been engaged in it many years, as may well be the case, considering the number I have lived altogether so many that there is not one among you, whose father I am not old enough to be. I shall therefore consider it far more agreeable, if you-do not object, to discuss your errand in the presence of all the inmates of the house.

Socrates/ On hearing this, I at once suspected that he had a mind to parade us before Prodicus and Hippias, and make it appear that we had come as his ardent admirers.

Accordingly I said, Why don't we then summon Prodicus and Hippias to come with their followers, and listen to our conversation?

Protagoras/ Let us do so by all means.

Callias/ What say you, to our making a regular divan, so that you may talk sitting?

Socrates/ His proposal being accepted, we all set to work with delight at the idea of listening to such clever men, and with our own hands seized on the stools and sofas, and ranged them in order by the side of Hippias, as the stools were already in his neighborhood. Before we had finished, Callias and Alcibiades, who had gone to fetch Prodicus, returned with him and his coterie, having succeeded in getting the professor out of bed.

As soon as we had all taken our seats, Protagoras began.

Protagoras/ Now then, Socrates, that these gentlemen have joined our party, you had better repeat what you mentioned to me a few minutes ago, with regard to this young man.

Socrates/ I open my account of our errand, in the same way as I did before. I present to you my friend Hippocrates, who is possessed with a desire of becoming your disciple, and would be glad, he says, to hear what advantages he may

expect to derive from your tuition. So much for our part of the business. In answer to this, Protagoras said to Hippocrates;

Protagoras/ My young friend, if you are to be my disciple, you will find that on the very day of your becoming such, you will go home a better man than you came; on the second day the result will be similar, and each succeeding day will be marked with the same gradual improvement.

Socrates/ But, Protagoras, there is nothing wonderful in this promise of yours; it is only what may naturally be expected. Since I am sure that even you yourself, advanced in years and wisdom as you are, could not fail of being improved by receiving information on a subject with which you might possibly chance to be unacquainted. No, this is not the sort of answer we want; but something of the following kind. Suppose our friend here were ere long to take a new fancy into his head, and conceive the desire of attaching himself to the young painter, Zeuxippus of Heraclea, who has lately come to Athens, and were to make the same application to him, that he is now making to you, and were to hear from him in reply, exactly as he has heard from you, that each day of his attendance would be marked by fresh improvement and progress. If our youth, however, not content with this answer, were further to inquire, In what do you mean that I shall improve, and wherein shall I make progress? Zeuxippus would say, In painting. And so, if on applying to Orthagoras of Thebes, and hearing from him the same answer that he hears from you, he were to proceed to ask, what would be the particular point in which he would daily improve by his daily attendance? the flute-player would reply, In playing the flute. This then is the kind of answer I wish you to give to Hippocrates, and to me who am questioning you on his behalf.

If my friend here becomes a pupil of yours, Protagoras, he will go home on the first day of his attendance a better man than he came, and on each succeeding day he will make similar progress to what, Protagoras? In what will he improve?

Protagoras/ Socrates, your question is a fair one, and I delight in answering fair questions. If Hippocrates comes to me, he will not be served as he would be served if he were to attach himself to any other sophist. Sophists in general misuse their pupils sadly. Just escaped as the lads are from their school studies, these teachers drive them back again, sorely against their will, into the old routine, and give them lessons

Socrates/ (while saying this, he glanced at Hippias)

Protagoras/ in arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music; whereas, if a youth comes to me, he will receive instruction on no other subject than that which he is come to learn. And what he will learn is this; such prudence in domestic concerns as will best enable him to regulate his own household; such wisdom in public affairs as will best qualify him for becoming a statesman and orator.

Socrates/ I wonder, whether I follow your meaning; I understand you to speak of the political art, and that you undertake to make men good citizens.

Protagoras/ This is exactly the profession I do make, Socrates.

Socrates/ Glorious truly then, is the art you possess, if so be that you do possess it; for to a man like you I will say nothing else than what I really think. Since for my part, Protagoras, I always imagined that this art was not capable of being taught, but when you say it is, I know not how to disbelieve you. My reasons, however, for believing that it cannot be taught, or communicated from man to man, I am

bound to declare. I hold, as all Greece holds, that the Athenians are a wise people. Now, I observe in all our meetings in the assembly, that whenever there is occasion to transact any public business connected with house-building, they invariably send for house builders, to advise them on the matter; whenever connected with shipbuilding, for ship builders; and the same practice is observed with regard to all the arts which they consider capable of being learnt and taught. But should any individual, whom they believe to be no member of the trade in question, obtrude his advice on the matter, be he ever so beautiful, or wealthy, or high-born, they do not a whit the more allow him a hearing on this account, but shower on him jeers and hisses, till our would-be speaker either gives way of himself to this storm of clamor, or is pulled down from the bema by the bowmen, and turned out of the house by command of the prytanes. Such then is the course they pursue with all business which they consider belongs to a craft. But whenever a matter connected with the public administration requires discussion, up starts any member who pleases, and proffers them his advice, no matter whether he be carpenter, smith, or shoemaker, merchant or skipper, rich or poor, high or low. And in this case no one thinks, as in the former, of objecting to the speaker, that without having received instruction from any quarter, without having any teacher to show, he yet presumes to offer advice; clearly, because they all believe that this knowledge is not capable of being taught. Nay, not only is public business conducted on this principle, but in private life we see our best and wisest citizens unable to impart to others the excellence which themselves possess. Take, for example, Pericles, the father of these two young men. In all that a master could teach, he has educated them liberally, and well; but in his own wisdom he neither instructs them himself, nor sends them anywhere else to be

instructed; but, like oxen consecrated to the gods, they are left to roam and pasture at will, if haply somewhere or other they may light by good fortune on virtue. Do you wish another case? There is Clinias, the younger brother of our friend here, Alcibiades. His guardian, this same Pericles, for fear, as he said, of his being corrupted by Alcibiades, tore him from the society of the latter, and placed him in Ariphrons house to be educated. But he had not been there six months before Ariphron restored him to his guardian, as not being able to make anything of him. And so I could cite instance upon instance of men, who, good themselves, have been unable to render better either their own sons or other people's; and it is, Protagoras, from the observation of such instances as these that I have been led to the belief, that virtue is not a thing that can be taught. Now, however, that I hear you maintain the contrary, that belief is shaken, and I am inclined to think that there must be something in what you say; since I esteem you a man of vast experience, of extensive acquirements, and no inconsiderable invention. If therefore you are able to make it clear by demonstration, that the nature of virtue admits of its being taught, do not grudge us, I beseech you, your proof.

Protagoras/ No, Socrates, I will not. But say, should you prefer me, as beseems an elder when addressing his juniors, to convey my proof in the form of a mythical story, or to go through it step by step in a serious discussion?

Socrates/ Many of the party calling out in reply, that he might do whichever he pleased;

Protagoras/ Well, since you leave me the choice, I think it pleasanter to tell you a story.

There was once a time when, though gods were, mortal races were not. But when there came, by law of fate, a time for these too to be created, the gods fashioned them in the

bowels of the earth, out of a mixture of earth and fire, and substances which combine the two. And when they were ready to bring them forth to the light, they charged Prometheus and Epimetheus with the office of equipping them, and dispensing to each of them suitable endowments. Epimetheus, however, entreated his brother to leave the distribution to him; and when I have completed my work, do you, says he, review it.

Having obtained his request, he began to distribute. To some he assigned strength without speed; others, that were weaker, he equipped with speed. Some he furnished with weapons; while for those whom he left weapon less, he devised some other endowment to save them. Animals, which he clad with puny frames, were to find safety in the flight of their wings, or subterranean retreats; those which he invested with size, were by this very size to be preserved. And so throughout the whole of the distribution he maintained the same equalizing principle; his object in all these contrivances being to prevent any species from becoming extinct. Having thus supplied them with means of escaping mutual destruction, he proceeded to arm them against the seasons, by clothing them with thick furs and strong hides, proof against winter-frost and summer-heat, and fitted also to serve each of them, when seeking rest, as his own proper and native bed; and under the feet he furnished some with hoofs, others with hair and thick and bloodless skins. His next care was to provide them with different kinds of food; to one class he gave herbs of the field; to another, fruits of trees; to a third, roots; while a fourth he destined to live by making other animals their prey. Such, however, he allowed to multiply but slowly, while their victims he compensated with fecundity, thus ensuring preservation to the species. Forasmuch though as Epimetheus was not altogether wise, he unawares

exhausted all the endowments at his command on the brute creation; so he still had left on his hands without provision the human family, and he knew not what to do.

While thus embarrassed, Prometheus came up to review his distribution, and found that, while other animals were in all points well suited, man was left naked and barefoot, imbedded and unarmed. Yet now the fated day was close at hand, on which man too was to go forth from earth to light. Prometheus therefore, being sorely puzzled what means of safety to devise, steals in his extremity the inventive skill of Hephaestus and Athene, together with fire; for without fire it could neither be acquired, nor used by any; and presented them to the human race.

Thus man obtained the arts of life, but the art of polity he had not; for it was kept in the house of Zeus, and into the citadel, the dwelling of Zeus, Prometheus was not now allowed to enter; moreover, the watchmen of Zeus were terrible. But into the joint abode of Athene and Hephaestus, where they worked together at the craft they loved, he stole unnoticed, and purloining the fiery art of Hephaestus, and the other proper to Athene, bestowed them on man; and hence man derives abundance for life. But Prometheus, for his brothers fault, was visited not long after, as the story goes, by the penalty of his theft.

Man being thus made partaker of a divine condition was in the first place, by reason of his relationship to God, the only animal that acknowledged gods, and attempted to erect to gods altars and statues. Secondly, by his art he soon articulated sounds and words, and devised for himself houses, and raiment, and shoes, and beds, and food out of the ground.

Thus furnished, men lived at first scattered here and there, but cities there were none. So they fell a prey

piecemeal to the beasts of the field, because wherever they met them they were weaker than they, and their mechanical art, though sufficient for their support, was found unequal to the war with beasts. For as yet they had not the art of polity, which comprises the art of war. So they sought to assemble together, and save their lives by founding cities. But often as they assembled they injured one another, for lack of the political art; so that again they dispersed, and again were perishing. Zeus therefore, fearing for our race that it would be quite destroyed, sent Hermes to take to men justice and shame, that they might be orderers of cities, and links to bring together friendship. Whereupon Hermes inquired of Zeus in what manner he was to present shame and justice to men. Am I to dispense them, he asked, in the same way that the arts have been dispensed? which have been dispensed on this wise; One man received the art of medicine for the use of many not physicians, and so with the other crafts. Is it thus that I am to distribute shame and justice among men, or bestow them on all alike? On all alike, said Zeus; let all partake, for cities cannot be formed, if only a few are to partake of them, as of other arts. Nay more, enact a law from me, that whosoever is incapable of partaking in shame and injustice, be put to death as a pest to a city.

Thus you see the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and others, when there is a question on excellence in carpentering, or any other manual art, conceive that few only are qualified to advise them; and why, if anyone not of the number of the few, presumes to offer his counsel, they refuse him a hearing, as you assert; and refuse it justly, as I maintain. But whenever they come to a debate on political virtue, which ought altogether to depend on justice and prudence, they listen with good reason to every speaker whatsoever, esteeming it every man's duty to partake of this

virtue, if he par takes of no other, as otherwise no city can exist. This, Socrates, is the true reason of the fact. That you may not, however, fancy yourself imposed upon, but may understand that it is really the universal opinion, that all men have a share of justice and political virtue in general, receive this additional proof. In all other kinds of excellence, for instance, if a man professes himself skilled in playing the flute, or in any other art whatsoever, while in reality he is not so, he is pursued, as you observe, with either ridicule or indignation, and his relations come up and reprimand him as a madman. But in the case of justice and political virtue, albeit a man is known to be deficient in such virtue, yet if he tells the truth of himself before many hearers, this confession of the truth, which in the former case was considered good sense, is here looked upon as madness; and it is said that all men ought to profess to be just, whether they are so or not, and that he who does not profess it is out of his senses; it being necessary that every single person should in some degree partake of justice, if he is to live among men.

So much then to prove that on this particular virtue they with good reason allow every man to offer his advice, because they believe that every man has a share in it; and further, that they consider it to be, not of natural or spontaneous growth, but that, wherever it exists, it is the result of teaching and study, I will next endeavor to demonstrate. If you take notice of all the evils which men believe their neighbors possess by the fault of nature or of fortune, you will observe that no one is angry with those who are thus afflicted; no one takes them to task; no one attempts to instruct or correct them with a view to their alteration for the better; pity is the only feeling entertained. Who, for instance, is so unreasonable as to visit another with any of these modes of treatment for being ugly, or small, or sickly? No

one, clearly, because no one, I imagine, is ignorant that evils of this kind, as well as their opposite advantages, accrue to men either by nature or fortune. Look, on the other hand, at those merits which it is believed may be acquired by application, exercise, and instruction; if a man, instead of possessing these merits, possesses the opposite vices, here, if I mistake not, is indignation excited, punishment inflicted, and reproof ad ministered. Now of this kind injustice and impiety are individual instances, while the entire opposite to political virtue composes the class. And for this every man is angry with his neighbor, every man takes his neighbor to task, clearly because every man believes that it is acquired by education and habit. Nay, Socrates, if you will but observe the purport of punishment, it will itself teach you that in the opinion of the world, at any rate, virtue is a thing capable of being acquired. No one when punishing a criminal directs his thought to the fact, or punishes him for the fact, of his having committed the crime, unless he be pursuing his victim with the blind vengeance of a reasonless brute. No, he that would punish with reason, punishes not on account of the past offence for what has been done he surely cannot undo but for the sake of the future, in order that the offender himself, and all who have witnessed his punishment, may be prevented from offending hereafter. And if he conceives such a notion as this, he also conceives the notion that virtue may be taught; at any rate he punishes with a view of deterring from vice. This, therefore, is the opinion entertained by all who inflict punishment, either in a private or public capacity. Now, punishment and correction are inflicted by all the world on those whom they believe to be guilty, and by none more than by your own citizens, the Athenians; so that, by this reasoning, the Athenians also are in the number of those who consider that virtue may be acquired and taught. That your countrymen then have good

reason for listening to the advice of a smith or a shoemaker on political affairs, and that in their opinion virtue is a thing susceptible of being taught and acquired, has been proved to you, Socrates, with arguments which, for my part, I consider convincing.

There still remains, however, a difficulty which puzzles you. You ask how it is that good fathers instruct their children in all know ledge that depends upon teachers, and make them wise therein, but in the virtue wherein they are good themselves they make them no better than others. In answering this question, Socrates, I shall address you no more in fable, but in serious argument. And let us view the matter thus. Is there not some one thing of which all members of a state must partake, if a state it is to be? for here, if anywhere, shall we find the solution of your difficulty. For if such a thing there be, and if this single thing be neither the art of the carpenter, nor of the brazier, nor of the potter, but justice and discretion and holiness, and, in a word, that which I call compendiously a man's virtue; if this be a thing of which all must partake, and with which every lesson must be learnt, and every deed done, without which no lesson learnt and no deed done; if all who do not partake of it must be instructed and corrected, be they men, or women, or children, until by such treatment they are improved; while those who refuse to hearken to the voice of correction and instruction are to be expelled from their country, or put to death as incurable; if all this be true, and in spite of this being true, virtuous men have their children instructed in all other knowledge, but fail to have them instructed in this, just think what extraordinary people you make of your virtuous men. For we have proved that as individuals and statesmen they believe virtue to be the fruit of education and culture; and, with this belief on their part, is it possible to suppose that they instruct their sons in

knowledge where death is not the punishment of ignorance, but that in the knowledge of that, wherein if they fail to instruct their children, they entail upon them the penalty of death, and of exile, and beside death the confiscation of their goods; and, in a word, the utter ruin of their house; is it possible, I say, to suppose that in the know ledge of this, that is, in the knowledge of virtue, they do not instruct their children and bestow thereon all their care? Surely we must believe they do. Yes, Socrates, from infancy upwards they instruct and admonish them as long as they live. The moment that a child understands what is said to him, the one point contended for by nurse, and mother, and governor, and the father himself, is the progress of their charge in virtue; from everything that is said and done they take occasion to tell and explain to him, that such a thing is just, and such another unjust, that this conduct is honorable, and that disgraceful, that one deed is holy, and another impious; this you must do, they say, and that you must not do. If the child yield a willing obedience, all is well; if not, they treat him like a young tree that is twisted and bent, and try to straighten him with threats and blows. After this, they send him to school, with a strict charge to the master to pay far greater heed to the good be savior of the children than to their progress in reading and music. And the master does make this his principal care, and as soon as his boys have learned their letters, and are in a condition to understand what is written, as before what was spoken, he sets before them on their benches the works of good poets to read, and compels them to learn them by heart, choosing such poems as contain moral admonitions, and many a narrative interwoven with praise and panegyric on the worthies of old, in order that the boy may admire, and emulate, and strive to become such himself. And exactly on a similar principle the study of the music-master is to produce sobriety of

character, and deter the young from the commission of evil; and further, when he has taught them to play, he again instructs them in the works of other good poets, selecting lyric poems for their use, which he sets to his music, and compels the minds of his pupils to be familiarized with measure and harmony, to the end that their natures may be softened, and that, by becoming more sensible to time and tune, they may be better qualified to speak and to act. For the life of man in all its stages requires modulation and harmonizing. Nay more, they send them to gymnastic schools, in order that by an increase of bodily strength they may be better able to serve their virtuous minds, and not be compelled by physical infirmity to shrink from their post in war and other emergencies. Such is the course of education adopted by those fathers who are best able to follow it, that is to say, by the wealthiest citizens; and their sons are the first to go to school, and the last to leave it. And as soon as they are released from school, the state on its part constrains them to learn its laws, and live by them as by a model, that they may not follow the random bent of their own inclinations. And exactly as writing-masters under-rule lines with their pen for such pupils as are still awkward at writing, before they give them their writing lesson, and oblige them to follow in their writing the direction of the lines; so too does the state mark out a line of laws, the discoveries of good and ancient lawgivers, which it forces its members to be guided by, as well in exercising as in obeying authority, while it visits with punishment all who transgress the line; and the name given to this punishment, both here and in other places, is correction, under the notion that justice directs. So great then being the attention paid to virtue both by states and individuals, do you wonder, Socrates, and doubt if virtue is capable of being taught? You ought not to wonder at that, but much rather, if it were not capable.

Protagoras/ How does it happen then, that virtuous fathers have frequently unworthy sons? Hear the reason; for neither in this is there anything to wonder at, if it be true, as I previously remarked, that virtue is a pursuit wherein no member of a state, if it is to be a state, must be altogether uninitiated. For if what I say be true, as most incontestably it is, consider the case by selecting in the way of example some other pursuit and subject of instruction. Suppose, for instance, that it were impossible for a state to exist without all its members being flute-players in a greater or less degree, according to their several capacities; suppose that all both publicly and privately were taught to play, and reproached if they played ill, and that no one envied another this attainment, just as under existing circumstances no one either envies a man his justice and his obedience to law, or affects to conceal his own, as he does his other accomplishments for each of us, I imagine, finds his own interest in his neighbors justice and virtue, and therefore all are eager to tell and teach to all the dictates of justice and law. Suppose, I repeat, that in the art of playing the flute we were all ready to instruct one another with the same zeal and freedom from jealousy; do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of superior flute-players would be at all more likely to turn out superior performers than the sons of inferior players? I think they would not; but any man's son who chanced to be born with a genius for flute-playing would rise to distinction, and if the genius were wanting, so would be the distinction; and often would it happen that a skillful player would be followed by an unskillful son, and an unskillful father by a skillful son. But still I feel sure that all would be competent players by the side of those, who did not make flute playing their business or their study. This then is the light in which I wish you to view our present condition. Select the individual whom you consider the most deficient

in justice of all who have been trained in law and society, and you will find him not only just, but a perfect master in justice, when compared with men who have neither training, nor tribunal, nor laws, nor any necessity ever compelling them to cultivate virtue; but who are in fact savages, like the wild men represented on the stage last year by the poet Pherecrates at the Lensean festival. I am confident that, if you were thrown among such men as those, like the misanthropical chorus in the play, you would be only too happy to fall in with a Eurybates or a Phrynondas, and would mourn with tears of regret for the villainy of your worst citizens here. But now you are fastidious, Socrates, and because all men are teachers of virtue to the best of their several abilities, you believe that it is taught by none. Again, if you were to search in Athens for a teacher of Greek, you would not find a single one; and equally unsuccessful, I imagine, would you be if you were to look for a master competent to instruct the sons of our mechanics in the very trade which they have each learnt from their father, as well as their father and his fellow-craftsmen were able to teach it. No, Socrates, if you wanted a teacher for such proficients as these, it would be no easy matter to discover one; but if for boys quite ignorant of the trade, you would find one with no trouble at all. And similar is the difficulty with respect to virtue and all those other qualities. But if there be any among us ever so little more capable than others of advancing men on the road to virtue, you may be well content. Now of this number I conceive that I am one; and I flatter myself that far above all other men do I understand the art of making a virtuous gentleman, and that my lessons are well worth the price I demand, ay and a still larger one, so much so that even the pupil himself allows it. And therefore the plan I have adopted in asking my terms is this. As soon as a pupil has finished his course, he pays me, if

willing, the full amount of my demand; if not, he goes to an altar, and there he makes on oath his own estimate of the value of my instructions, and pays me accordingly.

Such are my proofs, Socrates, both in fable and serious argument, in favor of the propositions, that virtue is capable of being taught, and that it is such in the opinion of the Athenians, and that there is nothing surprising in good fathers having bad sons, or in bad fathers having good sons; since to take from the various professions one case out of many, the sons of Polyclitus, the companion of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, are nothing m comparison with their father. But of Paralus and Xanthippus it is not as yet fair to predicate this; for their youth allows us to hope.

Socrates/ After this lengthened and varied display Protagoras ceased to speak. And for a long While I sat enchanted, with my eyes still fixed on him, in the expectation of his saying something more, and in my eagerness to hear it. At last, when I perceived that he had really Finished, I with some difficulty recovered myself, And turning to Hippocrates said, —

How Thankful I am to you, son of Apollodorus for having induced me to come hither, so high a privilege do I account it to have heard what I have heard from Protagoras. For heretofore I as of opinion that there was no method of human culture by which the virtuous acquired their virtue but now, am persuaded there is Only one slight difficulty remains in my mind, Which I am sure that Protagoras will easily Elucidate, since he has elucidated so much. For if you were to apply to any of our public Men for an explanation of these very matters, To Pericles, for instance, or some other able speaker, you might possibly hear from them as fine a speech as has just been delivered; but if you were to proceed with your interrogations, you would find them like books, unable either to give you an answer, or to ask any question

themselves; but if you start ever so slight an inquiry with respect to any remark they have made, exactly in the way that a vessel of brass, when struck, rings loud, and continues to ring, unless you stop it by laying on your finger, so do these orators respond to the shortest question with an harangue of inordinate length. But not so our Protagoras. He is not only equal, as the fact proves, to the delivery of long and beautiful speeches, but he is also able to return a short answer to a short question; and, when questioner in his turn, he can wait till he has received his answer gifts these of rare attainment. Now therefore, Protagoras, as I only want one slight explanation to be entirely satisfied, I trust to you for answering me this; You assert that virtue is susceptible of being taught, and if there be a man in the world on whose word I would believe it, I believe it on yours. But there was one thing that puzzled me, as you were speaking, and on this pray satisfy my mind. You said that Zeus sent justice and shame as a present to men; and again, in several places in your discourse, you spoke of justice, and discretion, and holiness, and similar qualities, as making all together one thing, which you called virtue. This, then, is the point that I wish to be accurately explained. Is virtue one thing, and are justice, discretion, holiness, parts of it, or are all these but so many names of one and the same thing? This is what I still want to know.

Protagoras/ Well, Socrates, if this be all, I shall have no difficulty in answering you. These qualities of which you ask are all parts of one thing, of virtue.

Socrates/ But are they parts, like the parts of a face, like the mouth, nose, ears, and eyes; or, like the parts of gold, do they exactly resemble one another and the whole, except in being greater or smaller?

Protagoras/ Like the former, I consider, Socrates. They bear the same relation to virtue that the parts of a face bear to the entire face.

Socrates/ How then, are these parts of virtue distributed among men? Do some men have one, and some another; or, if a man has received one, must he of necessity have all?

Protagoras/ Certainly not, Socrates. Many men are courageous without being just, many are just without being wise.

Socrates/ Then these too are parts of virtue, wisdom and courage.

Protagoras/ Most assuredly they are. Why, wisdom is chief of all the parts.

Socrates/ And every one of these parts is different from every other. Is it not so?

Protagoras/ It is.

Socrates/ And every one of them has a distinct function, like the parts of a face? An eye, you know, is not like an ear, nor is its function the same; and so of the other parts, there is not one like any other, either in function or in anything else. Is it the same then with the parts of virtue? do they all differ from one another, at once in themselves and their functions? Is it not clear though, that such must be the case, at least, if we are to keep to our comparison?

Protagoras/ Well, Socrates, it is the case.

Socrates/ If so, there are none of the other parts of virtue like wisdom, or like justice, or like courage, or like discretion, or like holiness.

Protagoras/ None.

Socrates/ Come then, let us examine together into the character of each of these parts. And, first, of justice. Is

justice a thing, or not a thing? For my part, I believe it to be a thing. But what do you?

Protagoras/ I believe so, too.

Socrates/ To proceed. If a man were to say to you and me, Protagoras and Socrates, be good enough to tell me whether this thing, as you have just called it, this justice, is, in itself, just or unjust? I should answer, Just; but what would be your decision? The same as mine, or different?

Protagoras/ The same.

Socrates/ The nature then of justice is to be just, I should say, if he were to ask me the question. Should you?

Protagoras/ I should.

Socrates/ And if he were to proceed to inquire whether we believed in the existence of holiness as well, we should doubtless assent.

Protagoras/ True.

Socrates/ And if he were to ask whether we called this a thing also, we should assent again.

Protagoras/ So we should.

Socrates/ But if he were further to inquire whether we considered the nature of this thing to be holy, or unholy, I, for my part, should be indignant at the question, and should reply, Hush, my good sir; it were hard for anything else to be holy, if holiness itself were not holy. And you, should not you answer thus?

Protagoras/ Most certainly I should.

Socrates/ If however to these questions he were to add the following, But what was it, my good friends, that you said a little time ago? Did I not hear you aright? I fancied you said that the parts of virtue were so disposed among themselves, as to bear no resemblance one to another. To this I should reply, For the rest you heard aright; but when you thought

that I too made this remark, your hearing deceived you. No, this was Protagoras's answer to a question of mine. On hearing this, if he were to turn to you, and say, Protagoras, does Socrates speak the truth? do you maintain that the different parts of virtue are all unlike each other? was this assertion yours? what would be your reply?

Protagoras/ I should be forced to allow that it was.

Socrates/ After this admission, Protagoras, what would be our answer, if he were to proceed thus? It appears then, that it is not the nature of holiness to be a just thing, nor of justice to be a holy thing; but, rather, of holiness to be a thing that is not just, and of justice to be a thing that is not holy; that is to say, holiness is an unjust thing, and justice an unholy thing. Well, what is to be our answer? On my own account I should reply, that, as for myself, I believed justice to be holy, and holiness just; and on yours, too, I should be glad, if you would allow me, to make the same answer; at any rate, to say that justice and holiness, if not exactly the same, resembled each other as nearly as possible; and that nothing was so like holiness as justice, or like justice as holiness. Determine then, whether you would forbid me to make this reply, or whether your opinion coincides with mine.

Protagoras/ I certainly do not think, Socrates, that it is so unconditionally true, as to demand my unqualified assent, that justice is holy, and holiness just. There appears to me to be a difference between them. But what matters that? If you wish it, I am quite ready to allow that holiness is just, and justice holy.

Socrates/ Pardon me. It is not at all my object to examine into an If you wish it, or an If you think so; but into what you think, and what I think; that is to say, I consider that

our argument will be most successfully investigated by putting ifs altogether out of the question.

Protagoras/ Well, Socrates, there is no doubt that justice and holiness are somewhat alike; for there are no two things in the world that do not, in some point of view, resemble one another. There are points of resemblance between black and white, hard and soft, and other qualities which are believed to be most diametrically opposed to each other. In fact, those very parts which we said just now had different functions and different natures the parts, that is, of the face do, in certain respects, resemble one another. So that, in this way, you might go on to prove, if you chose, that all things are alike. But it is not fair to call things like, because they have some point of resemblance; nor unlike, because they have some point of dissimilarity, if, in either case, the point be a very small one.

Socrates/ Do you mean to say then, that, in your opinion, the relation between justice and holiness is that of the faintest resemblance?

Protagoras/ I don't quite say this, but neither, on the other hand, am I inclined to take your view of the matter.

Socrates/ Well, since this question seems to put you out of humor, let us allow it to pass; and from the other things you said select the following for consideration.

Socrates/ Is there a thing you call folly?

Protagoras/ There is.

Socrates/ And is not the direct contrary of this thing wisdom?

Protagoras/ I think so.

Socrates/ When men act correctly and beneficially, are they discreet, think you, in so acting; or would they be, if they were to act in the opposite manner?

Protagoras/ Discreet in so acting.

Socrates/ Are they not discreet by virtue of discretion?

Protagoras/ Of course they are.

Socrates/ And do not those, who do not act correctly, act foolishly, and show themselves not discreet in so acting?

He assented.

Socrates/ It appears then that acting foolishly is the contrary to acting discreetly.

Protagoras/ It does.

Socrates/ Is it not true, that what is done foolishly is done through folly, and what is done discreetly, through discretion?

To this he agreed.

And that if a thing be done through strength, it is done strongly; if through weakness, weakly?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if with quickness, quickly; and if with slowness, slowly?

Protagoras/ True.

Socrates/ And, in short, that if anything is done in such and such wise, it is done by virtue of the corresponding quality; and if contrariwise, by the contrary quality?

Protagoras/ Granted.

Socrates/ To proceed. Is there such a thing as beauty?

Protagoras/ There is.

Socrates/ And has it any contrary except deformity?

Protagoras/ None.

Socrates/ Again, is there such a thing as good?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Has it any contrary except evil?

Protagoras/ No.

Socrates/ Once more, is there such a thing as high in sound?

Protagoras/ There is.

Socrates/ And is there any contrary to it except low?

Protagoras/ Not any.

Socrates/ Has every single thing then only one contrary, and not many?

Protagoras/ Only one, I admit.

Socrates/ Come then, let us reckon up our admissions. We have admitted that each thing has one contrary, and no more, have we not?

Protagoras/ We have.

Socrates/ And that whatever is done contrariwise, is done by virtue of contraries?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that whatever is done foolishly, is done contrariwise to that which is done discreetly?

Protagoras/ Granted.

Socrates/ And that what is done discreetly, is done through discretion; what foolishly, through folly?

Protagoras/ Agreed.

Socrates/ Well, if they be done contrariwise, they must be done through contraries, must they not?

Protagoras/ They must.

Socrates/ And the one is done through discretion, the other through folly, is it not?

Protagoras/ Just so.

Socrates/ Contrariwise?

Protagoras/ Of course.

Socrates/ Through contraries then?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ It follows then that folly is contrary to discretion?

Protagoras/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Do you remember though our agreeing before that folly was contrary to wisdom?

Protagoras/ I do.

Socrates/ And that one thing had only one contrary?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, which of our two assertions are we to retract, Protagoras? the one which maintains that one thing has only one contrary, or that, in which it was stated that wisdom and discretion were distinct, both being parts of virtue, and not only distinct but unlike, both in nature and function, just as the parts of the face are unlike? Which of the two, I repeat, are we to retract? for when set side by side these two statements do not present a very musical appearance, as they neither accord nor harmonies with one another. For how can they possibly accord, if on the one hand it is necessary that one thing have only one contrary and no more, and on the other it appears that folly, which is one thing, has wisdom for a contrary and likewise discretion? I state the case correctly, do I not, Protagoras? —

He confessed that I did, though sorely against his will. —

Socrates/ Might it not be then, that wisdom and discretion are one and the same thing? Just as before we found that justice and holiness were pretty nearly the same. But come now, Protagoras, let us not be faint hearted, but examine the rest. If a man commits injustice, does he appear to you to be discreet in committing it?

Protagoras/ I, for my part, Socrates, should be ashamed to avow this; there are many though who do.

Socrates/ Shall I maintain then my argument with them or with you?

Protagoras/ If you like, address yourself to this statement first, the statement of the many.

Socrates/ Well, it makes no difference to me, if you will only answer whether this be your own opinion or not. For it is the statement itself that I am bent on sifting, though it may possibly happen that we are at the same time sifted ourselves I in asking, and you in answering.

With this proposal Protagoras at first coquetted. The subject is so awkward, he pleaded. At last, however, he agreed to answer.

Socrates/ Come then, answer me from the beginning. Do people appear to you to be discreet when committing injustice?

Protagoras/ Be it so.

Socrates/ By their being discreet, do you mean that they are well advised?

Protagoras/ I do.

Socrates/ And by their being well advised, that they take good counsel in committing injustice?

Protagoras/ Granted.

Socrates/ Is this the case if they fare well in commit ting it, or if they fare ill?

Protagoras/ If they fare well.

Socrates/ Do you say then that there are certain good things?

Protagoras/ I do.

Socrates/ Are those things good which are advantageous to mankind?

Protagoras/ Yes, and there are things, I can tell you, that I call good, though they be not advantageous to mankind.

Socrates/ And by this time Protagoras seemed to be fairly exasperated and sorely fretted, and to be steadfastly set against answering any more. So, seeing him in this state, I was cautious, and asked him softly;

Will you tell me, Protagoras, whether you speak of things which are advantageous to no man, or of things which in no respect whatever are advantageous? Is it the latter sort that you call good?

Protagoras/ By no means. I know of many things which are disadvantageous to men, meats, and drinks, and drugs, and a thousand other things, and of things too which are advantageous. There are things also which to men are neither the one nor the other, though they are to horses, or to oxen, or to dogs; while there are other things again which are neither good nor bad for any animal, but only for trees. And here again there is a distinction; some things are good for the roots, but bad for the branches. Dung, for instance, is a capital thing for the roots of all plants when laid at the roots, but if you choose to lay it on the branches and young shoots, you destroy the tree. Then again there is oil, which is very bad for all plants, and most destructive to the hair of every animal but man, while to man it is of service not only for his hair, but also for the rest of his body. Nay, so varied and multifarious a thing is good, that even this very thing of which we are speaking is good for external application, but the worst thing in the world to be taken internally. And for this reason medical men make a point of forbidding their patients the use of oil, save only of the smallest possible quantity in what they are going to eat, of just enough, in fact, to drown the disagreeableness in their viands and seasonings which impresses itself on their organs of smell.

Socrates/ This harangue was received by the party present with clamorous approval. For myself, I said;

Protagoras, it is my misfortune to be a forgetful sort of person, and if a man makes me a long speech, I forget what it is all about. Just then as, if I had chanced to be short of hearing, you would have considered it necessary, if intending to converse with me, to speak louder than you do to other people; so now, since I happen to be short of memory, you must curtail me your answers, and make them briefer, if you mean me to keep up with you.

Protagoras/ In what sense do you bid me make them briefer? Are they to be briefer than is proper?

Socrates/ Oh dear no.

Protagoras/ Are they to be the proper length?

Socrates/ Precisely.

Protagoras/ Pray then must I answer you at the length which I consider proper, or which you consider proper?

Socrates/ Protagoras, I have certainly heard that you both possess yourself the gift, and can teach it to others, of speaking, if you choose, on any given subject at such a length, that your speech never comes to an end, and then again on the same subject so concisely that no one expresses himself in fewer words. If therefore you intend to converse with me, I must request you to adopt your latter style, your brevity.

Protagoras/ Socrates, I in my time have entered the lists of argument with many men, and had I been in the habit of doing as you recommend, of talking, that is, as my antagonist bade me talk, I should be still a mere nobody, and the name of Protagoras would never have been heard in Greece.

Socrates/ Then I, knowing that he had not pleased himself with his former answers, and that he would not consent if he could help it to go on answering, and feeling in

consequence that it was no longer my business to be present at the meeting, addressed him thus;

I can assure you, Protagoras, that I for my part am not desirous of carrying on our conversation in a way that you dislike, but as soon as you like to talk in such a manner that I can keep pace with you, I shall then be happy to converse. For you, as fame says, and you say yourself, are capable of conducting a discourse in a style both of brevity and prolixity for you are a clever man; but I have not the gift for these long speeches, albeit I should have liked well to possess it. It was your place therefore, as master of both styles, to have given me the choice, that so we might have managed a conversation. But now since you refuse to do so, and I have an engagement, and could not wait while you launched out into long orations being required elsewhere I will take myself off; otherwise I might possibly have heard even long speeches from you not unpleasantly. —

With these words I rose to depart. And as I was rising, Callias seized my hand with his right, and with his left laid hold of my cloak, saying;

Callias/ We won't let you go, Socrates; for if you leave us, we shall find our conversation no longer the same thing. I beg, therefore, that you will remain with us; for I know nothing that I would more gladly hear than a discussion between you and Protagoras. So pray oblige us all. —

Socrates/ To this I replied, having already risen to leave the house;

Son of Hipponicus, charmed as I always am with your philosophic spirit, I now love and admire it more than ever. So that it would give me great pleasure to comply with your request, if it were but feasible. But now it's just as if you were to ask me to keep up with a runner in his prime, like Crison of Himera; or to compete in speed with one of our

long-distance runners or couriers. Were you to ask me to do this, I should reply, You cannot be so anxious for me, as I am for myself, to keep up with such runners as these; but as I cannot, I do not try. No, if you want to see me and Crison running together, you must ask him to come down to my level; for he can manage a slow pace, though I cannot a fast. And so in the present matter, if you are desirous of hearing Protagoras and me, you must request him to answer, as he did at first, briefly, and to the question. Otherwise, what is to be the plan of our conversation? for my part, I always thought there was a distinction between conversing and haranguing.

Callias/ But you see, Socrates, Protagoras's proposal is only just; he demands for himself permission to converse as he pleases, and leaves the same liberty to you. —

Socrates/ Alcibiades broke in—

Alcibiades/ That's not fair, Callias, My friend Socrates here confesses that he has no notion of making long speeches, and yields the palm therein to Protagoras; but, in the power of conversing, and knowing how to give and answer a question, I should be surprised if he finds his master anywhere. If therefore, Protagoras, on his side, admits that he is a worse hand than Socrates at conversing, Socrates is content; but if he professes to be his match, let him maintain the conversation with question and answer, and not launch out into a long harangue, whenever a question is proposed, for the purpose of eluding his opponents arguments; and, instead of rendering a simple answer, protracting his speech to a length, that most of the hearers forget what the question was about; though as for Socrates himself, I'll be bound that he will not forget, for all his joking and pretending to have a bad memory. I therefore (as everyone of us ought to declare his opinion) maintain that Socrates' proposal is the fairer of the two.

Socrates/ After Alcibiades, it was Critias, if I remember right, who spoke.

Critias/ Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be very much on the side of Protagoras; and Alcibiades, as usual, is a vehement partisan, whatever side he takes. It is our business, however, to side neither with Socrates nor Protagoras; but impartially request of them both not to break up our meeting in the middle.

Socrates/ Critias having thus spoken, Prodicus began.

Prodicus/ Very well said, Critias, in my opinion. It is the duty of all who are present in a conversation of this kind, to regard both sides with impartiality, but not with equality. For I conceive there is a difference. To both we should give an impartial hearing; but not reward both with an equal meed: but the cleverer of the two with a greater, and the less clever with a less. I therefore, in my turn Protagoras and Socrates, request of you both to make concessions; and in considering the question, to debate, if you will, but not to wrangle; for friends debate with friends, just out of friendship, but those only wrangle who are at variance and feud with one another. And thus your conversation will be best for us all. For, on the one hand, you, the speakers, will by this means be most likely to obtain from us, the hearers, approbation, and not praise for approbation is felt in the mind of the listener, and there is no deception in it; but praises are often bestowed by those who falsify with their lips the belief of their hearts; and we, on the other hand, the hearers, shall thus be most likely to feel delight, not pleasure for a man feels delight in learning, and in partaking of wisdom in his mind; but pleasure in eating, and experiencing any other agreeable sensation merely in the body.

Socrates/ Thus spoke Prodicus, and was very generally applauded; and after Prodicus, Hippias the learned took up the word.

Hippias/ My friends who are here present, I regard you all as of one kin and family and country by nature, though not by law; for like is akin to like by nature; but law, which lords it over men, does frequently violence to nature. It were a shame then in us to know the nature of things, to be the wisest men of Greece, and in this very character to have now met together in that city of Greece which is the home and altar of Grecian wisdom, and in that cities greatest and wealthiest house, and yet to exhibit no result worthy of this our rank, but, like the lowest of mankind, to quarrel with one another. It is at once therefore my entreaty and my advice to you, Protagoras and Socrates, that you will allow us as arbiters to mediate between you; and do not you, Socrates, insist upon this your strict method of talking, which admits only of the extremist brevity, if such a method is disagreeable to Protagoras, but allow yourself more liberty, and give the rein to your words, order that they may appear before us with greater majesty and grace; and for you, Protagoras, do not stretch every rope spread every sail, and, losing sight of land, run before the wind into your ocean of words but see both of you whether you cannot cut out some middle course between you. Such then the plan you should adopt, and, if you take my advice, you will elect an umpire, and a chairman and a president, who will take care that neither of you transgress on either side the bounds of moderation.

Socrates/ This proposal pleased the party, and, all approving it, Callias repeated that he would not let me go, and I was requested to name a president. To which I replied, that it would be unworthy of us to select an umpire for our conversation. If, I urged, the object of our choice is found to

be our inferior, it cannot be well for such a person to preside over his betters; nor can it be well if he turn out to be an equal, for being himself no better than we are, his acts will be no better either; so that our election will prove to have been superfluous. But you will appoint you say, a superior to the post. To tell you the truth, I do not believe that it is in your power to elect a wiser man than Protagoras; but if you appoint one who is not superior, though you maintain he is, Protagoras is still exposed to the indignity of having a president set over him like a common man. For myself, I say nothing it makes no difference to me. But I will tell you what I will do to gratify your desire for the continuance of our meeting and conversation. If Protagoras does not like answering, let him take the questioning part, and I will answer, and in doing so will endeavor to show the sort of answers that, in my opinion, ought to be given. And as soon as I have answered all the questions he may choose to propose, let him in turn answer mine in a similar manner. And should he still evince an unwillingness to keep to the question in his answers, I will then join with you all in entreating him, as you are now entreating me, not to destroy our party. And so there will be no need for a single president to be appointed; you will all discharge the office jointly.

This plan of mine being universally sanctioned, Protagoras was compelled, though with a very bad grace, to agree to begin by asking questions; and when he had asked enough, to give brief answers in his turn to any question of mine. He commenced then pretty nearly thus;

Protagoras/ In my opinion, Socrates, one of the most important elements in a gentleman's education is a critical knowledge of poetry, and by this I understand the capacity of distinguishing between such passages in the poets as are correctly and incorrectly composed, and the power of discussing them scientifically, and giving reasons when

questioned about them. Accordingly, the question which I now have to propose, though it will relate to the subject which you and I are at present discussing that is to say, to virtue, shall be transferred to the region of poetry. This shall be the only difference. If I remember right, Simonides says to Scopas, son of Creon the Thessalian, No doubt to become a good man truly is hard, a man in hand and foot and heart four square wrought to a faultless work. Do you know the ode, or shall I give it you entire?

Socrates/ Not the slightest occasion, thank you. I not only know the piece, but have studied it with considerable attention.

Protagoras/ I am glad to hear it. Pray then do you consider it a beautiful and correct composition?

Socrates/ Certainly I do, very beautiful and correct.

Protagoras/ And do you think it beautiful if the poet contradicts himself?

Socrates/ Certainly not.

Protagoras/ Look at it closer then.

Socrates/ You are very good, but I have looked at it close enough.

Protagoras/ Are you aware then, that in the course of the poem he proceeds, if I mistake not, to say, I'll do I accord with that word of Pittacus, though it fell from the lips of a sage, Tis hard to be good. You observe, that it is the same person who makes both this remark and the former one.

Socrates/ I do.

Protagoras/ And do you think them consistent with each other?

Socrates/ I must confess I do. At the same time, though, I was sorely frightened, lest there should be something in what he said. However, But perhaps you don't.

Protagoras/ Why how, can I possibly think a writer consistent with himself who makes both these assertions? who in the first place premises in his own person, that it is hard truly to become a good man, and yet, before he has advanced any distance in his poem, is so oblivious as to find fault with Pittacus for saying, as he had said himself, that it is hard to be good, and declares that he cannot admit such an assertion, though it is exactly the same as his own. Surely it is evident that in finding fault with a man, who says only what he has said himself, he finds fault with himself as well; so that in the first passage or the second he is clearly wrong.

Socrates/ These remarks drew from many of the hearers clapping and applause. For myself, at first, just as if a blow had been dealt me by a skillful boxer, I was blinded and made giddy at once by the speech of my antagonist, and the plaudits of his supporters. At last, with a view (to confess to you the truth) of gaining time to consider the sense of the poet, I turned to Prodicus, and calling out to him, said; —

Prodicus, sure Simonides is a countryman of yours. You are bound to come to his aid.

And in thus inviting your assistance, I can fancy myself using the words of Scamander to Simois, when beset by Achilles; for according to Homer he summons him thus;

Come, brother, hasten; let us both unite

To quell a mortals too presumptuous might.

And so I now call upon you to join me in saving our friend Simonides from being demolished by Protagoras. And I can assure you, the defense requires all that exquisite art of yours, whereby you prove that to wish and to desire are not the same, and which supplied you with those numerous and delicate distinctions which you just now established. And now consider whether your opinion agrees with mine. Mine

is, that Simonides does not contradict himself in this matter; but, before I support it, I wish you to publish yours.

Do you conceive that becoming and being are identical or different?

Prodicus/ Different, to be sure.

Socrates/ And did not Simonides in the first passage declare his own opinion, that to become a good man truly is hard?

Prodicus/ He did.

Socrates/ And afterwards he condemns Pittacus, not, as Protagoras supposes, for making the same assertion that he had made himself, but for a different one. For Pittacus does not make, like Simonides, the difficulty to consist in becoming good, but in being good. And let me tell you, Protagoras, on the authority of Prodicus, that being and becoming are not the same. And if being is not the same with becoming, Simonides does not contradict himself. And I should not wonder if Prodicus and many others of the party were to bring forward Hesiod to prove, that no doubt to become good is hard; for in front of virtue, he says, the gods have placed sweat but when you are come to the top, for all its being so hard, it is easy to possess.

As soon as I had finished, Prodicus complimented me, but Protagoras rejoined;

Protagoras/ Your amendment, Socrates, involves a greater error than what you would amend.

Socrates/ If so, my work has been unfeatly done, and I am a sorry sort of physician; in attempting to cure I augment the disease.

Protagoras/ Well it is so, Socrates.

Socrates/ How do you mean?

Protagoras/ Why, it would argue great folly in the poet, if he really maintained that virtue was so common a thing to possess, when in the universal opinion of mankind it-is the hardest thing of all.

Socrates/ How very luckily it happens, that Prodicus is present at our conversation. For you must know, Protagoras, I apprehend that the art of Prodicus was in old time of a god like sort, and commenced either with Simonides, or at some still more ancient date. But you, though acquainted with a great many things, are apparently not acquainted with this; whereas I on the contrary am, thanks to the teaching of Prodicus. And so in the present instance you appear to me not to be aware that this very word hard was possibly not under stood by Simonides in the sense in which you understand it, but that he was like our friend here, who is constantly taking me to task on the meaning of the word δεινὸς (terrible, also sharp, clever). For whenever, in lauding you or any other distinguished person, I say of the object of my panegyric, that he is a terrible clever man, Prodicus asks me whether I am not ashamed of myself, for calling good things terrible? Whatever is terrible, says he, is evil; at any rate, no one ever thinks of talking of terrible wealth, or terrible peace, or terrible good health; but men do talk of terrible sickness, and terrible war, and terrible poverty; thereby implying, that whatever is terrible is evil. And so perhaps too the Ceans, with Simonides at their head, conceive what is hard to be evil, or give it some other signification with which you are not acquainted. But what says Prodicus to the question? for he is the person to apply to about Simonides' language. What did Simonides mean, Prodicus, by the word hard?

Prodicus/ Evil.

Socrates/ This then, I suppose, is the reason why he finds fault with Pittacus for saying, Tis hard to be good, just as if he had heard him say, that it was evil to be good.

Prodicus/ Why what else, Socrates, do you suppose that Simonides does mean? This of course and he makes it a reproach to Pittacus that he did not know how to distinguish rightly the meaning of words, as being a Lesbian, and reared in a barbarous dialect.

Socrates/ You hear, Protagoras, what Prodicus says. Have you any answer to make?

Protagoras/ You are altogether wrong, Prodicus, I am confident that Simonides meant by hard, just as we all do, not what is evil, but that which, instead of being easy, is done with a great deal of trouble.

Socrates/ Well, to tell you the truth, Protagoras, I agree with you. I believe Simonides did mean this, and what is more, Prodicus knows he did; only he is bantering you, and thinks to try whether you are able to back your own assertions. Since a very strong proof, that, at any rate, Simonides did not understand hard to be evil, is afforded by his very next remark. For he says, that God alone can possess this boon; and I am sure that, if he had meant to say that it was evil to be good, he could not have at once added, that none but God can possess good, and have assigned this as a special attribute to the deity. Were this the case, Prodicus would call his countryman an impious profligate, and no true son of Ceos. But what appears to me to be in this poem the intention of Simonides throughout, I am willing to tell you, if you would like, Protagoras, to have a sample of my capacity for the criticism of poetry that you talk about. To this proposal Protagoras answered, —

Prodicus/ Exactly as you please, Socrates;

Socrates/ but Prodicus, Hippias, and the rest, pressed me strongly to begin.

Socrates/ Well then, I will endeavor thoroughly to explain to you the view which I, for my part, take of the poem.

In no countries of Greece is philosophy of higher antiquity, or more generally prevalent, than in Crete and Lacedaemon, and nowhere in the world are sophists more numerous than there. But the inhabitants of these countries deny the fact, and, like those sophists of whom Protagoras told us, affect an unlearned exterior, in order that their superiority in Greece may not be discovered to consist in wisdom, but be thought to depend upon their velour in war, as they imagine that, if the secret of their ascendency were known, it would at once be universally practiced. As it is, however, they have so skillfully concealed it, that they have taken in all the would-be Spartans in other states; and, accordingly, you may see these gentlemen getting their ears battered in their ardent emulation, encircling their arms with the straps of the cestus, toiling in the palaestra, and wearing brief cloaks, under the impression, doubtless, that these are the practices to which the Spartans owe their supremacy in Greece. But the Lacedaemonians, wishing to enjoy the society of their native sophists without restraint, and getting wearied of having to meet them in secret, made a clearance by alien-acts of these foreign imitators, and all other strangers in their country, and thenceforward lived in intercourse with their sophists, without foreigners being aware of the fact. And, further, they allow none of their own youth to visit other cities, for fear of their there unlearning the lessons they have learnt at home a practice which is observed by the Cretans as well. Nay, not only are there men in these countries who pique themselves on their erudition, but women also share their zeal. Now, that my statement is correct, and that the Lacedaemonians are admirably trained

in philosophy and the art of words, may be discovered from the following fact. If you converse with the most ordinary Spartan you find him for a long while in the conversation appearing an ordinary sort of person; but just wait for an opportunity to present itself, and he will shoot at you, like a skillful archer, a notable saying of terse and pointed brevity, so that you, his antagonist, will show no better than a child by his side. And it was observing this very fact which led certain men, in times both past and present, to believe that the Spartan idiosyncrasy consisted rather in a devotion to wisdom than gymnastics, as they were aware that the capacity for uttering pithy sentences of this sort implied in its possessor a finished education. Of this number were Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias the Prienian, Solon among ourselves, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chene, and the Lacedaemonian Chilon, who was reckoned to make up the seven. All these sages were admirers and lovers and disciples of the Spartan system, and easily may you discover their wisdom to have been after the Spartan model, by the brief and memorable sayings that were uttered by each. Nay more, when they met together to dedicate the choice offering-of their wisdom to Apollo, in his temple at Delphi, they inscribed thereon, in their joint capacity, those famous sayings, which are, you know, on everybody's lips, Know yourself, and, Nothing in extremes.

Socrates/ What is my object, you will ask, in saying this? It is to show, that among the ancients philosophy was couched in a style of Laconic pith and brevity. A particular instance of which is afforded by this very saying of Pittacus, Tis hard to be good; which, being received with applause by the learned, was passed in private circles from mouth to mouth. Simonides then, being a man ambitious of philosophic distinction, felt sure that if he were to succeed

in overturning this famous dictum, he would, like a novice who had defeated a champion wrestler, establish himself a reputation among the men of his day. It was in opposition then to this current saying, and with this ambitious view in thus seeking to suppress it, that he composed the entire ode, according to my view of the matter.

Let us now then all unite in examining the piece, to see whether my view be a correct one. To begin, the very commencement would appear to be insane, if the author wished simply to state the fact that it was hard to be good; for he inserts the words no doubt, which seem to be inserted with no object in the world, unless we conceive him engaged in a sort of quarrel with the saying of Pittacus; and that, when Pittacus asserts that it is hard to be good, Simonides contradicts him and says, It is not so, but to become a good man is hard, Pittacus, in very truth. Mind, he does not say, truly good; it is not to good that he applies the word truly as though he thought that some things were truly good, and others good indeed, but not good truly. No, this would be silly, and not like Simonides. But we must make a transposition of the word truly, and presuppose that the two remarks were made in something like the following manner. Pittacus enunciates thus, Mortals, it is hard to be good; and Simonides replies, You are wrong, Pittacus; be is not the word, but no doubt to become a good man, in hand and word and thought complete, wrought to a faultless work, is hard in very truth. Thus you see we find a reason for inserting no doubt, and the word truly seems to be correctly placed at the end of the sentence. And that this is here the sense of the poet, is attested by all the remainder of the poem. For were I to review each passage in it separately, I could abundantly prove it to be a perfect composition; for it is all very charming and elaborate. As, however, it would be too long a matter to analyze it thus, I will content myself with making it clear by

a general sketch that the scope of the entire poem is nothing more or less, from beginning to end, than a refutation of Pittacus' dictum.

For after a brief interval the poet proceeds to assert, just as he would do if maintaining an argument, that though no doubt to become a good man is truly hard, yet for a certain time at least it is possible; but when become so, to remain in this condition, and be, as you say, Pittacus, a good man, is altogether impossible, and more than human. God alone may possess this boon; But for man, he cannot possibly be other than evil, whom helpless misfortune prostrates. Who is it then that helpless misfortune prostrates in the command of a ship? Clearly not the landsman; for the landsman is always prostrate. Just then, as you cannot throw down a man who is on the ground, but he must be on his legs before you can so throw him as to lay him on the ground; exactly in the same way a man must be possessed of help and resource before he can be prostrated by helpless misfortune, while the man who is ever without help can never possibly be prostrated. A violent storm may overtake the pilot, and make him helpless; a severe season may surprise the farmer, and make him help less; and so may the physician be made help less by an analogous professional calamity. For the good man is capable of becoming evil, as is attested by another poet, who says, The good are sometimes evil, sometimes good; but the evil man cannot possibly become, but must of necessity ever be, evil. Thus it appears then, that whenever a helpful, a wise, and a virtuous man is prostrated by helpless misfortune, he cannot possibly be other than evil. But, you say, Pittacus, it is hard to be good; no, the truth is, that to become good no doubt is hard, yet possible; but to be good is impossible quite. For, as the poet continues, Every man is good by faring well, and evil by faring ill. What then is faring well with

regard to letters? and what makes a man good in letters? Clearly the learning of letters. And what kind of faring well makes a good physician? Clearly the learning of the treatment of the sick. And evil, he says, by faring ill. Who then is capable of becoming an evil physician? Clearly the man who starts with being in the first instance a physician, and in the second a good physician. For he can also become a bad physician. But we who are unprofessional cannot possibly become, by faring ill, either physicians, or carpenters, or anything of the kind; and whosoever cannot become a physician by faring ill, obviously cannot become an evil physician either. Thus you see it is only the good man that can ever become evil, whether he become so by decay, or pain, or disease, or any other casualty for this alone is evil faring, to lose ones know ledge but the evil man can never become evil, for he is always evil; if he would fain become evil, he must first become good. So that this part of the poem also tends to prove that it is not possible to be a good man in the sense of continuing good, but to become good is possible, just as it is to become evil. And they, adds the poet, are best for the longest time whom the gods love.

And if it be plain that these passages are directed against Pittacus, the aim of the poet in the following is still more clearly marked. For thus he proceeds; Wherefore never will in quest of that which cannot be, throw away a part of life on empty bootless hope; in quest, I say, of an all-blameless man among us, who feed on the fruits of the wide-bosomed earth. When I find one, I will let you know. So vehemently and uniformly throughout the poem does he persist in attacking that expression of Pittacus. But all I praise and love willingly who do naught vile with necessity not even gods contend. And this again is directed to the same point. For Simonides was not so ill-informed as to express his admiration of those who committed no evil willingly, as

though he imagined there were any in the world who did commit evil willingly. I had almost said, that no wise man ever entertained the opinion, that any mortal errs willingly, or commits base and wicked actions willingly. On the contrary, wise men well know that all who do base and evil deeds, do them involuntarily. And so Simonides, as a wise man, does not profess himself an admirer of those who do not commit evil willingly; but he predicates the willingness of himself. For he conceived it to be frequently the duty of a good and noble man to force himself to become the friend and admirer of others for instance, when a man is unfortunate enough to have an unworthy father, or mother, or country, or any similar tie. Now wicked men, when subject to any evil of this kind, observe it with a kind of satisfaction; and draw attention to it by their vituperations, and enlarge on the enormity whether in their parents or their country in order that, while they neglect their own duty towards them, men may not make such neglect a ground of accusation, or reproach. And thus their censure far exceeds what is merited; and, to unavoidable causes of dislike, they add causes of their own making. Whereas good men, on the contrary, dissemble in such cases, and compel themselves to speak even the language of praise; and, if ever at all enraged with their parents, or country, for wrong inflicted, they sober and tranquillize their feelings, and seek a reconciliation by forcing themselves into a condition to love and admire those who are thus connected with them. And so, I imagine, did Simonides frequently find it his duty to speak of a tyrant, or some similar, character, in terms of admiration and panegyric not willingly, remember, but by compulsion. This then explains what he says to Pittacus. If I blame you, Pittacus, it is not because I am fond of blaming; since I, for my part, am content with a man who is not evil or helpless quite; who does but know the justice that saves

a city, and is of sound mind. Such a man I will not censure; for censure I do not love; besides, infinite is the family of fools (thereby implying, that if a man were fond of blaming, he might take his fill by blaming these). Sure, all is fair wherewith foul is not mixed. And by this he does not mean the same as if he had said, Sure, all is white wherewith black is not mixed; for this would be absurd, in more ways than one; but what he does mean to say is, that he admits of a mean which he does not condemn. And I search not, he says, for an all-blameless man among us, who feed on the fruits of the wide-bosomed earth; when I find one, I will let you know. So that if on this depended praise, I should praise none; but I am content with one who holds the mean, and does no evil; since all I love and praise (here, as addressing Pittacus, he uses the dialect of Mytilene); since all I love and praise willingly (here, at the word willingly, we must make the pause in reading) who do naught vile; there are some, though, whom I praise and love against my will. You therefore, Pittacus, had you spoken but moderate sooth and reason, I would never have blamed; but now, as your lie is utter, and on the greatest things, while you fancy yourself speaking truth, I cannot choose but give you blame.

Such, Prodicus and Protagoras, I conclude to have been the object which Simonides had in view in the composition of this poem. —

Hippias/ And a very fair exposition you have made of it too, Socrates, in my opinion. I however, gentlemen, possess a critique of my own on this piece a very good one which I am willing to propound to you, if you would like to hear it.

Alcibiades/ Thank you, Hippias, another day, if you please. To-day its only fair that Protagoras and Socrates should fulfill their mutual agreement; which binds Socrates to reply, if Protagoras has any further question to propose; but to ask questions himself, if Protagoras prefers to answer.

Socrates/ Yes, I leave it to Protagoras to choose whichever is more agreeable to him. But, Protagoras, if you have no objection, I should like to drop these criticisms on songs and poems, and should much prefer coming to a conclusion on the former subject of our inquiry, by investigating it in company with you. For, I must confess, I think that talking about poetry bears a close resemblance to the festive amusements of the vulgar and uneducated. For these people, being too ignorant to converse together over their cups through the medium of their own voices and words, keep up the prices of flute-players by hiring, for large sums, the foreign aid of their flutes, and entertaining each other through their voices. But in the banquets of gentlemen and scholars, you will see neither dancing girls nor women that play on the flute or the lyre; but you will find the guests themselves equal to the task of conversing, without these puerile toys, by their own voices; both speaking and listening in turn, with decency and order, even though they have drunk a great quantity of wine. And so too parties like the present, if indeed composed of such men as most of us profess to be, have no need to borrow the foreign voices even of poets, whom it is impossible to interrogate as to their meaning; but who are cited as authorities by combatants in their talk, while both sides assign a different sense to the citation, and persist in disputing a point, which they can never satisfactorily settle. No; wise men care nothing for such entertainment as this; but entertain each other with their own stores, by giving and receiving mutually, in their own conversation, proofs of their capacity. And such is the example which it appears to me that you and I ought rather to imitate; let us throw the poets on one side, and, conducting the discourse by our own unaided efforts, bring at once truth and our own selves to the test. Should you therefore wish still to interrogate, I am ready to lend myself

to you in reply; but if you prefer answering, do you lend me your aid in bringing to a conclusion that inquiry, of which we abandoned the discussion in the middle. —

Notwithstanding these and similar remarks on my part, Protagoras continued to keep us in the dark as to the course he should prefer; upon which Alcibiades looked at Callias, and said;

Alcibiades/ Callias, do you still think that Protagoras acts fairly in refusing to let us know whether he will answer or not? For my part, I certainly do not think that he does. No, let him either continue the conversation, or tell us at once that he is unwilling to do so, in order that, his unwillingness being once clearly understood, we may either get Socrates to converse with someone else, or find another pair willing to engage in a discussion.

Socrates/ Whereupon, Protagoras being piqued, as it appeared to me, by this remark of Alcibiades, and being pressed by Callias and nearly all the remainder of the party, was at length induced, though with great difficulty, to renew the conversation; which he did by requesting me to start my inquiries, as he was now ready to reply.

So I began. Pray do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have ever any other design in conversing with you, than a wish to examine thoroughly into difficulties which I cannot of myself unravel. I think that Homer was very right in saying, When two go together, one observes before the other. For so do all of us mortals acquire a greater facility for every deed, and word, and thought. But if haply a man has thought alone, he straightway goes up and down, and searches till he find someone else to whom he may communicate his thought, and in concert with whom he may verify it. And this is the reason why I have greater pleasure in conversing with you than with any other man in the world, as I am persuaded

that none are so well capable of investigating all subjects which are worth the good man's study, and in particular the subject of virtue. For to whom but you should I apply? when not only do you profess yourself a virtuous gentleman, just as is professed by many good people, who cannot impart their goodness to others; but when, beside being virtuous yourself, you are able to make others virtuous also; when, further, your confidence in yourself is so implicit, that, whereas it is the custom with other masters of your art to dissemble it with care, you, on the other hand, have yourself publicly cried under the name of a sophist before all the Greeks, and advertise yourself a teacher of accomplishment and virtue; being moreover the first to conceive yourself entitled to receive a price for your instructions. Is it not then every man's duty to appeal to you for the investigation of these matters, to inquire into your opinions, and communicate his own? Most assuredly it is. And so on the present occasion I am anxious to renew from the beginning those questions, which I in the first instance proposed to you on these subjects, hoping that you will remind me of points which we decided, and join me in considering others. My inquiry, if I remember right, was this; Wisdom, discretion, courage, holiness, and justice, are these all but five names for one and the same thing; or is there attached to each of these names a distinct idea, and a distinct thing possessing a separate function of its own, whereby it is distinguished from all the rest? To this you replied, that they were not names of one thing, but that each of these names was applied to a distinct thing, and that all these things were parts of virtue, not like the parts of gold, which resemble both one another, and the whole whereof they are parts, but like the parts of the face, which are dissimilar from the whole and from one another, each being possessed of a distinct function. If then you still adhere to your former opinion, tell

me; but if you have altered it at all, mark the alteration clearly, as I hold you in no wise accountable for any difference of opinion you may choose to ex press. Nay, I should not be surprised if your previous answer was merely intended to try me.

Protagoras/ Well, Socrates, I tell you that all these qualities are parts of virtue, and that four of them bear a reasonably close resemblance to one another, but that courage is very different indeed from them all. And the following fact will prove my assertion. You will find many men distinguished for injustice, impiety, intemperance, and stupidity, who are yet eminently conspicuous for their courage.

Socrates/ Hold there a moment, your observation is worth examining. By the courageous, do you mean the daring?

Protagoras/ Yes, and those who are ready to plunge into dangers which most men are afraid to encounter.

Socrates/ Again, do you pronounce virtue to be a beautiful thing, and as being a beautiful thing do you come forward to teach it?

Protagoras/ Nay, Socrates, as I m a sane man, I pronounce it to be of all things most beautiful.

Socrates/ Is, however, one part of it beautiful and another ugly, or is it all beautiful?

Protagoras/ All beautiful, I consider, and in the highest degree.

Socrates/ Do you know who they are that dive into wells daringly?

Protagoras/ Of course I do. Divers.

Socrates/ Is it because they know how to dive, or for some other reason?

Protagoras/ Because they know how to dive.

Socrates/ And who are daring fighters on horseback, good riders or bad?

Protagoras/ Good riders.

Socrates/ And who are daring as targeteers, those who understand the service or those who do not?

Protagoras/ Those who do. And so in everything else, if this is what you are driving at, the scientific are more daring than the unscientific, and the same person when he has acquired the science is more daring than he was before he acquired it.

Socrates/ Have you ever in your life, met with persons who were unscientific in all these matters, and yet engaged in them all with daring?

Protagoras/ Certainly I have, and with excessive daring.

Socrates/ Are these daring people also courageous?

Protagoras/ If they were, courage would be far from being a beautiful thing; for these are mere madmen.

Socrates/ Pray how do you define the courageous? Did you not say they were the daring?

Protagoras/ I did, and I say so now.

Socrates/ It would appear then, that those who are daring in this way are not courageous, but mad; and from the former instances I adduced, that the wisest men are also most daring, and as being most daring are most courageous. So that by this reasoning, wisdom would be courage, would it not?

Protagoras/ You do not rightly remember, Socrates, what I said in reply to your question. When asked by you whether the courageous were daring, I agreed they were; but whether the daring also were courageous, you did not ask me then. Had you done so, I should have replied, Not all. But that the

courageous are not daring, and that I was wrong in admitting they were, you have no where proved. Instead of doing so, you take the trouble of showing, that those who possess science are more daring than they were themselves before they possessed it, and more daring than others who do not possess it, and thereby you conclude that courage and wisdom are identical. But, by pursuing this method of inquiry, you might equally well arrive at the conclusion, that bodily strength is wisdom. For if, in following out this course, you were in the first place, to ask me whether the strong were powerful, I should say, Yes; if you were to proceed to inquire whether scientific wrestlers were more powerful than unscientific wrestlers, and more powerful than they were themselves before they had learnt the science of wrestling, I should again reply, Yes; and after I had made these admissions, you would be in a condition, by availing yourself of the same logic as before, to state that by my admission wisdom was bodily strength. But here again observe, I nowhere admit that the powerful are strong, though I do that the strong are powerful. For I do not consider strength and power to be the same; but the one, power, to arise from science, yes, and from madness too, and passion; but strength from sound nature and good bodily nourishment. In like manner, I maintain that courage and daring are not the same. Courageous men are daring, but it is not all daring men that are courageous; for daring, like power, arises from scientific skill, and from passion too, and madness, but courage, from nature and good mental nurture.

Socrates/ Do you allow, Protagoras, that some men live well, and others ill?

Protagoras/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you think that a man would live well if he lived in vexation and pain?

Protagoras/ No.

Socrates/ But if he lived in pleasure to the day of his death, you would consider him then, would you not, to have lived well?

Protagoras/ I should.

Socrates/ To live pleasantly then, it appears, is a good thing; to live unpleasantly, an evil thing.

Protagoras/ Yes, if the pleasures a man lives in, be but honest.

Socrates/ How, Protagoras, do you maintain with the many, that some pleasant things are evil, and some painful things good? For myself, I say, as far as things are pleasant, are they not so far good, if they are to have no other results? And, on the other hand, are not painful things in the same way evil, in so far as they are painful?

Protagoras/ I am not sure, Socrates, whether I ought to answer as unreservedly as you ask, that pleasant things are all good, and painful things all evil. No, I conceive that it would be safer for me, not only in reference to my present answer, but also to all the rest of my life, if I were to reply that there are some pleasant things which are not good, some painful things which are not evil, others again which are such, while there is a third class which are neither the one nor the other, neither evil nor good.

Socrates/ By pleasant things, do you not mean those with which pleasure is connected or which cause pleasure?

Protagoras/ To be sure I do.

Socrates/ I ask then, whether they be not good, in so far as they are pleasant; meaning by this question to ask, whether pleasure itself be not a good thing.

Protagoras/ Well, Socrates, I say to you, as you are always saying yourself, let us examine the matter, and if the

question seem germane to our subject, and it appears that pleasure and good are the same, we will agree on the point; if not, we will then join issue.

Socrates/ Would you like, to take the lead in the examination yourself, or shall I?

Protagoras/ You are the proper person to lead, for it was you who started the subject.

Socrates/ Perhaps then, by some way like the following, we shall arrive at a clear view of the question. Just as a person who was forming an estimate of a man's health or physical capacity in any particular, from a survey of his bodily form, would be sure to say to him, if he saw no more than his face and hands, Come, my good friend, strip, if you please, and show me your chest and your back, that I may inspect you more closely; so do I now crave some disclosure of the kind for our present investigation. Having observed, from what you have told me, the state of your mind with regard to pleasure and good, I still require to say, Come, friend Protagoras, uncover your mind further, and show me its state with regard to knowledge. On this point, also, do you think as the many do, or differently? Their opinion of knowledge is, that it is not a strong, nor a commanding, nor a governing thing; nor do they form their notions with reference to it, as though it were such; but conceive that, though knowledge is often to be found in a man, it is not his knowledge that governs him, but some other thing, at one time passion, at another pleasure, at another pain, sometimes love, and often fear; so that they plainly think of knowledge as of a poor slave, liable to be dragged about at will by all those other things. Is this then your opinion also? or do you conceive knowledge to be a noble thing, well fitted to govern mankind; and that if a man does but know what is good and evil, he can never be so swayed by any other thing, as to do aught else than what his knowledge

prescribes, and, in fine, that wisdom is well able to defend mankind?

Protagoras/ I quite think as you say, Socrates. And besides, if for any man in the world, it were a shame for me, to deny that wisdom and knowledge are of all human things the mightiest.

Socrates/ Well and truly said. Are you aware though, that most men do not believe you and me in this matter, but say that many people, who know what is best, do not choose to practice it, though it is in their power to practice it, but practice other things? And never have I asked the reason of this conduct, but I have been told that such people act thus from being overpowered by pleasure or pain, or mastered by some one of those things which I just now mentioned.

Protagoras/ I don't doubt it, Socrates. There are many other points on which men speak in correctly.

Socrates/ Come then, and join me in endeavoring to persuade these men, and teach them what that state is, which they call being over powered by pleasure, and which prevents people from doing, although they know, what is best. For I should not wonder if on our saying to them, You speak incorrectly, my friends, you are deceived, they were to turn upon us with the question; Protagoras and Socrates, if being overpowered by pleasure is not this, pray what is it? what do you declare it to be? tell us both of you.

Protagoras/ What business is it of ours, Socrates, to examine into the opinion of the vulgar herd, who just say what comes first into their head?

Socrates/ I think, that we shall find this inquiry help us somewhat in discovering the relation which courage bears to the other parts of virtue. If it is your intention then to abide by our late agreement which assigned the lead to me, let me beg you to follow me on the road which I expect will best

conduct us to the light. But if you are unwilling to do so, I will drop this question, if such be your pleasure.

Protagoras/ No, Socrates, you are right, finish as you have begun.

Socrates/ Again then, if they were to ask us, What do you declare this to be, which we called being subject to pleasures? I for my part should answer, Hearken, my friends, we will endeavor to tell you, Protagoras and I. Do you not allow that you experience this subjection in the following circumstances? that often you are so swayed by eating and drinking and love, all pleasant things, that, though you know them to be evil, you still indulge in them?

Protagoras/ Yes, they would allow it.

Socrates/ You and I then, Protagoras, will ask them again, In what point of view do you say that they are evil? Is it because they afford this pleasure at the moment, and because each of them is pleasant for the moment, or because they lay up for your future life diseases and poverty, and many other similar evils? Or, if they produced none of these after effects, but merely created pleasure, should you still pronounce them evil for making a man pleased under any circumstances and in any way whatsoever? Can we conceive, Protagoras, that they would return us any other answer, than that these things were evil, not for the mere fact of creating the momentary pleasure, but on account of the diseases and other results which follow in their train?

Protagoras/ Such, I imagine, would be the answer of the many.

Socrates/ And when they create diseases, do they create pain? and when they create poverty, do they create pain? They would assent to this, I think.

Protagoras/ And so do I.

Socrates/ Are you of opinion then, my friends, as I and Protagoras hold, that these things are evil for no other reason than because they terminate in pain, and deprive us of other pleasures? They would assent? We both agreed that they would.

But suppose we were to reverse our question, and ask, When you speak, on the other hand, good people, of painful things being good, do you not mean such things as gymnastic exercises, and military service, and the treatment of diseases by cautery and the knife, by dosing and starving? Is it not such things you call good, but painful? Yes, they would say.

Protagoras/ Granted.

Socrates/ Do you call these things good then for the reason, that they afford us at the moment the utmost pain and annoyance, or because their after results are the health and good condition of bodies, the safety, empire, and wealth of states? For the latter reason, would be their answer, I think.

Protagoras/ Certainly it would.

Socrates/ Are these things good on any other account than because they terminate in pleasures, and in deliverance from, and avoidance of, pains? Or can you tell me of some other end which you have in view when you call them good, than that of pleasure and pain? No, they would answer, in my opinion.

Protagoras/ And in mine too.

Socrates/ Do you pursue then pleasure as being a good thing, and shun pain as being an evil thing?

Protagoras/ They do.

Socrates/ This then, pain, you esteem to be an evil, and pleasure to be a good; since you say that even the enjoyment of pleasure itself is evil, when it deprives you of greater

pleasures than itself contains, or produces pains which exceed its own pleasures. For, if you call pleasure itself an evil for any other reason, or with any other end in view than this, you may tell us, if you can; but you cannot.

Protagoras/ No, I do not think they can.

Socrates/ And is it not exactly the same, on the other hand, with suffering pain? Do you not call pain itself a good, when it rids you of greater pains than its own, or produces pleasures which exceed its pains? Since, if you have any other end in view when you call pain itself a good, you may tell us, if you can; but you cannot.

Protagoras/ Quite true, Socrates, they cannot.

Socrates/ But if, my friends, you were on your side to interrogate me and ask, Why ever do you say so much on this question, and turn it in so many ways? Bear with me, I should reply; for, in the first place, it is no easy matter to prove what that is which you call being subject to pleasures; and secondly, on this very question hinges all my proof. But even now, late as it is, you are at liberty to retract, if you can say that good is anything else than pleasure; evil, anything else than pain; if you can tell me that you are not content to live out your life pleasantly in freedom from pain. But if you are so content, and cannot tell me of anything being good or evil, which does not terminate in these, hearken to what follows. I maintain that, if this be the case, your words become ridiculous, when you say, that often a man who knows evil to be evil, practices it nevertheless, when he is not obliged to practice it, from being led and carried out of himself by pleasures; and when, on the other hand, you say, that the man, who knows what is good, does not choose to practice it, on account the immediate pleasures by which he is over mastered. —

Now the absurdity of these statements will be clearly seen, if we abstain from using the many names of pleasant and painful, and good and evil; but agree, since the things have been found to be only two, to call them only by two names; first, by those of good and evil, and then by those of pleasant and painful. This being established, let us say, that a man knowing evil to be evil, nevertheless does it if anyone ask us, Why? We shall answer, because he is overpowered. By what? will be the next question. But we are no longer at liberty to say, By pleasure; for it has received another name, and instead of pleasure, is now called good. Let us answer him then and say Because he is overpowered. By what? he will repeat. By good, we must reply. Now should our friend be disposed to raillery, he will laugh at us, and say, Ridiculous conduct this you speak of, when a man does evil knowing it to be evil, with no obligation to do it because he is overpowered by good. Is it by a good he will ask, which is worthy or not worthy in your opinion to overcome the evil? To this, of course, we shall reply, Not worthy for otherwise the man whom we say is subject to pleasure would not be in fault. And in what respect, he will probably continue, are good things unworthy to overcome evil, or evil to overcome good? is it in any other than in that of magnitude or quantity? We shall not be able to mention any other than this. It is evident then, he will conclude, that by this case of being overpowered, you mean, choosing greater evil instead of less good. So far then on this track. Now let us change our names, and again applying the terms pleasant and painful to these same things, let us say that a man does things, which we before called evil and now call painful, knowing them to be painful, being overpowered by pleasant things, which are of course unworthy to obtain the mastery. And what other measure is there of pleasure in comparison with pain, than that of excess and defect? that is to say, of one

being greater or smaller than the other, more or less, stronger or weaker? For if it be said, But, Socrates, there is a great difference between that which is pleasant at the moment, and that which is ultimately pleasant or painful; Does it lie, I should ask, in anything else than in pleasure and in pain? In nothing else, I am sure. No, like a man expert at weighing, put together all the pleasures, and put together all the pains, then set both their nearness and remoteness in the scales, and tell me which are the heavier. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, the greater and the greater number are always to be chosen; if pains against pains, the smaller and the smaller number; if pleasures against pains, then, if the pains be exceeded by the pleasures, whether nearby remote, or remote by near, the line of conduct is to be pursued in which this excess is contained; but if the pleasures be exceeded by the pains, then it is not to be pursued. Good people, I should ask, can these matters be settled in any other way? I am sure that they could tell me of no other. —

Protagoras did not think they could either.

Seeing, then, that this is the case, answer me the following question. Do the same objects appear to your sight to be greater in size when near, and smaller in size when remote? or do they not?

Protagoras/ They do, would be their answer.

Socrates/ And is it not the same with the thickness and number of objects? And do not equal sounds appear louder when near, fainter at a distance?

Protagoras/ Yes, they would say.

Socrates/ If then our well-being had depended upon this, upon our making and choosing great lengths, and our avoiding and not making small ones, what would, to all appearance, have been the safeguard of our life? Would it be

the art of mensuration, or the force of appearances? Or would this latter have led us astray, and caused us to be ever choosing and ever rejecting the same things; and ever repenting, in our practice and choice of lengths, both great and small? while the art of mensuration would bring to naught this phantom show, and, pointing out to us the truth, would anchor our soul thereon, and bid it rest, and assure us our life's safety. Would they allow, think you, that, in this case, the art of mensuration would save us, or some other art?

Protagoras/ None other.

Socrates/ Again, if the security of our life depended on the choice of odd and even numbers, on choosing, at the proper time, the larger, and at the proper time the smaller, by comparison both between themselves and one another, whether they might be far or whether they might be near; what would, in this case, be our life's safeguard? Would it not be a science? and would it not, further, be one of measurement, since it relates to excess and defect? and since it has numbers for its object, could it be any other than arithmetic? To this would our friends assent, or would they not? —

Protagoras agreed with me that they would.

Come then, my friends, I proceeded, since the security of our life has been found to depend on our choice of pleasure and pain being correct, with reference at once to quantity and degree and distance, does not our security appear to you, in the first instance, to consist in measurement, since it has to consider excess and defect and respective equality?

Protagoras/ Yes, it must.

Socrates/ And if in measurement, it must, of necessity, be an art and a science.

Protagoras/ Assuredly, they will say.

Socrates/ What art, what science this is, we will in quire some other time. That it is a science, is quite sufficient for the explanation which Protagoras and I have to give you of the question that you asked us. You proposed it, if you remember, at the time when Protagoras and I were agreeing that nothing was so powerful as scientific knowledge; and that knowledge was ever dominant, wherever it existed, over both pleasure and everything else. But you, on the other hand, said that pleasure was often dominant, even over the man that was possessed of knowledge; and when we refused to agree with you, you proceeded to ask; Socrates and Protagoras, you said, if being vanquished by pleasure is not this, pray what is it? what do you declare it to be? Tell us. If, then, at that moment we had answered you, that it was ignorance, you would have laughed at us; but now, if you laugh at us, you will laugh at your selves as well. For you have yourselves agreed, that whoever commits error in the choice of pleasure and pain that is, of good and evil commits it through defect of knowledge; and not only of knowledge, but, as you further agreed, a knowledge of measurement. Now all action, that errs for want of knowledge, is committed, you must yourselves know, through ignorance. Being vanquished therefore by pleasure is ignorance, of all ignorance the greatest. Now of this Protagoras here professes himself a physician; and so do Prodicus and Hippias. But you, because you believe it to be something else than ignorance, neither go yourselves, nor send your children, to these sophists to be instructed in this matter, as though you imagined it could not be taught; but, by being chary of your gold, and by refusing to bestow it upon these men, succeed badly in your transactions, both public and private. Such would be the answer we would render to the crowd. —

But you, Hippias and Prodicus, I ask you, in concert with Protagoras, wishing you to join in our conversation, do you judge that what I say is true or false? —

They all agreed that nothing was more true.

You admit then, that the pleasant is good, and the painful evil. But I would enter a protest against our friend Prodicus' verbal distinctions. Yes, my very excellent Prodicus, whether you call it pleasant, or agreeable, or enjoyable; whatever be the name, from whatever quarter derived, which you may be pleased to give it, restrict yourself to that answer which I wish to hear. —

Prodicus laughed, and said he quite agreed with me, and so did all the rest.

But what do you say to the following. All actions which tend to this, to living, that is, pleasantly and without pain, are they not honorable, and, being honorable, are they not both good and useful? —

They assented.

If then, the pleasant is good, no man who either knows or believes that other things are better than that which he is doing, if they are such things as he can do, proceeds to do the less good, when he might do the better. Neither is subjection to self, aught else than ignorance; mastery over self, aught else than wisdom. —

They all assented.

But tell me. What is ignorance, according to you? is it not having a false opinion and being deceived on matters of great moment? —

Here again there was no dissentient voice.

Is it not true then, that no one enters willingly into evil, or into that which he considers evil; that it is not, in fact, in the nature of man to engage with deliberate purpose in what

he believes to be evil instead of in good; that no man, when compelled to choose one of two evils, will choose the greater, when he might choose the less? —

All these questions met with universal assent.

To the point then. Do you say that there is such a thing as terror or fear? Do you understand by it the same as I do? To you, Prodicus, I address myself. I understand by it a certain expectation of evil, whether you call it terror or fear. —

Protagoras and Hippias were of opinion that this was the meaning both of terror and fear; Prodicus thought it was of terror, but not of fear.

No matter for that, Prodicus, said I. But this does matter. If our former conclusions are true, will any man in the world deliberately enter into what he fears, when he might enter into that which he does not fear? or is it impossible by our previous admissions? for we have admitted that, what he fears he believes to be evil, and what he believes to be evil, he never engages in or chooses willingly. All agreed to this also.

Prodicus and Hippias, now that we have established these points, let us call on Protagoras to defend the answer which he gave us at first no, not quite at first. At first he said, that of the parts of virtue, which were five in number, there was not one like any other, and that each had a distinct function of its own. This is not the statement I mean, but a later one; for afterwards he said, that four of these parts bore a reasonably close resemblance to one another, but that the fifth was widely different from the rest, this fifth being courage. And he told me that I should be convinced of this by the following fact. Socrates, said he, you will find men of the greatest impiety, and injustice, and intemperance, and ignorance most distinguished for courage. This will show

you that courage differs greatly from the other parts of virtue. And astonished as I was by this answer at the moment, it has astonished me still more since my late investigations with you. However, at the time I asked him whether by the courageous he meant the daring. Yes, said he, and men eager for encounter. Do you remember giving this answer, Protagoras?

Protagoras/ I do.

Socrates/ Come then, tell us what it is which, according to you, the courageous are eager to encounter? Is it the same as cowards?

Protagoras/ No.

Socrates/ Is it different then?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do cowards engage in what is safe, brave men in what is formidable?

Protagoras/ So it is generally said, Socrates.

Socrates/ You are right, but this is not my question. According to you, what is it which brave men are eager to encounter? that which is formidable, believing it to be formidable, or that which is not formidable?

Protagoras/ Why the former, Socrates, your late arguments have shown to be impossible.

Socrates/ Again you are right. If our reasoning was correct, no man engages in what he believes to be formidable, since we found that want of self-command was want of knowledge.

Protagoras/ Granted.

Socrates/ But on the other hand, all men engage in that which inspires them with confidence, whether they be cowardly or courageous, and in this point of view, at any rate, both the one and the other encounter the same things.

Protagoras/ But I can assure you, Socrates, that no things can be more opposed to each other than the things which cowards and brave men encounter. To take the first instance that comes, the latter are willing to encounter war, the former are not.

Socrates/ When it is honorable, to engage in it, or disgraceful?

Protagoras/ When it is honorable.

Socrates/ And if it is honorable, it is also good by our former admission; for we admitted that all honorable actions were good.

Protagoras/ We did, and I am always of this opinion.

Socrates/ And very properly too. But which class do you say are not willing to encounter war, when it is honorable and good?

Protagoras/ Cowards.

Socrates/ And if it be honorable and good, it is also pleasant?

Protagoras/ Certainly, according to our premises.

Socrates/ Do cowards knowingly refuse to engage in what is honorable, and pleasant, and good?

Protagoras/ No; for if we allow this, we shall overturn all our former admissions.

Socrates/ And the courageous man? does not he engage in what is honorable, and pleasant, and good?

Protagoras/ I must allow he does.

Socrates/ In a word then, the courageous men fear no base fears, when they do fear, nor are they inspired with base confidences. Is not this true?

Protagoras/ It is.

Socrates/ And if not base, are they not honorable?

Protagoras/ Granted.

Socrates/ And if honorable, good?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are not the cowardly, the foolhardy, and the frenzied, possessed on the contrary with base fears, and inspired with base confidences?

Protagoras/ They are.

Socrates/ And when they dare what is base and evil, do they dare it in consequence of anything else than ignorance and want of understanding?

Protagoras/ No.

Socrates/ Again, That which makes cowards cowardly, do you call it cowardice or courage?

Protagoras/ Cowardice, of course.

Socrates/ And have they not been found to be cowardly in consequence of their ignorance of that which is formidable?

Protagoras/ Certainly they have.

Socrates/ It is this ignorance then, it appears, which makes them cowardly?

Protagoras/ Granted.

Socrates/ And that which makes them cowardly you have allowed to be cowardice?

Protagoras/ I have.

Socrates/ Ignorance then of that which is formidable and not formidable proves to be cowardice. —

He nodded his head.

Socrates/ Again, is courage opposite to cowardice?

Protagoras/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is knowledge of that which is formidable and not formidable opposite to ignorance of the same? —

Here again he nodded his head.

Socrates/ And ignorance of this is cowardice? —

Though with a very bad grace, he here nodded again.

Knowledge then of that which is formidable and not formidable is courage, since it is opposite to ignorance of the same. —

At this he would neither make a sign nor utter a word.

So I said; How is it, Protagoras, that you will not say either yes or no to my question?

Protagoras/ Finish by yourself.

Socrates/ Only one more question will I ask you. Do you still think, as you did formerly, that there are some men very ignorant, and at the same time very courageous?

Protagoras/ You seem to stickle, Socrates, for the answer coming from me. Well, I'll indulge you so far, and say that by our previous admissions this appears to me to be impossible.

Socrates/ I can assure you, that I have no other motive in proposing all these questions than a wish to observe the relations of virtuous things, and the nature of virtue itself. For certain am I, that, if this point be once discovered, we shall clearly discern that other, on which both you and I launched out into a long harangue, I in maintaining that virtue could not be taught, and you in maintaining that it could. And I can fancy the upshot of our conversation attacking and deriding us like a human being, and that, if it got a voice, it would say, You are strange persons, both of you, Socrates and Protagoras. You, Socrates, who formerly maintained that virtue could not be taught, are now bent on contradicting yourself, by endeavoring to prove that all things are knowledge, both justice, and discretion, and courage; a course of argument which leads most clearly to the result that virtue is a thing which can be taught. For if

virtue were something different from knowledge, as Protagoras has been attempting to maintain, it evidently would not be susceptible of being taught; but now, if it be found to be all knowledge, as you, Socrates, are insisting, it will be strange indeed if it cannot be taught. Protagoras, on the other hand, who started with asserting that he could teach it, seems now bent on proving, in contradiction to that assertion, that it is almost anything rather than knowledge, and consequently the last thing in the world to be taught. I therefore, Protagoras, on observing how terrible is the confusion in which all these matters are thrown together, am all-desirous of bringing them to the light, and should be glad to follow up our late investigation by inquiring into the nature of virtue, and then reconsidering whether or no it is capable of being taught, lest haply the Epimetheus of your story trip us up treacherously in our examination, just as in the distribution of functions he neglected us carelessly, according to your account. The fore thought of your Prometheus pleased me far more than his brothers afterthought; and it is because I take Prometheus for my counselor, and look forward with his forethought over all my future life, that I busy myself with all these studies, and should be delighted, as I said before, to join you, if you have no objection, in fathoming them to the bottom. —

To this Protagoras replied;

Protagoras/ I for my part, Socrates, applaud your zeal, and your skill in the evolution of arguments. For I consider that in no point of view am I a bad man, and that I am the last person in the world to be jealous. Thus often ere now have I said of you, that among all whom I am in the habit of meeting, I admire you the most, and among those of your own age by far the most; and I add, that I should not be surprised if you win yourself a place among our distinguished sages. And with regard to the present

discussion, we will continue it on some future occasion, when agreeable to you, but to-day it is high time for me to betake myself to other business.

Socrates/ So be it, since such is your pleasure. For I too ought long ago to have departed on the errand I mentioned; only I stayed to oblige the beautiful Callias.

Our conversation thus concluded, we left the house.

THE END

The Rivals.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, and two anonymous rivals.

Socrates/ I entered the school of Dionysius, the teacher of grammar, and I saw there those of the young men, who were deemed to be the most remarkable for their personal appearance and the good repute of their fathers, and their admirers likewise. Two of the youths happened to be disputing, but about what I did not very well hear. They appeared however to be disputing about Anaxagoras, or Œnopides; as they were describing circles, and imitating by their hands certain inclinations, with great earnestness. And I, for I was sitting near an admirer of one of the young persons, nudged him with my elbow, and asked

On what were the two youths so earnestly engaged? Surely it is a subject important and beautiful, on which they have bestowed so serious an attention.

First Rival/ What call you important and beautiful? They are prating about things above in the sky, and trifling away their time in philosophizing.

Socrates/ And I, in wonder at such an answer, said Do you think it, young man, to be a disgraceful thing to philosophize? or why do you speak so harshly?

But another person, who was a rival admirer of the youths, and happened to be sitting near, on hearing me asking the question, and the answer, said

Second Rival/ It is not for you, Socrates, to ask this man, whether he thinks it disgraceful to philosophize. Know you not that he has spent all his time in being throstled, and cramming himself, and sleeping? so that what other answer

think you he would give, but that it is disgraceful to philosophize?

Socrates/ Now this person had employed his whole time in mental cultivation, but the other, whom he abused, in bodily exercises. It seemed then to me that I ought to dismiss the one, who had been interrogated, for he did not pretend even to be skilled in words, but in deeds; and to interrogate thoroughly the other, who pretended to be rather clever, in order that I might, if I could, be benefited by him in knowledge. I said therefore to him, that I had proposed my question in common for all; but if you think you will give a better answer, I put the same question to you as I did to him, Whether you think it honorable to philosophize or not?

Just as we were conversing thus, the two youths, overhearing us, became silent; and ceasing from the dispute, became listeners. Now, what their admirers suffered, I know not; but I was struck with astonishment. For I am always struck so in the case of the young and handsome. One of them, however, seemed to me in no less an agony than myself; and he answered with the air of a person eager for honor.

Second Rival/ Should I ever, Socrates, consider it disgraceful to philosophize, I should no longer deem myself a human being; nor, indeed, anyone else, so disposed.

Socrates/ He said pointing to his Rival, and speaking with a loud voice, so that the objects of their admiration might hear.

To you, then, it seems honorable to philosophize.

Second Rival/ Most highly.

Socrates/ What then; does it seem to you possible for a man to know anything whatever, whether it is disgraceful or honorable, who does not know at all what that thing is?

Second Rival/ No.

Socrates/ Know you then, what it is to philosophize?

Second Rival/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ What is it then?

Second Rival/ What else, than according to the sentiment of Solon? For Solon says somewhere;

Even as I grow old, still much I learn.

And it appears to me that the man, who would philosophize, ought to be always learning some one thing at least, when he is either young or old, in order that he may during life learn the greatest number of things.

Socrates/ At first it seemed to me that he had said something to the purpose; but afterwards, on thinking thrice, I asked him, whether he considered philosophy to be much learning?

Second Rival/ Completely so.

Socrates/ And do you consider, that philosophy is only honorable? or good likewise?

Second Rival/ It is likewise very good.

Socrates/ Do you perceive this to be something peculiar to philosophy? or does it seem to you to be the case in other things likewise? For instance, do you consider a love of gymnastic exercises to be not only honorable but good likewise, or not?

To this he said very ironically two things.

Second Rival/ To this man let it be said, that it is neither; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honorable and good.

Socrates/ Do you think that in these exercises the undergoing much toil is a love of exercise?

Second Rival/ By all means; just as in philosophizing, I consider that much learning is philosophy.

Socrates/ Do you think then, that the lovers of those exercises desire anything else than that, which will cause the body to be in a good state?

Second Rival/ That very thing.

Socrates/ Do then,, many labors, cause the body to be in a good state?

Second Rival/ Certainly; for how should a person have, from little labor, his body in a good state?

Socrates/ Here I thought it best to call upon the lover of gymnastics, in order that he might assist me through his knowledge of the gymnastic art. And I asked him, Why are you silent, O best of men, while this person is talking thus? Or to you likewise do persons seem to have their bodies in a good state from much labor or little?

First Rival/ For my part, Socrates, I thought he had known the saying, that moderate labor is best for the body.

Socrates/ How so?

First Rival/ I speak not of a man sleepless, and foodless, and having his neck not worn down and attenuated by care.

Socrates/ On his saying this the youths were delighted, and burst into a laugh; but the other party blushed.-

I then said, What then, do you now concede that neither much nor little labor causes human beings to have their bodies in a good state, but only what is moderate? or will you contest with us two?

Second Rival/ Against him, I would enter the lists with much pleasure, and I know well that I should be competent to support the proposition I have laid down, if I had laid down one weaker than this; for he is nothing. But against you I beg not to contend in favor of a paradox; and I admit, that not many, but moderate exercises procure for men a good habit of body.

Socrates/ And what in the case of food? said I. Is it the moderate, or much?

He admitted it in the case of food. And thus I compelled him to confess that, in the case of all the other things relating to the body, the moderate is the most beneficial, and not the much or little. And he confessed the moderate and all this he granted me.

What then, said I, as regards the soul? Of the things applied to it do the moderate or the immoderate benefit it?

Second Rival/ The moderate.

Socrates/ Is not learning one of the things applied to the soul?

He admitted it.

Of learning then, the moderate quantity benefits, but not the great.

He assented.

Of whom then, making an inquiry, should we justly inquire what kind of exercise and of food are moderate for the body? We all three agreed that it is a physician or a master of exercise. And of whom shall we inquire about the sowing of seeds? About this, we confessed the husbandman. But inquiring of whom, should we justly inquire respecting the planting and sowing of learning in the soul, how many, and of what kinds of it are moderate? We were here all full of difficulty. Upon which I said, byway of a joke, Since we are all at a loss, are you willing for us to ask these youths here? Or perhaps we are ashamed, as Homer says the suitors were, who deemed that no one else was fit to stretch the bow.

Since then they now seemed to be dispirited on the question, I endeavored to view it in another light, and I said

What kinds of learning do we best conjecture those are, which a philosopher ought to learn? since they are not all or

many. Whereupon the wiser person, taking up the discourse, observed that the most beautiful kinds of learning, and the most becoming, are those by which a person would obtain the highest reputation for philosophy; and that he would obtain the highest, if he seemed to be skilled in all arts; and, if not all, at least in as many as possible, and especially those of the greatest account, after having learnt such of them as are fitting for freemen to learn, and are connected with intellect, and not with a handicraft merely.

Do you mean in the same way as in carpentry? For there you may purchase a tip-top carpenter for five or six minæ; but you could not buy an architect even for ten thousand drachmas; so few of these are to be found amongst all the Greeks. Are you speaking of some such thing?

And he, on hearing, admitted that he was speaking of such a thing.

I then asked him, if it was not impossible for one person to learn thus only two arts, much less, many and great.

Second Rival/ Do not understand me, Socrates,, as if I were saying that a philosopher ought to know each of the arts accurately, as he does, who makes it his profession; but to be able, as becomes a person of a liberal education, to follow better than the persons present, what is said by the handicraftsman; and to give his opinion so as to appear, in what is said and done relating to the arts, to have a finer taste, and more knowledge, than those who happen to be present.

Socrates/ Then I, for I was still doubtful what he meant by his speech, said to him, Do I conceive rightly what kind of person you call a philosopher? For you seem to me to speak of a person, such as are the competitors in five kinds of contest, compared with the runner, or the wrestlers. For

the former fall short of the latter, as regards the contests of the latter, and are second to them; but of all the other competitors, they are the first, and are the victors. Some such thing you mean perhaps that the study of philosophy effects in those, who pursue it, in that they fall short of the first prize, in the intellect relating to the arts, but in attaining the second, they are superior to all the rest; so that he, who has studied philosophy, becomes in everything a person under the tip-top man. Some such person you seem to me to point out.

Second Rival/ You appear to me, Socrates, to understand correctly what relates to a philosopher, in likening him to a competitor in five contests. For he is really such a man, as not to be a slave to anything; nor has he labored upon anyone thing with such accuracy, as, through his attention to that one thing, to be deficient in all the rest, as are handicraftsmen, but he has touched moderately upon all.

Socrates/ After this reply, I was anxious to know clearly what he meant, and I inquired of him, whether he considered good persons to be useful or useless.

Second Rival/ Useful, surely, Socrates.

Socrates/ If then the good are useful, are not the bad useless?

He agreed.

Well then,, do you deem philosophers to be useful, or not?

He acknowledged they were useful; and moreover he said, that he deemed them the most useful of all persons.

Come now, let us see whether you say what is true. How can these second-rate men be of any use to us? For it is plain that the philosopher is inferior to each of those who possess their respective arts.

He acknowledged it.

Come then, if either yourself were unwell, or any of your friends, for whom you have a great regard, would you, being desirous to recover health, introduce that second-rate person, the philosopher, to your family; or take a physician.

Second Rival/ Both of them.

Socrates/ Do not say both; but which in preference, and the first?

Second Rival/ No man would hesitate about this, that I would take the physician in preference and first.

Socrates/ What then, in a vessel tost in a storm? To whom would you rather entrust yourself and your property? To a pilot, or to a philosopher?

Second Rival/ To a pilot, for my part.

Socrates/ And so, too, in all other affairs; so long as there is a person of skill in a profession, the philosopher is of no use.

Second Rival/ It appears so.

Socrates/ The philosopher, therefore, is some useless person; for there are surely persons of skill in all professions. But we have agreed that the good are useful, and the wicked useless.

He was forced to own it.

What then, shall I ask you about what comes after this? or is it not rather rude to put a question?

Second Rival/ Ask what you please.

Socrates/ I desire nothing else, than to repeat the concessions already made. Now the matter stands thus. We have conceded that philosophy is an honorable thing, and that we are ourselves philosophers; and that philosophers are good; and that the good are useful, and the wicked useless. Again, on the other hand, we have conceded that philosophers are useless, as long as there are persons of skill

in any particular profession; and that such persons are existing at all times. For was not all this conceded?

Second Rival/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We concede, therefore, agreeably to your own reasoning, that if it be philosophy to be skilled in arts in the manner you state, such persons are wicked and useless as long as there are artists. But see, my friend, if the case be so, and that to philosophize is not to attend to arts, nor to busy oneself about many things, nor to be living like a workman, bending over his work, nor to be learning many things, but something else? Since I thought, it was a reproach for persons, much occupied in arts, to be called operatives. But we shall know more clearly by this means, whether I am speaking truly, if you will answer me this. Who know how to punish horses correctly? Whether they, who make them better, or others?

Second Rival/ They who make them better.

Socrates/ Well then, do not they, who know how to make dogs better, know how to chastise dogs properly?

Second Rival/ Yes.

Socrates/ The same art then makes better, and chastises properly.

Second Rival/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well then, is the art, which makes better and chastises properly, the same as that which knows the good and the vicious, or is it a different one?

Second Rival/ It is the same.

Socrates/ Are you then willing to concede this, in the case of human beings likewise, that the art, which makes men better, is that, which chastises properly, and knows the good and the bad?

Second Rival/ By all means.

Socrates/ Does not then the art which applies to one apply to many too, and that which applies to many apply to one likewise? And so too as regards horses and all other things?

Second Rival/ I confess it.

Socrates/ What then is the science, which chastises properly the licentious and the lawless in civil states? Is it not the judicial science?

Second Rival/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you mean by justice any other science than this?

Second Rival/ No other.

Socrates/ Do not then men know the good and the bad by that science, by which they chastise properly?

Second Rival/ By that.

Socrates/ And he, who knows one, will know many?

Second Rival/ Yes.

Socrates/ And whoever does not know many, will not know one.

Second Rival/ I confess it.

Socrates/ If then a horse, as being but a horse, knows not good and bad horses, he would not know of which kind he is himself?

Second Rival/ I admit it.

Socrates/ And if an ox, being but an ox, knows not good and bad oxen, he would not know of which kind he is himself?

Second Rival/ True.

Socrates/ And so too, in the case of a dog?

He admitted it.

What then, if a man knows not the good men and the bad, would he not be ignorant whether he is good or bad, inasmuch as he too is a man?

He agreed.

Now to be ignorant of oneself, is it to be of sound mind, or not sound?

Not sound.

To know then oneself, is to be of sound mind.

Second Rival/ I admit it.

Socrates/ To this then, as it seems, the Delphic inscription exhorts, namely, to exercise a sound mind, and justice.

Second Rival/ It seems so.

Socrates/ And by the very same science we know too how to chastise properly.

Second Rival/ I admit it.

Socrates/ Is not then justice that, by which we know how to chastise properly? but soundness of mind that, by which we have the skill to know ourselves and others?

Second Rival/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Justice then, and soundness of mind are the same thing.

Second Rival/ It appears so.

Socrates/ In this way states are well governed, when they, who do wrong, suffer punishment.

Second Rival/ You speak the truth.

Socrates/ The same science too is that of the statesman.

He assented.

What then, when a single man administers correctly the affairs of a state, he is not a tyrant, and a king?

Second Rival/ I admit it.

Socrates/ Does he not administer affairs by the art of the king? or the tyrant?

Second Rival/ Just so.

Socrates/ These arts then are the same with those.

Second Rival/ They appear so.

Socrates/ Well then, when one man administers the affairs of a household correctly, what is his name? Is it not steward, or master?

Second Rival/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whether by justice would he administer the affairs of a household correctly? or by any other art?

Second Rival/ By justice.

Socrates/ The same kind of person then, it seems, is a king, a tyrant, a statesman, a steward, a master, a man of sound mind, and a just man; and one is the art of the king, of the tyrant, of the statesman, of the master, of the steward, of the just man, and the man of sound mind.

Second Rival/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Is it not then disgraceful for a philosopher, when the physician is speaking about persons who are ill, not to be able to follow what is said, nor to give an opinion on what is said or done, and similarly, when anyone skilled operative is speaking? and when a judge, or a king, or anyone else of those whom we have just now enumerated, is speaking of things belonging to his office, is it not disgraceful for a philosopher not to follow what they say or do, nor to be able to give an opinion respecting them?

Second Rival/ How, Socrates, is it not disgraceful for him, to be able to give no opinion on subjects so important?

Socrates/ Shall we assert then, that on these points the philosopher must be a competitor in five contests, and be second-rate, having the second prize after all, and be

useless, so long as there exists any of the first-rate? Or must he in the first place not commit his household to another person, nor have the second place in that business; but ought himself to chastise after being the judge, if his household is about to be administered correctly.

In this he agreed with me.

And then, should his friends submit an award to him, or the state order him to decide upon anything, or to act the judge, would it not, my friend, be disgraceful for him to appear in such cases to be second or third, and not to take the lead?

Second Rival/ So it seems to me.

Socrates/ To philosophize therefore, thou best of men, wants much of being great in learning, or the busying oneself about arts.

On my saying this, the wise man, ashamed of what he had before asserted, was silent; but the illiterate person said, it was in that way, and the rest approved of what had been stated.

The Rivals.

THE LOVERS

[OR ON PHILOSOPHY: ETHICAL]

Translated by Lamb.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, and two anonymous rivals.

Socrates/ I entered the grammar school of the teacher Dionysius, and saw there the young men who are accounted the most comely in form and of distinguished family, and their lovers. Now it chanced that two of the young people were disputing, but about what, I did not clearly overhear: it appeared, however, that they were disputing either about Anaxagoras or about Oenopides; at any rate, they appeared to be drawing circles, and they were imitating certain inclinations with their arms, bending to it and taking it most earnestly. Then I—for I was sitting beside the lover of one of the pair—nudged him with my elbow and asked him what on earth the two youngsters were so earnest about, and I said: Is it then something great and fine, in which they are so earnestly immersed?

First Rival/ Great and fine, indeed! Why, these fellows are prating about the heavenly bodies, and babbling philosophy.

Socrates/ Then I, surprised at his answer, said: Young man, do you consider philosophizing to be shameful? Else, why do you speak so sharply?

Then the other youth—for he chanced to be sitting near him, as his rival in love—when he heard my question and his rivals answer, said:

Second Rival/ You do yourself no good, Socrates, by pressing this fellow with a further question, as to whether he considers philosophizing to be shameful. Do you not

know that he has spent the whole of his life in practicing the neck-hold, and stuffing himself, and sleeping? So why did you suppose he would make any other reply than that philosophy is shameful?

Socrates/ Now this one of the two lovers had spent his time on humane studies, whereas the other, whom he was abusing, had spent his on athletics. So I decided that I had best relinquish the other, whom I had been questioning, since he did not even himself set up to be experienced in words, but only in deeds; and that I should interrogate the one who set up to be wiser, in order that so far as I was able I might get some benefit from him. I said therefore: I addressed my question to both in common; but if you think you could answer more creditably than he, I put the same question to you as I did to him: do you consider philosophizing to be honorable or not?

Then the two striplings, overhearing us speak somewhat like this, were silent, and ceasing from their own contention they became listeners to ours. What their lovers sensations were, I do not know, but I myself, at any rate, was staggered; for every time I am staggered by handsome young people. It seemed to me, however, that my young friend too was in as great a flutter as myself; but nevertheless he answered me in a most ambitious spirit:

Second Rival/ Why, of course, Socrates, if I should ever consider philosophizing to be shameful, I should not account myself so much as a man, nor anyone else either who was disposed to think so.

Socrates/ Here he pointed to his rival lover, and spoke with a loud voice, in order that his favorite might hear every word. Then I remarked: So philosophizing seems to you to be honorable?

Second Rival/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Well now, does it seem to you possible to know whether anything is honorable or shameful without knowing what it is fundamentally?

Second Rival/ No.

Socrates/ Then do you know what philosophizing is?

Second Rival/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ Then what is it?

Second Rival/ Why, just what Solon called it; you know it was Solon who said:

And ever, as I older grow, I learn yet more and more; —

and I agree with him that a man who intends to philosophize should in this way be ever learning something or other, whether he be younger or older, in order that he may learn as many things as possible in his life.

Socrates/ Now at first I felt there was something in his reply, but then, on second thoughts, I asked him whether he considered philosophy to be much learning, to which he answered:

Second Rival/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do you consider philosophy to be merely honorable or good as well?

Second Rival/ Good as well: very much so.

Socrates/ Then do you observe this as peculiar to philosophy, or do you find it similarly in everything else? For example, do you consider the love of athletics to be not merely honorable, but good as well, or do you not?

Whereupon he, most slily, gave a double answer:

Second Rival/ To him my statement must be “neither”; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honorable and good: for I consider this the right view.

Socrates/ Well now, in athletics, do you consider that much exercise is love of athletics?

Second Rival/ Certainly, just as in philosophizing I consider much learning to be philosophy.

Socrates/ And do you then consider that the lovers of athletics desire anything else than that which will cause them to be in good bodily condition?

Second Rival/ Only that.

Socrates/ And does much exercise cause them to be in good bodily condition?

Second Rival/ Yes, for how could one be in good bodily condition through little exercise?

Socrates/ Here I felt it was time to stir up the lover of athletics, in order that he might give me the support of his athletic experience; so I proceeded to ask him: And you then, pray, why are you silent, excellent sir, while your friend here is speaking thus? Do you agree that men are in good bodily condition through much exercise, or is it rather through moderate exercise?

First Rival/ For my part, Socrates, I thought even a pig—as the saying is—would have known that moderate exercise causes them to be in good bodily condition, so why should not a fellow who is sleepless and unfed, with unchafed neck and slender, care-worn frame!

Socrates/ And when he had said this the boys were delighted and laughed their approval, while the other lover blushed.

Socrates/ Well, do you now concede that it is neither much, nor little, but moderate exercise that causes men to be in good bodily condition? Or do you bid defiance to the two of us on this point?

Second Rival/ Against him I should be only too glad to fight it out, and I am certain I should prove able to support the theory I have put forward, even had I put forward a weaker one; for he is naught. But with you I do not aim at

winning an unscrupulous success; and so I admit that not a great but a moderate amount of athletics causes good condition in men.

Socrates/ And what of food? Moderate or much?

Second Rival/ The same applied to food.

Socrates/ Then I went on and sought to compel him also to admit that everything else connected with the body when most beneficial, was the moderate thing, not the much or the little; and he admitted that it was the moderate thing.

Socrates/ And now, as regards the soul; are moderate or immoderate things beneficial, as adjuncts of it?

Second Rival/ Moderate things.

Socrates/ And are studies among the adjuncts of the soul?

He admitted they were.

So among these also it is the moderate that are beneficial, and not the much?

He agreed.

Then whom should we be justified in asking what sort of exercise or food is moderate for the body?

The three of us agreed that it must be a doctor or a trainer.

And whom should we ask about the moderate measure in the sowing of seed?

In that matter, we agreed, it must be a farmer.

And whom should we be justified in asking as to the moderate degree and kind, in regard to the sowing and planting of studies in the soul?

At this point we all began to be full of perplexity; then I, mocking at them, asked: Do you mind, since we are in perplexity, if we ask these boys here? Or perhaps we are

ashamed, as Homer said the suitors were, and do not think it fit there should be someone else who will string the bow?

Then, as it seemed to me that they were losing their zeal for the argument, I tried to pursue the inquiry in another way, and said: But what, as nearly as we can guess, are the kinds of learning which the philosopher should learn, since he is not to learn all things or many things?

At this the wiser one interjected:

Second Rival/ The finest and most suitable kinds of learning are those which will bring him the most reputation for philosophy; and he will get most reputation if he appears well versed in all the arts, or if not in all, in as many of them, and those the most considerable, as he can, by learning so much of them as befits a free man to learn, that is, what belongs to the understanding rather than the handiwork of each.

Socrates/ Well now, do you mean, in the same way as in carpentry? For there, you know, you can buy a carpenter for five or six minae, but a first-rate architect cannot be got for even ten thousand drachmae; few such, indeed, could be found throughout the whole of Greece. Is it something of this sort that you mean? When he heard me say this, he admitted that something like this was what he himself meant.

I next asked him if it was not impossible for the same person to learn in this way merely two of the arts, not to speak of many or the principal ones; to which he replied:

Second Rival/ Do not conceive me, Socrates, to be stating that the philosopher must have accurate knowledge of each of the arts, like the actual adept in any of them; I mean only so far as may be expected of a free and educated man: that is, he should be able to follow the explanations of the craftsman more readily than the rest of the company, and to contribute an opinion of his own which will make him appear

the cleverest and most accomplished of the company who may at any time be present at some verbal or practical exposition of the arts.

Socrates/ Then, as I was still unsettled in my mind as to the drift of his words, I asked him: Do I quite grasp the sort of man whom you mean by the philosopher? For you seem to me to mean someone like the all-round athletes in contest with the runners or the wrestlers: the former yield, you know, to the latter in their particular exercises, and are their inferiors in these, but are superior to the usual sort of athletes and beat them. I daresay it may be something of this sort that you would suggest as the effect produced by philosophy on those who make it their pursuit: they yield to those who are first-rate in an understanding of the arts, but in taking the second place they surpass the rest; and in this way the man who has studied philosophy comes just next to the top in everything. That is the kind of person whom you appear to me to indicate.

Second Rival/ You are quite right, it seems to me, Socrates, in your conception of the philosopher's position, with your comparison of him to the all-round athlete. For it is precisely his nature not to be enslaved to any business, or to work out anything exactly, so as to let his application to that one matter make him deficient in the rest, as the craftsmen do, but to have a moderate contact with all of them.

Socrates/ Well, after this answer I was eager to know clearly what he meant, so I inquired of him whether he conceived of good men as useful or useless.

Second Rival/ Useful, I should say, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then if good men are useful, are wicked men useless?

He agreed that they were.

Again, do you consider that philosophers are useful persons or not?

He agreed that they were useful; nay, more, that he considered they were most useful.

Come now, let us make out, if what you say is true, where these second-best men are also useful to us: for clearly the philosopher is inferior to any particular adept in the arts.

He agreed.

Well now, I went on, if you yourself, or one of your friends for whom you feel great concern, should have fallen sick, would you fetch that second-best man into the house with a view to obtaining health, or would you summon the doctor?

Second Rival/ For my part, I should have both.

Socrates/ Please do not say "both," but which of the two you would prefer and also summon first.

Second Rival/ No one would make any question but that the doctor should be preferred and also summoned first.

Socrates/ And again, if you were in a ship that was making rough weather, to which would you rather entrust yourself and yours, the pilot or the philosopher?

Second Rival/ I should choose the pilot.

Socrates/ And so it will be in everything else: so long as there is some craftsman, the philosopher is not useful?

Second Rival/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So now we find that the philosopher is a useless person? For I suppose we always have craftsmen; and we have agreed that good men are useful, and bad ones useless.

He was obliged to agree to this.

Then what follows? Am I to ask you, or will it be too ill-mannered?

Second Rival/ Ask whatever you please.

Socrates/ Well, my aim is merely to recall our agreements upon what has been stated. The matter stands somewhat like this. We agreed that philosophy is an honorable thing, and that philosophers are good; and that good men are useful, and wicked men useless: but then again we agreed that philosophers, so long as we have craftsmen, are useless, and that we always do have craftsmen. Has not all this been agreed?

Second Rival/ Yes, to be sure.

Socrates/ Then we agreed, it seems, by your account—if philosophizing means having knowledge of the arts in the way you describe—that philosophers are wicked and useless so long as there are arts among mankind. But I expect they are not so really, my friend, and that philosophizing is not just having a concernment in the arts or spending one's life in meddlesome stooping and prying and accumulation of learning, but something else; because I imagined that this life was actually a disgrace, and that people who concerned themselves with the arts were called sordid. But we shall know more definitely whether this statement of mine is true, if you will answer me this: What men know how to punish horses rightly? Is it those who make them into the best horses, or some other men?

Second Rival/ Those who make them into the best horses.

Socrates/ Or again, is it not the men who know how to make dogs into the best dogs that know also how to punish them rightly?

Second Rival/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then it is the same art that makes them into the best dogs and punishes them rightly?

Second Rival/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Again, is the art that makes them into the best ones and punishes them rightly the same as that which knows the good and the bad ones, or is it some other?

Second Rival/ The same.

Socrates/ Then in the case of men also will you be prepared to agree that the art which makes them into the best men is that which punishes them rightly and distinguishes the good and the bad ones?

Second Rival/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that which does this to one, does it also to many, and that which does it to many, does it also to one?

Second Rival/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so it is also with horses and everything else?

Second Rival/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then what is the knowledge which rightly punishes the licentious and law-breaking people in our cities? Is it not judicature?

Second Rival/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is it any other art than this that you call justice?

Second Rival/ No, only this.

Socrates/ And that whereby they punish rightly is that whereby they know the good and bad people?

Second Rival/ It is.

Socrates/ And whoever knows one will know many also?

Second Rival/ Yes.

Socrates/ And whoever does not know many will not know one?

Second Rival/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then if one were a horse, and did not know the good and wicked horses, would one not know which sort one was oneself?

Second Rival/ I think not.

Socrates/ And if one were an ox and did not know the wicked and good oxen, would one not know which sort one was oneself?

Second Rival/ That is so.

Socrates/ And so it would be, if one were a dog?

He agreed.

Well now, when one is a man, and does not know the good and bad men, one surely cannot know whether one is good or wicked oneself, since one is a man also oneself?

He granted this.

And is "not knowing oneself" being temperate, or not being temperate?

Second Rival/ Not being temperate.

Socrates/ So "knowing oneself" is being temperate?

Second Rival/ I agree.

Socrates/ So this is the message, it seems, of the Delphic inscription—that one is to practice temperance and justice.

Second Rival/ It seems so.

Socrates/ And it is by this same art that we know also how to punish rightly?

Second Rival/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then that whereby we know how to punish rightly is justice, and that whereby we know how to distinguish our own and others quality is temperance?

Second Rival/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then justice and temperance are the same thing?

Second Rival/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And further, it is thus, you know, that cities are well ordered—when the wrongdoers pay the penalty.

Second Rival/ That is true.

Socrates/ Hence this is also statecraft.

He concurred.

Again, when one man governs a city rightly, is he not called a despot and king?

Second Rival/ I agree.

Socrates/ And he governs by a kingly and despotic art?

Second Rival/ That is so.

Socrates/ And these arts are the same as the former?

Second Rival/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Again, when a man singly governs a house aright, what is he called? Is he not a house-manager and master?

Second Rival/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then would he also govern his house well by justice, or by some other art?

Second Rival/ By justice.

Socrates/ Hence they are all the same, it seems, —king, despot, statesman, house-manager, master, and the temperate man and the just man; and it is all one art, —the kingly, the despotic, the statesman's, the master's, the house-manager's, and justice and temperance.

Second Rival/ It is so, apparently.

Socrates/ Then, if it is disgraceful in the philosopher to be unable, when a doctor speaks about the sick, either to follow his remarks or to contribute anything of his own to what is being said or done, and to be in the same case when any other of the craftsmen speaks, is it not disgraceful that

he should be unable, when it is a judge or a king or some other of the persons whom we have just instanced, either to follow their words or contribute anything to their business?

Second Rival/ It must indeed be disgraceful, Socrates, to have nothing to contribute to subjects of such great importance!

Socrates/ Are we then to say that in these matters also he is to be an all-round athlete, a second-rate man, taking the second place in all the subjects of this art—he, the philosopher—and is to be useless so long as there is one of these persons; or that, first of all, he is to entrust his own house to nobody else and is not to take the second place in it, but is himself to judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well managed?

He granted me that it must be so.

Secondly, I presume, whether his friends entrust him with an arbitration, or the state charges him to determine or judge any matter, it is disgraceful for him, my good friend, in such cases, to be found in the second or third place, and not to lead?

Second Rival/ I agree.

Socrates/ Hence we see, my excellent sir, that philosophizing is very far from being much learning and that affair of busying oneself with the arts.

On my saying this the cultivated youth was silent, feeling ashamed for what he had said before, while the unlearned one said it was as I stated; and the rest of the company praised the argument.

Rival Lovers

Translated by Jeffrey Mitscherling.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, and two anonymous rivals.

Socrates/ I walked into the school of Dionysus the grammarian and saw there some extremely attractive young men of good family; their lovers were there too. Two of the boys happened to be arguing about something, but I couldn't quite make out what it was. They appeared, however, to be arguing about Anaxagoras or Oenopides; in any event, they appeared to be drawing circles and holding their hands at angles to depict certain astronomical inclinations, and they were very serious about it. And I—I'd sat down next to the lover of one of them—I nudged him with my elbow and asked him what it could be that the boys were arguing about so seriously and said, "It must be something important and admirable for them to be putting such serious effort into it."

First Rival/ "What?! Important and admirable? Those guys are just babbling about things up in the sky and talking philosophical nonsense."

Socrates/ Astonished at his reply, I asked him, "Young man, does the pursuit of philosophy seem to you to be contemptible? Why do you speak of it so harshly?"

And the other one—a rival lover of the boy, you see, happened to be sitting next to him—the other one heard my question and his reply and said;

Second Rival/ "You're wasting your time, Socrates, asking him whether he thinks philosophy is a contemptible pursuit. Don't you realize that he's spent his whole life wrestling, stuffing himself and sleeping? How could you expect him to give any answer other than that philosophy is contemptible?"

Socrates/ Of the two lovers, this one spent all his time pursuing the liberal studies, while the other, the one he'd just insulted, spent all his time on athletics. And it seemed to me that I ought to leave off questioning the one I'd just asked—as he didn't claim to be any good with words, but only with deeds—and instead direct my questions to the one who claimed to be the wiser, on the chance that I might somehow be able to benefit from him.

So then I said, "My question was addressed to everybody, and if you think you can give a better answer, then I'll ask you the same thing: do you think the pursuit of philosophy is admirable, or not?"

At about this point in our conversation, the two boys overheard us and fell silent, and, putting aside their argument, came over to listen to us. Now, I don't know what their lovers were feeling, but I was struck senseless—as always happens to me when I'm around beautiful young men. It did seem to me, however, that the other lover was struggling no less than I was. And yet he did manage to answer me, and in a very self-important manner.

Second Rival/ "Socrates, if I ever came to regard philosophy as contemptible, I would no longer consider myself a human being, nor anybody else who felt that way!"

Socrates/ As he said this he gestured toward his rival and raised his voice so that his young favorite would be sure to get the message.

"So, you think philosophy is an admirable pursuit."

Second Rival/ "Certainly,"

Socrates/ "Well then, do you think it's possible for someone to know whether a thing is admirable or contemptible unless he first knows what it is?"

Second Rival/ "No."

Socrates/ "So you know what philosophy is."

Second Rival/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “What is it, then?

Second Rival/ “What else but what Solon says it is? He says somewhere, ‘I continue to learn many things as I grow old.’ And I agree with him that someone who wants to pursue philosophy, whether young or old, should always be learning one thing or another in order to learn as many things as possible in life.”

Socrates/ Now at first I thought there was something to this, but after I thought it over a bit I asked him if he thought philosophy consisted in learning many things.

Second Rival/ “Precisely that.”

Socrates/ “And do you believe, that philosophy is only admirable, or that it’s also good?”

Second Rival/ “It’s also good, of course it is.”

Socrates/ “Do you regard this property as something peculiar to philosophy, or do you think it belongs to other things as well? For example, do you believe athletics to be not only admirable but also good, or don’t you?”

Very sarcastically, he gave me two answers:

Second Rival/ “To him I would say that it is neither. But with you, Socrates, I agree that it is both admirable and good, for I believe this to be correct.”

Socrates/ Then I asked him, “And do you think athletics consists in doing lots of exercise?”

Second Rival/ “Indeed, just as I think philosophy consists in learning many things.”

Socrates/ “Do you think that athletes desire anything other than what will bring about their good physical condition?”

Second Rival/ “Just that.

Socrates/ “And is it true, that it’s by doing lots of exercise that one gets into good physical condition?”

Second Rival/ “Obviously, for how could anyone get into good physical condition by doing only a little exercise?”

Socrates/ It seemed to me appropriate at this point to get the athlete going, so that he might offer me some assistance drawn from his experience in athletics. So I asked him, “How can you sit there so quietly, my friend, with this man saying these things? Does it seem to you too that people get into good physical condition by exercising a lot, or by exercising moderately?”

First Rival/ “As far as I’m concerned, Socrates, I thought even a pig would know, as they say, that it’s moderate exercise that produces good physical condition, so why shouldn’t a man who doesn’t sleep or eat know this, somebody who’s out of shape and scrawny from sitting around meditating?”

Socrates/ The boys were amused by what he said, and they snickered, while the other lover blushed.

And I said, “Well then, do you now grant that it’s neither lots of exercise nor a little, but a moderate amount, that produces good physical condition? Or do you want to fight out the argument against the two of us?”

Second Rival/ “With him I would very happily fight it out, and I’m sure that I would be able to support the claim I made, even if my position were far weaker than it is—for he’s no competition. But there’s no need to compete with you about my opinion. I agree that it’s not lots of athletics but a moderate amount that produces good physical condition in people.”

Socrates/ “And what about food? A moderate amount or a lot?”

He agreed about food as well.

And then I also made him agree that with everything else concerning the body the moderate is the most beneficial, neither a large nor a small amount; and he agreed with me about that.

“And what about the soul? Does it benefit most from having moderate or immoderate amounts of things administered to it?”

Second Rival/ “Moderate amounts.”

Socrates/ “And isn’t learning something that’s administered to the soul?”

He agreed.

“And so a moderate amount of learning is beneficial, but not a great deal of learning?”

He agreed.

“Now suppose we wanted to ask which exercises and which foods are moderate for the body; who would be the right man to ask?”

All three of us agreed that it would be either a doctor or an athletic trainer.

“And who would we ask about the moderate amount of seed to sow?”

The farmer, is what we agreed this time.

“And what about sowing and planting the seeds of learning in the soul? Suppose we wanted to ask which ones and how many were moderate; who would be the right man to ask?”

At this point we all found ourselves completely at a loss. So I asked them, in fun, “Since we’re all at a loss, would you like it if we asked these boys here? Or perhaps we’re ashamed to do that, like the suitors in Homer, who didn’t expect anybody else to be able to string the bow?”

At this point they seemed to me to be losing enthusiasm for the argument, so I tried a different approach, and I said, “What would you guess are the main sorts of subjects that a philosopher needs to learn, since he doesn’t need to learn them all, or even a lot of them?”

The wiser one now took up the question and said;

Second Rival/ “The most admirable and proper sorts of learning are those from which one derives the most fame as a philosopher, and one acquires the most fame by appearing to be an expert in all the skills, or if not in all of them, in most of the really important ones, learning as much of them as is proper for a free man—that is, their theory, not their actual practice.”

Socrates/ “Do you mean, something like in the building trade? You can buy a workman for five or six minas, but a master architect will cost you thousands of drachmas, and indeed there are few of them in all of Greece. Do you perhaps mean something like that?” He agreed that what I said was something like what he meant.

Then I asked him if it wasn’t impossible to learn even two of the skills so thoroughly, let alone several important ones.

Second Rival/ “You mustn’t think I’m saying, Socrates, that the philosopher needs to understand each skill as thoroughly as the man who makes it his profession. He needs to understand it only as far as is reasonable for a free and educated man, so that he can follow the explanations offered by the tradesman better than everyone else present, and can add his own opinion; that way, he always appears to be the most accomplished and the wisest of those present whenever the skills are discussed or practiced.”

Socrates/ But since I still wasn’t sure what he meant, I asked him, “Am I understanding what sort of man you suppose the philosopher to be? It seems to me that you mean someone like the pentathlon athletes who compete against runners or wrestlers. They lose to the latter in their respective sports and are runners-up behind them, but they place first among the other athletes and defeat them. Perhaps you’re suggesting something along those lines, that philosophy produces this result in those who devote themselves to it. In

knowledge of the skills, they rank behind those who place first, but as runners-up they remain superior to the rest; and so a man who has studied philosophy becomes a strong competitor in all subjects. You seem to be describing someone like that."

Second Rival/ "You appear to me, Socrates, to have just the right conception of the philosopher, when you compare him with the pentathlete. He is just the sort of man not to be enslaved to anyone thing, nor to have worked anything out in such detail that, by concentrating on only that one thing, as do the tradesmen, he is left behind in all the others, but has touched on everything to a moderate extent."

Socrates/ After he'd offered this answer, I was eager to know exactly what he meant, so I asked him whether he supposed that good people were useful or useless.

Second Rival/ "Useful, surely, Socrates."

Socrates/ "So, if good people are useful, then bad people are useless?"

He agreed.

"Well then, do you think that philosophers are useful men, or not?"

He agreed that they were useful, and he added that he held them to be extremely useful.

"Let's see, then. Supposing what you're saying is true, when are these people, these runners-up, of any use to us? For it's obvious that the philosopher is inferior to each of the skilled professionals."

He agreed.

"And what about you?" I went on. "If it happened that you, or one of your friends about whom you cared a great deal, were to become sick, and you were looking for a cure, would

you call that runner-up, the philosopher, to your house, or would you call the doctor?"

Second Rival/ "I'd call both."

Socrates/ "No, don't tell me you'd call both of them; tell me which you'd rather call first."

Second Rival/ "No one would have any doubt, about calling the doctor first."

Socrates/ "Well then, on a ship in stormy weather, to whom would you rather entrust you and your possessions, the pilot or the philosopher?"

Second Rival/ "I would prefer the pilot."

Socrates/ "And isn't it the same in every other case, that as long as there's a tradesman, the philosopher is of no use?"

Second Rival/ "So it appears."

Socrates/ "Then isn't the philosopher actually useless to us? For surely we always have tradesmen. We agreed, however, that good men are useful, and bad men useless."

He was forced to agree.

"So what follows? Should I question you further, or would that be rude?"

Second Rival/ "Ask whatever you like."

Socrates/ "All I'm trying to do, is sum up what's been said. It was something like this: we agreed that philosophy is admirable, that philosophers are good, that good men are useful, and that bad men are useless; on the other hand, we agreed that philosophers are of no use whenever there are tradesmen, and that tradesmen are always to be found. Isn't that what we agreed?"

Second Rival/ "It is indeed."

Socrates/ "We agreed then, it seems, at least according to your argument, that if philosophy consists, as you suggest, in

knowledge of skills, then philosophers are bad and useless, as long as there are men with skills.

"But no, my friend, philosophers are not like that, and philosophy does not consist in stooping to a concern with skills nor in learning many things, but in something quite different—in fact, I thought that was actually dishonorable, and that people who pursued the skills were called vulgar. But we'll be able to see more clearly whether what I say is true if you will answer this: who understands how to discipline horses properly, those who make them better horses, or someone else?"

Second Rival/ "Those who make them better."

Socrates/ "And as it is with horses, so it is with every other animal?"

Second Rival/ "That's correct."

Socrates/ "Well then, aren't those who know how to make dogs better also those who know how to discipline them properly?"

Second Rival/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "Then it's the same skill which both makes better and properly disciplines?"

Second Rival/ "That's how it seems to me."

Socrates/ "Well then, is the skill that makes them better and properly disciplines them the same as that which distinguishes between the good ones and the bad ones, or is it a different skill?"

Second Rival/ "It's the same."

Socrates/ "And are you prepared to agree to this point concerning people, that the skill which makes them better is the same as that which disciplines them and that which distinguishes between the good ones and the bad?"

Second Rival/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ “And a skill that can do this with one can also do it with many, and vice versa?”

Second Rival/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Now what kind of knowledge is it that properly disciplines the undisciplined and lawless people in cities? Is it not knowledge of the law?”

Second Rival/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Now is what you call justice the same as this or is it different?”

Second Rival/ “No, it’s the same.”

Socrates/ “Isn’t the knowledge used in disciplining people properly the same as that used in knowing the good ones from the bad?”

Second Rival/ “It’s the same.”

Socrates/ “And whoever has such knowledge with regard to one person will also have it with regard to many?”

Second Rival/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And whoever is ignorant with regard to many is also ignorant with regard to one?”

Second Rival/ “That’s correct.”

Socrates/ “So if one were a horse and didn’t know good horses from bad horses, then one also wouldn’t know what sort of horse one was oneself?”

Second Rival/ “That’s right.”

Socrates/ “And if one were an ox and didn’t know bad oxen from good ones, then one also wouldn’t know what sort of ox one was?”

Second Rival/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “Likewise if one were a dog?”

He agreed.

“Well then, if a human being didn’t know good human beings from bad ones, wouldn’t he fail to know whether he himself was good or bad, since he is in fact a human being?”

He conceded that.

“And not knowing yourself, is that being sensible, or is it not being sensible?”

Second Rival/ “Not being sensible.”

Socrates/ “Then knowing yourself is being sensible?”

Second Rival/ “It is.”

Socrates/ “So it is this, it seems, which is prescribed in the Delphic inscription, to exercise good sense and justice.”

Second Rival/ “It would seem so.”

Socrates/ “And this is how we understand how to discipline properly?”

Second Rival/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “So the way we understand how to discipline properly is justice, and the way we evaluate ourselves and others is good sense.”

Second Rival/ “It would seem so.”

Socrates/ “So justice and good sense are one and the same.”

Second Rival/ “Apparently.”

Socrates/ “And isn’t it also the case that cities are well governed when the unjust are punished?”

Second Rival/ “That’s true.”

Socrates/ “And this is political skill.”

He agreed.

“Well then, when one man properly governs a city, isn’t he called a tyrant or a king?”

Second Rival/ “He is.”

Socrates/ “And isn’t it by means of kingly or tyrannical skill that he governs?”

Second Rival/ “That’s right.”

Socrates/ “These skills, then, are the same as the previous ones?”

Second Rival/ “So they seem.”

Socrates/ “Well then, when one man governs a household properly, what’s the name for him? Isn’t it ‘head of the household’, and ‘master of slaves’?”

Second Rival/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “And isn’t it also by means of justice that he governs his household well, or is it through some other skill?”

Second Rival/ “It’s through justice.”

Socrates/ “So they are all the same, it seems: king, tyrant, politician, head of the household, master of slaves, sensible man, and just man. And they are all one skill: kingly, tyrannical, political, managerial and household skills, and justice and good sense.”

Second Rival/ “So it seems.”

Socrates/ “Now if it is contemptible for the philosopher to be unable to follow what the doctor says when he talks about sick people or to add any opinion of his own regarding what’s being said or done, and to be in the same situation whenever any other tradesman does or says something—when it’s a judge speaking or a king or any of those others we’ve just been talking about—wouldn’t it be contemptible for him to be able neither to follow what is said nor to add his own opinion?”

Second Rival/ “How could it not be contemptible, Socrates, for him to be incapable of contributing an opinion concerning such matters?”

Socrates/ “So, are we to say that he needs to be a pentathlete and a runner-up in these areas as well? To begin

with, surely he shouldn't hand over control of his own household to anybody else or take second place in it, but should himself administer justice and discipline, if his household is to be well governed?"

He conceded this point to me.

"And furthermore, if his friends entrust him with the settling of some dispute, or if the city commissions him to investigate or pass judgment on something, wouldn't it surely be contemptible in these cases, my friend, for him to appear second or third and not to take the lead?"

Second Rival/ "I think it would."

Socrates/ "So for us to say, my friend, that philosophy consists in learning many things and busying oneself with skills, would be very far from the truth."

When I said this, the wise fellow was ashamed at what he'd said before and fell silent, while the unlearned one said that I was right; and the others approved of what I'd said.

The Rivals.

Translated by Mr. Sydenham.

the persons of the dialogue.

Socrates, man of learning, man of exercise.

scene the school of Dionysius.

Socrates/ I went into the School of Dionysius the grammarian; and I there saw the comeliest and finest of our young gentry, accompanied by such as courted their esteem and friendship. Two of these youths happened at that time to be disputing: but what was the subject of their dispute I did not perfectly apprehend. There was reason however to suppose it related either to Anaxagoras or to Oenopides: for they appeared to be describing circles; and by holding their hands in an inclining and oblique portion, seemed to be representing, not in play, but with much seriousness, certain inclinations of the pole. Upon which, as I had seated myself next to an admirer of one of the young disputants, I moved him with my elbow to turn his face to me, and then asked him what point it was which engaged those two youths so earnestly in debate; adding, It must certainly be something of great importance, and a matter of fine speculation, that, on which they bellowed so serious an attention.

First Rival/ What call you great and fine? They are prating about things up in the sky, and trifle away their time in philosophizing.

Socrates/ This answer of his seemed to me a strange one; and I said, Young man, do you then think it mean and dishonorable for a man to philosophize? or for what other reason do you speak so hardily of what they are employed about?

On my putting this question to him, another person, who happened to be a rival of his for the esteem of the youths I mentioned, and was therefore seated near us, having heard my question, with his answers to them, interposed, and said to me;

Second Rival/ It is unworthy of you, Socrates, to ask the opinion of this man, whether he thinks it mean and dishonorable to philosophize. Know you not him, that he has spent all his time in wrestling, cramming himself, and sleeping? What other answer then can you expect from him than this, that the study of philosophy is dishonorable and base.

Socrates/ Now the person, who thus spoke to me, ye are to understand, employed his whole time in the improvement of his mind, and in the study of the arts and sciences: the other, whom he had vilified, spent his in the care and improvement of his body by the gymnic exercises. I therefore thought it proper to desist from putting my questions to him, this robust body of a man; seeing that he professed not to be well-practiced in the arts of reasoning and discoursing, but in feats only of activity and strength: and I chose rather to interrogate and sift the other, who pretended to be the wiser man; in hopes that, if it were possible for me, I might receive from him some improvement in knowledge. Addressing myself therefore to him, I told him that I had proposed my question before all who heard me; and if you think yourself, said I, capable of giving me a better answer than that man, I repeat the same question to you, Whether you think it honorable, or not, to philosophize?

About the time we had proceeded thus far in our conversation, the two youths, overhearing what we said, became silent; and breaking off the dispute between themselves, gave their attention to us. Now, what were the sentiments of their professed friends and admirers on this

occasion I know not; but, for my own part, I was struck with admiration at the scene; as I always am, when I see such a disposition in the young and handsome. One of them, however, the person to whom I had proposed my question last, seemed to me no less charmed with it than myself: not but that he answered with a free and open air, as if ambitious only of having the preference and the praise given to his own studies.

Hinting at his Rival, and raising his voice, that he might be heard by the youths, of whose esteem both of them were emulous, replied.

Second Rival/ Should I ever, Socrates, come to think meanly of philosophy, I should no longer deem myself a human being; as I deem not any person, who entertains such a sentiment worthy of that character.

Socrates/ You then, think highly of philosophy.

Second Rival/ Most highly.

Socrates/ But what? Do you suppose it possible for a man to know the true dignity of anything, to know whether it be base or honorable, unless he first knows what the nature of that thing is?

Second Rival/ I do not.

Socrates/ Know you then, what it is to philosophize?

Second Rival/ Perfectly well.

Socrates/ What is it then?

Second Rival/ What other thing than that described by Solon in these verses.

> To various knowledge, I had gain'd before.
> I add each year variety of more;
> And thus old-age increases still my store.

Agreeably to this is my opinion that the man, who would philosophize, ought to be always, in his old-age as well as in

his youth, still adding to his stock of knowledge by some new acquisition; making use of life to learn as many things as possible.

Socrates/ Now this account of his seemed to me, at first appearance, to have some weight in it: but after reviewing it a little within myself, I asked him, whether philosophy in his judgment consisted in multiplicity of knowledge.

Second Rival/ That is entirely my opinion.

Socrates/ And is it your opinion too, that philosophy is only a becoming and an honorable study? or do you deem it also good and beneficial?

Second Rival/ Good and beneficial in the highest degree.

Socrates/ Does this appear to you the peculiar property of philosophy? or think you that other studies partake of the same advantage? For instance, love of the gymnic exercises, do you deem it not only honorable and becoming a man, but good for him also? or think you otherwise?

To this question, he facetiously replied;

Second Rival/ I have two answers to give. To this man here I would say, It is neither: but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both, to be good for a man, as well as becoming him.

Socrates/ Then I asked him, whether in these exercises he thought the undergoing much toil to be the same thing with love of exercise.

Second Rival/ By all means; just as in philosophizing, I take the acquisition of much knowledge to be the same thing with philosophy.

Socrates/ Do you think then, that the lovers of those exercises have any other view than to acquire a good habit of body?

Second Rival/ No other.

Socrates/ Is a good habit of body then, acquired by using much exercise, and undergoing much toil and labor in it?

Second Rival/ Certainly: for how should a man, who labors little, or uses little exercise, acquire a good habit of body.

Socrates/ Here I thought it most advisable to call in to my assistance our champion for the gymnastic art, on account of his experience. I therefore said to him, How can you sit silent, my friend, and hear this man talk so strangely? Are you of opinion too, that a good habit of body is acquired through great toil, labor, and exercise, and not rather by means of such as are moderate?

First Rival/ For my part, Socrates, I was thinking that I had an evident proof before my eyes, at this very time, to confirm the truth of that well-known saying, that moderate labor is best for the body.

Socrates/ How so?

First Rival/ Do I not see him there, in want of sleep and good nourishment, scarce able to turn his head, and worn away to a shadow with much study and hard labor of the brain?

Socrates/ At this sarcasm, the youths, who heard him, were pleased, and could not refrain from laughing; a circumstance which put our great student a little out of countenance.

Socrates/ Well; do you now agree with us, that a good habit of body is procured neither by much nor by little labor, but by that only which is moderate? or will you dispute the point with us, one against two?

Second Rival/ Against him, I would enter the lists with much pleasure, well assured that I should be able to support my side of the argument, even though it were worse and weaker than it is: for in such combats, he is a mere nothing.

But against you, Socrates, I would not choose to contend for any kind of paradox: and therefore I admit, that not violent but moderate exercise procures men a good habit of body.

Socrates/ And how is it with respect to food? Is it much or moderate, which contributes to the same end?

Second Rival/ With respect to food also I acknowledge moderation to be best.

Socrates/ And thus I led him on through all other things which had relation to the body; urging him to own, that it was best to be moderate in the use of them all, and neither to exceed, nor to be deficient: and all this he granted me.

Well; and how is it with respect to the soul? Is this benefited most by a moderate or by an immoderate quantity of those things which it receives?

Second Rival/ By a moderate quantity.

Socrates/ Is not learning one of the things administered to the soul?

It was admitted.

Most beneficial therefore to the soul is moderate learning, and not an immense heap.

He granted it.

Who now is the proper person for us to advise with concerning the body; would we know, what kinds and degrees of exercise are moderate, and what is a moderate quantity of food? We must all three of us agree, that it is either a physician or a master of exercise. And concerning corn, what is a moderate and due quantity for sowing, we must agree, that the husbandman is the fittest person to be consulted. But concerning the soul, and the discipline or learning to be there sown and planted, of whom ought we to inquire, what measure and what share is to be accounted moderate?

We were here all of us at a stand. Upon which, in a jocular way, I said since we are at a loss, ourselves, what to answer, will you con sent to ask the opinion of these youths here on the point in question? But perhaps we are above that; like the wooers of Penelope, of whom Homer says, that they disdained to suffer any to draw the bow beside themselves.

When they now seemed to be giving up the argument, in despair of coming to a conclusion; I bethought myself how to put the inquiry on another footing. And accordingly I proposed this question, What sorts of learning, to the best of our conjecture, does it become a philosopher to acquire principally? since we have already found, that it is not all sorts, nor even many.

To this my learned companion answered;

Second Rival/ That the finest sorts of learning, and the most becoming to the philosophic character, were those which give a man the highest reputation as a philosopher: and this reputation that man would gain, who should appear conversant in all the arts and sciences. at least in as many as possible, especially in those which are held in esteem the most, and are the most deserving of it; the man, who having studied these arts, as far as is requisite to a liberal education, hath acquired so much knowledge in them, as depends on taste and judgment, not on the mechanical exercise of any, or on the labor of the hands.

Socrates/ Do you mean in the same way, as it is in building? For in that affair, if you have occasion for artificers and artists, a bricklayer or a carpenter you may hire for five or six minæ, but an architect will cost you above ten thousand drachmas, so few of these are to be found in all Greece. Do you mean to distinguish in some such way as this?

He admitted such to be his meaning.

On this, I asked him, if it was not impossible for one man to be a perfect master of any two arts, much more to attain a mastership in any considerable number, especially of such as are great and excellent.

Second Rival/ Do not imagine, Socrates, that I mean, it is requisite for a philosopher to have so thorough a knowledge of any art, as the man who makes it his profession; but to be able, as becomes a gentleman of a liberal education, to understand what the artist says, when he is speaking of his work, better than any of the bystanders; and to interpose judiciously his own advice about the workmanship: so as always to appear, in every conversation relating to the arts, and in criticizing on every performance of the artists, to have a finer taste, and more knowledge, than any other person present.

Socrates/ Then I, for I was not yet quite certain what he meant, said to him thus; Do I conceive rightly, what kind of man you call a philosopher? You seem to me to have described such a man, as the general combatants are in the Olympic games, compared with the racers or the wrestlers. For in each kind of competition, those universalists fall short of the respective excellencies of the particular professors, and are but the next best men to them in their own way, but at the same time are superior to the professors of the other kind, and easily get the better of these, whose excellence lies only in the other way. Such a degree of skill as this, you may perhaps mean, that the study of philosophy begets in those who are addicted to it; a degree, by which they fail of supreme excellence in knowledge of the arts, but attaining an excellence which is next to the supreme, they excel all men except the artists: so that he, who has studied philosophy, is, in every employment or business of life, a second-rate man, and below the pitch of perfection. Some

such man, I think, as this you point out to us for a philosopher.

Second Rival/ You seem, Socrates, to have a just conception of what belongs to a philosopher, in likening him to a general combatant in the public games. For he is absolutely such a man, as not to be a slave to anything; nor has he studied any branch of knowledge so accurately and minutely, as, through entire attention to that one, to be deficient in all the rest, like vulgar artists, and the professors of one only science; but he has bestowed a competent measure of application on them all.

Socrates/ After he had made me this answer, I, desirous he should explain himself more fully and clearly, asked him, whether he thought the good, in any way of life, to be useful men, or useless.

Second Rival/ Useful, without doubt, Socrates.

Socrates/ If then the good are useful, are not the bad useless?

He agreed.

Well then, do you take philosophers to be useful men, or not?

He acknowledged they were useful: and not only so, said he;

Second Rival/ But I account them the most useful of all men.

Socrates/ Come now, let us examine whether this be true. How can they be even of any use at all, these second-rate men? For it is plain, that your philosopher is inferior in every art or science to the man who is a perfect master of it.

This he acknowledged.

Well; suppose now, that you yourself, or any friend of yours, for whom you have a great regard, should happen to

fall sick, I ask you, whether, with a view to the recovery of health, you would send for that second-rate man, the philosopher; or whether you would send for a physician.

Second Rival/ For both of them.

Socrates/ I ask you not that; but which of the two you would send for in the first place, or in preference to the other.

Second Rival/ No man would doubt, in such a case, to give the preference to the physician.

Socrates/ And how in the case of a storm at sea? to whom rather would you choose to entrust yourself and your concerns; to a pilot, or to a philosopher?

Second Rival/ To a pilot, I for my part.

Socrates/ And thus it is in every other affair; so long as a man, professing skill in it, is to be found, a philosopher is of no use.

Second Rival/ Thus it appears.

Socrates/ A philosopher therefore, we have discovered to be a man entirely useless; since it is clear, that in every affair of life, men, who profess skill therein, are to be found. And we agreed before, that the good in any way were the useful men, and the bad were the useless.

He was forced to own it.

But now, that we have carried our reasoning to this length, may I go on with my questions? or would it not be rather unpolite and rude to push the point further?

Second Rival/ Ask any questions that you please.

Socrates/ Nay; I desire nothing else, than to recapitulate what has been already said. The present state of the argument then is this: We acknowledged, that philosophy was an honorable study, and professed to be philosophers ourselves: we acknowledged that philosophers were, in their way, good as well as honorable; that the good, in any way,

were useful men, and the bad useless. On the other hand, we acknowledged that philosophers were useless, whenever we could find good workmen and men of skill of every kind; and that good workmen of every kind, professors of the several sciences, and practicers of the several arts, were always to be found. For was not all this granted?

Second Rival/ It was.

Socrates/ We grant therefore, agreeably to those our own concessions, that, if philosophy be, what you say it is, knowledge in the arts and sciences, the spending our time in philosophizing is then a bad and useless way of life, and philosophers are useless men, and good for nothing. But what, my friend, if their case be otherwise? what, if the philosophic life consist not in studying the arts; nor in busying a man's self about a multitude of experiments, and continually poring over them; nor in acquiring a multiplicity of knowledge; but in something else? For I thought, that such employments were accounted dishonorable and base, and that those who followed them were called, by way of reproach, dirty mechanics and bellows-blowers. Whether my suspicions are just or not, will, evidently appear, if you but answer to the following questions.

What men are those who understand how to give proper chastisement to vicious horses? are they those very men who can give a horse all the improvement he is capable of; or are they a different sort of men?

Second Rival/ The very same men.

Socrates/ And those who are able to improve the useful qualities of a dog, do not the same men know how properly to chastise dogs which are vicious?

Second Rival/ They do.

Socrates/ By one and the same art then, are those animals improved and properly chastised.

Second Rival/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well; but is it also the same art, through which a man distinguishes amongst those animals the good from the vicious? or is this an art different from that, through which they receive improvement and due correction?

Second Rival/ It is still the same art.

Socrates/ Will you admit then, that this holds true with regard to the human species in like manner; that the art, whatever it be, by which men are made to excel in virtue, is the same art with that through which bad men are properly chastised, and the same also with that though which the good and the bad are known and distinguished one sort from the other?

Second Rival/ By all means.

Socrates/ Now the art, which gives this power and this knowledge with respect to one man, has it the same efficacy with respect to many men? And the art of thus managing and judging of many, has it the same abilities with respect to one?

Second Rival/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it so in the case of horses too and in all other cases after the same manner?

Second Rival/ Beyond a doubt.

Socrates/ Now what science is that, through which proper chastisement is given to the licentious and the lawless in civil states? Is it not the judicial science, that of judges and other magistrates?

Second Rival/ It is.

Socrates/ Is the science of justice any other than this science?

Second Rival/ No other.

Socrates/ And is it not through the same science that the good and the bad are both known?

Second Rival/ It was through the same science.

Socrates/ And the science through which one man is known, will give equal skill to know many men.

Second Rival/ True.

Socrates/ And whoever through want of this science, hath not the skill to know many, will be equally deficient in the knowledge of one.

Second Rival/ Right.

Socrates/ If a horse therefore, as being but a horse, be incapable of knowing and distinguishing between good and bad horses, must he not be ignorant of which sort he himself is?

Second Rival/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if an ox being but an ox, knows not how to distinguish and judge of good and bad oxen, is it possible that he can know of which sort he is himself?

Second Rival/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And is not the same thing certain with respect to the ignorance of dogs?

Second Rival/ It is.

Socrates/ And how is it in the case of men? When a man knows not who are the good men and who the bad, is he not at the same time ignorant of himself, and unable to tell whether he is good or bad, in as much as he also is a man?

He allowed it to be true.

Now to be ignorant of oneself is it to be sound of mind, or to be insane?

Second Rival/ To be insane.

Socrates/ To know oneself therefore is to be sound of mind.

Second Rival/ I agree.

Socrates/ This then should seem to be the precept contained in the Delphic inscription; it is to exercise wisdom and justice.

Second Rival/ It should seem so.

Socrates/ And through the same science we know how to correct others duly and rightly.

Second Rival/ True.

Socrates/ Now that, through which we have this knowledge, is the science of justice; and that, through which a man has the knowledge of himself, and of other men, is soundness of mind, or wisdom.

Second Rival/ It appears so to be.

Socrates/ The science therefore of justice and the science belonging to every sound mind, wisdom, are one and the same science.

Second Rival/ It appears to be so proved.

Socrates/ Again, by the same means are civil states well governed; that is, when the doers of injustice are duly punished.

Second Rival/ Right.

Socrates/ The same science therefore, is the science of politics.

He assented.

And when a civil state is thus well governed by one man, is not that man called either a tyrant, or a king?

Second Rival/ He is.

Socrates/ Does he not thus govern through the kingly art, or the tyrannic?

Second Rival/ He does.

Socrates/ These arts therefore, the kingly and the tyrannic, are the same with that art and science just before mentioned.

Second Rival/ So they appear.

Socrates/ Well, and when a family is in like manner well governed by one man, what is this man called? Either the steward, of the household, or else the master of the family; is he not?

Second Rival/ He is.

Socrates/ Whether is it the science of justice now which enables this man also to govern well his family? or is it any other art or science?

Second Rival/ The science of justice only.

Socrates/ The same kind of person, it seems then, is a king, a tyrant, a politician a steward of a household, a lord and master of a family, a man of wisdom, and a just and good man. And one and the same art is the kingly, the tyrannic, the political, the despotic, and the economical, the same with the science of justice, and the same with wisdom.

Second Rival/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Well then: is it a shame for a philosopher not to understand what the physician says, when speaking of his patient's malady; nor to be able to give a judicious opinion, himself, upon the case? and so with regard to other artists and their arts, is it a shame for him to be ignorant? and yet, when a magistrate, or a king, or any of the others, just now enumerated, is speaking of the affairs or functions of his office, is it not shameful in a philosopher not to understand perfectly what any of these persons say, nor to be able to give good counsel himself in such cases?

Second Rival/ How, Socrates, can it be otherwise than shameful to him, to have nothing pertinent to say on subjects so important?

Socrates/ Are we of opinion then, that in these cases it becomes a philosopher to be like a general combatant, a second-rate man, to come next behind all who have these offices, and to be useless, so long as any such are to be found? or do we hold quite the contrary, that he ought, in the first place, not to commit the management of his domestic affairs to another man, nor to come next behind some other in his own house; but that he ought himself to be the ruler, corrector, and impartial judge, if he would have right order and good government at home?

This he granted me.

And besides this, if his friends should submit their differences to his arbitration, or if the state should refer to his judgment the decision of any controverted point, is it not a shame that he should appear in such cases to be but a second or a third rate man, and not to have the lead?

Second Rival/ I must own myself of that opinion.

Socrates/ Philosophizing, therefore, my friend, is a thing quite different, we find, from the acquiring a multiplicity of various knowledge, or the being busied in the circle of arts and sciences.

When I had said this, the Man of Learning, ashamed of what he had before asserted, was silent: the man without learning said, I had made it a clear case: and the rest of our audience gave their assent and approbation.

THE END OF THE RIVALS.

Plato's Symposium

Translated by Benardete.

Persons of the Dialog

Apollodorus, Friend Of Apollodorus, Glauco, Aristodemus, Socrates, Servant, Agatho, Pausanias, Aristophanes, Eryximachus, Phaedrus, Diotima, Alcibiades.

Apollodorus/ In my own opinion, I am not unprepared for what you ask about; for just the other day, when I was on my way up to town from my home in Phaleron, one of my acquaintances spotted me a long way off from behind and called, playing with his call:

Glaucon/ Phalerian! You there, Apollodorus, aren't you going to wait?

Apollodorus/ And I stopped and let him catch up.

Glaucon/ Apollodorus, why, it was just recently that I was looking for you; I had wanted to question you closely about Agathon's party, the one at which Socrates, Alcibiades, and the others were then present at dinner together, to question you about the erotic speeches. What were they? Someone else who had heard about the party from Phoenix the son of Philippus was telling me about it, and he said that you too knew. As a matter of fact, there wasn't anything he could say with certainty. So you tell me, for it is most just that you report the speeches of your comrade. But first tell me, were you yourself present at this party or not?

Apollodorus/ It really does seem as if there were nothing certain in what your informant told you, if you believe that this party which you are asking about occurred so recently that I too was present.

Glaucon/ That is indeed what I believed.

Apollodorus/ But how could that be, Glaucon? Don't you know that it has been many years since Agathon resided here, but that it is scarcely three years now that I have been spending my time with Socrates and have made it my concern on each and every day to know whatever he says or does? Before that, I used to run round and round aimlessly, and though I believed I was doing something of importance, I was more miserable than anyone in the world (no less than you are at this moment), for I believed that everything was preferable to philosophy.

Glaucon/ Don't mock me now, but tell me when this party did occur.

Apollodorus/ When we were still boys, at the time of Agathon's victory with his first tragedy, on the day after he and his choral dancers celebrated the victory sacrifice.

Glaucon/ Oh, a very long time ago, it seems. But who told you? Was it Socrates himself?

Apollodorus/ No, by Zeus, but the same one who told Phoenix. It was a certain Aristodemus, a Kydathenean, little and always unshod. He had been present at the party and, in my opinion, was the one most in love with Socrates at that time. Not, however, that I have not asked Socrates too about some points that I had heard from Aristodemus; and Socrates agreed to just what Aristodemus narrated.

Glaucon/ Why, then, don't you tell me? The way to town, in any case, is as suitable for speaking, while we walk, as for listening.

Apollodorus/ So as we walked, we talked together about these things; and so, just as I said at the start, I am not unprepared. If it must be told to you as well, that is what I must do. As for me, whenever I make any speeches on my own about philosophy or listen to others, apart from my belief that I am benefited, how I enjoy it! But whenever the

speeches are of another sort, particularly the speeches of the rich and of moneymakers, your kind of talk, then just as I am distressed, so do I pity your comrades, because you believe you are doing something of importance, but in fact it's all pointless. And perhaps you, in turn, believe that I am a wretch; and I believe you truly believe it. I, on the other hand, do not believe it about you, I know it.

Friend/ You are always of a piece, Apollodorus, for you are always slandering yourself and others; and in my opinion you simply believe that, starting with yourself, everyone is miserable except Socrates. And how you ever got the nickname Softy, I do not know, for you are always like this in your speeches, savage against yourself and others except Socrates.

Apollodorus/ My dearest friend, so it is plain as it can be, is it, that in thinking this about myself as well as you I am a raving lunatic?

Friend/ It is not worthwhile, Apollodorus, to argue about this now; just do what we were begging you to do; tell what the speeches were.

Apollodorus/ Well, they were somewhat as follows, but I shall just try to tell it to you from the beginning as Aristodemus told it.

He said that Socrates met him freshly bathed and wearing fancy slippers, which was not Socrates usual way, and he asked Socrates where he was going now that he had become so beautiful.

Socrates/ To dinner at Agathon's, for yesterday I stayed away from his victory celebration, in fear of the crowd, but I did agree to come today. It is just for this that I have got myself up so beautifully, that beautiful I may go to a beauty. But you, how do you feel about going uninvited to dinner? Would you be willing to do so?

Aristodemus/ I shall do whatever you say.

Socrates/ Then follow so that we may change and ruin the proverb, the good go to Agathon's feasts on their own. Homer, after all, not only ruined it, it seems, but even committed an outrage [hybris] on this proverb; for though he made Agamemnon an exceptionally good man in martial matters, and Menelaus a soft spearman, yet when Agamemnon was making a sacrifice and a feast, he made Menelaus come to the dinner uninvited, an inferior to his better's.

Apollodorus/ He said that when he heard this he said;

Aristodemus/ Perhaps I too shall run a risk, Socrates, perhaps it is not as you say, but as Homer says, a good-for-nothing going uninvited to a wise man's dinner. Consider the risk in bringing me. What will you say in your defense? For I shall not agree that I have come uninvited but shall say that it was at your invitation.

Socrates/ With the two of us going on the way together we shall deliberate on what we shall say. Well, let us go.

Apollodorus/ He said that once they had finished their conversation along these lines, they went on. And as they were making their way Socrates somehow turned his attention to himself and was left behind, and when Aristodemus waited for him, he asked him to go on ahead. When Aristodemus got to Agathon's house, he found the door open, and he said something ridiculous happened to him there. Straight off, a domestic servant met him and brought him to where the others were reclining, and he found them on the point of starting dinner. So Agathon, of course, saw him at once, and said;

Agathon/ Aristodemus, you have come at a fine time to share a dinner. If you have come for something else, put it off for another time, as I was looking for you yesterday to

invite you but could not find you. But how is it that you are not bringing our Socrates?

Aristodemus/ And I turn around and do not see Socrates following anywhere. So I said that I myself came with Socrates, on his invitation to dinner here.

Agathon/ It is a fine thing for you to do, but where is he?

Aristodemus/ He was just coming in behind me. I am wondering myself where he might be.

Agathon/ Go look, boy, and bring Socrates in. And you, Aristodemus, lie down beside Eryximachus.

Apollodorus/ And he said the boy washed him so he could lie down; and another of the boys came back to report;

Boy/ Your Socrates has retreated into a neighbor's porch and stands there, and when I called him, he was unwilling to come in.

Agathon/ That is strange. Call him and don't let him go.

Aristodemus/ No, no, leave him alone. That is something of a habit with him. Sometimes he moves off and stands stock still wherever he happens to be. He will come at once, I suspect. So do not try to budge him, but leave him alone.

Agathon/ Well, that is what we must do, if it is your opinion. Well now, boys, feast the rest of us. Though you always serve in any case whatever you want to whenever someone is not standing right over you, still now, in the belief that I, your master, as much as the others, has been invited to dinner by you, serve in such a way that we may praise you.

Apollodorus/ After this, they dined; but Socrates did not come in, and though Agathon often ordered that Socrates be sent for, Aristodemus did not permit it. Then Socrates did come in, he had lingered as long as was usual for him, when they were just about in the middle of dinner. Then he said

that Agathon, who happened to be lying down at the far end alone, said;

Agathon/ Here, Socrates, lie down alongside me, so that by my touching you, I too may enjoy the piece of wisdom that just occurred to you while you were in the porch. It is plain that you found it and have it, for otherwise you would not have come away beforehand.

Apollodorus/ And Socrates sat down and said;

Socrates/ It would be a good thing, Agathon, if wisdom were the sort of thing that flows from the fuller of us into the emptier, just by our touching one another, as the water in wine cups flows through a wool thread from the fuller to the emptier. For if wisdom too is like that, then I set a high price on my being placed alongside you, for I believe I shall be filled from you with much fair wisdom. My own may turn out to be a sorry sort of wisdom, or disputable like a dream; but your own is brilliant and capable of much development, since it has flashed out so intensely from you while you are young; and yesterday it became conspicuous among more than thirty thousand Greek witnesses.

Agathon/ You are outrageous, Socrates. A little later you and I will go to court about our wisdom, with Dionysus as judge, but now first attend to dinner.

Apollodorus/ After this, he said, when Socrates had reclined and dined with the rest, they made libations, sang a song to the god and did all the rest of the customary rites, and then turned to drinking. Then Pausanias, he said, began to speak somewhat as follows.

Pausanias/ All right, men. What will be the easiest way for us to drink? Now I tell you that I am really in a very bad way from yesterday's drinking, and I need a rest. I suspect many of you do too, for you were also here yesterday. So consider what would be the easiest way for us to drink.

Aristophanes/ That is a good suggestion, Pausanias, to arrange our drinking in some easier way, for I too am one of yesterday's soaks.

Apollodorus/ Eryximachus, he said, the son of Akoumenos, heard them out and then said;

Eryximachus/ What a fine thing you say. But I still have need to hear from one of you, from Agathon, how set he is on heavy drinking.

Agathon/ Not at all, nor do I have the strength.

Eryximachus/ We seem to be in luck, myself, Aristodemus, Phaedrus, and those here, if you who have the greatest capacity for drink have now given up, for we are always incapable. And I leave Socrates out of account, as he can go either way, he will be content with whatever we do. Now, since in my opinion none of those present is eager to drink a lot of wine, perhaps I should be less disagreeable were I to speak the truth about what drunkenness is. For I believe this has become quite plain to me from the art of medicine. Drunkenness is a hard thing for human beings; and as far as it is in my power, I should neither be willing to go on drinking nor to advise another to do so, particularly if he still has a headache from yesterday's debauch.

Phaedrus/ Well, as for myself, I am used to obeying you, particularly in whatever you say about medicine; and now the rest will do so too, if they take good counsel.

Apollodorus/ When they heard this, all agreed not to make the present party a drinking bout, but for each to drink as he pleased.

Eryximachus/ Since, then, it has been decreed that each is to drink as much as he wants to, and there is to be no compulsion about it, I next propose to dismiss the flute girl who just came in and to let her flute for herself, or, if she wants, for the women within, while we consort with each

other today through speeches. And as to what sort of speeches, I am willing, if you want, to make a proposal.

Apollodorus/ All then agreed that this was what they wanted and asked him to make his proposal.

Eryximachus/ The beginning of my speech is in the manner of Euripides Melanippe, for the tale that I am about to tell is not my own, but Phaedrus here. On several occasions Phaedrus has said to me in annoyance, Isn't it awful, Eryximachus, that hymns and paeans have been made by the poets for other gods, but for Eros, who is so great and important a god, not one of the many poets there have been has ever made even a eulogy? And if you want, consider, in their turn, the good Sophists, they write up in prose praises of Heracles and others, as the excellent Prodicus does. Though you need not wonder at this, for I have even come across a volume of a wise man in which salt got a marvelous puff for its usefulness, and you might find many other things of the kind with eulogies. So they employ much zeal in things like that, yet to this day not one human being has dared to hymn Eros in a worthy manner; but so great a god lies in neglect. Now, Phaedrus, in my opinion, speaks well in this regard. So, as I desire to make a comradely loan to please him, it is, in my opinion, appropriate for those of us who are now here to adorn the god. And if you share in my opinion, we should find enough of a pastime in speeches. For it is my opinion that each of us, starting on the left, should recite the fairest praise of Eros that he can, and Phaedrus should be the first to begin, inasmuch as he is lying on the head couch and is also the father of the argument.

Socrates/ No one, will cast a vote against you, Eryximachus. For I would surely not beg off, as I claim to have expert knowledge of nothing but erotics; nor would Agathon and Pausanias beg off, to say nothing of

Aristophanes, whose whole activity is devoted to Dionysus and Aphrodite. And none of the others I see here would refuse either. And yet it is not quite fair for those of us who lie on the last couches; but if those who come first speak in a fine and adequate way, we shall be content. Well, good luck to Phaedrus then. Let him make a start and eulogize Eros.

Apollodorus/ All the others then approved and urged it as Socrates had done. Now, Aristodemus scarcely remembered all that each and every one of them said, and I in turn do not remember all that he said; but I shall tell you the noteworthy points of those speeches that, in my opinion, most particularly deserved remembering.

First of all, as I say, he said that Phaedrus began his speech at somewhat the following point: that Eros was a great and wondrous god among human beings as well as gods, and that this was so in many respects and not least in the matter of birth.

Phaedrus/ For the god to be ranked among the oldest is a mark of honor, and here is the proof: the parents of Eros neither exist nor are they spoken of by anyone, whether prose author or poet; but Hesiod says that Chaos came first;

> Then thereafter
> Broad-breasted Earth, always the safe seat of all.
> And Eros.

After Chaos, there came to be these two. Earth and Eros. And Parmenides says that Genesis;

> First of all gods, devised Eros.

Akousilaus agrees with Hesiod as well. So there is an agreement in many sources that Eros is among the oldest. And as he is the oldest, we have him as the cause of the greatest goods, for I can hardly point to a greater good for someone to have from youth onward than a good lover, and for a lover, a beloved. For that which should guide human

beings who are going to live fairly throughout their lives can be implanted by neither blood ties, nor honors, nor wealth, nor anything else as beautifully as by love. Now what do I say this is? It is shame in the face of shameful things and honorable ambition in the face of beautiful things; for without them neither city nor private person can accomplish great and beautiful deeds. So I assert that in the case of any real man who loves, were it to come to light that he was either doing something shameful or putting up with it from another out of cowardice and without defending himself, he would not be as pained on being observed by either his father, his comrades, or anyone else as by his beloved. We observe that this same thing holds in the case of the beloved; he is exceptionally shamed before his lovers whenever he is seen to be involved in something shameful. So if there were any possibility that a city or an army could be composed of lovers and beloveds, then there could be no better way for them to manage their own city; for they would abstain from all that is shameful and be filled with love of honor before one another. And besides, were they to do battle alongside one another, then even a few of this sort would win over just about all human beings; for a real man in love would of course far less prefer to be seen by his beloved than by all the rest when it comes to deserting his post or throwing away his weapons; he would choose to be dead many times over before that happened. And, to say nothing of leaving behind one's beloved or not coming to his aid when he is in danger, there is no one so bad that, once the god Eros had entered him, he would not be directed toward virtue, to the point where he is like one who is best by nature: And simply, as Homer said, the strength that the god breathed into some of the heroes, Eros supplies from himself to lovers.

And what is more, lovers are the only ones who are willing to die for the sake of another; and that is not only true of

real men but of women as well. Alcestis, the daughter of Pelias, offers a sufficient testimony for Greeks on behalf of this argument. She alone was willing to die on behalf of her husband, though his father and mother were alive; but through her love she so much surpassed his parents in friendship that she showed them up as alien to their own son and only related to him in name. Her performance of this deed was thought to be so noble in the opinion not only of human beings but of the gods as well that, although there have been many who have accomplished many noble deeds, the gods have given to only a select number of them the guerdon of sending up their souls again from Hades, and hers they did send up in admiring delight at her deed. So gods, too, hold in particular esteem the zeal and virtue that pertain to love. Orpheus, the son of Oeagrus, they sent back from Hades unfulfilled; and though they showed him a phantom of his wife, for whom he had come, they did not give her very self to him, because it was thought he was soft, like the lyre player he was, and had not dared to die for love like Alcestis, but contrived to go into Hades alive. Consequently, they imposed a punishment on him, and made him die at the hands of women, and did not honor him as they had Achilles, the son of Thetis. For Achilles they sent away to the Isles of the Blest, because, though he had learned from his mother that he would be killed if he killed Hector, and that if he did not, he would return home and die in old age, still he dared to choose to come to the aid of his lover Patroclus; and with his vengeance accomplished, he dared not only to die on his behalf but to die after him who had died. On this account, the gods were particularly impressed and gave him outstanding honors, because he had made so much of his lover. Aeschylus talks nonsense in claiming that Achilles was in love with Patroclus (rather than the other way around), for Achilles was more beautiful than

not only Patroclus but all the other heroes as well; and besides, he was unbearded, and thirdly, far younger than Patroclus, as Homer says. Well, anyhow, though the gods really hold in very high esteem that virtue which concerns love, they wonder, admire, and confer benefits even more when the beloved has affection for the lover than when the lover has it for the beloved. A lover is a more divine thing than a beloved, for he has the god within him. This is the reason why they honored Achilles more than Alcestis and sent him to the Isles of the Blest.

So this is how I assert that Eros is the oldest, most honorable, and most competent of the gods with regard to the acquisition of virtue and happiness by human beings both when living and dead.

Apollodorus/ He said that Phaedrus made some such speech, and after Phaedrus there were some others that he scarcely could recall; he passed them over and told of Pausanias speech. He said that Pausanias said;

Pausanias/ Phaedrus, in my opinion it is not noble the way the argument has been proposed to us, commanding us to eulogize Eros in so unqualified a fashion. For were Eros one, it would be noble, but as it is, it is not noble, for he is not one; and as he is not one, it is more correct that it be declared beforehand which Eros is to be praised. So first I shall try to set the record straight, to point out the Eros who is to be praised, and then to praise him in a manner worthy of the god. We all know that there is no Aphrodite without Eros; and were she one, Eros would be one; but since there are two Aphrodites, it is necessary that there be two Erotes as well. Who would deny that there are two goddesses? One surely is the elder and has no mother, the daughter of Uranos, the one to whom we apply the name Uranian; the other is younger and the daughter of Zeus and Dione, the one we call Pandemus. So it is necessary that the Eros who

is a fellow worker with one correctly be called Pandemus, and the other one, Uranian. Now all gods must be praised, but one must still try to say what has been allotted to each god. Every action is of the following sort: When being done in terms of itself, it is neither noble nor base. For example, what we are now doing, either drinking, singing, or conversing, none of these things is in itself a noble thing, only in terms of how it is done in the doing of it does it turn out to be the sort of thing that it is. For if it is done nobly and correctly, it proves to be noble, and if incorrectly, base. So, too, in the case of loving and Eros, for Eros as a whole is not noble nor deserving of a eulogy, but only that Eros who provokes one to love in a noble way.

Now the Eros who belongs to Aphrodite Pandemus is truly pandemian and acts in any sort of way. And here you have the one whom good-for-nothing human beings have as their love. Those who are of the same sort as this Eros are, first of all, no less in love with women than with boys; secondly, they are in love with their bodies rather than their souls; and thirdly, they are in love with the stupidest there can be, for they have an eye only to the act and are unconcerned with whether it is noble or not. That is how it happens that it turns out for them, however it turns out, with the same likelihood of its being good as the opposite. For Eros Pandemus depends on the Aphrodite who is far younger than the other goddess, and who partakes in her birth of female as well as of male. But the other Eros is of Uranian Aphrodite, who, first of all, does not partake of female but only of male (and this is the love of boys); and secondly, is the elder and has no part in outrage. That is how it comes about that those inspired by this kind of love turn to the male, with an affection for that which is naturally more vigorous and has more sense. And one might recognize in pederasty itself those who have been prompted purely by

this kind of love; for they do not love boys except when boys start having sense, and that is close to the time when the beard first appears. For those who start loving a boy at this point in time are in a position I believe to be with him and live with him for their whole life and not, once they have deceived and seized a young and foolish boy, to laugh at him and then run away to another. There should have been a law as well to prohibit the loving of boys, in order that a lot of zeal would not have been wasted for an uncertain result; for it is not clear where the perfection of boys has its end with regard to the vice and virtue of both soul and body. Now, the good willingly lay down this law upon themselves, but there should have been applied the same sort of compulsory prohibition to those pandemian lovers, just as we compel them as far as we can not to love freeborn matrons. For here you have those who have made pederasty a disgrace, so that some have the nerve to say that it is shameful to gratify lovers. They say it is shameful with an eye to those pandemian lovers, observing their impropriety and injustice, since surely any action whatsoever that is done in an orderly and lawful way would not justly bring reproach.

Now in general the law about love in other cities is easy to understand, for it has been simply determined; but the law here and in Sparta is complicated. In Elis and among the Boeotians, and where they are not wise in speaking, the gratification of lovers has been unqualifiedly legalized as noble, and no one, whether young or old, would say that it is shameful. This is so, I suspect, in order that they might have no trouble in trying to persuade the young by speech, because they are incapable of speaking. In Ionia, on the other hand, and in many other places (wherever they live under barbarians), it has been customarily held to be shameful. In the eyes of barbarians, on account of their tyrannies, pederasty as well as philosophy and the love of

gymnastics is shameful; for I suspect that it is not to the advantage of the rulers that great and proud thoughts be engendered among their subjects, any more than strong friendships and associations. It is precisely this that love, as well as all these other things, especially tends to implant. And the tyrants here [in Athens] actually learned this by deed; for the love of Aristogeiton and the friendship of Harmodius, once it became firm, dissolved the tyrants rule. So wherever it has been laid down as shameful to gratify lovers, it has been through the vice of those who have done so, the hankering after more on the part of the rulers, and the lack of manliness on the part of their subjects; and wherever the gratifying of lovers has been held to be a fine thing without qualification, it has been through the slothfulness of soul of those who have so ordained. But here [in Athens] there are much finer customs than elsewhere; yet just as I said, they are not easy to understand. Let one just reflect that it is said to be a finer thing, to love openly than in secret; and particularly to love the noblest and best, even if they are uglier than others; and again, that everyone enthusiastically encourages the lover, and not as if he were doing anything shameful; and if a lover makes a successful capture, it is thought to be fine, and if he fails, shameful; and that, for making an attempt at seizure, the law grants the lover the opportunity to be praised for doing amazing deeds. If one dared to do any of these deeds in pursuing and wishing to accomplish anything else whatsoever except this, one would reap the greatest reproaches leveled against philosophy. For if, in wanting to take money from someone, or to take a governmental office, or any other position of power, one were willing to act just as lovers do toward their beloved, making all sorts of supplications and beseechings in their requests, swearing oaths, sleeping at the doors of their beloveds, and being willing to perform acts of

slavishness that not one slave would, he would be checked from acting so by his enemies as much as by his friends, the former reproaching him for his flatteries and servilities, the latter admonishing him and feeling ashamed on his behalf. But if the lover does all of this, there is a grace upon him; and the law allows him to act without reproaching him, on the ground that he is attempting to carry through some exceedingly fine thing; and what is most dreadful, as the many say, is that, if he swears and then departs from his oath, for him alone there is pardon from the gods, for they deny that an oath in sex is an oath. Thus the gods and human beings have made every opportunity available to the lover, as the law here states. Now on these grounds one might suppose that it is customarily held to be a very fine thing in this city both to love and for lovers to have friends. But on the other hand, when fathers set attendants in charge of the beloveds and prohibit them from conversing with their lovers, and the attendant has this as a standing order, and the beloved's contemporaries and comrades blame him if they see anything like this going on; and the elders, in turn, do not stand in the way of those who cast reproaches or abuse them on the grounds that they are speaking incorrectly, then, if one glances in this direction, one would believe that such a thing is customarily held to be most shameful. This is to be explained, I believe, as follows. The matter is not simple; and, as was said at the start, it is neither noble nor base in itself, but if nobly done, noble, and if basely done, base. Now, it is base to gratify one who is no good and to do so in a bad way; while it is noble to gratify the good and to do so in a noble way. It is the pandemian lover who is no good, the one in love with the body rather than with the soul. He is not even, for example, a lasting lover, because he is in love with a thing that is not lasting either. As soon as the bloom of the body fades, which is what

he was in love with, he is off and takes wing, having made a foul shame of many speeches and promises. But he who is in love with a good character remains throughout life, for he is welded to what is lasting. So our law, in good and noble fashion, really wants to test these and to have the beloved gratify one group of lovers and escape from the others. On account of this it exhorts lovers to pursue and beloveds to flee, setting up a contest so that there may be a test as to which group the lover belongs and to which the beloved. And because of this, first, to let oneself be caught too quickly is customarily held shameful, since it is precisely the passing of time that is thought to test many things nobly; and secondly, to be caught by money and political power is shameful, regardless of whether a hurt humbles the beloved and prevents him from resisting, or a benefit consisting of money or political favors prevents him from feeling contempt; for neither money nor political favors are thought to be stable or lasting, to say nothing of the fact that in the natural course of things no noble and generous friendship comes out of them. So there is only one way left according to our law, if a beloved is to gratify a lover in a fine way. For just as we have a law that in the case of lovers to be enslaved willingly in any slavery to the beloved is agreed not to be flattery nor a matter of reproach, so too there is only one other willing enslavement that is not a matter of reproach. This is the enslavement regarding virtue; for it is customarily held by us that if anyone is willing to devote his care to someone in the belief that he will be better because of him, either in regard to some kind of wisdom or any other part of virtue whatsoever, this willing enslavement is not disgraceful nor is it flattery. So these two laws (the law about pederasty and the law about philosophy and the rest of virtue) must contribute to the same end if it is going to turn out that a beloved's gratification of a lover is noble. For whenever lover

and beloved come to the same point, each with a law, the one, in serving a beloved who has granted his favors, would justly serve in anything; and the other, in assisting him who is making him wise and good, would justly assist. And the one is able to contribute to prudence and the rest of virtue, while the other stands in need of them for the acquisition of education and the rest of wisdom. Then and only then, when these laws converge, does it result that a beloved's gratification of his lover is noble; but in any other circumstance it is not. Even to be deceived in this regard is no disgrace; but in all other cases, whether one is deceived or not, it does involve disgrace. If someone granted his favors to a lover for the sake of wealth because he thought him rich, and then were deceived and got no money when the lover was found to be poor, it is no less a disgrace; for a beloved of that sort is thought to display his very self as one who for the sake of money would serve anyone in anything, and this is not noble. So along the same line of argument, were someone to grant his favors because he thought that his lover was good and that he himself would be better through his friendship with this lover, then even if his lover is found to be bad and without virtue, the deception is noble all the same. For he too is thought to have made plain what holds in his own case, that strictly for the sake of virtue and of becoming better he would show his total zeal in everything, and this is the noblest thing of all. Thus, for the sake of virtue alone is it wholly noble to grant one's favors. This is the love of the Uranian goddess, and it is Uranian and very worthwhile for both city and private men, for it compels both the lover himself and the beloved, each in his own case, to exercise much concern for virtue. All the other loves are of the other goddess, the pandemian.

Here, Phaedrus, you have my extemporary contribution to Eros.

Apollodorus/ With Pausanias pausation, the wise teach me to talk in such balanced phrases, Aristodemus said that it was Aristophanes turn to speak; however, he had just got the hiccups (from satiety or something else) and was unable to speak, but he did say, the doctor Eryximachus was lying on the couch next to him;

Aristodemus/ Eryximachus, it is only just that you either stop my hiccups or speak on my behalf until I do stop.

Eryximachus/ Well, I shall do both. I shall talk in your turn, and you, when you stop hiccupping, in mine. And while I am speaking, see if by holding your breath for a long time, you make the hiccups stop; but if they do not, gargle with water. And if they prove very severe, take something with which you might irritate your nose, and sneeze; and if you do this once or twice, even if the hiccups are severe, they will stop.

Aristodemus/ Go ahead and speak. I shall do the rest.

Eryximachus/ Well, in my opinion, since Pausanias made a fine start to his speech but did not adequately complete it, it is necessary for me to try to put a complete end to the argument. Inasmuch as Eros is double, it is, in my opinion, a fine thing to divide him; but that he presides not only over the souls of human beings in regard to the beautiful but also in regard to many other things and in other cases, the bodies of all the animals as well as those things that grow in the earth, and just about all the things that are, that, in my opinion, I have come to see from medicine, our art. For how great and wondrous the god is in his comprehensive aims, both in terms of human things and in terms of divine things! I shall begin my speech with medicine, so that we may venerate that art as well. The nature of bodies has this double Eros, for the health and the sickness of the body are by agreement different and dissimilar; and the dissimilar

desires and loves dissimilar things. Now, there is one love that presides over the healthy state, and another over the sickly. Just as Pausanias was saying, it is a fine thing to gratify those who are good among human beings and disgraceful to gratify the intemperate, so too, in the case of men's bodies taken by themselves is it a fine and needful thing to gratify the good and healthy things of each body (this is what has the name the medical'); but it is shameful to gratify the bad and sickly things, and one has to abstain from favoring them, if one is to be skilled. For the art of medicine is, to sum it up, the expert knowledge of the erotics of the body in regard to repletion and evacuation; and he who diagnostically discriminates in these things between the noble and base love is the one most skilled in medicine; while he who induces changes, so as to bring about the acquisition of one kind of love in place of the other, and who, in whatever things where there is no love but there needs must be, has the expert knowledge to instill it, or to remove it from those things in which it is [but should not be], would be a good craftsman. For he must, in point of fact, be able to make the things that are most at enmity in the body into friends and to make them love one another. The most opposite things are the most at enmity: cold and hot, bitter and sweet, dry and moist, and anything of the sort. Our ancestor Asklepios, who had the expert knowledge to instill love and unanimity into these doings, as the poets here assert and as I am convinced is so, put together our art. Not only medicine, as I say, is entirely captained by this god, but likewise gymnastics and farming. And it is plain to anyone who pays the slightest attention that music is also on the same level as these, as perhaps Heracleitus too wants to say, though as far as his actual words go, what he says is not fine. For he says that the one alone in differing with itself agrees with itself, as is the harmony of lyre and bow."° It is a lot of

nonsense to affirm that a harmony differs with itself or is composed of still differing things. But perhaps he wanted to say that, from the prior differences between the high and the low, there arises from their later agreement a harmony by means of the art of music; for there surely would no longer be a harmony from high and low notes while they were differing with each other; for harmony is consonance, and consonance is a kind of agreement. But it is impossible to derive agreement from differing things as long as they are differing; and it is impossible, in turn, to fit together the differing or non-agreeing, just as rhythm arises from the fast and the slow, from their prior state of difference and their subsequent agreement. Here, music inserts agreement in all these things (just as, there, medicine does) as it instills mutual love and unanimity; and music, in turn, is expert knowledge of the erotics of harmony and rhythm. And in the simple constitution of harmony and rhythm it is not at all hard to diagnose the erotics, for the double eros is not yet present there; but whenever rhythm and harmony have to be employed in regard to human beings, either by making rhythm and harmony (what they call lyric poetry) or by using correctly the songs and meters that have been made (what has been called education), it is difficult and a good craftsman is needed. For the same argument returns here, namely, that decent human beings must be gratified, as well as those who are not as yet decent, so that they might become more decent; and the love of the decent must be preserved. And this love is the beautiful one, the Uranian, the Eros of the Uranian Muse. But the pandemian one is Polyhymnia's, which must, whenever it is applied, be applied cautiously, in order that it might harvest its own pleasure but not instill any intemperance, just as in our art it is a large order to employ in a fair way the desires that cluster around the art of making delicacies so as to harvest their

pleasure without illness. And in general, in music, in medicine, and in all other things, the human and the divine, each Eros must be watched as far as practicable; for both of the Erotes are present in these things. The composition of the seasons of the year, for example, is also full of both these Erotes; and whenever the hot and the cold, and the dry and the moist, which I mentioned before, obtain decent love for each other and accept a moderate harmony and mixture, they come bearing good seasonableness and health to human beings and to the rest of the animals and plants and commit no injustice. But whenever Eros with his hubris proves to be too strong with regard to the seasons of the year, he corrupts and commits injustice against many things. For plagues as well as many other diseases are wont to arise for wild beasts and plants from things like that. Frosts, for example, and hailstorms and blights arise from the greediness and disorderliness of such erotic things in relation to one another; and the science of these erotic things in regard to the revolutions of stars and seasons of the years is called astronomy. Furthermore, all the sacrifices and things over which divination presides, these are concerned with the communing of gods and human beings with one another, involve almost nothing else but the protection and healing of Eros. For impiety as a whole is wont to arise if one does not gratify the decent Eros and honor and venerate him in every deed, but instead gratifies and honors the other one, in matters that concern parents, both living and dead, and gods. And so it is, accordingly, that divination is charged with the overseeing and healing of lovers; and divination, in turn, is the craftsman of friendship between gods and human beings, since it has expert knowledge of human erotics, as far as erotics has to do with sacred law and piety.

This is the great and overwhelming power that Eros as a whole has (and indeed it is rather close to total power); but

the Eros concerned with good things, consummately perfected with moderation and justice, among us and among gods, this has the greatest power and provides us with every kind of happiness, making us able to associate with one another and to be friends even with the gods who are stronger than we are. Now, perhaps in praising Eros I too am omitting many things; but I have done that unwillingly. For if I did omit anything, it is your job, Aristophanes, to fill it in; or if you intend to make a different eulogy of the god, proceed to do so, since you have stopped hiccupping.

Apollodorus/ He then said that Aristophanes accepted and said;

Aristophanes/ It has stopped, to be sure; not, however, before sneezing had been applied to it. So I wonder at the orderly decency of the body desiring such noises and garglings as a sneeze is; for my hiccupping stopped right away as soon as I applied the sneeze to it.

Eryximachus/ My good Aristophanes, look at what you are doing. You have made [us] laugh just as you were about to speak; and you compel me to be a guardian of your own speech, lest you ever say anything laughable, though you did have the chance to speak in peace.

Apollodorus/ And Aristophanes laughed and said;

Aristophanes/ You have made a good point, Eryximachus, and please let what has been said be as if it were never spoken. But do not be my guardian, for in what is about to be said I am not afraid to say laughable things, for that would be a gain and native to our Muse, but only things that are laughed at.

Eryximachus/ You believe you can hit and run, Aristophanes,, but pay attention and speak as though you are to render an account; perhaps, however, if I so resolve, I shall let you go.

Aristophanes/ Well, Eryximachus, I do intend to speak in a somewhat different vein from that in which you and Pausanias spoke. Human beings, in my opinion, have been entirely unaware of the power of Eros, since if they were aware of it, they would have provided the greatest sanctuaries and altars for him, and would be making him the greatest sacrifices, and not act as they do now when none of this happens to him, though it most certainly should. For Eros is the most philanthropic of gods, a helper of human beings as well as a physician dealing with an illness the healing of which would result in the greatest happiness for the human race. So I shall try to initiate you into his power; and you will be the teachers of everyone else. But you must first understand human nature and its afflictions. Our nature in the past was not the same as now but of a different sort. First of all, the races of human beings were three, not two as now, male and female; for there was also a third race that shared in both, a race whose name still remains, though it itself has vanished. For at that time one race was androgynous, and in looks and name it combined both, the male as well as the female; but now it does not exist except for the name that is reserved for reproach. Secondly, the looks of each human being were as a whole round, with back and sides in a circle. And each had four arms, and legs equal in number to his arms, and two faces alike in all respects on a cylindrical neck, but there was one head for both faces, they were set in opposite directions, and four ears, and two sets of genitals, and all the rest that one might conjecture from this. Each used to walk upright too, just as one does now, in whatever direction he wanted; and whenever he had the impulse to run fast, then just as tumblers with their legs straight out actually move around as they tumble in a circle, so did they, with their eight limbs as supports, quickly move in a circle. It is for this reason

that the races were three and of this sort: because the male was in origin the offspring of the sun; the female, of the earth; and the race that shared in both, of the moon, since the moon also shares in both. And they themselves were globular, as was their manner of walking, because they were like their parents. Now, they were awesome in their strength and robustness, and they had great and proud thoughts, so they made an attempt on the gods. And what Homer says about Ephialtes and Otus, is said about them, that they attempted to make an ascent into the sky with a view to assaulting the gods. Then Zeus and the other gods deliberated as to what they should do with them. And they were long perplexed, for the gods knew neither how they could kill them and (just as they had struck the giants with lightning) obliterate the race, for, in that case, their own honors and sacrifices from human beings would vanish, nor how they could allow them to continue to behave licentiously. Then Zeus thought hard and says, In my own opinion, he said, I have a device whereby human beings would continue to exist and at the same time, having become weaker, would stop their licentiousness. I shall now cut each of them in two, he said; and they will be both weaker and more useful to us through the increase in their numbers. And they will walk upright on two legs. But if they are thought to behave licentiously still, and are unwilling to keep quiet, then I shall cut them again in two, he said, so that they will go hopping on one leg. As soon as he said this he began to cut human beings in two, just like those who cut sorb-apples in preparation for pickling, or those who cut eggs with hairs. And whenever he cut someone, he had Apollo turn the face and half the neck around to face the cut, so that in beholding his own cutting the human being might be more orderly; and he had him heal all the rest. Apollo turned the face around; and by drawing together the skin

from everywhere toward what is now called the belly (just like drawstring bags) he made one opening, which he tied off in the middle of the belly, and that is what they call the navel. He shaped up the chest and smoothed out many of the other wrinkles, with somewhat the same kind of tool as shoemakers use in smoothing the wrinkles in leather on the last; but he left a few wrinkles, those on the belly itself and the navel, to be a reminder of our ancient affliction. When its nature was cut in two, each, desiring its own half, came together; and throwing their arms around one another and entangling themselves with one another in their desire to grow together, they began to die off due to hunger and the rest of their inactivity, because they were unwilling to do anything apart from one another; and whenever one of the halves did die and the other was left, the one that was left tried to seek out another and entangle itself with that, whether it met the half of the whole woman, and that is what we now call a woman, or of a man; and so they continued to perish. But Zeus took pity on them and supplies another device: He rearranges their genitals toward the front, for up till then they had them on the outside, and they generated and gave birth not in one another but in the earth, like cicadas, and for this purpose, he changed this part of them toward the front, and by this means made generation possible in one another, by means of the male in the female; so that in embracing, if a man meets with a woman, they might generate and the race continue; and if male meets with male, there might at least be satiety in their being together; and they might pause and turn to work and attend to the rest of their livelihood. So it is really from such early times that human beings have had, inborn in themselves, Eros for one another, Eros, the bringer-together of their ancient nature, who tries to make one out of two and to heal their human nature. Each of us, then, is a token of a human

being, because we are sliced like fillets of sole, two out of one; and so each is always in search of his own token. Now all who are the men's slice from the common genus, which was then called androgynous, are lovers of women; and many adulterers have been of this genus; and, in turn, all who are women of this genus prove to be lovers of men and adulteresses. And all women who are sliced off from woman hardly pay attention to men but are rather turned toward women, and lesbians arise from this genus. But all who are male slices pursue the males; and while they are boys, because they are cutlets of the male, they are friendly to men and enjoy lying down together with and embracing men; and these are the best of boys and lads, because they are naturally the manliest. Some, to be sure, assert that such boys are shameless, but they lie. For it is not out of shamelessness that they do this but out of boldness, manliness, and masculinity, feeling affection for what is like to themselves. And there is a great proof of this, for once they have reached maturity, only men of this kind go off to political affairs. When they are fully grown men, they are pederasts and naturally pay no attention to marriage and procreation, but are compelled to do so by the law; whereas they would be content to live unmarried with one another. Now it is one of this sort who wholly becomes a pederast and passionate lover, always feeling affection for what is akin to himself. And when the pederast or anyone else meets with that very one who is his own half, then they are wondrously struck with friendship, attachment, and love, and are just about unwilling to be apart from one another even for a short time. And here you have those who continue through life with one another, though they could not even say what they want to get for themselves from one another. For no one would be of the opinion that it was sexual intercourse that was wanted, as though it were for this reason, of all things,

that each so enjoys being with the other in great earnestness; but the soul of each plainly wants something else. What it is, it is incapable of saying, but it divines what it wants and speaks in riddles. If Hephaestus with his tools were to stand over them as they lay in the same place and were to ask, What is it that you want, human beings, to get for yourselves from one another?, and if in their perplexity he were to ask them again, Is it this you desire, to be with one another in the very same place, as much as is possible, and not to leave one another night and day? For if you desire that, I am willing to fuse you and make you grow together into the same thing, so that, though two, you would be one; and as long as you lived, you would both live together just as though you were one; and when you died, there again in Hades you would be dead together as one instead of as two. So see if you love this and would be content if you got it. We know that there would not be even one who, if he heard this, would refuse, and it would be self-evident that he wants nothing else than this; and he would quite simply believe he had heard what he had been desiring all along: in conjunction and fusion with the beloved, to become one from two. The cause of this is that this was our ancient nature and we were wholes. So love is the name for the desire and pursuit of the whole. And previously, as I say, we were one; but now through our injustice we have been dispersed by the god, just as the Arcadians were dispersed by the Spartans. There is the fear, then, that if we are not orderly in our behavior to the gods, we shall be split again and go around like those who are modeled in relief on stelae, sawed through our nostrils, like dice. For this reason every real man must be exhorted to be pious toward the gods in all his acts, so that we may avoid the one result and get the other, as Eros is our guide and general. Let no one act contrary to Eros, and he acts contrary whoever incurs the enmity of the

gods, for if we become friends and reconciled to the gods, we shall find out and meet with our own favorites, which few at the moment do. And please don't let Eryximachus suppose, in making a comedy of my speech, that I mean Pausanias and Agathon, perhaps they have found their own and are both naturally born males. For whatever the case may be with them, I am referring to all men and women: our race would be happy if we were to bring our love to a consummate end, and each of us were to get his own favorite on his return to his ancient nature. And if this is the best, it must necessarily be the case that, in present circumstances, that which is closest to it is the best; and that is to get a favorite whose nature is to one's taste. And were we to hymn the god who is the cause of this we should justly hymn Eros, who at the present time benefits us the most by leading us to what is our own; and in the future he offers the greatest hopes, while we offer piety to the gods, to restore us to our ancient nature and by his healing make us blessed and happy.

Here, Eryximachus, is my speech about Eros, different from yours. So, just as I begged you, don't make a comedy of it, in order that we may listen to what each of the others, or rather, what each of the two, will say; for Agathon and Socrates are left.

Eryximachus/ Well, I shall obey you. Your speech was indeed a pleasure for me. And if I did not know that both Socrates and Agathon were skilled in erotics, I should be very much afraid of their being at a loss for words on account of the fullness and variety of what has been said; but as it is, I am confident.

Socrates/ That is because you yourself put up a fine show in the contest, Eryximachus; but if you were where I am now, or rather where I shall be when Agathon has spoken well, then you would really be afraid and as wholly baffled as I am now.

Agathon/ You want to bewitch me, Socrates. You would have me believe that the audience is full of expectation that I shall speak well, and in that way, I shall be in a turmoil.

Socrates/ I should surely be forgetful, Agathon, if I did that. I saw your courage and greatness of mind in mounting the platform with the actors and in facing so large an audience when you were about to display your own speeches, and I saw that you were in no way disturbed, should I now believe that you will be in a turmoil on account of us few human beings?

Agathon/ What's this, Socrates? You really do not believe that I am so wrapped up in the theater as not to know that to a man of sense a few who are sensible are more terrifying than many fools?

Socrates/ Well, I should surely be in disgrace, Agathon, were I to presume any lack of urbanity in you; for I know very well that were you to meet any you believed wise, you would think more of them than of the many. But I suspect that we shall not prove to be of the wise, for we too were present there and were part of the many; but if you were to meet others who were indeed wise, then you might be ashamed before them, if you were perhaps to believe that you were doing something that is disgraceful. Is this what you mean?

Agathon/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ But you would not be ashamed before the many if you believed you were doing something disgraceful?

Apollodorus/ Phaedrus then interrupted and said;

Phaedrus/ Dear Agathon, if you answer Socrates, it will not make any difference to him what effect this might have on our present arrangements, provided only that he has someone to converse with, especially if he is beautiful. And I myself listen to Socrates conversation with pleasure; but I

am compelled to attend to the eulogy to Eros and to receive from each one of you your speech; so let each of you repay the god and then go on conversing as you were.

Agathon/ Well, what you say is fine, Phaedrus, and nothing keeps me from speaking; for it will be possible for me to converse with Socrates on many other occasions.

I want first to say how I must speak, and then to speak. For in my own opinion all the previous speakers did not eulogize the god but blessed human beings for the goods of which the god is the cause; yet no one has said what sort is he who makes these gifts. There is one proper manner in every praise of anything: to tell in speech, whomever the speech is about, what sort he is and what sort of things he causes. This is the just way for us too to praise Eros, first what sort he is, and then his gifts. I declare that though all gods are happy, Eros (if sacred law allow it and it be without nemesis to say so) is the happiest of them, as he is the most beautiful and the best. As the most beautiful he is of the following sort: First, he is the youngest of gods, Phaedrus; and he by himself supplies a great proof for this assertion, for with headlong flight he avoids old age, swift though it plainly is, coming on us, at any rate, swifter than he should. It is precisely old age that Eros naturally detests; he does not even come within hailing distance of it. He is always with and of the young. For the old saying holds good, that like to like always draws near. Though I agree with Phaedrus in many other respects, I do not agree that Eros is more ancient than Kronos and lapetos; but I affirm his being the youngest of gods and ever young. And the events of old about gods of which Hesiod and Parmenides speak belong to Necessity and not Eros, if what they say is true. Otherwise there would not have been castrations and bindings of each other, and many other acts of violence among the gods, had Eros been among them; but there would have been friendship and peace, just

as there is now since Eros became king of the gods. So he is young, and besides being young, he is tender. But there is need of a poet as good as Homer was to show a god's tenderness. Homer says that Ate is a goddess and tender, her feet at any rate are tender, saying:

Tender are her feet, for she does not on the threshold
Draw near, but lo! she walks on the heads of men.

So in my opinion it is with a fine piece of evidence that he shows her softness, because she walks not on the hard but on the soft. And we too shall use the same piece of evidence about Eros to prove that he is soft; for not upon earth does he walk nor even on skulls, which are hardly soft, but on the softest of beings he walks and dwells. For he has set up his dwelling place in the characters and souls of gods and human beings, and not in each and every soul, for whichever soul he finds to have a hard character, he goes away from, and whichever he finds to have a soft one he dwells in. So, as he is always touching with his feet and every other part the softest of the softest, it is necessary that he be most tender. Now besides being youngest and tenderest, he is supple in his looks. Otherwise he would not be able to fold himself around everywhere, nor to be unobserved on first entering or on departing from every soul, if he were hard. The harmony of his figure is a great piece of evidence for his proportioned and supple appearance, and on all sides it is agreed that Eros is exceptionally harmonious; for lack of harmony and Eros are always at war with one another. The god's way of living among blooming flowers means that his complexion is beautiful; for Eros does not settle on what is fading and has passed its bloom, whether it be body or soul or anything else, but wherever a place is blooming and scented, there he settles and remains.

Now this is enough about beauty as attributable to the god, though many points are still omitted; but Eros virtue

must next be spoken of. The greatest thing is that Eros neither commits injustice nor has injustice done to him, neither against a god nor by a god, neither against a human being nor by a human being. For it is not by violence that Eros is affected, if he is affected at all, for violence does not touch him; nor does he act with violence, for every one of his own accord serves Eros in everything. And whatever anyone of his own accord agrees upon with another of his own accord, the royal laws of the city declare to be just. And besides the share he has in justice he has his fullest share in moderation. For it is agreed that to be moderate means to dominate over pleasures and desires; but no pleasure is stronger than Eros; and if other pleasures are weaker, they will be dominated by Eros; and since it is he who is dominant, then in dominating pleasures and desires Eros must be exceptionally moderate. And besides, in point of courage, not even Ares resists Eros; for Ares does not possess Eros (for Aphrodite, as the story goes), but Eros Ares. And he who possesses is stronger than he who is possessed; and in dominating the bravest of all the rest, he must be the bravest. Now that the god's justice, moderation, and courage have been mentioned, all that remains is wisdom; so, as far as I can, I must try to supply the omission. And first, that I too might honor our art as Eryximachus did his, the god is a poet of such wisdom that he can make poets of others too; at any rate, everyone whom Eros touches proves to be a poet, though he be without the Muses before. We can, accordingly, properly make use of this fact to infer that in every kind of musical making [i.e., poetry] Eros is a good poet [maker]; for what one does not have and does not know, one could neither give to another nor teach another. And who will oppose the fact that the making of all animals is nothing but Eros wisdom, by which all the animals come to be and grow? And don't we know that, in the case of the

arts, whomever this god teaches turns out to be renowned and conspicuous in craftsmanship, and that he whom Eros does not touch remains obscure? Archery, for example, medicine, and divination were invented by Apollo when desire and love were his guides; and thus he too must be a pupil of Eros, as are the Muses in music, Hephaestus in blacksmithing, Athena in weaving, and Zeus the captain of gods and human beings. So it is plain that, when Eros came to be among them, the affairs of the gods were arranged out of love of beauty, for there is no eros present in ugliness. But before that, as I said at the start, many awesome events took place among the gods, as is said, through the monarchy of Necessity; whereas since the birth of this god, all good things have resulted for gods as well as for human beings from loving the beautiful things.

Thus Eros, in my opinion, Phaedrus, stands first, because he is the fairest and the best, and, after this, he is the cause for everyone else of the same sort of fair and good things. It occurs to me to say something in meter too, that he is the one who makes

> Peace among human beings, on the open sea calm
> And cloudlessness, the resting of winds and sleeping of care.

He empties us of estrangement, he fills us with attachment; he arranges in all such gatherings as this our coming together with one another; in festivals, in dances, in sacrifices he proves himself a guide; furnishing gentleness, banishing wildness; loving giver of amity, no giver of enmity; gracious, good; spectacular to the wise, wonderful to the gods; enviable to the have-nots, desirable to the haves; father of luxury, splendor, glory, graces, yearning, and longing, caring for good ones, careless of bad ones; in toiling, in fearing, in longing, in speaking, the best governor, mariner, fellow warrior, and savior; the ornament of all gods

and human beings, the fairest and best guide, whom every real man must follow hymning beautifully, and sharing the song Eros sings in charming the thought of all gods and human beings.

Here, Phaedrus, you have the speech from me. Let it be dedicated to the god, sharing, as far as I am able, partly in playfulness, partly in measured earnestness.

Apollodorus/ Aristodemus said that when Agathon had finished speaking, all those present applauded vigorously, as the youth had spoken in a way as suited to himself as to the god. Socrates then said, with a glance at Eryximachus;

Socrates/ Son of Akoumenos, is it your opinion that my long-standing fear was groundless, and that I was not prophetic, when I said before that Agathon would speak in a marvelous way, and that I should be at a loss?

Eryximachus/ In my opinion, your first point was indeed prophetic, that Agathon would speak well; but as to the other, that you would be at a loss, that I do not believe.

Socrates/ You blessed innocent! How can you say that? Am I and anyone else whatsoever not to be at a loss after so fair and varied a speech has been made? Though the rest was not quite so marvelous, that bit at the end, who would not be thunderstruck on hearing the beauty of its words and phrases? I for my part, on reflecting that I myself should be unable to say anything nearly as beautiful, almost ran off and was gone in shame, if I had any place to go. For the speech reminded me of Gorgias; so I was simply affected as in the saying of Homer's. I was afraid that Agathon in his speech would at last send the head of the dread speaker Gorgias against my speeches and turn me to very stone in speechlessness. And then I realized that, after all, I am to be laughed at for having agreed to eulogize Eros in turn with you, and for claiming that I was skilled in erotics; for as it

has turned out, I know nothing of the matter, nor how one is to eulogize anything. For in my stupidity I believed the truth had to be told about anything that was given a eulogy, and that this was the underpinning, and that by selecting the most beautiful parts of the truth one was to arrange them in the seemliest manner possible. And I was quite filled with the proud thought that I should speak well, since I knew the truth about praising anything. But it was not this after all, it seems, that was meant by the fair praising of anything, but the attribution to the matter at hand of the greatest and fairest things possible regardless of whether this was so or not. And if the praise were false, it was of no importance anyway; for the injunction was, it seems, that each of us should be thought to eulogize Eros, and not just eulogize him. It is for this reason, I suspect, that you leave no argument unturned and dedicate each and every argument to Eros. And you assert that he is of this sort and that sort and the cause of so many things, so that he may seem to be as beautiful and good as possible, plainly to those who do not know, for this surely is not the case for those who do know, and so the praise turns out to be beautiful and awesome. But after all I did not know that this was to be the manner of praise, and in ignorance I came to an agreement with you that I would take my turn in praising. So the tongue promised but the mind did not; let me then call it quits. I am not a eulogist in this fashion: I am simply incapable of it. Not that I am unwilling, on the contrary I am willing, if you want, to tell the truth on my own terms, so long as my words are not to be compared with your speeches, lest I be laughed at. Decide, then, Phaedrus, if you have any need for such a speech too, for hearing the truth being said about Eros, even though the phrasing and arrangement of the sentences just fall as they come.

Apollodorus/ He said that Phaedrus and the others urged Socrates to speak in whatever way he himself believed he had to speak.

Socrates/ Allow me further, Phaedrus, to ask Agathon about a few small points, in order that when I have got him to agree with me I can go ahead and speak.

Phaedrus/ Well, I allow it. Ask.

Apollodorus/ After this he said that Socrates began from somewhat the following point.

Socrates/ Well, dear Agathon, in my opinion you made a fine start to your speech, in saying that one had to show first what sort of being Eros himself is, and then his deeds. I very much admire this beginning. So come now, since you have explained fairly and magnificently all the rest about what sort he is, then tell me this as well about Eros: is Eros the sort that is love of something or of nothing? I am not asking whether he is of a mother or of a father (for the question whether Eros is love of mother or father would be laughable), but just as if I asked about this very word, father, is the father, father of someone or not? You should doubtless tell me, if you wanted to give a fair reply, that the father is father of a son or daughter. Isn't that so?

Agathon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And the same is true of the mother?

Apollodorus/ This too was agreed upon.

Socrates/ Answer me just a little more, so that you might come to understand better what I want. Suppose I asked, What about this point? Is a brother, just in terms of what he is, a brother of someone, or isn't he?

Apollodorus/ He answered that he is.

Socrates/ And of a brother or a sister, right?

Apollodorus/ He agreed.

Socrates/ Do try, then, to tell about love as well. Is Eros love of nothing or something?

Agathon/ Of course he is of something.

Socrates/ Keep this fast in your memory, this something of which you claim he is, but now say only this much: That Eros that is the love of something, does he desire this something or not?

Agathon/ Of course he does.

Socrates/ And is it when he has, or does not have, that which he desires and loves, that he desires and loves it?

Agathon/ It is at least likely that he does not have it.

Socrates/ Think, is it not a necessity rather than a likelihood that the desirous thing desires what it is in need of, and does not desire unless it is in need? For in my opinion, Agathon, it is a marvelous necessity. What is your opinion?

Agathon/ It's my opinion too.

Socrates/ What you say is fair. Would anyone want to be tall if he were tall, or strong if he were strong?

Agathon/ From what has been agreed upon, that would be impossible.

Socrates/ For he surely would not be in need of those things that he already is.

Agathon/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ So that if he wanted to be strong being strong and swift being swift, and healthy being healthy, I say this so that we may not deceive ourselves, for one might perhaps suppose with regard to these and all cases of this sort that those who are of this sort and have these things desire those things that they have, but if you have these cases in mind, Agathon, then who would desire each of those things that of necessity he has at the moment when, whether he wants to

or not, he has it? For whenever anyone says, I am healthy and want to be healthy or I am wealthy and want to be wealthy, and I desire those very things that I have, we should tell him, You, human being, possessing wealth, health, and strength, want to possess them also in the future, since at the present moment at least, whether you want to or not, you have them. Consider then, whenever you say, I want the present things, if you mean anything else than, I want the things of the present moment to be present also in future time. Would he agree to that?

Apollodorus/ Aristodemus said that Agathon consented.

Socrates/ To want that those things be safe and present for him in future time, is to love that which is not yet at hand for him and which he does not have.

Agathon/ Of course.

Socrates/ So he and everyone else who desires what is not at hand desires what is not present; and what he does not have and what he himself is not and what he is in need of, it is things like that of which desire and love are, right?

Agathon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Come then. Let us draw up an agreement about what has been said. Eros is love, first of all, of some things, and secondly, of whatever things the need for which is present to him.

Agathon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Would you now think back then to what you asserted Eros to be of in your speech; but if you want, I shall remind you. I believe you spoke somewhat along these lines, that matters were arranged by the gods through love of beautiful things, for there would not be love of ugly things. Weren't you speaking somewhat along these lines?

Agathon/ I said so.

Socrates/ And what you say is reasonable, comrade. And if this is so, Eros would be nothing else than love of beauty, but not of ugliness?

Apollodorus/ He agreed.

Socrates/ Hasn't it been agreed that that of which one is in need and does not have one loves?

Agathon/ Yes.

Socrates/ So Eros is in need of and does not have beauty.

Agathon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ What about this? That which is in need of beauty and in no way possesses beauty, do you say that it is beautiful?

Agathon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Do you still agree then that Eros is beautiful, if this is so?

Agathon/ It's probable, Socrates, that I knew nothing of what I had said.

Socrates/ And yet spoke you beautifully, Agathon. But, Still, tell me about a small point. Are the good things beautiful as well in your opinion?

Agathon/ Yes, in mine.

Socrates/ So if Eros is in need of beautiful things, and the good things are fair, he would be in need of the good things as well.

Agathon/ I, Socrates, would not be able to contradict you; so let it be as you say.

Socrates/ Not at all, my dear Agathon. It is rather that you are unable to contradict the truth, since it is not at all hard to contradict Socrates.

Socrates/ And I shall let you go for now, and turn to the speech about Eros that I once heard from a woman, Diotima of Mantineia. She was wise in these and many other things;

when the Athenians once made a sacrifice before the plague, she caused the onset of the disease to be delayed ten years; and she is the very one who taught me erotics. The speech that she was wont to make, I shall now try to tell you all on the basis of what has been agreed on between Agathon and myself; and I shall try to do it on my own, as best I can. For just as you explained, Agathon, one must first tell who Eros himself is and what sort he is, and then tell his deeds. In my opinion, it is easiest to do this in just the same way that the stranger once did in quizzing me. For I came pretty near, in speaking to her, to saying the same sort of things that Agathon said to me now, that Eros was a great god, and was the love of beautiful things. She then went on to refute me with those same arguments with which I refuted him, that he is neither beautiful, according to my argument, nor good.

Socrates/ How do you mean it, Diotima? Is Eros after all ugly and bad?

Diotima/ Hush! Or do you believe that whatever is not beautiful must necessarily be ugly?

Socrates/ Absolutely.

Diotima/ And whatever is not wise, without understanding? Or were you unaware that there is something in between wisdom and lack of understanding?

Socrates/ What is this?

Diotima/ Don't you know, that to opine correctly without being able to give an account [logos] is neither to know expertly (for how could expert knowledge be an unaccounted for [alogon] matter?) nor lack of understanding? (For how could lack of understanding be that which has hit upon what is.) But surely correct opinion is like that, somewhere between intelligence and lack of understanding.

Socrates/ What you say is true.

Diotima/ Then do not compel what is not beautiful to be ugly, or what is not good, to be bad. So too since you yourself agree that Eros is not good or beautiful, do not at all believe that he must be ugly and bad, but something between the two of them.

Socrates/ And yet, it is agreed on by all that he is a great god.

Diotima/ Do you mean by all who do not know, or by those who know?

Socrates/ No, by all together.

And she said with a laugh;

Diotima/ And how, Socrates, could he be agreed to be a great god by those who deny even that he is a god?

Socrates/ Who are these?

Diotima/ You are one and I am one.

Socrates/ How can you say this?

Diotima/ It's easy. Tell me, don't you assert that all gods are happy and beautiful? Or would you dare to deny that anyone of the gods is beautiful and happy?

Socrates/ By Zeus, I would not.

Diotima/ But don't you mean by the happy precisely those who possess the good things and the beautiful things?

Socrates/ Of course.

Diotima/ And do you hold to the agreement that Eros, out of need for the good and beautiful things, desires those very things of which he is in need?

Socrates/ Yes, I hold to it.

Diotima/ How then could he who is without a share in the beautiful and good things be a god?

Socrates/ In no way, it seems.

Diotima/ Do you see then, that you too hold that Eros is not a god?

Socrates/ What would Eros then be? A mortal?

Diotima/ Hardly that.

Socrates/ Well, what then?

Diotima/ Just as before, between mortal and immortal.

Socrates/ What is that, Diotima?

Diotima/ A great daemon, Socrates, for everything daemonic is between god and mortal.

Socrates/ With what kind of power?

Diotima/ Interpreting and ferrying to gods things from human beings and to human beings things from gods: the requests and sacrifices of human beings, the orders and exchanges-for-sacrifices of gods; for it is in the middle of both and fills up the interval so that the whole itself has been bound together by it. Through this proceeds all divination and the art of the priests who deal with sacrifices, initiatory rituals, incantations, and every kind of soothsaying and magic. A god does not mingle with a human being; but through this occurs the whole intercourse and conversation of gods with human beings while they are awake and asleep. And he who is wise in things like this is a daemonic man; but he who is wise in anything else concerning either arts or handicrafts is vulgar and low. These daemons are many and of all kinds; and one of them is Eros.

Socrates/ Who is his father? And who is his mother?

Diotima/ It is rather long to explain; but I shall tell you all the same. When Aphrodite was born, all the other gods as well as Poros [Resource] the son of Metis [Intelligence] were at a feast; and when they had dined, Penia [Poverty] arrived to beg for something, as might be expected at a festivity, and she hung about near the door. Then Poros got

drunk on nectar, for there was not yet wine, and, heavy of head, went into the garden of Zeus and slept. Then Penia, who because of her own lack of resources was plotting to have a child made out of Poros, reclined beside him and conceived Eros. It is for this reason that Eros has been the attendant and servant of Aphrodite, as he was conceived on her birthday; for he is by nature a lover in regard to the beautiful, and Aphrodite is beautiful. So because Eros is the son of Poros and Penia, his situation is in some such case as this. First of all, he is always poor; and he is far from being tender and beautiful, as the many believe, but is tough, squalid, shoeless, and homeless, always lying on the ground without a blanket or a bed, sleeping in doorways and along waysides in the open air; he has the nature of his mother, always dwelling with neediness. But in accordance with his father he plots to trap the beautiful and the good, and is courageous, stout, and keen, a skilled hunter, always weaving devices, desirous of practical wisdom and inventive, philosophizing through all his life, a skilled magician, druggist, sophist. And his nature is neither immortal nor mortal; but sometimes on the same day he flourishes and lives, whenever he has resources; and sometimes he dies, but gets to live again through the nature of his father. And as that which is supplied to him is always gradually flowing out, Eros is never either without resources nor wealthy, but is in between wisdom and lack of understanding. For here is the way it is: No one of the gods philosophizes and desires to become wise, for he is so, nor if there is anyone else who is wise, does he philosophize. Nor, in turn, do those who lack understanding philosophize and desire to become wise; for it is precisely this that makes the lack of understanding so difficult, that if a man is not beautiful and good, nor intelligent, he has the opinion that that is sufficient for him.

Consequently, he who does not believe that he is in need does not desire that which he does not believe he needs.

Socrates/ Then who, Diotima, are the philosophizers, if they are neither the wise nor those who lack understanding?

Diotima/ By now it is perfectly plain even to a child, that they are those between them both, of whom Eros would be one. For wisdom is one of the most beautiful things, and Eros is love in regard to the beautiful; and so Eros is, necessarily, a philosopher; and as a philosopher he is between being wise and being without understanding. His manner of birth is responsible for this, for he is of a wise and resourceful father, and an unwise and resourceless mother. Now the nature of the daemon, dear Socrates, is this; but as for the one whom you believed to be Eros, it is not at all surprising that you had this impression. You believed, in my opinion, as I conjecture from what you say, that the beloved is Eros, and is not that which loves. It is for this reason, I believe, that Eros seemed to you to be wholly beautiful. For the beloved thing is truly beautiful, delicate, perfect, and most blessed; but that which loves has another kind of look, the sort that I just explained.

Socrates/ All right, stranger, what you say is fine. If Eros is of this sort, of what use is he for human beings?

Diotima/ It is this, Socrates, that I shall next try to teach you. Now, Eros is of that sort and was born in that way; and he is of the beautiful things, as you assert. But what if someone were to ask us, What about those beautiful things of which Eros is, Socrates and Diotima? It is more clearly expressed as follows: He who loves the beautiful things loves, what does he love?

Socrates/ That they be his.

Diotima/ But the answer still longs for the following sort of question: What will he have who gets the beautiful things?

Socrates/ I said that I was hardly capable of giving a ready answer to this question.

Diotima/ Well. What if someone changed his query and used the good instead of the beautiful? Come, Socrates, the lover of the good things loves: what does he love?

Socrates/ That they be his.

Diotima/ And what will he who gets the good things have?

Socrates/ This, I can answer more adequately: he will be happy.

Diotima/ That is because the happy are happy by the acquisition of good things; and there is no further need to ask, For what consequence does he who wants to be happy want to be so? But the answer is thought to be a complete one.

Socrates/ What you say is true.

Diotima/ This wanting and this eros, do you suppose they are common to all human beings, and all want the good things to be theirs always, or how do you mean it?

Socrates/ That way. They are common to all.

Diotima/ Why is it, then, Socrates, that we deny that everyone loves, given, that is, that everyone loves the same things and always, but we say that some love and some do not?

Socrates/ I too, am amazed.

Diotima/ Well, don't persist in your amazement; for we detach from eros a certain kind of eros and give it the name eros, imposing upon it the name of the whole; while in the other cases we employ several different names.

Socrates/ What are those?

Diotima/ Like the following: You know that making has a wide range; for, you see, every kind of making is responsible for anything whatsoever that is on the way from what is not

to what is. And thus all the productions that are dependent on the arts are makings, and all the craftsmen engaged in them are makers.

Socrates/ What you say is true.

Diotima/ But nevertheless, you know that not all craftsmen are called makers but have other names; and one part is separated off from all of making, that which is concerned with music and meters, and is addressed by the name of the whole. For this alone is called poetry; and those who have this part of making are poets.

Socrates/ What you say is true.

Diotima/ So too in the case of eros. In brief, eros is the whole desire of good things and of being happy, the greatest and all-beguiling eros. But those who turn toward it in many other ways, in terms of either money-making, love of gymnastics, or philosophy, are neither said to love nor called lovers; whereas those who earnestly apply themselves to a certain single kind, get the name of the whole, love, and are said to love and called lovers.

Socrates/ What you say is probably true.

Diotima/ And there is a certain account according to which those who seek their own halves are lovers. But my speech denies that eros is of a half or of a whole, unless, comrade, that half or whole can be presumed to be really good; for human beings are willing to have their own feet and hands cut off, if their opinion is that their own are no good. For I suspect that each does not cleave to his own (unless one calls the good one's own and belonging to oneself, and the bad alien to oneself) since there is nothing that human beings love other than the good. Or is it your opinion that they do?

Socrates/ No, by Zeus, that is not my opinion.

Diotima/ Then is it to be said unqualifiedly that human beings love the good?

Socrates/ Yes.

Diotima/ What about this? Mustn't it be added, that they love the good to be theirs?

Socrates/ It must be added.

Diotima/ And not only that it be theirs, but always as well?

Socrates/ This too must be added.

Diotima/ So, in sum, eros is of the good's being one's own always.

Socrates/ What you say is most true.

Diotima/ Since eros is always this, then in what manner and in what activity would the earnestness and intensity of those who pursue the good be called eros. What in fact are they doing when they act so? Can you tell?

Socrates/ If I could, Diotima, then I should not, you know, in admiration of your wisdom resort to you to learn this very thing.

Diotima/ Well, I shall tell you. Their deed is bringing to birth in beauty both in terms of the body and in terms of the soul.

Socrates/ Whatever it is that you mean, is in need of divination, and I do not begin to understand.

Diotima/ Well, I shall speak more clearly. All human beings, Socrates, conceive both in terms of the body and in terms of the soul, and whenever they are at a certain age, their nature desires to give birth; but it is incapable of giving birth in ugliness, but only in beauty, for the being together of man and woman is a bringing to birth. This thing, pregnancy and bringing to birth, is divine, and it is immortal in the animal that is mortal. It is impossible for this to

happen in the unfitting; and the ugly is unfitting with everything divine, but the beautiful is fitting. So Kallone [Beauty] is the Moira [Fate] and Eileithyia for birth. It is for these reasons that whenever the pregnant draws near to beauty, it becomes glad and in its rejoicing dissolves and then gives birth and produces offspring; but whenever it draws near to ugliness, then, downcast and in pain, it contracts inwardly, turns away, shrinks up, and does not produce offspring, but checking the course of the pregnancy, has a hard time of it. So this is why someone who is pregnant, with breasts already swelling, flutters so much around the beautiful, because the one who has the beautiful releases him from great labor pains. For eros is not, Socrates, of the beautiful, as you believe.

Socrates/ Well, what then?

Diotima/ It is of engendering and bringing to birth in the beautiful.

Socrates/ All right!

Diotima/ It is more than all right. And why is eros of engendering? Because engendering is born forever and is immortal as far as that can happen to a mortal being. From what has been agreed to, it is necessary to desire immortality with good, provided eros is of the good's always being one's own. So it is necessary from this argument that eros be of immortality too.

Socrates/ All of these things she used to teach me whenever she made her speeches about erotics. And once she also asked;

Diotima/ What do you believe, Socrates, is the cause of this eros and desire? Or aren't you aware how uncanny is the disposition of all the beasts (the footed as well as the winged) whenever they desire to produce offspring? They are all ill and of an erotic disposition, first concerning actual

intercourse with one another, then later concerning the nurture of what is generated. And they are ready to fight to the finish, the weakest against the strongest, for the sake of those they have generated, and to die on their behalf; and they are willingly racked by starvation and stop at nothing to nourish their offspring. One might suppose, that human beings do this from calculation; but as for the beasts, what is the cause of their erode disposition's being of this sort? Can you say?

Socrates/ And I again said that I did not know; and she said;

Diotima/ Do you really think you will ever become skilled in erotics, if you do not understand this?

Socrates/ But you see, Diotima, that is the reason, as I said just now, why I have come to you: I know I am in need of teachers. But do tell me the cause of these things as well as of the rest that concern erotics.

Diotima/ If you put your trust, in the statement that by nature eros is of that which we have often agreed to, don't persist in your amazement. For in the eros of the beasts, in terms of the same argument as that concerning men, the mortal nature seeks as far as possible to be forever and immortal. Mortal nature is capable of immortality only in this way, the way of generation, because it is always leaving behind another that is young to replace the old. For while each one of the animals is said to live and be the same (for example, one is spoken of as the same from the time one is a child until one is an old man; and though he never has the same things in himself, nevertheless, he is called the same), he is forever becoming young in some respects as he suffers losses in other respects: his hair, flesh, bones, blood, and his whole body. And this is so not only in terms of the body but also in terms of the soul; his ways, character, opinions,

desires, pleasures, pains, fears, each of these things is never present as the same for each, but they are partly coming to be and partly perishing. And what is far stranger still is that in the case of our sciences too not only are some coming to be while others are perishing (and we are never the same in terms of the sciences either); but also each single one of the sciences is affected in the same way. For studying, as it is called, is done on the grounds that the science is passing out from us; for forgetfulness is the exiting of science; and studying, by instilling a fresh memory again to replace the departing one, preserves the science, so that it may be thought to be the same. For in this way every mortal thing is preserved; not by being absolutely the same forever, as the divine is, but by the fact that that which is departing and growing old leaves behind another young thing that is as it was. By this device, Socrates, the mortal shares in immortality, both body and all the rest; but the immortal has a different way. So do not be amazed if everything honors by nature its own offshoot; for it is for the sake of immortality that this zeal and eros attend everything.

Socrates/ And when I had heard her speech I was amazed and said, Really! Wisest Diotima, is it truly like this?

And she, like the perfect Sophists, said;

Diotima/ Know it well, Socrates, inasmuch as in the case of human beings, if you were willing to glance at their love of honor, you would be amazed at their irrationality unless you understand what I have said and reflect how uncanny their disposition is made by their love of renown, and their setting up immortal fame for eternity; and for the sake of fame even more than for their children, they are ready to run all risks, to exhaust their money, to toil at every sort of toil, and to die. For do you suppose, that Alcestis would have died for Admetus sake, or Achilles would have died after Patroclus, or your own Codrus would have died before his sons for the

sake of their kingship, if they had not believed that there would be an immortal remembering of their virtue, which we now retain? Far from it, but I believe that all do all things for the sake of immortal virtue and a famous reputation of that sort; and the better they are, so much the more is it thus; for they love the immortal. Now there are those who are pregnant in terms of their bodies, and they turn rather to women and are erotic in this way, furnishing for themselves through the procreation of children immortality, remembrance, and happiness (as they believe) for all future time. But there are others who are pregnant in terms of the soul, for these, in fact, are those who in their souls even more than in their bodies conceive those things that it is appropriate for soul to conceive and bear. And what is appropriate for soul? Prudence and the rest of virtue; it is of these things that all the poets and all the craftsmen who are said to be inventive are procreators; and by far the greatest and most beautiful part of prudence, is the arranging and ordering of the affairs of cities and households. Its name is moderation and justice. So whenever someone from youth onward is pregnant in his soul with these virtues, if he is divine and of suitable age, then he desires to give birth and produce offspring. And he goes round in search, I believe, of the beautiful in which he might generate; for he will never generate in the ugly. So it is beautiful bodies rather than ugly ones to which he cleaves because he is pregnant; and if he meets a beautiful, generous, and naturally gifted soul, he cleaves strongly to the two (body and soul) together. And to this human being he is at once fluent in speeches about virtue, of what sort the good man must be and what he must practice, and he tries to educate him. So in touching the one who is beautiful, I suspect, and in association with him, he engenders and gives birth to offspring with which he was long pregnant; and whether the [lover] is present or absent

he holds the beautiful one in memory, and nurtures with him that which has been generated in common. Therefore, those of this sort maintain a greater association and firmer friendship with one another than do those who have children in common, because the children they share in common are more beautiful and more immortal. And everyone would choose to have for himself children like these rather than the human kind; and if one looks at Homer, Hesiod, and the other good poets, one envies them: what offspring of themselves they have left behind! For as these offspring are in their own right immortal, they supply the poets with immortal fame and memory. And if you want. think of the children that Lycurgus left behind in Sparta, the preservers of Sparta and, to exaggerate a little, of Greece. Solon too is honored among you through his engendering of the laws; and other men as well in many other regions, among Greeks and among barbarians, by their showing forth of many beautiful deeds, have engendered every kind of virtue. It is to these that many sanctuaries are now dedicated through children of this kind; while through the human sort there are no sanctuaries for anyone yet.

Now perhaps, Socrates, you too might be initiated into these erotics; but as for the perfect revelations, for which the others are means, if one were to proceed correctly on the way, I do not know if you would be able to be initiated into them. Now I shall speak. I shall not falter in my zeal; do try to follow, if you are able. He who is to move correctly in this matter must begin while young to go to beautiful bodies. And first of all, if the guide is guiding correctly, he must love one body and there generate beautiful speeches. Then he must realize that the beauty that is in anybody whatsoever is related to that in another body; and if he must pursue the beauty of looks, it is great folly not to believe that the beauty of all bodies is one and the same. And with this realization

he must be the lover of all beautiful bodies and in contempt slacken this [erotic] intensity for only one body, in the belief that it is petty. After this he must believe that the beauty in souls is more honorable than that in the body. So that even if someone who is decent in his soul has only a slight youthful charm, the lover must be content with it, and love and cherish him, and engender and seek such speeches as will make the young better; in order that [the lover], on his part, may be compelled to behold the beautiful in pursuits and laws, and to see that all this is akin to itself, so that he may come to believe that the beauty of the body is something trivial. And after these pursuits, he must lead [the beloved] on to the sciences, so that he [himself, the lover] may see the beauty of sciences, and in looking at the beautiful, which is now so vast, no longer be content like a lackey with the beauty in one, of a boy, of some human being, or of one practice, nor be a sorry sort of slave and petty calculator; but with a permanent turn to the vast open sea of the beautiful, behold it and give birth, in ungrudging philosophy, to many beautiful and magnificent speeches and thoughts; until, there strengthened and increased, he may discern a certain single philosophical science, which has as its object the following sort of beauty. Try to pay as close attention as you can. Whoever has been educated up to this point in erotics, beholding successively and correctly the beautiful things, in now going to the perfect end of erotics shall suddenly glimpse something wonderfully beautiful in its nature, that very thing, Socrates, for whose sake alone all the prior labors were undertaken, something that is, first of all, always being and neither coming to be nor perishing, nor increasing nor passing away; and secondly, not beautiful in one respect and ugly in another, nor at one time so, and at another time not, either with respect to the beautiful or the ugly, nor here beautiful and there ugly, as being beautiful to

some and ugly to others; nor in turn will the beautiful be imagined by him as a kind of face or hands or anything else in which body shares, nor as any speech nor any science, and not as being somewhere in something else (for example, in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything else), but as it is alone by itself and with itself, always being of a single form; while all other beautiful things that share in it do so in such a way that while it neither becomes anything more or less, nor is affected at all, the rest do come to be and perish. So whenever anyone begins to glimpse that beauty as he goes on up from these things through the correct practice of pederasty, he must come close to touching the perfect end. For this is what it is to proceed correctly, or to be led by another, to erotics, beginning from these beautiful things here, always to proceed on up for the sake of that beauty, using these beautiful things here as steps: from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies; and from beautiful bodies to beautiful pursuits; and from pursuits to beautiful lessons; and from lessons to end at that lesson, which is the lesson of nothing else than the beautiful itself; and at last to know what is beauty itself. It is at this place in life, in beholding the beautiful itself, my dear Socrates, that it is worth living, if, for a human being, it is [worth living] at any place. Should you ever see the beautiful itself, it will be your opinion that it is not to be compared to gold and garments and the beautiful boys and youths at whose sight you are now thunderstruck. And you and many others are prepared, in seeing the beloved and in always being with him, neither to eat nor drink, if it were somehow possible, but only to behold him and be with him. What then, do we believe happens to one, if he gets to see the beautiful itself, pure, clean, unmixed, and not infected with human flesh, colors, or a lot of other mortal foolishness, and can glimpse the divine beautiful itself as being of a single shape? Do you

believe, that life would prove to be a sorry sort of thing, when a human being gazes in the direction of the beautiful and beholds it with the instrument with which he must and is together with it? Or don't you realize, that only here, in seeing in the way the beautiful is seeable, will he get to engender not phantom images of virtue, because he does not lay hold of a phantom, but true, because he lays hold of the true; and that once he has given birth to and cherished true virtue, it lies within him to become dear to god and, if it is possible for any human being, to become immortal as well?

Socrates/ Here, Phaedrus and you others, is what Diotima declared and what I am convinced of. And in this state of conviction, I try to persuade others that for this possession one could not easily get a better co-worker with human nature than Eros. Accordingly, I assert that every real man must honor Eros, as I myself honor erotics and train myself exceptionally in them; and I urge it on the rest, and now and always I eulogize the power and courage of Eros as far as I am able. Regard this speech, then, Phaedrus, if you want to, as spoken in eulogy of Eros; but if not, and your pleasure is to give it some other kind of name, so name it.

Apollodorus/ When Socrates had said this, some praised it; and Aristophanes tried to say something, because Socrates in speaking had mentioned him and referred to his speech. But suddenly a hammering on the courtyard door made a lot of noise, revelers they thought, and they heard the sound of a flute girl. Then Agathon said;

Agathon/ Boys, go look. And if it is anyone of our close friends, invite him in; but if not, say that we are not drinking but have already stopped.

Apollodorus/ Not much later they heard the voice of Alcibiades in the courtyard, very drunk and shouting loudly, asking where Agathon was and commanding them to lead

him to Agathon. Then the flute girl who, together with some other of his attendants, supported him and led him before them; and he stood at the door, thickly crowned with ivy and violets, with many fillets on his head. And he said;

Alcibiades/ Men, hail! Will you welcome a man who's terribly drunk as a fellow drinker? Or shall we go away just as soon as we have wreathed Agathon, for which single purpose we have come? For I, you see, could not come yesterday, but now I have come with fillets on my head, so that from my own head I might wreathe the head of the wisest and most beautiful, well! And if I shall say that, what then? Will you laugh at me because I am drunk? But all the same, even if you do laugh, I know well that I am telling the truth. Well, tell me on the spot, shall I enter on the said conditions or not? Will you join me in drink or not?

Apollodorus/ Then they all applauded loudly and asked him to enter and lie down; and Agathon summoned him. And he came led by his creatures; and as he was taking off the fillets to do the crowning, he had had them before his eyes and so did not observe Socrates, he sat down alongside Agathon, between him and Socrates; for Socrates had made room for Alcibiades when he saw him. On sitting down he embraced Agathon and bound on the fillets.

Then Agathon said;

Agathon/ Take off Alcibiades shoes, boys, so that he may lie down in the third place.

Alcibiades/ Certainly, but who is here as our third fellow drinker?

Apollodorus/ And at once he turned around and saw Socrates; and as soon as he saw him he leapt up and said;

Alcibiades/ Heracles! What is the meaning of this? Socrates is here? Once again you lie in ambush; and just as is your habit, you appear suddenly wherever I believed you

were least likely to be. And now, why have you come? And why did you lie down here? For it is not with Aristophanes, or with anyone else who is, or wants to be, laughable that you lie; but you managed it so that you might lie down beside the most beautiful of those in this room.

Socrates/ Agathon, consider! Are you going to defend me? The love I have of this human being has proved quite bothersome. For since the time that I first loved him, it is no longer possible for me to look at or converse with even one beauty; or else in jealousy and envy of me he does amazing things, and abuses me and hardly keeps his hands off me. Take care lest he do something now, and do reconcile us; or if he tries to use force, defend me, since I really quake with fear at his madness and love of lovers.

Alcibiades/ But, reconciliation between you and me is impossible. Well, I shall take my vengeance on you for this at another time; but now, Agathon, spare us some of the fillets, so that I may wreathe this amazing head of his; and he need not reproach me because I wreathed you, and not him; for he conquers all human beings in speeches, and not just the day before yesterday as you did, but at all times.

Apollodorus/ And at once he took some of the fillets, wreathed Socrates, and lay down.

And when he lay down, he said;

Alcibiades/ All right, men. In my opinion you're sober. This cannot be allowed; you must drink, for we have agreed to it. And I choose as leader of the drinking, until you have drunk enough, myself. But let someone do the fetching, Agathon, if there is any large beaker. But there is no need really; just bring that wine cooler there, boy;

Apollodorus/ He saw that it had a capacity of more than eight pints. Once he saw that it got filled he was the first to

drink it off; and then, as he asked that it be poured for Socrates.

Alcibiades/ It is no sophistic stratagem of mine against Socrates, men; for as much as one asks him to, so much he drinks off without any risk of getting more drunk.

Apollodorus/ Then the boy poured and Socrates drank.

Eryximachus/ What are we to do, Alcibiades? Is this to be our way, to say nothing at all over our cups, nor sing anything, but simply to drink like the thirsty?

Alcibiades/ Eryximachus, best son of the best and most moderate father, hail!

Eryximachus/ You too. But what shall we do?

Alcibiades/ Whatever you order. For we must obey you, For a physician is worth the equivalent of many others. Prescribe what you want.

Eryximachus/ Listen then. It was our resolution before you entered that each of us in turn, beginning on the left, should make as fair a speech as he could about Eros, and eulogize him. Now all the rest of us have spoken; and since you have not spoken but have drunk up, it is just that you speak. And after your speech prescribe for Socrates whatever you want; and then let him prescribe for him on his right, and so on for the rest.

Alcibiades/ Well, Eryximachus, what you say is fine, but I am afraid it is not quite fair for a drunkard to be matched against the speeches of the sober. And at the same time, you blessed innocent, has Socrates really convinced you of anything he just said? Don't you know that things are exactly the opposite of what he was saying? For if I praise anyone other than himself, whether god or human being, while he is present, he will not keep his hands off me.

Socrates/ Hush.

Alcibiades/ No, by Poseidon. Say nothing against this, since there is no one else I should praise while you were present.

Eryximachus/ Well, do so, if you want. Praise Socrates.

Alcibiades/ What are you saying? Is it thought that I should, Eryximachus? Shall I assault the man and take vengeance on him in your presence?

Socrates/ You there. What do you have in mind? To praise me for the sake of raising a laugh? Or what will you do?

Alcibiades/ I shall tell the truth. See if you allow it.

Socrates/ Well, if it is the truth, I both allow and order you to tell it.

Alcibiades/ Your word is my command. Now you do as follows. If I say anything that is untrue, check me in the middle if you want to and say in what respect I am telling a lie; for as far as my will goes, I shall not lie. Now if in reminiscing I speak of one thing and then another, don't be surprised; for it is not at all easy for me in the condition I am in to enumerate fluently and consecutively your strangeness.

I shall try in this way, men, to praise Socrates, through likenesses. Now he perhaps will suppose it is for raising a laugh; but the likeness will be for the sake of the truth, not for the sake of the laughable. I declare that he is most strictly like those silenuses that sit in the shops of herm sculptors, the ones that craftsmen make holding reed pipes or flutes; and if they are split in two and opened up, they show that they have images of gods within. And I declare, in turn, that he bears a likeness to the satyr Marsyas. Now, that you are like them at least in looks, Socrates, surely not even you would dispute; and as for your likeness to them in other respects, just listen to what I have to say. You are hubristic,

are you not? For if you do not agree, I shall get witnesses. Well, aren't you a flute player? You are far more marvelous, to be sure, than Marsyas. He used to charm human beings by means of instruments, with the power from his mouth, as anyone still does today who plays his flute songs. For I ascribe to Marsyas as what Olympus fluted since Marsyas had taught him; so that the songs of Olympus, whether a good flutist or a sorry sort of flute girl should play them, are the only ones, because they are divine, that cause possession and reveal those who are in need of the gods and initiatory rituals. And you differ from him only in that you do the same thing with bare words without instruments. We, at any rate, whenever we hear the speeches of anyone else, no matter how good a speaker he is, just about no one gets concerned. But whenever anyone of us hears you or another speaking your speeches, even if the speaker is very poor, regardless of whether a woman, man, or lad hears them, we are thunderstruck and possessed. I, at any rate, men, were I not going to be thought utterly drunk, should tell you on oath exactly how his speeches have affected me, and still do to this very day. For whenever I listen, my heart jumps far more than the Corybantes, and tears pour out under the power of his speeches; and I see that they affect many, many others in the same way. When I heard Pericles and other good speakers, I thought they spoke well, but they could not affect me in any way like that, nor did my soul grow troubled and become distressed at my slavish condition. But I had so often been put in this state by this Marsyas you see before you that I came to the opinion that it was not worth living in the way I am. Now, Socrates, you will not say that this is not true. And even now I know within myself that were I willing to lend my ears, I should not be capable of holding out but should be affected in the same way. For he compels me to agree that, though I am still in need of much myself, I neglect

myself and handle instead the affairs of the Athenians. So it was by main force that I stopped my ears and took off in flight, as if from the Sirens, in order that I might not sit here in idleness and grow old beside him. In regard to this human being alone have I been affected in a way that no one would suspect was in me, to feel shame before anyone at all. Only before him do I feel shame. For I know within myself that I am incapable of contradicting him or of saying that what he commands must not be done; and whenever I go away, I know within myself that I am doing so because I have succumbed to the honor I get from the many. So I have become a runaway and avoid him; and whenever I see him, I am ashamed of what has been agreed upon. And many is the time when I should see with pleasure that he is not among human beings; but again, if this should happen, I know well that I should be much more greatly distressed. I do not know what to do with this human being.

And I and many others have been affected in such ways by the flute songs of this satyr here before us. But as to the rest, hear me tell how he is like those to whom I have likened him, and how amazing is the power he has. For, know well that not one of you is acquainted with him; but I shall make it plain, inasmuch as I have started on it. You see that Socrates is erotically inclined to the beauties and is always around them, and that he is thunderstruck; and again that he is ignorant of everything and knows nothing. Now isn't this guise of his silenic? It certainly is. For he has wrapped this around himself on the outside, just as the carved silenus; but once he is opened up, do you suspect, fellow drinking men, how full he is of moderation? Know that he's not at all concerned if someone is beautiful, and he holds this in such great contempt that no one would believe it, any more than if someone is rich or has any other honor of those deemed blessed by the multitude. But he believes that all

these possessions are worth nothing and that we are nothing, I tell you, and all his life he keeps on being ironical and playful to human beings. And when he is in earnest and opened up, I do not know if anyone has seen the images within; but I once saw them, and it was my opinion that they were so divine, golden, altogether beautiful, and amazing that one had to do just about whatever Socrates commanded. Believing him to be in earnest about my youthful beauty, I believed I had had a lucky find and an amazing piece of good luck: I had the chance, if I gratified Socrates, to hear everything that he knew; for I used to take an amazing amount of pride in my youthful beauty. So with this in mind, though I previously was not in the habit of being alone with him without an attendant, I then sent the attendant away and was alone with him. (For the whole truth must be told you, but pay attention, and if I lie, Socrates, try and refute me.) So I was alone with him alone, men; and I believed he would converse with me at once in just the way a lover would converse with his beloved in isolation, and I rejoiced. But exactly nothing of the sort happened; but just as he used to do, he would converse with me; and having spent the day with me he would take his leave. After this I challenged him to join me in stripping; and I stripped along with him. Here, I thought, I shall get my way. So he joined me in stripping and often wrestled with me when no one else was present. And what need is there to say more? I got no advantage from it at all. And when I made no headway in this manner, I resolved that the man must be set upon by force and not be released, since I was already committed to the attempt, and now I had to find out what was really the matter. I invited him then to join me at supper, simply as a lover plots against a beloved. And he did not quickly yield to me in this, but in time, at any rate, he was persuaded. And when he came for the first time, he wanted, once he had

dined, to go away. And then out of shame I let him go; but I renewed my plotting once more. And tills time when we had dined I kept on conversing far into the night; and when he wanted to go away, I pretended that it was too late and compelled him to remain. So he took his rest in the bed next to me on which he had dined; and no one else slept in the room but ourselves. Now, what I have said up to this point in my speech could properly be told to anyone at all. And you would not hear any more from me than this were it not that, first of all, as the saying goes, wine, with boys and without boys, is truthful, and in the second place, that it is patently unjust for me, once I have come to the point of praising Socrates, to keep hidden his magnificently overweening deed. Furthermore, the affliction of a victim of the viper's bite is also mine. For they say, as you know, that anyone who has been so afflicted is unwilling to speak of what sort of thing it is except to those who themselves have been bitten, since they alone will recognize it and pardon him if his pain brought him to the point of doing and saying anything. Take me, for instance. I was bitten by a more painful viper in the place that is most liable to pain, the heart or soul or whatever name it must have, bitten and struck by philosophical speeches, which grip in a more savage way than the viper, whenever they get a hold on a young soul that is not ill-favored by nature, and make it do and say anything whatsoever, and seeing in turn Phaedruses, Agathons, Eryximachuses, Pausaniases, Aristodemuses, as well as Aristophaneses…and what need is there to speak of Socrates and all the others? You all have shared in the philosophic madness and Bacchic frenzy, so accordingly you all will hear; for you will pardon the things then done and now said. But you house servants, and if there is anyone else who is profane and rustic, put large gates over your ears.

So, men, when the lamp was extinguished and the boys were outside, I resolved that I should in no way complicate the issue before him, but freely speak what were my opinions. And I nudged him and said, Socrates, are you asleep?

Socrates/ Certainly not.

Alcibiades/ Do you know then what I have resolved?

Socrates/ What in particular?

Alcibiades/ You, in my opinion have proved to be the only deserving lover of mine; and it seems to me that you hesitate to mention it to me. Now I am in this state: I believe it is very foolish not to gratify you in this or anything else of mine, my wealth or my friends, that you need; for nothing is more important to me than that I become the best possible; and I believe that, as far as I am concerned, there is no one more competent than you to be a fellow helper to me in this. So I should be far more ashamed before men of good sense for not gratifying a man like you than I should be before the many and senseless for gratifying you.

And when he heard this, he said very ironically, and exactly as he is, and in his usual fashion;

Socrates/ Really, my dear Alcibiades, you're no sucker if what you say about me is really true and there is some power in me through which you could become better. You must see, you know, an impossible beauty in me, a beauty very different from the fairness of form in yourself. So if, in observing my beauty, you are trying to get a share in it and to exchange beauty for beauty, you are intending to get far the better deal. For you are trying to acquire the truth of beautiful things in exchange for the seeming and opinion of beautiful things; and you really have in mind to exchange gold for bronze. But, blessed one, do consider better: without your being aware of it, I may be nothing. Thought, you know,

begins to have keen eyesight when the sight of the eyes starts to decline from its peak; and you are still far from that.

Alcibiades/ And I heard this, and said, This is the way matters stand on my side, not one of my words has been said in a way different from what I think; but you yourself take whatever counsel you believe to be best for yourself and me.

Socrates/ Well, what you say is good; for in the future, after deliberating, we shall do whatever looks best to us two concerning these things and the rest.

Alcibiades/ So I, when I had heard and said these things, and had shot my darts as it were, thought he had been wounded. And I got up, and did not allow him to speak any more, but wrapped my mantle around him, for it was winter, and lay down under his blanket; and I threw my arms around this truly daemonic and amazing being, and lay down beside him the whole night. And not even in this, Socrates, will you say that I lie. But when I had done this, he so far prevailed over me and despised and laughed at my youthful beauty and committed an outrage against it (and in that regard I believed I was something special, men of the jury, for you are the judges of Socrates arrogance)… for, know well, by the gods, by the goddesses, that though I slept the night through with Socrates I got up without anything more untoward having happened than would have been the case if I had slept with my father or elder brother.

So after this, what notion do you suppose I had? I believed I had been dishonored, and yet I still admired his nature, moderation, and courage; I had met a human being whose prudence and endurance were such as I believed I should never encounter. Consequently, I did not know how I could be angry at him and be deprived of his association; nor did I have any resources whereby I could attract him. I knew well that, on all sides, he was far more invulnerable to money

than Ajax was to iron; and even at that one point where I believed he could be taken, he had escaped me. So I was in a quandary; and enslaved by this human being as no one has been by anyone else, I wandered about in distraction. Now, all this had happened to me earlier; and after this we went together on the expedition to Potidaea, and we shared our mess there. Now first of all he faced trials not only better than I did but better than all others. Whenever we were cut off somewhere and compelled to go without food, as happens in campaigns, the others were nothing compared to him in self-control. And again at festivities he alone was able to take pleasure in other things, and in drinking as well; for even though he wasn't willing to drink, whenever he was compelled to do so, he outdid everybody; and what is the most amazing thing of all, no human being has ever seen Socrates drunk. Now it is my opinion that there will soon be a test of this. And again, in regard to resistance against the winter, for winters are terrible there, all the rest that he did was amazing. And once when the frost was the most terrible imaginable, and no one went outdoors (or if any did go out, they wrapped themselves in an amazing number of garments and put on shoes and tied up their feet in felt and sheepskins), he went out among them with the same sort of mantle as he wore at any time, and without shoes he marched through the ice more easily than the others did shod; and the soldiers looked askance at him as if he were despising them. And that is the way things were.

What sort of thing the strong man did and dared there on campaign once, is worth hearing. Once, he had gotten a thought, and he stood on the same spot from dawn on, considering it; and when he made no progress, he did not let up but stood searching. And it was already noon, and the men became aware of it; and in amazement one said to another that Socrates had stood there in reflection since

dawn. And finally some Ionians, when it was evening and they had dined, for it was then summer, brought out their pallets and slept in the cold and watched to see if he would also stand during the night. And he stood until it was dawn and the sun came up; and then having made a prayer to the sun he went away. And in combat, if you want to hear about it, for it is just to credit him with this, once when there was a battle for which the generals gave me the prize of excellence, no other human being saved me but he; for he was not willing to leave me wounded, but saved both myself and my weapons. And I even then, Socrates, asked the generals to offer you the prize of excellence. And in this too you will not blame me and say that I lie; but as a matter of fact, when the generals looked to my rank and wanted to offer me the prize of excellence, you proved more eager than the generals that I take it rather than yourself. Furthermore, men, it was worthwhile to behold Socrates when the army retreated in flight from Delium; for I happened to be there on horseback and he was a hoplite. The soldiers were then in rout, and while he and Laches were retreating together, I came upon them by chance. And as soon as I saw them, I at once urged the two of them to take heart, and I said I would not leave them behind. I had an even finer opportunity to observe Socrates there than I had had at Potidaea, for I was less in fear because I was on horseback. First of all, how much more sensible he was than Laches; and secondly, it was my opinion, Aristophanes (and this point is yours); that walking there just as he does here in Athens, stalking like a pelican, his eyes darting from side to side, quietly on the lookout for friends and foes, he made it plain to everyone even at a great distance that if one touches this real man, he will defend himself vigorously. Consequently, he went away safely, both he and his comrade; for when you behave in war

as he did, then they just about do not even touch you; instead they pursue those who turn in headlong flight.

Now, one could praise Socrates for many other amazing things; but whereas for the rest of his pursuits, one might perhaps say the like about someone else as well, what deserves all wonder is that respect in which he is like no human being, neither the ancients nor those of the present day. For one might liken Brasidas and others to such a one as Achilles was; and, in turn, liken the sort that Pericles was to both Nestor and Antenor (and there are others as well); and of the rest one might make likenesses in the same way. But the sort that this human being in his strangeness proved to be, both in himself and in his speeches, one could not even come close to finding, whether one looked among the men of today or among the ancients; unless, after all, one were to liken him in himself and in his speeches to those I say, to no human being but to silenuses and satyrs.

And what is more, I omitted to say at the beginning that his speeches too are most like the silenuses when opened up. For were one willing to hear Socrates speeches, they would at first look altogether laughable. The words and phrases that they wrap around themselves on the outside are like that, the very hide of a hubristic satyr. For he talks of pack-asses, blacksmiths, shoemakers, and tanners, and it looks as if he is always saying the same things through the same things; and hence every inexperienced and foolish human being would laugh at his speeches. But if one sees them opened up and gets oneself inside them, one will find, first, that they alone of speeches have sense inside; and, second, that they are most divine and have the largest number of images of virtue in them; and that they apply to the largest area, indeed to the whole area that it is proper to examine for one who is going to be beautiful and good.

Here, men, is what I praise Socrates for; and I mixed in with it what, in turn, I blame him for, when I told you how he committed an outrage against me. And what is more, he not only did this to me, but to Charmides the son of Glaucon, Euthydemus the son of Diodes, and many, many others, for while deceiving them into thinking of him as the lover, he brings it about that he is the beloved rather than the lover. It is this that I am telling you, Agathon. Do not be deceived by him; but with the knowledge of our afflictions be on your guard, and do not, as in the proverb, like a fool realize it after you have suffered.

Apollodorus/ When Alcibiades said this, there was laughter at his outspokenness because it was thought that he was still erotically inclined toward Socrates. Then Socrates said;

Socrates/ You are sober, in my opinion, Alcibiades, for otherwise you would never have so elegantly cast a screen about yourself and tried to conceal why you said all this; for you spoke of it as if it were a side-issue by inserting it at the end, as though you had not said everything for its sake, to set Agathon and me at odds, believing that I must love you and no one else, and that Agathon must be loved by you and by no one else. But you did not get away with it; this satyr and silenic drama of yours was quite obvious. Well, my dear Agathon, see that he does not get the advantage, and prepare yourself against anyone setting you and me at odds.

Agathon/ Why, Socrates, I am afraid that what you say is true. My evidence is the fact that he lay down between you and me so that he may hold us apart. Well, he will not get the advantage, but I shall come and lie down beside you.

Socrates/ Yes, do come lie down in the place beside me.

Alcibiades/ Zeus! What the fellow does to me! He believes he must surpass me everywhere. Well, if nothing else, you wondrous being, let Agathon lie down between us.

Socrates/ But that is impossible. For you praised me, and I in turn must praise the one on the right; surely if Agathon lies down next to you, he will not praise me again, will he, before he has been praised by me? But leave it as it is, daemonic being, and do not begrudge the lad's being eulogized by me, for I want very much to sing his praises.

Agathon/ Now I get it, Alcibiades. It is impossible for me to remain here; and I shall not fail to change my place so that I may be praised by Socrates.

Alcibiades/ This is the usual thing. When Socrates is present it is impossible for someone else to get hold of the beauties, just as now you see how resourcefully he has found a persuasive argument to get Agathon to lie down beside him.

Apollodorus/ Now Agathon got up to lie down beside Socrates; but suddenly a large crowd of revelers came to the door; and finding it open, someone had gone out, they walked straight in among the guests and lay down. And everything was full of commotion, and everybody was compelled, but no longer with any order, to drink a great deal of wine. Now Aristodemus said that Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and some others went away, but he himself was overtaken by sleep. And he slept very deeply, because the night was far gone and the cocks were already singing when he woke toward daybreak. And on awakening he saw that the rest were sleeping or had gone away; but Agathon, Aristophanes, and Socrates were the only ones who were still awake, and they were drinking from a large cup, passing it from left to right. Socrates was conversing with them. And Aristodemus said, he did not remember the other points of

the speeches, for he was not only absent at the start, but was dozing, however, the chief point, he said, was that Socrates was compelling them to agree that the same man should know how to make comedy and tragedy; and that he who is by art a tragic poet is also a comic poet. They were compelled to admit this, though they were not following too well and were nodding. Aristophanes went to sleep first, and then, when it was already day, Agathon. Then Socrates, having put them to bed, got up and went away, and he (Aristodemus) followed, just as he was accustomed to; and Socrates went to the Lyceum, washed up, and spent the rest of his day just as he did at any other time. And once he had passed the time in this way, toward evening he took his rest at home.

The Banquet.

or

on Love.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Apollodorus, Friend Of Apollodorus, Glauco, Aristodemus, Socrates, Agatho, Pausanias, Aristophanes, Eryximachus, Phædrus, Diotima, Alcibiades.

Apollodorus/ Respecting the matters, about which you are inquiring, I think myself to be not unprepared. For I happened yesterday to be coming up to the city from my house at Phalerus; when one of my acquaintances, who was behind, seeing me at distance, called out to me; and playing upon my name, said, at the same time;

Glaucon/ Hollo! Apollodorus, you Phalerean, will you not stop?

Apollodorus/ Upon which I stopped, and waited for him.

Glaucon/ Apollodorus, I was just now looking after you, being desirous of hearing fully about the meeting between Agatho, and Socrates, and Alcibiades, and the rest who were present at the supper, which took place then, when there were some speeches on the subject of love. For another person narrated a part, having heard it from Phœnix, the son of Philip; and he said that you knew all: but that he had it not in his power to state anything clearly. Do you then tell me; for you have the best right to narrate the conversation of your friend. But first, tell me, were you present yourself at the meeting or not? —

Apollodorus/ It appears, that your informant has by no means given you a clear account, if you suppose that the

meeting, about which you are asking, took place recently, so that I could be present at it. —

Glaucon/ I thought so. —

Apollodorus/ How, Glauco, could it be? —Know you not, that Agatho has not sojourned here for many years? whereas, since I first passed my time with Socrates, and made it my care each day to know what he said and did, it is not yet three years. Before that time, running about wherever chance led me, and fancying I was doing something, I was more wretched than any being whatever, and not less so than you are now in thinking that you must do everything rather than philosophize. —

Glaucon/ Do not scoff, but tell me when the meeting took place. —

Apollodorus/ When we were still children, it was that Agatho won the prize with the first tragedy, and the day after that in which he and his performers in the Chorus had made the sacrifice for his victory. —

Glaucon/ It is then a long time since, it seems; but who was the relater? Was it Socrates himself? —

Apollodorus/ Not Socrates, by Zeus; but he who told it to Phoenix. It was one Aristodemus, a Cydathencean, a man of small size, and who always went without sandals. He was present at the meeting, being, it seems to me, an admirer, the greatest amongst those then living, of Socrates. Nevertheless, I inquired of Socrates himself about some of the things I had heard from him Aristodemus; and he Socrates confessed to all he had reported. —

Glaucon/ Why then, do not you tell me? The road to the city is very convenient for persons, as they walk along, to speak and hear.

Apollodorus/ Proceeding in this way we entered into conversation together, so that I am now, as I said at the

commencement, not quite unprepared. If then I must relate these matters over again to you, I must do so. Besides, for in other respects, when I am either making myself, or hearing from others, any discourse on philosophy, I feel, independent of considering myself benefited, a delight beyond all bounds. But when I hear some other conversation, and especially yours, who are wealthy, and engaged in money-making, I feel a weariness myself, and pity for you my friends, who fancy you are doing something, while you are in fact doing nothing. But perhaps, on the other hand, you consider me possessed with an evil genius; and I think that you think correctly. I do not however think so of you; but I know it full well.

Friend/ You are always the same man, Apollodorus, ever railing at yourself and others, and you seem to me as if you really thought all men, commencing from yourself, to be, with the exception of Socrates, miserable. Now, from whence you acquired the surname of a madman, I know not; for in your discourses, you are ever in such a mood, and are savage against yourself and all others, Socrates excepted.

Apollodorus/ And is it, my dearest friend, evident then that by so thinking of myself, and you, I am mad and talk at random?

Friend/ It is not worthwhile, Apollodorus, to dispute about this now. But as to what we have requested, do not do otherwise, but tell us what the speeches were.

Apollodorus/ The speeches then were of some such kind as this. But I will rather endeavor to relate, as he Aristodemus related to me all from the beginning.

For he told me that Socrates, having washed himself and put on his slippers, which he was wont to do very seldom, met him; and that he asked him, whither he was going, after he had made himself so smart; when Socrates told him, he

was going to Agatho's to supper; for yesterday said he at the sacrifice for the victory, I avoided him, for fear of the crowd; but agreed to be with him to-day.

Socrates/ I have therefore made myself smart to go to a handsome man in a handsome manner. But how, Aristodemus, have you the disposition to be willing to go with me, uninvited, to a supper? —

Aristodemus/ I will do as you may command. —

Socrates/ Follow me then, that we may by a change pervert the proverb, that

> To the feasts of the good will go
> The good of their own accord.

Homer, however, nearly seems to have not merely perverted the proverb, but to have done violence to it. For after describing Agamemnon as pre-eminently good in the affairs of war, and Menelaus as "a soft-hearted spearman," yet, when Agamemnon had made a sacrifice and was feasting, he has introduced Menelaus as coming to the feast uninvited, an inferior man to the banquet of his betters.

Aristodemus/ Perhaps I too shall run a risk, not Socrates, as you say, but as in Homer, if I, a person of no parts, go to the banquet of a clever man uninvited. Will you then make an apology for bringing me? for, as to myself, I will not confess that I came uninvited, but invited by you.

Socrates/

> "We two together going will consult,
> The one for the other," what we have to say.

But come, let us be going.

Apollodorus/ After conversing a little in this way on they went. But on the way, Socrates, attending to something in his own mind, was left behind in the walk; and that he, Socrates, bade him, Aristodemus, who was waiting, to go on; but that when he arrived at Agatho's dwelling he found the

door open, and there, he said, happened a ludicrous incident. For a servant from within, straightway meeting him, led him to where the rest were reclining at the table; and that Agatho, on seeing him, said immediately;

Agathon/ Aristodemus, you are come very opportunely to sup with us; but if you are come for any other purpose, defer it to another time; for know that I was looking about for you yesterday, that I might invite you, but I could not see you. But how are you not bringing Socrates to us? —

Aristodemus/ And I, turning round, saw nowhere Socrates following me. I stated however that I had come with Socrates, having been invited hither by him to supper. —

Agathon/ You did well; but where is he himself? —

Aristodemus/ He was coming behind me just now; and I too wonder where he can be. —

Apollodorus/ Agatho said to one of his servants;

Agathon/ Boy, will you not make inquiry for Socrates, and bring him in? but do you, Aristodemus, recline near Eryximachus.

Apollodorus/ And he said that a servant washed him, that he might take his place upon the couch; but that some other of the servants came and brought word, that

Boy/ this Socrates had withdrawn himself, and was standing in the porch of a neighboring house; and when I called to him, he refused to come in. —

Agathon/ Absurd! Will you not call him? and do not leave him there. —

Aristodemus/ By no means; but let him alone; for he has such a habit of withdrawing himself. He sometimes stands still, wherever he may happen to be. He will be here presently, as I guess. Do not then disturb him, but let him alone.

Agathon/ Nay then, if you think it best, so we must do. But, slaves, prepare the feast for us the rest. By all means put before us what you like; since there is nobody to superintend—an act which I never do myself. Conceiving then myself and the rest here to be invited by you to supper, entertain us so that we may commend you. —

Apollodorus/ After this, they went to supper; but Socrates had not come in. Agatho, therefore, gave frequent orders to send for Socrates; but Aristodemus would not permit it. That Socrates therefore came, having waited as usual, a not long time, but at furthest, when they were in the middle of supper. Agatho then, who happened to be lying on the couch at the lower end of the table alone, said;

Agathon/ Come hither, Socrates, and lay yourself down by me; in order that, by touching you, I may enjoy that wise thought, which has occurred to you in the porch. For it is plain that you have found out and possess it; for you would not have previously stood aloof. —

Apollodorus/ Socrates then, sitting down, observed;

Socrates/ It would be well, Agatho, if wisdom were a thing of such a kind, as to flow from the party filled with it, to the one who is less so, when they touch each other; like water in vessels running by means of a thread of wool from the fuller vessel into the emptier. For if wisdom were in this state, I should value highly a reclining near you. For I think I should be filled by you with wisdom abundant and beautiful. For mine would be mean and questionable, being as it were a dream. But yours is brilliant, and has a great hope for an increase, since already it has shone out from you so vehemently, and became conspicuous the day before yesterday, in the presence of more than thirty thousand Greeks, its witnesses.

Agathon/ You are saucy, Socrates. But I and you will shortly afterwards try the question touching our wisdom, and Bacchus shall decide the cause, but for the present turn yourself to the supper.

Apollodorus/ Upon this he told me that Socrates reclined himself, and took his supper, and so did the rest, and that they made libations, and sung the praises of the god, and after performing the other rites, they turned themselves to drinking; when Pausanias, he said, opened the conversation thus: —

Pausanias/ Well then, gentlemen, after what fashion shall we drink the easiest and best? For my part, I confess to you that I really feel myself not very well from yesterday's debauch, and I have need of some respite, and so I think the most of you have; for you were here yesterday. Consider then in what way we may drink the easiest. —

Aristophanes/ You speak however well, Pausanias, on this point, that we should by all means procure for ourselves an easy method in our drinking. For I am one of those, who were thoroughly drenched yesterday. —

Eryximachus/ Both of you say well: but I want to hear from one of you, how does Agatho bear up with strength in drinking. —

Agathon/ I am by no means very strong. —

Eryximachus/ It would be a god-send, for us, both myself, and Aristodemus, and Phædrus, and these here, if you, the stouter men at the bottle, have on the present occasion flinched. For we are at all times weak. Socrates indeed I put out of the account; for he is all-sufficient on both points, so that it matters not to him, whichsoever we may do. Since then none of the persons present seem inclined to drink much wine, I may be perhaps the less disagreeable, if I tell

the truth about getting drunk. For from the physician's art, I conceive that this has become a matter quite evident to myself, that drunkenness is for men a very bad thing; and I would neither willingly myself be willing to drink far on, nor advise any other person to do so, especially when still suffering with a head-ache from the night before. —

Phaedrus/ As for me, I am accustomed to attend to you in other respects, and in whatever you say about the physician's art, and so would the rest here, if they are well-advised. —

Apollodorus/ On hearing this, they all agreed not to make the present meeting a debauch; but to drink thus as they pleased. —

Eryximachus/ Since then this has been decreed, that we are to drink as each one pleases, and that there is to be no compulsion, the next thing I have to propose is, to let the flute-playing damsel, who has just come in, go away and play to herself, or, if she pleases, to the women within; but for us to mix with each other to-day in conversation: and on what kind of conversation I am willing, if you wish it, to explain. —

Apollodorus/ This, they all said, they wished, and bade him explain accordingly.

Eryximachus/ The commencement then of my speech is in the style of the Melanippe of Euripides.

The tale I have to tell is not my own.

but from Phædrus here. For Phædrus is on every occasion saying to me, with an air of indignation, Is it not a shocking thing, says he, Eryximachus, for hymns and pæans to be made by poets in honor of some other deities; and yet not one amongst so many poets who have been born, has ever composed a panegyric upon Love, who is a deity of such an age, and of such a power? But if, on the other hand, you are

willing to look carefully into the utilitarian sophists, you will find that some have composed encomiums in prose on Hercules, and other persons, as the best of them, Prodicus, has done. This, however, is the less wonderful. But I have lately met with a little book, by a wise man, in which salt has a wondrous praise for its utility; and upon many, other things of such a kind you may see encomiums. Strange that about such subjects many should have bestowed great care, but that not a single person should ever to this day have dared to hymn Love worthily; and thus has a deity so great been neglected. Now, in all this, Phædrus seems to me to speak correctly. I am desirous, therefore to bring at the same time my contribution to this subject, and to gratify him; and at the same time it seems to me becoming for the persons here on the present occasion to give glory to the god. If then this seems good to you likewise, there will be a sufficient subject of discussion before us. For I vote that each of us shall speak in praise of Love, an oration, the most beautiful he can, proceeding on the right-hand side; and that Phædrus shall begin, as he is reclining at the top, and is, moreover, the father of the discussion. —

Socrates/ Not a single person, Eryximachus, will give a contrary vote. For neither would I say no, who say that I know nothing else than the matters relating to love; nor would Agatho, nor Pausanias, nor would, I ween, Aristophanes, whose whole occupation is relating to Dionysus and Aphrodite; nor would anyone else of these whom I see here. And yet it is not fair and equal for us who are reclining the lowest down. However, if those who are before us shall speak sufficiently and well, it will be enough for us. Let Phædrus then, with fortune favoring, begin and make a panegyric upon Love.

Apollodorus/ To this all the rest assented, and bade him do, as Socrates had said. Of all then which each person said,

neither had Aristodemus a perfect recollection, nor have I of all that he told me: but what was said, and by whom, that seemed to be worth remembering on these points, I will detail the speech of each individual.

He told me then, as I say, that Phædrus first began somewhat after this way, and said—

Phaedrus/ Love is a deity mighty and wonderful amongst men and gods, on many other accounts, and not the least as regards his origin. For to be one of the oldest of the gods, is a thing said he of honor. And there is a proof of this. For the parents of Love neither exist, nor are said by any individual or poet to exist. Now Hesiod says;

> Chaos was first produced; Earth rose the next,
> 'Wide-bosomed, a firm seat for all; then Love—

the poet says that next after Chaos were born these two, Earth and Love. And Parmenides says of Generation, that it

> Plann'd that of all the gods Love should be first.

Acusilaus too agrees with Hesiod. Thus on many sides it is confessed that Love is among the most ancient of things. And being the most ancient, he is the cause to us of the greatest good. For to a person being now young, I cannot mention what is a greater good than a useful lover, or to a lover than an object of affection. For that, which should lead persons who are to live correctly through the whole of life, neither consanguinity is able to produce in us, nor honors, nor wealth, nor anything else, so well as love; I mean some such thing as the shame for base acts, and the love of glory for honorable deeds. For without these two it is not possible for a state or individual to accomplish anything great or honorable. I assert therefore that he, who loves, if he is found committing any base act, or suffering one from anybody, and failing through cowardice to revenge himself, would not be

in so much pain, when seen by his father and friends or anyone else, as by the object of his affection. In the very same manner, we see that the party loved is vehemently ashamed before the parties loving, if discovered doing any dishonorable act. If then there could be any contrivance to form a city or an army of persons loving and loved, it is not possible for them to regulate their own country better than by abstaining from everything base, and having a desire to be honored by one another for what is noble; and fighting side by side, such persons, although few in number, would conquer, so to say, the whole world. For a lover would less endure to be seen by his beloved, when deserting his post, or throwing away his arms, than by all the others; and in preference to this, either to leave behind his beloved when he has fallen, or not to assist him when in danger, he would rather die many deaths. There is not a man so much of a coward as that Love would not divinely inspire him to deeds of velour, and make him equal to the very best by birth. And in good truth, what Homer says, that a god did into some heroes breathe a spirit, this, from himself produced, does Love to all lovers furnish. Moreover, to die for another lovers alone are ready, not only men, but women too. Of this Alcestis, the daughter of Pelias, affords a sufficient proof amongst the Hellenes in behalf of this reasoning, in being alone willing to die for her husband, although his father and mother were then living; whom she so much excelled in affection through love as to prove them to be aliens in blood to their own son, and relations only in name. And having done this deed so noble, she was thought by not only men, but the gods likewise, to have effected that, although many had achieved many and noble acts, to only some, to be easily counted, did the gods grant this as a gift, for the soul to return from Hades; but they sent her back, struck with admiration of the deed. Thus do even the gods especially

honor the zeal bestowed on Love and velour. But Orpheus, the son of Oeagrus, did the gods send back from Hades with his object unaccomplished, by showing him the phantom merely of his wife, for whom he went, and not restoring her real self; because he appeared to act the coward, as being a harper, and not daring, like Alcestis, to die for Love, but contriving to go alive to Hades. Hence on this very account did the gods impose on him a punishment, and caused his death to take place at the hands of women. Not so did they honor him, as they did Achilles, the son of Thetis, whom they sent even to the islands of the blest, because, having heard from his mother, that he would die himself, after he had slain Hector, but that if he slew not Hector, he would return home and die an old man, he dared to prefer, after aiding his lover Patroclus and avenging his fate, not only to die for him, but over him when dead. From whence the gods, being amazingly struck with admiration, honored him exceedingly, because he had valued so highly the person who had loved him. For Æschylus talks idly, in saying that Achilles was in love with Patroclus; for Achilles was more handsome not only than Patroclus, but all the other heroes, and still beardless, and moreover, as Homer says, much younger. But in reality the gods honor most the velour, which is shown in behalf of love: they still feel a greater wonder and admiration, and act more kindly, when the person loved has an affection for the lover, than when the lover has for the loved. For the lover is more of a godlike thing than the loved, as being inspired by a god. On this account did the gods honor Achilles even more than Alcestis, by sending him to the islands of the blest. Thus then do I assert that Love is the most ancient, and most honored, and most powerful of the gods, for the attainment of velour and happiness by man both during life and in the grave.

Apollodorus/ Some such speech as this, Aristodemus told me, did Phædrus pronounce. But after Phædrus, there were some others, which he did not well remember; and omitting these, he repeated that of Pausanias, who said: —

Pausanias/ The subject, Phædrus, does not seem to me to have been fairly set before us, when it was simply proposed to make an encomium upon Love. This would have been well had there been but one Love; but now it is not, for one there is not. Since then one there is not, the better way is for it to be stated beforehand which kind of love we ought to praise. I will endeavor then to put the question on a right footing, and to state first what Love we ought to praise; and then to praise in a manner worthy of the god. We all know that without Love Venus is not. If then there were only one Venus, there would have been only one Love. But since there are two, there must be likewise two Loves. And how are there not two, one the elder, and who had no mother, a daughter of Uranus, Heaven, whom we name the celestial; the other, younger, a daughter of Zeus and Dione, whom we call the vulgar. It is necessary then for the Love who works with the latter Venus to be called the vulgar, but the other, the celestial. All the gods, indeed, we ought to praise; but we must endeavor to state what each has obtained by lot. For every action is in this state; it is itself by itself neither honorable nor base; as for instance, what we are now doing, either drinking, or singing, or discoursing, there is not one of these acts which is good, itself by itself, but it turns out such in the doing. Rightly performed according as it may be done it is right and honorably; not rightly performed, it is dishonorable. So in the case of loving, not every Love is honorable, and worthy to be highly praised, but that which impels to loving honorably. The one then belonging to the vulgar Venus is a Love truly vulgar, and works out whatever

may happen; and this it is which inspires the worthless love; and such persons in the first place love women not less than boys; and next, of such as they love, they love the bodies rather than the minds; and then of persons the most silly that can be, through their looking only to the act of enjoyment, and disregarding the doing so honorably or not. And hence it results that they do whatever they may have in their power, whether good or the reverse. For there is even from the younger deity much than from the other, and partaking of the female and male in its generation. But that from the celestial Venus, in the first place, not partaking of the female, but only of the male, and this is the love of boys: next of the elder, and a not sharing in lust; and hence they who are inspired by this love, turn themselves to the male, feeling an affection for that which is naturally of greater strength and possesses more of mind. And anyone would in the boy-love itself discover those sincerely impelled by this passion. For they do not love boys, but youths, when they are beginning to possess mind. Now this is near the time of their obtaining a beard. But they who begin from this date to love, are, I think, prepared, as if about to associate through the whole of life together, and to live in common, and not, after having obtained an object in an hour of imprudence, through cheating him as a youth, to go away, laughing at him, and to run to another one. There ought then to be a law not to love a boy, in order that much care may not be wasted upon an uncertainty; for it is uncertain to what end may come that relating to boys, whether of vice or virtue, as regards the body or soul. Such a law do men of virtue indeed lay down, themselves for themselves, of their own accord; but we ought to compel in some such way as this those vulgar lovers; just as we compel them, as far as we can, not to fall in love with free-born women. For it is such lovers as these who give rise to the reproach, that, as

some dare to say, it is shameful to gratify a lover. Now they say so with a view to lovers of this kind, from witnessing their conduct at once unseasonable and unjust. For certainly no act done decently and lawfully can bring with it justly blame. And indeed the law relating to love in other states is easy to be understood, for it has been defined with simplicity; but that one here, and that at Sparta, are complex. For in Elis, and amongst the Bœotians, and wherever there are not persons clever in speaking, the law is laid down simply, that it is honorable to gratify a lover; nor would anyone there, either young or old, say that it is disgraceful, in order, I presume, that they who endeavor to persuade over the youths, may not be put to trouble, as being unskilled in speaking. But by those in Ionia, and many other places, where persons live under the barbarians, it is held to be dishonorable. For through their tyrannical governments this, and the love of wisdom and of gymnastic exercises, are considered disgraceful. For it is not, I conceive, to the interest of the rulers that high thoughts should be engendered in their subjects, nor strong friendships formed, nor societies in common; all which those other things and love especially is wont to introduce. And thus by experience learnt the tyrants here. For the love of Aristogeiton and the firm friendship of Harmodius dissolved their power. And thus, wherever it has been held disgraceful to gratify a lover, it has been so laid down through the depravity of the legislators, and the desire of possession in the rulers, and the want of manliness in the ruled; but wherever it is simply enjoined, it is through the listlessness of soul in the legislators. But here the law is placed upon a better footing; although, as I said before, it is not easy to understand it. For to a person considering that it is reputed more honorable to love openly than secretly, and especially the most nobly born and the best, even though they be uglier than others; and on

the other hand, that the exhortation to a lover from all parties is wonderful, as if he were not doing something disgraceful, and that it appears to be honorable to the party obtaining, but not obtaining disgraceful; and that towards making the attempt to obtain, the law grants a permission to the lover, while doing wonderful acts, to be commended, such acts as, should a person dare to do when pursuing anything else whatever, and desirous to accomplish it, except this, he would obtain as the fruit of his doings, the greatest reproaches of philosophy. For if with a desire either to obtain money from anyone, or an office in the government, or a power of any other kind, a person would be willing to do what lovers do towards their boy-loves, by making supplications, and urgent requests in their begging, and swearing oaths, lying down at their doors, and willingly enduring a servitude such as not even a slave would endure, he would be stopped from acting in this way both by friends and enemies the latter reproaching him for his fawning and want of spirit, and the former giving him advice, and feeling ashamed on his behalf. But even a grace follows the lover when doing all this; and he is allowed by the law to do so without reproach, as performing some very honorable act. But the most terrible thing is what the multitude say, that there is to him alone, after swearing an oath, a pardon from the gods for transgressing it. “For an oath, they say, of Venus is no oath.” Thus both gods and men give all kinds of license to the lover, as says the law here. In this way then a person would imagine that in this state it is held a very honorable thing both to love and to be the friend to a lover. But when we see that parents, after appointing instructors over the loved, do not permit them to have any intercourse with their lovers, and that orders are given to this effect to the instructor, and when their equals in age and companions censure them, if they see any such thing taking place, and

when the old folks do not stop the censurers, nor abuse them for speaking not correctly, a person, looking to such acts, would imagine, on the contrary, that love of this kind is here held to be disgraceful. But the case I conceive stands thus. As it was stated at the beginning, to love is not a simple thing. Taken itself by itself I conceive it to be neither honorable nor disgraceful; but if carried on honorably, it is honorable; if disgracefully, disgraceful. Now to gratify a vicious person in a vicious manner is to carry it on disgracefully; but to gratify a virtuous person in a virtuous manner is to carry it on honorably. The vicious lover is he of the vulgar kind, who is in love with the body rather than the mind. For he is not a lasting lover, being in love with a thing which is not lasting; since, with the decaying flower of the body, of which he is enamored, he goes away on wing, putting to shame all his speeches and promises. But he who is enamored of a virtuous character, abides a lover through life, as being closely united with what is itself abiding. Now these our law is desirous to test well and truly, and to permit persons to gratify some, and to fly from others. On this account therefore it exhorts some to pursue, but others to fly; by appointing itself the judge in a contest, and testing of what kind is the lover, and of what the loved. And thus by this very reason it is held by law to be disgraceful, in the first place, for a person to be captivated quickly; in order that time may intervene, which seems to be of many things the fairest test; in the next place, it is held disgraceful for a person to be caught by considerations of money or political power; whether he crouch on being ill-used and do not bear up manfully, or whether, being kindly treated as regards pecuniary and political transactions, he does not feel a contempt. For none of these things appear to be firm and abiding, without a generous friendship being produced from them. There is left then one only way for our law, if the object

in view is to gratify honorably the lover. For our law is, as it was in the case of lovers, that for a person willing to endure any servitude whatever for his beloved youth, it is not an act of fawning nor worthy of reproach. Thus then there is left only one other willing servitude not worthy of reproach; and this is that which relates to virtue. For it is a settled law with us, that whoever wishes to pay court to anyone, conceiving that through that person he shall become better as regards wisdom, or any other part of virtue, such voluntary servitude again is neither disgraceful nor an act of fawning. Now these two laws ought to come to the same point, and both the one relating to the love of youths, and the other relating to philosophy and the other parts of virtue, if indeed it is about to be agreed that it is honorable to gratify a lover. For, when the lover and the beloved youth come together, each having their respective laws, the one in ministering to the beloved youth, who is complying, would justly minister anything whatever, and the other being subservient to the person making him both wise and good, would on the other hand be justly subservient in anything whatever. For the one being able to make a collision for the attainment of prudence and the other parts of virtue, and the other being desirous to acquire instruction and the other parts of wisdom, then only indeed while these two parties come to the same spot, do the matters relating to the two laws fall to the same point, so that it is honorable for the boy to gratify a lover? And in this case it is no disgrace to be deceived; but in the others it brings on shame equally to the party deceived or not. For if anyone for the sake of money gratifies a lover as being wealthy, and is disappointed, and obtains no money, through the lover being found to be poor, the act is not at all the less disgraceful; for such a person seems to lay open his character, and that for the sake of money he would minister in anything to any person. Now this is not honorable. By

parity of reasoning, should anyone gratify a person, as if he were virtuous, and with the view of becoming himself better through the friendship of the lover, and be disappointed through his being found to be a bad man, and not possessed of virtue, the disappointment nevertheless is still honorable: for on the other hand, this person too seems to have laid open his character, and that for the sake of virtue, and to be made better, he would be ready to minister in everything to everyone. Now this, on the other hand, is of all acts the most honorable. So entirely honorable is it to gratify for the sake of virtue. This is that love, the co-worker of the celestial Venus, himself celestial, and of great value to both the state and individuals, through compelling, both the lover himself and the party beloved by him, to pay considerable attention to virtue; but all the others belong to the other Venus, the vulgar. Thus much, Phædrus, have I to contribute, said he, on the instant, upon the subject of love.

Apollodorus/ On Pausanias pausing, —for the wise teach me to talk thus in parities, —Aristodemus told me, that Aristophanes should have spoken: but either from repletion, or some other cause, a fit of the hiccups happened to come upon him, and he became unable to speak; and he said to the physician, Eryximachus, who was reclining lower;

Aristophanes/ You are the proper person, Eryximachus, either to stop my hiccups, or to speak in my turn, until I cease from them myself. —

Apollodorus/ To which Eryximachus replied;

Eryximachus/ I will do both. I will speak in your turn, and when your hiccups are gone you shall speak in mine: and while I am speaking, should the hiccups cease, through your keeping yourself without breathing for some time, it is well, but if not, gargle your throat with water; and if they are very violent, take some such thing as this, with which you

can tickle your nose and then sneeze; and when you have done so once or twice the hiccups will cease, be they ever so violent. —

Aristophanes/ You will not say a word, before I do so.

Apollodorus/ —Eryximachus then said—

Eryximachus/ Since then Pausanias, after setting out so well on the subject has ended imperfectly, it seems that I must of necessity endeavor to put the finish to the speech. In distinguishing Love into two kinds, he appears to me to have correctly divided. And that the Love exists not only in the soul of man for beautiful persons, but for many other objects in other beings likewise, in the bodies of all animals as well as in the productions of the earth, and, so to speak, in all existing things I seem to myself to see clearly from my own healing art; and how great and wonderful a god is Love, who extends his sway over all, as regards things human and divine. And I will commence with the healing art in order that I may give the highest honors to my own profession. Now the very nature of our bodies partakes of this twofold love. For health and disease in the body are confessedly different and unlike. Now the unlike longs for and loves the unlike. The love in a healthy body is of one kind; the love in a diseased body is of another. Now it is, as Pausanias just stated, honorable to gratify the good amongst men, but dishonorable the vicious; so in the case of bodies themselves, to gratify the good and healthy parts of each is well and necessary, and this it is from which there is the name of the healing art. But to gratify the bad and diseased is disgraceful; and he who would act according to art, must deny the gratification. For medical science, to speak summarily, is the knowledge of the feelings of love in the body relating to repletion and evacuation; and he, who in

these appetites can distinguish the right love and wrong, is the best physician; while he who causes a change, so as to obtain one in the place of the other, and knows how to infuse a love into those bodies in which it is not, but ought to be, and how to expel a love which is there, but ought not to be, would be a skillful practitioner. For he should be able to cause things in the body, that are most hostile, to be friendly and to love each other. Now the things most hostile are such as are the most contrary, as cold is to hot, bitter to sweet, dry to moist, and all things of that sort. Into these things our ancestor Æsculapius, knowing how to introduce love and concord, as say the poets here, and as I believe, put together our art. And the present art of healing is, as I state, entirely regulated by this very deity. And in like manner is the gymnastic art, and agriculture. And it is evident to everyone, who gives even a little attention to the subject, that music is in the same state as the others, as Heracleitus perhaps meant to say; for he expresses himself not clearly in his language. For he says that the one disagreeing with itself, is carried on like the harmony of the bow and lyre. Now it is very irrational to say that harmony differs from itself; or that it exists from things that differ: but perhaps he meant to say this; that from a sharp and flat, different originally, a harmony is produced from their subsequent agreement through the art of musicians. For harmony cannot assuredly consist of sharp and flat sounds, while still disagreeing; because harmony is consonance, and consonance is a kind of agreement; and it is impossible for any agreement to exist between things disagreeing, so long as they disagree; and on the other hand, it is impossible to fit a thing disagreeing and not agreeing. So too rhythm is produced from notes quick and slow previously disagreeing, but subsequently agreeing. As there the medical art, so here the musical art, introduces in all these an agreement, by affecting a love of and a

concord with each other; and thus music is the knowledge of amorous unions relating to harmony and rhythm. Now in this combination itself of harmony and rhythm, it is not at all difficult to know thoroughly the amorous unions; for the twofold love exists there not at all. But when it shall be necessary to misuse rhythm and harmony, applied to mankind, by a person composing, what is called setting to music, or in making a right use of melodies and measure composed already, which is called instruction, there indeed the thing is very difficult, and requires a skillful practitioner. For here recurs the same reasoning as before, that we must gratify the well-ordered, and those who would be, but are not as yet, better ordered, and we must guard their love. For this is the honorable, the heavenly, the co-worker with the heavenly muse. But the co-worker with Polyhymnia is the vulgar love, whom a person ought with caution to bring to whom he may bring it, in order that men may enjoy the pleasure from it, and that he may not introduce any intemperance; just as in our own art it is a matter of moment to use correctly the appetites relating to the confectioner's art, so that a person may enjoy the pleasure without detriment to health. Thus, in music, and in medicine, and in all other things, both human and divine, we must, as far as is permissible, watch each of those Loves: for both exist. Since even the constitution of the seasons of the year is full of both these; and when the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, which I mentioned before, meet in opposition to each other, with a well-regulated love, and receive a temperate fitting-together and combination, they come bringing in their train a year of good seasons and health to men, and the rest of animals, and plants, and do no injury. But when the love which is mixed up with ungovernable passion becomes rather violent as regards the seasons of the year, it destroys or injures many things. For from such

seasons are wont to be produced plagues and many other unequal disorders on wild beasts and plants. For hoar-frosts, and hail-storms, and mildews are generated from the excessive and disorderly state of such feelings of love with respect to each other; the knowledge of which, as regards the movements of the stars and the seasons of the year, is called astronomy. Further still, all kinds of sacrifice, and the things over which the diviner's art presides—now these are the reciprocal intercourse between gods and men—are conversant about nothing else than the guardianship and the healing of Love. For every kind of impiety is wont to be generated, if one does not gratify the well-ordered Love, and honor him, and hold him as the chief, —but serve rather the other, —in every act relating to parents living and dead, and to the gods, according as it has been ordained for the divining art to superintend the Loves and to heal them. And again, the divining art is the artificer, skilled in promoting friendship between gods and men, through knowing what things relating to Love amongst mortals tend to justice and impiety respectively. So various and vast, or rather universal, a power does every kind, to speak in one word, of Love possess. But that which is conversant about the good, and is effected in union with temperance and justice, both towards us and the gods, this is the one that has the greatest power, and procures for us every kind of happiness, so as to enable us to associate with each other, and to be dear to beings superior to ourselves, the gods. It is possible, indeed, that I too, in praising Love, have omitted many things; not, however, intentionally. But if I have left out aught, it is your business, Aristophanes, to fill it up; or, if you have it in your mind to praise the god in any other way, praise him, now that your hiccups have ceased.

Apollodorus/ He said then that Aristophanes, taking up the discourse, observed that—

Aristophanes/ the hiccups had very much ceased, not however before the sneezing was applied to them, so that I wonder how a well-ordered part of the body should be in love with such noises and ticklings, such as sneezing is: for when I brought to it a sneezing it immediately ceased entirely. —

Eryximachus/ My good friend Aristophanes, consider what you are doing. For being about to speak, you are acting the buffoon, and compel me to keep a watch over your speech, lest you say ought to excite a laugh, when you might speak in peace. —

Aristophanes/ You have spoken correctly, Eryximachus; and let what I said just now be considered as unsaid. But do not watch me. Since I have a fear of what is about to be said, lest I should say not what will be laughable—for that would be an advantage and indigenous to my muse—but to be laughed down. —

Eryximachus/ Having shot your bolt, Aristophanes, think you to escape? But have a care, and so speak, as if about to give an account for it. Perhaps, however, if it seem good to me, I shall dismiss you unhurt.

Aristophanes/ In good truth, Eryximachus, I have it in my mind to speak in some other way than you and Pausanias have spoken. For to me men appear to be utterly insensible of the power of Love. Since, being sensible of it, they would have instituted most important sacred rites, and built altars, and made to him the greatest sacrifices; nor, as now, would anything of this kind have occurred, at a time when it ought to have occurred the least. For he is, of all the gods, the most friendly to man, the aider of man, and the healer of those wounds which, being healed, there would be the greatest happiness to the human race. I will, therefore, endeavor to explain to you his power, and you shall be the teacher of it to others. But you must first learn the nature of

man, and what sufferings it has undergone. For our nature of old was not the same as it is now. In the first place, there were three kinds of human beings, not as at present, only two, male and female; but there was also a third common to both of those; the name only of which now remains, it has itself disappeared. It was then one man-woman, whose form and name partook of and was common to both the male and the female. But it is now nothing but a name, given by way of reproach. In the next place, the entire form of every individual of the human race was rounded, having the back and sides as in a circle. It had four hands, and legs equal in number to the hands; and two faces upon the circular neck, alike in every way, and one head on both the faces placed opposite, and four ears, and two kinds of sexual organs, and from these it is easy to conjecture how all the other parts were doubled. They walked, as now, upright, whithersoever they pleased. And when it made haste to run, it did, in the manner of tumblers, who after turning their legs upward in a circle, place them accurately in an upright position, support itself on its eight limbs, and afterwards turn itself over quickly in a circle. Now these three and such kinds of beings existed on this account, because the male kind was the produce originally of the sun, the female of the earth, and that which partook of the other two, of the moon; for the moon partakes of both the others the sun and the earth. The bodies thus were round, and the manner of their running was circular, through their being like their parents. They were terrible in force and strength and had high aspirations, and they made an attempt against the gods; and what Homer says of Ephialtus and Otus, was told of them likewise; that they attempted to ascend to heaven with the view of attacking the gods. Upon which Zeus and the other gods consulted together what they should do to them; but they were in a difficulty. They had not the mind to destroy

them by making the race to disappear with the thunderbolt, as they did the giants; for then the honors and the holy rites paid them by that race would have been extinct, nor yet could they suffer them to act wantonly. At length Zeus, on reflection, said, I seem to myself to have a plan, so that men may exist, and still be stopt by becoming weaker from their unbridled licentiousness. For now, said he, I will divide each of them into two; and they will at the same time become weaker, and at the same time more useful to us, through their becoming more in number; and they shall walk upright upon two legs; but if they shall think fit to behave licentiously, and are not willing to keep quiet, I will again, said he, divide them, each into two, so that they shall go upon one leg, hopping. So saying, he cut men into two parts, as people cut meddlers when about to pickle them, or as they cut eggs with hairs. But whomsoever he cut, he ordered Apollo to turn the face and the half of the neck to that part where the section had taken place, in order that the man might, on seeing the cutting off, be better behaved than before, and he ordered him to heal the other parts. And he Apollo turned the face; and pulling the skin together on every side like a contracted purse, over that which is now called the belly, he did, after making a single orifice, tie up the skin at the middle of the belly, now called the navel. He then smoothed the greater part of the remainder of the wrinkles of the skin, and jointed the breast, having an instrument such as shoemakers use when they smooth wrinkles of the leather on the last. But he left a few wrinkles on the belly and navel as a memorial of their original suffering. Now when their nature had been bisected, each half perceived with a longing its other self; and throwing their arms around each other and becoming entwined, they had a great desire to grow together, but they died through famine and idleness. And when one of these halves died, and the other was left,

the surviving half sought another, and was entwined with it, whether it met with the half of a whole woman, which half we now call a woman, or with the half of a whole man. And thus they were in the act of perishing. But Zeus in pity devised another plan, and placed the organs of generation in front, for hitherto they had been on the outside, and they begot and bred, not with one another, but with the earth, like grasshoppers. And therefore he changed them to the front; and by them he caused the generation to be with each other, from the female through the male, on this account, that should a male meet with a female, they might in the embrace at one time generate, and the race be thus propagated; but if at another time a male met with a male, a surfeit might take place from the connection, and that they might cease and turn themselves to their business, and attend to the other affairs of life. From this period has been implanted by nature in mankind a mutual love, which is the bringer together of their ancient nature, and which endeavors to make one out of two, and to heal the nature of man. Each of us then is but the counterpart of a human creature, as having been cut like the Psettæ from one into two. Hence each one is in search of his counterpart. As many men then as are sections of the form common to men, which was then called Man-Woman, are lovers of women; and from this race are sprung the majority of adulterers: and on the other hand, as many women as are addicted to the love of men, and are adulteresses, are sprung from the same race. But such women as are sections of the female, do not pay much attention to men, but turn themselves rather to women; and from this race are the Lesbian courtesans. Such as are sections of the male form, follow the males: and whilst they are young, being fragments of men, they love men and are delighted in being with them; and these are the best of boys and youths, as being the most manly in their

disposition. Yet some say, indeed, they are shameless. But in this they say false; for it is not through shamelessness, but through assurance, and a manly temper and manly look, that they embrace what resembles themselves. And of this there is a great proof. For when they are full grown, such alone turn out men as regards political affairs: but when they have become men, they feel a love for young persons, and do not turn their thoughts to marriage and child-getting naturally, but are led by the force of custom and law, although it would be sufficient for them to continue to live unmarried. Altogether then such a person is both a lover of youths and a lover of those who love him, and ever embraces what is from the same race as himself. Now, whenever the lover of youths, and everyone else, meet with that very thing, the half of himself, they are both smitten with a friendship in a wondrous manner, and attracted by an intimacy and love, and are unwilling to be separated from each other for even, so to say, a brief period. And these are they, who continue to live together through life; and yet they could not tell what they wish to take place to themselves from each other; for it does not seem to be sexual intercourse, that the one should, for the sake of that, be delighted with the company of the other, and seek it with so much trouble; but the soul of each being evidently desirous of something else, which it is unable to tell, it divines what it wishes, and hints at it. And if while they are lying down in the same place, Vulcan were to stand over them with his tools in his hand, and ask them "What is it do ye, mortals, desire to take place, the one by the other?" and if, finding them in a difficulty, were he to demand them again, "Do ye desire this, to be as much as possible in the same place with each other, so as never, by night or day, to be apart from each other? for if ye long for this, I am willing to melt you down together, and to mold you into the same mass, so that ye two may become

one, and as long as ye live, may live both of you in common, as one person; and when ye die, may, having died in common, remain forever in Hades, one soul instead of two. See then whether ye desire this, and it is sufficient for you, should ye obtain it." On hearing this not a single person, I know that, would refuse, nor would he appear to wish for anything else; but everyone would in reality conceive he had heard that which he had long ago wished for, and that having come into the company of, and being melted with, his beloved, he would out of two become one. And of this the cause is, that this was our original nature. We were once whole. To the desire then and pursuit of this whole, the name of Love is given. And we were, as I said, formerly one. But now, for our iniquity, we have been cut in twain by the deity, and have been made, like the Arcadians by the Lacedæmonians, to dwell asunder. There is therefore a fear, that, unless we are well-behaved towards the gods, we shall be again cleft in twain, and go about with our noses split down, as those have, who are modeled on pillars in profile, and become, as it were, pebbles cut through and rubbed smooth. On this account then, it is meet to exhort every man to behave in all things piously towards the gods, that we may on the one hand escape from the ills, and on the other obtain the good, to which Love is our guide and general; to whom let no one act in opposition. For he who acts in opposition, is an enemy to the gods. But by becoming friends and being reconciled to the god, we shall, what few of those now living do, find and meet with our beloved, the halves of ourselves. And let not Eryximachus take me up, and ridicule my speech, as if I meant Pausanias and Agatho. For perhaps they are amongst such, the fortunate few, and are both of them males in nature. I say then of all in general, both men and women, that the whole of our race would be happy, if we worked out Love perfectly; and if each were to meet with his

beloved, having returned to his original nature. If this then be the best, it necessarily follows, that of the things now present, that which is nearest to this is the best; and that is, to meet with youthful objects of love that are naturally suited to one's ideas. In celebrating then the deity who is the cause of this fitness, we should justly celebrate Love; who both at the present time benefits us the most, by leading us to our own; and for hereafter gives us the greatest hopes, that, if we pay the debt of piety to the gods, he will restore us to our original nature, and, by healing us, render us happy.

Such, Eryximachus, is my speech, in behalf of Love, of a different kind from yours. As then I requested, do not ridicule it, in order that we may hear what each of the rest will say; or rather what both will; for the rest are only Agatho and Socrates.

Eryximachus/ I will be obedient; for the speech has been spoken in a delightful manner; and if I were not conscious that Socrates and Agatho were deeply versed in affairs of Love, I should have greatly feared they would be at a loss for reasons through there having been said so much, and of all kinds. But now I have every confidence. —

Socrates/ This is all very well for you, Eryximachus; since you have already gone through the ordeal yourself with honor. But if you were, where I am now, or rather perhaps where I shall be, when Agatho shall have spoken his speech cleverly, you would be in a very great fright, and in every kind of heart-sinking, as I am now. —

Agathon/ You wish, Socrates, to drug me, in order that I may be confused through thinking that the spectators have a great expectation of my being about to make a clever speech. —

Socrates/ I should have been, Agatho, forgetful indeed, if, after witnessing your courage and high spirit, when you

came upon the stage with the performers and looking so numerous an audience in the face, you were about to exhibit your compositions without being in the least daunted, I thought you could be now disturbed on account of us, so few in number. —

Agathon/ Surely, Socrates, you do not think me so inflated by a theatrical audience, as not to know that to a man, who has any mind, a few persons of sense are more awful than a multitude of fools. —

Socrates/ I should be acting not at all correctly if I thought there was anything about you, Agatho, of a boorish nature. But I know very well, that if you met with any whom you considered wise, you would think more of them than of the multitude. But I fear we are not such; for we were there likewise, and made a part of that multitude. But if you had met with other wise men, you would perhaps have felt a shame before them, had you thought you were doing an act really disgraceful. Is it not so? or how say you? —

Agathon/ It is true. —

Socrates/ But before the multitude would you not feel a shame, if you thought you were doing anything base? —

Phaedrus/ If, dear Agatho, you will give Socrates an answer, it will be no manner of concern to him what becomes of anything whatever here, or if he can only have somebody to converse with, and especially one who is handsome. I confess I do with much pleasure hear Socrates conversing: but it is necessary for me to take care of the panegyric upon Love, and to receive a speech from every one of you. But do both of you pay thus your tribute to the god, and then converse.

Agathon/ You say well, Phædrus; and there is nothing to prevent me from beginning my speech. For I shall have frequently the means of conversing again with Socrates.

I wish in the first place to state how I ought to speak; and I will then so speak. For all of those who have spoken before me, appear to me to have celebrated not the god, but to felicitate mankind upon the good, of which the god is the cause. But what he is himself, who has bestowed these gifts, not one of them has explained. Now upon each subject of every panegyric, there is only one correct method; and that is, to detail in a rational way of how great things how great a cause is he, respecting whom the discourse may be. In this way then it is meet for us to make the encomium upon Love, by showing, first, how great he is, and afterwards his gifts. I assert then, that of all the gods in reality blessed, Love is, if it is lawful to say so, and without calling down vengeance, the most blessed of all the gods, and at once the most beautiful and the best. But such he is, being the most beautiful. In the first place, he is, Phædrus, the youngest of the gods. Of this assertion he affords himself a powerful proof, by running away in haste from Old Age, who is quick-footed, it is plain, at least it approaches quicker than is necessary; and which, indeed, Love naturally hates, nor does he come near to it within a great distance; but he is ever with the young, and is. For, as the old proverb rightly has it, "Like always doth approach to like." Now, though I agree with Phædrus in many other points, I do not agree in this, that Love is older than Saturn and Japetus; but of gods, I affirm, he is the youngest, and is ever young, and that the doings of the olden time, which Hesiod and Parmenides detail, were produced, if indeed they say true, by the power of Necessity, and not Love. For, had Love been with them, there had been no castrations, nor bindings, nor those many other acts of violence, but friendship and peace, as now, from the time when Love came to be the ruler of the gods. Thus then he is young, and in addition to being young is a tender being. But he wants a poet, such as Homer was, to express the

tenderness of the god. Now Homer describes Ate as a goddess, and of a tender frame. At least he speaks of her feet as being tender:

> Her feet are tender; not on ground she stalks,
> But on the top of human heads she walks.

The poet then seems to me to show by such a proof her tenderness; because she walks not upon a hard place, but a soft one. And the same proof we shall use respecting Love, that he too is tender. For he neither walks on the ground, nor upon human skulls, which in truth are places not very soft; but on the softest of all existing things, he walks and dwells there. For he has fixed his abode in the dispositions and souls of gods and men: and yet not in all souls indiscriminately: but whenever he meets with a soul possessing a harsh disposition, away he goes, and takes up his abode with a tender one. Since, then, he is ever touching with his feet, and in every way the softest parts in the softest persons, he must needs be extremely tender. Thus then he is very young and very tender; and in addition to these qualities he is of a flexible form. For he would not be able to entwine himself around everything, nor to pass through every soul, at first unperceived, and to go out again, if he were of a hard substance. And a great proof of his form being in proportion and flexible, is in its gracefulness, which Love confessedly possesses in a manner superior to all. For between Ungracefulness and Love there is always a war. His diet too on flowers points out the beauty of his color. For Love does not settle upon a body, or any other spot where flowers are not, or where they have fallen off; but wherever is a spot flowery and fragrant, there he settles and fixes his abode., As regards then the beauty of the god thus much is sufficient; although much still remains. I must speak after this on virtue of Love. Now is the highest praise; that he does no injury to a god or man, nor by a god or man is he injured.

Nor, if he suffers aught, does he suffer by violence; for violence touches not Love; nor if he does aught, does he it with violence; for everyone willingly ministers in everything to Love. But whatever one party agrees to do of his own accord for another party of his own accord, such acts the laws, that are the rulers in a state, say are justly done. In addition to justice, Love has the greatest share of temperance. For to be superior to pleasures and to passions, is everywhere confessed to be temperance. But no pleasure is superior to Love. If then they are inferior, they will be Love's subjects; and he will be their master; and being thus superior to pleasures and passions, he will be pre-eminently temperate. Moreover, as regards velour, not Ares Mars himself can stand up against Love. For it is not Ares that holds Love, but Love Ares, the son, as the saying is, of Aphrodite Venus. Now he who holds is superior to the party held; and he who is the master of the party more valiant than all the rest, will be the most valiant. Thus then have we spoken of the justice, and temperance, and velour of the god; and it is left to speak of his wisdom. As far then as we can, we must endeavor to be in no way wanting. And in the first place, that I too may do honor to my own art, as Eryximachus did to his, the god is so clever a poet, that he is able to make even another person one.

> For each becomes a poet, though before
> He was not musical, when Love touches him.

This testimony it is fitting for us to use, to prove that the poet Love is excellent for all the creative power connected with the Muse. For that, which one has not, or does not know, he cannot either give to another or teach. Moreover who will gainsay the assertion that the making of all animals is through the wisdom of Love, by which all living things are generated and produced? Then as regards handicraft-skill in arts, know we not that he, whose teacher is the deity, turns

out a person of repute and illustrious; but he on whom Love does not lay his hands, remains in obscurity? The art of the archer, and of the physician, and of the prophet, did Apollo invent, under the guidance of Love; so that he would be disciple of Love; and (through desire) the Muses (became the inventors) of music, and Hephaestus, of brass-working, and Athena, of weaving, and Zeus, of governing gods and men. From whence then were the affairs of the gods put into order? Through the birth, it is plain, of the love of beauty; for Love does not follow ugliness. For previously, as I stated at the commencement, many and terrible things befell, as they say, the gods, through the rule of necessity. But when this god was born, through his loving all things of beauty, "to gods and men did all good things arise."—Thus, Phædrus, Love appears to me to be, in the first place, himself the most beautiful and best; in the next, to be the cause of such like beautiful things in other beings. And it comes into my mind to speak something in verse, because he it is, who produces

> Peace amongst men, upon the sea a calm;
> Stillness on winds, on joyless bed sweet sleep.

It is he who divests us of all feelings of alienation; and fills us with those of intimacy; who establishes all meetings such as these, and in festivals, in dances, and in sacrifices, he becomes the leader; introducing mildness, and banishing a harshness of manners; the friendly giver of good-will, the non-giver of enmity; gracious to the good; looked up to by the wise, admired by the gods; envied by those who have no lot in life, possessed by those who have; the parent of luxury, of tenderness, of elegance, of grace, of desire, and regret; careful of the good, regardless of the bad; in labor, in fear, in wishes', and in speech, the pilot, the encourager, the bystander, and best savior: of gods and men, taken all together, the ornament; a leader the most beautiful and best;

in whose train it is the duty of everyone to follow, hymning well his praise, and bearing a part in that sweet song which he sings himself when soothing the mind of every god and man. —

Let this my speech be offered up, Phædrus, to Love, partaking, as best I could, in some parts of what is gay, in others of what is grave.

Apollodorus/ When Agatho had done speaking, all present, said Aristodemus, roared out applause, for he had spoken in a manner worthy of himself and the god. —

Upon which Socrates, looking at Eryximachus, said;

Socrates/ Do I appear to you, son of Acumenus, to have felt just now a fear that was no fear, when I spoke prophetically, what I asserted lately, that Agatho would speak marvelously well, and that I should be placed in a difficulty? —

Eryximachus/ One portion you appear to have foretold truly, that Agatho would speak excellently, but the other, that you would be in a difficulty, I do not consider true.

Socrates/ And how, O happy man, am I not likely to be in a difficulty, and anyone else too, who is to speak after a speech so full of beauty and variety? In other respects it was not equally admirable, but who, that heard the conclusion, would not have been struck with the beauty of the nouns and verbs? For when I consider how unable I shall be to say anything beautiful approaching to this, I should run away for very shame, had I in any way the power. For the speech put me in mind of Gorgias: so that I suffered what is told in Homer. For I feared that Agatho would at last send in his speech the head of that formidable speaker Gorgias against my speech; and, through my inability to say a word, turn me into stone! And I perceived how ridiculous I was then, when I agreed that I would in my turn after you make an

encomium upon Love, and asserted that I had some skill in the matter of Love, yet knowing nothing of it, nor how it was necessary to praise anything whatever. For in my stupidity I thought one ought to speak truths respecting each subject praised, and that these were to be the substratum, and that selecting out of these very matters the most beautiful, to put them together in the most becoming manner. And I had a great notion that I should speak well, as knowing well the truths relating to the praising of anything whatever. But this it seems is not the way to praise correctly, but we must attribute to the subject qualities the greatest and the best possible, whether they are such or not; and if the encomiums are untrue, that is an affair quite immaterial. For it was stated before, as it seems, that each of us should appear to praise Love, and not merely to praise. On this account, I suppose, you turn over every topic and attribute to Love, and assert that he is of such a kind, and the cause of things so great, as to appear the most beautiful and best—to those it is clear who know him not—for he certainly would not appear so to those who did know him. And thus the praise becomes fine and pompous. But for my part, I know nothing of this kind of praise; and through not knowing, I agreed to compose myself in my turn a panegyric. "But my tongue only promised, not my mind." And so farewell to it. For I should not be able to say anything, not I indeed. But I am ready to speak the truth according to my own notions, if you are willing to hear, but not by way of comparison with yours, in order that I may not pay the debt of laughter. Do you then, Phædrus, consider, if indeed you are in want at all of such a speech, whether you wish to hear the truth spoken about Love with such an arrangement of nouns and verbs as may happen to come into my mind.

Apollodorus/ Phædrus then and the rest requested him to speak in the manner which he thought he ought to speak.

Socrates/ Permit me, Phædrus, however, to ask Agatho still some trifling questions; that, after having obtained a confession from him, I may then speak in this way.

Phaedrus/ I permit you. Question him.

Apollodorus/ Hereupon he said, that Socrates began somewhat after this fashion:

Socrates/ In good truth, friend Agatho, you seem to me to have begun your speech well, in saying that we ought in the first place to set forth what is the nature of Love, and afterwards his doings. With this introduction I am quite delighted. Come, then, touching this Love; since you have gone through the other points in a beautiful and splendid manner, tell me this also. Is Love a being of such a kind as to be the love of something or nothing? I do not ask, whether it is of some father or mother; —for the question, whether love is the love of a father or mother, would be ridiculous—but as if I had asked this respecting a father, Is a father a father; and the father of something, or not? In this case you would surely have said, if you wished to answer correctly, that a father is the father of a son or daughter, would you not? —

Agathon/ Certainly. —

Socrates/ And is not a mother in the same predicament? —

Apollodorus/ To this too Agatho assented. —

Socrates/ Answer me still further to a question a little larger, that you may the better apprehend my meaning. If I had asked, What, then, of a brother—whatever that very thing may be—is he a brother of some person, or not? —

Agathon/ He is. —

Socrates/ Is he not of a brother or a sister? —

Apollodorus/ Agatho assented. —

Socrates/ Try then to tell me about love. Is it the love of nothing, or of something? —

Agathon/ Of something, by all means. —

Socrates/ This, therefore, keep to yourself, remembering what it is; but tell me so much as this. Does love desire that very thing, of which it is the love, or does it not? —

Agathon/ Desires it, certainly. —

Socrates/ Whether, when possessing what it desires and loves, does it then desire and love it? or only when not possessing it? —

Agathon/ It would seem only when not possessing it. —

Socrates/ Instead of seeming consider if it be not of necessity thus, that desire desires only that, of which it is in want; and that it does not desire, if it be from want. For to me, Agatho, this seems to be marvelously necessary. But how does it to you? —

Agathon/ To me too it seems. —

Socrates/ You say well. Would then a big man, being big already, wish to be big? or a man being strong, wish to be strong? —

Agathon/ This is, from what has been just now stated, impossible. For, being so, he would not be wanting on those points. —

Socrates/ You say true; for, if a person, being already strong, should wish to be strong, and being swift, wish to be swift, and being healthy, wish to be healthy, one might perhaps imagine that those who are such, as regards these and such-like points, and possess these, would desire those things which they already possess. That we may not therefore be deceived, it is for this that I speak. For if you consider the matter, Agatho, you will see that they, who possess at present any of those things, must possess them,

whether they will or not; and of such a thing, how can anyone ever have a desire? But when a person says thus—"I, who am now in health, desire to be in health; and I, who am now wealthy, desire to be wealthy; and I long for those very things, which I possess;" we should say to him thus: "You mean, my man, that you, who now possess wealth, and health, and strength, are desirous to possess those things for the time to come; since at the present time you possess them, whether you will or not." When you say, therefore, thus—"I desire what is present," consider whether you are saying anything else than this—"I wish that what are now present may be present for the time to come." Would aught else but this be acknowledged? —

Apollodorus/ Agatho agreed that it would not. —

Socrates/ Is not this then, to love to desire that which is not at hand to him, and which he does not possess; and that what are now present should be preserved for him for the time to come. —

Agathon/ Certainly so. —

Socrates/ Both this man, therefore, and everyone else who feels a desire, desires that which lies not at hand, and which is not present, and which he has not, and which he himself is not, and of which he is in want of; such things only are those of which there is the desire and the love. —

Agathon/ Certainly. —

Socrates/ Come then, let us agree upon what has been said. Is Love anything else than, in the first place, the love of something? next, of those things of which there is a want? —

Agathon/ Clearly not. —

Socrates/ In addition to these, recollect, of what things you asserted in your speech there was a Love. But, if you wish it, I will remind you. For, I think, you said something

like this—“that their affairs were put into order by the gods, through a love of things beautiful: for that of things ugly there could be no love.” Did you not say some such thing?

Agathon/ I did say so. —

Socrates/ And you spoke reasonably, friend. Now, if such be the case, would Love be anything else than the love of beauty, and not of ugliness? —

Apollodorus/ He confessed it. —

Socrates/ And has it not been confessed that a person loves that thing of which he is in want, and which he does not possess? —

Agathon/ Yes. —

Socrates/ Love then, is in want of, and does not possess, beauty. —

Agathon/ It is so of necessity. —

Socrates/ What then, do you call that beautiful, to which beauty is wanting, and does not possess it at all? —

Agathon/ Certainly not. —

Socrates/ Do you then, still confess that Love is beautiful, if such be the case? —

Agathon/ I seem nearly, Socrates, to know nothing of what I then asserted. —

Socrates/ And you have, Agatho, spoken fairly. But tell me still one little thing. Do not things good seem to you to be also beautiful? —

Agathon/ They do. —

Socrates/ If then, Love is in want of things beautiful, and if good things are beautiful, Love will be in want of good things likewise. —

Agathon/ I am not able to argue against you, Socrates; let then the case be as you say. —

Socrates/ You are not able, my beloved Agatho to argue against the truth: for to argue against Socrates is by no means difficult. And now here I will leave you. But as regards the discourse about Love, which I heard formerly from Diotima of Mantinea, who was a clever person on these and many other points—for when the Athenians were making sacrifices on account of the plague, she effected its being put off for ten years—she it was who instructed even me in Love affairs. The speech then which she spoke I will endeavor to go through before you on the principles agreed upon by myself and Agatho, relying as well as I can, myself upon myself. It is then, Agatho, very meet to declare, first, as you have stated, who Love is, and of what kind, and then his doings. Now it seems to me a thing the most easy to go through the subject, as the stranger went through it, while sifting myself. For I spoke to her in other words, but on nearly such points as Agatho just now did to me, by saying that Love was a god of goodness, and was also one of things beautiful. But she refuted me with the same arguments as I did this person Agatho; by showing that, according to my own reasoning, Love was neither beautiful nor good.

How say you, Diotima? Is Love an ugly and an evil being? —

Diotima/ Will you not speak words of good omen? Or do you imagine that everything which is not beautiful, must of necessity be ugly? —

Socrates/ Most certainly. —

Diotima/ And is everything that is not wise, ignorant? Or do you not perceive, there is something between wisdom and ignorance? —

Socrates/ What is that? —

Diotima/ To think correctly, and without being able to give a reason, know you not, is neither to know—for how can knowledge exist without a reason? —nor yet is it ignorance; for how can that which hits the truth be ignorance? There is then some such thing as correct opinion between intelligence and ignorance. —

Socrates/ You say truly. —

Diotima/ Do not then compel what is not beautiful to be ugly; or what is not good to be evil. And thus, since you have confessed that Love is neither good nor beautiful, do not fancy a whit the more that he is ugly and evil; but something, between those two. —

Socrates/ However, he is acknowledged by all to be a god of might. —

Diotima/ By all who do not know him, or by those who do likewise? —

Socrates/ By all universally.

Diotima/ How, Socrates, can he be acknowledged a god of might by those, who say he is no god at all? —

Socrates/ Who are they?. —

Diotima/ You yourself, are one and I am one. —

Socrates/ How say you this? —

Diotima/ Easily. For tell me. Say you not that all the gods are blest and beautiful? or would you dare assert that anyone of the gods is not beautiful and blest? —

Socrates/ Not I, indeed, by Zeus. —

Diotima/ Say you not that those who possess things good and beautiful are happy? —

Socrates/ Certainly. —

Diotima/ But you have confessed that, through the want of things good and beautiful, Love has a desire for those very things of which he is in want. —

Socrates/ I have confessed. —

Diotima/ But how can he be a god, who has no share in things beautiful and good? —

Socrates/ It seems, by no means. —

Diotima/ You see then, that even you do not consider Love as a god. —

Socrates/ What then, is Love a mortal? —

Diotima/ Least of all. —

Socrates/ What then? —

Diotima/ As in the case before mentioned, between a mortal and immortal. —

Socrates/ What is this, Diotima? —

Diotima/ A great dæmon, Socrates. For the whole dæmon-kind is between a god and mortal. —

Socrates/ What power has it? —

Diotima/ It interprets for, and transmits to, the gods what is sent from men; and for and to men what is sent from the gods; from men, their petitions and sacrifices; from the gods, their commands and returns for sacrifices; and being in the middle space between both gods and men it fills up the whole. So that by it all have been bound together into one. Through them proceeds every kind of prophecy, and the priestly art relating to sacrifices, and initiations and incantations, and the whole of magic and sorcery. For a god is not mixed up with man; but through that middle nature is carried on all intercourse and converse between gods and men, whether awake or asleep. Now he who is wise in things of this kind is a dæmon-like man; but he who is wise in any other matter, whether arts or handicrafts, is an operative merely. But these dæmons are many and various, and one of them is Love. —

Socrates/ But, from what father or mother is he? —

Diotima/ It is a rather long story, to tell. However, I will relate it. When Venus was born the gods had a feast, all the rest, and likewise Plenty, the son of Planning. And when they had supped, Poverty came to beg, as there was good cheer there, and she staid about the door. Just then Plenty, intoxicated with nectar, —for as yet wine was not, —went into the garden of Zeus, and being drowsy with liquor, fell asleep. Poverty therefore laid a plot against him, so as to have a child by Plenty, and placed herself down by him, and became pregnant with Love. Hence Love has become the follower of and attendant upon Venus, as having been begotten on the birth-day of that deity, and being also naturally fond of the beautiful and of Aphrodite, as being beautiful. As Love then is the son of Plenty and of Poverty, he is in this state of fortune. In the first place, he is always poor and so far from being either tender or fair, as the multitude fancy, he is rough and dirty, and shoeless, and houseless, ever stretched on the bare ground, and bedless, and lying at doors, and in the road under the sky alone; and as partaking of his mother's nature, dwelling ever with indigence. On the other hand, taking after his father, he is a plotter against the beautiful and good; courageous and bold, and on the stretch to act; a skillful hunter, forever weaving some contrivance; eagerly desirous of intellect, and finding away for himself; acting the philosopher through the whole of life; a clever sorcerer and a drug-employer, and sophist; and naturally neither an immortal nor a mortal; but at one time in the same day he blooms and lives, when he is faring well; and at another time he dies; but revives again through his father's nature. Whatever is furnished to him, is ever secretly flowing out; so that Love is never either in want or in wealth. He is likewise in a middle place between wisdom and ignorance. For the case is this: —

No god philosophizes, or desires to become wise; for they are so; and if there is any other being who is wise, neither does he philosophize. Nor yet are the ignorant philosophers, nor do they desire to become wise. For on this very account, Ignorance is in a hard case, in that a person, being neither beautiful, nor good, nor wise, still appears to himself to be all-sufficient. Hence he who fancies himself to be not wanting, does not desire that, of which he fancies he is not in want. —

Socrates/ Who then, Diotima, are they who philosophize? if they are neither the wise nor the ignorant? —

Diotima/ This, is surely clear even to a child, that they are those between both of these; of whom Love too is one. For of the things most beautiful is wisdom. Now Love is conversant with the beautiful. So that it is of necessity for Love to be a lover of wisdom, and for a lover of wisdom to be between the wise and the ignorant. And of this too the cause is in his birth; for he is from a father wise and in abundance, but from a mother unwise and in want. Such, my dear Socrates, is the nature of this dæmon. But as to whom you fancied to be Love, you have suffered nothing to be wondered at. For you fancied, as it seems to me, making a guess from what you are saying, that Love is the thing loved, and not the loving; and hence, I think, Love appeared to you to be all-beautiful. For the thing loved is in reality beautiful and delicate and perfect and blest. But the thing loving possesses another nature, and such as I have described. —

Socrates/ Be it so, stranger lady; for you have spoken well. But if Love be of such a nature, of what advantage is he to mankind? —

Diotima/ This, Socrates, I will subsequently endeavor to teach you. Love then is of such a nature, and has been so begotten; and he is, as you assert, the love of things

beautiful. Now should anyone ask us, What is, O Socrates and Diotima, the Love of things beautiful? —but I will speak more clearly in this way—What does the lover of things beautiful long for? —

Socrates/ For them to be his. —

Diotima/ This answer, seeks still such a question as this. What will there be to that man, who shall possess things beautiful? —

Socrates/ To this question, I had it not in my power to give an answer very ready at hand. —

Diotima/ But, should a person making a change, and putting good in the place of beautiful, inquire of you by saying, Come tell me, Socrates, what does the lover of good things long for? —

Socrates/ For them to be his. —

Diotima/ And what will there be to a man, who shall possess good things? —

Socrates/ This is more easy to answer: that he will be happy. —

Diotima/ Right; for by the possession of good things the happy are happy, nor is there any need to ask, Why does he, who wishes to be happy, wish so; but the answer appears to be conclusive. —

Socrates/ You say true. —

Diotima/ Now do you conceive, that this wishing and this longing is common to all men, and that all wish for good things to be in their possession always; or how say you? —

Socrates/ I think in this way; that it is common to all. —

Diotima/ Why then, Socrates, do we not say that all men are in love, if all love the same things, and always? but say rather, that some are in love, and some are not? —

Socrates/ I too am in a wonderment. —

Diotima/ Do not wonder; for after we have taken away a certain species of love, we call it love, adding the name of the whole; but as regards the rest, we make an improper use of other names. —

Socrates/ As how, for example? —

Diotima/ As this. You know that creation is a thing of extensive meaning. For that which is the cause of anything coming out of non-existence into existence, is altogether a creation. So that all the operations effected by all the arts, are creations; and all the workers of them are creators. —

Socrates/ You say true. —

Diotima/ And yet you know, they are not called creators, but have other names; but from all kinds of creation one portion has been separated, relating to the musical art and to meters; and is called by the name belonging to the whole. For it alone is called poesy i.e. making; and they, who possess this portion of the creative power, are poets i.e. makers: —

Socrates/ You say true. —

Diotima/ Just so it is with Love. Universally all long after good things; and a state of good fortune is to everyone a Love the greatest and deceitful. But some persons, turning themselves towards him in many and various ways, either through money-making, or a love of gymnastic exercises, or of wisdom, are neither said to be in love nor are called lovers; while others who go, and are seriously occupied, according to one kind of love, have the name of the whole, and love, and are said to be in love, and are called lovers. —

Socrates/ You are very near the truth. —

Diotima/ There is a story told, that they who are in love are in search of their other half. But my doctrine is, that a person loves neither the half nor the whole of anything, unless it happens, my friend, to be somehow a good. Since

men are willing to have their feet and hands cut off, if their own limbs are deemed to be an evil. For each person does not hug his own, I fancy, unless he calls good his own property, but evil the property of another: since there is nothing else of which men are in love, but good alone. How do they seem to you? —

Socrates/ By Zeus, to me at least not otherwise. —

Diotima/ May we not then say simply, that men love the good? —

Socrates/ Yes. —

Diotima/ What, must we not add that they desire the good to be present to them? —

Socrates/ This must be added. —

Diotima/ And not only, to be present, but to be present always? —

Socrates/ This too must be added. —

Diotima/ There is then, to speak comprehensively, the desire that the good should be present to a person forever. —

Socrates/ You speak most truly. —

Diotima/ Since then, there is the love of this, the good, of those who pursue it in any manner, and by any act, the eagerness and the stretch for it would be called love. But can you state what this act would happen to be? —

Socrates/ I should not however have wondered, Diotima, at your wisdom, nor have frequented your school to learn these very things, had I been able to tell. —

Diotima/ Well then, I will tell you. The act is of breeding upon a beautiful thing, as regards both the body and soul. —

Socrates/ What you are saying, has need of divination. For I do not understand. —

Diotima/ I will speak then, more clearly. All human beings, Socrates, yearn, as regards the body and soul; and when they arrive at maturity our nature longs to beget. But it is unable to beget upon an ugly thing, but only upon a beautiful one. For the begetting is through the connection of a man and woman. But this is a god-like act, and this the yearning and generation is in a mortal animal an immortal act. But these it is impossible to take place in a thing unsuitable. Now what is ugly is ill-suited to everything that is divine? But what is beautiful is suited. For Beauty is Fate and Eileithuia, who presides over child-birth. Hence when what is yearning comes close to what is beautiful, it becomes joyous, and being delighted it pours itself out and breeds and begets. But when it comes close to what is ugly, it assumes a sour look, and is vexed and coils itself up, and turns away, and unrolls itself, and does not beget, but restraining the swelling, it takes the matter grievously to heart. Hence to the party yearning and swelling with desire, there is an excessive fluttering of mind respecting the beautiful; on account of its being able to deliver him who has it from his great agony. But, Socrates, this is not, as you fancied, the love of the beautiful. —

Socrates/ Of what then is it? —

Diotima/ It is the love of generation and of begetting in a beautiful thing. —

Socrates/ Be it so. —

Diotima/ By all means. —

Socrates/ But why of generation? —

Diotima/ Because generation is a thing ever producing, and immortal, as far as it can be for a mortal. Now from what has been agreed upon it is necessary to desire immortality with a good, if there is to Love the desire of the good being

ever present to himself. It is necessary then from this reasoning, that there is a love likewise of immortality.

Socrates/ All this did Diotima teach me, when she was discoursing upon love matters. And once upon a time she asked me;

Diotima/ What do you imagine, Socrates, to be the cause of that love and desire? Do you not perceive how vehemently all brute animals are affected, when they feel such a desire to breed, both beasts and birds? how they are all sick and lovingly disposed, in the first place, to have a connection with each other; and afterwards to rear their offspring; and how ready in their behalf the weakest are to fight against the strongest, and to die for them, and though they are themselves pining away with hunger, they do not faint in doing everything, so as to bring them up. Human beings indeed, one might fancy, acted thus from reflection, but what reason is there for wild animals to be so lovingly disposed. Can you state? —

Socrates/ And I said again that I did not know. —

Diotima/ And do you think, ever to become a person of power in questions of love, if you do not understand this? —

Socrates/ It is for this very reason, Diotima, as I just now stated, that I come to you, being well aware that I have need of teachers. Do you then tell me the cause both of this and of all the rest relating to questions of love. —

Diotima/ If you believe then, that there is naturally the love of that, which we have often confessed, do not wonder. For here, on the same ground as that, the mortal nature seeks as far as possible to be ever and immortal. Now this it effects only by generation; when it leaves another new thing in the place of the old; since at the time when each individual animal is said to live, and to be the same; as for instance, a person is called the same from childhood, until he becomes

an old man; and though he never possesses the same things in himself, he is nevertheless called the same person, being perpetually altered, by obtaining some new things, and losing the old, as regards the hair and flesh, and bones and blood, and the whole body. And not only as regards the body, but the soul likewise; his manners, morals, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, all these never remain the same to any man; but some are produced, and some destroyed. And there is something still more strange than this; since not only are some sciences produced, and some lost by us, but we are never the same, not even as regards sciences in general; but each single science suffers in a similar way. For what we call to practice oneself is to act, as if a science were about to depart; and indeed oblivion is the departure of science; but practice, introducing again a fresh remembrance in the place of the departing one, preserves the science, so that it seems to be the same. In this manner everything mortal is preserved, not by its being in every respect the same forever, as the deity is; but by the thing that is departing and growing old, leaving another new thing, such as it was itself. By this contrivance, Socrates, that which is mortal partakes of immortality, both body and all other things. But that which is immortal in another way. Do not then wonder that everything honors its own offspring. For this earnest attention and love follows everything for the sake of immortality. —

Socrates/ And I on hearing the discourse was amazed and said;

Be this so thou most wise Diotima; since such is truly the case. And she, like the perfect sophists, replied;

Diotima/ Rest assured, Socrates. Since, if you are willing to turn your eyes to the love of glory in mankind, you would wonder at your want of reason touching the points on which I have spoken, unless you bear in mind and consider how

terribly they are affected with the desire to become renowned;

And fame undying to lay up for ever.

And for this they are ready to run the risk of all kinds of danger, even still more than for their children, and to expend their substance, and undergo labors of whatsoever kind, and for it to die. Since do you fancy, that Alcestis would have died for Admetus, or Achilles have died over the body of Patroclus, or your countryman Codrus to preserve the kingdom for his children, had they not thought that of their virtuous deeds the remembrance would never-dying live, as it actually does forever, which we cherish to this day? —

Socrates/ Far from it.

Diotima/ But I think, that in behalf of undying virtue, and of a reputation glorious as this, all men perform all deeds, and so much the more, as they are the more excellent. For they have a yearning for immortality. —

They then, who have a yearning according to the body, turn themselves rather to women, and are in this way given to love affairs; and by child-getting procure for themselves, as they fancy, immortality and a remembrance and happiness for the time to come. But they who have a yearning according to the soul—

Socrates/ Are there then, they who yearn in their souls? —

Diotima/ Still more than in their bodies; for which it is fitting for the soul to yearn and to bring forth. What fitting offspring is this? Intellect and every other excellence. Of which all poets are the generators, and such handy-craftsmen as are said to be inventive. But the greatest and most beautiful part of intellect is that, which is conversant in the well-ordering of cities and private dwellings, to which is given the name of temperance and justice. With these

when anyone is teeming from his youth, as being divine in his soul, and when he has arrived at a mature age, he longs already to beget and breed; and he seeks, I think, even he, going about, for the beautiful thing, upon which he may generate: for he never will generate on what is ugly; and thus yearning, he takes to his arms handsome bodies rather than the ugly; but if he meets with a soul beautiful and noble, and finely molded, he ardently embraces both united; and to such a person he immediately discourses copiously on virtue, and what a virtuous man ought to be, and what pursuits he should follow; and he endeavors himself to act the teacher; for laying hold, I think, of a beautiful thing, and associating with it, he breeds and begets that, with which he has been yearning of old, and has both present and absent borne in recollection; and in common with the other party, he brings up what has been produced; so that such persons have a communion of feeling towards each other much greater than what arises from other children, and a friendship more firm; inasmuch as they have a joint interest in children more lovely and more immortal. Now everyone would choose that such children should be born to him rather than those of a human kind. And turning his thoughts to Homer, Hesiod, and the rest of the excellent poets, he would envy them for having left such an issue of their own, as to obtain for them an undying glory and remembrance. Or, if you prefer it, see what children Lycurgus left behind him at Lacedæmon, the saviors of their country, and, so to say, of the whole of Greece. Amongst yourselves, too, how honored is Solon, for his begetting the laws! and there are many other men elsewhere and in many places amongst both the Greeks and Barbarians, who have shown forth many and noble deeds, and begotten every kind of virtue. And to them many holy rites have been paid on account of such their progeny; but never to any man on

account of his human offspring. In such mysteries relating to Love even you, Socrates, would perhaps be initiated. But the consummation, on account of which the looking-on itself exists, if a person follows the rites correctly, I know well you would not complete. However, I will tell you, and not be wanting in a readiness to instruct you. But do you endeavor to follow me, as long as you are able. He then, who would rightly arrive at this consummation, must begin when young to direct his steps to forms that are beautiful. And if, in the first place, his leader conducts him rightly, he must feel a love for one of them, and there beget conversations full of beauty. In the next place, he must have a due perception that the beauty, which exists in any form whatever, is the brother to that which is in a different form. And if he must pursue the beauty, which is in a species, there would be a great want of understanding not to consider the beauty found in all bodies as one and the same. And he, who thus considers, must become a lover of all beautiful forms, and relax the violence of his love for a single form, and despise it, and hold it of no moment; and afterwards consider of greater value the beauty existing in the soul, than that existing in the body; so that, if there be a person only reasonably beautiful in soul, and if he bears only a small flower, he should be satisfied to feel a love, and to tend with care, and to give birth to conversations of this kind, full of beauty, and to seek such as will make the young better, in order that he may, on the other hand, be compelled to behold the beauty existing in the employments of life, and the regulations of laws, and to see this, that all this has an affinity with itself, in order that he may consider as of little value the beauty that is around the body; and after these liberal employments to lead him to sciences in order that he may see again the loveliness of science; and looking upon beauty as being now manifold, he may no longer be the slave

of that which exists in one form—as a domestic is contentedly in love with the beauty of a little child, or of a man, or one employment—and become a person of no mark, and of contracted notions; but turning himself to the wide sea of beauty, and contemplating the many and beautiful and magnificent discourses, he may there give birth to conceptions in unstinting philosophy, until being there in philosophy strengthened and increased, he shall behold some single science of such a kind that it is conversant with so great and beautiful a thing. But now try, to give me all the attention you can. Whoever then has been instructed thus far in the mysteries of Love, and has beheld in due order and correctly the things of beauty, he will, when he arrives at the consummation of the things of Love, see on a sudden some wondrous sight of natural beauty, for the sake of which all his previous labors have been undertaken. For in the first place, it exists for ever, being neither produced nor destroyed, and neither suffering increase nor decay. In the next place, it is not beautiful only on this side, but ugly on that; nor only at one time, but not so at another; nor as regards one point beautiful, but as regards another ugly; nor as being beautiful in the eyes of some, but ugly in the eyes of others; nor will its beauty be a mere outward appearance, as if it were a face, or hands, or anything else in which the body participates; nor is it any discourse or science; nor does it exist in any other being, such as an animal; nor in the earth, nor in the heavens, nor in any other part of the universe; but it subsists by and with itself, and possesses a form eternally one; while all the other things are beautiful through their participating in this, in some such manner, that whereas the rest are produced and destroyed, it becomes neither greater in aught, nor less, nor is exposed to any state of suffering. And when ascending from these, through rightly loving the young, he begins to have a view of

the beautiful, he will have nearly arrived at the consummation. Now this is to march by oneself correctly to the affairs of Love, or to be led by another; beginning from the things of beauty, to keep ascending, for the sake of the beautiful itself, by making use as it were of steps, from one beautiful object to two, and from two to all; and from the beauty of bodies to the beauty of soul; and from the beauty of soul to that of pursuits; from the beauty of pursuits to that of doctrines; until he arrives at length from the beauty of doctrines generally, to that single one relating to nothing else than beauty in the abstract, and he knows at last what is the beautiful itself. In this state of life, if anywhere, dear Socrates.

Socrates/ Said the stranger-prophetess;

Diotima/ should a person live, contemplating beauty in the abstract; which should he behold, it will appear to be not in a bit of gold, nor in dress, nor in beautiful boys or youths; with the sight of which you are struck, and are ready both yourself and many others, if it were possible, to look upon your beloved and live with them forever, and to neither eat nor drink, but to feast yourselves with the view, and to be together. What think you then, would take place, if it were in the power of any person to behold beauty itself, clear as the light, pure and unmixed, but not polluted with human flesh and color, and much of other kinds of mortal trash; but be able to view the godlike beautiful in its singleness of form? Think you, that the life of a man would be of little account who looks thither, and beholds it with what he ought, and is in its company? Perceive you not, that there alone will it be in the power of him, who looks upon the beautiful with the eye by which it can be seen, to beget not the shadowy show of virtue—as not coming in contact with shadowy shows—but virtue in reality, as coming in contact with a reality; and that to a person, begetting virtue in reality and bringing her

up, it will happen for him to become god-beloved, and, if ever man was, immortal. —

Socrates/ Thus, friend Phædrus and ye the rest here, spoke Diotima, and I am myself convinced, and being convinced, I am endeavoring to convince the rest, that no one would readily find a better assistant to human nature for the attainment of such a possession than Love. And hence I assert, that every man ought to hold Love in honor; and I do myself pay all honors to the things of Love, and cultivate them particularly, and I exhort others likewise; and both now and ever I celebrate, as far as I can, the power and the excellence of Love. —Consider then, Phædrus, this speech as having been spoken in praise of Love, if you are so inclined; but if not, giving it

> "What thou, with thy genius, thy youth, and thy name,
> Thou born of the Russells, whose instinct to run
> The accustomed career of their sire is the same,
> As the eaglet's to soar with its eyes to the sun."

any other name, and taking it in any other sense, so call it.

Apollodorus/ When Socrates had thus spoken, the rest praised the speech; but Aristophanes endeavored to say something, because Socrates had, when speaking, alluded to his speech. On a sudden, however, the door of the porch was knocked at and it sent within a loud noise, so that there was heard the voice of revelers, and of a pipe-playing damsel. Upon this Agatho said to the servants;

Agathon/ Will you not see to the matter? and if there is any acquaintance, invite him in; but if not, say that we are no longer drinking, and have already left off.

Apollodorus/ Not long afterwards, the voice of Alcibiades, who was very drunk, was heard in the court, bawling very loud, and asking—Where is Agatho? and ordering a slave to lead him to Agatho. The flute-player, therefore, and some

others of his followers, supported him towards Agatho, and he stood at the door crowned with a garland of ivy and violets, and having very many fillets on his head, and exclaiming;

Alcibiades/ All hail, my friends! Either receive as a fellow-tippler a man very drunk, or let us depart, after crowning Agatho alone, for which purpose we have come. For I was not able to come yesterday; but I am here now with fillets on my head, that, from my own, I may bind them on the head of the wisest and the most beautiful person. If I should say so, will you laugh at me, as being drunk? However, although you may laugh, I well know that I am speaking the truth. But tell me immediately, shall I come in or not on these conditions? Will you drink with me or not?

Apollodorus/ Thereupon all the company was in an uproar, and ordered him to enter and recline on a couch, and Agatho too invited him. And Alcibiades came, led by his attendants; and at the same time taking off the fillets, as if about to bind them on Agatho, he did not see Socrates, who was before his eyes, but sat down by Agatho, and between him and Socrates: for Socrates had made way for him that he might sit down; and sitting down he embraced Agatho, and bound the fillet on him. Thereupon said Agatho;

Agathon/ Slaves, unloose the sandals of Alcibiades, that he may recline as the third among us.

Alcibiades/ By all means; but, who is this third person our fellow-drinker?

Apollodorus/ and at the same time turning round, he beheld Socrates; and on seeing him, he started up, and exclaimed;

Alcibiades/ O Hercules! what is this? What ho Socrates? are you again sitting here in ambush against me, just as you are wont to do, and to appear suddenly, where I least

expected you would be. And why are you reclining here? and not with Aristophanes, or any other person who is, and wishes to be a source of merriment? But you have contrived to sit near the most beautiful of those within.

Socrates/ See, Agatho, if you can assist me; for the love of this man here is to me no trifling matter; since from the time when I fell in love with him, I am no longer permitted either to look at, or speak to, any beautiful person; or he is, through jealousy and envy, practicing strange devices, and abuses me, and scarcely keeps off his hands? See therefore that he does not do something now, but do you reconcile us; or, should he attempt to do any violence, do you assist me: for I greatly fear the madness of this man, and his strong feeling of love. —

Alcibiades/ But, there shall be no reconciliation between you and me. For I will by and by revenge myself upon you for this. But for the present, Agatho, give me some of the fillets, that I may bind them on the wonderful head of this man, and he may not find fault with me, because I have bound the fillets on you, but not on him, who vanquishes all men in discourse, not only lately as you have done, but at all times, upon all subjects.

Apollodorus/ And at the same time, taking some of the fillets, he bound them upon Socrates, and laid himself down. When he had laid himself down, he said;

Alcibiades/ Let things be; for you appear to me to be sober; this you must not be allowed, but you must drink; for so it has been agreed. I therefore elect myself the chairman until you have drunk enough. But, Agatho, let someone bring a beaker, if there is a large one; or rather, there is no need; but bring hither, boy, that wine cooler, which seems to hold more than eight kotylæ.

Apollodorus/ Having filled it, he first drank it off himself; and afterwards ordered them to pour out of it for Socrates, and stated at the same time;

Alcibiades/ This stratagem of mine, gentlemen, is of no avail against Socrates; for, let him drink as much as anyone may command, he will not be a bit the more intoxicated.

Apollodorus/ Socrates then, when the boy had poured out the wine, drank it off.

Eryximachus/ What shall we do, Alcibiades? Shall we neither say nor sing over the cup, but drink really like those who are thirsty?

Alcibiades/ Hail, Eryximachus! thou best of men, sprung from the best and most temperate of fathers.

Eryximachus/ And hail thou too. But what shall we do?

Alcibiades/ Whatever you may order; for you we must obey. For

> A man of physic has 'gainst many others
> A worth.

Order then what you will.

Eryximachus/ Hear then. Before you came in, it was determined that everyone, beginning at the right hand, should in turn make a speech in praise of Love, to the best of his ability. All the rest of us, therefore, have spoken; and it is just, since you have not spoken, but have been drinking, that you too should make a speech; and, when you have spoken, order Socrates to do whatever you please, and he too order the person on his right hand, and so with respect to the rest.

Alcibiades/ You say well, Eryximachus; but it is not fair to compare a drunken man against a sober one in their speeches. But, O happy man, does Socrates persuade you with respect to what he has just now said? Or do you know that everything is the contrary to what he has said? For he

it is, who, when I in his presence praise anyone, except himself, whether god or man, will not keep his hands from me.

Socrates/ Will you not speak fair words?

Alcibiades/ By Neptune, say nothing against this; for I wall praise no other person, while you are present.

Eryximachus/ Do so then; if you will, praise Socrates.

Alcibiades/ How say you? Does it seem good to you, Eryximachus, that I should do so? Must I fall upon this man, and revenge myself before you?

Socrates/ Ho, sir, what have you in mind? Will you praise me so as to make me ridiculous? or what will you do?

Alcibiades/ I will speak the truth. But see whether you will permit me.

Socrates/ Nay, I both permit, and command you to speak the truth.

Alcibiades/ I will do it instantly. But however do you act thus; if I assert anything not true, lay hold of me while speaking if you will, and say that I am telling a falsehood; for I shall not willingly tell a lie. And do not wonder if I speak as if recollecting one thing after another; for it is not easy for a man in my state to enumerate readily, and in succession, your strange behavior. I will then endeavor, gentlemen, to praise Socrates in this way by means of images. He indeed will perhaps imagine that I am turning him into ridicule; but the image will be for the sake of what is true, and not ridiculous.

I say, then, that Socrates is most like the figures of Silenus that are seated in the workshops of statuaries, which the artists have made, holding reeds or flutes; but which, when they are opened down the middle, appear to contain within them statues of the gods. And I again say, that he resembles the satyr Marsyas. Now that in your

outward form, Socrates, you resemble these things, even you yourself will not deny; but that you resemble them likewise in other points, hear in the next place. You are saucy in deeds; or are you not? For, if you do not acknowledge it, I will bring witnesses to the fact. Are you not also a piper much more wonderful than Marsyas? For he charmed men through instruments, by a power proceeding from the mouth; and he charms even now, when anyone plays his melodies. For what Olympus played, I call the melodies of Marsyas, who taught him. Now his melodies, whether a good male flute-player plays them, or a bad female one, alone cause a person to be spell-bound, and point out, through their being divine, those that stand in need of the gods and the mysteries; but you in this respect alone differ from him, that you effect the very same thing by naked words without instruments. We therefore, when we hear another person, although a good speaker himself, pronouncing the speeches of others, not a single hearer, so to say, pays any regard to them; but when anyone hears you, or your discourses spoken by another, although he is a wretched speaker, yet, whether a woman or a man or a lad is the auditor, we are astonished and spell-bound. I therefore, gentlemen, unless I seemed to be very much in liquor, would tell you upon oath what I have suffered by the discourses of this man, and am suffering even now. For when I hear him, my heart leaps much more than that of the Corybantes; and my tears flow forth through his discourses. I see too many others suffering in the very same way. But when I hear Pericles, and other excellent orators, I think indeed that they speak well, but I suffer nothing of this kind; nor is my soul agitated with tumult, nor is it indignant, as if I were in a servile state. But by this Marsyas here I am often so affected, that it appears to me I ought not to live, while I am in such a state. You will not, Socrates, say that this is not true. And even now I feel

conscious that, were I willing to lend him my ears, I could not bear it, but should suffer in the very same way. For he would compel me to confess, that, being yet very deficient, I neglect my own affairs, but attend to those of the Athenians. By violence therefore restraining myself as to my ears, I depart from him, flying, as it were, from the Syrens, lest I should sit there by him until I grew old. And towards him alone of all men, I suffer that, which no one would think to be in me, to be ashamed of anyone. But I am abashed before him alone. For I feel conscious of my inability to deny that what he exhorts me to do ought not to be done; but when I depart from him, I am conscious of being overcome by the honor I receive from the multitude. I therefore run away from and avoid him; and when I see him, I am ashamed for what I had consented to do. And often, indeed, I would gladly see him no longer amongst men: and yet again, if this should happen, I well know I should be afflicted still more; so that I know not what to do with this man. And from the melodies indeed of this Satyr in such a manner both I and many others have suffered.

Hear too from me on other points, how like he is to what I have compared him, and what a wonderful power he possesses. For be well assured, that not one of you knows him; but I will lay him open, since I have begun to speak. You see then that he is disposed in a very amatory manner towards beautiful persons; and that he is always about them and struck with them; but on the other hand, he is ignorant of everything and knows nothing how his figure is. Is not this Silenus-like? For he is invested with this externally like a carved Silenus; but when he is opened inwardly, with temperance how great, think you, fellow-tipplers, is he filled? Know too, that if any person is beautiful, he regards him not, but despises him to such an extent as no one would suppose; nor if he is wealthy, or possesses any other honor

amongst those who are considered by the multitude as blessed; but he holds all these possessions to be nothing worth, and that we too are of no account. He passes likewise the whole of life indulging in irony and jests against mankind; but when he is serious and is opened, I know not whether anyone of you has seen the images within; but I once saw them, and they appeared to me to be so divine and golden, and all-beautiful and wonderful, that I thought I must in a short time do whatever Socrates ordained. Conceiving too that he paid great attention to my beauty, I considered this as a god-send, and a piece of wondrous good fortune for myself, since by gratifying Socrates it would be in my power to hear from him all that he knew. For I prided myself on my beauty marvelously. With these thoughts in my head, although I had previously been never accustomed to be in his company without an attendant, on that occasion I sent the page away and remained with him alone; for I must state the whole truth, and do you give me your attention; and if I am telling a falsehood, do you, Socrates, confute me. I was, gentlemen, alone with him alone; and I thought he would immediately converse with me in the way that lovers are wont to speak to their beloved in private; and I was highly delighted with the expectation. Nothing however of this kind very much took place; but after conversing somewhat and passing the day with me as usual, he went away. Then I challenged him to contend with me in the naked exercises, and I did contend as if about to effect something by this means. He engaged therefore naked, and had a tussle frequently against me, no one being present. But why need I mention this? Nothing more took place. But when I accomplished nothing at all by this means, I determined to attack the man with all my might, nor to let him off; since I had put my hand to the task. But you must now know what is the affair. Accordingly I invited him to supper, artlessly

laying a plot as a lover does against his beloved. Even to this he did not quickly give ear. In time, however, he was over-persuaded. But when he came for the first time, he wished, as soon as he had supped, to go away; and I, feeling ashamed, let him go. Having laid however again a plot, after supper I had a conversation with him far into the night; and when he wished to go away, I pretended it was late, and I compelled him to stay. He reposed, therefore, in a couch close to mine, and on which he had supped; and no other person besides us slept in the house. Thus far in my story it would be well to state to anyone; but what is to come, you would not have heard me telling, unless, in the first place, according to the proverb;

> Wine, with children, or without,
> Does a tale of truth let out;

and in the second place, it seems to me to be unjust in him who comes to praise a person, to leave in obscurity a proud deed of Socrates. Moreover, the suffering of him, who has been bitten by a viper, possesses likewise myself. For they say that the person so suffering is unwilling to tell what it is, except to those who have been bitten, as being alone about to know and to pardon him, should he dare to do and say everything from excess of pain. I say it then, having been bitten by something still more painful. For it is the most painful of all, by which a person can be bitten, in heart or soul, or whatever else it is meet to call it, bitten and wounded, namely, by discourses in philosophy; which are wont to give out something more acute than that from the viper, when they the discourses lay hold of a young person with a not badly-disposed soul, and cause him to do and say anything whatever. And looking, moreover, at the Phædruses, Agathos, Eryximachuses, Pausaniases, Aristodemuses, Aristophaneses. —But why need I say, Socrates himself, and whoever forms the rest of the

company. For all of you have partaken with me of the madness and Bacchic fury of philosophy; and on this account you shall all hear. For you will pardon what was done then, and is said now. But let the domestics, and if there is any other profane and rude person present, place upon their ears gates of very great size. When therefore the lamp was extinguished, and the servants had gone out, it seemed to me that I ought not to employ words of many meanings towards him, but tell him freely what was in my thoughts. And nudging him I said, Socrates, are you asleep?

Socrates/ Not yet.

Alcibiades/ Do you know then on what I am determined?

Socrates/ What is it particularly?

Alcibiades/ You seem to me, said I, the only lover worthy of myself; and yet you appear to feel a dread to have a recollection towards me. But, as I am thus affected, I think it very silly for me not to gratify you both in this point, and in anything else of which you may be in want, whether it be my own property, or that of my friends: for nothing is to me of greater moment than to become the best of men: and for this I think there is no person a more competent assister than yourself; and I should feel a much greater shame before the wise, in not gratifying such a man, than before the many and the unwise by gratifying him. Socrates, having heard me, said, very ironically, and very much after his usual manner;

Socrates/ My dear Alcibiades, you seem to be in reality a man of no common mark, if what you say concerning me happens to be true, and there is in me a certain power, through which you can become better. But what boundless beauty could you see in me, and vastly superior to the fine form in yourself, if, on beholding it, you endeavor to have dealings with me, and to exchange beauty for beauty. You

have surely an idea of possessing more than I do; for you endeavor to obtain the truth of beautiful things instead of the reputation, and you conceive that you will in reality exchange brass for gold. But, O blessed man, think better of it, nor let me lie hid from you, as being nothing. The power of intellectual vision begins then to see acutely, when that of the eye loses its acme. You however are still far off from this.

Alcibiades/ And I, having heard him, replied, As regards myself the facts are so; of which not one has been stated otherwise than as I conceive myself. But do you counsel me in what you may consider to be best both for you and me.

Socrates/ In this you say well: for in the time to come let us consult together, and we will do what appears to be the best for us, both with respect to these and other matters.

Alcibiades/ Having thus heard and spoken, and sent as it were arrows, I thought that he was wounded; and I rose up, and not suffering him to speak any more, I wrapped myself round with this garment, for it was winter, and lying down under the old cloak of this man, I threw my arms around the truly divine and wonderful man, and lay there the whole night. And in this again, Socrates, you will not say that I am telling a falsehood. But though I acted in this manner, yet he was victorious, and despised, and jeered at, and even insulted my beauty. And yet I fancied it was something, men and judges, for judges you are, of the haughtiness of Socrates. For by the gods and goddesses, rest assured that I rose from Socrates no otherwise than if I had slept with my father, or my elder brother.

What feelings then do you fancy I had after this, on reflecting that I had been dishonored, but yet admiring the nature, and the temperance and fortitude of this man, after I had met with a person such as I never thought I should meet with for prudence and self-control; so that I neither had

it in my power to be angry with him, nor though I was deprived of intercourse with him, had I any means of attaching him to myself. For I well knew that he would be on every side more invulnerable to money, than Ajax was to the sword; and that he had escaped me, at the very time when I fancied he would be caught. And thus I was reduced to my wits' ends, and went about, the slave of this man, as no one else was of any other. For not only did all this occur to me formerly, but after this likewise, during a campaign common to both of us, took place against Potidæa, and there we messed together. And here, in the first place, he not only surpassed myself, but all others, in the labors of the field. But when we were left somewhere, and compelled, as happens in campaigns, to be greatly without food, the rest were nothing to him for the power of endurance. On the other hand, at our jollifications, he was the only person who could enjoy them; for though he was generally unwilling to drink, yet when forced to do so, he beat all the rest; and what is the most wonderful of all, no one ever saw Socrates intoxicated. But of this it appears to me there will be shortly a confutation. Again, with respect to his endurance in winter, for the winters there are very severe, he performed wonders in other ways, and once also when the frost was most bitter, and all did not go out from their quarters, or if any did so, he clothed himself in wonderfully thick cloaks, had his feet bound and wrapped in felt and sheep-skins, Socrates went out amongst them, wearing just the same clothing as he had been previously accustomed to wear, and marched through the ice without shoes, more easily than others with shoes; and the soldiers had a suspicion that he held them in contempt. And thus much on these points.

"But what this patient man did do and dare," during the campaign there, it is worthwhile to hear. For while he was thinking of some question from himself, he stood from the

dawn investigating it; and, as he did not succeed, he did not desist, but stood still investigating it. It was mid-day, and some persons perceived him, and wondering said, one to the other, that Socrates had been standing from the morning thinking upon something. At length some Ionian soldiers, when it was evening, having supped—for it was then summer—ambush against brought out their ground-litters, and partly slept in the cold and partly kept watch, whether he would stand there all night. And he did stand until the dawn appeared and the sun rose; after which he departed, having first offered a prayer to the sun. And if you are willing to hear, what he was in battle, must not be passed by. For it is surely just to pay him this tribute. For when the battle took place, in which the generals assigned to myself the prize of superior good conduct, no other man rescued me but he, through his being unwilling to leave me when wounded; and he preserved both my arms and myself. And I indeed at that time urged the commanders to give you, Socrates, the prize of good conduct—and for stating this, you will neither blame me, nor say that I am speaking falsely—but the generals, looking to my rank in life, and wishing to give me those rewards, you were more eager for me to receive them than for yourself. Further still, gentlemen, it was well worthwhile to see Socrates when our army retreated from Delium; for I happened to be present with the cavalry, but Socrates was among the heavy-armed. For when the troops were already scattered, both he and Laches retreated; and I, meeting with and seeing the two, immediately exhorted them to take courage, and said that I would not abandon them. Here then I had a better view of Socrates than at Potidæa; for I was in less fear, because I was on horseback. In the first place then, how greatly did he surpass Laches in his being cautious; and in the next place, he seemed, according to your description, Aristophanes, to carry himself loftily, and to throw his eye

on one side, to survey quietly both friends and foes; and it was manifest to everyone, and even to a person at a distance, that whoever presumed to touch this man, would be very vigorously repulsed. Hence both he and the other departed in safety; for scarcely anyone, who thus conducts himself in war, is touched; but the pursuit is of those who turn and run away. There are many other things for which a person would have it in his power to praise Socrates wondrously. But of his other pursuits, someone may perhaps speak in this way even about another person; but to be like not one, either of the ancients or moderns, this is a thing worthy of all wonder. For such as Achilles was, one might conjecture was Brasidas and others: and again, that, such as Pericles was, were Antenor and Nestor. And there are others likewise; and the rest a person might compare after the same manner. But such a strange character as is this man, both in himself and in his discourses, no one will by searching discover any man approaching near to him, either among those living now or in the olden time; unless indeed someone should compare him to no human being, but to what I have mentioned, Silenuses and Satyrs. For I omitted to state this at first, that his discourses too are very like the Silenuses when opened. For should anyone be willing to hear the discourses of Socrates, they will appear to be very ridiculous at first; with such nouns and verbs do they envelop externally, as it were, the hide of a Satyr. For he speaks of panniered asses, and of copper-smiths, and leather-cutters, and tanners, and he appears to be always saying the same things upon the same subjects; so that every man who has neither skill nor sense will laugh at his words. But he who beholds his discourses when opened, and gets within them, will, in the first place, find that they alone of all other discourses possess an internal meaning; and, in the next place, that they are most divine, and hold the most numerous images of virtue, and

extend to the farthest point, or rather to everything, which it is fitting for him to consider, who intends to become a man at once beautiful and good. These then are the reasons, gentlemen, for which I praise Socrates; but on the other hand, for what I blame him, I have mixed up in the recital of the insults he has heaped upon me. Nor has he acted in this manner towards me alone, but also towards Charmides, the son of Glauco, Euthydemus, the son of Diodes, and very many others; whom this man has deceived, as if he were their lover, when, instead of the loving, he is himself the beloved. Hence, I caution you, Agatho, not to be deceived by this man; but, taught by my sufferings, to have a care, and not, according to the proverb, By suffering, like a silly person, knowledge gain.

Apollodorus/ When Alcibiades had thus spoken, there was a general laugh at his freedom of speech, because he appeared to be lovingly disposed towards Socrates; who thereupon observed;

Socrates/ You seem to me, Alcibiades, to be sober; for, otherwise, you would not have attempted in so elegant and circuitous a manner to conceal that, for the sake of which you have said all this; and, as if mentioning something of no consequence, you have cleverly placed at the end that you have said all this on this account, namely, to throw discord between me and Agatho, conceiving that I ought to love you and no other person, and that Agatho ought to be loved by you, and by no one else. But you have not lain hid from me; but this play of yours is plainly a Satyric one and Silenus-like. But, my dear Agatho, let not anything occur in his favor, but do you prepare yourself so that no one may set you and me at variance.

Agathon/ You seem indeed, Socrates, to be speaking very nearly the truth, and I conjecture that he has been reclining between you and me, that he might keep us apart. There will

not, however, occur anything in his favor from this; for I will come and recline by you.

Socrates/ By all means come hither, and recline below me.

Alcibiades/ O Zeus! How greatly again do I suffer from this man! He fancies he must surpass me in everything; but, O wonderful man, if nothing else, suffer at least Agatho to recline between us.

Socrates/ It is impossible: for as you have praised me, it is now necessary for me to praise him, reclining at my right hand. If, therefore, Agatho reclines below you, he will not surely again praise me, before he has been praised by me. Cease, then, thou happy fellow, and do not grudge my being praised by the youth; for I have a great desire to pass an encomium on him.

Agathon/ Ho! ho! there is no reason why I should remain here, but every reason rather that I should change my place, that I may be praised by Socrates.

Alcibiades/ This is as usual. When Socrates is present, it is impossible for any other to share the favors of the beautiful. And now observe how easily he has discovered a persuasive language, so that this youth should recline at his side.

Apollodorus/ After this Agatho rose up, as if about to recline close to Socrates. But on a sudden there came very many revelers to the gates, and, finding them open, in consequence of someone having gone out in an opposite direction, they marched in, and threw themselves on the couches; and the whole place was filled with uproar, and no longer in any order everyone was compelled to drink a great quantity of wine. Whereupon Eryximachus and Phædrus, and some others, said Aristodemus, went away, but that sleep laid hold of him; and that he slept for a very long time,

as the nights were long, and rose at daybreak while the cocks were crowing; and on getting up he saw that the rest of the guests were asleep, or gone; but that Agatho, Aristophanes, and Socrates were still awake, and drinking out of a great bowl, which they kept passing to the right hand, and that Socrates was discoursing with them; but he did not recollect, said Aristodemus, what the discourse was in other respects, as he was not present at the beginning of it, and dozing; but the sum of it, he said, was this, that Socrates was compelling them to admit that it was the province of the same person to know how to write comedy and tragedy, and that he, who was by art a tragic poet, was also a comic one; and that when they had been compelled to admit this, they began, as not very well following the argument, to doze; and that Aristophanes fell asleep the first, and when it was now day, Agatho; but that Socrates, having put them to sleep, got up and went away; and that he, Aristodemus, as he was wont, followed; and that he Socrates went to the Lyceum, and, having washed himself as at another time, passed the rest of the day; and having thus passed it till evening, he took his rest at home.

Symposium.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Apollodorus, *who repeats to his companion the dialogue which he had heard from Aristodemus, and had already once narrated to Glaucon.*

Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes.

Agathon, Socrates, Alcibiades.

A troop of Revelers.

Scene: —The House of Agathon.

Apollodorus/ Concerning the things about which you ask to be informed I believe that I am not ill-prepared with an answer. For the day before yesterday I was coming from my own home at Phalerum to the city, and one of my acquaintance, who had caught a sight of me from behind, calling out playfully in the distance, said:

Glaucon/ Apollodorus, O thou Phalerian man, halt!

Apollodorus/ So I did as I was bid; and then he said;

Glaucon/ I was looking for you, Apollodorus, only just now, that I might ask you about the speeches in praise of love, which were delivered by Socrates, Alcibiades, and others, at Agathon's supper. Phoenix, the son of Philip, told another person who told me of them; his narrative was very indistinct, but he said that you knew, and I wish that you would give me an account of them. Who, if not you, should be the reporter of the words of your friend? And first tell me, were you present at this meeting?

Apollodorus/ Your informant, Glaucon, must have been very indistinct indeed, if you imagine that the occasion was recent; or that I could have been of the party.

Glaucon/ Why, yes, I thought so.

Apollodorus/ Impossible: Are you ignorant that for many years Agathon has not resided at Athens; and not three have elapsed since I became acquainted with Socrates, and have made it my daily business to know all that he says and does. There was a time when I was running about the world, fancying myself to be well employed, but I was really a most wretched being, no better than you are now. I thought that I ought to do anything rather than be a philosopher.

Glaucon/ Well, jesting apart, tell me when the meeting occurred.

Apollodorus/ In our boyhood, when Agathon won the prize with his first tragedy, on the day after that on which he and his chorus offered the sacrifice of victory.

Glaucon/ Then it must have been a long while ago; and who told you—did Socrates?

Apollodorus/ No indeed, but the same person who told Phoenix; —he was a little fellow, who never wore any shoes, Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum. He had been at Agathon's feast; and I think that in those days there was no one who was a more devoted admirer of Socrates. Moreover, I have asked Socrates about the truth of some parts of his narrative, and he confirmed them.

Glaucon/ Then, let us have the tale over again; is not the road to Athens just made for conversation?

Apollodorus/ And so we walked, and talked of the discourses on love; and therefore, as I said at first, I am not ill-prepared to comply with your request, and will have another rehearsal of them if you like. For to speak or to hear others speak of philosophy always gives me the greatest pleasure, to say nothing of the profit. But when I hear another strain, especially that of you rich men and traders, such conversation displeases me; and I pity you who are my

companions, because you think that you are doing something when in reality you are doing nothing. And I dare say that you pity me in return, whom you regard as an unhappy creature, and very probably you are right. But I certainly know of you what you only think of me—there is the difference.

Friend/ I see, Apollodorus, that you are just the same—always speaking evil of yourself, and of others; and I do believe that you pity all mankind, with the exception of Socrates, yourself first of all, true in this to your old name, which, however deserved, I know not how you acquired, of Apollodorus the madman; for you are always raging against yourself and everybody but Socrates.

Apollodorus/ Yes, friend, and the reason why I am said to be mad, and out of my wits, is just because I have these notions of myself and you; no other evidence is required.

Friend/ No more of that, Apollodorus; but let me renew my request that you would repeat the conversation.

Apollodorus/ Well, the tale of love was on this wise: —But perhaps I had better begin at the beginning, and endeavor to give you the exact words of Aristodemus:

He said that he met Socrates fresh from the bath and sandaled; and as the sight of the sandals was unusual, he asked him whither he was going that he had been converted into such a beau: —

Socrates/ To a banquet at Agathon's, whose invitation to his sacrifice of victory I refused yesterday, fearing a crowd, but promising that I would come to-day instead; and so I have put on my finery, because he is such a fine man. What say you to going with me unasked?

Aristodemus/ I will do as you bid me.

Socrates/ Follow then, and let us demolish the proverb: —

'To the feasts of inferior men the good unbidden go;'

instead of which our proverb will run: —

'To the feasts of the good the good unbidden go;' and this alteration may be supported by the authority of Homer himself, who not only demolishes but literally outrages the proverb. For, after picturing Agamemnon as the most valiant of men, he makes Menelaus, who is but a fainthearted warrior, come unbidden to the banquet of Agamemnon, who is feasting and offering sacrifices, not the better to the worse, but the worse to the better.

Aristodemus/ I rather fear, Socrates, lest this may still be my case; and that, like Menclaus in Homer, I shall be the inferior person, who

'To the feasts of the wise unbidden goes.'

But I shall say that I was bidden of you, and then you will have to make an excuse.

Socrates/

'Two going together,'

in Homeric fashion, one or other of them may invent an excuse by the way.

Apollodorus/ This was the style of their conversation as they went along. Socrates dropped behind in a fit of abstraction, and desired Aristodemus, who was waiting, to go on before him. When he reached the house of Agathon he found the doors wide open, and a comical thing happened. A servant coming out met him, and led him at once into the banqueting-hall in which the guests were reclining, for the banquet was about to begin. Welcome, Aristodemus, said Agathon, as soon as he appeared—

Agathon/ You are just in time to sup with us; if you come on any other matter put it off, and make one of us, as I was looking for you yesterday and meant to have asked you, if I

could have found you. But what have you done with Socrates?

Aristodemus/ I turned round, but Socrates was nowhere to be seen; and I had to explain that he had been with me a moment before, and that I came by his invitation to the supper.

Agathon/ You were quite right in coming; but where is he himself?

Aristodemus/ He was behind me just now, as I entered, and I cannot think what has become of him.

Agathon/ Go and look for him, boy, and bring him in; and do you, Aristodemus, meanwhile take the place by Eryximachus.

Apollodorus/ The servant then assisted him to wash, and he lay down, and presently another servant came in and reported that our friend Socrates had retired into the portico of the neighboring house.

Boy/ 'There he is fixed and when I call to him he will not stir.'

Agathon/ How strange; then you must call him again, and keep calling him.

Aristodemus/ Let him alone; he has a way of stopping anywhere and losing himself without any reason. I believe that he will soon appear; do not therefore disturb him.

Agathon/ Well, if you think so, I will leave him.

Apollodorus/ And then, turning to the servants, he added;

Agathon/ 'Let us have supper without waiting for him. Serve up whatever you please, for there is no one to give you orders; hitherto I have never left you to yourselves. But on this occasion imagine that you are our hosts, and that I and

the company are your guests; treat us well, and then we shall commend you.'

Apollodorus/ After this, supper was served, but still no Socrates; and during the meal Agathon several times expressed a wish to send for him, but Aristodemus objected; and at last when the feast was about half over—for the fit, as usual, was not of long duration—Socrates entered. Agathon, who was reclining alone at the end of the table, begged that he would take the place next to him; that

Agathon/ 'I may touch you, and have the benefit of that wise thought which came into your mind in the portico, and is now in your possession; for I am certain that you would not have come away until you had found what you sought.'

Apollodorus/ Socrates taking his place as he was desired said;

Socrates/ How I wish that wisdom could be infused by touch, out of the fuller into the emptier man, as water runs through wool out of a fuller cup into an emptier one; if that were so, how greatly should I value the privilege of reclining at your side! For you would have filled me full with a stream of wisdom plenteous and fair; whereas my own is of a very mean and questionable sort, no better than a dream. But yours is bright and full of promise, and was manifested forth in all the splendor of youth the day before yesterday, in the presence of more than thirty thousand Hellenes.

Agathon/ You are mocking, Socrates and ere long you and I will have to determine who bears off the palm of wisdom—of this Dionysus shall be the judge; but at present you are better occupied with supper.

Apollodorus/ Socrates took his place on the couch, and supped with the rest; and then libations were offered, and after a hymn had been sung to the god, and there had been

the usual ceremonies, they were about to commence drinking, when Pausanias said;

Pausanias/ And now, my friends, how can we drink with least injury to ourselves? I can assure you that I feel severely the effect of yesterday's potations, and must have time to recover; and I suspect that most of you are in the same predicament, for you were of the party yesterday. Consider then: How can the drinking be made easiest?

Aristophanes/ I entirely agree that we should, by all means, avoid hard drinking, for I was myself one of those who were yesterday drowned in drink.

Eryximachus/ I think that you are right; but I should still like to hear one other person speak: Is Agathon able to drink hard?

Agathon/ I am not equal to it.

Eryximachus/ Then the weak heads like myself, Aristodemus, Phaedrus, and others who never can drink, are fortunate in finding that the stronger ones are not in a drinking mood. (I do not include Socrates, who is able either to drink or to abstain, and will not mind, whichever we do.) Well, as none of the company seem disposed to drink much, I may be forgiven for saying, as a physician, that drinking deep is a bad practice, which I never follow, if I can help, and certainly do not recommend to another, least of all to anyone who still feels the effects of yesterday's carouse.

Phaedrus/ I always do what you advise, and especially what you prescribe as a physician and the rest of the company, if they are wise, will do the same.

Apollodorus/ It was agreed that drinking was not to be the order of the day, but that they were all to drink only so much as they pleased.

Eryximachus/ Then, as you are all agreed that drinking is to be voluntary, and that there is to be no compulsion, I

move, in the next place, that the flute-girl, who has just made her appearance, be told to go away and play to herself, or, if she likes, to the women who are within. To-day let us have conversation instead; and, if you will allow me, I will tell you what sort of conversation.

Apollodorus/ This proposal having been accepted, Eryximachus proceeded as follows: —

Eryximachus/ I will begin after the manner of Melanippe in Euripides;

'Not mine the word'

which I am about to speak, but that of Phaedrus. For often he says to me in an indignant tone: —'What a strange thing it is, Eryximachus, that, whereas other gods have poems and hymns made in their honor, the great and glorious god, Love, has no encomiast among all the poets who are so many. There are the worthy sophists too—the excellent Prodicus for example, who have descanted in prose on the virtues of Heracles and other heroes; and, what is still more extraordinary, I have met with a philosophical work in which the utility of salt has been made the theme of an eloquent discourse; and many other like things have had a like honor bestowed upon them. And only to think that there should have been an eager interest created about them, and yet that to this day no one has ever dared worthily to hymn Love's praises! So entirely has this great deity been neglected.' Now in this Phaedrus seems to me to be quite right, and therefore I want to offer him a contribution; also I think that at the present moment we who are here assembled cannot do better than honor the god Love. If you agree with me, there will be no lack of conversation; for I mean to propose that each of us in turn, going from left to right, shall make a speech in honor of Love. Let him give us the best which he can; and Phaedrus, because he is sitting first on the left

hand, and because he is the father of the thought, shall begin.

Socrates/ No one will vote against you, Eryximachus. How can I oppose your motion, who profess to understand nothing but matters of love; nor, I presume, will Agathon and Pausanias; and there can be no doubt of Aristophanes, whose whole concern is with Dionysus and Aphrodite; nor will anyone disagree of those whom I see around me. The proposal, as I am aware, may seem rather hard upon us whose place is last; but we shall be contented if we hear some good speeches first. Let Phaedrus begin the praise of Love, and good luck to him.

Apollodorus/ All the company expressed their assent, and desired him to do as Socrates bade him. Aristodemus did not recollect all that was said, nor do I recollect all that he related to me; but I will tell you what I thought most worthy of remembrance, and what the chief speakers said.

Phaedrus began by affirming that Love is a mighty god, and wonderful among gods and men, but especially wonderful in his birth.

Phaedrus/ For he is the eldest of the gods, which is an honor to him; and a proof of his claim to this honor is, that of his parents there is no memorial; neither poet nor prose-writer has ever affirmed that he had any. As Hesiod says: —

> 'First Chaos came, and then broad-bosomed Earth,
> The everlasting seat of all that is,
> And Love.'

In other words, after Chaos, the Earth and Love, these two, came into being. Also Parmenides sings of Generation:

> 'First in the train of gods, he fashioned Love.'

And Acusilaus agrees with Hesiod. Thus numerous are the witnesses who acknowledge Love to be the eldest of the gods. And not only is he the eldest, he is also the source of the

greatest benefits to us. For I know not any greater blessing to a young man who is beginning life than a virtuous lover, or to the lover than a beloved youth. For the principle which ought to be the guide of men who would nobly live—that principle, I say, neither kindred, nor honor, nor wealth, nor any other motive is able to implant so well as love. Of what am I speaking? Of the sense of honor and dishonor, without which neither states nor individuals ever do any good or great work. And I say that a lover who is detected in doing any dishonorable act, or submitting through cowardice when any dishonor is done to him by another, will be more pained at being detected by his beloved than at being seen by his father, or by his companions, or by anyone else. The beloved too, when he is found in any disgraceful situation, has the same feeling about his lover. And if there were only some way of contriving that a state or an army should be made up of lovers and their loves, they would be the very best governors of their own city, abstaining from all dishonor, and emulating one another in honor; and when fighting at each other's side, although a mere handful, they would overcome the world. For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms? He would be ready to die a thousand deaths rather than endure this. Or who would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger? The veriest coward would become an inspired hero, equal to the bravest, at such a time; Love would inspire him. That courage which, as Homer says, the god breathes into the souls of some heroes, Love of his own nature infuses into the lover.

Love will make men dare to die for their beloved—love alone; and women as well as men. Of this, Alcestis, the daughter of Pelias, is a monument to all Hellas; for she was willing to lay down her life on behalf of her husband, when

no one else would, although he had a father and mother; but the tenderness of her love so far exceeded theirs, that she made them seem to be strangers in blood to their own son, and in name only related to him; and so noble did this action of hers appear to the gods, as well as to men, that among the many who have done virtuously she is one of the very few to whom, in admiration of her noble action, they have granted the privilege of returning alive to earth; such exceeding honor is paid by the gods to the devotion and virtue of love. But Orpheus, the son of Oeagrus, the harper, they sent empty away, and presented to him an apparition only of her whom he sought, but herself they would not give up, because he showed no spirit; he was only a harp-player, and did not dare like Alcestis to die for love, but was contriving how he might enter Hades alive; moreover, they afterwards caused him to suffer death at the hands of women, as the punishment of his cowardliness. Very different was the reward of the true love of Achilles towards his lover Patroclus—his lover and not his love (the notion that Patroclus was the beloved one is a foolish error into which Aeschylus has fallen, for Achilles was surely the fairer of the two, fairer also than all the other heroes; and, as Homer informs us, he was still beardless, and younger far). And greatly as the gods honor the virtue of love, still the return of love on the part of the beloved to the lover is more admired and valued and rewarded by them, for the lover is more divine; because he is inspired by God. Now Achilles was quite aware, for he had been told by his mother, that he might avoid death and return home, and live to a good old age, if he abstained from slaying Hector. Nevertheless he gave his life to revenge his friend, and dared to die, not only in his defense, but after he was dead. Wherefore the gods honored him even above Alcestis, and sent him to the Islands of the Blest. These are my reasons for affirming that

Love is the eldest and noblest and mightiest of the gods, and the chiefest author and giver of virtue in life, and of happiness after death.

Apollodorus/ This, or something like this, was the speech of Phaedrus; and some other speeches followed which Aristodemus did not remember; the next which he repeated was that of Pausanias.

Pausanias/ Phaedrus, the argument has not been set before us, I think, quite in the right form; —we should not be called upon to praise Love in such an indiscriminate manner. If there were only one Love, then what you said would be well enough; but since there are more Loves than one, you should have begun by determining which of them was to be the theme of our praises. I will amend this defect; and first of all I will tell you which Love is deserving of praise, and then try to hymn the praiseworthy one in a manner worthy of him. For we all know that Love is inseparable from Aphrodite, and if there were only one Aphrodite there would be only one Love; but as there are two goddesses there must be two Loves. And am I not right in asserting that there are two goddesses? The elder one, having no mother, who is called the heavenly Aphrodite—she is the daughter of Uranus; the younger, who is the daughter of Zeus and Dione—her we call common; and the Love who is her fellow-worker is rightly named common, as the other love is called heavenly. All the gods ought to have praise given to them, but not without distinction of their natures; and therefore I must try to distinguish the characters of the two Loves. Now actions vary according to the manner of their performance. Take, for example, that which we are now doing, drinking, singing and talking—these actions are not in themselves either good or evil, but they turn out in this or that way according to the mode of performing them; and when well done they are good, and when wrongly done they are evil;

and in like manner not every love, but only that which has a noble purpose, is noble and worthy of praise. The Love who is the offspring of the common Aphrodite is essentially common, and has no discrimination, being such as the meaner sort of men feel, and is apt to be of women as well as of youths, and is of the body rather than of the soul—the most foolish beings are the objects of this love which desires only to gain an end, but never thinks of accomplishing the end nobly, and therefore does good and evil quite indiscriminately. The goddess who is his mother is far younger than the other, and she was born of the union of the male and female, and partakes of both. But the offspring of the heavenly Aphrodite is derived from a mother in whose birth the female has no part, —she is from the male only; this is that love which is of youths, and the goddess being older, there is nothing of wantonness in her. Those who are inspired by this love turn to the male, and delight in him who is the more valiant and intelligent nature; anyone may recognize the pure enthusiasts in the very character of their attachments. For they love not boys, but intelligent beings whose reason is beginning to be developed, much about the time at which their beards begin to grow. And in choosing young men to be their companions, they mean to be faithful to them, and pass their whole life in company with them, not to take them in their inexperience, and deceive them, and play the fool with them, or run away from one to another of them. But the love of young boys should be forbidden by law, because their future is uncertain; they may turn out good or bad, either in body or soul, and much noble enthusiasm may be thrown away upon them; in this matter the good are a law to themselves, and the coarser sort of lovers ought to be restrained by force, as we restrain or attempt to restrain them from fixing their affections on women of free birth. These are the persons who bring a reproach on love; and

some have been led to deny the lawfulness of such attachments because they see the impropriety and evil of them; for surely nothing that is decorously and lawfully done can justly be censured. Now here and in Lacedaemon the rules about love are perplexing, but in most cities they are simple and easily intelligible; in Elis and Boeotia, and in countries having no gifts of eloquence, they are very straightforward; the law is simply in favor of these connections, and no one, whether young or old, has anything to say to their discredit; the reason being, as I suppose, that they are men of few words in those parts, and therefore the lovers do not like the trouble of pleading their suit. In Ionia and other places, and generally in countries which are subject to the barbarians, the custom is held to be dishonorable; loves of youths share the evil repute in which philosophy and gymnastics are held, because they are inimical to tyranny; for the interests of rulers require that their subjects should be poor in spirit, and that there should be no strong bond of friendship or society among them, which love, above all other motives, is likely to inspire, as our Athenian tyrants learned by experience; for the love of Aristogeiton and the constancy of Harmodius had a strength which undid their power. And, therefore, the ill-repute into which these attachments have fallen is to be ascribed to the evil condition of those who make them to be ill-reputed; that is to say, to the self-seeking of the governors and the cowardice of the governed; on the other hand, the indiscriminate honor which is given to them in some countries is attributable to the laziness of those who hold this opinion of them. In our own country a far better principle prevails, but, as I was saying, the explanation of it is rather perplexing. For, observe that open loves are held to be more honorable than secret ones, and that the love of the noblest and highest, even if their persons are less beautiful

than others, is especially honorable. Consider, too, how great is the encouragement which all the world gives to the lover; neither is he supposed to be doing anything dishonorable; but if he succeeds he is praised, and if he fail he is blamed. And in the pursuit of his love the custom of mankind allows him to do many strange things, which philosophy would bitterly censure if they were done from any motive of interest, or wish for office or power. He may pray, and entreat, and supplicate, and swear, and lie on a mat at the door, and endure a slavery worse than that of any slave—in any other case friends and enemies would be equally ready to prevent him, but now there is no friend who will be ashamed of him and admonish him, and no enemy will charge him with meanness or flattery; the actions of a lover have a grace which ennobles them; and custom has decided that they are highly commendable and that there is no loss of character in them; and, what is strangest of all, he only may swear and forswear himself (so men say), and the gods will forgive his transgression, for there is no such thing as a lover's oath. Such is the entire liberty which gods and men have allowed the lover, according to the custom which prevails in our part of the world. From this point of view a man fairly argues that in Athens to love and to be loved is held to be a very honorable thing. But when parents forbid their sons to talk with their lovers, and place them under a tutor's care, who is appointed to see to these things, and their companions and equals cast in their teeth anything of the sort which they may observe, and their elders refuse to silence the reprovers and do not rebuke them—anyone who reflects on all this will, on the contrary, think that we hold these practices to be most disgraceful. But, as I was saying at first, the truth as I imagine is, that whether such practices are honorable or whether they are dishonorable is not a simple question; they are honorable to him who follows them

honorably, dishonorable to him who follows them dishonorably. There is dishonor in yielding to the evil, or in an evil manner; but there is honor in yielding to the good, or in an honorable manner. Evil is the vulgar lover who loves the body rather than the soul, inasmuch as he is not even stable, because he loves a thing which is in itself unstable, and therefore when the bloom of youth which he was desiring is over, he takes wing and flies away, in spite of all his words and promises; whereas the love of the noble disposition is life-long, for it becomes one with the everlasting. The custom of our country would have both of them proven well and truly, and would have us yield to the one sort of lover and avoid the other, and therefore encourages some to pursue, and others to fly; testing both the lover and beloved in contests and trials, until they show to which of the two classes they respectively belong. And this is the reason why, in the first place, a hasty attachment is held to be dishonorable, because time is the true test of this as of most other things; and secondly there is a dishonor in being overcome by the love of money, or of wealth, or of political power, whether a man is frightened into surrender by the loss of them, or, having experienced the benefits of money and political corruption, is unable to rise above the seductions of them. For none of these things are of a permanent or lasting nature; not to mention that no generous friendship ever sprang from them. There remains, then, only one way of honorable attachment which custom allows in the beloved, and this is the way of virtue; for as we admitted that any service which the lover does to him is not to be accounted flattery or a dishonor to himself, so the beloved has one way only of voluntary service which is not dishonorable and this is virtuous service.

For we have a custom, and according to our custom anyone who does service to another under the idea that he

will be improved by him either in wisdom, or in some other particular of virtue—such a voluntary service, I say, is not to be regarded as a dishonor, and is not open to the charge of flattery. And these two customs, one the love of youth, and the other the practice of philosophy and virtue in general, ought to meet in one, and then the beloved may honorably indulge the lover. For when the lover and beloved come together, having each of them a law, and the lover thinks that he is right in doing any service which he can to his gracious loving one; and the other that he is right in showing any kindness which he can to him who is making him wise and good; the one capable of communicating wisdom and virtue, the other seeking to acquire them with a view to education and wisdom; when the two laws of love are fulfilled and meet in one—then, and then only, may the beloved yield with honor to the lover. Nor when love is of this disinterested sort is there any disgrace in being deceived, but in every other case there is equal disgrace in being or not being deceived. For he who is gracious to his lover under the impression that he is rich, and is disappointed of his gains because he turns out to be poor, is disgraced all the same: for he has done his best to show that he would give himself up to anyone's 'uses base' for the sake of money; but this is not honorable. And on the same principle he who gives himself to a lover because he is a good man, and in the hope that he will be improved by his company, shows himself to be virtuous, even though the object of his affection turn out to be a villain, and to have no virtue; and if he is deceived he has committed a noble error. For he has proved that for his part he will do anything for anybody with a view to virtue and improvement, than which there can be nothing nobler. Thus noble in every case is the acceptance of another for the sake of virtue. This is that love which is the love of the heavenly goddess, and is heavenly, and of great price to

individuals and cities, making the lover and the beloved alike eager in the work of their own improvement. But all other loves are the offspring of the other, who is the common goddess. To you, Phaedrus, I offer this my contribution in praise of love, which is as good as I could make extempore.

Apollodorus/ Pāusănĭās cāme tŏ ă pāuse—this is the balanced way in which I have been taught by the wise to speak; and Aristodemus said that the turn of Aristophanes was next, but either he had eaten too much, or from some other cause he had the hiccough, and was obliged to change turns with Eryximachus the physician, who was reclining on the couch below him.

Aristophanes/ Eryximachus, you ought either to stop my hiccough, or to speak in my turn until I have left off.

Eryximachus/ I will do both: I will speak in your turn, and do you speak in mine; and while I am speaking let me recommend you to hold your breath, and if after you have done so for some time the hiccough is no better, then gargle with a little water; and if it still continues, tickle your nose with something and sneeze; and if you sneeze once or twice, even the most violent hiccough is sure to go. I will do as you prescribe, said Aristophanes, and now get on.

Eryximachus/ Seeing that Pausanias made a fair beginning, and but a lame ending, I must endeavor to supply his deficiency. I think that he has rightly distinguished two kinds of love. But my art further informs me that the double love is not merely an affection of the soul of man towards the fair, or towards anything, but is to be found in the bodies of all animals and in productions of the earth, and I may say in all that is; such is the conclusion which I seem to have gathered from my own art of medicine, whence I learn how great and wonderful and universal is the deity of love, whose empire extends over all things, divine as well as human. And

from medicine I will begin that I may do honor to my art. There are in the human body these two kinds of love, which are confessedly different and unlike, and being unlike, they have loves and desires which are unlike; and the desire of the healthy is one, and the desire of the diseased is another; and as Pausanias was just now saying that to indulge good men is honorable, and bad men dishonorable: —so too in the body the good and healthy elements are to be indulged, and the bad elements and the elements of disease are not to be indulged, but discouraged. And this is what the physician has to do, and in this the art of medicine consists: for medicine may be regarded generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of the body, and how to satisfy them or not; and the best physician is he who is able to separate fair love from foul, or to convert one into the other; and he who knows how to eradicate and how to implant love, whichever is required, and can reconcile the most hostile elements in the constitution and make them loving friends, is a skillful practitioner. Now the most hostile are the most opposite, such as hot and cold, bitter and sweet, moist and dry, and the like. And my ancestor, Asclepius, knowing how to implant friendship and accord in these elements, was the creator of our art, as our friends the poets here tell us, and I believe them; and not only medicine in every branch, but the arts of gymnastic and husbandry are under his dominion. Anyone who pays the least attention to the subject will also perceive that in music there is the same reconciliation of opposites; and I suppose that this must have been the meaning of Heracleitus, although his words are not accurate; for he says that The One is united by disunion, like the harmony of the bow and the lyre. Now there is an absurdity in saying that harmony is discord or is composed of elements which are still in a state of discord. But what he probably meant was, that harmony is composed

of differing notes of higher or lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now reconciled by the art of music; for if the higher and lower notes still disagreed, there could be no harmony, —clearly not. For harmony is a symphony, and symphony is an agreement; but an agreement of disagreements while they disagree there cannot be; you cannot harmonize that which disagrees. In like manner rhythm is compounded of elements short and long, once differing and now in accord; which accordance, as in the former instance, medicine, so in all these other cases, music implants, making love and unison to grow up among them; and thus music, too, is concerned with the principles of love in their application to harmony and rhythm. Again, in the essential nature of harmony and rhythm there is no difficulty in discerning love which has not yet become double. But when you want to use them in actual life, either in the composition of songs or in the correct performance of airs or meters composed already, which latter is called education, then the difficulty begins, and the good artist is needed. Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love—the love of Urania the fair and heavenly muse, and of the duty of accepting the temperate, and those who are as yet intemperate only that they may become temperate, and of preserving their love; and again, of the vulgar Polyhymnia, who must be used with circumspection that the pleasure be enjoyed, but may not generate licentiousness; just as in my own art it is a great matter so to regulate the desires of the epicure that he may gratify his tastes without the attendant evil of disease. Whence I infer that in music, in medicine, in all other things human as well as divine, both loves ought to be noted as far as may be, for they are both present.

The course of the seasons is also full of both these principles; and when, as I was saying, the elements of hot

and cold, moist and dry, attain the harmonious love of one another and blend in temperance and harmony, they bring to men, animals, and plants health and plenty, and do them no harm; whereas the wanton love, getting the upper hand and affecting the seasons of the year, is very destructive and injurious, being the source of pestilence, and bringing many other kinds of diseases on animals and plants; for hoar-frost and hail and blight spring from the excesses and disorders of these elements of love, which to know in relation to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies and the seasons of the year is termed astronomy. Furthermore all sacrifices and the whole province of divination, which is the art of communion between gods and men—these, I say, are concerned only with the preservation of the good and the cure of the evil love. For all manner of impiety is likely to ensue if, instead of accepting and honoring and reverencing the harmonious love in all his actions, a man honors the other love, whether in his feelings towards gods or parents, towards the living or the dead. Wherefore the business of divination is to see to these loves and to heal them, and divination is the peacemaker of gods and men, working by a knowledge of the religious or irreligious tendencies which exist in human loves. Such is the great and mighty, or rather omnipotent force of love in general. And the love, more especially, which is concerned with the good, and which is perfected in company with temperance and justice, whether among gods or men, has the greatest power, and is the source of all our happiness and harmony, and makes us friends with the gods who are above us, and with one another. I dare say that I too have omitted several things which might be said in praise of Love, but this was not intentional, and you, Aristophanes, may now supply the omission or take some other line of commendation; for I perceive that you are rid of the hiccough.

Aristophanes/ Yes, the hiccough is gone; not, however, until I applied the sneezing; and I wonder whether the harmony of the body has a love of such noises and ticklings, for I no sooner applied the sneezing than I was cured.

Eryximachus/ Beware, friend Aristophanes, although you are going to speak, you are making fun of me; and I shall have to watch and see whether I cannot have a laugh at your expense, when you might speak in peace.

Aristophanes/ You are quite right. I will unsay my words; but do you please not to watch me, as I fear that in the speech which I am about to make, instead of others laughing with me, which is to the manner born of our muse and would be all the better, I shall only be laughed at by them.

Eryximachus/ Do you expect to shoot your bolt and escape, Aristophanes? Well, perhaps if you are very careful and bear in mind that you will be called to account, I may be induced to let you off.

Apollodorus/ Aristophanes professed to open another vein of discourse; he had a mind to praise Love in another way, unlike that either of Pausanias or Eryximachus.

Aristophanes/ Mankind, judging by their neglect of him, have never, as I think, at all understood the power of Love. For if they had understood him they would surely have built noble temples and altars, and offered solemn sacrifices in his honor; but this is not done, and most certainly ought to be done: since of all the gods he is the best friend of men, the helper and the healer of the ills which are the great impediment to the happiness of the race. I will try to describe his power to you, and you shall teach the rest of the world what I am teaching you. In the first place, let me treat of the nature of man and what has happened to it; for the original human nature was not like the present, but different. The sexes were not two as they are now, but originally three in

number; there was man, woman, and the union of the two, having a name corresponding to this double nature, which had once a real existence, but is now lost, and the word 'Androgynous' is only preserved as a term of reproach. In the second place, the primeval man was round, his back and sides forming a circle; and he had four hands and four feet, one head with two faces, looking opposite ways, set on a round neck and precisely alike; also four ears, two privy members, and the remainder to correspond. He could walk upright as men now do, backwards or forwards as he pleased, and he could also roll over and over at a great pace, turning on his four hands and four feet, eight in all, like tumblers going over and over with their legs in the air; this was when he wanted to run fast. Now the sexes were three, and such as I have described them; because the sun, moon, and earth are three; and the man was originally the child of the sun, the woman of the earth, and the man-woman of the moon, which is made up of sun and earth, and they were all round and moved round and round like their parents. Terrible was their might and strength, and the thoughts of their hearts were great, and they made an attack upon the gods; of them is told the tale of Otys and Ephialtes who, as Homer says, dared to scale heaven, and would have laid hands upon the gods. Doubt reigned in the celestial councils. Should they kill them and annihilate the race with thunderbolts, as they had done the giants, then there would be an end of the sacrifices and worship which men offered to them; but, on the other hand, the gods could not suffer their insolence to be unrestrained. At last, after a good deal of reflection, Zeus discovered a way. He said: 'Methinks I have a plan which will humble their pride and improve their manners; men shall continue to exist, but I will cut them in two and then they will be diminished in strength and increased in numbers; this will have the advantage of

making them more profitable to us. They shall walk upright on two legs, and if they continue insolent and will not be quiet, I will split them again and they shall hop about on a single leg.' He spoke and cut men in two, like a sorb-apple which is halved for pickling, or as you might divide an egg with a hair; and as he cut them one after another, he bade Apollo give the face and the half of the neck a turn in order that the man might contemplate the section of himself: he would thus learn a lesson of humility. Apollo was also bidden to heal their wounds and compose their forms. So he gave a turn to the face and pulled the skin from the sides all over that which in our language is called the belly, like the purses which draw in, and he made one mouth at the center, which he fastened in a knot (the same which is called the navel); he also molded the breast and took out most of the wrinkles, much as a shoemaker might smooth leather upon a last; he left a few, however, in the region of the belly and navel, as a memorial of the primeval state. After the division the two parts of man, each desiring his other half, came together, and throwing their arms about one another, entwined in mutual embraces, longing to grow into one, they were on the point of dying from hunger and self-neglect, because they did not like to do anything apart; and when one of the halves died and the other survived, the survivor sought another mate, man or woman as we call them, —being the sections of entire men or women, —and clung to that. They were being destroyed, when Zeus in pity of them invented a new plan: he turned the parts of generation round to the front, for this had not been always their position, and they sowed the seed no longer as hitherto like grasshoppers in the ground, but in one another; and after the transposition the male generated in the female in order that by the mutual embraces of man and woman they might breed, and the race might continue; or if man came to man they might be

satisfied, and rest, and go their ways to the business of life: so ancient is the desire of one another which is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, making one of two, and healing the state of man. Each of us when separated, having one side only, like a flat fish, is but the indenture of a man, and he is always looking for his other half. Men who are a section of that double nature which was once called Androgynous are lovers of women; adulterers are generally of this breed, and also adulterous women who lust after men: the women who are a section of the woman do not care for men, but have female attachments; the female companions are of this sort. But they who are a section of the male follow the male, and while they are young, being slices of the original man, they hang about men and embrace them, and they are themselves the best of boys and youths, because they have the most manly nature. Some indeed assert that they are shameless, but this is not true; for they do not act thus from any want of shame, but because they are valiant and manly, and have a manly countenance, and they embrace that which is like them. And these when they grow up become our statesmen, and these only, which is a great proof of the truth of what I am saying. When they reach manhood they are lovers of youth, and are not naturally inclined to marry or beget children, —if at all, they do so only in obedience to the law; but they are satisfied if they may be allowed to live with one another unwedded; and such a nature is prone to love and ready to return love, always embracing that which is akin to him. And when one of them meets with his other half, the actual half of himself, whether he be a lover of youth or a lover of another sort, the pair are lost in an amazement of love and friendship and intimacy, and one will not be out of the other's sight, as I may say, even for a moment: these are the people who pass their whole lives together; yet they could not explain what they

desire of one another. For the intense yearning which each of them has towards the other does not appear to be the desire of lover's intercourse, but of something else which the soul of either evidently desires and cannot tell, and of which she has only a dark and doubtful presentiment. Suppose Hephaestus, with his instruments, to come to the pair who are lying side by side and to say to them, 'What do you people want of one another?' they would be unable to explain. And suppose further, that when he saw their perplexity he said: I do you desire to be wholly one; always day and night to be in one another's company? for if this is what you desire, I am ready to melt you into one and let you grow together, so that being two you shall become one, and while you live, live a common life as if you were a single man, and after your death in the world below still be one departed soul instead of two—I ask whether this is what you lovingly desire, and whether you are satisfied to attain this?'—there is not a man of them who when he heard the proposal would deny or would not acknowledge that this meeting and melting into one another, this becoming one instead of two, was the very expression of his ancient need. And the reason is that human nature was originally one and we were a whole, and the desire and pursuit of the whole is called love. There was a time, I say, when we were one, but now because of the wickedness of mankind God has dispersed us, as the Arcadians were dispersed into villages by the Lacedaemonians. And if we are not obedient to the gods, there is a danger that we shall be split up again and go about in basso-relievo, like the profile figures having only half a nose which are sculptured on monuments, and that we shall be like tallies. Wherefore let us exhort all men to piety, that we may avoid evil, and obtain the good, of which Love is to us the lord and minister; and let no one oppose him—he is the enemy of the gods who opposes him. For if we are friends

of the God and at peace with him we shall find our own true loves, which rarely happens in this world at present. I am serious, and therefore I must beg Eryximachus not to make fun or to find any allusion in what I am saying to Pausanias and Agathon, who, as I suspect, are both of the manly nature, and belong to the class which I have been describing. But my words have a wider application—they include men and women everywhere; and I believe that if our loves were perfectly accomplished, and each one returning to his primeval nature had his original true love, then our race would be happy. And if this would be best of all, the best in the next degree and under present circumstances must be the nearest approach to such an union; and that will be the attainment of a congenial love. Wherefore, if we would praise him who has given to us the benefit, we must praise the god Love, who is our greatest benefactor, both leading us in this life back to our own nature, and giving us high hopes for the future, for he promises that if we are pious, he will restore us to our original state, and heal us and make us happy and blessed. This, Eryximachus, is my discourse of love, which, although different to yours, I must beg you to leave unassailed by the shafts of your ridicule, in order that each may have his turn; each, or rather either, for Agathon and Socrates are the only ones left.

Eryximachus/ Indeed, I am not going to attack you, for I thought your speech charming, and did I not know that Agathon and Socrates are masters in the art of love, I should be really afraid that they would have nothing to say, after the world of things which have been said already. But, for all that, I am not without hopes.

Socrates/ You played your part well, Eryximachus; but if you were as I am now, or rather as I shall be when Agathon has spoken, you would, indeed, be in a great strait.

Agathon/ You want to cast a spell over me, Socrates, in the hope that I may be disconcerted at the expectation raised among the audience that I shall speak well.

Socrates/ I should be strangely forgetful, Agathon, of the courage and magnanimity which you showed when your own compositions were about to be exhibited, and you came upon the stage with the actors and faced the vast theatre altogether undismayed, if I thought that your nerves could be fluttered at a small party of friends.

Agathon/ Do you think, Socrates, that my head is so full of the theatre as not to know how much more formidable to a man of sense a few good judges are than many fools?

Socrates/ Nay, I should be very wrong in attributing to you, Agathon, that or any other want of refinement. And I am quite aware that if you happened to meet with any whom you thought wise, you would care for their opinion much more than for that of the many. But then we, having been a part of the foolish many in the theatre, cannot be regarded as the select wise; though I know that if you chanced to be in the presence, not of one of ourselves, but of some really wise man, you would be ashamed of disgracing yourself before him—would you not?

Agathon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But before the many you would not be ashamed, if you thought that you were doing something disgraceful in their presence?

Phaedrus/ Do not answer him, my dear Agathon; for if he can only get a partner with whom he can talk, especially a good-looking one, he will no longer care about the completion of our plan. Now I love to hear him talk; but just at present I must not forget the encomium on Love which I ought to receive from him and from everyone. When you and he have paid your tribute to the god, then you may talk.

Agathon/ Very good, Phaedrus; I see no reason why I should not proceed with my speech, as I shall have many other opportunities of conversing with Socrates. Let me say first how I ought to speak, and then speak: —

The previous speakers, instead of praising the god Love, or unfolding his nature, appear to have congratulated mankind on the benefits which he confers upon them. But I would rather praise the god first, and then speak of his gifts; this is always the right way of praising everything. May I say without impiety or offence, that of all the blessed gods he is the most blessed because he is the fairest and best? And he is the fairest: for, in the first place, he is the youngest, and of his youth he is himself the witness, fleeing out of the way of age, who is swift enough, swifter truly than most of us like: —Love hates him and will not come near him; but youth and love live and move together—like to like, as the proverb says. Many things were said by Phaedrus about Love in which I agree with him; but I cannot agree that he is older than Iapetus and Kronos: —not so; I maintain him to be the youngest of the gods, and youthful ever. The ancient doings among the gods of which Hesiod and Parmenides spoke, if the tradition of them be true, were done of Necessity and not of Love; had Love been in those days, there would have been no chaining or mutilation of the gods, or other violence, but peace and sweetness, as there is now in heaven, since the rule of Love began. Love is young and also tender; he ought to have a poet like Homer to describe his tenderness, as Homer says of Ate, that she is a goddess and tender: —

> 'Her feet are tender, for she sets her steps,
> Not on the ground but on the heads of men:'

herein is an excellent proof of her tenderness, —that she walks not upon the hard but upon the soft. Let us adduce a similar proof of the tenderness of Love; for he walks not upon the earth, nor yet upon the skulls of men, which are not so

very soft, but in the hearts and souls of both gods and men, which are of all things the softest: in them he walks and dwells and makes his home. Not in every soul without exception, for where there is hardness he departs, where there is softness there he dwells; and nestling always with his feet and in all manner of ways in the softest of soft places, how can he be other than the softest of all things? Of a truth he is the tenderest as well as the youngest, and also he is of flexile form; for if he were hard and without flexure he could not enfold all things, or wind his way into and out of every soul of man undiscovered. And a proof of his flexibility and symmetry of form is his grace, which is universally admitted to be in an especial manner the attribute of Love; ungrace and love are always at war with one another. The fairness of his complexion is revealed by his habitation among the flowers; for he dwells not amid bloomless or fading beauties, whether of body or soul or aught else, but in the place of flowers and scents, there he sits and abides. Concerning the beauty of the god I have said enough; and yet there remains much more which I might say. Of his virtue I have now to speak: his greatest glory is that he can neither do nor suffer wrong to or from any god or any man; for he suffers not by force if he suffers; force comes not near him, neither when he acts does he act by force. For all men in all things serve him of their own free will, and where there is voluntary agreement, there, as the laws which are the lords of the city say, is justice. And not only is he just but exceedingly temperate, for Temperance is the acknowledged ruler of the pleasures and desires, and no pleasure ever masters Love; he is their master and they are his servants; and if he conquers them he must be temperate indeed. As to courage, even the God of War is no match for him; he is the captive and Love is the lord, for love, the love of Aphrodite, masters him, as the tale runs; and the master is stronger than the

servant. And if he conquers the bravest of all others, he must be himself the bravest. Of his courage and justice and temperance I have spoken, but I have yet to speak of his wisdom; and according to the measure of my ability I must try to do my best. In the first place he is a poet (and here, like Eryximachus, I magnify my art), and he is also the source of poesy in others, which he could not be if he were not himself a poet. And at the touch of him everyone becomes a poet, even though he had no music in him before; this also is a proof that Love is a good poet and accomplished in all the fine arts; for no one can give to another that which he has not himself, or teach that of which he has no knowledge. Who will deny that the creation of the animals is his doing? Are they not all the works of his wisdom, born and begotten of him? And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of them whom love inspires has the light of fame? —he whom Love touches not walks in darkness. The arts of medicine and archery and divination were discovered by Apollo, under the guidance of love and desire; so that he too is a disciple of Love. Also the melody of the Muses, the metallurgy of Hephaestus, the weaving of Athene, the empire of Zeus over gods and men, are all due to Love, who was the inventor of them. And so Love set in order the empire of the gods—the love of beauty, as is evident, for with deformity Love has no concern. In the days of old, as I began by saying, dreadful deeds were done among the gods, for they were ruled by Necessity; but now since the birth of Love, and from the Love of the beautiful, has sprung every good in heaven and earth. Therefore, Phaedrus, I say of Love that he is the fairest and best in himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in all other things. And there comes into my mind a line of poetry in which he is said to be the god who;

> 'Gives peace on earth and calms the stormy deep,
> Who stills the winds and bids the sufferer sleep.'

This is he who empties men of disaffection and fills them with affection, who makes them to meet together at banquets such as these: in sacrifices, feasts, dances, he is our lord—who sends courtesy and sends away discourtesy, who gives kindness ever and never gives unkindness; the friend of the good, the wonder of the wise, the amazement of the gods; desired by those who have no part in him, and precious to those who have the better part in him; parent of delicacy, luxury, desire, fondness, softness, grace; regardful of the good, regardless of the evil: in every word, work, wish, fear—savior, pilot, comrade, helper; glory of gods and men, leader best and brightest: in whose footsteps let every man follow, sweetly singing in his honor and joining in that sweet strain with which love charms the souls of gods and men. Such is the speech, Phaedrus, half-playful, yet having a certain measure of seriousness, which, according to my ability, I dedicate to the god.

Apollodorus/ When Agathon had done speaking, Aristodemus said that there was a general cheer; the young man was thought to have spoken in a manner worthy of himself, and of the god. And Socrates, looking at Eryximachus, said:

Socrates/ Tell me, son of Acumenus, was there not reason in my fears? and was I not a true prophet when I said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration, and that I should be in a strait?

Eryximachus/ The part of the prophecy which concerns Agathon, appears to me to be true; but not the other part—that you will be in a strait.

Socrates/ Why, my dear friend, must not I or anyone be in a strait who has to speak after he has heard such a rich and varied discourse? I am especially struck with the beauty of the concluding words—who could listen to them without

amazement? When I reflected on the immeasurable inferiority of my own powers, I was ready to run away for shame, if there had been a possibility of escape. For I was reminded of Gorgias, and at the end of his speech I fancied that Agathon was shaking at me the Gorginian or Gorgonian head of the great master of rhetoric, which was simply to turn me and my speech into stone, as Homer says, and strike me dumb. And then I perceived how foolish I had been in consenting to take my turn with you in praising love, and saying that I too was a master of the art, when I really had no conception how anything ought to be praised. For in my simplicity I imagined that the topics of praise should be true, and that this being presupposed, out of the true the speaker was to choose the best and set them forth in the best manner. And I felt quite proud, thinking that I knew the nature of true praise, and should speak well. Whereas I now see that the intention was to attribute to Love every species of greatness and glory, whether really belonging to him or not, without regard to truth or falsehood—that was no matter; for the original proposal seems to have been not that each of you should really praise Love, but only that you should appear to praise him. And so you attribute to Love every imaginable form of praise which can be gathered anywhere; and you say that 'he is all this,' and 'the cause of all that,' making him appear the fairest and best of all to those who know him not, for you cannot impose upon those who know him. And a noble and solemn hymn of praise have you rehearsed. But as I misunderstood the nature of the praise when I said that I would take my turn, I must beg to be absolved from the promise which I made in ignorance, and which (as Euripides would say) was a promise of the lips and not of the mind. Farewell then to such a strain: for I do not praise in that way; no, indeed, I cannot. But if you like to hear the truth about love, I am ready to speak in my own

manner, though I will not make myself ridiculous by entering into any rivalry with you. Say then, Phaedrus, whether you would like to have the truth about love, spoken in any words and in any order which may happen to come into my mind at the time. Will that be agreeable to you?

Apollodorus/ Aristodemus said that Phaedrus and the company bid him speak in any manner which he thought best.

Socrates/ Then let me have your permission first to ask Agathon a few more questions, in order that I may take his admissions as the premises of my discourse.

Phaedrus/ I grant the permission: put your questions.

Apollodorus/ Socrates then proceeded as follows: —

Socrates/ In the magnificent oration which you have just uttered, I think that you were right, my dear Agathon, in proposing to speak of the nature of Love first and afterwards of his works—that is a way of beginning which I very much approve. And as you have spoken so eloquently of his nature, may I ask you further, Whether love is the love of something or of nothing? And here I must explain myself: I do not want you to say that love is the love of a father or the love of a mother—that would be ridiculous; but to answer as you would, if I asked is a father a father of something? to which you would find no difficulty in replying, of a son or daughter: and the answer would be right.

Agathon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And you would say the same of a mother?

Apollodorus/ He assented.

Socrates/ Yet let me ask you one more question in order to illustrate my meaning: Is not a brother to be regarded essentially as a brother of something?

Agathon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ That is, of a brother or sister?

Agathon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now I will ask about Love: —Is Love of something or of nothing?

Agathon/ Of something, surely.

Socrates/ Keep in mind what this is, and tell me what I want to know—whether Love desires that of which love is.

Agathon/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ And does he possess, or does he not possess, that which he loves and desires?

Agathon/ Probably not, I should say.

Socrates/ Nay, I would have you consider whether 'necessarily' is not rather the word. The inference that he who desires something is in want of something, and that he who desires nothing is in want of nothing, is in my judgment, Agathon, absolutely and necessarily true. What do you think?

Agathon/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ Very good. Would he who is great, desire to be great, or he who is strong, desire to be strong?

Agathon/ That would be inconsistent with our previous admissions.

Socrates/ True. For he who is anything cannot want to be that which he is?

Agathon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And yet, if a man being strong desired to be strong, or being swift desired to be swift, or being healthy desired to be healthy, in that case he might be thought to desire something which he already has or is. I give the example in order that we may avoid misconception. For the possessors of these qualities, Agathon, must be supposed to have their respective advantages at the time, whether they

choose or not; and who can desire that which he has? Therefore, when a person says, I am well and wish to be well, or I am rich and wish to be rich, and I desire simply to have what I have—to him we shall reply: 'You, my friend, having wealth and health and strength, want to have the continuance of them; for at this moment, whether you choose or no, you have them. And when you say, I desire that which I have and nothing else, is not your meaning that you want to have what you now have in the future?' He must agree with us—must he not?

Agathon/ He must.

Socrates/ Then he desires that what he has at present may be preserved to him in the future, which is equivalent to saying that he desires something which is nonexistent to him, and which as yet he has not got:

Agathon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then he and everyone who desires, desires that which he has not already, and which is future and not present, and which he has not, and is not, and of which he is in want; —these are the sort of things which love and desire seek?

Agathon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then now, let us recapitulate the argument. First, is not love of something, and of something too which is wanting to a man?

Agathon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Remember further what you said in your speech, or if you do not remember I will remind you: you said that the love of the beautiful set in order the empire of the gods, for that of deformed things there is no love—did you not say something of that kind?

Agathon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, and the remark was a just one. And if this is true, Love is the love of beauty and not of deformity?

Apollodorus/ He assented.

Socrates/ And the admission has been already made that Love is of something which a man wants and has not?

Agathon/ True.

Socrates/ Then Love wants and has not beauty?

Agathon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty?

Agathon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then would you still say that love is beautiful?

Agathon/ I fear that I did not understand what I was saying.

Socrates/ You made a very good speech, Agathon; but there is yet one small question which I would fain ask: —Is not the good also the beautiful?

Agathon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good?

Agathon/ I cannot refute you, Socrates: —Let us assume that what you say is true.

Socrates/ Say rather, beloved Agathon, that you cannot refute the truth; for Socrates is easily refuted.

Socrates/ And now, taking my leave of you, I will rehearse a tale of love which I heard from Diotima of Mantineia, a woman wise in this and in many other kinds of knowledge, who in the days of old, when the Athenians offered sacrifice before the coming of the plague, delayed the disease ten years. She was my instructress in the art of love, and I shall repeat to you what she said to me, beginning with the

admissions made by Agathon, which are nearly if not quite the same which I made to the wise woman when she questioned me: I think that this will be the easiest way, and I shall take both parts myself as well as I can. As you, Agathon, suggested, I must speak first of the being and nature of Love, and then of his works. First I said to her in nearly the same words which he used to me, that Love was a mighty god, and likewise fair; and she proved to me as I proved to him that, by my own showing, Love was neither fair nor good.

'What do you mean, Diotima, is love then evil and foul?'

Diotima/ 'Hush, must that be foul which is not fair?'

Socrates/ 'Certainly,'

Diotima/ 'And is that which is not wise, ignorant? do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?'

Socrates/ 'And what may that be?'

Diotima/ 'Right opinion, which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge (for how can knowledge be devoid of reason? nor again, ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth), but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance and wisdom.'

Socrates/ 'Quite true,'

Diotima/ 'Do not then insist, that what is not fair is of necessity foul, or what is not good evil; or infer that because love is not fair and good he is therefore foul and evil; for he is in a mean between them.'

Socrates/ 'Well, Love is surely admitted by all to be a great god.'

Diotima/ 'By those who know or by those who do not know?'

Socrates/ 'By all.'

Diotima/ 'And how, Socrates, can Love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?'

Socrates/ 'And who are they?'

Diotima/ 'You and I are two of them,'

Socrates/ 'How can that be?'

Diotima/ 'It is quite intelligible, for you yourself would acknowledge that the gods are happy and fair—of course you would—would you dare to say that any god was not?'

Socrates/ 'Certainly not,'

Diotima/ 'And you mean by the happy, those who are the possessors of things good or fair?'

Socrates/ 'Yes.'

Diotima/ 'And you admitted that Love, because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want?'

Socrates/ 'Yes, I did.'

Diotima/ 'But how can he be a god who has no portion in what is either good or fair?'

Socrates/ 'Impossible.'

Diotima/ 'Then you see that you also deny the divinity of Love.'

Socrates/ 'What then is Love?' I asked; 'Is he mortal?'

Diotima/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'What then?'

Diotima/ 'As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two.'

Socrates/ 'What is he, Diotima?'

Diotima/ 'He is a great spirit (δαίμων), and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal.'

Socrates/ 'And what, is his power?'

Diotima/ 'He interprets, between gods and men, conveying and taking across to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and replies of the gods; he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and therefore in him all is bound together, and through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all prophecy and incantation, find their way. For God mingles not with man; but through Love all the intercourse and converse of God with man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom which understands this is spiritual; all other wisdom, such as that of arts and handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. Now these spirits or intermediate powers are many and diverse, and one of them is Love.'

Socrates/ 'And who, was his father, and who his mother?'

Diotima/ 'The tale, will take time; nevertheless I will tell you. On the birthday of Aphrodite there was a feast of the gods, at which the god Poros or Plenty, who is the son of Metis or Discretion, was one of the guests. When the feast was over, Penia or Poverty, as the manner is on such occasions, came about the doors to beg. Now Plenty, who was the worse for nectar (there was no wine in those days), went into the garden of Zeus and fell into a heavy sleep; and Poverty considering her own straitened circumstances, plotted to have a child by him, and accordingly she lay down at his side and conceived Love, who partly because he is naturally a lover of the beautiful, and because Aphrodite is herself beautiful, and also because he was born on her birthday, is her follower and attendant. And as his parentage is, so also are his fortunes. In the first place he is always poor, and anything but tender and fair, as the many imagine him; and he is rough and squalid, and has no shoes, nor a house to dwell in; on the bare earth exposed he lies under the open heaven, in the streets, or at the doors of houses,

taking his rest; and like his mother he is always in distress. Like his father too, whom he also partly resembles, he is always plotting against the fair and good; he is bold, enterprising, strong, a mighty hunter, always weaving some intrigue or other, keen in the pursuit of wisdom, fertile in resources; a philosopher at all times, terrible as an enchanter, sorcerer, sophist. He is by nature neither mortal nor immortal, but alive and flourishing at one moment when he is in plenty, and dead at another moment, and again alive by reason of his father's nature. But that which is always flowing in is always flowing out, and so he is never in want and never in wealth; and, further, he is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge. The truth of the matter is this: No god is a philosopher or seeker after wisdom, for he is wise already; nor does any man who is wise seek after wisdom. Neither do the ignorant seek after wisdom. For herein is the evil of ignorance, that he who is neither good nor wise is nevertheless satisfied with himself: he has no desire for that of which he feels no want.'

Socrates/ 'But who then, Diotima, are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?'

Diotima/ 'A child may answer that question; they are those who are in a mean between the two; Love is one of them. For wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and Love is of the beautiful; and therefore Love is also a philosopher or lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean between the wise and the ignorant. And of this too his birth is the cause; for his father is wealthy and wise, and his mother poor and foolish. Such, my dear Socrates, is the nature of the spirit Love. The error in your conception of him was very natural, and as I imagine from what you say, has arisen out of a confusion of love and the beloved, which made you think that love was all beautiful. For the beloved is the truly beautiful, and delicate, and perfect, and blessed;

but the principle of love is of another nature, and is such as I have described.'

Socrates/ 'O thou stranger woman, thou sayest well; but, assuming Love to be such as you say, what is the use of him to men?'

Diotima/ 'That, Socrates, I will attempt to unfold: of his nature and birth I have already spoken; and you acknowledge that love is of the beautiful. But someone will say: Of the beautiful in what, Socrates and Diotima? —or rather let me put the question more clearly, and ask: When a man loves the beautiful, what does he desire?'

Socrates/ 'I answered her: 'That the beautiful maybe his.'

Diotima/ 'Still, the answer suggests a further question: What is given by the possession of beauty?'

Socrates/ 'To what you have asked, I have no answer ready.'

Diotima/ 'Then, let me put the word "good" in the place of the beautiful, and repeat the question once more: If he who loves, loves the good, what is it then that he loves?'

Socrates/ 'The possession of the good,'

Diotima/ 'And what does he gain who possesses the good?'

Socrates/ 'Happiness, there is less difficulty in answering that question.'

Diotima/ 'Yes, the happy are made happy by the acquisition of good things. Nor is there any need to ask why a man desires happiness; the answer is already final.'

Socrates/ 'You are right,'

Diotima/ 'And is this wish and this desire common to all? and do all men always desire their own good, or only some men? —what say you?'

Socrates/ 'All men, the desire is common to all.'

Diotima/ 'Why, then, are not all men, Socrates, said to love, but only some of them? whereas you say that all men are always loving the same things.'

Socrates/ 'I myself wonder, why this is.'

Diotima/ 'There is nothing to wonder at, the reason is that one part of love is separated off and receives the name of the whole, but the other parts have other names.'

Socrates/ 'Give an illustration,'

Diotima/ 'There is poetry, which, as you know, is complex and manifold. All creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making, and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of arts are all poets or makers.'

Socrates/ 'Very true.'

Diotima/ 'Still, you know that they are not called poets, but have other names; only that portion of the art which is separated off from the rest, and is concerned with music and meter, is termed poetry, and they who possess poetry in this sense of the word are called poets.'

Socrates/ 'Very true,'

Diotima/ 'And the same holds of love. For you may say generally that all desire of good and happiness is only the great and subtle power of love; but they who are drawn towards him by any other path, whether the path of money-making or gymnastics or philosophy, are not called lovers—the name of the whole is appropriated to those whose affection takes one form only—they alone are said to love, or to be lovers.'

Socrates/ 'I dare say, that you are right.'

Diotima/ 'Yes, and you hear people say that lovers are seeking for their other half; but I say that they are seeking neither for the half of themselves, nor for the whole, unless the half or the whole be also a good. And they will cut off

their own hands and feet and cast them away, if they are evil; for they love not what is their own, unless perchance there be someone who calls what belongs to him the good, and what belongs to another the evil. For there is nothing which men love but the good. Is there anything?'

Socrates/ 'Certainly, I should say, that there is nothing.'

Diotima/ 'Then, the simple truth is, that men love the good,'

Socrates/ 'Yes,'

Diotima/ 'To which must be added that they love the possession of the good?'

Socrates/ 'Yes, that must be added.'

Diotima/ 'And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?'

Socrates/ 'That must be added too.'

Diotima/ 'Then love, may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?'

Socrates/ 'That is most true.'

Diotima/ 'Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further, what is the manner of the pursuit? what are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love? and what is the object which they have in view? Answer me.'

Socrates/ 'Nay, Diotima, if I had known, I should not have wondered at your wisdom, neither should I have come to learn from you about this very matter.'

Diotima/ 'Well I will teach you: —The object which they have in view is birth in beauty, whether of body or soul.'

Socrates/ 'I do not understand you, the oracle requires an explanation.'

Diotima/ 'I will make my meaning clearer, I mean to say, that all men are bringing to the birth in their bodies and in

their souls. There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous of procreation—procreation which must be in beauty and not in deformity; and this procreation is the union of man and woman, and is a divine thing; for conception and generation are an immortal principle in the mortal creature, and in the inharmonious they can never be. But the deformed is always inharmonious with the divine, and the beautiful harmonious. Beauty, then, is the destiny or goddess of parturition who presides at birth, and therefore, when approaching beauty, the conceiving power is propitious, and diffusive, and benign, and begets and bears fruit: at the sight of ugliness she frowns and contracts and has a sense of pain, and turns away, and shrivels up, and not without a pang refrains from conception. And this is the reason why, when the hour of conception arrives, and the teeming nature is full, there is such a flutter and ecstasy about beauty whose approach is the alleviation of the pain of travail. For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love of the beautiful only.'

Socrates/ 'What then?'

Diotima/ 'The love of generation and of birth in beauty.'

Socrates/ 'Yes'

Diotima/ 'Yes, indeed,'

Socrates/ 'But why of generation?'

Diotima/ 'Because to the mortal creature, generation is a sort of eternity and immortality, and if, as has been already admitted, love is of the everlasting possession of the good, all men will necessarily desire immortality together with good: Wherefore love is of immortality.'

Socrates/ All this she taught me at various times when she spoke of love. And I remember her once saying to me;

Diotima/ 'What is the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire? See you not how all animals, birds, as well

as beasts, in their desire of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of love, which begins with the desire of union; whereto is added the care of offspring, on whose behalf the weakest are ready to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and to die for them, and will let themselves be tormented with hunger or suffer anything in order to maintain their young. Man may be supposed to act thus from reason; but why should animals have these passionate feelings? Can you tell me why?'

Socrates/ Again I replied that I did not know.

Diotima/ And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?

Socrates/ 'But I have told you already, Diotima, that my ignorance is the reason why I come to you; for I am conscious that I want a teacher; tell me then the cause of this and of the other mysteries of love.'

Diotima/ 'Marvel not, if you believe that love is of the immortal, as we have several times acknowledged; for here again, and on the same principle too, the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal: and this is only to be attained by generation, because generation always leaves behind a new existence in the place of the old. Nay even in the life of the same individual there is succession and not absolute unity: a man is called the same, and yet in the short interval which elapses between youth and age, and in which every animal is said to have life and identity, he is undergoing a perpetual process of loss and reparation—hair, flesh, bones, blood, and the whole body are always changing. Which is true not only of the body, but also of the soul, whose habits, tempers, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, never remain the same in anyone of us, but are always coming and going; and equally true of knowledge, and what is still more surprising to us

mortals, not only do the sciences in general spring up and decay, so that in respect of them we are never the same; but each of them individually experiences a like change. For what is implied in the word "recollection," but the departure of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten, and is renewed and preserved by recollection, and appears to be the same although in reality new, according to that law of succession by which all mortal things are preserved, not absolutely the same, but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar existence behind—unlike the divine, which is always the same and not another? And in this way, Socrates, the mortal body, or mortal anything, partakes of immortality; but the immortal in another way. Marvel not then at the love which all men have of their offspring; for that universal love and interest is for the sake of immortality.'

Socrates/ I was astonished at her words, and said: 'Is this really true, O thou wise Diotima?' And she answered with all the authority of an accomplished sophist:

Diotima/ 'Of that, Socrates, you may be assured; —think only of the ambition of men, and you will wonder at the senselessness of their ways, unless you consider how they are stirred by the love of an immortality of fame. They are ready to run all risks greater far than they would have run for their children, and to spend money and undergo any sort of toil, and even to die, for the sake of leaving behind them a name which shall be eternal. Do you imagine that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus, or Achilles to avenge Patroclus, or your own Codrus in order to preserve the kingdom for his sons, if they had not imagined that the memory of their virtues, which still survives among us, would be immortal? Nay, I am persuaded that all men do all things, and the better they are the more they do them, in

hope of the glorious fame of immortal virtue; for they desire the immortal.

'Those who are pregnant in the body only, betake themselves to women and beget children—this is the character of their love; their offspring, as they hope, will preserve their memory and give them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future. But souls which are pregnant—for there certainly are men who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies—conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or contain. And what are these conceptions? —wisdom and virtue in general. And such creators are poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor. But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice. And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate. He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring—for in deformity he will beget nothing—and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body; above all when he finds a fair and noble and well-nurtured soul, he embraces the two in one person, and to such an one he is full of speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man; and he tries to educate him; and at the touch of the beautiful which is ever present to his memory, even when absent, he brings forth that which he had conceived long before, and in company with him tends that which he brings forth; and they are married by a far nearer tie and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children, for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal. Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? Who would not emulate them in the creation of

children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory? Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviors, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say? There is Solon, too, who is the revered father of Athenian laws; and many others there are in many other places, both among Hellenes and barbarians, who have given to the world many noble works, and have been the parents of virtue of every kind; and many temples have been raised in their honor for the sake of children such as theirs; which were never raised in honor of anyone, for the sake of his mortal children.

'These are the lesser mysteries of love, into which even you, Socrates, may enter; to the greater and more hidden ones which are the crown of these, and to which, if you pursue them in a right spirit, they will lead, I know not whether you will be able to attain. But I will do my utmost to inform you, and do you follow if you can. For he who would proceed aright in this matter should begin in youth to visit beautiful forms; and first, if he be guided by his instructor aright, to love one such form only—out of that he should create fair thoughts; and soon he will of himself perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another; and then if beauty of form in general is his pursuit, how foolish would he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same! And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover of all beautiful forms; in the next stage he will consider that the beauty of the mind is more honorable than the beauty of the outward form. So that if a virtuous soul have but a little comeliness, he will be content to love and tend him, and will search out and bring to the birth thoughts which may improve the young, until he is compelled to contemplate and

see the beauty of institutions and laws, and to understand that the beauty of them all is of one family, and that personal beauty is a trifle; and after laws and institutions he will go on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty, being not like a servant in love with the beauty of one youth or man or institution, himself a slave mean and narrow-minded, but drawing towards and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, he will create many fair and noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wisdom; until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere. To this I will proceed; please to give me your very best attention:

'He who has been instructed thus, far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (and this, Socrates, is the final cause of all our former toils)—a nature which in the first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning; secondly, not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example, in an animal, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place; but beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who from these ascending under the influence of true love, begins to perceive that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only,

and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. This, my dear Socrates,'

Socrates/ Said the stranger of Mantineia;

Diotima/ 'is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute; a beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, whose presence now entrances you; and you and many a one would be content to live seeing them only and conversing with them without meat or drink, if that were possible—you only want to look at them and to be with them. But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty—the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colors and vanities of human life—thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine? Remember how in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?'

Socrates/ Such, Phaedrus—and I speak not only to you, but to all of you—were the words of Diotima; and I am persuaded of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to persuade others, that in the attainment of this end human nature will not easily find a helper better than love. And therefore, also, I say that every man ought to honor him as I myself honor him, and walk in his ways, and exhort others to do the same, and praise the power and spirit of love according to the measure of my ability now and ever.

The words which I have spoken, you, Phaedrus, may call an encomium of love, or anything else which you please.

Apollodorus/ When Socrates had done speaking, the company applauded, and Aristophanes was beginning to say something in answer to the allusion which Socrates had made to his own speech, when suddenly there was a great knocking at the door of the house, as of revelers, and the sound of a flute-girl was heard. Agathon told the attendants to go and see who were the intruders.

Agathon/ 'If they are friends of ours, invite them in, but if not, say that the drinking is over.'

Apollodorus/ A little while afterwards they heard the voice of Alcibiades resounding in the court; he was in a great state of intoxication, and kept roaring and shouting

Alcibiades/ 'Where is Agathon? Lead me to Agathon,'

Apollodorus/ And at length, supported by the flute-girl and some of his attendants, he found his way to them.

Alcibiades/ 'Hail, friends,'

Apollodorus/ He said, appearing at the door crowned with a massive garland of ivy and violets, his head flowing with ribbons.

Alcibiades/ 'Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your revels? Or shall I crown Agathon, which was my intention in coming, and go away? For I was unable to come yesterday, and therefore I am here to-day, carrying on my head these ribbons, that taking them from my own head, I may crown the head of this fairest and wisest of men, as I may be allowed to call him. Will you laugh at me because I am drunk? Yet I know very well that I am speaking the truth, although you may laugh. But first tell me; if I come in shall we have the understanding of which I spoke? Will you drink with me or not?'

Apollodorus/ The company were vociferous in begging that he would take his place among them, and Agathon specially invited him. Thereupon he was led in by the people who were with him; and as he was being led, intending to crown Agathon, he took the ribbons from his own head and held them in front of his eyes; he was thus prevented from seeing Socrates, who made way for him, and Alcibiades took the vacant place between Agathon and Socrates, and in taking the place he embraced Agathon and crowned him.

Agathon/ Take off his sandals and let him make a third on the same couch.

Alcibiades/ By all means; but who makes the third partner in our revels?

Apollodorus/ Turning round and starting up as he caught sight of Socrates.

Alcibiades/ By Heracles, what is this? here is Socrates always lying in wait for me, and always, as his way is, coming out at all sorts of unsuspected places: and now, what have you to say for yourself, and why are you lying here, where I perceive that you have contrived to find a place, not by a joker or lover of jokes, like Aristophanes, but by the fairest of the company?

Apollodorus/ Socrates turned to Agathon and said:

Socrates/ I must ask you to protect me, Agathon; for the passion of this man has grown quite a serious matter to me. Since I became his admirer I have never been allowed to speak to any other fair one, or so much as to look at them. If I do, he goes wild with envy and jealousy, and not only abuses me but can hardly keep his hands off me, and at this moment he may do me some harm. Please to see to this, and either reconcile me to him, or, if he attempts violence, protect me, as I am in bodily fear of his mad and passionate attempts.

Alcibiades/ There can never be reconciliation between you and me; but for the present I will defer your chastisement. And I must beg you, Agathon, to give me back some of the ribbons that I may crown the marvelous head of this universal despot—I would not have him complain of me for crowning you, and neglecting him, who in conversation is the conqueror of all mankind; and this not only once, as you were the day before yesterday, but always.

Apollodorus/ Whereupon, taking some of the ribbons, he crowned Socrates, and again reclined.

Alcibiades/ You seem, my friends, to be sober, which is a thing not to be endured; you must drink—for that was the agreement under which I was admitted—and I elect myself master of the feast until you are well drunk. Let us have a large goblet, Agathon, or rather, attendant, bring me that wine-cooler.

Apollodorus/ The wine-cooler which had caught his eye was a vessel holding more than two quarts—this he filled and emptied, and bade the attendant fill it again for Socrates.

Alcibiades/ Observe, my friends that this ingenious trick of mine will have no effect on Socrates, for he can drink any quantity of wine and not be at all nearer being drunk.

Apollodorus/ Socrates drank the cup which the attendant filled for him.

Eryximachus/ What is this, Alcibiades? Are we to have neither conversation nor singing over our cups; but simply to drink as if we were thirsty?

Alcibiades/ Hail, worthy son of a most wise and worthy sire!

Eryximachus/ The same to you; but what shall we do?

Alcibiades/ That I leave to you.

'The wise physician skilled our wounds to heal'

shall prescribe and we will obey. What do you want?

Eryximachus/ Well, before you appeared we had passed a resolution that each one of us in turn should make a speech in praise of love, and as good a one as he could: the turn was passed round from left to right; and as all of us have spoken, and you have not spoken but have well drunken, you ought to speak, and then impose upon Socrates any task which you please, and he on his right hand neighbor, and so on.

Alcibiades/ That is good, Eryximachus; and yet the comparison of a drunken man's speech with those of sober men is hardly fair; and I should like to know, sweet friend, whether you really believe what Socrates was just now saying; for I can assure you that the very reverse is the fact, and that if I praise anyone but himself in his presence, whether God or man, he will hardly keep his hands off me.

Socrates/ For shame.

Alcibiades/ Hold your tongue, for by Poseidon, there is no one else whom I will praise when you are of the company.

Eryximachus/ Well then, if you like praise Socrates.

Alcibiades/ What do you think, Eryximachus? Shall I attack him and inflict the punishment before you all?

Socrates/ What are you about? Are you going to raise a laugh at my expense? Is that the meaning of your praise?

Alcibiades/ I am going to speak the truth, if you will permit me.

Socrates/ I not only permit, but exhort you to speak the truth.

Alcibiades/ Then I will begin at once and if I say anything which is not true, you may interrupt me if you will, and say 'that is a lie,' though my intention is to speak the truth. But you must not wonder if I speak any how as things come into

my mind; for the fluent and orderly enumeration of all your singularities is not a task which is easy to a man in my condition.

And now, my boys, I shall praise Socrates in a figure which will appear to him to be a caricature, and yet I speak, not to make fun of him, but only for the truth's sake. I say, that he is exactly like the busts of Silenus, which are set up in the statuaries' shops, holding pipes and flutes in their mouths; and they are made to open in the middle, and have images of gods inside them. I say also that he is like Marsyas the satyr. You yourself will not deny, Socrates, that your face is like that of a satyr. Aye, and there is a resemblance in other points too. For example, you are a bully, as I can prove by witnesses, if you will not confess. And are you not a flute-player? That you are, and a performer far more wonderful than Marsyas. He indeed with instruments used to charm the souls of men by the power of his breath, and the players of his music do so still: for the melodies of Olympus are derived from Marsyas who taught them, and these, whether they are played by a great master or by a miserable flute-girl, have a power which no others have; they alone possess the soul and reveal the wants of those who have need of gods and mysteries, because they are divine. But you produce the same effect with your words only, and do not require the flute: that is the difference between you and him. When we hear any other speaker, even a very good one, he produces absolutely no effect upon us, or not much, whereas the mere fragments of you and your words, even at second-hand, and however imperfectly repeated, amaze and possess the souls of every man, woman, and child who comes within hearing of them. And if I were not afraid that you would think me hopelessly drunk, I would have sworn as well as spoken to the influence which they have always had and still have over me. For my heart leaps within me more than that of any

Corybantian reveler, and my eyes rain tears when I hear them. And I observe that many others are affected in the same manner. I have heard Pericles and other great orators, and I thought that they spoke well, but I never had any similar feeling; my soul was not stirred by them, nor was I angry at the thought of my own slavish state. But this Marsyas has often brought me to such a pass, that I have felt as if I could hardly endure the life which I am leading (this, Socrates, you will admit); and I am conscious that if I did not shut my ears against him, and fly as from the voice of the siren, my fate would be like that of others, —he would transfix me, and I should grow old sitting at his feet. For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the wants of my own soul, and busying myself with the concerns of the Athenians; therefore I hold my ears and tear myself away from him. And he is the only person who ever made me ashamed, which you might think not to be in my nature, and there is no one else who does the same. For I know that I cannot answer him or say that I ought not to do as he bids, but when I leave his presence the love of popularity gets the better of me. And therefore I run away and fly from him, and when I see him I am ashamed of what I have confessed to him. Many a time have I wished that he were dead, and yet I know that I should be much more sorry than glad, if he were to die: so that I am at my wit's end.

And this is what I and many others have suffered from the flute-playing of this satyr. Yet hear me once more while I show you how exact the image is, and how marvelous his power. For let me tell you; none of you know him; but I will reveal him to you; having begun, I must go on. See you how fond he is of the fair? He is always with them and is always being smitten by them, and then again he knows nothing and is ignorant of all things—such is the appearance which he puts on. Is he not like a Silenus in this? To be sure he is:

his outer mask is the carved head of the Silenus; but, O my companions in drink, when he is opened, what temperance there is residing within! Know you that beauty and wealth and honor, at which the many wonder, are of no account with him, and are utterly despised by him: he regards not at all the persons who are gifted with them; mankind are nothing to him; all his life is spent in mocking and flouting at them. But when I opened him, and looked within at his serious purpose, I saw in him divine and golden images of such fascinating beauty that I was ready to do in a moment whatever Socrates commanded: they may have escaped the observation of others, but I saw them. Now I fancied that he was seriously enamored of my beauty, and I thought that I should therefore have a grand opportunity of hearing him tell what he knew, for I had a wonderful opinion of the attractions of my youth. In the prosecution of this design, when I next went to him, I sent away the attendant who usually accompanied me (I will confess the whole truth, and beg you to listen; and if I speak falsely, do you, Socrates, expose the falsehood). Well, he and I were alone together, and I thought that when there was nobody with us, I should hear him speak the language which lovers use to their loves when they are by themselves, and I was delighted. Nothing of the sort; he conversed as usual, and spent the day with me and then went away. Afterwards I challenged him to the palaestra; and he wrestled and closed with me several times when there was no one present; I fancied that I might succeed in this manner. Not a bit; I made no way with him. Lastly, as I had failed hitherto, I thought that I must take stronger measures and attack him boldly, and, as I had begun, not give him up, but see how matters stood between him and me. So I invited him to sup with me, just as if he were a fair youth, and I a designing lover. He was not easily persuaded to come; he did, however, after a while accept the

invitation, and when he came the first time, he wanted to go away at once as soon as supper was over, and I had not the face to detain him. The second time, still in pursuance of my design, after we had supped, I went on conversing far into the night, and when he wanted to go away, I pretended that the hour was late and that he had much better remain. So he lay down on the couch next to me, the same on which he had supped, and there was no one but ourselves sleeping in the apartment. All this may be told without shame to anyone. But what follows I could hardly tell you if I were sober. Yet as the proverb says, 'In vino veritas,' whether with boys, or without them; and therefore I must speak. Nor, again, should I be justified in concealing the lofty actions of Socrates when I come to praise him. Moreover I have felt the serpent's sting; and he who has suffered, as they say, is willing to tell his fellow-sufferers only, as they alone will be likely to understand him, and will not be extreme in judging of the sayings or doings which have been wrung from his agony. For I have been bitten by a more than viper's tooth; I have known in my soul, or in my heart, or in some other part, that worst of pangs, more violent in ingenuous youth than any serpent's tooth, the pang of philosophy, which will make a man say or do anything. And you whom I see around me, Phaedrus and Agathon and Eryximachus and Pausanias and Aristodemus and Aristophanes, all of you, and I need not say Socrates himself, have had experience of the same madness and passion in your longing after wisdom. Therefore listen and excuse my doings then and my sayings now. But let the attendants and other profane and unmannered persons close up the doors of their ears.

When the lamp was put out and the servants had gone away, I thought that I must be plain with him and have no more ambiguity. So I gave him a shake, and I said: 'Socrates, are you asleep?'

Socrates/ 'No.'

Alcibiades/ 'Do you know what I am meditating?'

Socrates/ 'What are you meditating?'

Alcibiades/ 'I think that of all the lovers whom I have ever had you are the only one who is worthy of me, and you appear to be too modest to speak. Now I feel that I should be a fool to refuse you this or any other favor, and therefore I come to lay at your feet all that I have and all that my friends have, in the hope that you will assist me in the way of virtue, which I desire above all things, and in which I believe that you can help me better than anyone else. And I should certainly have more reason to be ashamed of what wise men would say if I were to refuse a favor to such as you, than of what the world, who are mostly fools, would say of me if I granted it.'

To these words he replied in the ironical manner which is so characteristic of him: —

Socrates/ 'Alcibiades, my friend, you have indeed an elevated aim if what you say is true, and if there really is in me any power by which you may become better; truly you must see in me some rare beauty of a kind infinitely higher than any which I see in you. And therefore, if you mean to share with me and to exchange beauty for beauty, you will have greatly the advantage of me; you will gain true beauty in return for appearance—like Diomede, gold in exchange for brass. But look again, sweet friend, and see whether you are not deceived in me. The mind begins to grow critical when the bodily eye fails, and it will be a long time before you get old.'

Alcibiades/ Hearing this, I said: 'I have told you my purpose, which is quite serious, and do you consider what you think best for you and me.'

Socrates/ 'That is good, at some other time then we will consider and act as seems best about this and about other matters.'

Alcibiades/ Whereupon, I fancied that he was smitten, and that the words which I had uttered like arrows had wounded him, and so without waiting to hear more I got up, and throwing my coat about him crept under his threadbare cloak, as the time of year was winter, and there I lay during the whole night having this wonderful monster in my arms. This again, Socrates, will not be denied by you. And yet, notwithstanding all, he was so superior to my solicitations, so contemptuous and derisive and disdainful of my beauty—which really, as I fancied, had some attractions—hear, O judges; for judges you shall be of the haughty virtue of Socrates—nothing more happened, but in the morning when I awoke (let all the gods and goddesses be my witnesses) I arose as from the couch of a father or an elder brother.

What do you suppose must have been my feelings, after this rejection, at the thought of my own dishonor? And yet I could not help wondering at his natural temperance and self-restraint and manliness. I never imagined that I could have met with a man such as he is in wisdom and endurance. And therefore I could not be angry with him or renounce his company, any more than I could hope to win him. For I well knew that if Ajax could not be wounded by steel, much less he by money; and my only chance of captivating him by my personal attractions had failed. So I was at my wit's end; no one was ever more hopelessly enslaved by another.

All this happened before he and I went on the expedition to Potidaea; there we messed together, and I had the opportunity of observing his extraordinary power of sustaining fatigue. His endurance was simply marvelous when, being cut off from our supplies, we were compelled to

go without food—on such occasions, which often happen in time of war, he was superior not only to me but to everybody; there was no one to be compared to him. Yet at a festival he was the only person who had any real powers of enjoyment; though not willing to drink, he could if compelled beat us all at that, —wonderful to relate! no human being had ever seen Socrates drunk; and his powers, if I am not mistaken, will be tested before long. His fortitude in enduring cold was also surprising. There was a severe frost, for the winter in that region is really tremendous, and everybody else either remained indoors, or if they went out had on an amazing quantity of clothes, and were well shod, and had their feet swathed in felt and fleeces: in the midst of this, Socrates with his bare feet on the ice and in his ordinary dress marched better than the other soldiers who had shoes, and they looked daggers at him because he seemed to despise them.

I have told you one tale, and now I must tell you another, which is worth hearing;

'Of the doings and sufferings of the enduring man'

while he was on the expedition. One morning he was thinking about something which he could not resolve; he would not give it up, but continued thinking from early dawn until noon—there he stood fixed in thought; and at noon attention was drawn to him, and the rumor ran through the wondering crowd that Socrates had been standing and thinking about something ever since the break of day. At last, in the evening after supper, some Ionians out of curiosity (I should explain that this was not in winter but in summer), brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and see whether he would stand all night. There he stood until the following morning; and with the return of light he offered up a prayer to the sun, and went his way. I will also tell, if you please—and indeed I am bound to tell—of his courage in battle; for who but he

saved my life? Now this was the engagement in which I received the prize of velour: for I was wounded and he would not leave me, but he rescued me and my arms; and he ought to have received the prize of velour which the generals wanted to confer on me partly on account of my rank, and I told them so (this, again, Socrates will not impeach or deny), but he was more eager than the generals that I and not he should have the prize. There was another occasion on which his behavior was very remarkable—in the flight of the army after the battle of Delium, where he served among the heavy-armed, —I had a better opportunity of seeing him than at Potidaea, for I was myself on horseback, and therefore comparatively out of danger. He and Laches were retreating, for the troops were in flight, and I met them and told them not to be discouraged, and promised to remain with them; and there you might see him, Aristophanes, as you describe, just as he is in the streets of Athens, stalking like a pelican, and roiling his eyes, calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends, and making very intelligible to anybody, even from a distance, that whoever attacked him would be likely to meet with a stout resistance; and in this way he and his companion escaped—for this is the sort of man who is never touched in war; those only are pursued who are running away headlong. I particularly observed how superior he was to Laches in presence of mind. Many are the marvels which I might narrate in praise of Socrates; most of his ways might perhaps be paralleled in another man, but his absolute unlikeness to any human being that is or ever has been is perfectly astonishing. You may imagine Brasidas and others to have been like Achilles; or you may imagine Nestor and Antenor to have been like Pericles; and the same may be said of other famous men, but of this strange being you will never be able to find any likeness, however remote, either among men who now are or whoever have been—other than that

which I have already suggested of Silenus and the satyrs; and they represent in a figure not only himself, but his words. For, although I forgot to mention this to you before, his words are like the images of Silenus which open; they are ridiculous when you first hear them; he clothes himself in language that is like the skin of the wanton satyr—for his talk is of pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers, and he is always repeating the same things in the same words, so that any ignorant or inexperienced person might feel disposed to laugh at him; but he who opens the bust and sees what is within will find that they are the only words which have a meaning in them, and also the most divine, abounding in fair images of virtue, and of the widest comprehension, or rather extending to the whole duty of a good and honorable man.

This, friends, is my praise of Socrates. I have added my blame of him for his ill-treatment of me; and he has ill-treated not only me, but Charmides the son of Glaucon, and Euthydemus the son of Diodes, and many others in the same way—beginning as their lover he has ended by making them pay their addresses to him. Wherefore I say to you, Agathon, 'Be not deceived by him; learn from me and take warning, and do not be a fool and learn by experience, as the proverb says.'

Apollodorus/ When Alcibiades had finished, there was a laugh at his outspokenness; for he seemed to be still in love with Socrates.

Socrates/ You are sober, Alcibiades, or you would never have gone so far about to hide the purpose of your satyr's praises, for all this long story is only an ingenious circumlocution, of which the point comes in by the way at the end; you want to get up a quarrel between me and Agathon, and your notion is that I ought to love you and nobody else, and that you and you only ought to love

Agathon. But the plot of this Satyric or Silenic drama has been detected, and you must not allow him, Agathon, to set us at variance.

Agathon/ I believe you are right, and I am disposed to think that his intention in placing himself between you and me was only to divide us; but he shall gain nothing by that move; for I will go and lie on the couch next to you.

Socrates/ Yes, yes, by all means come here and lie on the couch below me.

Alcibiades/ Alas, how I am fooled by this man; he is determined to get the better of me at every turn. I do beseech you, allow Agathon to lie between us.

Socrates/ Certainly not; as you praised me, and I in turn ought to praise my neighbor on the right, he will be out of order in praising me again when he ought rather to be praised by me, and I must entreat you to consent to this, and not be jealous, for I have a great desire to praise the youth.

Agathon/ Hurrah! I will rise instantly, that I may be praised by Socrates.

Alcibiades/ The usual way; where Socrates is, no one else has any chance with the fair; and now how readily has he invented a specious reason for attracting Agathon to himself.

Apollodorus/ Agathon arose in order that he might take his place on the couch by Socrates, when suddenly a band of revelers entered, and spoiled the order of the banquet. Someone who was going out having left the door open, they had found their way in, and made themselves at home; great confusion ensued, and everyone was compelled to drink large quantities of wine. Aristodemus said that Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and others went away—he himself fell asleep, and as the nights were long took a good rest: he was awakened towards daybreak by a crowing of cocks, and

when he awoke, the others were either asleep, or had gone away; there remained only Socrates, Aristophanes, and Agathon, who were drinking out of a large goblet which they passed round, and Socrates was discoursing to them. Aristodemus was only half awake, and he did not hear the beginning of the discourse; the chief thing which he remembered was Socrates compelling the other two to acknowledge that the genius of comedy was the same with that of tragedy, and that the true artist in tragedy was an artist in comedy also. To this they were constrained to assent, being drowsy, and not quite following the argument. And first of all Aristophanes dropped off, then, when the day was already dawning, Agathon. Socrates, having laid them to sleep, rose to depart; Aristodemus, as his manner was, following him. At the Lyceum he took a bath, and passed the day as usual. In the evening he retired to rest at his own home.

Symposium.

Translated by Michael Joyce.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Apollodorus, Friend, Glaucon, Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Alcibiades, Servant, Aristodemus, Diotima.

Apollodorus/ Oh, if that's what you want to know, it isn't long since I had occasion to refresh my memory. Only the day before yesterday, as I was coming up to the city from my place at Phalerum, a friend of mine caught sight of me from behind, and while I was still a long way ahead he shouted after me,

Glaucon/ Here, I say, Apollodorus! Can't you wait for me?

Apollodorus/ So I stopped and waited for him.

Glaucon/ Apollodorus,

Apollodorus/ he said as he came up,

Glaucon/ you're the very man I'm looking for. I want to ask you about this party at Agathon's, when Socrates and Alcibiades and the rest of them were at dinner there. What were all these speeches they were making about Love? I've heard something about them from a man who'd been talking to Phoenix, but his information was rather sketchy and he said I'd better come to you. So you'll have to tell me the whole story, for you know we always count on you, Apollodorus, to report your beloved Socrates. But before you begin, tell me, were you there yourself?

Apollodorus/ Well, whoever was your informant I can well believe he wasn't very clear about it if you gathered it was such a recent party that I could have been there!

Glaucon/ That was my impression.

Apollodorus/ My dear Glaucon, I protested, how could it have been? Have you forgotten how long Agathon's been away from Athens? And don't you know it's only two or three years since I started spending so much of my time with Socrates, and making it my business to follow everything he says and does from day to day? Because, you know, before that I used to go dashing about all over the place, firmly convinced that I was leading a full and interesting life, when I was really as wretched as could be—much the same as you, for instance, for I know philosophy's the last thing *you'd* spend your time on.

Glaucon/ Now don't start girding at me, but tell me, when was this party, then?

Apollodorus/ It was given, when you and I were in the nursery, the day after Agathon's celebrations with the players when he'd won the prize with his first tragedy.

Glaucon/ Yes, that must have been a good many years ago. But who told you about it—Socrates himself?

Apollodorus/ No, no. I had it from the same source as Phoenix—Aristodemus of Cydathenaeum, a little fellow who used to go about barefoot. He was there himself; indeed I fancy he was one of Socrates' most impassioned admirers at the time. As a matter of fact I did ask Socrates about one or two points later on, and he confirmed what Aristodemus had told me.

Glaucon/ Very well, then you must tell me all about it before we reach the city. I'm sure it'll pass the time most agreeably.

Apollodorus/ Well, I told him all about it as we went along, and so, as I was saying, I've got the story pretty pat, and if you want to hear it too I suppose I may as well begin. For that matter I don't know anything that gives me greater pleasure, or profit either, than talking or listening to

philosophy. But when it comes to ordinary conversation, such as the stuff you talk about financiers and the money market, well, I find it pretty tiresome personally, and I feel sorry that my friends should think they're being very busy when they're really doing absolutely nothing. Of course, I know your idea of me; you think I'm just a poor unfortunate, and I shouldn't wonder if you're right. But then, I don't *think* that you're unfortunate—I know you are.

Friend/ There you go again, Apollodorus! Always running down yourself and everybody else! You seem to have some extravagant idea that the whole world, with the sole exception of Socrates, is in a state of utter misery—beginning with yourself. You're always the same—perhaps that's why people think you're mad—always girding at yourself and all the rest of us, except Socrates of course.

Apollodorus/ My dear man, of course I am! And of course I shouldn't *dream* of thinking such things about myself or about my friends if I weren't completely crazy.

Friend/ Oh, come now, Apollodorus! We needn't go into that. For heaven's sake, man, don't fly off at a tangent, but simply answer our question. What were these speeches about Love?

Apollodorus/ Well then, they were something like this—but perhaps I'd better begin at the beginning and tell you in Aristodemus' own words.

Aristodemus/ I met Socrates, looking very spruce after his bath, with a nice pair of shoes on although, as you know, he generally goes about barefoot. So I asked him where he was going, cutting such a dash.

Socrates/ I'm going to dinner with Agathon, I kept away from the public celebrations yesterday because I was afraid there'd be a crush, but I promised I'd go along this evening.

And I've got myself up like this because I don't want to disgrace such a distinguished host.

But what about you? How would you like to join the party uninvited?

Aristodemus/ Just as you think.

Socrates/ Then come along with me, and we'll adapt the proverb, 'Unbidden do the good frequent the tables of the good.' Though, if it comes to that, Homer himself has not so much adapted that very proverb as exploded it, for after making Agamemnon extremely stout and warlike, and Menelaus a most indifferent spearman, he shows Agamemnon making merry after the sacrifice and Menelaus coming to his table uninvited—that is, the lesser man coming to supper with the greater.

Aristodemus/ I'm afraid, that Homer's version is the apter so far as I'm concerned—an uninvited ignoramus going to dinner with a man of letters. So you'd better be preparing your excuses on the way, for you needn't think I'll apologize for coming without an invitation—I shall plead that you invited me.

Socrates/ Two heads are better than one, when it comes to excuses. Well, anyway, let's be off.

Aristodemus/ Having settled this point, we started out, and as we went along Socrates fell into a fit of abstraction and began to lag behind, but when I was going to wait for him he told me to go on ahead. So when I arrived at Agathon's, where the door was standing wide-open, I found myself in rather a curious position, for a servant immediately showed me in and announced me to the assembled company, who were already at table and just about to begin.

However, the moment Agathon saw me he cried;

Agathon/ Ah! Here's Aristodemus—just in time for dinner, and if you've come on business it'll have to wait,

that's flat. I was going to invite you yesterday, only I couldn't get hold of you. But I say, where's Socrates? Haven't you brought him with you?

Aristodemus/ I looked round, supposing that Socrates was bringing up the rear, but he was nowhere to be seen; so, I explained that we'd been coming along together, and that I'd come at his invitation.

Agathon/ Very nice of you, but what on earth can have happened to the man?

Aristodemus/ He was just coming in behind me; I can't think where he can be.

Agathon/ Here;

Aristodemus/ Said Agathon to one of the servants;

Agathon/ Run along and see if you can find Socrates, and show him in. And now, my dear Aristodemus, may I put you next to Eryximachus?

Aristodemus/ And so, I made my toilet and sat down, the servant meanwhile returning with the news that our friend Socrates had retreated into the next-door neighbor's porch.

Servant/ And there he stood. And when I asked him in, he wouldn't come.

Agathon/ This is very odd. You must speak to him again, and insist.

Aristodemus/ But here I broke in. I shouldn't do that. You'd much better leave him to himself. It's quite a habit of his, you know; off he goes and there he stands, no matter where it is. I've no doubt he'll be with us before long, so I really don't think you'd better worry him.

Agathon/ Oh, very well. I expect you know best. We won't wait then.

Aristodemus/ He said, turning to the servants.

Agathon/ Now you understand, you fellows are to serve whatever kind of dinner you think fit; I'm leaving it entirely to you. I know it's a new idea, but you'll simply have to imagine that we've all come here as your guests. Now go ahead and show us what you can do.

Aristodemus/ Well, we started dinner, and still there was no sign of Socrates; Agathon still wanted to send for him, but I wouldn't let him. And when at last he did turn up, we weren't more than halfway through dinner, which was pretty good for him.

As he came in, Agathon, who was sitting by himself at the far end of the table, called out;

Agathon/ Here you are, Socrates. Come and sit next to me; I want to share this great thought that's just struck you in the porch next door. I'm sure you must have mastered it, or you'd still be standing there.

Socrates/ My dear Agathon;

Aristodemus/ Socrates replied as he took his seat beside him.

Socrates/ I only wish that wisdom *were* the kind of thing one could share by sitting next to someone—if it flowed, for instance, from the one that was full to the one that was empty, like the water in two cups finding its level through a piece of worsted. If that were how it worked, I'm sure I'd congratulate myself on sitting next to you, for you'd soon have me brimming over with the most exquisite kind of wisdom. My own understanding is a shadowy thing at best, as equivocal as a dream, but yours, Agathon, glitters and dilates—as which of us can forget that saw you the other day, resplendent in your youth, visibly kindled before the eyes of more than thirty thousand of your fellow Greeks.

Agathon/ Now, Socrates, I know you're making fun of me; however, I shall take up this question of wisdom with you

later on, and let Bacchus judge between us. In the meantime you must really show a little interest in your food.

Aristodemus/ So Socrates drew up and had his dinner with the rest of them, and then, after the libation and the usual hymn and so forth, they began to turn their attention to the wine. It was Pausanias, so far as Aristodemus could remember, who opened the conversation.

Pausanias/ Well, gentlemen, what do you say? What sort of a night shall we make of it? Speaking for myself, I'm not quite up to form. I'm still a bit the worse for what I had last night, and I don't suppose you're most of you much better—we were all in the same boat. Anyhow, what do you say? How does everybody feel about the drink?

Aristophanes/ That's a most sensible question of yours, Pausanias. We don't want to make a burden of it—I speak as one who was pretty well soaked last night.

Eryximachus/ I quite agree, and there is just one question I should like to add. What about Agathon? Has he sufficiently recovered to feel like drinking?

Agathon/ Not I. You can count me out.

Eryximachus/ So much the better for me, and so much the better for Aristodemus and Phaedrus and one or two more I could mention. We never could keep up with heavy drinkers like the rest of you. I say nothing of Socrates, for we know he's equal to any occasion, drunk or sober. And now, gentlemen, since nobody seems very anxious to get drunk tonight, I may perhaps be pardoned if I take this opportunity of saying a few words on the true nature of inebriation. My own experience in medicine has entirely satisfied me that vinous excess is detrimental to the human frame. And therefore I can never be a willing party to heavy drinking, as regards either myself or my friends—especially

when one is only partially recovered from the excesses of the previous night.

Aristodemus/ But here Phaedrus broke in.

Phaedrus/ My dear Eryximachus, I always do what you tell me to, specially when it really is a case of 'doctor's orders,' and I think the others would be well advised to do the same.

Aristodemus/ Whereupon it was unanimously agreed that this was not to be a drunken party, and that the wine was to be served merely by way of refreshment.

Eryximachus/ Very well, then, since it is agreed that we need none of us drink more than we think is good for us, I also propose that we dispense with the services of the flute girl who has just come in, and let her go and play to herself or to the women inside there, whichever she prefers, while we spend our evening in discussion of a subject which, if you think fit, I am prepared to name.

Aristodemus/ It was generally agreed that he should go on with his proposal. So he continued;

Eryximachus/ If I may preface my remarks by a tag from Euripides, 'The tale is not my own,' as Melanippe says, that I am going to tell, but properly belongs to my friend Phaedrus here, who is continually coming to me with the following complaint. Is it not, he asks me, an extraordinary thing that; for all the hymns and anthems that have been addressed to the other deities, not one single poet has ever sung a song in praise of so ancient and so powerful a god as Love?

Take such distinguished men of letters as Prodicus, for instance, with their eulogies in prose of Heracles and all the rest of them—not that *they're* so much out of the way either, but do you know, I once came across a book which enumerated the uses of common salt and sang its praises in the most extravagant terms, and not only salt but all kinds

of everyday commodities. Now isn't it, as I say, an extraordinary thing, Eryximachus, that while all these screeds have been written on such trivial subjects, the god of love has found no man bold enough to sing his praises as they should be sung—is it not, in short, amazing that there should be so little reverence shown to such a god!

This, gentlemen, is Phaedrus' complaint, and I must say I think it is justified. And, moreover, not only am I willing to oblige him with a contribution on my own account, but also I suggest that this is a most suitable occasion for each one of us to pay homage to the god. If therefore, gentlemen, this meets with your approval, I venture to think we may spend a very pleasant evening in discussion. I suppose the best way would be for each in turn from left to right to address the company and speak to the best of his ability in praise of Love. Phaedrus, I think, should open the debate, for besides being head of the table he is the real author of our discussion.

Socrates/ The motion is carried, Eryximachus, unanimously, I should think. Speaking for myself, I couldn't very well dissent when I claim that love is the one thing in the world I understand—nor could Agathon and Pausanias; neither could Aristophanes, whose whole life is devoted to Dionysus and Aphrodite; no more could any of our friends who are here with us tonight. Of course, your procedure will come very hard on us who are sitting at the bottom of the table, but if the earlier speeches are fine enough, I promise you we shan't complain. So let Phaedrus go ahead with his eulogy of Love—and good luck to him.

Aristodemus/ Then all the rest of them agreed, and told Phaedrus to begin—

Phaedrus/ but before I go on I must make it quite clear that Aristodemus did not pretend to reproduce the various

speeches verbatim, any more than I could repeat them word for word as I had them from him. I shall simply recount such passages as the speaker or the thought itself made, so far as I could judge, especially memorable.

Aristodemus/ As I was saying, then, Phaedrus opened with some such arguments as these—that Love was a great god, wonderful alike to the gods and to mankind, and that of all the proofs of this the greatest was his birth.

Phaedrus/ The worship of this god, is of the oldest, for Love is unbegotten, nor is there mention of his parentage to be found anywhere in either prose or verse, while Hesiod tells us expressly that Chaos first appeared, and then;

> From Chaos rose broad-bosomed Earth, the sure
> And everlasting seat of all that is,
> And after, Love—

Acusilaus agrees with Hesiod, for he holds that after Chaos were brought forth these twain, Earth and Love, and Parmenides writes of the creative principle.

> And Love she framed the first of all the gods.

Thus we find that the antiquity of Love is universally admitted, and in very truth he is the ancient source of all our highest good. For I, at any rate, could hardly name a greater blessing to the man that is to be than a generous lover, or, to the lover, than the beloved youth. For neither family, nor privilege, nor wealth, nor anything but Love can light that beacon which a man must steer by when he sets out to live the better life. How shall I describe it—as that contempt for the vile, and emulation of the good, without which neither cities nor citizens are capable of any great or noble work. And I will say this of the lover, that, should he be discovered in some inglorious act, or in abject submission to ill-usage, he could better bear that anyone—father, friends, or who you will—should witness it than his beloved.

And the same holds good of the beloved—that his confusion would be more than ever painful if he were seen by his lovers in an unworthy light.

If only, then, a city or an army could be composed of none but lover and beloved, how could they deserve better of their country than by shunning all that is base, in mutual emulation? And men like these fighting shoulder to shoulder, few as they were, might conquer—I had almost said—the whole world in arms. For the lover would rather anyone than his beloved should see him leave the ranks or throw away his arms in flight—nay, he would sooner die a thousand deaths. Nor is there any lover so faint of heart that he could desert his beloved or fail to help him in the hour of peril, for the very presence of Love kindles the same flame of valor in the faintest heart that burns in those whose courage is innate. And so, when Homer writes that some god 'breathed might' into one of the heroes, we may take it that this is what the power of Love effects in the heart of the lover.

And again, nothing but Love will make a man offer his life for another's—and not only man but woman, of which last we Greeks can ask no better witness than Alcestis, for she alone was ready to lay down her life for her husband—for all he had a father and a mother, whose love fell so far short of hers in charity that they seemed to be alien to their own son, and bound to him by nothing but a name. But hers was accounted so great a sacrifice, not only by mankind but by the gods, that in recognition of her magnanimity it was granted—and among the many doers of many noble deeds there is only the merest handful to whom such grace has been given—that her soul should rise again from the Stygian depths.

Thus heaven itself has a peculiar regard for ardor and resolution in the cause of Love. And yet the gods sent Orpheus away from Hades empty-handed, and showed him

the mere shadow of the woman he had come to seek. Eurydice herself they would not let him take, because he seemed, like the mere minstrel that he was, to be a lukewarm lover, lacking the courage to die as Alcestis died for love, and choosing rather to scheme his way, living, into Hades. And it was for this that the gods doomed him, and doomed him justly, to meet his death at the hands of women.

How different was the fate of Achilles, Thetis' son, whom they sent with honors to the Islands of the Blessed, because, after learning from his mother that if he slew Hector he should die, while if he spared him he should end his days at home in the fullness of his years, he made the braver choice and went to rescue his lover Patroclus, avenged his death, and so died, not only *for* his friend, but to be with his friend in death. And it was because his lover had been so precious to him that he was honored so signally by the gods.

I may say that Aeschylus has reversed the relation between them by referring to Patroclus as Achilles' darling, whereas Achilles, we know, was much handsomer than Patroclus or any of the heroes, and was besides still beardless and, as Homer says, by far the younger of the two. I make a point of this because, while in any case the gods display especial admiration for the valor that springs from Love, they are even more amazed, delighted, and beneficent when the beloved shows such devotion to his lover, than when the lover does the same for his beloved. For the lover, by virtue of Love's inspiration, is always nearer than his beloved to the gods. And this, I say, is why they paid more honor to Achilles than to Alcestis, and sent him to the Islands of the Blessed.

In short, this, gentlemen, is my theme, that Love is the oldest and most glorious of the gods, the great giver of all goodness and happiness to men, alike to the living and to the dead.

Apollodorus/ This, to the best of Aristodemus' recollection, was Phaedrus' speech. It was followed by several more which had almost, if not quite, escaped him : so he went straight on to Pausanias, who spoke as follows.

Pausanias/ I am afraid, my dear Phaedrus, that our arrangement won't work very well if it means that we are simply to pronounce a eulogy of Love. It would be all very well if there were only one kind of Love, but unfortunately this is not the case, and we should therefore have begun by stipulating which kind in particular was to receive our homage. In the circumstances I will try to set the matter right by first defining the Love whom we are to honor, and then singing his praises in terms not unworthy, I hope, of his divinity.

Now you will all agree, gentlemen, that without Love there could be no such goddess as Aphrodite. If, then, there were only one goddess of that name, we might suppose that there was only one kind of Love, but since in fact there are two such goddesses there must also be two kinds of Love. No one, I think, will deny that there are two goddesses of that name—one, the elder, sprung from no mother's womb but from the heavens themselves, we call the Uranian, the heavenly Aphrodite, while the younger, daughter of Zeus and Dione, we call Pandemus, the earthly Aphrodite. It follows, then, that Love should be known as earthly or as heavenly according to the goddess in whose company his work is done. And our business, gentlemen—I need hardly say that every god must command our homage—our business at the moment is to define the attributes peculiar to each of these two.

Now it may be said of any kind of action that the action itself, as such, is neither good nor bad. Take, for example, what we are doing now. Neither drinking nor singing nor talking has any virtue in itself, for the outcome of each action

depends upon how it is performed. If it is done rightly and finely, the action will be good; if it is done basely, bad. And this holds good of loving, for Love is not of himself either admirable or noble, but only when he moves us to love nobly.

Well then, gentlemen, the earthly Aphrodite's Love is a very earthly Love indeed, and does his work entirely at random. It is he that governs the passions of the vulgar. For, first, they are as much attracted by women as by boys; next, whoever they may love, their desires are of the body rather than of the soul; and, finally, they make a point of courting the shallowest people they can find, looking forward to the mere act of fruition and careless whether it be a worthy or unworthy consummation. And hence they take their pleasures where they find them, good and bad alike. For this is the Love of the younger Aphrodite, whose nature partakes of both male and female.

But the heavenly Love springs from a goddess whose attributes have nothing of the female, but are altogether male, and who is also the elder of the two, and innocent of any hint of lewdness. And so those who are inspired by this other Love turn rather to the male, preferring the more vigorous and intellectual bent. One can always tell—even among the lovers of boys—the man who is wholly governed by this elder Love, for no boy can please him until he has shown the first signs of dawning intelligence, signs which generally appear with the first growth of beard. And it seems to me that the man who falls in love with a youth of such an age will be prepared to spend all his time with him, to share his whole life with him, in fact; nor will he be likely to take advantage of the lad's youth and credulity by seducing him and then turning with a laugh to some newer love.

But I cannot help thinking, gentlemen, that there should be a law to forbid the loving of mere boys, a law to prevent so much time and trouble being wasted upon an unknown

quantity—for what else, after all, is the future of any boy, and who knows whether he will follow the paths of virtue or of vice, in body and in soul? Of course, your man of principle is a law unto himself, but these followers of the earthly Love should be legally compelled to observe a similar restraint—just as we prevent them, as far as possible, from making love to our own wives and daughters—for it is their behavior that has brought the name of Love into such disrepute that one has even heard it held to be degrading to yield to a lover's solicitation. Anyone who can hold such a view must surely have in mind these earthly lovers, with their offensive importunities, for there can be nothing derogatory in any conduct which is sanctioned both by decency and custom.

Then again, gentlemen, may I point out that, while in all the other states of Hellas the laws that deal with Love are so simple and well defined that they are easy enough to master, our own code is most involved. In Elis and Boeotia, for instance, and wherever else the people are naturally inarticulate, it has been definitely ruled that it is right for the lover to have his way. Nor does anyone, old or young, presume to say that it is wrong—the idea being, I suppose, to save themselves from having to plead with the young men for their favors, which is rather difficult for lovers who are practically dumb.

On the other hand, in Ionia and many other countries under oriental rule, the very same thing is held to be disgraceful. Indeed, the oriental thinks ill not only of Love but also of both philosophy and sport, on account of the despotism under which he lives. For I suppose it does not suit the rulers for their subjects to indulge in high thinking, or in staunch friendship and fellowship, which Love more than anything is likely to beget. And those who seized the power here in Athens learned the same lesson from bitter experience, for it was the might of Aristogiton's love and

Harmodius' friendship that brought their reign to an end. Thus, wherever the law enacts that it is wrong to yield to the lover, you may be sure that the fault lies with the legislators—that is to say, it is due to the oppression of the rulers and the servility of their subjects. On the other hand, wherever you find the same thing expressly sanctioned, you may blame the legislators' mental inertia.

But in Athens, gentlemen, we have a far more admirable code—a code which, as I was saying, is not nearly so easy to understand. Take for instance our maxim that it is better to love openly than in secret, especially when the object of one's passion is eminent in nobility and virtue, and even if his personal appearance should lack the same distinction. And think how we all love to cheer the lover on, without the least idea that he is doing anything unworthy, and how we see honor in his success and shame in his defeat. And remember, gentlemen, what latitude the law offers to the lover in the prosecution of his suit, and how he may be actually applauded for conduct which, in any other circumstances or in any other cause, would call down upon him the severest censure.

Imagine what would happen to a man who wanted to get money out of someone, or a post, or powers of some kind, and who therefore thought fit to behave as the lover behaves to his beloved—urging his need with prayers and entreaties, and vowing vows, and sleeping upon doorsteps, subjecting himself, in short, to a slavery which no slave would ever endure—why, gentlemen, not only his friends, but his very enemies, would do their best to stop him, for his enemies would accuse him of the most abject servility, while his friends would take him to task because they felt ashamed of him.

But when it is a lover who does this kind of thing people only think the more of him, and the law expressly sanctions

his conduct as the means to an honorable end. And, what is the most extraordinary thing of all, it is popularly supposed that the lover is the one man whom the gods will pardon for breaking his vows, for lovers' promises, they say, are made to be forsworn. And so, gentlemen, we see what complete indulgence, not only human but divine, is accorded to the lover by our Athenian code.

In view of this, one would have thought that, here if anywhere, loving and being kind to one's lover would have been positively applauded. Yet we find in practice that if a father discovers that someone has fallen in love with his son, he puts the boy in charge of an attendant, with strict injunctions not to let him have anything to do with his lover. And if the boy's little friends and playmates see anything of that kind going on, you may be sure they'll call him names, while their elders will neither stop their being rude nor tell them they are talking nonsense. So if there were no more to it than that, anyone would think that we Athenians were really shocked at the idea of yielding to a lover.

But I fancy we can account for the apparent contradiction if we remember that the moral value of the act is not what one might call a constant. We agreed that love itself, as such, was neither good nor bad, but only in so far as it led to good or bad behavior. It is base to indulge a vicious lover viciously, but noble to gratify a virtuous lover virtuously. Now the vicious lover is the follower of the earthly Love who desires the body rather than the soul; his heart is set on what is mutable and must therefore be inconstant. And as soon as the body he loves begins to pass the first flower of its beauty, he 'spreads his wings and flies away,' giving the lie to all his pretty speeches and dishonoring his vows, whereas the lover whose heart is touched by moral beauties is constant all his life, for he has become one with what will never fade.

Now it is the object of the Athenian law to make a firm distinction between the lover who should be encouraged and the lover who should be shunned. And so it enjoins pursuit in certain cases, and flight in others, and applies various touchstones and criteria to discriminate between the two classes of lover and beloved. And this is why it is immoral, according to our code, to yield too promptly to solicitation; there should first be a certain lapse of time, which is generally considered to be the most effective test. Secondly, it is immoral when the surrender is due to financial or political considerations, or to unmanly fear of ill-treatment; it is immoral, in short, if the youth fails to show the contempt he should for any advantage he may gain in pocket or position. For in motives such as these we can find nothing fixed or permanent, except, perhaps, the certainty that they have never been the cause of any noble friendship.

There remains, therefore, only one course open to the beloved if he is to yield to his lover without offending our ideas of decency. It is held that, just as the lover's willing and complete subjection to his beloved is neither abject nor culpable, so there is one other form of voluntary submission that shall be blameless—a submission which is made for the sake of virtue. And so, gentlemen, if anyone is prepared to devote himself to the service of another in the belief that through him he will find increase of wisdom or of any other virtue, we hold that such willing servitude is neither base nor abject.

We must therefore combine these two laws—the one that deals with the love of boys and the one that deals with the pursuit of wisdom and the other virtues—before we can agree that the youth is justified in yielding to his lover. For it is only when lover and beloved come together, each governed by his own especial law—the former lawfully enslaving himself to the youth he loves, in return for his

compliance, the latter lawfully devoting his services to the friend who is helping him to become wise and good—the one sharing his wealth of wisdom and virtue, and the other drawing, in his poverty, upon his friend for a liberal education—it is then, I say, and only then, when the observance of the two laws coincides, that it is right for the lover to have his way.

There is no shame in being disappointed of such hopes as these, but any other kind of hope, whether it comes true or not, is shameful in itself. Take the case of a youth who gratifies his lover in the belief that he is wealthy and in the hope of making money. Such hopes will be nonetheless discreditable if he finds in the event that he has been the prey of a penniless seducer, for he will have shown himself for what he is, the kind of person, namely, who will do anything for money—which is nothing to be proud of. But suppose that he had yielded because he believed in his lover's virtue, and hoped to be improved by such an association; then, even if he discovered in the end that he had been duped by an unholy blackguard, there would still have been something noble in his mistake, for he, too, would have shown himself for what he was—the kind of person who will do anything for anybody for the sake of progress in the ways of virtue. And what, gentlemen, could be more admirable than that? I conclude, therefore, that it is right to let the lover have his way in the interests of virtue.

Such, then, is the Love of the heavenly Aphrodite, heavenly in himself and precious alike to cities and to men, for he constrains both lover and beloved to pay the most earnest heed to their moral welfare, but all the rest are followers of the other, the earthly Aphrodite. And this, Phaedrus, is all I have to say, extempore, on the subject of Love.

Apollodorus/ When Pausanias had paused—you see the kind of tricks we catch from our philologists, with their punning derivations—the next speaker, so Aristodemus went on to tell me, should have been Aristophanes; only as it happened, whether he'd been overeating I don't know, but he had got the hiccups so badly that he really wasn't fit to make a speech. So he said to the doctor, Eryximachus, who was sitting next below him;

Aristophanes/ Eryximachus, you'll either have to cure my hiccups or take my turn and go on speaking till they've stopped.

Eryximachus/ I'm prepared to do both. I'll take your turn to speak, and then when you've recovered you can take mine. Meanwhile, you'd better try holding your breath, or if that won't stop your hiccup try gargling with a little water, or if it's particularly stubborn you'll have to get something that you can tickle your nostrils with, and sneeze, and by the time you've done that two or three times you'll find that it will stop, however bad it is.

Aristophanes/ Go ahead, then. You make your speech, and I'll be doing as you say.

Apollodorus/ Whereupon Eryximachus spoke as follows.

Eryximachus/ Well, gentlemen, since Pausanias broke off, after an excellent beginning, without having really finished, I must try to wind up his argument myself. I admit that in defining the two kinds of Love he has drawn a very useful distinction, but the science of medicine seems to me to prove that, besides attracting the souls of men to human beauty, Love has many other objects and many other subjects, and that his influence may be traced both in the brute and the vegetable creations, and I think I may say in every form of existence—so great, so wonderful, and so all-

embracing is the power of Love in every activity, whether sacred or profane.

I propose, in deference to my own profession, to begin with the medical aspect. I would have you know that the body comprehends in its very nature the dichotomy of Love, for, as we all agree, bodily health and sickness are both distinct and dissimilar, and unlike clings to unlike. And so the desires of health are one thing, while the desires of sickness are quite another. I confirm what Pausanias has observed, that it is right to yield to the virtuous and wrong to yield to the vicious lover, and similarly, in the case of the body, it is both right and necessary to gratify such desires as are sound and healthy in each particular case, and this is what we call the art of medicine. But it is utterly wrong to indulge such desires as are bad and morbid, nor must anyone who hopes to become expert in this profession lend his countenance to such indulgence. For medicine may be described as the science of what the body loves, or desires, as regards repletion and evacuation, and the man who can distinguish between what is harmful and what is beneficial in these desires may claim to be a physician in the fullest sense of the word. And if he can replace one desire with another, and produce the requisite desire when it is absent, or, if necessary, remove it when it is present, then we shall regard him as an expert practitioner.

Yes, gentlemen, he must be able to reconcile the jarring elements of the body, and force them, as it were, to fall in love with one another. Now, we know that the most hostile elements are the opposites—hot and cold, sweet and sour, wet and dry, and so on—and if, as I do myself, we are to believe these poets of ours, it was his skill in imposing love and concord upon these opposites that enabled our illustrious progenitor Asclepius to found the science of medicine.

And so, gentlemen, I maintain that medicine is under the sole direction of the god of love, as are also the gymnastic and the agronomic arts. And it must be obvious to the most casual observer that the same holds good of music—which is, perhaps, what Heraclitus meant us to understand by that rather cryptic pronouncement, 'The one in conflict with itself is held together, like the harmony of the bow and of the lyre.' Of course it is absurd to speak of harmony as being in conflict, or as arising out of elements which are still conflicting, but perhaps he meant that the art of music was to create harmony by resolving the discord between the treble and the bass. There can certainly be no harmony of treble and bass while they are still in conflict, for harmony is concord, and concord is a kind of sympathy, and sympathy between things which are in conflict is impossible so long as that conflict lasts. There is, on the other hand, a kind of discord which it is not impossible to resolve, and here we may effect a harmony—as, for instance, we produce rhythm by resolving the difference between fast and slow. And just as we saw that the concord of the body was brought about by the art of medicine, so this other harmony is due to the art of music, as the creator of mutual love and sympathy. And so we may describe music, too, as a science of love, or of desire—in this case in relation to harmony and rhythm.

It is easy enough to distinguish the principle of Love in this rhythmic and harmonic union, nor is there so far any question of Love's dichotomy. But when we come to the application of rhythm and harmony to human activities—as for instance the composition of a song, or the instruction of others in the correct performance of airs and measures which have already been composed—then, gentlemen, we meet with difficulties which call for expert handling. And this brings us back to our previous conclusion, that we are

justified in yielding to the desires of the temperate—and of the intemperate in so far as such compliance will tend to sober them, and to this Love, gentlemen, we must hold fast, for he is the fair and heavenly one, born of Urania, the Muse of heaven. But as for that other, the earthly Love, he is sprung from Polyhymnia, the Muse of many songs, and whatever we have to do with him we must be very careful not to add the evils of excess to the enjoyment of the pleasures he affords—just as, in my own profession, it is an important part of our duties to regulate the pleasures of the table so that we may enjoy our meals without being the worse for them. And so in music, in medicine, and in every activity, whether sacred or profane, we must do our utmost to distinguish the two kinds of Love, for you may be sure that they will both be there.

And again, we find these two elements in the seasons of the year, for when the regulating principle of Love brings together those opposites of which I spoke—hot and cold, wet and dry—and compounds them in an ordered harmony, the result is health and plenty for mankind, and for the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and all goes as it should. But when the seasons are under the influence of that other Love, all is mischief and destruction, for now plague and disease of every kind attack both herds and crops, and not only these, but frost and hail and blight—and all of them are due to the uncontrolled and the acquisitive in that great system of Love which the astronomer observes when he investigates the movements of the stars and the seasons of the year.

And further, the sole concern of every rite of sacrifice and divination—that is to say, the means of communion between god and man—is either the preservation or the repair of Love. For most of our impiety springs from our refusal to gratify the more temperate Love, and to respect and defer to him in everything we do, and from our following that other

Love in our attitude toward our parents, whether alive or dead, and toward the gods. It is the diviner's office to be the guide and healer of these Loves, and his art of divination, with its power to distinguish those principles of human love that tend to decency and reverence, is, in fact, the source of concord between god and man.

And so, gentlemen, the power of Love in its entirety is various and mighty, nay, all-embracing, but the mightiest power of all is wielded by that Love whose just and temperate consummation, whether in heaven or on earth, tends toward the good. It is he that bestows our every joy upon us, and it is through him that we are capable of the pleasures of society, aye, and friendship even, with the gods our masters.

And now, gentlemen, if, as is not unlikely, there are many points I have omitted in my praise of Love, let me assure you that such omissions have been unintentional. It is for you, Aristophanes, to make good my deficiencies, that is unless you're thinking of some other kind of eulogy. But in any case, let us hear what you have to say—now you've recovered from your hiccups.

Apollodorus/ To which, Aristodemus went on to tell me, Aristophanes replied;

Aristophanes/ Yes, I'm better now, thank you, but not before I'd had recourse to sneezing—which made me wonder, Eryximachus, how your orderly principle of the body could possibly have called for such an appalling union of noise and irritation; yet there's no denying that the hiccups stopped immediately I sneezed.

Eryximachus/ Now, Aristophanes, take care, and don't try to raise a laugh before you've even started. You'll only have yourself to thank if I'm waiting to pounce on your silly jokes, instead of giving your speech a proper hearing.

Aristodemus/ Aristophanes laughed.

Aristophanes/ You're quite right, Eryximachus. I take it all back. But don't be too hard on me. Not that I mind if what I'm going to say is funny—all the better if it is; besides, a comic poet is supposed to be amusing. I'm only afraid of being utterly absurd.

Eryximachus/ Now, Aristophanes, I know the way you loose your shafts of ridicule and run away. But don't forget that anything you say may be used against you—and yet, who knows? Perhaps I shall decide to let you go with a caution.

Aristophanes/ Well then, Eryximachus, I propose, as you suggested, to take quite a different line from you and Pausanias. I am convinced that mankind has never had any conception of the power of Love, for if we had known him as he really is, surely we should have raised the mightiest temples and altars, and offered the most splendid sacrifices, in his honor, and not—as in fact we do—have utterly neglected him. Yet he of all the gods has the best title to our service, for he, more than all the rest, is the friend of man; he is our great ally, and it is he that cures us of those ills whose relief opens the way to man's highest happiness. And so, gentlemen, I will do my best to acquaint you with the power of Love, and you in your turn shall pass the lesson on.

First of all I must explain the real nature of man, and the change which it has undergone—for in the beginning we were nothing like we are now. For one thing, the race was divided into three; that is to say, besides the two sexes, male and female, which we have at present, there was a third which partook of the nature of both, and for which we still have a name, though the creature itself is forgotten. For though 'hermaphrodite' is only used nowadays as a term of contempt, there really was a man-woman in those days, a being which was half male and half female.

And secondly, gentlemen, each of these beings was globular in shape, with rounded back and sides, four arms and four legs, and two faces, both the same, on a cylindrical neck, and one head, with one face one side and one the other, and four ears, and two lots of privates, and all the other parts to match. They walked erect, as we do ourselves, backward or forward, whichever they pleased, but when they broke into a run they simply stuck their legs straight out and went whirling round and round like a clown turning cartwheels. And since they had eight legs, if you count their arms as well, you can imagine that they went bowling along at a pretty good speed.

The three sexes, I may say, arose as follows. The males were descended from the Sun, the females from the Earth, and the hermaphrodites from the Moon, which partakes of either sex, and they were round and they *went* round, because they took after their parents. And such, gentlemen, were their strength and energy, and such their arrogance, that they actually tried—like Ephialtes and Otus in Homer—to scale the heights of heaven and set upon the gods.

At this Zeus took counsel with the other gods as to what was to be done. They found themselves in rather an awkward position; they didn't want to blast them out of existence with thunderbolts as they did the giants, because that would be saying good-by to all their offerings and devotions, but at the same time they couldn't let them get altogether out of hand. At last, however, after racking his brains, Zeus offered a solution.

I think I can see my way, he said, to put an end to this disturbance by weakening these people without destroying them. What I propose to do is to cut them all in half, thus killing two birds with one stone, for each one will be only half as strong, and there'll be twice as many of them, which will suit us very nicely. They can walk about, upright, on their

two legs, and if, said Zeus, I have any more trouble with them, I shall split them up again, and they'll have to hop about on one.

So saying, he cut them all in half just as you or I might chop up sorb apples for pickling, or slice an egg with a hair. And as each half was ready he told Apollo to turn its face, with the half-neck that was left, toward the side that was cut away—thinking that the sight of such a gash might frighten it into keeping quiet—and then to heal the whole thing up. So Apollo turned their faces back to front, and, pulling in the skin all the way round, he stretched it over what we now call the belly—like those bags you pull together with a string—and tied up the one remaining opening so as to form what we call the navel. As for the creases that were left, he smoothed most of them away, finishing off the chest with the sort of tool a cobbler uses to smooth down the leather on the last, but he left a few puckers round about the belly and the navel, to remind us of what we suffered long ago.

Now, when the work of bisection was complete it left each half with a desperate yearning for the other, and they ran together and flung their arms around each other's necks, and asked for nothing better than to be rolled into one. So much so, that they began to die of hunger and general inertia, for neither would do anything without the other. And whenever one half was left alone by the death of its mate, it wandered about questing and clasping in the hope of finding a spare half-woman—or a whole woman, as we should call her nowadays—or half a man. And so the race was dying out.

Fortunately, however, Zeus felt so sorry for them that he devised another scheme. He moved their privates round to the front, for of course they had originally been on the outside—which was now the back—and they had begotten and conceived not upon each other, but, like the

grasshoppers, upon the earth. So now, as I say, he moved their members round to the front and made them propagate among themselves, the male begetting upon the female—the idea being that if, in all these clippings and claspings, a man should chance upon a woman, conception would take place and the race would be continued, while if man should conjugate with man, he might at least obtain such satisfaction as would allow him to turn his attention and his energies to the everyday affairs of life. So you see, gentlemen, how far back we can trace our innate love for one another, and how this love is always trying to redintegrate our former nature, to make two into one, and to bridge the gulf between one human being and another.

And so, gentlemen, we are all like pieces of the coins that children break in half for keepsakes—making two out of one, like the flatfish—and each of us is forever seeking the half that will tally with himself. The man who is a slice of the hermaphrodite sex, as it was called, will naturally be attracted by women—the adulterer, for instance—and women who run after men are of similar descent—as, for instance, the unfaithful wife. But the woman who is a slice of the original female is attracted by women rather than by men—in fact she is a Lesbian—while men who are slices of the male are followers of the male, and show their masculinity throughout their boyhood by the way they make friends with men, and the delight they take in lying beside them and being taken in their arms. And these are the most hopeful of the nation's youth, for theirs is the most virile constitution.

I know there are some people who call them shameless, but they are wrong. It is not immodesty that leads them to such pleasures, but daring, fortitude, and masculinity—the very virtues that they recognize and welcome in their lovers—which is proved by the fact that in after years they

are the only men who show any real manliness in public life. And so, when they themselves have come to manhood, their love in turn is lavished upon boys. They have no natural inclination to marry and beget children. Indeed, they only do so in deference to the usage of society, for they would just as soon renounce marriage altogether and spend their lives with one another.

Such a man, then, gentlemen, is of an amorous disposition, and gives his love to boys, always clinging to his like. And so, when this boy lover—or any lover, for that matter—is fortunate enough to meet his other half, they are both so intoxicated with affection, with friendship, and with love, that they cannot bear to let each other out of sight for a single instant. It is such reunions as these that impel men to spend their lives together, although they may be hard put to it to say what they really want with one another, and indeed, the purely sexual pleasures of their friendship could hardly account for the huge delight they take in one another's company. The fact is that both their souls are longing for a something else—a something to which they can neither of them put a name, and which they can only give an inkling of in cryptic sayings and prophetic riddles.

Now, supposing Hephaestus were to come and stand over them with his tool bag as they lay there side by side, and suppose he were to ask, Tell me, my dear creatures, what do you really want with one another?

And suppose they didn't know what to say, and he went on, How would you like to be rolled into one, so that you could always be together, day and night, and never be parted again? Because if that's what you want, I can easily weld you together, and then you can live your two lives in one, and, when the time comes, you can die a common death and still be two-in-one in the lower world. Now, what do you say? Is

that what you'd like me to do? And would you be happy if I did?

We may be sure, gentlemen, that no lover on earth would dream of refusing such an offer, for not one of them could imagine a happier fate. Indeed, they would be convinced that this was just what they'd been waiting for—to be merged, that is, into an utter oneness with the beloved.

And so all this to-do is a relic of that original state of ours, when we were whole, and now, when we are longing for and following after that primeval wholeness, we say we are in love. For there was a time, I repeat, when we were one, but now, for our sins, God has scattered us abroad, as the Spartans scattered the Arcadians. Moreover, gentlemen, there is every reason to fear that, if we neglect the worship of the gods, they will split us up again, and then we shall have to go about with our noses sawed asunder, part and counterpart, like the basso-relievos on the tombstones. And therefore it is our duty one and all to inspire our friends with reverence and piety, for so we may ensure our safety and attain that blessed union by enlisting in the army of Love and marching beneath his banners.

For Love must never be withstood—as we do, if we incur the displeasure of the gods. But if we cling to him in friendship and reconciliation, we shall be among the happy few to whom it is given in these latter days to meet their other halves. Now, I don't want any coarse remarks from Eryximachus. I don't mean Pausanias and Agathon, though for all I know they may be among the lucky ones, and both be sections of the male. But what I am trying to say is this—that the happiness of the whole human race, women no less than men, is to be found in the consummation of our love, and in the healing of our dissevered nature by finding each his proper mate. And if this be a counsel of perfection, then we must do what, in our present circumstances, is next

best, and bestow our love upon the natures most congenial to our own.

And so I say that Love, the god who brings all this to pass, is worthy of our hymns, for his is the inestimable and present service of conducting us to our true affinities, and it is he that offers this great hope for the future—that, if we do not fail in reverence to the gods, he will one day heal us and restore us to our old estate, and establish us in joy and blessedness.

Such, Eryximachus, is my discourse on Love—as different as could be from yours. And now I must ask you again. Will you please refrain from making fun of it, and let us hear what all the others have to say—or rather, the other two, for I see there's no one left but Agathon and Socrates.

Eryximachus/ Well, you shall have your way, and, joking apart, I enjoyed your speech immensely. Indeed, if I were not aware that Socrates and Agathon were both authorities on Love, I should be wondering what they could find to say after being treated to such a wealth and variety of eloquence. But, knowing what they are, I've no doubt we'll find them equal to the occasion.

Aristodemus/ To which Socrates retorted;

Socrates/ It's all very well for you to talk, Eryximachus, after your own magnificent display, but if you were in my shoes now—or rather when Agathon has finished speaking—you'd be just as nervous as I am.

Agathon/ Now, Socrates, I suppose you're trying to upset me by insisting on the great things my public is expecting of me.

Socrates/ My dear Agathon, do you think I don't remember your ease and dignity as you took the stage with the actors the other day, and how you looked that vast audience in the face, as cool as you please, and obviously

prepared to show them what you were made of? And am I to suppose that the sight of two or three friends will put you out of countenance?

Agathon/ Ah, but, Socrates, you mustn't think I'm so infatuated with the theater as to forget that a man of any judgment cares more for a handful of brains than an army of blockheads.

Socrates/ Oh, I should never make such a mistake, as to credit you, my dear Agathon, with ideas that smacked of the illiterate. I've no doubt that if you found yourself in what you really considered intellectual company, you'd be more impressed by their opinion than by the mob's. But we, alas, can't claim to be your intelligent minority, for we were there too, you know, helping to swell that very crowd. But tell me, if you were with some other set of people, whose judgment you respected, I suppose you'd feel uncomfortable if they saw you doing anything you thought beneath you. Am I right?

Agathon/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ And yet, you wouldn't feel uncomfortable if the *mob* saw you doing something equally unworthy?

Aristodemus/ But here Phaedrus stepped in.

Phaedrus/ My dear Agathon, if you go on answering his questions he won't care two-pence what becomes of our debate, so long as there's someone he can argue with—especially if it's somebody good-looking. Now, much as I enjoy listening to Socrates' arguments, it's my duty as chairman to insist that each man makes his speech. So I must ask you both to pay your tribute to the god, and then you can argue as much as you please.

Agathon/ Phaedrus is right. I'm quite prepared to speak. After all, I can argue with Socrates any day.

Now, before I begin my speech I want to explain what sort of a speech I think it ought to be. For to my way of thinking the speakers we have heard so far have been at such pains to congratulate mankind upon the blessings of Love that they have quite forgotten to extol the god himself, and have thrown no light at all upon the nature of our divine benefactor. Yet surely, if we are to praise anyone, no matter whom, no matter how, there is only one way to go about it, and that is to indicate the nature of him whose praises we are to sing, and of the blessings he is the author of. And so, gentlemen, with Love. Our duty is first to praise him for what he is, and secondly, for what he gives.

And so I shall begin by maintaining that, while all the gods are blessed, Love—be it said in all reverence—is the blessedest of all, for he is the loveliest and the best. The loveliest, I say, because first of all, Phaedrus, he is the youngest of the gods, which is proved by his flight, aye, and his escape, from the ravages of time, who travels fast enough—too fast, at any rate, for us poor mortals. But Love was born to be the enemy of age, and shuns the very sight of senility, clinging always to his like in the company of youth, because he is young himself.

I agreed with most of Phaedrus' speech, but not with his suggestion that Love was older than even Cronus or Iapetus. No, gentlemen, Love, in his imperishable youth, is, I repeat, the youngest of them all. And as for those old stories of the gods we have read in Hesiod and Parmenides, we may be sure that any such proceedings were the work not of Love but of Necessity—if, indeed, such tales are credible at all. For if Love had been among them then, they would neither have fettered nor gelded one another; they would have used no violence at all, but lived together in peace and concord as they do today, and as they have done since Love became their heavenly overlord.

It is clear, then. that he is young, and not only young but dainty, with a daintiness that only a Homer could describe. For it is Homer, is it not, who writes of Ate as being both divine and dainty—dainty of foot, that is. 'How delicate,' he says;

> How delicate her feet who shuns the ground,
> Stepping a-tiptoe on the heads of men.

Now, you will agree that to prefer what is soft to what is hard is proof enough of being dainty, and the same argument will demonstrate the daintiness of Love, for he never treads upon the ground, nor even on our heads—which, after all, are not so very soft—but lives and moves in the softest thing in the whole of nature. He makes the dispositions and the hearts of gods and men his dwelling place—not, however, without discrimination, for if the heart he lights upon be hard he flies away to settle in a softer. And so, not only treading on but altogether clinging to the softest of the soft, he must indeed be exquisitely dainty.

We see, then, that Love is for one thing the youngest, and for another the most delicate, thing in the world, and thirdly, gentlemen, we find that he is tender and supple. For if he were hampered by the least inflexibility, how could he wind us in such endless convolutions, and steal into all our hearts so secretly—aye, and leave them, too, when he pleases? And that elegance of his, which all the world confesses, bears witness to his suppleness and symmetry, for Love and unsightliness will never be at peace. Moreover, his life among the flowers argues in himself a loveliness of hue, for Love will never settle upon bodies, or souls, or anything at all where there is no bud to blossom, or where the bloom is faded. But where the ground is thick with flowers and the air with scent, there he will settle, gentlemen, and there he loves to linger.

I shall say no more about Love's loveliness—though much remains to say—because we must now consider his moral excellence, and in particular the fact that he is never injured by, nor ever injures, either god or man. For, whatever Love may suffer, it cannot be by violence—which, indeed, cannot so much as touch him—nor does he need to go to work by force, for the world asks no compulsion, but is glad to serve him, and, as we know, a compact made in mutual good will is held to be just and binding by the sovereign power of the law.

Added to his righteousness is his entire temperance. I may take it, I suppose, for granted that temperance is defined as the power to control our pleasures and our lusts, and that none of these is more powerful than Love. If, therefore, they are weaker, they will be overcome by Love, and he will be their master, so that Love, controlling, as I said, our lusts and pleasures, may be regarded as temperance itself.

Then, as to valor, as the poet sings, But him not even Ares can withstand.' ' For, as the story goes, it was not Ares that captured Love, but Love that captured Ares—love, that is, of Aphrodite. Now, the captor is stronger than the captive, and therefore Love, by overcoming one who is mightier than all the rest, has shown himself the mightiest of all.

So much, gentlemen, for the righteousness of Love, his temperance, and his valor; there remains his genius, to which I must do such scanty justice as I can. First of all, then—if, like Eryximachus, I may give pride of place to my own vocation—Love is himself so divine a poet that he can kindle in the souls of others the poetic fire, for no matter what dull clay we seemed to be before, we are everyone of us a poet when we are in love. We need ask no further proof than this that Love is a poet deeply versed in every branch of what I may define succinctly as creative art, for, just as

no one can give away what he has not got, so no one can teach what he does not know.

And who will deny that the creative power by which all living things are begotten and brought forth is the very genius of Love? Do we not, moreover, recognize that in every art and craft the artist and the craftsman who work under the direction of this same god achieve the brightest fame, while those that lack his influence grow old in the shadow of oblivion? It was longing and desire that led Apollo to found the arts of archery, healing, and divination—so he, too. was a scholar in the school of Love. It was thus that the fine arts were founded by the Muses, the smithy by Hephaestus, and the loom by Pallas, and thus it was that Zeus himself attained the 'governance of gods and men.' And hence the actions of the gods were governed by the birth of Love—love, that is, of beauty, for, as we know, he will have none of ugliness. We are told, as I have already said, that in the beginning there were many strange and terrible happenings among them, because Necessity was king, but ever since the birth of the younger god, Love—the love of what is lovely—has showered every kind of blessing upon gods and men.

And so I say, Phaedrus, that Love, besides being in himself the loveliest and the best, is the author of those very virtues in all around him. And now I am stirred to speak in numbers, and to tell how it is he that brings;

> Peace upon earth, the breathless calm
> That lulls the long-tormented deep,
> Rest to the winds, and that sweet balm
> And solace of our nature, sleep.

And it is he that banishes estrangement and ushers friendship in; it is he that unites us in such friendly gatherings as this—presiding at the table, at the dance, and at the altar, cultivating courtesy and weeding out brutality,

lavish of kindliness and sparing of malevolence, affable and gracious, the wonder of the wise, the admiration of the gods, the despair of him that lacks, and the happiness of him that has, the father of delicacy, daintiness, elegance, and grace, of longing and desire, heedful of the good and heedless of the bad, in toil or terror, in drink or dialectic, our helmsman and helper, our pilot and preserver, the richest ornament of heaven and earth alike, and, to conclude, the noblest and the loveliest of leaders, whom every one of us must follow, raising our voices in harmony with the heavenly song of Love that charms both mortal and immortal hearts.

And there, my dear Phaedrus, you have my speech. Such is my offering to the god of love. I have done my best to be at once amusing and instructive.

Aristodemus/ Agathon took his seat, amid a burst of applause, for we all felt that his youthful eloquence did honor to himself as well as to the god.

Aristodemus/ Then Socrates turned to Eryximachus and said;

Socrates/ Well, Eryximachus, you laughed at my misgivings, but you see—they've been justified by the event. There's not much left for *me* to say after the wonderful speech we've just had from Agathon.

Eryximachus/ I admit, that your prognosis was correct so far as Agathon's eloquence was concerned, but as to your own embarrassment, I'm not so sure.

Socrates/ My dear sir, what chance have I or anyone of knowing what to say, after listening to such a flood of eloquence as that? The opening, I admit, was nothing out of the way, but when he came to his peroration, why, he held us all spellbound with the sheer beauty of his diction, while I, personally, was so mortified when I compared it with the

best that I could ever hope to do, that for two pins I'd have tried to sneak away. Besides, his speech reminded me so strongly of that master of rhetoric, Gorgias, that I couldn't help thinking of Odysseus, and his fear that Medusa would rise from the lower world among the ghosts, and I was afraid that when Agathon got near the end he would arm his speech against mine with the Gorgon's head of Gorgias' eloquence, and strike me as dumb as a stone.

And then I saw what a fool I'd been to agree to take part in this eulogy of yours, and, what was worse, to claim a special knowledge of the subject, when, as it turned out, I had not the least idea how this or any other eulogy should be conducted. I had imagined in my innocence that one began by stating the facts about the matter in hand, and then proceeded to pick out the most attractive points and display them to the best advantage. And I flattered myself that my speech would be a great success, because I knew the facts. But the truth, it seems, is the last thing the successful eulogist cares about; on the contrary, what he does is simply to run through all the attributes of power and virtue, however irrelevant they may be, and the whole thing may be a pack of lies, for all it seems to matter.

I take it then that what we undertook was to flatter, rather than to praise, the god of love, and that's why you're all prepared to say the first thing about him that comes into your heads, and to claim that he either is, or is the cause of, everything that is loveliest and best. And of course the uninitiated are impressed by the beauty and grandeur of your encomiums; yet those who know will not be taken in so easily. Well then, I repeat, the whole thing was a misunderstanding, and it was only in my ignorance that I agreed to take part at all. I protest, with Euripides' Hippolytus, it was my lips that promised, not my soul, and that, gentlemen, is that. I won't have anything to do with

your eulogy, and what is more, I couldn't if I tried. But I don't mind telling you the truth about Love, if you're interested; only, if I do, I must tell it in my own way, for I'm not going to make a fool of myself, at my age, trying to imitate the grand manner that sits so well on the rest of you. Now, Phaedrus, it's for you to say. Have you any use for a speaker who only cares whether his matter is correct and leaves his manner to take care of itself?

Aristodemus/ Whereupon Phaedrus and the others told him to go ahead and make whatever kind of speech he liked.

Socrates/ Very well, but there's just one other thing. Has our chairman any objection to my asking Agathon a few simple questions? I want to make certain we're not at cross-purposes before I begin my speech.

Phaedrus/ Ask what you like. I don't mind.

Apollodorus/ Whereupon Socrates began, so far as Aristodemus could trust his memory, as follows.

Socrates/ I must say, my dear Agathon, that the remarks with which you prefaced your speech were very much to the point. You were quite right in saying that the first thing you had to do was to acquaint us with the nature of the god, and the second to tell us what he did. Yes, your introduction was admirable. But now that we've had the pleasure of hearing your magnificent description of Love, there's just one little point I'm not quite clear about. Tell me. Do you think it is the nature of Love to be the love of somebody, or of nobody? I don't mean, is he a mother's or a father's love? That would be a silly sort of question, but suppose I were to ask you whether a father, *as* a father, must be *somebody's* father, or not; surely the only reasonable answer would be that a father must be the father of a son or a daughter. Am I right?

Agathon/ Why, yes.

Socrates/ And could we say the same thing about a mother?

Agathon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Good. And now, if you don't mind answering just one or two more questions, I think you'll see what I'm driving at. Suppose I were to ask, what about a brother, *as* a brother? Must he be *somebody's* brother, or not?

Agathon/ Of course he must.

Socrates/ You mean, he must be the brother of a brother or a sister.

Agathon/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Well, then, I want you to look at Love from the same point of view. Is he the love of something, or of nothing?

Agathon/ Of something, naturally.

Socrates/ And now, bearing in mind what Love is the love of, tell me this. Does he long for what he is in love with, or not?

Agathon/ Of course he longs for it.

Socrates/ And does he long for whatever it is he longs for, and is he in love with it, when he's got it, or when he hasn't?

Agathon/ When he hasn't got it, probably.

Socrates/ Then isn't it probable, or rather isn't it certain that everything longs for what it lacks, and that nothing longs for what it doesn't lack? I can't help thinking, Agathon, that that's about as certain as anything could be. Don't you think so?

Agathon/ Yes, I suppose it is.

Socrates/ Good. Now, tell me. Is it likely that a big man will want to be big, or a strong man to be strong?

Agathon/ Not if we were right just now.

Socrates/ Quite, for the simple reason that neither of them would be lacking in that particular respect.

Agathon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ For if, the strong were to long for strength, and the swift for swiftness, and the healthy for health—for I suppose it *might* be suggested that in such cases as these people long for the very things they have, or are, already, and so I'm trying to imagine such a case, to make quite sure we're on the right track—people in their position, Agathon, if you stop to think about them, are bound here and now to have those very qualities, whether they want them or not; so why should they trouble to want them? And so, if we heard someone saying, 'I'm healthy, and I want to be healthy; I'm rich, and I want to be rich; and in fact I want just what I've got,' I think we should be justified in saying, Tut, my dear sir, you've *got* wealth and health and strength already, and what you want is to go on having them, for at the moment you've got them whether you want them or not. Doesn't it look as if, when you say you want these things here and now, you really mean, what you've got now, you want to go on keeping?' Don't you think, my dear Agathon, that he'd be bound to agree?

Agathon/ Why, of course he would.

Socrates/ Well, then, desiring to secure something to oneself forever may be described as loving something which is not yet to hand.

Agathon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And therefore, whoever feels a want is wanting something which is not yet to hand, and the object of his love and of his desire is whatever he isn't, or whatever he hasn't got—that is to say, whatever he is lacking in.

Agathon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And now, are we agreed upon the following conclusions? One, that Love is always the love of something, and two, that that something is what he lacks.

Agathon/ Agreed.

Socrates/ So far, so good. And now, do you remember what you said were the objects of Love, in your speech just now? Perhaps I'd better jog your memory. I fancy it was something like this—that the actions of the gods were governed by the love of beauty—for of course there was no such thing as the love of ugliness. Wasn't that pretty much what you said?

Agathon/ It was.

Socrates/ No doubt you were right, too. And if that's so, doesn't it follow that Love is the love of beauty, and not of ugliness?

Agathon/ It does.

Socrates/ And haven't we agreed that Love is the love of something which he hasn't got, and consequently lacks?

Agathon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then Love has no beauty, but is lacking in it?

Agathon/ Yes, that must follow.

Socrates/ Well then, would you suggest that something which lacked beauty and had no part in it was beautiful itself?

Agathon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And, that being so, can you still maintain that Love is beautiful?

Aristodemus/ To which Agathon could only reply;

Agathon/ I begin to be afraid, my dear Socrates, that I didn't know what I was talking about.

Socrates/ Never mind, it was a lovely speech, but there's just one more point. I suppose you hold that the good is also beautiful?

Agathon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then, if Love is lacking in what is beautiful, and if the good and the beautiful are the same, he must also be lacking in what is good.

Agathon/ Just as you say, Socrates. I'm afraid you're quite unanswerable.

Socrates/ No, no, dear Agathon. It's the truth you find unanswerable, not Socrates. And now I'm going to leave you in peace, because I want to talk about some lessons I was given, once upon a time, by a Mantinean woman called Diotima—a woman who was deeply versed in this and many other fields of knowledge. It was she who brought about a ten years' postponement of the great plague of Athens on the occasion of a certain sacrifice, and it was she who taught me the philosophy of Love. And now I am going to try to connect her teaching—as well as I can without her help—with the conclusions that Agathon and I have just arrived at. Like him, I shall begin by stating who and what Love is, and go on to describe his functions, and I think the easiest way will be to adopt Diotima's own method of inquiry by question and answer. I'd been telling her pretty much what Agathon has just been telling me—how Love was a great god, and how he was the love of what is beautiful, and she used the same arguments on me that I've just brought to bear on Agathon to prove that, on my own showing, Love was neither beautiful nor good.

Whereupon, My dear Diotima, are you trying to make me believe that Love is bad and ugly?

Diotima/ Heaven forbid. But do you really think that if a thing isn't beautiful it's therefore bound to be ugly?

Socrates/ Why, naturally.

Diotima/ And that what isn't learned must be ignorant? Have you never heard of something which comes between the two?

Socrates/ And what's that?

Diotima/ Don't you know, that holding an opinion which is in fact correct, without being able to give a reason for it, is neither true knowledge—how can it be knowledge without a reason? —nor ignorance—for how can we call it ignorance when it happens to be true? So may we not say that a correct opinion comes midway between knowledge and ignorance?

Socrates/ Yes, I admitted, that's perfectly true.

Diotima/ Very well, then, why must you insist that what isn't beautiful is ugly, and that what isn't good is bad? Now, coming back to Love, you've been forced to agree that he is neither good nor beautiful, but that's no reason for thinking that he must be bad and ugly. The fact is that he's between the two.

Socrates/ And yet, it's generally agreed that he's a great god.

Diotima/ It all depends, on what you mean by 'generally.' Do you mean simply people that don't know anything about it, or do you include the people that do?

Socrates/ I meant everybody.

At which she laughed, and said;

Diotima/ Then can you tell me, my dear Socrates, how people can agree that he's a great god when they deny that he's a god at all?

Socrates/ What people do you mean?

Diotima/ You for one, and I for another.

Socrates/ What on earth do you mean by that?

Diotima/ Oh, it's simple enough. Tell me, wouldn't you say that all the gods were happy and beautiful? Or would you suggest that any of them were neither?

Socrates/ Good heavens, no!

Diotima/ And don't you call people happy when they possess the beautiful and the good?

Socrates/ Why, of course.

Diotima/ And yet you agreed just now that Love lacks, and consequently longs for, those very qualities?

Socrates/ Yes, so I did.

Diotima/ Then, if he has no part in either goodness or beauty, how can he be a god?

Socrates/ I suppose he can't be.

Diotima/ And now, haven't I proved that you're one of the people who don't believe in the divinity of Love?

Socrates/ Yes, but what can he be, then? A mortal?

Diotima/ Not by any means.

Socrates/ Well, what then?

Diotima/ What I told you before—halfway between mortal and immortal.

Socrates/ And what do you mean by that, Diotima?

Diotima/ A very powerful spirit, Socrates, and spirits, you know, are half-way between god and man.

Socrates/ What powers have they, then?

Diotima/ They are the envoys and interpreters that ply between heaven and earth, flying upward with our worship and our prayers, and descending with the heavenly answers and commandments, and since they are between the two estates they weld both sides together and merge them into one great whole. They form the medium of the prophetic arts, of the priestly rites of sacrifice, initiation, and incantation,

of divination and of sorcery, for the divine will not mingle directly with the human, and it is only through the mediation of the spirit world that man can have any intercourse, whether waking or sleeping, with the gods. And the man who is versed in such matters is said to have spiritual powers, as opposed to the mechanical powers of the man who is expert in the more mundane arts. There are many spirits, and many kinds of spirits, too, and Love is one of them.

Socrates/ Then who were his parents?

Diotima/ I'll tell you, though it's rather a long story. On the day of Aphrodite's birth the gods were making merry, and among them was Resource, the son of Craft. And when they had supped, Need came begging at the door because there was good cheer inside. Now, it happened that Resource, having drunk deeply of the heavenly nectar—for this was before the days of wine—wandered out into the garden of Zeus and sank into a heavy sleep, and Need, thinking that to get a child by Resource would mitigate her penury, lay down beside him and in time was brought to bed of Love. So Love became the follower and servant of Aphrodite because he was begotten on the same day that she was born, and further, he was born to love the beautiful since Aphrodite is beautiful herself.

Then again, as the son of Resource and Need, it has been his fate to be always needy; nor is he delicate and lovely as most of us believe, but harsh and arid, barefoot and homeless, sleeping on the naked earth, in doorways, or in the very streets beneath the stars of heaven, and always partaking of his mother's poverty. But, secondly, he brings his father's resourcefulness to his designs upon the beautiful and the good, for he is gallant, impetuous, and energetic, a mighty hunter, and a master of device and artifice—at once desirous and full of wisdom, a lifelong

seeker after truth, an adept in sorcery, enchantment, and seduction.

He is neither mortal nor immortal, for in the space of a day he will be now, when all goes well with him, alive and blooming, and now dying, to be born again by virtue of his father's nature, while what he gains will always ebb away as fast. So Love is never altogether in or out of need, and stands, moreover, midway between ignorance and wisdom. You must understand that none of the gods are seekers after truth. They do not long for wisdom, because they are wise—and why should the wise be seeking the wisdom that is already theirs? Nor, for that matter, do the ignorant seek the truth or crave to be made wise. And indeed, what makes their case so hopeless is that, having neither beauty, nor goodness, nor intelligence, they are satisfied with what they are, and do not long for the virtues they have never missed.

Socrates/ Then tell me, Diotima, who are these seekers after truth, if they are neither the wise nor the ignorant?

Diotima/ Why, a schoolboy, could have told you that, after what I've just been saying. They are those that come between the two, and one of them is Love. For wisdom is concerned with the loveliest of things, and Love is the love of what is lovely. And so it follows that Love is a lover of wisdom, and, being such, he is placed between wisdom and ignorance—for which his parentage also is responsible, in that his father is full of wisdom and resource, while his mother is devoid of either.

Such, my dear Socrates, is the spirit of Love, and yet I'm not altogether surprised at your idea of him, which was, judging by what you said, that Love was the beloved rather than the lover. So naturally you thought of Love as utterly beautiful, for the beloved is, in fact beautiful, perfect,

delicate, and prosperous—very different from the lover, as I have described him.

Socrates/ Very well, dear lady, no doubt you're right. But in that case, what good can Love be to humanity?

Diotima/ That's just what I'm coming to, Socrates. So much, then, for the nature and the origin of Love. You were right in thinking that he was the love of what is beautiful. But suppose someone were to say, Yes, my dear Socrates. Quite so, my dear Diotima. But what do you mean by the love of what is beautiful? Or, to put the question more precisely, what is it that the lover of the beautiful is longing for?

Socrates/ He is longing to make the beautiful his own.

Diotima/ Very well, but your answer leads to another question. What will he gain by making the beautiful his own?

Socrates/ This, as I had to admit, was more than I could answer on the spur of the moment.

Diotima/ Well then, suppose that, instead of the beautiful, you were being asked about the good. I put it to you, Socrates. What is it that the lover of the good is longing for?

Socrates/ To make the good his own.

Diotima/ Then what will he gain by making it his own?

Socrates/ I can make a better shot at answering that. He'll gain happiness.

Diotima/ Right, for the happy are happy inasmuch as they possess the good. and since there's no need for us to ask why men should want to be happy, I think your answer is conclusive.

Socrates/ Absolutely, I agreed.

Diotima/ This longing, then, this love—is it common to all mankind? What do you think, do we all long to make the good our own?

Socrates/ Yes, as far as that goes we're all alike.

Diotima/ Well then, Socrates, if we say that everybody always loves the same thing, does that mean that everybody is in love? Or do we mean that some of us are in love, while some of us are not?

Socrates/ I was a little worried about that myself, I confessed.

Diotima/ Oh, it's nothing to worry about. You see, what we've been doing is to give the name of Love to what is only one single aspect of it; we make just the same mistake, you know, with a lot of other names.

Socrates/ For instance—?

Diotima/ For instance, poetry. You'll agree that there is more than one kind of poetry in the true sense of the word—that is to say, calling something into existence that was not there before, so that every kind of artistic creation is poetry, and every artist is a poet.

Socrates/ True.

Diotima/ But all the same, we don't call them all poets, do we? We give various names to the various arts, and only call the one particular art that deals with music and meter by the name that should be given to them all. And that's the only art that we call poetry, while those who practice it are known as poets.

Socrates/ Quite.

Diotima/ And that's how it is with Love. For 'Love, that renowned and all-beguiling power,' includes every kind of longing for happiness and for the good. Yet those of us who are subject to this longing in the various fields of business,

athletics, philosophy, and so on, are never said to be in love, and are never known as lovers, while the man who devotes himself to what is only one of Love's many activities is given the name that should apply to all the rest as well.

Socrates/ Yes. I suppose you must be right.

Diotima/ I know it has been suggested, that lovers are people who are looking for their other halves, but as I see it, Socrates, Love never longs for either the half or the whole of anything except the good. For men will even have their hands and feet cut off if they are once convinced that those members are bad for them. Indeed I think we only prize our own belongings in so far as we say that the good belongs to us, and the bad to someone else, for what we love is the good and nothing but the good. Or do you disagree?

Socrates/ Good heavens, no!

Diotima/ Then may we state categorically that men are lovers of the good?

Socrates/ Yes, we may.

Diotima/ And shouldn't we add that they long for the good to be their own?

Socrates/ We should.

Diotima/ And not merely to be their own but to be their own forever?

Socrates/ Yes, that must follow.

Diotima/ In short, that Love longs for the good to be his own forever?

Socrates/ Yes, that's absolutely true.

Diotima/ Very well, then. And that being so, what course will Love's followers pursue, and in what particular field will eagerness and exertion be known as Love? In fact, what is this activity? Can you tell me that, Socrates?

Socrates/ If I could, my dear Diotima. I shouldn't be so much amazed at your grasp of the subject, and I shouldn't be coming to you to learn the answer to that very question.

Diotima/ Well, I'll tell you, then. To love is to bring forth upon the beautiful, both in body and in soul.

Socrates/ I'm afraid that's too deep, for my poor wits to fathom.

Diotima/ I'll try to speak more plainly, then. We are all of us prolific, Socrates, in body and in soul, and when we reach a certain age our nature urges us to procreation. Nor can we be quickened by ugliness, but only by the beautiful. Conception, we know, takes place when man and woman come together, but there's a divinity in human propagation, an immortal something in the midst of man's mortality which is incompatible with any kind of discord. And ugliness is at odds with the divine, while beauty is in perfect harmony. In propagation, then, Beauty is the goddess of both fate and travail, and so when procreancy draws near the beautiful it grows genial and blithe, and birth follows swiftly on conception. But when it meets with ugliness it is overcome with heaviness and gloom, and turning away it shrinks into itself and is not brought to bed, but still labors under its painful burden. And so, when the procreant is big with child, he is strangely stirred by the beautiful, because he knows that beauty's tenant will bring his travail to an end. So you see, Socrates, that Love is not exactly a longing for the beautiful, as you suggested.

Socrates/ Well, what is it, then?

Diotima/ A longing not for the beautiful itself, but for the conception and generation that the beautiful effects.

Socrates/ Yes. No doubt you're right.

Diotima/ Of course I'm right. And why all this longing for propagation? Because this is the one deathless and eternal

element in our mortality. And since we have agreed that the lover longs for the good to be his own forever, it follows that we are bound to long for immortality as well as for the good—which is to say that Love is a longing for immortality.

Socrates/ So much I gathered, gentlemen, at one time and another from Diotima's dissertations upon Love.

And then one day she asked me;

Diotima/ Well, Socrates, and what do you suppose is the cause of all this longing and all this love? Haven't you noticed what an extraordinary effect the breeding instinct has upon both animals and birds, and how obsessed they are with the desire, first to mate, and then to rear their litters and their broods, and how the weakest of them are ready to stand up to the strongest in defense of their young, and even die for them, and how they are content to bear the pinch of hunger and every kind of hardship, so long as they can rear their offspring?

With men, you might put it down to the power of reason, but how can you account for Love's having such remarkable effects upon the brutes? What do you say to that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Again I had to confess my ignorance.

Diotima/ Well, I don't know how you can hope to master the philosophy of Love, if *that's* too much for you to understand.

Socrates/ But, my dear Diotima, as I said before, that's just why I'm asking you to teach me—because I realize how ignorant I am. And I'd be more than grateful if you'd enlighten me as to the cause not only of this, but of all the various effects of Love.

Diotima/ Well, it's simple enough, so long as you bear in mind what we agreed was the object of Love. For here, too, the principle holds good that the mortal does all it can to put on immortality. And how can it do that except by breeding,

and thus ensuring that there will always be a younger generation to take the place of the old?

Now, although we speak of an individual as being the same so long as he continues to exist in the same form, and therefore assume that a man is the same person in his dotage as in his infancy, yet, for all we call him the same, every bit of him is different, and every day he is becoming a new man, while the old man is ceasing to exist, as you can see from his hair, his flesh, his bones, his blood, and all the rest of his body. And not only his body, for the same thing happens to his soul. And neither his manners, nor his disposition, nor his thoughts, nor his desires, nor his pleasures, nor his sufferings, nor his fears are the same throughout his life, for some of them grow, while others disappear.

And the application of this principle to human knowledge is even more remarkable, for not only do some of the things we know increase, while some of them are lost. so that even in our knowledge we are not always the same, but the principle applies as well to every single branch of knowledge. When we say we are studying, we really mean that our knowledge is ebbing away. We forget, because our knowledge disappears, and we have to study so as to replace what we are losing, so that the state of our knowledge may seem, at any rate, to be the same as it was before.

This is how every mortal creature perpetuates itself. It cannot, like the divine, be still the same throughout eternity; it can only leave behind new life to fill the vacancy that is left in its species by obsolescence. This, my dear Socrates, is how the body and all else that is temporal partakes of the eternal; there is no other way. And so it is no wonder that every creature prizes its own issue, since the whole creation is inspired by this love, this passion for immortality.

Socrates/ Well, Diotima, when she had done, that's a most impressive argument. I wonder if you're right.

Diotima/ Of course I am.

Socrates/ She said with an air of authority that was almost professorial.

Diotima/ Think of the ambitions of your fellow men, and though at first they may strike you as upsetting my argument, you'll see how right I am if you only bear in mind that men's great incentive is the love of glory, and that their one idea is 'To win eternal mention in the deathless roll of fame.'

For the sake of fame they will dare greater dangers, even, than for their children; they are ready to spend their money like water and to wear their fingers to the bone, and, if it comes to that, to die.

Do you think, that Alcestis would have laid down her life to save Admetus, or that Achilles would have died for the love he bore Patroclus, or that Codrus, the Athenian king, would have sacrificed himself for the seed of his royal consort, if they had not hoped to win 'the deathless name for valor,' which, in fact, posterity has granted them? No, Socrates, no. Every one of us, no matter what he does, is longing for the endless fame, the incomparable glory that is theirs, and the nobler he is, the greater his ambition, because he is in love with the eternal.

Well then, those whose procreancy is of the body turn to woman as the object of their love, and raise a family, in the blessed hope that by doing so they will keep their memory green, 'through time and through eternity.' But those whose procreancy is of the spirit rather than of the flesh—and they are not unknown, Socrates—conceive and bear the things of the spirit. And what are they? you ask. Wisdom and all her

sister virtues; it is the office of every poet to beget them, and of every artist whom we may call creative.

Now, by far the most important kind of wisdom, is that which governs the ordering of society, and which goes by the names of justice and moderation. And if any man is so closely allied to the divine as to be teeming with these virtues even in his youth, and if, when he comes to manhood, his first ambition is to be begetting, he too, you may be sure, will go about in search of the loveliness—and never of the ugliness—on which he may beget. And hence his procreant nature is attracted by a comely body rather than an ill-favored one, and if, besides, he happens on a soul which is at once beautiful, distinguished, and agreeable, he is charmed to find so welcome an alliance. It will be easy for him to talk of virtue to such a listener, and to discuss what human goodness is and how the virtuous should live—in short, to undertake the other's education.

And, as I believe, by constant association with so much beauty, and by thinking of his friend when he is present and when he is away, he will be delivered of the burden he has labored under all these years. And what is more, he and his friend will help each other rear the issue of their friendship—and so the bond between them will be more binding, and their communion even more complete, than that which comes of bringing children up, because they have created something lovelier and less mortal than human seed.

And I ask you, who would not prefer such fatherhood to merely human propagation, if he stopped to think of Homer, and Hesiod, and all the greatest of our poets? Who would not envy them their immortal progeny, their claim upon the admiration of posterity?

Or think of Lycurgus, and what offspring he left behind him in his laws, which proved to be the saviors of Sparta

and, perhaps, the whole of Hellas. Or think of the fame of Solon, the father of Athenian law, and think of all the other names that are remembered in Grecian cities and in lands beyond the sea for the noble deeds they did before the eyes of all the world, and for all the diverse virtues that they fathered. And think of all the shrines that have been dedicated to them in memory of their immortal issue, and tell me if you can of *anyone* whose mortal children have brought him so much fame.

Well now, my dear Socrates, I have no doubt that even you might be initiated into these, the more elementary mysteries of Love. But I don't know whether you could apprehend the final revelation, for so far, you know, we are only at the bottom of the true scale of perfection.

Never mind, I will do all I can to help you understand, and you must strain every nerve to follow what I'm saying.

Well then, the candidate for this initiation cannot, if his efforts are to be rewarded, begin too early to devote himself to the beauties of the body. First of all, if his preceptor instructs him as he should, he will fall in love with the beauty of one individual body, so that his passion may give life to noble discourse. Next he must consider how nearly related the beauty of anyone body is to the beauty of any other, when he will see that if he is to devote himself to loveliness of form it will be absurd to deny that the beauty of each and every body is the same. Having reached this point, he must set himself to be the lover of every lovely body, and bring his passion for the one into due proportion by deeming it of little or of no importance.

Next he must grasp that the beauties of the body are as nothing to the beauties of the soul, so that wherever he meets with spiritual loveliness, even in the husk of an unlovely body, he will find it beautiful enough to fall in love

with and to cherish—and beautiful enough to quicken in his heart a longing for such discourse as tends toward the building of a noble nature. And from this he will be led to contemplate the beauty of laws and institutions. And when he discovers how nearly every kind of beauty is akin to every other he will conclude that the beauty of the body is not, after all, of so great moment.

And next, his attention should be diverted from institutions to the sciences, so that he may know the beauty of every kind of knowledge. And thus, by scanning beauty's wide horizon, he will be saved from a slavish and illiberal devotion to the individual loveliness of a single boy, a single man, or a single institution. And, turning his eyes toward the open sea of beauty, he will find in such contemplation the seed of the most fruitful discourse and the loftiest thought, and reap a golden harvest of philosophy, until, confirmed and strengthened, he will come upon one single form of knowledge, the knowledge of the beauty I am about to speak of.

And here, you must follow me as closely as you can.

Whoever has been initiated so far in the mysteries of Love and has viewed all these aspects of the beautiful in due succession, is at last drawing near the final revelation. And now, Socrates, there bursts upon him that wondrous vision which is the very soul of the beauty he has toiled so long for. It is an everlasting loveliness which neither comes nor goes, which neither flowers nor fades, for such beauty is the same on every hand, the same then as now, here as there, this way as that way, the same to every worshiper as it is to every other.

Nor will his vision of the beautiful take the form of a face, or of hands, or of anything that is of the flesh. It will be neither words, nor knowledge, nor a something that exists

in something else, such as a living creature, or the earth, or the heavens, or anything that is—but subsisting of itself and by itself in an eternal oneness, while every lovely thing partakes of it in such sort that, however much the parts may wax and wane, it will be neither more nor less, but still the same inviolable whole.

And so, when his prescribed devotion to boyish beauties has carried our candidate so far that the universal beauty dawns upon his inward sight, he is almost within reach of the final revelation. And this is the way, the only way, he must approach, or be led toward, the sanctuary of Love. Starting from individual beauties, the quest for the universal beauty must find him ever mounting the heavenly ladder, stepping from rung to rung—that is, from one to two, and from two to *every* lovely body, from bodily beauty to the beauty of institutions, from institutions to learning, and from learning in general to the special lore that pertains to nothing but the beautiful itself—until at last he comes to know what beauty is.

And if, my dear Socrates, man's life is ever worth the living, it is when he has attained this vision of the very soul of beauty. And once you have seen it, you will never be seduced again by the charm of gold, of dress, of comely boys, or lads just ripening to manhood; you will care nothing for the beauties that used to take your breath away and kindle such a longing in you, and many others like you, Socrates, to be always at the side of the beloved and feasting your eyes upon him, so that you would be content, if it were possible, to deny yourself the grosser necessities of meat and drink, so long as you were with him.

But if it were given to man to gaze on beauty's very self—unsullied, unalloyed, and freed from the mortal taint that haunts the frailer loveliness of flesh and blood—if, I say, it were given to man to see the heavenly beauty face to face,

would you call *his,* an unenviable life, whose eyes had been opened to the vision, and who had gazed upon it in true contemplation until it had become his own forever?

And remember, that it is only when he discerns beauty itself through what makes it visible that a man will be quickened with the true, and not the seeming, virtue—for it is virtue's self that quickens him, not virtue's semblance. And when he has brought forth and reared this perfect virtue, he shall be called the friend of god, and if ever it is given to man to put on immortality, it shall be given to him.

Socrates/ This, Phaedrus—this, gentlemen—was the doctrine of Diotima. I was convinced, and in that conviction I try to bring others to the same creed, and to convince them that, if we are to make this gift our own, Love will help our mortal nature more than all the world. And this is why I say that every man of us should worship the god of love, and this is why I cultivate and worship all the elements of Love myself, and bid others do the same. And all my life I shall pay the power and the might of Love such homage as I can. So you may call this my eulogy of Love, Phaedrus, if you choose; if not, well, call it what you like.

Aristodemus/ Socrates took his seat amid applause from everyone but Aristophanes, who was just going to take up the reference Socrates had made to his own theories, when suddenly there came a knocking at the outer door, followed by the notes of a flute and the sound of festive brawling in the street.

Agathon/ Go and see who it is;

Aristodemus/ Said Agathon to the servants.

Agathon/ If it's one of our particular friends you can ask him in, but if not, you'd better say the party's over and there's nothing left to drink.

Aristodemus/ Well, it wasn't long before they could hear Alcibiades shouting in the courtyard, evidently very drunk, and demanding where Agathon was, because he *must* see Agathon at once. So the flute girl and some of his other followers helped him stagger in, and there he stood in the doorway, with a mass of ribbons and an enormous wreath of ivy and violets sprouting on his head, and addressed the company.

Alcibiades/ Good evening, gentlemen. I'm pretty well bottled already, so if you'd rather I didn't join the party, only say the word and I'll go away, as soon as I've hung this wreath on Agathon's head—which is what I really came for. I couldn't get along yesterday, so here I am tonight, with a bunch of ribbons on my head, all ready to take them off and put them on the head of the cleverest, the most attractive, and, I may say—well, anyway, I'm going to crown him. And now I suppose you're laughing at me, just because I'm drunk. Go on, have your laugh out, don't mind me. I'm not so drunk that I don't know what I'm saying, and you can't deny it's true. Well, what do you say, gentlemen? Can I come in on that footing? And shall we all have a drink together, or shan't we?

Aristodemus/ At that they all cheered and told him to come in and make himself at home, while Agathon gave him a more formal invitation. And while his people helped him in he started pulling off the ribbons, so that he could transfer them to Agathon's head as soon as he was near enough. As it happened, the wreath slipped over his eyes and he didn't notice Socrates, although he sat down on the same couch, between him and Agathon—for Socrates had made room for him as soon as he came in. So down he sat, with a 'How d' you do!' to Agathon, and began to tie the ribbons round his head.

Then Agathon said to the servants;

Agathon/ Here, take off Alcibiades' shoes, so that we can all three make ourselves comfortable.

Alcibiades/ Yes, do. But just a minute, who's the third?

Aristodemus/ And when he turned round and saw who it was, he leaped out of his seat and cried;

Alcibiades/ Well I'll be damned! You again, Socrates! So that's what you're up to, is it? —The same old game of lying in wait and popping out at me when I least expect you. Well, what's in the wind tonight? And what do you mean by sitting *here,* and not by Aristophanes or one of these other humorists? Why make such a point of sitting next to the handsomest man in the room?

Socrates/ I say, Agathon, I'll have to ask you to protect me. You know, it's a dreadful thing to be in love with Alcibiades. It's been the same ever since I fell in love with him; I've only got to look at anyone who's in the least attractive, or say a single word to him, and he flies into a fit of jealous fury, and calls me the most dreadful names, and behaves as if it was all he could do to keep his hands off me. So I hope you'll keep an eye on him, in case he tries to do me an injury. If you can get him to be friends, so much the better, but if you can't, and if he gets violent, you'll really have to protect me—for I shudder to think what lengths he might go to in his amorous transports.

Alcibiades/ Friends with *you.* Not on your life! I'll be getting my own back on you one of these days, but at the moment Agathon, give me back some of those ribbons, will you? I want to crown Socrates' head as well—and a most extraordinary head it is. I don't want him to say I wreathed a garland for Agathon and none for him, when *his* words have been too much for all the world—and all his life too, Agathon, not just the other day, like yours.

Aristodemus/ So saying, he crowned Socrates' head with a bunch of ribbons, and took his seat again.

Alcibiades/ And now, gentlemen.

Aristodemus/ as he settled himself on the couch;

Alcibiades/ can I be right in thinking that you're sober? I say, you know, we can't have this! Come on, drink up! You promised to have a drink with me. Now, I'll tell you, there's no one fit to take the chair at this meeting—until you've all got reasonably drunk—but me. Come on, Agathon, tell them to bring out something that's worth drinking out of.

No, never mind;

Aristodemus/ he went on.

Alcibiades/ Here, you, just bring me that wine cooler, will you?

Aristodemus/ He saw it would hold a couple of quarts or so. He made them fill it up, and took the first drink himself, after which he told them to fill it again for Socrates, and remarked to the others;

Alcibiades/ But I shan't get any change out of *him.* It doesn't matter *how* much you make him drink, it never makes him drunk.

Aristodemus/ Meanwhile the servant had filled the wine cooler up for Socrates and he had his drink.

But here Eryximachus broke in;

Eryximachus/ Is this the way to do things, Alcibiades? Is there to be no grace before we drink? Are we to pour the wine down our throats like a lot of thirsty savages?

Alcibiades/ Why, there's Eryximachus, the noblest, soberest father's soberest, noblest son, what? Hallo, Eryximachus!

Eryximachus/ Hallo yourself. Well, what do you say?

Alcibiades/ What do you say? We have to take *your* orders, you know. What's the tag? —'A good physician's more than all the world.' So let's have your prescription.

Eryximachus/ Here it is. Before you came in we had arranged for each of us in turn, going round from left to right, to make the best speech he could in praise of Love. Well, we've all had our turn; so since you've had your drink without having made a speech I think it's only right that you should make it now. And then, when you've finished, you can tell Socrates to do whatever you like and he can do the same to the next man on his right, and so on all the way round.

Alcibiades/ That's a very good idea, Eryximachus. Only you know it's hardly fair to ask a man that's more than half cut already to compete with a lot of fellows who are practically sober. And another thing, my dear Eryximachus. You mustn't believe a word of what Socrates has just been telling you. Don't you see that it's just the other way round? It's him that can't keep his hands off *me* if he hears me say a good word for anyone—god or man—but him.

Socrates/ Oh, do be quiet.

Alcibiades/ You can't deny it. God knows I've never been able to praise anyone else in front of you.

Eryximachus/ Now there's a good idea. Why don't you give us a eulogy of Socrates?

Alcibiades/ Do you really mean that? Do you think I ought to, Eryximachus? Shall I go for him, and let you all hear me get my own back?

Socrates/ Here, I say. What are you up to now? Do you want to make me look a fool with this eulogy, or what?

Alcibiades/ I'm simply going to tell the truth—you won't mind that, will you?

Socrates/ Oh, of course, you may tell the truth; in fact I'll go so far as to say you must.

Alcibiades/ Then here goes. There's one thing, though. If I say a word that's not the solemn truth I want you to stop me right away and tell me I'm a liar—but I promise you it won't be my fault if I do. On the other hand, you mustn't be surprised if I tell them about you just as it comes into my head, and jump from one thing to another. You can't expect anyone that's as drunk as I am to give a clear and systematic account of all *your* eccentricities.

Well, gentlemen, I propose to begin my eulogy of Socrates with a simile. I expect he'll think I'm making fun of him, but, as it happens, I'm using this particular simile not because it's funny, but because it's true. What he reminds me of more than anything is one of those little sileni that you see on the statuaries' stalls; you know the ones I mean—they're modeled with pipes or flutes in their hands, and when you open them down the middle there are little figures of the gods inside. And then again, he reminds me of Marsyas the satyr.

Now I don't think even you, Socrates, will have the face to deny that you *look* like them, but the resemblance goes deeper than that, as I'm going to show. You're quite as impudent as a satyr, aren't you? If you plead not guilty I can call witnesses to prove it. And aren't you a piper as well? I should think you were—and a far more wonderful piper than Marsyas, who had only to put his flute to his lips to bewitch mankind. It can still be done, too, by anyone who can play the tunes he used to play. Why, there wasn't a note of Olympus'

melodies that he hadn't learned from Marsyas. And whoever plays them, from an absolute virtuoso to a two penny-halfpenny flute girl, the tunes will still have a magic power,

and by virtue of their own divinity they will show which of us are fit subjects for divine initiation.

Now the only difference, Socrates, between you and Marsyas is that you can get just the same effect without any instrument at all—with nothing but a few simple words, not even poetry. Besides, when we listen to anyone else talking, however eloquent he is, we don't really care a damn what he says. But when we listen to you, or to someone else repeating what you've said, even if he puts it ever so badly, and never mind whether the person who's listening is man, woman, or child, we're absolutely staggered and bewitched. And speaking for myself, gentlemen, if I wasn't afraid you'd tell me I was completely bottled, I'd swear on oath what an extraordinary effect his words have had on me—and still do, if it comes to that. For the moment I hear him speak I am smitten with a kind of sacred rage, worse than any Corybant, and my heart jumps into my mouth and the tears start into my eyes—oh, and not only me, but lots of other men.

Yes, I've heard Pericles and all the other great orators, and very eloquent I thought they were, but they never affected me like that; they never turned my whole soul upside down and left me feeling as if I were the lowest of the low. But this latter-day Marsyas, here, has often left me in such a state of mind that I've felt I simply couldn't go on living the way I did—now, Socrates, you can't say that isn't true—and I'm convinced that if I were to listen to him at this very moment I'd feel just the same again. I simply couldn't help it. He makes me admit that while I'm spending my time on politics I am neglecting all the things that are crying for attention in myself. So I just refuse to listen to him—as if he were one of those Sirens, you know—and get out of earshot as quick as I can, for fear he keep me sitting listening till I'm positively senile.

And there's one thing I've never felt with anybody else—not the kind of thing you'd expect to find in me, either—and that is a sense of shame. Socrates is the only man in the world that can make me feel ashamed. Because there's no getting away from it, I know I ought to do the things he tells me to, and yet the moment I'm out of his sight I don't care what I do to keep in with the mob. So I dash off like a runaway slave, and keep out of his way as long as I can, and then next time I meet him I remember all that I had to admit the time before, and naturally I feel ashamed. There are times when I'd honestly be glad to hear that he was dead, and yet I know that if he did die I'd be more upset than ever—so I ask you, what is a man to do?

Well, that's what this satyr does for me, and plenty like me, with his piping. And now let me show you how apt my comparison was in other ways, and what extraordinary powers he has got. Take my word for it, there's not one of you that really knows him. But now I've started on him, I'll show him up. Notice, for instance, how Socrates is attracted by good-looking people, and how he hangs around them, positively gaping with admiration. Then again, he loves to appear utterly uninformed and ignorant—isn't that like Silenus? Of course it is. Don't you see that it's just his outer casing, like those little figures I was telling you about? But believe me, friends and fellow drunks, you've only got to open him up and you'll find him so full of temperance and sobriety that you'll hardly believe your eyes. Because, you know, he doesn't really care a row of pins about good looks—on the-contrary, you can't think how much he looks down on them—or money, or any of the honors that most people care about. He doesn't care a curse for anything of that kind, or for any of us either—yes, I'm telling you—and he spends his whole life playing his little game of irony, and laughing up his sleeve at all the world.

I don't know whether anybody else has ever opened him up when he's been being serious, and seen the little images inside, but I saw them once, and they looked so godlike, so golden, so beautiful, and so utterly amazing that there was nothing for it but to do exactly what he told me. *I* used to flatter myself that he was smitten with my youthful charms, and I thought this was an extraordinary piece of luck because I'd only got to be a bit accommodating and I'd hear everything he had to say—I tell you, I'd a pretty high opinion of my own attractions. Well, I thought it over, and then, instead of taking a servant with me as I always used to, I got rid of the man, and went to meet Socrates by myself. Remember, I'm bound to tell you the whole truth and nothing but the truth; so you'd all better listen very carefully, and Socrates must pull me up if I begin telling lies.

Well, gentlemen, as I was saying, I used to go and meet him, and then, when we were by ourselves, I quite expected to hear some of those sweet nothings that lovers whisper to their darlings when they get them alone—and I liked the idea of that. But not a bit of it! He'd go on talking just the same as usual till it was time for him to go, and then he said good-by and went.

So then I suggested we should go along to the gymnasium and take a bit of exercise together, thinking that something was bound to happen there. And, would you believe it, we did our exercises together and wrestled with each other time and again, with not a soul in sight, and still I got no further. Well, I realized that there was nothing to be gained in *that* direction, but having put my hand to the plow I wasn't going to look back till I was absolutely certain how I stood; so I decided to make a frontal attack. I asked him to dinner, just as if I were the lover trying to seduce his beloved, instead of the other way round. It wasn't easy, either, to get him to accept, but in the end I managed to.

Well, the first time he came he thought he ought to go as soon as we'd finished dinner, and I was too shy to stop him. But next time, I contrived to keep him talking after dinner, and went on far into the night, and then, when he said he must be going, I told him it was much too late and pressed him to stay the night with me. So he turned in on the couch beside me—where he'd sat at dinner—and the two of us had the room to ourselves.

So far I've said nothing I need blush to repeat in any company, but you'd never have heard what I'm going to tell you now if there wasn't something in the proverb, 'Drunkards and children tell the truth'—drunkards anyway. Besides, having once embarked on my eulogy of Socrates it wouldn't be fair not to tell you about the arrogant way he treated me. People say, you know, that when a man's been bitten by a snake he won't tell anybody what it feels like except a fellow sufferer, because no one else would sympathize with him if the pain drove him into making a fool of himself. Well, that's just how I feel, only I've been bitten by something much more poisonous than a snake; in fact, mine is the most painful kind of bite there is. I've been bitten in the heart, or the mind, or whatever you like to call it, by Socrates' philosophy, which clings like an adder to any young and gifted mind it can get hold of, and does exactly what it likes with it. And looking round me, gentlemen, I see Phaedrus, and Agathon, and Eryximachus, and Pausanias, and Aristodemus, and Aristophanes, and all the rest of them—to say nothing of Socrates himself—and every one of you has had his taste of this philosophical frenzy, this sacred rage; so I don't mind telling *you* about it because I know you'll make allowances for me—both for the way I behaved with Socrates and for what I'm saying now. But the servants must put their fingers in their ears, and so must anybody else who's liable to be at all profane or beastly.

Well then, gentlemen, when the lights were out and the servants had all gone, I made up my mind to stop beating about the bush and tell him what I thought point-blank.

So I nudged him and said, Are you asleep, Socrates?

Socrates/ No, I'm not.

Alcibiades/ Then do you know what I think?

Socrates/ Well, what?

Alcibiades/ I think, you're the only lover I've ever had who's been really worthy of me. Only you're too shy to talk about it. Well, this is how I look at it. I think it'd be just as absurd to refuse you *this* as anything else you wanted that belonged to me or any of my friends. If there's one thing I'm keen on it's to make the best of myself, and I think you're more likely to help me there than anybody else, and I'm sure I'd find it harder to justify myself to men of sense for refusing to accommodate a friend of that sort than to defend myself to the vulgar if I *had* been kind to him.

He heard me out, and then said with that ironical simplicity of his;

Socrates/ My dear Alcibiades, I've no doubt there's a lot in what you say, if you're right in thinking that I have some kind of power that would make a better man of you, because in that case you must find me so extraordinarily beautiful that your own attractions must be quite eclipsed. And if you're trying to barter your own beauty for the beauty you have found in me, you're driving a very hard bargain, let me tell you. You're trying to exchange the semblance of beauty for the thing itself—like Diomede and Glaucus swapping bronze for gold. But you know, my dear fellow, you really must be careful. Suppose you're making a mistake, and I'm not worth anything at all. The mind's eye begins to see clearly when the outer eyes grow dim—and I fancy yours are still pretty keen.

Alcibiades/ To which I replied, Well, I've told you exactly how I feel about it, and now it's for you to settle what's best for us both.

Socrates/ That sounds reasonable enough. We must think it over one of these days, and do whatever seems best for the two of us—about this and everything else.

Alcibiades/ Well, by this time I felt that I had shot my bolt, and I'd a pretty shrewd idea that I'd registered a hit. So I got up, and, without giving him a chance to say a word, I wrapped my own cloak round him—for this was in the winter—and, creeping under his shabby old mantle, I took him in my arms and lay there all night with this godlike and extraordinary man—you can't deny that, either, Socrates. And after *that* he had the insolence, the infernal arrogance, to laugh at my youthful beauty and jeer at the one thing I was really proud of, gentlemen of the jury—I say 'jury' because that's what you're here for, to try the man Socrates on the charge of arrogance—and believe it, gentlemen, or believe it not, when I got up next morning I had no more *slept* with Socrates, within the meaning of the act, than if he'd been my father or an elder brother.

You can guess what I felt like after *that.* I was torn between my natural humiliation and my admiration for his manliness and self-control, for this was strength of mind such as I had never hoped to meet. And so I couldn't take offense and cut myself off from his society, but neither was there any way I could think of to attract him. I knew very well that I'd no more chance of getting at him with money than I had of getting at Ajax with a spear, and the one thing I'd made sure would catch him had already failed. So I was at my wits' end, and went about in a state of such utter subjection to the man as was never seen before.

It was after all this, you must understand, that we were both sent on active service to Potidaea, where we messed together. Well, to begin with, he stood the hardships of the campaign far better than I did, or anyone else, for that matter. And if—and it's always liable to happen when there's fighting going on—we were cut off from our supplies, there was no one who put such a good face on it as he. But on the other hand, when there was plenty to eat he was the one man who really seemed to enjoy it, and though he didn't drink for choice, if we ever pressed him to he'd beat the lot of us. And, what's the most extraordinary thing of all, there's not a man living that's ever seen Socrates drunk. And I dare say he'll have a chance to show what he's made of before *this* party's over.

Then again, the way he got through that winter was most impressive, and the winters over there are pretty shocking. There was one time when the frost was harder than ever, and all the rest of us stayed inside, or if we did go out we wrapped ourselves up to the eyes and tied bits of felt and sheepskins over our shoes, but Socrates went out in the same old coat he'd always worn, and made less fuss about walking on the ice in his bare feet than we did in our shoes. So much so, that the men began to look at him with some suspicion and actually took his toughness as a personal insult to themselves.

Well, so much for that. And now I must tell you about another thing 'our valiant hero dared and did' in the course of the same campaign. He started wrestling with some problem or other about sunrise one morning, and stood there lost in thought, and when the answer wouldn't come he still stood there thinking and refused to give it up. Time went on, and by about midday the troops noticed what was happening, and naturally they were rather surprised and began telling each other how Socrates had been standing

there thinking ever since daybreak. And at last, toward nightfall, some of the Ionians brought out their bedding after supper—this was in the summer, of course—a partly because it was cooler in the open air, and partly to see whether he was going to stay there all night. Well, there he stood till morning, and then at sunrise he said his prayers to the sun and went away.

And now I expect you'd like to hear what kind of a show he made when we went into action, and I certainly think you ought to know. They gave me a decoration after one engagement, and do you know, Socrates had saved my life, absolutely singlehanded. I'd been wounded and he refused to leave me, and he got me out of it, too, armor and all. And as you know, Socrates, I went straight to the general staff and told them you ought to have the decoration, and you can neither deny that nor blame me for doing it. But the authorities thought they'd rather give it to me, because of my family connections and so forth, and you were even keener than they were that I should have it instead of you.

And then, gentlemen, you should have seen him when we were in retreat from Delium. I happened to be in the cavalry, while he was serving with the line. Our people were falling back in great disorder and he was retreating with Laches when I happened to catch sight of them. I shouted to them not to be downhearted and promised to stand by them. And this time I'd a better chance of watching Socrates than I'd had at Potidaea—you see, being mounted, I wasn't quite so frightened. And I noticed for one thing how much cooler he was than Laches, and for another how—to borrow from a line of yours, Aristophanes—he was walking with the same 'lofty strut and sideways glance' that he goes about with here in Athens. His 'sideways glance' was just as unconcerned whether he was looking at his own friends or at the enemy, and you could see from half a mile away that if you tackled

him you'd get as good as you gave—with the result that he and Laches both got clean away. For you're generally pretty safe if that's the way you look when you're in action; it's the man whose one idea it is to get away that the other fellow goes for.

Well, there's a lot more to be said about Socrates, all very peculiar and all very much to his credit. No doubt there's just as much to be said about any of his little ways, but personally I think the most amazing thing about him is the fact that he is absolutely unique; there's no one like him, and I don't believe there ever was. You could point to some likeness to Achilles in Brasidas and the rest of them; you might compare Nestor and Antenor, and so on, with Pericles. There are plenty of such parallels in history, but you'll never find anyone like Socrates, or any ideas like his ideas, in our own times or in the past—unless, of course, you take a leaf out of my book and compare him, not with human beings, but with sileni and satyrs—and the same with his ideas.

Which reminds me of a point I missed at the beginning; I should have explained how his arguments, too, were exactly like those sileni that open down the middle. Anyone listening to Socrates for the first time would find his arguments simply laughable; he wraps them up in just the kind of expressions you'd expect of such an insufferable satyr. He talks about pack asses and blacksmiths and shoemakers and tanners, and he always seems to be saying the same old thing in just the same old way, so that anyone who wasn't used to his style and wasn't very quick on the uptake would naturally take it for the most utter nonsense. But if you open up his arguments, and really get into the skin of them, you'll find that they're the only arguments in the world that have any sense at all, and that nobody else's are so godlike, so rich in images of virtue, or so peculiarly, so entirely pertinent

to those inquiries that help the seeker on his way to the goal of true nobility.

And there, gentlemen, you have my eulogy of Socrates, with a few complaints thrown in about the unspeakable way he's treated me. I'm not the only one either; there's Charmides and Euthydemus and ever so many more. He's made fools of them all, just as if he were the beloved, not the lover. Now, Agathon, I'm telling you this for your own good, so that you'll know what to look out for, and I hope you'll learn from our misfortunes, and not wait for your own to bring it home to you, like the poor fool in the adage.

Aristodemus/ As Alcibiades took his seat there was a good deal of laughter at his frankness—especially as he seemed to be still in love with Socrates. But the latter said;

Socrates/ I don't believe you're as drunk as you make out, Alcibiades, or you'd never have given the argument such a subtle twist and obscured the real issue. What you were really after—though you only slipped it in casually toward the end—was to make trouble between me and Agathon, so that I as your lover, and he as your beloved, should both belong to you and nobody else. But you can't humbug me; I can see what you're getting at with all this satyr and silenus business. I only hope, Agathon, my dear, that he won't succeed, and I hope you'll be very careful not to let anybody come between us.

Agathon/ I'm inclined to think you're right, Socrates. Remember how he sat down in the middle so as to keep us apart. But I'll come round and sit next to you, so that won't help him very much.

Socrates/ Yes, do. Come round the other side.

Alcibiades/ Oh, God! Look what I have to put up with! He's determined to drive me off the field. All the same, Socrates, I think you might let Agathon sit in the middle.

Socrates/ Oh, no, that would never do. Now you've finished singing my praises, I've got to do the same by the next man on my right. So you see, if he sat next to you, he'd have to start eulogizing me before he'd had my eulogy of him. So be a good chap and let the boy alone; you mustn't grudge him the praise I'm going to give him, because I'm dying to start my eulogy.

Agathon/ Aha! You don't catch me staying *here* much longer, Alcibiades. I shall certainly change places if it means a tribute from Socrates.

Alcibiades/ Oh, it's always the same. No one else gets a look in with the beauties when Socrates is there. Look how easily he trumped up an excuse for Agathon to sit beside him.

Apollodorus/ And then, all of a sudden, just as Agathon was getting up to go and sit by Socrates, a whole crowd of revelers came to the door, and finding it open, as someone was just going out, they marched straight in and joined the party. No sooner had they sat down than the whole place was in an uproar; decency and order went by the board, and everybody had to drink the most enormous quantities of wine. By this time Eryximachus and Phaedrus and some of the others were beginning to leave, so Aristodemus told me, while he himself fell off to sleep.

He slept on for some time, for this was in the winter and the nights were long, and when at last he woke it was near daybreak and the cocks were crowing. He noticed that all the others had either gone home or fallen asleep, except Agathon and Aristophanes and Socrates, who were still awake and drinking out of an enormous bowl which they kept passing round from left to right. Socrates was arguing with the others—not that Aristodemus could remember very much of what he said, for, besides having missed the beginning, he

was still more than half asleep. But the gist of it was that Socrates was forcing them to admit that the same man might be capable of writing both comedy and tragedy—that the tragic poet might be a comedian as well.

Apollodorus/ But as he clinched the argument, which the other two were scarcely in a state to follow, they began to nod, and first Aristophanes fell off to sleep and then Agathon, as day was breaking. Whereupon Socrates tucked them up comfortably and went away, followed, of course, by Aristodemus. And, after calling at the Lyceum for a bath, he spent the rest of the day as usual, and then, toward evening, made his way home to rest.

Symposium

Translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Apollodorus, Friend, Glaucon, Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Alcibiades, Servant, Aristodemus, Diotima.

Apollodorus/ In fact, your question does not find me unprepared. Just the other day, as it happens, I was walking to the city from my home in Phaleron when a man I know, who was making his way behind me, saw me and called from a distance:

Glaucon/ "The gentleman from Phaleron!"

Apollodorus/ he yelled, trying to be funny.

Glaucon/ "Hey, Apollodorus, wait!"

Apollodorus/ So I stopped and waited.

Glaucon/ "Apollodorus, I've been looking for you! You know there once was a gathering at Agathon's when Socrates, Alcibiades, and their friends had dinner together; I wanted to ask you about the speeches they made on Love. What were they? I heard a version from a man who had it from Phoenix, Philip's son, but it was badly garbled, and he said you were the one to ask. So please, will you tell me all about it? After all, Socrates is your friend—who has a better right than you to report his conversation? But before you begin, tell me this: were you there yourself?"

Apollodorus/ "Your friend must have really garbled his story, if you think this affair was so recent that I could have been there."

Glaucon/ "I did think that,"

Apollodorus/ “Glaucon, how could you? You know very well Agathon hasn’t lived in Athens for many years, while it’s been less than three that I’ve been Socrates’ companion and made it my job to know exactly what he says and does each day. Before that, I simply drifted aimlessly. Of course, I used to think that what I was doing was important, but in fact I was the most worthless man on earth—as bad as you are this very moment: I used to think philosophy was the last thing a man should do.”

Glaucon/ “Stop joking, Apollodorus. Just tell me when the party took place.”

Apollodorus/ “When we were still children, when Agathon won the prize with his first tragedy. It was the day after he and his troupe held their victory celebration.”

Glaucon/ “So it really was a long time ago. Then who told you about it? Was it Socrates himself?”

Apollodorus/ “Oh, for god’s sake, of course not! It was the very same man who told Phoenix, a fellow called Aristodemus, from Cydatheneum, a real runt of a man, who always went barefoot. He went to the party because, I think, he was obsessed with Socrates—one of the worst cases at that time. Naturally, I checked part of his story with Socrates, and Socrates agreed with his account.”

Glaucon/ “Please tell me, then. You speak and I’ll listen, as we walk to the city. This is the perfect opportunity.”

Apollodorus/ So this is what we talked about on our way; and that’s why, as I said before, I’m not unprepared. Well, if I’m to tell you about it too—I’ll be glad to. After all, my greatest pleasure comes from philosophical conversation, even if I’m only a listener, whether or not I think it will be to my advantage. All other talk, especially the talk of rich businessmen like you, bores me to tears, and I’m sorry for you and your friends because you think your affairs are important

when really they're totally trivial. Perhaps, in your turn, you think I'm a failure, and, believe me, I think that what you think is true. But as for all of you, I don't just think you are failures—I know it for a fact.

Friend/ You'll never change, Apollodorus! Always nagging, even at yourself! I do believe you think everybody—yourself first of all—is totally worthless, except, of course, Socrates. I don't know exactly how you came to be called "the maniac," but you certainly talk like one, always furious with everyone, including yourself—but not with Socrates!

Apollodorus/ Of course, my dear friend, it's perfectly obvious why I have these views about us all: it's simply because I'm a maniac, and I'm raving!

Friend/ It's not worth arguing about this now, Apollodorus. Please do as I asked: tell me the speeches.

Apollodorus/ All right... Well, the speeches went something like this—but I'd better tell you the whole story from the very beginning, as Aristodemus told it to me.

Apollodorus/ He said, then, that one day he ran into Socrates, who had just bathed and put on his fancy sandals—both very unusual events. So he asked him where he was going, and why he was looking so good.

Socrates/ "I'm going to Agathon's for dinner. I managed to avoid yesterday's victory party—I really don't like crowds—but I promised to be there today. So, naturally, I took great pains with my appearance: I'm going to the house of a good-looking man; I had to look my best. But let me ask you this, I know you haven't been invited to the dinner; how would you like to come anyway?"

Apollodorus/ And Aristodemus answered;

Aristodemus/ "I'll do whatever you say."

Socrates/ "Come with me, then, and we shall prove the proverb wrong; the truth is, 'Good men go uninvited to

Goodman's feast.' Even Homer himself, when you think about it, did not much like this proverb; he not only disregarded it, he violated it. Agamemnon, of course, is one of his great warriors, while he describes Menelaus as a 'limp spearman.' And yet, when Agamemnon offers a sacrifice and gives a feast, Homer has the weak Menelaus arrive uninvited at his superior's table."

Apollodorus/ Aristodemus replied to this;

Aristodemus/ "Socrates, I am afraid Homer's description is bound to fit me better than yours. Mine is a case of an obvious inferior arriving uninvited at the table of a man of letters. I think you'd better figure out a good excuse for bringing me along, because, you know, I won't admit I've come without an invitation. I'll say I'm your guest."

Socrates/ "Let's go. We'll think about what to say 'as we proceed the two of us along the way."

Apollodorus/ With these words, they set out. But as they were walking, Socrates began to think about something, lost himself in thought, and kept lagging behind. Whenever Aristodemus stopped to wait for him, Socrates would urge him to go on ahead. When he arrived at Agathon's he found the gate wide open, and that, Aristodemus said, caused him to find himself in a very embarrassing situation: a household slave saw him the moment he arrived and took him immediately to the dining room, where the guests were already lying down on their couches, and dinner was about to be served.

As soon as Agathon saw him, he called:

Agathon/ "Welcome, Aristodemus! What perfect timing! You're just in time for dinner! I hope you're not here for any other reason—if you are, forget it. I looked all over for you yesterday, so I could invite you, but I couldn't find you

anywhere. But where is Socrates? How come you didn't bring him along?"

Aristodemus/ So I turned around and Socrates was nowhere to be seen. And I said that it was actually Socrates who had brought me along as his guest.

Agathon/ "I'm delighted he did. But where is he?"

Aristodemus/ "He was directly behind me, but I have no idea where he is now."

Agathon/ "Go look for Socrates,"

Apollodorus/ Agathon ordered a slave;

Agathon/ "and bring him in.

Aristodemus, you can share Eryximachus' couch."

Apollodorus/ A slave brought water, and Aristodemus washed himself before he lay down. Then another slave entered and said:

Servant/ "Socrates is here, but he's gone off to the neighbor's porch. He's standing there and won't come in even though I called him several times."

Agathon/ "How strange, Go back and bring him in. Don't leave him there."

Apollodorus/ But Aristodemus stopped him.

Aristodemus/ "No, no. Leave him alone. It's one of his habits: every now and then he just goes off like that and stands motionless, wherever he happens to be. I'm sure he'll come in very soon, so don't disturb him; let him be."

Agathon/ "Well, all right, if you really think so,"

Apollodorus/ Agathon turned to the slaves:

Agathon/ "Go ahead and serve the rest of us. What you serve is completely up to you; pretend nobody's supervising you—as if I ever did! Imagine that we are all your own guests, myself included. Give us good reason to praise your service."

Apollodorus/ So they went ahead and started eating, but there was still no sign of Socrates. Agathon wanted to send for him many times, but Aristodemus wouldn't let him. And, in fact, Socrates came in shortly afterward, as he always did—they were hardly halfway through their meal. Agathon, who, as it happened, was all alone on the farthest couch, immediately called:

Agathon/ "Socrates, come lie down next to me. Who knows, if I touch you, I may catch a bit of the wisdom that came to you under my neighbor's porch. It's clear you've seen the light. If you hadn't, you'd still be standing there."

Apollodorus/ Socrates sat down next to him and said;

Socrates/ "How wonderful it would be, dear Agathon, if the foolish were filled with wisdom simply by touching the wise. If only wisdom were like water, which always flows from a full cup into an empty one when we connect them with a piece of yarn—well, then I would consider it the greatest prize to have the chance to lie down next to you. I would soon be overflowing with your wonderful wisdom. My own wisdom is of no account—a shadow in a dream—while yours is bright and radiant and has a splendid future. Why, young as you are, you're so brilliant I could call more than thirty thousand Greeks as witnesses."

Agathon/ "Now you've gone too far, Socrates. Well, eat your dinner. Dionysus will soon enough be the judge of our claims to wisdom!"

Apollodorus/ Socrates took his seat after that and had his meal, according to Aristodemus. When dinner was over, they poured a libation to the god, sang a hymn, and—in short—followed the whole ritual. Then they turned their attention to drinking. At that point Pausanias addressed the group:

Pausanias/ "Well, gentlemen, how can we arrange to drink less tonight? To be honest, I still have a terrible hangover from

yesterday, and I could really use a break. I daresay most of you could, too, since you were also part of the celebration. So let's try not to overdo it."

Apollodorus/ Aristophanes replied:

Aristophanes/ "Good idea, Pausanias. We've got to make a plan for going easy on the drink tonight. I was over my head last night myself, like the others."

Apollodorus/ After that, up spoke Eryximachus, son of Acumenus:

Eryximachus/ "Well said, both of you. But I still have one question: How do you feel, Agathon? Are you strong enough for serious drinking?"

Agathon/ "Absolutely not. I've no strength left for anything."

Eryximachus/ "What a lucky stroke for us, for me, for Aristodemus, for Phaedrus, and the rest—that you large-capacity drinkers are already exhausted. Imagine how weak drinkers like ourselves feel after last night! Of course I don't include Socrates in my claims: he can drink or not, and will be satisfied whatever we do. But since none of us seems particularly eager to overindulge, perhaps it would not be amiss for me to provide you with some accurate information as to the nature of intoxication. If I have learned anything from medicine, it is the following point: inebriation is harmful to everyone. Personally, therefore, I always refrain from heavy drinking; and I advise others against it—especially people who are suffering the effects of a previous night's excesses."

Phaedrus/ "Well,"

Apollodorus/ Phaedrus interrupted him;

Phaedrus/ "I always follow your advice, especially when you speak as a doctor. In this case, if the others know what's good for them, they too will do just as you say."

Apollodorus/ At that point they all agreed not to get drunk that evening; they decided to drink only as much as pleased them.

Eryximachus/ "It's settled, then. We are resolved to force no one to drink more than he wants. I would like now to make a further motion: let us dispense with the flute-girl who just made her entrance; let her play for herself or, if she prefers, for the women in the house. Let us instead spend our evening in conversation. If you are so minded, I would like to propose a subject."

Apollodorus/ They all said they were quite willing, and urged him to make his proposal.

Eryximachus/ "Let me begin by citing Euripides' Melanippe: 'Not mine the tale.' What I am about to tell belongs to Phaedrus here, who is deeply indignant on this issue, and often complains to me about it:

"'Eryximachus,' he says, 'isn't it an awful thing! Our poets have composed hymns in honor of just about any god you can think of; but has a single one of them given one moment's thought to the god of love, ancient and powerful as he is? As for our fancy intellectuals, they have written volumes praising Heracles and other heroes (as did the distinguished Prodicus). Well, perhaps that's not surprising, but I've actually read a book by an accomplished author who saw fit to extol the usefulness of salt! How could people pay attention to such trifles and never, not even once, write a proper hymn to Love? How could anyone ignore so great a god?'

"Now, Phaedrus, in my judgment, is quite right. I would like, therefore, to take up a contribution, as it were, on his behalf, and gratify his wish. Besides, I think this a splendid time for all of us here to honor the god. If you agree, we can spend the whole evening in discussion, because I propose that each of us give as good a speech in praise of Love as he is

capable of giving, in proper order from left to right. And let us begin with Phaedrus, who is at the head of the table and is, in addition, the father of our subject."

Socrates/ "No one will vote against that, Eryximachus. How could I vote 'No,' when the only thing I say I understand is the art of love?

Could Agathon and Pausanias? Could Aristophanes, who thinks of nothing but Dionysus and Aphrodite? No one I can see here now could vote against your proposal.

"And though it's not quite fair to those of us who have to speak last, if the first speeches turn out to be good enough and to exhaust our subject, I promise we won't complain. So let Phaedrus begin, with the blessing of Fortune; let's hear his praise of Love."

Apollodorus/ They all agreed with Socrates, and pressed Phaedrus to start. Of course, Aristodemus couldn't remember exactly what everyone said, and I myself don't remember everything he told me. But I'll tell you what he remembered best, and what I consider the most important points.

As I say, he said Phaedrus spoke first, beginning more or less like this:

Phaedrus/ Love is a great god, wonderful in many ways to gods and men, and most marvelous of all is the way he came into being. We honor him as one of the most ancient gods, and the proof of his great age is this: the parents of Love have no place in poetry or legend. According to Hesiod, the first to be born was Chaos;

> ... but then came Earth, broad-chested, a seat for all, forever safe,
> And Love?

And Acusilaus agrees with Hesiod: after Chaos came Earth and Love, these two. And Parmenides tells of this beginning:

> The very first god [she] designed was Love.

All sides agree, then, that Love is one of the most ancient gods. As such, he gives to us the greatest goods. I cannot say what greater good there is for a young boy than a gentle lover, or for a lover than a boy to love. There is a certain guidance each person needs for his whole life, if he is to live well; and nothing imparts this guidance—not high kinship, not public honor, not wealth—nothing imparts this guidance as well as Love. What guidance do I mean? I mean a sense of shame at acting shamefully, and a sense of pride in acting well. Without these, nothing fine or great can be accomplished, in public or in private.

What I say is this: if a man in love is found doing something shameful, or accepting shameful treatment because he is a coward and makes no defense, then nothing would give him more pain than being seen by the boy he loves—not even being seen by his father or his comrades. We see the same thing also in the boy he loves, that he is especially ashamed before his lover when he is caught in something shameful. If only there were a way to start a city or an army made up of lovers and the boys they love! Theirs would be the best possible system of society, for they would hold back from all that is shameful, and seek honor in each other's eyes. Even a few of them, in battle side by side, would conquer all the world, I'd say. For a man in love would never allow his loved one, of all people, to see him leaving ranks or dropping weapons. He'd rather die a thousand deaths! And as for leaving the boy behind, or not coming to his aid in danger—why, no one is so base that true Love could not inspire him with courage, and make him as brave as if he'd been born a hero. When Homer says a god 'breathes might' into some of the heroes, this is really Love's gift to every lover.

Besides, no one will die for you but a lover, and a lover will do this even if she's a woman. Alcestis is proof to everyone in Greece that what I say is true. Only she was willing to die in

place of her husband, although his father and mother were still alive. Because of her love, she went so far beyond his parents in family feeling that she made them look like outsiders, as if they belonged to their son in name only. And when she did this her deed struck everyone, even the gods, as nobly done. The gods were so delighted, in fact, that they gave her the prize they reserve for a handful chosen from the throngs of noble heroes—they sent her soul back from the dead. As you can see, the eager courage of love wins highest honors from the gods.

Orpheus, however, they sent unsatisfied from Hades, after showing him only an image of the woman he came for. They did not give him the woman herself, because they thought he was soft (he was, after all, a cithara-player) and did not dare to die like Alcestis for Love's sake, but contrived to enter living into Hades. So they punished him for that, and made him die at the hands of women.

The honor they gave to Achilles is another matter. They sent him to the Isles of the Blest because he dared to stand by his lover Patroclus and avenge him, even after he had learned from his mother that he would die if he killed Hector, but that if he chose otherwise he'd go home and end his life as an old man. Instead he chose to die for Patroclus, and more than that, he did it for a man whose life was already over. The gods were highly delighted at this, of course, and gave him special honor, because he made so much of his lover. Aeschylus talks nonsense when he claims

Achilles was the lover; he was more beautiful than Patroclus, more beautiful than all the heroes, and still beardless. Besides he was much younger, as Homer says.

In truth, the gods honor virtue most highly when it belongs to Love. They are more impressed and delighted, however, and are more generous with a loved one who cherishes his lover,

than with a lover who cherishes the boy he loves. A lover is more godlike than his boy, you see, since he is inspired by a god. That's why they gave a higher honor to Achilles than to Alcestis, and sent him to the Isles of the Blest.

Therefore I say Love is the most ancient of the gods, the most honored, and the most powerful in helping men gain virtue and blessedness, whether they are alive or have passed away.

Apollodorus/ That was more or less what Phaedrus said according to Aristodemus. There followed several other speeches which he couldn't remember very well. So he skipped them and went directly to the speech of Pausanias.

Pausanias/ Phaedrus I'm not quite sure our subject has been well defined. Our charge has been simple—to speak in praise of Love. This would have been fine if Love himself were simple, too, but as a matter of fact, there are two kinds of Love. In view of this, it might be better to begin by making clear which kind of Love we are to praise. Let me therefore try to put our discussion back on the right track and explain which kind of Love ought to be praised. Then I shall give him the praise he deserves, as the god he is.

It is a well-known fact that Love and Aphrodite are inseparable. If, therefore, Aphrodite were a single goddess, there could also be a single Love; but, since there are actually two goddesses of that name, there also are two kinds of Love. I don't expect you'll disagree with me about the two goddesses, will you? One is an older deity, the motherless daughter of Uranus, the god of heaven: she is known as Urania, or Heavenly Aphrodite. The other goddess is younger, the daughter of Zeus and Dione: her name is Pandemos, or Common Aphrodite. It follows, therefore, that there is a Common as well as a Heavenly Love, depending on which goddess is Love's partner. And although, of course, all the

gods must be praised, we must still make an effort to keep these two gods apart.

The reason for this applies in the same way to every type of action: considered in itself, no action is either good or bad, honorable or shameful. Take, for example, our own case. We had a choice between drinking, singing, or having a conversation. Now, in itself none of these is better than any other: how it comes out depends entirely on how it is performed. If it is done honorably and properly, it turns out to be honorable; if it is done improperly, it is disgraceful. And my point is that exactly this principle applies to being in love: Love is not in himself noble and worthy of praise; that depends on whether the sentiments he produces in us are themselves noble.

Now the Common Aphrodite's Love is himself truly common. As such, he strikes wherever he gets a chance. This, of course, is the love felt by the vulgar, who are attached to women no less than to boys, to the body more than to the soul, and to the least intelligent partners, since all they care about is completing the sexual act. Whether they do it honorably or not is of no concern. That is why they do whatever comes their way, sometimes good, sometimes bad; and which one it is, is incidental to their purpose. For the Love who moves them belongs to a much younger goddess, who, through her parentage, partakes of the nature both of the female and the male.

Contrast this with the Love of Heavenly Aphrodite. This goddess, whose descent is purely male (hence this love is for boys), is considerably older and therefore free from the lewdness of youth. That's why those who are inspired by her Love are attracted to the male: they find pleasure in what is by nature stronger and more intelligent. But, even within the group that is attracted to handsome boys, some are not moved purely by this Heavenly Love; those who are do not fall in love

with little boys; they prefer older ones whose cheeks are showing the first traces of a beard—a sign that they have begun to form minds of their own. I am convinced that a man who falls in love with a young man of this age is generally prepared to share everything with the one he loves—he is eager, in fact, to spend the rest of his own life with him. He certainly does not aim to deceive him—to take advantage of him while he is still young and inexperienced and then, after exposing him to ridicule, to move quickly on to someone else.

As a matter of fact, there should be a law forbidding affairs with young boys. If nothing else, all this time and effort would not be wasted on such an uncertain pursuit—and what is more uncertain than whether a particular boy will eventually make something of himself, physically or mentally? Good men, of course, are willing to make a law like this for themselves, but those other lovers, the vulgar ones, need external restraint. For just this reason we have placed every possible legal obstacle to their seducing our own wives and daughters. These vulgar lovers are the people who have given love such a bad reputation that some have gone so far as to claim that taking any man as a lover is in itself disgraceful. Would anyone make this claim if he weren't thinking of how hasty vulgar lovers are, and therefore how unfair to their loved ones? For nothing done properly and in accordance with our customs would ever have provoked such righteous disapproval.

I should point out, however, that, although the customs regarding Love in most cities are simple and easy to understand, here in Athens (and in Sparta as well) they are remarkably complex. In places where the people are inarticulate, like Elis or Boeotia, tradition straightforwardly approves taking a lover in every case. No one there, young or old, would ever consider it shameful. The reason, I suspect, is that, being poor speakers, they want to save themselves the

trouble of having to offer reasons and arguments in support of their suits.

By contrast, in places like Ionia and almost every other part of the Persian empire, taking a lover is always considered disgraceful. The Persian empire is absolute; that is why it condemns love as well as philosophy and sport. It is no good for rulers if the people they rule cherish ambitions for themselves or form strong bonds of friendship with one another. That these are precisely the effects of philosophy, sport, and especially of Love is a lesson the tyrants of Athens learned directly from their own experience: Didn't their reign come to a dismal end because of the bonds uniting Harmodius and Aristogiton in love and affection?

So you can see that plain condemnation of Love reveals lust for power in the rulers and cowardice in the ruled, while indiscriminate approval testifies to general dullness and stupidity.

Our own customs, which, as I have already said, are much more difficult to understand, are also far superior. Recall, for example, that we consider it more honorable to declare your love rather than to keep it a secret, especially if you are in love with a youth of good family and accomplishment, even if he isn't all that beautiful. Recall also that a lover is encouraged in every possible way; this means that what he does is not considered shameful. On the contrary, conquest is deemed noble, and failure shameful. And as for attempts at conquest, our custom is to praise lovers for totally extraordinary acts—so extraordinary, in fact, that if they performed them for any other purpose whatever, they would reap the most profound contempt. Suppose, for example, that in order to secure money, or a public post, or any other practical benefit from another person, a man were willing to do what lovers do for the ones they love. Imagine that in pressing his suit he went to his knees in public view and begged in the most humiliating

way, that he swore all sorts of vows, that he spent the night at the other man's doorstep, that he were anxious to provide services even a slave would have refused—well, you can be sure that everyone, his enemies no less than his friends, would stand in his way. His enemies would jeer at his fawning servility, while his friends, ashamed on his behalf, would try everything to bring him back to his senses. But let a lover act in any of these ways, and everyone will immediately say what a charming man he is! No blame attaches to his behavior: custom treats it as noble through and through. And what is even more remarkable is that, at least according to popular wisdom, the gods will forgive a lover even for breaking his vows—a lover's vow, our people say, is no vow at all. The freedom given to the lover by both gods and men according to our custom is immense.

In view of all this, you might well conclude that in our city we consider the lover's desire and the willingness to satisfy it as the noblest things in the world. When, on the other hand, you recall that fathers hire attendants for their sons as soon as they're old enough to be attractive, and that an attendant's main task is to prevent any contact between his charge and his suitors; when you recall how mercilessly a boy's own friends tease him if they catch him at it, and how strongly their elders approve and even encourage such mocking—when you take all this into account, you're bound to come to the conclusion that we Athenians consider such behavior the most shameful thing in the world.

In my opinion, however, the fact of the matter is this. As I said earlier, love is, like everything else, complex: considered simply in itself, it is neither honorable nor a disgrace—its character depends entirely on the behavior it gives rise to. To give oneself to a vile man in a vile way is truly disgraceful behavior; by contrast, it is perfectly honorable to give oneself honorably to the right man. Now you may want to know who

counts as vile in this context. I'll tell you: it is the common, vulgar lover, who loves the body rather than the soul, the man whose love is bound to be inconstant, since what he loves is itself mutable and unstable. The moment the body is no longer in bloom, "he flies off and away," his promises and vows in tatters behind him. How different from this is a man who loves the right sort of character, and who remains its lover for life, attached as he is to something that is permanent.

We can now see the point of our customs: they are designed to separate the wheat from the chaff, the proper love from the vile. That's why we do everything we can to make it as easy as possible for lovers to press their suits and as difficult as possible for young men to comply; it is like a competition, a kind of test to determine to which sort each belongs. This explains two further facts: First, why we consider it shameful to yield too quickly: the passage of time in itself provides a good test in these matters. Second, why we also consider it shameful for a man to be seduced by money or political power, either because he cringes at ill-treatment and will not endure it or because, once he has tasted the benefits of wealth and power, he will not rise above them. None of these benefits is stable or permanent, apart from the fact that no genuine affection can possibly be based upon them.

Our customs, then, provide for only one honorable way of taking a man as a lover. In addition to recognizing that the lover's total and willing subjugation to his beloved's wishes is neither servile nor reprehensible, we allow that there is one—and only one—further reason for willingly subjecting oneself to another which is equally above reproach: that is subjection for the sake of virtue. If someone decides to put himself at another's disposal because he thinks that this will make him better in wisdom or in any other part of virtue, we approve of his voluntary subjection: we consider it neither shameful nor servile. Both these principles—that is, both the principle

governing the proper attitude toward the lover of young men and the principle governing the love of wisdom and of virtue in general—must be combined if a young man is to accept a lover in an honorable way. When an older lover and a young man come together and each obeys the principle appropriate to him—when the lover realizes that he is justified in doing anything for a loved one who grants him favors, and when the young man understands that he is justified in performing any service for a lover who can make him wise and virtuous—and when the lover is able to help the young man become wiser and better, and the young man is eager to be taught and improved by his lover—then, and only then, when these two principles coincide absolutely, is it ever honorable for a young man to accept a lover.

Only in this case, we should notice, is it never shameful to be deceived; in every other case it is shameful, both for the deceiver and the person he deceives. Suppose, for example, that someone thinks his lover is rich and accepts him for his money; his action won't be any less shameful if it turns out that he was deceived and his lover was a poor man after all. For the young man has already shown himself to be the sort of person who will do anything for money—and that is far from honorable. By the same token, suppose that someone takes a lover in the mistaken belief that this lover is a good man and likely to make him better himself, while in reality the man is horrible, totally lacking in virtue; even so, it is noble for him to have been deceived. For he too has demonstrated something about himself: that he is the sort of person who will do anything for the sake of virtue—and what could be more honorable than that? It follows, therefore, that giving in to your lover for virtue's sake is honorable, whatever the outcome. And this, of course, is the Heavenly Love of the heavenly goddess. Love's value to the city as a whole and to the citizens is immeasurable, for he compels the lover and his

loved one alike to make virtue their central concern. All other forms of love belong to the vulgar goddess.

Phaedrus, I'm afraid this hasty improvisation will have to do as my contribution on the subject of Love.

Apollodorus/ When Pausanias finally came to a pause (I've learned this sort of fine figure from our clever rhetoricians), it was Aristophanes' turn, according to Aristodemus. But he had such a bad case of the hiccups—he'd probably stuffed himself again, though, of course, it could have been anything—that making a speech was totally out of the question. So he turned to the doctor, Eryximachus, who was next in line, and said to him:

Aristophanes/ "Eryximachus, it's up to you—as well it should be. Cure me or take my turn."

Eryximachus/ "As a matter of fact, I shall do both. I shall take your turn—you can speak in my place as soon as you feel better—and I shall also cure you. While I am giving my speech, you should hold your breath for as long as you possibly can. This may well eliminate your hiccups. If it fails, the best remedy is a thorough gargle. And if even this has no effect, then tickle your nose with a feather. A sneeze or two will cure even the most persistent case."

Aristophanes/ "The sooner you start speaking, the better. I'll follow your instructions to the letter."

Apollodorus/ This, then, was the speech of Eryximachus:

Eryximachus/ Pausanias introduced a crucial consideration in his speech, though in my opinion he did not develop it sufficiently. Let me therefore try to carry his argument to its logical conclusion. His distinction between the two species of Love seems to me very useful indeed. But if I have learned a single lesson from my own field, the science of medicine, it is that Love does not occur only in the human soul; it is not simply the attraction we feel toward human

beauty: it is a significantly broader phenomenon. It certainly occurs within the animal kingdom, and even in the world of plants. In fact, it occurs everywhere in the universe. Love is a deity of the greatest importance: he directs everything that occurs, not only in the human domain, but also in that of the gods.

Let me begin with some remarks concerning medicine—I hope you will forgive my giving pride of place to my own profession. The point is that our very bodies manifest the two species of Love. Consider for a moment the marked difference, the radical dissimilarity, between healthy and diseased constitutions and the fact that dissimilar subjects desire and love objects that are themselves dissimilar. Therefore, the love manifested in health is fundamentally distinct from the love manifested in disease. And now recall that, as Pausanias claimed, it is as honorable to yield to a good man as it is shameful to consort with the debauched. Well, my point is that the case of the human body is strictly parallel. Everything sound and healthy in the body must be encouraged and gratified; that is precisely the object of medicine. Conversely, whatever is unhealthy and unsound must be frustrated and rebuffed: that's what it is to be an expert in medicine.

In short, medicine is simply the science of the effects of Love on repletion and depletion of the body, and the hallmark of the accomplished physician is his ability to distinguish the Love that is noble from the Love that is ugly and disgraceful. A good practitioner knows how to affect the body and how to transform its desires; he can implant the proper species of Love when it is absent and eliminate the other sort whenever it occurs. The physician's task is to effect a reconciliation and establish mutual love between the most basic bodily elements. Which are those elements? They are, of course, those that are most opposed to one another, as hot is to cold, bitter to sweet, wet to dry, cases like those. In fact, our ancestor Asclepius

first established medicine as a profession when he learned how to produce concord and love between such opposites—that is what those poet fellows say, and—this time—I concur with them.

Medicine, therefore, is guided everywhere by the god of Love, and so are physical education and farming as well. Further, a moment's reflection suffices to show that the case of poetry and music, too, is precisely the same. Indeed, this may have been just what Heraclitus had in mind, though his mode of expression certainly leaves much to be desired. The one, he says, "being at variance with itself is in agreement with itself "like the attunement of a bow or a lyre." Naturally, it is patently absurd to claim that an attunement or a harmony is in itself discordant or that its elements are still in discord with one another. Heraclitus probably meant that an expert musician creates a harmony by resolving the prior discord between high and low notes. For surely there can be no harmony so long as high and low are still discordant; harmony, after all, is consonance, and consonance is a species of agreement. Discordant elements, as long as they are still in discord, cannot come to an agreement, and they therefore cannot produce a harmony. Rhythm, for example, is produced only when fast and slow, though earlier discordant, are brought into agreement with each other. Music, like medicine, creates agreement by producing concord and love between these various opposites. Music is therefore simply the science of the effects of Love on rhythm and harmony.

These effects are easily discernible if you consider the constitution of rhythm and harmony in themselves; Love does not occur in both his forms in this domain. But the moment you consider, in their turn, the effects of rhythm and harmony on their audience—either through composition, which creates new verses and melodies, or through musical education, which teaches the correct performance of existing

compositions—complications arise directly, and they require the treatment of a good practitioner. Ultimately, the identical argument applies once again: the love felt by good people or by those whom such love might improve in this regard must be encouraged and protected. This is the honorable, heavenly species of Love, produced by the melodies of Urania, the Heavenly Muse. The other, produced by Polyhymnia, the muse of many songs, is common and vulgar. Extreme caution is indicated here: we must be careful to enjoy his pleasures without slipping into debauchery—this case, I might add, is strictly parallel to a serious issue in my own field, namely, the problem of regulating the appetite so as to be able to enjoy a fine meal without unhealthy aftereffects.

In music, therefore, as well as in medicine and in all the other domains, in matters divine as well as in human affairs, we must attend with the greatest possible care to these two species of Love, which are, indeed, to be found everywhere. Even the seasons of the year exhibit their influence. When the elements to which I have already referred—hot and cold, wet and dry—are animated by the proper species of Love, they are in harmony with one another: their mixture is temperate, and so is the climate. Harvests are plentiful; men and all other living things are in good health; no harm can come to them. But when the sort of Love that is crude and impulsive controls the seasons, he brings death and destruction. He spreads the plague and many other diseases among plants and animals; he causes frost and hail and blights. All these are the effects of the immodest and disordered species of Love on the movements of the stars and the seasons of the year, that is, on the objects studied by the science called astronomy.

Consider further the rites of sacrifice and the whole area with which the art of divination is concerned, that is, the interaction between men and gods. Here, too, Love is the central concern: our object is to try to maintain the proper

kind of Love and to attempt to cure the kind that is diseased. For what is the origin of all impiety? Our refusal to gratify the orderly kind of Love, and our deference to the other sort, when we should have been guided by the former sort of Love in every action in connection with our parents, living or dead, and with the gods. The task of divination is to keep watch over these two species of Love and to doctor them as necessary. Divination, therefore, is the practice that produces loving affection between gods and men; it is simply the science of the effects of Love on justice and piety.

Such is the power of Love—so varied and great that in all cases it might be called absolute. Yet even so it is far greater when Love is directed, in temperance and justice, toward the good, whether in heaven or on earth: happiness and good fortune, the bonds of human society, concord with the gods above—all these are among his gifts.

Perhaps I, too, have omitted a great deal in this discourse on Love. If so, I assure you, it was quite inadvertent. And if in fact I have overlooked certain points, it is now your task, Aristophanes, to complete the argument—unless, of course, you are planning on a different approach. In any case, proceed; your hiccups seem cured.

Apollodorus/ Then Aristophanes took over (so Aristodemus said):

Aristophanes/ 'The hiccups have stopped all right—but not before I applied the Sneeze Treatment to them. Makes me wonder whether the 'orderly sort of Love' in the body calls for the sounds and itchings that constitute a sneeze, because the hiccups stopped immediately when I applied the Sneeze Treatment."

Eryximachus/ "You're good, Aristophanes. But watch what you're doing. You are making jokes before your speech, and you're forcing me to prepare for you to say something funny,

and to put up my guard against you, when otherwise you might speak at peace."

Apollodorus/ Then Aristophanes laughed.

Aristophanes/ "Good point, Eryximachus. So let me 'unsay what I have said.' But don't put up your guard. I'm not worried about saying something funny in my coming oration. That would be pure profit, and it comes with the territory of my Muse. What I'm worried about is that I might say something ridiculous."

Eryximachus/ "Aristophanes, do you really think you can take a shot at me, and then escape? Use your head! Remember, as you speak, that you will be called upon to give an account. Though perhaps, if I decide to, I'll let you off."

Aristophanes/ "Eryximachus, indeed I do have in mind a different approach to speaking than the one the two of you used, you and Pausanias.

You see, I think people have entirely missed the power of Love, because, if they had grasped it, they' have built the greatest temples and altars to him and made the greatest sacrifices. But as it is, none of this is done for him, though it should be, more than anything else! For he loves the human race more than any other god, he stands by us in our troubles, and he cures those ills we humans are most happy to have mended. I shall, therefore, try to explain his power to you; and you, please pass my teaching on to everyone else."

First you must learn what Human Nature was in the beginning and what has happened to it since, because long ago our nature was not what it is now, but very different. There were three kinds of human beings, that's my first point—not two as there are now, male and female. In addition to these, there was a third, a combination of those two; its name survives, though the kind itself has vanished. At that time, you see, the word "androgynous" really meant

something: a form made up of male and female elements, though now there's nothing but the word, and that's used as an insult. My second point is that the shape of each human being was completely round, with back and sides in a circle; they had four hands each, as many legs as hands, and two faces, exactly alike, on a rounded neck. Between the two faces, which were on opposite sides, was one head with four ears. There were two sets of sexual organs, and everything else was the way you'd imagine it from what I've told you. They walked upright, as we do now, whatever direction they wanted. And whenever they set out to run fast, they thrust out all their eight limbs, the ones they had then, and spun rapidly, the way gymnasts do cartwheels, by bringing their legs around straight.

Now here is why there were three kinds, and why they were as I described them: The male kind was originally an offspring of the sun, the female of the earth, and the one that combined both genders was an offspring of the moon, because the moon shares in both. They were spherical, and so was their motion, because they were like their parents in the sky.

In strength and power, therefore, they were terrible, and they had great ambitions. They made an attempt on the gods, and Homer's story about Ephialtes and Otus was originally about them: how they tried to make an ascent to heaven so as to attack the gods. Then Zeus and the other gods met in council to discuss what to do, and they were sore perplexed. They couldn't wipe out the human race with thunderbolts and kill them all off, as they had the giants, because that would wipe out the worship they receive, along with the sacrifices we humans give them. On the other hand, they couldn't let them run riot. At last, after great effort, Zeus had an idea.

“I think I have a plan, that would allow human beings to exist and stop their misbehaving: they will give up being wicked when they lose their strength. So I shall now cut each of them in two. At one stroke they will lose their strength and also become more profitable to us, owing to the increase in their number. They shall walk upright on two legs. But if I find they still run riot and do not keep the peace, I will cut them in two again, and they’ll have to make their way on one leg, hopping.”

So saying, he cut those human beings in two, the way people cut sorb-apples before they dry them or the way they cut eggs with hairs. As he cut each one, he commanded Apollo to turn its face and half its neck towards the wound, so that each person would see that he'd been cut and keep better order. Then Zeus commanded Apollo to heal the rest of the wound, and Apollo did turn the face around, and he drew skin from all sides over what is now called the stomach, and there he made one mouth, as in a pouch with a drawstring, and fastened it at the center of the stomach. This is now called the navel. Then he smoothed out the other wrinkles, of which there were many, and he shaped the breasts, using some such tool as shoemakers have for smoothing wrinkles out of leather on the form. But he left a few wrinkles around the stomach and the navel, to be a reminder of what happened long ago.

Now, since their natural form had been cut in two, each one longed for its own other half, and so they would throw their arms about each other, weaving themselves together, wanting to grow together. In that condition they would die from hunger and general idleness, because they would not do anything apart from each other. Whenever one of the halves died and one was left, the one that was left still sought another and wove itself together with that. Sometimes the half he met came from a woman, as we'd call her now, sometimes it came from a man; either way, they kept on dying.

Then, however, Zeus took pity on them, and came up with another plan: he moved their genitals around to the front! Before then, you see, they used to have their genitals outside, like their faces, and they cast seed and made children, not in one another, but in the ground, like cicadas. So Zeus brought about this relocation of genitals, and in doing so he invented interior reproduction, by the man in the woman. The purpose of this was so that, when a man embraced a woman, he would cast his seed and they would have children; but when male embraced male, they would at least have the satisfaction of intercourse, after which they could stop embracing, return to their jobs, and look after their other needs in life. This, then, is the source of our desire to love each other. Love is born into every human being; it calls back the halves of our original nature together; it tries to make one out of two and heal the wound of human nature.

Each of us, then, is a "matching half" of a human whole, because each was sliced like a flatfish, two out of one, and each of us is always seeking the half that matches him. That's why a man who is split from the double sort (which used to be called "androgynous") runs after women. Many lecherous men have come from this class, and so do the lecherous women who run after men. Women who are split from a woman, however, pay no attention at all to men; they are oriented more towards women, and lesbians come from this class. People who are split from a male are male-oriented. While they are boys, because they are chips off the male block, they love men and enjoy lying with men and being embraced by men; those are the best of boys and lads, because they are the most manly in their nature. Of course, some say such boys are shameless, but they're lying. It's not because they have no shame that such boys do this, you see, but because they are bold and brave and masculine, and they tend to cherish what is like themselves. Do you want me to prove it? Look, these are the

only kind of boys who grow up to be real men in politics. When they're grown men, they are lovers of young men, and they naturally pay no attention to marriage or to making babies, except insofar as they are required by local custom. They, however, are quite satisfied to live their lives with one another unmarried. In every way, then, this sort of man grows up as a lover of young men and a lover of Love, always rejoicing in his own kind.

And so, when a person meets the half that is his very own, whatever his orientation, whether it's to young men or not, then something wonderful happens: the two are struck from their senses by love, by a sense of belonging to one another, and by desire, and they don't want to be separated from one another, not even for a moment.

These are the people who finish out their lives together and still cannot say what it is they want from one another. No one would think it is the intimacy of sex—that mere sex is the reason each lover takes so great and deep a joy in being with the other. It's obvious that the soul of every lover longs for something else; his soul cannot say what it is, but like an oracle it has a sense of what it wants, and like an oracle it hides behind a riddle. Suppose two lovers are lying together and Hephaestus stands over them with his mending tools, asking, "What is it you human beings really want from each other?" And suppose they're perplexed, and he asks them again: "Is this your heart's desire, then—for the two of you to become parts of the same whole, as near as can be, and never to separate, day or night? Because if that's your desire, I'd like to weld you together and join you into something that is naturally whole, so that the two of you are made into one. Then the two of you would share one life, as long as you lived, because you would be one being, and by the same token, when you died, you would be one and not two in Hades, having died

a single death. Look at your love, and see if this is what you desire: wouldn't this be all the good fortune you could want?"

Surely you can see that no one who received such an offer would turn it down; no one would find anything else that he wanted. Instead, everyone would think he'd found out at last what he had always wanted: to come together and melt together with the one he loves, so that one person emerged from two. Why should this be so? It's because, as I said, we used to be complete wholes in our original nature, and now "Love" is the name for our pursuit of wholeness, for our desire to be complete.

Long ago we were united, as I said; but now the god has divided us as punishment for the wrong we did him, just as the Spartans divided the Arcadians. So there's a danger that if we don't keep order before the gods, we'll be split in two again, and then we'll be walking around in the condition of people carved on gravestones in bas-relief, sawn apart between the nostrils, like half dice. We should encourage all men, therefore, to treat the gods with all due reverence, so that we may escape this fate and find wholeness instead. And we will, if Love is our guide and our commander. Let no one work against him. Whoever opposes Love is hateful to the gods, but if we become friends of the god and cease to quarrel with him, then we shall find the young men that are meant for us and win their love, as very few men do nowadays.

Now don't get ideas, Eryximachus, and turn this speech into a comedy. Don't think I'm pointing this at Pausanias and Agathon. Probably, they both do belong to the group that are entirely masculine in nature. But I am speaking about everyone, men and women alike, and I say there's just one way for the human race to flourish: we must bring love to its perfect conclusion, and each of us must win the favors of his very own young man, so that he can recover his original nature. If that is the ideal, then, of course, the nearest

approach to it is best in present circumstances, and that is to win the favor of young men who are naturally sympathetic to us.

If we are to give due praise to the god who can give us this blessing, then, we must praise Love. Love does the best that can be done for the time being: he draws us towards what belongs to us. But for the future, Love promises the greatest hope of all: if we treat the gods with due reverence, he will restore to us our original nature, and by healing us, he will make us blessed and happy.

"That is my speech about Love, Eryximachus. It is rather different from yours. As I begged you earlier, don't make a comedy of it. I'd prefer to hear what all the others will say—or, rather, what each of them will say, since Agathon and Socrates are the only ones left."

Eryximachus/ "I found your speech delightful, so I'll do as you say. Really, we've had such a rich feast of speeches on Love, that if I couldn't vouch for the fact that Socrates and Agathon are masters of the art of love, I'd be afraid that they' have nothing left to say. But as it is, I have no fears on this score."

Apollodorus/ Then Socrates said;

Socrates/ "That's because you did beautifully in the contest, Eryximachus. But if you ever get in my position, or rather the position I'll be in after Agathon's spoken so well, then you'll really be afraid. You'll be at your wit's end, as I am now."

Agathon/ "You're trying to bewitch me, Socrates, by making me think the audience expects great things of my speech, so I'll get flustered."

Socrates/ "Agathon! How forgetful do you think I am? I saw how brave and dignified you were when you walked right up to the theater platform along with the actors and looked

straight out at that enormous audience. You were about to put your own writing on display, and you weren't the least bit panicked. After seeing that, how could I expect you to be flustered by us, when we are so few?"

Agathon/ "Why, Socrates. You must think I have nothing but theater audiences on my mind! So you suppose I don't realize that, if you're intelligent, you find a few sensible men much more frightening than a senseless crowd?"

Socrates/ "No. It wouldn't be very handsome of me to think you crude in any way, Agathon. I'm sure that if you ever run into people you consider wise, you'll pay more attention to them than to ordinary people. But you can't suppose we're in that class; we were at the theater too, you know, part of the ordinary crowd. Still, if you did run into any wise men, other than yourself, you'd certainly be ashamed at the thought of doing anything ugly in front of them. Is that what you mean?"

Agathon/ 'That's true."

Socrates/ "On the other hand, you wouldn't be ashamed to do something ugly in front of ordinary people. Is that it?"

Apollodorus/ At that point Phaedrus interrupted:

Phaedrus/ "Agathon, my friend, if you answer Socrates, he'll no longer care whether we get anywhere with what we're doing here, so long as he has a partner for discussion. Especially if he's handsome. Now, like you, I enjoy listening to Socrates in discussion, but it is my duty to see to the praising of Love and to exact a speech from everyone of this group. When each of you two has made his offering to the god, then you can have your discussion."

Agathon/ "You're doing a beautiful job, Phaedrus. There's nothing to keep me from giving my speech. Socrates will have many opportunities for discussion later."

I wish first to speak of how I ought to speak, and only then to speak. In my opinion, you see, all those who have spoken

before me did not so much celebrate the god as congratulate human beings on the good things that come to them from the god. But who it is who gave these gifts, what he is like—no one has spoken about that. Now, only one method is correct for every praise, no matter whose: you must explain what qualities in the subject of your speech enable him to give the benefits for which we praise him. So now, in the case of Love, it is right for us to praise him first for what he is and afterwards for his gifts.

I maintain, then, that while all the gods are happy, Love—if I may say so without giving offense—is the happiest of them all, for he is the most beautiful and the best. His great beauty lies in this: First, Phaedrus, he is the youngest of the gods. He proves my point himself by fleeing old age in headlong flight, fast-moving though it is (that's obvious—it comes after us faster than it should). Love was born to hate old age and will come nowhere near it. Love always lives with young people and is one of them: the old story holds good that like is always drawn to like. And though on many other points I agree with Phaedrus, I do not agree with this: that Love is more ancient than Cronus and Iapetos. No, I say that he is the youngest of the gods and stays young forever.

Those old stories Hesiod and Parmenides tell about the gods—those things happened under Necessity, not Love, if what they say is true. For not one of all those violent deeds would have been done—no castrations, no imprisonments—if Love had been present among them. There would have been peace and brotherhood instead, as there has been now as long as Love has been king of the gods.

So he is young. And besides being young, he is delicate. It takes a poet as good as Homer to show how delicate the god is. For Homer says that Mischief is a god and that she is delicate—well, that her feet are delicate, anyway! He says:

… hers are delicate feet: not on the ground

Does she draw nigh; she walks instead upon the heads of men.

A lovely proof, I think, to show how delicate she is: she doesn't walk on anything hard; she walks only on what is soft. We shall use the same proof about Love, then, to show that he is delicate. For he walks not on earth, not even on people's skulls, which are not really soft at all, but in the softest of all the things that are, there he walks, there he has his home. For he makes his home in the characters, in the souls, of gods and men—and not even in every soul that comes along: when he encounters a soul with a harsh character, he turns away; but when he finds a soft and gentle character, he settles down in it. Always, then, he is touching with his feet and with the whole of himself what is softest in the softest places. He must therefore be most delicate.

He is youngest, then, and most delicate; in addition he has a fluid, supple shape. For if he were hard, he would not be able to enfold a soul completely or escape notice when he first entered it or withdrew. Besides, his graceful good looks prove that he is balanced and fluid in his nature. Everyone knows that Love has extraordinary good looks, and between ugliness and Love there is unceasing war.

And the exquisite coloring of his skin! The way the god consorts with flowers shows that. For he never settles in anything, be it a body or a soul, that cannot flower or has lost its bloom. His place is wherever it is flowery and fragrant; there he settles, there he stays.

Enough for now about the beauty of the god, though much remains still to be said. After this, we should speak of Love's moral character. The main point is that Love is neither the cause nor the victim of any injustice; he does no wrong to gods or men, nor they to him. If anything has an effect on him, it is

never by violence, for violence never touches Love. And the effects he has on others are not forced, for every service we give to love we give willingly. And whatever one person agrees on with another, when both are willing, that is right and just; so say "the laws that are kings of society."

And besides justice, he has the biggest share of moderation. For moderation, by common agreement, is power over pleasures and passions, and no pleasure is more powerful than Love! But if they are weaker, they are under the power of Love, and he has the power; and because he has power over pleasures and passions, Love is exceptionally moderate.

And as for manly bravery, "Not even Ares can stand up to" Love! For Ares has no hold on Love, but Love does on Ares—love of Aphrodite, so runs the tale. But he who has hold is more powerful than he who is held; and so, because Love has power over the bravest of the others, he is bravest of them all.

Now I have spoken about the god's justice, moderation, and bravery; his wisdom remains. I must try not to leave out anything that can be said on this. In the first place—to honor our profession as Eryximachus did his—the god is so skilled a poet that he can make others into poets: once Love touches him, anyone becomes a poet, however uncultured he had been before.

This, we may fittingly observe, testifies that Love is a good poet, good, in sum, at every kind of artistic production. For you can't give to another what you don't have yourself, and you can't teach what you don't know.

And as to the production of animals—who will deny that they are all born and begotten through Love's skill?

And as for artisans and professionals—don't we know that whoever has this god for a teacher ends up in the light of fame, while a man untouched by Love ends in obscurity? Apollo, for

one, invented archery, medicine, and prophecy when desire and love showed the way. Even he, therefore, would be a pupil of Love, and so would the Muses in music, Hephaestus in bronze work, Athena in weaving, and Zeus in "the governance of gods and men."

That too is how the gods' quarrels were settled, once Love came to be among them—love of beauty, obviously, because love is not drawn to ugliness. Before that, as I said in the beginning, and as the poets say, many dreadful things happened among the gods, because Necessity was king. But once this god was born, all goods came to gods and men alike through love of beauty.

This is how I think of Love, Phaedrus: first, he is himself the most beautiful and the best; after that, if anyone else is at all like that, Love is responsible. I am suddenly struck by a need to say something in poetic meter, that it is he who—

> Gives peace to men and stillness to the sea,
> Lays winds to rest, and careworn men to sleep.

Love fills us with togetherness and drains all of our divisiveness away. Love calls gatherings like these together. In feasts, in dances, and in ceremonies, he gives the lead. Love moves us to mildness, removes from us wildness. He is giver of kindness, never of meanness. Gracious, kindly—let wise men see and gods admire! Treasure to lovers, envy to others, father of elegance, luxury, delicacy, grace, yearning, desire. Love cares well for good men, cares not for bad ones. In pain, in fear, in desire, or speech, Love is our best guide and guard; he is our comrade and our savior. Ornament of all gods and men, most beautiful leader and the best! Every man should follow Love, sing beautifully his hymns, and join with him in the song he sings that charms the mind of god or man.

This, Phaedrus, is the speech I have to offer. Let it be dedicated to the god, part of it in fun, part of it moderately serious, as best I could manage.

Apollodorus/ When Agathon finished, Aristodemus said, everyone there burst into applause, so becoming to himself and to the god did they think the young man's speech.

Then Socrates glanced at Eryximachus and said;

Socrates/ "Now do you think I was foolish to feel the fear I felt before? Didn't I speak like a prophet a while ago when I said that Agathon would give an amazing speech and I would be tongue-tied?"

Eryximachus/ "You were prophetic about one thing, I think, that Agathon would speak well. But you, tongue-tied? No, I don't believe that."

Socrates/ "Bless you. How am I not going to be tongue-tied, I or anyone else, after a speech delivered with such beauty and variety? The other parts may not have been so wonderful, but that at the end! Who would not be struck dumb on hearing the beauty of the words and phrases? Anyway, I was worried that I'd not be able to say anything that came close to them in beauty, and so I would almost have run away and escaped, if there had been a place to go. And, you see, the speech reminded me of Gorgias, so that I actually experienced what Homer describes: I was afraid that Agathon would end by sending the Gorgian head, awesome at speaking in a speech, against my speech, and this would turn me to stone by striking me dumb. Then I realized how ridiculous I'd been to agree to join with you in praising Love and to say that I was a master of the art of love, when I knew nothing whatever of this business, of how anything whatever ought to be praised. In my foolishness, I thought you should tell the truth about whatever you praise, that this should be your basis, and that from this a speaker should select the most beautiful truths

and arrange them most suitably. I was quite vain, thinking that I would talk well and that I knew the truth about praising anything whatever. But now it appears that this is not what it is to praise anything whatever; rather, it is to apply to the object the grandest and the most beautiful qualities, whether he actually has them or not. And if they are false, that is no objection; for the proposal, apparently, was that everyone here make the rest of us think he is praising Love—and not that he actually praise him. I think that is why you stir up every word and apply it to Love; your description of him and his gifts is designed to make him look better and more beautiful than anything else—to ignorant listeners, plainly, for of course he wouldn't look that way to those who knew. And your praise did seem beautiful and respectful. But I didn't even know the method for giving praise; and it was in ignorance that I agreed to take part in this. So "the tongue" promised, and "the mind" did not. Goodbye to that! I'm not giving another eulogy using that method, not at all—I wouldn't be able to do it! —but, if you wish, I'd like to tell the truth my way. I want to avoid any comparison with your speeches, so as not to give you a reason to laugh at me. So look, Phaedrus, would a speech like this satisfy your requirement?

You will hear the truth about Love, and the words and phrasing will take care of themselves."

Apollodorus/ Then Aristodemus said that Phaedrus and the others urged him to speak in the way he thought was required, whatever it was.

Socrates/ "Well then, Phaedrus, allow me to ask Agathon a few little questions, so that, once I have his agreement, I may speak on that basis."

Phaedrus/ "You have my permission. Ask away."

Apollodorus/ After that, said Aristodemus, Socrates began:

Socrates/ “Indeed, Agathon, my friend, I thought you led the way beautifully into your speech when you said that one should first show the qualities of Love himself, and only then those of his deeds. I must admire that beginning. Come, then, since you have beautifully and magnificently expounded his qualities in other ways, tell me this, too, about Love. Is Love such as to be a love of something or of nothing? I’m not asking if he is born of some mother or father, (for the question whether Love is love of mother or of father would really be ridiculous), but it’s as if I’m asking this about a father—whether a father is the father of something or not. You’ tell me, of course, if you wanted to give me a good answer, that it’s of a son or a daughter that a father is the father. Wouldn’t you?”

Agathon/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Then does the same go for the mother?”

Apollodorus/ He agreed to that also.

Socrates/ “Well, then, answer a little more fully, and you will understand better what I want. If I should ask, “What about this: a brother, just insofar as he is a brother, is he the brother of something or not?”

Apollodorus/ He said that he was.

Socrates/ “And he’s of a brother or a sister, isn’t he?”

Apollodorus/ He agreed.

Socrates/ “Now try to tell me about love. Is Love the love of nothing or of something?”

Agathon/ “Of something, surely!”

Socrates/ “Then keep this object of love in mind, and remember what it is. But tell me this much: does Love desire that of which it is the love, or not?”

Agathon/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “At the time he desires and loves something, does he actually have what he desires and loves at that time, or doesn’t he?”

Agathon/ “He doesn’t. At least, that wouldn’t be likely.”

Socrates/ “Instead of what’s likely, ask yourself whether it’s necessary that this be so: a thing that desires, desires something of which it is in need; otherwise, if it were not in need, it would not desire it. I can’t tell you, Agathon, how strongly it strikes me that this is necessary. But how about you?”

Agathon/ “I think so too.”

Socrates/ “Good. Now then, would someone who is tall, want to be tall? Or someone who is strong want to be strong?”

Agathon/ “Impossible, on the basis of what we’ve agreed.”

Socrates/ “Presumably because no one is in need of those things he already has.”

Agathon/ “True.”

Socrates/ “But maybe a strong man could want to be strong, or a fast one fast, or a healthy one healthy: in cases like these, you might think people really do want to be things they already are and do want to have qualities they already have—I bring them up so they won’t deceive us. But in these cases, Agathon, if you stop to think about them, you will see that these people are what they are at the present time, whether they want to be or not, by a logical necessity. And who, may I ask, would ever bother to desire what’s necessary in any event? But when someone says ‘I am healthy, but that’s just what I want to be,’ or ‘I am rich, but that’s just what I want to be,’ or ‘I desire the very things that I have,’ let us say to him: ‘You already have riches and health and strength in your possession, my man, what you want is to possess these things in time to come, since in the present, whether you want to or not, you have them. Whenever you say, desire what I

already have, ask yourself whether you don't mean this: I want the things I have now to be mine in the future as well.' Wouldn't he agree?"

Apollodorus/ According to Aristodemus, Agathon said that he would.

So Socrates said;

Socrates/ "Then this is what it is to love something which is not at hand, which the lover does not have: it is to desire the preservation of what he now has in time to come, so that he will have it then."

Agathon/ "Quite so."

Socrates/ "So such a man or anyone else who has a desire desires what is not at hand and not present, what he does not have, and what he is not, and that of which he is in need; for such are the objects of desire and love."

Agathon/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "Come, then. Let us review the points on which we've agreed. Aren't they, first, that Love is the love of something, and, second, that he loves things of which he has a present need?"

Agathon/ "Yes."

Socrates/ "Now, remember, in addition to these points, what you said in your speech about what it is that Love loves. If you like, I'll remind you. I think you said something like this: that the gods' quarrels were settled by love of beautiful things, for there is no love of ugly ones. Didn't you say something like that?"

Agathon/ "I did."

Socrates/ "And that's a suitable thing to say, my friend. But if this is so, wouldn't Love have to be a desire for beauty, and never for ugliness?"

Apollodorus/ He agreed.

Socrates/ “And we also agreed that he loves just what he needs and does not have.”

Agathon/ “Yes.”

Socrates/ “So Love needs beauty, then, and does not have it.”

Agathon/ “Necessarily.”

Socrates/ “So! If something needs beauty and has got no beauty at all, would you still say that it is beautiful?”

Agathon/ “Certainly not.”

Socrates/ “Then do you still agree that Love is beautiful, if those things are so?”

Apollodorus/ Then Agathon said;

Agathon/ “It turns out, Socrates, I didn’t know what I was talking about in that speech.”

Socrates/ “It was a beautiful speech, anyway, Agathon. Now take it a little further. Don’t you think that good things are always beautiful as well?”

Agathon/ “I do.”

Socrates/ “Then if Love needs beautiful things, and if all good things are beautiful, he will need good things too.”

Agathon/ “As for me, Socrates, I am unable to challenge you. Let it be as you say.”

Socrates/ “Then it’s the truth, my beloved Agathon, that you are unable to challenge. It is not hard at all to challenge Socrates.”

Socrates/ Now I’ll let you go. I shall try to go through for you the speech about Love I once heard from a woman of Mantinea, Diotima—a woman who was wise about many things besides this: once she even put off the plague for ten years by telling the Athenians what sacrifices to make. She is the one who taught me the art of love, and I shall go through

her speech as best I can on my own, using what Agathon and I have agreed to as a basis.

Following your lead, Agathon, one should first describe who Love is and what he is like, and afterwards describe his works—I think it will be easiest for me to proceed the way Diotima did and tell you how she questioned me.

You see, I had told her almost the same things Agathon told me just now: that Love is a great god and that he belongs to beautiful things. And she used the very same arguments against me that I used against Agathon; she showed how, according to my very own speech, Love is neither beautiful nor good.

So I said, "What do you mean, Diotima? Is Love ugly, then, and bad?"

But she said;

Diotima/ "Watch your tongue! Do you really think that, if a thing is not beautiful, it has to be ugly?"

Socrates/ "I certainly do."

Diotima/ "And if a thing's not wise, it's ignorant? Or haven't you found out yet that there's something in between wisdom and ignorance?"

Socrates/ "What's that?"

Diotima/ "It's judging things correctly without being able to give a reason. Surely you see that this is not the same as knowing—for how could knowledge be unreasoning? And it's not ignorance either—for how could what hits the truth be ignorance? Correct judgment, of course, has this character: it is in between understanding and ignorance."

Socrates/ "True, as you say."

Diotima/ "Then don't force whatever is not beautiful to be ugly, or whatever is not good to be bad. It's the same with Love: when you agree he is neither good nor beautiful, you

need not think he is ugly and bad; he could be something in between."

Socrates/ "Yet everyone agrees he's a great god."

Diotima/ "Only those who don't know? Is that how you mean 'everyone'? Or do you include those who do know?"

Socrates/ "Oh, everyone together."

Socrates/ And she laughed.

Diotima/ "Socrates, how could those who say that he's not a god at all agree that he's a great god?"

Socrates/ "Who says that?"

Diotima/ "You, for one, and I for another."

Socrates/ "How can you say this!"

Diotima/ "That's easy. Tell me, wouldn't you say that all gods are beautiful and happy? Surely you'd never say a god is not beautiful or happy?"

Socrates/ "Zeus! Not I."

Diotima/ "Well, by calling anyone 'happy,' don't you mean they possess good and beautiful things?"

Socrates/ "Certainly."

Diotima/ "What about Love? You agreed he needs good and beautiful things, and that's why he desires them—because he needs them."

Socrates/ "I certainly did."

Diotima/ "Then how could he be a god if he has no share in good and beautiful things?"

Socrates/ "There's no way he could, apparently."

Diotima/ "Now do you see? You don't believe Love is a god either!"

Socrates/ "Then, what could Love be? A mortal?"

Diotima/ "Certainly not."

Socrates/ "Then, what is he?"

Diotima/ “He’s like what we mentioned before. He is in between mortal and immortal.”

Socrates/ “What do you mean, Diotima?”

Diotima/ “He’s a great spirit, Socrates. Everything spiritual, you see, is in between god and mortal.”

Socrates/ “What is their function?”

Diotima/ “They are messengers who shuttle back and forth between the two, conveying prayer and sacrifice from men to gods, while to men they bring commands from the gods and gifts in return for sacrifices. Being in the middle of the two, they round out the whole and bind fast the all to all. Through them all divination passes, through them the art of priests in sacrifice and ritual, in enchantment, prophecy, and sorcery. Gods do not mix with men; they mingle and converse with us through spirits instead, whether we are awake or asleep. He who is wise in any of these ways is a man of the spirit, but he who is wise in any other way, in a profession or any manual work, is merely a mechanic. These spirits are many and various, then, and one of them is Love.”

Socrates/ “Who are his father and mother?”

Diotima/ “That’s rather a long story. I’ll tell it to you, all the same.”

“When Aphrodite was born, the gods held a celebration. Poros, the son of Metis, was there among them. When they had feasted, Penia came begging, as poverty does when there’s a party, and stayed by the gates. Now Poros got drunk on nectar (there was no wine yet, you see) and, feeling drowsy, went into the garden of Zeus, where he fell asleep. Then Penia schemed up a plan to relieve her lack of resources: she would get a child from Poros. So she lay beside him and got pregnant with Love. That is why Love was born to follow Aphrodite and serve her: because he was conceived on the day of her birth.

And that's why he is also by nature a lover of beauty, because Aphrodite herself is especially beautiful.

"As the son of Poros and Penia, his lot in life is set to be like theirs. In the first place, he is always poor, and he's far from being delicate and beautiful (as ordinary people think he is); instead, he is tough and shriveled and shoeless and homeless, always lying on the dirt without a bed, sleeping at people's doorsteps and in roadsides under the sky, having his mother's nature, always living with Need. But on his father's side he is a schemer after the beautiful and the good; he is brave, impetuous, and intense, an awesome hunter, always weaving snares, resourceful in his pursuit of intelligence, a lover of wisdom through all his life, a genius with enchantments, potions, and clever pleadings.

"He is by nature neither immortal nor mortal. But now he springs to life when he gets his way; now he dies—all in the very same day. Because he is his father's son, however, he keeps coming back to life, but then anything he finds his way to always slips away, and for this reason Love is never completely without resources, nor is he ever rich.

"He is in between wisdom and ignorance as well. In fact, you see, none of the gods loves wisdom or wants to become wise—for they are wise—and no one else who is wise already loves wisdom; on the other hand, no one who is ignorant will love wisdom either or want to become wise. For what's especially difficult about being ignorant is that you are content with yourself, even though you're neither beautiful and good nor intelligent. If you don't think you need anything, of course you won't want what you don't think you need."

Socrates/ "In that case, Diotima, who are the people who love wisdom, if they are neither wise nor ignorant?"

Diotima/ "That's obvious. A child could tell you. Those who love wisdom fall in between those two extremes. And Love is

one of them, because he is in love with what is beautiful, and wisdom is extremely beautiful. It follows that Love must be a lover of wisdom and, as such, is in between being wise and being ignorant. This, too, comes to him from his parentage, from a father who is wise and resourceful and a mother who is not wise and lacks resource.

"My dear Socrates, that, then, is the nature of the Spirit called Love. Considering what you thought about Love, it's no surprise that you were led into thinking of Love as you did. On the basis of what you say, I conclude that you thought Love was being loved, rather than being a lover. I think that's why Love struck you as beautiful in every way: because it is what is really beautiful and graceful that deserves to be loved, and this is perfect and highly blessed; but being a lover takes a different form, which I have just described."

Socrates/ "All right then, my friend. What you say about Love is beautiful, but if you're right, what use is Love to human beings?"

Diotima/ "I'll try to teach you that, Socrates, after I finish this. So far I've been explaining the character and the parentage of Love. Now, according to you, he is love for beautiful things. But suppose someone asks us, 'Socrates and Diotima, what is the point of loving beautiful things?'

"It's clearer this way: The lover of beautiful things has a desire; what does he desire?'"

Socrates/ "That they become his own."

Diotima/ "But that answer calls for still another question, that is, 'What will this man have, when the beautiful things he wants have become his own?'"

Socrates/ I said there was no way I could give a ready answer to that question.

Then she said;

Diotima/ "Suppose someone changes the question, putting 'good' in place of 'beautiful,' and asks you this: Tell me, Socrates, a lover of good things has a desire; what does he desire?'"

Socrates/ "That they become his own."

Diotima/ "And what will he have, when the good things he wants have become his own?"

Socrates/ "This time it's easier to come up with the answer. He'll have happiness."

Diotima/ "That's what makes happy people happy, isn't it—possessing good things. There's no need to ask further, 'What's the point of wanting happiness?' The answer you gave seems to be final."

Socrates/ "True."

Diotima/ "Now this desire for happiness, this kind of love—do you think it is common to all human beings and that everyone wants to have good things forever and ever? What would you say?"

Socrates/ "Just that. It is common to all."

Diotima/ "Then, Socrates, why don't we say that everyone is in love, since everyone always loves the same things? Instead, we say some people are in love and others not; why is that?"

Socrates/ "I wonder about that myself."

Diotima/ "It's nothing to wonder about. It's because we divide out a special kind of love, and we refer to it by the word that means the whole—love'; and for the other kinds of love we use other words."

Socrates/ "What do you mean?"

Diotima/ "Well, you know, for example, that 'poetry' has a very wide range. After all, everything that is responsible for creating something out of nothing is a kind of poetry; and so

all the creations of every craft and profession are themselves a kind of poetry, and everyone who practices a craft is a poet."

Socrates/ "True."

Diotima/ "Nevertheless, as you also know, these craftsmen are not called poets. We have other words for them, and out of the whole of poetry we have marked off one part, the part the Muses give us with melody and rhythm, and we refer to this by the word that means the whole. For this alone is called 'poetry,' and those who practice this part of poetry are called poets."

Socrates/ "True."

Diotima/ "That's also how it is with love. The main point is this: every desire for good things or for happiness is 'the supreme and treacherous love' in everyone. But those who pursue this along any of its many other ways—through making money, or through the love of sports, or through philosophy—we don't say that these people are in love, and we don't call them lovers. It's only when people are devoted exclusively to one special kind of love that we use these words that really belong to the whole of it: 'love' and 'in love' and 'lovers.'"

Socrates/ "I am beginning to see your point."

Diotima/ "Now there is a certain story, according to which lovers are those people who seek their other halves. But according to my story, a lover does not seek the half or the whole, unless, my friend, it turns out to be good as well. I say this because people are even willing to cut off their own arms and legs if they think they are diseased. I don't think an individual takes joy in what belongs to him personally unless by 'belonging to me' he means 'good' and by 'belonging to another' he means 'bad.' That's because what everyone loves is really nothing other than the good. Do you disagree?"

Socrates/ “Zeus! Not I.

Diotima/ “Now, then. Can we simply say that people love the good?”

Socrates/ “Yes.”

Diotima/ “But shouldn’t we add that, in loving it, they want the good to be theirs?”

Socrates/ “We should.”

Diotima/ “And not only that. They want the good to be theirs forever, don’t they?”

Socrates/ “We should add that too.”

Diotima/ “In a word, then, love is wanting to possess the good forever.”

Socrates/ “That’s very true.”

Diotima/ “This, then, always is the object of love. In view of that, how do people pursue it if they are truly in love? What do they do with the eagerness and zeal we call love? What is the real purpose of love? Can you say?”

Socrates/ “If I could, I wouldn’t be your student, filled with admiration for your wisdom, and trying to learn these very things.”

Diotima/ “Well, I’ll tell you. It is giving birth in beauty, whether in body or in soul.”

Socrates/ “It would take divination to figure out what you mean. I can’t.”

Diotima/ “Well, I’ll tell you more clearly. All of us are pregnant, Socrates, both in body and in soul, and, as soon as we come to a certain age, we naturally desire to give birth. Now no one can possibly give birth in anything ugly; only in something beautiful. That’s because when a man and a woman come together in order to give birth, this is a godly affair. Pregnancy, reproduction—this is an immortal thing for a mortal animal to do, and it cannot occur in anything that is

out of harmony, but ugliness is out of harmony with all that is godly. Beauty, however, is in harmony with the divine. Therefore the goddess who presides at childbirth—she's called Moira or Eilithuia—is really Beauty. That's why, whenever pregnant animals or persons draw near to beauty, they become gentle and joyfully disposed and give birth and reproduce; but near ugliness they are foul-faced and draw back in pain; they turn away and shrink back and do not reproduce, and because they hold on to what they carry inside them, the labor is painful. This is the source of the great excitement about beauty that comes to anyone who is pregnant and already teeming with life: beauty releases them from their great pain. You see, Socrates, what Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is."

Socrates/ "Well, what is it, then?"

Diotima/ "Reproduction and birth in beauty."

Socrates/ "Maybe."

Diotima/ "Certainly. Now, why reproduction? It's because reproduction goes on forever; it is what mortals have in place of immortality. A lover must desire immortality along with the good, if what we agreed earlier was right, that Love wants to possess the good forever. It follows from our argument that Love must desire immortality."

Socrates/ All this she taught me, on those occasions when she spoke on the art of love. And once she asked;

Diotima/ "What do you think causes love and desire, Socrates? Don't you see what an awful state a wild animal is in when it wants to reproduce? Footed and winged animals alike, all are plagued by the disease of Love. First they are sick for intercourse with each other, then for nurturing their young—for their sake the weakest animals stand ready to do battle against the strongest and even to die for them, and they may be racked with famine in order to feed their young. They

would do anything for their sake. Human beings, you'd think, would do this because they understand the reason for it; but what causes wild animals to be in such a state of love? Can you say?"

Socrates/ And I said again that I didn't know.

So she said;

Diotima/ "How do you think you'll ever master the art of love, if you don't know that?"

Socrates/ "But that's why I came to you, Diotima, as I just said. I knew I needed a teacher. So tell me what causes this, and everything else that belongs to the art of love."

Diotima/ "If you really believe that Love by its nature aims at what we have often agreed it does, then don't be surprised at the answer. For among animals the principle is the same as with us, and mortal nature seeks so far as possible to live forever and be immortal. And this is possible in one way only: by reproduction, because it always leaves behind a new young one in place of the old. Even while each living thing is said to be alive and to be the same—as a person is said to be the same from childhood till he turns into an old man—even then he never consists of the same things, though he is called the same, but he is always being renewed and in other respects passing away, in his hair and flesh and bones and blood and his entire body. And it's not just in his body, but in his soul, too, for none of his manners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, or fears ever remains the same, but some are coming to be in him while others are passing away. And what is still far stranger than that is that not only does one branch of knowledge come to be in us while another passes away and that we are never the same even in respect of our knowledge, but that each single piece of knowledge has the same fate. For what we call studying exists because knowledge is leaving us, because forgetting is the departure of

knowledge, while studying puts back a fresh memory in place of what went away, thereby preserving a piece of knowledge, so that it seems to be the same. And in that way everything mortal is preserved, not, like the divine, by always being the same in every way, but because what is departing and aging leaves behind something new, something such as it had been. By this device, Socrates, what is mortal shares in immortality, whether it is a body or anything else, while the immortal has another way. So don't be surprised if everything naturally values its own offspring, because it is for the sake of immortality that everything shows this zeal, which is Love."

Socrates/ Yet when I heard her speech I was amazed, and spoke: "Well, most wise Diotima, is this really the way it is?"

And in the manner of a perfect sophist she said;

Diotima/ "Be sure of it, Socrates. Look, if you will, at how human beings seek honor. You' be amazed at their irrationality, if you didn't have in mind what I spoke about and if you hadn't pondered the awful state of love they're in, wanting to become famous and 'to lay up glory immortal forever,' and how they're ready to brave any danger for the sake of this, much more than they are for their children; and they are prepared to spend money, suffer through all sorts of ordeals, and even die for the sake of glory. Do you really think that Alcestis would have died for Admetus, or that Achilles would have died after Patroclus, or that your Codrus would have died so as to preserve the throne for his sons, if they hadn't expected the memory of their virtue—which we still hold in honor—to be immortal? Far from it, I believe that anyone will do anything for the sake of immortal virtue and the glorious fame that follows; and the better the people, the more they will do, for they are all in love with immortality.

"Now, some people are pregnant in body, and for this reason turn more to women and pursue love in that way,

providing themselves through childbirth with immortality and remembrance and happiness, as they think, for all time to come; while others are pregnant in soul—because there surely are those who are even more pregnant in their souls than in their bodies, and these are pregnant with what is fitting for a soul to bear and bring to birth. And what is fitting? Wisdom and the rest of virtue, which all poets beget, as well as all the craftsmen who are said to be creative. But by far the greatest and most beautiful part of wisdom deals with the proper ordering of cities and households, and that is called moderation and justice. When someone has been pregnant with these in his soul from early youth, while he is still a virgin, and, having arrived at the proper age, desires to beget and give birth, he too will certainly go about seeking the beauty in which he would beget; for he will never beget in anything ugly. Since he is pregnant, then, he is much more drawn to bodies that are beautiful than to those that are ugly; and if he also has the luck to find a soul that is beautiful and noble and well-formed, he is even more drawn to this combination; such a man makes him instantly teem with ideas and arguments about virtue—the qualities a virtuous man should have and the customary activities in which he should engage; and so he tries to educate him. In my view, you see, when he makes contact with someone beautiful and keeps company with him, he conceives and gives birth to what he has been carrying inside him for ages. And whether they are together or apart, he remembers that beauty. And in common with him he nurtures the newborn; such people, therefore, have much more to share than do the parents of human children, and have a firmer bond of friendship, because the children in whom they have a share are more beautiful and more immortal. Everyone would rather have such children than human ones, and would look up to Homer, Hesiod, and the other good poets with envy and admiration

for the offspring they have left behind—offspring, which, because they are immortal themselves, provide their parents with immortal glory and remembrance. “For example, those are the sort of children Lycurgus left behind in Sparta as the saviors of Sparta and virtually all of Greece. Among you the honor goes to Solon for his creation of your laws. Other men in other places everywhere Greek or barbarian, have brought a host of beautiful deeds into the light and begotten every kind of virtue. Already many shrines have sprung up to honor them for their immortal children, which hasn’t happened yet to anyone for human offspring.

“Even you, Socrates, could probably come to be initiated into these rites of love. But as for the purpose of these rites when they are done correctly—that is the final and highest mystery, and I don’t know if you are capable of it. I myself will tell you, and I won’t stint any effort. And you must try to follow if you can.”

“A lover who goes about this matter correctly must begin in his youth to devote himself to beautiful bodies. First, if the leader leads aright, he should love one body and beget beautiful ideas there; then he should realize that the beauty of anyone body is brother to the beauty of any other and that if he is to pursue beauty of form he'd be very foolish not to think that the beauty of all bodies is one and the same. When he grasps this, he must become a lover of all beautiful bodies, and he must think that this wild gaping after just one body is a small thing and despise it.

“After this he must think that the beauty of people’s souls is more valuable than the beauty of their bodies, so that if someone is decent in his soul, even though he is scarcely blooming in his body, our lover must be content to love and care for him and to seek to give birth to such ideas as will make young men better. The result is that our lover will be forced to gaze at the beauty of activities and laws and to see

that all this is akin to itself, with the result that he will think that the beauty of bodies is a thing of no importance. After customs he must move on to various kinds of knowledge. The result is that he will see the beauty of knowledge and be looking mainly not at beauty in a single example—as a servant would who favored the beauty of a little boy or a man or a single custom (being a slave, of course, he's low and small-minded)—but the lover is turned to the great sea of beauty, and, gazing upon this, he gives birth to many gloriously beautiful ideas and theories, in unstinting love of wisdom, until, having grown and been strengthened there, he catches sight of such knowledge, and it is the knowledge of such beauty …

"Try to pay attention to me, as best you can. You see, the man who has been thus far guided in matters of Love, who has beheld beautiful things in the right order and correctly, is coming now to the goal of Loving: all of a sudden he will catch sight of something wonderfully beautiful in its nature; that, Socrates, is the reason for all his earlier labors:

"First, it always is and neither comes to be nor passes away, neither waxes nor wanes. Second, it is not beautiful this way and ugly that way, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another, nor beautiful in relation to one thing and ugly in relation to another; nor is it beautiful here but ugly there, as it would be if it were beautiful for some people and ugly for others. Nor will the beautiful appear to him in the guise of a face or hands or anything else that belongs to the body. It will not appear to him as one idea or one kind of knowledge. It is not anywhere in another thing, as in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything else, but itself by itself with itself, it is always one in form; and all the other beautiful things share in that, in such a way that when those others come to be or pass away, this does not become the least bit smaller or greater nor suffer any change. So when someone rises by

these stages, through loving boys correctly, and begins to see this beauty, he has almost grasped his goal. This is what it is to go aright, or be led by another, into the mystery of Love: one goes always upwards for the sake of this Beauty, starting out from beautiful things and using them like rising stairs: from one body to two and from two to all beautiful bodies, then from beautiful bodies to beautiful customs, and from customs to learning beautiful things, and from these lessons he arrives in the end at this lesson, which is learning of this very Beauty, so that in the end he comes to know just what it is to be beautiful.

"And there in life, Socrates, my friend,"

Socrates/ said the woman from Mantinea;

Diotima/ "there if anywhere should a person live his life, beholding that Beauty. If you once see that, it won't occur to you to measure beauty by gold or clothing or beautiful boys and youths—who, if you see them now, strike you out of your senses, and make you, you and many others, eager to be with the boys you love and look at them forever, if there were any way to do that, forgetting food and drink, everything but looking at them and being with them. But how would it be, in our view, if someone got to see the Beautiful itself, absolute, pure, unmixed, not polluted by human flesh or colors or any other great nonsense of mortality, but if he could see the divine Beauty itself in its one form? Do you think it would be a poor life for a human being to look there and to behold it by that which he ought, and to be with it? Or haven't you remembered, that in that life alone, when he looks at Beauty in the only way that Beauty can be seen—only then will it become possible for him to give birth not to images of virtue (because he's in touch with no images), but to true virtue (because he is in touch with the true Beauty). The love of the gods belongs to anyone who has given birth to true virtue and

nourished it, and if any human being could become immortal, it would be he."

Socrates/ This, Phaedrus and the rest of you, was what Diotima told me. I was persuaded. And once persuaded, I try to persuade others too that human nature can find no better workmate for acquiring this than Love. That's why I say that every man must honor Love, why I honor the rites of Love myself and practice them with special diligence, and why I commend them to others. Now and always I praise the power and courage of Love so far as I am able. Consider this speech, then, Phaedrus, if you wish, a speech in praise of Love. Or if not, call it whatever and however you please to call it.

Apollodorus/ Socrates' speech finished to loud applause. Meanwhile, Aristophanes was trying to make himself heard over their cheers in order to make a response to something Socrates had said about his own speech. Then, all of a sudden, there was even more noise. A large drunken party had arrived at the courtyard door and they were rattling it loudly, accompanied by the shrieks of some flute-girl they had brought along. Agathon at that point called to his slaves:

Agathon/ "Go see who it is. If it's people we know, invite them in. If not, tell them the party's over, and we're about to turn in."

Apollodorus/ A moment later they heard Alcibiades shouting in the courtyard, very drunk and very loud. He wanted to know where Agathon was, he demanded to see Agathon at once. Actually, he was half-carried into the house by the flute-girl and by some other companions of his, but, at the door, he managed to stand by himself, crowned with a beautiful wreath of violets and ivy and ribbons in his hair.

Alcibiades/ "Good evening, gentlemen. I'm plastered. May I join your party? Or should I crown Agathon with this wreath—which is all I came to do, anyway—and make myself scarce? I

really couldn't make it yesterday, but nothing could stop me tonight! See, I'm wearing the garland myself. I want this crown to come directly from my head to the head that belongs, I don't mind saying, to the cleverest and best looking man in town. Ah, you laugh; you think I'm drunk! Fine, go ahead—I know I'm right anyway. Well, what do you say? May I join you on these terms? Will you have a drink with me or not?"

Apollodorus/ Naturally they all made a big fuss. They implored him to join them, they begged him to take a seat, and Agathon called him to his side. So Alcibiades, again with the help of his friends, approached Agathon. At the same time, he kept trying to take his ribbons off so that he could crown Agathon with them, but all he succeeded in doing was to push them further down his head until they finally slipped over his eyes. What with the ivy and all, he didn't see Socrates, who had made room for him on the couch as soon as he saw him. So Alcibiades sat down between Socrates and Agathon and, as soon as he did so, he put his arms around Agathon, kissed him, and placed the ribbons on his head.

Agathon asked his slaves to take Alcibiades' sandals off.

Agathon/ "We can all three fit on my couch."

Alcibiades/ "What a good idea! But wait a moment! Who's the third?"

Apollodorus/ As he said this, he turned around, and it was only then that he saw Socrates. No sooner had he seen him than he leaped up and cried:

Alcibiades/ "Good lord, what's going on here? It's Socrates! You've trapped me again! You always do this to me—all of a sudden you'll turn up out of nowhere where I least expect you! Well, what do you want now? Why did you choose this particular couch? Why aren't you with Aristophanes or anyone else we could tease you about? But no, you figured

out a way to find a place next to the most handsome man in the room!"

Socrates/ "I beg you, Agathon, protect me from this man! You can't imagine what it's like to be in love with him: from the very first moment he realized how I felt about him, he hasn't allowed me to say two words to anybody else—what am I saying, I can't so much as look at an attractive man but he flies into a fit of jealous rage. He yells; he threatens; he can hardly keep from slapping me around! Please, try to keep him under control. Could you perhaps make him forgive me? And if you can't, if he gets violent, will you defend me? The fierceness of his passion terrifies me!"

Alcibiades/ "I shall never forgive you! I promise you, you'll pay for this! But for the moment,"

Apollodorus/ he said, turning to Agathon;

Alcibiades/ "give me some of these ribbons. I'd better make a wreath for him as well—look at that magnificent head! Otherwise, I know, he'll make a scene. He'll be grumbling that, though I crowned you for your first victory, I didn't honor him even though he has never lost an argument in his life."

Apollodorus/ So Alcibiades took the ribbons, arranged them on Socrates' head, and lay back on the couch. Immediately, however, he started up again:

Alcibiades/ "Friends, you look sober to me; we can't have that! Let's have a drink! Remember our agreement? We need a master of ceremonies; who should it be? … Well, at least till you are all too drunk to care, I elect … myself!

Who else? Agathon, I want the largest cup around … No! Wait! You! Bring me that cooling jar over there!"

Apollodorus/ He'd seen the cooling jar, and he realized it could hold more than two quarts of wine. He had the slaves fill it to the brim, drained it, and ordered them to fill it up again for Socrates.

Alcibiades/ “Not that the trick will have any effect on him. Socrates will drink whatever you put in front of him, but no one yet has seen him drunk.”

Apollodorus/ The slave filled the jar and, while Socrates was drinking, Eryximachus said to Alcibiades:

Eryximachus/ “This is certainly most improper. We cannot simply pour the wine down our throats in silence: we must have some conversation, or at least a song. What we are doing now is hardly civilized.”

Apollodorus/ What Alcibiades said to him was this:

Alcibiades/ “O Eryximachus, best possible son to the best possible, the most temperate father: Hi!”

Aristophanes/ “Greetings to you, too. Now what do you suggest we do?”

Alcibiades/ “Whatever you say. Ours to obey you, ‘For a medical mind is worth a million others’. Please prescribe what you think fit.”

Eryximachus/ “Listen to me. Earlier this evening we decided to use this occasion to offer a series of encomia of Love. We all took our turn—in good order, from left to right—and gave our speeches, each according to his ability. You are the only one not to have spoken yet, though, if I may say so, you have certainly drunk your share. It’s only proper, therefore, that you take your turn now. After you have spoken, you can decide on a topic for Socrates on your right; he can then do the same for the man to his right, and we can go around the table once again.”

Alcibiades/ “Well said, O Eryximachus. But do you really think it’s fair to put my drunken ramblings next to your sober orations? And anyway, my dear fellow, I hope you didn’t believe a single word Socrates said: the truth is just the opposite! He’s the one who will most surely beat me up if I dare praise anyone else in his presence—even a god!”

Socrates/ “Hold your tongue!”

Alcibiades/ “By god, don’t you dare deny it! I would never—never—praise anyone else with you around.”

Eryximachus/ “Well, why not just do that, if you want? Why don’t you offer an encomium to Socrates?”

Alcibiades/ “What do you mean? Do you really think so, Eryximachus? Should I unleash myself upon him? Should I give him his punishment in front of all of you?”

Socrates/ “Now, wait a minute. What do you have in mind? Are you going to praise me only in order to mock me? Is that it?”

Alcibiades/ “I’ll only tell the truth—please, let me!”

Socrates/ “I would certainly like to hear the truth from you. By all means, go ahead.”

Alcibiades/ “Nothing can stop me now. But here’s what you can do: if I say anything that’s not true, you can just interrupt, if you want, and correct me; at worst, there’ll be mistakes in my speech, not lies. But you can’t hold it against me if I don’t get everything in the right order—I’ll say things as they come to mind. And even a sober and unclouded mind would find it hard to come to terms with your bizarreness!”

I’ll try to praise Socrates, my friends, but I’ll have to use an image. And though he may think I’m trying to make fun of him, I assure you my image is no joke: it aims at the truth. Look at him! Isn’t he just like a statue of Silenus? You know the kind of statue I mean; you’ll find them in any shop in town. It’s a Silenus sitting, his flute or his pipes in his hands, and it’s hollow. It’s split right down the middle, and inside it’s full of tiny statues of the gods. Now look at him again! Isn’t he also just like the satyr Marsyas?

Nobody, not even you, Socrates, can deny that you look like them. But the resemblance goes beyond appearance, as you’re about to hear.

You are impudent, contemptuous, and vile! No? If you won't admit it, I'll bring witnesses. And you're quite a flute-player, aren't you? In fact, you're much more marvelous than Marsyas, who needed instruments to cast his spells on people. And so does anyone who plays his tunes today—for even the tunes Olympus played are Marsyas' work, since Olympus learned everything from him. Whether they are played by the greatest flautist or the meanest flute-girl, his melodies have in themselves the power to possess and so reveal those people who are ready for the god and his mysteries. That's because his melodies are themselves divine. The only difference between you and Marsyas is that you need no instruments; you do exactly what he does, but with words alone. You know, people hardly ever take a speaker seriously, even if he's the greatest orator; but let anyone—man, woman, or child—listen to you or even to a poor account of what you say—and we are all transported, completely possessed.

If I were to describe for you what an extraordinary effect his words have always had on me (I can feel it this moment even as I'm speaking), you might actually suspect that I'm drunk! Still, I swear to you, the moment he starts to speak, I am beside myself: my heart starts leaping in my chest, the tears come streaming down my face, even the frenzied Corybantes seem sane compared to me—and, let me tell you, I am not alone. I have heard Pericles and many other great orators, and I have admired their speeches. But nothing like this ever happened to me: they never upset me so deeply that my very own soul started protesting that my life—my life! —was no better than the most miserable slave's. And yet that is exactly how this Marsyas here at my side makes me feel all the time: he makes it seem that my life isn't worth living! You can't say that isn't true, Socrates. I know very well that you could make me feel that way this very moment if I gave you half a chance. He always traps me, you see, and he makes me admit that my

political career is a waste of time, while all that matters is just what I most neglect: my personal shortcomings, which cry out for the closest attention. So I refuse to listen to him; I stop my ears and tear myself away from him, for, like the Sirens, he could make me stay by his side till I die.

Socrates is the only man in the world who has made me feel shame—ah, you didn't think I had it in me, did you? Yes, he makes me feel ashamed: I know perfectly well that I can't prove he's wrong when he tells me what I should do; yet, the moment I leave his side, I go back to my old ways: I cave in to my desire to please the crowd. My whole life has become one constant effort to escape from him and keep away, but when I see him, I feel deeply ashamed, because I'm doing nothing about my way of life, though I have already agreed with him that I should. Sometimes, believe me, I think I would be happier if he were dead. And yet I know that if he dies I'll be even more miserable. I can't live with him, and I can't live without him! What can I do about him?

That's the effect of this satyr's music—on me and many others. But that's the least of it. He's like these creatures in all sorts of other ways; his powers are really extraordinary. Let me tell you about them, because, you can be sure of it, none of you really understands him. But, now I've started, I'm going to show you what he really is.

To begin with, he's crazy about beautiful boys; he constantly follows them around in a perpetual daze. Also, he likes to say he's ignorant and knows nothing. Isn't this just like Silenus? Of course it is! And all this is just on the surface, like the outsides of those statues of Silenus. I wonder, my fellow drinkers, if you have any idea what a sober and temperate man he proves to be once you have looked inside. Believe me, it couldn't matter less to him whether a boy is beautiful. You can't imagine how little he cares whether a person is beautiful, or rich, or famous in any other way that

most people admire. He considers all these possessions beneath contempt, and that's exactly how he considers all of us as well. In public, I tell you, his whole life is one big game—a game of irony. I don't know if any of you have seen him when he's really serious. But I once caught him when he was open like Silenus' statues, and I had a glimpse of the figures he keeps hidden within: they were so godlike—so bright and beautiful, so utterly amazing—that I no longer had a choice—I just had to do whatever he told me.

What I thought at the time was that what he really wanted was me, and that seemed to me the luckiest coincidence: all I had to do was to let him have his way with me, and he would teach me everything he knew—believe me, I had a lot of confidence in my looks. Naturally, up to that time we'd never been alone together; one of my attendants had always been present. But with this in mind, I sent the attendant away, and met Socrates alone. (You see, in this company I must tell the whole truth: so pay attention. And, Socrates, if I say anything untrue, I want you to correct me.)

So there I was, my friends, alone with him at last. My idea, naturally, was that he'd take advantage of the opportunity to tell me whatever it is that lovers say when they find themselves alone; I relished the moment. But no such luck! Nothing of the sort occurred. Socrates had his usual sort of conversation with me, and at the end of the day he went off.

My next idea was to invite him to the gymnasium with me. We took exercise together, and I was sure that this would lead to something. He took exercise and wrestled with me many times when no one else was present. What can I tell you? I got nowhere. When I realized that my ploy had failed, I decided on a frontal attack. I refused to retreat from a battle I myself had begun, and I needed to know just where matters stood. So what I did was to invite him to dinner, as if I were his lover and he my young prey! To tell the truth, it took him quite a

while to accept my invitation, but one day he finally arrived. That first time he left right after dinner: I was too shy to try to stop him. But on my next attempt, I started some discussion just as we were finishing our meal and kept him talking late into the night. When he said he should be going, I used the lateness of the hour as an excuse and managed to persuade him to spend the night at my house. He had had his meal on the couch next to mine, so he just made himself comfortable and lay down on it. No one else was there.

Now you must admit that my story so far has been perfectly decent; I could have told it in any company. But you'd never have heard me tell the rest of it, as you're about to do, if it weren't that, as the saying goes, 'there's truth in wine when the slaves have left'—and when they're present, too. Also, would it be fair to Socrates for me to praise him and yet to fail to reveal one of his proudest accomplishments? And, furthermore, you know what people say about snakebite—that you'll only talk about it with your fellow victims: only they will understand the pain and forgive you for all the things it made you do. Well, something much more painful than a snake has bitten me in my most sensitive part—I mean my heart, or my soul, or whatever you want to call it, which has been struck and bitten by philosophy, whose grip on young and eager souls is much more vicious than a viper's and makes them do the most amazing things. Now, all you people here, Phaedrus, Agathon, Eryximachus, Pausanias, Aristodemus, Aristophanes—I need not mention Socrates himself—and all the rest, have all shared in the madness, the Bacchic frenzy of philosophy. And that's why you will hear the rest of my story; you will understand and forgive both what I did then and what I say now. As for the house slaves and for anyone else who is not an initiate, my story's not for you: block your ears!

To get back to the story. The lights were out; the slaves had left; the time was right, I thought, to come to the point and tell him freely what I had in mind. So I shook him and whispered:

"Socrates, are you asleep?"

Socrates/ "No, no, not at all."

Alcibiades/ "You know what I've been thinking?"

Socrates/ "Well, no, not really."

Alcibiades/ "I think you're the only worthy lover I have ever had—and yet, look how shy you are with me! Well, here's how I look at it. It would be really stupid not to give you anything you want: you can have me, my belongings, anything my friends might have. Nothing is more important to me than becoming the best man I can be, and no one can help me more than you to reach that aim. With a man like you, in fact, I'd be much more ashamed of what wise people would say if I did not take you as my lover, than I would of what all the others, in their foolishness, would say if I did."

He heard me out, and then he said in that absolutely inimitable ironic manner of his:

Socrates/ "Dear Alcibiades, if you are right in what you say about me, you are already more accomplished than you think. If I really have in me the power to make you a better man, then you can see in me a beauty that is really beyond description and makes your own remarkable good looks pale in comparison. But, then, is this a fair exchange that you propose? You seem to me to want more than your proper share: you offer me the merest appearance of beauty, and in return you want the thing itself, 'gold in exchange for bronze.'

"Still, my dear boy, you should think twice, because you could be wrong, and I may be of no use to you. The mind's sight becomes sharp only when the body's eyes go past their prime—and you are still a good long time away from that."

Alcibiades/ When I heard this I replied:

“I really have nothing more to say. I’ve told you exactly what I think. Now it’s your turn to consider what you think best for you and me.”

Socrates/ “You’re right about that. In the future, let’s consider things together. We’ll always do what seems the best to the two of us.”

Alcibiades/ His words made me think that my own had finally hit their mark, that he was smitten by my arrows. I didn’t give him a chance to say another word. I stood up immediately and placed my mantle over the light cloak which, though it was the middle of winter, was his only clothing. I slipped underneath the cloak and put my arms around this man—this utterly unnatural, this truly extraordinary man—and spent the whole night next to him. Socrates, you can’t deny a word of it. But in spite of all my efforts, this hopelessly arrogant, this unbelievably insolent man—he turned me down! He spurned my beauty, of which I was so proud, members of the jury—for this is really what you are: you’re here to sit in judgment of Socrates’ amazing arrogance and pride. Be sure of it, I swear to you by all the gods and goddesses together, my night with Socrates went no further than if I had spent it with my own father or older brother!

How do you think I felt after that? Of course, I was deeply humiliated, but also I couldn’t help admiring his natural character, his moderation, his fortitude—here was a man whose strength and wisdom went beyond my wildest dreams! How could I bring myself to hate him? I couldn’t bear to lose his friendship. But how could I possibly win him over? I knew very well that money meant much less to him than enemy weapons ever meant to Ajax, and the only trap by means of which I had thought I might capture him had already proved a dismal failure. I had no idea what to do, no purpose in life; ah, no one else has ever known the real meaning of slavery!

All this had already occurred when Athens invaded Potidaea, where we served together and shared the same mess. Now, first, he took the hardships of the campaign much better than I ever did—much better, in fact, than anyone in the whole army. When we were cut off from our supplies, as often happens in the field, no one else stood up to hunger as well as he did. And yet he was the one man who could really enjoy a feast; and though he didn't much want to drink, when he had to, he could drink the best of us under the table. Still, and most amazingly, no one ever saw him drunk (as we'll straightaway put to the test).

Add to this his amazing resistance to the cold—and, let me tell you, the winter there is something awful. Once, I remember, it was frightfully cold; no one so much as stuck his nose outside. If we absolutely had to leave our tent, we wrapped ourselves in anything we could lay our hands on and tied extra pieces of felt or sheepskin over our boots. Well, Socrates went out in that weather wearing nothing but this same old light cloak, and even in bare feet he made better progress on the ice than the other soldiers did in their boots. You should have seen the looks they gave him; they thought he was only doing it to spite them!

So much for that! But you should hear what else he did during that same campaign;

The exploit our strong-hearted hero dared to do.

One day, at dawn, he started thinking about some problem or other; he just stood outside, trying to figure it out. He couldn't resolve it, but he wouldn't give up. He simply stood there, glued to the same spot. By midday, many soldiers had seen him, and, quite mystified, they told everyone that Socrates had been standing there all day, thinking about something. He was still there when evening came, and after dinner some Ionians moved their bedding outside, where it

was cooler and more comfortable (all this took place in the summer), but mainly in order to watch if Socrates was going to stay out there all night. And so he did; he stood on the very same spot until dawn! He only left next morning, when the sun came out, and he made his prayers to the new day.

And if you would like to know what he was like in battle—this is a tribute he really deserves. You know that I was decorated for bravery during that campaign: well, during that very battle, Socrates single-handedly saved my life! He absolutely did! He just refused to leave me behind when I was wounded, and he rescued not only me but my armor as well. For my part, Socrates, I told them right then that the decoration really belonged to you, and you can blame me neither for doing so then nor for saying so now. But the generals, who seemed much more concerned with my social position, insisted on giving the decoration to me, and, I must say, you were more eager than the generals themselves for me to have it.

You should also have seen him at our horrible retreat from Delium. I was there with the cavalry, while Socrates was a foot soldier. The army had already dispersed in all directions, and Socrates was retreating together with Laches. I happened to see them just by chance, and the moment I did I started shouting encouragements to them, telling them I was never going to leave their side, and so on. That day I had a better opportunity to watch Socrates than I ever had at Potidaea, for, being on horseback, I wasn't in very great danger. Well, it was easy to see that he was remarkably more collected than Laches. But when I looked again I couldn't get your words, Aristophanes, out of my mind: in the midst of battle he was making his way exactly as he does around town, with swaggering gait and roving eye.

He was observing everything quite calmly, looking out for friendly troops and keeping an eye on the enemy. Even from a

great distance it was obvious that this was a very brave man, who would put up a terrific fight if anyone approached him. This is what saved both of them. For, as a rule, you try to put as much distance as you can between yourself and such men in battle; you go after the others, those who run away helter-skelter.

You could say many other marvelous things in praise of Socrates. Perhaps he shares some of his specific accomplishments with others. But, as a whole, he is unique; he is like no one else in the past and no one in the present—this is by far the most amazing thing about him. For we might be able to form an idea of what Achilles was like by comparing him to Brasidas or some other great warrior, or we might compare Pericles with Nestor or Antenor or one of the other great orators. There is a parallel for everyone—everyone else, that is. But this man here is so bizarre, his ways and his ideas are so unusual, that, search as you might, you'll never find anyone else, alive or dead, who's even remotely like him. The best you can do is not to compare him to anything human, but to liken him, as I do, to Silenus and the satyrs, and the same goes for his ideas and arguments.

Come to think of it, I should have mentioned this much earlier: even his ideas and arguments are just like those hollow statues of Silenus. If you were to listen to his arguments, at first they' strike you as totally ridiculous; they're clothed in words as coarse as the hides worn by the most vulgar satyrs. He's always going on about pack asses, or blacksmiths, or cobblers, or tanners; he's always making the same tired old points in the same tired old words. If you are foolish, or simply unfamiliar with him, you'd find it impossible not to laugh at his arguments. But if you see them when they open up like the statues, if you go behind their surface, you'll realize that no other arguments make any sense. They're truly worthy of a god, bursting with figures of virtue inside. They're

of great—no, of the greatest—importance for anyone who wants to become a truly good man.

Well, this is my praise of Socrates, though I haven't spared him my reproach, either; I told you how horribly he treated me—and not only me but also Charmides, Euthydemus, and many others. He has deceived us all: he presents himself as your lover, and, before you know it, you're in love with him yourself! I warn you, Agathon, don't let him fool you!

Remember our torments; be on your guard: don't wait, like the fool in the proverb, to learn your lesson from your own misfortune.

Apollodorus/ Alcibiades' frankness provoked a lot of laughter, especially since it was obvious that he was still in love with Socrates, who immediately said to him:

Socrates/ "You're perfectly sober after all, Alcibiades. Otherwise you could never have concealed your motive so gracefully: how casually you let it drop, almost like an afterthought, at the very end of your speech! As if the real point of all this has not been simply to make trouble between Agathon and me! You think that I should be in love with you and no one else, while you, and no one else, should be in love with Agathon—well, we were not deceived; we've seen through your little satyr play. Agathon, my friend, don't let him get away with it: let no one come between us!"

Apollodorus/ Agathon said to Socrates:

Agathon/ "I'm beginning to think you're right; isn't it proof of that that he literally came between us here on the couch? Why would he do this if he weren't set on separating us? But he won't get away with it; I'm coming right over to lie down next to you."

Socrates/ "Wonderful. Come here, on my other side."

Alcibiades/ "My god! How I suffer in his hands! He kicks me when I'm down; he never lets me go. Come, don't be selfish,

Socrates; at least, let's compromise: let Agathon lie down between us."

Socrates/ "Why, that's impossible. You have already delivered your praise of me, and now it's my turn to praise whoever's on my right. But if Agathon were next to you, he'd have to praise me all over again instead of having me speak in his honor, as I very much want to do in any case. Don't be jealous; let me praise the boy."

Agathon/ "Oh, marvelous, Alcibiades, nothing can make me stay next to you now. I'm moving no matter what. I simply must hear what Socrates has to say about me."

Alcibiades/ "There we go again. It's the same old story: when Socrates is around, nobody else can get close to a good-looking man. Look how smoothly and plausibly he found a reason for Agathon to lie down next to him!"

Apollodorus/ And then, all of a sudden, while Agathon was changing places, a large drunken group, finding the gates open because someone was just leaving, walked into the room and joined the party. There was noise everywhere, and everyone was made to start drinking again in no particular order.

At that point, Aristodemus said, Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and some others among the original guests made their excuses and left. He himself fell asleep and slept for a long time (it was winter, and the nights were quite long). He woke up just as dawn was about to break; the roosters were crowing already. He saw that the others had either left or were asleep on their couches and that only Agathon, Aristophanes, and Socrates were still awake, drinking out of a large cup which they were passing around from left to right. Socrates was talking to them. Aristodemus couldn't remember exactly what they were saying—he'd missed the first part of their discussion, and he was half-asleep anyway—but the main

point was that Socrates was trying to prove to them that authors should be able to write both comedy and tragedy: the skillful tragic dramatist should also be a comic poet. He was about to clinch his argument, though, to tell the truth, sleepy as they were, they were hardly able to follow his reasoning. In fact, Aristophanes fell asleep in the middle of the discussion, and very soon thereafter, as day was breaking, Agathon also drifted off.

But after getting them off to sleep, Socrates got up and left, and Aristodemus followed him, as always. He said that Socrates went directly to the Lyceum, washed up, spent the rest of the day just as he always did, and only then, as evening was falling, went home to rest.

The Banquet.

Translated by Percy Bysshe Shelley.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Apollodorus, Friend, Glaucon, Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Alcibiades, Servant, Aristodemus, Diotima.

Apollodorus/ I think that the subject of your inquiries is still fresh in my memory; for yesterday, as I chanced to be returning home from Phaleros, one of my acquaintance, seeing me before him, called out to me from a distance, jokingly;

Glaucon/ "Apollodorus, you Phalerian, will you not wait a minute?"

Apollodorus/ I waited for him, and as soon as he overtook me;

Glaucon/ "I have just been looking for you, Apollodorus, for I wished to hear what those discussions were on Love, which took place at the party, when Agathon, Socrates, Alcibiades, and some others met at supper. Someone who heard it from Phoenix, the son of Philip, told me that you could give a full account, but he could relate nothing distinctly himself. Relate to me, then, I entreat you, all the circumstances. I know you are a faithful reporter of the discussions of your friends; but, first tell me, were you present at the party or not?"

Apollodorus/ "Your informant, seems to have given you no very clear idea of what you wish to hear, if he thinks that these discussions took place so lately as that I could have been of the party."

Glaucon/ "Indeed, I thought so."

Apollodorus/ “For how, O Glauco! could I have been present? Do you not know that Agathon has been absent from the city many years? But, since I began to converse with Socrates, and to observe each day all his words and actions, three years are scarcely past. Before this time I wandered about wherever it might chance, thinking that I did something, but being, in truth, a most miserable wretch, not less than you are now, who believe that you ought to do anything rather than practice the love of wisdom.”

Glaucon/ “Do not cavil, but tell me, when did this party take place?”

Apollodorus/ “Whilst we were yet children, when Agathon first gained the prize of tragedy, and the day after that on which he and the chorus made sacrifices in celebration of their success.”

Glaucon/ “A long time ago, it seems. But who told you all the circumstances of the discussion? Did you hear them from Socrates himself?”

Apollodorus/ “No, by Zeus! But the same person from whom Phoenix had his information, one Aristodemus, a Cydathenean, a little man who always went about without sandals. He was present at this feast, being, I believe, more than any of his contemporaries, a lover and admirer of Socrates. I have questioned Socrates concerning some of the circumstances of his narration, who confirms all that I have heard from Aristodemus.”

Glaucon/ “Why, then, why not relate them, as we walk, to me? The road to the city is every way convenient, both for those who listen and those who speak.”

Apollodorus/ Thus as we walked I gave him some account of those discussions concerning Love; since, as I said before, I remember them with sufficient accuracy. If I am required to relate them also to you, that shall willingly be done; for,

whensoever either I myself talk of philosophy, or listen to others talking of it, in addition to the improvement which I conceive there arises from such conversation, I am delighted beyond measure; but whenever I hear your discussions about monied men and great proprietors, I am weighed down with grief, and pity you, who, doing nothing, believe that you are doing something. Perhaps you think that I am a miserable wretch; and, indeed, I believe that you think truly. I do not think, but well know, that you are miserable.

Friend/ You are always the same, Apollodorus

always saying some ill of yourself and others. Indeed, you seem to me to think everyone miserable except Socrates, beginning with yourself. I do not know what could have entitled you to the surname of the "Madman," for I am sure, you are consistent enough, forever inveighing with bitterness against yourself and all others, except Socrates.

Apollodorus/ My dear friend, it is manifest that I am out of my wits from this alone that I have such opinions as you describe concerning myself and you.

Friend/ It is not worthwhile, Apollodorus, to dispute now about these things; but do what I entreat you, and relate to us what were these discussions.

Apollodorus/ They were such as I will proceed to tell you. But let me attempt to relate them in the order which Aristodemus observed in relating them to me. He said that he met Socrates washed, and, contrary to his usual custom, sandaled, and having inquired whither he went so gaily dressed, Socrates replied;

Socrates/ "I am going to sup at Agathon's; yesterday I avoided it, disliking the crowd, which would attend at the prize sacrifices then celebrated; today I promised to be there, and I made myself so gay, because one ought to be beautiful

to approach one who is beautiful. But you, Aristodemus, what think you of coming uninvited to supper?"

Aristodemus/ "I will do, as you command."

Socrates/ "Follow, then, that we may, by changing its application, disarm that proverb which says, 'To the feasts of the good, the good come uninvited.' Homer, indeed, seems not only to destroy, but to outrage the proverb; for, describing Agamemnon as excellent in battle, and Menelaus but a faint-hearted warrior, he represents Menelaus as coming uninvited to the feast of one better and braver than himself."

Aristodemus/ "I also am in some danger, Socrates, not as you say, but according to Homer, of approaching like an unworthy inferior, the banquet of one more wise and excellent than myself. Will you not, then, make some excuse for me? for, I shall not confess that I came uninvited, but shall say that I was invited by you."

Socrates/ "As we walk together, we will consider together what excuse to make but let us go."

Apollodorus/ Thus discoursing, they proceeded. But, as they walked, Socrates, engaged in some deep contemplation, slackened his pace, and, observing Aristodemus waiting for him, he desired him to go on before. When Aristodemus arrived at Agathon's house he found the door open, and it occurred somewhat comically, that a slave met him at the vestibule, and conducted him where he found the guests already reclined. As soon as Agathon saw him;

Agathon/ "You arrive just in time to sup with us, Aristodemus, if you have any other purpose in your visit, defer it to a better opportunity. I was looking for you yesterday, to invite you to be of our party; I could not find you anywhere. But how is it that you do not bring Socrates with you?"

Apollodorus/ But he turning round, and not seeing Socrates behind him, said to Agathon;

Aristodemus/ “I just came hither in his company, being invited by him to sup with you.”

Agathon/ “You did well, to come; but where is Socrates?”

Aristodemus/ “He just now came hither behind me; I myself wonder where he can be.”

Agathon/ “Go and look, boy, and bring Socrates in; meanwhile, you, Aristodemus, recline there near Eryximachus.”

Apollodorus/ And he bade a slave wash his feet that he might recline. Another slave, meanwhile, brought word that Socrates had retired into a neighboring vestibule, where he stood, and, in spite of his message, refused to come in.

Agathon/ “What absurdity you talk, call him, and do not leave him till he comes.”

Aristodemus/ “Leave him alone, by all means, it is customary with him sometimes to retire in this way and stand wherever it may chance. He will come presently, I do not doubt; do not disturb him.”

Agathon/ “Well, be it as you will, as it is, you boys, bring supper for the rest; put before us what you will, for I resolved that there should be no master of the feast. Consider me, and these, my friends, as guests, whom you have invited to supper, and serve them so that we may commend you.”

Apollodorus/ After this they began supper, but Socrates did not come in. Agathon ordered him to be called, but Aristodemus perpetually forbade it. At last he came in, much about the middle of supper, not having delayed so long as was his custom. Agathon (who happened to be reclining at the end of the table, and alone,) said, as he entered;

Agathon/ “Come hither, Socrates, and sit down by me; so that by the mere touch of one so wise as you are, I may enjoy the fruit of your meditations in the vestibule; for, I well know, you would not have departed till you had discovered and secured it.”

Apollodorus/ Socrates having sate down as he was desired, replied;

Socrates/ “It would be well, Agathon, if wisdom were of such a nature, that when we touched each other, it would overflow of its own accord, from him who possesses much to him who possesses little; like the water in two chalices, which will flow through a flock of wool from the fuller into the emptier, until both are equal. If wisdom had this property, I should esteem myself most fortunate in reclining near to you. I should thus soon be filled, I think, with the most beautiful and various wisdom. Mine, indeed, is something obscure, and doubtful, and dreamlike. But yours is radiant, and has been crowned with amplest reward; for, though you are yet so young, it shone forth from you, and became so manifest yesterday, that more than thirty thousand Greeks can bear testimony to its excellence and loveliness.”

Agathon/ “You are laughing at me, Socrates, but you and I will decide this controversy about wisdom by and by, taking Bacchus for our judge. At present turn to your supper.”

Apollodorus/ After Socrates and the rest had finished supper, and had reclined back on their couches, and the libations had been poured forth, and they had sung hymns to the god, and all other rites which are customary, had been performed, they turned to drinking. Then Pausanias made this kind of proposal.

Pausanias/ “Come, my friends, in what manner will it be pleasantest for us to drink? I must confess to you that, in

reality, I am not very well from the wine we drank last night, and I have need of some intermission. I suspect that most of you are in the same condition, for you were here yesterday. Now, consider how we shall drink most easily and comfortably."

Aristophanes/ "'Tis a good proposal, Pausanias, to contrive, in some way or other, to place moderation in our cups. I was one of those who were drenched last night."

Eryximachus/ "I am of your opinion; I only wish to know one thing

whether Agathon is in the humor for hard drinking?"

Agathon/ "Not at all, I confess that I am not able to drink much this evening."

Eryximachus/ "It is an excellent thing for us, I mean myself, Aristodemus, Phaedrus, and these others, if you who are such invincible drinkers, now refuse to drink. I ought to except Socrates, for he is capable of drinking everything, or nothing; and whatever we shall determine will equally suit him. Since, then, no one present has any desire to drink much wine, I shall perhaps give less offence, if I declare the nature of drunkenness. The science of medicine teaches us that drunkenness is very pernicious: nor would I choose to drink immoderately myself, or counsel another to do so, especially if he had been drunk the night before."

Phaedrus/ "Yes, I have been accustomed to confide in you, especially in your directions concerning medicine; and I would now willingly do so, if the rest will do the same."

Apollodorus/ All then agreed that they would drink at this present banquet not for drunkenness, but for pleasure.

Eryximachus/ "Since, then, it is decided that no one shall be compelled to drink more than he pleases, I think that we may as well send away the flute-player to play to herself; or, if she likes, to the women within. Let us devote the present

occasion to conversation between ourselves, and if you wish, I will propose to you what shall be the subject of our discussion."

Apollodorus/ All present desired and entreated that he would explain.

Eryximachus/ "The exordium of my speech,' will be in the style of the Menalippe of Euripides, for the story which I am about to tell belongs not to me, but to Phaedrus. Phaedrus has often indignantly complained to me, saying—'Is it not strange, Eryximachus, that there are innumerable hymns and paeans composed for the other gods, but that not one of the many poets who spring up in the world has ever composed a verse in honor of Love, who is such and so great a god? Nor anyone of those accomplished sophists, who, like the famous Prodicus, have celebrated the praise of Hercules and others, have ever celebrated that of Love; But what is more astonishing, I have lately met with the book of some philosopher, in which salt is extolled on account of its utility, and many other things of the same nature are in like manner celebrated with elaborate praise. That so much serious thought is expended on such trifles, and that no man has dared to this day to frame a hymn in honor of Love, who being so great a deity, is thus neglected, may well be sufficient to excite my indignation.'

"There seemed to me some justice in these complaints of Phaedrus; I propose, therefore, at the same time for the sake of giving pleasure to Phaedrus, and that we may on the present occasion do something well and befitting us, that this god should receive from those who are now present the honor which is most due to him. If you agree to my proposal, an excellent discussion might arise on the subject. Everyone ought, according to my plan, to praise Love with as much eloquence as he can. Let Phaedrus begin first, both because

he reclines the first in order, and because he is the father of the discussion."

Socrates/ "No one will vote against you, Eryximachus, for how can I oppose your proposal, who am ready to confess that I know nothing on any subject but love? Or how can Agathon, or Pausanias, or even Aristophanes, whose life is one perpetual ministration to Venus and Bacchus? Or how can any other whom I see here? Though we who sit last are scarcely on an equality with you; for if those who speak before us shall have exhausted the subject with their eloquence and reasonings, our discourses will be superfluous. But in the name of Good Fortune, let Phædrus begin and praise Love."

Apollodorus/ The whole party agreed to what Socrates said, and entreated Phaedrus to begin.

What each then said on this subject, Aristodemus did not entirely recollect, nor do I recollect all that he related to me; but only the speeches of those who said what was most worthy of remembrance. First, then, Phaedrus began thus:

Phaedrus/ "Love is a mighty deity, and the object of admiration, both to gods and men, for many and for various claims; but especially on account of his origin. For that he is to be honored as one of the most ancient of the gods, this may serve as a testimony, that Love has no parents, nor is there any poet or other person who has ever affirmed that there are such. Hesiod says, that first 'Chaos was produced; then the broad-bosomed Earth, to be a secure foundation for all things; then Love.' He says, that after Chaos these two were produced, the Earth and Love. Parmenides, speaking of generation, says: —'But he created Love before any of the gods.' Acusileus agrees with Hesiod. Love, therefore, is universally acknowledged to be among the oldest of things. And in addition to this, Love is the author of our greatest

advantages; for I cannot imagine a greater happiness and advantage to one who is in the flower of youth than an amiable lover, or to a lover, than an amiable object of his love. For neither birth, nor wealth, nor honors, can awaken in the minds of men the principles which should guide those who from their youth aspire to an honorable and excellent life, as Love awakens them. I speak of the fear of shame, which deters them from that which is disgraceful; and the love of glory, which incites to honorable deeds. For it is not possible that a state or private person should accomplish, without these incitements, anything beautiful or great. I assert, then, that should one who loves be discovered in any dishonorable action, or tamely enduring insult through cowardice, he would feel more anguish and shame if observed by the object of his passion, than if he were observed by his father, or his companions, or any other person. In like manner, among warmly attached friends, a man is especially grieved to be discovered by his friend in any dishonorable act. If then, by any contrivance, a state or army could be composed of friends bound by strong attachment, it is beyond calculation how excellently they would administer their affairs, reframing from anything base, contending with each other for the acquirement of fame, and exhibiting such velour in battle as that, though few in numbers, they might subdue all mankind. For should one friend desert the ranks or cast away his arms, in the presence of the other, he would suffer far acuter shame from that one person's regard, than from the regard of all other men. A thousand times would he prefer to die, rather than desert the object of his attachment, and not succor him in danger.

"There is none so worthless whom Love cannot impel, as it were by a divine inspiration, towards virtue, even so that he may through this inspiration become equal to one who

might naturally be more excellent; and, in truth, as Homer says: The God breathes vigor into certain heroes—so Love breathes into those who love, the spirit which is produced from himself. Not only men, but even women who love, are those alone who willingly expose themselves to die for others. Alcestis, the daughter of Pelias, affords to the Greeks a remarkable example of this opinion; she alone being willing to die for her husband, and so surpassing his parents in the affection with which love inspired her towards him, as to make them appear, in the comparison with her, strangers to their own child, and related to him merely in name; and so lovely and admirable did this action appear, not only to men, but even to the Gods, that, although they conceded the prerogative of bringing back the spirit from death to few among the many who then performed excellent and honorable deeds, yet, delighted with this action, they redeemed her soul from the infernal regions: so highly do the Gods honor zeal and devotion in love. They sent back indeed Orpheus, the son of Œagrus, from Hell, with his purpose unfulfilled, and, showing him only the specter of her for whom he came, refused to render up herself. For Orpheus seemed to them, not as Alcestis, to have dared die for the sake of her whom he loved, and thus to secure to himself a perpetual intercourse with her in the regions to which she had preceded him, but like a cowardly musician, to have contrived to descend alive into Hell; and, indeed, they appointed as a punishment for his cowardice, that he should be put to death by women.

"Far otherwise did they reward Achilles, the son of Thetis, whom they sent to inhabit the islands of the blessed. For Achilles, though informed by his mother that his own death would ensue upon his killing Hector, but that if he refrained from it he might return home and die in old age, yet preferred revenging and honoring his beloved Patroclus; not to die for

him merely, but to disdain and reject that life which he had ceased to snare. Therefore the Greeks honored Achilles beyond all other men, because he thus preferred his friend to all things else.

"On this account have the Gods rewarded Achilles more amply than Alcestis; permitting his spirit to inhabit the island of the blessed. Hence do I assert that Love is the most ancient and venerable of deities, and most powerful to endow mortals with the possession of happiness and virtue, both whilst they live and after they die."

Apollodorus/ Thus Aristodemus reported the discourse of Phaedrus; and after Phaedrus, he said that some others spoke, whose discourses he did not well remember. When they had ceased, Pausanias began thus:

Pausanias/ "Simply to praise Love, O Phaedrus, seems to me too bounded a scope for our discourse. If Love were one, it would be well. But since Love is not one, I will endeavor to distinguish which is the Love whom it becomes us to praise, and having thus discriminated one from the other, will attempt to render him who is the subject of our discourse the honor due to his divinity. We all know that Venus is never without Love; and if Venus were one, Love would be one; but since there are two Venuses, of necessity also must there be two Loves. For assuredly are there two Venuses; one, the eldest, the daughter of Uranus, born without a mother, whom we call the Uranian; the other younger, the daughter of Zeus and Dione, whom we call the Pandemian; —of necessity must there also be two Loves, the Uraman and Pandemian companions of these goddesses. It is becoming to praise all the Gods, but the attributes which fall to the lot of each may be distinguished and selected. For any particular action whatever, in itself is neither good nor evil; what we are now doing—drinking, singing, talking, none of these things are good in themselves, but the mode in which

they are done stamps them with its own nature; and that which is done well, is good, and that which is done ill, is evil. Thus, not all love, nor every mode of love is beautiful, or worthy of commendation, but that alone which excites us to love worthily. The Love, therefore, which attends upon Venus Pandemos is, in truth, common to the vulgar, and presides over transient and fortuitous connections, and is worshipped by the least excellent of mankind. The votaries of this deity seek the body rather than the soul, and the ignorant rather than the wise, disdaining all that is honorable and lovely, and considering how they shall best satisfy their sensual necessities. This Love is derived from the younger goddess, who partakes in her nature both of male and female. But the attendant on the other, the Uranian, whose nature is entirely masculine, is the Love who inspires us with affection, and exempts us from all wantonness and libertinism. Those who are inspired by this divinity seek the affections of those who are endowed by nature with greater excellence and vigor both of body and mind. And it is easy to distinguish those who especially exist under the influence of this power, by their choosing in early youth as the objects of their love those in whom the intellectual faculties have begun to develop. For those who begin to love in this manner seem to me to be preparing to pass their whole life together in a community of good and evil, and not ever lightly deceiving those who love them, to be faithless to their vows. There ought to be a law that none should love the very young; so much serious affection as this deity enkindles should not be doubtfully bestowed; for the body and mind of those so young are yet unformed, and it is difficult to foretell what will be their future tendencies and power, The good voluntarily impose this law upon themselves, and those vulgar lovers ought to be compelled to the same observance, as we deter them with all the power

of the laws from the love of free matrons. For these are the persons whose shameful actions embolden those who observe their importunity and intemperance to assert, that it is dishonorable to serve and gratify the objects of our love. But no one who does this gracefully and according to law, can justly be liable to the imputation of blame.

"Not only friendship, but philosophy and the practice of the gymnastic exercises, are represented as dishonorable by the tyrannical governments under which the barbarians live. For I imagine it would little conduce to the benefit of the governors, that the governed should be disciplined to lofty thoughts and to the unity and communion of steadfast friendship, of which admirable effects the tyrants of our own country have also learned that Lore is the author. For the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, strengthened into a firm friendship, dissolved the tyranny. Wherever, therefore, it is declared dishonorable in any case to serve and benefit friends, that law is a mark of the depravity of the legislator, the avarice and tyranny of the rulers, and the cowardice of those who are ruled. Wherever it is simply declared to be honorable without distinction of cases, such a declaration denotes dullness and want of subtlety of mind in the authors of the regulation. Here the degrees of praise or blame to be attributed by law are far better regulated; but it is yet difficult to determine the cases to which they should refer.

"It is evident, however, for one in whom passion is enkindled, it is more honorable to love openly than secretly; and most honorable to love the most excellent and virtuous, even if they should be less beautiful than others. It is honorable for the lover to exhort and sustain the object of his love in virtuous conduct. It is considered honorable to attain the love of those whom we seek, and the contrary shameful; and to facilitate this attainment, opinion has given to the lover the permission of acquiring favor by the

most extraordinary devices, which if a person should practice for any purpose besides this, he would incur the severest reproof of philosophy. For if anyone desirous of accumulating money, or ambitious of procuring power, or seeking any other advantage, should, like a lover seeking to acquire the favor of his beloved, employ prayers and entreaties in his necessity, and swear such oaths as lovers swear, and sleep before the threshold, and offer to subject himself to such slavery as no slave even would endure; he would be frustrated of the attainment of what he sought, both by his enemies and friends, these reviling him for his flattery, those sharply admonishing him, and taking to themselves the shame of his servility. But there is a certain grace in a lover who does all these things, so that he alone may do them without dishonor. It is commonly said that the Gods accord pardon to the lover alone if he should break his oath, and that there is no oath by Venus. Thus, as our law declares, both Gods and men have given to lovers all possible indulgence.

"The affair, however, I imagine, stands thus: —As I have before said, love cannot be considered in itself as either honorable or dishonorable: if it is honorably pursued, it is honorable; if dishonorably, dishonorable: it is dishonorable basely to serve and gratify a worthless person; it is honorable honorably to serve a person of virtue. That Pandemic lover who loves rather the body than the soul is worthless, nor can be constant and consistent, since he has placed his affections on that which has no stability. For as soon as the flower of the form, which was the sole object of his desire, has faded, then he departs and is seen no more; bound by no faith nor shame of his many promises and persuasions. But he who is the lover of virtuous manners is constant during life, since he has placed himself in harmony and desire with that which is consistent with itself.

“These two classes of persons we ought to distinguish with careful examination, so that we may serve and converse with the one and avoid the other; determining, by that inquiry, by what a man is attracted, and for what the object of his love is dear to him. On the same account it is considered as dishonorable to be inspired with love at once, lest time should be wanting to know and approve the character of the object. It is considered dishonorable to be captivated by the allurements of wealth and power, or terrified through injuries to yield up the affections, or not to despise in the comparison with an unconstrained choice all political influence and personal advantage. For no circumstance is there in wealth or power so invariable and consistent, as that no generous friendship can ever spring up from amongst them. “We have an opinion with respect to lovers which declares that it shall not be considered servile or disgraceful, though the lover should submit himself to any species of slavery for the sake of his beloved. The same opinion holds with respect to those who undergo any degradation for the sake of virtue. And also it is esteemed among us, that if anyone chooses to serve and obey another for the purpose of becoming more wise or more virtuous through the intercourse that might thence arise, such willing slavery is not the slavery of a dishonest flatterer. Through this we should consider in the same light a servitude undertaken for the sake of love as one undertaken for the acquirement of wisdom or any other excellence, if indeed the devotion of a lover to his beloved is to be considered a beautiful thing. For when the lover and the beloved have once arrived at the same point, the province of each being distinguished; … the one able to assist in the cultivation of the mind and in the acquirement of every other excellence; the other yet requiring education, and seeking the possession of wisdom; then alone, by the union of these

conditions, and in no other case, is it honorable for the beloved to yield up the affections to the lover. In this servitude alone there is no disgrace in being deceived and defeated of the object for which it was undertaken, whereas every other is disgraceful, whether we are deceived or no.

"On the same principle, if anyone seeks the friendship of another, believing him to be virtuous, for the sake of becoming better through such intercourse and affection, and is deceived, his friend turning out to be worthless, and far from the possession of virtue; yet it is honorable to have been so deceived. For such a one seems to have submitted to a kind of servitude, because he would endure anything for the sake of becoming more virtuous and wise; a disposition of mind eminently beautiful.

"This is that Love who attends on the Uranian deity, and is Uranian; the author of innumerable benefits both to the state and to individuals, and by the necessity of whose influence those who love are disciplined into the zeal of virtue. All other loves are the attendants on Venus Pandemos. So much, although unpremeditated, is what I have to deliver on the subject of love, O Phædrus."

Apollodorus/ Pausanias having ceased (for so the learned teach me to denote the changes of the discourse), Aristodemus said that it came to the turn of Aristophanes to speak; but it happened that, from repletion or some other cause, he had an hiccough which prevented him; so he turned to Eryximachus, the physician, who was reclining close beside him, and said

Aristophanes/ "Eryximachus. it is but fair that you should cure my hiccough, or speak instead of me until it is over."

Eryximachus/ "I will do both, I will speak in your turn, and you, when your hiccough has ceased, shall speak in

mine. Meanwhile, if you hold your breath some time, it will subside. If not, gargle your throat with water; and if it still continue, take something to stimulate your nostrils, and sneeze; do this once or twice, and even though it should be very violent it will cease."

Aristophanes/ "Whilst you speak, I will follow your directions."

Apollodorus/ Eryximachus then began:

Eryximachus/ "Since Pausanias, beginning his discourse excellently, placed no fit completion and development to it, I think it necessary to attempt to fill up what he has left unfinished. He has reasoned well in defining love as of a double nature. The science of medicine, to which I have addicted myself, seems to teach me that the love which impels towards those who are beautiful, does not subsist only in the souls of men, but in the bodies also of those of all other living beings which are produced upon earth, and, in a word, in all things which are. So wonderful and mighty is this divinity, and so widely is his influence extended over all divine and human things! For the honor of my profession, I will begin by adducing a proof from medicine. The nature of the body contains within itself this double love.

For that which is healthy and that which is diseased in a body differ and are unlike: that which is unlike, loves and desires that which is unlike. Love, therefore, is different in a sane and in a diseased body. Pausanias has asserted rightly that it is honorable to gratify those things in the body which are good and healthy, and in this consists the skill of the physician; whilst those which are bad and diseased, ought to be treated with no indulgence. The science of medicine, in a word, is a knowledge of the love affairs of the body, as they bear relation to repletion and evacuation; and he is the most skillful physician who can trace those operations of the good

and evil love, can make the one change places with the other, and attract love into those parts from which he is absent, or expel him from those which he ought not to occupy. He ought to make those things which are most inimical, friendly, and excite them to mutual love. But those things are most inimical which are most opposite to each other; cold to heat, bitterness to sweetness, dryness to moisture. Our progenitor, Æsculapius, as the poets inform us, {and indeed I believe them,) through the skill which he possessed to inspire love and concord in these contending principles, established the science of medicine.

"The gymnastic arts and agriculture, no less than medicine, are exercised under the dominion of this God. Music, as anyone may perceive, who yields a very slight attention to the subject, originates from the same source; which Heraclitus probably meant, though he could not express his meaning very clearly in words, when he says, 'One though apparently differing, yet so agrees with itself, as the harmony of 'lyre and a bow.' It is great absurdity to say that a harmony differs, and can exist between things whilst they are dissimilar; but probably he meant that from sounds which first differed, like the grave and the acute, and which afterwards agreed, harmony was produced according to musical art. For no harmony can arise from the grave and the acute whilst yet they differ.

But harmony is symphony: symphony is, as it were, concord. But it is impossible that concord should subsist between things that differ, so long as they differ. Between things which are discordant and dissimilar there is then no harmony. A rhythm is produced from that which is quick, and that which is slow, first being distinguished and opposed to each other, and then made accordant; so does medicine, no less than music, establish a concord between

the objects of its art, producing love and agreement between adverse things.

"Music is then the knowledge of that which relates to love in harmony and system. In the very system of harmony and rhythm, it is easy to distinguish love. The double love is not distinguishable in music itself; but it is required to apply it to the service of mankind by system and harmony, which is called poetry, or the composition of melody; or by the correct use of songs and measures already composed, which is called discipline; then one can be distinguished from the other, by the aid of an extremely skillful artist. And the better love ought to be honored and preserved for the sake of those who are virtuous, and that the nature of the vicious may be changed through the inspiration of its spirit. This is that beautiful Uranian love, the attendant on the Uranian muse: the Pandemian is the attendant of Polyhymnia; to whose influence we should only so far subject ourselves, as to derive pleasure from it without indulging to excess; in the same manner as, according to our art, we are instructed to seek the pleasures of the table, only so far as we can enjoy them without the consequences of disease. In music, therefore, and in medicine, and in all other things, human and divine, this double love ought to be traced and discriminated; for it is in all things.

"Even the constitution of the seasons of the year is penetrated with these contending principles. For so often as heat and cold, dryness and moisture, of which I spoke before, are influenced by the more benignant love, and are harmoniously and temperately intermingled with the seasons, they bring maturity and health to men, and to all the other animals and plants. But when the evil and injurious love assumes the dominion of the seasons of the year, destruction is spread widely abroad. Then pestilence is accustomed to arise, and many other blights and diseases

fall upon animals and plants: and hoar frosts, and hails, and mildew on the corn, are produced from that excessive and disorderly love, with which each season of the year is impelled towards the other; the motions of which and the knowledge of the stars is called astronomy. All sacrifices, and all those things in which divination is concerned (for these things are the links by which is maintained an intercourse and communion between the Gods and men,) are nothing else than the science of preservation and right government of Love. For impiety is accustomed to spring up, so soon as anyone ceases to serve the more honorable Love, and worship him by the sacrifice of good actions; but submits himself to the influences of the other, in relation to his duties towards his parents, and the Gods, and the living, and the dead. It is the object of divination to distinguish and remedy the effects of these opposite loves; and divination is therefore the author of the friendship of Gods and men, because it affords the knowledge of what in matters of love is lawful or unlawful to men.

"Thus every species of love possesses collectively a various and vast, or rather universal power. But love which incites to the acquirement of its objects according to virtue and wisdom, possesses the most exclusive dominion, and prepares for his worshippers the highest happiness through the mutual intercourse of social kindness which it promotes among them, and through the benevolence which he attracts to them from the Gods, our superiors.

"Probably in thus praising Love, I have unwillingly omitted many things; but it is your business, O Aristophanes, to fill up all that I have left incomplete; or, if you have imagined any other mode of honoring the divinity; for I observe your hiccough is over."

Aristophanes/ "Yes, but not before I applied the sneezing. I wonder why the harmonious construction of our body

should require such noisy operations as sneezing; for it ceased the moment I sneezed."

Eryximachus/ "Do you not observe what you do, my good Aristophanes? you are going to speak, and you predispose us to laughter, and compel me to watch for the first ridiculous idea which you may start in your discourse, when you might have spoken in peace."

Aristophanes/ "Let me unsay what I have said, then. Do not watch me, I entreat you; though I am not afraid of saying what is laughable, (since that would be all gain, and quite in the accustomed spirit of my muse,) but lest I should say what is ridiculous."

Eryximachus/ "Do you think to throw your dart, and escape with impunity, Aristophanes? Attend, and what you say be careful you maintain; then, perhaps, if it pleases me, I may dismiss you without question."

Aristophanes/ "Indeed, Eryximachus, I have designed that my discourse should be very different from yours and that of Pausanias. It seems to me that mankind are by no means penetrated with a conception of the power of Love, or they would have built sumptuous temples and altars and have established magnificent rites of sacrifice in his honor; he deserves worship and homage more than all the other Gods and he has yet received none. For Love is of all the Gods the most friendly to mortals; and the physician of those wounds, whose cure would be the greatest happiness which could be conferred upon the human race. I will endeavor to unfold to you his true power, and you can relate what I declare to others.

"You ought first to know the nature of man, and the adventures he has gone through; for his nature was anciently far different from that which it is at present. First, then, human beings were formerly not divided into two

sexes, male and female; there was also a third, common to both the others, the name of which remains, though the sex itself has disappeared. The androgynous sex, both in appearance and in name, was common both to male and female; its name alone remains, which labors under a reproach.

"At the period to which I refer, the form of every human being was round, the back and the sides being circularly joined, and each had four arms and as many legs; two faces fixed upon a round neck, exactly like each other; one head between the two faces; four ears, and everything else as from such proportions it is easy to conjecture. Man walked upright as now, in whatever direction he pleased; but when he wished to go fast he made use of all his eight limbs, and proceeded in a rapid motion by rolling circularly round, — like tumblers, who, with their legs in the air, tumble round and round. We account for the production of three sexes by supposing that, at the beginning, the male was produced from the sun, the female from the earth; and that sex which participated in both sexes, from the moon, by reason of the androgynous nature of the moon. They were round, and their mode of proceeding was round, from the similarity which must needs subsist between them and their parent.

"They were strong also, and had aspiring thoughts. They it was who levied war against the Gods; and what Homer writes concerning Ephialtus and Otus, that they sought to ascend heaven and dethrone the Gods, in reality relates to this primitive people. Zeus and the other Gods debated what was to be done in this emergency. For neither could they prevail on themselves to destroy them, as they had the giants, with thunder, so that the race should be abolished; for in that case they would be deprived of the honors of the sacrifices which they were in the custom of receiving from them; nor could they permit a continuance of their insolence

and impiety. Zeus, with some difficulty having desired silence, at length spoke. 'I think,' said he, 'I have contrived a method by which we may, by rendering the human race more feeble, quell the insolence which they exercise, without proceeding to their utter destruction. I will cut each of them in half; and so they will at once be weaker and more useful on account of their numbers. They shall walk upright on two legs. If they show any more insolence, and will not keep quiet, I will cut them up in half again, so they shall go about hopping on one leg.'

"So saying, he cut human beings in half, as people cut eggs before they salt them, or as I have seen eggs cut with hairs. He ordered Apollo to take each one as he cut him, and turn his face and half his neck towards the operation, so that by contemplating it he might become more cautious and humble; and then, to cure him, Apollo turned the face round, and drawing the skin upon what we now call the belly, like a contracted pouch, and leaving one opening, that which is called the navel, tied it in the middle. He then smoothed many other wrinkles, and molded the breast with much such an instrument as the leather-cutters use to smooth the skins upon the block. He left only a few wrinkles in the belly, near the navel, to serve as a record of its former adventures. Immediately after this division, as each desired to possess the other half of himself, these divided people threw their arms around and embraced each other, seeking to grow together; and from this resolution to do nothing without the other half, they died of hunger and weakness: when one half died and the other was left alive, that which was thus left sought the other and folded it to its bosom; whether that half were an entire woman (for we now call it a woman) or a man; and thus they perished. But Zeus, pitying them, thought of another contrivance.... In this manner is generation now produced, by the union of male and female;

so that from the embrace of a man and woman the race is propagated.

"From this period, mutual love has naturally existed between human beings; that reconciler and bond of union of their original nature, which seeks to make two one, and to heal the divided nature of man. Every one of us is thus the half of what may be properly termed a man, and like a pselta cut in two, is the imperfect portion of an entire whole, perpetually necessitated to seek the half belonging to him. …

"Such as I have described is ever an affectionate lover and a faithful friend, delighting in that which is in conformity with his own nature. Whenever, therefore, any such as I have described are impetuously struck, through the sentiment of their former union, with love and desire and the want of community, they are unwilling to be divided even for a moment. These are they who devote their whole lives to each other, with a vain and inexpressible longing to obtain from each other something they know not what; for it is not merely the sensual delights of their intercourse for the sake of which they dedicate themselves to each other with such serious affection; but the soul of each manifestly thirsts for, from the other, something which there are no words to describe, and divines that which it seeks, and traces obscurely the footsteps of its obscure desire. If Vulcan should say to persons thus affected, 'My good people, what is it that you want with one another?' And if, while they were hesitating what to answer, he should proceed to ask, 'Do you not desire the closest union and singleness to exist between you, so that you may never be divided night or day? If so, I will melt you together, and make you grow into one, so that both in life and death ye may be undivided. Consider, is this what you desire? Will it content you if you become that which I propose?' We all know that no one would refuse such

an offer, but would at once feel that this was what he had ever sought; and intimately to mix and melt and to be melted together with his beloved, so that one should be made out of two.

"The cause of this desire is, that according to our original nature, we were once entire. The desire and the pursuit of integrity and union is that which we all love. First, as I said, we were entire, but now we have been dwindled through our own weakness, as the Arcadians by the Lacedemonians. There is reason to fear, if we are guilty of any additional impiety towards the Gods, that we may be cut in two again, and may go about like those figures painted on the columns, divided through the middle of our nostrils, as thin as lispæ. On which account every man ought to be exhorted to pay due reverence to the Gods, that we may escape so severe a punishment, and obtain those things which Love, our general and commander, incites us to desire; against whom let none rebel by exciting the hatred of the Gods. For if we continue on good terms with them, we may discover and possess those lost and concealed objects of our love; a good-fortune which now befalls to few.

"I assert, then, that the happiness of all, both men and women, consists singly in the fulfillment of their love, and in that possession of its objects by which we are in some degree restored to our ancient nature. If this be the completion of felicity, that must necessarily approach nearest to it, in which we obtain the possession and society of those whose natures most intimately accord with our own. And if we would celebrate any God as the author of this benefit, we should justly celebrate Love with hymns of joy; who, in our present condition, brings good assistance in our necessity, and affords great hopes, if we preserve in piety towards the Gods, that he will restore us to our original state, and confer on us the complete happiness alone suited to our nature.

“Such, Eryximachus, is my discourse on the subject of Love; different indeed from yours, which I nevertheless entreat you not to turn into ridicule, that we may not interrupt what each has separately to deliver on the subject.”

Eryximachus/ “I will refrain at present, for your discourse delighted me. And if I did not know that Socrates and Agathon were profoundly versed in the science of love affairs. I should fear that they had nothing new to say, after so many and such various imaginations. As it is, I confide in the fertility of their geniuses.”

Socrates/ “Your part of the contest, at least, was strenuously fought, Eryximachus, but if you had been in the situation in which I am, or rather shall be, after the discourse of Agathon, like me, you would then have reason to fear, and be reduced to your wits’ end.”

Agathon/ “Socrates, wishes to confuse me with the enchantments of his wit, sufficiently confused already with the expectation I see in the assembly in favor of my discourse.”

Socrates/ “I must have lost my memory, Agathon, if I imagine that you could be disturbed by a few private persons, after having witnessed your firmness and courage in ascending the rostrum with the actors, and in calmly reciting your compositions in the presence of so great an assembly as that which decreed you the prize of tragedy.”

Agathon/ “What then, Socrates, do you think me so full of the theatre as to be ignorant that the judgment of a few wise is more awful than that of a multitude of others, to one who rightly balances the value of their suffrages?”

Socrates/ “I should judge ill indeed. Agathon, in thinking you capable of any rude and unrefined conception, for I well know that if you meet with any whom you consider wise, you esteem such alone of more value than all others. But we are

far from being entitled to this distinction, for we were also of that assembly, and to be numbered among the rest. But should you meet with any who are really wise, you would be careful to say nothing in their presence which you thought they would not approve—is it not so?"

Agathon/ "Certainly."

Socrates/ "You would not then exercise the same caution in the presence of the multitude in which they were included?"

Phaedrus/ "My dear Agathon, if you answer all the questions of Socrates, they will never have an end; he will urge them without conscience so long as he can get any person, especially one who is so beautiful, to dispute with him. I own it delights me to hear Socrates discuss; but at present, I must see that Love is not defrauded of the praise, which it is my province to exact from each of you. Pay the God his due, and then reason between yourselves if you will."

Agathon/ "Your admonition is just, Phaedrus, nor need any reasoning I hold with Socrates impede me: we shall find many future opportunities for discussion. I will begin my discourse then; first having defined what ought to be the subject of it. All who have already spoken seem to me not so much to have praised Love, as to have felicitated mankind on the many advantages of which that deity is the cause; what he is, the author of these great benefits, none have yet declared. There is one mode alone of celebration which would comprehend the whole topic, namely, first to declare what are those benefits, and then what he is who is the author of those benefits, which are the subject of our discourse. Love ought first to be praised, and then his gifts declared. I assert, then, that although all the Gods are immortally happy, Love, if I dare trust my voice to express

so awful a truth, is the happiest, and most excellent, and the most beautiful. That he is the most beautiful is evident; first, O Phaedrus, from this circumstance, that he is the youngest of the Gods; and, secondly, from his fleetness; and from his repugnance to all that is old; for he escapes with the swiftness of wings from old age; a thing in itself sufficiently swift, since it overtakes us sooner than there is need; and which Love, who delights in the intercourse of the young, hates, and in no manner can be induced to enter into community with. The ancient proverb, which says that like is attracted by like, applies to the attributes of Love. I concede many things to you O Phædrus, but this I do not concede, that Love is more ancient than Saturn and Zeus. I assert that he is not only the youngest of the Gods, but invested with everlasting youth. Those ancient deeds among the Gods recorded by Hesiod and Parmenides, if their relations are to be considered as true, were produced not by Love, but by Necessity. For if Love had been then in Heaven, those violent and sanguinary crimes never would have taken place; but there would ever have subsisted that affection and peace, in which the Gods now live, under the influence of Love.

"He is young, therefore, and being young is tender and soft. There were need of some poet like Homer to celebrate the delicacy and tenderness of Love. For Homer says, that the goddess Calamity is delicate, and that her feet are tender. 'Her feet are soft,' he says, 'for she treads not upon the ground, but makes her path upon the heads of men.' He gives as an evidence of her tenderness, that she walks not upon that which is hard, but that which is soft. The same evidence is sufficient to make manifest the tenderness of Love. For Love walks not upon the earth, nor over the heads of men, which are not indeed very soft; but he dwells within, and treads on the softest of existing things, having

established his habitation within the souls and inmost nature of Gods and men; not indeed in all souls—for wherever he chances to find a hard and rugged disposition, there he will not inhabit, but only where it is most soft and tender. Of needs must he be the most delicate of all things, who touches lightly with his feet only the softest parts of those things which are the softest of all.

"He is then the youngest and the most delicate of all divinities; and in addition to this, he is, as it were, the most moist and liquid. For if he were otherwise, he could not, as he does, fold himself around everything, and secretly flow out and into every soul. His loveliness, that which Love possesses far beyond all other things, is a manifestation of the liquid and flowing symmetry of his form; for between deformity and Love there is eternal contrast and repugnance. His life is spent among flowers, and this accounts for the immortal fairness of his skin; for the winged Love rests not in his flight on any form, or within any soul the flower of whose loveliness is faded, but there remains most willingly where is the odor and the radiance of blossoms, yet unwithered. Concerning the beauty of the God, let this be sufficient, though many things must remain unsaid. Let us next consider the virtue and power of Love.

"What is most admirable in Love is, that he neither inflicts nor endures injury in his relations either with Gods or men. Nor if he suffers anything does he suffer it through violence, nor doing anything does he act it with violence, for Love is never even touched with violence. Everyone willingly administers everything to Love; and that which everyone voluntarily concedes to another, the laws, which are the kings of the republic, decree that is just for him to possess. In addition to justice, Love participates in the highest temperance; for if temperance is defined to be the being superior to and holding under dominion pleasures and

desires; then Love, than whom no pleasure is more powerful, and who is thus more powerful than all persuasions and delights, must be excellently temperate. In power and velour Mars cannot contend with Love: the love of Venus possesses Mars; the possessor is always superior to the possessed, and he who subdues the most powerful must of necessity be the most powerful of all.

"The justice and temperance and velour of the God have been thus declared; —there remains to exhibit his wisdom. And first, that, like Eryximachus, I may honor my own profession, the God is a wise poet; so wise that he can even make a poet one who was not before: for everyone, even if before he were ever so undisciplined, becomes a poet as soon as he is touched by Love; —a sufficient proof that Love is a great poet, and well skilled in that science according to the discipline of music. For what anyone possesses not, or knows not, that can he neither give nor teach another. And who will deny that the divine poetry, by which all living things are produced upon the earth, is harmonized by the wisdom of Love? Is it not evident that Love was the author of all the arts of life with which we are acquainted, and that he whose teacher has been Love, becomes eminent and illustrious, whilst he who knows not Love, remains forever unregarded and obscure? Apollo invented medicine, and divination, and archery, under the guidance of desire and Love; so that Apollo was the disciple of Love. Through him the Muses discovered the arts of literature, and Vulcan that of molding brass, and Minerva the loom, and Zeus the mystery of the dominion which he now exercises over gods and men. So were the Gods taught and disciplined by the love of that which is beautiful; for there is no love towards deformity.

"At the origin of things, as I have before said, many fearful deeds are reported to have been done among the Gods, on

account of the dominion of necessity. But so soon as this deity sprang forth from the desire which forever tends in the universe towards that which is lovely, then all blessings descended upon all living things, human and divine. Love seems to me, O Phædrus, a divinity the most beautiful and the best of all, and the author to all others of the excellencies with which his own nature is endowed. Nor can I restrain the poetic enthusiasm which takes possession of my discourse, and bids me declare that Love is the divinity who creates peace among men, and calm upon the sea, the windless silence of storms, repose and sleep in sadness. Love divests us of all alienation from each other, and fills our vacant hearts with overflowing sympathy; he gathers us together in such social meetings as we now delight to celebrate, our guardian and our guide in dances, and sacrifices, and feasts. Yes, Love, who showers benignity upon the world, and before whose presence all harsh passions flee and perish; the author of all soft affections; the destroyer of all ungentle thoughts; merciful, mild; the object of the admiration of the wise, and the delight of gods; possessed by the fortunate, and desired by the unhappy, therefore unhappy because they possess him not; the father of grace, and delicacy, and gentleness, and delight, and persuasion, and desire; the cherisher of all that is good, the abolisher of all evil; our most excellent pilot, defense, savior and guardian in labor and in fear, in desire and in reason; the ornament and governor of all things human and divine; the best, the loveliest; in whose footsteps everyone ought to follow, celebrating him excellently in song, and bearing each his part in that divinest harmony which Love sings to all things which live and are, soothing the troubled minds of Gods and men. This, O Phædrus, is what I have to offer in praise of the divinity; partly composed, indeed, of

thoughtless and playful fancies, and partly of such serious ones, as I could well command."

Apollodorus/ No sooner had Agathon ceased, than a loud murmur of applause arose from all present; so becomingly had the fair youth spoken, both in praise of the God, and in extenuation of himself. Then Socrates, addressing Eryximachus. said

Socrates/ "Was not my fear reasonable, son of Acumenus? Did I not divine what has, in fact, happened, — that Agathon's discourse would be so wonderfully beautiful, as to preoccupy all interest in what I should say?"

Eryximachus/ "You, indeed, divined well so far, O Socrates, that Agathon would speak eloquently, but not that, therefore, you would be reduced to any difficulty."

Socrates/ "How, my good friend, can I or anyone else be otherwise than reduced to difficulty, who speak after a discourse so various and so eloquent, and which otherwise had been sufficiently wonderful, if, at the conclusion, the splendor of the sentences, and the choice selection of the expressions, had not struck all the hearers with astonishment; so that I, who well know that I can never say anything nearly so beautiful as this, would, if there had been any escape, have run away for shame. The story of Gorgias came into my mind, and I was afraid lest in reality I should suffer what Homer describes; and lest Agathon, scanning my discourse with the head of the eloquent Gorgias, should turn me to stone for speechlessness. I immediately perceived how ridiculously I had engaged myself with you to assume a part in rendering praise to love, and had boasted that I was well skilled in amatory matters, being so ignorant of the manner in which it is becoming to render him honor, as I now perceive myself to be. I, in my simplicity, imagined that the truth ought to be spoken concerning each of the topics of

our praise, and that it would be sufficient, choosing those which are the most honorable to the God, to place them in as luminous an arrangement as we could. I had, therefore, great hopes that I should speak satisfactorily, being well aware that I was acquainted with the true foundations of the praise which we have engaged to render. But since, as it appears, our purpose has been, not to render Love his due honor, but to accumulate the most beautiful and the greatest attributes of his divinity, whether they in truth belong to it or not, and that the proposed question is not how Love ought to be praised, but how we should praise him most eloquently, my attempt must of necessity fail. It is on this account, I imagine, that in your discourses you have attributed everything to Love, and have described him to be the author of such and so great effects as, to those who are ignorant of his true nature, may exhibit him as the most beautiful and the best of all things. Not, indeed, to those who know the truth. Such praise has a splendid and imposing effect, but as I am unacquainted with the art of rendering it, my mind, which could not foresee what would be required of me, absolves me from that which my tongue promised. Farewell then, for such praise I can never render.

"But if you desire, I will speak what I feel to be true; and that I may not expose myself to ridicule, I entreat you to consider that I speak without entering into competition with those who have preceded me. Consider, then, Phædrus, whether you will exact from me such a discourse, containing the mere truth with respect to Love, and composed of such unpremeditated expressions as may chance to offer themselves to my mind."

Apollodorus/ Phædrus and the rest bade him speak in the manner which he judged most befitting.

Socrates/ “Permit me, then, O Phædrus, to ask Agathon a few questions, so that, confirmed by his agreement with me, I may proceed.”

Phaedrus/ “Willingly, ask.”

Apollodorus/ Then Socrates thus began:

Socrates/ “I applaud, dear Agathon, the beginning of your discourse, where you say, we ought first to define and declare what Love is, and then his works. This rule I particularly approve. But, come, since you have given us a discourse of such beauty and majesty concerning Love, you are able, I doubt not, to explain this question, whether Love is the love of something or nothing? I do not ask you of what parents Love is; for the inquiry, of whether Love is the love of any father or mother, would be sufficiently ridiculous. But if I were asking you to describe that which a father is, I should ask, not whether a father was the love of anyone, but whether a father was the father of anyone or not; you would undoubtedly reply, that a father was the father of a son or daughter; would you not?”

Agathon/ “Assuredly.”

Socrates/ “You would define a mother in the same manner?”

Agathon/ “Without doubt.”

Socrates/ “Yet bear with me, and answer a few more questions, for I would learn from you that which I wish to know. If I should inquire, in addition, is not a brother, through the very nature of his relation, the brother of someone?”

Socrates/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “Of a brother or sister, is he not?”

Agathon/ “Without question.”

Socrates/ “Try to explain to me then the nature of Love; Love is the love of something or nothing?”

Agathon/ “Of something, certainly.”

Socrates/ “Observe and remember this concession. Tell me yet farther, whether Love desires that of which it is the Love or not?”

Agathon/ “It desires it, assuredly.”

Socrates/ “Whether possessing that which it desires and loves, or not possessing it, does it desire and love?”

Agathon/ “Not possessing it, I should imagine.”

Socrates/ “Observe now, whether it does not appear, that, of necessity, desire desires that which it wants and does not possess, and no longer desires that which it no longer wants: this appears to me, Agathon, of necessity to be; how does it appear to you?”

Agathon/ “It appears so to me also.”

Socrates/ “Would anyone who was already illustrious, desire to be illustrious; would anyone already strong, desire to be strong?

Agathon/ From what has already been conceded, it follows that he would not.

Socrates/ If anyone already strong, should desire to be strong; or anyone already swift, should desire to be swift; or anyone already healthy, should desire to be healthy, it must be concluded that: they still desired the advantages of which they already seemed possessed. To destroy the foundation of this error, observe, Agathon, that each of these persons must possess the several advantages in question, at the moment present to our thoughts, whether he will or no. And, now, is it possible that those advantages should be at that time the objects of his desire? For, if anyone should say, being in health, ‘I desire to be in health; being rich, ‘I desire

to be rich, and thus still desire those things which I already possess we might say to him, 'You, my friend, possess health, and strength, and riches; you do not desire to possess now, but continue to possess them in future; for, whether you will or no, they now belong to you. Consider then, whether, when you say that you desire things present to you, and in your own possession, you say anything else than that you desire the advantages to be for the future also in your possession.' What else could he reply?"

Agathon/ "Nothing, indeed."

Socrates/ "Is not Love, then, the love of that which is not within its reach, and which cannot hold in security, for the future, those things of which it obtains a present and transitory possession?"

Agathon/ "Evidently."

Socrates/ "Love, therefore, and everything else that desires anything, desires that which is absent and beyond his reach, that which it has not, that which is not itself, that which it wants; such are the things of which there are desire and love."—-

Agathon/ "Assuredly."

Socrates/ "Come, let us review your concessions. Is Love anything else than the love first of something; and, secondly, of those things of which it has need?"

Agathon/ "Nothing."

Socrates/ "Now, remember of those things you said in your discourse, that Love was the love—if you wish I will remind you. I think you said something of this kind, that all the affairs of the gods were admirably disposed through the love of the things which are beautiful; for, there was no love of things deformed; did you not say so?"

Agathon/ "I confess that I did."

Socrates/ “You said what was most likely to be true, my friend; and if the matter be so, the love of beauty must be one thing, and the love of deformity another.”

Agathon/ “Certainly.”

Socrates/ “It is conceded, then, that Love loves that which he wants but possesses not?”

Agathon/ “Yes, certainly.”

Socrates/ “But Love wants and does not possess beauty?”

Agathon/ “Indeed it must necessarily follow.”

Socrates/ “What, then! call you that beautiful which has need of beauty and possesses not?”

Agathon/ “Assuredly no.”

Socrates/ “Do you still assert, then, that Love is beautiful, if all that we have said be true?”

Agathon/ “Indeed, Socrates, I am in danger of being convicted of ignorance, with respect to all that I then spoke.”

Socrates/ “You spoke most eloquently, my dear Agathon; but bear with my questions yet a moment. You admit that things which are good are also beautiful?”

Agathon/ “No doubt.”

Socrates/ “If Love, then, be in want of beautiful things, and things which are good are beautiful, he must be in want of things which are good?”

Agathon/ “I cannot refute your arguments, Socrates.”

Socrates/ “You cannot refute truth, my dear Agathon: to refute Socrates is nothing difficult. “But I will dismiss these questionings. At present let me endeavor, to the best of my power, to repeat to you, on the basis of the points which have been agreed upon between me and Agathon, a discourse concerning Love, which I formerly heard from the prophetess Diotima, who was profoundly skilled in this and many other doctrines, and who, ten years before the pestilence, procured

to the Athenians, through their sacrifices, a delay of the disease; for it was she who taught me the science of things relating to Love.

"As you well remarked, Agathon, we ought to declare who and what is Love, and then his works. It is easiest to relate them in the same order, as the foreign prophetess observed when, questioning me, she related them. For I said to her much the same things that Agathon has just said to me—that Love was a great deity, and that he was beautiful; and she refuted me with the same reasons as I have employed to refute Agathon, compelling me to infer that he was neither beautiful nor good, as I said.

Socrates/ 'What, then O Diotima, is Love ugly and evil?'

Diotima/ 'Good words, I entreat you, do you think that everything which is not beautiful, must of necessity be ugly?'

Socrates/ 'Certainly.'

Diotima/ 'And everything that is not wise, ignorant? Do you not perceive that there is something between ignorance and wisdom?'

Socrates/ 'What is that?'

Diotima/ 'To have a right opinion or conjecture. Observe, that this kind of opinion, for which no reason can be rendered, cannot be called knowledge; for how can that be called knowledge, which is without evidence or reason? Nor ignorance, on the other hand; for how can that be called ignorance which arrives at the persuasion of that which it really is? A right opinion is something between understanding and ignorance.'

Socrates/ I confessed that what she alleged was true.

Diotima/ 'Do you then say, that what is not beautiful is of necessity deformed, nor what is not good is of necessity evil; nor, since you have confessed that Love is neither

beautiful nor good, infer, therefore, that he is deformed or evil, but rather something intermediate.'

Socrates/ 'But, Love is confessed by all to be a great God.'

Diotima/ 'Do you mean, when you say all, all those who know, or those who know not, what they say?'

Socrates/ 'All collectively.'

Diotima/ 'And how can that be, Socrates? how can he be acknowledged to be a great God, by those who assert that he is not even a God at all?'

Socrates/ 'And who are they?'

Diotima/ 'You for one, and I for another.'

Socrates/ 'How can you say that, Diotima.'

Diotima/ 'Easily, and with truth; for tell me, do you not own that all the Gods are beautiful and happy? or will you presume to maintain that any God is otherwise?

Socrates/ 'By Zeus, not I!'

Diotima/ 'Do you not call those alone happy who possess all things that are beautiful and good?'

Socrates/ 'Certainly.'

Diotima/ 'You have confessed that Love, through his desire for things beautiful and good, possesses not those materials of happiness.'

Socrates/ 'Indeed, such was my concession.'

Diotima/ 'But how can we conceive a God to be without the possession of what is beautiful and good?'

Socrates/ 'In no manner, I confess.'

Diotima/ 'Observe, then, that you do not consider Love to be a God.'

Socrates/ 'What, then, is Love a mortal?'

Diotima/ 'By no means.'

Socrates/ 'But what, then?'

Diotima/ 'Like those things which I have before instanced, he is neither mortal nor immortal, but something intermediate.'

Socrates/ 'What is that, O Diotima?'

Diotima/ 'A great dæmon, Socrates; and everything dæmoniacal holds an intermediate place between what is divine and what is mortal.'

Socrates/ "'What is his power and nature?'

Diotima/ 'He interprets and makes a communication between divine and human things, conveying the prayers and sacrifices of men to the Gods, and communicating the commands and directions concerning the mode of worship most pleasing to them, from Gods to men. He fills up that intermediate space between these two classes of beings, so as to bind together, by his own power, the whole universe of things. Through him subsist all divination, and the science of sacred things as it relates to sacrifices, and expiations, and disenchantments, and prophecy, and magic. The divine nature cannot immediately communicate with what is human, but all that intercourse and converse which is conceded by the Gods to men, both whilst they sleep and when they wake, subsists through the intervention of Love; and he who is wise in the science of this intercourse is supremely happy, and participates in the dæmoniacal nature; whilst he who is wise in any other science or art, remains a mere ordinary slave. These dæmons are, indeed, many and various, and one of them is Love.'

Socrates/ "'Who are the parents of Love?'

Diotima/ 'The history of what you ask, is somewhat long; nevertheless I will explain it to you. On the birth of Venus the Gods celebrated a great feast, and among them came Plenty, the son of Metis. After supper, Poverty, observing the profusion, came to beg, and stood beside the door. Plenty

being drunk with nectar, for wine was not yet invented, went out into Zeus's garden, and fell into a deep sleep. Poverty wishing to have a child by Plenty, on account of her low estate, lay down by him, and from his embraces conceived Love. Love is, therefore, the follower and servant of Venus, because he was conceived at her birth, and because by nature he is a lover of all that is beautiful, and Venus was beautiful. And since Love is the child of Poverty and Plenty, his nature and fortune participate in that of his parents. He is forever poor, and so far from being delicate and beautiful, as mankind imagine, he is squalid and withered; he flies low along the ground, and is homeless and unsandalled; he sleeps without covering before the doors, and in the unsheltered streets; possessing thus far his mother's nature, that he is ever the companion of want. But, inasmuch as he participates in that of his father, he is forever scheming to obtain things which are good and beautiful; he is fearless, vehement, and strong; a dreadful hunter, forever weaving some new contrivance; exceedingly cautious and prudent, and full of resources; he is also, during his whole existence, a philosopher, a powerful enchanter, a wizard, and a subtle sophist. And, as his nature is neither mortal nor immortal, on the same day when he is fortunate and successful, he will at one time flourish, and then die away, and then, according to his father's nature, again revive. All that he acquires perpetually flows away from him, so that Love is never either rich or poor, and holding forever an intermediate state between ignorance and wisdom. The case stands thus; —no God philosophizes or desires to become wise, for he is wise; nor, if there exist any other being who is wise, does he philosophize. Nor do the ignorant philosophize, for they desire not to become wise; for this is the evil of ignorance, that he who has neither intelligence, nor virtue, nor delicacy of sentiment, imagines

that he possesses all those things sufficiently. He seeks not, therefore, that possession, of whose want he is not aware.'

Socrates/ 'Who, then, O Diotima, are philosophers, if they are neither the ignorant nor the wise?'

Diotima/ 'It is evident, even to a child, that they are those intermediate persons, among whom is Love. For Wisdom is one of the most beautiful of all things; Love is that which thirsts for the beautiful, so that Love is of necessity a philosopher, philosophy being an intermediate state between ignorance and wisdom. His parentage accounts for his condition, being the child of a wise and well provided father, and of a mother both ignorant and poor. Such is the demoniacal nature, my dear Socrates; nor do I wonder at your error concerning Love, for you thought, as I conjecture from what you say, that Love was not the lover but the beloved, and thence, well concluded that he must be supremely beautiful; for that which is the object of Love must indeed be fair, and delicate. and perfect, and most happy; but Love inherits, as I have declared, a totally opposite nature.'

Socrates/ 'Your words have persuasion in them, O stranger, be it as you say. But this Love, what advantages does he afford to men?'

Diotima/ 'I will proceed to explain it to you, Socrates. Love being such and so produced as I have described, is, indeed, as you say, the love of things which are beautiful. But if anyone should ask us, saying: O Socrates and Diotima, why is Love the love of beautiful things? Or, in plainer words, what does the lover of that which is beautiful, love in the object of his love, and seek from it?'

Socrates/ 'He seeks, the property and possession of it.'

Diotima/ 'But that, might still be met with another question, What has he, who possesses that which is beautiful."

Socrates/ 'indeed, I cannot immediately reply.'

Diotima/ 'But, if changing the beautiful for good, anyone should inquire, —I ask, O Socrates, what is that which he who loves that which is good, loves in the object of his love?'

Socrates/ 'To be in his possession.'

Diotima/ 'And what has he, who has the possession of good?'

Socrates/ 'This question is of easier solution, he is happy.'

Diotima/ 'Those who are happy, then, are happy through the possession; and it is useless to inquire what he desires, who desires to be happy; the question seems to have a complete reply. But do you think that this wish and this love are common to all men, and that all desire, that that which is good should be forever present to them?'

Socrates/ 'Certainly, common to all.'

Diotima/ 'Why do we not say then, Socrates, that everyone loves? if, indeed, all love perpetually the same thing? But we say that some love, and some do not.'

Socrates/ 'Indeed I wonder why it is so.'

Diotima/ 'Wonder not, for we select a particular species of love, and apply to it distinctively, the appellation of that which is universal.'

Socrates/ "'Give me an example of such a select application.'

Diotima/ 'Poetry; which is a general name signifying every cause whereby anything proceeds from that which is not, into that which is; so that the exercise of every inventive art is poetry, and all such artists poets. Yet they are not called poets, but distinguished by other names; and one portion or

species of poetry, that which has relation to music and rhythm, is divided from all others, and known by the name belonging to all. For this is alone properly called poetry, and those who exercise the art of this species of poetry, poets. So, with respect to Love. Love is indeed universally all that earnest desire for the possession of happiness and that which is good; the greatest and the subtlest love, and which inhabits the heart of every living being; but those who seek this object through the acquirement of wealth, or the exercise of the gymnastic arts, or philosophy, are not said to love, nor are called lovers; one species alone is called love, and those alone are said to be lovers, and to love, who seek the attainment of the universal desire through one species of love, which is peculiarly distinguished by the name belonging to the whole. It is asserted by some, that they love, who are seeking the lost half of their divided being. But I assert, that Love is neither the love of half nor of the whole, unless, my friend, it meets with that which is good; since men willingly cut off their own hands and feet, if they think that they are the cause of evil to them. Nor do they cherish and embrace that which may belong to themselves, merely because it is their own; unless, indeed, anyone should choose to say, that that which is good is attached to his own nature and is his own, whilst that which is evil is foreign and accidental; but love nothing but that which is good. Does it not appear so to you?'

Socrates/ 'Assuredly.'

Diotima/ 'Can we then simply affirm that men love that which is good?'

Socrates/ 'Without doubt.'

Diotima/ 'What, then, must we not add, that, in addition to loving that which is good, they love that it should be present to themselves?'

Socrates/ 'Indeed that must be added.'

Diotima/ 'And not merely that it should be present, but that it should ever be present?'

Socrates/ 'This also must be added.'

Diotima/ "'Love, then, is collectively the desire in men that good should be forever present to them.'

Socrates/ 'Most true.'

Diotima/ 'Since this is the general definition of Love, can you explain in what mode of attaining its object, and in what species of actions, does Love peculiarly consist?'

Socrates/ 'If I knew what you ask, O Diotima, I should not have so much wondered at your wisdom, nor have sought you out for the purpose of deriving improvement from your instructions.'

Diotima/ 'I will tell you, Love is the desire of generation in the beautiful, both with relation to the body and the soul.'

Socrates/ 'I must be a diviner to comprehend what you say, for, being such as I am, I confess that I do not understand it.'

Diotima/ 'But I will explain it more clearly. The bodies and the souls of all human beings are alike pregnant with their future progeny, and when we arrive at a certain age, our nature impels us to bring forth and propagate. This nature is unable to produce in that which is deformed, but it can produce in that which is beautiful. The intercourse of the male and female in generation, a divine work, through pregnancy and production, is, as it were, something immortal in mortality. These things cannot take place in that which is incongruous; for that which is deformed is incongruous, but that which is beautiful is congruous with what is immortal and divine. Beauty is, therefore, the fate, and the Hera Lucina to generation. Wherefore, whenever that which is pregnant with the generative principle,

approaches that which is beautiful, it becomes transported with delight, and is poured forth in over-flowing pleasure, and propagates. But when it approaches that which is deformed it is contracted by sadness, and being repelled and checked, it does not produce, but retains unwillingly that with which it is pregnant. Wherefore, to one pregnant, and, as it were, already bursting with the load of his desire, the impulse towards that which is beautiful is intense, on account of the great pain of retaining that which he has conceived. Love, then, O Socrates, is not as you imagine the love of the beautiful.'

Socrates/ 'What, then?'

Diotima/ 'Of generation and production in the beautiful.'

Socrates/ 'Why then of generation?'

Diotima/ 'Generation is something eternal and immortal in mortality. It necessarily, from what has been confessed, follows, that we must desire immortality together with what is good, since Love is the desire that good bet for ever present to us. Of necessity Love must also be the desire of immortality.'

Socrates/ "Diotima taught me all this doctrine in the discourse we had together concerning Love; and, in addition, she inquired;

Diotima/ 'What do you think, Socrates, is the cause of this love and desire? Do you not perceive how all animals, both those of the earth and of the air, are affected when they desire the propagation of their species, affected even to weakness and disease by the impulse of their love; first, longing to be mixed with each other, and then seeking nourishment for their offspring, so that the feeblest are ready to contend with the strongest in obedience to this law, and to die for the sake of their young, or to waste away with hunger, and do or suffer anything so that they may not want

nourishment. It might be said that human beings do these things through reason, but can you explain why other animals are thus affected through love?'

Socrates/ I confessed that I did not know.

Diotima/ 'Do you imagine yourself to be skillful in the science of Love, if you are ignorant of these things?'

Socrates/ 'As I said before, O Diotima, I come to you, well knowing how much I am in need of a teacher. But explain to me, I entreat you, the cause of these things, and of the other things relating to Love.'

Diotima/ 'If, you believe that Love is of the same nature as we have mutually agreed upon, wonder not that such are its effects. For the mortal nature seeks, so far as it is able, to become deathless and eternal. But it can only accomplish this desire by generation, which forever leaves another new in place of the old. For, although each human being be severally said to live, and be the same from youth to old age, yet, that which is called the same, never contains within itself the same things, but always is becoming new by the loss and change of that which it possessed before; both the hair and the flesh, and the bones, and the entire body.

"'And not only does this change take place in the body, but also with respect to the soul. Manners, morals, opinions, desires, pleasures, sorrows, fears; none of these ever remain unchanged in the same persons; but some die away, and others are produced. And, what is yet more strange is, that not only does some knowledge spring up, and another decay, and that we are never the same with respect to our knowledge, but that each several object of our thoughts suffers the same revolution. That which is called meditation, or the exercise of memory, is the science of the escape or departure of memory; for, forgetfulness is the going out of knowledge; and meditation, calling up a new memory in the

place of that which has departed, preserves knowledge; so that, though forever displaced and restored, it seems to be the same. In this manner everything mortal is preserved: not that it is constant and eternal, like that which is divine; but that in the place of what has grown old and is departed, it leaves another new like that which it was itself. By this contrivance, O Socrates, does what is mortal, the body and all other things, partake of immortality; that which is immortal, is immortal in another manner. Wonder not, then, if everything by nature cherishes that which was produced from itself, for this earnest Love is a tendency towards eternity.'

Socrates/ "Having heard this discourse, I was astonished, and asked, Can these things be true, O wisest Diotima?' And she, like an accomplished sophist, said;

Diotima/ 'Know well, O Socrates, that if you only regard that love of glory which inspires men, you will wonder at your own unskillfulness in not having discovered all that I now declare. Observe with how vehement a desire they are affected to become illustrious and to prolong their glory into immortal time, to attain which object, far more ardently than for the sake of their children, all men are ready to engage in many dangers, and expend their fortunes, and submit to any labors and incur any death. Do you believe that Alcestis would have died in the place of Admetus, or Achilles for the revenge of Patroclus, or Codrus for the kingdom of his posterity, if they had not believed that the immortal memory of their actions, which we now cherish, would have remained after their death? Far otherwise; all such deeds are done for the sake of ever-living virtue, and this immortal glory which they have obtained; and inasmuch as anyone is of an excellent nature, so much the more is he impelled to attain this reward. For they love what is immortal.

"'Those whose bodies alone are pregnant with this principle of immortality are attracted by women, seeking through the production of children what they imagine to be happiness and immortality and an enduring remembrance; but they whose souls are far more pregnant than their bodies, conceive and produce that which is more suitable to the soul. What is suitable the soul? Intelligence, and every other power and excellence of the mind; of which all poets, and all other artists who are creative and inventive, are the authors. The greatest and most admirable wisdom is that which regulates the government of families and states, and which is called moderation and justice. Whosoever, therefore, from his youth feels his soul pregnant with the conception of these excellences, is divine; and when due time arrives, desires to bring forth; and wandering about, he seeks the beautiful in which he may propagate what he has conceived; for there is no generation in that which is deformed; he embraces those bodies which are beautiful rather than those which are deformed, in obedience to the principle which is within him, which is ever seeking to perpetuate itself. And if he meets, in conjunction with loveliness of form, a beautiful, generous and gentle soul, he embraces both at once, and immediately undertakes to educate this object of his love, and is inspired with an overflowing persuasion to declare what is virtue, and what he ought to be who would attain to its possession, and what are the duties which it exacts. For, by the intercourse with, and as it were, the very touch of that which is beautiful, he brings forth and produces what he had formerly conceived; and nourishes and educates that which is thus produced together with the object of his love, whose image, whether absent or present, is never divided from his mind. So that those who are thus united are linked by a nobler community and a firmer love, as being the common parents of a lovelier

and more endearing progeny than the parents of other children. And everyone who considers what posterity Homer and Hesiod, and the other great poets, have left behind them, the sources of their own immortal memory and renown, or what children of his soul Lycurgus has appointed to be the guardians, not only of Lacedæmon, but of all Greece; or what an illustrious progeny of laws Solon has produced, and how many admirable achievements, both among the Greeks and Barbarians. men have left as the pledges of that love which subsisted between them and the beautiful, would choose rather to be the parent of such children than those in a human shape. For divine honors have often been rendered to them on account of such children, but on account of those in human shape, never.

"'Your own meditation, O Socrates, might perhaps have initiated you in all these things which I have already taught you on the subject of Love. But those perfect and sublime ends to which these are only the means, I know not that you would have been competent to discover. I will declare them, therefore, and will render them as intelligible as possible: do you meanwhile strain all your attention to trace the obscure depth of the subject. He who aspires to love rightly, ought from his earliest youth to seek an intercourse with beautiful forms, and first to make a single form the object of his love, and therein to generate intellectual excellences. He ought, then, to consider that beauty in whatever form it resides is the brother of that beauty which subsists in another form; and if he ought to pursue that which is beautiful in form, it would be absurd to imagine that beauty is not one and the same thing in all forms, and would therefore remit much of his ardent preference towards one, through his perception of the multitude of claims upon his love. In addition, he would consider the beauty which is in souls more excellent than that which is in form. So that one endowed with an

admirable soul, even though the flower of the form were withered, would suffice him as the object of his love and care, and the companion with whom he might seek and produce such conclusions as tend to the improvement of youth; so that it might be led to observe the beauty and the conformity which there is in the observation of its duties and the laws, and to esteem little the mere beauty of the outward form. He would then conduct his pupil to science, so that he might look upon the loveliness of wisdom; and that contemplating thus the universal beauty, no longer would he unworthily and meanly enslave himself to the attractions of one form in love, nor one subject of discipline or science, but would turn towards the wide ocean of intellectual beauty, and from the sight of the lovely and majestic forms which it contains, would abundantly bring forth his conceptions in philosophy; until, strengthened and confirmed, he should at length steadily contemplate one science, which is the science of this universal beauty.

"'Attempt, I entreat you, to mark what I say with as keen an observation as you can. He who has been disciplined to this point in Love, by contemplating beautiful objects gradually, and in their order, now arriving at the end of all that concerns Love, on a sudden beholds a beauty wonderful in its nature. This is it, O Socrates, for the sake of which all the former labors were endured. It is eternal, unproduced, indestructible; neither subject to increase nor decay: not, like other things, partly beautiful and partly deformed; not at one time beautiful and at another time not; not beautiful in relation to one thing and deformed in relation to another; not here beautiful and there deformed; not beautiful in the estimation of one person and deformed in that of another; nor can this supreme beauty be figured to the imagination like a beautiful face, or beautiful hands, or any portion of the body, nor like any discourse, nor any science. Nor does

it subsist in any other that lives or is, either in earth, or in heaven, or in any other place; but it is eternally uniform and consistent, and monoeidic with itself. All other things are beautiful through a participation of it, with this condition, that although they are subject to production and decay, it never becomes more or less, or endures any change. When anyone, ascending from a correct system of Love, begins to contemplate this supreme beauty, he already touches the consummation of his labor. For such as discipline themselves upon this system, or are conducted by another beginning to ascend through these transitory objects which are beautiful, towards, that which is beauty itself, proceeding as on steps from the love of one form to that of two, and from that of two, to that of all forms which are beautiful; and from beautiful forms to beautiful habits and institutions, and from institutions to beautiful doctrines; until, from the meditation of many doctrines, they arrive at that which is nothing else than the doctrine of the supreme beauty itself, in the knowledge and contemplation of which at length they repose.

"'Such a life as this, my dear Socrates,'

Socrates/ exclaimed the stranger Prophetess;

Diotima/ 'spent in the contemplation of the beautiful, is the life for men to live; which if you chance ever to experience, you will esteem far beyond gold and rich garments, and even those lovely persons whom you and many others now gaze on with astonishment, and are prepared neither to eat nor drink so that you may behold and live forever with these objects of your love What then shall we imagine to be the aspect of the supreme beauty itself, simple, pure, uncontaminated with the intermixture of human flesh and colors, and all other idle and unreal shapes attendant on mortality; the divine, the original, the supreme, the monoeidic beautiful itself? What must be the

life of him who dwells with and gazes on that which it becomes us all to seek? Think you not that to him alone is accorded the prerogative of bringing forth, not images and shadows of virtue, for he is in contact not with a shadow but with reality; with virtue itself, in the production and nourishment of which he becomes dear to the Gods, and if such a privilege is conceded to any human being, himself immortal.'

Socrates/ "Such, O Phaedrus, and my other friends, was what Diotima said. And being persuaded by her words, I have since occupied myself in attempting to persuade others, that it is not easy to find a better assistant than Love in seeking to communicate immortality to our human natures. Wherefore I exhort everyone to honor Love; I hold him in honor, and chiefly exercise myself in amatory matters, and exhort others to do so; and now and ever do I praise the power and excellence of Love, in the best manner that I can. Let this discourse, if it pleases you, Phædrus, be considered as an encomium of Love; or call it by what other name you will."

Apollodorus/ The whole assembly praised his discourse, and Aristophanes was on the point of making some remarks on the allusion made by Socrates to him in a part of his discourse, when suddenly they heard a loud knocking at the door of the vestibule, and a clamor as of revelers, attended by a flute-player.

Agathon/ "Go, boys, and see who is there: if they are any of our friends, call them in; if not, say that we have already done drinking."

Apollodorus/ A minute afterwards, they heard the voice of Alcibiades in the vestibule excessively drunk and roaring out:

Alcibiades/ "Where is Agathon? Lead me to Agathon!"

Apollodorus/ The flute-player, and some of his companions then led him in, and placed him against the doorpost, crowned with a thick crown of ivy and violets, and having a quantity of fillets on his head.

Alcibiades/ “My friends, hail! I am excessively drunk already, but I’ll drink with you, if you will. If not, we will go away after having crowned Agathon, for which purpose I came. I assure you that I could not come yesterday, but I am now here with these fillets round my temples, that from my own head I may crown his who, with your leave, is the most beautiful and wisest of men. Are you laughing at me because I am drunk? Ay, I know what I say is true, whether you laugh or not. But tell me at once, whether I shall come in, or no. Will you drink with me?”

Apollodorus/ Agathon and the whole party desired him to come in and recline among them; so he came in, led by his companions. He then unbound his fillets that he might crown Agathon, and though Socrates was just before his eyes, he did not see him, but sat down by Agathon, between Socrates and him, for Socrates moved out of the way to make room for him. When he sat down, he embraced Agathon and crowned him; and Agathon desired the slaves to untie his sandals, that he might make a third, and recline on the same couch.

Alcibiades/ “By all means, but what third companion have we here?”

Apollodorus/ And at the same time turning round and seeing Socrates, he leaped up and cried out:

Alcibiades/ “O Hercules! what have we here? You, Socrates, lying in ambush for me wherever I go! and meeting me just as you always do, when I least expected to see you! And, now, what are you come here for? Why have you chosen to recline exactly in this place, and not near Aristophanes,

or anyone else who is, or wishes to be ridiculous, but have contrived to take your place beside the most delightful person of the whole party?"

Socrates/ "Agathon, see if you cannot defend me. I declare my friendship for this man is a bad business: from the moment that I first began to know him I have never been permitted to converse with, or so much as to look upon anyone else. If I do, he is so jealous and suspicious that he does the most extravagant things, and hardly refrains from beating me. I entreat you to prevent him from doing anything of that kind at present. Procure a reconciliation: or, if he perseveres in attempting any violence, I entreat you to defend me."

Alcibiades/ "Indeed, I will not be reconciled to you; I shall find another opportunity to punish you for this. But now,"

Apollodorus/ said he, addressing Agathon;

Alcibiades/ "lend me some of those fillets, that I may crown the wonderful head of this fellow, lest I incur the blame, that having crowned you, I neglected to crown him who conquers all men with his discourses, not yesterday alone as you did, but ever."

Apollodorus/ Saying this he took the fillets, and having bound the head of Socrates, and again having reclined, said:

Alcibiades/ "Come, my friends, you seem to be sober enough. You must not flinch, but drink, for that was your agreement with me before I came in. I choose as president, until you have drunk enough myself. Come, Agathon, if you have got a great goblet, fetch it out. But no matter, that wine-cooler will do; bring it, boy!"

Apollodorus/ And observing that it held more than eight cups, he first drank it off, and then ordered it to be filled for Socrates, and said:

Alcibiades/ “Observe, my friends, I cannot invent any scheme against Socrates, for he will drink as much as anyone desires him, and not be in the least drunk.”

Apollodorus/ Socrates, after the boy had filled up, drank it off;

Eryximachus/ “Shall we then have no conversation or singing over our cups, but drink down stupidly, just as if we were thirsty?”

Alcibiades/ “Ah, Eryximachus, I did not see you before; hail, you excellent son of a wise and excellent father!”

Eryximachus/ “Hail to you also, but what shall we do?”

Alcibiades/ “Whatever you command, for we ought to submit to your directions; a physician is worth a hundred common men. Command us as you please.”

Eryximachus/ “Listen then, before you came in, each of us had agreed to deliver as eloquent a discourse as he could in praise of Love, beginning at the right hand; all the rest of us have fulfilled our engagement; you have not spoken, and yet have drunk with us: you ought to bear your part in the discussion; and having done so, command what: you please to Socrates, who shall have the privilege of doing so to his right-hand neighbor, and so on to the others.”

Alcibiades/ “Indeed, there appears some justice in your proposal, Eryximachus, though it is rather unfair to induce a drunken man to set his discourse in competition with that of those who are sober. And, besides, did Socrates really persuade you that what he just said about me was true, or do you not know that matters are in fact exactly the reverse of his representation? For I seriously believe that, should I praise in his presence, be he god or man, any other beside himself, he would not keep his hands off me. But I assure you, Socrates, I will praise no one beside yourself in your presence.”

Eryximachus/ “Do so, then, praise Socrates if you please.”

Alcibiades/ “What, shall I attack him, and punish him before you all?”

Socrates/ “What have you got into your head now, are you going to expose me to ridicule, and to misrepresent me? Or what are you going to do?”

Alcibiades/ “I will only speak the truth; will you permit me on this condition?”

Socrates/ “I not only permit, but exhort you to say all the truth you know.”

Alcibiades/ “I obey you willingly and if I advance anything untrue, do you, if you please, interrupt me, and convict me of misrepresentation, for I would never willingly speak falsely. And bear with me if I do not relate things in their order, but just as I remember them, for it is not easy for a man in my present condition to enumerate systematically all your singularities.

“I will begin the praise of Socrates by comparing him to a certain statue. Perhaps he will think that this statue is introduced for the sake of ridicule, but I assure you that it is necessary for the illustration of truth. I assert, then, that Socrates is exactly like those Silenuses that sit in the sculptors’ shops, and which are carved holding flutes or pipes, but which, when divided in two, are found to contain within-side the images of the gods. I assert that Socrates is like the satyr Marsyas. That your form and appearance are like these satyrs, I think that even you will not venture to deny; and how like you are to them in all other things, now hear. Are you not scornful and petulant? If you deny this, I will bring witnesses. Are you not a piper, and far more wonderful a one than he? For Marsyas, and whoever now pipes the music that he taught, for that music which is of

heaven, and described as being taught by Marsyas, enchants men through the power of the mouth. For if any musician, be he skillful or not, awakens this music, it alone enables him to retain the minds of men, and from the divinity of its nature makes evident those who are in want of the gods and initiation. You differ only from Marsyas in this circumstance, that you effect without instruments, by mere words, all that he can do. For when we hear Pericles, or any other accomplished orator, deliver a discourse, no one, as it were, cares anything about it. But when anyone hears you, or even your words related by another, though ever so rude and unskillful a speaker, be that person a woman, man or child, we are struck and retained, as it were, by the discourse clinging to our mind.

"If I was not afraid that I am a great deal too drunk, I would confirm to you by an oath the strange effects which I assure you I have suffered from his words, and suffer still; for when I hear him speak, my heart leaps up far more than the hearts of those who celebrate the Corybantic mysteries; my tears are poured out as he talks, a thing I have seen happen to many others beside myself. I have heard Pericles and other excellent orators, and have been pleased with their discourses, but I suffered nothing of this kind; nor was my soul ever on those occasions disturbed and filled with self-reproach, as if it were slavishly laid prostrate. But this Marsyas here has often affected me in the way I describe, until the life which I lead seemed hardly worth living. Do not deny it, Socrates, for I well know that if even now I chose to listen to you, I could not resist, but should again suffer the same effects. For, my friends, he forces me to confess that while I myself am still in want of many things, I neglect my own necessities, and attend to those of the Athenians. I stop my ears, therefore, as from the Syrens, and flee away as fast as possible, that I may not sit down beside him and grow old

in listening to his talk. For this man has reduced me to feel the sentiment of shame, which I imagine no one would readily believe was in me; he alone inspires me with remorse and awe. For I feel in his presence my incapacity of refuting what he says, or of refusing to do that which he directs; but when I depart from him, the glory which the multitude confers overwhelms me. I escape, therefore, and hide myself from him, and when I see him I am overwhelmed with humiliation, because I have neglected to do what I have confessed to him ought to be done; and often and often have I wished that he were no longer to be seen among men. But if that were to happen, I well know that I should suffer far greater pain; so that where I can turn, or what I can do with this man. I know not. All this have I and many others suffered from the piping of this satyr.

"And observe, how like he is to what I said, and what a wonderful power he possesses. Know that there is not one of you who is aware of the real nature of Socrates; but since I have begun, I will make him plain to you. You observe how passionately Socrates affects the intimacy of those who are beautiful, and how ignorant he professes himself to be; appearances in themselves excessively Silenic. This, my friends, is the external form with which, like one of the sculptured Sileni, he has clothed himself; for if you open him, you will find within admirable temperance and wisdom. For he cares not for mere beauty, but despises more than anyone can imagine all external possessions, whether it be beauty or wealth, or glory, or any other thing for which the multitude felicitates the possessor. He esteems these things and us who honor them, as nothing, and lives among men, making all the objects of their admiration the playthings of his irony. But I know not if anyone of you have ever seen the divine images which are within, when he has been opened and is serious- I have seen them, and they are so supremely

beautiful, so golden, so divine, and wonderful, that everything which Socrates commands surely ought to be obeyed, even like the voice of a God....

"At one time we were fellow-soldiers, and had our mess together in the camp before Potidaea. Socrates there overcame not only me, but everyone beside, in endurance of toils: when, as often happens in a campaign, we were reduced to few provisions, there were none who could sustain hunger like Socrates; and when we had plenty, he alone seemed to enjoy our military fare. He never drank much willingly, but when he was compelled he conquered all even in that to which he was least accustomed; and what is most astonishing, no person ever saw Socrates drunk either then or at any other time. In the depth of winter (and the winters there are excessively rigid), he sustained calmly incredible hardships: and amongst other things, whilst the frost was intolerably severe, and no one went out of their tents, or if they went out, wrapt themselves up carefully, and put fleeces under their feet, and bound their legs with hairy skins, Socrates went out only with the same cloak on that he usually wore, and walked barefoot upon the ice; more easily, indeed, than those who had sandaled themselves so delicately: so that the soldiers thought that he did it to mock their want of fortitude. It would indeed be worthwhile to commemorate all that this brave man did and endured in that expedition. In one instance he was seen early in the morning, standing in one place wrapt in meditation; and as he seemed not to be able to unravel the subject of his thoughts, he still continued to stand as inquiring and discussing within himself, and when noon, came, the soldiers observed him, and said to one another

'Socrates has been standing there thinking, ever since the morning.' At last some Ionians came to the spot, and having supped, as it was summer, bringing their blankets, they lay

down to sleep in the cool; they observed that Socrates continued to stand there the whole night until morning, and that, when the sun rose, he saluted it with a prayer and departed.

"I ought not to omit what Socrates is in battle. For in that battle after which the generals decreed to me the prize of courage, Socrates alone of all men was the savior of my life, standing by me when I had fallen and was wounded, and preserving both myself and my arms from the hands of the enemy. On that occasion I entreated the generals to decree the prize, as it was most due, to him. And this, O Socrates, you cannot deny, that while the generals wishing to conciliate a person of my rank, desired to give me the prize, you were far more earnestly desirous than the generals that this glory should be attributed not to yourself, but me.

"But to see Socrates when our army was defeated and scattered in flight at Delius, was a spectacle worthy to behold. On that occasion I was among the cavalry, and he on foot, heavily armed. After the total rout of our troops, he and Laches retreated together; I came up by chance, and seeing them, bade them be of good cheer, for that I would not leave them. As I was on horseback, and therefore less occupied by a regard of my own situation, I could better observe than at Potidæa the beautiful spectacle exhibited by Socrates on this emergency. How superior was he to Laches in presence of mind and courage! Your representation of him on the stage, O Aristophanes, was not wholly unlike his real self on this occasion, for he walked and darted his regards around with a majestic composure, looking tranquilly both on his friends and enemies; so that it was evident to everyone, even from afar, that whoever should venture to attack him would encounter a desperate resistance. He and his companion thus departed in safety; for those who are scattered in flight are pursued and killed, whilst men

hesitate to touch those who exhibit such a countenance as that of Socrates even in defeat.

"Many other and most wonderful qualities might well be praised in Socrates; but such as these might singly be attributed to others. But that which is unparalleled in Socrates, is, that he is unlike and above comparison with all other men, whether those who have lived in ancient times, or those who exist now. For it may be conjectured, that Brasidas and many others are such as was Achilles. Pericles deserves comparison with Nestor and Antenor; and other excellent persons of various times may, with probability, be drawn into comparison with each other. But to such a singular man as this, both himself and his discourses are so uncommon, no one, should he seek, would find a parallel among the present or the past generation of mankind; unless they should say that he resembled those with whom I lately compared him, for, assuredly, he and his discourses are like nothing but the Sileni, and the Satyrs. At first I forgot to make you observe how like his discourses are to those Satyrs when they are opened, for, if anyone will listen to the talk of Socrates, it will appear to him at first extremely ridiculous; the phrases and expressions which he employs, fold around his exterior the skin, as it were, of a rude and wanton Satyr. He is always talking about great market-asses, and brass-founders, and leather-cutters, and skin-dressers; and this is his perpetual custom, so that any dull and unobservant person might easily laugh at his discourse. But if anyone should see it opened, as it were, and get within the sense of his words, he would then find that they alone of all that enters into the mind of man to utter, had a profound and persuasive meaning, and that they were most divine; and that they presented to the mind innumerable images of every excellence, and that they tended towards objects of the highest moment, or rather towards all that he who seeks the

possession of what is supremely beautiful and good need regard as essential to the accomplishment of his ambition.

"These are the things, my friends, for which I praise Socrates."...

Apollodorus/ Alcibiades having said this, the whole party burst into a laugh at his frankness, and Socrates said;

Socrates/ "You seem to be sober enough, Alcibiades, else you would not have made such a circuit of words, only to hide the main design for which you made this long speech, and which, as it were carelessly, you just throw in at the last; now, as if you had not said all this for the mere purpose of dividing me and Agathon? You think that I ought to be your friend, and to care for no one else. I have found you out; it is evident enough for what design you invented all this Satyrical and Silenic drama. But, my dear Agathon, do not let his device succeed. I entreat you to permit no one to throw discord between us."

Agathon/ "No doubt, he sat down between us only that he might divide us; but this shall not assist his scheme, for I will come and sit near you."

Socrates/ "Do so, come, there is room for you by me."

Alcibiades/ "Oh. Zeus! what I endure from that man! He thinks to subdue every way; but, at least, I pray you, let Agathon remain between us."

Socrates/ "Impossible, you have just praised me; I ought to praise him sitting at my right hand. If Agathon is placed beside you, will he not praise me before I praise him? Now, my dear friend, allow the young man to receive what praise I can give him. I have a great desire to pronounce his encomium."

Agathon/ "Quick, quick, Alcibiades, I cannot stay here, I must change my place, or Socrates will not praise me."

Apollodorus/ Agathon then arose to take his place near Socrates.

He had no sooner reclined than there came in a number of revelers for someone who had gone out had left the door open and took their places on the vacant couches, and everything became full of confusion; and no order being observed, everyone was obliged to drink a great quantity of wine. Eryximachus, and Phaedrus, and some others, said Aristodemus, went home to bed; that, for his part, he went to sleep on his couch, and slept long and soundly the nights were then long until the cock crew in the morning. When he awoke he found that some were still fast asleep, and others had gone home, and that Aristophanes, Agathon, and Socrates had alone stood it out, and were still drinking out of a great goblet which they passed round and round. Socrates was disputing between them. The beginning of their discussion Aristodemus said that he did not recollect, because he was asleep; but it was terminated by Socrates forcing them to confess, that the same person is able to compose both tragedy and comedy, and that the foundations of the tragic and comic arts were essentially the same. They, rather convicted than convinced, went to sleep. Aristophanes first awoke, and then, it being broad daylight, Agathon. Socrates, having put them to sleep, went away, Aristodemus following him, and coming to the Lyceum he washed himself, as he would have done anywhere else, and after having spent the day there in his accustomed manner, went home in the evening.

The Banquet.

Translated by Mr. Sydenham. Speech of Alcibiades by Taylor.

Persons of the dialogue.

Apollodorus Pausanias

Friend of Apollodorus, Aristophanes, Glauco, Eryximachus, Aristodemus, Phædrus, Socrates, Diotima, Agatho, Alcibiades.

scene—Principally within the City of Athens.

Apollodorus/ The affair concerning which ye inquire I think myself now not quite unprepared to relate to you. For it happened a few days since, as I was walking up to the city from my house at Phalerus, that an acquaintance of mine, who was going the same way, seeing me at a considerable distance before him, called out to me; and by way of joke at the same time said;

Glaucon/ Apollodorus, you Phalerean, will not you stop a while till I come up to you?

Apollodorus/ Upon which I stopped, and stayed for him. As soon as he had joined me.

Glaucon/ Apollodorus, I was just now inquiring after you; from a desire I have to be thoroughly acquainted with what passed in the conversation between Agatho, and Socrates, and Alcibiades, and the rest who were of the party, at an entertainment where the subject of their discourse was Love. I should be glad to be informed by you what was said on the occasion. For the person who gave me some account of it, such as he received from Phoenix the son of Philippus, told me that you knew every particular: but that, as to himself, he did not pretend to be at all perfect or exact in his relation. Do you then give me an account of it yourself; for you have

the best right to relate a conversation in which an intimate friend of your own had the most distinguished share. But first tell me, were you yourself one of the company?

Apollodorus/ It appears plainly indeed, that your author by no means gave you an exact account of the circumstances of that conversation, if you suppose it passed so lately as to admit a possibility of my being of the company.

Glaucon/ Really I imagined so.

Apollodorus/ How could it be, Glauco? Do you not know that Agatho has not been at Athens for these many years? whereas it is not yet three since I first became a follower of Socrates, and began, as I have continued ever since, daily to observe and study all his sayings and actions. Before that time, running about here and there, wherever chance led me, and fancying myself all the while well employed, no mortal was in so wretched a condition as I: it was such as you are in at present, who give every study and every pursuit the preference to that of philosophy.

Glaucon/ Leave off railing and tell me when that conversation happened.

Apollodorus/ Before we wrote ourselves men. It was at the time when Agatho brought his first tragedy upon the stage, and won the prize with it. It was the very next day after that himself and his chorus-singers had offered the usual thanksgiving-sacrifice for his victory.

Glaucon/ It is then a long time since, it seems. But who was it that related the conversation to you? Was it Socrates himself?

Apollodorus/ Not Socrates, by Zeus; but the same person who related it to Phoenix. It was one Aristodemus, a Cydathenian, a man of remarkably low stature, who always went barefoot. He was of the party; being one of those who at that time were the most attached to the person and

company of Socrates, Not but that I asked Socrates himself concerning some of the particulars reported by Aristodemus; and he allowed they were reported justly.

Glaucon/ Why then should not you favor me with that relation? The way to the city is perfectly convenient for people to converse together, as they go along.

Apollodorus/ Upon which we resumed our walk, and entered into the relation which my friend desired. So that I am now, as I said, not quite unprepared upon the subject. If then I am to relate that affair over again to you, so it must be. Besides, I must own, that when I am discoursing myself, or hearing the discourse of others, upon philosophical subjects, abstracted from the consideration of improvement, I am beyond measure delighted. But when I hear conversation of any other kind, especially the usual discourse between you rich people, who are still contriving to heap up money, I feel a tediousness in myself, and a concern for you my friends, who imagine you are employing your time to good purpose, while you are only trifling. On the other hand, it is possible you may think that I lead an unhappy life; and I believe those thoughts of yours are just: but as to you, I do not say that I believe, for I know, the state which you are in to be unhappy.

Friend/ You are always the same man, Apollodorus, always railing at yourself and the whole world. You seem to me as if you absolutely thought all men wretched, and yourself in the first place; excepting none but Socrates. Whence you acquired the surname of the madman, for my part I know not: for, in your discourse, you are always the same as you are now, severe upon yourself and all other people, —Socrates alone excepted.

Apollodorus/ My dearest friend, it is evident enough now, that the entertaining such notions of myself, and of all you, proves me beyond question out of my senses and a madman.

Friend/ It is not worth the while, Apollodorus, to dispute about this at present. Only do what I desired of you, and give me an account of the speeches made at that banquet.

Apollodorus/ The speeches then were as follows: —But I had better, I think, give you the whole history of that affair from the beginning, just as Aristodemus gave it me. For he told me, that he met Socrates fresh out of the bath, and perfectly clean, a condition which he was not in very often; wearing on his feet likewise a handsome pair of slippers, a part of dress which he used only on rare occasions: and that upon asking him, whither he was going, that he had made himself so spruce and fine, Socrates told him, he was going to Agatho's house to sup with him.

Socrates/ For yesterday at the sacrifice, I quitted his company, for fear of the crowd; but promised to be with him today. Now thus fine have I made myself, that I may visit so honorable and fine a person in a manner not unbecoming. But what think you, Aristodemus, of going to supper there yourself, without invitation? How do you find yourself disposed upon that point?

Aristodemus/ And I replied, that I was entirely at his disposal.

Socrates/ Follow me then; to corrupt the old proverb, by altering it, —and proving, that;

> When made by worthy men are feasts,
> The worthy go, unbidden guests.

Homer, before us, seems not merely to have corrupted, but to have offered violence to the proverb, by reversing it. For, notwithstanding that he describes Agamemnon as a

man excellent in all military virtues, and Menelaus as a man weak in arms, who;

——————Failed of manly force
To sting the well-aimed javelin;

yet, on occasion of a sacrifice and feast made by Agamemnon, he has brought Menelaus to the banquet uninvited, a meaner man to the banquet of his betters.

Aristodemus/ Perhaps I too, on hearing this, shall incur the imputation of a conduct, not, Socrates, such a one as you have supposed, but like that in Homer, if I go to the banquet of a man of great abilities, without being entitled to it either by merit or invitation. Will you, therefore, if you lead me thither, make an apology for so doing? for, as to myself, I shall not confess my coming without invitation, but shall plead that I was invited by you.

Socrates/ Well.

With social steps, companions of the way.

as we walk along, we will consult together what speech to make. But come, let us be going.

Apollodorus/ After this little talk together, on they went. But in the way, Socrates musing, and attentive to something in his own mind, was out-walked by him; and, observing him to stop, bid him walk on. When he was come to Agatho's house, the door of which was open, an incident, happened, which put him into some confusion. For a servant, who was coming out, meeting him there upon the spot, led him directly to the banquet-room, where he found the company just going to supper. Immediately Agatho, on seeing him enter the room.

Agathon/ Aristodemus, you are come very opportunely to sup with us. But if any other purpose brings you hither, defer it to another time. I was looking about for you in the temple yesterday, with intention to desire your company,

and could not see you. But how came you not to bring us Socrates with you?

Aristodemus/ Upon which I looked back, but could nowhere see Socrates following me, as I had imagined. However, I declared I came along with Socrates, upon his invitation hither to supper.

Agathon/ You did well; but where is he then himself?

Aristodemus/ He was following me in but just now; and for my part, I wonder where he can be.

Aristodemus/ Agatho said to one of his servants;

Agathon/ Boy, will you go and see if you can find Socrates, and conduct him in?

Aristodemus/ Then, turning to me;

Agathon/ Do you, Aristodemus take your place next to Eryximachus.

Aristodemus/ And immediately he ordered a servant to come and wash my feet clean, that I might take my place upon the couch. Just then the boy who had been sent out returned, and told us, that Socrates had withdrawn himself into the porch of some neighboring house, and was there standing;

Boy/ I called to him, he refused to come.

Agathon/ Absurd! Go and call him again; and do not leave him in that manner.

Apollodorus/ But Aristodemus told me, that he himself opposed it, and desired that Socrates might be let alone, for that it was usual with him so to do.

Aristodemus/ He goes along he will sometimes stop, without regarding where, and stand still a while. I make no doubt but he will be here presently. Let me entreat you, therefore, not to disturb him, but leave him at quiet.

Agathon/ Be it so then, if you think it best; but let the rest of us, however, proceed to supper. —

Apollodorus/ Then, turning to his servants;

Agathon/ Boys, serve us up something or other; it is left to you what, for there is nobody to give you any particular directions: you know it is not my way on these occasions. — You are now to suppose me and these gentlemen, my friends here, invited by you to supper: entertain us handsomely, therefore, that you may have our commendations.

Apollodorus/ Immediately upon this, they went to supper; but Socrates was still missing.

Aristodemus/ Agatho, therefore, would every now and then be giving orders to his people to call Socrates in; but I, constantly opposed it. At length Socrates, having stayed away, as usual, not very long, entered; about the time, at furthest, when supper was half over. Agatho then, who lay on the couch at the lower end of the table, alone, said;

Agathon/ Come hither, Socrates, and lay yourself down by me; that, by being close to you, I may have the benefit of that piece of wisdom, which you made a new acquisition of in the porch. For it is plain that you found it, and are in possession; otherwise you would never have desisted from the pursuit.

Apollodorus/ Socrates then, sat down on the couch.

Socrates/ It would be well, Agatho, if wisdom were a thing of such a nature, as to pass from those who abound with it into such as want it, when they sit close to one another, and are in contact; like water running through the wool out of the fuller vessel into the emptier. If this quality attend wisdom, I shall set a high value upon partaking of your couch: for I shall expect to have Wisdom flow into me from you in great quantity, and of a kind which appears the fairest. As for the little which I have, it must be mean and

trivial, doubtful and questionable, seeming but a dream. But the wisdom you are master of is splendid, and promises a future great increase of brightness, having already in the morning of your age shone out with so much glory; as more than thirty thousand Grecians, before whom it appeared the other day, can witness.

Agathon/ You are a joker, Socrates. But this controversy between us about our wisdoms shall be tried by and by, and Bacchus shall decide the cause. At present, turn your thoughts to the table.

Apollodorus/ Upon this, Socrates reclined, himself, and made his supper. After he and the rest of them had done, performed their libations, sung the praises of the God, and gone through the other usual ceremonies, they were beginning to sit-in to drinking; when Pausanias opened the conversation thus: —

Pausanias/ Well, gentlemen, what method shall we take to find most pleasure in our bottles tonight? For my own part, I confess to you that last night's debauch sits very heavy upon me, and I want a little respite. I imagine too that many more of us are in the same condition, such as were here at the entertainment yesterday. Consider, therefore, what way is the best to make drinking agreeable and easy to us.

Aristophanes/ It is a good proposal of yours, Pausanias, in my opinion, this, that we should by all means procure ourselves an easy drinking-bout. For I am one of those who were well soaked yesterday.

Eryximachus/ Both of you say well. But I should be glad to be informed about one other person, and that is Agatho; in what condition of strength he finds himself with regard to drinking.

Agathon/ I am by no means very strong at present myself neither.

Eryximachus/ It is lucky for us, for me, and Aristodemus, and Phædrus, and the rest of us here, if you fail and are disabled, you stout men at the bottle. For we are at all times weak in that respect. Socrates, indeed, I except; for he is equally well qualified to drink, or to let it alone. So that he will be satisfied, and ready to comply, whichever course we take. Since none of the company, therefore, seem inclined to drink hard, I may be the less displeasing, perhaps, if I speak the truth about this matter in plain terms. For I have been convinced myself, from the experience, acquired in our profession, that hard drinking is usually attended with ill consequences. For which reason, I should neither choose to venture far in drinking myself, nor advise it to any other person, especially when oppressed with the load of the last night's debauch. —

Phaedrus/ As for me, I am accustomed to hearken to your advice in everything, especially in what relates to your own profession: but now I find all the rest of the company are in the same complying disposition.

Apollodorus/ This they all assented to, and agreed not to make the present meeting a debauch; but to drink, every man, just as much as might be agreeable to him.

Eryximachus/ This point then being determined that we are to drink at our own pleasure, and that no compulsion Is to be used; the next thing I have to offer is this, that the piper-girl, who has just entered the room, may be dismissed, to pipe to herself, or, if she pleases, to the women in the inner rooms; and that we enjoy one another this evening in the way of conversation. The manner and the subject, I am ready, if you permit me, to propose.

Apollodorus/ To this they all unanimously gave consent, and desired him to propose accordingly.

Eryximachus/ I shall begin my proposal after the manner of Euripides in his prologue to the Melanippe, for

The tale I have to tell is not my own;

I have it from Phædrus here. For Phædrus is continually saying to me, with an air of indignation, Is it not astonishing, says he, Eryximachus, that the poets have made hymns and odes in honor of some other of the Deities; and yet not one poet, amongst so many in every age, has ever composed a panegyric upon Love; but the praises of a God so powerful, and of so excellent a nature, to this day remain unsung? The same complaint I have to make against the sophists: the best of whom, as you will find, have, in their prosaic compositions, made encomiums on Hercules, and other great and illustrious persons; as the celebrated Prodicus has done, for instance. This, however, is not greatly to be wondered at. But I have lately met with a treatise, written by one of those wise men, containing a high panegyric upon salt on account of its utility. And many other things of as little worth you may see set off with great encomiums. That so much pains should be bestowed upon subjects so mean, and yet that no man should ever to this day have undertaken to give Love his due praises, but that so great a God has been neglected to such a degree, is it not astonishing? Now Phædrus, in all this, which I have repeated from his mouth, seems to me to plead well. I should be glad, therefore, to have him gratified, and to contribute my share to his gratification. Besides that I think it highly becoming this assembly to decorate with all possible honors the Deity of Love. If all of you then are of the same opinion with me, we may spend our time agreeably enough tonight in discoursing. For my proposal is, that every man of us should deliver an oration in praise of Love, as proper and handsome a one as he is

able, the right hand way down; and that Phædrus should take the lead, as he is at the upper end, and is, besides, the father and founder of the argument. —

Socrates/ You may be assured, Eryximachus, that none of us will put a negative on your proposal. For by no means ever should I, who pretend not to the knowledge of any other matters than those which belong to Love: neither would Agatho, nor Pausanias: no more will Aristophanes, without dispute; for his whole time is taken up about Bacchus and Venus: nor indeed will any other person whom I see present. We indeed, who sit lowest, and are to speak last, shall have the disadvantage. However, if the prior speakers speak well and fully to the point, we shall desire nothing more. Let Phædrus then, with our best wishes to attend him, begin, and make his panegyric upon Love.

Apollodorus/ To this all the rest of the company consented, and joined with Socrates in the encouraging Phædrus to begin. Now what was said by each of the several speakers Aristodemus did not perfectly remember; neither can I, indeed, all that he told me: but the speeches of those whom I looked on as the most considerable persons, and everything which I thought most worth remembering, I will endeavor to relate to you distinctly.

He told me then, that Phædrus, in compliance with the request made him, spoke first; and began somewhat in this way, with saying—

THE SPEECH OF PHÆDRUS.

Phaedrus/ That Love was powerful, and wonderfully great, both on earth and amongst the Gods: that superior dignity belonged to him on many accounts, but especially with regard to his generation.

For to be one of the eldest of the Gods, is a circumstance redounding highly to his honor. And that he enjoys this advantage, appears in that he had no parents; and that never any writer, whether uninspired or poet, pretended that he had. But Hesiod says;

> Chaos was first produced; Earth rose the next,
> Wide-bosom'd, a fixd seat secure to all
> For ever yielding; and with her rose Love.

Here the poet tells us, that next after Chaos were born these two, Earth and Love. Parmenides relates the generation thus;

> First from th' eternal council forth came Love,
> First of the Gods. ——

Acusilaus says the same thing with Hesiod. On so many different hands is it agreed, that Love is among the most ancient of the Gods. And as he is thus of highest antiquity in the nature of things, so is he the cause of the greatest good to human kind. For to young persons, at their first setting out in life, I know no greater good than love; to the party beloved, if she has a worthy lover; or to the lover himself, if his mistress be worthy: because that, which should be our leading principle in order to right conduct in every circumstance of life, consanguinity has not the power to excite in us, neither have honors, nor riches, nor aught else, so effectually as love. The principle I mean is the sense of shame attending a base conduct, together with a sense of honor in the doing what is honorable. For, without such a principle, no civil community nor private person can execute anything great or noble. In confirmation of this, I take upon me to assert that if a man in love be found committing a base action, or suffering base usage from any, through cowardice, or without taking his revenge, he is not in so much pain at being seen by his father, by his intimates, or by any other person, as at being seen by his mistress. The same effect we

see it has upon the party beloved, to be more ashamed of her lover's sight than of the eyes of the whole world, if she be discovered doing aught dishonorable. If, therefore, there could be any contrivance to have a city or an army composed of lovers and their beloved, the interest of the whole could not be promoted by any better way than this; in which every individual would have a care not to behave basely, and a zeal to behave nobly, excited by a desire to gain the good opinion of some other. Such a people fighting side by side in battle, a handful of them would conquer, I could almost say, the world. For a lover deserting his rank, or throwing down his arms, would less endure to be seen by his beloved than by all mankind. Rather than bear this, he would choose to die a thousand deaths: so would he, rather than forsake the defense of his beloved, or rather than forbear flying to her aid, if she had fallen into danger. There is not any man such a dastard, whom Love himself would not inspire, and make an enthusiast in virtue: so that he should become equal to a man born with a disposition the most excellent. For what Homer says of certain of his heroes, that some God inspired them with a force resistless, this in reality Love does to lovers; such an effect being produced in them by Love alone. And then to die for another, only lovers are ready; not only men, but women too. A signal instance of this appears in the daughter of Pelias, Alcestis; who, as the story goes among the Grecians, undertook to reprieve her husband's life by her own death, when no other mortal could be found, willing to die for him, though he had both a father and a mother then living. But Love wrought in her heart an affection for him so far surpassing theirs, that she proved them to be, in comparison with herself, strangers to his blood, and in name only his relations. When, therefore, she had executed her undertaking, the Gods themselves, as well as men, deemed the achievement so singularly noble, that out of many

persons, eminent for many virtues, she was added to the number of those select few distinguished by being restored to life again after death as a reward for their distinguished excellence: for to her also was her departed soul sent back again by the Gods, admiring at the heroic greatness of her resolution. So much do they encourage us to make love our care, by bestowing superior honors on all such as exercise upon that subject in particular superior virtue, But Orpheus the son of Oeager the Gods dismissed from those invisible regions, without granting him to succeed in the purpose of his journey thither; showing him only the phantom of his wife, but not restoring to him the reality: for that he appeared effeminate and cowardly, suitable to his profession, that of a mere fiddler; not daring to die for the sake of love, like Alcestis; but contriving actually to go alive to the other world. For this did the Gods assign him an adequate punishment, ordaining his death to be by women. In a very different way disposed they of Achilles, the son of Thetis, in sending him to the islands of the blest: because, though he had heard from the goddess his mother, that he must soon die himself after he had slain Hector—but that, if he slew not Hector, he should return home and live to a good old-age, —he dared to make death his choice; not only hazarding his life in aid of his friend Patroclus, as ready to die that he might save him, but afterwards avenging his death at the expense of his own life, as resolute not to survive him. This exalted virtue of his the Gods paid a singular regard to; and rewarded with their choicest favors the regard which he had shown to friendship, in setting so high a value on the man who admired and loved him. For Æschylus talks idly, when he says that Achilles was the admirer of Patroclus; Achilles, whose excellence, though he was but in the dawn of manhood, surpassed not only Patroclus, but all the other Grecian heroes. True it is, that

the Gods confer superior honors on all virtue, to the exercise of which love and friendship minister occasion: but they more wonder, more approve, and bestow greater rewards, where the person admired feels all the force of friendship and affection for the admirer, than where the noblest offices of friendship are performed by the other party. For the admirer has more of divinity in him than the person admired, as being full of the God who inspires and possesses him. For this cause did the Gods reward Achilles with a higher degree of happiness than they did Alcestis; for to her they gave only a second life on earth, but to the hero they assigned his mansion in the islands of the blest. Thus have I performed my part, in asserting Love to be the eldest in age and of highest dignity amongst the Gods; and to be in a peculiar manner the author of virtue and happiness to all of human kind, whilst they continue in life, and when departed.

Apollodorus/ Such, Aristodemus told me, was the discourse made by Phædrus. After Phædrus, spoke some others, whose speeches, he did not well remember: omitting these, therefore, he repeated next that of Pausanias, who began thus: —

THE SPEECH OF PAUSANIAS.

Pausanias/ In my opinion, Phædrus, the subject was not fairly and distinctly set before us, when it was proposed in general terms, that we should make encomiums upon Love. This, indeed, would have been right, were there but one Love, or if Love were but of one kind. But since the truth is otherwise, the better way is to declare first, which Love it is our present business to praise. To put this matter, therefore, on a right footing, I shall, in the first place, distinguish that Love whose praises we ought to celebrate; and then do my best to celebrate them myself, in a manner worthy of his

Deity. We all know that it is the office of Love to attend always upon Venus. If then there were only one Venus, there had been no occasion for more than one Love. But since there are two Venuses, there must of necessity be two Loves. For it is undeniable, that two different Goddesses there are, each of whom is a Venus: one of them elder, who had no mother, and was born only from Uranus, or Heaven, her father; she is called the celestial Venus: the other, younger, daughter of Zeus and Dione; and to her we give the name of the vulgar Venus. Agreeably to this account, it is proper to call that Love who attends on the latter Venus by the name of the vulgar Love, the other by the name of the celestial. All the Gods, indeed, it is our duty to honor with our praises: but we ought to distinguish, as well as we are able, each by his peculiar attributes; that we may give to each his due praise. For every action or operation is attended with this condition: the doing it, considered simply in itself, is neither base nor honorable: as for instance, every one of the things we are now doing, drinking, singing, or discoursing, is in itself a matter of indifference; but the manner of doing it determines the nature of the thing. Rightly performed, it is right and honorable; performed in a wrong manner, it is wrong and dishonorable. So likewise, not every Love is generous or noble, or merits high encomiums; but that Love only who prompts and impels men to love generously and nobly. The attendant of the vulgar Venus is a Love truly vulgar, suffering himself to be employed in any the meanest actions: and this Love it is who inspires the mean and the worthless. Those who are the most addicted to this love, are, in the first place, the least disposed to friendship; in the next place, they are more enamored of the bodies than of the minds of their paramours; and besides, they choose from the objects of their passion the silliest creatures they can light on: for, confining their views to the gratification of their

passion by the act of enjoyment, they are regardless in what manner they gratify it, whether basely or honorably. Hence it comes, that in the pursuit of their loves, and afterwards in the enjoyment, they are equally ready for any action which offers itself, whether good or bad, indifferently. For the Love who inspires them is born of that younger Venus, in whose generation there is a mixture of the male and the female; whence it is that she partakes of both. But the other Love is sprung from the celestial Venus; from her whose properties are these: —in the first place, she partakes not of the female, but of the male only; whence she is the parent of friendship: then, she is in age the elder, and a stranger to brutal lust; and hence it happens, that as many as are inspired by this love addict themselves to friendship, conceiving an affection for that which by nature is of greater strength and understanding. Now, whether the man who is under the influence of love feels the genuine impulse of this generous affection, is easy to discern. For, if so, he fixes not his love on any person who is not arrived at the maturity of her understanding. But, commencing their loves from this state, one may well presume them duly qualified, both of them, to live together throughout life, partners in all things, Nor is the lover likely in this case to act like one who, after discovering some childish folly in the person he has chosen, exposes her, and turns her into ridicule, forfeits his faith to her and forsakes her, and attaches himself to a new mistress. To prevent this, there ought to be a law, that no man should make choice of too young a person for the partner of his best; because, what so young a person may hereafter prove, whether good or bad, either in mind or body, the event is so uncertain. Men of virtue indeed themselves to themselves make this a law: but upon those vulgar lovers we should put a public restraint of this kind; in the same manner as we restrain them, as much as possible, from

entering into amorous intrigues with any women above the rank of servitude. For they are of this sort of lovers, they who bring upon their mistresses reproach and shame; and have given occasion to that verse of one of the poets, in which he has dared to vilify the power of Love, by pronouncing.

> 'Tis loss of honor to the fair
> To yield, and grant the lover's prayer.

But he said this only with a view to lovers of this kind, from seeing their untimely haste and eagerness, their ingratitude and injustice. For certainly no action governed by the rules of justice and of decency can any way merit blame. Now, the rules concerning love established in other states are easy to be understood, as being plain and simple; but our own laws, and those of Sparta upon this head, are complex and intricate. For in Elis, and amongst the Bœotians, and in every other Grecian state where the arts of speaking flourish not, the law in such places absolutely makes it honorable to gratify the lover; nor can any person there, whether young or old, stain such a piece of conduct with dishonor: the reason of which law, I presume, is to prevent the great trouble they would otherwise have in courting the fair, and trying to win them by the arts of oratory, arts in which they have no abilities. But in Ionia, and many other places, and in all barbarian countries universally, the same conduct is ordained and held to be dishonorable. For the tyrannical governments under which the people of those countries live, discountenance that way of mutual love, and bring it into disrepute. But the same fate in those countries attends philosophy, or the love of wisdom; as it does no less the love of manly exercises. And the reason, I presume, in all these cases is the same; it is not the interest of the rulers there to have their subjects high-spirited or high-minded; nor to suffer strong friendships to be formed amongst them, or any other ties of a common or joint interest: and these are the

usual and natural effects of love, as well as of those other studies and practices prohibited by tyrants. Those who formerly tyrannized over Athens experienced this to be true. For the firm and stable friendship between Aristogiton and Harmodius was the destruction of their tyranny. Thus we find, that wherever the stricter ties of love and friendship are forbidden or discouraged, it is owing to vice, to lust of power, and of whatever is the private interest of the governor; to want of spirit and courage, and every other virtue, in the governed: and that wherever they are enjoined or encouraged simply and without restriction, it is owing to a littleness and laziness of soul in those who have the making of the laws. But in our own state the laws relating to this point are put upon a better footing; though, as I said before, it is not obvious or easy to comprehend their meaning. For, when we consider, that with us it is reputed honorable for men openly to profess love, rather than to make a secret of it; and to fix their best affections on such as excel in the accomplishments of mind, though inferior to others of their sex in outward beauty; that everyone highly favors and applauds the lover, as not thinking him engaged in any designs which are base or unbecoming a man; that success in love is held an honor to the lover; disappointment, a dishonor; and that the law allows the lover liberty to do his utmost for the accomplishing his end; and permits such strange actions to be commended in him, such, as were a man to be guilty of in any other pursuit than that of love, and as the means of succeeding in any other design, he would be sure of meeting with the highest reproaches from philosophy. For if, with a view either of getting money out of any person, or of attaining to any share in the government, or of acquiring power of any other kind, a man should submit to do such things as lovers ordinarily practice to gain their mistresses, supplicating and begging in the humblest

manner, making vows and oaths, keeping nightly vigils at their doors, and voluntarily stooping to such slavery as no slave would undergo, both his friends and his enemies would prevent him from so doing; his enemies reproaching him for his servility and illiberality; his friends admonishing him and ashamed for him. But in a lover all this is graceful; and the law grants him free leave to do it uncensored, as a business highly commendable for him to undertake and execute. But that which is more than all the rest prodigious is, that the Gods, though they pardon not the crime of perjury in any besides, yet excuse in a lover the violation of his oath, if the opinion of the multitude be true; for oaths in love, they say, are not binding. Thus the Gods, as well as men, give all kinds of license to the lover; as says the law established in our state. Viewing now the affair in this light, a man would imagine that among us not only love in the lover, but a grateful return likewise from the beloved party, was reputed honorable. But when we see the parents of the youthful fair appointing governesses and guardians over them, who have it in their instructions not to suffer them to hold discourse in private with their lovers; when we see their acquaintance, and their equals in age, and other people besides, censuring them, if they are guilty of such a piece of imprudence, and the old folks not opposing the censurers, nor reprehending them as guilty of unjust censures; in this view, a man would be apt to think that, on the contrary, we condemned those very things which he might otherwise suppose we had approved of. But, upon the whole, the case, I believe, stands thus: The affair of love, as I said at first, considered simply and generally, is neither right nor wrong; but, carried on and accomplished with honor, is fair and honorable; transacted in a dishonorable manner, is base and dishonorable. Now, it is a dishonor to a maiden to gratify a vicious and bad lover, or to yield to him from base and unworthy motives: but in

granting favors to a good and virtuous lover, and complying with his love from generous and noble views, she does herself an honor. The vicious lover is he of the vulgar sort, who is in love with the body rather than the mind. For he is not a lasting lover, being in love with a thing which is not lairing; since, with the slower of youth when that is gone which he admired, the lover himself too takes wing and flies away, shaming all his fine speeches and fair promises. But the man who is in love with his mistress's moral character, when her disposition and manners are settled in what is right, he is a lover who abides through life, as being united with that which is durable and abiding. Our law wills accordingly, that all lovers should be well and fairly proved; and that, after such probation, upon some the favors of the fair should be bestowed, to others they should be constantly refused. It encourages, therefore, the lover to pursue, but bids the beloved party fly: by all ways of trial, and in every kind of combat, making it appear of which sort the lover is, and of which sort his mistress. For this reason it is that the law deems it dishonorable, in the first place, to be won soon or easily; in order that time may be gained; for of the truth of many things time seems to be the fairest test: in the next place, it is held dishonorable for the fair one to be won by considerations of profit or power; whether she be used ill, or terrified, and therefore yield, through want of noble endurance; or whether she be flattered with riches or rank, and despise not such kind of obligations. For none of these things appear fixed or durable; much less can they give rise to any generous friendship. There remains then one only way, in which, according to our law, the fair one may honorably yield, and consent to her lover's passion. For, as any kind of servitude which the lover undergoes of his own free choice in the service of his mistress is not by our law deemed adulation, nor accounted a matter of disgrace; so,

on the other part, there is left only one other servitude or compliance not disgraceful in the fair; and this is that which is for the sake of virtue. For it is a settled rule with us, that whoever pays any court or attendance, whoever yields any service or compliance to another, in expectation of receiving by his means improvement in wisdom, or in any other branch of virtue, is not by such voluntary subjection guilty of servility or base adulation. Now these two rules are to correspond one with the other, and must concur to the same end, the rule relating to lovers, and this which concerns philosophy and every other part of virtue, in order to make it honorable in the fair one to comply with her lover's passion. For, when the lover and his mistress meet together, bringing with them their respective rules, each of them; the lover, his—that it is right to minister any way to the service of his mistress; the fair one, hers—that it is right to yield any service or compliance to the person who improves her in wisdom and in virtue; the one also, with abilities to teach and to make better; the other, with a desire of instruction and the being bettered; —then, both those rules thus corresponding and conspiring, in these circumstances only, and in no other, it falls out, by a concurrence of all the necessary requisites, to be honorable in the fair one to gratify her lover. Besides, in this case it is no dishonor to her to be deceived: but, in the case of compliance on any other terms, she incurs shame equally, whether she be deceived or not. For If, on a supposition of her lover's being wealthy, she yields to him with a view of enriching herself, but is disappointed, and gets nothing from her paramour, whom at length she discovers to be poor, it is not at all the less dishonorable to her: because such a woman discovers openly her own heart, and makes it appear, that for the sake of wealth she would yield anything to any person: and this is highly dishonorable and base. But if, imagining her lover

to be a good man, and with a view to her own improvement in virtue through the friendship of her lover, she yields to him, and is deceived, finding him a bad man, unpossessed of virtue, her disappointment, however, is still honorable to her: for a discovery has been also made of her aims; and it has appeared evident, that as a means to acquire virtue, and to be made better, she was ready to resign to any man her all: and this is of all things the most generous and noble. So entirely and absolutely honorable is it in the fair one to comply for the sake of virtue. This is that Love, the offspring of the celestial Venus, himself celestial; of high importance to the public interest, and no less valuable to private persons; compelling as well the lover, as the beloved, with the utmost care to cultivate virtue. All the other Loves hold of the other Venus, of her the vulgar. Thus much, Phædrus, have I to contribute on this sudden call to the subject you have proposed to us, the praise of Love.

Apollodorus/ Pausanias here pausing, —for I learn from the wise to use parities in speaking, and words of similar sound; Aristodemus told me, it came next in turn to Aristophanes to speak: but whether from repletion, or whatever else was the cause, he happened to be seized with a fit of the hiccups, and consequently became unfit for speech-making. Upon which, as he sat next to Eryximachus the physician, he addressed him thus:

Aristophanes/ Eryximachus, you must either drive away my hiccups, or speak in my turn till they have left me.

Eryximachus/ Well; I will do both. I will speak in your turn, and you, when your hiccups are gone, shall speak in mine: and while I am speaking, if you hold your breath for a considerable time, your hiccups, perhaps, will have an end. Should they continue, notwithstanding, then gargle your throat with water. But if they are very obstinate, take some such thing as this feather, and tickle your nose till you

provoke a sneezing. When you have sneezed once or twice, your hiccups will cease, be they ever so violent.

Aristophanes/ As soon as you begin your speech, I shall set about doing what you bid me.

Apollodorus/ Eryximachus then began in this manner:

THE SPEECH OF ERYXIMACHUS.

Eryximachus/ Since Pausanias, after setting out so excellently well, ended his discourse imperfectly, it seems a task incumbent on me, to finish the argument which he began. For, in distinguishing two different kinds of Love, he made, I think, a very proper and just distinction. But that Love gives us an attraction not only to beautiful persons, but to many other things beside; and that he dwells not only in human hearts, but has also his seat in other beings, in the bodies of all animals, and in the vegetable productions of the earth; in fine, that he lives throughout all nature; my own art, that of medicine, has given me occasion to observe; and to remark, how great and wonderful a God is Love, stretching everywhere his attractive power, and reaching at all things, whether human or divine. I shall instance first in medicine; that I may pay my first regards to my own profession. I say then, that our bodies partake of this two-fold love. For bodily health and disease bear an analogy to the two different dispositions of the soul mentioned by Pausanias. And as the body in a state of health, and the body when diseased, are in themselves very different one from the other, so they love and long for very different things. The love in a healthy body is of one kind; the love in a diseased body is of another kind, quite different. Now, as Pausanias says, it is honorable to comply with a good lover, but dishonorable to yield to one who is vicious: so is it with respect to the body: whatever is in a sound and healthy state, it is commendable and right

to please; it is the physician's duty so to do, and the effectual doing of it denotes him truly a physician. But to gratify that which is diseased and bad, is blamable; and the physician, who would practice agreeably to the rules of art, must deny it the gratification which it demands. For medical science, to give a summary and brief account of it, is the knowledge of those amorous passions of the body, which tend to filling and emptying. Accordingly, the man who in these passions or appetites can distinguish the right love from that which is wrong, he has most of all men the science belonging to a physician. And the man who is able to effect a change, so as in the place of one of those loves to introduce the other; and knows how to infuse love into those bodies which have it not, yet ought to have it; and how to expel a love with which they are but ought not to be possessed; he is a skillful practicers of his art. For those things in the body which are most at variance must he be able to reconcile to each other, and to conciliate amity between them and mutual love. The things most at variance are such as are the most contrary one to the other; as the cold is to the hot, the bitter to the sweet, the dry to the moist, and all others of that sort. Into these things, thus at variance, our ancestor Æsculapius had power to inspire a spirit of love and concord; and, as our friends here the poets tell us, and as I believe, framing into a system the rules for so doing, was properly the author of our art. So that medicine, in the manner I have described, is all under the direction and management of Love. So is the gymnastic art in like manner; and so is the art of agriculture. And that music is so too, is evident to every man who considers the nature of this art with the least attention; and is perhaps the very thing which Heraclitus meant to say: for his way of expressing himself is inaccurate and obscure. "The one," says he, "disagreeing with itself, yet proceeds in amicable concord; like the harmony made by the bow and

lyre." Now it is very absurd to say, that in harmony any disagreement can find place; or that the component parts of harmony can ever disagree. But his meaning perhaps was this; that things in their own nature disagreeing, that is, sounds, some shrill and others deep, at length brought to an agreement by the musical art, compose harmony. For harmony cannot consist of shrill and deep sounds, whilst they remain in disagreement: because harmony is consonance, or a conspiration of sounds; and consonance is one kind of agreement: but it is impossible that any agreement should be between disagreeing things, so long as they disagree: and no less impossible is it, that things between which there is no agreement should at the same time harmonize together, so as to produce harmony. And as it is with sound so is it with motion; the quick measures and the slow ones, by nature disagreeing, but afterwards brought to agree together, compose rhythm. In both these cases, where things differ and are opposite to one another, it is the art of music which brings about the reconcilement and agreement; just as the art of medicine does in the former case; inspiring them in the same manner with the spirit of love and concord. And thus musical science is the knowledge of those amorous conjunctions whose offspring are harmony and rhythm. Now in the systems themselves, whether of harmony or of rhythm, there is no difficulty at all in knowing the amorous conjunctions: for here love is not distinguished into two kinds. But when the intention is to apply rhythm and harmony to the ears of some audience, then comes the difficulty; then is there need of a skillful artist, whether in composing the odes, and setting them to music, or in making a right choice of those ready composed and set, and properly adapting them to the geniuses of youth, For here that distinction takes place; here must we recur again to that rule of Pausanias, that the decent, the well-ordered, and the

virtuous it is right to gratify, for the sake of preserving their love, and of improving such as are yet deficient in virtue. The Love by whom these are inspired is the noble, the celestial; that Love who attends the celestial muse. But the attendant of Polyhymnia, and the follower of every muse at random, is the other Love, he of the vulgar kind: whom we ought cautiously to indulge, whenever we indulge him; that he may enjoy his own pleasures without introducing disorder and debauchery. And this is an affair of no less difficulty than in our art it is to manage prudently the appetites which regard the table; so as to permit them the enjoyment of their proper pleasures, without danger of diseases. Thus, in the practice of music, and of medicine, and in every other employment, whether human or divine, we are to preserve, as far as consistently we may, both Loves: for both are to be found in all things. Full of both is the constitution of the annual seasons. And when those contraries in nature before mentioned, the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, under the influence of the modest Love, admit a sober correspondence together, and temperate commixture; they bring along with them, when they come, fair seasons, fine weather, and health to men, brute animals, and plants, doing injury to none. But when that Love who inspires lawless and ungoverned passion prevails in the constitution of the season, he corrupts, injures and ruins many of the fair forms of nature. For the usual fruits of this Love are plagues, and other preternatural diseases, which come upon animals, and vegetables too; mildews, hail-storms, and blights being generated from the irregular state of the amorous affections in those elementary beings, and the want of temperance in their conjunctions: the knowledge of which their amorous affections, and consequent conjunctions, considered as owing to the aspects of the heavenly bodies, and as respecting the seasons of the year, is called

astronomy. Further, all kinds of sacrifice, and all the subjects of the diviner's art, those agents employed in carrying on a reciprocal intercourse between the Gods and mortals, are employed with no other view than to preserve the right love, and cure that which is wrong. For every species of impiety is the usual consequence of not yielding to and gratifying the better Love, the regular; and of not paying to him, but to the other Love, our principal regards, in everything we do relating to our parents, whether living or deceased, and in everything relating to the Gods. In all such cases, to superintend the Loves, to cherish the right, and cure the wrong, is the business of divination. And thus Divination is an artist, skilled in procuring and promoting friendliness and good correspondence between the Gods and men, through her knowledge of what amorous affections in men tend to piety and justice, and what are opposite to these, and lead the contrary way. So widely extensive, so highly predominant, or rather all-prevailing, is the power of Love. Of all love in general this is true; but especially, and the most true is it, of that Love who attains his ends in the attainment of good things, and enjoys them without ever exceeding the bounds of temperance, or violating the laws of justice. For it is this Love who bears the chief sway both in the human nature and the divine; it is this Love who procures for us every kind of happiness; enabling us to live in social converse one with another, and in friendship with beings so much superior to ourselves, the Gods. It is possible now after all, that, in the panegyric I have made on Love, I may have omitted, as well as Pausanias, many topics of his due praise: it has not, however, been done designedly; and if I have left aught unsaid, it is your business, Aristophanes, to supply that deficiency: or, if your intentions are to celebrate the God in a different way, now that your hiccups are over, you may begin.

Aristophanes/ I am now indeed no longer troubled with my hiccups: but they would not be easy before I brought the sneezings to them. I wonder that a modest and decent part of the body should be in love with and long for these ticklings, or be pleased with such boisterous roaring noises, such as sneezing is: for, as soon as I had, procured it a good sneezing, immediately it was quiet.

Eryximachus/ Friend Aristophanes, consider what you are about: you are raising up a spirit of ridicule here, just as you are going to begin your speech; and put me upon the watch, to say hold of something or other in it for the company to laugh at, when you might, if you pleased, have spoken in quiet.

Aristophanes/ You are in the right, Eryximachus: what I said just now, let it be looked on as unsaid. But, pray, do not watch me. For I am in pain for the speech I am going to make; not for fear there should be anything in it to laugh at; for a laugh would be an advantage gained to me, and the natural product of my muse; but for fear it should be really in itself ridiculous.

Eryximachus/ You shoot your bolt, Aristophanes, and then think to march off. But take care of what you say, and expect to be called to a strict account for it. Perhaps, however, I shall be gracious enough to spare you.

Apollodorus/ Aristophanes then began:

THE SPEECH OF ARISTOPHANES.

Aristophanes/ My intentions, Eryximachus, are to speak in a way very different, I assure you, from the way taken by you and Pausanias in your speeches. To me men seem utterly insensible what the power of Love is. For, were they sensible of it, they would build temples and erect altars to him the most magnificent, and would offer to him the noblest

sacrifices. He would not be neglected as he is now, when none of these honors are paid him, though, of all the Gods, Love ought the most to be thus honored. For, of all the God, Love is the most friendly to man, his relief and remedy in those evils the perfect cure of which would be productive of the highest happiness to the whole human race. I will do my best, therefore, to make his power known to you, and you shall teach it to others. But you must first be informed what the human nature is, and what changes it has undergone. For our nature of old was different from what it is at present. In the first place, there were anciently three sorts, or subordinate species, of the humankind; not as at present, only two, male and female; there being, then, a third species beside, which partook of both the others: the name only of which species now remains, the species itself being extinct and lost. For then existed actually and flourished hermaphrodites, who partook of both the other species, the male and the female. But they are now become merely a name, a name of abuse and of reproach. In the next place, the entire form of every individual of the human kind was cylindrical; for their bodies, back and sides together, were everywhere, from top to bottom, circular. Everyone had four hands, and the same number of legs. They had two faces, each, upon their round necks, every way both alike: but these two faces belonged but to one head; on the sides of which were placed these faces, opposite one to the other. Each had also four ears, and two distinctions of the sex. From this description, it is easy to conceive how all the other parts of the human body were doubled. They walked upon whichever legs they pleased, on any side; and, as they walk now, upright. But when anyone wanted to go with expedition, then, as tumblers, after pitching on their hands, throw their legs upward, and bring them over, and thus tumble themselves round; in the same manner did the

people of those days, supported by their eight limbs alternately, and wheeled along with great dispatch. Now you are to know, that these three species of the human race were precisely so many in number, and their bodies made in such a form, for this reason, —because the male kind was produced originally by the sun, the female rose from the earth, and the third, which partook of the other two, was the offspring of the moon; for the moon, you know, partakes of both the others, the sun and the earth. The bodies, therefore, of each kind were round, and the manner of their running was circular, in resemblance of their first parents. Their force and strength were prodigious; their minds elevated and haughty; so they undertook to invade heaven. And of them is related the same fact which Homer relates of Ephialtus and Otus, that they set about railing an ascent up to the skies, with intention to attack the Gods. Upon which Zeus and the other Deities consulted together what they should do to these rebels; but could come to no determination about the punishment proper to be inflicted on them. They could not resolve upon destroying them by thunder, as they did the giants; far thus the whole human race would be extinct; and then the honors paid them by that race would be extinct together with it, and their temples come to ruin. Nor yet could they suffer those mortals to continue in their insolence. At length Zeus, after much consideration of so difficult a case, said, I have a device, by which the race of men may be preserved, and yet an end put to their insolence; as my device will much diminish the greatness of their strength. For I intend, you must know, to divide every one of them into two: by which means their strength will be much abated, and at the same time their number much increased, to our advantage and the increase of our honor. They shall walk upright upon two legs; and if any remains of insolence shall ever appear in them, and they

resolve not to be at quiet, I will again divide them, each into two; and they shall go upon one leg, hopping. As he said, so did he; he cut all the human race in twain, as people cut eggs to salt them for keeping. The face, together with the half-neck of every half-body, he ordered Apollo to turn half round, and fix it on that side where the other half of the body was cut off; with intention that all people, viewing themselves on that side where they had suffered the loss of half themselves, might be brought to a sober way of thinking, and learn to behave with more modesty. For what remained necessary to be done, he bid him exercise his own healing art. —Accordingly, Apollo turned the face of everyone about to the reverse of its former situation: and drawing the skin together, like a purse, from all parts of the body, over that which is now called the belly, up to one orifice or opening, he tied up at the middle of the belly this orifice, now called the navel. He then smoothed most part of the wrinkles of the skin, after having framed the bones of the breast under it; in the same manner as shoe-makers smooth the wrinkles of the leather, when they have stretched it upon the last. But a few wrinkles, those on the belly and navel, he let remain, for a memorial of their old crime and punishment. Now, when all the human race were thus bisected, every section longed for its fellow half. And when these happened to meet together, they mutually embraced, folded in each other's arms, and wishing they could grow together and be united. The consequence of this was, that they both died, through famine, and the other evils naturally brought on by idleness. And if one of these halves died, and left the other behind, the surviving half was immediately employed in looking about for another partner; and whether it happened to meet with the half of a whole woman, (which half we now call a woman,) or with the half of a whole man, they were continually embracing. After all, Zeus, seeing them thus in danger of

destruction, took pity on them, and contrived another device; which was, to place the distinction of sex before: for till then this had still remained on the other side; and they had engendered, not one with another, but with the earth, like grasshoppers. This scheme Zeus carried into execution; and thus made the work of generation to be thenceforth carried on by both sexes jointly, the female conceiving from the male. Now, in making this the sole way of generating, Zeus had these ends in view: that, if a man should meet with a woman, they might, in the embrace, generate together, and the human kind be thus continued; but if he met with another man, that then both might be surfeited with such commixture; and that, immediately ceasing from their embraces, they might apply themselves to business, and turn their studies and pursuits to the other affairs of life. From all this it appears how deeply mutual love is implanted by nature in all of the human race; bringing them again to their pristine form; coupling them together; endeavoring out of two to make one, and thus to remedy the evils introduced into the human nature. So that everyone of us at present is but the tally of a human creature; which has been cut like a polypus, and out of one made two. Hence it comes, that we are all in continual search of our several counterparts, to tally with us. As many men, accordingly, as are sections of that double form called the hermaphrodite, are lovers of women: and of this species are the multitude of rakes. So, on the other hand, as many women as are addicted to the love of men are sprung from the same amphibious race. But such women as are sections of the female form are not much inclined to men; their affections tend rather to their own sex: and of this kind are the Sapphic lovers. Men, in like manner, such as are sections of the male form, follow the males: and whilst they are children, being originally fragments of men, it is men they love, and it is in men's company and caresses

they are most delighted. Those children and those youths who are of this sort are the best, as being the most manly in their temper and disposition. Some people, I know, say, they are shameless and impudent: but in this they wrong them; for it is not impudence and want of modesty, but it is manly assurance, with a manly temper and turn of mind, by which they are led to associate with those whom they resemble. A shrewd conjecture may hence be formed, from what race they originally spring; a conjecture justified by their conduct afterwards. For only boys of this manly kind, when they arrive at the age of maturity, apply themselves to political affairs: and as they advance further in the age of manhood, they delight to encourage and forward the youth of their own sex in manly studies and employments; but have naturally no inclination to marry and beget children: they do it only in conformity to the laws, and would choose to live unmarried, in a state of friendship. Such persons as these are indeed by nature formed for friendship solely, and to embrace always whatever is congenial with themselves. Now, whenever it fortunes that a man meets with that very counterpart of himself, his other half, they are both smitten with love in a wondrous manner; they recognize their ancient intimacy; they are strongly attracted together by a consciousness that they belong to each other; and are unwilling to be parted, or become separate again, though forever so short a time. Those pairs who of free choice live together throughout life, are such as have met with this good fortune. Yet are none of them able to tell what it is they would have one from the other. For it does not seem to be the venereal congress. In all appearance, it is not merely for the sake of this that they feel such extreme delight in the company of each other; and seek it, when they have it not, with so eager a desire. It is evident, that their souls long for some other thing, which neither can explain; something which they can only give

obscure hints of, in the way of enigmas; and each party can only guess at in the other, as it were, by divination. But when they are together, and caressing each other, were Vulcan to stand by with his tools in his hand, and say, “Mortals! what is it ye want, and would have, one from the other?”—and finding them at a loss what to answer, were he to demand of them again, and say, “Is this what ye long for; to be united together with the most entire union, so as never, either by night or day, to be separate from each other? If ye long for this, I will melt you down, both of you together, and together form you both again; that, instead of two, ye may become one; whilst ye live, living a joint life, as one person; and when ye come to die, dying at once one death; and afterwards, in the state of souls departed, continuing still undivided. Consider now within yourselves, whether ye like the proposal, and whether ye would be glad to have it carried into execution.”—I am certain, that not a single mortal to whom Vulcan should make this offer would reject it. It would appear that none had any other wish; and every man would be conscious to himself, that the secret desire which he had of old conceived in his heart, was at length brought to light and expressed in clear language, that is, to be mingled and melted in with his beloved, and out of two to be made one. The cause of which desire in us all is this, that our pristine nature was such as I have described it; we were once whole. The desire and pursuit of this wholeness of our nature, our becoming whole again, is called Love. For, as I said, we were anciently one: but now, as a punishment for our breach of the laws of justice, the Gods have compelled us to live asunder in separate bodies: just as the people of Arcady are treated by the Spartans. If, therefore, we behave not to the Gods with reverence and decency, there is reason to fear we shall be again cleft in sunder, and go about with our guilt delineated in our figure, like those who have their crimes

engraved on pillars, our noses slit, and our bodies split in two. The consideration of this should engage every man to promote the universal practice of piety toward the Gods; that we may escape this misfortune, and attain to that better state, as it shall please Love to guide and lead us. Above all, let none of us act in opposition to this benign Deity; whom none oppose but such as are at enmity with the Gods. For, if we are reconciled to Love, and gain his favor, we shall find out and meet with our naturally beloved, the other half of ourselves; which at present is the good fortune but of few. Eryximachus now must not carp at what I say, on a suspicion that I mean Pausanias and Agatho: though perhaps they may be of the fortunate few: but I say it of all in general, whether men or women, through the whole human race, that everyone of us might be happy, had we the perfection of Love, and were to meet with our own proper paramours, recovering thus the similitude of our pristine nature. If this fortune then be the best absolutely, it follows, that the best in our present circumstances must be that which approaches to it the nearest; and that is, to meet with partners in love, whose temper and disposition are the most agreeable and similar to our own. In giving glory to the divine cause of this similarity and mutual fitness, we celebrate in a proper manner the praise of Love; a deity who gives us in our present condition so much relief and consolation, by leading us to our own again; and further, gives us the fairest hopes, that, if we pay due regard and reverence to the Gods, he will hereafter, in recovering to us our ancient nature, and curing the evils we now endure, make us blest and happy.

Thus, Eryximachus, you have my speech concerning Love, a speech of a different kind from yours, and no way interfering with what you have said. Therefore, as I desired of you before, do not, I pray you, make a jest of it; that we may hear, peaceably and quietly, all the speeches which

remain to be spoken; or rather both the speeches; for I think only those of Agatho and Socrates are yet behind.

Eryximachus/ Well; I shall not disobey you: for I must acknowledge that I have been highly entertained and pleased with your speech. If I was not perfectly well assured that Socrates and Agatho were deeply versed in the science of Love, I should much fear they would be at a loss for something to say, so copiously and so variously has the subject been already handled. But now, notwithstanding this, I am under no concern about the success of those great matters.

Socrates/ I do not wonder, that you are free from all concern, Eryximachus, about the matter; since you have come off so honorably yourself, and are out of all danger. But if you were in the circumstances I am in, much more in those which I shall be in when Agatho shall have made his speech, your fears would be not a few, and your distresses, like mine at present, no trifles.

Agathon/ I see you have a mind, Socrates, by such suggestions, to do as enchanters do with their drugs, that is, to disorder and disturb my thoughts, with imagining this company here to be big with expectations of hearing some fine speech from me.

Socrates/ I must have forgotten then, Agatho, the courage and greatness of mind which you discovered lately, and of which I was a spectator, when you came upon the stage, together with the actors just going to exhibit your compositions; when you looked so large an audience in the face without being in the least daunted; I must have forgotten this, if I thought you could be now disturbed on account of us, who are comparatively so few in number.

Agathon/ I hope, Socrates, you do not imagine me so full of a theatre, as not to know that a few men of sense make

an assembly more respectable and awful to a man who thinks justly, than a multitude of fools.

Socrates/ I should be greatly mistaken indeed if I imagined in you, Agatho, anything which favored of rusticity or ill breeding. I am satisfied enough, that if you met with any whom you supposed wise, you would regard them more than you would the multitude. But I doubt we have no pretensions to any such particular regard, because we were at the theatre, and made a part of that multitude. The case, I suppose, is in truth this: Were you in the presence of other sort of men, that is, the wise; in reverence to them, perhaps, you would be ashamed if you were then employed in any action you thought unbecoming or dishonorable. Is it not so? or how say you?

Agathon/ It is true.

Socrates/ And would you not to him again, revere the multitude too, and be ashamed even in their presence, if you were seen by them doing anything you thought base or wrong?

Phaedrus/ My friend Agatho, if you go on giving answers to all the questions put to you by Socrates, he will be under no manner of concern, what becomes of our affair of the speeches, or what the rest of us here are doing in the meantime. It is sufficient for him, if he has but somebody to talk with in his own way, especially if it be a person who is handsome. I must confess I take much pleasure myself in hearing Socrates dispute: but it is necessary for me to look to the affair I set on foot myself, that of the panegyrics on Love, and to take care that I have a speech from every person in this assembly. When you have, each of you, paid your tribute to the God, you may then dispute, with all my heart, at your own pleasure.

Agathon/ You say well, Phædrus; and nothing hinders but that I begin my speech. For I shall not want frequent opportunities of disputing again with Socrates.

Apollodorus/

THE SPEECH OF AGATHO.

Agathon/ I shall begin by showing in what way a panegyric on Love ought to be made, and then proceed that way in making one myself. For none of those who have gone before me have, in my opinion, celebrated the praise of Love; but all have made it their sole business to felicitate human kind upon the good they enjoy through the beneficence of that God. For what he is in himself, he from whom all this happiness is derived, none of them has shown. Now, whatever the subject of our panegyric be, there is but one right way to take in the composing it: and that is, the showing how excellent is the nature, and how good are the operations or effects, of that person or thing we are to praise. In this way it is that we ought to make our panegyrics on Love; praising, first, the excellence and absolute goodness of his own nature, and then his relative goodness to us in the blessings he bestows. According to this method, I take upon me, in the first place, to say, if without offence to what is sacred and divine I may be allowed to say it, that, though all the Gods enjoy a state of blessedness, yet Love is blest above all others, as he excels them all in beauty and in virtue. The most beautiful he must be, for these reasons: first, in that he is the youngest of the Gods, my Phædrus! Of this he himself gives us a convincing proof, by his running away from Old-age, and outrunning him who is evidently so swift-footed. For Old-age, you know, arrives and is with us sooner than we desire. Between Love and him there is a natural antipathy: so that Love comes not within a wide distance of him; but makes his abode with youth, and is always sound in company with the young. For, as the old proverb rightly

has it, “Like always goes to like.” I must own, therefore, though I agree with Phædrus in many other of his opinions, I cannot agree with him in this, that Love is elder than Saturn and Japetus. Of all the Gods, I affirm, he is the youngest, and enjoys perpetual youth. Accordingly I contend, that, if any such events happened among the Gods as Hesiod and Parmenides report, they were occasioned by the power of Necessity, not that of Love. For, had Love been with them, there had been no castrations, no chains, none of those many other acts of violence had been done or suffered amongst them: but friendship and peace had flourished in heaven, as they now do, and have ever done, since Love began his reign, and became chief amongst the Gods. Thus then it appears that Love is young. Nor is he less delicate and tender. But he wants a poet, such as Homer was, to express in fit terms how great his tenderness. Now Homer, where he tells us that Ate or Mischief was a goddess, of a subtle and fine frame, thus describes the tenderness and delicacy of her feet;

> The tender-footed Goddess shuns the ground
> With airy step, upon the heads of men
> Sets her fine treading, and from head to head
> Trips it along full nimbly. ——

The poet here produces a fair proof, I think, of her tenderness, her going on the soft place rather than the hard. The same argument shall I make use of, to prove the tenderness of Love. For he neither walks on the ground, nor goes upon human heads (which in truth are places not altogether soft); but the softest places possible to be found does Love make the places of his range, and of his dwelling too. For in the manners and in the souls of Gods and men he fixes his abode: not in all souls indiscriminately; for, if he lights on any whose manners are rough, away he marches, and takes up his residence in tender souls, whose manners

are the softest. Since, therefore, with his feet, and all over his fine frame, he endures not to touch, any but the softest persons, nor in any but their softest parts, he cannot but be extremely delicate and tender. Thus have we seen that Love is full of youth, delicacy and tenderness. He is, besides, of a soft and yielding substance. For it would be impossible for him to diffuse himself through every part of us, and penetrate into our inmost soul, or to make his first entry and his final exit unperceived by us, if his substance were hard and resisting to the touch. But a clear proof of his yielding, easy and pliant form is that gracefulness of person, which it is certain belongs to him in the highest degree by the acknowledgment of all: for Ungracefulness and Love never agree, but are always visibly at variance. That he excels in beauty of color, is evident from his way of life, in that he is continually conversant with flowers, his own likeness. For Love resides not in a body, or in a soul, or any other place, where flowers never sprung; or, if they did, where they are all fallen, and the place quite deflowered. But wherever a spot is to be found flowery and fragrant, he there seats himself and settles his abode. Concerning the beauty of this deity thus much is sufficient; though much still remains unsaid. I am to speak next on the subject of his virtue. And here the highest praise which can be attributed to any being is justly due to Love; that he does no injury to God or man; nor by God or man can he be injured. He never acts through compulsion or force himself; for compulsion or force cannot reach Love: nor ever forces he or compels others; for every being obeys freely and willingly every dictate and command of Love: where both parties then are willing, and each is freely consenting to the other, those in the city who are kings, the laws, say there is no injustice done. But not only the perfection of justice belongs to Love; he is equally endued with consummate temperance. For to be superior to

pleasure, and to govern the desires of it, is everywhere called temperance. Now it is universally agreed, that no pleasure is superior to Love; but, on the contrary, that all pleasures are his inferiors. If so, they must be subjects and servants, all of them, to Love; and he must rule, and be the master. Having dominion thus over all pleasures and all desires, in the highest degree must he be temperate. Then, in point of velour, not Mars himself can pretend to vie with Love. For it is not, Mars has Love, but Love has Mars; the Love, as same says, of Venus. Now the person who has another in his possession must have the mastery over that person whom he possesses. The subduer and master then of him who in velour excels all others, must himself in that virtue excel without exception all. Thus we have already shown the justice, temperance, and fortitude of this God. To show his wisdom is yet wanting: and I must do my best to be no way wanting to my subject. In the first place then, that I may honor my own art, like Eryximachus, with my first regards, in the wisdom of poetry Love is so great a master, that he is able to make anyone a poet. For, though a man be ever so much a stranger to the Muses, yet, as soon as his soul is touched by Love, he becomes a poet. It concerns me to lay a particular stress on this argument, to prove Love an excellent poet, in all that kind of creative power which is the proper province of the Muses. For no being can impart to another that which itself has not, or teach another other that which itself knows not. In the other kind of the creative power, the making of animals, it is undeniably to the wisdom of this deity that all living things owe their generation and production. Then, for the works of the mechanic arts, know we not that every artist who hath Love for his teacher becomes eminent and illustrious; but that the artist whom Love inspires not and animates never rises from obscurity? The bowman's art, the art of healing, and that of divination,

were the inventions of Apollo, under the guidance of Love, and the influence of his auspicious power. So that the God of Wisdom himself, we see, was the disciple of the God of Love. Prompted by Love, the Muses invented the art of music, Vulcan the art of working metals, Minerva the art of weaving, and Zeus the art of well governing the Gods and mortals. From the beginning of that æra were the affairs of the Gods well settled; from the time when Love arose and interposed among them, —the Love certainly of beauty; for disorder and deformity are by no means the objects of Love. Antecedent to that time it was, as I observed before, that those many sad and strange accidents, they tell us, befell the Gods: it was when Necessity reigned and ruled in all things. But as soon as the charms of beauty gave birth to the God whom we celebrate, with him rose every good which blesses either Gods or mortals. —Thus, Phædrus, in the first place Love, as he appears to me, is most excellent himself in beauty and in virtue; in the next place, he is the cause of the like excellencies in other beings. I feel within me an inclination to make a verse or two on this subject, on the effects which Love produces; —

> The rugged main he smooths, the rage of men
> He softens; thro, the troubled air he spreads
> A calm, and lulls the unquiet soul to rest.

It is he who frees us from reserve and strangeness; and who procures us openness and intimacy: it is he who establishes social meetings and assemblies, such as this of ours: in festival entertainments, in dances, and in feasts, he is the manager, the leader, and the founder; introducing courtesy and sweetness, banishing rusticity and savageness; dispensing abroad benevolence and kindness, restraining malignity and ill-will: propitious, gracious, and good to all: the admired spectacle of wise men, the heartfelt delight of Gods: the envy of those to whose lot he falls not,

the acquisition of such only as are fortunate: the parent of delicacy and tenderness, of elegance and grace, of attractive charms and amorous desires: observant of good, overlooking evil: in difficulties, in fears, in silent wishes, and in soft addresses, the protector, the encourager, the patron, and the inspirer: of Gods and men, of all linked together, the beauty and the ornament: a guide to all which is good and amiable, the best and the most charming: whom it is the duty of everyone to follow; joining in chorus to his praise, or bearing part in that sweet song sang by Love himself, with which he softens the heart and sooths the mind of every God and mortal.

This is my speech, Phædrus, which I consecrate to Love; a speech, partly jocose and partly serious, such as the best of my poor abilities in wit and eloquence are able to furnish out.

Apollodorus/ When Agatho had done speaking, Aristodemus told me, the room rang with the applauses of the company; all of them loudly declaring, that Agatho's speech on Love was worthy of himself, and worthy of the God in whose honor it was spoken.

Upon which Socrates, directing his eyes to Eryximachus, said;

Socrates/ Well, what think you now, you son of Acumenus? Think you not that I had good grounds for those fears I told you I was under? and that I spoke prophetically, when I said that Agatho would make an admirable speech, and that I should be driven to distress?

Eryximachus/ The first thing, I think you foretold truly, "that Agatho's speech would be excellent"—but the other, that "yourself would be driven to distress," I do not believe was a true prophecy.

Socrates/ How, my good friend, should I avoid being at a loss, and distressed for something to say? or how, indeed, could any other person, who was to speak, after a speech on the same subject so full of beauty and variety? It was not, I must acknowledge, in all respects, and in all the parts of it, equally admirable: but who, that heard the conclusion, could help being astonished at the elegant choice of words, and beauty of the diction? For my part, when I consider how little I shall be able to say anything that will not fall far short of it, I should be tempted to run away for very shame, had I any possibility of making my escape. For, whilst he was speaking, he put me in mind of Gorgias; and, to say the truth, that which Homer relates struck me at that time very sensibly. Now, thought I, what if Agatho should at the last send forth the head of that formidable speaker Gorgias to assault my imagination; and thus should, by the conclusion of his speech, stop my speech, and turn into stone my speaking faculties! —I considered, how ridiculous it was in me to profess myself a great master in love matters, and consent to bear a part with you in making panegyrics on Love, when at the same time I was entirely ignorant of the affair we undertook, and knew not the right way to celebrate the praise of anything. For I was so silly as to imagine that we ought never to say anything but what was true in our encomiums on any subject whatever; that the real properties of it were the materials which lay before us, as it were, to work on; and that the business of a panegyrist was nothing more than out of these materials to select the handsomest and best, and frame them together in the most skillful and the best manner. Prepossessed with this imagination, I had entertained a strong opinion that I should speak well on the subject proposed, because I well knew what praises were with truth to be ascribed to Love. Whereas I now find that this is not the right way of making a panegyric; but that,

when we praise, we are to attribute to our subject all qualities which are great and good, whether they truly belong to it or not. Should our encomiums happen to be false, the falsehood of them, to be sure, is not material. For the proposal, it seems, was this, that each of us should make a panegyric, which, by common consent, was to pass and be taken for a panegyric made on Love; and not to make a panegyric properly belonging to Love, or such a one as he truly merited. Hence it is, I presume, that you gather from all quarters every topic of praise, and attribute to Love all kinds of perfection; representing him and his operations to be of such a nature, that he cannot fail of appearing in the highest degree beautiful and good—to all those I mean who are unacquainted with him—for he certainly can never be deemed so by those who know him: and thus the panegyric is made fine and pompous. But, for my part, I was an utter stranger to the composing of panegyrics after this manner; and in my ignorance it was that I agreed to be one of the composers. Only with my tongue, therefore, did I engage myself: my mind was no party to the agreement. And so farewell to it; for I shall never make panegyrics in this way: I should not, indeed, know how. Not but that I am ready to speak the truth concerning the subject proposed, if you have any inclination to hear it, and if I may be allowed to speak after my own manner; for I mean not to set my speech in competition with any of yours, and so I run the risk of being deservedly laughed at. Consider, therefore, Phædrus, for it is your affair, whether such a kind of speech as you have to expect from me would be agreeable to you; and whether you would like to hear the truth spoken concerning Love in terms no higher than are adequate and fitting, and with such a disposition of the several particulars as shall happen to arise from the nature of the subject.

Apollodorus/ Phædrus, then, and the rest of the company, made it their joint request to him, that he would speak in the manner which he himself judged to be the most proper.

Socrates/ But stay; give me leave first to propose to Agatho a few questions; that, after we have agreed together on some necessary premises, I may the better proceed to what I have to say.

Phaedrus/ You have my consent; so propose your questions. —

Apollodorus/ Socrates then, as Aristodemus told me, began in this manner: —

INTRODUCTION TO THE SPEECH OF SOCRATES.

Socrates/ In my opinion, my friend Agatho, you began your speech well, in saying that we ought in the first place to set forth the nature of Love, what he is in himself, and afterward to show his effects, and what he operates in others. This introduction of yours I much approve of. Now, then, tell me further concerning Love: and since you have so fairly and amply displayed the other parts of his nature and character, answer me also to this question, whether Love is a being of such a kind as to be of something; or whether he is of nothing? I ask you not, whether he is of some father or mother; for the question, whether Love is the love of father or mother, would be ridiculous; but I mean it in the same sense as if the subject of my question was the very thing now mentioned, that is, a father; and the question itself was, whether a father was the father of something, or not: in this case you would certainly answer, if you answered rightly, that a father was the father of a son or of a daughter: — would you not?

Agathon/ Certainly I should.

Socrates/ And an answer of the same kind you would give me, if I asked you concerning a mother.

Apollodorus/ Agatho again assented;

Socrates/ Answer me now to a question or two more, that you may the better apprehend my meaning. Suppose I were to ask you concerning a brother, with regard to that very circumstance, his being a brother, is he brother to some person or not?

Apollodorus/ Agatho answered in the affirmative.

Socrates/ And is not this person, either a brother or a sister? —

Apollodorus/ To which when Agatho had assented;

Socrates/ Try then, to tell me concerning Love; is it the love of nothing, or of something? —

Agathon/ Of something, by all means.

Socrates/ Whatever you think that something to be, for the present keep your thought to yourself; only remember it. And let me ask you this question further, relating to Love: Does Love desire that something of which it is the love, or does it not?

Agathon/ Desires it, without doubt.

Socrates/ Whether, when possessed of that which it desires, of that which it is in love with, does it then desire it? or only when not possessed of it?

Agathon/ Only when not possessed of it, it is probable.

Socrates/ Instead of being probable, consider if it be not necessary that every being which feels any desire should desire only that which it is in want of; and that as far as any being is free from want, so far it must be free also from desire. Now to me, Agatho, this appears in the highest degree necessary. But how does it appear to you?

Agathon/ To me in the same manner.

Socrates/ You say well. I ask you then, Can a man whose size is large wish to be a man of large size? or a man who is strong, can he wish to be strong?

Agathon/ The impossibility of this follows from what we have just now agreed in. For the man who is what he would wish to be, must in that respect, and so far, be free from want.

Socrates/ True: for, if it were possible that the strong could wish to be strong, the swift wish to be swift, and the healthy wish to be healthy, one might then perhaps imagine it equally possible in all cases of the like kind, that such as are possessed of anything good or advantageous could desire that which they already have. I mention this in general, to prevent our being imposed upon. For the person who enjoys any of these advantages, if you consider, Agatho, must appear to you to have of necessity at present that which he has, whether he wills it, or not: and how can this ever be the object of his desire? Should any man, therefore, say thus: I, who am now in health, desire to be healthy; or, I, who now have riches, desire to be rich, and long for those very things which I have; we should make him this reply: —You mean, friend, you that are at present possessed of riches, or health, or strength, would be glad to continue in possession of them always: for at this present you possess them, whether you will or not. When you say, therefore, that you desire what is present with you, consider, whether you mean any other thing than this; you would be glad that what I present with you now might be present with you for the time to come. Would he not acknowledge, think you, that this was his only meaning?

Apollodorus/ Agatho agreed that he would.

Socrates/ This then, is to love and desire that from which he is now at some distance, neither as yet has he; and that

is, the preserving of what he possesses at the present, and his continuing in possession of it for the future.

Agathon/ It certainly is so.

Socrates/ This man, therefore, and everyone who feels desire, desires that which lies not ready for his enjoyment, that which is not present with him, that which he has not, that which he himself is not, and that which he is in want of; such things only being the objects of love and of desire.

Apollodorus/ Agatho to this entirely assented.

Socrates/ Come then, let us agree upon these conclusions: Is not Love, in the first place, love of something? in the next place, is it not love of that which is wanting?

Agathon/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Now then, recollect what it was you told us in your speech was the proper object of Love. But I, if you please, will remind you of it. I think you said something like this, “that the affairs of the Gods were put in good order, and well established, through love of things beautiful: for that things of opposite kind to these could never be the objects of love.” Did you not tell us some such thing?

Agathon/ I own it.

Socrates/ You own the truth, my good friend. Now, if this be as you say, must not Love be love of beauty, and not of deformity?

Agathon/ I agree.

Socrates/ And have you not agreed too, that Love is love of something which is wanting, and not of anything possessed already?

Agathon/ True.

Socrates/ It follows then, that Love is not in possession, but in want, of beauty.

Agathon/ It follows of necessity.

Socrates/ Well then, that to which beauty is absolutely wanting, that which is totally unpossessed of beauty, do you call that beautiful?

Agathon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Are you still then of the same opinion, that Love is beautiful, if we have reasoned rightly?

Agathon/ I am in danger, Socrates, of being found ignorant in the subject I undertook to praise.

Socrates/ You have honestly and fairly spoken. And now answer me to this little question more: Think you not that everything good is also fair and beautiful?

Agathon/ I do.

Socrates/ If then, Love be in want of beauty, and if everything good be fair and beautiful, Love must be in want of good too.

Agathon/ I am not able, to argue against you, Socrates; and therefore I admit it to be true what you say.

Socrates/ You are not able, my beloved Agatho, to argue against the truth: for to argue against Socrates is nothing difficult. And here shall I dismiss you from being further questioned. But the discourse concerning Love, which I heard formerly from Diotima the prophetess, a woman wise and knowing in these and many other subjects; so profoundly knowing, that when the plague seemed to be approaching Athens, and when the people offered sacrifice to avert it, she caused the coming of that distemper to be delayed for the space of ten years; (she it was who instructed me in the knowledge of all things that appertain to Love;) a discourse, I say, on this subject, which I once heard from her, I will try if I can relate again to you; laying down, for the foundation of it, those points agreed on just now between me and Agatho; but purposing, however, to relate the whole of this by myself, as well as I am able.

Apollodorus/

THE SPEECH OF SOCRATES.

Socrates/ Right and proper is it, Agatho, to follow the method marked out by you; in the first place, to declare what kind of a being Love is, and afterwards to show what are the effects produced by him. Now I think the easiest way that I can take, in executing this plan, will be to say before you the whole of this doctrine in the very manner and order in which I myself was examined and lectured on the subject by Diotima. She began with me, on my saying to her much the same things that were asserted just now by Agatho; that Love was a deity excellent in goodness, and was also one of those who were fair and beautiful. And she refuted me with the same arguments I have made use of to refute Agatho; proving to me that Love, according to my own account of him, was neither beautiful nor good.

How say you, Diotima? Is Love an ugly and an evil being?

Diotima/ Soft,; no abusive language: do you imagine that every being who is not beautiful, must of course be ugly?

Socrates/ Without doubt.

Diotima/ And every being who is not wise, do you conclude it must be ignorant? Do you not see there is something between wisdom and ignorance?

Socrates/ I asked her, what that could be.

Diotima/ To think of things rightly, as being what they really are, without being able to assign a reason why they are such. Do you not perceive, that this is not to have the science or true knowledge of them? For, where the cause or reason of a thing remains unknown, how can there be science? Nor yet is it ignorance: for that which errs not from the truth, how should that be ignorance? Such then is right opinion, something between wisdom and ignorance.

Socrates/ You are certainly in the right

Diotima/ Deem it not necessary then, that what is not beautiful should be ugly; or that what is not good must of consequence be evil. To apply this to the case of Love; though you have agreed, he is neither good nor beautiful, yet imagine not he must ever the more on that account be ugly and evil; but something between those opposites.

Socrates/ Well, but he is acknowledged by all to be a powerful God, however.

Diotima/ By all who know him, do you mean, or by all who know him not?

Socrates/ By all universally.

Upon which she smiled, and said;

Diotima/ How, Socrates, should he be acknowledged a powerful God by those who absolutely deny his divinity?

Socrates/ Who are they?

Diotima/ You yourself are one of them, and I am another.

Socrates/ Explain your meaning.

Diotima/ My meaning is easy to be explained. For answer me to this question: Say you not that the Gods are, all of them, blest and happy? or would you offer to say of anyone of the Gods, that he was not a blest and happy being?

Socrates/ Not I, for my part, by Zeus.

Diotima/ By a happy being, do you not mean a being possessed of things fair, beautiful and good?

Socrates/ It is granted.

Diotima/ And you granted before, that Love, from his indigence and want of things good and beautiful, desired those things of which he was destitute.

Socrates/ I allowed it.

Diotima/ How then can he be a God, he who is destitute of things fair, beautiful and good?

Socrates/ It appears that he by no means can.

Diotima/ You see then, that, even in your own judgment, Love is no God.

Socrates/ What! Must Love then be a mortal?

Diotima/ Far from that.

Socrates/ Of what nature was he then?

Diotima/ Of like kind with those natures we have just now been speaking of, an intermediate one, between the mortal and the immortal.

Socrates/ But what in particular, O Diotima?

Diotima/ A great dæmon. For the dæmon-kind is of an intermediate nature between the divine and the human.

Socrates/ What is the power and virtue of this intermediate kind of being?

Diotima/ To transmit and to interpret to the Gods, what comes from men; and to men, in like manner, what comes from the Gods; from men their petitions and their sacrifices; from the Gods, in return, the revelation of their will. Thus these beings, standing in the middle rank between divine and human, fill up the vacant space, and link together all intelligent nature. Through their intervention proceeds every kind of divination, and the priestly art relating to sacrifices, and the mysteries and incantations, with the whole of divination and magic. For divinity is not mingled with man; but by means of that middle nature is carried on all converse and communication between the Gods and mortals, whether in sleep or waking. Whoever has wisdom and skill in things of this kind is a dæmoniacal man: the knowing and skillful in any other thing, whether in the arts, or certain manual operations, are illiberal and sordid. These dæmons are many and various. One of them is Love.

Socrates/ But, from what parents was he born?

Diotima/ The history of his parentage is somewhat long to relate: however, I will give you the relation. At the birth of Venus, the Gods, to celebrate that event, made a feast; at which was present, amongst the rest, Plenty, the son of Counsel. After they had supped, Poverty came a-begging, an abundance of dainties being there, and loitered about the door. Just then Plenty, intoxicated with nectar, (for as yet wine was not) went out into the gardens of Zeus; and oppressed with the load of liquor that he had drunk, fell asleep. Poverty, therefore, desiring through her indigence to have a child from Plenty, artfully lay down by him, and became with child of Love. Hence it is that Love is the constant follower and attendant of Venus, as having been begotten on the birthday of that Goddess: being also, by his natural disposition, fond of all beauty, he is the more attached to Venus herself on account of her being beautiful. Now, as Love is the son of Plenty and of Poverty, the condition of his life and fortune is as follows: In the first place, he is always poor; and is far from being either fair or tender, as the multitude imagine him; for he is rough, and hard, and dry, without shoes to his feet, and without a house or any covering to his head; always groveling on the earth, and lying on the bare ground, at doors, and in the streets, in the open air; partaking thus of his mother's disposition, and living in perpetual want. On the other hand, he derives from his father's side qualities very different from those others: for hence it is that he is full of designs upon the good and the fair: hence it is that he is courageous, sprightly, and prompt to action; a mighty sportsman, always contriving some new device to entrap his game: much addicted to thought, and fruitful in expedients; all his life philosophizing; powerful in magic and enchantment, nor less so in sophistry. His nature is not mortal, in the common way of mortality, nor yet is it immortal, after the manner of

the immortal Gods; for sometimes, in one and the same day, he lives and flourishes, when he happens to fare well; and presently afterwards he dies; and soon after that revives again, as partaking of his father's nature. Whatever abundance flows in upon him is continually stealing away from him: so that Love is never absolutely in a state either of affluence or of indigence. Again, he is seated in the midst between Wisdom and Ignorance. For the case is this with regard to wisdom: —None of the Gods philosophize, or desire to become wise; for they are so; and if there be any other being beside the Gods who is truly wise, neither does such a being philosophize. Nor yet does philosophy, or the search of Wisdom, belong to the Ignorant. For on this very account is the condition of Ignorance so wretched, that notwithstanding she is neither fair, good, nor wise, yet she thinks she has no need of any kind of amendment or improvement. So that the ignorant, not imagining themselves in need, neither seek nor desire that which they think they want not.

Socrates/ Who are they then, O Diotima, who philosophize, if they are neither the wise nor the ignorant?

Diotima/ That is evident: even a child may now discover that they must be such as stand in the middle rank of being; in the number of whom is Love. For wisdom is among the things of highest beauty; and all beauty is the object of love. It follows therefore of necessity, that Love is a philosopher, or a lover of wisdom; and that, as such, he stands between the adept in wisdom and the wholly ignorant. This, as well as all the rest of his condition, is owing to his parentage; as he derives his birth from a father wise and rich in all things, and from a mother unwise and in want of all things. Such, dear Socrates, is the nature of this dæmon. But that you had other thoughts of that being, whom you took for Love, is not at all surprising. For, if I may guess from the description you

gave of him yourself, you seem to have taken for Love that which is beloved, not that which loves: and from this mistake it arose, as I imagine, that Love appeared to you in all respects so beauteous. For the object of love, the amiable, is truly beauteous and delicate, is perfect and completely blest. But to the subject of love, the lover, belongs a different nature, such a one as I have described to you.

Socrates/ Be it granted such, Diotima: for what you tell me bids fair to be the truth. But now, such being his nature, of what advantage is he to human kind?

Diotima/ This, Socrates, in the next place, I shall do my best to teach you. Already then it appears what kind of being Love is, and of what parents he was born: and that his object, is beauty you yourself have asserted. Now what answer shall we make should we be asked this question, "O Socrates and Diotima! how or in what respect mean ye, when ye say that beauty is the object of Love?"

To express the meaning of my question in plainer terms, What is it which the lover of beauty longs for?

Socrates/ To be in possession, of the beloved beauty.

Diotima/ Your answer, draws on a further question: What will be the state or condition of that man who is in possession of his beloved beauty?

Socrates/ I told her, I could by no means answer readily to such a question.

Diotima/ Suppose then, that changing the subject of the question, and putting good in the place of beauty, one were to ask you thus, and say, Answer me. Socrates, to this question, What is it which the lover of good longs for?

Socrates/ To be in possession of that good, answered I.

Diotima/ And what;

Socrates/ She asked me again;

Diotima/ Will be the state of that man who is in possession of good?

Socrates/ This, is a question I can answer with much less difficulty, thus: that such a man will be happy.

Diotima/ Right; for by the possessing of good things it is that the happy are in that happy state which they enjoy. Nor is there any room to question further, and ask, Why, or for the sake of what, a man wishes to be happy; but a conclusive answer appears to have been given, fully satisfactory.

Socrates/ True, without dispute.

Diotima/ Now this wishing. and this longing, let me ask you, whether in your opinion it is common to all men; whether you think that all wish to be always in possession of things good; or how otherwise?

Socrates/ I think just so, that such a wish is common to all.

Diotima/ Well then, Socrates, must we not acknowledge that all men are in love; seeing that the affections of them all are always fixed on the same things? or shall we say that some are in love, and some are not?

Socrates/ It is a thought, which, I confess, a little surprises me.

Diotima/ Be not surprised; for the case is nothing more than this, that the name of love, which belongs to all love in general, we appropriate to one particular kind of love, singled out from the others, which we distinguish by other names.

Socrates/ To make me conceive your meaning more perfectly, cannot you produce some other case parallel to this?

Diotima/ I can. The following case is parallel: Making or creating, you know, comprehends many kinds of operation.

For all cause by which anything proceeds out of non-being into being is creation. So that all the operations and all the works executed through any of the arts, are indeed so many creations: and all the artless and the workmen are real creators, makers, or poets.

Socrates/ True.

Diotima/ And yet you know, they are not all of them called poets or makers, but are distinguished by different names: whilst one particular kind of creation, that which is performed in meter through the Muse's art, is singled out from the other kinds; and the name, to which they have all an equal right, is given to that alone. For that alone is called poesy or making: and the artists in this species of creation only are peculiarly distinguished by the name of poets or makers.

Socrates/ Perfectly right.

Diotima/ Just so is it then in the case of Love. Universally all desire of things good, and all that longing after happiness, which is in every individual of human kind, is the mighty Deity of Love, who by secret ways and stratagems subdues and governs the hearts of all. His votaries in many various ways, such as those engaged in the pursuit of wealth, or strength of body, or wisdom, are not said to be in love; nor is the name of lover allowed to any such. But to those only who are devoted to Love in one particular way, and addict themselves to one certain species of love, we appropriate those terms of love, and lovers, and the being in love, which ought to be considered as general terms, applicable in common to all the different kinds.

Socrates/ In all appearance, you are entirely in the right.

She proceeded, however, to confirm the truth of what she had said, in the following manner:

Diotima/ There is a saying that lovers are in search of the other half of themselves. But my doctrine is, that we love neither the half, nor even the whole of ourselves, if it happen not, my friend, some way or other to be good. For we are willing to have our feet and our hands cut off, though our own, if we deem them incurably and absolutely evil. It is not to what is their own that men have so strong an attachment, nor do they treat it so tenderly on that account, unless there be a man who thinks good to be his own, and properly belonging to him, but evil to be foreign to his nature. So true is it, that there is no other object of love to man than good alone. Or do you think there is?

Socrates/ By Zeus, there appears to me no other.

Diotima/ Is this now sufficient for us? and have we done justice to our argument if we finish it with this simple and slender conclusion, that all men love what is good?

Socrates/ Why not?

Diotima/ What? Must we not add this, that they long to have possession of the loved good?

Socrates/ This, must be added.

Diotima/ And not only now to have possession of it, but to have possession of it forever too; must not this be added further?

Socrates/ This further.

Diotima/ Love then, in fine, is the desire of having good in perpetual possession.

Socrates/ Most true: in every tittle you are right.

Diotima/ Since then, this general desire is found always to subsist and to operate in all, can you tell me in what particular way it operates on those who are commonly said to be in love? what the aim is of such lovers, and what the work or effect of this kind of love?

Socrates/ Were I able to tell, O Diotima, I should not have been so full of admiration at your wisdom; nor should I have applied myself to you to be taught these very things, if I already knew them.

Diotima/ Well, I will teach you then. The aim of these lovers, and the work of this love, is to generate upon the beautiful as well in a mental way as in that which is corporeal.

Socrates/ Your words, have need of some diviner to interpret them: I confess I do not apprehend their meaning.

Diotima/ I will express myself then, in plainer language. All of human race, O Socrates, are full of the seeds of generation, both in their bodies and in their minds: and when they arrive at maturity of age, they naturally long to generate. But generate they cannot upon the ugly or uncomely, and only upon the fair and the agreeable. For the work of generation is carried on, you know, by means of the natural commerce between the two sexes: and this is a work above human art, it is divine. For to conceive and to impregnate is to immortalize the kind: it is producing immortality out of an animal which is mortal. In each of the sexes, therefore, is some immortal and divine principle, the cause of conception in the one, and of impregnation in the other. But in neither of them can this principle operate effectually, unless the subject on which it operates be suitable to it and corresponding. Now deformity and ugliness but ill suit with aught which is divine. Beauty alone agrees with it and corresponds. For Beauty is that celestial influence which favors, and that goddess who patronizes, the work of generation, Hence, whenever that which teems with generative power approaches that which is beautiful, it smiles benignly; and through the delight it feels, opening and diffusing itself abroad, breeds or generates. But whenever it meets with that which is deformed or ugly, it

grows morose, saddens, and contracts itself; it turns away, retires back, and generates not; but, restraining the swollen power within, which is ready to burst forth, it bears the burthen with uneasiness. Hence it is that they who are full of this, and long to generate, employ much of their creative power upon that which is beautiful: it is because the beautiful frees them from those generative throes with which they labor. But, Socrates, this is not, as you imagined, the love of beauty.

Socrates/ What is it then?

Diotima/ It is the love, of generating and begetting issue, there where we find beauty.

Socrates/ Be it so.

Diotima/ It certainly is so.

Socrates/ But, what has Love to do with generating?

Diotima/ Because generating perpetuates and in some manner immortalizes that which is mortal. Now, that the desire of immortality must always accompany the love of good, follows from what we before agreed in, that love was the desire of having good in perpetual possession. For the necessary consequence of that position is this, that Love desires immortality.

Socrates/ All these things learned I formerly in a conversation with Diotima, discoursing upon Love.

At another time she thus questioned me:

Diotima/ What do you imagine, Socrates, to be the cause of that love, and that desire which lately was the subject of conversation between you and me? Do you not observe, how vehement are the passions of all brute animals when the season comes in which they couple? Birds as well as beasts, you may perceive them all sick with love: so intense is their desire, in the first place, to generate and breed. Nor is their ardor less afterwards in the rearing of their young. In defense

of these, you see them ready to engage in fight, the weakest animals with the strongest. To support these, you see them willingly themselves perishing with famine; in short, doing and suffering for their sakes the utmost possible. Those indeed of human kind one might imagine acted thus from a motive of reason in themselves: but, in brute animals, can you assign the cause why the affections of love should be so deep and strong?

Socrates/ I told her, I was at a loss to account for it.

Diotima/ And do you think, ever to become a thorough adept in the science of love, if you are at a loss in a case so easy?

Socrates/ It is for this very reason, Diotima, as I lately told you, that I come to you for instruction: it is because I am sensible how much I want it. Do you, therefore, teach me what the cause is of those vehement affections you mentioned just now, and of every other sentiment and passion incident to love.

Diotima/ If you believe that love is, what you have often owned it to be, the desire of having good in perpetual possession, you will be at no loss to conceive what the cause is of those affections. For the case of brute animals and that of the human kind are in this respect exactly the same; in both the same principle prevails; the mortal nature seeks to be perpetuated, and, as far as possible, immortalized. Now this is possible in one only way, that is, by generation; in which some new living thing is constantly produced to supply the place of the deceased old one. And in no other manner than this is life continued to any individual being, of which we say that it lives still, and pronounce it to be the same being. Thus every man, for instance, from his infancy on to old-age, is called the same person; though he never has anything in him which abides with him, and is

continually a new man; having lost the man he was in his hair, in his flesh, in his bones, in his blood, in fine in his whole body. Nor in his body only, but in his soul too, does he undergo incessant change. His ways, his manners, his opinions, his desires and pleasures; his fears and sorrows; none of these ever continue in any man the same; but new ones are generated and spring up in him, whilst the former fade and die away. But a paradox much greater than, any yet mentioned is with regard to knowledge: not only some new portions of knowledge we acquire, whilst we lose others, of which we had before been masters; and never continue long the same persons as to the sum of our present knowledge; but we suffer also the like change in every particular article of that knowledge. For what we call meditation supposes some knowledge to have actually, as it were, left us; and indeed oblivion; is the departure of this knowledge; meditation then, raising up in the room of this departed knowledge a fresh remembrance in our minds, preserves in some manner and continues to us that which we had lost; so as to make the memory of it, the likeness, seem the very same thing. Indeed everything mortal is preserved in this only way, not by the absolute sameness of it forever, like things divine, but by leaving behind it, when it departs, dies, or vanishes, another in its room, a new being, bearing its resemblance. By this contrivance in nature, Socrates, does body, and every other thing naturally mortal, partake of immortality immortal after a different manner is that which naturally is immortal. Wonder not, therefore, that all beings, are by nature lovingly affected towards their offspring. For this affectionate regard, this love, follows every being for the sake of immortality.

Socrates/ These things, O Diotima, wisest of women! undoubtedly are so.

To which she, in the language of the most accomplished sophists, replied;

Diotima/ You may be assured, Socrates, it is the truth. Nor is it less plain, from instances, of a different kind, that immortality is the great aim and end of all. For, if you observe how the love of fame and glory operates on men, and what effect it has upon their conduct, you must wonder at their folly in laboring so much and suffering so greatly in the pursuit of it, unless you consider the mighty power of that passion which possesses them, a zeal to become illustrious in after-ages, and to acquire a fame that may last forever and be immortal. For this, more than for the sake of their families or friends, are they ready to encounter dangers, to expend their treasures, to undergo the severest hardships, and to meet death itself. Do you think that Alcestis would have died for her husband Admetus to preserve his life? or that Achilles would have died for his friend Patroclus to avenge his death? or that your Athenian Codrus would have died for his children's sake to secure to them the succession of his kingdom? had they not imagined their virtue would live forever in the remembrance of posterity, as it actually does throughout all Greece at this very day. Assure yourself their conduct had been quite different, had they not been full of this imagination. For, with a view to the immortality of virtue, and the never-dying glory which attends it, have all great actions ever been performed; a view which inspires and animates the performers, in proportion to the degree of their own personal worth and excellence. For they are governed by that universal passion, the desire of immortality. But though immortality be thus sought by all men, yet men of different dispositions seek it by different ways. In men of certain constitutions, the generative power lies chiefly and eminently in their bodies. Such persons are particularly fond of the other sex, and court intimacies chiefly with the fair:

they are easily enamored in the vulgar way of love; and procure to themselves, by begetting children, the preservation of their names, a remembrance of themselves which they hope will be immortal, a happiness to endure forever. In men of another stamp, the faculties of generation are, in as eminent a degree, of the mental kind. For those there are who are more prolific in their souls than in their bodies; and are full of the seeds of such an offspring as it peculiarly belongs to the human soul to conceive and to generate. And what offspring is this, but wisdom and every other virtue? Those who generate most, and who are parents of the most numerous progeny in this way, are the poets, and such artists of other kinds as are said to have been the inventors of their respective arts. But by far the most excellent and beauteous part of wisdom is that which is conversant in the founding and well-ordering of cities and other habitations of men; a part of wisdom distinguished by the names of temperance and justice. When the soul of any man has been teeming with the seeds of this wisdom from his youth (and of divine soul it is the native property thus to teem), as soon as he arrives at maturity of age, and those seeds are fully ripened, he longs to sow them in the souls of others, and thus to propagate wisdom. In this situation of his mind, his whole employment, I suppose, is to look about and search for beauty, where he may generate; for never can he generate on aught which is ugly or uncomely. Meeting first then with outward beauty, that of the body, he welcomes and embraces it; but turns away from where he sees deformity in the body; for his soul is full of love. But if, in his further and deeper search, he has the good fortune to meet with the inward and hidden beauty of a well-natured and generous soul, he then entirely attaches himself, and adheres closely to the whole person in whom it is found, the compound of soul and body. He now finds in himself a

facility and a copiousness of expression when he entertains this partner of his soul with discourses concerning virtue; by what means it is acquired; what is a character completely good; what studies should be pursued; what arts be learnt; and how time should be employed in order to the forming such a character. Desirous, therefore, thus to form and perfect the object of his love, he undertakes the office of preceptor. Indeed, whilst he is conversing intimately with that which is fair, those seeds of wisdom, which he was before big with, burst forth spontaneous, and he generates. From this time, whether in the presence or absence of his mistress, his mind and memory become prompt and active; and he readily produces all his mental store. Both the parents then join in cherishing, rearing up, and cultivating the fruits of their love and amorous converse. Hence it is that a friendship of the firmest kind cements such a pair; and they are held together by a much stricter band of union than by an offspring of their bodies; having a common and joint interest in an offspring from themselves more beautiful and more immortal. Who would not choose to be the father of such children, rather than of mortals sprung from his body? Who that considers Homer, Hesiod, and other excellent poets, with the admiration they deserve, would not wish for such an issue as they left behind them, an issue of this mental kind, such as perpetuates their memory with the highest honor, and procures for them an immortality of fame? Or such a posterity, as that whose foundation Lycurgus said at Lacedæmon, a race of which himself was the first father, the preservers of their country and of all Greece? Amongst yourselves, what honors are paid to the memory of Solon, who begat the Laws! And abroad as well as at home how illustrious are the names of many others, Barbarians as well as Grecians, who have exhibited to the world many noble actions, and have thus begotten all kinds

of virtue! To men like these have temples often been erected, on account of such their progeny: but never was any man thus honored on account of his mortal merely human offspring. In the mysteries of Love thus far perhaps, Socrates, you may be initiated and advanced. But to be perfected, and to attain the intuition of what is secret and inmost, introductory to which is all the rest, if undertaken and performed with a mind rightly disposed, I doubt whether you may be able. However, not to be wanting in a readiness to give you thorough information, I will do my best to conduct you till we have reached the end. Do but you your best to follow me. Whoever then enters upon this great affair in a proper manner, and begins according to a right method, must have been from his earliest youth conversant with bodies that are beautiful. Prepared by this acquaintance with beauty, he must, in the first place, if his leader lead aright, fall in love with someone particular person, fair and beauteous; and on her beget fine sentiments and fair discourse. He must afterwards consider, that the beauty of outward form, that which he admires so highly in his favorite fair one, is sister to a beauty of the same kind, which he cannot but see in some other fair. If he can then pursue this corporeal beauty, and trace it wherever it is to be found, throughout the human species, he must want understanding not to conceive, that beauty is one and the same thing in all beauteous bodies. With this conception in his mind, he must become a lover of all visible forms, which are partakers of this beauty; and in consequence of this general love, he must moderate the excess of that passion for one only female form, which had hitherto engrossed him wholly: for he cannot now entertain thoughts extravagantly high of the beauty of any particular fair one, a beauty not peculiar to her, but which she partakes of in common with all other corporeal forms that are beauteous. After this, if he

thinks rightly, and knows to estimate the Value of things justly, he will esteem that beauty which is inward, and lies deep in the soul, to be of greater value and worthy of more regard than that which is outward, and adorns only the body. As soon, therefore, as he meets with a person of a beauteous soul and generous nature, though flowering forth but a little in superficial beauty, with this little he is satisfied; he has all he wants; he truly loves, and assiduously employs all his thoughts and all his care on the object of his affection. Researching in his mind and memory, he draws forth, he generates such notions of things, such reasonings and discourses, as may best improve his beloved in virtue. Thus he arrives, of course, to view beauty in the arts, the subjects of discipline and study; and comes to discover, that beauty is congenial in them all. He now, therefore, accounts all beauty corporeal to be of mean and inconsiderable value, as being but a small and inconsiderable part of beauty. From the arts he proceeds further to the sciences, and beholds beauty no less in these. And by this time having seen, and now considering within himself, that beauty is manifold and various, he is no longer, like one of our domestics who has conceived a particular affection for some child of the family, a mean and illiberal slave to the beauty of anyone particular, whether person or art, study or practice; but betaking himself to the ample sea of beauty, and surveying it with the eye of intellect, he begets many beautiful and magnificent reasonings, and dianoëtic conceptions in prolific philosophy, till thus being strengthened and increased, he perceives what that one science is which is so singularly great, as to be the science of so singularly great a beauty. But now try to give me all the attention you are master of. Whoever then is advanced thus far in the mysteries of Love by a right and regular progress of contemplation, approaching now to perfect intuition,

suddenly he will discover, bursting into view, a beauty astonishingly admirable; that very beauty, to the gaining a sight of which the aim of all his preceding studies and labors had been directed: a beauty, whose peculiar characters are these: In the first place, it never had a beginning, nor will ever have an end, but always is, and always flourishes in perfection, unsusceptible of growth or of decay. In the next place, it is not beautiful only when looked at one way, or seen in one light; at the same time that, viewed another way, or seen in some other light, it is far from being beautiful: it is not beautiful only at certain times, or with reference only to certain circumstances of things; being at other times, or when things are otherwise circumstanced, quite the contrary: nor is it beautiful only in some places, or as it appears to some persons; whilst in other places, and to other persons, its appearance is the reverse of beautiful. Nor can this beauty, which is indeed no other than the beautiful itself, ever be the object of imagination; as if it had some face or hands of its own, or any other parts belonging to body: nor is it some particular reason, nor some particular science. It resides not in any other being, not in any animal, for instance; nor in the earth, nor in the heavens, nor in any other part of the universe; but, simple and separate from other things, it subsists alone with itself, and possesses an essence eternally uniform. All other forms which are beauteous participate of this; but in such a manner they participate, that by their generation or destruction this suffers no diminution, receives no addition, nor undergoes any kind of alteration. When from those lower beauties, re-ascending by the right way of Love, a man begins to gain a sight of this supreme beauty, he must have almost attained somewhat of his end. Now to go, or to be led by another, along the right way of Love, is this: beginning from those beauties of lower rank, to proceed in a continual ascent, all

the way proposing this highest beauty as the end; and using the rest but as so many steps in the ascent; to proceed from one to two, from two to all beauteous bodies; from the beauty of bodies to that of souls; from the beauty of souls to that of arts; from the beauty of arts to that of disciplines; until at length from the disciplines he arrives at that discipline which is the discipline of no other thing than of that supreme beauty; and thus finally attains to know what is the beautiful itself.

Here is to be found, dear Socrates, here if anywhere, the happy life, the ultimate object of desire to man: it is to live in beholding this consummate beauty; the sight of which if ever you attain, it will appear not to be in gold, nor in magnificent attire, nor in beautiful youths or damsels: with such, however, at present, many of you are so entirely taken up, and with the sight of them so absolutely charmed, that you would rejoice to spend your whole lives, were it possible, in the presence of those enchanting objects, without any thoughts of eating or drinking, but feasting your eyes only with their beauty, and living always in the bare sight of it. If this be so, what effect, think you, would the sight of beauty itself have upon a man, were he to see it pure and genuine, not corrupted and stained all over with the mixture of flesh, and colors, and much more of like perishing and fading trash; but were able to view that divine essence, the beautiful itself, in its own simplicity of form? Think you, that the life of such a man would be contemptible or mean; of the man who always directed his eye toward the right object, who looked always at real beauty, and was conversant with it continually? Perceive you not, that in beholding the beautiful with that eye, with which alone it is possible to behold it, thus, and thus only, could a man ever attain to generate, not the images or semblances of virtue, as not having his intimate commerce with an image or a semblance;

but virtue true, real, and substantial, from the converse and embraces of that which is real and true. Thus begetting true virtue, and bringing her up till she is grown mature, he would become a favorite the Gods; and at length would be, if any man ever be, himself one of the immortals.

Socrates/ The doctrines which I have now delivered to you, Phædrus, and to the rest of my friends here, I was taught by Diotima, and am persuaded they are true. Full of this persuasion myself, I endeavor to persuade others, and to show them, that it is difficult for any man to find a better guide or assistant to him than Love, in his way to happiness. And on this account, I further contend, that every man ought to pay all due honors to that patron of human nature. For my own part, I make it my chief study to cultivate the art which Love teaches, and employ myself upon the subjects proper for the exercise of that art with a particular attention; encouraging others to follow my example, and at all times, as well as now, celebrating the power and virtue of Love as far as I am able.

This speech, Phædrus, you may accept, if you are so pleased, for a panegyric in praise of Love: or if you choose to call it by any other name, and to take it in any other sense, be that its right name, and that its proper acceptation.

Apollodorus/ Socrates having thus spoken, the rest praised his oration; but Aristophanes endeavored to say something, because Socrates in his speech had mentioned him. On a sudden, however, a loud knocking was heard at the door of the porch, together with the voices of the intoxicated, and the sound of the pipe. Upon this Agatho said to the servants;

Agathon/ See who are there; and if there is anyone among them fit for this company, call him in: if not, say that we are no longer drinking.

Apollodorus/ Not long after this the voice of Alcibiades, who was very much intoxicated, was heard in the court, asking where Agatho was, and commanding to be led to him. The flute-player, therefore, and some other of his companions, brought him to Agatho, and stood with him at the doors, he being crowned with a garland of ivy and violets, having many fillets on his head, and exclaiming;

Alcibiades/ All hail, my friends! Either receive as your associate in drinking a man very much intoxicated, or let us depart, crowning Agatho alone, for whose sake we came. For I could not be with you yesterday; but now I come with fillets on my head, that, from my own, I may crown the head of the wisest and the most beautiful person, if I may be allowed so to speak. Do you, therefore, laugh at me as one intoxicated? However, though you may laugh, I well know that I speak the truth. But tell me immediately, whether I may come in to him or not; and whether you continue drinking or not?

Apollodorus/ All the company, therefore, was in an uproar, and ordered him to enter and seat himself; which he accordingly did, and called for Agatho. Agatho, therefore, came, led by his companions; and Alcibiades at the same time taking off his fillets, that he might crown him, did not see Socrates, though he sat before him, but sat near Agatho, and between him and Socrates: for Socrates had made way for him that he might sit. Alcibiades, therefore, being seated, saluted and crowned Agatho: and then Agatho said;

Agathon/ Boys, take off the shoes of Alcibiades, that he may recline as the third among us.

Alcibiades/ By all means, but asked, Who is this third drinking companion of ours?

Apollodorus/ And at the same time turning himself round saw Socrates; but seeing him, he started, and exclaimed;

Alcibiades/ O Hercules! what is this? Are you again sitting here to ensnare me? as it is usual with you to appear suddenly where I least expected to find you. And now for what purpose are you here? And why do you sit in this place, and not with Aristophanes, or with some other who is ridiculous, and wishes to be so? But you have contrived to sit with the most beautiful of the guests.

Socrates/ Agatho, See if you can assist me; for the love of this man is not to me a vile thing; since from the time in which I began to love him I am no longer at liberty either to behold or speak to any beautiful person. Or does not he, in consequence of emulating and envying me in amatory affairs, contrive wonderful devices, and also revile and scarcely keep his hands from me? See, therefore, that he does not do this now, but conciliate us; or, if he should attempt violence, assist me: for the mania of this man, and his amatory impulse, very much terrify me.

Alcibiades/ There is no occasion for any conciliation between you and me. I shall, however, at some other time take vengeance on you for these things. But now, Agatho, give me some of the fillets, that I may crown the wonderful head of this man, that he may not blame me that I have crowned you, but not him who vanquishes all men in discourse, not only lately as you have done, but at all times.

Apollodorus/ And at the same time receiving the fillets, he crowned Socrates, and seated himself.

Alcibiades/ Come, gentlemen, drink, for you appear to me to be sober. This, however, is not to be allowed; for it was agreed that we should drink. I therefore engage to be your leader in drinking, till you have drunk enough. But, Agatho, pass the cup, if there is any large one. Or, rather, there is no occasion for this; but Bring hither, boy, that cooling vessel, which seems to hold more than eight cotylæ.

Apollodorus/ Having filled this vessel, he first drank himself, and afterwards ordered them to pour out of it for Socrates, and at the same time said;

Alcibiades/ This stratagem of mine, gentlemen, is nothing to Socrates; for, let him drink as much as anyone may command, he will not be in the least intoxicated.

Apollodorus/ Socrates, therefore, the boy having poured out of the large vessel, drank.

Eryximachus/ How shall we do, Alcibiades? Shall we neither say anything, nor sing anything, over the cup; but act exactly like those that are thirsty?

Alcibiades/ Hail, Eryximachus! best of men, sprung from the best and most prudent of fathers.

Eryximachus/ And hail to you. But what shall we do?

Alcibiades/ That which you order us; for it is necessary to be obedient to you. For a man who is a physician is equivalent to many others. Command, therefore, whatever you please.

Eryximachus/ Hear then. Before you entered, it seemed to us to be proper that everyone, beginning at the right hand, should deliver an oration in praise of Love, to the best of his ability. All the rest of us, therefore, have delivered our orations; and it is just, since you have not spoken, but have drunk, that you also should deliver one: and when you have spoken, you may order Socrates to do whatever you please, and he may also order him on his right hand, and in a similar manner with respect to the rest.

Alcibiades/ You speak well; but it is not equitable that a man intoxicated should engage in a verbal competition with those that are sober. But, O blessed man, has Socrates persuaded you with respect to anything which he just now said? Or do you know that everything which he said is just the contrary? For if I, he being present, should praise

anyone, whether God or man, except himself, he would not keep his hands from me.

Socrates/ Will you not predict better things?

Alcibiades/ By Neptune say nothing to these things; for I shall praise no other person when you are present.

Eryximachus/ Do so then: if you will, praise Socrates.

Alcibiades/ How do you say? Does it seem to you fit, O Eryximachus. that I should attack this man, and revenge myself before you?

Socrates/ So then, what have you in your mind? Will you praise me for things ridiculous? or what will you do?

Alcibiades/ I shall speak the truth. But see if you permit me.

Socrates/ Indeed, I not only permit, but order you to speak the truth.

Alcibiades/ I shall by all means do so. But observe, if I should assert anything that is not true, stop me when you please, and say that in this I have spoken falsely; for I shall not willingly lie in anything. And do not wonder if, in confluence of recollecting, I narrate different circumstances from different places; for it is not an easy thing for a man in my condition to enumerate readily, and in succession, thy wonderful nature. But, gentlemen, I will thus endeavor to praise Socrates through images. He indeed will, perhaps, suspect that I shall turn my discourse to things ridiculous; but the image will be for the sake of truth, and not for the sake of the ridiculous.

I say, then, that Socrates is most similar to those Silenuses that are seated in the workshops of statuaries, which the artists have fabricated with pipes or flutes in their hands; and which, when they are bisected, appear to contain within statues of the Gods. And I again say, that he resembles the satyr Marsyas. That your outward form,

therefore, is similar to these. O Socrates, even you yourself will not deny; but that you also resemble them in other things, hear in the next place. You are contumelious: or are you not? For, if you do not acknowledge it, I will bring witnesses. Are you not also a piper much more wonderful than Marsyas? For he charmed men through instruments, by a power proceeding from the mouth; and he also accomplices this even now, when anyone uses that modulation. For I call the modulation of Olympus, that of Marsyas, because he instructed Olympus in it. That harmony, therefore whether it is produced by a good piper, or by a bad female player on the pipe, alone detains the hearers, and manifests, because it is divine, those that stand in need of the Gods and the mysteries; but you in this respect only differ from that harmony, that you effect this very same thing by mere words without instruments. We, therefore, when we hear some other person relating the discourse of another, though he that relates it should be a very good rhetorician, yet we pay, as I may say, no attention to it; but when anyone hears you, or another person, relating your discourses, though he that repeats them should be a bad speaker, and whether it be a woman, or a man, or a lad, that is the auditor, we are astonished and possessed. I therefore, my friends, unless I should appear to be very much intoxicated, will tell you upon oath in what manner I have been affected by the discourses of this man, and how I am even now affected. For when I hear him, my heart leaps much more than that of those who celebrate the mysteries of the Corybantes; and my tears flow from his discourses. I also see many others affected in the same manner. But when I hear Pericles, and other good rhetoricians, I think, indeed, that they speak well, but I suffer nothing of this kind; nor is my soul agitated with tumult, nor is it indignant, as if it were in a servile condition. But by this Marsyas I am often so

affected, that it appears to me I ought not to live while I lead such a life as I do. You will not, Socrates, say that these things are not true. And even now I perceive that, if I were willing to listen to him, I could not bear it, but should be affected in the very same manner. For he would compel me to acknowledge, that, being yet deficient in many things, I neglect myself, but attend to the affairs of the Athenians. By violence, therefore, retraining my ears, I depart from him, flying, as it were, from the Syrens, lest I should sit with him till I became old. From him alone likewise, of all men, I suffer that which no one would think to be in me, to be ashamed of something. But I am abashed before him alone. For I am conscious that I am unable to deny that what he exhorts me to do ought not to be done; but when I depart from him, I am vanquished by the honor which I receive from the multitude. I therefore avoid, and fly from him; and when I see him I am ashamed, in consequence of what I had consented to do. And often, indeed, it would be a pleasure to me no longer to see him among men: and yet again, if this should happen, I well know that I should be in a much greater degree afflicted; so that I am ignorant in what manner I should use this man. And from the modulations, indeed, of this satyr, both I and many others have suffered such-like things. But hear from me how much he resembles such things as I shall assimilate him to, and what a wonderful power he possesses. For be well assured of this, that no one of you knows him; but I will manifest him, since I have begun to speak. You see then that he is disposed in a very amatory manner towards beautiful things; and that he is always conversant with and astonished about these. And again, he knows all things, and yet knows nothing; so that this figure of him is very Silenical; for he is externally inverted with it, like a carved Silenus. But when he is opened inwardly, would you think, O my fellow guests, how replete

he is with temperance? Know also, that neither if anyone is beautiful, does he pay any attention to his beauty, but despises it far beyond what you would suppose; nor does he esteem anyone for being rich, or for possessing any other honor from the things which are considered as blessed by the multitude. But he thinks that all these possessions are of no worth, and that we are nothing. He also passes the whole of his life among men in irony and jest; but when he is serious and is opened, I know not whether anyone of you has seen the images which are within. I however once saw them, and they appeared to me to be so divine, golden, all-beautiful and wonderful, that I was determined to act in every respect conformably to the advice of Socrates. Thinking too that he paid great attention to my beauty, I considered this as my gain, and as a circumstance wonderfully fortunate, as I conceived that by gratifying Socrates I should hear from him all that he knew. For I formed a great opinion of my beauty, and thought it admirable. Thus conceiving, as prior to this I had never been with him alone without an attendant, I then dismissed my attendant, and remained with him alone: For it is necessary to narrate everything to you truly.

But now attend to me; and if I lie, do you, Socrates, confute me. I was with him, O my fellow guests, I alone with him alone, and expected that he would immediately speak to me in such a manner as lovers are accustomed to speak to the objects of their love, in solitude; and I was delighted with the expectation. Nothing however of this kind took place; but he discoursed with me as usual till evening, and then departed. After this, I incited him to engage with me in gymnastic exercises, expecting that I should effect something by this mean. We engaged, therefore, in these exercises, and often wrestled together, no one being present. But what occasion is there to say more? I did not in the least

accomplish my purpose. Not succeeding, therefore, in this in any respect, it appeared to me that I should attack the man more strenuously, since it was my determination to ensnare him. Hear now then what the thing was. I invited him to sup with me, in reality forming the same stratagem as a lover would for the objects of his love. He did not readily accept my invitation: however, sometime after he accepted it. But when he came, as soon as he had supped, he wished to depart; and then I being ashamed consented to his going away. Again however attacking him, after supper, I discoursed with him a considerable part of the night; and when he again wished to depart, observing that it was late, I compelled him to stay. He reposed, therefore, in a bed next to mine, and in which he had supped; and no other person besides us slept in the house. Thus far then, what I have said is well, and might have been said to anyone; but you must not hear me narrate what follows without first admitting the proverb, that wine without childhood and with childhood is true. Besides, to leave in obscurity the proud deed of Socrates appears to me unjust in one who undertakes to praise him. To which I may add, that I am affected in the same manner as he is who is bitten by a viper: for they say he is not willing to tell his feelings except to those that are in a similar condition, as they alone can know them, and will pardon everything which he may dare to do and say through the pain. I, therefore, have been bit by that which gives more pain, and which indeed causes the most acute of all pains. For those who have the heart or soul, or whatever else it may be proper to call it, bit and wounded by philosophic discourses, find the pain to be much more acute than that produced by the bite of the viper, and are impelled by it to do and say anything; when such discourses are received in a soul juvenile and not ignoble. Again, therefore, looking at Phædrus, Agatho, Eryximachus, Pausanias,

Aristodemus, Aristophanes, and, in short, Socrates, and the rest of the company; Since all of you, partake with me of the mania and Bacchic fury of philosophy, on this account let all hear me. For you will pardon what I then did, and what I now say. But let the servants, or any other profane and rustic person that may be present, close their ears with mighty gates. When, therefore, the lamp was extinguished, and the servants had left the room, it appeared to me requisite to employ no dissimulation towards him, but freely to tell him my sentiments. And I said, moving him, Socrates, are you asleep?

Socrates/ Not yet.

Alcibiades/ Do you know then, what I conceive?

Socrates/ About what particularly?.

Alcibiades/ You appear to me to be the only lover worthy of me, though you are not forward in courting me. But, as I am thus affected, I think it would be very stupid, not to gratify you in this particular, and in anything else of which you may be in want, whether it be my property, or my friends: for nothing is to me more honorable than to become the best of men. But I think that no one can give me more assistance in this than you. And I should much more fear the reprehensions of the wise, in not gratifying such a man, than I should fear the many and the unwise by gratifying him. Socrates, having heard me, said, very ironically, and very much after his usual manner;

Socrates/ O beloved Alcibiades, you appear in reality to be no vile person, if what you say concerning me is true, and there is in me a certain power, through which you can be made better, and if also you perceive in me an immense beauty, and very much excelling the elegance of your form. If, therefore, perceiving this, you endeavor to have communion with me, and to change beauty for beauty, you

strive to possess much more than I do; for instead of the opinion you endeavor to obtain the truth of beauty, and conceive that you shall in reality exchange brass for gold. But, O blessed youth, consider more maturely, nor let me be concealed from you, who am nothing. For then indeed the sight of the dianoëtic power begins to perceive acutely, when that of the eye loses its acme. You, however, are as yet at a distance from these things.

Alcibiades/ Having heard him, I replied, With respect to myself the particulars are such as I have told you, nor have I said anything different from what I conceive; but do you advise in such a manner as you may think best both for you and me.

Socrates/ This, you say well: for in future let us, consulting together, do that which appears to be best for us, both about these and other particulars.

Alcibiades/ Having heard and replied to these things, and ceasing to speak, as if I had thought that he was wounded with a dart, I rose, and would not suffer him to speak any more; and wrapping myself round with this old garment (For it was winter), I reclined in it, embracing in my arms this truly divine and wonderful man, and thus lay the whole night. And again, Socrates, neither will you say that I have asserted these things falsely. But though I acted in this manner, yet he was victorious, and despised, ridiculed, and even insulted my beauty. And as, O my fellow guests, you are judges of the haughtiness of Socrates, I call the Gods and Goddesses to witness, that I rose from Socrates no otherwise than if I had slept with my father, or my elder brother.

What then do you suppose were my thoughts after this, conceiving that I had been despised, but admiring the nature, the temperance and fortitude of this man?

conceiving that I had met with such a man for prudence and fortitude, as I should never have expected to find? Hence I could not be in any respect angry with him, nor could I abandon his conversation, nor discover any means of alluring him. For I well knew that it is much more difficult to subdue him by money, than it was to vanquish Ajax by the sword; and that by which alone I thought he might be ensnared deceived me. Hence I wandered about dubious, and more enslaved by this man than anyone by any other. All these things, therefore, were at that time effected by me. After this, he was my associate and my daily guest in the military expedition against Potidæa. And here, in the first place, he not only surpassed me, but all others, in labors. Hence, when we were compelled through a deficiency of provisions to fast, as is sometimes the case in armies, the rest were nothing to him with respect to endurance. Again, in feasts at the military table, he alone was the only person that appeared to enjoy them; and though he was unwilling to drink, yet when compelled he vanquished all the rest. And what is the most wonderful of all, no one ever saw Socrates intoxicated. However, it seems to me that a consultation of this will immediately follow. But with respect to endurance in the severity of the winter (for the winter there is very severe), he performed wonders; and once, the cold being so dreadful that no one could venture out of his tent, or, if he did venture, he was very abundantly clothed, and had his feet bound and wrapt in wool and sheep-skins, Socrates then went out with just the same clothing as before this he was accustomed to wear. He likewise marched through the ice without shoes, more easily than others with shoes. But the soldiers beheld him as one who despised them. And thus much for these particulars.

Again, what this strenuous man did and endured in that army, it is worthwhile to hear. For thinking deeply about

something one morning, he stood considering it; and though he was not able to discover what he was investigating, he did not desist, but stood exploring. It was now too mid-day, and the soldiers perceived him, and wondering, said one to the other, that Socrates had stood from the morning cogitating. At length some of the Ionian soldiers when it was evening, having supped (For it was then summer), said themselves down on the bare ground, that they might observe whether he continued in the same posture through the night. But he stood till it was morning and the sun rose; after which he departed, having first adored the sun. If you are also willing, hear how he conducted himself in battle; for it is but just to relate this. For in that engagement in which the commanders of the army conferred on me those rewards which are usually given to such as have conducted themselves best in battle, no other man saved me than Socrates; for, as I was wounded, he was not willing to leave me, but preserved both my arms and me. And I indeed, O Socrates, at that time urged the commanders to give you the rewards which are bestowed on the most valiant; and for saying this, you neither blame me, nor accuse me of speaking falsely. The commanders, however, looking to my dignity, wished to give up those rewards, you also being more desirous that I should receive them than yourself.

Further still, O fellow guests, it was well worthwhile to behold Socrates when our army fled from Delium; for I happened to be in that battle among the cavalry, but Socrates was among the foot. The ranks, therefore, being broken, he and Laches retreated; and I meeting with and seeing the troops, immediately exhorted them to take courage, and said that I would not abandon them. Here then I could see Socrates better than at Potidaea; for I was in lest fear, because I was on horse-back. In the first place, therefore, he greatly surpassed Laches in prudent caution;

and, in the next place, he appeared to me, O Aristophanes, to carry himself loftily, as you also say he does here, and darting his eye around calmly to survey both friends and enemies; so that it was manifest to everyone, and even to him that was at a considerable distance, that he who touched this man would be very strenuously resisted. Hence both he and his companion retreated with security; for scarcely was anyone attacked who thus concluded himself in the battle, but they pursued those that fled rapidly and in disorder.

There are many other things, indeed, in which Socrates is admirable, and for which he might be praised. And in other pursuits, others perhaps may merit the same praise; but to resemble no man, neither of the ancients nor the moderns, this is a circumstance worthy of all wonder. For such as Achilles was, such also it may be conjectured was Brasidas and others: and again, such as Pericles was, such also it may be said were Antenor and Nestor. And there are likewise others that after the same manner may be compared with others. But such a prodigy is this man, both as to himself and his discourses, that no one by searching will find any man that nearly resembles him, neither among those of the present age nor among the ancients. He can, therefore, only be said to resemble, both in himself and his discourses, those things to which I have compared him, viz. no one among men, but the Silenuses and Satyrs. For I omitted to mention this before, that his discourses are most similar to the Silenuses when opened. For the discourses of Socrates, to him who is willing to hear them, will at first appear to be perfectly ridiculous; since the nouns and verbs which he employs externally enfold a certain gift of a reviling Satyr. For he speaks of asses and their burdens, of copper-smiths, shoe-makers and tanners, and he always appears to say the same things through the same; so that every unskillful and

ignorant man will ridicule his words. But he who beholds his discourses when opened, and penetrates into their depth, will, in the first place, find that they alone of all other discourses contain intellect within them; and, in the next place, that they are most divine, are replete with numerous images of virtue, and have a very ample extent, or rather extend themselves to everything which it is fit he should consider who intends to become a truly worthy man. These then are the things, my fellow guests, for which I praise and also for which I blame Socrates. I have likewise inserted in them the injuries which he has done me. Nor has he alone acted in this manner towards me, but also towards Charmides the son of Glauco, Euthydemus the son of Diodes, and very many others; for he has deceived these, as if he had been their lover, when at the same time he rather became the beloved object himself. Hence, I caution you, O Agatho, not to be deceived by this man, but, knowing what I have suffered, take care, and do not, as the proverb says of fools, become wise by experience.

Apollodorus/ Aristodemus related, that when Alcibiades had thus spoken, the freedom of his speech excited a general laugh, because he appeared to have for Socrates an amatory regard.

Socrates/ You seem to me, O Alcibiades. to be sober; for, otherwise, you would not have attempted in so elegant and circuitous a manner to conceal that for the sake of which you have said all these things, nor would you have asserted that which, as if foreign from the purpose, you have added at the end; as if the intention of all that you have said was not to separate me and Agatho. For you think that I ought to love you and no other, and that Agatho ought to be loved by you, and by no one besides. Neither is this Satiric and Silenic drama of yours concealed from, but is perfectly evident to, us. But, dear Agatho, may none of these his

contrivances succeed! and let us endeavor that nothing may separate you and me.

Agathon/ Indeed, Socrates, you appear to speak the truth; and I infer that he sits between you and me, that he may separate us. He will, however, derive no advantage from this; for I will come and sit next to you.

Socrates/ By all means, come hither, and sit below me.

Alcibiades/ O Zeus! How much do I suffer from this man! He thinks it is necessary to surpass me in everything; but, O wonderful man, suffer Agatho, if no one else, to sit between us.

Socrates/ It is impossible: for you have praised me, and it is necessary that I should now praise him sitting at my right hand. If, therefore, Agatho reclines under you, he certainly will not again praise me before he has been praised by me. But cease, O dæmoniacal man, and do not envy my praise of the lad; for I very much desire to pass an encomium on him.

Agathon/ Excellent! excellent! Alcibiades: there is no reason why I should stay here, but there is every reason that I should change my seat, that I may be praised by Socrates.

Alcibiades/ These things are usual: when Socrates is present, it is impossible for any other to share the favors of the beautiful. And now observe how easily, and with what persuasive language, he draws this youth to him.

Apollodorus/ After this Agatho rose, that he might sit by Socrates: but on a sudden many revelers came to the gates, and, finding them open, in consequence of someone having gone out, they entered and seated themselves.

Hence, all things were full of tumult; and as there was no longer any order observed, everyone was compelled to drink a great quantity of wine. Aristodemus therefore said, that Eryximachus and Phædrus, and some others, went home to

take some sleep; but that he slept there very abundantly, the nights being long, and rose about daybreak, the cocks then crowing. When, therefore, he had risen, he saw that some of the guests were asleep, and that others had departed; but that Agatho, Aristophanes, and Socrates, were the only persons awake, and were drinking to the right hand out of a great bowl. He also added, that Socrates was discoursing with them; but that he did not recollect what the discourse was, because he was not present at the beginning of it, as he was then asleep. However, the sum of it, was this, that Socrates compelled them to acknowledge that it was the province of the same person to compose comedy and tragedy; and that he who was by art a tragic, was also a comic poet. When they had assented to these things by compulsion, and not very readily, Aristodemus said, they fell asleep; and that Aristophanes fell asleep first, and afterwards, it being now day, Agatho; but that Socrates, they being asleep, rising, went out, he as usual following him. And lastly, that Socrates went to the Lyceum, and, having washed himself as at another time, conversed there the whole day, and in the evening went home to rest.

THE END OF THE BANQUET.

The Theages.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Demodocus, Socrates, Theages.

Demodocus/ I want, Socrates, to speak with you in private about some matters, if you are at leisure; and if your want of leisure be not very great, for my sake however make leisure.

Socrates/ Nay, I am at leisure in other respects, and on your account very much so. If then you wish to say anything, it is in your power to do so.

Demodocus/ Are you willing then for us to retire out of the way, to the portico of Zeus Eleutherius hard by?

Socrates/ If it seems good to you.

Demodocus/ Let us go then, Socrates. All natural productions, growing out of the earth, and other animals as well as man, appear to subsist in nearly the same manner. For to such of us as cultivate the ground it is a thing the most easy in the case of plants, to prepare everything prior to planting, and even the planting itself. But when what has been planted is in a living state, the care of it becomes great and painful, and difficult. The same thing appears to take place with respect to human beings likewise. I form this conjecture as regards other things from my own affairs. For of this my son, whether one must call it the planting, or the procreating, it is the easiest of all things; but his education is difficult, and I am continually in fear about him. On other points much might be said; but the desire which now possesses him alarms me very much. It is not indeed an ignoble one, but it is dangerous. For he desires, Socrates, as he says, to become a wise man. I suspect that certain youths

of his own age, and of the same ward, have been going down to the city, and repeating certain discourses, and disturbed his mind very much. Of these he is emulous; and for a long time is giving me great trouble, thinking it fit that I should pay attention to him, and pay money to some of the sophists, who might make him a wise man. For the money indeed I care less than nothing, but think that, in going whither he is hastening, he is running into no small danger. Hitherto I have by soothing restrained him; but as I am no longer able to do so, I think it best to yield to him, lest by frequently associating with others without me, he should be corrupted. Hence I am come for this very purpose, that I may place him with some one of those, who are considered to be sophists. Opportunely then for us have you appeared, with whom, as I am about to engage in affairs of this kind, I wished very much to consult. If then you have any advice to give respecting what you have heard from me, it is both lawful and needful to do so.

Socrates/ Counsel, Demodocus, is said to be a sacred thing. If then, any other consultation is sacred, this is so, about which you are now considering. For there is not a thing, about which a person may consult, more divine, than about the instruction of himself and of those related to him. In the first place then, let you and I agree together as to what we think that thing is, about which we are consulting; lest I may not perchance take it to be one thing, and you another; and we afterwards perceive, when the conference has proceeded far, that we are an object of ridicule, both I who give, and you who request, advice, in not thinking the same upon anything.

Demodocus/ You appear to me, Socrates, to speak correctly; and it is meet so to do.

Socrates/ And speak I do correctly, but not entirely so; since I make a trifling alteration. For I am thinking, that

perhaps this youth may not desire that, which we think he desires, but something else; and in that case we shall be still more absurd in consulting about something different. It appears, therefore, to me to be the most correct to begin by inquiring of him what the thing is, which he desires.

Demodocus/ It appears very nearly to be the best to do as you say.

Socrates/ Tell me then what is the name of this handsome youth? what must we call him?

Demodocus/ His name, Socrates, is Theages.

Socrates/ You have given your son, Demodocus, a beautiful and sacred-like name. Tell us, Theages, do you say that you desire to become a wise man? and do you think it fit for this your father to find out the acquaintance of such a person as may make you wise?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you call those men wise, who are skilled in that, respecting which they have a knowledge, or those, who have not?

Theages/ Those, who have a knowledge.

Socrates/ What then, has not your father caused you to be instructed, or taught you himself, what others are taught, who are the sons of fathers good and honorable; for instance, letters, to play on the harp, to wrestle, and other exercises?

Theages/ Yes, myself.

Socrates/ Do you think then there is still a want of some knowledge, to which it is proper for your father to pay attention for your sake?

Theages/ I do.

Socrates/ What is it? Tell us it, that we may gratify you.

Theages/ My father knows it, Socrates; for I have often mentioned it to him. But he designedly says this to you, as

if truly he did not know what I desire; for in this and other matters likewise he opposes me, and is unwilling to place me with anyone.

Socrates/ But all that you have hitherto said to him, has been said, as it were, without witnesses. Now therefore make me a witness and state before me what is the wisdom you desire. For come now, if you should desire that wisdom, by which men steer ships, and I should happen to ask you—What is the wisdom, Theages, of which being in want you blame your father, because he is unwilling to place you with a man, through whom you might become wise? what answer would you give me? What would you say this wisdom is? Is it not the pilot's art?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if you desired to be wise in that wisdom, by which persons direct chariots, and afterwards blamed your father, on my asking you what this wisdom is, what answer would you give me? Would you not say it is the charioteer's art?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ But is the wisdom, of which you have now a desire, nameless, or has it a name?

Theages/ I think it has a name.

Socrates/ Whether then do you know it, but not its name? Or its name likewise?

Theages/ Its name likewise.

Socrates/ Say then what it is.

Theages/ What other name, Socrates, can one say it has, than that of wisdom?

Socrates/ Is not then the charioteer's art wisdom likewise? Or does it appear to you to be ignorance?

Theages/ It does not.

Socrates/ But wisdom?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ For what do we use it? Is it not for that, by which we know how to manage horses when yoked?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is not then the pilot's art wisdom likewise?

Theages/ To me at least it appears so.

Socrates/ Is it not that, by which we know how to manage ships?

Theages/ It is.

Socrates/ But what is the wisdom of which you are desirous? What by it do we know how to govern?

Theages/ By it we know, it seems to me, how to govern men.

Socrates/ What, sick men?

Theages/ No.

Socrates/ For that wisdom is the physician's art. Is it not?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it that then, by which we know how to regulate singers in choirs?

Theages/ It is not.

Socrates/ For this is the musician's art.

Theages/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But is it that, by which we know how to regulate those, who are engaged in gymnastic exercises?

Theages/ No.

Socrates/ For this is the gymnast's art.

Theages/ It is.

Socrates/ Is it that of those, who do what? Be ready to state it to myself, as I have the preceding to you.

Theages/ It is that, by which persons do something in the city.

Socrates/ Are there not then in a city persons who are sick?

Theages/ Yes. But I am not speaking of these only, but also of the others in the city.

Socrates/ Do I then understand the art of which you are speaking? For you appear to me to say it is not that, by which we know how to govern mowers, and grape-gatherers, and planters, and sowers, and threshers; for it is the husbandman's art, by which we govern these. Is it not?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor are you speaking of that, by which we govern sawyers, and planers, and turners; for does not this belong to the carpenter's art?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ But perhaps you are speaking of that wisdom, by which we govern all these, and husbandmen, and carpenters, and all artificers skilled and unskilled, and men and women.

Theages/ Of this wisdom, Socrates, I have for a long while ago been wishing to speak.

Socrates/ Can you say, that Ægisthus, who slew Agamemnon at Argos, had dominion over what you have mentioned, artificers skilled and unskilled, and men and women, all taken together, or over some other things?

Theages/ No; but over these.

Socrates/ What then, did not Peleus, the son of Æacus, have dominion over those very kind of persons in Phthia?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you have heard that Periander, the son of Cypselus, was a ruler in Corinth.

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And did he not rule over the very kind of persons in his city?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ What then, do you not think that Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who was lately the ruler in Macedonia, had dominion over the same kind of persons?

Theages/ I do.

Socrates/ And over whom do you think that Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, ruled in this city? was it not over these kind of persons?

Theages/ How not?

Socrates/ Can you tell me then, what appellation Bacis, and the Sibyl, and our countryman Amphilytus, bore?

Theages/ What else, Socrates, than oracle-chanters?

Socrates/ You speak correctly. But endeavor to give me an answer as to what appellation Hippias and Periander bore through the same kind of dominion?

Theages/ Tyrants, I think; for what else could it be?

Socrates/ Whoever then desires to have dominion over all the men together in the city, desires this very same dominion, the tyrannic, and to be a tyrant.

Theages/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Do you then say that you desire this dominion?

Theages/ It seems so from what I have said.

Socrates/ O you wicked youth! Do you desire to tyrannize over us? And have you for a long time blamed your father, because he did not send you to the school of some tyrant-teacher? And are not you, Demodocus, ashamed of yourself? who, having known a long time ago what this youth desired, and having likewise the power of sending him, where you might have made him that skillful artist in wisdom, of which

he is desirous, have, notwithstanding, begrudged him this, and are unwilling to send him? But now, you see—since he has spoken against you before me—let us consult in common, you and I, to whose school we may send him; and through associating with whom he may become a wise tyrant.

Demodocus/ Let us, by Zeus, then, Socrates, consult; for it appears to me that there is need of no despicable counsel in this affair.

Socrates/ Permit us first, thou good man, to interrogate him sufficiently.

Demodocus/ Interrogate him.

Socrates/ What then, Theages, if we should make use of Euripides? For he somewhere says;

> Tyrants are wise, by converse with the wise.

If then someone should ask Euripides—In what say you, Euripides, do tyrants become wise by the conversation of the wise? just as if he had said;

> Farmers are wise, by converse with the wise—

and we had asked him—In what are they wise? What would he have answered? Would he reply that they are wise in anything else than in things pertaining to agriculture?

Theages/ In nothing else but those.

Socrates/ But what, if he had said;

> Cooks become wise, by converse with the wise—

and we had asked him—In what are they wise? What would he have answered? Would it not have been—In things pertaining to cooking?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Again, if he had said;

> Wrestlers are wise, by converse with the wise—

and we had asked him—In what are they wise? Would he not have said—In things pertaining to wrestling?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ But since he says;

> Tyrants are wise, by converse with the wise—

upon our asking him—In what say you, Euripides, are they wise? What would be his answer?

Theages/ By Zeus, I do not know.

Socrates/ Are you willing then for me to tell you?

Theages/ If you are willing.

Socrates/ It is that, which Anacreon says Callicrete knew. Or do you not know the song?

Theages/ I do.

Socrates/ What then, do you also desire the conversation of a man, who happens to be a fellow-artist with Callicrete the daughter of Cyane, and who knows the art of a tyrant, as the poet says she did, in order that you may become a tyrant over us and the city?

Theages/ You have for some time, Socrates, been laughing at and playing with me.

Socrates/ What then, do you say that you do not desire this wisdom, by which you may rule over all the citizens? And doing this, would you be anything else but a tyrant?

Theages/ I would pray, indeed, I fancy, to be a tyrant over all men, or, if not of all, of the greatest part; and I think that you, and all other men, would do the same, and perhaps still more, to be a god. But I did not say that I desired this.

Socrates/ But what then, after all, is this which you desire? Do you not say that you desire to rule over the citizens?

Theages/ Not by violence, nor as tyrants do; but I desire to rule over the willing, in the same manner as other men of note in the city.

Socrates/ Do you mean, as Themistocles, and Pericles, and Cimon, and such as were skilled in state affairs?

Theages/ By Zeus, I mean those.

Socrates/ What then, if you happened to be desirous of becoming wise in horsemanship, by going to whom do you think you would become a skillful horseman? would it be by going to others than those skilled in horses?

Theages/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ But you would go to those very men, who are skilled in these matters, and who possess horses, and who continually use both their own and many that are the property of others.

Theages/ It is evident I should.

Socrates/ What then, if you wished to become wise in the throwing of darts, think you not that you would become skilled by going to those engaged in the art of dart-throwing, and who possess darts, and continually use many darts, both their own and those belonging to others?

Theages/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Tell me then, since you wish to become wise in state affairs, think you that you will become wise by going to any others than those statesmen, who are skilled in state affairs themselves, and who continually make use of their own state and many others, and have an intercourse both with the Greek and Barbarian states? Or do you think, that by associating with certain other persons, but not with these, you will become wise in those things, in which they are wise?

Theages/ I have heard the discourses, Socrates, which persons say you have spoken, how that the sons of those very statesmen were in no respect better than the sons of shoemakers: and you appear to me to have spoken most truly, from what I am able to perceive. I should be senseless then, if I thought that anyone of these could impart to me his wisdom, when he could not in any respect benefit his own son; if indeed he were able on these points to benefit any person whatever.

Socrates/ What then, O best of men, would you do, if you had a son, who should give you trouble of this kind, and say that he desired to become a good painter, and blame you, his father, because you were not willing to expend money for the sake of these things, while he was despising painters, the artists in this very matter, and unwilling to learn from them; or if, being desirous to become a piper or harper, he should act in this manner towards pipers or harpers? In what way would you treat him, and whither would you send him, when thus unwilling to learn from those persons?

Theages/ By Zeus, I do not know.

Socrates/ Now then, as you are doing these very things to your father, do you wonder at and blame him, if he is in doubt how he shall treat you, and whither send you? For we will place you with whomever of the Athenians you wish, the most skilled in state affairs, and who will be with you gratuitously; and at the same time you will not lose- your money, and likewise be in greater repute with the many than by associating with anyone else.

Theages/ What then, Socrates, are not you one of the excellent men? For if you are willing to associate with me, it is sufficient, and I seek no other.

Socrates/ Why say you this, Theages?

Demodocus/ He does not, Socrates, speak badly; and at the same time by doing this you will gratify me. Since there is nothing I should consider a greater piece of good luck than for my son to be pleased with your society, and for you to be willing to associate with him. And indeed I am ashamed to say how very much I wish it. I entreat both of you, therefore, you, Socrates, to be willing to associate with him, and you, my son, not to seek to associate with any other than Socrates; and you will thus release me from many and dreadful cares. For I now very much fear for him, lest he should meet with some other person able to corrupt him.

Theages/ Do not, father, feel any longer any fear for me, if you can but persuade Socrates to permit me to associate with him.

Demodocus/ You speak very well. And after this, the conversation, Socrates, will be directed to you. For I am ready, so to say in few words, to give up to you both me and mine, and the nearest related, whatever, in short, you may require, if you will take this youth to your bosom, and benefit him as far as you can.

Socrates/ O Demodocus, I do not wonder that you are so importunate, if you think that your son can be especially benefited by me. For I do not know anything about which he, who is endued with intellect, ought to be more anxious, than how his son may become the best of men. But from whence it has appeared to you that I am more able to benefit your son towards his becoming a good citizen, than you are yourself, and from whence he has thought that I can benefit him more than you, I very much wonder. For, in the first place, you are older than I am; and in the next place, you have held many offices, and those the greatest among the Athenians; and you are honored by the people of the Anagyrusian ward, by much the most, and no less so by the rest of the city. But neither of you can see anyone of these

things in me; and next, if Theages here despises the society of statesmen, and seeks after certain others who profess themselves able to instruct young men, there is Prodicus of Ceos, and Gorgias the Leontine, and Polus the Agrigentine, and many others, who are so wise, that they go to cities and persuade the noblest and wealthiest of the young men, who are permitted to associate gratuitously with anyone of the citizens they please, —they persuade, I say, these to give up those of their own city, and to associate with them, and to put down moreover a considerable sum of money, and, as a remuneration, to give them thanks besides. Of these, then, it is reasonable for your son and yourself to select someone; but to select me it is not reasonable; for I know none of that blessed and beautiful learning, although I wish I did; but I am always somehow asserting that I happen to know, I may say, nothing but a mere trifle relating to matters of love. But in that kind of learning I lay claim to being more skilled than anyone man of the past or present time.

Theages/ See you, father, how Socrates does not appear to me to be very willing to pass the time with me. For, as to myself, I am ready, if he is willing. But he says this, playing with us. For I know some of the same age with myself, and others a little older, who, before they associated with him, were worth nothing; but when they had been with him, in a very little time they appeared to be better than all, to whom they were previously inferior.

Socrates/ Do you know then, son of Demodocus, how this is?

Theages/ Yes, by Zeus, I do; and that, if you are willing, I too shall be able to become such as they are.

Socrates/ Not so, thou excellent youth; but you are not conscious how this occurs; and I will tell you. There is, by a divine allotment, a certain dæmon that has followed me,

beginning from childhood. This is a voice, which, when it exists, always signifies to me the abandonment of what I am about to do; but it never at any time incites me. And, if anyone of my friends communicates anything to me, and there is the voice, it dissuades me from that very thing, and it does not suffer me to do it. Of this I will produce you witnesses. You know the beautiful Charmides, the son of Glauco. He once happened to communicate to me that he was about to contend for the stadium at Nemea; and immediately, on his beginning to say, that he meant to contend, there was the voice. And I forbade him, and said, While you were speaking to me, there was the voice of the dæmon; do not, therefore, contend. Perhaps, said he, the voice signified to you, that I should not conquer; but, though I should not be victorious, yet, by exercising myself at this time, I shall be benefited. Having thus spoken, he engaged in the contest. It is worthwhile, therefore, to inquire of him, what happened to him after this very act of contending. And if you are willing to inquire of Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus, what Timarchus said to him, when, being about to die, he went right against the dæmon, both he and Euathlus, the runner in the stadium, who received Timarchus when he was an exile, will tell you what he then said.

Theages/ What did he say?

Socrates/ O Clitomachus, said he, I indeed am now going to die, because I was unwilling to be persuaded by Socrates. But why Timarchus said this, I will tell you. When Timarchus rose from the banquet, together with Philemon the son of Philemonides, with the view of murdering Nicias the son of Heroscomander, they two alone were cognizant of the plot; and Timarchus, as he rose, said to me, What do you say, Socrates? Do you continue drinking; but I must rise up and go somewhere. I will, however, return shortly, if I am

successful. And there was the voice. And I said to him, By no means, said I, rise up; for there has been to me the usual dæmon signal. Upon this he stayed. And after a slight interval, he was again going away, and said—Socrates, I am going. And there was again the voice. Again, therefore, I compelled him to stay. The third time, wishing to escape me unnoticed, he rose up without saying anything to me, and escaped unnoticed, having watched me, while I had my attention otherwise engaged; and thus departing he perpetrated the acts, through which he went away about to die. Hence he told his brother, what I have now told you, that he was going to die, through his not believing in me. Further still, you will hear from many respecting the events in Sicily, what I said concerning the destruction of the army. And the things that are past, you may hear from those that know them; but you may now make trial of the dæmon signal, if it says anything to the purpose. For on the departure of Sannio the beautiful for the army, there came to me the signal; and he is now gone with Thrasyllus, to carry on the campaign right through Ephesus and Ionia. And I think that he will either die, or that he will meet with an end something near to it. And I very much fear for the rest of the enterprise. All these things have I said to you, because this power of this dæmon is able to effect everything with respect to the intercourse of those, who pass their time with me. For it is opposed to many; and it is not possible for those to be benefited by passing their time with me, so that it is not possible for me to live with them. With many, however, it does not prevent me from conversing; and yet they are not at all benefited by being with me. But they, whom the power of the dæmon assists to the intercourse, are those whom you have noticed; for in a short time they make a proficiency. And of those, who make a proficiency, some have the benefit firm and lasting; but many, as long as they are with me,

advance in a wonderful manner; but when they separate themselves from me, they again differ in no respect from any person whatever. This did Aristides, the son of Lysimachus and grandson of Aristides, suffer; for, while passing his time with me, he made a very great proficiency in a short period; but afterwards an expedition took place, and he went away, sailing with it. On his return he found Thucydides, the son of Melesias and grandson of Thucydides, passing his time with me. Now this Thucydides, the day before, had felt some ill against me during a conversation. Aristides, therefore, after he had seen and saluted me, and other matters had been talked of, observed—I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides thinks highly of himself, on some points, and is angry with you, as if he were really something. It is so, said I. What then, said he, does he not know what a slave he was before he associated with you? By the gods, said I, it does not seem that he does. But I too, said he, am in a ridiculous situation, Socrates. What is it? said I. It is, said he, that, before I sailed away, I was able to converse with any man whatever, and not to appear inferior to anyone in argument, so that I sought the society of men the most elegant; but now, on the contrary, I shun anyone, whom I perceive to be instructed, so ashamed am I of my own littleness. But, said I, whether did this power leave you suddenly or by degrees? By degrees, he replied. When was it present with you, said I? Was it present while you were learning something from me, or was it in some other way? I will tell you, said he, Socrates, a thing incredible indeed, by the gods, but true. I never, at any time, learnt anything from you, as you know. I made, however, a proficiency when I associated with you, even if I was only in the same house, though not in the same room; but more so when I was in the same room with you; and I seemed to myself to improve much more when, being in the same room, I looked at you, when you were speaking, than when I looked

another way. But I made by far the greatest proficiency, when I sat near you and touched you. Now, however, said he, all that habit has entirely oozed away. Of such kind then is, Theages, the intercourse with myself; for, if it is pleasing to the god, you will make a very great and rapid proficiency; but if not, not. See, then, whether it is not safer for you to be instructed by some one of those, who have a power over the benefit, with which they benefit men, than by me, who have the power to do only whatever may happen.

Theages/ It appears to me, Socrates, that we should act in this manner, namely, to make a trial of this dæmon by associating together. And, if he is favorable to us, this will be the best; but if not, then let us immediately consult what we shall do, whether we shall associate with some other person, or endeavor to appease the divine power, that is present with you, by prayers and sacrifices, or any other method that the diviners may explain.

Demodocus/ Do not, Socrates, oppose the lad any longer on these points; for Theages speaks well.

Socrates/ If it appears proper so to act, let us act so.

The Theages.

[OR ON WISDOM: "OBSTETRIC"]

Translated by Lamb.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

Demodocus, Socrates, Theages.

Demodocus/ Socrates, I was wanting to have some private talk with you, if you had time to spare; even if there is some demand, which is not particularly important, on your time, do spare some, nevertheless, for me.

Socrates/ Why, in any case I happen to have time to spare, and for you, moreover, I have plenty. Well, you are free to say whatever you wish.

Demodocus/ Then do you mind if we step aside here from the street into the portico of Zeus the Liberator ?

Socrates/ As you think best.

Demodocus/ Let us go, then. Socrates, it would seem that all growths follow the same course, both those that grow from the earth, and the animals, including man. In regard to the plants, as you know, we who cultivate the earth find it the easiest part of our work to make all our preparations that are needed before planting, and to do the planting itself; but when the plant begins to grow, thenceforward we have a great deal of difficult and vexatious business in tending the new growth. Such, it seems, is also the case in regard to men: I take my own concerns as evidence for judging of the rest. For indeed I have found the planting, or the procreation—whichever one ought to call it—of this son of mine the easiest thing in the world; but his upbringing has been vexatious and a constant source of alarm, so great are my fears for him. Among the many instances that I could mention, the desire which occupies him at the moment is a

thing that especially alarms me: for it is not an ill-bred desire, but a dangerous one, since here we have him, Socrates, as he says, desiring to become wise. My opinion is that some of his fellow-townsmen, about his own age, who pay visits to the city, excite him with accounts of certain discussions they have heard there; and in his envy of these he has long been pestering me with the demand that I should take due thought for his needs, and pay fees to some sophist or other who will make him wise. Now I do not mind so much about the fees, but I believe he is running into no slight danger where he is hastening. I did for a time restrain him with good advice; but since I am no longer able to do so, I believe my best course is to comply with his request, in order that he may not resort, perchance, behind my back to somebody who will corrupt him. So I have come now on this very business of placing this youth with one of these sophists, or purveyors of wisdom, as they are held to be. It is a happy chance, therefore, that has thrown you in our way, as I should be particularly glad, with this plan of action in my mind, to ask your advice. Come, if you have any advice to give on what you have heard from me, you not only may, but should, give it.

Socrates/ Well, you know, Demodocus, they do say that advice is a holy thing. And so, if ever it is to be accounted holy, it must be in this instance, in which you now seek it. For there is no more divine matter on which a mortal could take counsel than the education either of himself or of his relations. Now, first of all, let you and me come to an agreement as to what we suppose that this thing can be, on which we are taking counsel; for it may happen that I conceive it to be one thing, and you another, and then when we have proceeded some little way in our conference, we may perceive how ridiculous we are, I the adviser and you the advised, in having no common ground in our notions.

Demodocus/ Why, I think you are right there, Socrates, and we should do as you suggest.

Socrates/ Yes, I am right, but yet not entirely, because I have a slight change to make. For it occurs to me that this youngster may not be desiring the thing that we suppose him to desire, but something else, and there again we may be still more absurdly taking counsel on some other thing. Hence our proper course, it seems to me, is to begin with the youth himself, and inquire of him what it actually is that he desires.

Demodocus/ It does rather look, in fact, as though our best way would be thus, as you suggest.

Socrates/ Then tell me, what is the young person s goodly name: how are we to address him?

Demodocus/ Theages is his name, Socrates.

Socrates/ Goodly is the name, Demodocus, and holy-sounding, that you have bestowed on your son. Tell me, then, Theages, do you say you desire to become wise, and do you require your father here to find out a school of some man who is qualified to make you wise?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And which sort of man do you call wise, those who have knowledge of such and such a thing, whatever it may be, or those who have not?

Theages/ Those who have knowledge, I say.

Socrates/ Well now, has not your father taught and educated you in the subjects which form the education of everyone else here—all the sons of noble and honorable fathers—in letters, I mean, and harping and wrestling and the other sorts of contest?

Theages/ Yes, he has.

Socrates/ And you think you are still lacking in some knowledge which it behooves your father to provide for you?

Theages/ I do.

Socrates/ What knowledge is it? Tell us on our side, that we may oblige you.

Theages/ He knows it, as well as I, Socrates, since I have often told him; only he says this to you of set purpose, making as if he did not know what I desire. For he assails me too with other statements of the same sort, and refuses to place me with any instructor.

Socrates/ Well, what you said to him before was spoken, as it were, without witnesses; but now you shall take me as a witness, and declare before me what is this wisdom that you desire. Come now; suppose you desired the wisdom whereby men steer a ship, and I happened to put this further question to you: Theages, what wisdom is it that you lack, when you blame your father for refusing to place you with people who would enable you to become wise? What answer would you have given me? What wisdom would you name? The steersman's art, would you not?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if a desire to be wise in the wisdom whereby they steer chariots led you to blame your father, and I asked what wisdom this was, what would you name in reply? The charioteer's art, would you not?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is that which you happen to be desiring now a nameless one, or has it a name?

Theages/ I should say it has a name.

Socrates/ Now do you know it, though not its name, or do you know its name as well?

Theages/ I know its name as well.

Socrates/ Then what is it? Tell me.

Theages/ What other name, Socrates, can one give it but wisdom?

Socrates/ And the driver's art too is wisdom? Or do you think it is ignorance?

Theages/ I do not.

Socrates/ You call it wisdom?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ What use do we make of it? Is it not the art whereby we know how to govern a team of horses?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the steersman's art too is wisdom?

Theages/ I think so.

Socrates/ Is not this the art whereby we know how to govern ships?

Theages/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ And the wisdom that you so desire, what is it? That whereby we know how to govern whom?

Theages/ To govern men, I imagine.

Socrates/ Sick men, do you mean?

Theages/ Oh, no.

Socrates/ For that is medicine, is it not?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, that whereby we know how to govern the singers in a chorus?

Theages/ No.

Socrates/ For that is music?

Theages/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Well, that whereby we know how to govern men in gymnastic training?

Theages/ No.

Socrates/ For that is gymnastics?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, to govern people who do what? Endeavor your best to speak, as I have done for you in what preceded.

Theages/ To govern the people in the city, I imagine.

Socrates/ And are the sick people also in the city?

Theages/ Yes, but I mean not these only, but all the rest who are in the city besides.

Socrates/ Do I understand what art it is that you mean? For you strike me as meaning, not that whereby we know how to govern reapers and harvesters and planters and sower and threshers, for it is the farmers art whereby we govern these, is it not?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor, I suppose, do you mean that whereby we know how to govern sawyers and borers and planers and turners, as a class together; for is not that carpentry?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ But perhaps it is that whereby we govern, not only all these, but farmers themselves also, and carpenters, and all craftsmen and ordinary people, whether men or women: that, perhaps, is the wisdom you mean.

Theages/ That, Socrates, is what I have been intending to mean all the time.

Socrates/ Then can you tell me whether Aegisthus, who slew Agamemnon in Argos, governed all these people that you mean—craftsmen and ordinary people, both men and women, or some other persons?

Theages/ No, just those.

Socrates/ Well now, did not Peleus, son of Aeacus, govern these same people in Phthia?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And have you ever heard of Periander, son of Cypselus, and how he governed at Corinth?

Theages/ I have.

Socrates/ Did he not govern these same people in his city?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Or again, do you not consider that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, who governed recently in Macedonia, governed these same people?

Theages/ I do.

Socrates/ And who do you think were governed by Hippias, son of Peisistratus, who governed in this city? Were they not these people?

Theages/ To be sure they were.

Socrates/ Now, can you tell me what appellation is given to Bacis and Sibyl and our native Amphilytus?

Theages/ Why, soothsayers, of course, Socrates.

Socrates/ That is correct. But try to answer me in that way regarding those others—Hippias and Periander: what appellation is given them on account of their government?

Theages/ Despots, I suppose; it must be that.

Socrates/ And when a man desires to govern the whole of the people in his city, he desires the same government as those did—despotism, and to be a despot?

Theages/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And it is this that you say you desire?

Theages/ It seems so, from what I have said.

Socrates/ You scoundrel! So you were desiring to be a despot over us, all the time that you were blaming your father for not sending you to some seminary of despots! And

you, Demodocus, are you not ashamed of having known all the time what he is desiring, and though you could have sent him where you would have made him an expert in the wisdom which he desires, actually grudging it to him and refusing to send him? But now, look here, as he has declared against you in my presence, shall you and I consult together on the question of whose school we shall send him to, and whose classes will help him to become a wise despot?

Demodocus/ Yes, in faith, Socrates, let us certainly consult, as I feel this is a matter on which no slight counsel is needed.

Socrates/ By and by, my good sir. Let us first cross-examine him thoroughly.

Demodocus/ Examine him then.

Socrates/ Well now, what if we called in Euripides to our aid, Theages? For you know Euripides says:

Despots are wise by converse with the wise.

Now, if someone should ask Euripides: Euripides, in what are these men wise, by whose converse you say that despots are wise? I mean, suppose he had said:

Farmers are wise by converse with the wise.

and we had asked him, —Wise in what? —what answer would he have given us? Surely none other than, —In farming.

Theages/ That, and none other.

Socrates/ Or again, if he had said:

Piemen are wise by converse with the wise.

and we had asked him, —Wise in what? —what answer would he have given us? He would have said, —In the pie-making business, —would he not?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Or again, if he had said:

Wrestlers are wise by converse with the wise.

and we had asked him, —Wise in what? —would he not reply, —In wrestling?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ But as he said:

Despots are wise by converse with the wise.

and we ask him, —In what do you mean that the latter are wise, Euripides? —what will he reply? What sort of subjects will he mention here?

Theages/ Why, upon my word, I for my part do not know.

Socrates/ Well, do you mind if I tell you?

Theages/ If you do not mind.

Socrates/ They are the same subjects that Anacreon said Callicrite understood; or do you not know the ode?

Theages/ I do.

Socrates/ Well then, do you desire to partake in some instruction of that sort from any man who is a fellow-craftsman of Callicrite, daughter of Cyane, and knows all about despotism as she did, according to the poet, in order that you may become a despot over us and our city?

Theages/ You are joking all this time, Socrates, and making fun of me.

Socrates/ Why, do you not say that you desire that wisdom which will enable you to govern all the citizens? And in doing that, will you be anything else but a despot?

Theages/ I should indeed pray, I imagine, that I might become a despot, if possible, over all men, and failing that, over as many as might be; so would you, I imagine, and everybody else besides: nay, even more, I daresay, that I might become a god; but I did not say I desired that.

Socrates/ Well, what on earth then is it that you do desire? Do you not say you desire to govern the citizens?

Theages/ Yes, but not by force, or as despots do, but with their consent, as is done by all the other men of importance in the state.

Socrates/ Do you mean, as by Themistocles and Pericles and Cimon, and by all those who have shown themselves able statesmen?

Theages/ Yes, in good earnest, I mean those people.

Socrates/ Then what if you chanced to desire to become wise in horsemanship? To whom would you have had to resort before expecting to be a clever horseman? To whom else but the horse-masters?

Theages/ To none else, I am sure.

Socrates/ And moreover, you would go to the actual men who are clever at the business, and who have horses and constantly use them in great numbers, both their own and other people's?

Theages/ Obviously I should.

Socrates/ And what if you wished to become wise in javelin-throwing? Would you not expect to get this wisdom by having resorted to those javelin-masters who have javelins and who constantly use javelins, both other people's and their own, in great numbers?

Theages/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then pray tell me, since it is your wish to become wise in state-matters, do you expect to get your wisdom by resorting to any other persons than those statesmen, who not only have their own ability in state-matters, but have constant dealings with other cities besides their own, by their intercourse alike with Greek cities and with foreign peoples? Or do you think to get wisdom in their business by resorting to any other persons than these particular men?

Theages/ Well, Socrates, I have heard of the argument that you are said to put forward—that the sons of those statesmen are no better men than the sons of shoemakers; and in my opinion your words are very true, from what I am able to gather. Hence I should be an utter fool if I supposed that any of these men would impart his wisdom to me when he never was of any use to his own son, as he would have been, if he were able to be of use in this matter to anyone at all in the world.

Socrates/ Then which way, most excellent sir, would you turn if, when you came to have a son, he should trouble you in the same manner, and tell you he desired to become a good painter, and should blame you, his father, for refusing to spend money on him for that very purpose, but at the same time should disregard the practitioners of that very thing, the painters, and decline to learn from them? Or the flute-players, when he wished to become a flute-player, or the harp-players? Would you know what to do with him, and where else you should send him if he refused to learn from these?

Theages/ Upon my word, I should not.

Socrates/ And do you now, when you are behaving in just the same way to your father, feel surprised and blame him for being at a loss what to do with you and where to send you? Why, we are ready to place you with any well-bred Athenian statesman you may choose, who will train you free of charge; and so not only will you be at no expense of money, but will gain far greater commendation amongst the mass of men than if you studied with anyone else.

Theages/ But then, Socrates, are not you too one of our well-bred gentlemen? Indeed, if you will agree to instruct me, I am content and seek no other.

Socrates/ What do you mean by that, Theages?

Demodocus/ Nay, Socrates, there is nothing amiss in what he says, and you will oblige me at the same time; for I should count it the greatest possible stroke of luck if he should welcome your instruction and you also should consent to instruct him. Nay, indeed, I am quite ashamed to say how keenly I wish it; but I entreat you both—you, to consent to teach Theages, and you, to seek the teaching of no one else than Socrates; you will thus relieve me of a harassing load of anxiety. For just now I am sorely afraid of his falling in with some other person who is likely to corrupt him.

Theages/ Have no more fears for me now, father, so long as you are able to persuade him to receive me as his pupil.

Demodocus/ Very rightly spoken. Socrates, from now onward we must address ourselves to you; for I am ready, in short, to place both myself and all that I hold dearest of what is mine in your hands—whatever you may require, absolutely—if you will open your arms to Theages here, and do him any service that you can.

Socrates/ Demodocus, your zeal is no wonder to me, if you suppose that I especially could be of use to your boy; for I know of nothing for which a sensible man could be more zealous than for his own son's utmost improvement. But how you came to form this opinion, that I would be better able to be of use to your son in his aim of becoming a good citizen than you would yourself, and how he came to suppose that I rather than yourself would be of use to him—this does fill me with wonder. For you, in the first place, are my elder, and further, you have held in your time many of the highest offices in Athens, and are respected by the people of Anagyrus far above all your fellow-townsmen, and by the whole state as much as any man, whereas neither of you can notice anything like this about me. And moreover, if Theages here does despise the instruction of our statesmen, and is

looking for some other persons who profess to be able to educate young people, we have here Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus of Acragas, and many more, who are so wise that they go to our cities and persuade the noblest and wealthiest of our young men—who have the choice of learning from any citizen they choose, free of charge—they persuade them to abandon that instruction and learn from them, with a deposit, besides, of a large sum of money as their fee, and to feel thankful in addition. Some of these persons might naturally have been chosen both by your son and by yourself, in preference to me; for I have no knowledge of those fair and beatific subjects of study: I only wish that I had. But what I always say, you know, is that I am in the position of knowing practically nothing except one little subject, that of love-matters. In this subject, however, I claim to be skilled above anybody who has ever lived or is now living in the world.

Theages/ Do you see, father? Socrates does not seem to me to be at all willing now to spend his time on me; for there is readiness enough on my part, if he is willing. But he is only jesting in what he has just told us. For I know of some of my equals in age, and some a little older, who were of no account before they learnt from him, but after beginning to learn from him have in a very short time proved themselves superior to all whose inferiors they were before.

Socrates/ And do you know what the meaning of it is, son of Demodocus?

Theages/ Yes, on my soul, I do—that, if it be your pleasure, I too shall be able to become such as those others are.

Socrates/ No, good sir, the meaning of it escapes you; but I will tell it you. There is something spiritual which, by a divine dispensation, has accompanied me from my

childhood up. It is a voice that, when it occurs, always indicates to me a prohibition of something I may be about to do, but never urges me on to anything; and if one of my friends consults me and the voice occurs, the same thing happens: it prohibits, and does not allow him to act. And I will produce witnesses to convince you of these facts. You know our Charmides here, who has grown so handsome, the son of Glaucon: he once happened to be consulting me on his intention of training for the Nemean races, and he had no sooner begun to say that he intended to train than the voice occurred, and I tried to prevent him, saying—"Just as you were speaking my spirit-voice has occurred: no, you must not train." "Perhaps," said he, "it indicates to you that I shall not win; but even if I am not to win, at any rate the exercise I shall get in the meantime will do me good." So saying, he went and trained; and so you may as well inquire of him as to the results he got from his training. Or if you like, ask Cleitomachus, brother of Timarchus, what Timarchus said to him when he was going straight to the prison to meet his death, he and Euathlus the racing runner, who had harbored Timarchus as a fugitive; for he will tell you that the words he spoke to him were these:

Theages/ What?

Socrates/ "Cleitomachus," he said, "I tell you I am going to my death now, because I would not take Socrates' advice." Now, why on earth did Timarchus say that? I will tell you. When Timarchus and Philemon, son of Philemonides, got up from the wine-party to kill Nicias, son of Heroscamandrus, those two alone had knowledge of the plot; and Timarchus, as he got up, said to me: "What say you, Socrates? Go on drinking, all of you; I have to get up and go somewhere, but I will join you a little later, if I get the chance." Then occurred that voice of mine, and I said to him: No, no, do not get up; for my accustomed spiritual sign has occurred to me." So he

stopped. Then after an interval of time he again started to go, and said: “Well, I am going, Socrates.” Again the voice occurred, and so again I constrained him to stop. The third time, wishing to give me the slip, he got up without saying another word to me; he gave me the slip by watching until my attention was turned elsewhere. Thus it was that he went right off and committed the deed which was the cause of his going then to his death. And hence it was that he spoke those words to his brother which I quoted to you just now, that he was going to his death because he had not taken my advice. And moreover, in regard to the Sicilian business, many will tell you what I said about the destruction of the army. As to bygones, you may hear from those who know: but there is an opportunity now of testing the worth of what the sign says. For as the handsome Sannio was setting out on campaign, the sign occurred to me, and he has gone now with Thrasyllus on an expedition bound for Ephesus and Ionia. I accordingly expect him to be either killed or brought very near it, and I have great fears for our force as a whole.

Now I have told you all this, because this spiritual power that attends me also exerts itself to the full in my intercourse with those who spend their time with me. To many, indeed, it is adverse, and it is not possible for these to get any good by conversing with me, and I am therefore unable to spend my time in conversing with them. And there are many with whom it does not prohibit my intercourse, yet the intercourse does them no good. But those who are assisted in their intercourse by that spiritual power are the persons whom you have noticed; for they make rapid progress there and then. And of these, again, who make progress some find the benefit both solid and enduring; while there are many who, for as long a time as they are with me, make wonderful progress, but when they are parted from me relapse, and are no different from anybody else. This once befell Aristeides,

son of Lysimachus, son of Aristeides. For by conversing with me he had made immense progress in a little time; and then he had to go on an expedition, and he went and sailed away. On his return he found that Thucydides, son of Melesias, son of Thucydides, had been conversing with me. Now Thucydides, the day before, had quarreled with me over some arguments we had had. So when Aristeides saw me, after greeting me and talking of other affairs, he said: “But Thucydides, I hear, Socrates, is somewhat on his dignity with you, and is annoyed as though he were somebody. “Yes, that is so,” I replied. “Well, but does he not know,” he said, “what a sad slave he was, before he associated with you?” “It seems not,” I replied, “upon my soul.” “But indeed I myself also,” he said, “am in a ridiculous position, Socrates.” “How exactly?” I asked. “Because,” he replied, “before I sailed away, I was able to discuss things with anybody, and show myself inferior to none in argument, so that I even sought out the debates of the most accomplished people: but now, on the contrary, I shun them, wherever I notice there is anyone of education, so ashamed I am of my own ineptitude.” “Tell me,” I said, “did this power forsake you of a sudden, or little by little?” “Little by little,” he replied. “And when it was present with you,” I asked, “was it present through your having learnt something from me, or in some other way?” “I will tell you, Socrates,” he said, “what is incredible, upon my soul, yet true. For I never yet learnt anything from you, as you know yourself: but I made progress, whenever I was with you, if I was merely in the same house, without being in the same room, but more progress, when I was in the same room. And it seemed to me to be much more when I was in the same room and looked at you as you were speaking, than when I turned my eyes elsewhere: but my progress was far the greatest and most marked whenever I sat beside you and held and touched

you. Now, however," he said, "that condition has all oozed away."

Such then, The ages, is the intercourse you would have with me: if God so wills, you will make very great and rapid progress, but otherwise, you will not. Consider, therefore, if it is not safer for you to be educated by one of those persons who have command themselves of the benefit which they bestow on mankind, rather than follow the course on which you may chance with me.

Theages/ Well then, I decide, Socrates, that our plan shall be to make trial of that spiritual sign by associating with each other. Thus, if it leaves us free, that will be best of all; if it does not, it will be time then for us to consider, at the moment, what we shall do—whether we shall associate with someone else, or try to conciliate the divine sign itself that occurs to you with prayers and sacrifices and anything else that the seers may indicate.

Demodocus/ In view of this, Socrates, say no more in opposition to the lad; for Theages is right in what he says.

Socrates/ Well, if you consider that this is what we ought to do, let us do it.

Theages

Translated by Nicholas D. Smith.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Demodocus, Theages

Demodocus/ Oh, Socrates, I've been needing to have a talk with you in private, if you've got the time—even if you are busy—still, please make some time, for my sake.

Socrates/ Well, it so happens that I do have some time, lots of time, in fact, if it's for your sake. If there's something you want to talk about, go ahead.

Demodocus/ Do you mind if we move back out of the way into the portico of Zeus the Liberator?

Socrates/ If you like.

Demodocus/ Then let's go.

Socrates, all living things tend to follow the same course—particularly man, but also the other animals and the plants that grow in the earth. It's an easy thing, for us farmers, to prepare the ground for planting, and the planting is easy, too. But after the plants come up, there's a great deal of hard and difficult work in tending to them. It seems the same goes for people, if others have the same problems I've had. I found the planting, or procreation—whatever you're supposed to call it—of this son of mine the easiest thing in the world. But his upbringing has been difficult, and I've always been anxious about him.

There are many things I could mention, but his current passion really scares me—not that it's beneath him, but it is dangerous. Here we have him, Socrates, saying that he wants to become wise. What I think is that some other boys from his district who go into town have got him all worked up by telling him about certain discussions they've heard. He envies them

and he's been pestering me for a long time—he's demanding that I take his ambition seriously, and pay money to some expert who'll make him wise. The money is actually the least of my concerns, but I think what he's up to is very risky.

For a while I held him back with reassurances. But since I can't hold him back any longer, I think I'd better give in to him, so that he won't get corrupted, as he might by associating with someone behind my back. This is why I've come to town, to place this boy with one of those so-called experts. And then you appeared before us at just the right moment, and I'd be very glad to have your advice about what to do next. If you've got any advice to give based on what I've said, you're welcome to give it, please.

Socrates/ Well, you know, Demodocus, they say that advice is a sacred thing, and if it's ever sacred, then it surely is in this case. There's nothing more divine for a man to take advice about than the education of himself and his family.

First, then, let's settle exactly what it is that you and I intend to discuss. I might perhaps be taking it to be one thing, and you another, and then, after we'd discussed it a while, we'd both feel silly because I, the one giving advice, and you, the one taking advice, would be thinking about entirely different matters.

Demodocus/ I think you're right, Socrates—that's the way it should be done.

Socrates/ I am right, but not completely—I have one little change to make. It occurs to me that this youngster may not really want what we think he wants, but something else. In that case our thinking would be even more absurd and irrelevant. So it seems best for us to start with the boy himself, and ask what exactly it is that he wants.

Demodocus/ Well, it does seem that it would be best to do as you say.

Socrates/ Then tell me, what's the fine name of the young man? How should we address him?

Demodocus/ Theages is his name, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is a fine name you've given your son, Demodocus, and godly. Tell us, then, Theages, do you say you want to become wise; are you demanding that your father here arrange to have you associate with some man who'll make you wise?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whom do you call wise—those who know (whatever they know about), or those who don't?

Theages/ Those who know.

Socrates/ Well, didn't your father have you taught and trained in what others of your age—the sons of gentlemen—are taught, such as reading and writing, and playing the lyre, and wrestling, and other sports?

Theages/ Yes, he did.

Socrates/ Yet you think that you're lacking some knowledge, which it's appropriate for your father to provide you?

Theages/ I do.

Socrates/ What is it? Tell us, so we can oblige you.

Theages/ He knows it, Socrates, because I've often told him. But in front of you he talks as if he didn't know what I want. In fact, he argues with me about these things, and other things, too, and refuses to place me with anyone.

Socrates/ But what you said before was said without witnesses, as it were. Now make me your witness, and state in my presence what this wisdom is that you want. Come on; if you desired that wisdom by which people steer ships, and I asked you: "Theages, what wisdom do you lack? Why do you criticize your father for refusing to place you with someone

who could make you wise?" What would you answer me? What is it? Isn't it the helmsman's skill?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if you criticized your father because you "desired the wisdom by which people steer chariots, and again I asked what this wisdom is, what would you say it is? Isn't it the charioteer's skill?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the object of your current desire; is it some nameless thing, or does it have a name?

Theages/ I think it has.

Socrates/ Then do you know it, but not the name, or do you know the name, as well?

Theages/ I know the name, too.

Socrates/ So what is it? Tell me!

Theages/ What other name, Socrates, would anyone give it but wisdom?

Socrates/ But isn't the charioteer's skill also a kind of wisdom? Or do you think it's ignorance?

Theages/ I don't.

Socrates/ So it's wisdom.

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ What do we use it for? Isn't it what we use in knowing how to direct a team of horses?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Isn't the helmsman's skill also a kind of wisdom?

Theages/ I think it is.

Socrates/ And isn't that the skill we use in knowing how to direct ships?

Theages/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ And the one that you desire, what sort of wisdom is that? What would it give us the knowledge to direct?

Theages/ People, I think.

Socrates/ Sick people?

Theages/ Of course not!

Socrates/ That would be medicine, wouldn't it?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well is it what we use in knowing how to direct the singers in choruses?

Theages/ No.

Socrates/ That would be music?

Theages/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Well is it what we use in knowing how to direct athletes?

Theages/ No.

Socrates/ Because that's physical education?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, to direct those who are doing what? Try your best to tell me, following the examples I've just given.

Theages/ Those in the city, that's what I think.

Socrates/ But aren't the sick people in the city, too?

Theages/ Yes, but I don't mean just those people, but also everyone else in the city, too.

Socrates/ Let's see if I understand the skill you're talking about. I don't think you're talking about the skill by which we know how to direct harvesters and pickers and planters and seeders and threshers, for it's the farmer's skill by which we direct these isn't it?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor, I suppose, do you mean the skill by which we know how to direct sawyers and drillers and planers and turners, and so on, because that would be carpentry.

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Perhaps it's the skill by which we know how to direct or rule over all of these—the farmers and the carpenters, and all the workers and ordinary people, both women and men. Is this, perhaps, the sort of wisdom you mean?

Theages/ That's what I've been trying to say all along, Socrates.

Socrates/ So, can you say whether Aegisthus, who killed Agamemnon in Argos, ruled over those you mean—the workers and the ordinary people, both men and women, all together, or over other people?

Theages/ No; just those.

Socrates/ Really? Didn't Peleus (son of Aeacus) rule over the same sorts of people in Phthia?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And have you heard about how Periander (son of Cypselus) ruled in Corinth?

Theages/ I have.

Socrates/ Weren't these the people he ruled over in his city?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, then. Don't you think that Archelaus (son of Perdiccas), who recently ruled in Macedonia, ruled over the same sorts of people?

Theages/ I do.

Socrates/ And whom do you suppose did Hippias (son of Pisistratus) rule over when he ruled this city? Weren't they the same sort of people?

Theages/ Of course.

Socrates/ Tell me next, then, what name do Bakis, and Sibyl, and our own Amphilytus have?

Theages/ "Oracle-givers," Socrates. What else?

Socrates/ Right. Now try to answer me in the same way about these: what name do Hippias and Periander have, considering their style of ruling?

Theages/ "Tyrants," I suppose. What else could we call them?

Socrates/ When someone wants to rule over all the people in the city together, doesn't he want the same sort of rule as these people had—tyranny, and to be a tyrant?

Theages/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Isn't this what you claim to desire?

Theages/ It seems so, from what I said.

Socrates/ You rascal! So you want to be a tyrant over us, and that's why you criticized your father all along for refusing to send you to some tyrant-teacher! And you, Demodocus, aren't you ashamed for having known all along what he wants, and though you knew where you could have sent him to make him skilled in the wisdom he wants, you begrudge it to him and refuse to send him! But look here; now that he has accused you right in front of me, don't you think you and I had better discuss this together? To whom should we send him? Whose company will make him a wise tyrant?

Demodocus/ Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, let's do it. It seems to me that this issue requires careful consideration.

Socrates/ Not now, my good man; let's first finish our examination of him.

Demodocus/ Let's do that.

Socrates/ Well now, what if we were to bring in Euripides, Theages? For Euripides somewhere says, "Wise company

makes wise tyrants." So if someone were to ask Euripides, "Euripides, in what are these men wise, whose company, you say, makes tyrants wise? For example, if he said, "Wise company makes wise farmers," and we asked: "Wise in what?," what would his answer be? Wouldn't it be: "in what's pertinent to farming"?

Theages/ Right.

Socrates/ And what if he said, "Wise company makes wise cooks?" If we asked "wise in what?," what would his answer be? Wouldn't it be: "in what's pertinent to cooking"?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what if "Wise company makes wise wrestlers" were what he said? If we asked "Wise in what?" wouldn't he say, "in wrestling"?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ But since he said: "Wise company makes wise tyrants," we are asking, "What do you mean, Euripides, those who are wise in what?" What would he reply? What would he say it was this time?

Theages/ Well, by Zeus, I don't know!

Socrates/ Well, do you want me to tell you?

Theages/ If you want to.

Socrates/ These are the kinds of things that Anacreon said that Callicrite knew. Or don't you know the song?

Theages/ I do.

Socrates/ Well, now, do you, too, desire to get together with some man who has the same skill as Callicrite (daughter of Cyane), and knows what is pertinent to tyranny, as the poet said, so that you, too, may become a tyrant over us and the city?

Theages/ All along, Socrates, you've been joking and playing games with me.

Socrates/ Really? Don’t you claim to desire that wisdom by which you might rule over all the citizens? If you did this, would you be anything other than a tyrant?

Theages/ I would pray, no doubt, to become a tyrant, over all people if possible, but if not, over as many as possible. And so would you, I think, and everyone else. Or perhaps even to become a god. But that’s not what I said I wanted.

Socrates/ Well, what is it you want, then? Didn’t you claim to want to rule over the citizens?

Theages/ But not by violence, the way tyrants do. I want to rule over those who voluntarily submit. This is the way other people—men of good repute in the city—rule over people.

Socrates/ So you mean you want to rule over people in the way Themistocles and Pericles and Cimon did, and whoever else was an outstanding politician.

Theages/ Yes, by Zeus, that’s what I mean!

Socrates/ Well, then, what if you wanted to become wise in horsemanship? To whom do you suppose you'd have to go, in order to become an outstanding horseman? To the horsemen, right?

Theages/ Right, by Zeus!

Socrates/ Moreover, you'd go to those who are themselves outstanding at these things, and who have horses and work with them all the time, both their own horses and many other people’s, too?

Theages/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And what if you wanted to become wise in javelin-throwing? Don’t you suppose that you'd become wise by going to the javelin-throwers, who have javelins, and work with them all the time, many of them, both others’ and their own?

Theages/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then tell me: since you want to become wise in politics, do you suppose that you'll become wise by going to anyone else than the politicians, the ones who are outstanding at politics, and work with their own city all the time, and many others, conducting business with both Greek and foreign cities? Or do you believe you'll become wise in what these men do by associating with other people and not with the politicians themselves?

Theages/ I've heard, Socrates, about the arguments they say you offer, that the sons of the politicians are no better than the sons of the shoemakers. And I believe that what you say is really true, from what I've been able to see. So I'd be foolish if I thought that one of these men would give his wisdom to me, but wouldn't be of any help to his own son, if indeed he could have been helpful to anyone else at all in these matters.

Socrates/ Well, then, my dear sir, how would you deal with it, if, when you came to have a son, he pestered you like this, and said that he wanted to become a good painter, and criticized you, his father, for refusing to spend money on him for this, and yet he didn't respect those who practiced this very thing, the painters, and refused to learn from them? Or the flute-players, if he wanted to become a flute-player, or the lyre-players? Would you know what to do with him and where else to send him, if he refused to learn from them?

Theages/ By Zeus, I wouldn't.

Socrates/ So now, when you yourself are acting like this with your father, how can you be surprised and criticize him if he's at a loss as to what to do with you and where to send you? And yet we'll place you with any of the gentlemen in politics you want, of the Athenians at least, who'll associate with you without charge. You won't waste any money, and

you'll also gain a much better reputation among the general public than if you associate with someone else.

Theages/ Well, then, Socrates—aren't you one of these gentlemen? If you'll agree to associate with me, that satisfies me, and I won't look for anyone else.

Socrates/ What do you mean by that, Theages?

Demodocus/ Oh, Socrates, that's not a bad idea at all! And you would oblige me as well; for there's nothing I'd consider a greater stroke of luck than if he were content to associate with you and you agreed to associate with him. Indeed, I'm even ashamed to say how much I want it! I beg you both: you—to agree to associate with this boy, and you—not to seek to associate with anyone other than Socrates. You'll thereby relieve me of a great load of worry. As it is now, I'm very afraid that he might fall in with some other person who'll corrupt him.

Theages/ Don't worry any more about me now, father, if you're able to persuade him to accept me!

Demodocus/ Excellent! Socrates, what I have to say from here on is now your business: to be brief, I'm prepared to make available to you both myself and what I own, as freely as I can, pretty well whatever you might need—if you'll welcome Theages here and be of whatever service you can.

Socrates/ Demodocus, I'm not surprised at your seriousness, if you think that I could really help this boy of yours—for I don't know what a sensible person should be more serious about than that his own son become the best he can be. But I do wonder where you got the idea that I would be better able than you yourself to help your son become a good citizen—and how he imagined that I'd help him more than you could. In the first place, you're older than I am, and moreover you've served in many of the highest offices for the Athenians, and are held in the highest esteem by those of the

Anagyrus district, as well as by the rest of the city. You don't see this in my case.

Moreover, if Theages here refuses to associate with the politicians and seeks some other men, who claim to be able to educate young people, there are a number of such men here: Prodicus of Ceos, and Gorgias of Leontini, and Polus of Acragas, and many others, who are so wise that they go from city to city and persuade the most aristocratic and wealthiest of the young men—who can associate with any of the citizens they want without charge—these men persuade them to desert the others and associate only with them instead, to pay a great deal of money up front, and, on top of that, to be grateful! It would be reasonable for your son and you to choose one of these men, but it wouldn't be reasonable to choose me. I know none of these magnificent and splendid subjects. I wish I did! I am always saying, indeed, that I know virtually nothing, except a certain small subject—love, although on this subject, I'm thought to be amazing, better than anyone else, past or present.

Theages/ You see, father? I really don't think that Socrates is actually willing to associate with me, and yet I'd be prepared to if he were willing. But he's only playing games with us. I know some people my age, and some a little older, who were nothing before they associated with him, but after associating even for a very short time with him became obviously better than all of those they had been worse than before.

Socrates/ Do you know how that's possible, son of Demodocus?

Theages/ Yes, by Zeus, I do: if you agree, I will become like them, too.

Socrates/ No, sir; you don't understand. I'll have to explain it to you. There's a certain spiritual thing which, by divine dispensation, has been with me from childhood. It's a voice

that, when it comes, always signals me to turn away from what I'm about to do, but never prescribes anything.

And if someone of my friends consults with me and the voice comes, it's the same: it prohibits him and won't allow him to act.

I have witnesses for this: Surely you know Charmides (son of Glaucon) who's become so good-looking. He once happened to be consulting with me when he was just about to train for the race at Nemea. As soon as he began to tell me that he was going to train, the voice came and I tried to stop him and said, "As you were speaking, the voice of the spiritual thing came to me. Don't train!"

"Maybe," he said, "its significance is that I won't win; but even if I'm not going to win, I'll benefit from the exercise I'll get." Saying this, he trained; it would be worthwhile to ask him what happened to him as a result of his training.

Or if you want, ask Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus, what Timarchus said to him when he was on his way to his death together with Euathlus the runner, who harbored Timarchus as a fugitive. This is what Timarchus said, according to him …

Theages/ What?

Socrates/ "Clitomachus," he said, "I'm going off to die now, because I refused to trust Socrates."

You might wonder why Timarchus would say that. I'll explain. When Timarchus and Philemon (son of Philemonides) got up to leave the banquet, they were planning to kill Nicias (son of Heroscamandrus). Only those two knew the plot.

But Timarchus, as he got up to leave, said to me, "What do you say, Socrates? You guys go on drinking, but I have to get up and go somewhere. I'll be back a little later, perhaps."

And then the voice came to me and I said to him, “No! Don’t get up! For my familiar spiritual sign has come to me.” And he stayed.

But after a while he again started to go and said, “Well, I’m going, Socrates.”

Again the voice came, and so again I compelled him to stay. The third time, wanting me not to notice, he got up without saying anything more to me, watching until I had my attention elsewhere. Thus it was that he went off and did what led him to his death. And this is why he spoke to his brother in the way I just told you—he was going to his death because he hadn’t trusted me.

Moreover, many people can tell you what I said about the destruction of the army in Sicily. You can hear about past events from those who know the details, but it’s still possible to test the sign, to see if it means anything. For when the good-looking Sannio went out on campaign, the sign came to me; and he’s now with Thrasyllus on an expedition to Ephesus and the rest of Ionia. So I suppose he’ll either die or else come close to it, and I’m really afraid about the rest of that business.

I’ve told you all these things because this spiritual thing has absolute power in my dealings with those who associate with me. On the one hand, it opposes many, and it’s impossible for them to be helped by associating with me, so I can’t associate with them. On the other hand, it does not prevent my associating with many others, but it is of no help to them. Those whose association with me the power of the spiritual thing assists, however—these are the ones you’ve noticed, for they make rapid progress right away. And of these, again, who make progress, some are helped in a secure and permanent way, whereas many make wonderful progress as long as they’re with me, but when they go away from me they’re again no different from anyone else.

This is what happened to Aristides (son of Lysimachus, grandson of Aristides). While he was associating with me he made tremendous progress in a short time; but then there was some military expedition and he sailed away. On his return he learned that Thucydides (son of Melesias, grandson of Thucydides) was associating with me. Thucydides had quarreled with me the day before about some arguments that had come up.

When Aristides saw me, after greeting me and talking of other things, he said, "I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides is rather indignant and irritated with you, as if he were someone important."

"Yes, that's right," I said.

"Doesn't he know," he said, "what a slave he was before he began associating with you?"

"Apparently not, by the gods," I said.

"You know, Socrates, he said, "I am also in a ridiculous situation!"

"Why?" I said.

"Because," he said, "before I sailed away, I was able to discuss things with anyone, and never came off worse than anyone in arguments; I even tried to associate with the cleverest people. But now, on the contrary, whenever I even see anybody with any education, I avoid them. That's how ashamed I am of my incompetence."

"Did you lose your ability all of a sudden," I asked, "or little by little?"

"Little by little," he said.

"And when you had your ability," I said, "Did you have it by learning something from me, or some other way?"

"By the gods, Socrates, you're not going to believe this, but it's true! I've never learned anything from you, as you know.

But I made progress whenever I was with you, even if I was only in the same house and not in the same room—but more when I was in the same room. And it seemed, to me at least, that when I was in the same room and looked at you when you were speaking, I made much more progress than when I looked away. And I made by far the most and greatest progress when I sat right beside you, and physically held on to you or touched you. But now," he said, "all that condition has trickled away."

So this is how it is when you associate with me, Theages. If it's favored by the god, you'll make great and rapid progress; if not, you won't. So think about it; wouldn't it be safer for you to become educated in the company of somebody who has control over the way he benefits people rather than taking your chances with me?

Theages/ It seems to me, Socrates, that we should do this: let's test this spiritual thing by associating with one another. If it allows us, then that's what's best; if not, then we'll immediately think about what we should do—whether to go and associate with someone else, or try to appease the divine thing that comes to you with prayers and sacrifices and any other way the diviners might suggest.

Demodocus/ Don't oppose the boy any more in these things, Socrates; for Theages is right.

Socrates/ Well, if it seems that this is what we ought to do, then let's do it.

The Theages.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

Demodocus, Socrates, Theages.

Demodocus/ I WANT, Socrates, to speak with you in private about certain things, if you are at leisure; and if you are not, unless your business is of great importance, make leisure for my sake.

Socrates/ But I am indeed at leisure, and very much at your service. You have my permission therefore to speak, if you wish to say anything.

Demodocus/ Are you willing therefore that we should retire from this place into the porch of Zeus Eleutherius, which is very near?

Socrates/ If you please.

Demodocus/ Let us go then, Socrates. All plants, whatever is produced from the earth, other animals, and man, appear to subsist after the same manner. For in plants this thing is easy to such of us as cultivate the earth, viz. to prepare everything prior to planting, and the planting itself; but when that which is planted lives, then the attention which the plant requires is great and very difficult. The same thing also appears to take place respecting men. For I form a conjecture of other things from my own affairs. For of this my son, the planting, or the procreating, or whatever else it may be requisite to call it, is the easiest of all things; but his education is difficult, and occasions one to be in continual fear about him. With respect to other things, therefore, much might be said; but the desire which he now possesses very much terrifies me. It is not indeed ignoble, but it is dangerous. For he desires, Socrates, as he says, to become

a wise man. And as it appears to me, certain plebeians of the same age with him, coming to this city, and repeating certain discourses which they have heard, have very much disturbed him. Of these he is emulous, and some time ago was troublesome to me, thinking it fit that I should pay attention to him, and give a sum of money to some one of the sophists, who might make him a wise man. I am not indeed much concerned about the expense; but I think that the object of his pursuit will lead him into no small danger. Hitherto, therefore, I have restrained by soothing him; but as I am no longer able to effect this, I have thought it best to comply with his wishes, lest by frequently associating with others without me he should be corrupted. Hence I am come for this very purpose, that I may place him with some one of those who appear to be sophists. Our meeting with you, therefore, is a fortunate circumstance: for as I am going to engage in affairs of this kind, I wish very much to consult you about them. If then you have any advice to give respecting what you have heard from me, it is both lawful and proper for you to give it.

Socrates/ Counsel, however, O Demodocus, is said to be a sacred thing. If therefore any other thing whatever is sacred, this will be so which is now the object of your consultation: For it is not possible for man to consult about anything more divine than about the erudition of himself and of those that belong to him. In the first place, therefore, you and I should mutually agree, what we think this thing to be about which we consult; lest I should frequently apprehend it to be one thing, and you another, and afterwards very much dissenting from each other in our conference, we should perceive ourselves to be ridiculous: I who give, and you who request, advice not agreeing in anyone thing.

Demodocus/ You appear to me, Socrates, to speak rightly, and it is proper so to do.

Socrates/ I do say right, and yet not entirely, since I make an alteration in a certain trifling particular: for I am thinking that perhaps this youth may not desire that which we think he desires, but something else. And if something else is the object of his wishes, we shall act absurdly in consulting about that which is different from them. It appears therefore to me to be most right to begin by inquiring of him what it is which he desires.

Demodocus/ It appears indeed, as you say, to be best to do so.

Socrates/ But tell me what the name is of this fine youth: what must we call him?

Demodocus/ His name, Socrates, is Theages.

Socrates/ You have given to your son, O Demodocus, a beautiful and sacred name. But tell us, O Theages, do you say that you desire to become a wise man, and do you think it is fit that this your father should find out a man, who by associating with you may make you wise.

Theages/ I do.

Socrates/ But whether do you call those men wise, who are scientifically knowing, whatever that may be about which they possess this knowledge; or do you call those wise who do not possess scientific knowledge?

Theages/ I call the scientific wise.

Socrates/ What then? Has not your father taught and instructed you in those things, in which others here are instructed who are the sons of respectable fathers; viz. letters, to play on the harp, to wrestle, and other exercises?

Theages/ He has.

Socrates/ Do you think, then, that there is still a certain science wanting, which it is proper your father should pay attention to for your sake?

Theages/ I do.

Socrates/ What is it? Tell us also, that we may gratify you.

Theages/ My father also knows what it is, Socrates: for I have often mentioned it to him. But he designedly says these things to you, as if he did not know what I desire: for in other things also he similarly opposes me, and is not willing to place me with anyone.

Socrates/ But all that you have hitherto said to him has been said without witnesses: now therefore make me a witness, and before me say what the wisdom is which you desire: for come now, if you should desire that wisdom by which men steer ships, and I should ask you, O Theages, what is the wisdom, of which being in want, you blame your father as unwilling to place you with a man through whom you might become wise? what answer would you give me? What would you say this wisdom is? Is it not that of piloting?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if you desired to be wise according to that wisdom by which they drive chariots, and afterwards blamed your father, on my asking you what this wisdom is, what answer would you give me? Would you not say it is the charioteering art?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ But with respect to the wisdom which you now desire, whether is it without a name, or has it a name?

Theages/ I think it has a name.

Socrates/ Whether therefore do you know the thing itself, but not its name? Or do you also know its name?

Theages/ I also know its name.

Socrates/ Say, therefore, what it is.

Theages/ What other name, Socrates, can anyone say it has than that of wisdom?

Socrates/ Is not then the charioteering art also wisdom? Or does it appear to you to be ignorance?

Theages/ It does not.

Socrates/ But wisdom?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ What is the use of it? Is it not that we may know how to manage horses when yoked to a chariot?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is not therefore the piloting art also wisdom?

Theages/ To me it appears to be so.

Socrates/ Is it not that by which we know how to manage ships?

Theages/ It is.

Socrates/ But what is the wisdom of which you are desirous? Or, what is that which, when we obtain it, we shall know how to govern?

Theages/ To me it appears to be that by which we know how to govern men.

Socrates/ What, sick men?

Theages/ No.

Socrates/ For that wisdom is the medicinal art. Is it not?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it that, then, by which we know how to regulate singers in choirs?

Theages/ It is not.

Socrates/ For this is music.

Theages/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But is it that by which we know how to govern those that engage in gymnastic exercises?

Theages/ It is not.

Socrates/ For this is gymnastic.

Theages/ It is.

Socrates/ Is it the wisdom by which those who do something effect their purpose? Endeavor to tell me, in the same manner as I have told you above.

Theages/ It appears to me to be that wisdom by which we know how to govern those in a city.

Socrates/ Are there not, therefore, in a city also those that are sick?

Theages/ Yes: but I do not speak of these only, but also of others in the city.

Socrates/ I understand then the art of which you speak. For you appear to me not to say, that it is that art by which we know how to govern mowers, vine-dressers, ploughmen, sowers, and threshers; for that by which we know how to govern these is agriculture. Is it not?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor is it that by which we know how to govern those that handler the saw, the plane, and the lathe for this belongs to the carpenter's art. Does it not?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ But perhaps you speak of that wisdom by which we govern all these, viz. husbandmen, carpenters, all artificers, and private persons, both men and women.

Theages/ It is this wisdom, Socrates, of which I wished to speak some time ago.

Socrates/ Are you, therefore, disposed to say that Ægisthus, who slew Agamemnon in Argos, had dominion over these things of which you speak. viz. all artificers and

private persons, both men and women, or over certain other things?

Theages/ He only had dominion over such as these.

Socrates/ But what? Did not Peleus, the son of Aeacus, have dominion over these very things in Phthia?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ And have you not heard that Periander, the son of Cypselus, governed Corinth.

Theages/ I have.

Socrates/ And did he not rule over these very same things in his city?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ But what? Do you not think that Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who lately governed in Macedonia, had dominion over these very things?

Theages/ I do.

Socrates/ But over what things do you think Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, who rules in this city, has dominion? Is it not over these things?

Theages/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Can you tell me, then, what Bacis and the Sibyl, and our Amphilytus, are called?

Theages/ What else, Socrates, than diviners?

Socrates/ You speak rightly. Endeavor, therefore, also to tell me what name you give to Hippias and Periander through the same dominion?

Theages/ I think they are tyrants: for what else can they be called?

Socrates/ Whoever, therefore, desires to have dominion over all the men in the city, desires this very same dominion, the tyrannic, and to be a tyrant.

Theages/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Do you therefore say that you desire this dominion?

Theages/ It seems so from what I have said.

Socrates/ O you wicked one. Do you desire to tyrannize over us? And did you some time ago blame your father because he did not send you to some tyrannic preceptor? And are not you, O Demodocus, ashamed; who, having for some time known what your son desires, and having likewise the ability of sending him to be made that artist in wisdom which he aspires to be, have, notwithstanding, envied him this object of his wishes, and have not been willing to send him to obtain it? Now, however, since he accuses you before me, let us consult in common, you and I, whither we should send him; and through associating with whom he may become a wise tyrant.

Demodocus/ Let us indeed, by Zeus, Socrates, consult: For it appears to me that no despicable counsel is requisite about this affair.

Socrates/ Permit us first, O good man, to make inquiry of him sufficiently.

Demodocus/ Interrogate him.

Socrates/ What then, O Theages, if we should make use of Euripides? For he somewhere says.

Tyrants are wise that with the wise converse.

If, therefore, someone should ask Euripides, In what, O Euripides, do you say tyrants become wise by the conversation of the wise? just as if he had said;

Farmers are wise that with the wise converse:

and we should ask him, In what are they rendered wise? What answer would he give us? Would he reply that they are

rendered wise in anything else than in things pertaining to agriculture?

Theages/ He would not.

Socrates/ But what? If he had said.

Wise are the cooks that with the wise converse:

and we should ask him, In what they become wise? What do you think he would answer? Would it not be, that they become wise in things pertaining to cooking?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ Again, if he had said.

Wrestlers are wise that with the wise converse:

and we should ask him, In what they are rendered wise? Would he not say in things pertaining to wrestling?

Theages/ Yes.

Socrates/ But since he says.

Tyrants are wise that with the wise converse:

if we should ask him, In what do you say they become wise, O Euripides? What would be his answer?

Theages/ By Zeus, I do not know.

Socrates/ Are you willing, then, I should tell you?

Theages/ If you please.

Socrates/ These are the things which Anacreon, says Callicrete, knew. Or are you not acquainted with the verse?

Theages/ I am.

Socrates/ What then? Do you also desire to associate with a man of this kind, who possesses the same art with Callicrete the daughter of Cyane, and who knows tyrannic concerns, in the same manner as the poet says she did; and this, that you may become a tyrant to us and the city?

Theages/ You have for some time, Socrates, derided and jested with me.

Socrates/ But what? Do you not say that you desire this wisdom, by which you may have dominion over all the citizens? And doing this, will you be anything else than a tyrant?

Theages/ I think, indeed, that I should pray to become the tyrant of all men, or, if not of all, of the greater part; and I think that you, and all other men, would do the same. Or, perhaps, you would rather pray that you might become a god. But I did not say that *I* desired this.

Socrates/ But what then, after all, is this which you desire? Do you not say that you desire to govern the citizens?

Theages/ Not by violence, nor as tyrants do; but I desire to govern the willing, in the same manner as other excellent men in the city.

Socrates/ Do you speak of such men as Themistocles, and Pericles, and Cimon, and such as were skillful in political affairs?

Theages/ By Zeus, I speak of these.

Socrates/ What then, if you desired to become wise in equestrian affairs, would you obtain the object of your wish, by going to any other than those who are skilled in the management of horses?

Theages/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ But you would go to these very men who are skilled in these things, who possess horses, and who continually use both their own and many that are the property of others.

Theages/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what! If you desired to become wise in things pertaining to the throwing of darts, would you not go to those who are skilled in these affairs, and who continually

use many darts, both those belonging to others and their own?

Theages/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Tell me then, since you wish to become wise in political affairs, do you think you will become wise by going to any others than these politicians, who are skillful in political affairs, who continually use their own city, and many others, and who are conversant both with Grecian and Barbarian cities? Or do you think, that by associating with certain other persons you will become wise in those things in which they are wise, but not in these very things?

Theages/ I have heard assertions, which they say are yours; that the sons of these political men are in no respect better than the sons of shoe-makers; and you appear to me to have spoken most truly, from what I am able to perceive. I should be stupid, therefore, if I should think that anyone of these could impart to me his wisdom, when he cannot in any respect benefit his own son; or if I should suppose that he could in these things benefit any other man.

Socrates/ What then would you do, O best of men, if you had a son who caused you molestation of this kind; and who should say that he desired to become a good painter; and should blame you, his father, because you are not willing to be at any expense for the sake of these things; while he, on the other hand, despised those artists, the painters, and was unwilling to learn from them; or, if he acted in this manner towards pipers or harpers, being at the same time desirous to become a piper or harper? What would you do with him, and where would you send him, being thus unwilling to learn from these persons?

Theages/ By Zeus, I do not know.

Socrates/ Now, therefore, doing these very things to your father, can you wonder at and blame him, if he is dubious

what he should do with you, and where he should send you? For, if you are willing, he will immediately place you with those Athenians that are most skilled in political affairs: and with these you will not be at any expense, and at the same time will be much more generally renowned than by associating with any others.

Theages/ What then, Socrates; are not you among the number of excellent and worthy men? For if you are willing to associate with me, it is sufficient, and I shall seek for no other.

Socrates/ Why do you say this, Theages?

Demodocus/ O Socrates, he does not speak badly; and at the same time by doing this you will gratify me. For there is not anything which I should consider to be a greater gain, than for my son to be pleased with your conversation; and for you to be willing to associate with him. And indeed I am ashamed to say how very much I wish this to take place. I therefore entreat both of you; you, Socrates, that you will be willing to associate with him; and you, my son, that you do not seek to associate with any other than Socrates; and you will thus liberate me from many and dreadful cares. For I now very much fear lest my son should meet with some other person who may corrupt him.

Theages/ You need not fear any longer, O father, for me, if you can but persuade Socrates to permit me to associate with him.

Demodocus/ You speak very well. And after this, all the conversation, Socrates, will be directed to you. For I am ready, in short, to give up myself to you, and whatever is most dear to me that you may require, if you will love this my Theages, and benefit him to the utmost of your ability.

Socrates/ O Demodocus, I do not wonder that you are so importunate, if you think that your son can be especially

benefited by me. For I do not know anything about which he who is endued with intellect ought to be more anxious, than how his son may become the best of men. But whence it has appeared to you that I am more able to assist your son in becoming a good citizen, than you yourself, and whence you have thought that I can benefit him more than you, I very much wonder. For you, in the first placer are older than I am; and in the next place, you have exercised the principal offices among the Athenians; nor is anyone more honored than you by the Anagyrusian populace and the rest of the city. But neither of you sees, anyone of these things in me. If therefore Theages, here, despises the associating with political men, and seeks after certain others who profess to give instruction, there and here, Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias the Leontine. Polus the Agrigentine, and many others, who are so wise, that going into cities they persuade the noblest and most wealthy of the youth, who are permitted to associate gratis with anyone of the citizens they please, — they persuade these, I say, to renounce those of their own city, and adhere to them, though the youth give them a considerable sum of money, and thanks besides, for their instruction. It is fit, therefore, that you and your son should choose someone of these; but it is not fit that you should choose me; for I know none of these blessed and beautiful disciplines; though I wish I did; but I always profess to know nothing, as I may say, except a certain small discipline of amatory affairs. In this discipline, I acknowledge myself to be more skillful than anyone of the past or present age.

Theages/ Do you not see, O father, that Socrates does not appear to be very willing to associate with me. For, as to myself, I am ready, if he is willing; but he says these things in jest to us. For I know some of the same age with myself, and others who are a little older, who before they were familiar with him were of no worth, but when they associated

with him, in a very little time appeared to be the best of all men, and surpassed those to whom they were before inferior.

Socrates/ Do you know, therefore, O son of Demodocus, how this comes to pass?

Theages/ Yes, by Zeus, I do; and if you were willing, I also should become such as they were.

Socrates/ Not so, O excellent youth; but you are ignorant in what manner this takes place. However, I will tell you how it happens; —There is a certain dæmoniacal power which has followed me by a divine allotment from childhood. This is a voice, which when it takes place always signifies to me that I should abandon what I am about to do; but it never at any time incites me. And, if anyone of my friends communicates anything to me, and I hear the voice, it dissuades me from this thing, and does not suffer me to do it. Of these things I will adduce to you witnesses: You know the beautiful Charmides, the son of Glauco; he once came to me, in order to communicate to me his intention of contending in the Nemean games; and immediately, on his beginning to tell me that he meant to contend, I heard the voice. And I forbade him, and said, While you was speaking to me, I heard the voice of the dæmoniacal power; do not, therefore, contend. Perhaps, said he, the voice signified to you that I should not conquer; but, though I should not be victorious, yet by exercising myself at this time I shall be benefited. Having thus spoken, he engaged in the contest. It is worthwhile, therefore, to inquire of him what happened to him from contending in these game. If you are willing also, ask Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus, what Timarchus said to him when he was about to die, for having despised the admonition of the dæmonical power. For he and Euathlus, who was famous for running races, and who received Timarchus when he fled, will tell you what he then said.

Theages/ What did he say?

Socrates/ O Clitomachus, said he, I indeed am now going to die, because I was unwilling to be persuaded by Socrates. But why Timarchus said this I will tell you. When Timarchus rose from the banquet, together with Philemon the son of Philemon ides, in order to kill Nicias the son of Heroscomander, for none but they two were in the conspiracy, —Timarchus, as he rose, said to me, What do you say, Socrates? Do you indeed continue drinking; but it is necessary that I should depart. I will, however, return shortly, if I can. I then heard the voice, and I said to him, By no means should you leave us; for I have heard the accustomed dæmoniacal signal. Upon this he stayed; and having remained with us for a time, he again rose up to depart, and said, Socrates, I am going: and again I heard the voice. Again, therefore, I compelled him to stay. The third time wishing to escape me unnoticed, he rose without saying anything to me, when my attention was otherwise engaged, and thus departing he did that which was the cause of his death. Whence he said this to his brother, which I have now told you, viz. that he was going to die, because he would not believe me. Further still, you may also learn from many in Sicily, what I said concerning the destruction of the army. And with respect to things that are past, you may hear them from those that know them; but you may now make trial of the dæmoniacal signal, if it says anything to the purpose. For Sannion, the son of Calus, is gone to the army; and on his going, I heard the dæmonical signal. But he is now gone with Thrasyllus, in order to wage war immediately with Ephesus and Ionia; and I think that he will either die, or that some misfortune will befall him. And I very much fear for the rest of the enterprise. I have said all these things to you, because this power of the dæmon is able to effect everything with respect to the conversations of those that associate with

me. For it is adverse to many, nor can those be benefited by associating with me whom the dæmon opposes: so that it is not possible for me to live with these. With many, however, he does not prevent me from conversing; and yet they are not all benefited by associating with me. But those whose conversation with me is favored by the power of the dæmon, these are they whom you have noticed: for in a short time they make a proficiency. And of these, some possess this advantage with firmness and stability; but many, as long as they are with me, advance in a wonderful manner, but when they leave me, they again differ in no respect from other men. This Aristides, the son of Lysimachus and grandson of Aristides, once experienced: for, associating with me, he made a very great proficiency in a short time; but afterwards he failed from hence, in order to engage in some military expedition. When he returned, he found Thucydides, the son of Melesias and grandson of Thucydides, associating with me. But this Thucydides, the day before, had quarreled with me in a certain conference. Aristides, therefore, seeing me, after he had saluted me, and some conversation had passed between us, said, —I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides thinks highly of himself, with respect to some things, and is angry with you, as if he were an extraordinary person. It is so, said I. But what? said he, does he not know what a slave he was before he associated with you? It does not seem that he does, said I, by the gods. But a ridiculous circumstance, said he, has happened to me, Socrates. What is it, said I. It is this, said he, that before I went to the army, I was able to converse with any man whoever he might be, nor did I appear to be inferior to anyone in argument, so that I sought after the company of the most elegant men; but now, on the contrary, I shun anyone whom I perceive to be learned, so ashamed am I of my own vileness. But, said I, whether did this power leave you suddenly, or by degrees? By degrees, he replied.

When was it present with you, said I? Was it present while you was learning something from me, or was it in some other way? I will tell you, said he, Socrates, a thing incredible indeed, by the gods, but true: for I never, at any time, learnt anything from you, as you know, but I made a proficiency when I associated with you, even if I was only in the same house that you were, though not in the same room; but my proficiency was greater when I was in the same room with you. I also appeared to myself to improve much more when, being in the same room with you, I looked at you when you spoke, than, when I looked another way. But I made by far the greatest proficiency when I sat near you and touched you. Now, however, said he, all that habit has entirely fled. Such, therefore, O Theages, is the association with me: for if it pleases divinity, you will make a very great and rapid proficiency; but you will not, if he does not please. See then, whether it is not safer for you to be instructed by some one of those who have power over the benefit which they impart to men, than by me who benefit, or not, just as it may happen.

Theages/ It appears to me, therefore, Socrates, that we should act in this manner, viz. that we should make trial of this dæmoniacal power by associating together. And, if he is favorable to us, the best consequences will ensue; but if he is not, then let us immediately consult what is to be done, whether we should associate with some other, or endeavor to appease the divine power, that is present with you, by prayers and sacrifices, or any other means which our diviners teach.

Demodocus/ Do not oppose the lad any longer, Socrates, in these things: for Theages speaks well.

Socrates/ If it appears proper thus to act, let us do so.

The end of the Theages.

The Republic.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, *who is the narrator*. Cephalus.

Glaucon. Thrasymachus.

Adeimantus. Cleitophon.

Polemarchus.

And others who are mute auditors.

The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus.

Book 1

Socrates/ I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess; and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was equally, if not more, beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, we turned in the direction of the city; and at that instant Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch sight of us from a distance as we were starting on our way home, and told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind, and said:

Boy/ Polemarchus desires you to wait.

Socrates/ I turned round, and asked him where his master was.

Boy/ There he is, coming after you, if you will only wait.

Glaucon/ Certainly we will.

Socrates/ in a few minutes Polemarchus appeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, Niceratus the son of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession.

Polemarchus/ I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion are already on your way to the city.

Socrates/ You are not far wrong.

Polemarchus/ But do you see how many we are?

Socrates/ Of course.

Polemarchus/ And are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain where you are.

Socrates/ May there not be the alternative, that we may persuade you to let us go?

Polemarchus/ But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Polemarchus/ Then we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured.

Adeimantus/ Has no one told you of the torch-race on horseback in honor of the goddess which will take place in the evening?

Socrates/ With horses! That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race?

Polemarchus/ Yes, and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper and see this festival; there will be a gathering of young men, and we will have a good talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse.

Glaucon/ I suppose, since you insist, that we must.

Socrates/ Very good.

Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon the son of Aristonymus. There too was Cephalus the father of Polemarchus, whom I had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged.

He was seated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had been sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs in the room arranged in a semicircle, upon which we sat down by him. He saluted me eagerly, and then he said: —

Cephalus/ You don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were still able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the Piraeus. For let me tell you, that the more the pleasures of the body fade away, the greater to me is the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not then deny my request, but make our house your resort and keep company with these young men; we are old friends, and you will be quite at home with us.

Socrates/ There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus, than conversing with aged men; for I regard them as travelers who have gone a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to enquire, whether the way is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at that time which the poets call the 'threshold of old age' — Is life harder towards the end, or what report do you give of it?

Cephalus/ I will tell you, Socrates, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is—I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age

were the cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles, —are you still the man you were? Peace, most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men's characters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.

Socrates/ I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go on—Yes, Cephalus, but I rather suspect that people in general are not convinced by you when you speak thus; they think that old age sits lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but because you are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter.

Cephalus/ You are right, they are not convinced: and there is something in what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian: 'If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, neither of us would have been famous.' And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age, the same

reply may be made; for to the good poor man old age cannot be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself.

Socrates/ May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or acquired by you?

Cephalus/ Acquired! Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather: for my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I possess now; but my father Lysanias reduced the property below what it is at present: and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less but a little more than I received.

Socrates/ That was why I asked you the question, because I see that you are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them; the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth.

Cephalus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question? —What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth?

Cephalus/ One, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds

done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the thought that they may be true: either from the weakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of these things; suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age:

> 'Hope,' he says, 'cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey; —hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.'

How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.

Socrates/ Well said, Cephalus, but as concerning justice, what is it? —to speak the truth and to pay your debts—no more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.

Cephalus/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ But then, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice.

Polemarchus/ Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed.

Cephalus/ I fear, that I must go now, for I have to look after the sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.

Socrates/ Is not Polemarchus your heir?

Cephalus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ He went away laughing to the sacrifices.

Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you truly say, about justice?

Polemarchus/ He said that the re-payment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me to be right.

Socrates/ I should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt.

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to make the return?

Polemarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not mean to include that case?

Polemarchus/ Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend and never evil.

Socrates/ You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a debt, —that is what you would imagine him to say?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?

Polemarchus/ To be sure, they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy, as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him—that is to say, evil.

Socrates/ Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken darkly of the nature of justice; for he really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt.

Polemarchus/ That must have been his meaning.

Socrates/ By heaven! and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us?

Polemarchus/ He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies.

Socrates/ And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?

Polemarchus/ Seasoning to food.

Socrates/ And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?

Polemarchus/ If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies.

Socrates/ That is his meaning then?

Polemarchus/ I think so.

Socrates/ And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness?

Polemarchus/ The physician.

Socrates/ Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?

Polemarchus/ The pilot.

Socrates/ And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?

Polemarchus/ In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other.

Socrates/ But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a physician?

Polemarchus/ No.

Socrates/ And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?

Polemarchus/ No.

Socrates/ Then in time of peace justice will be of no use?

Polemarchus/ I am very far from thinking so.

Socrates/ You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes, —that is what you mean?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?

Polemarchus/ In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use.

Socrates/ And by contracts you mean partnerships?

Polemarchus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ But is the just man or the skillful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts?

Polemarchus/ The skillful player.

Socrates/ And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder?

Polemarchus/ Quite the reverse.

Socrates/ Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better partner than the just man?

Polemarchus/ In a money partnership.

Socrates/ Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want a just man to be your counselor in the purchase or sale of a horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better?

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be preferred?

Polemarchus/ When you want a deposit to be kept safely.

Socrates/ You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?

Polemarchus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?

Polemarchus/ That is the inference.

Socrates/ And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser?

Polemarchus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And so of all other things; —justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful?

Polemarchus/ That is the inference.

Socrates/ Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point: Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And he who is most skillful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best able to create one?

Polemarchus/ True?

Socrates/ And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?

Polemarchus/ That, I suppose, is to be inferred.

Socrates/ Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it.

Polemarchus/ That is implied in the argument.

Socrates/ Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favorite of his, affirms that

> He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury.

And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of theft; to be practiced however 'for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies'—that was what you were saying?

Polemarchus/ No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I still stand by the latter words.

Socrates/ Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming?

Polemarchus/ Surely, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil.

Socrates/ Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely?

Polemarchus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends?

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good?

Polemarchus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But the good are just and would not do an injustice?

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?

Polemarchus/ Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.

Socrates/ Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?

Polemarchus/ I like that better.

Socrates/ But see the consequence: —Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.

Polemarchus/ Very true, and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words 'friend' and 'enemy.'

Socrates/ What was the error, Polemarchus?

Polemarchus/ We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.

Socrates/ And how is the error to be corrected?

Polemarchus/ We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; and that he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said.

Socrates/ You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil?

Polemarchus/ Yes, that appears to me to be the truth.

Socrates/ But ought the just to injure anyone at all?

Polemarchus/ Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.

Socrates/ When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated.

Polemarchus/ The latter.

Socrates/ Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?

Polemarchus/ Yes, of horses.

Socrates/ And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?

Polemarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that human virtue is justice?

Polemarchus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?

Polemarchus/ That is the result.

Socrates/ But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?

Polemarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?

Polemarchus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad?

Polemarchus/ Assuredly not.

Socrates/ Any more than heat can produce cold?

Polemarchus/ It cannot.

Socrates/ Or drought moisture?

Polemarchus/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ Nor can the good harm anyone?

Polemarchus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And the just is the good?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then to injure a friend or anyone else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust?

Polemarchus/ I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies, —to say this is not wise; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.

Polemarchus/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against anyone who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer?

Polemarchus/ I am quite ready to do battle at your side.

Socrates/ Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?

Polemarchus/ Whose?

Socrates/ I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that justice is 'doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies.'

Polemarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Yes, but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered?

Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a

pause, he could no longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the sight of him.

He roared out to the whole company:

Thrasymachus/ What folly, Socrates, has taken possession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honor to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy.

Socrates/ I was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and was therefore able to reply to him. Thrasymachus, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were 'knocking under to one another' and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.

Thrasymachus, with a bitter laugh replied;

Thrasymachus/ How characteristic of Socrates! —that's your ironical style! Did I not foresee—have I not already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering?

Socrates/ You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, and well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, 'for this sort of nonsense will not do for me'—then obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort, 'Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one? —is that your meaning?'—How would you answer him?

Thrasymachus/ Just as if the two cases were at all alike!

Socrates/ Why should they not be? and even if they are not, but only appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?

Thrasymachus/ I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?

Socrates/ I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I approve of any of them.

Thrasymachus/ But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?

Socrates/ Done to me! —as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise—that is what I deserve to have done to me.

Thrasymachus/ What, and no payment! a pleasant notion!

Socrates/ I will pay when I have the money.

Glaucon/ But you have, Socrates. and you, Thrasymachus, need be under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates.

Thrasymachus/ Yes, and then Socrates will do as he always does—refuse to answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of someone else.

Socrates/ Why, my good friend, how can anyone answer who knows, and says that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing is, that the speaker should be someone like yourself who professes to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer, for the edification of the company and of myself?

Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and Thrasymachus, as anyone might see, was in reality eager to speak; for he thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length he consented to begin.

Thrasymachus/ Behold, the wisdom of Socrates; he refuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even says Thank you.

Socrates/ That I learn of others, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I have; and how ready I am to praise anyone who appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you will answer well.

Thrasymachus/ Listen, then, I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course you won't.

Socrates/ Let me first understand you. Justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?

Thrasymachus/ That's abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument.

Socrates/ Not at all, my good sir, I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer.

Thrasymachus/ Well, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?

Socrates/ Yes, I know.

Thrasymachus/ And the government is the ruling power in each state?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Thrasymachus/ And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that

everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.

Socrates/ Now I understand you, and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself used the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words 'of the stronger' are added.

Thrasymachus/ A small addition, you must allow.

Socrates/ Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say 'of the stronger'; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.

Thrasymachus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?

Thrasymachus/ To be sure, they are liable to err.

Socrates/ Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects, —and that is what you call justice?

Thrasymachus/ Doubtless.

Socrates/ Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?

Thrasymachus/ What is that you are saying?

Socrates/ I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?

Polemarchus/ Nothing can be clearer, Socrates.

Clitophon/ Yes, if you are allowed to be his witness.

Polemarchus/ But there is no need of any witness, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.

Clitophon/ Yes, Polemarchus, —Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just.

Polemarchus/ Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that

justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.

Clitophon/ But. he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest, —this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice.

Polemarchus/ Those were not his words.

Socrates/ Never mind, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?

Socrates/ Yes, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken.

Thrasymachus/ You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a

ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger.

Socrates/ Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring you in the argument?

Thrasymachus/ Nay, 'suppose' is not the word—I know it; but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.

Socrates/ I shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any misunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask, in what sense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he being the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute—is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term?

Thrasymachus/ In the strictest of all senses. And now cheat and play the informer if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be able, never.

Socrates/ And do you imagine, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.

Thrasymachus/ Why, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.

Socrates/ Enough, of these civilities. It will be better that I should ask you a question: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician.

Thrasymachus/ A healer of the sick.

Socrates/ And the pilot—that is to say, the true pilot—is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor?

Thrasymachus/ A captain of sailors.

Socrates/ The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account; neither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his skill and of his authority over the sailors.

Thrasymachus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now, every art has an interest?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For which the art has to consider and provide?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, that is the aim of art.

Socrates/ And the interest of any art is the perfection of it—this and nothing else?

Thrasymachus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has wants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may be ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which the art of medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of medicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right?

Thrasymachus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the interests of seeing and hearing—has art in itself, I say, any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require another supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and another without end? Or have the arts to look only after their own

interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of another? —having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they have only to consider the interest of their subject-matter. For every art remains pure and faultless while remaining true—that is to say, while perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me whether I am not right.

Thrasymachus/ Yes, clearly.

Socrates/ Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body?

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of horsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts care for themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which is the subject of their art?

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects?

To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.

Then, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker?

He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally acquiesced.

Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is not a mere money-maker; that has been admitted?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of sailors and not a mere sailor?

Thrasymachus/ That has been admitted.

Socrates/ And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's interest?

He gave a reluctant

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ Then, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does. When we had got to this point in the argument, and everyone saw that the definition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus, instead of replying to me, said:

Thrasymachus/ Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?

Socrates/ Why do you ask such a question, when you ought rather to be answering?

Thrasymachus/ Because she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose: she has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep.

Socrates/ What makes you say that?

Thrasymachus/ Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherds fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of states, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good; that is to say, the interest

of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; and injustice the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the State: when there is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office; there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is most apparent; and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable—that is to say tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little but wholesale; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private and public; for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating anyone of them singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace—they who do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens has

made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest.

Socrates/ Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bath-man, deluged our ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company would not let him; they insisted that he should remain and defend his position; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us.

Thrasymachus, excellent man, how suggestive are your remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to determine the way of man's life so small a matter in your eyes—to determine how life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?

Thrasymachus/ And do I differ from you, as to the importance of the enquiry?

Socrates/ You appear rather, to have no care or thought about us, Thrasymachus—whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not keep your knowledge to yourself; we are a large party; and any benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. For, granting

that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice.

Thrasymachus/ And how am I to convince you, if you are not already convinced by what I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof bodily into your souls?

Socrates/ Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark, Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that although you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you thought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own good, but like a mere diner or banqueter with a view to the pleasures of the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already ensured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether in a state or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.

Thrasymachus/ Think! Nay, I am sure of it.

Socrates/ Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly without payment, unless under the

idea that they govern for the advantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: Are not the several arts different, by reason of their each having a separate function? And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think, that we may make a little progress.

Thrasymachus/ Yes, that is the difference.

Socrates/ And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one—medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would you, that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your exact use of language?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that the art of payment is medicine?

Thrasymachus/ I should not.

Socrates/ Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And we have admitted, that the good of each art is specially confined to the art?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by him?

He gave a reluctant assent to this.

Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which they preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he were paid as well?

Thrasymachus/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly, he confers a benefit.

Socrates/ Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor governments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before saying, they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are the weaker and not the stronger—to their good they attend and not to the good of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern without remuneration. For, in the execution of his work, and in giving his orders to another, the true artist does not regard his own interest, but always that of his subjects; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment, money, or honor, or a penalty for refusing.

Glaucon/ What do you mean, Socrates? The first two modes of payment are intelligible enough, but what the

penalty is I do not understand, or how a penalty can be a payment.

Socrates/ You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And for this reason, money and honor have no attraction for them; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honor. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonorable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help—not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to anyone who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects; and everyone who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger. This latter question

need not be further discussed at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer?

Glaucon/ I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous.

Socrates/ Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was rehearsing?

Glaucon/ Yes, I heard him, but he has not convinced me.

Socrates/ Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is saying what is not true?

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ If, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, and in the end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in our enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ And which method do I understand you to prefer?

Glaucon/ That which you propose.

Socrates/ Well, then, Thrasymachus, suppose you begin at the beginning and answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect justice?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.

Socrates/ And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?

Thrasymachus/ What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not.

Socrates/ What else then would you say?

Thrasymachus/ The opposite.

Socrates/ And would you call justice vice?

Thrasymachus/ No, I would rather say sublime simplicity.

Socrates/ Then would you call injustice malignity?

Thrasymachus/ No; I would rather say discretion.

Socrates/ And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust, and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but perhaps you imagine me to be talking of cutpurses. Even this profession if undetected has advantages, though they are not to be compared with those of which I was just now speaking.

Socrates/ I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.

Thrasymachus/ Certainly, I do so class them.

Socrates/ Now, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer might have been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive that

you will call injustice honorable and strong, and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.

Thrasymachus/ You have guessed most infallibly.

Socrates/ Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are speaking your real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing yourself at our expense.

Thrasymachus/ I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you? —to refute the argument is your business.

Socrates/ Very true, that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?

Thrasymachus/ Far otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature which he is.

Socrates/ And would he try to go beyond just action?

Thrasymachus/ He would not.

Socrates/ And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?

Thrasymachus/ He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would not be able.

Socrates/ Whether he would or would not be able, is not to the point. My question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, he would.

Socrates/ And what of the unjust—does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just?

Thrasymachus/ Of course, for he claims to have more than all men.

Socrates/ And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust man or action, in order that he may have more than all?

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ We may put the matter thus, —the just does not desire more than his like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike?

Thrasymachus/ Nothing, can be better than that statement.

Socrates/ And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?

Thrasymachus/ Good again.

Socrates/ And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?

Thrasymachus/ Of course, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a certain nature; he who is not, not.

Socrates/ Each of them, is such as his like is?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Very good, Thrasymachus, and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And which is wise and which is foolish?

Thrasymachus/ Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.

Socrates/ And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?

Thrasymachus/ I do not think that he would.

Socrates/ But he would claim to exceed the non-musician?

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?

Thrasymachus/ He would not.

Socrates/ But he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?

Thrasymachus/ That, I suppose, can hardly be denied.

Socrates/ And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?

Thrasymachus/ I dare say.

Socrates/ And the knowing is wise?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the wise is good?

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite?

Thrasymachus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? Were not these your words?

Thrasymachus/ They were.

Socrates/ And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like but his unlike?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?

Thrasymachus/ That is the inference.

Socrates/ And each of them is such as his like is?

Thrasymachus/ That was admitted.

Socrates/ Then the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and ignorant.

Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer's day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point:

Well, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not also saying that injustice had strength; do you remember?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, I remember, but do not suppose that I approve of what you are saying or have no answer; if

however I were to answer, you would be quite certain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to have my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer 'Very good,' as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod 'Yes' and 'No.'

Socrates/ Certainly not, if contrary to your real opinion.

Thrasymachus/ Yes, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What else would you have?

Socrates/ Nothing in the world, and if you are so disposed I will ask and you shall answer.

Thrasymachus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by anyone. But I want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You would not deny that a state may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other states, or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection?

Thrasymachus/ True, and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust state will be most likely to do so.

Socrates/ I know, that such was your position; but what I would further consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior state can exist or be exercised without justice or only with justice.

Thrasymachus/ If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with justice; but if I am right, then without justice.

Socrates/ I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and dissent, but making answers which are quite excellent.

Thrasymachus/ That is out of civility to you.

Socrates/ You are very kind, and would you have the goodness also to inform me, whether you think that a state, or an army, or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if they injured one another?

Thrasymachus/ No indeed, they could not.

Socrates/ But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act together better?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and justice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ I agree, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.

Socrates/ How good of you, but I should like to know also whether injustice, having this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or among freemen, will not make them hate one another and set them at variance and render them incapable of common action?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just?

Thrasymachus/ They will.

Socrates/ And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power?

Thrasymachus/ Let us assume that she retains her power.

Socrates/ Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any other body, that body is, to begin with, rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction; and does it not become its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just? Is not this the case?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just? Is not that true, Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And O my friend, surely the gods are just?

Thrasymachus/ Granted that they are.

Socrates/ But if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be their friend?

Thrasymachus/ Feast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company.

Socrates/ Well then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action; nay more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil acting at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them to combine; if there had not been they would have injured one another as well as their victims; they were but half-villains in their enterprises; for had they been

whole villains, and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given; but still I should like to examine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life.

Thrasymachus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has some end?

Thrasymachus/ I should.

Socrates/ And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

Thrasymachus/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or hear, except with the ear?

Thrasymachus/ No.

Socrates/ These then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?

Thrasymachus/ They may.

Socrates/ But you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other ways?

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose?

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?

Thrasymachus/ We may.

Socrates/ Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

Thrasymachus/ I understand your meaning, and assent.

Socrates/ And that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask again whether the eye has an end?

Thrasymachus/ It has.

Socrates/ And has not the eye an excellence?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the ear has an end and an excellence also?

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and a special excellence?

Thrasymachus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Well, and can the eyes fulfill their end if they are wanting in their own proper excellence and have a defect instead?

Thrasymachus/ How can they, if they are blind and cannot see?

Socrates/ You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question more generally, and only enquire whether the things which fulfill their ends fulfill them by their own proper excellence, and fail of fulfilling them by their own defect?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper excellence they cannot fulfill their end?

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ And the same observation will apply to all other things?

Thrasymachus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfill? for example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?

Thrasymachus/ To no other.

Socrates/ And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?

Thrasymachus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And has not the soul an excellence also?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And can she or can she not fulfill her own ends when deprived of that excellence?

Thrasymachus/ She cannot.

Socrates/ Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, and the good soul a good ruler?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, necessarily.

Socrates/ And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?

Thrasymachus/ That has been admitted.

Socrates/ Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill?

Thrasymachus/ That is what your argument proves.

Socrates/ And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of happy?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?

Thrasymachus/ So be it.

Socrates/ But happiness and not misery is profitable.

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice.

Thrasymachus/ Let this, Socrates, be your entertainment at the Bendidea.

Socrates/ For which I am indebted to you, now that you have grown gentle towards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.

Book 2.

Socrates/ With these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For Glaucon, who is always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus' retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So, he said to me:

Glaucon/ Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?

Socrates/ I should wish really to persuade you, if I could.

Glaucon/ Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now: —How would you arrange goods—are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although nothing follows from them?

Socrates/ I agree in thinking that there is such a class.

Glaucon/ Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Glaucon/ And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of money-making—these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or result which flows from them?

Socrates/ There is, this third class also. But why do you ask?

Glaucon/ Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice?

Socrates/ In the highest class, —among those goods which he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results.

Glaucon/ Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided.

Socrates/ I know, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him.

Glaucon/ I wish, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practice justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just—if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by anyone in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I

am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?

Socrates/ Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would oftener wish to converse.

Glaucon/ I am delighted, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.

They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice; —it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honored by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.

Now that those who practice justice do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them; then we

shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead and rescinded. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the cullet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the cullet outwards and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result—when he turned the cullet inwards he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; where as soon as he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them, and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature

that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with anyone at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever anyone thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine anyone obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. Enough of this.

Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the isolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft; like the skillful pilot or physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice: (he who is found out is nobody:) for the

highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honored and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honors and rewards; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he must be imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will have been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have readied the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two.

Socrates/ Heavens! my dear Glaucon, how energetically you polish them up for the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two statues.

Glaucon/ I do my best. And now that we know what they are like there is no difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. This I will proceed to describe; but as you may think the description a little too coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the words which follow are not mine. —Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists

of injustice: They will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound—will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled: Then he will understand that he ought to seem only, and not to be, just; the words of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not live with a view to appearances—he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only: —

> 'His mind has a soil deep and fertile,
> Out of which spring his prudent counsels.'

In the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the city; he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also he can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own advantage, because he has no misgivings about injustice; and at every contest, whether in public or private, he gets the better of his antagonists, and gains at their expense, and is rich, and out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies; moreover, he can offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnificently, and can honor the gods or any man whom he wants to honor in a far better style than the just, and therefore he is likely to be dearer than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men are said to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life of the just.

Socrates/ I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus, his brother, interposed:

Adeimantus/ Socrates, you do not suppose that there is nothing more to be urged?

Socrates/ Why, what else is there?

Adeimantus/ The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned.

Socrates/ Well, then, according to the proverb, 'Let brother help brother'—if he fails in any part do you assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take from me the power of helping justice.

Adeimantus/ Nonsense. But let me add something more: There is another side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of justice and injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I believe to be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation; in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages, and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of justice. More, however, is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the others; for they throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of whom says, that the gods make the oaks of the just—

> 'To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle;
> And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces'.

and many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer has a very similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is—

> 'As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god,
> Maintains justice; to whom the black earth brings forth
> Wheat and barley, whose trees are bowed with fruit,
> And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives him fish.'

Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son vouchsafe to the just; they take them down into the world below, where they have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands; their idea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards yet further; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful and just shall survive to the third and fourth generation. This is the style in which they praise justice. But about the wicked there is another strain; they bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve; also while they are yet living they bring them to infamy, and inflict upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the just who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the other.

Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is found in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always declaring that justice and virtue are honorable, but grievous and toilsome; and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only censured by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to call wicked men happy, and to honor them both in public and private when they are rich or in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and poor, even though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many good men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendicant prophets go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they have a power

committed to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man's own or his ancestor's sins by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and feasts; and they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost; with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they say, to execute their will. And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod: —

> 'Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and her dwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil,'

and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the gods may be influenced by men; for he also says: —

> 'The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them and avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by libations and the odor of fat, when they have sinned and transgressed.'

And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who were children of the Moon and the Muses—that is what they say—according to which they perform their ritual, and persuade not only individuals, but whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at the service of the living and the dead; the latter sort they call mysteries, and they redeem us from the pains of hell, but if we neglect them no one knows what awaits us.

Socrates/ He proceeded:

Adeimantus/ And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and vice, and the way in which gods and men regard them, how are their minds likely to be affected, my dear Socrates, —those of them, I mean, who are quick-witted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower, and from all that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to

what manner of persons they should be and in what way they should walk if they would make the best of life? Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of Pindar—

> 'Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days?'

For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just, profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends. But I hear someone exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed. With a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose them to have no care of human things—why in either case should we mind about concealment? And even if there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets; and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by 'sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by

offerings.' Let us be consistent then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak truly, why then we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice; for if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished. 'But there is a world below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds.' Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty cities declare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony.

On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us. Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honor justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears justice praised? And even if there should be someone who is able to disprove the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to forgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own free will; unless, peradventure, there be someone whom the divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has attained knowledge of the truth—but no other man. He only blames injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.

The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of the argument, when my brother, and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice—beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and ending with the men of our own time—no one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories, honors, and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and invisible to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man's soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain, had you sought to persuade us of this from our youth upwards, we should not have been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong, but everyone would have been his own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harboring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating, and words even stronger than these about justice and injustice, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement manner, as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to hear from you the opposite side; and I would ask you to show not only the superiority which justice has over injustice, but what effect they have on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputations; for unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of it; we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark, and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good

and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest, though injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of that highest class of goods which are desired indeed for their results, but in a far greater degree for their own sakes—like sight or hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and not merely conventional good—I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one point only: I mean the essential good and evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them. Let others praise justice and censure injustice, magnifying the rewards and honors of the one and abusing the other; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I hear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only prove to us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

Socrates/ I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on hearing these words I was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an illustrious father, that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses which the admirer of Glaucon made in honor of you after you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara: —

> 'Sons of Ariston,' he sang, 'divine offspring of an illustrious hero'

The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice, and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not convinced—this I infer from your general character, for had I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted

you. But now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand I feel that I am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which justice has over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help, while breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in her defense. And therefore I had best give such help as I can.

Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, that the enquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very good eyes. Seeing then, that we are no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that a short-sighted person had been asked by someone to read small letters from a distance; and it occurred to someone else that they might be found in another place which was larger and in which the letters were larger—if they were the same and he could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser—this would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune.

Adeimantus/ Very true, but how does the illustration apply to our enquiry?

Socrates/ I will tell you, justice, which is the subject of our enquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And is not a State larger than an individual?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them.

Adeimantus/ That, is an excellent proposal.

Socrates/ And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.

Adeimantus/ I dare say.

Socrates/ When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our search will be more easily discovered.

Adeimantus/ Yes, far more easily.

Socrates/ But ought we to attempt to construct one? for to do so, as I am inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore.

Adeimantus/ I have reflected, and am anxious that you should proceed.

Socrates/ A State, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?

Adeimantus/ There can be no other.

Socrates/ Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of life and existence.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand: We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, someone else a weaver—shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?

Adeimantus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labors into a common stock? —the individual husbandman, for example, producing for four, and laboring four times as long and as much as he need in the provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself; or will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of producing for them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining three fourths of his time be employed in making

a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no partnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants?

Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at producing everything.

Socrates/ Probably, that would be the better way; and when I hear you say this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations, or when he has only one?

Adeimantus/ When he has only one.

Socrates/ Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the right time?

Adeimantus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the business his first object.

Adeimantus/ He must.

Socrates/ And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural to him and does it at the right time, and leaves other things.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will not make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools—and he too needs many; and in like manner the weaver and shoemaker.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Then carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers in our little State, which is already beginning to grow?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Yet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as husbandmen may have draught cattle, and curriers and weavers fleeces and hides, —still our State will not be very large.

Adeimantus/ That is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all these.

Socrates/ Then, again, there is the situation of the city—to find a place where nothing need be imported is well-nigh impossible.

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply from another city?

Adeimantus/ There must.

Socrates/ But if the trader goes empty-handed, having nothing which they require who would supply his need, he will come back empty-handed.

Adeimantus/ That is certain.

Socrates/ And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?

Adeimantus/ They will.

Socrates/ Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we shall want merchants?

Adeimantus/ We shall.

Socrates/ And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skillful sailors will also be needed, and in considerable numbers?

Adeimantus/ Yes, in considerable numbers.

Socrates/ Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions? To secure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our principal objects when we formed them into a society and constituted a State.

Adeimantus/ Clearly they will buy and sell.

Socrates/ Then they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Suppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some production to market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him, —is he to leave his calling and sit idle in the market-place?

Adeimantus/ Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the office of salesmen. In well-ordered states they are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other purpose; their duty is to be in the market, and to give money in exchange for goods to those who desire to sell and to take money from those who desire to buy.

Socrates/ This want, then, creates a class of retail-traders in our State. Is not 'retailer' the term which is applied to those who sit in the market-place engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to another are called merchants?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength for labor, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not mistake, hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of their labor.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Then hirelings will help to make up our population?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the State did they spring up?

Adeimantus/ Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I cannot imagine that they are more likely to be found anywhere else.

Socrates/ I dare say that you are right in your suggestion, we had better think the matter out, and not shrink from the enquiry. Let us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, they will work, in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the praises of the gods, in happy converse with one

another. And they will take care that their families do not exceed their means; having an eye to poverty or war.

Glaucon, interposing, said;

Glaucon/ But, you have not given them a relish to their meal.

Socrates/ True, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish—salt, and olives, and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs such as country people prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs, and peas, and beans; and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and health to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them.

Glaucon/ Yes, Socrates, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?

Socrates/ But what would you have, Glaucon?

Glaucon/ Why, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style.

Socrates/ Yes, now I understand: the question which you would have me consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described. But if you wish also to see a State at fever-heat. I have no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every variety; we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first speaking, such as

houses, and clothes, and shoes: the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no longer sufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with forms and colors; another will be the votaries of music—poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of divers kinds of articles, including women's dresses. And we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry, tire-women and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swineherds, too, who were not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are needed now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be animals of many other kinds, if people eat them.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?

Glaucon/ Much greater.

Socrates/ And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough?

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then a slice of our neighbors' land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth?

Glaucon/ That, Socrates, will be inevitable.

Socrates/ And so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will be nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom we were describing above.

Glaucon/ Why? are they not capable of defending themselves?

Socrates/ No, not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged by all of us when we were framing the State: the principle, as you will remember, was that one man cannot practice many arts with success.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ But is not war an art?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder—in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted, and at that he was to continue working all his life long and at no other; he was not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a good workman. Now nothing

can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else? No tools will make a man a skilled workman, or master of defense, nor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never bestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war become a good fighter all in a day, whether with heavy-armed or any other kind of troops?

Glaucon/ Yes, the tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond price.

Socrates/ And the higher the duties of the guardian, the more time, and skill, and art, and application will be needed by him?

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Will he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted for the task of guarding the city?

Glaucon/ It will.

Socrates/ And the selection will be no easy matter, but we must be brave and do our best.

Glaucon/ We must.

Socrates/ Is not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding and watching?

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake the enemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught him, they have to fight with him.

Glaucon/ All these qualities, will certainly be required by them.

Socrates/ Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any other animal? Have you never observed how invincible and unconquerable is spirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any creature to be absolutely fearless and indomitable?

Glaucon/ I have.

Socrates/ Then now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are required in the guardian.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, and with everybody else?

Glaucon/ A difficulty by no means easy to overcome.

Socrates/ Whereas, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and gentle to their friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for their enemies to destroy them.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ What is to be done then? how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ He will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities; and yet the combination of them appears to be impossible; and hence we must infer that to be a good guardian is impossible.

Glaucon/ I am afraid that what you say is true.

Socrates/ Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded. —My friend, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost sight of the image which we had before us.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite qualities.

Glaucon/ And where do you find them?

Socrates/ Many animals, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.

Glaucon/ Yes, I know.

Socrates/ Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Would not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature, need to have the qualities of a philosopher?

Glaucon/ I do not apprehend your meaning.

Socrates/ The trait of which I am speaking, may be also seen in the dog, and is remarkable in the animal.

Glaucon/ What trait?

Socrates/ Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he welcomes him, although

the one has never done him any harm, nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious?

Glaucon/ The matter never struck me before; but I quite recognize the truth of your remark.

Socrates/ And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming; —your dog is a true philosopher.

Glaucon/ Why?

Socrates/ Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?

Glaucon/ They are the same.

Socrates/ And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?

Glaucon/ That we may safely affirm.

Socrates/ Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end—How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length.

Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us.

Then, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if somewhat long.

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our story shall be the education of our heroes.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the traditional sort? —and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music for the soul.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ And literature may be either true or false?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false?

Adeimantus/ I do not understand your meaning.

Socrates/ You know, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics.

Adeimantus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily taken.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up?

Adeimantus/ We cannot.

Socrates/ Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorized ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mold the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded.

Adeimantus/ Of what tales are you speaking?

Socrates/ You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, for they are necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them.

Adeimantus/ Very likely, but I do not as yet know what you would term the greater.

Socrates/ Those, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great storytellers of mankind.

Adeimantus/ But which stories do you mean, and what fault do you find with them?

Socrates/ A fault which is most serious, the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad lie.

Adeimantus/ But when is this fault committed?

Socrates/ Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes, —as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that sort of thing is certainly very blamable; but what are the stories which you mean?

Socrates/ First of all, there was that greatest of all lies in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too, —I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed.

Adeimantus/ Why, yes, those stories are extremely objectionable.

Socrates/ Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State; the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his father when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following the example of the first and greatest among the gods.

Adeimantus/ I entirely agree with you, in my opinion those stories are quite unfit to be repeated.

Socrates/ Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments; and we shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children; and when they grow up, the poets also should be told to compose for them in a similar spirit. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Herè his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods in Homer—these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.

Adeimantus/ There you are right, but if anyone asks where are such models to be found and of what tales are you speaking—how shall we answer him?

Socrates/ You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business.

Adeimantus/ Very true, but what are these forms of theology which you mean?

Socrates/ Something of this kind, —God is always to be represented as he truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which the representation is given.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And no good thing is hurtful?

Adeimantus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And that which is not hurtful hurts not?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And that which hurts not does no evil?

Adeimantus/ No.

Socrates/ And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And the good is advantageous?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And therefore the cause of well-being?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only?

Adeimantus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.

Adeimantus/ That appears to me to be most true.

Socrates/ Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks

> 'Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots,'

and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two;

> 'Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;'

but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill;

> 'Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth.'

And again—

> 'Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.'

And if anyone asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was really the work of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Aeschylus, that

> 'God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.'

And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe—the subject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur—or of the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking: he must say that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their misery—the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of evil to anyone is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or

heard in verse or prose by anyone whether old or young in any well-ordered commonwealth. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.

Adeimantus/ I agree with you, and am ready to give my assent to the law.

Socrates/ Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform, —that God is not the author of all things, but of good only.

Adeimantus/ That will do.

Socrates/ And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another—sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image?

Adeimantus/ I cannot answer you, without more thought.

Socrates/ Well, but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be effected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing?

Adeimantus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is in the fullest vigor also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or any similar causes.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged by any external influence?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite things—furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are least altered by time and circumstances.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is least liable to suffer change from without?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?

Adeimantus/ Of course they are.

Socrates/ Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes?

Adeimantus/ He cannot.

Socrates/ But may he not change and transform himself?

Adeimantus/ Clearly, that must be the case if he is changed at all.

Socrates/ And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse and more unsightly?

Adeimantus/ If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty.

Socrates/ Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would anyone, whether God or man, desire to make himself worse?

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being, as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God remains absolutely and forever in his own form.

Adeimantus/ That necessarily follows, in my judgment.

Socrates/ Then, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that

> 'The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and down cities in all sorts of forms;'

and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let anyone, either in tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Herè disguised in the likeness of a priestess asking an alms

> 'For the life-giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos;'

—let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of these myths—telling how certain gods, as they say, 'Go about by night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms;' but let them take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the same time speak blasphemy against the gods.

Adeimantus/ Heaven forbid.

Socrates/ But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft and deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word or deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself?

Adeimantus/ I cannot say.

Socrates/ Do you not know, that the true lie, if such an expression may be allowed, is hated of gods and men?

Adeimantus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there, above all, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him.

Adeimantus/ Still, I do not comprehend you.

Socrates/ The reason is, that you attribute some profound meaning to my words; but I am only saying that deception, or being deceived or uninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves, which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie, is what mankind least like; —that, I say, is what they utterly detest.

Adeimantus/ There is nothing more hateful to them.

Socrates/ And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, not pure unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right?

Adeimantus/ Perfectly right.

Socrates/ The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in dealing with enemies—that would be an instance; or again, when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive; also in the tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking—because we do not know the truth about ancient times, we make falsehood as much like truth as we can, and so turn it to account.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention?

Adeimantus/ That would be ridiculous.

Socrates/ Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God?

Adeimantus/ I should say not.

Socrates/ Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?

Adeimantus/ That is inconceivable.

Socrates/ But he may have friends who are senseless or mad?

Adeimantus/ But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God.

Socrates/ Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie?

Adeimantus/ None whatever.

Socrates/ Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he changes not; he deceives not, either by sign or word, by dream or waking vision.

Adeimantus/ Your thoughts, are the reflection of my own.

Socrates/ You agree with me then, that this is the second type or form in which we should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not magicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in any way.

Adeimantus/ I grant that.

Socrates/ Then, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses of Aeschylus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials

> 'Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, and to know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all things blessed of heaven

> he raised a note of triumph and cheered my soul. And I thought that the word of Phoebus, being divine and full of prophecy, would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at the banquet, and who said this—he it is who has slain my son.'

These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall we allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true worshippers of the gods and like them.

Adeimantus/ I entirely agree, in these principles, and promise to make them my laws.

Book 3.

Socrates/ Such then, are our principles of theology—some tales are to be told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth upwards, if we mean them to honor the gods and their parents, and to value friendship with one another.

Adeimantus/ Yes; and I think that our principles are right.

Socrates/ But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons besides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real and terrible?

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Then we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales as well as over the others, and beg them not simply to revile, but rather to commend the world below, intimating to them that their descriptions are untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors.

Adeimantus/ That will be our duty.

Socrates/ Then, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, beginning with the verses;

> 'I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than rule over all the dead who have come to naught.'

We must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared;

> 'Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should be seen both of mortals and immortals.'

And again: —

> 'O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form but no mind at all!'

Again of Tiresias: —

> ['To him even after death did Persephone grant mind,] that he alone should be wise; but the other souls are flitting shades.'

Again: —

> 'The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her fate, leaving manhood and youth.'

Again: —

> 'And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the earth.'

And, —

> 'As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has dropped out of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling to one another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they moved.'

And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike out these and similar passages, not because they are unpoetical, or unattractive to the popular ear, but because the greater the poetical charm of them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Also we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which describe the world below—Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the earth, and sapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes a shudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but there is a danger that the nerves of

our guardians may be rendered too excitable and effeminate by them.

Adeimantus/ There is a real danger.

Socrates/ Then we must have no more of them.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Another and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men?

Adeimantus/ They will go with the rest.

Socrates/ But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is that the good man will not consider death terrible to any other good man who is his comrade.

Adeimantus/ Yes; that is our principle.

Socrates/ And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he had suffered anything terrible?

Adeimantus/ He will not.

Socrates/ Such an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself and his own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of fortune, is to him of all men least terrible.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him.

Adeimantus/ Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another.

Socrates/ Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men, and making them over to women (and not even to women who are good for anything), or to men of a baser sort, that those who are being educated by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the like.

Adeimantus/ That will be very right.

Socrates/ Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict Achilles, who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on his back, and then on his face; then starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren sea; now taking the sooty ashes in both his hands and pouring them over his head, or weeping and wailing in the various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of the gods as praying and beseeching;

> 'Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name.'

Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce the gods lamenting and saying;

> 'Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow.'

But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him say—

> 'O heavens! with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased round and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful.'

Or again: —

> 'Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius.'

For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such unworthy representations of the gods, instead of

laughing at them as they ought, hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be dishonored by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination which may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead of having any shame or self-control, he will be always whining and lamenting on slight occasions.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is most true.

Socrates/ Yes, but that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument has just proved to us; and by that proof we must abide until it is disproved by a better.

Adeimantus/ It ought not to be.

Socrates/ Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a violent reaction.

Adeimantus/ So I believe.

Socrates/ Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed.

Adeimantus/ Still less of the gods, as you say.

Socrates/ Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as that of Homer when he describes how

> 'Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods,
> when they saw Hephaestus bustling about the mansion.'

Socrates/ On your views, we must not admit them.

Adeimantus/ On my views, if you like to father them on me; that we must not admit them is certain.

Socrates/ Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is useless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine to men, then the use of such medicines should be restricted to physicians; private individuals have no business with them.

Adeimantus/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ Then if anyone at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest of the crew, and how things are going with himself or his fellow sailors.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State;

> 'Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter.'

he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of ship or State.

Adeimantus/ Most certainly, if our idea of the State is ever carried out.

Socrates/ In the next place our youth must be temperate?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience to commanders and self-control in sensual pleasures?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Then we shall approve such language as that of Diomede in Homer;

> 'Friend, sit still and obey my word,'

and the verses which follow;

> 'The Greeks marched breathing prowess,
> … in silent awe of their leaders,'

and other sentiments of the same kind.

We shall.

Socrates/ What of this line;

> 'O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a stag,'

and of the words which follow? Would you say that these, or any similar impertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to their rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken?

Adeimantus/ They are ill spoken.

Socrates/ They may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to temperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young men—you would agree with me there?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his opinion is more glorious than

> 'When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer carries round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups;'

is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such words? Or the verse

> 'The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger'?

What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and men were asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising plans, but forgot them all in a moment through his lust, and was so completely overcome at the sight of Herè that he would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had

never been in such a state of rapture before, even when they first met one another

> 'Without the knowledge of their parents;'

or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast a chain around Ares and Aphrodite?

Adeimantus/ Indeed, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that sort of thing.

Socrates/ But any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men, these they ought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the verses;

> 'He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart,
> Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured!'

Certainly.

Socrates/ In the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of money.

Certainly not.

Socrates/ Neither must we sing to them of

> 'Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings.'

Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to have given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them; but that without a gift he should not lay aside his anger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles himself to have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon's gifts, or that when he had received payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but that without payment he was unwilling to do so.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly, these are not sentiments which can be approved.

Socrates/ Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say that in attributing these feelings to Achilles, or in believing that

they are truly attributed to him, he is guilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says;

> 'Thou hast wronged me, O, far-darter, most abominable of deities.
>
> Verily I would be even with thee, if I had only the power;'

or his insubordination to the river-god, on whose divinity he is ready to lay hands; or his offering to the dead Patroclus of his own hair, which had been previously dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius, and that he actually performed this vow; or that he dragged Hector round the tomb of Patroclus, and slaughtered the captives at the pyre; of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more than I can allow our citizens to believe that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disordered in his wits as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by avarice, combined with overweening contempt of gods and men.

Adeimantus/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ And let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale of Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous son of Zeus, going forth as they did to perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other hero or son of a god daring to do such impious and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to them in our day: and let us further compel the poets to declare either that these acts were not done by them, or that they were not the sons of gods; —both in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We will not have them trying to persuade our youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men—sentiments which, as we were saying, are neither pious nor true, for we have already proved that evil cannot come from the gods.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly not.

Socrates/ And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them; for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by—

> 'The kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral altar, the altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida'

and who have

> 'the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins.'

And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity of morals among the young.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ But now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or are not to be spoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted by us. The manner in which gods and demigods and heroes and the world below should be treated has been already laid down.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of our subject.

Adeimantus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ But we are not in a condition to answer this question at present, my friend.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men poets and story-tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are often happy, and the good miserable; and that injustice is profitable when undetected, but that justice is a man's own loss and another's gain—these things we

shall forbid them to utter, and command them to sing and say the opposite.

Adeimantus/ To be sure we shall.

Socrates/ But if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall maintain that you have implied the principle for which we have been all along contending.

Adeimantus/ I grant the truth of your inference.

Socrates/ That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which we cannot determine until we have discovered what justice is, and how naturally advantageous to the possessor, whether he seem to be just or not.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Enough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style; and when this has been considered, both matter and manner will have been completely treated.

Adeimantus/ I do not understand what you mean.

Socrates/ Then I must make you understand; and perhaps I may be more intelligible if I put the matter in this way. You are aware, I suppose, that all mythology and poetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or to come?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or a union of the two?

Adeimantus/ That again, I do not quite understand.

Socrates/ I fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much difficulty in making myself apprehended. Like a bad speaker, therefore, I will not take the whole of the subject, but will break a piece off in illustration of my meaning. You know the first lines of the Iliad, in which the poet says that Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that Agamemnon flew into a passion with him; whereupon Chryses, failing of his object, invoked the

anger of the God against the Achaeans. Now as far as these lines;

> 'And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus, the chiefs of the people,'

the poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose that he is anyone else. But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses, and then he does all that he can to make us believe that the speaker is not Homer, but the aged priest himself. And in this double form he has cast the entire narrative of the events which occurred at Troy and in Ithaca and throughout the Odyssey.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites from time to time and in the intermediate passages?

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say that he assimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs you, is going to speak?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way of imitation?

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Or, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then again, the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple narration. However, in order that I may make my meaning quite clear, and that you may no more say, 'I don't understand,' I will show how the change

might be effected. If Homer had said, 'The priest came, having his daughter's ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans, and above all the kings;' and then if, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, he had continued in his own person, the words would have been, not imitation, but simple narration. The passage would have run as follows (I am no poet, and therefore I drop the meter), 'The priest came and prayed the gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might capture Troy and return safely home, but begged that they would give him back his daughter, and take the ransom which he brought, and respect the God. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks revered the priest and assented. But Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not come again, lest the staff and chaplets of the God should be of no avail to him—the daughter of Chryses should not be released, he said—she should grow old with him in Argos. And then he told him to go away and not to provoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed. And the old man went away in fear and silence, and, when he had left the camp, he called upon Apollo by his many names, reminding him of everything which he had done pleasing to him, whether in building his temples, or in offering sacrifice, and praying that his good deeds might be returned to him, and that the Achaeans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the god,'—and so on. In this way the whole becomes simple narrative.

Adeimantus/ I understand.

Socrates/ Or you may suppose the opposite case—that the intermediate passages are omitted, and the dialogue only left.

Adeimantus/ That also, I understand; you mean, for example, as in tragedy.

Socrates/ You have conceived my meaning perfectly; and if I mistake not, what you failed to apprehend before is now

made clear to you, that poetry and mythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative—instances of this are supplied by tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, in which the poet is the only speaker—of this the dithyramb affords the best example; and the combination of both is found in epic, and in several other styles of poetry. Do I take you with me?

Adeimantus/ Yes, I see now what you meant.

Socrates/ I will ask you to remember also what I began by saying, that we had done with the subject and might proceed to the style.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I remember.

Socrates/ In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an understanding about the mimetic art, —whether the poets, in narrating their stories, are to be allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the latter, in what parts; or should all imitation be prohibited?

Adeimantus/ You mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted into our State?

Socrates/ Yes, but there may be more than this in question: I really do not know as yet, but whither the argument may blow, thither we go.

Adeimantus/ And go we will.

Socrates/ Then, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be imitators; or rather, has not this question been decided by the rule already laid down that one man can only do one thing well, and not many; and that if he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining much reputation in any?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And this is equally true of imitation; no one man can imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one?

Adeimantus/ He cannot.

Socrates/ Then the same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in life, and at the same time to be an imitator and imitate many other parts as well; for even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same persons cannot succeed in both, as, for example, the writers of tragedy and comedy—did you not just now call them imitations?

Adeimantus/ Yes, I did; and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot succeed in both.

Socrates/ Any more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Neither are comic and tragic actors the same; yet all these things are but imitations.

Adeimantus/ They are so.

Socrates/ And human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been coined into yet smaller pieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well, as of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ If then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our guardians, setting aside every other business, are to dedicate themselves wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State, making this their craft, and engaging in no work which does not bear on this end, they ought not to practice or imitate anything else; if they imitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward only those characters which are suitable to their profession—the

courageous, temperate, holy, free, and the like; but they should not depict or be skillful at imitating any kind of illiberality or baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never observe how imitations, beginning in early youth and continuing far into life, at length grow into habits and become a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind?

Adeimantus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Then, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of whom we say that they ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, whether young or old, quarrelling with her husband, or striving and vaunting against the gods in conceit of her happiness, or when she is in affliction, or sorrow, or weeping; and certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or labor.

Adeimantus/ Very right.

Socrates/ Neither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the offices of slaves?

Adeimantus/ They must not.

Socrates/ And surely not bad men, whether cowards or any others, who do the reverse of what we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or revile one another in drink or out of drink, or who in any other manner sin against themselves and their neighbors in word or deed, as the manner of such is. Neither should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of men or women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice, is to be known but not to be practiced or imitated.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Neither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or boatswains, or the like?

Adeimantus/ How can they, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to the callings of any of these?

Socrates/ Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing?

Adeimantus/ Nay, if madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the behavior of madmen.

Socrates/ You mean, if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of narrative style which may be employed by a truly good man when he has anything to say, and that another sort will be used by a man of an opposite character and education.

Adeimantus/ And which are these two sorts?

Socrates/ Suppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the course of a narration comes on some saying or action of another good man, —I should imagine that he will like to personate him, and will not be ashamed of this sort of imitation: he will be most ready to play the part of the good man when he is acting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when he is overtaken by illness or love or drink, or has met with any other disaster. But when he comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of that; he will disdain such a person, and will assume his likeness, if at all, for a moment only when he is performing some good action; at other times he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practiced, nor will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser models; he feels the employment of such an art, unless in jest, to be beneath him, and his mind revolts at it.

Adeimantus/ So I should expect.

Socrates/ Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of Homer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and narrative; but there will be very little of the former, and a great deal of the latter. Do you agree?

Adeimantus/ Certainly, that is the model which such a speaker must necessarily take.

Socrates/ But there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and, the worse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too bad for him: and he will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large company. As I was just now saying, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hail, or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes, pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: he will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, or crow like a cock; his entire art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there will be very little narration.

Adeimantus/ That, will be his mode of speaking.

Socrates/ These, then, are the two kinds of style?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has but slight changes; and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen for their simplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep within the limits of a single harmony (for the changes are not great), and in like manner he will make use of nearly the same rhythm?

Adeimantus/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Whereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms, if the music and the style are to correspond, because the style has all sorts of changes.

Adeimantus/ That is also perfectly true.

Socrates/ And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all poetry, and every form of expression in

words? No one can say anything except in one or other of them or in both together.

Adeimantus/ They include all.

Socrates/ And shall we receive into our State all the three styles, or one only of the two unmixed styles? or would you include the mixed?

Adeimantus/ I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue.

Socrates/ Yes, Adeimantus; but the mixed style is also very charming: and indeed the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is the most popular style with children and their attendants, and with the world in general.

Adeimantus/ I do not deny it.

Socrates/ But I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our State, in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one part only?

Adeimantus/ Yes; quite unsuitable.

Socrates/ And this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we shall find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a husbandman to be a husbandman and not a dicast also, and a soldier a soldier and not a trader also, and the same throughout?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And therefore when anyone of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool

upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to employ for our souls' health the rougher and severer poet or story-teller, who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will follow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers.

Adeimantus/ We certainly will, if we have the power.

Socrates/ Then now, my friend, that part of music or literary education which relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished; for the matter and manner have both been discussed.

Adeimantus/ I think so too.

Socrates/ Next in order will follow melody and song.

Adeimantus/ That is obvious.

Socrates/ Everyone can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to be consistent with ourselves.

Glaucon, laughing, said;

Glaucon/ I fear that the word 'everyone' hardly includes me, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be; though I may guess.

Socrates/ At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts—the words, the melody, and the rhythm; that degree of knowledge I may presuppose?

Glaucon/ Yes, so much as that you may.

Socrates/ And as for the words, there will surely be no difference between words which are and which are not set to music; both will conform to the same laws, and these have been already determined by us?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We were saying, when we spoke of the subject-matter, that we had no need of lamentation and strains of sorrow?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical, and can tell me.

Glaucon/ The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the full-toned or bass Lydian, and such like.

Socrates/ These then, must be banished; even to women who have a character to maintain they are of no use, and much less to men.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly unbecoming the character of our guardians.

Glaucon/ Utterly unbecoming.

Socrates/ And which are the soft or drinking harmonies?

Glaucon/ The Ionian, and the Lydian; they are termed 'relaxed.'

Socrates/ Well, and are these of any military use?

Glaucon/ Quite the reverse, and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian are the only ones which you have left.

Socrates/ Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one warlike, to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a determination to endure; and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to persuade God by prayer, or man by

instruction and admonition, or on the other hand, when he is expressing his willingness to yield to persuasion or entreaty or admonition, and which represents him when by prudent conduct he has attained his end, not carried away by his success, but acting moderately and wisely under the circumstances, and acquiescing in the event. These two harmonies I ask you to leave; the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate, the strain of courage, and the strain of temperance; these, I say, leave.

Glaucon/ And these, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I was just now speaking.

Socrates/ Then, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and melodies, we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale?

Glaucon/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and complex scales, or the makers of any other many-stringed curiously-harmonized instruments?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit them into our State when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together; even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute?

Glaucon/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and the shepherds may have a pipe in the country.

Glaucon/ That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument.

Socrates/ The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his instruments is not at all strange.

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ And so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the State, which not long ago we termed luxurious.

Glaucon/ And we have done wisely.

Socrates/ Then let us now finish the purgation. Next in order to harmonies, rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same rules, for we ought not to seek out complex systems of meter, or meters of every kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of a courageous and harmonious life; and when we have found them, we shall adapt the foot and the melody to words having a like spirit, not the words to the foot and melody. To say what these rhythms are will be your duty—you must teach me them, as you have already taught me the harmonies.

Glaucon/ But, indeed, I cannot tell you. I only know that there are some three principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are framed, just as in sounds there are four notes out of which all the harmonies are composed; that is an observation which I have made. But of what sort of lives they are severally the imitations I am unable to say.

Socrates/ Then, we must take Damon into our counsels; and he will tell us what rhythms are expressive of meanness, or insolence, or fury, or other unworthiness, and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic or heroic, and he arranged them in some manner which I do not quite understand, making the rhythms equal in the rise and fall of the foot, long and short alternating; and, unless I am

mistaken, he spoke of an iambic as well as of a trochaic rhythm, and assigned to them short and long quantities. Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm; or perhaps a combination of the two; for I am not certain what he meant. These matters, however, as I was saying, had better be referred to Damon himself, for the analysis of the subject would be difficult, you know?

Glaucon/ Rather so, I should say.

Socrates/ But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is an effect of good or bad rhythm.

Glaucon/ None at all.

Socrates/ And also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad style; and that harmony and discord in like manner follow style; for our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words, and not the words by them.

Glaucon/ Just so, they should follow the words.

Socrates/ And will not the words and the character of the style depend on the temper of the soul?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And everything else on the style?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on simplicity, —I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character, not that other simplicity which is only an euphemism for folly?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these graces and harmonies their perpetual aim?

Glaucon/ They must.

Socrates/ And surely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive art are full of them, —weaving, embroidery, architecture, and every kind of manufacture; also nature, animal and vegetable, —in all of them there is grace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and discord and inharmonious motion are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature, as grace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness.

Glaucon/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ But shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to be required by us to express the image of the good in their works, on pain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the same control to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he who cannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practicing his art in our State, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason.

Glaucon/ There can be no nobler training than that.

Socrates/ And therefore, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has received this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good, and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason why; and when reason comes he will recognize and salute the friend with whom his education has made him long familiar.

Glaucon/ Yes, I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be trained in music and on the grounds which you mention.

Socrates/ Just as in learning to read, we were satisfied when we knew the letters of the alphabet, which are very few, in all their recurring sizes and combinations; not slighting them as unimportant whether they occupy a space large or small, but everywhere eager to make them out; and not thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognize them wherever they are found:

Glaucon/ True—

Socrates/ Or, as we recognize the reflection of letters in the water, or in a mirror, only when we know the letters themselves; the same art and study giving us the knowledge of both:

Glaucon/ Exactly—

Socrates/ Even so, as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom we have to educate, can ever become musical until we and they know the essential forms of temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and their kindred, as well as the contrary forms, in all their combinations, and can recognize them and their images wherever they are found, not slighting them either in small things or great, but believing them all to be within the sphere of one art and study.

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two are cast in one mold, that will be the fairest of sights to him who has an eye to see it?

Glaucon/ The fairest indeed.

Socrates/ And the fairest is also the loveliest?

Glaucon/ That may be assumed.

Socrates/ And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the loveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?

Glaucon/ That is true, if the deficiency be in his soul; but if there be any merely bodily defect in another he will be patient of it, and will love all the same.

Socrates/ I perceive, that you have or have had experiences of this sort, and I agree. But let me ask you another question: Has excess of pleasure any affinity to temperance?

Glaucon/ How can that be? pleasure deprives a man of the use of his faculties quite as much as pain.

Socrates/ Or any affinity to virtue in general?

Glaucon/ None whatever.

Socrates/ Any affinity to wantonness and intemperance?

Glaucon/ Yes, the greatest.

Socrates/ And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love?

Glaucon/ No, nor a madder.

Socrates/ Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order—temperate and harmonious?

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true love?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then mad or intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near the lover and his beloved; neither of them can have any part in it if their love is of the right sort?

Glaucon/ No, indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them.

Socrates/ Then I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a law to the effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to his love than a father would use to his son, and then only for a noble purpose, and he must first have the other's consent; and this rule is to limit him in all his intercourse, and he is never to be seen going further, or, if he exceeds, he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste.

Glaucon/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ Thus much of music, which makes a fair ending; for what should be the end of music if not the love of beauty?

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ After music comes gymnastic, in which our youth are next to be trained.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Gymnastic as well as music should begin in early years; the training in it should be careful and should

continue through life. Now my belief is, —and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in confirmation of my own, but my own belief is, —not that the good body by any bodily excellence improves the soul, but, on the contrary, that the good soul, by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this may be possible. What do you say?

Glaucon/ Yes, I agree.

Socrates/ Then, to the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing over the more particular care of the body; and in order to avoid prolixity we will now only give the general outlines of the subject.

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ That they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by us; for of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know where in the world he is.

Glaucon/ Yes, that a guardian should require another guardian to take care of him is ridiculous indeed.

Socrates/ But next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are in training for the great contest of all—are they not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ I am afraid, that a habit of body such as they have is but a sleepy sort of thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe that these athletes sleep away their lives, and are liable to most dangerous illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their customary regimen?

Glaucon/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Then, a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior athletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the utmost keenness; amid the many changes of water and also of food, of summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure when on a campaign, they must not be liable to break down in health.

Glaucon/ That is my view.

Socrates/ The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which we were just now describing.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, I conceive that there is a gymnastic which, like our music, is simple and good; and especially the military gymnastic.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ My meaning may be learned from Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes at their feasts, when they are campaigning, on soldiers' fare; they have no fish, although they are on the shores of the Hellespont, and they are not allowed boiled meats but only roast, which is the food most convenient for soldiers, requiring only that they should light a fire, and not involving the trouble of carrying about pots and pans.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular; all professional athletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good condition should take nothing of the kind.

Glaucon/ Yes, and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them.

Socrates/ Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of Sicilian cookery?

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ Nor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a Corinthian girl as his fair friend?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Neither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of Athenian confectionary?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ All such feeding and living may be rightly compared by us to melody and song composed in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ There complexity engendered license, and here disease; whereas simplicity in music was the parent of temperance in the soul; and simplicity in gymnastic of health in the body.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ But when intemperance and diseases multiply in a State, halls of justice and medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the doctor and the lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of education than this, that not only artisans and the meaner sort of people need the skill of first-rate physicians and judges, but also those who would profess to have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful, and a great sign of the want of good-breeding, that a man should have to go abroad for his law and physic because he has none of his own at home, and must therefore surrender

himself into the hands of other men whom he makes lords and judges over him?

Glaucon/ Of all things, the most disgraceful.

Socrates/ Would you say 'most' when you consider that there is a further stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long litigant, passing all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is actually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his litigiousness; he imagines that he is a master in dishonesty; able to take every crooked turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy and getting out of the way of justice: and all for what? —in order to gain small points not worth mentioning, he not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a napping judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing. Is not that still more disgraceful?

Glaucon/ Yes, that is still more disgraceful.

Socrates/ Well, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to be cured, or on occasion of an epidemic, but just because, by indolence and a habit of life such as we have been describing, men fill themselves with waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh, compelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find more names for diseases, such as flatulence and catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace?

Glaucon/ Yes, they do certainly give very strange and newfangled names to diseases.

Socrates/ Yes, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in the days of Asclepius; and this I infer from the circumstance that the hero Eurypylus, after he has been wounded in Homer, drinks a posset of Pramnian wine well besprinkled with barley-meal and grated cheese, which are certainly inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who

were at the Trojan war do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink, or rebuke Patroclus, who is treating his case.

Glaucon/ Well, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a person in his condition.

Socrates/ Not so extraordinary, if you bear in mind that in former days, as is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius did not practice our present system of medicine, which may be said to educate diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly constitution, by a combination of training and doctoring found out a way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world.

Glaucon/ How was that?

Socrates/ By the invention of lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which he perpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian; he could do nothing but attend upon himself, and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he struggled on to old age.

Glaucon/ A rare reward of his skill!

Socrates/ Yes, a reward which a man might fairly expect who never understood that, if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants in valetudinarian arts, the omission arose, not from ignorance or inexperience of such a branch of medicine, but because he knew that in all well-ordered states every individual has an occupation to which he must attend, and has therefore no leisure to spend in continually being ill. This we remark in the case of the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and ready cure; an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife, —these are his remedies. And if someone prescribes for him a course of dietetics, and tells him that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his customary employment; and therefore bidding good-bye to this sort of physician, he resumes his ordinary habits, and either gets well and lives and does his business, or, if his constitution fails, he dies and has no more trouble.

Glaucon/ Yes, and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art of medicine thus far only.

Socrates/ Has he not, an occupation; and what profit would there be in his life if he were deprived of his occupation?

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ But with the rich man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he has any specially appointed work which he must perform, if he would live.

Glaucon/ He is generally supposed to have nothing to do.

Socrates/ Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practice virtue?

Glaucon/ Nay, I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner.

Socrates/ Let us not have a dispute with him about this, but rather ask ourselves: Is the practice of virtue obligatory on the rich man, or can he live without it? And if obligatory on him, then let us raise a further question, whether this dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical

arts, does not equally stand in the way of the sentiment of Phocylides?

Glaucon/ Of that, there can be no doubt; such excessive care of the body, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic, is most inimical to the practice of virtue.

Socrates/ Yes, indeed, and equally incompatible with the management of a house, an army, or an office of state; and, what is most important of all, irreconcilable with any kind of study or thought or self-reflection—there is a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness are to be ascribed to philosophy, and hence all practicing or making trial of virtue in the higher sense is absolutely stopped; for a man is always fancying that he is being made ill, and is in constant anxiety about the state of his body.

Glaucon/ Yes, likely enough.

Socrates/ And therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited the power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy constitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment; such as these he cured by purges and operations, and bade them live as usual, herein consulting the interests of the State; but bodies which disease had penetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure by gradual processes of evacuation and infusion: he did not want to lengthen out good-for-nothing lives, or to have weak fathers begetting weaker sons "if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had no business to cure him; for such a cure would have been of no use either to himself, or to the State.

Glaucon/ Then, you regard Asclepius as a statesman.

Socrates/ Clearly; and his character is further illustrated by his sons.

Note that they were heroes in the days of old and practiced the medicines of which I am speaking at the

siege of Troy: You will remember how, when Pandarus wounded Menelaus, they

Socrates/ 'Sucked the blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies,'

but they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or drink in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus; the remedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal any man who before he was wounded was healthy and regular in his habits; and even though he did happen to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others; the art of medicine was not designed for their good, and though they were as rich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them.

Glaucon/ They were very acute persons, those sons of Asclepius.

Socrates/ Naturally so. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar disobeying our behests, although they acknowledge that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was at the point of death, and for this reason he was struck by lightning. But we, in accordance with the principle already affirmed by us, will not believe them when they tell us both; —if he was the son of a god, we maintain that he was not avaricious; or, if he was avaricious, he was not the son of a god.

Glaucon/ All that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to you: Ought there not to be good physicians in a State, and are not the best those who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and bad? and are not the best judges in like manner those who are acquainted with all sorts of moral natures?

Socrates/ Yes, I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do you know whom I think good?

Glaucon/ Will you tell me?

Socrates/ I will, if I can. Let me however note that in the same question you join two things which are not the same.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, you join physicians and judges. Now the most skillful physicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with the knowledge of their art the greatest experience of disease; they had better not be robust in health, and should have had all manner of diseases in their own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with which they cure the body; in that case we could not allow them ever to be or to have been sickly; but they cure the body with the mind, and the mind which has become and is sick can cure nothing.

Glaucon/ That is very true.

Socrates/ But with the judge it is otherwise; since he governs mind by mind; he ought not therefore to have been trained among vicious minds, and to have associated with them from youth upwards, and to have gone through the whole calendar of crime, only in order that he may quickly infer the crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from his own self-consciousness; the honorable mind which is to form a healthy judgment should have had no experience or contamination of evil habits when young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple, and are easily practiced upon by the dishonest, because they have no examples of what evil is in their own souls.

Glaucon/ Yes, they are far too apt to be deceived.

Socrates/ Therefore, the judge should not be young; he should have learned to know evil, not from his own soul, but

from late and long observation of the nature of evil in others: knowledge should be his guide, not personal experience.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is the ideal of a judge.

Socrates/ Yes, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your question); for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning and suspicious nature of which we spoke, —he who has committed many crimes, and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is amongst his fellows, is wonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he judges of them by himself: but when he gets into the company of men of virtue, who have the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again, owing to his unseasonable suspicions; he cannot recognize an honest man, because he has no pattern of honesty in himself; at the same time, as the bad are more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, he thinks himself, and is by others thought to be, rather wise than foolish.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but the other; for vice cannot know virtue too, but a virtuous nature, educated by time, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice: the virtuous, and not the vicious man has wisdom—in my opinion.

Glaucon/ And in mine also.

Socrates/ This is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you will sanction in your state. They will minister to better natures, giving health both of soul and of body; but those who are diseased in their bodies they will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put an end to themselves.

Glaucon/ That is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State.

Socrates/ And thus our youth, having been educated only in that simple music which, as we said, inspires temperance, will be reluctant to go to law.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And the musician, who, keeping to the same track, is content to practice the simple gymnastic, will have nothing to do with medicine unless in some extreme case.

Glaucon/ That I quite believe.

Socrates/ The very exercises and toils which he undergoes are intended to stimulate the spirited element of his nature, and not to increase his strength; he will not, like common athletes, use exercise and regimen to develop his muscles.

Glaucon/ Very right.

Socrates/ Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, as is often supposed, the one for the training of the soul, the other for the training of the body.

Glaucon/ What then is the real object of them?

Socrates/ I believe, that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the improvement of the soul.

Glaucon/ How can that be?

Socrates/ Did you never observe, the effect on the mind itself of exclusive devotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to music?

Glaucon/ In what way shown?

Socrates/ The one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of softness and effeminacy.

Glaucon/ Yes, I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of a savage, and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is good for him.

Socrates/ Yet surely, this ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if rightly educated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is liable to become hard and brutal.

Glaucon/ That I quite think.

Socrates/ On the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness. And this also, when too much indulged, will turn to softness, but, if educated rightly, will be gentle and moderate.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And both should be in harmony?

Glaucon/ Beyond question.

Socrates/ And the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs of which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in warbling and the delights of song; in the first stage of the process the passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made useful, instead of brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the softening and soothing process, in the next stage he begins to melt and waste, until he has wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul; and he becomes a feeble warrior.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily accomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of music weakening the spirit renders him excitable; —on the least provocation he flames up at once, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having spirit he grows irritable and passionate and is quite impracticable.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great feeder, and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy, at first the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit, and he becomes twice the man that he was.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what happens? if he do nothing else, and holds no converse with the Muses, does not even that intelligence which there may be in him, having no taste of any sort of learning or enquiry or thought or culture, grow feeble and dull and blind, his mind never waking up or receiving nourishment, and his senses not being purged of their mists?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using the weapon of persuasion, —he is like a wild beast, all violence and fierceness, and knows no other way of dealing; and he lives in all ignorance and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace.

Glaucon/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ And as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirited and the other the philosophical, some God, as I should say, has given mankind two arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and body), in order that these two principles (like the strings of an

instrument) may be relaxed or drawn tighter until they are duly harmonized.

Glaucon/ That appears to be the intention.

Socrates/ And he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and best attempers them to the soul, may be rightly called the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.

Glaucon/ You are quite right, Socrates.

Socrates/ And such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the government is to last.

Glaucon/ Yes, he will be absolutely necessary.

Socrates/ Such, then, are our principles of nurture and education: Where would be the use of going into further details about the dances of our citizens, or about their hunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian contests? For these all follow the general principle, and having found that, we shall have no difficulty in discovering them.

Glaucon/ I dare say that there will be no difficulty.

Socrates/ Very good, then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are to be rulers and who subjects?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And that the best of these must rule.

Glaucon/ That is also clear.

Socrates/ Now, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And as we are to have the best of guardians for our city, must they not be those who have most the character of guardians?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special care of the State?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves?

Glaucon/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the same interests with himself, and that of which the good or evil fortune is supposed by him at any time most to affect his own?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those who in their whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of their country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her interests.

Glaucon/ Those are the right men.

Socrates/ And they will have to be watched at every age, in order that we may see whether they preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence either of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to the State.

Glaucon/ How cast off?

Socrates/ I will explain to you. A resolution may go out of a man's mind either with his will or against his will; with his will when he gets rid of a falsehood and learns better, against his will whenever he is deprived of a truth.

Glaucon/ I understand, the willing loss of a resolution; the meaning of the unwilling I have yet to learn.

Socrates/ Why, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good, and willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to possess the truth a good? and you would agree that to conceive things as they are is to possess the truth?

Glaucon/ Yes, I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived of truth against their will.

Socrates/ And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force, or enchantment?

Glaucon/ Still, I do not understand you.

Socrates/ I fear that I must have been talking darkly, like the tragedians. I only mean that some men are changed by persuasion and that others forget; argument steals away the hearts of one class, and time of the other; and this I call theft. Now you understand me?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Those again who are forced, are those whom the violence of some pain or grief compels to change their opinion.

Glaucon/ I understand, and you are quite right.

Socrates/ And you would also acknowledge that the enchanted are those who change their minds either under the softer influence of pleasure, or the sterner influence of fear?

Glaucon/ Yes, everything that deceives may be said to enchant.

Socrates/ Therefore, as I was just now saying, we must enquire who are the best guardians of their own conviction that what they think the interest of the State is to be the rule of their lives. We must watch them from their youth

upwards, and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That will be the way?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them, in which they will be made to give further proof of the same qualities.

Glaucon/ Very right.

Socrates/ And then, we must try them with enchantments—that is the third sort of test—and see what will be their behavior: like those who take colts amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature, so must we take our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them into pleasures, and prove them more thoroughly than gold is proved in the furnace, that we may discover whether they are armed against all enchantments, and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have learned, and retaining under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature, such as will be most serviceable to the individual and to the State. And he who at every age, as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State; he shall be honored in life and death, and shall receive sepulture and other memorials of honor, the greatest that we have to give. But him who fails, we must reject. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed. I speak generally, and not with any pretension to exactness.

Glaucon/ And, speaking generally, I agree with you.

Socrates/ And perhaps the word ‘guardian’ in the fullest sense ought to be applied to this higher class only who

preserve us against foreign enemies and maintain peace among our citizens at home, that the one may not have the will, or the others the power, to harm us. The young men whom we before called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the principles of the rulers.

Glaucon/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately spoke—just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers, if that be possible, and at any rate the rest of the city?

Glaucon/ What sort of lie?

Socrates/ Nothing new, only an old Phoenician tale of what has often occurred before now in other places, (as the poets say, and have made the world believe,) though not in our time, and I do not know whether such an event could ever happen again, or could now even be made probable, if it did.

Glaucon/ How your words seem to hesitate on your lips!

Socrates/ You will not wonder, at my hesitation when you have heard.

Glaucon/ Speak, and fear not.

Socrates/ Well then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you in the face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which I propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their youth was a dream, and the education and training which they received from us, an appearance only; in reality during all that time they were being formed and fed in the womb of the earth, where they themselves and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured; when they were completed, the earth, their mother, sent them up; and so, their country being their

mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers.

Glaucon/ You had good reason, to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell.

Socrates/ True, but there is more coming; I have only told you half. Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honor; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard, or of which they are to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the race. They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring; for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised to honor, and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be destroyed. Such is the tale; is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?

Glaucon/ Not in the present generation, there is no way of accomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and their sons' sons, and posterity after them.

Socrates/ I see the difficulty, yet the fostering of such a belief will make them care more for the city and for one another. Enough, however, of the fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumor, while we arm our earth-born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their rulers. Let them look round and select a spot whence they can best suppress insurrection, if any prove refractory within, and also defend themselves against enemies, who like wolves may come down on the fold from without; there let them encamp, and when they have encamped, let them sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare their dwellings.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ And their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of winter and the heat of summer.

Glaucon/ I suppose that you mean houses.

Socrates/ Yes, but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of shop-keepers.

Glaucon/ What is the difference?

Socrates/ That I will endeavor to explain. To keep watch-dogs, who, from want of discipline or hunger, or some evil habit or other, would turn upon the sheep and worry them, and behave not like dogs but wolves, would be a foul and monstrous thing in a shepherd?

Glaucon/ Truly monstrous.

Socrates/ And therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries, being stronger than our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and become savage tyrants instead of friends and allies?

Glaucon/ Yes, great care should be taken.

Socrates/ And would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?

Glaucon/ But they are well-educated already.

Socrates/ I cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon, I am much more certain that they ought to be, and that true education, whatever that may be, will have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize them in their relations to one another, and to those who are under their protection.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And not only their education, but their habitations, and all that belongs to them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians, nor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of sense must acknowledge that.

Glaucon/ He must.

Socrates/ Then now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should they have a private house or store closed against anyone who has a mind to enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more; and they will go to mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have therefore no need of the dross which is current among men, and ought not to pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture; for that commoner metal has been the source of many unholy deeds, but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the saviors of the State. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become

housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other citizens; hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and to the rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our State be ordered, and that these shall be the regulations appointed by us for our guardians concerning their houses and all other matters?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Book 4.

Socrates/ Here Adeimantus interposed a question:

Adeimantus/ How would you answer, Socrates, if a person were to say that you are making these people miserable, and that they are the cause of their own unhappiness; the city in fact belongs to them, but they are none the better for it; whereas other men acquire lands, and build large and handsome houses, and have everything handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the gods on their own account, and practicing hospitality; moreover, as you were saying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that is usual among the favorites of fortune; but our poor citizens are no better than mercenaries who are quartered in the city and are always mounting guard?

Socrates/ Yes, and you may add that they are only fed, and not paid in addition to their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot, if they would, take a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on a mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought to be happiness; and many other accusations of the same nature might be added.

Adeimantus/ But, let us suppose all this to be included in the charge.

Socrates/ You mean to ask, what will be our answer?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ If we proceed along the old path, my belief, is that we shall find the answer. And our answer will be that, even as they are, our guardians may very likely be the happiest of men; but that our aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of anyone class, but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice, and in the ill-ordered

State injustice: and, having found them, we might then decide which of the two is the happier. At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy State, not piecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole; and by-and-by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of State. Suppose that we were painting a statue, and someone came up to us and said, Why do you not put the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the body—the eyes ought to be purple, but you have made them black—to him we might fairly answer, Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes; consider rather whether, by giving this and the other features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And so I say to you, do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will make them anything but guardians; for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and bid them till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our potters also might be allowed to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, passing round the wine-cup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working at pottery only as much as they like; in this way we might make every class happy—and then, as you imagine, the whole State would be happy. But do not put this idea into our heads; for, if we listen to you, the husbandman will be no longer a husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no one will have the character of any distinct class in the State. Now this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be what you are not, is confined to cobblers; but when the guardians of the laws and of the government are only seeming and not real guardians, then see how they turn the State upside down; and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness to the State. We mean our

guardians to be true saviors and not the destroyers of the State, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State. But, if so, we mean different things, and he is speaking of something which is not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole. But if the latter be the truth, then the guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way. And thus the whole State will grow up in a noble order, and the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them.

Adeimantus/ I think that you are quite right.

Socrates/ I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me.

Adeimantus/ What may that be?

Socrates/ There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.

Adeimantus/ What are they?

Socrates/ Wealth, and poverty.

Adeimantus/ How do they act?

Socrates/ The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you, any longer take the same pains with his art?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ He will grow more and more indolent and careless?

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?

Adeimantus/ Yes; he greatly deteriorates.

Socrates/ But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself with tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate?

Adeimantus/ That is evident.

Socrates/ Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, against which the guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved.

Adeimantus/ What evils?

Socrates/ Wealth, and poverty; the one is the parent of luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent.

Adeimantus/ That is very true, but still I should like to know, Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is rich and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war.

Socrates/ There would certainly be a difficulty, in going to war with one such enemy; but there is no difficulty where there are two of them.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ In the first place, if we have to fight, our side will be trained warriors fighting against an army of rich men.

Adeimantus/ That is true.

Socrates/ And do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was perfect in his art would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do gentlemen who were not boxers?

Adeimantus/ Hardly, if they came upon him at once.

Socrates/ What, not, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up? And supposing he were to do this several times under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert, overturn more than one stout personage?

Adeimantus/ Certainly, there would be nothing wonderful in that.

Socrates/ And yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and practice of boxing than they have in military qualities.

Adeimantus/ Likely enough.

Socrates/ Then we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or three times their own number?

Adeimantus/ I agree with you, for I think you right.

Socrates/ And suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to one of the two cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver and gold we neither have nor are permitted to have, but you may; do you therefore come and help us in war, and take the spoils of the other city: Who, on hearing these words, would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs, rather than, with the dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep?

Adeimantus/ That is not likely; and yet there might be a danger to the poor State if the wealth of many States were to be gathered into one.

Socrates/ But how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own!

Adeimantus/ Why so?

Socrates/ You ought to speak of other States in the plural number; not one of them is a city, but many cities, as they say in the game. For indeed any city, however small, is in

fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich; these are at war with one another; and in either there are many smaller divisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark if you treated them all as a single State. But if you deal with them as many, and give the wealth or power or persons of the one to the others, you will always have a great many friends and not many enemies. And your State, while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in her, will be the greatest of States, I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance, but indeed and truth, though she number not more than a thousand defenders. A single State which is her equal you will hardly find, either among Hellenes or barbarians, though many that appear to be as great and many times greater.

Adeimantus/ That is most true.

Socrates/ And what, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they are considering the size of the State and the amount of territory which they are to include, and beyond which they will not go?

Adeimantus/ What limit would you propose?

Socrates/ I would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity; that, I think, is the proper limit.

Adeimantus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Here then, is another order which will have to be conveyed to our guardians: Let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but one and self-sufficing.

Adeimantus/ And surely, this is not a very severe order which we impose upon them.

Socrates/ And the other, of which we were speaking before is lighter still, —I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when inferior, and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the lower classes, when naturally superior. The intention was, that, in the case

of the citizens generally, each individual should be put to the use for which nature intended him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is not so difficult.

Socrates/ The regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not, as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing, —a thing, however, which I would rather call, not, great, but sufficient for our purpose.

Adeimantus/ What may that be?

Socrates/ Education, and nurture: If our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, as well as other matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the possession of women and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common, as the proverb says.

Adeimantus/ That will be the best way of settling them.

Socrates/ Also, the State, if once started well, moves with accumulating force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good constitutions, and these good constitutions taking root in a good education improve more and more, and this improvement affects the breed in man as in other animals.

Adeimantus/ Very possibly.

Socrates/ Then to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of our rulers should be directed, —that music and gymnastic be preserved in their original form, and no innovation made. They must do their utmost to maintain them intact. And when anyone says that mankind most regard

'The newest song which the singers have,'

they will be afraid that he may be praising, not new songs, but a new kind of song; and this ought not to be praised, or conceived to be the meaning of the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State, and ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe him; —he says that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the State always change with them.

Adeimantus/ Yes, and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and your own.

Socrates/ Then, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in music?

Adeimantus/ Yes, the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in.

Socrates/ Yes, in the form of amusement; and at first sight it appears harmless.

Adeimantus/ Why, yes, and there is no harm; were it not that little by little this spirit of license, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates into manners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades contracts between man and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an overthrow of all rights, private as well as public.

Socrates/ Is that true?

Adeimantus/ That is my belief.

Socrates/ Then, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths themselves become lawless, they can never grow up into well-conducted and virtuous citizens.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And when they have made a good beginning in play, and by the help of music have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, in a manner how unlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them in all their actions and be a principle of growth to them, and if there be any fallen places in the State will raise them up again.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Thus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which their predecessors have altogether neglected.

Adeimantus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean such things as these: —when the young are to be silent before their elders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit; what honor is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general. You would agree with me?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such matters, —I doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written enactments about them likely to be lasting.

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ It would seem, Adeimantus, that the direction in which education starts a man, will determine his future life. Does not like always attract like?

Adeimantus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Until someone rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and may be the reverse of good?

Adeimantus/ That is not to be denied.

Socrates/ And for this reason, I shall not attempt to legislate further about them.

Adeimantus/ Naturally enough.

Socrates/ Well, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings between man and man, or again about agreements with artisans; about insult and injury, or the commencement of actions, and the appointment of juries, what would you say? there may also arise questions about any impositions and exactions of market and harbor dues which may be required, and in general about the regulations of markets, police, harbors, and the like. But, oh heavens! shall we condescend to legislate on any of these particulars?

Adeimantus/ I think, that there is no need to impose laws about them on good men; what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough for themselves.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws which we have given them.

Adeimantus/ And without divine help, they will go on forever making and mending their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining perfection.

Socrates/ You would compare them, to those invalids who, having no self-restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?

Adeimantus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Yes, and what a delightful life they lead! they are always doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always fancying that they will be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them to try.

Adeimantus/ Such cases are very common, with invalids of this sort.

Socrates/ Yes, and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up eating and drinking and wenching and idling, neither drug nor cautery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail.

Adeimantus/ Charming! I see nothing charming in going into a passion with a man who tells you what is right.

Socrates/ These gentlemen, do not seem to be in your good graces.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly not.

Socrates/ Nor would you praise the behavior of States which act like the men whom I was just now describing. For are there not ill-ordered States in which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the constitution; and yet he who most sweetly courts those who live under this regime and indulges them and fawns upon them and is skillful in anticipating and gratifying their humors is held to be a great and good statesman—do not these States resemble the persons whom I was describing?

Adeimantus/ Yes, the States are as bad as the men; and I am very far from praising them.

Socrates/ But do you not admire, the coolness and dexterity of these ready ministers of political corruption?

Adeimantus/ Yes, I do; but not of all of them, for there are some whom the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really statesmen, and these are not much to be admired.

Socrates/ What do you mean? you should have more feeling for them. When a man cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure declare that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?

Adeimantus/ Nay, certainly not in that case.

Socrates/ Well, then, do not be angry with them; for are they not as good as a play, trying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing; they are always fancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in contracts, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing that they are in reality cutting off the heads of a hydra?

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is just what they are doing.

Socrates/ I conceive, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with this class of enactments whether concerning laws or the constitution either in an ill-ordered or in a well-ordered State; for in the former they are quite useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them; and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations.

Adeimantus/ What, then, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation?

Socrates/ Nothing to us, but to Apollo, the god of Delphi, there remains the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of all.

Adeimantus/ Which are they?

Socrates/ The institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of gods, demigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of the dead, and the rites which have to be observed by him who would propitiate the inhabitants of the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant ourselves, and as founders of a city we should be unwise in trusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the center, on the navel of the earth, and he is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.

Adeimantus/ You are right, and we will do as you propose.

Socrates/ But where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where. Now that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search, and get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, and let us see where in it we can discover justice and where injustice, and in what they differ from one another, and

which of them the man who would be happy should have for his portion, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

Glaucon/ Nonsense. did you not promise to search yourself, saying that for you not to help justice in her need would be an impiety?

Socrates/ I do not deny that I said so; and as you remind me, I will be as good as my word; but you must join.

Glaucon/ We will.

Socrates/ Well, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way: I mean to begin with the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect.

Glaucon/ That is most certain.

Socrates/ And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.

Glaucon/ That is likewise clear.

Socrates/ And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not found will be the residue?

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ If there were four things, and we were searching for one of them, wherever it might be, the one sought for might be known to us from the first, and there would be no further trouble; or we might know the other three first, and then the fourth would clearly be the one left.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are also four in number?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ First among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and in this I detect a certain peculiarity.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in counsel?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but by knowledge, do men counsel well?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?

Glaucon/ Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in carpentering.

Socrates/ Then a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which counsels for the best about wooden implements?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?

Glaucon/ Not by reason of any of them.

Socrates/ Nor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would give the city the name of agricultural?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, and is there any knowledge in our recently-founded State among any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing in the State, but about the whole, and considers how a State can best deal with itself and with other States?

Glaucon/ There certainly is.

Socrates/ And what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found?

Glaucon/ It is the knowledge of the guardians, and is found among those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians.

Socrates/ And what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of knowledge?

Glaucon/ The name of good in counsel and truly wise.

Socrates/ And will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths?

Glaucon/ Socrates: The smiths, will be far more numerous.

Socrates/ Will not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?

Glaucon/ Much the smallest.

Socrates/ And so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which resides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State, being thus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and this, which has the only knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been ordained by nature to be of all classes the least.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Thus, then, the nature and place in the State of one of the four virtues has somehow or other been discovered.

Glaucon/ And, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered.

Socrates/ Again, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage, and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the State.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Why, everyone who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's behalf.

Glaucon/ No one, would ever think of any other.

Socrates/ The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the city either the one or the other.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; and this is what you term courage.

Glaucon/ I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you.

Socrates/ I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.

Glaucon/ Salvation of what?

Socrates/ Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the words 'under all circumstances' to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?

Glaucon/ If you please.

Socrates/ You know, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white color first; this they prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast color, and

no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom. But, when the ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other color.

Glaucon/ Yes, I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance.

Socrates/ Then now, you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic; we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection, and the color of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure—mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree.

Glaucon/ But I agree, for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave—this, in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have another name.

Socrates/ Most certainly.

Glaucon/ Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe?

Socrates/ Why, yes, you may, and if you add the words 'of a citizen' you will not be far wrong; —hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but justice; and for the purpose of our enquiry we have said enough.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State—first, temperance, and then justice which is the end of our search.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?

Glaucon/ I do not know how that can be accomplished, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favor of considering temperance first.

Socrates/ Certainly, I should not be justified in refusing your request.

Glaucon/ Then consider.

Socrates/ Yes, I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Temperance, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of 'a man being his own master;' and other traces of the same notion may be found in language.

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ There is something ridiculous in the expression 'master of himself;' for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better

principle, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse—in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.

Glaucon/ Yes, there is reason in that.

Socrates/ And now, look at our newly-created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words 'temperance' and 'self-mastery' truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.

Glaucon/ Yes, I see that what you say is true.

Socrates/ Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and those the best born and best educated.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.

Glaucon/ That I perceive.

Socrates/ Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance be found—in the rulers or in the subjects?

Glaucon/ In both, as I should imagine.

Socrates/ Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?

Glaucon/ Why so?

Socrates/ Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in states and individuals.

Glaucon/ I entirely agree with you.

Socrates/ And so, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a state virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.

Glaucon/ The inference is obvious.

Socrates/ The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and pass out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this

country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her first, let me know.

Glaucon/ Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him—that is about as much as I am good for.

Socrates/ Offer up a prayer with me and follow.

Glaucon/ I will, but you must show me the way.

Socrates/ Here is no path, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must push on.

Glaucon/ Let us push on.

Socrates/ Here I saw something: Halloo!, I begin to perceive a track, and I believe that the quarry will not escape.

Glaucon/ Good news.

Socrates/ Truly, we are stupid fellows.

Glaucon/ Why so?

Socrates/ Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands—that was the way with us—we looked not at what we were seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of justice, and have failed to recognize her.

Glaucon/ I grow impatient at the length of your exordium.

Socrates/ Well then, tell me, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man should practice one thing only, the thing to which his nature

was best adapted; —now justice is this principle or a part of it.

Glaucon/ Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.

Socrates/ Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us.

Glaucon/ Yes, we said so.

Socrates/ Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?

Glaucon/ I cannot, but I should like to be told.

Socrates/ Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one.

Glaucon/ That follows of necessity.

Socrates/ If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject, —the quality, I mean, of everyone doing his own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm—the question is not so easily answered.

Glaucon/ Certainly, there would be a difficulty in saying which.

Socrates/ Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of determining suits at law?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?

Glaucon/ Yes; that is their principle.

Socrates/ Which is a just principle?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State?

Glaucon/ Not much.

Socrates/ But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Seeing then, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?

Glaucon/ Precisely.

Socrates/ And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just.

Glaucon/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ We will not, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be not verified, we must have a fresh enquiry. First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we

constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual—if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls.

Glaucon/ That will be in regular course; let us do as you say.

Socrates/ When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?

Glaucon/ Like.

Socrates/ The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State?

Glaucon/ He will.

Socrates/ And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question—whether the soul has these three principles or not?

Glaucon/ An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the good.

Socrates/ Very true, and I do not think that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; the true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous enquiry.

Glaucon/ May we not be satisfied with that? —under the circumstances, I am quite content.

Socrates/ I too, shall be extremely well satisfied.

Glaucon/ Then faint not in pursuing the speculation.

Socrates/ Must we not acknowledge, that in each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from the individual they pass into the State? —how else can they come there? Take the quality of passion or spirit; —it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, e.g. the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the northern nations; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ There is no difficulty in understanding this.

Glaucon/ None whatever.

Socrates/ But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action—to determine that is the difficulty.

Glaucon/ Yes, there lies the difficulty.

Socrates/ Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different.

Glaucon/ How can we?

Socrates/ The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but different.

Glaucon/ Good.

Socrates/ For example, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Still, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we should hereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment—to such a mode of speech we should object, and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot), his objection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference; and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes round. But if, while revolving,

the axis inclines either to the right or left, forwards or backwards, then in no point of view can they be at rest.

Glaucon/ That is the correct mode of describing them.

Socrates/ Then none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation to the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.

Glaucon/ Certainly not, according to my way of thinking.

Socrates/ Yet, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections, and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity, and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if this assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn.

Glaucon/ Yes, that will be the best way.

Socrates/ Well, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether they are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in the fact of their opposition)?

Glaucon/ Yes, they are opposites.

Socrates/ Well, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again willing and wishing, —all these you would refer to the classes already mentioned. You would say—would you not? —that the soul of him who desires is seeking after the object of his desire; or that he is drawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess: or again, when a person wants anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his desire, intimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent, as if he had been asked a question?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them?

Glaucon/ Let us take that class.

Socrates/ The object of one is food, and of the other drink?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for example, warm or cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any particular sort: but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small: but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?

Glaucon/ Yes, the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the simple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.

Socrates/ But here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but good drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object of desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good drink; and the same is true of every other desire.

Glaucon/ Yes, the opponent might have something to say.

Socrates/ Nevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some have a quality attached to either term of the relation; others are simple and have their correlatives simple.

Glaucon/ I do not know what you mean.

Socrates/ Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the much greater to the much less?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to be to the less that is to be?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And so of more and less, and of other correlative terms, such as the double and the half, or again, the heavier and the lighter, the swifter and the slower; and of hot and cold, and of any other relatives; —is not this true of all of them?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge; I mean, for example, that the science of house-building is a kind of knowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed architecture.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Because it has a particular quality which no other has?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular kind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original meaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if one term of a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one term is qualified, the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that relatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is healthy, or of disease necessarily diseased, or that the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil; but only that, when the term science is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which in this case is the nature of health and disease, it becomes defined, and is hence called not merely science, but the science of medicine.

Glaucon/ I quite understand, and I think as you do.

Socrates/ Would you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms, having clearly a relation—

Glaucon/ Yes, thirst is relative to drink.

Socrates/ And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires only drink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?

Glaucon/ That is plain. ‘

Socrates/ And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink, that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like a beast to drink; for,

as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same.

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ No more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the bow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other pulls.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink?

Glaucon/ Yes, it constantly happens.

Socrates/ And in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him?

Glaucon/ I should say so.

Socrates/ And the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from one another; the one with which a man reasons, we may call the rational principle of the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the flutterings of any other desire, may be termed the irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions?

Glaucon/ Yes, we may fairly assume them to be different.

Socrates/ Then let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding?

Glaucon/ I should be inclined to say—akin to desire.

Socrates/ Well, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.

Glaucon/ I have heard the story myself.

Socrates/ The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as though they were two distinct things.

Glaucon/ Yes; that is the meaning.

Socrates/ And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason; —but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed, is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in anyone else?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is the less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as hunger, or cold, or any other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him—these he deems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited by them.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more.

Glaucon/ The illustration is perfect, and in our State, as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds.

Socrates/ I perceive, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a further point which I wish you to consider.

Glaucon/ What point?

Socrates/ You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind of desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ But a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also, or only a kind of reason; in which latter case, instead of three principles in the soul, there will only be two, the rational and the concupiscent; or rather, as the State was composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counselors, so may there not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason?

Glaucon/ Yes, there must be a third.

Socrates/ Yes, if passion, which has already been shown to be different from desire, turn out also to be different from reason.

Glaucon/ But that is easily proved: —We may observe even in young children that they are full of spirit almost as

soon as they are born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of them late enough.

Socrates/ Excellent, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may once more appeal to the words of Homer, which have been already quoted by us;

> 'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul;'

for in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual, and that they are three in number.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State constitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in which the State is just?

Glaucon/ That follows of course.

Socrates/ We cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class?

Glaucon/ We are not very likely to have forgotten.

Socrates/ We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?

Glaucon/ Yes, we must remember that too.

Socrates/ And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm?

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the fullness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural-born subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without; the one counseling, and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands and counsels?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear?

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and which proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel?

Glaucon/ Certainly, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual.

Socrates/ And surely, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just.

Glaucon/ That is very certain.

Socrates/ And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which we found her to be in the State?

Glaucon/ There is no difference in my opinion.

Socrates/ Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.

Glaucon/ What sort of instances do you mean?

Socrates/ If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would anyone deny this?

Glaucon/ No one.

Socrates/ Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country?

Glaucon/ Never.

Socrates/ Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonor his father and mother, or to fail in his religious duties?

Glaucon/ No one.

Socrates/ And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether in ruling or being ruled?

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?

Glaucon/ Not I, indeed.

Socrates/ Then our dream has been realized; and the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been verified?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And the division of labor which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another's, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and

concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others, —he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals—when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.

Glaucon/ You have said the exact truth, Socrates.

Socrates/ Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood?

Glaucon/ Most certainly not.

Socrates/ May we say so, then?

Glaucon/ Let us say so.

Socrates/ And now, injustice has to be considered.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles—a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the

natural vassal, —what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice?

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly clear?

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Why, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is unhealthy causes disease.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?

Glaucon/ That is certain.

Socrates/ And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this natural order?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order?

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practice virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed?

Glaucon/ In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice; assuming them both to be such as we have described?

Socrates/ Yes, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as we are near the spot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with our own eyes, let us not faint by the way.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Come up hither, and behold the various forms of vice, those of them, I mean, which are worth looking at.

Glaucon/ I am following you: proceed.

Socrates/ The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from some tower of speculation, a man may look down and see that virtue is one, but that the forms of vice are innumerable; there being four special ones which are deserving of note.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as there are distinct forms of the State.

Glaucon/ How many?

Socrates/ There are five of the State, and five of the soul.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ The first, is that which we have been describing, and which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But I regard the two names as describing one form only; for whether the government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been trained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the State will be maintained.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Book 5.

Socrates/ Such is the good and true City or State, and the good and true man is of the same pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong; and the evil is one which affects not only the ordering of the State, but also the regulation of the individual soul, and is exhibited in four forms.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ I was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared to me to succeed one another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting a little way off, just beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to him: stretching forth his hand, he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the shoulder, and drew him towards him, leaning forward himself so as to be quite close and saying something in his ear, of which I only caught the words;

Polemarchus/ 'Shall we let him off, or what shall we do?'

Socrates/ Raising his voice, Adeimantus said;

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Who is it, whom you are refusing to let off?

Adeimantus/ You.

Socrates/ Why am I especially not to be let off?

Adeimantus/ Why, we think that you are lazy, and mean to cheat us out of a whole chapter which is a very important part of the story; and you fancy that we shall not notice your airy way of proceeding; as if it were self-evident to everybody, that in the matter of women and children 'friends have all things in common.'

Socrates/ And was I not right, Adeimantus?

Adeimantus/ Yes, but what is right in this particular case, like everything else, requires to be explained; for community may be of many kinds. Please, therefore, to say what sort of community you mean. We have been long

expecting that you would tell us something about the family life of your citizens—how they will bring children into the world, and rear them when they have arrived, and, in general, what is the nature of this community of women and children—for we are of opinion that the right or wrong management of such matters will have a great and paramount influence on the State for good or for evil. And now, since the question is still undetermined, and you are taking in hand another State, we have resolved, as you heard, not to let you go until you give an account of all this.

Glaucon/ To that resolution, you may regard me as saying Agreed.

Thrasymachus/ And without more ado, you may consider us all to be equally agreed.

Socrates/ You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me: What an argument are you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had finished, and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep, and was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said, you ask me to begin again at the very foundation, ignorant of what a hornet's nest of words you are stirring. Now I foresaw this gathering trouble, and avoided it.

Thrasymachus/ For what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, —to look for gold, or to hear discourse?

Socrates/ Yes, but discourse should have a limit.

Glaucon/ Yes, Socrates, and the whole of life is the only limit which wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind about us; take heart yourself and answer the question in your own way: What sort of community of women and children is this which is to prevail among our guardians? and how shall we manage the period between birth and education, which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us how these things will be.

Socrates/ Yes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more doubts arise about this than about our previous conclusions. For the practicability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at in another point of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practicable, would be for the best, is also doubtful. Hence I feel a reluctance to approach the subject, lest our aspiration, my dear friend, should turn out to be a dream only.

Glaucon/ Fear not, for your audience will not be hard upon you; they are not skeptical or hostile.

Socrates/ My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by these words.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse; the encouragement which you offer would have been all very well had I myself believed that I knew what I was talking about: to declare the truth about matters of high interest which a man honors and loves among wise men who love him need occasion no fear or faltering in his mind; but to carry on an argument when you are yourself only a hesitating enquirer, which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery thing; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be childish), but that I shall miss the truth where I have most need to be sure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the words which I am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about beauty or goodness or justice in the matter of laws. And that is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than among friends, and therefore you do well to encourage me.

Glaucon laughed and said:

Glaucon/ Well then, Socrates, in case you and your argument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of the homicide, and shall not be held to be a deceiver; take courage then and speak.

Socrates/ Well, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from guilt, and what holds at law may hold in argument.

Glaucon/ Then why should you mind?

Socrates/ Well, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part of the men has been played out, and now properly enough comes the turn of the women. Of them I will proceed to speak, and the more readily since I am invited by you. For men born and educated like our citizens, the only way, in my opinion, of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women and children is to follow the path on which we originally started, when we said that the men were to be the guardians and watchdogs of the herd.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Let us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be subject to similar or nearly similar regulations; then we shall see whether the result accords with our design.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ What I mean may be put into the form of a question: Are dogs divided into he's and she's, or do they both share equally in hunting and in keeping watch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we entrust to the males the entire and exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave the females at home, under the idea that the bearing and suckling their puppies is labor enough for them?

Glaucon/ No, they share alike; the only difference between them is that the males are stronger and the females weaker.

Socrates/ But can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are bred and fed in the same way?

Glaucon/ You cannot.

Socrates/ Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the same nurture and education?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ The education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war, which they must practice like the men?

Glaucon/ That is the inference, I suppose.

Socrates/ I should rather expect, that several of our proposals, if they are carried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous.

Glaucon/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked in the palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they are no longer young; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any more than the enthusiastic old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness continue to frequent the gymnasia.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed: according to present notions the proposal would be thought ridiculous.

Socrates/ But then, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not fear the jests of the wits which will be directed against this sort of innovation; how they will talk of women's attainments both in music and gymnastic, and

above all about their wearing armor and riding upon horseback!

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Yet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law; at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the Hellenes were of the opinion, which is still generally received among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper; and when first the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians introduced the custom, the wits of that day might equally have ridiculed the innovation.

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ But when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye vanished before the better principle which reason asserted, then the man was perceived to be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously inclines to weigh the beautiful by any other standard but that of the good.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ First, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest, let us come to an understanding about the nature of woman: Is she capable of sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or not at all? And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or cannot share? That will be the best way of commencing the enquiry, and will probably lead to the fairest conclusion.

Glaucon/ That will be much the best way.

Socrates/ Shall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against ourselves; in this manner the adversary's position will not be undefended.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ Then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will say: 'Socrates and Glaucon, no adversary need convict you, for you yourselves, at the first foundation of the State, admitted the principle that everybody was to do the one work suited to his own nature' And certainly, if I am not mistaken, such an admission was made by us. 'And do not the natures of men and women differ very much indeed?' And we shall reply: Of course they do. Then we shall be asked, 'Whether the tasks assigned to men and to women should not be different, and such as are agreeable to their different natures?' Certainly they should. 'But if so, have you not fallen into a serious inconsistency in saying that men and women, whose natures are so entirely different, ought to perform the same actions?'—What defense will you make for us, my good Sir, against anyone who offers these objections?

Glaucon/ That is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall and I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side.

Socrates/ These are the objections, Glaucon, and there are many others of a like kind, which I foresaw long ago; they made me afraid and reluctant to take in hand any law about the possession and nurture of women and children.

Glaucon/ By Zeus, the problem to be solved is anything but easy.

Socrates/ Why yes, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth, whether he has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid ocean, he has to swim all the same.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And must not we swim and try to reach the shore: we will hope that Arion's dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?

Glaucon/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Well then, let us see if any way of escape can be found. We acknowledged—did we not? that different natures ought to have different pursuits, and that men's and women's natures are different. And now what are we saying? —that different natures ought to have the same pursuits, — this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us.

Glaucon/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Verily, Glaucon, glorious is the power of the art of contradiction!

Glaucon/ Why do you say so?

Socrates/ Because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will. When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just because he cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of fair discussion.

Glaucon/ Yes, such is very often the case; but what has that to do with us and our argument?

Socrates/ A great deal; for there is certainly a danger of our getting unintentionally into a verbal opposition.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that different natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never considered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of nature, or why we distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same natures.

Glaucon/ Why, no, that was never considered by us.

Socrates/ Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy men; and if this is

admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we should forbid the hairy men to be cobblers, and conversely?

Glaucon/ That would be a jest.

Socrates/ Yes, a jest; and why? because we never meant when we constructed the State, that the opposition of natures should extend to every difference, but only to those differences which affected the pursuit in which the individual is engaged; we should have argued, for example, that a physician and one who is in mind a physician may be said to have the same nature.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Whereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if, the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness for any art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be assigned to one or the other of them; but if the difference consists only in women bearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education she should receive; and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Next, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any of the pursuits or arts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that of a man?

Glaucon/ That will be quite fair.

Socrates/ And perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient answer on the instant is not easy; but after a little reflection there is no difficulty.

Glaucon/ Yes, perhaps.

Socrates/ Suppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument, and then we may hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution of women which would affect them in the administration of the State.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Let us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question: —when you spoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to say that one man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty; a little learning will lead the one to discover a great deal; whereas the other, after much study and application, no sooner learns than he forgets; or again, did you mean, that the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind, while the body of the other is a hindrance to him? —would not these be the sort of differences which distinguish the man gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted?

Glaucon/ No one will deny that.

Socrates/ And can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not all these gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be great, and in which for her to be beaten by a man is of all things the most absurd?

Glaucon/ You are quite right, in maintaining the general inferiority of the female sex: although many women are in many things superior to many men, yet on the whole what you say is true.

Socrates/ And if so, my friend, there is no special faculty of administration in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both; all the pursuits of

men are the pursuits of women also, but in all of them a woman is inferior to a man.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women?

Glaucon/ That will never do.

Socrates/ One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and another has no music in her nature?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one has spirit, and another is without spirit?

Glaucon/ That is also true.

Socrates/ Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was not the selection of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Men and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they differ only in their comparative strength or weakness.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble in capacity and in character?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits?

Glaucon/ They ought.

Socrates/ Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians—to that point we come round again.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ The law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore not an impossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary practice, which prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature.

Glaucon/ That appears to be true.

Socrates/ We had to consider, first, whether our proposals were possible, and secondly whether they were the most beneficial?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the possibility has been acknowledged?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ The very great benefit has next to be established?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ You will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian will make a woman a good guardian; for their original nature is the same?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ I should like to ask you a question.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ Would you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better than another?

Glaucon/ The latter.

Socrates/ And in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the guardians who have been brought up on our model system to be more perfect men, or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling?

Glaucon/ What a ridiculous question!

Socrates/ You have answered me, Well, and may we not further say that our guardians are the best of our citizens?

Glaucon/ By far the best.

Socrates/ And will not their wives be the best women?

Glaucon/ Yes, by far the best.

Socrates/ And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that the men and women of a State should be as good as possible?

Glaucon/ There can be nothing better.

Socrates/ And this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present in such manner as we have described, will accomplish?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree beneficial to the State?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be their robe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defense of their country; only in the distribution of labors the lighter are to be assigned to the women, who are the weaker natures, but in other respects their duties are to be the same. And as for the man who laughs at naked women exercising their bodies from the best of motives, in his laughter he is plucking

'A fruit of unripe wisdom'

and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is about; —for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, *That the useful is the noble and the hurtful is the base*.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women, which we may say that we have now escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common; to the utility and also to the possibility of this arrangement the consistency of the argument with itself bears witness.

Glaucon/ Yes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped.

Socrates/ Yes, but a greater is coming; you will not think much of this when you see the next.

Glaucon/ Go on; let me see.

Socrates/ The law, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded, is to the following effect, —'that the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent'

Glaucon/ Yes, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the possibility as well as the utility of such a law are far more questionable.

Socrates/ I do not think, that there can be any dispute about the very great utility of having wives and children in common; the possibility is quite another matter, and will be very much disputed.

Glaucon/ I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both.

Socrates/ You imply that the two questions must be combined. Now I meant that you should admit the utility;

and in this way, as I thought, I should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility.

Glaucon/ But that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to give a defense of both.

Socrates/ Well, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favor: let me feast my mind with the dream as day dreamers are in the habit of feasting themselves when they are walking alone; for before they have discovered any means of effecting their wishes—that is a matter which never troubles them—they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities; but assuming that what they desire is already granted to them, they proceed with their plan, and delight in detailing what they mean to do when their wish has come true—that is a way which they have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for much. Now I myself am beginning to lose heart, and I should like, with your permission, to pass over the question of possibility at present. Assuming therefore the possibility of the proposal, I shall now proceed to enquire how the rulers will carry out these arrangements, and I shall demonstrate that our plan, if executed, will be of the greatest benefit to the State and to the guardians. First of all, then, if you have no objection, I will endeavor with your help to consider the advantages of the measure; and hereafter the question of possibility.

Glaucon/ I have no objection; proceed.

Socrates/ First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey in the one and the power of command in the other; the guardians must themselves obey the laws, and they must also imitate the spirit of them in any details which are entrusted to their care.

Glaucon/ That is right.

Socrates/ You, who are their legislator, having selected the men, will now select the women and give them to them; —they must be as far as possible of like natures with them; and they must live in common houses and meet at common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own; they will be together, and will be brought up together, and will associate at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other—necessity is not too strong a word, I think?

Glaucon/ Yes; —necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity which lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to the mass of mankind.

Socrates/ True, and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after an orderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an unholy thing which the rulers will forbid.

Glaucon/ Yes, and it ought not to be permitted.

Socrates/ Then clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the highest degree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And how can marriages be made most beneficial? —that is a question which I put to you, because I see in your house dogs for hunting, and of the nobler sort of birds not a few. Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have you ever attended to their pairing and breeding?

Glaucon/ In what particulars?

Socrates/ Why, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not some better than others?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to breed from the best only?

Glaucon/ From the best.

Socrates/ And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age?

Glaucon/ I choose only those of ripe age.

Socrates/ And if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would greatly deteriorate?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the same of horses and of animals in general?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Good heavens! my dear friend, what consummate skill will our rulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!

Glaucon/ Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any particular skill?

Socrates/ Because, our rulers will often have to practice upon the body corporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen, the inferior sort of practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be given, then the doctor should be more of a man.

Glaucon/ That is quite true, but to what are you alluding?

Socrates/ I mean, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were saying that the use of all these things regarded as medicines might be of advantage.

Glaucon/ And we were very right.

Socrates/ And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations of marriages and births.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, the principle has been already laid down that the best of either sex should be united with the best as

often, and the inferior with the inferior, as seldom as possible; and that they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is to be maintained in first-rate condition. Now these goings on must be a secret which the rulers only know, or there will be a further danger of our herd, as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into rebellion.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Had we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring together the brides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices will be offered and suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim will be to preserve the average of population? There are many other things which they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible to prevent the State from becoming either too large or too small.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then they will accuse their own ill-luck and not the rulers.

Glaucon/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other honors and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought to have as many sons as possible.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are to be held by women as well as by men—

Glaucon/ Yes—

Socrates/ The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be.

Glaucon/ Yes, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure.

Socrates/ They will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no mother recognizes her own child; and other wet-nurses may be engaged if more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be protracted too long; and the mothers will have no getting up at night or other trouble, but will hand over all this sort of thing to the nurses and attendants.

Glaucon/ You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when they are having children.

Socrates/ Why, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our scheme. We were saying that the parents should be in the prime of life?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of about twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty in a man's?

Glaucon/ Which years do you mean to include?

Socrates/ A woman, at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the State, and continue to bear them until forty; a man may begin at five-and-twenty, when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life beats quickest, and continue to beget children until he be fifty-five.

Glaucon/ Certainly, both in men and women those years are the prime of physical as well as of intellectual vigor.

Socrates/ Anyone above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing; the child of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have been conceived under auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers, which at each hymeneal priestesses and priests and the whole city will offer, that the new generation may be better and more useful than their good and useful parents, whereas his child will be the offspring of darkness and strange lust.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And the same law will apply to anyone of those within the prescribed age who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without the sanction of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to the State, uncertified and unconsecrated.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ This applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age: after that we allow them to range at will, except that a man may not marry his daughter or his daughter's daughter, or his mother or his mother's mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their sons or fathers, or son's son or father's father, and so on in either direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the permission with strict orders to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light; and if any force a way to the birth, the parents must understand that the offspring of such an union cannot be maintained, and arrange accordingly.

Glaucon/ That also, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know who are fathers and daughters, and so on?

Socrates/ They will never know. The way will be this: —dating from the day of the hymeneal, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male children who are born in the seventh and the tenth month afterwards his sons, and the female children his daughters, and they will call him father, and he will call their children his grandchildren, and they will call the elder generation grandfathers and grandmothers. All who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called their brothers and sisters, and these, as I was saying, will be forbidden to intermarry. This, however, is not to be understood as an absolute prohibition of the marriage of brothers and sisters; if the lot favors them, and they receive the sanction of the Pythian oracle, the law will allow them.

Glaucon/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Such is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our State are to have their wives and families in common. And now you would have the argument show that this community is consistent with the rest of our polity, and also that nothing can be better—would you not?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Shall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought to be the chief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the organization of a State, —what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil, and then consider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good or of the evil?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?

Glaucon/ There cannot.

Socrates/ And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains—where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow?

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is disorganized—when you have one half of the world triumphing and the other plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the citizens?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the terms 'mine' and 'not mine,' 'his' and 'not his.'

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of persons apply the terms 'mine' and 'not mine' in the same way to the same thing?

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual—as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the whole frame, drawn towards the soul as a center and forming one kingdom under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger; and the same expression is used about any other part of the body, which has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering.

Glaucon/ Very true, and I agree with you that in the best-ordered State there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe.

Socrates/ Then when anyone of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the whole State will make his case their own, and will either rejoice or sorrow with him?

Glaucon/ Yes, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State.

Socrates/ It will now be time, for us to return to our State and see whether this or some other form is most in accordance with these fundamental principles.

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ Our State like every other has rulers and subjects?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ All of whom will call one another citizens?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other States?

Glaucon/ Generally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply call them rulers.

Socrates/ And in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people give the rulers?

Glaucon/ They are called saviors and helpers.

Socrates/ And what do the rulers call the people?

Glaucon/ Their maintainers and foster-fathers.

Socrates/ And what do they call them in other States?

Glaucon/ Slaves.

Socrates/ And what do the rulers call one another in other States?

Glaucon/ Fellow-rulers.

Socrates/ And what in ours?

Glaucon/ Fellow-guardians.

Socrates/ Did you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would speak of one of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not being his friend?

Glaucon/ Yes, very often.

Socrates/ And the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an interest, and the other as a stranger in whom he has no interest?

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ But would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as a stranger?

Glaucon/ Certainly he would not; for everyone whom they meet will be regarded by them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with him.

Socrates/ Capital, but let me ask you once more: Shall they be a family in name only; or shall they in all their actions be true to the name? For example, in the use of the word 'father,' would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the law commands; and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good either at the hands of God or of man? Are these to be or not to be the strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about those who are intimated to them to be their parents and the rest of their kinsfolk?

Glaucon/ These, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous than for them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act in the spirit of them?

Socrates/ Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when anyone is well or ill, the universal word will be 'with me it is well' or 'it is ill.'

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying that they will have their pleasures and pains in common?

Glaucon/ Yes, and so they will.

Socrates/ And they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will alike call 'my own,' and having this common interest they will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain?

Glaucon/ Yes, far more so than in other States.

Socrates/ And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the State, will be that the guardians will have a community of women and children?

Glaucon/ That will be the chief reason.

Socrates/ And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as was implied in our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation of the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain?

Glaucon/ That we acknowledged, and very rightly.

Socrates/ Then the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the source of the greatest good to the State?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming, —that the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property; their pay was to be their food, which they were to receive from the other citizens, and they were to have no private expenses; for we intended them to preserve their true character of guardians.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Both the community of property and the community of families, as I am saying, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city in pieces by differing about 'mine' and 'not mine;' each man dragging any acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own, where he has a separate wife and children and private

pleasures and pains; but all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them, and therefore they all tend towards a common end.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own, suits and complaints will have no existence among them; they will be delivered from all those quarrels of which money or children or relations are the occasion.

Glaucon/ Of course they will.

Socrates/ Neither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among them. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall maintain to be honorable and right; we shall make the protection of the person a matter of necessity.

Glaucon/ That is good.

Socrates/ Yes; and there is a further good in the law; viz. that if a man has a quarrel with another he will satisfy his resentment then and there, and not proceed to more dangerous lengths.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the younger.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other violence to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor will he slight him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty to prevent him: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on those who are to them in the relation of parents;

fear, that the injured one will be succored by the others who are his brothers, sons, fathers.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with one another?

Glaucon/ Yes, there will be no want of peace.

Socrates/ And as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one another.

Glaucon/ None whatever.

Socrates/ I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will be rid, for they are beneath notice: such, for example, as the flattery of the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs which men experience in bringing up a family, and in finding money to buy necessaries for their household, borrowing and then repudiating, getting how they can, and giving the money into the hands of women and slaves to keep—the many evils of so many kinds which people suffer in this way are mean enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking of.

Glaucon/ Yes, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that.

Socrates/ And from all these evils they will be delivered, and their life will be blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ The Olympic victor, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of the blessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more glorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost. For the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State; and the crown with which they and their children are

crowned is the fullness of all that life needs; they receive rewards from the hands of their country while living, and after death have an honorable burial.

Glaucon/ Yes, and glorious rewards they are.

Socrates/ Do you remember, how in the course of the previous discussion someone who shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians unhappy—they had nothing and might have possessed all things—to whom we replied that, if an occasion offered, we might perhaps hereafter consider this question, but that, as at present advised, we would make our guardians truly guardians, and that we were fashioning the State with a view to the greatest happiness, not of any particular class, but of the whole?

Glaucon/ Yes, I remember.

Socrates/ And what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to be far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors—is the life of shoemakers, or any other artisans, or of husbandmen, to be compared with it?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ At the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere, that if any of our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that he will cease to be a guardian, and is not content with this safe and harmonious life, which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best, but infatuated by some youthful conceit of happiness which gets up into his head shall seek to appropriate the whole state to himself, then he will have to learn how wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, 'half is more than the whole.'

Glaucon/ If he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, when you have the offer of such a life.

Socrates/ You agree then, that men and women are to have a common way of life such as we have described—common education, common children; and they are to watch

over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to war; they are to keep watch together, and to hunt together like dogs; and always and in all things, as far as they are able, women are to share with the men? And in so doing they will do what is best, and will not violate, but preserve the natural relation of the sexes.

Glaucon/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ The enquiry, has yet to be made, whether such a community will be found possible—as among other animals, so also among men—and if possible, in what way possible?

Glaucon/ You have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest.

Socrates/ There is no difficulty, in seeing how war will be carried on by them.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Why, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with them any of their children who are strong enough, that, after the manner of the artisan's child, they may look on at the work which they will have to do when they are grown up; and besides looking on they will have to help and be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers and mothers. Did you never observe in the arts how the potters' boys look on and help, long before they touch the wheel?

Glaucon/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ And shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in giving them the opportunity of seeing and practicing their duties than our guardians will be?

Glaucon/ The idea is ridiculous.

Socrates/ There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other animals, the presence of their young ones will be the greatest incentive to valor.

Glaucon/ That is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may often happen in war, how great the danger is! the children will be lost as well as their parents, and the State will never recover.

Socrates/ True, but would you never allow them to run any risk?

Glaucon/ I am far from saying that.

Socrates/ Well, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some occasion when, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their youth is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may fairly be incurred.

Glaucon/ Yes, very important.

Socrates/ This then must be our first step, —to make our children spectators of war; but we must also contrive that they shall be secured against danger; then all will be well.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Their parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war, but to know, as far as human foresight can, what expeditions are safe and what dangerous?

Glaucon/ That may be assumed.

Socrates/ And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the dangerous ones?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will be their leaders and teachers?

Glaucon/ Very properly.

Socrates/ Still, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good deal of chance about them?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then against such chances the children must be at once furnished with wings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and when they have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war: the horses must not be spirited and warlike, but the most tractable and yet the swiftest that can be had. In this way they will get an excellent view of what is hereafter to be their own business; and if there is danger they have only to follow their elder leaders and escape.

Glaucon/ I believe that you are right.

Socrates/ Next, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman or artisan. What do you think?

Glaucon/ By all means, I should say.

Socrates/ And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what they like with him.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him? In the first place, he shall receive honor in the army from his youthful comrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you say?

Glaucon/ I approve.

Socrates/ And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?

Glaucon/ To that too, I agree.

Socrates/ But you will hardly agree to my next proposal.

Glaucon/ What is your proposal?

Socrates/ That he should kiss and be kissed by them.

Glaucon/ Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: Let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the expedition lasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether his love be youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of velour.

Socrates/ Capital. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has been already determined: and he is to have first choices in such matters more than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible?

Glaucon/ Agreed.

Socrates/ Again, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave youths should be honored; for he tells how Ajax, after he had distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chines, which seems to be a compliment appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age, being not only a tribute of honor but also a very strengthening thing.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then in this, Homer shall be our teacher; and we too, at sacrifices and on the like occasions, will honor the brave according to the measure of their velour, whether men or women, with hymns and those other distinctions which we were mentioning; also with

'seats of precedence, and meats and full cups;'

and in honoring them, we shall be at the same time training them.

Glaucon/ That, is excellent.

Socrates/ Yes, and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in the first place, that he is of the golden race?

Glaucon/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Nay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are dead

> 'They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of evil, the guardians of speech-gifted men'?

Glaucon/ Yes; and we accept his authority.

Socrates/ We must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and heroic personages, and what is to be their special distinction; and we must do as he bids?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their sepulchers as at the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who are deemed pre-eminently good, whether they die from age, or in any other way, shall be admitted to the same honors.

Glaucon/ That is very right.

Socrates/ Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?

Glaucon/ In what respect do you mean?

Socrates/ First of all, in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes should enslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if they can help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians?

Glaucon/ To spare them is infinitely better.

Socrates/ Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe.

Glaucon/ Certainly, they will in this way be united against the barbarians and will keep their hands off one another.

Socrates/ Next as to the slain; ought the conquerors, to take anything but their armor? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford an excuse for not facing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead, pretending that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now has been lost from this love of plunder.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also a degree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body when the real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind him, —is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant, quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?

Glaucon/ Very like a dog.

Socrates/ Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?

Glaucon/ Yes, we most certainly must.

Socrates/ Neither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all the arms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good feeling with other Hellenes; and, indeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from kinsmen may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Again, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses, what is to be the practice?

Glaucon/ May I have the pleasure, of hearing your opinion?

Socrates/ Both should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take the annual produce and no more. Shall I tell you why?

Glaucon/ Pray do.

Socrates/ Why, you see, there is a difference in the names 'discord' and 'war,' and I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures; the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is external and foreign; and the first of the two is termed discord, and only the second, war.

Glaucon/ That is a very proper distinction.

Socrates/ And may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange to the barbarians?

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war; but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends; and such enmity is to be called discord.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Consider then, when that which we have acknowledged to be discord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear! No true lover of

his country would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse and mother: There might be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered of their harvest, but still they would have the idea of peace in their hearts and would not mean to go on fighting forever.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is a better temper than the other.

Socrates/ And will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city?

Glaucon/ It ought to be.

Socrates/ Then will not the citizens be good and civilized?

Glaucon/ Yes, very civilized.

Socrates/ And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own land, and share in the common temples?

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as discord only—a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then they will quarrel as those who intend someday to be reconciled?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor will they burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a city—men, women, and children—are equally their enemies, for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends. And for all these reasons they

will be unwilling to waste their lands and raze their houses; their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction?

Glaucon/ I agree, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.

Socrates/ Then let us enact this law also for our guardians: —that they are neither to devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses.

Glaucon/ Agreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our previous enactments, are very good. But still I must say, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this way you will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement of this discussion you thrust aside: —Is such an order of things possible, and how, if at all? For I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan which you propose, if only feasible, would do all sorts of good to the State. I will add, what you have omitted, that your citizens will be the bravest of warriors, and will never leave their ranks, for they will all know one another, and each will call the other father, brother, son; and if you suppose the women to join their armies, whether in the same rank or in the rear, either as a terror to the enemy, or as auxiliaries in case of need, I know that they will then be absolutely invincible; and there are many domestic advantages which might also be mentioned and which I also fully acknowledge: but, as I admit all these advantages and as many more as you please, if only this State of yours were to come into existence, we need say no more about them; assuming then the existence of the State, let us now turn to the question of possibility and ways and means—the rest may be left.

Socrates/ If I loiter for a moment, you instantly make a raid upon me, and have no mercy; I have hardly escaped the

first and second waves, and you seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third, which is the greatest and heaviest. When you have seen and heard the third wave, I think you will be more considerate and will acknowledge that some fear and hesitation was natural respecting a proposal so extraordinary as that which I have now to state and investigate.

Glaucon/ The more appeals of this sort which you make, the more determined are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible: speak out and at once.

Socrates/ Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search after justice and injustice.

Glaucon/ True, but what of that?

Socrates/ I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to require that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice; or may we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?

Glaucon/ The approximation will be enough.

Socrates/ We were enquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the character of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order that we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled them, but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Would a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to show that any such man could ever have existed?

Glaucon/ He would be none the worse.

Socrates/ Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State?

Glaucon/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described?

Glaucon/ Surely not.

Socrates/ That is the truth. But if, at your request, I am to try and show how and under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must ask you, having this in view, to repeat your former admissions.

Glaucon/ What admissions?

Socrates/ I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does not the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual, whatever a man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short of the truth? What do you say?

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every respect coincide with the ideal: if we are only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that we have discovered the possibility which you demand; and will be contented. I am sure that I should be contented—will not you?

Glaucon/ Yes, I will.

Socrates/ Let me next endeavor to show what is that fault in States which is the cause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change which will enable a State to pass into the truer form; and let the change, if possible, be of one thing only, or, if not, of two; at any rate, let the changes be as few and slight as possible.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I think, that there might be a reform of the State if only one change were made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ Now then, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the waves; yet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and drown me in laughter and dishonor; and do you mark my words.

Glaucon/ Proceed.

Socrates/ *Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils, —no, nor the human race, as I believe, —and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day*. Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would fain have uttered if it had not seemed too extravagant; for to be convinced that in no other State can there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard thing.

Glaucon/ Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable persons too, in a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment, and seizing any weapon that comes to hand, will run at you might and main, before you know where you are, intending to do heaven knows what; and if you don't prepare an answer, and put yourself in motion, you will be 'pared by their fine wits' and no mistake.

Socrates/ You got me into the scrape.

Glaucon/ And I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to get you out of it; but I can only give you good-will and good advice, and, perhaps, I may be able to fit answers to your questions better than another—that is all. And now, having such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show the unbelievers that you are right.

Socrates/ I ought to try, since you offer me such invaluable assistance. And I think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must explain to them whom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the State; then we shall be able to defend ourselves: There will be discovered to be some natures who ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the State; and others who are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers rather than leaders.

Glaucon/ Then now for a definition.

Socrates/ Follow me, and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to give you a satisfactory explanation.

Glaucon/ Proceed.

Socrates/ I dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that a lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to someone part of that which he loves, but to the whole.

Glaucon/ I really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my memory.

Socrates/ Another person, might fairly reply as you do; but a man of pleasure like yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast, and are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not this a way which you have with the fair: one has a snub nose, and you praise his charming face; the hook-nose of another has, you say, a royal look; while he who is neither snub nor hooked

has the grace of regularity: the dark visage is manly, the fair are children of the gods; and as to the sweet 'honey pale,' as they are called, what is the very name but the invention of a lover who talks in diminutives, and is not averse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth? In a word, there is no excuse which you will not make, and nothing which you will not say, in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the spring-time of youth.

Glaucon/ If you make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the argument, I assent.

Socrates/ And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same? They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine.

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ And the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army, they are willing to command a file; and if they cannot be honored by really great and important persons, they are glad to be honored by lesser and meaner people, —but honor of some kind they must have.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Once more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the whole class or a part only?

Glaucon/ The whole.

Socrates/ And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of wisdom only, but of the whole?

Glaucon/ Yes, of the whole.

Socrates/ And he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has no power of judging what is good and what is not, such an one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not hungry, and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I not right?

Glaucon/ If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a strange being will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights have a delight in learning, and must therefore be included. Musical amateurs, too, are a folk strangely out of place among philosophers, for they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical discussion, if they could help, while they run about at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus; whether the performance is in town or country—that makes no difference—they are there. Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes, as well as the professors of quite minor arts, are philosophers?

Socrates/ Certainly not, they are only an imitation.

Glaucon/ Who then are the true philosophers?

Socrates/ Those, who are lovers of the vision of truth.

Glaucon/ That is also good, but I should like to know what you mean?

Socrates/ To another, I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.

Glaucon/ What is the proposition?

Socrates/ That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?

Glaucon/ True again.

Socrates/ And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same remark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various combinations of them with actions and things and with one another, they are seen in all sorts of lights and appear many?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-loving, art-loving, practical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers.

Glaucon/ How do you distinguish them?

Socrates/ The lovers of sounds and sights, are, as I conceive, fond of fine tones and colors and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Few are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable to follow—of such an one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the real object?

Glaucon/ I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.

Socrates/ But take the case of the other, who recognizes the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the

idea in the place of the objects—is he a dreamer, or is he awake?

Glaucon/ He is wide awake.

Socrates/ And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge, and that the mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our statement, can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, without revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?

Glaucon/ We must certainly offer him some good advice.

Socrates/ Come, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, and that we are rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him.)

Glaucon/ I answer that he knows something.

Socrates/ Something that is or is not?

Glaucon/ Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?

Socrates/ And are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of view, that absolute being is or may be absolutely known; but that the utterly non-existent is utterly unknown?

Glaucon/ Nothing can be more certain.

Socrates/ Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the absolute negation of being?

Glaucon/ Yes, between them.

Socrates/ And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to not-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if there be such?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do we admit the existence of opinion?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?

Glaucon/ Another faculty.

Socrates/ Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed further I will make a division.

Glaucon/ What division?

Socrates/ I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and hearing, for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly explained the class which I mean?

Glaucon/ Yes, I quite understand.

Socrates/ Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and therefore the distinctions of figure, color, and the like, which enable me to discern the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I think only of its sphere and its result; and that which has the same sphere and the same result I call the same faculty, but that which has another sphere and another result I call different. Would that be your way of speaking?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you say that knowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?

Glaucon/ Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties.

Socrates/ And is opinion also a faculty?

Glaucon/ Certainly, for opinion is that with which we are able to form an opinion.

Socrates/ And yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the same as opinion?

Glaucon/ Why, yes: how can any reasonable being ever identify that which is infallible with that which errs?

Socrates/ An excellent answer, proving, that we are quite conscious of a distinction between them.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct spheres or subject-matters?

Glaucon/ That is certain.

Socrates/ Being is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge, and knowledge is to know the nature of being?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And opinion is to have an opinion?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do we know what we opine? or is the subject-matter of opinion the same as the subject-matter of knowledge?

Glaucon/ Nay, that has been already disproven; if difference in faculty implies difference in the sphere or subject-matter, and if, as we were saying, opinion and

knowledge are distinct faculties, then the sphere of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same.

Socrates/ Then if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something else must be the subject-matter of opinion?

Glaucon/ Yes, something else.

Socrates/ Well then, is not-being the subject-matter of opinion? or, rather, how can there be an opinion at all about not-being? Reflect: when a man has an opinion, has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion which is an opinion about nothing?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking, nothing?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Of not-being, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of being, knowledge?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being?

Glaucon/ Not with either.

Socrates/ And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?

Glaucon/ That seems to be true.

Socrates/ But is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a greater clearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than ignorance?

Glaucon/ In neither.

Socrates/ Then I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge, but lighter than ignorance?

Glaucon/ Both; and in no small degree.

Socrates/ And also to be within and between them?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate?

Glaucon/ No question.

Socrates/ But were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not-being; and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be found in the interval between them?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call opinion?

Glaucon/ There has.

Socrates/ Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of the nature of being and not-being, and cannot rightly be termed either, pure and simple; this unknown term, when discovered, we may truly call the subject of opinion, and assign each to their proper faculty, —the extremes to the faculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the mean.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty—in whose opinion the beautiful is the manifold—he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights, who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the just is one, or that anything is one—to him I would appeal,

saying, Will you be so very kind, sir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things, there is one which will not be found ugly; or of the just, which will not be found unjust; or of the holy, which will not also be unholy?

Glaucon/ No, the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly; and the same is true of the rest.

Socrates/ And may not the many which are doubles be also halves? —doubles, that is, of one thing, and halves of another?

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names?

Glaucon/ True; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them.

Socrates/ And can anyone of those many things which are called by particular names be said to be this rather than not to be this?

Glaucon/ They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with what he hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was sitting. The individual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle, and have a double sense: nor can you fix them in your mind, either as being or not-being, or both, or neither.

Socrates/ Then what will you do with them? Can they have a better place than between being and not-being? For they are clearly not in greater darkness or negation than not-being, or more full of light and existence than being.

Glaucon/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the multitude entertain about the

beautiful and about all other things are tossing about in some region which is half-way between pure being and pure not-being?

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ Yes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of knowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see the many just, and not absolute justice, and the like, —such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge?

Glaucon/ That is certain.

Socrates/ But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know, and not to have opinion only?

Glaucon/ Neither can that be denied.

Socrates/ The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember, who listened to sweet sounds and gazed upon fair colors, but would not tolerate the existence of absolute beauty.

Glaucon/ Yes, I remember.

Socrates/ Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us for thus describing them?

Glaucon/ I shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is true.

Socrates/ But those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

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Socrates/ And thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view.

Glaucon/ I do not think, that the way could have been shortened.

Socrates/ I suppose not, and yet I believe that we might have had a better view of both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one subject and if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to see in what respect the life of the just differs from that of the unjust must consider.

Glaucon/ And what is the next question?

Socrates/ Surely, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you which of the two classes should be the rulers of our State?

Glaucon/ And how can we rightly answer that question?

Socrates/ Whichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of our State—let them be our guardians.

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ Neither, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes?

Glaucon/ There can be no question of that.

Socrates/ And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other

world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them—are not such persons, I ask, simply blind?

Glaucon/ Truly, they are much in that condition.

Socrates/ And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being their equals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of virtue, also know the very truth of each thing?

Glaucon/ There can be no reason, for rejecting those who have this greatest of all great qualities; they must always have the first place unless they fail in some other respect.

Socrates/ Suppose then, that we determine how far they can unite this and the other excellences.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about him, and, when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the State.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which shows them' the eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption.

Glaucon/ Agreed.

Socrates/ And further, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being; there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honorable, which they are willing to renounce; as we said before of the lover and the man of ambition.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality which they should also possess?

Glaucon/ What quality?

Socrates/ Truthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their mind falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.

Glaucon/ Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them.

Socrates/ 'May be,' my friend, is not the word; say rather, 'must be affirmed:' for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?

Glaucon/ How can there be?

Socrates/ Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?

Glaucon/ Never.

Socrates/ The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure—I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.

Glaucon/ That is most certain.

Socrates/ Such an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the motives which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no place in his character.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ There should be no secret corner of illiberality; nothing can be more antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole of things both divine and human.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence, think much of human life?'

Glaucon/ He cannot.

Socrates/ Or can such an one account death fearful?

Glaucon/ No indeed.

Socrates/ Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or mean, or a boaster, or a coward—can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in his dealings?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and unsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the unphilosophical.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ There is another point which should be remarked.

Glaucon/ What point?

Socrates/ Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love that which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel?

Glaucon/ That is certain.

Socrates/ Laboring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?

Glaucon/ To proportion.

Socrates/ Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally well-proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards the true being of everything.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go together, and are they not, in a

manner, necessary to a soul, which is to have a full and perfect participation of being?

Glaucon/ They are absolutely necessary.

Socrates/ And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn, —noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred?

Glaucon/ The god of jealousy himself, could find no fault with such a study.

Socrates/ And to men like him, when perfected by years and education, and to these only you will entrust the State.

Here Adeimantus interposed and said:

Adeimantus/ To these statements, Socrates, no one can offer a reply; but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling passes over the minds of your hearers: They fancy that they are led astray a little at each step in the argument, owing to their own want of skill in asking and answering questions; these littles accumulate, and at the end of the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all their former notions appear to be turned upside down. And as unskillful players of draughts are at last shut up by their more skillful adversaries and have no piece to move, so they too find themselves shut up at last; for they have nothing to say in this new game of which words are the counters; and yet all the time they are in the right. The observation is suggested to me by what is now occurring. For anyone of us might say, that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of the argument, he sees as a fact that the votaries of philosophy, when they carry on the study, not only in youth as a part of education, but as the pursuit of their maturer years, most of them become strange monsters, not to say utter rogues, and that those who may be

considered the best of them are made useless to the world by the very study which you extol.

Socrates/ Well, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?

Adeimantus/ I cannot tell, but I should like to know what is your opinion.

Socrates/ Hear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right.

Adeimantus/ Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be of no use to them?

Socrates/ You ask a question, to which a reply can only be given in a parable.

Adeimantus/ Yes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all accustomed, I suppose.

Socrates/ I perceive, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into such a hopeless discussion; but now hear the parable, and then you will be still more amused at the meagerness of my imagination: for the manner in which the best men are treated in their own States is so grievous that no single thing on earth is comparable to it; and therefore, if I am to plead their cause, I must have recourse to fiction, and put together a figure made up of many things, like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The sailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering—everyone is of opinion that he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of navigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will further assert that it cannot be

taught, and they are ready to cut in pieces anyone who says the contrary. They throng about the captain, begging and praying him to commit the helm to them; and if at any time they do not prevail, but others are preferred to them, they kill the others or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the stores; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed on their voyage in such manner as might be expected of them. Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own whether by force or persuasion, they complement with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a good-for-nothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship, and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other people like or not—the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part of their calling. Now in vessels which are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers, how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater, a star-gazer; a good-for-nothing?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then you will hardly need, to hear the interpretation of the figure, which describes the true philosopher in his relation to the State; for you understand already.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised at finding that philosophers

have no honor in their cities; explain it to him and try to convince him that their having honor would be far more extraordinary.

Adeimantus/ I will.

Socrates/ Say to him, that, in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be useless to the rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to attribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to themselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him—that is not the order of nature; neither are 'the wise to go to the doors of the rich'—the ingenious author of this saying told a lie—but the truth is, that, when a man is ill, whether he be rich or poor, to the physician he must go, and he who wants to be governed, to him who is able to govern. The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his subjects to be ruled by him; although the present governors of mankind are of a different stamp; they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsmen to those who are called by them good-for-nothings and stargazers.

Adeimantus/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ For these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest pursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the opposite faction; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done to her by her opponents, but by her own professing followers, the same of whom you suppose the accuser to say, that the greater number of them are arrant rogues, and the best are useless; in which opinion I agreed.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the reason why the good are useless has now been explained?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember, was his leader, whom he followed always and in all things; failing in this, he was an impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that was said.

Socrates/ Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance with present notions of him?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And have we not a right to say in his defense, that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being—that is his nature; he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, but will go on—the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he cease from his travail.

Adeimantus/ Nothing, can be more just than such a description of him.

Socrates/ And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie?

Adeimantus/ He will.

Socrates/ And when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band which he leads?

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Justice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will follow after?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage, magnificence, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly depraved; we were then led to enquire into the grounds of these accusations, and have now arrived at the point of asking why are the majority bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true philosopher.

Adeimantus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature, why so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling—I am speaking of those who were said to be useless but not wicked—and, when we have done with them, we will speak of the imitators of philosophy, what manner of men are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation of which we speak.

Adeimantus/ What are these corruptions?

Socrates/ I will see if I can explain them to you. Everyone will admit that a nature having in perfection all the qualities

which we required in a philosopher, is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men.

Adeimantus/ Rare indeed.

Socrates/ And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures!

Adeimantus/ What causes?

Socrates/ In the first place there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance, and the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys and distracts from philosophy the soul which is the possessor of them.

Adeimantus/ That is very singular.

Socrates/ Then there are all the ordinary goods of life—beauty, wealth, strength, rank, and great connections in the State—you understand the sort of things—these also have a corrupting and distracting effect.

Adeimantus/ I understand; but I should like to know more precisely what you mean about them.

Socrates/ Grasp the truth as a whole, and in the right way; you will then have no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no longer appear strange to you.

Adeimantus/ And how am I to do so?

Socrates/ Why, we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or animal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil, in proportion to their vigor, are all the more sensitive to the want of a suitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than to what is not.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien conditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is greater.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are ill-educated, become pre-eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit of pure evil spring out of a fullness of nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil?

Adeimantus/ There I think that you are right.

Socrates/ And our philosopher follows the same analogy—he is like a plant which, having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so often say, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts?

Adeimantus/ When is this accomplished?

Socrates/ When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame—at such a time will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming

flood of popular opinion? or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have—he will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be?

Adeimantus/ Yes, Socrates; necessity will compel him.

Socrates/ And yet, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been mentioned.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ The gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death, which, as you are aware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply when their words are powerless.

Adeimantus/ Indeed they do; and in right good earnest.

Socrates/ Now what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be expected to overcome in such an unequal contest?

Adeimantus/ None.

Socrates/ No, indeed, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly; there neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different type of character which has had no other training in virtue but that which is supplied by public opinion—I speak, my friend, of human virtue only; what is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included: for I would not have you ignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God, as we may truly say.

Adeimantus/ I quite assent.

Socrates/ Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation.

Adeimantus/ What are you going to say?

Socrates/ Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists and whom they deem to be

their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing but the opinion of the many, that is to say, the opinions of their assemblies; and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him—he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or infuriated; and you may suppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this, he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or passions of which he is speaking, but calls this honorable and that dishonorable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes; and he can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and having no power of explaining to others the nature of either, or the difference between them, which is immense. By heaven, would not such an one be a rare educator?

Adeimantus/ Indeed he would.

Socrates/ And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or music, or, finally, in politics, differ from him whom I have been describing? For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the State, making them his judges when he is not obliged, the so-called necessity of Diomede will oblige him to produce whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are

utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honorable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?

Adeimantus/ No, nor am I likely to hear.

Socrates/ You recognize the truth of what I have been saying ? Then let me ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful, or of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher?

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the world?

Adeimantus/ They must.

Socrates/ And of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?

Adeimantus/ That is evident.

Socrates/ Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence—these were admitted by us to be the true philosopher's gifts.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Will not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first among all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets older for their own purposes?

Adeimantus/ No question.

Socrates/ Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honor and flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now, the power which he will one day possess.

Adeimantus/ That often happens.

Socrates/ And what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such circumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, and having got such notions into his head will he not dilate and elevate himself in the fullness of vain pomp and senseless pride?

Adeimantus/ To be sure he will.

Socrates/ Now, when he is in this state of mind, if someone gently comes to him and tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding, which can only be got by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse circumstances, he will be easily induced to listen?

Adeimantus/ Far otherwise.

Socrates/ And even if there be someone who through inherent goodness or natural reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think that they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap from his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to prevent him from yielding to his better nature and to render his teacher powerless, using to this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions?

Adeimantus/ There can be no doubt of it.

Socrates/ And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, divert him from philosophy, no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other so-called goods of life?

Adeimantus/ We were quite right.

Socrates/ Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure which I have been describing of the natures best adapted to the best of all pursuits; they are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time; this being the class out of which come the men who are the authors of the greatest evil to States and individuals; and also of the greatest good when the tide carries them in that direction; but a small man never was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to States.

Adeimantus/ That is most true.

Socrates/ And so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for her own have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are leading a false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonor her; and fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter, who affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing, and that the greater number deserve the severest punishment.

Adeimantus/ That is certainly what people say.

Socrates/ Yes; and what else would you expect, when you think of the puny creatures who, seeing this land open to them—a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles—like prisoners running out of prison into a sanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy; those who do so being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts? For, although philosophy be in this evil case, still

there remains a dignity about her which is not to be found in the arts. And many are thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are maimed and disfigured by their meannesses, as their bodies are by their trades and crafts. Is not this unavoidable?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of durance and come into a fortune; he takes a bath and puts on a new coat, and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter, who is left poor and desolate?

Adeimantus/ A most exact parallel.

Socrates/ What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard?

Adeimantus/ There can be no question of it.

Socrates/ And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her who is in a rank above them, what sort of ideas and opinions are likely to be generated? Will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin to true wisdom?

Adeimantus/ Adeimantus: No doubt.

Socrates/ Then, Adeimantus, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a small remnant: perchance some noble and well-educated person, detained by exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting influences remains devoted to her; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics of which he contemns and neglects; and there may be a gifted few who leave the arts, which they justly despise, and come to her; —or peradventure there are some who are restrained by our friend Theages' bridle; for everything in the life of Theages conspired to divert him from philosophy; but ill-health kept him away from politics. My own case of the

internal sign is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude; and they know that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such an one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts—he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good-will, with bright hopes.

Adeimantus/ Yes, and he will have done a great work before he departs.

Socrates/ A great work—yes; but not the greatest, unless he find a State suitable to him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a larger growth and be the savior of his country, as well as of himself. The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been sufficiently explained: the injustice of the charges against her has been shown—is there anything more which you wish to say?

Adeimantus/ Nothing more on that subject, but I should like to know which of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her.

Socrates/ Not any of them, and that is precisely the accusation which I bring against them—not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and hence that nature is warped and estranged; —as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be overpowered and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth of philosophy, instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another character. But if philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection which she herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but human; —and now, I know, that you are going to ask, What that State is:

Adeimantus/ No, there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another question—whether it is the State of which we are the founders and inventors, or some other?

Socrates/ Yes, ours in most respects; but you may remember my saying before, that some living authority would always be required in the State having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as legislator you were laying down the laws.

Adeimantus/ That was said.

Socrates/ Yes, but not in a satisfactory manner; you frightened us by interposing objections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and difficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.

Adeimantus/ What is there remaining?

Socrates/ The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be the ruin of the State: All great attempts are attended with risk; 'hard is the good' as men say.

Adeimantus/ Still, let the point be cleared up, and the enquiry will then be complete.

Socrates/ I shall not be hindered, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a want of power: my zeal you may see for yourselves; and please to remark in what I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare that States should pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but in a different spirit.

Adeimantus/ In what manner?

Socrates/ At present, the students of philosophy are quite young; beginning when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time saved from moneymaking and housekeeping to such pursuits; and even those of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean dialectic, take themselves off. In after life when invited by someone else, they may, perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they make much ado, for philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business: at last, when they grow old, in most cases they are extinguished more truly than Heracleitus' sun, inasmuch as they never light up again.

Adeimantus/ But what ought to be their course?

Socrates/ Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years: during this period while they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and special care should be given to their bodies that they may have them to use in the service of philosophy; as life advances and the intellect begins to mature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul; but when the strength of our citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labor, as we intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a similar happiness in another.

Adeimantus/ How truly in earnest you are, Socrates! I am sure of that; and yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced; Thrasymachus least of all.

Socrates/ Do not make a quarrel, between Thrasymachus and me, who have recently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for I shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other men, or do something which may profit them against the day when they live again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.

Adeimantus/ You are speaking of a time which is not very near.

Socrates/ Rather, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with eternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe; for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized; they have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting of words artificially brought together, not like these of ours having a natural unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly molded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue—such a man ruling in a city which bears the same image, they have never yet seen, neither one nor many of them—do you think that they ever did?

Adeimantus/ No indeed.

Socrates/ No, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble sentiments; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society.

Adeimantus/ They are strangers, to the words of which you speak.

Socrates/ And this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor States nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially compelled, whether they will or not, to take care of the State, and until a like necessity be laid on the State to obey them; or until kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely inspired with a true love of true philosophy. That either or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm: if they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries. Am I not right?

Adeimantus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert to the death, that this our constitution has been, and is—yea, and will be whenever the Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this; that there is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves.

Adeimantus/ My opinion agrees with yours.

Socrates/ But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude?

Adeimantus/ I should imagine not.

Socrates/ O my friend, do not attack the multitude: they will change their minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the view of soothing them and removing their dislike of over-education, you show them your philosophers

as they really are and describe as you were just now doing their character and profession, and then mankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed—if they view him in this new light, they will surely change their notion of him, and answer in another strain. Who can be at enmity with one who loves them, who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for you, that in a few this harsh temper may be found but not in the majority of mankind.

Adeimantus/ I quite agree with you.

Socrates/ And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the many entertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with them, who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation? and nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this.

Adeimantus/ It is most unbecoming.

Socrates/ For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed towards things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse?

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows; but like everyone else, he will suffer from detraction.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which he beholds elsewhere, will he, think you, be an unskillful artificer of justice, temperance, and every civil virtue?

Adeimantus/ Anything but unskillful.

Socrates/ And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth, will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when we tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern?

Adeimantus/ They will not be angry if they understand. But how will they draw out the plan of which you are speaking?

Socrates/ They will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which, as from a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean surface.

Adeimantus/ This is no easy task.

Socrates/ But whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference between them and every other legislator, —they will have nothing to do either with individual or State, and will inscribe no laws, until they have either found, or themselves made, a clean surface.

Adeimantus/ They will be very right.

Socrates/ Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the constitution?

Adeimantus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human

copy; and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a man; and this they will conceive according to that other image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God?

Adeimantus/ Indeed, in no way could they make a fairer picture.

Socrates/ And now, are we beginning to persuade those whom you described as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions is such an one as we were praising; at whom they were so very indignant because to his hands we committed the State; and are they growing a little calmer at what they have just heard?

Adeimantus/ Much calmer, if there is any sense in them.

Socrates/ Why, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?

Adeimantus/ They would not be so unreasonable.

Socrates/ Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the highest good?

Adeimantus/ Neither can they doubt this.

Socrates/ But again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favorable circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or will they prefer those whom we have rejected?

Adeimantus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ Then will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers bear rule, States and individuals will have

no rest from evil, nor will this our imaginary State ever be realized?

Adeimantus/ I think that they will be less angry.

Socrates/ Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle, and that they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other reason, cannot refuse to come to terms?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will anyone deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by nature philosophers?

Adeimantus/ Surely no man.

Socrates/ And when they have come into being will anyone say that they must of necessity be destroyed; that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by us; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape—who will venture to affirm this?

Adeimantus/ Who indeed!

Socrates/ But, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous.

Adeimantus/ Yes, one is enough.

Socrates/ The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or impossibility?

Adeimantus/ I think not.

Socrates/ But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if only possible, is assuredly for the best.

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not impossible.

Adeimantus/ Very good.

Socrates/ And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but more remains to be discussed; —how and by what studies and pursuits will the saviors of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to apply themselves to their several studies?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the procreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of attainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are now disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must be investigated from the very beginning. We were saying, as you will remember, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by the test of pleasures and pains, and neither in hardships, nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism—he was to be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive honors and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her face; not liking to stir the question which has now arisen.

Adeimantus/ I perfectly remember.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold word; but now let me dare to say—that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher.

Adeimantus/ Yes, let that be affirmed.

Socrates/ And do not suppose that there will be many of them; for the gifts which were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together; they are mostly found in shreds and patches.

Adeimantus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ You are aware, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity, cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner; they are driven any way by their impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ On the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are always in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office or command.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And will they be a class which is rarely found?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labors and dangers and pleasures which we

mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation which we did not mention—he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all, or will faint under them, as in any other studies and exercises.

Adeimantus/ Yes, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge?

Socrates/ You may remember, that we divided the soul into three parts; and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom?

Adeimantus/ Indeed, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more.

Socrates/ And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them?

Adeimantus/ To what do you refer?

Socrates/ We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at the end of which they would appear; but that we could add on a popular exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the enquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner; whether you were satisfied or not, it is for you to say.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair measure of truth.

Socrates/ But, my friend, a measure of such things which in any degree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further.

Adeimantus/ Not an uncommon case when people are indolent.

Socrates/ Yes, and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State and of the laws.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ The guardian then, must be required to take the longer circuit, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his proper calling.

Adeimantus/ What, is there a knowledge still higher than this—higher than justice and the other virtues?

Socrates/ Yes, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline merely, as at present—nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy!

Adeimantus/ A right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge?

Socrates/ Nay, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have often been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?

Adeimantus/ Assuredly not.

Socrates/ You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?

Adeimantus/ How ridiculous!

Socrates/ Yes, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it—for the good they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they use the term 'good'—this is of course ridiculous.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved.

Adeimantus/ There can be none.

Socrates/ Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to be what is just and honorable without the reality; but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good—the reality is what they seek; in the case of the good, appearance is despised by everyone.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions, having a presentiment

that there is such an end, and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things, —of a principle such and so great as this ought the best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be in the darkness of ignorance?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ I am sure, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them.

Adeimantus/ That, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.

Socrates/ And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be perfectly ordered?

Adeimantus/ Of course, but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either?

Socrates/ Aye, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters.

Adeimantus/ True, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others, and never telling his own.

Socrates/ Well, but has anyone a right to say positively what he does not know?

Adeimantus/ Not, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.

Socrates/ And do you not know, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? You would not deny

that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others will tell you of brightness and beauty?

Glaucon/ Still, I must implore you, Socrates, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear—otherwise, not.

Glaucon/ By all means, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent.

Socrates/ I do indeed wish, that I could pay, and you receive, the account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, however, this latter by way of interest, and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you.

Glaucon/ Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.

Socrates/ Yes, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term 'many' is applied.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?

Glaucon/ The sight.

Socrates/ And with the hearing, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?

Glaucon/ No, I never have.

Socrates/ Then reflect: has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?

Glaucon/ Nothing of the sort.

Socrates/ No, indeed, and the same is true of most, if not all, the other senses—you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or being seen?

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to see; color being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colors will be invisible.

Glaucon/ Of what nature are you speaking?

Socrates/ Of that which you term light.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble thing?

Glaucon/ Nay, the reverse of ignoble.

Socrates/ And which, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear?

Glaucon/ You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.

Socrates/ May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?

Glaucon/ By far the most like.

Socrates/ And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognized by sight?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind:

Glaucon/ Will you be a little more explicit?

Socrates/ Why, you know, that the eyes, when a person directs them towards objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness of vision in them?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they see clearly and there is sight in them?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes

the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honor yet higher.

Glaucon/ What a wonder of beauty that must be, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good?

Socrates/ God forbid, but may I ask you to consider the image in another point of view?

Glaucon/ In what point of view?

Socrates/ You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.

Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness:

Glaucon/ By the light of heaven, how amazing!

Socrates/ Yes, and the exaggeration may be set down to you; for you made me utter my fancies.

Glaucon/ And pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun.

Socrates/ Yes, there is a great deal more.

Glaucon/ Then omit nothing, however slight.

Socrates/ I will do my best, but I should think that a great deal will have to be omitted.

Glaucon/ I hope not.

Socrates/ You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the name (οὐρανός, ὁρατός). May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?

Glaucon/ I have.

Socrates/ Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?

Glaucon/ Yes, I understand.

Socrates/ Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?

Glaucon/ Most undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.

Glaucon/ In what manner?

Socrates/ Thus: —There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.

Glaucon/ I do not quite understand your meaning.

Socrates/ Then I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are their hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?

Glaucon/ Yes, I know.

Socrates/ And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on—the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value.

Glaucon/ I understand, that you are speaking of the province of geometry and the sister arts.

Socrates/ And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses—that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.

Glaucon/ I understand you, not perfectly, for you seem to me to be describing a task which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, I understand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also contemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses: yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would

term understanding and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason.

Socrates/ You have quite conceived my meaning, and now, corresponding to these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul—reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or conviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last—and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth.

Glaucon/ I understand, and give my assent, and accept your arrangement.

Book 7.

Socrates/ And now, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened: —Behold! human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs at and necks chained so that they cannot move, and a distance; can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

Glaucon/ I see.

Socrates/ And do you see, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

Glaucon/ You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

Socrates/ Like ourselves, and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

Glaucon/ True, how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

Socrates/ And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

Glaucon/ No question.

Socrates/ To them, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

Glaucon/ That is certain.

Socrates/ And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive someone saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision, —what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them, —will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

Glaucon/ Far truer.

Socrates/ And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

Glaucon/ Not all in a moment.

Socrates/ He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?

Glaucon/ Clearly, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

Socrates/ And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?

Glaucon/ Certainly, he would.

Socrates/ And if they were in the habit of conferring honors among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honors and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer;

'Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,'

and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?

Glaucon/ Yes, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

Socrates/ Imagine once more, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

Glaucon/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if anyone tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

Glaucon/ No question.

Socrates/ This entire allegory, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will

not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed—whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

Glaucon/ I agree, as far as I am able to understand you.

Socrates/ Moreover, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

Glaucon/ Yes, very natural.

Socrates/ And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavoring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?

Glaucon/ Anything but surprising.

Socrates/ Anyone who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or

from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees anyone whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

Glaucon/ That, is a very just distinction.

Socrates/ But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

Glaucon/ They undoubtedly say this.

Socrates/ Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?

Glaucon/ Yes, such an art may be presumed.

Socrates/ And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue—how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eye-sight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below—if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.

Glaucon/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Yes, and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able ministers of State; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not

act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all—they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labors and honors, whether they are worth having or not.

Glaucon/ But is not this unjust? ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?

Socrates/ You have again forgotten, my friend, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making anyone class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.

Glaucon/ True, I had forgotten.

Socrates/ Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received.

But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State, which is also yours, will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly light?

Glaucon/ Impossible; for they are just men, and the commands which we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of our present rulers of State.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, and there lies the point. You must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will they rule

who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after their own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?

Glaucon/ Indeed, I do not.

Socrates/ And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.

Glaucon/ No question.

Socrates/ Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honors and another and a better life than that of politics?

Glaucon/ They are the men, and I will choose them.

Socrates/ And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and how they are to be brought from darkness to light, —as some are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ The process, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being,

that is, the ascent from below, which we affirm to be true philosophy?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the power of effecting such a change?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to being? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes?

Glaucon/ Yes, that was said.

Socrates/ Then this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?

Glaucon/ What quality?

Socrates/ Usefulness in war.

Glaucon/ Yes, if possible.

Socrates/ There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ There was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body, and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and corruption?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ But what do you say of music, what also entered to a certain extent into our former scheme?

Glaucon/ Music, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic, and trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making them harmonious,

by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and the words, whether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of rhythm and harmony in them. But in music there was nothing which tended to that good which you are now seeking.

Socrates/ You are most accurate, in your recollection; in music there certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there, my dear Glaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts were reckoned mean by us?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts are also excluded, what remains?

Socrates/ Well, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and then we shall have to take something which is not special, but of universal application.

Glaucon/ What may that be?

Socrates/ A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common, and which everyone first has to learn among the elements of education.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three—in a word, number and calculation: —do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the art of war partakes of them?

Glaucon/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Then Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares that he had invented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been numbered before, and Agamemnon must be

supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own feet—how could he if he was ignorant of number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been?

Glaucon/ I should say a very strange one, if this was as you say.

Socrates/ Can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?

Glaucon/ Certainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of military tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at all.

Socrates/ I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this study?

Glaucon/ What is your notion?

Socrates/ It appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and which leads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly used; for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being.

Glaucon/ Will you explain your meaning?

Socrates/ I will try, and I wish you would share the enquiry with me, and say 'yes' or 'no' when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may have clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.

Glaucon/ Explain.

Socrates/ I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them; while in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further enquiry is imperatively demanded.

Glaucon/ You are clearly referring, to the manner in which the senses are imposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade.

Socrates/ No, that is not at all my meaning.

Glaucon/ Then what is your meaning?

Socrates/ When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass from one sensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do; in this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer: — here are three fingers—a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger.

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ You may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the point.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin—it makes no difference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not compelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger? for the sight never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And therefore, as we might expect, there is nothing here which invites or excites intelligence.

Glaucon/ There is not.

Socrates/ But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or thinness, of softness or hardness? And so of the other senses; do they give perfect

intimations of such matters? Is not their mode of operation on this wise—the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be both hard and soft?

Glaucon/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, light?

Glaucon/ Yes, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious and require to be explained.

Socrates/ Yes, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several objects announced to her are one or two.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a state of division, for if they were undivided they could only be conceived of as one?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ The eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused manner; they were not distinguished.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not confused.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Was not this the beginning of the enquiry 'What is great?' and 'What is small?'

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ And thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ This was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect, or the reverse—those which are simultaneous with opposite impressions, invite thought; those which are not simultaneous do not.

Glaucon/ I understand, and agree with you.

Socrates/ And to which class do unity and number belong?

Glaucon/ I do not know.

Socrates/ Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer; for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or by any other sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the finger, there would be nothing to attract towards being; but when there is some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and involves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks 'What is absolute unity?' This is the way in which the study of the one has a power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being.

Glaucon/ And surely, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see the same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?

Socrates/ Yes, and this being true of one must be equally true of all number?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And they appear to lead the mind towards truth?

Glaucon/ Yes, in a very remarkable manner.

Socrates/ Then this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a double use, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and therefore he must be an arithmetician.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe; and we must endeavor to persuade those who are to be the principal men of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor again, like merchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.

Glaucon/ That is excellent.

Socrates/ Yes, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the science is! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end, if pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper!

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule anyone who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you divide, they multiply, taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.

Glaucon/ That is very true.

Socrates/ Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say, there is a unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal, invariable, indivisible, —what would they answer?

Glaucon/ They would answer, as I should conceive, that they were speaking of those numbers which can only be realized in thought.

Socrates/ Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary, necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the attainment of pure truth?

Glaucon/ Yes; that is a marked characteristic of it.

Socrates/ And have you further observed, that those who have a natural talent for calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they may derive no other advantage from it, always become much quicker than they would otherwise have been.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and not many as difficult.

Glaucon/ You will not.

Socrates/ And, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the best natures should be trained, and which must not be given up.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Let this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall we enquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?

Glaucon/ You mean geometry?

Socrates/ Exactly so.

Glaucon/ Clearly, we are concerned with that part of geometry which relates to war; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, or closing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military maneuver, whether in actual battle or on a march, it will make all the difference whether a general is or is not a geometrician.

Socrates/ Yes, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or calculation will be enough; the question relates rather to the greater and more advanced part of geometry—whether that tends in any degree to make more easy the vision of the idea of good; and thither, as I was saying, all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place, where is the full perfection of being, which she ought, by all means, to behold.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming only, it does not concern us?

Glaucon/ Yes, that is what we assert.

Socrates/ Yet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny that such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the ordinary language of geometricians.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ They have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow and ridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the like—they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life; whereas knowledge is the real object of the whole science.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then must not a further admission be made?

Glaucon/ What admission?

Socrates/ That the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not of aught perishing and transient.

Glaucon/ That, may be readily allowed, and is true.

Socrates/ Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down.

Glaucon/ Nothing will be more likely to have such an effect.

Socrates/ Then nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants of your fair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover the science has indirect effects, which are not small.

Glaucon/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ There are the military advantages of which you spoke, and in all departments of knowledge, as experience proves, anyone who has studied geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not.

Glaucon/ Yes indeed, there is an infinite difference between them.

Socrates/ Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth will study?

Glaucon/ Let us do so.

Socrates/ And suppose we make astronomy the third—what do you say?

Glaucon/ I am strongly inclined to it, the observation of the seasons and of months and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer or sailor.

Socrates/ I am amused, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these purified and re-illumined; and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by it alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons: one class of those who will agree with you and will take your words as a revelation; another class to whom they will be utterly unmeaning, and who will naturally deem them to be idle tales, for they see no sort of profit which is to be obtained from them. And therefore you had better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing to argue. You will very likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at the same time you do not grudge to others any benefit which they may receive.

Glaucon/ I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own behalf.

Socrates/ Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the sciences.

Glaucon/ What was the mistake?

Socrates/ After plane geometry, we proceeded at once to solids in revolution, instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the second dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth, ought to have followed.

Glaucon/ That is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known as yet about these subjects.

Socrates/ Why, yes, and for two reasons: —in the first place, no government patronizes them; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them, and they are difficult; in the second place, students cannot learn them unless they have a director. But then a director can hardly be found, and even if he could, as matters now stand, the students, who are very conceited, would not attend to him. That, however, would be otherwise if the whole State became the director of these studies and gave honor to them; then disciples would want to come, and there would be continuous and earnest search, and discoveries would be made; since even now, disregarded as they are by the world, and maimed of their fair proportions, and although none of their votaries can tell the use of them, still these studies force their way by their natural charm, and very likely, if they had the help of the State, they would someday emerge into light.

Glaucon/ Yes, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly understand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of plane surfaces?

Socrates/ Yes.

Glaucon/ And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?

Socrates/ Yes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid geometry, which, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass over this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if encouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth.

Glaucon/ The right order. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar manner in which I praised astronomy before, my praise shall be given in your own spirit. For everyone, as I think, must see that astronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another.

Socrates/ Everyone but myself, to everyone else this may be clear, but not to me.

Glaucon/ And what then would you say?

Socrates/ I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy appear to me to make us look downwards and not upwards.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ You, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our knowledge of the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking downwards, not upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he floats, or only lies on his back.

Glaucon/ I acknowledge, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to that knowledge of which we are speaking?

Socrates/ I will tell you: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon a visible ground, and therefore,

although the fairest and most perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by sight.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that higher knowledge; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures excellently wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great artist, which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw them would appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true double, or the truth of any other proportion.

Glaucon/ No, such an idea would be ridiculous.

Socrates/ And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the movements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect manner? But he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day, or of both to the month, or of the month to the year, or of the stars to these and to one another, and any other things that are material and visible can also be eternal and subject to no deviation—that would be absurd; and it is equally absurd to take so much pains in investigating their exact truth.

Glaucon/ I quite agree, though I never thought of this before.

Socrates/ Then, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems, and let the heavens alone if we would

approach the subject in the right way and so make the natural gift of reason to be of any real use.

Glaucon/ That, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers.

Socrates/ Yes, and there are many other things which must also have a similar extension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any value. But can you tell me of any other suitable study?

Glaucon/ No, not without thinking.

Socrates/ Motion, has many forms, and not one only; two of them are obvious enough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others, as I imagine, which may be left to wiser persons.

Glaucon/ But where are the two?

Socrates/ There is a second, which is the counterpart of the one already named.

Glaucon/ And what may that be?

Socrates/ The second, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first is to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and these are sister sciences—as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with them?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But this, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better go and learn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other applications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight of our own higher object.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, and which our pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying that they did in astronomy. For in the science of harmony, as you probably know, the

same thing happens. The teachers of harmony compare the sounds and consonances which are heard only, and their labor, like that of the astronomers, is in vain.

Glaucon/ Yes, by heaven! and 'tis as good as a play to hear them talking about their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears close alongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their neighbor's wall—one set of them declaring that they distinguish an intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the unit of measurement; the others insisting that the two sounds have passed into the same—either party setting their ears before their understanding.

Socrates/ You mean, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and rack them on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor and speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to sound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these are not the men, and that I am referring to the Pythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to enquire about harmony. For they too are in error, like the astronomers; they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which are heard, but they never attain to problems—that is to say, they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not.

Glaucon/ That, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge.

Socrates/ A thing, which I would rather call useful; that is, if sought after with a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in any other spirit, useless.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now, when all these studies reach the point of intercommunion and connection with one another, and

come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them.

Glaucon/ I suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.

Socrates/ What do you mean? the prelude or what? Do you not know that all this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician?

Glaucon/ Assuredly not, I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning.

Socrates/ But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will have the knowledge which we require of them?

Glaucon/ Neither can this be supposed.

Socrates/ And so, Glaucon, we have at last arrived at the hymn of dialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, as you may remember, was imagined by us after a while to behold the real animals and stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic; when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the visible.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then this is the progress which you call dialectic?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the underground den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying to look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to perceive even with their weak eyes the images in the water [which are divine], and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of images cast by a light of fire, which compared with the sun is only an image)—this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may compare the raising of that faculty which is the very light of the body to the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible world—this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit of the arts which has been described.

Glaucon/ I agree in what you are saying, which may be hard to believe, yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny. This however is not a theme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be discussed again and again. And so, whether our conclusion be true or false, let us assume all this, and proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain, and describe that in like manner. Say, then, what is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our final rest.

Socrates/ Dear Glaucon, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the absolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or would not have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would have seen something like reality; of that I am confident.

Glaucon/ Doubtless.

Socrates/ But I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.

Glaucon/ Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.

Socrates/ And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of comprehending by any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in general are concerned with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view to production and construction, or for the preservation of such productions and constructions; and as to the mathematical sciences which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being—geometry and the like—they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever become science?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and she uses as handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion, the sciences which we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science: and this, in our previous sketch, was called

understanding. But why should we dispute about names when we have realities of such importance to consider?

Glaucon/ Why indeed, when any name will do which expresses the thought of the mind with clearness?

Socrates/ At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two for intellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth perception of shadows, opinion being concerned with becoming, and intellect with being; and so to make a proportion: —

> As being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion.
> And as intellect is to opinion, so is science to belief,
> and understanding to the perception of shadows.

But let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of opinion and of intellect, for it will be a long enquiry, many times longer than this has been.

Glaucon/ As far as I understand, I agree.

Socrates/ And do you also agree, in describing the dialectician as one who attains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not possess and is therefore unable to impart this conception, in whatever degree he fails, may in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will you admit so much?

Glaucon/ Yes, how can I deny it?

Socrates/ And you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until the person is able to abstract and define rationally the idea of good, and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to absolute truth, never faltering at any step of the argument—unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows neither the idea of good nor any other good; he apprehends only a shadow, if anything at all, which is given by opinion and not by science; —dreaming

and slumbering in this life, before he is well awake here, he arrives at the world below, and has his final quietus.

Glaucon/ In all that I should most certainly agree with you.

Socrates/ And surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom you are nurturing and educating—if the ideal ever becomes a reality—you would not allow the future rulers to be like posts, having no reason in them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions?

Glaucon/ Yes, you and I together will make it.

Socrates/ Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, and is set over them; no other science can be placed higher—the nature of knowledge can no further go?

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ But to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to be assigned, are questions which remain to be considered.

Glaucon/ Yes, clearly.

Socrates/ You remember, how the rulers were chosen before?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given to the surest and the bravest, and, if possible, to the fairest; and, having noble and generous tempers, they should also have the natural gifts which will facilitate their education.

Glaucon/ And what are these?

Socrates/ Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind more often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of gymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared with the body.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labor in any line; or he will never be able to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go through all the intellectual discipline and study which we require of him.

Glaucon/ Certainly, he must have natural gifts.

Socrates/ The mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no vocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand and not bastards.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting industry—I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle: as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and all other bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labor of learning or listening or enquiring. Or the occupation to which he devotes himself may be of an opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of lameness.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And as to truth, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at herself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary falsehood, and does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance, and has no shame at being detected?

Glaucon/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every other virtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true son and the bastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities states and individuals unconsciously err; and the state makes a ruler, and the individual a friend, of one who, being defective in some part of virtue, is in a figure lame or a bastard.

Glaucon/ That is very true.

Socrates/ All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us; and if only those whom we introduce to this vast system of education and training are sound in body and mind, justice herself will have nothing to say against us, and we shall be the saviors of the constitution and of the State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse will happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy than she has to endure at present.

Glaucon/ That would not be creditable.

Socrates/ Certainly not, and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest I am equally ridiculous.

Glaucon/ In what respect?

Socrates/ I had forgotten, that we were not serious, and spoke with too much excitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled underfoot of men, I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the authors of her disgrace: and my anger made me too vehement.

Glaucon/ Indeed! I was listening, and did not think so.

Socrates/ But I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you that, although in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do so in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man when he grows old may learn many things—for he can no more learn much than he can run much; youth is the time for any extraordinary toil.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our system of education.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge of any kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then, my good friend, do not use compulsion, but let early education be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out the natural bent.

Glaucon/ That is a very rational notion.

Socrates/ Do you remember that the children, too, were to be taken to see the battle on horseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be brought close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?

Glaucon/ Yes, I remember.

Socrates/ The same practice may be followed, in all these things—labors, lessons, dangers—and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be enrolled in a select number.

Glaucon/ At what age?

Socrates/ At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether of two or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless for any other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning; and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most important tests to which our youth are subjected.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ After that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old will be promoted to higher honor, and the sciences which they learned without any order in their early education will now be brought together, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root.

Socrates/ Yes, and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of dialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical.

Glaucon/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ These, are the points which you must consider; and those who have most of this comprehension, and who are most steadfast in their learning, and in their military and other appointed duties, when they have arrived at the age of thirty will have to be chosen by you out of the select class, and elevated to higher honor; and you will have to prove them by the help of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able to give up the use of sight and the other senses, and in company with truth to attain absolute being: And here, my friend, great caution is required.

Glaucon/ Why great caution?

Socrates/ Do you not remark, how great is the evil which dialectic has introduced?

Glaucon/ What evil?

Socrates/ The students of the art are filled with lawlessness.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Do you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in their case? or will you make allowance for them?

Glaucon/ In what way make allowance?

Socrates/ I want you, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son who is brought up in great wealth; he is one of a great and numerous family, and has many flatterers. When he grows up to manhood, he learns that his alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he is unable to discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave towards his flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the period when he is ignorant of the false relation, and then again when he knows? Or shall I guess for you?

Glaucon/ If you please.

Socrates/ Then I should say, that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be likely to honor his father and his mother and his supposed relations more than the flatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when in need, or to do or say anything against them; and he will be less willing to disobey them in any important matter.

Glaucon/ He will.

Socrates/ But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would diminish his honor and regard for them, and would become more devoted to the flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he would now live after their ways, and openly associate with them, and, unless he were of an unusually good disposition, he would trouble himself no more about his supposed parents or other relations.

Glaucon/ Well, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the disciples of philosophy?

Socrates/ In this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and honor, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental authority we have been brought up, obeying and honoring them.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and attract the soul, but do not influence those of us who have any sense of right, and they continue to obey and honor the maxims of their fathers.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is fair or honorable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, and then arguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven into believing that nothing is honorable any more than dishonorable, or just and good any more than the reverse, and so of all the notions which he most valued, do you think that he will still honor and obey them as before?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And when he ceases to think them honorable and natural as heretofore, and he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to pursue any life other than that which flatters his desires?

Glaucon/ He cannot.

Socrates/ And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have described, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable.

Glaucon/ Yes, and, I may add, pitiable.

Socrates/ Therefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens who are now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in introducing them to dialectic.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early; for youngsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; like puppy-dogs, they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them.

Glaucon/ Yes, there is nothing which they like better.

Socrates/ And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing anything which they believed before, and hence, not only they, but philosophy and all that relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of the world.

Glaucon/ Too true.

Socrates/ But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such insanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and the greater moderation of his character will increase instead of diminishing the honor of the pursuit.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now, any chance aspirant or intruder?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Suppose, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics and to be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the number of years which were passed in bodily exercise—will that be enough?

Glaucon/ Would you say six or four years?

Socrates/ Say five years, at the end of the time they must be sent down again into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether, when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm or flinch.

Glaucon/ And how long is this stage of their lives to last?

Socrates/ Fifteen years; and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to their consummation: the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also; making philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty; and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there; and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and honor them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, but if not, as in any case blessed and divine.

Glaucon/ You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors faultless in beauty.

Socrates/ Yes, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not suppose that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far as their natures can go.

Glaucon/ There you are right, since we have made them to share in all things like the men.

Socrates/ Well, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has been said about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and although difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which has been supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings are born in a State, one or more of them, despising the honors of this present world which they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all things right and the honor that springs from right, and regarding justice as the greatest and most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are, and whose principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their own city?

Glaucon/ How will they proceed?

Socrates/ They will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of the city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of their children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents; these they will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws which we have given them: and in this way the State and constitution of which we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happiness, and the nation which has such a constitution will gain most.

Glaucon/ Yes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, that you have very well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into being.

Socrates/ Enough then of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its image—there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him.

Glaucon/ There is no difficulty, and I agree with you in thinking that nothing more need be said.

Book 7.

Socrates/ And so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common; and that all education and the pursuits of war and peace are also to be common, and the best philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings?

Glaucon/ That has been acknowledged.

Socrates/ Yes, and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when appointed themselves, will take their soldiers and place them in houses such as we were describing, which are common to all, and contain nothing private, or individual; and about their property, you remember what we agreed?

Glaucon/ Yes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions of mankind; they were to be warrior athletes and guardians, receiving from the other citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their maintenance, and they were to take care of themselves and of the whole State.

Socrates/ True, and now that this division of our task is concluded, let us find the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the old path.

Glaucon/ There is no difficulty in returning; you implied, then as now, that you had finished the description of the State: you said that such a State was good, and that the man was good who answered to it, although, as now appears, you had more excellent things to relate both of State and man. And you said further, that if this was the true form, then the others were false; and of the false forms, you said, as I remember, that there were four principal ones, and that their defects, and the defects of the individuals corresponding to them, were worth examining. When we had seen all the individuals, and finally agreed as to who was the best and who was the worst of them, we were to consider

whether the best was not also the happiest, and the worst the most miserable. I asked you what were the four forms of government of which you spoke, and then Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word; and you began again, and have found your way to the point at which we have now arrived.

Socrates/ Your recollection, is most exact.

Glaucon/ Then, like a wrestler, you must put yourself again in the same position; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the same answer which you were about to give me then.

Socrates/ Yes, if I can, I will.

Glaucon/ I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which you were speaking.

Socrates/ That question, is easily answered: the four governments of which I spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, those of Crete and Sparta, which are generally applauded; what is termed oligarchy comes next; this is not equally approved, and is a form of government which teems with evils: thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very different: and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which differs from them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not know, do you? of any other constitution which can be said to have a distinct character. There are lordships and principalities which are bought and sold, and some other intermediate forms of government. But these are nondescripts and may be found equally among Hellenes and among barbarians.

Glaucon/ Yes, we certainly hear of many curious forms of government which exist among them.

Socrates/ Do you know, that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? For we cannot suppose

that States are made of ‘oak and rock,’ and not out of the human natures which are in them, and which in a figure turn the scale and draw other things after them?

Glaucon/ Yes, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human characters.

Socrates/ Then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of individual minds will also be five?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Him who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call just and good, we have already described.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure justice or pure injustice. The enquiry will then be completed. And we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer justice.

Glaucon/ Certainly, we must do as you say.

Socrates/ Shall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to clearness, of taking the State first and then proceeding to the individual, and begin with the government of honor? —I know of no name for such a government other than timocracy, or perhaps timarchy. We will compare with this the like character in the individual; and, after that, consider oligarchy and the oligarchical man; and then again we will turn our attention to democracy and the democratical man; and lastly, we will go and view the city of

tyranny, and once more take a look into the tyrant's soul, and try to arrive at a satisfactory decision.

Glaucon/ That way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable.

Socrates/ First, then, let us enquire how timocracy (the government of honor) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly, all political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing power; a government which is united, however small, cannot be moved.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ In what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the two classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to tell us 'how discord first arose'? Shall we imagine them in solemn mockery, to play and jest with us as if we were children, and to address us in a lofty tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest?

Glaucon/ How would they address us?

Socrates/ After this manner: —A city which is thus constituted can hardly be shaken; but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end, even a constitution such as yours will not last forever, but will in time be dissolved. And this is the dissolution: —In plants that grow in the earth, as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility and sterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences of the circles of each are completed, which in short-lived existences pass over a short space, and in long-lived ones over a long space. But to the knowledge of human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and education of your rulers will not attain; the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an intelligence which

is alloyed with sense, but will escape them, and they will bring children into the world when they ought not. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is contained in a perfect number, but the period of human birth is comprehended in a number in which first increments by involution and evolution [or squared and cubed] obtaining three intervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning numbers, make all the terms commensurable and agreeable to one another. The base of these (3) with a third added (4) when combined with five (20) and raised to the third power furnishes two harmonies; the first a square which is a hundred times as great (400 = 4 × 100), and the other a figure having one side equal to the former, but oblong, consisting of a hundred numbers squared upon rational diameters of a square (i.e. omitting fractions), the side of which is five (7 × 7 = 49 × 100 = 4900), each of them being less by one (than the perfect square which includes the fractions, sc. 50) or less by two perfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the side of which is five = 50 + 50 = 100); and a hundred cubes of three (27 × 100 = 2700 + 4900 + 400 = 8000). Now this number represents a geometrical figure which has control over the good and evil of births. For when your guardians are ignorant of the law of births, and unite bride and bridegroom out of season, the children will not be goodly or fortunate. And though only the best of them will be appointed by their predecessors, still they will be unworthy to hold their fathers' places, and when they come into power as guardians, they will soon be found to fail in taking care of us, the Muses, first by undervaluing music; which neglect will soon extend to gymnastic; and hence the young men of your State will be less cultivated. In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of your different races, which, like Hesiod's, are of gold and silver and brass

and iron. And so iron will be mingled with silver, and brass with gold, and hence there will arise dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity, which always and in all places are causes of hatred and war. This the Muses affirm to be the stock from which discord has sprung, wherever arising; and this is their answer to us.

Glaucon/ Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly.

Socrates/ Why, yes, of course they answer truly; how can the Muses speak falsely?

Glaucon/ And what do the Muses say next?

Socrates/ When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the iron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and silver; but the gold and dual silver races, not wanting money but having the true riches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue and the ancient order of things. There was a battle between them, and at last they agreed to distribute their land and houses among individual owners; and they enslaved their friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly protected in the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and servants; and they themselves were engaged in war and in keeping a watch against them.

Glaucon/ I believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change.

Socrates/ And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate between oligarchy and aristocracy?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Such will be the change, and after the change has been made, how will they proceed? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between oligarchy and the perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other, and will also have some peculiarities.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ In the honor given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warrior class from agriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution of common meals, and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military training—in all these respects this State will resemble the former.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no longer to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements; and in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters, who are by nature fitted for war rather than peace; and in the value set by them upon military stratagems and contrivances, and in the waging of everlasting wars—this State will be for the most part peculiar.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yes, and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like those who live in oligarchies; they will have a fierce secret longing after gold and silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines and treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them; also castles which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they please.

Glaucon/ That is most true.

Socrates/ And they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the money which they prize; they will spend that which is another man's on the gratification of their desires, stealing their pleasures and running away like children from the law, their father: they have been schooled not by gentle influences but by force, for they have neglected her who is the true Muse, the companion of reason

and philosophy, and have honored gymnastic more than music.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly, the form of government which you describe is a mixture of good and evil.

Socrates/ Why, there is a mixture, but one thing, and one thing only, is predominantly seen, —the spirit of contention and ambition; and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Such is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been described in outline only; the more perfect execution was not required, for a sketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most perfectly unjust; and to go through all the States and all the characters of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable labor.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now what man answers to this form of government—how did he come into being, and what is he like?

Adeimantus/ I think, that in the spirit of contention which characterizes him, he is not unlike our friend Glaucon.

Socrates/ Perhaps, he may be like him in that one point; but there are other respects in which he is very different.

Adeimantus/ In what respects?

Socrates/ He should have more of self-assertion and be less cultivated, and yet a friend of culture; and he should be a good listener, but no speaker. Such a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man, who is too proud for that; and he will also be courteous to freemen, and remarkably obedient to authority; he is a lover of power and

a lover of honor; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is the type of character which answers to timocracy.

Socrates/ Such an one will despise riches only when he is young; but as he gets older he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a piece of the avaricious nature in him, and is not single-minded towards virtue, having lost his best guardian.

Adeimantus/ Who was that?

Socrates/ Philosophy, tempered with music, who comes and takes up her abode in a man, and is the only savior of his virtue throughout life.

Adeimantus/ Good.

Socrates/ Such, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical State.

Adeimantus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ His origin is as follows: —He is often the young son of a brave father, who dwells in an ill-governed city, of which he declines the honors and offices, and will not go to law, or exert himself in any way, but is ready to waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble.

Adeimantus/ And how does the son come into being?

Socrates/ The character of the son begins to develop when he hears his mother complaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which the consequence is that she has no precedence among other women. Further, when she sees her husband not very eager about money, and instead of battling and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever happens to him quietly; and when she

observes that his thoughts always center in himself, while he treats her with very considerable indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son that his father is only half a man and far too easy-going: adding all the other complaints about her own ill-treatment which women are so fond of rehearsing.

Adeimantus/ Yes, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints are so like themselves.

Socrates/ And you know, that the old servants also, who are supposed to be attached to the family, from time to time talk privately in the same strain to the son; and if they see anyone who owes money to his father, or is wronging him in any way, and he fails to prosecute them, they tell the youth that when he grows up he must retaliate upon people of this sort, and be more of a man than his father. He has only to walk abroad and he hears and sees the same sort of thing: those who do their own business in the city are called simpletons, and held in no esteem, while the busy-bodies are honored and applauded. The result is that the young man, hearing and seeing all these things—hearing, too, the words of his father, and having a nearer view of his way of life, and making comparisons of him and others—is drawn opposite ways: while his father is watering and nourishing the rational principle in his soul, the others are encouraging the passionate and appetitive; and he being not originally of a bad nature, but having kept bad company, is at last brought by their joint influence to a middle point, and gives up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle of contentiousness and passion, and becomes arrogant and ambitious.

Adeimantus/ You seem to me to have described his origin perfectly.

Socrates/ Then we have now, the second form of government and the second type of character?

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ Next, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says;

'Is set over against another State;'

Socrates/ or rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ I believe that oligarchy follows next in order.

Adeimantus/ And what manner of government do you term oligarchy?

Socrates/ A government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have power and the poor man is deprived of it.

Adeimantus/ I understand.

Socrates/ Ought I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to oligarchy arises?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into the other.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin of timocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what do they or their wives care about the law?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus the great mass of the citizens become lovers of money.

Adeimantus/ Likely enough.

Socrates/ And so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making a fortune the less they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the balance, the one always rises as the other falls.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And in proportion as riches and rich men are honored in the State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonored.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And what is honored is cultivated, and that which has no honor is neglected.

Adeimantus/ That is obvious.

Socrates/ And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become lovers of trade and money; they honor and look up to the rich man, and make a ruler of him, and dishonor the poor man.

Adeimantus/ They do so.

Socrates/ They next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the qualification of citizenship; the sum is higher in one place and lower in another, as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow no one whose property falls below the amount fixed to have any share in the government. These changes in the constitution they effect by force of arms, if intimidation has not already done their work.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is established.

Adeimantus/ Yes, but what are the characteristics of this form of government, and what are the defects of which we were speaking?

Socrates/ First of all, consider the nature of the qualification. Just think what would happen if pilots were to

be chosen according to their property, and a poor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a better pilot?

Adeimantus/ You mean that they would shipwreck?

Socrates/ Yes; and is not this true of the government of anything?

Adeimantus/ I should imagine so.

Socrates/ Except a city? —or would you include a city?

Adeimantus/ Nay, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as the rule of a city is the greatest and most difficult of all.

Socrates/ This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And here is another defect which is quite as bad.

Adeimantus/ What defect?

Socrates/ The inevitable division: such a State is not one, but two States, the one of poor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot and always conspiring against one another.

Adeimantus/ That, surely, is at least as bad.

Socrates/ Another discreditable feature is, that, for a like reason, they are incapable of carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do not call them out in the hour of battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to fight as they are few to rule. And at the same time their fondness for money makes them unwilling to pay taxes.

Adeimantus/ How discreditable!

Socrates/ And, as we said before, under such a constitution the same persons have too many callings—they

are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in one. Does that look well?

Adeimantus/ Anything but well.

Socrates/ There is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to which this State first begins to be liable.

Adeimantus/ What evil?

Socrates/ A man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property; yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part, being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a poor, helpless creature.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is an evil which also first begins in this State.

Socrates/ The evil is certainly not prevented there; for oligarchies have both the extremes of great wealth and utter poverty.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ But think again: In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money, was a man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes of citizenship? Or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body, although in truth he was neither ruler nor subject, but just a spendthrift?

Adeimantus/ As you say, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift.

Socrates/ May we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the other is of the hive?

Adeimantus/ Just so, Socrates.

Socrates/ And God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings, whereas of the walking

drones he has made some without stings but others have dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in their old age end as paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal class, as they are termed.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that neighborhood there are hidden away thieves and cut-purses and robbers of temples, and all sorts of malefactors.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Well, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?

Adeimantus/ Yes, nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler.

Socrates/ And may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals to be found in them, rogues who have stings, and whom the authorities are careful to restrain by force?

Adeimantus/ Certainly, we may be so bold.

Socrates/ The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education, ill-training, and an evil constitution of the State?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Such, then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy; and there may be many other evils.

Adeimantus/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Then oligarchy, or the form of government in which the rulers are elected for their wealth, may now be dismissed. Let us next proceed to consider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this State.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Does not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this wise?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ A time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first he begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but presently he sees him of a sudden foundering against the State as upon a sunken reef, and he and all that he has is lost; he may have been a general or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers, and either put to death, or exiled, or deprived of the privileges of a citizen, and all his property taken from him.

Adeimantus/ Nothing more likely.

Socrates/ And the son has seen and known all this—he is a ruined man, and his fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion headforemost from his bosom's throne; humbled by poverty he takes to money-making and by mean and miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such an one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the vacant throne and to suffer it to play the great king within him, girt with tiara and chain and scimitar?

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ And when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground obediently on either side of their sovereign, and taught them to know their place, he compels the one to think only of how lesser sums may be turned into larger ones, and will not allow the other to worship and admire anything but riches and rich men, or to be ambitious of anything so much as the acquisition of wealth and the means of acquiring it.

Adeimantus/ Of all changes, there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one.

Socrates/ And the avaricious, is the oligarchical youth?

Adeimantus/ Yes, at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the State out of which oligarchy came.

Socrates/ Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between them.

Adeimantus/ Very good.

Socrates/ First, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Also in their penurious, laborious character; the individual only satisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them; his other desires he subdues, under the idea that they are unprofitable.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ He is a shabby fellow, who saves something out of everything and makes a purse for himself; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud. Is he not a true image of the State which he represents?

Adeimantus/ He appears to me to be so; at any rate money is highly valued by him as well as by the State.

Socrates/ You see that he is not a man of cultivation.

Adeimantus/ I imagine not, had he been educated he would never have made a blind god director of his chorus, or given him chief honor.

Socrates/ Excellent! Yet consider: Must we not further admit that owing to this want of cultivation there will be found in him drone-like desires as of pauper and rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his general habit of life?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his rogueries?

Adeimantus/ Where must I look?

Socrates/ You should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting dishonestly, as in the guardianship of an orphan.

Adeimantus/ Aye.

Socrates/ It will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him a reputation for honesty he coerces his bad passions by an enforced virtue; not making them see that they are wrong, or taming them by reason, but by necessity and fear constraining them, and because he trembles for his possessions.

Adeimantus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Yes, indeed, my dear friend, but you will find that the natural desires of the drone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend what is not his own.

Adeimantus/ Yes, and they will be strong in him too.

Socrates/ The man, then, will be at war with himself; he will be two men, and not one; but, in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over his inferior ones.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ For these reasons such an one will be more respectable than most people; yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far away and never come near him.

Adeimantus/ I should expect so.

Socrates/ And surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a State for any prize of victory, or other object of honorable ambition; he will not spend his money in the contest for glory; so afraid is he of awakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the

struggle; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his money.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money-maker answers to the oligarchical State?

Adeimantus/ There can be no doubt.

Socrates/ Next comes democracy; of this the origin and nature have still to be considered by us; and then we will enquire into the ways of the democratic man, and bring him up for judgment.

Adeimantus/ That, is our method.

Socrates/ Well, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy arise? Is it not on this wise? —The good at which such a State aims is to become as rich as possible, a desire which is insatiable?

Adeimantus/ What then?

Socrates/ The rulers, being aware that their power rests upon their wealth, refuse to curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they gain by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their estates and thus increase their own wealth and importance?

Adeimantus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ There can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation cannot exist together in citizens of the same state to any considerable extent; one or the other will be disregarded.

Adeimantus/ That is tolerably clear.

Socrates/ And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?

Adeimantus/ Yes, often.

Socrates/ And still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and fully armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their citizenship; a third class are in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against those who have got their property, and against everybody else, and are eager for revolution.

Adeimantus/ That is true.

Socrates/ On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and pretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert their sting—that is, their money—into someone else who is not on his guard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied into a family of children: and so they make drone and pauper to abound in the State.

Adeimantus/ Yes, there are plenty of them—that is certain.

Socrates/ The evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it, either by restricting a man's use of his own property, or by another remedy:

Adeimantus/ What other?

Socrates/ One which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to look to their characters: —Let there be a general rule that everyone shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous money-making, and the evils of which we were speaking will be greatly lessened in the State.

Adeimantus/ Yes, they will be greatly lessened.

Socrates/ At present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named, treat their subjects badly; while they and their adherents, especially the young men of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of luxury and idleness both of body and mind; they do nothing, and are incapable of resisting either pleasure or pain.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ They themselves care only for making money, and are as indifferent as the pauper to the cultivation of virtue.

Adeimantus/ Yes, quite as indifferent.

Socrates/ Such is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often rulers and their subjects may come in one another's way, whether on a journey or on some other occasion of meeting, on a pilgrimage or a march, as fellow-soldiers or fellow-sailors; aye and they may observe the behavior of each other in the very moment of danger—for where danger is, there is no fear that the poor will be despised by the rich—and very likely the wiry sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh—when he sees such an one puffing and at his wits'-end, how can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to despoil them? And when they meet in private will not people be saying to one another 'Our warriors are not good for much'?

Adeimantus/ Yes, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking.

Socrates/ And, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external provocation a commotion may arise within—in the same way wherever there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the occasion may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their oligarchical, the other their democratical allies, and then the State falls sick, and is at war with herself; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no external cause.

Adeimantus/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has been effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to withdraw.

Socrates/ And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have they? for as the government is, such will be the man.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ In the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of freedom and frankness—a man may say and do what he likes?

Adeimantus/ 'Tis said so.

Socrates/ And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases?

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human natures?

Adeimantus/ There will.

Socrates/ This, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just as women and children think a variety of colors to be of all things most charming, so there are many men to whom this State, which is spangled with the manners and characters of mankind, will appear to be the fairest of States.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yes, my good Sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a government.

Adeimantus/ Why?

Socrates/ Because of the liberty which reigns there—they have a complete assortment of constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, as we have been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them, and pick out the one that suits him; then, when he has made his choice, he may found his State.

Adeimantus/ He will be sure to have patterns enough.

Socrates/ And there being no necessity, for you to govern in this State, even if you have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or to go to war when the rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are so disposed—there being no necessity also, because some law forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office or be a dicast, if you have a fancy—is not this a way of life which for the moment is supremely delightful?

Adeimantus/ For the moment, yes.

Socrates/ And is not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite charming? Have you not observed how, in a democracy, many persons, although they have been sentenced to death or exile, just stay where they are and walk about the world—the gentleman parades like a hero, and nobody sees or cares?

Adeimantus/ Yes, many and many a one.

Socrates/ See too, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the 'don't care' about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine principles which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city—as when we said that, except in the case of some rarely gifted nature, there never will be a good man who has not from his childhood been used to play amid things of beauty and make of them a joy and a

study—how grandly does she trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet, never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honor anyone who professes to be the people's friend.

Adeimantus/ Yes, she is of a noble spirit.

Socrates/ These and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.

Adeimantus/ We know her well.

Socrates/ Consider now, what manner of man the individual is, or rather consider, as in the case of the State, how he comes into being.

Adeimantus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Is not this the way—he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father who has trained him in his own habits?

Adeimantus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called unnecessary?

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?

Adeimantus/ I should.

Socrates/ Are not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of which the satisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called so, because we are framed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what is necessary, and cannot help it.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ We are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?

Adeimantus/ We are not.

Socrates/ And the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his youth upwards—of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some cases the reverse of good—shall we not be right in saying that all these are unnecessary?

Adeimantus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a general notion of them?

Adeimantus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class?

Adeimantus/ That is what I should suppose.

Socrates/ The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is essential to the continuance of life?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other luxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained in youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary?

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ May we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money because they conduce to production?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures and desires of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires, whereas he who was subject to the necessary only was miserly and oligarchical?

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Again, let us see how the democratical man grows out of the oligarchical: the following, as I suspect, is commonly the process.

Adeimantus/ What is the process?

Socrates/ When a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' honey and has come to associate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure—then, as you may imagine, the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into the democratical?

Adeimantus/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected by an alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so too the young man is changed by a class of desires coming from without to assist the desires within him, that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin and alike?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him, whether the influence of a father or of kindred, advising or rebuking him, then there arises in his soul a faction and an opposite faction, and he goes to war with himself.

Adeimantus/ It must be so.

Socrates/ And there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the oligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; a spirit of reverence enters into the young man's soul and order is restored.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that sometimes happens.

Socrates/ And then, again, after the old desires have been driven out, fresh ones spring up, which are akin to them, and because he their father does not know how to educate them, wax fierce and numerous.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is apt to be the way.

Socrates/ They draw him to his old associates, and holding secret intercourse with them, breed and multiply in him.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul, which they perceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and true words, which make their abode in the minds of men who are dear to the gods, and are their best guardians and sentinels.

Adeimantus/ None better.

Socrates/ False and boastful conceits and phrases mount upwards and take their place.

Adeimantus/ They are certain to do so.

Socrates/ And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters, and takes up his dwelling there in the face of all men; and if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain conceits shut the gate of the king's fastness; and they will neither allow the embassy itself to enter, nor if private advisers offer the fatherly counsel of the aged will they listen to them or receive them. There is a battle and they gain the day, and then

modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by them, and temperance, which they nickname unmanliness, is trampled in the mire and cast forth; they persuade men that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness, and so, by the help of a rabble of evil appetites, they drive them beyond the border.

Adeimantus/ Yes, with a will.

Socrates/ And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now in their power and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in bright array having garlands on their heads, and a great company with them, hymning their praises and calling them by sweet names; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste magnificence, and impudence courage. And so the young man passes out of his original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures.

Adeimantus/ Yes, the change in him is visible enough.

Socrates/ After this he lives on, spending his money and labor and time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be fortunate, and is not too much disordered in his wits, when years have elapsed, and the heyday of passion is over—supposing that he then re-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to their successors—in that case he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn; and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another; he despises none of them but encourages them all equally.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of advice; if anyone says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honor some and chastise and master the others—whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that one is as good as another.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is the way with him.

Socrates/ Yes, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a water-drinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a philosopher; often he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is emulous of anyone who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so he goes on.

Adeimantus/ Yes, he is all liberty and equality.

Socrates/ Yes, his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of many; —he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many a constitution and many an example of manners is contained in him.

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called the democratic man.

Adeimantus/ Let that be his place.

Socrates/ Last of all comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike, tyranny and the tyrant; these we have now to consider.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Say then, my friend, In what manner does tyranny arise? —that it has a democratic origin is evident.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy from oligarchy—I mean, after a sort?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ The good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it was maintained was excess of wealth—am I not right?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for the sake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings her to dissolution?

Adeimantus/ What good?

Socrates/ Freedom, which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory of the State—and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman of nature deign to dwell.

Adeimantus/ Yes; the saying is in every body's mouth.

Socrates/ I was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect of other things introduces the change in democracy, which occasions a demand for tyranny.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cup-bearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and says that they are cursed oligarchs.

Adeimantus/ Yes, a very common occurrence.

Socrates/ Yes, and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her slaves who hug their chains and men of naught; she would have subjects who are like rulers, and rulers who are like subjects: these are men after her own heart, whom she praises and honors both in private and public. Now, in such a State, can liberty have any limit?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them.

Adeimantus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his sons and to fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he having no respect or reverence for either of his parents; and this is his freedom, and the metic is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger is quite as good as either.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is the way.

Socrates/ And these are not the only evils, —there are several lesser ones: In such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike; and the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready to compete with him in word or deed; and old men condescend to the young and are full of pleasantry and gaiety; they are loth to

be thought morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money, whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each other.

Adeimantus/ Why not, as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?

Socrates/ That is what I am doing, and I must add that no one who does not know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other State: for truly, the she-dogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their she-mistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at anybody who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them: and all things are just ready to burst with liberty.

Adeimantus/ When I take a country walk, I often experience what you describe. You and I have dreamed the same thing.

Socrates/ And above all, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority, and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written or unwritten; they will have no one over them.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I know it too well.

Socrates/ Such, my friend, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which springs tyranny.

Adeimantus/ Glorious indeed. But what is the next step?

Socrates/ The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease magnified and intensified by liberty overmasters democracy—the truth being that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite direction; and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and animal life, but above all in forms of government.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ The excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to pass into excess of slavery.

Adeimantus/ Yes, the natural order.

Socrates/ And so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty?

Adeimantus/ As we might expect.

Socrates/ That, however, was not, as I believe, your question—you rather desired to know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and democracy, and is the ruin of both?

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Well, I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts, of whom the more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers, the same whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless, and others having stings.

Adeimantus/ A very just comparison.

Socrates/ These two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good physician and lawgiver of the State ought, like the wise bee-master, to keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in; and if they

have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their cells cut out as speedily as possible.

Adeimantus/ Yes, by all means.

Socrates/ Then, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine democracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into three classes; for in the first place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than there were in the oligarchical State.

Adeimantus/ That is true.

Socrates/ And in the democracy they are certainly more intensified.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ Because in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from office, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in a democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener sort speak and act, the rest keep buzzing about the bema and do not suffer a word to be said on the other side; hence in democracies almost everything is managed by the drones.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then there is another class which is always being severed from the mass.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ They are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be the richest.

Adeimantus/ Naturally so.

Socrates/ They are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of honey to the drones.

Adeimantus/ Why, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have little.

Socrates/ And this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.

Adeimantus/ That is pretty much the case.

Socrates/ The people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their own hands; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon. This, when assembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a democracy.

Adeimantus/ True, but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate unless they get a little honey.

Socrates/ And do they not share? Do not their leaders deprive the rich of their estates and distribute them among the people; at the same time taking care to reserve the larger part for themselves?

Adeimantus/ Why, yes, to that extent the people do share.

Socrates/ And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as they best can?

Adeimantus/ What else can they do?

Socrates/ And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge them with plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality; they do not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments them and breeds revolution in them.

Adeimantus/ That is exactly the truth.

Socrates/ Then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ The people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse into greatness.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is their way.

Socrates/ This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first appears above ground he is a protector.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is quite clear.

Socrates/ How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when he does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus.

Adeimantus/ What tale?

Socrates/ The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf. Did you never hear it?

Adeimantus/ O yes.

Socrates/ And the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the favorite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizens; some he kills and others he banishes, at the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of lands: and after this, what will be his destiny? Must he not either perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf—that is, a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ This, is he who begins to make a party against the rich?

Adeimantus/ The same.

Socrates/ After a while he is driven out, but comes back, in spite of his enemies, a tyrant full grown.

Adeimantus/ That is clear.

Socrates/ And if they are unable to expel him, or to get him condemned to death by a public accusation, they conspire to assassinate him.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is their usual way.

Socrates/ Then comes the famous request for a body-guard, which is the device of all those who have got thus far in their tyrannical career—'Let not the people's friend' as they say, 'be lost to them.'

Adeimantus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ The people readily assent; all their fears are for him—they have none for themselves.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of the people sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus;

> 'By pebbly Hermus' shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to be a coward.'

Adeimantus/ And quite right too, for if he were, he would never be ashamed again.

Socrates/ But if he is caught, he dies.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not 'larding the plain' with his bulk, but himself the overthrower of many, standing up in the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer protector, but tyrant absolute.

Adeimantus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And now let us consider the happiness of the man, and also of the State in which a creature like him is generated.

Adeimantus/ Yes, let us consider that.

Socrates/ At first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he salutes everyone whom he meets; —he to be called a tyrant, who is making promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors, and distributing land to the people and his followers, and wanting to be so kind and good to everyone!

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and there is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some war or other, in order that the people may require a leader.

Adeimantus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Has he not also another object, which is that they may be impoverished by payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily wants and therefore less likely to conspire against him?

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom, and of resistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for destroying them by placing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war.

Adeimantus/ He must.

Socrates/ Now he begins to grow unpopular.

Adeimantus/ A necessary result.

Socrates/ Then some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power, speak their minds to him and to one another, and the more courageous of them cast in his teeth what is being done.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that may be expected.

Socrates/ And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything.

Adeimantus/ He cannot.

Socrates/ And therefore he must look about him and see who is valiant, who is high-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy of them all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no, until he has made a purgation of the State.

Adeimantus/ Yes, and a rare purgation.

Socrates/ Yes, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the body; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he does the reverse.

Adeimantus/ If he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.

Socrates/ What a blessed alternative: —to be compelled to dwell only with the many bad, and to be by them hated, or not to live at all!

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is the alternative.

Socrates/ And the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites and the greater devotion in them will he require?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them?

Adeimantus/ They will flock to him, of their own accord, if he pays them.

Socrates/ By the dog!, here are more drones, of every sort and from every land.

Adeimantus/ Yes, there are.

Socrates/ But will he not desire to get them on the spot?

Adeimantus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ He will rob the citizens of their slaves; he will then set them free and enroll them in his body-guard.

Adeimantus/ To be sure, and he will be able to trust them best of all.

Socrates/ What a blessed creature, must this tyrant be; he has put to death the others and has these for his trusted friends.

Adeimantus/ Yes, they are quite of his sort.

Socrates/ Yes, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into existence, who admire him and are his companions, while the good hate and avoid him.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Verily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian.

Adeimantus/ Why so?

Socrates/ Why, because he is the author of the pregnant saying;

'Tyrants are wise by living with the wise;'

and he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes his companions.

Adeimantus/ Yes, and he also praises tyranny as godlike; and many other things of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets.

Socrates/ And therefore, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and any others who live after our manner if we do not receive them into our State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny.

Adeimantus/ Yes, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us.

Socrates/ But they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and hire voices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to tyrannies and democracies.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honor—the greatest honor, as might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from democracies; but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the more their reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed further.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ But we are wandering from the subject: Let us therefore return and enquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various and ever-changing army of his.

Adeimantus/ If, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate and spend them; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may suffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to impose upon the people.

Socrates/ And when these fail?

Adeimantus/ Why, clearly, then he and his boon companions, whether male or female, will be maintained out of his father's estate.

Socrates/ You mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being, will maintain him and his companions?

Adeimantus/ Yes, they cannot help themselves.

Socrates/ But what if the people fly into a passion, and aver that a grown-up son ought not to be supported by his father, but that the father should be supported by the son? The father did not bring him into being, or settle him in life, in order that when his son became a man he should himself be the servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble of slaves and companions; but that his son should protect him, and that by his help he might be

emancipated from the government of the rich and aristocratic, as they are termed. And so he bids him and his companions depart, just as any other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and his undesirable associates.

Adeimantus/ By heaven, then the parent will discover what a monster he has been fostering in his bosom; and, when he wants to drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his son strong.

Socrates/ Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What! beat his father if he opposes him?

Adeimantus/ Yes, he will, having first disarmed him.

Socrates/ Then he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this is real tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the saying is, the people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest form of slavery.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Very well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently discussed the nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from democracy to tyranny?

Adeimantus/ Yes, quite enough.

Book 9.

Socrates/ Last of all comes the tyrannical man; about whom we have once more to ask, how is he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live, in happiness or in misery?

Adeimantus/ Yes, he is the only one remaining.

Socrates/ There is, however, a previous question which remains unanswered.

Adeimantus/ What question?

Socrates/ I do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number of the appetites, and until this is accomplished the enquiry will always be confused.

Adeimantus/ Well, it is not too late to supply the omission.

Socrates/ Very true, and observe the point which I want to understand: Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be unlawful; everyone appears to have them, but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and by reason, and the better desires prevail over them—either they are wholly banished or they become few and weak; while in the case of others they are stronger, and there are more of them.

Adeimantus/ Which appetites do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power is asleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and having shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires; and there is no conceivable folly or crime—not excepting incest or any other unnatural union, or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food—which at such a time, when he has

parted company with all shame and sense, a man may not be ready to commit.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and fed them on noble thoughts and enquiries, collecting himself in meditation; after having first indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering with the higher principle—which he leaves in the solitude of pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future: when again he has allayed the passionate element, if he has a quarrel against anyone—I say, when, after pacifying the two irrational principles, he rouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes his rest, then, as you know, he attains truth most nearly, and is least likely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions.

Adeimantus/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ In saying this I have been running into a digression; but the point which I desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider whether I am right, and you agree with me.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I agree.

Socrates/ And now remember the character which we attributed to the democratic man. He was supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained under a miserly parent, who encouraged the saving appetites in him, but discountenanced the unnecessary, which aim only at amusement and ornament?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of people, and taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite extreme from an abhorrence of his father's meanness. At last, being a better man than his corruptors, he was drawn in both directions until he halted midway and led a life, not of vulgar and slavish passion, but of what he deemed moderate indulgence in various pleasures. After this manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?

Adeimantus/ Yes, that was our view of him, and is so still.

Socrates/ And now, years will have passed away, and you must conceive this man, such as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his father's principles.

Adeimantus/ I can imagine him.

Socrates/ Then you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which has already happened to the father: —he is drawn into a perfectly lawless life, which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty; and his father and friends take part with his moderate desires, and the opposite party assist the opposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and tyrant-makers find that they are losing their hold on him, they contrive to implant in him a master passion, to be lord over his idle and spendthrift lusts—a sort of monstrous winged drone—that is the only image which will adequately describe him.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is the only adequate image of him.

Socrates/ And when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands and wines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let loose, come buzzing around him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire which they implant in his drone-like nature, then at last this lord of the soul, having Madness for the captain of his guard, breaks out into a frenzy; and if he finds in himself any good

opinions or appetites in process of formation, and there is in him any sense of shame remaining, to these better principles he puts an end, and casts them forth until he has purged away temperance and brought in madness to the full.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated.

Socrates/ And is not this the reason why of old love has been called a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ I should not wonder.

Socrates/ Further, has not a drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ He has.

Socrates/ And you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind, will fancy that he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the gods?

Adeimantus/ That he will.

Socrates/ And the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being when, either under the influence of nature, or habit, or both, he becomes drunken, lustful, passionate?

Adeimantus/ O my friend, is not that so?

Socrates/ Assuredly.

Adeimantus/ Such is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live?

Socrates/ Suppose, as people facetiously say, you were to tell me. I imagine, at the next step in his progress, that there will be feasts and carousals and retellings and courtesans, and all that sort of thing; Love is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the concerns of his soul.

Adeimantus/ That is certain.

Socrates/ Yes; and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable, and their demands are many.

Adeimantus/ They are indeed.

Socrates/ His revenues, if he has any, are soon spent.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Then comes debt and the cutting down of his property.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ When he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest like young ravens, be crying aloud for food; and he, goaded on by them, and especially by love himself, who his is in a manner the captain of them, is in a frenzy, and would fain discover whom he can defraud or despoil of his property, in order that he may gratify them?

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is sure to be the case.

Socrates/ He must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and pangs.

Adeimantus/ He must.

Socrates/ And as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got the better of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger will claim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has spent his own share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs.

Adeimantus/ No doubt he will.

Socrates/ And if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all to cheat and deceive them.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And if he fails, then he will use force and plunder them.

Adeimantus/ Yes, probably.

Socrates/ And if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend? Will the creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them?

Adeimantus/ Nay, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents.

Socrates/ But, O heavens! Adeimantus, on account of some newfangled love of a harlot, who is anything but a necessary connection, can you believe that he would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary to his very existence, and would place her under the authority of the other, when she is brought under the same roof with her; or that, under like circumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father, first and most indispensable of friends, for the sake of some newly-found blooming youth who is the reverse of indispensable?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed, I believe that he would.

Socrates/ Truly, then, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother.

Adeimantus/ He is indeed.

Socrates/ He first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures are beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house, or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer; next he proceeds to clear a temple. Meanwhile the old opinions which he had when a child, and which gave judgment about good and evil, are overthrown by those others which have just been emancipated, and are now the body-guard of love and share his empire. These in his democratic days, when he was still subject to the laws and to his father, were only let loose in the dreams of sleep. But now that he is under the dominion of Love, he becomes always and in waking reality what he was then very rarely and in a dream only; he will commit the foulest murder, or eat forbidden food, or be guilty of any other horrid act. Love is his tyrant, and lives lordly in him and lawlessly, and being himself a king, leads him on, as a tyrant leads a State, to the performance of any reckless deed by which he can maintain

himself and the rabble of his associates, whether those whom evil communications have brought in from without, or those whom he himself has allowed to break loose within him by reason of a similar evil nature in himself. Have we not here a picture of his way of life?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And if there are only a few of them in the State, and the rest of the people are well disposed, they go away and become the body-guard or mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a war; and if there is no war, they stay at home and do many little pieces of mischief in the city.

Adeimantus/ What sort of mischief?

Socrates/ For example, they are the thieves, burglars, cut-purses, foot-pads, robbers of temples, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to speak they turn informers, and bear false witness, and take bribes.

Adeimantus/ A small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in number.

Socrates/ Yes, but small and great are comparative terms, and all these things, in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not come within a thousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and their followers grow numerous and become conscious of their strength, assisted by the infatuation of the people, they choose from among themselves the one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul, and him they create their tyrant.

Adeimantus/ Yes, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.

Socrates/ If the people yield, well and good; but if they resist him, as he began by beating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he beats them, and will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the Cretans

say, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be their rulers and masters. This is the end of his passions and desires.

Adeimantus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ When such men are only private individuals and before they get power, this is their character; they associate entirely with their own flatterers or ready tools; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are equally ready to bow down before them: they profess every sort of affection for them; but when they have gained their point they know them no more.

Adeimantus/ Yes, truly.

Socrates/ They are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of anybody; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship.

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And may we not rightly call such men treacherous?

Adeimantus/ No question.

Socrates/ Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of justice?

Adeimantus/ Yes, and we were perfectly right.

Socrates/ Let us then sum up in a word, the character of the worst man: he is the waking reality of what we dreamed.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ And this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule, and the longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.

Glaucon, taking his turn to answer, said:

Glaucon/ That is certain.

Socrates/ And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most miserable? and he who has

tyrannized longest and most, most continually and truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of men in general?

Glaucon/ Yes, inevitably.

Socrates/ And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the democratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the others?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to man?

Glaucon/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Then comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city which is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue?

Glaucon/ They are the opposite extremes, for one is the very best and the other is the very worst.

Socrates/ There can be no mistake, as to which is which, and therefore I will at once enquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about their relative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow ourselves to be panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us go as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about, and then we will give our opinion.

Glaucon/ A fair invitation, and I see, as everyone must, that a tyranny is the wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king the happiest.

Socrates/ And in estimating the men too, may I not fairly make a like request, that I should have a judge whose mind can enter into and see through human nature? he must not be like a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the

beholder, but let him be one who has a clear insight. May I suppose that the judgment is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able to judge, and has dwelt in the same place with him, and been present at his daily life and known him in his family relations, where he may be seen stripped of his tragedy attire, and again in the hour of public danger—he shall tell us about the happiness and misery of the tyrant when compared with other men?

Glaucon/ That again, is a very fair proposal.

Socrates/ Shall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and have before now met with such a person? We shall then have someone who will answer our enquiries.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the State; bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other of them, will you tell me their respective conditions?

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Beginning with the State, would you say that a city which is governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved?

Glaucon/ No city, can be more completely enslaved.

Socrates/ And yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters in such a State?

Glaucon/ Yes, I see that there are—a few; but the people, speaking generally, and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved.

Socrates/ Then if the man is like the State, must not the same rule prevail? his soul is full of meanness and vulgarity—the best elements in him are enslaved; and there is a small ruling part, which is also the worst and maddest.

Glaucon/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ And would you say that the soul of such an one is the soul of a freeman, or of a slave?

Glaucon/ He has the soul of a slave, in my opinion.

Socrates/ And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of acting voluntarily?

Glaucon/ Utterly incapable.

Socrates/ And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul taken as a whole) is least capable of doing what she desires; there is a gadfly which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?

Glaucon/ Poor.

Socrates/ And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Reflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State to be the most miserable of States?

Glaucon/ And I was right.

Socrates/ Certainly. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man, what do you say of him?

Glaucon/ I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.

Socrates/ There, I think that you are beginning to go wrong.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.

Glaucon/ Then who is more miserable?

Socrates/ One of whom I am about to speak.

Glaucon/ Who is that?

Socrates/ He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life has been cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.

Glaucon/ From what has been said, I gather that you are right.

Socrates/ Yes, but in this high argument you should be a little more certain, and should not conjecture only; for of all questions, this respecting good and evil is the greatest.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Let me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, throw a light upon this subject.

Glaucon/ What is your illustration?

Socrates/ The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from them you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition, for they both have slaves; the only difference is that he has more slaves.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is the difference.

Socrates/ You know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their servants?

Glaucon/ What should they fear?

Socrates/ Nothing. But do you observe the reason of this?

Glaucon/ Yes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the protection of each individual.

Socrates/ Very true. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of some fifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves, carried off by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him—will he not be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and children should be put to death by his slaves?

Glaucon/ Yes, he will be in the utmost fear.

Socrates/ The time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of his slaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things, much against his will—he will have to cajole his own servants.

Glaucon/ Yes, that will be the only way of saving himself.

Socrates/ And suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with neighbors who will not suffer one man to be the master of another, and who, if they could catch the offender, would take his life?

Glaucon/ His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere surrounded and watched by enemies.

Socrates/ And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound—he who being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of fears and lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all men in the city, he is never allowed to go on a journey, or to see the things which other freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like a woman hidden in the house, and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into foreign parts and sees anything of interest.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And amid evils such as these will not he who is ill-governed in his own person—the tyrannical man, I mean—whom you just now decided to be the most miserable of all—will not he be yet more miserable when, instead of leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public tyrant? He has to be master of others when he is not master of himself: he is like a diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life, not in retirement, but fighting and combating with other men.

Glaucon/ Yes, the similitude is most exact.

Socrates/ Is not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a worse life than he whose life you determined to be the worst?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave, and is obliged to practice the greatest adulation and servility, and to be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is utterly unable to satisfy, and has more wants than anyone, and is truly poor, if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his life long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as the State which he resembles: and surely the resemblance holds?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power: he becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, more friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the purveyor and cherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that he is supremely miserable, and that he makes everybody else as miserable as himself.

Glaucon/ No man of any sense will dispute your words.

Socrates/ Come then, and as the general umpire in theatrical contests proclaims the result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first in the scale of happiness, and who second, and in what order the others follow: there are five of them in all—they are the royal, timocratical, oligarchical, democratical, tyrannical.

Glaucon/ The decision will be easily given, they shall be choruses coming on the stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they enter, by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.

Socrates/ Need we hire a herald, or shall I announce, that the son the of Ariston [the best] has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself; and that the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and that this is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his State?

Glaucon/ Make the proclamation yourself.

Socrates/ And shall I add, 'whether seen or unseen by gods and men'?

Glaucon/ Let the words be added.

Socrates/ Then this, will be our first proof; and there is another, which may also have some weight.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that the individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three principles, the division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration.

Glaucon/ Of what nature?

Socrates/ It seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures correspond; also three desires and governing powers.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ There is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns, another with which he is angry; the third, having many forms, has no special name, but is denoted by the general term appetitive, from the extraordinary strength and vehemence of the desires of eating and drinking and the other sensual appetites which are the main elements of it; also money-loving, because such desires are generally satisfied by the help of money.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ If we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were concerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single notion; and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as loving gain or money.

Glaucon/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering and getting fame?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious—would the term be suitable?

Glaucon/ Extremely suitable.

Socrates/ On the other hand, everyone sees that the principle of knowledge is wholly directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others for gain or fame.

Glaucon/ Far less.

Socrates/ 'Lover of wisdom,' 'lover of knowledge,' are titles which we may fitly apply to that part of the soul?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in others, as may happen?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men—lovers of wisdom, lovers of honor, lovers of gain?

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own and depreciating that of others: the money-maker will contrast the vanity of honor or of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages of gold and silver?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And the lover of honor—what will be his opinion? Will he not think that the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, if it brings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And are we to suppose, that the philosopher sets any value on other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the heaven of pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary, under the idea that if there were no necessity for them, he would rather not have them?

Glaucon/ There can be no doubt of that.

Socrates/ Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in dispute, and the question is not which life is more or less honorable, or better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless—how shall we know who speaks truly?

Glaucon/ I cannot myself tell.

Socrates/ Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience and wisdom and reason?

Glaucon/ There cannot be a better.

Socrates/ Then, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of gain, in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of the pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain?

Glaucon/ The philosopher, has greatly the advantage; for he has of necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood upwards: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity tasted—or, I should rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have tasted—the sweetness of learning and knowing truth.

Socrates/ Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for he has a double experience?

Glaucon/ Yes, very great.

Socrates/ Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honor, or the lover of honor of the pleasures of wisdom?

Glaucon/ Nay, all three are honored in proportion as they attain their object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have their crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honor they all have experience of the pleasures of honor; but the delight which is to be found in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only.

Socrates/ His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than anyone?

Glaucon/ Far better.

Socrates/ And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Further, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not possessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher?

Glaucon/ What faculty?

Socrates/ Reason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the lover of gain would surely be the most trustworthy?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Or if honor or victory or courage, in that case the judgment of the ambitious or pugnacious would be the truest?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges—

Glaucon/ The only inference possible, is that pleasures which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest.

Socrates/ And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that he of us in whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life.

Glaucon/ Unquestionably, the wise man speaks with authority when he approves of his own life.

Socrates/ And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the pleasure which is next?

Glaucon/ Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honor; who is nearer to himself than the money-maker.

Socrates/ Last comes the lover of gain?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust in this conflict; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to Olympian Zeus the savior: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise is quite true and pure—all others are a shadow only; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls?

Glaucon/ Yes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself?

Socrates/ I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions.

Glaucon/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?

Glaucon/ There is.

Socrates/ A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about either—that is what you mean?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ You remember what people say when they are sick?

Glaucon/ What do they say?

Socrates/ That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill.

Glaucon/ Yes, I know.

Socrates/ And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?

Glaucon/ I have.

Socrates/ And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them as the greatest pleasure?

Glaucon/ Yes, at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest.

Socrates/ Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be painful?

Glaucon/ Doubtless.

Socrates/ Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain?

Glaucon/ So it would seem.

Socrates/ But can that which is neither become both?

Glaucon/ I should say not.

Socrates/ And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not motion, and in a mean between them?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ This then is an appearance only and not a reality; that is to say, the rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and painful in comparison

of what is pleasant; but all these representations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real but a sort of imposition?

Glaucon/ That is the inference.

Socrates/ Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

Glaucon/ What are they, and where shall I find them?

Socrates/ There are many of them: take as an example the pleasures of smell, which are very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment, and when they depart leave no pain behind them.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul through the body are generally of this sort—they are reliefs of pain.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Shall I give you an illustration of them?

Glaucon/ Let me hear.

Socrates/ You would allow, that there is in nature an upper and lower and middle region?

Glaucon/ I should.

Socrates/ And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he not imagine that he is going up; and

he who is standing in the middle and sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper region, if he has never seen the true upper world?

Glaucon/ To be sure, how can he think otherwise?

Socrates/ But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine, that he was descending?

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and lower regions?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so that when they are only being drawn towards the painful they feel pain and think the pain which they experience to be real, and in like manner, when drawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure; they, not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with grey instead of white—can you wonder, I say, at this?

Glaucon/ No, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite.

Socrates/ Look at the matter thus: —Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanition's of the bodily state?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And ignorance and folly are inanition's of the soul?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that which has more existence the truer?

Glaucon/ Clearly, from that which has more.

Socrates/ What classes of things have a greater share of pure existence in your judgment—those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the question in this way: —Which has a more pure being—that which is concerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such a nature, and is found in such natures; or that which is concerned with and found in the variable and mortal, and is itself variable and mortal?

Glaucon/ Far purer, is the being of that which is concerned with the invariable.

Socrates/ And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree as of essence?

Glaucon/ Yes, of knowledge in the same degree.

Socrates/ And of truth in the same degree?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of essence?

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of the soul?

Glaucon/ Far less.

Socrates/ And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real existence and is less real?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more really and truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which participates in less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in an illusory and less real pleasure?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and in this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, and, in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that which is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent.

Glaucon/ Verily, Socrates, you describe the life of the many like an oracle.

Socrates/ Their pleasures are mixed with pains—how can they be otherwise? For they are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are colored by contrast, which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought about

as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth.

Glaucon/ Something of that sort must inevitably happen.

Socrates/ And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action, be in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or violent and contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honor and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense?

Glaucon/ Yes, the same will happen with the spirited element also.

Socrates/ Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honor, when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth: and they will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is best for each one is also most natural to him?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural.

Socrates/ And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they are capable?

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ But when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in attaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure which is a shadow only and which is not their own?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from law and order?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest distance?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the royal and orderly desires are nearest?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural pleasure, and the king at the least?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most pleasantly?

Glaucon/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them?

Glaucon/ Will you tell me?

Socrates/ There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious: now the transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious; he has run away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode with certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of his inferiority can only be expressed in a figure.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ I assume, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch; the democrat was in the middle?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an image of pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure of the oligarch?

Glaucon/ He will.

Socrates/ And the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal and aristocratical?

Glaucon/ Yes, he is third.

Socrates/ Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number which is three times three?

Glaucon/ Manifestly.

Socrates/ The shadow then of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of length will be a plane figure.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if you raise the power and make the plane a solid, there is no difficulty in seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is parted from the king.

Glaucon/ Yes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum.

Socrates/ Or if some person begins at the other end and measures the interval by which the king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will find him, when the multiplication is completed, living 729 times more pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval.

Glaucon/ What a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the distance which separates the just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain!

Socrates/ Yet a true calculation, and a number which nearly concerns human life, if human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and years.

Glaucon/ Yes, human life is certainly concerned with them.

Socrates/ Then if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life and in beauty and virtue?

Glaucon/ Immeasurably greater.

Socrates/ Well, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we may revert to the words which brought us hither: Was not someone saying that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just?

Glaucon/ Yes, that was said.

Socrates/ Now then, having determined the power and quality of justice and injustice, let us have a little conversation with him.

Glaucon/ What shall we say to him?

Socrates/ Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented before his eyes.

Glaucon/ Of what sort?

Socrates/ An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient mythology, such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are many others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one.

Glaucon/ There are said to have been such unions.

Socrates/ Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster, having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphose at will.

Glaucon/ You suppose marvelous powers in the artist; but, as language is more pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you propose.

Socrates/ Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second.

Glaucon/ That, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say.

Socrates/ And now join them, and let the three grow into one.

Glaucon/ That has been accomplished.

Socrates/ Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may believe the beast to be a single human creature.

Glaucon/ I have done so.

Socrates/ And now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and the lion-like qualities, but to starve and weaken the man, who is consequently liable to be dragged about at the mercy of either of the other two; and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another—he ought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and devour one another.

Glaucon/ Certainly, that is what the approver of injustice says.

Socrates/ To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most complete mastery over the entire human creature. He should watch over the many-headed monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from growing; he should be making the lion-heart his ally, and in common care of them all should be uniting the several parts with one another and with himself.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is quite what the maintainer of justice will say.

Socrates/ And so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honor, or advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant?

Glaucon/ Yes, from every point of view.

Socrates/ Come, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. 'Sweet Sir' we will say to him, 'what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast?' He can hardly avoid saying Yes—can he now?

Glaucon/ Not if he has any regard for my opinion.

Socrates/ But, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: 'Then how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he received? And will anyone say that he is not a miserable caitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most godless and detestable? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin.'

Glaucon/ Yes, far worse—I will answer for him.

Socrates/ Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent element in them disproportionately grows and gains strength?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this same creature, and make a coward of him?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual is unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his great study is how to flatter them.

Glaucon/ Such appears to be the reason.

Socrates/ And therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of the best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant, but because everyone had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within him; or, if this be impossible, then by an external authority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends and equals.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we exercise over children, and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in them a principle analogous to the constitution of a state, and by cultivation of this higher element have set up in their hearts

a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their ways.

Glaucon/ Yes, the purpose of the law is manifest.

Socrates/ From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man is profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness?

Glaucon/ From no point of view at all.

Socrates/ What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health, in proportion as the soul is more honorable than the body.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies of his life. And in the first place, he will honor studies which impress these qualities on his soul, and will disregard others?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the body as to preserve the harmony of the soul?

Glaucon/ Certainly he will, if he has true music in him.

Socrates/ And in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and harmony which he will also observe; he will not allow himself to be dazzled by the foolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite harm?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ He will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no disorder occur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or from want; and upon this principle he will regulate his property and gain or spend according to his means.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy such honors as he deems likely to make him a better man; but those, whether private or public, which are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid?

Glaucon/ Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman.

Socrates/ By the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own he certainly will, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he have a divine call.

Glaucon/ I understand; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not believe that there is such an one anywhere on earth?

Socrates/ In heaven, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order. But whether such an one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter; for he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other.

Glaucon/ I think so.

Book 10.

Socrates/ Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about poetry.

Glaucon/ To what do you refer?

Socrates/ To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be received; as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have been distinguished.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe—but I do not mind saying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only antidote to them.

Glaucon/ Explain the purport of your remark.

Socrates/ Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had an awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than the truth, and therefore I will speak out.

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ Listen to me then, or rather, answer me.

Glaucon/ Put your question.

Socrates/ Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know.

Glaucon/ A likely thing, then, that I should know.

Socrates/ Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the keener.

Glaucon/ Very true, but in your presence, even if I had any faint notion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire yourself?

Socrates/ Well then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a number of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a corresponding idea or form: —do you understand me?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the world—plenty of them, are there not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But there are only two ideas or forms of them—one the idea of a bed, the other of a table.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in accordance with the idea—that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances—but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could he?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And there is another artist, —I should like to know what you would say of him.

Glaucon/ Who is he?

Socrates/ One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.

Glaucon/ What an extraordinary man!

Socrates/ Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all other things—the earth and heaven, and the things which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also.

Glaucon/ He must be a wizard and no mistake.

Socrates/ Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which you could make them all yourself?

Glaucon/ What way?

Socrates/ An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and round—you would soon enough make the sun and the heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and all the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the mirror.

Glaucon/ Yes, but they would be appearances only.

Socrates/ Very good, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too is, as I conceive, just such another—a creator of appearances, is he not?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?

Glaucon/ Yes, but not a real bed.

Socrates/ And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too makes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but only a particular bed?

Glaucon/ Yes, I did.

Socrates/ Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence, but only some semblance of existence; and if anyone were to say that the work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.

Glaucon/ At any rate, philosophers would say that he was not speaking the truth.

Socrates/ No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth.

Glaucon/ No wonder.

Socrates/ Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire who this imitator is?

Glaucon/ If you please.

Socrates/ Well then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by God, as I think that we may say—for no one else can be the maker?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ There is another which is the work of the carpenter?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the work of the painter is a third?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?

Glaucon/ Yes, there are three of them.

Socrates/ God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will be made by God.

Glaucon/ Why is that?

Socrates/ Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind them which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the ideal bed and not the two others.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed which is essentially and by nature one only.

Glaucon/ So we believe.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?

Glaucon/ Yes, inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the author of this and of all other things.

Socrates/ And what shall we say of the carpenter—is not he also the maker of the bed?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But would you call the painter a creator and maker?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?

Glaucon/ I think, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that which the others make.

Socrates/ Good, then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an imitator?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?

Glaucon/ That appears to be so.

Socrates/ Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter? —I would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?

Glaucon/ The latter.

Socrates/ As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will appear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of all things.

Glaucon/ Yes, the difference is only apparent.

Socrates/ Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting designed to be—an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear—of appearance or of reality?

Glaucon/ Of appearance.

Socrates/ Then the imitator, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image. For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And whenever anyone informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man—whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyze the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their works that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the many to speak so well?

Glaucon/ The question, should by all means be considered.

Socrates/ Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as if he had nothing higher in him?

Glaucon/ I should say not.

Socrates/ The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in realities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them.

Glaucon/ Yes, that would be to him a source of much greater honor and profit.

Socrates/ Then, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not going to ask him, or any other

poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second-hand; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. 'Friend Homer' then we say to him, 'if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third—not an image maker or imitator—and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small have been similarly benefited by others; but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about you?' Is there any city which he might name?

Glaucon/ I think not. not even the Homerids themselves pretend that he was a legislator.

Socrates/ Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive?

Glaucon/ There is not.

Socrates/ Or is there any invention of his, applicable to the arts or to human life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him?

Glaucon/ There is absolutely nothing of the kind.

Socrates/ But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate with him, and who handed

down to posterity an Homeric way of life, such as was established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the order which was named after him?

Glaucon/ Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive?

Socrates/ Yes, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind—if he had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator—can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many followers, and been honored and loved by them? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others, have only to whisper to their contemporaries: 'You will never be able to manage either your own house or your own State until you appoint us to be your ministers of education'—and this ingenious device of theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at home with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough?

Glaucon/ Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true.

Socrates/ Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with Homer, are only imitators; they

copy images of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as we have already observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does, and judge only by colors and figures.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on the colors of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, in meter and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very well—such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colors which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an explanation.

Glaucon/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the worker in leather and brass will make them?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who knows how to use them—he knows their right form.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And may we not say the same of all things?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is told by him?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him who knows, by talking to him and being compelled to hear what he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions about what he should draw?

Glaucon/ Neither.

Socrates/ Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations?

Glaucon/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own creations?

Glaucon/ Nay, very much the reverse.

Socrates/ And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the

tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or in Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when seen at a distance?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And the same objects appear straight when looked at out of the water, and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colors to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding—there is the beauty of them—and the apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul?

Glaucon/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible—the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same thing?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the soul?

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and associates of a principle within us which is equally removed from reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior offspring.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry?

Glaucon/ Probably the same would be true of poetry.

Socrates/ Do not rely, on a probability derived from the analogy of painting; but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ We may state the question thus: —Imitation imitates the actions of men, whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything more?

Glaucon/ No, there is nothing else.

Socrates/ But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself—or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and opposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also is there not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again, for I remember that all this has been already admitted; and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment?

Glaucon/ And we were right.

Socrates/ Yes, thus far we were right; but there was an omission which must now be supplied.

Glaucon/ What was the omission?

Socrates/ Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more equanimity than another?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?

Glaucon/ The latter, is the truer statement.

Socrates/ Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?

Glaucon/ It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.

Socrates/ When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he would be ashamed of anyone hearing or seeing him do?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his sorrow?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in him?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also, because no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which at the moment is most required.

Glaucon/ What is most required?

Socrates/ That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best; not, like children

who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.

Socrates/ Yes, and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational, useless, and cowardly?

Glaucon/ Indeed, we may.

Socrates/ And does not the latter—I mean the rebellious principle—furnish a great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm temperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which they are strangers.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature made, nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter, for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an inferior degree of truth—

in this, I say, he is like him; and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another small—he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truth.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation: —the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.

Socrates/ Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping, and smiting his breast—the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most.

Glaucon/ Yes, of course I know.

Socrates/ But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality—we would fain be quiet and patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which anyone of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?

Glaucon/ No, that is certainly not reasonable.

Socrates/ Nay, quite reasonable from one point of view.

Glaucon/ What point of view?

Socrates/ If you consider, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets; —the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's; and the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying anyone who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own.

Glaucon/ How very true!

Socrates/ And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness; —the case of pity is repeated; —there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having

stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action—in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue.

Glaucon/ I cannot deny it.

Socrates/ Therefore, Glaucon, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you should take him up again and again and get to know him and regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honor those who say these things—they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State.

Glaucon/ That is most true.

Socrates/ And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our defense serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have

described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of 'the yelping hound howling at her lord' or of one 'mighty in the vain talk of fools' and 'the mob of sages circumventing Zeus' and the 'subtle thinkers who are beggars after all'; and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her—we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.

Socrates/ Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only—that she make a defense of herself in lyrical or some other meter?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers—I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?

Glaucon/ Certainly, we shall be the gainers.

Socrates/ If her defense fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamored of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too

are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defense, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law.

Glaucon/ Yes, I quite agree with you.

Socrates/ Yes, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will anyone be profited if under the influence of honor or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue?

Glaucon/ Yes, I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that anyone else would have been.

Socrates/ And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue.

Glaucon/ What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness.

Socrates/ Why, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity?

Glaucon/ Say rather 'nothing'.

Socrates/ And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole?

Glaucon/ Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?

Socrates/ Are you not aware, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?

—He looked at me in astonishment, and said:

Glaucon/ No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to maintain this?

Socrates/ Yes, I ought to be, and you too—there is no difficulty in proving it.

Glaucon/ I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light.

Socrates/ Listen then.

Glaucon/ I am attending.

Socrates/ There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you admit that everything has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will; for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor evil.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction?

Glaucon/ That may be assumed.

Socrates/ Well, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?

Glaucon/ Yes, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

Socrates/ But does any of these dissolve or destroy her? —and here do not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her? do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the body?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And yet, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Consider, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is disease, brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of food, which is another, and which does not engender any natural infection—this we shall absolutely deny?

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?

Glaucon/ Yes, there is reason in that.

Socrates/ Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body; but that the soul, or anything else if not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to be affirmed by any man.

Glaucon/ And surely, no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust in consequence of death.

Socrates/ But if someone who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take this disorder die by the natural inherent power of

destruction which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds?

Glaucon/ Nay, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, if it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive—aye, and well awake too; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of death.

Socrates/ True, if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction.

Glaucon/ Yes, that can hardly be.

Socrates/ But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or external, must exist forever, and if existing forever, must be immortal?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ That is the conclusion, and, if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ But this we cannot believe—reason will not allow us—any more than we can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ The soul, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are many other proofs; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and then her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be compared to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look.

Glaucon/ Where then?

Socrates/ At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society and converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal and divine; also how different she would become if wholly following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up around her because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by the good things of this life as they are termed:

then you would see her as she is, and know whether she have one shape only or many, or what her nature is. Of her affections and of the forms which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said enough.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And thus, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument; we have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her own nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?

Glaucon/ What did I borrow?

Socrates/ The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just: for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember?

Glaucon/ I should be much to blame if I had forgotten.

Socrates/ Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the estimation in which she is held by

gods and men and which we acknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us; since she has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to her own.

Glaucon/ The demand, is just.

Socrates/ In the first place, —and this is the first thing which you will have to give back—the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods.

Glaucon/ Granted.

Socrates/ And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death: for the gods have a care of anyone whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue?

Glaucon/ Yes, if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.

Socrates/ And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?

Glaucon/ That is my conviction.

Socrates/ And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal: they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their ears draggling on their shoulders, and without a crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just; he who endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men have to bestow.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers in their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term them; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are true?

Glaucon/ Certainly, what you say is true.

Socrates/ These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other good things which justice of herself provides.

Glaucon/ Yes, and they are fair and lasting.

Socrates/ And yet, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument owes to them.

Glaucon/ Speak, there are few things which I would more gladly hear.

Socrates/ Well, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pile, he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a great company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth; they were near together, and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after they had given judgment on them and had bound their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He

drew near, and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a festival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously enquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon, would take too long to tell; but the sum was this: —He said that for every wrong which they had done to anyone they suffered tenfold; or once in a hundred years—such being reckoned to be the length of man's life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behavior, for each and all of their offences they received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers,

there were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another, 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' (Now this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was: 'He comes not hither and will never come. And this' said he, 'was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and there were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been great criminals: they were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of these incurable sinners or someone who had not been sufficiently punished tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and heard the sound, seized and carried them off; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the passers-by what were their crimes, and that they were being taken away to be cast into hell.' And of all the many terrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great.

Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the eighth they were obliged to

proceed on their journey, and, on the fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in color resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer; another day's journey brought them to the place, and there, in the midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt of heaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the under-girders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth; and the description of it implied that there is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another lesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight in all, like vessels which fit into one another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on their lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home through the center of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following proportions—the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest [or fixed stars] is spangled, and the seventh [or sun] is brightest; the eighth [or moon] colored by the reflected light of the seventh; the second and fifth [Saturn and Mercury] are in color like one another, and yellower than the preceding; the third [Venus] has the whitest light; the fourth [Mars] is reddish; the sixth [Zeus] is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in one direction, the

seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness appeared to move according to the law of this reversed motion the fourth; the third appeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form one harmony; and roundabout, at equal intervals, there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens—Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other.

When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: 'Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honors or dishonors her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser—God is justified' When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots indifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which fell

near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength and success in games, or, again, for their birth and the qualities of their ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was every other quality, and they all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health; and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and therefore, the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find someone who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul,

and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he will be able to determine which is the better and which is the worse; and so he will choose, giving the name of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul more just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this is the best choice both, in life and after death. A man must take with him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villainies, he do irremediable wrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but in all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness.

And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was what the prophet said at the time: 'Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last despair.' And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and in a former life had

dwelt in a well-ordered State, but his virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came from earth having themselves suffered and seen others suffer were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, was the spectacle—sad and laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience of a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swan and other musicians, wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation: and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far away

among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures—the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations.

All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made them irreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an

instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre.

And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing.

Republic Of Plato.

Translated by Francis Macdonald Cornford.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Cephalus, Glaucon, Thrasymachus,
Adeimantus, Cleitophon, Polemarchus, Boy

Socrates/ I walked down to the Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to make my prayers to the goddess. As this was the first celebration of her festival, I wished also to see how the ceremony would be conducted. The Thracians, I thought, made as fine a show in the procession as our own people, though they did well enough. The prayers and the spectacle were over, and we were leaving to go back to the city, when from some way off Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, caught sight of us starting homewards and sent his slave running to ask us to wait for him. The boy caught my garment from behind and gave me the message.

I turned round and asked where his master was.

Boy/ There; coming up behind. Please wait.

Glaucon/ Very well; we will.

Socrates/ A minute later Polemarchus joined us, with Glaucon's brother, Adeimantus, and Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and some others who must have been at the procession.

Polemarchus/ Socrates, I do believe you are starting back to town and leaving us.

Socrates/ You have guessed right.

Polemarchus/ Well, you see what a large party we are?

Socrates/ I do.

Polemarchus/ Unless you are more than a match for us, then, you must stay here.

Socrates/ Isn't there another alternative? We might convince you that you must let us go.

Polemarchus/ How will you convince us, if we refuse to listen?

Glaucon/ We cannot.

Polemarchus/ Well, we shall refuse; make up your minds to that.

Adeimantus/ Don't you even know that in the evening there is going to be a torch-race on horseback in honor of the goddess?

Socrates/ On horseback! That is something new. How will they do it? Are the riders going to race with torches and hand them on to one another?

Polemarchus/ Just so. Besides, there will be a festival lasting all night, which will be worth seeing. We will go out after dinner and look on. We shall find plenty of young men there and we can have a talk. So please stay, and don't disappoint us.

Glaucon/ It looks as if we had better stay.

Socrates/ Well, if you think so, we will.

Accordingly, we went home with Polemarchus; and there we found his brothers, Lysias and Euthydemus, as well as Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Charmantides of Paeania, and Cleitophon, the son of Aristonymus. Polemarchus' father, Cephalus, was at home too. I had not seen him for some time, and it struck me that he had aged a good deal. He was sitting in a cushioned chair, wearing a garland, as he had just been conducting a sacrifice in the court-yard. There were some chairs standing round, and we sat down beside him.

As soon as he saw me, Cephalus greeted me.

Cephalus/ You don't often come down to the Piraeus to visit us, Socrates. But you ought to. If I still had the strength to walk to town easily, you would not have to come here we would come to you. But, as things are, you really ought to come here oftener. I find, I can assure you, that in proportion as bodily pleasures lose their savor, my appetite for the things of the mind grows keener and I enjoy discussing them more than ever. So you must not disappoint me. Treat us like old friends, and come here often to have a talk with these young men.

Socrates/ To tell the truth, Cephalus, I enjoy talking with very old people. They have gone before us on a road by which we too may have to travel, and I think we do well to learn from them what it is like, easy or difficult, rough or smooth. And now that you have reached an age when your foot, as the poets say, is on the threshold, I should like to hear what report you can give and whether you find it a painful time of life.

Cephalus/ I will tell you by all means what it seems like to me, Socrates. Some of us old men often meet, true to the old saying that people of the same age like to be together. Most of our company are very sorry for themselves, looking back with regret to the pleasures of their young days, all the delights connected with love affairs and merry-making. They are vexed at being deprived of what seems to them so important; life was good in those days, they think, and now they have no life at all. Some complain that their families have no respect for their years, and make that a reason for harping on all the miseries old age has brought. But to my mind, Socrates, they are laying the blame on the wrong shoulders. If the fault were in old age, so far as that goes, I and all who have ever reached my time of life would have the same experience; but in point of fact, I have met many who felt quite differently. For instance, I remember someone

asking Sophocles, the poet, whether he was still capable of enjoying a woman. 'Don't talk in that way,' he answered; 'I am only too glad to be free of all that; it is like escaping from bondage to a raging madman.' I thought that a good answer at the time, and I still think so; for certainly a great peace comes when age sets us free from passions of that sort. When they weaken and relax their hold, most certainly it means, as Sophocles said, a release from servitude to many forms of madness. All these troubles, Socrates, including the complaints about not being respected, have only one cause; and that is not old age, but a man's character. If you have a contented mind at peace with itself, age is no intolerable burden; without that, Socrates, age and youth will be equally painful.

Socrates/ I was charmed with these words and wanted him to go on talking; so I tried to draw him out. I fancy, Cephalus, most people will not accept that account; they imagine that it is not character that makes your burden light, but your wealth. The rich, they say, have many consolations.

Cephalus/ That is true; they do not believe me; and there is something in their suggestion, though not so much as they suppose. When a man from Seriphus taunted Themistocles and told him that his fame was due not to himself but to his country, Themistocles made a good retort: 'Certainly, if I had been born a Seriphian, I should not be famous; but no more would you, if you had been born at Athens.' And so one might say to men who are not rich and feel old age burdensome: If it is true that a good man will not find it easy to bear old age and poverty combined, no more will riches ever make a bad man contented and cheerful.

Socrates/ And was your wealth, Cephalus, mostly inherited or have you made your own fortune?

Cephalus/ Made my fortune, Socrates? As a man of business I stand somewhere between my grandfather and my father. My grandfather, who was my namesake, inherited about as much property as I have now and more than doubled it; whereas my father Lysanias reduced it below its present level. I shall be content if I can leave these sons of mine not less than I inherited, and perhaps a little more.

Socrates/ I asked, because you strike me as not caring overmuch about money; and that is generally so with men who have not made their own fortune. Those who have are twice as fond of their possessions as other people. They have the same affection for the money they have earned that poets have for their poems, or fathers for their children: they not merely find it useful, as we all do, but it means much to them as being of their own creation. That makes them disagreeable company; they have not a good word for anything but riches.

Cephalus/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ It is indeed; but one more question: what do you take to be the greatest advantage you have got from being wealthy?

Cephalus/ One that perhaps not many people would take my word for I can tell you, Socrates, that, when the prospect of dying is near at hand, a man begins to feel some alarm about things that never troubled him before. He may have laughed at those stories they tell of another world and of punishments there for wrongdoing in this life; but now the soul is tormented by a doubt whether they may not be true. Maybe from the weakness of old age, or perhaps because, now that he is nearer to what lies beyond, he begins to get some glimpse of it himself—at any rate he is beset with fear and misgiving; he begins thinking over the past: is there anyone he has wronged? If he finds that his life has been full

of wrongdoing, he starts up from his sleep in terror like a child, and his life is haunted by dark forebodings; whereas, if his conscience is clear, that 'sweet Hope' that Pindar speaks of is always with him to tend his age. Indeed, Socrates, there is great charm in those lines describing the man who has led a life of righteousness:

> Hope is his sweet companion, she who guides
> Man's wandering purpose, warms his heart
> And nurses tenderly his age.

That is admirably expressed, admirably. Now in this, as I believe, lies the chief value of wealth, not for everyone, perhaps, but for the right-thinking man. It can do much to save us from going to that other world in fear of having cheated or deceived anyone even unintentionally or of being in debt to some god for sacrifice or to some man for money. Wealth has many other uses, of course; but, taking one with another, I should regard this as the best use that can be made of it by a man of sense.

Socrates/ You put your case admirably, Cephalus. But take this matter of doing right: can we. say that it really consists in nothing more nor less than telling the truth and paying back anything we may have received? Are not these very actions sometimes right and sometimes wrong? Suppose, for example, a friend who had lent us a weapon were to go mad and then ask for it back, surely anyone would say we ought not to return it. It would not be 'right' to do so; nor yet to tell the truth without reserve to a madman.

Cephalus/ No, it would not.

Socrates/ Right conduct, then, cannot be defined as telling the truth and restoring anything we have been trusted with.

Polemarchus/ Yes, it can, at least if we are to believe Simonides.

Cephalus/ Well, well, I will bequeath the argument to you. It is time for me to attend to the sacrifice.

Polemarchus/ Your part, then, will fall to me as your heir.

Cephalus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Cephalus said with a smile; and with that he left us, to see to the sacrifice.

Then, if you are to inherit this discussion, tell me, what is this saying of Simonides about right conduct which you approve?

Polemarchus/ That it is just to render every man his due. That seems to me a fair statement.

Socrates/ It is certainly hard to question the inspired wisdom of a poet like Simonides; but what this saying means you may know, Polemarchus, but I do not. Obviously it does not mean what we were speaking of just now—returning something we have been entrusted with to the owner even when he has gone out of his mind. And yet surely it is his due, if he asks for it back?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But it is out of the question to give it back when he has gone mad?

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Simonides, then, must have meant something different from that when he said it was just to render a man his due.

Polemarchus/ Certainly he did; his idea was that, as between friends, what one owes to another is to do him good, not harm.

Socrates/ I see; to repay money entrusted to one is not to render what is due, if the two parties are friends and the repayment proves harmful to the lender. That is what you say Simonides meant?

Polemarchus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And what about enemies? Are we to render whatever is their due to them?

Polemarchus/ Yes certainly, what really is due to them; which means, I suppose, what is appropriate to an enemy—some sort of injury.

Socrates/ It seems, then, that Simonides was using words with a hidden meaning, as poets will. He really meant to define justice as rendering to everyone what is appropriate to him; only he called that his 'due'.

Polemarchus/ Well, why not?

Socrates/ But look here. Suppose we could question Simonides about the art of medicine—whether a physician can be described as rendering to some object what is due or appropriate to it; how do you think he would answer?

Polemarchus/ That the physician administers the appropriate diet or remedies to the body.

Socrates/ And the art of cookery—can that be described in the same way?

Polemarchus/ Yes; the cook gives the appropriate seasoning to his dishes.

Socrates/ Good. And the practice of justice?

Polemarchus/ If we are to follow those analogies, Socrates, justice would be rendering services or injuries to friends or enemies.

Socrates/ So Simonides means by justice doing good to friends and harm to enemies?

Polemarchus/ I think so.

Socrates/ And in matters of health who would be the most competent to treat friends and enemies in that way?

Polemarchus/ A physician.

Socrates/ And on a voyage, as regards the dangers of the sea?

Polemarchus/ A ship's captain.

Socrates/ In what sphere of action, then, will the just man be the most competent to do good or harm?

Polemarchus/ In war, I should imagine; when he is fighting on the side of his friends and against his enemies.

Socrates/ I see. But when we are well and staying on shore, the doctor and the ship's captain are of no use to us.

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Is it also true that the just man is useless when we are not at war?

Polemarchus/ I should not say that.

Socrates/ So justice has its uses in peace-time too?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Like farming, which is useful for producing crops, or shoe-making, which is useful for providing us with shoes. Can you tell me for what purposes justice is useful or profitable in time of peace?

Polemarchus/ For matters of business, Socrates.

Socrates/ In a partnership, you mean?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if we are playing draughts, or laying bricks, or making music, will the just man be as good and helpful a partner as an expert draught-player, or a builder, or a musician?

Polemarchus/ No.

Socrates/ Then in what kind of partnership will he be more helpful?

Polemarchus/ Where money is involved, I suppose.

Socrates/ Except, perhaps, Polemarchus, when we are putting our money to some use. If we are buying or selling a horse, a judge of horses would be a better partner; or if we are dealing in ships, a shipwright or a sea-captain.

Polemarchus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Well, when will the just man be specially useful in handling our money?

Polemarchus/ When we want to deposit it for safe-keeping.

Socrates/ When the money is to lie idle, in fact?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So justice begins to be useful only when our money is out of use?

Polemarchus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ And in the same way, I suppose, if a pruning-knife is to be used, or a shield, or a lyre, then a vine-dresser, or a soldier, or a musician will be of service; but justice is helpful only when these things are to be kept safe. In fact justice is never of any use in using things; it becomes useful when they are useless.

Polemarchus/ That seems to follow.

Socrates/ If that is so, my friend, justice can hardly be a thing of much value. And here is another point. In boxing or fighting of any sort skill in dealing blows goes with skill in keeping them off; and the same doctor that can keep us from disease would also be clever at producing it by stealth; or again, a general will be good at keeping his army safe, if he can also cheat the enemy and steal his plans and dispositions. So a man who is expert in keeping things will always make an expert thief.

Polemarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ The just man, then, being good at keeping money safe, will also be good at stealing it.

Polemarchus/ That seems to be the conclusion, at any rate.

Socrates/ So the just man turns out to be a kind of thief. You must have learnt that from Homer, who showed his predilection for Odysseus' grandfather Autolycus by remarking that he surpassed all men in cheating and perjury. Justice, according to you and Homer and Simonides, turns out to be a form of skill in cheating, provided it be to help a friend or harm an enemy. That was what you meant?

Polemarchus/ Good God, no; but I have forgotten now what I did mean. All the same, I do still believe that justice consists in helping one's friends and harming one's enemies.

Socrates/ Which do you mean by a man's friends and enemies—those whom he believes to be good honest people and the reverse, or those who really are, though they may not seem so?

Polemarchus/ Naturally, his loves and hates depend on what he believes.

Socrates/ But don't people often mistake an honest man for a rogue, or a rogue for an honest man; in which case they regard good people as enemies and bad people as friends?

Polemarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ But all the same, it will then be right for them to help the rogue and to injure the good man?

Polemarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And yet a good man is one who is not given to doing wrong.

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ According to your account, then, it is right to ill-treat a man who does no wrong.

Polemarchus/ No, no, Socrates; that can't be sound doctrine.

Socrates/ It must be the wrongdoers, then, that it is right to injure, and the honest that are to be helped.

Polemarchus/ That sounds better.

Socrates/ Then, Polemarchus, the conclusion will be that for a bad judge of character it will often be right to injure his friends, when they really are rogues, and to help his enemies, when they really are honest men—the exact opposite of what we took Simonides to mean.

Polemarchus/ That certainly does follow. We must shift our ground. Perhaps our definition of friend and enemy was wrong.

Socrates/ What definition, Polemarchus?

Polemarchus/ We said a friend was one whom we believe to be an honest man.

Socrates/ And how are we to define him now?

Polemarchus/ As one who really is honest as well as seeming so. If he merely seems so, he will be only a seeming friend. And the same will apply to enemies.

Socrates/ On this showing, then, it is the good people that will be our friends, the wicked our enemies.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ You would have us, in fact, add something to our original definition of justice: it will not mean merely doing good to friends and harm to enemies, but doing good to friends who are good, and harm to enemies who are wicked.

Polemarchus/ Yes, I think that is all right.

Socrates/ Can it really be a just man's business to harm any human being?

Polemarchus/ Certainly; it is right for him to harm bad men who are his enemies.

Socrates/ But does not harming a horse or a dog mean making it a worse horse or dog, so that each will be a less perfect creature in its own special way?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Isn't that also true of human beings—that to harm them means making them worse men by the standard of human excellence?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not justice a peculiarly human excellence?

Polemarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ To harm a man, then, must mean making him less just.

Polemarchus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ But a musician or a riding-master cannot be exercising his special skill, if he makes his pupils unmusical or bad riders.

Polemarchus/ No.

Socrates/ Whereas the just man is to exercise his justice by making men unjust? Or, in more general terms, the good are to make men bad by exercising their virtue? Can that be so?

Polemarchus/ No, it cannot.

Socrates/ It can no more be the function of goodness to do harm than of heat to cool or of drought to produce moisture. So if the just man is good, the business of harming people, whether friends or not, must belong to his opposite, the unjust.

Polemarchus/ I think that is perfectly true, Socrates.

Socrates/ So it was not a wise saying that justice is giving every man his due, if that means that harm is due from the just man to his enemies, as well as help to his friends. That is not true; because we have found that it is never right to harm anyone.

Polemarchus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then you and I will make common cause against anyone who attributes that doctrine to Simonides or to any of the old canonical sages, like Bias or Pittacus.

Polemarchus/ Yes, I am prepared to support you.

Socrates/ Do you know, I think that account of justice, as helping friends and harming enemies, must be due to some despot, so rich and powerful that he thought he could do as he liked—someone like Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenias of Thebes.

Polemarchus/ That is extremely probable.

Socrates/ Very good; and now that we have disposed of that definition of justice, can anyone suggest another?

All this time Thrasymachus had been trying more than once to break in upon our conversation; but his neighbors had restrained him, wishing to hear the argument to the end. In the pause after my last words he could keep quiet no longer; but gathering himself up like a wild beast he sprang at us as if he would tear us in pieces. Polemarchus and I were frightened out of our wits, when he burst out to the whole company:

Thrasymachus/ What is the matter with you two, Socrates? Why do you go on in this imbecile way, politely deferring to each other's nonsense? If you really want to know what justice means, stop asking questions and scoring off the answers you get. You know very well it is easier to ask questions than to answer them. Answer yourself, and tell us

what you think justice means. I won't have you telling us it is the same as what is obligatory or useful or advantageous or profitable or expedient; I want a clear and precise statement; I won't put up with that sort of verbiage.

Socrates/ I was amazed by this onslaught and looked at him in terror. If I had not seen this wolf before he saw me, I really believe I should have been struck dumb; but fortunately I had looked at him earlier, when he was beginning to get exasperated with our argument; so I was able to reply, though rather tremulously: Don't be hard on us, Thrasymachus. If Polemarchus and I have gone astray in our search, you may be quite sure the mistake was not intentional. If we had been looking for a piece of gold, we should never have deliberately allowed politeness to spoil our chance of finding it; and now when we are looking for justice, a thing much more precious than gold, you cannot imagine we should defer to each other in that foolish way and not do our best to bring it to light. You must believe we are in earnest, my friend; but I am afraid the task is beyond our powers, and we might expect a man of your ability to pity us instead of being so severe.

Thrasymachus replied with a burst of sardonic laughter.

Thrasymachus/ Good Lord; Socrates at his old trick of shamming ignorance! I knew it; I told the others you would refuse to commit yourself and do anything sooner than answer a question.

Socrates/ Yes, Thrasymachus; because you are clever enough to know that if you asked someone what are the factors of the number twelve, and at the same time warned him: 'Look here, you are not to tell me that twelve is twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three; I won't put up with any such nonsense'—you must surely see that no one would answer a question put like that. He

would say: 'What do you mean, Thrasymachus? Am I forbidden to give any of these answers, even if one happens to be right? Do you want me to give a wrong one?' What would you say to that?

Thrasymachus/ Humph! As if that were a fair analogy!

Socrates/ I don't see why it is not; but in any case, do you suppose our barring a certain answer would prevent the man from giving it, if he thought it was the truth?

Thrasymachus/ Do you mean that you are going to give me one of those answers I barred?

Socrates/ I should not be surprised, if it seemed to me true, on reflection.

Thrasymachus/ And what if I give you another definition of justice, better than any of those? What penalty are you prepared to pay?

Socrates/ The penalty deserved by ignorance, which must surely be to receive instruction from the wise. So I would suggest that as a suitable punishment.

Thrasymachus/ I like your notion of a penalty! But you must pay the costs as well.

Socrates/ I will, when I have any money.

Glaucon/ That will be all right; we will all subscribe for Socrates. So let us have your definition, Thrasymachus.

Thrasymachus/ Oh yes; so that Socrates may play the old game of questioning and refuting someone else, instead of giving an answer himself!

Socrates/ But really, what can you expect from a man who does not know the answer or profess to know it, and, besides that, has been forbidden by no mean authority to put forward any notions he may have? Surely the definition should naturally come from you, who say you do know the answer and can tell it us. Please do not disappoint us. I

should take it as a kindness, and I hope you will not be chary of giving Glaucon and the rest of us the advantage of your instruction.

Glaucon and the others added their entreaties to mine. Thrasymachus was evidently longing to win credit, for he was sure he had an admirable answer ready, though he made a show of insisting that I should be the one to reply. In the end he gave way and exclaimed:

Thrasymachus/ So this is what Socrates' wisdom comes to! He refuses to teach, and goes about learning from others without offering so much as thanks in return.

Socrates/ I do learn from others, Thrasymachus; that is quite true; but you are wrong to call me ungrateful. I give in return all I can—praise; for I have no money. And how ready I am to applaud any idea that seems to me sound, you will see in a moment, when you have stated your own; for I am sure that will be sound.

Thrasymachus/ Listen then. What I say is that 'just' or 'right' means nothing but what is to the interest of the stronger party. Well, where is your applause? You don't mean to give it me.

Socrates/ I will, as soon as I understand I don't see yet what you mean by right being the interest of the stronger party. For instance, Polydamas, the athlete, is stronger than we are, and it is to his interest to eat beef for the sake of his muscles; but surely you don't mean that the same diet would be good for weaker men and therefore be right for us?

Thrasymachus/ You are trying to be funny, Socrates. It's a low trick to take my words in the sense you think will be most damaging.

Socrates/ No, no; but you must explain.

Thrasymachus/ Don't you know, then, that a state may be ruled by a despot, or a democracy, or an aristocracy?

Socrates/ Of course.

Thrasymachus/ And that the ruling element is always the strongest?

Socrates/ Yes.

Thrasymachus/ Well then, in every case the laws are made by the ruling party in its own interest; a democracy makes democratic laws, a despot autocratic ones, and so on. By making these laws they define as 'right' for their subjects whatever is for their own interest, and they call anyone who breaks them a 'wrongdoer' and punish him accordingly. That is what I mean: in all states alike 'right' has the same meaning, namely what is for the interest of the party established in power, and that is the strongest. So the sound conclusion is that what is 'right' is the same everywhere: the interest of the stronger party.

Socrates/ Now I see what you mean; whether it is true or not, I must try to make out. When you define right in terms of interest, you are yourself giving one of those answers you forbade to me; though, to be sure, you add 'to the stronger party'.

Thrasymachus/ An insignificant addition, perhaps!

Socrates/ Its importance is not clear yet; what is clear is that we must find out whether your definition is true. I agree myself that right is in a sense a matter of interest; but when you add 'to the stronger party', I don't know about that. I must consider.

Thrasymachus/ Go ahead, then.

Socrates/ I will. Tell me this. No doubt you also think it is right to. obey the men in power?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ Are they infallible in every type of state, or can they sometimes make a mistake?

Thrasymachus/ Of course they can make a mistake.

Socrates/ In framing laws, then, they may do their work well or badly?

Thrasymachus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Well, that is to say, when the laws they make are to their own interest; badly, when they are not?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the subjects are to obey any law they lay down, and they will then be doing right?

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ If so, by your account, it will be right to do what is not to the interest of the stronger party, as well as what is so.

Thrasymachus/ What's that you are saying?

Socrates/ Just what you said, I believe; but let us look again. Haven't you admitted that the rulers, when they enjoin certain acts on their subjects, sometimes mistake their own best interests, and at the same time that it is right for the subjects to obey, whatever they may enjoin?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, I suppose so.

Socrates/ Well, that amounts to admitting that it is right to do what is not to the interest of the rulers or the stronger party. They may unwittingly enjoin what is to their own disadvantage; and you say it is right for the others to do as they are told. In that case, their duty must be the opposite of what you said, because the weaker will have been ordered to do what is against the interest of the stronger. You with your intelligence must see how that follows.

Polemarchus/ Yes, Socrates, that is undeniable.

Clitophon/ No doubt, if you are to be a witness on Socrates' side.

Polemarchus/ No witness is needed; Thrasymachus himself admits that rulers sometimes ordain acts that are to their own disadvantage, and that it is the subjects' duty to do them.

Clitophon/ That is because Thrasymachus said it was right to do what you are told by the men in power.

Polemarchus/ Yes, but he also said that what is to the interest of the stronger party is right; and, after making both these assertions, he admitted that the stronger sometimes command the weaker subjects to act against their interests. From all which it follows that what is in the stronger's interest is no more right than what is not.

Clitophon/ No; he meant whatever the stronger believes to be in his own interest. That is what the subject must do, and what Thrasymachus meant to define as right.

Polemarchus/ That was not what he said.

Socrates/ No matter, Polemarchus; if Thrasymachus says so now, let us take him in that sense. Now, Thrasymachus, tell me, was that what you intended to say—that right means what the stronger thinks is to his interest, whether it really is so or not?

Thrasymachus/ Most certainly not. Do you suppose I should speak of a man as 'stronger' or 'superior' at the very moment when he is making a mistake?

Socrates/ I did think you said as much when you admitted that rulers are not always infallible.

Thrasymachus/ That is because you are a quibbler, Socrates. Would you say a man deserves to be called a physician at the moment when he makes a mistake in treating his patient and just in respect of that mistake; or a mathematician, when he does a sum wrong and just in so far as he gets a wrong result? Of course we do commonly speak of a physician or a mathematician or a scholar having

made a mistake; but really none of these, I should say, is ever mistaken, in so far as he is worthy of the name we give him. So strictly speaking—and you are all for being precise—no one who practices a craft makes mistakes. A man is mistaken when his knowledge fails him; and at that moment he is no craftsman. And what is true of craftsmanship or any sort of skill is true of the ruler: he is never mistaken so long as he is acting as a ruler; though anyone might speak of a ruler making a mistake, just as he might of a physician. You must understand that I was talking in that loose way when I answered your question just now; but the precise statement is this. The ruler, in so far as he is acting as a ruler, makes no mistakes and consequently enjoins what is best for himself; and that is what the subject is to do. So, as I said at first, 'right' means doing what is to the interest of the stronger.

Socrates/ Very well, Thrasymachus. So you think I am quibbling?

Thrasymachus/ I am sure you are.

Socrates/ You believe my questions were maliciously designed to damage your position?

Thrasymachus/ I know it. But you will gain nothing by that. You cannot outwit me by cunning, and you are not the man to crush me in the open.

Socrates/ Bless your soul, I should not think of trying. But, to prevent any more misunderstanding, when you speak of that ruler or stronger party whose interest the weaker ought to serve, please make it clear whether you are using the words in the ordinary way or in that strict sense you have just defined.

Thrasymachus/ I mean a ruler in the strictest possible sense. Now quibble away and be as malicious as you can. I want no mercy. But you are no match for me.

Socrates/ Do you think me mad enough to beard a lion or try to outwit a Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ You did try just now, but it wasn't a success.

Socrates/ Enough of this. Now tell me about the physician in that strict sense you spoke of: is it his business to earn money or to treat his patients? Remember, I mean your physician who is worthy of the name.

Thrasymachus/ To treat his patients.

Socrates/ And what of the ship's captain in the true sense? Is he a mere seaman or the commander of the crew?

Thrasymachus/ The commander.

Socrates/ Yes, we shall not speak of him as a seaman just because he is on board a ship. That is not the point. He is called captain because of his skill and authority over the crew.

Thrasymachus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And each of these people has some special interest?

Thrasymachus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And the craft in question exists for the very purpose of discovering that interest and providing for it?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Can it equally be said of any craft that it has an interest, other than its own greatest possible perfection?

Thrasymachus/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ Here is an illustration. If you ask me whether it is sufficient for the human body just to be itself, with no need of help from without, I should say, Certainly not; it has weaknesses and defects, and its condition is not all that it might be. That is precisely why the art of medicine was

invented: it was designed to help the body and provide for its interests. Would not that be true?

Thrasymachus/ It would.

Socrates/ But now take the art of medicine itself. Has that any defects or weaknesses? Does any art stand in need of some further perfection, as the eye would be imperfect without the power of vision or the ear without hearing, so that in their case an art is required that will study their interests and provide for their carrying out those functions? Has the art itself any corresponding need of some further art to remedy its defects and look after its interests; and will that further art require yet another, and so on forever? Or will every art look after its own interests? Or, finally, is it not true that no art needs to have its weaknesses remedied or its interests studied either by another art or by itself, because no art has in itself any weakness or fault, and the only interest it is required to serve is that of its subject-matter? In itself, an art is sound and flawless, so long as it is entirely true to its own nature as an art in the strictest sense—and it is the strict sense that I want you to keep in view. Is not that true?

Thrasymachus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Then, the art of medicine does not study its own interest, but the needs of the body, just as a groom shows his skill by caring for horses, not for the art of grooming. And so every art seeks, not its own advantage—for it has no deficiencies—but the interest of the subject on which it is exercised.

Thrasymachus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But surely, Thrasymachus, every art has authority and superior power over its subject.

To this he agreed, though very reluctantly.

So far as arts are concerned, then, no art ever studies or enjoins the interest of the superior or stronger party, but always that of the weaker over which it has authority.

Thrasymachus assented to this at last, though he tried to put up a fight. I then went on:

So the physician, as such, studies only the patient's interest, not his own. For as we agreed, the business of the physician, in the strict sense, is not to make money for himself, but to exercise his power over the patient's body; and the ship's captain, again, considered strictly as no mere sailor, but in command of the crew, will study and enjoin the interest of his subordinates, not his own.

He agreed reluctantly.

And so with government of any kind: no ruler, in so far as he is acting as ruler, will study or enjoin what is for his own interest. All that he says and does will be said and done with a view to what is good and proper for the subject for whom he practices his art.

At this point, when everyone could see that Thrasymachus' definition of justice had been turned inside out, instead of making any reply, he said:

Thrasymachus/ Socrates, have you a nurse?

Socrates/ Why do you ask such a question as that? Wouldn't it be better to answer mine?

Thrasymachus/ Because she lets you go about sniffling like a child whose nose wants wiping. She hasn't even taught you to know a shepherd when you see one, or his sheep either.

Socrates/ What makes you say that?

Thrasymachus/ Why, you imagine that a herdsman studies the interests of hi flocks or cattle, tending and fattening them up with some other end in view; than his

master's profit or his own; and so you don't see that, in politics, the genuine ruler regards his subjects exactly like sheep, and thinks of nothing else, night and day, but the good he can get out of them for himself. You are so far out in your notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, as not to know that 'right' actually means what is good for someone else, and to be 'just' means serving the interest of the stronger who rules, at the cost of the subject who obeys; whereas injustice is just the reverse, asserting its authority over those innocents who are called just, so that they minister solely to their master's advantage and happiness, and not in the least degree to their own. Innocent as you are yourself, Socrates, you must see that a just man always has the worst of it Take a private business: when a partnership is wound up, you will never find that the more honest of two partners comes off with the larger share; and in their relations to the state, when there are taxes to be paid, the honest man will pay more than the other on the same amount of property; or if there is money to be distributed, the dishonest will get it all. When either of them holds some public office, even if the just man loses in no other way, his private affairs at any rate will suffer from neglect, while his principles will not allow him to help himself from the public funds; not to mention the offence he will give to his friends and relations by refusing to sacrifice those principles to do them a good turn. Injustice has all the opposite advantages. I am speaking of the type I described just now, the man who can get the better of other people on a large scale: you must fix your eye on him, if you want to judge how much it is to one's own interest not to be just. You can see that best in the most consummate form of injustice, which rewards wrongdoing with supreme welfare and happiness and reduces its victims, if they won't retaliate in kind, to misery. That form is despotism, which uses force or fraud to plunder

the goods of others, public or private, sacred or profane, and to do it in a wholesale way. If you are caught committing anyone of these crimes on a small scale, you are punished and disgraced; they call it sacrilege, kidnapping, burglary, theft and brigandage. But if, besides taking their property, you turn all your countrymen into slaves, you will hear no more of those ugly names; your countrymen themselves will call you the happiest of men and bless your name, and so will everyone who hears of such a complete triumph of injustice; for when people denounce injustice, it is because they are afraid of suffering wrong, not of doing it. So true is it, Socrates, that injustice, on a grand enough scale, is superior to justice in strength and freedom and autocratic power; and 'right', as I said at first, means simply what serves the interest of the stronger party; 'wrong' means what is for the interest and profit of oneself.

Socrates/ Having deluged our ears with this torrent of words, as the man at the baths might empty a bucket over one's head, Thrasymachus meant to take himself off; but the company obliged him to stay and defend his position. I was specially urgent in my entreaties.

My good Thrasymachus, do you propose to fling a doctrine like that at our heads and then go away without explaining it properly or letting us point out to you whether it is true or not? Is it so small a matter in your eyes to determine the whole course of conduct which everyone of us must follow to get the best out of life?

Thrasymachus/ Don't I realize it is a serious matter?

Socrates/ Apparently not; or else you have no consideration for us, and do not care whether we shall lead better or worse lives for being ignorant of this truth you profess to know. Do take the trouble to let us into your secret; if you treat us handsomely, you may be sure it will

be a good investment; there are so many of us to show our gratitude. I will make no secret of my own conviction, which is that injustice is not more profitable than justice, even when left free to work its will unchecked. No; let your unjust man have full power to do wrong, whether by successful violence or by escaping detection; all the same he will not convince me that he will gain more than he would by being just. There may be others here who feel as I do, and set justice above injustice. It is for you to convince us that we are not well advised.

Thrasymachus/ How can I? If you are not convinced by what I have just said, what more can I do for you? Do you want to be fed with my ideas out of a spoon?

Socrates/ God forbid! Not that. But I do want you to stand by your own words; or, if you shift your ground, shift it openly and stop trying to hoodwink us as you are doing now. You see, Thrasymachus, to go back to your earlier argument, in speaking of the shepherd you did not think it necessary to keep to that strict sense you laid down when you defined the genuine physician. You represent him, in his character of shepherd, as feeding up his flock, not for their own sake but for the table or the market, as if he were out to make money as a caterer or a cattle-dealer, rather than a shepherd. Surely the sole concern of the shepherd's art is to do the best for the charges put under its care; its own best interest is sufficiently provided for, so long as it does not fall short of all that shepherding should imply. On that principle it followed, I thought, that any kind of authority, in the state or in private life, must, in its character of authority, consider solely what is best for those under its care. Now what is your opinion? Do you think that the men who govern states—I mean rulers in the strict sense—have no reluctance to hold office?

Thrasymachus/ I don't think so; I know it.

Socrates/ Well, but haven't you noticed, Thrasymachus, that in other positions of authority no one is willing to act unless he is paid wages, which he demands on the assumption that all the benefit of his action will go to his charges? Tell me: Don't we always distinguish one form of skill from another by its power to effect some particular result? Do say what you really think, so that we may get on.

Thrasymachus/ Yes, that is the distinction.

Socrates/ And also each brings us some benefit that is peculiar to it: medicine gives health, for example; the art of navigation, safety at sea; and so on.

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And wage-earning brings us wages; that is its distinctive product. Now, speaking with that precision which you proposed, you would not say that the art of navigation is the same as the art of medicine, merely on the ground that a ship's captain regained his health on a voyage, because the sea air was good for him. No more would you identify the practice of medicine with wage-earning because a man may keep his health while earning wages, or a physician attending a case may receive a fee.

Thrasymachus/ No.

Socrates/ And, since we agreed that the benefit obtained by each form of skill is peculiar to it, any common benefit enjoyed alike by all these practitioners must come from some further practice common to them all?

Thrasymachus/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ Yes, we must say that if they all earn wages, they get that benefit in so far as they are engaged in wage-earning as well as in practicing their several arts.

He agreed reluctantly.

This benefit, then, —the receipt of wages—does not come to a man from his special art. If we are to speak strictly, the physician, as such, produces health; the builder, a house; and then each, in his further capacity of wage-earner, gets his pay. Thus every art has its own function and benefits its proper subject. But suppose the practitioner is not paid; does he then get any benefit from his art?

Thrasymachus/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ And is he doing no good to anyone either, when he work for nothing?

Thrasymachus/ No, I suppose he does some good.

Socrates/ Well then, Thrasymachus, it is now clear that no form of skill or authority provides for its own benefit. As we were saying some time ago, it always studies and prescribes what is good for its subject—the interest of the weaker party, not of the stronger. And that, my friend, is why I said that no one is willing to be in a position of authority and undertake to set straight other men's troubles, without demanding to be paid; because, if he is to do his work well, he will never, in his capacity of ruler, do, or command others to do, what is best for himself, but only what is best for the subject. For that reason, if he is to consent, he must have his recompense, in the shape of money or honor, or of punishment in case of refusal.

Glaucon/ What do you mean, Socrates? I recognize two of your three kinds of reward; but I don't understand what you mean by speaking of punishment as a recompense.

Socrates/ Then you don't understand the recompense required by the best type of men, or their motive for accepting authority when they do consent. You surely know that a passion for honors or for money is rightly regarded as something to be ashamed of.

Glaucon/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ For that reason, good men are unwilling to rule, either for money's sake or for honor. They have no wish to be called mercenary for demanding to be paid, or thieves for making a secret profit out of their office; nor yet will honors tempt them, for they are not ambitious. So they must be forced to consent under threat of penalty; that may be why a readiness to accept power under no such constraint is thought discreditable. And the heaviest penalty for declining to rule is to be ruled by someone inferior to yourself. That is the fear, I believe, that makes decent people accept power; and when they do so, they face the prospect of authority with no idea that they are coming into the enjoyment of a comfortable berth; it is forced upon them because they can find no one better than themselves, or even as good, to be entrusted with power. If there could ever be a society of perfect men, there might well be as much competition to evade office as there now is to gain it; and it would then be clearly seen that the genuine ruler's nature is to seek only the advantage of the subject, with the consequence that any man of understanding would sooner have another to do the best for him than be at the pains to do the best for that other himself. On this point, then, I entirely disagree with Thrasymachus' doctrine that right means what is to the interest of the stronger.

However, we may return to that question later. Much more important is the position Thrasymachus is asserting now: that a life of injustice is to be preferred to a life of justice. Which side do you take, Glaucon? Where do you think the truth lies?

Glaucon/ I should say that the just life is the better worth having.

Socrates/ You heard Thrasymachus' catalogue of all the good things in store for injustice?

Glaucon/ I did, but I am not convinced.

Socrates/ Shall we try to convert him, then, supposing we can find some way to prove him wrong?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ We might answer Thrasymachus' case in a set speech of our own, drawing up a corresponding list of the advantages of justice; he would then have the right to reply, and we should make our final rejoinder; but after that we should have to count up and measure the advantages on each list, and we should need a jury to decide between us. Whereas, if we go on as before, each securing the agreement of the other side, we can combine the functions of advocate and judge. We will take whichever course you prefer.

Glaucon/ I prefer the second.

Socrates/ Come then, Thrasymachus, let us start afresh with our questions. You say that injustice pays better than justice, when both are carried to the furthest point?

Thrasymachus/ I do; and I have told you why.

Socrates/ And how would you describe them? I suppose you would call one of them an excellence and the other a defect?

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Justice an excellence, and injustice a defect?

Thrasymachus/ Now is that likely, when I am telling you that injustice pays, and justice does not?

Socrates/ Then what do you say?

Thrasymachus/ The opposite.

Socrates/ That justice is a defect?

Thrasymachus/ No; rather the mark of a good-natured simpleton;

Socrates/ Injustice, then, implies being ill-natured?

Thrasymachus/ No; I should call it good policy.

Socrates/ Do you think the unjust are positively superior in character and intelligence, Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, if they are the sort that can carry injustice to perfection and make themselves masters of whole cities and nations. Perhaps you think I was talking of pickpockets. There is profit even in that trade, if you can escape detection; but it doesn't come to much as compared with the gains I was describing.

Socrates/ I understand you now on that point. What astonished me was that you should class injustice with superior character and intelligence and justice with the reverse.

Thrasymachus/ Well, I do.

Socrates/ That is a much more stubborn position, my friend; and it is not so easy to see how to assail it. If you would admit that injustice, however well it pays, is nevertheless, as some people think, a defect and a discreditable thing, then we could argue on generally accepted principles. But now that you have gone so far as to rank it with superior character and intelligence, obviously you will say it is an admirable thing as well as a source of strength, and has all the other qualities we have attributed to justice.

Thrasymachus/ You read my thoughts like a book.

Socrates/ However, it is no good shirking; I must go through with the argument, so long as I can be sure you are really speaking your mind. I do believe you are not playing with us now, Thrasymachus, but stating the truth as you conceive it.

Thrasymachus/ Why not refute the doctrine? What does it matter to you whether I believe it or not?

Socrates/ It does not matter.

Thrasymachus' assent was dragged out of him with a reluctance of which my account gives no idea. He was sweating at every pore, for the weather was hot; and I saw then what I had never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing. However, now that we had agreed that justice implies superior character and intelligence, injustice a deficiency in both respects, I went on:

Good; let us take that as settled. But we were also saying that injustice was a source of strength. Do you remember, Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ I do remember; only your last argument does not satisfy me, and I could say a good deal about that. But if I did, you would tell me I was haranguing you like a public meeting. So either let me speak my mind at length, or else, if you want to ask questions, ask them, and I will nod or shake my head, and say 'Humm?' as an old woman telling us a story.

Socrates/ No, please; don't give your assent against your real opinion.

Thrasymachus/ Anything to please you, since you won't let me have my say. What more do you want?

Socrates/ Nothing. If that is what you mean to do, I will go on with my questions.

Thrasymachus/ Go on, then.

Socrates/ Well, to continue where we left off. I will repeat my question: What is the nature and quality of justice as compared with injustice? It was suggested, I believe, that injustice is the stronger and more effective of the two; but now we have seen that justice implies superior character and intelligence, it will not be hard to show that it will also be superior in power to injustice, which implies ignorance and stupidity; that must be obvious to anyone. However, I would rather look deeper into this matter than take it as

settled off-hand. Would you agree that a state may be unjust and may try to enslave other states or to hold a number of others in subjection unjustly?

Thrasymachus/ Of course it may; above all if it is the best sort of state, which carries injustice to perfection.

Socrates/ I understand; that was your view. But I am wondering whether a state can do without justice when it is asserting its superior power over another in that way.

Thrasymachus/ Not if you are right, that justice implies intelligence; but if I am right, injustice will be needed.

Socrates/ I am delighted with your answer, Thrasymachus; this is much better than just nodding and shaking your head.

Thrasymachus/ It is all to oblige you.

Socrates/ Thank you. Please add to your kindness by telling me whether any set of men—a state or an army or a band of robbers or thieves—who were acting together for some unjust purpose would be likely to succeed, if they were always trying to injure one another. Wouldn't they do better, if they did not?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, they would.

Socrates/ Because, of course, such injuries must set them quarrelling and hating each other. Only fair treatment can make men friendly and of one mind.

Thrasymachus/ Be it so; I don't want to differ from you.

Socrates/ Thank you once more. But don't you agree that, if injustice has this effect of implanting hatred wherever it exists, it must make any set of people, whether freemen or slaves, split into factions, at feud with one another and incapable of any joint action?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so with any two individuals: injustice will set them at variance and make them enemies to each other as well as to everyone who is just.

Thrasymachus/ It will.

Socrates/ And will it not keep its character and have the same effect, if it exists in a single person?

Thrasymachus/ Let us suppose so.

Socrates/ The effect being, apparently, wherever it occurs—in a state or a family or an army or anywhere else—to make united action impossible because of factions and quarrels, and moreover to set whatever it resides in at enmity with itself as well as with any opponent and with all who are just.

Thrasymachus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Then I suppose it will produce the same natural results in an individual. He will have a divided mind and be incapable of action, for lack of singleness of purpose; and he will be at enmity with all who are just as well as with himself?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And 'all who are just' surely includes the gods?

Thrasymachus/ Let us suppose so.

Socrates/ The unjust man, then, will be a god-forsaken creature; the goodwill of heaven will be for the just.

Thrasymachus/ Enjoy your triumph. You need not fear my contradicting you. I have no wish to give offence to the company.

Socrates/ You will make my enjoyment complete if you will answer my further questions in the same way. We have made out so far that just men are superior in character and

intelligence and more effective in action. Indeed without justice men cannot act together at all; it is not strictly true to speak of such people as ever having effected any strong action in common. Had they been thoroughly unjust, they could not have kept their hands off one another; they must have had some justice in them, enough to keep them from injuring one another at the same time with their victims. This it was that enabled them to achieve what they did achieve: their injustice only partially incapacitated them for their career of wrongdoing; if perfect, it would have disabled them for any action whatsoever. I can see that all this is true, as against your original position. But there is a further question which we postponed: Is the life of justice the better and happier life? What we have said already leaves no doubt in my mind; but we ought to consider more carefully, for this is no light matter: it is the question, what is the right way to live?

Thrasymachus/ Go on, then.

Socrates/ I will. Some things have a function; a horse, for instance, is useful for certain kinds of work. Would you agree to define a thing's function in general as the work for which that thing is the only instrument or the best one?

Thrasymachus/ I don't understand.

Socrates/ Take an example. We can see only with the eyes, hear only with the ears; and seeing and hearing might be called the functions of those organs.

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Or again, you might cut vine-shoots with a carving-knife or a chisel or many other tools, but with none so well as with a pruning-knife made for the purpose; and we may call that its function.

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ Now, I expect, you see better what I meant by suggesting that a thing's function is the work that it alone can do, or can do better than anything else.

Thrasymachus/ Yes, I will accept that definition.

Socrates/ Good; and to take the same examples, the eye and the ear, which we said have each its particular function: have they not also a specific excellence or virtue? Is not that always the case with things that have some appointed work to do?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now consider: is the eye likely to do its work well, if you take away its peculiar virtue and substitute the corresponding defect?

Thrasymachus/ Of course not, if you mean substituting blindness for the power of sight.

Socrates/ I mean whatever its virtue may be; I have not come to that yet I am only asking, whether it is true of things with a function—eyes or ears or anything else—that there is always some specific virtue which enables them to work well; and if they are deprived of that virtue, they work badly.

Thrasymachus/ I think that is true.

Socrates/ Then the next point is this. Has the soul a function that can be performed by nothing else? Take for example such actions as deliberating or taking charge and exercising control: is not the soul the only thing of which you can say that these are its proper and peculiar work?

Thrasymachus/ That is so.

Socrates/ And again, living—is not that above all the function of the soul?

Thrasymachus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And we also speak of the soul as having a certain specific excellence or virtue?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, Thrasymachus, if the soul is robbed of its peculiar virtue, it cannot possibly do its work well. It must exercise its power of controlling and taking charge well or ill according as it is itself in a good or a bad state.

Thrasymachus/ That follows.

Socrates/ And did we not agree that the virtue of the soul is justice, and injustice its defect?

Thrasymachus/ We did.

Socrates/ So it follows that a just soul, or in other words a just man, will live well; the unjust will not.

Thrasymachus/ Apparently, according to your argument.

Socrates/ But living well involves well-being and happiness.

Thrasymachus/ Naturally.

Socrates/ Then only the just man is happy; injustice will involve unhappiness.

Thrasymachus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ But you cannot say it pays better to be unhappy.

Thrasymachus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Injustice then, my dear Thrasymachus, can never pay better than justice.

Thrasymachus/ Well, this is a feast-day, and you may take all this as your share of the entertainment.

Socrates/ For which I have to thank you, Thrasymachus; you have been so gentle with me since you recovered your temper. It is my own fault if the entertainment has not been satisfactory. I have been behaving like a greedy guest, snatching a taste of every new dish that comes round before he has properly enjoyed the last. We began by looking for a definition of justice; but before we had found one, I dropped

that question and hurried on to ask whether or not it involved superior character and intelligence; and then, as soon as another idea cropped up, that injustice pays better, I could not refrain from pursuing that.

So now the whole conversation has left me completely in the dark; for so long as I do not know what justice is, I am hardly likely to know whether or not it is a virtue, or whether it makes a man happy or unhappy.

Socrates/ I thought that, with these words, I was quit of the discussion; but it seems this was only a prelude. Glaucon, undaunted as ever, was not content to let Thrasymachus abandon the field.

Glaucon/ Socrates, you have made a show of proving that justice is better than injustice in every way. Is that enough, or do you want us to be really convinced?

Socrates/ Certainly I do, if it rests with me.

Glaucon/ Then you are not going the right way about it. I want to know how you classify the things we call good. Are there not some which we should wish to have, not for their consequences, but just for their own sake, such as harmless pleasures and enjoyments that have no further result beyond the satisfaction of the moment?

Socrates/ Yes, I think there are good things of that description.

Glaucon/ And also some that we value both for their own sake and for their consequences—things like knowledge and health and the use of our eyes?

Socrates/ Yes.

Glaucon/ And a third class which would include physical training, medical treatment, earning one's bread as a doctor or otherwise—useful, but burdensome things, which we want only for the sake of the profit or other benefit they bring.

Socrates/ Yes, there is that third class. What then?

Glaucon/ In which class do you place justice?

Socrates/ I should say, in the highest, as a thing which anyone who is to gain happiness must value both for itself and for its results.

Glaucon/ Well, that is not the common opinion. Most people would say it was one of those things, tiresome and disagreeable in themselves, which we cannot avoid practicing for the sake of reward or a good reputation.

Socrates/ I know; that is why Thrasymachus has been finding fault with it all this time and praising injustice. But I seem to be slow in seeing his point.

Glaucon/ Listen to me, then, and see if you agree with mine. There was no need, I think, for Thrasymachus to yield so readily, like a snake you had charmed into submission; and nothing so far said about justice and injustice has been established to my satisfaction. I want to be told what each of them really is, and what effect each has, in itself, on the soul that harbors it, when all rewards and consequences are left out of account. So here is my plan, if you approve. I shall revive Thrasymachus' theory. First, I will state what is commonly held about the nature of justice and its origin; secondly, I shall maintain that it is always practiced with reluctance, not as good in itself, but as a thing one cannot do without; and thirdly, that this reluctance is reasonable, because the life of injustice is much the better life of the two—so people say. That is not what I think myself, Socrates; only I am bewildered by all that Thrasymachus and ever so many others have dinned into my ears; and I have never yet heard the case for justice stated as I wish to hear it. You, I believe, if anyone, can tell me what is to be said in praise of justice in and for itself; that is what I want. Accordingly, I shall set you an example by glorifying the life

of injustice with all the energy that I hope you will show later in denouncing it and exalting justice in its stead. Will that plan suit you?

Socrates/ Nothing could be better. Of all subjects this is one on which a sensible man must always be glad to exchange ideas.

Glaucon/ Good. Listen then, and I will begin with my first point: the nature and origin of justice.

What people say is that to do wrong is, in itself, a desirable thing; on the other hand, it is not at all desirable to suffer wrong, and the harm to the sufferer outweighs the advantage to the doer. Consequently, when men have had a taste of both, those who have not the power to seize the advantage and escape the harm decide that they would be better off if they made a compact neither to do wrong nor to suffer it. Hence they began to make laws and covenants with one another; and whatever the law prescribed they called lawful and right. That is what right or justice is and how it came into existence; it stands half-way between the best thing of all—to do wrong with impunity—and the worst, which is to suffer wrong without the power to retaliate. So justice is accepted as a compromise, and valued, not as good in itself, but for lack of power to do wrong; no man worthy of the name, who had that power, would ever enter into such a compact with anyone; he would be mad if he did. That, Socrates, is the nature of justice according to this account, and such the circumstances in which it arose.

The next point is that men practice it against the grain, for lack of power to do wrong. How true that is, we shall best see if we imagine two men, one just, the other unjust, given full license to do whatever they like, and then follow them to observe where each will be led by his desires. We shall catch the just man taking the same road as the unjust; he will be

moved by self-interest, the end which it is natural to every creature to pursue as good, until forcibly turned aside by law and custom to respect the principle of equality.

Now, the easiest way to give them that complete liberty of action would be to imagine them possessed of the talisman found by Gyges, the ancestor of the famous Lydian. The story tells how he was a shepherd in the King's service. One day there was a great storm, and the ground where his flock was feeding was rent by an earthquake. Astonished at the sight, he went down into the chasm and saw, among other wonders of which the story tells, a brazen horse, hollow, with windows in its sides. Peering in, he saw a dead body, which seemed to be of more than human size. It was naked save for a gold ring, which he took from the finger and made his way out. When the shepherds met, as they did every month, to send an account to the King of the state of his flocks, Gyges came wearing the ring. As he was sitting with the others, he happened to turn the bezel of the ring inside his hand. At once he became invisible, and his companions, to his surprise, began to speak of him as if he had left them. Then, as he was fingering the ring, he turned the bezel outwards and became visible again. With that, he set about testing the ring to see if it really had this power, and always with the same result: according as he turned the bezel inside or out he vanished and reappeared. After this discovery he contrived to be one of the messengers sent to the court. There he seduced the Queen, and with her help murdered the King and seized the throne.

Now suppose there were two such magic rings, and one were given to the just man, the other to the unjust. No one, it is commonly believed, would have such iron strength of mind as to stand fast in doing right or keep his hands off other men's goods, when he could go to the market-place and fearlessly help himself to anything he wanted, enter

houses and sleep with any woman he chose, set prisoners free and kill men at his pleasure, and in a word go about among men with the powers of a god. He would behave no better than the other; both would take the same course. Surely this would be strong proof that men do right only under compulsion; no individual thinks of it as good for him personally, since he does wrong whenever he finds he has the power. Every man believes that wrongdoing pays him personally much better, and, according to this theory, that is the truth. Granted full license to do as he liked, people would think him a miserable fool if they found him refusing to wrong his neighbors or to touch their belongings, though in public they would keep up a pretense of praising his conduct, for fear of being wronged themselves. So much for that.

Finally, if we are really to judge between the two lives, the only way is to contrast the extremes of justice and injustice. We can best do that by imagining our two men to be perfect types, and crediting both to the full with the qualities they need for their respective ways of life. To begin with the unjust man: he must be like any consummate master of a craft, a physician or a captain, who, knowing just what his art can do, never tries to do more, and can always retrieve a false step. The unjust man, if he is to reach perfection, must be equally discreet in his criminal attempts, and he must not be found out, or we shall think him a bungler; for the highest pitch of injustice is to seem just when you are not. So we must endow our man with the full complement of injustice; we must allow him to have secured a spotless reputation for virtue while committing the blackest crimes; he must be able to retrieve any mistake, to defend himself with convincing eloquence if his misdeeds are denounced, and, when force is required, to bear down all opposition by his courage and strength and by his command of friends and money.

Now set beside this paragon the just man in his simplicity and nobleness, one who, in Aeschylus' words, 'would be, not seem, the best'. There must, indeed, be no such seeming; for if his character were apparent, his reputation would bring him honors and rewards, and then we should not know whether it was for their sake that he was just or for justice's sake alone. He must be stripped of everything but justice, and denied every advantage the other enjoyed. Doing no wrong, he must have the worst reputation for wrong-doing, to test whether his virtue is proof against all that comes of having a bad name; and under this lifelong imputation of wickedness, let him hold on his course of justice unwavering to the point of death. And so, when the two men have carried their justice and injustice to the last extreme, we may judge which is the happier.

Socrates/ My dear Glaucon, how vigorously you scour these two characters clean for inspection, as if you were burnishing a couple of statues!

Glaucon/ I am doing my best. Well, given two such characters, it is not hard, I fancy, to describe the sort of life that each of them may expect; and if the description sounds rather coarse, take it as coming from those who cry up the merits of injustice rather than from me. They will tell you that our just man will be thrown into prison, scourged and racked, will have his eyes burnt out, and, after every kind of torment, be impaled. That will teach him how much better it is to seem virtuous than to be so. In fact those lines of Aeschylus I quoted are more fitly applied to the unjust man, who, they say, is a realist and does not live for appearances: 'he would be, not seem' unjust, reaping the harvest sown In those deep furrows of the thoughtful heart Whence wisdom springs.

With his reputation for virtue, he will hold offices of state, ally himself by marriage to any family he may choose,

become a partner in any business, and, having no scruples about being dishonest, turn all these advantages to profit. If he is involved in a lawsuit, public or private, he will get the better of his opponents, grow rich on the proceeds, and be able to help his friends and harm his enemies. Finally, he can make sacrifices to the gods and dedicate offerings with due magnificence, and, being in a much better position than the just man to serve the gods as well as his chosen friends, he may reasonably hope to stand higher in the favor of heaven. So much better, they say, Socrates, is the life prepared for the unjust by gods and men.

Socrates/ Here Glaucon ended, and I was meditating a reply, when his brother Adeimantus exclaimed:

Adeimantus/ Surely, Socrates, you cannot suppose that that is all there is to be said.

Socrates/ Why, isn't it?

Adeimantus/ The most essential part of the case has not been mentioned.

Socrates/ Well, there is a proverb about a brother's aid. If Glaucon has failed, it is for you to make good his shortcomings; though, so far as I am concerned, he has said quite enough to put me out of the running and leave me powerless to rescue the cause of justice.

Adeimantus/ Nonsense; there is more to be said, and you must listen to me. If we want a clear view of what I take to be Glaucon's meaning, we must study the opposite side of the case, the arguments used when justice is praised and injustice condemned. When children are told by their fathers and all their pastors and masters that it is a good thing to be just, what is commended is not justice in itself but the respectability it brings. They are to let men see how just they are, in order to gain high positions and marry well and win

all the other advantages which Glaucon mentioned, since the just man owes all these to his good reputation.

In this matter of having a good name, they go farther still: they throw in the favorable opinion of heaven, and can tell us of no end of good things with which they say the gods reward piety. There is the good old Hesiod, who says the gods make the just man's oak-trees 'bear acorns at the top and bees in the middle; and their sheep's fleeces are heavy with wool', and a great many other blessings of that sort. And Homer speaks in the same strain:

As when a blameless king fears the gods and upholds right judgment; then the dark earth yields wheat and barley, and the trees are laden with fruit; the young of his flocks are strong, and the sea gives abundance of fish.

Musaeus and his son Eumolpus enlarge in still more spirited terms upon the rewards from heaven they promise to the righteous. They take them to the other world and provide them with a banquet of the Blest, where they sit for all time carousing with garlands on their heads, as if virtue could not be more nobly recompensed than by an eternity of intoxication. Others, again, carry the rewards of heaven yet a stage farther: the pious man who keeps his oaths is to have children's children and to leave a posterity after him. When they have sung the praises of justice in that strain, with more to same effect, they proceed to plunge the sinners and unrighteous men into a pool of mud in the world below, and set them to fetch water in a sieve. Even in this life, too, they give them a bad name, and make out that the unjust suffer all those penalties which Glaucon described as falling upon the good man who has a bad reputation: they can think of no others. That is how justice is recommended and injustice denounced.

Besides all this, think of the way in which justice and injustice are spoken of, not only in ordinary life, but by the poets. All with one voice reiterate that self-control and justice, admirable as they may be, are difficult and irksome, whereas vice and injustice are pleasant and very easily to be had; it is mere convention to regard them as discreditable. They tell us that dishonesty generally pays better than honesty. They will cheerfully speak of a bad man as happy and load him with honors and social esteem, provided he be rich and otherwise powerful; while they despise and disregard one who has neither power nor wealth, though all the while they acknowledge that he is the better man of the two.

Most surprising of all is what they say about the gods and virtue: that heaven itself often allots misfortunes and a hard life to the good man, and gives prosperity to the wicked. Mendicant priests and soothsayers come to the rich man's door with a story of a power they possess by the gift of heaven to atone for any offence that he or his ancestors have committed with incantations and sacrifice, agreeably accompanied by feasting. If he wishes to injure an enemy, he can, at a trifling expense, do him a hurt with equal ease, whether he be an honest man or not, by means of certain invocations and spells which, as they profess, prevail upon the gods to do their bidding. In support of all these claims they call the poets to witness. Some, by way of advertising the easiness of vice, quote the words: 'Unto wickedness men attain easily and in multitudes; smooth is the way and her dwelling is very near at hand. But the gods have ordained much sweat upon the path to virtue' and a long road that is rough and steep.

Others, to show that men can turn the gods from their purpose, cite Homer: 'Even the gods themselves listen to entreaty. Their hearts are turned by the entreaties of men

with sacrifice and humble prayers and libation and burnt offering, whensoever anyone transgresses and does amiss.' They produce a whole farrago of books in which Musaeus and Orpheus, described as descendants of the Muses and the Moon, prescribe their ritual; and they persuade entire communities, as well as individuals, that, both in this life and after death, wrongdoing may be absolved and purged away by means of sacrifices and agreeable performances which they are pleased to call rites of initiation. These deliver us from punishment in the other world, where awful things are in store for all who neglect to sacrifice.

Now, my dear Socrates, when all this stuff is talked about the estimation in which virtue and vice are held by heaven and by mankind, what effect can we suppose it has upon the mind of a young man quick-witted enough to gather honey from all these flowers of popular wisdom and to draw his own conclusions as to the sort of person he should be and the way he should go in order to lead the best possible life? In all likelihood he would ask himself, in Pindar's words: 'Will the way of right or the by-paths of deceit lead me to the higher fortress', where I may entrench myself for the rest of my life? For, according to what they tell me, I have nothing to gain but trouble and manifest loss from being honest, unless I also get a name for being so whereas, if I am dishonest and provide myself with a reputation for honesty, they promise me a marvelous career. Very well, then; since 'outward seeming', as wise men inform me, 'overpowers the truth' and decides the question of happiness, I had better go in for appearances wholeheartedly. I must ensconce myself behind an imposing facade designed to look like virtue, and trail the fox behind me, 'the cunning shifty fox'—Archilochus knew the world as well as any man. You may say it is not so easy to be wicked without ever being found out. Perhaps not; but great things are never easy. Anyhow, if we are to reach

happiness, everything we have been told points to this as the road to be followed. We will form secret societies to save U from exposure; besides, there are men who teach the art of winning over popular assemblies and courts of law; so that, one way or another, by persuasion or violence, we shall get the better of our neighbors without being punished. You might object that the gods are not to be deceived and are beyond the reach of violence. But suppose that there are no gods, or that they do not concern themselves with the doings of men; why should we concern ourselves to deceive them? Or, if the gods do exist and care for mankind, all we know or have ever heard about them comes from current tradition and from the poets who recount their family history, and these same authorities also assure us that they can be won over and turned from their purpose 'by sacrifice and humble prayers' and votive offerings. We must either accept both these statements or neither. If we are to accept both, we had better do wrong and use part of the proceeds to offer sacrifice. By being just we may escape the punishment of heaven, but we shall be renouncing the profits of injustice; whereas by doing wrong we shall make our profit and escape punishment into the bargain, by means of those entreaties which win over the gods when we transgress and do amiss. But then, you will say, in the other world the penalty for our misdeeds on earth will fall either upon us or upon our children's children. We can counter that objection by reckoning on the great efficacy of mystic rites and the divinities of absolution, vouched for by the most advanced societies and by the descendants of the gods who have appeared as poets and spokesmen of heavenly inspiration.

What reason, then, remains for preferring justice to the extreme of injustice, when common belief and the best authorities promise us the fulfillment of our desires in this life and the next, if only we conceal our ill-doing under a

veneer of decent behavior? The upshot is, Socrates, that no man possessed of superior powers of mind or person or rank or wealth will set any value on justice; he is more likely to laugh when he hears it praised. So, even one who could prove my case false and were quite sure that justice is best, far from being indignant with the unjust, will be very ready to excuse them. He will know that, here and there, a man may refrain from wrong because it revolts some instinct he is graced with or because he has come to know the truth; no one else is virtuous of his own will; it is only lack of spirit or the infirmity of age or some other weakness that makes men condemn the iniquities they have not the strength to practice. This is easily seen: give such a man the power, and he will be the first to use it to the utmost.

What lies at the bottom of all this is nothing but the fact from which Glaucon, as well as I, started upon this long discourse. We put it to you, Socrates, with all respect, in this way. All you who profess to sing the praises of right conduct, from the ancient heroes whose legends have survived down to the men of the present day, have never denounced injustice or praised justice apart from the reputation, honors, and rewards they bring; but what effect either of them in itself has upon its possessor when it dwells in his soul unseen of gods or men, no poet or ordinary man has ever yet explained. No one has proved that a soul can harbor no worse evil than injustice, no greater good than justice. Had all of you said that from the first and tried to convince us from our youth up, we should not be keeping watch upon our neighbors to prevent them from doing wrong to us, but everyone would keep a far more effectual watch over himself, for fear lest by wronging others he should open his doors to the worst of all evils.

That, Socrates, is the view of justice and injustice which Thrasymachus and, no doubt, others would state, perhaps

in even stronger words. For myself, I believe it to be a gross perversion of their true worth and effect; but, as I must frankly confess, I have put the case with all the force I could muster because I want to hear the other side from you. You must not be content with proving that justice is superior to injustice; you must make clear what good or what harm each of them does to its possessor, taking it simply in itself and, as Glaucon required, leaving out of account the reputation it bears. For unless you deprive each of its true reputation and attach to it the false one, we shall say that you are praising or denouncing nothing more than the appearances in either case, and recommending us to do wrong without being found out; and that you hold with Thrasymachus that right means what is good for someone else, being the interest of the stronger, and wrong is what really pays, serving one's own interest at the expense of the weaker. You have agreed that justice belongs to that highest class of good things which are worth having not only for their consequences, but much more for their own sakes—things like sight and hearing, knowledge, and health, whose value is genuine and intrinsic, not dependent on opinion. So I want you, in commending justice, to consider only how justice, in itself, benefits a man who has it in him, and how injustice harms him, leaving rewards and reputation out of account. I might put up with others dwelling on those outward effects as a reason for praising the one and condemning the other; but from you, who have spent your life in the study of this question, I must beg leave to demand something better. You must not be content merely to prove that justice is superior to injustice, but explain how one is good, the other evil, in virtue of the intrinsic effect each has on its possessor, whether gods or men see it or not.

Socrates/ I was delighted with these speeches from Glaucon and Adeimantus, whose gifts I had always admired.

How right, I exclaimed, was Glaucon's lover to begin that poem of his on your exploits at the battle of Megara by describing you two as the sons divine Of Ariston's noble line!

Like father, like sons: there must indeed be some divine quality in your nature, if you can plead the cause of injustice so eloquently and still not be convinced yourselves that it is better than justice. That you are not really convinced I am sure from all I know of your dispositions, though your words might well have left me in doubt. But the more I trust you, the harder I find it to reply. How can I come to the rescue? I have no faith in my own powers, when I remember that you were not satisfied with the proof I thought I had given to Thrasymachus that it is better to be just. And yet I cannot stand by and hear justice reviled without lifting a finger. I am afraid to commit a sin by holding aloof while I have breath and strength to say a word in its defense. So there is nothing for it but to do the best I can.

Glaucon and the others begged me to step into the breach and carry through our inquiry into the real nature of justice and injustice, and the truth about their respective advantages. So I told them what I thought.

This is a very obscure question and we shall need keen sight to see our way. Now, as we are not remarkably clever, I will make a suggestion as to how we should proceed. Imagine a rather short-sighted person told to read an inscription in small letters from some way off. He would think it a godsend if someone pointed out that the same inscription was written up elsewhere on a bigger scale, so that he could first read the larger characters and then make out whether the smaller ones were the same.

Adeimantus/ No doubt; but what analogy do you see in that to our inquiry?

Socrates/ I will tell you. We think of justice as a quality that may exist in a whole community as well as in an individual, and the community is the bigger of the two. Possibly, then, we may find justice there in larger proportions, easier to make out. So I suggest that we should begin by inquiring what justice means in a state. Then we can go on to look for its counterpart on a smaller scale in the individual.

Adeimantus/ That seems a good plan.

Socrates/ Well then, suppose we imagine a state coming into being before our eyes. We might then be able to watch the growth of justice or of injustice within it. When that is done, we may hope it will be easier to find what we are looking for.

Adeimantus/ Much easier.

Socrates/ Shall we try, then, to carry out this scheme? I fancy it will be no light undertaking; so you had better think twice.

Adeimantus/ No need for that. Don't waste any more time.

Socrates/ My notion is, that a state comes into existence because no individual is self-sufficing; we all have many needs. But perhaps you can suggest some different origin for the foundation of a community?

Adeimantus/ No, I agree with you.

Socrates/ So, having all these needs, we call in one another's help to satisfy our various requirements; and when we have collected a number of helpers and associates to live together in one place, we call that settlement a state.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So if one man gives another what he has to give in exchange for what he can get, it is because each finds that to do so is for his own advantage.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Very well. Now let us build up our imaginary state from the beginning. Apparently, it will owe its existence to our needs, the first and greatest need being the provision of food to keep us alive. Next we shall want a house; and thirdly, such things as clothing.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ How will our state be able to supply all these demands? We shall need at least one man to be a farmer, another a builder, and a third a weaver. Will that do, or shall we add a shoemaker and one or two more to provide for our personal wants?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ The minimum state, then, will consist of four or five men.

Adeimantus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Now here is a further point. Is each one of them to bring the product of his work into a common stock? Should our one farmer, for example, provide food enough for four people and spend the whole of his working time in producing corn, so as to share with the rest; or should he take no notice of them and spend only a quarter of his time on growing just enough corn for himself, and divide the other three-quarters between building his house, weaving his clothes, and making his shoes, so as to save the trouble of sharing with others and attend himself to all his own concerns?

Adeimantus/ The first plan might be the easier.

Socrates/ That may very well be so; for, as you spoke, it occurred to me, for one thing, that no two people are born exactly alike. There are innate differences which fit them for different occupations.

Adeimantus/ I agree.

Socrates/ And will a man do better working at many trades, or keeping to one only?

Adeimantus/ Keeping to one.

Socrates/ And there is another point: obviously work may be ruined, if you let the right time go by. The workman must wait upon the work; it will not wait upon his leisure and allow itself to be done in a spare moment. So the conclusion is that more things will be produced and the work be more easily and better done, when every man is set free from all other occupations to do, at the right time, the one thing for which he is naturally fitted.

Adeimantus/ That is certainly true.

Socrates/ We shall need more than four citizens, then, to supply all those necessaries we mentioned. You see, Adeimantus, if the farmer is to have a good plough and spade and other tools, he will not make them himself. No more will the builder and weaver and shoemaker make all the many implements they need. So quite a number of carpenters and smiths and other craftsmen must be enlisted. Our miniature state is beginning to grow.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Still, it will not be very large, even when we have added cowherds and shepherds to provide the farmers with oxen for the plough, and the builders as well as the farmers with draught-animals, and the weavers and shoemakers with wool and leather.

Adeimantus/ No but it will not be so very small either.

Socrates/ And yet, again, it will be next to impossible to plant our city in a territory where it will need no imports. So there will have to be still another set of people, to fetch what it needs from other countries.

Adeimantus/ There will.

Socrates/ Moreover, if these agents take with them nothing that those other countries require in exchange, they will return as empty-handed as they went. So, besides everything wanted for consumption at home, we must produce enough goods of the right kind for the foreigners whom we depend on to supply us. That will mean increasing the number of farmers and craftsmen.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And then, there are these agents who are to import and export all kinds of goods—merchants, as we call them. We must have them; and if they are to do business overseas, we shall need quite a number of ship-owners and others who know about that branch of trading.

Adeimantus/ We shall.

Socrates/ Again, in the city itself how are the various sets of producers to exchange their products? That was our object, you will remember, in forming a community and so laying the foundation of our state.

Adeimantus/ Obviously, they must buy and sell.

Socrates/ That will mean having a market-place, and a currency to serve as a token for purposes of exchange.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now suppose a farmer, or an artisan, brings some of his produce to market at a time when no one is there who wants to exchange with him. Is he to sit there idle, when he might be at work?

Adeimantus/ No; there are people who have seen an opening here for their services. In well-ordered communities they are generally men not strong enough to be of use in any other occupation. They have to stay where they are in the marketplace and take goods for money from those who want to sell, and money for goods from those who want to buy.

Socrates/ That, then, is the reason why our city must include a class of shopkeepers—so we call these people who sit still in the market-place to buy and sell, in contrast with merchants who travel to other countries.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ There are also the services of yet another class, who have the physical strength for heavy work, though on intellectual grounds they are hardly worth including in our society—hired laborers, as we call them, because they sell the use of their strength for wages. They will go to make up our population.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, Adeimantus, has our state now grown to its full size?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Then, where in it shall we find justice or injustice? If they have come in with one of the elements we have been considering, can you say with which one?

Adeimantus/ I have no idea, Socrates; unless it be somewhere in their dealings with one another.

Socrates/ You may be right. Anyhow, it is a question which we shall have to face.

Let us begin, then, with a picture of our citizens' manner of life, with the provision we have made for them. They will be producing corn and wine, and making clothes and shoes. When they have built their houses, they will mostly work

without their coats or shoes in summer, and in winter be well shod and clothed. For their food, they will prepare flour and barley-meal for kneading and baking, and set out a grand spread of loaves and cakes on rushes or fresh leaves. Then they will lie on beds of myrtle-boughs and bryony and make merry with their children, drinking their wine after the feast with garlands on their heads and singing the praises of the gods. So they will live pleasantly together; and a prudent fear of poverty or war will keep them from begetting children beyond their means.

Here Glaucon interrupted me:

Glaucon/ You seem to expect your citizens to feast on dry bread.

Socrates/ True; I forgot that they will have something to give it a relish, salt, no doubt, and olives, and cheese, and country stews of roots and vegetables. And for dessert we will give them figs and peas and beans; and they shall roast myrtle-berries and acorns at the fire, while they sip their wine. Leading such a healthy life in peace, they will naturally come to a good old age, and leave their children to live after them in the same manner.

Glaucon/ That is just the sort of provender you would supply, Socrates, if you were founding a community of pigs.

Socrates/ Well, how are they to live, then, Glaucon?

Glaucon/ With the ordinary comforts. Let them lie on couches and dine off tables on such dishes and sweets as we have nowadays.

Socrates/ Ah, I see; we are to study the growth, not just of a state, but of a luxurious one. Well, there may be no harm in that; the consideration of luxury may help us to discover how justice and injustice take root in society. The community I have described seems to me the ideal one, in sound health as it were: but if you want to see one suffering

from inflammation, there is nothing to hinder us. So some people, it seems, will not be satisfied to live in this simple way; they must have couches and tables and furniture of all sorts; and delicacies too, perfumes, unguents, courtesans, sweetmeats, all in plentiful variety. And besides, we must not limit ourselves now to those bare necessaries of house and clothes and shoes; we shall have to set going the arts of embroidery and painting, and collect rich materials, like gold and ivory.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we must once more enlarge our community. The healthy one will not be big enough now; it must be swollen up with a whole multitude of callings not ministering to any bare necessity: hunters and fishermen, for instance; artists in sculpture, painting, and music; poets with their attendant train of professional reciters, actors, dancers, producers; and makers of all sorts of household gear, including everything for women's adornment. And we shall want more servants: children's nurses and attendants, lady's maids, barbers, cooks and confectioners. And then swineherds—there was no need for them in our original state, but we shall want them now; and a great quantity of sheep and cattle too, if people are going to live on meat.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And with this manner of life physicians will be in much greater request.

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ The country, too, which was large enough to support the original inhabitants, will now be too small. If we are to have enough pasture and plough land, we shall have to cut off a slice of our neighbors' territory; and if they too are not content with necessaries, but give themselves up to getting unlimited wealth, they will want a slice of ours.

Glaucon/ That is inevitable, Socrates.

Socrates/ So the next thing will be, Glaucon, that we shall be at war.

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ We need not say yet whether war does good or harm, but only that we have discovered its origin in desires which are the most fruitful source of evils both to individuals and to states.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ This will mean a considerable addition to our community—a whole army, to go out to battle with any invader, in defense of all this property and of the citizens we have been describing.

Glaucon/ Why so? Can't they defend themselves?

Socrates/ Not if the principle was right, which we all accepted in framing our society. You remember we agreed that no one man can practice many trades or arts satisfactorily.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Well, is not the conduct of war an art, quite as important as shoemaking?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But we would not allow our shoemaker to try to be also a farmer or weaver or builder, because we wanted our shoes well made. We gave each man one trade, for which he was naturally fitted; he would do good work, if he confined himself to that all his life, never letting the right moment slip by. Now in no form of work is efficiency so important as in war; and fighting is not so easy a business that a man can follow another trade, such as farming or shoemaking, and also be an efficient soldier. Why, even a game like draughts or dice must be studied from childhood;

no one can become a fine player in his spare moments. Just taking up a shield or other weapon will not make a man capable of fighting that very day in any sort of warfare, any more than taking up a tool or implement of some kind will make a man a craftsman or an athlete, if he does not understand its use and has never been properly trained to handle it.

Glaucon/ No; if that were so, tools would indeed be worth having.

Socrates/ These guardians of our state, then, inasmuch as their work is the most important of all, will need the most complete freedom from other occupations and the greatest amount of skill and practice.

Glaucon/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ And also a native aptitude for their calling.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So it is our business to define, if we can, the natural gifts that fit men to be guardians of a commonwealth, and to select them accordingly. It will certainly be a formidable task; but we must grapple with it to the best of our power.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Don't you think then, that, for the purpose of keeping guard, a young man should have much the same temperament and qualities as a well-bred watch-dog? I mean, for instance, that both must have quick senses to detect an enemy, swiftness in pursuing him, and strength, if they have to fight when they have caught him.

Glaucon/ Yes, they will need all those qualities.

Socrates/ And also courage, if they are to fight well.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And courage, in dog or horse or any other creature, Implies a spirited disposition. You must have noticed that a high spirit is unconquerable. Every soul possessed of it is fearless and indomitable in the face of any danger.

Glaucon/ Yes, I have noticed that.

Socrates/ So now we know what physical qualities our Guardian must have, and also that he must be of a spirited temper.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, Glaucon, how are men of that natural disposition to be kept from behaving pugnaciously to one another and to the rest of their countrymen?

Glaucon/ It is not at all easy to see.

Socrates/ And yet they must be gentle to their own people and dangerous only to enemies; otherwise they will destroy themselves without waiting till others destroy them.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ What are we to do, then? If gentleness and a high temper are contraries, where shall we find a character to combine them? Both are necessary to make a good Guardian, but it seems they are incompatible. So we shall never have a good Guardian.

Glaucon/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ Here I was perplexed, but on thinking over what we had been saying, I remarked that we deserved to be puzzled, because we had not followed up the comparison we had just drawn.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ We never noticed that, after all, there are natures in which these contraries are combined. They are to be found in animals, and not least in the kind we compared

to our Guardian. Well-bred dogs, as you know, are by instinct perfectly gentle to people whom they know and are accustomed to, and fierce to strangers. So the combination of qualities we require for our Guardian is, after all, possible and not against nature.

Glaucon/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Do you further agree that, besides this spirited temper, he must have a philosophical element in his nature?

Glaucon/ I don't see what you mean.

Socrates/ This is another trait you will see in the dog. It is really remarkable how the creature gets angry at the mere sight of a stranger and welcomes anyone he knows, though he may never have been treated unkindly by the one or kindly by the other. Did that never strike you as curious?

Glaucon/ I had not thought of it before; but that certainly is how a dog behaves.

Socrates/ Well, but that shows a fine instinct, which is philosophic in the true sense.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Because the only mark by which he distinguishes a friendly and an unfriendly face is that he knows the one and does not know the other; and if a creature makes that the test of what it finds congenial or otherwise, how can you deny that it has a passion for knowledge and understanding?

Glaucon/ Of course, I cannot.

Socrates/ And that passion is the same thing as philosophy—the love of wisdom.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Shall we boldly say, then, that the same is true of human beings? If a man is to be gentle towards his own

people whom he knows, he must have an instinctive love of wisdom and understanding.

Glaucon/ Agreed.

Socrates/ So the nature required to make a really noble Guardian of our commonwealth will be swift and strong, spirited, and philosophic.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Given those natural qualities, then, how are these Guardians to be brought up and educated? First, will the answer to that question help the purpose of our whole inquiry, which is to make out how justice and injustice grow up in a state? We want to be thorough, but not to draw out this discussion to a needless length.

Adeimantus/ I certainly think it will help.

Socrates/ If so, we must not think of dropping it, though it may be rather a long business.

Adeimantus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Come on then. We will take our time and educate our imaginary citizens.

Adeimantus/ Yes, let us do so.

Socrates/ What is this education to be, then? Perhaps we shall hardly invent a system better than the one which long experience has worked out, with its two branches for the cultivation of the mind and of the body. And I suppose we shall begin with the mind, before we start physical training.

Adeimantus/ Naturally.

Socrates/ Under that head will come stories; and of these there are two kinds: some are true, others fictitious. Both must come in, but we shall begin our education with the fictitious kind.

Adeimantus/ I don't understand.

Socrates/ Don't you understand, that we begin by telling children stories, which, taken as a whole, are fiction, though they contain some truth? Such story-telling begins at an earlier age than physical training; that is why I said we should start with the mind.

Adeimantus/ You are right.

Socrates/ And the beginning, as you know, is always the most important part, especially in dealing with anything young and tender. That is the time when the character is being molded and easily takes any impress one may wish to stamp on it.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then shall we simply allow our children to listen to any stories that anyone happens to make up, and so receive into their minds ideas often the very opposite of those we shall think they ought to have when they are grown up?

Adeimantus/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ It seems, then, our first business will be to supervise the making of fables and legends, rejecting all which are unsatisfactory; and we shall induce nurses and mothers to tell their children only those which we have approved, and to think more of molding their souls with these stories than they now do of rubbing their limbs to make them strong and shapely. Most of the stories now in use must be discarded.

Adeimantus/ What kind do you mean?

Socrates/ If we take the great ones, we shall see in them the pattern of all the rest, which are bound to be of the same stamp and to have the same effect.

Adeimantus/ No doubt; but which do you mean by the great ones?

Socrates/ The stories in Hesiod and Homer and the poets in general, who have at all times composed fictitious tales and told them to mankind.

Adeimantus/ Which kind are you thinking of, and what fault do you find in them?

Socrates/ The worst of all faults, especially if the story is ugly and immoral as well as false—misrepresenting the nature of gods and heroes, like an artist whose picture is utterly unlike the object he sets out to draw.

Adeimantus/ That is certainly a serious fault; but give me an example.

Socrates/ A signal instance of false invention about the highest matters is that foul story, which Hesiod repeats, of the deeds of Uranus and the vengeance of Cronos; and then there is the tale of Cronos's doings and of his son's treatment of him. Even if such tales were true, I should not have supposed they should be lightly told to thoughtless young people. If they cannot be altogether suppressed, they should only be revealed in a mystery, to which access should be as far as possible restricted by requiring the sacrifice, not of a pig, but of some victim such as very few could afford.

Adeimantus/ It is true: those stories are objectionable.

Socrates/ Yes, and not to be repeated in our commonwealth, Adeimantus. We shall not tell a child that, if he commits the foulest crimes or goes to any length in punishing his father's misdeeds, he will be doing nothing out of the way, but only what the first and greatest of the gods have done before him.

Adeimantus/ I agree; such stories are not fit to be repeated.

Socrates/ Nor yet any tales of warfare and intrigues and battles of gods against gods, which are equally untrue. If our future Guardians are to think it a disgrace to quarrel lightly

with one another, we shall not let them embroider robes with the Battle of the Giants or tell them of all the other feuds of gods and heroes with their kith and kin. If by any means we can make them believe that no one has ever had a quarrel with a fellow citizen and it is a sin to have one, that is the sort of thing our old men and women should tell children from the first; and as they grow older, we must make the poets write for them in the same strain. Stories like those of Hera being bound by her son, or of Hephaestus flung from heaven by his father for taking his mother's part when she was beaten, and all those battles of the gods in Homer, must not be admitted into our state, whether they be allegorical or not. A child cannot distinguish the allegorical sense from the literal, and the ideas he takes in at that age are likely to become indelibly fixed; hence the great importance of seeing that the first stories he hears shall be designed to produce the best possible effect on his character.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is reasonable. But if we were asked which of these stories in particular are of the right quality, what should we answer?

Socrates/ You and I, Adeimantus, are not, for the moment, poets, but founders of a commonwealth. As such, it is not our business to invent stories ourselves, but only to be clear as to the main outlines to be followed by the poets in making their stories and the limits beyond which they must not be allowed to go.

Adeimantus/ True; but what are these outlines for any account they may give of the gods?

Socrates/ Of this sort A poet, whether he is writing epic, lyric, or drama, surely ought always to represent the divine nature as it really is. And the truth is that that nature is good and must be described as such.

Adeimantus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Well, nothing that is good can be harmful; and if it cannot do harm, it can do no evil; and so it cannot be responsible for any evil.

Adeimantus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Again, goodness is beneficent, and hence the cause of wellbeing.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Goodness, then, is not responsible for everything, but only for what is as it should be. It is not responsible for evil.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ It follows, then, that the divine, being good, is not, as most people say, responsible for everything that happens to mankind, but only for a small part; for the good things in human life are far fewer than the evil, and, whereas the good must be ascribed to heaven only, we must look elsewhere for the cause of the evils.

Adeimantus/ I think that is perfectly true.

Socrates/ So we shall condemn as a foolish error Homer's description of Zeus as the 'dispenser of both good and ill'. We shall disapprove when Pandarus' violation of oaths and treaties is said to be the work of Zeus and Athena, or when Themis and Zeus are said to have caused strife among the gods. Nor must we allow our young people to be told by Aeschylus that 'Heaven implants guilt in man, when his will is to destroy a house utterly'. If a poet writes of the sorrows of Niobe or the calamities of the house of Pelops or of the Trojan war, either he must not speak of them as the work of a god, or, if he does so, he must devise some such explanation as we are now requiring: he must say that what the god did was just and good, and the sufferers were the better for being chastised. One who pays a just penalty must not be called miserable, and his misery then laid at heaven's

door. The poet will only be allowed to say that the wicked were miserable because they needed chastisement, and the punishment of heaven did them good. If our commonwealth is to be well-ordered, we must fight to the last against any member of it being suffered to speak of the divine, which is good, being responsible for evil. Neither young nor old must listen to such tales, in prose or verse. Such doctrine would be impious, self-contradictory, and disastrous to our commonwealth.

Socrates/ I agree, and I would vote for a law to that effect.

Socrates/ Well then, that shall be one of our laws about religion. The first principle to which all must conform in speech or writing is that heaven is not responsible for everything, but only for what is good.

Adeimantus/ I am quite satisfied.

Socrates/ Now what of this for a second principle? Do you think of a god as a sort of magician who might, for his own purposes, appear in various shapes, now actually passing into a number of different forms, now deluding us into believing he has done so; or is his nature simple and of all things the least likely to depart from its proper form?

Adeimantus/ I cannot say offhand.

Socrates/ Well, if a thing passes out of its proper form, must not the change come either from within or from some outside cause?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it not true, then, that things in the most perfect condition are the least affected by changes from outside? Take the effect on the body of food and drink or of exertion, or the effect of sunshine and wind on a plant: the healthiest and strongest suffer the least change. Again, the bravest and wisest spirit is least disturbed by external influence. Even manufactured things—furniture, houses, clothes—suffer least from wear and tear when they are well made and in good condition. So this immunity to change from outside is characteristic of anything which, thanks to art or nature or both, is in a satisfactory state.

Adeimantus/ That seems true.

Socrates/ But surely the state of the divine nature must be perfect in every way, and would therefore be the last thing to suffer transformations from any outside cause.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, would a god change or alter himself?

Adeimantus/ If he changes at all, it can only be in that way.

Socrates/ Would it be a change for the better or for the worse?

Adeimantus/ It could only be for the worse; for we cannot admit any imperfection in divine goodness or beauty.

Socrates/ True; and that being so, do you think, Adeimantus, that anyone, god or man, would deliberately make himself worse in any respect?

Adeimantus/ That is impossible.

Socrates/ Then a god cannot desire to change himself. Being as perfect as he can be, every god, it seems, remains simply and forever in his own form.

Adeimantus/ That is the necessary conclusion.

Socrates/ If so, my friend, the poets must not tell us that 'the gods go to and fro among the cities of men, disguised as strangers of all sorts from far countries'; nor must they tell any of those false tales of Proteus and Thetis transforming themselves, or bring Hera on the stage in the guise of a priestess collecting alms for 'the life-giving children of Inachus, the river of Argos'. Mothers, again, are not to follow these suggestions and scare young children with mischievous stories of spirits that go about by night in all sorts of outlandish shapes. They would only be blaspheming the gods and at the same time making cowards of their children.

Adeimantus/ No, that must not be allowed.

Socrates/ But are we to think that the gods, though they do not really change, trick us by some magic into believing that they appear in many different forms?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ What? said would a god tell a falsehood or act one by deluding us with an apparition?

Adeimantus/ I cannot say.

Socrates/ Do you not know that the true falsehood—if that is a possible expression—is a thing that all gods and men abominate?

Adeimantus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ This: no one, if he could help it, would tolerate the presence of untruth in the most vital part of his nature concerning the most vital matters. There is nothing he would fear so much as to harbor falsehood in that quarter.

Adeimantus/ Still I do not understand.

Socrates/ Because you think I mean something out of the ordinary. All I mean is the presence of falsehood in the soul concerning reality. To be deceived about the truth of things and so to be in ignorance and error and to harbor untruth in the soul is a thing no one would consent to. Falsehood in that quarter is abhorred above everything.

Adeimantus/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ Well then, as I was saying, this ignorance in the soul which entertains untruth is what really deserves to be called the true falsehood; for the spoken falsehood is only the embodiment or image of a previous condition of the soul, not pure unadulterated falsity. Is it not so?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ This real falsehood, then, is hateful to gods and men equally. But is the spoken falsehood always a hateful thing? Is it not sometimes helpful—in war, for instance, or as a sort of medicine to avert some fit of folly or madness that might make a friend attempt some mischief? And in those legends we were discussing just now, we can turn fiction to account; not knowing the facts about the distant past, we can make our fiction as good an embodiment of truth as possible.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is so.

Socrates/ Well, in which of these ways would falsehood be useful to a god? We cannot think of him as embodying truth in fiction for lack of information about the past.

Adeimantus/ No, that would be absurd.

Socrates/ So there is no room in his case for poetical inventions. Would he need to tell untruths because he has enemies to fear?

Adeimantus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Or friends who are mad or foolish?

Adeimantus/ No; a fool or a madman could hardly enjoy the friendship of the gods.

Socrates/ Gods, then, have no motive for lying. There can be no falsehood of any sort in the divine nature.

Adeimantus/ None.

Socrates/ We conclude, then, that a god is a being of entire simplicity and truthfulness in word and in deed. In himself he does not change, nor does he delude others, either in dreams or in waking moments, by apparitions or oracles or signs.

Adeimantus/ I agree, after all you have said.

Socrates/ You will assent, then, to this as a second principle to guide all that is to be said or written about the gods: that they do not transform themselves by any magic or mislead us by illusions or lies. For all our admiration of Homer, we shall not approve his story of the dream Zeus sent to Agamemnon; nor yet those lines of Aeschylus where Thetis tells how Apollo sang at her wedding:

> Boding good fortune for my child, long life
> From sickness free, in all things blest by heaven,
> His song, so crowned with triumph, cheered my heart.
> I thought those lips divine, with prophecy
> Instinct, could never lie. But he, this guest,

Whose voice so rang with promise at the feast,
Even he, has slain my son.

If a poet writes of the gods in this way, we shall be angry and refuse him the means to produce his play. Nor shall we allow such poetry to be used in educating the young, if we mean our Guardians to be god-fearing and to reproduce the divine nature in themselves so far as man may.

Adeimantus/ I entirely agree with your principles and I would have them observed as laws.

Socrates/ So far, then, as religion is concerned, we have settled what sorts of stories about the gods may, or may not, be told to children who are to hold heaven and their parents in reverence and to value good relations with one another.

Adeimantus/ Yes; and I believe we have settled right.

Socrates/ We also want them to be brave. So the stories they hear should be such as to make them unafraid of death. A man with that fear in his heart cannot be brave, can he?

Adeimantus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ And can a man be free from that fear and prefer death in battle to defeat and slavery, if he believes in a world below which is full of terrors?

Adeimantus/ No.

Socrates/ Here again, then, our supervision will be needed. The poets must be told to speak well of that other world. The gloomy descriptions they now give must be forbidden, not only as untrue, but as injurious to our future warriors. We shall strike out all lines like these:

I would rather be on earth as the hired servant of another, in the house of a landless man with little to live on, than be king over all the dead;

or these:

Alack, there is, then, even in the house of Death a spirit or a shade; but the wits dwell in it no more.

We shall ask Homer and the poets in general not to mind if we cross out all passages of this sort.. If most people enjoy them as good poetry, that is all the more reason for keeping them from children or grown men who are to be free, fearing slavery more than death.

Adeimantus/ I entirely agree.

Socrates/ We must also get rid of all that terrifying language, the very sound of which is enough to make one shiver: 'loathsome Styx', 'the River of Wailing', 'infernal spirits', 'anatomies', and so on. For other purposes such language may be well enough; but we are afraid that fever consequent upon such shivering fits may melt down the fine-tempered spirit of our Guardians. So we will have none of it; and we shall encourage writing in the opposite strain.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Another thing we must banish is the wailing and lamentations of the famous heroes. For this reason: if two friends are both men of high character, neither of them will think that death has any terrors for his comrade; and so he will not mourn for his friend's sake, as if something terrible had befallen him.

Adeimantus/ No.

Socrates/ We also believe that such a man, above all, possesses within himself all that is necessary for a good life and is least dependent on others, so that he has less to fear from the loss of a son or brother or of his wealth or any other possession. When such misfortune comes, he will bear it patiently without lamenting.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ We shall do well, then, to strike out descriptions of the heroes bewailing the dead, and make over such lamentations to women (and not to women of good standing either) and to men of low character, so that the

Guardians we are training for our country may disdain to imitate them.

Adeimantus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Once more, then, we shall ask Homer and the other poets not to represent Achilles, the son of a goddess, as 'tossing from side to side, now on his face, now on his back', and then as rising up and wandering distractedly on the seashore, or pouring ashes on his head with both hands, with all those tears and wailings the poet describes; nor to tell how Priam, who was near akin to the gods, 'rolled in the dung as he made entreaty, calling on each man by name'. Still more earnestly shall we ask them not to represent gods as lamenting, or at any rate not to dare to misrepresent the highest god by making him say: 'Woe is me that Sarpedon, whom I love above all men, is fated to die at the hands of Patroclus.' For if our young men take such unworthy descriptions seriously instead of laughing at them, they will hardly feel themselves, who are but men, above behaving in that way or repress any temptation to do so. They would not be ashamed of giving way with complaints and outcries on every trifling occasion; and that would be contrary to the principle we have deduced and shall adhere to, until someone can show us a better.

Adeimantus/ It would.

Socrates/ Again, our Guardians ought not to be overmuch given to laughter. Violent laughter tends to provoke an equally violent reaction. We must not allow poets to describe men of worth being overcome by it; still less should Homer speak of the gods giving way to 'unquenchable laughter' at the sight of Hephaestus 'bustling from room to room'. That will be against your principles.

Adeimantus/ Yes, if you choose to call them mine.

Socrates/ Again, a high value must be set upon truthfulness. If we were right in saying that gods have no use for falsehood and it is useful to mankind only in the way of a medicine, obviously a medicine should be handled by no one but a physician.

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ If anyone, then, is to practice deception, either on the country's enemies or on its citizens, it must be the Rulers of the commonwealth, acting for its benefit; no one else may meddle with this privilege. For a private person to mislead such Rulers we shall declare to be a worse offence than for a patient to mislead his doctor or an athlete his trainer about his bodily condition, or for a seaman to misinform his captain about the state of the ship or of the crew. So, if anyone else in our commonwealth 'of all that practice crafts, physician, seer, or carpenter', is caught not telling the truth, the Rulers will punish him for introducing a practice as fatal and subversive in a state as it would be in a ship.

Adeimantus/ It would certainly be as fatal, if action were suited to the word.

Socrates/ Next, our young men will need self-control; and for the mass of mankind that chiefly means obeying their governors, and themselves governing their appetite for the pleasures of eating and drinking and sex. Here again we shall disapprove of much that we find in Homer.

Adeimantus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Whereas we shall allow the poets to represent any examples of self-control and fortitude on the part of famous men, and admit such lines as these: 'Odysseus smote his breast, chiding his heart: Endure, my heart; thou has borne worse things than these.'

Adeimantus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Nor again must these men of ours be lovers of money, or ready to take bribes. They must not hear that 'gods and great princes may be won by gifts'.

Adeimantus/ No, that sort of thing cannot be approved.

Socrates/ If it were not for my regard for Homer, I should not hesitate to call it downright impiety to make Achilles say to Apollo: 'Thou has wronged me, thou deadliest of gods; I would surely requite thee, if I had but the power.' And all those stories of Achilles dragging Hector round the tomb of Patroclus and slaughtering captives on the funeral pyre we shall condemn as false, and not let our Guardians believe that Achilles, who was the son of a goddess and of the wise Peleus, third in descent from Zeus, and the pupil of the sage Chiron, was so disordered that his heart was a prey to two contrary maladies, mean covetousness and arrogant contempt of gods and men.

Adeimantus/ You are right.

Socrates/ We have now distinguished the kinds of stories that may and may not be told about gods and demigods, heroes, and the world below. There remains the literature concerned with human life.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ We cannot lay down rules for that at our present stage.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because, I suspect, we shall find both poets and prose-writers guilty of the most serious misstatements about human life, making out that wrongdoers are often happy and just men miserable; that injustice pays, if not detected; and that my being just is to another man's advantage, but a loss to myself. We shall have to prohibit such poems and tales and tell them to compose others in the contrary sense. Don't you think so?

Adeimantus/ I am sure of it.

Socrates/ Well, as soon as you admit that I am right there, may I not claim that we shall have reached agreement on the subject of all this inquiry?

Adeimantus/ That is a fair assumption.

Socrates/ Then we must postpone any decision as to how the truth is to be told about human life, until we have discovered the real nature of justice and proved that it is intrinsically profitable to its possessor, no matter what reputation he may have in the eyes of the world.

Adeimantus/ That is certainly true.

Socrates/ So much for the content of literature. If we consider next the question of form, we shall then have covered the whole field.

Adeimantus/ I don't understand what you mean by form.

Socrates/ I must explain, then. Let me put it in this way. Any story in prose or verse is always a setting forth of events, past, present, or future, isn't it?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that can be done either in pure narrative or by means of representation or in both ways.

Adeimantus/ I am still rather in the dark.

Socrates/ I seem to be a poor hand at explaining; I had better give a particular illustration. You remember the beginning of the Iliad, which describes how Chryses begged Agamemnon to release his daughter, and Agamemnon was angry, and Chryses called on his god to avenge the refusal on the Greeks. So far the poet speaks in his own person, but later on he speaks in the character of Chryses and tries to make us feel that the words come, not from Homer, but from an aged priest Throughout the Iliad and Odyssey, the events are set forth in these two different forms. All the time, both

in the speeches and in the narrative parts in between, he is telling his story; but where he is delivering a speech in character, he tries to make his manner resemble that of the person he has introduced as speaker. Any poet who does that by means of voice and gesture, is telling his story by way of dramatic representation; whereas, if he makes no such attempt to suppress his own personality, the events are set forth in simple narrative.

Adeimantus/ Now I understand.

Socrates/ Observe, then, that, if you omit the intervening narrative and leave only the dialogue, you get the opposite form.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I see; that occurs in tragedy, for instance.

Socrates/ Exactly. Now I think you see the distinction I failed to make clear. All story-telling, in prose or poetry, is in one of three forms. It may be wholly dramatic: tragedy, as you say, or comedy. Or the poet may narrate the events in his own person; perhaps the best example of that is the dithyramb. Or again both methods may be used, as in epic and several other kinds of poetry.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I see now what you meant.

Socrates/ Remember, too, I began by saying that, having done with the content, we had still to consider the form. I meant that we should have to decide whether to allow our poets to tell their story in dramatic form, wholly, or in part (and, if so, in what parts), or not at all..

Adeimantus/ You mean, I suspect, the question whether we shall admit tragedy and comedy into our commonwealth.

Socrates/ Perhaps, or the question may be wider still. I do not know yet; but we must go wherever the wind of the argument carries us.

Adeimantus/ That is good advice.

Socrates/ Here then, Adeimantus, is a question for you to consider: Do we want our Guardians to be capable of playing many parts? Perhaps the answer follows from our earlier principle that a man can only do one thing well; if he tries his hand at several, he will fail to make his mark in any of them. Does not that principle apply to acting? The same man cannot act many parts so well as he can act one.

Adeimantus/ No, he cannot.

Socrates/ Then he will hardly be able to pursue some worthy occupation and at the same time represent a variety of different characters. Even in the case of two forms of representation so closely allied as tragedy and comedy, the same poet cannot write both with equal success. Again, the recitation of epic poetry and acting on the stage are distinct professions; and even on the stage different actors perform in tragedy and comedy.

Adeimantus/ That is so.

Socrates/ And human talent, Adeimantus, seems to be split up into subdivisions even minuter than these; so that no man can successfully represent many different characters in the field of art or pursue a corresponding variety of occupations in real life.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ If, then, we are to hold fast to our original principle that our Guardians shall be set free from all manual crafts to be the artificers of their country's freedom, with the perfect mastery which comes of working only at what conduces to that end, they ought not to play any other part in dramatic representation any more than in real life; but if they act, they should, from childhood upward, impersonate only the appropriate types of character, men who are brave, religious, self-controlled, generous. They are not to do anything mean or dishonorable; no more should

they be practiced in representing such behavior, for fear of becoming infected with the reality. You must have noticed how the reproduction of another person's gestures or tones of voice or states of mind, if persisted in from youth up, grows into a habit which becomes second nature.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ So these charges of ours, who are to grow up into men of worth, will not be allowed to enact the part of a woman, old or young, railing against her husband, or boasting of a happiness which she imagines can rival the gods', or overwhelmed with grief and misfortune; much less a woman in love, or sick, or in labor; nor yet slaves of either sex, going about their menial work; nor men of a low type, behaving with cowardice and all the qualities contrary to those we mentioned, deriding one another and exchanging coarse abuse, whether drunk or sober, and otherwise using language and behavior that are an offence against themselves as well as their neighbors; nor must they copy the words and actions of madmen. Knowledge they must have of baseness and insanity both in men and women, but not reproduce such behavior in life or in art.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Again, are they to impersonate men working at some trade, such as a smith's, or rowing a galley or giving the time to the oarsmen?

Adeimantus/ How should they, when they are not even to take any notice of such occupations?

Socrates/ And may they take part in performances which imitate horses neighing and bulls bellowing or the noise of rivers and sea and thunder?

Adeimantus/ We have already forbidden them to represent the ravings of insanity.

Socrates/ If I understand you, then, there are two contrasted forms of expression in which any series of events may be set forth: one which will always be used by a man of fine character and breeding, the other by one whose nature and upbringing are of a very different sort.

Adeimantus/ Yes, there are those two forms.

Socrates/ One of them involves little change and variety; when the words have been fitted to a suitable musical mode and rhythm, the recitation can keep almost to the same mode and rhythm throughout, the modulations required being slight. The other, on the contrary, involves every sort of variation and demands the use of all the modes and rhythms there are.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Now all writers and composers fall into one or other of these styles, or a mixture of both. What shall we do? Are we to admit into our commonwealth one or other of the extreme styles, or the mixed one, or all three?

Adeimantus/ If my judgment is to prevail, the simple one which serves to represent a fine character.

Socrates/ On the other hand, Adeimantus, the mixed style has its attractions; and children and their attendants, not to mention the great mass of the public, find the opposite of the one you chose the most attractive of all.

Adeimantus/ No doubt they do.

Socrates/ But perhaps you think it will not suit our commonwealth, where no man is to be two or more persons or a jack of all trades; this being the reason why ours is the only state in which we shall find a shoemaker who cannot also take command of a ship, a farmer who does not leave his farm to serve on juries, a soldier who is not a tradesman into the bargain.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Suppose, then, that an individual clever enough to assume any character and give imitations of anything and everything should visit our country and offer to perform his compositions, we shall bow down before a being with such miraculous powers of giving pleasure; but we shall tell him that we are not allowed to have any such person in our commonwealth; we shall crown him with fillets of wool, anoint his head with myrrh, and conduct him to the borders of some other country. For our own benefit, we shall employ the poets and story-tellers of the more austere and less attractive type, who will reproduce only the manner of a person of high character and, in the substance of their discourse, conform to those rules we laid down when we began the education of our warriors.

Adeimantus/ Yes, we shall do that, if it lies in our power.

Socrates/ So now, my dear Adeimantus, we have discussed both the content and the form of literature, and we have finished with that part of education.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ There remains the question of style in song and poetry set to music. It must be easy now for anyone to discover the rules we must make as to their character, if we are to be consistent.

Glaucon laughed.

Glaucon/ I am afraid 'anyone' does not include me, Socrates. At the moment I cannot quite see what the rules should be, though I have my suspicions.

Socrates/ You can see this much at any rate, that song consists of three elements: words, musical mode, and rhythm.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so far as the words go, it will make no difference whether they are set to music or not; in either case

they must conform to the rules we have already made for the content and form of literature.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And the musical mode and the rhythm should fit the words?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And we said that we did not want dirges and laments. Which are the modes that express sorrow? Tell me; you are musical.

Glaucon/ Modes like the Mixed Lydian and Hyperlydian.

Socrates/ Then we may discard those; men, and even women of good standing, will have no use for them.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Again, drunkenness, effeminacy, and inactivity are most unsuitable in Guardians. Which are the modes expressing softness and the ones used at drinking-parties?

Glaucon/ There are the Ionian and certain Lydian modes which are called 'slack'.

Socrates/ You will not use them in the training of your warriors?

Glaucon/ Certainly not. You seem to have the Dorian and the Phrygian left.

Socrates/ I am not an expert in the modes; but leave me one which will fittingly represent the tones and accents of a brave man in warlike action or in any hard and dangerous task, who, in the hour of defeat or when facing wounds and death, will meet every blow of fortune with steadfast endurance. We shall need another to express peaceful action under no stress of hard necessity; as when a man is using persuasion or entreaty, praying to the gods or instructing and admonishing his neighbor, or again submitting himself to the instruction and persuasion of others; a man who is

not overbearing when any such action has proved successful, but behaves always with wise restraint and is content with the outcome. These two modes you must leave: the two which will best express the accents of courage in the face of stern necessity and misfortune, and of temperance in prosperity won by peaceful pursuits.

Glaucon/ The modes you want are just the two I mentioned.

Socrates/ Our songs and airs, then, will not need instruments of large compass capable of modulation into all the modes, and we shall not maintain craftsmen to make them, in particular the flute, which has the largest compass of all. That leaves the lyre and the cithara for use in the town; and in the country the herdsmen may have some sort of pipe.

Glaucon/ That seems to be the conclusion.

Socrates/ At any rate, it is no innovation to prefer Apollo to Marsyas in the choice of instruments.

Glaucon/ Surely not.

Socrates/ It strikes me that, without noticing it, we have been purging our commonwealth of that luxurious excess we said it suffered from.

Glaucon/ A wise proceeding.

Socrates/ Let us go through with it, then. Next after the modes will come the principle governing rhythm, which will be, not to aim at a great variety of meters, but to discover the rhythms appropriate to a life of courage and self-control; and we shall then adapt meter and melody to the words expressing a life of that sort, not the words to the meter and melody. What these rhythms are, it is for you to explain, as you explained the modes.

Glaucon/ Really, I cannot do that. I have observed that there are three fundamental types of rhythm to which all

meters may be reduced, just as there are four intervals at the base of all the modes; but what kind of life each rhythm is suited to express, I cannot say.

Socrates/ Well, we shall consult Damon on this question, which meters are expressive of meanness, insolence, frenzy, and other such evils, and which rhythms we must retain to express their opposites. It would take a long time to settle all that.

Glaucon/ It would indeed.

Socrates/ One thing, however, is easily settled, namely that grace and seemliness of form and movement go with good rhythm; ungracefulness and unseemliness with bad.

Glaucon/ Naturally.

Socrates/ And again, good or bad rhythm and also tunefulness or discord in music go with the quality of the poetry; for they will be modeled after its form, if, as we have said, meter and music must be adapted to the sense of the words.

Glaucon/ Well, they must be so adapted.

Socrates/ And the content of the poetry and the manner in which it is expressed depend, in their turn, on moral character.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Thus, then, excellence of form and content in discourse and of musical expression and rhythm, and grace of form and movement, all depend on goodness of nature, by which I mean, not the foolish simplicity sometimes called by courtesy 'good nature', but a nature in which goodness of character has been well and truly established.

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ So, if our young men are to do their proper work in life, they must follow after these qualities wherever

they may be found. And they are to be found in every sort of workmanship, such as painting, weaving, embroidery, architecture, the making of furniture; and also in the human frame and in all the works of nature: in all these grace and seemliness may be present or absent. And the absence of grace, rhythm, harmony is nearly allied to baseness of thought and expression and baseness of character; whereas their presence goes with that moral excellence and self-mastery of which they are the embodiment.

Glaucon/ That is perfectly true.

Socrates/ Then we must not only compel our poets, on pain of expulsion, to make their poetry the express image of noble character; we must also supervise craftsmen of every kind and forbid them 'to leave the stamp of baseness, license, meanness, unseemliness, on painting and sculpture, or building, or any other work of their hands; and anyone who cannot obey shall not practice his art in our commonwealth. We would not have our Guardians grow up among representations of moral deformity, as in some foul pasture where, day after day, feeding on every poisonous weed they would, little by little, gather insensibly a mass of corruption in their very souls. Rather we must seek out those craftsmen whose instinct guides them to whatsoever is lovely and gracious; so that our young men, dwelling in a wholesome climate, may drink in good from every quarter, whence, like a breeze bearing health from happy regions, some influence from noble works constantly falls upon eye and ear from childhood upward, and imperceptibly draws them into sympathy and harmony with the beauty of reason, whose impress they take.

Glaucon/ There could be no better upbringing than that.

Socrates/ Hence, Glaucon the decisive importance of education in poetry and music: rhythm and harmony sink

deep into the recesses of the soul and take the strongest hold there, bringing that grace of body and mind which is only to be found in one who is brought up in the right way. Moreover, a proper training in this kind makes a man quick to perceive any defect or ugliness in art or in nature. Such deformity will rightly disgust him. Approving all that is lovely, he will welcome it home with joy into his soul and, nourished thereby, grow into a man of a noble spirit. All that is ugly and disgraceful he will rightly condemn and abhor while he is still too young to understand the reason; and when reason comes, he will greet her as a friend with whom his education has made him long familiar.

Glaucon/ I agree; that is the purpose of education in literature and music.

Socrates/ Now in learning to read we were proficient when we could recognize the few letters there are wherever they occur in all the multitude of different words, never thinking them beneath our notice in the most insignificant word, but bent upon distinguishing them everywhere, because we should not be scholars until we had got thus far.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Also we must know the letters themselves before we can recognize images of them, reflected (say) in water or in a mirror. The same skill and practice are needed in either case.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, is it not true, in the same way, that we and these Guardians we are to bring up will never be fully cultivated until we can recognize the essential Forms of temperance, courage, liberality, high-mindedness, and all other kindred qualities, and also their opposites, wherever they occur. We must be able to discern the presence of these Forms themselves and also of their images in anything that

contains them, realizing that, to recognize either, the same skill and practice are required, and that the most insignificant instance is not beneath our notice.

Glaucon/ That must surely be so.

Socrates/ And for him who has eyes to see it, there can be no fairer sight than the harmonious union of a noble character in the soul with an outward form answering thereto and bearing the same stamp of beauty.

Glaucon/ There cannot.

Socrates/ And the fairest is also the most lovable.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ So the man who has been educated in poetry and music will be in love with such a person, but never with one who lacks this harmony.

Glaucon/ Not if the defect should lie in the soul; if it were only some bodily blemish, he would accept that with patience and goodwill.

Socrates/ I understand; you are or have been in love with a person like that, and I agree. But tell me: is excessive pleasure compatible with temperance?

Glaucon/ How can it be, when it unsettles the mind no less than pain?

Socrates/ Or with virtue in general?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ It has more to do with insolence and profligacy?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is there any pleasure you can name that is greater and keener than sexual pleasure?

Glaucon/ No; nor any that is more like frenzy.

Socrates/ Whereas love rightfully is such a passion as beauty combined with a noble and harmonious character

may inspire in a temperate and cultivated mind. It must therefore be kept from all contact with licentiousness and frenzy; and where a passion of this rightful sort exists, the lover and his beloved must have nothing to do with the pleasure in question.

Glaucon/ Certainly not, Socrates.

Socrates/ It appears, then, that in this commonwealth we are founding you will have a law to the effect that a lover may seek the company of his beloved and, with his consent, kiss and embrace him like a son, with honorable intent, but must never be suspected of any further familiarity, on pain of being thought ill-bred and without any delicacy of feeling.

Glaucon/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ Then is not our account of education in poetry and music now complete? It has ended where it ought to end, in the love of beauty.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Next, the upbringing of our young men must include physical training; and this must be no less carefully regulated throughout life from childhood onwards. In my view, which I should like you to consider, it is not true that a sound and healthy body is enough to produce a sound mind; while, on the contrary, the sound mind has power in itself to make the bodily condition as perfect as it can be. What do you say?

Glaucon/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ We should do well, then, to leave the care of the body in detail to those minds which have already been thoroughly cared for themselves. We may save time by giving only a rough outline.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Drunkenness we have already forbidden. A Guardian is surely the last person to be allowed to get drunk and not know where he is.

Glaucon/ Yes, it would be absurd that a Guardian should need to be guarded.

Socrates/ What of their food? Our men will be in training for the greatest of all contests. Will the habit of body of the ordinary athlete be suitable for them?

Glaucon/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ But it is rather a drowsy condition, and precarious for health. You must have noticed how athletes sleep their life away, and fall seriously ill whenever they depart only slightly from their prescribed diet. A finer sort of training will be needed for our warrior athletes, who must be as wakeful as watchdogs and have sharp eyes and ears. On their campaigns too they will be exposed to so many changes of food and drinking-water and extremes of heat and cold that it will not do for their health to be too nicely balanced.

Glaucon/ I believe you are right.

Socrates/ Then the best training will be closely akin to that education ¦ in poetry and music which we described, in being simple and flexible, especially training for war.

Glaucon/ What will it be like?

Socrates/ That, at any rate, may be learnt from Homer. As you know, he gives his heroes on their campaign no fish for their meals, although they are on the shores of the Hellespont, and no boiled meat; nothing but roast, which is convenient for soldiers: they have only to light a fire wherever they may be and not to carry pots and pans about with them. I fancy, too, that Homer never mentions sweets. Even the ordinary athlete knows that you must not eat anything of that sort, if you want to be in good condition.

Glaucon/ Yes, they are wise to be so abstemious.

Socrates/ It seems, then, you would not approve of those refinements of Sicilian cookery for which the tables of Syracuse are famous, or of our Athenian confectionery, supposed to be so delicious; and you would not advise a man who is to keep himself fit to take a Corinthian girl as a mistress.

Glaucon/ Of course not.

Socrates/ We might, in fact, see an analogy between this luxurious living and that style of music which uses every variation of mode and rhythm. Variety there engendered license in the soul, and simplicity temperance. So in the body, variety breeds maladies and simplicity health.

Glaucon/ That is perfectly true.

Socrates/ In a community where licentiousness and disease are rife, law-courts and dispensaries have their doors constantly open. Law and medicine begin to give themselves airs, when, even among free men, large numbers take too keen an interest in them.

Glaucon/ That is inevitable.

Socrates/ Is it not the surest sign of a disgracefully low state of education that highly skilled physicians and judges should be in request, not merely among the lower classes who work with their hands, but among those who lay claim to a liberal upbringing? Could anything show a more shameful lack of culture than to have so little justice in oneself that one must get it from others, who thus become masters and judges over one?

Glaucon/ There could be no worse disgrace.

Socrates/ Or is there a yet lower depth, when, not content with spending most of his life in courts of law as plaintiff or defendant, a man is actually led to take a vulgar pride in being so litigious; one who fancies himself as an expert in dishonesty, up to every turn and twist that will enable him

to evade punishment, and all for the sake of trivial or worthless ends, because he does not know how much better it is so to order one's life as never to stand in need of a drowsy judge?

Glaucon/ That is indeed a lower depth.

Socrates/ Is it not also disgraceful to need doctoring, not merely for a wound or an attack of some seasonal disorder, but because, through living in idleness and luxury, our bodies are infested with winds and humors, like marsh gas in a stagnant pool, so that the sons of Asclepius are put to inventing for diseases such ingenious names as flatulence and catarrh?

Glaucon/ Yes; they are queer, these modern terms.

Socrates/ And not in use, I fancy, in the days of Asclepius himself, to judge from the behavior of his sons at Troy. When Eurypylus was wounded, they had no fault to find with the woman who gave him a draught of Pramnian wine well sprinkled with barley meal and grated cheese—rather an inflammatory mixture, you might think—nor did they blame Patroclus, who was in charge of the case.

Glaucon/ It certainly was an odd drink for a wounded man.

Socrates/ Not if you reflect that in the old days, until the time of Herodicus, the sons of Asclepius had no use for the modern coddling treatment of disease. But Herodicus, who was a gymnastic master and lost his health, combined training and doctoring in such a way as to become a plague to himself first and foremost and to many others after him.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ By lingering out his death. He had a mortal disease, and he spent all his life at its beck and call, with no hope of a cure and no time for anything but doctoring himself. Every departure from his fixed regimen was a

torment; and his skill only enabled him to reach old age in a prolonged death struggle.

Glaucon/ A fine reward for his art to win him!

Socrates/ Yes, but a suitable one for a man who never understood that, if Asclepius did not reveal these valetudinarian arts to his descendants, it was not from ignorance or lack of experience, but because he realized that in every well-ordered community each man has his appointed task which he must perform; no one has leisure to spend all his life in being ill and doctoring himself. We can see how that is true for an artisan, but absurdly enough we do not see that it applies to the rich, who are supposed to be so fortunate. When a carpenter is ill, he asks his doctor to give him an emetic or a purge to expel the trouble, or to rid him of it by cautery or the knife. But if he is advised to take a long course of treatment, to keep his head wrapped up, and all that sort of thing, he soon replies that he has not time to be ill and it is not worth his while to live in that way, thinking of nothing but his illness and neglecting his proper work. And so he bids good-bye to that kind of doctor and goes back to his ordinary way of life. Then he either regains his health and lives to go about his proper business, or, if his body is not equal to the strain, gets rid of all his troubles by dying.

Glaucon/ Yes, we should think that the right attitude towards medicine for a man of his class.

Socrates/ Because he had work to do, and it was not worth his while to live if he could not do it; whereas the rich man, we imagine, has no function such that life will not be worth living if he is prevented from performing it.

Glaucon/ I never heard of any.

Socrates/ Why, don't you know that saying of Phocylides, that a man should practice virtue when he has made enough to live on?

Glaucon/ I should have thought he might begin sooner.

Socrates/ We need not quarrel with Phocylides on that point. We had better assure ourselves whether the practice of virtue is the rich man's business and his life is not worth living otherwise, or whether that valetudinarianism which prevents any craftsman from attending to his work, does not equally stand in the way of following Phocylides' advice.

Glaucon/ Yes. Surely there could be no worse hindrance than this excessive care of the body, over and above the exercise it needs to keep it in health. It becomes a nuisance to anyone who has to manage a household or serve in the field or hold any office at home.

Socrates/ Worst of all, it is prejudicial to learning of all kinds and to thought and meditation. The constant apprehension of headaches and dizziness, for which study is held responsible, is a bar to any exercise or test of intellectual qualities, when a man is always fancying himself ill and never stops being anxious about his body.

Glaucon/ Naturally.

Socrates/ Shall we say, then, that Asclepius recognized this and revealed the art of medicine for the benefit of people of sound constitution who normally led a healthy life, but had contracted some definite ailment? He would rid them of their disorders by means of drugs or the knife and tell them to go on living as usual, so as not to impair their usefulness as citizens. But where the body was diseased through and through, he would not try, by nicely calculated evacuations and doses, to prolong a miserable existence and let his patient beget children who were likely to be as sickly as himself. Treatment, he thought, would be wasted on a man

who could not live in his ordinary round of duties and was consequently useless to himself and to society.

Glaucon/ A statesmanlike person, your Asclepius!

Socrates/ Obviously; and because he was so, his sons, you may observe, not only fought bravely at Troy, but practiced medicine in the way I am describing. You will remember how, when Menelaus was shot with an arrow by Pandarus, they 'sucked the blood and spread mild simples' on the wound; but what he was to eat and drink afterwards they no more prescribed for him than for Eurypylus. Simples were enough to cure a wounded man who had hitherto lived a regular and healthy life, even if he should drink the next moment a mixture of meal, wine, and cheese. But if a man had a sickly constitution and intemperate habits, his life was worth nothing to himself or to anyone else; medicine was not meant for such people and they should not be treated, though they might be richer than Midas.

Glaucon/ Shrewd fellows, these sons of Asclepius, by your account.

Socrates/ As they should be; and yet Pindar and the tragedians, in defiance of our principles, allege that Asclepius, although he was Apollo's son, took a bribe to raise to life a rich man already at the point of death, and was struck by a thunderbolt for doing so. As we said before, we cannot accept both statements; if he was the son of a god, he was not avaricious; if avaricious, he was not the son of a god.

Glaucon/ All that is certainly true, Socrates; but what do you say to this? The physicians in our commonwealth must surely be good ones; and the best, I suppose, would be those who had had the widest experience in dealing with healthy and sick people; and in the same way the best judges will be men who have associated with every type of character.

Socrates/ I agree, we must have good ones. But do you know which I should call good?

Glaucon/ I shall, if you will tell me.

Socrates/ Well, I will try. But your question referred to two different things as if they were alike. It is true enough of physicians that the ablest might prove to be men who, from childhood up, besides mastering their profession, had been in contact with the largest number of the worst cases, and moreover were not of a robust constitution and had themselves suffered from every malady. That is because what they use in taking care of people's bodies is not their own body; if it were, it would never do for that body to be in a bad condition; it is their mind, and if that is or has been in a bad state, it cannot take proper care of anything. But with a judge it is otherwise; his is the jurisdiction of mind over mind; and that mind must not have been brought up from childhood in the society of vicious minds and itself have been guilty of the whole catalogue of crimes in order to sharpen its wits in drawing inferences about the crimes of others from its own experience, as was permissible in the case of bodily disease. It can be a sound judge of what is right only if it is itself good and honorable; and to that end it must not have been tainted in youth by familiarity with evil characters. That is, of course, why decent people seem simple-minded when they are young, and are easily taken in by dishonesty: they have no pattern of wickedness in themselves enabling them to detect it in others by their own feelings.

Glaucon/ True, they are at a great disadvantage.

Socrates/ For that reason, to make a good judge, a man must be old. The knowledge of what wickedness is should have come late in life, not from a consciousness of its presence in his own soul, but from long practice in observing

its evil effects in the souls of others. It should be a matter of knowledge, not of personal experience.

Glaucon/ A good portrait of a genuine judge.

Socrates/ Yes, and of the good judge, to whom your question referred; for his merit consists in the goodness of his soul. Your cunning person, who is quick to suspect evil through having been so often guilty of it himself, and fancies himself master of all the tricks, has all his own wickedness to put him on his guard against others, and so he seems formidable, so long as he is dealing with men of his own stamp. But as soon as he comes in contact with honest men older than himself, he appears stupid with his ill-timed suspicions; he cannot recognize a sound character, because he has no soundness in himself to judge by. If he passes in his own eyes and in others' estimation as on the whole more clever than stupid, it is because he falls in with more rogues than honest men.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ For a good and understanding judge, then, we must look rather to the other type. Vice can never know both itself and virtue; but virtue, in a well-trained nature, will in time come to a knowledge of vice, as well as of itself. So it is the virtuous man, as I believe, that will make the wise judge.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then you will establish in your state physicians and judges such as we have described. They will look after those citizens whose bodies and souls are constitutionally sound. The physically unsound they will leave to die; and they will actually put to death those who are incurably corrupt in mind.

Glaucon/ Yes; that, as we can now see, will be the best thing for them as well as for the community.

Socrates/ And your young men, so long as they keep to that simple education which, we said, engenders temperance, will take good care never to fall in need of legal correction; while if they follow similar lines in physical training, they may, if they choose, become independent of medicine in all but extreme cases.

Glaucon/ I think they may.

Socrates/ Now, the ordinary athlete undergoes the rigors of training for the sake of muscular strength; but ours will do so rather with a view to stimulating the spirited element in their nature. So perhaps the purpose of the two established branches of education is not, as some suppose, the improvement of the soul in one case and of the body in the other. Both, it may be, aim chiefly at improving the soul.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Have you noticed how a life-long devotion to either branch, to the exclusion of the other, affects the mind, resulting in an uncivilized hardness in the one case, and an over-civilized softness in the other?

Glaucon/ I have certainly noticed that unmitigated athletics produce a sort of ferocity, and a merely literary and musical education makes men softer than is good for them.

Socrates/ Surely that ferocity is the outcome of the spirited element in our nature. A proper training would produce courage; but if that element is overstrained, it naturally becomes hard and savage. Gentleness, on the other hand, is characteristic of the philosophic disposition. Here again, too much relaxation will result in over-softness; the right training will produce a gentleness that is steady and disciplined. Now we agree that our Guardians must combine both these dispositions; and they will have to be harmonized so that courage and steadfastness may be

united in a soul that would otherwise be either unmanly or boorish.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ When a man surrenders himself to music, allowing his soul to be flooded through the channels of his ears with those sweet and soft and mournful airs we spoke of, and gives up all his time to the delights of song and melody, then at first he tempers the high-spirited part of his nature, like iron whose brittle hardness is softened to make it serviceable; but if he persists in subduing it to such incantation, he will end by melting it away altogether. He will have cut the sinews of his soul and made himself what Homer calls a faint-hearted warrior. Moreover, this result follows quickly in a temperament that is naturally spiritless; while a high-spirited one is rendered weak and unstable, readily flaring up and dying down again, on slight provocation. Such men become rather irritable, bad-tempered, and peevish.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ On the other hand, there are the consequences of hard bodily exercise and high living, with no attempt to cultivate the mind or use the intellect in study. At first, the sense of physical fitness fills a man with self-confidence and energy and makes him twice the man he was. But suppose he does nothing else and holds aloof from any sort of culture; then, even if there was something in him capable of desiring knowledge, it is starved of instruction and never encouraged to think for itself by taking part in rational discussion or intellectual pursuits of any kind; and so it grows feeble for lack of stimulus and nourishment, and deaf and blind because the darkness that clouds perception is never cleared away. Such a man ends by being wholly uncultivated and a hater of reason. Having no more use for reasonable

persuasion, he gains all his ends by savage violence, like a brute beast, and he lives in a dull stupor of ignorance with no touch of inward harmony or grace.

Glaucon/ That is exactly what happens.

Socrates/ There are, then, these two elements in the soul, the spirited and the philosophic; and it is for their sake, as I should say, and not (except incidentally) for the sake of soul and body, that heaven has given to mankind those two branches of education. The purpose is to bring the two elements into tune with one another by adjusting the tension of each to the right pitch. So one who can apply to the soul both kinds of education blended in perfect proportion will be master of a nobler sort of musical harmony than was ever made by tuning the strings of the lyre.

Glaucon/ We may well say that, Socrates.

Socrates/ And our commonwealth will need the constant vigilance of such a master, to preserve its constitution.

Glaucon/ Certainly, he will be indispensable.

Socrates/ So much, then, for the outlines of education and nurture. We need not go into all the details of their musical performances or of their hunting and athletic contests and races. Obviously these will follow from our principles and can easily be worked out.

Glaucon/ Yes, easily.

Socrates/ Good; and what is the next point to be settled? Is it not the question, which of these Guardians are to be rulers and which are to obey?

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Well, it is obvious that the elder must have authority over the young, and that the rulers must be the best.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And as among farmers the best are those with a natural turn for farming, so, if we want the best among our Guardians, we must take those naturally fitted to watch over a commonwealth. They must have the right sort of intelligence and ability; and also they must look upon the commonwealth as their special concern—the sort of concern that is felt for something so closely bound up with oneself that its interests and fortunes, for good or ill, are held to be identical with one's own.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ So the kind of men we must choose from among the Guardians will be those who, when we look at the whole course of their lives, are found to be full of zeal to do whatever they believe is for the good of the commonwealth and never willing to act against its interest.

Glaucon/ Yes, they will be the men we want.

Socrates/ We must watch them, I think, at every age and see whether they are capable of preserving this conviction that they must do what is best for the community, never forgetting it or allowing themselves to be either forced or bewitched into throwing it over.

Glaucon/ How does this throwing over come about?

Socrates/ I will explain. When a belief passes out of the mind, a man may be willing to part with it, if it is false and he has learnt better, or unwilling, if it is true.

Glaucon/ I see how he might be willing to let it go; but you must explain how he can be unwilling.

Socrates/ Where is your difficulty? Don't you agree that men are unwilling to be deprived of good, though ready enough to part with evil? Or that to be deceived about the truth is evil, to possess it good? Or don't you think that possessing truth means thinking of things as they really are?

Glaucon/ You are right. I do agree that men are unwilling to be robbed of a true belief.

Socrates/ When that happens to them, then, it must be by theft, or violence, or bewitchment.

Glaucon/ Again I do not understand.

Socrates/ Perhaps my metaphors are too high-flown. I call it theft when one is persuaded out of one's belief or forgets it. Argument in the one case, and time in the other, steal it away without one's knowing what is happening. You understand now?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by violence I mean being driven to change one's mind by pain or suffering.

Glaucon/ That too I understand, and you are right.

Socrates/ And bewitchment, as I think you would agree, occurs when a man is beguiled out of his opinion by the allurements of pleasure or scared out of it under the spell of panic.

Glaucon/ Yes, all delusions are like a sort of bewitchment.

Socrates/ As I said just now, then, we must find out who are the best guardians of this inward conviction that they must always do what they believe to be best for the commonwealth. We shall have to watch them from earliest childhood and set them tasks in which they would be most likely to forget or to be beguiled out of this duty. We shall then choose only those whose memory holds firm and who are proof against delusion.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ We must also subject them to ordeals of toil and pain and watch for the same qualities there. And we

must observe them when exposed to the test of yet a third kind of bewitchment. As people lead colts up to alarming noises to see whether they are timid, so these young men must be brought into terrifying situations and then into scenes of pleasure, which will put them to severer proof than gold tried in the furnace. If we find one bearing himself well in all these trials and resisting every enchantment, a true guardian of himself, preserving always that perfect rhythm and harmony of being which he has acquired from his training in music and poetry, such a one will be of the greatest service to the commonwealth as well as to himself. Whenever we find one who has come unscathed through every test in childhood, youth, and manhood, we shall set him as a Ruler to watch over the commonwealth; he will be honored in life, and after death receive the highest tribute of funeral rites and other memorials. All who do not reach this standard we must reject. And that, I think, my dear Glaucon, may be taken as an outline of the way in which we shall select Guardians to be set in authority as Rulers.

Glaucon/ I am very much of your mind.

Socrates/ These, then, may properly be called Guardians in the fullest sense, who will ensure that neither foes without shall have the power, nor friends within the wish, to do harm. Those young men whom up to now we have been speaking of as Guardians, will be better described as Auxiliaries, who will enforce the decisions of the Rulers.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Now, can we devise something in the way of those convenient fictions we spoke of earlier, a single bold flight of invention, which we may induce the community in general, and if possible the Rulers themselves, to accept?

Glaucon/ What kind of fiction?

Socrates/ Nothing new; something like an Eastern tale of what, according to the poets, has happened before now in more than one part of the world. The poets have been believed; but the thing has not happened in our day, and it would be hard to persuade anyone that it could ever happen again.

Glaucon/ You seem rather shy of telling this story of yours.

Socrates/ With good reason, as you will see when I have told it.

Glaucon/ Out with it; don't be afraid.

Socrates/ Well, here it is; though I hardly know how to find the courage or the words to express it. I shall try to convince, first the Rulers and the soldiers, and then the whole community, that all that nurture and education which we gave them was only something they seemed to experience as it were in a dream. In reality they were the whole time down inside the earth, being molded and fostered while their arms and all their equipment were being fashioned also; and at last, when they were complete, the earth sent them up from her womb into the light of day. So now they must think of the land they dwell in as a mother and nurse, whom they must take thought for and defend against any attack, and of their fellow citizens as brothers born of the same soil.

Glaucon/ You might well be bashful about coming out with your fiction.

Socrates/ No doubt; but still you must hear the rest of the story. It is true, we shall tell our people in this fable, that all of you in this land are brothers; but the god who fashioned you mixed gold in the composition of those among you who are fit to rule, so that they are of the most precious quality; and he put silver in the Auxiliaries, and iron and brass in the farmers and craftsmen. Now, since you are all

of one stock, although your children will generally be like their parents, sometimes a golden parent may have a silver child or a silver parent a golden one, and so on with all the other combinations. So the first and chief injunction laid by heaven upon the Rulers is that, among all the things of which they must show themselves good guardians, there is none that needs to be so carefully watched as the mixture of metals in the souls of the children. If a child of their own is born with an alloy of iron or brass, they must, without the smallest pity, assign him the station proper to his nature and thrust him out among the craftsmen or the farmers. If, on the contrary, these classes produce a child with gold or silver in his composition, they will promote him, according to his value, to be a Guardian or an Auxiliary. They will appeal to a prophecy that ruin will come upon the state when it passes into the keeping of a man of iron or brass. Such is the story; can you think of any device to make them believe it?

Glaucon/ Not in the first generation; but their sons and descendants might believe it, and finally the rest of mankind.

Socrates/ Well, even so it might have a good effect in making them care more for the commonwealth and for one another; for I think I see what you mean.

So we will leave the success of our story to the care of popular tradition; and now let us arm these sons of Earth and lead them, under the command of their Rulers, to the site of our city. There let them look round for the best place to fix their camp, from which they will be able to control any rebellion against the laws from within and to beat off enemies who may come from without like wolves to attack the fold. When they have pitched their camp and offered sacrifice to the proper divinities, they must arrange their

sleeping quarters; and these must be sufficient to shelter them from winter cold and summer heat.

Glaucon/ Naturally. You mean they are going to live there?

Socrates/ Yes; but live like soldiers, not like men of business.

Glaucon/ What is the difference?

Socrates/ I will try to explain. It would be very strange if a shepherd were to disgrace himself by keeping, for the protection of his flock, dogs who were so ill-bred and badly trained that hunger or unruliness or some bad habit or other would set them worrying the sheep and behaving no better than wolves. We must take every precaution against our Auxiliaries treating the citizens in any such way and, because they are stronger, turning into savage tyrants instead of friendly allies; and they will have been furnished with the best of safeguards, if they have really been educated in the right way.

Glaucon/ But surely there is nothing wrong with their education.

Socrates/ We must not be too positive about that, my dear Glaucon; but we can be sure of what we said not long ago, that if they are to have the best chance of being gentle and humane to one another and to their charges, they must have the right education, whatever that may be.

Glaucon/ We were certainly right there.

Socrates/ Then besides that education, it is only common sense to say that the dwellings and other belongings provided for them must be such as will neither make them less perfect Guardians nor encourage them to maltreat their fellow citizens.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ With that end in view, let us consider how they should live and be housed. First, none of them must possess any private property beyond the barest necessaries. Next, no one is to have any dwelling or store-house that is not open for all to enter at will. Their food, in the quantities required by men of temperance and courage who are in training for war, they will receive from the other citizens as the wages of their guardianship, fixed so that there shall be just enough for the year with nothing over; and they will have meals in common and all live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver, we shall tell them they will not need, having the divine counterparts of those metals always in their souls as a god-given possession, whose purity it is not lawful to sully by the acquisition of that mortal dross, current among mankind, which has been the occasion of so many unholy deeds. They alone of all the citizens are forbidden to touch and handle silver or gold, or to come under the same roof with them, or wear them as ornaments, or drink from vessels made of them. This manner of life will be their salvation and make them the saviors of the commonwealth. If ever they should come to possess land of their own and houses and money, they will give up their guardianship for the management of their farms and households and become tyrants at enmity with their fellow citizens instead of allies. And so they will pass all their lives in hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, in much greater fear of their enemies at home than of any foreign foe, and fast heading for the destruction that will soon overwhelm their country with themselves. For all these reasons let us say that this is how our Guardians are to be housed and otherwise provided for, and let us make laws accordingly.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Adeimantus/ Socrates, how would you meet the objection that you are not making these people particularly happy? It

is their own fault too, if they are not; for they are really masters of the state, and yet they get no good out of it as other rulers do, who own lands, build themselves fine houses with handsome furniture, offer private sacrifices to the gods, and entertain visitors from abroad; who possess, in fact, that gold and silver you spoke of, with everything else that is usually thought necessary for happiness. These people seem like nothing so much as a garrison of mercenaries posted in the city and perpetually mounting guard.

Socrates/ Yes, and what is more they will serve for their food only without getting a mercenary's pay, so that they will not be able to travel on their own account or to make presents to a mistress or to spend as they please in other ways, like the people who are commonly thought happy. You have forgotten to include these counts in your indictment, and many more to the same effect.

Adeimantus/ Well, take them as included now.

Socrates/ And you want to hear the answer?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ We shall find one, I think, by keeping to the line we have followed so far. We shall say that, though it would not be surprising if even these people were perfectly happy under such conditions, our aim in founding the commonwealth was not to make anyone class specially happy, but to secure the greatest possible happiness for the community as a whole. We thought we should have the best chance of finding justice in a state so constituted, just as we should find injustice where the constitution was of the worst possible type; we could then decide the question which has been before us all this time. For the moment, we are constructing, as we believe, the state which will be happy as a whole, not trying to secure the well-being of a select few;

we shall study a state of the opposite kind presently. It is as if we were coloring a statue and someone came up and blamed us for not putting the most beautiful colors on the noblest parts of the figure; the eyes, for instance, should be painted crimson, but we had made them black. We should think it a fair answer to say: Really, you must not expect us to paint eyes so handsome as not to look like eyes at all. This applies to all the parts: the question is whether, by giving each its proper color, we make the whole beautiful. So too, in the present case, you must not press us to endow our Guardians with a happiness that will make them anything rather than guardians. We could quite easily clothe our farmers in gorgeous robes, crown them with gold, and invite them to till the soil at their pleasure; or we might set our potters to lie on couches by their fire, passing round the wine and making merry, with their wheel at hand to work at whenever they felt so inclined. We could make all the rest happy in the same sort of way, and so spread this well-being through the whole community. But you must not put that idea into our heads; if we take your advice, the farmer will be no farmer, the potter no longer a potter; none of the elements that make up the community will keep its character. In many cases this does not matter so much: if a cobbler goes to the bad and pretends to be what he is not, he is not a danger to the state; but, as you must surely see, men who make only a vain show of being guardians of the laws and of the commonwealth bring the whole state to utter ruin, just as, on the other hand, its good government and well-being depend entirely on them. We, in fact, are making genuine Guardians who will be the last to bring harm upon the commonwealth; if our critic aims rather at producing a happiness like that of a party of peasants feasting at a fair, what he has in mind is something other than a civic community. So we must consider whether our aim in

establishing Guardians is to secure the greatest possible happiness for them, or happiness is something of which we should watch the development in the whole commonwealth. If so, we must compel these Guardians and Auxiliaries of ours to second our efforts; and they, and all the rest with them, must be induced to make themselves perfect masters each of his own craft. In that way, as the community grows into a well-ordered whole, the several classes may be allowed such measure of happiness as their nature will compass.

Adeimantus/ I think that is an admirable reply.

Socrates/ I wonder whether you will agree on another point closely connected with that and concerned with the craftsmen. Is it not true that they also are spoilt and turned into bad workmen by wealth and by poverty alike?

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ In this way. When a potter grows rich, will he go on with his trade? Does he not become idle and careless, and consequently a worse potter? And equally, if he is too poor to provide himself with tools and other things he needs for his craft, his work will be worse, and he will not make such good craftsmen of his sons and apprentices. So work and workmen suffer from both causes, poverty and riches as well.

Adeimantus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Here, then, are some more evils which must not elude the vigilance of our Guardians and find their way into the commonwealth: riches and poverty. The one produces luxury and idleness, the other low standards of conduct and workmanship; and both have a subversive tendency.

Adeimantus/ True enough. But I should like to know, Socrates, how our state will be able to go to war, if it has no money, especially if it is forced to fight a rich and powerful enemy.

Socrates/ Obviously it would be hard to fight one such enemy, but easier to deal with two.

Adeimantus/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ In the first place, if they have to fight, they will be highly trained soldiers matched against rich men.

Adeimantus/ True, so far as that goes.

Socrates/ Well then, Adeimantus, would not a single boxer in perfect training easily be a match for two wealthy and corpulent antagonists who could not box?

Adeimantus/ Not for both at once perhaps.

Socrates/ Not even if he could give ground and then turn and plant a blow on whichever came up first? Suppose he kept on doing that under a burning sun, would he not get the better of even more than two?

Adeimantus/ It would certainly not be surprising.

Socrates/ Well, don't you think that rich people know more of the theory and practice of boxing than of the art of war?

Adeimantus/ I am sure they do.

Socrates/ In that case it will probably be an easy matter for our trained warriors to fight twice or three times their number.

Adeimantus/ I will grant you that; I believe you are right.

Socrates/ And now suppose they sent envoys to one of the two enemy countries to tell them what is in fact the truth: 'We have no use for gold and silver; we are not allowed to possess them. But you are allowed; so join forces with us, and you may have the spoils of the other country.' After such an offer would anyone choose to fight against tough, wiry dogs sooner than join the dogs in attacking the fat and tender sheep?

Adeimantus/ I should say not. But if a single state amasses the wealth of all the others, will not that be a danger to a state that has none?

Socrates/ I congratulate you on your idea that any state other than the one we are constructing deserves the name.

Adeimantus/ Why, what should the others be called?

Socrates/ By some grander name, for each of them is not one state, but many: two at least, which are at war with one another, one of the rich, the other of the poor, and each of these is divided into many more. To treat them all as a single state is a complete mistake. If you treat them as many and offer to make over to one class the wealth and power and even the persons of the others, you will always find that your allies outnumber your enemies. Consequently, so long as your commonwealth is ordered wisely on the lines we have laid down, it will be the greatest of all; I do not mean the most famous, but greatest in the literal sense, even though it have no more than a thousand men to fight in its defense. You will not easily find in Hellas or elsewhere a state of that size which is really one, though there are plenty which look like single states and are many times as large. Don't you agree?

Adeimantus/ I do indeed.

Socrates/ Here, then, our Rulers will find the best principle for determining the size of the state and the proportionate amount of territory, beyond which they will not go: the state should be allowed to grow only so far as it can increase in size without loss of unity.

Adeimantus/ An excellent rule.

Socrates/ So we must lay yet another command on our Guardians: they are to take all possible care that the state shall neither be too small nor yet one that seems great but has no unity.

Adeimantus/ You think that will be easy!

Socrates/ Not so hard as the duty we mentioned earlier, of moving down any inferior child born to the Guardians into the other classes and promoting from those classes any child who is good enough to be a Guardian. Our intention there was to set the other citizens to work, one man at one task for which his nature fitted him, so that by keeping to that one business he might come to be a single man and not many. In that way the state as a whole would grow to be a single community, and not many.

Adeimantus/ You may well call that not so easy!

Socrates/ No, but really, my good Adeimantus, we are not laying upon the Guardians a whole number of burdensome duties, as you might suppose. It will all be easy enough, if only they will see to 'the one great thing', as the saying goes, though I would rather call it the one thing that is sufficient: education and nurture. If a sound education has made them reasonable men, they will easily see their way through all these matters as well as others which we will pass over for the moment, such as the possession of wives, marriage, and child-bearing, and the principle that here we should follow, as far as possible, the proverb which says that friends have all things in common.

Adeimantus/ Yes, all should go well then.

Socrates/ Moreover, when a community has once made a good start, its growth proceeds in a sort of cycle. If a sound system of nurture and education is maintained, it produces men of a good disposition; and these in their turn, taking advantage of such education, develop into better men than their forebears, and their breeding qualities improve among the rest, as may be seen in animals.

Adeimantus/ That is likely enough.

Socrates/ In short, then, those who keep watch over our commonwealth must take the greatest care not to overlook the least infraction of the rule against any innovation upon the established system of education either of the body or of the mind. When the poet says that men care most for 'the newest air that hovers on the singer's lips', they will be afraid lest he be taken not merely to mean new songs, but to be commending a new style of music. Such innovation is not to be commended, nor should the poet be so understood. The introduction of novel fashions in music is a thing to beware of as endangering the whole fabric of society, whose most important conventions are unsettled by any revolution in that quarter. So Damon declares, and I believe him.

Adeimantus/ You may count me too among his supporters.

Socrates/ It seems, then, that it is here, in the field of music and poetry, that our Guardians must build their watch-tower.

Adeimantus/ It is certainly there that lawlessness easily creeps in unobserved.

Socrates/ Yes, in the guise of a pastime, which seems so harmless.

Adeimantus/ It would be harmless, were it not that, little by little, this lawless spirit gains a lodgment and spreads imperceptibly to manners and pursuits; and from thence with gathering force invades men's dealings with one another, and next goes on to attack the laws and the constitution with wanton recklessness, until it ends by overthrowing the whole structure of public and private life.

Socrates/ Really? Is all that true?

Adeimantus/ So I believe.

Socrates/ Our children's pastimes, then, as I began by saying, must be kept from the first within stricter bounds; if

any license be admitted, they will catch the spirit and will never grow into law-abiding and well-conducted men. And so, when children have made a good beginning in their play and musical education has instilled a spirit of order, this reverence for law, in complete contrast to the license you were describing just now, will attend them in all their doings and foster their growth, restoring any institutions that may earlier have fallen into decay.

Adeimantus/ That is true.

Socrates/ As a consequence, they will rediscover rules of behavior which their predecessors have let fall into disuse, including matters supposed to be of little importance: how the young should be silent in the presence of their elders, give up their seats to them, and take dutiful care of their parents; not to mention details of personal appearance, such as the way their hair is cut and the clothes and shoes' they wear. It would be silly, I think, to make laws on these matters; such habits cannot be established or kept up by written legislation. It is probable, at any rate, that the bent given by education will determine the quality of later life, by that sort of attraction which like things always have for one another, till they finally mount up to one imposing result, whether for good or ill. For that reason I should not myself be inclined to push legislation to that length.

Adeimantus/ With good reason.

Socrates/ But now look here, what are we to do about business transactions, dealings between buyers and sellers, contracts with tradesmen, actions for foul language and assault, legal proceedings and the impaneling of juries, collection and payment of any market or harbor dues that may be needed, and generally regulations for markets, police, custom houses, and all that sort of thing? Can we go so far as to legislate on any of these matters?

Adeimantus/ No; there will be no need to dictate to men of good breeding. They will soon find out for themselves what regulations are needed.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, provided that, by the grace of heaven, they preserve the institutions we have already described.

Adeimantus/ Quite so. Otherwise they will spend their lives making a host of petty regulations and amending them in the hope of reaching perfection.

Socrates/ Living, in fact, like those invalids who are too self-indulgent to give up their unwholesome habits.

Adeimantus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And a pretty sort of life they have of it. All they gain from being doctored is that their ailments grow more severe and complicated, though they are always expecting to be cured by every fresh remedy that someone recommends.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is a good description of a certain type of invalid.

Socrates/ And another amusing thing about them is that they take for their worst enemy anyone who tells them frankly that until they give up eating and drinking too much and idleness and debauchery, no medicine or surgery and no charms or amulets will do them any good.

Adeimantus/ I see nothing very amusing in being in a rage with good advice.

Socrates/ You don't seem to be an admirer of people like that.

Adeimantus/ I certainly am not.

Socrates/ Then neither will you admire the same sort of behavior in a whole society. You will find something very like those invalids in some states with a bad form of government, which forbid their citizens, under pain of death, to make any

radical change in the constitution, and at the same time honor as a good and profoundly wise person any obsequious flatterer who, without attempting such drastic treatment, can minister agreeably to their humors, which he is clever enough to anticipate.

Adeimantus/ The resemblance is very close, and I have nothing to say for them.

Socrates/ And what of the men who are willing and eager to minister to these invalid states? Have you no admiration for such cool temerity?

Adeimantus/ Yes, except when they are deluded by popular applause into fancying themselves to be real statesmen.

Socrates/ Why can't you make some allowances for them? When a man who cannot measure is told by a lot of equally ignorant people that he is six feet high, you cannot expect him not to believe them.

Adeimantus/ No, not in that instance.

Socrates/ Don't be so hard upon them, then. Surely there is something very amusing in the way they go on enacting their petty laws and amending them, always imagining they will find some way to put an end to fraud in business and in all those other transactions I was speaking of. They have no idea that really they are cutting off the heads of a hydra.

Adeimantus/ It is true; that is all they are doing.

Socrates/ I should have thought that laws and institutions of that order do not deserve the attention of a law-giver worthy of the name, no matter whether the constitution be good or bad. If it is bad, they are useless and effect nothing; if good, some are such as anyone could devise, and the rest will follow of themselves from the practices we have already instituted.

Adeimantus/ Then, what is there left for us to do in the way of legislation?

Socrates/ For us, nothing; but there are institutions of the highest worth and importance that must be left to the Delphian Apollo.

Adeimantus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The founding of temples, sacrifices, and the cults of gods, demigods, and heroes; the burial of the dead, and services to propitiate the powers of the other world. These are matters we do not understand ourselves, and in founding our commonwealth we shall be wise to consult no other religious authority than our national divinity. Indeed in religious matters, the authority of this god, from his seat at the very navel of the earth, may be said to extend to all mankind.

Adeimantus/ Good. Let us do so.

Socrates/ So now at last, son of Ariston, your commonwealth is established. The next thing is to bring to bear upon it all the light you can get from any quarter, with the help of your brother and Polemarchus and all the rest, in the hope that we may see where justice is to be found in it and where injustice, how they differ, and which of the two will bring happiness to its possessor, no matter whether god and men see that he has it or not.

Glaucon/ Nonsense; you promised to conduct the search yourself, because it would be a sin not to uphold justice by every means in your power.

Socrates/ That is true; I must do as you say, but you must all help.

Glaucon/ We will.

Socrates/ I suspect, then, we may find what we are looking for in this way. I take it that our state, having been

founded and built up on the right lines, is good in the complete sense of the word.

Glaucon/ It must be.

Socrates/ Obviously, then, it is wise, brave, temperate, and just.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Then if we find some of these qualities in it, the remainder will be the one we have not found. It is as if we were looking somewhere for one of any four things: if we detected that one immediately, we should be satisfied; whereas if we recognized the other three first, that would be enough to indicate the thing we wanted; it could only be the remaining one. So here we have four qualities. Had we not better follow that method in looking for the one we want?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ To begin then: the first quality to come into view in our state seems to be its wisdom; and there appears to be something odd about this quality.

Glaucon/ What is there odd about it?

Socrates/ I think the state we have described really has wisdom; for it will be prudent in counsel, won't it?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And prudence in counsel is clearly a form of knowledge; good counsel cannot be due to ignorance and stupidity.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But there are many and various kinds of knowledge in our Commonwealth. There is the knowledge possessed by the carpenters or the smiths, and the knowledge how to raise crops. Are we to call the state wise and prudent on the strength of these forms of skill?

Glaucon/ No; they would only make it good at furniture-making or working in copper or agriculture.

Socrates/ Well then, is there any form of knowledge, possessed by some among the citizens of our new-founded commonwealth, which will enable it to take thought, not for some particular interest, but for the best possible conduct of the state as a whole in its internal and external relations?

Glaucon/ Yes, there is.

Socrates/ What is it, and where does it reside?

Glaucon/ It is precisely that art of guardianship which resides in those Rulers whom we just now called Guardians in the full sense.

Socrates/ And what would you call the state on the strength of that knowledge?

Glaucon/ Prudent and truly wise.

Socrates/ And do you think there will be more or fewer of these genuine Guardians in our state than there will be smiths?

Glaucon/ Far fewer.

Socrates/ Fewer, in fact, than any of those other groups who are called after the kind of skill they possess?

Glaucon/ Much fewer.

Socrates/ So, if a state is constituted on natural principles, the wisdom it possesses as a whole will be due to the knowledge residing in the smallest part, the one which takes the lead and governs the rest. Such knowledge is the only kind that deserves the name of wisdom, and it appears to be ordained by nature that the class privileged to possess it should be the smallest of all.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Here then we have more or less made out one of our four qualities and its seat in the structure of the commonwealth.

Glaucon/ To my satisfaction, at any rate.

Socrates/ Next there is courage. It is not hard to discern that quality or the part of the community in which it resides so as to entitle the whole to be called brave.

Glaucon/ Why do you say so?

Socrates/ Because anyone who speaks of a state as either brave or cowardly can only be thinking of that part of it which takes the field and fights in its defense; the reason being, I imagine, that the character of the state is not determined by the bravery or cowardice of the other parts.

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ Courage, then, is another quality which a community owes to a certain part of itself. And its being brave will mean that, in this part, it possesses the power of preserving, in all circumstances, a conviction about the sort of things that it is right to be afraid of—the conviction implanted by the education which the law-giver has established. Is not that what you mean by courage?

Glaucon/ I do not quite understand. Will you say it again?

Socrates/ I am saying that courage means preserving something.

Glaucon/ Yes, but what?

Socrates/ The conviction, inculcated by lawfully established education, about the sort of things which may rightly be feared. When I added 'in all circumstances', I meant preserving it always and never abandoning it, whether under the influence of pain or of pleasure, of desire or of fear. If you like, I will give an illustration.

Glaucon/ Please do.

Socrates/ You know how dyers who want wool to take a purple dye, first select the white wool from among all the other colors, next treat it very carefully to make it take the dye in its full brilliance, and only then dip it in the vat. Dyed in that way, wool gets a fast color, which no washing, even with soap, will rob of its brilliance; whereas if they choose wool of any color but white, or if they neglect to prepare it, you know what happens.

Glaucon/ Yes, it looks washed-out and ridiculous.

Socrates/ That illustrates the result we were doing our best to achieve when we were choosing our fighting men and training their minds and bodies. Our only purpose was to contrive influences whereby they might take the color of our institutions like a dye, so that, in virtue of having both the right temperament and the right education, their convictions about what ought to be feared and on all other subjects might be indelibly fixed, never to be washed out by pleasure and pain, desire and fear, solvents more terribly effective than all the soap and fuller's earth in the world. Such a power of constantly preserving, in accordance with our institutions, the right conviction about the things which ought, or ought not, to be feared, is what I call courage. That is my position, unless you have some objection to make.

Glaucon/ None at all; if the belief were such as might be found in a slave or an animal—correct, but not produced by education—you would hardly describe it as in accordance with our institutions, and you would give it some other name than courage.

Socrates/ Quite true.

Glaucon/ Then I accept your account of courage.

Socrates/ You will do well to accept it, at any rate as applying to the courage of the ordinary citizen; if you like we will go into it more fully some other time. At present we are

in search of justice, rather than of courage; and for that purpose we have said enough.

Glaucon/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ Two qualities, I went on, still remain to be made out in our state, temperance and the object of our whole inquiry, justice. Can we discover justice without troubling ourselves further about temperance?

Glaucon/ I do not know, and I would rather not have justice come to light first, if that means that we should not go on to consider temperance. So if you want to please me, take temperance first.

Socrates/ Of course I have every wish to please you.

Glaucon/ Do go on then.

Socrates/ I will. At first sight, temperance seems more like some sort of concord or harmony than the other qualities did.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Temperance surely means a kind of orderliness, a control of certain pleasures and appetites. People use the expression, 'master of oneself', whatever that means, and various other phrases that point the same way.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Is not 'master of oneself' an absurd expression? A man who was master of himself would presumably be also subject to himself, and the subject would be master; for all these terms apply to the same person.

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ I think, however, the phrase means that within the man himself, in his soul, there is a better part and a worse; and that he is his own master when the part which is better by nature has the worse under its control. It is certainly a term of praise; whereas it is considered a

disgrace, when, through bad breeding or bad company, the better part is overwhelmed by the worse, like a small force outnumbered by a multitude. A man in that condition is called a slave to himself and intemperate.

Glaucon/ Probably that is what is meant.

Socrates/ Then now look at our newly founded state and you will find one of these two conditions realized there. You will agree that it deserves to be called master of itself, if temperance and self-mastery exist where the better part rules the worse.

Glaucon/ Yes, I can see that is true.

Socrates/ It is also true that the great mass of multifarious appetites and pleasures and pains will be found to occur chiefly in children and women and slaves, and, among free men so called, in the inferior multitude; whereas the simple and moderate desires which, with the aid of reason and right belief, are guided by reflection, you will find only in a few, and those with the best inborn dispositions and the best educated.

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Do you see that this state of things will exist in your commonwealth, where the desires of the inferior multitude will be controlled by the desires and wisdom of the superior few? Hence, if any society can be called master of itself and in control of pleasures and desires, it will be ours.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ On all these grounds, then, we may describe it as temperate. Furthermore, in our state, if anywhere, the governors and the governed will share the same conviction on the question who ought to rule. Don't you think so?

Glaucon/ I am quite sure of it.

Socrates/ Then, if that is their state of mind, in which of the two classes of citizens will temperance reside—in the governors or in the governed?

Glaucon/ In both, I suppose.

Socrates/ So we were not wrong in divining a resemblance between temperance and some kind of harmony. Temperance is not like courage and wisdom, which made the state wise and brave by residing each in one particular part. Temperance works in a different way; it extends throughout the whole gamut of the state, producing a consonance of all its elements from the weakest to the strongest as measured by any standard you like to take—wisdom, bodily strength, numbers, or wealth. So we are entirely justified in identifying with temperance this unanimity or harmonious agreement between the naturally superior and inferior elements on the question which of the two should govern, whether in the state or in the individual.

Glaucon/ I fully agree.

Socrates/ Good. We have discovered in our commonwealth three out of our four qualities, to the best of our present judgment. What is the remaining one, required to make up its full complement of goodness? For clearly this will be justice.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Now is the moment, then, Glaucon, for us to keep the closest watch, like huntsmen standing round a covert, to make sure that justice does not slip through and vanish undetected. It must certainly be somewhere hereabouts; so keep your eyes open for a view of the quarry, and if you see it first, give me the alert.

Glaucon/ I wish I could; but you will do better to give me a lead and not count on me for more than eyes to see what you show me.

Socrates/ Pray for luck, then, and follow me.

Glaucon/ I will, if you will lead on.

Socrates/ The thicket looks rather impenetrable; too dark for it to be easy to start up the game. However, we must push on.

Glaucon/ Of course we must.

Socrates/ Here I gave the view halloo. Glaucon, I exclaimed, I believe we are on the track and the quarry is not going to escape us altogether.

Glaucon/ That is good news.

Socrates/ Really, we have been extremely stupid. All this time the thing has been under our very noses from the start, and we never saw it We have been as absurd as a person who hunts for something he has all the time got in his hand. Instead of looking at the thing, we have been staring into the distance. No doubt that is why it escaped us.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I believe we have been talking about the thing all this while without ever understanding that we were giving some sort of account of it.

Glaucon/ Do come to the point. I am all ears.

Socrates/ Listen, then, and judge whether I am right. You remember how, when we first began to establish our commonwealth and several times since, we have laid down, as a universal principle, that everyone ought to perform the one function in the community for which his nature best suited him. Well, I believe that that principle, or some form of it, is justice.

Glaucon/ We certainly laid that down.

Socrates/ Yes, and surely we have often heard people say that justice means minding one's own business and not

meddling with other men's concerns; and we have often said so ourselves.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ Well, my friend, it may be that this minding of one's own business, when it takes a certain form, is actually the same thing as justice. Do you know what makes me think so?

Glaucon/ No, tell me.

Socrates/ I think that this quality which makes it possible for the three we have already considered, wisdom, courage, and temperance, to take their place in the commonwealth, and so long as it remains present secures their continuance, must be the remaining one. And we said that, when three of the four were found, the one left over would be justice.

Glaucon/ It must be so.

Socrates/ Well now, if we had to decide which of these qualities will contribute most to the excellence of our commonwealth, it would be hard to say whether it was the unanimity of rulers and subjects, or the soldier's fidelity to the established conviction about what is, or is not, to be feared, or the watchful intelligence of the Rulers; or whether its excellence were not above all due to the observance by everyone, child or woman, slave or freeman or artisan, ruler or ruled, of this principle that each one should do his own proper work without interfering with others.

Glaucon/ It would be hard to decide, no doubt.

Socrates/ It seems, then, that this principle can at any rate claim to rival wisdom, temperance, and courage as conducing to the excellence of a state. And would you not say that the only possible competitor of these qualities must be justice?

Glaucon/ Yes, undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Here is another thing which points to the same conclusion. The judging of law-suits is a duty that you will lay upon your Rulers, isn't it?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And the chief aim of their decisions will be that neither party shall have what belongs to another or be deprived of what is his own.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Because that is just?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ So here again justice admittedly means that a man should possess and concern himself with what properly belongs to him.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Again, do you agree with me that no great harm would be done to the community by a general interchange of most forms of work, the carpenter and the cobbler exchanging their positions and their tools and taking on each other's jobs, or even the same man undertaking both?

Glaucon/ Yes, there would not be much harm in that.

Socrates/ But I think you will also agree that another kind of interchange would be disastrous. Suppose, for instance, someone whom nature designed to be an artisan or tradesman should be emboldened by some advantage, such as wealth or command of votes or bodily strength, to try to enter the order of fighting men; or some member of that order should aspire, beyond his merits, to a seat in the council-chamber of the Guardians. Such interference and exchange of social positions and tools, or the attempt to combine all these forms of work in the same person, would be fatal to the commonwealth.

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Where there are three orders, then, any plurality of functions or shifting from one order to another is not merely utterly harmful to the community, but one might fairly call it the extreme of wrongdoing. And you will agree that to do the greatest of wrongs to one's own community is injustice.

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ This, then, is injustice. And, conversely, let us repeat that when each order—tradesman, Auxiliary, Guardian—keeps to its own proper business in the commonwealth and does its own work, that is justice and what makes a just society.

Glaucon/ I entirely agree.

Socrates/ We must not be too positive yet. If we find that this same quality when it exists in the individual can equally be identified with justice, then we can at once give our assent; there will be no more to be said; otherwise, we shall have to look further. For the moment, we had better finish the inquiry which we began with the idea that it would be easier to make out the nature of justice in the individual if we first tried to study it in something on a larger scale. That larger thing we took to be a state, and so we set about constructing the best one we could, being sure of finding justice in a state that was good. The discovery we made there must now be applied to the individual. If it is confirmed, all will be well; but if we find that justice in the individual is something different, we must go back to the state and test our new result. Perhaps if we brought the two cases into contact like flint and steel, we might strike out between them the spark of justice, and in its light confirm the conception in our own minds.

Glaucon/ A good method. Let us follow it.

Socrates/ Now, if two things, one large, the other small, are called by the same name, they will be alike in that respect to which the common name applies. Accordingly, in so far as the quality of justice is concerned, there will be no difference between a just man and a just society.

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ Well, but we decided that a society was just when each of the three types of human character it contained performed its own function; and again, it was temperate and brave and wise by virtue of certain other affections and states of mind of those same types.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Accordingly, my friend, if we are to be justified in attributing those same virtues to the individual, we shall expect to find that the individual soul contains the same three elements and that they are affected in the same way as are the corresponding types in society.

Glaucon/ That follows.

Socrates/ Here, then, We have stumbled upon another little problem: Does the soul contain these three elements or not?

Glaucon/ Not such a very little one, I think. It may be a true saying, Socrates, that what is worthwhile is seldom easy.

Socrates/ Apparently; and let me tell you, Glaucon, it is my belief that we shall never reach the exact truth in this, matter by following our present methods of discussion; the road leading to that goal is longer and more laborious. However, perhaps we can find an answer that will be up to the standard we have so far maintained in our speculations.

Glaucon/ Is not that enough? I should be satisfied for the moment.

Socrates/ Well, it will more than satisfy me.

Glaucon/ Don't be disheartened, then, but go on.

Socrates/ Surely we must admit that the same elements and characters that appear in the state must exist in every one of us; where else could they have come from? It would be absurd to imagine that among peoples with a reputation for a high-spirited character, like the Thracians and Scythians and northerners generally, the states have not derived that character from their individual members; or that it is otherwise with the love of knowledge, which would be ascribed chiefly to our own part of the world, or with the love of money, which one would specially connect with Phoenicia and Egypt.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So far, then, we have a fact which is easily recognized. But here the difficulty begins. Are we using the same part of ourselves in all these three experiences, or a different part in each? Do we gain knowledge with one part, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of food, sex, and so on? Or is the whole soul at work in every impulse and in all these forms of behavior? The difficulty is to answer that question satisfactorily.

Glaucon/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ Let us approach the problem whether these elements are distinct or identical in this way. It is clear that the same thing cannot act in two opposite ways or be in two opposite states at the same time, with respect to the same part of itself, and in relation to the same object. So if we find such contradictory actions or states among the elements concerned, we shall know that more than one must have been involved.

Glaucon/ Very well.

Socrates/ Consider this proposition of mine, then. Can the same thing, at the same time and with respect to the same part of itself, be at rest and in motion?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ We had better state this principle in still more precise terms, to guard against misunderstanding later on. Suppose a man is standing still, but moving his head and arms. We should not allow anyone to say that the same man was both at rest and in motion at the same time, but only that part of him was at rest, part in motion. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ An ingenious objector might refine still further and argue that a peg-top, spinning with its peg fixed at the same spot, or indeed anybody that revolves in the same place, is both at rest and in motion as a whole. But we should not agree, because the parts in respect of which such a body is moving and at rest are not the same. It contains an axis and a circumference; and in respect of the axis it is at rest inasmuch as the axis is not inclined in any direction, while in respect of the circumference it revolves; and if, while it is spinning, the axis does lean out of the perpendicular in all directions, then it is in no way at rest.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ No objection of that sort, then, will disconcert us or make us believe that the same thing can ever act or be acted upon in two opposite ways, or be two opposite things, at the same time, in respect of the same part of itself, and in relation to the same object.

Glaucon/ I can answer for myself at any rate.

Socrates/ Well, anyhow, as we do not want to spend time in reviewing all such objections to make sure that they are unsound, let us proceed on this assumption, with the

understanding that, if we ever come to think otherwise, all the consequences based upon it will fall to the ground.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is a good plan.

Socrates/ Now, would you class such things as assent and dissent, striving after something and refusing it, attraction and repulsion, as pairs of opposite actions or states of mind—no matter which?

Glaucon/ Yes, they are opposites.

Socrates/ And would you not class all appetites such as hunger and thirst, and again willing and wishing, with the affirmative members of those pairs I have just mentioned? For instance, you would say that the soul of a man who desires something is striving after it, or trying to draw to itself the thing it wishes to possess, or again, in so far as it is willing to have its want satisfied, it is giving its assent to its own longing, as if to an inward question.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And, on the other hand, disinclination, unwillingness, and dislike, we should class on the negative side with acts of rejection or repulsion.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ That being so, shall we say that appetites form one class, the most conspicuous being those we call thirst and hunger?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Thirst being desire for drink, hunger for food?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, is thirst, just in so far as it is thirst, a desire in the soul for anything more than simply drink? Is it, for instance, thirst for hot drink or for cold, for much drink or for little, or in a word for drink of any particular kind? Is it not rather true that you will have a desire for cold drink

only if you are feeling hot as well as thirsty, and for hot drink only if you are feeling cold; and if you want much drink or little, that will be because your thirst is a great thirst or a little one? But, just in itself, thirst or hunger is a desire for nothing more than its natural object, drink or food, pure and simple.

Glaucon/ Yes, each desire, just in itself, is simply for its own natural object. When the object is of such and such a particular kind, the desire will be correspondingly qualified.

Socrates/ We must be careful here, or we might be troubled by the objection that no one desires mere food and drink, but always wholesome food and drink. We shall be told that what we desire is always something that is good; so if thirst is a desire, its object must be, like that of any other desire, something—drink or whatever it may be—that will be good for one.

Glaucon/ Yes, there might seem to be something in that objection.

Socrates/ But surely, wherever you have two correlative terms, if one is qualified, the other must always be qualified too; whereas if one is unqualified, so is the other.

Glaucon/ I don't understand.

Socrates/ Well, 'greater' is a relative term; and the greater is greater than the less; if it is much greater, then the less is much less; if it is greater at some moment, past or future, then the less is less at that same moment. The same principle applies to all such correlatives, like 'more' and 'fewer', 'double' and 'half'; and again to terms like 'heavier' and 'lighter', 'quicker' and 'slower', and to things like hot and cold.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Or take the various branches of knowledge: is it not the same there? The object of knowledge pure and

simple is the knowable—if that is the right word—without any qualification; whereas a particular kind of knowledge has an object of a particular kind. For example, as soon as men learnt how to build houses, their craft was distinguished from others under the name of architecture, because it had a unique character, which was itself due to the character of its object; and all other branches of craft and knowledge were distinguished in the same way.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ This, then, if you understand me now, is what I meant by saying that, where there are two correlatives, the one is qualified if, and only if, the other is so. I am not saying that the one must have the same quality as the other—that the science of health and disease is itself healthy and diseased, or the knowledge of good and evil is itself good and evil—but only that, as soon as you have a knowledge that is restricted to a particular kind of object,- namely health and disease, the knowledge itself becomes a particular kind of knowledge. Hence we no longer call it merely knowledge, which would have for its object whatever can be known, but we add the qualification and call it medical science.

Glaucon/ I understand now and I agree.

Socrates/ Now, to go back to thirst: is not that one of these relative terms? It is essentially thirst for something.

Glaucon/ Yes, for drink.

Socrates/ And if the drink desired is of a certain kind, the thirst will be correspondingly qualified. But thirst which is just simply thirst is not for drink of any particular sort—much or little, good or bad—but for drink pure and simple.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ We conclude, then, that the soul of a thirsty man, just in so far as he is thirsty, has no other wish than

to drink. That is the object of its craving, and towards that it is impelled.

Glaucon/ That is clear.

Socrates/ Now if there is ever something which at the same time pulls it the opposite way, that something must be an element in the soul other than the one which is thirsting and driving it like a beast to drink; in accordance with our principle that the same thing cannot behave in two opposite ways at the same time and towards the same object with the same part of itself. It is like an archer drawing the bow: it is not accurate to say that his hands are at the same time both pushing and pulling it. One hand does the pushing, the other the pulling.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Now, is it sometimes true that people are thirsty and yet unwilling to drink?

Glaucon/ Yes, often.

Socrates/ What, then, can one say of them, if not that their soul contains something which urges them to drink and something which holds them back, and that this latter is a distinct thing and overpowers the other?

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ And is it not true that the intervention of this inhibiting principle in such cases always has its origin in reflection; whereas the impulses driving and dragging the soul are engendered by external influences and abnormal conditions?

Glaucon/ Evidently.

Socrates/ We shall have good reason, then, to assert that they are two distinct principles. We may call that part of the soul whereby it reflects, rational; and the other, with which it feels hunger and thirst and is distracted by sexual passion and all the other desires, we will call irrational appetite, associated with pleasure in the replenishment of certain wants.

Glaucon/ Yes, there is good ground for that view.

Socrates/ Let us take it, then, that we have now distinguished two elements in the soul. What of that passionate element which makes us feel angry and indignant? Is that a third, or identical in nature with one of those two?

Glaucon/ It might perhaps be identified with appetite.

Socrates/ I am more inclined to put my faith in a story I once heard about Leontius, son of Aglaion. On his way up from the Piraeus outside the north wall, he noticed the bodies of some criminals lying on the ground, with the executioner standing by them. He wanted to go and look at them, but at the same time he was disgusted and tried to turn away. He struggled for some time and covered his eyes, but at last the desire was too much for him. Opening his eyes wide, he ran up to the bodies and cried, 'There you are, curse you; feast yourselves on this lovely sight!'

Glaucon/ Yes, I have heard that story too.

Socrates/ The point of it surely is that anger is sometimes in conflict with appetite, as if they were two distinct principles. Do we not often find a man whose desires would force him to go against his reason, reviling himself and indignant with this part of his nature which is trying to put constraint on him? It is like a struggle between two factions, in which indignation takes the side of reason. But I believe you have never observed, in yourself or anyone else, indignation make common cause with appetite in behavior which reason decides to be wrong.

Glaucon/ No, I am sure I have not.

Socrates/ Again, take a man who feels he is in the wrong. The more generous his nature, the less can he be indignant at any suffering, such as hunger and cold, inflicted by the man he has injured. He recognizes such treatment as just, and, as I say, his spirit refuses to be roused against it.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ But now contrast one who thinks it is he that is being wronged. His spirit boils with resentment and sides with the right as he conceives it. Persevering all the more for the hunger and cold and other pains he suffers, it triumphs and will not give in until its gallant struggle has ended in success or death; or until the restraining voice of reason, like a shepherd calling off his dog, makes it relent.

Glaucon/ An apt comparison; and in fact it fits the relation of our Auxiliaries to the Rulers: they were to be like watch-dogs obeying the shepherds of the commonwealth.

Socrates/ Yes, you understand very well what I have in mind. But do you see how we have changed our view? A moment ago we were supposing this spirited element to be something of the nature of appetite; but now it appears that, when the soul is divided into factions, it is far more ready to be up in arms on the side of reason.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Is it, then, distinct from the rational element or only a particular form of it, so that the soul, will contain no more than two elements, reason and appetite? Or is the soul like the state, which had three orders to hold it together, traders, Auxiliaries, and counselors? Does the spirited element make a third, the natural auxiliary of reason, when not corrupted by bad upbringing?

Glaucon/ It must be a third.

Socrates/ Yes, provided it can be shown to be distinct from reason, as we saw it was from appetite.

Glaucon/ That is easily proved. You can see that much in children: they are full of passionate feelings from their very birth; but some, I should say, never become rational, and most of them only late in life.

Socrates/ A very sound observation, the truth of which may also be seen in animals. And besides, there is the witness of Homer in that line I quoted before: 'He smote his breast and spoke, chiding his heart.' The poet is plainly thinking of the two elements as distinct, when he makes the one which has chosen the better course after reflection rebuke the other for its unreasoning passion.

Glaucon/ I entirely agree.

Socrates/ And so, after a stormy passage, we have reached the land. We are fairly agreed that the same three elements exist alike in the state and in the individual soul.

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ Does it not follow at once that state and individual will be wise or brave by virtue of the same element in each and in the same way? Both will possess in the same manner any quality that makes for excellence.

Glaucon/ That must be true.

Socrates/ Then it applies to justice: we shall conclude that a man is just in the same way that a state was just. And we have surely not forgotten that justice in the state meant that each of the three orders in it was doing its own proper work. So we may henceforth bear in mind that each one of us likewise will be a just person, fulfilling his proper function, only if the several parts of our nature fulfill theirs.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And it will be the business of reason to rule with wisdom and forethought on behalf of the entire soul; while the spirited element ought to act as its subordinate and ally. The two will be brought into accord, as we said earlier, by that combination of mental and bodily training which will tune up one string of the instrument and relax the other, nourishing the reasoning part on the study of noble literature and allaying the other's wildness by harmony and rhythm. When both have been thus nurtured and trained to know their own true functions, they must be set in command over the appetites, which form the greater part of each man's soul and are by nature insatiably covetous. They must keep watch lest this part, by battening on the pleasures that are called bodily, should grow so great and powerful that it will no longer keep to its own work, but will try to enslave the others and usurp a dominion to which it has no right, thus turning the whole of life upside down. At the same time, those two together will be the best of guardians for the entire soul and for the body against all enemies from without: the one will take counsel, while the other will do battle, following its ruler's commands and by its own bravery giving effect to the ruler's designs.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is all true.

Socrates/ And so we call an individual brave in virtue of this spirited part of his nature, when, in spite of pain or

pleasure, it holds fast to the injunctions of reason about what he ought or ought not to be afraid of.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And wise in virtue of that small part which rules and issues these injunctions, possessing as it does the knowledge of what is good for each of the three elements and for all of them in common.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And, again, temperate by reason of the unanimity and concord of all three, when there is no internal conflict between the ruling element and its two subjects, but all are agreed that reason should be ruler.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is an exact account of temperance, whether in the state or in the individual.

Socrates/ Finally, a man will be just by observing the principle we have so often stated.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Now is there any indistinctness in our vision of justice, that might make it seem somehow different from what we found it to be in the state?

Glaucon/ I don't think so.

Socrates/ Because, if we have any lingering doubt, we might make sure by comparing it with some commonplace notions. Suppose, for instance, that a sum of money were entrusted to our state or to an individual of corresponding character and training, would anyone imagine that such a person would be specially likely to embezzle it?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ And would he not be incapable of sacrilege and theft, or of treachery to friend or country; never false to an oath or any other compact; the last to be guilty of adultery or of neglecting parents or the due service of the gods?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the reason for all this is that each part of his nature is exercising its proper function, of ruling or of being ruled.

Glaucon/ Yes, exactly.

Socrates/ Are you satisfied, then, that justice is the power which produces states or individuals of whom that is true, or must we look further?

Glaucon/ There is no need; I am quite satisfied.

Socrates/ And so our dream has come true—I mean the inkling we had that, by some happy chance, we had lighted upon a rudimentary form of justice from the very moment when we set about founding our commonwealth. Our principle that the born shoemaker or carpenter had better stick to his trade turns Out to have been an adumbration of justice; and that is why it has helped us. But in reality justice, though evidently analogous to this principle, is not a matter of external behavior, but of the inward self and of attending to all that is, in the fullest sense, a man's proper concern. The just man does not allow the several elements in his soul to usurp one another's functions; he is indeed one who sets his house in order, by self-mastery and discipline coming to be at peace with himself, and bringing into tune those three parts, like the terms in the proportion of a musical scale, the highest and lowest notes and the mean between them, with all the intermediate intervals. Only when he has linked these parts together in well-tempered harmony and has made himself one man instead of many, will he be ready to go about whatever he may have to do, whether it be making money and satisfying bodily wants, or business transactions, or the affairs of state. In all these fields when he speaks of just and honorable conduct, he will mean the behavior that helps to produce and to

preserve this habit of mind; and by wisdom he will mean the knowledge which presides over such conduct. Any action which tends to break down this habit will be for him unjust; and the notions governing it he will call ignorance and folly.

Glaucon/ That is perfectly true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Good. I believe we should not be thought altogether mistaken, if we claimed to have discovered the just man and the just state, and wherein their justice consists.

Glaucon/ Indeed we should not.

Socrates/ Shall we make that claim, then?

Glaucon/ Yes, we will.

Socrates/ So be it. Next, I suppose, we have to consider injustice.

Glaucon/ Evidently.

Socrates/ This must surely be a sort of civil strife among the three elements, whereby they usurp and encroach upon one another's functions and some one part of the soul rises up in rebellion against the whole, claiming a supremacy to which it has no right because its nature fits it only to be the servant of the ruling principle. Such turmoil and aberration we shall, I think, identify with injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance, and in a word with all wickedness.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And now that we know the nature of justice and injustice, we can be equally clear about what is meant by acting justly and again by unjust action and wrongdoing.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Plainly, they are exactly analogous to those wholesome and unwholesome activities which respectively produce a healthy or unhealthy condition in the body; in the same way just and unjust conduct produce a just or unjust

character. Justice is produced in the soul, like health in the body, by establishing the elements concerned in their natural relations of control and subordination, whereas injustice is like disease and means that this natural order is inverted.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ It appears, then, that virtue is as it were the health and comeliness and well-being of the soul, as wickedness is disease, deformity, and weakness.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And also that virtue and wickedness are brought about by one's way of life, honorable or disgraceful.

Glaucon/ That follows.

Socrates/ So now it only remains to consider which is the more profitable course: to do right and live honorably and be just, whether or not anyone knows what manner of man you are, or to do wrong and be unjust, provided that you can escape the chastisement which might make you a better man.

Glaucon/ But really, Socrates, it seems to me ridiculous to ask that question now that the nature of justice and injustice has been brought to light. People think that all the luxury and wealth and power in the world cannot make life worth living when the bodily constitution is going to rack and ruin; and are we to believe that, when the very principle whereby we live is deranged and corrupted, life will be worth living so long as a man can do as he will, and wills to do anything rather than to free himself from vice and wrongdoing and to win justice and virtue?

Socrates/ Yes, it is a ridiculous question. Nevertheless, we are now within sight of the clearest possible proof of our conclusions, and we ought not to slacken our efforts.

Glaucon/ No, anything rather than that.

Socrates/ If you will take your stand with me, then, on this point of vantage to which we have climbed, you shall see all the forms that evil takes, or at least all that it seems worthwhile to look at.

Glaucon/ Lead the way and tell me what you see.

Socrates/ What I see is that, whereas there is only one form of excellence, imperfection exists in innumerable shapes, of which there are four that specially deserve notice.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ It looks as if there were as many types of character as there are distinct varieties of political constitution.

Glaucon/ How many?

Socrates/ Five of each.

Glaucon/ Will you define them?

Socrates/ Yes. One form of constitution will be the form we 'have been describing, though it may be called by two names: monarchy, when there is one man who stands out above the rest of the Rulers; aristocracy, when there are more than one.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ That, then, I regard as a single form; for, so long as they observe our principles of upbringing and education, whether the Rulers be one or more, they will not subvert the important institutions in our commonwealth.

Glaucon/ Naturally not.

Socrates/ Such, then, is the type of state or constitution that I call good and right, and the corresponding type of man. By this standard, the other forms in which a state or an individual character may be organized are depraved and wrong. There are four of these vicious forms.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ Here I was going on to describe these forms in the order in which, as I thought, they develop one from another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting a little way from Adeimantus, reached out his hand and took hold of his garment by the shoulder. Leaning forward and drawing Adeimantus towards him, he whispered something in his ear, of which I only caught the words: What shall we do? Shall we leave it alone?

Adeimantus, raising his voice said;

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ What is this, I asked, that you are not going to leave alone?

Adeimantus/ You.

Socrates/ Why, in particular? I inquired.

Adeimantus/ Because we think you are shirking the discussion of a very important part of the subject and trying to cheat us out of an explanation. Everyone, you said, must of course see that the maxim, 'friends have all things in common' applies to women and children. You thought we should pass over such a casual remark!

Socrates/ But wasn't that right, Adeimantus?

Adeimantus/ Yes, but 'right' in this case, as in others, needs to be defined. There may be many ways of having things in common, and you must tell us which you mean. We have been waiting a long time for you to say something about the conditions in which children are to be born and brought up and your whole plan of having wives and children held in common. This seems to us a matter in which right or wrong management will make all the difference to society; and now, instead of going into it thoroughly, you are passing on to some other form of constitution. So we came to the resolution which you overheard, not to let you off discussing it as fully as all the other institutions.

Glaucon/ I will vote for your resolution too.

Thrasymachus/ In fact, Socrates, you may take it as carried unanimously.

Socrates/ You don't know what you are doing, in holding me up like this. You want to start, all over again, on an enormous subject, just as I was rejoicing at the idea that we had done with this form of constitution. I was only too glad that my casual remark should be allowed to pass. And now, when you demand an explanation, you little know what a swarm of questions you are stirring up. I let it alone, because I foresaw no end of trouble.

Thrasymachus/ Well, what do you think we came here for—to play pitch-and-toss or to listen to a discussion?

Socrates/ A discussion, no doubt; but within limits.

Glaucon/ No man of sense, would think the whole of life too long to spend on questions of this importance. But never mind about us; don't be faint-hearted yourself. Tell us what you think about this question: how our Guardians are to have wives and children in common, and how they will bring up the young in the interval between their birth and education, which is thought to be the most difficult time of all. Do try to explain how all this is to be arranged.

Socrates/ I wish it were as easy as you seem to think. These arrangements are even more open to doubt than any we have so far discussed. It may be questioned whether the plan is feasible, and even if entirely feasible, whether it would be for the best. So I have some hesitation in touching on what may seem to be an idle dream.

Glaucon/ You need not hesitate. This is not an unsympathetic audience; we are neither incredulous nor hostile.

Socrates/ Thank you; I suppose that remark is meant to be encouraging.

Glaucon/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ Well, it has just the opposite effect. You would do well to encourage me, if I had any faith in my own understanding of these matters. If one knows the truth, there is no risk to be feared in speaking about the things one has most at heart among intelligent friends; but if one is still in the position of a doubting inquirer, as I am now, talking becomes a slippery venture. Not that I am afraid of being laughed at—that would be childish—but I am afraid I may miss my footing just where a false step is most to be dreaded and drag my friends down with me in my fall. I devoutly hope, Glaucon, that no nemesis will overtake me for what I am going to say; for I really believe that to kill a man unintentionally is a lighter offence than to mislead him concerning the goodness and justice of social institutions. Better to run that risk among enemies than among friends; so your encouragement is out of place.

Glaucon laughed at this.

Glaucon/ No, Socrates, if your theory has any untoward effect on us, our blood shall not be on your head; we absolve you of any intention to mislead us. So have no fear.

Socrates/ Well, when a homicide is absolved of all intention, the law holds him clear of guilt; and the same principle may apply to my case.

Glaucon/ Yes, so far as that goes, you may speak freely.

Socrates/ We must go back, then, to a subject which ought, perhaps, to have been treated earlier in its proper place; though, after all, it may be suitable that the women should have their turn on the stage when the men have quite finished their performance, especially since you are so insistent. In my judgment, then, the question under what conditions people born and educated as we have described should possess wives and children, and how they should

treat them, can be rightly settled only by keeping to the course on which we started them at the outset. We undertook to put these men in the position of watch-dogs guarding a flock. Suppose we follow up the analogy and imagine them bred and reared in the same sort of way. We can then see if that plan will suit our purpose.

Glaucon/ How will that be?

Socrates/ In this way. Which do we think right for watch-dogs: should the females guard the flock and hunt with the males and take a share in all they do,, or should they be kept within doors as fit for no more than bearing and feeding their puppies, while all the hard work of looking after the flock is left to the males?

Glaucon/ They are expected to take their full share, except that we treat them as not quite so strong.

Socrates/ Can you employ any creature for the same work as another, if you do not give them both the same upbringing and education?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ Then, if we are to set women to the same tasks as men, we must teach them the same things. They must have the same two branches of training for mind and body and also be taught the art of war, and they must receive the same treatment.

Glaucon/ That seems to follow.

Socrates/ Possibly, if these proposals were carried out, they might be ridiculed as involving a good many breaches of custom.

Glaucon/ They might indeed.

Socrates/ The most ridiculous—don't you think? —being the notion of women exercising naked along with the men in the wrestling-schools; some of them elderly women too, like

the old men who still have a passion for exercise when they are wrinkled and not very agreeable to look at.

Glaucon/ Yes, that would be thought laughable, according to our present notions.

Socrates/ Now we have started on this subject, we must not be frightened of the many witticisms that might be aimed at such a revolution, not only in the matter of bodily exercise but in the training of women's minds, and not least when it comes to their bearing arms and riding on horseback. Having begun upon these rules, we must not draw back from the harsher provisions. The wits may be asked to stop being witty and try to be serious; and we may remind them that it is not so long since the Greeks, like most foreign nations of the present day, thought it ridiculous and shameful for men to be seen naked. When gymnastic exercises were first introduced in Crete and later at Sparta, the humorists had their chance to make fun of them; but when experience had shown that nakedness is better uncovered than muffled up, the laughter died down and a practice which the reason approved ceased to look ridiculous to the eye. This shows how idle it is to think anything ludicrous but what is base. One who tries to raise a laugh at any spectacle save that of baseness and folly will also, in his serious moments, set before himself some other standard than goodness of what deserves to be held in honor.

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ The first thing to be settled, then, is whether these proposals are feasible; and it must be open to anyone, whether a humorist or serious-minded, to raise the question whether, in the case of mankind, the feminine nature is capable of taking part with the other sex in all occupations, or in none at all, or in some only; and in particular under which of these heads this business of military service falls.

Well begun is half done, and would not this be the best way to begin?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Shall we take the other side in this debate and argue against ourselves? We do not want the adversary's position to be taken by storm for lack of defenders.

Glaucon/ I have no objection.

Socrates/ Let us state his case for him. 'Socrates and Glaucon', he will say, 'there is no need for others to dispute your position; you yourselves, at the very outset of founding your commonwealth, agreed that everyone should do the one work for which nature fits him.' Yes, of course; I suppose we did. 'And isn't there a very great difference in nature between man and woman?' Yes, surely. 'Does not that natural difference imply a corresponding difference in the work to be given to each?' Yes. 'But if so, surely you must be mistaken now and contradicting yourselves when you say that men and women, having such widely divergent natures, should do the same things?' What is your answer to that, my ingenious friend?

Glaucon/ It is not easy to find one at the moment. I can only appeal to you to state the case on our own side, whatever it may be.

Socrates/ This, Glaucon, is one of many alarming objections which I foresaw some time ago. That is why I shrank from touching upon these laws concerning the possession of wives and the rearing of children.

Glaucon/ It looks like anything but an easy problem.

Socrates/ True; but whether a man tumbles into a swimming-pool or into mid-ocean, he has to swim all the same. So must we, and try if we can reach the shore, hoping for some Arion's dolphin or other miraculous deliverance to bring us safe to land.

Glaucon/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Come then, let us see if we can find the way out. We did agree that different natures should have different occupations, and that the natures of man and woman are different; and yet we are now saying that these different natures are to have the same occupations. Is that the charge against us?

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ It is extraordinary, Glaucon, what an effect the practice of debating has upon people.

Glaucon/ Why do you say that?

Socrates/ Because they often seem to fall unconsciously into mere disputes which they mistake for reasonable argument, through being unable to draw the distinctions proper to their subject; and so, instead of a philosophical exchange of ideas, they go off in chase of contradictions which are purely verbal.

Glaucon/ I know that happens to many people; but does it apply to us at this moment?

Socrates/ Absolutely. At least I am afraid we are slipping unconsciously into a dispute about words. We have been strenuously insisting on the letter of our principle that different natures should not have the same occupations, as if we were scoring a point in a debate; but we have altogether neglected to consider what sort of sameness or difference we meant and in what respect these natures and occupations were to be defined as different or the same. Consequently, we might very well be asking one another whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald and long-haired men, and, when that was admitted, forbid one set to be shoemakers, if the other were following that trade.

Glaucon/ That would be absurd.

Socrates/ Yes, but only because we never meant any and every sort of sameness or difference in nature, but the sort that was relevant to the occupations in question. We meant, for instance, that a man and a woman have the same nature if both have a talent for medicine; whereas two men have different natures if one is a born physician, the other a born carpenter.

Glaucon/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ If, then, we find that either the male sex or the female is specially qualified for any particular form of occupation, then that occupation, we shall say, ought to be assigned to one sex or the other. But if the only difference appears to be that the male begets and the female brings forth, we shall conclude that no difference between man and woman has yet been produced that is relevant to our purpose. We shall continue to think it proper for our Guardians and their wives to share in the same pursuits.

Glaucon/ And quite rightly.

Socrates/ The next thing will be to ask our opponent to name any profession or occupation in civic life for the purposes of which woman's nature is different from man's.

Glaucon/ That is a fair question.

Socrates/ He might reply, as you did just now, that it is not easy to find a satisfactory answer on the spur of the moment, but that there would be no difficulty after a little reflection.

Glaucon/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Suppose, then, we invite him to follow us and see if we can convince him that there is no occupation concerned with the management of social affairs that is peculiar to women. We will confront him with a question: When you speak of a man having a natural talent for something, do you mean that he finds it easy to learn, and

after a little instruction can find out much more for himself; whereas a man who is not so gifted learns with difficulty and no amount of instruction and practice will make him even remember what he has been taught? Is the talented man one whose bodily powers are readily at the service of his mind, instead of being a hindrance? Are not these the marks by which you distinguish the presence of a natural gift for any pursuit?

Glaucon/ Yes, precisely.

Socrates/ Now do you know of any human occupation in which the male sex is not superior to the female in all these respects? Need I waste time over exceptions like weaving and watching over saucepans and batches of cakes, though women are supposed to be good at such things and get laughed at when a man does them better?

Glaucon/ It is true, in almost everything one sex is easily beaten by the other. No doubt many women are better at many things than many men; but taking the sexes as a whole, it is as you say.

Socrates/ To conclude, then, there is no occupation concerned with the management of social affairs which belongs either to woman or to man, as such. Natural gifts are to be found here and there in both creatures alike; and every occupation is open to both, so far as their natures are concerned, though woman is for all purposes the weaker.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is that a reason for making over all occupations to men only?

Glaucon/ Of course not.

Socrates/ No, because one woman may have a natural gift for medicine or for music, another may not.

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ Is it not also true that a woman may, or may not, be warlike or athletic?

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ And again, one may love knowledge, another hate it; one may be high-spirited, another spiritless?

Glaucon/ True again.

Socrates/ It follows that one woman will be fitted by nature to be a Guardian, another will not; because these were the qualities for which we selected our men Guardians. So for the purpose of keeping watch over the commonwealth, woman has the same nature as man, save in so far as she is weaker.

Glaucon/ So it appears.

Socrates/ It follows that women of this type must be selected to share the life and duties of Guardians with men of the same type, since they are competent and of a like nature, and the same natures must be allowed the same pursuits.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ We come round, then, to our former position, that there is nothing contrary to nature in giving our Guardians' wives the same training for mind and body. The practice we proposed to establish was not impossible or visionary, since it was in accordance with nature. Rather, the contrary practice which now prevails turns out to be unnatural.

Glaucon/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Well, we set out to inquire whether the plan we proposed was feasible and also the best. That it is feasible is now agreed; we must next settle whether it is the best.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Now, for the purpose of producing a woman fit to be a Guardian, we shall not have one education for men and another for women, precisely because the nature to be taken in hand is the same.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ What is your opinion on the question of one man being better than another? Do you think there is no such difference?

Glaucon/ Certainly I do not.

Socrates/ And in this commonwealth of ours which will prove the better men—the Guardians who have received the education we described, or the shoemakers who have been trained to make shoes?

Glaucon/ It is absurd to ask such a question.

Socrates/ Very well. So these Guardians will be the best of all the citizens?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And these women the best of all the women?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Can anything be better for a commonwealth than to produce in it men and women of the best possible type?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ And that result will be brought about by such a system of mental and bodily training as we have described?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ We may conclude that the institution we proposed was not only practicable, but also the best for the commonwealth.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ The wives of our Guardians, then, must strip for exercise, since they will be clothed with virtue, and they must take their share in war and in the other social duties of guardianship. They are to have no other occupation; and in these duties the lighter part must fall to the women, because of the weakness of their sex. The man who laughs at naked women, exercising their bodies for the best of reasons, is like one that 'gathers fruit unripe', for he does not know what it is that he is laughing at or what he is doing. There will never be a finer saying than the one which declares that whatever does good should be held in honor, and the only shame is in doing harm.

Glaucon/ That is perfectly true.

Socrates/ So far, then, in regulating the position of women, we may claim to have come safely through with one hazardous proposal, that male and female Guardians shall have all occupations in common. The consistency of the argument is an assurance that the plan is a good one and also feasible. We are like swimmers who have breasted the first wave without being swallowed up.

Glaucon/ Not such a small wave either.

Socrates/ You will not call it large when you see the next.

Glaucon/ Let me have a look at the next one, then.

Socrates/ Here it is: a law which follows from that principle and all that has gone before, namely that, of these Guardians, no one man and one woman are to set up house together privately: wives are to be held in common by all; so too are the children, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent.

Glaucon/ It will be much harder to convince people that that is either a feasible plan or a good one.

Socrates/ As to its being a good plan, I imagine no one would deny the immense advantage of wives and children

being held in common, provided it can be done. I should expect dispute to arise chiefly over the question whether it is possible.

Glaucon/ There may well be a good deal of dispute over both points.

Socrates/ You mean, I must meet attacks on two fronts. I was hoping to escape one by running away: if you agreed it was a good plan, then I should only have had to inquire whether it was feasible.

Glaucon/ No, we have seen through that maneuver. You will have to defend both positions.

Socrates/ Well, I must pay the penalty for my cowardice. But grant me one favor. Let me indulge my fancy, like one who entertains himself with idle day-dreams on a solitary walk. Before he has any notion how his desires can be realized, he will set aside that question, to save himself the trouble of reckoning what may or may not be possible. He will assume that his wish has come true, and amuse himself with settling all the details of what he means to do then. So a lazy mind encourages itself to be lazier than ever; and I am giving way to the same weakness myself. I want to put off till later that question, how the thing can be done. For the moment, with your leave, I shall assume it to be possible, and ask how the Rulers will work out the details in practice; and I shall argue that the plan, once carried into effect, would be the best thing in the world for our commonwealth and for its Guardians. That is what I shall now try to make out with your help, if you will allow me to postpone the other question.

Glaucon/ Very good; I have no objection.

Socrates/ Well, if our Rulers are worthy of the name, and their Auxiliaries likewise, these latter will be ready to do what they are told, and the Rulers, in giving their

commands, will themselves obey our laws and will be faithful to their spirit in any details we leave to their discretion.

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ It is for you, then, as their lawgiver, who have already selected the men, to select for association with them women who are so far as possible of the same natural capacity. Now since none of them will have any private home of his own, but they will share the same dwelling and eat at common tables, the two sexes will be together; and meeting without restriction for exercise and all through their upbringing, they will surely be drawn towards union with one another by a necessity of their nature—necessity is not too strong a word, I think?

Glaucon/ Not too strong for the constraint of love, which for the mass of mankind is more persuasive and compelling than even the necessity of mathematical proof.

Socrates/ Exactly. But in the next place, Glaucon, anything like unregulated unions would be a profanation in a state whose citizens lead the good life. The Rulers will not allow such a thing.

Glaucon/ No, it would not be right.

Socrates/ Clearly, then, we must have marriages, as sacred as we can make them; and this sanctity will attach to those which yield the best results.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ How are we to get the best results? You must tell me, Glaucon, because I see you keep sporting dogs and a great many game birds at your house; and there is something about their mating and breeding that you must have noticed.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ In the first place, though they may all be of good stock, are there not some that turn out to be better than the rest?

Glaucon/ There are.

Socrates/ And do you breed from all indiscriminately? Are you not careful to breed from the best so far as you can?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And from those in their prime, rather than the very young or the very old?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Otherwise, the stock of your birds or dogs would deteriorate very much, wouldn't it?

Glaucon/ It would.

Socrates/ And the same is true of horses or of any animal?

Glaucon/ It would be very strange if it were not.

Socrates/ Dear me; we shall need consummate skill in our Rulers, if it is also true of the human race.

Glaucon/ Well, it is true. But why must they be so skillful?

Socrates/ Because they will have to administer a large dose of that medicine we spoke of earlier. An ordinary doctor is thought good enough for a patient who will submit to be dieted and can do without medicine; but he must be much more of a man if drugs are required.

Glaucon/ True, but how does that apply?

Socrates/ It applies to our Rulers: it seems they will have to give their subjects a considerable dose of imposition and deception for their good. We said, if you remember, that such expedients would be useful as a sort of medicine.

Glaucon/ Yes, a very sound principle.

Socrates/ Well, it looks as if this sound principle will play no small part in this matter of marriage and child-bearing.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ It follows from what we have just said that, if we are to keep our flock at the highest pitch of excellence, there should be as many unions of the best of both sexes, and as few of the inferior, as possible, and that only the offspring of the better unions should be kept. And again, no one but the Rulers must know how all this is being effected; otherwise our herd of Guardians may become rebellious.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ We must, then, institute certain festivals at which we shall bring together the brides and the bridegrooms. There will be sacrifices, and our poets will write songs befitting the occasion. The number of marriages we shall leave to the Rulers' discretion. They will aim at keeping the number of the citizens as constant as possible, having regard to losses caused by war, epidemics, and so on; and they must do their best to see that our state does not become either great or small.

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ I think they will have to invent some ingenious system of drawing lots, so that, at each pairing off, the inferior candidate may blame his luck rather than the Rulers.

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Moreover, young men who acquit themselves well in war and other duties, should be given, among other rewards and privileges, more liberal opportunities to sleep with a wife, for the further purpose that, with good excuse, as many as possible of the children may be begotten of such fathers.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ As soon as children are born, they will be taken in charge by officers appointed for the purpose, who may be men or women or both, since offices are to be shared by both sexes. The children of the better parents they will carry to the crèche to be reared in the care of nurses living apart in a certain quarter of the city. Those of the inferior parents and any children of the rest that are born defective will be hidden away, in some appropriate manner that must be kept secret.

Glaucon/ They must be, if the breed of our Guardians is to be kept pure.

Socrates/ These officers will also superintend the nursing of the children. They will bring the mothers to the crèche when their breasts are full, while taking every precaution that no mother shall know her own child; and if the mothers have not enough milk, they will provide wet-nurses. They will limit the time during which the mothers will suckle their children, and hand over all the hard work and sitting up at night to nurses and attendants.

Glaucon/ That will make child-bearing an easy business for the Guardians' wives.

Socrates/ So it should be. To go on with our scheme: we said that children should be born from parents in the prime of life. Do you agree that this lasts about twenty years for a woman, and thirty for a man? A woman should bear children for the commonwealth from her twentieth to her fortieth year; a man should begin to beget them when he has passed 'the racer's prime in swiftness', and continue till he is fifty-five.

Glaucon/ Those are certainly the years in which both the bodily and the mental powers of man and woman are at their best.

Socrates/ If a man either above or below this age meddles with the begetting of children for the commonwealth, we shall hold it an offence against divine and human law. He will be begetting for his country a child conceived in darkness and dire incontinence, whose birth, if it escape detection, will not have been sanctioned by the sacrifices and prayers offered at each marriage festival, when priests and priestesses join with the whole community in praying that the children to be born may be even better and more useful citizens than their parents.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ The same law will apply to any man within the prescribed limits who touches a woman also of marriageable age when the Ruler has not paired them. We shall say that he is foisting on the commonwealth a bastard, unsanctioned by law or by religion.

Glaucon/ Perfectly right.

Socrates/ As soon, however, as the men and the women have passed the age prescribed for producing children, we shall leave them free to form a connection with whom they will, except that a man shall not take his daughter or daughter's daughter or mother or mother's mother, nor a woman her son or father or her son's son or father's father; and all this only after we have exhorted them to see that no child, if any be conceived, shall be brought to light, or, if they cannot prevent its birth, to dispose of it on the understanding that no such child can be reared.

Glaucon/ That too is reasonable. But how are they to distinguish fathers and daughters and those other relations you mentioned?

Socrates/ They will not. But, reckoning from the day when he becomes a bridegroom, a man will call all children born in the tenth or the seventh month sons and daughters,

and they will call him father. Their children again he will call grandchildren, and they will call his group grandfathers and grandmothers; and all who are born within the period during which their mothers and fathers were having children will be called brothers and sisters. This will provide for those restrictions on unions that we mentioned; but the law will allow brothers and sisters to live together, if the lot so falls out and the Delphic oracle also approves.

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ This, then, Glaucon, is the manner in which the Guardians of your commonwealth are to hold their wives and children in common. Must we not next find arguments to establish that it is consistent with our other institutions and also by far the best plan?

Glaucon/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ We had better begin by asking what is the greatest good at which the lawgiver should aim in laying down the constitution of a state, and what is the worst evil. We can then consider whether our proposals are in keeping with that good and irreconcilable with the evil.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Does not the worst evil for a state arise from anything that tends to rend it asunder and destroy its unity, while nothing does it more good than whatever tends to bind it together and make it one?

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ And are not citizens bound together by sharing in the same pleasures and pains, all feeling glad or grieved on the same occasions of gain or loss; whereas the bond is broken when such feelings are no longer universal, but any event of public or personal concern fills some with joy and others with distress?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And this disunion comes about when the words 'mine' and 'not mine', 'another's' and 'not another's' are not applied to the same things throughout the community. The best ordered state will be the one in which the largest number of persons use these terms in the same sense, and which accordingly most nearly resembles a single person. When one of us hurts his finger, the whole extent of those bodily connections which are gathered up in the soul and unified by its ruling element is made aware and it all shares as a whole in the pain of the suffering part; hence we say that the man has a pain in his finger. The same thing is true of the pain or pleasure felt when any other part of the person suffers or is relieved.

Glaucon/ Yes; I agree that the best organized community comes nearest to that condition.

Socrates/ And so it will recognize as a part of itself the individual citizen to whom good or evil happens, and will share as a whole in his joy or sorrow.

Glaucon/ It must, if the constitution is sound.

Socrates/ It is time now to go back to our own commonwealth and see whether these conclusions apply to it more than to any other type of state. In all alike there are rulers and common people, a of whom will call one another fellow citizens.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But in other states the people have another name as well for their rulers, haven't they?

Glaucon/ Yes; in most they call them masters; in democracies, simply the government.

Socrates/ And in ours?

Glaucon/ The people will look upon their rulers as preservers and protectors.

Socrates/ And how will our rulers regard the people?

Glaucon/ As those who maintain them and pay them wages.

Socrates/ And elsewhere?

Glaucon/ As slaves.

Socrates/ And what do rulers elsewhere call one another?

Glaucon/ Colleagues.

Socrates/ And ours?

Glaucon/ Fellow Guardians.

Socrates/ And in other states may not a ruler regard one colleague as a friend in whom he has an interest, and another as a stranger with whom he has nothing in common?

Glaucon/ Yes, that often happens.

Socrates/ But that could not be so with your Guardians? None of them could ever treat a fellow Guardian as a stranger.

Glaucon/ Certainly not. He must regard everyone whom he meets as brother or sister, father or mother, son or daughter, grandchild or grandparent.

Socrates/ Very good; but here is a further point. Will you not require them, not merely to use these family terms, but to behave as a real family? Must they not show towards all whom they call 'father' the customary reverence, care, and obedience due to a parent, if they look for any favor from gods or men, since to act otherwise is contrary to divine and human law? Should not all the citizens constantly reiterate in the hearing of the children from their earliest years such traditional maxims of conduct towards those whom they are taught to call father and their other kindred?

Glaucon/ They should. It would be absurd that terms of kinship should be on their lips without any action to correspond.

Socrates/ In our community, then, above all others, when things go well or ill with any individual everyone will use that word 'mine' in the same sense and say that all is going well or ill with him and his.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And, as we said, this way of speaking and thinking goes with fellow-feeling; so that our citizens, sharing as they do in a common interest which each will call his own, will have all their feelings of pleasure or pain in common.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ A result that will be due to our institutions, and in particular to our Guardians' holding their wives and children in common.

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ But you will remember how, when we compared a well-ordered community to the body which shares in the pleasures and pains of any member, we saw in this unity the greatest good that a state can enjoy. So the conclusion is that our commonwealth owes to this sharing of wives and children by its protectors its enjoyment of the greatest of all goods.

Glaucon/ Yes, that follows.

Socrates/ Moreover, this agrees with our principle that they were not to have houses or lands or any property of their own, but to receive sustenance from the other citizens, as wages for their guardianship, and to consume it in common. Only so will they keep to their true character; and our present proposals will do still more to make them genuine Guardians. They will not rend the community

asunder by each applying that word 'mine' to different things and dragging off whatever he can get for himself into a private home, where he will have his separate family, forming a center of exclusive joys and sorrows. Rather they will all, so far as may be, feel together and aim at the same ends, because they are convinced that all their interests are identical.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Again, if a man's person is his only private possession, lawsuits and prosecutions will all but vanish, and they will be free of those quarrels that arise from ownership of property and from having family ties. Nor would they be justified even in bringing actions for assault and outrage; for we shall pronounce it right and honorable for a man to defend himself against an assailant of his own age, and in that way they will be compelled to keep themselves fit.

Glaucon/ That would be a sound law.

Socrates/ And it would also have the advantage that, if a man's anger can be satisfied in this way, a fit of passion is less likely to grow into a serious quarrel.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But an older man will be given authority over all younger persons and power to correct them; whereas the younger will, naturally, not dare to strike the elder or do him any violence, except by command of a Ruler. He will not show him any sort of disrespect. Two guardian spirits, fear and reverence, will be enough to restrain him—reverence forbidding him to lay hands on a parent, and fear of all those others who as sons or brothers or fathers would come to the rescue.

Glaucon/ Yes, that will be the result.

Socrates/ So our laws will secure that these men will live in complete peace with one another; and if they never quarrel among themselves, there is no fear of the rest of the community being divided either against them or against itself.

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ There are other evils they will escape, so mean and petty that I hardly like to mention them: the poor man's flattery of the rich, and all the embarrassments and vexations of rearing a family and earning just enough to maintain a household; now borrowing and now refusing to repay, and by any and every means scraping together money to be handed over to wife and servants to spend. These sordid troubles are familiar and not worth describing.

Glaucon/ Only too familiar.

Socrates/ Rid of all these cares, they will live a more enviable life than the Olympic victor, who is counted happy on the strength of far fewer blessings than our Guardians will enjoy. Their victory is the nobler, since by their success the whole commonwealth is preserved; and their reward of maintenance at the public cost is more complete, since their prize is to have every need of life supplied for themselves and for their children; their country honors them while they live, and when they die they receive a worthy burial.

Glaucon/ Yes, they will be nobly rewarded.

Socrates/ Do you remember, then, how someone who shall be nameless reproached us for not making our Guardians happy: they were to possess nothing, though all the wealth of their fellow citizens was within their grasp? We replied, I believe, that we would consider that objection later, if it came in our way: for the moment we were bent on making our Guardians real guardians, and molding our

commonwealth with a view to the greatest happiness, not of one section of it, but of the whole.

Glaucon/ Yes, I remember.

Socrates/ Well, it appears now that these protectors of our state will have a life better and more honorable than that of any Olympic victor; and we can hardly rank it on a level with the life of a shoemaker or other artisan or of a farmer.

Glaucon/ I should think not.

Socrates/ However, it is right to repeat what I said at the time: if ever a Guardian tries to make himself happy in such a way that he will be a guardian no longer; if, not content with the moderation and security of this way of living which we think the best, he becomes possessed with some silly and childish notion of happiness, impelling him to make his power a means to appropriate all the citizens' wealth, then he will learn the wisdom of Hesiod's saying that the half is more than the whole.

Glaucon/ My advice would certainly be that he should keep to his own way of living.

Socrates/ You do agree, then, that women are to take their full share with men in education, in the care of children, and in the guardianship of the other citizens; whether they stay at home or go out to war, they will be like watch-dogs which take their part either in guarding the fold or in hunting and share in every task so far as their strength allows. Such conduct will not be unwomanly, but all for the best and in accordance with the natural partnership of the sexes.

Glaucon/ Yes, I agree.


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Socrates/ It remains to ask whether such a partnership can be established among human beings, as it can among animals, and if so, how.

Glaucon/ I was just going to put that question.

Socrates/ So far as fighting is concerned, it is easy to see how they will go out to war.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Men and women will take the field together and moreover bring with them the children who are sturdy enough, to learn this trade, like any other, by watching what they will have to do themselves when they are grown up; and besides looking on, they will fetch and carry for their fathers and mothers and see to all their needs in time of war. You must have noticed how, in the potter's trade for example, the children watch their fathers and wait on them long before they may touch the wheel. Ought our Guardians to be less careful to train theirs by letting them look on and become familiar with their duties?

Glaucon/ No, that would be absurd.

Socrates/ Moreover, any creature will fight better in the presence of its young.

Glaucon/ That is so. But in case of defeat, which may always happen in war, there will be serious danger of their children's lives being lost with their own, so that the country could never recover.

Socrates/ True; but, in the first place, do you think we must make sure that they never run any risk?

Glaucon/ No, far from it.

Socrates/ Well, if they are ever to take their chance, should it not be on some occasion when, if all goes well, they will be the better for it?

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And is it of no importance that men who are to be warriors should see something of war in childhood? Is that not worth some danger?

Glaucon/ Yes; it is important.

Socrates/ Granted, then, that the children are to go to war as spectators, all will be well if we can contrive that they shall do so in safety. To begin with, their fathers will not be slow to judge, so far as human foresight can, which expeditions are hazardous and which are safe; and they will be careful not to take the children into danger. Also they will put them in charge of officers qualified by age and experience to lead and take care of them.

Glaucon/ Yes, that would be the proper way.

Socrates/ All the same, the unexpected often happens; and to guard against such chances we must see that they have, from their earliest years, wings to fly away with if need be.

Glaucon/ What do you mean by wings?

Socrates/ Horses, which they must be taught to ride at the earliest possible age; then, when they are taken to see the fighting, their mounts must not be spirited chargers but the swiftest we can find and the easiest to manage. In that way they will get a good view of their future business, and in case of need they will be able to keep up with their older leaders and escape in safety.

Glaucon/ That seems an excellent plan.

Socrates/ Now, as to the conduct of war and your soldiers' relations to one another and to the enemy: am I right in thinking that anyone guilty of an act of cowardice, such as deserting his post or throwing away his arms, should be reduced to the artisan or farmer class; while if any fall alive

into the enemy's hands, we shall make them a present of him, and they may do what they like with their prey?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what shall be done to the hero who has distinguished himself by his velour? First, should he not be crowned on the field by the youths and children each in turn?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ And they might shake his hand?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But you would stop there, no doubt. I am sure you would not approve of his exchanging kisses with them all?

Glaucon/ I am all for that; indeed I would add to the law the provision that, so long as they are on the campaign, no one whom he wishes to kiss may refuse. That would make any soldier who chanced to be in love with a youth or a girl all the more eager to win the prize of velour.

Socrates/ Very well. We have already said that the brave man is to be selected for marriage more frequently than the rest, so that as many children as possible may have such a man for their father. But besides that, these valiant youths may well be rewarded in the Homeric manner. When Ajax distinguished himself in the war, he was 'honored with slices of the chine's full length', a suitable compliment to a lusty young hero, and one that would at the same time strengthen his muscles.

Glaucon/ An excellent idea.

Socrates/ Then here at any rate we will follow Homer. At sacrificial feasts and all such occasions, we shall reward the brave, in proportion to their merit, not only with songs and those privileges we mentioned but 'with seats of honor, meat,

and cups brimful'; and so at once pay tribute to the bravery of these men and women and improve their physique.

Glaucon/ Nothing could be better.

Socrates/ Good. And of those who are slain in the field, we shall say that all who fell with honor are of that Golden Race, who, when they die;

> Dwell here on earth, pure spirits, beneficent,
> Guardians to shield us mortal men from harm.

Shall we not believe those words of Hesiod?

Glaucon/ We shall.

Socrates/ Then we shall ask the Oracle with what special rites these men of more than human mold should be buried, and we shall do as it prescribes. And for all time to come we shall reverence their tombs and worship them as demigods. Others, too, who die in the natural course of old age or otherwise shall be honored in the same way, if they are judged to have led an exceptionally noble life.

Glaucon/ That is but fair.

Socrates/ And next, how will our soldiers deal with enemies?

Glaucon/ In what respect?

Socrates/ First take slavery. Is it right that Greek states should sell Greeks into slavery? Ought they not rather to do all they can to stop this practice and substitute the custom of sparing their own race, for fear of falling into bondage to foreign nations?

Glaucon/ That would be better, beyond all comparison.

Socrates/ They must not, then, hold any Greek in slavery themselves, and they should advise the rest of Greece not to do so.

Glaucon/ Certainly. Then they would be more likely to keep their hands off one another and turn their energies against foreigners.

Socrates/ Next, is it well to strip the dead, after a victory, of anything but their arms? It only gives cowards an excuse for not facing the living enemy, as if they were usefully employed in poking about over a dead body. Many an army has been lost through this pillaging. There is something mean and greedy in plundering a corpse; and a sort of womanish pettiness in treating the body as an enemy, when the spirit, the real enemy, has flown, leaving behind only the instrument with which he fought. It is to behave no better than a dog who growls at the stone that has hit him and leaves alone the man who threw it.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ So we will have no stripping of the slain and we shall not prevent their comrades from burying them. Nor shall we dedicate in the temples trophies of their weapons, least of all those of Greeks, if we are concerned to show loyalty towards the rest of Hellas. We shall rather be afraid of desecrating a sanctuary by bringing to it such spoils of our own people, unless indeed the Oracle should pronounce otherwise.

Glaucon/ That is very right.

Socrates/ And what of ravaging Greek lands and burning houses? How will your soldiers deal with their enemies in this matter?

Glaucon/ I should like to hear your own opinion.

Socrates/ I think they should do neither, but only carry off the year's harvest. Shall I tell you why?

Glaucon/ Please do.

Socrates/ It seems to me that war and civil strife differ in nature as they do in name, according to the two spheres in

which disputes may arise: at home or abroad, among men of the same race or with foreigners. War means fighting with a foreign enemy; when the enemy is of the same kindred, we call it civil strife.

Glaucon/ That is a reasonable distinction.

Socrates/ Is it not also reasonable to assert that Greeks are a single people, all of the same kindred and alien to the outer world of foreigners?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we shall speak of war when Greeks fight with foreigners, whom we may call their natural enemies. But Greeks are by nature friends of Greeks, and when they fight, it means that Hellas is afflicted by dissension which ought to be called civil strife.

Glaucon/ I agree with that view.

Socrates/ Observe, then, that in what is commonly known as civil strife, that is to say, when one of our Greek states is divided against itself, it is thought an abominable outrage for either party to ravage the lands or burn the houses of the other. No lover of his country would dare to mangle the land which gave him birth and nursed him. It is thought fair that the victors should carry off the others' crops, but do no more. They should remember that the war will not last forever; some day they must make friends again.

Glaucon/ That is a much more civilized state of mind.

Socrates/ Well then, is not this commonwealth you are founding a Greek state, and its citizens good and civilized people?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And lovers of Greece, who will think of all Hellas as their home, where they share in one common religion with the rest?

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Accordingly, the Greeks being their own people, a quarrel with them will not be called a war. It will only be civil strife, which they will carry on as men who will someday be reconciled. So they will not behave like a foreign enemy seeking to enslave or destroy, but will try to bring their adversaries to reason by well-meant correction. As Greeks they will not devastate the soil of Greece or burn the homesteads; nor will they allow that all the inhabitants of any state, men, women, and children, are their enemies, but only the few who are responsible for the quarrel. The greater number are friends, whose land and houses, on all these accounts, they will not consent to lay waste and destroy. They will pursue the quarrel only until the guilty are compelled by the innocent sufferers to give satisfaction.

Glaucon/ For my part, I agree that our citizens should treat their adversaries in that way, and deal with foreigners as Greeks now deal with one another.

Socrates/ We will make this a law, then, for our Guardians: they are not to ravage lands or burn houses.

Glaucon/ Yes, we will; it is as satisfactory as all our other laws. But really, Socrates, if you are allowed to go on like this, I am afraid you will forget all about the question you thrust aside some time ago: whether a society so constituted can ever come into existence, and if so, how. No doubt, if it did exist, all manner of good things would come about. I can even add some that you have passed over. Men who acknowledged one another as fathers, sons, or brothers and always used those names among themselves would never desert one another; so they would fight with unequalled bravery. And if their womenfolk went out with them to war, either in the ranks or drawn up in the rear to intimidate the enemy and act as a reserve in case of need, I am sure all this

would make them invincible. At home, too, I can see many advantages you have not mentioned. But, since I admit that our commonwealth would have all these merits and any number more, if once it came into existence, you need not describe it in further detail. All we have now to do is to convince ourselves that it can be brought into being and how.

Socrates/ This is a very sudden onslaught; you have no mercy on my shilly-shallying. Perhaps you do not realize that, after I have barely escaped the first two waves, the third, which you are now bringing down upon me, is the most formidable of all. When you have seen what it is like and heard my reply, you will be ready to excuse the very natural fears which made me shrink from putting forward such a paradox for discussion.

Glaucon/ The more you talk like that, the less we shall be willing to let you off from telling us how this constitution can come into existence; so you had better waste no more time.

Socrates/ Well, let me begin by reminding you that what brought us to this point was our inquiry into the nature of justice and injustice.

Glaucon/ True; but what of that?

Socrates/ Merely this: suppose we do find out what justice is, are we going to demand that a man who is just shall have a character which exactly corresponds in every respect to the ideal of justice? Or shall we be satisfied if he comes as near to the ideal as possible and has in him a larger measure of that quality than the rest of the world?

Glaucon/ That will satisfy me.

Socrates/ If so, when we set out to discover the essential nature of justice and injustice and what a perfectly just and a perfectly unjust man would be like, supposing them to

exist, our purpose was to use them as ideal patterns: we were to observe the degree of happiness or unhappiness that each exhibited, and to draw the necessary inference that our own destiny would be like that of the one we most resembled. We did not set out to show that these ideals could exist in fact.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then suppose a painter had drawn an ideally beautiful figure complete to the last touch, would you think any the worse of him, if he could not show that a person as beautiful as that could exist?

Glaucon/ No, I should not.

Socrates/ Well, we have been constructing in discourse the pattern of an ideal state. Is our theory any the worse, if we cannot prove it possible that a state so organized should be actually founded?

Glaucon/ Surely not.

Socrates/ That, then, is the truth of the matter. But if, for your satisfaction, I am to do my best to show under what conditions our ideal would have the best chance of being realized, I must ask you once more to admit that the same principle applies here. Can theory ever be fully realized in practice? Is it not in the nature of things that action should come less close to truth than thought? People may not think so; but do you agree or not?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then you must not insist upon my showing that this construction we have traced in thought could be reproduced in fact down to the last detail. You must admit that we shall have found a way to meet your demand for realization, if we can discover how a state might be constituted in the closest accordance with our description. Will not that content you? It would be enough for me.

Glaucon/ And for me too.

Socrates/ Then our next attempt, it seems, must be to point out what defect in the working of existing states prevents them from being so organized, and what is the least change that would effect a transformation into this type of government—a single change if possible, or perhaps two; at any rate let us make the changes as few and insignificant as may be.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Well, there is one change which, as I believe we can show, would bring about this revolution—not a small change, certainly, nor an easy one, but possible.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ I have now to confront what we called the third and greatest wave. But I must state my paradox, even though the wave should break in laughter over my head and drown me in ignominy. Now mark what I am going to say.

Glaucon/ Go on.

Socrates/ Unless either philosophers become kings in their countries or those who are now called kings and rulers come to be sufficiently inspired with a genuine desire for wisdom; unless, that is to say, political power and philosophy meet together, while the many natures who now go their several ways in the one or the other direction are forcibly debarred from doing so, there can be no rest from troubles, my dear Glaucon, for states, nor yet, as I believe, for all mankind; nor can this commonwealth which we have imagined ever till then see the light of day and grow to its full stature. This it was that I have so long hung back from saying; I knew what a paradox it would be, because it is hard to see that there is no other way of happiness either for the state or for the individual.

Glaucon/ Socrates, after delivering yourself of such a pronouncement as that, you must expect a whole multitude of by no means contemptible assailants to fling off their coats, snatch up the handiest weapon, and make a rush at you, breathing fire and slaughter. If you cannot find arguments to beat them off and make your escape, you will learn what it means to be the target of scorn and derision.

Socrates/ Well, it was you who got me into this trouble.

Glaucon/ Yes, and a good thing too.

Socrates/ However, I will not leave you in the lurch. You shall have my friendly encouragement for what it is worth; and perhaps you may find me more complaisant than some would be in answering your questions. With such backing you must try to convince the unbelievers.

Glaucon/ I will, now that I have such a powerful ally.

Socrates/ Now, if we are to elude those assailants you have described, we must, I think, define for them whom we mean by these lovers of wisdom who, we have dared to assert, ought to be our rulers. Once we have a clear view of their character, we shall be able to defend our position by pointing to some who are naturally fitted to combine philosophic study with political leadership, while the rest of the world should accept their guidance and let philosophy alone.

Glaucon/ Yes, this is the moment for a definition.

Socrates/ Here, then, is a line of thought which may lead to a satisfactory explanation. Need I remind you that a man will deserve to be called a lover of this or that, only if it is clear that he loves that thing as a whole, not merely in parts?

Glaucon/ You must remind me, it seems; for I do not see what you mean.

Socrates/ That answer would have come better from someone less susceptible to love than yourself, Glaucon. You

ought not to have forgotten that any boy in the bloom of youth will arouse some sting of passion in a man of your amorous temperament and seem worthy of his attentions. Is not this your way with your favorites? You will praise a snub nose as piquant and a hooked one as giving a regal air, while you call a straight nose perfectly proportioned; the swarthy, you say, have a manly look, the fair are children of the gods; and what do you think is that word 'honey-pale', if not the euphemism of some lover who had no fault to find with sallowness on the cheek of youth? In a word, you will carry pretense and extravagance to any length sooner than reject a single one that is in the flower of his prime.

Glaucon/ If you insist on taking me as an example of how lovers behave, I will agree for the sake of argument.

Socrates/ Again, do you not see the same behavior in people with a passion for wine? They are glad of any excuse to drink wine of any sort. And there are the men who covet honor, who, if they cannot lead an army, will command a company, and if they cannot win the respect of important people, are glad to be looked up to by nobodies, because they must have someone to esteem them.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Do you agree, then, that when we speak of a man as having a passion for a certain kind of thing, we mean that he has an appetite for everything of that kind without discrimination?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ So the philosopher, with his passion for wisdom, will be one who desires all wisdom, not only some part of it. If a student is particular about his studies, especially while he is too young to know which are useful and which are not, we shall say he is no lover of learning or of wisdom; just as, if he were dainty about his food, we

should say he was not hungry or fond of eating, but had a poor appetite. Only the man who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and throws himself into acquiring it with an insatiable curiosity will deserve to be called a philosopher. Am I not right?

Glaucon/ That description would include a large and ill-assorted company. It is curiosity, I suppose, and a delight in fresh experience that gives some people a passion for all that is to be seen and heard at theatrical and musical performances. But they are a queer set to reckon among philosophers, considering that they would never go near anything like a philosophical discussion, though they run round at all the Dionysiac festivals in town or country as if they were under contract to listen to every company of performers without fail. Will curiosity entitle all these enthusiasts, not to mention amateurs of the minor arts, to be called philosophers?

Socrates/ Certainly not; though they have a certain counterfeit resemblance.

Glaucon/ And whom do you mean by the genuine philosophers?

Socrates/ Those whose passion it is to see the truth.

Glaucon/ That must be so; but will you explain?

Socrates/ It would not be easy to explain to everyone; but you, I believe, will grant my premise.

Glaucon/ Which is-------?

Socrates/ That since beauty and ugliness are opposite, they are two things; and consequently each of them is one. The same holds of justice and injustice, good and bad, and all the essential Forms: each in itself is one; but they manifest themselves in a great variety of combinations, with actions, with material things, and with one another, and so each seems to be many.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ On the strength of this premise, then, I can distinguish your amateurs of the arts and men of action from the philosophers we are concerned with, who are alone worthy of the name.

Glaucon/ What is your distinction?

Socrates/ Your lovers of sights and sounds delight in beautiful tones and colors and shapes and in all the works of art into which these enter; but they have not the power of thought to behold and to take delight in the nature of Beauty itself. That power to approach Beauty and behold it as it is in itself, is rare indeed.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Now if a man believes in the existence of beautiful things, but not of Beauty itself, and cannot follow a guide who would lead him to a knowledge of it, is he not living in a dream? Consider: does not dreaming, whether one is awake or asleep, consist in mistaking a semblance for the reality it resembles?

Glaucon/ I should certainly call that dreaming.

Socrates/ Contrast with him the man who holds that there is such a thing as Beauty itself and can discern that essence as well as the things that partake of its character, without ever confusing the one with the other—is he a dreamer or living in a waking state?

Glaucon/ He is very much awake.

Socrates/ So may we say that he knows, while the other has only a belief in appearances; and might we call their states of mind knowledge and belief?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But this person who, we say, has only belief without knowledge may be aggrieved and challenge our

statement. Is there any means of soothing his resentment and converting him gently, without telling him plainly that he is not in his right mind?

Glaucon/ We surely ought to try.

Socrates/ Come then, consider what we are to say to him. Or shall we ask him a question, assuring him that, far from grudging him any knowledge he may have, we shall be only too glad to find that there is something he knows? But, we shall say, tell us this: When a man knows, must there not be something that he knows? Will you answer for him, Glaucon?

Glaucon/ My answer will be, that there must.

Socrates/ Something real or unreal?

Glaucon/ Something real; how could a thing that is unreal ever be known?

Socrates/ Are we satisfied, then, on this point, from however many points of view we might examine it: that the perfectly real is perfectly knowable, and the utterly unreal is entirely unknowable?

Glaucon/ Quite satisfied.

Socrates/ Good. Now if there is something so constituted that it both is and is not, will it not lie between the purely real and the utterly unreal?

Glaucon/ It will.

Socrates/ Well then, as knowledge corresponds to the real, and absence of knowledge necessarily to the unreal, so, to correspond to this intermediate thing, we must look for something between ignorance and knowledge, if such a thing there be.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is there not a thing we call belief?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ A different power from knowledge, or the same?

Glaucon/ Different.

Socrates/ Knowledge and belief, then, must have different objects, answering to their respective powers.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And knowledge has for its natural object the real—to know the truth about reality. However, before going further, I think we need a definition. Shall we distinguish under the general name of faculties' those powers which enable us—or anything else—to do what we can do? Sight and hearing, for instance, are what I call faculties, if that will help you to see the class of things I have in mind.

Glaucon/ Yes, I understand.

Socrates/ Then let me tell you what view I take of them. In a faculty I cannot find any of those qualities, such as color or shape, which, in the case of many other things, enable me to distinguish one thing from another. I can only look to its field of objects and the state of mind it produces, and regard these as sufficient to identify it and to distinguish it from faculties which have different fields and produce different states. Is that how you would go to work?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us go back, then, to knowledge. Would you class that as a faculty?

Glaucon/ Yes; and I should call it the most powerful of all.

Socrates/ And is belief also a faculty?

Glaucon/ It can be nothing else, since it is what gives us the power of believing.

Socrates/ But a little while ago you agreed that knowledge and belief are not the same thing.

Glaucon/ Yes; there could be no sense in identifying the infallible with the fallible.

Socrates/ Good. So we are quite clear that knowledge and belief are different things?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ If so, each of them, having a different power, must have a different field of objects.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ The field of knowledge being the real; and its power, the power of knowing the real as it is.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whereas belief, we say, is the power of believing. Is its object the same as that which knowledge knows? Can the same things be possible objects both of knowledge and of belief?

Glaucon/ Not if we hold to the principles we agreed upon. If it is of the nature of a different faculty to have a different field, and if both knowledge and belief are faculties and, as we assert, different ones, it follows that the same things cannot be possible objects of both.

Socrates/ So if the real is the object of knowledge, the object of belief must be something other than the real.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Can it be the unreal? Or is that an impossible object even for belief? Consider: if a man has a belief, there must be something before his mind; he cannot be believing nothing, Can he?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ He is believing something, then; whereas the unreal could only be called nothing at all.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now we said that ignorance must correspond to the unreal, knowledge to the real. So what he is believing cannot be real nor yet unreal.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Belief, then, cannot be either ignorance or knowledge.

Glaucon/ It appears not.

Socrates/ Then does it lie outside and beyond these two? Is it either more clear and certain than knowledge or less clear and certain than ignorance?

Glaucon/ No, it is neither.

Socrates/ It rather seems to you to be something more obscure than knowledge, but not so dark as ignorance, and so to lie between the two extremes?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Well, we said earlier that if some object could be found such that it both is and at the same time is not, that object would lie between the perfectly real and the utterly unreal; and that the corresponding faculty would be neither knowledge nor ignorance, but a faculty to be found situated between the two.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now what we have found between the two is the faculty we call belief.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ It seems, then, that what remains to be discovered is that object which can be said both to be and not to be and cannot properly be called either purely real or purely unreal. If that can be found, we may justly call it the object of belief, and so give the intermediate faculty the intermediate object, while the two extreme objects will fall to the extreme faculties.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ On these assumptions, then, I shall call for an answer from our friend who denies the existence of Beauty itself or of anything that can be called an essential Form of Beauty remaining unchangeably in the same state forever, though he does recognize the existence of beautiful things as a plurality—that lover of things seen who will not listen to anyone who says that Beauty is one, Justice is one, and so on. I shall say to him, Be so good as to tell us: of all these many beautiful things is there one which will not appear ugly? Or of these many just or righteous actions, is there one that will not appear unjust or unrighteous?

Glaucon/ No, they must inevitably appear to be in some way both beautiful and ugly; and so with all the other terms your question refers to.

Socrates/ And again the many things which are doubles are just as much halves as they are doubles. And the things we call large or heavy have just as much right to be called small or light.

Glaucon/ Yes; any such thing will always have a claim to both opposite designations.

Socrates/ Then, whatever anyone of these many things may be said to be, can you say that it absolutely is that, any more than that it is not that?

Glaucon/ They remind me of those punning riddles people ask at dinner parties, or the child's puzzle about what the eunuch threw at the bat and what the bat was perched on. These things have the same ambiguous character, and one cannot form any stable conception of them either as being or as not being, or as both being and not being, or as neither.

Socrates/ Can you think of any better way of disposing of them than by placing them between reality and unreality?

For I suppose they will not appear more obscure and so less real than unreality, or clearer and so more real than reality.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ It seems, then, we have discovered that the many conventional notions of the mass of mankind about what is beautiful or honorable or just and so on are adrift in a sort of twilight between pure reality and pure unreality.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ And we agreed earlier that, if any such object were discovered, it should be called the object of belief and not of knowledge. Fluctuating in that half-way region, it would be seized upon by the intermediate faculty.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ So when people have an eye for the multitude of beautiful things or of just actions or whatever it may be, but can neither behold Beauty or Justice itself nor follow a guide who would lead them to it, we shall say that all they have is beliefs, without any real knowledge of the objects of their belief.

Glaucon/ That follows.

Socrates/ But what of those who contemplate the realities themselves as they are forever in the same unchanging state? Shall we not say that they have, not mere belief, but knowledge?

Glaucon/ That too follows.

Socrates/ And, further, that their affection goes out to the objects of knowledge, whereas the others set their affections on the objects of belief; for it was they, you remember, who had a passion for the spectacle of beautiful colors and sounds, but would not hear of Beauty itself being a real thing.

Glaucon/ I remember.

Socrates/ So we may fairly call them lovers of belief rather than of wisdom—not philosophical, in fact, but philodoxical. Will they be seriously annoyed by that description?

Glaucon/ Not if they will listen to my advice. No one ought to take offence at the truth.

Socrates/ The name of philosopher, then, will be reserved for those whose affections are set, in every case, on the reality-By all means. So at last, Glaucon, after this long and weary way, we have come to see who are the philosophers and who are not.

Glaucon/ I doubt if the way could have been shortened.

Socrates/ Apparently not. I think, however, that we might have gained a still clearer view, if this had been the only topic to be discussed; but there are so many others awaiting us, if we mean to discover in what ways the just life is better than the unjust.

Glaucon/ Which are we to take up now?

Socrates/ Surely the one that follows next in order. Since the philosophers are those who can apprehend the eternal and unchanging, while those who cannot do so, but are lost in the mazes of multiplicity and change, are not philosophers, which of the two ought to be in control of a state?

Glaucon/ I wonder what would be a reasonable solution.

Socrates/ To establish as Guardians whichever of the two appear competent to guard the laws and ways of life in society.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Well, there can be no question whether a guardian who is to keep watch over anything needs to be keen-sighted or blind. And is not blindness precisely the condition of men who are entirely cut off from knowledge of

any reality, and have in their soul no clear pattern of perfect truth, which they might study in every detail and constantly refer to, as a painter looks at his model, before they proceed to embody notions of justice, honor, and goodness in earthly institutions or, in their character of Guardians, to preserve such institutions as already exist?

Glaucon/ Certainly such a condition is very like blindness.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, make such as these our Guardians in preference to men who, besides their knowledge of realities, are in no way inferior to them in experience and in every excellence of character?

Glaucon/ It would be absurd not to choose the philosophers, whose knowledge is perhaps their greatest point of superiority, provided they do not lack those other qualifications.

Socrates/ What we have to explain, then, is how those qualifications can be combined in the same persons with philosophy.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The first thing, as we said at the outset, is to get a clear view of their inborn disposition. When we are satisfied on that head, I think we shall agree that such a combination of qualities is possible and that we need look no further for men fit to be in control of a commonwealth. One trait of the philosophic nature we may take as already granted: a constant passion for any knowledge that will reveal to them something of that reality which endures forever and is not always passing into and out of existence. And, we may add, their desire is to know the whole of that reality; they will not willingly renounce any part of it as relatively small and insignificant, as we said before when we

compared them to the lover and to the man who covets honor.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Is there not another trait which the nature we are seeking cannot fail to possess—truthfulness, a love of truth and a hatred of falsehood that will not tolerate untruth in any form?

Glaucon/ Yes, it is natural to expect that.

Socrates/ It is not merely natural, but entirely necessary that an instinctive passion for any object should extend to all that is closely akin to it; and there is nothing more closely akin to wisdom than truth. So the same nature cannot love wisdom and falsehood; the genuine lover of knowledge cannot fail, from his youth up, to strive after the whole of truth.

Glaucon/ I perfectly agree.

Socrates/ Now we surely know that when a man's desires set strongly in one direction, in every other channel they flow more feebly, like a stream diverted into another bed. So when the current has set towards knowledge and all that goes with it, desire will abandon those pleasures of which the body is the instrument and be concerned only with the pleasure which the soul enjoys independently—if, that is to say, the love of wisdom is more than a mere pretense. Accordingly, such a one will be temperate and no lover of money; for he will be the last person to care about the things for the sake of which money is eagerly sought and lavishly spent.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ Again, in seeking to distinguish the philosophic nature, you must not overlook the least touch of meanness. Nothing could be more contrary than pettiness to a mind constantly bent on grasping the whole of things, both divine and human.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And do you suppose that one who is so high-minded and whose thought can contemplate all time and all existence will count this life of man a matter of much concern?

Glaucon/ No, he could not.

Socrates/ So for such a man death will have no terrors.

Glaucon/ None.

Socrates/ A mean and cowardly nature, then, can have no part in the genuine pursuit of wisdom.

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ And if a man is temperate and free from the love of money, meanness, pretentiousness, and cowardice, he will not be hard to deal with or dishonest. So, as another indication of the philosophic temper, you will observe whether, from youth up, he is fair-minded, gentle, and sociable.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Also you will not fail to notice whether he is quick or slow to learn. No one can be expected to take a reasonable delight in a task in which much painful effort makes little headway. And if he cannot retain what he learns, his forgetfulness will leave no room in his head for knowledge; and so, having all his toil for nothing, he can only end by hating himself as well as his fruitless occupation. We must not, then, count a forgetful mind as competent to pursue wisdom; we must require a good memory.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Further, there is in some natures a crudity and awkwardness that can only tend to a lack of measure and proportion; and there is a close affinity between proportion and truth. Hence, besides our other requirements, we shall

look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, which will be instinctively drawn to see every reality in its true light.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, now that we have enumerated the qualities of a mind destined to take its full part in the apprehension of reality, have you any doubt about their being indispensable and all necessarily going together?

Glaucon/ None whatever.

Socrates/ Then have you any fault to find with a pursuit which none can worthily follow who is not by nature quick to learn and to remember, magnanimous and gracious, the friend and kinsman of truth, justice, courage, temperance?

Glaucon/ No; Momus himself could find no flaw in it.

Socrates/ Well then, when time and education have brought such characters as these to maturity, would you entrust the care of your commonwealth to anyone else?

Adeimantus/ No one could deny all that, Socrates; but, whenever you talk in this way, your hearers feel a certain misgiving: they think that, because they are inexperienced in your method of question and answer, at each question the reasoning leads them a little farther astray, until at last these slight divergences amount to a serious error and they find themselves contradicting their original position. Just as in draughts the less skillful player is finally hemmed into a corner where he cannot make a move, so in this game where words take the place of counters they feel they are being cornered and reduced to silence, but that does not really prove them in the wrong. I say this with an eye to the present situation. Anyone might say now that at each question you ask there is no contradicting you, but that nevertheless, as a matter of plain fact, the votaries of philosophy, when they carry on the study too long, instead of taking it up in youth as a part of general culture and then dropping it, almost

always become decidedly queer, not to say utterly worthless; while even the most respectable are so far the worse for this pursuit you are praising as to become useless to society.

Socrates/ Well, do you think that charge is untrue?

Adeimantus/ I do not know; I should like to hear your opinion.

Socrates/ You shall; I think it is true.

Adeimantus/ Then how can it be right to say that there will be no rest from trouble until states are ruled by these philosophers whom we are now admitting to be of no use to them?

Socrates/ That is a question which needs to be answered by means of a parable.

Adeimantus/ Whereas you, of course, never talk in parables!

Socrates/ Ah mocking me, are you? after forcing upon me a thesis that is so hard to prove. But never mind; listen to my parable, and you will see once more what an effort it costs me to scrape one together. The better sort of philosophers are placed in such a cruel position in relation to their country that there is no one thing in nature to be compared to it; I can plead their cause only by collecting materials for my parable from more than one quarter, like an artist drawing a goat-stag or other such composite monster. Imagine this state of affairs on board a ship or a number of ships. The master is bigger and burlier than any of the crew, but a little deaf and short-sighted and no less deficient in seamanship. The sailors are quarrelling over the control of the helm; each thinks he ought to be steering the vessel, though he has never learnt navigation and cannot point to any teacher under whom he has served his apprenticeship; what is more, they assert that navigation is a thing that cannot be taught at all, and are ready to tear in

pieces anyone who says it can. Meanwhile they besiege the master himself, begging him urgently to trust them with the helm; and sometimes, when others have been more successful in gaining his ear, they kill them or throw them overboard, and, after somehow stupefying the worthy master with strong drink or an opiate, take control of the ship, make free with its stores, and turn the voyage, as might be expected of such a crew, into a drunken carousal. Besides all this, they cry up as a skilled navigator and master of seamanship anyone clever enough to lend a hand in persuading or forcing the master to set them in command. Every other kind of man they condemn as useless. They do not understand that the genuine navigator can only make himself fit to command a ship by studying the seasons of the year, sky, stars, and winds, and all that belongs to his craft; and they have no idea that, along with the science of navigation, it is possible for him to gain, by instruction or practice, the skill to keep control of the helm whether some of them like it or not. If a ship were managed in that way, would not those on board be likely to call the expert in navigation a mere star-gazer, who spent his time in idle talk and was useless to them?

Adeimantus/ They would indeed.

Socrates/ I think you understand what I mean and do not need to have my parable interpreted in order to see how it illustrates the attitude of existing states towards the true philosopher.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Use it, then, to enlighten that critic whom you spoke of as astonished that philosophers are not held in honor by their country. You may try, in the first place, to convince him that it would be far more astonishing if they were; and you may tell him further that he is right in calling

the best sort of philosophers useless to the public; but for that he must rather blame those who make no use of them. It is not in the natural course of things for the pilot to beg the crew to take his orders, any more than for the wise to wait on the doorsteps of the rich; the author of that epigram was mistaken. What is natural is that the sick man, whether rich or poor, should wait at the door of the physician, and that all who need to be governed should seek out the man who can govern them; it is not for him to beg them to accept his rule, if there is really any help in him. But our present rulers may fairly be compared to the sailors in our parable, and the useless visionaries, as the politicians call them, to the real masters of navigation.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Under these conditions, the noblest of pursuits can hardly be thought much of by men whose own way of life runs counter to it. But by far the most formidable reproach is brought upon philosophy by those professed followers whom your critic no doubt had in mind when he denounced almost all of its votaries as utterly worthless and the best of them as of no use. I admitted the truth of that, did I not?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, we have explained why the better sort are of no use. Shall we now go on to the question why the majority cannot fail to be worthless, and try to show, if we can, that here again the fault does not lie with philosophy?

Adeimantus/ Yes, by all means.

Socrates/ Before we begin the discussion, let us recall the point from which we started in describing the inborn disposition required for the making of a noble character. The leading characteristic, if you remember, was truth, which he must always and everywhere follow or else be an impostor

with no part in true philosophy. This was one point where the current estimate of the philosopher is very much against us.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ But might we not fairly plead in defense our account of the true lover of knowledge as one born to strive towards reality, who cannot linger among that multiplicity of things which men believe to be real, but holds on his way with a passion that will not faint or fail until he has laid hold upon the essential nature of each thing with that part of his soul which can apprehend reality because of its affinity therewith; and when he has by that means approached real being and entered into union with it, the offspring of this marriage is intelligence and truth; so that at last, having found knowledge and true life and nourishment, he is at rest from his travail?

Adeimantus/ No defense could be fairer.

Socrates/ Well then, such a one cannot but hate falsehood and love the truth; and when truth takes the lead, we may look to find in its train, not a whole company of defects, but a sound character, in which temperance attends on justice. Nor is there any need to prove once more that a whole array of other qualities must go with the philosophic nature: you will remember how it entailed courage, magnanimity, quickness to learn, and a good memory. Then you objected that, though everyone must assent to all this, yet, if he turned his attention from theory to fact, he would find the actual persons in question to be some of them useless, and most of them having every possible fault. Looking for the grounds of this reproach, we are now inquiring why the majority have these defects; and it was with a view to this problem that we have defined once more

the qualities which the genuinely philosophic nature cannot fail to possess.

Adeimantus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Next then, we must study the influences that corrupt this nature and in many cases completely ruin it, though some few escape, who, as you remark, are said to be of no use, but not altogether worthless. Then we will consider the quality of those counterfeit natures which take to a pursuit too high and too good for them and by their manifold delinquencies have fastened upon philosophy, all the world over, the reputation you spoke of.

Adeimantus/ What are these corrupting influences?

Socrates/ I will describe them as well as I can. Everyone, I think, would agree that a nature with all the qualities we required to make the perfect philosopher is a rare growth, seldom seen among men.

Adeimantus/ Extremely rare.

Socrates/ Consider, then, how many grave dangers threaten to destroy these few. Strangest of all, every one of those qualities which we approved—courage, temperance, and all the rest—tends to ruin its possessor and to wrest his mind away from philosophy.

Adeimantus/ That does sound strange.

Socrates/ And, besides this, all the good things of life, as they are called, corrupt and distract the soul: beauty, wealth, strength, powerful connections, and so forth—you know the sort of thing I mean.

Adeimantus/ Yes, but I should like you to explain in more detail.

Socrates/ The matter will be clear enough, and what I have just said will not seem so strange, when you have grasped the underlying principle. We know it to be true of

any seed or growing thing, whether plant or animal, that if it fails to find its proper nourishment or climate or soil, then the more vigorous it is, the more it will lack the qualities it should possess. Evil is a worse enemy to the good than to the indifferent; so it is natural that bad conditions of nurture should be peculiarly uncongenial to the finest nature and that it should come off worse under them than natures of an insignificant order.

Adeimantus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Is not the same principle true of the mind, Adeimantus: if their early training is bad, the most gifted turn out the worst. Great crimes and unalloyed wickedness are the outcome of a nature full of generous promise, ruined by bad upbringing; no great harm, or great good either, will ever come of a slight or feeble disposition.

Adeimantus/ That is true.

Socrates/ So is it, then, with this temperament we have postulated for the philosopher: given the right instruction, it must grow to the full flower of excellence; but if the plant is sown and reared in the wrong soil, it will develop every contrary defect, unless saved by some miracle. Or do you hold the popular belief that, here and there, certain young men are demoralized by the private instructions of some individual sophist? Does that sort of influence amount to much? Is not the public itself the greatest of all sophists, training up young and old, men and women alike, into the most accomplished specimens of the character it desires to produce?

Adeimantus/ When does that happen?

Socrates/ Whenever the populace crowds together at any public gathering, in the Assembly, the law-courts, the theatre, or the camp, and sits there clamoring its approval or disapproval, both alike excessive, of whatever is being

said or done; booing and clapping till the rocks ring and the whole place redoubles the noise of their applause and outcries. In such a scene what do you suppose will be a young man's state of mind? What sort of private instruction will have given him the strength to hold out against the force of such a torrent, or will save him from being swept away down the stream, until he accepts all their notions of right and wrong, does as they do, and comes to be just such a man as they are?

Adeimantus/ Yes, Socrates, such influence must be irresistible.

Socrates/ And I have said nothing of the most powerful engines of persuasion which the masters in this school of wisdom bring to bear when words have no effect. As you know, they punish the recalcitrant with disfranchisement, fines, and death.

Adeimantus/ They do.

Socrates/ How could the private teaching of any individual sophist avail in counteracting theirs? It would be great folly even to try; for no instruction aiming at an ideal contrary to the training they give has ever produced, or ever will produce, a different type of character—on the level, that is to say, of common humanity: one must always make an exception of the superhuman; and you may be sure that, in the present state of society, any character that escapes and comes to good can only have been saved by some miraculous interposition.

Adeimantus/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ Then I hope you will also agree to this. Every one of these individuals who make a living by teaching in private and whom the public are pleased to call sophists and to regard as their rivals, is teaching nothing else than the opinions and beliefs expressed by the public itself when it

meets on any occasion; and that is what he calls wisdom. It is as if the keeper of some huge and powerful creature should make a study of its moods and desires, how it may best be approached and handled, when it is most savage or gentle and what makes it so, the meaning of its various cries and the tones of voice that will soothe or provoke its anger; and, having mastered all this by long familiarity, should call it wisdom, reduce it to a system, and set up a school. Not in the least knowing which of these humors and desires is good or bad, right or wrong, he will fit all these terms to the fancies of the great beast and call what it enjoys good and what vexes it bad. He has no other account to give of their meaning; for him any action will be 'just' and 'right' that is done under necessity, since he is too blind to tell how great is the real difference between what must be and what ought to be. It would be a queer sort of education that such a person could offer, would it not?

Adeimantus/ It would indeed.

Socrates/ And is there anything to choose between him and one who thinks it is wisdom to have studied the moods and tastes of the assembled multitude, either in painting and music or in politics? Certainly, no one can go into such mixed company and submit to their judgment a poem or a work of art or some service he would render to the state, thus going out of his way to make the public his masters, without falling under the fatal necessity to give them whatever they like and do whatever they approve; but have you ever heard any argument which was not beneath contempt to show that what they admire is really beautiful or what they approve really good?

Adeimantus/ No; and I do not expect to hear one.

Socrates/ Now, with all this in mind, recall that distinction we drew earlier, between Beauty itself and the

multiplicity of beautiful things. Is it conceivable that the multitude should ever believe in the existence of any real essence, as distinct from its many manifestations, or listen to anyone who asserts such a reality?

Adeimantus/ Assuredly not.

Socrates/ If that is so, the multitude can never be philosophical. Accordingly it is bound to disapprove of all who pursue wisdom; and so also, of course, are those individuals who associate with the mob and set their hearts on pleasing it.

Adeimantus/ That is clear.

Socrates/ What hope can you see, then, that a philosophic nature should be saved to persevere in the pursuit until the goal is reached? Remember how we agreed that the born philosopher will be distinguished by quickness of understanding, good memory, courage, and generosity. With such gifts, already as a boy he will stand out above all his companions, especially if his person be a match for his mind; and when he grows older, his friends and his fellow citizens will no doubt want to make use of him for their own purposes. They will fawn upon him with their entreaties and promises of advancement, flattering beforehand the power that will someday be his.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that happens often enough.

Socrates/ What will become of a youth so circumstanced, above all if he belongs to a great country and is conspicuous there for his birth and wealth, as well as for a tall and handsome person? Will he not be filled with unbounded ambition, believing himself well able to manage the affairs of all the world, at home and abroad, and thereupon give himself airs and be puffed up with senseless self-conceit?

Adeimantus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Now suppose that while this frame of mind is gaining upon him, someone should come and quietly tell him the truth, that there is no sense in him and that the only way to get the understanding he needs is to work for it like a slave: will he find it easy to listen, surrounded by all these evil influences?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Perhaps, however, because there is something in a fine nature that responds to the voice of reason, he might be sensitive to the force which would draw him towards philosophy and begin to yield. But then those friends of his will see that they are in danger of losing one who might do so much for their party. Sooner than let him be won over, there is no engine of force or persuasion, from private intrigue to prosecution in the courts, that they will not bring to bear either upon him or upon his counselor. How can he ever become a lover of wisdom?

Adeimantus/ He never will.

Socrates/ You see, then, I was not wrong in saying that, in a way, the very qualities which make up the philosopher's nature may, with a bad upbringing, be the cause of his falling away, no less than wealth and all other so-called advantages.

Adeimantus/ Yes, you were right.

Socrates/ These, then, are the dangers which threaten the noblest natures, rare enough in any case, and spoil them for the highest of all pursuits. And among men of this type will be found those who do the greatest harm or, if the current should chance to set the other way, the greatest good, to society and to individuals; whereas no great good or harm will come to either from a little mind.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ So Philosophy is left forlorn, like a maiden deserted by her nearest kin; and while these apostates take to a life that is no true life for them, she, bereft of her natural protectors, is dishonored by unworthy interlopers, who fasten on her the reproach you have repeated, that some who have to do with her are worthless and most of them deserve heavy punishment.

Adeimantus/ That is what people say.

Socrates/ Naturally enough; when any poor creature who has proved his cleverness in some mechanical craft, sees here an opening for a pretentious display of high-sounding words and is glad to break out of the prison of his paltry trade and take sanctuary in the shrine of philosophy. For as compared with other occupations, philosophy, even in its present case, still enjoys a higher prestige, enough to attract a multitude of stunted natures, whose souls a life of drudgery has warped and maimed no less surely than their

sedentary crafts have disfigured their bodies. For all the world they are like some little bald-headed tinker, who, having come into some money, has just got out of prison, had a good wash at the baths, and dressed himself up in a new coat as a bridegroom, ready to marry his master's daughter, who has been left poor and friendless. Could the issue of such a match ever be anything but pitiful base-born creatures? And, by the same token, what sort of ideas and opinions will be begotten of the misalliance of Philosophy with men incapable of culture? Not any true-born child of wisdom; the only right name for them will be sophistry.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ So, Adeimantus, the remnant who are worthy to consort with Philosophy will be small indeed: perhaps some noble and well-nurtured character, saved by exile from those influences which would have impaired his natural impulse to be constant in her service; or it may be a great mind born in a petty state whose affairs are beneath its notice; and, possibly, a gifted few who have turned to philosophy from some other calling which they rightly disdain. Some, again, might be held back like our friend Theages, who, with every temptation to abandon study for a public life, has been restrained by ill health. Of my own case there is little need to speak; the warning of the divine sign, I dare say, has come to few men, if any, before me. One who has joined this small company and tasted the happiness that is their portion; who has, watched the frenzy of the multitude and seen that there is no soundness in the conduct of public life, nowhere an ally at whose side a champion of justice could hope to escape destruction; but that, like a man fallen among wild beasts, if he should refuse to take part in their misdeeds and could not hold out alone against the fury of all, he would be destined, before he could be of any service to his country or his friends, to perish,

having done no good to himself or to anyone else—one who has weighed all this keeps quiet and goes his own way, like the traveler who takes shelter under a wall from a driving storm of dust and hail; and seeing lawlessness spreading on all sides, is content if he can keep his hands clean from iniquity while this life lasts, and when the end comes take his departure, with good hopes, in serenity and peace.

Adeimantus/ Surely, that would be no small achievement.

Socrates/ Yes; but far less than he might achieve, if his lot were cast in a society congenial to his nature, where he could grow to his full height and save his country as well as himself.

Well then, I went on, enough has been said about the prejudice against philosophy, why it exists and how unfair it is, unless you have anything to add.

Adeimantus/ No, nothing on that head. But is there any existing form of society that you would call congenial to philosophy?

Socrates/ Not one. That is precisely my complaint: no existing constitution is worthy of the philosophic nature; that is why it is perverted and loses its character. As a foreign seed sown in a different soil yields to the new influence and degenerates into the local variety, so this nature cannot now keep its proper virtue, but falls away and takes on an alien character. If it can ever find the ideal form of society, as perfect as itself, then we shall see that it is in reality something divine, while all other natures and ways of life are merely human. No doubt you will ask me next, what this ideal society is.

Adeimantus/ You are mistaken; I was going to ask whether you meant the commonwealth we have been founding.

Socrates/ Yes, in all points but one: our state must always contain some authority which will hold to the same idea of its constitution that you had before you in framing its laws. We did, in fact, speak of that point before, but not clearly enough; you frightened me with your objections, which have shown that the explanation is a long and difficult matter; and the hardest part is still to come.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ The question how a state can take in hand the pursuit of philosophy without disaster; for all great attempts are hazardous, and the proverb is only too true, that what is worthwhile is never easy.

Adeimantus/ All the same, this point must be cleared up to complete your account.

Socrates/ If I fail, it will not be for want of goodwill; 'yourself shall see me do my uttermost'. In proof of which I shall at once be rash enough to remark that the state should deal with this pursuit, not as it does now, but in just the opposite way. As things are, those who take it up at all are only just out of their childhood. In the interval before they set up house and begin 'to earn their living, they are introduced to the hardest part—by which I mean abstract discussions—and then, when they have done with that, their philosophic education is supposed to be complete. Later, they think they have done much if they accept an invitation to listen to such a discussion, which is, in their eyes, to be taken as a pastime; and as age draws on, in all but a very few the light is quenched more effectually than the sun of Heraclitus, inasmuch as it is never rekindled.

Adeimantus/ And what would be the right plan?

Socrates/ Just the opposite. Boys and youths should be given a liberal education suitable to their age; and, while growing up to manhood, they should take care to make their

bodies into good instruments for the service of philosophy. As the years go on in which the mind begins to reach maturity, intellectual training should be intensified. Finally, when strength fails and they are past civil and military duties, let them range at will, free from all serious business but philosophy; for theirs is to be a life of happiness, crowned after death with a fitting destiny in the other world.

Adeimantus/ You really do seem to be doing your uttermost, Socrates. But I fancy most of your hearers will be even more in earnest on the other side. They are not at all likely to agree; least of all Thrasymachus.

Socrates/ Don't try to make a quarrel between Thrasymachus and me, when we have just become friends—not that we were enemies before. You and I will spare no effort until we convince him and the rest of the company, or at least take them some way with us, against the day when they may find themselves once more engaged in discussions like ours in some future incarnation.

Adeimantus/ Rather a distant prospect!

Socrates/ No more than a moment in the whole course of time. However, it is no wonder that most people have no faith in our proposals, for they have never seen our words come true in fact. They have heard plenty of eloquence, not like our own unstudied discourse, but full of balanced phrases and artfully matched antitheses; but a man with a character so finely balanced as to be a match for the ideal of virtue in word and deed, ruling in a society as perfect as himself—that they have never yet seen in a single instance.

Adeimantus/ They have not.

Socrates/ Nor yet have they cared to listen seriously to frank discussion of the nobler sort that is entirely bent on knowing the truth for its own sake and leaves severely alone those tricks of special pleading in the law-court or the

lecture-room which aim only at influencing opinion or winning a case.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ These, then, were the obstacles I foresaw when, in spite of my fears, truth compelled me to declare that there will never be a perfect state or constitution, nor yet a perfect man, until some happy circumstance compels these few philosophers who have escaped corruption but are now called useless, to take charge, whether they like it or not, of a state which will submit to their authority; or else until kings and rulers or their sons are divinely inspired with a genuine passion for true philosophy. If either alternative or both were impossible, we might justly be laughed at as idle dreamers; but, as I maintain, there is no ground for saying so. Accordingly, if ever in the infinity of time, past or future, or even to-day in some foreign region far beyond our horizon, men of the highest gifts for philosophy are constrained to take charge of a commonwealth, we are ready to maintain that, then and there, the constitution we have described has been realized, or will be realized when once the philosophic muse becomes mistress of a state. For that might happen. Our plan is difficult—we have admitted as much—but not impossible.

Adeimantus/ I agree to that.

Socrates/ But the public, you are going to say, think otherwise?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ My dear Adeimantus, you must not condemn the public so sweepingly; they will change their opinion, if you avoid controversy and try gently to remove their prejudice against the love of learning. Repeat our description of the philosopher's nature and of his pursuits, and they will see that you do not mean the sort of person they imagine. It

is only ill-temper and malice in oneself that call out those qualities in others who are not that way inclined; and I will anticipate you by declaring that, in my belief, the public with a few exceptions is not of such an unyielding temper.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I agree with you there.

Socrates/ Will you also agree that, if it is ill-disposed towards philosophy, the blame must fall on that noisy crew of interlopers who are always bandying abuse and spiteful personalities—the last thing of which a philosopher can be guilty? For surely, Adeimantus, a man whose thoughts are fixed on true reality has no leisure to look downwards on the affairs of men, to take part in their quarrels, and to catch the infection of their jealousies and hates. He contemplates a world of unchanging and harmonious order, where reason governs and nothing can do or suffer wrong; and, like one who imitates an admired companion, he cannot fail to fashion himself in its likeness. So, the philosopher, in constant companionship with the divine order of the world, will reproduce that order in his soul and, so far as man may, become godlike; though here, as everywhere, there will be scope for detraction.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Suppose, then, he should find himself compelled to mold other characters besides his own and to shape the pattern of public and private life into conformity with his vision of the ideal, he will not lack the skill to produce such counterparts of temperance, justice, and all the virtues as can exist in the ordinary man. And the public, when they see that we have described him truly, will be reconciled to the philosopher and no longer disbelieve our assertion that happiness can only come to a state when its lineaments are traced by an artist working after the divine pattern.

Adeimantus/ Yes, they will be reconciled when once they understand. But how will this artist set to work?

Socrates/ He will take society and human character as his canvas, and begin by scraping it clean. That is no easy matter; but, as you know, unlike other reformers, he will not consent to take in hand either an individual or a state or to draft laws, until he is given a clean surface to work on or has cleansed it himself.

Adeimantus/ Quite rightly.

Socrates/ Next, he will sketch in the outline of the constitution. Then, as the work goes on, he will frequently refer to his model, the ideals of justice, goodness, temperance, and the rest, and compare with them the copy of those qualities which he is trying to create in human society. Combining the various elements of social life as a painter mixes his colors, he will reproduce the complexion of true humanity, guided by that divine pattern whose likeness Homer saw in the men he called godlike. He will rub out and paint in again this or that feature, until he has produced, so far as may be, a type of human character that heaven can approve.

Adeimantus/ No picture could be more beautiful than that.

Socrates/ Are we now making any impression on those assailants who, you said, would fall upon us so furiously when we spoke in praise of the philosopher and proposed to give him control of the state? Will they be calmer now that we have told them we mean an artist who will use his skill in this way to design a constitution?

Adeimantus/ They ought to be, if they have any sense.

Socrates/ Yes, for what ground is left for dispute? It would be absurd to deny that a philosopher is a lover of truth and reality; or that his nature, as we have described it, is allied

to perfection; or again, that given the right training, no other will be so completely good and enlightened. They will hardly give the preference to those impostors whom we have ruled out.

Adeimantus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ So they will no longer be angry with us for saying that, until philosophers hold power, neither states nor individuals will have rest from trouble, and the commonwealth we have imagined will never be realized.

Adeimantus/ Less angry perhaps.

Socrates/ I suggest that, if we go farther and assume them to be completely pacified and convinced, then, perhaps, they might agree with us for very shame.

Adeimantus/ Certainly they might.

Socrates/ Granted, then, that they are convinced so far, no one will dispute our other point, that kings and hereditary rulers might have sons with a philosophic nature, and these might conceivably escape corruption. It would be hard to save them, we admit; but can anyone say that, in the whole course of time, not a single one could be saved?

Adeimantus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ Well, one would be enough to effect all this reform that now seems so incredible, if he had subjects disposed to obey; for it is surely not impossible that they should consent to carry out our laws and customs when laid down by a ruler. It would be no miracle if others should think as we do; and we have, I believe, sufficiently shown that our plan, if practicable, is. the best. So, to conclude: our institutions would be the best, if they could be realized, and to realize them, though hard, is not impossible.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is the conclusion.

Socrates/ One difficulty, then, has been surmounted. It remains to ask how we can make sure of having men who will preserve our constitution. What must they learn, and at what age should they take up each branch of study?

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is the next point.

Socrates/ I gained nothing by my cunning in putting off those thorny questions of the possession of wives and children and the appointment of Rulers. I knew that the ideal plan would give offence and be hard to carry out; none the less I have had to discuss these matters. We have now disposed of the women and children, but we must start all over again upon the training of the Rulers. You remember how their love for their country was to be proved, by the tests of pain and pleasure, to be a faith that no toil or danger, no turn of fortune could make them abandon. All who failed were to be rejected; only the man who came out flawless, like gold tried in the fire, was to be made a Ruler with privileges and rewards in life and after death. So much was said, when our argument turned aside, as if hoping, with veiled face, to slip past the danger that now lies in our path.

Adeimantus/ Quite true, I remember.

Socrates/ Yes, I shrank from the bold words which have now been spoken; but now we have ventured to declare that our Guardians in the fullest sense must be philosophers. So much being granted, you must reflect how few are likely to be available. The natural gifts we required will rarely grow together into one whole; they tend to split apart.

Adeimantus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Qualities like ready understanding, a good memory, sagacity, quickness, together with a high-spirited, generous temper, are seldom combined with willingness to live a quiet life of sober constancy. Keen wits are apt to lose all steadiness and to veer about in every direction. On the

other hand, the steady reliable characters, whose impassivity is proof against the perils of war, are equally proof against instruction. Confronted with intellectual work, they become comatose and do nothing but yawn.

Adeimantus/ That is true.

Socrates/ But we insist that no one must be given the highest education or hold office as Ruler, who has not both sets of qualities in due measure. This combination will be rare. So, besides testing it by hardship and danger and by the temptations of pleasure, we may now add that its strength must be tried in many forms of study, to see whether it has the courage and endurance to pursue the highest kind of knowledge, without flinching as others flinch under physical trials.

Adeimantus/ By all means; but what kinds of study do you call the highest?

Socrates/ You remember how we deduced the definitions of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom by distinguishing three parts of the soul?

Adeimantus/ If I had forgotten that, I should not deserve to hear any more.

Socrates/ Do you also remember my warning you beforehand that in order to gain the clearest possible view of these qualities we should have to go round a longer way, although we could give a more superficial account in keeping with our earlier argument. You said that would do; and so we went on in a way which seemed to me not sufficiently exact; whether you were satisfied, it is for you to say.

Adeimantus/ We all thought you gave us a fair measure of truth.

Socrates/ No measure that falls in the least degree short of the whole truth can be quite fair in so important a matter. What is imperfect can never serve as a measure; though

people sometimes think enough has been done and there is no need to look further.

Adeimantus/ Yes, indolence is common enough.

Socrates/ But the last quality to be desired in the Guardian of a commonwealth and its laws. So he will have to take the longer way and work as hard at learning as at training his body; otherwise he will never reach the goal of the highest knowledge, which most of all concerns him.

Adeimantus/ Why, are not justice and the other virtues we have discussed the highest? Is there something still higher to be known?

Socrates/ There is; and of those virtues themselves we have as yet only a rough outline, where nothing short of the finished picture should content us. If we strain every nerve to reach precision and clearness in things of little moment, how absurd not to demand the highest degree of exactness in the things that matter most.

Adeimantus/ Certainly. But what do you mean by the highest kind of knowledge and with what is it concerned? You cannot hope to escape that question.

Socrates/ I do not; you may ask me yourself. All the same, you have been told many a time; but now either you are not thinking or, as I rather suspect, you mean to put me to some trouble with your insistence. For you have often been told that the highest object of knowledge is the essential nature of the Good, from which everything that is good and right derives its value for us. You must have been expecting me to speak of this now, and to add that we have no sufficient knowledge of it. I need not tell you that, without that knowledge, to know everything else, however well, would be of no value to us, just as it is of no use to possess anything without getting the good of it. What advantage can there be in possessing everything except what is good, or in

understanding everything else while of the good and desirable we know nothing?

Adeimantus/ None whatever.

Socrates/ Well then, you know too that most people identify the Good with pleasure, whereas the more enlightened think it is knowledge.

Adeimantus/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ And further that these latter cannot tell us what knowledge they mean, but are reduced at last to saying, 'knowledge of the Good'.

Adeimantus/ That is absurd.

Socrates/ It is; first they reproach us with not knowing the Good, and then tell us that it is knowledge of the Good, as if we did after all understand the meaning of that word 'Good' when they pronounce it.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ What of those who define the Good as pleasure? Are they any less confused in their thoughts? They are obliged to admit that there are bad pleasures; from which it follows that the same things are both good and bad.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Evidently, then, this is a matter of much dispute. It is also evident that, although many are content to do what seems just or honorable without really being so, and to possess a mere semblance of these qualities, when it comes to good things, no one is satisfied with possessing what only seems good: here all reject the appearance and demand the reality.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ A thing, then, that every soul pursues as the end of all her actions, dimly divining its existence, but perplexed and unable to grasp its nature with the same

clearness and assurance as in dealing with other things, and so missing whatever value those other things might have—a thing of such supreme importance is not a matter about which those chosen Guardians of the whole fortunes of our commonwealth can be left in the dark.

Adeimantus/ Most certainly not. ‘

Socrates/ At any rate, institutions or customs which are desirable and right will not, I imagine, find a very efficient guardian in one who does not know in what way they are good. I should rather guess that he will not be able to recognize fully that they are right and desirable.

Adeimantus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ So the order of our commonwealth will be perfectly regulated only when it is watched over by a Guardian who does possess this knowledge.

Adeimantus/ That follows. But, Socrates, what is your own account of the Good? Is it knowledge, or pleasure, or something else?

Socrates/ There you are! I exclaimed; I could see all along that you were not going to be content with what other people think.

Adeimantus/ Well, Socrates, it does not seem fair that you should be ready to repeat other people’s opinions but not to state your own, when you have given so much thought to this subject.

Socrates/ And do you think it fair of anyone to speak as if he knew what he does not know?

Adeimantus/ No, not as if he knew, but he might give his opinion for what it is worth.

Socrates/ Why, have you never noticed that opinion without knowledge is always a shabby sort of thing? At the best it is blind. One who holds a true belief without

intelligence is just like a blind man who happens to take the right road, isn't he?

Adeimantus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Well, then, do you want me to produce one of these poor blind cripples, when others could discourse to you with illuminating eloquence?

Glaucon/ No really, Socrates, you must not give up within sight of the goal. We should be quite content with an account of the Good like the one you gave us of justice and temperance and the other virtues.

Socrates/ So should I be, my dear Glaucon, much more than content! But I am afraid it is beyond my powers; with the best will in the world I should only disgrace myself and be laughed at. No, for the moment let us leave the question of the real meaning of good; to arrive at what I at any rate believe it to be would call for an effort too ambitious for an inquiry like ours. However, I will tell you, though only if you wish it, what I picture to myself as the offspring of the Good and the thing most nearly resembling it.

Glaucon/ Well, tell us about the offspring, and you shall remain in our debt for an account of the parent.

Socrates/ I only wish it were within my power to offer, and within yours to receive, a settlement of the whole account. But you must be content now. with the interest only; and you must see to it that, in describing this offspring of the Good, I do not inadvertently cheat you with false coin.

Glaucon/ We will keep a good eye on you. Go on.

Socrates/ First we must come to an understanding. Let me remind you of the distinction we drew earlier and have often drawn on other occasions, between the multiplicity of things that we call good or beautiful or whatever it may be and, on the other hand, Goodness itself or Beauty itself and

so on. Corresponding to each of these sets of many things, we postulate a single Form or real essence, as we call it.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is so.

Socrates/ Further, the many things, we say, can be seen, but are not objects of rational thought; whereas the Forms are objects of thought, but invisible.

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And we see things with our eyesight, just as we hear sounds with our ears and, to speak generally, perceive any sensible thing with our sense-faculties.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Have you noticed, then, that the artificer who designed the senses has been exceptionally lavish of his materials in making the eyes able to see and their objects visible?

Glaucon/ That never occurred to me.

Socrates/ Well, look at it in this way. Hearing and sound do not stand in need of any third thing, without which the ear will not hear nor sound be heard; and I think the same is true of most, not to say all, of the other senses. Can you think of one that does require anything of the sort?

Glaucon/ No, I cannot.

Socrates/ But there is this need in the case of sight and its objects. You may have the power of vision in your eyes and try to use it, and color may be there in the objects; but sight will see nothing and the colors will remain invisible in the absence of a third thing peculiarly constituted to serve this very purpose.

Glaucon/ By which you mean----------?

Socrates/ Naturally I mean what you call light; and if light is a thing of value, the sense of sight and the power of being

visible are linked together by a very precious bond, such as unites no other sense with its object.

Glaucon/ No one could say that light is not a precious thing.

Socrates/ And of all the divinities in the skies is there one whose light, above all the rest, is responsible for making our eyes see perfectly and making objects perfectly visible?

Glaucon/ There can be no two opinions: of course you mean the Sun.

Socrates/ And how is sight related to this deity? Neither sight nor the eye which contains it is the Sun, but of all the sense-organs it is the most sun-like; and further, the power it possesses is dispensed by the Sun, like a stream flooding the eye. And again, the Sun is not vision, but it is the cause of vision and also is seen by the vision it causes.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ It was the Sun, then, that I meant when I spoke of that offspring which the Good has created in the visible world, to stand there in the same relation to vision and visible things as that which the Good itself bears in the intelligible world to intelligence and to intelligible objects.

Glaucon/ How is that? You must explain further.

Socrates/ You know what happens when the colors of things are no longer irradiated by the daylight, but only by the fainter luminaries of the night: when you look at them, the eyes are dim and seem almost blind, as if there were no unclouded vision in them. But when you look at things on which the Sun is shining, the same eyes see distinctly and it becomes evident that they do contain the power of vision.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Apply this comparison, then, to the soul. When its gaze is fixed upon an object irradiated by truth and

reality, the soul gains understanding and- knowledge and is manifestly in possession of intelligence. But when it looks towards that twilight world of things that come into existence and pass away, its sight is dim and it has only opinions and beliefs which shift to and fro, and now it seems like a thing that has no intelligence.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ This, then, which gives to the objects of knowledge their truth and to him who knows them his power of knowing, is the Form or essential nature of Goodness. It is the cause of knowledge and truth; and so, while you may think of it as an object of knowledge, you will do well to regard it as something beyond truth and knowledge and, precious as these both are, of still higher worth. And, just as in our analogy light and vision were to be thought of as like the Sun, but not identical with it, so here both knowledge and truth are to be regarded as like the Good, but to identify either with the Good is wrong. The Good must hold a yet higher place of honor.

Glaucon/ You are giving it a position of extraordinary splendor, if it is the source of knowledge and truth and itself surpasses them in worth. You surely cannot mean that it is pleasure.

Socrates/ Heaven forbid. But I want to follow up our analogy still further. You will agree that the Sun not only makes the things we see visible, but also brings them into existence and gives them growth and nourishment; yet he is not the same thing as existence. And so with the objects of knowledge: these derive from the Good not only their power of being known, but their very being and reality; and Goodness is not the same thing as being, but even beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power.

Glaucon exclaimed with some amusement at my exalting Goodness in such extravagant terms.

Socrates/ It is your fault; you forced me to say what I think.

Glaucon/ Yes, and you must not stop there. At any rate, complete your comparison with the Sun, if there is any more to be said.

Socrates/ There is a great deal more.

Glaucon/ Let us hear it, then; don't leave anything out.

Socrates/ I am afraid much must be left unspoken. However, I will not, if I can help it, leave out anything that can be said on this occasion.

Glaucon/ Please do not.

Socrates/ Conceive, then, that there are these two powers I speak of, the Good reigning over the domain of all that is intelligible, the Sun over the visible world—or the heaven as I might call it; only you would think I was showing off my skill in etymology. At any rate you have these two orders of things clearly before your mind: the visible and the intelligible?

Glaucon/ I have.

Socrates/ Now take a line divided into two unequal parts, one to represent the visible order, the other the intelligible; and divide each part again in the same proportion, symbolizing degrees of comparative clearness or obscurity. Then (A) one of the two sections in the visible world will stand for images. By images I mean first shadows, and then reflections in water or in close-grained, polished surfaces, and everything of that kind, if you understand.

Glaucon/ Yes, I understand.

Socrates/ Let the second section (B) stand for the actual things of which the first are likenesses, the living creatures about us and all the works of nature or of human hands.

Glaucon/ So be it.

Socrates/ Will you also take the proportion in which the visible world has been divided as corresponding to degrees of reality and truth, so that the likeness shall stand to the original in the same ratio as the sphere of appearances and belief to the sphere of knowledge?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now consider how we are to divide the part which stands for the intelligible world. There are two sections. In the first (C) the mind uses as images those actual things which themselves had images in the visible world; and it is compelled to pursue its inquiry by starting from assumptions and travelling, not up to a principle, but down to a conclusion. In the second (D) the mind moves in the other direction, from an assumption up towards a principle which is not hypothetical; and it makes no use of the images employed in the other section, but only of Forms, and conducts its inquiry solely by their means.

Glaucon/ I don't quite understand what you mean.

Socrates/ Then we will try again; what I have just said will help you to understand. (C) You know, of course, how students of subjects like geometry and arithmetic begin by postulating odd and even numbers, or the various figures and the three kinds of angle, and other such data in each subject. These data they take as known; and, having adopted them as assumptions, they do not feel called upon to give any account of them to themselves or to anyone else, but treat them as self-evident. Then, starting from these assumptions, they go on until they arrive, by a series of

consistent steps, at all the conclusions they set out to investigate.

Glaucon/ Yes, I know that.

Socrates/ You also know how they make use of visible figures and discourse about them, though what they really have in mind is the originals of which these figures are images: they are not reasoning, for instance, about this particular square and diagonal which they have drawn, but about the Square and the Diagonal; and so in all cases. The diagrams they draw and the models they make are actual things, which may have their shadows or images in water; but now they serve in their turn as images, while the student is seeking to behold those realities which only thought can apprehend.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ This, then, is the class of things that I spoke of as intelligible, but with two qualifications: first, that the mind, in studying them, is compelled to employ assumptions, and, because it cannot rise above these, does not travel upwards to a first principle; and second, that it uses as images those actual things which have images of their own in the section below them and which, in comparison with those shadows and reflections, are reputed to be more palpable and valued accordingly.

Glaucon/ I understand: you mean the procedure of geometry and of the kindred arts.

Socrates/ (D) Then by the second section of the intelligible world you may understand me to mean all that unaided reasoning apprehends by the power of dialectic, when it treats its assumptions, not as first principles, but as hypotheses in the literal sense, things 'laid down' like a flight of steps up which it may mount all the way to something that is not hypothetical, the first principle of all; and having

grasped this, may turn back and, holding on to the consequences which depend upon it, descend at last to a conclusion, never making use of any sensible object, but only of Forms, moving through Forms from one to another, and ending with Forms.

Glaucon/ I understand, though not perfectly; for the procedure you describe sounds like an enormous undertaking. But I see that you mean to distinguish the field of intelligible reality studied by dialectic as having a greater certainty and truth than the subject-matter of the 'arts', as they are called, which treat their assumptions as first principles. The students of these arts are, it is true, compelled to exercise thought in contemplating objects which the senses cannot perceive; but because they start from assumptions without going back to a first principle, you do not regard them as gaining true understanding about those objects, although the objects themselves, when connected with a first principle, are intelligible. And I think you would call the state of mind of the students of geometry and other such arts, not intelligence, but thinking, as being something between intelligence and mere acceptance of appearances.

Socrates/ You have understood me quite well enough. And now you may take, as corresponding to the four sections, these four states of mind: intelligence for the highest, thinking for the second, belief for the third, and for the last imagining. These you may arrange as the terms in a proportion, assigning to each a degree of clearness and certainty corresponding to the measure in which their objects possess truth and reality.

Glaucon/ I understand and agree with you. I will arrange them as you say.

Socrates/ Next, here is a parable to illustrate the degrees in which our nature may be enlightened or unenlightened. Imagine the condition of men living in a sort of cavernous chamber underground, with an entrance open to the light and a long passage all down the cave. Here they have been from childhood, chained by the leg and also by the neck, so that they cannot move and can see only what is in front of them, because the chains will not let them turn their heads. At some distance higher up is the light of a fire burning behind them; and between the prisoners and the fire is a track with a parapet built along it, like the screen at a puppet-show, which hides the performers while they show their puppets over the top.

Glaucon/ I see.

Socrates/ Now behind this parapet imagine persons carrying along various artificial objects, including figures of men and animals in wood or stone or other materials, which project above the parapet. Naturally, some of these persons will be talking, others silent.

Glaucon/ It is a strange picture, and a strange sort of prisoners.

Socrates/ Like ourselves; for in the first place prisoners so confined would have seen nothing of themselves or of one another, except the shadows thrown by the fire-light on the wall of the Cave facing them, would they?

Glaucon/ Not if all their lives they had been prevented from moving their heads.

Socrates/ And they would have seen as little of the objects carried past.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, if they could talk to one another, would they not suppose that their words referred only to those passing shadows which they saw.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And suppose their prison had an echo from the wall facing them? When one of the people crossing behind them spoke, they could only suppose that the sound came from the shadow passing before their eyes.

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ In every way, then, such prisoners would recognize as reality nothing but the shadows of those artificial objects.

Glaucon/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ Now consider what would happen if their release from the chains and the healing of their unwisdom should come about in this way. Suppose one of them set free and forced suddenly to stand up, turn his head, and walk with eyes lifted to the light; all these movements would be painful, and he would be too dazzled to make out the objects whose shadows he had been used to see. What do you think he would say, if someone told him that what he had formerly seen was meaningless illusion, but now, being somewhat nearer to reality and turned towards more real objects, he was getting a truer view? Suppose further that he were shown the various objects being carried by and were made to say, in reply to questions, what each of them was. Would he not be perplexed and believe the objects now shown him to be not so real as what he formerly saw?

Glaucon/ Yes, not nearly so real.

Socrates/ And if he were forced to look at the fire-light itself, would not his eyes ache, so that he would try to escape and turn back to the things which he could see distinctly, convinced that they really were clearer than these other objects now being shown to him?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And suppose someone were to drag him away forcibly up the steep and rugged ascent and not let him go until he had hauled him out into the sunlight, would he not suffer pain and vexation at such treatment, and, when he had come out into the light, find his eyes so full of its radiance that he could not see a single one of the things that he was now told were real?

Glaucon/ Certainly he would not see them all at once.

Socrates/ He would need, then, to grow accustomed before he could see things in that upper world. At first it would be easiest to make out shadows, and then the images of men and things reflected in water, and later on the things themselves. After that, it would be easier to watch the heavenly bodies and the sky itself by night, looking at the light of the moon and stars rather than the Sun and the Sun's light in the day-time.

Glaucon/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ Last of all, he would be able to look at the Sun and contemplate its nature, not as it appears when reflected in water or any alien medium, but as it is in itself in its own domain.

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And now he would begin to draw the conclusion that it is the Sun that produces the seasons and the course of the year and controls everything in the visible world, and moreover is in a way the cause of all that he and his companions used to see.

Glaucon/ Clearly he would come at last to that conclusion.

Socrates/ Then if he called to mind his fellow prisoners and what passed for wisdom in his former dwelling-place, he would surely think himself happy in the change and be sorry for them. They may have had a practice of honoring and

commending one another, with prizes for the man who had the keenest eye for the passing shadows and the best memory for the order in which they followed or accompanied one another, so that he could make a good guess as to which was going to come next. Would our released prisoner be likely to covet those prizes or to envy the men exalted to honor and power in the Cave? Would he not feel like Homer's Achilles, that he would far sooner 'be on earth as a hired servant in the house of a landless man' or endure anything rather than go back to his old beliefs and live in the old way?

Glaucon/ Yes, he would prefer any fate to such a life.

Socrates/ Now imagine what would happen if he went down again to take his former seat in the Cave. Coming suddenly out of the sunlight, his eyes would be filled with darkness. He might be required once more to deliver his opinion on those shadows, in competition with the prisoners who had never been released, while his eyesight was still dim and unsteady; and it might take some time to become used to the darkness. They would laugh at him and say that he had gone up only to come back with his sight ruined; it was worth no one's while even to attempt the ascent. If they could lay hands on the man who was trying to set them free and lead them up, they would kill him.

Glaucon/ Yes, they would.

Socrates/ Every feature in this parable, my dear Glaucon, is meant to fit our earlier analysis. The prison dwelling corresponds to the region revealed to us through the sense of sight, and the firelight within it to the power of the Sun. The ascent to see the things in the upper world you may take as standing for the upward journey of the soul into the region of the intelligible; then you will be in possession of what I surmise, since that is what you wish to be told. Heaven knows whether it is true; but this, at any rate, is how

it appears to me. In the world of knowledge, the last thing to be perceived and only with great difficulty is the essential Form of Goodness. Once it is perceived, the conclusion must follow that, for all things, this is the cause of whatever is right and good; in the visible world it gives birth to light and to the lord of light, while it is itself sovereign in the intelligible world and the parent of intelligence and truth. Without having had a vision of this Form no one ran act with wisdom, either in his own life or in matters of state.

Glaucon/ So far as I can understand, I share your belief.

Socrates/ Then you may also agree that it is no wonder if those who have reached this height are reluctant to manage the affairs of men. Their souls long to spend all their time in that upper world—naturally enough, if here once more our parable holds true. Nor, again, is it at all strange that one who comes from the contemplation of divine things to the miseries of human life should appear awkward and ridiculous when, with eyes still -dazed and not yet accustomed to the darkness, he is compelled, in a law-court or elsewhere, to dispute about the shadows of justice or the images that cast those shadows, and to wrangle over the notions of what is right in the minds of men who have never beheld Justice itself.

Glaucon/ It is not at all strange.

Socrates/ No; a sensible man will remember that the eyes may, be confused in two ways—by a change from light to darkness or from darkness to light; and he will recognize that the same thing happens to the soul. When he sees it troubled and unable to discern anything clearly, instead of laughing thoughtlessly, he will ask whether, coming from a brighter existence, its unaccustomed vision is obscured by the darkness, in which case he will think its condition enviable and its life a happy one; or whether, emerging from

the depths of ignorance, it is dazzled by excess of light. If so, he will rather feel sorry for it; or, if he were inclined to laugh, that would be less ridiculous than to laugh at the soul which has come down from the light.

Glaucon/ That is a fair statement.

Socrates/ If this is true, then, we must conclude that education is not what it is said to be by some, who profess to put knowledge into a soul which does not possess it, as if they could put sight into blind eyes. On the contrary, our own account signifies that the soul of every man does possess the power of learning the truth and the organ to see it with; and that, just as one might have to turn the whole body round in order that the eye should see light instead of darkness, so the entire soul must be turned away from this changing world, until its eye can bear to contemplate reality and that supreme splendor which we have called the Good. Hence there may well be an art whose aim would be to effect this very thing, the conversion of the soul, in the readiest way; not to put the power of sight into the soul's eye, which already has it, but to ensure that, instead of looking in the wrong direction, it is turned the way it ought to be.

Glaucon/ Yes it may well be so.

Socrates/ It looks, then, as though wisdom were different from those ordinary virtues, as they are called, which are not far removed from bodily qualities, in that they can be produced by habituation and exercise in a soul which has not possessed them from the first. Wisdom, it seems, is certainly the virtue of some diviner faculty, which never loses its power, though its use for good or harm depends on the direction towards which it is turned. You must have noticed in dishonest men with a reputation for sagacity the shrewd glance of a narrow intelligence piercing the objects to which it is directed. There is nothing wrong with their power of

vision, but it has been forced into the service of evil, so that the keener its sight, the more harm it works.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And yet if the growth of a nature like this had been pruned from earliest childhood, cleared of those clinging overgrowths which come of gluttony and all luxurious pleasure and, like leaden weights charged with affinity to this mortal world, hang upon the soul, bending its vision downwards; if, freed from these, the soul were turned round towards true reality, then this same power in these very men would see the truth as keenly as the objects it is turned to now.

Glaucon/ Yes, very likely.

Socrates/ Is it not also likely, or indeed certain after what has been said, that a state can never be properly governed either by the uneducated who know nothing of truth or by men who are allowed to spend all their days in the pursuit of culture? The ignorant have no single mark before their eyes at which they must aim in all the conduct of their own lives and of affairs of state; and the others will not engage in action if they can help it, dreaming that, while still alive, they have been translated to the Islands of the Blest.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ It is for us, then, as founders of a commonwealth, to bring compulsion to bear on the noblest natures. They must be made to climb the ascent to the vision of Goodness, which we called the highest object of knowledge; and, when they have looked upon it long enough, they must not be allowed, as they now are, to remain on the heights, refusing to come down again to the prisoners or to take any part in their labors and rewards, however much or little these may be worth.

Glaucon/ Shall we not be doing them an injustice, if we force on them a worse life than they might have?

Socrates/ You have forgotten again, my friend, that the law is not concerned to make anyone class specially happy, but to ensure the welfare of the commonwealth as a whole. By persuasion or constraint it will unite the citizens in harmony, making them share whatever benefits each class can contribute to the common good; and its purpose in forming men of that spirit was not that each should be left to go his own way, but that they should be instrumental in binding the community into one.

Glaucon/ True, I had forgotten.

Socrates/ You will see, then, Glaucon, that there will be no real injustice in compelling our philosophers to watch over and care for the other citizens. We can fairly tell them that their compeers in other states may quite reasonably refuse to collaborate: there they have sprung up, like a self-sown plant, in despite of their country's institutions; no one has fostered their growth, and they cannot be expected to show gratitude for a care they have never received. 'But', we shall say, 'it is not so with you. We have brought you into existence for your country's sake as well as for your own, to be like leaders and king-bees in a hive; you have been better and more thoroughly educated than those others and hence you are more capable of playing your part both as men of thought and as men of action. You must go down, then, each in his turn, to live with the rest and let your eyes grow accustomed to the darkness. You will then see a thousand times better than those who live there always; you will recognize every image for what it is and know what it represents, because you have seen justice, beauty, and goodness in their reality; and so you and we shall find life in our commonwealth no mere dream, as it is in most existing states, where men live fighting one another about shadows

and quarrelling for power, as if that were a great prize; whereas in truth government can be at its best and free from dissension only where the destined rulers are least desirous of holding office.'

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then will our pupils refuse to listen and to take their turns at sharing in the work of the community, though they may live together for most of their time in a purer air?

Glaucon/ No; it is a fair demand, and they are fair-minded men. No doubt, unlike any ruler of the present day, they will think of holding power as an unavoidable necessity.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend; for the truth is that you can have a well-governed society only if you can discover for your future rulers a better way of life than being in office; then only will power be in the hands of men who are rich, not in gold, but in the wealth that brings happiness, a good and wise life. All goes wrong when, starved for lack of anything good in their own lives, men turn to public affairs hoping to snatch from thence the happiness they hunger for. They set about fighting for power, and this internecine conflict ruins them and their country. The life of true philosophy is the only one that looks down upon offices of state; and access to power must be confined to men who are not in love with it; otherwise rivals will start fighting. So whom else can you compel to undertake the guardianship of the commonwealth, if not those who, besides understanding best the principles of government, enjoy a nobler life than the politician's and look for rewards of a different kind?

Glaucon/ There is indeed no other choice.

Socrates/ Shall we next consider how men of this quality are to be produced and how they may be led upward to the light, as some are fabled to have ascended from the underworld to the gods?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ It is a question of 'night or day', to be determined not, as in the children's game, by spinning a shell, but by the turning about of the soul from a day that is like night to the veritable day, that journey up to the real world which we shall call the true pursuit of wisdom. We have to ask what studies will have this effect.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ What form of study is there, Glaucon, that would draw the soul from the world of change to reality? At this moment it occurs to me that our young men were to be trained warriors; so the study we are looking for ought to be not without use in warfare as well.

Glaucon/ Yes, if possible.

Socrates/ Now, of the two branches of their earlier education, physical training is certainly concerned with perishable things, for bodily strength grows and decays. So this cannot be the study we are in search of. Can it be education in poetry and music carried to the point we laid down earlier?

Glaucon/ No; that, if you remember, was the counterpart of bodily training. It educated our Guardians by the influence of habit, imparting no real knowledge, but only a kind of measure and harmony by means of melody and rhythm, and forming the character in similar ways through the content of the literature, fabulous or true. It taught nothing useful for so high a purpose as you now have in view.

Socrates/ Quite true; your memory is very exact. But where shall we find what we want? The manual crafts, we agreed, were all rather degrading.

Glaucon/ Yes, of course. But if you exclude them as well as all that early education, what is there left to study?

Socrates/ Well, if we cannot find anything over and above these subjects, suppose we take something that has a bearing upon them all. There is one, for instance, which is universally useful in all, crafts and in every form of knowledge and intellectual operation—the first thing everyone has to learn.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ A simple matter: learning to tell the difference between one, two, and three, or, to put it shortly, number and calculation. Is it not true that this is something which no art or science can dispense with?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Including the art of war. On the stage, at any rate, Agamemnon is made to look a very ridiculous sort of general. You must remember how often the tragedians make Palamedes claim to have invented number and by that means to have marshaled the ranks of the army at Troy and counted the ships and everything. Apparently nothing could be counted before, and Agamemnon could not even tell how many feet he had—an odd kind of general, don't you think?

Glaucon/ Very odd, if that is really true.

Socrates/ So we may conclude that a soldier must know how to count and calculate?

Glaucon/ He must, or he could not be a human being at all, to say nothing of marshalling an army.

Socrates/ Does it strike you, then, that this study is one of those we are looking for, which naturally awaken the power of thought, though no one makes a right use of its tendency to draw us towards reality?

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ I will try to explain how I distinguish in my own mind the things which have that tendency. If you will

consider them too and say whether or not you agree, we shall see if I am right in my surmise.

Glaucon/ Please explain.

Socrates/ Take our perceptions, then. I can point to some of these which do not provoke thought to reflect upon them, because we are satisfied with the judgment of the senses. But in other cases perception seems to yield no trustworthy result, and reflection is instantly demanded.

Glaucon/ You mean objects seen from a great distance, or illusory effects in scene-painting.

Socrates/ No, you have not understood me. I mean that reflection is provoked when perception yields a contradictory impression, presenting two opposite qualities with equal clearness, no matter whether the object be distant or close at hand. When there is no such contradiction, we are not encouraged to reflect. Let me illustrate what I mean. Here are three fingers, the middle finger, the third, and the little one. I am assuming that you have a close view of them. The point is this. Each one of them presents itself equally as a finger, and in this respect it makes no difference whether we see it at either end of the row or in the middle, as fair or dark, thick or thin, and so on. In any case we see it as a finger, and the ordinary mind is not driven to call in its power of reflection and ask for a definition of 'finger', because at no stage has the sense of sight intimated that the finger is at the same moment the opposite of a finger. So an impression of this kind naturally has no tendency to arouse reflection.

Glaucon/ Naturally.

Socrates/ But now take the size of these fingers. Can sight satisfactorily distinguish their bigness and smallness, and does it make no difference whether any particular one of them is at the end of the row or in between? Or can touch

discriminate between thick and thin or hard and soft? In reporting on qualities like these all the senses are deficient. They seem to work in this way. The sense which takes cognizance of hardness must also take cognizance of softness, and it reports to the mind that it feels the same thing as both hard and soft.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ In such cases, then, the mind must be at a loss to know what this sensation means by hard, since it declares the same thing to be also soft; or what sensations of lightness and heaviness mean by light and heavy, if they intimate that what is light is heavy and what is heavy is light.

Glaucon/ Yes; these reports strike the mind as paradoxical and they do call for reflection.

Socrates/ So it is natural in these circumstances for the mind to invoke the help of reason with its power of calculation, to consider whether any given message it receives refers to a single thing or to two. If there appear to be two things, each of them will appear as one thing, distinct from the other; and accordingly, each being one and both together making two, the mind will conceive them as separate; otherwise it would think of them not as two, but as one.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Now sight, too, as we said, perceives both big and little; only not as separate, but in a confused impression. In order to clear up this confusion, intelligence was driven to look at bigness and smallness in the opposite way, as distinct things. It is some such experience as this that first prompts us to ask what is meant by bigness or smallness. And that is how we came to distinguish what we call the object of intelligence from the thing seen.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Well then, that is the distinction I was trying to express just now, when I defined as provocative of thought impressions of sense in which opposites are combined; whereas, if there is no contradictory impression, there is nothing to awaken reflection.

Glaucon/ I understand now and I agree.

Socrates/ Now what about unity and number? To which of those two classes do they belong?

Glaucon/ I cannot be sure.

Socrates/ What we have just said should help you to a conclusion. If unity can be satisfactorily apprehended, just by itself, by sight or any other sense, as we said of the finger, then it will not have the quality of drawing the mind towards reality. But if it is always seen in some contradictory combination, so as to appear no more one than the opposite of one, then a judge will be needed to decide; the mind will be forced to seek a way out of the difficulty, setting thought in motion and asking what unity means. In this way the study of unity would be one of those which convert the soul and lead it to the contemplation of reality. Well, unity is a case in which sight certainly does present a contradiction. We see the same thing as both one and also indefinitely many. Then if that is true of unity, all number has the same property, hasn't it?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well now, number is the subject of the whole art of calculation and of the science of number; and since the properties of number appear to have the power of leading us towards reality, these must be among the studies we are in search of. The soldier must learn them in order to marshal his troops; the philosopher, because he must rise above the

world of change and grasp true being, or he will never become proficient in the calculations of reason. Our Guardian is both soldier and philosopher; so this will be a suitable study for our law to prescribe. Those who are to take part in the highest functions of state must be induced to approach it, not in an amateur spirit, but perseveringly, until, by the aid of pure thought, they come to see the real nature of number. They are to practice calculation, not like merchants or shopkeepers for purposes of buying and selling, but with a view to war and to help in the conversion of the soul itself from the world of becoming to truth and reality.

Glaucon/ Excellent.

Socrates/ Moreover, talking of this study, it occurs to me now what a fine thing it is and in how many ways it will further our intentions, if it is pursued for the sake of knowledge and not for commercial ends. As we were saying, it has a great power of leading the mind upwards and forcing it to reason about pure numbers, refusing to discuss collections of material things which can be seen and touched. Good mathematicians, as of course you know, scornfully reject any attempt to cut up the unit itself into parts: if you try to break it up small, they will multiply it up again, taking good care that the unit shall never lose its oneness and appear as a multitude of parts.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And if they are asked what are these numbers they are talking about, in which every unit, as they claim, is exactly equal to every other and contains no parts, what would be their answer?

Glaucon/ This, I should say: that the numbers they mean can only be conceived by thought: there is no other way of dealing with them.

Socrates/ You see, then, that this study is really indispensable for our purpose, since it forces the mind to arrive at pure truth by the exercise of pure thought.

Glaucon/ Yes, it has a powerful effect of that kind.

Socrates/ Have you noticed, too, how people with a talent for calculation are naturally quick at learning almost any other subject; and how a training in it makes a slow mind quicker, even if it does no other good?

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ Also, it would not be easy to find many branches of study which require more effort from the learner. For all these reasons we cannot do without this form of training for the most gifted natures.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ It is settled, then, that arithmetic is to be one of our subjects. Have we any use for the one that comes next?

Glaucon/ You mean geometry?

Socrates/ I do.

Glaucon/ Obviously, so much of it as bears on warlike operations will concern us. For pitching a camp, occupying a position, closing up or deploying troops, and for other formations in battle or on the march, a knowledge of geometry will be an advantage.

Socrates/ But still, for such purposes a small amount of geometry and arithmetic will be enough. We have to ask whether a much more advanced study will help towards a comprehension of the essential Form of Goodness. Any study, as we said, will have that tendency, if it forces the soul to turn towards the region of that beatific reality, which it must by all means behold. So geometry will be suitable or

not, according as it makes us contemplate reality or the world of change.

Glaucon/ That is our view.

Socrates/ In this respect, then, no one who has even a slight acquaintance with geometry will deny that the nature of this science is in flat contradiction with the absurd language used by mathematicians, for want of better terms. They constantly talk of 'operations' like 'squaring', 'applying', 'adding', and so on, as if the object were to do something, whereas the true purpose of the whole subject is knowledge—knowledge, moreover, of what eternally exists, not of anything that comes to be this or that at some time and ceases to be.

Glaucon/ Yes, that will be readily agreed: geometry is knowledge of the eternally existent.

Socrates/ If so, it will tend to draw the soul towards truth and to direct upwards the philosophic intelligence which is now wrongly turned earthwards.

Glaucon/ There is no doubt about that.

Socrates/ Then there can be no doubt that geometry must by no means be neglected by the citizens of your Callipolis. It has incidental advantages, too, which are not to be despised. There are its uses in war, which you mentioned; and also we know that a training in geometry makes all the difference in preparing the mind for any kind of study.

Glaucon/ It does indeed.

Socrates/ Then we will make this the second subject of study for our young men.

Glaucon/ We will.

Socrates/ Shall we put astronomy third? Do you agree?

Glaucon/ Certainly I do. It is important for military purposes, no less than for agriculture and navigation, to be able to tell accurately the times of the month or year.

Socrates/ I am amused by your evident fear that the public will think you are recommending useless knowledge. True, it is quite hard to realize that every soul possesses an organ better worth saving than a thousand eyes, because it is our only means of seeing the truth; and that when its light is dimmed or extinguished by other interests, these studies will purify the hearth and rekindle the sacred fire. Those who believe in this faculty will approve of your proposals without reserve; all who are unaware of its existence will of course think them nonsense, because they can see in such knowledge no ulterior profit worth mentioning. So you had better decide at once which party you mean to reason with. Or you may ignore both and carry on the discussion chiefly for your own satisfaction, though anyone who can benefit by it may be welcome to do so.

Glaucon/ I would rather go on with the conversation for my own sake in the main.

Socrates/ Well then, we must retrace our steps. We made a mistake just now about the subject that comes next after geometry. From plane geometry we went straight on to the study of solid bodies in circular motion. We ought first to take solid bodies in themselves; for the third dimension should come after the second, and that brings us to the cube and all the figures which have depth.

Glaucon/ That is so. But this subject, Socrates, seems not to have been investigated.

Socrates/ There are two reasons for that. These inquiries, difficult as they are, languish because no state thinks them worth encouraging. Secondly, students are not likely to make discoveries without a director, who is hard to find, and

supposing him found,, as matters now stand, the men with a gift for these researches would be too proud to accept his guidance. They would be amenable only if a whole community were to conceive a respect for such work and give a director its support. The problems might then be solved by continuous and energetic investigation. Even now, despised as the subject is by the public and curtailed, by students who do not take account of its true utility, in spite of everything it is gaining ground, thanks to its inherent charm; and it would not be surprising if inquiry should succeed in bringing the truth to light.

Glaucon/ Yes, it has a remarkable charm. But please explain further. Just now you spoke of geometry as the study of plane surfaces, and you put astronomy next. But then you went back on that.

Socrates/ Yes, I was in too great a hurry to cover all the ground; more haste less speed. The study of solids should have come next; I passed it over because it is in such a pitiable state, and went on to astronomy, which studies the motion of solid bodies.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then let us put astronomy fourth, assuming the subject now neglected to have been established, provided that the state will take it up.

Glaucon/ That may well happen. And now, Socrates, I will praise astronomy on your own principles, instead of commending its usefulness in the vulgar spirit for which you upbraided me. Anyone can see that this subject forces the mind to look upwards, away from this world of ours to higher things.

Socrates/ Anyone except me, perhaps. I do not agree.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ As it is now handled by those who are trying to lead us up to philosophy, I think it simply turns the mind's eye downwards.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ You put a too generous construction on the study of 'higher things'. Apparently you would think a man who threw his head back to contemplate the decorations on a ceiling was using his reason, not his eyes, to gain knowledge. Perhaps you are right and my notion is foolish; but I cannot think of any study as making the mind look upwards, except one which has to do with unseen reality. No one, I should say, can ever gain knowledge of any sensible object by gaping upwards any more than by shutting his eyes and searching for it on the ground, because there can be no knowledge of sensible things. His mind will be looking downwards, though he may pursue his studies lying on his back or floating on the sea.

Glaucon/ I deserve to be rebuked. But how did you mean the study of astronomy to be reformed, so as to serve our purposes?

Socrates/ In this way. These intricate traceries in the sky are, no doubt, the loveliest and most perfect of material things, but still part of the visible world, and therefore they fall far short of the true realities—the real relative velocities, in the world of pure number and all perfect geometrical figures, of the movements which carry round the bodies involved in them. These, you will agree, can be conceived by reason and thought, not seen by the eye.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Accordingly, we must use the embroidered heaven as a model to illustrate our study of those realities, just as one might use diagrams exquisitely drawn by some consummate artist like Daedalus. An expert in geometry,

meeting with such designs, would admire their finished workmanship, but he would think it absurd to study them in all earnest with the expectation of finding in their proportions the exact ratio of anyone number to another.

Glaucon/ Of course it would be absurd.

Socrates/ The genuine astronomer, then, will look at the motions of the stars with the same feelings. He will admit that the sky with all that it contains has been framed by its artificer with the highest perfection of which such works are capable. But when it comes to the proportions of day to night, of day and night to month, of month to year, and of the periods of other stars to Sun and Moon and to one another, he will think it absurd to believe that these visible material things go on forever without change or the slightest deviation, and to spend all his pains on trying to find exact truth in them.

Glaucon/ Now you say so, I agree.

Socrates/ If we mean, then, to turn the soul's native intelligence to its proper use by a genuine study of astronomy, we shall proceed, as we do in geometry, by means of problems, and leave the starry heavens alone.

Glaucon/ That will make the astronomer's labor many times greater than it is now.

Socrates/ Yes; and if we are to be of any use as lawgivers, the other tasks we set will be no less burdensome. And now, have you any further suitable study to suggest?

Glaucon/ Not at the moment.

Socrates/ Yet there is more than one variety of motion, I fancy. An expert would be able to name them all; but even people like U can distinguish two.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ Besides the motion studied in astronomy, there is its counterpart, the harmonious movement for which our ears are framed, as our eyes are for the study of the stars. These are sister sciences, so the Pythagoreans say, and we may agree with them. This is a large subject and we will ask what they have to tell us about it, and perhaps about some other questions. Only we must constantly hold by our own principle, not to let our pupils take up any study in an imperfect form, stopping short of that higher region to which all studies should attain, as we said just now in speaking of astronomy. As you will know, the students of harmony make the same sort of mistake as the astronomers: they waste their time in measuring audible concords and sounds one against another.

Glaucon/ Yes, they are absurd enough, with their talk of 'groups of quarter-tones' and all the rest of it. They lay their ears to the instrument as if they were trying to overhear the conversation from next door. One says he can still detect a note in between, giving the smallest possible interval, which ought to be taken as the unit of measurement, while another insists that there is now no difference between the two notes. Both prefer their ears to their intelligence.

Socrates/ You are thinking of those worthy musicians who tease and torture the strings, racking them on the pegs. I will not push the metaphor so far as to picture the musician beating them with the plectrum and charging them with faults which the strings deny or brazen out. I will drop the comparison and tell you that I am thinking rather of those Pythagoreans whom we were going to consult about harmony. They are just like the astronomers—intent upon the numerical properties embodied in these audible consonances: they do not rise to the level of formulating problems and inquiring which numbers are inherently consonant and which are not, and for what reasons.

Glaucon/ That sounds like a superhuman undertaking.

Socrates/ I would rather call it a 'useful study; but useful only when pursued as a means to the knowledge of beauty and goodness.

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Further, this whole course of study will, I believe, contribute to the end we desire and not be labor wasted, only if it is carried to the point at which reflection can take a comprehensive view of the mutual relations and affinities which bind all these sciences together.

Glaucon/ So I suspect; but it is an enormous task, Socrates.

Socrates/ What do you refer to? The prelude? Do we not know that all this is no more than an introduction to the main theme which has yet to be learnt? Surely you would not regard experts in mathematics as masters of dialectic.

Glaucon/ Certainly not, except a very few of those I have met.

Socrates/ Well, can the knowledge we are demanding ever be attained by people who cannot give a rational account of their statements or make others give an account of theirs?

Glaucon/ Once more I should say No.

Socrates/ Here at last, then, we come to the main theme, to be developed in philosophic discussion. It falls within the domain of the intelligible world; but its progress is like that of the power of vision in the released prisoner of our parable. When he had reached the stage of trying to look at the living creatures outside the Cave, then at the stars, and lastly at the Sun himself, he arrived at the highest object in the visible world. So here, the summit of the intelligible world is reached in philosophic discussion by one who aspires, through the discourse of reason unaided by any of the senses, to make his way in every case to the essential reality

and perseveres until he has grasped by pure intelligence the very nature of Goodness itself. This journey is what we call Dialectic.

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ There was also that earlier stage when the prisoner, set free from his chains, turned from the shadows to the images which cast them and to the fire-light, and climbed up out of the cavern into the sunshine. When there, he was still unable to look at the animals and plants and the sunlight; he could only see the shadows of things and their reflections in water, though these, it is true, are works of divine creation and come from real things, not mere shadows of images thrown by the light of the fire, which was itself only an image as compared with the Sun. Now the whole course of study in the arts we have reviewed has the corresponding effect of leading up the noblest faculty of the soul towards the contemplation of the highest of all realities, just as in our allegory the bodily organ which has the clearest perceptions was led up towards the brightest of visible things in the material world.

Glaucon/ I agree to what you are saying; I find it very hard to accept, but in another way no less hard to deny. However, there will be many other opportunities to reconsider it; so let us assume for the moment that it is true, and go on to develop what you call the main theme as fully as we have treated the prelude. I want you to describe the function of philosophic discussion, into what divisions it falls, and what are its methods; for here, it seems, we have come to the procedure which should lead to the resting-place at our journey's end.

Socrates/ My dear Glaucon, you will not be able to follow me farther, though not for want of willingness on my part. It would mean that, instead of illustrating the truth by an

allegory, I should be showing you the, truth itself, at least as it appears to me. I cannot be sure whether or not I see it as it really is; but we can be sure that there is some such reality which it concerns us to see. Is not that so?

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And also that it can be revealed only to one who is trained in the studies we have discussed, and to him only by the power of dialectic?

Glaucon/ That also we can assert.

Socrates/ At any rate, no one will maintain against us that there is any other method of inquiry which systematically attempts in every case to grasp the nature of each thing as it is in itself. The other arts are nearly all concerned with human opinions and desires, or with the production of natural and artificial things, or with the care of them when produced. There remain geometry and those other allied studies which, as we said, do in some measure apprehend reality; but we observe that they cannot yield anything clearer than a dream-like vision of the real so long as they leave the assumptions they employ unquestioned and can give no account of them. If your premise is something you do not really know and your conclusion and the intermediate steps are a tissue of things you do not really know, your reasoning may be consistent with itself, but how can it ever amount to knowledge?

Glaucon/ It cannot.

Socrates/ So, the method of dialectic is the only one which takes this course, doing away with assumptions and travelling up to the first principle of all, so as to make sure of confirmation there. When the eye of the soul is sunk in a veritable slough of barbarous ignorance, this method gently draws it forth and guides it upwards, assisted in this work of conversion by the arts we have enumerated. From force of

habit we have several times spoken of these as branches of knowledge; but they need some other name implying something less clear than knowledge, though not so dim as the apprehension of appearances. 'Thinking', I believe, was the term we fixed on earlier; but in considering matters of such high importance we shall not quarrel about a name.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ We shall be satisfied, then, with the names we gave earlier to our four divisions: first, knowledge; second, thinking; third, belief; and fourth, imagining. The last two taken together constitute the apprehension of appearances in the world of Becoming; the first two, intelligence concerned with true Being. Finally, as Being is to Becoming, so is intelligence to the apprehension of appearances; and in the same relation again stand knowledge to belief, and thinking to imagining. We had better not discuss the corresponding objects, the intelligible world and the world of appearance, or the twofold division of each of those provinces and the proportion in which the divisions stand. We might be involved in a discussion many times as long as the one we have already had.

Glaucon/ Well, I certainly agree on those other points, so far as I can follow you.

Socrates/ And by a master of dialectic do you also mean one who demands an account of the essence of each thing? And would you not say that, in so far as he can render no such account to himself or to others, his intelligence is at fault?

Glaucon/ I should.

Socrates/ And does not this apply to the Good? He must be able to distinguish the essential nature of Goodness, isolating it from all other Forms; he must fight his way through all criticisms, determined to examine every step by

the standard, not of appearances and opinions, but of reality and truth, and win through to the end without sustaining a fall. If he cannot do this, he will know neither Goodness itself nor any good thing; if he does lay hold upon some semblance of good, it will be only a matter of belief, not of knowledge; and he will dream away his life here in a, sleep which has no awakening on this side of that world of Death where he will sleep at last forever.

Glaucon/ I do most earnestly agree with you.

Socrates/ Well then, if you should ever be charged in actual fact with the upbringing and education of these imaginary children of yours, you will not allow them, I suppose, to bear rule in your commonwealth so long as their minds are, as a mathematician might say, irrational quantities, not commensurate with the highest responsibilities. So you will make a law that they must devote themselves especially to the discipline which will make them masters of the technique of asking and answering questions.

Glaucon/ Yes, I will, with your collaboration.

Socrates/ May we conclude, then, that our account of the subjects of study is now complete? Dialectic will stand as the coping-stone of the whole structure; there is no other study that deserves to be put above it.

Glaucon/ Yes, I agree.

Socrates/ It only remains, then, to draw up a scheme showing how, and to whom, these studies are to be allotted.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ You remember what sort of people we chose earlier to be Rulers?

Glaucon/ Of course I do.

Socrates/ In most respects, then, natures of that quality are to be selected: we shall prefer the steadiest, the bravest, and, so far as possible, the handsomest persons. But, besides that, we must look not only for generous and virile characters, but for gifts fitting them for this sort of education. They must be eager students and learn with ease, because the mind is more apt to shrink from severe study than from hard physical exercise, in which part of the burden falls upon the body. Also we must demand a good memory and a dogged appetite for hard work of every kind. How else can you expect a man to undergo all the hardships of bodily training and, on the top of that, to carry through such a long course of study?

Glaucon/ He will certainly need every natural advantage.

Socrates/ At any rate, this explains what is wrong now with the position of Philosophy and why she has fallen into disrepute: as I said before, she ought never to have been wooed by the base-born, who are unworthy of her favors. To begin with, the genuine aspirant should not be one-sided in his love of work, liking one half of it and neglecting the other; as happens with one who throws himself into athletics and hunting and all sorts of bodily exertion, but hates the trouble of learning anything from others or of thinking for himself. His industry goes halting on one foot; and so it does too if it takes the opposite direction.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Also with regard to truth, we shall count as equally crippled a mind which, while it hates deliberate falsehood, cannot bear to tell lies, and is very angry when others do so, yet complacently tolerates involuntary error and is in no way vexed at being caught wallowing in swinish ignorance. We must be no less on the watch to distinguish the base metal from the true in respect of temperance,

courage, high-mindedness, and every kind of virtue. A state which chooses its rulers, or a man who chooses his friends, without a searching eye for these qualities will find themselves, in respect of one or another of them, cheated by a counterfeit or leaning on a broken reed. So all such precautions are very much our concern. If we can find, for this long course of training and study, men who are at all points sound of limb and sound in mind, then Justice herself will have no fault to find with us and we shall ensure the safety of our commonwealth and its institutions. We should only ruin it by choosing pupils of a different stamp; and moreover we should bring down upon philosophy an even greater storm of ridicule.

Glaucon/ That would be a discreditable result.

Socrates/ It would. But at the moment I seem to be inviting ridicule myself.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ By speaking with so much warmth and forgetting that these speculations are only an amusement for our leisure. As I spoke, I seemed to see Philosophy suffering undeserved insults, and was so vexed with her persecutors that I lost my temper and became too vehement.

Glaucon/ I did not think so as I listened.

Socrates/ No, but I felt it myself. However, here is something we must not forget. When we spoke earlier of selecting Rulers, we said we should choose old men; but that will not do for the selection we are making now. We must not let Solon persuade us that a man can learn many things as he grows old; he could sooner learn to run. Youth is the time for hard work of all sorts.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Arithmetic, then, and geometry and all branches of the preliminary education which is to pave the

way for Dialectic should be introduced in childhood; but not in the guise of compulsory instruction, because for the free man there should be no element of slavery in learning. Enforced exercise does no harm to the body, but enforced learning will not stay in the mind. So avoid compulsion, and let your children's lessons take the form of play. This will also help you to see what they are naturally fitted for.

Glaucon/ That is a reasonable plan.

Socrates/ You remember, too, our children were to be taken to the wars on horseback to watch the fighting, and, when it was safe, brought close up like young hounds to be given a taste of blood.

Glaucon/ I remember.

Socrates/ Then we must make a select list including everyone who shows forwardness in all these studies and exercises and dangers.

Glaucon/ At what age?

Socrates/ As soon as they are released from the necessary physical training. This may take two or three years, during which nothing else can be done; for weariness and sleep are unfavorable to study. And at the same time, these exercises will provide not the least important test of character.

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ When that time is over, then, some of those who are now twenty years old will be selected for higher privileges. The detached studies in which they were educated as children will now be brought together in a comprehensive view of their connections with one another and with reality.

Glaucon/ Certainly that is the only kind of knowledge which takes firm root in the mind.

Socrates/ Yes, and the chief test of a natural gift for Dialectic, which is the same thing as the ability to see the connections of things.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ You will keep an eye, then, on these qualities and make a further selection of those who possess them in the highest degree and show most steadfastness in study as well as in warfare and in their other duties. When they reach thirty they will be promoted to still higher privileges and tested by the power of Dialectic, to see which can dispense with sight and the other senses and follow truth into the region of pure reality. And here, my friend, you will need the greatest watchfulness.

Glaucon/ Why in particular?

Socrates/ You must have seen how much harm is done now by philosophical discussion—how it infects people with a spirit of lawlessness.

Glaucon/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ Does that surprise you? Can you not make allowances for them? Imagine a child brought up in a rich family with powerful connections and surrounded by a host of flatterers; and suppose that, when he comes to manhood, he learns that he is not the son of those who call themselves his parents and his true father and mother are not to be found. Can you guess how he would feel towards his supposed parents and towards his flatterers before he knew about his parentage and after learning the truth? Or shall I tell you what I should expect?

Glaucon/ Please do.

Socrates/ I should Say that, so long as he did not know the truth, he would have more respect for his reputed parents and family than for the flatterers, and be less inclined to neglect them in distress or to be insubordinate in

word or deed; and in important matters the flatterers would have less influence with him. But when he learnt the facts, his respect would be transferred to them; their influence would increase, and he would openly associate with them and adopt their standards of behavior, paying no heed to his reputed father and family, unless his disposition were remarkably good.

Glaucon/ Yes; all that would be likely to happen. But how does your illustration apply to people who are beginning to take part in philosophical discussions?

Socrates/ In this way. There are certain beliefs about right and honorable conduct, which we have been brought up from childhood to regard with the same sort of reverent obedience that is shown to parents. In opposition to these, other courses attract us with flattering promises of pleasure; though a moderately good character will resist such blandishments and remain loyal to the beliefs of his fathers. But now suppose him confronted by the question, What does 'honorable' mean? He gives the answer he has been taught by the lawgiver, but he is argued out of his position. He is refuted again and again from many different points of view and at last reduced to thinking that what he called honorable might just as well be called disgraceful. He comes to the same conclusion about justice, goodness, and all the things he most revered. What will become now of his old respect and obedience?

Glaucon/ Obviously they cannot continue as before.

Socrates/ And when he has disowned these discredited principles and failed to find the true ones, naturally he can only turn to the life which flatters his desires; and we shall see him renounce all morality and become a lawless rebel. If this is the natural consequence of plunging the young into

philosophical discussion, ought we not to make allowances, as I said before?

Glaucon/ Yes, and be sorry for them too.

Socrates/ Then, if you do not want to be sorry for those pupils of yours who have reached the age of thirty, you must be very careful how you introduce them to such discussions. One great precaution is to forbid their taking part while they are still young. You must have seen how youngsters, when they get their first taste of it, treat argument as a form of sport solely for purposes of contradiction. When someone has proved them wrong, they copy his methods to confute others, delighting like puppies in tugging and tearing at anyone who comes near them. And so, after a long course of proving others wrong and being proved wrong themselves, they rush to the conclusion that all they once believed is false; and the result is that in the eyes of the world they discredit, not themselves only, but the whole business of philosophy. An older man will not share this craze for making a sport of contradiction. He will prefer to take for his model the conversation of one who is bent on seeking truth, and his own reasonableness will bring credit on the pursuit. We meant to ensure this result by all that we said earlier against the present practice of admitting anybody, however unfit, to philosophic discussions, and about the need for disciplined and steadfast character.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If a man, then, is to devote himself to such discussion as continuously and exclusively as he gave himself up earlier to the corresponding training of his body, will twice as long a time be enough?

Glaucon/ Do you mean six years or four?

Socrates/ No matter; let us say five. For after that they must be sent down again into that Cave we spoke of and

compelled to take military commands and other offices suitable to the young, so that they may not be behind their fellow citizens in experience. And at this stage they must once more be tested to see whether they will stand firm against all seductions.

Glaucon/ How much time do you allow for this?

Socrates/ Fifteen years. Then, when they are fifty, those who have come safely through and proved the best at all points in action and in study must be brought at last to the goal. They must lift up the eye of the soul to gaze on that which sheds light on all things; and when they have seen the Good itself, take it as a pattern for the right ordering of the state and of the individual, themselves included. For the rest of their lives, most of their time will be spent in study; but they will all take their turn at the troublesome duties of public life and act as Rulers for their country's sake, not regarding it as a distinction, but as an unavoidable task. And so, when each generation has educated others like themselves to take their place as Guardians of the commonwealth, they will depart to dwell in the Islands of the Blest. The state will set up monuments for them and sacrifices, honoring them as divinities, if the Pythian Oracle approves, or at least as men blest with a godlike spirit.

Glaucon/ That is a fine portrait of our Rulers, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, Glaucon, and you must not forget that some of them will be women. All I have been saying applies just as much to any women who are found to have the necessary gifts.

Glaucon/ Quite right, if they are to share equally with the men in everything, as we said.

Socrates/ Well then, do you agree that our scheme of a commonwealth and its constitution has not been a mere day-dream? Difficult it may be, but possible, though only on

the one condition we laid down, that genuine philosophers—one or more of them—shall come into power in a state; men who will despise all existing honors as mean and worthless, caring only for the right and the honors to be gained from that, and above all for justice as the one indispensable thing in whose service and maintenance they will reorganize their own state.

Glaucon/ How will they do that?

Socrates/ They must send out into the country all citizens who are above ten years old, take over the children, away from the present habits and manners of their parents, and bring them up in their own ways under the institutions we have described. Would not that be the quickest and easiest way in which our polity could be established, so as to prosper and be a blessing to any nation in which it might arise?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly; and I think, Socrates, you have satisfactorily explained how, if ever, it might come into being.

Socrates/ Have we now said enough, then, about this commonwealth and also about the corresponding type of man; for it must be clear what sort of person we shall expect him to be?

Glaucon/ It is clear; and, to answer your question, I believe our account is complete.

Socrates/ Very well. So far, then, Glaucon, we agree that in a state destined to reach the height of good government wives and children must be held in common; men and women must have the same education throughout and share all pursuits, warlike or peaceful; and those who have proved themselves the best both in philosophy and in war are to be kings among them. Further, the Rulers, as soon as they are appointed, will lead the soldiers and settle them in quarters such as we prescribed, common to all, with nothing private

about them; and besides these dwellings we agreed, if you remember, how far they should have anything they could call their own.

Glaucon/ Yes, I remember we thought they should have no property in the ordinary sense, but, as Guardians in training for war, they should receive as wages from the other citizens enough to keep them for the year while they fulfilled their duty of watching over the community, themselves included.

Socrates/ That is right. But when we had done with those matters, we went off into the digression which has brought us to this point. Let us go back now into our old path. Where did we leave it?

Glaucon/ That is easy to remember.- You were talking, very much as you are now, as if your description of the state were complete, and telling us that such a constitution and the corresponding type of man were what you would call good; although, as it now appears, you had it in your power to tell of a state and an individual of a still higher quality. But at any rate you said that, if this constitution were right, all others must be wrong, mentioning, if I remember, four varieties as worth considering with an eye to their defects. We were also to look at all the corresponding types of individual character, decide which was the best and which the worst, and then consider whether or not the best is also the happiest, the worst the most miserable. I was asking what these four constitutions were, when Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted us; and so you entered on the discussion which has brought us to this point.

Socrates/ Your memory is very accurate. Let us be like wrestlers, then, who go back to the same grip after an indecisive fall. If I repeat my question, try to give me the answer you were going to make.

Glaucon/ I will do my best.

Socrates/ Well, I am just as eager to hear what are the four type of government you meant. There is no difficulty about that; they are the types which have names in common use. First there is the constitution of Crete and Sparta, which is so commonly admired; second and next in esteem oligarchy, as it is called, a constitution fraught with many evils; next follows its antagonist, democracy; then despotism, which is thought so glorious and goes beyond them all as the fourth and final disease of society. Can you mention any other type of government, I mean any that is obviously a distinct species? There are, of course, types like hereditary monarchy, and states where the highest offices can be bought; but these are rather intermediate forms, to be found quite as frequently outside Greece as within it.

Glaucon/ True, one hears of many strange varieties.

Socrates/ Do you see, then, that there must be as many types of human character as there are forms of government? Constitutions cannot come out of stocks and stones; they must result from the preponderance of certain characters which draw the rest of the community in their wake. So if there are five forms of government, there must be five kinds of mental constitution among individuals.

Glaucon/ Naturally.

Socrates/ Now we have already described the man whom we regard as in the full sense good and just and who corresponds to aristocracy, the government of the best. We have next to consider the inferior types: the competitive and ambitious temperament, answering to the Spartan constitution, and then the oligarchic, democratic, and despotic characters, in order that, by setting the extreme examples in contrast, we may finally answer the question how pure justice and pure injustice stand in respect of the

happiness or misery they bring, and so decide to pursue the one or the other, according as we listen to Thrasymachus or to the argument we are now developing.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is the next thing to be done.

Socrates/ When we were studying moral qualities earlier, we began with the state, because they stood out more clearly there than in the individual. On the same principle we had better now take, in each case, the constitution first, and then, in the light of our results, examine the corresponding character. We shall start with the constitution dominated by motives of ambition—it has no name in common use that I know of; let us call it timarchy or timocracy—and then go on to oligarchy and democracy, and lastly visit a state under despotic government and look into the despot's soul. We ought then to be in a position to decide the question before us.

Glaucon/ Yes, such a systematic review should give us the materials for judgment.

Socrates/ Come then, let us try to explain how the government of the best might give place to a timocracy. Is it not a simple fact that in any form of government revolution always starts from the outbreak of internal dissension in the ruling class? The constitution cannot be upset so long as that class is of one mind, however small it may be.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then how, Glaucon, will trouble begin in our commonwealth? How will our Auxiliaries and Rulers come to be divided against each other or among themselves? Shall we, like Homer, invoke the Muses to tell us 'how first division came', and imagine them amusing themselves at our expense by talking in high-flown language, as one teases a child with a pretense of being in earnest?

Glaucon/ What have they to say?

Socrates/ Something of this sort. 'Hard as it may be for a state so framed to be shaken, yet, since all that comes into being must decay, even a fabric like this will not endure forever, but will suffer dissolution. In this manner: not only for plants that grow in the earth, but also for all creatures that move thereon, there are seasons of fruitfulness and unfruitfulness for soul and body alike, which come whenever a certain cycle is completed, in a period short or long according to the length of life of each species. For your own race, the rulers you have bred for your commonwealth, wise as they are, will not be able, by observation and reckoning, to hit upon the times propitious or otherwise for birth; someday the moment will slip by and they will beget children out of due season. For the divine creature there is a period embraced by a perfect number; while for the human there is a geometrical number determining the better or worse quality of the births. When your Guardians, from ignorance of this, bring together brides and bridegrooms out of season, their children will not be well-endowed or fortunate. The best of these may be appointed by the elder generation; but when they succeed to their fathers' authority as Guardians, being unworthy, they will begin to neglect us and to think too lightly first of the cultivation of the mind, and then of bodily training, so that your young men will come to be worse educated. Then Rulers appointed from among them will fail in their duty as Guardians to try the mettle of your citizens, those breeds of gold and silver, brass and iron that Hesiod told of; and when the silver is alloyed with iron and the gold with brass, diversity, inequality, and disharmony will beget, as they always must, enmity and war. Such, everywhere, is the birth and lineage of civil strife.'

Glaucon/ Yes, we will take that as a true answer to our question.

Socrates/ How could it be otherwise, when it comes from the Muses?

Glaucon/ And what will they go on to tell us?

Socrates/ Once civil strife is born, the two parties begin to pull different ways: the breed of iron and brass towards money-making and the possession of house and land, silver and gold; while the other two, wanting no other wealth than the gold and silver in the composition of their souls, try to draw them towards virtue and the ancient ways. But the violence of their contention ends in a compromise: they agree to distribute land and houses for private ownership; they enslave their own people who formerly lived as free men under their guardianship and gave them maintenance; and, holding them as serfs and menials, devote themselves to war and to keeping these subjects under watch and ward.

Glaucon/ I agree: that is how the transition begins.

Socrates/ And this form of government will be midway between the rule of the best and oligarchy, will it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Such being the transition, how will the state be governed after the change? Obviously, as intermediate between the earlier constitution and oligarchy, it will resemble each of these in some respects and have some features of its own.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ It will be like the earlier constitution in several ways. Authority will be respected; the fighting class will abstain from any form of business, farming, or handicrafts; they will keep up their common meals and give their time to physical training and martial exercises.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ On the other hand, it will have some peculiar characteristics. It will be afraid to admit intellectuals to office. The men of that quality now at its disposal will no longer be single-minded and sincere; it will prefer simpler characters with plenty of spirit, better suited for war than for peace. War will be its constant occupation, and military tricks and stratagems will be greatly admired.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ At the same time, men of this kind will resemble the ruling class of an oligarchy in being avaricious, cherishing furtively a passionate regard for gold and silver; for they will now have private homes where they can hoard their treasure in secret and live ensconced in a nest of their own, lavishing their riches on their women or whom they please. They will also be miserly, prizing the money they may not openly acquire, though prodigal enough of other people's wealth for the satisfaction of their desires. They will enjoy their pleasures in secret, like truant children, in defiance of the law; because they have been educated not by gentle influence but under compulsion, cultivating the body in preference to the mind and caring nothing for the spirit of genuine culture which seeks truth by the discourse of reason.

Glaucon/ The society you describe is certainly a mixture of good and evil.

Socrates/ Yes, it is a mixture; but, thanks to the predominance of the spirited part of our nature, it has one most conspicuous feature: ambition and the passion to excel.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Such, then, is the origin and character of this form of government. We have given only an outline, for no more finished picture is needed for the purpose of setting

before our eyes the perfect types of just and unjust men. It would be an endless task to go through all the forms of government and of human character without omitting any detail.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And now what of the corresponding individual? How does he come into being, and what is he like?

Adeimantus/ I imagine, his desire to excel, so far as that goes, would make him rather like Glaucon.

Socrates/ Perhaps; but in other ways the likeness fails. He must be more self-willed than Glaucon and rather uncultivated, though fond of music; one who will listen readily, but is no speaker. Not having a properly educated man's consciousness of superiority to slaves, he will treat them harshly; though he will be civil to free men, and very obedient to those in authority. Ambitious for office, he will base his claims, not on any gifts of speech, but on his exploits in war and the soldierly qualities he has acquired through his devotion to athletics and hunting. In his youth he will despise money, but the older he grows the more he will care for it, because of the touch of avarice in his nature; and besides his character is not thoroughly sound, for lack of the only safeguard that can preserve it throughout life, a thoughtful and cultivated mind.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ If that is the sort of young man whose character reflects a timocratical regime, his history will be something like this. He may be the son of an excellent father who, living in an ill-governed state, holds aloof from public life because he would sooner forgo some of his rights than take part in the scramble for office or be troubled with going to law. His son's character begins to take shape when he hears his mother complaining that she is slighted by the other women

because her husband has no official post. She sees too that he cares little for money, and is indifferent to all the scurrilous battle of words that goes on in the Assembly and the law-courts; and she finds him always absorbed in his thoughts, without much regard for her, or disregard either. Nursing all these grievances, she tells her son that his father is not much of a man and far too easy-going, and has all the other weaknesses that the wives of such men are fond of harping on.

Adeimantus/ Yes, we hear plenty of these feminine complaints.

Socrates/ Besides, as you know, servants who are esteemed loyal to the family sometimes talk privately to the sons in the same way. If they see the father taking no action against a swindler or a defaulting debtor, they urge the son, when he is grown up, to stand up for his rights and be more of a man than his father. When the boy goes out, he sees and hears the same sort of thing: one man is made light of as a fool for minding his own business, whereas another who has a finger in every pie is praised and respected. All this experience affects the young man, and on the other hand he listens to his father's conversation and can see at close quarters how his way of life compares with other people's; and so he is pulled both ways. His father tends the growth of reason in his soul, while the rest of the world is fostering the other two elements, ambition and appetite. By temperament he is not a bad man, but he has fallen into bad company, and the two contrary influences result in a compromise: he gives himself up to the control of the middle principle of high-spirited emulation and becomes an arrogant and ambitious man.

Adeimantus/ That is a good account of his history, I think.

Socrates/ So now we have an idea of the second form of government and the corresponding individual.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Shall we go on then, as Aeschylus might say, to tell of 'another man, matched with another state', or rather keep to our plan of taking the state first?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then I suppose the next type of constitution will be oligarchy.

Adeimantus/ What sort of regime do you mean?

Socrates/ The one which is based on a property qualification, where the rich are in power and the poor man cannot hold office.

Adeimantus/ I see.

Socrates/ We must start, then, by describing the transition from timocracy to oligarchy. No one could fail to see how that happens. The downfall of timocracy is due to the flow of gold into those private stores we spoke of. In finding new ways of spending their money, men begin by stretching the law for that purpose, until they and their wives obey it no longer. Then, as each keeps an envious eye on his neighbor, their rivalry infects the great mass of them; and as they go to further lengths in the pursuit of riches, the more they value money and the less they care for virtue. Virtue and wealth are balanced against one another in the scales; as the rich rise in social esteem, the virtuous sink. These changes of valuation, moreover, are always reflected in practice. So at last the competitive spirit of ambition in these men gives way to the passion for gain; they despise the poor man and promote to power the rich, who wins all their praise and admiration. At this point they fix by statute the qualification for privilege in an oligarchy, an amount of wealth which varies with the strength of the oligarchical

principle; no one may hold office whose property falls below the prescribed sum. This measure is carried through by armed force, unless they have already set up their constitution by terrorism. That, then, is how an oligarchy comes to be established.

Adeimantus/ Yes; but what is the character of this regime, and what are the defects we said it would have?

Socrates/ In the first place, the principle on which it limits privilege. How would it be, if the captain of a ship were appointed on a property qualification, and a poor man could never get a command, though he might know much more about seamanship?

Adeimantus/ The voyage would be likely to end in disaster.

Socrates/ Is not the same true of any position of authority? Or is the government of a state an exception?

Adeimantus/ Anything but an exception, inasmuch as a state is the hardest thing to govern and the most important.

Socrates/ So this is one serious fault of oligarchy.

Adeimantus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Is it any less serious that such a state must lose its unity and become two, one of the poor, the other of the rich, living together and always plotting against each other?

Adeimantus/ Quite as serious.

Socrates/ Another thing to its discredit is that they may well be unable to carry on a war. Either they must call out the common people or not. If they do, they will have more to fear from the armed multitude than from the enemy; and if they do not, in the day of battle these oligarchs will find themselves only too literally a government of the few. Also, their avarice will make them unwilling to pay war-taxes.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And again, is it right that the same persons should combine many occupations, agriculture, business, and soldiering? We condemned that practice some time ago.

Adeimantus/ No, not at all right.

Socrates/ Worst of all, a man is allowed to sell all he has to another and then to go on living in a community where he plays no part as tradesman or artisan or as a soldier capable of providing his own equipment; he is only what they call a pauper. This is an evil which first becomes possible under an oligarchy, or at least there is nothing to prevent it; otherwise there would not be some men excessively wealthy and others destitute.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Now think of this pauper in his earlier days when he was well off. By spending his money, was he doing any more good to the community in those useful ways I mentioned? He seemed to belong to the ruling class, but really he was neither ruling the state nor serving it; he was a mere consumer of goods. His house might be compared to one of those cells in the honeycomb where a drone is bred to be the plague of the hive. The drones which can fly were all created without stings; but these walking drones are of two sorts: some have formidable stings, the rest have none. In society, the stingless drones end as beggars in their old age; the ones which have stings become what is known as the criminal class. It follows that, in any community where beggars are to be seen, there are also thieves and pickpockets and temple-robbers and other such artists in crime concealed somewhere about the place. And you will certainly see beggars in any state governed by an oligarchy.

Adeimantus/ Yes, nearly everywhere, outside the ruling class.

Socrates/ Then we may assume that there are also plenty of drones with stings, criminals whom the government takes care to hold down by force; and we shall conclude that they are bred by lack of education, bad upbringing, and a vicious form of government.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Such, then, is the character of a state ruled by an oligarchy. It has all these evils and perhaps more.

Adeimantus/ Very likely.

Socrates/ We have finished, then, with the constitution known as oligarchy, where power is held on a property qualification, and we may turn now to the history and character of the corresponding individual.

Adeimantus/ Yes, let us do so.

Socrates/ The transition from the timocratic type to the oligarchical happens somewhat in this way. The timocratical man has a son, who at first emulates his father and follows in his steps. Then suddenly he sees him come up against society, like a ship striking a sunken rock, and founder with all his possessions; he may have held some high office or command and then have been brought to trial by informers and put to death or banished or outlawed with the loss of all his property.

Adeimantus/ All this might well happen.

Socrates/ The son is terror-stricken at the sight of this ruin, in which his own fortunes are involved. At once that spirit of eager ambition which hitherto ruled in his heart is thrust headlong from the throne. Humbled by poverty, he turns to earning his living and, little by little, through hard work and petty savings, scrapes together a fortune. And now he will install another spirit on the vacant throne, the money-loving spirit of sensual appetite, like an eastern monarch with diadem and golden chain and scimitar girt at

his side. At its footstool, on either hand, will crouch the two slaves he has forced into subjection: Reason, whose thought is now confined to calculating how money may breed more money, and Ambition, suffered to admire and value nothing but wealth and its possessors and to excel in nothing but the struggle to gain money by any and every means.

Adeimantus/ There is no swifter and surer way by which an ambitious young man may be transformed into a lover of money.

Socrates/ Is this, then, our oligarchical type?

Adeimantus/ Well, at any rate, the type from which he has developed corresponded to the constitution from which oligarchy arose.

Socrates/ Let us see, then, whether he will not have the same sort of character. The first point of resemblance is that he values wealth above everything. Another is that he is niggardly and a worker who satisfies only his necessary wants and will go to no further expense; his other desires he keeps in subjection as leading nowhere. There is something squalid about him, with his way of always expecting to make a profit and add to his hoard—the sort of person who is much admired by the vulgar. Surely there is a likeness here to the state under an oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ I think there is, especially in the way that money is valued above everything.

Socrates/ Because, I suspect, he has never thought of cultivating his mind.

Adeimantus/ Never; or he would not have promoted the blind god of Wealth to lead the dance.

Socrates/ Good; and here is another point. As a consequence of his lack of education, appetites will spring up in him, comparable to those drones in society whom we classified as either beggars or criminals, though his habitual carefulness will keep them in check. If you want to see his criminal tendencies at work, you must look to any occasions, such as the guardianship of orphans, where he has a chance to be dishonest without risk. It will then be clear that in his other business relations, where his apparent honesty gives him a good reputation, he is only exercising a sort of enforced moderation. The base desires are there, not tamed by a reasonable conviction that it is wrong to gratify them, but only held down under stress of fear, which makes him tremble for the safety of his whole fortune. Moreover, you may generally be sure of discovering these drone-like appetites whenever men of this sort have other people's money to spend.

Adeimantus/ That is very true.

Socrates/ Such a man, then, will not be single-minded but torn in two by internal conflict, though his better desires will usually keep the upper hand over the worse. Hence he presents a more decent appearance than many; but the genuine virtue of a soul in peace and harmony with itself will be utterly beyond his reach.

Adeimantus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Further, his stinginess weakens him as a competitor for any personal success or honorable distinction. He is unwilling to spend his money in a struggle for that sort of renown, being afraid to stir up his expensive desires by calling upon them to second his ambition. So, like a true oligarch, fighting with only a small part of his forces, he is usually beaten and remains a rich man.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Have we any further doubts, then, about the likeness between a state under an oligarchy and this parsimonious money-getter?

Adeimantus/ None at all.

Socrates/ Democracy, I suppose, should come next. A study of its rise and character should help us to recognize the democratic type of man and set him beside the others for judgment.

Adeimantus/ Certainly that course would fit in with our plan.

Socrates/ If the aim of life in an oligarchy is to become as rich as possible, that insatiable craving would bring about the transition to democracy. In this way: since the power of the ruling class is due to its wealth, they will not want to have laws restraining prodigal young men from ruining themselves by extravagance. They will hope to lend these spendthrifts money on their property and buy it up, so as to become richer and more influential than ever. We can see at once that a society cannot hold wealth in honor and at the same time establish a proper self-control in its citizens. One or the other must be sacrificed.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is fairly obvious.

Socrates/ In an oligarchy, then, this neglect to curb riotous living sometimes reduces to poverty men of a not ungenerous nature. They settle down in idleness, some of them burdened with debt, some disfranchised, some both at once; and these drones are armed and can sting. Hating the men who have acquired their property and conspiring against them and the rest of society, they long for a revolution. Meanwhile the usurers, intent upon their own business, seem unaware of their existence; they are too busy planting their own stings into any fresh victim who offers

them an opening to inject the poison of their money; and while they multiply their capital by usury, they are also multiplying the drones and the paupers. When the danger threatens to break out, they will do nothing to quench the flames, either in the way we mentioned, by forbidding a man to do what he likes with his own, or by the next best remedy, which would be a law enforcing a respect for right conduct. If it were enacted that, in general, voluntary contracts for a loan should be made at the lender's risk, there would be less of this shameless pursuit of wealth and a scantier crop of those evils I have just described.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ But, as things are, this is the plight to which the rulers of an oligarchy, for all these reasons, reduce their subjects. As for themselves, luxurious indolence of body and mind makes their young men too lazy and effeminate to resist pleasure or to endure pain; and the fathers, neglecting everything but money, have no higher ideals in life than the poor. Such being the condition of rulers and subjects, what will happen when they are thrown together, perhaps as fellow-travelers by sea or land to some festival or on a campaign, and can observe one another's demeanor in a moment of danger? The rich will have no chance to feel superior to the poor. On the contrary, the poor man, lean and sunburnt, may find himself posted in battle beside one who, thanks to his wealth and indoor life, is panting under his burden of fat and showing every mark of distress. 'Such men', he will think, 'are rich because we are cowards'; and when he and his friends meet in private, the word will go round: 'These men are no good: they are at our mercy.'

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is sure to happen.

Socrates/ This state, then, is in the same precarious condition as a person so unhealthy that the least shock from

outside will upset the balance or, even without that, internal disorder will break out. It falls sick and is at war with itself on the slightest occasion, as soon as one party or the other calls in allies from a neighboring oligarchy or democracy; and sometimes civil war begins with no help from without.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And when the poor win, the result is a democracy. They kill some of the opposite party, banish others, and grant the rest an equal share in civil rights and government, officials being usually appointed by lot.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is how a democracy comes to be established, whether by force of arms or because the other party is terrorized into giving way.

Socrates/ Now what is the character of this new regime? Obviously the way they govern themselves will throw light on the democratic type of man.

Adeimantus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ First of all, they are free. Liberty and free speech are rife everywhere; anyone is allowed to do what he likes.

Adeimantus/ Yes, so we are told.

Socrates/ That being so, every man will arrange his own manner of life to suit his pleasure. The result will be a greater variety of individuals than under any other constitution. So it may be the finest of all, with its variegated pattern of all sorts of characters. Many people may think it the best, just as women and children might admire a mixture of colors of every shade in the pattern of a dress. At any rate if we are in search of a constitution, here is a good place to look for one. A democracy is so free that it contains a sample of every kind; and perhaps anyone who intends to found a state, as we have been doing, ought first to visit this

emporium of constitutions and choose the model he likes best.

Adeimantus/ He will find plenty to choose from.

Socrates/ Here, too, you are not obliged to be in authority, however competent you may be, or to submit to authority, if you do not like it; you need not fight when your fellow citizens are at war, nor remain at peace when they do, unless you want peace; and though you may have no legal right to hold office or sit on juries, you will do so all the same if the fancy takes you. A wonderfully pleasant life, surely, for the moment.

Adeimantus/ For the moment, no doubt.

Socrates/ There is a charm, too, in the forgiving spirit shown by some who have been sentenced by the courts. In a democracy you must have seen how men condemned to death or exile stay on and go about in public, and no one takes any more notice than he would of a spirit that walked invisible. There is so much tolerance and superiority to petty considerations; such a contempt for all those fine principles we laid down in founding our commonwealth, as when we said that only a very exceptional nature could turn out a good man, if he had not played as a child among things of beauty and given himself only to creditable pursuits. A democracy tramples all such notions under foot; with a magnificent indifference to the sort of life a man has led before he enters politics, it will promote to honor anyone who merely calls himself the people's friend.

Adeimantus/ Magnificent indeed.

Socrates/ These then, and such as these, are the features of a democracy, an agreeable form of anarchy with plenty of variety and an equality of a peculiar kind for equals and unequals alike.

Adeimantus/ All that is notoriously true.

Socrates/ Now consider the corresponding individual character. Or shall we take his origin first, as we did in the case of the constitution?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ I imagine him as the son of our miserly oligarch, brought up under his father's eye and in his father's ways. So he too will enforce a firm control over all such pleasures as lead to expense rather than profit—unnecessary pleasures, as they have been called. But, before going farther, shall we draw the distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites, so as not to argue in the dark?

Adeimantus/ Please do so.

Socrates/ There are appetites which cannot be got rid of, and there are all those which it does us good to fulfill. Our nature cannot help seeking to satisfy both these kinds; so they may fairly be described as necessary. On the other hand, 'unnecessary' would be the right name for all appetites which can be got rid of by early training and which do us no good and in some cases do harm. Let us take an example of each kind, so as to form a general idea of them. The desire to eat enough plain food—just bread and meat—to keep in health and good condition may be called necessary. In the case of bread the necessity is twofold, since it not only does us good but is indispensable to life; whereas meat is only necessary in so far as it helps to keep us in good condition. Beyond these simple needs the desire for a whole variety of luxuries is unnecessary. Most people can get rid of it by early discipline and education; and it is as prejudicial to intelligence and self-control as it is to bodily health. Further, these unnecessary appetites might be called expensive, whereas the necessary ones are rather profitable, as helping

a man to do his work. The same distinctions could be drawn in the case of sexual appetite and all the rest.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, when we were speaking just now of drones, we meant the sort of man who is under the sway of a host of unnecessary pleasures and appetites, in contrast with our miserly oligarch, over whom the necessary desires are in control. Accordingly, we can now go back to describe how the democratic type develops from the oligarchical. I imagine it usually happens in this way. When a young man, bred, as we were saying, in a stingy and uncultivated home, has once tasted the honey of the drones and keeps company with those dangerous and cunning creatures, who know how to purvey pleasures in all their multitudinous variety, then the oligarchical constitution of his soul begins to turn into a democracy. The corresponding revolution was effected in the state by one of the two factions calling in the help of partisans from outside. In the same way one of the conflicting sets of desires in the soul of this youth will be reinforced from without by a group of kindred passions; and if the resistance of the oligarchical faction in him is strengthened by remonstrances and reproaches coming from his father, perhaps, or his friends, the opposing parties will soon be battling within him. In some cases the democratic interest yields to the oligarchical: a sense of shame gains a footing in the young man's soul, and some appetites are crushed, others banished, until order is restored.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that happens sometimes.

Socrates/ But then again, perhaps, owing to the father's having no idea how to bring up his son, another brood of desires, akin to those which were banished, are secretly nursed up until they become numerous and strong. These

draw the young man back into clandestine commerce with his old associates, and between them they breed a whole multitude. In the end, they seize the citadel of the young man's soul, finding it unguarded by the trusty sentinels which keep watch over the minds of men favored by heaven. Knowledge, right principles, true thoughts, are not at their post; and the place lies open to the assault of false and presumptuous notions. So he turns again to those lotus-eaters and now throws in his lot with them openly. If his family send reinforcements to the support of his thrifty instincts, the impostors who have seized the royal fortress shut the gates upon them, and will not even come to parley with the fatherly counsels of individual friends. In the internal conflict they gain the day; modesty and self-control, dishonored and insulted as the weaknesses of an unmanly fool, are thrust out into exile; and the whole crew of unprofitable desires take a hand in banishing moderation and frugality, which, as they will have it, are nothing but churlish meanness. So they take possession of the soul which they have swept clean, as if purified for initiation into higher mysteries; and nothing remains but to marshal the great procession bringing home Insolence, Anarchy, Waste, and Impudence, those resplendent divinities crowned with garlands, whose praises they sing under flattering names: Insolence they call good breeding, Anarchy freedom, Waste magnificence, and Impudence a manly spirit. Is not, that a fair account of! the revolution which gives free rein to unnecessary and harmful pleasures in a young man brought up in the satisfaction only of the necessary desires?

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is a vivid description.

Socrates/ In his life thenceforward he spends as much time and pains and money on his superfluous pleasures as on the necessary ones. If he is lucky enough not to be carried beyond all bounds, the tumult may begin to subside as he

grows older. Then perhaps he may recall some of the banished virtues and cease to give himself up entirely to the passions which ousted them; and now he will set all his pleasures on a footing of equality, denying to none its equal rights and maintenance, and allowing each in turn, as it presents itself, to succeed, as if by the chance of the lot, to the government of his soul until it is satisfied. When he is told that some pleasures should be sought and valued as arising from desires of a higher order, others chastised and enslaved because the desires are base, he will shut the gates of the citadel against the messengers of truth, shaking his head and declaring that one appetite is as good as another and all must have their equal rights. So he spends his days indulging the pleasure of the moment, now intoxicated with wine and music, and then taking to a spare diet and drinking nothing but water; one day in hard training, the next doing nothing at all, the third apparently immersed in study. Every now and then he takes a part in politics, leaping to his feet to say or do whatever comes into his head. Or he will set out to rival someone he admires, a soldier it may be, or, if the fancy takes him, a man of business. His life is subject to no order or restraint, and he has no wish to change an existence which he calls pleasant, free, and happy.

Adeimantus/ That well describes the life of one whose motto is liberty and equality.

Socrates/ Yes, and his character contains the same fine variety of pattern that we found in the democratic state; it is as multifarious as that epitome of all types of constitution. Many a man, and many a woman too, will find in it something to envy. So we may see in him the counterpart of democracy, and call him the democratic man.

Adeimantus/ We may.

Socrates/ Now there remains only the most admired of all constitutions and characters—despotism and the despot. How does despotism arise? That it comes out of democracy is fairly clear. Does the change take place in the same sort of way as the change from oligarchy to democracy? Oligarchy was established by men with a certain aim in life: the good they sought was wealth, and it was the insatiable appetite for money-making to the neglect of everything else that proved its undoing. Is democracy likewise ruined by greed for what it conceives to be the supreme good?

Adeimantus/ What good do you mean?

Socrates/ Liberty. In a democratic country you will be told that liberty is its noblest possession, which makes it the only fit place for a free spirit to live in.

Adeimantus/ True; that is often said.

Socrates/ Well then, as I was saying, perhaps the insatiable desire for this good to the neglect of everything else may transform a democracy and lead to a demand for despotism. A democratic state may fall under the influence of unprincipled leaders, ready to minister to its thirst for liberty with too deep draughts of this heady wine; and then, if its rulers are not complaisant enough to give it unstinted freedom, they will be arraigned as accursed oligarchs and punished. Law-abiding citizens will be insulted as nonentities who hug their chains; and all praise and honor will be bestowed, both publicly and in private, on rulers who behave like subjects and subjects who behave like rulers. In such a state the spirit of liberty is bound to go to all lengths.

Adeimantus/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ It will make its way into the home, until at last the very animals catch the infection of anarchy. The parent falls into the habit of behaving like the child, and the child like the parent: the father is afraid of his sons, and they show

no fear or respect for their parents, in order to assert their freedom. Citizens, resident aliens, and strangers from abroad are all on an equal footing. To descend to smaller matters, the schoolmaster timidly flatters his pupils, and the pupils make light of their masters as well as of their attendants. Generally speaking, the young copy their elders, argue with them, and will not do as they are told; while the old, anxious not to be thought disagreeable tyrants, imitate the young and condescend to enter into their jokes and amusements. The full measure of popular liberty is reached when the slaves of both sexes are quite as free as the owners who paid for them; and I had almost forgotten to mention the spirit of freedom and equality in the mutual relations of men and women.

Adeimantus/ Well, to quote Aeschylus, we may as well speak 'the word that rises to our lips'.

Socrates/ Certainly; so I will No one who had not seen it would believe how much more freedom the domestic animals enjoy in a democracy than elsewhere. The very dogs behave as if the proverb 'like mistress, like maid' applied to them; and the horses and donkeys catch the habit of walking down the street with all the dignity of freemen, running into anyone they meet who does not get out of their way. The whole place is simply bursting with the spirit of liberty.

Adeimantus/ No need to tell me that. I have often suffered from it on my way out of the town.

Socrates/ Putting all these items together, you can see the result: the citizens become so sensitive that they resent the slightest application of control as intolerable tyranny, and in their resolve to have no master they end by disregarding even the law, written or unwritten.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I know that only too well.

Socrates/ Such then, I should say, is the seed, so full of fair promise, from which springs despotism.

Adeimantus/ Promising indeed. But what is the next stage?

Socrates/ The same disease that destroyed oligarchy breaks out again here, with all the more force because of the prevailing license, and enslaves democracy. The truth is that, in the constitution of society, quite as much as in the weather or in plants and animals, any excess brings about an equally violent reaction. So the only outcome of too much freedom is likely to be excessive subjection, in the state or in the individual; which means that the culmination of liberty in democracy is precisely what prepares the way for the cruelest extreme of servitude under a despot. But I think you were asking rather about the nature of that disease which afflicts democracy in common with oligarchy and reduces it to slavery.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I was.

Socrates/ What I had in mind was that set of idle spendthrifts, among whom the bolder spirits take the lead. We compared these leaders, if you remember, to drones armed with stings, the sting-less drones being their less enterprising followers. In any society where these two groups appear they create disorder, as phlegm and bile do in the body. Hence the lawgiver, as a good physician of the body politic, should take measures in advance, no less than the prudent bee-keeper who tries to forestall the appearance of drones, or, failing that, cuts them out, cells and all, as quickly as he can.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then, to gain a clearer view of our problem, let us suppose the democratic commonwealth to be divided into three parts, as in fact it is. One consists of the drones we

have just described. Bred by the spirit of license, in a democracy this class is no less numerous and much more energetic than in an oligarchy, where it is despised and kept out of office and so remains weak for lack of exercise. But in a democracy it furnishes all the leaders, with a few exceptions; its keenest members make the speeches and transact the business, while the other drones settle on the benches round, humming applause to drown any opposition. Thus nearly the whole management of the commonwealth is in its hands.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Meanwhile, a second group is constantly emerging from the mass. Where everyone is bent upon making money, the steadiest characters tend to amass the greatest wealth. Here is a very convenient source from which the drones can draw an abundance of honey.

Adeimantus/ No doubt; they cannot squeeze any out of men of small means.

Socrates/ 'The rich', I believe, is what they call this class which provides provender for the drones.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The third class will be the 'people', comprising all the peasantry who work their own farms, with few possessions and no interest in politics. In a democracy this is the largest class and, when once assembled, its power is supreme.

Adeimantus/ Yes, but it will not often meet, unless it gets some share of the honey.

Socrates/ Well, it always does get its share, when the leaders are distributing to the people what they have taken from the well-to-do, always provided they can keep the lion's share for themselves. The plundered rich are driven to defend themselves in debate before the Assembly and by any

measures they can compass; and then, even if they have no revolutionary designs, the other party accuse them of plotting against the people and of being reactionary oligarchs. At last, when they see the people unwittingly misled by such denunciation into attempts to treat them unjustly, then, whether they wish it or not, they become reactionaries in good earnest. There is no help for it; the poison is injected by the sting of those drones we spoke of. Then follow impeachments and trials, in which each party arraigns the other.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And the people always put forward a single champion of their interests, whom they nurse to greatness. Here, plainly enough, is the root from which despotism invariably springs.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ How does the transformation of the people's champion into a despot begin? You have heard the legend they tell of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia: how one who tastes a single piece of human flesh mixed in with the flesh of the sacrificial victims is fated to be changed into a wolf. In the same way the people's champion, finding himself in full control of the mob, may not scruple to shed a brother's blood; dragging him before a tribunal with the usual unjust charges, he may foully murder him, blotting out a man's life and tasting kindred blood with unhallowed tongue and lips; he may send men to death or exile with hinted promises of debts to be cancelled and estates to be redistributed. Is it not thenceforth his inevitable fate either to be destroyed by his enemies or to seize absolute power and be transformed from a human being into a wolf?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Here, then, we have the party-leader in the civil war against property. If he is banished, and then returns from exile in despite of his enemies, he will come back a finished despot. If they cannot procure his banishment or death by denouncing him to the state, they will conspire to assassinate him. Then comes the notorious device of all who have reached this stage in the despot's career, the request for a bodyguard to keep the people's champion safe for them. The request is granted, because the people, in their alarm on his account, have no fear for themselves.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ This is a terrifying sight for the man of property, who is charged with being not merely rich but the people's enemy. He will follow the oracle's advice to Croesus;

> To flee by Hermus' pebbly shore,
> Dreading the coward's shame no more.

Adeimantus/ Well, he would have little chance to dread it a second time.

Socrates/ True; if he is caught, no doubt he will be done to death; whereas our champion himself does not, like Hector's charioteer, 'measure his towering length in dust', but on the contrary, overthrows a host of rivals and stands erect in the chariot of the state, no longer protector of the people, but its absolute master.

Adeimantus/ Yes, it must come to that.

Socrates/ And now shall we describe the happy condition of the man and of the country which harbors a creature of this stamp?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ In the early days he has a smile and a greeting for everyone he meets; disclaims any absolute power; makes large promises to his friends and to the public; sets about the relief of debtors and the distribution of land to the people

and to his supporters; and assumes a mild and gracious air towards everybody. But as soon as he has disembarrassed himself of his exiled enemies by coming to terms with some and destroying others, he begins stirring up one war after another, in order that the people may feel their need of a leader, and also be so impoverished by taxation that they will be forced to think of nothing but winning their daily bread, instead of plotting against him. Moreover, if he suspects some of cherishing thoughts of freedom and not submitting to his rule, he will find a pretext for putting them at the enemy's mercy and so making away with them. For all these reasons a despot must be constantly provoking wars.

Adeimantus/ He must.

Socrates/ This course will lead to his being hated by his countrymen more and more. Also, the bolder spirits among those who have helped him to power and now hold positions of influence will begin to speak their mind to him and among themselves and to criticize his policy. If the despot is to maintain his rule, he must gradually make away with all these malcontents, until he has not a friend or an enemy left who is of any account. He will need to keep a sharp eye open for anyone who is courageous or high-minded or intelligent or rich; it is his happy fate to be at war with all such, whether he likes it or not, and to lay his plans against them until he has purged the commonwealth.

Adeimantus/ A fine sort of purgation!

Socrates/ Yes, the exact opposite of the medical procedure, which removes the worst elements in the bodily condition and leaves the best.

Adeimantus/ There seems to be no choice, if he is to hold his power.

Socrates/ No; he is confined to the happy alternatives of living with people most of whom are good for nothing and

who hate him into the bargain, or not living at all. And the greater the loathing these actions inspire in his countrymen, the more he will need trustworthy recruits to strengthen his bodyguard. Where will he turn to find men on whom he can rely?

Adeimantus/ They will come flocking of their own accord, if he offers enough pay.

Socrates/ Foreigners of all sorts, you mean—yet another swarm of drones. But why not draw upon the home supply? He could rob the citizens of their slaves, emancipate them, and enroll them in his bodyguard.

Adeimantus/ No doubt they would be the most faithful adherents he could find.

Socrates/ What an enviable condition for the despot, to put his trust in such friends as these, when he has made away with his earlier supporters! He will, of course, be the admiration of all this band of new-made citizens, whose company he will enjoy when every decent person shuns him with loathing. It is not for nothing that the tragic drama is thought to be a storehouse of wisdom, and above all Euripides, whose profundity of thought appears in the remark that 'despots grow wise by converse with the wise', meaning no doubt by the wise these associates we have described.

Adeimantus/ Yes, and Euripides praises absolute power as godlike, with much more to the same effect. So do the other poets.

Socrates/ That being so, the tragedians will give a further proof of their wisdom if they will excuse us and all states whose constitution resembles ours, when we deny them admittance on the ground that they sing the praises of despotism. At the same time, I expect they will go the round of other states, where they will hire actors with fine sonorous

voices to sway the inclination of the assembled crowd towards a despotic or a democratic constitution. Naturally they are honored and well paid for these services, by despots chiefly, and in a less degree by democracies. But the higher they mount up the scale of commonwealths, the more their reputation flags, like a climber who gives in for lack of breath. However, we are wandering from our subject. Let us go back to the despot's army. How is he to maintain this fine, ever-shifting array of nondescripts?

Adeimantus/ No doubt he will spend any treasure there may be in the temples, so long as it will last, as well as the property of his victims, thus lightening the war-taxes imposed on the people.

Socrates/ And when that source fails?

Adeimantus/ Clearly he will support himself, with his boon-companions, minions, and mistresses, from his parent's estate.

Socrates/ I understand: the despot and his comrades will be maintained by the common people which gave him birth.

Adeimantus/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ But how if the people resent this and say it is not right for the father to support his grown-up son—it ought to be the other way about; they did not bring him into being and set him up in order that, when he had grown great, they should be the slaves of their own slaves and support them together with their master and the rest of his rabble; he was to be the champion to set them free from the rich and the so-called upper class. Suppose they now order him and his partisans to leave the country, as a father might drive his son out of the house along with his riotous friends?

Adeimantus/ Then, to be sure, the people will learn what sort of a creature it has bred and nursed to greatness in its

bosom, until now the child is too strong for the parent to drive out.

Socrates/ Do you mean that the despot will dare to lay violent hands on this father of his and beat him if he resists?

Adeimantus/ Yes, when once he has disarmed him.

Socrates/ So the despot is a parricide, with no pity for the weakness of age. Here, it seems, is absolutism openly avowed. The people, as they say, have escaped the smoke only to fall into the fire, exchanging service to free men for the tyranny of slaves. That freedom which knew no bounds must now put on the livery of the most harsh and bitter servitude, where the slave has become the master.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is what happens.

Socrates/ May we say, then, that we have now sufficiently described the transition from democracy to despotism, and what despotism is like when once established?

Adeimantus/ Yes, quite sufficiently.

Socrates/ Last comes the man of despotic character. It remains to ask how he develops from the democratic type, what he is like, and whether his life is one of happiness or of misery.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Here I feel the need to define, more fully than we have so far done, the number and nature of the appetites. Otherwise it will not be so easy to see our way to a conclusion.

Adeimantus/ Well, it is not too late.

Socrates/ Quite so. Now, about the appetites, here is the point I want to make plain. Among the unnecessary pleasures and desires, some, I should say, are unlawful. Probably they are innate in everyone; but when they are disciplined by law and by the higher desires with the aid of

reason, they can in some people be got rid of entirely, or at least left few and feeble, although in others they will be comparatively strong and numerous.

Adeimantus/ What kind of desires do you mean?

Socrates/ Those which bestir themselves in dreams, when the gentler part of the soul slumbers and the control of reason is withdrawn; then the wild beast in us, full-fed with meat or drink, becomes rampant and shakes off sleep to go in quest of what will gratify its own instincts. As you know, it will cast away all shame and prudence at such moments and stick at nothing. In fantasy it will not shrink from intercourse with a mother or anyone else, man, god, or brute, or from forbidden food or any deed of blood. In a word, it will go to any length of shamelessness and folly.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ It is otherwise with a man sound in body and mind, who, before he goes to sleep, awakens the reason within him to feed on high thoughts and questionings in collected meditation. If he has neither starved nor surfeited his appetites, so that, lulled to rest, no delights or griefs of theirs may trouble that better part, but leave it free to reach out, in pure and independent thought, after some new knowledge of things past, present, or to come; if, likewise, he has soothed his passions so as not to fall asleep with his anger roused against any man; if, in fact, he does not take his rest until he has quieted two of the three elements in his soul and awakened the third wherein wisdom dwells, then he is in a fair way to grasp the truth of things, and the visions of his dreams will not be unlawful. However, we have been carried away from our point, which is that in every one of us, even those who seem most respectable, there exist desires, terrible in their untamed lawlessness, which reveal themselves in dreams. Do you agree?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Remember, then, our account of the democratic man, how his character was shaped by his early training under a parsimonious father, who respected only the businesslike desires, dismissing the unnecessary ones as concerned with frivolous embellishments. Then, associating with more sophisticated people who were a prey to those lawless appetites we have just described, he fell into their ways, and hatred of his father's miserliness drove him into every sort of extravagance. But, having a better disposition than his corrupters, he came to a compromise between the two conflicting ways of life, making the best of both with what he called moderation and avoiding alike the meanness of the one and the license of the other. So the oligarchical man was transformed into the democratic type.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I hold by that description.

Socrates/ Now imagine him grown old in his turn, with a young son bred in his ways, who is exposed to the same influences, drawn towards the utter lawlessness which his seducers call perfect freedom, while on the other side his father and friends lend their support to the compromise. When those terrible wizards who would conjure up an absolute ruler in the young man's soul begin to doubt the power of their spells, in the last resort they contrive to engender in him a master passion, to champion the mob of idle appetites which are for dividing among themselves all available plunder—a passion that can only be compared to a great winged drone. Like a swarm buzzing round this creature, the other desires come laden with incense and perfumes, garlands and wine, feeding its growth to the full on the pleasures of a dissolute life, until they have implanted the sting of a longing that cannot be satisfied. Then at last this passion, as leader of the soul, takes madness for the' captain of its guard and breaks out in frenzy; if it can lay

hold upon any thoughts or desires that are of good report and still capable of shame, it kills them or drives them forth, until it has purged the soul of all sobriety and called in the partisans of madness to fill the vacant place.

Adeimantus/ That is a complete picture of how the despotic character develops.

Socrates/ Is not this the reason why lust has long since been called a tyrant? A drunken man, too, has something of this tyrannical spirit; and so has the lunatic who dreams that he can lord it over all mankind and heaven besides. Thus, when nature or habit or both have combined the traits of drunkenness, lust, and lunacy, then you have the perfect specimen of the despotic man.

Adeimantus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Such, then, being his origin and character, what will his life be like?

Adeimantus/ I give it up. You must tell me.

Socrates/ I will. When a master passion is enthroned in absolute dominion over every part of the soul, feasting and reveling with courtesans and all such delights will become the order of the day. And every day and night a formidable crop of fresh appetites springs up, whose numerous demands quickly consume whatever income there may be. Soon he will be borrowing and trenching on his capital; and when all resources fail, the lusty brood of appetites will crowd about him clamoring. Goaded on to frenzy by them and above all by that ruling passion to which they serve as a sort of bodyguard, he will look out for any man of property whom he can rob by fraud or violence. Money he must have, no matter how, if he is not to suffer torments.

Adeimantus/ All that is inevitable.

Socrates/ Now, just as a succession of new pleasures asserted themselves in his soul at the expense of the older

ones, so this young man will claim the right to live at his parents' expense and help himself to their property when his own portion is spent. If they resist, he will first try to cheat them; and failing that, he will rob them by force. If the old people still hold out, will any scruple restrain him from behaving like a despot?

Adeimantus/ I should not have much hope for the parents of such a son.

Socrates/ And yet consider, Adeimantus: his father and mother have been bound to him by the closest ties all his life; and now that they are old and faded, would he really be ready to beat them for the sake of the charms of some new-found mistress or favorite who has no sort of claim on him? Is he going to bring these creatures under the same roof and let them lord it over his parents?

Adeimantus/ I believe he would.

Socrates/ It is no very enviable lot, then, to give birth to a despotic son.

Adeimantus/ It is not.

Socrates/ And now suppose that his parents' resources begin to fail, while his appetites for new pleasures have mustered into a great swarm in his soul; he will begin by breaking into someone's house or robbing a traveler by night, and go on to sweep some temple clean of its treasures. Meanwhile, the old approved beliefs about right and wrong which he had as a child will be overpowered by thoughts, once held in subjection, but now emancipated to second that master passion whose bodyguard they form. In his democratic days when he was still under the control of his father and of the laws, they broke loose only in sleep; but now that this passion has set up an absolute dominion, he has become for all his waking life the man he used to be from time to time in his dreams, ready to shed blood or eat

forbidden food or do any dreadful deed. The desire that lives in him as sole ruler in a waste of lawless disrule will drive him, as a tyrant would drive his country, into any desperate venture which promises to maintain it with its horde of followers, some of whom evil communication has brought in from without, while others have been released from bondage by the same evil practices within. Is that a fair account of his manner of life?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ If there are a few such characters in a country where most men are law-abiding, they will go elsewhere to join some despot's bodyguard or serve as mercenaries in any war that is toward. In quiet times of peace, they stay at home and commit crimes on a small scale, as thieves, burglars, pickpockets, temple-robbers, kidnappers; or, if they have a ready tongue, they may take to selling their services as informers and false witnesses.

Adeimantus/ Such crimes will be a small matter, you mean, so long as the criminals are few in number.

Socrates/ Small is a relative term; and all of them put together do not, as they say, come within sight of the degradation and misery of society under a despot. When the number of such criminals and their hangers-on increases and they become aware of their strength, then it is they who, helped by the folly of the common people, create the despot out of that one among their number whose soul is itself under the most tyrannical despotism.

Adeimantus/ Yes, such a state of mind would naturally be his best qualification.

Socrates/ All goes smoothly if men are ready to submit. But the country may resist; and then, just as he began by calling his father and mother to order, so now he will discipline his once loved fatherland, or motherland as the

Cretans call it, and see that it shall live in subjection to the new-found partisans he has called in to enslave it. So this man's desires come to their fulfillment.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is true.

Socrates/ In private life, before they gain power, men of this stamp either consort with none but parasites ready to do them any service, or, if they have a favor to beg, they will not hesitate themselves to cringe and posture in simulated friendliness, which soon cools off when their end is gained. So, throughout life, the despotic character has not a friend in the world; he is sometimes master, sometimes slave, but never knows true friendship or freedom. There is no faithfulness in him; and, if we were right in our notion of justice, he is the perfect example of the unjust man.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ To sum up, then: this worst type of man is he who behaves in waking life as we said men do in their dreams. The born despot who gains absolute power must come to this, and the longer he lives as a tyrant, the more this character grows upon him.

Glaucon/ Inevitably, who now took his turn to answer.

Socrates/ Now shall we find that the lowest depth of wickedness goes with the lowest depth of unhappiness, and that the misery of the despot is really in proportion to the extent and duration of his power, though the mass of mankind may hold many different opinions?

Glaucon/ Yes, that much is certain.

Socrates/ It is true, is it not? that each type of individual—the despotic, the democratic, and so on—resembles the state with the corresponding type of constitution, and will be good and happy in a corresponding degree.

Glaucon/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ In point of excellence, then, how does a state under a despotism compare with the one governed by kings, such as we first described?

Glaucon/ They are at opposite extremes: the best and the worst.

Socrates/ I shall not ask which is which, for that is obvious. Is your estimate the same with respect to their degrees of happiness or misery? We must not let our eyes be dazzled by fixing them only on the despot himself and some few of his supporters; we should not decide until we have looked into every corner and inspected the life of the whole community.

Glaucon/ That is a fair demand. Everyone must see that a state is most wretched under a despot and happiest under a true king.

Socrates/ And in judging between the corresponding individuals, is it not equally fair to demand the verdict of one who is not dazzled, like a child, by the outward pomp and parade of absolute power, but whose understanding can enter into a man's heart and see all that goes on within? Should we not all do well to listen to such a competent judge, if he had also lived under the same roof and witnessed the despot's behavior, not only in the emergencies of public life, but towards intimates in his own household, where he can best be seen stripped of his theatrical garb? We might then ask for a report on the happiness or misery of the despot as compared with the rest of the world.

Glaucon/ Yes, that would be perfectly fair.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, make believe that we ourselves are qualified to judge from having been in contact with despots, so that we may have someone to answer our questions?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Bearing in mind, then, the analogy between state and individual, you shall tell me what you think of the condition of each in turn. To begin with the state: is it free under a despot, or enslaved?

Glaucon/ Utterly enslaved.

Socrates/ And yet you see it contains some who are masters and free men.

Glaucon/ Yes, a few; but almost the whole of it, including the most respectable part, is degraded to a miserable slavery.

Socrates/ If the individual, then, is analogous to the state, we shall find the same order of things in him: a soul laboring under the meanest servitude, the best elements in it being enslaved, while a small part, which is also the most frenzied and corrupt, plays the master. Would you call such a condition of the soul freedom or slavery?

Glaucon/ Slavery, of course.

Socrates/ And just as a state enslaved to a tyrant cannot do what it really wishes, so neither can a soul under a similar tyranny do what it wishes as a whole. Goaded on against its will by the sting of desire, it will be filled with confusion and remorse. Like the corresponding state, it must always be poverty-stricken, unsatisfied, and haunted by fear. Nowhere else will there be so much lamentation, groaning, and anguish as in a country under a despotism, and in a soul maddened by the tyranny of passion and lust.

Glaucon/ It cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ These, I think, were the considerations that made you judge such a state to be the most unhappy of all.

Glaucon/ Was I not right?

Socrates/ Certainly. But, in view of the same facts, what would you say of the despotic type of individual?

Glaucon/ That he is by far the most miserable of men.

Socrates/ There I think you are wrong. You will perhaps agree that there is a still lower depth of misery, to be found in a man of this temperament who has not the good fortune to remain in a private station but is thrust by circumstance into the position of an actual despot.

Glaucon/ Judging by what we have said already, I should think that must be true.

Socrates/ Yes; but this is the most important of all questions, the choice between a good and an evil life; and we must be content with nothing short of a reasoned conviction. Am I right in thinking that some light may be gained from considering those wealthy private individuals who own a large number of slaves? In that respect they are like the despot, though his subjects are still more numerous. Now, as you know, they do not live in terror of their servants.

Glaucon/ No; what have they to fear?

Socrates/ Nothing. But do you see why?

Glaucon/ Yes; it is because the individual is protected by the whole community.

Socrates/ True; but imagine a man owning fifty or more slaves, miraculously caught up with his wife and children and planted, along with all his household goods and servants, in some desert place where there were no freemen to come to his rescue. Would he not be horribly afraid that his servants would make away with him and his family? He would be driven to fawn upon some of the slaves with liberal promises and give them their freedom, much against his will. So he would become a parasite, dependent on his own henchmen.

Glaucon/ That would be his only way to escape destruction.

Socrates/ Moreover, the place he was transported to might be surrounded by neighbors who would not tolerate the claims of one man to lord it over others, but would retaliate fiercely on anyone they caught in such an attempt.

Glaucon/ In that case he would be in still more desperate straits, hemmed in on all sides by enemies.

Socrates/ Is not that a picture of the prison to which the despot is confined? His nature is such as we have described, infested with all manner of fears and lusts. However curious he may be, he alone can never travel abroad to attend the great festivals which every freeman wants to witness, but must live like a woman ensconced in the recesses of his house, envying his countrymen who can leave their homes to see what is worth seeing in foreign lands. You spoke just now of the despotic character, ill governed in his own soul, as the most miserable of men; but these disadvantages I have mentioned add to his wretchedness when he is driven by ill luck out of his private station to become an actual despot and undertake to rule others when he is not his own master. You might as well force a paralytic to leave the sheltered life of an invalid and spend his days in fighting or in trials of physical strength.

Glaucon/ Quite true, Socrates; that is a fair comparison.

Socrates/ So the despot's condition, my dear Glaucon, is supremely wretched, even harder than the life you pronounced the hardest of all. Whatever people may think, the actual tyrant is really the most abject slave, a parasite of the vilest scoundrels. Never able to satisfy his desires, he is always in need, and, to an eye that sees a soul in its entirety, he will seem the poorest of the poor. His condition is like that of the country he governs, haunted throughout life by terrors and convulsed with anguish. Add to this what we said before, that power is bound to exaggerate every fault and

make him ever more envious, treacherous, unjust, friendless, impure, harboring every vice in his bosom, and hence only less of a calamity to all about him than he is to himself.

Glaucon/ No man of sense will dispute that.

Socrates/ Then the time has come for you, as the final judge in this competition, to decide who stands first in point of happiness and to arrange in order all our five types of character, the kingly, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, the despotic.

Glaucon/ The decision is easy. In respect both of goodness and of happiness I range them in the order in which they have entered the lists.

Socrates/ Shall we hire a herald, then, or shall I myself proclaim that, in the judgment of the son of Ariston, the happiest man is he who is first in goodness and justice, namely the true king who is also king over himself; and the most miserable is that lowest example of injustice and vice, the born despot whose tyranny prevails in his own soul and also over his country.

Glaucon/ Yes, you may proclaim that.

Socrates/ May I add that it would make no difference if the true character of both should remain unknown to heaven and to mankind?

Glaucon/ You may.

Socrates/ Very well; that may stand as one of our proofs. But I want to consider a second one, which can, I think, be based on our division of the soul into three parts, corresponding to the three orders in the state. Each part seems to me to have its own form of pleasure and its peculiar desire; and anyone of the three may govern the soul.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ There was the part with which a man gains knowledge and understanding, and another whereby he shows spirit. The third was so multifarious that we could find no single appropriate name; we called it after its chief and most powerful characteristic 'appetite', because of the intensity of all the appetites connected with eating and drinking and sex and so on. We also called it money-loving, because money is the principal means of satisfying desires of this kind. Gain is the source of its pleasures and the object of its affection; so 'money-loving' or 'gain-loving' might be the best single expression to sum up the nature of this part of the soul for the purpose of our discussion.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ The spirited element, again, we think of as wholly bent upon winning power and victory and a good name. So we might call it honor-loving or ambitious.

Glaucon/ Very suitably.

Socrates/ Whereas the part whereby we gain knowledge and understanding is least of all concerned with wealth or reputation. Obviously its sole endeavor is to know the truth, and we may speak of it as loving knowledge and philosophic.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And the human soul is sometimes governed by this principle, sometimes by one of the other two, as the case may be. Hence we recognize three main classes of men, the philosophic, the ambitious, and the lovers of gain. So there will also be three corresponding forms of pleasure.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now, if you choose to ask men of these three types, which of their lives is the pleasantest, each in turn will praise his own above the rest. The man of business will say that, as compared with profit-making, the pleasures of winning a high reputation or of learning are worthless,

except in so far as they bring in money. The ambitious man will despise the pleasure derived from money as vulgar, and the pleasure of learning, if it does not bring fame, as moonshine. The philosopher, again, will think that the satisfaction of knowing the truth and always gaining fresh understanding is beyond all comparison with those other pleasures, which he will call 'necessary' in the fullest sense; for he would have no use for them, if they were not unavoidable. In this dispute about the pleasures of each class and as to which of the three lives as a whole is not merely better and nobler but actually pleasanter or less painful, how is one to know whose judgment is the truest?

Glaucon/ I am not prepared to say.

Socrates/ Well, think of it in this way. What is required for a sound judgment? Can it rest on any better foundation than experience, or insight, or reasoning?

Glaucon/ Surely not.

Socrates/ Take experience, then. Which of our three men has the fullest acquaintance with all the pleasures we have mentioned? Has the lover of gain such an understanding of the truth as to know by experience the pleasure of knowledge better than the philosopher knows the pleasure of gain?

Glaucon/ No, all the advantage lies with the philosopher, who cannot help experiencing both the other kinds of pleasure from childhood up; whereas the lover of gain is under no necessity to taste the sweetness of understanding the truth of things; rather he would not find it easy to gain that experience, however hard he should try.

Socrates/ In experience of both sorts of pleasure, then, the philosopher has the advantage over the lover of gain. How does he compare with the ambitious man? Is he less well acquainted with the pleasures of honor than the other is with the pleasures of wisdom?

Glaucon/ No, honor comes to them all, if they accomplish their several purposes; the rich man is esteemed by many people, and so are the brave man and the wise. So the pleasure of being honored is familiar to them all; but only the philosopher can know how sweet it is to contemplate the truth.

Socrates/ Then, so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three.

Glaucon/ Yes, by far.

Socrates/ And the only one in whom experience is seconded by insight.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Further, we agreed that the decision must be reached by means of reasoning; and this is peculiarly the tool of the philosopher, not of the money-lover or of the ambitious man.

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Now, if wealth and profit were the most satisfactory criteria, the judgments of value passed by the lover of gain would be nearest to the truth; and if honor, courage, and success were the test, the best judge would be the man who lives for honor and victory; but since the tests are experience, insight, and reasoning—?

Glaucon/ The truest values must be those approved by the philosopher, who uses reason for the pursuit of wisdom.

Socrates/ Of the three kinds of pleasure, then, the sweetest will belong to that part of the soul whereby we gain understanding and knowledge, and the man in whom that part predominates will have the pleasantest life.

Glaucon/ It must be so; in praising his own life the wise man speaks with authority.

Socrates/ What life or form of pleasure will this judge rank second?

Glaucon/ Obviously, that of the warlike and ambitious temperament. It comes nearer than the business man's to his own.

Socrates/ And the pleasure of gain will come last, it seems.

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ So now the just man has scored a second victory over the unjust There remains the third round, for which the wrestlers at the Great Games invoke Olympian Zeus, the Preserver; and a fall in this bout should be decisive. I seem to have heard some wise man say that only the pleasures of intelligence are entirely true and pure; all the others are illusory.

Glaucon/ That should settle the matter. But what does it mean?

Socrates/ I shall discover the meaning, if you will help me by answering my questions. We speak of pain as the contrary of pleasure. Is there not also a neutral state between the two, in which the mind feels neither pleasure nor pain, but is as it were at rest from both?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, you must have heard people say, when they are ill, that nothing is pleasanter than to be well, though they never knew it until they were ill; and people in great pain will tell you that relief from pain is the greatest pleasure in the world. There are many such cases in which you find the sufferer saying that the height of pleasure is not positive enjoyment, but the peace which comes with the absence of pain.

Glaucon/ Yes; I suppose, at such moments the state of rest becomes pleasurable and all that can be desired.

Socrates/ In the same way, then, when enjoyment comes to an end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful.

Glaucon/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ If so, that state of rest which, we said, lies between pleasure and pain, will be sometimes one, sometimes the other. But if it is neither of the two, how can it become both?

Glaucon/ I do not think it can.

Socrates/ And besides, both pleasure and pain are processes of change which take place in the mind, are they not? whereas the neutral condition appeared to be a state of rest between the two. So can it be right to regard the absence of pain as pleasant or the absence of enjoyment as painful?

Glaucon/ No, it cannot.

Socrates/ It follows, then, that the state of rest is not really either pleasant or painful, but only appears so in these cases by contrast. There is no soundness in these appearances; by the standard of true pleasure they are a sort of imposture.

Glaucon/ That seems to be the conclusion.

Socrates/ You might be tempted, in these instances, to suppose that pleasure is the same thing as relief from pain, and pain the same as the cessation of pleasure; but, as an instance to the contrary, consider pleasures which do not follow on pain. There are plenty of them; the best example is the pleasures of smell. These occur suddenly with extraordinary intensity; they are not preceded by any pain and they leave no pain behind when they cease.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ We are not to be persuaded, then, that relief from pain is the same thing as pure pleasure, or cessation of pleasure the same as pure pain.

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ On the other hand, the class of pleasures which do involve some sort of relief from pain may be said to include the great majority and the most intense of all the pleasures, so called, which reach the mind by way of the body; and the same description applies to the pleasures or pains of anticipation which precede them.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Here is an analogy, to illustrate their nature. You think of the world as divided into an upper region and a lower, with a center between them. Now if a person were transported from below to the center, he would be sure to think he was moving 'upwards'; and when he was stationed at the center and looking in the direction he had come from, he would imagine he was in the upper region, if he had never seen the part which is really above the center. And supposing he were transported back again, he would think he was travelling 'downwards', and this time he would be right. His mistake would be due to his ignorance of the real

distinctions between the upper and lower regions and the center.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ You will not be surprised, then, if people whose ignorance of truth and reality gives them many unsound ideas, are similarly confused about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state. When the movement is towards a painful condition, they are right in believing that the pain is real; but when they are passing from a state of pain to the neutral point, they are firmly convinced that they are approaching the pleasure of complete satisfaction. In their ignorance of true pleasure, they are deceived by the contrast between pain and the absence of pain, just as one who had never seen white might be deceived by the contrast between black and grey.

Glaucon/ Certainly; I should be much more surprised if it were not so.

Socrates/ Then look at it in this way. As hunger and thirst are states of bodily inanition, which can be replenished by food, so ignorance and unwisdom in the soul are an emptiness to be filled by gaining understanding. Of the two sorts of nourishment, will not the more real yield the truer satisfaction?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Which kind of nourishment, then, has the higher claim to pure reality—food-stuffs like bread and meat and drink, or such things as true belief, knowledge, reason, and in a word all the excellences of the mind? You may decide by asking yourself whether something which is closely connected with the unchanging and immortal world of truth and itself shares that nature together with the thing in which it exists, has more or less reality than something

which, like the thing which contains it, belongs to a world of mortality and perpetual change.

Glaucon/ No doubt it is much more real.

Socrates/ And a higher or lower degree of reality goes with a greater or less measure of knowledge and so of truth?

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And is there not, to speak generally, less of truth and reality in the things which serve the needs of the body than in those which feed the soul?

Glaucon/ Much less.

Socrates/ And, again, less in the body itself than in the soul?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And in proportion as the sustenance and thing sustained by it are more real, the satisfaction itself is a more real satisfaction.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Accordingly, if the appropriate satisfaction of natural needs constitutes pleasure, there will be more real enjoyment of true pleasure in such a case; whereas in the opposite case the satisfaction is not so genuine or secure and the pleasure is less true and trustworthy.

Glaucon/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ To conclude, then: those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue and spend their whole time in feasting and self-indulgence are all their lives, as it were, fluctuating downwards from the central point and back to it again, but never rise beyond it into the true upper region, to which they have not lifted their eyes. Never really satisfied with real nourishment, the pleasure they taste is uncertain and impure. Bent over their tables, they feed like cattle with stooping heads and eyes fixed upon the ground; so they grow

fat and breed, and in their greedy struggle kick and butt one another to death with horns and hoofs of steel, because they can never satisfy with unreal nourishment that part of themselves which is itself unreal and incapable of lasting satisfaction.

Glaucon/ Your description of the way most people live is quite in the oracular style, Socrates.

Socrates/ Does it not follow that the pleasures of such a life are illusory phantoms of real pleasure, in which pleasure and pain are so combined that each takes its color and apparent intensity by contrast with the other? Hence the frenzied desire they implant in the breasts of fools, who fight for them as Stesichorus says the combatants at Troy fought in their blindness, for a phantom Helen.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is bound to be so.

Socrates/ Take, again, the satisfaction of the spirited element in our nature. Must not that be no less illusory, when a man seeks, at all costs, to gratify his ambition by envy, his love of victory by violence, and his ill-temper by outbursts of passion, without sense or reason?

Glaucon/ It must.

Socrates/ What then? May we boldly assert that all the desires both of the gain-loving and of the ambitious part of our nature will win the truest pleasures of which they are capable, if they accept the guidance of knowledge and reason and pursue only those pleasures which wisdom approves? Such pleasures will be true, because truth is their guide, and will also be proper to their nature, if it is a fact that a thing always finds in what is best for it something akin to its real self.

Glaucon/ Well, that is certainly a fact.

Socrates/ To conclude, then, each part of the soul will not only do its own work and be just when the whole soul, with

no inward conflict, follows the guidance of the wisdom-loving part, but it also will enjoy the pleasures that are proper to it and the best and truest of which it is capable; whereas if either of the other two parts gains the upper hand, besides failing to find its own proper pleasure, it will force the others to pursue a false pleasure uncongenial to their nature.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now would not these evil effects be most of all produced by the elements farthest removed from philosophy and reason, that is to say, from subordination to law? Such, we have seen, are the lustful and despotic appetites; whereas the orderly and kingly desires stand nearest to the controlling reason. Accordingly, the despot is at the farthest remove from the true pleasure proper to man's nature, and his life is the least pleasant, in contrast with the king's, who stands at the opposite extreme. Have you any notion how much less pleasant it is?

Glaucon/ No, tell me.

Socrates/ There are, it seems, three kinds of pleasure, one genuine and two spurious. The despot, in his flight from law and reason, goes beyond the bounds even of the spurious kinds, to surround himself with pleasures comparable to a bodyguard of slaves. The measure of his inferiority can hardly be expressed, unless perhaps in this way. The despot, you remember, was at the third remove from the oligarch; for the democratic man came between. If that was right, the pleasure he enjoys will be a phantom three times less real than the oligarch's. And the oligarch himself was third in rank below the king, if we identify kingship with the rule of the best. So the number representing the distance that separates this phantom pleasure of the despot from reality will be three times three; and when that number is squared and cubed, calculation

will show how great the interval becomes. Conversely, you will find that, in respect of truth and reality, the kingly life is seven hundred and twenty-nine times the pleasanter, and the despot's more painful by the same amount.

Glaucon/ I feel quite overwhelmed by your estimate of the difference between the just and unjust man, on the score of pleasure and pain.

Socrates/ All the same, my figure is correct and applicable to the lives of men as surely as the reckoning of days and nights, months, and years. And if the good and just man is so far superior to the bad and unjust in point of pleasure, there is no saying by how much more his life will surpass the other's in grace, nobility, and virtue.

Glaucon/ I entirely agree.

Socrates/ Good. And now that the argument has brought us to this point, let us recall something that was said at the outset, namely, if I remember aright, that wrongdoing is profitable when a man is completely unjust but has a reputation for justice.

Glaucon/ Yes, that position was stated.

Socrates/ Well, we are now agreed about the real meaning and consequences of doing wrong as well as of doing right, and the time has come to point out to anyone who maintains that position what his statement implies. We may do so by likening the soul to one of those many fabulous monsters said to have existed long ago, such as the Chimaera or Scylla or Cerberus, which combined the forms of several creatures in one. Imagine, to begin with, the figure of a multifarious and many-headed beast, girt round with heads of animals, tame and wild, which it can grow out of itself and transform at will.

Glaucon/ That would tax the skill of a sculptor; but luckily the stuff of imagination is easier to mold than wax.

Socrates/ Now add two other forms, a lion and a man. The many-headed beast is to be the largest by far, and the lion next to it in size. Then join them in such a way that the three somehow grow together into one. Lastly, mold the outside into the likeness of one of them, the man, so that, to eyes which cannot see inside the outward sheath, the whole may look like a single creature, a human being.

Glaucon/ Very well. What then?

Socrates/ We can now reply to anyone who says that for this human creature wrongdoing pays and there is nothing to be gained by doing right. This simply means, we shall tell him, that it pays to feed up and strengthen the composite beast and all that belongs to the lion, and to starve the man till he is so enfeebled that the other two can drag him whither they will, and he cannot bring them to live together in peace, but must leave them to bite and struggle and devour one another. On the other hand, to declare that justice pays is to assert that all our words and actions should tend towards giving the man within us complete mastery over the whole human creature, and letting him take the many-headed beast under his care and tame its wildness, like the gardener who trains his cherished plants while he checks the growth of weeds. He should enlist the lion as his ally, and, caring for all alike, should foster their growth by first reconciling them to one another and to himself.

Glaucon/ Yes, such are the implications when justice or injustice is commended.

Socrates/ From every point of view, then, whether of pleasure or reputation or advantage, one who praises justice speaks the truth; he who disparages it does not know what it is that he idly condemns.

Glaucon/ I agree; he has no conception.

Socrates/ But his error is not willful; so let us reason with him gently. We will ask him on what grounds conduct has come to be approved or disapproved by law and custom. Is it not according as conduct tends to subdue the brutish parts of our nature to the human—perhaps I should rather say to the divine in us—or to enslave our humanity to the savagery of the beast? Will he agree?

Glaucon/ Yes, if he has any regard for my opinion.

Socrates/ On that showing, then, can it profit a man to take money unjustly, if he is thereby enslaving the best part of his nature to the vilest? No amount of money could make it worth his while to sell a son or daughter as slaves into the hands of cruel and evil men; and when it is a matter of ruthlessly subjugating all that is most godlike in himself to whatsoever is most ungodly and despicable, is not the wretch taking a bribe far more disastrous than the necklace Eriphyle took as the price of her husband's life?

Glaucon/ Far more, if I may answer on his behalf.

Socrates/ You will agree, too, with the reasons why certain faults have always been condemned: profligacy, because it gives too much license to the multiform monster; self-will and ill temper, when the lion and serpent part of us is strengthened till its sinews are over-strung: luxury and effeminacy, because they relax those sinews till the heart grows faint; flattery and meanness, in that the heart's high spirit is subordinated to the turbulent beast, and for the sake of money to gratify the creature's insatiable greed the lion is browbeaten and schooled from youth up to become an ape. Why, again, is mechanical toil discredited as debasing? Is it not simply when the highest thing in a man's nature is naturally so weak that it cannot control the animal parts but can only learn how to pamper them?

Glaucon/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Then, if we say that people of this sort ought to be subject to the highest type of man, we intend that the subject should be governed, not, as Thrasymachus thought, to his own detriment, but on the same principle as his superior, who is himself governed by the divine element within him. It is better for everyone, we believe, to be subject to a power of godlike wisdom residing within himself, or, failing that, imposed from without, in order that all of us, being under one guidance, may be so far as possible equal and united. This, moreover, is plainly the intention of the law in lending its support to every member of the community, and also of the government of children; for we allow them to go free only when we have established in each one of them as it were a constitutional ruler, whom we have trained to take over the guardianship from the same principle in ourselves.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ On what ground, then, can we say that it is profitable for a man to be unjust or self-indulgent or to do any disgraceful act which will make him a worse man, though he may gain money and power? Or how can it profit the wrongdoer to escape detection and punishment? He will only grow still worse; whereas if he is found out, chastisement will tame the brute in him and lay it to rest, while the gentler part is set free; and thus the entire soul, restored to its native soundness, will gain, in the temperance and righteousness which wisdom brings, a condition more precious than the strength and beauty which health brings to the body, in proportion as the soul itself surpasses the body in worth. To this end the man of understanding will bend all his powers through life, prizing in the first place those studies only which will fashion these qualities in his soul; and, so far from abandoning the care of his bodily condition to the irrational pleasures of the brute and setting

his face in that direction, he will not even make health his chief object. Health, strength, and beauty he will value only in so far as they bring soundness of mind, and you will find him keeping his bodily frame in tune always for the sake of the resulting concord in the soul.

Glaucon/ Yes, if he is to have true music in him.

Socrates/ And in the matter of acquiring wealth he will order his life in harmony with the same purpose. He will not be carried away by the vulgar notion of happiness into heaping up an unbounded store which would bring him endless troubles. Rather, in adding to or spending his substance, he will, to the best of his power, be guided by watchful care that neither want nor abundance may unsettle the constitution set up in his soul. Again, in accepting power and honors he will keep the same end in view, ready to enjoy any position in public or private life which he thinks will make him a better man, and avoiding any that would break down the established order within him.

Glaucon/ Then, if that is his chief concern, he will have no wish to take part in politics.

Socrates/ Indeed he will, in the politics of his own commonwealth, though not perhaps in those of his country, unless some miraculous chance should come about.

Glaucon/ I understand: you mean this commonwealth we have been founding in the realm of discourse; for I think it nowhere exists on earth.

Socrates/ No; but perhaps there is a pattern set up in the heavens for one who desires to see it and, seeing it, to found one in himself. But whether it exists anywhere or ever will exist is no matter; for this is the only commonwealth in whose politics he can ever take part.

Glaucon/ I suspect you are right.

Socrates/ Indeed, our commonwealth has many features which make me think it was based on very sound principles, especially our rule not on any account to admit the poetry of dramatic representation. Now that we have distinguished the several parts of the soul, it seems to me clearer than ever that such poetry must be firmly excluded.

Glaucon/ What makes you say so?

Socrates/ Between ourselves—for you will not denounce me to the tragedians and the other dramatists—poetry of that sort seems to be injurious to minds which do not possess the antidote in a knowledge of its real nature.

Glaucon/ What have you in mind?

Socrates/ I must speak out, in spite of a certain affection and reverence I have had from a child for Homer, who seems to have been the original master and guide of all this imposing company of tragic poets. However, no man must be honored above the truth; so, as I say, I must speak my mind.

Glaucon/ Do, by all means.

Socrates/ Listen then, or rather let me ask you a question. Can you tell me what is meant by representation in general? I have no very clear notion myself.

Glaucon/ So you expect me to have one!

Socrates/ Why not? It is not always the keenest eye that is the first to see something.

Glaucon/ True; but when you are there I should not be very desirous to tell what I saw, however plainly. You must use your own eyes.

Socrates/ Well then, shall we proceed as usual and begin by assuming the existence of a single essential nature or Form for every set of things which we call by the same name? Do you understand?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then let us take any set of things you choose. For instance there are any number of beds or of tables, but only two Forms, one of Bed and one of Table.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we are in the habit of saying that the craftsman, when he makes the beds or tables we use or whatever it may be, has before his mind the Form of one or other of these pieces of furniture. The Form itself is, of course, not the work of any craftsman. How could it be?

Glaucon/ It could not.

Socrates/ Now what name would you give to a craftsman who can produce all the things made by every sort of workman?

Glaucon/ He would need to have very remarkable powers!

Socrates/ Wait a moment, and you will have even better reason to say so. For, besides producing any kind of artificial thing, this same craftsman can create all plants and animals, himself included, and earth and sky and gods and the heavenly bodies and all the things under the earth in Hades.

Glaucon/ That sounds like a miraculous feat of virtuosity.

Socrates/ Are you incredulous? Tell me, do you think there could be no such craftsman at all, or that there might be someone who could create all these things in one sense, though not in another? Do you not see that you could do it yourself, in a way?

Glaucon/ In what way, I should like to know.

Socrates/ There is no difficulty; in fact there are several ways in which the thing can be done quite quickly. The quickest perhaps would be to take a mirror and turn it round in all directions. In a very short time you could produce sun

and stars and earth and yourself and all the other animals and plants and lifeless objects which we mentioned just now.

Glaucon/ Yes, in appearance, but not the actual things.

Socrates/ Quite so; you are helping out my argument. My notion is that a painter is a craftsman of that kind. You may say that the things he produces are not real; but there is a sense in which he too does produce a bed.

Glaucon/ Yes, the appearance of one.

Socrates/ And what of the carpenter? Were you not saying just now that he only makes a particular bed, not what we call the Form or essential nature of Bed?

Glaucon/ Yes, I was.

Socrates/ If so, what he makes is not the reality, but only something that resembles it. It would not be right to call the work of a carpenter or of any other handicraftsman a perfectly real thing, would it?

Glaucon/ Not in the view of people accustomed to thinking on these lines.

Socrates/ We must not be surprised, then, if even an actual bed is a somewhat shadowy thing as compared with reality.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Now shall we make use of this example to throw light on our question as to the true nature of this artist who represents things? We have here three sorts of bed: one which exists in the nature of things and which, I imagine, we could only describe as a product of divine workmanship; another made by the carpenter; and a third by the painter. So the three kinds of bed belong respectively to the domains of these three: painter, carpenter, and god.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now the god made only one ideal or essential Bed, whether by choice or because he was under some necessity not to make more than one; at any rate two or more were not created, nor could they possibly come into being.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because, if he made even so many as two, then once more a single ideal Bed would make its appearance, whose character those two would share; and that one, not the two, would be the essential Bed. Knowing this, the god, wishing to be the real maker of a real Bed, not a particular manufacturer of one particular bed, created one which is essentially unique.

Glaucon/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Shall we call him, then, the author of the true nature of Bed, or something of that sort?

Glaucon/ Certainly he deserves the name, since all his works constitute the real nature of things.

Socrates/ And we may call the carpenter the manufacturer of a bed?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Can we say the same of the painter?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then what is he, with reference to a bed?

Glaucon/ I think it would be fairest to describe him as the artist who represents the things which the other two make.

Socrates/ Very well; so the work of the artist is at the third remove from the essential nature of the thing?

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ The tragic poet, too, is an artist who represents things; so this will apply to him: he and all other artists are, as it were, third in succession from the throne of truth.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ We are in agreement, then, about the artist. But now tell me about our painter: which do you think he is trying to represent—the reality that exists in the nature of things, or the products of the craftsman?

Glaucon/ The products of the craftsman.

Socrates/ As they are, or as they appear? You have still to draw that distinction.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean: you may look at a bed or any other object from straight in front or slantwise or at any angle. Is there then, any difference in the bed itself, or does it merely look different?

Glaucon/ It only looks different.

Socrates/ Well, that is the point. Does painting aim at reproducing any actual object as it is, or the appearance of it as it looks? In other words, is it a representation of the truth or of a semblance?

Glaucon/ Of a semblance.

Socrates/ The art of representation, then, is a long way from reality; and apparently the reason why there is nothing it cannot reproduce is that it grasps only a small part of any object, and that only an image. Your painter, for example, will paint us a shoemaker, a carpenter, or other workman, without understanding anyone of their crafts; and yet, if he were a good painter, he might deceive a child or a simple-minded person into thinking his picture was a real carpenter, if he showed it them at some distance.

Glaucon/ No doubt.

Socrates/ But I think there is one view we should take in all such cases. Whenever someone announces that he has met with a person who is master of every trade and knows more about every subject than any specialist, we should

reply that he is a simple fellow who has apparently fallen in with some illusionist and been tricked into thinking him omniscient, because of his own inability to discriminate between knowledge and ignorance and the representation of appearances.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Then it is now time to consider the tragic poets and their master, Homer, because we are sometimes told that they understand not only all technical matters but also all about human conduct, good or bad, and about religion; for, to write well, a good poet, so they say, must know his subject; otherwise he could not write about it. We must ask whether these people have not been deluded by meeting with artists who can represent appearances, and in contemplating the poets' work have failed to see that it is at the third remove from reality, nothing more than semblances, easy to produce with no knowledge of the truth. Or is there something in what they say? Have the good poets a real mastery of the matters on which the public thinks they discourse so well?

Glaucon/ It is a question we ought to look into.

Socrates/ Well then, if a man were able actually to do the things he represents as well as to produce images of them, do you believe he would seriously give himself up to making these images and take that as a completely satisfying object in life? I should imagine that, if he had a real understanding of the actions he represents, he would far sooner devote himself to performing them in fact. The memorials he would try to leave after him would be noble deeds, and he would be more eager to be the hero whose praises are sung than the poet who sings them.

Glaucon/ Yes, I agree; he would do more good in that way and win a greater name.

Socrates/ Here is a question, then, that we may fairly put to Homer or to any other poet. We will leave out of account all mere matters of technical skill: we will not ask them to explain, for instance, why it is that, if they have a knowledge of medicine and not merely the art of reproducing the way physicians talk, there is no record of any poet, ancient or modern, curing patients and bequeathing his knowledge to a school of medicine, as Asclepius did. But when Homer undertakes to tell us about matters of the highest importance, such as the conduct of war, statesmanship, or education, we have a right to inquire into his competence. 'Dear Homer', we shall say, 'we have defined the artist as one who produces images at the third remove from reality. If your knowledge of all that concerns human excellence was really such as to raise you above him to the second rank, and you could tell what courses of conduct will make men better or worse as individuals or as citizens, can you name any country which was better governed thanks to your efforts? Many states, great and small, have owed much to a good lawgiver, such as Lycurgus at Sparta, Charondas in Italy and Sicily, and our own Solon. Can you tell us of any that acknowledges a like debt to you?

Glaucon/ I should say not. The most devout admirers of Homer make no such claim.

Socrates/ Well, do we hear of any war in Homer's day being won under his command or thanks to his advice?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ Or of a number of ingenious inventions and technical contrivances, which would show that he was a man of practical ability like Thales of Miletus or Anacharsis the Scythian?

Glaucon/ Nothing of the sort.

Socrates/ Well, if there is no mention of public services, do we hear of Homer in his own lifetime presiding, like Pythagoras, over a band of intimate disciples who loved him for the inspiration of his society and handed down a Homeric way of life, like the way of life which the Pythagoreans called after their founder and which to this day distinguishes them from the rest of the world?

Glaucon/ No; on the contrary, Homer's friend with the absurd name, Creophylus, would look even more absurd when considered as a product of the poet's training, if the story is true that he completely neglected Homer during his lifetime.

Socrates/ Yes, so they say. But what do you think, Glaucon? If Homer had really possessed the knowledge qualifying him to educate people and make them better men, instead of merely giving us a poetical representation of such matters, would he not have attracted a host of disciples to love and revere him? After all, any number of private teachers like Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Ceos have succeeded in convincing their contemporaries that they will never be fit to manage affairs of state or their own households unless these masters superintend their education; and for this wisdom they are so passionately admired that their pupils are all but ready to carry them about on their shoulders. Can we suppose that Homer's contemporaries, or Hesiod's, would have left them to wander about reciting their poems, if they had really been capable of helping their hearers to be better men? Surely they would sooner have parted with their money and tried to make the poets settle down at home; or failing that, they would have danced attendance on them wherever they went, until they had learnt from them all they could.

Glaucon/ I believe you are quite right, Socrates.

Socrates/ We may conclude, then, that all poetry, from Homer onwards, consists in representing a semblance of its subject, whatever it may be, including any kind of human excellence, with no grasp of the reality. We were speaking just now of the painter who can produce what looks like a shoemaker to the spectator who, being as ignorant of shoemaking as he is himself, judges only by form and color. In the same way the poet, knowing nothing more than how to represent appearances, can paint in words his picture of any craftsman so as to impress an audience which is equally ignorant and judges only by the form of expression; the inherent charm of meter, rhythm, and musical setting is enough to make them think he has discoursed admirably about generalship or shoemaking or any other technical subject. Strip what the poet has to say of its poetical coloring, and I think you must have seen what it comes to in plain prose. It is like a face which was never really handsome, when it has lost the fresh bloom of youth.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Here is a further point, then. The artist, we say, this maker of images, knows nothing of the reality, but only the appearance. But that is only half the story. An artist can paint a bit and bridle, while the smith and the leather-worker can make them. Does the painter understand the proper form which bit and bridle ought to have? Is it not rather true that not even the craftsmen who make them know that, but only the horseman who understands their use?

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ May we not say generally that there are three arts concerned with any object—the art of using it, the art of making it, and the art of representing it?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that the excellence or beauty or rightness of any implement or living creature or action has reference to the use for which it is made or designed by nature?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ It follows, then, that the user must know most about the performance of the thing he uses and must report on its good or bad points to the maker. The flute-player, for example, will tell the instrument-maker how well his flutes serve the player's purpose, and the other will submit to be instructed about how they should be made. So the man who uses any implement will speak of its merits and defects with knowledge, whereas the maker will take his word and possess no more than a correct belief, which he is obliged to obtain by listening to the man who knows.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But what of the artist? Has he either knowledge or correct belief? Does he know from direct experience of the subjects he portrays whether his representations are good and right or not? Has he even gained a correct belief by being obliged to listen to someone who does know and can tell him how they ought to be represented?

Glaucon/ No, he has neither.

Socrates/ If the artist, then, has neither knowledge nor even a correct belief about the soundness of his work, what becomes of the poet's wisdom in respect of the subjects of his poetry?

Glaucon/ It will not amount to much.

Socrates/ And yet he will go on with his work, without knowing in what way any of his representations is sound or unsound. He must, apparently, be reproducing only what pleases the taste or wins the approval of the ignorant multitude.

Glaucon/ Yes, what else can he do?

Socrates/ We seem, then, so far to be pretty well agreed that the artist knows nothing worth mentioning about the subjects he represents, and that art is a form of play, not to be taken seriously. This description, moreover, applies above all to tragic poetry, whether in epic or dramatic form.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ But now look here; the content of this poetical representation is something at the third remove from reality, is it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ On what part of our human nature, then, does it produce its effect?

Glaucon/ What sort of part do you mean?

Socrates/ Let me explain by an analogy. An object seen at a distance does not, of course, look the same size as when it is close at hand; a straight stick looks bent when part of it is under water; and the same thing appears concave or convex to an eye misled by colors. Every sort of confusion like these is to be found in our minds; and it is this weakness in our nature that is exploited, with a quite magical effect, by many tricks of illusion, like scene-painting and conjuring.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But satisfactory means have been found for dispelling these illusions by measuring, counting, and weighing. We are no longer at the mercy of apparent differences of size and quantity and weight; the faculty which has done the counting and measuring or weighing takes control instead. And this can only be the work of the calculating or reasoning element in the soul.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And when this faculty has done its measuring and announced that one quantity is greater than, or equal

to, another, we often find that there is an appearance which contradicts it. Now, as we have said, it is impossible for the same part of the soul to hold two contradictory beliefs at the same time. Hence the part which agrees with the measurements must be a different part from the one which goes against them; and its confidence in measurement and calculation is a proof of its being the highest part; the other which contradicts it must be an inferior one.

Glaucon/ It must.

Socrates/ This, then, was the conclusion I had in view when I said that paintings and works of art in general are far removed from reality, and that the element in our nature which is accessible to art and responds to its advances is equally far from wisdom. The offspring of a connection thus formed on no true or sound basis must be as inferior as the parents. This will be true not only of visual art, but of art addressed to the ear, poetry as we call it.

Glaucon/ Naturally.

Socrates/ Then, instead of trusting merely to the analogy from painting, let us directly consider that part of the mind to which the dramatic element in poetry appeals, and see how much claim it has to serious worth. We can put the question in this way. Drama, we say, represents the acts and fortunes of human beings. It is wholly concerned with what they do, voluntarily or against their will, and how they fare, with the consequences which they regard as happy or otherwise, and with their feelings of joy and sorrow in all these experiences. That is all, is it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in all these experiences has a man an undivided mind? Is there not an internal conflict which sets him at odds with himself in his conduct, much as we were saying that the conflict of visual impressions leads him to

make contradictory judgments? However, I need not ask that question; for, now I come to think of it, we have already agreed that innumerable conflicts of this sort are constantly occurring in the mind. But there is a further point to be considered now. We have said that a man of high character will bear any stroke of fortune, such as the loss of a son or of anything else he holds, dear, with more equanimity than most people. We may now ask: will he feel no pain, or is that impossible? Will he not rather observe due measure in his grief?

Glaucon/ Yes, that is nearer the truth.

Socrates/ Now tell me: will he be more likely to struggle with his grief and resist it when he is under the eyes of his fellows or when he is alone?

Glaucon/ He will be far more restrained in the presence of others.

Socrates/ Yes; when he is by himself he will not be ashamed to do and say much that he would not like anyone to see or hear.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ What encourages him to resist his grief is the lawful authority of reason, while the impulse to give way comes from the feeling itself; and, as we said, the presence of contradictory impulses proves that two distinct elements in his nature must be involved. One of them is law-abiding, prepared to listen to the authority which declares that it is best to bear misfortune as quietly as possible without resentment, for several reasons: it is never certain that misfortune may not be a blessing; nothing is gained by chafing at it; nothing human is matter for great concern; and, finally, grief hinders us from calling in the help we most urgently need. By this I mean reflection on what has happened, letting reason decide on the best move in the

game of life that the fall of the dice permits. Instead of behaving like a child who goes on shrieking after a fall and hugging the wounded part, we should accustom the mind to set itself at once to raise up the fallen and cure the hurt, banishing lamentation with a healing touch.

Glaucon/ Certainly that is the right way to deal with misfortune.

Socrates/ And if, as we think, the part of us which is ready to act upon these reflections is the highest, that other part which impels us to dwell upon our sufferings and can never have enough of grieving over them is unreasonable, craven, and faint-hearted.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now this fretful temper gives scope for a great diversity of dramatic representation; whereas the calm and wise character in its unvarying constancy is not easy to represent, nor when represented is it readily understood, especially by a promiscuous gathering in a theatre, since it is foreign to their own habit of mind. Obviously, then, this steadfast disposition does not naturally attract the dramatic poet, and his skill is not designed to find favor with it. If he is to have a popular success, he must address himself to the fretful type with its rich variety of material for representation.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ We have, then, a fair case against the poet and we may set him down as the counterpart of the painter, whom he resembles in two ways: his creations are poor things by the standard of truth and reality, and his appeal is not to the highest part of the soul, but to one which is equally inferior. So we shall be justified in not admitting him into a well-ordered commonwealth, because he stimulates and strengthens an element which threatens to undermine

the reason. As a country may be given over into the power of its worst citizens while the better sort are ruined, so, we shall say, the dramatic poet sets up a vicious form of government in the individual soul: he gratifies that senseless part which cannot distinguish great and small, but regards the same things as now one, now the other; and he is an image-maker whose images are phantoms far removed from reality.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ But, the heaviest count in our indictment is still to come. Dramatic poetry has a most formidable power of corrupting even men of high character, with a few exceptions.

Glaucon/ Formidable indeed, if it can do that.

Socrates/ Let me put the case for you to judge. When we listen to some hero in Homer or on the tragic stage moaning over his sorrows in a long tirade, or to a chorus beating their breasts as they chant a lament, you know how the best of us enjoy giving ourselves up to follow the performance with eager sympathy. The more a poet can move our feelings in this way, the better we think him. And yet when the sorrow is our own, we pride ourselves on being able to bear it quietly like a man, condemning the behavior we admired in the theatre as womanish. Can it be right that the spectacle of a man behaving as one would scorn and blush to behave oneself should be admired and enjoyed, instead of filling us with disgust?

Glaucon/ No, it really does not seem reasonable.

Socrates/ It does not, if you reflect that the poet ministers to the satisfaction of that very part of our nature whose instinctive hunger to have its fill of tears and lamentations is forcibly restrained in the case of our own misfortunes. Meanwhile the noblest part of us, insufficiently schooled by reason or habit, has relaxed its watch over these querulous

feelings, with the excuse that the sufferings we are contemplating are not our own and it is no shame to us to admire and pity a man with some pretensions to a noble character, though his grief may be excessive. The enjoyment itself seems a clear gain, which we cannot bring ourselves to forfeit by disdaining the whole poem. Few, I believe, are capable of reflecting that to enter into another's feelings must have an effect on our own: the emotions of pity our sympathy has strengthened will not be easy to restrain when we are suffering ourselves.

Glaucon/ That is very true.

Socrates/ Does not the same principle apply to humor as well as to pathos? You are doing the same thing if, in listening at a comic performance or in ordinary life to buffooneries which you would be ashamed to indulge in yourself, you thoroughly enjoy them instead of being disgusted with their ribaldry. There is in you an impulse to play the clown, which you have held in restraint from a reasonable fear of being set down as a buffoon; but now you have given it rein, and by encouraging its impudence at the theatre you may be unconsciously carried away into playing the comedian in your private life. Similar effects are produced by poetic representation of love and anger and all those desires and feelings of pleasure or pain which accompany our every action. It waters the growth of passions which should be allowed to wither away and sets them up in control, although the goodness and happiness of our lives depend on their being held in subjection.

Glaucon/ I cannot but agree with you.

Socrates/ If so, Glaucon, when you meet with admirers of Homer who tell you that he has been the educator of Hellas and that on questions of human conduct and culture he deserves to be constantly studied as a guide by whom to

regulate your whole life, it is well to give a friendly hearing to such people, as entirely well-meaning according to their lights, and you may acknowledge Homer to be the first and greatest of the tragic poets; but you must be quite sure that we can admit into our commonwealth only the poetry which celebrates the praises of the gods and of good men. If you go further and admit the honeyed muse in epic or in lyric verse, then pleasure and pain will usurp the sovereignty of law and of the principles always recognized by common consent as the best.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ So now, since we have recurred to the subject of poetry, let this be our defense: it stands to reason that we could not but banish such an influence from our commonwealth. But, lest poetry should convict us of being harsh and unmannerly, let us tell her further that there is a long-standing quarrel between poetry and philosophy. There are countless tokens of this old antagonism, such as the lines which speak of 'the cur which at his master yelps', or 'one mighty in the vain talk of fools' or 'the throng of all-too-sapient heads', or 'subtle thinkers all in rags'. None the less, be it declared that, if the dramatic poetry whose end is to give pleasure can show good reason why it should exist in a well-governed society, we for our part should welcome it back, being ourselves conscious of its charm; only it would be a sin to betray what we believe to be the truth. You too, my friend, must have felt this charm, above all when poetry speaks through Homer's lips.

Glaucon/ I have indeed.

Socrates/ It is fair, then, that before returning from exile poetry should publish her defense in lyric verse or some other measure; and I suppose we should allow her champions who love poetry but are not poets to plead for her

in prose, that she is no mere source of pleasure but a benefit to society and to human life. We shall listen favorably; for we shall clearly be the gainers, if that can be proved.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But if it cannot, then we must take a lesson from the lover who renounces at any cost a passion which he finds is doing him no good. The love for poetry of this kind, bred in us by our own much admired institutions, will make us kindly disposed to believe in her genuine worth; but so long as she cannot make good her defense we shall, as we listen, rehearse to ourselves the reasons we have just given, as a counter-charm to save us from relapsing into a passion which most people have never outgrown. We shall reiterate that such poetry has no serious claim to be valued as an apprehension of truth. One who lends an ear to it should rather beware of endangering the order established in his soul, and would do well to accept the view of poetry which we have expressed.

Glaucon/ I entirely agree.

Socrates/ Yes, Glaucon; for much is at stake, more than most people suppose: it is a choice between becoming a good man or a bad; and poetry, no more than wealth or power or honors, should tempt us to be careless of justice and virtue.

Glaucon/ Your argument has convinced me, as I think it would anyone else.

Socrates/ And yet, we have not so far described the chief wages of virtue or the greatest prize it can hope to win.

Glaucon/ It is hard to conceive any greater than those you have already spoken of.

Socrates/ Can there be anything great in a short span of time? And, as compared with all time, the whole of this life from childhood to old age is short enough.

Glaucon/ Indeed it is nothing.

Socrates/ Well, ought not an immortal thing to be more seriously concerned with all time than with so brief a span?

Glaucon/ No doubt; but what do you mean by that?

Socrates/ Are you not aware that our soul is immortal and never perishes?

Glaucon looked at me in astonishment.

Glaucon/ Indeed I am not. Are you prepared to assert that?

Socrates/ I ought to be; and so, I think, ought you. There is no difficulty.

Glaucon/ There is for me; but if you find it so easy a matter, I should like to hear your account.

Socrates/ You shall. When you speak of a certain thing as 'a good', and of another as 'an evil', do you agree with me in thinking of the evil as always being the thing which corrupts and destroys, and of the good as that which benefits and preserves?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And would you say that everything has its peculiar evil as well as its good, for instance, ophthalmia for the eyes, disease for the body in general, mildew for grain, rot for timber, rust for iron and copper—and, as I say, that almost anything has some special evil or malady, which impairs the thing it attacks and ends by breaking it up and destroying it altogether?

Glaucon/ Yes, no doubt.

Socrates/ Everything, then, is destroyed by its own peculiar evil or corruption; or if that will not destroy it, there is at any rate nothing else that can bring it to an end; for clearly what is good for it will never destroy it, nor yet what is neither good nor evil. Hence if we find that there is a thing whose peculiar evil does indeed deprave it but cannot bring

about its utter dissolution, shall we not at once be sure that it is by nature indestructible?

Glaucon/ That seems likely.

Socrates/ What of the soul, then? Has it not some special evil which depraves it?

Glaucon/ Certainly; there are all the vices we have been speaking of, injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

Socrates/ And does any of these vices work its complete destruction? We must be careful here not to be misled into supposing that when a wicked and foolish man is found out, he has been destroyed by his wickedness, which is a depraved condition of his soul. Think of it rather in this way. It is true of the body, is it not? that physical evil, namely disease, wastes and destroys it until it is no longer a body at all, and all the other things we instanced are annihilated by the pervading corruption of the evil which peculiarly besets them. Now is it true in the same way of the soul that injustice and other forms of vice, by besetting and pervading it, waste it away in corruption until they sever it from the body and bring about its death?

Glaucon/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ On the other hand, it would be unreasonable to suppose that a thing which cannot be destroyed by its own vice should be destroyed by the vicious condition of something else. Observe that we should not think it proper to say of the body that it was destroyed simply by the badness of its food, which might be rotten or moldy; only when such food has induced a bad condition of the body itself do we say that the body is destroyed by its own diseased state, occasioned by the bad food. The body is one thing, the food another; and we shall not allow that the evil belonging to that other thing can ever destroy the body, unless it engenders the body's own peculiar evil. By the same

reasoning, if bodily evil does not engender in the soul the soul's peculiar evil, we must never allow that the soul is destroyed merely by an evil peculiar to something else.

Glaucon/ That is reasonable.

Socrates/ Either, then, we must prove this argument unsound, or, so long as it stands unrefuted, we must deny that fever or any other disease or even slaughtering the body and cutting it to atoms can effect anything towards the destruction of the soul, until it can be shown that the soul itself becomes more wicked and impure because the body suffers in those ways. We shall not allow anyone to say that the soul or anything else perishes merely through the occurrence in another thing of that other thing's peculiar evil.

Glaucon/ Well, no one will ever prove that death makes the dying man's soul more wicked.

Socrates/ No; and if anyone does venture to challenge our argument and try to escape the conclusion that souls are immortal by asserting that a dying man does become wickeder, we shall argue that, if what he says is true, wickedness must be a sort of fatal disease with a power of its own to kill those who catch it, quickly or slowly according to the severity of the attack; instead of being merely the occasion of their death, which is in fact caused by other people who punish them for their crimes.

Glaucon/ Yes, if that were so, surely there would be nothing very terrible about wickedness, for a fatal attack would be the end of all troubles. But I think we shall find that, on the contrary, it brings about the death of other people to the best of its power, and, far from being deadly to the wicked man himself, it makes him very much alive and fills him with an unsleeping energy.

Socrates/ You are right. For if its own evil and depravity cannot kill the soul, it is hardly likely that an evil designed for the destruction of a different thing will destroy the soul or anything but its own proper object. So, since the soul is not destroyed by any evil, either its own or another's, clearly it must be a thing that exists forever, and is consequently immortal.

Glaucon/ That follows.

Socrates/ Let us take this, then, as proved. And if it is so, there must always be the same number of souls in existence. For if none perishes, their number cannot grow less; nor yet can it be increased, since any increase of the immortal must come from the mortal, and then all things would end by being immortal.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Well, reason forbids us to imagine that conclusion. And again, we must not think of the soul, in her truest nature, as full of diversity and unlikeness and perpetually at variance with herself.

Glaucon/ In what way do you mean?

Socrates/ We were thinking just now of the soul as composed of a number of parts not put together in the most satisfactory way; and such a composite thing could hardly be everlasting.

Glaucon/ Probably not.

Socrates/ Well then, that the soul is immortal is established beyond doubt by our recent argument and the other proofs; but to understand her real nature, we must look at her, not as we see her now, marred by association with the body and other evils, but when she has regained that pure condition which the eye of reason can discern; you will then find her to be a far lovelier thing and will distinguish more clearly justice and injustice and all the

qualities we have discussed. Our description of the soul is true of her present appearance; but we have seen her afflicted by countless evils, like the sea-god Glaucus, whose original form can hardly be discerned, because parts of his body have been broken off or crushed and altogether marred by the waves, and the clinging overgrowth of weed and rock and shell has made him more like some monster than his natural self. But we must rather fix our eyes, Glaucon, on her love of wisdom and note how she seeks to apprehend and hold converse with the divine, immortal, and everlasting world to which she is akin, and what she would become if her affections were entirely set on following the impulse that would lift her out of the sea in which she is now sunken, and disencumber her of all that wild profusion of rock and shell, whose earthy substance has encrusted her, because she seeks what men call happiness by making earth her food. Then one might see her true nature, whatever it may be, whether manifold or simple. For the moment we have described—sufficiently, as I think—the aspects shown by the soul in the experiences of human life.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And now, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument; in particular, we have not introduced those rewards which, as you two complained, Homer and Hesiod hold out to men who have acquired a reputation for justice. We have found that, apart from all such consequences, justice is the best thing for the soul, which should do what is right, whether or not it possess the ring of Gyges and the cap of invisibility besides. Accordingly, there can now be no objection to our crediting justice and virtue in general with a full measure of those due rewards which they win for the soul from gods and men, both during life and after death.

Glaucon/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ Then you must let me take back the concession I made when you asked me to grant, for the sake of argument, that the just man should have the reputation of being unjust, and the unjust man of being just It might be impossible, you said, that heaven and mankind should be so deceived, but you wished that justice and injustice simply in themselves should be confronted for judgment That judgment has now been given; and I must ask you in return to allow justice to enjoy the estimation in which it is actually held among gods and men. We have seen that justice never defrauds its possessor of the blessings that come of being really just Let us now add the prizes which fall to those whose justice is apparent to all.

Glaucon/ That is a fair demand.

Socrates/ You will concede, then, to begin with, that neither of the two characters is hidden from the sight of the gods, who will accordingly, as we agreed at the outset, favor the just and hate the unjust And the favorite of heaven may expect, in the fullest measure, all the blessings that heaven can give, save perhaps for some suffering entailed by offences in a former life. So we must suppose that, if the righteous man is afflicted with poverty or sickness or any other seeming evil, all this will come to some good for him in the end, either in this life or after death. For the gods, surely, can never be regardless of one who sets his heart on being just and making himself by the practice of virtue as like a god as man may.

Glaucon/ No, naturally they would not neglect one who is like themselves.

Socrates/ And must we not think the opposite of the unjust man?

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Such, then, are the prizes which the just man wins from the gods. What may he expect from mankind? If we look at the facts, is it not true that the clever rogue is like the runner who runs well for the first half of the course, but flags before reaching the goal: he is quick off the mark, but ends in disgrace and slinks away crestfallen and uncrowned. The crown is the prize of the really good runner who perseveres to the end. Is it not usually so with the just, that towards the close of any course of action or of their dealings with other people or of life itself they win a good name and bear off the prize from the hands of their fellows?

Glaucon/ Yes, that is true.

Socrates/ Will you allow me, then, to say now of the just all that you said yourself of the unjust: that when they are advanced in years they will hold positions of authority in their own country if they so desire, ally themselves in marriage to any family they choose, and so forth? Of the unjust, on the other hand, I will say that most of them, though they may go undetected in their youth, are caught and disgraced at the end of their course; in old age their misery is insulted by citizen and stranger alike; they are beaten and suffer all those torments which you truly called unmentionable: I need not repeat them. May I say all this?

Glaucon/ Yes; it is a fair statement.

Socrates/ Such then are the prizes, rewards, and gifts that the just man may expect at the hands of gods and men in his lifetime, in addition to those other blessings which come simply from being just.

Glaucon/ Yes, the rewards are splendid and sure.

Socrates/ These, however, are as nothing, in number or in greatness, when compared with the recompense awaiting the just and the unjust after death. This must now be told,

in order that each may be paid in full what the argument shows to be his due.

Glaucon/ Go on; there are not many things I would sooner hear about.

Socrates/ My story will not be like Odysseus' tale to Alcinous; but its hero was a valiant man, Er, the son of Armenius, a native of Pamphylia, who was killed in battle. When the dead were taken up for burial ten days later, his body alone was found undecayed. They carried him home, and two days afterwards were going to bury him, when he came to life again as he lay on the funeral pyre. He then told what he had seen in the other world.

He said that, when the soul had left his body, he journeyed with many others until they came to a marvelous place, where there were two openings side by side in the earth, and opposite them two others in the sky above. Between them sat Judges, who, after each sentence given, bade the just take the way to the right upwards through the sky, first binding on them in front tokens signifying the judgment passed upon them. The unjust were commanded to take the downward road to the left, and these bore evidence of all their deeds fastened on their backs. When Er himself drew near, they told him that he was to carry tidings of the other world to mankind, and he must now listen and observe all that went on in that place. Accordingly he saw the souls which had been judged departing by one of the openings in the sky and one of those in the earth; while at the other two openings souls were coming up out of the earth travel-stained and dusty, or down from the sky clean and bright. Each company, as if they had come on a long journey, seemed glad to turn aside into the Meadow, where they encamped like pilgrims at a festival. Greetings passed between acquaintances, and as either party questioned the other of what had befallen them, some wept as they

sorrowfully recounted all that they had seen and suffered on their journey under the earth, which had lasted a thousand years; while others spoke of the joys of heaven and sights of inconceivable beauty. There was much, Glaucon, that would take too long to tell; but the sum, was this. For every wrong done to any man sinners had in due course paid the penalty ten times over, that is to say, once in each hundred years, such being the span of human life, in order that the punishment for every offence might be tenfold. Thus, all who have been guilty of bringing many to death or slavery by betraying their country or their comrades in arms, or have taken part in any other iniquity, suffer tenfold torments for each crime; while deeds of kindness and a just and sinless life are rewarded in the same measure. Concerning infants who die at birth or live but a short time he had more to say, not worthy of mention.

The wages earned by honoring the gods and parents, or by dishonoring them and by doing murder, were even greater. He was standing by when one spirit asked another, 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' This Ardiaeus had been despot in some city of Pamphylia just a thousand years before, and, among many other wicked deeds, he was said to have killed his old father and his elder brother. The answer was: 'He has not come back hither, nor will he ever come. This was one of the terrible sights we saw. When our sufferings were ended and we were near the mouth, ready to pass upwards, suddenly we saw Ardiaeus and others with him. Most of them were despots, but there were some private persons who had been great sinners. They thought that at last they were going to mount upwards, but the mouth would not admit them; it bellowed whenever one whose wickedness was incurable or who had not paid the penalty in full tried to go up. Then certain fierce and fiery-looking men, who stood by and knew what the sound meant, seized

some and carried them away; but Ardiaeus and others they bound hand and foot and neck and flinging them down flayed them. They dragged them along the wayside, carding their flesh like wool with thorns and telling all who passed by why this was done to them and that they were being taken to be cast into Tartarus. We had gone through many terrors of every sort, but none so great as the fear each man felt lest the sound should come as he went up; and when it was not heard, his joy was great.' Such were the judgments and penalties, and the blessings received were in corresponding measure.

Now when each company had spent seven days in the Meadow, on the eighth they had to rise up and journey on. And on the fourth day afterwards they came to a place whence they could see a straight shaft of light, like a pillar, stretching from above throughout heaven and earth, more like the rainbow than anything else, but brighter and purer. To this they came after a day's journey, and there, at the middle of the light, they saw stretching from heaven the extremities of its chains; for this light binds the heavens, holding together all the revolving firmament, like the under-girths of a ship of war.

And from the extremities stretched the Spindle of Necessity, by means of which all the circles revolve. The shaft of the Spindle and the hook were of adamant, and the whorl partly of adamant and partly of other substances. The whorl was of this fashion. In shape it was like an ordinary whorl; but from Er's account we must imagine it as a large whorl with the inside completely scooped out, and within it a second smaller whorl, and a third and a fourth and four more, fitting into one another like a nest of bowls. For there were in all eight whorls, set one within another, with their rims showing above as circles and making up the continuous surface of a single whorl round the shaft, which

pierces right through the center of the eighth. The circle forming the rim of the first and outermost whorl (Fixed Stars) is the broadest; next in breadth is the sixth (Venus); then the fourth (Mars); then the eighth (Moon); then the seventh (Sun); then the fifth (Mercury); then the third (Zeus); and the second (Saturn) is narrowest of all. The rim of the largest whorl (Fixed Stars) was spangled; the seventh (Sun) brightest; the eighth (Moon) colored by the reflected light of the seventh; the second and fifth (Saturn, Mercury) like each other and yellower; the third (Zeus) whitest; the fourth (Mars) somewhat ruddy; the sixth (Venus) second in whiteness. The Spindle revolved as a whole with one motion; but, within the whole as it turned, the seven inner circles revolved slowly in the opposite direction; and of these the eighth (Moon) moved most swiftly; second in speed and all moving together, the seventh, sixth, and fifth (Sun, Venus, Mercury); next in speed moved the fourth (Mars) with what appeared to them to be a counter-revolution; next the third (Zeus), and slowest of all the second (Saturn).

The Spindle turned on the knees of Necessity. Upon each of its circles stood a Siren, who was carried round with its movement, uttering a single sound on one note, so that all the eight made up the concords of a single scale. Roundabout, at equal distances, were seated, each on a throne, the three daughters of Necessity, the Fates, robed in white with garlands on their heads, Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos, chanting to the Sirens' music, Lachesis of things past, Clotho of the present, and Atropos of things to come. And from time to time Clotho lays her right hand on the outer rim of the Spindle and helps to turn it, while Atropos turns the inner circles likewise with her left, and Lachesis with either hand takes hold of inner and outer alternately.

The souls, as soon as they came, were required to go before Lachesis. An Interpreter first marshaled them in

order; and then, having taken from the lap of Lachesis a number of lots and samples of lives, he mounted on a high platform and said:

'The word of Lachesis, maiden daughter of Necessity, Souls of a day, here shall begin a new round of earthly life, to end in death. No guardian spirit will cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own destiny. Let him to whom the first lot falls choose first a life to which he will be bound of necessity. But Virtue owns no master: as a man honors or dishonors her, so shall he have more of her or less. The blame is his who chooses; Heaven is blameless'.

With these words the Interpreter scattered the lots among them all. Each took up the lot which fell at his feet and showed what number he had drawn; only Er himself was forbidden to take one. Then the Interpreter laid on the ground before them the sample lives, many more than the persons there. They were of every sort: lives of all living creatures, as well as of all conditions of men. Among them were lives of despots, some continuing in power to the end, others ruined in mid-course and ending in poverty, exile, or beggary. There were lives of men renowned for beauty of form and for strength and prowess, or for distinguished birth and ancestry; also lives of unknown men; and of women likewise. All these qualities were variously combined with one another and with wealth or poverty, health or sickness, or intermediate conditions; but in none of these lives was there anything to determine the condition of the soul, because the soul must needs change its character according as it chooses one life or another.

Here, it seems, my dear Glaucon, a man's whole fortunes are at stake. On this account each one of us should lay aside all other learning, to study only how he may discover one who can give him the knowledge enabling him to distinguish the good life from the evil, and always and everywhere to

choose the best within his reach, taking into account all these qualities we have mentioned and how, separately or in combination, they affect the goodness of life. Thus he will seek to understand what is the effect, for good or evil, of beauty combined with wealth or with poverty and with this or that condition of the soul, or of any combination of high or low birth, public or private station, strength or weakness, quickness of wit or slowness, and any other qualities of mind, native or acquired; until, as the outcome of all these calculations, he is able to choose between the worse and the better life with reference to the constitution of the soul, calling a life worse or better according as it leads to the soul becoming more unjust or more just. All else he will leave out of account; for, as we have seen, this is the supreme choice for a min, both while he lives and after death. Accordingly, when he goes into the house of death he should hold this faith like adamant, that there too he may not be dazzled by wealth and such-like evils, or fling himself into the life of a despot or other evil-doer, to work irremediable harm and suffer yet worse things himself, but may know how to choose always the middle course that avoids both extremes, not only in this life, so far as he may, but in every future existence; for there lies the greatest happiness for man.

To return to the report of the messenger from the other world. The Interpreter then said: 'Even for the last comer, if he choose with discretion, there is left in store a life with which, if he will live strenuously, he may be content and not unhappy. Let not the first be heedless in his choice, nor the last be disheartened.'

After these words, he who had drawn the first lot at once seized upon the most absolute despotism he could find. In his thoughtless greed he was not careful to examine the life he chose at every point, and he did not see the many evils it contained and that he was fated to devour his own children;

but when he had time to look more closely, he began to beat his breast and bewail his choice, forgetting the warning proclaimed by the Interpreter; for he laid the blame on fortune, the decrees of the gods, anything rather than himself. He was one of those who had come down from heaven, having spent his former life in a well-ordered commonwealth and become virtuous from habit without pursuing wisdom. It might indeed be said that not the least part of those who were caught in this way were of the company which had come from heaven, because they were not disciplined by suffering; whereas most of those who had come up out of the earth, having suffered themselves and seen others suffer, were not hasty in making their choice. For this reason, and also because of the chance of the lot, most of the souls changed from a good life to an evil, or from an evil life to a good. Yet, if upon every return to earthly life a man seeks wisdom with his whole heart, and if the lot so fall that he is not among the last to choose, then this report gives good hope that he will not only be happy here, but will journey to the other world and back again hither, not by the rough road underground, but by the smooth path through the heavens.

It was indeed, said Er, a sight worth seeing, how the souls severally chose their lives—a sight to move pity and laughter and astonishment; for the choice was mostly governed by the habits of their former life. He saw one soul choosing the life of a swan; this had once been the soul of Orpheus, which so hated all womankind because of his death at their hands that it would not consent to be born of woman. And he saw the soul of Thamyras take the life of a nightingale, and a swan choose to be changed into a man, and other musical creatures do the same. The soul which drew the twentieth lot took a lion's life; this had been Ajax, the son of Telamon, who shrank from being born as a man, remembering the

judgment concerning the arms of Achilles. After him came the soul of Agamemnon, who also hated mankind because of his sufferings and took in exchange the life of an eagle. Atalanta's soul drew a lot about half-way through. She took the life of an athlete, which she could not pass over when she saw the great honors he would win. After her he saw the soul of Epeius, son of Panopeus, passing into the form of a craftswoman; and far off, among the last, the buffoon Thersites' soul clothing itself in the body of an ape. It so happened that the last choice of all fell to the soul of Odysseus, whose ambition was so abated by memory of his former labors that he went about for a long time looking for a life of quiet obscurity. When at last he found it lying somewhere neglected by all the rest, he chose it gladly, saying that he would have done the same if his lot had come first. Other souls in like manner passed from beasts into men and into one another, the unjust changing into the wild creatures, the just into the tame, in every sort of combination.

Now when all the souls had chosen their lives, they went in the order of their lots to Lachesis; and she gave each into the charge of the guardian genius he had chosen, to escort him through life and fulfill his choice. The genius led the soul first to Clotho, under her hand as it turned the whirling Spindle, thus ratifying the portion which the man had chosen when his lot was cast. And, after touching her, he led it next to the spinning of Atropos, thus making the thread of destiny irreversible. Thence, without looking back, he passed under the throne of Necessity. And when he and all the rest had passed beyond the throne, they journeyed together to the Plain of Lethe through terrible stifling heat; for the plain is bare of trees and of all plants that grow on the earth. When evening came, they encamped beside the River of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold. All

are required to drink a certain measure of this water, and some have not the wisdom to save them from drinking more. Every man as he drinks forgets everything. When they had fallen asleep, at midnight there was thunder and an earthquake, and in a moment, they were carried up, this way and that, to their birth, like shooting stars. Er himself was not allowed to drink of the water. How and by what means he came back to the body he knew not; but suddenly he opened his eyes and found himself lying on the funeral pyre at dawn.

And so, Glaucon, the tale was saved from perishing; and if we will listen, it may save us, and all will be well when we cross the river of Lethe. Also we shall not defile our souls; but, if you will believe with me that the soul is immortal and able to endure all good and ill, we shall keep always to the upward way and in all things pursue justice with the help of wisdom. Then we shall be at peace with Heaven and with ourselves, both during our sojourn here and when, like victors in the Games collecting gifts from their friends, we receive the prize of justice; and so, not here only, but in the journey of a thousand years of which I have told you, we shall fare well.

Republic.

Translated by H. Spens. 1763

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Glauco, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Adimantus, Cephalus.

The First Book

Socrates/ I went down yesterday to the Piraeum, with Glauco, the son of Aristo, to pay my devotion to the goddess; and desirous, at the same time, to observe in what manner they would celebrate the festival, as they were now to do it for-the first time. The procession of our own country-men seemed to me to be indeed beautiful; yet that of the Thracians appeared no less proper.

After we had paid our devotion, and seen the solemnity, we were on our way to the city, when Polemarchus, the Son of Cephalus, observing us at a distance, hurrying home; ordered his boy to run and desire us to wait for him; and the boy, taking hold of my robe behind;

Boy/ Polemarchus, desires you to wait.

Socrates/ I turned about and asked where he was.

Boy/ He is coming up, after you; but do you wait for him.

Glaucon/ We will wait.

Socrates/ Soon afterwards-came Polemarchus, and Adimantus the brother of Glauco, and Niceratus the son of Nicias, and some others as from the procession.

Polemarchus/ Socrates, you seem to me to be hurrying to the city.

Socrates/ You judge, not amiss.

Polemarchus/ You see us, then, how many there are of us.

Socrates/ Why do I not?

Polemarchus/ Therefore, now, you must either be stronger than these, or you must stay here.

Socrates/ Is there not, one way still remaining? May we not persuade you that you must let us go?

Polemarchus/ Can you be able to persuade, such as will not hear?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Polemarchus/ Then, as we are not to hear, determine accordingly.

Adeimantus/ But you do not know, that there is to be an illumination, in the evening, on horseback to the goddess.

Socrates/ On horseback! that is new. Are they to have torches, and give them to one another, contending together with their horses? or how do you mean?

Polemarchus/ Just so. And besides, they will perform a nocturnal solemnity worth seeing. For we shall rise after supper and see the nocturnal festival, and shall be there with many of the youth, and converse together. But do you stay, and do not do otherwise.

Glaucon/ It seems proper, then, we should stay.

Socrates/ Nay, if it seem so, we ought to do it.

We went home therefore to Polemarchus's house; and there we found both Lysias and Euthydemus, brothers of Polemarchus; likewise, Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, and Charmantides the Paeoneian, and Clitipho the son of Aristonimus. Cephalus the father of Polemarchus was likewise in the house; he seemed to me to be pretty well advanced in years, for I had not seen him of a long time. He was sitting crowned, on a certain couch and seat, for he had been offering sacrifice in the hall. So we sat down by him,

for some seats were placed there in a circle. Immediately, then, when Cephalus saw me he saluted me and said;

Cephalus/ Socrates, you do not often come down to us to the Piraeum; nevertheless you ought to do it, for were I still able easily to go up to the city, you should not need to come hither, but we would be with you. But now you should come hither more frequently; for I assure you, that with relation to myself, as the pleasures respecting the body become insipid, the desire and pleasure of conversation increase. Do not fail, then, to make a party often with these youths, and come hither to us as to your friends and old acquaintance.

Socrates/ And, truly, Cephalus, I take pleasure in conversing with those who are well advanced in years; for it appears to me proper that we learn from them, as from persons who have gone before us, what the road is which it is likely we have to travel, whether rough and difficult or plain and easy. And I would gladly learn from you, as you are now arrived at that time of life which the poets call the threshold of old-age, what your opinion of it is; whether you look on it, as the most grievous part of life or what you think of it?

Cephalus/ And I will tell you, Socrates, what is really my opinion; for we frequently meet together in one place, several of us, who are of the same age, observing the old proverb. Now, most of us, when assembled, lament their state, when they feel a want of the pleasures of youth, and call to their remembrance the pleasures of love, those of drinking and feasting, and some others akin to these, and they express indignation, as if they were bereaved of some mighty things. In those days, they say, they lived well, but now they do not live at all. Some of them, too, bemoan the contempt which old-age meets with from their acquaintance, and on this account also they lament old-age, which is to them the cause of so many ills. But these men, Socrates, seem not to me to

blame the real cause; for if this were the cause, I likewise should have suffered the same things on account of old-age, and all others, even as many as have come to these years: whereas I have met with several who are not thus affected, and particularly was once with Sophocles the poet when he was asked by one, How, Sophocles, are you affected towards the pleasures of love; are you still able to enjoy them? Softly, friend, most gladly, indeed, have I escaped from these pleasures, as from some furious and savage master. He seemed to me to speak well at that time, and no less so now, for certainly there is in old age a deal of peace and freedom from such things; for when the appetites cease to be vehement, and are become easy, what Sophocles said certainly happens: we are delivered from very many, and those, too, furious masters. But with relation to these things, and those likewise respecting our acquaintance, there is one and the same cause, which is not old-age, Socrates, but manners; for, if indeed they are discreet and moderate, even old-age is but moderately burdensome: if not, both old-age, Socrates, and youth are grievous to such.

Socrates/ Being delighted to hear him say these things, and wanting him to discourse further, I urged him and said; I fancy, Cephalus, the generality will not agree with you in those things, but will imagine that you bear old-age easily, not from manners, but from possessing much wealth; for the rich, say they, have many consolations.

Cephalus/ You say true, they do not agree with me; and there is something in what they say, but, however, not so much as they imagine.. But the saying of Themistocles was just; who, when the Seriphian reviled him, and said that he was honored not on his own account,' but on that of his country, replied that neither would himself have been renowned had he been a Seriphian, nor would he, had he been an Athenian. The same saying is justly applicable to

those who are not rich and who bear old-age with uneasiness: that neither would the worthy man, were he poor, bear old-age quite easily, nor would he who is unworthy, though enriched, ever be agreeable to himself.

Socrates/ But whether, Cephalus, was the greater part of what you possess left you, or have you acquired it?

Cephalus/ Somewhat, Socrates, I have acquired. As to money-getting, I am in a medium between my grandfather and my father: for my grandfather of the same name with me, who was left almost as much substance as I possess at present, made it many times as much again; but my father Lysanias made it yet less than it is now. I am satisfied if I leave my sons here no less, but some little more, than I received.

Socrates/ I asked you, for this reason, because you seem to me to love riches moderately, and those generally do so who have not acquired them: but those who have acquired them are doubly fond of them; for as poets love their own poems, and as parents love their children, in the same manner those who have enriched themselves value their riches as a work of their own, as well as for the utilities they afford; for which riches are valued by others.

Cephalus/ You say true.

Socrates/ It is entirely so. But further, tell me this: what do you imagine is the greatest good derived from the possession of much substance?

Cephalus/ What, probably, I shall not persuade the generality of. For, be assured, Socrates, that after a man begins to think he is soon to die, he feels a fear and concern about things which before gave him no uneasiness: for those stories concerning a future state, which represent that the man who has done injustice here must there be punished, though formerly ridiculed, do then trouble his soul with

apprehensions that they may be true; and the man, either through the infirmity of old-age, or as being now more near those things, views them more attentively. He becomes therefore full of suspicion and dread, and considers and reviews whether he has in anything injured anyone. He then who finds in his life a great deal of iniquity, and is wakened from sleep as children by repeated calls, is afraid and lives in miserable hope. But the man who is not conscious of any iniquity;

> Still pleasing hope, sweet nourisher of age!
> Attends, —

as Pindar says. This, Socrates, he has beautifully expressed: that whoever lives a life of justice and holiness;

> Sweet hope, the nourisher of age, his heart
> Delighting, with him lives; which most of all
> Governs the many veering thoughts of man.

So that he says well and very admirably; wherefore, for this purpose I deem the possession of riches to be chiefly valuable, not to every man, but to the man of worth: for the possession of riches contributes considerably to free us from being tempted to cheat or deceive, and from being obliged to depart thither in a terror, when either indebted in sacrifices to God, or in money to man. It has many other advantages besides; but, for my part, Socrates, I deem riches to be most advantageous, to a man of understanding, chiefly in this respect.

Socrates/ You speak most handsomely, Cephalus. But with respect to this very thing, Justice, whether shall we call it truth, simply, and the restoring of what one has received from another? Or shall we say that the very same things may sometimes be done justly and sometimes unjustly? My meaning is this: Everyone would somehow own, that if a man should receive arms from his friend who was of a sound

mind, it would not be proper to restore such things if he should demand them when mad; nor would the restorer be just: as little would he who, to a man in such a condition, should willingly tell all the truth.

Cephalus/ You say right.

Socrates/ This, then, to speak the truth and restore what one has received, is not the definition of justice?

Polemarchus/ It is not, Socrates, if at least we may give any credit to Simonides.

Cephalus/ However that be, I give up, this conversation to you; for I must now go to take care of the sacred rites.

Socrates/ Is not Polemarchus, your heir?

Cephalus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Smiling, he went off to the sacred rites. —

Tell me, then, you who are heir in the conversation, what is it which, according to you, Simonides says so well concerning justice?

Polemarchus/ That to give everyone his due is just; in saying this, he seems to me to say well.

Socrates/ It is, indeed, not easy to disbelieve Simonides, for he is a wise and divine man. But what his meaning may be in this, you, Polemarchus, probably know it, but I do not; for it is plain he does not mean what we were saying just now: that when one deposits with another anything, it is to be given back to him when he asks for it again in his madness, yet what has been deposited is in some respect, at least, due. Is it not?

Polemarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ But yet it is not at all, by any means, then, to be restored when anyone asks for it in his madness?

Polemarchus/ It is not.

Socrates/ Simonides then, as it should seem, says something different from this, that to deliver up what is due is just?

Polemarchus/ Something different, truly; for he thinks that friends ought to do their friends some good, but no ill..

Socrates/ I understand. He who restores gold deposited with him, if to restore and receive it be hurtful, and the restorer and receiver be friends, does not give what is due. Is not this what you allege Simonides says?

Polemarchus/ Surely.

Socrates/ But what? are we to give our enemies, too, what may chance to be due to them?

Polemarchus/ By all means, —what is due to them; and from an enemy to an enemy there is due, I imagine, what is fitting, that is, some evil.

Socrates/ Simonides, then, as it should seem, expressed what is just enigmatically, and after the manner of the poets; for he well understood, as it appears, that this was just, to give everyone what was fitting for him, and this he called his due. But what, is your opinion? Truly, if anyone should ask him thus: Simonides, what is the art which, dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due, is called Medicine? What would he answer us, do you think?

Polemarchus/ That art, surely, which dispenses drugs and prescribes regimen of meats and drinks to bodies.

Socrates/ And what is the art which, dispensing to certain things something fitting and due, is called Cookery?

Polemarchus/ The art which gives seasonings to victuals.

Socrates/ Be it so. What then is that art which, dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due, may be called Justice?

Polemarchus/ If we ought to be any way directed, Socrates, by what is said above, the art which dispenses good offices to friends and injuries to enemies.

Socrates/ To do good, then, to friends, and ill to enemies, he calls justice?

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Who, then, is most able to do good to his friends when they are diseased, and ill to his enemies, with respect to sickness and health?

Polemarchus/ The Physician.

Socrates/ And who, when they fail, with respect to the danger of the sea?

Polemarchus/ The Pilot.

Socrates/ But as to the just man, in what business, and with respect to what action, is he most able to serve his friends and to harm his enemies?

Polemarchus/ It seems to me, in fighting in alliance with the one, and against the other.

Socrates/ Be it so. But surely the physician is useless, Polemarchus, to those, at least, who are not sick?

Polemarchus/ It is true.

Socrates/ And the pilot to those who do not fail?

Polemarchus/ He is.

Socrates/ And is the just man, in like manner, useless to those who are not at war?

Polemarchus/ I can by no means think that.

Socrates/ Justice, then, is useful likewise in time of peace.

Polemarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ And so is agriculture, is it not?

Polemarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Towards the possession of grain?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not shoe-making likewise useful?

Polemarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Towards the possession of shoes, you will say, I imagine.

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what, now? For the use or possession of what would you say that justice were useful in time of peace?

Polemarchus/ For co-partnerships, Socrates.

Socrates/ You call co-partnerships joint companies, or what else?

Polemarchus/ Joint companies, certainly.

Socrates/ Whether, then, is the just man or the dice-player a good •and useful co-partner for playing at dice.

Polemarchus/ The dice-player.

Socrates/ But, in the laying of tiles or stones, is the just man a more useful and a better partner than the mason?

Polemarchus/ By no means.

Socrates/ In what joint company, now, is the just man a better copartner than the harper, as the harper is better than the just man for touching the strings of a harp?

Polemarchus/ In a partnership about money, as I imagine.

Socrates/ And yet it is likely, Polemarchus, that with regard to the making use of money, when it is necessary jointly to buy or sell a horse, the jockey, as I imagine, is then the better co-partner. Is he not?

Polemarchus/ He would appear so.

Socrates/ And with respect to a ship, the shipwright or shipmaster?

Polemarchus/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ When then is it, with respect to the joint application of money, that the just man is more useful than others?

Polemarchus/ When it is to be deposited and be safe, Socrates!

Socrates/ Do you not mean, when there is no need to use it, but to let it lye?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ When, then, money is useless, justice is then useful with regard to it?

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ And when a pruning-hook is to be kept, justice is useful both for a community and for a particular person; but when it is to be used, the art of vine-dressing is useful.

Polemarchus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And you will say, that when a buckler, a harp, is to be kept, and not to be used, then justice is useful; but when they are to be used, then the military and the musical art.

Polemarchus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And with reference to all other things, when they are to be used, justice is useless, but when they are not to be used, it is useful.

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Justice, then, my friend, can be no very important matter, if it is useful only in respect of things which are not to be used. But let us consider this matter. Is not he who is the most dexterous at striking, whether in battle or in boxing, the same likewise in defending himself?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not he who is dexterous in warding off and shunning a distemper most dexterous too in bringing it on?

Polemarchus/ So I imagine.

Socrates/ And he too the best guardian of a camp who can steal the councils and the other operations of the enemy?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Of whatever, then, anyone is a good guardian, of that likewise he is a dexterous thief.

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, the just man be dexterous in guarding money, he is dexterous likewise in stealing.

Polemarchus/ So it would appear, from this reasoning.

Socrates/ The just man, then, has appeared to be a sort of thief; and you seem to have learned this from Homer, for he admires Autolycus, the grandfather of Ulysses by his mother, and says that he was distinguished beyond all men for thefts and oaths. It seems then, according to you, and according to Homer and Simonides, that justice is a sort of thieving, for the profit, indeed, of friends and for the hurt of enemies. Did not you say so?

Polemarchus/ No, by no means—nor, indeed, do I know any longer what I said; yet I still think that justice profits friends and hurts enemies.

Socrates/ But whether do you pronounce such to be friends as seem to be honest? or such as are so, though they do not seem; and in the same way as to enemies?

Polemarchus/ It is reasonable, to love those whom a man deems to be honest, and to hate those whom he deems to be wicked.

Socrates/ But do not men mistake in this, so as that many who are not honest appear so to them, and many contrary wise?

Polemarchus/ They do mistake.

Socrates/ To such, then, the good are enemies and the bad are friends.

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But, however, it is then just for them to profit the bad and to hurt the good.

Polemarchus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But the good are likewise just, and such as do no ill.

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ But, according to your speech, it is just to do ill to those who do no ill.

Polemarchus/ By no means, Socrates; for the speech seems to be wicked.

Socrates/ It is just, then, to hurt the unjust and to profit the just.

Polemarchus/ This speech appears more handsome than the other.

Socrates/ Then it will happen, Polemarchus, to many, to as many indeed of mankind as have misjudged, that it shall be just to hurt their friends who are really bad, and to profit their enemies, who are really good; and so we shall say the very reverse of what we affirmed Simonides said.

Polemarchus/ It does, indeed, happen so. But let us define again, for we seem not to have rightly defined a friend and an enemy.

Socrates/ How were they defined, Polemarchus?

Polemarchus/ That he who seems honest is a friend.

Socrates/ But how shall we now define?

Polemarchus/ That he who seems, and likewise is honest, is a friend; but he who seems honest, yet is not, seems, yet is not a friend. And the distinction about an enemy to be the very same.

Socrates/ The good man, according to this speech, will, as it seems, be the friend, and the wicked man the enemy.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you now require us to describe what is just, as we did before, when we said it was just to do good to a friend and ill to an enemy? Or shall we add to the definition and now say that it is just to do good to a friend when he is good, and hurt to an enemy when he is ill?

Polemarchus/ This last, seems to me to be perfectly well expressed.

Socrates/ Is it, then, the part of a just man to hurt any man?

Polemarchus/ By all means, he ought to hurt the wicked and his enemies.

Socrates/ But do' horses, when they are hurt, become better or worse?

Polemarchus/ Worse.

Socrates/ Whether in the virtue of dogs or of horses?

Polemarchus/ In that of horses.

Socrates/ And do not dogs, when they are hurt, become worse in the virtue of dogs, and not of horses?

Polemarchus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And shall we not in like manner, my friend, say that men, when they are hurt, become worse in the virtue of a man?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But is not justice the virtue of a man?

Polemarchus/ Of necessity this likewise.

Socrates/ Of necessity then, friend, those men who are hurt must become more unjust.

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But can musicians, by music, make men unmusical?

Polemarchus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Or horsemen, by horsemanship, make men unskilled in horsemanship?

Polemarchus/ It cannot be.

Socrates/ Or can the just, by justice, make men unjust; or in general can the good, by virtue, make men wicked?

Polemarchus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ For it is not, as I imagine, the effect of heat to make cold, but of its contrary.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor is it the effect of drought to make moist, but its contrary.

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Neither is it the part of a good man to hurt, but of his contrary.

Polemarchus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But the just is good?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Neither, then, is it the part of a just man, Polemarchus, to hurt either friend, or any other, but the part of his contrary, the unjust man.

Polemarchus/ In all respects, you seem to me, Socrates, to say true.

Socrates/ If, then, anyone says that it is just to give everyone his due, and thinks this with himself, that hurt is due to enemies from a just man, and profit to his friend, he was not wise who said so, for he spoke not the truth. For it has nowhere appeared to us that any just man hurts anyone.

Polemarchus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Let us jointly contend, then, if anyone shall say that Simonides, a Bias, a Pittacus, said so, or any other of those wise and happy men.

Polemarchus/ I am ready, to join in the fight.

Socrates/ But do you know, whose saying I fancy it is, that it is just to profit friends and hurt enemies?

Polemarchus/ Whose?

Socrates/ I fancy it is the saying of Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenius the Theban, or some other rich man who thought himself able to do a great deal.

Polemarchus/ You say most true.

Socrates/ Be it so. But as this has not appeared to be justice, nor just, what else may one say that it is?

Thrasymachus frequently, during our reasoning, rushed in the midst to lay hold of the discourse, but was hindered by those who sate by, who wanted to hear the conversation to an end. But when we paused, and I had said these things, he was no longer quiet, but, collecting himself, as a wild beast he came upon us, as if he would have torn us in pieces. Both Polemarchus and I, being frightened, were thrown into the utmost consternation; but he, roaring out in the midst;

Thrasymachus/ What trifling, Socrates, is this, which long ago possessed you? and why do you thus play the fool together, yielding mutually to one another? But if you truly want to know what is just, ask not questions only and value

yourself in confuting when anyone answers you anything (knowing this, that it is easier to ask than to answer), but answer yourself, and tell what it is you call just. And you are not to tell me that it is what is fit, nor what is due, nor what is profitable, nor what is gainful, nor what is advantageous; but what you mean, tell plainly and accurately; for I will not allow it, if you speak such trifles as these.

Socrates/ When I heard this, I was astonished, and looking at him, was frightened; and I should have become speechless, I imagine, if I had not perceived him before he perceived me. But I had observed him first, when he began to grow fierce at our reasoning, so that I was now able to answer him, and said, trembling: Thrasymachus, be not hard on us, for if we mistake in our inquiries, Polemarchus and I, be well assured that we mistake unwittingly: For think not that, in searching for gold, we would never wittingly yield to one another in the search, and mar the finding it; but that, searching for justice, an affair far more valuable than a great deal of gold, we should yet foolishly yield to each other, and not labor, friend, with the utmost ardor that we may discover what it really is. But I am afraid we are not able to discover it. It is more reasonable, then, that we be pitied than be used hardly by you who are men of ability!

Having heard this, he laughed aloud in a very coarse manner, and said:

Thrasymachus/ By Hercules! this is Socrates's wonted irony. This I both knew and foretold to these here, that you never incline to answer if anyone ask you anything.

Socrates/ You are a wise man, therefore, Thrasymachus; for you knew well that if you asked anyone, How many is twelve, and, when you ask should tell him before: You are not, friend, to tell me that twelve is twice six, nor that it is three times four, nor that it is four times three, for I will not

admit it if you trifle in such a manner—I fancy it is plain to you that no man would answer one asking in such a way. But if he should say to you: Wonderful Thrasymachus, how do you mean? May I answer in none of those ways you have told me—not even though the real and true answer happen to be one of them? but I am to say something else than the truth? or how is it you mean? What would you say to him in answer to these things?

Thrasymachus/ If they were alike, I should give an answer; but how are they alike?

Socrates/ Nothing hinders it. But though they were not alike, but should appear so to him who was asked, would he the less readily answer what appeared to him, whether we forbad him or not?

Thrasymachus/ And will you do so now? Will you say in answer some of these things which I forbid you to say?

Socrates/ I should not wonder if I did, if it should appear so to me on inquiry.

Thrasymachus/ What then, if I shall show you another and a better answer, besides all these about justice; what will you deserve to suffer?

Socrates/ What else, but what is proper for the ignorant to suffer; and it is proper for them to learn somewhere from a wise man. I shall therefore deserve to suffer this.

Thrasymachus/ You are pleasant now, but together with the learning, do you pay money likewise.

Socrates/ Shall it not be after I have got it?

Glaucon/ There is for you. so, as to money, Thrasymachus, say on, for all of us will advance for Socrates.

Thrasymachus/ I truly imagine so, that Socrates may go on in his wonted manner—not answer himself, but when another answers, he may take up the discourse and confute.

Socrates/ How, most excellent Thrasymachus, can one answer? In the first place, when he neither knows, nor says he knows, and then, if he have any opinion about these matters, he is forbid by no mean man to advance any of his opinions. But it is more reasonable that you speak, as you say you know, and can tell us. Do not decline, then, but oblige me in answering, and do not grudge to instruct Glauco here and the rest of the company.

When I had said this, both Glauco and the rest of the company in treated him not to decline it. And Thrasymachus appeared plainly desirous to speak, in order to gain applause, reckoning he had a very fine answer to make, yet pretended to be earnest that I should be the answerer; but at last he agreed, and then:

Thrasymachus/ This, is the wisdom of Socrates: unwilling himself to teach, he goes about learning from others, and gives no thanks for it.

Socrates/ That indeed I learn from others, Thrasymachus, is true; but in saying that I do not give thanks for it you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able; and I am only able to commend them, for money I have not. And how readily I do this, when anyone appears to me to speak well, you shall perfectly know this moment, when you make an answer: for I imagine you are to speak well.

Thrasymachus/ Hear, then, for I say that what is just is nothing else but the advantage of the more powerful. But why do not you commend? You are unwilling.

Socrates/ Let me learn first, what you say, for as yet I do not understand it. The advantage of the more powerful, you say, is what is just. What at all is this you say now, Thrasymachus? for you certainly do not mean such a thing as this: If Polydamus, the wrestler, be more powerful than we, and if beef be beneficial for his body, that this food is

likewise both just and advantageous for us who are weaker than he.

Thrasymachus/ You are most impudent, Socrates, and lay hold of my speech on that side where you may do it the greatest hurt.

Socrates/ By no means, most excellent Thrasymachus: but tell more plainly what is your meaning.

Thrasymachus/ Do not you then know, that with reference to states, some are tyrannical, others democratical, and others aristocratical?

Socrates/ Why are they not?

Thrasymachus/ And is not the governing part in each state the more powerful?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Thrasymachus/ And every government makes laws for its own advantage: a democracy, democratic laws; a tyranny, tyrannic; and others the same way. And when they have made them, they give out that to be just for the governed which is advantageous for themselves; and they punish the transgressor of this as one acting contrary both to law and justice. This, then, most excellent Socrates, is what I say, that, in all states, what is just and what is advantageous for the established government are the same; it has the power. So that it appears to him who reasons rightly that, in all cases, what is the advantage of the more powerful, the same is just.

Socrates/ Now I have learned, what you say; but whether it be true or not, I shall endeavor to learn. What is advantageous, then, Thrasymachus, you yourself have affirmed to be likewise just, though you forbid me to give this answer; but, indeed, you have added to it that of the more powerful.

Thrasymachus/ Probably, but a small addition.

Socrates/ It is not yet manifest whether it is small or great; but it is manifest that this is to be considered, whether you speak, the truth, since I too acknowledge that what is just is somewhat that is advantageous: but you add to it, and say that it is that of the more powerful. This I do not know, but it is to be considered.

Thrasymachus/ Consider then.

Socrates/ That, shall be done. And, tell me, do not you say that it is just to obey governors?

Thrasymachus/ I say so.

Socrates/ Whether are the governors in the several states infallible, or are they capable of erring?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly, they are liable to err.

Socrates/ Do they not, then, when they attempt to make laws, make some of them right, and some of them not right?

Thrasymachus/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ To make them right, is it not to make them advantageous for themselves; and to make them not right, disadvantageous? Or what is it you mean?

Thrasymachus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And what they enact is to be observed by the governed, and this is what is just?

Thrasymachus/ Why not?

Socrates/ It is, then, according to your reasoning, not only just to do what is advantageous for the more powerful, but also to do the contrary, what is not advantageous.

Thrasymachus/ What do you say,?

Socrates/ The same, I imagine, that you say yourself. But let us consider better. Have we not acknowledged that governors, in enjoining the governed to do certain things, may sometimes mistake what is best for themselves; and

that what the governors enjoin is just for the governed to do? Have not these things been acknowledged?

Thrasymachus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Think, also, then, that you have acknowledged that it is just to do what is disadvantageous to governors and the more powerful, since governors unwillingly enjoin what is ill for themselves, and you say that it is just for the others to do what these enjoin. Must it not then, most wise Thrasymachus, necessarily happen that, by this means, it may be just to do the contrary of what you say? For that which is the disadvantage of the more powerful is sometimes enjoined the inferiors to do?

Polemarchus/ Yes, indeed, Socrates; these things are most manifest.

Clitophon/ Yes, if you bear him witness.

Polemarchus/ What need, of a witness? For Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that governors do indeed sometimes enjoin what is ill for themselves, but that it is just for the governed to do these things.

Clitophon/ For it has, Polemarchus, been established by Thrasymachus to be just to do what is enjoined by the governors.

Polemarchus/ And he has likewise, Clitipho, established that to be just which is the advantage of the more powerful. And having established both these things, he has acknowledged likewise that the more powerful sometimes enjoin the inferiors and governed to do what is disadvantageous for themselves; and, from these concessions, the advantage of the more powerful can no more be just than the disadvantage.

Clitophon/ But, he said the advantage of the more powerful—that is, what the more powerful judged to be

advantageous to himself—that this was to be done by the inferior; and this he established as just.

Polemarchus/ But, it was not said so.

Socrates/ There is no difference, Polemarchus. But if Thrasymachus says so now, we shall allow him to do it. And tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you meant to> say was just: the advantage of the more powerful, such as appeared so to the more powerful, whether it is advantageous or is not? Shall we say that you spoke thus?

Thrasymachus/ By no means: for do you imagine I call him the more powerful who misjudges at the time he misjudges?

Socrates/ I imagined, you said this, when you acknowledged that rulers were not infallible, but that in some things they even erred.

Thrasymachus/ You are a sycophant, in reasoning, Socrates: for do you now call him who mistakes about the management of the sick a physician, as to that very thing in which he mistakes? or him who mistakes in reasoning a reasoner, when he errs, and with reference to that very error? But, I imagine, we say in common language that the physician erred, that the reasoner erred, and the grammarian: thus, however, I imagine that each of these, as far as he is what we call him, errs not at any time. So that, according to accurate discourse (since you discourse accurately) none of the artists errs: for he who errs, errs by departing from science, and in this he is no artist; so that no artist, or wise man, or governor, errs, in so far as he is a governor. Yet anyone may say the physician erred, the governor erred. Imagine, then, it was in this way I now answered you. But the most accurate answer is this: that the governor, in as far as he is governor, errs not; and as he does not err, he enacts that which is left for himself, and this

is to be observed by the governed. So that what I said from the beginning, I maintain, is just: to do what is the advantage of the more powerful.

Socrates/ Be it so, Thrasymachus. Seem I to act the sycophant?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly, indeed.

Socrates/ For you imagine that I spoke as I did insidiously, and to abuse you?

Thrasymachus/ I know it well, but you shall gain nothing by it; for whether you abuse me in a concealed manner, or otherwise, you shall not be able to overcome me by your reasoning.

Socrates/ I shall not attempt it, happy Thrasymachus! But, that nothing of this kind may happen to us again, define whether you speak of a governor and the more powerful according to common talk, or according to accurate discourse, as you now said, whose advantage, as he is the more powerful, it shall be just for the inferior to observe.

Thrasymachus/ I speak of him, who, in the most accurate discourse, is governor. For this, now, abuse me and act the sycophant, if you are able: I do not shun you. But you cannot do it.

Socrates/ Do you imagine me, to be so mad as to attempt to shave a lion and act the sycophant with Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ You have now, attempted it, but with no effect.

Socrates/ Enough, of this. But tell me, with reference to him who, accurately speaking, is a physician, whom you now mentioned, whether is he a gainer of money, or one who takes care of the sick? and speak of him who is really a physician.

Thrasymachus/ One who takes care, of the sick.

Socrates/ But what of the pilot, who is a pilot truly? Whether is he the governor of the sailors, or a sailor?

Thrasymachus/ The governor of the sailors.

Socrates/ That, I imagine, is not to be minded, that he sails in the ship, nor that he is called a sailor; for it is not for his sailing that he is called pilot, but for his art and his governing the sailors.

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ Is there not, then, something advantageous to each of these?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is it not for this purpose, that art has had its rise, to seek out and afford to each thing its advantage?

Thrasymachus/ For this purpose.

Socrates/ Is there, now, anything else advantageous to each of the arts but to be the most perfect possible?

Thrasymachus/ How ask you this?

Socrates/ As if you asked me, whether it sufficed the body to be body, or if it stood in need of anything? I would say that it stood in need of something else. For this reason is the medicinal art invented, because the body is infirm, and is not sufficient for itself in such a state. In order therefore to afford it things for its advantage, for this purpose art has been provided. Do I seem to you, to say right or not in speaking in this manner?

Thrasymachus/ Right.

Socrates/ But what now? This medicinal art itself, or any other, is it imperfect so long as it is wanting in a certain virtue—as the eyes when they want seeing, and the ears hearing; and, for these reasons, have they need of a certain art to perceive and afford them what is advantageous for these purposes? And is there, still, in art itself some

imperfection; and does every art stand in need of another art to perceive what is advantageous to it, and this stand in need of another in like manner, and so on to infinity? Or shall each art perceive what is advantageous to itself, and stand in need neither of itself nor of another to perceive what is for its advantage, with reference to its own imperfection. For there is no imperfection nor error in any art, nor does it belong to it to seek what is advantageous to anything but to that of which it is the art; but it is, itself, infallible, pure, being in the right, so long as each art is an accurate whole, whatever it is. And consider now, according to that accurate discourse, whether it be thus or otherwise.

Thrasymachus/ Thus, it appears.

Socrates/ The medicinal art, then, does not consider what is advantageous to the medicinal art, but to the body.

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor the art of managing horses what is advantageous for that art, but what is advantageous for horses. Nor does any other art consider what is advantageous for itself (for it has no need), but what is advantageous for that of which it is the art?

Thrasymachus/ So, it appears.

Socrates/ But, Thrasymachus, the arts rule and govern that of which they are the arts.

He yielded this, but with great difficulty.

No science, then, considers the advantage of the more powerful, nor enjoins it, but that of the inferior and of what is governed.

He consented to these things at last, though he attempted to contend about them, but afterwards he consented. Why, no physician, so far as he is a physician, considers what is advantageous for the physician, nor enjoins it, but what is advantageous for the sick; for it has been agreed that the

accurate physician is one who takes care of sick bodies, and not an amasser of wealth. Has it not been agreed?

He assented.

And likewise that the accurate pilot is the governor of the sailors, and not a sailor?

Thrasymachus/ It has been agreed.

Socrates/ Such a pilot, then, and governor will not consider and enjoin what is the advantage of the pilot, but what is advantageous to the sailor and the governed.

He consented, with difficulty.

Nor yet, Thrasymachus, does any other in any government, as far as he is a governor, consider or enjoin his own advantage, but that of the governed and of those to whom he ministers; and with an eye to this, and to what is advantageous and suitable to this, he both says what he says, and does what he does.

When we were at this part of the discourse, and it was evident to all the definition of what was just stood now on the contrary side, Thrasymachus, instead of making answer:

Thrasymachus/ Tell me, Socrates, have you a nurse?

Socrates/ What: ought you not rather to answer than ask such things?

Thrasymachus/ Because, she neglects you when your nose is stuffed, and does not wipe it when it needs it, you who understand neither what is meant by sheep nor by shepherd.

Socrates/ For what now is all this?

Thrasymachus/ Because you think that shepherds and neatherds ought to consider the good of the sheep or oxen, to fatten them and to minister to them, having in their eye something other than their master's good and their own. And you fancy that those who govern in cities, those who govern

truly, are somehow otherwise affected towards the governed than one is towards sheep; and that they are attentive, day and night, to somewhat else than this, how they shall be gainers themselves. And so far are you from the notion of just and of justice, and of unjust and injustice, that you do not know that both justice and just are, in reality, a foreign good, the advantage of the more powerful and of the governor, but, properly, the hurt of the subject and inferior; and injustice is the contrary. And justice governs such as are truly simple and just; and the governed do what is for the governor's advantage, he being more powerful, and ministering to him, promote his happiness, but by no means their own. You must thus consider it, most simple Socrates, that, on all occasions, the just man gets less than the unjust. First, in copartnerships with one another, where the one joins in company with the other, you never can find, on the dissolving of the company, the just man gets more than the unjust, but less. Then, in civil affairs, where there are taxes to be paid from equal substance, the just man pays more, the other less; but when there is anything to be gained, the one gains nothing, the other a' great deal, for when each of them governs in any public magistracy, this, if no other loss, befalls the just man, that his domestic affairs, at least, are in a worse situation through his neglect, and that he gains nothing from the public, because he is just; add to this, that he comes to be hated by his domestics and acquaintance, when at no time he will serve them beyond what is just. But all these things are quite otherwise with the unjust, such an one, I mean, as I now mentioned, one who has it greatly in his power to become rich. Consider him, then, if you would judge, how much more it is for his private advantage to be unjust than just, and you will most easily understand it if you come to the most finished injustice, such as renders the unjust man most happy, but the injured, and those who are

unwilling to do injustice, most wretched; and that is tyranny, which takes away the goods of others, both by secret fraud and by open violence, both things sacred and holy, both private and public, and these not by degrees, but all at once. In all particular cases of such crimes, when one committing injustice is not concealed, he is punished, and suffers the greatest ignominy; for according to the several kinds of the wickedness they commit, they are called sacrilegious, robbers, housebreakers, pilferers, thieves. But when anyone, besides these thefts of the substance of his citizens, shall steal and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of those ugly names he is called happy and blest, not by his citizens alone, but likewise by others, as many as are informed that he has committed the most consummate wickedness. For such as revile wickedness revile it not because they are afraid of doing, but because they are afraid of suffering, unjust things. And thus, Socrates, injustice, when in sufficient measure, is both more powerful, more free, and has more absolute command than justice: and (as I said at the beginning) the advantage of the more powerful is justice; but injustice is the profit and advantage of one's self.

Socrates/ Thrasymachus, having said these things, inclined to go away, like the bath-keeper after he had poured into our ears this rapid and long discourse. These, however, who were present would not suffer him, but forced him to stay and give account of what he had said I too, myself, earnestly entreated him, and said: Divine Thrasymachus, after throwing in upon us so strange a discourse, do you intend to go away before you teach us sufficiently, or learn yourself, whether the case be as you say or otherwise? Do you imagine you attempt to determine a small matter, and not the guide of life by which each of us, being conducted, may lead the most happy life?

Thrasymachus/ But I imagine, that this is otherwise.

Socrates/ You seem, truly, to care nothing for us, nor to be any way concerned whether we shall live well or ill, whilst we are ignorant of what you say you know. But, good Thrasymachus, be readily disposed to show it also to us: nor will the favor be ill placed, whatever you shall bestow on so many as are of us. And I, for my own part, tell you that I am not persuaded, nor do I think that injustice is more profitable than justice, not although it should be permitted to exert itself, and be no way hindered from doing whatever it should incline. But, good Thrasymachus, let him be unjust, let him be able to do unjustly, either in secret or by force, yet will you not persuade me at least that injustice is more profitable than justice; and probably some other of us here is of the same mind, and I not single. Convince us, then, blest Thrasymachus! that we imagine wrong when we value justice more than injustice.

Thrasymachus/ But how, shall I convince you? For if I have not convinced you by what I have said already, what shall I further do for you? Shall I enter into your soul and put my reasoning within you?

Socrates/ God forbid! you shall not do that. But, first of all, whatever you have said, abide by it or, if you do change, change openly and do not deceive us. For now you see, Thrasymachus (for let us still consider what is said above), that when you first defined the true physician, you did not afterwards think it needful that the true shepherd should, strictly, upon the like principles, keep his flock; but you fancy, that as a shepherd, he may feed his flock, not regarding what is best for the sheep, but as some glutton who is going to feast on them at some entertainment, or yet to dispose of them as a merchant, and not a shepherd. But the shepherd-art has certainly no other care but of that for which it is ordained, to afford it what is best: for its own

affairs are already sufficiently provided for, so as to be in the very best state while it needs nothing of the shepherd-art. In the same manner I, at least, imagined there was a necessity for agreeing with us in this, that every government, in as far as it is government, considers what is best for nothing else but for the governed and those under its charge, both in political and private government. But do you imagine that governors in cities, such as are truly governors, govern willingly?

Thrasymachus/ Truly, as for that, I not only imagine it, but am quite certain.

Socrates/ Why now, Thrasymachus, do you not perceive, as to all other governments, that no one undertakes them willingly, but they ask a reward, as the profit arising from governing is not to be to themselves, but to the governed? Or tell me this now: Do not we say that every particular art is in this distinct, in having a distinct power? And now, blest Thrasymachus! answer not differently from your sentiments, that we may make some progress.

Thrasymachus/ In this, it is distinct.

Socrates/ And does not each of them afford us a certain distinct advantage, and not a common one? as the medicinal affords health, the pilot-art preservation in sailing, and the others in like manner.

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And does not the mercenary art afford a reward, for this is its power? Or do you call both the medicinal art and the pilot art one and the same? Or, rather, if you will define them accurately, as you proposed, though one in piloting recover his health, because sailing agrees with him, you will not the more, on this account, call it the medicinal art?

Thrasymachus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Nor will you, I imagine, call the mercenary art the medicinal, though one, in gaining a reward, recover his health.

Thrasymachus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ What now? Will you call the medicinal the mercenary art, if one, in performing a cure, gains a reward?

Thrasymachus/ No.

Socrates/ Have we not acknowledged, then, that there is a distinct advantage of every art?

Thrasymachus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ What is that advantage, then, with which all artists in common are advantaged? It is plain it must be in using something common to all that they are advantaged by it.

Thrasymachus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Yet we say that artists are profited in receiving a reward arising to them from the increase of a lucrative art.

He agreed, with difficulty.

Has not, then, everyone this advantage in his art, the receiving a reward. Yet, if we are to consider accurately, the medicinal art produces health, and the mercenary art a reward, masonry a house, and the mercenary art accompanying it a reward; and all the others in like manner—everyone produces its own work, and advantages that for which it was ordained. But if it meet not with a reward, what is the artist advantaged by his art?

Thrasymachus/ It does not appear.

Socrates/ But does he then no service when he works without reward?

Thrasymachus/ I think he does.

Socrates/ Is not this, then, now evident, Thrasymachus, that no art nor government provides what is advantageous

for itself, but as I said, long ago, provides and enjoins what is advantageous for the governed, having in view the profit of the inferior, and not that of the more powerful. And for these reasons, friend Thrasymachus, I likewise said now, that no one is willing to govern, and to undertake to rectify the ills of others, but asks a reward for it; because whoever will perform the art handsomely, never acts what is best for himself, in ruling according to art, but what is best for the governed; and on this account, it seems, a reward must be given to those who shall be willing to govern, either money or honor, or punishment if they will not govern.

Glaucon/ How say you so, Socrates? Two of the rewards I understand; but this punishment you speak of, and here you mention it in place of a reward, I know not.

Socrates/ You know not, then, the reward of the best of men, on account of which the most worthy govern, when they consent to govern. Or, do you not know that to be ambitious and covetous is both deemed a reproach, and really is so?

Glaucon/ I know.

Socrates/ For those reasons, then, good men are not willing to govern, neither for money nor for honor; for they are neither willing to be called mercenary, in openly receiving a reward for governing, nor to be called thieves, in taking clandestinely from those under their government; as little are they willing to govern for honor, for they are not ambitious. Of necessity, then, there must be laid on them a fine, that they may consent to govern; and hence, it seems, it has been accounted dishonorable to enter on government willingly, and not by constraint. And the greatest part of the punishment is to be governed by a naughty person, if one himself is not willing to govern: and the good seem to me to govern from a fear of this, when they do govern; and then

they enter on the government, not as on anything good, or as what they are to reap advantage by, but as on a necessary task, and finding none better than themselves, nor like them to entrust with the government—since it would appear that if there was a city of good men, the contest would be not to be in the government, as at present it is to govern. And hence it would be manifest that he who is indeed the true governor does not aim at his own advantage, but at that of the governed; so that every understanding man would rather choose to be served than to have trouble in serving another. This, therefore, I, for my part, will never yield to Thrasymachus, that justice is the advantage of the more powerful; but this we shall consider afterwards. What Thrasymachus says now seems to me of much more importance, when he says that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. You, then, Glauco, which side do you choose? and which seems to you most agreeable to truth?

Glaucon/ The life of the just, I, for my part, deem to be the more profitable.

Socrates/ Have you heard, how many good things Thrasymachus just now enumerated in the life of the unjust?

Glaucon/ I heard, but am not persuaded.

Socrates/ Are you willing, then, that we should persuade him (if we be able any how to find arguments) that there is no truth in what he says?

Glaucon/ Why not.

Socrates/ If then, pulling on the other side, we advance argument for argument, how many good things there are in being just, and then again, he on the other side, we shall need a third person to compute and estimate what each shall have said on either side, and likewise need some judges to

determine the matter. But if, as now, assenting to one another, we consider these things, we shall be both judges and pleaders ourselves.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Which way, then, do you choose?

Glaucon/ This way.

Socrates/ Come then, Thrasymachus, answer us from the beginning. Do you say that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, indeed, I say so; and the reasons for it I have told.

Socrates/ Come now, do you ever affirm anything of this kind concerning them? Do you call one of them virtue, and the other vice?

Thrasymachus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Is not then justice virtue, and injustice vice?

Thrasymachus/ Very likely, most pleasant Socrates, after I say that injustice is profitable, but justice is not.

Socrates/ What then?

Thrasymachus/ The contrary.

Socrates/ Is it justice you call vice?

Thrasymachus/ No, but I call it altogether genuine simplicity.

Socrates/ Do you, then, call injustice cunning?

Thrasymachus/ No, but I call it sagacity.

Socrates/ Do the unjust seem to you, Thrasymachus, to be both prudent and good?

Thrasymachus/ Such, at least, as are able to do injustice in perfection; such as are able to subject to themselves states and nations. But you probably imagine I speak of those who cut purses: even such things as these, are

profitable if concealed; but such only as I now mentioned are of any worth.

Socrates/ I understand, what you want to say: but this I have wondered at, that you should deem injustice to be a part of virtue and of wisdom, and justice among their contraries.

Thrasymachus/ But I do deem it altogether so.

Socrates/ Your meaning, is now more determined, friend, and it is no longer easy for one to find what to say against it: for if, when you had set forth injustice as profitable, you had still allowed it to be vice, or ugly, as some others do, we should have had something to say, speaking according to the received opinions; but now it is plain you will call it beautiful and powerful, and all those other things you will attribute to it which we attribute to the just man, since you have dared to class it with virtue and wisdom.

Thrasymachus/ You conjecture, most true.

Socrates/ But, however, I must not grudge, to pursue our inquiry, so long as I imagine you speak as you think; for to me you plainly seem now, Thrasymachus, not to be in irony, but to speak what you think concerning the truth.

Thrasymachus/ What is the difference to you, whether I think so or not, if you do not confute my reasoning?

Socrates/ None at all. But endeavor, further, to answer me this likewise: Does a just man seem to you desirous to have more than another just man?

Thrasymachus/ By no means; for otherwise he should not be courteous and simple, as we now supposed him.

Socrates/ But what? will he not desire it in a just action?

Thrasymachus/ Not even in a just action.

Socrates/ But whether would he deem it proper to exceed the unjust man, and count it just, or would he not?

Thrasymachus/ He would, both count it just and deem it proper, but would not be able for it.

Socrates/ That, I do not ask; but whether a just man would neither deem it proper, nor incline to exceed a just man, but would deem it proper to exceed the unjust?

Thrasymachus/ This last, is what he would incline, to do.

Socrates/ But what would the unjust man do? Would he deem it proper to exceed the just man, even in a just action?

Thrasymachus/ Why not? —he who deems it proper to exceed all others.

Socrates/ Will not, then, the unjust man desire to exceed the unjust man likewise, and in an unjust action, and contend that he himself receive more than all others?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Thus we say, then: The just man does not desire to exceed one like himself, but one unlike; but the unjust man desires to exceed both one like and one unlike himself.

Thrasymachus/ You have spoken, perfectly well.

Socrates/ But, the unjust man is both wise and good, but the just man is neither.

Thrasymachus/ This, too, is well said.

Socrates/ Is not then, the unjust man like the wise and the good, and the just man unlike?

Thrasymachus/ Must he not, be like them, being such an one as we have supposed, and he who is otherwise be unlike them?

Socrates/ Excellently. Each of them is indeed such as those he resembles.

Thrasymachus/ What else?

Socrates/ Be it so, Thrasymachus. Call you one musical, and another unmusical?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ Which of the two call you wise, and which unwise?

Thrasymachus/ I call the musical wise, and the unmusical unwise.

Socrates/ Is he not good in as much as he is wise, and ill in as much as he is unwise?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what as to the physician? Is not the case the same?

Thrasymachus/ The same.

Socrates/ Do you imagine then, most excellent Thrasymachus, that any musician, in tuning a harp, wants to exceed, or deems proper to have more skill, than a man who is a musician, with reference to the intention or remission of the strings?

Thrasymachus/ I am not of that opinion.

Socrates/ But what say you of exceeding a man who is no musician?

Thrasymachus/ Of necessity, he will deem it proper to exceed him.

Socrates/ And what as to the physician? In presenting a regimen of meats or drinks, does he want to exceed another physician in medical cases?

Thrasymachus/ No indeed.

Socrates/ But to exceed one who is no physician?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And as to all science and ignorance, does anyone appear to you intelligent who wants to grasp at, or do, or say more than another intelligent in the art, and not to do the same things, in the same affair, which one equally intelligent with himself does?

Thrasymachus/ Probably there is a necessity, it be so.

Socrates/ But what as to him who is ignorant? will not he want to exceed the intelligent and the ignorant both alike?

Thrasymachus/ Probably.

Socrates/ But the intelligent is wise?

Thrasymachus/ I say so.

Socrates/ And the wise is good?

Thrasymachus/ I say so.

Socrates/ But the good and the wise will not want to exceed one like himself, but the unlike and contrary?

Thrasymachus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But the evil and the ignorant wants to exceed both one like himself and his opposite?

Thrasymachus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Why then, Thrasymachus, the unjust desires to exceed both one unlike and one like himself. Do not you say so?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ But the just man will not desire to exceed one like himself, but one unlike?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The just man, then, resembles the wise and the good, and the unjust resembles the evil and the ignorant.

Thrasymachus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But we acknowledged that each of them was such as that which they resembled.

Thrasymachus/ We acknowledged so, indeed.

Socrates/ The just man, then, has appeared to us to be good and wise, and the unjust to be ignorant and ill.

Thrasymachus, now, confessed all these things, not easily, as I now narrate them, but dragged and with

difficulty, and prodigious sweat, it being now summer season; and I then saw, but never before, Thrasymachus blush. After we had acknowledged that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice was vice and ignorance:

Well, let this remain so. But we said, likewise, that injustice was powerful. Do not you remember, Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ I remember. But what you now say does not please me, and I have somewhat to say concerning it, which I well know you would call declaiming, if I should advance it. Either, then, suffer me to say what I incline, or if you incline to ask, do it: and I shall answer you, "be it so," as to old women telling stories, and shall assent and dissent.

Socrates/ By no means, contrary to your own opinion.

Thrasymachus/ Just to please you, since you will not allow me to speak. But do you want anything further?

Socrates/ Nothing, truly; but if you are to do thus, do: I shall ask.

Thrasymachus/ Ask then.

Socrates/ This, then, I ask, which I did just now (that we may in an orderly way see through our discourse): Of what kind is justice, compared with injustice; for it was surely said that injustice was more powerful and stronger than justice.

Thrasymachus/ It was so said, just now.

Socrates/ But if justice be both virtue and wisdom, it will easily, I imagine, appear to be likewise more powerful than injustice, since injustice is ignorance; of this, now, none can be ignorant. But I am willing, for my own part, Thrasymachus, to consider it not simply in this manner, but somehow thus: Might you not say that a state was unjust, and attempted to enslave other states unjustly, and did enslave them, and had many states in slavery under itself?

Thrasymachus/ Why not?: and the best state will chiefly do this, and such as is most completely unjust.

Socrates/ I understand, that this was your speech. But I consider this in it: Whether this state, which becomes more powerful than the other state, shall hold this power without justice, or must it of necessity be with justice?

Thrasymachus/ With justice, if indeed, as you now said, justice be wisdom; but if as I said, with injustice.

Socrates/ I am much delighted, Thrasymachus, that you do not merely assent and dissent, but that you answer so handsomely.

Thrasymachus/ I do it, to gratify you.

Socrates/ That is obliging in you. But gratify me in this, likewise, and tell me, do you imagine that a city, or camp, or robbers, or thieves, or any other community, such as jointly undertakes to do anything unjustly, is able to effectuate anything if they injure one another?

Thrasymachus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But what if they do not injure one another? will they not do better?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For injustice, somehow, Thrasymachus, brings seditions, and hatreds, and fighting among them; but justice affords harmony and friendship. Does it not?

Thrasymachus/ Be it so, that I may not differ from you.

Socrates/ You are very obliging, most excellent Thrasymachus. But tell me this: If this be the work of injustice, wherever it is, to create hatred, will it not then, when happening among free men and slaves, make them hate one another, and grow seditious, and become impotent to do anything together in company?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what in the case of injustice between any two men? Will they not differ and hate, and become enemies to one another, and to just men?

Thrasymachus/ They will become so.

Socrates/ If, now, wonderful Thrasymachus, injustice be in one, whether does it lose its power, or will it no less retain it?

Thrasymachus/ Let it, no less retain it.

Socrates/ Does it not, then, appear to have such a power as this: That, wherever it is, whether in a city, or tribe, or camp, or wherever else, in the first place it renders it unable for action in itself, through seditions and differences, and, besides, makes it an enemy to itself and to every opponent, and to the just? Is it not thus?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when injustice is in one man, it will have, I imagine, all these effects which it is natural for it to produce. In the first place, it will render him unable for action, whilst he is in sedition and disagreement with himself; and, next, as he is an enemy both to himself and to the just. Is it not so?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the Gods, friend, are likewise just.

Thrasymachus/ Let them be so.

Socrates/ The unjust man, then, Thrasymachus, shall be an enemy also to the Gods, and the just man a friend.

Thrasymachus/ Feast yourself, with the reasoning boldly; for I will not oppose you, that I may not render myself odious to these Gods.

Socrates/ Come then, and complete to me this feast, answering as you was doing just now: for the just already appear to be wiser, and better, and more powerful to act; but

the unjust are not able to act anything with one another. And what we said with reference to those who are unjust, that they are ever at any time able strenuously to act jointly together, this we spoke not altogether true, for they would not spare one another being thoroughly unjust; but it is plain that there was in them justice, which made them refrain from injuring one another and those of their party, and by this justice they performed what they did. And they rushed on unjust actions through injustice, being half wicked, since those who are completely wicked and perfectly unjust are likewise perfectly unable to act. This, then, I understand, is the case with reference to these matters, and not as you were establishing at first. But whether the just live better than the unjust, and are more happy (which we proposed to consider afterwards), is now to be considered: and they appear to do so even at present, as I imagine, at least from what has been said. Let us, however, consider it further; for the discourse is not about an accidental thing, but about this: in what manner we ought to live.

Thrasymachus/ Consider, then.

Socrates/ I am considering. And tell me, does there anything seem to you to be the work of a horse?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Would you not call that the work of a horse, or of anyone else, which one does with him only, or in the best manner?

Thrasymachus/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Thus, then: Do you see with anything else but the eyes?

Thrasymachus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ What now, could you hear with anything but the ears?

Thrasymachus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Do we not justly, then, call these things the works of these?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what, could not you with a sword, a knife, and many other things, cut off a branch of a vine?

Thrasymachus/ Why not.

Socrates/ But with nothing, at least, I imagine, so handsomely as with a pruning hook, which is made for that purpose: Shall we not then settle this to be its work?

Thrasymachus/ We shall then settle it.

Socrates/ I imagine, then, you may now understand better what I was asking, when I enquired whether the work of each thing were not that which it alone performs, or performs in the best manner.

Thrasymachus/ I understand you, and this does seem to me to be the work of each thing.

Socrates/ Be it so. And is there not likewise a virtue belonging to everything to which there is a certain work assigned? But let us go over, again, the same things: we say there is a work belonging to the eyes?

Thrasymachus/ There is.

Socrates/ And is there not a virtue also belonging to the eyes?

Thrasymachus/ A virtue also.

Socrates/ Well then, was there any work of the ears?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is there not then a virtue also?

Thrasymachus/ A virtue also.

Socrates/ And what as to all other things? Is it not thus?

Thrasymachus/ It is.

Socrates/ But come, could the eyes ever handsomely perform their work, not having their own proper virtue—but, instead of virtue, having vice?

Thrasymachus/ How could they?, for you probably mean their having blindness instead of sight.

Socrates/ Whatever, be their virtue; for I do not ask this, but whether it be with their own proper virtue they handsomely perform their own proper work, whatever things are performed, and by their vice unhandsomely?

Thrasymachus/ In this at least, you say true.

Socrates/ And will not the ears likewise, when deprived of their virtue, perform their work ill?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do we settle all other things according to the same reasoning?

Thrasymachus/ So I imagine.

Socrates/ Come then, after these things, consider this: Is there belonging to the soul a certain work which with no one other being whatever you can perform? such as this—to care for, to govern, to consult, and all such things; is there any other than the soul to whom we may justly ascribe them and say they properly belong to it?

Thrasymachus/ No other.

Socrates/ But what of this—to live: shall we say it is the work of the soul?

Thrasymachus/ Most especially.

Socrates/ Do not we say, then, that there is some virtue of the soul likewise?

Thrasymachus/ We say so.

Socrates/ And shall, then, the soul ever at all, Thrasymachus! perform her works handsomely whilst deprived of her proper virtue, or is this impossible?

Thrasymachus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Of necessity, then, an ill soul must in a bad manner govern and take care of things, and a good soul perform all these things well.

Thrasymachus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ But did not we agree that justice was the virtue of the soul, and injustice its vice?

Thrasymachus/ We did agree.

Socrates/ Why then, the just soul and the just man shall live well, and the unjust ill.

Thrasymachus/ It appears so, according to your reasoning.

Socrates/ But surely he who lives well is both blessed and happy, and he who does not is the opposite.

Thrasymachus/ Why not?

Socrates/ The just, then, is happy, and the unjust miserable.

Thrasymachus/ Let them be so.

Socrates/ But it is not advantageous to be miserable, but to be happy.

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ At no time, then, blest Thrasymachus, is injustice more advantageous than justice.

Thrasymachus/ Thus now, Socrates, have you been feasted in Diana's festival.

Socrates/ By you, truly I have, Thrasymachus, since you are grown meek and have ceased to be troublesome. I have not feasted handsomely, owing to myself, and not to you: but as voracious guests, snatching still what is bringing before them, taste of it before they have sufficiently enjoyed what went before, so I, as I imagine, before I have found what we first enquired into, what justice is, have left this, hurrying to

enquire concerning it whether it be vice and ignorance, or wisdom and virtue: And a discourse afterwards falling in, that injustice was more profitable than justice, I could not refrain from coming to this from the other, so that from the dialogue I have now come to know nothing: for whilst I do not know what justice is, I shall hardly know whether it be some virtue or not, and whether he who possesses it be unhappy or happy.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK

The Second Book

Socrates/ When I had said these things, I imagined that the debate was over; but this it seems was only the introduction. For Glauco, as he is on all occasions most courageous, so truly at that time did not approve of Thrasymachus in giving up the debate, but said:

Glaucon/ Socrates, desire you to seem to have persuaded us, or to have persuaded us in reality, that in every respect it is better to be just than unjust?

Socrates/ I would choose, to do it in reality, if it depended on me.

Glaucon/ You do not, then, do what you desire. For, tell me, does there appear to you any good of this kind, such as we would choose to have, not regarding the consequences, but embracing it for its own sake—as joy, and such pleasures as are harmless, though nothing else arises afterwards from these pleasures than that the possession gives us delight.

Socrates/ There seems to me, to be something of this kind.

Glaucon/ But what? is there something, too, which we both love for its own sake, and also for what arises from it? —as wisdom, sight, and health: for we somehow embrace these things on both accounts.

Socrates/ Yes.

Glaucon/ But do you perceive, a third species of good, among which is bodily labor, to be healed when sick, to practice physic, or other lucrative employment; for we say those things are troublesome but that they profit us and we should not choose these things for their own sake, but on account of the rewards and those other advantages which arise from them.

Socrates/ There is then, indeed, likewise this third kind.

Glaucon/ But what now? in which of these, do you place justice?

Socrates/ I imagine, in the most handsome; which, both on its own account, and account of what arises from it, is desired by the man who is in pursuit of happiness.

Glaucon/ It does not, however, seem so to the generality, but to be of the troublesome kind, which is pursued for the sake of glory, and on account of rewards and honors, but, on its own account, is to be shunned as being difficult.

Socrates/ I know, that it seems so; and it was in this view that Thrasymachus a while ago despised it and commended injustice; but, it seems, I am one of those who are dull in learning.

Glaucon/ Come then, hear me likewise, if this be agreeable to you: for Thrasymachus seems to me to have been charmed by you, like an adder, sooner than was proper; but with respect to myself, the proof has not come out hitherto to my satisfaction in reference to neither of the two, for I desire to hear what each is, and what power it has, by itself, when in the soul, letting alone the rewards and the consequences arising from them. I will proceed, therefore, in this manner, if it seem proper to you: I will renew the speech of Thrasymachus, and, first of all, I will tell you what they say justice is and whence it arises; and, secondly, that all those who pursue it, pursue it unwillingly as necessary, but not as good; thirdly, that they do this reasonably, for, as they say, the life of an unjust man is much better than that of the just, although, for my own part, to me, Socrates, it does not yet appear so; I am, however, in doubt, having my ears stunned in hearing Thrasymachus and innumerable others. But I have never hitherto heard from anyone, as I incline, a discourse concerning justice as being better than injustice:

I want, then, to hear it commended as it is in itself, and I most especially imagine I shall hear this from you: wherefore, pulling oppositely, I shall speak in commendation of an unjust life, and, in speaking, shall show you in what manner I want to hear you condemn injustice and commend justice. But see if what I say be agreeable to you.

Socrates/ Extremely so; for what would any man of understanding delight more to speak and to hear of frequently?

Glaucon/ You speak most handsomely. And hear what I said I was first to speak of: what justice is, and whence it arises; for they say that, according to nature, to do injustice is good, but to suffer injustice is bad, but that the 'evil which arises from suffering injustice is greater than the good which arises from doing it. So that after men had done one another injustice, and likewise suffered it, and had experienced both, it seemed proper to those who were not able to shun the one and choose the other to agree among themselves neither to do injustice nor to be injured, and that hence laws begun to be established, and their compacts; and that which was enjoined by law they denominated lawful and just, and that this is the origin and essence of justice. Being in the middle between what is best, when he who does injustice is not punished; and of what is worst, when the injured person is unable to punish; and that justice, being thus in the middle of both these, is desired, not as good, but is held in honor from an imbecility in doing injustice. For the man who had ability to do so would never, if really a man, agree with anyone either to injure or to be injured, for otherwise he were mad. This, then, Socrates, and of such a kind as this, is the nature of justice, and this, as they say, is its origin. And we shall best perceive that these who pursue it, pursue it unwillingly and from an impotence to injure, if we imagine in our mind such a case as this: Let us give liberty to each

of them, both to the just and to the unjust, to do whatever they incline, and then let us follow them, observing how their inclination will lead each of them. We should then find the just man, with full inclination, going the same way with the unjust, through a desire of having more than others. This, every nature is made to pursue as good, but by law is forcibly led to an equality. And the liberty which I speak of may be chiefly of this kind, if they happened to have such a power as they say happened once to Gyges, the progenitor of Lydus: for they say that he was the hired shepherd of the then governor of Lydia, and that a prodigious rain and earthquake happening, part of the earth was rent, and an opening made in the place where he pastured his flocks; that when he beheld, and wondered, he went down, and saw many other wonders, handed down to us in way of tradition, and a brazen horse likewise, hollow and with doors: and on looking in he saw within, a dead body larger in appearance, than that of a man, which had nothing else upon it but a gold ring on its hand, which ring he took off and came up again. That when there was a convention of the shepherds, as usual, for reporting to the king what related to their flocks, he also came, having the ring. And whilst he sat with the others, he happened to turn the stone of the ring to the inner part of his hand, and when this was done, he became invisible to those who sate by, and they talked of him as absent. That he wondered, and again handling his ring, turned the stone outward; and on this became visible: And that having observed this, he made trial of the ring, whether it had this power, and that it happened that on turning the stone inward he became invisible, and on turning it outward he became visible. That perceiving this, he instantly got himself made one of the embassy to the king, and that on his arrival he debauched his wife, and, with her, assaulting the king, killed him and possessed the kingdom. If, now, there were

two such rings, and the just man had the one, and the unjust the other, none, it seems, would be so adamantine as to persevere in justice, and dare to refrain from the things of others, and not to touch them, whilst it was in his power to take, even from the Forum, without fear, whatever he pleased, to enter into houses and embrace anyone he pleased, to kill and to loose from chains whom he pleased, and to do all other things with the same power as a God among men. Acting in this manner he is no way different from the other, but both of them go the same road. This, now, one may say, is a strong proof that no one is just from choice, but by constraint, as it is not a good merely in itself, since everyone does injustice, wherever he imagines he is able to do it; for every man imagines that injustice is, to the particular person, more profitable than justice; and he imagines justly, according to this way of reasoning: since if anyone with such a liberty would never do any injustice, nor touch the things of others, he would be deemed by men of sense to be the most wretched and most void of understanding; yet would they commend him before one another, imposing on each other, from a fear of being injured. Thus much, then, concerning these things. But with reference to the difference of their lives whom we speak of, we shall be able to discern aright, if we set apart by themselves the most just man and the most unjust, and not otherwise. And, now, what is this separation? Let us take from the unjust man nothing of injustice, nor of justice from the just man, but let us make each of them perfect in his own profession. And, first, as to the unjust man, let him act as the able artist: as a complete pilot or physician he comprehends the possible and the impossible in the art; the one he attempts, and the other he lets alone, and if he fail in anything, he is able to rectify it. So, in like manner, the unjust man, attempting pieces of injustice in a dexterous

manner, let him be concealed, if he want to be exceedingly unjust; but if he be caught, let him be deemed worthless; for the most complete injustice is to seem just, not being so. We must give, then, to the completely unjust the most complete injustice, and not take from him, but allow him, whilst doing the greatest injustice, to procure to himself the highest reputation for justice; and if in anything he fail, let him be able to rectify it: And let him be able to speak so as to persuade, if anything of his injustice be spread abroad: Let him be able to do by force, what requires force, through his courage and strength, and by means of his friends and his wealth. And having set him up such an one as this, let us place the just man beside him, in our reasoning, a simple and ingenuous man, desiring, according to Aeschylus, not the appearance, but the reality of goodness. Let us take from him the appearance of goodness; for if he shall appear to be just, he shall have honors and rewards, and thus it may be uncertain whether he be such for the sake of justice, or on account of the rewards and honors. Let him be striped of everything but justice, and be made quite contrary to the other. Whilst he does no injustice, let him have the reputation of doing the greatest, that he may be tortured for justice, not yielding to reproach, and such things as arise from it, but may be immoveable 'till death—appearing, indeed, to be unjust' through life, yet being really just, that so, both of them arriving at the utmost pitch, the one of justice, and the other of injustice, we may judge which of them is the happier.

Socrates/ Strange! friend Glauco, how strenuously you clean up each of the men as a statue which is to be judged of.

Glaucon/ As much, as I am able. Whilst, then, they continue to be such, there will not, as I imagine, be any further difficulty to observe what kind of life remains to each

of them. It must, therefore, be told. And, if possibly it should be told with greater rusticity, imagine not, Socrates, that it is I who tell it, but those who commend injustice preferably to justice; and they will say these things: That the just man, being of this disposition, will be scourged, tormented, fettered, have his eyes burnt, and, lastly, having suffered all manner of evils, will be crucified; and he shall know that he should not desire the reality, but the appearance of justice: And that it is much more proper to pronounce that saying of Aeschylus concerning the unjust man: For they will in reality say that the unjust man, as being in pursuit of what is real, and living not according to the opinion of men, wants not to have the appearance, but the reality, of injustice;

> Reaping the hollow furrow of his mind,
> Whence all his glorious councils blossom forth.

In the first place, he holds the magistracy in the state, being thought to be just; next, he marries wherever he inclines, and matches his children with whom he pleases, he joins in partnership and company with whom he inclines, and, besides all this, he will succeed in all his projects for gain, as he does not scruple to do injustice. When, then, he engages in competitions, he will, both in private and in public, surpass and exceed his adversaries, and by this means he will be rich, and serve his friends and hurt his enemies; and he will amply and magnificently render sacrifices and offerings to the Gods, and will honor the Gods, and such men as he chooses, much better than the just man: from whence they reckon that it is likely he will be more beloved of the Gods than the just man. Thus they say, Socrates, that both with Gods and men there is a better life prepared for the unjust man than for the just.

Socrates/ When Glauco had said these things, I had a design to say something in reply. But his brother Adimantus said:

Adeimantus/ Socrates, you do not imagine there is yet enough said on the argument.

Socrates/ What further then?

Adeimantus/ That has not yet been spoken, which ought most especially to have been mentioned.

Socrates/ Why, then, the proverb is, A brother is help at hand: so do you assist, if he has failed in anything—though what has been said by him is sufficient to throw me down and make me unable to succor justice.

Adeimantus/ You say nothing. But hear this further, for we must go through all the arguments opposite to what he has said, which commend justice and condemn injustice, that what Glauco seems to me to intend may be more manifest. Now, parents surely tell and exhort their sons, as do all those who have the care of any, that it is necessary to be just, not commending justice in itself, but the honors arising from it; that whilst a man is reputed to be just, he may get by this reputation magistracies, and marriages, and whatever Glauco just now enumerated as the consequence of being reputed just. But these men carry this matter of reputation somewhat further; for, throwing in the approbation of the Gods, they have unspeakable blessings to enumerate to holy persons, which, they say, the Gods bestow. As the generous Hesiod and Homer say; the one, that the Gods cause the oaks to produce to just men

> Acorns at top, and in the middle bees;
> Their woolly sheep are laden with their fleece;

and a great many other good things of the same nature. In like manner the other;

> The blameless king, who holds a godlike name,
> Barley and wheat his black mold brings him forth;
> With fruit his trees are laden; and his flocks
> Bring forth with ease; the sea affords him fish.

But Musaeus and his son tell us that the Gods give just men more splendid blessings than these; for, carrying them, in his poem, into the other world, and setting them down in company with holy men at a feast prepared for them, they crown them, and make them pass the whole of their time in drinking, deeming eternal inebriation the finest reward of virtue. But some carry the rewards from the Gods still further; for they say that the offspring of the holy and the faithful, and their children's children, still remain. With these things, and such as these, they commend justice. But the unholy and unjust they bury in the other world, in a kind of mud, and compel them to carry water in a sieve, and making them, even whilst alive, to live in infamy. Whatever punishments were assigned by Glauco to the just, whilst they were reputed unjust, these they assign to the unjust, but no others they mention. This, now, is the way in which they commend and discommend them severally.

But besides this, Socrates, consider another kind of reasoning concerning justice and injustice, mentioned both privately and by the poets; for all of them, with one mouth, celebrate temperance and justice as indeed excellent, but yet difficult and laborious, and intemperance and injustice as indeed pleasant and easy to attain, but by opinion only and by law abominable. And they say, that for the most part, unjust actions are more profitable than just. And they are gladly willing, both in public and private, to pay honor to wicked rich men, and such as have power of any kind, and to pronounce them happy, but to contemn and overlook those who are anyhow weak and poor, even whilst they acknowledge them to be better than the others. But of all these speeches, the most marvelous are those concerning the Gods and virtue: as if even the Gods gave to many good men misfortunes and an evil life, and to contrary persons a contrary fate. And mountebanks and prophets, frequenting

the gates of the rich, persuade them that they have a power, granted them by the Gods, of expiating by sacrifices and songs, with pleasures and with feastings, if any injustice has been committed by anyone or his forefathers; and if he want to blast any enemy, at a small expense he shall injure the just, in the same manner as the unjust, by certain blandishments and bonds, as they say, persuading the Gods to succor them. And to all these discourses they bring the poets, as witnesses, who, mentioning the proneness to vice, say:

> How vice at once and easily is got;
> The way is smooth, and very nigh it dwells;
> Sweat, before virtue, by the Gods is placed.

and a certain long and steep way. Others make Homer witness how the Gods are prevailed on by men, because he says;

> ——The Gods themselves are turn'd
> With sacrifices and appeasing vows;
> Libation and with fat, men them persuade,
> Praying when one transgresses and offends.

They show, likewise, a great many books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring, as they say, of the moon and of the Muses, according to which they perform their sacred rites, persuading not only private persons, but states likewise, that there are absolutions and purgations from iniquities, by means of sacrifices and sportive pleasures, and this for the benefit both of the living and of the dead: these they call the Mysteries, which absolve us from evils there, but that dreadful things await such who do not offer sacrifice.

All these, and so many things of the kind, friend Socrates, being said of virtue and vice, and their reward both with men and Gods, what do we imagine the souls of our youth do when they hear them; such of them as are of good birth, and

able as it were to rush into all these things which are said, and from all to deliberate in what sort of character, and in what sort of road one may best pass through life? He might likely say to himself, according to that of Pindar;

> Whether shall I the lofty wall
> Of justice try to scale;
> Or, hedged within the winding maze
> Of vice, still shall I dwell?

For, according to what is said, though I be just, if I be not reputed so, there shall be no profit, but manifest troubles and punishments; but the unjust man, who procures to himself the character of justice, is said to have a divine life. Since, then, the appearance surpasses the reality, as wise men demonstrate to me, and is the primary part of happiness, ought I not to turn wholly to it, and to draw round myself as a covering and picture the image of virtue, but to draw after me the cunning and versatile fox of the most wise Archilochus? But, says one, it is not easy, being wicked, always to be concealed. Neither is anything else easy (will we say) which is great. But, however, if we would be happy, thither let us go, where the steps of the reasonings lead us. For, in order to be concealed, we will make conjurations and associations together; and there are masters of persuasion, who teach a popular and political wisdom, by which means, whilst partly by persuasion and partly by force, we seize more than our due, we shall not be punished. But, surely, to be concealed from the Gods, or to overpower them, is impossible.

If then they be not at all, or care not about human affairs, we need not have any concern about being concealed. But if they really are, and care for us, we neither know nor have heard of them otherwise than from traditions, and from the poets who write their genealogies; and these very persons tell us that they are to be moved and persuaded by sacrifices

and appeasing vows and offerings—both of which we are to believe, or neither. If, then, we are to believe both, we may do injustice, and of the fruits of our injustice offer sacrifice; if we be just, we shall indeed be unpunished by the Gods, but then we shall not have the gains of injustice: but if we be unjust, we shall make gain; and after we have transgressed and offended, we shall appease them by offerings, and come off unpunished: but we shall be punished in the other world for our unjust doings here, either we ourselves, or our children's children. But, friend, will the reasoner say, the Mysteries can do much; the Gods are exorable, as say the mightiest states, and the children of the Gods, the poets, who are also their prophets, who declare that these things are so.

For what reason, then, should we still prefer justice before the greatest injustice? which if we shall attain to, with any deceiving appearance, we shall fare according to our mind, both with reference to Gods and men, both living and dying, according to the speech now mentioned of many and excellent men. From all which has been said, by what means shall one incline to honor justice who has any ability of fortune or of wealth, of body, or of birth, and not laugh when he hears it commended? So that, though one were able even to show what we have said to be false, and fully understood that justice is better, he has, however, great allowance surely to give, and is not angry at the unjust; for he knows, that unless one from a divine temper abhors to do injustice, or from acquired knowledge abstain from it, of others no one is willingly just, but either through cowardice, old age, or some other weakness condemns the doing injustice, when unable to do it. That it is so, is plain; for the first of these who gets it in his power is the first to do injustice, as far as he is able.

And the reason of all this is no other than that from whence all this discourse proceeded, Socrates, because, rare

friend, of you all, as many as call yourselves the commenders of justice, beginning from those ancient heroes of whom any accounts are left to the men of the present time, no one has at any time condemned injustice, nor commended justice, otherwise than regarding the reputations, honors, and rewards arising from them: but no one has hitherto sufficiently examined, neither in poetry nor in prose-discourse, either of them in itself, and subsisting by its own power in the soul of him who has it, and concealed from both Gods and men, how that the one is the greatest of all the evils which the soul has within it, and justice the greatest good. For if it had thus from the beginning been spoken of by you all, and you had so persuaded us from our youth, we would not need to watch over our neighbor lest he should do us injustice, but every man would have been the best guardian over himself, afraid lest in doing injustice he should dwell with the greatest evil.

These things, now, Socrates, and probably much more than these, Thrasymachus or some other might say of justice and injustice, inverting their power, disagreeably as I imagine, for my own part. But I (for I want to conceal nothing from you), being desirous to hear you on the opposite side, speak the best I am able, pulling the contrary way. Do not, therefore, only show us in your reasoning that justice is better than injustice, but in what manner each of them by itself, affecting the mind, is, the one evil, and the other good. And take away all opinions, as Glauco likewise enjoined; for if you do not take away the false opinions on both sides, and add the true ones, we will say you do not commend justice, but the appearance, nor condemn being unjust, but the appearance; and that you give it as your advice to be unjust when concealed; and that you assent to Thrasymachus, that justice is a foreign good, the profit of the more powerful; and that injustice is the profit and

advantage of one's self, but unprofitable to the inferior. Wherefore, now, after that you have acknowledged that justice is among the greatest goods, such as are worthy to be possessed for what arises from them, and much more in themselves, and for their own sake, such as, sight, hearing, wisdom, health, and such other goods as are real in their own nature, and not merely in opinion, in the same manner commend justice, how in itself it profits the owner, and injustice hurts him. And leave to others to commend the rewards and opinions; for I could bear with others in this way commending justice, and condemning injustice, celebrating and reviling their opinions and rewards; but not with you (unless you desire me), because you have passed the whole of life considering nothing else but this. Show us, then, in your discourse, not only that justice is better than injustice, but in what manner each of them by itself affecting the owner, whether he be concealed or not concealed from Gods and men, is, the one good, and the other evil.

Socrates/ On hearing these things, as I always indeed liked the disposition of Glauco and Adimantus, so, at that time, I was perfectly delighted, and said: It was not ill said concerning you, sons of that worthy man, by the lover of Glauco, who wrote the beginning of the Elegies, when, celebrating your behavior at the battle of Megara, he said:

> Aristo's sons, of an illustrious man
> The race divine——

This, friends, seems to be well said; for you are truly affected in a divine manner, if you are not persuaded that injustice is better than justice, and yet are able to speak thus for it. And to me you seem truly not to be persuaded; and I reason from the whole of your other behavior, since, according to your present speeches at least, I should distrust you. But the more I can trust you, the more I am in doubt what argument I shall use; for I can neither think of any

assistance I have to give (for I seem to be unable, and my mark is, that you do not accept of what I said to Thrasymachus, when I imagined I showed that justice was better than injustice); nor yet can I think of giving no assistance, for I am afraid lest it be an unholy thing to desert justice when I am present and see it accused, and not assist it whilst I breathe and amiable to speak. It is best then to succor it in such a manner as I can.

Hereupon Glauco and the rest entreated me by all means to assist, and not give over the discourse, but to search thoroughly what each of them is, and which way the truth lies as to their respective advantage. I, then, said what appeared to me: That the inquiry we were attempting, was not contemptible, but was that of one who was sharp-sighted, as I imagined. Since, then, we are not very expert, it seems proper to make the inquiry concerning this matter in such a manner as if it were ordered those who are not very sharp-sighted to read small letters at a distance, and one should afterwards understand that the same letters are greater somewhere else, and in a larger field: it would appear eligible, I imagine, first to read these, and thus come to consider the lesser if they happen to be the same.

Adeimantus/ Perfectly right. But what of this kind, Socrates, do you perceive in the inquiry concerning justice?

Socrates/ I shall tell you. Do not we say there is justice in one man, and there is likewise justice in a whole state?

Adeimantus/ It is certainly so.

Socrates/ Is not a state a greater object than one man?

Adeimantus/ Greater.

Socrates/ It is likely, then, that justice should be greater in what is greater, and be more easy to be understood? We shall first, then, if you incline, inquire what it is in states, and then, after the same manner, we shall consider it in each

individual, contemplating the similitude of the greater in the idea of the lesser.

Adeimantus/ You seem to me, to say right.

Socrates/ If then, we contemplate in our discourse a state existing, shall we not perceive its justice and injustice existing?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ And, is there not ground to hope, if this exists, that we shall more easily find what we seek for?

Adeimantus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ It seems, then, we ought to attempt to succeed, for I imagine this to be a work of no small importance. Consider then.

Adeimantus/ We are considering, and do you no otherwise.

Socrates/ A city, then, as I imagine, takes its rise from this, that none of us happens to be self-sufficient, but is indigent of many things; or do you imagine there is any other origin of building a city?

Adeimantus/ None other.

Socrates/ Thus then, one taking in one person for one indigence, and another for another, as they stand in need of many things, they assemble into one habitation many companions and assistants, and to this joint-habitation we give the name city. Do not we?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And they mutually exchange with one another, each judging that if he either gives or takes in exchange, it will be for his advantage.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, let us in our discourse make a city from the beginning. And, it seems, our indigence has made it.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ But the first and the greatest of wants is the preparation of food, in order to subsist and live.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ The second is of lodging, the third, of clothing and such like.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ But come, how shall the city be able to make so great a provision? Shall not one be a husbandman, another a mason, some other a weaver? or shall we add to them a shoemaker, or some other of those who minister to the necessaries of the body?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So that the most indigent city might consist of four or five men?

Adeimantus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But what now? must each of those do his work for them all in common? as the husbandman, being one, shall he prepare food for four, and consume quadruple time and labor in preparing food, and sharing it with others; or, neglecting them, shall he for himself alone make the fourth part of this food, in the fourth part of the time; and, of the other three parts of time, shall he employ one in the preparation of a house, the other in that of clothing, the other of shoes, and not give himself trouble in sharing with others, but do his own affairs by himself?

Adeimantus/ And probably, Socrates, this way is more easy than the other.

Socrates/ No, certainly, it were absurd; for whilst you are speaking, I consider that we are born not perfectly resembling one another, but differing in disposition, one being fitted for doing one thing, and another for doing another. Does it not seem so to you?

Adeimantus/ It does.

Socrates/ But what now? Whether will one do better if, being one, he works in many arts or in one?

Adeimantus/ When in one.

Socrates/ But this, I imagine, is also plain, that if one miss the season of any work, it is ruined.

Adeimantus/ That is plain.

Socrates/ For, I imagine, the work will not wait upon the leisure of the workman, but, of necessity, the workman must attend close upon the work, and not in way of a by-job.

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And hence it appears, that more will be done, and better and with greater ease, when everyone does but one thing, according to their genius, and in proper season, and freed from other things.

Adeimantus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ But we need certainly, Adimantus, more citizens than four for those provisions we mentioned. For the husbandman, it would seem, will not make a plough for himself, if it is to be handsome, nor yet a spade, nor other instruments of agriculture; as little will the mason, for he likewise needs many things; and in the same way the weaver and the shoemaker likewise. Is it not so?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Joiners, then, and smiths, and other such workmen being admitted into our little city, make it throng.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But it would be no very great matter neither, if we did not give them neatherds likewise, and shepherds, and those other herdsmen, in order that both the husbandmen may have oxen for ploughing, and that the masons, with the help of the husbandmen, may use the cattle for their carriages, and that the weavers, likewise, and the shoemakers may have hides and wool.

Adeimantus/ Nor yet, would it be a very small city, having all these.

Socrates/ But, it is almost impossible to set down such a city in any such place as that it shall need no importations.

Adeimantus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ It shall then certainly want others still who may import from another state what it needs.

Adeimantus/ It shall want them.

Socrates/ And surely this service would be empty if it carry out nothing which these want from whom they import what they need themselves. It goes out empty in such a case, does it not?

Adeimantus/ To me it seems so.

Socrates/ But the city ought not only to make what is sufficient for itself, but such things, and so much also, as may answer for those things they need.

Adeimantus/ It ought.

Socrates/ Our city, then, certainly wants a great many more husbandmen and other workmen?

Adeimantus/ A great many more.

Socrates/ And other servants besides, to import and export the several things: and these are merchants, are they not?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ We shall then want merchants likewise?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And if the merchandise is by sea, it will want many others, such as are skillful in sea affairs.

Adeimantus/ Many others, truly.

Socrates/ But what as to the city within itself? How will they exchange with one another the things which they have each of them worked, and for the sake of which, making a community, they have built a city?

Adeimantus/ It is plain, in selling and buying.

Socrates/ Hence we must have a market-place, and money, as a symbol, for the sake of exchange.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If now the husbandman, or any other workman, bring any of his work to the market, but come not at the same time with those who want to make exchange with him, must he not be set idle from his work, sitting in the market?

Adeimantus/ By no means. But there are some who, observing this, set themselves to this service; and in well-regulated cities they are mostly such as are weakest in their body, and unfit to do any other work. There they are to attend about the market, to give money in exchange for such things as any may want to sell, and things in exchange for money to such as want to buy.

Socrates/ This indigence, procures our city a race of shopkeepers; for do not we call shop-keepers those who, fixed in the market, serve both in selling and buying, but such as travel to other cities we call merchants?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ There are still, as I imagine, certain other ministers who, though unfit to serve the public in things which require understanding, have yet strength of body

sufficient for labor, who, selling the use of their strength, and calling the reward of it hire, are called, as I imagine, hirelings: are they not?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Hirelings, then, are, it seems, the complement of the city?

Adeimantus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Has our city now, Adimantus, already so increased upon us as to be complete?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Where, now, at all, should justice and injustice be in it? and in which of the things that we have considered does it appear to exist?

Adeimantus/ I do not know, Socrates, if it be not in a certain use, somehow, of these things with one another.

Socrates/ Perhaps, you say right. But we must consider it, and not weary. First, then, let us consider after what manner those who are thus procured shall be supported. Is it any other way than by making bread and wine, and cloths and shoes, and building houses? In summer, indeed, they will work for the most part without cloths and shoes, and in winter they will be sufficiently furnished with cloths and shoes. They will be nourished, partly with barley, making meal of it, and partly with wheat, making loaves, boiling part, and toasting part, putting fine loaves and cakes over a fire of stubble, or over dried leaves, and resting themselves on couches strawed with smilax and myrtle leaves, they and their children will feast, drinking wine, and crowned, and singing to the Gods, they will pleasantly live together, begetting children not beyond their substance, guarding against poverty or war.

Glauco, replying, says;

Glaucon/ You make the men to feast, as it appears, without meats.

Socrates/ You say true; for I forget that they shall have meats likewise. They shall have salt and olives and cheese, and they shall boil bulbous roots and herbs of the field; and we set before them deserts of figs and vetches and beans; and they will toast at the fire myrtle berries and the berries of the beech-tree, drinking in moderation. And thus passing their life in peace and health, and dying, as is likely, in old age, they will leave to their children another such life.

Glaucon/ If you had been making, Socrates, a city of hogs, what else would you have fed them with but with these things?

Socrates/ But how should we do, Glauco?

Glaucon/ What is usually done. They must, as I imagine, have their beds and tables, and meats and deserts, as we now have, if they are not to be miserable.

Socrates/ Be it so: I understand you. We consider, it seems, not only how a city may exist, but how a luxurious city: and perhaps it is not amiss; for in considering such an one we may probably see how justice and injustice have their origin in cities. But the true city seems to me to be such an one as we have described, like one who is healthy; but if you incline that we likewise consider a city that is corpulent, nothing hinders it. For these things will not, it seems, please some, nor this sort of life satisfy them; but there shall be beds and tables and all other furniture, seasonings, ointments, and perfumes, mistresses, and confections: and various kinds of all these. And we must no longer consider as alone necessary what we mentioned at the first, houses and cloths and shoes, but painting, too, and all the curious arts must be set a-going, and carving, and gold, and ivory; and all these things must be got, must they not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Must not the city, then, be larger? For that healthy one is no longer sufficient, but is already full of luxury, and of a crowd of such as are no way necessary to cities; such as-all kinds of sportsmen, and the imitative artists, many of them imitating in figures, and colors; and others in music; poets, too, and their ministers, rhapsodists, actors, dancers, undertakers, workmen of all sorts of instruments, and what has reference to female ornaments, as well as other things. We shall need likewise many more servants. Do not you think they will need pedagogues, and nurses, and tutors, hair-dressers, barbers, victualer too, and cooks? And further still, we shall want swine-herds likewise; of these there were none in the other city (for there needed not), but in this we shall want these, and many other sorts of herds likewise, if any eats the several animals, shall we not?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ Shall we not, then, in this manner of life be much more in need of physicians than formerly?

Glaucon/ Much more.

Socrates/ And the country, which was then sufficient to support the inhabitants, will, instead of being sufficient, become too little; or how shall we say?

Glaucon/ In this way.

Socrates/ Must we not then encroach upon the neighboring country, if we want to have sufficient for plough and pasture, and they in like manner on us, if they likewise suffer themselves to accumulate wealth to infinity, going beyond the boundary of necessaries?

Glaucon/ There is great necessity for it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we afterwards fight, Glauco, or how shall we do?

Glaucon/ We shall certainly.

Socrates/ But we say nothing, whether war does any evil or any good, but this much only, that we have found the origin of war, from whence most especially arise the greatest mischiefs to states, both private and public.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ We shall need then, friend, still a larger city, not for a small, but for a large army, who in going out may fight with those who assault them for their whole substance, and everything we have now mentioned.

Glaucon/ What, are not these sufficient to fight?

Socrates/ No, if you, at least, and all of us, have rightly agreed when we formed our city: and we agreed, if you remember, that it was impossible for one to perform many arts handsomely.

Glaucon/ You say true.

Socrates/ What then, as to that contest of war; does it not appear to require art?

Glaucon/ Very much.

Socrates/ Ought we then to take more care of the art of shoe-making than of the art of making war?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But we charged the shoemaker neither to undertake, at the same time, to be a husbandman, nor a weaver, nor a mason, but a shoemaker, that the work of that art may be done for us handsomely. And in like manner we allotted to every one of the rest one thing, to which the genius of each led him, and what each took care of, freed from other things, to do it well, applying to it the whole of his life, and not neglecting the seasons of working. And now, as to the affairs of war, whether is it of the greatest importance that they be well performed? Or is this so easy a

thing, that one may be a husbandman and likewise a soldier and shoemaker, or be employed in any other art; but not even at chess or dice can one ever play skillfully unless he study this very thing from his childhood, and not make it a by work. Or shall one, taking a spear or any other of the warlike arms and instruments, become instantly an expert combatant in an encounter in arms, or in any other relating to war? And shall the taking up of no other instrument make a workman or a wrestler, nor be useful to him, who has neither the knowledge of that particular thing, nor has bestowed the study sufficient for it?

Glaucon/ Such instruments, would truly be very valuable.

Socrates/ By how much then, this work of guards is one of the greatest importance, by so much it should require the greatest leisure from other things, and likewise the greatest art and study.

Glaucon/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ And shall it not likewise require a competent genius for this profession?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ It should surely be our business, as it seems, if we be able to choose who and what kind of geniuses are competent for the guardianship of the city.

Glaucon/ Ours, indeed.

Socrates/ We have, truly, undertaken no mean business; but, however, we are not to despair, so long at least as we have any ability.

Glaucon/ No indeed.

Socrates/ Do you think then, that the genius of a generous whelp differs anything, for guardianship, from that of a generous youth?

Glaucon/ What is it you say?

Socrates/ It is this. Must not each of them be acute in the perception, swift to pursue what they perceive, and strong likewise if there is need to conquer what they shall catch?

Glaucon/ There is need, of all these.

Socrates/ And surely he must be brave likewise if he fight well.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But will he be brave who is not spirited, whether it is a horse, a dog, or any other animal? Or have you not observed that the spirit is somewhat insurmountable and invincible, by the presence of which every soul is, in respect of all things whatever, unterrified and unconquerable?

Glaucon/ I have observed it.

Socrates/ It is plain then what sort of a guard we ought to have with reference to his body.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And with reference to his soul, that he should be spirited.

Glaucon/ This, likewise, is plain.

Socrates/ How then, Glauco, will they not be savage towards one another, and the other citizens, being of such a temper?

Glaucon/ No, truly, not easily.

Socrates/ But yet, it is necessary that towards their friends they be meek, and fierce towards their enemies; for otherwise they will not wait till others destroy them, but they will prevent them doing it themselves.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ What then, shall we do? Where shall we find, at once, the meek and the magnanimous temper? For the meek disposition is somehow opposite to the spirited.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But, however, if he be deprived of either of these, he cannot be a good guardian, for it seems to be impossible; and thus it appears that a good guardian is an impossible thing.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ After hesitating and considering what had past: Justly, friend, are we in doubt, for we have departed from that image which we first established.

Glaucon/ How say you?

Socrates/ Have we not observed that there are truly such tempers as we were not imagining, who have these opposite things?

Glaucon/ Where then?

Socrates/ One may see it in other animals, and not a little in that one with which we compared our guardian. For this, you know, is the natural temper of generous dogs, to be most mild towards the domestics and their acquaintance, but the reverse to those they know not.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ This, then, is possible; and it is not against nature, that we require our guardian to be such an one.

Glaucon/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Are you, further, of this opinion, that he who is to be our guardian should, besides being spirited, be a philosopher likewise?

Glaucon/ How?, for I do not understand you.

Socrates/ This, likewise, you will observe in the dogs, and it is worthy of admiration in the brute.

Glaucon/ As what?

Socrates/ He is angry at whatever unknown person he sees, though he has never got any harm from him before; but he is fond of whatever acquaintance he sees, though he has never at any time received any good from him. Have you not wondered at this?

Glaucon/ I never, much attended to it before; but that he does this is plain.

Socrates/ But indeed this affection of his nature seems to be an excellent disposition and truly philosophical.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ As, it distinguishes between a friendly and unfriendly aspect by nothing else but this, that it knows the one, but is ignorant of the other. How, now, should not this be deemed the love of learning, which distinguishes what is friendly and what is foreign by knowledge and ignorance?

Glaucon/ It can no way be shown why it should not.

Socrates/ But however, to be a lover of learning and a philosopher are the same.

Glaucon/ The same.

Socrates/ May we not then boldly settle it, that in man too, if anyone is to be of a mild disposition towards his domestics and acquaintance, he must be a philosopher and a lover of learning?

Glaucon/ Let us settle it.

Socrates/ He then, who is to be a good and worthy guardian, for us, of the city, shall be a philosopher, and spirited, and swift, and strong in his disposition.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Let then our guardian, be such an one. But in what manner shall these be educated for us and instructed? And will the consideration of this be of any assistance in

perceiving that for the sake of which we consider all else: in what manner justice and injustice arise in the city; that we may not omit a necessary part of the discourse, nor consider what is superfluous?

The brother of Glauco, said

Adeimantus/ I, for my part, greatly expect that this inquiry will be of assistance to that.

Socrates/ Truly, friend Adimantus, it is not to be omitted, though it should happen to be somewhat tedious.

Adeimantus/ No, truly.

Socrates/ Come then, let us, as if we were talking in the way of fable and at our leisure, educate these men in our reasoning.

Adeimantus/ It must be done.

Socrates/ What, then, is the education? —or is it difficult to find a better than that which was found long ago, which is, exercise for the body, and music for the mind?

Adeimantus/ It is, indeed.

Socrates/ Shall we not then, first, begin with instructing them in music, rather than in exercise?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ When you say music you mean discourses, do you not?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ But of discourses there are two kinds, the one true, and the other false.

Adeimantus/ There are.

Socrates/ And they must be educated in them both, and first in the false.

Adeimantus/ I do not understand, what you mean.

Socrates/ Do not you understand, that we first of all tell children fables? And this part of music, somehow, to speak in the general, is false, yet there is truth in them; and we accustom children to fables before their exercises.

Adeimantus/ We do so.

Socrates/ This, then, is what I meant, when I said that children were to begin music before their exercises.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ And do you not know that the beginning of every work is of the greatest importance, especially to anyone young and tender; for then, truly, in the easiest manner is formed and taken on the impression which one inclines to imprint on every individual?

Adeimantus/ It is entirely so.

Socrates/ Shall we then suffer the children to hear any kind of fables composed by any kind of persons, and to receive for the most part into their minds opinions contrary to those we judge they ought to have when they are grown up?

Adeimantus/ We shall by no means suffer it.

Socrates/ First of all, then, we must preside over the fable-makers, and whatever beautiful fable they make must be chosen, and what are otherwise must be rejected; and we shall persuade the nurses and mothers to tell the children such fables as shall be chosen, and to fashion their minds by fables, much more than their bodies by their hands. But the most of what they tell them at present must be thrown out.

Adeimantus/ As what?

Socrates/ In the greater ones we shall see the lesser likewise; for the fashion of them must be the same, and both

the greater and the lesser must have the same kind of power. Do not you think so?

Adeimantus/ I do: but I do not at all understand which you call the greater ones.

Socrates/ Those, which Hesiod and Homer tell us, and the other poets; for they composed false fables to mankind, and told them as they do still.

Adeimantus/ Which, do you mean, and what is it you blame in them?

Socrates/ That, which first of all and most especially ought to be blamed: when one does not falsify handsomely.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ When one in his composition gives ill representations of the nature of Gods and heroes—as a painter drawing a picture no way resembling what he wanted to paint.

Adeimantus/ It is right, to blame such things as these. But how have they failed, say we, and as to what?

Socrates/ First of all, with reference to that greatest lye and matters of the greatest importance, he did not lye handsomely who told how Uranus did what Hesiod says he did; and then again how Saturn punished him, and then what Saturn did, and what he suffered from his son. Although they were true, yet I should not imagine they ought to be so plainly told to the unwise and the young, but ought much rather to be concealed; but if there were a necessity to tell them, they should be heard in secrecy by as few as possible, after they had sacrificed, not a hog, but some great and wonderful sacrifice, that thus the fewest possible might chance to hear them.

Adeimantus/ These fables, are indeed truly hurtful.

Socrates/ And not to be mentioned, Adimantus, in our city. Nor is it to be said in the hearing of a youth, that he who does the most extreme wickedness does nothing strange; nor he who in every shape punishes his unjust father, but does the same as the first and the greatest of the Gods.

Adeimantus/ No, truly, these things do not seem to me proper to be said.

Socrates/ Nor, in the general, how Gods war with Gods, and plot and fight against one another (for they are not true), if, at least, those who are to guard the city for us ought to account it the most shameful thing to hate one another on slight grounds; as little ought we to tell in fables, and embellish to them, the fights of the giants, and many other various feuds both of the Gods and heroes with their own kindred and relations. But if we are at all to persuade them that at no time does one citizen hate another, and that it is unholy, such things as these are rather to be said to them immediately when they are children, by the old men and women, and by those well advanced in life; and the poets are to be obliged to compose agreeably to these things. Hera fettered by her son, and Vulcan thrown down from heaven by his father, for going to assist his mother when beaten, and all those fights of the Gods which Homer has composed, must not be admitted into the city, whether they be composed in way of allegory or without allegory. For the young person is not able to judge what is allegory and what is not; but whatever opinions he receives at such an age are difficult to be washed out, and are immoveable. On these accounts one would imagine that, of all things, we should endeavor that what they are first to hear be composed in the most handsome manner for exciting them to virtue.

Adeimantus/ There is reason for it. But if anyone now should ask us concerning these, what they are, and what kind of fables they are, which should we name?

Socrates/ Adimantus, you and I are not poets at present, but founders of a city; and it belongs to the founders to know the models according to which the poets are to compose their fables, contrary to which if they compose they are not to be tolerated; but it belongs not to us to make fables for them.

Adeimantus/ Right. But as to this very thing, the models concerning theology, which are they?

Socrates/ Some such as these. God is always to be represented such as he is, whether one represent him in epic, in song, or in tragedy.

Adeimantus/ This ought to be done.

Socrates/ Is not God essentially good, and is he not to be described as such?

Adeimantus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ But nothing which is good is hurtful, is it?

Adeimantus/ It does not appear to me.

Socrates/ Does, then, that which is not hurtful ever do hurt?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Does that which does no hurt do any evil?

Adeimantus/ Nor this neither.

Socrates/ And what does no evil cannot be the cause of any evil.

Adeimantus/ How can it?

Socrates/ But what? Good is beneficial.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is then the cause of welfare?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Good, therefore, is not the cause of all things, but the cause of those things which are in a right state; but is not the cause of those things which are in a wrong.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Neither then can God, since he is good, be the cause of all things, as the generality say, but he is the cause of a few things to men; but of many things he is not the cause: for our good things are much fewer than our evil, and no other is the cause of our good things; but of our evils we must not make God the cause, but seek for some other.

Adeimantus/ You seem to me, to speak most true.

Socrates/ We must not then, take it, neither from Homer nor any other poet trespassing so foolishly, with reference to the Gods, and saying how;

> Two coffers on Jove's threshold stand, and both
> Are full of lots: one good, the other ill;
> The man whose lot Jove mingles out of both,
> Sometimes by ill is rul'd, sometimes by good.
> Whose lot is otherwise, of ill unmix'd,
> Him o'er the sacred earth dire famine drives.

Nor that Zeus is the dispenser of our good and evil. Nor if anyone say that the violation of oaths and treaties, violated by Pandarus, was done by Minerva and Zeus, shall we commend it; nor that dissension among the Gods and judgment by Themis and Zeus; nor yet must we suffer the youth to hear what Aeschylus says, how;

> Whenever God inclines to raze
> A house, himself contrives a cause.

But if anyone make poetical compositions, in which are these iambics, the sufferings of Niobe, of the Pelopides, or the Trojans, or others of a like nature, we must either not suffer them to say they are the works of God; or, if of God, we must find that reason of them which we now require, and

we must say that God did what was just and good; and that they were bettered by being chastised: but we must not suffer a poet to say, that they are miserable who are punished, and that it is God who does these things. But if they say that the wicked, as being miserable, needed correction, and that in being punished they were profited by God, we may suffer them. But to say that God, who is good, is the cause of ill to anyone, this we must by all means oppose, nor suffer anyone to say so in his city, if he want to have it well-regulated; nor suffer anyone, neither young nor old, to hear such things told in fable, neither in verse nor prose, as they are neither agreeable to holiness to be told, nor profitable to us, nor consistent together.

Adeimantus/ I vote along with you, in this law, and it pleases me.

Socrates/ This then, may be one of the laws and models with reference to the Gods: by which it shall be necessary that those who speak and who compose shall compose and say that God is not the cause of all things, but of good.

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed, it is necessary.

Socrates/ But what as to this second law? Think you that God is a buffoon, and insidiously appears, at different times, in different shapes, sometimes like himself, and at other times changing his appearance into many shapes, sometimes deceiving us and making us conceive false opinions of him; or do you imagine him to be simple, and, of all, the least departing from his proper appearance?

Adeimantus/ I cannot, at present at least, say so.

Socrates/ But what as to this: If anything be changed from its appearance, is there not a necessity that it be changed by itself or by another?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Are not these things which are in the best state least of all changed and moved by any other thing? —as the body, by meats and drinks and labors, and every vegetable by tempests and winds, and such like accidents: is not the most sound and vigorous least of all changed?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ And as to the soul itself, will not any perturbation from without least of all disorder and change the most brave and wise?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And surely, somehow, all vessels which are made, and buildings, and vestments, according to the same reasoning, such as are properly worked and in a right state, are least changed by time or other accidents?

Adeimantus/ They are so, indeed.

Socrates/ Everything, then, which is in a good state, either by nature or art, or both, receives the smallest change from anything else.

Adeimantus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But God and all the divine conduct are in the best state.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ In this way then, God should least of all have many shapes.

Adeimantus/ Least of all, truly.

Socrates/ But should he change and alter himself?

Adeimantus/ It is plain, if he be changed at all.

Socrates/ Whether then should he change himself to the better and to the more handsome, or to the worse and the more deformed?

Adeimantus/ Of necessity, to the worse, if he be changed at all; for we shall never at any time say that God is any way deficient with respect to beauty or excellence.

Socrates/ You say most right. And this being so, do you imagine, Adimantus, that anyone, either of Gods or men, would willingly make himself any way worse?

Adeimantus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ It is impossible then, for a God to desire to change-himself; but each of them, being most fair and good, continues always, to the utmost of his power, invariably in his own form.

Adeimantus/ This appears to me, at least, wholly necessary.

Socrates/ Let not then, most excellent Adimantus, any of the' poets tell us how the Gods;

——Like various foreign travellers drest,
And various forms assuming, visit states.

Nor let anyone belie Proteus and Thetis, nor bring in Hera, in tragedies or other poems, as having transformed herself like a priestess, and collecting for the gracious sons of Inachus the Argive River;, nor let them tell us many other such lies. Nor let the mothers, persuaded by them, affright their children, telling the stories wrong, how that certain Gods go about all night;

Resembling various guests of various climes.

that they may not, at one and the same time, blaspheme against the Gods and render their children more dastardly.

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ But are the Gods, such as, though in themselves they never change, yet make us imagine they appear in various forms, deceiving us and playing the mountebanks?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ But what, can a God cheat, holding forth a phantasm, either in word or deed?

Adeimantus/ I do not know.

Socrates/ Do not you know, that what is truly a cheat, if one can speak so, all, both Gods and men, abhor?

Adeimantus/ How do you say.

Socrates/ Thus, that to offer a cheat to the chiefest part of themselves, and that about their chiefest interests, is what none willingly incline; but of all things everyone is most afraid of having got a cheat there.

Adeimantus/ Neither as yet, do I understand you.

Socrates/ Because, you fancy I am saying some great matter: but I am saying, that to cheat the soul concerning realities, and to be so cheated, and to be ignorant, and there to have got and to keep a cheat, is what everyone would least of all choose; and a cheat in the soul is what they most especially hate.

Adeimantus/ Most especially.

Socrates/ But this, as I was now saying, might most justly be called a true cheat, ignorance in the soul of the cheated person: since a cheat in words is but a kind of imitation of what the soul feels, and an image afterwards arising, and not altogether a pure cheat. Is it not so?

Adeimantus/ Entirely.

Socrates/ But this real lye is not only hated of the Gods, but of men likewise.

Adeimantus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But, what now? The cheat in words, when has it something of utility, so as not to deserve hatred? Is it not when employed towards our enemies, and some even of those called our friends, when, in madness or other

distemper they attempt to do some mischief? in that case, for a dissuasive, as a drug it is useful. And in those fables we were now mentioning, as we know not how the truth stands concerning ancient things, making a lye resembling the truth we render it useful as much as possible.

Adeimantus/ It is, perfectly so.

Socrates/ In which then of these cases is a lye useful to God? Whether does he make a lye resembling the truth, as being ignorant of ancient things?

Adeimantus/ That were ridiculous.

Socrates/ God is not, then, a lying poet.

Adeimantus/ I do not think it.

Socrates/ But should he make a lye from fear of his enemies?

Adeimantus/ Far from it.

Socrates/ But on account of the folly or madness of his kindred?

Adeimantus/ But, none of the foolish and mad are the friends of God.

Socrates/ There is then no occasion at all for God to make a lie.

Adeimantus/ There is none.

Socrates/ The divine and Godlike nature is then, in all respects, without a lie?

Adeimantus/ Altogether.

Socrates/ God then is simple and true, both in word and deed; neither is he changed himself nor does he deceive others, neither by visions, nor by discourse, nor by the pomp of signs, neither when we are awake nor when we sleep.

Adeimantus/ So it appears, to me at least, whilst you are speaking.

Socrates/ You agree then, that this shall be the second model by which we are to speak and to compose concerning the Gods: that they are neither mountebanks to change themselves, nor to mislead us by lies either in word or deed?

Adeimantus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Whilst then we commend many other things in Homer, this we shall not commend, the dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon; neither shall we commend Aeschylus, when he makes Thetis say that Apollo had sung at her marriage that;

> A comely offspring she shou'd raise,
> From sickness free, of lengthen'd days:
> Apollo, singing all my fate,
> And praising high my Godlike state,
> Rejoic'd my heart; and 'twas my hope,
> That all was true Apollo spoke:
> But he who at my marriage feast
> Extoll'd me thus, and was my guest;
> He who did thus my fate explain
> Is he who now my son has slain.

When anyone says such things as these of the Gods, we shall show displeasure, and not afford the chorus: nor shall we suffer teachers to make use of such things in the education of the youth, if our guardians are to be godly and divine men as far as it is possible for man to be.

Adeimantus/ I agree with you, perfectly, as to these models, and we may use them as laws.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK

The Third Book

Socrates/ These things indeed then, and such as these, are, as seems, what are to be heard and not heard, concerning the Gods, immediately from childhood, by those who are to honor the Gods and their parents, and who are not to despise friendship with one another.

Adeimantus/ And I imagine, that these things have appeared aright.

Socrates/ But what now? If they are to be brave, must not these things be narrated to them, and such other likewise as may render them least of all afraid of death? or do you imagine that anyone can ever be brave whilst he has this fear within him?

Adeimantus/ Not I, truly.

Socrates/ But what? do you imagine that anyone can be void of a fear of death whilst he imagines that there is another world, and that it is dreadful, and that in battles he will choose death before defeat and slavery?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ We ought then, as appears, to give orders likewise to those who undertake to discourse about fables of this kind, and to entreat them not to reproach thus in general the things of the other world, but rather to commend them, as they say neither what is true, nor what is profitable to those who are to be soldiers.

Adeimantus/ We ought, indeed.

Socrates/ Beginning then, at this verse, we shall leave out all of such kind as this:

> I'd rather, as a rustic slave, submit
> To some mean man, who had but scanty fare,
> Than govern all the wretched shades below.

And that;

The house, to mortals and immortals, seems
Horrible and squalid, and what Gods abhor.

And;

O wretched! in the mansions of the grave
Is there a soul and shape, but ne'er a mind.

And;

Alone are wise—the shades all flutter round.

And;

The soul fled from the body to the grave,
And, leaving youth and manhood, wail'd its fate.

And;

The soul, like smoke, down to the shades
Went howling.

And;

As when, in hollow of a spacious cave,
The owls fly, screaming if one chance to fall
Down from the rock, they all confusedly fly,
So these together howling went.

We shall beg Homer and the other poets not to take it amiss if we raze these things, and such as these, not that they are not poetical, and pleasant to many to be heard, but the more poetical they are, the less ought they to be heard by children, and men who ought to be free and more afraid of slavery than of death.

Adeimantus/ By all means, truly.

Socrates/ Further, are not all dreadful and frightful names about these things likewise to be rejected? Cocytus, and Styx, those below, and the dead, and such other appellations in this style, such as terrify all who hear them. These may perhaps serve some other purpose; but we are afraid for our guardians, lest by such a terror they be rendered more effeminate and soft than they ought to be.

Adeimantus/ We are rightly afraid of it.

Socrates/ Are these then to be taken away?

Adeimantus/ They are.

Socrates/ And they must speak and compose on a contrary model.

Adeimantus/ That is plain.

Socrates/ We shall take away likewise the bewailings and lamentations of illustrious men?

Adeimantus/ This is necessary, if what is above be so.

Socrates/ Consider then, whether we rightly take away or not. And do not we say, that the worthy man will imagine that to die is not a dreadful thing to the worthy man whose companion he is?

Adeimantus/ We say so.

Socrates/ Neither then will he lament over him, at least, as if his friend suffered something dreadful.

Adeimantus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And we say this likewise, that such an one is most of all sufficient in himself, for to live happily and in a distinguished manner from others is least of all indigent.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ It is to him, then, the least dreadful to be deprived of a son, a brother, wealth, or any other of those things.

Adeimantus/ Least of all, indeed.

Socrates/ So that he will least of all lament, but endure in the mildest manner when any such misfortune befalls him.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We shall rightly then take away the lamentations of famous men, and assign them to the women,

but not to the better sort, and to such of the men as are dastardly, that so those whom we propose to educate for the guardianship of the country may disdain to make lamentations of this kind.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ We shall again then entreat Homer and the other poets not to say in their compositions that Achilles the son of a Goddess;

> Lay sometimes on his side, and then anon
> On back supine, then prone; then rising up,
> Lamenting wander'd on the barren shore.

Nor how;

> ——With both his hands,
> He pour'd the burning dust upon his head;

nor the rest of his lamentation and bewailing, such and so great as he has composed. Nor that Priamus, so near to the Gods, so meanly supplicated and rolled himself in the dirt:

> Calling on every soldier by his name.

But still much more must we entreat them not to make the Gods, at least, to bewail and say:

> Oh! wretched I, in bearing worthiest son.

And if they are not thus to bring in the Gods, far less should they dare to represent the greatest of the Gods in so unbecoming a manner as this:

> How dear a man, around the town pursu'd,
> Mine eyes behold! and grieved is my heart.
> Ah me! 'tis fated that Patroclus kill
> Sarpedon, whom, of all men, most I love.

For if, friend Adimantus, our youth should seriously hear such things as these, and not laugh at them as spoken most unsuitably, hardly should anyone think it unworthy of himself, of himself being a man, or check himself if he should happen either to say or to do anything of the kind; but

without any shame or endurance would, on small sufferings, sing many lamentations and moans.

Adeimantus/ You say most true.

Socrates/ They must not, therefore, do in this manner, as our reasoning now has showed us—which we must believe, till someone persuade us by some better.

Adeimantus/ They must not, indeed.

Socrates/ But surely neither ought we to be given to excessive laughter; for where one gives himself to violent laughter, such a disposition commonly requires a violent change.

Adeimantus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Nor, if anyone shall represent worthy men as overcome of laughter, must we allow it: much less if he thus represent the Gods.

Adeimantus/ Much less, indeed.

Socrates/ Neither then shall we receive such things as these from Homer, concerning the Gods:

> Excessive laughter rose among the Gods,
> When they beheld lame Vulcan hurrying round.

This is not to be admitted, according to your reasoning.

Adeimantus/ If you incline, to call it my reasoning; this, indeed, is not to be admitted.

Socrates/ But surely the truth is much more to be valued. For if lately we reasoned aright, and if indeed a lye be unprofitable to the Gods, but useful to men in way of a drug, it is plain that such a thing is to be entrusted only to the physicians, but not to be touched by private persons.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ It belongs then to the governors of the city, if to any others, to make a lie, with reference either to enemies or citizens, for the good of the city; but none of the rest must

venture on such a thing. But for a private person to tell a lie to such governors, we will call it the same, and even a greater offence, than for the patient to tell a lie to the physician, or for the man who learns his exercises not to tell his master the truth as to the indispositions of his body; or for one not to tell the pilot the real state of things respecting the ship and sailors, in what condition himself and the other sailors are.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But if you find in the city anyone else making a lye;

> ——Of those who artists are,
> Or prophet, or physician, or who make
> The shafts of spears.

you shall punish them, as introducing a practice subversive and destructive of the city, as of a ship.

Adeimantus/ We must do so, if indeed it is upon speech that actions are completed.

Socrates/ But what? shall not our youth have need of temperance?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are not such things as these the principal parts of temperance: that they be obedient to their governors; that the governors themselves be temperate in drinking, feasting, and in venereal pleasures? And we shall say, I imagine, that such things as these are well spoken, which Diomed says in Homer:

> Sit thou in silence, and obey my speech.

And what follows; thus:

> The Greeks went on in silence, breathing force,
> Revering their commanders, —

and such like.

Adeimantus/ Well spoken.

Socrates/ But what as to these: Thou drunkard with dogs eyes and heart of deer, and all of this kind; are these, or such other juvenile things, which any private person may say against their governors, spoken handsomely?

Adeimantus/ Not handsomely.

Socrates/ For I do not imagine, that when they are heard, they are fit to promote temperance in the youth; and though they may afford a pleasure of a different kind, it is no wonder. But what do you think?

Adeimantus/ Just the same way.

Socrates/ But what say you of this: to make the wisest man say that he thinks it the most handsome thing of all;

> ----When tables are all full
> Of meats and fleshes, and the butler bears
> The wine in flagons, and fills up the cups;

Is the hearing of this proper for the youth towards having the command of himself? Or yet this:

> Most miserable it is,
> To die of famine and have adverse fate.

Or that Zeus, through desire of love-pleasures, easily forgetting all those things which he alone awake revolved in his mind, whilst other Gods and men were asleep, was so struck on seeing Hera as not to choose to come into the house, but wanted to embrace her in the field, telling he is possessed with such desire as exceeded what he felt on their first coming together;

> ——Hid from their parents dear.

Nor yet how Mars and Venus were bound by Vulcan, and other such things?

Adeimantus/ No, truly; these things do not seem fit.

Socrates/ But if any instances of self-denial, with respect to all these things be told, and practiced by eminent men, these are to be beheld and heard. Such as this:

He beat his breast, and thus he chid his heart:
Bear up, my heart! who heavier fate hast borne.

Adeimantus/ By all means, we should do thus.

Socrates/ Neither must we suffer men to receive bribes nor to be covetous.

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Nor must we sing to them that;

Gifts gain the Gods and venerable Kings.

Nor must we commend Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, as if he spoke in moderation in counseling him to accept of presents and assist the Greeks, but without presents not to desist from his wrath. Neither shall we commend Achilles, nor approve of his being so covetous as to receive presents from Agamemnon, and likewise a ransom to give up the dead body of Hector, but not to incline to do it otherwise.

Adeimantus/ It is not right, to commend such things as these.

Socrates/ I grudge, for Homer's sake, to say it, that neither is it lawful that these things, at least, be said against Achilles, nor that they be believed when said by others: how that he spoke thus to Apollo:

Me thou hast injur'd—thou, far-shooting God!
Of all the most destructive: but reveng'd
I sure shou'd be, were I possess'd of power.

And how disobedient he was to the river, though a divinity, and was ready to fight; and again, he says to the river Sperchius, with his sacred locks:

Thy lock to great Patroclus I cou'd give,
Who now is dead.

Nor are we to believe he did this. And the dragging Hector round the sepulcher of Patroclus, and the slaughtering the captives at his funeral pile, that all these things are true we will not say; nor will we suffer our people to be persuaded that Achilles, the son of a Goddess and of Peleus, the most temperate of men and the third from Zeus, and educated by the most wise Chiron, was full of such disorder as to have within him two distempers opposite to one another: the illiberal and covetous disposition, and a contempt both of Gods and of men.

Adeimantus/ You say right.

Socrates/ Neither, let us be persuaded of these things, nor suffer any to say, that Theseus the son of Neptune, and Perithous the son of Zeus, rushed so upon horrible rapines; nor that any child of other deity, nor any hero, would dare to do horrible and impious deeds, such as the lies of the poets ascribe to them: but let us compel the poets, either to say that these are not the actions of these persons, or that these persons are not the children of the Gods, and not to say both. Nor let us suffer them to attempt to persuade our youth that the Gods create evil, and that heroes are no way better than men: for, as we said formerly, these things are neither holy nor true: for we have elsewhere shown that it is impossible that evil should proceed from the Gods.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ And these things are truly hurtful, to the hearers at least; for everyone will forgive himself his own naughtiness when he is persuaded that even the near relations of the gods do and have done things of the same kind: such as are near to Zeus;

> Who, on the top of Ida, have up-rear'd
> To parent Zeus an altar;

And;

Whose Godlike blood is not yet quite extinct.

On which accounts, all such fables must be suppressed, lest they create in our youth a powerful habit of wickedness.

Adeimantus/ We must do so, by all means.

Socrates/ What other species of discourses, have we still remaining, now whilst we are determining what ought to be spoken and what not? We have already mentioned in what manner we ought to speak of the Gods, and likewise of daemons and heroes, and likewise of what relates to another world.

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Should not then what yet remains seem to be concerning men?

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ But it is impossible for us, friend, to regulate this at present.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ Because, I imagine, we will say that the poets and orators speak amiss concerning the greatest affairs of men—how that the most of men are unjust, and, notwithstanding, they are happy; and that the just are miserable; and that it is profitable for one to do unjustly when he is concealed; and that justice is gain indeed to others, but the loss of the just man himself—these, and innumerable other such things, we will forbid them to say, and enjoin them to sing and compose in- fable the contrary to these. Do not you think so?

Adeimantus/ I know it well.

Socrates/ If. then, you acknowledge that I say right, shall I not say that you have acknowledged what all along we seek for?

Adeimantus/ You judge right.

Socrates/ Shall we not then acknowledge that such discourses are to be spoken concerning men, whenever we shall have found out what justice is, and how in its nature it is profitable to the just man to be such, whether he appear to be such or not?

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Concerning the discourses, then, let this suffice. We must now consider, as I imagine, the manner of discourse, and then we shall have completely considered both what is to be spoken, and the manner how.

Here Adimantus said;

Adeimantus/ But I do not understand what you say.

Socrates/ But, it is needful you should, and perhaps you will rather understand it in this way: Is not everything told by the mythologists or poets a narrative of the past, present, or future?

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And do not they execute it, either by simple narration, or imitation, or by both?

Adeimantus/ This, too, I want to understand more plainly.

Socrates/ I seem, to be a ridiculous and obscure instructor; therefore, like those who are unable to speak, I will endeavor to explain, not the whole, but taking up a particular part, show my meaning by this particular. And tell me, do not you know the beginning of the Iliad—where the poet says that Chryses entreated Agamemnon to set free his daughter, but that he was displeased, that Chryses, when he did not succeed, prayed against the Greeks to the God.

Adeimantus/ I know.

Socrates/ You know then that down to these verses;

—The Grecians all he pray'd.

But chief the two commanders, Atreus' sons, the poet himself speaks, and does not attempt to divert our attention elsewhere as if any other person were speaking: but what he says after this he says as if he himself were Chryses, and endeavors as much as possible to make us imagine that the speaker is not Homer, but the priest, an old man; and that in this manner he has composed almost the whole narrative of what happened at Troy and in Ithaca, and all the adventures in the whole Odyssey.

Adeimantus/ It is certainly so.

Socrates/ Is it not then narration when he tells the several speeches, and likewise when he tells what intervenes between the speeches?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ But when he makes any speech in the person of another, do not we say that then he assimilates his speech as much as possible to each person he introduces as speaking?

Adeimantus/ We say so, why do not we?

Socrates/ And is not the assimilating one's self to another, either in voice or figure, the imitating him to whom one assimilates himself?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ In such a manner as this then, it seems, both he and the other poets perform the narrative by means of imitation.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But if the poet did not at all conceal himself, his whole action and narrative would be without imitation: And that you may not say you do not again understand how this should be, I shall tell you. If Homer—after telling how Chryses came with his daughter's ransom, beseeching the

Greeks, but chiefly the kings—had spoken afterwards, not as Chryses, but still as Homer, you know it would not have been imitation, but simple narration. And it would have been somehow thus (I shall speak without meter, for I am no poet): The priest came and prayed that the Gods might grant they should take Troy, and return safe, and begged them to restore him his daughter, accepting the presents, and revering the God. When he had said this, all the rest showed respect, and consented; but Agamemnon was enraged, charging him now to be gone, and not to return again, lest his scepter and the garlands of the God should be of no avail; and told him, that before he would restore his daughter, she should grow old with him in Argos, but ordered him to be gone, and not to irritate him, that he might get home in safety. The old man, upon hearing this, was afraid, and went away in silence. And when he was retired from the camp he made many supplications to Apollo, rehearsing the names of the God, and putting him in mind, and beseeching him, that if ever he had made any acceptable donation, in the building of temples or the offering of sacrifices, in return of these to avenge his tears upon the Greeks with his arrows. Thus, friend, the narration is simple without imitation!

Adeimantus/ I understand.

Socrates/ Understand then, that the opposite of this happens when one, taking away the poet's part between the speeches, leaves the speeches themselves.

Adeimantus/ This, I likewise understand, that the manner of tragedies is of such a kind.

Socrates/ You apprehend perfectly well. And, I imagine, I now make plain to you what I could not before, that in poetry, and likewise in mythology, one kind is wholly by imitation, such as you say tragedy and comedy are; and another kind by the narration of the poet himself, and you

will find this kind most especially in the Dithyrambus; and another again by both, as in Epic poetry, and in many other cases besides, if you understand me.

Adeimantus/ I understand now, what you meant before.

Socrates/ And remember too that, before that, we were saying that we had already mentioned what things were to be spoken, but that it yet remained to be considered in what manner they were to be spoken.

Adeimantus/ I remember, indeed.

Socrates/ This then is what I was saying: that it were necessary we agreed whether we shall suffer the poets to make narratives to us in the way of imitation, or partly in the way of imitation and partly not (and what in each way), or if they are not to use imitation at all.

Adeimantus/ I conjecture, you are to consider whether we shall receive tragedy and comedy into our city, or not.

Socrates/ Perhaps, and something more too, for I do not as yet know, indeed; but wherever our reasoning, as a gale, bears us, there we must go.

Adeimantus/ And truly, you say well.

Socrates/ Consider this, now, Adimantus, whether our guardians ought to practice imitation, or not. Or does this follow from what is above: that each one may handsomely perform one business, but many he cannot; or if he shall attempt it, in grasping at many things he shall fail in all, so as to be remarkable in none?

Adeimantus/ Why shall he not?

Socrates/ And is not the reason the same concerning imitation: that one man is not so able to imitate many things well, as one.

Adeimantus/ He is not.

Socrates/ Hardly then shall he perform any part of the more eminent employments, and at the same time imitate many things, and be an imitator, since the same persons are not able to perform handsomely imitations of two different kinds, which seem to resemble each other; as, for instance, they cannot succeed both in comedy and tragedy: or did you not lately call these two imitations?

Adeimantus/ I did; and you say true that the same persons cannot succeed in them.

Socrates/ Nor can they, at the same time, be rhapsodists and actors.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Nor can the same persons be actors in comedies and in tragedies: and all these are imitations, are they not?

Adeimantus/ Imitations.

Socrates/ The genius of man seems to me, Adimantus, to be shut up within still lesser bounds than these, so that it is unable to imitate handsomely many things, or do these very things of which even the imitations are the resemblances.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ If therefore we are to hold to our first reasoning, that our guardians, unoccupied in any manufacture whatever, ought to be the most accurate manufacturers of the liberty of the city, and to mind nothing but what has some reference to this, it were surely proper they neither did nor imitated anything else; but if they shall imitate at all, to imitate immediately from their childhood such things as are correspondent to these—brave, temperate, holy, free men, and all such things as these—but neither to do, nor to be desirous in imitating, things illiberal or base, lest from imitating they come to be really such. Or have you not

observed that imitations, if from earliest youth they be continued onwards for a long time, are established into the manners and natural temper, both with reference to the body and voice, and likewise the understanding?

Adeimantus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ We will not surely allow, those we profess to take care of, and who ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, either young or old, either reviling her husband, or quarreling with the Gods, or speaking boastingly, when she imagines herself happy; nor yet to imitate her in her misfortunes, sorrows, and lamentations, when sick, or in love, or in child-bed labor. We shall be far from permitting this.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Nor to imitate man or maidservants in doing what belongs to servants.

Adeimantus/ Nor this, neither.

Socrates/ Nor yet to imitate naughty men, as it seems, such as are dastardly and do the contrary of what we have now been mentioning; reviling and railing at one another and speaking abominable things either drunk or sober, or any other things such as persons of this sort are guilty of, either in words or actions, either with respect to themselves or one another. Neither must they accustom themselves to resemble madmen, in words or actions. Even the mad and wicked are to be known, both the men and the women, but none of their actions are to be done or imitated.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But what? are they to imitate such as work in brass or any other handicrafts, or such as are employed in rowing boats, or such as command these, or anything else appertaining to these things?

Adeimantus/ How can they, as they are not to be allowed to give application to any of those things?

Socrates/ But what? shall they imitate horses neighing, or bulls lowing, or rivers murmuring, or the sea roaring, or thunder, and all such like things?

Adeimantus/ We have forbidden them, to be mad, or to resemble madmen.

Socrates/ If then I understand, what you say, there is a certain kind of speech and of narration in which he who is truly a good and worthy man expresses himself when it is necessary for him to say anything, and another kind again, unlike to this, which he who has been born and educated in an opposite manner always possesses, and in which he expresses himself.

Adeimantus/ But of what kind are these?

Socrates/ I imagine, that the worthy man, when he comes in his narrative to any speech or action of a good man, will willingly tell it as if he were himself the man, and will not be ashamed of such an imitation, most especially when he imitates a good man acting prudently and without a slip, and failing seldom, and but little, through diseases, or love, drunkenness, or any other misfortune. But when he comes to anything unworthy of himself, he will not be studious to resemble himself to that which is worse, unless I for a short time when it produces some good, but will be I ashamed, both as he is unpracticed in the imitation of such characters as these, and likewise, as he grudges to degrade himself and stand among the models of baser characters, disdaining it in his mind, and doing it only for amusement.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ He will, not then make use of such a narrative as we lately mentioned with reference to the compositions of Homer, but his composition will participate of both imitation

and the other narrative, and but a small part of it imitation in a great deal of plain narrative. Do I seem to say anything, or nothing at all?

Adeimantus/ You express, perfectly well what ought to be the model of such an orator.

Socrates/ And on the other hand, will not the man, who is not such an one, the more naughty he is, be the readier to rehearse everything whatever, and shall not think anything unworthy of him, so that he shall undertake to imitate everything in earnest, and likewise in presence of many and such things likewise as we now mentioned—thunderings and noises of winds and tempests, and of axles and wheels, and trumpets and pipes and whistles, and sounds of all manner of instruments, and voices of dogs too, and of sheep, and of birds; and the whole expression of all these things shall be by imitation in voices and gestures, having but a small part of it narration.

Adeimantus/ This too, must happen of necessity.

Socrates/ These now, I called the two kinds of diction.

Adeimantus/ They are so.

Socrates/ But has not the one of these small variations; and if the orator afford the becoming harmony and measure to the diction, where he speaks with propriety, the discourse is almost upon one and the same manner, and in one harmony, for the variations are but small, and in a measure which accordingly is somehow familiar?

Adeimantus/ It is indeed, entirely so.

Socrates/ But what as to the other kind? Does it not require the contrary, all kinds of harmony, all kinds of measure, if it be to be naturally expressed, as it has all sorts of variations?

Adeimantus/ It is perfectly so.

Socrates/ Do not, now, all the poets, and such as speak in any kind, make use of either one or other of these models of diction] or of one compounded of both?

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ What then shall we do? Whether shall we admit into our city all of these, or one of the unmixed, or the one compounded?

Adeimantus/ If my opinion, prevail, that uncompounded one which is imitative of what is worthy.

Socrates/ But, surely, Adimantus, the mixed is pleasant at least; and the opposite of what you choose is by far the most pleasant to children and pedagogues and the crowd.

Adeimantus/ It is most pleasant.

Socrates/ But you will not likely, think it suitable to our government, because with us no man is to mind two or more employments, but to be quite simple, as everyone does one thing.

Adeimantus/ It is not indeed suitable.

Socrates/ Shall we not then find, that in such a city alone, a shoemaker is only a shoemaker, and not a pilot along with shoemaking, and that the husbandman is only a husbandman, and not a judge along with husbandry, and that the soldier is a soldier, and not a money-maker besides; and all others in the same way?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And it would appear that if a man who through wisdom were able to become everything, and to imitate everything, should come into our city, and should want to show us his poems, we should revere him as a sacred, admirable and pleasant person, but we should tell him that there is no such person with us in our city, nor is there any such allowed to be, and we should send him out to some

other city, pouring oil on his head and crowning him with wool; but we use a more austere poet and mythologist for our advantage, who may imitate to us the diction of the worthy manner, and may say whatever he says according to those models which we established by law at first, when we undertook the education of our soldiers.

Adeimantus/ So we should do, if it depended on us.

Socrates/ It appears, friend, that we have now thoroughly discussed that part of music respecting oratory and fable, for we have already told what is to be spoken, and in what manner.

Adeimantus/ It appears so to me likewise.

Socrates/ Does it not yet remain, that we speak of the manner of song and of melodies?

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ May not anyone find out what we must say of these things, and of what kind these ought to be, if we are to be consistent with what is above-mentioned?

Here Glauco, laughing, said:

Glaucon/ But I appear, Socrates, to be a stranger to all these matters; for I am not able at present to guess at what we ought to say: I suspect, however.

Socrates/ You are certainly, fully able to say this in the first place, that melody is made up of three things, of sentiment, harmony, and measure.

Glaucon/ Yes, this I can say.

Socrates/ And that the part which consists in the sentiment differs in nothing from that sentiment which is not sung, in this respect, that it ought to be done upon the same models as we just now said, and in the same manner.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And surely, then, the harmony and measure ought to correspond to the sentiment.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But we observed there was no occasion for wailings and lamentations in compositions.

Glaucon/ No occasion, truly.

Socrates/ Which then are the wailing harmonies? Tell me, for you are a musician.

Glaucon/ The mixt Lydian, and the sharp Lydian, and some others of this kind.

Socrates/ Are not these then, to be rejected, for they are unprofitable even to women, such as are worthy, and much more to men?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But drunkenness is most unbecoming our guardians, and effeminacy and idleness.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ Which then are the effeminate and gossiping harmonies?

Glaucon/ The Ionic, and the Lydian, which are called relaxing.

Socrates/ Can you make any use of these, my friend, for military men?

Glaucon/ By no means,: but, it seems, you have yet remaining the Doric and the Phrygian.

Socrates/ I do not know, the harmonies; but leave that harmony which may in a becoming manner imitate the voice and accents of a truly brave man going on in a military action, and every rough adventure, and bearing his fortune in a determinate and persevering manner when he fails of success, goes against wounds or deaths, or falls into any other distress; and that kind of harmony, likewise, which is

suited to what is peaceable, where there is no violence, but all voluntary—where one either persuades or beseeches anyone about anything, either God by prayer, or man by instruction and admonition; or, on the other hand, where one submits himself to another who beseeches, instructs, and persuades, and, upon all these things, acts according to intelligence, and does not behave haughtily, demeaning himself soberly and moderately, gladly embracing whatever befalls. Leave then these two harmonies, the vehement and the gentle, which in the most handsome manner imitate the voice of the misfortunate and of the fortunate, of the moderate and of the brave.

Glaucon/ You desire, to leave no others but those I now mentioned.

Socrates/ We shall not then, have any need of a great many strings, nor a variety of harmony in our songs and melodies.

Glaucon/ It appears to me, we shall not.

Socrates/ We shall not breed, then, such workmen as make harps and spinets, and all those instruments which have many strings and a variety of harmony.

Glaucon/ No, as appears.

Socrates/ But what? Will you admit into your city such workmen as make pipes, or pipers? for are not the instruments which consist of the greatest number of strings, and have all sorts of harmony, imitations of the pipe?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ There is left you still, the lyre and the harp, as useful for your city, and there might likewise be some reed for shepherds in the fields.

Glaucon/ Thus reason, shows us.

Socrates/ We then, do nothing strange if we prefer Apollo and Apollo's instruments, to Marsyas and the instruments of that eminent musician.

Glaucon/ Truly, we do not appear to do it.

Socrates/ And I swear, we have unawares cleansed again our city, which we said was become luxurious.

Glaucon/ And we have wisely done it.

Socrates/ Come then, and let us cleanse what remains; for what concerns the measure, should be suitable to our harmonies, that our citizens pursue not such measures as are diversified and have a variety of cadencies, but observe what are the measures of a decent and manly life, and whilst they observe these, to make the foot and the melody subservient to sentiment of such a kind, and not the sentiment subservient to the foot and melody. But what these measures are is your business to tell, as you have done the harmonies.

Glaucon/ But truly, I cannot tell. That there are three species of which the notes are composed, as there are four in sounds, whence the whole of harmony, I can say, as I have observed it; but which are the imitations of one kind of life, and which of another, I am not able to tell.

Socrates/ But these things, we must consider with Damon's assistance, what notes are suitable to illiberality and insolence, to madness or other ill disposition, and what notes are proper for their opposites. And I remember, but not distinctly, to have heard him calling a certain warrior, composite, a dactyle, and heroic measure, ornamenting him I do not know how, making him equal above and below, in breadth and length, and called one, as I imagine, Iambus, and another Trochaeus. He adapted, besides, the lengths and shortnesses, and in some of these, I believe, he blamed and commended the measure of the foot no less than the

numbers themselves, or something compounded of both, for I cannot speak of these things; for these things, as I said, are to be thrown over upon Damon: to speak distinctly on these matters, would require no small discourse; do not you think so?

Glaucon/ Not a small one, truly.

Socrates/ But can you determine this, that the propriety and impropriety corresponds to the good or ill measure?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But with respect to the good or ill measure, the one corresponds to handsome expression, conforming itself to it, and the other to the reverse. And, in the same way as to the harmonious and the discordant, since the measure and harmony are subservient to the sentiment, as has been now said, and not the sentiment to these.

Glaucon/ These indeed, are to be subservient to the sentiment.

Socrates/ But what, as to the manner of expression, and as to the sentiment itself? must it not correspond to the temper of the soul?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ And all other things correspond to the expression?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ So that the beauty of expression, fine consonancy, and propriety and excellence of numbers, are subservient to the good disposition—not that stupidity which in complaisant language we call good temper, but an understanding truly adorned with a beautiful and fine temper.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Must not these things be always pursued by the youth if they are to mind their business?

Glaucon/ They are indeed to be pursued.

Socrates/ But painting too is, somehow, full of these things, and every other workmanship of the kind; and weaving is full of these, and carving, and architecture, and all workmanship of every kind of vessels—as is, moreover, the nature of bodies and of all vegetables: for in all these there is propriety and impropriety; and the impropriety, discord and dissonance are the sisters of ill expression and ill sentiment, and their opposites are the sisters and imitations of sober and good sentiment.

Glaucon/ 'Tis entirely so.

Socrates/ Are we then to give injunctions to the poets alone, and oblige them to work into their poems the image of the good sentiment, otherwise not to compose at all with us; or are we to enjoin all other workmen likewise, and restrain this ill, undisciplined, illiberal, indecent manner, that they exhibit it neither in the representations of animals, in buildings, nor in any other workmanship; or that he who is not able to do this be not suffered to work with us, lest our guardians, being educated in the midst of ill representations, as in an ill pasture, whereby every day plucking and eating a deal of different things, by little and little they contract imperceptibly some mighty evil in their soul. But we must seek out such workmen as are able by the help of a good natural genius to trace the nature of the beautiful and the decent, that our youth, dwelling as it were in a healthful place, may be profited at all hands; whence from the beautiful works something will be conveyed to the sight and hearing, as a breeze bringing health from salutary places, imperceptibly leading them on directly from

childhood to the resemblance, friendship, and harmony with right reason.

Glaucon/ They should thus, be educated in the most handsome manner by far.

Socrates/ On these accounts therefore, Glauco, is not education in music of the greatest importance, because that the measure and harmony enter in the strongest manner into the inward part of the soul, and most powerfully affect it, introducing decency along with it into the mind, and making everyone decent if he is properly educated, and the reverse if he is not. And, moreover, because the man who has here been educated as he ought, perceives in the quickest manner whatever workmanship is defective, and whatever execution is unhandsome, or whatever productions are of that kind; and being disgusted in a proper manner, he will praise what is beautiful, rejoicing in it, and receiving it into his soul, be nourished by it, and become a worthy and good man; but whatever is ugly, he will in a proper manner despise and hate, whilst yet he is young, and before he is able to understand reason; and when reason comes, such an one as has been thus educated will embrace it, recognizing it perfectly well from its intimate familiarity with him.

Glaucon/ It appears to me, that education in music is for the sake of such things as these.

Socrates/ Just as with reference to letters, we are then sufficiently instructed when we are not ignorant of the elements, which are but few in number, wherever they are concerned, and when we do not despise them more or less as unnecessary to be observed, but by all means give diligence to understand them thoroughly, as it is impossible for us to be men of letters till we do thus.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And if the images of letters appeared anywhere, either in water or in mirrors, should we not know them before we knew the letters themselves? or does this belong to the same art and study?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Is it indeed then according as I say, that we shall never become musicians, neither we ourselves nor those guardians we say we are to educate, before we understand the images of temperance, fortitude, liberality, and magnificence, and the other sister virtues; and on the other hand again, what is the reverse of these, which are everywhere to be met with, and observe them wheresoever they are, both the virtues themselves and the images of them, and despise them neither in small nor in great instances, but let us believe that this belongs to the same art and study?

Glaucon/ There is, great necessity for it.

Socrates/ Must not then, the person who shall have in his soul fine dispositions, and in his appearance whatever is proportionable and corresponding to these, partaking of the same impression, be the most beautiful spectacle to anyone who is able to behold it?

Glaucon/ Exceedingly so.

Socrates/ But what is most beautiful is most desirable.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ He who is musical should surely love those men who are most eminently of this kind, but if one be unharmonious he shall not love him.

Glaucon/ He shall not, if the person be any way defective as to his soul; if, indeed, it were in his body, he would bear with it, so as to be willing to associate with him.

Socrates/ I understand, that your favorites are, or have been of this kind; and I agree to it. But tell me this: is there any communion between temperance and excessive pleasure?

Glaucon/ How can there, for this pleasure discomposes no less than grief?

Socrates/ But has it communion with any other virtue?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But what, has it communion with insolence and intemperance?

Glaucon/ Most of all.

Socrates/ Can you mention a greater and more vehement pleasure than that respecting sensual love?

Glaucon/ I cannot, nor yet one that is more furious.

Socrates/ But the right love is of such a nature as to love the beautiful and the handsome in a temperate and a musical manner?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Nothing then which is furious, or akin to intemperance, is to approach to a right love. Neither must pleasure approach to it, nor must the lover and the persons he loves have communion with it, where they love and are beloved in a right manner.

Glaucon/ No, truly, they must not, Socrates, approach to these.

Socrates/ Thus then, as appears, you will establish by law in the city which is to be settled that the lover is to love, to converse, and associate with his loves, as with his son, for the sake of virtue, if he gain the consent; and as to everything besides, that everyone so converse with him whose love he solicits, as never at all to appear to associate for anything beyond what is now mentioned, and that

otherwise he shall undergo the reproach of being unmusical and unacquainted with the beautiful.

Glaucon/ It must be thus.

Socrates/ Does then, the discourse concerning music seem to you to be finished? for it has terminated where it ought to terminate, as the affairs of music ought, somehow, to terminate in the love of the beautiful.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ But after music, our youth are to be educated in exercise.

Glaucon/ But what?

Socrates/ It is surely necessary that in this likewise they be accurately disciplined, from their infancy, through the whole of life. For the matter, as I imagine, is somehow thus; but do you also consider. For I indeed do not imagine that whatever body is found does by its own virtue render the soul good, but contrariwise, that a good soul, by its virtue, renders the body the best which is possible. But how does it appear to you?

Glaucon/ In the same manner to me, likewise.

Socrates/ If then, when we have sufficiently cultivated the understanding, we shall commit to it the accurate management of the concerns of the body, shall not we, as we are only laying down models (that we may not enlarge), act in a right manner?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ We say then that they are to abstain from drunkenness; for it is more allowable to any than to a guardian to be drunk and not to know where he is.

Glaucon/ It were ridiculous, that the guardian should stand in need of a guardian.

Socrates/ But what as to meats—for these men are wrestlers in the noblest combat, are they not?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ Would not then the bodily plight of the wrestlers be proper for such as these?

Glaucon/ Probably.

Socrates/ But, it is of a drowsy kind, and ticklish as to health: or do you not observe that they sleep out their life, and if they depart but a little from their appointed diet, such wrestlers become greatly and extremely sick?

Glaucon/ I perceive it.

Socrates/ But some more elegant exercise, is requisite for our military wrestlers, who, as dogs, ought to be wakeful, and to see and to hear in the most acute manner, and in their expeditions to put up with many changes of water and of food, of heat and of cold, that so they may not have a ticklish state of health.

Glaucon/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ Is not then the best exercise a kind of sister to the simple music which we a little ago described?

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ That the exercise is to be simple and moderate, and of that kind most especially which pertains to war.

Glaucon/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ Even from Homer, one may learn these things; for you know, that in their warlike expeditions, at the entertainments of their heroes, he never feasts them with fishes—and that even whilst they were by the sea at the Hellespont—nor yet with boiled fleshes, but only with roast, as what soldiers can most easily get; for, in short, one can everywhere more easily make use of fire than carry vessels about with them.

Glaucon/ Yes. indeed.

Socrates/ Neither does Homer, as I imagine, anywhere make mention of seasonings: and this is what the other wrestlers understand, that the body which is to be in good habit must abstain from all these things.

Glaucon/ They rightly understand, and abstain.

Socrates/ You do not then, friend, as appears, approve of the Syracusian table and the Sicilian variety of meats, since this other appears to you to be right?

Glaucon/ I do not, as appears.

Socrates/ You will likewise disapprove of a Corinthian girl, as a mistress, for them who are to be of a good habit of body.

Glaucon/ By all means, truly.

Socrates/ And likewise of those delicacies, as they are reckoned, of Attic confections.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ For all feeding and dieting of this kind, if we compare it to melody and song, which are composed in a harmony and measure diversified all manner of ways, shall not the comparison be just?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ And does not the diversity in that case create intemperance, and here disease; but simplicity as to music creates in the soul temperance, and, as to exercise, creates health in the body.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And when intemperance and diseases multiply in the city, shall we not have many halls of justice and of medicine opened, and the arts of justice and of medicine be in request, when many free persons shall earnestly apply to them?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But can you pitch upon any greater mark of an ill and base education in a city than that there should be need of physicians and supreme magistrates, and that not only for the contemptible and low handicrafts, but for those who boast of having been educated in a liberal manner? Or does it not appear to be base, and a great sign of want of education, to be obliged to observe justice pronounced on us by others, as our masters and judges, and to have no sense of it in ourselves?

Glaucon/ Of all things, this, is the most base.

Socrates/ And do you not, deem this to be more base still, when one not only spends a great part of life in courts of justice, as defendant and plaintiff, but from his ignorance of the beautiful imagines that he becomes renowned for this very thing, as being dexterous in doing injustice, and able to turn himself through all sorts of windings, and using every sort of subterfuge, thinks to get off, so as to evade justice, and all this for the sake of small and contemptible things, being ignorant how much better and more handsome it were so to regulate his life as not to stand in need of a sleepy judge?

Glaucon/ This, is still more base than the other.

Socrates/ And to stand in need of the medicinal art, not on account of wounds, or some epidemical distempers incident, but through sloth and such a diet as we mentioned, filled with rheums and wind, like lakes, obliging the skillful sons of Aesculapius to invent new names to diseases, such as dropsies and catarrhs—do not you think this abominable?

Glaucon/ These are truly, very new and strange names of diseases.

Socrates/ Such, as were not, I imagine, in the days of Aesculapius. And I conjecture so from this, that when Eurypylus was wounded at Troy, and was getting Pramnian wine to drink with a deal of flour in it, with cheese added to it (all which seem to be phlegmatic), the sons of Aesculapius neither blamed the woman who presented it, nor reprehended Patroclus who had presented the cure.

Glaucon/ And surely the potion, is absurd for one in such a case.

Socrates/ No, if you consider that, as they tell us, the descendants of Aesculapius did not, before the days of Herodicus, practice this method of cure, now in use, which puts the patient on a regimen. But Herodicus, being a teacher of youth, and at the same time infirm in his health, mixing exercise and medicine together he made himself most uneasy, in the first place, and afterwards many others besides.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ In procuring to himself, a lingering death; for whilst he was constantly attentive to his disease, which was mortal, he was not able, as I imagine, to cure himself, though, neglecting everything besides, he was still using medicines. And thus he passed his life, still in the greatest uneasiness if he departed in the least from his accustomed diet, and through this wisdom of his, struggling long with death, he arrived at old-age.

Glaucon/ A mighty reward, he reaped of his art!

Socrates/ Such as became one, who did not understand that it was not from ignorance or inexperience of this method of cure that Aesculapius did not discover it to his descendants, but because that he knew, that in all well-regulated states there was some certain work enjoined everyone in the city, which was necessary to be done, and

no one allowed to have the leisure of being sick the whole of life, and attentive only to the taking of medicines. This we may pleasantly observe in the case of laboring people, but we do not observe it in the case of the rich, and such as are counted happy.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ A smith, when he falls sick, thinks it fit to take from the physician some potion, to throw up his disease or purge it downwards, or by means of caustic or amputation to get quit of the trouble; but if anyone prescribe for him a long regimen, putting caps on his head, and other such things, he quickly tells him that he has not leisure to lye sick, nor does it avail him to live in this manner, attentive to his trouble and negligent of his proper work; and so, bidding such a physician farewell, he returns to his ordinary diet, and, if he recovers his health, he continues to manage his own affairs; but if his body be not able to support, he dies, and is freed from troubles.

Glaucon/ It seems proper, for such an one to use the medicinal art in this manner.

Socrates/ Is it not, because he has a certain business, which, if he does not perform, it is not for his advantage to live?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ But the rich man, as we say, has no such work allotted him, from which, if he be obliged to refrain, life is not worth the having.

Glaucon/ He is surely said at least to have none.

Socrates/ For you do not, attend to what Phocylides says, that one ought still, whilst there is life, to practice virtue!

Glaucon/ I think, we attended to that formerly.

Socrates/ Let us by no means, differ from him in this, but let us inform ourselves whether this excessive attention to one's disease is to be the business of the rich, and that life is not worth keeping if he does not give this attention; for that such a life is indeed a hindrance of the mind's application to masonry and other arts, but with respect to the exhortation of Phocylides it is no hindrance.

Glaucon/ Yes, truly it is, and that in the greatest degree, when this excessive care of the body goes beyond proper exercise.

Socrates/ Neither does it agree with attention to private economy, or military expeditions, or sedentary magistracies in the city. But what is of the greatest moment is, that such application to health is ill-fitted for any sort of learning, and enquiry, and study by one's self, whilst one is perpetually dreading certain pains and swimmings of the head, and blaming philosophy as occasioning them; so that where there is this attention to health, it is a great obstacle to the practice of virtue and improvement in it, for it makes us always imagine that we are ill, and always complain of the body.

Glaucon/ That is likely.

Socrates/ And shall we not say that Aesculapius too understood these things, when, to persons of a healthful constitution, and such as used a wholesome diet, but were afflicted by some particular disease, to these and to such a constitution he prescribed medicine, repelling their diseases by drugs and incisions, and enjoined them their accustomed diet, that the public might suffer no damage? But he did not attempt, by extenuating or nourishing diet, to cure such constitutions as were wholly diseased within, as it would but afford a long and miserable life to the man himself, and the descendants which would spring from him would probably

be of the same kind; for he did not imagine the man ought to be cured who could not live in the ordinary course, as he would be neither profitable to himself nor to the state.

Glaucon/ You make Aesculapius, a politician.

Socrates/ It is plain, and his sons may show that he was so. Or do you not see that at Troy they excelled in war, and likewise practiced medicine in the way I mention? Or do not you remember, that when Menelaus was wounded by Pandarus, they

> Wash'd off the blood, and soft'ning drugs applied.

But as to what was necessary for him to eat or drink afterwards, they prescribed for him no more than for Eurypylus, deeming external applications sufficient to heal men who before they were wounded were healthful and moderate in their diet, whatever mixture they happened to have drunk at the time; but they judged, that to have a diseased constitution, and to live an intemperate life, was neither profitable to the men themselves nor to others, and that their art ought not to be employed on these, nor to minister to them, not even though they were richer than Midas.

Glaucon/ You make, the sons of Aesculapius truly ingenious.

Socrates/ It is proper, —though, in opposition to us, the writers of tragedy, and Pindar, call indeed Aesculapius the son of Apollo, but say that he was prevailed on by gold to undertake the cure of a rich man who was already in a deadly state, for which, truly, he was even struck with a thunderbolt. But we, agreeably to what has been formerly said, will not believe them as to both these things, but will aver, that if he was the son of the God, he was not given to filthy lucre; or if he were given to filthy lucre, he was not a son of the God.

Glaucon/ These things, are most right. But what do you say, Socrates, as to this: Is it not necessary to provide good physicians for the state? and must not these, most likely, be such who have been conversant with the greatest number of healthy and of sickly people? and these, in like manner, be the best judges who have been conversant with all sorts of dispositions?

Socrates/ I mean now, those who are very good. But do you know whom I deem to be such?

Glaucon/ If you tell me.

Socrates/ I shall endeavor to do it; but you enquire in one question about two different things.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ Physicians, would become most expert if, beginning from their infancy, they would in learning the art be conversant with the greatest number of bodies, and these the most sickly, and labored themselves under all manner of diseases, and by natural constitution were not quite healthful; for it is not by the body, I imagine, that they cure the body (else their own bodies could at no time be admitted to be of an ill constitution), but they cure the body by the soul, which, whilst it is of an ill constitution, is not capable to perform well any cure.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ But the judge, friend, governs the soul by the soul; which, if from its childhood it has been educated with bad souls, and has been conversant with them, and has itself done all manner of evil, it is not able to come out from among them so as accurately by itself to judge of the evils of others, as happens in the diseases of the body; but it must in its youth be inexperienced and unpolluted with evil manners, if it means to be good and beautiful itself, and to judge soundly of what is just. And hence the virtuous in their

youth appear simple and easily deceived by the unjust, as they have not within themselves dispositions similar to those of the wicked.

Glaucon/ And surely this at least, they do often suffer extremely.

Socrates/ For which reason, the good judge is not to be a young man, but an old, having been late in learning wickedness what it is; perceiving it not as a kindred possession residing in his own soul, but as a foreign one in the souls of others, which he has for a long time studied, and has understood what sort of an evil it is, by the help of science, rather than by proper experience.

Glaucon/ Such an one, is like to be the most able judge.

Socrates/ And likewise a good one, which was what you required, for he who has a good soul is good. But the other notable and suspicious man, who has committed many pieces of iniquity himself, when indeed he converses with his like, being thought to be subtle and wise, he appears a notable man, being extremely cautious, having an eye to those models which he has within himself; but when he approaches the good and the more aged, he appears foolish, suspicious out of season, and ignorant of integrity of manners, as having within no models of such a kind. But, however, being more frequently conversant with the wicked than with the wise, he appears, both to himself and others, to be more wise rather than more ignorant.

Glaucon/ This, is perfectly true.

Socrates/ We must not, therefore, look for such an one to be a wise and good judge, but the former one; for indeed vice can never at all know both itself and virtue; but virtue, where the temper is instructed by time, shall attain to the knowledge of both itself and vice. This one, then, and not the wicked, as it appears to me, is the wise man.

Glaucon/ And I, am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ Will you not then establish in the city such a method of medicine as we have mentioned, along with such a method of judicature as shall carefully preserve for you those of your citizens who are of goodly constitutions both in mind and in body; and with respect to those who are otherwise, such as are so in their bodies, they shall suffer to die, but such as are of naughty and incurable constitutions in their soul, these they shall themselves put to death.

Glaucon/ This, has appeared to be best, both for those who suffer it, and for the city.

Socrates/ And it is plain, that your youth will be afraid of needing this judiciary, whilst they are employed in that simple music which, we say, generates temperance.

Glaucon/ Why will they not?

Socrates/ And according to the very same steps of reasoning, the musician who takes a fancy to perform exercises will choose to do it so as not to require any medicine unless there be necessity.

Glaucon/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ And he will perform his exercises and his labors, studying the sprightliness of his temper and the animating it, rather as bodily vigor, and not as the other wrestlers, who take meats and drinks to promote bodily strength.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ Why then, Glauco, they who propose to teach music and exercise, propose these things, not for what the generality imagine, to cure the body by the one, and the soul by the other.

Glaucon/ What then?

Socrates/ They seem, to propose them both chiefly on the soul's account.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ Do not you perceive, how these are affected as to their understanding who have all their life been conversant in exercises, but have never applied to what is musical? or how these are affected who have lived in a method the reverse of this?

Glaucon/ Whom, do you speak of?

Socrates/ Of rusticity, and fierceness, and again of softness and mildness.

Glaucon/ I know, that these who are conversant in nothing but mere exercises turn out to be more rustic than is becoming; and they, again, who mind music alone are more soft than is for their honor.

Socrates/ And surely, this rusticity, at least, may generate a sprightliness of temper, and, when rightly disciplined, may turn to fortitude; but when carried further than is becoming, may, as is likely, be both more fierce and troublesome.

Glaucon/ So I imagine.

Socrates/ But what, does not the philosophic temper partake of the mild? and when this disposition is carried too far, may it not prove more soft than is becoming, but when rightly disciplined, be really mild and comely?

Glaucon/ These things are so.

Socrates/ But we say that our guardians ought to have both these dispositions.

Glaucon/ They ought.

Socrates/ Ought not then these to be adapted to one another?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ And the soul in which they are thus adapted is temperate and brave.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But the soul in which they are not adapted is cowardly and savage.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And when one yields up himself to be soothed with the charms of music, and pours into his soul through his ears, as through a pipe, those we denominated the soft, effeminate, and plaintive harmonies, and spends the whole of his life chanting and ravished with melody, such an one, at the first, if he have anything high spirited, softens it like iron, and from being useless and fierce, renders it profitable. But when he, still persisting, does not desist, but enchants his soul, after this it melts and dissolves him, till it thoroughly soften his spirit and cut out, as it were, the nerves of his soul, and render him an effeminate warrior.

Glaucon/ It is certainly so indeed.

Socrates/ But if, he had from the beginning a spiritless temper, this he quickly effectuates, but if high spirited, it renders the mind weak and easily turned, so as instantly to be enraged at trifles, and again the rage is extinguished: so that from being high spirited, they become outrageous and passionate, full of the morose.

Glaucon/ So indeed it happens.

Socrates/ But what now, if one labor much in exercises, and feast extremely well, but apply not to music and philosophy, shall he not, in the first place, being in good plight of body, be filled with courage and spirit, and become more courageous than he was before?

Glaucon/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ But what? When he does nothing else, nor participates in anything which is music like, though there were any love of learning in his soul, as it neither tastes of any study, nor bears a share in any inquiry nor reasoning, nor anything besides which is musical, must it not become feeble and deaf and blind, as his perceptions are neither awakened nor nourished nor refined?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Such an one then becomes, as I imagine, a reason-hater, and unmusical, and by no means can be persuaded to anything by reasoning, but is carried to everything by force and savageness, as a wild beast; and thus he lives in ignorance and barbarity, out of measure and unpolished.

Glaucon/ It is, entirely so.

Socrates/ Corresponding then to these two tempers, I would say that some God, as appears, has given men two arts, those of music and exercise, in reference to the sprightly and the philosophic temper, not for the soul and body, otherwise than as a by-work, but for that other purpose, that those two tempers might be adapted to one another, being stretched and slackened to the proper pitch.

Glaucon/ So indeed it appears.

Socrates/ Whoever then shall in the most handsome manner mingle exercise with music, and have these in the justest measure in his soul, him we shall most properly call the most completely musical and of the best harmony, far more than the man who adjusts to one another musical strings.

Glaucon/ Most reasonably, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we not then, Glauco, always have need of such a president for our state, if our government is to be preserved?

Glaucon/ We shall most especially have need of this.

Socrates/ Those then may be the models of education and discipline. For why should one go over the dances, the hunting of wild beasts, both with dogs and with nets, the wrestlings and the horse-races proper for such persons, for it is quite manifest that these naturally follow of course, and it is no difficult matter to find them out.

Glaucon/ It is indeed, not difficult.

Socrates/ Be it so; but what follows next? What was next to be determined by us? Was it which of these shall govern, and be governed?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ Is it not plain that the elder ought to be governors, and the younger to be the governed?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And is it not likewise plain that the best of them are to govern?

Glaucon/ This too is plain.

Socrates/ But are not the best husbandmen the most assiduous in agriculture?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ If now our guardians are the best, will they not be most vigilant over the city?

Glaucon/ They will.

Socrates/ Must we not, for this purpose, make them prudent, and able, and careful likewise of the city?

Glaucon/ We must do so.

Socrates/ But one would seem to be most careful of that which he happens to love?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And one shall most especially love that to which he thinks the same things are profitable which are so to himself, and with whose good estate he thinks his own connected; and where he is of a contrary opinion he will be contrary-wise affected.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ We must choose then from the other guardians such men as shall most of all others appear to us, on observation, to do with the greatest cheerfulness, through the whole of life, whatever they think advantageous for the state, and what appears to be disadvantageous they will not do by any means.

Glaucon/ These are the most proper.

Socrates/ It truly appears to me that they ought to be observed through every stage of their life, if they be tenacious of this opinion, so as that neither fraud nor force make them inconsiderately throw out this opinion: that they ought to do what is best for the state.

Glaucon/ What throwing out do you mean?

Socrates/ I will tell you. An opinion seems to me to go out of the understanding voluntarily or involuntarily: a false opinion goes voluntarily from the mind which unlearns it, but every true opinion goes involuntarily.

Glaucon/ The case of the voluntary one, I understand, but that of the involuntary I want to learn.

Socrates/ What now? Do not you think, that men are involuntarily deprived of good things, but voluntarily of evil things? Or is it not an evil to miss of the truth, and a good to form true opinion? Or does it not appear to you that to conceive of things as they really are is to form true opinion?

Glaucon/ You say rightly indeed; they do seem to me to be deprived unwillingly of true opinion.

Socrates/ Do not they then suffer this, either in the way of theft, flattery, or force?

Glaucon/ I do not now, understand you.

Socrates/ I seem, to speak theatrically. But, I say, those have their opinions stolen away who are persuaded to change their opinions, and those who forget them: in the one case they are imperceptibly taken away by time, and in the other by reasoning. Do you now understand in any measure?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And those, I say, have their opinions forced from them whom grief or agony obliges to change them.

Glaucon/ This, I understand, and you say right.

Socrates/ And those, I imagine you will say, are beguiled out of their opinions, who change them, being bewitched by pleasure or seduced by fear, being afraid of something.

Glaucon/ It seems, that everything beguiles which deceives us.

Socrates/ That then which I was now mentioning must be sought for: who are the best guardians of this opinion—that that is to be done which is best for the state—and they must be observed immediately from their childhood, setting before them such pieces of work in which they may most readily forget such a principle and be deluded; and he who is mindful and hard to be deluded is to be chosen, and he who is otherwise is to be rejected. Is it not so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we must appoint them trials of labors and of pains, in which we must observe the same things.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Must we not, appoint them a third contest, that of the mountebank kind, and observe them as those do who,

when they lead on young horses against noises and tumults, observe whether they are frightened. So must they, whilst young, be led into dreadful things, and again be thrown into pleasures, trying them more than gold in the fire, whether one is hard to be beguiled with mountebank tricks, and appear composed amidst all, being a good guardian of himself and of that music which he learned, showing himself in all these things to be in just measure and harmony. Being of such a kind as this, he would truly be of the greatest advantage both to himself and to the state. And the man who in childhood, in youth, and in manhood has been thus tried, and has come out pure, is to be appointed governor and guardian of the state, and honors are to be paid him whilst alive, and when dead he should receive the highest rewards of public funeral and other memorials; and he who is not such an one is to be rejected. Of such a kind, Glauco, as it appears to me, is to be the choice and establishment of our governors and guardians, as in a sketch and not accurately.

Glaucon/ And I, am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ Is it not then truly most just to call these the most complete guardians, both with reference to enemies abroad and to friends at home, so as that the one shall not have the will, nor the other have the power, to do any mischief? And the youth (whom we now called guardians) will be allies and auxiliaries to the decrees of the governors.

Glaucon/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ What now, may be the contrivance of those lies, which are made on occasion, and of which we were lately saying that it is a most generous part in making lies, to persuade the governors themselves most especially, or if not these, the rest of the state?

Glaucon/ What sort do you mean?

Socrates/ Nothing new, but somewhat Phoenician, which has frequently happened heretofore, as the poets tell us, and have persuaded us, but has not happened in our times, nor do I know if ever it shall happen: to persuade one of it surely requires a subtle persuasion.

Glaucon/ How like you are, to one who grudges to speak out!

Socrates/ I shall appear, to grudge with very good reason after I tell it.

Glaucon/ Speak, and do not fear.

Socrates/ I speak then, though I know not with what courage, and using what expressions, I shall tell it. And I shall attempt, first of all, to persuade the governors themselves and the soldiers, and afterwards the rest of the state, how that whatever things we educated and instructed them in seemed to happen to them, and to befall them all as dreams, but that they were in truth at that time formed and educated within the earth, both they themselves, and their armor, and their other utensils likewise fabricated, and after that they were completely fashioned, the earth, who is their mother, brought them forth; and now they ought to be affected towards the country where they are, as to their mother and nurse, to defend her if any invade her, and to consider the rest of the citizens as being their brothers and sprung from their mother earth.

Glaucon/ It was not without reason, that a while ago you was ashamed to tell this falsehood.

Socrates/ I had truly reason: but hear, however, the rest of the fable. All of you now in the state are brothers (as we shall tell them in way of fable), but the God, when he formed you, mixed gold in the formation of such of you as are able to govern, therefore are they the most honorable; and silver in such as are auxiliaries, and iron and brass in the

husbandmen and other handicrafts. As you are all of the same kind, you for the most part resemble one another, and it sometimes happens that of the gold is generated the silver, and of the silver there is a golden descendant, and thus every different way are they generated of one another. The God gives in charge, first of all, and chiefly to the governors, that of nothing are they to be so good guardians, nor are they so strongly to keep watch over anything as over their children, to know what of those principles is mixed in their souls; and if their descendant shall be of the brazen or iron kind, they shall by no means have compassion, but assigning him honor proportioned to his natural temper, they shall push him down to the craftsmen or husbandmen. And if, again, any from among these shall be born of a golden or silver kind, they shall pay them honor and prefer them, those to the guardianship, and these to the auxiliary rank—it being pronounced by the oracle that the state is then to perish, when iron or brass shall have the guardianship of it. Have you now any contrivance to persuade them of this fable?

Glaucon/ None, to persuade these men themselves; but I can contrive how that their sons and posterity, and all mankind afterwards, shall believe it.

Socrates/ Even this, would do well towards making them more concerned about the state and one another; for I almost understand what you say, and this truly will lead the same way as the oracle. But let us, having armed these earth-born sons, lead them forwards under their leaders, and when they are come into the city, let them consider where it is best to place their camp, so as best to keep in order those who are within, if anyone should want to disobey the laws, and likewise defend against those without, if any enemy, as a wolf, should come upon the fold. And when they have marked out their camp, and performed sacrifices to the

proper Divinities, let them erect their tents—or how are they to do?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Shall they not be such as may be sufficient to defend them both from winter and summer?

Glaucon/ Why not? for you seem, to mean houses.

Socrates/ Yes, but military ones, not such as are costly.

Glaucon/ What do you say, is the difference between the one and the other?

Socrates/ I will endeavor, to tell you; for of all things it is the most dreadful, and the most shameful to shepherds, to breed such kind of dogs, and in such a manner, as auxiliaries of the flocks, as either through intemperance or famine, or some other ill disposition, the dogs themselves should attempt to hurt the sheep, and, instead of dogs, resemble wolves.

Glaucon/ That is dreadful; why, is it not?

Socrates/ Must we not then, by all means, take care lest our allies do such a thing towards our citizens, as they are more powerful, and instead of generous allies resemble savage lords?

Glaucon/ We must take care.

Socrates/ Would they not be prepared, as to the greatest part of the care, if they were really well educated?

Glaucon/ But they are so at least.

Socrates/ That is not proper to be confidently affirmed, friend Glauco, but that is proper which we were now saying, that they ought to have good education, whatever it is, if they are to have what is of the greatest consequence towards rendering them mild, both among themselves and towards those who are guarded by them.

Glaucon/ Very right.

Socrates/ Besides then this education, anyone of understanding would say that their houses, and all their other substance, ought to be so contrived as not to hinder their guardians from being the very best of men, and not to stir them up to injure the other citizens.

Glaucon/ And he will say true.

Socrates/ If then they intend to be such, consider, whether they ought to live and dwell in some such manner as this: First then, let none possess any substance privately, unless there be the greatest necessity for it; next, let none have any dwelling or store-house into which whoever inclines may not enter; as for necessaries, let them be such as temperate and brave warriors may require, and as they are instituted by the other citizens, let them receive such a reward of their guardianship as to have neither overplus nor deficiency at the year's end. Let them have public meals, as in encampments, and live in common. They must be told that they have from the Gods a divine gold and silver at all times in their souls, and have no need of the human, and that it were profane to pollute the possession of the divine kind by mixing it with the possession of this mortal gold, because the money of the vulgar has produced many wicked deeds, but that of these men is incorruptible. And of all the men in the city, they alone are not allowed to handle nor to touch gold nor silver, nor to bring it under their roof, nor carry it about with them, nor to drink out of silver or gold, and that thus they are to preserve themselves and the state. But whenever they shall possess lands, and houses, and money in a private way, they shall become stewards and farmers instead of guardians, hateful lords instead of allies to the other citizens, hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they shall pass the whole of their life, much oftener, and more afraid of the enemies from within than from without, they and the rest of the state hastening

speedily to destruction. For all which reasons, let us affirm that our guardians are thus to be constituted, with reference both to their houses and to other things. And let us settle these things by law. Shall we?

Glaucon/ By all means.

THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK

The Fourth Book

Socrates/ Adimantus hereupon replying;

Adeimantus/ What now, Socrates, will you say in your own defense, if one shall say that you do not make these men very happy, though it is owing to these men that the city really exists, yet they enjoy no advantage in the city, such as others do who possess lands, build beautiful and large houses, purchase suitable furniture, offer sacrifices at their own expense, give public entertainments to strangers, and possess what you was now mentioning, gold and silver, and everything which is reckoned to contribute towards the rendering men happy; but one may readily say that, like hired auxiliaries, they seem to possess nothing in the city but the employment of keeping guard.

Socrates/ Yes, and that too only for their maintenance, without receiving, as all others do, any reward besides. So that they are not allowed so much as to travel privately anywhere abroad, though they should incline it, nor to bestow money on others, nor to spend it in such other methods as these do who are counted happy. These and many such things you leave out of the accusation.

Adeimantus/ But let these things too, be charged against them.

Socrates/ You ask then what we shall say in our defense?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Whilst we go on in the same road, we shall find, as I imagine, what may be said; for we shall say that it were nothing strange if these men, even in these circumstances, should be the happiest possible; yet it was not with an eye to this that we established the city, to have anyone tribe in it remarkably happy beyond the rest, but that the whole city might be in the happiest condition. For we judged that in such an one we should most especially find justice, and

injustice in the city the worst established, and that upon thoroughly examining these we should determine what we have for some time been in quest of. Now then, as I imagine, we are forming a happy state, not picking out some few persons to make them alone happy, but are establishing the universal happiness of the whole; and we shall next consider a state which is the reverse. As if, then, we were painting human figures, and one approaching should blame us, saying that we do not put the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the creature, for that the eyes, the most beautiful part, were not painted with purple, but with black, would not we seem to say tolerably well, in our defense to him, when we said, Wonderful critic! do not imagine that we ought to paint the eyes beautiful, in such a way as that they would not appear to be eyes, and so with reference to all other parts, but consider whether in giving each particular part its due we make the whole beautiful. And so now, do not oblige us to confer such a happiness on our guardians as shall make them anything rather than guardians. For we know too how to array the husbandmen in rich and costly robes, and to enjoin them to cultivate the ground only with a view to pleasure; and in like manner those who make earthen ware, to lie at their ease by the fire, to drink and feast, neglecting the wheel, and working only so much as they incline; and we know how to confer a felicity of this nature on every individual, in order to render the whole state happy. But do not advise us to act after this manner, since, if we obey you, neither would the husbandman really be a husbandman, nor the potter be a potter, nor would any other really be of any of those professions of which the city is composed. But as to others it is less matter; for when shoe-makers become bad, and are degenerate, and profess to be shoemakers when they are not, no great mischief happens to the state; but when the

guardians of the law and of the state are not so in reality, but only in appearance, you see how they entirely destroy the whole constitution, if they alone shall have the privilege of an affluent and happy life. If we then are for appointing men who shall be really guardians of the city, the least of all hurtful to it, and he who makes the objection, is for having them rather as certain farmers, and as in a festival-meeting, not in a city, certain public entertainers indulging in jollity, he must mean something else than a city. We must then consider whether we establish guardians with this view, that they may have the greatest happiness; or if we establish them with a view to the happiness of the whole city. Let us see whether this takes place, and let us oblige these allies and guardians to do this, and we must persuade them they shall thus become the best performers of their own particular work; and we must deal with all others in the same manner. And thus the whole city being increased and well constituted, let us allow the several tribes to participate of happiness as their natures admit.

Adeimantus/ You seem to me, to say well.

Socrates/ Shall I appear to you, to speak right in what is akin to this?

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Consider whether other artificers are corrupted by these things, so as to be made bad workmen.

Adeimantus/ What things do you mean?

Socrates/ Riches, and poverty.

Adeimantus/ As how?

Socrates/ Thus: does the potter after he becomes rich seem still to mind his art?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ But will he not become more idle and careless than formerly?

Adeimantus/ Much more so.

Socrates/ Shall he not then become a more unskillful potter?

Adeimantus/ Much more so likewise.

Socrates/ And surely, being unable through poverty to furnish himself with tools, or anything else requisite to his art, his workmanship shall be more imperfectly executed, and his sons or those others whom he instructed shall be inferior artists.

Adeimantus/ How should they not?

Socrates/ Through both these now, poverty and riches, the workmanship in the arts is rendered less perfect, and the artists themselves become less expert.

Adeimantus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ We have then, it seems, discovered other things, which our guardians must by all means watch against, that they may nowise escape their notice and steal into the city.

Adeimantus/ What kind of things are these?

Socrates/ Riches, and poverty: as the one is productive of luxury, idleness, and a love of novelty, and the other, besides a love of novelty, is illiberal and productive of mischief.

Adeimantus/ They are entirely so. But consider this, Socrates: How shall our city be able to engage in war, since she is possessed of no money, especially if she be obliged to wage war against a great and opulent state?

Socrates/ It is plain, that to fight against one of this kind is somewhat difficult, but to fight against two is a more easy matter.

Adeimantus/ How say you,?

Socrates/ First of all now, if they have at all occasion to fight, will they not, being expert in the art of war, fight against rich men?

Adeimantus/ They will.

Socrates/ What then, Adimantus, do not you think that one boxer, who is fitted out in the best manner possible for this exercise, is easily able to fight against two who are not expert boxers, but on the contrary are rich and unwieldy?

Adeimantus/ He would not easily fight with both at once?

Socrates/ No? —though he had it in his power to retire a little, and then turn on the one who should be the furthest advanced towards him, and strike him, and by doing this frequently in the fun and heat, might not a person of this kind easily defeat many such as these?

Adeimantus/ To be sure, that would be no great wonder.

Socrates/ But do not you think that the rich have more knowledge and experience of boxing than of the military art?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Easily then, as it plainly appears, will our boxers combat with double and triple their number.

Adeimantus/ I will agree with you, for you seem to me to say right.

Socrates/ But what if they should send an embassy to another state, informing them of the true situation of the affair, telling we make no use of gold or silver, neither is it lawful for us to use them, but with you it is lawful; if then you become our allies in the war, you will receive the spoils of all the other states: do you imagine that any, on hearing these things, would choose to fight against strong and resolute dogs, rather than in alliance with the dogs to fight against fat and tender sheep?

Adeimantus/ I do not think it; but if the riches of others be amassed into one state, see that it does not endanger that which is poor.

Socrates/ You are happy, that you imagine any other deserves to be called a state besides such an one as we have established.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ We must give others, a more magnificent appellation, for each of them consists of many states, and is not one, as is said in way of irony; for there are always in them two parties at war with each other, the poor and the rich; and in each of these again there are very many, to which, if you apply as to one, you are mistaken entirely; but if, as to many, you put one part in possession of the goods and power of another, or even deliver up the one to the other, you shall always have the many for your allies, and the few for enemies. And so long as your state shall continue temperately, as now established, it shall be the greatest. I do not say it shall be accounted so, but shall be really the greatest, though its defenders were no more than one thousand; for one state so great you will not easily find, neither among the Greeks not Barbarians, but many which are accounted many times larger than such an one as this. Are you of a different opinion?

Adeimantus/ No truly.

Socrates/ Might not this then, be the best mark for our rulers how large to make the city, and what extent of ground to mark off for it in proportion to its bulk, without minding anything more?

Adeimantus/ What mark?

Socrates/ I imagine, this one: so long as the city on its increase continues to be one, so long it may be increased, but not beyond it.

Adeimantus/ Very right.

Socrates/ Shall we not then lay this further injunction on our guardians, to take care by all means that the city be neither small nor great, but of moderate extent, and be one city?

Adeimantus/ We shall probably, enjoin them a trifling affair.

Socrates/ A more trifling affair still than this, is that we mentioned above, when we observed, that if any descendant of the guardians be naughty, he ought to be dismissed to the other classes; and if any descendant of the others be worthy, he is to be raised to the rank of the guardians. And this was intended to show that all the other citizens ought to apply themselves each to that particular art for which he has a natural genius, that so everyone minding his own proper work may not be many, but be one, and so likewise the whole state may become one and not be many.

Adeimantus/ This indeed, is still a more trifling matter than the other.

Socrates/ We do not here, good Adimantus, as one may imagine, enjoin them many and great matters, but such as are all trifling, if they take care of one grand point, as the saying is, or rather that which is sufficient in place of the grand.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Education, and nurture; for if, being well educated, they become temperate men, they will easily see through all these things, and such other things as we omit at present, respecting women, marriages, and the propagation of the species. For these things ought all, according to the proverb, to be made entirely common among friends.

Adeimantus/ That, would be the rightest way.

Socrates/ And surely, if once a Republic is set a-going, it proceeds happily, increasing as a circle. And whilst good education and nurture are preserved, they produce good geniuses; and good geniuses, partaking of such education, produce still better than the former, as well in other respects, as with reference to propagation, as in the case of other animals.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ To speak then briefly, this the guardians of the state must oppose, that it may not, escaping their notice, hurt the constitution; nay, above all things, they must guard against this, not to make any innovations in the exercise and music, contrary to the established order of the state, but to maintain this order as much as possible. Being afraid lest that whilst one says that poetical expression;

> —Men most admire that song
> Which has the most of novelty.

one should frequently imagine that the Poet means not new songs, but a new method of the song, and should commend this. Such a thing is neither to be commended nor admitted: for to receive a new kind of music is to be guarded against as endangering the whole of the constitution; for never are the measures of music altered without the greatest politic laws, according to Damon, with whom I agree.

Adeimantus/ You may place me likewise. among those who are of that opinion.

Socrates/ We must erect then, some barrier, as would seem, somewhere here for our guardians themselves, with regard to music.

Adeimantus/ A transgression here, easily indeed steals in imperceptibly.

Socrates/ It does, in the way of diversion, and as productive of no mischief.

Adeimantus/ For neither indeed does it produce any other, but that becoming familiar by degrees it insensibly runs into the manners and pursuits; and from thence, in intercourse of dealings one with another, it becomes greater; and from this intercourse it enters into laws and policies with a deal of impudence, Socrates, till at last it overturn all things, both private and public.

Socrates/ Well, let it be allowed to be so.

Adeimantus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Ought not then our children, as I said at the beginning, to receive directly from their infancy an education more agreeable to the laws of the constitution? because if their education be such as is contrary to law, and the children be of such a nature themselves, it is impossible that they should ever grow up to be worthy men and observant of the laws.

Adeimantus/ Why is it not?

Socrates/ But when handsome amusements are appointed them from their infancy, and when by means of the music they embrace that amusement which is according to law (contrariwise to those others), this music attends them in everything else, and grows with them, and raises up in the city whatever formerly was fallen down.

Adeimantus/ It is true indeed.

Socrates/ And these men, discover those establishments which appear trifling, and which those others destroyed altogether.

Adeimantus/ What establishments?

Socrates/ Such as these: silence of the younger before the elder, which is proper, and the giving them place, and rising up before them, and reverence of parents; likewise what shaving, what clothes, shoes, with the whole dress of the

body, and everything else of the kind. Are you not of this opinion?

Adeimantus/ I am.

Socrates/ But to establish these things by law would, I imagine, be a silly thing, nor is it done anywhere, nor would it stand, though established both by word and writing.

Adeimantus/ For how is it possible?

Socrates/ It seems then, Adimantus, that a man's character and conduct will always be according to his education, let him apply himself afterwards to what he will; or does not the like always produce the like?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ And we may say, I imagine, that at last it arrives at somewhat complete and vigorous, either good or what is the reverse.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ I would not then, for these reasons, as yet, undertake to settle by law such things as these.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ But what truly now, as to those laws relative to matters of exchange, and to their traffic one with another at market, and, if you please, their traffic likewise among their handicrafts, their scandals, bodily hurt, and raising of lawsuits, their institution of judges, and likewise such imposts and payments of taxes as may be necessary either at mecates or at shores, or in general whatever laws are municipal, civil, or of the marine, or what other laws there may be of this kind—shall we dare to establish any of these?

Adeimantus/ It is improper, to prescribe these to good and worthy men, for they will easily find out the most of them, such as ought to be established by law.

Socrates/ Yes, friend, if at least God grant them the preservation of the laws we formerly explained.

Adeimantus/ And if not, they will spend the whole of their life, making and amending many such laws as these, imagining that they shall thus attain to that which is best.

Socrates/ You say that such as these shall lead a life, like those who are sick, and at the same time unwilling, through intemperance, to quit an unwholesome diet.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And these truly must live very pleasantly! For though they deal with physicians, they gain nothing, but render their diseases greater and more complex; and they still hope that, when anyone recommends any medicine to them, they shall by means of it be made whole.

Adeimantus/ This is entirely the situation of such diseased persons as these.

Socrates/ But what, is not this pleasant in them? to count that man the most hateful of all who tells them the truth: that, 'till one give over drunkenness, and gluttony, and unchaste pleasure, and laziness, neither drugs nor caustics, nor amputations, nor charms, nor applications, nor any other such things as these, will be of any avail.

Adeimantus/ That, is not quite pleasant; for to be enraged at one who tells us what is right has nothing pleasant in it.

Socrates/ You are no admirer, as it would seem, of this sort of men.

Adeimantus/ No truly.

Socrates/ Neither then, though the whole of the city (as we were lately saying) should do such a thing, would you commend them; or is not the same thing which is done by these people done by all those cities which, being ill-governed, enjoin their citizens not to alter any part of the

constitution, for that whoever shall do such a thing is to be put to death, but that whoever shall with greatest cheerfulness pay reverence to those who govern in this fashion, and shall gratify them in the most obsequious manner, and anticipating their desires, be most dexterous in satisfying them, shall be reckoned both worthy and wise in matters of highest importance, and be held by them in the greatest honor?

Adeimantus/ They seem to me at least, to do the very same thing, and by no means do I commend them.

Socrates/ But what again as to those who desire to have the management of such states, and are even fond of it? are you not delighted with their courage and dexterity?

Adeimantus/ I am, excepting such as are imposed on by them and fancy that they are really politicians, because they are commended as such by the multitude.

Socrates/ How do you mean? Do you not pardon those men? Or do you even think it is possible for a man who cannot measure himself, when he hears many other such men telling that he is four cubits, not to believe this of himself?

Adeimantus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Then be not angry in this case; for such men as these are of all the most ridiculous, always making laws about such things as we now mentioned, and always amending. They imagine that they shall find some period of these frauds respecting commerce, and those other things I now spoke of, being ignorant that they are in reality attempting to destroy a hydra.

Adeimantus/ They are surely, doing nothing else.

Socrates/ I imagine then, that a true law-giver ought not to give himself much disturbance about such a species of laws and police, either in an ill or well-regulated state: in the

one, because it is unprofitable and of no avail; in the other, because anyone can find out some of the laws, and others of them show of course from the habits arising from their early education.

Adeimantus/ What part then of the institutions of law, have we yet remaining?

Socrates/ To us indeed there is nothing remaining; but however, to the Delphian Apollo there remains the greatest, noblest, and most important of legal institutions.

Adeimantus/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ The institutions of temples, sacrifices, and other worship of the Gods, Daemons, and heroes; likewise the depositing the dead, and what other rites ought to be performed to them, so as to make them propitious. For truly such things as these we ourselves neither know, nor in founding the state will we entrust them to any other, if we be wise, nor will we make use of any other interpreter besides our own God; for this God is the supreme interpreter to all men in these things, who interprets to them sitting on the middle of the earth.

Adeimantus/ And it is well established, and we must do accordingly.

Socrates/ Thus now, son of Aristo, is the city established for you. And in the next place, having procured somehow sufficient light, do you yourself observe, and call on your brother and on Polemarchus, and these others to assist us, if by any means we may at all perceive where justice is, and where injustice, and in what respect they differ from each other, and which of them the man ought to acquire who proposes to himself to be happy, whether he be concealed or not concealed both from Gods and men.

Glaucon/ But you say nothing to the purpose; for you yourself promised to inquire into this, deeming it impious for

you not to assist the cause of justice by every possible means.

Socrates/ It is true, what you put me in mind of, and I must do accordingly; but it is proper that you too should assist in the inquiry.

Glaucon/ We shall do so.

Socrates/ I hope then, to find it out in this manner. I imagine that our city, if it be rightly established, is perfectly good.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Then it is plain that it is wise and brave and temperate and just.

Glaucon/ It manifestly is so.

Socrates/ Whichever then of these we shall find in it, shall there not remain behind that which is not found?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ For as if we were in quest of one of any other four, in anything whatever, if we discovered this one at the first we would be satisfied; but if we should first discover the other three from this itself, that which we were inquiring after would be known, for it is plain it would be no other but that which remained.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ Since then there are in our state those four above-mentioned, shall we not inquire about them according to the same manner?

Glaucon/ It is plain we ought.

Socrates/ First of all then, to me at least, wisdom appears to be conspicuous in it; and concerning it there appears something very uncommon.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ Surely this city which we have described appears to me to be wise, for its councils are wise, are they not?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ And surely this very thing, the ability of counseling well, is plainly a certain science; for men nowhere counsel well through ignorance, but through science.

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ But there are many and various species of science in the state.

Glaucon/ Why are there not?

Socrates/ Is it then from the science of the carpenters that the state is to be denominated wise and well-counseled?

Glaucon/ By no means from this, is it said to be wise, but to be mechanical.

Socrates/ Is then the state to be denominated wise when it consults wisely through its knowledge in utensils of wood, how to have these in the best manner possible?

Glaucon/ Nor this neither.

Socrates/ But what, is it for its knowledge of these in brass, or for anything else of this kind?

Glaucon/ For none of these.

Socrates/ Nor yet for its knowledge of the fruits of the earth is it said to be wise, but to be skilled in agriculture.

Glaucon/ It seems so to me.

Socrates/ But what, is there any science among any of the citizens in this city which we have founded, which deliberates, not about any particular thing in the city, but about the whole, how it may in the best manner behave towards itself and towards other cities?

Glaucon/ There is truly.

Socrates/ What is it, and among whom is it to be found?

Glaucon/ This very guardianship, is it, and it is among these governors whom we lately denominated complete guardians.

Socrates/ What now do you denominate the state on account of this knowledge?

Glaucon/ Well-counseled, and really wise.

Socrates/ Whether then, do you imagine the brass-smiths or these true guardians will be most numerous in the state?

Glaucon/ The brass-smiths, will be much more numerous.

Socrates/ And of all, as many as having any knowledge are of any account, will not these guardians be the fewest in number?

Glaucon/ By much.

Socrates/ From this smallest tribe, then, and part of the state, and from that presiding and governing knowledge in it, is the whole city wisely established according to nature, and this tribe, as appears, is by nature the smallest to whom it belongs to share in this knowledge, which of all others ought alone to be denominated wisdom.

Glaucon/ You say, perfectly true.

Socrates/ This one, then, of the four we have found, I know not how, both what it is, and in what part of the state it resides.

Glaucon/ And it seems to me, to be sufficiently described.

Socrates/ But surely as to fortitude, at least, it is no difficult matter both to find out itself and the particular part of the city in which it resides, on account of which virtue the city is denominated brave.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ Does anyone, call a city brave or cowardly, with reference to any other than that particular part of it which makes war and fights in its defense?

Glaucon/ No one, calls it such with reference to any other part.

Socrates/ For I do not imagine, that the other tribes who are in it, whether they be cowardly or brave, have power to render the city either the one or the other.

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ The city then is brave likewise in one particular part of itself, because it has within it a power of such a nature as shall always preserve their opinions about things which are dreadful, that they are both these very things, and of the very same kind which the law-giver inculcated on them in their education? Do not you call this fortitude?

Glaucon/ I have not, entirely comprehended what you say; but tell it over again.

Socrates/ I call fortitude, a certain preservative.

Glaucon/ What sort of preservative?

Socrates/ A preservative of opinion formed by law in a course of education about things which are dreadful, what these are and of what kind. I called it a preservative at all times, because they were to preserve it in pains and in pleasures, in desires and fears, and never to cast it off; and, if you please, I shall liken it to what in my opinion it bears a near resemblance.

Glaucon/ I am pleased.

Socrates/ Do not you know then, that the dyers, when they want to dye their wool so as to be a purple color, out of all the colors they first make choice of the white, and then, with no small preparation, they prepare and manage it so as best of all to take on the purest color, and thus they dye it:

and whatever is tinged in this manner, is of an indelible dye, and no washing, neither without or with soap, is able to take away the pure color. But such wool as is not managed in this manner, you know what sort it proves, whether one is dying other colors or this one, without the due preparation beforehand.

Glaucon/ I know, that they are easily washed out, and are ridiculous.

Socrates/ Imagine then that we too, according to our ability, were aiming at such a thing as this, when we were choosing out our soldiers and were instructing them in music and exercise; and do not imagine we had anything else in view but that, in obedience to us, they should in the best manner imbibe the laws as a color, in order that their opinion about what is dreadful, and about other things, might be indelible, both by means of natural temper and suitable education, and that these washes, however powerful in effacing, may not be able to wash away their dye, pleasure, which is more powerful in effecting this than all soap and ashes, pain, and fear, and desire, which exceed every other cosmetic. Such a power now, and perpetual preservation of right opinion, and such as is according to law, about things which are dreadful, and which are not, I call and constitute fortitude, unless you offer something else.

Glaucon/ But I offer, nothing else; for you seem to me to reckon that such right opinion of these things as arises without education is both savage and servile, and not at all according to law, and you call it something other than fortitude.

Socrates/ You say most true.

Glaucon/ I admit then that this is fortitude.

Socrates/ Admit it further, to be political fortitude, and you shall admit rightly; but if you please, we shall inquire about it more perfectly another time, for at present it is not this, but justice we were seeking; and with regard to the inquiry concerning this, it has, in my opinion, been carried far enough.

Glaucon/ You speak very well.

Socrates/ There yet remains, two things in the city which we must search out: both temperance, and that for the sake of which we have been searching after all the rest, to wit justice.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ How now can we find out justice, that we may not be further troubled about temperance?

Glaucon/ I truly neither know, nor do I wish it to appear first, if we are to drop altogether the consideration of temperance; but if you please to gratify me, consider this before the other.

Socrates/ I am indeed pleased, if I be not doing an injury.

Glaucon/ Consider then.

Socrates/ We must consider, and as it appears from this point of view, it seems to resemble symphony and harmony more than those things formerly mentioned.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Temperance, is somehow a kind of symmetry and a government, as they say, of certain pleasures and desires, and to appear superior to one's self, I do not know how; and other such things are mentioned as characters of it, are they not?

Glaucon/ These are the principal characters of it.

Socrates/ Is not then the expression "superior to one's self" ridiculous? For he who is superior to himself must

somehow be likewise inferior to himself, and the inferior be the superior, for the same person is spoken of in all these cases.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But to me, the expression seems to denote that in the same man, with respect to his soul, there is one part better, and another worse, and that when the part more excellent in its nature is that which governs the inferior part, this is called being superior to himself, and expresses a commendation; but when through ill education, or any kind of converse, that better part, which is smaller, is conquered by the crowd, the worst part. This, by way of reproach, both expresses blame and denotes the person thus affected to be inferior to himself, and altogether licentious.

Glaucon/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Observe then, our new city, and you shall find one of these in it; for you will own it may justly be said to be superior to itself, if where the better part governs the worse, that state is said to be temperate and superior to itself.

Glaucon/ I observe, and you say true.

Socrates/ And surely one may find a great many and various desires and pleasures and pains, more especially among children and women and domestics, and among the greatest and most naughty part of those who are called free.

Glaucon/ It is perfectly so.

Socrates/ But the simple and the moderate desires, and such as are truly governed with understanding and the judgment of right opinion, you will meet with both in the few, and of the best natural temper, and of the best education.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And do not you see those things in our city, that there too the desires of the many, and of the baser part,

are governed by the desires and by the prudence of the smaller and more moderate part.

Glaucon/ I see it.

Socrates/ If then any city ought to be called superior to pleasures and desires and to itself, this one is to be called so.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And is it not on all these accounts temperate?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And if in any other city there is the same opinion in the governors and the governed about this point, who ought to govern, it is to be found in this one; do not you think so?

Glaucon/ I am strongly of that opinion.

Socrates/ In whom then of the citizens will you say that temperance resides, when they are thus affected in the governors or the governed?

Glaucon/ In both of them somehow.

Socrates/ You see then, that we justly conjectured of late that temperance resembles a kind of harmony.

Glaucon/ For what?

Socrates/ Because not as fortitude and wisdom, which reside each of them in a certain part, the one of them making the city wise, and the other courageous—not after this manner does it render the city temperate, but it is naturally diffused through the whole, connecting the weakest, and those in the middle, all in one symphony, either as to wisdom, if you will, or if you will in strength, or in substance, or in any other of those things; so that most justly may we say that this concord is temperance—a symphony of that which is naturally the worse and the better part, with

reference to this, which of them ought to govern in the city and in every individual.

Glaucon/ I am entirely, of the same opinion.

Socrates/ Be it so then. There are now three things in the city, it would seem, clearly discovered; but now with respect to that other species which remains, by which the city partakes of virtue, what at all can it be? Is it not plain that it is justice?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ Ought we not now, Glauco, like some huntsmen, to surround the thicket carefully, attending lest justice somehow escape, and, disappearing, remain undiscovered. For it is plain that she is somewhere here. Look and be eager to perceive her, if anyhow you spy her sooner than I, and point her to me.

Glaucon/ I wish I could; but if you employ me as an attendant rather, and one who is able to perceive what is pointed out to him, you will treat me perfectly well.

Socrates/ Follow, after you have offered prayers along with me.

Glaucon/ I will do so, only, lead you the way.

Socrates/ To me this seems, to be a place somehow of difficult access and shady: it is truly dark, and difficult to be scrutinized; we must, however, go on.

Glaucon/ We must go.

Socrates/ Io! Io! Glauco, we seem to have somewhat which appears to be a footstep, and I imagine that something shall not very long escape us.

Glaucon/ You tell good news.

Socrates/ We are truly, of a slow disposition.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ It appears, happy friend, to have been long since rolling at our feet, from the beginning, and we perceived it not, but made the most ridiculous figure: like those who seek sometimes for what they have in their hand, so we did not perceive it, but were looking somewhere off at a distance, and in this way perhaps it escaped us.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ Thus, that we seem to me to have been speaking and hearing of it long since, and not to understand ourselves that in some measure we expressed it.

Glaucon/ A long preamble to one who is eager to hear.

Socrates/ Hear then, if I say anything. For that which we at first established, when we regulated the city, as what ought always to be done, that, I imagine, or a species of it, is justice. For we somewhere established it, and often spoke of it, if you remember, that everyone ought to apply himself to one thing relating to the city to which his genius was naturally most adapted.

Glaucon/ We did speak of it.

Socrates/ And that to do one's own affairs, and not to be pragmatic, is justice. This we have both heard from many others, and have often spoken of it ourselves.

Glaucon/ We have indeed spoken of it.

Socrates/ This then, friend, appears to be in a certain manner justice: to do one's own affairs. Do you know whence I conjecture this?

Glaucon/ No, but tell.

Socrates/ Besides those things we have already considered in the city, viz., temperance, fortitude and wisdom, this, seems to remain, which gives power to all these both to have a being in the state, and, whilst they exist

in it, to afford it safety; and we said too, that justice would be that which would remain, if we found the other three.

Glaucon/ There is necessity for it.

Socrates/ But if, it be necessary to judge which of these, when subsisting in the city, shall in the greatest measure render it good, it would be difficult to determine whether the agreement between the governors and the governed, or the maintaining of sound opinion by the soldiers about what things are dreadful and what are not, or wisdom and guardianship in the rulers, or whether this, when it exists in the city, renders it in the greatest measure good, viz., when child and woman, bond and free, artificer, magistrate and subject, when everyone does their own affairs, and is not pragmatic.

Glaucon/ It is difficult to determine, why is it not?

Socrates/ This power then, by which everyone in the city performs his own office, is co-rival it seems for the perfection of the city along with its wisdom, temperance and fortitude.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ Will you not then constitute justice to be this co-rival with these for the perfection of the city?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Consider it likewise in this manner, whether it shall thus appear to you. Will you enjoin the rulers to give just decisions in judgment?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But will they give just judgment if they aim at anything preferable to this, that no one shall have what belongs to others, nor be deprived of his own?

Glaucon/ No, but they can only give just judgment when they aim at this.

Socrates/ And do they not aim at this as being just?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And thus justice is acknowledged to be the habitual practice of one's own proper and natural work.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ See then if you agree with me. If a carpenter take in hand to do the work of a shoemaker, or a shoemaker the work of a carpenter, or exchange either their utensils or prices, or if the same man take in hand to do both, and all else be exchanged, do you imagine the state would be any way greatly injured?

Glaucon/ Not very much.

Socrates/ But I imagine, that when one who is a craftsman, or who is born to any lucrative employment, shall afterwards, being puffed up by riches, by the mob, or by strength, or any other such thing, attempt to go into the rank of counselor and guardian, when unworthy of it, and when these shall exchange utensils and prices with one another, or when the same man shall take in hand to do all these things at once, then I imagine you will be of opinion that this interchange of these things, and this variety of employments practiced by one, is the destruction of the state.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Pragmatism then in these three species, and their change into one another, is the greatest hurt to the state, and may most justly be called its naughtiness.

Glaucon/ It may so truly.

Socrates/ But will not you say that injustice is the greatest ill of the state?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ This then is injustice. But let us again speak of it in this manner. When the craftsman, the auxiliary, and the guardian-band do their proper work, each of them doing

their own work in the city, this is the contrary of the other, that is justice, and renders the city just.

Glaucon/ It seems to me, to be no otherwise than thus.

Socrates/ But let us not, affirm it very strongly; but if it shall be allowed us that this species of these, when it enters into any individual, is likewise justice in him, we shall then be agreed (for what shall we say?); if not, we shall consider something else. But now let us finish that speculation which we thought proper, when we judged, that if we attempted first to contemplate justice in some of the greater objects which possess it, it would more easily be seen in one man. And a city appeared to us to be the most proper object of this kind, and so we established the very best one we could, well knowing that justice would be in a good one. Let us now transfer and apply to a single person what has there appeared to us with respect to a whole city, and if the same things correspond, it shall be well; but if anything different appear in the individual, going back again to the city we shall put it to the proof, and instantly considering them, when placed by one another, and striking them, we shall make justice shine out as from flints, and when it is become manifest, we shall firmly establish it among ourselves.

Glaucon/ You say quite in the right way, and we must do so.

Socrates/ Why then, when we denominate anything the same, though different in degrees, is it dissimilar in that respect in which we call it the same, or is it similar?

Glaucon/ It is similar.

Socrates/ The just man then, will differ nothing from the just city, according to the idea of justice, but will be similar to it.

Glaucon/ He will be similar to it.

Socrates/ But indeed with respect to this inquiry, the city at least appeared then to be just, when the three species of dispositions in it did each of them its own work, viz., the temperate, the brave, and the wise, by virtue of their own proper natures, and not according to any other affections and habits.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And shall we not, friend, judge it proper that the individual, who has in his soul the same principles (viz., temperance, fortitude, wisdom), shall, from having the same affections with those in the city, be called by the same names.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ We have again, rare friend, fallen into no mean speculation concerning the soul, whether it has in it those three principles or not.

Glaucon/ Into no mean one, as I imagine. And it is likely, Socrates, that the common saying is true, that things excellent are difficult.

Socrates/ It appears. But know well, Glauco, that according to my opinion we shall never comprehend this matter accurately in the methods we are now using in these reasonings, for the road leading to it is greater and longer. We may however, it is likely, speak of it in such a manner as may be worthy of our former disquisitions and speculations.

Glaucon/ Is not that desirable? This would satisfy me for my own part, at present at least.

Socrates/ This, shall to me too be quite sufficient.

Glaucon/ Do not then give over, but pursue your inquiry.

Socrates/ Are we not then under a necessity, of acknowledging that there are in every one of us the same principles and dispositions which are in the city? for from

nowhere else did they get thither. For it were ridiculous if one should imagine that the irascible disposition did not arise from the individuals in cities, who have this blemish, as those of Thrace, Scythia, and in some measure almost all the higher region. And the same thing may be said with respect to the love of learning, which one may chiefly ascribe to this country; or with reference to the love of riches, which we may say prevailed especially among the Phoenicians and the inhabitants of Egypt.

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ This then is so, nor is it difficult to be known.

Glaucon/ No indeed.

Socrates/ But this is difficult to determine, whether we perform each of these by the same power, or, as they are three, we perform one by one power, and another by another; that is, we learn by one, we are angry by another, and by a certain third we desire those pleasures relating to nutrition and propagation, and the other pleasures of affinity to these. Or do we in each of these, when we apply to them, act with the whole soul? These things are difficult to be determined in a manner worthy of the subject.

Glaucon/ So it seems to me.

Socrates/ Let us then in this manner attempt to determine these things, whether they are the same with one another or different.

Glaucon/ How are we to do it?

Socrates/ It is plain that one and the same thing cannot at one and the same time do or suffer contrary things in the same respect, and with reference to the same object; so that if we anywhere find these circumstances existing among them, we shall know that it was not one and the same thing, but several.

Glaucon/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Consider then what I am saying.

Glaucon/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Is it possible for the same thing to stand and to be moved at once in the same respect?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Let us settle this more accurately still, lest as we proceed we be any way uncertain about it. For if one should say, that when a man stands, yet moves his hands and his head, that the same person at once stands and is moved, we would not, I imagine, think it proper to speak in this manner, but that one part of him stood, and another part was moved. Would not we speak in this manner?

Glaucon/ In this manner.

Socrates/ But if one who says these things should, in a more jocose humor still, and factiously caviling allege that tops stand wholly and are moved at once, when their center is fixed on one point and they are whirled about, or that anything else going round in a circle in the same position does this, we would not admit it, as it is not in the same respect that they stand still and are moved; but we would say that they have in them the perpendicular and the periphery, and that with relation to the perpendicular they stood (for towards no side they declined), but with relation to the periphery they moved in a circle. But when its perpendicularity declines either to the right or left hand forwards or backwards, whilst it is at the same time whirling round, then in no respect does it stand.

Glaucon/ Very right.

Socrates/ Nothing then of this kind shall move us when it is said; nor shall anyone persuade us, as if anything, being one and the same thing, could do and suffer contraries at one and the same time, with reference to the same object, and in the same respect.

Glaucon/ He shall not persuade me.

Socrates/ But, however, that we may not be obliged to be tedious in going over all these quibbles, and in evincing them to be false, let us proceed on this supposition that so it is, after we have agreed that, if at any time these things appear otherwise than as we now settle them, we shall yield up again all we shall gain by it.

Glaucon/ It is necessary, to do so.

Socrates/ Would not you then, deem these things among those which are opposite to one another, whether they be actions or passions, for in this there is no difference: to assent, to wit, and to dissent; to desire to get a thing, and to reject it; to bring towards one's self, and to push away?

Glaucon/ I would deem these, among the things which are opposite to each other.

Socrates/ What then, with respect to thirsting, to hungering, and, in general, with respect to all the passions—and further, to desire, to will, and all these—may they not somehow be placed among those species which have now been mentioned? As for example, will you not always say that the soul of one who has desire goes out after that which it desires, or brings near to it that which it wishes to have; or again, in so far as it wants something to be afforded it, like one who only sees an object, intimates by signs to have it brought near, desiring the actual possession of it?

Glaucon/ I would say so.

Socrates/ But what, to be unwilling not to wish, nor to desire, shall we not deem these of the same kind as to push away from the soul, and drive off, and everything else which is opposite to the former?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ This being the case, shall we say there is some species of the desires? and that the most conspicuous are to thirst and to hunger?

Glaucon/ We shall say so.

Socrates/ Is not the one the desire of drinking, and the other of eating?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it then, when considered as thirst, a desire in the soul of something further than of drink? It is according to the nature of the thirst. Is there then a thirst of a hot drink, or of a cold, of much or of little, or in short of some particular kind of drink? for if there be any heat accompanying the thirst, it readily occasions a desire of a cold drink, but if cold accompanies it, then there is excited a desire of a warm drink. If the thirst be great, through many circumstances, it occasions a desire of a great drink, but if small a desire of a small one, but the desire itself to thirst never creates the desire of anything else, but of drink itself, as its nature prompts, and in like manner of the appetite of hunger with relation to meat.

Glaucon/ Thus every desire, in itself is of that alone of which it is the desire; but to be a desire of such or such a particular species are adventitious circumstances.

Socrates/ Let not then anyone, create us any trouble, as if we were inadvertent, that no one desired drink, but good drink, or meat, but good meat, for indeed all men desire that which is good. If then thirst be a desire, it is of what is good, whether it be of drink, or of whatever else it is the desire. And in the same way of all the other desires.

Glaucon/ Perhaps, the man who should mention these things would seem to say something material.

Socrates/ But, however, whatever things are of such a nature, as to belong to any genus, have a general reference

to the genus; but each particular of these refers to a particular species of that genus.

Glaucon/ I have not understood you.

Socrates/ Have you not understood, that greater is of such a kind as to be greater than somewhat?

Glaucon/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ Is it not greater than the lesser?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which is considerably greater than that which is considerably lesser, is it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which was formerly greater than that which was formerly lesser, and that which is to be greater than that which is to be lesser?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ And after the same manner, what is more numerous with respect to what is less numerous, and what is double with reference to what is half, and all such like things; and further, what is heavier with respect to lighter, and swifter to slower; and further still, hot to cold, and all such like things, are they not after this manner?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what as to the sciences? Is not the case the same? For science in general is the science of learning in general, or of whatever else you think proper to make it the science; but a certain particular science, and of such a particular kind, refers to a certain particular object, and of such a kind. What I mean is this: After the science of building houses arose, did it not separate from other sciences, so as to be called architecture?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ Was it not from its being of such a kind as none of the others were?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Was it not then from its being the art of such a particular thing that itself became such a particular art? and all other arts and sciences in like manner?

Glaucon/ They are so.

Socrates/ Allow then, that this is what I wanted to express, if you have now understood it: where things are considered as having reference to other things, generals alone refer to generals, and particulars to particulars. I do not, however, say that the science altogether resembles that of which it is the science (as if, for example, the science of healthy and sickly were itself healthy and sickly, or that the science of good and evil were itself good and evil). But as science is not constituted the science of that thing in general of which it is the science, but only of a certain quality of it (to wit, of its healthy and sickly state), so itself comes to be a certain particular science, and this causes it to be called no longer simply a science, but the medicinal science, the particular species it is of being superadded.

Glaucon/ I have understood you, and it appears to me to be so.

Socrates/ But will not you, make thirst now, whatever it be, to be one of those things which respect somewhat else, considered as what it is, and it is surely thirst?

Glaucon/ I will, and it respects drink.

Socrates/ And does not a particular thirst desire a particular drink? But thirst in general is neither of much nor of little, nor of good nor bad, nor, in one word, of any particular kind, but of drink in general alone is thirst in general naturally the desire.

Glaucon/ Entirely so, indeed.

Socrates/ The soul of the man, then, who thirsts inclines for nothing further than to drink; this he desires, to this he hastens.

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ If then, at any time anything pull back the thirsting soul, it must be some different part of it from that which thirsts, and leads it as a wild beast to the drink; for have we not said that it is impossible for the same thing, in the same respects, and with the same parts of it, to do at once contrary things?

Glaucon/ It is indeed impossible.

Socrates/ In the same manner, I imagine, as it is not proper to say of an archer that his hands at once push out, and likewise pull in the bow, but that the one hand is that which pushes out, and the other that which pulls in.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But whether may we say that there are some who when athirst are not willing to drink?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed, there are many, and many times that is the case.

Socrates/ What now, may one say of these persons? Might it not be said that there was in their soul somewhat prompting them to drink, and likewise something hindering them, different from the other, and superior to the prompting principle.

Glaucon/ It seems so to me.

Socrates/ Does not then the restraining principle arise from reason when it arises; but those which push and drive forwards proceed from passions and diseases?

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ We shall then, not unreasonably account these to be two, and different from one another, calling the one

part which reasons the rational part of the soul, but that part with which it loves and hungers and thirsts, and those other appetites, the irrational and concupiscible part, the friend of certain gratifications and pleasures.

Glaucon/ We shall not, but we may most reasonably consider them in this light.

Socrates/ Let these then, be allowed to be distinct species in the soul. But as to that of anger, is it a third principle, or has it affinity to one of those two?

Glaucon/ Perhaps it is, to the concupiscible part.

Socrates/ But I believe, what I have somewhere heard, how that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, as he returned from the Pyraeum, perceived some dead bodies lying in the sewer, below the outside of the north wall, and had both a desire to look at them, and at the same time was averse from it, and turned himself away; and for a while he struggled with his desire and covered his eyes; but at last, being overcome by his appetite, with eager eyes, running towards the dead bodies, lo now, you wretched eyes! glut yourselves with this fine spectacle.

Glaucon/ I too, have heard it.

Socrates/ This speech now, shows that anger sometimes opposes the appetites, as being different one from another.

Glaucon/ It shows it, indeed.

Socrates/ And do not we often perceive, when the appetites compel anyone contrary to reason, that he reproaches himself, and is angry at the compelling principle within him, and when the rational and concupiscible are in a state of sedition, anger in such a person becomes as it were an ally to reason? but when the appetite goes along with reason, then anger gives no opposition. You will say, I imagine, that you have perceived nothing of this kind in yourself, at any time, nor yet in any other.

Glaucon/ No truly.

Socrates/ What now, when one imagines he does an injury, the more generous he is, is he not so much the less apt to be angry when he suffers hunger and cold, or any other such things from one who inflicts, as he imagines, these things with justice? And, as I have said, his anger will not incline him to rise up against such an one.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But what, when one imagines he is injured, does not anger in such an one burn, and has he not indignation, and fights as an ally on the side of what appears to be just; and under all the sufferings of hunger, cold, and such like, bears up, and conquers, and ceases not from its generous toils till either it accomplish them or dies, or is restrained by the rational principle within him, like a dog by the shepherd, and is rendered mild?

Glaucon/ It perfectly resembles, what you say; for in our city we appointed the auxiliaries to be obedient as dogs, to the rulers of the city, as to shepherds.

Socrates/ You rightly understand, what I would say. But have you besides considered this?

Glaucon/ As what?

Socrates/ That here the reverse appears concerning the irascible from that in the former case; for there we were deeming it the same with the concupiscible, but now we say it is far from it, or that in the sedition of the soul it much rather joins its arms with the rational part.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is it then as something different from it, or as a species of the rational, so as that there are not three species, but only two in the soul, the rational and concupiscible? Or as there were three species which completed the city, the lucrative, the auxiliary, the

legislative, so in the soul this irascible is a third thing, naturally an auxiliary to the rational, if it be not corrupted by bad education?

Glaucon/ Of necessity it is, a third.

Socrates/ Yes, if at least it appear to be any way different from the rational, as it appeared to be distinct from the concupiscible.

Glaucon/ But that is not difficult, to be seen, for one may see this even in little children, that immediately from their infancy they are full of anger; but some appear to me at least never at all to participate of reason, and the most arrive at it but late.

Socrates/ Yes, truly, you say right; and one may yet further observe in the brute creatures that what you say is really the case. And besides this, it is likewise attested by what we formerly mentioned from Homer;

> Striking his breast, his heart he thus reproved.

For in that passage Homer has plainly made one part reprehend another—the part which reasons about good and evil reprehend the part which is unreasonably angry.

Glaucon/ You say perfectly right.

Socrates/ These things, we have with difficulty agreed to, and it is now sufficiently acknowledged that the same species of principles as are in a city are in every individual, and in the same number.

Glaucon/ They are so.

Socrates/ Must it not therefore of necessity follow that, after what manner the city was wise, and in what respect, after the same manner, and in the same respect is the individual wise also.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ And in what respects, and after what manner the individual is brave, in the same respect, and after the same manner is a city brave; and so in all other respects both of them are the same as to virtue.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And I fancy, Glauco, we shall say that a man is just in the same way as we said a city was so?

Glaucon/ This likewise is quite necessary.

Socrates/ But have we not somehow forgot this, that the city was just, when everyone of the three species in it did each its own work?

Glaucon/ We do not appear to me, to have forgot it.

Socrates/ We must then remember likewise, that each one of us will be just, and do his own work, when he does his own affairs within himself.

Glaucon/ We must, carefully remember it.

Socrates/ Is it not then proper that the rational part should govern, as it is wise, and has the care of the whole soul? and that the irascible part should be obedient and an auxiliary of the other?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Shall not then the mixture, as we observed, of music and exercise make these two harmonious, raising and nourishing the one with worthy reasonings and learning, and unbending the other, soothing and sweetening it by harmony and measure?

Glaucon/ Most perfectly.

Socrates/ And when those two are in this manner nourished, and have been truly taught and instructed in their own affairs, let them be set over the concupiscible part, which in everyone is the greater part of the soul, and in its nature most insatiably desirous of being gratified: they are

to take care of this part, lest being filled with these bodily pleasures, as they are called, it become great and vigorous, and do not its own work, but attempt to enslave and rule over those it ought not, and overturn the whole life of all in general.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And might he not, by this principle guard likewise in the best manner against enemies from without, by its influence both over the whole soul and body likewise, the one deliberating, and the other fighting in obedience to its leader, and executing with fortitude the things deliberated.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ And I imagine that we call one brave when, through all the pains and pleasures of life, the irascible part preserves the opinion dictated by reason concerning what is terrible and what is not.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And we call him wise, from that small part which governs in him, and dictates these things, having in it the knowledge of what is advantageous for each one, and for the whole community of the three themselves.

Glaucon/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ But what, do we not call him temperate, moreover, from the friendship and harmony of these very things, when the governing and governed agree in one, that reason ought to govern, and when they do not raise sedition?

Glaucon/ Temperance, is no other than this, both as to the city and the individual.

Socrates/ But as we have often said, he shall be just by these things and in this manner.

Glaucon/ It is quite necessary.

Socrates/ What then, has anything blunted us, that we should fancy justice to be anything else than what it has appeared to be in a city?

Glaucon/ Nothing appears to me at least, to have done it.

Socrates/ But in this manner, let us by all means confirm ourselves, if there yet remains any doubt in the soul that can be an objection to this principle, by bringing the man into difficult circumstances.

Glaucon/ As what?

Socrates/ Such as this: if we were obliged to declare concerning such a city, and concerning a man born and educated conformably to it, whether we thought such a one, when entrusted with gold or silver, would embezzle it, do you imagine that anyone would think such a one would do it sooner than those who are not of such a kind?

Glaucon/ No one.

Socrates/ Will not such a one then be free of sacrileges, thefts, treacheries, against companions in private, or the city in public?

Glaucon/ He will be free.

Socrates/ Nor will he ever, in any shape, be faithless, either as to his oaths or other declarations?

Glaucon/ How can he.

Socrates/ Adulteries, and neglect of parents, impiety against the Gods, will belong to everyone else sooner than to such a one.

Glaucon/ They will belong to everyone else truly.

Socrates/ And is not this the cause of all these things, that of all within him, each one thing does its own work as to governing and being governed?

Glaucon/ This is it, and nothing else.

Socrates/ Do you desire justice to be anything else but such a power as produces such men and cities?

Glaucon/ Not I truly, for my part.

Socrates/ Our dream, then, which we conjectured is at last accomplished: that when we first began to build our city, we seemed by some God's assistance to have got to a beginning and pattern of justice.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And that, Glauco, was a certain image of justice, according to which it behooved the man who was fitted by nature for the office of a shoemaker to perform properly that office, and to do nothing else, and he who is a carpenter to perform that office, and all others in the same way.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And of such a kind truly was justice, as it appeared to us, I do not mean as to external action, but concerning that which is really internal, relating to the man himself and those things which are properly his own; not allowing any principle in himself to attempt to do what belongs to others, nor the principles to be pragmatic, engaging in one another's affairs; but having well established his own proper affairs, and holding the government of himself, adorning himself, and becoming his own friend, and attuning those three principles in the most natural manner, as three musical strings, base, tenor, and treble, or whatever others may chance to intervene—to combine all these together, and become of many an entire one, temperate and attuned, and in that manner to perform whatever is done either in the way of acquiring wealth, or concerning the management of the body, or any public affair or private bargain; and in all these cases to account and call that action just and handsome which always sustains and

promotes this habit; and to call the knowledge which presides over this action, wisdom, but to call that an unjust action which dissolves this habit, and the opinion which presides over this, folly.

Glaucon/ You say perfectly true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Be it so. If then we should say that we have found out a just man and city, and what justice is in them, I don't imagine we should seem to be altogether telling a lie.

Glaucon/ No truly.

Socrates/ May we say so?

Glaucon/ We may say it.

Socrates/ Be it so. But we were next, I think, to consider injustice.

Glaucon/ That is plain.

Socrates/ Must it not then be some sedition among the three principles, some pragmatism and intermeddling in things foreign to their proper business, and an insurrection of someone principle against the whole soul, to govern in it when it does not belong to it, but which is of such a nature, as what really ought to be in subjection to the governing principle? I imagine then we shall call their tumult and mistake by such names as these, injustice, intemperance, cowardice and folly, and, in general, all vice.

Glaucon/ These things, are quite so.

Socrates/ To do injustice then, and to be injurious, and likewise to do justly, all these must be very manifest if, to wit, injustice and justice are so.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ Because they are no way different from what is salutary or noxious: as these are in the body, so are the others in the soul.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Such things as are healthy constitute health, and such as are noxious produce disease.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And must not the doing justly produce justice, and doing unjustly produce injustice?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ But to produce health is to establish all in the body according to nature, to govern and to be governed of one another; and to produce disease is to govern and be governed, one part by another, contrary to nature.

Glaucon/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ Then, again, to produce justice, is it not to establish all in the soul according to nature, to govern and be governed by one another? and injustice is to govern and be governed by one another contrary to nature.

Glaucon/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ Virtue then, it seems, is a sort of health, and beauty, and good habit of the soul, and vice the disease, and deformity, and infirmity.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ Do not then honorable pursuits lead to the acquisition of virtue, but dishonorable ones to that of vice?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ What remains then for us, as seems, to consider is, whether it be profitable to do justly, and to pursue what is honorable, and to be just, whether one under such a character be unknown or not; or to do unjustly, and to be unjust, though one be never punished, nor by chastisement become better?

Glaucon/ But, Socrates, this speculation, seems now, to me at least, to be ridiculous. For if when the nature of the body is corrupted it be thought that life is not worth having,

not even though one had all kinds of meats and drinks, all kind of wealth, all kind of dominion, when the nature of that by which we live is disordered and thoroughly corrupted, shall life then be worth having, though one can do everything else which he inclines besides this, how he shall get quit of vice and injustice, and acquire justice and virtue, since, to wit, both these things have appeared as we have represented?

Socrates/ It would be truly ridiculous. But however, as we have arrived at such a point as enables us most distinctly to perceive that these things are so, we must not give over.

Glaucon/ We must not at all truly, give over.

Socrates/ Come then, that you may likewise see how many principles vice has, principles which, as I imagine, are worthy of attention.

Glaucon/ I attend: only tell me.

Socrates/ And truly now, since we have reached this part of our discourse, it appears now to me, as from a summit, that there is one principle of virtue, but those of vice are infinite, of which there are four which deserve to be mentioned.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ There seem to be as many species of soul as there are of republics.

Glaucon/ How many then?

Socrates/ There are five, of republics, and five of the soul.

Glaucon/ Tell, what these are.

Socrates/ I say, that this which we have gone through is one species of a republic, and it may have a twofold appellation; for if among the rulers there be one surpassing the rest, it may be called a Monarchy; if there be several, an Aristocracy.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ I call this then, one species; for whether they be several, or but one who govern, they will never alter the principal laws of the city, observing the nurture and education we have described.

Glaucon/ It is not likely.

THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK

The Fifth Book

Socrates/ I denominate then indeed both such a city and republic, and such a man as we have described, good and upright; and if this republic be an upright one, I deem the others bad and erroneous, both as to the regulations in cities, and the establishing the temper of soul of individuals, and that in four species of illness.

Glaucon/ Of what kind are these?

Socrates/ I was then proceeding to mention them in order, as they appeared to me to rise out of one another, but Polemarchus, stretching out his hand (for he sat a little further off than Adimantus), caught him by the robe at his shoulder and drew him near, and bending himself towards him, spoke something in a whisper, of which we heard nothing but this:

Polemarchus/ Shall we let pass then?, or what shall we do?

Socrates/ Adeimantus, speaking now aloud;

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ What then will not you let pass?

Adeimantus/ You.

Socrates/ As I had said what?

Adeimantus/ You seem to us to be growing negligent, and to steal a whole branch of the discourse, and that not the least considerable, that you may not have the trouble of going through it; and you imagine that you escaped our notice when you made this speech so simply, viz., that both as to wives and children, it is manifest to everyone that these things will be common among friends.

Socrates/ Did not I say right, Adimantus?

Adeimantus/ Yes; but this, which was rightly said, like other parts of your discourse, requires explanation, to show

what is the manner of their being common, for there may be many kinds of it. Do not omit then to tell which is the method you spoke of; for we have been in expectation for some time past, imagining you would on some occasion make mention of the propagation of children, in what way they should be propagated, and when they are born, how they should be nurtured, and everything relative to what you spoke concerning wives and children being in common; for we imagine that it is of considerable, nay, of the utmost importance to the state, when this is rightly performed or otherwise. But now when you are entering on the consideration of another constitution, before you have sufficiently discussed these things, it seemed proper to us what you now heard, not to let you pass before you went over all these things as you did the others.

Glaucon/ And you may count me too, as joining in this vote.

Thrasymachus/ You may easily judge, Socrates, that this is the opinion of us all.

Socrates/ What is this, you have done, laying hold of me? What a mighty discourse do you again raise, as you did at the beginning about a republic, in which I was rejoicing as having now completed it, being fond, if anyone would have let these things pass, and been content with what was then said. But you know not what a swarm of reasonings you raise by what you now challenge, which I foreseeing, passed by at that time, lest it should occasion great disturbance.

Thrasymachus/ What then, do you imagine that these are now come hither to melt gold, and not to hear reasonings?

Socrates/ Yes, but in measure.

Glaucon/ The whole of life, Socrates, is with the wise the measure of hearing such reasonings as these. But pass what relates to us, and do not at all grudge to explain your opinion

concerning what we inquire about—what sort of community of wives and children is to be observed by our guardians, and concerning the nurture the latter are to have while very young, in the period between their generation and their education, which seems to be the most troublesome of all. Endeavor then to tell us in what manner it should be done.

Socrates/ It is not easy, happy Glauco, to go through these things, for there are many of them hard to be believed, whether the things we say be possible; and though they could easily be done, whether they would be for the best might still be doubted. Wherefore, dear companion, I grudge somewhat to touch on these things, lest our reasoning appear to be rather what were to be wished for than what could take place.

Glaucon/ Do not at all grudge, for your hearers are neither stupid, nor incredulous, nor ill-affected towards you.

Socrates/ Then, do you say this, most excellent Glauco, with a desire to encourage me?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then your discourse has a quite contrary effect; for if I trusted to myself that I understood what I am to say, your encouragement would do well. For one who understands the truth about the greatest and the most interesting affairs, speaks with safety and confidence among the wise and friendly; but to be diffident of one's self and doubtful of the truth, and at the same time to be haranguing as I do now, is both dreadful and dangerous, not only lest he should be exposed to ridicule (for that is but a trifling thing), but lest that, mistaking the truth, I not only fall myself, but draw my friends along with me into an error about things in which we ought least of all to be mistaken. I adore therefore Adrastia for what, Glauco, I am going to say; for I trust it is a smaller offence to be a man-slayer without intention, than

to be an impostor with regard to what is good and excellent, just and lawful: and it were better to hazard such a thing among enemies than friends; so that you must give me better encouragement.

Then Glauco, laughing:

Glaucon/ But Socrates, if we suffer anything amiss from your discourse, we shall acquit you as clear of any man-slaughter, and as no impostor; so proceed boldly.

Socrates/ But indeed, he who is acquit at a court of justice, is deemed clear of the crime, as the law says; and if it be so in that case, 'tis reasonable it should be so in this.

Glaucon/ For this reason then, proceed.

Socrates/ We must now, return again to what it seems should, according to method, have been recited before; and perhaps it is right to proceed in this manner, that after having entirely finished the drama respecting the men, we go over that which concerns the women, especially since you challenge me to proceed in this manner. For in my opinion, men who have been born and educated in such a manner as we have described can have no right profession and enjoyment of children and wives but in pursuing the same tract in which we have proceeded from the beginning: for we have endeavored in our reasoning to form somehow men as the guardians of a flock.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ Let us proceed then, having established likewise affairs relating to propagation and education in a manner similar to that of the males; and let us consider whether it be proper for us to do so or not.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Thus. Whether shall we judge it proper for the females of our guardian dogs, to watch likewise in the same manner as the males do, and to hunt along with them, and

do everything else in common; or shall we judge it proper for them to manage domestic affairs within doors, as being unable for the other exercises, because of the bringing forth, and the nursing the whelps, and the males to labor and to have the whole care of the flocks?

Glaucon/ They are to do all, in common. Only we are to employ the females as the weaker, and the males as the stronger.

Socrates/ Is it possible then, to employ any creature for the same purposes with another, unless you give it the same nurture and education as you give the other?

Glaucon/ It is not possible.

Socrates/ If then we shall employ the women for the same purposes as we do the men, must we not likewise teach them the same things?

Glaucon/ We must.

Socrates/ Were not both music and exercise bestowed on the males?

Glaucon/ They were.

Socrates/ These two arts therefore, and those likewise relating to war, must be bestowed also on the women, and they must be employed about the same things.

Glaucon/ It is reasonable, from what you say.

Socrates/ Yet as these things, are contrary perhaps to custom, many of these things we are now speaking of may appear ridiculous, if practiced in the way we mention.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ What, do you perceive as the most ridiculous part? Or is it plainly because that you see the women naked in the Palaestra wrestling with the men, and not only the young women, but even the more advanced in years, in the same manner as old men in the wrestling schools, when they

are wrinkled, and not at all handsome to the eye, yet still fond of the exercises?

Glaucon/ Yes, truly; because it might indeed appear ridiculous, at least, as matters stand at present.

Socrates/ Must we not therefore, since we have entered upon this discourse, be afraid of the railleries of the men of pleasantry, whatever things they may say with regard to such a revolution being introduced, as well in the exercises as in music, and particularly in the use of arms, and the management of horses.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ But since we have entered on this discourse, we must go to the rigor of the law, and beg these men not to follow their own customs, but to think seriously and remember that it is not long ago since these things appeared base and ridiculous to the Greeks, which are only so now to the most of the Barbarians, such as to see naked men. And when first the Cretans, and afterwards the Lacedaemonians, began their exercises, it was in the power of the men of humor of that time to turn all these things into ridicule. Do not you think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ But I imagine, that when upon experience it appeared better to strip themselves of all these things than to be wrapped in them, what was ridiculous indeed to the eye was removed by the idea of best, mentioned in our reasoning; and this too showed manifestly that he is a fool who deems anything ridiculous but what is bad, and attempts to rally upon any other idea of the ridiculous but that of the foolish and the vicious, or to be serious in any other pursuit but that of the good.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Is not this then first of all to be agreed on, whether these things be possible or not? And we must allow it to be a matter of dispute, if anyone, either in jest or earnest, inclines to doubt whether the human genius in the female sex be able in everything to bear a share with the male, or if it be not in any one thing, or if it be able in some things but not in others, and among which of these are the affairs of war? Would not the man who thus sets out in the most handsome manner conclude too, as it seems, most handsomely?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ Are you willing then, that we ourselves, instead of others, dispute about these things, that the opposite side may not be destitute of a defense?

Glaucon/ Nothing hinders.

Socrates/ Let us then say this for them. That there is no need, Socrates and Glauco, of others to dispute with you about this matter, for yourselves, in the beginning of your establishment, when you established your city, agreed that it was necessary for each individual to practice one business, according to their several genius. I think we acknowledged it; for why should they not? Does not then the genius of the male differ widely from that of the female? Why does it not differ? And is it not fit to enjoin each a different work, according to their genius? Why not? Are not you then in the wrong now, and contradict yourselves, when you say that men and women ought to do the same things, whilst their genius is extremely different? Can you in answer to these objections, admirable Glauco, make any defense?

Glaucon/ It is not quite an easy matter, to do it immediately: but I will entreat you, and do now entreat you, to go through the arguments on our side, whatever they may be.

Socrates/ These are the things, Glauco, and many other such like, which I long ago foreseeing, was both afraid and backward to touch on the law concerning the possession of wives and the education of children.

Glaucon/ It is not easy indeed.

Socrates/ It is not. But the case is thus. If one falls into a small fish-pond, or into the middle of the greatest sea, he must still swim in the one no less than in the other.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Must not we swim then, and endeavor to escape from this reasoning, expecting that either some dolphin is to carry us out, or that we shall have some other remarkable deliverance?

Glaucon/ It seems we must do so.

Socrates/ Come then, if we can anywhere find an out-gate; for we did acknowledge that different geniuses ought to study different things; but the genius of man and woman is different; yet now we say that different geniuses ought to study the same things: these are the things which you accuse us of.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ How strong, Glauco, is the power of the art of caviling?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Because, many seem to fall into it unwillingly, and imagine that they are not caviling, but reasoning truly, because they are not able to understand the subject, by dividing it into its proper parts, and under this arguing will pursue the opposite of their subject, using caviling instead of reasoning.

Glaucon/ This is indeed, the case with many; but does it at present extend likewise to us?

Socrates/ Entirely so, we seem then unwillingly to have fallen into a contradiction.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Because we have very strenuously and very keenly asserted, that when the genius is not the same, they ought not to have the same employments; but we have not in any respect considered what is the characteristic of the sameness or diversity of genius, nor to what it points: we stopped then, when we had assigned different pursuits to different geniuses, and to the same geniuses the same pursuits.

Glaucon/ We have never indeed, considered it.

Socrates/ It is therefore, still in our power, as appears, to question ourselves whether the genius of the bald, or of those who wear their hair, be the same, and not different. And after we should agree that it was different, whether, if the bald made shoes, we should allow those who wear hair to make them; or if those who wear hair made them, whether we should allow the others.

Glaucon/ That were ridiculous.

Socrates/ Is it in any other respect, ridiculous then that we did not wholly determine the sameness and diversity of genius, but attended only to that species of diversity and sameness which respects the employments themselves? just as we say that the physician and the man who has a medical soul have one and the same genius? Do not you think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ But that the physician and architect have a different.

Glaucon/ Entirely.

Socrates/ And so, of the genius of men and of women, if it appear different, in respect to any art, or other

employment, we shall say that this different employment is to be assigned to each separately. But if their genius appear different only in this, that the female brings forth and the male begets, we shall not say that this has at all shown the man to be different from the woman in the respect we speak of, but we shall still be of opinion that both our guardians and their wives ought to pursue the same employments.

Glaucon/ And with reason.

Socrates/ Shall we not then henceforth desire anyone who says the contrary to instruct us in this point: What is that art or study respecting the establishment of a city, where the genius of the man and woman is not the same, but different?

Glaucon/ It is reasonable truly.

Socrates/ Possibly someone may say, as you was saying a while ago, that it is not easy to tell this sufficiently on the sudden, but that it is not all difficult to one who has considered it.

Glaucon/ One might indeed say so.

Socrates/ Are you willing then that we desire such an opponent to listen to us, if by any means we shall show him that there is in the administration of the city no employment peculiar to the women?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Come on then (shall we say to him), answer us. Is not this your meaning: that one man has a good genius for anything, and another a bad, in this respect, that the one learns anything easily, and the other with difficulty; and the one with a little instruction discovers a great deal in what he learns, but the other, when he gets a great deal of instruction and care, does not retain even what he has learned: with the one, the body is duly subservient to the mind; with the other, it opposes its improvement. Are there any other marks than

these by which you would determine one to have a good genius for anything, and another to have a bad one?

Glaucon/ No one., would mention any other.

Socrates/ Know you then of anything which is managed by mankind, with reference to which the men have not all these marks in a more excellent degree than the women? Or should we not be tedious if we mentioned particularly the weaving art, and the dressing pot herbs and victuals, in which the female genius seems to be somewhat considerable, and is most ridiculous where it is surpassed.

Glaucon/ You say true, that in the general, in everything the one genius is superior to the other, yet there are many women who in many things excel many men; but on the whole, it is as you say.

Socrates/ There is not then, my friend, any office among the whole inhabitants of the city peculiar to the woman, considered as woman, nor to the man, considered as man; but the geniuses are indiscriminately diffused through both: the woman is naturally fitted for sharing in all offices, and so is the man; but in all the woman is weaker than the man.

Glaucon/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ Shall we then commit everything to the care of the men. and nothing to the care of the women?

Glaucon/ How shall we do so?

Socrates/ It is therefore, I imagine, as we say, that one woman too is fitted by natural genius for being a physician, and another is not; one is naturally a musician, and another is not?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ And one is naturally fitted for the exercises, and another is not, one is fitted for war, and another is not.

Glaucon/ I at least am of this opinion.

Socrates/ And is not one likewise a lover of philosophy, and another averse to it? one of high spirits, and another of low?

Glaucon/ This likewise is true.

Socrates/ And has not one woman a natural genius for being a guardian, and another not? And have not we made choice of such a genius as this for our guardian men?

Glaucon/ Of such a genius as this.

Socrates/ The genius then of the woman and of the man for the guardianship of the city is the same, only that the one is weaker, and the other stronger.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And such women as these are to be chosen to dwell with these men, and be guardians along with them, as they are naturally fit for them, and of a kindred genius.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And must not the same employments be assigned to the same geniuses?

Glaucon/ The same.

Socrates/ We are now come in a roundabout way to what we formerly mentioned; and we allow that it is not contrary to nature to appoint for the wives of our guardians music and exercise.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ We are not then establishing things impossible, or such as can only be wished for, since we establish the law according to nature; and what is at present contrary to these things is contrary to nature rather, as appears.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Was not our inquiry to hear of what was possible and best?

Glaucon/ It was.

Socrates/ And we have agreed that these things are possible.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ And we must next agree that they are best.

Glaucon/ It is plain we must.

Socrates/ In order therefore to make a guardian woman, at least the education will not be different from that of the men, especially as she has received the same natural genius.

Glaucon/ It will not be different.

Socrates/ What do you think then of such an opinion as this?

Glaucon/ Of what?

Socrates/ That of imagining with yourself one man to be better, and another worse, or do you deem them to be all alike?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ In the city now which we establish, whether do you judge that our guardians, with this education we have described, or shoemakers with education in their art, will be rendered the better men?

Glaucon/ The question, is ridiculous.

Socrates/ I understand you. But what, of all the other citizens, are not they the best?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ But what, will not these women too be the best of women?

Glaucon/ They will be so, by far.

Socrates/ Is there anything better in a city than that both the women and the men be rendered the very best?

Glaucon/ There is not.

Socrates/ This then will be effected by music and exercise being afforded them according as we have described.

Glaucon/ Why will it not?

Socrates/ We have then established a law which is not only possible, but moreover best for the state.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ The wives, then, of our guardians must be unclothed, since they are to put on virtue for clothes, and they must bear a part in war and the other guardianship of the city, and do nothing else: but the lightest part of these services are to be allotted to the women rather than to the men, on account of the weakness of their sex. And the man who laughs at naked women, whilst performing the exercises for the sake of what is best, reaps the empty fruit of a ridiculous wisdom, and in no respect knows, as appears, at what he laughs, nor why he does it. For that ever was and will be deemed a noble saying, That what is most advantageous for the public is handsome, and what is hurtful is ugly.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Let us say, then, that we have got over one wave, as it were, having thus settled the law with respect to the women, without being wholly overwhelmed, ordaining that our male and female guardians are to manage all things in common: but our reasoning has been consistent with itself, as it respects both what is possible and likewise advantageous.

Glaucon/ It is truly no small wave you get over.

Socrates/ You will not, call it a great one, when you see what comes after it.

Glaucon/ Mention it, that I may see.

Socrates/ That law, and those others formerly mentioned, are followed, as I imagine, by this one.

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ That these women must all be common to all these men, and that no one woman dwell with any man privately, and that their children likewise be common; that neither the parent know his own children, nor the children their parent.

Glaucon/ This is much greater than the other, as to the incredibility both of its being possible and at the same time advantageous.

Socrates/ I do not believe, that anyone will doubt of its utility, at least, as if it were not the greatest good to have the women and children in common, if it were but possible. But I imagined the greatest question will be, whether it be possible or not?

Glaucon/ One may very readily, dispute as to both.

Socrates/ You mention, a crowd of disputes. But I thought that I should at least have escaped from the one, if its utility had been agreed on, and that it should have only remained to consider its possibility.

Glaucon/ But you have not, got off unobserved; give then an account of both.

Socrates/ I must then, submit to a trial. But however, indulge me thus far: allow me to feast myself, as those are wont to feast themselves who are slow in understanding, when they walk alone. For men of this sort, sometimes, before they find out how they shall attain what they desire, waving that inquiry, that they may not fatigue themselves in deliberating about the possibility or impossibility of it, suppose they have obtained what they desire, and then go through what remains; and they delight in running over what they will do when their desire is obtained, rendering

their soul, otherwise indolent, more indolent still. I am now effeminate after this manner, and wish to put off those debates, and to inquire afterwards whether these things be possible; but at present, holding them possible, if you allow me, I will consider in what manner our rulers shall regulate these things, when they take place, that they may be done in the most advantageous manner both to the state and the guardians. These things I shall endeavor, in the first place, to go over with your assistance, and the others afterwards, if you allow me.

Glaucon/ I allow, and inquire accordingly.

Socrates/ I imagine then, that if our rulers are worthy of that name, and in like manner these who are their auxiliaries, their ministers in the government, the latter will be disposed to do whatever is enjoined them, and the former will be ready to command; enjoining them some things in direct obedience to the law, and imitating the law in whatever things are entrusted to them.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Do you now, who are their lawgiver, in the same manner as you have chosen out the men, choose out likewise the women, making their genius as similar as possible: and as they dwell and eat together in common, and as no one possesses any of these things privately, they will meet together; and being mingled in their exercises and other conversation, they will be led from an innate necessity, as I imagine, to mutual embraces. Do not I seem to say what will necessarily happen?

Glaucon/ Not, by any geometrical, but concupiscible necessity, which seems to be more pungent than the other to persuade and draw the bulk of mankind.

Socrates/ Much more. But after this, Glauco, to mix together in a disorderly manner, or to do anything else, is

neither holy in a city of happy persons, nor will the rulers permit it.

Glaucon/ It were not just.

Socrates/ It is plain then, that after this they shall make marriages as much as possible sacred; but the most advantageous would be sacred.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ How then shall they be most advantageous? Tell me that, Glauco, for I see in your houses dogs of chase, and a great many excellent birds. Have you then indeed ever attended at all, in any respect, to their marriages, and the propagation of their species?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ First of all, that among these, although they be excellent themselves, are there not some who are most excellent?

Glaucon/ There are.

Socrates/ Whether then do you breed from all of them alike, or are you careful to breed chiefly from the best?

Glaucon/ From the best.

Socrates/ But how? from the youngest or from the oldest, or from those who are most in their prime?

Glaucon/ From those in their prime.

Socrates/ And if the breed be not of this kind, you reckon that the race of birds and dogs greatly degenerates.

Glaucon/ I reckon so.

Socrates/ And what think you as to horses, and other animals? is the case any otherwise with respect to these?

Glaucon/ That, were absurd.

Socrates/ Strange! my friend, how extremely perfect governors must we have, if the case be the same with respect to the human race.

Glaucon/ But it is so; but what then?

Socrates/ Because there is a necessity, for their using many medicines: for where bodies have no occasion for medicines, but are ready to subject themselves to a regimen of diet, we reckon that a weaker physician may suffice; but when there is a necessity for medicines, we know that a more able physician is then requisite.

Glaucon/ True; but with what view do you say this?

Socrates/ With this view. It appears that our rulers are obliged to use a deal of fiction and deceit for the advantage of the governed; and we said somewhere that all these things were useful in the way of medicines.

Glaucon/ And rightly.

Socrates/ This piece of right now seems not to be the most inconsiderable in marriages and the propagation of children.

Glaucon/ How, now?

Socrates/ It is proper, from what we have acknowledged, that the best men embrace for the most part the best women, and the most naughty men, on the contrary, the most naughty women; and the offspring of the former is to be educated, but not that of the latter, if you desire to have the flock of the most perfect kind; and this must be performed in such a manner as to escape the notice of all but the governors themselves, if you would have the whole herd of the guardians to be as free from sedition as possible.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ Shall there not then be some festivals by law established, in which we shall draw together the brides and bridegrooms? Sacrifices too must be performed, and hymns

composed by our poets suitable to the marriages which are making. But the number of the marriages we shall commit to the rulers, that as much as possible they may preserve the same number of men, having an eye to the wars, diseases, and everything else of this kind, and that as far as possible our city may be neither too great nor little.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And certain lots too, I imagine, should be made so artificial, that the naughty man may, on every embrace, accuse his fortune, and not the governors.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And those of the youth who distinguish themselves, whether in war or anywhere else, ought to have rewards and prizes given them, and the most ample liberty of embracing women, that so under this pretext likewise the greatest number of children may be generated of such persons.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And shall the children always as they are born be received by magistrates appointed for these purposes, whether men or women, or both; for the magistracies are in common to women as to men.

Glaucon/ They are so.

Socrates/ And when they receive the children of worthy persons, they will carry them, I imagine, to the nursery, to certain nurses dwelling apart in a certain place of the city. But the children of the more naughty, and such others as are any way lame, they will hide in some secret and obscure place as is proper.

Glaucon/ If they want, the race of guardians to be pure.

Socrates/ And shall not these take care likewise of their nursing, in bringing to the nursery the mothers when their

breasts are full, practicing every art, that no one know her own child, and in providing others who have milk, if these shall prove insufficient, and they shall likewise take care of these nurses, that they suckle a competent time: and they shall appoint the nurses and keepers to be wakeful, and to take every other necessary toil.

Glaucon/ You speak, of great ease to the wives of our guardians, in the breeding of children.

Socrates/ It is fit. But let us go over what comes next, which we chiefly intended. We took notice that good children ought to be generated of persons in their prime. Are you then of opinion with me, that the proper season of prime is twenty years to a woman, and thirty to a man?

Glaucon/ Of what continuance are these primes?

Socrates/ The woman, beginning at twenty, is to bear children to the state until the age of forty; and the man, after he has passed the most raging part of his course, from that period, is to beget children to the state until the age of fifty-five.

Glaucon/ This indeed is the prime, in both sexes, both of body and of mind.

Socrates/ If then anyone who is older or younger than these shall meddle in generating for the public, we shall say the trespass is neither holy nor just, as he begets to the state a child which, if it be concealed, is born and grows up without sacrifices and prayers (which upon every marriage the priestesses and priests, and the whole of the city shall offer, that the descendants of the good-may be still more good, and from useful descendants still more useful may arise), but is born in darkness, and from a dreadful intemperance.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And the law, must be the same, if any of those men, who are yet of the age for generating, shall touch women of a proper age, without the concurrence of the magistrate, we shall consider him as having raised to the state a bastardly, illegitimate and unhallowed child.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ And I imagine, that when the women and men exceed the age of generating, we will allow the men at liberty to cohabit with any woman they incline, besides their daughter and mother, and these who are the children of their daughters, or those upwards from their mother; and so likewise the women to embrace any, but a son and father, and the children of these, either downwards or upwards: all this liberty we will allow them, after we have enjoined them to attend carefully, in the first place, if anything should be conceived not to bring it to the light; but if by any accident it should be brought forth, to expose it as a creature for which no provision is made.

Glaucon/ All these things, are reasonably said. But how shall fathers and daughters, and those other relations you now mentioned, be known of one another?

Socrates/ They shall not be known at all. But from the day on which anyone is a bridegroom, whatever children are born in the tenth or in the seventh month after it, all these he shall call the male his sons, and the female his daughters, and they shall call him father. And in the same way again, he shall call the children of these grandchildren, and they again shall call them grandfathers and grandmothers: and those who were born in that period in which their fathers and mothers were begetting children, they shall call sisters and brothers, so as not to touch each other, as I just now said. But the law shall allow brothers and sisters to live together, if their lot to fall out, and the oracle give consent.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ This, Glauco, and such as this, is the community of women and children among your city guardians; and that it is both consonant to the other parts of our polity, and by far the best, we must in the next place establish from reason; or how shall we do?

Glaucon/ Just so indeed.

Socrates/ Did not we then agree on this at the beginning: to inquire what we can mention as the greatest good with relation to the establishment of a state, with an eye to which the law-giver ought to enact the laws, and what is the greatest evil; and then to inquire whether what we have hitherto gone over contributes towards leading us in the steps of this good, and away from that evil?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Is there then, any greater ill to a city than that which rents it in pieces, and instead of one, makes it many? Or is there any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?

Glaucon/ There is not.

Socrates/ Does not then one common feeling of pleasure and pain bind them together, when the whole of the citizens as much as possible rejoice and mourn in the same manner for the same things when they are obtained, and when they are lost?

Glaucon/ By all means so.

Socrates/ But a separate feeling of these things destroys it, when some of the citizens are extremely grieved, and others extremely glad at the same sufferings of the city, or of those who are in it.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ Does not then such an evil arise from this that follows, when they do not all jointly in the state pronounce these words, mine, and not mine? And will not that city be best regulated, when every individual, with regard to the concerns of another, in the same way with him pronounces these words, mine, and not mine?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And it is such as comes nearest to one man. As, when our finger is anyhow hurt, the whole common feeling spread through the body to the soul, with one symphony of its governing part perceives it, and the entire whole mourns along with the distressed part; and so we say that the man is distressed in his finger: and the reasoning is the same as to any other part of a man, both with respect to grief, when any part is in pain, or with respect to pleasure, when any part is at ease.

Glaucon/ It is the same.

Socrates/ And to return to your question, the city which comes nearest to this is governed in the best manner. When anyone of the citizens receives any good or ill, such a city, I imagine, will most especially say that she herself receives it, and the whole city rejoice or mourn together.

Glaucon/ Of necessity, this must prevail in a city governed by good laws.

Socrates/ It may be time for us to go back to our city, and consider how those things are in it which we have agreed on in oar reasoning, whether they prevail most in our city, or more in some other.

Glaucon/ We must do so.

Socrates/ What now, are there not in other cities governors and people? and are there not likewise in this?

Glaucon/ There are.

Socrates/ And will not all these call one another citizens?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But besides this of citizens, what does the people call their governors in other states?

Glaucon/ Masters or Lords in most states and in democracies, this very name, Governors.

Socrates/ But in our city, besides that of citizens, what does the people call their Governors?

Glaucon/ Their Preservers, and Helpers.

Socrates/ And what do they call the people?

Glaucon/ Rewarders, and Nourishers.

Socrates/ And in other cities, what do the governors call their people?

Glaucon/ Slaves.

Socrates/ And what do the governors call one another?

Glaucon/ Fellow rulers.

Socrates/ And ours, what?

Glaucon/ Fellow guardians.

Socrates/ Can you tell whether anyone of the governors in other cities can address one of their fellow governors as his kinsman,' and another as a stranger?

Glaucon/ Very many so.

Socrates/ Does he not then reckon and call the kindred one his own, and the stranger one as not his own?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But how is it with your guardians? Is there so much as anyone of them who can deem and call anyone of their fellow guardians a stranger?

Glaucon/ By no means; for with whomsoever anyone meets, he reckons he meets with a brother or sister, a father

or mother, a son or daughter, or the descendants or ancestors of these.

Socrates/ You say most nobly. But further, tell me this likewise: whether will you only establish among them, by law, these kindred names, or will you also enjoin them to perform all their actions suitable to these names? —with respect to parents, whatever the law enjoins to be performed to parents, such as reverence, and care, and obedience—and that otherwise it will not be for his advantage, neither in the sight of Gods nor of men, as he acts what is neither holy nor just, if he do other things than these. Shall these, or any other speeches from all our citizens, resound directly in the ears of our children, both concerning their parents, whom anyone shall point out to them, and concerning other relations?

Glaucon/ These things shall be said; for it were ridiculous if friendly names alone resounded, without any actions accompanying them.

Socrates/ Of all cities then, there will be the greatest harmony in it, when anyone individual is either well or ill, as to the expression we lately mentioned, viz., mine is well, or mine is ill.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Did not we say too, that their common pleasures and pains will accompany this opinion and expression?

Glaucon/ And we said rightly.

Socrates/ Will not then our citizens most especially have this in common which they call my own; and having this in common, they will of all others most especially have in common pleasure and pain?

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And along with the other parts of the constitution, is not the community of women and children among the guardians the cause of these things?

Glaucon/ This is it most especially.

Socrates/ But we agreed, that this was the greatest good of a city, likening a well-established city to a body in its being affected with the pleasure and pain of any part.

Glaucon/ And we rightly, agreed on this.

Socrates/ This community then of women and children among our auxiliaries, has appeared to us to be the cause of the greatest good to the city.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And surely we agree at least with what went before; for we somewhere said that they ought neither to have houses of their own, nor land, nor any possession, but receiving their subsistence from others, as a reward for their guardianship, they should all spend it in common, if they intended really to be guardians.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Do not therefore, as I say, both these things which were formerly mentioned, and still more what we now speak of, render them real guardians, and prevent the city from being rent in pieces by their not at all calling one and the same thing their own, but one, one thing, and another, another; one drawing to his own house whatever he can possess separate from others, and another to his, which is different from the other, and having both wives and children different, which occasion different pleasures and pains, which are private, as belonging to private persons, but being of one opinion concerning their home, and all of them pointing towards the same thing, as far as possible, to have one common feeling of pleasure and pain.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ But what, shall law-suits and accusations against one another be banished from among them, so to speak, by their possessing nothing as private property but their body, and everything else being common, from whence they shall be free of all those disturbances which men raise about money, children or relations.

Glaucon/ They will of necessity be free of these.

Socrates/ Neither indeed can there be reasonably among them any actions raised for violence or unseemly treatment. For, making the protection of their persons a necessary thing, we will own it to be handsome and just for those of equal age to help one another.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And this law, has this right in it likewise: that if anyone be in a passion, gratifying his passion in this manner he is less apt to raise greater seditions.

Glaucon/ It is entirely so.

Socrates/ The elder shall be enjoined both to govern and to chastise the younger.

Glaucon/ That is plain.

Socrates/ And surely the younger, as becomes them, shall never attempt to beat the elder, or in any other way to offer violence to him, unless appointed by the governors. Nor will they, I imagine, in any sort dishonor them, for there are sufficient guardians to hinder it, both fear and reverence. Reverence on the one hand restraining them from assaulting, as it were, their parents, and fear on the other, lest others shall assist the sufferer, some as sons, others as brothers, and others as fathers.

Glaucon/ It happens so.

Socrates/ In every respect then, as far as relates to the laws, the men shall live peaceably with one another.

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And while these have no seditions among themselves, there is no danger in any other cities raising disturbance against these, or that they shall split into factions.

Glaucon/ There is not.

Socrates/ As for the lesser evils, from which surely they will be freed, I do not choose, because of the impropriety of it, so much as to mention them—what flattery of the rich, what indigence and solicitude in the education of their children, and in making money for the necessary support of their family the poor have; sometimes borrowing, and sometimes being despised, and sometimes using all manner of shifts in procuring provisions, which they give to the management of their wives and domestics—how many slavish and mean things, my friend, they suffer in all these respects, are not even worthy to be mentioned.

Glaucon/ And they are manifest, to one blind.

Socrates/ They shall be delivered from all these things, and shall live happier than that happiest life which these enjoy who gain the prize in the Olympic games.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Those are esteemed happy on account of a small part of what these enjoy. But the victory of these is more noble, and their maintenance from the public is more complete; for the victory they gain is the safety of the whole city, and both they and their children are crowned with their maintenance, and all the other necessaries of life, as laurels, and receive honor from their city while alive, and at their death an honorable funeral.

Glaucon/ The most noble rewards.

Socrates/ Do you remember then, that in our former reasonings, I do not know who it was objected to us that we

were not making our guardians happy, who, though they had it in their power to have the whole wealth of their citizens, had nevertheless nothing at all? and we proposed to consider of this afterwards, if it fell in our way; but that at the present we were making our guardians only guardians, and the city itself as happy as possible, but without regarding one particular tribe in it, with a view to make it happy.

Glaucon/ I remember it.

Socrates/ What think you now of the life of our auxiliaries, which appears far more noble and happy than that of those who gain the prize at the Olympic games? It does not at all appear to resemble the life of the leather cutter, the handicraft, or farmer.

Glaucon/ I do not think it.

Socrates/ But however, it is proper that I mention here what I likewise said on a former occasion, that if the guardian shall attempt to be happy in such a way as to be no longer a guardian, nor be content with this moderate, and steady, and, as we say, best life, but, being seized with a foolish and youthful opinion about happiness, shall, because he has it in his power, be driven to make himself the master of everything in the city, he shall know that Hesiod was truly wise in saying that the half is somehow more than the whole.

Glaucon/ If he take me, for his counselor he will remain in such a life.

Socrates/ You allow then, that the women act in common with the men, as we have explained, with respect to education and the breeding of children, and the guardianship of the other citizens, both remaining in the city and in going forth to war, and that along with the men they ought to keep guard, and to hunt like dogs, and in every case

to take a share in all things as far as they can; and that while they do these things, they will do what is best, and no way contrary to the nature of the female, with respect to the male, by which nature they are made to act jointly with one another.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Does not then this, remain to be discussed, whether it be possible that this community take place among men likewise, as among other animals, and how far it is possible?

Glaucon/ You have prevented me, in mentioning what I was going to ask.

Socrates/ For with relation to warlike affairs, it is plain, I imagine, how they will fight.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ That they will jointly go out on their military expeditions, and besides will carry along with them such of their children as are grown up, that like these of other artists they may see those things which it will be necessary for them to practice when they are grown up; and besides, seeing that they may serve and administer in everything with relation to the war, and assist both their fathers and mothers. Or have you not observed what happens in the common arts? how that the children of the potters, ministering to them for a long time, look on before they apply themselves to the making earthen ware?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Whether now are these or our guardians to instruct their children with greater care, by the practice and view of what belongs to their office?

Glaucon/ To suppose those, should take greater care than our guardians, were ridiculous.

Socrates/ But every creature fights more remarkably in presence of its offspring.

Glaucon/ The case is so; but there is no small danger, Socrates, when they are defeated, as is often the case in war, that when their children as well as themselves are cut off, it shall be impossible to raise another city.

Socrates/ You say true,; but you imagine we ought, first of all, to take care never to run any risk.

Glaucon/ No, by no means.

Socrates/ What then, if they are at all to hazard themselves in any case, is it not where, if they succeed, they shall become better men?

Glaucon/ That is plain.

Socrates/ But do you imagine it a small matter, and not worthy of the risk, whether children, who yet are to be military men, see affairs relating to war or not?

Glaucon/ No; it is a matter of consequence with respect to what you mention.

Socrates/ We must then, first, endeavor to make our children spectators of the war, but contrive for them a place of safety—and then it shall do well, shall it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And shall not then, our parents, in the first place, as being men, not be ignorant, but understand which of the camps are, and which are not dangerous?

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ And they shall bring them into the one, but with respect to the other they will be on their guard.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And they will probably set governors over them, not such as are the most naughty, but such as by experience and years are able leaders and pedagogues.

Glaucon/ It is very proper.

Socrates/ But we will say many things have happened contrary to expectation.

Glaucon/ Very many.

Socrates/ With reference therefore to such events as these, it is proper that whilst they are children they get wings, that so, in any necessity, they may escape by flight.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ They must, when extremely young, be mounted on horses, and taught to ride on horse-back, and brought to see the battle, not on high mettled and warlike horses, but on the fleetest and those that are the most obedient to the rein; for thus they shall in the best manner observe their proper work, and, on any necessity, shall escape with the greatest safety, following the aged leaders.

Glaucon/ You seem to me, to say right.

Socrates/ But what, as to the affairs of war? how are you to manage your soldiers, both with respect to one another and their enemies? Have I imagined rightly or not?

Glaucon/ As to what?

Socrates/ That whoever of them, leaves his rank, throws away his arms, or does any such thing from cowardice, must he not be made a handicraft, or land-laborer?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And shall not the man who is taken alive by the enemy be given gratis to any who incline to employ him in the country as they have a mind?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And are you of opinion that he who gains a character, and excels, ought, in the first place, in the expedition itself, to be crowned in some measure by everyone

of the youths and boys who are his fellow soldiers? or think you otherwise?

Glaucon/ I am of opinion, for my part, they ought to be crowned.

Socrates/ But what, and get the right hand likewise?

Glaucon/ This likewise.

Socrates/ But this further, I imagine, you are not yet satisfied about.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That they embrace and be embraced by everyone.

Glaucon/ They should most of all others; and I will add to this law, that whilst they are upon this expedition, no one shall be allowed to refuse them, whoever they incline to embrace, that if any happen to be in love with anyone, male or female, he may be the more animated to win the prizes.

Socrates/ Very well; for we have already said that there are more marriages provided for the good citizen than for others, and more frequent choice in such matters allowed them than others, that the descendants of such an one may be as numerous as possible.

Glaucon/ We have already said so.

Socrates/ But surely, even according to Homer's opinion, it is just that such of the youth as are brave be honored in this way. For Homer says that Ajax, who excelled in war, was rewarded with a large share at the entertainments, this being the most natural reward to a brave man in the bloom of youth, by which he at the same time acquired honor and strength.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ We shall then obey Homer, at least in these things. And we shall honor the good, both at our sacrifices,

and all such occasions, in as far as they appear to be deserving, with hymns likewise, and with those things we lately mentioned: and besides these things, with seats, and dishes, and full cups, that at the same time we may both honor and exercise the virtue of worthy men and women.

Glaucon/ You say most admirably well.

Socrates/ Be it so. If anyone of those who die in the army shall have distinguished himself, shall we not, in the first place, say that he is of the golden kind?

Glaucon/ Most especially.

Socrates/ And shall we not believe Hesiod telling us, that when any of these die;

> They blameless deities become on earth,
> Beneficent, all evil warding off;
> Guardians of men? ——

Glaucon/ We shall believe him.

Socrates/ And we shall ask the oracle in what manner we ought to bury divine and god-like men, and with what marks of distinction, and thus shall we bury them in that very manner which shall be explained.

Glaucon/ Why shall we not?

Socrates/ And we shall in all after time reverence and worship their tombs as those of Deities. And we shall enact by law that the same things be performed, and in the same manner, to any who shall have been deemed to have remarkably distinguished themselves in life, when they die of old age or anything else?

Glaucon/ It is right.

Socrates/ But what now, how shall our soldiers behave towards enemies?

Glaucon/ As to what?

Socrates/ First, as to bringing into slavery. Do you think it just that Greeks should enslave Greek cities? or, rather, as far as they are able, not suffer any other to do it, and accustom themselves to this, to be sparing of the Grecian tribe, being greatly on their guard against being enslaved by the Barbarians?

Glaucon/ It is, in general, and in every particular case, best to be sparing.

Socrates/ Are they not to acquire any Grecian slave themselves, and to counsel the other Greeks to act in the same manner?

Glaucon/ By all means. They will the more, at least, by such a conduct, turn themselves against the Barbarians, and abstain from one another.

Socrates/ But what, to strip the dead, of anything but their arms, after they conquer them, is it handsome or not? It gives a pretense to cowards not to go against the enemy who is alive, as being necessarily occupied when they are thus employed about the one who is dead; and many armies have been lost by this plundering.

Glaucon/ Very many.

Socrates/ And does it not appear to you to be illiberal and sordid, and the part of a womanish and little mind to strip the dead body, and deem the body of the deceased an enemy, when the enemy is fled off, and there is only left behind that with which he fought? Or do you imagine that they who act in this manner do any way different from dogs, who are in a rage at the stones they throw at them, not touching the man who throws them?

Glaucon/ Not in the least.

Socrates/ We must let alone then this stripping the dead, and these hindrances arising from the carrying off booty.

Glaucon/ Truly, these must be banished.

Socrates/ Nor shall we at any time bring the arms into the temples, as if we were to dedicate them, at least not the arms of Grecians, if we have any concern to have the good liking of the other Greeks; but we shall rather be afraid, lest it should be a kind of profanation to bring into the temple such things as these from our own kinsman, unless the oracle shall say otherwise.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ But what, with reference to the laying waste Grecian lands and burning of houses, how shall your soldiers behave towards their enemies?

Glaucon/ I should be glad, to hear you signifying your opinion.

Socrates/ Truly then, in my opinion, neither of these ought to be done, but only one year's produce to be carried off. And would you have me tell you the reason why this should be done?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ It appears to me that as these two words, war and sedition, are different, so they are two different things which are signified by them: I call them two different things, the one is domestic and akin, the other foreign and strange. When hatred is among ourselves, it is called sedition; when it respects foreigners, it is called war.

Glaucon/ What you say, is no way unreasonable.

Socrates/ But consider now, if I say this likewise reasonably: for I aver that the Greek nation is friendly and akin to itself, but is foreign and strange to the Barbarian.

Glaucon/ This too is right.

Socrates/ When then the Greeks fight with the Barbarians, and the Barbarians with the Greeks, we shall say they wage war, and are naturally enemies; and this

hatred is to be called war. But when Greeks do any such thing to Greeks, we shall say that they are friends by nature, and that Greece in such a case is distempered and in sedition; and such a hatred is to be called a sedition.

Glaucon/ I agree, to account of it in the same manner.

Socrates/ Consider then, that in the sedition now mentioned, wherever such a thing happens, and the city is disjointed, if they sequester the lands, and bum the houses of one another, how destructive the sedition appears, and neither of them seems to be lovers of their country; for otherwise they would never dare to lay waste their nurse and mother; but it would suffice the victors to carry off the fruits of the vanquished, and to consider they are to be reconciled, and not perpetually to be at war.

Glaucon/ This indeed is by much a more mild sentiment than the other.

Socrates/ But what now? Is not this city you are establishing a Greek one?

Glaucon/ It should be so.

Socrates/ And shall not they be good and mild?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And shall they not be lovers of Greeks? And shall they not account Greece akin to them? And shall they not have the same religious rites with the rest of the Greeks?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ A difference then with Greeks, as with kinsmen, will they not denominate a sedition, and not a war?

Glaucon/ They will.

Socrates/ And they will behave as those who are to be reconciled?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ They shall then be mild and moderate, not punishing so far to enslave or destroy, since they are moderate and not hostile.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Neither then, as they are Greeks, will they sequester Grecian lands, nor burn their houses, nor will they allow that in every city all are their enemies, men, women, and children, but that always a few only are enemies, the authors of the quarrel. And on all these accounts they will neither choose to lay waste lands, as the greatest number are their friends, nor will they overturn the houses, but will carry on the war so far as till the guilty be obliged by the innocent, whom they distress, to make reparation.

Glaucon/ I agree, that we ought to behave so towards our own citizens when we are set against one another; and to behave so towards the Barbarians as the Greeks at present do to one another.

Socrates/ Let us then likewise establish this law for our guardians, neither to lay waste the lands, nor burn the houses.

Glaucon/ Let us establish it, and this further, that these things, and those too you mentioned formerly, are right. But it appears to me, Socrates, if one is to allow you to speak in this manner, that you will never remember what you formerly passed by when you entered on all this you have now said—this, to wit, how far such a government is possible? and in what way it is at all possible? For if it be at all possible, I will allow that all these good things will belong to that city, and these likewise which you have omitted; that they will in the best manner fight against their enemies, and of all others least abandon one another, recognizing these names, and calling one another by these, fathers, sons, and brothers. And if the female shall encamp along with them,

whether in the same rank, or drawn up behind them, to strike terror into the enemies, and at the same time to assist if ever there be necessity for it, I know that in this way they will entirely be invincible. And I plainly see too what advantages they have at home, which we have omitted. But speak no more about this government, as I allow that all these, and ten thousand other things, will belong to it, if it actually exist. But let us endeavor to persuade one another of this itself, whether it be possible, and in what respect it is so, and let us omit those other things.

Socrates/ You have suddenly, made an assault on my reasoning, and make no allowance for one who is fighting; for perhaps you do not advert that with difficulty I am escaped from two waves, and now you are bringing upon me the greatest and most dangerous of the three. After you have seen and heard this, you will entirely forgive me, allowing that I with reason grudged and was afraid to mention so great a paradox, and undertake to examine it.

Glaucon/ The more, you mention these things, the less will you be freed from explaining in what respect this government is possible. Proceed then, and do not spend time.

Socrates/ Must not this then, in the first place, be remembered, that we are come hither in search of justice, what it is, and what injustice is?

Glaucon/ It must. But what is this to the purpose?

Socrates/ Nothing. But if we find out what justice is, shall we then judge that the just man ought in no respect to differ from it, but in every respect to be such as justice is? and shall we be satisfied if he approach the nearest to it, and, of all others, partake of it the most?

Glaucon/ We shall, be satisfied so.

Socrates/ As a model then, we were inquiring into this, what kind of thing justice is, and we likewise were in quest of a just man, and considered what sort of man he should be, if he did exist. We likewise inquired what injustice is, and what too the most unjust men, in order that looking into these two models, what sort of men they appeared with respect to happiness and its opposite, we might be obliged to acknowledge concerning ourselves, that whoever should most resemble them in character, shall have a fortune the most resembling theirs; and not for this end, to show that these things are possible or not.

Glaucon/ In this, you say true.

Socrates/ Do you imagine then that the painter is in any degree the less excellent, who having painted a model of the most beautiful man, and brought everything fully into his piece, is yet unable to show that such a man does really exist?

Glaucon/ Truly, I do not.

Socrates/ What then, have we not made in our reasonings (shall we say) a model of a good city?

Glaucon/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ Have we then spoken anything the worse, do you imagine, on this account, that we are not able to show, that it is possible for a city to be established such as we have described?

Glaucon/ No indeed.

Socrates/ This then, is the truth in the case. But if truly I must now likewise, on your account, hasten to this, to show how especially and in what respects it is most possible, in order to this discovery you must again grant the same things as formerly.

Glaucon/ What things?

Socrates/ Is it possible for anything to be executed so perfectly as it is described? or is such the nature of practice that it approaches not so near the truth as theory, though some may think otherwise? But whether will you allow this or not?

Glaucon/ I allow it.

Socrates/ Do not then oblige me to show you all these things, and in every respect existing in fact, so perfectly as we have described in our reasoning; but if we be able to find out how a city may be established the nearest possible to what we have mentioned, you'll say we have found out that these things which you require are possible? Or will you not even be satisfied if this be obtained? for my own part I should be satisfied.

Glaucon/ And I too.

Socrates/ We are now it seems, in the next place, to endeavor to find out and to show what at all is the evil which is now practiced in cities through which they are not established in this manner we have described; and what is that smallest change which, if made, would bring the city to this model of government, and let us chiefly see, if this can be effected by the change of one thing; if not, by the change of two; if not that, by the change of the fewest things in number and the smallest in power.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Upon the change then of one thing, I am able, I think, to show that the state can fall into this model of government; but the change is not indeed small nor easy, yet it is possible.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ I am now come, to what I compared to the greatest wave: and it shall now be mentioned, though, like a

breaking wave, it should overwhelm us with excessive laughter and unbelief. But consider, what I am going to say.

Glaucon/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Unless either philosophers, govern in cities, or those who are at present called kings and governors philosophize really and thoroughly, and these two, the political power and philosophy, unite in one, and 'till the bulk of those who at present pursue each of these separately are of necessity excluded, there shall be no end, Glauco, to the miseries of cities, nor yet, as I imagine, to those of the human race; nor till then shall ever this republic, which we have gone over in our reasonings, spring up to a possibility, and behold the light of the sun. But this is that which all along made me grudge to mention it, that I saw what a paradox I was to utter: for it is difficult to be convinced that no other but this republic can enjoy happiness, whether public or private.

Glaucon/ You have thrown out, Socrates, such an expression and argument as you may imagine will bring on you a great many, and these courageous to such a degree as to put off their clothes, and naked to snatch whatever weapon fortune affords each of them, and, as if they were to perform prodigies, rush upon you in battle array. And unless mowing them down with argument you make your escape, you will pay for it by suffering most severe ridicule.

Socrates/ And are not you the cause of all this?

Glaucon/ But in acting handsomely at least. However, in this affair, I will not betray you, but defend you with such things as I am able, and I am able, both by my good-will, and by encouraging you, and probably I will answer your questions more carefully than any other; only do you endeavor, with the help of such an assistant, to show those

who are backward to believe these things that the case really is as you represent it.

Socrates/ I must endeavor, since even you afford so great an alliance. And here it seems to me to be necessary, if we are anyhow to make our escape from those you mention, accurately to define to them what kind of men these are we call philosophers, when we dare to assert that they alone ought to govern; in order that when they are made perfectly manifest, anyone may be able to defend himself when he asserts that to these it naturally belongs both to apply themselves to philosophy, and likewise to take upon them the government of the state: but others are to apply themselves neither to philosophy nor government, but to obey their leader.

Glaucon/ It is proper, to define them.

Socrates/ Come then, follow me this way, if together anyhow we shall sufficiently explain this matter.

Glaucon/ Lead on then.

Socrates/ Will it then be needful, to put you in mind, or do you remember it, that when we say of anyone that he loves anything, when we speak with propriety, he must not appear to love one part of it and not another, but to have an affection for the whole?

Glaucon/ I need, it seems, to be put in mind, for I do not understand it perfectly.

Socrates/ It might become another, Glauco, to say what you say; but it does not become a man who is a lover to forget that all those who are in their bloom sting somehow, and give emotion to one who is amorous and a lover, as they are deemed worthy both of respect and of being saluted. Or do you not behave in this manner towards the beautiful? One, because fiat-nosed, shall be called agreeable, and be commended by you; and the hook-nose of the other, you say,

is princely; and that which is in the middle of these is according to the exactest symmetry: the black are said to be manly to behold, and the fair to be the children of the Gods; but this appellation of pale green, do you imagine it is the invention of any other than of a flattering lover, and one who easily bears with the paleness, provided it is in the bloom of youth? And, in one word, you make all sort of pretenses, and say everything so as never to reject anyone who is of a blooming age?

Glaucon/ If you incline, to judge by me of other lovers, that they do in this sort, I agree to it for the sake of the argument.

Socrates/ And what, with respect to the lovers of wine; do you not observe them acting in the same manner, cheerfully drinking every kind of wine upon every pretext?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And you perceive, as I imagine, that the ambitious likewise, if they cannot obtain the command of a whole army, will take the third command; and if they cannot be honored by greater and better men, are content if they be honored by the lower and more contemptible, being desirous of honor at any rate?

Glaucon/ It is perfectly so.

Socrates/ Agree to this or not: if we say one is desirous of anything, shall we say that he desires the whole species, or that he desires one part of it, but not another?

Glaucon/ The whole.

Socrates/ Shall we not then likewise say that the philosopher is desirous of wisdom, and that not of one part only, but of the whole?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ He then who has a dislike of learning, especially if he be young, and has not at all understanding to discern what is good, and what is otherwise, shall not be called a lover of learning, nor a philosopher; in the same manner as we say of one who is disgusted with meats, that he neither hungers after nor desires meats, nor is a lover but a hater of them.

Glaucon/ And we shall say right.

Socrates/ But the man who readily inclines to taste of every piece of learning, and with pleasure enters on the study of it, and is insatiable of it, this man we shall with justice call a philosopher, shall we not?

Glaucon/ You shall have a great many such philosophers as those very absurd: for all your lovers of shows appear to me to be of this kind, from their taking a pleasure in learning, and your story lovers are the most stupid of all, to be reckoned among philosophers at least. These indeed would not willingly attend on such reasonings, and such a disquisition as this. But yet, as if they had hired out their ears to listen to every chorus, they run about to the Bacchanalia, omitting neither those of cities nor villages. Shall all these then, and others studious of such things, and those who apply to the inferior arts, be called by us philosophers?

Socrates/ By no means, but resembling philosophers?

Glaucon/ But whom, do you call the true ones?

Socrates/ Those, who are desirous of discerning the truth.

Glaucon/ This likewise, is right; but how do you mean?

Socrates/ It is not easy, to tell it to another; but you, I imagine, will agree with me in this.

Glaucon/ In what?

Socrates/ That since the beautiful is opposite to the deformed, these are two things.

Glaucon/ Why are they not?

Socrates/ And if they are two, then each of them is one.

Glaucon/ This also is granted.

Socrates/ And the reasoning is the same concerning justice and injustice, good and evil. And concerning every other species of things, the argument is the same. That each of them is one in itself, but appears to be many, being everywhere diversified by their communication with action and body, and with one another.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ In this manner then, I separate these, and set apart those you now mentioned, the lovers of public shows, of handicrafts, and mechanics, and then apart from these, I set those of whom we discourse at present, whom alone we may properly call philosophers.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ The lovers of common stories and of spectacles delight in fine sounds, colors, and figures, and everything which is compounded of these; but the real nature of beauty itself their understandings are incapable to discern and admire.

Glaucon/ Indeed the case is so.

Socrates/ But as to those then who are able to approach this beauty itself, and to behold it as it is in itself, must they not be few in number?

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ He then who accounts some things beautiful, but neither knows beauty itself, nor is able to follow, if one were to lead him to the knowledge of it, does he seem to you to live in a dream, or to be awake? Consider now, what is it

to dream. Is it not this, when one, whether asleep or awake, imagines the similitude of a thing is not the similitude, but really the thing itself which it resembles?

Glaucon/ I for my part would aver, that such a person is really in a dream.

Socrates/ But what now as to him who judges opposite to this, who understands both what beauty is itself, and is able to discern both it and such things as participate of it, and neither deems the participants to be beauty, nor beauty to be the participants? whether does such an one seem to you to live awake, or in a dream?

Glaucon/ Perfectly awake.

Socrates/ May we not then properly call this man's perception, as he really knows, knowledge, but that of the other, opinion, as he only imagines?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But what if the person who we say only imagines things, but does not really know them, be enraged at us, and dispute with us, alleging that what we say is not true, shall we have any method of soothing and persuading him, in a gentle manner, by concealing that he is not in a sound state?

Glaucon/ At least there is need of it.

Socrates/ Come now, consider what we shall say to him. Or do you incline we shall thus interrogate him, telling him that if he knows anything, no one envies him for it, but we shall gladly see him possessed of some knowledge? But only tell us this: does the man who has knowledge know something or nothing? Do you now answer me for him?

Glaucon/ I will answer, that he knows something.

Socrates/ Whether something which really exists, or which does not?

Glaucon/ What does really exist; for how can that be known which has no real existence?

Socrates/ We have then examined this sufficiently, though we might have considered it more fully: that what really is may be really known, but what does not at all exist cannot at all be known.

Glaucon/ We have examined it most sufficiently.

Socrates/ Be it so. But if there be anything of such a kind as both to be and not to be, must it not lie between that which perfectly is, and that which is not at all?

Glaucon/ Between them.

Socrates/ As to what really is, then, is there not knowledge, and as to that which is not at all, is there not of necessity ignorance; and for that which is between these we must seek for something between ignorance and knowledge, if there be any such thing.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Do we say then that opinion is anything?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ Whether is it a different power from knowledge, or the same?

Glaucon/ Different.

Socrates/ Is opinion then conversant about one thing, and knowledge about another, by virtue of the same power, or each of them by virtue of a power of its own?

Glaucon/ This last.

Socrates/ Is not the power of knowledge conversant about what really exists, to know that it is? Or rather it seems to me to be necessary to distinguish in this manner.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ We shall say that powers are a certain species of real existences, by which both we can do whatever we can

do, and every being else whatever it can do. Thus, I say that seeing and hearing are among these powers, if you understand what I mean to call a species.

Glaucon/ I understand.

Socrates/ Hear then what appears to me concerning them, for I do not see any color of a power, nor figure, nor any of such qualities, as of many other things, in regard to which I distinguish some things with myself, that they are different from one another. But as to power, I regard that alone about which it is conversant, and what it effects, and on this account I have called each of these a power. And the power which is conversant about, and effects, one and the same thing, I call the same power, but that conversant about, and effecting a different thing, I call a different power. But what say you? In what manner do you?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But come again, excellent Glauco, whether do you say that knowledge is itself a certain power, or to what class do you refer it?

Glaucon/ I refer it to this class of power, as it is of all powers the most strong.

Socrates/ But what now? Shall we refer opinion to power, or to some other species?

Glaucon/ By no means to power; for that by which we form opinions, is nothing else but opinion.

Socrates/ But you owned a little ago that knowledge and opinion were not the same.

Glaucon/ How, can ever anyone who has understanding reduce under one that which is infallible and that which is not infallible?

Socrates/ You say right. And it is plain that we have allowed opinion to be a different thing from knowledge.

Glaucon/ A different.

Socrates/ Each of them then has naturally a different power over a different thing.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Knowledge has a power over being itself, in knowing real existence, how it exists.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But we say that opinion imagines.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whether does it imagine the same thing which knowledge understands? and shall that which is known and that which is imagined be the same? or is this impossible?

Glaucon/ Impossible, from what we have allowed, since they are naturally powers of different things, and both of them are powers, opinion and knowledge, and each of them different from the other, as we have said. From these things it cannot be that that which is imagined is the same with that which is known.

Socrates/ If then real existence itself be known, must it not be different from the existence which is imagined?

Glaucon/ Different.

Socrates/ Does he then imagine that which has no existence? Or is it impossible even to imagine that which does not exist at all? Consider now, does not the man who imagines, refer his opinion to somewhat? Or is it possible to imagine, and yet imagine nothing at all?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ But whoever imagines, imagines some one thing.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But surely that which does not exist cannot be called anyone thing, but most properly nothing at all.

Glaucon/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ But we necessarily referred ignorance to that which does not exist, but knowledge to real existence.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Therefore neither existence, nor what does not exist imagines.

Glaucon/ No indeed.

Socrates/ Opinion then is neither knowledge, nor is it ignorance.

Glaucon/ It appears it is not.

Socrates/ Does it then exceed these, either knowledge in perspicuity, or ignorance in obscurity?

Glaucon/ It does neither.

Socrates/ But does opinion, seem to you to be more obscure than knowledge, but more perspicuous than ignorance?

Glaucon/ A great deal.

Socrates/ But does it lye between them both then?

Glaucon/ It does.

Socrates/ Opinion then is in the middle of these two.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And have we not already said that if anything appeared of such a kind as at the same time to be and yet not to be, such a thing would lie between that which has really an existence, and that which does not at all exist, and that neither knowledge nor ignorance would be conversant about it, but that which appeared to be between ignorance and knowledge.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And now that which we call opinion has appeared to be between them.

Glaucon/ It has appeared.

Socrates/ It yet remains for us, as appears, to find out that which participates of both these, of existence and of non-existence, and which with propriety can be called neither of them perfectly, that if it appear to be what is imagined, we may justly call it so, assigning to the extremes what is extreme, and to the middle what is in the middle. Shall we not do thus?

Glaucon/ Thus.

Socrates/ These things being settled, let this worthy man, I will say, tell and answer me, he who reckons that beauty, and a certain idea of beauty, there is none, always the same, and in the same respects; but this lover of beautiful objects reckons there are many beautiful things, but can never bear it? —if anyone tells him that there is one beautiful, and one just, and so of others. Of all these many things, excellent man, shall we say to him, where is there any which will not appear ugly, and of those just which will not appear unjust, of those holy which will not appear profane?

Glaucon/ No, but of necessity, the beautiful things themselves must in some respects appear even ugly, and others in like manner.

Socrates/ But what, many things which are double, or twofold, do they less really appear to be halves than doubles?

Glaucon/ No less.

Socrates/ And things great and small, light and heavy, shall they be denominated what we call them, any more than the opposite?

Glaucon/ No, but each of them, always participates of both.

Socrates/ Whether then is each of these many things that which it is said to be, or is it not?

Glaucon/ It is like their riddles at feasts, and the riddle of children about the eunuch's striking the bat, puzzling one another in what manner and how far he strikes it. For all these things have a double meaning, and it is impossible to know accurately that they are, or are not, that they are both, or neither of the two.

Socrates/ How can you do with them then, or have you a better class for them than a medium between existence and non-existence? For nothing seems more obscure than non-existence in respect of having no being at all, nor more perspicuous than existence in respect of real being.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ We have then discovered, it seems, that the most of the maxims of the generality of mankind concerning the beautiful, and those other things, roll somehow between existence and non-existence.

Glaucon/ We have accurately discovered it.

Socrates/ But we formerly agreed that if any such thing should appear, it ought to be called that which is imagined, and not what is known; and that which fluctuates between the two to be perceived by the power between the two.

Glaucon/ We agreed.

Socrates/ Those then who contemplate many beautiful things, but who never perceive beauty itself, nor are able to follow another leading them to it and many just things, but never justice itself, and all other things in like manner, we will say that they imagine all things, but of all that they imagine they know none.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ But what now? Those who perceive each of the things themselves, always existing in the same manner and in the same respect, will we not say that they know, and do not imagine?

Glaucon/ Of necessity this likewise.

Socrates/ And will we not say that these embrace and love these things of which they have knowledge, and the others the things of which they have opinion? Or do we not remember that we said they beheld and loved fine sounds and colors, and such things, but that beauty itself they do not admit of as any real existence?

Glaucon/ We remember.

Socrates/ Shall we then commit any wrong in calling them lovers of opinion, rather as philosophers? Yet they will be greatly enraged at us, if we call them so.

Glaucon/ No. if they be persuaded by me; for it is not lawful to be enraged at the truth, These then who admire everything which has a real existence, are to be called philosophers, and not lovers of opinion.

Socrates/ By all means.

THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK

The Sixth Book

Socrates/ These now who are philosophers, Glauco, and these who are not, have, through a long compass of discourse, with difficulty, discovered themselves what they severally are.

Glaucon/ Because, perhaps, it was not easy, in a short one.

Socrates/ So it appears. But I still think they would have better discovered themselves, if we had been to speak to no other point than this, and not have gone through, all those other things, when we were to consider what difference there is between a just life and an unjust.

Glaucon/ What then, are we to treat of next?

Socrates/ What else, but of what is next in course. Since those are philosophers who are able to attain to the knowledge of that which exists always, and in all respects the same, but those who are not able to attain to this, but who wander amidst many things, and such as are every way shifting, are not philosophers, which of these ought to be the governors of the city?

Glaucon/ Which way, shall we determine in this, and determine reasonably?

Socrates/ Whichever of them, appears capable of preserving the laws and institutions of cities, these are to be made guardians.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ This now, is certainly plain, whether a blind or quick-sighted guardian be proper for guarding anything.

Glaucon/ Why, is it not plain?

Socrates/ Whether then do those appear to you to differ from the blind, who are wholly deprived of the knowledge of each particular being, and have neither a clear model in their

soul, nor are able, as painters looking up to the truest model, and always referring themselves thither, and contemplating it in the most accurate manner possible, to establish here too in like manner just maxims of the beautiful, and just and good, if there be occasion to establish them, and to guard and preserve such as are already established?

Glaucon/ No, surely, they do not differ much.

Socrates/ Shall we then appoint those to be guardians, or those who know each being, and who in experience are nothing behind those others, nor inferior to them in any other part of virtue?

Glaucon/ It were absurd, to choose others, at least if these are not behind in other things; for in this, which is almost the greatest, they excel.

Socrates/ Shall we not then speak to this point? In what manner the same persons shall be able to have both the one and the other of those things?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ It is then first of all necessary, as we observed in the beginning of this discourse, thoroughly to understand their genius, and I imagine, if we sufficiently agree as to it, we shall likewise agree that the same persons are able to have both of these things, and that no others but these ought to be the governors of cities.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Let this now be agreed among us concerning the philosophic geniuses, that they are always desirous of such learning as may discover to them that being which always exists, and is not changed by generation or corruption.

Glaucon/ Let it be agreed.

Socrates/ And likewise, that they are desirous of the whole of such learning, and that they will not willingly omit any part of it, neither small nor great, more honorable, or more dishonorable, as we formerly observed concerning the ambitious, and concerning lovers.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ Consider then, in the next place, if besides what we have mentioned, it be necessary that this also should subsist in the genius of those who are to be such as we have described.

Glaucon/ As what?

Socrates/ That they be void of falsehood, nor willingly at any time receive a lie, but hate it, and love the truth.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ It is not only likely, friend, but must be so of necessity, that one who is naturally in love with anything should love everything akin and belonging to the objects of his affection.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Can you then find anything more akin to wisdom than truth?

Glaucon/ How can we?

Socrates/ Is it possible then that the same genius can be philosophic, and at the same time a lover of falsehood?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ He then, who is in reality a lover of learning, ought immediately from his infancy to be in the greatest measure desirous of all truth.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But we know, somehow, that whoever has his desires running vehemently after anyone thing, has them

upon this very account weaker as to other things, as a current diverted from its channel.

Glaucon/ Why are they not?

Socrates/ But whosoever has his desires running out after learning, and everything of this kind, would be conversant, I imagine, about the pleasure of the soul itself, and would forsake those pleasures which arise from the body—provided he be not a counterfeit, but some real philosopher.

Glaucon/ This of necessity must be the case.

Socrates/ And such an one is moderate, and by no means a lover of money; for the reasons why money is with so much trouble solicitously sought after, have weight with any other than such an one to make him solicitous.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And surely somehow you must likewise consider this, when you are to judge what is a philosophic genius, and what is not.

Glaucon/ As what?

Socrates/ That it do not without your knowledge partake of an illiberal turn; for littleness of soul is most opposite to a mind which is always to pursue earnestly the whole, and everything divine and humane.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Do you then imagine that any understanding which has a greatness of mind, and is fitted for the contemplation of the whole of time, and the whole of being, can possibly think human life a great matter?

Glaucon/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Such an one then will not account death anything terrible.

Glaucon/ Least of all.

Socrates/ A cowardly and illiberal genius then will not it seems readily participate of true philosophy.

Glaucon/ No, as I imagine.

Socrates/ What now, can the moderate man, and one who is not a lover of money, nor illiberal, nor boasting, nor cowardly, ever possibly be an ill co-partner or unjust?

Glaucon/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ And you will likewise consider this, when you are viewing from its infancy what is the philosophic soul, and what is not, whether it be just and mild, or unsocial and savage.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Neither indeed, as I imagine, will you omit this.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Whether it be docile or indocile? Or do you expect that ever anyone will at all love anything to purpose, in performing which he performs with uneasiness and with difficulty, making small progress?

Glaucon/ It cannot be.

Socrates/ But what if he can retain nothing of what he learns, being quite forgetful, is it possible for him not to be void of knowledge?

Glaucon/ How is it possible?

Socrates/ And when he labors unprofitably, do you not imagine he will be obliged at last to hate both himself and such practice?

Glaucon/ Why must he not?

Socrates/ We shall never then reckon a forgetful soul among those who are thoroughly philosophic, but we shall require it to be of a good memory.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But never shall we say this at least, that an unmusical and indecent genius leads anywhere else but towards intemperance.

Glaucon/ Where else?

Socrates/ But whether do you reckon truth akin to intemperance, or to temperance?

Glaucon/ To temperance.

Socrates/ Let us require then among other things an understanding naturally temperate and graceful, as a proper guide towards attaining the real idea of each particular being, according to its own nature.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ What now? Do we not in some measure seem to you to have gone through the necessary qualifications, and such as are consequent on one another, in a soul which is to apprehend being sufficiently, and to perfection.

Glaucon/ The most necessary.

Socrates/ Is it possible then for you in any measure to find fault with such a study as this, which one can never be able sufficiently to apply to, unless he be naturally possessed of a good memory, be docile, generous, graceful, and the friend and ally of truth, justice, fortitude and temperance?

Glaucon/ Not even Momus himself, could find fault with such a study.

Socrates/ But, will it not be to these alone, when they are perfected by education and age, that you will entrust the city?

Adeimantus/ Indeed, Socrates, no one is able to contradict you as to these things; but all who hear you at any time advancing what you do at present, are somehow affected in this manner. Being led off a little by your

reasoning on each question, through their inexperience in this method of question and answer, when all these littles are collected together, at the close of your reasonings, they reckon that the mistake appears considerable, and the contrary of their first concessions: and like those who play at talus with such as are dexterous, but are themselves unskillful, they are in the end shut up and can do no more, so your hearers have nothing to say, shut up by this other kind of game, not with pieces, but with your reasonings, though the truth at least is not by this any way advanced. I say this with reference to the present inquiry: for one may tell you that he has nothing to oppose to each of your questions by way of argument, but that in fact he sees, that all those who plunge into philosophy, applying to it not with this view, that being early instructed they may give it over when in their prime, but that they may continue in it much longer, become the most of them quite awkward, not to say altogether naughty, and those of them who appear the most worthy do yet suffer this much from this study you so much commend, that they become useless to the public.

Socrates/ When I had heard this, do you imagine then, that such as say these things are telling a falsehood?

Adeimantus/ I do not know, but would gladly hear your opinion.

Socrates/ You would then hear that they appear to me to say true.

Adeimantus/ How then, is it right to say that the miseries of cities shall never have an end till they be governed by philosophers, whom we are now acknowledging to be useless to them?

Socrates/ You ask a question, which needs an answer by a comparison.

Adeimantus/ And you, are not wont, I imagine, to talk by comparisons.

Socrates/ Be it so. You joke now, when you have brought me on a subject which is so hard to be explained. But hear now my comparison, that you may see further with what difficulty I make one; for the sufferings of the most worthy philosophers, in the management of public affairs, are so grievous, that there is not anyone other suffering so severe; but in making our comparison, and in apologizing for them, we must collect from many particulars, in the same manner as painters mix the figures of two different animals together, and paint a creature which is both goat and stag in one, and others of this kind. Imagine now that such an one as this is the pilot of a fleet, or of a single ship, one who exceeds all in the ship, both in bulk and in strength, but is somewhat deaf, and sees in like manner but a short way, and whose skill in sea affairs is much of the kind. And imagine that the sailors are all in sedition among themselves, contending for the pilotship, each imagining he ought to be pilot, though he never at all learned the art, nor is able to show who was his master, nor what time he learned it. That besides this, all of them say that the art itself cannot be taught, and are ready to cut in pieces anyone who says that it can. Imagine, further, that they continually surround the pilot himself, begging and doing everything that he may put the helm into their hands; and even sometimes, when they are not so successful in persuading him as others are, they either kill these others, or throw them overboard: and after they have by mandragora, or wine, or some other thing, rendered the real pilot incapable, they manage the ship with the assistance of the crew, and whilst they drink and feast in this manner, they fail as it may be expected of such people. And besides these things, if anyone be dexterous in assisting them to get the government into their own hands, and in

setting aside the pilot, either by persuasion or force, they commend such an one, calling him sailor and pilot, and intelligent in navigation, but they contemn as useless everyone who is not of this kind—whilst it never enters into their thought that the true pilot must have regard to the year, the seasons, the heavens, and stars, and winds, and everything belonging to the art, if he mean to be a governor of a ship in reality; but the art and practice of governing men, whether some be willing or not, they think impossible for one to attain along with the art of navigation. Whilst affairs are in this situation with regard to the ships, do you not imagine that the true pilot will be called by the sailors aboard of ships fitted out in this manner, a stargazer, insignificant, and unprofitable to them?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ I imagine then, that you will not want any explanation of the comparison, to see that it represents how they are affected in cities towards true philosophers, but that you understand what I say?

Adeimantus/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ First of all then with respect to this, if anyone wonders that philosophers are not honored in cities, teach him our comparison, and endeavor to persuade him that it would be much more wonderful were they held in greater honor.

Adeimantus/ I will teach them so.

Socrates/ And further, that it is indeed true, what you now was observing, that the best of those who apply to philosophy are useless to the bulk of mankind; but however, for this, bid them blame such as make no use of these philosophers, and not these philosophers themselves. For it is not natural for the pilot to entreat the sailors to allow him to govern them, nor for the wise to be resorting to the gates

of the rich; but whoever made this witty objection was in a mistake; for this is the most natural method, that whoever is sick, whether rich or poor, must of necessity go to the gates of the physician, and whoever wants to be governed, must wait on him who is capable to govern—for it is not natural that the governor who is really of any value should entreat the governed to subject themselves to his government. But you will not greatly err, when you compare our present political governors to those sailors we now mentioned, and those who are called by them insignificant and star-gazers to those who are truly pilots.

Adeimantus/ Most right.

Socrates/ From hence then it would seem that the best pursuit is not likely to be held in esteem among those who pursue studies of an opposite nature; but by far the greatest and most violent accusation of philosophy is occasioned by means of those who profess to be studying it, the most of whom, you say your accuser of philosophy calls altogether naughty, and the very best of them of no advantage to the state—and I agreed that you say the truth, did I not?

Adeimantus/ You did.

Socrates/ And have we not fully explained the cause, why the best of them are of no advantage?

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ Would you choose, then, that we should, in the next place, explain the reason why the most of them must of necessity be naughty, and that we endeavor to demonstrate that of this, as little as of the other, is philosophy the cause?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Let us attend then, and begin our reasoning, calling to mind what we formerly observed concerning the natural genius which necessarily belongs to the good and worthy. And what was a leading part in it, if you remember,

was truth, which he must by all means wholly pursue, or else be a vain boaster, and never partake of true philosophy.

Adeimantus/ It was so said.

Socrates/ Is not this one part of his character quite contrary to the present opinions of him?

Adeimantus/ It is very much so.

Socrates/ Will it not then be no small defense, if we be able to show that the true lover of learning is naturally made to aspire to the knowledge of real being, and not to rest in the many particular things which are the objects of opinion, but goes on, and is not blunted, nor ceases from his love of truth before he attain to the knowledge of the nature of each particular being, by that part of the soul whose office it is to attain to such knowledge, and it belongs to that principle in the mind which is akin to it: and when he' has approached to this knowledge, and mingled with real being, having generated intelligence and truth, he would then really have true knowledge, and enjoy life and nourishment in the most real manner, and then alone, and no sooner, does he cease from trouble?

Adeimantus/ This, will be a most reasonable defense.

Socrates/ What now, will it be the part of such an one to love falsehood, or quite the contrary, to hate it?

Adeimantus/ To hate it.

Socrates/ But whilst truth indeed leads the way, we can never at all, as I imagine, say that any band of evils follows in her train.

Adeimantus/ How can we?

Socrates/ But on the contrary we may aver that she is followed by~ a sound and moderate disposition, and such as is accompanied with temperance.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ Why now, need we go over again, and range in order the whole qualities of the philosophic genius? for you no doubt remember that there belong to men of this character fortitude, magnanimity, docility, memory: and when you replied, that everyone would, be obliged to agree to what we said, we quitted that subject, and turned to that which is the subject of discourse at present, on your saying that you observed some of the philosophers were insignificant, and many of them altogether naughty. And while we were examining into the cause of that calumny, we are now come to this, whence it is that many of them are naughty. And on this account we have gone over again the genius of true philosophers, and have-necessarily defined what it is.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ It is necessary now, that we consider the corruptions of this genius, and in what manner it is destroyed in-the most. But one small matter escapes us: who they: are they call not naughty, but insignificant; and next, what those geniuses are which counterfeit the philosophic one, and pretend to its pursuits—what is the genius of their minds, who aspire to a pursuit which does not belong to them, and is above their reach. Thus by their manifold blunders, they have everywhere spread over all this opinion of philosophy you mention.

Adeimantus/ What sort of corruptions, do you mean?

Socrates/ I shall endeavor to rehearse them, if I be able. And this now, I imagine, everyone will allow us, that such a genius, with all those qualifications we have enjoined one who is to be a perfect philosopher, rarely arises among men, and that there are but few of them. Do not you think so?

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And of those few, consider how many and how great are the causes of corruption.

Adeimantus/ As what?

Socrates/ What is most of all wonderful to hear, that each of those things we commended in the genius of a philosopher corrupts the mind which possesses them, and withdraws it from philosophy, fortitude, I mean, and temperance, and all those other qualifications we have gone through.

Adeimantus/ That is strange to hear.

Socrates/ And further still, besides these things, all those which are commonly called good, such as beauty, riches, strength of body, a powerful alliance in the city, and everything akin to these, corrupt and withdraw it from philosophy; for you have now a sample of what I mean.

Adeimantus/ I have, and would gladly understand more perfectly what you say.

Socrates/ Understand then, the whole of it aright, and it will appear manifest, and what we formerly said will not appear absurd.

Adeimantus/ How then, do you bid me do?

Socrates/ With respect to every kind of seed or plant, whether of vegetables or animals, we know that whatever does not meet with the proper nourishment, nor season, nor place belonging to it, the more vigorous it is by nature, the more it is defective in the excellencies of its kind; for evil is more opposite to good than to that which is not good.

Adeimantus/ Why is it not?

Socrates/ It is then agreeable to reason, I imagine, that the best genius, when meeting with nourishment foreign to it, shall be more changed to what is evil than a bad genius.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ And shall we not, Adimantus, in the same manner say that souls of the noblest genius, when they meet with ill education, become remarkably bad? Or do you imagine that great iniquity and the extremest wickedness arise from a weak genius, and not from a vigorous one quite ruined in its education; but that a weakly genius will never at all be the cause of anything remarkable, whether good or evil?

Adeimantus/ I do not think it will, but the case is as you say.

Socrates/ If then this philosophic genius, which we have established, meet with suitable instruction, it will, as I imagine, necessarily grow up and attain to every virtue; but if when sown in an improper soil it grow up and be nourished accordingly, it will on the other hand turn out quite the reverse, unless one of the Gods come to its assistance. Or do you imagine, as the generality do, that certain of the youth are corrupted by the sophists, and that the corruptors are certain private sophists, which is worthy of our notice? Or think you rather, that the persons who' say these things are themselves the greatest sophists, conveying their instruction in the most powerful manner, and rendering young and old, men and women, such as they incline?

Adeimantus/ When do they so?

Socrates/ When many of them, are set down, crowded together in an assembly, in their courts of justice, the theatre, or the camp, or any other public meeting of the people, with a deal of tumult, they blame some speeches and actions, and commend others, roaring and bawling out the one and the other beyond measure; and besides these things, the rocks and the place where they are, resounding, redoubles the noise they make whilst they blame and applaud in this manner. In such a situation now, what kind

of heart, as we say, do you imagine the youth are to have? Or what private instruction can make him withstand, so as not to be quite overwhelmed by such blame or applause, and giving way, be carried down the stream wherever it carries him, and say that things are beautiful and base, according as these people say, and pursue the things they pursue, and become of the very same kind himself?

Adeimantus/ This, must of necessity happen, Socrates.

Socrates/ But, we have not yet mentioned what must of the greatest necessity be the case.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That which these instructors and sophists superadd by action, not being able to persuade by speech; or do you not know that they punish with disgraces, and fines, and deaths, the man whom they cannot persuade?

Adeimantus/ I know that, extremely well.

Socrates/ What other sophist then, or what private reasonings do you imagine capable, drawing opposite to these, to overpower them?

Adeimantus/ I know none.

Socrates/ But is it not besides, great folly even to attempt it? For there neither is, nor was, nor ever can be a different method of attaining virtue, besides this education by these sophists. I mean a humane method, friend, for a divine one, according to the proverb, I keep out of the question; for you must know well, that whatever temper is preserved, and becomes such as it ought to be in such a constitution of politics, you will not say amiss when you say that a divine interposition has preserved it.

Adeimantus/ Nor am I, of a different opinion.

Socrates/ But further now, besides these things, you must likewise be of this opinion.

Adeimantus/ Of what?

Socrates/ That each of these private hirelings, which these men call sophists and deem the rivals of their art, teach no other things but those maxims of the vulgar which they approve when they are assembled together, and call it wisdom. As if one had learned what were the passions and desires of a great and strong animal he were nourishing, how one must approach it, how touch it, and at what seasons it is most fierce or most mild, and from what causes, and the sounds which on these several occasions it was wont to utter, and at what sounds uttered by another the animal is rendered both mild and savage; and having learned all these things by associating with the animal, and by spending considerable time with it, should call this wisdom, and as if he had established an art, should set about the teaching it; whilst yet with reference to these opinions and desires, he knows not in reality what is handsome, or base, or good, or ill, or just, or unjust, but should pronounce all these according to the opinions of the great animal, calling these things good in which it delighted, and that evil with which it was vexed, and should have no other measure as to these things; and should call these things which proceed from necessity of nature, handsome and just, but the nature of necessity and good, how much they differ in reality, he has never discovered himself, nor is able to show to another. Whilst he is such an one, does he not truly appear to you an absurd teacher?

Adeimantus/ To me he appears so.

Socrates/ And from this man, think you, does he any way differ, who deems it wisdom to have understood the anger, and the pleasures of the multitude, and of assemblies of all kinds of men, whether with relation to painting, music, or politics? For if anyone converses with these, and shows them either a poem, or any other piece of workmanship, or piece

of administration respecting the city, and makes the multitude the judges of it, he is under what is called a Diomedaean necessity, which is above all other necessities, of doing whatever they commend. But to show that these things are in reality good and handsome, have you at any time heard any of them advance a reason that was not quite ridiculous?

Adeimantus/ Nor do I imagine, I ever shall.

Socrates/ Whilst you attend then to all these things, bear this in mind, that the multitude never will admit or reckon that there is the one beautiful, and not many beautifuls, one proper nature to each thing, and not many natures.

Adeimantus/ They will be the last to do so.

Socrates/ It is impossible then for the multitude to be philosopher.

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And those who philosophize, must of necessity be reproached by them.

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And likewise by those private persons who, in conversing with the multitude, desire to please them.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ From this state of things now, what safety do you see for the philosophic genius to continue in its pursuit and arrive at perfection? and consider from what was formerly hinted, for we have allowed, that docility, memory, fortitude, and magnanimity belong to this genius.

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ And shall not such an one, of all-men, immediately be the first at everything, especially if he have a body naturally assisting to the soul?

Adeimantus/ Why shall he not?

Socrates/ And when he comes to riper years, his kindred and citizens, I imagine, will incline to employ him in their affairs.

Adeimantus/ Why will they not?

Socrates/ And making supplications to him, and paying him homage, they will submit to him, and anticipate and flatter before-hand his growing power.

Adeimantus/ Thus, it usually happens.

Socrates/ What now, do you imagine such an one will do in such a case, especially if he happen to belong to a great city, and be rich and of a noble descent, and withal beautiful and of a handsome stature? Shall he not be filled with extravagant hopes, deeming himself capable of managing both the affairs of Greeks and Barbarians, and on these accounts carry himself loftily, without any solid judgment, full of ostentation and vain conceit?

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ If one should gently approach a man of this disposition and tell him the truth, that he has no judgment, yet needs it, but that it is not to be acquired but by one who subjects himself to this acquisition, do you think, that with all these evils about him, he would be ready to hearken?

Adeimantus/ Far from it.

Socrates/ If now, through a good natural temper and an innate disposition to reason, anyone should somehow be made sensible, and be bended and drawn towards philosophy, what do we imagine those others will do when they reckon they shall lose his company and acquaintance? Will they not by every action, every speech, say and do everything both towards the man himself, not to suffer himself to be persuaded, and towards his adviser, to render him incapable by insnaring him in private, and bringing him to public trial?

Adeimantus/ This, must of necessity happen.

Socrates/ Is it likely, now, such an one shall philosophize?

Adeimantus/ Not altogether.

Socrates/ You see then, that we were not wrong when we said that even the very ingredients of the philosophic genius, when they meet with bad education, are in some measure the cause of a falling off from this pursuit, as well as those vulgarly reputed goods, riches, and all furniture of this kind.

Adeimantus/ We were not, but it was rightly said.

Socrates/ Such then, admirable friend, is the ruin, such and so great the corruption of the best genius for the noblest pursuit, and which besides but rarely happens, as we observed. And from among such as these are the men who do the greatest mischief to cities and to private persons, and likewise they who do the greatest good, such as happen to be drawn to this side; but a little genius never did any-thing remarkable to anyone, neither to a private person, nor to a city.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ These indeed then whose business it chiefly was to apply to philosophy, having thus fallen off, leaving her desolate and imperfect, lead themselves a life neither becoming nor genuine, whilst other unworthy persons, intruding themselves on philosophy, abandoned in a manner by her kindred, have disgraced her, and loaded her with reproaches, such as these you say her reproachers reproach her with: how that of those who converse with her, some are of no value, and the generality of them worthy of the greatest punishments.

Adeimantus/ These things, are commonly said.

Socrates/ And with reason, they are said. For other contemptible men seeing the field unoccupied, and that the

possession of it is attended with dignities and honorable names, like persons who make their escape from prisons to temples, these likewise gladly leap from their handicrafts to philosophy; such of them as are of the greatest address in their own little art; for even in this situation of philosophy, her remaining dignity, in comparison with all the other arts, is still far superior: of which dignity many are desirous, who by natural disposition are unfit for it, whose bodies are not only deformed by their arts and handicrafts, but whose souls also are in like manner confused and crushed by their servile works. Must it not of necessity be so?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Do you imagine then, that they are any way different in appearance from a black-smith, who has made a little money, bald and puny, newly loosed from chains, and washed in the bath, with a new robe on him, just decked out as a bridegroom, presuming to marry the daughter of his master, encouraged by the poverty and forlorn circumstances he sees him in?

Adeimantus/ There is, no great difference.

Socrates/ What sort of a race must such as these produce? Must at not be bastardly and abject?

Adeimantus/ Most necessarily.

Socrates/ But what now? When men who are unworthy of instruction apply to it, and are conversant in it, in an unworthy manner, what sort of sentiments and opinions shall we say are produced? Must they not be such as ought properly to be termed sophisms, and having nothing at all genuine or worthy of one of true judgment?

Adeimantus/ By all means so.

Socrates/ A very small number now, Adimantus, remains of those who worthily are conversant in philosophy, who happen either to be detained somehow in banishment, and

whose generous and well cultivated genius persists in the study of philosophy, being removed from everything which tends to corrupt it; or else, when in a small city a mighty genius arises, who, despising the honors of the state, entirely neglects them, and likewise with justice despising any small thing arising from the other arts, his generous soul returns to philosophy: so that the bridle which keeps in our friend Theagis, is sufficient to keep them; for all other things conspire to withdraw Theagis from philosophy, but the care of his health excluding him from politics, keeps him to it. For as to my genius, it is not worth mentioning; for certainly it has happened heretofore to but one other, or to none at all. And even of these few now, such as are tasting, and have tasted how sweet and happy the acquisition of philosophy is, and have withal sufficiently seen the madness of the multitude, and how none of them, to speak in the general, does anything salutary in the affairs of cities, and that there is no ally with whom one might go to the assistance of the just and be safe, but that he is as a man falling among wild beasts—being neither willing to join them in injustice, nor able, being but one, to oppose the whole savage crew, but, ere he can serve the city or his friends, is destroyed and is unprofitable both to himself and others—reasoning on all these things, lying quiet and minding his own affairs, as in a tempest, when earth and sea are driven by winds, entering under roof, beholding others overwhelmed in injustice, he is satisfied if he shall himself anyhow pass his life here pure from injustice and unholy deeds, and make his exit hence in good hopes, cheerful and composed.

Adeimantus/ And he shall make his exit, after having done none of the smallest matters.

Socrates/ Nor the greatest neither, whilst he has not met with a republic that is suitable to him; for in a suitable one

he shall both be more improved himself, and shall preserve the affairs of private persons as well as of the public. We have now then, I imagine, sufficiently told whence it happens that philosophy is accused, and that it is so unjustly, unless you have something else to offer.

Adeimantus/ But, I say nothing further about this point. But which of the present republics do you say is suitable to philosophy?

Socrates/ Not one indeed; but this is what I complain of, that there is no constitution of a city at present worthy of the philosophic genius, which is therefore turned and altered, as a foreign seed, sown in an improper soil, which degenerates to what is usually produced in that soil. After the same manner this race, as it has not at present its proper activity, degenerates to another species: but should it meet with the best republic, as it is the best in itself, then shall it indeed discover that it is really divine, and that all besides are human, both as to their genius and their pursuits. But now you seem plainly to be going to ask which is this republic.

Adeimantus/ You are mistaken; for this I was not going to ask, but whether it was this which we have described, in establishing our city, or another one.

Socrates/ As to other things, it is this one, and this very thing was then mentioned, that there must always be in the city something which shall have the same regard for the republic, which you the legislator have, when you establish the laws.

Adeimantus/ It was mentioned.

Socrates/ But it was not, made sufficiently plain, through fears which pre-occupied you, when you signified that the illustration of the thing would be both tedious and difficult; and it is not indeed altogether easy to go over what remains.

Adeimantus/ As what?

Socrates/ In what manner a city shall attempt philosophy and not be destroyed, for all grand things are dangerous, and, as the saying is, fine things are truly difficult.

Adeimantus/ But however, let our disquisition be completed in making this evident.

Socrates/ Want of inclination, shall not hinder, though want of ability may. And being present, you shall know my eagerness, and consider now how eagerly and adventurously I am going to say, that a city ought to attempt this study in a way opposite to that at present.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ At present, those who meddle with it are striplings, who immediately from their childhood, amidst their domestic affairs and lucrative employments, apply themselves to the most abstruse parts of philosophy, and then they go off most consummate philosophers. I call the most difficult part, that respecting the art of reasoning. And in all after time, if, when they are invited by others who practice this art, they are pleased to become hearers, they think it a mighty matter, reckoning they ought to do it as a by-work; but towards old-age, besides some few, they are extinguished much more than the Heraclitean sun, in that they are never kindled up again.

Adeimantus/ But how should they do?

Socrates/ Quite the reverse. Whilst they are striplings and boys they should apply to juvenile instruction and philosophy, and in taking proper care of their body whilst it shoots and grows to firmness, provide for philosophy a proper assistant; and then, as that age advances in which the soul begins to be perfected, they ought vigorously to apply to her exercises; and when strength decays, and is no longer able for civil and military employments, they should

then be dismissed and live at pleasure, and excepting a by-work, do nothing else but philosophize, if they propose to live happy, and at death to have in the other world a lot suitable to the life they have led in this.

Adeimantus/ How truly, Socrates, do you seem to me to speak with zeal; yet, I imagine, the greater part of your hearers will still more zealously oppose you, and by no means be persuaded, and that Thrasymachus will be the first of them.

Socrates/ Do not divide, Thrasymachus and me, who are now become friends, nor were we enemies heretofore. For we shall no way desist from our attempts, till we either persuade both him and the rest, or make some advances towards that life at which when they arrive they shall again meet with such discourses as these.

Adeimantus/ You have spoken, but short time.

Socrates/ None at all, with respect at least to the whole of time: but that the multitude are not persuaded by what is said, is no wonder, for they have never at any time seen existing what has now been mentioned, but rather such discourses as have been industriously composed, and have not fallen in naturally as these do at present. But as for a man who is come up to the model of virtue, and is rendered conformable to it in the most perfect manner possible, both in word and in deed, never at all have they seen such a man, neither one nor more of the kind. Or do you imagine they have?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Neither yet, happy friend, have they sufficiently attended to noble and generous reasonings, so as keenly to inquire after the truth, by every method, merely for the sake of knowing it, banishing at a distance such intricate and contentious debates as tend to nothing else but to opinion

and contention, both in their courts of justice and in their private meetings.

Adeimantus/ The case is just so.

Socrates/ On these accounts then, and with foresight of these things, we were formerly afraid; however, being compelled by the truth, we did assert, that neither city nor republic, nor even single man in the same way, would ever become perfect, till some necessity of fortune oblige these few philosophers, who are at present accounted not naughty, yet insignificant, to take the government of the city whether they will or not, and oblige the city to be obedient to them; or till the sons of those who are in the offices of power and magistracies, or they themselves, by some divine inspiration, be smitten with a genuine love of genuine philosophy: and I aver that no one has reason to think that either of these, or both, are impossible; for thus might we justly be laughed at as saying things which are only to be wished for. Is it not so?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ If then, in the infinite series of past ages, the greatest necessity has obliged philosophy to take the government of a state, or is now prevailing in any barbarous region, remote somewhere from our observation, or shall afterwards happen, we are ready in that case to contend in our reasoning, that this republic we have described has existed and subsists, and shall arise at least when this our muse shall get the government of the state. For this is neither impossible to happen, nor do we talk impossibilities, though we ourselves confess that they are difficult.

Adeimantus/ I am likewise, of the same opinion.

Socrates/ But you will say, that the multitude do not think so too.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Happy friend, do not thus altogether accuse the multitude; but whatever opinion they may have, without upbraiding them, but rather encouraging them, and removing the reproach thrown on philosophy, point out to them the persons you call philosophers, and define distinctly, as at present, both their genius and their pursuits, that they may not think you call these philosophers whom they think so; or if they mean the same men, you will tell them they have conceived a different opinion of the men from what you have, and give very different answers about them from yours. Or do you imagine, that one can be enraged at one who is not in a passion? or that one shall envy the envious, who is himself both void of envy and is of a mild disposition? I will prevent you, and say that I imagine there is in some few so bad a natural temper, but not in the generality.

Adeimantus/ I likewise, imagine so.

Socrates/ Are you not then of the same opinion with me in this: that these men are the cause of the multitude's being ill affected towards philosophy, who openly satirize what is no way becoming them, behaving in a scoffing and distasteful manner towards the multitude, always making? discourses about particular men, doing what is least of all becoming philosophy.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For certainly, somehow, Adimantus, the man at least who really applies his understanding to real being, has not leisure to look down to the little affairs of mankind, and in fighting with them, to be filled with envy and ill nature; but beholding and contemplating such objects as are orderly and always uniform, such as neither injure nor are injured of one another, but are in all respects beautiful and according to reason, these he imitates and resembles as far

as possible. Or do you imagine it possible to find out any contrivance to draw men off from the imitation of that in conversing with which they are filled with admiration?

Adeimantus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ The philosopher then who converses with that which is beautiful and divine, as far as is possible for man, becomes himself beautiful and divine. But calumny is powerful in everything.

Adeimantus/ It is entirely so.

Socrates/ If then, he be under any necessity, not merely forming himself alone, but likewise of endeavoring to introduce anything he beholds there among mankind, in order to form their manners, both in private and in public life, would he prove, think you, a bad artist of temperance and of justice, and of every social virtue?

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ But if now the multitude perceive that we say the truth of such an one, will they be angry at philosophers, and disbelieve us when we say that the city can never otherwise be happy unless it be drawn by those painters who follow a divine original?

Adeimantus/ They will not be angry, if they perceive so. But what method of painting do you mean?

Socrates/ When they have got, the city and the manners of men as their canvas, they would first make it clean, which is not altogether an easy matter. But in this, you know, they differ from others, that they are unwilling to meddle either with private man or city, or to prescribe laws, 'till once they either receive these clean, or cleanse them themselves.

Adeimantus/ And rightly.

Socrates/ And after this, do not you imagine they will draw a sketch of the republic?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Afterwards, I imagine, as they proceed in their work, they will frequently look both ways, both to what is naturally just, and beautiful, and temperate, and the like; and likewise again to that which they can establish among mankind, blending and compounding their human form from different human characters and pursuits, drawing from this which Homer calls the divine likeness and the divine resemblance subsisting among men.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ They will then, I imagine, strike out one thing, and insert another, 'till they have rendered human manners, as far. as is possible, amiable to the Gods.

Adeimantus/ It should thus, be the most beautiful picture.

Socrates/ Do we now then, any way persuade these men, who, you said, were coming upon us in battle array, that such a painter of republics is the man we then recommended to them, and on whose account they were enraged at us, that we committed cities to him, and will they now be more mild when they hear us mentioning it?

Adeimantus/ Certainly, if they be wise.

Socrates/ For what is there now they can further question? Shall they say that philosophers are not lovers of real being and of truth?

Adeimantus/ That, were absurd.

Socrates/ Or that their genius, as we described it, is not akin to that which is best?

Adeimantus/ Nor this neither.

Socrates/ What then? Whilst their genius is such as this, and meets with suitable exercises, shall it not become

perfectly good and philosophic, if any other be so? Or will you say those will be more so whom we set aside?

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Will they still then be enraged at us, when we say that till the philosophic race have the government of the city, neither the miseries of the city nor of the citizens shall have an end, nor shall this republic, which we speak of in way of fable, come in fact to perfection?

Adeimantus/ It is likely, they will be less enraged.

Socrates/ Are you content then, that we say not of them they are less enraged at us, but that they are altogether appeased and persuaded, that if we make no more of them, they may at least consent by their blushing?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Let them then, be persuaded of this. But is there anyone will call this into question, that those of the philosophic genius do not usually spring from kings and sovereigns?

Adeimantus/ Not one, would allege that.

Socrates/ And though they were born with a philosophic genius, one may say they are under a great necessity of being corrupted; for indeed that it is a difficult matter for these geniuses to be preserved untainted, even we ourselves agree. But that in the infinite series of time, of the whole of the human race, there should never at all be so much as a single one preserved pure and untainted, is there anyone who will call into question?

Adeimantus/ How could any do it?

Socrates/ But surely, a single one is sufficient, if he exists, and has a city subject to him, to accomplish everything now so much disbelieved.

Adeimantus/ He is sufficient.

Socrates/ And when the governor, has established the laws and customs we have recited, it is not at all impossible that the citizens should be willing to obey him.

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ But is it wonderful or impossible that what appears to us should also appear to others?

Adeimantus/ I do not think it.

Socrates/ And that these things are best, if they be possible, we have sufficiently, as I imagine, explained in the preceding part of our discourse.

Adeimantus/ Sufficiently indeed.

Socrates/ Now then it seems we are agreed about our legislation—that the laws we mention are the best, if they could exist, but that it is difficult to get them to prevail, not, however, impossible.

Adeimantus/ We are agreed.

Socrates/ After that this has with difficulty been brought to a conclusion, shall we not, in the next place, consider what follows? In what manner, and from what education and studies, they shall become the preservers of our republic? and in what periods of life they shall each of them apply to the several branches of education.

Adeimantus/ We must indeed consider that.

Socrates/ I acted not wisely, when in the former part of our discourse, I left untouched the difficulty attending the possession of women, and the propagation of the species, and the establishing governors, knowing with what envy and difficulty they must be introduced, or be carried no further than theory. For now we are under no less a necessity of discussing these things at present. What relates to women and children is already finished; and we must now go over again, as from the beginning, what refers to governors. We

said, if you remember, that they should appear to be lovers of the city, and be tried both by pleasures and by pains, and appear to quit this opinion neither through toils nor fears, nor any other change, and that he who was not able to do this was to be rejected; but he who came forth altogether pure as gold tried in the fire, was to be appointed ruler, and to have honors and rewards paid him both alive and dead. Such were the things we said whilst our reasoning passed over and concealed itself, as afraid to rouse the present argument.

Adeimantus/ You say most truly, for I remember it.

Socrates/ For I grudged, friend, to say what I am now to adventure on; but now we must even venture to assert this: that the most complete guardians must be made philosophers.

Adeimantus/ Let this be agreed upon.

Socrates/ But consider that you shall likely have but few of them: for such a genius as we said they must of necessity have, is wont but seldom in all its parts to meet in one; but its different parts generally spring up in different persons.

Adeimantus/ How do you say?

Socrates/ That such as are wont to be docile, of good memory, quick, and acute, and endued with whatever qualifications are akin to these, are not at the same time vigorous, and magnanimous in their mind, so as to live decently, with quietness and stability; but that such are carried by their acuteness wherever it happens, and everything that is stable departs from them.

Adeimantus/ You say true.

Socrates/ With regard then to these firm habits of the mind, which are not at all versatile, and which one might rather employ as trusty, and which are difficult to be moved at dangers in war, are they not of the same temper with

reference to learning; they move heavily, and with difficulty learn, as if they were benumbed, and are oppressed with sleep and yawning, when they are obliged to labor at anything of this kind?

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ But we said that he must partake both these well and handsomely, or else he ought not to share in the most perfect education, nor magistracy, nor honors of the state.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ Do not you imagine this will but rarely happen?

Adeimantus/ Why will it not?

Socrates/ They must be tried then both in the things we formerly mentioned, in labors, in fears, and in pleasures, and likewise in what we then passed over, and are now mentioning; we must exercise them in various kinds of learning, whilst we consider whether their genius be able for the highest learning, or whether it fails, as those who fail in the other things.

Adeimantus/ It is proper now, to consider this question at least in this manner. But which learning do you call the highest?

Socrates/ You remember in some measure, that when we had distinguished the soul into three parts, we determined concerning justice, temperance, fortitude, and wisdom, what each of them is.

Adeimantus/ If I did not remember, it were just I should not hear what remains.

Socrates/ Do you likewise remember what was said before that?

Adeimantus/ What was it?

Socrates/ We somewhere said that it was possible to behold these in their most beautiful forms, but that the journey would be tedious which one must go over who would see them conspicuously. That it was possible, however, to approach towards them in the way of our demonstrations above-mentioned; and you said that these were sufficient; so what was then advanced, came to be spoken far short, in my own opinion, of accuracy, but if agreeably to you, you may say so.

Adeimantus/ To me at least, they seemed to be discussed in measure; and the rest seemed to think so too.

Socrates/ But, friend, in speaking of matters of this kind, such a measure as leaves out any part whatever of the truth is not altogether in measure. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything—though some at times are of opinion that matters are sufficiently well when brought this length, and that there is no necessity for further inquiry.

Adeimantus/ Very many, are thus affected through indolence.

Socrates/ But the guardian of the city and of the laws, has least of all need of that passion.

Adeimantus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Such an one then, friend, must go over the longer compass, and labor no less in learning than in the exercises, otherwise, as we were now saying, he shall never at all arrive at the perfection of the highest and most suitable learning.

Adeimantus/ But are not these, the highest? Or is there yet anything higher than justice, and those virtues which we mentioned?

Socrates/ There is even higher. And even of these, we must not contemplate only the coarse draught, but not omit the highest finishing. Or is it not ridiculous in other things

of small account to employ our whole labor, and to strain hard to have them the most accurate and perfect, and not deem the highest and most important matters worthy of our highest attention, in order to render them the most perfect?

Adeimantus/ The sentiment, is very just. But however, do you imagine, that anyone will let you pass without asking you what indeed is this highest learning, and about what is it conversant, when you call it so?

Socrates/ Not at all, but do you yourself ask me; for assuredly you have not seldom heard it, and at present you either do not attend, or you intend to occasion me trouble in raising opposition. This I rather imagine, since you have often heard at least that the idea of the good is the highest learning: which idea, when justice and the other virtues use as a model, they become really useful and advantageous; you now almost know that this is what I mean to say, and besides this, that we do not sufficiently know that idea, and that without this knowledge, though we understood all else in the highest measure, you know that it profits us nothing: in the same manner, as it would avail us nothing though we possessed anything whatever without the possession of the good. Or do you imagine there is any more profit in possessing all things without the possession of the good, than in knowing all things without the knowledge of the good, knowing nothing at all that is beautiful and good?

Adeimantus/ Not I, for my part, indeed.

Socrates/ But surely this too at least you know, that to the multitude pleasure seems to be the good, and to the more elegant it seems to be wisdom.

Adeimantus/ And very ridiculously.

Socrates/ How indeed can it be otherwise? if when they upbraid us, that we know not what is the good, they tell us that they know, and call it the wisdom of what is good, as if

we understood what they say, when they pronounce the word the good.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But what, those who define pleasure to be good, are they any way in a lesser error than the. others, or are not these too obliged to confess that pleasures are evil?

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ They come then to acknowledge, I imagine, that the same things are both good and evil, do they not?

Adeimantus/ Why do not they?

Socrates/ Is it not evident then that there are great and manifold doubts about it?

Adeimantus/ Why are there not?

Socrates/ But what, is it not also evident, that with reference to things just and beautiful, the multitude choose the apparent, even though they be not really so, yet they act, and possess, and are reputed of accordingly; but the acquisition of goods, that were only the apparent never yet satisfied anyone, but in this they seek what is real, and here everyone despises what is only the apparent.

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ This then is that which every soul pursues, and for the sake of this it acts all with a prophetic impression, that it is somewhat yet in doubt, and unable to comprehend what it is, nor to hold by a steady opinion of it, as in other things, and thus are they unsuccessful also in other things, if there be in them any profit. About a matter now of such a kind, and of such mighty consequence, shall we say that even these our best men in the city, and by whom we take in hand to do everything, shall be thus in the dark?

Adeimantus/ As little at least as possible.

Socrates/ I imagine then, that whilst it is unknown in what manner the just and beautiful are good, they are not of any great value to a guardian to possess, if it be likely he shall know these, whilst he is ignorant of this, but I prophesy no one will come to the real knowledge of these before he knows what is good.

Adeimantus/ You prophesy rightly.

Socrates/ Shall not then our republic be completely adorned if such a guardian be set over it as is intelligent in these things?

Adeimantus/ It must of necessity. But with respect to yourself, whether, Socrates, do you say that the good is science, or pleasure, or something else besides these?

Socrates/ You was ever, a worthy man, and manifestly showed of old that you was not to be satisfied with the opinions of others about these things.

Adeimantus/ Nor does it appear to me just, Socrates, that one should be able to tell the opinions of others, but not his own, after having spent so much time inquiring about these things.

Socrates/ But what, does it then appear to you just for one to speak of these things of which he is ignorant, as if he knew them?

Adeimantus/ By no means, as if he knew them; yet however, according as he imagines, that he should be willing to tell us what he imagines.

Socrates/ But what, have you not observed of opinions void of knowledge how deformed they all are? Or do those, who without understanding form right opinion, seem to you in any respect to differ from those who are blind, and at the same time go straight on the road?

Adeimantus/ No way.

Socrates/ Do you incline then that we should examine things deformed, blind, and crooked, having it in our power to hear from others what is clear and beautiful?

Glaucon/ Do not, I entreat you, Socrates, give over at the end; for it will suffice us, if in the same way as you have talked of justice, and temperance, and those other virtues, you likewise talk concerning the good.

Socrates/ And I too shall be very well satisfied, friend, but I'm afraid I shall not be able; and by appearing keen I shall incur the ridicule of the unmannerly. But, my happy friends, let us quit at present this inquiry, what the good is (for it appears to me a greater matter than that in our present pursuit we can overtake, even what I imagine of it at the time); but I am willing to tell you what the offspring of the good appears, and what most resembles it, if this be agreeable to you, and if not, shall let it alone.

Glaucon/ But tell us; for you shall afterwards explain to us what the father is.

Socrates/ I could wish, both that I were able to give that explanation, and you to receive it, and not as now the offspring only. Receive now then this child and offspring of the good itself. Yet take care, however, that unwillingly I deceive you not, in any respect, giving an adulterate account of this offspring.

Glaucon/ We shall take care, as we are able; only tell us.

Socrates/ I shall tell then, after we shall have settled matters together, and I have put you in mind of what was mentioned in our preceding discourse, and has been frequently said on other occasions.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ That there are many things, beautiful, and many good, and each of these we say is so, and we distinguish them in our reasoning.

Glaucon/ We say so.

Socrates/ But as to the beautiful itself, and the good itself, and in like manner concerning all those things which we then placed as many, now again establishing them according to one simple idea of each particular, as being one, we give each that appellation which belongs to it; and the things themselves we say are seen by the eye, but not understood by the intellect; but that the ideas are understood by the intellect, but not seen by the eye.

Glaucon/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ By what part then of ourselves do we see things visible?

Glaucon/ By the sight.

Socrates/ And is it not, by hearing that we perceive what is heard, and by the other senses all the matters of sense?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But have you not observed, with regard to the maker of the senses, how he has formed the power of sight, and of being visible in the most perfect manner?

Glaucon/ I have not entirely perceived it.

Socrates/ But consider it in this manner. Is there any other species, which hearing and sound require, in order that the one may hear, and the other be heard, which third thing if it be not present, the one shall not hear, and the other not be heard?

Glaucon/ There is nothing.

Socrates/ Imagine then, that neither do many others (that I may not say none) require any such thing: or can you mention anyone that does require it?

Glaucon/ Not I.

Socrates/ But with reference to the sense of seeing and the object of sight, do not you perceive that they require something?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ When there is sight in the eyes, and when he who has it attempts to use it, and when there is color in the objects before him, unless there concur some third species, naturally formed for the purpose, you know that the sight shall see nothing, and the colors shall be invisible.

Glaucon/ What is that you speak of?

Socrates/ What you call light.

Glaucon/ You say true.

Socrates/ This species then is not despicable. By no small idea then are the sense of seeing, and the power of being seen, connected together; but by a bond the most honorable of all bonds, if light be not dishonorable.

Glaucon/ But it is far, from being dishonorable.

Socrates/ Whom then of the Gods in heaven can you assign as the cause of this, that light makes our sight to see, and visible objects to be seen in the best manner?

Glaucon/ The same as you, and others do; for it is evident you mean the sun.

Socrates/ Is not the sight then naturally formed in this manner with reference to this God?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ The sight is not the sun, nor is that the sun in which sight is, which we call the eye.

Glaucon/ It is not.

Socrates/ But yet, I imagine, that of all the organs of sense, it par-takes most of the image of the sun.;

Glaucon/ Greatly so.

Socrates/ And the power which it has, does it not possess as dispensed and flowing from hence?

Glaucon/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ Is not then the sun, which indeed is not sight itself, yet as it is the cause of it, seen by sight itself?

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ Imagine then, that this is what I was calling the offspring of the good, which the good generates, analogous to itself, and that what this is in the intellectual world, with respect to intelligence and the objects of intelligence, the same is the sun in the visible world with respect to sight and visible things.

Glaucon/ How is it? Explain to me yet further.

Socrates/ You know that the eyes, when they are no longer directed towards objects whose colors are shone upon by the light of day, but by that faint one of the night, grow dim and appear almost blind, as if they had in them no perfect sight.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But, I imagine, when they turn to objects which the sun illuminates, they see clearly, and in those very eyes there appears now to be sight.

Glaucon/ There does.

Socrates/ Understand then, in the same manner, the case to be so with reference to the soul. When it shall firmly adhere to that which truth and real being enlighten, then it understands and knows it, and appears to have intelligence; but when it adheres to that which is blended with darkness, which is generated and which perishes, it fancies and guesses, takes up and lays down its opinions, and resembles now one without intelligence.

Glaucon/ It has such a resemblance.

Socrates/ That therefore which gives truth to what is known, and dispenses the power to him who knows, you may call the idea of good, being the cause of knowledge and of truth, as being known by intelligence. And as both these two, knowledge and truth, are so beautiful, when you deem that the good is something different, and still more beautiful than these, you shall deem aright. Knowledge and truth here are as light and sight there, which we rightly judged to partake most of the image of the sun, but that we were not to imagine they were the sun. So here it is right to judge, that both these partake of the image of the good, but to imagine either of them the good, is not right, but the good itself is worthy of greater honor.

Glaucon/ You mean, an inestimable beauty, since it affords knowledge and truth, but is itself superior to these in beauty. And you never anywhere at all said that it was pleasure.

Socrates/ Softly, and in this manner rather consider its image yet further.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ You will say, I imagine, that the sun gives to things which are seen, not only their visibility, but likewise their generation, growth and nourishment, though in itself it be not generation.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ We may say, therefore, that things which are known have not only this from the good, that they are known, but likewise their being and essence are given them by it, whilst the good itself is not essence, but above essence, superior to it both in dignity and in power.

Here Glauco, with a great laugh, says;

Glaucon/ What a prodigious excellence is this! I swear.

Socrates/ You yourself, are the cause, having obliged me to tell my opinion about it.

Glaucon/ And by no means, stop, if something does not hinder you, but go over again the resemblance relating to the sun, if you are omitting anything.

Socrates/ But I omit, many things.

Glaucon/ Do not omit, the smallest matter.

Socrates/ I imagine, there will be a great deal omitted; however, as far as I am able at present, I shall not willingly omit anything.

Glaucon/ Do it not.

Socrates/ Attend then, how that we say there are two species, and that the one reigns over the intellectual world, and the other over the visible, not to say the heavens, lest I seem to you to be using sophistry in the expression. You understand then these two species? —the visible, the intellectual?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ As if then you took a line cut into two unequal parts, and cut over again each section according to the same proportion, both that of the visible species, and that of the intellectual—and thus you shall have perspicuity and obscurity placed by one another—in the visible species you shall have in one section images—I call images, in the first place, shadows; next, the appearances in water, and such as appear in bodies which are close, polished, and bright, and everything of this kind, if you understand me.

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Suppose now the other section of the visible which this resembles, such as the animals around us, and every kind of plant, and all sort of workmanship.

Glaucon/ I suppose it.

Socrates/ Are you willing then that this section appear to be divided into true and untrue? And that the same proportion, which the object of opinion has to the object of knowledge, the very same proportion has the resemblance to that of which it is the resemblance?

Glaucon/ I am indeed, extremely so.

Socrates/ But it now again the section of the intellectual, how it was divided.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ How as to one part of it the soul uses the former sections as images, and is obliged to inquire upon hypotheses, not going to the beginning, but to the conclusion; and the other part again, where the soul goes by an hypothesis to a beginning, not supposed, and without those images about it, by the species themselves, making its way through them.

Glaucon/ I have not, sufficiently understood you in these things.

Socrates/ But again, for you shall more easily understand me after these things have been premised. For I imagine that those who are conversant in geometry and computations, and such like, after they have laid down hypotheses of excess and of equality, and made their figures, and three kinds of angles, and other things akin, according to each method, they go upon these things as known, having laid down all these as hypotheses, and do not give any further reason about them, neither to themselves nor others, as being things obvious to all; but beginning at these, they directly go over, explaining the rest, and with full consent end at that which their inquiry pursued.

Glaucon/ I know this, perfectly well.

Socrates/ And do you not likewise know that when they make use of the visible species, and reason about them, their

understandings are not employed about these species, but about those which they are the resemblances of, holding their reasonings about a real square, and about a real diameter, not about that which they draw? And, in the same manner, with reference to other things, those very things which they form and draw, in which number, shadows and images in water are to be reckoned, these they make use of as images, seeking to behold those real things which one can no way see but by his intellect.

Glaucon/ You say true.

Socrates/ This, then, I called a species of the intellectual, but that the soul was obliged to use hypotheses in the search of it, not going back to the principle, as not being able to go beyond hypotheses in ascending upwards, but made use of images formed from things below, to lead to those above, as perspicuous, as objects of opinion, and distinct from the things themselves.

Glaucon/ I understand, that you mention what happens in the geometrical and other sister arts.

Socrates/ Understand now, that by the other section of the intellectual I mean this, that which reason by itself attains, making hypotheses by its own reasoning power, not as principles, but really hypotheses, as steps and handles to go on to that which was not an hypothesis, but the principle of the whole, and attain to it; and then, again, holding by all those things which hold by it, to descend down to the conclusion, using nowhere anything which is matter of sense but the ideas themselves, from some, onwards to others, and concluding in ideas.

Glaucon/ I understand, but not sufficiently, for you seem to me to talk of a perplexed subject; but you want, however, to determine that the discoveries concerning real being and the objects of intellect, made by the science of reasoning, are

more conspicuous than the discoveries made by the arts, as they are called, which have hypotheses for their first principles, and those who inquire into them are obliged, in their disquisitions, to use their understandings and not their external senses. But as they are not able to perceive by rising up to the principle, but by hypotheses, they seem to you not to have intelligence, though the things are objects of the intellect, by the help of the principle; and you seem to me to call the practice, in geometrical and such other arts, demonstration, and that it is somewhat between opinion and science.

Socrates/ You have comprehended, most sufficiently. And conceive now, that corresponding to my four sections there are these four faculties in the soul: intelligence answering to the highest, demonstration to the second, and assign opinion to the third, and to the last imagination, and range the objects accordingly, that as their objects participate of truth, so reckon that they participate of perspicuity.

Glaucon/ I understand, and I agree, and I range them as you desire.

THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK

The Seventh Book

Socrates/ After these things now, compare, with reference to instruction and the want of instruction, our nature to such a condition as follows. Consider men as in a subterraneous habitation resembling a cave, with its entrance opening to the light, and answering to the whole extent of the cave. Suppose them to have been in it from their childhood, with chains both on their legs and necks, so as to remain there and only be able to look before them, but by the chain incapable to turn their heads round. Suppose them to have light of a fire, burning far above and behind them, and that between the fire and the chained men there is a road above them, along which observe a low wall built, like that which hedges in the stage of mountebanks on which they show to men their wonderful tricks.

Glaucon/ I observe it.

Socrates/ Observe now, along this wall, men bearing all sorts of utensils, raised above the wall, and human statues, and other animals, in wood and stone, and all sort of furniture, and, as is likely, some of those who are carrying these are speaking, and others silent.

Glaucon/ You mention, a wonderful comparison, and wonderful chained men.

Socrates/ But such, however, as resemble us. For, in the first place, do you imagine that such as these see anything of themselves or of one another, but the shadows formed by the fire, falling on the opposite part of the cave?

Glaucon/ How can they, if through the whole of life they be under a necessity, at least, of having their heads unmoved?

Socrates/ But what do they see of what is carrying along? Is it not the very same?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ If then they were able to converse with one another, do not you imagine they would think it proper to give names to those very things they saw before them?

Glaucon/ Of necessity they must.

Socrates/ And what if the opposite part of this prison had an echo, when any of those who passed along spoke, do you imagine they would reckon that what spoke was anything else than the shadow passing by?

Glaucon/ Not I, truly.

Socrates/ Such as these then, will entirely judge that there is nothing genuine but the shadows of utensils.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ With reference then both to their freedom from these chains, and their cure of this ignorance, consider the nature of it, if such a thing should happen to them. When anyone should be loosed, and obliged on a sudden to rise up, turn round his neck, and walk and look up towards the light, and in doing all these things he should be pained, and be unable, from the splendors, to behold the things he formerly saw the shadows of, what do you imagine he would say, if one should tell him that formerly he had seen trifles, but now being somewhat nearer to reality, and having his face turned toward what was more real, he saw better; and so, pointing out to him each of the things passing along, should question him, and oblige him to tell what it were, do not you imagine he would be both in doubt, and would deem what he had formerly seen to be more genuine than what was now pointed out to him?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And if he should oblige him to look to the light itself, would not he find pain in his eyes, and shun it; and turning to such things as he is able to behold, reckon that these are really more certain than those pointed out?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But if one, should drag him from thence violently, through a rough and steep ascent, and never stop till he drew him up to the light of the sun, would not he whilst he was thus drawn, both be in torment, and be filled with indignation, and after he had even come to the light, having his eyes filled with splendor, he would be able to see none of those things now called genuine.

Glaucon/ He would not, all of a sudden, at least.

Socrates/ But he would need, I imagine, to be accustomed to it some time, if he were to perceive things above. And, first of all, he would most easily perceive shadows, afterwards the images of men and of other things in water, and after that the things themselves. And with reference to these things, he would more easily see the things in the heavens, and the heavens themselves, looking in the nighttime to the light of the stars and the moon, than by day, looking on the sun and the light of the sun.

Glaucon/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ And, last of all, he may be able, I imagine, thoroughly to perceive and contemplate the sun himself, not in water, nor images of him, appearing in anything else, but as he is in himself, in his own proper region, such as he is.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And after this he would now reason with himself concerning him, that it is he who gives the seasons and years, and regulates all things in this visible region, and that, of all these things which they formerly saw, he is in a certain manner the cause.

Glaucon/ It is certain, that after these things, he may come to such reasonings as these.

Socrates/ But what? when he remembers his first habitation, and the wisdom which was there, and those who

were there his companions in bonds, do you not imagine he will esteem himself happy by the exchange, and compassionate them?

Glaucon/ And that greatly.

Socrates/ And if there were there any honors and encomiums and rewards among themselves for him who most accurately perceived what passed along, and best remembered which of them were wont to pass foremost, which latest, and which of them went together, and from these observations were most able to presage what was to happen, do you imagine he will be desirous of these honors, or envy those who among these are honored and in power? or rather wish to suffer that of Homer, and greatly desire

——as laborer to work
To some ignoble man for hire——

and rather to suffer anything than to hold such opinions, and live after such a manner?

Glaucon/ I imagine so, —that he would suffer and embrace anything rather than live in that manner.

Socrates/ But consider this further, if such an, one should descend and sit down again in the same seat, should not he now have his eyes filled with darkness, coming on the sudden from the sun?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And should he now again be obliged to give his opinion of those shadows, and to dispute about them with those who are there eternally chained, whilst yet his eyes were dazzled, and before they recovered their former state (which would require no small time of habit) would he not afford them laughter, and would it not be said of him, that having gone above, he was returned with vitiated eyes, and that it was not proper even to attempt to go above, and that whoever should attempt to loose them and lead them up, if

ever they were able to get him into their hands, should even be put to death?

Glaucon/ They would by all means, put him to death.

Socrates/ The whole of this comparison now, friend Glauco, is to be applied to our preceding discourse; for if you compare this region, which is seen by the sight, to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in. it to the power of the sun, and the ascent above, and the sight of things above, to the soul's ascent into the region of intelligence, you will apprehend my meaning, since you want to hear it. But God knows whether it be true. Appearances then to me appear in this manner. In the intellectual world the idea of the good is most remote, and scarcely to be seen; but if it be seen, it is to be deemed as indeed the cause to all of all things bright and beautiful, generating in the visible world light, and its principle the sun, and in the intellectual world, it is itself the principle producing truth and intelligence, and that this must be beheld by him who is to act wisely, either privately or in public.

Glaucon/ I agree with you, in such manner as I can.

Socrates/ Come now, and agree with me likewise in this, and do not wonder that such as come hither are unwilling to act in human affairs, but their souls are carried always to converse with things above; for it is somehow reasonable it should be so, if these matters hold according to our comparison above-mentioned.

Glaucon/ It is indeed reasonable.

Socrates/ But what, do you imagine this anything wonderful, that when one comes from divine contemplations to human evils, he should behave awkwardly and appear extremely ridiculous, whilst yet the light is in his eyes, and is obliged, before he is sufficiently accustomed to the present darkness, to contend in courts of justice, or elsewhere, about

the shadows of justice, or those statues which occasion the shadows, and to dispute about this point, how these things are conceived of by those who have never at any time beheld justice itself?

Glaucon/ This is not at all, to be wondered at.

Socrates/ But if one has, at least, understanding, he must remember that there is a twofold disturbance of the sight, and arising from two causes, when one comes from light to darkness, and from darkness to light. And when one imagines that these very things happen with reference also to the soul, when at any time he sees one in confusion, and unable to perceive anything, he will not laugh in an unreasonable manner, but will consider whether the soul, coming from a more enlightened life, be darkened by ignorance, or going from prevailing ignorance to a life more enlightened, be filled with the dazzling splendor; and so will congratulate the one on its fate and life, and compassionate the life and fate of the other. And if he wants to laugh at the soul that goes from darkness to light, his laughter would be less improper than if he were to laugh at the soul which comes from the light to darkness.

Glaucon/ You say very reasonably.

Socrates/ It is proper then, that we judge of them after such a manner as this, if those things be true. That education is not such a thing as some undertakers talk of; for they somehow say, that whilst there is no knowledge in the soul, they will insert it, as if they were inserting sight in blind eyes.

Glaucon/ They say so.

Socrates/ But our present reasoning, now shows that this power being in the soul of everyone, and the organ by which everyone learns, and being in the same condition as the eye, if it were unable otherwise than with the whole body to turn

from darkness to light, must in like manner, with the whole soul, be turned from generated being, till it be able to endure the contemplation of being itself, and the most splendid of being; and this we call the good. Do we not?

Glaucon/ We do.

Socrates/ This then, would appear to be the art of his conversion, in what manner he shall with greatest ease and advantage be turned. Not to implant in him the power of seeing, but considering him as possessed of it, only improperly situated, and not looking at what he ought, to contrive a method of accomplishing this point.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ The other virtues now then of the soul, as they are called, seem to be somewhat resembling those of the body (for when in reality they were not in it formerly, they are afterwards produced in it by habits and exercises), but that of wisdom, as it seems, happens to be of a nature somewhat more divine than any other, as it never loses its power, but, according as it is turned, is useful and advantageous, or useless and hurtful. Or have you not observed of those who are said to be wicked, yet wise, how sharply the little soul sees, and how acutely it comprehends everything to which it is turned, as having no contemptible sight, but compelled to minister to wickedness: so that the more accurately it sees, so much the more productive is it of wickedness?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But however, with reference to this part of such a genius, if, being dressed immediately from childhood, it should be stripped of everything akin to procreation, as leaden weights, and of all those pleasures and lusts which relate to feastings and such like, which turn the sight of the soul towards things downwards, from all which if the soul,

being freed, should turn itself towards truth, the very same principle in the same men would most accurately see those things as it now does these to which it is turned.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ But what, is not this likely, and necessarily flowing from what has been mentioned, that neither these who are uninstructed and unacquainted with truth can ever sufficiently take care of the city, nor yet those who allow themselves to spend the whole of their time in learning—those, because they have no one scope in life, aiming at which they ought to do whatever they do, both in private and in public; and the latter, because they are not willing to manage civil affairs, imagining that whilst they are yet alive they inhabit the islands of the blest.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ It is our business then, to oblige those of the inhabitants who have the best geniuses, to apply to that learning which we formerly said was the greatest, both to view the good, and to ascend that ascent; and, when they have ascended and sufficiently viewed it, we are not to allow them what is now allowed them.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ To continue there, and be unwilling to descend again to those bondmen, or share with them in their toils and honors, whether more trifling or more important.

Glaucon/ Shall we then, do them injustice, and make them live a worse life when they have it in their power to live a better?

Socrates/ You have again forgot, friend, that this is not the legislator's concern, in what manner anyone tribe in the city shall live remarkably happy; but this he endeavors to effectuate in the whole city, connecting the citizens together, and by necessity, and by persuasion, making them share the

advantage with one another, with which they are severally able to benefit the community. And the legislator, when he makes such men in the city, does it not that he may permit them to go where each may incline, but that himself may employ them for connecting the city together.

Glaucon/ True, I forgot, indeed.

Socrates/ Consider then, Glauco, that we shall no way injure the philosophers who arise among us, but tell them what is just, when we oblige them to take care of others, and to be guardians. We will allow, indeed, that those who in other cities become philosophers, with reason do not participate of the toils of public offices in the state (for they spring up of themselves, the policy of each city opposing them; and it is just, that what springs of itself, owing its growth to none, should not be forward to pay for its nurture to anyone). But you have we generated both for yourselves and for the rest of the state, as the leaders and kings in a hive, and have educated you better, and in a more perfect manner than they, and made you more capable of sharing both in the rewards and labors attending public offices. Everyone then must, in part, descend to the dwelling of the others, and accustom himself to behold obscure objects; for when you are accustomed to them, you will infinitely better perceive things there, and will fully know the several images what they are, and of what, from your having perceived the truth concerning things beautiful and just and good. And thus, as a real vision, both to us and you, shall the city be inhabited, and not as a dream, as are the generality of cities at present inhabited by such as both fight with one another about shadows, and raise sedition about governing, as if it were some mighty good. But the truth is in this manner: In whatever city those who are to govern are the most averse to undertake government, that city, of necessity, will be the best established and the most free from sedition; and that

city whose governors are of an opposite character, will be in a condition quite opposite.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Do you imagine then that our pupils will disobey us, when they hear these injunctions, and be unwilling to labor jointly in the city, each bearing a part, but. spend the most of their time with one another, free from public affairs?

Glaucon/ Impossible; for we prescribe just things to just men. And each of them enters on magistracy from this consideration beyond all others, that they are under a necessity to govern contrariwise to all the present governors of all other cities.

Socrates/ For thus the matter stands, companion. If you shall find out a life for those who are to be our governors, better than that of governing, then it will be possible for you to have the city well established, for in it alone shall those govern who are truly rich, not in gold, but in that in which a happy man ought to be rich, in a good and prudent life. But if, whilst they are poor and destitute of goods of their own, they come to the public, imagining they ought thence to pillage good, it is not possible to have the city rightly established. For the contest being who shall govern, such a war being domestic and within them, it destroys both themselves and the rest of the city.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Have you then, any other kind of life which despises public magistracies, but that of true philosophy?

Glaucon/ No truly.

Socrates/ But however, they ought, at least, not to be fond of governing who enter on it, otherwise the rivals will fight about it.

Glaucon/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ Whom else then will you oblige to enter on the guardianship of the city but those who are most intelligent in those things by which the city is best established, and who have other honors, and a life better than the political one?

Glaucon/ No others.

Socrates/ Are you willing, then, that we now consider this, by what means such men shall be produced, and how one shall bring them into the light, as some are said, from the lower regions, to have ascended to the gods?

Glaucon/ Why am I not willing,?

Socrates/ This now, as it seems, is not the turning of a shell, but the conversion of the soul coming from some benighted day to the true re-ascent to real being, which we shall say is true philosophy.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Ought we not then to consider which of the parts of learning has such a power?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ What now, Glauco, may be that discipline of the soul which draws her from that which is generated towards being itself? But this I consider whilst I am speaking. Did not we indeed say that it was necessary for them, whilst young, to be wrestlers in war?

Glaucon/ We said so.

Socrates/ It is proper, then, that this piece of learning likewise be added to that which we are inquiring after.

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ Not to be useless to military men.

Glaucon/ It must indeed, be added if possible.

Socrates/ They were somewhere in our former discourse instructed by us in exercise and music.

Glaucon/ They were.

Socrates/ Exercise indeed somehow respects what is generated and destroyed, for it presides over the increase and corruption of body.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ This then cannot be the learning we require.

Glaucon/ It cannot.

Socrates/ Is it music then, such as we formerly described?

Glaucon/ But it was, as a counter-part of exercise, if you remember, by habits instructing our guardians, imparting no science, but only with respect to harmony, a certain propriety, and with regard to measure, a certain propriety of measure, and in discourses, certain other things akin to these, both in such discourses as are fabulous, and in such as are nearer to truth. But as to learning respecting such a good as you now inquire after, there was nothing at all of this in that music.

Socrates/ You have, most accurately, put me in mind, for it treated in reality of no such thing. But, divine Glauco, what may this learning be? for all the mechanical arts have somehow appeared to be servile.

Glaucon/ Why have they not? And what other learning is there left yet remaining distinct from music, exercise, and the mechanical arts?

Socrates/ Come, if we have nothing yet further besides these to lay hold of, let us lay hold of something in these which extends over them all.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ Such as this general thing, which all arts, and reasonings, and sciences make use of, and which everyone ought in the first place necessarily to learn.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ This trifling thing, to understand one, and two, and three: I call this in the general, number, or computation. Or is it not thus with reference to these, that every art, and likewise every science, must of necessity participate of these?

Glaucon/ They must of necessity.

Socrates/ And must not the art of war likewise participate of them?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Palamedes then, in the tragedies, shows everywhere Agamemnon to have been at least a most ridiculous general; or have you not observed how he says, that having invented numeration, he adjusted the ranks in the camp at Troy, and numbered up both the ships and all the other forces which were not numbered before; and Agamemnon, as it seems, did not even know how many foot he had, as he understood not how to number them. But what kind of general do you imagine him to be?

Glaucon/ Some absurd one, for my part, if this were true.

Socrates/ Is there any other learning then, which we shall establish as more necessary to a military man than to be able to compute and to number?

Glaucon/ This most of all, if he would any way understand how to range his troops, and more still if he want to be a man.

Socrates/ Do you perceive then, with regard to this piece of learning the same thing as I do?

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ It seems to be of those things which we are inquiring after, which naturally lead to intelligence, but that

no one uses it aright, being entirely a conductor towards real being.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ I shall endeavor, to explain at least my own opinion. With reference to those things which I distinguish with myself into such as lead towards intelligence, and such as do not, do you consider them along with me, and either agree or dissent, in order that we may more distinctly see whether this be such as I conjecture of it.

Glaucon/ Show me.

Socrates/ I show you then, if you perceive some things with relation to the senses, which call not upon the intelligence to the inquiry, as they are sufficiently determined by the sense, but other things which by all means call upon it to inquire, as the sense does nothing genuine.

Glaucon/ You plainly mean, such things as appear at a distance, and such as are painted.

Socrates/ You have not altogether, hit my meaning.

Glaucon/ Which then, do you mean?

Socrates/ These things, call not upon intelligence, which do not issue in a contrary sensation at one and the same time; but such as issue in this manner, I deem to be of those which call upon intelligence, since here sense makes the one sensation no more manifest than its contrary, whether it meet with it nigh at hand or at a distance. But you will understand my meaning more plainly in this manner: These, we say, are three fingers—the little finger, the next to it, and the middle finger?

Glaucon/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ Consider me, then, as speaking of them when seen nigh at hand, and take notice of this concerning them.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Each of them alike appears to be a finger, and in this there is no difference, whether it be seen in the middle or in the end, whether it be white or black, gross or slender, or anything else of this kind; for in all these the soul of the multitude is under no necessity to question their intellect what is a finger, for never at all does sight itself at the same time intimate finger to be finger, and its opposite.

Glaucon/ It does not.

Socrates/ Is it not likely then, that such a case as this at least shall neither call upon, nor excite intelligence?

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ But what, with reference to their greatness and littleness, does the sight sufficiently perceive this matter, and makes it no difference to it that one of them is situated in the middle, or at the end? And in like manner with reference to their grossness and slenderness, their softness and hardness, does the touch sufficiently perceive these things? And in like manner the other senses, do they no way defectively manifest such things? Or does each of them act in this manner? First of all, must not that sense which relates to hard, of necessity relate likewise to soft; and feeling these, it reports to the soul, as if both hard and soft were one and the same?

Glaucon/ It does.

Socrates/ And must not then the soul again, in such cases, of necessity be in doubt what at all the sense points out to it as hard, since it calls the same thing soft likewise; and so likewise with reference to the sense relating to light and heavy; the soul must be in doubt what is light and what is heavy, if the sense intimates that heavy is light, and that light is heavy.

Glaucon/ These at least, are truly absurd reports to the soul, and stand in need of examination.

Socrates/ It is likely then, that first of all, in such cases as these, the soul, calling in reason and intelligence, endeavors to find out whether the things reported be one, or whether they be two.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ And if they appear to be two, each of them appears to be one, and distinct from the other.

Glaucon/ It does.

Socrates/ And if each of them be one, and both of them two, his understanding will at least-perceive two distinct; for if they were not distinct, he could not perceive two, but only one.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ The sight in like manner, we say, perceives great and small, but not as distinct from each other, but as somewhat blended together. Does it not?

Glaucon/ It does.

Socrates/ In order to clear this matter, the intellect is obliged again to consider great and small, not as blended together, but distinct, contrariwise of what the sense does.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And is it not from hence, somehow, that it comes first of all to question us, What at all, then, is great, and what is little?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And so we have called the one that which is known by intellect, and the other that which is seen by the eye.

Glaucon/ Very right.

Socrates/ This then is what at present I was endeavoring to express, when I said that some things call on the intelligence, and others do not. Such as fall on the sense at the same time with their contraries, I define to be such as require intelligence, but such as do not, do not excite intelligence.

Glaucon/ I understand now, and it appears so to me.

Socrates/ What now, with reference to number and unity? to which of the two classes do you imagine they belong?

Glaucon/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ But reason by analogy, from what we have already said: for if unity be of itself sufficiently seen, or be apprehended by any other sense, it will not lead towards real being, as we said concerning finger. But if there be always seen at the same time something contrary to it, so as that it shall no more appear unity than the contrary, it would truly want then one to judge of it: and the soul would be under a necessity to doubt within itself, and to inquire, rousing the intellect within itself, and to interrogate it what this unity is. And thus the learning which relates to unity would be of the class of those which lead up and turn the soul towards the contemplation of real being.

Glaucon/ But indeed this at least, is what the very sight of it does in no small measure effect: for we behold the same thing, at one and the same time as one, and as an infinite multitude.

Socrates/ And if this be the case with reference to unity, will not every number be affected in the same manner?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But surely both computation and arithmetic wholly relate to number.

Glaucon/ They do entirely.

Socrates/ These then at least seem to lead towards truth.

Glaucon/ Remarkably so.

Socrates/ They are then, as it appears, of those pieces of learning which we are in search of. For the soldier must necessarily learn these things, for the disposing of his ranks; and the philosopher for the attaining to real being, coming up above what is generated, otherwise he can never become a reasoner.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ But our guardian at least happens to be both a soldier and a philosopher.

Glaucon/ Why is he not?

Socrates/ It were proper then, Glauco, to establish by law this piece of learning, and to persuade those who are to manage the greatest affairs of the city, to apply to computation, and study it, not in a common way, but 'till by the intellect itself they arrive at the contemplation of the nature of numbers, not for the sake of buying nor of selling, as merchants and retailers, but both for war and for the agility of the soul itself, and its conversion from what is generated towards both truth and being.

Glaucon/ Most finely said.

Socrates/ And surely now, I perceive likewise, at present whilst this learning respecting computations is mentioned, how elegant it is, and every way advantageous towards our purpose, if one applies to it for the sake of knowledge, and not to make a traffic by it.

Glaucon/ Which way,!

Socrates/ This very thing at least, which we now mentioned, how powerfully does it somehow lead up the soul, and put it under a necessity of reasoning about the numbers themselves, no way admitting, if one in reasoning

with it shall produce numbers which have visible and tangible bodies. For you know of some who are dexterous in these things, how that if one, in reasoning, shall attempt to divide unity itself, they both ridicule him and will not admit of it, but if you divide it into parts, they multiply them, afraid lest anyhow unity should appear not to be unity, but many.

Glaucon/ You say, most true.

Socrates/ What think you now, Glauco, if one should ask them: Wonderful men, about what kind of numbers are you reasoning? In which there is unity, such as you allow of, each whole equal to each whole, and not differing in the smallest degree, having no fraction in itself? What do you imagine they would answer?

Glaucon/ This, as I imagine: that they mean such numbers as can be conceived by the mind alone, but cannot at all be comprehended any other way.

Socrates/ You see then, friend, that, in reality, this learning appears necessary for us, since it appears to lay the soul under a necessity at least of employing the intellect itself towards the discovery of truth itself.

Glaucon/ And surely now, it does this at least in a very strong degree.

Socrates/ But what, have you hitherto considered this? that those who are naturally computers appear to be acute in all pieces of learning; and such as are naturally slow, if they be instructed and practiced in this, though they gain nothing else, all of them however proceed so far as to become more acute than they were before.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ And surely, as I imagine, you will not easily find anything, and not at all many, which occasion greater labor to the learner and student than this.

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ On all these accounts then, this learning is not to be omitted, but the best geniuses are to be instructed in it.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Let this one thing then, be established among us; and, in the next place, what is akin to it, let us consider if it any way belongs to us.

Glaucon/ What is it?; or do you mean geometry?

Socrates/ That very thing.

Glaucon/ As far, as it relates to warlike affairs, it is plain that it belongs to us; for as to encampments, and the occupying of ground, contracting and extending an army, and all those figures into which they form armies, both in battles and in marches, the same man would differ from himself when he were a geometer, and when he were not.

Socrates/ But surely now, for such purposes as these, some little geometry, and some particle of computation might suffice: but we must inquire, whether much of it, and great advances in it, would contribute anything to this great end, to make us more easily comprehend the idea of the good. And we say that everything contributes to this that obliges the soul to turn itself towards that region in which is the most divine of being, which it must by all means contemplate.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ If therefore it oblige the soul to contemplate being, it belongs to us; but if it oblige to contemplate what is generated only, it does not belong to us.

Glaucon/ We say so at least.

Socrates/ They then who are but a little conversant in geometry, will not dispute with us this point at least, that

this science is quite opposite to the common modes of speech employed in it by those who practice it.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ They speak somehow very ridiculously, and through necessity; for all the discourse they employ in it appears to be with a view to operation and to practice. Thus they speak of making a square, of prolonging, of adjoining, and the like; but yet the whole of this learning is somehow studied with a view to knowledge.

Glaucon/ By all means indeed.

Socrates/ Must not this further be agreed on?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That it is the knowledge of what is perpetual, and not at all of what is ever generated and destroyed.

Glaucon/ This, is agreed on; for geometrical knowledge is of that which is perpetual.

Socrates/ It would seem then, brave Glauco, to draw the soul towards truth, and to be productive of a philosophic understanding, so as to make us raise the powers of the mind to things above, instead of unworthily fixing them on things below.

Glaucon/ As much as possible.

Socrates/ As much as possible then, must we give orders that those in this finest city of yours by no means omit geometry; for even its by-works are not inconsiderable.

Glaucon/ What by-works?

Socrates/ Those, which you mentioned relating to war; and indeed with reference to all pieces of learning, as to the understanding of them more handsomely, we know somehow that one's having learned geometry or not makes every way an entire difference.

Glaucon/ Every way truly.

Socrates/ Let us then establish this second piece of learning for the youth.

Glaucon/ Let us establish it.

Socrates/ But what, shall we, in the third place, establish astronomy? or are you of a different opinion?

Glaucon/ I am, of the same; for to be well skilled in the seasons of months and years, belongs not only to agriculture and navigation, but equally to the military art.

Socrates/ You are pleasant, as you seem to be afraid of the multitude, lest you appear to enjoin useless pieces of learning. But this is not altogether despicable, though it is hard to persuade them, that by each of these pieces of learning some power of the soul is both purified and invigorated, which was destroyed and blunted by other studies, though more worthy of preservation than ten thousand eyes, for by it alone is truth beheld. To such therefore as are of the same opinion you will very readily appear to reason admirably well; but such as have never observed this will probably imagine you say nothing at all, for they perceive no other advantage in these things worthy of account. Consider now from this point, with which of these two you will reason; or carry on the reasonings with neither of them, but principally for your own sake, yet not grudge another, if anyone shall be able to reap any benefit by them.

Glaucon/ In this manner, I choose, on my own account principally, both to reason, and to question and answer.

Socrates/ Come then, let us go back again, for we have not taken aright in order what comes next after geometry.

Glaucon/ How have we taken?

Socrates/ After plain surface, we have taken a solid moving in a circle, before we considered it by itself, but the right method was to have taken the third augment

immediately after the second, and that is somehow the augment of cubes and what participates of depth.

Glaucon/ It is so. But these things, Socrates, seem not yet to be found out.

Socrates/ The reason of it, is twofold. Because there is no city which holds them in sufficient honor, they are slightly searched into, being difficult; and besides, those who do search into them want a leader, without which they cannot find them out. And this leader is, in the first place, hard to be found; and after that he does exist, as matters are at present, the inquirers into these things, as they are high-spirited, will not obey him. But if the whole city presided over these things, and held them in esteem, such as inquired into them would be obedient, and their inquiries, being carried on with assiduity and vigor, would discover themselves what they were; since even now, whilst they are on the one hand despised, and kept down by the multitude, and on the other by those who study them without being able to give any account of their utility, they yet forcibly, under all these disadvantages, grow up through their native charm, and it is no wonder that they do appear.

Glaucon/ Because truly, this charm is very remarkable. But tell me more plainly what you were just now saying; for somehow that study which respects plain surface you called geometry.

Socrates/ I did.

Glaucon/ And then, you mentioned astronomy in the first place after it, but afterwards you drew back.

Socrates/ Because whilst I am hastening, to go through all things speedily, I advance more slowly. For that augment by depth which was next in method we passed over, because the investigation of it is ridiculous, and after geometry we

mentioned astronomy, which is the circular motion of a solid.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ We establish then, astronomy as the fourth piece of learning, supposing that one to subsist which we have now omitted, if the city shall enter upon it.

Glaucon/ It is reasonable. And now that you agree with me, Socrates, I proceed in my commendation of astronomy, which you formerly reproved as unseasonable. For it is evident, I imagine, to everyone, that this piece of learning at least obliges the soul to look to that which is above, and from the things here conducts it thither.

Socrates/ It is probable, that it is evident to everyone, but to me; for to me it does not appear so.

Glaucon/ How then do you think of it?

Socrates/ In the way these pursue it who introduce it into philosophy, it plainly makes the soul entirely to look downwards.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ You seem to me, to have formed with yourself no ignoble opinion of the learning respecting things above, what it is; for you seem to think that if anyone contemplates the various bodies in the firmament, and by earnestly looking up apprehends everything, you reckon he has intelligence of these things, and not merely sees them with his eyes. And perhaps you judge right, and I foolishly. For I, on the other hand, for my part, am not able to imagine that any other learning can make a soul look upwards but that which respects the being, and that which is invisible. And if anyone undertakes to learn anything of sensible objects, whether he gape upwards, or bellow downwards, never at all shall I say that he learns; for I aver he has no real knowledge of these things, nor shall I say that his soul looks upwards,

but downwards, even though he learns lying on his back, either at land or at sea.

Glaucon/ I am punished, for you have justly reproved me. But which was the proper way, said you, of learning astronomy different from the methods they learn at present, if they mean to learn it with advantage for the purposes we speak of?

Socrates/ In this manner, that these variegated bodies in the heavens, as they are varied in a visible subject, be deemed the most beautiful and the most regular of the kind, but far inferior to real beings, according to those orbits in which the real velocity, and the real slowness, in true number, and in all true figures are carried with respect to one another, and carry all things that are within them. Which things truly are to be comprehended by reason and intellect, but not by sight. Or do you think they can?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Is not then, that variety in the heavens to be made use of as a pattern for learning those real things, in the same manner as if one should meet with geometrical figures, drawn remarkably well and elaborately by Daedalus or some other artist or painter? For one who were any way skilled in geometry, or seeing these, would truly think the workmanship most excellent, yet would esteem it ridiculous to consider these things seriously, as if from thence he were to learn the truth as to what were in equal, in duplicate, or in any other proportion?

Glaucon/ Why would it not be ridiculous?

Socrates/ And do not you then imagine that he who is truly an astronomer is affected in the same manner when he looks up to the orbits of the planets? And that he reckons that the heavens and all in them are indeed established by the Former of the heavens, in the finest manner possible for

such works to be established. But would not he deem him absurd, who should imagine that this proportion of night with day, and of both these to a month, and of a month to a year, and of other planets to such like things, and towards one another, existed always in the same manner, and in no way suffered any change, though they have a body, and are visible, but would search by every method to apprehend the truth of these things?

Glaucon/ So it appears to me, whilst I am hearing you.

Socrates/ Let us then make use of problems, in the study of astronomy, as in geometry. And let us drop the heavenly bodies, if we want truly to apprehend astronomy, and render profitable instead of unprofitable that part of the soul which is naturally wise.

Glaucon/ You truly enjoin a much harder task on astronomers, than is taken at present.

Socrates/ And I imagine, at least, that we must likewise enjoin other things, in the same manner, if we are to be of any service as law-givers. But can you suggest any of the proper pieces of learning?

Glaucon/ I can suggest none, at present at least.

Socrates/ Motion, as I imagine, affords us not one indeed, but many species of learning, all of which any wise man can probably tell. What occur to us are two.

Glaucon/ Which now?

Socrates/ Along with this, there is its counter-part.

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ As the eyes, seem to be fitted to astronomy, so the ears seem to be fitted to harmonious motion. And these seem to be sister arts to one another, both as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glauco, agree with them; or how do we do?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Shall we not, as they deal greatly in these matters, inquire how they talk about them, and if there be any other thing besides these, inquire into it likewise? But above all these things, we will still watch over our own affairs.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ That those we educate never at all attempt at any time to learn any of those things in an imperfect manner, and not pointing always at that mark to which all ought to be directed, as we now mentioned with reference to astronomy. Or do not you know that they do the same thing with regard to harmony as in astronomy? For whilst they measure one with another the symphonies and sounds which are heard, they labor like the astronomers unprofitably.

Glaucon/ Nay truly, and ridiculously too, whilst they frequently repeat certain notes, and listen with their ears, to catch the sound as from a neighborhood; and some of them say they hear some middle note, but that the difference is exceeding small which measures them; and others again are in doubt about it, and say that the notes are the same as were sounded before, and both parties subject the mind to the ears.

Socrates/ But you speak, of the lucrative musicians, who perpetually harass and torment their strings, and turn them on the pegs. But that the comparison may not be too tedious, I shall say nothing of their complaints of the strings, their refusals and stubbornness, but put an end to it. But I say we ought not to choose these to talk of harmony, but these true musicians whom we spoke of. For these do the same things here as the others did in astronomy; for in these symphonies which are heard they search for numbers, but

they pass not thence to the problems, to inquire which numbers are symphonious, and which are not, and the reason why they are either the one or the other.

Glaucon/ This is truly, a divine work you mention.

Socrates/ It is then indeed profitable in the search of the beautiful and good, but if pursued in another manner, it is unprofitable.

Glaucon/ It is likely at least.

Socrates/ But I imagine, that the proper method of inquiry into all these things, if it reach the union and affinity which they have, and compute in what respects they are akin to one another, this exercise will contribute somewhat towards what we want, and our labor will not be unprofitable, otherwise it will.

Glaucon/ I likewise, am of the same opinion. But you speak, Socrates, of a very mighty work.

Socrates/ Mean you the introduction, or what else? Or do not we know that all these things are introductory to the law itself, which we ought to learn; for even the dialectic philosophers do not appear any way expert as to these things.

Glaucon/ No, truly, unless a very few of all I have met with.

Socrates/ But whilst they are not able, to offer and to hear reason, shall they ever be able to know anything of what we say is necessary to be known?

Glaucon/ Never shall they be able to do this at least.

Socrates/ Is not this itself then, Glauco, the law? To carry the power of reasoning to its highest perfection, which, being intellectual, the power of sight may be said to resemble it; which power endeavors, as we said, first to look at the animals, then at the stars, and last of all at the sun himself.

So when anyone attempts to reason without any of the senses, by reasoning he pushes on to know each particular, what it is; and if he never give over till he apprehend by his intelligence what is the good itself, he then arrives at the perfection of intelligence, as the other' does at that of visible.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ What now? Do not you call this progress reasoning?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ And now, as the loosing the men from their chains, and their turning from the shadows towards the statues, and the light, and their ascent from the subterraneous dwelling to the sun; and when there, the looking at the images in water, from their inability at first to look at animals and vegetables, and the light of the sun. And here the contemplating the divine images themselves, and the shadows of real beings, and not the shadows of images shadowed out by another sort of light, as by the sun: this whole exercise in the arts we have mentioned has this power, to lead back again that which is best in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in beings, as in the former case that which is brightest in the body is led to that which is brightest in the material and visible world.

Glaucon/ I admit, of these things, though truly it appears to me quite difficult to admit of them, and in another respect it is difficult not to admit of them. But however (for we shall hear these things not only now at present, but often go over them afterwards), establishing these things as now expressed, let us go to the law itself, and go through with it as we have done with the introduction. Say then what is the manner of the reasoning power, and into what species is it divided, and what are the paths leading to it? For these, it is likely, conduct us to that place at which, when we are

arrived, we shall have repose from travel, and the end of the journey.

Socrates/ You will not as yet, friend Glauco, be able to follow, for otherwise no zeal should be wanting on my part; nor should you any longer only see the image of what we speak of, but the truth itself. But this is what to me at least it appears, whether it be so in reality or not, this it is not proper confidently to affirm, but that indeed it is somewhat of this kind may be affirmed. May it not?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ And further that it is the reasoning power alone which can discover this to one who is conversant in these things we have mentioned, and that by no other power it is possible.

Glaucon/ This also, we may confidently affirm.

Socrates/ This at least no one, will dispute with us. That no other method can attempt to comprehend at all, in any orderly way, what each particular being is; for all the other arts respect either the opinions and passions of men, or generations, and compositions, or are all employed in the culture of things generated and compounded. Those others, which we said participated somewhat of being, geometry, and such as are connected with her, these we see, having a dream as it were of the being; but it is impossible for them to see the reality, so long as employing hypotheses they hold by these immovably, without being able to give the reason of them. For where one holds as a principle what he does not know, and a conclusion and intermediate steps are connected with that unknown principle, what contrivance can there be found by which an assent of such a kind shall ever become science?

Glaucon/ None at all.

Socrates/ Does not then, the reasoning method proceed in this way alone, towards the first principle itself, removing all hypotheses, in order to establish it, and disengaging the eye of the soul from a certain barbarian clay with which it was buried, gently draws and leads it upwards, using as helps and assistants those arts we have mentioned, which through custom we frequently call sciences, but they require another appellation more expressive than opinion, and more indistinct than science. We have somewhere m our preceding discourse termed it demonstration. But it is not, as I imagine, about a name they dispute, who inquire into matters of so great importance as we have now before us.

Glaucon/ No indeed.

Socrates/ Do you agree then, as formerly, to call the first class science, the second demonstration, the third faith, and the fourth imagination? and both these last opinion, and the two former intelligence. And that opinion respects what is generated, and intelligence real being; and in the same proportion as being is to what is generated, so is intelligence to opinion, science to faith, and demonstration to imagination. But as for the analogy of the things which these powers respect, and the division of each of them into two, to wit what is matter of opinion, and what is matter of intellect, we omit, Glauco, that we may not be more tedious here than in our former reasonings.

Glaucon/ As for me, with reference to those other things, as far as I am able to follow, I am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ But do not you call him a reasoner, who apprehends the reason of the being of each particular? And as for the man who is not able to give a reason to himself and to another, in as far as he is not able, so far will you say he wants intelligence of the thing?

Glaucon/ Why should I not say so?

Socrates/ And is not the case the same with reference to the good? Whosoever cannot define it by reason, separating the idea of good from all others, and piercing through all arguments as in a battle, eagerly contending to prove it, not according to opinion, but according to reality, and in all these cases to march forward with unerring reason, such an one knows nothing of the good itself, nor of any good whatever; but if he has attained to any image of the good, we will say he has attained to it by opinion, not by science, and is dreaming and sleeping out his present life, and ere he be awakened, he will descend to the lower regions, there to sleep on to the end.

Glaucon/ Now truly, I will strongly aver all these things.

Socrates/ But surely you will not, as I imagine, allow your own children at least whom you bred up and educated in reasoning, if ever at all indeed you educate them, to have the supreme government of the most important affairs in the state, whilst they are void of reason as letters of the alphabet.

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ You will then lay down this to them as a law. That in a most especial manner they attain to that piece of education, by which they may become capable to question and answer in the most scientific manner.

Glaucon/ I will settle it by law, with your assistance at least.

Socrates/ Do you agree then, that above all the other pieces of learning, we place the art of reasoning as the top stone, and that no other piece of learning can be properly set above it, but that everything respecting learning is now finished?

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ There now remains for you, the distribution: to whom shall we assign these pieces of learning, and after what manner?

Glaucon/ That is plain.

Socrates/ Do you remember then our former election of rulers, what kind we chose?

Glaucon/ Why do I not?

Socrates/ As to other things then, imagine, that such geniuses as these ought to be picked out. For the most firm and brave are to be preferred, and, as far as possible, the most graceful; and besides, we must not only seek for such as are of noble and stern manner, but they must be possessed of every other natural disposition conducive to this education.

Glaucon/ Which dispositions do you recommend?

Socrates/ They must have, happy friend, acuteness for the sciences, that they may not learn with difficulty; for souls are much more discouraged by hard pieces of learning than by severe bodily exercises, as the toil which is proper to them, and not in common with the body, more intimately affects them.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And we must seek for one of good memory, untainted, and every way laborious: or how else do you imagine anyone shall be willing to endure the fatigue of the body, and to accomplish at the same time such learning and study?

Glaucon/ No one, unless he be every way of a fine genius.

Socrates/ The mistake then about philosophy, and the contempt of it have been occasioned through these things, because, as I formerly said, they apply to it not in a worthy

manner; for it ought not to be applied to it by the bastardly, but the legitimate.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ In the first place, he who is to apply to philosophy ought not, to be lame as to his love of any kind of labor, loving it in some things, and hating it in others: and this is the case when one loves wrestling and hunting, and all exercises of the body, but is not a lover of learning, and loves neither to hear nor to inquire, but in all these respects has aversion to labor. He likewise is lame, in a different manner from this one, who dislikes all bodily exercise.

Glaucon/ You say most true.

Socrates/ And shall we not, in like manner account that soul lame as to truth, who hates indeed a voluntary falsehood, and bears it ill in itself, and is beyond measure enraged when others tell a lie; but the involuntary lye, it easily admits, and though at any time it be found ignorant, it is not displeased, but like a savage sow willingly wallows in ignorance.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And in like manner, as to temperance and fortitude, and magnanimity, and all the parts of virtue, we must no less carefully attend to what is bastardly and what is legitimate; for when either any private person or city understands not how to attend all these things, they unawares employ the lame and the bastardly for whatever they have occasion; private persons employ them as friends, and cities as governors.

Glaucon/ The case is entirely so.

Socrates/ But we, must beware of all such things; for if we take such as are entire in body and in mind for so extensive learning, and so extensive an exercise, and instruct them, justice herself will not blame us, and we shall

preserve both the city and its constitution; but if we introduce other sort of persons into these affairs, we shall do everything the reverse, and bring philosophy under still greater ridicule.

Glaucon/ That indeed were shameful.

Socrates/ Certainly. But I myself seem at present to be somewhat ridiculous.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ I forgot, that we were amusing ourselves, and spoke with too great keenness; for whilst I was speaking, I cast my eye towards philosophy, and seeing her most unworthily abused, I seem to have been filled with indignation, and as being enraged at those who are the cause of it, to have spoken more earnestly what I said.

Glaucon/ No truly, not to me your hearer at least.

Socrates/ But for me, the speaker. But let us not forget this, that in our former election we made choice of old men, but in this election it will not be allowed us. For we must not believe Solon, that one who is old is able to learn many things; but he is less so than to run. They are the young who perform all great and frequent toils.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Everything then relating to arithmetic and geometry, and all that previous instruction which they should be taught before they learn the art of reasoning, ought to be set before them whilst they are children, and that method of teaching observed which shall make them learn without compulsion.

Glaucon/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because, a free spirit ought to learn no piece of learning with slavery; for the toils of the body, when undergone through compulsion, render the body nothing

worse; but no piece of compelled learning is lasting in the soul.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Do not then, excellent friend, compel boys in their learning; but train them up amusing themselves, that you may be better able to discern to what everyone's genius naturally tends.

Glaucon/ What you say, is reasonable.

Socrates/ Do not you remember then, that we said the boys are even to be carried to war, as spectators, on horseback, and that they are to be brought nearer, if they can with safety, and like young hounds taste the blood?

Glaucon/ I remember.

Socrates/ Whoever then, shall appear the most forward in all these toils, and in all pieces of learning, and in terrors, are to be selected into a certain number.

Glaucon/ At what age?

Socrates/ When they have, finished their necessary exercises, for during this time, whilst it continues, for two or three years, it is impossible to do anything else; for fatigue and sleep are enemies to learning. And this too is none of the least of their trials, what each of them appears to be in his exercises.

Glaucon/ Why is it not?

Socrates/ And after this period, let such as formerly have, been selected of the age of twenty receive greater honors than others, and let those pieces of learning which in their youth they learned separately be brought before them in one view, that they may see the relation between the sciences and the nature of real being.

Glaucon/ This learning indeed will alone, remain immoveable in those in whom it obtains.

Socrates/ And this, is the greatest trial for distinguishing between those geniuses which are naturally fitted for learning, and those which are not. He who perceives this relation is a reasoning genius; he who does not, is none.

Glaucon/ I am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ It will then be necessary for you, after you have observed these things, and seen who are most approved in these, persevering in learning, persevering in war, and in the other things established by law, to make choice of such after they exceed thirty years, choosing a-new from those chosen formerly, and advance them to greater honors; and observe them, trying them by the reasoning power, who of them without the help of his eyes, or any other sense, is able to proceed with truth to being itself. And here, friend, is a work of great care.

Glaucon/ For what principally?

Socrates/ Do not you perceive, the evil which at present attends reasoning, how great it is?

Glaucon/ What is it, you mean?

Socrates/ How it is somehow, full of what is contrary to law.

Glaucon/ Greatly so.

Socrates/ Do you imagine then, they suffer some dreadful thing, and will you not forgive them?

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Just as if, a certain supposititious child were educated in great opulence in a rich and noble family, and amidst many flatterers, and should perceive when grown up to manhood that he is not descended of those who are said to be his parents, but yet should not discover his real parents; can you guess how such an one would be affected both towards his flatterers and towards his supposed

parents, both at the time when he knew nothing of the cheat, and at that time, again, when he came to perceive it? Or are you willing to hear me, while I guess at it?

Glaucon/ I am willing.

Socrates/ I conjecture then, that he will pay more honor to his father and mother, and his other supposed relations, than to the flatterers, and that he will less neglect them when they are in any want, and be less apt to do or say anything amiss to them, and in matters of consequence be less disobedient to them than to those flatterers, during that period in which he knows not the truth.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ But when he perceives the real state of the matter, I conjecture, he will then slacken in his honor and respect for them, and go after the flatterers, and be remarkably more persuaded by them now than formerly, and truly live according to their manner, conversing with them openly. But for that father, and those supposed relations, if he be not of an entirely good natural disposition, he will have no regard.

Glaucon/ You say everything, as it would happen. But in what manner does this comparison respect our present argument?

Socrates/ In this. We have certain opinions from our childhood concerning just and beautiful, in which we have been educated, as by parents, obeying and honoring them.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ Are there not likewise other pursuits opposite to these, with pleasures flattering our souls, and drawing towards these. They do not however persuade those who are in any degree moderate, but they honor those their relations, and obey them.

Glaucon/ These things are so.

Socrates/ What now, when to one who is thus affected the question is proposed, What is the beautiful? and when he, answering what he has heard from the law-giver, is refuted by reason; and reason frequently and every way convincing him, reduces him to the opinion, that this is no more beautiful than it is ugly. And in the same manner, as to what is just and good, and whatever else he held in highest esteem, what do you imagine such an one will after this do with regard to these things, as to honoring and observing them?

Glaucon/ Of necessity, he will neither honor nor observe them any more in the same manner as formerly.

Socrates/ When then he no longer deems, these things honorable, and a-kin to him as formerly, and cannot discover those which really are so, is it possible he can readily join himself to any other life than the flattering one?

Glaucon/ It is not possible.

Socrates/ And from being an observer of the law, he shall, I imagine, appear to be a transgressor.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Is it not likely then, that those shall be thus affected who in this situation apply to reasoning, and that they should have, as I was just now saying, great forgiveness.

Glaucon/ And pity too.

Socrates/ Whilst you take care then lest this compassionable case befall these of the age of thirty, ought you not by every method to accomplish them in reasoning?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not this one prudent care? that they meddle not with reasonings whilst they are young: for you have not forgot, I imagine, that the youth, when they first

meddle with reasonings, abuse them in the way of amusement, whilst they use them always in the way of contradiction. And imitating those who are refuters, they themselves refute others, delighting like whelps in dragging and tearing to pieces, in their reasonings, those always who are near them.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And after they have confuted many, and been themselves confuted by many, do they not powerfully and speedily come to hold none of the opinions they held formerly? And by these means they themselves and the whole of philosophy are scandalized to others.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ But he who is of a riper age, will not incline to share in such a madness, but will rather imitate him who inclines to reason and inquire after truth, than one who, for the sake of diversion, amuses himself and contradicts; and will both be more modest himself, and render the practice of disputing more honorable instead of being more dishonorable.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Were not then all our former remarks rightly made, in the way of precaution, in this point, that the geniuses ought to be decent and grave, to which one shall impart the art of reasoning, and not, as at present, when every common genius, and such as is not at all proper, is admitted to it?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Will not then the double of the former period suffice one to remain in imbibing the art of reasoning with perseverance and application, and doing nothing else, but in way of counterpart exercising himself in all bodily exercises?

Glaucon/ Do you mean six years, or four?

Socrates/ 'Tis of no consequence; make it five. After this you must make them descend to that cave again, and oblige them to govern both in things relating to war, and such other magistracies as require youth, that they may not fall short of others in experience. And they must be still further tried among these, whether being drawn to every different quarter, they will continue firm, or! whether they will in any measure be drawn aside.

Glaucon/ And for how long a time, do you appoint this?

Socrates/ For fifteen years. And when they are of the age of fifty, such of them as are preserved, and as have excelled in all these things, in actions, and in the sciences, are to be brought to the highest degree, and are to be obliged to direct the beam of their soul towards that which gives light to all; and when they have viewed the good itself, to use it as a model, each of them in their turn, in adorning both the city and private persons, and themselves, all the remainder of their life; occupied for the most part in philosophy, and when their turn comes on them, they toil in political affairs, and take the government, each for the good of the city, performing this office, not as anything honorable, but as a matter of necessity. And after they have educated others in the same manner still, and left such as resemble themselves to be the guardians of the city, they depart to inhabit the islands of the blest. But the city will publicly erect for them monuments, and offer sacrifices, if the oracle assent, as to superior beings; and if it do not, as to happy and divine men.

Glaucon/ You have, Socrates, like a statuary, made our governors every way perfect.

Socrates/ And our governesses likewise, Glauco. For do not imagine that I have spoken what I have said any more concerning the men, than concerning the women, such of them as are of a sufficient genius.

Glaucon/ Right, if at least they are to share in all things equally with the men, as we explained.

Socrates/ What then, do you agree that, with reference to the city and republic, we have not altogether spoken what can only be considered as wishes, but such things as are indeed difficult, yet possible some way, and in no other way than what has been mentioned, viz., when those who are truly philosophers, whether more of them or a single one, becoming governors in a city, shall despise those present honors, esteeming them illiberal and of no value, but esteeming the right and the honors which come from it above all things, and accounting justice of greatest moment and most absolutely necessary, and ministering to it and increasing it, thoroughly regulate the constitution of their own city?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ As many, of the more advanced in life as have lived ten years in the city, they will send out to the country, and taking their children away from those habits which the domestics have at present, they will educate them in their own manners and laws, which are what we formerly mentioned; and the city and republic we have described being thus established in the speediest and easiest manner, it will both be happy itself, and be of the greatest advantage to that people among whom it is established.

Glaucon/ Very much so indeed. And you seem to me, Socrates, to have told very well how this city shall arise, if it arise at all.

Socrates/ Are not now then, our discourses sufficient both concerning such a city as this, and concerning a man similar to it? For it is also now evident what sort of a man we shall say he ought to be.

Glaucon/ It is evident; and your inquiry seems to me to be at an end.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK

The Eighth Book

Socrates/ Be it so. These things, Glauco, have now been agreed on—that in this city which is to be established in a perfect manner, the women are to be common, the children common, and likewise the whole of education; and, in like manner, their employments both in peace and war are to be common; and that their kings are to be such as most excel both in philosophy and in the arts of war.

Glaucon/ These things, have been agreed on.

Socrates/ And surely we likewise agreed on these things, that when the governors are marching with the soldiers, and come to settle themselves, they shall dwell in such habitations as we formerly mentioned, which have nothing peculiar to anyone, but are common to all. And besides these houses, we likewise, if you remember, agreed on what sort of possessions they shall have.

Glaucon/ I remember, that we were of opinion none of them ought to possess anything as others do at present; but, as wrestlers in war and guardians, they were to receive a reward for their guardianship from others, or an yearly maintenance on these accounts, and were to take care of themselves and the rest of the city.

Socrates/ You say right. But after we have finished this now, let us recollect whence we made this digression, that we may now proceed again in the same way.

Glaucon/ That is no hard matter: for you were mentioning much the same things of the city with those you have done at present, saying that you held such a city to be good, as it was at that time described, and the man to be good who resembles it; whilst yet it seems you are able to describe a better city and a better man. And you said, moreover, that all the others were wrong, if this one was right. Of the other republics, you said, as I remember, there were four species

which deserved to be considered, and to have the errors in them and the lawless people in them observed; in order that, when we have beheld the whole of them, and when we have agreed which is the best and which is the worst man, we may inquire whether the best man be the happiest, and the worst the most miserable, or otherwise. And when I asked you which you call the four republics, Polemarchus and Adimantus hereupon interrupted; and you in this manner having taken up the subject are come to this part of the reasoning.

Socrates/ You have recollected, most accurately.

Glaucon/ As a wrestler, now, afford me again the same opportunity; and whilst I ask you the same question, endeavor to answer what you was going to do then.

Socrates/ If indeed I be able.

Glaucon/ And I am truly desirous, for my part, to hear which you call the four republics.

Socrates/ You shall hear that, without difficulty, for they are these I mention, and they have names too. There is that which is commended by many, the Cretan and the Spartan. There is. secondly, that which has a secondary praise, called Oligarchy, a republic full of many evils: and that which is different from this one, and follows next in order, a Democracy; then genuine Tyranny, different from all these, the fourth and last disease of a city. Or have you any other form of a republic belonging to any distinct species? For your little principalities and venal kingdoms, and such like republics, are somehow of a middle kind between these, and one may find of them as many among the barbarians as among the Greeks.

Glaucon/ They are indeed, said to be very many, and very strange ones.

Socrates/ Do you know now, that there is somehow a necessity that there be as many species of men as of republics? Or do you imagine that republics are generated somehow of an oak, or a rock, and not of the manners of those who are in the city, to which, as into a current, all other things likewise are drawn?

Glaucon/ By no means do I imagine, they are generated from anything but from hence.

Socrates/ If then there be five species of cities, the species of souls in individuals shall be likewise five.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ We have already gone over that one which resembles an Aristocracy, which we have rightly pronounced to be both good and just.

Glaucon/ We have so.

Socrates/ Are we now, in the next place, to go over the worse species, the contentious and the ambitious man, who is formed according to the Spartan republic; and then him resembling an Oligarchy; then the Democratic and the Tyrannic, that we may contemplate the most unjust, and set him in opposition to the most just, that our inquiry may be completed; how after all, the most finished justice is in comparison of the most finished injustice, as to the happiness or misery of the possessor: that so we may either follow injustice, being persuaded by Thrasymachus, or justice, yielding to the present reasoning?

Glaucon/ By all means, we must do so.

Socrates/ Shall we then, in the same manner as we began, consider the manners in republics, before we consider them in private persons, as being there more conspicuous? And according to this method the ambitious republic is first to be considered (for I have no other name to call it by, but it may be called either ambitious, or aspiring

after power), and along with it we shall consider a man resembling it; afterwards we shall consider an Oligarchy, and a man resembling Oligarchy; and then, again, when we have viewed a Democracy, we shall contemplate a Democratic man; and then in the fourth place, when we come to Tyranny, and contemplate it, and likewise a tyrannic soul, we shall endeavor to become competent judges of what we proposed.

Glaucon/ Both our contemplation and judgment, would in this manner at least be agreeable to reason.

Socrates/ Come then, let us endeavor to tell in what manner the ambitious republic arises out of Aristocracy. Or is not this plain, that every republic changes by means of that part which holds the magistracies, when in this itself there arises sedition; but whilst this agrees with itself, though the state be extremely small, it is impossible to be changed?

Glaucon/ It is so indeed.

Socrates/ How then, Glauco, shall our city be changed, or in what shape shall our allies and rulers fall into sedition with one another, and among themselves? Or are you willing that, like Homer, we invoke the Muses to tell us, "How first sedition rose"? and shall we say, that whilst they talk tragically, playing with us, and rallying us as children, they yet talk seriously and sublimely?

Glaucon/ In what manner?

Socrates/ Somehow thus: It is indeed difficult for a city in this manner constituted to be changed; but as everything which is generated is liable to corruption, neither will such a constitution as this remain forever, but be dissolved. And its dissolution is this: Not only the vegetable species, but likewise the animal, has seasons of fertility and sterility of soul as well as of body, when their revolutions complete the

periphery of their respective orbits—which are shorter to the shorter lived, and contrariwise to such as are the contrary. And with reference to the fertility and sterility of our race, although they are wise, these you have educated to be governors of cities, yet will they not, for all that, by their reason joined with sensation, observe the proper seasons, but overlook them, and sometimes, generate children when they ought not. Now the period for a divine generation is that which the perfect number comprehends, and that for a human generation is that whole geometrical number which is of such an influence as to regulate the better and the worse births—of which when our governors, being ignorant, join our couples together unseasonably, the children shall neither be of a good genius nor fortunate. And though the former governors-shall install the best of them in the office, they nevertheless being unworthy of it, and coming to have the power their fathers had, will begin to be negligent of us, in their guardianship in the first place, esteeming music less than they ought, and in the next place the exercises. Hence our youth shall become less acquainted with music, and the guardians which shall be appointed from among these shall not be altogether expert guardians to distinguish, according to Hesiod and us, the several species of geniuses. —the golden, the silver, the brazen and the iron; but whilst iron is mixed with silver and brass with gold, dissimilitude arises and unharmonious irregularity. And when these arise, wherever they prevail they perpetually" generate war and enmity. To such a race now of men as this, we must suppose them to say that sedition belongs whenever it happens to rise.

Glaucon/ And we shall say that they have answered justly at least.

Socrates/ And of necessity, for they are muses.

Glaucon/ What then, do the muses say next?

Socrates/ When sedition is risen, two of the species of geniuses, the iron and the brazen, will be carried, after making gain, and the acquisition of lands and houses, of gold and silver. But the golden and the silver geniuses, as they are not in want, but naturally rich, will lead the soul towards virtue and the original constitution; yet as they live in a violent manner, and draw contrary to one another, they make an agreement to divide their lands and houses between them, and to dwell apart one from another; and then enslaving those who were formerly kept by them as freemen, as friends, and tutors, they keep them as domestics and slaves, for service in war and for their own protection.

Glaucon/ This revolution, seems to me to arise in such a manner.

Socrates/ Shall not then this republic, be somewhat in the middle between Aristocracy and Oligarchy?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the change shall happen in this manner, and on this change what sort of life shall it lead? Or is it not plain that in some things it shall imitate the former republic, and in others Oligarchy, as being in the middle of the two, and shall likewise have somewhat peculiar to itself?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Shall they not then, in honoring their rulers, and in this that their military abstain from agriculture, from mechanical and other gainful employments, in their establishing common meals, and in studying both gymnastic exercises and contests of war—in all these things shall they not imitate the former republic?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But in this, that they are afraid to bring wise men into the magistracy, as having no longer any such as are truly simple and inflexible, but such as are of a mixed

kind; and in that they incline for those who are more forward and rough, whose natural genius is rather fitted for war than peace, and in that they esteem tricks and stratagems, and spend the whole of their time in continual war—in all these respects shall it not have many things peculiar to itself?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And such as these, shall be desirous of wealth, as those who live in Oligarchies, and in an illiberal manner value gold and silver hoarded up, as having repositories of their own, and domestic treasuries, where they hoard them up and hide them, and have their houses enclosed about, where, as in nests altogether peculiar, they squander everything profusely, together with their wives and such others as they fancy.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And will they not likewise be sparing of their substance, as valuing it highly, and acquiring it not in an open manner, but love to squander the substance of others, through their dissoluteness and secretly indulging their pleasures. They will likewise fly from the law, as children from their father, who have been educated not by persuasion but by force, having neglected the true muse, which is accompanied with reason and philosophy, and honored exercise more than music.

Glaucon/ You describe entirely, a mixed republic, compounded of good and ill.

Socrates/ It is indeed mixed. One thing is most remarkable in it, from the prevalence of the forward temper, contention, and ambition.

Glaucon/ Exceedingly.

Socrates/ Does not then, this republic arise in this manner? And is it not of such a kind as this, as far as the form of a republic can be described in words where there is

not perfect accuracy, as it suffices us to contemplate in description likewise the most just and the most unjust man, and it were a work of prodigious length to go over all republics, and all the various manners of men, without omitting anything?

Glaucon/ Very right.

Socrates/ What now shall the man be correspondent to this republic? how shall be he formed, and of what kind?

Adeimantus/ I imagine, he shall be somewhat like Glauco here, at least in a love of contention.

Socrates/ Perhaps, as to this particular; but in other respects he does not seem to me to have a natural resemblance of him.

Adeimantus/ In what?

Socrates/ He must necessarily, be more arrogant, and unapt to music, but fond of it, and fond to hear oratory, but not at all an orator. And such an one will be rough towards some slaves, without despising them, as he does who is sufficiently educated; he will be mild towards such as are free, and extremely submissive to governors; fond of being in the magistracy and of dignity, reckoning that neither eloquence, nor any such thing, should entitle to magistracy, but political management and military performances, being a lover of exercises and of hunting.

Adeimantus/ This indeed, is the temper of that republic.

Socrates/ And shall not such an one, despise money whilst he is young, but the older he grows, the more he will always value it, because he partakes of the covetous natural temper, and is not sincerely affected towards virtue, because destitute of the best guardian.

Adeimantus/ Which?

Socrates/ Reason, accompanied with music, which, being the alone inbred preservative of virtue, dwells with the possessor through the whole of life.

Adeimantus/ You say well.

Socrates/ And surely at least such an ambitious youth, resembles such a city.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And such an one, is formed, somehow, in this manner. He happens sometimes to be the young son of a worthy father, who dwells in an ill regulated city, and who shuns honors and magistracies, and law-suits, and all such public business, and wants to be neglected in obscurity, in order that he may have no trouble.

Adeimantus/ In what manner then, is he formed?

Socrates/ When first of all, he hears his mother venting her indignation, because her husband is not in the magistracy, and complaining that she is on this account neglected among other women, and that she observes him not extremely attentive to the making of money, not fighting nor scolding privately nor publicly in courts of justice; but behaving on all these occasions indolently, and perceiving him always taken up about himself, and treating her neither with extreme respect nor contempt—upon all these accounts, being filled with indignation, she tells her son that his father is unmanly and extremely remiss, and all other such things as wives are wont to cant over concerning such husbands.

Adeimantus/ They are very many truly, and very much in their spirit.

Socrates/ And you know, that the domestics likewise of such families, such of them as appear good-natured, sometimes privately say the same things to the son; and if they see anyone either owing money, whom the father does

not sue at law, or in any other way doing injustice, they exhort him to punish all such persons when he comes to be a man, and to be more of a man than his father. And when he goes abroad he hears other such like things. And he sees that such in the city as mind their own affairs are called simple, and held in little esteem, and that such as mind not their affairs are both honored and commended. The young man, now hearing and seeing all these things, and then again hearing the speeches of his father, and observing his pursuits in a near view, in comparison with those of others, being drawn by both these, his father watering and increasing the rational part in his soul, and these others the concupiscible and irascible, and being naturally no bad man, but spoiled by the bad conversations of others, he is brought to a mean between the two, and delivers up the government within himself to a middle power, that which is fond of contention and irascible, and so he becomes a haughty and ambitious man.

Adeimantus/ You seem, to have accurately explained the formation of such an one.

Socrates/ We have now then, the second republic and the second man.

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ Shall we not after this say with Aeschylus;

> "O'er diff'rent cities diff'rent men are set"?

Or, rather, according to our plan, shall we first establish the cities?

Adeimantus/ By all means so.

Socrates/ It would be Oligarchy then, I imagine, which succeeds this republic.

Adeimantus/ But what constitution, is it you call Oligarchy?

Socrates/ That republic, which is founded on men's valuations, in which the rich bear rule, and the poor have no share in the government.

Adeimantus/ I understand.

Socrates/ Must we not tell, first, how the change is made from the ambitious republic to the Oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ We must.

Socrates/ And surely at least how this change is made, is manifest even to the blind.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ That treasury, which everyone has filled with gold destroys such a republic; for first of all they find out for themselves methods of expense, and to this purpose strain the laws, both they and their wives disobeying them.

Adeimantus/ That is likely.

Socrates/ And afterwards, as I imagine, one observing another, and coming to rival one another, the generality are rendered of this kind.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ And from hence then, proceeding still to a greater desire of making money, the more honorable they account this to be, the more will virtue be thought dishonorable. Or is not virtue so different from wealth, that, if each of them be placed in the opposite arm of a balance, they always weigh opposite to each other?

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But whilst wealth and the wealthy are held in honor in the city, both virtue and the good must be more dishonored.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And what is honored is always pursued, and what is dishonored is neglected.

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Instead then of contentious and ambitious men, they will at last become lovers of gain and of wealth. The rich, on the one hand, they both praise and admire, and bring into the magistracy, but the poor man they despise?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do not they then make laws, marking out the boundary of the Oligarchic constitution, and regulating the quantity of Oligarchic power according to the quantity of wealth, more to the more wealthy, and less to the less, intimating that he who has not the valuation settled by law is to have no share in the government? And these things they transact violently, by force of arms, or establish such a republic after they have previously stricken them with terror. Is it not thus?

Adeimantus/ Thus indeed.

Socrates/ This then, to say in a word, is the constitution.

Adeimantus/ It is. But what now is the nature of the republic, and what are the faults we ascribed to it?

Socrates/ First of all, this very thing, the constitution itself, what think you of this? For consider, if one should in this manner appoint pilots of ships according to their valuations, but never entrust one with a poor man, though better skilled in piloting?

Adeimantus/ They would, make very bad navigation.

Socrates/ And is it not in the same manner with reference to any other thing, or any government whatever?

Adeimantus/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ Is it so in all cases but in a city? or is it so with reference to a city likewise?

Adeimantus/ There most especially, in as much as it is the most difficult and the greatest government.

Socrates/ Oligarchy then would seem to have this one, which is so great a fault.

Adeimantus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But what, is this anything less than it?

Adeimantus/ What?

Socrates/ That such a city is not one, but of necessity two; one consisting of the poor, and the other of the rich, dwelling in one place, and always plotting against one another.

Adeimantus/ Truly, it is no way less.

Socrates/ But surely neither is this a handsome thing, to be incapable to wage any war, because of the necessity they are under either of employing the armed multitude, and of dreading them more than the enemy themselves, or not employing them, to appear in battle itself truly Oligarchic, and at the same time to be unwilling to advance money for the public service, through a natural disposition of covetousness.

Adeimantus/ This is not handsome.

Socrates/ But what, with reference to what we long ago condemned, the engaging in a multiplicity of different things the same persons, at the same time, minding in such a republic, agriculture, lucrative employments, and military affairs, does this appear to be right?

Adeimantus/ Not in any degree.

Socrates/ But see now whether this form of republic be the first which introduces this greatest of all evils.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That one shall be allowed to dispose of the whole of his effects, and another to purchase them from him, and the seller be allowed to dwell in the city, whilst he belongs to no one class in the city, and is neither called a

maker of money, nor mechanic, nor horse-man, nor foot-soldier, but poor and destitute.

Adeimantus/ It is the first.

Socrates/ But yet such an one shall not be prohibited in Oligarchic governments, for otherwise some of them should not be over-rich, and others altogether poor.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ But consider this likewise: When such a rich man as this is spends of his substance, was it of any more advantage to the city with reference to the purposes we now mentioned? or did he appear to be indeed one of the magistrates, but was in truth neither magistrate of the city, nor servant to it, but a waster of substance?

Adeimantus/ So he appeared.

Socrates/ He was nothing but a waster. Are you willing then, that we say of him, that as when a drone is in a bee-cell it is the disease of the swarm, in like manner such an one, when a drone in his house, it is the disease of the city?

Adeimantus/ Entirely so, Socrates.

Socrates/ And has not God, Adimantus, made all the winged drones without any sting? but these with feet, some of them without stings, and some of them with dreadful stings? And of those who are without stings are they who continue poor to old age; and of those who have stings are all these who are called mischievous.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ It is plain then, that in a city where you observe there are poor, there are somewhere in that place concealed thieves and purse-cutters, and sacrilegious persons, and workers of all other such evils.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ What then? Do not you perceive poor people in cities under Oligarchic government?

Adeimantus/ They are almost all so, except the governors.

Socrates/ And do we not imagine, that there are many mischievous persons in them with stings, whom the magistracy, by diligence and by force, restrains?

Adeimantus/ We imagine so indeed.

Socrates/ And shall we not say, that through want of education, through bad nurture, and a corrupt constitution of state, such sort of persons are there produced?

Adeimantus/ We shall say so.

Socrates/ Is not then the city which is under Oligarchy of such a kind as this, and has it not such evils as these, and probably more too?

Adeimantus/ It is nearly so.

Socrates/ We have now finished, this republic likewise, which they call Oligarchy, having its governors according to valuation. And let us now consider the man who resembles it, in what manner he arises, and what sort of man he is.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And is not the change from that ambitious one, to the Oligarchic, chiefly in this manner?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ When such a one has a son, first of all, he both emulates his father, and follows his steps; afterwards he sees him, on a sudden, dashed on the city, as on a rock, and wasting both his substance and himself, either in the office of a general, or some other principal magistracy; then falling into courts of justice, destroyed by sycophants, either put to death, or striped of his dignities, disgraced, and losing all his substance.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ When he has seen and suffered those things, friend, and has lost his substance, he instantly, in a terror, pushes headlong from the throne of his soul that ambitious and forward disposition, and being humbled by, his poverty, turns to the making of money, lives meanly and sparingly, and applying to work, scrapes together substance. Or do you not imagine that such a man will then seat in that throne the covetous and avaricious disposition, and make it a mighty king within himself, decked out with Persian crowns, and bracelets, and scepters?

Adeimantus/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ But he, I imagine, having placed both the rational and the ambitious disposition low on the ground, on either side, and having enslaved them under it, the one he allows to reason on nothing, nor ever to inquire but in what way lesser substance shall be made greater; and the other, again, he allows to admire and honor nothing but riches and rich people, and to receive honor on no other account but the acquisition of money, or whatever conduces towards it.

Adeimantus/ There is no other change, of an ambitious youth to a covetous one so sudden and so powerful as this.

Socrates/ Is not this then, the Oligarchic man?

Adeimantus/ And the change into such an one is from a man resembling that republic from which the Oligarchic republic arises.

Socrates/ Let us consider now if he any way resembles it.

Adeimantus/ Let us consider.

Socrates/ Does he not, in the first place, resemble it in valuing money above all things?

Adeimantus/ Why, does he not?

Socrates/ And surely at least in being sparing and laborious, satisfying only his necessary desires, and not

allowing of any other expenses, but subduing the other desires as foolish.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And being, an emaciated man, and making gain of everything, a hoarding-up person, such as the multitude extols—would not this be the man who resembles such a republic?

Adeimantus/ It appears so to me. Riches then must be most valued both by the city and by such a man.

Socrates/ For I do not imagine, that such a man has applied his mind to education.

Adeimantus/ I do not imagine he has, for he would not have taken a blind one to be the leader of his life.

Socrates/ But farther still, consider this attentively: shall we not say that there are in him, from the want of education, the desires of the drone, some of them beggarly, and some of them mischievous, forcibly kept in by some other desire?

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Do you know then, where you will best observe their wickedness?

Adeimantus/ Where?

Socrates/ In their tutelages of orphans, or in whatever else of this kind comes in their way, where they have it much in their power to do injustice.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ | And is not this now manifest, that in every other commerce of life, wherever such an one acts so as to be approved, appearing to be just, and by a certain moderate behavior restrains the other wrong desires within him, he does so, not from any persuasion that it is not better to indulge them, nor from sober reason, but from necessity and fear, trembling for the rest of his substance.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And truly, friend, you shall find in the most of them desires partaking of the nature of the drone, where there is occasion to spend the things of others.

Adeimantus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Such a one as this, then, will not be without sedition within himself, nor be one, but a kind of double man. He will, however, have for the most part desires governing other desires, the better governing the worse.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ And on these accounts such a one, as I imagine, will be more decent than many others, but the true virtue of a harmonized and consistent soul would far escape him.

Adeimantus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ And the parsimonious man will, in private life, be but a poor rival for any victory, or in any contest of the honorable kind. And being unwilling, for the sake of good reputation, or for any such contests, to spend his substance, being afraid to waken up expensive desires, or any alliance or contest of this kind, fighting with a small part of his forces in an Oligarchic manner, he is generally defeated, and makes rich.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Do we then yet hesitate, to rank the covetous and parsimonious man as most of all resembling the city under Oligarchic government?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Democracy now, as seems, is next to be considered, in what manner it arises, and what kind of man it produces when arisen; that understanding the nature of such a man, we may bring him to a trial.

Adeimantus/ We shall in this method, proceed in a consistency with ourselves.

Socrates/ Is not, the change from Oligarchy to Democracy produced in some such way as this, through the insatiable desire of the proposed good, viz., the desire of becoming as rich as possible?

Adeimantus/ How now?

Socrates/ As those who are governors in it govern on account of their possessing great riches, they will be unwilling, I imagine, to restrain by law such of the youth as are dissolute from having the liberty of squandering and wasting their substance; that so, by purchasing the substance of such persons, and lending them on usury, they may still become both richer, and be held in greater honor.

Adeimantus/ They will be more unwilling than any other.

Socrates/ And is not this already manifest in the city, that it is impossible for the citizens to hold riches in esteem, and at the same time sufficiently to possess temperance, but either the one or the other must of necessity be neglected?

Adeimantus/ It is abundantly plain.

Socrates/ But whilst in Oligarchies they neglect education, and suffer the youth to grow licentious, they lay sometimes under a necessity of becoming poor such as are of no ungenerous disposition.

Adeimantus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And these, I imagine, sit in the city, fitted both with slings and with armor, some of them in debt, others in contempt, others in both, hating and conspiring against those who possess their substance, and others likewise, being desirous of a change.

Adeimantus/ These things are so.

Socrates/ But the money-catchers, still brooding over it, and not seeming to observe these; but wherever they see any of the rest giving way, they wound them by throwing money into their hands, and drawing to themselves exorbitant usury, fill the city with plenty of drones and of poor.

Adeimantus/ How can there be, but great plenty?

Socrates/ Nor yet, when so great an evil is burning in the city, are they willing to extinguish it, not even by that method, restraining anyone from spending his substance at pleasure, nor yet to take that method by which, according to the second law, such disorder might be removed.

Adeimantus/ According to which?

Socrates/ According to that which, after that other, is secondary, obliging the citizens to apply to virtue. For if one should enjoin them to trade a great deal in the way of voluntary commerce, and upon their own hazard, they should in a less shameful way make money in the city, and likewise less of those evils we have now mentioned should arise in it.

Adeimantus/ Much less.

Socrates/ But at present, by means of all these things, the governors render the governed of this kind. And do they not render both themselves and all belonging to them, and the youth likewise, luxurious and idle with respect to all the exercises of body and of mind, and effeminate in bearing both pleasures and pains, and likewise indolent?

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ As to themselves, they neglect everything but the making of money, and make no more account of virtue than the poor do.

Adeimantus/ They do not indeed.

Socrates/ After they are trained up in this manner, when these governors and their subjects meet together, either on the road in their journeying, or in any other meetings, either at public shows or military marches, either when fellow-sailors or fellow-soldiers, or when they see one another in common dangers, by no means are the poor in these cases contemned by the rich; but very often a robust fellow, poor and sun-burnt, when he has his rank in battle beside a rich man bred up in the shade, and swollen with a great deal of adventitious flesh, and sees him panting for breath and in agony, do not you imagine that he thinks it is through their own fault that such fellows grow rich, and that they say to one another, when they meet in private, that our rich men are good for nothing at all?

Adeimantus/ I know very well, that they do so.

Socrates/ For as a diseased body needs but the smallest shock from without to render it sickly, and sometimes without any impression from without is in sedition with itself, shall not in like manner a city resembling it in these things, on the smallest occasion from without, when either the one party makes an alliance with the Oligarchic, or the other with the Democratic, be sickly and fight with itself, and sometimes, without these things from abroad, be in sedition?

Adeimantus/ And extremely so.

Socrates/ A Democracy then, as I imagine, arises when the poor, prevailing over the rich, kill some and banish others, and share the places in the republic and the magistracies equally among the remainder; and for the most part the magistracies are disposed in it by lot.

Adeimantus/ This, truly, is the establishment of a Democracy, whether it arise by force of arms, or through others withdrawing themselves through fear.

Socrates/ In what manner now, do these live, and what sort of a republic is this? for it is plain that a man of this kind shall appear some Democratic one.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ Is not then the city, in the first place, full of all freedom of action, and of speech, and of liberty, to do in it what anyone inclines?

Adeimantus/ So, truly, it is said at least.

Socrates/ And wherever there is liberty, it is plain that everyone will regulate his own method of life in whatever way he pleases.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And I imagine that, in such a republic most especially, there would arise men of all kinds.

Adeimantus/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ This, seems to be the finest of all republics. As a variegated robe, diversified with all kinds of flowers, so this republic, variegated with all sorts of manners, appears the finest.

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And it is likely, that the multitude judge this republic to be the best, like children and women gazing at variegated things.

Adeimantus/ Very likely.

Socrates/ And it is very proper at least, happy friend, to search for a republic in such a state as this.

Adeimantus/ How now?

Socrates/ Because it contains all kinds of republics on account of liberty; and it appears necessary for anyone who wants to constitute a city, as we do at present, to come to a Democratic city, as to a general fair of republics, and choose that form which he fancies.

Adeimantus/ It is likely indeed, he should not be in want of models.

Socrates/ But what now, is not this a divine and sweet manner of life for the present. To be under no necessity in such a city to govern, not though you were able to govern, nor yet to be subject unless you incline, nor to be engaged in war when others are, nor to live in peace when others do so unless you be desirous of peace; and though there be a law restraining you from governing or administering justice, to govern, nevertheless, and administer justice if you incline.

Adeimantus/ It is likely, it is pleasant for the present at least.

Socrates/ But what now, is not the meekness of some of those who are condemned very curious? Or have you not as yet observed, in such a republic, men condemned to death or banishment, yet nevertheless continuing still, and walking up and down openly, and as if no one minded or observed him, the condemned man returns like a hero?

Adeimantus/ I have observed very many.

Socrates/ But is not this indulgence of the city very generous, and not at all to say the small regard, but the contempt it shows for all those things we celebrated so much when we settled our city, how that unless one had an extraordinary genius, he never would become a good man, unless when a child he were instantly educated in things handsome, and should diligently apply to all these things. How magnanimously it despises all these things, and does not regard from what sort of pursuits one comes to act in political affairs, but honors him if he only say he is well affected towards the multitude?

Adeimantus/ This contempt, is very generous indeed.

Socrates/ These now, and such things as are a-kin to these, are to be found in a Democracy, and it would be, as

appears, a pleasant sort of republic, anarchical and variegated, distributing a certain equality to all alike without distinction.

Adeimantus/ What you say, is quite manifest.

Socrates/ Consider now, what sort of man such an one is in private, or, first, must we not consider as we did with respect to the republic in what manner he arises?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does he not in this manner arise from that parsimonious one, who was under the Oligarchy as a son, I imagine, trained up by his father in his manners?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Such a one by force governs his own pleasures, these of them which are expensive, and tend not towards making money, and which are called unnecessary ones.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ Are you willing then, that we may not reason in the dark, first to determine what desires are necessary, and what are not?

Adeimantus/ I am content.

Socrates/ May not such be justly called necessary, which we are not able to remove, and such as when gratified are of advantage to us; for both these kinds our nature is under a necessity to pursue, is it not?

Adeimantus/ Very strongly.

Socrates/ This then we shall justly say makes the necessary part in our desires.

Adeimantus/ Justly.

Socrates/ But what now? Such desires as one may banish, if he study it from his youth, and such as whilst they remain do no good, if we say of these that they are not necessary, shall we not say right?

Adeimantus/ Right indeed.

Socrates/ Let us choose out a sample of each of them, that we may understand by an example what they are.

Adeimantus/ It is proper.

Socrates/ Is not the desire of eating, so far as is conducive towards health and good habit of body, and the desire of food and victuals, may it not be considered as of the necessary kind?

Adeimantus/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ The desire of food at least is indeed necessary on both accounts, as meat is advantageous, and as the want of it must put an end to life altogether.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ And the desire of victuals is likewise necessary if it any how contribute anything towards the good habit of the body.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what, such desire even of these things as goes beyond these purposes, or such desire as respects other meats than these, and yet is capable of being curbed in youth, and by being disciplined, to be removed from many things, and which is hurtful both to the body, and hurtful to the soul with reference to her attaining wisdom and temperance, may not such desire be rightly called unnecessary.

Adeimantus/ Most rightly indeed.

Socrates/ And may we not call these expensive likewise, and the others frugal, as they are conducive towards the actions of life?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ In the same manner, surely shall we say of venereal desires and the others.

Adeimantus/ In the same manner.

Socrates/ And did we not by him whom we just now denominated the drone, mean one who was full of such desires and pleasures, and was governed by the unnecessary desires, but that he who was under the necessary ones was the parsimonious and Oligarchic?

Adeimantus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Let us again mention, how the Democratic arises from the Oligarchic, and to me he appears to arise in great measure thus.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ When a young man, bred up, as we now mentioned, without proper instruction, and in a parsimonious manner, comes to taste the honey of the drones, and associates with those vehement and terrible creatures who are able to procure all sorts of pleasures, and every way diversified, and from every quarter, thence imagine there is somehow the beginning of a change in him from the Oligarchic to the Democratic.

Adeimantus/ There is great necessity for it.

Socrates/ And as the city was changed by the assistance of an alliance from without with one party of it with which it was a-kin, shall not the youth be changed in the same manner, by the assistance of one species of desires from without to another within him which resembles it, and is a-kin to it?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And I imagine at least, if by any alliance there be given counter-assistance to the Oligarchic party within him, either anyhow by his father, or by the others of the family, both admonishing and upbraiding him, then truly arises sedition, and opposition, and a fight within him with himself.

Adeimantus/ Why does there not?

Socrates/ And sometimes indeed, I imagine, the Democratic party yields to the Oligarchic, and some of the desires are destroyed, some of them retire, on the rise of a certain modesty in the soul of the youth, and he is again rendered somewhat decent.

Adeimantus/ It happens sometimes.

Socrates/ And again, I imagine, that when some desires retire, there are others a-kin to them which grow up, and through inattention to the father's instruction, become both many and powerful.

Adeimantus/ It is wont, to happen so.

Socrates/ And do they not draw towards intimacies among themselves, and meeting privately together, generate a multitude?

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And at length, I imagine, they seize the citadel of the soul of the youth, finding it evacuated both of noble learning and pursuits and of true reasoning, which truly are the best watchmen and guardians in the understandings of men beloved of the Gods.

Adeimantus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And then indeed, false and boasting reasonings and opinions, rushing up in their stead, possess the same place in such a one.

Adeimantus/ Strongly so.

Socrates/ And does he not now again, on coming among those Lotophagi, dwell with them openly? And if any assistance come from his friends to the parsimonious part of his soul, those boasting reasonings shutting the gates of the royal wall against it, neither give entrance to this alliance, nor to the ambassadorial admonitions of private old

men; but fighting against these, hold the government themselves. And denominating modesty to be stupidity, they thrust it out disgracefully as a fugitive, and temperance they call unmanliness, and abusing it most shamefully, thrust it out; and persuading themselves that moderation, and decent expense, are no other than rusticity and illiberality, they expel them their territories, with many other and unprofitable desires.

Adeimantus/ This they do mightily.

Socrates/ And after that they have emptied and cleared of all these desires the soul that is held down by them, and is initiated in all the great mysteries, they next lead in, with encomiums and applauses, insolence, and anarchy, and luxury, and impudence, shining with a great retinue, and crowned with crowns; insolence, they denominate Education, anarchy they call Liberty, luxury thy call Magnificence, and impudence they call Manhood. Is it not, somehow in this manner that a youth changes from one bred up with the necessary desires into the licentiousness and remissness of the unnecessary and unprofitable pleasures?

Adeimantus/ And very plainly so.

Socrates/ And such a one, I imagine, after this leads his life, expending his substance, his labor, and his time no more on the necessary than the unnecessary pleasures; and if he be fortunate, and be not excessively debauched, when he is somewhat more advanced in years, and when the great crowd of desires is over, he admits a part of those which were thrust out, and does not deliver himself wholly up to such as had intruded, but regulates his pleasures by a sort of equality, and so lives delivering up the government of himself to every incidental desire as it chances, till it be satisfied, and then to another, undervaluing none of them, but indulging them all alike.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And such a one, does not listen to true reasoning, nor admit it into the citadel, if any should tell him that there are some pleasures of the worthy and the good desires, and others of the ill ones; and that he ought to pursue and honor those, but to chastise and subject these But, in all these cases, he dissents, and says that they are all alike, and ought to be held in equal honor.

Adeimantus/ Whoever is thus affected, acts in this manner very powerfully.

Socrates/ And does he not live, from day to day, indulging after this manner every incidental desire—sometimes indulging himself in drinking strong drink, and in music, sometimes drinking water, and extenuating himself by abstinence; then again minding the exercises—sometimes too he is quite indolent and careless about everything; then again he applies as it were to philosophy. Many times he acts the part of a politician, and in a desultory manner says and does whatever happens. If at any time he affects to imitate any of the military, thither he is carried; or of the mercantile, then again hither. Nor is his life regulated by any order, or any necessity, but deeming this sort of life pleasant, and free, and happy, he follows it throughout?

Adeimantus/ You have entirely, gone through the life of one who puts all laws whatever on a level.

Socrates/ I imagine at least, that he is multiform, and full of very different manners; and that, like the city, he is fine, and variegated, and that very many men and women would desire to imitate his life, as he has in him a great many patterns of republics and of manners.

Adeimantus/ He has so.

Socrates/ What now? Shall such a man as this be ranked as resembling a Democracy, as he may truly be called Democratic?

Adeimantus/ Let him be ranked.

Socrates/ But it yet remains that we go over, the most excellent republic, and the most excellent man, viz., Tyranny and the Tyrant.

Adeimantus/ It does.

Socrates/ Come then, friend companion, in what manner does Tyranny arise? for it is almost plain that the change is from Democracy.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ Does not Tyranny arise in the same manner from Democracy, as Democracy does from Oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ What did Oligarchy, propose as its good, and according to what was it constituted? It was with a view to become extremely rich, was it not?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ An insatiable desire then of riches, and a neglect of other things, through attention to making money, destroys it.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And with reference to that which Democracy denominated good, an insatiable thirst of it destroys it likewise?

Adeimantus/ But what is it you say it denominates good?

Socrates/ Liberty. For this you are told is most beautiful in a city which is under a Democracy, and that for the sake of liberty anyone who is naturally of a free spirit chooses to live in it alone.

Adeimantus/ This word, Liberty, is indeed often mentioned.

Socrates/ Does not then, as I was going to say, the insatiable desire of this, and the neglect of other things, change even this republic, and prepare it to stand in need of a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ How.

Socrates/ When a city, is under a Democracy, and is thirsting after liberty, and happens to have bad cup-bearers appointed it, and grows drunk with an unmixed draught of it beyond what is necessary, it punishes even the governors if they will not be entirely tame and afford a deal of liberty, accusing them as corrupted and leaning towards Oligarchy.

Adeimantus/ That they do.

Socrates/ But such as are obedient to magistrates, they abuse, as willing slaves and good for nothing, and both in private and in public commend and honor magistrates who resemble subjects, and subjects who resemble magistrates. Must they not in such a city, of necessity, go to the highest pitch of liberty?

Adeimantus/ Why must they not?

Socrates/ And must not this inbred anarchy, friend, descend into private families, and in the end reach even the brutes?

Adeimantus/ How, do we say such a thing as this?

Socrates/ Just as if, a father should accustom himself to resemble a child, and to be afraid of his sons, and the son accustom himself to resemble his father, and neither to revere nor to stand in awe of his parents, that so indeed he may be free, as if a stranger were to be equaled with a citizen, and a citizen with a stranger, and in like manner a foreigner.

Adeimantus/ It is just so.

Socrates/ These things, and other little things of a like nature happen. The teacher in such a city fears and flatters the scholars, and the scholars despise their teachers and their tutors in like manner. And in general the youth resemble the more advanced in years, and rival it with them both in words and deeds: and the old men sitting down with the young, are full of merriment and pleasantry, mimicking the youth, that they may not appear to be morose and despotic.

Adeimantus/ It is entirely so.

Socrates/ But that highest pitch, of the liberty of the multitude, how great it is in such a city as this, when the men and women-slaves are no less free than those who purchase them, and how great an equality and liberty the wives have with their husbands, and husbands with their wives, we have almost forgotten to mention.

Adeimantus/ Shall we not then, according to Aeschylus, say whatever now comes into our mouth.

Socrates/ By all means; and accordingly I do say in this manner; with reference even to the brute creatures, such of them as are under men's discipline, how much more free they are in such a city, one who has not experience of it will not easily believe. For readily even the puppies, according to the proverb, resemble their mistresses; and the horses and asses are accustomed to go freely and gracefully, marching up against anyone they meet on the road unless he give way: and many other such things happen full, in like manner of liberty.

Adeimantus/ You tell me, my dream, for I have often met with this when going into the country.

Socrates/ But do you observe, what is the sum of all those things collected together? How delicate it makes the soul of the citizens, in so much that if anyone bring near to them

anything of slavery, they are filled with indignation and cannot endure it. And do you know, that at length they regard not even the laws, written or unwritten, that no one whatever by any manner of means may become their master.

Adeimantus/ I know it well.

Socrates/ This now, friend, is that government, so beautiful and youthful, whence Tyranny springs, as it appears to me.

Adeimantus/ Youthful, truly!

Socrates/ But what comes after this? The same thing, which springing up as a disease in Oligarchy, destroyed it, the same arising here in a greater and more powerful manner, through its licentiousness, enslaves the Democracy. And in reality, the doing anything to excess is wont to occasion a mighty change to the reverse: thus in seasons, in vegetable and in animal bodies, and in republics as much as any.

Adeimantus/ It is probable.

Socrates/ And excessive liberty seems to change into nothing else but excessive slavery, both with a private person and a city.

Adeimantus/ It is probable indeed.

Socrates/ It is probable then, that out of no other republic is Tyranny constituted but out of Democracy, out of the most excessive liberty I imagine the greatest and most savage slavery.

Adeimantus/ There is indeed, reason for it.

Socrates/ But this I imagine, was not what you was asking. But what is that disease which enslaves Democracy, resembling that which destroys Oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ You say true.

Socrates/ That then, I called the race of idle and profuse men, one part of which was more brave and were leaders, the other more cowardly, and followed. And we compared them to drones, some to such as have stings, others to such as have none.

Adeimantus/ And rightly.

Socrates/ These two now, springing up in any republic, raise disturbance, as phlegm and bile in a natural body. And it behooves a wise physician and law-giver of a city no less than a wise bee-master, to be afraid of these, at a great distance principally, that they never get in; but if they have gotten in, that they be in the speediest manner possible cut off, together with their very cells.

Adeimantus/ Yes, truly, by all means.

Socrates/ Let us take it then, in this manner, that we may see more distinctly what we want.

Adeimantus/ In what manner?

Socrates/ Let us divide in our reasoning a Democratic city into three, as it really is; for one such species as the above grows through licentiousness in it, no less than in the Oligarchic.

Adeimantus/ It does so.

Socrates/ But it is much more fierce at least in this than in that one.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ Under Oligarchy, because it is not in places of honor, but is debarred from the magistracies, it is unexercised, and does not become strong. But in a Democracy this, excepting a few, is somehow the presiding party, and now it says and does itself the most outrageous things, and then again approaching courts of justice, it makes a noise, and cannot bear any other to say different

from it; so that all things, if it be not some few, in such a republic are administered by such a party.

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ Some other party now, such as this, is always separated from the multitude.

Adeimantus/ Which?

Socrates/ Whilst the whole are somehow in the pursuit of gain, such as are naturally the most temperate become for the most part the wealthiest.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ And hence, I imagine, the greatest quantity of honey, and what comes with the greatest ease, is pressed out of these by the drones.

Adeimantus/ For how, shall anyone press out of those who have but a little?

Socrates/ Such wealthy people, I imagine, are called the pasture of the drones.

Adeimantus/ Almost so.

Socrates/ And the people would be a sort of third species, such of them as mind their own affairs, and meddle not with any others, who have not very much substance, but yet are the most numerous, and the most prevalent in a Democracy, whenever it is fully assembled.

Adeimantus/ It is so; but this it will not do often, if it does not get some share of the honey.

Socrates/ Does it not always get a share, as far as their leaders are able, robbing those who have substance, and giving to the people, that they may have the most themselves?

Adeimantus/ They are indeed, sharers in this manner.

Socrates/ These then, who are thus despoiled are obliged to defend themselves, saying and doing all they can among the people.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Others then give them occasion to form designs against the people, though they should have no inclination to introduce a change of government, and so they are Oligarchic.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ But at length, after they see that the people, not of their own accord, but being ignorant and imposed on by those slanderers, attempt to do them wrong, do they not then indeed, whether they will or not, become truly Oligarchic, yet not spontaneously? but this mischief likewise is generated by that drone stinging them.

Adeimantus/ Extremely so indeed.

Socrates/ And so they have accusations, law-suits, and contests one with another.

Adeimantus/ Frequently too.

Socrates/ And are not the people wont always to set someone, in a conspicuous manner, over themselves, and to cherish him and greatly to increase his power?

Adeimantus/ They are wont indeed.

Socrates/ And this, is plain, that whenever a tyrant arises it is from this president root, and from nothing else that he blossoms.

Adeimantus/ This is extremely manifest.

Socrates/ What is the beginning then of the change from a president into a tyrant? Or is it plain, that it is after that the president begins to do the same thing with that in the fable which is told in relation to the temple of Lycaean Zeus, to whom was dedicated the wolf in Arcadia.

Adeimantus/ Which?

Socrates/ How that whoever tasted human entrails which were mixed with those of other sacrifices, necessarily became a wolf. Have you not heard the story?

Adeimantus/ I have.

Socrates/ And must not he, in the same manner, who being president of the people, and receiving an extremely submissive multitude, abstains not from kindred blood, but unjustly accusing them (of such things as they are wont) and bringing them into courts of justice, stains himself with bloodshed, taking away the life of a man, and with unhallowed tongue and mouth tasting kindred blood, and banishes, and slays, and proposes the abolition of debts, and division of lands—must not such an one of necessity, and as it is destined, be either destroyed by his enemies or exercise tyranny, and from being a man become a wolf?

Adeimantus/ Of great necessity.

Socrates/ This is he now, who becomes seditious towards those who have substance, and when he fails he goes against his enemies with open force, and becomes an accomplished tyrant.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And if they be unable to expel him, or to put him to death on an accusation before the city, they truly conspire to cut him off privately by a violent death.

Adeimantus/ It is wont indeed, to happen so.

Socrates/ And on this account all those who mount up to tyranny invent this celebrated tyrannical demand, to demand of the people certain guards for their person, that the assistance of the people may be secured to them.

Adeimantus/ This, they take special care of.

Socrates/ And they grant them, I imagine, being afraid of his safety, but secure as to their own.

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And when one who has substance, and who along with his substance, has the crime of hating the people, observes this, he then, friend, according to the answer of the oracle to Croesus;

——To craggy Hermus flies,
Nor stays, nor fears, to be a coward deemed.

because he would not, be in fear again a second time. But he at least, I imagine, who is caught is put to death.

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ It is plain then that this president of the city does not himself behave like a truly great man in a manner truly great, but tumbling down many others, sits in his chair a consummate tyrant of the city, instead of a president.

Adeimantus/ Why is he not?

Socrates/ Shall we consider now, the happiness of the man, and of the city in which such a mortal arises?

Adeimantus/ By all means, let us consider it.

Socrates/ Does he not then, in the first days, and for the first season, smile and salute everyone he meets, says he is no tyrant, and promises many things, both in private and in public, and frees from debts, and distributes land both to the people in general, and to those about him, and affects to be mild and of the patriot spirit toward? ail?

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ But when, as I imagine, he has reconciled to himself some of his foreign enemies, and destroyed others, and there is tranquility with reference to these, he in the first place always raises some wars, in order that the people may be in need of a leader.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ And is it not likewise with this view, that being rendered poor by payment of taxes, they may be under a necessity of becoming intent on a daily sustenance, and may be less ready to conspire against him?

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And, I imagine, if he suspect that any of them who are of free spirits will not allow him to govern, in order to have some pretext for destroying them, he exposes them to the enemy. On all these accounts a tyrant is always under a necessity of raising war.

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And whilst he is doing these things, he must readily become more hateful to his citizens.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ And must not some of those who have been promoted along with him, and who are in power, speak out freely both towards him, and among themselves, finding fault with the transactions, such of them as are of a more manly spirit?

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ It behooves the tyrant then to cut off all these, if he means to govern, till he leave no one, either of friends or foes, worth anything.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ He must then carefully observe who is courageous, who is magnanimous, who wise, who rich, and in this manner is he happy, that, willing or not willing, he is under a necessity of being an enemy to all such as these, and to lay snares till he cleanse the city of them.

Adeimantus/ A noble cleansing!

Socrates/ Yes, the reverse of what physicians do with respect to animal bodies; for they, taking away what is worst, leave the best, but he does the contrary.

Adeimantus/ Because it seems, he must of necessity do so, if he is to govern.

Socrates/ In a blessed necessity then truly is he bound, which obliges him either to live with many naughty people, and to be hated too by them, or not to live at all.

Adeimantus/ In such necessity he is.

Socrates/ And the more he is hated by his citizens whilst he does these things, shall he not so much the more want a greater number of guards, and more faithful ones?

Adeimantus/ Why shall he not?

Socrates/ Who then are the faithful, and from whence shall he send for them?

Adeimantus/ Many, of their own accord will come flying, if he give them hire.

Socrates/ You seem, by the dog, again to mention certain drones foreign and multiform.

Adeimantus/ You imagine right.

Socrates/ But those at home, would he not incline to have them also as guards?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ After he has taken away the citizens, to give the slaves their liberty, and make of them guards about his person?

Adeimantus/ By all means, for these are the most faithful to him.

Socrates/ What a blessed possession, is this which you mention belonging to the tyrant, if he employ such friends and faithful men, after having destroyed those former ones!

Adeimantus/ But surely such at least, he does employ.

Socrates/ And such companions, admire him, and the new citizens accompany him, but the worthy men both hate and fly from him.

Adeimantus/ Why will they not?

Socrates/ It is not without reason, that tragedy in the general is thought a wise thing, and that Euripides is thought to excel in it.

Adeimantus/ For what?

Socrates/ Because he uttered this, which is the mark of a good understanding: That tyrants are wise, by the conversation of the wise, and he plainly said those were wise with whom they hold converse.

Adeimantus/ And he commends, too, Tyranny as a divine thing, and says a great many other things of it, as do likewise the other poets.

Socrates/ Therefore then, those composers of tragedy, as they are wise, will forgive us, and such as establish the government of cities in a manner nearly resembling ours, in not admitting them into our republic as being panegyrists of Tyranny.

Adeimantus/ I imagine, such of them at least as are more polite will forgive us.

Socrates/ But going about among other cities, I imagine, and drawing together the crowds, and putting to sale their fine, magnificent and persuasive words, they will draw over the republics to Tyrannies and Democracies.

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And do they not further receive rewards, and are held in honor chiefly by Tyrants, as is natural, and in the next place by Democracy? But the further on they advance towards the republics the reverse of these, their

honor forsakes them the more as if it were disabled by an asthma to advance.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Thus far, we have digressed. But now again let us mention in what manner that army of the Tyrant, which is so beautiful, so numerous and multiform, and no way the same, shall be maintained.

Adeimantus/ It is plain, that if at any time there be any sacred things in the city, these they will spend, that so what they sell for may still answer their demands, and the people be obliged to pay in the lighter taxes.

Socrates/ But what shall they do, when these fail them?

Adeimantus/ It is plain, that he and his drunken companions, and his associates, male and female, shall be maintained out of the paternal inheritance.

Socrates/ I understand, that the people who have made the Tyrant shall nourish him and his companions.

Adeimantus/ They are under great necessity.

Socrates/ How do you say? What if the people be enraged, and say that it is not just that the son who is come to maturity be maintained by the father, but contrariwise that the father be maintained by the son; and that they did not make and establish him for this purpose, to be a slave to his slaves when he should be grown up, and to maintain him and his slaves with their other tumultary attendants, but in order that they might be set at liberty from the rich in the city, who are also called the good and worthy, by having set him over them. And now they order him and his companions to be gone out of the city, as a father drives out of the house his son with his tumultuary drunken companions.

Adeimantus/ Then indeed at least shall the people, know truly what a beast they are themselves, and what a beast they have generated, and hugged, and bred up, and that

whilst they are the weaker, they attempt to drive out the stronger.

Socrates/ How do you say? Will the Tyrant dare to offer violence to his father, and if he cannot persuade him, will he strike him?

Adeimantus/ Yes, even stripping him of his armor.

Socrates/ You call, the Tyrant a parricide and a miserable nourisher of old-age; and yet, as it is probable, Tyranny would really seem to be of this kind, and according to the saying, the people, defending themselves against the smoke of slavery amid free men, have fallen into the slavish fire of despotism; instead of that excessive and unseasonable liberty, embracing the most rigorous and the most wretched slavery of bond-men.

Adeimantus/ These things, happen very much so.

Socrates/ What then, shall we not speak modestly, if we say that we have sufficiently shown how Tyranny arises out of Democracy, and what it is when it does arise?

Adeimantus/ Quite sufficiently.

THE END OF THE EIGHTH BOOK

The Ninth Book

Socrates/ The tyrannical man himself, remains yet to be considered, in what manner he arises out of the Democratic, and when he does arise, what kind of man he is, and what kind of life he leads, whether wretched or happy.

Adeimantus/ He indeed yet remains.

Socrates/ Do you know, what I still want?

Adeimantus/ What is it?

Socrates/ We do not appear to me to have sufficiently distinguished that matter of the desires, of what kind they are, and how many; and whilst this is defective, the inquiry we make shall be less evident.

Adeimantus/ May it not be done, in good season still.

Socrates/ Certainly. And consider what it is I want to know about them; for it is this. Of those pleasures and desires which are not necessary, some appear to me to be repugnant to law: these indeed appear to spring up in everyone, but being chastised by the laws, and the better desires, along with reason, they either forsake some men altogether, or are less few in number, and feeble; in others they are more powerful and in greater number.

Adeimantus/ Which are these you mean?

Socrates/ Such, as are excited in sleep, when the other part of the soul, such as is rational and mild, and which governs in it, is asleep, and the part which is brutal and savage, being filled with meats and drunkenness, frisks about, and pushing away sleep, wants to go and accomplish its practices. In such a one you know it dares to do everything, as being loosed and disengaged from all modesty and discretion; for it scruples not the embraces, as it imagines of a mother, or of anyone else, whether of Gods, of men, or of beasts; nor to kill anyone, nor to abstain from any

sort of meat, and, in one word, is wanting in no folly nor impudence.

Adeimantus/ You say most true.

Socrates/ But I imagine, when one is in health, and keeps himself temperately, and goes to sleep, having stirred up the rational part, and having feasted it with worthy reasonings and inquiries, coming to an unanimity with himself, and allowing the part of the soul which is concupiscible neither to be starved nor glutted, that it may lie quiet and give no disturbance to the part which is best, either by its joy or grief, but suffer it by itself alone and untainted to inquire, and to desire to apprehend what it knows not, either something of what has existed, or of what now exists, or what will exist hereafter; and having likewise soothed the irascible part, not suffering it to be hurried by anything to transports of anger, and to fall asleep with agitated passion, but having quieted these two parts of the soul, and excited the third part, in which wisdom resides, shall in this manner take rest—by such an one, you know, the truth is chiefly apprehended, and the visions of his dreams are then least of all repugnant to law.

Adeimantus/ I am altogether, of this opinion.

Socrates/ We have, indeed, been carried a little too far in mentioning these things. But what we want to be known is this, that there is in everyone a certain species of desires which is terrible, savage, and irregular, even in some who entirely seem to us to be moderate. And this species becomes indeed manifest in sleep. But consider if there appear to be anything in what I say, and if you agree with me.

Adeimantus/ But I agree.

Socrates/ Recollect now what kind of man we said the Democratic one was. For he was somehow educated from his infancy under a parsimonious father, who valued the

avaricious desires alone; but such as were not necessary, but rose only through a love of amusement and finery, he despised Was he not?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But being conversant with those who are more refined, and such as are full of those desires we now mentioned, running into their manner and all sort of insolence, from a detestation of his father's parsimony; however, having a better natural temper than those who corrupt him, and being drawn opposite ways, he settles into a manner in the middle of both, and participating moderately, as he imagines, of each of them, he leads a life neither illiberal nor licentious, becoming a Democratic man from an Oligarchic.

Adeimantus/ This was, and is our opinion of such an one.

Socrates/ Suppose now again, that when such a one is become old, his young son is educated in his manners.

Adeimantus/ I suppose it.

Socrates/ And suppose too, the same things happening to him as to his father: that he is drawn into all kind of licentiousness—which is termed, however, by such as draw him off the most complete liberty—and that his father and all the domestics are aiding to those desires which are in the middle, and others also give aid likewise. But when those curious magicians and tyrant-makers have no hopes of retaining the youth in their power any other way, they contrive to excite in him a certain love which presides over the indolent desires, and such as minister readily to their pleasures a certain winged and large drone; or do you imagine that the love of these things is anything else?

Adeimantus/ I imagine, it is nothing other than this.

Socrates/ And when other desires make a noise about him, full of their odors and perfumes, and crowns, and

wines, and those pleasures of the most dissolute kind which belong to such copartnerships, and being increased and cherished, add a sting of desire to the drone, then truly he is surrounded with madness as a life-guard, and that president of the soul rages with frenzy; and if he find in himself any opinions or desires which seem to be good, and which yet retain modesty, he kills them and pushes them from him, 'till he be cleansed of temperance, and is filled with additional madness.

Adeimantus/ You describe perfectly, the formation of a tyrannical man.

Socrates/ Is it not, on such an account as this that of old love is said to be a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And, friend, has not a drunken man likewise somewhat of a tyrannical spirit?

Adeimantus/ He has indeed.

Socrates/ And surely at least he who is mad and is disturbed in his mind undertakes and hopes to be able to govern not only men, but likewise the Gods.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ The tyrannical man then, divine friend, becomes so in perfection, when either by temper, or by his pursuits, or by both, he becomes drunk, and in love, and melancholy.

Adeimantus/ Perfectly so indeed.

Socrates/ Such a one, it seems then, arises in this manner. But in what manner does he live?

Adeimantus/ As they say in their plays, that you will tell me likewise.

Socrates/ I tell then. For I imagine that after this there are feastings among them, and reviling and banqueting, and

mistresses, and all such things as may be expected among those where Love the tyrant, dwelling within, governs all in the soul.

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And every day and night do there blossom forth many and dreadful desires, indigent of many things.

Adeimantus/ They are many indeed.

Socrates/ And if they have any supplies, they are soon spent.

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And after this there is borrowing and pillaging of substance.

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And when everything fails them, is there not a necessity that the desires, on the one hand, nestling in the mind, shall give frequent and powerful cries; and the men, on the other hand, being driven, as by stings, both by the other desires, and more especially by Love itself, commanding all the others as its life-guards, shall rage with frenzy, and search if anyone have anything which they are able, by deceit or violence, to carry off?

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ They must of necessity therefore be plundering from every quarter, or be tormented with great agonies and pains.

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And as with such a man his new pleasures have more to say than his ancient once, and take away what belonged to them, shall not he deem it proper in the same manner, that himself being young, should have more than his father and mother, and take away from them, and, if he has spent his own portion, encroach on that of his parents?

Adeimantus/ Why will he not?

Socrates/ And if they do not allow him, will he not first endeavor to pilfer from, and beguile his parents?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And where he is not able to do this, will he not, in the next place, use rapine and violence?

Adeimantus/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ But, wonderful friend, when the old man and the old woman oppose and fight, will he not revere them, and beware of doing anything tyrannical?

Adeimantus/ I, for my part, am not quite secure, with reference to the safety of the parents of such an one.

Socrates/ But do you truly, Adimantus, imagine that for the sake of a newly beloved and unnecessary mistress, such a one §would give up his anciently beloved and necessary mother; or for the sake of a blooming youth newly beloved, and not necessary, give up his decayed, his necessary and aged father, the most ancient of all his friends, to stripes, and suffer these to be enslaved by those others, if he should bring them into the same house?

Adeimantus/ Yes, truly I do.

Socrates/ It seems, to be an extremely happy thing to beget a tyrannical son.

Adeimantus/ Not altogether so.

Socrates/ But what, when the substance of his father and mother fails such an one, and when now there is the greatest swarm of pleasures assembled in him, shall he not first break into some house, or late at night strip someone of his coat, and after this shall he not rifle some temple? and in all these actings those desires, newly loosed from slavery and become as the guards of love, shall along with him rule over those ancient opinions he had from his infancy, the

established decisions concerning good and evil—these desires which heretofore were only loose from their slavery in sleep, when he was as yet under the laws and his father, when under Democratic government, now when he is tyrannized over by love, such as he rarely was when asleep, such shall he be always when awake; and from no horrid slaughter, or food, or deed of any kind, shall he abstain. But that tyrannical love within him, living without any restraint of law or government, as being sole monarch itself, shall lead on the man it possesses, as a city, to every mad attempt whence he may support himself and the crew about him; which partly enters from without from ill company, and partly through their manners and his own is become unrestrained and licentious. Or is not this the life of such a one?

Adeimantus/ It is this truly.

Socrates/ And if there be, but a few such in the city, and the rest of the multitude be sober, they go out and serve as guards to some other tyrant, or assist him for hire, if there be any war; but if they remain in peace and quiet they commit at home in the city a great many small mischief's.

Adeimantus/ Which do you mean?

Socrates/ Such as these: they steal, break houses, cut purses, strip people of their clothes, rifle temples, make people slaves; and where they can speak they sometimes turn false informers, and give false testimony, and take gifts.

Adeimantus/ You call these, small mischief's, if there be but a few such persons.

Socrates/ What is small, is small in comparison of great; and all those things, with regard to the tyrant, when compared with the wickedness and misery of the city, do not, as the saying is, come near the mark; for when there are many such in the city, and others accompanying them, and

when they perceive their own number, then these are they who through the foolishness of the people establish as tyrant the man who among them has himself most of the tyrant, and in the greatest strength within his soul.

Adeimantus/ It is probable indeed, for he shall be most tyrannical.

Socrates/ Shall he not be so, if they willingly submit to him? But if the city shall not allow him, in the same manner as he formerly used violence to his father and mother, so now again shall he chastise his country if he be able, and bringing in other young people, he shall keep and nourish under subjection to these his formerly beloved mother- and father-country, as the Cretans say? And this shall be the issue of such a man's desire.

Adeimantus/ It shall be entirely this.

Socrates/ But do not these, become such as this, first in private, and before they govern? In the first place by the company they keep, either conversing with their own flatterers, and such as are ready to minister to them in everything, or if they need anything themselves, falling down to those they converse with, they dare to assume every appearance as friends, but after they have gained their purpose, they act as enemies.

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ Thus they pass the whole of their life, never friends to anyone, but always either domineering, or enslaved to another. But liberty and true friendship the tyrannic disposition never tastes.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ May we not then rightly call these men faithless?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ And surely we may call them most of all unjust, if we have rightly agreed about justice, in our former reasonings, what it is.

Adeimantus/ But we did rightly agree.

Socrates/ Let us finish then, our worst man. He would then seem such a one awake, as we described as asleep.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And does not that man become such a one, who, being most tyrannical by natural temper, is in possession of supreme power, and the longer time he lives in tyranny, the more he becomes such a one?

Glaucon, taking up the discourse, opened with;

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And shall not the man, who appears the most wicked, appear likewise the most wretched, and he who shall tyrannize for the longest time, and in the greatest measure, shall in reality, in the greatest measure, and for the longest time, be such a one? But as many men, as many minds.

Glaucon/ Of necessity, these things at least must be so.

Socrates/ And would this tyrannic man at least differ anything, as to likeness when compared with the city under Tyranny, and the Democratic man when compared with the city under Democracy, and the same way of others?

Glaucon/ How should they?

Socrates/ As city then is in respect of city as to virtue and happiness, will not man be to man in the same way?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ What then? How is the city which is tyrannized over, in respect of that under kingly government, such as we at the first described?

Glaucon/ Quite the reverse, for the one is the best, and the other is the worst.

Socrates/ I will not ask, which you mean, for it is plain; but do you judge in the same way, or otherwise, as to their happiness and misery? And let us not be struck with admiration, whilst we regard the tyrant alone, or some few about him; but let us, as we ought to do, enter into the whole of the city, and consider it, and going through every part, and viewing it, let us declare our opinion.

Glaucon/ You propose rightly; and it is evident to everyone that there is no city more wretched than that which is under Tyranny, nor any more happy than that under regal power.

Socrates/ If now, I should propose the same things with respect to the men, should I rightly propose, whilst I account him worthy to judge about them, who is able by his understanding to enter within, and see through the temper of the man and who may not, as a child beholding the outside, be struck with admiration of tyrannical pomp, which he makes a show of to those without, but may sufficiently see through him. If then I should be of opinion that all of us ought to hear such a one, who, having dwelt with the man in the same house, and having been along with him in his actions in his family, is able to judge in what manner he behaves to each of his domestics (in which most especially one appears striped of theatrical shows), and likewise in public dangers; and after he has observed all these things, we shall bid him declare, how the Tyrant is as to happiness and misery, in comparison of others.

Glaucon/ You would advise to these things, most properly.

Socrates/ Are you willing then, that we pretend to be ourselves of the number of those who are thus able to judge, and that we have already met with such men, that we may have one who shall answer our questions?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Come then, consider in this manner. Recollect the resemblance of the city and the man to one another, and thus considering each of them apart, tell the affections of each.

Glaucon/ Which affections?

Socrates/ To begin first, with the city. Do you call the one under Tyranny either free or enslaved?

Glaucon/ Slavish, in the greatest degree possible.

Socrates/ And yet, surely, at least, you see in it masters and free men.

Glaucon/ I see, some small part so; but the whole in it, in the general, and the most excellent part, is disgracefully and miserably slavish.

Socrates/ If then the man, resembles the city, is it not necessary that there be the same regulation in him likewise, and that his soul be full of the greatest slavery and illiberality, and that these parts of his soul which are the noblest be enslaved, and that some small part which is most wicked and frantic is master.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ What now? shall you say that such a soul is slavish or free?

Glaucon/ Slavish somehow, I say.

Socrates/ But does not then the city, which is slavish and tyrannized over, least of all do what it inclines?

Glaucon/ In great measure.

Socrates/ And shall not the soul too, which is tyrannized over, least of all do what it shall incline, to speak in the general of the whole soul; but hurried violently by some stinging passion, shall be full of tumult and inconstancy?

Glaucon/ Why shall it not?

Socrates/ But whether shall the city which is tyrannized over be necessarily rich or poor?

Glaucon/ Poor.

Socrates/ And the soul under Tyranny be of necessity likewise indigent and insatiable.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But what? Must not such a city and such a man of necessity be full of fear?

Glaucon/ In great measure.

Socrates/ Do you imagine you will find more lamentations and groans and weepings and torments in any other city?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But with reference to a man, do you imagine that these things are greater in any other than in this tyrannical one, who madly rages by his desires and lusts?

Glaucon/ How can they?

Socrates/ It is then on consideration of all these things, and others such as these, I imagine, that you have deemed this city the most wretched of cities?

Glaucon/ And have I not deemed right?

Socrates/ Extremely so. But what say you again with reference to the tyrannical man, when you consider these things?

Glaucon/ That he is by far, the most wretched of all others.

Socrates/ You do not as yet say this rightly.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ I do not as yet imagine, that he is such in the greatest degree.

Glaucon/ But who then is so?

Socrates/ This one shall probably appear to you to be yet more miserable than the other.

Glaucon/ Which one?

Socrates/ He, who being naturally tyrannical, leads not a private life, but is unfortunate, and through some misfortune it is brought upon him to become a Tyrant.

Glaucon/ I conjecture, from what was formerly mentioned, that you say true.

Socrates/ It is so. But we ought not merely to conjecture about matters of such importance as these, but most thoroughly to inquire into them by reasoning of this kind: for the inquiry is concerning the most important matter, a good life and a bad.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ Consider then whether there be anything in what I say; for, in considering this question, I am of opinion we ought to perceive it from these things.

Glaucon/ From what?

Socrates/ From each particular one of private men, such of them as are rich and possess many slaves, for those have this resemblance at least of Tyrants, that they rule over many, with this difference, that the Tyrant has great numbers.

Glaucon/ There is this difference.

Socrates/ You know then that these live securely, and are not afraid of their domestics.

Glaucon/ What should they be afraid of?

Socrates/ Nothing; but do you consider the reason?

Glaucon/ Yes; it is because the whole city gives assistance to each particular private man.

Socrates/ You say right. But what now, if some God should lift some man who had fifty slaves or upwards out of

the city, both him and his wife and children, and set him down in a desert with his other substance and his domestics, where no freeman was to give him assistance, in what kind of fear, and in how great, do you imagine he would be about himself, his children and wife, lest they should be destroyed by the domestics?

Glaucon/ In the greatest possible, I imagine, for my part.

Socrates/ Would he not be obliged even to flatter some of the very slaves, and promise them many things, to set them at liberty when there was no occasion for it: and appear to be himself a flatterer of servants?

Glaucon/ He is under great necessity, to do so, or be destroyed.

Socrates/ But what, if the God should settle round him many other neighbors, who could not endure if anyone should pretend to lord it over another; but if they anywhere found such a one, should punish him with the extremest rigor.

Glaucon/ I imagine, that he would be still more in all sort of distress, thus beset with all sort of enemies.

Socrates/ And in such a prison-house is not the tyrant bound, being such by disposition, as we have mentioned, full of many and most various fears and loves of all kinds? And whilst he has in his soul the greatest desire, he alone of all in the city is neither allowed to go anywhere abroad, nor to see such things as other men are desirous of; but creeping into his house, lives mostly as a woman, envying the other citizens if any of them goes abroad and sees any good.

Glaucon/ It is entirely so.

Socrates/ And besides such evils as these, does not the man reap still more of them who, being under ill policy within himself (which you just now deemed to be the most wretched Tyranny), lives not as a private person, but

through some fortune is obliged to act the tyrant, and without holding the government of himself, attempts to govern others, as if one. with a body diseased, and unable to support itself, were obliged to lead their life not in a private way, but in wrestling and fighting against other bodies?

Glaucon/ You say, Socrates, what is altogether most likely and true.

Socrates/ Is not then, friend Glauco, this condition altogether miserable, and does not the tyrant live more miserably still than the man deemed by you to live most miserably?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ True it is then, though one may fancy otherwise, that the truly tyrannical man is truly slavish with respect to the greatest flatteries and slaveries, and is a flatterer of the most abandoned men. Nor does he ever in the smallest degree obtain the gratification of his desires, but is of all the most indigent of the most things, and appears poor indeed, if one knows how to contemplate his whole soul; and full of fear through the whole of life, being filled with anxieties and griefs, if indeed he resembles the constitution of that city which he governs. But he does resemble it, does he not?

Glaucon/ Extremely.

Socrates/ And shall we not, besides these things, likewise ascribe to this man what we formerly mentioned, that he must necessarily be, and, by governing still, become more than formerly envious, faithless, unjust, unfriendly, unholy, and a sink and breeder of all wickedness; and from all these things be most especially unhappy himself, and then render all about him unhappy likewise.

Glaucon/ No one, who has understanding will contradict you.

Socrates/ Come now, as a judge who pronounces after considering all, so do you tell me who, according to your opinion, is the first as to happiness, and who second, and the rest in order, they being five in all—the Regal, the Ambitious, the Oligarchic, the Democratic, and the Tyrannic.

Glaucon/ But the judgment, is easy; for as if I had entered among them, I judge of them as of public performers, by their virtue and vice, and by their happiness, and its contrary.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, hire a Herald? or shall I myself declare that the son of Ariston has judged the best and justest man to be the happiest (and that this is the man who has most of the regal spirit, and rules himself with a kingly power), and that the worst and the most unjust is the most wretched; and that he again happens to be the man who is most tyrannical who in the greatest degree tyrannizes over himself and the city.

Glaucon/ Let it be published by you.

Socrates/ Shall I add, whether they be unknown to be such or not both to all men and Gods?

Glaucon/ Add it.

Socrates/ Be it so, this would seem to be one proof of ours. And this, if you are of the same opinion, must be the second.

Glaucon/ Which is it?

Socrates/ Since the soul, of every individual is divided into three, in the same manner as the city was divided into three parts, it will, in my opinion, afford a second proof.

Glaucon/ Which is it?

Socrates/ It is this. Of the three parts of the soul, there appear to me to be three pleasures, one peculiar to each one; and the desires and governments are in the same manner.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ There is one part, we said, by which a man learns, and another by which he is irascible; the third is so multiform, we are unable to express it by one word peculiar to itself, but we denominated it from that which is greatest, and most impetuous in it; for we called it the concupiscible, on account of the impetuosity of the desires relative to meat, drink, and venereal pleasures, and whatever others belong to these, and we called it avaricious likewise, because it is by means of wealth most especially that such desires are accomplished.

Glaucon/ And we said rightly.

Socrates/ If then we say that its pleasure and delight are in gain, shall we not best of all reduce it under one head in our discourse, so as to express something to ourselves, when we make mention of this part of the soul, and calling it the covetous, and the desirous of gain, shall we not term it properly?

Glaucon/ So I imagine at least.

Socrates/ But what, do not we say that the irascible ought wholly to run after superiority, victory, and applause?

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ If then we term it the contentious and ambitious, shall it not be accurately expressed?

Glaucon/ Most accurately.

Socrates/ But it is evident to everyone that the part of the soul by which we learn is wholly intent always to know the truth, and as to wealth and glory, it cares for these least of all.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ When we call it then the desirous of learning and the philosophic, we shall call it according to propriety.

Glaucon/ Why shall we not?

Socrates/ And do not these, govern in souls, one of them in some, and in others another, as it happens?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ On this account then we said there were three original species of men: the philosophic, the ambitious, and the avaricious.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And that there were likewise three species of pleasures, one subject to each of these.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ You know then, that if you were to ask these three men, each of them apart, which of these lives is the most pleasant, each would most of all commend his own. And the avaricious will say, that in comparison with the pleasure of making gain, that arising from honor, or from learning, is of no value, unless one make money by them.

Glaucon/ I True.

Socrates/ And what says the ambitious? does not he deem the pleasure arising from making money a sort of burden, and likewise that arising from learning, unless learning brings him honor, does he not deem it smoke and trifling?

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ And we shall suppose the philosopher, to deem the other pleasures as nothing in comparison of that of knowing the truth, how it is, and that whilst he is always employed in learning something of this kind, he is not very remote from pleasure; but that he calls the other pleasures truly necessary, as wanting nothing of the others, but where there is a necessity for it.

Glaucon/ This, we must well understand.

Socrates/ When therefore, these several lives, and the respective pleasure of each, dispute among themselves, not with reference to living more worthily or more basely, or worse or better, but merely with reference to this, of living more pleasantly, or on the contrary more painfully, how can we know which of them speaks most conformably to truth?

Glaucon/ I am not quite able, to tell.

Socrates/ But consider it thus. By what ought we to judge of whatever is to be rightly judged of? Is it not by experience, by prudence, and by reason? Or has anyone a better criterion than these?

Glaucon/ How can he?

Socrates/ Consider now; of the three men, who is the most experienced in all the pleasures? Whether do you imagine that the avaricious man, in learning truth itself, what it is, is more experienced in the pleasure arising from knowledge than the philosopher is in that arising from making money?

Glaucon/ There is, a great difference; for the philosopher, beginning from his childhood, must of necessity taste the other pleasures; but what it is to know real beings, and how sweet this pleasure is, the lucrative man has no necessity of tasting, or of becoming experienced in, but, rather, when he uses earnest endeavors it is no easy matter.

Socrates/ The philosopher then, far surpasses the lucrative man, at least in experience of both the pleasures.

Glaucon/ Far indeed.

Socrates/ But what with reference to the ambitious man? Is he more experienced in the pleasure arising from honor than the philosopher is in that arising from knowledge?

Glaucon/ Honor, attends all of them, if they obtain each of them what they aim at; for the rich man is honored of many, and so is the brave, and the wise; so as to that of

honor, what sort of pleasure it is, all of them have the experience. But in the contemplation of being itself, what pleasure there is, it is impossible for any other but the philosopher to have tasted.

Socrates/ On account of experience then, he of all men judges the best.

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And surely, along with prudence at least, he alone becomes experienced.

Glaucon/ Why does he not?

Socrates/ But even the organ by which these pleasures must be judged is not the organ of the lucrative, nor of the ambitious, but of the philosopher.

Glaucon/ Which is it?

Socrates/ We said somewhere that they must be judged of by reason, did we not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But reasoning is chiefly the organ of the philosopher.

Glaucon/ Why is it not?

Socrates/ If then the things to be determined were best determined by riches and gain, what the lucrative man commended or despised were of necessity most agreeable to truth.

Glaucon/ Entirely.

Socrates/ And if by honor, and victory and bravery, must it not be as the ambitious and contentious man determined?

Glaucon/ It is evident.

Socrates/ But since it is by experience, and prudence, and reason?

Glaucon/ Of necessity, what the philosopher and the philologist commends must be the most true.

Socrates/ Of the three pleasures then, that is the most pleasant [which belongs to that part of the soul by which we learn most, and in whomsoever of us this part governs, his life is the most pleasant.

Glaucon/ How can it, be otherwise? For the wise man being the sovereign commender, commends his own life.

Socrates/ But which life, does our judge pronounce the second, and which the second pleasure?

Glaucon/ It is plain that of the war-like and ambitious man, for this is nearer to his own than that of the lucrative.

Socrates/ And that of the covetous, as it appears, is last of all.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ These things now have thus succeeded one another in order. And the just man has twice now overcome the unjust. The third victory now, as at the Olympic games, is sacred to Olympic Zeus, the deliverer: for consider, that the pleasure of the others is not every way genuine, but that of the wise man is, nor are they pure, but somehow colored over, as I imagine I have heard from one of the wise men. And this truly now would be the greatest and most complete downfall of the unjust.

Glaucon/ Extremely so; but how do you mean?

Socrates/ I shall thus trace it out, whilst in searching you answer my questions.

Glaucon/ Ask then.

Socrates/ Tell me then, do we not say that pain is opposite to pleasure?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And do we not say likewise, that to feel neither pleasure nor pain is somewhat?

Glaucon/ We say it is.

Socrates/ That being in the middle of both these, it is a certain tranquility of the soul with reference to them. Do you not thus understand it?

Glaucon/ Thus.

Socrates/ Do you not remember, the speeches of the sick diseased, which they utter in their sickness?

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ How that nothing is more pleasant than health, but that it escaped their notice before they became sick, that it was the most pleasant.

Glaucon/ I remember it.

Socrates/ And are you not wont to hear those who are under any acute pain say, that there is nothing more pleasant than a cessation from pain?

Glaucon/ I am wont to hear them.

Socrates/ And you may perceive in men, I imagine, the same thing, when they are in many other such like circumstances, where, when they are in pain, they extol a freedom from pain, and the tranquility of such a state, as being the most pleasant, and do not extol that of feeling joy.

Glaucon/ Because this, it is likely, becomes at that time pleasant and desirable tranquility.

Socrates/ And when anyone ceases, to feel joy, this tranquility from pleasure will be painful.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ This tranquility then, which we just now said was between the two, shall at times become each of these, pain and pleasure.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But is it truly possible that what is neither of the two should become both?

Glaucon/ I do not imagine it is.

Socrates/ And surely at least, when anything pleasant or anything painful is in the soul, both sensations are a sort of emotion; are they not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But did not that which is neither painful nor pleasant appear just now to be tranquility, and in the middle of these two?

Glaucon/ It appears so indeed.

Socrates/ How is it right, then, to deem it pleasant not to be in pain, or painful not to enjoy pleasure?

Glaucon/ It is by no means.

Socrates/ In these cases, then, tranquility is not really so, but it appears pleasant in respect of the painful, and painful in respect of the pleasant. And there is nothing genuine in these appearances as to the truth of pleasure, but a sort of imposture.

Glaucon/ As our reasoning shows.

Socrates/ Consider then, the pleasures which do not arise from the cessation of pains, that you may not frequently in the present discourse imagine, that by nature these two are universally in this manner, pleasure, the cessation of pain, and pain the cessation of pleasure.

Glaucon/ How, and which pleasures do you mean?

Socrates/ There are many others, but chiefly if you incline to consider the pleasures from smells; for these, without any preceding pain, are on a sudden immensely great, and when they cease, they leave no pain behind them.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Let us not then be persuaded that pure pleasure is the removal of pain, or pain the removal of pleasure.

Glaucon/ Let us not.

Socrates/ But yet, these which reach the soul, by means of the body, and which are called pleasures, the greatest part of them almost, and the most considerable, are of this species, certain cessations of pain.

Glaucon/ They are so.

Socrates/ And are not the pre-conceptions of pleasure and pain, which arise in the mind from the foresight of these things, of the same kind?

Glaucon/ Of the same.

Socrates/ Do you know then, what kind they are of, and what they chiefly resemble?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Do you reckon, there is any such thing in nature as this, the above, the below, and the middle?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you imagine then, that anyone when he is brought from the below to the middle, imagines anything else than that he is brought to the above, and when he stands in the middle, and looks down whence he was brought, will he imagine he is anywhere else but in the above, whilst yet he has not seen the true above?

Glaucon/ Truly, I do not think that such an one will imagine otherwise.

Socrates/ But if he should again, be carried to the below, he would imagine he was carried to the below, and would imagine according to truth.

Glaucon/ Why would he not?

Socrates/ Would he not be effected in all these respects, from his not having experience in what is really above, and in the middle, and below?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ Should you wonder then that whilst men are inexperienced in the truth, they have unsound opinions about many other things, and that as to pleasure and pain, and what is between these, they are likewise affected in this same manner? So that even when they are brought to what is painful, they imagine truly, and are truly pained; but when from pain they are brought to the middle, they strongly imagine that they are arrived at fullness of pleasure. In the same manner as these who along with the black color look at the grey, through inexperience of the white, are deceived; so those who consider pain along with a freedom from pain, are deceived through inexperience of pleasure.

Glaucon/ Truly, I should not wonder, but much rather if it were not so.

Socrates/ But consider it at least, in this manner. Are not hunger and thirst, and such like, certain emptinesses in the bodily habit?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ And is not ignorance and folly an emptiness in the habit of the soul?

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And is not the one filled when it receives food, and the other when it has intelligence?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But which is the more real repletion, that of the less, or that of the more real existence?

Glaucon/ It is plain that of the more real.

Socrates/ Which species, then, do you imagine participates most of a more pure substance; whether these which participate of bread and drink, and meat, and all such sort of nourishment; or that species which participates of true opinion, and knowledge, and intelligence, and in general, of all virtue? And judge of it in this manner. That which resides in that which is always alike, and immortal, and true, and is so itself, and arises in what is such, does it appear to you to exist more really than that which resides in what is never alike, and mortal, is so itself, and arises in what is such?

Glaucon/ This, differs much from that which is always alike.

Socrates/ Does then the essence of that which is always alike participate any more of essence than of science?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But what with relation to truth?

Glaucon/ Nor of this neither.

Socrates/ If it participate less of truth, does it not likewise do so of essence?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ In general then, do not the species relating to the care of the body participate less of truth and essence than the species relating to the care of the soul?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And the body less than the soul; do you not think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Is not that which is filled with more real beings, and is itself a more real being, in reality more truly filled than that which is filled with less real beings, and is itself a less real being?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ If then it be pleasant to be filled with what is suitable to nature, that which is in reality filled, and with more real being, must be made both more really and more truly to enjoy true pleasure; but that which participates of less real being must be less truly and solidly filled, and participates of a more uncertain and less genuine pleasure.

Glaucon/ Most necessarily.

Socrates/ Such then as are unacquainted with wisdom and virtue, and are always conversant in feastings and such like, are carried as it appears to the below, and back again to the middle, and there they wander for life. But never at all,! getting beyond this, do they look towards the true above, nor are carried to it, nor are they ever really filled with real being, nor have they ever tasted solid and pure pleasure, but after the manner of brutes looking always downwards, and bowed towards earth and their tables,! they live feeding and coupling, and from a lust of these things, kicking and pushing at one another with iron horns and hoofs, they perish through their insatiableness, as those who are filling with unreal being that which is no real being, nor friendly to themselves.

Glaucon/ You ‘pronounce most perfectly, Socrates, as from an oracle, the life of the multitude.

Socrates/ Must they not then, of necessity, be conversant in pleasures mixed with pains, images of the true pleasure, painted over, and colored by their position beside one another, hence both their pleasures and pains appear vehement, and engender their mad passions in the foolish. Hence also they must fight about these things, as Stesichorus says those at Troy fought about the image of Helen, through ignorance of the true one.

Glaucon/ Of necessity, the matter must be something of this kind.

Socrates/ And what as to the irascible part of the soul? Must not other such like things happen wherever anyone gratifies it, either in the way of envy through ambition, or in the way of violence through contentiousness, or in the way of anger through moroseness, pursuing after a glut of honor, of conquest, and of anger, both without reason and without intelligence?

Glaucon/ Such things as these, must necessarily happen with reference to this part of the mind.

Socrates/ What then, shall we boldly say concerning all the Measures, both respecting the avaricious and the ambitious part, that such of them as are obedient to intelligence and reason, and along with these follow after and obtain the pleasures to which wisdom points, shall obtain he truest pleasures, as far as it is possible for them to attain true pleasure, and in as much as they follow truth, Measures which are properly their own, if indeed what is best for everyone be most properly his own? But surely it is most properly, his own at least. When then the whole soul is obedient to the philosophic part and there is no sedition in it, then every part in other respects does its proper business and is just, and also reaps is own pleasures, and such as are the best and as far as is possible the most true.

Glaucon/ Certainly, indeed.

Socrates/ But when any of the others governs, it happens that it neither attains its own pleasures, and it obliges the other parts to pursue a pleasure foreign to them, and not at all true.

Glaucon/ It does so.

Socrates/ Do not then the parts which are the most remote from philosophy and reason most especially effectuate such things?

Glaucon/ Extremely.

Socrates/ And is not that which is most remote from law and order, likewise most remote from reason?

Glaucon/ It plainly is.

Socrates/ And have not the amorous and the tyrannical desires appeared to be most remote from law and order?

Glaucon/ Extremely.

Socrates/ And the royal and the moderate ones, the least remote?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ The tyrant then, I imagine, shall be the most remote from true pleasure, and such as is most properly his own, and the other shall be the least.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And the tyrant, shall lead a life the most unpleasant, and the king the most pleasant one.

Glaucon/ Of great necessity.

Socrates/ Do you know then, how much more unpleasant a life the tyrant leads than the king?

Glaucon/ If you tell me.

Socrates/ As there are three pleasures, as it appears, one genuine, and two illegitimate, the Tyrant in carrying the illegitimate to extremity, and flying from law and reason, dwells with slavish pleasure as his life-guards, and how far he is inferior, is not easily to be told, unless it may be done in this manner.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ The Tyrant is somehow the third remote from the Oligarchic; for the Democratic was in the middle between them.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does he not then dwell with the third image of pleasure, distant from him with reference to truth, if our former reasonings be true?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But the Oligarchic is the third again from the Royal, if we suppose the Aristocratic and the Royal the same.

Glaucon/ He is the third.

Socrates/ The Tyrant then, is remote from true pleasure, the third from the third.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ A plain surface then, may be the image of tyrannical pleasure, as to the computation of length.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But as to power, and the third augment, it is manifest, by how great a distance it is remote.

Glaucon/ It is manifest, to the computer at least.

Socrates/ If now, conversely, one shall say the King is distant from the Tyrant as to truth of pleasure, as much as and are distant from, shall he not, on completing the multiplication, find him leading the more pleasant life, and the Tyrant the more wretched one by this same distance?

Glaucon/ You have heaped up, a prodigious account of the difference between these two men, the just and the unjust,; with reference to pleasure and pain.

Socrates/ Yet the numbers are true, and corresponding to their lives, if indeed days, and nights, and months, and years, correspond to them.

Glaucon/ But these, do correspond to them.

Socrates/ If then the good and just man surpasses so far the evil and unjust man in pleasure, in what a prodigious degree further shall he surpass him in decorum of life, in beauty and in virtue?

Glaucon/ In a prodigious degree, truly.

Socrates/ Be it so. Since now we are come to this part of our argument, let us recapitulate what we first said, on account of which we have come hither: and it was somewhere said that it was advantageous to do injustice, if one were completely unjust but were reputed just. Was it not so said?

Glaucon/ It was indeed.

Socrates/ Now then, let us settle this point, since we have now settled the other with reference to acting justly and unjustly, what power each of these has in itself.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Let us in our reasoning make a resemblance of the soul, that the man who said those things may know what he said.

Glaucon/ What kind of resemblance?

Socrates/ One of those creatures, which are fabled to have been of old, as that of Chimaera, of Scylla, of Cerberus, and many others are spoken of, where many particular natures existed together in one.

Glaucon/ They are spoken of indeed.

Socrates/ Form now one figure of a creature, various and many-headed, having all around heads of tame creatures and of wild, and having power in itself of changing all these heads, and of breeding them out of itself.

Glaucon/ This is the work, of a curious former; however, as the formation is easier in reasoning than in wax and such like, let it be formed.

Socrates/ Let there be now one other figure of a lion, and one of a man, but let the first be by far the greatest, and the second be the second in bulk.

Glaucon/ These are easy, and they are formed.

Socrates/ Conjoin now these three in one, so as to exist somehow with one another.

Glaucon/ They are conjoined.

Socrates/ Form now around them the external appearance of one of them, that of the man, so that to one who is not able to see what is within, but who perceives only the external covering, the man may appear one creature.

Glaucon/ This is formed around.

Socrates/ Let us now tell him who says that it is profitable to this man to do injustice, but to do justice is unprofitable, that he says nothing else than that it is profitable for him to feast the multiform creature, and to make it strong; and likewise the lion, and what respects the lion, whilst the man he kills with famine, and renders weak, so as to be dragged whichever way either of those drag him, and never accustom the one to live in harmony with the other, nor to make them friends, but to suffer them to be biting one another, and to fight and devour one another.

Glaucon/ He, who commends the doing injustice says undoubtedly these things.

Socrates/ And does not he again who says it is profitable to do justice say that he ought to do and to say such things by which the inner man shall come to have the most entire command of the man, and, as a tiller of the ground, shall take care of the many-headed creature, cherishing the mild ones, and nourishing them, and hindering the wild ones to grow up, taking the nature of the Lyon as his ally, and having a common care for all, make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so nourish them?

Glaucon/ He who commends justice undoubtedly says such things as these.

Socrates/ In all respects then, he who commends justice would seem to speak the truth, but he who commends injustice to speak what is false; for with regard both to pleasure, and applause, and profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, and he who discommends it speaks nothing genuine. Nor does he discommend with understanding what he discommends.

Glaucon/ Not at all, as appears to me at least.

Socrates/ Let us then in a mild manner persuade him (for it is not willingly he errs), asking him, happy man, do not we say that the maxims of good and evil become so upon such accounts as these? These are good which subject the brutal part of our nature most to the human, or rather to the divine, but these evil which enslave the mild part of our nature to the brutal. Shall he agree with us? or how?

Glaucon/ He shall, if he be advised by me.

Socrates/ Is there then, anyone whom it avails, by this reasoning, to take gold unjustly, if something of this kind happens, if whilst he takes the money he at the same time subjects the best part of himself to the worst; or if, taking gold, he should enslave a son or daughter, and that even to savage and wicked men, this would not avail him, no, though he should receive for it a prodigious sum? But if he enslaves the most divine part of himself to the most unhallowed and most polluted part, without any pity, is he not wretched, and takes a gift of gold to his far more dreadful ruin than Euriphyle did when she received the necklace for her husband's life?

Glaucon/ By far, for I will answer you for the man.

Socrates/ And do you not imagine that to be intemperate, has of old been discommended on such accounts as these,

because that in such a one that terrible, that great and multiform beast was indulged more than was meet?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And are not arrogance and moroseness blamed, when the lion and the serpentine disposition increase and stretches beyond measure?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And are not luxury and effeminacy blamed because of the remissness and looseness of this disposition, when it engenders in the man cowardice?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ Are not flattery and illiberality blamed, when anyone makes this irascible part itself subject to the brutal crew, and for the sake of wealth and its insatiable lust, accustoms the irascible to be affronted from its youth, and instead of a lion to become an ape?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But why is it, do you imagine, that bodily toil and handicrafts are despicable? Shall we say it is on any other account than this, that when one has the best part of his constitution naturally weak, so as not to be able to govern the creatures within himself, but to minister to them, he is able only to learn what flatters them?

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ In order then that such a one may be governed in the same manner as the best man is, do we not say that he must be the servant of one who is the best, and who has within him the divine governor? not at all imagining that he should be governed to the hurt of the subject (as Thrasymachus imagined), but as it is best for everyone to be governed by one divine and wise, most especially having it of his own within him, if not subjecting himself to it without;

that as far as possible we may all resemble one another and be friends, governed by one and the same?

Glaucon/ Rightly indeed.

Socrates/ And law at least, plainly shows it intends such a thing, being an ally to all in the city, as does likewise the government of children, in not allowing them to be free 'till we establish in them a proper government, as in a city; and having cultivated that in them which is best, by [that which is best in ourselves, we establish a similar guardian and governor for youth, and then truly we set it free.

Glaucon/ It shows indeed.

Socrates/ In what way then shall we say, Glauco, and according to what reasoning, that it is profitable to do injustice, to be intemperate, or do anything base, by which a man shall indeed become more wicked, but yet shall acquire more wealth, or any kind of power?

Glaucon/ In no way.

Socrates/ But how shall we say it is profitable for the unjust to be concealed, and not to suffer punishment? or does he not indeed, who is concealed, still become more wicked? but he who is not concealed, and is punished, has the brutal part quieted and made mild, and the mild part set at liberty. And the whole soul being settled in the best temper, in possessing temperance and justice, with wisdom, acquires a more valuable habit than the body does in acquiring vigor and beauty, with a sound constitution, in as far as the soul is more valuable than the body.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Shall not everyone then, who has understanding at least, regulate his life in bending the whole of his powers hither, in the first place, in honoring those pieces of learning which will render his soul of this kind, and despising all other things?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And next, with reference to a good habit of body and its nourishment, he will spend his life in attention to these, not that he may indulge the brutal and irrational pleasure, nor yet with a view to health, nor principally regarding this, to become strong, and healthy, and beautiful, unless by means of these he is to become temperate likewise; but he always appears to adjust the harmony of the body for the sake of the symphony which is in the soul.

Glaucon/ By all means, if indeed he is to be truly musical.

Socrates/ That arrangement then, and symphony arising from the possession of wealth, and that vulgar magnificence, he will not, struck with admiration of the felicity of the multitude, increase to infinity, and bring on himself infinite evils.

Glaucon/ I do not think it.

Socrates/ But having an eye, to that polity within himself, and taking care that nothing there be moved out of its 'place, through the greatness or smallness of his substance, governing in this manner as far as he is able, he will add to his substance, and spend out of it.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ He will regard honors likewise in the same manner; some he will willingly partake of and taste, which he judges will render him a better man, but those which he imagines would dissolve that habit of soul which subsists within him, he will fly from, both in private and in public.

Glaucon/ He shall not then, be willing to act in polities, if he take care of this.

Socrates/ Yes, truly, in his own city, and greatly too. But not probably in his country, unless some divine fortune befall him.

Glaucon/ I understand. You mean in the city we have now established, which exists in our reasoning, since it is nowhere on earth, at least, as I imagine.

Socrates/ But in heaven, probably, there is a model of it, for anyone who inclines to contemplate it, and on contemplating to regulate himself accordingly; and it is no matter to him whether it does exist anywhere, or shall ever exist here. He does the duties of this one alone, and of no other.

Glaucon/ It is reasonable.

THE END OF THE NINTH BOOK

The Tenth Book

Socrates/ I observe, with reference to many other things, that we have established a city in a right manner, beyond what all others have done, and among these establishments I mean that respecting poesy as none of the least.

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ That no part of it which is imitative be by any means admitted. For it appears, now most of all and with greatest perspicuity, that it is not to be admitted, after that the several principles of the soul have been distinguished apart from one another.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ To tell it as to you (for you will not accuse me to the composers of tragedy, and the rest of the imitative kind), all such things as these seem to be the ruin of the understanding of the hearers; such of them as have not a medicine to enable them to discern what kind they are of.

Glaucon/ From what consideration, do you say so?

Socrates/ It must be spoken, although a certain friendship, at least, and reverence for Homer, which I have had from my childhood, restrains me from telling it; for he seems truly both to have been the first teacher and leader of all these good composers of tragedy: but the man must not be honored preferably to the truth. But what I mean must be spoken.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Hear me then, or rather answer me.

Glaucon/ Ask.

Socrates/ Can you tell me perfectly what at all imitation is? for I do not myself altogether understand what it means?

Glaucon/ And shall I then anyhow understand it?

Socrates/ That would be no way strange, since those who are dim-sighted perceive many things sooner than those who see more clearly.

Glaucon/ The case is so; but whilst you are present, I should not be able to adventure to tell, even though something did appear to me. But consider it yourself.

Socrates/ Do you incline then that we hence begin our inquiry in our usual method: for we were wont to suppose a certain species with respect to many individuals, to which we give the same name; or do you not understand me?

Glaucon/ I understand.

Socrates/ Let us suppose now of the many, which you choose; as for example, there are many beds and tables, if you incline.

Glaucon/ Why are there not?

Socrates/ But the ideas, at least, respecting these pieces of furniture are two; one of bed, and one of table.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are we not wont to say that the workmen of each of these pieces of furniture, looking towards the idea, make in this manner, the one the beds, and the other the tables which we use? and all other things after the same manner. For no one of the artists makes, at least, the idea itself; for how can he?

Glaucon/ In no way.

Socrates/ But see now whether you call such a one as this an artist? Which one. One who does all things, whatever each particular mechanic does.

Glaucon/ You mention some dexterous and wonderful man.

Socrates/ Not yet, at least, but you will much more say so presently; for this same mechanic is not only able to make

all sorts of utensils, but he makes also everything which springs from the earth, and he makes all sorts of animals, himself, as well as others; and besides these things, he makes the earth, and heaven, and the Gods, and all things in heaven and in the world below.

Glaucon/ You mention, quite a wonderful sophist.

Socrates/ You do not believe me? But tell me, do you imagine there is no such artist at all? or that, in one respect he is the maker of all these things, and in another he is not? Or do you not perceive that even you yourself might be able to make all these things, in a certain manner at least?

Glaucon/ And what, is this manner?

Socrates/ 'Tis no difficult manner, but is many ways and Quickly performed; but in the quickest manner of all, if you choose to take a mirror and carry it round everywhere, you shall quickly make the sun, and the things in the heavens, quickly the earth, quickly yourself, and the other animals, and utensils, and vegetables, and all that was now mentioned.

Glaucon/ Yes, the appearances, but not however the real things at least.

Socrates/ You come well, and seasonably, with your remark; for I imagine that the painter too is one of these artists. Is he not?

Glaucon/ Why is not he?

Socrates/ But you will say, I imagine, that he does not make genuine what he makes, although the painter too, in a certain manner, at least, makes a bed, does he not?

Glaucon/ Yes, he too makes only the appearance.

Socrates/ But what with reference to the bed-maker? Did you not indeed say just now that he does not make the

species which we say exists, which is bed, but a particular bed?

Glaucon/ I said so indeed.

Socrates/ If then he does not make that which is, he does not make real being, but some such thing as being, but not being itself; but if anyone would say, that the work of a bed-maker, or of any other handicraft, were real being, he would seem not to say true.

Glaucon/ He would, as it would appear at least to those who are conversant in such kind of reasonings.

Socrates/ Let us not then at all wonder if this likewise happen to be somewhat obscure with reference to the truth.

Glaucon/ Let us not.

Socrates/ Do you incline then, that with reference to these very things we inquire concerning the imitator who he really is.

Glaucon/ If you incline.

Socrates/ Are there not then these three sorts of beds? One which exists in nature, and which we may say, as I imagine, God made, or who else?

Glaucon/ None, I imagine.

Socrates/ And one at least which the joiner makes.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And one which the painter makes. Is it not so?

Glaucon/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Now the painter, the bed-maker, God, these three preside over three species of beds.

Glaucon/ They are three indeed.

Socrates/ But God, whether it were that he did not incline it, or whether there was some necessity for it that he should not make but one bed in nature, made this one only, which

is really bed; but two such, or more, have never been produced by God, nor ever will be produced.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Because, if he had made but two, one again there would have appeared, the species of which both these two would have partaken of, and that species would be that which is bed, and not those two.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ God then knowing these things, as I imagine, and willing to be the maker of bed, really, and really existing, but not of any particular bed, nor to be any particular bed-maker, produced but one in nature.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Do you incline then that we call him the creator of this one, or something of this kind?

Glaucon/ It is just in reason, since he has, in their nature, made both this and all other things.

Socrates/ But what as to the joiner? Is not he the workman of a bed?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is the painter too, the workman and maker of such a work?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But what will you say he is with relation to bed?

Glaucon/ This, as I imagine, we may most reasonably call him: the imitator of what these are the workmen.

Socrates/ Be it so. You call him then the imitator who makes what is generated the third from nature?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And this the composer of tragedy shall be likewise, since he is an imitator, rising as a sort of third from

the King and the truth, and in like manner all other imitators.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ We have agreed then as to the imitator. But tell me this concerning the painter. Whether do you imagine he undertakes to imitate each particular thing in nature, or the works of artists?

Glaucon/ The works of artists.

Socrates/ Whether such as they really are, or such as they appear? Determine this further.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ Thus: Does a bed differ anything from itself, whether he view it obliquely, or directly opposite, or in any particular position? or does it differ nothing, but only appears different? And in the same way as to other things?

Glaucon/ Thus, it appears, but differs nothing.

Socrates/ Consider this too: with reference to which of the two does painting work, in each particular work? whether with reference to real being, to imitate it as it really is, or with reference to what is apparent, as it appears? and whether is it the imitation of appearance or of truth?

Glaucon/ Of appearance.

Socrates/ The imitative art, then, is far from the truth; and on this account, it seems, he is able to make these things, because he is able to attain but to some small part of each particular, and that but an image. Thus we say that a painter shall paint us a shoemaker, a joiner, and other artists, though he be skilled in none of those arts; yet he shall be able to deceive children and ignorant people, if he be a good painter, when he paints a joiner, and shows him at a distance, so far as to make them imagine he is a real joiner.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But this, I imagine, friend, we must consider with reference to all these things; that-when anyone tells us of such a painter, that he has met with a man who is skilled in all manner of workmanship, and everything else which every several artist understands, and that there is nothing which he does not understand more accurately than anyone else, we ought to reply to such a one that he is a simple man, and that it seems, having met with some impostor and mimic, he has been deceived; so that he has appeared to him to know everything, from his own incapacity to distinguish between science, and ignorance, and imitation.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Ought we not then, in the next place, to consider tragedy, and its leader, Homer, since we hear from some that these poets understand all arts, and all human affairs respecting virtue and vice, and likewise all divine things, for a good poet must of necessity compose with knowledge, if he means to compose well what he composes, else he is not able to compose. It behooves us then to consider whether these who have met with those imitators have been deceived, and on viewing their works have not perceived that they are the third distant from real being, and that their works are such as can easily be made by one who knows not the truth (for they are phantoms they make, and not real beings); or whether they do say somewhat, and that the good poets in reality have knowledge in these things which they seem to the multitude elegantly to express.

Glaucon/ By all means, this is to be inquired into.

Socrates/ Do you imagine then, that if anyone were able to make both of these, that which is imitated and likewise the image, he would allow himself seriously to apply to the

workmanship of the images, and propose this to himself as the best thing in life?

Glaucon/ I do not.

Socrates/ But if he were in reality intelligent in these things which he imitates, he would far rather, I imagine, seriously apply himself to the things than to the imitations, and would endeavor to leave behind him many and beautiful actions, as monuments of himself, and would study rather to be himself the person commended than the commender.

Glaucon/ I imagine so; for neither is the honor nor the profit equal.

Socrates/ As to other things then, let us not call them to account, asking Homer or any other of the poets whether any of them were any way skilled in medicine, and not an imitator only of medical discourses; for which of the ancient or latter poets is said to have recovered any to health, as Aesculapius did? or what students in medicine has any left behind him, as he did his descendants? Nor let us ask them concerning the other arts, but let them alone: but with reference to those greatest and most noble things which Homer attempts to speak of, with reference to wars, and armies, and constitutions of cities, and the education belonging to men, it is just, somehow, to question him, whilst we demand of him: Friend Homer, if you be not the third from the truth with regard to virtue, being the workman of an image (which we have defined an imitator to be), but art the second, and art able to discern what pursuits render men better or worse, both in private and public, tell us which of the cities has been by you better constituted, as Lacedaemon was by Lycurgus, and many other both great and small cities by many others? But what city acknowledges you to have been a good lawgiver, and to have been of advantage to them? Italy and Sicily acknowledge

Charondas, and we Solon; but shall anyone acknowledge you as anything?

Glaucon/ I fancy not. It is not then pretended even by the Homerics themselves.

Socrates/ But. what war in Homer's days is recorded to have been well conducted by him as leader or counselor?

Glaucon/ Not one.

Socrates/ But what are his discoveries? as among the works of a wise man there are many discoveries and inventions spoken of respecting the arts and other affairs—as of Thales the Milesian, and of Anacharsis the Scythian?

Glaucon/ By no means is there any such thing.

Socrates/ But if not in a public manner, is Homer said to have lived as a private tutor to any, who delighted in his conversation, and have delivered down to posterity a certain Homeric manner of life, in like manner as Pythagoras was remarkably beloved on this account, and even to this day such as denominate themselves from the Pythagorean manner of life appear to be somehow, eminent beyond others?

Glaucon/ Neither is there, anything of this kind related of Homer. For flesh-lover Creaphilus, Socrates, the companion of Homer, may probably appear more ridiculous still in his education than in his name, if what is said of Homer be true. For it is said that he was greatly neglected when he lived under Homer's tuition.

Socrates/ It is said indeed. But do you imagine, Glauco, that if Homer had been able to educate men and to render them better, as being capable not only to imitate with respect to these matters, but to understand them, would he not then have procured himself many companions, and have been honored and beloved by them? But Protagoras the Abderite, and Prodicus the Chian, and many others are able to

persuade the men of their times, conversing with them privately, that they shall neither be able to govern their family, nor yet their city, unless they themselves shall preside over their education; and for this wisdom of theirs they are so exceedingly beloved, that their companions almost carry them about on their heads. Would then the men of Homer's time have left him or Hesiod to go about singing their songs, if he had been able to profit men in the way of virtue, and not rather have retained him with gold, and obliged him to stay with them? or, if they could not persuade him, they would as scholars have followed him everywhere, 'till they had got sufficient education?

Glaucon/ You seem to me, Socrates, to say perfectly right.

Socrates/ Shall we not then establish this point: That all the poetical men, beginning with Homer, are imitators of the images of virtue, and of other things about which they compose, but that they do not attain to the truth? but as we just now said, a painter who himself knows nothing about the making of shoes, shall draw a shoemaker, who shall appear to be real to such as are not intelligent, but who view according to the color and figures?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ In the same manner, I imagine, we shall say that the poet colors over with his names and words certain colors of the several arts, whilst he understands nothing himself, but merely imitates, so as to others such as himself who view things in his compositions, he appears to have knowledge; and if he say anything about shoe-making in measure, number, and harmony, he seems to say quite well, and in like manner if of an expedition, or of anything else, so great an enchantment have these things naturally—since you know, I imagine, in what manner poetical things appear

when stript of musical coloring, and expressed apart by themselves, for you have somewhere beheld it.

Glaucon/ I have.

Socrates/ Do they not, resemble the faces of people who are in their prime, but who are not beautiful, such as they appear when their bloom forsakes them?

Glaucon/ Entirely.

Socrates/ Come now, and consider this. The maker of the image, whom we call imitator, knows nothing of real being, but only of the apparent. Is it not so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us not then leave it expressed by halves, but let us sufficiently perceive it.

Glaucon/ Say on.

Socrates/ A painter, we say, shall paint reins and a bit.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the leather-cutter and the smith shall make them.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Does then the painter understand what kind of reins and bit there ought to be, or not even he who makes them, the smith nor the leather-cutter, but he who understands to use them, the horseman alone?

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Shall we not say it is so in everything else?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ That with reference to each particular thing, there are these three arts—that which is to use it, that which is to make it, and that which is to imitate it?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is then the virtue, and the beauty, and the rectitude of every utensil, and animal, and action for nothing else but for the use for which each particular was made or generated?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Of all necessity then, he who uses each particular must be the most skillful, and be able to tell the maker what he makes good or bad, with reference to the use in which he uses it. Thus, for example, a player on the pipe tells the pipe-maker concerning pipes, what things are of service towards the playing on the pipe, and he shall give orders how he ought to make them, but the work-man does not so.

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ Does not the one then being intelligent, pronounce concerning good and bad pipes, and the other, believing him, make accordingly.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ With reference then to one and the same instrument, the maker shall have right opinion concerning its excellence or naughtiness, whilst he is conversant with one who is intelligent, and is obliged to hear from the intelligent; but he who uses it shall have science.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But whether shall the imitator have intelligence from using the things he paints, whether they be handsome and right, or otherwise; or shall he have right opinion from his being necessarily conversant with the intelligent, and from being enjoined in what manner he ought to paint?

Glaucon/ Neither of the two.

Socrates/ The imitator then shall have neither knowledge nor right opinion about what he imitates, with reference to excellence or naughtiness.

Glaucon/ It appears not.

Socrates/ The imitator then should be very agreeable in his imitation, with regard to wisdom concerning what he paints.

Glaucon/ Not entirely.

Socrates/ But, however, he will imitate at least, without knowing concerning each particular in what respect it is ill or good; but it is likely, such as appears to be beautiful to the multitude and those who know nothing, that he shall imitate.

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ We have now indeed sufficiently, as it appears at least, settled these things: that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning in those things which he imitates, but that imitation is a sort of amusement, and not a serious affair; and likewise, that those who apply to tragic poetry in iambics and heroics are all imitators in the highest degree.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But certainly, this of imitation, is it not somehow in the third degree from the truth? Is it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ To what part then of man bears it a reference, having the power it has?

Glaucon/ What part do you speak of?

Socrates/ Of such as this. The same magnitude, perceived by sight, does not appear in the same manner near at hand and at a distance.

Glaucon/ It does not.

Socrates/ And the same things appear crooked and straight, when we look at them in water and out of water, and concave and convex, through the mistake of the sight as to colors; all this disturbance is manifest in the soul. And this infirmity of our nature painting lays hold of and leaves nothing of imposture undone, in the same way as magic does, and many other arts of this kind.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And have not the arts of measuring, numbering and weighing appeared to be most ingenious helps in these things, that so the apparent greater or less, the apparent more or heavier, may not govern us, but the numbered, the measured, and the weighed?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ But this again is at least the work of the rational part in the soul.

Glaucon/ It is so indeed.

Socrates/ But whilst reason often measures and declares some things to be greater or less than other things, or equal, the contrary appears at the same time with reference to these things.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But did not we say that it was impossible for - the same person to have contrary opinions about the same things at the same time?

Glaucon/ And thus far at least we said rightly.

Socrates/ That part of the soul, then, which judges contrary to the measure, would seem not to be the same with that; which judges according to the measure.

Glaucon/ It would not.

Socrates/ But surely at least that which trusts to measure and computation would seem to be the best part of the soul.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ That then which opposes itself to it would seem to be some of the naughty parts of us.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ It was then this I inclined should be agreed upon, when I said that painting, and imitation in general, being far from the truth, delight in their own work, conversing with that part in us which is far from wisdom, and are its companion and friend, to no sound nor genuine purpose.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Imitation then, being naughty in itself, and joining with that which is naughty, generates naughty things.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Whether, is the case thus, with reference to the imitation which is by the sight only, or is it likewise so with reference to that by hearing, which we call poetry?

Glaucon/ Likely as to this also.

Socrates/ We shall not therefore, trust to the appearance in painting, but we shall proceed to the consideration of that part of the intellect with which the imitation by poetry is conversant, and see whether it is naughty or valuable.

Glaucon/ It must be done.

Socrates/ Let us proceed then thus. Poetic imitation, we say, imitates men acting either voluntarily or involuntarily, and imagining that in their acting they have done either well or ill, and in all these cases, receiving either pain or pleasure. Does it any more than this?

Glaucon/ No more.

Socrates/ In all these, now, does the man agree with himself, or, as he disagreed with reference to sight, and had contrary opinions in himself of the same things at one and the same time, does he in the same manner disagree likewise in his actions, and fight with himself? But I recollect that there is no occasion for us to settle this at least; for in our reasonings above we sufficiently settled all these things, that our soul is full of a thousand such contrarieties existing in it.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Right, truly, but it appears to me necessary to go over now what was then omitted.

Glaucon/ As what?

Socrates/ We said somewhere formerly, that a good man when he meets with such a fortune as the loss of a son, or I of anything else, which he values the most, will bear it of all men the easiest.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But let us now consider this further, whether will he grieve none at all, or is this indeed impossible, but he will, however, moderate his grief?

Glaucon/ The truth, is rather this last.

Socrates/ But tell me this now concerning him, whether do you imagine that he will struggle more with grief and oppose it, when he is observed by his equals, or when he is in solitude, alone by himself?

Glaucon/ Much more, when he is observed.

Socrates/ But when alone he will venture, I imagine, to utter many things which, if anyone heard him, he would be ashamed of, and he will do many things which he would not wish anyone saw him doing.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ Is it not then reason and law which command him to restrain his grief, but what drags him to grief is the passion itself?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ As then there is in the man an opposite conduct with regard to the same thing, at one and the same time, we must necessarily say that he has two conductors.

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ And shall we not say that one of them is ready to obey the law wherever law leads him?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Law in a manner says that it is best in misfortunes to have the greatest tranquility possible, and not to bear them ill; since the good and evil of such things as these is not manifest, and since no advantage follows the bearing these things ill, and as nothing of human affairs is worthy of great concern, and besides their grief proves a hindrance to that in them which we ought to have most at hand.

Glaucon/ What is it, you speak of?

Socrates/ To deliberate, on the event, and as on a throw of the dice, to regulate his affairs according to what casts up, in whatever way reason shall declare to be best. And not as children when they fall, to lye still and waste the time in crying, but always to accustom the soul to apply in the speediest manner to heal and rectify what was fallen and sick, dismissing lamentation.

Glaucon/ One would thus, behave in the best manner in every condition.

Socrates/ And did not we say that the best part is willing to follow this which is rational?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And shall not we say that the part which leads to the remembrance of the affliction, and to wailings, and is insatiably given to these, is irrational and idle, and a friend to cowardice?

Glaucon/ We shall say so truly.

Socrates/ Is not then the grieving part that which admits of much and of various imitation? But the prudent and tranquil part, which is always uniform with itself, is neither easily imitated, nor when imitated, easily understood, especially by a popular assembly, where all sorts of men are assembled together in a theatre? For it is the imitation of a disposition which is foreign to them.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ It is plain then that the imitative poet is not made at least for such a part of the soul as this. Nor is his skill fitted to please it, if he mean to gain the applause of the multitude; but he applies to the passionate and the multiform part, as it is easily imitated.

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ May we not then, with justice, lay hold of the imitative poet and place him as correspondent to the painter; for he resembles him, both in that, as to truth, he does but naughty things, and in this too he resembles him, in being conversant with a different part of the soul from that which is best. And thus we may with justice not admit him into our city, which is to be well regulated, because he excites and nourishes this part of the soul, and strengthening it, destroys the rational; as, when one in a city makes the wicked powerful, he betrays the city and destroys the best men, in the same manner we shall say that the imitative poet establishes a bad republic in the soul of each individual, gratifying the foolish part of it, which neither discerns what

is great nor what is little, but deems the same things sometimes great and sometimes small, forming little images in its own imagination, altogether remote from the truth.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But we have not, however, as yet at least, brought the greatest accusation against it, for that is, somehow, a very dreadful one: that it is able to corrupt even the good, if it be not a very few excepted.

Glaucon/ Why will it not, since it acts in this manner?

Socrates/ But hear now, and consider; for somehow, the best of us, when we hear Homer, or any of the tragic writers imitating some of the heroes when in grief, pouring forth long speeches in their sorrow, bewailing and beating their breasts, you know we are delighted, and yielding ourselves, we follow along and sympathizing with them, we seriously commend him as an able poet, whoever most affects us in this manner.

Glaucon/ I know it.

Socrates/ Why do you not? But when any domestic grief befalls any of us, you perceive, on the other hand, that we value ourselves on the opposite behavior, if we can be quiet and endure, this being the part of a man, but that of a woman, which in the other case we commended.

Glaucon/ I perceive it.

Socrates/ Is this commendation then, a handsome one, when we see such a man as one would not deign to be one's self, but would be ashamed of, not to abominate but to delight in him, and commend him?

Glaucon/ No, truly; it appears unreasonable.

Socrates/ Certainly, if you consider it at least in this manner.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ If you consider that the part of us, which in our private misfortunes is forcibly restrained, and is kept from weeping and bewailing to the full, being by nature of such a kind as is desirous of these, is the very part which is by the poets filled and gratified; but that part in us which is naturally the best, being not sufficiently instructed, neither by season nor habit, grows remiss in its guardianship over the bewailing part, by attending to the sufferings of others, and deems it no way disgraceful to itself to commend and pity one who grieves immoderately, whilst he professes to be a good man. But this it thinks it gains, even pleasure, which it would not choose to be deprived of, by despising the whole of the poem. For I imagine it falls to the share of few to be able to consider that what we feel with respect to the fortunes of others must necessarily be felt with respect to our own, since it is not easy for one to bear up under his own misfortunes, who strongly cherishes the bewailing disposition over those of others.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And is not the reasoning the same with reference to the ridiculous? For when you hear, in imitation by comedy, or in private conversation, what you would be ashamed to do yourself to excite laughter, and are delighted with it, and imitate it, you do the same thing here as in the tragic: for that part, which, when it wanted to excite laughter, was formerly restrained by reason from a fear of incurring the character of scurrility, you now letting loose, and allowing there to grow vigorous, you are often imperceptibly brought to be in your own behavior a buffoon.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And the case is the same as to venereal pleasures, and anger, and the whole of the passions, as well the sorrowful as the joyful; which, truly, we have said, attend

us in every action that the poetical imitation of these has the same effect upon us; for it nourishes and waters those things which ought to be parched, and constitutes as our governor those which ought to be governed, in order to our becoming better and happier, instead of being worse and more miserable.

Glaucon/ I can say no otherwise.

Socrates/ When therefore, Glauco, you meet with the com-menders of Homer, who tell how this poet instructed Greece, and that he deserves to be taken as a master to teach one both the management, and the knowledge of human affairs, and that one should regulate the whole of his life according to this poet, we should indeed love and embrace such people, as being the best they are able, and agree with them that Homer is most poetical, and the first of tragedy writers; but they must know that the hymns of the Gods, and the praises of worthy action are alone to be admitted into the city. But if it should admit the pleasurable muse likewise, in songs or verses, you should have pleasure and pain reigning in the city, instead of law and of that reason which always appears best to the community.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Let these things now, be our apology, when we recollect what we have said with reference to poetry, that it was with reason we then dismissed it from our republic, since it is such as is now described: for reason obliged us. And let us tell it further, lest it accuse us of a certain roughness, and rusticity, that there is an old variance between philosophy and poetry. For such as these;

> "That bawling bitch, which at her mistress barks,"

and;

> "He's great in empty eloquence of fools,"

and;

"On trifles still they plod, because they're poor,"

and a thousand such like, are marks of an ancient opposition between them. But nevertheless let it be said, that if anyone show reason for it, that the poetry and the imitation which are calculated for pleasure ought to be in a well-regulated city, we for our part shall gladly admit them, as we are at least conscious to ourselves that we are charmed by them. But to betray what appears to be truth were an unholy thing. For are not you yourself, friend, charmed by this imitation, and most especially when you see it performed by Homer?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Is it not just, then, that we introduce it, apologizing for itself, either in song or in any other measure?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And we may at least grant, somehow, even to its defenders, such as are not poets but lovers of poetry, to speak in its behalf, without verse, and show that it is not only pleasant, but profitable for republics, and for human life; and we shall hear with pleasure, for we shall gain somewhat if it shall appear not only pleasant but also profitable.

Glaucon/ Why shall we not gain?

Socrates/ And if it happen otherwise, friend, we shall do as those who have been in love, when they deem their love unprofitable: though it is a violence on them, they however desist; so we in like manner, through this inborn love of such poetry that prevails in our best republics, shall be well pleased to see it appear to be the best and truest, and we shall hear it till it is able to make no further apology. But we shall take along with us this discourse we have held, as a counter-charm and incantation, being afraid to fall back again into a childish and vulgar love. We may perceive then

that we are not to be much in earnest about such poetry as this, as if it were a serious affair, and approached to the truth, but the hearer is to beware of it, and to be afraid for the republic within himself, and to hold those opinions of poetry which we mentioned.

Glaucon/ I entirely agree.

Socrates/ For great, friend Glauco, great is the contest, and not such as is imagined, to become a good or a bad man, so as not to be moved neither through honor, nor riches, nor any magistracy, nor poetic imitation, ever to neglect justice and the other virtues.

Glaucon/ I agree with you, from what we have discussed, and so I imagine will any other.

Socrates/ But we have not yet, gone through the greatest prize of virtue, and the rewards laid up for her.

Glaucon/ You speak of some prodigious greatness, if there be other greater than those mentioned.

Socrates/ But what is there, can be great in a little time? for this whole period from infancy to old age is but little in respect of the whole.

Glaucon/ Nothing at all, indeed.

Socrates/ What then? Do you imagine an immortal being ought to be much concerned about such a period, and not about the whole of duration?

Glaucon/ I imagine, about the whole. But why do you mention this?

Socrates/ Have you not perceived, that our soul is immortal, and never at all perishes? On which, he, looking at me and wondering, said:

Glaucon/ Not I, indeed. But are you able to show this?

Socrates/ I should otherwise do a wrong. And I imagine you yourself can show it, for it is, in no respect, difficult.

Glaucon/ To me, at least, it is difficult; but I would willingly hear from you this which is not difficult.

Socrates/ You shall hear then.

Glaucon/ Only speak.

Socrates/ Is there not something, you call good, and something you call evil?

Glaucon/ I own it.

Socrates/ Do you then conceive of them in the same manner as I do?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ That which destroys and corrupts everything is the evil, and what preserves and profits it is the good.

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ But what? Do you not say there is something is good, and something is bad, to each particular? As blindness to the eyes, and disease to every animal body, blasting to corns, rottenness to wood, rust to brass and iron, and as I am saying, almost everything has its peculiar evil and disease?

Glaucon/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ And when anything of this kind befalls anything, does it not render that which it befalls naughty, and in the end dissolves and destroys it?

Glaucon/ Why does it not?

Socrates/ Its own peculiar evil then, and naughtiness, destroys each particular, or if this does not destroy it, nothing else at least can ever destroy it. For that which is good at least, can never at all destroy anything, nor yet that which is neither good nor evil.

Glaucon/ How can they?

Socrates/ If then, we shall be able to find among beings anyone which has indeed some evil, which renders it

naughty, but is not, however, able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not then know that a being thus constituted cannot be destroyed at all?

Glaucon/ So, it appears.

Socrates/ What then? Is there not something which renders the soul evil?

Glaucon/ Certainly, all these things which we have now mentioned, injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

Socrates/ But does then any of these dissolve and destroy it? And attend now, that we may not be imposed on in imagining that an unjust and foolish man, when he is caught doing injustice, is then destroyed through his injustice, which is the naughtiness of his soul. But consider it thus: As disease, which is the naughtiness of animal body, dissolves and destroys body, and reduces it to be no longer that body, and all those things we mentioned, being destroyed by their own proper evil adhering to them and possessing them, are reduced to a non-existence. Is it not so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Consider now the soul in the same manner. Does injustice or other vice possessing it, by possessing it, and adhering to it, corrupt and deface it, 'till bringing it to death, it separate it from the body?

Glaucon/ By no means, does it this.

Socrates/ But it were absurd, that anything should be destroyed, by the naughtiness of another, but not by its own.

Glaucon/ Absurd.

Socrates/ For consider, Glauco, that neither by the naughtiness of victuals, whether it be their moldiness, or rottenness, or whatever else, do we imagine our body can be destroyed, but if this naughtiness in them create in the body

a naughtiness of the body, we will say that through their means the body is destroyed by its own evil, which is disease. But we will never allow that by the naughtiness of food which is one thing, the body which is another thing, can ever by this foreign evil, without creating in it its own peculiar evil, be at any time destroyed.

Glaucon/ You say most right.

Socrates/ According to the same reasoning then, unless the naughtiness of the body create a naughtiness of the soul, let us never allow that the soul can be destroyed by an evil which is foreign, without its own peculiar evil, one thing by the evil of another.

Glaucon/ There is reason for it.

Socrates/ Let us then either refute these things as not good reasoning, or so long as they are unrefuted, let us at no time say that the soul shall be ever in any degree the more destroyed, either by burning fever, or by any other disease, or by slaughter, not even though one should cut the whole body into the smallest parts possible, 'till one show that through these sufferings of the body, the soul herself becomes more unjust and impure. But we will never allow it to be said that when a foreign evil befalls anything, whilst its own proper evil is not within it, that either the soul or anything else is destroyed.

Glaucon/ But this at least, no one shall ever show, that the souls of those who die are by death rendered more unjust.

Socrates/ But if anyone, shall dare to contend with us in reasoning, and, in order that he may not be obliged to own the souls are immortal, will say that when one dies he becomes more wicked and unjust, we shall somehow justly demand of him to show, if he says true in telling us this, that injustice is deadly to the possessor, as a disease, and that

those who embrace it are destroyed by it as by a disease destructive in its own nature—of those most speedily who embrace it most, and those more slowly who embrace it less, and not as at present, where the unjust die having this punishment inflicted on them by others.

Glaucon/ Truly, injustice does not appear altogether dreadful, if it shall be deadly to him who practices it (for that were a deliverance from evil); but I rather imagine it will appear to be altogether the reverse, it destroying others as far as it can, but rendering the unjust extremely alive, and along with his being alive rendering him wakeful likewise; so far, it seems, does it dwell from being deadly.

Socrates/ You say well, for when one's own wickedness and peculiar evil is insufficient to kill and destroy the soul, hardly can that evil at least, which aims at the destruction of another, destroy a soul or anything else, but what it is aimed against.

Glaucon/ Hardly indeed, as appears to me at least.

Socrates/ When therefore it is destroyed by no one evil, neither I peculiar nor foreign, is it not plain that of necessity it always exists, and if it always exists, it is immortal?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Let this then, be fixed in this manner. And if it be, you'll perceive that the same souls shall, always remain,! for their number shall never become less, none being destroyed, nor shall it become greater; for if anyhow the number of immortals was made greater, you know it would take from the mortal, and in the end all would be immortal.

Glaucon/ You say true.

Socrates/ But let us not, imagine this (for reason will not allow of it), nor yet that the soul in its truest nature is of such a kind as to be full of much variety, diversity and difference, considered in itself.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ That can hardly, be eternal which is compounded of many things, and which has not the finest composition as has now appeared to us to be the case with reference to the soul?

Glaucon/ It is not likely, at least.

Socrates/ That the soul then is something immortal, both our present reasonings and others too, may oblige us to own; but in order to know what kind of being the soul is, in truth, one ought not to contemplate it, as it is damaged both by its conjunction with the body and by other evils, as we now behold it, but such as it is when become pure, such it must by reasoning be fully contemplated, and he who does this) shall find it far more beautiful at least, and shall more plainly see through justice and injustice, and everything we have now gone over. We are now telling the truth concerning it, such as it appears at present. We have seen it, indeed, in the same condition in which they see the marine Glaucus, where they cannot easily perceive his ancient nature, because the ancient members of his body are partly broken off, and others are worn away, and he altogether damaged by the waves; and besides other things are grown to him, such as shell fish, sea weed, and stones, so that he every way resembles a beast, rather as what he naturally was. In such a condition do we behold the soul under a thousand evils. But we ought, Glauco, to behold it there.

Glaucon/ Where?

Socrates/ In its philosophy, and to observe to what it applies, and hat intimacies it affects, as being allied to that which divine, immortal, and eternal; and what it would become if it pursued wholly what is of this kind, and were by this pursuit, brought out of that ocean in which it now is, and had the stones and shell fish shaken off from it, which

at present, as it is fed on earth, render its nature in great measure earthy, stony, and savage, through those enjoyments which are said to render happy. And then should le behold its true nature, whether multiform or uniform, id everything concerning it. But we have, now, as I imagine, sufficiently gone over its passions and appearances human life.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Have we not now, discussed everything else in our reasonings, but have not produced those rewards and honors of justice (as you say Hesiod and Homer do), but we find justice itself to be the best reward to the soul; and that it ought to do what is just, whether it have, or have not Gyges' ring, and along with such a ring, the helmet likewise of Pluto.

Glaucon/ You say most true.

Socrates/ Will it not now then, Glauco, be attended with no envy, if besides these, we add those rewards to justice and the other virtues, what and how great there are afforded to the soul both by men and Gods, both whilst the man is alive, and after he is dead?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Will you then restore me what you borrowed in the reasoning?

Glaucon/ What, chiefly?

Socrates/ I granted you that the just man should be deemed unjust, and the unjust be deemed to be just. For you were of opinion, that though it were not possible that these things should be concealed from Gods and men, it should however be granted for the sake of the argument, that justice in itself might be compared with injustice in itself; or do you not remember it?

Glaucon/ I should indeed be unjust, if I did not.

Socrates/ Now after the judgment is over, I demand again, it behalf of justice, that as you allow it to be indeed esteemed both by Gods and men, you likewise allow it to have the same good reputation, that it may also receive these prize; of victory which it acquires from the reputation of justice and bestows them on those who possess it, since it hat) already appeared to bestow those good things which arise from really being just, and that it does not deceive those who truly embrace it.

Glaucon/ You demand what is just.

Socrates/ Will you not then, in the first place restore m this? That it is not concealed from the Gods what sort of man each of the two is.

Glaucon/ We will grant it.

Socrates/ And if they be not concealed, one of them shall be beloved of the Gods, and one of them hated, as we agreed in the beginning.

Glaucon/ We did so.

Socrates/ And shall we not agree that, as to the man who is beloved of the Gods, whatever comes to him from the Gods shall ill be the best possible, unless he have some necessary ill from former miscarriage.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ We are then, to think in this manner of the just man, that if he happen to be in poverty, or in diseases, or in any other of those imaginary evils, these things to him issue in something good, either whilst alive, or dead. For never at all is he neglected by the Gods at least, whoever he is who inclines earnestly to endeavor to become just, and practices virtue as far as it is possible for man to resemble God.

Glaucon/ It is reasonable, that such an one should not be neglected by him he resembles.

Socrates/ And are we not to think the reverse of these things, concerning the unjust man?

Glaucon/ Entirely.

Socrates/ Such then would seem to be the prizes which the just man receives from the Gods.

Glaucon/ Such they are indeed in my opinion.

Socrates/ But what, do they receive from men? Is not the case thus? (if we are to suppose the truth). Do not cunning and unjust men do the same thing as racers who run well at the beginning, but not so at the end? for at the first they briskly leap forward, but in the end they become ridiculous, and, with their ears on their neck, they run off without any reward. But such as are true racers, arriving at the end, both receive the prizes and are crowned. Does it not happen thus for the most part as to just men? that at the end of every action and intercourse of life they are both held in esteem, and receive rewards from men.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ You will then suffer me to say of these what you yourself aid of the unjust. For I will aver now, that the just when they are grown up, shall arrive at power if they desire magistracies, they shall marry where they incline, and hall settle their children in marriage where they incline, and everything else you mentioned concerning the others, now say concerning these. And on the other hand, I will say of the unjust, that the most of them, though they may be concealed whilst they are young, yet being caught at the end of the race, are ridiculous, and when they become old, are wretched and ridiculed, and shall be scourge. both by foreigners and citizens, and they shall afterward be tortured and burnt, which you said were terrible thing and you spoke the truth. Imagine you hear from me that they suffer all these things. But see if you will admit of what I say.

Glaucon/ Entirely, for you say what is just.

Socrates/ Such as these now, are the prizes, the rewards an gifts, which a just man receives in his life time, both from Gods and men, besides those good things which jus tic contains in itself.

Glaucon/ And they are extremely beautiful, and likewise permanent.

Socrates/ But these now, are nothing in number or magnitude, when compared with those which await each of the two at death. And these things must likewise be heard that each of them may completely have what is their due in the reasoning.

Glaucon/ You may say on, not as to a hearer who hath heard much, but who hears with greater pleasure.

Socrates/ But, however, I will not, tell you the apologue of Alcinus, but that, indeed, of a brave man, Erus the son of Armenius, by descent a Pamphilian, who happening on time to die in battle, when the dead were on the tenth day carried off, already all corrupted, he was taken up sound and being carried home, as he was about to be buried on the twelfth day, when laid on the funeral pile, he revived, and being revived, he told what he saw in the other state, and said: That after his soul went out, it went with many others, and that they came to a certain region of spirit where there were two gulps in the earth, near to one another, and other two openings in the heavens, opposite to them, and that the judges sate between these. And when they give judgment, they commanded the just to go to the right hand, and upwards through the heaven, fixing before them the accounts of the judgment pronounced but the unjust they commanded to the left, and downwards, and these likewise had behind them the accounts of all they had done. But on his coming before the judges, they said it behooved him to

be a messenger to men concerning things there, and they commanded him to hear, and to contemplate everything in the place. And that he saw here, through two openings, one of the heaven, and one of the earth, the souls going away, after they were there judged; and through the other two openings he saw, rising through the one out of the earth, souls full of squalidness and dust; and through the other he saw other souls descending pure from heaven; and that always on their arrival, they seemed to come off a long journey, and that they gladly went to rest themselves in the meadow, as in a public assembly, and saluted one another, such as were of acquaintance, and that these who rose out of the earth, asked the others concerning the things above, and those from heaven asked them concerning the things below, and that they told one another: those wailing and weeping whilst they called to mind what and how many things they suffered and saw in their journey under earth (for it was a journey of a thousand years), and that these again from heaven explained their enjoyments and spectacles of inexpressible beauty. To narrate many of them, Glauco, would take much time; but this, was the sum, whatever pieces of injustice any had committed, and how many soever anyone had injured, they were punished for all these separately tenfold, and that it was in each, according to the rate of an hundred years, the life of man being considered as so long, that they might suffer tenfold punishment of the injustice they had done. So that if anyone had put any to death, either by betraying cities, or armies, or bringing men into slavery, or being confederates in any other wickedness, for each of all these they reaped tenfold sufferings; and if, again, they had benefited any by good deeds, and had been just and holy, they reaped what was worthy, according to these actions. Of those who died very young, and lived but a little time, he told what is not worth

relating in respect of other things. But of impiety and piety towards the Gods, and parents, and of suicide, he told the more remarkable retributions. For he was present when one was asked by another where the great Aridaeus was? This Aridaeus had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia a thousand years before that time, and had killed his aged father and his elder brother, and had done many other unhallowed deeds, as it was reported. And he said the one who was asked, replied: He neither comes, nor ever will come hither. For we then surely saw this likewise among other dreadful spectacles, when we were near the mouth of the opening, and were about to come up after having suffered all our sufferings, we beheld both him on a sudden, and others likewise, the most of whom were tyrants, and some private persons who had committed great iniquity, whom, when they imagined they were to get up, the mouth of the opening did not admit, but bellowed when any of those who were so polluted with wickedness, or who had not been sufficiently punished, made an attempt to ascend. And then, fierce men, and all of fire to look at, standing by and understanding the bellowing, took them and led them apart, Aridaeus and the rest, binding their hands and their feet, and thrusting down their head, and pulling off their skin, dragged them to an outer road, tearing them on thorns, declaring always to those who passed by, on what accounts they suffered these things, and that they were carrying them to be thrown into Tartarus. And hence, that amidst all their various terrors, this terror surpassed, lest the mouth should bellow, and that when it was silent, everyone most gladly ascended. And that the punishments and torments were such as these, and their rewards were the reverse of these. And that everyone, after they had been seven days in the meadow, arising thence, it behooved them to depart on the eight day, and arrive at another place on the fourth day after, from whence

they perceived from above, through the whole heaven and earth, a light stretched as a pillar, mostly resembling the rainbow, but more bright, and pure. At which they arrived in one day's journey, and thence they perceived through the middle of the light from heaven, the extremities of its ligatures extended: for that this light was the belt of heaven, like the transverse beams of ships in like manner keeping the whole circumference united. And that from the extremities hang the distaff of necessity, by which all the revolutions were turned round, whose spindle, and point, were both of adamant, but its whirl mixed of this and of other things, and that the nature of the whirl was of such a kind, as to its figure, as is anyone we see here. And you must conceive it, from what he said, to be of such a kind as this. As if in some great hollow whirl, carved throughout, there was such another, but lesser within it, fitted to it, like casks fitted one within another, and in the same manner a third, and a fourth, and other four, for that the whirls were eight in all, as circles one within another, having their lips appearing upwards, and forming 'round the spindle one united convexity of one whirl; and that the spindle was driven through the middle of the eight; and that the first and outmost whirl had the widest circumference in the lip, that the sixth had the second wide, and that of the fourth is the third wide, and the fourth wide that of the eight, and the fifth wide that of the seventh, the sixth wide that of the fifth, and the seventh wide that of the third, and the eight wide that of the second. And that that of the largest is variegated, that of the seventh is the brightest, and that of the eight has its color from the shining of the seventh, that of the second and fifth like to one another, more yellow than those others. But the third has the whitest color, the fourth reddish; the second in whiteness surpassing the sixth, and that the distaff must turn round in a circle with the whole it carries,

and whilst the whole is turning round, the seven inner circles are gently turned round in a contrary motion to the whole. And that of these, the eight moves the swiftest, and next to it, and equal to one another, the seventh, the sixth and the fifth; and that the third went in a motion which as appeared to them completed its circle in the same way as the fourth. The fourth in swiftness was the third, and the fifth was the second, and it was turned round on the knees of necessity. And that on each of its circles there was seated a Syren on the upper side carried round, and uttering her voice in one monotone, but that the whole of them being eight, composed one harmony. That there were other three sitting round at equal distance one from another, each on a throne, the daughters of necessity, the Fates, in white vestments, and having crowns on their heads; Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, singing to the harmony of the Syrens, Lachesis singing the past, Clotho the present, and Atropos the future. And that Clotho, at certain intervals, with her right hand laid hold of the spindle, and along with her mother turned about the outer circle; and Atropos, in like manner, turned the inner ones with her left hand; and that Lachesis touched both of these severally with either hand. After they arrive here, it behooves them to go directly to Lachesis. That then a certain prophet first of all ranges them in order, and then taking the lots, and the models of lives, from the knees of Lachesis, and ascending a lofty tribunal, he says: The speech of virgin Lachesis, the daughter of necessity; souls of a day! The beginning of another period of men of mortal race. The daemon shall not receive you as his lot, but you shall choose the daemon: he who draws the first, let him first make choice of a life, to which he must of necessity adhere: virtue is independent which everyone shall partake of, more or less, according as he honors, or dishonors her: the cause is in himself, who makes the

choice, and God is blameless. And that when he had said these things, he threw on all of them the lots, and that each took up the one which fell beside him, and that he was allowed to take no other than it. And that when he had taken it, he knew what number he had drawn. That after this he placed on the ground before them, the models of lives many more than those we see at present. And that they were of every kind. For there were lives of all sorts of animals, and human lives of every kind. And that among these, there were tyrannies also, some of them perpetual, and others destroyed in the midst of their greatness, and ending in poverty, banishment, and want. That there were also lives of renowned men, some for their appearance as to beauty, strength, and agility; and others renowned for their descent and the virtues of their ancestors. There were the lives of renowned women in the same manner. But that there was no disposition of soul among these models, because, of necessity, on choosing a different life it becomes different itself. As to other things, riches and poverty, sickness and health, they were mixed with one another, and some were in a middle station between these. There, then, as appears, friend Glauco, is the whole danger of man. And, on these accounts, this, of all things, is most to be studied, in what manner every one of us, omitting other studies, shall become an enquirer and learner in this study, if by any means he be able to learn and find out who shall make him expert and intelligent to discern a good life and a bad; and to choose everywhere, and at all times, the best of what is possible, considering all the things now mentioned, both compounded and separated from one another, what they are with respect to the virtue of life. And to understand what good or evil beauty operates when mixed with poverty, or riches, and with this or the other habit of soul; and what is operated by noble and ignoble descent, by privacy, and by public station,

by strength and weakness, docility and indocility, and everything else of the kind which naturally pertains to the soul, and likewise of what is acquired when blended one with another; so as to be able from all these things to compute, and having an eye to the nature of the soul, to comprehend both the worse and the better life, pronouncing that to be the worse which shall lead the soul to become more unjust, and that to be the better life which (shall lead it to become more just, and to dismiss every Bother consideration. For we have seen that in life and in death this is the best choice. But it is necessary that one 'pave this opinion firm as an adamant in him, when he goes into the other world, in order that there also he may be unmoved with riches, or any such evils, and may not, [stumbling into tyrannies, and other such practices, do [many and incurable mischief's, and himself suffer still greater; but may understand to choose always the middle life, as to these things, and to shun the extremes on either hand, both in this life as far as is possible, and in the whole of hereafter. For thus man becomes most happy. For that then the messenger from the other world further told how that the prophet spoke thus: Even, to him who comes last, choosing with judgment, living consistently, there is prepared a desirable life, no way bad. Let neither him who is first be heedless in his choice, nor let him who is last, despair. He said that when the prophet had spoken these things, the first who drew a lot run instantly and chose the greatest tyranny, but through folly and insatiableness had not sufficiently examined all things on making his choice, but was ignorant that in this life there was this destiny, the devouring of his own children, and other evils, and that afterwards, when he had considered at leisure, he wailed and lamented his choice, not having observed the admonitions of the prophet above mentioned. For that he did not accuse himself, as the author of his

misfortunes, but fortune and the daemons, and everything instead of himself; and that he was one of those who came from heaven, who had in his former life lived in a regulated republic, and had been virtuous by custom without philosophy, and that in general among these, there were not a few found who came from heaven, as being unexercised in trials. But that the most of those who came from earth, as they had endured hardships themselves, and had seen others in hardships, did not precipitately make their choice; and hence, and through the fortune of the lot, to most souls there was an exchange of good and evil things. Since if one should always, whenever he comes into this life, soundly philosophize, and the lot of election should not fall on him the very last, it would seem from what has been told us from thence, that he shall be happy not only here, but when he goes hence, and his journey hither back again shall not be earthy and rugged, but smooth and heavenly. This spectacle, was worthy to behold, in what manner the several souls made choice of their life; for it was both pitiful and ridiculous and wonderful to behold, as each for the most part chose according to the habit of their former life. For he told that he saw the soul which was formerly the soul of Orpheus making choice of the life of a swan, through hatred of womankind, being unwilling to be born of woman on account of the death he suffered from them. He saw, likewise, the soul of Thamyris, making choice of the life of a nightingale, and he saw likewise a swan turning to the choice of human life, and other musical animals, in like manner, as is likely. And that he saw one soul, in making its choice, choosing the life of a lion, and that it was the soul of Telamonian Ajax, shunning to become a man, remembering the judgment given with reference to the amour. That next he saw the soul of Agamemnon, and that this one, in hatred also of the human kind, on account of his misfortunes, exchanged it for the life

of an eagle. And that he saw the soul of Atalante choosing her lot amidst the rest, and having attentively observed the great honors paid an athletic man, was unable to pass by, but took it. That after it he saw the soul of Epaeus the Panopean going into the nature of a skillful workwoman. And that far off, among the last, he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites assuming the ape. And that by chance, he saw the soul of Ulysses, who had drawn its lot last of ill, going to make its choice: that in remembrance of its former toils, and tired of ambition, it went about a long time seeking the life of a private man of no business, and with difficulty found it lying somewhere, neglected by the rest. And that when it saw it, it said that he would have made the same choice if he had gotten the first lot, and gladly made choice of it. And that in like manner the souls of wild beasts went into men, and men again into beasts. The unjust changing into wild beasts, and the just into tame, and that they were blended by all sorts of mixtures. That after all the souls had chosen their lives according as they drew their lots, they went all in order to Lachesis, and that she gave to everyone the daemon he chose, and sent him along to be the guardian of his life, and the accomplisher of what he had chosen. He first of all conducts it to Clotho, to ratify under her hand and by the whirl of the vortex of her spindle, the destiny he had chosen by lot; and after being with her, he leads him back again to the spinning of Atropos, who makes the destinies irreversible, and that from hence they proceed directly under the throne of Necessity. And after he had passed by it, as all others passed, they marched all into the plain of Lethe amidst dreadful heat and scorching, for he said that it is void of trees and everything that the earth produces. That when night came on they encamped beside the river Amelete, whose water no vessel contains; a certain measure then of the water all of them must of necessity drink, and such of

them as are not preserved by prudence, drink more than the measure, and that he who drinks, always forgets everything. And that after they were laid asleep, and it became midnight, there was thunder, and an earthquake, and they were thence on a sudden carried upwards, someone way, and some another, approaching to generation, like stars. But that he himself was forbidden to drink of the water. Where however, and in what manner, he came into his body, he knew nothing, but suddenly looking up in the morning he saw himself already laid on the funeral pile. And this fable, Glauco, has been preserved, and is not lost, and it may preserve us, if we observe it, and shall happily pass over the river Lethe, and shall not contaminate the soul.

But if the company will be persuaded by me, accounting the soul immortal, and able to bear all evil and all good, we shall always hold the road which leads above. And justice with prudence we shall by all means pursue in order that we may be friends both to ourselves and to the Gods, both whilst we remain here, and when we receive its rewards, like victors assembled together; and. we shall both here, and in that thousand years' journey we have described, enjoy a happy life.

THE END OF THE TENTH BOOK

Republic Of Plato.

Translated by Davis, Henry

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates; Cephalus; Glaucon; Adimantus;
Polemarchus; Thrasymachus.

Book 1.

Socrates/ I went down yesterday to the Piræus, with Glaucon, son of Ariston, to pay my devotion to the goddess, —and wishing, at the same time, to observe in what manner they would celebrate the festival, as they were now to do so for the first time. The procession of the natives themselves, indeed, seemed beautiful; yet that which the Thracians conducted appeared not less elegant. After we had paid our devotions, and seen the solemnity, we were going back to the city, when Polemarchus, son of Cephalus, observing us from a distance, hurrying home, bid his boy run and tell us to wait for him; and the boy, taking hold of my robe behind, said: —

Boy/ Polemarchus desires you to wait.

Socrates/ I turned then and asked, where he was.

Boy/ He is coming after you, but pray wait for him.

Glaucon/ Yes, we will wait:

Socrates/ and just afterwards came Polemarchus and Adimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and Niceratus, son of Nicias, and some others, as from the procession.

Polemarchus/ Socrates, you seem to me to be hurrying to the city, as on your return.

Socrates/ Aye, you do not make a bad guess.

Polemarchus/ See you, then, how many we are?

Socrates/ Yes, of course.

Polemarchus/ Well, then, you must either prove yourselves stronger than these, or else remain here.

Socrates/ One expedient, is still left; namely, to persuade you that you should let us go.

Polemarchus/ How can you possibly persuade such as will not hear?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Polemarchus/ Make up your mind then, that we will not hear.

Adeimantus/ But know you not, that in the evening there is to be a torch-race on horseback to the goddess?

Socrates/ On horseback; surely, this is a novelty. Are they to have torches, and to hand them to one another, contending together on horseback; —or how do you mean?

Polemarchus/ Just so. And besides, they will perform a nocturnal solemnity well worth seeing; —for we shall rise after supper and see it the night festival, and shall be there with many of our young friends, and have a chat. Do you also stay and do the same.

Glaucon/ It is right, I think, that we should stay.

Socrates/ Well, —if you please, we will so.

We went home therefore to Polemarchus' house, and there we found, both Lysias and Euthydemus, brothers of Polemarchus, —likewise Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Pæoneian, and Clitophon the son of Aristonymus.

Cephalus, the father of Polemarchus, was likewise in the house; and he seemed to me to have become a good deal aged, for I had not seen him for a long time.

He was sitting crowned on a cushioned seat; for he had been offering sacrifice in the inner court. So we sat down by

him; for some seats stood there in a circle. Immediately, therefore, on seeing me, Cephalus saluted me, and said:

Cephalus/ Socrates, you do not often come down to us to the Piraeus, though you ought; for, could I still easily go up to the city, there would have been no need for you to come hither, but we should have gone up to you. As it is, however, you should come hither more frequently; for be assured that with me, the more bodily pleasures decay, the more also do the desires and pleasures of conversation increase. Do not then fail us, but accompany these youths, and resort hither, as to friends, and very dear friends too.

Socrates/ As for me, Cephalus, I am delighted to converse with persons well advanced in years; for it appears to me a duty to learn from them, as from persons who have gone before us, on a road which we too must necessarily travel, what kind of road it is, —whether rough and difficult, or level and easy. Moreover, I would gladly learn from you as you are now at that time of life which the poets call the threshold of old age, what your opinion of it is, whether it be a burdensome part of life, or how you describe it.

Cephalus/ By Zeus! I will tell you, Socrates, what I, for my part, think of it; for several of us, who are of the same age, frequently meet together in the same place, observing the old proverb. Most of us, therefore, when we are together, complain of missing the pleasures of youth, calling to remembrance the pleasures of love, those of drinking and feasting, and such like: and they are mightily in dudgeon, as being bereaved of some great things, —having once lived happily, but now scarce living at all. Some of them, too, bemoan the contempt which old age meets with from intimate friends: and, on this account, they whine about old age, as being the cause of so many of their ills. To me, however, Socrates, these men seem not to blame the real cause; for, if this were the cause, I myself likewise should

have suffered these very same things through old age, —and all others, likewise, who have come to these years. Now I have met with several not thus affected; and particularly I was once in company with Sophocles the poet, when he was asked by some one: How, do you feel, Sophocles, as to the pleasures of love; are you still able to enjoy them? Softly, friend; —most gladly, indeed, have I escaped from these pleasures, as from some furious and savage master. To me, then, he, at that time, seemed to speak well, and now not less so: for, on the whole, as respects such things there is in old age great peace and freedom; because, when the appetites cease to be vehement and have let go their hold, what Sophocles said, most certainly happens; we are delivered from very many, and those too, furious masters. With relation to these things, however, and what concerns our intimates, there is one and the same cause; which is, not old age, Socrates, but the disposition or different men: for, if they be discreet and moderate, even old age is but moderately burdensome: but if not, Socrates, —to such an one, both old age and youth are grievous.

Socrates/ Delighted to hear him say these things, and wishing him to discourse further, I urged him, and said: I fancy, Cephalus, the generality will not agree with you in these opinions; but will imagine that you bear old age easily, not owing to your natural bias, but from possessing much wealth; for the rich, say they, have many consolations.

Cephalus/ True; they do not agree with me; and there is something in what they say, yet not so much as they imagine. The saying of Themistocles, however, is just; who, when the Seriphian reviled him, and said, that he was honored, not on his own account, but on account of his country, replied, that neither would himself have been renowned, had he been a Seriphian, nor would he, the Seriphian, had he been an Athenian. To those likewise, who

are not rich and bear old age with impatience, the same saying fairly applies; —that neither would the worthy man bear old age with poverty quite easily, nor would he who is unworthy, though enriched, ever be agreeable to himself.

Socrates/ But, tell me, Cephalus; was the greater part of what you possess, left you, or did you acquire it yourself?

Cephalus/ Somewhat, Socrates, I have acquired: as to money-getting I am in a medium between my grandfather and my father: for my grandfather of the same name with myself, who was left almost as much property as I possess at present, increased it manifold; while my father Lysanias made it yet less than it is now: I, on the other hand, am content, if I can leave my sons here not less, but some little more than I received.

Socrates/ I asked you, for this reason, —because you seem to me to have no excessive love for riches; and this is generally the case with those who have not acquired them; while those who have acquired them themselves, are doubly fond of them: for, as poets love their own poems, and as parents love their own children, —in the same manner, too, those who have enriched themselves, value their wealth, as their own production, as well as for its utility, —on which ground it is valued by others.

Cephalus/ True.

Socrates/ Aye, entirely so. But further, tell me this; —what do you conceive to be the greatest good realized through the possession of extensive property?

Cephalus/ That, probably, of which I shall not persuade the generality, were I even to mention it. For, be assured, Socrates, that, after a man begins to think he is soon to die, he becomes inspired with a fear and concern about things, that had not entered his head before: for those stories concerning a future state, which tell us, that the man who

has been unjust here must be punished hereafter, have a tendency, much as he formerly ridiculed them, to trouble his soul at such a time with apprehensions, that they may be true; and the man, either through the infirmity of old age, or being now, as it were, in closer proximity to them, views them more attentively, and consequently becomes full of suspicion and dread, and reflects and considers whether he has in anything done anyone a wrong. That man, then, who discovers in his own life much of iniquity, and, like children, constantly starting in his sleep, is full of terrors, and lives on with scarce a hope of the future. But with the man who is not conscious of any such iniquity;

> Hope, the solace of old age,
> Is ever present.

As Pindar says: for this, Socrates, he has beautifully expressed, that whoever lives a life of justice and holiness;

> With him to cheer his heart, the nurse of age,
> Sweet hope abides, companion blest, that sways
> With power supreme the changeful mind of man.

In this he speaks well, and with great elegance. In conformity with this thought, therefore, I deem the possession of riches to be chiefly valuable, not to every man indeed, but to the man of worth: for as respects liberating us from the temptation of cheating or deceiving against our will, —or again from departing thither in fear, because we owe either sacrifices to God, or money to man, —for this, indeed, the possession of money has great advantages. It has many other also; —but for my part, Socrates, that seems not the least, among all others, which proves its high advantage to a man of understanding.

Socrates/ You speak admirably, Cephalus: —but this very thing, *Justice*, —shall we call it Truth, simply, and the restoring what one has received from another, —or shall we

say, that it is possible to do the very same things at one time justly and at another unjustly? My meaning is somewhat as follows: Everyone would probably be of opinion, that if a man received arms from a friend in sound mind, and that person should demand them back when mad, it would not be proper to restore such articles, nor would the restorer be just; nor again, would he who, to a man so situated, should willingly tell the whole truth.

Cephalus/ Right.

Socrates/ This, then, is not the definition of justice, namely, to speak the truth, and restore what one has received.

Polemarchus/ Of course it is, Socrates, if at least we are to believe Simonides.

Cephalus/ However that be, I leave this conversation to you; for I must now go to attend to the sacred rites.

Socrates/ Well then, is not Polemarchus, the heir of your argument?

Cephalus/ Certainly!

Socrates/ Smiling, Cephalus went off to the sacred rites. —

Tell me, then, you who are heir in the conversation, what is it, that you affirm Simonides to have correctly alleged about justice?

Polemarchus/ That to restore to each his due, is just: in saying this, he seems, to me at least, to speak correctly.

Socrates/ Aye, indeed, we cannot easily discredit Simonides; for he is a wise and divine man: —but as to his meaning in this passage, you, Polemarchus, are probably acquainted with it, but I am not; for it is plain he does not mean what we were saying just now, —that, when one has deposited anything with us, we should return it to him, even

if he demand it in his insanity: and yet the thing deposited is in some sense due, is it not?

Polemarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ At least, then, you will grant it must on no account whatever be restored, when a man asks for it in his insanity?

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Simonides then, it would seem, has some other meaning than this, in saying that to deliver up what is due, is just?

Polemarchus/ Yes, —one quite different: for he is of opinion, that friends ought to do their friends good—not ill.

Socrates/ I understand; —that man does not give back what is due, who restores money deposited with him, if the repayment and receipt be really hurtful, and the receiver and restorer be friends: —is not this what you allege Simonides to say?

Polemarchus/ Surely.

Socrates/ What then? —-are we to give our enemies, also, what may chance to be their due?

Polemarchus/ By all means, what is really due to them; and from an enemy to an enemy, there is due, I imagine, what is fitting too, —namely some evil.

Socrates/ Simonides, then, it would seem, defined the nature of justice somewhat enigmatically, and after the manner of the poets; for it seems he had a notion, that justice consists in giving everyone what was expedient for him; and this he called his due.

Polemarchus/ But what is your opinion?

Socrates/ By Zeus, if anyone then should ask him thus, —Simonides, what is the art, which, dispensing to certain

persons something fitting and due, is called medicine, what, think you, would he answer us?

Polemarchus/ That art, surely, which dispenses drugs to the body, and also meats and drinks.

Socrates/ And what is the art, which, dispensing to certain things something fitting and due, is called cookery?

Polemarchus/ The art which gives seasonings to victuals.

Socrates/ Granted. What then, is that art, which may be called justice, as dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due?

Polemarchus/ If we ought to be at all directed, Socrates, by what has been said above, it is the art which dispenses good offices to friends, and injuries to enemies.

Socrates/ To do good, then, to friends, and ill to enemies, he calls justice?

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Who then can best serve his friends, when they are sick, and most ill to his enemies, as either in sickness or health?

Polemarchus/ A physician.

Socrates/ And who to those at sea, as respects danger on the sea?

Polemarchus/ A pilot.

Socrates/ But what as to the just man? In what business, and with respect to what action, can he most serve his friends and harm his foes?

Polemarchus/ In fighting in alliance with the one, and against the other, —so far as I think.

Socrates/ Just so; but at any rate, to those who are not sick, Polemarchus, the physician is useless?

Polemarchus/ Aye.

Socrates/ And the pilot, to those who do not sail?

Polemarchus/ He is.

Socrates/ And is the just man, in like manner, useless to those not engaged in war?

Polemarchus/ This, at any rate, is not at all my opinion.

Socrates/ Is justice, then, useful also in time of peace?

Polemarchus/ Yes, useful, too.

Socrates/ And so is agriculture, is it not?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Towards the getting in of crops?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not shoemaking useful too?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Towards the possession of shoes, methinks you will say?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what then? For the use or possession of what is it, that would you say justice were useful in time of peace?

Polemarchus/ For contracts, Socrates!

Socrates/ By these contracts do you mean copartnerships, or what else?

Polemarchus/ Copartnerships, certainly.

Socrates/ Well then; is the just man or the dice-player, a good and useful copartner for playing at dice?

Polemarchus/ The dice-player.

Socrates/ But, in the laying of tiles or stones, is the just man a more useful and a better partner than the builder?

Polemarchus/ By no means.

Socrates/ In what copartnership then, is the just man a better copartner than the harper, as the harper is better than the just man for touching the strings of a harp?

Polemarchus/ In one about money, as I imagine.

Socrates/ And yet perhaps, with regard to the use of money, Polemarchus, when it is necessary jointly to buy or sell a horse, then, I should think, the jockey is the better copartner, is he not?

Polemarchus/ He would appear so.

Socrates/ And with respect to a ship, the shipwright or pilot?

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ When is it, then, with respect to the joint application of money, that the just man is more useful than others?

Polemarchus/ When it is to be deposited and be safe, Socrates!

Socrates/ Do you not mean when there is no need to use it, but to leave it in deposit?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ When money then, is useless, justice is still useful with regard to it?

Polemarchus/ It seems likely.

Socrates/ When, therefore, one wants to put by a pruning-hook, justice is useful, both for a community and for a particular person: but when one wants to use it, then the art of vine-dressing is useful.

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ You will say, likewise, that when a shield or a lyre is to be kept and not used, then justice is useful; but when they are to be used, then the arts of warfare and music?

Polemarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And with reference to all other things, when they are to be used, justice is useless; but when they are not to be used, it is useful?

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Justice, then, my friend, can be no very important matter, if it is useful only in respect of things not to be used. But let us consider this matter: —is not he who is the cleverest at striking in a fight, whether with the fists or some other way, the cleverest likewise, in self-defense?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And as to the person who is clever in warding off and escaping from a distemper, is he not very clever also in bringing it on?

Polemarchus/ So I suppose.

Socrates/ And he too the best guardian of a camp, who can steal the counsels, and the other operations of the enemy?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Of whatever, then, anyone is a good guardian, of that likewise he is a clever thief.

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ If, therefore, the just man be clever in guarding money, he is clever likewise in stealing.

Polemarchus/ So it would seem, from this reasoning.

Socrates/ The just man, then, has been shown to be a sort of thief; and it is likely you have learned this from Homer; for he not only admires Autolycus, the maternal-grandfather of Ulysses, but says, that he was distinguished beyond all men for thievishness and swearing. Justice, then, seems in your opinion as well as in that of Homer and Simonides, to be a sort of thieving carried on for the benefit

of our friends on the one hand, and for the injury of our enemies on the other: —did not you say so?

Polemarchus/ No, by Zeus, I did not; nor, indeed, do I any longer know what I was saying: —yet it is still my opinion, that justice benefits friends, but injures foes.

Socrates/ But tell me, whether you pronounce such to be friends, as seem to be honest; or such merely as are so, though not seeming so; —and in the same way as to enemies?

Polemarchus/ It is reasonable, to love those whom one deems honest, and to hate those one deems wicked.

Socrates/ But do not men fall into error on this point, so that many appear to them honest who are not so, and many the contrary?

Polemarchus/ Yes, they do.

Socrates/ To such as these, then, the good are enemies, and the bad friends?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But still is it, in that case, just for them to benefit the wicked, and hurt the good?

Polemarchus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ The good, moreover, are just, and incapable of doing any ill.

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ According to your argument, then, is it just to do those harm, who do no harm themselves?

Polemarchus/ By no means think that, Socrates; for that opinion seems to be vicious.

Socrates/ With respect to the unjust, then, is it right to injure these, but to do good to the just?

Polemarchus/ This opinion seems fairer than the other.

Socrates/ To many, then, it will occur to think, Polemarchus, —that is, to as many as have formed wrong opinions of men, —that they may justly hurt their friends for they are wicked to them, and, on the other hand, benefit their enemies, inasmuch as they are good: —and thus we shall state the very reverse of what we alleged Simonides to say.

Polemarchus/ That is precisely the case: —but, let us change our definition; for we seem not to have rightly defined a friend and a foe.

Socrates/ How were they defined, Polemarchus?

Polemarchus/ That he who seems honest, is a friend.

Socrates/ How then are we now to alter our definition?

Polemarchus/ That the person, who seems, and also is honest, is a friend; but that he who is apparently honest, but not really so, seems to be, yet is not really a friend: the definition, too, respecting an enemy, exactly corresponds.

Socrates/ The good man, according to this reasoning, will, it seems, be a friend; and the wicked man a foe?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you bid us then make an addition to our former definition of justice, by saying that it is just to serve a friend and harm a foe: —and are we now to say, in addition to this, that it is just to serve a friend who is good, but to hurt an enemy who is bad?

Polemarchus/ This last, seems to me perfectly well expressed.

Socrates/ Is it the just man's part, then, to hurt anyone mortal whatever?

Polemarchus/ By all means; the wicked at least, and his enemies, he ought certainly to injure.

Socrates/ And horses, when hurt, do they become better or worse?

Polemarchus/ Worse.

Socrates/ Do they so, as regards the virtue of dogs or horses?

Polemarchus/ That of horses.

Socrates/ And, do not dogs, when hurt, become worse as regards the virtue of dogs, but not of horses?

Polemarchus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ As to men, then, friend, may we not likewise say, that when hurt, they become worse with reference to man's virtue?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But is not justice a human virtue?

Polemarchus/ This too we must allow.

Socrates/ It follows, then, friend, that those men who are hurt become more unjust?

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Can musicians, then, by music, make men unmusical?

Polemarchus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Or horsemen, by horsemanship, make men unskilled in horsemanship?

Polemarchus/ They cannot.

Socrates/ Is it possible, either, that by justice the just can make men unjust; or in general that by virtue, the good can make men wicked?

Polemarchus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Yes, for it is not, methinks, the effect of heat to make cold, but the effect of its contrary?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor of drought to make moist, but that of its contrary?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Neither is it the part of a good man to hurt, but that of his contrary?

Polemarchus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But, at any rate, the just is good?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Neither, then, is it the part of a just man, Polemarchus, to hurt either friend or any other, but that of his contrary, the unjust man.

Polemarchus/ In all respects, Socrates, you seem to reason truly.

Socrates/ If, then, anyone affirms it just to give everyone his due, and consequently thinks this within himself, that injury is due from a just man to enemies, but service to friends, —be was not wise who said so, for he spoke not the truth: —for in no case has the justice been proved of injuring anyone at all.

Polemarchus/ I agree.

Socrates/ You and I then will jointly dispute the point, if anyone allege, that Simonides, or Bias, or Pittacus, or any other of those wise and happy men said so.

Polemarchus/ I am ready, for my part, to take part in this discussion.

Socrates/ But know you, whose saying I conceive it to be, —that it is just to serve friends, and hurt enemies?

Polemarchus/ Whose?

Socrates/ I conceive it to be Periander's, or Perdiccas's, or Xerxes's, or Ismenius's, the Theban, or of some other rich man, who thought himself mightily important.

Polemarchus/ You say most truly.

Socrates/ Be it so: —but as this has not been shown to be justice nor the just, what else may one say it is? Now Thrasymachus had frequently during our discourse been on the point of breaking in upon the discussion with some objection, but was hindered by the sitters-by, who wanted to hear out the conversation. When, however, we came to a pause, and after my making these last remarks, he could no longer keep quiet; but, taking his spring like a wild beast, attacked us, as if he would tear us in pieces. Both myself and Polemarchus were frightened and terror-struck.

But he, raising his voice in the midst, cried out: —

Thrasymachus/ What is this, Socrates, which has so long possessed you; and why do you thus play the fool together, conceding mutually to one another? But if in particular you really want to know the nature of justice, do not only ask questions, and value yourself in refuting the answers you may get, well knowing that it is easier to ask than to answer; but answer yourself, and state your own view of the nature of justice. And take care that you do not tell me that it is what is fit, or what is due, or what is profitable, or what is gainful, or what is expedient; but, whatever you mean, express it plainly and accurately; for I will not allow you to utter such trifles as these.

Socrates/ I was astounded on hearing this; and when I looked at him, I was frightened; and, methinks, had I not perceived him before he perceived me, I should have become speechless. But just when he began to grow fierce under our discussion, I observed him first, so that I was now able to answer him, and said, somewhat in a flutter: —Be not hard on us, Thrasymachus; if I and he Polemarchus err in the working out of our arguments, be well assured we err unwittingly: for, think not, that if we were searching for gold, we would ever wittingly yield to one another in the search, thus frustrating all chance of discovering it, and yet

searching for justice, —a matter far more valuable than gold, foolishly make concessions to each other, and not labor with the utmost ardor for its discovery: —think you so, friend?

Thrasymachus/ Nay, methinks, we could not.

Socrates/ That we should be sympathized with by your clever persons is far more to be expected then, than that we should be treated with contempt.

On hearing this he, Thrasymachus, gave a disdainful sort of laugh, and said: —

Thrasymachus/ By Heracles, this is Socrates' wonted irony; and this I both knew, and foretold to these here, —that you never incline to answer, but use your irony, and do anything rather than answer, if anyone asks you anything.

Socrates/ Aye; you are a wise man, Thrasymachus; for you knew well, that if you asked anyone, how many make twelve; and, if asking, you should tell him, you must not tell me, man, that twelve are twice six, —or three times four, —or four times three; because I will not admit it, if you are such a trifler; it was plain to you, methinks, that no man would answer one so inquiring. But if he should say to you, What mean you, Thrasymachus, may I not answer in any of these ways you have told me, —not even though the real answer happen to be one of them; but am I rather to say something else than the truth? Or, how is it you mean? What would you say to him in reply to these things?

Thrasymachus/ If they were alike, I should give an answer; for the one, forsooth, is like the other.

Socrates/ That is no real objection; but even if it be not like, but only appears so to him who has been asked, do you think he would the less readily express his opinion, whether we should forbid him or not?

Thrasymachus/ And, will you do so now? Will you state, in reply, some of those things which I forbade you to say?

Socrates/ I should not wonder, if I did, if it appeared so to me on inquiry.

Thrasymachus/ What, then, if I should show you another answer, besides all these about justice, and better, too, than these, —what will you deserve to suffer?

Socrates/ What else, but what the ignorant ought to suffer? —and it is proper, perhaps, to learn from a wise man, I consequently deserve to suffer this.

Thrasymachus/ You are merry now; but besides learning, you must pay money too.

Socrates/ Aye, when I have it.

Glaucon/ We have got some: but, as for the money, Thrasymachus, say on, for all of us will club for Socrates.

Thrasymachus/ By all means, I think, in order that Socrates may go on in his usual manner, —not answer himself, but when another answers, take up the discourse and confute.

Socrates/ How, then, in the first place, my good fellow, can a man answer, when he neither knows, nor pretends to know; and when, supposing him to have any opinion at all about these matters, he is forbidden to say what he thinks by no ordinary person? But it is more reasonable, then, that you speak, as you say you know, and can tell us. Do not refuse, then, but oblige me by answering, and do not begrudge instructing Glaucon here, and the rest of the company.

On my saying this, both Glaucon and the rest of the company entreated him not to decline it: —and Thrasymachus in particular, was evidently most anxious to speak, in order to gain applause, reckoning he had a mighty clever answer to make, and pretending to be earnest that I should be the answerer; but at last he agreed.

Thrasymachus/ Now, this, forsooth, is the wisdom of Socrates, that he himself is unwilling to teach, but goes about learning from others, and gives no thanks for it.

Socrates/ That I learn from others, Thrasymachus, is quite true; but in saying, that I do not thank persons for it, you are wrong. I pay as much as I am able, and I can only give them praise, for money I have none; but how readily I do this, when anyone appears to me to speak well, you shall perfectly know directly, whenever you make your answer; for methinks you will speak well.

Thrasymachus/ Hear, then, for I say that the just is nothing else but what is expedient for the strongest. But why do not you commend? —Ah! you do not like that.

Socrates/ Let me learn first, what it is you are talking about; for as yet I know not. That which is expedient for the strongest you say, is the just. And what, at all, is it that you are talking of now, Thrasymachus? for you certainly do not mean anything like this. If Polydamas, the wrestler, be stronger than we, and if beef be better for his body, this food is likewise both just and beneficial to us, who are weaker than himself.

Thrasymachus/ You are a saucy fellow, Socrates, and lay hold of my argument just on that side where you may damage it most.

Socrates/ By no means, my good fellow; but say more plainly what is your meaning.

Thrasymachus/ Know you not, then, that with reference to States, some are tyrannical, others democratical, and others aristocratical?

Socrates/ Of course.

Thrasymachus/ And is not the governing part of each State the more powerful?

Socrates/ Certainly: and every government makes laws precisely to suit itself, —a democracy, democratic laws; a tyranny, tyrannic; and the rest in like manner: —and when they have made them, they declare that to be just for the governed, which is advantageous for themselves, and anyone who transgresses it, they punish as one acting contrary both to law and justice.

Thrasymachus/ This, then, most excellent Socrates, is what I say, that in all States the same thing constitutes justice, viz., what is expedient for the established government. This, then, is the fact with him who reasons rightly, that in all cases whatever that same is just which is expedient for the more powerful.

Socrates/ Now, I understand what you mean. But as to its truth or otherwise, I will try to find out. As for the expedient, then, even you yourself, Thrasymachus, have affirmed it to be the just; and yet, though you forbade me to give the answer, still you are adding the expression of the more powerful.

Thrasymachus/ Quite a trifling addition, perhaps.

Socrates/ It is not clear yet, whether it is small or great; but it is clear that we must inquire whether you speak the truth, since I, too, acknowledge that the just is something that is expedient; but you say, in addition, that it is that also which belongs to the most powerful. This I am not sure of; but that is what we have to inquire.

Thrasymachus/ Inquire then.

Socrates/ We will do so: —and, tell me, —do you not say, that it is just to obey governors?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Are the governors in the several states infallible, or are they capable of erring?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly, they are liable to err.

Socrates/ When they set about making laws, then, do they not make some of them right, and some of them wrong?

Thrasymachus/ I think so.

Socrates/ To make them right, then, is to make them expedient for themselves, and to make them not right, is that inexpedient; —or how mean you?

Thrasymachus/ Just so.

Socrates/ And what they enact is to be observed by the governed; and this is what is just?

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ According to your reasoning, then, it is just, to do what is expedient to the stronger, while the contrary is what is not expedient: —what say you?

Thrasymachus/ I am of the same opinion as yourself.

Socrates/ But let us inquire better. Is it not granted, that governors in bidding the governed do certain things, may sometimes be in error as to what is best for themselves; and that what the governors enjoin, is just for the governed to do? Have not these truths been granted?

Thrasymachus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Consider also, therefore, that you have allowed it to be just to do what is inexpedient for governors and the more powerful, whenever governors unwillingly enjoin what is ill for themselves; and yet you say, that it is just for the others to do what these enjoin. Must it not necessarily happen, then, most sage Thrasymachus, that, in this case, it may be just to do the contrary of what you say: for that which is the disadvantage of the more powerful, is sometimes enjoined on the inferiors?

Polemarchus/ Yes, by Zeus, these things are quite clear, Socrates.

Clitophon/ Yes, if you bear him witness.

Socrates/ What need, of a witness? —for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that governors sometimes order what is ill for themselves, and that it is just for the governed to do these things. Aye, Polemarchus; for he laid it down, that it is just to do what is bidden by the governors, and he has also defined that as just, Clitophon, which is expedient for the more powerful; and, having laid down both these propositions, he has granted that the more powerful sometimes bid the inferiors and governed to do what is inexpedient for themselves; and, from these concessions, what is expedient for the more powerful can no more be just than what is not expedient.

Clitophon/ But he alleged, that what was expedient for the strongest was what the strongest judged expedient for himself; this, too, was to be done by the inferior, and this he defined as the just.

Polemarchus/ Aye, —but that was not stated.

Socrates/ There is no difference, Polemarchus; but, if Thrasymachus says so now, so let us understand him. Now tell me, Thrasymachus; was this what you meant by justice, —namely, the advantage of the more powerful, such as appeared so to the more powerful, whether it really were so, or not: —shall we say that you mean this?

Thrasymachus/ Not at all: —for, think you, I call him who errs, the more powerful, at the time he errs?

Socrates/ For my part, I thought you meant this, when you acknowledged that governors were not infallible, but that in some things even they erred.

Thrasymachus/ You are a sycophant, in reasoning, Socrates! For, for instance do you call him a physician, who errs about the treatment of the sick, in respect of that very thing in which he errs; or him a reasoner, who errs in reasoning, at the very time he errs, and with reference to

that very error? But, we say, in common language, I fancy, that the physician erred, the reasoner erred, and the grammarian likewise; but in fact I think, each of these, so far as he is what we designate him, never errs; so that, strictly speaking especially as you are a strict reasoner, no artist errs; —for he who errs, errs through defect of science, in what he is not an artist; and hence no artist, or wise man, or governor, errs, in so far as he is a governor. Yet everyone would say 'the physician erred,' and 'the governor erred,' You must understand, then, that it was in this way I just now answered you. But the most accurate answer is this: —that the governor, in as far as he is governor, errs not; and as he does not err, he enacts that which is best for himself, and this must be observed by the governed. So that as I said at the beginning, I call justice the doing that which is for the advantage of the strongest *i.e.* the best.

Socrates/ Be it so, Thrasymachus; —but do I seem to you to act the sycophant?

Thrasymachus/ Aye, surely.

Socrates/ Do you think that I insidiously mislead you in the argument, to put the question to you as I did?

Thrasymachus/ I know it well, and you shall gain nothing by it; for neither shall you mislead me unawares, nor can you unawares get the better of me in argument.

Socrates/ I shall not attempt it, my excellent friend, but, that nothing of this kind may happen to us again, —define in which way you speak of a ruler, and superior, according only to common talk, or in the strict sense of the word, as you just now said, he, whose advantage, in that he is the more powerful, it is just for the inferior to observe.

Thrasymachus/ I speak of him, who is a ruler in the strictest sense of the word. For this now abuse and

calumniate me, as you like. I do not deprecate your doing so; but you are quite unable.

Socrates/ Do you think me so mad, as to attempt to shave a lion, and traduce Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ You have just attempted it, but with no effect.

Socrates/ Enough of such matters; but tell me he who is, strictly speaking, a physician, whom you just now mentioned, is he a gainer of money, or a tender of the sick? —and mind—tell us of him who is really a physician.

Thrasymachus/ A tender of the sick.

Socrates/ But what of the pilot? is he who is really a pilot, a master of sailors, or a sailor?

Thrasymachus/ A master of sailors.

Socrates/ It matters not, I fancy, that he sails in a ship, and is not to be called a sailor; for he it is not called a pilot from his sailing, but from his art, and his mastery of the sailors.

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ Has not each of these, then, something that is advantageous for him?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Was not the art then acquired for this very purpose, to seek out and supply to each what is advantageous for him?

Thrasymachus/ For that purpose.

Socrates/ To each of the arts, then, is any other advantage wanting, than to be as perfect as possible?

Thrasymachus/ —How mean you by this question?

Socrates/ If you were to ask me, whether it is sufficient for the body to be a body, or whether it needs something else, I should say, that it certainly does stand in need of

something else. For this reason, indeed, has the medicinal art been already invented, because the body is infirm, and it is not sufficient for it to be such as it is: —in order then to supply what is advantageous for it, art has been provided. Do you think then, that I am right, or not, in thus speaking?

Thrasymachus/ Right.

Socrates/ But what then? Is this very art of medicine, or any other whatever, imperfect, as being deficient in a certain virtue; just as the eyes, when deficient as to sight, and the ears as to hearing; and for these reasons need they a certain additional art to seek out and furnish what is expedient for these very organs? Is there then in art itself some imperfection, and does every art need another art, to consider what is expedient for it, and does that which considers again need another, and so on to infinity; or will each art consider what is expedient for itself; or will each need neither itself, nor any other, to consider what is expedient for it with reference to its own imperfection? —For there is no imperfection nor error in any art whatever; nor is it the business of art to seek what is expedient for anything else, but that of which it is the art; —but as for itself, it is infallible and pure, because it is right, so long as each, whatever it is, be an accurate whole: —and consider now, in that same strict sense of the words, whether it be thus or otherwise.

Thrasymachus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ The art of medicine, then, does not consider what is expedient for the art of medicine, but for the body?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor the art of managing horses, what is expedient for that art, but for horses. Nor any other art for itself for that is needless, but only for that of which it is the art?

Thrasymachus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ However, Thrasymachus, the arts rule and govern that of which they are arts?

He assented to this, though with great difficulty.

No science whatever, then, either considers or dictates what is expedient for the superior, but only what is so for the inferior, —that, namely, which is governed by it?

To this also he at length assented, though he attempted to contend about it. But when he had assented, What else is this, but saying that no physician, so far as he is a physician, either considers or dictates what is expedient for the physician, but only what is expedient for the sick? —For the physician, strictly so called, has been acknowledged to be one who has charge of the body, and is not an amasser of wealth. —Has it not been acknowledged?

He assented.

And likewise that the pilot, so called, is the master of the sailors, and not a sailor?

Thrasymachus/ It has been acknowledged.

Socrates/ Such a pilot and master then, will not consider and dictate what is expedient for the pilot, but what is so to the sailor and the governed?

He acquiesced, but unwillingly.

Nor yet, Thrasymachus, does any other in any government whatever, so far as he is a governor, consider or dictate what is expedient for himself, but only for the governed and those to whom he acts as steward; and, with an eye to this, and to what is expedient and suitable for this, he both says what he says, and does what he does.

When we were at this part of the discussion, and it was evident to all, that the definition of justice stood now quite

contrary to that of Thrasymachus, Thrasymachus, instead of replying, said:

Thrasymachus/ Tell me, Socrates, have you a nurse?

Socrates/ What now; —ought you not rather to answer, than put such questions?

Thrasymachus/ Because, forsooth, she neglects you when your nose is stuffed, and does not wipe it when it needs it, you, who as well as she, understand neither about sheep nor shepherd.

Socrates/ What is the meaning of all this?

Thrasymachus/ Because you think that shepherds and herdsmen consider the good of the sheep or oxen, to fatten and tend them, having their eye on something else than their masters good and their own; moreover, that those who rule in cities, those, who rule truly, are somehow differently disposed towards the governed, than a shepherd would be towards sheep, and that they attend day and night to somewhat else than the question, how they shall be gainers themselves; and so far are you from the notion of the just and justice, and the unjust and injustice, that you seem ignorant that both justice and the just are, in reality, a foreign good, expedient for the stronger and ruling party, but positively injurious to the subject and servant, —while injustice, on the contrary, takes the rule of such as are truly simple and just, and the governed do what is expedient for him, since he possesses the most power, and promote his happiness, by serving him, but themselves not at all. —In this case, most simple Socrates, we should consider, that a just man gets less on all occasions than an unjust. —First, in mutual contracts with one another, where a certain party joins with another, you will never find on the dissolution of the partnership, that the just man gets more than the unjust, but less: —then, again, in civil affairs, when public

imposts are to be paid, the just man, from equal means, pays more, the other less; and when anything is to be gained, the one gains nothing, the other much; and when each of these holds any public office, if no other loss befalls the just man, at any rate his domestic affairs become deteriorated through neglect, and from the public he derives no benefit, because he is just; —besides which, he becomes hated by his domestics and acquaintance, since he will never serve them, beyond what is just. —But with the unjust man, all the contrary of this occurs; for I maintain, what I lately said, that such an one has a great power of becoming unfairly rich. —Consider the case of this man, therefore, if you would discern how much more it conduces to his private interest to be unjust, rather than just.

This you will most easily of all understand if you come to the most finished injustice, such as renders the unjust man most happy, but the injured and those who are unwilling to do injustice, most wretched. —This, now, is tyranny, which takes away the goods of others, as well by secret fraud as open violence, both things sacred and holy, private and public, and these in no small portions, but all at once. —In all particular cases of such crimes, when a man undisguisedly commits injustice, he is both punished and treated with the greatest ignominy: and as a proof of this, they are called sacrilegious, kidnappers, housebreakers, pilferers, and thieves, according to the several kinds of the wickedness committed.

But when a man, in addition to the property of the citizens, takes prisoners and enslaves the citizens themselves, instead of these ugly names, he is called happy and blest, not only by the citizens, but likewise by all the rest, whoever may get informed that he has committed such enormous injustice; —for those who revile wickedness, revile it—not because they are afraid of doing, but because they

are afraid of suffering what is unjust. —Thus, Socrates, is it, that injustice, when it attains a certain point, is both more powerful, more free, and more absolutely despotic than justice: and as I said at the beginning the advantage of the stronger happens to be just, while that is unjust which profits and benefits one's self.

Socrates/ Saying this, Thrasymachus purposed going off, after pouring on our ears, as a bath-keeper, this impetuous and lengthened discourse.

Those present, however, would not suffer him, but forced him to stay and give account of what he had advanced; and I myself, also, strongly urged him, and said: Oh! wonderful Thrasymachus; do you purpose, after throwing on us such strange talk, to go away without rightly instructing us, or informing yourself whether the case be as you say, or otherwise?

Do you think that you are trying to determine some small matter, and not the guide of life, by which each of us being conducted may pass his life most profitably?

Thrasymachus/ Can I think that the case is otherwise?

Socrates/ You seem, at any rate, to care nothing at all about us, nor to be any way concerned whether we shall live well or ill, through our ignorance of what you say you know: —but, my good friend, be so obliging as to show it to us also; nor will the favor be ill-placed, whatever you may bestow on so many of us as are here present. And I, for my part, can say that I am not persuaded, nor do I think, that injustice is more gainful than justice, —not even should we allow it play, and not prevent it doing what it likes. But, my good friend, even supposing him to be unjust and able to do unjustly, either secretly or by open force, yet I at least am not persuaded that injustice is more gainful than justice; and on this point probably some of us here are of the same mind,

and not I alone. Persuade us, therefore, sufficiently, my admirable friend, that we are wrong in deeming justice of more value than injustice.

Thrasymachus/ But how, am I to persuade you? for if you are not persuaded by what I have said already, what further can I do for you? Shall I take and implant my arguments in your very soul?

Socrates/ By Zeus, no; —but, first of all, whatever you have said, abide by it: or, if you do change, change openly, and do not deceive us. Now, you see, Thrasymachus—for we will reconsider what has been above said, —that in first defining the true physician, you did not think it needful afterwards, that the true shepherd should strictly keep his flock, but fancy, that so far as he is a shepherd, he may feed his flock without regarding the best interests of the sheep, but rather as some glutton going to feast on them at some entertainment, or to dispose of them as a merchant, and not care for them as a shepherd. The shepherd art, however, has certainly no other care but that for which it is appointed, namely, to afford it what is best, since its own affairs are already so sufficiently provided for, as to be in the very best state without needing any of the shepherd art. So likewise, I, for my part, conceived that there you must necessarily agree with us in this, that every government, in as far as it is government, considers what is best for nothing else but for that which is governed and tended, whether in political or private government. But with respect to rulers in cities, think you that such as are really rulers govern willingly?

Thrasymachus/ No, by Zeus, I do not think so; but I am quite certain.

Socrates/ Why now, Thrasymachus, do you not perceive, as regards all other governments, that no one undertakes them willingly, but men ask for recompense, since the

benefits likely to accrue from governing are not to come to themselves, but to the governed? Tell me this, then; —do we not always say that each several art is distinct in this, in having a distinct function? And my admirable friend, do not answer contrary to your opinion, that we may make some real progress.

Thrasymachus/ In this respect, at any rate, it is distinct.

Socrates/ And does not each of them afford us some certain peculiar advantage, and not a common one; —as, for instance, the medicinal, health; the pilot art, safety in sailing, —and the rest in like manner?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And has not the mercenary art mercenary reward? for this is its function. Do you call both the medicinal art and the pilot art one and the same? Or, if you mean to define them strictly, as you proposed, though one in piloting recover his health, on account of the expedience of his going to sea, you will not at all the more on this account call it the medicinal art?

Thrasymachus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Nor will you call the mercenary art the medicinal, I fancy, though in earning a reward one may recover his health?

Thrasymachus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ What then? Will you call the medicinal the mercenary art, if, in performing a cure, one earn a reward?

Thrasymachus/ No.

Socrates/ Have we not acknowledged, then, that each art has its peculiar advantage?

Thrasymachus/ Granted.

Socrates/ Whatever, then, be that advantage, with which all artists in common are advantaged, it must plainly be by

using some same thing in common to all, that they are advantaged by it.

Thrasymachus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Still, we say that the advantage accruing to artists from receiving a reward comes to them from the adoption of a mercenary art.

He acquiesced unwillingly.

Socrates/ This, then, is not the advantage which each receives from his own art, namely, the receiving a reward? —But if we strictly consider it, the art of medicine produces health, that of money-getting a reward, masonry a house, and the mercenary art accompanying it, a reward; and all the others in like manner, —everyone performs its own work, and confers advantage on that for which it was designed; but if it meet not with a reward, is the artist benefited at all by his art?

Thrasymachus/ It appears not.

Socrates/ But confers he no service when he works gratuitously?

Thrasymachus/ I think he does.

Socrates/ This, then, is now evident, Thrasymachus, that no art or government provides what is advantageous for itself; but, as we said long ago, it both provides and prescribes for the governed what is advantageous to him, having in view the interest of the inferior and not that of the more powerful. For these reasons, then, friend Thrasymachus, I even just now said, that no one is willing to govern and undertake the setting right of others' troubles without asking a reward; because, whoever intends to practice his art well, never himself does nor enjoins on others what is best for himself, if he enjoins according to his art, but rather what is best for the governed; for which reason, therefore, as it seems, a recompense must be given

to those who are likely to be willing governors, —either money, or honor, —or punishment, on the other hand, if a man will not govern.

Glaucon/ How say you this, Socrates? —the two rewards, indeed, I understand; but the punishment, that you mention, and how you can speak of it under the head of reward, I know not.

Socrates/ As for the reward, then, of the best of men, do you not understand why the most worthy govern, when they are willing to govern: —or, do you not know, that to be ambitious and covetous, is both deemed a reproach, and is so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ For these reasons, then, good men are not willing to govern, either for money or for honor; inasmuch as they neither wish to be called mercenary, for openly making gain by governing, —nor thieves, for taking clandestinely from what belongs to their office: —nor again are they willing to govern for honor, since they are not ambitious. Hence if they are to be induced to govern willingly, there must be laid on them both compulsion and punishment; and hence it seems likely, that a willing undertaking of government, without waiting for compulsion, has been reckoned dishonorable. The greatest part of the punishment, however, in case he is not willing to govern himself, is the being governed by one who is inferior. It is chiefly through fear of this, methinks, that the good govern, when they do govern: and in that case they enter on the government, not as on anything good, or as about to derive any advantage therefrom, but as on a necessary task, and finding none better than, or even like, themselves, to entrust with the government. It seems likely, indeed, that if there were a state of good men, the contest would be, not to govern, as now it

is to govern; and, hence, it would be manifest, that the really true governor does not naturally aim at his own advantage, but at that of the governed; so that anyone who has sense would rather choose to be benefited by another, than have trouble in benefiting another.

This, therefore, I, for my part, by no means grant to Thrasymachus; that justice is what is expedient for the stronger: —but this, indeed, we shall consider again hereafter. —What Thrasymachus says now, however, seems to me of much more importance, —when he says, that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just.

You, then, Glaucon, which opinion do you choose; and which of the two seems to you most consistent with truth?

Glaucon/ The life of the just, is in my opinion the more profitable.

Socrates/ Have you heard, how many good things Thrasymachus just now enumerated in the life of the unjust?

Glaucon/ I heard; but I am not persuaded.

Socrates/ Do you wish, then, that we should persuade him if we can find any means of doing so, that there is no truth in what he says?

Glaucon/ How should I not wish it?

Socrates/ If then, by way of opposition, we advance, as argument against argument, how many good things are involved in being just, —and again, he on the other side, and we again rejoin, it will be requisite to compute and estimate what either of us says on either side; and we shall want also some judges to decide thereon. But if, as just now, we investigate these matters, by agreeing with each other, we shall ourselves be both judges and counsel?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Which of these plans, then, do you choose?

Glaucon/ The latter.

Socrates/ Come then, Thrasymachus; —answer us from the beginning. Say you, that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice?

Thrasymachus/ Assuredly, I do say so; —and why, too, I have already told you.

Socrates/ Come, now, how can you affirm anything like the following concerning them? —Do you call one of them virtue; and the other vice?

Thrasymachus/ How not?

Socrates/ Is not justice, then, a virtue, —and injustice a vice?

Thrasymachus/ Likely, indeed, that I should say so, facetious man; since I say that injustice is profitable, but justice not so!

Socrates/ What then?

Thrasymachus/ Quite the contrary.

Socrates/ Do you call justice a vice?

Thrasymachus/ No; but a very generous folly.

Socrates/ Do you, then, call injustice a want of principle?

Thrasymachus/ No, but sagacity.

Socrates/ Do the unjust, Thrasymachus, seem to you both wise and good?

Thrasymachus/ Such, at least, as are able to do injustice in perfection, and can subject states and nations to themselves; but you think, perhaps, that I speak of cut-purses. Even such employment as this, is profitable, if concealed; but yet is of no value in comparison with what I just mentioned.

Socrates/ I am not ignorant, of what you mean to say: but at this I am surprised, —that you should reckon injustice as a part of virtue and wisdom, and justice among their contraries.

Thrasymachus/ But, I certainly do reckon it so.

Socrates/ This, my good friend, is somewhat too hard, and it is no longer easy to know what one can say: for if you had alleged that injustice is profitable, and had still allowed it to be a vice, or base, as some others do, —we should have had something to say, speaking according to received opinions. But now it is evident that you will say it is beautiful and strong, and will attribute to it all other properties which we ascribe to the just man, because, forsooth, you have ventured to class it with virtue and wisdom.

Thrasymachus/ You augur very truly.

Socrates/ I must not grudge, however, to pursue our inquiry, so long as I conceive you speak what you really think; for you appear to me, Thrasymachus, without doubt, not to be jesting, but only to speak what you conceive to be the truth.

Thrasymachus/ What difference is it to you, whether I think so, or not; —and why do you not refute my reasoning?

Socrates/ No difference at all: —but try further to reply to this likewise: does one just man appear to you to wish to have more than another just man?

Thrasymachus/ By no means; for otherwise he would not have been accommodating and silly, as we just conceived him.

Socrates/ What; not even in a just action?

Thrasymachus/ No, —not even in one that is just.

Socrates/ But, would he deem it right to overreach the unjust man, and reckon it just; or would he not think it just?

Thrasymachus/ He would both count it just, and deem it right; but yet he would not be able to do it.

Socrates/ That, I do not ask, —but, whether the just man would neither deem it right, nor feel a wish to overreach a just man, but yet would do so to the unjust?

Thrasymachus/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ What, then, would the unjust man do? —Would he deem it right to overreach the just man, even in a just action?

Thrasymachus/ How not, since he deems it right to overreach all men?

Socrates/ With respect, then, to the unjust man and unjust action, will not the unjust man desire to overreach both; and eagerly strive himself to receive most of all?

Thrasymachus/ Such is the fact.

Socrates/ This, then, is what we mean: —the just man does not try to overreach one like himself, but one that is unlike, while the unjust man does so both to one like, and one unlike himself.

Thrasymachus/ You have expressed yourself admirably.

Socrates/ Well, then, the unjust man is both wise and good; but the just man is neither.

Thrasymachus/ Well, again.

Socrates/ In that case, is not the unjust man like the wise and the good, and the just man unlike.

Thrasymachus/ Of course, a person of a certain character is likely to resemble one of like character: and he who is otherwise, not.

Socrates/ Well said: —such an one then, of course, is either of those whom he resembles?

Thrasymachus/ Why doubt it?

Socrates/ Granted, Thrasymachus; —now do you call one man musical, and another unmusical?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ Which of the two do you call wise, and which unwise?

Thrasymachus/ The musical, surely, wise, and the unmusical unwise.

Socrates/ As being wise, then, is he not good; but as unwise, bad?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what as to the physician, is it not the same?

Thrasymachus/ The same.

Socrates/ Do you think, then, my excellent friend, that any musician, when he is tuning a harp, wants to overreach, or deems it right to have more skill than a man who is a musician, in straining and slackening the strings?

Thrasymachus/ Not I.

Socrates/ But what with respect to one unmusical?

Thrasymachus/ He could not help it.

Socrates/ And what as to the physician? In prescribing meats or drinks, would he try to overreach either another physician, or the art he professes?

Thrasymachus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But one who is no physician would?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Just consider then, as respects all science and ignorance, whether any skillful man, be he who he may, appears to you to have a desire to grasp at, or do, or say more than another skillful man, —and not rather to do the

same things, in the same business as one equally skillful with himself?

Thrasymachus/ Aye, it seems, it must be so.

Socrates/ But what, as to him who is unskilled, will not he like to overreach both alike the skillful and the unskilled?

Thrasymachus/ Probably.

Socrates/ But the skillful man is wise?

Thrasymachus/ I admit it.

Socrates/ And the wise, good?

Thrasymachus/ I admit it.

Socrates/ Both the good and the wise, then, will not want to overreach his like, but rather one unlike, and contrary to himself?

Thrasymachus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But the bad and the ignorant man will want to overreach both his like and his contrary?

Thrasymachus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ In that case, Thrasymachus; —the unjust man desires to overreach both one unlike and one like himself: —did not you say so?

Thrasymachus/ I did.

Socrates/ The just man, however, on his side, will not overreach his like, but one unlike?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The just man then, resembles the wise and the good, but the unjust, the evil and the ignorant?

Thrasymachus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But we agreed, that each of them was such as what he resembled?

Thrasymachus/ We did agree so.

Socrates/ The just man, then, has been clearly shown to be good and wise, but the unjust, ignorant and evil.

Thrasymachus at last agreed to all these things, —not easily, as I now narrate them, but dragged to it, and with difficulty, and with a wondrous deal of sweating, just as if it was summer.

Then, indeed, did I behold—I never did before—Thrasymachus blushing.

And after we had agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice, vice and ignorance, —well, let this be so settled; —but we said also, that injustice is powerful: —do not you remember, Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ I do remember; —but, to me at least, what you now say is not pleasing, and I have somewhat to say about it; but should I mention it, I well know you would say I am declaiming. Either, then, let me say what I please, or, if you wish to question me, do so, and I will say to you, as to gossiping old women, "Be it so," and will assent and dissent.

Socrates/ Not by any means, if against your own opinion.

Thrasymachus/ Just to please you, since you will not let me speak: though what else do you wish?

Socrates/ Nothing, by Zeus: but if you will do this, do it, and I will ask questions.

Thrasymachus/ Ask, then.

Socrates/ This, then, I ask, as just now that we may regularly examine our argument, of what quality is justice, compared with injustice? for I think it has been said that injustice was more powerful and stronger than justice. —But now, at any rate, if justice be both virtue and wisdom, it will easily, methinks, be seen to be more powerful also than injustice, since injustice is ignorance; no one can any longer be ignorant of this. —For my part, however, Thrasymachus,

I am not desirous of getting rid of the question at once, but to consider it somehow thus. —Would you say that a state may be unjust, and attempt to enslave other states unjustly, and have enslaved them, and besides that actually hold many in slavery under herself?

Thrasymachus/ How not and this for the most part the best state will do, and one that is most completely unjust.

Socrates/ I am aware, that this was your assertion: —but this is what I wish to inquire; whether the state, which becomes more powerful than another state, is to hold this power without justice, or must necessarily do so with justice?

Thrasymachus/ If indeed, as you now alleged, justice is wisdom—with justice; but if, as I said, —with injustice.

Socrates/ I am quite delighted, Thrasymachus, that you not merely assent and dissent; but also that you answer quite capitally.

Thrasymachus/ For I oblige you.

Socrates/ Therein doing well: oblige me, then, in this too, and tell me, —think you that a city, or camp, or robbers, or thieves, or any other company of men, such as jointly undertake anything unjustly, can meet with any success, if they injure one another?

Thrasymachus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But what, if they do no wrong? —will they not get on better?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For, somehow or other, Thrasymachus, injustice induces seditions, and hatreds, and contentions among men, —while justice brings harmony and friendship. Does it not?

Thrasymachus/ Granted, that I may not differ from you.

Socrates/ You are very kind, my excellent friend, then tell me this too; —if this be the work of injustice to engender hatred wherever it exists, will it not, when exercised both among freemen and slaves, make them hate one another, and become seditious, and incapable of doing anything in concert for the common advantage?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what if it happen in the case of two only; will they not differ, and hate, and become enemies both to one another and to the just also?

Thrasymachus/ They will.

Socrates/ If then, my admirable friend, injustice reside in a person, —will it lose its power, or still retain it?

Thrasymachus/ It will still retain it.

Socrates/ Seems it not, then, to have some such power as this; —that, in whatever it exists, whether in a city, or race, or camp, or anywhere else, it first of all renders it unable to act of itself, owing to seditions and differences; besides which, it becomes an enemy not only to itself, but to every opponent, especially to the just—is it not so?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And, methinks, when injustice residing in one man will have all these effects, which it is natural for it to produce, it will, in the first place, render him unable to act, while at variance and discord with himself; —and, secondly, as being an enemy both to himself and the just: —is it not so?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But, at any rate, friend, the gods are just?

Thrasymachus/ Granted.

Socrates/ As respects the gods, then, Thrasymachus, the unjust man will be a foe, but the just man a friend?

Thrasymachus/ Feast yourself boldly on this reasoning; for I will not oppose you, that I may not render myself odious to those who think so.

Socrates/ Come then, and satiate me with the rest of the feast, by answering as you were doing just now: for as respects the just appearing wiser and better and more able to act, but the unjust being capable of doing nothing in concert; and besides that, as to what we said with reference to the unjust, that they are ever at any time able strenuously to act in mutual concert, —this we advanced not quite correctly, for being thoroughly unjust, they would not spare one another: but yet it was evident that there was a justice in them, which made them refrain at any rate from injuring one another and those of their party, —owing to which they performed what they did; and they rushed into unjust actions, through injustice, in a kind of half-wicked feeling; for the completely wicked are both perfectly unjust, and also quite incapable of action: —that this is really so, I understand, but not in the way that you first defined it.

Besides, whether the just live better than the unjust, and are more happy which we proposed to consider afterwards, is now to be considered: —and, methinks, they appear to do so even at present, from what we have said: —but let us consider the matter still better; for the discussion is not about a casual matter, but about the manner in which we ought to live.

Thrasymachus/ Consider, then.

Socrates/ I am considering; —and tell me, does there seem to you to be any work peculiar to a horse?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Would you not call that the peculiar work both of a horse, and indeed of any being whatever, which he can do, or best do, with him alone?

Thrasymachus/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ But thus; —see you with anything else than the eyes?

Thrasymachus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ What then? Could you hear with anything else than the ears?

Thrasymachus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Should we not, then, justly call these the works peculiar to them?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what—could you not with a sword, a knife, and many other things, lop off a vine-branch?

Thrasymachus/ How not?

Socrates/ But with nothing, at any rate, methinks, so well as with a pruning-knife made for that purpose.

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ Shall we not then define this to be its peculiar work?

Thrasymachus/ We will so define it then.

Socrates/ Now, methinks, you may understand better what I was asking, when I inquired whether the work of each be not that which, of all others, one performs either alone or in the best manner.

Thrasymachus/ I understand you; and this seems to me to be each one's peculiar work.

Socrates/ Granted: —and does there not likewise appear to you to be a virtue belonging to everything, to which a certain work is assigned? But let us run over the same ground once more: —We say that the eyes have a certain work?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is there not then a virtue belonging to the eyes?

Thrasymachus/ A virtue also.

Socrates/ Well, then, have the ears a certain work?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And of course a virtue also?

Thrasymachus/ A virtue also.

Socrates/ And, about all the rest; —is it not thus?

Thrasymachus/ It is.

Socrates/ But, hold: —could the eyes ever cleverly perform their work, when not possessed of their own proper virtue, but vice instead of virtue?

Thrasymachus/ How could they? for perhaps you mean blindness instead of sight.

Socrates/ Whatever, be their virtue, that I mean, —for I do not yet enter on this question; but, whether by their own proper virtue they will perform their own proper work well, whatever they undertake; and by vice, badly?

Thrasymachus/ In this, at least, you speak the truth.

Socrates/ And will not the ears also, when deprived of their virtue, perform their work ill?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And, are we to settle all other things by the same reasoning?

Thrasymachus/ So I suppose.

Socrates/ Come then, after this, consider what follows: has the soul a certain work, which you can perform by no other living thing, —such as this, to take care, to govern, to consult, and all such acts? Is there any other than the soul, to which we can justly ascribe them, and say they are its proper functions?

Thrasymachus/ No other.

Socrates/ But what of this? —To live; shall we say it is the work of the soul?

Thrasymachus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Do not we say, then, that there is some virtue, also, peculiar to the soul?

Thrasymachus/ We do.

Socrates/ And can the soul, then, Thrasymachus, ever perform its own works cleverly, whilst deprived of its proper virtue; —or, is this impossible?

Thrasymachus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Of necessity, then, a bad soul must govern and take care of things badly, and a good soul perform all these things well?

Thrasymachus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Did we not then agree, that justice was the virtue of the soul, and injustice its vice?

Thrasymachus/ We did so agree.

Socrates/ The just soul, then, and the just man, will live well, and the unjust ill?

Thrasymachus/ It appears so, according to your reasoning.

Socrates/ Surely, then, he who lives well is both blessed and happy; and he who does not, the opposite?

Thrasymachus/ How not?

Socrates/ The just, then, is happy, and the unjust miserable?

Thrasymachus/ Granted.

Socrates/ But at any rate, it is not advantageous to be miserable, but happy?

Thrasymachus/ How not?

Socrates/ In that case, excellent Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profitable than justice.

Thrasymachus/ Well, now, Socrates, you have been capitally well feasted at these Bendideia.

Socrates/ Aye, by you, Thrasymachus, I certainly have; for you are grown quite mild, and have ceased to be troublesome: —and if I have not feasted handsomely, it is owing to myself, not you. —But just as greedy guests, ever gloating on what is fresh brought before them, taste thereof, without having properly enjoyed what went before, —so I, methinks, without having first ascertained what we were before investigating, —namely the nature of justice, have omitted this, and rushed eagerly forward to inquire concerning it, whether it be vice and ignorance, or wisdom and virtue; —and when an assertion was afterwards introduced, that injustice is more profitable than justice, I could not refrain from coming to this, from the other; so that now, from this conversation, I have learnt nothing at all; —for since I do not know what justice is, I can scarcely know whether it be a virtue or not, —and whether he who possesses it be unhappy or happy.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

Book 2.

Socrates/ Having said these things, I thought to have been relieved from the debate; but this it seems was only the introduction; for Glaucon is on all occasions most courageous, and then especially did not approve of Thrasymachus' withdrawal from the debate, but said; —

Glaucon/ Socrates, have you any desire of seeming to have persuaded us, or to succeed in really persuading us that it is in every respect better to be just than unjust?

Socrates/ I, for my part, would prefer to do so in reality, if it depended on me.

Glaucon/ You are not doing then, what you desire: for, tell me, does there appear to you any good of this kind, such as we would accept as a possession, without regard to its results, but embracing it simply for its own sake; such as joy and all kinds of harmless pleasures, though for the future no other advantage springs from them than the delight arising from their possession.

Socrates/ To me, indeed, there does seem to be something of this kind.

Glaucon/ But what; —is there not some species of good which we both love for its own sake, and also for what springs from it, —as wisdom, sight, and health? —for such goods we surely embrace on both accounts.

Socrates/ Yes.

Glaucon/ But do you see, a third species of good, —among which are bodily exercise, being healed when sick, the practice of medicine, or any other lucrative employment? —for these things, we should say, are laborious, yet beneficial to us, and we should not choose them for their own sake, but on account of the rewards and other advantages that spring from them.

Socrates/ There is, indeed, this third species also: but what then?

Glaucon/ In which of these species, do you place justice?

Socrates/ I think, indeed, in the most beautiful, —as being a good, which, both on its own account and for what springs from it, is desired by a man bent on being happy.

Glaucon/ It does not seem so, however, to the multitude, but rather to be of that laborious kind which is pursued on account of rewards and honors gained through high repute, but on its own account to be shunned, as fraught with trouble.

Socrates/ I am aware, that it seems so; and it was in this view, that it was some time since condemned by Thrasymachus, but injustice praised: —it seems, however, that I am one of those who are dull in learning.

Glaucon/ Come now, listen to me too, if you please; for Thrasymachus seems to me to have been charmed by you just like a snake, more quickly than he ought; while, with respect to myself, the proof has not yet been made to my satisfaction in either case, for I desire to hear what each is, and what intrinsic power it has by itself, when residing in the soul, —letting alone the rewards and what springs from them.

I will proceed, in this manner, therefore, if it be your pleasure.

I will take up Thrasymachus' argument in another shape; and, first of all, I will tell you what they say justice is, and whence it arises, —and, secondly, that all who cultivate it, cultivate it unwillingly, as necessary, but not as good, —and thirdly, that they do this with reason, inasmuch as, according to their notion, the life of an unjust man is much better than that of one that is just.

Though, for my own part, Socrates, it by no means appears so to me, still I am thrown into a state of doubt, from having my ears stunned by hearing Thrasymachus and innumerable others. —But as for the statement respecting justice, that it is better than injustice, I have never yet heard it explained as I wish.

I wish, therefore, to hear it eulogized on its own account, and am quite of opinion that I shall hear it from you: wherefore, by way of opposition, I shall speak in praise of an unjust life, and in so speaking will show you in what manner I want to hear you in turn condemn injustice and commend justice.

But see if my proposal be agreeable to you.

Socrates/ Quite so; for about what would any man of intellect delight more frequently to speak and hear?

Glaucon/ You speak excellently well: —and now, as to what I said I would first speak about, listen, both what justice is and whence it springs.

They say, forsooth, that to do injustice is naturally good, and to suffer injustice bad, —but that suffering injustice is attended with greater evil than doing injustice with good; so that, when men do each other injustice, and likewise suffer it, and have a taste of both, it seems advantageous for those, who are not able to avoid the one and choose the other, to agree among themselves neither to act unjustly nor yet to be treated so; and also, that hence they began to form for themselves laws and compacts, and to call what is enjoined by law lawful and just. —This, then, is the origin and essence of justice, —a medium between what is best, namely, when a man acts unjustly with impunity, and what is worst, that is, when one injured is unable to obtain redress; —and this justice being half-way between both these, is desired, not as good, but as being held in honor,

owing to an incapacity for doing injustice; because the man who had ability to do so would never, if really a man, agree with anyone neither to injure nor be injured; for he would be mad to do so.

This, then, Socrates, and such like, is the nature of justice; and such, as they say, is the source whence it arises.

Again, —that those who cultivate it through an incapability of doing injustice, cultivate it unwillingly, we shall best be made aware, if we should mentally conceive such a case as follows: —Let us give full liberty to each of them, both the just and the unjust, to do whatever they please, —and then follow them, observing whither inclination will lead each. —We should then detect the just man going the same way with the unjust, through a desire of having more than others, —which every nature naturally pursues as good, but by law and compulsion is led to respect equality.

And the liberty of which I speak may be chiefly of such a kind, as if they possessed such a power, as they say once belonged to Gyges the progenitor of the Lydian king; and of him, forsooth, they say, that he was a hired shepherd with the then governor of Lydia, but when a portion of ground was torn up by a prodigious rain and earthquake, and an opening made in the place where he was grazing his flocks, —that, in astonishment at the sight, he descended and saw other wonders besides, which men hand down in fables, especially a brazen horse, hollow, provided with doors, leaning against which, he beheld inside a dead body, apparently larger than that of a man, and that it had nothing else except that it wore a gold ring on its hand, which he took off and came out.

And when there was a meeting of the shepherds, as usual, for making their monthly report to the king about their

flocks, he also came with the ring; and while sitting with the rest, he happened to turn the stone of the ring towards himself into the inner part of his hand; and when this was done, he became invisible to those who sat beside him, and they talked of him as absent: and astonished at this, he again handled his ring, turned the stone outward, and on turning it became visible.

On observing this, then, he made trial of the ring, whether it had this power; and it always happened so, that, when he turned the stone inward, he became invisible, —when outward, visible.

Perceiving this, he instantly contrived to be made one of the embassy to the king; and on his arrival he debauched his wife, and, with her, assaulted and killed the king, and took possession of the kingdom.

If now, there were two such rings, and the just man had one, and the unjust the other, no one, we should think, would be so case-hardened as to persevere in justice, and dare to refrain from others' property and not touch it, when it was in his power both to take fearlessly, even from the market-place, whatever he pleased, and to enter houses, and embrace anyone he pleased, —both to kill and loose from chains whomever he pleased, —and to do anything else likewise, as a god among men: —acting in this manner, he would in no respect differ from the other, but both would go the same road.

This, in truth, one may say, is a strong proof, that no one is willingly just, but only by constraint, as if it were not an intrinsic good, because everyone, where he thinks he can, does injustice.

Every man, then, thinks that injustice is intrinsically much more profitable than justice, thinking truly, as he says, who argues on such a subject as this: inasmuch as, if

anyone possessed of such a liberty were never to act unjustly, nor touch others' property, he would be deemed by men of sense to be most wretched, and most void of understanding; yet would they praise him in each other's presence, mutually deceiving one another through fear of being injured.

Thus much, then, concerning these things.

With respect, again, to the decision on the life of those of whom we are speaking, —if we distinguish the supremely just and the supremely unjust, we shall be able to come to a right judgment, —but not otherwise; and what, then, is this distinction?

It is this; —let us, from the unjust man, take nothing of injustice, nor from the just man, of justice; but let us make each of them perfect in his own pursuit.

First, then, let the unjust man act as clever artists do.

For instance, a skillful pilot or physician comprehends both the possible and impossible in his art, the former of which he attempts, but relinquishes the latter; —and again, if he meet with any failure, he is able to rectify it: —so, in like manner, let the unjust man when he attempts clever acts of injustice, remain concealed, if he intends to be exceedingly unjust; but, as for him that is caught, he must be deemed worthless: for the most complete injustice is—to seem just, when not so.

To the completely unjust, then, we must ascribe the most complete injustice, and not take it from him, but allow him, while doing the greatest injustice, to win the highest reputation for justice; and, if he should fail at all, he should be able to rectify it, and be capable of speaking persuasively, if any report of his unjust deeds get abroad, and be able also to effect by force what requires force, owing to his courage and strength, and through the instrumentality of his friends

and his wealth; supposing him, then, to be such as this, let us for argument place in contrast with him a just, simple-minded, and generous-hearted man, who, according to Æschylus, desires less the seeming than the reality of goodness: let us take from him, then, the mere seeming of goodness; for, should he seem just, honors and rewards will be his lot, because he merely seems so: —and thus it may be uncertain whether he be such for the sake of justice, or rewards and honors.

Let him be stripped, then, of everything but justice, and be placed in direct contrast to the other; —without doing injustice too, let him have the reputation of doing the greatest, —in order that he may be put to the test for justice, and not be moved to reproach and its consequences, but rather be unchangeable till death, seeming, indeed, to be unjust through life, though really just; and that thus both arriving at the extreme, —one of justice, the other of injustice, we may judge which of the two is the happier.

Socrates/ Bah, bah, dear Glaucon, how exceedingly anxious you are to cleanse each of these men for trial, just as you would a statue!

Glaucon/ As much, as I can: but, as they are such, there will be no difficulty, I suppose, in ascertaining what life will be the lot of either.

It shall be told, then: —and, even if it should be told with more than usual bluntness, think not, that it is I who tell it, Socrates, but those who praise injustice before justice. —This then will they say, that the just man, thus situated, will be scourged, tortured, fettered, have his eyes burnt out, and lastly, suffer all manner of evils, and be crucified; and he will know too, that a man should desire not to be, but to appear just.

As for that saying of Æschylus, too, it applied far better against the unjust man: for in reality men will say, that the unjust man, as being in pursuit of an object connected with truth, and not living according to opinion, has no desire to appear, but to be unjust, —

> Reaping the hollow furrow of his mind,
> Whence all his cherished councils blossom forth.

In the first place, he holds the magistracy in the state, because he is thought just, —next, he marries out of whatever family he pleases, and gives his children in marriage to whom he pleases, forms agreements and joins in partnership with whom he likes, —and, besides all this, succeeds in all his projects for gain, because he scruples not to commit injustice.

When he engages, therefore, in competitions, he both in private and public surpasses and overreaches his adversaries; and by this overreaching gets rich, serves his friends, hurts his foes; and to the gods, as respects sacrifices and offerings, he not only sufficiently but even magnificently both sacrifices and makes offerings, serving far better than the just man, not only the gods, but of men also whomsoever he pleases; so that it is very likely that he should be a greater favorite of the gods than the just man.

Thus, they say, Socrates, that with gods and men a better life awaits the unjust than the just.

Socrates/ Glaucon having said this, I was thinking of saying something in reply; but his brother Adimantus said—

Adeimantus/ Do you not think, Socrates, that enough has been already said on the matter?

Socrates/ What then?

Adeimantus/ The very point has not been mooted, which ought most especially to have been discussed.

Socrates/ Why then, as the saying is, let a brother help a brother, —so that, if he fails at all, do you help him out: —yet, as far as I am concerned, what he has alleged is quite sufficient to defeat me, and disable me from defending justice.

Adeimantus/ Oh, it is a mere nothing you allege; —but still hear this in addition; —for we must go through all the arguments in opposition to what he has said, those, namely, which praise justice and condemn injustice, —in order that it may be more clearly seen, what, I think, Glaucon means: and perhaps parents tell and exhort their sons, as all those do who care for them, that they ought to be just, —not commending justice for itself, but for the reputation arising therefrom; —and hence to a man reputed to be just, there may accrue from that very repute both state-offices and marriage-connections, and whatever Glaucon just now enumerated as the consequences of being reputed just: these, however, carry this notion of repute too far; —for, throwing in the approbation of the gods, they can speak of abundant blessings, which, they say, the gods bestow on the holy.

Just as noble Hesiod and Homer say; —the former, that the gods make oaks produce for just men

> Acorns at top, and in the middle bees;
> Their woolly sheep are laden thick with fleece;

and a great many other good things of the same nature: —similarly, also, the latter: —

> Unrivalled, like the praise of some great king,
> Who o'er a numerous people and renown'd
> Presiding like a deity, maintains
> Justice and truth.
> The earth under his sway
> Her produce yields abundantly; the trees

Fruit-laden bend; the lusty flocks bring forth;
The ocean teems with finny swarms beneath
His joint control, and all the land is blest.

Musæus, too, and his son Eumolpus tell us, that the gods give just men far more splendid blessings than these; for carrying them in his poem into Hades, and placing them at table in company with holy men, at a feast prepared for them, they crown them, and make them pass the whole of their time drunken, —deeming eternal inebriation to be the best reward of virtue. —Some, however, extend down still further than these the rewards from the gods; for they say, that children's children, and a future generation of the holy and faithful, are left on earth. These, then, and such as these, are their eulogies of justice. As for the unholy and unjust, however, they bury them in Hades, in mud, and compel them to carry water in a sieve; —and as for those that are yet living, if they lead them into wrong notions, as Glaucon did in enumerating the punishments of just persons, but reputed unjust, —this they can allege about the unjust, but nothing else. The praise then or blame belongs to either party as they please.

In addition to this, however, consider, Socrates, another species of argument about justice and injustice, referred to both privately and by poets; for all with one mouth celebrate temperance and justice as beautiful, but still difficult and laborious, but intemperance and injustice as sweet and easy of attainment, though by repute only and law disgraceful: and they mostly say, that unjust are more profitable than just actions; and wicked rich men, and such as have power of any kind, either public or private, they are quite willing to pronounce happy and to honor both publicly and privately, but to despise and overlook those who may be at all weak and poor, even though they acknowledge them to be better than the others. —But of all these arguments, the most

marvelous are those concerning the gods and virtue, —as if it were a matter of course, that the gods allot misfortunes and an evil life to many good men, and to the opposite, an opposite fate.

Peddler-priests also, and prophets, frequenting the gates of the rich, persuade them, that they possess a power granted them by the gods, of expiating by sacrifices and incantations in the midst of pleasures and feastings, whatever injustice has been committed by anyone, or his forefathers: and if he wishes to blast a foe, he can at small expense injure the just, as well as the unjust, by certain blandishments and magic ties, persuading the gods, as they say, to succor them: and to all these discourses they bring the poets as witnesses; who, mentioning man's predisposition to vice, say, —

> How vice at once and easily we choose;
> The way so smooth, its dwelling too so nigh;
> Toil before virtue, thus forewill'd the gods—

and a certain road, both long and steep; —while others make Homer witness as to the persuasive power of men over the gods, inasmuch as that poet says, —

> .....the gods
> In virtue thy superiors, are themselves
> Yet placable; and if a mortal man
> Offend by transgression of their laws,
> Libation, incense, sacrifice, and prayers
> In meekness offer'd turn their wrath away.

They bring forward, too, a crowd of books of Musæus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and the Muses, as they say, in accordance with which they perform their sacred rites, persuading not only private individuals, but states likewise, that both absolutions and purgations from iniquities are effected by sacrifices, and sportive pleasures,

—and this, too, for the benefit of the living as well as the dead; —which purgations they call *mysteries*, which absolve us from the evils of another life, —whereas a dreadful fate awaits those who perform no sacrifice.

As respects all such and so much as has been said, dear Socrates, about virtue and vice, and what reward both men and gods attach thereto, —what do we suppose the souls of our youth do when they hear them, such at least as are of good natural parts, and able to rush, as it were, to all that is said, and thence infer in what sort of character, and by what procedure one may best pass through life?

He might probably say to himself, according to Pindar, —

> Shall I yon rampart, loftier far
> Than justice, dare ascend, —or crooked fraud
> Invite, to cheat the world, and thus
> Myself live cased in guilt's base panoply.

For what is said happens to me, if I am just, though I am not reputed so, they say it is no profit, but clearly, mere trouble and punishment, —whereas the unjust man, who has procured for himself the reputation of justice, is said to have a divine life. Since then, as the sages tell me, appearance both does violence to reality, and is the arbiter of happiness, I ought surely to turn wholly thereto, drawing round myself, as a covering and picture, an image of virtue, but still dragging after me the cunning and versatile fox of that very clever Archilochus. Perhaps, however, someone will say, —it is not easy for a bad man always to practice his wickedness in secret. —Neither is anything else easy will we say of important matters: but still, would we be happy, thither we must go where the tracks of reasoning lead us: for, with a view to concealment, we shall form conspiracies and associations; and there are masters of persuasion, who teach a popular and forensic wisdom, —by which, partly

though persuasion and partly by force, we may escape punishment after all our overreaching. However, it is not possible either to escape the notice of the gods, or to overpower them.

Wherefore, if they have no existence, and have no care about human affairs, neither need we care about concealment; and as respects their existence and care for us, we neither know nor have heard of them otherwise than from traditions, and from the poets who write their genealogies; and these very persons tell us, that they are to be moved and persuaded by sacrifices and propitiatory vows, and offerings, —both of which we are to believe, or neither.

If, however, we are to believe both, we may do injustice, and offer sacrifice from the fruits of unjust deeds.

For if we be just, we shall escape punishment from the gods, and then deprive ourselves of the gains of injustice: but if, on the other hand, we be unjust, we shall make gain, and after transgressing and offending, shall appease them by prayers, and so escape punishment.

Nevertheless, we shall suffer in Hades the punishment of our misdeeds here, either ourselves, or our children's children.

But the reasoner may say, Friend, the mysteries again can do much, and the gods who expiate, —as say the mightiest states, and those children of the gods, —the poets and prophets, who declare that these things are so.

For what reason, then, should we prefer justice before the greatest injustice? —Should we acquire it by any unfair pretenses, we shall, both with reference to gods and men, fare according to our wishes both in life and death, as we are told by the sayings both of the multitude and the learned too. —From all that has been said, then, Socrates, how shall a man contrive to acquire a will for honoring justice, who

has any power of mind, or wealth, or body, or birth, and not rather laugh at hearing its praises?

Although, therefore, a man be able even to show what we have said to be false, and fully knows that justice is best, he will, perhaps, greatly excuse and not be angry with the unjust, because he knows, that unless a man through a divine instinct abhor injustice, or from knowledge abstain from it, —of all the rest not one is willingly just, but either through cowardice, old age, or some other weakness, condemns injustice, when unable to do it.

That it is so, is plain; —for the first of such persons, who arrives at the power, is the first to commit injustice, as far as he is able.

The reason of all this, again, is no other than that, from whence all this discussion set out between my brother and me and you, Socrates, because, among all of you, my wonderful man, who call yourselves the eulogists of justice, from these ancient heroes downwards, of all whose arguments are left to the men of the present time, no one has ever yet condemned injustice, nor praised justice, otherwise than as respects the repute, honors, and emoluments arising therefrom; while, as respects either of them in itself, and subsisting by its own power in the soul of the possessor, and concealed both from gods and men, no one has yet sufficiently investigated, either in poetry or prose-writing, —how, namely, that the one is the greatest of all the evils that the soul has within it, and justice the greatest good: for had it from the beginning been thus stated by you all, and you had so persuaded us from our youth, we should not need to guard against injustice from our fellows, but every man would be the best guardian over himself, through fear, lest by doing injustice he should dwell with the greatest evil.

These things, Socrates, and, perhaps also, yet more than these, Thrasymachus, and others too, might say respecting justice and injustice, perverting their power, disagreeably as I conceive: —but, I, for I wish to conceal nothing from you, am very anxious to hear your refutation, and so say the most I can by way of opposition. —Do not, therefore, merely show us in your reasoning, that justice is better than injustice, but in what way each by itself affects the mind, the one as in itself evil, and the other as good; and put out of the question mere opinion, as Glaucon recommended; for if you do not set aside the true opinions on both sides, and add those that are false, we will say you do not praise justice, but its appearance, and do not condemn injustice, but its appearance, —advising the unjust man to hide himself, and agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is a foreign good expedient for the more powerful, while injustice is what is expedient and profitable for one's self, but inexpedient for the inferior.

Since, then, you have granted that justice is one of those greatest goods, which on account of their results are worthy to be possessed, but yet far more in themselves for their own sake, —such as sight, hearing, wisdom, health, and all other genuine goods, such as are so in their own nature, and not merely in opinion; for this very reason we may praise justice, as intrinsically, in itself, profitable to its owner, and injustice harmful; but as for rewards and repute, let others sing their praises. —I could endure, perhaps, that the rest of the world should thus praise justice and condemn injustice, complimenting and reviling the opinions and rewards that concern them; but certainly I could not endure it in you except you absolutely require it, because you have passed the whole of life, engaged in no other inquiry but this. —Show us, then, in course of the discussion, not only that justice is better than injustice, but also what either

intrinsically by itself makes its owner, whether concealed or not from gods and men, the one being good, and the other evil.

Socrates/ On hearing this, pleased, as I always am, with the disposition of Glaucon and Adimantus, I was then, in particular, perfectly delighted, and replied: O sons of that worthy sire the Sophist, with good reason does the lover of Glaucon thus begin his elegies which he made on you, when you distinguished yourselves in the battle of Megara.

> Ariston's sons! of sire renown'd afar,
> That race divine.....

This, friends, seems well observed; for you must be under some influence quite divine, if you are not persuaded that injustice is better than justice, when you can thus speak in its defense. Still methinks, you are not really persuaded; and I reason from the rest of your behavior; because, according to your mode of talking, I should certainly have disbelieved you: —but the more I trust you, the more I am at a loss, as to the kind of argument I should use. I know not, indeed, how I am to defend it, —as I seem unable: —and the proof of it is, that, as respects what I thought I had clearly shown in arguing with Thrasymachus, that justice is better than injustice, you did not admit my proofs; —nor, on the other hand, have I any excuse for not defending it; because I fear it may be impious to abandon justice, and see it accused when I am present, without defending it, so long as I have breath and am able to speak.

It is best then to assist it in such a manner as I can.

Hereupon Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means to defend it, and not relinquish the discussion, but rather investigate thoroughly the nature of each, and what the truth is, as to their respective advantages.

I then stated what I thought, —that the inquiry we were attempting was no trifling one, but one, as appears to me, suited for sharp-sighted persons.

Since then, we are not very expert, it seems proper to make such an investigation of it, as if a person should order persons not very sharp-sighted to read small letters at a distance, and then find out that the same letters are rather larger elsewhere, and in a larger field; —it would then appear desirable, methinks, first to read these, and then examine the lesser, whether they happen to be the same.

Adeimantus/ By all means. But what analogy do you perceive, Socrates, in the inquiry about justice?

Socrates/ I will tell you: —do we not say that justice affects an individual man and an entire state also?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is not a state a greater object than an individual?

Adeimantus/ Greater.

Socrates/ Perhaps, then, justice will be more fully developed in what is greater, and also more easily intelligible: —we will first, then, if you please, inquire what it is in states; and then, we will in like manner examine it in the individual, searching for the similitude of the greater in the idea of the less.

Adeimantus/ Yes, —you seem to me, to speak rightly.

Socrates/ If then, we contemplate in argument the rise of a state, shall we not also perceive the rise of justice and injustice?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Well then, if this be the case, is there no ground for hoping that we shall more easily find the object of our inquiry?

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Does it not seem, then, that we ought to try after success? for I imagine this is a work of no small importance. Consider then.

Adeimantus/ We have considered, and do you the same.

Socrates/ A state then, takes its rise, methinks, —because none of us individually happens to be self-sufficient, but stands in need of many things; do you think that there is any other origin of the settlement of a state?

Adeimantus/ None.

Socrates/ Thus, then, one assisting one person for the want of one thing, and another, another for the want of another, as we stand in need of many things, we collect into one dwelling many companions and assistants, and to this joint dwelling we give the name of city; do we not?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ One then imparts to another, if he does impart anything, or receives in exchange, thinking it will be for his advantage?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, let us, for argument's sake, form a city from the beginning; —our necessity, as it seems, will form it?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But the first and the greatest of wants is the provision of food, in order that we may subsist and live?

Adeimantus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ The second is of lodging, the third of clothing, and the like?

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ But come, how will the city be able to make so great a provision? —Shall not one be a husbandman,

another a builder, a third a weaver; —and must we not add to them a shoemaker, or someone else of those that minister to our bodily wants?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The state then, that is most in need, will consist of only four or five men?

Adeimantus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ What then? must each of these contribute his work for the whole in common? —as, for instance, must the husbandman, though only one, provide food for four, and spend fourfold time and labor in providing food and sharing it with others; or is he, without any care for them, to prepare for himself alone the fourth part of this food in the fourth part of the time, while of the other three parts of his time, he employs one in the providing a house, another clothing, the other shoes, —and not trouble himself to share with others, but give his whole attention to his own affairs?

Adeimantus/ Aye, but perhaps the former way, Socrates, is easier than the latter.

Socrates/ By Zeus, that is not amiss: —for, while you are speaking, I am thinking that first of all we are born not each perfectly alike to each, but differing in disposition, —one fitted for doing one thing, and another for another; —does it not seem so to you?

Adeimantus/ It does.

Socrates/ What then? —Will a man do better, when, as a single individual, he works in many arts, or only in one?

Adeimantus/ When one works in one.

Socrates/ This, moreover, is also plain, methinks; —that if one miss the seasonable time for any work, it is ruined?

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Aye, —for the work, methinks, will not wait on the leisure of the workman, but the workman must necessarily attend closely on his work, not in the way of a by-job?

Adeimantus/ He must.

Socrates/ And hence more will be done, and better, and with greater ease, when everyone does but one thing, according to his genius, at the proper time, and when at leisure from all other pursuits.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Surely, Adimantus, we need more citizens than four for the provisions that we mentioned: for the husbandman, it seems, will not himself make his own plough, if it is to be good, nor yet a spade or any other instruments of agriculture: —neither, again, will the builder, —for he, likewise, needs many things; and in the same way, the weaver also and the shoemaker: —is it not so?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Carpenters, then, and smiths, and many other such workmen, by becoming members of our little city, make it throng?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Yet it would be no very great matter, either, if we added to them herdsmen also, and shepherds, and all other sorts of graziers, —in order that both the husbandmen may have oxen for ploughing, and the builders by aid of the husbandmen may have cattle for their carriages, and the weavers also, and shoemakers, hides and wool.

Adeimantus/ Yet it would be no very small city, that had all these.

Socrates/ Moreover, it is all but impossible to settle the city itself in such a place that it will not require imported goods.

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Surely, then, it will require others in addition, to bring to it what it needs from other cities.

Adeimantus/ It will require them.

Socrates/ And, moreover, if the servant were to go empty, taking with him nothing that they need from whom what they themselves require is imported, he will return empty; will he not?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ It is necessary for them, then, not only to produce what is sufficient for themselves, but such and as many things also, as are required by those whose services they require.

Adeimantus/ It ought.

Socrates/ Our city, then, certainly wants many more husbandmen and other kinds of workmen.

Adeimantus/ Aye, many more.

Socrates/ And all other servants besides, to import and export the several articles; and these are merchants, are they not?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ We shall want merchants then, as well?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if the traffic is carried on by sea, it will want many others besides, skilled in navigation.

Adeimantus/ Many others, truly.

Socrates/ What then; —in the city itself, how will they exchange with one another what each has produced, for the

sake of which, we have formed a city and established a community?

Adeimantus/ It is plain, that by selling and buying they will do so.

Socrates/ A market-place, therefore, and an established coinage, as a symbol for the purposes of exchange, must spring up from hence.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If then the husbandman, or any other workman, bring any of his work to the market, but does not come at the same time as those who want to make exchanges with him, will he not, while sitting in the market, be unoccupied at his trade?

Adeimantus/ By no means; for there are some, who, observing this, devote themselves to this service; and, in well-regulated cities, they are chiefly such, as are weakest in body and unfit for any other work; —these then should attend about the market, to give money in exchange for what people wish to sell, and goods in exchange for money to such as want to buy.

Socrates/ It is this want, that provides our city with a race of shopkeepers; for do we not call those shopkeepers, who sit in the market, and serve both in selling and buying; whereas such as travel to other cities we call merchants?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ There are certain other servants still, I conceive, who, though as regards intellectual power unworthy to be taken into society, yet possess bodily strength adequate for labor; and these selling the use of their strength, and calling the reward of it hire, are called, I think, hired laborers; —are they not?

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Hired laborers then, as it seems, form the complement of a city.

Adeimantus/ Aye, it seems so.

Socrates/ Has our city then, Adimantus, so increased on us already, as to be complete?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Where, then, will justice and injustice be placed in it; and, in which of the matters that we have considered is it engendered?

Adeimantus/ I do not know, Socrates, unless it be somehow in a certain use of these very things with one another.

Socrates/ Perhaps, you are right: —but yet we must consider the point, and not avoid it. First, then, let us consider how the persons thus procured are to be supported. —In making bread and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and building houses, will they not work in summer, chiefly without clothes and shoes, but in winter, sufficiently clad and shod? and will they be supported partly on barley made into meal, and partly on wheat made into loaves, partly boiled and partly toasted, with fine loaves and cakes placed over a fire of stubble or dried leaves, and will they feast, they and their children, resting on couches strewed with smilax and myrtle-leaves, —drinking wine, crowned, and singing to the gods, pleasantly living together, begetting children not beyond their means, and cautiously guarding against poverty or war?

Glaucon then, in answer, said:

Glaucon/ You make the men feast, it seems, without esculents.

Socrates/ You say true: I forgot that they were to have esculents too; —and they will clearly have salt, and olives, and cheese, and will boil bulbous roots, and potherbs, such

as are cooked in the fields: and we will set before them desserts of figs, peas, and beans; and they will toast at the fire myrtle-berries and beech-nuts, drinking in moderation; and thus passing their life in peace healthily, they will die in old age, probably, and leave a similar mode of life to their children.

Glaucon/ Socrates, if you had been making a city of hogs, on what else but these would you have fed them?

Socrates/ But what ought we to do then, Glaucon?

Glaucon/ What is usual: let them lie down on beds, I think, unless they are to live miserably, and take their meals from tables, and have esculents, as the present men have, and desserts.

Socrates/ Be it so: —I understand. We are considering, it seems, not only how a city, but how a luxurious city may exist; and perhaps it is not amiss: for, in considering one of this character, we may probably see how justice and injustice arise in cities. But the true city, which we have lately described, seems to me just like a person that is in health; but if you are desirous that we should inspect, also, a city that is inflated, there can be no objection to it: for these things that concern a merely simple mode of life will not of course suffice for some, nor will this sort of life satisfy them; but there must be beds, tables, and all other articles of furniture, —seasonings, unguents, and perfumes, mistresses, confections, and many miscellaneous articles of this description. And especially as to what we before mentioned, we must no longer consider these as alone necessary, —namely, houses, and clothes, and shoes; but we must set in operation painting too, and all the refined arts, and must possess gold, and ivory, and all things of that kind; must we not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Must we not, then, increase the size of our city? —For that healthy one is no longer sufficient, but already full of repletion and abundance of such things as are in nowise requisite for cities, —such as all kinds of sportsmen, and imitative artists, many of whom imitate in figures and colors, and many in music: poets too, and their assistants, rhapsodists, actors, dancers, contractors, and manufacturers of all sorts of trinkets, especially of those belonging to female attire; and in that case, too, we shall require many more servants; and think you not they will require teachers, nurses, tutors, hair-dressers, barbers, confectioners, too, and cooks?

Glaucon/ Aye, and further still, we shall want swine-herds.

Socrates/ Of these, indeed, there were none in the other state for there needed none; but in this we shall need these also; and shall require, too, many other sorts of cattle, if anyone eats them; shall we not?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Shall we not, then, in this mode of life, require physicians far more than in the former one?

Glaucon/ Much more.

Socrates/ And the land, perhaps, which at first sufficed to support the inhabitants, will, instead of being sufficient, become too little; or how shall we say?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Must we not then cut off a part from the neighboring country, if we would have enough for arable and pasture, and they in turn from ours, if they on their part devote themselves to the accumulation of boundless wealth, going beyond the limits of mere necessity?

Glaucon/ We must, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we go to war afterwards, Glaucon, or how shall we do?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But let us not yet, consider the question, whether war produces harm or good, —but thus much only, that we have found the origin of war, and whence especially arise mischief to cities, both privately and publicly.

Glaucon/ Aye, indeed.

Socrates/ We shall require, then, friend, a still larger city, —not for a small, but for a large army, which may go out and fight with those who assail it, for their whole substance and everything that we have now mentioned.

Glaucon/ What, are not these sufficient to fight?

Socrates/ No; —not if you and all of us were rightly agreed, when we formed our state: and we agreed, if you remember, that it was impossible for a single person to practice many arts well.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ What then, do not struggles in war seem to require art?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Ought we then to take more care of the shoemaking art than of that of warfare?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But we charged the shoemaker not to attempt to be at the same time a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder, in order that the work of shoemaking might be well done; and in like manner we allotted to each of the others a single calling, to which each was adapted by nature, and at which, each by abstaining from the rest, and applying to it the whole of his life, and not neglecting the proper opportunities, he would be likely to work well; but is it not

of the greatest importance that what concerns war should be well performed? or is it so easy that one who is a husbandman may also be a soldier, and a shoemaker, and one who practices any other art, —while no one could become a skillful chess or dice player, who does not study it from childhood, but makes it a mere by-work? and can a person who takes a spear or other warlike arms and instruments, instantly become an expert combatant in an armed encounter or aught else relating to war; while, as respects the tools of any other art whatever, one cannot become a good artist, or even a wrestler to any useful extent, without having correct knowledge and bestowing sufficient attention?

Glaucon/ In that case, such tools, would truly be very valuable.

Socrates/ Therefore, by how much more important is the work of the state-guardians, by so much will it require the greatest leisure from other pursuits, and likewise the greatest art and study! I really think so. And will it not also require natural talents suited to this particular profession?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ I think, then, we should make it our special business, if possible, to choose what men and what talents are suited for the guardianship of a state.

Glaucon/ Aye, our special business.

Socrates/ By Zeus, in that case we have undertaken no trifling business; but, still we must not despair, as long, at least, as we have any ability.

Glaucon/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Think you, then, that the genius of a high-bred whelp at all differs as respects guardianship, from that of a high-bred youth?

Glaucon/ "What do you mean?

Socrates/ For instance, must not each of them be acute in perception, swift in pursuing what he perceives, and strong likewise, if he wants, when he has taken, to overcome it?

Glaucon/ Of all these there is great need.

Socrates/ And surely he must be brave also, if he is to fight well.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But is he likely to be brave, who has not a high spirit; whether horse, or dog, or any other animal? Have you not observed, how irresistible and invincible is anger, and, when it is present, that every soul is fearless of everything and indomitable?

Glaucon/ I have.

Socrates/ It is plain, then, what species of guardian we ought to have, as respects the body?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And with reference to his soul moreover, that he should be spirited.

Glaucon/ That is clear, also.

Socrates/ How then, Glaucon, can they be otherwise than savage towards each other and the other citizens, when of such a temper?

Glaucon/ By Zeus, not easily.

Socrates/ Still it is necessary, that towards their friends they should be mild, but towards their enemies fierce: —for otherwise they would not wait for others to destroy them, but rather be beforehand with them in doing it.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ What shall we do, then; —whence shall we find a disposition at the same time mild and magnanimous? —for the mild nature is surely opposed to the high-spirited?

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Nevertheless, if he be deprived of either of these, he cannot be a good guardian; but this seems to be impossible: —and thus it turns out that it is impossible there should be a good guardian.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then I, being at a loss, and considering what had passed, said: —We very justly hesitate, my friend, for we have departed from the image that we first established.

Glaucon/ How say you?

Socrates/ Did we not observe that there are such kinds of tempers as we imagined did not exist, having these opposite qualities?

Glaucon/ Where?

Socrates/ One may see it also in other animals, and not a little in that, to which we compared our guardian; for you know it is the natural temper of generous dogs to be as gentle as possible towards their intimates and their acquaintances, but the reverse to those whom they know not.

Glaucon/ Aye, —I know it.

Socrates/ This then, is quite possible; and we do not unnaturally require our guardian to be so.

Glaucon/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Are you, further, of opinion, that he who is to be our guardian should, besides being spirited, have a philosophic nature also?

Glaucon/ How? —for I do not understand.

Socrates/ This too, you will observe in dogs, what is also well worthy of admiration in the brute.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ He is angry at every unknown person that he sees, though he has never suffered ill from him before; but one that is known he fawns upon, even though he may never have received any good from him. Did you never wonder at this?

Glaucon/ I never, thought of it before; but he does so, it is clear.

Socrates/ Moreover, this affection of his nature appears elegant at least, and truly philosophic.

Glaucon/ In what respect?

Socrates/ Because, it distinguishes a friendly and unfriendly aspect by nothing else but this, —that it knows the one, but not the other: —and how can we refuse to consider that as the love of learning, which defines the friendly and the foreign by intelligence and ignorance?

Glaucon/ By no means: —it cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ Nevertheless, to be a lover of learning and a philosopher, are the same.

Glaucon/ The same.

Socrates/ May we not then boldly lay down the principle, that in man too, if anyone be mild towards his intimates and acquaintances, he must by nature be a philosopher and a lover of learning?

Glaucon/ Let us so lay it down.

Socrates/ He, then, who intends to be a good and worthy state-guardian, should be by nature a philosopher, spirited, swift, and strong.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Let him, then, be just such as this. In what manner, then, shall they be trained and instructed? and will the consideration of this at all aid us in perceiving the object, for the sake of which we are considering all these things;

that is to say, how justice and injustice arise in a state? that we may not omit any necessary part of our argument, or wade through what is superfluous?

Then, said Glaucon's brother:

Adeimantus/ I, for my part, quite expect, that this inquiry will conduce to this end.

Socrates/ By Zeus, friend Adimantus, we must not dismiss it; even though it be somewhat too long.

Adeimantus/ No, truly.

Socrates/ Come then, let us, as if we were talking in the way of fable, and at our leisure, give some ideal training to these men.

Adeimantus/ It is right to do so.

Socrates/ What then is the education? —Is it difficult to discover a better than has been discovered for a long time? that is, surely, gymnastics for the body, and music for the mind?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Must we not first, then, begin by teaching music, rather than gymnastics?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ When you say music, you mean arguments, do you not?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ But of arguments there are two kinds, —the one true, the other false.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And they must be instructed in both, —but first in the false.

Adeimantus/ I do not understand, what you mean.

Socrates/ Know you not, that first of all we tell children fables; —and this, surely, to speak generally, is falsehood; though there is some truth in it; but we employ fables with children before gymnastic exercises.

Adeimantus/ We do.

Socrates/ This was what I meant, then, by saying that we must begin music before gymnastics.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ And know you not, that the beginning of every work is most important, especially to anyone young and tender; —because then that particular impression is most easily instilled and formed, which anyone may wish to imprint on each individual.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Shall we then let children hear any kind of fables composed by any kind of persons, and receive into their minds opinions in a great measure contrary to those which we think they should have when they are grown up?

Adeimantus/ We should by no means allow it.

Socrates/ First of all, then, as it seems, we must exercise control over the fable-makers; and whatever beautiful fable they may invent, we should select, and what is not so, we should reject: —and we are to prevail on nurses and mothers to repeat to the children such fables as are selected, and fashion their minds by fables, much more than their bodies by their hands. But very many of those that they now tell them must be cast aside.

Adeimantus/ What, for instance?

Socrates/ In the more important fables, we shall see the lesser likewise: —for the fashion of them must be the same; and both the greater and the less must have the same kind of influence: —do not you think so?

Adeimantus/ I do: but I do not at all understand, which of them you call the greater.

Socrates/ Those, which both Hesiod and Homer told us, and the other poets also: —for they composed and related false fables for mankind, and do still relate them.

Adeimantus/ What class, do you mean; —and what do you blame in them?

Socrates/ That, which ought first and most of all to be blamed, —especially when one does not falsify well.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ When a poet, in his composition, exhibits bad representations of the nature of gods and heroes, —just as a painter draws a picture not at all resembling what he was intending to paint.

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is quite right, that such as these should be blamed: —but how do we say, and in what respect?

Socrates/ First of all, with reference to that greatest falsehood, in matters of grave importance too, in saying which he did not falsify well, that Uranus made what Hesiod says he did; and then again how Kronos punished him, and what Kronos did, and suffered from his son: for though these things were true, yet I think they should not be so readily told to the unwise and the young, but rather concealed from them; —and were there need to tell them, they should be heard in secrecy, by as few as possible, after sacrificing not a Valueless hog, but some great and wonderful sacrifice, in order that it may fall to the lot of the fewest possible to hear them.

Adeimantus/ These fables, are indeed injurious.

Socrates/ Neither are they to be told, Adimantus, in our state: —nor should it be said in the hearing of a youth, that he who commits the most extreme injustice, or that he who

punishes in every possible way a father who commits injustice, does nothing strange, but only does the same as the first and the greatest of the gods.

Adeimantus/ No truly, nor do such things as these seem to me proper to be said.

Socrates/ Neither, generally, must it be told, how gods war with gods, and plot and fight against one another for such assertions are not true, —if, at least, it be the duty of those who are to guard the state to esteem it most shameful to hate each other on slight grounds.

As little ought we to describe in fables, and with ornamental aids, the battles of the giants, and other many and various feuds, both of gods and heroes, with their own kindred and relations: —but if we would persuade them that never at all should one citizen hate another, and that it is not holy, such things as these are rather to be told them in early childhood, by the old men and women and those well advanced in life; and the poets should be obliged to compose consistently with these views.

And the fables of Hera fettered by her son, and Hephaestus hurled from heaven by his father for going to assist his mother when beaten, and all those battles of the gods which Homer has composed, we must not admit into our state; —either in allegory or without allegory; for young persons are not able to judge what is allegory and what is not, but whatever opinions they receive at such an age are wont to be obliterated with difficulty, and immovable.

Hence, one would think, we should of all things endeavor, that what they first hear be composed in the best manner for exciting them to virtue.

Adeimantus/ There is reason for it: —but, if anyone should ask us about these, what they are, and what kind of fables, which should we name?

Socrates/ Adimantus, you and I are not poets at present, but founders of a city, and it is the founders business to know the models on which the poets are to compose their fables, contrary to which they are not to be tolerated; but it is not our province to make fables for them.

Adeimantus/ Right. But as to this very thing, —namely, the models to be taken in speaking about the gods, what must they be?

Socrates/ Some such as these: —God is always to be represented such as he is, whether we represent him in epic, in song, or in tragedy.

Adeimantus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Is not God essentially good, and is he not to be described as such?

Adeimantus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ But nothing that is good is hurtful, is it?

Adeimantus/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ Does then what is not hurtful ever hurt?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Does that, which hurts not, do any evil?

Adeimantus/ Nor this either.

Socrates/ And what does no evil cannot be the cause of any evil?

Adeimantus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ But what? —good is beneficial.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is, therefore, the cause of prosperity?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Good, therefore, is not the cause of all things, but the cause of those things only which are in a right state, —not the cause of those things which are in a wrong state.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Neither, then, can God, since he is good, be the cause of all things, as the many say, but only the cause of a few things to men, but of many things not the cause; for our blessings are much fewer than our troubles: and no other must be assigned as the cause of our blessings; whereas of our troubles we must seek some other causes, and not God.

Adeimantus/ You seem to me, to speak most truly.

Socrates/ We must not admit, then, that error of Homer or any other poet who foolishly errs with respect to the gods, and says how—

> Fast by the threshold of Jove's courts are placed
> Two casks; one stored with evil, one with good,
> From which the God dispenses as he wills.
> For whom the glorious Thund'rer mingles both,
> He leads a life chequer'd with good and ill
> Alternate; but to whom he gives unmix'd
> The bitter cup, he makes that man a curse,
> His name becomes a by-word of reproach,
> His strength is hunger-bitten, and he walks
> The blessed earth unblest, go where he may, —

Nor, that Zeus—

> Grants mortal man both happiness and woe.

As regards the violation of oaths and treaties which Pandarus effected, if any should say it was done by the agency of Athena and Zeus, we cannot approve; —neither if he were to relate the dissension among the gods, and the judgment by Themis and Zeus; nor yet must we suffer the youth to hear what Æschylus says; how;

> Forthwith to mortals God invents a cause,
> Whene'er he wills their dwellings to destroy; —

and, besides, if anyone is making poetical compositions, in which are these iambics, the sufferings of Niobe, of the

Pelopides, or the Trojans, or others of a like nature, we must either not suffer him to say, that they are the works of God, —or, if of God, we must discover that principle of action which we now require, and say, that God did what was just and good, and that they were benefited by being chastised: and we must not let a poet say, that those are miserable who are punished, and that it is God who does these things. If they say, however, that the wicked, as being miserable, need correction, and that, in being punished, they are benefited by God, we may suffer the assertion. —To say, however, that God, who is good, is the cause of ill to anyone, this we must by all means oppose, and suffer no one to say so in our state; if at any rate we wish it well governed; —neither must we allow anyone, young or old, to hear such things told in fable, either in verse or prose, —as their relation is neither consistent with holiness, nor profitable to us, nor consistent with themselves.

Adeimantus/ I vote along with you, as respects this law, —for it quite pleases me.

Socrates/ This, then, is probably one of the laws and models as respects the gods, by which it will be necessary for those who speak to speak and for those who compose to compose, that God is not the cause of all things, but of good.

Adeimantus/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ But what as to this second law? —Think you that God is a sorcerer, and appears designedly, at different times, in different shapes, —sometimes like himself, —and, at other times, changing his form into many shapes, —sometimes deceiving us and making us conceive false opinions of him; —or, that he is simple, and that he by no means quits his proper form?

Adeimantus/ I cannot, now, at least, say so.

Socrates/ But what as to this; —if anything be changed from its proper form, must it not be necessarily changed by itself, or by another?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Are not those things which are in the best state, changed and moved least of all other by another; —as the body, by meats and drinks, and labors, and all kinds of plants by droughts and winds, and such like accidents? Is not the most healthy and vigorous least of all changed?

Adeimantus/ Surely.

Socrates/ And as to the soul itself, will not external accidents least of all disorder and change the bravest and wisest?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And surely all manufactured vessels, and buildings, and vestments, such as are properly made and in a right state, are according to the same reasoning least of all changed by time, or other accidents?

Adeimantus/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ Everything then, which is in a good state, either by nature or art, or both, receives the smallest change from another.

Adeimantus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But God, and all that belongs to divinity, are in the best state?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ In this way, then, God should least of all have many shapes?

Adeimantus/ Least of all, truly.

Socrates/ Again. —should he change and alter himself?

Adeimantus/ Clearly so, if he be changed at all.

Socrates/ Does he then change himself to what is better, and fairer, or to the worse, and more deformed?

Adeimantus/ To the worse, surely, —if he be changed at all; for we can never say, that God is at all deficient in beauty or excellence.

Socrates/ You speak most correctly. And this being so, think you, Adimantus, that anyone, either of gods or men, would willingly make himself any way worse?

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ It is impossible, then, for a god to desire to change himself; but, as it seems, each being most beautiful and excellent, continues always to the utmost of his power invariably in his own form.

Adeimantus/ This seems a necessary conclusion.

Socrates/ Well then, most excellent Adimantus, let not any of the poets tell us, how;

> .....
> in similitude of strangers oft
> The gods, who can with ease all shapes assume,
> Repair to populous cities.
> .....

Neither let anyone belie Proteus and Thetis, nor introduce Hera in tragedies or other poems, as having transformed herself into a priestess, collecting for;

> Those life-sustaining sons
> Of Inachus, the Argive streams; —

nor let them tell us many other such falsehoods: —nor again, let mothers, persuaded by them, terrify their children, telling the stories wrong, —as, that certain gods wander by night.

> Resembling various guests, in various forms, —

lest they should, at one and the same time, blaspheme against the gods, and make their children cowards.

Adeimantus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ But do the gods, who in themselves never change, still make us imagine that they appear in various forms, deceiving us, and playing the sorcerer?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps they do.

Socrates/ What; —can a god wish to deceive, —holding up a mere phantom, either in word or deed?

Adeimantus/ I know not.

Socrates/ Know you not, that a real falsehood if we be allowed to say so, both all the gods and men abhor?

Adeimantus/ How mean you?

Socrates/ Thus: that to be deceived in the most excellent part of oneself, and that about one's highest interests, is what no one wishes of his own accord; but, of all things, everyone is most afraid of this happening to him.

Adeimantus/ Even yet, I do not understand you.

Socrates/ Because, you think I am saying something awful but I am saying, that for the soul to be deceived with respect to realities, and to be so deceived and ignorant, and in that to have obtained and to maintain a falsehood, is what everyone would least of all choose; and would most hate it in the soul.

Adeimantus/ Most especially.

Socrates/ But this, as I was now saying, might very correctly be termed a real falsehood—ignorance in the soul of the deceived person; for imitation in words is a kind of image of the affection the soul feels, and springs up afterwards, and is not altogether a pure falsehood : —is it not so?

Adeimantus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But a real falsehood is not only hated by the gods, but also by men.

Adeimantus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ But what as to a falsehood in words? when is it of such service, so as not to deserve hatred? —Is it not when employed towards enemies, and some even of those called friends, —when during madness, or other folly, they attempt to do some mischief; —in that case, is it not useful for dissuasion as a drug; —and in the fables we just mentioned, because we know not how the truth stands about ancient things, do we not forge a falsehood resembling the truth as much as possible, and so make it useful?

Adeimantus/ It certainly is so.

Socrates/ In which of these cases, then, is a falsehood useful to God? —Does he invent a falsehood resembling the truth, because he is ignorant of ancient things?

Adeimantus/ That were ridiculous.

Socrates/ In God, then, there is not a lying poet?

Adeimantus/ I think not.

Socrates/ But would he invent a falsehood through fear of his enemies?

Adeimantus/ Far from it.

Socrates/ Or on account of the folly or madness of his friends?

Adeimantus/ No, none of the foolish and mad are beloved of God.

Socrates/ There is no occasion at all, then, for a god to invent a falsehood?

Adeimantus/ None.

Socrates/ The divine and godlike nature, then, is altogether free from falsehood?

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ God, then, is quite simple and true, both in word and deed; neither is he changed himself, nor does he

deceive others, —neither by visions, nor discourse, nor the pomp of signs, neither when we are awake nor when we sleep?

Adeimantus/ So it appears to me, just as you say.

Socrates/ You agree then, that this shall be the second principle which we are to lay down both in speaking and composing concerning the gods, —namely, that they are neither sorcerers and change themselves, nor mislead us by falsehoods, either in word or deed?

Adeimantus/ I agree.

Socrates/ While, then, we commend many other things in Homer, this we shall not commend, —namely, the dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon; nor that in Æschylus, when he makes Thetis say that Apollo had sung at her marriage, that;

> …… her happy lot should be
> To bear an offspring fair, from ailment free,
> And blest with lengthen'd days; and then the God,
> Unfolding all, with pæans high proclaim'd
> Thy heaven-blest fortunes, welcome to my soul
> I hoped that all was true that Phoebus sang
> So sweetly tuned with high prophetic art; —
> But he who at my nuptials joy foretold,
> The same is he, who now hath slain my child.

When anyone alleges such things as these about the gods, we must show disapproval, and not grant them the privilege of a chorus; neither should we suffer teachers to employ them in the training of youth, —if at least our guardians are to be pious and divine men, as far as man can be.

Adeimantus/ As to all these models, I entirely agree with you, and I should adopt them as laws.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

Book 3.

Socrates/ Concerning the gods, then, such things as these are, it seems, to be both heard, and not heard, from childhood upwards, by those who will honor the gods and parents, and not lightly esteem mutual friendship.

Adeimantus/ Aye, —and methinks, these things are rightly so understood.

Socrates/ But what then? —If men are to be brave, must not these things be told them, and such others likewise, as may make them least of all afraid of death; or, think you, that anyone can ever be brave, who has this fear within him?

Adeimantus/ Not I, truly.

Socrates/ But what? think you anyone can be free from the fear of death, while he conceives that there is Hades—and a dreadful place, too, —and that in battles he will choose death in preference to defeat and slavery?

Adeimantus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ We ought then, it seems, to take the command, also, of those who undertake to discourse about these fables, and entreat them not so sweepingly to abuse what is in Hades, but rather to praise it; —since they neither speak what is true, nor what is expedient for those who mean to be soldiers.

Adeimantus/ We ought indeed.

Socrates/ Beginning then, at this verse, we will omit all such as these: —

> I had rather live
> The servile hind for hire, and eat the bread
> Of some man scantily, himself sustained,
> Than sovereign empire hold o'er all the shades; —

And this—

> Lest Neptune o'er his head

Shattering the vaulted earth, should wide disclose
To mortal and immortal eyes his realm
Terrible, squalid, to the gods themselves
A dreaded spectacle; —

And—

Oh, then, ye gods! there doubtless are below,
The soul and semblance both, but empty forms; —

And—

He's wise alone, the rest are fluttering shades; —

And—

Down into Hades from his limbs dismiss'd
His spirit fled sorrowful, of youth's prime
And vigorous manhood suddenly bereft; —

And—

.....
His soul, like smoke, down to the shades
Fled howling.
.....

And—

As when the bats within some hallow'd cave
Flit screaming all around; for if but one
Fall from the rock, the rest all follow him;
In such connection mutual they adhere;
So.
.....the ghosts
Troop'd downward, gibbering all the dreary way.

As to these and all such like passages, we must request Homer and the other poets not to be offended at our erasing them, —not as unpoetical and displeasing to the ears of the multitude; —for the more poetical they are, the less should they be listened to by children, or men either, who would be free, and fear slavery more than death.

Adeimantus/ Aye, by all means.

Socrates/ Further, are not all dreadful and frightful titles also, about these things, to be rejected; —Cocytus and Styx, the infernals, the life-lorn, and many other appellations of this character, such as make all hearers shudder? —and perhaps they may well serve some other purpose; but we fear for our guardians, lest by such terror they be made more effeminate and soft than is fitting.

Adeimantus/ We are in the right too, to be afraid of that.

Socrates/ Are these then to be suppressed?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And must they speak, then, and compose on a contrary model to these?

Adeimantus/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ And are we likewise to suppress the wailings and lamentations of illustrious men?

Adeimantus/ We must, if we do the former.

Socrates/ Consider then, whether we shall suppress them rightly or not, —and do we say, that the virtuous man to another virtuous man—whose friend he is—deems death dreadful?

Adeimantus/ We do.

Socrates/ He would not then, at any rate, lament over him, as if he had suffered something dreadful?

Adeimantus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And we say this likewise, that such an one is most of all self-sustained as regards living happily, and distinctively above all others, least in need of foreign aid.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ To him, then, it is least dreadful to be deprived of a son, a brother, or property, or other like things?

Adeimantus/ Aye, least of all so.

Socrates/ Least of all then will he lament, but rather endure with the utmost meekness whatever trouble may befall him?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We should be right then in suppressing the lamentations of famous men, and should assign them to women, and among these even not to the better sort, and to such men as are cowards; in order that, as regards those whom we propose to educate for the guardianship of the country, they may disdain to act thus.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ Again, then, we will entreat Homer and the rest of the poets not to say in their compositions about Achilles, the son of a goddess, that

> Now on his side he lay, now lay supine,
> Now prone; then starting from his couch he roam'd
> Forlorn the beach.
> .....

Nor how—

> .....
> grasping with both hands the ashes.
> Down he pour'd them burning on his head.
> ...

Nor the rest of his lamentation and wailing, —of whatever kind and quantity he made them; —nor Priam, near as he was to the gods, who—

> .....
> to all—kneel'd
> In turn, then roll'd himself in dust, and each
> By name solicited to give him way.

Still much more must we entreat them not to represent the gods as bewailing, and saying;

> Ah me, forlorn! ah me, parent in vain
> Of an illustrious birth.

And if they are not thus to introduce the gods, far less should they dare thus unbecomingly to represent the greatest of those gods:

> Ah! I behold a warrior dear to me,
> Around the walls of Ilium driven, and grieve
> For Hector, —

And again, —

> Alas, he falls! my most beloved of men,
> Sarpedon, vanquished by Patroclus, falls:
> So will the Fates!

Supposing then, friend Adimantus, our youths should seriously hear such things as these, and not ridicule them as spoken unworthily, —hardly anyone would think it unworthy of himself as a man, or reprove himself for it, if he should chance either to say or do anything of the kind, — but would rather, without shame or endurance, sing many lamentations and moanings over trifling sufferings.

Adeimantus/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ But they must not, —as our argument has just evinced; which we must believe, till someone persuades us by some better.

Adeimantus/ They must not, of course.

Socrates/ Neither ought we, moreover, to be over fond of laughing: —for commonly where a man gives himself to violent laughter, such a disposition requires a violent change.

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Neither, if anyone should represent worthy men as overcome by laughter, should we allow it, much less if he thus represent the gods.

Adeimantus/ Much, indeed.

Socrates/ Neither, then, ought we to receive such statements as these of Homer concerning the gods: —

> Heaven rang with laughter inextinguishable—
> Peal after peal, such pleasure all conceived
> At sight of Vulcan in his new employ.

This cannot be admitted, according to your reasoning.

Adeimantus/ If you please to call it my reasoning, —this, indeed, cannot be admitted.

Socrates/ Besides this, however, the truth must be held of great importance: —for if we just now argued rightly, and falsehood be really of no service to the gods, but useful to men, in the form of a drug, it is plain that such a thing should be trusted only to physicians, but not meddled with by private persons.

Adeimantus/ Quite plain.

Socrates/ To the governors of the state, then, if to any, it especially belongs to speak falsely either about enemies or citizens, for the good of the state; whereas, for all the rest, they must venture on no such a thing. For a private person, moreover, to speak falsely against such governors, we shall deem the same and even a greater offence, than for a patient not to speak the truth to his physician, or for one who is learning his exercises to his gymnastic master about the ailments of his body, —or for one not to tell the pilot the real state of what concerns the ship and sailors, how himself and the other sailors are performing their duty.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ If, however, he should detect any other citizen in a falsehood—

> ……. of those, who by profession serve
> The public, prophet, healer of disease,
> Or him who makes the shafts of spears.

he will punish him, as introducing a practice subversive and destructive of the city, as well as of a ship.

Adeimantus/ If, at least, it is on speech that actions are completed.

Socrates/ But what; —will our youths have no need of temperance?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are not such as these in general the principal parts of temperance; namely, obedience to governors, —and also, that the governors themselves be temperate in drinking, feasting, and pleasures of love?

Adeimantus/ I am quite of that opinion.

Socrates/ And we shall say, I believe, that such views are just, —just as in Homer Diomedes says:

> Sit thou in silence, and obey my speech, —
> and what is in connection therewith, —thus:
> So moved the Greeks successive, ev'ry chief
> His loud command proclaiming, while the rest,
> As voice in all those thousands none had been,
> Heard mute…….

and so on.

Adeimantus/ Well spoken.

Socrates/ But what of such as these? —

> Oh! charged with wine, in steadfastness of face
> Dog unabash'd, and yet at heart a deer, —

and as respects what follows, and whatever other childish effusions are uttered in prose or verse by private individuals,

are they well pronounced? No, not well: —for, methinks, even as respects temperance, such discourses are not fit for the young to hear; and supposing they do afford some other sort of pleasure, it is no wonder: —but what is your notion of the matter?

Adeimantus/ The same as your own.

Socrates/ What? —To make the wisest man say, that it appears to him supremely beautiful, when

> ..... the steaming table's spread
> With plenteous viands, while the cups, with wine
> From brimming beakers fill'd, pass brisk around, —

does it seem proper to you that a youth should hear, in order to obtain a command over himself; —or yet this: —

> ..... most miserable it is,
> To die of famine and have adverse fate; —

or that Zeus, through desire for the pleasures of love, could easily forget all that in solitary watching he had revolved in his mind, while other gods and men were asleep, and could be so struck on seeing Hera, as not even to care to enter his chamber, but to desire connection with her on the very spot, to embrace her on the ground, and at the same time to declare that he was possessed with a desire, exceeding even what he felt on their first acquaintance;

> ..... Hidden from their parents dear; —

nor yet how Ares and Aphrodite were bound by Hephaestus, and other such things?

Adeimantus/ No, by Zeus; these seem quite unfit.

Socrates/ But if, any instances of self-denial in all matters are both to be spoken of and practiced by men of eminence, these should be held up for a spectacle and celebrated in verse, —such as this: —

> ..... Smiting on his breast, thus he reproved

The mutinous inhabitant within.

Adeimantus/ Just so, by all means.

Socrates/ Of course, then, we cannot by any means allow men to receive bribes, or be covetous.

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Neither must we sing to them, that

> Gifts gain the gods and venerable kings; —

neither can we commend Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, as if he spoke correctly, when counseling him to accept of presents and assist the Greeks, but, without presents, not to desist from his wrath: —nor again, should we commend Achilles himself, or approve of his being so covetous as to receive presents from Agamemnon, and, likewise for giving up the dead body of Hector, on receiving a ransom, when otherwise he would not do so.

Adeimantus/ Of course it is not right, to commend such conduct as this.

Socrates/ I am loath, for Homer's sake, to say, that it is not allowable to allege these things against Achilles, or to believe them, when said by others; nor, again, that he spoke thus to Apollo: —

> Oh! of all the powers above,
> To me most adverse, archer of the skies!
> Thou hast beguiled me, leading me away.
> And hast defrauded me of great renown.
> Ah! had I power, I would requite thee well, —

and how he disobeyed the river Xanthus though a divinity, and was ready to fight; and again, how he says to that other river, Spercheius, with his sacred locks;

> Thy lock to great Patroclus I could give,
> Who now is dead…

Adeimantus/ Now, that he actually did this, we cannot believe.

Socrates/ And again, the dragging of Hector round the tomb of Patroclus, and the murder of the captives at his funeral pile, —we shall deny that all this is spoken truly; nor shall we suffer our people to believe, that Achilles, the son of a goddess, and of Peleus, the most wise of men, and the third from Zeus, educated also by that sage Chiron, could be of so disordered a constitution as to have within him two positively opposite moral ailments, —illiberality and covetousness, and moreover a contempt both of gods and men.

Adeimantus/ You say right.

Socrates/ Let us not then believe these things, nor yet suffer any to say, that Theseus, son of Poseidon, and Pirithous, son of Zeus, were impelled to such dire abductions; nor that any other son of a deity, or hero either, would dare to commit horrible and impious deeds, such as now they falsely ascribe to them; but let us compel the poets to say, either that the actions do not belong to these persons, or that these persons are not the children of gods, —but not to say both, nor yet try to persuade our youth that the gods are the origin of evil, and heroes no better than men: —for just as we said before, these statements are neither holy nor true; inasmuch as we have somewhere or other shown, that evils cannot possibly proceed from the gods.

Adeimantus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ But, besides this, they are hurtful to the hearers also; for everyone will pardon his own depravity, through the persuasion that even the near relatives of the gods, near to Zeus himself, do, and have done, things of a similar nature, of whom it has been written, —

They, on the top of Ida, have uprear'd

To parent Zeus an altar; —

And;

Whose blood derived from gods is not extinct.

Wherefore, we should suppress all such fables, lest they create in our youth a great readiness for committing wickedness.

Adeimantus/ We should so, of course.

Socrates/ What other species of argument, then, —since we are speaking about arguments, —have we still remaining, which ought, or ought not, to be maintained? —For in what manner we ought to speak of the gods we have already mentioned, and likewise of demons and heroes, and those too in Hades.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Does it not remain, then, to speak concerning men?

Adeimantus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Still it is impossible for us, my friend, to regulate this at present.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ Because we shall say, I think, that the poets and orators speak amiss in most important respects concerning mankind, as for instance, that many are unjust, and yet happy, while the just are miserable; and that injustice is profitable, if it escape observation, while justice is another's gain indeed, but injury to one's self; such things, as these, we must forbid them to say, but yet bid them sing and compose in fable the very contrary. Do you not think so?

Adeimantus/ I know it well.

Socrates/ If then you acknowledge that I am right, shall I conclude that you have admitted what all along we were seeking for?

Adeimantus/ You judge right.

Socrates/ Shall we not allow, then, that such arguments may be stated about men, whenever we shall have discovered the nature of justice, —and how it is naturally profitable for the just man to be such, whether he seem so or not?

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Concerning the arguments, then, let what we have said suffice, and now we should consider, methinks, the manner of stating them; and then we shall have completely considered, both what is to be spoken, and the manner how.

Adeimantus/ What you now say, I do not understand.

Socrates/ Nevertheless, it needs you should. —Perhaps then you will understand it better in this way: —is not everything told by the mythologists or poets, a narrative of the past, present, or future?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And do not they execute it, either in simple narrative, or through the medium of imitation, or both?

Adeimantus/ This too, I yet require to understand more plainly.

Socrates/ I appear, to be a ridiculous and dull instructor: —like those, then, who are unable to speak, I will endeavor to explain my meaning, —not the whole generally, but by a particular case. And tell me, —are you acquainted with the opening of the Iliad, where the poet says, Chryses entreated Agamemnon to ransom his daughter; but that he was angry, whereupon the former, since he did not obtain his request, besought the god, against the Greeks?

Adeimantus/ I know it.

Socrates/ You know, then, that down to these verses, —

> His supplication was at large to all
> The host of Greece; but most of all to two,
> The sons of Atreus, highest in command, —

the poet himself speaks, and does not attempt to divert our attention elsewhere, as if any other person were speaking except himself; but as to what he says after this, he speaks as though he himself were Chryses, and tries all he can to make us think that the speaker is not Homer, but the priest, an old man: —and thus he has composed nearly all the rest of the narrative of what happened at Troy, and in Ithaca, and the adventures throughout the Odyssey.

Adeimantus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not narrative, then, when he recites the several speeches, and also when he recites what intervenes between the speeches?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But when he speaks in the person of another, do we not say, that then he assimilates his speech as much as possible to each person whom he introduces as speaking?

Adeimantus/ We will grant it; —why not?

Socrates/ And is not a poet's assimilation of himself to another, either in voice or figure, an imitation of that person to whom he assimilates himself?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ In such a case as this, then, it seems, both he and the other poets execute their narrative by means of imitation?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But if the poet were not to conceal himself at all, his whole action and narrative would be without imitation. —That you may not say, however, that you do not

again understand how this can be, I will tell you. —If, for instance, in relating how Chryses came with his daughters ransom, beseeching the Greeks, but chiefly the kings, Homer had subsequently spoken, not in the character of Chryses, but still as Homer, you know it would not be imitation, but only simple narrative: —and it would have been somehow thus I shall speak without meter, for I am no poet: —"The priest came and prayed, that the gods would allow them to take Troy, and return in safety; and begged them also to restore him his daughter, and accept the presents, out of respect to the god. When he had said this, all the rest showed respect, and consented; but Agamemnon became enraged, and charged him to depart instantly, and not return, lest his scepter and the garlands of the god should not avail him, and added also, that, before his daughter should be ransomed she should grow old with him in Argos; and he ordered him to be gone, and not irritate him, if he would get home in safety. The old man on hearing this was terrified and went away in silence. And after his retiring from the camp he offered numerous prayers to Apollo, calling on the god by his various names, and reminding as well as imploring him, that, if ever, either in the building of temples, or the offering of sacrifices, he had made any acceptable presents, —for the sake of these then, he besought him, to avenge with his shafts on the Greeks the tears that had been shed by himself."—Thus far, friend, the narrative is simple, without imitation.

Adeimantus/ I understand.

Socrates/ Understand, then, that the opposite of this happens, when one takes out the poets words between the speeches, and leaves only the dialogue.

Adeimantus/ This too, I understand, that something like this takes place with tragedies.

Socrates/ You have apprehended my meaning quite correctly. And methinks, I can now make plain to you what before I could not, —that in poetry, and all fabulous writing, one species of it is wholly imitative, as, for instance just as you say, tragedy and comedy; another species employs the narration of the poet himself, you will find this chiefly in dithyrambics; and another again by both, as in epic poetry, and many other kinds besides: —if you understand me.

Adeimantus/ Aye, —I now understand, what you meant before.

Socrates/ Remember, too, that we were before saying, that it had already been settled what were to be the subjects of speech, but it yet remained to be considered how they should be spoken.

Adeimantus/ I do remember.

Socrates/ This then, is the very thing that I was saying, —namely, that we ought to have agreed, whether we will allow the poets to make us narratives wholly through the medium of imitation, or partly through imitation, partly not so, —and, of what kind in each, —or lastly whether they are not to employ imitation at all.

Adeimantus/ I guess, you are inquiring, whether we are to receive tragedy and comedy into our state, or not.

Socrates/ Perhaps so, and something more too, —for I as yet know not; but wherever our reason, wind-like, carries us, there must we go.

Adeimantus/ You say well.

Socrates/ Let us then consider, Adimantus, whether our guardians ought to be practiced imitators or not: —does not this follow, from what has been above stated, that each may exercise one business well, but many, not, —and should he attempt it, that, in grasping at many things, he will fail in all, and excel, perhaps, in none?

Adeimantus/ Of course he will.

Socrates/ Well then, does not the same reasoning apply to imitation, that the same man cannot so well imitate many things as one?

Adeimantus/ Of course he cannot.

Socrates/ In that case he can perform scarcely any of the more eminent employments, and at the same time imitate many things, and be an apt imitator, —since the same persons cannot well execute two different sorts of imitations, apparently similar to each other; as, for instance, comedy and tragedy: —and as for that, did you not, just now, call both of these imitations?

Adeimantus/ I did; and you are right in saying, that the same persons cannot succeed in both.

Socrates/ Nor can they, at the same time, be rhapsodists and actors?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Nor can the same persons be actors in comedies and in tragedies: —and all these are imitations, are they not?

Adeimantus/ Aye, —surely.

Socrates/ The genius of man, Adimantus, seems to have been cut up even into a still greater number of minute particles, —so much so, indeed, that it cannot properly imitate many things, or perform in earnest those very things, of which even the imitations are the resemblances.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ If we are to hold to our first reasoning, therefore, that our guardians, though unoccupied in any productive art whatever, ought to be the most skillful laborers for the liberty of the state, and to mind nothing but what refers thereto, it were surely proper that they should

neither perform nor imitate anything else, —but, should they imitate at all, to imitate from their childhood upwards just what correspond with these, —brave, temperate, pious, generous-hearted men, and the like; —but neither to perform, nor desire to imitate what is illiberal or base, lest from the very imitation they come to experience the positive reality, Have you not also observed, that imitations, if from earliest youth onwards they be long continued, become established in the manners and natural temper, both as to body and voice, and intellect too?

Adeimantus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Surely we are not to allow those, for whom we profess to be anxious, and who ought to be good men, to imitate a woman either young or old, whether reviling her husband, or contending against the gods, and speaking boastingly from the idea of her own happiness; —neither should we imitate her in her misfortunes, sorrows, and lamentations, when sick, or in love, or in the throes of child-birth; we shall be far from allowing this.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Nor to imitate male or female servants in doing servants' duties?

Adeimantus/ Nor this either.

Socrates/ Nor yet, it seems, depraved men, dastards, and those who do the contrary of what has been just mentioned, who revile and rail at one another; and speak abominable things, whether drunk or sober, or do any other misdeeds, such as this class of persons are guilty of, either in words or actions, either as respects themselves or others? —I think too, that they should not even accustom themselves to resemble madmen, in words or actions, for one may know both the mad and wicked, whether men or women; —yet we must not either do or imitate anyone of their actions.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But what; —are braziers or other craftsmen, or such as row vessels, or pilot the sailors, or any others connected therewith to be imitated?

Adeimantus/ How can it be so, by those at least who are not allowed to give their mind up to those pursuits?

Socrates/ But what, —are they to imitate horses neighing, or bulls lowing, or rivers murmuring, or the sea roaring, or thunder, and all such like things?

Adeimantus/ No surely: —we have forbidden them either to get mad, or resemble madmen.

Socrates/ If then I understand what you mean, there is a sort of speech and narrative in which the truly good and worthy man expresses himself, when required to say anything, —and another again quite dissimilar, to which a person quite oppositely born and bred always adheres, and in which he always expresses himself.

Adeimantus/ But what sorts are they?

Socrates/ That man, seems a worthy man, who on coming in his narrative to any speech or action of a good man, will willingly tell it, as if he were himself the man, and not be ashamed of such an imitation, —the more especially, if he be imitating a good man acting cautiously and sensibly, one who is seldom and but little led astray through ailments, or love, or drink, or any other mishap. But when there arises in his narrative anything unworthy of himself, he will not be in any hurry to assimilate himself to one that is worse, except it be for a short time when he is doing some good; and besides, he will be ashamed of it, both as being unpracticed in the imitation of such characters, and also, as unwilling to mold himself, and stand among the models of baser men, whom all the while he despises in his heart, bearing with them only for mere amusement.

Adeimantus/ Probably.

Socrates/ Will he employ a narrative such as that we not long since described in the case of Homer's poems; and will his language partake both of imitation and simple narrative, but have only a small portion of imitation inserted in a great quantity of plain narrative? —Do you think I speak to the purpose or not?

Adeimantus/ Yes, certainly; that must needs be the type of such an orator.

Socrates/ In that case, will not such a man, the more he is depraved, the more readily narrate any matter whatever, thinking nothing unworthy of him, —so much so, indeed, that he will undertake to imitate everything zealously and in public, and such especially as we just mentioned, thunderings and noises of winds and tempests, and of axles and wheels, and of trumpets, pipes, whistles, and sounds of all kinds of instruments, and the cries of dogs likewise, and sheep, and birds?-—and of course the whole expression of this is to be by imitation, both in voice and gestures, partaking but slightly of narrative.

Adeimantus/ This too, is a matter of course.

Socrates/ These, are what I termed the two kinds of diction.

Adeimantus/ Yes, they are.

Socrates/ Has not one of the two, then, very trifling variations; and to give the diction a becoming harmony and rhythm, he who would speak correctly must always speak in the same style, in one harmony, —for the variations are but trifling, —and of course in a rhythm closely corresponding?

Adeimantus/ It is so, clearly.

Socrates/ But as to the other kind, does it not require the contrary, —all kinds of harmonies, and all kinds of rhythms,

if, indeed, it is to be naturally expressed, on account of its having all sorts and shades of variation?

Adeimantus/ That is precisely the case.

Socrates/ Do not, then, all the poets, and writers of narrative generally, use one or other of these models of diction, or a blending of the other two?

Adeimantus/ They must.

Socrates/ What are we to do then: —shall we admit into our state all of these models, or only one of the unmixed, or the one compounded?

Adeimantus/ If my opinion, is to prevail, you should employ that uncompounded one, which imitates only what is worthy.

Socrates/ But surely, Adimantus, the mixed is at least pleasant: —the most pleasant of all, both to children and pedagogues, is the opposite of what you choose, and it is so to the crowd likewise.

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is the most pleasant.

Socrates/ But probably, you will not deem it suited to our civil establishment, because with us no man can be engaged in two or more occupations, but each individual is employed in one only?

Adeimantus/ Of course, it is not fit.

Socrates/ Shall we not find then, that in such a state alone, a shoemaker is only a shoemaker, and not a pilot as well as a shoe-maker; and that the husbandman is only a husbandman, and not a judge as well as a husbandman; and that the soldier is a soldier, and not a money-maker as well; and so with the rest?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ With respect to the man then, who is enabled by his talents to become everything and imitate everything,

if that person were to come into our state and wish to show us his poems, we should respect him as a pious, wonderful, and pleasant person, but would say that we have no such person in our state, nor could such be allowed; and then we should send him to some other state, pouring oil on his head, and crowning him with a woolen chaplet, while we ourselves would call in, to our advantage, a more austere and less pleasing poet and mythologist, to imitate for us the diction of what is becoming, and say whatever he says, in accordance with those models which we regularly set forth on first undertaking the education of our soldiers.

Adeimantus/ So we should do, if it depended on us.

Socrates/ Now then, friend, it seems that we have thoroughly discussed that part of music which concerns oratory and fable; for what is to be spoken, and how spoken, we have already considered.

Adeimantus/ I think so too.

Socrates/ Are we not next to speak, about the style of song and melody?

Adeimantus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Cannot one already find out, then, what we ought to say about these things, and of what kind they should be, if we would be consistent with what we have above said?

Here Glaucon, smiling, said, —

Glaucon/ I seem, indeed, Socrates, to be a stranger to the whole business, for I cannot at present conceive what we ought to say, though I have some inkling.

Socrates/ You can, surely, at any rate, fully state this much, —that melody has three constituents, —sentiment, harmony, and rhythm?

Glaucon/ Yes, this much, at any rate.

Socrates/ And as concerns the sentiment, —that differs in nothing from the sentiment which is not sung, inasmuch as it ought to be performed on the same models, as we just said, and after the same fashion.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Surely, then, the harmony and rhythm should correspond with the sentiment?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But yet we said there was no need for wailings and lamentations in written compositions?

Glaucon/ None, certainly.

Socrates/ Which then are the querulous harmonies? Tell me, —for you are a musician.

Glaucon/ The mixed Lydian, and the sharp Lydian, and some others of this kind.

Socrates/ Are not these, then, to be rejected, as being useless even to well-conducted women, not to speak of men?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Drunkenness, moreover, is highly unbecoming in our guardians, as well as effeminacy and idleness?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Which then are the effeminate and convivial harmonies?

Glaucon/ The Ionic, and the Lydian, which are called relaxing.

Socrates/ Can you use these, my friend, for military men?

Glaucon/ By no means; but it seems you have yet the Doric remaining, and the Phrygian.

Socrates/ I am not learned, in harmonies; but let us put out of the question that harmony, which would fitly imitate the voice and accents of a brave man, engaged in military

action, and every sort of rough adventure, and, should he fail of success, rushing on wounds or death, or any other distress, all the while regularly and resolutely battling with fortune: —let us put out of the question, also, that kind of harmony which suits what is peaceable, where there is no violence, but everything is voluntary, where a man either persuades or beseeches anyone, about anything, —either God by prayer, or man by instruction and admonition; or, on the other hand, where one submits to another's entreaties, instructions, or persuasion, and in all these points acts in accordance with intellect, and does not behave haughtily, but demeans himself soberly and moderately, gladly embracing whatever may happen: —put out of the question, too, these two harmonies, the vehement and the voluntary, which so capitally imitate the voice both of the unfortunate and fortunate, —the moderate and brave.

Glaucon/ Aye, you are anxious, to leave no others but those I now mentioned.

Socrates/ We shall have no need, then, in our songs and melodies, for many strings or instruments expressive of all the harmonies.

Glaucon/ We shall not, it seems.

Socrates/ We are not to maintain, then, such craftsmen, as make harps and spinets, and instruments of many strings that produce a variety of harmony.

Glaucon/ We are not, it seems.

Socrates/ But what, —will you admit into our city flute-makers or flute-players? for, are not those instruments which consist of the greatest number of strings, and those that produce all kinds of harmony, imitations of the flute?

Glaucon/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ There are still left you, then, the lyre and the harp, as useful for your city; and, as respects the fields again, a reed or so for the shepherds?

Glaucon/ This is quite reasonable.

Socrates/ We are doing nothing new then, in preferring Apollo and Apollo's instruments, to Marsyas and his instruments.

Glaucon/ Truly not, it seems.

Socrates/ By the dog, too, we have been once more unconsciously cleansing our city, which, we just now said, had become luxurious.

Glaucon/ Aye; we were wise to do so.

Socrates/ Come then, and let us cleanse the remainder; for what concerns rhythm will follow after harmonies, —namely, that our citizens pursue not ever-varying rhythms having a variety of cadences, but observe what are the rhythms of an orderly and manly life; and observing these, should compel the time and the melody to subserve the sentiment, and not the sentiment to subserve the time and melody. —Now, what these rhythms are, it is your business to tell, as you did with the harmonies.

Glaucon/ Nay, by Zeus, I cannot tell: —-so far, indeed, as that there are three forms from which all measures are composed, just as there are four primitive sounds, from which all harmony is derived, this I can say from observation; but what kind of imitations they are, and of what kind of life, I am not able to tell.

Socrates/ These things, however, with Damon's aid we will consider, —what measures suit illiberality and insolence, or madness and any other ill disposition, —and what rhythms also must be left for their opposites. And I have a confused recollection of having heard him call a certain measure enoplion, which was compound, another a

dactyl, and a third an heroic measure, —embellishing them I know not how, —making them equal above and below, in breadth and length: and methinks he called one an iambus, and another a trochee, and regulated also the long and short measures. In some of these, too, I fancy, he both blamed and praised the measure of the foot, no less than the numbers themselves, or something compounded of both. As for these matters, however, as I said, let them be thrown on Damon: for to define them distinctly, indeed, would require no small discourse: do not you think so?

Glaucon/ No small one, truly.

Socrates/ But as for this point, —whether the propriety or impropriety is dependent on the good or ill rhythm, —can you at all discern that?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Moreover, with respect to good or ill rhythm, the one depends on elegant expression, and conforms to it, while the other is the reverse; and, in the same way, as to the harmonious and discordant, the rhythm and harmony being subservient to the sentiment, as we just said, and not the sentiment to the former.

Glaucon/ These, indeed, should subserve the sentiment.

Socrates/ And what, as to the manner of expression, and as to the sentiment itself, must it not be suited to the temper of the soul?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And all the rest to the expression?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, fine expression, fine harmony, perfect propriety, and perfect rhythm, are dependent on good disposition, —not that dullness which in flattering

language we call good temper, but the intellect itself, adorned with excellent and amiable moral feelings?

Glaucon/ Surely, altogether so.

Socrates/ Must not all these then be always pursued by the youth, if they would perform their duties?

Glaucon/ They should, indeed, be so pursued.

Socrates/ Painting, indeed, is, somehow, full of these things, and so is every other such kind of craftsmanship; and weaving, too, is full thereof, and embroidery and architecture, and all craftship of all kinds of implements; and yet further, the nature of animal bodies and of all plants, —for in all these is found either propriety or impropriety: and moreover, impropriety, want of rhythm, and want of harmony, are close akin to bad language and depraved manners, —their opposites being likewise related, and imitations of discretion and good morals.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Must we, then, merely superintend the poets, and oblige them to present in their poems the idea of good morals, or else not write at all with us; —or should we superintend all other craftsmen also, and restrain this immoral, undisciplined, illiberal, indecent style, so as not to exhibit it either in the representation of animals, or in buildings, or in any other craftsmanship, —so that he who cannot do this may not be suffered to work with us? —This we must do, for fear that our guardians, being trained by images of evil, as in bad pasture-land, by every day plucking and eating many different things, should establish imperceptibly, by little and little, some mighty evil in their soul; —but rather should we seek for such craftsmen, as, by the help of a good natural genius, can investigate the nature of the beautiful and becoming, —in order that our youths, dwelling, as it were, in a healthful place, may receive

advantage on all sides, and so receive some service, either by sight or hearing, from fine productions, just as a breeze brings health from healthy places, and imperceptibly lead them from childhood onwards to resemblance, friendship, and harmony with right reason.

Glaucon/ Thus indeed, they would be brought up in the best possible manner.

Socrates/ In this case, then, Glaucon; —is not musical training of the utmost importance, inasmuch as rhythm and harmony enter largely into the inward part of the soul, and most powerfully affect it, at the same time introducing decorum, and rendering everyone becoming, if properly trained, and, if not so, the reverse? —Moreover, the man, who has thus been brought up as he ought, very soon perceives whatever workmanship is defective and badly executed, or what productions are of such description, —and through a right feeling of disgust will praise and rejoice in the beautiful, and receiving it in his soul will be fostered thereby, and thus become a worthy, good man, —while, as to all that is base, he will rightly despise and hate it, even from early youth, and before he can partake of reason; and again, when reason comes, having been thus trained, he will heartily embrace it, because he clearly recognizes it from its intimate familiarity with himself.

Glaucon/ This appears to me, the very reason, why there should be musical training.

Socrates/ Just as in learning our letters, we are only then sufficiently instructed, when we are acquainted, on meeting them, with the few elementary letters through their various combinations, and do not more or less despise them as unnecessary to be learnt, but take all pains to understand them thoroughly, —as we cannot be good grammarians till we do so.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And supposing the images of letters were seen anywhere, either in water or in mirrors, should we not recognize them before the letters themselves? —or is this a part of the same art and study?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ Is it then true, what I say, by the gods, that in this case we shall never become musicians, neither ourselves nor the guardians we talk of training, unless we understand the ideas of temperance, fortitude, liberality, and magnificence, and whatever are akin to these, are acquainted also with their contraries, so familiar to all, and unless, wheresoever they are, we observe both the virtues themselves and the images thereof, and despise them neither in small nor great instances, but conceive them to be rather a part of the same art and study.

Glaucon/ It must be so.

Socrates/ Must not that person, then, whose lot it is to have virtuous habits in his soul, and what is proportioned and corresponding thereto in his appearance, partake of the same impression and be a fine spectacle to anyone who is able to behold him?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Yet, what is most beautiful is most lovely?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ He, then, who is most musical should surely love those men, who are most eminent in this way; but if a man be unmusical, he will not love them?

Glaucon/ He will not, if he be at all defective in his soul: still, if it were in his body, he would bear with it, and be willing to associate with him.

Socrates/ I understand, that your favorites are or have been of this kind: and I too agree to that; but tell me this, —is there any communion between temperance and excessive pleasure?

Glaucon/ How can there? for such pleasure causes a privation of intellect, not less than grief.

Socrates/ But has it communion with any other virtue?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ What then, —has it communion with insolence and intemperance?

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Can you mention a greater and more acute pleasure than what respects the matters of love?

Glaucon/ I cannot, nor yet one that is more insane.

Socrates/ But right love is of a nature to love the beautiful and the good temperately and harmoniously?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Nothing, then, which is mad, or allied to intemperance, may approach real and right love.

Glaucon/ It may not approach it.

Socrates/ Nor may pleasure approach it; neither may the lover and the person he loves have communion with it, if they are rightly to love and be beloved?

Glaucon/ No, truly; they may not, Socrates.

Socrates/ Thus, then, it seems, you will lay down a law in the city you are establishing, that the lover shall love, converse, and associate with the objects of his love, as with a son, —from a virtuous motive and with his consent; and as to everything else, everyone will so converse with him whose love he solicits, as never to wish to associate for any other purpose but what we have said; —for otherwise he

would undergo the reproach of being unmusical and unacquainted with the beautiful.

Glaucon/ It must be so.

Socrates/ Do not you think then, that our discourse concerning music is now concluded? —For it has now terminated where it ought, —as what is concerned with the art of music somehow ought to terminate in the love of the beautiful.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ After music, then, our youths must be trained in gymnastics.

Glaucon/ What then?

Socrates/ In this likewise they must needs be accurately trained, from infancy upwards through their whole life: —For the matter, methinks, stands somehow thus; —and do you also consider. —I do not think that any sound body can, by its own virtue, render the soul good; and contrariwise, that a good soul can, by its own virtue, render the body the best possible: what think you?

Glaucon/ I think so too.

Socrates/ If then, after having sufficiently trained the intellect, we commit to it the careful management of what concerns the body, shall we not, as we are only laying down patterns, that we may not be tedious, act in a right manner?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ We say then, that they must abstain from drunkenness; for anyone, rather than a guardian, might be allowed to get drunk, and not know where he is.

Glaucon/ It were ridiculous, for a guardian to need a guardian himself.

Socrates/ But what as respects meats; —for these men are wrestlers in most important combats; —are they not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Would not then the bodily state of the wrestlers suit such as these?

Glaucon/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ But, they are a sluggish set, and of dubious health: —do you not observe, that they sleep out their life; and, that if they only ever so little depart from their regular diet, such wrestlers become extensively and deeply diseased?

Glaucon/ I do observe it.

Socrates/ But a more elegant kind of exercise, is required for our military wrestlers, —who, as dogs, ought to be wakeful, and see and hear most acutely, and endure, in their expeditions, many changes of water and food, of heat and cold, that so they may not fail in their health?

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ Is not then the best kind of gymnastic exercise very like the simple music which we just before described?

Glaucon/ How mean you?

Socrates/ That the gymnastics should be simple and moderate, and of that kind most especially which concern war.

Glaucon/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ Even from Homer, one may learn such things as these: for you know, that in their military expeditions, at their heroes' banquets, he never feasts them with fish, not even while they were by the sea at the Hellespont, nor yet with boiled flesh, but only with roast meat, as what soldiers can most easily procure: for, in short, one can everywhere more easily use fire, than carry vessels about?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Neither does Homer, I think, make any mention of seasonings: and this is what every wrestler knows, —that the body, to be in good condition, must abstain from these.

Glaucon/ They are right, and do abstain.

Socrates/ You do not then approve, friend, it would seem, of the Syracusan table, and the various Sicilian made-dishes, since you think the other right?

Glaucon/ It seems I do not.

Socrates/ You will disapprove also of a Corinthian girl, as a mistress, for such as would be in good bodily condition?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And likewise of those celebrated delicacies of Attic confections?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ As respects all such feeding and dieting, if we compare it to the melody and song produced in full harmony and universal rhythm, will not the comparison hold good?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And does not that diversity cause insubordination in this case—disease in the other? But simplicity in music, engenders temperance in the soul, —and in gymnastics, bodily health.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And when insubordination and diseases multiply in a city, must not many law-courts and medicine-halls be opened; and will not the forensic and medicinal arts be in request, when many, even of the free, will earnestly apply to them?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Can you then adduce any greater proof of bad and shameful training in a city, than the fact of their needing physicians and supreme magistrates, and these too, not only

for base and low craftsmen, but for those also, who boast of having been liberally educated; —and again, does it not seem base, and a great proof of defective education, to be obliged to see justice pronounced on us by others, as our masters and judges, and yet to have no sense of it in ourselves?

Glaucon/ This, is of all things the most base.

Socrates/ And deem you not this far more base; when a person not only spends a great part of his life in courts of justice, as defendant or plaintiff, —but, from ignorance of the beautiful, thinks he is renowned for his very dexterity in doing injustice, and his cleverness at turning through all sorts of windings, and using every kind of subterfuge, with the idea of evading justice, —and all this for the sake of small and contemptible things, —ignorant how much better and more noble it were so to regulate life as not to need a sleepy judge?

Glaucon/ This, is still baser than the other.

Socrates/ And to need the medicinal art, not on account of wounds, or some incidental epidemic complaint, but through sloth, and such diet as we mentioned, being filled with rheums and wind, like lakes, and obliging the skillful sons of Æsculapius to invent new names for diseases, —such as dropsies and catarrhs: —do not you think this abominable?

Glaucon/ Truly, those are very new and strange names of diseases.

Socrates/ Such, as I think, existed not in the days of Æsculapius: and I guess so from this, that when Eurypylus was wounded at Troy, and was getting Pramnian wine to drink with much flour sprinkled in it, and cheese grated all which seem to be of inflammatory tendency, the sons of Æsculapius neither blamed the woman who presented it, nor reproved Patroclus, for presenting the cure.

Glaucon/ Surely such a potion, is absurdly improper for one in such a case.

Socrates/ Not so, if you consider, that the descendants of Æsculapius, as they tell us, did not, before the time of Herodicus, practice the method of cure now in use, which puts the patient on a regimen; —whereas Herodicus, being a teacher of youth, and in weak health too, confounded gymnastics and medicine, and made himself first very uncomfortable, and afterwards many others besides.

Glaucon/ How was that?

Socrates/ By procuring himself a lingering death; for while he was constantly attending to his disease, which was mortal, he was not able, as I imagine, to cure himself; though, to the neglect of everything else, he was constantly using medicines, and thus passed his life, always most uneasy, if he departed in the least from his usual diet; and through this wisdom of his, struggling long with death, he arrived at old age.

Glaucon/ A mighty reward, he reaped for his cleverness!

Socrates/ Such as became one, who was unconscious that it was not from ignorance or inexperience of this method of cure, that Æsculapius did not discover it to his descendants, but simply because he was aware, that in all well-regulated states there everyone had a certain work enjoined him, necessary to be done, and no one could be permitted to have time or leisure to get sick throughout life, or busy himself with taking medicine; —a fact that we amusingly discover in the case of laboring people, but do not see it in that of the rich, and those reputed happy.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ A builder, when he falls sick, gets from the physician some potion for throwing up his disease, or purging it downwards, or else, by means of caustic or

amputation, for getting freed from trouble; but if anyone prescribe him a system of regimen, putting caps on his head and so on, he quickly tells him that he has no leisure to lie sick, and it does not suit him to live in that manner, attending to his troubles, and neglecting his duty; and so, bidding the physician farewell, he returns to his ordinary diet, and, should he recover, he goes on managing his affairs, but should his body be unable to bear up against the disease, he dies, and gets rid of his troubles.

Glaucon/ Such a one, ought to use the art of medicine just in this manner.

Socrates/ Is it not, because he has a certain business, —and which, if he does not do it, it is no profit for him to live?

Glaucon/ Plainly.

Socrates/ But the rich man, as we say, has no such work allotted him, from which, when compelled to refrain, life is not worth the having?

Glaucon/ It is said so of him, at least.

Socrates/ You do not mind, what Phocylides says, —that one ought, throughout life, to practice virtue.

Glaucon/ I think, we attended to that formerly.

Socrates/ We shall not differ on this point. But let us learn, whether excessive attention to one's disease is to be the business of the rich, and life is not worth keeping, if he does not give this attention; inasmuch, as such a life hinders the mind from attending to building and other arts, —but, as respects the exhortation of Phocylides, it is no hindrance.

Glaucon/ Yes, by Zeus, it is, and that in the greatest degree, when this unusual care of the body goes beyond gymnastics.

Socrates/ It agrees neither with attention to private economy, or military expeditions, or sedentary magistracies

in the city. But what is of most importance is, that such application to health ill suits any sort of learning and inquiry and solitary study, because one is then perpetually dreading certain pains and swimming of the head, and blaming philosophy as the cause thereof, —so that, where there is this attention to health, it greatly hinders the practice of virtue and improvement therein, as it makes us always imagine that we are ill and ailing.

Glaucon/ Very probably.

Socrates/ And shall we not say, that Æsculapius too understood these things, when to persons in health, and such as used a wholesome diet, but were afflicted by some particular disease, to these and such kind of constitution he prescribed medicine, resisting their ailments by drugs and incisions, but still ordering them their usual diet, that the public might not be injured; but he did not attempt, either by low or nourishing diet, to cure thoroughly diseased systems; and so to afford a long and miserable life to the man himself, and his descendants too, who would probably be of the same kind: for he did not think that a man ought to be cured, who could not live in the ordinary course, as in that case he would be of no service either to himself or the state.

Glaucon/ You make Æsculapius, a politician.

Socrates/ Plainly so; and his sons may evince that he was so. See you not again, that at Troy they proved their bravery in war, and, as I say, practiced medicine likewise? And do not you remember, that when Menelaus was wounded by Pandarus, —

> they sucked the wound, then spread it o'er
> With drugs of balmy power; —

but as for what he wanted to eat or drink afterwards, they prescribed for him no more than for Eurypylus, because they

deemed external applications sufficient to heal men, who, before they were wounded, had been healthy and moderate in their diet, whatever potion they might have drunk at the time, but conceived, that a diseased constitution and an intemperate life were beneficial neither to the men themselves nor to others, and that their art ought not to be employed on, nor minister to them, even were they richer than Midas.

Glaucon/ How vastly clever, you are making the sons of Æsculapius!

Socrates/ It is quite right; —though in opposition to us, the tragedy-writers, and Pindar also, say that Æsculapius was the son of Apollo, and was induced by gold to undertake the cure of a rich man, already in a dying state, —for which indeed he was struck with a thunderbolt: —but we, in accordance with what has been before said, will not believe them as to both these statements, but assert, that were he really a god's son, he would not have been given to filthy lucre, —or else, if he were given to filthy lucre, he was not a god's son.

Glaucon/ This at least, is quite correct. But what say you to this, Socrates? —Must we not provide good physicians for the state; and must not these probably be such as have been conversant with great numbers both of healthy and sick people; and judges also, who have had experience of all varieties of dispositions?

Socrates/ I am speaking particularly, of those who are good: but tell me, —are you aware who they are, that I deem such?

Glaucon/ I shall be, if you will tell me.

Socrates/ I will try to do so; but you are inquiring in one and the same question about two different things.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ Physicians, would become extremely skilled, if, from childhood upwards, they would, in course of learning their art, gain experience from a large number of bodies, and these too of a very sickly character, —especially if they should be themselves afflicted with all kinds of maladies, and not be altogether of a healthy constitution, —for it is not by the body, methinks, that they cure the body else their own bodies would never be allowed to be diseased, or become so, but they cure the body by the soul, which, while in a diseased state, or becoming so, is incapable of properly performing any cure whatever.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ But as for the judge, friend, he governs the soul by the soul; and if it has been bred up from childhood with depraved souls, has constantly associated with them, and has itself committed all sorts of crime, it cannot so far emancipate itself, as of itself to judge correctly about others' ill deeds, just as happens with respect to bodily ailments: —no, it must even in youth be unacquainted with and unpolluted by bad habits, if it would be fair and honorable itself and judge correctly of what is just. Hence, therefore, the virtuous, even in youth, appear simple, and easily deceived by the unjust, because they have within them, forsooth, no dispositions corresponding in sentiment with those of the wicked.

Glaucon/ Aye, indeed, this very often happens to them.

Socrates/ For this reason, the good judge must not be a youth, but old, —one who has been late in learning the nature of wickedness, which he apprehends not as a peculiar quality resident in his own soul, but from having, as a foreign one, long studied it in the souls of others, and from having ascertained the nature of its evil by positive science, rather than personal experience.

Glaucon/ Such an one as this, is likely to be a very noble judge.

Socrates/ And a good one too; the very thing you required: for the man with a good soul is good; —while on the other hand, the clever, slyly suspicious man, —he, namely, who has himself committed much sin, and is deemed subtle and wise when in the society of his equals, has the repute of being a clever, wary kind of person, because he has constantly in his eye those models that reside within himself: —but whenever he approaches the good, who are his seniors, he appears mightily inferior, unseasonably suspicious, and wholly ignorant of moral integrity, having within him no models of any such quality; but, on the other hand, as he has more frequent intercourse with the wicked than with the wise, he appears, both to himself and others, unusually wise, rather than ignorant.

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ We must not then, in such a man as this, look for a wise and good judge, but in the former one. Vice, indeed, can never know both itself and virtue; but virtue, where the moral temper is gradually instructed, will attain to a scientific knowledge both of itself and depravity also: —this man, then, and not the wicked one, is, as I think, wise.

Glaucon/ I, too, am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ You will establish, then, in your state a science of medicine such as we have described, and along with it a corresponding system of judicature, both of which together may carefully provide for such of your citizens as are naturally well disposed both in body and in mind; while, as regards the opposite, such as are diseased in their bodies, they should let die; but as for those who are thoroughly evil and incurable as to the soul, these they are themselves to put to death?

Glaucon/ It seems, at any rate, the best, that can happen, both for those who are thus afflicted and for the state itself.

Socrates/ As respects your youths, however, it is quite plain, that they will be cautious in calling in the aid of judicial science, so long as they are employed on that simple music, which, we said, generates temperance.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Will not then, the musician who pursues gymnastics, on the very same principles as his own art, prefer doing so in such a way as not to want medicine except when absolutely necessary?

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ His exercises too, and his labors, he will perform with reference more to the spirited portion of his nature thus stirred into action, than to mere physical strength, —differently, indeed, from all other wrestlers, who take food and undergo toil with a view to the promotion of bodily strength?

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ In that case, Glaucon, they who propose to teach music and gymnastics, propose them, not for what some imagine, namely, to cure the body by the one, and the soul by the other.

Glaucon/ If not, what is their motive?

Socrates/ They seem to propose them both, chiefly on the soul's account.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ Perceive you not, how those persons have regulated their intellect itself, who have all their life been conversant with gymnastics, yet never studied music, —or how those are affected who have lived in a manner quite the reverse of this?

Glaucon/ What are you speaking about?

Socrates/ Of savageness and fierceness, and again of effeminacy and mildness.

Glaucon/ Yes, I understand; —that is, persons who apply themselves to unmixed gymnastics become more savage than they ought; and those again who attend to music alone, are softer than becomes them.

Socrates/ And moreover, this very savageness imparts probably a certain spirit to the disposition, and, if rightly disciplined, will become fortitude; but when stretched too far, it will probably become indecently fierce and troublesome.

Glaucon/ So I think.

Socrates/ But what; —will not the philosophic nature partake of the mild also; and when this disposition is carried to excess, may it not prove softer than it ought, and if rightly disciplined, both mild and modest?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ We say also, that our guardians ought naturally to be possessed of both.

Glaucon/ They ought.

Socrates/ Ought they not, then, to be made to suit one another?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And the soul of the person thus suited is temperate and brave?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But the soul of a person not so suited is cowardly and savage?

Glaucon/ Especially so.

Socrates/ As a matter of course, then, when one consents to be soothed with the charms of music, and to have poured

into his soul through his ears as through a pipe those lately called the sweet, effeminate, and doleful harmonies, and spends the whole of his life humming ditties and charmed with melody, —such an one, first of all, —should he possess any spirit, —softens it like iron, and makes it serviceable, instead of useless and harsh. When, however, he positively declines desisting, and becomes the victim of a kind of fascination, —after this, he is melted and dissolved, till his spirit is quite spent, and the nerves are, as it were, cut out from his soul, making him an effeminate warrior.

Glaucon/ Quite so indeed.

Socrates/ Aye; if he had originally possessed a nature devoid of spirit, he would quickly have done thus; but, if he possesses one of high spirit, it makes the mind weak, and causes it to be quickly overbalanced, speedily either excited and overcome; and hence men become outrageous and ill-tempered, rather than high-spirited.

Glaucon/ Quite so, indeed.

Socrates/ But what; —if a man labor much in gymnastics and live on extremely good diet, but pay no attention to music and philosophy; is he not first of all, from having his body in good condition, abundantly filled with prudence and spirit, and does he not become braver than he was before?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ But what; —supposing he does nothing else, and has no commerce with the Muses, not even if he had any love of learning in his soul, as neither having a taste for investigation, nor sharing in any inquiry or reasoning, or other musical pursuit whatever, does it not become feeble, deaf, and blind, as being neither awakened, nor nurtured, nor his perceptions purified?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Such an one then becomes, I suppose, a hater of argument, and indisposed to music, —one who cannot at all be reasoned into anything, but conducts himself in all matters with violence and ferocity, like a wild beast; and thus he lives in ignorance and barbarity, out of measure, and unpolished?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Corresponding then to these two tempers, it seems, I would say, that some deity has furnished men with two arts, —music and gymnastics, —relating respectively to the high-spirited and the philosophic nature, —not indeed, for the soul and body, otherwise than as a by-work and accessory, but with a view to those two tempers, that they may be mutually suitable to each other by being tightened and loosened at pleasure.

Glaucon/ Aye, —it seems so.

Socrates/ Whoever then can most cleverly mingle gymnastics with music, and introduce them in justest measure into the soul, this person we may most properly call completely musical, and most harmoniously disposed, —far more, indeed, than the man who puts in tune the strings of an instrument.

Glaucon/ Very likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we not then, always need, Glaucon, such a president in our city, if its government is to be kept entire?

Glaucon/ It will indeed be quite needful, as far at least as we can.

Socrates/ The above then are probably the true models both of education and discipline: —for why should one go through the dances, the hunts of wild beasts with dogs and nets, the wrestlings and the horse-races expedient for such persons? —for it is almost manifest that they follow as a matter of course, nor are they at all hard to discover.

Glaucon/ Well, perhaps they are not difficult.

Socrates/ Granted: —but after this, what had we next to determine? —Is it not, which of these shall govern, and be governed?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ Is it not plain that the governors should be the elder, and the governed the younger?

Glaucon/ Plain.

Socrates/ And also, that the best of them should govern?

Glaucon/ Aye, —that too.

Socrates/ And the best husbandmen; —are they not the cleverest in tillage?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, if it be fit that our guardians be the best, will they not be most strictly watchful over the city?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ With this view should we not make them prudent, and able, and careful also of the city?

Glaucon/ It is the fact.

Socrates/ At any rate a man would be most careful of what he happens to love?

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And this at least one must especially love, —namely, what he deems to have a community of interest with himself, especially when he conceives, that in another's good fortune he may find good fortune too, —but if otherwise, the reverse?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ We must choose then, from the rest of the guardians such men, as on inquiry most of all seem to perform with all cheerfulness through an entire life whatever

they deem expedient for the state, —while, as to the inexpedient, they will not do it by any means at all.

Glaucon/ These are just the proper persons.

Socrates/ I really think that they ought to be observed at all stages of life, whether they act consistently with this opinion, without either being reduced or forcibly compelled inconsiderately to throw up the opinion, of its being a duty to do what is best for the state.

Glaucon/ What throwing up do you mean?

Socrates/ I will tell you. Opinion seems to me to come from the intellect either voluntarily or involuntarily, —voluntarily indeed as regards false opinion, when it comes from him who unlearns it, —but involuntarily, as regards every true one.

Glaucon/ The case of the voluntary one, I understand; but that of the involuntary I want to learn.

Socrates/ What; —are not even you of opinion, that men are deprived of good things involuntarily, but of evil things voluntarily? Is being deceived respecting the truth no evil, and the attainment of truth no good? and think you not, that to form opinions respecting things as they really exist is attaining the truth?

Glaucon/ Aye, you speak correctly: —they do indeed seem to me to be deprived unwillingly of true opinion.

Socrates/ Are they then thus affected by being robbed, or enchanted, or forced?

Glaucon/ Now, at any rate, I do not understand you.

Socrates/ I am probably expressing myself, just like the tragedians: for, I say, that those have their opinions stolen, who change them through persuasion, or else forget them; because, in the one case, they are imperceptibly removed by

time, and in the other by reasoning: —now perhaps you understand?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And those, I say, are forced out of their opinions, whom grief or agony obliges to change them?

Glaucon/ This too, I understand, and you are right in saying so.

Socrates/ Those, moreover, methinks, you will say, are enchanted out of their opinions, who change them, either bewitched by pleasure or appalled by fear.

Glaucon/ For whatever deceives, seems to exercise a kind of magical enchantment.

Socrates/ We must now then inquire, —as I was saying before, —who are the best guardians of their own particular maxim, that they should do whatever they deem to be best for the state; and they should observe them too quite from childhood, setting before them such work, as may lead them most readily to forget such a matter and delude themselves; and we should choose one who is mindful and hard to be deluded, while one who is not so we should reject: —is that it?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we must appoint them labors and pains and contests, in which we must observe these very same things.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Should we not, also, appoint a third contest, that of the mountebank kind; and look to see, just as persons lead young colts amidst noises and tumults, to find out whether they are frightened? —and thus, while yet young, they must be led into various fearful situations, and again be thrown back into pleasures, trying them far more

than gold in the fire, whether a person appears hard to be beguiled by mountebank tricks, and is of composed demeanor amidst all, because he is a good guardian of himself, and of that music in which he had been instructed, proving himself in all these respects to be in just rhythm and harmony.

Glaucon/ Being of such character, he would truly be most useful both to himself and the state.

Socrates/ And he who in childhood, youth, and manhood, has been thus tried, and come out pure, may be appointed governor and guardian of the state; honors are to be paid him while he lives, and at his death he should receive the highest rewards of public burial and other memorials: —while one that is not such we must reject. Somewhat like this, methinks, Glaucon, —for we have only drawn it in outline, not defined it accurately, —should be the mode of choosing and establishing our governors and guardians.

Glaucon/ I think so too.

Socrates/ Is it not then really most correct to call these the perfect guardians, both as to what relates to enemies abroad and friends at home, for taking from one party the will, and from the other the power of doing mischief, while the youth whom we just now called guardians will be allies and auxiliaries to the decrees of the governors?

Glaucon/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ What then, should be our plan, when we are falsifying by one of the well-intentioned and necessary untruths, such as we just mentioned, with a view to persuade chiefly the governors themselves; —but, if not these, the rest of the state?

Glaucon/ What kind of untruth do you mean?

Socrates/ Nothing new, but something like the Phoenician fable, which has often taken place heretofore, as

the poets say and have persuaded us, but which has not happened in our times, nor do I know whether it is likely to happen, —to persuade one of which indeed requires great suasive power.

Glaucon/ You seem to me, to hesitate to tell it!

Socrates/ I shall appear to you, to hesitate with very good reason, whenever I shall tell it.

Glaucon/ Speak, and be not afraid.

Socrates/ I will tell you then, though I know not with what courage, or what words I am to use in telling you; —and I will attempt, first of all to persuade the governors themselves, and the soldiers, and then also the rest of the state, that, whatever training or education we gave them, all these particulars seemed to affect and befall them like dreams, while really they were in course of formation and development beneath the earth, where are fabricated not only themselves, but also their amour and other equipments: —but after they were completely fashioned, the earth, who is their mother, brought them forth; and now they ought to consult the interests of the country in which they reside as for a mother and nurse, and to defend her in case of invasion, and to look upon the rest of the citizens as their brethren, and sprung from the same soil.

Glaucon/ It is not without reason, that some time back, you were ashamed to tell this falsehood.

Socrates/ Quite so: —but still hear the remainder of the fable. All of you in the state truly are brethren as we shall tell them by way of fable; but the God, in forming you, mixed gold in the formation of such of you as are able to govern; —on which account they are the most honorable; —in such as are auxiliaries, silver; —and in the husbandmen and other craftsmen, iron and brass. Since then you are all of the same kindred, you would for the most part beget children

resembling yourselves; and sometimes perhaps silver will be generated out of gold, and out of silver there might be a golden offspring; and thus in all other ways are they generated out of one another. Governors then, first and chiefly, the God charges, that over nothing are they to be such good guardians, or to keep such vigilant watch, as over their children; —to know with which of these principles their souls are imbued; —and should their descendants be of brass or iron, they will show them no indulgence whatever, but assigning them honor just proportioned to their natural temper, will thrust them down to the rank of craftsmen or husbandmen. And if again any from among these latter shall exhibit a golden or silver sort of nature, they are to pay them honor and elevate them; —some to the guardianship, others to the rank of auxiliaries, —the oracle having declared that the state shall perish whenever iron or brass shall hold its guardianship. With, respect to this fable then, have you any means of persuading them of its truth?

Glaucon/ None, of persuading these men themselves; but I have as respects their sons and posterity, and the rest of mankind afterwards.

Socrates/ Even this, would act well in making them more anxious about the state's welfare, and for one another; for I almost understand what you mean: —and this truly will lead the same way as the oracle. As for ourselves, having armed these earthborn sons, let us lead them forward under the conduct of their leaders; and when they are come into the city, let them consider where they may best pitch their camp, so as best to keep in order those within it, should anyone be unwilling to obey the laws; and likewise how they may defend it against those without, should any enemy come, like a wolf, on the fold. And when they have pitched their camp, and sacrificed to the proper divinities, let them erect their tents: is that the way?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ They should be such then as may suffice to defend them, both from winter's cold and summer-heat?

Glaucon/ Of course; for I think, you are alluding to houses.

Socrates/ Yes, those of the military class, not those of the money-makers.

Glaucon/ How, do you say that the latter differs from the former?

Socrates/ I will try to tell you; for, of all things, it is the most dreadful, and disgraceful to shepherds, to breed, as guardians of the flocks, such kind of dogs, and in such a manner, as that, either through want of discipline, or hunger, or some other ill habit, the dogs should themselves attempt to hurt the sheep and so resemble wolves rather than dogs.

Glaucon/ It is dreadful, of course.

Socrates/ Must we not then take all care, lest our allies act thus towards our citizens, as being the more powerful, and, instead of generous allies, resemble savage masters?

Glaucon/ We must take care.

Socrates/ Would they not be prepared to exercise the greatest caution, if they were really well educated?

Glaucon/ They are so, moreover.

Socrates/ I then, for my part, observed: that you cannot properly insist on, friend Glaucon; but what we were just now saying is proper; namely, that they should have a good education, whatever its nature, if they are to possess what is most important towards rendering them mild, both among themselves and towards those under their guardianship.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ In addition then to this training, any intelligent person would say, that their houses and all other effects ought to be so contrived, as neither to impede their guardians in becoming the very best possible, nor to excite them to the injury of the other citizens.

Glaucon/ Aye, and he will say true.

Socrates/ If then they intend to be such, consider, whether they ought to live and arrange their household in some such manner, as follows: First, let none possess any private property unless it be absolutely necessary: next, let none have any dwelling, or store-house, into which anyone that pleases may not enter: then, as for necessaries, let them be such as both temperate and brave champions in war may require; making for themselves this law, not to receive such a reward of their guardianship from the other citizens, as to have either surplus or deficiency at the years end. Let them also frequent public meals, as in camps, and live in common; and we must tell them, that they have ever in their souls from the gods a divine gold and silver, and therefore have no need of that which is human; and that it were profane to pollute the possession of the divine ore, by mixing it with the alloy of the mortal metal; because the money of the vulgar has produced many impious deeds, while that which they have is pure; and that of all men in the city, they alone should not be allowed to handle or touch gold or silver, or harbor it under their roof, or carry it about, nor to drink out of silver or gold. By such means they will be likely to preserve both themselves and the state; but whenever they shall possess private lands and houses, and money, they will become stewards and farmers instead of guardians, and hateful masters instead of allies to the other citizens; in hating indeed, and being hated, in plotting, and being plotted against, they will pass the whole of their life; much more frequently and more really terrified by the enemies

from within than by those from without, as they and the rest of the state are hastening very near to destruction.

For all these reasons, we must say, that our guardians should be thus regulated, both as to their houses and all other matters. And let us consider these things as law; shall we not?

Glaucon/ By all means.

The end of the third book.

Book 4.

Socrates/ Adimantus hereupon rejoining said:

Adeimantus/ What answer will you make, Socrates, if one were to say that you do not make these men very happy, —and that owing to themselves, whose property the state really is, —yet they enjoy no advantage in the state, such as others do who possess lands, build beautiful and large houses, purchase suitable furniture, offer sacrifices to the gods at their own expense, entertain strangers, and, as you were just now saying, possess gold and silver, and everything generally supposed to contribute towards making men happy. Aye, doubtless, he may say, they seem, like hired auxiliaries, to be settled in the state for no other purpose than keeping guard.

Socrates/ Yes; and that too only for their maintenance, without receiving, like the rest, pay as well as rations; —so that they are not to be allowed so much as to travel abroad privately, though they wish it, nor bestow money on mistresses, nor spend it in such other ways as those do who are reputed to be happy. These and many such like things you leave out of the accusation.

Adeimantus/ Well, let these charges too, be made against them.

Socrates/ What answer then, are we to make, you ask?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ While travelling on the same road, we shall find, methinks, what is to be said: for we shall state, that it would be nothing strange, were these men, under these circumstances, to be the happiest possible: —yet it was not with an eye to this, that we are establishing our state, —to have anyone tribe in it remarkably happy, but that the whole state might be so to the fullest extent; for we judged, that in such an one more particularly we should meet with justice,

and again in that the worst established injustice; and that, on thoroughly examining these, we might determine what we have long been seeking. Now then, as we suppose, we are forming a happy state, not by selection, making some few only so in it, but the whole: and we will next consider one its reverse.

Just as if, when we were painting human figures, a person should come and blame us, saying, that we do not place the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the creature, —inasmuch as the eyes, the most beautiful part, were not painted with purple, but black; we should seem perhaps to make a sufficient answer to him, by saying, Clever fellow, do not suppose that we ought to paint the eyes so beautifully, as that they should not appear to be eyes, and so with the other parts; —but consider, rather, whether, in giving each particular part its due, we make the whole beautiful.

And especially now, do not oblige us to confer such happiness on our guardians as shall make them anything rather than guardians: for we know too, how to dress out the husbandmen in fine robes and gird them with gold, and bid them till the ground with a view to pleasure only, —and in like manner, those who make earthenware, to lie at their ease by the fire, drinking and feasting, and placing the wheel near them to work just so much as they like; —and so also how to confer happiness on everyone in such a manner as to render the whole state happy.

But do not advise us in this way; because, if we obey you, neither will the husbandman be really a husbandman, nor the potter a potter; nor will anyone else be really of any of those professions of which the state is composed.

As to all the rest, it is of less consequence: —for, when shoemakers become bad and corrupt, and profess to be

shoemakers when they are not so, no great mischief befalls the state; but when guardians of the laws and of the state are not so really, but only in appearance, you see how entirely they destroy the whole state, and, on the other hand, that they alone have the opportunity of managing it well and effecting its happiness.

If then we would appoint men who shall be really guardians of the city, let us choose those who will be least hurtful to it; but he who says that they should be a kind of farmers, and as in a festival meeting, not in a state, jolly entertainers, must speak of something else rather than a city.

We must consider, then, whether we establish guardians with this view, that they may enjoy the greatest happiness, —or, looking to the entire state, we regard whether it is to be found therein; and we must compel these allies and guardians to do this, and persuade them to become the best performers of their own particular work, and act also towards all others in the same manner; and thus, as the whole city becomes prosperous, and well constituted, we must permit its several classes to share in that degree of happiness which their nature admits.

Adeimantus/ I think you say well.

Socrates/ Well then, what is near akin to this, shall I be thought to say rightly.

Adeimantus/ In what particularly?

Socrates/ With respect to all other artificers again, consider whether these things corrupt them, so as to make them bad workmen.

Adeimantus/ To what do you allude?

Socrates/ Riches? and poverty.

Adeimantus/ As how?

Socrates/ Thus: —Would the potter, think you, after he has become rich, have any desire still to mind his art?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ But will he not become more idle and careless than he was before?

Adeimantus/ Much more so.

Socrates/ Will he not then become a worse potter?

Adeimantus/ This too, much more so.

Socrates/ And, moreover, being unable through poverty to supply himself with tools, or other requisites of his art, his workmanship will be more imperfectly executed, and his sons, or others whom he instructs, will be inferior artists.

Adeimantus/ Of course they will.

Socrates/ Owing to both these causes, then, namely poverty and riches, the workmanship in the arts becomes inferior, and the artists themselves inferior too.

Adeimantus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ We have then, it seems, found out other things for our guardians, against which they must by all means watch, that they may not steal into the state without their knowledge.

Adeimantus/ Of what sort are these?

Socrates/ Riches, and poverty; —the one engendering luxury, idleness, and a love of innovation; —the other, illiberality and mischief, as well as a love of innovation.

Adeimantus/ Quite so. But, Socrates, pray consider this; —how is our state to have the power of engaging in war, when she is possessed of no money, especially if compelled to wage war against a great and opulent one?

Socrates/ It is plain, that to fight against one is somewhat difficult; but against two such is more easy.

Adeimantus/ How say you?

Socrates/ First of all, now, if there is any occasion for fighting, will they not, being practiced warriors, fight against rich men?

Adeimantus/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ What then, Adimantus, would not a single boxer, trained as highly as possible to this exercise, seem to you easily able to fight against two who are not boxers, but on the other hand, are rich and fat?

Adeimantus/ Not perhaps with both at once.

Socrates/ Not even, if he should be enabled to retire a little, and then turn back and give a blow to the furthest in advance, and repeat this frequently in the sun and heat? —would not a person of this kind easily defeat many such as these?

Adeimantus/ Clearly so, and no wonder.

Socrates/ But think you not, that the rich have more science and experience in boxing than in the military art?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ In that case, according to appearances, our wrestlers will easily combat with double and threefold their number.

Adeimantus/ I will agree with you; for I believe you say right.

Socrates/ But what, —supposing they were to send an embassy to another state, informing them of their true situation, telling them, We make no use either of gold or silver, neither is it lawful for us to use them, while for you it is so: —if then you become our allies in war, you shall receive the enemy's spoils; —think you that any, on hearing this, would choose to fight against stanch and resolute dogs, rather than in alliance with the dogs to fight against fat and tender sheep?

Adeimantus/ I think not; but, if the wealth of all the rest be accumulated in one single state, take care that it the wealthy state does not endanger that which is poor.

Socrates/ How good you are, to think that any other deserves to be called a state except such as we have established.

Adeimantus/ Why not? Socrates.

Socrates/ To those others, we must give a more magnificent appellation; for each of them comprises very many states, and is not one, as was said in the game; for there are always in them, however small they be, two parties hostile to each other, —the poor and the rich; and in each of these again there are very many; —to which, if you apply as to one, you would be entirely mistaken; —but if, as to many, giving one party the goods and power, or even persons, of the other, you will always have the many for your allies, and the few for enemies; and, so long as your state be managed temperately, as lately established, it will be the greatest, —not I mean in mere repute, but really the greatest, though its defenders were no more than one thousand; for a single state of such size you will not easily find, either among Greeks or barbarians, but many which have the repute of being many times larger than one such as this. Are you of a different opinion?

Adeimantus/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ This, then, will probably be the best boundary-mark for our rulers as to the size that a state should attain, and what extent of ground should be marked off for it in proportion to its bulk, without reference to anything further?

Adeimantus/ What boundary?

Socrates/ I suppose, it should be this: So long as the city, as it increases, continues to be one, so far it may increase, but no further.

Adeimantus/ Very right.

Socrates/ We will impose, then, this further injunction on our guardians, to take care by all means that the city be neither small nor great, but of moderate extent, and one only.

Adeimantus/ This probably, will be a trifling injunction.

Socrates/ A more trifling one still, is what we previously mentioned, when we observed, that if any descendant of the guardians be depraved, he should be dismissed to the other classes; and if one from the other classes be worthy, he should be promoted to that of the guardians; —by all which it was intended to show that all the other citizens should apply themselves each to that particular art for which he has a natural genius, that so, each minding his own proper work, should not become many, but one; and thus, consequently, the whole state would have the nature of unity; —not plurality.

Adeimantus/ Well, —this, indeed, is a still more trifling injunction than the other.

Socrates/ We do not here, good Adimantus, as anyone might suppose, impose on them many and grave injunctions, but all of them rather trifling, if they take care of one grand point that we speak about, or rather not so much great as sufficient.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ The education, and nurture of children; for if, by being well educated, they become temperate men, they will easily see through all these things, and such other things as we pass by at present, —women, marriages, and the propagation of the species, —inasmuch as these things ought all, according to the proverb, to be made entirely common among friends.

Adeimantus/ Yes, —for that, would be most right.

Socrates/ And moreover, if once a republic is set a-going, it proceeds as a circle, constantly on the increase. For nurture and good education, when maintained, engender good dispositions, and good dispositions, partaking of such education, turn out still better than the former, especially with reference to propagation, just as with all other animals.

Adeimantus/ Probably.

Socrates/ To speak then in brief, this, particularly, the guardians of the state must guard against, that it may not be corrupted unawares, —nay, above all things, must they guard against this, not to make innovations in gymnastics and music, contrary to the established order of the state, but as far as possible maintain it, through fear that while a man adopts that poetical expression;

> …… Men most admire that song
> Which most partakes of novelty.

one might often think that the poet means not new songs, but some new style of song, and so commends it: but such as this one ought neither to commend nor admit; for as to receiving a new kind of music one should be specially cautious, as endangering the whole: for never, as Damon says, and I quite agree with him, are the measures of music altered without affecting the most important laws of the state.

Adeimantus/ And me too, you may place, among those who are of that opinion.

Socrates/ We must erect then, in music, as it seems, a kind of citadel for our guardians.

Adeimantus/ Nevertheless, neglect of the laws even here, easily and imperceptibly steals in.

Socrates/ Yes, in the way of diversion, and as if it were doing no mischief.

Adeimantus/ No, for it does nothing else, but by gradually insinuating itself into it, insensibly flow into their manners and pursuits; and afterwards in a greater degree it finds its way into their contracts with each other; and from contracts it enters with much boldness into the laws and political establishments, Socrates, till at last it overturns everything, privately as well as publicly.

Socrates/ Well, then, is this the case?

Adeimantus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Ought not our children then, as I said at the beginning, even from infancy, to be allowed diversions more conformable to the laws? because, if their diversions are inconsistent with the laws, and the children such themselves, it is impossible that they should grow up men obedient to the laws and virtuous.

Adeimantus/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ When, therefore, children beginning well set about their diversions conformably to the laws, with music, quite the contrary to what happens in the former case attends them in everything, and grows up with them, and corrects in the state whatever was before neglected.

Adeimantus/ True, indeed.

Socrates/ And regulations, even, that seem but of little importance, these persons discover anew, which the others had allowed altogether to perish.

Adeimantus/ What regulations?

Socrates/ Such as these: —That the younger should keep silence before the elder, as is proper, and give them place, and rise up before them, and show reverence to parents; likewise what shaving, what clothes and shoes are proper, with the whole bodily dress, and all similar matters. Do not you think so?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ But to make laws about these things, would, I think, be silly; neither is it done anywhere; nor would it stand, though established both by word and writing.

Adeimantus/ For how can it?

Socrates/ It seems then, Adimantus, that in whatever way a man sets out in his education, such accordingly will be its consequences; for does not the like always attract the like?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And we may say, I suppose, that it results at last in something complete and vigorous, whether it be good or the contrary?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ I would not then, for these reasons, undertake as yet, to make laws about such matters as these.

Adeimantus/ Very properly.

Socrates/ But what, by the gods, as to those laws relative to matters of contract, and to the traffic which they severally transact with each other in the market, and, if you please, their traffic likewise among their handicrafts, their abusiveness and bodily assaults, their entering of actions at law, their institution of judges, and likewise such imposts and payments of taxes as might be expedient either in the markets or at the ports, —or generally as to laws commercial, municipal, or marine, or any other the like, —shall we venture to establish any of these?

Adeimantus/ It is improper, to prescribe them to good and worthy men; for the greater part of them, such as ought to be established by law, they will easily find out for themselves.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, if at least God grant them security for those laws which we have above described.

Adeimantus/ But if not so, they will spend the whole of their life making and amending many such regulations, imagining that they will thus attain to what is best.

Socrates/ You say that such as these, will lead a life like that of sick persons, and such as are unwilling, through intemperance, to relinquish a bad mode of living?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And truly, these at least pass their time very pleasantly; for though they undergo remedial treatment, they do nothing but make their ailments greater and more complex; and they are ever in hopes, when anyone recommends any medicine to them, that by these means they shall soon get well.

Adeimantus/ Aye, that is just the case with diseased persons like these.

Socrates/ But what, is not this pleasant of them, to reckon that man the most hateful of all, who tells them the truth, namely, that, till one abandons drunkenness, gluttony, unchaste pleasures, and laziness, neither drugs nor caustics, nor the use of the knife, nor charms, nor amulets, nor any other such things as these, will be of any avail?

Adeimantus/ That, is not very pleasant; for to be angry with one who tells us what is right, has nothing in it that is pleasant.

Socrates/ You seem to be no admirer, of such men as these.

Adeimantus/ No, truly.

Socrates/ You cannot then surely approve of it, even though the entire city as we were lately saying should act so;

or rather, do they not seem to be doing the same that is done by all those cities, which, however ill-governed, command their citizens not to alter any part of the constitution, for that death will be inflicted on all who do any such things; while, on the other hand, whoever most cheerfully serves those who thus govern, gratifying them with insinuating flattery, and exhibits great dexterity in anticipating and satisfying their desires, will be deemed both good and wise in matters of highest importance, and will be held by them also in the greatest honor?

Adeimantus/ They seem to me at least, to do the very same thing, and I cannot by any means commend them.

Socrates/ But what again as to those who desire to manage such states, and are even fond of it, do you not admire their courage and dexterity?

Adeimantus/ I do; excepting, indeed, such as are imposed on by them, and fancy that they are really politicians, because they are praised by the multitude. How do you mean?

Socrates/ Do you not pardon those men? Do you think it even possible that a man ignorant of the art of measuring, supposing he should hear many other such men tell him that he is four cubits high, would not believe this of himself?

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Be not angry then; for such as these are of all the most ridiculous; because, as they are ever making laws about such things as we have just mentioned, and ever mending them, they conceive they shall find some end to the frauds respecting commerce, and what else I just now spoke about, through ignorance of the fact that they are in fact, as it were, trying to destroy a hydra.

Adeimantus/ Nevertheless, it is nothing else, that they are now attempting.

Socrates/ I think, then, that a true lawgiver ought not to give himself much trouble about such sorts of laws and police, either in an ill or well-ordered state; in the one, because it is unprofitable and of no avail; in the other, because, as for some of the laws, anyone whatever can find them out, while others flow quite of their own accord out of their former habits and pursuits.

Adeimantus/ What then, in the enactment of laws, yet remains for us to consider?

Socrates/ We have nothing, indeed, remaining: to the Delphian Apollo, however, there remains the greatest, noblest, and most important of legal institutions.

Adeimantus/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ The erection of temples, sacrifices, and other services to the gods, demons, and heroes; likewise the rites of the dead, and what other ceremonies should be gone through, with a view to their propitiation. Such things as these, indeed, we neither know ourselves, nor, in founding the state, would we entrust them to any other, if we be wise; nor would we employ any other interpreter than that of the country: for surely this god, being the natural interpreter to all men about such matters, interprets to them sitting in the middle, and, as it were, navel of the earth.

Adeimantus/ Aye, you say well; and we must act accordingly.

Socrates/ Thus then, son of Ariston, is our state established. And, in the next place, having provided from some source or other sufficient light for it, do you yourself observe, and call on your brother and Polemarchus and these others also to do so also, whether we can at all perceive where justice lies, and where injustice, and in what respect they differ from each other; and likewise which of the two

that man ought to possess, who proposes to be happy, whether with or without the knowledge of gods and men.

Glaucon/ You say nothing to the purpose; for you yourself promised to inquire into this, as it was unholy for you not to assist by all possible means the cause of justice.

Socrates/ What you remind me of, is true; and I must act accordingly; still it is proper, that you too should assist in the inquiry.

Glaucon/ Aye, that we will.

Socrates/ I hope then, to be able to find what I want in the following manner: —I think that our city, if at least it has been rightly established, should be perfectly good.

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ It is evident then, that it is wise, and brave, and temperate, and just.

Glaucon/ Manifestly so.

Socrates/ Whatever then of these virtues we shall find in it, the remainder will be that which is not found?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Supposing of any four things whatever, if we were in quest of one, were we to discover this one at first, we should be satisfied; and were we first to discover the other three, we should discover from this itself what we were inquiring after; for it would be manifestly no other than what was left behind.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ Well then, since of the virtues above mentioned there happened to be four in our state, shall we not inquire about them in a similar manner?

Glaucon/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ First of all, indeed, to my mind at least, wisdom appears to hold in it a very conspicuous place; and there appears to be something very peculiar about it.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ The state which we have described appears to me to be really wise, for it is well advised; is it not?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ And surely this very thing, the ability of advising well, is evidently a kind of science; for in no case do men advise well through ignorance, but only by means of science.

Glaucon/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ But there are many and various kinds of science in the state?

Glaucon/ Of course there are.

Socrates/ Is it then owing to the science of builders, that the state is to be termed wise and well-advised?

Glaucon/ By no means through this; for it would only be clever in buildings A state, then, is not to be called wise on account of its skill in advising the best methods of building?

Socrates/ Surely not. And what, as respects skill in brass-work or anything else of a similar nature?

Glaucon/ For none of these.

Socrates/ Nor yet for its knowledge of the productions of the earth is it said to be wise, but only skilled in agriculture.

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ But what; is there any science among any of the citizens in the state which we have just founded, which deliberates, not about any particular thing in the city, but about the whole, how it may best be conducted, both as regards itself and its intercourse with other cities?

Glaucon/ Yes, there is.

Socrates/ What is it, and among whom to be found?

Glaucon/ This very guardianship; and it may be found among those very governors, whom we lately termed perfect guardians.

Socrates/ On account then of this skill, what do you term the state?

Glaucon/ Well-advised, and really wise.

Socrates/ Whether then, do you imagine that the braziers, or these true guardians, will be the more numerous in the state?

Glaucon/ The braziers, far more so.

Socrates/ And of all, who owing to their skill are to be held in account, will not these guardians be the fewest in number?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ By this smallest class and portion of the state then, and by the science that presides over and governs it, is the whole city wisely established on natural principles; and this class, as it seems, is by nature the smallest, whose business it is to have a share in that science, which of all others ought alone to be denominated wisdom.

Glaucon/ Your remark, is perfectly true.

Socrates/ We have found then, I know not how, one of the four, both as respects its nature and the part of the state in which it resides.

Glaucon/ And for my part, I think it has been sufficiently described.

Socrates/ But as to fortitude, both as respects itself, and the particular part of the state in which it resides, on account of which the state is termed brave, that can be no difficult matter to discover.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Who, would call a state brave or cowardly, with relation to any other than that particular portion which makes war and fights in its defense?

Glaucon/ No one would, with relation to any other.

Socrates/ No, for I do not think that the other classes therein, whether cowardly or brave, can have any influence to make it either the one or the other.

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ The state then is brave in a certain part of itself, because it contains such a power as will constantly maintain its opinion about things dreadful, as to their being these very things, and such like, just as the lawgiver inculcated during training: —Do you not call this fortitude?

Glaucon/ I have not thoroughly comprehended, what you say; so tell it over again.

Socrates/ Fortitude, I term a kind of preservative.

Glaucon/ What sort of preservative?

Socrates/ A preservative of opinion formed by law in a course of education about things dreadful, as to their nature and quality; and I called it a constant preservative, because one retains it both in pains and pleasures, desires and fears, and never casts it off; and, if you please, I will liken it to what I think it closely resembles.

Glaucon/ Pray do.

Socrates/ Do not you know then, that dyers, when they want to dye their wool, that it may be purple, choose out of ever so many colors only the white, and then prepare and manage it with no trifling pains, so that it may best take a bright hue, and then they dye it? And whatever is dyed in this manner is of an indelible dye; nor can any washing, either without or with soap, take away its hue; but as for wool not thus managed, you know of what sort it proves,

whether one dye either this or other colors, without previous preparation.

Glaucon/ I know, that they are easily washed out, and get shabby.

Socrates/ Suppose then, that we, too, were to perform according to our ability a similar operation, when selecting our soldiers, and instructing them in music and gymnastics; and that we should attend to no other object, than that they should obediently and in the best manner receive the laws, as they would a color, and so acquire indelible opinions about the dreadful, and other things as well, through having had a suitable temper and education; these leys then, however strongly detersive, could not wash away their dye, whether they be pleasure which is more powerful in effecting this than any alkali or lye whatever, or pain, fear, and desire, which exceed in power all other solvents. —Such a power then, and constant maintenance of right and legitimate opinion about what is dreadful or not so, I term and define to be fortitude, unless you offer some other meaning.

Glaucon/ No; I can offer none; for you seem to me to hold, that when a right opinion about these matters arises without education, it is both savage and slavish, and not at all according to law; and you give it some other name besides fortitude.

Socrates/ Your remark is quite true.

Glaucon/ I admit, then, that this is fortitude.

Socrates/ Admit further, that it is political fortitude, and you will admit rightly; but we will inquire about it, if you please, more perfectly some other time; for, at present, it is not this, but justice, that we are seeking; and with regard to the inquiry about the other, that has, in my opinion, been carried far enough.

Glaucon/ You say well.

Socrates/ There yet remain, two virtues in the state which we must consider, —namely, temperance, and that, for the sake of which we have been searching after all the rest, —that is justice.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ How then can we find out justice, so as to trouble ourselves no further about temperance?

Glaucon/ I truly neither know, nor do I wish it to be developed before the other, if at least we are on that account to dismiss altogether the consideration of temperance; but, pray oblige me, and consider this before the other.

Socrates/ I for my part am quite willing; for I should be acting wrongly not to do so.

Glaucon/ Consider then.

Socrates/ We must consider; and as it appears from this point of view, it seems to resemble a sort of symphony and harmony more than the virtues formerly mentioned.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Temperance, is somehow a certain decorum, and a restraint, as one may say, exercised over certain pleasures and desires; and when one boasts of being superior to oneself, and many other suchlike expressions, these are mentioned as indications of it; are they not?

Glaucon/ Yes, —they are its leading indications.

Socrates/ But is not the expression, "superior to oneself," ridiculous? —for he who is superior to himself must somehow also be inferior to himself; and the inferior be the superior, —for the same person is spoken of in all these cases.

Glaucon/ How otherwise?

Socrates/ To me, however, the expression seems to denote, that in the same man, as regards his soul, there is

one part better, and another worse; and that when the better part of his nature governs the inferior, this is what is termed being superior to himself, and expresses a commendation; but when, owing to bad education or associations, that better and smaller part is swayed by the superior power of the worse part, —then one says, by way of reproach and blame, that the person thus affected is inferior to himself and altogether in disorder.

Glaucon/ Aye, —it would seem so.

Socrates/ Look then, at our new state, and you will find one of these in it: for you will agree, that it may justly be addressed as superior to itself, if that state, in which the better part governs the worse, is called temperate and superior to itself.

Glaucon/ I do see it; —and you say true.

Socrates/ And moreover one may find very many and various desires, and pleasures, and pains, especially among children, and women, and domestics, and likewise among the greatest and most depraved portion of those who are called free.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But as for the simple and moderate desires, which are led by the intellect, with judgment and right opinion, you will meet with them only in the few, those, namely, of the best temper and best educated.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And do not you see that these things are contained in our state, and that there too the desires of the many and the baser part are restrained by the desires and prudence of the smaller and more moderate part?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ If then, we are to call any state superior to pleasures and desires, and to itself also, this may be so called.

Glaucon/ Yes, by all means.

Socrates/ And is it not on all these accounts temperate?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And if, again, in any other state, the governors and the governed agree in opinion on the point, as to the fit governing party, it is to be found in this: —do you not think so?

Glaucon/ I am strongly of that opinion.

Socrates/ In whom then of the citizens will you say that temperance resides, when they are thus situated; —in the governors, or the governed?

Glaucon/ In both of them, probably.

Socrates/ Do you see then, that we just now rightly guessed, that temperance resembles a kind of harmony?

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Because—not as fortitude and wisdom each of which resides in a certain part, the latter making the state wise, and the former courageous, not after this manner does temperance render the state temperate; but it is naturally diffused through the whole, making the weakest and the strongest and the intermediate all to agree, either in prudence, if you will, or if you will, in strength, magnitude, or in substance, or anything else of the same kind; so that most justly may we say, that this concord is temperance, a natural consent between the worse and the better part, with reference to the question which of them ought to govern, either in the state or in each individual.

Glaucon/ I am quite of the same opinion.

Socrates/ Well then, three qualities in our state, it would seem, have been clearly discovered: but with respect to the remaining species, owing to which the state has the quality of virtue; what can it be?

Glaucon/ It is plain that it is justice.

Socrates/ It is plain. Ought we not then, Glaucon, like huntsmen, closely surrounding a thicket, to take great care that justice does not somehow or other escape, and vanish from our sight? —for it is clear that it is somewhere here. Look earnestly, therefore, to spy it out, if you can any how see it sooner than me, and then point it out to me.

Glaucon/ Would that I could; but if you will use me rather as an attendant, and one able only to perceive what is pointed out to him, you will then be treating me just as you ought.

Socrates/ Call on the gods with me, and follow.

Glaucon/ I will do so; do you only lead the way.

Socrates/ To me, this seems a place somehow hard of access, and overcast with shadow: —it is indeed dark, and hard to penetrate; —but still we must go on.

Glaucon/ We must.

Socrates/ Ho! Ho! Glaucon, we seem to have some track; and I think that it will not altogether escape us.

Glaucon/ You tell good news.

Socrates/ Verily, our senses are somewhat blunted.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ Long since, even from the first, my fine fellow, has it been rolling at our feet; and we perceived it not, but made the most ridiculous figure, like those who sometimes seek for what they already have in their hands: —so we did not perceive it, but were looking out to a distance; and thus perhaps it escaped us.

Glaucon/ How mean you?

Socrates/ Thus; —that I think, although we have been long talking and hearing of it, we do not understand ourselves, as to the manner in which we expressed it.

Glaucon/ A long preamble, to one who is eager to hear.

Socrates/ Well now, listen whether I say anything to the point: —for what we at first settled, when regulating the state, as what ought always to be done, —that, I think, or a species thereof, is justice: —this surely we settled, and frequently mentioned, if you remember; —that everyone ought to apply himself to one thing, with reference to the state, —to that, namely, to which his genius most naturally inclines him?

Glaucon/ Yes, we did say so.

Socrates/ And also, that attending to one's own affairs, and not busying oneself about many things, is justice, and this we have not only heard from many others, but have frequently said ourselves.

Glaucon/ We have said so.

Socrates/ This then, my friend, somehow seems to be justice, to attend to one's own business. —Do you know whence I infer this?

Glaucon/ No; pray tell me.

Socrates/ Besides what we have already considered in the state, —namely, temperance, fortitude, and wisdom, —this, seems to remain, which enables all these both to have a being in the state and to afford safety to its indwellers as long as it continues therein; and we said likewise, that justice would be that remaining part, if we found the other three.

Glaucon/ It must be so.

Socrates/ But if, you want to judge, which of these, by its presence in the state, will do it the greatest proportionate good; it would be difficult to determine whether the coincidence of opinion between the governors and the governed, or the maintenance of legitimate opinion among the soldiers about what is dreadful, and what is not so, —or what is wisdom and guardianship in the rulers, —or whether this, by its existence in the state, makes it proportionably best, —namely, when child and woman, bond and free, artificer, magistrate, and subject, everyone in short attends to his own business, and does not meddle.

Glaucon/ Yes, it is hard to decide, of course.

Socrates/ With reference, then, to the virtue of a state, that power which makes each person in it attend to his own business, rivals, as it seems, its wisdom, temperance, and courage.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly so.

Socrates/ Will you not then constitute justice as a co-rival with these, with reference to the virtue of a state?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Consider, then, whether you agree with me in this: will you enjoin the rulers to give just decisions in judgment?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And in giving judgment, what else are they to aim at in preference to this, —namely, that no one shall have what belongs to others, or be deprived of his own?

Glaucon/ No; they must aim at this.

Socrates/ And do they not aim at it, when acting justly?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And thus justice is acknowledged to be the habitual practice of one's own proper and special work?

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ See then, if you agree with me: —suppose a carpenter to take in hand the work of a shoemaker, or a shoemaker the work of a carpenter, exchanging either their tools or wages; or if the same man undertake both, and make all the other exchanges; think you that the state would be much injured?

Glaucon/ Not very much.

Socrates/ But methinks, if a craftsman, or one born to a money-getting employment, should afterwards, through being elated by wealth, popularity, strength, or anything else of the kind, try to advance into the military class, or out of the military class into that of counselor and guardian, when unworthy of it, —and these should exchange tools and rewards; or if the same man should undertake to do all these things at once; then, I suppose, you will be of opinion, that this interchange of things and this multiplicity of employments by a single person is the destruction of the state.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ A meddling spirit, then, in these three classes, and the change from one to another, is the greatest injury to the state, and may be most correctly called its depravity.

Glaucon/ Aye, truly so.

Socrates/ But will not you say that injustice is the greatest ill a state can do itself?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ This then is injustice. Again we say, as follows: The peculiar occupation of the money-getting, the auxiliary, and the guardian class, when each of them does his own work in a state, will be the contrary of the other, that is justice, and will make the state just.

Glaucon/ The case appears to me, to be no otherwise than thus.

Socrates/ Let us not as yet, affirm this for certain: but if it shall be conceded by us, that this kind enters into each individual, and that there is justice, we will then agree; for what shall we say? but if not, then we must push our inquiries further. —But now let us finish the inquiry on which we were engaged, —namely, whether, in judging, we should be better able, by first contemplating justice in some of the greater objects that possess it, to distinguish its nature in a single man, and that as a state appeared to us this very object; we thus therefore formed it as well as we possibly could, in the assurance that justice would be found in one that is good.

As to what we have discovered in the state, then, let us now transfer and apply it to a single person; and if the two correspond, it will be well; but if there be any difference in the individual, we will go back again to the state, and put it to the test; and, perhaps, in considering them side by side, and by striking them, we shall make justice shine forth, like fire from flints; and when once clearly apparent, we can then firmly establish it among ourselves.

Glaucon/ Aye, you are speaking quite in the right way; and thus, too, we must act.

Socrates/ With respect then, to what may be termed the same, whether greater or less, does it happen to be dissimilar in that respect in which we call it the same, or is it similar?

Glaucon/ Similar.

Socrates/ The just man then, will not at all differ from the just state, as respects the idea of justice, but will be similar to it.

Glaucon/ Aye, similar.

Socrates/ However a state appeared to be just, because three kinds of dispositions being in it, each performed its own work; but it appeared to be temperate, brave, and wise, on account of certain other affections and habits of these very same kinds.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And in that case, my friend, we shall deem it proper, that the individual, who has these very same principles in his soul namely, temperance, fortitude, wisdom, should have a good right, from having the same affections with the state, to be called by the same names?

Glaucon/ He needs must.

Socrates/ Here again, my clever fellow, we have fallen into a trifling discussion about the soul, whether it does or does not contain within itself these three principles.

Glaucon/ I do not think it is a trifling one: for probably, Socrates, the common saying is true, that things excellent are difficult.

Socrates/ They seem so. And be assured of this at least, Glaucon, that, in my opinion, we shall never comprehend this matter accurately by such methods as we are now using in our conversation, because the road which really leads to it is longer and of greater extent: still we will consider it in a manner consistent with our former disquisitions and inquiries.

Glaucon/ Ought we not to acquiesce in this for to me at least, and for the present, it would be satisfactory enough.

Socrates/ Aye, and for me too, it will be quite sufficient.

Glaucon/ Do not get tired then; but pursue the inquiry.

Socrates/ Is it then necessary, that we should acknowledge the very same characters and manners to exist in every individual that are found in the state? because there

is no other source whence they arrived thither. It were ridiculous, indeed, to imagine that the high spirit for which the Thracians, Scythians, and nearly all the northern nations are reputed, does not arise from individual personages; and the same may be said respecting the love of learning, which one may especially deem natural to the people of this country, —or, with reference to the love of riches, which we may say prevailed especially among the Phoenicians and the people of Egypt.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ It is so, of course; and it is not hard of recognition.

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ This, however, is truly hard to decide, whether we perform our separate acts by one and the same power, or whether, as they are three, we perform one by one, and another by another; that is, learn by one, get angry by another, and by a third covet the pleasures of nutrition and propagation, and others akin to these; or whether, when we devote ourselves to them, we act on each with the whole soul: these matters are difficult adequately to determine.

Glaucon/ I think so too.

Socrates/ Let us try to define these things, whether they are the same with one another, or different.

Glaucon/ How can we?

Socrates/ It is plain that the same thing evidently cannot at the same time produce or experience contrary effects in the same respect, and relatively to the same object; so that, if we ever find anything thus occurring, we shall know that it was not one and the same thing, but several.

Glaucon/ Granted.

Socrates/ Attend now to what I am saying.

Glaucon/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Is it possible for the same thing, considered in the same relation, to be both at rest and in motion?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Let us define this more accurately still, lest, as we proceed, we be inclined to waver: —for, if one were to say that, when a man stands, though yet moving his hands and head, the same person is at once still and in motion; we should not, I conceive, reckon this a correct mode of speaking, but that one part of him is at rest, and another part in motion: —is it not so?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But if a person arguing thus were to proceed jestingly and facetiously allege that tops are wholly at rest, but yet are at the same time in motion, when, fixed on the same point, they are whirled about their center, —or that anything else going round in a circle in the same position does the same, —we should not admit it, as it is not in the same respect that they both stand still and are in motion; but we should say that they have in them the straight line *i.e.* the axis and the circumference; and that, with relation to the axis they are at rest because it inclines to neither side; but with relation to the circumference, they move in a circle: —and again, if, while it is whirling round, its perpendicularity inclines either to the right or the left, forwards or backwards, then it is by no means at rest.

Glaucon/ Very right.

Socrates/ No assertion then of this kind will frighten us; nor shall anyone persuade us, that anything, being one and the same, can do and suffer contraries at one and the same time, in the same respect, and relatively to the same object.

Glaucon/ Me, at any rate, he shall not.

Socrates/ But once more, not to be tedious in going over and refuting all these quibbles, let us proceed on the supposition, that this is really the case, acknowledging, also, that if at any time these things are found to be different from what they now are, all that we have gained will be lost.

Glaucon/ This then, is what we must do.

Socrates/ Well then, —nodding an assent, and making a sign of dissent, desiring to take a thing and refusing it, attracting or repelling—will you reckon all such things contraries respectively, whether actions or passions; —for it matters not which?

Glaucon/ Contraries, certainly.

Socrates/ What then, —thirst, hunger, and the desires generally, —and further, to wish and to will, may not all these be considered as of the same kind with the species just mentioned? —As for instance, will you not always say of a man who desires, that his soul aims after what it desires, or attracts to itself what it wishes to have? —Or again, so far as the soul wishes something to be given to it, does it not make a sign for it, as if a person were asking for it, through desire of acquiring its possession?

Glaucon/ I should say so.

Socrates/ But what? —to be unwilling, not to wish, and not to desire, —shall we not deem them synonymous with repelling and driving off from the soul, and so all things else that are contrary of the former?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ This being the case, shall we say that there is a certain species of desires, and that the most conspicuous are those which we call thirst and hunger?

Glaucon/ We shall say so.

Socrates/ Is not one the desire of drinking, the other of eating?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ In the case of thirst then, is it, so far as it is thirst, a desire in the soul of anything more than what we were saying; and as far as thirst goes, —is there a thirst for hot drink, or cold, for much or little, or in short for some particular kind of drink? —or again, if heat be added to the thirst, will it not readily occasion a desire for cold drink; but if cold be added to it, then a desire for warm drink: and if the thirst be great, owing to numerous causes, will it not occasion a desire for much drink, but if small, a desire for little; while as for the desire of thirst itself, it never becomes the desire of anything else, but of that only to which it naturally belongs, —and so, also, of hunger with reference to meat?

Glaucon/ Just so, every desire belongs in itself to that alone of which it is the desire; but whether they be desires of such or such a particular kind, are adventitious circumstances.

Socrates/ Let no one then, trouble us, as if we were inadvertent, by objecting to us that no one desires drink, but good drink, —nor meat, but good meat; —inasmuch as all men desire what is good. If then thirst be a desire, it is one of something good; whether it be of drink, or anything else whatever, —and in the same way with all the other desires.

Glaucon/ Aye, perhaps, the man who says this may be deemed to say something to the purpose.

Socrates/ But in truth, things naturally relative, refer in each particular, as I think, to this or that object, to which they belong, while in their individual character they refer only to themselves individually.

Glaucon/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Do not you understand, that greater is relatively greater than something?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not greater than the lesser?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which is much greater than that which is much less; is it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which was formerly greater than that which was formerly less, and that which is to be greater than that which is to be less?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And in like manner, the more numerous has reference to the less numerous, and the double to the half, and so in all such-like cases; —and further, the heavier to the lighter, and the swifter to the slower; and further still, the hot to the cold; and all such like, are they not thus related?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what as to the sciences; —is not the case the same? —for, science itself is the science of pure learning, or of whatever else one sees fit to make it the science; while, on the other hand, a certain particular science, of a particular kind, refers to a certain particular kind, and also to a particular object. My meaning is as follows: —when the science of building houses arose, was it not so far separated from the other sciences, as to acquire the name of architecture?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Was it not so, because it was of a kind like none else?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Was it not then from its being the art of such a particular thing, that it became itself such a particular art; —and are not all other arts and sciences in like manner?

Glaucon/ They are so.

Socrates/ Consider then, that this is what I wanted to express, if you now understand me; namely, that things which are relative, taken by themselves alone, relate to themselves alone, but considered as of such a quality, relate to particular objects. I do not say, however, that a science altogether resembles that of which it is the science; as if, for example, the science of healthy and sickly were itself healthy and sickly, or the science of good and evil itself good and evil; but as science is not constituted the science of that generally of which it is the science, but only of a certain quality of it that is, of its healthy and sickly state, so it comes to be itself a particular science; and hence it is no longer called simply a science, but the medicinal science, the particular class to which it belongs being superadded.

Glaucon/ I understand you; and I think it is so.

Socrates/ As for thirst then, will you not class it among those things which have relation to something else, so far as it is what it is? and is not thirst a thirst for something?

Glaucon/ I should, certainly, for drink.

Socrates/ And does not a particular thirst desire a particular drink? —whereas thirst in general is neither of much nor of little, nor of good nor bad, nor, in one word, of any particular kind; but abstractly and in general, the natural desire of drink.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ The soul of the man then who thirsts, so far as he thirsts, wishes nothing further than to drink; and this he covets, and to this he hurries?

Glaucon/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ If therefore, when the soul is athirst, anything draws it back, must it not be some different principle from that which excites thirst, and leads it as a wild beast to drink; —since it is impossible, we say, for the same thing, by itself, and at the same time, to produce contrary results from the same cause?

Glaucon/ It is indeed impossible.

Socrates/ Just as it is not proper, methinks, to say of an archer, that his hands at once propel and draw in the bow, but that one of his hands propels it, and the other draws it in?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Can we say, then, that there are some, who when athirst are not willing to drink?

Glaucon/ Certainly, many, and often.

Socrates/ What then, is one to say of these persons? —Might it not be said, that there is something in their soul that prompts them to drink, and likewise something that restrains them, quite different, and that prevails over the prompting principle?

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ Does not the restraining principle then, whenever it arises, arise from reason; while those that lead and urge men onwards, proceed from affections and ailments?

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ We shall not then, be unreasonable in defining these as distinctly two, and separate from one another, if we call that with which one reasons, the rational part of the soul, but that part with which it loves, and hungers, and thirsts, and is carried away by desires, the irrational and

concupiscent part, as associated with certain gratifications and pleasures.

Glaucon/ We shall not; but we may reasonably regard them in this light.

Socrates/ Let these two then, be defined as distinct principles in the soul. But as to that of anger, and by which we are angry, is it a third principle, or is it of like nature with one or other of these two?

Glaucon/ Perhaps, with one of them, the concupiscent.

Socrates/ But I believe, what I have somewhere heard: — Leontius, son of Aglaion, as he was returning from the Piræus, along the outside of the northern wall, perceiving some dead bodies lying close to the place of public punishment, had a desire to look at them, but yet at the same time revolted therefrom and turned away; and for a while he resisted, and covered his eyes, but, at last, overcome by his desire, ran with eyes wide open towards the dead bodies, and said: "Here now, ye wretched eyes of mine! glut yourselves with this fine spectacle.

Glaucon/ I too have heard it.

Socrates/ This story now shows. that anger sometimes opposes the desires, as being distinct from each other.

Glaucon/ Yes, it does show it.

Socrates/ Do we not then in other cases, and very frequently, perceive, when the appetites compel anyone against his reason, that he reproaches himself, and is angry at the compelling principle within him; and that like two persons at variance, the anger of such a person becomes an ally to reason; but that it sides with the desires when reason decides that no opposition is to be offered, you will say, I think, that you have never perceived anything of this kind either in yourself, nor yet in any other?

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ What then, is it not the case, when a man imagines he is doing a wrong, that the more generous he is, the less is he apt to be angry, however he may suffer hunger or cold, or other like privations, from one, who, as he thinks, inflicts them with justice? —And, as I have said, his anger will not incline him to rise up against such an one.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But what; —when a man thinks himself injured, does he not in this case boil with rage and become indignant and ally himself on the side of what seems just; and under all the sufferings of hunger, cold, and the like, does he not bear up and strive to conquer; nor does he cease from his generous toils, until he has either accomplished them, or dies, or, like a dog by the shepherd, is called off and pacified by the rational principle within him?

Glaucon/ Certainly, it is precisely like what you say; for, in our state, we appointed the auxiliaries to be obedient, like dogs, to the state rulers, as being shepherds of the state.

Socrates/ You quite understand, what I mean to say: —but have you considered this also?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That here apparently, as regards the irascible, the reverse takes place from what took place in the former instance, —for then we reckoned it the same as the concupiscent; but now we say it is far from it, or rather that, in the sedition of the soul, it more willingly arrays itself on the side of the rational part.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is it then as something entirely distinct, or as a species of the rational; —so as that there are not three species, but only two in the soul, the rational and concupiscent? —or, as there were three species which completed the city, the money-getting, the auxiliary, the

deliberative; so, in the soul, is this irascible a third natural principle, auxiliary to the rational, when not corrupted by bad education?

Glaucon/ Of course, it must, be a third.

Socrates/ Yes, if at least it seem at all different from the rational, just as it seemed to be distinct from the concupiscent.

Glaucon/ Aye, that is not hard to see; —and as a proof of this, one may see, even in little children, that quite from their infancy they are full of anger, while some of them, at least in my opinion, never have any share in reason, the majority indeed only arriving at it but late in life.

Socrates/ Aye, truly, you are right. And in the brute beasts, too, one may observe yet further, that what you say is really the case; and besides this, it is attested also by what we formerly cited from Homer—

> His breast he struck, and thus his heart reproved; —

for, in this passage, Homer has plainly made one part reprove the other; that part, namely, which reasons about good and evil, to reprove the part which is unreasonably angry.

Glaucon/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ These things, we have agreed to after some difficulty; and it is now sufficiently acknowledged, that the same sort of principles that are in a state reside also in the soul of every individual, and equal in number. Must it not, then, necessarily follow, that in whatever manner the state is wise, and in whatever respect, after the same manner and in the same respect, the individual is so also?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And in whatever respects, and after whatever manner, the individual is brave, in the same respect, and

after the same manner, a state is brave also? and so in all other respects, both are the same as regards virtue?

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And I think, Glaucon, it may be said that a man is so just in the same way as a state is so.

Glaucon/ This also must needs be the case.

Socrates/ Aye; but have we not somehow or other forgotten this, that the state is just, when everyone of the three species in it does its own particular work?

Glaucon/ No, I do not think we have forgotten that point.

Socrates/ We must remember then likewise, that each of us will be just, and do his own work, each part of whose soul does its own proper duty.

Glaucon/ Aye, we must be sure to recollect that.

Socrates/ Is it not proper, then, that the rational part should govern, as being wise, and charged with the care of the whole soul; and that the spirited part should obey and ally itself to the other?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Will not the mixture then, as we said, of music and gymnastics, make the two to harmonize by exalting and nurturing the one with excellent arguments and good discipline, while it unbends the other by soothing and rendering it mild through harmony and rhythm?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And when these two are thus nurtured and have been truly taught and practiced in their own affairs, they will preside over the concupiscent part, which in everyone occupies the largest part of the soul, and by its nature is insatiable of wealth; and they will take care, lest, having acquired growth and strength by being filled with bodily pleasures, as they are termed, it become discontented

with its own work, and so attempt to enslave and rule over those it ought not, and thus wholly upset the entire system of life.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And by this principle, will not the two maintain a good guard against enemies from without, owing to their joint influence over both soul and body, the one laying down the plans, and the other fighting in obedience to its leader, and executing with fortitude the plans laid down?

Glaucon/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ And I think we call a man brave, when, through all the pains and pleasures of life, the spirit maintains the opinion dictated by reason about what is terrible, and what is not so.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And we call a man wise, from that small part which governs him, and dictates this, inasmuch as it possesses the knowledge of what is expedient for each separately, and for the whole of the three together.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And, do we not moreover term a man temperate, from the association and harmony of these very principles, when the governing and governed agree in one, —namely, when reason governs, and when the others are not at variance therewith?

Glaucon/ Temperance, is no other than this, either as respects the state or the individual.

Socrates/ But he will be just, owing to those causes and in the manner which we have often before mentioned?

Glaucon/ He must.

Socrates/ What then; has anything blunted us, that we should regard justice as anything else than what it is seen to be in a state?

Glaucon/ Not in my opinion at least.

Socrates/ In this manner then if there yet remain any doubt in the soul, let us, by all means, satisfy ourselves by bringing the man into difficult circumstances.

Glaucon/ As what?

Socrates/ For instance, if we be compelled to declare, concerning such a state and a man born and educated conformably thereto, whether such a man, if entrusted with gold or silver, is likely to embezzle it, —who do you think would imagine, that such an one would do it sooner than those of a different character?

Glaucon/ No one would.

Socrates/ Will not such an one then be free from sacrileges, thefts, and treacheries, either privately against his friends, or publicly against the state?

Glaucon/ He will.

Socrates/ Nor will he ever, in any shape, be faithless, either as to his oaths, or other compacts?

Glaucon/ How should he.

Socrates/ Adulteries, neglect of parents, and impiety against the gods, will be found then in anyone rather than such a man as this?

Glaucon/ Aye, in anyone else, truly.

Socrates/ And is not this the cause of all these things, —that, of all the parts within him each separate one does its own work, as to governing and being governed?

Glaucon/ This is it, and nothing else.

Socrates/ What else do you wish justice to be, except such a power as produces men and states like these?

Glaucon/ Not I, truly, for my part.

Socrates/ Our dream then, which we conjectured, is at last accomplished; that on our very first attempt to found our state we have apparently arrived by divine assistance at a principle and pattern of justice?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And that, Glaucon, was a certain image of justice, that the man naturally fitted for the office of a shoemaker, should make shoes properly, and do nothing else; and that he also, who is a carpenter, should do that work, —and so also, of the rest.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ In truth, then, of such a kind was justice, as it seems; nor does it regard merely a man's external action, but what is really internal, relating to the man himself, and what is properly his own; not allowing any principle in him to attempt what is another's province, or to meddle and interfere with what does not belong to it; but really well establishing his own proper affairs, and maintaining proper self-government, keeping due order, becoming his own friend, and most naturally attuning these three principles, as three musical strings, base, tenor, and treble, or whatever others may intervene: —thus will he be led to combine all these together, and out of many to form one whole, temperate, attuned, and able to perform whatever is to be done, either in acquiring wealth, or managing the body, or any public affair or private bargain, and in all these cases reckoning that action to be just and good, which always sustains and promotes this habit; and so also calling the knowledge which presides over this action wisdom, —and on the contrary, calling that an unjust action, which destroys this habit, —and the opinion which presides over this, folly.

Glaucon/ Perfectly true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Be it so: —if then we should say, that we have found out a just man and state, and the nature of justice in both, I think we should not be considered altogether in error.

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ May we assume it, then?

Glaucon/ We may.

Socrates/ Be it so. But we were next, I think, to consider injustice?

Glaucon/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Is it not then necessarily a kind of variance between the three principles, a kind of meddling and interfering spirit in things foreign to their proper business, and an insurrection of someone principle against the whole soul, to govern where it is not its province, though it be really of such a nature, that it ought to be in subjection to the governing principle? I imagine then we are to call this tumult and error by some such names as these, —injustice, intemperance, cowardice, folly, and in a word, all vices?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ To commit injustice then, and to be injurious, and likewise to act justly, all these must be very manifest, if indeed injustice and justice are so.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Because, they do not differ from what is salutary or noxious; —as the latter are in the body, so are the former in the soul.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ Such things as are healthy produce health, and such as are noxious, disease.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does not acting justly produce justice, —and acting unjustly, injustice?

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ To produce health, however, is to establish everything in the body, so that they shall mutually govern and be governed, conformably to nature, —while the production of disease, on the other hand, consists in one part governing and being governed by another, contrary to nature.

Glaucon/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ Then again, to produce justice, is it not to establish all in the soul, so that its parts shall mutually govern and be governed according to nature; —and does not injustice consist in governing and being governed by one another contrary to nature?

Glaucon/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ Virtue then, as it seems, is a kind of health, beauty, and good habit of the soul; and vice its disease, deformity, and infirmity?

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ Do not honorable pursuits then lead to the attainment of virtue, but dishonorable to that of vice?

Glaucon/ They must.

Socrates/ What remains for us to consider then is, —whether it be profitable to act justly, and pursue what is honorable, and to be just, and whether a man can be of such a character unconsciously or not; —or to act unjustly, and to be unjust, though one be never punished, or reformed by correction?

Glaucon/ But, Socrates, this inquiry seems, to me at least, quite ridiculous; —that if in a corrupt state of the body life be deemed not worth possession, not even though accompanied by all kinds of meats and drinks, and all wealth and power, yet when the nature of the vital principle

is disordered and thoroughly corrupted, life will then be worth having, though a man were to do everything else that he likes, except ascertaining how he shall get released from vice and injustice, and cultivate justice and virtue, —since both these things have been proved such as we have represented them.

Socrates/ Aye, it would be truly ridiculous. However, since we have arrived at such a point as enables us most distinctly to perceive that these things are so, we must not get weary.

Glaucon/ On no account, by Zeus, must we be weary.

Socrates/ Come then, and let us see also how many principles vice possesses, —principles indeed that are worthy of attention.

Glaucon/ I am all attention; —only tell me.

Socrates/ And truly now; —since we have reached this part of our discourse, it appears to me, as to one looking from a height, that there is but one principle of virtue, while those of vice are infinite: —and of these there are four, particularly deserving of mention.

Glaucon/ How say you?

Socrates/ There seem to be as many classes of the soul as there are forms of government.

Glaucon/ How many then?

Socrates/ Five, of governments, and five of the soul.

Glaucon/ Name them.

Socrates/ What we have just described, is one species of government; and it may have a twofold appellation; for, if among the rulers one prevails over the rest, it may be termed a Monarchy, —but if there be several, an Aristocracy.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ I call this then, one species; for, whether there be several, or whether it be but one who governs, they will never alter the principal laws of the state, —because they will observe the nature and education we have described.

Glaucon/ It is not likely.

THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.

Book 5.

Socrates/ Such a state and government then, and such a man as we have described, I term good and upright: and if this government be an upright one, I reckon the others bad and erroneous, both as to the regulations in states, and the establishment of the moral nature in individuals, inasmuch as there are four species of depravity.

Glaucon/ Of what kind are these?

Socrates/ I was about to mention them in order, as they each appeared to me to rise one out of another; but Polemarchus stretching out his hand—for he sat a little further off than Adimantus, —caught him by the robe at his shoulder, and drew him near; and, bending towards him, he spoke something in a whisper, of which we heard nothing but this:

Polemarchus/ Shall we let that pass, then? or what shall we do?

Socrates/ Adimantus, now speaking aloud said;

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ What will not you let pass?

Adeimantus/ You, indeed: —for it was to you I alluded. You seem to us to be getting careless and to be stealing through a whole branch of the discourse, and that not the least important, that you may not have the trouble of going through it; and you think you escaped our notice, when you made this speech so simply, viz., that it is clear to everyone both as to wives and children, that whatever belongs to friends will be common.

Socrates/ Did not I say right, Adimantus?

Adeimantus/ Yes: but this, which was rightly said, like the rest of your discourse, requires explanation; —namely, to show what is the mode of that community; for there must

be many: —do not omit saying then which mode you mean; for we have been expecting it for some time past, thinking you would, some time or other, speak of the propagation of children, how they are to be propagated; —and when born, how they should be brought up, and everything relating to this community that you were mentioning both of wives and children; for we suppose it to be of great, nay—paramount importance to the state, whether this be rightly performed or not. Now then, since you are taking in hand another kind of state-government before you have sufficiently discussed this, we have determined, as you just heard, not to let you pass, without going over all these things, as you did the others.

Glaucon/ And me too you may reckon, as joining in this vote.

Thrasymachus/ Be quite sure, Socrates, that this is the opinion of us all.

Socrates/ What have you done, in seizing me thus? What a mighty talk is this you are again raising, as you did at the beginning, about your republic, which I was so glad at having completely described, pleased to think that anyone would let these things pass, and admit what was then said! —And as to what you now challenge me to, you know not what a swarm of disputes you are stirring up: I foresaw them, and let them pass at that time, for fear of making a great disturbance.

Thrasymachus/ What then, think you that these are now come hither to melt gold, and not to hear reasonings?

Socrates/ Aye, but in moderation.

Glaucon/ As for moderation, Socrates, the whole of life serves for hearing such reasonings as these: —but let pass what relates to us; and as to what we are inquiring, do not begrudge explaining what you think about it, —what sort of

community of wives and children is to be observed by our guardians, and how the latter ought to be reared while very young, in the period between their birth and their education, which seems to be the most troublesome of all. Try and tell us now, how that is to be accomplished.

Socrates/ It is not easy, my good fellow, to describe them; for many of them are very hard to be believed, even more than those we have before described; for even their possibility we might well disbelieve; and even were they possible, one might still doubt, whether they would best be done in this particular way: —on this account, my dear friend, I somewhat hesitate to touch on these topics, lest our reasoning appear to be a mere wish, rather than absolute reality.

Glaucon/ Do not hesitate now; for your hearers are neither unreasonable, nor incredulous, nor ill-disposed.

Socrates/ Now, my very good Glaucon, is it with the desire of reassuring me, that you say this?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then you have produced quite a contrary effect; for could I trust to myself, that I thoroughly know what I am to say, your encouragement would have been quite right; for among intelligent and friendly persons, one who understands the truth, may speak with safety and confidence about the most important matters; but when one speaks, as of course I do, with diffidence and a sort of searching spirit, there is both fear and danger, not only of being exposed to ridicule for that is but a trifling thing, but lest, mistaking the truth, I not only fall myself, but draw my friends along with me into an error about matters, in which we ought least of all to be mistaken. I conjure Adrasteia, therefore, Glaucon, with respect to what I am going to say: —For I hope it is a smaller offence to be unintentionally a

murderer, than an impostor about what is good and excellent, just and lawful: and as for this risk, it were better to risk it among enemies than friends; so that you are not giving me proper encouragement.

Glaucon, laughing, then said:

Glaucon/ Aye, but Socrates, even if we should suffer aught amiss from your discourse, we acquit you as clear of homicide, and as no impostor: so proceed boldly.

Socrates/ But the man, who is acquitted in a court of justice is, at any rate, deemed clear of the crime, as the law says; and if it be so in that case, it should be so in this.

Glaucon/ As respects this then, pray proceed.

Socrates/ We must now, once more return to what perhaps in strict order should have been considered before; and thus perhaps it would be correct, after having entirely completed the men's part, to complete also the women's; especially since you challenge me to do so. Men who have been born and educated as we have described, cannot, in my opinion, otherwise rightly acquire and employ their wives and children than by following the same track, in which we have proceeded from the beginning: for we surely undertook, in our argument, to represent men as the guardians of a flock.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us proceed then, to give the children a corresponding birth and education; and let us consider, whether it be proper for us or not.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Thus: Are we to reckon it proper for the females among our guardian dogs to watch and hunt, and do everything else in common with the males; or rather to manage domestic affairs within doors, as being disabled from other exercises on account of bearing and nursing the

whelps, while the males are to labor and take the entire charge of the flocks?

Glaucon/ All in common; except that we employ the females as the weaker, and the males as the stronger.

Socrates/ Is it possible then, to employ an animal for the same purposes with another, without giving it the same nurture and education?

Glaucon/ It is not possible.

Socrates/ If, therefore, we are to employ the women for the same purposes as the men, must we not give them also the same kind of instruction?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Were both music and gymnastics bestowed on the males?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ To the women too, then, we must impart these two arts, and those likewise that refer to war; and we must employ them in the same manner.

Glaucon/ It is probable from what you say.

Socrates/ Perhaps, however, many things, concerning what we are now speaking, may appear ridiculous, because contrary to custom, —if they shall be practiced in the way now mentioned.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But which of them, do you conceive to be the most ridiculous? Would it not clearly be to behold the women naked in the palaestra wrestling with the men, and not only the young women, but even those more advanced in years, just like the old men in the wrestling-schools, who are still fond of the exercises, though wrinkled, and not at all comely to the eye?

Glaucon/ Aye, by Zeus; it would appear truly ridiculous, as present fashions go.

Socrates/ Ought we not then, since we have entered on this discourse, to fear the raillery of wits, which they would probably bestow pretty abundantly on such innovations as respects exercising the women in gymnastics, music, and more especially in the use of arms, and the management of horses?

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ But since we have entered on this discourse, let us go to the rigor of the law, and beg these men not to be the slaves of prejudice, but to think seriously, and remember, that not long since the sight of naked men appeared base and disgusting to the Greeks, just as now indeed it does to most of the barbarians: and when first the Cretans, and afterwards the Lacedæmonians, began their exercises, the wits of that day might have made a jest of all this: do not you think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ But methinks, when those experienced in the art thought it better to strip themselves, than to cover up such parts, the merely apparent ridiculousness of the thing is set aside by the advantage stated in our reasoning; and this, too, manifestly shows that the man is a fool who deems anything ridiculous except what is bad, and tries to run down as ridiculous any other idea but that of the foolish and the vicious, or employs himself seriously with any other end in view but that of the good.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Must we not then, first of all, agree on this, —whether these things be possible or not; —and set forth a question, whether anyone, either in jest or earnest, can doubt, if the human nature in the female can in all cases

share with the male, or in no case share at all; or in some cases, but not in others; and this too with reference to what concerns war? Would not the man who thus sets out so also probably conclude?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do you wish then, that we should argue against ourselves about these things, in order that the opposite side may not, if attacked, be destitute of defense?

Glaucon/ Nothing hinders.

Socrates/ Let us then say this for them: There is no need, Socrates and Glaucon, for others to dispute with you about this matter; for yourselves, in first establishing your state, agreed that each individual ought to practice one business, according to his particular talent.

Glaucon/ We did so agree, I think; for how could we do otherwise?

Socrates/ Does not then the nature of a woman differ widely from that of a man?

Glaucon/ Of course it differs.

Socrates/ And is it not right to allot to each a different work, according to the nature of each?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Are not you in the wrong then, and do you not contradict yourselves, in saying that men and women ought to do the same things, with natures so widely different? Have you any answer to make against this, my clever Glaucon?

Glaucon/ To do so on the moment is no such easy matter; but I will entreat you, and I do so now, to unravel the arguments on our side, whatever they may be.

Socrates/ These, Glaucon, and many other such things, are what I long ago foresaw; and I was both afraid and

unwilling to touch on the law concerning the possession of wives and the education of children.

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus, it seems no easy matter.

Socrates/ Certainly not. The case, however, is thus: If a man fall into a small fish-pond, or quite into the ocean itself, still he has to swim no less.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us too, then, swim, and try to escape from this argument, expecting that either some dolphin will rescue us, or that we shall have some other remarkable deliverance?

Glaucon/ It seems we ought.

Socrates/ Come then; —let us see, if we can anywhere find an outlet; for we acknowledged that different natures ought to study different things, and that the natures of a woman and a man are different; yet now we say, that different natures ought to study the same things: —do you accuse us of this?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ How admirable, Glaucon, is the power of the art of disputing!

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Because, many seem to fall into it unwillingly, supposing that they are not caviling, but reasoning truly, owing to their inability to divide a subject rightly and investigate it according to its species: but following the literal sense, they pursue what is quite contradictory to their subject, making use of caviling instead of argument.

Glaucon/ This is indeed the case with many; but does that extend likewise to us in the present instance?

Socrates/ Quite so; for I think, that without meaning it, we have fallen into a contradiction.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Because we have very boldly and disputatiously asserted, that unless persons' natures are the same, they ought not to have the same employments; though we have not at all inquired the sort of difference and identity of the nature here referred to, and with reference to which we defined them, when we ascribed different pursuits to different natures, and to the same natures the same pursuits.

Glaucon/ No certainly, we did not consider that.

Socrates/ It would seem then, that we may still ask ourselves the question, whether the nature of the bald and those who wear hair be the same and not different; —and if we agree that it be different, whether, if the bald made shoes, we should let those who wear hair make them; —or if again, those who wear hair made them, whether we should allow the others to do so likewise?

Glaucon/ That were ridiculous.

Socrates/ Is it then ridiculous, for any other reason than that we did not then in general define the sameness and diversity of natures, but observed only that species of diversity and sameness, which respects their peculiar functions, just as we say that a physician, and a man who has a genius for being a physician, have one and the same nature? Do not you think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ But have the physician and the carpenter a different nature?

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ In that case, as regards the natures of men and women, if they appear different, with respect to any art, or other employment, we are supposed to assign to each separately his proper employment: —but if it appear to differ

only in this, —namely, that the female bears children, and the male begets them, —we must not say that it has at all as yet been proved that a man differs from a woman in the sense of which we are speaking, and we must still think, that both our guardians and their wives may pursue the same employments.

Glaucon/ And with reason.

Socrates/ After this, then, should we not require anyone who says the contrary, to inform us on this point, —what is that art or function in the arrangements of a state, where the nature of a man and woman is not the same, but different?

Glaucon/ A reasonable demand, too.

Socrates/ Perhaps then someone may reply, as you said some time since, that it is not easy all at once to explain this sufficiently, but yet no hard matter for one who has considered it?

Glaucon/ Yes, —one might well say so.

Socrates/ Do you wish then, that we should request such an opponent to follow us, while we try to show him, that there is no function peculiar to a woman in the management of a state?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Come then we will say to him, answer us: —did you not mean that one man has a natural talent for anything, and another not, in this respect, —namely, that one learns a thing easily, and another with difficulty; and one with a little instruction discovers much in what he learns, while another, after much instruction and care, does not retain even what he has learned; and that with the one, the body is duly subservient to the mind; while in the other it is opposed to it? —Well, and what other marks are there

besides these, by which you would distinguish a man that has particular talents from him that has none at all?

Glaucon/ One cannot mention any other.

Socrates/ Know you then of any function performed by mankind, in which the males have not all these characteristics in a superior degree to the females; —and would it not be tedious to specify particularly the weaving art, and the making of pastry and spice-meats, for which female talents seem to have some repute, and cannot be surpassed without the greatest disgrace?

Glaucon/ You are right, in saying that in all things universally the talent of the one is superior to that of the other; —yet many women are superior in many respects to many men; though, on the whole, it is as you say.

Socrates/ There is no function, my friend, then, among the entire members of our state that is peculiar to woman, considered as such, nor to man, considered as such; but natural talents are indiscriminately diffused through both, and the woman naturally shares in all offices, the same as the man, though in all cases the woman is weaker than the man.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Are we then to commit all state concerns to the men, and none to the women?

Glaucon/ How should we?

Socrates/ It is true then, I think as we say, that one woman too is fitted for being a physician, and another not so, —one is musical, another by nature unmusical.

Glaucon/ How otherwise?

Socrates/ And is one fitted for gymnastics and warlike, —another not fitted either for war or gymnastics?

Glaucon/ That is my opinion too.

Socrates/ And what; —is not one a lover of philosophy, and another averse to it; and one high-spirited, and another timid?

Glaucon/ This is true, too.

Socrates/ And is not one woman naturally suited for being a guardian, and another not so; —and have we not made choice of such a talent as this for our guardian men?

Glaucon/ Yes—-just of such as this.

Socrates/ The nature then of the woman and of the man, as respects the guardianship of the state, is the same, —only that the one is weaker, the other stronger.

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Women such as these then are to be chosen to dwell with such men, and to be their fellow-guardians, —inasmuch as they are naturally suited for them, and of kindred talents.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And must not the same employments be assigned to the same natures?

Glaucon/ The same.

Socrates/ We have now got round then, to our former point; and, we allow that it is not contrary to nature, to allot to the wives of our guardians the study both of music and gymnastics?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ We did not establish then what is impossible, or to be only vainly wished for, when we established the law according to nature: —and it would seem rather, that what is at present contrary to these things is contrary to nature?

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Was not then our inquiry, whether our establishment was possible and best?

Glaucon/ It was.

Socrates/ And we have agreed, that it is possible?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we must next be convinced, that it is best?

Glaucon/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ In order, therefore, that a woman may become a suitable guardian, there will not be one mode of education for making men guardians, and another for women, especially as the latter have received the same natural genius?

Glaucon/ No, —it will not be different.

Socrates/ What think you then of such an opinion as this?

Glaucon/ Of what?

Socrates/ That of imagining in your own mind, that one man is better and another worse; —or do you deem them to be all alike?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ In the state then which we were just establishing, —which of the two do you think to make the better men, —the guardians provided with this education we have described, or shoemakers that are taught shoemaking?

Glaucon/ That question, is ridiculous.

Socrates/ I understand you: —but, tell me; of all the other citizens, are not they the best?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ But what; —will not these women too be the best of women?

Glaucon/ They will, by far.

Socrates/ Is there anything better in a state, than that both women and men be rendered the very best?

Glaucon/ There is not.

Socrates/ And this is to be effected by music and gymnastics being imparted to them, as we have described?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ We have been establishing then a law, which is not only possible, but best also for the state?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ We must unclothe, then, the wives of our guardians, since they are to put on virtue for clothes; and they must bear a part in war, and all other guardianship of the state, and do nothing else: —but of these special services the lightest part is to be allotted to the women rather than the men, on account of the weakness of their sex: —and the man who laughs at naked women while going through their exercises with a view to the best object, reaps the unripe fruit of a ridiculous wisdom, and seems not rightly to know at what he laughs, or why he does it: —for that ever was and will be deemed a noble saying, that the profitable is beautiful, and the hurtful base.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ We may say then, that we have escaped one wave, as it were, by thus settling the law with respect to women, and have not been quite overwhelmed, through determining that our male and female guardians are to manage all things in common: and besides that, our reasoning has been consistent with itself, as respects both what is possible and advantageous also.

Glaucon/ Truly, it is no small wave you have escaped.

Socrates/ You will not call it a great one, when you see what follows.

Glaucon/ Tell me; and let me see.

Socrates/ After this enactment, and the others formerly mentioned, the following, I think, comes naturally.

Glaucon/ Which is that?

Socrates/ That these women be all common to all these men, and that no one woman dwell with any man privately, and that their children likewise be common; —so that neither shall the parents know their own children, nor the children their parents.

Glaucon/ This, in comparison with the other, is far more difficult to persuade, both as to its possibility and utility.

Socrates/ I do not think, as to its utility at least, that anyone would doubt about it being a very great good to have the women and children in common, if it were but possible: —but the greatest question, methinks, will be, whether it be possible or not?

Glaucon/ One might very well, raise a discussion on both points.

Socrates/ You are mentioning, a combination of discussions; but I thought, at least, that I should escape from one of them, if its utility had been agreed on, and that in that case it would only have remained to consider its possibility.

Glaucon/ But you have not slunk off, quite unobserved; and so, give us an account of both.

Socrates/ I must submit to a trial: —indulge me thus far, however: let me feast myself, as the slow in intellect are wont to feast themselves, when they walk alone: —for men of this sort, I imagine, ere finding out how to attain what they desire, waive that inquiry, in order that they may not tire themselves in deliberating about its possibility or impossibility, supposing they have obtained what they desire, and then they go through what remains, —rejoicing, also, to recount what they will do, when it has happened,

and rendering their soul, otherwise indolent, more indolent still.

Glaucon/ Now I too am become languid, and would, therefore, defer such debates, and inquire afterwards into the possibility of these arrangements.

Socrates/ At present, however, supposing them possible, I will, if you please, consider how our rulers are to regulate matters thence arising, in order that the doing of these things may be most advantageous both to the state and the guardians: —this, first, I will try to examine with your assistance, and the other question afterwards, if you allow me.

Glaucon/ Oh, I will give you leave; —so pray proceed with your inquiry.

Socrates/ I imagine then, if our rulers will be worthy of that name, and those also who are their auxiliaries, that the latter will cheerfully do whatever they are bidden, while the former will take the command, giving their directions in some matters conformably to the laws, and imitating their spirit in whatever matters we leave to their sole guidance.

Glaucon/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Do you then, their lawgiver, as you have chosen out the men, so choose out also the women, making them, as far as possible, of similar dispositions: —and these, as they dwell and eat together in common, and none possesses anything whatever in private, will be always together; —and as they mingle in the gymnastic yards and in all their other training exercises, they will, I think, be led by innate necessity, to mutual intimacies: —do not you think I am speaking of what must necessarily happen?

Glaucon/ Not, by any geometrical necessity, but by one founded on love, which seems to be more cogent than the other, in persuading and winning over the bulk of mankind.

Socrates/ Quite so; but in the next place, Glaucon, to form irregular intimacies, or to do anything else of the same character, is not at all right in a city of happy persons, nor ought the rulers to allow it.

Glaucon/ No, it were not just.

Socrates/ It is evident, by right, in the next place, to make marriages as far as possible sacred; and those most advantageous would be sacred.

Glaucon/ Altogether so.

Socrates/ How then are they to be most advantageous? Tell me this, Glaucon; —for in your house I see both sporting dogs, and a great number of well-bred birds; have you, by Zeus, ever attended to their pairing, and bringing forth young?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ First of all, among these, though all be well-bred, are not some of them far better than all the rest?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ Do you breed then from all alike; or are you anxious to do so, as far as possible, from the best breeds?

Glaucon/ From the best.

Socrates/ But how; from the youngest or the oldest, or those quite in their prime?

Glaucon/ From those in their prime.

Socrates/ And if they are not thus bred, you consider that the breed both of birds and dogs greatly degenerates?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And what think you as to horses, and other animals; —is the case otherwise with respect to these?

Glaucon/ It were absurd to think so.

Socrates/ How strange, my dear fellow; what extremely perfect governors must we have, —if the same applies to the human race!

Glaucon/ Nevertheless, it is so; but what then?

Socrates/ Because, they must necessarily use many medicines; but as for a physician, where the body does not want medicines, but men willingly subject themselves to a regimen of diet, we think that an inferior and less skillful one may suffice; but when there is need for taking medicines, we know that we want a more able physician.

Glaucon/ True; but with reference to what do you say this?

Socrates/ With reference to this: it seems likely that our rulers must use an abundance of lying and deceit for the advantage of the governed; and we said somewhere, that all these things were useful in the way of a remedy.

Glaucon/ Rightly too.

Socrates/ This apparent right now seems by no means inconsiderable in marriages and the propagation of children.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ It necessarily follows, from what has been acknowledged, that the best men should as often as possible form alliances with the best women, and the most depraved men, on the contrary, with the most depraved women; and the offspring of the former is to be educated, but not of the latter, if the flock is to be of the most perfect kind: —and this must be so done, as to escape the notice of all but the governors themselves, if at any rate the whole band of the guardians is to be as free as possible from sedition.

Glaucon/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Are there not to be festivals legally established, in which we shall draw together the brides and bridegrooms;

—and must not there be sacrifices, and hymns composed by our poets suitable to the marriages in course of celebration? —But as to the number of the marriages, this we will leave to the rulers, that they may as much as possible keep up the same number of men, having a regard both to wars and diseases, and all other such matters, so that as far as possible our state may be neither great nor small.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And chances too, I conceive, should be so well managed, that the depraved man may, on every turn of them, accuse his fortune, and not the governors.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ As for those youths, who distinguish themselves, either in war or other pursuits, they ought to have rewards and prizes given them, and the most ample liberty of lying with women, that so, under this pretext, the greatest number of children may spring from such parentage.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And as for the offspring born from time to time, are the authorities presiding over these matters to receive them, whether they be men or women, or both? —for somehow these offices belong in common both to men and women.

Glaucon/ Yes, they do.

Socrates/ As respects, then, the children of worthy persons, I think, they should carry them to some retirement, to certain nurses dwelling apart in a certain quarter of the city; but as for the children of the more depraved, and such of the rest as may be maimed or lame, they will hide them, as is right, in some secret and obscure place.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed, if the race of guardians is to be pure.

Socrates/ Will they not then take care also of their children's nurture, bringing to the nursery mothers with full breasts, taking every precaution that no woman should recognize her own child, and, where the mothers cannot suckle them, providing others who would be able to do so? And they will be careful also of this most particularly, that the nurses suckle only during a proper time, and they will enjoin, both on the nurses and keepers, their watching duties, and every other necessary toil.

Glaucon/ You speak, of a time of great ease to the wives of our guardians, in the breeding of children.

Socrates/ Yes, for it should be so. But let us next discuss what we were so anxious to do, when we said that the procreation of children should take place among persons in the prime of life.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Do you agree with me then, that this prime season is at twenty in a woman, and at thirty in a man?

Glaucon/ How do you reckon this time for each sex?

Socrates/ The woman, is to bear children to the state from the age of twenty to that of forty; and the man, after having passed the most excitable period of his course, is from that period to beget children to the state up to the age of fifty-five.

Glaucon/ This indeed, is the prime, in both sexes, both as respects body and mind.

Socrates/ If then, anyone, either older or younger than these, should employ himself in begetting children for the commonwealth, we should say that the trespass is neither right nor just, since he is begetting to the state a child, which if concealed is born and grows up, ushered in neither by sacrifices nor prayers—which, on every marriage, the priestesses and priests, and the whole state offer, that the descendants of the good may be still better, and that from

useful descendants others still more useful may arise, —but is born in darkness, and the result of dreadful incontinence.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And the law, must be the same, if any of those men, who are yet of the age for procreation, have intercourse with women of a proper age, without the magistrate's leave; for we may consider him as having raised to the state a bastard, born in adultery and unmoored by religious auspices.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ And I presume, whenever either the women or the men are past the age of procreation, we are to let the men cohabit with any woman they like, except their daughter and mother, and the children of their daughters, or those upwards from their mother; and so likewise the women are to embrace any, except a son, a father, and the children of these, in either direction: all this liberty we are to grant them, after we have enjoined them to be careful, first, if a child be conceived, not to bring it to the light, but if, by accident, it should be brought forth, so to expose it as if there were no provision for it.

Glaucon/ All these things, are reasonably said: —but how are the fathers and daughters, and the other relations you just mentioned, to be known to one another?

Socrates/ They are not to be known at all; but from the day on which anyone is married, whatever children are born between the seventh or tenth month after it, all these he is to call, the males his sons, and the females his daughters, and they are to call him father; and in the same way again, he is to call the children of these—grandchildren; and they in turn are to call them grandfathers and grandmothers; and those who were born during the period in which their fathers and mothers were begetting children, they shall call sisters

and brothers, as I just observed, —so that they may have no sexual intercourse. —But as for brothers and sisters, the law will allow them to live together, —if their lot so fall, and the Pythian oracle give consent.

Glaucon/ Quite right.

Socrates/ This, and such as this, Glaucon, is the community of women and children, among the guardians of the state: and that this is consistent both with the rest of our polity, and is by far the best, we must next establish from reason; —or how shall we do?

Glaucon/ By Zeus, just so.

Socrates/ Is not this, then, the beginning of our agreement, to ask ourselves what we can allege to be the greatest good for the establishment of a state, with a view to which the lawgiver is to enact the laws, and what the greatest evil, —and next to examine, whether what we have hitherto described tends to or conforms with the track of the good, and is opposed to that of the evil?

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Is there, then, any greater evil for a state than that which tears it in pieces, and makes it many instead of one; —or, any greater good than that which binds it together, and makes it one?

Glaucon/ There is not.

Socrates/ Does not then the communion both of pleasure and pain bind men together, when the whole of the citizens as much as possible rejoice and mourn in fellowship, for the same matters, whether gainful or the contrary?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And again, any mere private perception of such things dissolves that union, when some grieve exceedingly,

and others rejoice exceedingly at the same events, either in the state or those composing it?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Does not this then arise from the following circumstance, —when such words as these are not pronounced at the same time in a state, as mine, and not mine; and with regard to what concerns another, in the same way?

Glaucon/ Aye, surely.

Socrates/ And the state, in which the greatest number unite in saying of the same things, that this concerns me, and that does not concern me, —that is best regulated?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And it is that also, which most closely resembles the individual man; —-just as, when a person's finger is wounded, the entire fellowship of feeling, extending through the body towards the soul, and producing that harmony which is the work of the governing principle within it, viz. the soul, experiences a sensation, and at the same time wholly sympathizes with the ailing part; and thus we say that the man has a finger-ache: —and so also, with respect to any part whatever of the human frame, the same reasoning applies either with respect to grief, when a part is in pain, or with respect to pleasure, when it is at ease.

Glaucon/ Aye, the very same: and as to what you are asking, the state that nearest approaches this is the best governed.

Socrates/ When, therefore, any individual citizen receives good or ill, such a state, methinks, will most especially maintain that she herself is the party affected, and will unite as a whole in joy or mourning.

Glaucon/ That must be the case, in a state, governed, at least, by good laws.

Socrates/ It will be time perhaps for us to return to our state, and consider as to the points on which we have agreed in our discussion, whether they belong more particularly to our state than any other.

Glaucon/ Yes, —we must.

Socrates/ What then? there are surely in other states, both governors and people? —and so also in this?

Glaucon/ There are.

Socrates/ And will not all these address one another as citizens?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But besides calling them citizens, what do the people call their governors under the other forms of government?

Glaucon/ In most states, masters, but in democracies, this very name governors.

Socrates/ But what as to the people in our state? besides citizens, what do they say their governors are?

Glaucon/ Saviors, and helpers.

Socrates/ And what do they call the people?

Glaucon/ Paymasters, and supporters.

Socrates/ And in the other states, what do the governors call their people?

Glaucon/ Slaves.

Socrates/ And what do the governors call one another?

Glaucon/ Fellow-governors.

Socrates/ And ours, what?

Glaucon/ Fellow-guardians.

Socrates/ Can you then tell about the governors in other states, whether anyone of them can address one of his fellow-governors as an intimate, and another as a stranger?

Glaucon/ Aye, very many can.

Socrates/ Does he not then esteem and speak of his intimate as his own, and the stranger as not his own?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But how is it with your guardians? Is there anyone of them, who can esteem or address any of his fellow-guardians as a stranger?

Glaucon/ By no means; —for with whomever a person falls in, he will conceive that he falls in with a brother or sister, or a father or mother, or a son or daughter, or their descendants or ancestry.

Socrates/ You speak exceedingly well: —and further, tell me this also, whether you will give them only a legal right to these familiar names, —or rather bid them perform all their actions in accordance with these names, especially as respects parents, whatever the law enjoins as the parents' due, —such as reverence, and care, and obedience, —it being otherwise not for his advantage, either in the sight of God or of men, inasmuch as he would do what is neither holy nor just, if he acted otherwise than thus? —Will these, or other maxims coming from the whole body of our citizens, echo close round the ears of our children, both about their parents, when pointed out to them, and about other relations likewise?

Glaucon/ These maxims must so; for it were ridiculous, if, without actions, their proper names were uttered by the mouth alone.

Socrates/ Of all states then, in this especially, when anyone individual fares either well or ill, the citizens will mostly agree in exclaiming, according to our late expression, —namely, "Mine fares well, or mine ill?

Glaucon/ Quite true.

Socrates/ Did we not say too, that agreeably to this opinion and expression, their common pleasures and pains should agree?

Glaucon/ Aye, —and we said rightly.

Socrates/ Will not then our citizens most especially hold in common that same thing, which they call "*my own*"—and, holding this in common, thus have a special fellowship in pleasure and pain?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And the cause of all this, independently of other regulations of the state, —is it not the community of women and children among the guardians?

Glaucon/ Most especially so.

Socrates/ We had agreed, moreover, as to the greatest good of a state, by comparing a well-managed state to a body, which feels pleasure or pain affecting any part of it.

Glaucon/ Aye, we were right, in agreeing about this.

Socrates/ The cause then of all this high degree of good to our state was found to be the community of women and children among our defenders?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ And in that case, we agree at least with what was before alleged; for we said, I believe, that they ought to have neither houses of their own, nor land, nor any possession, but to receive their subsistence from others, as a reward for their guardianship, and all to consume it in common, if they mean really to be guardians?

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Do not then, as I say, the circumstances formerly mentioned, and still more those now mentioned, cause them to be true guardians, and prevent those divisions in the state which arise from not calling one and

the same thing their own, —but one, one thing, and another, another; —one drawing to his own dwelling whatever he can acquire separately from the rest, and another, to his likewise that which is separate; and also different wives and children, occasioning both pleasures and pains, individually private, though holding one and the same opinion concerning what is domestic, —all, as far as possible, pointing towards the same thing, —namely, a community of feeling respecting pleasure and pain?

Glaucon/ Of course, we grant that.

Socrates/ But what? —will not lawsuits and criminal charges in the courts be banished from among them so to speak, from the fact of their possessing nothing in private but their body, but all the rest in common, —owing to which, they will be kept free from all the dissensions which men raise about money, or children and relatives?

Glaucon/ It is quite clear, they will be thus relieved.

Socrates/ And, moreover, in these there could not fairly be any suits, as regards personal violence or improper treatment: —for conceiving personal preservation to be an absolute necessity, we will own it to be handsome and just for compeers in age to help their compeers.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And this privilege, at any rate this law possesses: —if a man be in a passion with anyone, be will in such a case be less apt to venture on still greater seditions.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The elder, moreover, will be ordered both to govern and chastise all the younger.

Glaucon/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ And moreover, as to the younger, with regard to the elder, unless the magistrates order it, he will never

attempt to beat the elder, or otherwise offer him violence, —nor, methinks, will he by any other means dishonor him: —for there are two sufficient guardians to hinder it, fear and respect, —respect on the one hand restraining him from laying hands on a parent, and fear on the other, that others might come to the defense of the sufferer; —some as sons, others as brothers, and others as fathers.

Glaucon/ Yes, —such is the case.

Socrates/ In every respect then, in consequence of the laws, these men, *i.e.* the warriors, will enjoy peace with one another?

Glaucon/ Yes, much.

Socrates/ And so long as these do not quarrel among themselves, there is no danger of the rest of the state rising or mutually splitting into factions.

Glaucon/ No, of course not.

Socrates/ As for the least important evils, I am unwilling for propriety's sake even to mention from how many they will have been relieved, —the poor, for instance, as regards the work of flattering the rich, —and the difficulties and anxieties, which people have in bringing up their children and procuring money for the support of servants, —sometimes borrowing, sometimes denying debts, and at other times using all manner of shifts in procuring money, and then giving it to the management of their wives and domestics; —about these matters, friend, how many slavish and ignoble troubles they suffer are not even worthy to be mentioned.

Glaucon/ Yes, they are manifest, even to one blind.

Socrates/ From all these troubles, therefore, they will be relieved, and will live more blessedly than that most blessed life which those live who gain the Olympic prizes.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ On one small account only are those esteemed happy, compared with what these enjoy; —for the victory of these is more noble, and their maintenance at the public expense more complete: inasmuch as the victory that they gain brings safety to the entire state, —and by way of crown and reward, both they and their children receive their maintenance and all other necessaries of life, thus winning honors from their own state while living, and at their death an honorable funeral.

Glaucon/ Noble rewards! indeed.

Socrates/ Do you remember, then, that in a former part of our discussion, someone, —I know not who, —objected to us, that we were not making our guardians happy, by decreeing that those who had the whole wealth of the citizens at their command should nevertheless have nothing at all? —and we said, I believe, that we would consider this afterwards, if it fell in our way; but that at present we were making our guardians real guardians, and the state itself as happy as possible, without exclusively regarding any single class in it, with a view to make it happy?

Glaucon/ I remember.

Socrates/ What think you now of the life of our auxiliaries, which appears far more noble and happy than that of those of the Olympic prizemen; —do you think it can be compared to the life of the leather-cutter, or any other kind of craftsman, or even the farmer?

Glaucon/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ Still even, what I said before, it is proper that I mention here also, —if the guardian should try to become happy in such a way as to lose his character as a guardian, and not be content with a life thus moderate and steady, and as we say, of the best quality, but on the other hand be impelled by a silly boyish notion about happiness, to

appropriate to himself all the property in the state, because he has the power, he will know that Hesiod was really wise, in saying that “the half is considerably more than the whole.

Glaucon/ ” If he take me for his counselor, he will remain in such a life.

Socrates/ You agree then, as to the fellowship of the women with the men, which we have explained, in matters referring to education and children, and the guardianship of the other citizens; —that whether they remain in the state, or go forth to war, they ought to keep guard with them, and hunt with them like hounds, and in every case take a share in all things, as far as they can; and that doing these things they will do what is best, and not contrary to the nature of the female, as regards the male, —by which nature, indeed, they act jointly with one another?

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Does not this then, still remain to be discussed, whether it be possible that this community of habits can take place among men, even as among other animals? and how it is possible?

Glaucon/ You have forestalled me, by mentioning what I was just going to ask.

Socrates/ Aye; —for as to war, it is plain, methinks, how they will fight.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ They will go out jointly on their military expeditions, and will carry along with them to battle also such of their children as are robust, in order that those of the craftsmen may see what they ought to practice when arrived at full age, and, apart from mere observation, may serve and minister in all such matters subserviently both to their fathers and mothers. Have you not observed also what happens in the common arts, as, for instance, among the

children of the potters, —how long a time they help and look on, before they apply themselves to the making of pottery?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Should these then, or our guardians, be more careful in instructing their children by their own experience, and by observation of what is suitable for them?

Glaucon/ To suppose that the craftsman would, were truly ridiculous.

Socrates/ Yet every creature whatever will fight more valiantly in the presence of its offspring?

Glaucon/ It is so: but there is no small danger, Socrates, should they be defeated, as is often the case in war, that when their children, as well as themselves, are cut off, it will be impossible to restore the rest of the state.

Socrates/ You speak truly: but think you, that our first duty should be never to expose them to risk?

Glaucon/ No, by no means.

Socrates/ What then: if they are to hazard themselves in any case, is it not—where they will become better men, if they succeed?

Glaucon/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ But do you think it a small matter, and unworthy of the risk, that children destined for military life should or should not be observers of the transactions of war?

Glaucon/ No; —for it is highly important with reference to what you now mention.

Socrates/ This then, we must first contrive, —to make our children spectators of war, yet providing for their safety: —and then all will go well, will it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And surely their fathers, in the first place, as far as men can, will not be ignorant, but well informed as to the kinds of expeditions which are dangerous or not so.

Glaucon/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Into the one then, they will take them; but will be cautious of exposing them to the other.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And they will probably, set governors over them, not such as are the most depraved, but such as by experience and years are able leaders and trainers of the young.

Glaucon/ Yes, quite proper.

Socrates/ Yet many things, we may say, happen to many contrary to expectation.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ With reference, therefore, to such events as these, it is fit that we should provide the children with things while quite young, in order, if need be, that they may escape by flight.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ We must mount them on horseback, when extremely young; and when they have learnt to ride, they must be taken to see battles, not on high-mettled war-horses, but on the fleetest and most obedient to the rein; for thus they will best observe their proper work, and in case of need, escape with the greatest safety, following the aged leaders.

Glaucon/ I think, your remark is correct.

Socrates/ What then, as to the affairs of war; how are you to manage our soldiers, both as respects each other and their enemies? Is my opinion correct or not?

Glaucon/ Tell me what it is.

Socrates/ As for that man among them, who has left his rank, thrown away his arms, or done any such like act from mere cowardice, ought we not to make him a craftsman, or field laborer?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the man who is taken alive by the enemy, should he not be given away as a present to those inclined to use their booty just as they please?

Glaucon/ Yes, surely.

Socrates/ And as to him who has signalized himself and attained to high renown, think you not, that he ought, first of all in the field itself, to be crowned successively by each of the youths and boys who are his fellow-soldiers? —is it not so?

Glaucon/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ And will they give him the right hand likewise?

Glaucon/ And that too.

Socrates/ But what I am going to tell you, will not, methinks, be quite so pleasing.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That they should kiss and be kissed by each individually?

Glaucon/ This is by far the best of all: and for myself, I would add this regulation, —that, so long as they are on this expedition, no one shall be allowed to refuse the man, whoever it be that he pleases to kiss, —so that if a warrior happen to be in love with anyone, male or female, he may be the more animated to win the noblest prize of velour.

Socrates/ Very well: —for it has been already said, that more opportunities for marriage should be provided for the brave citizen than for others, and more frequent choice in such matters should be allowed to them than to all others,

in order that such a man's descendants maybe as numerous as possible.

Glaucon/ Yes, we did say so.

Socrates/ Moreover, even according to Homer, it is just that really brave youths should be honored in this way; inasmuch as Homer said, that Ajax, who on account of the renown he had gained in battle, was rewarded with a large share at the entertainments, —fit reward, too, for a brave and youthful man, from which he at once acquired both honor and strength.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ In this matter, at least, then, we are to obey the authority of Homer; and as a proof of this, we will so honor the brave, both at our sacrifices, and on such like occasions, in as far as they appear deserving, both with hymns, and the honors just mentioned; and besides this, with seats and viands, and brimming cups, so as at once both to honor and exercise the virtue of worthy men and women.

Glaucon/ You speak capitally well.

Socrates/ Well, of those then that die in the campaign, shall we not, in the first place, say, of the man that closes his life with glory, that he is of the golden race?

Glaucon/ Quite so, indeed.

Socrates/ And are we not to believe Hesiod, when he tells us, that if any of this race die, then—

> Chaste, holy, earthly spirits they become,
> Expelling evil, guardians of mankind?

Glaucon/ Yes, we will believe him.

Socrates/ We will ask the oracle then, how we ought to bury noble and divine men, and with what marks of distinction; and then we will bury them in the very manner that the God directs.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And in all aftertime we will reverence and worship their tombs as those of demigods, and enact that the same ceremonies shall be observed with regard to persons dying of old age, or from any other cause, after having been deemed remarkably good during their lifetime?

Glaucon/ Aye, it is only just.

Socrates/ But what? —how are our soldiers to behave towards enemies?

Glaucon/ In what respect?

Socrates/ First, as respects enslavement, think you it just, that Greeks should enslave Greek cities? —nay, ought they not, as far as they can, to prevent others from doing it, and act on the principle of sparing the Grecian tribe, cautiously looking to the possibility of being themselves enslaved by barbarians?

Glaucon/ Aye; both generally, and in every particular case, it is the best plan to be sparing.

Socrates/ Are they then not to keep any Greek slave themselves, and to counsel the rest of the Greeks to agree to the same plan?

Glaucon/ Surely: because they will thus at least, turn themselves the more against the barbarians, and abstain from one war against another.

Socrates/ But what?

Glaucon/ Stripping the dead, of anything but their arms after conquering them, is that right; —or does it not rather furnish cowards with an excuse not to go against a foe, as if they were doing some duty when bending over a mere corpse; and have not many armies been destroyed by this kind of plunder?

Socrates/ Very many.

Glaucon/ Do not you think it also illiberal and forbidden to plunder a corpse, and the mark of a feminine and little mind to deem the body of the deceased an enemy, after the enemy has fled away, and naught remains behind, but the instrument with which he fought?

Socrates/ Do you think that they who act thus do any otherwise than dogs do, who snap at the stones with which they are pelted and do not touch the man who throws them?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ We must have done then with this stripping of the dead, and these hindrances arising from the carrying off of booty.

Glaucon/ Aye, by Zeus, we must have done with them.

Socrates/ Moreover, we shall not at any time bring arms into the temples, for the purpose of dedicating them, at least not the arms of Greeks, —if we at all care for the kind feeling of the rest of the Greeks; but we shall rather fear its being a kind of profanation to bring into the temple such things as these from our close connections, unless the oracle direct us otherwise.

Glaucon/ Quite right.

Socrates/ And as regards the laying waste of Grecian lands and the burning of houses, how would your soldiers treat their enemies?

Glaucon/ Aye, —I should be glad, to hear you state your opinion on that point.

Socrates/ Truly then, my opinion is, that we should do neither of these things, but only carry off the year's crop: —and would you have me tell you the reason, why this should be done?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ It appears to me, that as these two words, war and discord, are different, so two different things are signified by them; and I call them different—the latter between members of the same community, and the former between foreigners and strangers. —When hatred is among one's own people, it is called discord; when it respects foreigners, war.

Glaucon/ What you say, is not at all unreasonable.

Socrates/ But consider, whether what I now state is also to the purpose; for I assert that the Greek nation itself is friendly and in alliance with itself, though foreign and strange to the barbarian.

Glaucon/ Well observed.

Socrates/ When therefore Greeks fight with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, we may then say, that they are at war, and naturally enemies; and this hatred we may call war: but when Greeks act thus towards Greeks, we may say that they are naturally friends, and that Greece in such a case is distempered, and at discord; and such a hatred is to be called discord.

Glaucon/ I agree, that we must view it thus.

Socrates/ Consider then, that in the discord just mentioned, whenever such a thing happens, how the state is split in factions, and when they sequester each other's lands and burn each other's houses, how destructive the discord seems, and neither of them seem to be lovers of their country; for otherwise they would never have dared to pillage their nurse and mother, but it would have been sufficient for the victors to carry off the crops of the vanquished, and to conceive that they would one day be reconciled, and not perpetually be at war.

Glaucon/ This indeed is by far a milder sentiment than the other.

Socrates/ But what then? this state that you are founding, is it to be a Greek one?

Glaucon/ It ought.

Socrates/ Are they not then to be good and mild?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And will they not be lovers of Greece; and will they not account Greece as related to them; and will they not observe the same religious rites as the rest of the Greeks?

Glaucon/ Most decidedly.

Socrates/ Any difference then, that they have with Greeks, as kinsmen, will they not consider that as discord, —not war?

Glaucon/ Yes, for it is not war.

Socrates/ And they will behave then, as those capable of being reconciled?

Glaucon/ Quite so, of course.

Socrates/ They will be mild then and moderate, not punishing so far as to enslave or destroy, —as advocates for correction, and not as enemies.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Neither then, as they are Greeks, will they pillage the lands, or burn the houses of Greeks; nor will they allow, that in every state, individually, all are their enemies, men, women, and children, but that in all cases a few only are enemies, —the originators of the quarrel: and on all these accounts they will not choose to lay waste their lands, since the majority of the occupants are their friends; nor will they overturn the houses: —and so far only will they carry on the war, until the real originators be obliged by the innocent to make reparation to those whom they have grieved.

Glaucon/ I agree, that we ought so to behave towards opponents among our own citizens, —but towards the barbarians, as the Greeks now act towards each other.

Socrates/ This law, then, also, let us enact for our guardians, that they shall neither lay waste the lands, nor burn the houses.

Glaucon/ Aye, let us enact it; and this further, that these things are right, and those also, that you before mentioned. It appears to me, however, Socrates, that if one allow you to go on speaking in this fashion, you will never remember what you formerly put aside, when you entered on all that you have now said; —namely, how far such a government is possible, and in what way it is at all possible? For, if it be at all possible, I will allow that all these high advantages will belong to that state in which it exists, and the following also, which you omitted; and I now tell you, that they will, with all possible courage, fight against their enemies, and least of all abandon each other, recognizing, and calling one another by these names, —fathers, sons, and brothers; and if the females encamp along with them, whether in the same rank, or drawn up behind them, they will strike terror into the enemies, and at the same time, in case of need, give all assistance: —in this way, I know, they will be utterly unconquerable; and as for the advantages they have at home, which we have omitted, those at any rate I plainly see. —But as I allow, that all these, and ten thousand other things, will belong to this form of government, if it actually does exist, let us talk no more about it, but try to persuade each other of this itself, how far it is possible, and in what way: —and let us omit the other points.

Socrates/ You have suddenly, made an attack on my argument, and make no allowance for one who is but a bungler; because, perhaps, you do not know with what difficulty I have got over two breakers, and now you are

driving me on the greatest and most dangerous of all the three. After having seen and heard this, you will, I am sure, forgive me; allowing, that I had reason for hesitation, and was frightened by the mention of so great a paradox from undertaking its examination.

Glaucon/ The more, you mention such things, the less will you be excused from explaining in what respect this government is possible. Proceed then without delay.

Socrates/ Must we not then, first remember this, that we are come hither to inquire into the nature of justice and injustice?

Glaucon/ We must. But what is this to the purpose?

Socrates/ Nothing. But supposing we find out the nature of justice, are we to judge then, that the just man ought nowise to differ therefrom, but in every respect to resemble justice; or are we to be satisfied, if he approach to it, as nearly as possible, and, of all others, partake of it the most?

Glaucon/ This will satisfy us.

Socrates/ For example's sake, then, we were inquiring into this, —what is the nature of justice; and we were in quest also of the perfectly just man, how he became so, and what was his nature, if he really existed, —and so also with respect to injustice, and the supremely unjust man, in order that, looking to them as regards their apparent qualities in relation to happiness and its opposite, we might be obliged to acknowledge concerning ourselves, that whoever most resembles them in character will have a fortune most resembling theirs; and not for the purpose of showing that these things are possible or not.

Glaucon/ It is quite true.

Socrates/ Think you, then, that he is in any degree an inferior painter, who having painted the portrait of a very

handsome man, and having expressed everything fully in his picture, is yet unable to show that such a man really exists?

Glaucon/ By Zeus, I do not.

Socrates/ Well, have we not now then logically defined, shall we say, the model of a good state?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Have we, indeed, less ably stated the case, think you, for this reason, because we are unable to show the possibility of a state being established as we have described?

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ This then, is the truth of the case: —but if indeed, I must now, on your account, be anxious on this point, —that is, to show how and in what respects it is most possible, with a view to this discovery, you must again allow what you did before.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Can anything possibly be executed as perfectly as it is described; or, is it the nature of practice, that it does not approach so near to truth as theory, though some may think otherwise: —will you allow this or not?

Glaucon/ I allow it.

Socrates/ Do not oblige me then to show you, that all these things in every respect positively exist in as great perfection as we have described in our reasoning: —if, however, we can find out how a state may be established as closely as possible to what has been mentioned, you will agree that we have discovered the possibility of what you require; or will you not even be satisfied, if this be proved? For my own part I should be satisfied.

Glaucon/ Yes, and I too.

Socrates/ Next then, it seems, we must endeavor to find out and show what is the evil now existing in states, owing to which they are not established in the manner we have described, —and what is that smallest change, by making which we could bring the state to this model of government; —and let us chiefly see, if this can be effected by the change of one thing, —if not, by the change of two, —if not that, by the change of the fewest things in number, and the smallest in power.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ By changing one thing only then, methinks, I can show that the state may be molded into this form of government: —that change, however, is neither small nor easy, though possible.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ I am now come, to what I compared to the greatest wave: and it shall now be mentioned, even though, as with a wave, I should be overwhelmed with ridicule and infamy. Consider, however, what I am now going to say.

Glaucon/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Unless either philosophers, govern in states, or those who are at present called kings and governors philosophize genuinely and sufficiently, and both political power and philosophy unite in one, —and until the bulk of those now pursuing each of these separately are of necessity excluded, there will be no end, Glaucon, to the miseries of states, nor yet, as I think, to those of the human race; nor till then will that government, which we have described in our reasonings, ever spring up to a positive existence, and behold the light of the sun. —And this is what all along made me dislike mentioning it, that I saw what a paradox I was about to advance: for one can scarcely be convinced that no

other government but this can enjoy happiness, either public or private.

Glaucon/ You have thrown out such an expression and argument, Socrates, as you think may bring on you a great many, and these too so specially bold as to put off their clothes, and snatch naked whatever weapon each happens to have ready as if about performing prodigies for rushing forward in battle-array: —and if you do not mow them down with argument, and so make your escape, you will pay for it by suffering the severest ridicule.

Socrates/ And are not you the cause of all this?

Glaucon/ Aye, through acting well at least: —yet in this affair, I will not betray but defend you, as far as I can; and I am enabled to do so both by my own good-will and your encouragement; and your questions probably I shall answer more carefully than any other: —only do you try, by help of such assistance, to show those who are loath to believe these things, that they really are what you represent them.

Socrates/ I must try; especially, as you afford me so much assistance. And here it seems necessary, if we can at all escape from those you mention, that we should at any rate define clearly what kind of men those are whom we call philosophers, —those, who, we are bold enough to say, ought alone to govern; —so that, when they are clearly pointed out, an able defense may be set up, by asserting that it is their natural province both to study philosophy, and also assume to themselves the government of the state, —while the other members of the state study neither philosophy nor politics, but only obey their leader.

Glaucon/ It is quite fit, that we should define them.

Socrates/ Come then, follow me this way, and see if we can in some way or other sufficiently explain this matter.

Glaucon/ Lead on then.

Socrates/ Will it be necessary then, to remind you, —or do you recollect, that when we say of anyone, that he loves a thing, he would not appear, if we speak strictly, to love one part of it, and not another, but to have an affection for the whole?

Glaucon/ I need, it seems, to be reminded of that; for I do not understand it perfectly.

Socrates/ Someone else, indeed, Glaucon, might say what you say; but it does not become a man who is a lover, to forget that all things in their bloom somehow excite, and agitate an amorous person and lover, as seeming worthy both of respect and of proper salutes: —do you not behave in this manner towards the beautiful? One, because flat-nosed, will be called agreeable, and be an object of praise; and the hooked nose of another, you call princely; and that between these, formed with exact symmetry: the dark are said to have a manly look, and the fair to be the children of the gods: but this name of delicate white, think you it is the invention of any other than a flattering lover, who easily bears with the paleness, if it be in the season of youth? —in one word, do you not make all kinds of pretenses, and say everything that you can, so as not to reject anyone who is in the prime of life?

Glaucon/ If you are disposed, to judge by me of other lovers, that they act in this manner, I agree to it for argument's sake.

Socrates/ And what, as to lovers of wine: —do not you find they act in the same manner, cheerfully drinking every kind of wine on every pretext?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And you perceive, I suppose, that the ambitious likewise, if they cannot obtain the command of an army, will take the command of a τριττύς; and if they cannot get honor

from greater and nobler men, are content to be honored by the lesser and the meaner sort, because they are desirous of honor at any rate?

Glaucon/ Perfectly true.

Socrates/ Will you allow this or not: if we say, one desires a thing, are we to say that he desires the whole species, or that he desires one part of it, but not another?

Glaucon/ The whole.

Socrates/ May we not then likewise say, that the philosopher desires wisdom, and that too, not one part only, but the whole?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ He then, who is averse to a course of discipline, especially if he be young, and has not understanding to discern what is good and what is otherwise, should not be called a lover of learning, nor a philosopher; —just as we say of a person disgusted with meats, that he neither hungers after nor desires meats, and is not a lover but a hater of them.

Glaucon/ Aye, —and we shall say right.

Socrates/ But the man who has a ready inclination to taste of every branch of learning, and enters with pleasure on its study, and is insatiable thereof, this man we may with justice call a philosopher, may we not?

Glaucon/ Many such philosophers as those will go into great absurdities; for all your lovers of shows appear to me to be of this kind, from taking a pleasure in learning; and your story-lovers are of all persons to he reckoned the most stupid, —among philosophers at least. These indeed would not willingly attend to such reasoning, or to such a disquisition as this. But yet, as if they had hired out their ears to listen to every public ditty, they run about to the Dionysia, omitting neither the civic nor village festivals. Are

all these then, and others who run after such matters, and those likewise who devote themselves to the inferior arts, to be called by us philosophers?

Socrates/ By no means, but, only like philosophers.

Glaucon/ Who are they, however, whom you call the true ones?

Socrates/ Those, who are desirous of discerning the truth.

Glaucon/ That too, is correct: —but how do you mean?

Socrates/ It is not easy, to tell another this; but you, I think, should agree with me in this.

Glaucon/ In what?

Socrates/ That since the beautiful is contrary to the deformed, these are two things.

Glaucon/ Of course, they are.

Socrates/ And if they are two, then each of them is one.

Glaucon/ Granted also.

Socrates/ And as regards justice and injustice, —good and evil, —and also respecting all ideas whatever, the argument is the same—that each of them is one in itself, though, as to their relation with actions and bodies, and each other mutually, they take an all-varying number of forms, so as to make the one appear many.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ In this manner then, do I distinguish and set apart those that you just mentioned, the lovers of public shows, from craftsmen and mechanics; and then quite apart from these I place those of whom we are now discoursing, whom alone we may properly call philosophers.

Glaucon/ How say you?

Socrates/ The lovers of common stories and spectacles, delight in fine sounds, colors, and figures, and everything

made up of these; but the nature of beauty itself their intellect is unable to discern and admire.

Glaucon/ That is the case, indeed.

Socrates/ As to those, however, who are able to approach this beauty itself and behold it in its real essence, surely they must be few in number?

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ He then who deems some things beautiful, but neither knows beauty itself nor is able to follow, should anyone lead to the knowledge of it, do you think he lives in a dream, or is awake? consider: is not this to dream, when a man, either asleep or awake, imagines the likeness of a thing not to be its likeness, but the real thing itself which it resembles?

Glaucon/ I for my part would assert, that such a person is really in a dream.

Socrates/ But what now as to him who comes to an exactly opposite conclusion, who understands the real nature of beauty, and is able to discern both it and its accessories, and deems neither the accessories to be beauty, nor beauty the accessories; —does such a man, think you, live in a waking or dreaming state?

Glaucon/ Wide awake.

Socrates/ May we not then properly call this man's intellectual power, so far as he really knows, knowledge, but that of the other, opinion, —as he only opines?

Glaucon/ Surely so.

Socrates/ But what, —if the person, who, we say, only opines things, but does not really know them, becomes indignant, and raises a dispute, alleging that our position is not true, shall we have any method of soothing and gently

persuading him, and yet at the same time concealing that he is not in a sound state?

Glaucon/ We surely ought.

Socrates/ Come then, bethink you what we are to say to him. —are you disposed that we should question him thus, —saying, that if he knows anything, no one envies him, and we should gladly see him possessed of more knowledge; — and tell us this too, does the man who has so much knowledge, know something or nothing? Do you answer me in his behalf.

Glaucon/ I will answer, that he knows something.

Socrates/ Is it something then, that does or does not exist?

Glaucon/ What does exist: for how can that, which does not exist, be known?

Socrates/ This, then, we have sufficiently considered; — though we might have considered it more fully, —that what really is, may be really known, but what does not at all exist, cannot be known at all?

Glaucon/ Yes, —this we have examined quite sufficiently.

Socrates/ Be it so: but if there be anything of such character, as both to be and not to be, must it not lie between what has a perfect existence, and what has none at all?

Glaucon/ Between them.

Socrates/ If then there is knowledge as to what really exists, and necessarily ignorance as to what does not exist, —as to what lies between these, must we not seek for something between ignorance and science, if there be any such thing?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Are we to allege, then, that opinion is anything?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Is it a different faculty from science, or the same?

Glaucon/ Different.

Socrates/ Opinion then is conversant about one thing, and science about another, each according to its own peculiar faculty?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Is not then the nature of science as regards that which exists, to know what existence is? It seems to me, however, far more necessary to lay down the distinction thus.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ We will say, that faculties are a certain kind of real existences, by which both we can do whatever we are able, and every being else also whatever it is able: for instance, I say, that seeing and hearing are faculties, if you understand what I mean to call 'the species" or idea.

Glaucon/ I understand.

Socrates/ Hear then what is my opinion about them: for I do not see any color nor figure, nor any of such qualities of a faculty, as of many other things, with reference to which I form a mental internal perception of their differences: but in a faculty, I regard that alone, about which it is employed, and what it accomplishes; and on this account I call each of these a faculty; and that which is employed about and accomplishes one and the same purpose, this I call the same faculty; but what is employed about and accomplishes a different purpose, that I call a different faculty: —what say you? In what manner do you call it?

Glaucon/ Just the same.

Socrates/ Here again, excellent Glaucon, —do you allege, that science is itself a certain faculty, or to what class do you refer it?

Glaucon/ To this, the strongest of all the faculties.

Socrates/ But what then; —are we to refer opinion to faculty, or to some other species?

Glaucon/ By no means; for that by which we have the power of forming opinions is nothing else but opinion.

Socrates/ But some time since, you allowed that science and opinion were not the same.

Glaucon/ How, can anyone with common sense reduce under one, what is infallible, and what is not infallible?

Socrates/ Right; —and it is plain, that we have allowed opinion to be a different thing from science.

Glaucon/ Yes, —different.

Socrates/ Each of them then has naturally a different faculty in reference to a different object?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Science surely as regards that which exists, so as to know the nature of real existence?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But we say that opinion opines?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it cognizant of the same thing that science is; —and will that which is known, and that which is matter of opinion, be the same; —or is this impossible?

Glaucon/ Impossible, from what has been granted: since they are naturally faculties of different things, and both of them are faculties, —opinion and science, —and each of them different from the other, as we have said; hence it cannot be, that what is opined is the same with that which is known.

Socrates/ If then, that which exists is known, must it not differ from what is perceived by opinion?

Glaucon/ It does differ.

Socrates/ Does opinion then entertain what has no existence; —or is it impossible to opine what does not exist at all? —Consider now, does not the man who opines, refer his opinion to some standard; —or is it possible to opine, and yet opine nothing at all?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ But whoever opines, opines some one thing?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But surely that which does not exist, cannot be called anyone thing, but most properly nothing at all?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But we necessarily referred ignorance to that which has no true being, and knowledge to real existence?

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ He does not, therefore, opine true being, nor yet that which has no being?

Glaucon/ He does not.

Socrates/ Opinion then is neither knowledge, nor is it ignorance?

Glaucon/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Does it then exceed these, either knowledge in perspicuity, or ignorance in obscurity?

Glaucon/ Neither.

Socrates/ Think you then, that opinion is more obscure than knowledge, but clearer than ignorance?

Glaucon/ Far.

Socrates/ Does it lie then between them both?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Opinion then is between the two?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And have we not already said, that if anything appeared of such a nature, as at once to exist and yet not exist, such a thing would lie between what really exists, and that which has no existence at all, and neither science nor ignorance would take cognizance of it, but that only which appeared to be between ignorance and science?

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And now, what we call opinion has been shown to lie between them.

Glaucon/ It has been so shown.

Socrates/ This then yet remains for us, as it seems, to discover, —what participates in both—that is, being, and non-being, and what can properly be called neither of them perfectly, —so that if it seems to be what it is reputed, we may with justice term it so, assigning to the extremes what are extreme, and to the middle what are between the two; —must we not?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ These things being determined, I will say, let this worthy man tell and answer me, —he who reckons that there is neither beauty, nor idea of beauty, always the same; but that lover of beautiful objects reckons that there are many beautiful objects, not enduring to be told that there is only one beautiful, and one just, and so of the rest. Of all these many things, excellent man! shall we say, whether there be any which will not appear deformed, and of those just which will not appear unjust, and of those holy which will not appear profane?

Glaucon/ No; but, the objects themselves must in some respects necessarily appear both beautiful and deformed, and whatever else you ask.

Socrates/ But what? —Do double quantities generally seem to have less capacity for being halves than the doubles of others?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ And things great and small, light and heavy, are they to be termed what we call them, any more than the opposite?

Glaucon/ No; —each of them, always participates of both.

Socrates/ Is then, or is not, each of these many things just what it is said to be?

Glaucon/ It resembles their equivocal jokes at feasts, and the riddle of children about the eunuch's striking the bat, with what and on what part they guess he strikes it: for all these things have a double meaning, and it is impossible to know accurately whether they are, or are not, —or are both, or neither of the two.

Socrates/ How can you act with them then, or what better position have you for them than a medium between being and non-being? —For nothing seems more obscure than non-being as compared with having no being at all, nor more clear than being in respect of real being.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ We have discovered then, it seems, that most of the maxims of the people about the beautiful, and those other things, fluctuate somehow between being and non-being.

Glaucon/ Yes, we have discovered it.

Socrates/ But it was formerly agreed at least, that if such a thing were apparent, it ought to be called that which is opined, and not what is known; and that which fluctuates between the two is to be perceived by the intermediate faculty.

Glaucon/ We agreed.

Socrates/ Those then, who contemplate many beautiful things, but yet never perceive beauty itself, and cannot follow another who would lead them to it, —and many just things, though not justice itself, and all other things in like manner, these persons, we will say, hold opinions on all things, yet have no accurate knowledge of what they opine.

Glaucon/ It must be so.

Socrates/ But what then, as regards those who perceive each of the objects themselves, always existing in the same manner, and in the same relations, —shall we not say that they know, and do not opine?

Glaucon/ This must be the case also.

Socrates/ And shall we not say, that these embrace and love the things of which they have knowledge, and the others the things of which they entertain only opinions; —and remember we not, that we alleged them to behold and love fine sounds and colors, and such things; though beauty itself they do not admit to have any real being?

Glaucon/ Yes, —we remember.

Socrates/ Shall we be wrong then in calling them lovers of opinion, rather than philosophers? —And yet they will be greatly enraged at us, if we call them so.

Glaucon/ Not if they be persuaded by me; for it is not right to be enraged at the truth.

Socrates/ Those then who embrace and love what has real being, we must call philosophers, and not lovers of opinion?

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

Book 6.

Socrates/ Philosophers then, Glaucon, and those who are not so, have, at length, after a long parade of talk and with some difficulty, been respectively defined.

Glaucon/ Aye, —for perhaps, it was not easy to do it briefly.

Socrates/ It appears not. —I still think, however, that their qualities would have been better exhibited, had we deemed it right to speak about this alone, and not discussed a multitude of other matters while considering the difference between a just and an unjust life.

Glaucon/ What then, are we to consider next?

Socrates/ What else, but that which is next in order? —Since those are philosophers who are able to concern themselves with what always maintains a constant relation, whereas those who cannot effect this, but ruminate among a host of material objects that are every way shifting, are not philosophers; —which of these ought to be the rulers of the state?

Glaucon/ Which way, shall we define the matter, and define correctly?

Socrates/ Such of them, as seem capable of preserving the laws and institutions of states, these are to be made guardians.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ This then, is of course evident, —whether we ought to seek for a guardian one that is blind or one that is sharp-sighted.

Glaucon/ Of course, that is quite evident.

Socrates/ What difference then is there between blind persons and those who are in fact deprived of the knowledge of each individual essence, and have no clear demonstration

of it in the soul, and cannot like painters who look at what is positively true, and refer everything thereto, examining it with all possible accuracy, if need be, form settled notions, of the beautiful, just, and good, and so maintain them, as if sanctioned by law?

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus; —they do not differ much.

Socrates/ Shall we then rather appoint these as our guardians, or those rather who know each individual being, and in experience are not at all inferior to those others, nor behind them in any other department of virtue?

Glaucon/ It were absurd, to choose any others, if at least they be not deficient in all other matters; since they excel in this, which is the most important.

Socrates/ Must we not inquire this then, —in what manner the same persons will be able to have both the one and the other?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ As we observed then, at the opening of this discussion, we must first of all thoroughly understand their disposition; and I think, if we are pretty well agreed about that, we shall agree also, that the same persons are able to possess both these qualities; and none else but these ought to be the governors of states.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Let us then so far agree about philosophic dispositions, that as respects learning they always covet that which discovers to them that ever-existing essence which does not vary through generation or corruption.

Glaucon/ Let it be agreed.

Socrates/ And likewise, that they desire the whole of such learning, and do not willingly omit any part of it, either small or great, more honorable or more dishonorable, as we

formerly observed concerning the ambitious and those engaged in love.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ Consider then, in the next place, whether, besides, what we have mentioned, it be necessary for those who would be such as we have described, to have this also in their natures.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Freedom from falsehood, and never willingly to admit a lie, but rather to hate it through love of truth.

Glaucon/ It probably would.

Socrates/ It is not only probable, my friend, but quite necessary, that one who naturally loves a thing should love everything that is allied and belongs to the object of his affection.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Is there anything that you can find more nearly allied to wisdom than truth?

Glaucon/ I cannot.

Socrates/ Is it possible, then, for the same disposition to be both philosophic, and fond of falsehood?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ He then who is really a lover of learning, ought from early infancy wholly to desire all truth?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But we know somehow, that whoever has his desires vehemently set on one object, for this very reason has them weaker as regards other things, —just as a current diverted from its channel.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Whoever then has his desires running out after learning and such like matters, would be engaged, methinks, with the pleasure of the soul itself, and forsake the pleasures arising from the body, —if indeed, he be not a pretender, but a real philosopher.

Glaucon/ This of course must necessarily follow.

Socrates/ Such an one moreover is prudent, and by no means fond of money; —for the reasons why money is so anxiously sought at so great a sacrifice are likely to make anyone anxious rather than a man like this.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And surely you should consider this too, when deciding about a philosophic disposition, and one that is not so.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That it shall not unconsciously take an illiberal turn, —since narrow-mindedness is most revolting to a soul that is ever earnestly pursuing all that is divine and human.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Think you then, that he who possesses magnificent intellectual conceptions and can contemplate all time and all being, can possibly consider human life as a thing of great consequence?

Glaucon/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Such an one then will not regard death as anything terrible.

Glaucon/ Least of all, surely.

Socrates/ It seems then, that a cowardly and illiberal disposition will not readily connect itself with true philosophy.

Glaucon/ I do not think it will.

Socrates/ What then; —can the well-disposed man, who has moderate desires, and is not a lover of money, nor illiberal, nor arrogant, nor cowardly, ever possibly be unjust, or a breaker of engagements?

Glaucon/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ And this also you will likewise consider, when viewing from its very source what is and is not a philosophic soul, whether it be just and gentle, or unsocial and savage.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Neither, as I think, will you omit this.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Whether it learn easily or with difficulty: —in fact, do you expect that a person will ever love a thing sufficiently, while he is uneasy in its performance, and makes but small progress?

Glaucon/ It cannot be.

Socrates/ But what if he be oblivious and retains nothing of what he learns, can he then possibly acquire science?

Glaucon/ How is it possible?

Socrates/ And when he thus vainly labors, think you not that he will be forced at last to hate both himself and such employment?

Glaucon/ Of course he must.

Socrates/ We can never reckon then among philosophic souls, that which is forgetful; but we shall on the other hand require it to have a good memory?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And we can never say this at any rate, that an unmusical and ill-regulated disposition leads anywhere but towards irregularity.

Glaucon/ Where else should it?

Socrates/ But as regards truth, think you it is allied to irregularity or regularity?

Glaucon/ To regularity.

Socrates/ Let us require then, in addition to all other qualities, an intellect naturally well-regulated and gracious, as a willing and naturally well-disposed guide in realizing the idea of individual being.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ What then; —do you not think, that we have in some measure discussed the necessary qualifications, and such as are mutually connected in a soul that would attain a fitting and perfect apprehension of being?

Glaucon/ Aye, the most necessary.

Socrates/ Can you then any how blame such a study as this, which a man can never sufficiently pursue, unless he has a naturally good memory, learns with facility, and is generous, kind-hearted, the friend and ally of truth, justice, manliness, and temperance?

Glaucon/ Not even Momus himself, could find fault with such a study.

Socrates/ Aye, and will it not be to such as these alone, when perfected by education and age, that you will entrust the state?

Glaucon/ No one, indeed, Socrates, can contradict you on these points; but all who from time to time bear you advancing what you do at present, feel somehow thus; —being led a little astray by your reasoning on each question, through inexperience in this mode of question and answer, when all these littles are collected together, they reckon at the close of the discussion that the mistake appears considerable, and the contrary of their first concessions; and just as those who play at talus with such as are dexterous, themselves being unskillful, are in the end driven into a

corner and cannot move a piece, so your hearers have nothing to say, being driven into a corner, at this different kind of play, not with the dice, but your reasonings; —though the truth at least is not thus at all advanced. —I say this with reference to the present inquiry; for a person may tell you, that he has nothing to allege as an argument against your questions individually, but sees in fact that all those who plunge into philosophy do not pursue it with the view of being taught in it during childhood, and liberated from it when they arrive at mature age, but rather in order that they may continue in it much longer, becoming most of them quite perverse, —not to say, altogether depraved; while even such of them as appear most worthy, are still so far affected by this pursuit that you so much commend, as to become useless to the public.

Socrates/ Think you then, that such as say these things are telling a falsehood?

Glaucon/ I know not; but I should like to hear what is your opinion.

Socrates/ You will hear then, that in my opinion they speak the truth.

Glaucon/ How, can it be right to say that the miseries of states are never to come to a close, till they be governed by philosophers, whom we now acknowledge as useless thereto?

Socrates/ You ask a question, which needs a figurative reply. And yet, I do not think you usually speak by figures. Granted: —and are you not jesting me, after having involved me in a subject so hard of explanation? —Yet attend to the comparison, in order that you may the better see how nicely I make it: —for the sufferings of the best philosophers in the management of public affairs are so grievous, that there is not one other suffering so severe: but in making our simile,

and putting in a defense for them, we must collect from many particulars, in the same way as painters mingle together different figures, and paint a creature both goat and stag in one, and others of the same kind.

Conceive now such a person as this to be the pilot of a fleet or a single ship, one who surpasses all in the ship both in bulk and strength, but is somewhat deaf, and short-sighted as well, and whose skill in nautical affairs is much of the same kind; —and also that the sailors are all quarrelling among each other about the pilotage, each thinking he ought to be pilot, though he never learned the art, and cannot show who was his master, nor at what time he got his learning; —that besides this, they all say that the art itself cannot be taught, and are ready to cut in pieces anyone who says that it can. —Imagine further, that they are constantly crowding round the pilot himself, begging, and forming all schemes to induce him to commit the helm into their hands, and that sometimes even, when they do not so well succeed in persuading him as others may, they either kill these others, or throw them overboard, and after having, by mandragora or wine or something else, rendered the noble pilot incapable, they manage the ship by aid of the crew, and sail on, thus drinking and feasting, as may be expected of such people; —and besides this, if anyone be clever at assisting them in getting the management into their own hands, and either by persuasion or force, setting aside the pilot, they praise such an one, calling him sailor and pilot, and versed in navigation, but despise as useless everyone not of this character, —not in the least considering that the true pilot must necessarily study the year, the seasons, the heavens, and stars, and winds, and everything belonging to his art, if he would be a real commander of a ship; but at the same time as respects the art and practice of governing men, whether some be willing or not, they think

it impossible for a man to attain it in connection with the art of navigation. —Whilst affairs are thus situated as regards ships, do you not think that the true pilot will be called by the sailors on board of ships thus regulated, a mere stargazer trifler, and of no use to them whatever?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ I think then, that you do not want this comparison explained, in order to see that it represents how people feel in states towards true philosophers, but that you quite understand what I mean.

Adeimantus/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ First of all then, as regards this, —namely, a person's wondering that philosophers are not honored in states, —you must acquaint him with our comparison, and try to persuade him, that it would be much more wonderful if they were honored.

Adeimantus/ I will so.

Socrates/ And further, that it is quiet true, as you were just observing, that the best of those who study philosophy are useless to the bulk of mankind: —but nevertheless, for all this, they intend to lay the blame not on the philosophers, but on such as make no use of them, —for it is not natural that the pilot should beg of the sailors to allow him to govern them, nor that the wise should hold attendance at the gates of the rich: —and whoever wittily said this was mistaken; for this indeed is the natural method, that whoever is sick, whether rich or poor, must necessarily go to the gates of the physician, and whoever wants to be governed must wait on a person able to govern; for it is not natural that a really worthy governor should beg of the governed to subject themselves to his government. —You will not be far wrong, however, in comparing our present political governors to

those sailors we now mentioned, and those whom they call insignificant and star-gazers to those who are truly pilots.

Adeimantus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Hence, then, it would seem, that the best pursuit is not likely to be held in much honor by persons engaged in those of an opposite nature, —but by far the greatest and most violent outcry against philosophy is caused by those who profess its study; —the very persons, whom most of all, you say, your reviler of philosophy calls downright wicked, and the very best useless; and I agreed that you spoke correctly, —did I not?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Have we not now fully explained the cause, why the best of them are useless?

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ Do you wish, then, that we should next explain the reason, why most of them must necessarily be depraved, and try also to show, that philosophy is not the cause of this.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us open our argument then, by carefully calling to mind what we before observed about the natural disposition necessarily belonging to the good and worthy philosopher; —and if you remember, the leading part therein was truth, which he must by all means wholly pursue, or else be a vain boaster, having no fellowship with true philosophy.

Adeimantus/ Aye, —so it was said.

Socrates/ Is not this single part of his character wholly the reverse of what is at present held respecting him?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ We shall be urging, therefore, no trifling argument in his defense, if we can show that the true lover

of learning is naturally inclined to aspire after the knowledge of real being, and, so far from being arrested by the numerous individual things which are the objects of opinion, that he proceeds undauntedly forward and desists not from his love of truth till he becomes acquainted with the nature of all existing things through the agency of that part of the soul whose business it is to take cognizance of such matters: —but it is the office of that part of the soul which is allied to real being; and when this true lover of learning approaches thus far, and mingles therewith, thus giving rise to intellect and truth, he will attain to true knowledge, and truly live and be maintained, and at length become liberated from the pains of production, —but not before.

Adeimantus/ As good a defense, as there possibly can be.

Socrates/ What then; —will it be a part of such a person's business to love falsehood, or quite the contrary, to hate it?

Adeimantus/ To hate it.

Socrates/ While truth, however, leads the way, we can never say, I think, that any band of evils follows in her train?

Adeimantus/ No, we cannot.

Socrates/ But on the contrary, sound and just morals accompanied with temperance?

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ Well then; —is it necessary that we again examine and re-arrange all the qualities of a philosophic nature? —for, no doubt, you remember that men of this character possess fortitude, magnanimity, aptitude for learning, and a good memory; and when you said by way of rejoinder, that everyone would be compelled to agree to our statement, we quitted that subject, and turned to the subject of our present discourse—your assertion of having found some of the philosophers useless, and the majority also completely depraved. —And in investigating the cause of

that calumny, we are at length come to inquire, how it is, that the greater part of them are bad; and on this account we have again analyzed the nature of true philosophers, and necessarily defined it.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ We must therefore, consider, the corruptions of this nature, how it becomes ruined in many, so that only some few escape, whom men call not depraved, but useless; and next we must consider those dispositions that counterfeit this nature, and only pretend to pursue it, and what is the nature also of those souls, which aspire to a pursuit not belonging to them, and above their reach: for these persons, by their multiplied errors, have everywhere and among all men, attached this opinion to philosophy which you are now mentioning.

Adeimantus/ To what kind of corruptions, do you allude?

Socrates/ I will try to recount them, if I can. —And this now, methinks, everyone will allow us, that such a nature, with all the qualifications that we just now enjoined to a person aspiring to be a perfect philosopher, is rarely to be found among men, and of these there are but very few: do you not think so?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And among those few, just consider how many and how great are the causes of corruption.

Adeimantus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The most surprising of all to hear, —namely, that of those qualities which we commended in the nature of a philosopher, each corrupts the soul possessing them, and withdraws it from philosophy—from fortitude, I mean, and temperance, and all those other qualities which we enumerated.

Adeimantus/ That is a strange saying.

Socrates/ And further still; —besides these things, all that are commonly called good, —such as beauty, riches, bodily strength, a powerful family connection in the state, and all that relates to these, corrupt and withdraw it from philosophy: —there, you now have the outline of what I mean.

Adeimantus/ I have, and would be glad more clearly to understand what you say.

Socrates/ Apprehend, therefore, the whole of it aright; and it will become perfectly clear, and what we before said will not be thought absurd.

Adeimantus/ How then, do you bid me act?

Socrates/ With respect to every kind of seed, or plant, whether of vegetables or animals, we know, that what is not properly nurtured and has not its proper nourishment, or season, or place, the stronger it is, so many more kindly influences does it require, —for evil is more contrary to good, than to that which is not good.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ It is reasonable then, I suppose, that the very best nature, if supported on diet unsuited to it, should become worse than one which is inferior?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Well then, Adimantus, are we to say, that souls naturally the best, if badly trained, become more than commonly depraved; —or think you that gross iniquity and extreme wickedness arise from an inferior rather than from a good disposition ruined in its education; whereas a weak disposition will never produce either great good or great evil?

Adeimantus/ No, —I think not; —and the case is as you say.

Socrates/ If then this philosophic nature, that we have here defined, meet with suitable training, it will of necessity grow up, I suppose, and attain to every virtue; but if it be sown in an improper soil, and grow up and be nurtured accordingly, it will become quite the reverse, unless one of the gods should by chance come to its assistance; —think you then, as most do, that some youths are corrupted by sophists, and that these sophists are men in private life who corrupt them in any matter soever that is worthy of their attention; —or rather, that the very persons who say these things are themselves the greatest sophists, conveying their instruction with most perfect skill, and rendering young and old, men and women, such as they wish them to be?

Adeimantus/ When is that?

Socrates/ When many of them, are seated and crowded together in an assembly, in their law-courts, theatres, camps, or other public meetings of the people, and when they blame with much tumult some speeches and acts, and commend others, shouting and stamping, to see which shall out vie the other; —and besides this, the echo from the rocks and the place where they are sitting, redoubles the tumult of their disapprobation and applause; —in such a situation as this, what kind of heart, as the saying is, do you think the youth has; or what private instruction can so restrain him, as to prevent him from being quite overwhelmed by such blame or applause, and from yielding and being carried along the stream wherever it bears him; —and will he not call things beautiful and base, according as these people call them, and just as they pursue them, thus becoming of the very same character?

Adeimantus/ This, must of course be the case, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet, we have not yet mentioned what is the greatest necessity of all.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ What these, your teachers and sophists, add, by way of acts to their talk, when they cannot persuade: —know you not that they punish with disgraces and fines and deaths, the man whom they cannot persuade?

Adeimantus/ I know that, extremely well.

Socrates/ What other sophist then, or what private reasonings, do you think, will counteract and overpower these?

Adeimantus/ I know none.

Socrates/ Is it not besides, great folly also even to attempt it? —For there neither is, nor was, nor can ever possibly be, any other system as regards virtue, to be compared with this education by the sophists, —I mean a human method, my friend; for a divine one, according to the proverb, we keep out of the question. —Indeed, you must well know, with respect to whatever is preserved, and becomes what it ought in such a constitution of government, that you will not be far wrong in deeming it preserved by divine destiny.

Adeimantus/ Nor am I, of a different opinion.

Socrates/ But further now, besides this, you must also be of this opinion.

Adeimantus/ Of what?

Socrates/ That each of these hired private teachers, whom these men call sophists and consider as rival artists, teach nothing else but those dogmas of the vulgar, which they approve in their assemblies, and term wisdom; —just as if a man were to learn the tempers and desires of a great and strong animal that he is training, —how it must be approached, how touched, and when it is most fierce or most mild, —and from what sorts it springs, and the sounds also which it is used occasionally to utter, and by what sounds when uttered by another, this beast is rendered either gentle

or savage; and if, after learning all these things by long associating with this animal, he should call this wisdom and, apply himself to the teaching thereof, as to an established art, —while yet, as regards these dogmas and desires, he has no real knowledge of what is beautiful or base, good or ill, just or unjust, but defines them all by the opinions of that great animal, calling those things good by which it is pleased, and those evil with which it is vexed, having no other measure respecting them, but calling things necessary both just and beautiful, though he has never himself seen, nor can show to another, the nature of the necessary and the good, and how far they really differ from each other. Being such as this, then, do you not, by Zeus, think him a ridiculous teacher?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ And, think you, he in any way differs from the man, who deems it wisdom to have understood the tempers and pleasures of the multitude, and of mixed assemblies, either in painting, music, or politics? —For if anyone converse with these, and show them either a poem, or other work of art, or piece of service connected with the state, and make the multitude the judges thereof, he is, beyond all other necessities, under what is called a "Diomedean" necessity, —that of doing whatever they commend. —But as respects these things being really good and beautiful, did you ever hear any of them advance a reason that was not quite ridiculous?

Adeimantus/ No; —and I think, I never shall.

Socrates/ Considering all these things, then, bear this in mind, that the multitude never will admit or reckon that there is the one beautiful itself, and not many beautiful, —one thing itself individually existing, and not many such individual things.

Adeimantus/ They will be the last to do so.

Socrates/ It is impossible, then, for the multitude to be philosophers.

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And those who philosophize must necessarily be subject to their reproach?

Adeimantus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And likewise to that of those private persons, who, in conversing with the multitude, desire to please them?

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ In consequence of this, then, what security do you see for the philosophic nature to continue its pursuit, and arrive at perfection? —And consider from what has gone before; for it has been admitted, that aptitude for learning, memory, fortitude, and magnanimity belong to this kind of disposition.

Adeimantus/ Yes, —it has.

Socrates/ Will not such an one as this, then, be the first of all men in all things whatever, especially if he have a body naturally suited to his soul?

Adeimantus/ Of course he will.

Socrates/ And when he is further advanced in years, his kindred and citizens, methinks, will be disposed to employ him in their affairs.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ As suppliants then they will pay him homage, and submit to him, anticipating and flattering beforehand his growing power.

Adeimantus/ Aye, such is usually the case.

Socrates/ What then, think you such an one will do under such circumstances, especially if he be a member of a great

state, rich, and nobly born, handsome withal and of large stature? —Will he not be filled with extravagant hopes, deeming himself capable of managing the affairs both of Greeks and barbarians, and on this account demean himself loftily, being full of ostentation and vain conceit, but without judgment?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ If one should gently approach a man of this disposition, and tell him the truth, that he has no judgment, but needs it; —as judgment is only to be acquired by one who devotes himself as a slave to its acquisition, think you, that, amidst all these evils it would be easy for him to hearken?

Adeimantus/ Far from it.

Socrates/ But if, through a good natural temper, and innate attachment to reasoning, he were to acquire penetration, and thus be bent and drawn towards philosophy, —what, think we, will those others do, when they reckon on losing his services and company: —will they not by every action, and every speech, say and do all to the man to prevent his being persuaded, —and as respects his adviser, take away all his influence, both by forming private plots and arraigning him at public trials?

Adeimantus/ This, of course, must necessarily be the case.

Socrates/ Is it likely then, that such an one as this will be a philosopher?

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ You see then, that we were not wrong in saying, that even the very essentials of the philosophic disposition, are, when badly directed, in some measure the cause of a falling off from this pursuit, as well as from those vulgarly reputed goods, —riches, and all such-like matters.

Adeimantus/ No, certainly; —that was correctly observed.

Socrates/ Such then, admirable friend! is the ruin, such and so great the corruption of the best nature for the best of all pursuits, and which, as we observe, is rarely elsewhere to be found: and among these are the men who do the greatest harm both to states and private persons, and those also who do the greatest good, such as are drawn to one particular side, viz. what is good: —whereas small talents do nothing great for anyone, either private person or state.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Since those, then, who thus fall off, whose chief business was to apply to philosophy, and who, leaving her deserted and imperfect, lead themselves a life neither becoming nor true, —while on this same philosophy other unworthy persons have intruded and disgraced her, loading her with reproaches, such as those with which you say her revilers reproach her: —of those who engage with her, —some are worth nothing, and most of them deserve great punishments.

Adeimantus/ Aye surely, this, is commonly said.

Socrates/ Aye, —and said too with reason; —for other contemptible men seeing the field unoccupied, and the possession of it followed by dignities and honorable names, just like persons who take refuge from their prisons in the temples, these likewise gladly leap from their trade-crafts to philosophy; —such of them I mean, as are most adept in their own little art. —Indeed, even in this position of philosophy, her remaining dignity, in comparison with all the other arts, is still of surpassing magnificence, —which dignity many eagerly covet, who yet are of an imperfect nature, and have bodies not only deformed by their arts and crafts, but souls likewise that are broken and crushed by their servile occupations: —must it not necessarily be so?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Think you, then, that they at all differ in appearance from a bald and puny blacksmith, who having made a little money, has been newly liberated from chains, and washed in the bath, with a new robe on him, just decked out as a bridegroom, presuming, on account of his masters poverty and forlorn situation, to propose for his daughter's hand?

Adeimantus/ There is no great difference.

Socrates/ What sort of a race must such as these produce; —must it not be bastardly and abject?

Adeimantus/ Certainly, —it must.

Socrates/ But what; —when persons unworthy of instruction study it, and meddle with it unworthily, what kind of sentiments and opinions must we say come from them? —Must they not be such as to be properly termed sophisms, and neither genuine, nor allied to true discretion?

Adeimantus/ Wholly so, of course.

Socrates/ An extremely small number is left, Adimantus, of those who engage worthily in philosophy, —men of that noble and well-cultivated nature, which somehow seeks retirement, and naturally persists in philosophic study, through the absence of corrupting tendencies; or it may be, in a small state, some mighty soul arises, who has despised and wholly neglected civil honors; —and there may be some small portion perhaps, who, having a naturally good disposition, hold other arts in just contempt, and then turn to philosophy. —These the bridle of our friend Theages will probably be able to restrain; for all other things are calculated to withdraw Theages from philosophy, while the care of his health occupies him to the exclusion of politics: —and as to what concerns myself, namely the sign of my demon, it is not worthwhile to mention that; for I think it has

heretofore been met with only by one other, if any at all. —And even of these few they are such as taste, and have tasted, how sweet and blessed is the acquisition of philosophy, and have withal sufficiently observed the madness of the multitude, and that none of them, as I may say, does what is wholesome in state matters, and that a man can get none to aid him in securely succoring the just, but is like one falling among wild beasts, neither willing nor able to aid them in doing wrong, as one only against a host of wild creatures, and so without doing any good either to the state or his friends, perishes unprofitably to all the world.

Adeimantus/ Quietly reasoning on all these things, and attending to his own affairs, like a man sheltered under a wall in a storm of dust and foam borne along on the wind, by which he sees all about him overwhelmed in disorder, such an one is content anyhow to pass his life pure from injustice and unholy deeds, and to effect his exit hence with good hopes cheerful and agreeable.

Socrates/ Aye, —and he will make his exit, without having done even the least of them.

Adeimantus/ Nor the greatest either; —because he has not found a suitable form of government; for in one that suits him, he will both make greater progress himself, and together with the affairs of private persons, will preserve those of the public also.

Socrates/ As respects philosophy, then, for what reasons it has been traduced, and that it has been so unjustly, we have, I think, sufficiently stated, —unless you have anything else to allege.

Adeimantus/ Nay; —I can say nothing further about this point: —but which of the present forms of government do you conceive to be suited to philosophy?

Socrates/ None whatever; and this particularly is what I complain of, that no existing constitution of a state is worthy of the philosophic nature; and on this account therefore it is turned and altered, just as a foreign seed sown in an improper soil becomes worthless, and has a tendency to fall under the influence of the soil in which it is placed; —so this race likewise has not at present its proper power, but degenerates to some pattern foreign to it; —but in case that it does meet with the best form of government, being itself also best, it will then be evident that this is really divine, and all others only human, both as to their natures and pursuits: —but as a matter of course you are evidently about to ask what is this form of government?

Adeimantus/ You are mistaken, —for this I was not going to ask; but whether it be this, which we have described in establishing our state, or some other.

Socrates/ As regards all other things, it is this one: —and this very thing was then mentioned, that there must always be in our state something having the same regard for the government, which you the legislator had in establishing the laws.

Adeimantus/ Aye, —that was mentioned.

Socrates/ Yes, but, it was not made sufficiently clear, owing to the fear of what you objected, when you showed also, that the illustration of the thing would be both tedious and difficult; —for indeed it is not on the whole quite easy to discuss what remains.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ In what manner a state is to undertake the study of philosophy, so as not itself to be destroyed; for all great pursuits are dangerous; and, —as the saying is, —those noble even are truly difficult.

Adeimantus/ But still, let our demonstration be completed by making this evident.

Socrates/ Want of inclination, will not hinder, though possibly want of power may: —and now you shall at once be assured of my readiness. —Consider indeed, how readily and adventurously I am about to assert, that a state ought to attempt this study in a way opposite to what it does at present.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ At present, those who engage in it are striplings, who, quite from childhood, amidst their domestic affairs and lucrative employments, betake themselves to most abstruse inquiries, considering themselves consummate philosophers, —and I call what respects reasoning, the most difficult of all; —and should they in after-time be invited by others practicing this art, they are pleased to become hearers, and think it a great condescension, reckoning they ought to do it as a by-work: —but towards old age, with the exception indeed of some few, they are extinguished even more than the Heraclitean sun, because they are never again rekindled.

Adeimantus/ But how should they act?

Socrates/ Quite the reverse of what they do: —while they are lads and youths they should study youthful learning and philosophy, and, take special care of the body, during its growth and strengthening by inviting its services to the aid of philosophy; and then, as that time of life progresses, during which the soul is attaining its perfection, they should vigorously apply to her exercises; —but when strength decays, and is no longer suited for civil and military employments, they should then be dismissed, and live at pleasure, with the exception of a by-work, that is, studying philosophy, —if indeed they propose to live happy, and,

when they die, possess in the other world, a destiny suited to the life which they have led in this.

Adeimantus/ How truly do I think, Socrates, that you speak with ready zeal: —I think, however, that most of your hearers will still more zealously oppose you, and by no means be persuaded, and Thrasymachus even first.

Socrates/ Do not divide Thrasymachus and me, who are now become friends, though not enemies heretofore; for we will not at all relax our efforts, till we either persuade both him and the rest, or make some advances towards that life, on attaining which they will again meet with such discourses as these.

Adeimantus/ You have spoken, only for a short time.

Socrates/ No time at all, as compared at least with the whole of time: but that the multitude are not persuaded by what is said, is no wonder; for they have never as yet seen that what was mentioned actually came to pass, but rather that they were certain mere words cleverly fitted to each other, and not as now coming out spontaneously: —and as regards the man, who is, as completely as possible, squared and made consistent with virtue both in word and deed, holding power in a state of such different character; they have never at all seen either one or more of the kind: —do you think they have?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ And again, as respects arguments, my excellent friend, they have not sufficiently listened to what are fair and liberal, such as persevere in the search for truth, by every method, for the mere sake of knowledge, saluting at a distance such intricate and contentious questions, as tend only to opinion and strife, either in their law-courts or private meetings.

Adeimantus/ Not even as respects these.

Socrates/ On these accounts then, and foreseeing these things, we, although with fear, still asserted compelled by truth, that neither state nor government, nor even a man in the same way, could ever become perfect, till some need of fortune should compel those few philosophers, who at present are termed not depraved but useless, to take the government of the state, whether they will or not, and oblige it to be obedient to them; or till the sons of those who are now in high offices and magistracies, or they themselves, be by some divine inspiration filled with a true love of sincere philosophy: and I am sure that no one can reasonably suppose either or both of these to be impossible; for thus might we justly be derided, as saying things which otherwise are only like wishes: —is it not so?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ If then, in the infinite series of past ages, absolute necessity has compelled men who have reached the summit of philosophy to take the government of a state, — or even if such is now the case in some barbarous region, remote from our observation, or is likely to be the case hereafter, we are ready, in that case, to advance in argument, that this form of government just described has existed and now exists in possibility, and will actually arise, when this our muse shall obtain the government of the state: for this is neither impossible to happen, nor do we speak of impossibilities, though we ourselves confess that they are difficult.

Adeimantus/ I too, am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ But you will say, that the multitude are not of that opinion?

Adeimantus/ Very likely.

Socrates/ My excellent friend, do not thus altogether condemn the multitude; and do not upbraid them for their

opinion, but rather encourage them, —remove the reproach thrown on philosophy, —and point out to them the persons you call philosophers, defining distinctly, as at present, both their genius and pursuits, that they may not think that you speak of such as they themselves call philosophers. —Indeed, if they talk of the same men, will you not say that they have conceived a different opinion of the men from what you have, and give very different replies from yours; and think you that one man can be angered at another, who is not angry himself; or that a man will envy the envious, who is himself free from envy, and of a gentle temper? I will anticipate you by saying, that I think some few, though not the great mass of mankind, have naturally so bad a temper as you have described.

Adeimantus/ I am quite of that opinion also.

Socrates/ Are you then of my opinion in this also, —namely, that, as regards the ill-feeling of the populace towards philosophy, those people from without, *i.e.* the sophists, are the real cause of it, by making an indecent and turbulent irruption thereinto, insulting and showing a downright hatred of philosophers, ever directing their discourses at particular men, and so doing what least of all becomes philosophy?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ In fact, Adimantus, the man who really applies his intellect to reflect on true being, probably has no leisure to look down on the little affairs of mankind, and by fighting with them, become filled with envy and ill-nature; but on the other hand, beholding and contemplating objects that are orderly, always self-consistent and stable, such as neither injure nor are injured by each other, but are in all respects beautiful and consonant with reason, these he imitates and resembles as far as possible: —what, think you it at all

possible, that a man will not imitate what he admires as soon as he is conversant therewith?

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ The philosopher then, who is occupied with what is divine and orderly, becomes himself divine and orderly, as far as lies in man's power: —yet in all there is great room for blame.

Adeimantus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ If then, he should be any how compelled to try to introduce among men what he beholds there in his world of contemplation, with a view of forming their manners, both in private and public, and not merely to form himself alone, —would he prove, think you, a bad artist, in the matter of temperance and justice and every civil virtue?

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ But, supposing that the multitude should perceive that we are speaking the truth about him, *i.e.* the philosopher, will they be angry at philosophers and discredit our assertion, that the state can never otherwise be happy, except as portrayed by painters who employ a divine pattern?

Adeimantus/ They will not be angry, if they do perceive it: but what method of painting do you mean?

Socrates/ When they have got for their groundwork, the state and manners of mankind, they would first make them pure, which is not altogether an easy matter; for you know, that in this they differ from others, —in being unwilling to meddle either with a private man or state, or to prescribe laws, till they have either received them as pure, or themselves have made them so.

Adeimantus/ Rightly too.

Socrates/ And after this, think you not they will draw a sketch of their form of government?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Afterwards, I think, as they proceed in their work, they will frequently look in two directions, —not only to what is naturally just and beautiful, and temperate and the like, but also, again, to that which they can establish among mankind, blending and compounding their human form out of different human characters and pursuits, drawing from what Homer calls the divine likeness, and the divine resemblance subsisting among men?

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ They will, of course, I think, erase one thing, and put in another, till they have, as far as possible, made human morals pleasing to the gods?

Adeimantus/ At that rate, the picture will be most beautiful.

Socrates/ In this case, do we at all succeed in persuading these men, who, you said, were coming upon us in battle-array, that a person who can thus depict governments is the man we then recommended to them, —and on whose account they were angry with us, for committing to him our states: —and will they now be more mild, when they hear our mention thereof?

Adeimantus/ Certainly, if they be wise: —for what is there now, that they can further question?

Socrates/ Will they assert that philosophers are not lovers of real being and truth?

Adeimantus/ That, were absurd.

Socrates/ Or that their disposition, as just described, is not allied to what is best?

Adeimantus/ Nor this either.

Socrates/ What then; —will not a disposition such as we have described, by finding suitable employments, become perfectly good and philosophic, if any other be so; —will men say that those more attain to it, whom we have selected?

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Will they still then be indignant at us for saying, that until the philosophic race have the government of the state, the miseries neither of state nor citizens can have an end, nor can this government, which we ideally describe, be ever perfectly realized?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps somewhat less indignant.

Socrates/ Is it your wish, then, that we say—not that they are somewhat less indignant, but that they have become altogether mild, and are persuaded, that they will at least consent, if no more, through very shame?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Let them then, be persuaded of this: —and is there anyone who will dispute this, —that men of a philosophic disposition do not usually spring from kings and sovereigns?

Adeimantus/ No one, would assert that.

Socrates/ And though they be born of such a character, one may say they are necessarily prone to be corrupted; for indeed, it is a hard matter for them to be preserved untainted, even we ourselves agree; —but will anyone contend throughout all time, that not one of the whole human race, would be preserved pure and untainted?

Adeimantus/ How can there be?

Socrates/ But surely, any individual born with adequate abilities, and who has his state in obedience to him, can accomplish everything now so much disbelieved?

Adeimantus/ Yes, for he is adequate to his task.

Socrates/ And when the governor, establishes the laws and customs here detailed, it is not at all impossible for him to make the citizens willingly obey him?

Adeimantus/ In no way whatever.

Socrates/ But is it wonderful or impossible, that what is our opinion should be the opinion of others also?

Adeimantus/ I, at least, do not think so.

Socrates/ And that these things are best, if they be possible, we have, I think, sufficiently explained in the former part of our discourse.

Adeimantus/ Yes, quite sufficiently.

Socrates/ Now then, it seems, we are agreed about our legislation; that the laws we mention are the best, if they could be realized, —and that if it be hard to establish them, yet it is not impossible?

Adeimantus/ Yes, —we are agreed.

Socrates/ Since this then has been with difficulty brought to a conclusion, shall we not next consider what remains; — in what manner, and in consequence of what sciences and pursuits, they will become installed as the preservers of the government, and at what periods of life they will all apply to their several pursuits?

Adeimantus/ Aye, we must talk of this.

Socrates/ My cunning has done me no service, in having left untouched, in the former part of our discourse, the difficulty attending the possession of women, and the procreation of children, and the establishment of governors, knowing how invidious the business is, and full of difficulty, even though it be perfectly true and correct: —for we are now under no less a compulsion of entering into these details. — What relates to women and children has already been brought to a close; and as to what concerns the governors,

we must now from the beginning reconsider that subject. —We have alleged, if you remember, that they should appear to be lovers of the state, —proved to be so both by pleasures and pains, and not seen to abandon this principle, either through toils or fears or any other change; and that he who cannot do this should be rejected; while as for him who comes forth altogether pure, as gold tried in the fire, we should appoint him ruler, and endow him with honors and rewards both during life and after death. Such was what we said, when our argument was wandering and assuming a veil, through fear of disturbing the present state of things.

Adeimantus/ You speak quite truly; —for I remember it.

Socrates/ Yes, —for I was loath, to say, my friend, what I must now venture to assert: —but now this assertion must at any rate be ventured, —that the most perfect guardians must be established philosophers.

Adeimantus/ Yes, —that has been stated.

Socrates/ But consider, I pray, that you will probably have only a few of these; for such a disposition, as we declared that they must necessarily have, is but rarely used to center in one single individual; though its different parts are commonly found in many different persons.

Adeimantus/ How say you?

Socrates/ That such as learn with facility, have a good memory, are sagacious and acute, and endued with all qualifications thereto allied, are yet not at the same time of so vigorous and lofty an intellect, as to live orderly, with calmness and constancy, but are carried happenchance by mere buoyancy of spirits, and are deserted by everything like stability.

Adeimantus/ Your remark is true.

Socrates/ Well then, these firm habits of the mind, which are not easily changeable, and which one might specially

employ as trusty, and which in time of war are hard to be excited to terror; —and similarly also as regards learning, —they move heavily, and learn with difficulty, as if benumbed, and oppressed with sleep and yawning, when compelled to labor at any work of this description?

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ But we said, that he ought to have a good and fair share of both these, or else should have no share whatever either in the most perfect kind of education, or in magisterial dignities or state-honors?

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ Do not you think then, that this will but rarely happen?

Adeimantus/ Of course it will.

Socrates/ They must be tried then both in what we before alluded to, —labors, fears, and pleasures; —and likewise in what we then passed over, and are now mentioning; —we must exercise them in various kinds of learning, with due regard for the power of their talents to go through the highest branches of study, or else their failure, as that of persons failing in all other things.

Adeimantus/ It is fit now, that we consider this question in this manner: —but what kind of studies are they, which you call the highest?

Socrates/ You remember, perhaps, that when we divided the soul into three parts, we defined the nature respectively of justice, temperance, fortitude, and wisdom?

Adeimantus/ If I did not remember, I should have no right to hear what remains.

Socrates/ Do you remember likewise what was said before that?

Adeimantus/ What was it?

Socrates/ We somewhere said, that it was possible to behold these in their most beautiful forms, but that the journey would be tedious, which a person must make, who would see them clearly; yet that it was possible, to approach them through our proofs before mentioned, and you said also, that these were sufficient; so, what was then asserted fell in my opinion far short of the truth; though if agreeable to you, you may say so.

Adeimantus/ I at least thought, that they had been discussed in fair measure; and the rest seemed to think so too.

Socrates/ But my friend, in speaking of things of this kind, such a measure as omits any part whatever of the truth is not wholly in measure; —for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything; —though people sometimes think that things are sufficiently well when thus circumstanced, and there is no need for further inquiry.

Adeimantus/ Very many, thus behave through indolence.

Socrates/ But the guardian of the state and the laws, should least of all be thus affected.

Adeimantus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Such an one, then, my friend, must make a more comprehensive circuit, and labor as much in learning as in exercising himself: otherwise, as we were just saying, he will never arrive at the summit of the greatest and most suitable learning.

Adeimantus/ But are not these branches the highest: —or is there, anyone yet higher than justice, and those virtues which we have discussed?

Socrates/ There is something greater; and even of these we must not, as just now, only contemplate the mere rude sketch; but we must not omit even its complete elaboration: is it not ridiculous in other things of small moment to employ

our whole labor, and strive to attain the utmost accuracy and perfection, and yet not deem the highest and most important affairs worthy of our highest attention, with a view to making them as perfect as possible?

Adeimantus/ The sentiment, is very just: —but with respect to the question, —what is this most important branch of study, and about what you say it is employed, —think you that anyone will let you go without asking its nature?

Socrates/ Not at all: —but do you ask; although you have assuredly often heard it, but at present you do not bear it in mind, or else intend to embarrass me by raising objections: —and I think this the more, as you have often heard at least, that the idea of the good is the highest branch of study; —about which, when justice and the other virtues employ themselves, they then become useful and advantageous. —Now then, you know pretty well that I mean to say this, and besides, that we do not sufficiently know that idea; and without this knowledge, though we were to understand everything else as fully as possible, yet you know that it could be of no service whatever to us: in the same manner as no possession whatever would be of aught avail, without the possession of the good: —and think you that it is more profitable to possess all things without the possession of the good than to know all things without the knowledge of the good, having no perception at all of the beautiful and good?

Adeimantus/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Of this, moreover, you may be quite certain, that to the multitude pleasure seems to be the good, while the more refined think it to be virtue.

Adeimantus/ How otherwise?

Socrates/ And you know also, my friend, that those who hold this opinion, are unable to show what knowledge is, but are compelled at last to call it the knowledge of the good.

Adeimantus/ Aye, and most absurdly too.

Socrates/ How indeed can it be otherwise, if when upbraiding us for not knowing the good, they yet speak as to persons knowing it, and say that knowledge is good itself, as if we understood their meaning when pronouncing the word “the good?

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But what? those who define pleasure to be good, are they less in error than the others; or are not these too compelled to confess that pleasures are evil?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ It happens then, I think, that they acknowledge the same things to be both good and evil, —do they not?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Is it not clear, then, that on this point there are great and manifold varieties of opinion?

Adeimantus/ Of course there are.

Socrates/ But what; —is it not clear also, that with reference to things just and beautiful, the multitude choose what is apparent, even though it has no real existence, yet acting and possessing and appearing to possess it; —though the acquisition of only apparent goods, never yet satisfied anyone: —for people on the other hand seek what is real, and all men despise what is only apparent?

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ This then is what every soul pursues, and for the sake of which it does everything, conjecturing it to be something, though still in doubt, and unable either fully to comprehend its nature, or employ belief alone respecting it

as of other things; and hence is it, that they fail of success even in other matters however useful. —Are we to say then, that about a matter of this nature, and of such vast consequence, even the best men in the state, to whom we commit the management of all things, will be thus in the dark?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ I am of opinion then, that the just and the beautiful, so long as they are unknown in what particular way they are good, cannot be of any great importance to have a guardian who is ignorant of this; and I suspect that no one will before this attain a sufficient knowledge thereof.

Adeimantus/ Yes, —you guess rightly.

Socrates/ Will not our government, therefore, have been completely set in order, if a guardian be set over it that is scientifically acquainted with these things?

Adeimantus/ It must of necessity: —but yet with respect to yourself, Socrates, say you that the good is science, or pleasure, or something independent of these?

Socrates/ Oh, you fine fellow, you long ago, clearly showed that you were not to be satisfied with other men's opinions about these matters.

Adeimantus/ Nor does it seem to me just, Socrates, that a man should keep talking of other men's opinions, and not his own, after having spent so much time in inquiring about these particulars.

Socrates/ But what; —do you think it just then, that a man should talk about matters of which he is ignorant, just as if he knew them?

Adeimantus/ By no means as if he knew them; yet, according to his thoughts, whatever he thinks he should willingly tell us.

Socrates/ But what; —have you not observed respecting unscientific opinions, how contemptible they all are, and the best of them blind; —and think you, that these persons, who without intellect form true opinions, are at all different from blind men walking on the right road?

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Do you wish, then, that we should contemplate things base, blind, and crooked, when it is in our power to hear from others what is clear and beautiful?

Glaucon/ By Zeus, Socrates, do not stop here, as if you had come to a close; for we shall be satisfied, if, in the same way as you have spoken of justice, temperance, and the other virtues, you will in like manner discourse of the good.

Socrates/ And I too shall be very well satisfied, my friend; but I am afraid that I shall not be able, and so, by my readiness may incur the ridicule of unmannerly persons. —But, my excellent friends, let us at present dismiss this inquiry about the nature of the good, for it seems to me more, as far as I now think, than we can attain, in our present attempt: but I am willing to tell you, if you please, what I conceive to be the offspring of the good, and its nearest representation; and if not, I shall dismiss it.

Glaucon/ Well then, tell us; for you shall afterwards acquit yourself of your debt by telling us of its parent.

Socrates/ I could wish, both that I were able to oblige you by explaining that, and not as now the offspring only and interest of my debt. This child and offspring of the good itself, pray receive; —but still take due care that I deceive you nowise unwillingly by paying my account of this offspring in base coin.

Glaucon/ We will take care of that, as far as we can: —only do you tell us.

Socrates/ I will then, when we are once thoroughly agreed, and I have reminded you of what was before mentioned, and has been often said on other occasions.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ That there are many things beautiful, and many good also; and each of these we declare to be so, and so define them in our argument.

Glaucon/ Yes, so we say.

Socrates/ But as to the beautiful itself and the good itself, and similarly as to all those things which we then considered as of various natures, we are now again establishing them according to the unity of the general idea, to which we conceive each related; and these indeed, we say, are observed by the eye, but are not objects of intellectual perception; whereas the ideas are perceived by the intellect, not seen by the eye.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ By what part then of ourselves do we see things visible?

Glaucon/ By the sight.

Socrates/ And is it not, by hearing, that we perceive what is heard; and by the other senses, all the other objects of sense?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But have you not perceived, as regards the artificer of the senses, with what perfect skill he has formed the power of seeing, and being seen?

Glaucon/ Not quite.

Socrates/ But consider it thus: —is there a third kind of faculty required by the hearing and voice, in order that the one may hear and the other be heard, in the absence of which the one will not hear, and the other not be heard?

Glaucon/ There is not.

Socrates/ I conceive, that many others also not to say, none at all require no such thing: —can you name anyone that does?

Glaucon/ Not I.

Socrates/ But with reference to the sense of seeing and the object of sight, do you not perceive that they require something?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ When there is sight in the eyes, and when he who has it attempts to use it, and when there is color in the objects before him, unless there concur some third kind of medium naturally formed for the purpose, —the sight, you are aware, will see nothing, and colors will be invisible.

Glaucon/ What is this of which you are now speaking?

Socrates/ What you call light.

Glaucon/ Your remark is true.

Socrates/ This sense of seeing then, and power of being seen, are no unimportant ideas, and are connected by a bond more precious than all other bonds, if light be not valueless.

Glaucon/ But it is far, from being valueless.

Socrates/ Whom then of the gods in heaven can you assign as the cause of this, —that light makes our sight to see, and visible objects to be seen, in the best manner?

Glaucon/ The same, as you and others do; for it is evident that you mean the sun.

Socrates/ Does not sight then derive its nature through its relation to this god?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ The sight is not the sun, nor is that the sun, in which sight is engendered, —which we call the eye.

Glaucon/ It is not.

Socrates/ But yet, methinks, this at least of all the organs of sense is most sun-like?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And the power which it possesses, does it not possess, as dispensed and emanating hence?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is not the sun then, though not sight itself, but the principle thereof, seen by sight itself?

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ This then, be assured, is what I called the offspring of the good, which the good generates, analogous to itself; and what this is in the sphere of intelligence, with reference to intellect, and the objects of intellect, that the sun is in the visible world with reference to sight and visible things.

Glaucon/ How is that pray further explain it.

Socrates/ You are aware, that the eyes, when directed towards objects, whose colors are no longer visited by the light of day, but by the glimmerings of the night, grow dim and appear almost blind, as if they had in them no pure vision.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But when they turn to objects which the sun illuminates, then, methinks, they see clearly, and in those very eyes there now appears vision.

Glaucon/ There does.

Socrates/ Understand the same, then, to be the case with reference to the soul. —When it firmly adheres to what is enlightened by truth and real being, then it understands and knows it, and appears to possess intellect; but when it adheres to what is blended with darkness, and is subject to

generation and destruction, it then has to do with opinion, and is dull, wandering from one opinion to another, like one without intellect.

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ That therefore which imparts truth to what is known, and dispenses the faculty of knowledge to him who knows, you may call the idea of the good and the principle of science and truth, as being known through intellect. And as both these, —knowledge and truth, are so beautiful, you will be right in thinking that the good is something different, and still more beautiful than these. Science and truth here are as light and sight there, which we rightly judged to be sun-like, but yet did not think them to be the sun: —so here it is right to hold, that both of them partake of the form of the good, —but yet not right to suppose that either of them is the good, inasmuch as the good itself is worthy of still greater honor.

Glaucon/ You speak, of some inestimable idea of "the beautiful," which exhibits science and truth, and yet is itself their superior in beauty; —for you have nowhere said, that it was pleasure.

Socrates/ Hope better things; but thus rather consider its image still further.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ You will say, I think, that the sun imparts to things which are seen, not only their visibility, but likewise their generation, growth, and nourishment, though not itself generation?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ We may say, therefore, as to things cognizable by the intellect, that they become cognizable not only from *the good*, by which they are known, but likewise that their being and essence are thence derived, while the good itself

is not essence, but beyond essence, and superior to both in dignity and power.

—Here Glaucon, heartily laughing, said;

Glaucon/ By Apollo, here is a marvelous transcendency! You yourself, are the cause of it, by compelling me to relate what I think about it. And by no means stop, unless there be some cause; from again discussing the analogy about the sun, if you have omitted anything.

Socrates/ Aye, I have omitted many things.

Glaucon/ Ah, but, pray do not omit the smallest particular.

Socrates/ I think, that much will be omitted: yet, as far as I can at present, I will not willingly omit anything.

Glaucon/ Do not.

Socrates/ Understand then, that we allege these to be two; ruling—the one over the intelligible genus and place, and the other over the visible world, —not to say the heavens, lest I should seem to you to employ a sophistical expression: you understand then these two descriptions of being, —the visible and intelligible?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Supposing now you to take a line cut into two equal sections, then again cut each part according to the same ratio, both that of the visible and that of the intelligible species, you will then have them placed in contrast with each other, either in clearness or obscurity, —the second section in the visible species being images. Now images I call, in the first place, shadows, —in the next, appearances in water, and such as subsist in opaque, polished and bright bodies, and all such-like representations, if you understand me.

Glaucon/ Yes, I understand.

Socrates/ Consider now the other section of the visible which this resembles, —the animals around us, and all kinds of plants, and everything of an artificial nature.

Glaucon/ I do consider it.

Socrates/ Do you wish to assert, then, that this section is divided by truth and its opposite; —and just as the objects of opinion are opposed to the objects of true knowledge, so also that which is compared as opposed to that with which it is compared?

Glaucon/ Aye, indeed: I am quite willing.

Socrates/ Consider once more about this section of the intelligible, how it is to be effected.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ That with respect to one part thereof, the soul uses the former sections as images, and is compelled to investigate by means of hypothesis, not going back to first principles, but advancing onward to conclusions; and the other part, again, is that where the soul proceeds from hypothesis to an unhypothetical principle, and makes its way even without those images by means of the ideas themselves.

Glaucon/ What you now say, I do not fully understand.

Socrates/ Once more, —for you will more easily understand me, from what has been previously stated, —you are not unaware, methinks, that persons versed in geometry, and computations, and such-like, after laying down hypotheses of the odd and even, and figures, and three kinds of angles, and other similar matters, according to each method, proceed on them as known, after establishing them as mere hypotheses, and give no further reason about them, either to themselves or others, as being things obvious to all; —but, beginning with these, then directly discuss the rest, and end by meeting at the point where the inquiry set out?

Glaucon/ I know this, perfectly well.

Socrates/ And do you not likewise know that they use the visible species, and reason about them, not employing their intellect about these species, but about those of which they are the resemblances, arguing about the square itself, and the diameter itself, and not about what they describe; —and, so also, with reference to other particulars, those very things which they form and describe, among which are shadows and images in water, these they use as images, trying to behold those very things, which a man can only perceive by his intellect?

Glaucon/ You say true.

Socrates/ This then was what I meant by the idea of the intelligible; but I said also, that the soul was obliged to use hypotheses in its investigation, not going back to the principle, as though unable to ascend higher than hypotheses, and employed comparisons formed from things below, to lead to those above, as to clearly-seen objects of thought, distinct from the things themselves.

Glaucon/ I understand, that you are speaking of what concerns geometry and its sister arts.

Socrates/ By that other section of the intelligible, then, you must understand me to mean what reason itself attains by its dialectic faculty, forming hypotheses, not as principles, but really hypotheses, just like steps and starting-points, in order that by proceeding up to the unhypothetical, —that is, the principle of the universe, coming in contact therewith, and so again coming into union with what is united to it in principle, it may thus reach the end without making use of anything sensible, but only of ideas themselves, proceeding through some to others, and so ending in ideas.

Glaucon/ I understand, but not fully: —for I think you are talking of some difficult work: but I understand it is your wish to prove that knowledge obtained by dialectic science respecting real and intelligible being is clearer than that acquired by means of what are called arts, which take hypotheses for their first principles, and which those who contemplate must view with the understanding and not the perceptive faculties; whereas, through their inability to go back to first principles, and as they reason only from hypotheses, you think they do not exercise intellect νοῦν in these matters, much as they might become intelligible with some principle for a foundation: —-and as for understanding or reasoning, —that which we acquire through geometry and its kindred arts, and not pure reason, this is something lying between opinion and pure intellect.

Socrates/ You have fully understood me: —and understand me now, that analogous to these four branches of knowledge are four affections or faculties of the soul, —pure reasoning answering to the highest, —understanding or reasoning to the second, faith to the third, —conjecture to the last: —and so arrange them, as to assign to them respectively more or less of clearness, as they are more or less allied to truth.

Glaucon/ I understand, and quite agree; and so let us adopt your proposed arrangement.

THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

Book 7.

Socrates/ After this then, compare our nature as respects education, or the want thereof, to a condition such as follows: —Behold men, as it were, in an underground cave-like dwelling, having its entrance open towards the light and extending through the whole cave, —and within it persons, who from childhood upwards have had chains on their legs and their necks, so as, while abiding there, to have the power of looking forward only, but not to turn round their heads by reason of their chains, their light coming from a fire that burns above and afar off, and behind them; and between the fire and those in chains is a road above, along which one may see a little wall built along, just as the stages of conjurers are built before the people in whose presence they show their tricks.

Glaucon/ I see.

Socrates/ Behold then by the side of this little wall men carrying all sorts of machines rising above the wall, and statues of men and other animals wrought in stone, wood, and other materials, some of the bearers probably speaking, others proceeding in silence.

Glaucon/ You are proposing, a most absurd comparison and absurd captives also.

Socrates/ Such as resemble ourselves; —for think you that such as these would have seen anything else of themselves or one another except the shadows that fall from the fire on the opposite side of the cave?

Glaucon/ How can they, if indeed they be through life compelled to keep their heads unmoved?

Socrates/ But what respecting the things carried by them: —is not this the same?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ If then they had been able to talk with each other, do you not suppose they would think it right to give names to what they saw before them?

Glaucon/ Of course they would.

Socrates/ But if the prison had an echo on its opposite side, when any person present were to speak, think you they would imagine anything else addressed to them, except the shadow before them?

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ At all events then, such persons would deem truth to be nothing else but the shadows of exhibitions.

Glaucon/ Of course they would.

Socrates/ Let us inquire then, as to their liberation from captivity, and their cure from insanity, such as it may be, and whether such will naturally fall to their lot; —were a person let loose and obliged immediately to rise up, and turn round his neck and walk, and look upwards to the light, and doing all this still feel pained, and be disabled by the dazzling from seeing those things of which he formerly saw the shadows; —what would he say, think you, if anyone were to tell him that he formerly saw mere empty visions, but now saw more correctly, as being nearer to the real thing, and turned towards what was more real, and then, specially pointing out to him every individual passing thing, should question him, and oblige him, to answer respecting its nature: —think you not he would be embarrassed, and consider that what he before saw was truer than what was just exhibited?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Therefore, even if a person should compel him to look to the light itself, would he not have pain in his eyes and shun it, and then, turning to what he really could

behold, reckon these as really more clear than what had been previously pointed out?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But if, a person should forcibly drag him thence through a rugged and steep ascent without stopping, till he dragged him to the light of the sun, would he not while thus drawn be in pain and indignation, and when he came to the light, having his eyes dazzled with the splendor, be unable to behold even anyone thing of what he had just alleged as true?

Glaucon/ No, he could not, at the moment at least.

Socrates/ He would require, at least then, to get some degree of practice, if he would see things above him: —and first, indeed, he would most easily perceive the shadows, and then the images of men and other animals in the water, and after that the things themselves; —and after this he would more easily behold the things in heaven, and heaven itself, by night, looking to the light of the stars and the moon, than after daylight to the sun and the light of the sun.

Glaucon/ How else?

Socrates/ Last of all, then, methinks, he might be able to perceive and contemplate the nature of the sun, not as respects its images in water or any other place, but itself by itself in its own proper station?

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And after this, he might reason with himself concerning the sun, that it is the body which gives us the seasons and years and administers everything in its stated place, being the cause also in a certain manner of all natural events.

Glaucon/ It is evident, after what has been formerly stated, that one must arrive at this conclusion.

Socrates/ What then, —when a man remembers his first habitation and the wisdom therein residing, and his fellow captives also, —think you not, that he would congratulate himself on the change and pity the rest?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And whatever honors and praises and rewards were assigned by mutual consent to him that had the most acute perception of the present, and the best recollection both of long past and recent events, and from such observations was best able to conjecture the future, —think you that he would desire such honors, or envy those honored by these, or possessing influence, or would not he rather experience what Homer says, and ardently desire

> As laborer, for some ignoble man
> To work for hire, —

and rather endure anything than entertain such opinions and live in such a manner?

Glaucon/ I think, that he would choose to suffer anything rather than live in that way.

Socrates/ And consider this, whether, in the case of such an one going down and again sitting in the same place, his eyes would not be blinded in consequence of coming so suddenly from the sun?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ As for those shadows again, if he were compelled to split straws and dispute about them with those persons who had been in constant captivity, while yet he was in darkness before the establishment of his sight, —and this time of getting habituated would not be short, —would he not excite ridicule; and would it not be said of him, that after having once ascended he had come back with his eyesight destroyed, and should not even try to ascend again; and as for anyone that attempted to liberate him and lead him up,

they ought to put him to death, if they could get him into their hands?

Glaucon/ Especially so.

Socrates/ As respects this image then, we must apply the whole of it to our preceding discourse; comparing the region that is seen by the eyes to the prison-habitation, and the light of the fire therein to the power of the sun; —and if you were to consider the ascent above, and the contemplation of things above as the soul's ascent into the region of intellect, you would not disappoint my expectations, since this it is which you desire to hear; —but God knows whether it be true. As respects appearances then, it thus seems, that in the subjects of human knowledge the idea of the good is the last object of vision, and hard to be seen; and when beheld it must be inferred from reason to be the cause of what is right and beautiful in all things, generating in what is visible, both light and its parent also, viz. the sun, while in that which is intelligible, it is itself the sovereign producing truth and intelligence; and it must be seen too by him that would act with judgment, either privately or in public.

Glaucon/ I too, am quite of your opinion, as far indeed as I can be.

Socrates/ Come then, agree on this point also; —and be not surprised that those who come here are unwilling to act in human affairs, but have their souls ever urged to dwell on things above; for it is surely reasonable it should be so, since these things take place according to the above-mentioned image.

Glaucon/ Aye, quite reasonable.

Socrates/ But what; —think you it at all surprising, that a man coming from divine contemplations to mere human woes, should appear awkward and extremely ridiculous, while he is yet dazzled, —and when, ere being used to the

present darkness, he is obliged to contend in courts of law or elsewhere about the shadows of justice, or the statues of which they are the shadows, and then to dispute how these matters are apprehended by those who have never contemplated justice itself?

Glaucon/ No wonder this.

Socrates/ Nay, if a man has intelligence, he will be conscious, that there are two disturbances of vision arising from two causes, —viz., when we turn from light into darkness and from darkness into light; —and when a man thinks that the same takes place with reference to the soul likewise, when it beholds him disturbed and unable to realize its perceptions, he will not laugh immoderately, but rather consider whether the soul has come out of a more brilliant existence and is now darkened by ignorance, or else emerging out of gross ignorance into a more luminous existence, be overpowered by dazzling splendor; —and thus he will congratulate the former on its life and destiny, while he pities the life and destiny of the other; and even if he wished to laugh at it, his laughter will be less ridiculous than if it were directed to the soul which comes from light into darkness.

Glaucon/ Your remark is perfectly reasonable.

Socrates/ It is fit then, if these things be true, that we form such an opinion as this respecting them, —that education is not of that character which some persons announce it to be, when they somehow assert that, there is no science in the soul, but that they can implant it just as if they implanted sight in the eyes of the blind.

Glaucon/ Aye, they say so.

Socrates/ Our present argument however, shows this power to reside in the soul of every person, and to be the organ by which everyone learns. —Just as the eye cannot

turn otherwise than with the whole body from darkness to the light, so also one must turn with the whole soul from sensible objects until it has become able to endure the contemplation of what is real, and what is most apparent of the real, and this we term *the good*: do we not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ It will be the art then of this very person, in turning about, to contrive this; namely, how he may turn with the greatest ease and advantage, not for the sake of implanting sight in him, but viewing him as already possessing it, though not rightly turned, and not looking in the right direction?

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ The other virtues of the soul, as they are called, seem to me somewhat like those of the body; for in fact those not before contained therein are afterwards engendered by custom and practice: —but the faculty of intellect possesses, it seems, a nature somewhat more god-like than all the rest; —never losing its power, but by exertion becoming useful and profitable, —by the opposite, useless and hurtful. Have you never yet observed of those that are termed wicked yet clever, —how sharply the little soul looks, acutely distinguishing all to which it is turned, having indeed no contemptible power of vision, but compelled to be so far the servant of wickedness, that in proportion as its vision is more acute, the more crime it perpetrates?

Glaucon/ Quite so, of course.

Socrates/ As regards this part of such a disposition, if from childhood upwards it should be stripped and cut off from what belongs to human production, as from leaden weights, —which have a relation to feastings, and pleasures, and lusts, that turn the sight of the soul to things downward; —if the soul can free itself and turn towards truth, the very

same principle in the same individuals would as acutely see those things as the objects to which it is now turned.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What then, is not this probable, and a necessary consequence of what has just been stated, that those who are untaught and inexperienced in truth can never exercise a sufficient superintendence over the state, nor yet those who are allowed to spend the whole of their time in philosophical pursuits, —the former, because they have no single object in life, towards which they should direct all their actions both private and public, —and the latter, because, as far as their will is concerned, they will not engage in public life, from the idea that even while yet living they have been transported to the islands of the blessed?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ It is our business then, to compel those of the inhabitants, who possess the greatest talent, to devote themselves to that learning which we formerly considered most important, both to contemplate the good and go in search of it; —and when they have gained it, and taken a sufficient view thereof, yet they are not to be allowed what is now allowed them.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ To abide there, and show an unwillingness to descend again to those captives of whom we were speaking, or share with them both their labors and honors, whether trifling or more important.

Glaucon/ In that case, are we to do them injustice, and make them live a worse life, when they could have lived a better?

Socrates/ You have forgotten again, that this is not the lawgivers concern, how anyone class in a state may be especially happy, but to contrive rather that happiness shall

be generated throughout the state, uniting the citizens both by persuasion and compulsion, making them share each other's services, such as they can confer on the community at large; and when he introduces such men as these into the state, he does so, not that he may dismiss them and let them turn whichever way each likes, but that he may employ them as a bond of the state.

Glaucon/ True indeed, for I had forgotten that.

Socrates/ Anxiously consider then, Glaucon, that we must do no injustice to the philosophers born among us, but tell them what is just, when we compel them to take charge of and guard the remainder: —for we will assert, that those who in all other states become such philosophers, do not probably take a share in the labors going on therein, as they spring up of their own accord without the consent of the government in each; and it is just that what is voluntary, inasmuch as it owes its nurture to none, should willingly pay no one the price of its nurture; —but as for you, we brought into being both yourselves and the rest of the state, as leaders and kings in beehives, brought up better and more perfectly than the others, and better able to take a share in both public life and philosophical pursuits. Each must then in turn descend to the dwelling of the rest, and accustom himself to behold obscure objects; for, when once used to them, you will perceive the individual images of each, what they are and whence sprung, ten thousand times better from having already seen the truth concerning what is beautiful, and just, and good: —and thus the state will be settled as a real vision, both by us and yourselves, and not as a dream, like most of those inhabited by persons fighting about shadows, and quarrelling about government, as if it were some great good. —The truth, however, is as follows: in whatever state those about to rule are least anxious to take the government, this must necessarily be the best and most

peacefully governed, while one that has governors of an opposite character, must of course be the opposite.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Think you then, that those under our charge, when they hear these things, will disobey us, and be unwilling to take their individual share in the labors of the state, and spend the greater part of their time with one another in a state of leisure?

Glaucon/ Impossible; —for we will prescribe what is just to just men, and each of them will enter on his office from this consideration above all others, that he should act in a manner directly contrary from those who now govern individual states.

Socrates/ Yes, for so it is, my friend; —if you find the life of those appointed to official stations superior to the dignity of their office, then your state may possibly be well settled; as in that alone will the really wealthy govern, —not those rich in gold, but as happy men should be rich, in a life of virtue and good sense; —whereas, should they be poor, and destitute of property of their own, and then come into public life, thinking that they ought to plunder the public of its property, it is not possible that such a state can be rightly settled: —for as the contest is about the possession of the ruling power, such a war being domestic and intestine, is destructive to themselves as well as the rest of the state.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Do you conceive then that any other kind of life despises political offices except that of true philosophy?

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But still it is fitting, at least, that those should enter upon it who are not fond of governing, otherwise the rivals will fight about it.

Glaucon/ Of course, it cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ Whom else, then, would you compel to enter on the guardianship of a state, except such as are most intelligent in what concerns the best establishment of a state, and possess other honors, and a mode of life superior to that of a mere politician?

Glaucon/ None other.

Socrates/ Do you wish, then, that we should now consider this, —in what manner such persons will be produced and how anyone can draw them upward into light, just as some are said to have ascended from Hades to the gods?

Glaucon/ Of course that is my wish.

Socrates/ This then, as it seems, is not a mere turning of a die, but a movement of the soul, which ascends from some half-night kind of day to the true light of existence, which we will term true philosophy.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Ought we not, then, to inquire what branch of learning possesses this influence?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ What then, Glaucon, may that training of the soul be, which draws it from what is generated and unstable towards that which has a positive existence? And talking of this, I am reminded: —did we not say that it is necessary for these persons even while young to engage in warlike exercises?

Glaucon/ We did say so.

Socrates/ We should add this, then, to the training which we are now seeking.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ That of not being useless to military men.

Glaucon/ Aye, we must indeed, if it be possible.

Socrates/ Moreover, in our former discourse, we somewhere said we would have them taught gymnastics and music.

Glaucon/ We did so.

Socrates/ The art of gymnastics has to do, I think, with what is unstable and perishable; for it presides over corporeal growth and decrease.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ This then cannot be the branch of study, of which we are in pursuit.

Glaucon/ It cannot.

Socrates/ Is it music then, such as we have previously described?

Glaucon/ That, if you remember, corresponded to gymnastics, as it trains the habits of the guardians, giving them a sort of concord founded on harmony—not science, —and good rhythm on the principles of rhythm, and other things in discourses which are akin to these both in such as are fabulous and such as more resemble truth; but as to its being a branch of science that refers to a good such as you are now investigating, music had no such character.

Socrates/ Most correctly, do you remind me; for it is in reality no such thing: but, excellent Glaucon, what branch of science is it, that possesses this character? —for all the arts somehow seem to be mechanical and illiberal.

Glaucon/ Of course; —and moreover what other branch of science is there, that is distinct from music, gymnastics, and the arts?

Socrates/ Come, if we cannot conceive any except these, let us take one of those which extends over all.

Glaucon/ Of what kind is that?

Socrates/ Such as this common idea which all arts, and intellects, and sciences employ, and which every person must learn at the outset.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ This trifling matter; —how to distinguish one, and two, and three, which I call in general terms arithmetic and computation: —is it not thus as regards these, that every art and science must necessarily have a share in these?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ Must not then the art of war?

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ What a ridiculous general then, does Palamedes in his tragedies constantly represent Agamemnon to be. —And have you not observed how he says, that after inventing numeration he adjusted the ranks at Ilium, and numbered the ships and the rest of the forces, as if they had never been numbered before, even when Agamemnon, as it seems, did not know how many feet he had, since he did not know how to count; —what kind of a general would you think him to be?

Glaucon/ I should think him a mighty absurd one, if this be true.

Socrates/ Shall we not say, then, that the power of computing and reckoning is a necessary attainment for a military man?

Glaucon/ Most certainly, if he intends to understand anything at all about marshalling troops, —or rather, if he means to be a man.

Socrates/ Do you then understand, about this branch of learning just what I do?

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ It seems in its nature to be among the number of those things which lead to pure reason—of which indeed we are in search; but no one seems rightly to employ it, as evidently leading the mind to the consideration of true being.

Glaucon/ How say you?

Socrates/ I will at least, try, to explain what is my opinion. —As to what I distinguish in my own mind as leading or not leading whither we are saying, viz., to true being, do you assist me in contemplating them, and either agree or dissent, so that we may more distinctly see whether they be such as I conjecture.

Glaucon/ Pray show me.

Socrates/ I will show you then, if you will observe that some things relating to the perceptions do not invite intellect to the inquiry, as being sufficiently determined by perception; while there are other things which by all means bid its interference, as perception alone does nothing correct.

Glaucon/ You are evidently speaking, of objects seen at a distance, and things sketched in a picture.

Socrates/ You have not quite comprehended my meaning.

Glaucon/ What are you speaking of then?

Socrates/ There are some things, which do not appeal to the intellect, and yet do not issue at once into a contrary perception; while those that do so issue I consider as so appealing, when the perceptive faculty takes cognizance of one thing more than another, on meeting it either near or afar off. —And you will thus more clearly know what I mean: these we say are three fingers, the little finger, the next to it, and the middle finger.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Consider me then to speak of them as seen only from a short distance, and consider this also, respecting them.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Each of them appears equally to be a finger, and so far it makes no difference whether one looks at the middle one or the last, whether it be white or black, thick or slender, or anything of the kind; for in all these the soul of man is not compelled to ask the intellect what of many things a finger is, for sight itself never at the same time indicates a finger to be a finger, and its contrary.

Glaucon/ Of course not.

Socrates/ It is probable, then, that such a case as this would neither appeal to nor rouse the intellect.

Glaucon/ Probably.

Socrates/ But what then; —does the sight sufficiently distinguish their large or small size, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them be placed in the middle or at the end? —And so in like manner does the sense of touch take cognizance of thickness and slenderness, softness and hardness? —And as for the other perceptions, are they not defective in showing such things, or rather does not each of them so act; and first of all, is not the sense which is affected by hardness necessarily also affected by softness, and does it not, when it perceives this, announce to the soul, that hard and soft are one and the same thing?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ It must necessarily follow then, that in such matters, the soul will be in doubt as to what the perception indicates as hard, since it calls the same thing soft also; —and so also as regards the sense referring to light and heavy, the soul must be in doubt what is light and what is heavy, if the sense intimates heavy to be light, and light heavy?

Glaucon/ These at least, are truly absurd reports made to the soul, and require investigation.

Socrates/ Probably then, in such cases as these the soul would first call in reason and intelligence to investigate the question whether the things reported be one or whether they be two.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ If then they appeared to be two, each of them will appear to be one and distinct from the other?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ If then each of them be one and both of them two, he will understand them to be two distinct; for, were they not distinct, he would not perceive two, but only one.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ The sight, moreover, we say, could contemplate what is great and small, though not as distinct from each other, but as somewhat confused: —could it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But for the sake of clearness in this matter, the intellect is once more obliged to consider great and small, not as confused, but as distinct in an opposite way from the other, —viz., the sense of sight.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And is it not hence somehow, that it first sets on questioning us, as to what is the great and what is the small?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And thus then we call the one intelligible, and the other visible.

Glaucon/ Very right.

Socrates/ This then is what I just now attempted to express, that some things appeal to the intellect and others

not; defining those that make such an appeal, as what affect the senses at the same time as their opposites, while such as do not, do not excite the intellect.

Glaucon/ I quite understand now; and I am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ What then; —to which of them, think you, do number and unity belong?

Glaucon/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ But let us reason by analogy, from what we have already said: —for if unity can be sufficiently seen of itself, or comprehended by any other sense, it still would not lead to true being, just as we remarked about the finger: —but if there be always seen at the same time an exact opposite thereto, so that it shall no more appear unity than it does the contrary, someone would then be wanted to judge respecting it; and in that very matter the soul would necessarily be in difficulty, exciting reflection within itself, and would inquire into the nature of this same unity, and thus that branch of science which concerns unity would be among those which lead and turn the soul to the contemplation of real being.

Glaucon/ Ah; —this is what the very sight of it does in no small degree; for we at once behold the same thing, both as one and as an infinite multitude.

Socrates/ If then, unity be thus affected, will not number generally be so likewise?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Yet, again, all computation and arithmetic concern number?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But these at least seem to lead towards truth?

Glaucon/ Especially so, of course.

Socrates/ They belong then, it seems, to the branches of learning which we are now investigating; —for a military man must necessarily learn them with a view to the marshalling of his troops, and so must a philosopher with the view of understanding real being, after having emerged from the unstable condition of becoming, or else he can never become an apt reasoner.

Glaucon/ That is the fact.

Socrates/ But that guardian of ours happens to be both a military man and a philosopher?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably so.

Socrates/ It would be proper then, Glaucon, to lay down laws for this branch of science and persuade those about to engage in the most important state-matters to apply themselves to computation, and study it, not in the common vulgar fashion, but with the view of arriving at the contemplation of the nature of numbers by the intellect itself, —not for the sake of buying and selling as anxious merchants and retailers, but for war also, and that the soul may acquire a facility of turning itself from what is in course of generation to truth and real being.

Glaucon/ A capital remark.

Socrates/ And, moreover, I now observe, respecting that branch of science which concerns computation, how refined it is, and in many ways useful to us as respects our wishes, if we will apply thereto for the sake of getting knowledge, and not with a view of traffic.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ Just what we now said, —that it powerfully leads the soul upwards, and compels it to reason on abstract numbers, without in any way allowing a person in his reasoning to advance numbers which are visible and tangible bodies; —for perhaps you know of some persons

skilled in these matters, who, if one were in argument to attempt dividing unity itself, would at once both ridicule him and not allow it; though, were you to divide it into parts, they would multiply them, lest unity should somehow seem not to be unity, but numerous parts.

Glaucon/ A very true remark.

Socrates/ What think you then, Glaucon, if a person should ask them—You wonderfully clever men, about what kind of numbers are you reasoning; —in which unity, such as you deem it, is equal, each whole to the whole, without any difference whatever, and having no parts in itself? — what think you they would reply? This, as far as I think; — that they speak of such numbers only—as can be comprehended by the intellect alone, but in no other way. You see then, my friend, I observed, that our real need of this branch of science, is probably because it seems to compel the soul to use pure intelligence in the search after pure truth.

Glaucon/ Aye, it does this to a remarkable extent.

Socrates/ Have you yet considered this, —that persons naturally skilled in computation seem clever in all branches of science, —whereas those naturally slow, if instructed and exercised in this, will yet all of them, if they derive no other advantage, make such progress, as to become cleverer than they were before?

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ And, moreover, I think you will not easily find that many things give the learner and student more trouble than this.

Glaucon/ Of course not.

Socrates/ On all these accounts, then, we must not omit this branch of science, but those with the best of talents should be instructed therein?

Glaucon/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ Let this one thing then, that has just been discussed, be settled between us; and now let us consider, in the second place, with respect to what follows from it, —whether and how far it concerns ourselves.

Glaucon/ What is it; —is it geometry you mean?

Socrates/ That very thing.

Glaucon/ So far, as it bears a relation to the concerns of war, it evidently does concern us; —for in pitching encampments, occupying positions, contracting and extending a line of troops, and as respects all the varied forms in which they draw up armies, either in battle itself or during a march, it would make a vast difference, whether a general were a geometrician or not.

Socrates/ Of course, for such purposes as these a very slender knowledge of geometry, and a small portion of arithmetic would suffice; —but as for any considerable amount thereof, and great progress in it, we must inquire how far they tend to this, —namely, to make us apprehend more easily the idea of the good: —and we say that all things contribute thereto, which compel the soul to turn itself to that region in which is the happiest portion of true being, which it must by all means perceive.

Glaucon/ Your remark is correct.

Socrates/ If then it compels the soul to contemplate true being, it is suitable, —but if only what is sensible and evanescent, it is not suitable.

Glaucon/ Aye, truly, we say so.

Socrates/ This point then, at least, those who have but little acquaintance with geometry, will not argue with us, —that this science has an entirely opposite nature to the words employed in it by those who practice it.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ They speak somehow most absurdly, and necessarily so, since all the terms they use seem to be with a view to operation and practice, —such as squaring, producing, adding, and such-like sounds; whereas on the other hand, the whole science should be studied for the sake of real knowledge.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Is this, then, further to be agreed on?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That it be studied with a view to the knowledge of eternal being, and not of that which is subject to generation and destruction?

Glaucon/ We may well grant that; for it is the business of geometry to concern itself with eternal being.

Socrates/ It would have a tendency, therefore, gentle sir, to draw the soul to truth, and to cause a philosophic intelligence to direct upwards the thoughts which we now improperly cast downwards.

Glaucon/ As much as possible.

Socrates/ As far as possible, then, we must give special orders, that the inhabitants of that fine state of yours should by no means omit the study of geometry, since even its by-works are not inconsiderable.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ Those which you have just mentioned that concern war; —and indeed with reference to all branches of science, for the better understanding thereof, we are somehow sure that it makes an entire difference every way, whether a man be acquainted with geometry or not.

Glaucon/ Every way, indeed, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Let us fix on this then, as the second branch of learning for youth.

Glaucon/ Let us so fix it.

Socrates/ But what; shall we fix upon astronomy, as the third, or think you otherwise?

Glaucon/ I quite think we should; for to have unusually acute perceptions respecting the times of months and years, is suitable not only for agriculture and navigation, but not less so for the art of war.

Socrates/ You are jesting, when you seem to be afraid that the multitude will charge you with enjoining useless objects of study: —yet it is not altogether a trifle, but rather difficult to persuade that by these branches of study some organ of the soul in each individual, is purified and rekindled like fire, after having been destroyed and blinded by other kinds of study, —an organ, indeed, better worth saving than ten thousand eyes, since by that alone can truth be seen. Among such, then, as join me in this opinion, you will have the reputation of reasoning admirably well; though such as never had any perception of this will think perhaps that you say nothing to the purpose, as they see no advantage therefrom accruing that is worthy of notice. Consider, then, from this point, against which of the parties you are arguing, —or whether against neither, but chiefly for your own sake you are carrying on the discussion; moreover, do not envy any other, if therefrom anyone could derive any possible advantage.

Glaucon/ Thus, do I choose, on my own account chiefly, to argue and ask questions, and make replies.

Socrates/ Let us go a little back then, in our argument, for just now, indeed, we did not rightly take what is next in order after geometry.

Glaucon/ How then did we act?

Socrates/ After a plain surface, we took a solid in a state of revolution, without first considering it by itself, in the abstract; but the correct plan is to take the third in order, after the second dimension: —and this, probably, refers to the dimension of cubes, and what has to do with depth.

Glaucon/ Aye, it is so: but these matters, Socrates, do not seem yet to have been investigated.

Socrates/ Aye, there are two causes for this: because no state holds them in honor, they are only slightly investigated, as being difficult; and those that do so investigate them require a guide, without whom they cannot discover them, —one whom, first of all, it would be hard to get, and, when he is got, as things are at present, the investigators of these matters having lofty notions of themselves, would not obey him; whereas, if the whole state were to hold such pursuits in honor, and superintend them, these persons would be obedient, and the investigations being conducted with assiduity and vigor, would exhibit their true character; whereas now, despised and mutilated by the multitude, as well as by those who study them without being able to account for their usefulness, they still, in spite of all things, increase through their native grace; and it is no wonder that they should appear so to do.

Glaucon/ Aye, indeed, this gracefulness is especially remarkable; but tell me more plainly what you were just now saying, —for you somehow defined geometry to be a study that concerns plane surfaces.

Socrates/ I did.

Glaucon/ Then next in order you mentioned astronomy; but afterwards you drew back.

Socrates/ Yes, because when I am in a hurry to get quickly over the discussion, I get on the more slowly; for as regards the mode of measuring depth, which is next in order,

that I passed over, as a hopeless investigation, and proceeded, after geometry, to speak about astronomy, which is the motion of solids.

Glaucon/ You say rightly.

Socrates/ Let us fix on astronomy then, as a fourth branch of science; as if that which we now omit, viz. solid geometry, may have an existence, whenever the state enters on that pursuit.

Glaucon/ Probably: and as to what you just now urged on me, Socrates, about astronomy, as having needlessly praised it, I now praise it in accordance with your notions: for I think it is clear to everyone, that it is this which compels the soul to look upwards, and from what is here conducts it thither.

Socrates/ Perhaps, it may be clear to all except myself; —to me it does not seem so.

Glaucon/ Ah! how is that?

Socrates/ As those who introduce it into philosophy, nowadays pursue it, it makes the soul look altogether downwards.

Glaucon/ How say you?

Socrates/ I am of opinion, that you are not ungenerous in forming your mental estimate of the real nature of that branch of science which concerns things above; for you seem to be of opinion, that if a person were to look up and discover some of the heavenly bodies in an enclosed space, be would contemplate them with his intellect and not his eyes. Perhaps, then, you judge rightly, and I am wrong; though I, on the other hand, cannot hold the opinion that any other branch of science can make the soul look upwards, except that which concerns real being and the invisible, —whether one were to gape upwards, or try by peering downwards to get acquainted with those matters: —and if anyone were to

gape upwards and so try to get acquainted with any perceptible object, I think that he never would get acquainted with it; as his soul has no scientific knowledge of such things, —nor would his soul look upwards, but downwards, —even though he were to try to learn, swimming on his back at sea or lying so on the ground.

Glaucon/ I am punished; —for you have rightly reproved me: —but in what manner did you say we ought to learn astronomy different from that in which they now teach it, if people are to be taught advantageously for the purposes of which we now speak?

Socrates/ Thus: —these various bright bodies in the heaven, —since indeed they are so variously placed in visible space, —ought to be deemed very beautiful and most perfect in their kind, though much inferior to the true magnificence of movement, with which real velocity and real retardation mutually bear along those bodies with all that belongs to them, in their true number and in all their true shapes; —which things, indeed, can be apprehended only by reason and intelligence, not by sight: —do you think they can?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Must we not then, use the various heavenly phenomena, as an exhibition for the purpose of instructing us in those real concerns, —just as one might meet with sketches, capitally well drawn and elaborated by Dædalus, or some other artist or painter? —For one skilled in geometry, on seeing such drawings, would, perhaps, think them to be exceedingly well wrought, and nevertheless deem it absurd to give them a serious consideration, —as if he were thence to get his conception of truth about equals, or doubles, or any other proportion.

Glaucon/ Of course, it would be absurd.

Socrates/ And think you not then, that the true astronomer will feel just the same, when he looks up to the orbits of the stars, —reckoning, indeed, that the heavens and all in them are established by the heavenly architect in the most beautiful manner possible for the formation of such works; and would not one deem it absurd of a man to conceive that this proportion of night with day, and of both these to a month, and of a month to a year, and of other stars to both of these, and towards each other has existed always in the same manner, and without experiencing any change, because they have a body, and are visible, and so to take all possible means to apprehend the truth of these things?

Glaucon/ So I think, whilst I listen to you.

Socrates/ Let us then, make use of problems, or hypotheses, in astronomy, as in geometry, and dismiss the heavenly bodies, —if we intend really to get acquainted with astronomy, and render useful instead of useless that portion of the soul which is naturally intelligent.

Glaucon/ You really impose, a far harder task on astronomers than is enjoined them at present.

Socrates/ I think, however, that we must enjoin other duties likewise, according to the same fashion, if we would be of any service as lawgivers. But have you anything to suggest about the fitting branches of study?

Glaucon/ I have not, —at present at least.

Socrates/ Motion, moreover, affords us, I think, not one indeed, but many species thereof; —all of which any wise man can probably tell; but those which occur to me are two.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ In addition to this, there is its counterpart.

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ As the eyes, seem formed for studying astronomy, so do the ears seem formed for harmonious motions; and these seem to be twin sciences to one another, as also the Pythagoreans say; and we too, Glaucon, agree with them: —how shall we do?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Shall we not, then, since it is a matter of high importance, inquire of them how they speak concerning them, and whether they have anything else to say besides this; but we, notwithstanding all this, shall defend our own conclusion?

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ That those whom we educate should never attempt to learn these things imperfectly, nor without always aiming at the object, to which all ought to be directed, —as we just stated with reference to astronomy: —and do not you know that they do some such thing with regard to harmony? —for, while they measure one with another the symphonies and sounds which are heard, they go through a fruitless toil, like the astronomers.

Glaucon/ Aye, by the gods, —and absurdly too, when they make very frequent trials of the notes, lending their ears to catch the sound as from a neighbor's voice, —some indeed saying that they hear some middle note, with the smallest appreciable interval, and others again doubtingly saying that the notes are just what were sounded before, —both parties placing the ears above the intellect.

Socrates/ But you are now speaking, of those thrifty, money-making musicians, who are ever harassing and tormenting their strings, turning them on the pegs: —but, that the comparison may not be too tedious, I refrain from speaking of their complaints about the refusal and stubbornness of the strings, and at once give up the simile,

saying that we do not mean to speak of these, but of those true musicians whom we before mentioned: —for these do here just what the others did in astronomy; for they search for numbers, in the symphonies which they hear, but do not go on to the inquiry proposed, —what numbers are symphonious, what not, and the reason why they are either the one or the other.

Glaucon/ You speak, of a noble undertaking.

Socrates/ It is serviceable, of course, in the search for the beautiful and good, —but, if pursued in another manner, it is quite useless.

Glaucon/ Aye, probably so.

Socrates/ Still, methinks, the plan of inquiry into all these matters that we have described, if it touches on their mutual communion and alliance, and proves how they are mutually related, will contribute something to what we require, and our labor will not be fruitless; but otherwise it will.

Glaucon/ I likewise, guess the very same thing: —but you are speaking, Socrates, of a most laborious undertaking.

Socrates/ Mean you the introduction, or what else? —what, —know we not, that all these things are introductory to the strain itself; which we ought to learn? —for even persons clever in these things you perhaps do not think skilled in dialectics.

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus, only some very few of such as I have met.

Socrates/ But supposing some of them not able, to offer and admit reasoning, will they ever be able to get acquainted with what we say they ought to know?

Glaucon/ They will never be able to do this.

Socrates/ Is not this then the very strain, Glaucon, which dialectic science executes, —which also, being cognizable by

the intellect, may be said to be imitated by the power of sight, —which faculty seeks, first, as we observed, to gaze at animals, then at the stars, and last of all at the sun himself: —so when a man attempts to discuss a subject without the aid of his perceptive faculties, he is impelled by reason to what is individual and real being; and if he stops not, till he apprehends by intelligence what is the good itself, then, indeed, he arrives at the end of the intelligible, as the other does at the end of the visible.

Glaucon/ Assuredly. What then; —do not you call this the dialectic process?

Socrates/ What else? And now, to revert to our former simile of the man in the cave, there is his liberation from chains, his turning from shadows towards the images and the light, and his ascent from the underground cavern to the sun, —and when there, his looking at images in water, owing to a want of power at first of beholding animals and plants, and the sun itself; —so also here in the intellectual world you have the contemplation of divine phantasms, and the shadows of real beings, and not the shadows of images shadowed out by another similar light, as by the sun. —All this exercise in the arts which we have discussed has this tendency, —namely, to lead back again the best part of the soul to the contemplation of what is best in existing beings; as in the former case, what is brightest in the body is led to what is most splendid in bodily and visible existence.

Glaucon/ I admit these things; though it really seems to me extremely difficult to admit them, though in other respects difficult not to admit them.

Socrates/ However, granting what has been asserted for we shall not only now hear these things, but often again discuss them, let us proceed to and discuss the strain itself, as we have finished the introduction. Say, then, of what kind

is the power of dialectic, —into what species is it divided, —and what are the paths leading to it; —for these probably conduct us to that place, which we shall find a resting-place, and the end of our journey. You will not as yet, dear Glaucon, be able to follow: —had you been so, no zeal would be wanting on my part; nor should you any longer only see the image of what we are now speaking about, but the truth itself, or what to me seems so. Whether it be so really or not, however, it is not proper positively to affirm; but that it is somewhat of this kind may be most strongly affirmed: —may it not?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And further, that it is the power of dialectics alone, which can discover this to a person skilled in what we have discussed, and that it can be done by no other power.

Glaucon/ This also, we may positively affirm.

Socrates/ This statement at least no one, will dispute with us, —that no other method can attempt to ascertain through a regular process the nature of each particular being; for all other arts respect either the opinions and desires of men, or generations and compositions, or are employed wholly in the study of what is generated and compounded: —but as for those others, which we alleged to have some relation to being, as geometry, and its dependent sciences, we behold them, as if dreaming indeed about real existence, it being impossible to have a true vision, so long as they employ hypotheses and keep them immovable, without the power of accounting for their existence: —for where the starting-point is the unknown, and the conclusion and intermediate steps are connected with that unknown principle, how can any such kind of assent ever possibly become science?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Is it not then the dialectic method only, that proceeds thus onwards, —removing all hypotheses back to the starting-point, that it may become firmly established, and so gradually draw and lead upward the eye of the soul, which was truly buried in a certain barbaric mire, by the aid and guidance of those arts we have mentioned, which through custom we frequently call sciences, but which require another name clearer indeed than opinion, but more obscure than science?

Glaucon/ We have somewhere in the former part of our discourse termed it reflection, or reasoning.

Socrates/ But the controversy is not, as it appears to me, about a mere name, when people are investigating things of such great importance as those now before us.

Glaucon/ It is not.

Socrates/ You are pleased, then, as formerly, to call the first part science, the second reflection, the third faith, the fourth conjecture, —both these last being opinion, and the two former intelligence; —and that opinion is employed also about generation, and intelligence about true being; —likewise, that true being bears to generation the same relation as intelligence to opinion, science to faith, and reflection to conjecture; —but as for the analogy of the things which these powers respect, and the twofold division of each, —viz., into the objects of opinion, and those of intellect, these we omit, Glaucon, that we may not be more prolix here than in our former discussions.

Glaucon/ As for me, as regards those other things, so far as I can comprehend, I am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ But do not you call that man skilled in dialectics, who apprehends the reason of the essence of each particular? —and as for the man who is unable to give a reason to himself, and to another, so far as regards this

inability, will you not so far say he wants intelligence of the thing?

Glaucon/ Of course I shall.

Socrates/ And is not the case the same with reference to *the good*? —whoever cannot logically define it, abstracting the idea of *the good* from all others, and taking as in a fight one opposing argument after another, and cannot proceed with unfailing proofs, eager to rest his case, not on the ground of opinion, but of true being, —such an one knows nothing of the good itself nor of any good whatever: and should he have attained to any knowledge of *the good*, we must say he has attained it by opinion, not science; that he is sleeping, and dreaming away his present life; and before he is roused, will descend to Hades, and there be profoundly and perfectly laid asleep.

Glaucon/ By Zeus, I will certainly affirm all these things.

Socrates/ But surely, methinks, you will not allow those children of yours, whom you are ideally training and educating, —if ever in fact you should educate them, —to have the supreme government of the most important affairs in the state, while they are void of reason, as letters of the alphabet?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ You will lay this down then as a law: that they shall most especially get that amount of education which may enable them to question and answer in the most scientific manner.

Glaucon/ I will make that a law, by your assistance at least.

Socrates/ Are you of opinion then, that dialectic science is to be placed on high as a bulwark to moral training, and that no other training can with propriety be more elevated

than this, but that this is the completion of scientific training?

Glaucon/ I am.

Socrates/ There now remains for you, the regulation of the persons to whom we shall assign these studies, and after what manner.

Glaucon/ That is evident.

Socrates/ Do you remember then, in our former election of rulers, what kind we chose?

Glaucon/ Of course I do.

Socrates/ As to other things then, conceive, that those dispositions should be selected, and that we should prefer the bravest, most resolute, and, as far as possible, the most handsome; and besides, we must not only seek for those whose manners are noble and grave, but such as have dispositions adapted to this education.

Glaucon/ What dispositions do you enjoin?

Socrates/ They must have, my excellent friend, acuteness as respects instruction, that they may learn without difficulty; for souls are much more daunted by severe mental studies, than by strenuous bodily exercise; for the employment which is most familiar to them is of a peculiar nature, having no connection with the body.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And we must seek for one of good memory, hardy, and in every way fond of toil: —or how think you anyone would willingly endure bodily fatigue, and at the same time accomplish such learning and study?

Glaucon/ No one, unless he be in all respects of a naturally good disposition.

Socrates/ The mistake then about philosophy, and the dishonor done to it, have been occasioned by this, as I

formerly said, that it is not studied in a way suitable to its dignity: for it ought not to have been attempted by bastards, but the well-born.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ In the first place, he who is to apply to philosophy, must not be lame in his love of labor, half-laborious, and half-averse to it; and this is the case, when a man is fond of wrestling and hunting, and all bodily exercises, but has no fondness for learning, or hearing instruction or making investigations, but in all these respects has an aversion to labor. —He too is lame, though in an opposite manner from the man who has wrongly employed his love of labor.

Glaucon/ You say most truly.

Socrates/ And shall we not, in like manner account that soul lame as to truth, which, though it hates a voluntary falsehood and is troubled by it, and is vastly indignant when others tell a lie, yet easily admits the involuntary lie, and if at any time it be found ignorant, is not displeased, but like a savage sow willingly wallows in ignorance?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And in like manner, as to temperance and fortitude, and magnanimity, and all other branches of virtue, we must no less carefully attend to what is bastardly, and what is well-born; for when either private persons or a state understand not how to attend to all these things, they unwarily employ the lame and the bastardly for whatever they want, —private persons employing them as friends, and states as governors.

Glaucon/ Such is exactly the case.

Socrates/ But we must be on our guard, about all such things; so that if we select for such extensive discipline such as are entire in body and mind, and take care to instruct

them in suitable exercises, justice herself will not blame us, and we shall preserve both the state and constitution; but if we introduce persons of a different description into these affairs, we shall do everything the reverse, and pour still greater contempt on philosophy.

Glaucon/ That indeed were shameful.

Socrates/ Certainly. But I myself seem at present to be somewhat ridiculous.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ I forgot, that we were amusing ourselves, and I spoke with too great keenness; for, while speaking, I was referring to philosophy; and seeing her most unworthily abused, I seem to have been filled with indignation, and, through rage, as it were, with those who are the cause of it, to have said what I did somewhat too earnestly.

Glaucon/ No truly, not for me as a listener at least.

Socrates/ Aye, but for me, who said it: —but let us not forget this, that in our former election we made choice of old men, which in this will not be allowed; —for we must not believe Solon, that a man in years can learn many things, far less even than running, but that all the most important and numerous kinds of toil are assigned to the young.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Everything then relating to arithmetic and geometry and all the previous instruction which they should receive before they learn dialectics, ought to be set before them while they are children, and on such a plan of teaching that they may learn without compulsion.

Glaucon/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because, a free man ought to acquire no learning under slavery: for the labors of the body when endured through compulsion do not at all deteriorate the

body: but as for the soul, it can endure no compulsory discipline.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Do not then, my best of friends, force boys to their learning; but train them up by amusements, that you may be better able to discern the direction of each one's genius.

Glaucon/ What you say, is reasonable.

Socrates/ Do not you remember our stating then, that the boys should even be carried to war, as spectators, on horseback, and be brought as near as possible with safety, and allowed like young hounds, to taste the blood?

Glaucon/ I remember.

Socrates/ Whoever then, shall appear the most forward in all these labors, studies, and dangers, such as these are to be selected to a certain number.

Glaucon/ At what age?

Socrates/ When they have finished their necessary exercises; for this period of life, even should it last two or three years, cannot accomplish anything else; for fatigue and sleep are hostile to learning; and this too is none of the least of their trials, what each will prove himself in his exercises.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And after this period, such as have formerly been selected of the age of twenty are to receive greater honors than others; and those studies, which in their youth they have pursued promiscuously, must be brought before them in one view, that they may see the connection of the whole with each other, and with the nature of real being.

Glaucon/ This indeed is the only kind of instruction that will abide permanently in those in whom it is engendered.

Socrates/ And this, is the best criterion for distinguishing talents naturally fitted for dialectics, from those which are not so. He who perceives this alliance is skilled in dialectics; he who does not, is not so.

Glaucon/ I am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ You will need then, after observing these things, and seeing who are most distinguished herein, and who persevere both in learning and in war, and in other things established by law, to make choice of them after they exceed thirty years, selecting from those before chosen, and then advance them to greater honors. Observing them likewise by the test of dialectics, in order to ascertain which of them can without aid from the eyes, or any other sense, proceed with truth to being itself. And here, my companion, is a work of great caution.

Glaucon/ In what principally?

Socrates/ Do not you perceive, how great is the evil which at present attends dialectics?

Glaucon/ What is it, you mean?

Socrates/ Its followers are somehow or other full of disorder.

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Think you then, that their being so is at all extraordinary; and will you not forgive them?

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Just as if, a certain supposititious child were brought up in great opulence in a rich and noble family, and amidst many flatterers, and were to perceive, when grown up to manhood, that he is not descended from those alleged to be his parents, but yet cannot discover his real parents; can you guess how such an one would feel both towards his flatterers and his supposed parents, both at the time when

he knew nothing of the cheat, and again at the time when he came to perceive it? —are you willing to hear me while I give a guess?

Glaucon/ I am willing.

Socrates/ I guess then, that he will honor his father and mother, and other supposed relatives, more than the flatterers, and that he will neglect them less in case of their need, and be less apt to do or say anything amiss to them, and in matters of consequence will disobey them less than those flatterers, during that period in which he knows not the truth.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ But when he perceives the real state of the case, I again guess, he will relax in honor and respect for them, and attend to the flatterers, and be much more persuaded by them now than formerly, and live also according to their fashion, —while for the father, and the rest of his fictitious relations, if he be not of an entirely good natural disposition, he will have no regard.

Glaucon/ You mention everything, just as it would happen.

Socrates/ But in what manner does this comparison respect those conversant with dialectics? In this: —there are certain doctrines about justice and honor, in which we have been bred, as by parents, from childhood to render them respect and obedience.

Glaucon/ There are.

Socrates/ Aye, —and there are other pursuits also, the opposite of these, attended by pleasures, that flatter and seduce the soul, but do not persuade those who are in any degree well-mannered; because these honor their relations, and obey them.

Glaucon/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ What then, if to a person thus affected the question be proposed, What is the beautiful? and, in reply to what he has heard from the lawgiver, he be refuted by reason; which frequently and in all ways convicts him and brings him round to the opinion, that objects are no more beautiful than they are deformed; and so also, as respects what is just and good, and whatever else he held in highest esteem, what do you think such an one will after this do, with regard to these things, as to honoring and obeying them?

Glaucon/ Of necessity, he will no longer either honor or obey them, as he formerly had done.

Socrates/ If then, he no longer deems these things honorable, and allied to him as formerly, and cannot discover those which really are so, can he possibly with readiness join himself to any other life than that of flattery?

Glaucon/ It is not possible.

Socrates/ And from being an observer of the law, he will now, I think, appear to be a law-breaker.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Is it not likely then, that the affections of persons who thus engage in reasoning, are deserving, as I was just now saying, of great consideration?

Glaucon/ We, and pity too.

Socrates/ While you take care then, that this pitiable case befall not those of the age of thirty, ought they not by every method to apply themselves to reasoning?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not this one prudent caution, —that they meddle not with discussions while young: for you have not forgotten, I suppose, that youths, when they first join in discussions, abuse them by way of mere amusement, ever

using them for the purpose of contradiction; and in imitation of those who are refuters, they themselves oppose others, ever delighting like whelps to drag and tear to pieces, by arguments, those who are their neighbors.

Glaucon/ Especially so.

Socrates/ And after they have confuted many, and been themselves confuted by many, then they vehemently and speedily fall into an indifference about their former opinions; and by these means they themselves, and the whole of philosophy, are calumniated by the rest of the world.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ But he who is of a riper age, will not like to share in such madness, but will imitate him who is disposed to reason and inquire after truth, rather than one who, for the sake of diversion, amuses himself by contradiction; and he will himself be more modest, thus rendering the practice of disputing honorable instead of dishonorable.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Have not then all our former remarks been rightly premised, by way of precaution on this point, that those who are to be taught dialectics should have gracious and steady dispositions, and not as now, when every chance person, even when quite unfit, is admitted thereto?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is twice the former period then sufficient for a man to be diligently and constantly engaged in acquiring dialectics without doing anything else but practicing by way of contrast all bodily exercises?

Glaucon/ Do you mean six years, or four?

Socrates/ No matter; —make it five: —for after this they must be made to descend to that cave again, and obliged to govern both in things relating to war, and in other youthful

offices, so as not to fall short of others in experience; and among these they must be still further tested, that it may be seen whether they will continue firm, when drawn in all directions, or be somewhat drawn aside.

Glaucon/ And how long a time, do you reckon for this?

Socrates/ Fifteen years. And when they are of the age of fifty, such of them as have been kept safely, and have in every way obtained all the prizes both in actions and sciences, are now to be led to the end, and are to be obliged to incline the eye of their soul to look at that which imparts light to all things, and, when they contemplate *the good itself* to use it as a pattern, each in turn, either state or private persons, for adorning themselves, during the remainder of their life, for the most part, indeed, occupying themselves with philosophy, and when it is their turn, toiling in political affairs, and taking the government, each for the good of the state performing this office, not as something honorable, but as a thing necessary; and after bringing up others also from time to time to be of the same character, and leaving them to be state-guardians, they depart to inhabit the islands of the blest: —and the state, will erect monuments for them at the public cost, and if the Pythian goddess consent, will offer sacrifice, as to superior beings, —if not, as to happy and divine men.

Glaucon/ Socrates, you have made our governors all-beautiful, just as a sculptor would.

Socrates/ And our governesses likewise, Glaucon; —for suppose not that what I have said referred more to men than women, —such at least as have sufficient talent.

Glaucon/ Right, if at least, as we said, they are to share in all things equally with the men.

Socrates/ What then; —do you agree, that with reference to a state and form of government, we have not altogether

stated mere wishes, —but such things as though difficult, are yet in a certain respect possible, and not otherwise than has been mentioned, —that is, when true philosophers, whether one or more of them, on becoming governors in a state, despise present honors, and deem them illiberal and of no value; but esteem, above all things, rectitude and the honors therefrom derived; account justice as a thing of all others the greatest, and most absolutely necessary; and, by ministering to it and advancing it, thoroughly regulate the constitution of their own state?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Such, of the more advanced in life, as have lived ten years in the state, let them send all into the country; and, removing their children away from the habits now contracted by domestics, let them bring them up according to their own manners and laws, as we formerly described them: —thus the state and government that we have described being most speedily and easily established, will both be happy itself, and of the greatest service to the people among whom it is established.

Glaucon/ Very much so indeed; —and you seem to me, Socrates, to have very well described how this state will rise, if it rise at all.

Socrates/ Well then, have we not had sufficient talk, both about such a state as this, and the individual that corresponds thereto? —For it is now clear perhaps, what kind of a man we shall say he ought to be.

Glaucon/ It is evident; and your inquiry, methinks, is now at an end.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.

Book 8.

Socrates/ Well then, Glaucon, these things have been agreed on, that in a state that is to be perfectly administered the women are to be in common, the children in common, and their education also. —so likewise, their employments both in war and peace in common, and their kings the best possible both in philosophy and warfare.

Glaucon/ It has been so agreed.

Socrates/ And this, moreover, we agreed on, that when the commanders are appointed and leading their soldiers, they should dwell in habitations, such as we have described, containing nothing particularly belonging to any individual, but common to all; and besides these habitations, we agreed also, if you recollect, as to their possessions, to what sort they should be entitled.

Glaucon/ Aye, I recollect, that we thought them entitled to no possessions whatever, like the other citizens, but that, like military wrestlers and guardians, they should receive the yearly pay of their service in maintenance provided by the rest, and should take care both of themselves and the rest of the state.

Socrates/ You say rightly: —but come, —since we have settled these matters, let us recollect from what point we made this digression, in order that we may again take up the same argument.

Glaucon/ No hard matter; —for you were pursuing much about the same argument respecting the state, as you did just now, when saying that you considered such a state to be good as you then described, and the individual man also analogous thereto, —and this, too, as it seems, when you were able to define both a better state and a better man. You said, moreover, that all the rest were wrong, if this were right; —and of the other kinds of states you said, I

remember, that four were deserving of consideration, with the view of seeing the errors therein and the people thereto corresponding, —in order that by seeing all these and deciding on the best and worst man, we might inquire whether the best be the happiest, and the worst the most wretched or otherwise: —and when I inquired which were the four kinds of states to which you referred, on this Polemarchus and Adimantus interrupted us; and so now resuming the subject you have arrived at this point.

Socrates/ You have recollected it, with great accuracy.

Glaucon/ Once more then, like a wrestler, furnish me with the same handle; and when I ask the same question, try to say just what you were then about to tell me.

Socrates/ Aye, if I can.

Glaucon/ Moreover, I am anxious also myself to hear what those four kinds of states were.

Socrates/ You shall hear that, and welcome: —for, of those which I can mention and which have names, —that praised by the multitude is the Cretan and Lacedæmonian polity, —the second, and that which deserves the second praise, called oligarchy, a polity full of abundant evils, —that which differs from it, and follows next in order, democracy, —and then genuine tyranny, or monarchy, differing from all the others, the fourth and last ailment of the state: —surely you have no other form of polity, having a distinct and established species? —for small principalities and purchased kingdoms, and such-like polities as these, are of an intermediate class, and may be found no less among barbarians than Greeks.

Glaucon/ Aye, indeed, many are mentioned, and those, too, absurd enough.

Socrates/ Do you know, then, that of men there are as many descriptions as of states? —or do you think that

states, somehow or other, spring out of an oak or a rock, and not out of the habits of those in the state, whither, indeed, everything else must verge and be attracted?

Glaucon/ I, for my part, think it is derived from no other source than that.

Socrates/ In that case, if there be five kinds of states, the intellectual distinctions of the individuals will be five likewise.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ As for the person then, who resembles an aristocracy, we have already described him, and rightly pronounced him to be both good and just.

Glaucon/ Aye, we have described him.

Socrates/ Are we then, in the next place, to argue about the inferior, —the contentious and ambitious man formed according to the Spartan model, and him again, who resembles an oligarchy, or a democracy, or a tyranny, in order that we may contemplate the most unjust, and contrast him with the most just, and thus our inquiry may be complete, how unmingled justice stands in opposition to unmingled injustice, as respects the happiness or misery of its possessor, —thus either pursuing injustice in compliance with Thrasymachus's suggestion, or else justice in compliance with our present argument?

Glaucon/ We must do so, by all means.

Socrates/ Are we then, just as we began, to consider moral habits in states primarily, or rather in private individuals, as being there more clearly developed; and now must we not thus first consider the ambitious republic for I cannot call it by any other term, but only denominate it a timocracy or a timarchy, and in connection with it an individual of the same character, —then again an oligarchy and a man of oligarchical character, —and so also, when

considering a democracy, must we contemplate a democratic person, —and, fourthly, coming to a state governed by a tyrant, consider a person of tyrannical disposition; —thus trying to become competent judges about what we proposed?

Glaucon/ According to reason, indeed, such should be both our view and decision.

Socrates/ Come then; —let us try to show in what way a timocracy arises out of an aristocracy: —is it not plain, at any rate, that every government changes through the agency of that portion which holds the public offices, whenever sedition arises in that particular part; whereas, if it only agree with itself, however small the state, it cannot possibly be disturbed?

Glaucon/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ How then, Glaucon, will our state be disturbed and how will our allies and rulers fall into quarrels with each other and amongst themselves: —do you wish, like Homer, that we implore the muses to tell us how first sedition rose, and address them in tragic fashion, as if we were children, playing and jesting, so to speak, with seriousness uttering lofty language?

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Somehow thus: —it is hard indeed for a state thus constituted to become disturbed; —but, as everything generated is liable to corruption, not even such a constitution as this can abide forever, but must be dissolved: —and its dissolution is as follows. —Not only as regards terrestrial plants, but likewise terrestrial animals, a fertility and sterility both of soul and body take place, when the revolutions of the heavenly bodies complete the periphery of their respective orbits, which are shorter to the shorter-lived, and contrariwise to the contrary: and with reference to the fertility and sterility of your race, though those are wise

whom you have trained as governors of the state, yet they will never, by intellect and sense united, observe the proper season for procreation, but let it slip by, and sometimes generate children when they ought not. —To that, however, which is divinely generated, there is a period which is comprehended by the perfect number; whereas, to that generated by man, there is one, in which the augmentations, both surpassing and surpassed, after having received three separations and four boundaries of things similar and dissimilar, increasing and decreasing, will render all things correspondent and rational; —of which the sesquiternian root, conjoined with the pentad and thrice increased, affords two harmonies, —one of these, the equally equal, just a hundred times as much; —while the other, of equal length indeed, but of oblong shape, is of a hundred numbers from effable diameters of the pentad, each wanting one, two of which are irrational and of a hundred cubes of the triad. —And the whole of this geometric number is, having such an influence, concerned with worse and better generations. Now, if our governors be ignorant of this, and join our couples together unseasonably, the children will neither possess talent, nor be fortunate either; and though former governors should have placed the best of them in office, nevertheless as they are unworthy of it, and only come into the power which their fathers had, they will begin to neglect us in their guardianship, holding music first of all, and then gymnastics in less esteem than they ought, and hence our young men will become too little disposed to music; —in consequence of which the governors to be appointed from among them will not be very clever guardians, as respects proving, according to Hesiod and ourselves, what are the several species of talents, the golden, the silver, the brazen, and the iron. Where iron, however, mingles with silver, and brass with gold, then there arises a dissimilitude and

unharmonious unevenness; —and when this is the case, wherever it prevails, it perpetually generates war and hatred; —we must say that sedition belongs to such a race as this, whenever it arises.

Glaucon/ Aye, —and we shall say that the answer was correctly given.

Socrates/ Aye, and it must be so too, —as they are Muses.

Glaucon/ What then, do the Muses say next?

Socrates/ Sedition having once arisen, two classes of genius, —the iron and the brazen, will be allured to gain, and the acquisition of land and houses, gold and silver, —while the golden and silver, not being in poverty but naturally rich, will lead souls to virtue and their original constitution; whereas, should they be violent and strive one against the other, they would agree to divide their lands and houses as individual possessions; and then, enslaving those formerly guarded by them as freemen, friends, and tutors, keep them as denizens and slaves, themselves providing for war and their own protection.

Glaucon/ This revolution, seems to me to have just this origin.

Socrates/ Will not then this government, be a medium between aristocracy and oligarchy?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Thus then will the revolution be effected, and when it has taken place, what arrangement will then be made? —Is it not plain, that in some things they will follow the pattern of the former republic, and in others oligarchy, as halfway between the two, and having something also peculiar to itself?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Will they, then, in honoring their rulers, in allowing their military to abstain from agriculture, as with us from mechanical and other money-making pursuits, in establishing common meals, and in studying both gymnastics and military contests, —in all these things will they not follow the pattern of the last form of government?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But, through the fear of admitting wise men into the magisterial office, inasmuch as the state no longer possesses men who are simple and resolute, but only such as are of a mixed character, —and through an inclination towards the high-spirited and even simple, naturally more suited for war than peace, and also towards those who are clever at tricks and schemes, spending their whole time in continual war; —in all these respects, will it not possess many such things as are peculiar to itself?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And such as these, will ever be lovers of wealth, just like those in oligarchies, and will have a wild though disguised love for gold and silver, as if they possessed treasuries of their own and domestic storehouses in which to hoard and hide them, —and, circularly-enclosed houses also, —nests as it were wholly their own, in which they can lose and spend much, together with their own wives and such others as they fancy.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Well then, —will they not from their love of wealth be sparing of it also, though not openly acquiring it, but disposed to squander other people's property through lustful desire and secret indulgence in pleasure; —-just as children escaping from parental law, who have been brought up not by persuasion but force, owing to their neglect of the

true muse, which unites reasoning and philosophy and the preference also which they give to gymnastics over music?

Glaucon/ It is quite a mixed government, of which you are now speaking, —compounded of good and ill.

Socrates/ Aye, mixed indeed: —but the most remarkable thing in it is what simply arises from the prevalence of high spirit, —contention and ambition.

Glaucon/ Aye, just so.

Socrates/ Such then is the origin and character of this form of government, if one may ideally sketch it without giving a complete description, —though enough for us to see from this sketch, —who is the just and the unjust man; and it were a work of tedious length to argue on all governments and all the various manners of men without any exception whatever.

Glaucon/ Quite right.

Socrates/ What then will the individual be, who corresponds to this form of government; —how did he become so: and what is his nature?

Adeimantus/ I think indeed, he has a tendency to be like this Glaucon here, as far at least as concerns the love of contention.

Socrates/ Perhaps so, as to this particular; —but I think, that in these respects he cannot at all resemble him.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ He must necessarily, be more self-willed, and somewhat unapt to music, though fond of it; and fond of hearing, but by no means a rhetorician: —such an one will be rough towards the slaves, without despising them, as the man does who is fairly educated. He will be polite towards the free, submissive to governors, a lover of dominion and honor, —not thinking it proper to govern by eloquence or

anything of the kind, but by political management and military achievements, being a lover of gymnastics and hunting.

Adeimantus/ This indeed, is the spirit of that form of government.

Socrates/ And will not such an one, despise money during his youth, but the older he grows, always value it the more, because he partakes of the covetous disposition, and is not sincerely affected towards virtue, because destitute of the best guardian?

Adeimantus/ Of what guardian?

Socrates/ Reason, accompanied with music, which being the only inbred preservative of virtue, dwells with the possessor through the whole of life.

Adeimantus/ You say well.

Socrates/ And surely the timocratic youth, resembles such a state.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And such an one, is somehow thus formed. —He may happen perhaps to be the youthful son of a worthy father, dwelling in an ill-governed state, and shunning public honors, magisterial offices, lawsuits, and all such public business, content to live neglected in obscurity, that he may have no trouble.

Adeimantus/ In what manner then, is he formed?

Socrates/ First of all, when he hears his mother complaining that her husband is not in magisterial office, and that she is on this account neglected among other women, and then sees that he is not over attentive to the acquisition of wealth, and does not wrangle and quarrel privately and publicly in the law courts, but on all these occasions acts indolently; —and when she perceives him

always attentive to himself, and treating her neither with extreme respect nor contempt; —on all these accounts, she is filled with indignation, and tells her son that his father is unmanly, extremely careless, and whatever else wives are wont to chant about such matters.

Adeimantus/ Aye, —many things, truly, and quite in accordance with their spirit.

Socrates/ And you know, that the domestics likewise of such families, such of them as would be thought good-natured, sometimes say privately the very same to the sons; and if they see either a debtor whom the father does not sue, or anyone otherwise acting unjustly, they exhort him to punish all such persons when he comes to manhood, and to be more of a man than his father. —And when he goes abroad, he hears other such-like things, and sees also that such in the state as attend to their own affairs are called simple, and held in little esteem, while such as do not attend to their affairs are both honored and commended. —The youth then who hears and sees all this, and then again hears his father's speeches, and closely observes his pursuits in contrast with those of others, is drawn in two opposite directions, —his father irrigating and promoting the growth of his rational part, and the others his passions and high spirit; —and so, being not naturally bad, but spoiled only by evil connection with others, he is brought to a mean between both and delivers up the government within himself to a middle power, —the love of contention and high spirit: —and so he becomes a haughty and ambitious man.

Adeimantus/ I think, you have quite correctly explained the training of such a person. —We have here then, the second form of government and the second individual.

Socrates/ Aye, —we have.

Adeimantus/ Shall we not then after this say with Æschylus, —

Where state to state, —then each to each incline; —

or rather, shall we, according to our plan, establish the state first?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It would be an oligarchy then, methinks, that would succeed such a government as this.

Adeimantus/ But what constitution is it, that you call an oligarchy?

Socrates/ That government, which is founded on the estimate of men's property; —in which the rich rule, and the poor have no share in the government.

Adeimantus/ Aye, —I understand.

Socrates/ Should we not, first of all explain, how the change is made from a timocracy to an oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ We should.

Socrates/ And surely the way, in which this change is made, is manifest even to the blind!

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ That treasury, which each one fills with gold destroys such a state; for, first of all, they discover for themselves modes of expense, for which they set aside the laws, —both themselves and their wives disobeying them.

Adeimantus/ Very likely, and afterwards, I think, when one observes another, and enters into rivalry, the people generally become of this character.

Socrates/ It is likely. And thence then, as they advance in the intensity of the desire for acquiring wealth, the more honorable they account this, the more dishonorable will they deem virtue; —for is not virtue so at variance with wealth,

that, supposing each to be placed at the opposite end of a balance, they would always weigh the one against the other?

Adeimantus/ Justly so.

Socrates/ While wealth then and the wealthy are honored in the state, both virtue and good men must necessarily be held in dishonor?

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And what is honored is always pursued, while what is dishonored is neglected?

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Instead then of being contentious and ambitious men, they have at last become lovers of gain and wealth; —and the rich they praise and admire, elevating them to the magistracy, while the poor man they quite despise.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do they not enact laws, marking out the boundary of the oligarchal constitution, and regulating the quantity of oligarchal power by the quantity of wealth, —allotting more to the more wealthy and less to those less so, intimating that he who has not the amount settled by law can have no share in the government; —and do they not settle these matters compulsorily, by force of arms, establishing such a state after previous intimidation? —Is it not thus?

Adeimantus/ Aye, indeed.

Socrates/ This then, so to speak, is its constitution?

Adeimantus/ Yes. What then is the nature of the government, and what are the faults thereto ascribed?

Socrates/ First of all, of this very thing, the constitution itself, what think you? —for consider, if a person were thus to appoint pilots of ships, by the amount of their property,

never entrusting one of them with a poor man, though better skilled in piloting, —what would then be the consequence?

Adeimantus/ They would make a very bad voyage.

Socrates/ And is it not the same about any other matter, or any presiding office whatever?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Is it always so, except in a state; or is it so as regards a state likewise?

Adeimantus/ There, beyond all others; inasmuch as it is the most difficult, and most important kind of government.

Socrates/ Oligarchy then would seem to have this unquestionably very great fault.

Adeimantus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But what; —is this no less a fault?

Adeimantus/ What?

Socrates/ That such a state is not integrally one, but necessarily two; one containing the poor, and the other the rich, dwelling in one place and always plotting against one another.

Adeimantus/ By Zeus, not a whit less; —and this besides is a fine thing, —the incapacity of waging war, through the necessity, either of employing the armed multitude, who are to be dreaded more than the enemy themselves, or else refusing to employ them at all, and so appearing quite oligarchical in battle, —being unwilling also to advance money for the public service, through a natural disposition to covetousness? This is not well.

Socrates/ What then; —with reference to what we long ago condemned, —engaging in a variety of pursuits, the same persons in such a state giving their attendance all at once to agriculture, money-making, and military affairs; does this seem right?

Adeimantus/ Not at all, of course.

Socrates/ Let us see, then, —does this form of government above all others introduce this greatest of all evils?

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ The permission to each person of selling the whole of his effects, and to another of purchasing them from him, and the privilege to the seller of dwelling in our state, though he belongs to no one class therein, and can be called neither a money-maker, nor mechanic, nor horseman, nor foot-soldier, but poor and destitute.

Adeimantus/ Yes, above all others.

Socrates/ Such a thing is not prevented in oligarchal governments; for, in that case some of them would not be over-rich, and others altogether poor.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ But consider this likewise; —when such a rich man as this spends his property, would it do the state any more service, as regards the objects just mentioned; or did he only seem to be one of the magistrates, while in truth he was neither magistrate nor servant to the state, but only a consumer of its substance?

Adeimantus/ Aye, —he did seem so; —he was nothing but a consumer.

Socrates/ Do you desire, then, that we should say of him, that, as a drone in a beehive brings ailment among the whole swarm, just so, such a person as this, like a drone in his house, is the ailment of a state?

Adeimantus/ Quite so, Socrates.

Socrates/ And has not God, Adimantus, made all the winged drones without any sting, —and those that have feet, some without stings, and some with dreadful stings? —And

do not those that are without stings continue poor to old age: —whereas those that have stings, are those that we called mischievous?

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ It is plain then, that in a state where you would observe poor people, there are doubtless concealed thieves, cutpurses, sacrilegious persons, and workers of all such evils.

Adeimantus/ Evidently so.

Socrates/ What then? Do not you find poor people in states that are placed under oligarchal government?

Adeimantus/ Almost all are so, except the governors themselves.

Socrates/ And do we not think, that they contain within them many mischievous persons with stings, whom the magistrates must restrain by vigilance and compulsory measures?

Adeimantus/ We do indeed think so.

Socrates/ And must we not say, that it is through want of education, bad nurture, and a corrupt constitution of state, that persons of this character are here engendered?

Adeimantus/ Yes we must.

Socrates/ Well then, is not the state oligarchally governed when under an oligarchy of this character; and is it not affected by all these evils, and probably more too?

Adeimantus/ It is nearly so.

Socrates/ Let us distinguish then this form of government likewise, which they call oligarchy, as one having its governors elected according to the valuation of their property. Next let us consider the man who is analogous to this form of government, how he is formed and what is his character.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Is it not thus then chiefly that the individual man changes from the timocratic to the oligarchic form?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ When such an one has a son, he, first of all, emulates his father, and follows his steps; afterwards, when he sees him suddenly dashed on the state like a ship on a rock, squandering his property and ruining himself, either at the head of the army, or in some other high magisterial office, —then falling into the law-courts, ruined by public informers, and either put to death, or exiled, and stripped of his honors and entire property.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Aye, my friend, and after seeing and suffering this, and losing his property, he instantly, through fear, I think, pushes headlong from the throne within his soul, his ambitious, lofty temper, and at length, humbled by poverty, turns his attention to gain, lives meanly and sparingly, and by hard labor acquires wealth; —do you not think that such a man will seat on that throne in his soul a covetous and money-loving spirit, making it a mighty king within himself, and girding it, as it were, with tiaras, and bracelets, and scepters?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ But, as for the principles of reason and high spirit, having laid them both at his feet on either side as mere slaves, he forbids the one to reason at all, or at any rate to inquire into aught else, except by what means a smaller amount of property can be made greater; and the other, again, to admire and honor anything but riches and the rich, and to receive honor with any other view than the acquisition of money, or whatever else may tend thereto.

Adeimantus/ There is no change, so sudden and powerful as that of an ambitious to an avaricious man.

Socrates/ Is not this, then, the oligarchic man?

Adeimantus/ Aye—the change which he undergoes is from a person who resembles that government from which oligarchy arises.

Socrates/ Shall we consider, now, if he does at all resemble it?

Adeimantus/ Let us consider.

Socrates/ Does he not, in the first place, resemble it in valuing money above all things?

Adeimantus/ Of course he does.

Socrates/ And he does so surely in being sparing and laborious, satisfying only his necessary desires, and not allowing himself any other expenses, but subduing the other desires as foolish.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And in being, a sordid kind of man, making gain of everything, intent on hoarding, —one, such as the multitude extols, will not this be the man that resembles such a form of government?

Adeimantus/ Aye, I think so: wealth at least must be highly valued by the state, as well as by the individual of such a character.

Socrates/ Aye, —for I do not think, that such a man has attended to education.

Adeimantus/ I do not think he has; for he would not then have chosen a blind guide for his chorus.

Socrates/ But further still, consider this attentively; —must we not say that, owing to his want of education, dronish desires springing in him, some of them beggarly,

and some mischievous, forcibly kept under restraint by the rest of his pursuits?

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Do you know, then, where you will best observe their wickedness?

Adeimantus/ Where?

Socrates/ By looking at their tutelage of orphans, or whatever else of this kind comes in their way, so as to give them much power to do injustice.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Is not this then quite clear, that in all other kinds of contracts, wherever such an one gains approbation, by the mere semblance of justice, he restrains the other wrong desires within him by exercising a certain moderation, not from any persuasion that it is not better to indulge them, nor from sober reason, but from necessity and fear, because he trembles for the remainder of his property?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Aye, by Zeus, my friend, most of them, when they want to spend the property of others, display passions much akin to those of drones.

Adeimantus/ Yes, exceedingly so.

Socrates/ Such a person as this, then, will not be free from internal discord; nor be integrally one, but a kind of double man; possessing desires, however, that are at variance with one another, the better, usually, governing the worse.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ On these accounts, then, such an one, methinks, will present a better appearance than many others; though the true virtue of a harmonized and consistent soul will wholly escape him.

Adeimantus/ Aye, it seems so.

Socrates/ And the sparing man, either privately or in the state, will be but a poor rival, as regards any victory or other struggle for honor; because either for reputation's sake, or any such contests, he is unwilling to spend his property, through fear of kindling expensive desires, and calling them into alliance or rivalry; —and warring, as he does, in oligarchic fashion, with only a few of his resources, he is in most cases defeated, though he still contrives to get rich.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Can we any longer hesitate, to rank the niggard and the money-maker as resembling a state under an oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Democracy, as it seems, must next be considered, —how it arises, and when once arisen, what kind of man it produces; —in order that understanding the nature of such a man, we may at once bring him to trial.

Adeimantus/ Yes; —that would be our consistent course.

Socrates/ Well then, is not the change from oligarchy to democracy produced in some such way as this, —through the insatiable desire of the proposed good, viz. the desire of becoming as rich as possible?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ Inasmuch as its governors govern through the possession of great wealth, they will have no wish, methinks, to restrain by law the profligate portion of the young men from squandering and wasting their property at pleasure; because, by purchasing such persons' effects, and lending on usury, they will not only be still more enriched, but held in higher repute.

Adeimantus/ Far more so than any other.

Socrates/ This, then, is already quite clear in our state, that to honor riches, and at the same time practice temperance, is impossible, since either the one or the other must necessarily be neglected.

Adeimantus/ Of course, that is quite plain.

Socrates/ While, therefore, they are neglectful in oligarchies, and allow the youths to indulge in licentiousness, they must necessarily sometimes bring men to poverty, even those that are not ignoble.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And these, I suppose, stand in our state both spurred, and in armor; some in debt, others in disgrace, others in both, hating and conspiring against those who have got what belonged to them, and against others also, for mere love of change.

Adeimantus/ Aye, such is the case.

Socrates/ These usurers, however, bent on their own interests, and apparently unobservant of these, wound all that ever yield to them by advancing them money, and so, by getting multiplied interest for the parent principal, fill the state with many a drone and pauper.

Adeimantus/ Aye, with many a one.

Socrates/ And even when such an evil is raging in the state, they are not willing to extinguish it, not even by restraining people from spending their property at pleasure, nor yet in this way by making another law to destroy such disorders.

Adeimantus/ What law?

Socrates/ One that shall follow the other, compelling the citizens to cultivate virtue; for if they were bidden to engage in voluntary contracts chiefly at their own hazard, their

usurers would create less scandal in the state, and fewer also of the evils now mentioned would arise therein.

Adeimantus/ Far fewer.

Socrates/ At present, however, it is by all these means that the governors in the state thus dispose of the governed; and both as to themselves and those belonging to them, do they not render the youths luxurious and idle as respects all bodily and mental exercises, effeminate in bearing pleasure and pains, and indolent likewise?

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And as to themselves, they neglect everything but the acquisition of wealth, and pay no more regard to virtue than the poor?

Adeimantus/ No, surely.

Socrates/ Having then been thus trained up, when the governors and their subjects are thrown together, either on a journey along the road, or in other meetings, either at public spectacles, or on warlike expeditions, either as fellow-sailors or fellow-soldiers, or when they see one another in real dangers, the poor in this case are by no means despised by the rich; —but very often a robust fellow, poor and sun-burnt, whose post in battle is by the side of a rich man bred up in the shade, and swollen with much unnecessary fat, if he should see him panting for breath and in agony, —think you not, he will consider such persons to grow rich to their own injury, and will say to his fellow, when meeting in private, that our rich men are good for nothing?

Adeimantus/ Of course, I well know, that they do so.

Socrates/ Well then, as a diseased body needs but the smallest shock from without to give it pain, and is sometimes thrown into disorder without any interference from without, so also the state that resembles it will, on the smallest occasion from without, either when one party forms an

alliance with an oligarchal, or the other with a democratic state, become discorded, and fight with itself, and also rise in revolt without any external interference.

Adeimantus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ A democracy then, I think, arises, when the poor prevailing over the rich, kill some, and banish others, and share the state-offices and magistracies equally among the remainder; and for the most part the magistracies therein are disposed of by lot.

Adeimantus/ Aye, this is the establishment of a democracy, whether it be effected through force of arms, or from the withdrawal of the other party through fear.

Socrates/ In what way then, do these live, —and what will be the character of this government; —for it is plain, that a man of this kind will appear democratic?

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ First, then, are they not free, and is not the state full of freedom of action, and speech, and each one at liberty to do what he pleases?

Adeimantus/ So it is said.

Socrates/ And where there is liberty, everyone will evidently regulate his own plan of life just as he pleases?

Adeimantus/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ Under such a government especially, methinks, men of all characters will spring up.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ This, seems likely to be the best of all governments; —just as a various-colored robe, embroidered with flowers of all kinds, —so will this appear best, variegated as it is with all sorts of manners.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And perhaps too, the multitude will reckon this the best, just as children and women looking at embroidered dresses.

Adeimantus/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Aye, my excellent friend, here is a state in which we may fitly look for a government.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ Because it comprises all kinds of government on the score of its liberty; and it seems necessary for one that desires to establish a state, as we are now doing, to come to any democratic state, the form of which he likes, as to a general political fair, and establish that which he has chosen.

Adeimantus/ Aye, he would probably be in no want of models.

Socrates/ Is not this, a divine and pleasant kind of life for the present, —that there be no need of governing in this state, even though you be able to do so, —nor yet of being a subject, unless you please, —nor of engaging in war because others do, —nor of keeping peace when others keep it, unless you desire peace; —nor again, though there be a law that restrains you from governing or administering justice, yet you no less shall govern and administer justice, if so disposed?

Adeimantus/ It is likely; —in this particular at least.

Socrates/ But what; is not their lenience towards some of those who are condemned very polite; and in such a government did you never yet see its lenity towards men condemned to death or banishment, who nevertheless remain there in open intercourse, the banished man, too, returning like a hero as if no one attended to or observed him?

Adeimantus/ Aye, many.

Socrates/ But this indulgence of the state, —not to mention the small regard, and even contempt which it shows for all that we deemed so important when settling our state, as that, unless a man had a most exalted nature, he would never become a good man, except he had from childhood upwards delighted in noble actions, and diligently followed all such pursuits; —how magnanimously does it despise and think as naught all these things, evincing an utter disregard as to the kind of pursuits from which a man comes to engage in politics, though it honors him if he only declares himself well affected towards the multitude?

Adeimantus/ How very generous.

Socrates/ These then, and others akin to these, are to be found in democracy; and it seems to be a pleasant sort of government, both anarchical and variegated, distributing a certain equality to all alike, both equals and unequals.

Adeimantus/ Aye, you say, what is perfectly well known.

Socrates/ Consider then, what kind of man such an one is in private; or shall we first consider, as we did with respect to the government, in what manner he is formed?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is he not then formed in this manner, —namely, from the parsimonious man who was under the oligarchy, —as a son, trained up under his father according to his habits?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Such an one forcibly governs his own pleasures, —such as are expensive, but not tending to the acquisition of wealth, which are hence called unnecessary.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ That we may not argue in the dark then, let us first, if you please, determine what desires are necessary, and what are not.

Adeimantus/ Willingly.

Socrates/ May not such be justly called necessary, which we cannot get rid of, and the gratification of which does us service? For both these kinds our nature must necessarily seek after; must it not?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ This then, we may justly say, is a necessary part to these desires?

Adeimantus/ Justly. But what now?

Socrates/ Such desires as a man may relinquish, if he try to do so from his youth, and which while they remain, do no good, if we say of these that they are not necessary, shall we not say right?

Adeimantus/ Right, indeed.

Socrates/ Let us select a pattern of each, that we may understand from example what they are.

Adeimantus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Is not the desire of eating necessary so far as is conducive to health and a good habit of body, and the desire of food and victuals?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ The desire of food, at least, is necessary on two accounts, as being advantageous in itself, and because the want of it must bring life to an end.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ And the desire of victuals is likewise necessary, as contributing towards a good habit of body.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what? —even such desire as goes beyond these things, or any other sorts of meats, and yet can be curbed from youth, and trained to abstain from most things, and which is hurtful both to body and soul as regards the attainment of wisdom and temperance, may not that be rightly called unnecessary?

Adeimantus/ Most rightly, indeed.

Socrates/ May we not say then that these too are expensive, and the others frugal, as they conduce towards the actions of life?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ We may speak in the same manner, surely, of venereal, and the other desires?

Adeimantus/ In the same manner.

Socrates/ And did we not, by him whom we just now called the drone, indicate a person full of such desires and pleasures, and governed by those that are unnecessary; but one governed by those merely necessary, a parsimonious man, and disposed to an oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Let us again mention, how the democratic man arises out of the oligarchic; and to me he appears to arise chiefly thus.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ When a young man brought up, as we now mentioned, without proper instruction, and in niggard fashion, comes to taste the drones' honey, and associates with those fiery, terrible creatures who can procure all sorts and varieties of pleasures, and from every quarter; —then you may conceive, he somehow begins to change the oligarchic for the democratic character.

Adeimantus/ It must be so.

Socrates/ Well then, just as the state was changed by the aid of another party from without to which it was related, is not the youth so changed likewise, through the aid of one species of desires from without, to others within him, which resemble them and are allied thereto?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And methinks, if any alliance should come to counteract the oligarchic principle within him, either through his father or other relatives, admonishing and upbraiding him, then truly will arise sedition, opposition, and an internal struggle against himself.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And sometimes, indeed, I think the democratic yields to the oligarchic principle, and some of the desires are destroyed, while others retire, because a certain modesty is engendered in the youth's soul, and he is again restored to order.

Adeimantus/ This is sometimes the case.

Socrates/ And again, I suppose, when some desires retire, others allied to them secretly grow up, which through neglect of parental instruction, become both many and powerful.

Adeimantus/ This is usually the case.

Socrates/ They draw them then towards the same intimacies as before, and through their connections secretly generate a multitude?

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And in the end, I think, they seize the citadel of the youth's soul, because they find it empty, as regards virtuous pursuits and true reasoning, —the best guardians and preservers of the rational part of men dear to the gods.

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ And then, indeed false and arrogant reasonings and opinions rush up in their stead, and take their place in such people.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And does he not then come once more, and dwell openly among those Lotophagi? —And if any aid come from intimate friends to strengthen the parsimonious principle within him, these said arrogant reasonings, by shutting against it the gates of the royal wall, neither permit the alliance itself, nor allow the ambassadorial admonitions of individual old men, but struggle against them and maintain themselves in power; —and as for modesty, they call it stupidity, and thrust it out into disgraceful exile, while temperance they call unmanliness, load it with abuse, and then expel it; —and as for moderation and decent expense, they persuade themselves that they are nothing else but rusticity and illiberality, and banish them from their territories, with many other unprofitable desires.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly, they do.

Socrates/ Having emptied and purified from all these desires, the soul, thus held by them, and initiated in the great mysteries, they next introduce with encomiums and false eulogies, indolence and anarchy, extravagance and shamelessness, shining with a great retinue, and wearing crowns, —calling insolence, good-breeding, —anarchy, liberty, —luxury, magnificence, —and impudence, manliness. Is it not, somehow thus, —that a youth, after being bred up with necessary desires falls away into the license and dissoluteness induced by needless and unprofitable pleasures?

Adeimantus/ Yes, plainly so.

Socrates/ Such an one, then, methinks, thenceforth passes his life, spending his property, labor, and time as

much on necessary as unnecessary pleasures, but if he be fortunate and not unusually excited by passion, he, as he advances in years, and the sovereignty of the passions is subdued, re-admits part of those expelled, and does not deliver himself wholly up to mere intruders, but regulates his pleasures on the principle of equality, and so lives, giving himself up to each incidental desire that happens to rule him, till he is sated, —and then another, undervaluing none, but indulging all alike.

Adeimantus/ Quite so, of course.

Socrates/ And yet such an one, will not listen to true reasoning, nor admit it into his stronghold, —should he be told that some pleasures are attached to honorable and virtuous desires, others to those that are depraved, and that he should pursue and honor the former, but chastise and hold captive the latter, —but in all these cases will dissent, and say that they are all alike, and to be held in equal honor.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly, one thus affected, does this.

Socrates/ Well then, thus does he daily live, gratifying every incidental desire, sometimes getting drunk to the sound of the flute, at others temperately drinking water, —at others, again exercising gymnastics; sometimes indolent and wholly careless; then again applying, as it were, to philosophy, —often too acting the politician, saying and doing by skips and jumps whatever comes first: —and if he would imitate any of the military tribe, thither he is carried; if the mercantile, then again thither; nor is his life regulated by any plan or law, but, deeming this particular life pleasant, and free, and blessed, he follows it throughout.

Adeimantus/ You have most fully described, the life of the man who places all laws on a level.

Socrates/ I at least am of opinion, that he is multiform, and filled with different habits; like the state, too, he is

handsome and of varied complexion, a man whose life many men and women would emulate, because he contains within himself numerous patterns both of forms of government and moral habits.

Adeimantus/ He does. What then?

Socrates/ Have we then so described and arranged such an one on the principles of democracy, as that he may be truly called one of democratic character.

Adeimantus/ We will allow that it has.

Socrates/ It still remains, however, that we discuss, that most excellent form of government and that most excellent man, —tyranny and the tyrant.

Adeimantus/ Surely.

Socrates/ Come then, my dear fellow; —what is the manner in which tyranny arises? —for it is almost plain, that it is a change from democracy.

Adeimantus/ Plain.

Socrates/ Does not tyranny arise in the same manner from democracy, as democracy does from oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ As respects the good then, which oligarchy proposed to itself, and according to which it was constituted; was it not with a view of becoming extremely rich?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ An insatiable desire then for riches, and a neglect of all besides, through attention to the acquisition of wealth, destroys it.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And with reference to what democracy denominates good, an insatiable thirst for it destroys it likewise?

Adeimantus/ But what say you, it denominates as good?

Socrates/ Liberty: —for this, you are told, is best found in a state under democratic rule, and hence anyone naturally free would choose to dwell in this alone.

Adeimantus/ This word liberty, is vastly much talked about.

Socrates/ Well then, observed I, as I was just going to say, does not the insatiable desire for this, and the neglect of other things, change even the form of government, and prepare it to need a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ When a state, is under democratic rule, thirsts after liberty, and happens to have bad cupbearers appointed it, and gets immoderately drunk with an unmixed draught thereof, it punishes even the governors, unless they be quite tame-spirited, and allow them excessive liberty, by accusing them of being corrupt and oligarchical.

Adeimantus/ They do so.

Socrates/ But such as obey the magistrates, it abuses as willing and good-for-nothing slaves; both publicly and in private they commending and honoring magistrates who resemble subjects, and subjects who resemble magistrates: must it not happen in such a state, that we must necessarily arrive at the acme of liberty?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And must it not descend, too, my friend, into private families, and at last reach even the brutes?

Adeimantus/ How, can we assert aught like this?

Socrates/ For instance, when a father gets used to become like his child, and fears his sons, and the son in like manner his father, and has neither respect nor fear of his parents, in order, forsooth, that he may be free; —and thus

a mere resident is placed on a level with a citizen, and a resident with a stranger, and so likewise a foreigner.

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Aye, these indeed happen, and other similar little things also: —and in such cases a teacher fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their teachers, and so also their tutors; and on the whole the youths resemble those more advanced in years, and rival them both in speech and action: while the old men sit down with the young, and imitate them in their love of merriment and pleasantry, for fear of appearing morose and despotic.

Adeimantus/ Quite so, of course.

Socrates/ But as to this extreme liberty of the multitude, what a height it attains in a state like this, where purchased slaves, male or female, are no less free than their purchasers, and how much equality and liberty wives enjoy with their husbands, and husbands with their wives, —this we have almost forgotten to mention.

Adeimantus/ Are we not then to say, according to Æschylus, whatever now comes into our mouth?

Socrates/ By all means; and accordingly I thus speak: —with reference even to brutes, such as are under the care of men, how much more free they are in such a state; he who has no experience thereof will not easily believe—for according to the proverb, even dogs resemble their mistresses; and horses and asses are used to run about at large, surlily driving against whomsoever they meet, unless they get out of their way; and many other such-like things happen, that indicate an abundance of liberty.

Adeimantus/ You are just telling me my dream, for this has often happened to me when going into the country.

Socrates/ But do you observe, when all these things are collected together in a whole, that they make the soul of the

citizens so sensitive, that if they were any how to be brought into slavery, they would be indignant and not endure it; —for in the end, you know, they regard laws neither written nor unwritten, and hence no one will by any means become their master?

Adeimantus/ I know it well.

Socrates/ This then, my friend, I suppose, is that government so beautiful and youthful, whence tyranny springs.

Adeimantus/ Youthful, indeed; but what then?

Socrates/ The same malady, that existed in an oligarchy, destroys this form likewise; rising also to a higher pitch of power, and enslaving the democracy by its very licentiousness; for, in fact, the doing of anything to excess usually causes great change in an opposite direction: and so it is in the seasons, as in vegetable and animal bodies, and so also not least of all in forms of government.

Adeimantus/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Aye, for excessive liberty seems only to degenerate into excessive slavery, either in private individuals or states.

Adeimantus/ It is probable, indeed.

Socrates/ Probably then, tyranny is established out of no other form than democracy; —out of the highest degree of liberty, methinks, the greatest and fiercest slavery.

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is reasonable.

Socrates/ This, however, methinks, was not what you asked: —but what is that same disease which arises in an oligarchy and a democracy, and reduces each to slavery?

Adeimantus/ Your remark is true.

Socrates/ I meant, that there was a race of idle and profuse men, the bravest of whom were the leaders, and the

more cowardly their followers, whom indeed we compared to drones; some to those with stings, others to those without stings.

Adeimantus/ Rightly too.

Socrates/ These two now, when they spring up in a government, disturb it, just like phlegm and bile in a natural body, —and against these it is the duty of a wise physician and lawgiver of a state, no less than of a wise bee-master, to take much fore-caution, —first, that they never gain admittance; —and if they should enter, that they be as soon as possible cut off, with their cells as well.

Adeimantus/ Yes, by Zeus; altogether so.

Socrates/ Let us thus then conceive the matter, that we may more distinctly see what we want.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ Let us ideally divide a democratic state into three parts, as it in fact is; for some such classification is natural to it, owing to its liberty, no less than to an oligarchy.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Yet it is much more fierce at least in this than in the former.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ In an oligarchy, from not being held in honor, but excluded from the magisterial office, it is unexercised and gains no strength; —but in a democracy it is, with a few exceptions, the presiding party, the fiercest of them ever talking and agitating, while the rest bustle about at the law-courts, and cannot endure anyone else to speak differently from itself; and thus all things, with only a few exceptions, under such a government, are managed by a party.

Adeimantus/ Very much the case.

Socrates/ Some other party, then, is always separated from the multitude.

Adeimantus/ Which?

Socrates/ While the general body are engaged in the pursuit of gain, such as are naturally the most temperate generally become the wealthiest.

Adeimantus/ Very probably.

Socrates/ And hence is it, methinks, that the greatest quantity of honey, and what comes with the greatest ease, is pressed out of these by the drones.

Adeimantus/ Yes, —for how, can anyone press it from those who have but little?

Socrates/ Such wealthy people, I think, are called the pasture of the drones.

Adeimantus/ Nearly so.

Socrates/ And the people will be a sort of third species, —such as mind their own affairs, without meddling with others, who have little property, but are yet the most numerous, and most prevailing in a democracy, whenever it is densely populated.

Adeimantus/ It is so; but this it will not often consent to do without getting some share of the honey.

Socrates/ This class, of course, always obtains a share, as far as their leaders are able, by robbing those that have property, and giving it to the people, in order that they may eat most themselves.

Adeimantus/ Aye, that is the way in which these become sharers.

Socrates/ These, then, are obliged to defend themselves. Those thus despoiled are compelled to defend themselves, saying and doing all they can among the people.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And though they have no inclination to introduce a change of government, they are charged with forming plots and plans against the common people, and being oligarchally disposed.

Adeimantus/ What next?

Socrates/ After seeing that the people, not willingly, but through ignorance and the impositions of these slanderers, attempt to injure them, do they not then, indeed, even against their wills, become truly oligarchic? —though not spontaneously, for this very mischief is generated by the drone that stings them.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And so they lay informations, make lawsuits, and have contests one with another.

Adeimantus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And are not the people always used to place someone in special presidency over themselves, and to cherish him, and promote him to great power?

Adeimantus/ They are.

Socrates/ And this, is plain, that whenever a tyrant rises, it is from the fact of thus presiding, and nothing else, that he flourishes.

Adeimantus/ This is very clear.

Socrates/ How, then, begins the change from a president into a tyrant? —is it not clearly when the president begins to do the same as is told in the fable, about the temple of the Lycean Zeus, to whom the wolf was dedicated in Arcadia?

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That whoever tastes human entrails mixed with those of other offerings, must necessarily become a wolf: —have you not heard the story?

Adeimantus/ I have.

Socrates/ Well, then, supposing him to be thus the president of the people, and having to deal with an extremely compliant multitude, he should not refrain from shedding even kindred blood, but by unjust charges, as usual, should bring men into the law-courts and murder them, as if he set no value on human life, and, tasting with unholy mouth and tongue even the blood of relations, should banish men and slay them, proposing the abolition of debts and fresh division of lands, —must not such an one of necessity, and by destiny, be either destroyed by his enemies, or else act the tyrant, and from a man, become a wolf?

Adeimantus/ Of great necessity.

Socrates/ This then, is he, —the same who rises in sedition against those who have property.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when he has been banished and returns against the will of his adversaries, he comes back, of course, an accomplished tyrant.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And if they cannot expel him, or put him to death on a state accusation, then they conspire to cut him off privately by a violent death.

Adeimantus/ It usually so happens.

Socrates/ And besides this, all who have advanced to this station invent this much-vaunted tyrannical demand, asking the people for certain body-guards, that the people's aid may be secured them.

Adeimantus/ Of this, they take special care.

Socrates/ And methinks they grant them this through fear of his safety, though secure as to their own.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And when a man observes this, who has property, and who, besides that, is further charged with hating the people, —he then, my friend, according to the answer of the oracle to Croesus;

> …… To pebble-bedded Hermus flies,
> Nor waits the brand of cowardice;……

Adeimantus/ Because he would not, be a second time in fear.

Socrates/ But surely, he at least, methinks, that is caught, is put to death.

Adeimantus/ Of necessity so.

Socrates/ It is plain, then, that this president of our state does not like a noble person, nobly lie, but, after hurling down many others, sits in his chair of office, a consummate tyrant of the state, —and not a president.

Adeimantus/ Of course, he is likely to be so.

Socrates/ Shall we then examine the happiness both of the man and the state, in which such a mortal as this is engendered?

Adeimantus/ Let us do so by all means.

Socrates/ Does he not, then, in the first days, and for a brief season, smile and salute everyone he meets, and asserting himself to be no tyrant, and promise many things, both in public and private, and liberate men from debts, and distribute land both to the public and those about him, and affect to be mild and liberal towards all?

Adeimantus/ He must.

Socrates/ But, methinks, when he becomes reconciled to some of his foreign enemies, and has destroyed others, and there is quiet respecting these, he first of all is ever exciting wars, that the people may be in need of a leader.

Adeimantus/ Aye, that is likely.

Socrates/ Is it not also then, that, being rendered poor by contributing to the public treasury, they may be compelled to be anxious for daily sustenance, and so less readily conspire against him?

Adeimantus/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ And methinks, if he suspects that any of a free spirit will not allow him to govern, —in order that he may have some pretext for destroying them, he exposes them to the enemy; for all these reasons a tyrant must necessarily be always raising war.

Adeimantus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And, while he is doing these things, he will necessarily become more hateful to the citizens.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And, therefore, some of those who have been promoted along with him and are in power, use great plainness of speech, towards him and among themselves, finding fault with what is done, —such at least, as are of a more manly spirit.

Adeimantus/ Aye, probably so.

Socrates/ The tyrant, therefore, if he means to govern, must cut off all these, till he leave no one, either friend or foe, worth anything.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ He must carefully notice them, —who is courageous, who is magnanimous, who wise, who rich; and in this manner is he happy, that, willing or unwilling, he is under a necessity of being an enemy to all like these; and to form plots against them, till he has purged the state.

Adeimantus/ A fine purging indeed!

Socrates/ Yes, the reverse of what the physicians do with regard to animal bodies; for they take away the worst and leave the best; but he does the contrary.

Adeimantus/ Because it seems, if he is to govern, he must necessarily do so.

Socrates/ By a blessed necessity, then truly, is he bound; which compels him either to live with a depraved multitude, —hated by them too, or not live at all.

Adeimantus/ In such necessity he is.

Socrates/ And the more he is hated by the citizens whilst he does these things, will he not so much the more require a greater number of guards, and those more faithful?

Adeimantus/ It is impossible he should not.

Socrates/ Who then are the faithful, and whence shall he procure them?

Adeimantus/ Many, will come flying to him of their own accord, if he give them pay.

Socrates/ By the dog, you seem again to be talking of certain drones, both foreign and multiform.

Adeimantus/ Aye, you think right.

Socrates/ But those of the state itself, —would he not desire to have them also as guards?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ After he has taken away the slaves from the citizens, would he not give them their liberty, and make of them guards about his person?

Adeimantus/ By all means; for these are the most faithful to him.

Socrates/ What a blessed possession of the tyrants, is this which you mention, if he employ such friends and faithful men, after having destroyed the former ones!

Adeimantus/ But at any rate, such he surely does employ.

Socrates/ And then his companions, admire him, and the young citizens flock around him: but those that are respectable men both hate and fly from him.

Adeimantus/ Of course they would.

Socrates/ It is not without reason, then, that tragedy is generally thought a wise thing, and that Euripides is thought to excel in it.

Adeimantus/ Why?

Socrates/ Because he uttered this, the result of deep reflection, that tyrants are wise, by intercourse with the wise; —and he plainly said, those were wise with whom they hold converse.

Adeimantus/ And he commends tyranny too, as some divine thing, and says a great deal else about it, as do the other poets.

Socrates/ Those composers then of tragedy, as they are wise, will forgive both ourselves and others who establish governments analogous to our own, for not admitting them into our republic, as being panegyrists of tyranny.

Adeimantus/ Methinks, such of them, at least, as are well mannered, will forgive us.

Socrates/ But they will go about through other states, methinks, drawing together the crowds, and put to sale their fine, magnificent, and persuasive words, and so draw over governments to tyrannies and democracies.

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ And do they not further receive rewards and are specially honored, first by tyrants, as is natural, and next by a democracy; but the higher they advance in the

forms of government, the more does honor forsake them, disabled as it were by an asthma from pursuing its progress.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Thus far, have we digressed: and now let us go back and talk about the army of the tyrant, beautiful as it is numerous, multiform, and ever the same, —how it is to be maintained.

Adeimantus/ It is plain, that whatever sacred things there be in the state, these they will despoil, and make the sale-proceeds therefrom to be such from time to time as to cause the commons to pay lighter taxes.

Socrates/ But when these fail, what will they do?

Adeimantus/ It is plain, that he and his boon-companions, and associates, male and female, will be maintained out of his paternal inheritance.

Socrates/ I understand: —the party that made the tyrant is to maintain him and his companions.

Adeimantus/ Surely it must be so.

Socrates/ How, say you? —if the people were to be enraged, and say, that it is not just for a son arrived at mature age to be maintained by the father, but on the contrary, the father by the son, and that he did not beget and bring him up for this purpose, to be himself a slave to his slaves after they have grown up, and to maintain him and his slaves with the rest of the riotous crew, —but rather that under his auspices he might be liberated from the rich in the state, who are also called the good and worthy: —and now he orders him and his companions to leave the state as a father drives from home his son and his rackety boon-fellows.

Adeimantus/ By Zeus, then, the people, such as they are, will know what sort of a creature they have begotten,

embraced, and nurtured, and that being themselves the weaker party, they are still trying to drive out the stronger.

Socrates/ How say you; —will the tyrant dare to offer violence to his father, and actually strike him if he will not yield?

Adeimantus/ Yes, for he has stripped him of his armor.

Socrates/ The tyrant, you call a parricide and a hard-hearted nourisher of old age; and this, as it seems, would be an acknowledged tyranny; and, as the saying is, —the common people, flying from the smoke of slavery among freemen, have fallen into the slavish fire of despotism, and instead of excessive and unreasonable liberty, they embrace the most rigorous and bitterest captivity of actual slaves.

Adeimantus/ Aye, —this is very much the case.

Socrates/ What then, may it not be concluded with due consideration, that we have shown in sufficient detail how tyranny arises out of democracy, and its nature also, when it does arise?

Adeimantus/ Quite sufficiently, of course.

THE END OF THE EIGHTH BOOK.

Book 8.

Socrates/ We have yet, to consider the tyrannical man himself, how he arises out of the democratic, —and, when he does arise, what is his nature, and what kind of life he leads, whether wretched or happy.

Adeimantus/ Yes, we have.

Socrates/ Know you, what I still want?

Adeimantus/ What?

Socrates/ We do not seem to have sufficiently distinguished as regards the desires; what is their nature and amount; and how many; and while there is any defect in this, the inquiry we make will not be very clear.

Adeimantus/ Is it not good time for that yet? I wish to know about them; —for it is this. Of pleasures and desires that are not necessary, some seem to me contrary to law, —which indeed seem engendered in all men: —though owing to the correction of the laws, and of improved desires aided by reason, they either forsake some men altogether, or are less numerous and feeble, while in others they are more powerful and more numerous. Will you inform me what these are?

Socrates/ Such, as are excited in sleep, when the rest of the soul—which is rational, mild, and its governing principle, is asleep, and when that part which is savage and rude, being sated with food and drink, frisks about, drives away sleep, and seeks to go and accomplish its practices; —in such an one, you know, it dares to do everything, because it is loosed and disengaged from all modesty and prudence: for, if it pleases, it scruples not at the embraces, even of a mother, or anyone else, whether gods, men, or beasts; nor to commit murder, nor abstain from any sort of meat, —and in one word, it is wanting neither in folly nor shamelessness.

Adeimantus/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ But when a man is in good health, methinks, and lives temperately, and goes to sleep, after exciting his reason, and feasting it with noble reasonings and investigations, having thus attained to an internal harmony, and given up the appetites neither to want nor repletion, that they may be at rest, and not disturb that part which is best, either by joy or grief, but suffer it by itself alone without interruption to inquire and long to apprehend what it knows not, —either something of what has existed, or now exists, or will exist hereafter; and so also, having soothed the spirited part of the soul, and not allowed it to be hurried into transports of anger, or to fall asleep with agitated passion; —but after having quieted these two parts of the soul, and roused to action that third part, in which wisdom dwells, he will thus take his rest; —you know, that by such an one the truth is best apprehended, and the visions of his dreams are then least of all portrayed contrary to the law.

Adeimantus/ I am quite of this opinion.

Socrates/ We have digressed indeed a little too far in talking of these things; —but what we want to be known is this, that in everyone resides a certain species of desires that are terrible, savage, and irregular, even in some that we deem ever so moderate: —and this indeed becomes manifest in sleep. —Now consider, if I seem to be speaking to the purpose, and whether you agree with me.

Adeimantus/ Aye, indeed, I do.

Socrates/ As for the people's man then, recollect how we described him, as being brought up somehow from infancy under a parsimonious father, who valued avaricious desires only; and despised all such as were unnecessary, arising only out of a love of amusement and finery. Was he not?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But getting acquainted with the more refined, who are full of the desires just mentioned, running into all sorts of insolence, and imbibing their manners through detestation of his father's parsimony; —and yet having a better natural temper than his corrupters, and being drawn opposite ways, he at length settles down into a mode of life equidistant from either, and so in his opinion, participating moderately of each, leads a life neither illiberal nor lawless, after having thus become a democrat instead of an oligarchist.

Adeimantus/ Yes, —this, was and is our opinion of such an one.

Socrates/ Suppose now again, that, when such an one has become old, he has a young son educated according to his own habits.

Adeimantus/ I suppose it.

Socrates/ And suppose, too, that the same happens to him as to his father; —that he is drawn into all lawlessness, which his seducers call all freedom; and that his father and his domestics are aiding those intermediate desires; —and that others also lend their assistance when these clever conjurers and tyrant-makers have no hopes of otherwise keeping youth in their power, and so contrive to excite in him a certain love which is to preside over the passive desires, which distribute what may be at hand to all the rest, —a certain large-winged drone; —or what else think you, is that kind of love?

Adeimantus/ For my part, I think, it is no other than this.

Socrates/ Well, —when the rest of the desires buzz about him, full of their odors and perfumes, and crowns and wines, and the dissolute pleasures belonging to such associations, —and at last by their increase and nurture, add to the drone a sting of desire, then truly he is sentinelled by madness as

a life-guard, and this president of the soul becomes frenzied; and even should he find in himself any opinions or desires which are deemed good and modest, he kills them and pushes them from him, till he has ridded himself of temperance and has become brimful of madness.

Adeimantus/ You perfectly describe, the formation of a tyrannical man.

Socrates/ Is it not for some such reason as this, that love has of old been said to be a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Well, my friend, and is not a drunken man likewise somewhat of a tyrannical spirit?

Adeimantus/ He is indeed.

Socrates/ And besides that, he that is mad and disturbed in his mind, undertakes and hopes to be able to govern not only men, but the gods as well.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ The tyrannical- character then, happy man! becomes so in full perfection, when either by temper or pursuits, or both, he becomes drunken and given up to love and melancholy.

Adeimantus/ Perfectly so, indeed.

Socrates/ Such an one, it seems, then, is thus engendered, —but how does he pass his life?

Adeimantus/ Just as they say in their games; —“this you shall tell me too.

Socrates/ I will tell you then; —for I think, that in the next place, they have feastings and reveling and banqueting and mistresses, and all such things as may be expected among those with whom dwells the tyrant love, and governing all in the soul.

Adeimantus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Will there not then, each day and night, blossom forth numerous fierce desires, eagerly in want of many things?

Adeimantus/ Many indeed.

Socrates/ And if they get any supplies of their wishes, these are soon spent?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And after this there are borrowings and forfeitures of property?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And when everything fails them, must it not follow, that while the numerous and powerful desires nestled in the mind, will on the one hand raise a clamor, the men, on the other hand, who are driven and goaded by the rest of the passions, but especially by love itself, which commands all the others as its life-guards, will rage with frenzy, and seek after people's property, to see if they can plunder it either by fraud or violence?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Of necessity, then, they must either plunder from all quarters, or else be hampered with great pain and anguish.

Adeimantus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And as in such a man his new pleasures are greater than those he had before, and depreciate the value of the others, will he not similarly deem it right for himself, however young, to have more than his father and mother, and to take away from them, when he has spent his own portion, applying to his own use what belongs to his parents?

Adeimantus/ Of course he will.

Socrates/ And if they will not give it up to him, will he not at first try to pilfer or defraud his parents?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And should he be unable to do this, he will next use rapine and violence?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ But supposing, my fine fellow, that the old man and woman fall out and fight, will he not be very cautious and wary of doing what is tyrannical?

Adeimantus/ I, for my part, am not quite sure about the safety of such a person's parents.

Socrates/ But by Zeus, Adimantus, think you, that for the sake of a newly beloved and unnecessary mistress, such a person would abandon his long loved and closely connected mother; or for the sake of a youth newly loved and with whom he has no ties, give up to stripes his withered but time-honored father, and the most ancient of all his friends, suffering them to be the slaves of these others, by bringing them into the same house?

Adeimantus/ Yes, by Zeus, I do.

Socrates/ It seems indeed, a vastly blessed thing to be the father of a tyrannical son! Not at all so. But what, when the father and mother's riches are beginning to fail such an one, and when the great swarm of pleasures has been already collected within him, will he not be the first to scale the wall of some house, or strip some one of his coat late at night, and after that rifle some temple? —And in all these acts, as respects the opinions which he formerly held from boyhood, and which guided his decisions concerning good and evil, the passions, that are newly loosed from slavery and placed as the body-guards of Love, will prevail therewith; —and these indeed had only just been loosed from their dreamy sleep, when he was himself still under the law and governed

by his father, as under a democracy: —yet afterwards, when tyrannized over by love, such as he rarely was when in his dreams, he will ever be when awake, nor will he abstain from slaughter, however horrid, or food, or any deed whatever: —but that tyrant love within him, living without restraint of law or government, as if it were sole monarch, will lead on the man it possesses, as it would a state, to every act of madness, whereby he can support himself and the mob of passions about him, which partly entering from without, through evil company, and partly through the manners of the man and his associates, have been unchained and set at liberty: now is not this the life of such an one?

Adeimantus/ It is this truly.

Socrates/ And if, there be, only a few such in the state, and the rest of the people are sober, they go out and serve as guards to other tyrants, or assist them for hire in case of war: but remain at home during peace and quiet, giving rise in the state to a great many minor evils.

Adeimantus/ What mean you?

Socrates/ Such as these: they steal, break open houses, cut purses, strip people of their clothes, rifle temples, make people slaves, and, where they can speak, sometimes turn false informers, give false testimony, and take bribes.

Adeimantus/ These then you call minor mischiefs, —if there be but a few such persons.

Socrates/ What is small, is small in comparison to the great; and all these things with regard to the tyrant, when compared with the wickedness and misery of the state, do not, as the saying is, come near the mark; for when the state has many such, and others for their companions, and when they perceive their own number, then these are the persons who, led by the people's folly, elevate to the tyranny the man

among them who has within his soul most of the tyrant, and in the greatest strength.

Adeimantus/ Probably so, indeed; for he will be most suited for a tyrant.

Socrates/ Of course, if they voluntarily submit to him: —but if the state will not allow him to use the violence towards them, with which he formerly treated his father and mother, so he will now again, if he can, chastise his country by bringing in his youthful associates, and enslaving under them, as the Cretans say, his once dear mother-land and fatherland: —and this will of course be the issue of such a man's desire.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Do not these then behave thus in private life; —even before becoming rulers; first with the company they keep, either associating with their own flatterers and those who are ready to supply their every want; or if they ask one for anything, falling down as suppliants, and deigning to assume the disguise of friends; but after they have gained their own purposes, acting as foes?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Throughout life then they live as real friends to no one whatever, but always either as masters or slaves to another; —because for liberty and true friendship the tyrant's nature has no relish whatever.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ May we not rightly call these men faithless?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And as unjust, moreover, as they possibly can be, if indeed we, in what we said before were rightly agreed as to the nature of justice?

Adeimantus/ Aye, we were quite right.

Socrates/ Let us then give a summary account, of this worst man of ours; he is the same kind of person, awake perhaps, whom we just described as asleep.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And does not that man become such, who with a tyrannical nature holds the sovereign sway, and the longer he lives in tyrant-life become so more and more?

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And will not the man, who appears the most wicked, appear likewise the most wretched; and will not he who holds the tyranny longest and exercises it most, be really such in the greatest measure and for the longest time? —but many as are men, so many are their minds.

Glaucon/ Of necessity, these things must be so.

Socrates/ And would not the tyrant man, as closely resemble a state under tyranny, at the democratic man resembles the state under democracy, and so likewise as respects the others?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ As state then is to state with regard to virtue and happiness, so surely will man be to man likewise?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ What then is the state governed by a tyrant as compared with one under a kingly government, —such as we first described?

Glaucon/ The exact contrary; for the one is best, and the other the worst.

Socrates/ I will not ask, which you mean, for that is plain; but do you judge is it thus or otherwise, that you judge of their happiness and misery? —and let us not be struck with admiration when considering the tyrant himself, or the few about him; but let us, as we ought, enter into the whole

state, and declare our opinion, after going through and viewing every part.

Glaucon/ You propose what is right: —and it is clear to all that no state is more wretched than one under tyranny, and none more happy than that under regal power.

Glaucon/ Well then, in proposing these same things with respect to individual men, should I rightly propose, if I accounted that man a suitable judge of them, who can by intellectual power penetrate into and inspect a man's disposition, and is not, as a child looking at exteriors, astounded by the pomp, which tyrants exhibit to those without, but has the power of looking properly through him? If then I thought that we should all listen to the man, who from having dwelt with him in the same house, and been joined in his family transactions, is able to judge how he behaves to each of his domestics, in which most especially a man appears stripped of his actors finery, and so also in public dangers; and if when he has observed all this, I were to bid him declare how the tyrant stands, as regards happiness and misery, in comparison with others.

Glaucon/ You would be quite right in proposing this.

Socrates/ Are you willing then, that we should set up to be of the number of those who are able to judge, and who have already fallen in with such characters, so that we may have someone to answer our questions?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Come then, thus consider it: —call to mind the mutual resemblance of the state and individual man; and thus, considering each by turns, describe to us the passions of each.

Glaucon/ What passions?

Socrates/ To begin first, with the state; —do you call the one under tyranny, free or enslaved?

Glaucon/ Enslaved, in the greatest degree possible.

Socrates/ And moreover, you see in it some who are masters and freemen?

Glaucon/ I see some indeed, but exceedingly few: —but the greatest and best part therein generally is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved.

Socrates/ If then, the individual man resembles the state, will he not necessarily be placed under like circumstances, and his soul be filled with slavery and illiberality, and those parts of it too be enslaved which were the most noble, and that small part of it too assume the mastery, which is the most wicked and insane of all?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ What then, —will you say, that such a soul is slavish or free?

Glaucon/ Slavish perhaps, I say.

Socrates/ But is not the state that is slavish, and governed by tyranny, least of all able to do what it likes?

Glaucon/ Aye, —quite so.

Socrates/ And speaking of a soul generally, will it not, when governed by tyranny, least of all do what it likes, —but being constantly hurried by some stinging passion, be full of tumult and inconstancy?

Glaucon/ Of course it must be so.

Socrates/ But will the state governed by tyranny be necessarily rich or poor?

Glaucon/ Poor.

Socrates/ And must a soul under a tyranny then be ever penurious and insatiable?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But what, —must not such a state and such an individual be necessarily full of fear?

Glaucon/ It must be so.

Socrates/ As for lamentations, and groans, and weepings, and torments, think you that you would find more in any other kind of state?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ And in a man, think you that such things exist in anyone to a greater extent than in this tyrannical one who is maddened by his desires and lusts?

Glaucon/ How can they?

Socrates/ It is with reference, I suppose, then to all these, and other such like things, that you have deemed this the most wretched of all states?

Glaucon/ Was I not right then in doing so?

Socrates/ Certainly. But what say you again as respects the tyrannical man, with regard to these same things?

Glaucon/ That he is by far, the most wretched of all in the world.

Socrates/ This, you are not quite correct in saying.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ He is not as yet, methinks, as unhappy as he can be.

Glaucon/ But who is so?

Socrates/ The following person probably you will deem even yet more miserable than the other.

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ That man, who being naturally tyrannical, remains not in private life, but is unfortunate enough to be induced by his destiny to become a tyrant.

Glaucon/ From what has been formerly observed, I presume that what you say is true.

Socrates/ Yes; —but we ought not merely to conjecture about matters so important as these, but to sift them to the bottom, in the way we are now about to do; for most momentous is the inquiry about a good life and a bad one.

Glaucon/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Consider, then, whether there be anything in what I say; for, in considering this question, it is my opinion that we ought to perceive it from what follows.

Glaucon/ From what?

Socrates/ From every individual private man, among such as are rich, and possess many slaves; for these have at least this resemblance to tyrants, that they rule over many, —the difference being in the multitude of the latter.

Glaucon/ Aye, —there is some difference.

Socrates/ Are you sure then that these live securely, without dread of their domestics?

Glaucon/ Aye, —for what should they fear?

Socrates/ Nothing; but do you understand the reason?

Glaucon/ Yes; —because the whole state assists each particular individual.

Socrates/ You say right: —but what, —if one of the gods were to take a man who had fifty slaves or upwards out of the state, —both himself, his wife, and children, —and set them down in a desert with the rest of his property, and his domestics, where no freemen would be likely to lend him aid, —what kind of fear, think you, he would entertain about himself, his children, and his wife, of being destroyed by the domestics?

Glaucon/ The greatest possible, methinks.

Socrates/ Would he not be obliged to flatter some of his very slaves and make them many promises, and set them at

liberty without need, and so appear to be himself the flatterer of servants?

Glaucon/ He must of course be compelled to do so, or else be destroyed.

Socrates/ But what; —if the god were to place round him many other neighbors who could not endure for anyone to pretend to lord it over another, —and, wherever they find such an one, punished him with extreme rigor?

Glaucon/ Methinks, he would be still more distressed, when thus beset by a whole host of foes.

Socrates/ And is not the tyrant bound in such a prison-house, if he be of such disposition as we have described, —full of many and all kinds of aversions and desires; and whilst he is most eager in his soul, he alone of all in the state is not allowed to go abroad, or to see what others love to see, but huddles himself at home, and lives mostly as a woman, envying the other citizens, whenever they travel abroad, and see what is good?

Glaucon/ Wholly so, of course.

Socrates/ Well, then, through such evils as these, does not the man reap still more, who, being ill-governed within himself, a person whom you just now deemed to be the most of all wretched, remains not in private station, but through some fortune or other is obliged to act the tyrant, and, though unable to control himself, attempts to govern others, as if with a body diseased, and unable to support itself, one were compelled to live not in a state of privacy, but in wrestling and fighting against other bodies?

Glaucon/ What you say, Socrates, is altogether most probable and true.

Socrates/ Is not this condition, then, dear Glaucon, altogether wretched; and does not the tyrant live more

wretchedly even than the man that you conceive to live the most wretchedly of all?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ True is it, then, though one may fancy otherwise, that the really tyrannical man is really a slave to the greatest flatteries and slaveries, and a flatterer of the most abandoned men; and without ever in the smallest degree satisfying his desires, he is of all men most in want of most things, and poor indeed, if one could but look into his whole soul, and full of fear throughout life, filled with terrors and griefs, —if, indeed, he resembles the constitution of the state he rules: —and he does resemble it; does he not?

Glaucon/ Extremely.

Socrates/ And in addition to this, shall we not ascribe also to the tyrant-man what we formerly mentioned that he must necessarily be, and by governing become increasingly, envious, faithless, unjust, unfriendly, impious, —the entertainer and encourager of all vice; and from all these causes be specially happy himself, and render all about him happy likewise?

Glaucon/ No one of understanding will, contradict you.

Socrates/ Come, then, as a judge who is examining the whole case; so tell me, —who, in your opinion, is first in happiness, and who second, and the rest in order, five in all; namely, the regal, the timocratic, the oligarchical, the democratic, and the tyrannic.

Glaucon/ Easy, indeed, is this decision: —for as they came before us, I have judged of them as public actors, by their virtue and vice, —happiness and its contrary.

Socrates/ Shall we then hire ourselves a herald? or shall I myself declare, that the son of Ariston has judged the best and justest man to be the happiest, and that this is the man who is fittest to be as king, and as king too over himself; and

that the worst and the most unjust is the most wretched; and that he is the most tyrannical, who in the greatest degree tyrannizes over himself and the state?

Glaucon/ So let it be pronounced by you.

Socrates/ Must I, then, state in addition, whether they be unknown to be such or not, to all men, and the gods too?

Glaucon/ Pray do so.

Socrates/ Well then; —this would seem to be one of our proofs; and this, if you please, must be the second.

Glaucon/ Which is this?

Socrates/ Since the soul, of every individual is divided into three parts, just as we divided our state, it will, in my opinion, admit of a second illustration.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ It is this: —of the parts of the soul there appear to me to be three pleasures, one peculiar to each, with desires and governments in like manner.

Glaucon/ How say you?

Socrates/ One part we say, by which a man learns, another by which he is roused to spirit; but as for the third, it is so multiform, that we cannot express it by anyone word peculiar to itself, but have named it from the greatest and most impetuous part thereof; calling it the desiderative, from the impetuosity of the desires for eating and drinking, and sexual pleasures, and such-like enjoyments, and calling it money-loving also, as it is through wealth most especially that such desires are accomplished.

Glaucon/ And we said rightly.

Socrates/ Well, then, if we are to call it the pleasure and delight in gain, shall we not do best to reduce it under one head in our discourse, so that we may have something quite clear to ourselves, when we are speaking of this part of the

soul? And in calling it money-loving, and profit-loving, shall we not be giving it its proper term?

Glaucon/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ But what; do not we say, that the spirited principle ought to be wholly impelled to superiority, victory, and applause?

Glaucon/ Especially so.

Socrates/ If, then, we term it the contentious and ambitious, shall we not accurately express it?

Glaucon/ Most accurately.

Socrates/ But as regards that part of the soul by which we gain knowledge, it is clear to everyone, that it is wholly intent on always knowing the truth, wherever it may be; and as to wealth and glory, least of all does it care for these.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ By terming it, then, the love of learning, and philosophy, we shall be defining it correctly?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And in these people's souls, one governs in some, and the other in others, as it happens?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ This was why we said then, that of men also there were three original species; the philosophic, the ambitious, and the avaricious?

Glaucon/ Surely so.

Socrates/ And likewise three species of pleasures, — corresponding to each of the others?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ You know, then, that if you were to ask these three men, by turns, which of these lives is the pleasantest, each would most commend his own; and the money-maker

would say, that, compared with the pleasures of acquiring wealth, those arising from honor, or learning, are of no value, unless they bring in money?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And what says the ambitious man? does not he deem the pleasure arising from moneymaking a sort of burden; —and again, that which arises from learning, unless it bring him honor, mere smoke and trifling?

Glaucon/ So it is.

Socrates/ And as for the philosopher, we may suppose that he deems all other pleasures in comparison with that of knowing the nature of truth as a mere nothing, and that, while constantly employed in learning something of this kind, he is not far off from pleasure, —and calls them really necessary, because he wanted none else, except when compelled by necessity.

Glaucon/ This, you should well know.

Socrates/ When these several lives then, and the pleasures peculiar to each, are at variance with each other, not with reference to a mode of life, worthier or more base, worse or better, —but merely with reference to living more pleasantly or painfully; —how can we know which of the two speaks most in accordance with truth?

Glaucon/ I am not, quite able to tell.

Socrates/ But consider it thus: —by what criterion ought we to judge about matters rightly presented for our judgment; —is it not by experience, prudence, and reason, —or can we find any better criterion than these?

Glaucon/ How can we?

Socrates/ Consider now; —of the three men, who is the most experienced in all the pleasures? —Think you that the money-loving man, by learning the real nature of truth,

gains more experience in the pleasure arising from knowledge, than the philosopher has in that resulting from the acquisition of wealth?

Glaucon/ There is a great difference: for the philosopher must necessarily from early childhood taste the other pleasures; but what it is to know real beings, and how sweet is its pleasure, the money-getting man need not taste, or become experienced therein; —nay, indeed, it is no easy matter, even should he earnestly try to accomplish it.

Socrates/ The philosopher then, far surpasses the money-getting man, at least in experience of both the pleasures.

Glaucon/ Far indeed.

Socrates/ But what as regards the ambitious man—has he any more experience in the pleasure arising from honor, than the philosopher in that which arises from the exercise of intellect?

Glaucon/ Honor, indeed, attends them all, if each obtains his object: for the rich man is honored by many, and so is the brave, and the wise; so all of them have experience, as to the kind of pleasure attending honor, but in the contemplation of being itself, as to the pleasure which it gives, it is impossible for any other than the philosopher to have tasted it.

Socrates/ On the ground of experience then, he of all men is the best judge.

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And surely, including prudence also, he alone has experience.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But the organ, by which these pleasures must be judged, is not the organ of the money-getter, nor of the ambitious man, but of the philosopher.

Glaucon/ Which is that?

Socrates/ We said somewhere, that they must be judged of by reason, —did we not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But reasoning is chiefly the organ of the philosopher?

Glaucon/ Of course it is.

Socrates/ If then the things to be determined could be best determined by riches and gain, what the money-getting man commended, or despised, would necessarily be most agreeable to truth?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And if by honor, victory, and courage, —must it not be as the ambitious and contentious man determined?

Glaucon/ It is evident.

Socrates/ But since it is by experience, prudence, and reason, it follows of course, that what is praised by the philosopher and the lover of reason must be the most true. —Of the three pleasures, then, that which belongs to that part of the soul by which we learn most is the most pleasant, and that man in whom this part of us holds the chief sway lives the pleasantest life.

Glaucon/ How can it be doubted? —for the wise man, who has the supreme right to commend, commends his own life.

Socrates/ But which life, does our judge pronounce the second, and which the second pleasure?

Glaucon/ Plainly, that of the warlike and ambitious man; for this is nearer to his own than that of the money-getter.

Socrates/ And that of the covetous, as it appears, is last of all?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ These things then will succeed one another in order; and the just man will twice prevail over the unjust: —the third victory now, as at the Olympic games, is sacred to Olympian Zeus, the Savior; for you must consider, that, with the exception of that of the wise man, the pleasure of the others is by no means genuine nor pure, but somehow shadowed over, as I think I have myself heard from one of the wise men: —and this truly would be the greatest and most complete downfall.

Glaucon/ Extremely so; —but how mean you?

Socrates/ I will thus trace it out, whilst in searching you answer my questions.

Glaucon/ Ask then.

Socrates/ Tell me then, do we not say that pain is contrary to pleasure?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And do we not say likewise, that to feel neither pleasure nor pain is something?

Glaucon/ We say it is.

Socrates/ And that the state between both of these is a certain tranquility of the soul with reference to them; —do you not so understand it?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Do you not remember, the speeches of the diseased, which they utter when they are sick?

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ That nothing is sweeter than health, but that it escaped their notice before they became sick, that it was the sweetest.

Glaucon/ I remember it.

Socrates/ And are you not wont to hear those who are under acute pain say, that there is nothing sweeter than a cessation from pain?

Glaucon/ I do hear them.

Socrates/ And you may perceive the same thing in men, I think, when they are in other but similar circumstances, where, if in pain, they extol a freedom from pain and the tranquility of such a state, as being most sweet, though they do not extol that of feeling joy.

Glaucon/ Because perhaps the latter, becomes at that time sweet and desirable, —namely, tranquility.

Socrates/ And when anyone ceases, from feeling joy, the tranquility of pleasure will be painful.

Glaucon/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ This tranquility, then, which we just now said was between the two, will at times become both pain and pleasure.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ What, —is it possible, that what is neither of the two should become both?

Glaucon/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ And moreover, when what is pleasant or painful is in the soul, both sensations are a certain excitement; are they not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But did not that which is neither painful nor pleasant appear just now to be tranquility, and between these two?

Glaucon/ It did appear so.

Socrates/ How is it right, then, to deem it sweet not to be in pain, or painful not to enjoy pleasure?

Glaucon/ It is by no means right.

Socrates/ In these cases, then, tranquility is not really so; but it appears pleasant by comparison with the painful, and painful compared with the pleasant; and there is nothing genuine in these appearances as regards the truth of pleasure, but a certain magical delusion.

Glaucon/ Aye, —just as our argument proves.

Socrates/ Consider the pleasures then, which do not arise from the cessation of pain, so as not frequently during our discussion to hold the frequent notion that these two naturally thus subsist; viz., that pleasure is the cessation of pain, and pain the cessation of pleasure.

Glaucon/ How, and to what pleasures do you allude?

Socrates/ There are many others, particularly if you wish to consider the pleasures that arise from smell; for these, without any preceding pain, are on a sudden immensely great, and, when they cease, they leave no pain behind them.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Let us not then be persuaded that pure pleasure is the removal of pain, or pain the removal of pleasure.

Glaucon/ No, we will not.

Socrates/ But yet, those which extend through the body to the soul, and which are called pleasures, the greatest part of them almost, and the most considerable, are of this species, —certain cessations from pain?

Glaucon/ They are so.

Socrates/ And are not the preconceptions of pleasure and pain, which arise in the mind from their expectation, of the same kind?

Glaucon/ Of the same.

Socrates/ Do you know then, of what class they are, and what they chiefly resemble?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Do you conceive, there is any such thing in nature as this, the above, the below, and the middle?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you think then that anyone, when brought from the below to the middle, imagines anything else than that he is brought to the above; and when he stands in the middle, and looks down whence he was brought, will he imagine that he is anywhere else than above, whilst yet he has not seen the true above?

Glaucon/ By Zeus, I do not think that such an one will imagine otherwise.

Socrates/ But if he should again, be carried to the below, he would conjecture he was carried to the below, and conjecture rightly?

Glaucon/ He would of course.

Socrates/ Would he not be thus affected from his want of experience in what is really above, and in the middle, and below?

Glaucon/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ Would you wonder then, that while men are inexperienced in the truth, they have unsound opinions about many other things, —and that as to pleasure and pain, and what is between these, they are likewise affected in the same manner; so that, even when they are brought to what is painful, they conceive truly, and are really pained; but when from pain they are brought to the middle, they strongly imagine that they have arrived at the highest pitch of pleasure, in the same manner as those, who along with the black color look at the gray, through inexperience of the

white, and so are deceived? and just so those who consider pain along with the freedom from pain, are deceived through inexperience of pleasure.

Glaucon/ By Zeus, I should not wonder, but much rather if it were not so.

Socrates/ Consider the matter thus; are not hunger and thirst, and such-like things, certain emptinesses in the bodily habit?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And are not ignorance and folly an emptiness in the habit of the soul?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And is not the one filled when it receives food, and the other when it acquires intelligence?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ But which is the more real repletion, that of the less, or the more truly real being?

Glaucon/ It is plain, that of the more real.

Socrates/ Which species, then, do you think, participate most of a purer essence; those which partake of bread and drink, and meat, and all such sort of nourishment; or that species which partakes of true opinion and science, and intelligence, and, in short, of all virtue? —And judge of it thus: —That which is connected with what is always similar, and immortal, and true, and is so of itself, and arises in what is of the same character, think you that it has more of the reality of being, than what is connected to what is never similar and mortal, and is such itself, and is generated in a thing of the same character?

Glaucon/ Aye, this differs greatly from that which is always similar.

Socrates/ Does then the essence of that which is always similar participate more of essence than of science?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But what as regards truth?

Glaucon/ Nor of this neither.

Socrates/ If it participate less of truth, does it not likewise do so of essence?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ In short, then, do not those species which relate to the care of the body partake less of truth and essence, than those relating to the care of the soul?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And the body likewise less than the soul; do you not think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Is not that which is filled with more real beings, and is itself a more real being, in reality more truly filled than that which is filled with less real beings, and is itself a less real being?

Glaucon/ Of course it is.

Socrates/ If then it be pleasant to be filled with what is suitable to nature, that which is in reality filled, and with more real being, must be made both more really and more truly to enjoy true pleasure; but that which participates of less real being, must be less truly and solidly filled, and participates of a more uncertain and less genuine pleasure.

Glaucon/ Most necessarily.

Socrates/ Such then as are unacquainted with wisdom and virtue, and are always conversant in feastings and things of that kind, are carried, as it appears, to the below, and back again to the middle; —and there they wander during life: —but as they never pass beyond this, they do not

look towards the true above, and are not carried to it; nor are they ever really filled with real being; nor have they ever tasted solid and pure pleasure; but, after the manner of brutes looking always downwards, bowed towards earth and their tables, they live feeding and coupling; and from a lust for such things, they kick and push at one another as with iron horns and hoofs, and perish through their own in satiety, just like those who are filling with unreal being that which is no real being, nor friendly to themselves.

Glaucon/ You are describing, Socrates, with quite oracular perfection what is the life of the multitude.

Socrates/ Must they not then, of necessity be conversant with pleasures mixed with pains, images of the true pleasure, shadowed in outline, and colored by their position beside each other; so that both their pleasures and pains will appear vehement, and engender their mad passions in the foolish? Hence also they must fight about these things, as Stesichorus says those at Troy fought about the image of Helen, through ignorance of the true one.

Glaucon/ Of necessity, something of this kind must take place.

Socrates/ But what? must not the same things necessarily happen to the irascible part of the soul, whenever anyone gratifies it, either through envy from ambition, or violence from contentiousness, or anger from moroseness, pursuing a glut of honor, of conquest, and of anger, both without reason, and without intelligence?

Glaucon/ Such things as these, must necessarily happen with relation to this part of the soul.

Socrates/ What then; —can we confidently say concerning all the pleasures, both as respects the avaricious and the ambitious part, that such of them as obey science and reason, and, in conjunction therewith, pursue and

obtain the pleasures of which the prudent part of the soul is the leader, that these will obtain the truest pleasures, as far as it is possible for them to attain true pleasure, and in as much as they follow truth, pleasures properly their own; if indeed what is best for each be most properly his own?

Glaucon/ Aye, it surely is most properly his own.

Socrates/ When then the whole soul is obedient to the philosophic part, and there is no sedition in it, then every part in other respects performs its proper business, and is just, and also reaps its own pleasures, and such as are the best, and as far as is possible the most genuine.

Glaucon/ Certainly, indeed.

Socrates/ But when any of the others governs, it happens that it neither attains its own pleasures, and it compels the other parts to pursue a pleasure foreign to them, and not at all genuine.

Glaucon/ It does so.

Socrates/ Will not then those parts, which are most remote from philosophy and reason most especially effect such things?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And is not that which is most remote from law and order, most remote likewise from reason?

Glaucon/ It plainly is.

Socrates/ And have not the amorous and the tyrannical desires appeared to be most remote from law and order?

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And the royal and the moderate ones, the least remote?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ The tyrant then, I think, will be the most remote from true pleasure, and such as is most properly his own, and the other will be the least.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And the tyrant, will lead a life the most unpleasant, and the king the most pleasant.

Glaucon/ Of great necessity.

Socrates/ Do you know then, how much more unpleasant a life the tyrant leads than the king?

Glaucon/ If you tell me.

Socrates/ As there are three pleasures, as it seems, one legitimate, and two illegitimate; the tyrant in carrying the illegitimate to extremity, and flying from law and reason, dwells with slavish pleasures as his life-guardians, and how far he is inferior cannot easily be told, unless it be done in this manner.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ The tyrant is somehow in the third degree remote from the oligarchic character; for the democratic was halfway between them.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Will he not then dwell in the third picture of pleasure, distant from him as regards truth, if our former reasonings be true?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But the oligarchic is the third again from the royal, if we suppose the aristocratic and the royal the same?

Glaucon/ He is the third.

Socrates/ The tyrant then, is remote from true pleasure, the third from the third?

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ A plain surface then, may be the image of tyrannical pleasure, as to the computation of length.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But as to power, and the third augment, it is manifest by how great a distance it is remote.

Glaucon/ It is manifest, to the computer at least.

Socrates/ If now, conversely, anyone shall say the king is distant from the tyrant as to truth of pleasure, as much as is the distance 9, and 20, and 700, shall he not, on completing the multiplication, find him leading the more pleasant life, and the tyrant the more wretched one, by this same distance?

Glaucon/ You have heaped up, a prodigious account of the difference between these two men, the just and the unjust, with reference to pleasure and pain.

Socrates/ Yet the numbers are true, and corresponding to their lives, if indeed days, and nights, and months, and years, correspond to them.

Glaucon/ But they do correspond.

Socrates/ If then the good and just man surpasses so far the evil and unjust man in pleasure, in what a prodigious degree further shall he surpass him in decorum of life, in beauty, and in virtue!

Glaucon/ Prodigious, indeed, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Well then, since we have reached this part of our argument, let us recapitulate what we first said, on account of which we came hither: now it was said, if I mistake not, that it is advantageous to one who is thoroughly unjust, but who has the character of being just, to commit injustice. Was it not so said?

Glaucon/ It was indeed.

Socrates/ Now then, let us settle this point, since we have now settled the other, with reference to acting justly and unjustly, what power each of these possesses in itself.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Let us ideally fashion an image of the soul, that the man who said those things may know what he said.

Glaucon/ What kind of image?

Socrates/ One of those creatures, which are fabled to have been of old, as that of Chimæra, of Scylla, of Cerberus; and many others are Spoken of, where many particular natures existed together in one.

Glaucon/ They are spoken of indeed.

Socrates/ Let us form now the figure of a creature, various, and many-headed, having all around heads of tame creatures, and of wild, and having power in itself of changing all these heads, and of breeding them out of itself.

Glaucon/ This is the work, of a skillful modeler: however, as the formation is easier in reasoning, than in wax and such-like, let it be formed.

Socrates/ Let there be now one other figure of a lion and one of a man; but let the first be by far the greatest, and the second be the second in bulk.

Glaucon/ These are easy, and they are formed.

Socrates/ Unite now these three in one, so that they may somehow coexist.

Glaucon/ They are united.

Socrates/ Form now around them the external appearance of one of them, that of the man; so that to one who is not able to see what is within, but who perceives only the external covering, the man may appear one creature.

Glaucon/ It is formed all round.

Socrates/ Let us now tell him who asserts that it is profitable to this man to do injustice, but to do justice unprofitable, that he asserts nothing else, than that it is profitable for him to feast the multiform creature, and to make it strong; and likewise the lion, and what respects the lion, whilst the man he kills with famine, and renders weak, so as to be dragged whichever way either of those drag him; and that he will also find it advantageous never to accustom the one to live in harmony with the other, nor to make them friends, but suffer them to bite one another, and to fight and devour each other.

Glaucon/ He, who commends the doing injustice, undoubtedly asserts these things.

Socrates/ And does not he again, who says it is advantageous to act justly, say that he ought to do and to say such things by which the inner man shall come to have the most entire command of the man, and, as a tiller of the ground, shall take care of the many-headed creature, cherishing the mild ones, and nourishing them, and hindering the wild ones from growing up, taking the nature of the lion as his ally, and, having a common care for all, make them friendly to one another, and to himself, and so nourish them?

Glaucon/ He who commends justice undoubtedly says such things as these.

Socrates/ In all respects, then, he who commends justice would seem to speak the truth, but he who commends injustice, to speak what is false; for, as respects pleasure, applause, and profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, and he who discommends it speaks nothing genuine; nor does he discommend with understanding what he discommends.

Glaucon/ Not at all, as appears to me at least.

Socrates/ Let us then in a mild manner persuade him for it is not willingly he errs, asking him, O blessed man! do not we say that the maxims of things beautiful and base become so upon such accounts as these? Those are good which make the brutal part of our nature most subject to the man, or rather perhaps to that which is divine; while those are evil which enslave the mild part of our nature to the brutal will he agree with us, —or how?

Glaucon/ He will, if he be advised by me.

Socrates/ Is there, then, anyone, whom it avails, from this reasoning, to take gold unjustly, supposing something of this kind to happen, if, while taking the money, he at the same time subjects the best part of himself to the worst? Or, if, taking gold, he should enslave a son or daughter, and that even to savage and wicked men, shall we not say this would not avail him, not though he should receive for it a prodigious sum? But if he enslaves the most divine part of himself to the most impious and most polluted part, without any pity, is he not wretched? and does he not take a gift of gold to his far more dreadful ruin, than Eriphyle did when she received the necklace for her husband's life?

Glaucon/ By far: for I will answer you for him.

Socrates/ Do you not, then, think that intemperance has of old been blamed on these accounts, because in such persons that terrible, great, and multiform beast was indulged more than was decent?

Glaucon/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ And are not arrogance and moroseness blamed, when the lion-like and serpentine disposition increases and stretches beyond measure?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are not luxury and effeminacy blamed because of the remissness and looseness of this disposition, when it engenders cowardice in the man?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ Are not flattery and illiberality blamed, when anyone makes this irascible part itself subject to the brutal crew, and, for the sake of wealth and its insatiable lust, accustoms the irascible to be affronted from its youth, and instead of a lion to become an ape?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But why is it, do you think, that mechanical arts and handicrafts bring disgrace? Shall we say it is on any other account than this, that when a man has the form of that which is best in his soul naturally weak, so as not to be able to govern the creatures within himself, but ministers to them, he is able only to learn what flatters them?

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ In order then that such an one may be governed in the same manner as the best man is, do we not say that he must be the servant of one who is the best, and who has within him the divine governing principle? not at all conceiving that he should be governed to the hurt of the subject as Thrasymachus imagined, but, as it is best for everyone to be governed, by one divine and wise, most especially possessing it as his own within him, if not subjecting himself to it externally; that as far as possible we may all resemble one another and be friends, governed by one and the same?

Glaucon/ Rightly, indeed.

Socrates/ And law at least, plainly shows it intends such a thing, being an ally to all in the city; as does likewise the government of children, in not allowing them to be free till we establish in them a proper government, as in a city; and

having cultivated that in them which is best, by that which is best in ourselves, we establish a similar guardian and governor for youth, and then at Length we set it free.

Glaucon/ It shows it indeed.

Socrates/ In what way then shall we say, Glaucon, and according to what reasoning, that it is profitable to do injustice, to be intemperate, or to do anything base, by which a man shall indeed become more wicked, but yet shall acquire more wealth, or any kind of power?

Glaucon/ In no way.

Socrates/ But how shall we say it is profitable for the unjust to be concealed, and not to suffer punishment? or does he not indeed, who is concealed, still become more wicked? but he who is not concealed, and is punished, has the brutal part quieted, and made mild, and the mild part set at liberty. And the whole soul being settled in the best temper, in possessing temperance and justice, with wisdom, acquires a more valuable habit than the body does, in acquiring vigor and beauty, with a sound constitution; in as far as the soul is more valuable than the body.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Will not everybody then, who possesses intellect, regulate his life, first by extending hither the whole of his powers, honoring those branches of science which will render his soul of this kind, and despising all other things?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And next, with regard to a good habit of body and its nourishment, he will spend his life in attention to these, not that he may indulge the brutal and irrational pleasure; nor yet with a view to health, nor principally with reference to becoming strong, healthy, and beautiful, unless by these means he is to become temperate likewise: but he

always appears to adjust the harmony of the body for the sake of the symphony which is in the soul.

Glaucon/ By all means, if indeed he is to be truly musical.

Socrates/ Will he not then, in acquiring wealth, maintain accord and symphony? nor moved by the congratulations of the multitude will he increase the bulk of his treasures to an infinite amount, occasioning thereby infinite evils?

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ But looking, to the government of it himself, and taking care that nothing there be moved out of its place, through the greatness or smallness of his property, thus governing as far as he is able, he will add to his property, and spend out of it.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ He will regard honors, likewise, in the same manner; of some he will willingly take a share, and taste of those which he judges will render him a better man, but as for those which he thinks would dissolve that habit of soul which subsists within him, he will fly from both those privately and in public.

Glaucon/ He will not be willing, then, to act the politician, if he takes care of this.

Socrates/ Yes, truly, in his own state, and greatly too; but not probably in his country, unless some divine fortune befall him.

Glaucon/ I understand. You mean in the state we have now established, which exists only in our reasoning, but I think has no existence on earth.

Socrates/ But in heaven, probably, there is a model of it, for anyone who inclines to contemplate it, and on contemplating to regulate himself accordingly; and to him it matters not whether it does exist anywhere, or will ever exist

here: —for he would perform the duties of this city alone, and of no other.

Glaucon/ It is reasonable.

THE END OF THE NINTH BOOK.

Book 10.

Socrates/ Moreover, both in many other respects, I observe that we have been rightly establishing our state, better indeed than all others; and not least so do I say, as regards our sentiments concerning poetry.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ That no part of it which is imitative should by any means be admitted; —for that it must not be admitted appears now, methinks, exceedingly clear, since the several forms of the soul hare been distinguished apart from one another.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ That I may tell it to you, —for you will not denounce me to the composers of tragedy, and the rest of the imitative class, —all such things as these seem to be the ruin of the intellect of the hearers, —that is, of such of them as have not a test to enable them to discern their peculiar nature.

Glaucon/ What consideration, leads you to say this?

Socrates/ It must be stated; although a certain friendship, at least, and reverence for Homer, which I have had from my childhood, almost restrains me from telling it; for he seems truly both to have been the first leader and teacher of all the good composers of tragedy; but still the man must not be honored in preference to truth. But what I mean must be spoken.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Hear me then, or rather answer me.

Glaucon/ Put your question then.

Socrates/ Can you tell me perfectly, what is the nature of imitation? —for I do not myself altogether understand its meaning.

Glaucon/ Is it possible then, that I shall any how understand it?

Socrates/ That would be no way strange; since those who are dim-sighted perceive many things sooner than those who see more clearly.

Glaucon/ The case is so; but while you are present, I would not venture to tell, even though I had some inkling of it, but consider it yourself.

Socrates/ Do you wish then, that we hence begin our inquiry in our usual method? for we used to suppose a certain idea relating to many individuals, to which we give the same name; —do you not understand?

Glaucon/ I do understand.

Socrates/ Let us suppose now anyone you please among the many, as for example, if you will, there are many beds and tables.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But the ideas, at least respecting these pieces of furniture, are two, one of bed, and one of table.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And do we not usually say, that the workman of each of these pieces of furniture, looking towards the idea, makes them thus—one of them the beds, and the other the tables which we use; —and all other things in like manner? —for surely not one of the artificers makes the idea itself; for how can he?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ See now then, what kind of an artificer do you call this?

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ He who makes all things which each several artificer makes.

Glaucon/ You are alluding to some skillful and wonderful person.

Socrates/ Not yet, at least; but you will much more say so presently; for this same mechanic is not only able to make all sorts of utensils, but makes everything also which springs from the earth, and he makes all sorts of animals, himself as well as others; and besides these things, he makes the earth, the heaven and the gods, and all things in heaven, and in Hades under the earth.

Glaucon/ You are speaking, of a perfectly wonderful sophist.

Socrates/ Do you disbelieve me? but tell me, do you not think that there is such an artificer; or that in one respect, he is the maker of all these things, and in another not so? — or do you not perceive, that even you yourself might be able to make all these things, in a certain manner at least?

Glaucon/ And what, is this manner?

Socrates/ It is not difficult, but is done in many ways, and quickly too; but in the quickest way of all, if I mistake not, if you please to make a mirror, and carry it round everywhere; for then you will very quickly make the sun, and the heavenly bodies, the earth, yourself, and the other animals and utensils and plants, and all that we have just now mentioned.

Glaucon/ Yes, the appearances, but not surely the realities.

Socrates/ You come in, both well and seasonably, with your remark; for the painter too, methinks, is an artificer of this kind; —is he not?

Glaucon/ He cannot possibly be otherwise.

Socrates/ You will say then, I suppose, that he does not make what he makes real and true, although the painter too, in a certain manner at least, makes a bed, does he not?

Glaucon/ Aye; but he too makes only the appearance.

Socrates/ But what as to the bed-maker? —did you not just now say, that he does not make the idea which we say exists, and is a bed, but only a particular bed?

Glaucon/ I did say so.

Socrates/ If then he does not make that which really exists, he does not make real being, but something resembling being, though not being itself: but if anyone should say that the work of the bed-maker, or any other craftsman, were real being, it seems he would not say what is true.

Glaucon/ He would not, as it should seem to those who are acquainted with such discussions.

Socrates/ We must not then be surprised if this likewise should seem somewhat obscure compared with the truth.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Are you willing then, that as regards these very things we inquire concerning the real nature of their imitator?

Glaucon/ If you please.

Socrates/ Are there not then these three sorts of beds: —one existing in nature, and which we may say, I suppose, God made, or who else?

Glaucon/ No one, I think.

Socrates/ And another which the joiner makes?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And a third which the painter makes: —is it not so?

Glaucon/ Granted.

Socrates/ Now the painter, the bed-maker, God, these three are the masters of three species of beds?

Glaucon/ They are three indeed.

Socrates/ But God, whether it were that he was unwilling, or whether there was some necessity that he should only make one bed in nature, made this one only, which is really a bed; while two or more of such other species have never been produced, nor ever will be produced by God.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Because, if he had made but two, one again would have appeared, the idea of which both these two would have possessed, and that idea would be that of a bed, and not those two.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ God then, methinks, being aware of these things, and willing to be the maker of a bed really, and having real being, though of no one particular bed, and not to be any particular bed-maker, produced but one in nature?

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Are you willing then that we should call him the producer of this, or of something of a similar nature?

Glaucon/ It is just, since he has in their essential nature created this, as well as all other things.

Socrates/ But what as to the joiner? —is not he the maker of a bed?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is the painter, too, the workman and maker of something similar?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But what will you say he has to do with a bed?

Glaucon/ This, as I think, we may most reasonably call him, an imitator of what the others actually make and contrive.

Socrates/ Be it so; then him you call the imitator who makes what is generated the third from nature?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And this composer of tragedy will in like manner, as being an imitator, rise as a sort of third from the king and the truth; and so likewise all other imitators?

Glaucon/ Aye, so it seems.

Socrates/ We have agreed, then, as to the imitator? —but tell me this concerning the painter, whether you think he undertakes to imitate each particular thing in nature, or the works of artificers?

Glaucon/ The works of artificers.

Socrates/ Whether, such as they really are, or such only as they appear? for this we must define more correctly.

Glaucon/ How say you?

Socrates/ Thus; does a bed differ at all in itself, whether a man view it obliquely or directly opposite, or in any particular position? —or, is it not at all different, but only apparently different, and so on as respects other things?

Glaucon/ Thus it appears, yet it does not really differ.

Socrates/ Consider this too, with reference to which of the two does painting work, in each particular work; whether with reference to real being, to imitate it as it really is, or with reference to what is apparent, as it appears; and whether is it the imitation of appearance, or of truth?

Glaucon/ Only of appearance.

Socrates/ The imitative art, then, is far from the truth: and on this account it seems, he is able to make these things, because he is able to attain only to some small part of each particular, and that but an image. Thus we say that a painter will paint us a shoemaker, a joiner, and other craftsmen, though having no acquaintance with any of these

arts; yet he will be able to deceive children and ignorant people, if he be a good painter, when he paints a joiner, and shows him at a distance, so far as to make them imagine he is a real joiner.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But this, I think, my friend, we must take into consideration in connection with all these things; that when anyone tells us of anyone, that he has met with a man skilled in all kinds of workmanship, and everything else which each particular artist understands, and that he knows everything whatever more accurately than anyone else, we ought to reply to such an one, that he is a simpleton, and that it seems, he has been deceived by falling in with some conjurer, or imitator, so as to seem to himself, to know everything owing to his very incapacity of distinguishing between science and ignorance and imitation.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Ought we not then next, to consider tragedy and its leader, Homer? —Since from some we hear that these poets understand all arts, and all human affairs, respecting virtue and vice, and likewise all divine things; for a good poet must necessarily compose with knowledge, if he means what he composes to compose well, —else he is not able to compose. It is our business then to consider whether those who have fallen in with these imitators have been deceived, and on viewing their works have not perceived that they are the third distant from real being, and their works such as can easily be made by one not knowing the truth for they make phantasms, and not real beings; or whether do they say something to the purpose, and do the good poets really know the things about which the multitude think they speak well.

Glaucon/ This, is by all means to be inquired into.

Socrates/ Think you then, that if anyone could make both of these, that which is imitated, and likewise the original idea, he would allow himself seriously to apply to the workmanship of the images, and propose that to himself as the best thing in life?

Glaucon/ I do not.

Socrates/ But if he were really intelligent in these things which he imitates, he would, I think, far more seriously study the things themselves than the imitations, and would try to leave behind him many and beautiful actions, as monuments of himself, and rather study to be himself the person commended than the mere eulogist.

Glaucon/ I think so; for neither is the honor nor the profit equal.

Socrates/ As to other things, then, let us not call them to account, —asking Homer or any other of the poets, whether they were skilled in medicine, and not mere imitators of medical discourses; —for which of the ancient or more recent poets is said to have restored any to health, as Æsculapius did? or what disciples of medical science has any of them left behind, such as he left his descendants? —Neither let us ask them about the other arts, but leave them out of the question; and with reference to those greatest and most beautiful things on which Homer tries to discourse, —about wars and armies, and civic constitutions, and human education, it is just, perhaps, to question and inquire of him: Friend Homer, if you be not the third from the truth with regard to virtue, as being the artificer of an image for thus we have defined an imitator, but rather the second, and can discern what pursuits render men better or worse, in private as well as public, tell us which of the states has been better constituted by you, as Lacedæmon was by Lycurgus, and great and small cities by many others; —but as respects

yourself, what state is it that acknowledges you to have been a good lawgiver, and to have done them good service? Italy and Sicily acknowledge Charondas, and we Solon; but who acknowledges you? Will he be able to mention anyone?

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ That is not pretended even by the Homeridæ themselves. But what war in Homers days is recorded to have been conducted by him as general, or adviser?

Glaucon/ Not one.

Socrates/ What then are his discoveries? —since among the works of a wise man there are many discoveries and inventions mentioned, that concern the arts, and other affairs; as of Thales the Milesian, and of Anacharsis the Scythian.

Glaucon/ There is not anyone such to be found.

Socrates/ But if not in a public manner, has Homer the repute of having lived as a private instructor to any who delighted in his conversation, and to have delivered down to posterity a certain Homeric manner of life, —just as Pythagoras was remarkably beloved on this account, and, as even to this day, such as denominate themselves Pythagoreans appear to be somehow eminent beyond others in their manner of life?

Glaucon/ Neither, is there anything of this kind related about Homer: —for Creophilus, Socrates, the friend of Homer, may probably appear even still more ridiculous in his education, than in his name, if what is said of Homer be true: —for it is said that he was greatly neglected by him when he lived.

Socrates/ It is said so indeed: —but think you, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate men, and to make them better, as being capable not only of imitating in these matters, but of understanding them likewise, he would

not then have won many intimate friends, and have been loved and honored by them? Whereas on the other hand, Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and many others, have the power of persuading the men of their day, by private conversation, that they will neither be able to govern their family or the state, unless they themselves direct their education; and for this wisdom of theirs, they are so exceedingly beloved, that their friends almost carry them about on their heads. Would then the men of Homer's time have left either him or Hesiod to go about singing their songs, if he could have done men service in the way of virtue, and not rather have kept him with offers of gold, and so obliged him to stay with them; or, —had they been unable to prevail on him, would they not as disciples have followed him everywhere, till they had gained a sufficient education?

Glaucon/ Assuredly, Socrates, you appear to me to say what is true.

Socrates/ Shall we not then establish this point, —that all the poets, beginning from Homer, are imitators of the images of virtue, and of other things about which they compose, but yet do not attain to the real truth; but, as we just now said, a painter, who himself knows nothing about the making of shoes, will draw a shoemaker, apparently real only to such as are not intelligent, but look at him only as to color and figures?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ In the same manner, I think, we shall say that the poet colors over with his names and words certain colors of the several arts, without understanding anything himself, but merely imitating, so that to others such as himself who view things in his compositions, he has the appearance of possessing knowledge: and if he says anything about shoemaking in measure, rhythm, and harmony, he seems to

speak perfectly well, whether it be respecting the art of a general or any other subject; so great is the enchantment which these things naturally have, because you know, I think, in what manner poetry appears when stript of the color of music, and expressed apart, —for you have somewhere beheld it.

Glaucon/ I have.

Socrates/ Do they not, resemble the faces of people who are in the prime of their life, but yet not beautiful, such as they appear when their bloom forsakes them?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Come then, consider this: —the maker of the image, whom we call the imitator, knows nothing of real being, but only of that which is apparent: —is it not so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us not then leave it expressed by halves, but let us examine it fully.

Glaucon/ Say on.

Socrates/ A painter, we say, will paint reins and a bridle.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the leather-cutter, and the smith, will make them.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Does the painter then understand what kind of reins and bridle there ought to be; —or not even he who makes them, the smith, nor the leather-cutter, but he who knows how to use them, the horseman alone?

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Shall we not say that this is the case in everything else?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ That with reference to each particular thing there are these three arts: —that which is to use it, that which is to make it, and that which is to imitate it?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are then the virtue, and the beauty, and the rectitude of every utensil, and animal, and action, for nothing else but for the use for which each particular was made, or generated?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Very necessarily, then, must he who uses each particular, be the most skillful, and most able to tell the maker what he makes good or bad, with regard to the use in which he employs it: thus, for example, a flute-player will tell the flute-maker concerning flutes, what things are expedient for playing on the flute, and will give orders how he ought to make them, but the latter will attend to his directions.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Will not the one then, being intelligent, pronounce concerning good and bad flutes, and the other, believing him, make them accordingly?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ With reference then to one and the same instrument, the maker will form a correct opinion concerning its beauty or deformity, while he is conversant with one who is intelligent, and is obliged to hear from the intelligent; but he who uses it must have science.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But will the imitator have science from using the things he paints, whether handsome and correct, or otherwise? or will he form a correct opinion from being necessarily conversant with the intelligent, and from being ordered how he ought to paint?

Glaucon/ Neither of the two.

Socrates/ The imitator then will neither know nor form a correct opinion about what he imitates with reference to beauty or deformity?

Glaucon/ It seems not.

Socrates/ The imitator then will be very skillful in his imitation, with regard to wisdom, concerning what he paints?

Glaucon/ Not wholly so.

Socrates/ Nevertheless he will at least imitate, without knowing about each particular in what respect it is bad or good; and he will probably imitate such as appears to be beautiful to the multitude, and those who know nothing?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ We have now, indeed, sufficiently, as it appears, at least, settled these things; —that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning in those things which he imitates, but imitation is a sort of amusement, and no serious business: —and likewise, that those who apply to tragic poetry in iambics and epics, are all imitators in the highest degree?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ By Zeus, though, this business of imitation is placed somehow in the third degree from the truth: —is it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ To what part then of man does it belong, having the power that it has?

Glaucon/ What part do you speak of?

Socrates/ Of such as this: —the same magnitude perceived by sight, does not appear in the same manner, both near and at a distance.

Glaucon/ It does not.

Socrates/ And the same things appear crooked and straight, when we look at them in water, and out of the water, and concave and convex, through error of the sight, as to colors. All this disturbance is manifest in the soul; and it is this infirmity of our nature which pointing attacks, leaving nothing of magical seduction unattempted, as well as the wonder-working art, and many other such-like devices.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And have not the arts of measure, number, and weight been deemed in these matters most ingenious helps, that so the apparent greater or less, the apparent more or heavier, may not govern us, but that which numbers, measures, and weighs?

Glaucon/ It must be so.

Socrates/ But this again is, at least, the work of the rational part in the soul.

Glaucon/ It is so, indeed.

Socrates/ But while reason often measures and pronounces some things to be greater or less than other things, or equal, the contrary appears at the same time as regards these things?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But did not we say that it was impossible for the same person to have contrary opinions about the same things at the same time?

Glaucon/ Thus far indeed we said rightly.

Socrates/ That part of the soul, then, which judges contrary to the measure, would seem not to be the same with that which judges according to the measure.

Glaucon/ It would not.

Socrates/ But surely that, at least, which trusts to measure and computation would seem to be the best part of the soul?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ That then which opposes itself to this will be one of our depraved parts.

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ It was this then I wished should be agreed upon, when I said that painting, and imitation, in general, being far from the truth, delights in its own work, conversing with that part in us which is far from wisdom, and is its companion and friend, to no sound nor genuine purpose.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Imitation, then, being depraved in itself, and joining with that which is depraved, generates depraved things.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Whether, is the case thus, with reference to the imitation which is by the sight only, or is it likewise so with reference to that by hearing, which we call poetry?

Glaucon/ Probably as to this also.

Socrates/ We shall not therefore, trust to the appearance in painting, but we shall proceed to the consideration of the intellectual part with which the imitation through poetry is conversant, and see whether it is depraved or worthy.

Glaucon/ It must be done.

Socrates/ Let us proceed then thus: Poetic imitation, we say, imitates men acting either voluntarily or involuntarily; and imagining that in their acting they have done either well or ill, and in all these cases receiving either pain or pleasure: is the case any otherwise than this?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ In all these, now, does the man agree with himself? or, as he disagreed with reference to sight, and had contrary opinions in himself of the same things at one and the same time, does he, in the same manner, disagree likewise in his actions, and fight with himself? But I recollect that there is no occasion for us to settle this at least; for, in our previous discussion, we sufficiently determined all this, —that our soul is full of a thousand such internal contrarieties.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Right indeed, but it appears to me necessary to discuss now, what was then omitted.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ We said somewhere formerly, that a good man, when he meets with such a misfortune as the loss of a son, or of anything else which he values the most, will bear it of all men the easiest.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But let us now consider this further, —whether will he not grieve at all, or is this indeed impossible, but will he moderate his grief?

Glaucon/ The truth, is rather this last.

Socrates/ But tell me this now concerning him, whether do you think that he will struggle more with grief and oppose it, when he is observed by his equals, or when he is in solitude, alone by himself?

Glaucon/ Much more, when he is observed.

Socrates/ But when alone, he will venture, I think, to utter many things, which, if anyone heard him, he would be ashamed of, and he will do many things which he would not wish anyone saw him doing.

Glaucon/ Aye, such is the case.

Socrates/ Do not then reason and law command him to restrain his grief, —while it is the passion itself that excites grief?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ As then there is a twofold inducement for man's conduct, with regard to the same thing, at one and the same time, we must necessarily say that he has two conductors.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And shall we not say that one of them is ready to obey the law wherever law leads him?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Law in a manner says that it is best to maintain the greatest possible tranquility in misfortunes, and not to bear them ill; since the good or evil of such things as these is not manifest, and since no advantage follows the bearing these things ill; and as nothing of human affairs deserves great interest; and, besides this, their grief proves a hindrance to that within them which we ought to have most at hand.

Glaucon/ What is it, you here mean?

Socrates/ Deliberating on the event; and, as on the throw of the dice, regulating our affairs according to what turns up, in whatever way reason shall dictate as best; and not as children, when they fall, to lie still, and waste the time in crying; but always to accustom the soul to apply in the speediest manner to heal and raise up what was fallen and sick, putting an end to lamentation by medicine.

Glaucon/ One would thus, behave in the best manner in every condition.

Socrates/ And did not we say that the best part is willing to follow this which is rational?

Glaucon/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ And shall we not say that the part which leads to the remembrance of affliction and to wailings, and is insatiably given to these, is irrational, and idle, and a friend to cowardice?

Glaucon/ We shall, indeed, say so.

Socrates/ Is not the grieving part then that which admits of much and various imitation? But the prudent and tranquil part, which is ever uniform with itself, is neither easily imitated, nor, when imitated, easily understood, especially by a popular assembly, where all sorts of men are assembled together in a theatre. For surely it is the imitation of a disposition which is foreign to them.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ It is plain, then, that the imitative poet is not made for such a part of the soul as this: —nor is his skill fitted to please it, if he means to gain the applause of the multitude; but he applies to the passionate and the multiform part, as it is easily imitated.

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ May we not then, with justice, lay hold of the imitative poet, and place him in correspondence with the painter? for he resembles him, both because, as to truth, he effects but depraved things, and resembles him too in this being conversant with a different part of the soul from that which is best: —and thus we may, with justice, not admit him into our city which is to be well regulated, because he excites and nurtures this part of the soul, and, by strengthening this, destroys the rational: —and just as he, who in a state gives power to the wicked, betrays the state, and ruins the best men, we may in like manner say that the imitative poet establishes a bad republic in the soul of each individual, gratifying the foolish part of it, which neither discerns what is great, nor what is little, but deems the same

things sometimes great, and sometimes small, forming little images in its own imagination, altogether remote from the truth?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Still we have not yet brought the greatest accusation against it: for that is, somehow, a very dreadful one, that it has the power of corrupting even the good, except only a very few.

Glaucon/ It must, if it acts in this manner.

Socrates/ But hear now, and consider; for somehow, the best of us, when we hear Homer, or any of the tragic writers, imitating some of the heroes when in grief, pouring forth long speeches in their sorrow, bewailing and beating their breasts, you know are delighted; and, yielding ourselves, we follow along, and, sympathizing with them, seriously commend him as an able poet whoever most affects us in this manner.

Glaucon/ I know it, of course.

Socrates/ But when any domestic grief befalls any of us, you perceive, on the other hand, that we value ourselves on the opposite behavior, if we can be quiet and endure, this being the part of a man, but that of a woman, which in the other case we commended.

Glaucon/ I perceive it.

Socrates/ Is this commendation proper, then, when we see such a man as one would not deign to be oneself, but would be ashamed of, not to abominate but to delight in and commend him?

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus; it appears unreasonable.

Socrates/ Certainly, if you consider the matter thus.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ If you reflect that the part of us, which in our private misfortunes is forcibly restrained, and is kept from weeping and bewailing to the full, being by nature of such a kind as desires these, is the very part which by the poets is filled and gratified; but that part in us, which is naturally the best, being not sufficiently instructed, either by reason or habit, grows remiss in its guardianship over the bewailing part, by attending to the sufferings of others, and deems it no way disgraceful to itself, to commend and pity one who grieves immoderately, whilst he professes to be a good man; —but this it thinks it gains, even pleasure, which it would not choose to be deprived of, by despising the whole of the poem: —for, methinks, it falls to the share of few to be able to consider, that what we feel for others' misfortunes must necessarily be felt with respect to our own, —because it is no easy matter for a man to bear up under his own troubles, who strongly cherishes the bewailing disposition over those of others.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And is not the reasoning the same with reference to the ridiculous? —For when you hear, by comic imitation, or in private conversation, what you would be ashamed to do yourself to excite laughter, and are delighted with it, and imitate it, you do the same thing here as in tragedy: for that part, which, when it wanted to excite laughter, was formerly restrained by reason from a fear of incurring the character of scurrility, by now letting loose, and allowing there to grow vigorous, you are often imperceptibly brought to be in your own conduct a buffoon.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And with respect to venereal pleasures, and anger, and the whole of the passions, as well the sorrowful as the joyful in the soul, which truly, we have said, attend

us in every action; the poetical imitation of these has the same effect upon us; for it nurtures and irrigates them, whereas they ought to be dried up, and makes them govern us, whereas they ought to be governed, in order to our becoming better and happier, instead of being worse and more miserable.

Glaucon/ I can say no otherwise.

Socrates/ When therefore, Glaucon, you find the eulogists of Homer saying that this poet instructed Greece, and that he deserves to be taken as a master to teach both the management and the knowledge of human affairs, and that a man should regulate the whole of his life by the rules of this poet, we should indeed love and embrace such people, as being as good as they can be; and agree with them that Homer is a fine poet, and the first of tragic writers: —yet they must know, that hymns to the gods, and the praises of worthy actions, are alone to be admitted into our state: —for if you were to admit the pleasurable muse likewise, in songs, or verses, we should have pleasure and pain reigning in our state instead of law, and that reason which always appears best to the community.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Let these things now, be our apology, when we recollect what we have said with reference to poetry, that we then very properly dismissed it from our republic, since it is such as is now described: for reason obliged us. And let us address it further, that it may not accuse us of a certain roughness and rusticity, that there is an ancient variance between philosophy and poetry; for such verses as these;

> That brawling whelp, which at her mistress barks.

And

> He apes the great with empty eloquence.

And

On trifles still they plod, because they're poor;

and a thousand such-like, are marks of an ancient opposition between them. Notwithstanding, however, it may be said, that if anyone can assign a reason why the poetry and the imitation which are calculated for pleasure ought to be in a well-regulated city, we, for our part, shall gladly admit them, as we are at least conscious to ourselves that we are charmed by them. But to betray what appears to be truth, were an unholy thing. For are not you yourself, my friend, charmed by this imitation, and most especially when you see it performed by Homer?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Is it not just, then, that we introduce it as speaking its own defense, either in song, or in any other measure?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And we may at least grant, even to its defenders, such as are not poets, but lovers of poetry, to speak in its behalf, without verse, and show that it is not only pleasant, but profitable for states, and human life also; for surely we shall derive some benefit if it shall be found to be not only pleasant but profitable.

Glaucon/ How can we do otherwise than derive benefit from it?

Socrates/ And if it happen otherwise, my friend, we shall do as those who have been in love, when they deem their love unprofitable, —they desist, though with violence; so we in like manner, through this innate love of such poetry that prevails in our best forms of government, shall be well pleased to see it appear to be the best and truest; and we shall hear it till it is able to make no further apology. But we shall take along with us this discourse which we have held, as a counter-charm, and incantation, being afraid to fall

back again into a childish and vulgar love. We may perceive then that we are not to be much in earnest about such poetry as this, as if it were a serious affair, and approached to the truth; but the hearer is to beware of it, and to be afraid for the republic within himself, and to entertain those opinions of poetry which we mentioned.

Glaucon/ I entirely agree.

Socrates/ For great is the contest, friend Glaucon, great not such as it appears, to become a good or a bad man: wherefore it is not right to be moved, either by honor, or riches, or any magistracy whatever, or poetry, so to neglect justice, and the other virtues.

Glaucon/ I agree with you, from what we have argued, and so I think will anyone else.

Socrates/ However, we have not yet, discussed the greatest prize of virtue, and the rewards laid up for her.

Glaucon/ You speak of some prodigious greatness, if there be other greater than those mentioned.

Socrates/ But what is there, can be great in a little time? for all this period from infancy to old age is but little in respect of the whole.

Glaucon/ Nothing at all indeed. What then?

Socrates/ Do you think an immortal being ought to be much concerned about such a period, and not about the whole of time?

Glaucon/ I think, about the whole. But why do you mention this?

Socrates/ Have you not perceived, that our soul is immortal, and never perishes?

On which he, looking at me, and wondering, said;

Glaucon/ By Zeus, not I indeed. But are you able to show this?

Socrates/ I should otherwise act unjustly. And I think you yourself can show it, for it is not at all difficult.

Glaucon/ To me at least, it is difficult; but I would willingly hear from you this which is not difficult.

Socrates/ You shall hear then.

Glaucon/ Only speak.

Socrates/ Is there not something, which you call good, and something which you call evil?

Glaucon/ I own it.

Socrates/ Do you conceive of them, then, just in the way that I do?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ That which destroys and corrupts everything is the evil, and what preserves and profits it is the good.

Glaucon/ I do. But what?

Socrates/ Do you say, that there is something which is good, and something which is bad, to each particular? as blindness to the eyes, and disease to every animal body, blasting to corn, rottenness to wood, rust to brass and iron, and, as I say almost everything to its connate evil and disease?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And when anything of this kind befalls anything, does it not render that which it befalls base, and in the end dissolve and destroy it?

Glaucon/ How should it not?

Socrates/ Its own connate evil then and baseness destroys each particular; or, if this does not destroy it, nothing else can ever destroy it: —because that which is good can never destroy anything, nor yet that which is neither good nor evil.

Glaucon/ How can they?

Socrates/ If then we shall be able to find among beings, anyone which has indeed some evil which renders it base, but is not however able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not then know that a being thus constituted cannot be destroyed at all?

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ What then? —is there not something which renders the soul evil?

Glaucon/ Certainly; all these things which we have now mentioned, —injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

Socrates/ But does any of these then dissolve and destroy it? —And attend now, that we may not be imposed on, in thinking that an unjust and foolish man, when detected acting unjustly, is then destroyed through his injustice, which is the baseness of his soul: but consider it thus: —As disease, which is the baseness of animal body, dissolves and destroys body, and reduces it to be no longer that body; so all those things we mentioned, being destroyed by their own proper evil adhering to them and possessing them, are reduced to non-existence.

Glaucon/ Is it not so?

Socrates/ Yes. Consider now the soul in the same manner. Does injustice, and the rest of vice, possessing it, by possessing, and adhering to it, corrupt and deface it, till, bringing it to death, it separates it from the body?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But it were absurd, that anything should be destroyed by the baseness of another, but not by its own.

Glaucon/ Absurd.

Socrates/ For you must reflect, Glaucon, that neither by the baseness of victuals, whether owing to moldiness, or rottenness, or whatever else, do we think our body can be

destroyed; but if this baseness in them create in the body a depravity of the body, we may allege, that through their means, the body is destroyed by its own evil, which is disease. But we will never allow that by the baseness of food, which is one thing, the body, which is another thing, can ever by this foreign evil, without creating in it its own peculiar evil, be at any time destroyed.

Glaucon/ You speak most correctly.

Socrates/ According to the same reasoning, then, unless the baseness of the body create a baseness of the soul, let us never allow that the soul can be destroyed by an evil which is foreign, without its own peculiar evil, one thing by the evil of another.

Glaucon/ There is reason for it.

Socrates/ Let us, then, either refute these things as not good reasoning; or, so long as they are unrefuted, let us at no time say, that the soul shall be ever in any degree the more destroyed, either by burning fever, or by any other disease, or by slaughter, not even though a man should cut the whole body into the smallest parts possible, till someone show that, through these sufferings of the body, the soul herself becomes more unjust and unholy. But we will never allow it to be said, that when a foreign evil befalls anything, whilst its own proper evil is not within it, either the soul or anything else is destroyed.

Glaucon/ But this, at least, no one can ever show, that the souls of those who die are by death rendered more unjust.

Socrates/ But if anyone, shall dare to contend with us in reasoning; and, in order that he may not be obliged to own that souls are immortal, should say, that when a man dies he becomes more wicked and unjust, we shall surely require if he who says this speaks truly, that injustice is deadly to

the possessor, as a disease; and that those who embrace it are destroyed by it as by a disease destructive in its own nature, —those most speedily who embrace it most, and those more slowly who embrace it less. And not as at present, where the unjust die having this punishment inflicted on them by others.

Glaucon/ By Zeus, injustice would not appear perfectly dreadful, if it were deadly to him who practices it for that were a deliverance from evil; but I rather think it will appear to be altogether the reverse, destroying others as far as it can, but rendering the unjust extremely alive, and, in conjunction with being alive, wakeful likewise; so far, as it seems, does it dwell from being deadly.

Socrates/ You say well; for, when a man's own wickedness and peculiar evil is not sufficient to kill and destroy the soul, that evil, which aims at the destruction of another, can scarcely destroy a soul, or anything else but that against which it is aimed.

Glaucon/ Hardly, indeed, as I think at least.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, it is destroyed by no one evil, neither peculiar nor foreign, is it not plain that, of necessity, it always is? and, if it always is, it is immortal?

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Let this then, be so settled: —and if it be, you will perceive that the same souls will always remain, for their number will never become less, none being destroyed, nor will it become greater; for if, anyhow, the number of immortals was made greater, you know it would take from the mortal, and in the end all would be immortal.

Glaucon/ You say true.

Socrates/ But let us not, think that this will be the case for reason will not allow of it, nor yet that the soul in its

truest nature is of such a kind as to be full of much variety, dissimilitude, and difference considered in itself.

Glaucon/ How mean you?

Socrates/ That cannot easily, be eternal which is compounded of many things, and which has not the most beautiful composition, as hath now appeared to us to be the case with reference to the soul.

Glaucon/ It is not likely.

Socrates/ That the soul then is something immortal, both our present reasonings, and others too, may oblige us to own: but in order to know what kind of being the soul is, in truth, one ought not to contemplate it as it is damaged both by its conjunction with the body and by other evils, as we now behold it, but such as it is when become pure, such it must by reasoning be fully contemplated; and he who does this will find it far more beautiful at least, and will more plainly see through justice, and injustice, and everything which we have now discussed. We are now telling the truth concerning it, such as it appears at present. We have seen it, indeed, in the same condition in which they see the marine Glaucus, where they cannot easily perceive his ancient nature, because the ancient members of his body are partly broken off, and others are worn away; and he is altogether damaged by the waves: and, besides this, other things are grown to him, such as shellfish, seaweed, and stones: so that he in every respect resembles a beast, rather than what he naturally was. In such a condition do we behold the soul under a thousand evils. But we ought to behold it there, Glaucon.

Glaucon/ Where?

Socrates/ In its philosophy; and to observe to what it applies, and what intimacies it professes, as being allied to that which is divine, immortal, and eternal; and what it

would become, if it wholly pursued a thing of this kind, and were by this pursuit brought out of that sea in which it now is, and had the stones and shellfish shaken off from it, which, at present, as it is fed on earth, render its nature, to a great extent, earthy, stony, and savage, through those aliments, which are said to procure felicity: and then one might behold its true nature, whether multiform, or uniform, and everything concerning it. But we have, I think, sufficiently discussed its passions, and forms in human life.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Have we not now, discussed everything else in our reasonings, though we have not produced those rewards and honors of justice as you say Hesiod and Homer do? but we find justice itself to be the best reward to the soul; and that it ought to do what is just, whether it have or have not Gyges' ring, and, together with such a ring, the helmet likewise of Pluto.

Glaucon/ You say most true.

Socrates/ Will it not now, then, Glaucon, be attended with no envy, if, besides these, we add those rewards to justice and the other virtues, which are bestowed on the soul by men and gods, both whilst the man is alive, and after he is dead?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Will you, then, restore me what you borrowed in the reasoning?

Glaucon/ What, chiefly?

Socrates/ I granted you, that the just man should be deemed unjust, and the unjust be deemed to be just. For you were of opinion, that though it were not possible that these things should be concealed from gods and men, it should, however, be granted, for the sake of the argument,

that justice in itself might be compared with injustice in itself; do you not remember it?

Glaucon/ I should, indeed, be unjust, if I did not.

Socrates/ Now after the judgment is over, I demand again, in behalf of justice, that as you allow it to be indeed esteemed both by gods and men, you likewise allow it to have the same good reputation, that it may also receive those prizes of victory, which it acquires from the reputation of justice, and bestows on those who possess it; since it has already appeared to bestow those good things which arise from really being just, and that it does not deceive those who truly embrace it.

Glaucon/ You demand what is just.

Socrates/ Will you not, then, in the first place, restore me this? That it is not concealed from the gods, what kind of man each of the two is.

Glaucon/ We will grant it.

Socrates/ And if they be not concealed, one of them will be beloved of the gods, and one of them hated, as we agreed in the beginning.

Glaucon/ Such is the case.

Socrates/ And shall we not agree, that as to the man who is beloved of the gods, whatever comes to him from the gods, will all be the best possible, unless he has some necessary ill from former miscarriage?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We are then to think thus of the just man. That if he happen to be in poverty, or in diseases, or in any other of those seeming evils, these things to him issue in something good, either whilst alive or dead. For never at any time is he neglected by the gods, who inclines earnestly to

endeavor to become just, and practices virtue as far as it is possible for man to resemble God.

Glaucon/ It is reasonable, that such an one should not be neglected by him whom he resembles.

Socrates/ And are we not to think the reverse of these things concerning the unjust man?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Such, then, would seem to be the prizes which the just man receives from the gods.

Glaucon/ Such they are, indeed, in my opinion.

Socrates/ But what, do they receive from men? Is not the case thus if we are to suppose the truth? Do not cunning and unjust men do the same thing as those racers, who run well at the beginning, but not so at the end? for at the first they briskly leap forward, but in the end they become ridiculous, and, with their ears on their neck, they run off without any reward. But such as are true racers, arriving at the end, both receive the prizes, and are crowned. Does it not happen thus, for the most part, as to just men; that at the end of every action and intercourse of life they are both held in esteem, and receive rewards from men?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ You will then suffer me to say of these what you yourself said of the unjust. For I will aver now, that the just, when they are grown up, shall arrive at power if they desire magistracies, they shall marry where they incline, and shall settle their children in marriage agreeably to their wishes; and everything else you mentioned concerning the others, I now say concerning these. And on the other hand, I will say of the unjust, that the most of them, though they may remain concealed while young, yet, being caught at the end of the race, are ridiculous; and, when they become old, are wretched and ridiculed, and shall be scourged both by

foreigners and citizens, and afterwards tortured and burnt; which you said were terrible things; —and you spoke the truth. You may suppose that you hear from me that they suffer all these things. But see if you will admit what I say.

Glaucon/ Certainly, for you say what is just.

Socrates/ These then, are the prizes, the rewards and gifts, which a just man receives during life, both from gods and men; besides those good things which justice contains in itself.

Glaucon/ And they are extremely beautiful, and permanent.

Socrates/ But these now, are nothing, in number or magnitude, when compared with those which await each of the two at death. And these things must likewise be heard, that each of them may completely have what is their due in the reasoning.

Glaucon/ You may say on, as to one who would not listen to many other things with greater pleasure.

Socrates/ But, however, I will not, tell you the apologue of Alcinous; but that, indeed, of a brave man, Erus the son of Armenius, by descent a Pamphylian; who happening on a time to die in battle, when the dead were on the tenth day carried off, already corrupted, as taken up sound; and being carried home, as he was about to be buried on the twelfth day, when laid on the funeral pile, revived; and being revived, he told what he saw in the other state, and said, that after his soul left the body, it went with many others, and that they came to a certain mysterious, hallowed place, where there were two chasms in the earth, near to each other, and two other openings in the heavens opposite on them, and that the judges sat between these; —that when they gave judgment, they commanded the just to go on the right hand, and upwards through the heaven, having fitted marks on the

front of those that had been judged; but the unjust they commanded to the left, and downwards, and these likewise had behind them marks of all that they had done.

But when he came before the judges, they said he ought to be a messenger to men concerning things there, and they commanded him to hear, and contemplate everything therein; —and that he saw there, through two openings, one of the heaven, and one of the earth, the souls departing, after they were there judged; and through the other two openings he saw, rising through the one out of the earth, souls full of squalidness and dust; and through the other, he saw other souls descending pure from heaven; and that on their arrival from time to time they seemed as if they came from a long journey, and that they gladly went to rest themselves in the meadow, as in a public assembly, and such as were acquainted saluted one another, and those who rose out of the earth asked the others concerning the things above, and those from heaven asked them concerning the things below, and that they told one another: those wailing and weeping whilst they called to mind, what and how many things they suffered and saw in their journey under the earth for it was a journey of a thousand years; and that these again from heaven explained their enjoyments, and spectacles of amazing beauty. —To narrate many of them, Glaucon, would occupy much time; but this, was the sum, that whatever unjust actions a man had committed, and whatever injuries a man had committed, they were punished for all these separately tenfold, and that it was in each, according to the rate of a hundred years the life of man being considered as so long, that they might suffer tenfold punishment for the injustice they had done; —so that if any had been the cause of many deaths, either by betraying cities or armies, or bringing men into slavery, or being confederates in any other wickedness, for each of all these they reaped tenfold

sufferings; and if, again, they had benefited any by good deeds, and had been just and holy, they were rewarded according to their deserts.

Of those who died very young, and lived but a little time, he related other things not worth mentioning; —but of impiety and piety towards the gods and parents, and of suicide, he told the more remarkable retributions; for he said he was present when one was asked by another, where the great Aridæus was?

This Aridæus had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia a thousand years before that time, and had killed his aged father and elder brother, and had done many other unhallowed deeds, as was reported: and he said, that the one who was asked, replied: He neither comes, nor ever will come hither.

Well then we saw this likewise, among other dreadful spectacles: When we were near the mouth of the opening, and were about to ascend after having suffered everything else, we on a sudden beheld both him, and others likewise, most of whom were tyrants, and there were some private persons who had committed great iniquity, whom, when they thought they were to ascend, the mouth of the opening did not admit, but bellowed when any of those who were so polluted with wickedness, or who had not been sufficiently punished, attempted to ascend.

And then, fierce men, and fiery to look on, standing by, and perceiving the bellowing, took some of them and led them apart, but Aridæus and the rest, having bound their hands and feet, and head, they thrust down and flayed, and then dragged them to an outer road, tearing them on thorns; declaring always to those who passed by, on what accounts they suffered these things, and that they were carrying them to be thrown into Tartarus.

And hence, that amidst all their various terrors, this terror surpassed, lest the mouth should bellow, and that when it was silent everyone most gladly ascended; and that the punishments and torments were such as these, and their rewards were the reverse of these.

He also added, that everyone arising thence, after they had been seven days in the meadow, was required to depart on the eighth day, and arrive at another place on the fourth day after, whence they perceived from above through the whole heaven and earth, a light extended as a pillar, mostly resembling the rainbow, but more splendid and pure; at which they arrived in one day's journey; and thence they perceived, through the middle of the light from heaven, the extremities of its ligatures extended; as this light was the belt of heaven, like the transverse beams of ships keeping the whole circumference united; —that from the extremities the distaff of Necessity is extended, by which all the revolutions were turned round, whose spindle and point were both of adamant, but its whirl commingled both with this and other things; and that the nature of the whirl was of such a kind, as to its figure, as is anyone we see here.

But you must conceive it, from what he said, to be of such a kind as this: as if in some great hollow whirl, carved throughout, there was such another, but lesser, within it, adapted to it, like casks fitted one within another; and in the same manner a third, and a fourth, and four others, for that the whirls were eight in all, as circles one within another, having their lips appearing upwards, and forming round the spindle one united convexity of one whirl; that the spindle was driven through the middle of the eight; and that the first and outmost whirl had the widest circumference in the lip, that the sixth had the second wide, and that of the fourth the third wide, and the fourth that of the eighth, and the fifth

that of the seventh, the sixth that of the fifth, and the seventh that of the third, and the eighth that of the second.

Likewise that the circle of the largest is variegated, that of the seventh is the brightest, and that of the eighth has its color from the shining of the seventh; those of the second and fifth resemble each other, but are more yellow than the rest.

But the third is bright white, the fourth reddish, the second in whiteness surpasses the sixth; and the distaff must turn round in a circle with the whole that it carries; and while the whole is turning round, the seven inner circles are gently turned round in a contrary motion to the whole; —again, that of these, the eighth moves the swiftest; and next to it, and equal to one another, the seventh, the sixth, and the fifth; and that the third went in a motion which as appeared to them completed its circle in the same way as the fourth.

The fourth in swiftness was the third, and the fifth was the second, and it was turned round on the knees of Necessity; —and that on each of its circles there was seated a Siren on the upper side, carried round, and uttering one voice variegated by diverse modulations; but that the whole of them, being eight, composed one harmony; —that there were other three sitting round at equal distance one from another, each on a throne, the daughters of Necessity, the Fates, clothed in white vestments, and having crowns on their heads; Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos, singing to the harmony of the Sirens; Lachesis singing the past, Clotho the present, and Atropos the future.

And that Clotho, at certain intervals, with her right hand laid hold of the spindle, and along with her mother turned about the outer circle; —and Atropos, in like manner, turned

the inner ones with her left hand, —and that Lachesis touched both of these, severally, with either hand.

After they arrive here, it is necessary for them to go directly to Lachesis.

That then a certain prophet first of all ranges them in order, and afterwards taking the lots, and the models of lives, from the knees of Lachesis, and ascending a lofty tribunal, he says: —The speech of the virgin Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity: Souls of a day! The beginning of another period of men of mortal race: —the demon shall not receive you as his lot, but you shall choose the demon: he who draws the first, let him first make choice of a life, to which he must of necessity adhere: Virtue is independent, of which everyone shall partake, more or less, according as he honors or dishonors her: the cause is in him who makes the choice, and the Deity is blameless; —that when he had said these things, he threw the lots on all of them, and that each took up the one which fell beside him, except himself, for he was not permitted; and that when each had taken it, he knew what number he had drawn; —that after this he placed on the ground before them the models of lives, many more than those we see at present; —and that they were all various, —for there were lives of all sorts of animals, and human lives of every kind; —and that among these there were tyrannies also, some of them perpetual, and others destroyed in the midst of their greatness, and ending in poverty, banishment, and want.

That there were also lives of renowned men, some for their appearance as to beauty, strength, and agility; and others for their descent, and the virtues of their ancestors.

There were the lives of renowned women in the same manner.

But that there was no disposition of soul among these models, because of necessity, on choosing a different life, it becomes different itself.

As to other things, riches and poverty, sickness and health, they were mixed with one another, and some were in a middle station between these.

There then, as it seems, friend Glaucon, is the whole danger of man.

And hence this of all things is most to be attended to, how each of us, omitting other studies, is to become an inquirer and learner in this study, in order to be able to learn and find out who will make him expert and intelligent to discern a good life, and a bad; and to choose everywhere, and at all times the best of what is possible, considering all that we have mentioned, both compounded and separated from one another, what they are with respect to the virtue of life; and to understand what good or evil beauty produces when mixed with poverty, or riches, and with this or the other habit of soul; and what is effected by noble and ignoble descent, by privacy, and by public station, by strength and weakness, docility and indocility, and everything else of the kind which naturally pertains to the soul, and likewise of what is acquired, when blended one with another, so as to be able from all these things to compute, and, having an eye to the nature of the soul, to comprehend both the worse and the better life, pronouncing that to be the worse which shall lead the soul to become more unjust, and that to be the better life which shall lead it to become more just, and to dismiss every other consideration: —for we have seen, that in life, and in death, this is the best choice.

It is necessary, therefore, that a man should have this opinion firm as an adamant in him, when he departs to Hades, that there also he may be unmoved by riches, or any

such evils, and may not, falling into tyrannies, and other such practices, do many and incurable mischiefs, and himself suffer still greater: but may know how to choose always the middle life, as to these things, and to shun the extremes on either hand, both in this life as far as is possible, and in the whole future.

For thus man becomes happy.

At that time, therefore, the messenger from the other world further told how that the prophet spoke thus: Even to him who comes last, if he chooses with judgment, and lives consistently, there is prepared a desirable life; not bad.

Let neither him who is first be negligent in his choice, not let him who is last despair.

He said, that when the prophet had spoken these things, the first who drew a lot ran instantly and chose the greatest tyranny, but through folly and insatiableness had not sufficiently examined all things on making his choice, but was ignorant that in this life there was this destiny, the devouring of his own children, and other evils; and that afterwards, when he had considered it at leisure, he wailed and lamented his choice, not having observed the admonitions of the prophet above mentioned; —inasmuch as he did not accuse himself, as the author of his misfortunes, but fortune and the demons, and everything rather than himself.

He added, that he was one of those who came from heaven, who had in his former life lived in a regulated republic, and had been virtuous by custom without philosophy; and that, in short, among these there were not a few who came from heaven, as being unexercised in trials; but most of those who came from earth, as they had endured hardships themselves, and had seen others in hardships, did not precipitately make their choice.

And hence, and through the fortune of the lot, to most souls there was an exchange of good and evil things.

Since, if one should always, whenever he comes into this life, soundly philosophize, and the lot of election should not fall on him the very last, it would seem, from what has been told us from thence, that he shall be happy not only here, but when he goes hence, and his journey hither back again shall not be earthy, and rugged, but smooth and heavenly.

This spectacle, was worthy to behold, in what manner the several souls made choice of their lives; for it was pitiful and ridiculous and wonderful to behold, as each for the most part chose according to the habit of his former life; for he alleged, that he saw the soul which was formerly the soul of Orpheus making choice of the life of a swan, through hatred of womankind, being unwilling to be born of woman on account of the death he suffered from them.

He saw likewise the soul of Thamyris making choice of the life of a nightingale.

And he saw also a swan turning to the choice of human life; and other musical animals in a similar manner, as is likely; —and he saw also one soul, while making its choice, choosing the Life of a lion; and it was the soul of Telamonian Ajax, unwilling to become a man, because it recollected the judgment given with reference to the armor; —that he then saw the soul of Agamemnon, which, in hatred also of the human kind, through his misfortunes, exchanged it for the life of an eagle: and that the soul of Atalante, choosing her lot amidst the rest, and, having attentively observed the great honors paid to an athletic man, was unable to pass by this lot, but took it.

Next to this, he saw the soul of Epeus the Panopean going into the nature of a skillful workwoman; and that far off,

among the last, he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites assuming the ape.

And that by chance he saw the soul of Ulysses, who had drawn its lot last of all, going to make its choice: that in remembrance of its former toils, and tired of ambition, it went about a long time seeking the life of a private man of no business, and with difficulty found it lying somewhere, neglected by the rest.

And that on seeing this life, it said, that it would have made the same choice even if it had obtained the first lot, — and joyfully chose it.

That in like manner the souls of wild beasts went into men, and men again into beasts: the unjust changing into wild beasts, and the just into tame; and that they were blended by all sorts of mixtures.

After, therefore, all the souls had chosen their lives according as they drew their lots, they all went in order to Lachesis, and that she gave to everyone the demon he chose, and sent him along with him to be the guardian of his life, and the accomplisher of what he had chosen. —That, first of all, he conducts the soul to Clotho, to ratify under her hand, and by the whirl of the vortex of her spindle, the destiny it had chosen by lot: and, after being with her, he leads it back again to the spinning of Atropos, who makes the destinies irreversible.

And that from hence they proceed directly under the throne of Necessity; and that, after he had passed by it, as all the others passed, they all of them marched into the plain of Lethe amidst dreadful heat and scorching, for he said that it is void of trees and everything that the earth produces; — that when night came on, they encamped beside the river Amelete, whose water no vessel contains. —Of this water all of them must necessarily drink a certain quantity, and such

as are not kept by prudence drink more than they ought, and that he who from time-to-time drinks forgets everything. —And, after they were laid asleep, and midnight was approaching, there was thunder, and an earthquake, and they were thence on a sudden carried upwards, someone way, and some another, approaching to generation like stars.

And he himself was forbidden to drink of the water.

Where, however, and in what manner, he came into his body, he was entirely ignorant; but, suddenly looking up in the morning, he saw himself already laid on the funeral pile.

And this fable, Glaucon, has been preserved, and is not lost, and it will preserve us, too, if we be persuaded thereby, for thus we shall happily pass over the river Lethe, and shall not pollute our souls.

But if the company will be persuaded by me; considering the soul to be immortal, and able to bear all evil and good, we shall always persevere in the road which leads upwards, and shall by all means pursue justice in unison with prudence, that so we may be friends both to ourselves and the gods, both whilst we remain here, and when we afterwards receive its rewards, like victors assembled together; and so, both here, and in that journey of a thousand years, which we have described, we shall be happy.

The End of the Tenth and Last Book of the Republic.

Republic Of Plato.

Translated by A. D. Lindsay.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, *who is the narrator*. Cephalus,
Glaucon, Thrasymachus,
Adeimantus. Cleitophon,
Polemarchus.
And others who are mute auditors.

The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus.

Book 1.

Socrates/ I went down to the Peiraeus yesterday with Glaucon, the son of Ariston. As this was the first celebration of the festival, I wished to make my prayers to the goddess and see the ceremony. I liked the procession of the residents, but I thought that the Thracians ordered theirs quite as successfully. We had offered our prayers and finished our sight-seeing, and were leaving for the city, when from some way off, Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, saw that we were starting homewards, and sent his slave to run after us and bid us wait. The lad caught my cloak from behind and said:

Boy/ 'Polemarchus bids you wait.'

Socrates/ I turned round and asked him where his master was.

Boy/ 'He is coming behind. but will you please wait?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely we will.'

Socrates/ Very soon up came Polemarchus, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, and Niceratus the son of Nicias, and some others, evidently from the procession.

Polemarchus/ 'Socrates, you seem to be leaving, and to be on your way to the city.'

Socrates/ 'You are not far wrong.'

Polemarchus/ 'Well, do you see our numbers?'

Socrates/ 'Surely.'

Polemarchus/ 'Then either show yourselves the stronger or remain here.'

Socrates/ 'But there is still an alternative. What if we persuade you that you ought to let us go?'

Polemarchus/ 'Do you mean to say, that you can persuade those who won't listen?'

Glaucon/ 'No, indeed.'

Polemarchus/ 'Well, you may make up your minds that we won't.'

Adeimantus/ 'But you do not know, that in the evening there is to be a torch race on horseback in honor of the goddess?'

Socrates/ 'On horseback? That is certainly a novelty. Will it be a horse-race with the riders carrying torches and handing them to one another, or how will it be done?'

Polemarchus/ 'As you say, and there will be a night festival besides, which will be worth seeing. We can go out and watch it after dinner, and many of the young men here will join our party, and we shall talk. So, please, stay, and don't refuse.

Glaucon/ 'It seems that we had better.'

Socrates/ 'Well, if you think so, let us stay.'

We went home, therefore, with Polemarchus, and found there his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them also Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Charmantides of Paeania and Cleitophon, the son of Aristomenes; within was Polemarchus' father, Cephalus. I thought him looking very old. It was indeed some time since I had seen him. He was sitting upon a cushioned chair, a garland on his head, for he had just been sacrificing in the court. There were seats

round the room, and we sat down beside him. Cephalus, as soon as he saw me, greeted me, and said:

Cephalus/ 'You don't very often visit us in the Peiraeus, Socrates. But you ought to. If I were still able to walk to town easily, there would be no need for you to come here; we could come to you. But, as things are, you ought to come here oftener; for I find that as I lose my taste for bodily pleasures, I grow more eager than ever for discussion, and enjoy it more. So do not refuse me. Spend your time with these young men, and visit us here where you know you are with old friends.'

Socrates/ 'Indeed, Cephalus, I enjoy talking with very old men. I consider that they have gone before us along a road which we must all travel in our turn, and it is good that we should ask them of the nature of that road, whether it be rough and difficult, or easy and smooth. You, Cephalus, are now at that time of life which the poets call "old age the threshold," and I should particularly like to ask your thoughts on this question. Is it a painful period of life, or what is your news of it?'

Cephalus/ 'I will give you my own opinion gladly, Socrates. You know some of us old men are often together, true to the old proverb. Now most of the company whenever they meet lament their wretched lot. They long for the pleasures of youth, and call to mind the delights of love, and drink and feasting, and so on. They complain that they are as men who have lost a great treasure, who once lived well, and now don't live at all; and some of them bewail the insults which their kinsfolk heap upon their years, and therefore they decry old age for all the evils it has brought upon them. But in my opinion, Socrates, they don't really see what is wrong. If they were right, then I too, and all who have come to my time of life, would by reason of old age have suffered as they have; but, as a matter of fact, I have met many whose

experience is different. Take the poet Sophocles, for example. I was with him once, when someone asked him: "How do you stand, Sophocles, in respect to the pleasures of sex? Are you still capable of intercourse?" "Hush, sir," "It gives me the greatest joy to have escaped the clutches of that savage and fierce master." I thought then that he spoke wisely, and I think so still, for certainly old age brings great peace and freedom from passions such as these. When the desires grow less intense and slacken, most certainly it is as Sophocles says: it means release from masters many and ravening. But all these troubles, their complaints against their kinsfolk among them, have but one cause, and that is not old age, Socrates, but men's dispositions; for old age lays but a moderate burden on men who have order and peace within themselves, but ill-governed natures find youth and old age alike irksome.'

Socrates/ I was delighted with him for what he said, and, wishing to hear more, I tried to draw him out by saying: 'I fancy, Cephalus, that most people don't admit what you say, but consider that you find old age pleasant, not because of your disposition, but because of your great wealth; for the rich, they say, have many consolations.'

Cephalus/ 'True. they do not admit it, and in a sense, they are right; but not so right as they think. There is great force in that retort of Themistocles to a Seriphian who said sneeringly that his fame was due not to himself but to his city. "Certainly," said Themistocles, "I should not have become famous were I a Seriphian, but neither would you were you an Athenian." The same applies to men 'ho, are not rich and cannot endure old age. A good man even would not easily endure old age and poverty conjoined, nor would the bad man, though he got riches, ever attain peace with himself.'

Socrates/ 'Did you inherit the greater part of your wealth, Cephalus, or have you made it?'

Cephalus/ 'What have I made myself, Socrates? In the matter of money-making, I might be called the mean between my grandfather and my father. My grandfather, Cephalus, inherited about as much wealth as now possess, and increased it many times, while Lysanias, my father, reduced it to even less than it is now. But I am content if I leave these young men not less, but perhaps a little more than I inherited.'

Socrates/ 'I asked, because you seemed to me not excessively fond of money; and that is usually the case with men who have not made it. But those who have made their money are twice as much attached to it as others; for as poets love their poems and fathers their children, just so money-makers value their money, not only for its uses, as other people do, but because it is their own production. They are disagreeable people to meet for that reason: they have no praise for anything but riches.'

Cephalus/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, but tell me this: What do you consider the greatest good in the possession of ample means?'

Cephalus/ 'Something that perhaps few men will credit. But you know, Socrates, when a man faces the thought that he must die, there come upon him fear and foreboding about things that have not troubled him before. Once he laughed at the tales about those in Hades, of punishment to be suffered there by him who here has done injustice. But now his soul is tormented by the thought that these may be true, and whether from the bodily weakness of old age, or because he is now nearer that other world, he himself sees those things more clearly. He becomes full of fear and suspicion. He begins to reckon up and consider if he has done any

injustice to any man. And finding in his life many such acts, often, like a child, he awakes out of sleep in terror, and lives in expectation of evil. But with him that is conscious of no injustice in him, kindly hope, the nurse of age, as Pindar calls it, is always present. For that is a beautiful saying of his, Socrates, that whoever has lived a righteous and holy life;

> She on his pilgrimage
> Fareth beside him, and his heart feeds.
> Sweet hope, the nurse of age;
> Most surely, she of all
> To its haven leads
> The many-turning mind
> Of human kind.

It is really a wonderfully fine description. Now here, I hold, lies the chief advantage of the possession of wealth, not perhaps for everyone, but for the good man; for we can go to that other world without fear only if we are guiltless of even involuntary deceit or falsehood, and if we are quit of all our debts of sacrifice to God and of money to man, and to this result money largely contributes. It has indeed many other uses; but setting one thing against another, I should regard this as not the least of the uses of wealth to a man of sense.'

Socrates/ 'What you say, Cephalus, is excellent. But as to this justice, can we quite without qualification define it as truthfulness and repayment of anything that we have received; or are these very actions sometimes just and sometimes unjust? For example, if we had been given weapons by a friend when he was of sound mind, and he went mad and reclaimed them, it would surely be universally admitted that it would not be right to give them back. Anyone who did so, and who was prepared to tell the whole truth to a man in that state, would not be just.'

Cephalus/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then this is not the definition of justice—speaking the truth and restoring what we have received?'

Polemarchus/ 'Yes, but it is, Socrates, if we are to believe Simonides.'

Cephalus/ 'Well, well, I leave the argument with you, for it is time for me to attend to the sacrifice.'

Socrates/ 'Well,' said I, 'is not Polemarchus your heir?'

Cephalus/ 'Certainly,'

Socrates/ he smiling, departed to sacrifice. —

'Come, then, you who have inherited the argument, what is this saying of Simonides about justice of which you approve?'

Polemarchus/ 'That to render to every man what is owing is just, and I for one think he was right in so saying.'

Socrates/ 'Well, Simonides is one whom we cannot lightly disbelieve. He was a wise and godlike man. But as to what this saying means, you, Polemarchus, may know that; I certainly do not. For it clearly does not mean what we were just saying, repayment of what has been given to a man in pledge if the claimant is out of his senses. Yet surely what has been given in pledge is owing, is it not?'

Polemarchus/ "Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But we were certainly not to make repayment when the claimant is out of his senses.'

Polemarchus/ "True.'

Socrates/ 'Then Simonides apparently means something else when he says that to repay what is owing is just.'

Polemarchus/ "But assuredly he does, for he thinks that friends owe to friends to do good and no evil.'

Socrates/ 'I understand, for what is repaid is not always what is owing; when, for example, a man repays money to

one who has deposited it with him, if the repayment or acceptance is harmful and the repayer and the receiver are friends. Is that what you say Simonides meant?'

Polemarchus/ "Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then are we to repay to enemies whatever is owing to them?'

Polemarchus/ "Certainly we must pay them what is owing. But I imagine that from an enemy to an enemy evil of some sort is owing, because there evil is appropriate.'

Socrates/ 'Simonides then apparently, as poets will, made a riddle on the nature of justice. For he thought, as it appears, that to pay every man what is appropriate is just; but he called that, what is owing.'

Polemarchus/ "Do you not agree?'

Socrates/ 'In heaven's name, what answer do you think he would have given us if we had asked him: "Simonides, what that is owing and appropriate does the art called medicine render, and to whom or what?"'

Polemarchus/ "Clearly that it renders drugs and food and drink to bodies.'

Socrates/ 'And what that is owing and appropriate does the art called cookery render, and to whom or what?'

Polemarchus/ "Seasoning to dishes.'

Socrates/ 'Well, what then does the art called justice render, and to whom or what?'

Polemarchus/ "If, Socrates, we are to be consistent, it renders benefits and injuries to friends and enemies.'

Socrates/ 'Then does he mean by justice doing good to friends and evil to enemies?'

Polemarchus/ "I think so.'

Socrates/ 'But when people are ill, who, as regards health and disease, is most capable of doing good to friends and harm to enemies?'

Polemarchus/ "A doctor.'

Socrates/ 'And when they are on a voyage, as regards the dangers of the sea?'

Polemarchus/ "A ship captain.'

Socrates/ 'Then what about the just man? In what action and in' what regard is he most capable of benefiting his friends and harming his enemies?'

Polemarchus/ "In wars and alliances, I imagine.'

Socrates/ 'Very good! But, my dear Polemarchus, a doctor is useless when men are not ill.'

Polemarchus/ "True.'

Socrates/ 'And a ship captain when they are not on the sea.'

Polemarchus/ "Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then is the just man also useless when men are not at war?'

Polemarchus/ "I cannot think so.'

Socrates/ 'Then justice is useful in peace also?'

Polemarchus/ "It is.'

Socrates/ 'So is farming, is it not?'

Polemarchus/ "Yes.'

Socrates/ 'In the procuring of the fruits of the earth, that is to say?'

Polemarchus/ "Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And is shoemaking also useful?'

Polemarchus/ "Yes.'

Socrates/ 'In the procuring of shoes, you would say?'

Polemarchus/ "Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Now, then, as to justice. What need docs it satisfy or what benefit procure that makes it useful in peace?'

Polemarchus/ "It is useful in dealings, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'By dealings, do you mean partnerships or something different?'

Polemarchus/ "Yes, partnerships.'

Socrates/ 'Then in a game of draughts is the just man or the draught player a good and useful partner?'

Polemarchus/ "The draught player.'

Socrates/ 'In bricklaying and masonry will the just man be a better and more useful partner than the builder?'

Polemarchus/ "Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then as the harp player is a better partner than the just man in playing music, in what kind of partnership will the just man be better than the harp player or the builder?'

Polemarchus/ "In a money partnership, I imagine.'

Socrates/ 'Except, perhaps, Polemarchus, in using money, as when it comes to buying or selling a horse. There, I imagine, the man who knows horses is the better partner. Is he not?'

Polemarchus/ "Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'And in buying or selling a ship, the shipbuilder or the captain will be the better?'

Polemarchus/ "Probably.'

Socrates/ 'Then on which occasions of using silver and gold is the just man a more useful partner than others?'

Polemarchus/ "In cases of depositing and keeping money safe.'

Socrates/ 'Is not that as good as saying, when there is no need to use money, but only to keep it unused?'

Polemarchus/ "Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then justice is useful in regard to money when money is useless?'

Polemarchus/ "It looks like it.'

Socrates/ 'And when a pruning knife is to be kept, justice is useful both in dealing with others, or for yourself; but when it is to be used, the art of vine-dressing is more useful?'

Polemarchus/ "Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'Would you say the same of a shield and a harp? When they are to be kept and not used, justice is useful; but when they are to be used, the arts of fighting and of music are more useful.'

Polemarchus/ "That must be so.'

Socrates/ 'And is it not the same with everything else? When anything is to be used, justice is useless; and when it is not to be used, useful?'

Polemarchus/ "It looks like it.'

Socrates/ 'Justice, then, my friend, cannot be of any great moment if it is useful only for things that are useless. But let us consider this point. In any kind of fight, whether with fists or weapons, is not he who is cleverest in striking also cleverest in warding off blows?'

Polemarchus/ "Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Moreover, is not he who is clever in warding off disease also cleverest in implanting it without being found out?'

Polemarchus/ "I think so.'

Socrates/ 'And he is an excellent guard of an army who is clever in stealing the plans of the enemy and all their dispositions?'

Polemarchus/ “Certainly.’

Socrates/ ‘Then whoever is a clever guarder of anything is also a clever thief of it?’

Polemarchus/ “Apparently.’

Socrates/ ‘Then if the just man is clever at guarding money, he is also clever at stealing it?’

Polemarchus/ “‘That is certainly the drift of the argument.’

Socrates/ ‘Then the just man stands revealed as a clever thief, and you have probably learnt that from Homer, for he had a great liking for Odysseus’ maternal grandfather, Autolycus, and says that he excelled all men in theft and perjury. Justice, then, according to you and Homer and Simonides seems to be a form of theft, for the advantage of friends and the harm of enemies. Have you not said so?’

Polemarchus/ “Good heavens, no! but I do not know now what I have said. Still I am of the same opinion, that justice is to help your and harm your enemies.’

Socrates/ ‘Do you define a man’s friends as those who seem to him to be trustworthy, or as those who really are whether they seems so or not, and so with his enemies?’

Polemarchus/ “It is but likely, that a man should love those whom he thinks trustworthy, and hate those whom he thinks evil.’

Socrates/ ‘But do not men make mistakes in this matter so that they think many men trustworthy who are not really so, and vice versa?’

Polemarchus/ “‘They do.’

Socrates/ ‘Then to those men are not the good enemies and the bad friends?’

Polemarchus/ “Certainly.’

Socrates/ 'But nevertheless it is just for them in those circumstances to help the evil and harm the good, is it not?'

Polemarchus/ "Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'But are not the good just, and such as do no injustice?'

Polemarchus/ "Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then, according to your argument, it is just to do ill to those who do no injustice.'

Polemarchus/ "Certainly not, Socrates. It Is the argument that seems evil.'

Socrates/ 'Then is it just to harm the unjust and benefit the just?'

Polemarchus/ "That seems a fairer conclusion than the former.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Polemarchus, for the many who have been entirely mistaken about men, it will be just to harm their friends, for some of them are evil, and to help their enemies, for some of them are good. So we shall come to a conclusion exactly contrary to what we asserted to be Simonides' meaning.'

Polemarchus/ "Yes, that is certainly the result. But let us change, for we probably did not define friend and enemy rightly.'

Socrates/ 'Where was the definition wrong, Polemarchus?'

Polemarchus/ "In defining the friend as him who seems to be trustworthy.'

Socrates/ 'And now, what change shall we make?'

Polemarchus/ "We shall say, that he is a friend who not only is thought to be but really is trustworthy, but he who is only thought to be and is not really trustworthy is thought

to be but is not really a friend. And the same change will apply to enemies.'

Socrates/ 'Then apparently according to the argument, the good man will be a friend and the bad an enemy.'

Polemarchus/ "Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then would you have us add to our definition of justice? In other words, whereas we said previously that it was just to do good to friends and harm to enemies, shall we now further say that justice is to do good to friends when they are good, and to harm enemies when they are bad?'

Polemarchus/ "Certainly. I think that is an excellent definition.'

Socrates/ 'Is it then, the nature of a just man to harm any human being whatever?'

Polemarchus/ "Why, certainly. He must harm those who are wicked and enemies.'

Socrates/ 'When horses are harmed, do they become better or worse?'

Polemarchus/ "Worse.'

Socrates/ 'Worse as horses, or worse as dogs?'

Polemarchus/ "Worse as horses.'

Socrates/ 'And, similarly, when dogs are harmed, do they become worse as dogs and not worse as horses?'

Polemarchus/ "Necessarily.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my good sir, shall we not say the same of men, that when harmed they become worse as men—that is, worse in human excellence?'

Polemarchus/ "Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But is not justice a human excellence?'

Polemarchus/ "That, too, is indisputable.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my friend, it is also indisputable that men who are harmed become more unjust.'

Polemarchus/ " Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'Now, can musicians, by the art of music, make men unmusical?'

Polemarchus/ "That is impossible.'

Socrates/ 'Or can horsemen by horsemanship make men worse riders?'

Polemarchus/ "No.'

Socrates/ 'Then can just men by justice make men unjust; or, in short, can good men by virtue make men bad?'

Polemarchus/ "No, that is impossible.'

Socrates/ 'It is not the function of heat, I imagine, to make cold, but of its opposite?'

Polemarchus/ "Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Nor of dryness to make wet, but of its opposite?'

Polemarchus/ "Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Nor of the good man to do harm, but of his opposite?'

Polemarchus/ "That is evident.'

Socrates/ And is not the just man good?'

Polemarchus/ "Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then to harm either his friend or any man is not the function of the just man, Polemarchus, but of his opposite, the unjust?'

Polemarchus/ What you say seems to me indisputable, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Then if any man has said that it is just to restore to each man what is owing, and if that means that the just owes harm to his enemies and help to his friends,

he was not a wise man, in that he said what was untrue. For we have discovered that it is never just to injure any man.'

Polemarchus/ "I agree.'

Socrates/ 'Then, you and I will take up arms together against anyone who attributes this saying to Simonides, or Bias, or Pittacus, or any other wise and blessed man.'

Polemarchus/ 'I am quite ready to do my share of the fighting.'

Socrates/ 'But do you know, whom I think to be the author of the saying that it is just to help friends and harm enemies?'

Polemarchus/ 'Whom?'

Socrates/ 'I fancy that it was Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenias the Theban, or some other man of wealth and fancied power.'

Polemarchus/ 'Yes, you are certainly right.'

Socrates/ 'Very good. Now since this definition of justice and what is just has been rejected, what other definition can anyone give?'

Now, while we had been talking, Thrasymachus had several times tried to interrupt the argument, but had been restrained by those next him who wished to hear it to the end. When we stopped for a moment, and I said these words, he could keep still no longer; but, gathering himself up, he sprang at us like a wild beast to make us his prey. Polemarchus and I shrank aside in fear. Then, speaking so that all could hear, he said:

Thrasymachus/ 'What nonsense has possessed you two all this time, Socrates? What do you mean by all your polite bowing and scraping to one another? If you have a genuine desire to know what justice is, don't confine yourself to asking questions, and making a show by refuting any

answer that is given. You know that it is much easier to ask questions than to answer them. But answer yourself, and say how you define justice; and don't dare to tell me that it is the obligatory, or the expedient, or the profitable, or the lucrative, or the advantageous, but make your answer precise and accurate, for I will not have any rubbish of that kind from you.'

Socrates/ When I heard this I was struck with amazement, and gazed at him, and began to be afraid. I think that if I had not looked at him before he looked at me, I should have been struck dumb. But when the argument began to exasperate him I had looked at him first, so that I was able to answer him:

'Thrasymachus, don't be hard on us, for if Polemarchus and I have gone astray in our scrutiny of the argument, our sin has assuredly not been deliberate. If gold had been the object of our search, we could never have allowed our politeness to spoil our chance of finding it; and now, when we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than much gold, never imagine that we should have given way to one another so weakly and foolishly, instead of making every effort to discover it. We are in earnest, my friend, believe me; but the task, I fancy, is beyond our powers; and, therefore, you clever people should rather pity than scold us.'

When he heard this he burst out laughing and said:

Thrasymachus/ 'O Heracles, this is our sly Socrates whom we all know so well. I knew how it would be, and I told the others that you would refuse to give an answer, but would take refuge in slyness or anything to excuse your answering a simple question.'

Socrates/ 'You are a wise man, Thrasymachus, and you know that if you' asked someone what are the factors of twelve, and said to him: "Don't dare, sir, to tell me that

twelve is twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, for I will not have any such nonsense from you," you could see, I fancy, that no one would answer that kind of question. If he said to you: "Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I to give none of these answers? But what, my good sir, if one of them happens to be right? Am I then to give another answer than the true one? or what do you mean?" What would you have said to that?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Oh, well, the cases are so exactly parallel, are they not?'

Socrates/ "There is no reason why they should not be. But even if they are not, but one of those answers seems true to the person questioned, do you fancy that he will not answer as he thinks, whether we forbid him or not?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Then are you actually going to do that? Will you give one of those answers which I have forbidden?'

Socrates/ 'I should not be surprised, if on consideration I thought it right to do so.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Well, what if I give you an answer about justice different from all these, and better? What penalty are you prepared to pay?'

Socrates/ 'None, but the befitting penalty of ignorance. It is befitting surely to learn from wisdom. I am ready to pay that penalty.'

Thrasymachus/ 'You are an entertaining fellow. Yes, you must learn, but you must pay in money also.'

Socrates/ 'Certainly, if I have any.'

Glaucon/ 'But that is all right. As far as money is concerned, Thrasymachus, you may say on, for we will all contribute for Socrates.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Oh, yes, to let Socrates play his usual game, refuse to answer himself, but listen to another's answer, and then refute it.'

Socrates/ 'But, my good sir, how can a man answer when, in the first place, he is ignorant and confesses his ignorance, and when, secondly, even if he has any opinions on the subject, he has been forbidden to say what he thinks by a man of no mean authority? It is much better that you should speak, for you say that you know and have an answer. Therefore don't refuse, but do me the favor of answering, and don't grudge instructing Glaucon here and the rest of us.

When I had said this, Glaucon and the others entreated him not to refuse. Now Thrasymachus was evidently eager to speak and win applause for the excellent answer he thought he had ready. But he pretended to insist on my answering. In the end he gave way and said:

Thrasymachus/ 'This is Socrates' wisdom. He refuses to teach, but goes about learning from others, and shows no gratitude for his lessons.'

Socrates/ 'It is perfectly true, Thrasymachus, that I learn from others. But it is untrue to say that I show no gratitude. I show all that I can, for I have no money. I can only give praise. When you answer, you will see at once how willingly I give that if I think an answer good, for I fancy that yours will be good.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Listen, then. I declare that justice is nothing else than that which is advantageous to the stronger. Well, where is your praise? You refuse it?

Socrates/ 'I must first learn what you mean. As yet I do not know. You say that what is advantageous to the stronger is just. Now, what do you mean by that, Thrasymachus? For example, you surely do not assert that if Polydamas the athlete is stronger than we, and it is to his bodily advantage

to eat meat, then for us also who are weaker this diet is advantageous, and consequently just?'

Thrasymachus/ 'You are shameless, Socrates. You conceive my meaning in the one way in which you can do most harm to the argument.'

Socrates/ 'Not at all, my good sir, but tell us your meaning more clearly.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Do you mean to say you don't know, that in some cities a tyrant is master, in others a democracy, in others an oligarchy?'

Socrates/ 'Surely.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Then it is the government which is master in each city, is it not?'

Socrates/ 'Certainly.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Well, every government lays down laws for its own advantage—a democracy democratic, a tyranny tyrannical laws, and so on. In laying down these laws they have made it plain that what is to their advantage is just. They punish him who departs from this as a law-breaker and an unjust man. And this, my good sir, is what I mean. In every city justice is the same. It is what is advantageous to the established government. But the established government is master, and so sound reasoning gives the conclusion that the same thing is always just—namely, what is advantageous to the stronger.'

Socrates/ 'I have found out, what you mean. I shall try to find out whether it is true or not. But, Thrasymachus, you yourself have given the answer that the advantageous is just; yet you forbade me to give that answer, though indeed you have added the qualification, "to the stronger."'

Thrasymachus/ 'And that is an insignificant qualification, I suppose?'

Socrates/ 'It is not yet evident whether it is insignificant or important, but it is evident that we must examine whether your assertion is true; for I myself acknowledge that justice is in a sense advantageous, but you define the advantageous further by the addition of "to the stronger." I do not know about that. I must think.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Think away.'

Socrates/ 'That I will. Now tell me. Do you not also say that it is just to obey the rulers?'

Thrasymachus/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Then are the rulers in every city infallible, or are they liable sometimes to make mistakes?'

Thrasymachus/ 'They are certainly liable to make mistakes.'

Socrates/ 'Then in their legislation will they not lay down some right and some mistaken laws?'

Thrasymachus/ 'I fancy so.'

Socrates/ 'Are right laws those which are to their advantage, and mistaken laws those which are to their disadvantage?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And their subjects must do what they order and this is justice?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then, according to your argument, not only is it just to do what is advantageous to the stronger, but also to do the opposite, what is not advantageous.'

Thrasymachus/ 'What are you saying?'

Socrates/ 'Just what you are, I imagine. But let us look more closely. Has it not been admitted that the rulers in prescribing certain acts to the governed sometimes mistake what is best for themselves, but that at the same time it is

just for the governed to do what the rulers prescribe? Has not that been admitted?'

Thrasymachus/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'Think also, that you have admitted that it is just to do what is to the disadvantage of those who govern and are stronger. The rulers unwittingly prescribe what is to their own hurt, and you say that it is just for others to do what they have prescribed. Then, my most wise Thrasymachus, must it not necessarily follow that it is thus just to do the opposite of what you say? For obviously the weaker are commanded to do what is to the disadvantage of the stronger.'

Polemarchus/ 'But, assuredly, Socrates, that is perfectly plain.'

Clitophon/ 'No doubt, if you are to give witness in his favor.'

Polemarchus/ 'What need is there of witness? Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that the rulers sometimes prescribe what is to their own hurt, and that it is just for the governed to obey those commands.'

Clitophon/ 'No, Polemarchus. Thrasymachus stated that it is just to do what the rulers command.'

Polemarchus/ 'Yes, and he also stated, Cleitophon, that what is to the advantage of the stronger is just, and in making these two statements he acknowledged that sometimes the stronger command the weaker over whom they rule to do what is to their disadvantage, and it follows from those admissions that what is advantageous to the stronger is no more just than what is disadvantageous.'

Clitophon/ 'But, by what is advantageous to the stronger he meant "what the stronger thinks is to his advantage." This is what the weaker must do, and this is his definition of justice.'

Polemarchus/ 'No, that is not what he said.'

Socrates/ 'Well, Polemarchus, it does not matter. If Thrasymachus says so now, let us take him in that sense. Tell me, Thrasymachus, was this how you wished to define justice—namely, as that which in the judgment of the stronger is advantageous to the stronger whether it is really so or not? Are we to say that this is your meaning?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Most certainly not. Do you think that I call him who makes a mistake the stronger at the time of his mistake?'

Socrates/ 'I certainly thought, that that was what you meant when you admitted that the rulers are not infallible, but sometimes make mistakes.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Well, you are a quibbler, Socrates. When a doctor makes a mistake about his patients, do you at that moment in so far as he is mistaken call him a doctor? or do you call a man who makes a mistake in calculating an accountant at the moment of, and in respect to, his mistake? No. I fancy that is only our way of speaking. We say the doctor, or the accountant, or the writer made a mistake; but really none of these, so far as he is what we call him, ever makes a mistake. To speak precisely, since you are for being precise, every craftsman is infallible. He who makes a mistake does so where his knowledge fails him; that is, where he is no craftsman. As with craftsmen and wise men, so with a ruler; he is always infallible so long as he is a ruler, although in ordinary language we all say that the doctor made a mistake and the ruler made a mistake. In such ordinary language was my answer to you a moment ago. But this is the precise form of my statement. A ruler, so far as he is a ruler, is infallible, and being infallible he prescribes what is best for himself, and this the subject must do. So that, as

I said originally, to do what is advantageous to the stronger is just.'

Socrates/ 'Very good, Thrasymachus. So you think that I am a quibbler, do you?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And do you imagine that I ask those questions of you in deliberate intent to discredit you in the argument?'

Thrasymachus/ 'I know it. But it will not serve you. You will not cheat me by your tricks, nor will you oust me from the argument by open violence.'

Socrates/ 'I have no intention of trying, my dear sir, but that we may escape a similar confusion in the future, will you indicate precisely when you speak of the stronger whose advantage it is just for the weaker to serve, whether you mean "the ruler and the stronger" in the popular sense or in that more precise sense which you have just now defined?'

Thrasymachus/ 'I mean a ruler in the most precise sense of the word. Try your tricks and your quibblings against that, if you can. I ask no quarter. But you are powerless.'

Socrates/ 'Do you imagine, that I should be as mad as to try to shave a lion or trick a Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ 'You tried it a moment ago, though you were no good at it.'

Socrates/ 'Well, enough of that. Answer me this. Is the doctor in the precise sense in which you have defined him a money-maker or a healer of the sick? Understand that I am asking about the real doctor.'

Thrasymachus/ 'A healer of the sick.'

Socrates/ 'What of the ship captain? Is the genuine captain a ruler of sailors or a sailor?'

Thrasymachus/ 'A ruler of sailors.'

Socrates/ 'The fact that he sails on a ship need not, I fancy, be taken into account, nor ought we to call him a sailor; for it is not because he is on board that he is called a ship captain, but because of his skill and his authority over sailors.'

Thrasymachus/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Both for sick people and for sailors there is something which is advantageous, is there not?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And is it not the natural end of the art to seek after and provide this?'

Thrasymachus/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'But is there anything advantageous to an art, except that it should be as perfect as possible?'

Thrasymachus/ 'What is the meaning of your question?'

Socrates/ 'This. If you were to ask me whether it is enough for a body to be a body, or whether it needs something more, I should reply: "Certainly it needs something more. In fact, this is why the art of medicine has been discovered, because the body is defective and it is not enough for it to be a body; and to provide what is advantageous to it this art is established." Do you think that such a statement would be correct?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Quite correct.'

Socrates/ 'Now is medicine itself defective? In other words, does any art whatsoever need some kind of virtue or power, as eyes need sight and ears hearing, so that what is advantageous to these powers must be discovered and provided by an art which presides over the eyes and ears? Is there any such defect in art as art, so that every art needs another to discover what is advantageous to it, and that discovering art another, and so on without end? or will each

art seek its own advantage? or is it unnecessary that either itself or any other art should discover what is advantageous to it and will supply its deficiency? For in truth no art is subject to any defect or mistake, and it is not the office of an art to seek the advantage of anything except its subject. So long as an art, which is strictly an art, is true to its own nature, it is correct, and is therefore without defect or blemish. Remember that we are using the words in their strict sense. Is that a true description or not?'

Thrasymachus/ 'It seems true.'

Socrates/ 'Then, medicine seeks what is advantageous not to medicine, but to the body.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And horsemanship what is advantageous not to horsemanship, but to horses; and no art seeks its own advantage (for it needs nothing), but the advantage of its subject.'

Thrasymachus/ 'So it appears.'

Socrates/ 'But, Thrasymachus, the arts govern and are masters of their subject.'

To this he agreed, though very reluctantly.

Socrates/ 'Then no science either prescribes or seeks the advantage of the stronger, but the advantage of the weaker over which it rules?

This also he admitted in the end, though he tried to make a fight of it.

When he had made the admission, I said:

Socrates/ 'Then does any doctor, so far as he is a doctor, prescribe or seek the advantage of the doctor rather than of the patient? For the doctor, in the strict sense of the word, has been admitted to be a ruler of bodies, and not a moneymaker. Have we not admitted that?'

He agreed.

'And is not the ship captain, in the strict sense of the word, a ruler of sailors rather than a sailor?'

'That has been admitted.'

'Then such a captain and ruler will not prescribe and seek the advantage of the captain, but of the sailors over whom he rules.'

He agreed reluctantly.

'Then, Thrasymachus, no one in any kind of government will, so far as he is a ruler, prescribe or seek his own advantage but that of the subject of his craft over which he rules; all that he says and does is said and done with the subject in view, and for his advantage and good.'

When we had reached this stage in the argument, and it was plain to all that the definition of justice had been turned upside down, Thrasymachus, instead of answering, said:

Thrasymachus/ 'Tell me, Socrates, have you a nurse?'

Socrates/ 'Why this? Should you not answer rather than ask questions of that kind?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Because, she lets you go on sniveling, and doesn't wipe your nose when you need it, for you have not learnt from her to distinguish sheep and shepherd.'

Socrates/ 'What, in particular, makes you say that?'

Thrasymachus/ 'You imagine that shepherds or herdsmen look after the good of their sheep or cattle, and fatten and tend them with some other end in view than the good of their masters and themselves, and you actually think that rulers in cities, who are really rulers, do not regard their subjects just as a man his sheep, and do not night and day seek how they may profit themselves, and that only. So profoundly wise are you concerning the just and justice, and the unjust and injustice, that you are unaware that justice

and the just is really the good of another, the advantage of the stronger who rules, but the self-inflicted injury of the subject who obeys; that injustice is the opposite, and rules those very simple just souls; that the governed serve the advantage of the stronger man, and by their obedience contribute to his happiness, but in no way to their own. My most simple Socrates, you must see that a just man always comes off worse than an unjust. Take, first, the case of commercial dealing, when a just and an unjust man are partners. At the dissolution of the partnership you will never find the just man with more than the unjust, but always with less. Then in politics, where there are taxes to pay, out of equal incomes the just man pays more, the unjust less; where there is money to be got, the just man gets nothing, the unjust much. Then, again, when they are in office, the just man, apart from other losses, ruins his own business by neglect, while his justice prevents his making a profit out of the public; and, in addition, he incurs the dislike of his kinsfolk and acquaintances by refusing to be unjust for their advantage. With the unjust man it is the opposite in every particular. For I am speaking, in accordance with my recent explanation, of him who is capable of aggrandizement on a large scale. If you wish to decide how much more advantageous for the individual injustice is than justice, consider such a man. For if you take the most perfect injustice, you will most easily see that it makes the doer of injustice the happiest of men; but those who suffer and will not do unjustly, the most miserable. This is tyranny. It plunders by fraud and force alike the goods of others, sacred and holy things, private and public possessions, and never pettily but always on a grand scale. Individual cases of these crimes are on detection visited with punishment and utter disgrace, and petty offenders of this sort are called temple-breakers, kidnappers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves. But

those who not only despoil the citizens of their money, but capture and enslave their persons, get no such ugly names, but are called happy and blessed men, not only by their citizens, but by all who hear of their complete injustice. Men revile injustice, not because they fear to do it, but because they fear to suffer it. Therefore, Socrates, injustice, when great enough, is mightier and freer and more masterly than justice; and, as I said at the start, justice is to the advantage of the stronger, but injustice is profitable and advantageous to oneself.'

Socrates/ Having so spoken, Thrasymachus was going to depart after having, like a bath man, flung a great flood of words about our ears; but the company would not suffer this, but insisted on his staying and giving account for what he had said. And I myself entreated him earnestly, saying: 'My good Thrasymachus, are you going to depart after throwing a-speech like that at us, before you nave thoroughly taught us or learnt yourself whether or no such things be? Or do you think it a small matter to undertake to decide on the whole course of life which each of us must follow if we would live most profitably.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Do you mean that I don't think it a serious matter?'

Socrates/ 'Apparently, or else you are perfectly indifferent about us, and care nothing whether our ignorance of the knowledge you profess leads us to live worse or better lives. But, my dear sir, take the trouble to convince us as well as yourself. You will not suffer for having helped so many of us. For I may tell you my own opinion. I am not convinced, and I do not think that injustice is more profitable than justice even if it is given free play, and may do what it will without hindrance. No, my dear sir, a man may be unjust, and may be able to practice injustice either by escaping detection, or by overpowering opposition; nevertheless, he cannot

convince me that it is really more profitable than justice. Perhaps some others of the company besides myself may feel the same. So, my good friend, give us satisfactory proof that we are wrong in prizing justice above injustice.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Well, how am I to persuade you? If you are not convinced by what I have just said, what more can I do for you? Am I to take the doctrine and feed you with it?'

Socrates/ 'God forbid! not that. But, firstly, abide by what you have said, or, if you change your mind, do so openly and don't deceive us. For as it is, Thrasymachus, to look back at the argument, observe that though you began by defining the genuine doctor, you did not think the same accuracy necessary afterwards when you came to the genuine shepherd. You thought that he, so far as he is a shepherd, fattens his sheep without considering what is best for them, but with an eye to good eating, like a gourmand who is giving a banquet, or with an eye to profit, like a moneymaker, not a shepherd. But surely the art of shepherding is only concerned with how it may provide what is best for that over which it presides? As for its own interests, all that can contribute to its excellence has been already provided, so long as it is not unfaithful to its nature. This made me think that we must admit that any government, so far as it is a government, considers what is best only for that which it governs and tends, whether the government be public or private. Now, do you think that those who rule in cities, who are genuine rulers, do so willingly?'

Thrasymachus/ 'No, I don't think so. I know it.'

Socrates/ 'How is that, Thrasymachus? Do you not notice that in the ordinary offices of state there are no voluntary rulers? They demand to be paid on the assumption that their holding office benefits not themselves, but the governed. And tell me this. Is not the test by which we always distinguish

one art from another its possession of different powers? Please, my dear sir, do not answer against your convictions, as we want to get on.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes, that is the distinguishing test.'

Socrates/ 'And does not each of these arts give us a distinctive, not a common benefit? —medicine health, for example; navigation safety on a voyage, and so on?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And the art of wages gives wages, does it not? For this is its power. For you do not call medicine and navigation the same art, do you? Speaking precisely, as you suggested, if a sea captain becomes healthy because being at sea suits him, that doesn't make you call his art medicine, does it?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Surely not.'

Socrates/ 'Nor do you call the art of wages medicine, I imagine, if a man gets well while earning wages?

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Well, would you call medicine the art of wages if a man earned wages in medical practice?'

Thrasymachus/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Then we have agreed that the benefit of each art is confined to that art?'

Thrasymachus/ 'We have.'

Socrates/ 'Then if there be any benefit which all craftsmen enjoy in common, that will clearly come from their all using as well something which is common to them all?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'We assert, therefore, that craftsmen who earn wages derive that benefit from their use of the additional art of wages.'

He agreed reluctantly.

Socrates/ 'Then in the case of each art this benefit, the receiving of wages, does not come from the art. If we consider carefully we shall see that health is given by the art of medicine, fees by the art of wages; a house is provided by the art of architecture, and pay by the accompanying art of wages, and so on with all the arts. Each fulfils its own function and benefits its subject. But is a craftsman benefited by his art if he does not get pay in addition?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Apparently not.'

Socrates/ 'Then the voluntary performance of his art does not benefit him?

Thrasymachus/ 'I think not.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Thrasymachus, it is now clear that no art or government provides what is for its own benefit, but, as we said long ago, it provides and prescribes what is for the benefit of the subject, seeking the advantage of him who is weaker, not the advantage of the stronger. It was for this reason, my dear Thrasymachus, that I said a moment ago that no one of his own will becomes a ruler and undertakes to set straight the misfortunes of others. The ruler demands wages, because he who is going to practice his art aright, and is prescribing in accordance with his art, neither practices nor prescribes what is best for himself, but for the subject. For these reasons, naturally, it is right that those who are going to consent to rule should be paid either in money or in honor, or by escaping a penalty which the refusal to rule involves.

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean by that, Socrates? The first two kinds of wages I know, but I do not understand the penalty you mention which you describe as a kind of wages.

Socrates/ ''Do you not understand, what are the wages of the best men, which induce the most virtuous to rule when they consent to do so? Do you not know that ambition and

love of money are held to be, and actually are, something to be ashamed of?

Glaucon/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'For that reason, neither money nor honor will make the good men consent to be rulers. They are unwilling to be called hirelings for openly exacting wages for their office, or to get the name of thieves by fraudulently enriching themselves from it. Nor will honor move them, for they are not ambitious. Therefore if they are to consent to rule the compulsion of a penalty must be laid upon them (this may be why to take office without compulsion is considered disgraceful); and the greatest penalty is to be ruled by an inferior if you will not rule yourself. When virtuous men take office I think they are prompted by this fear; and then they approach it not as a blessing or with any prospect of good fortune: they face it as a compulsory task because they can find none superior or equal to themselves to whom they might entrust it. Were there a city of good men, it is probable that men would contend to escape office as they now contend to gain and it would then be clearly shown that a true ruler is in reality one who seeks not his own advantage but the advantage of the subject, so that every man of understanding would prefer to be benefited by another rather than labor for another's benefit. Therefore I in no way agree with the statement of Thrasymachus that justice is the advantage of the stronger. But this we shall consider again. I attach much greater importance to Thrasymachus' present position, that the life of the unjust man is superior to that of the just man. And you, Glaucon? Which side do you take? Which statement do you consider the truer?'

Glaucon/ 'I think that the life of the just man is more profitable.'

Socrates/ 'Have you heard, the list of blessings which Thrasymachus has just assigned to the life of the unjust man?'

Glaucon/ 'I have, but I am not convinced.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we convince him, if we can possibly find a way of proving that his statements are untrue?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, let us.'

Socrates/ 'Now, if we match ourselves against him and give speech for speech, enumerating the advantages of justice, and he speaks a second time, and we speak yet again, then we must add up and measure the advantages enumerated by each party in each speech, and we shall need a jury to decide between us. But if we follow our previous form of inquiry, arguing till we come to an agreement, then we shall be at the same time jury and advocates.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

'Then have which you will.'

Glaucon/ 'Let us have the second way.'

Socrates/ 'Come, then, Thrasymachus, answer us from the beginning. You say that perfect injustice is more profitable than perfect justice?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly I do, and I have given reasons why it is so.'

Socrates/ Well, then, how do you deal with this question on the subject? I suppose you call one of them a virtue and the other a vice?'

Thrasymachus/ Surely.'

Socrates/ Justice a virtue, and injustice a vice?'

Thrasymachus/ 'That is likely, my dear good fellow, when I say that injustice is profitable, but justice not.'

Socrates/ 'Well, what else?'

Thrasymachus/ 'The opposite.'

Socrates/ 'Do you call justice a vice?'

Thrasymachus/ 'No, but certainly sublime good nature.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you call injustice ill nature?'

Thrasymachus/ 'No, I call it good policy.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Thrasymachus, do you actually think that the unjust are sagacious and good?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly. those who are capable of perfect injustice, who can bring cities and nations under their dominion. But perhaps you imagine that I was talking of pickpockets? Such injustice indeed is, if undetected, profitable in its way. But it is not worth considering beside that which I have described.'

Socrates/ 'I understand, that that is what you mean, but I marveled that you should class injustice with virtue and wisdom and justice with their opposites.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Well, that is exactly what I do.'

Socrates/ 'This is a much more stubborn position, and it is hard to know what to say to it. For if you had said that injustice is profitable, but admitted that it is a vice and evil, as certain people do, then we should have had something to say in accordance with ordinary notions about it; but now it is evident that you will say that it is also beautiful and strong, and you will give it all the attributes which we used to give to justice, since you have actually dared to class it with virtue and wisdom.'

Thrasymachus/ 'You are a most true prophet.'

Socrates/ 'Nevertheless, I must not shrink if I may take it that this is your real opinion, but must take thought and attack the argument; for I imagine, Thrasymachus, that you are really not scoffing, but are saying what is your opinion of the truth.'

Thrasymachus/ 'What difference does it make to you, whether this is my real opinion or not? Can you refute the argument?'

Socrates/ 'You are right. but will you try to answer this further question? Do you think that the just man is ready to outdo the just man in anything?

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly not. If he was, he would not be the pretty good-natured fellow that he is.'

Socrates/ 'Then will he outdo the just action?'

Thrasymachus/ 'No, not the just action either.'

Socrates/ 'Would he presume to outdo the unjust man, or would he or would he not think that just?'

Thrasymachus/ 'He would think so, and he would presume, but he would not manage it.'

Socrates/ 'That, is not my question. I asked whether the just man presumes and wishes to outdo not the just, but the unjust man.'

Thrasymachus/ 'It is as you suggest.'

Socrates/ 'Then what of the unjust? Does he presume to outdo the just man and the just action?'

Thrasymachus/ 'What else? seeing that he presumes to outdo all the world.'

Socrates/ 'Will he not also outdo the unjust man and action, and strive to get the most of everything for himself?'

Thrasymachus/ 'That is the case.'

Socrates/ 'Then let us put it in this way. The just outdoes not the like but the unlike; the unjust man both the like and the unlike.

Thrasymachus/ 'You have expressed it excellently.'

Socrates/ 'And of course, the unjust is sagacious and good, but the just is neither.'

Thrasymachus/ 'That is also excellent.'

Socrates/ 'Then the unjust resembles the sagacious and good, but the just does not?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes. the former, being what he is, must be like those who are of the same nature with himself, and the latter unlike.'

Socrates/ 'Good! Then is each man of the same nature as those whom he is like?'

Thrasymachus/ 'What else?'

Socrates/ 'Very good, Thrasymachus. Now do you call one man musical and another unmusical?'

Thrasymachus/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Which do you call wise and which unwise?'

Thrasymachus/ 'The musical man, of course, I call wise, and the unmusical unwise.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you also say that a man is good in the same respects as he is wise, and evil in the same respects as he is unwise?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And do you say the same of a medical man?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Now, my excellent friend, do you think that a musician in tuning a harp would wish to outdo or would presume to get the better of a musician in tightening or loosening the strings?'

Thrasymachus/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'But would he outdo the unmusical man?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Of necessity.'

Socrates/ 'What of the medical man? In the prescription of food or drink, would he eek to outdo a medical man in the practice of medicine?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Of course not.'

Socrates/ 'But would he outdo the non-medical man?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then consider knowledge and ignorance in general, and tell me whether you think that any expert would choose to outdo either the actions or the words of another expert? Would he not rather say or do the same as his fellow in the same case?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Perhaps, it must be as you suggest.'

Socrates/ 'But what of the ignorant man? Would he not outdo the expert and the ignorant man with equal indifference?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Perhaps.'

Socrates/ 'And is the scientific man wise?'

Thrasymachus/ 'He is.'

Socrates/ 'And is the wise man good?'

Thrasymachus/ 'He is.'

Socrates/ 'Then the man who is good and wise will not try to outdo his like, but his unlike and opposite?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Probably.'

Socrates/ 'But the man who is bad and unlearned will outdo both his like and his opposite?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'But, Thrasymachus, does not our unjust man outdo both his like and his unlike? Did you not say so?'

Thrasymachus/ 'I did.'

Socrates/ 'While the just man will outdo not his like but his unlike, will he not?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then, the just man is like the good man and wise, but the unjust man like the bad and unlearned?

Thrasymachus/ 'That seems likely.'

Socrates/ 'And we agreed that if two men are like one another, they are of the same nature?'

Thrasymachus/ 'We did.'

Socrates/ 'Then the just man is revealed to us as good and wise, but the unjust man as unlearned and bad?'

Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not in the easy way in which I repeat them, but reluctantly, after great resistance and with floods of perspiration, for the weather was hot. Then too for the first time I caught Thrasymachus blushing.

Socrates/ As we had now agreed to rank justice with virtue and wisdom, and injustice with vice and ignorance, I said: 'So much for that point. But we also said that injustice is strong. Have you forgotten, Thrasymachus?'

Thrasymachus/ 'No, I remember. but I am not satisfied with your arguments, and I have something to say on those points. Only if I said it, I know that you would accuse me of speechifying. So either let me say as much as I want, or if you wish to ask questions, ask them; but I shall treat you as we treat garrulous old women, say Yes! Yes! and nod or shake my head as occasion requires.'

Socrates/ 'Please, don't assent to what you don't believe.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Anything to please you, since you won't let me speak. What else do you want?'

Socrates/ 'Nothing in the world. If this is your desire, follow it, and I shall ask questions.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Ask.'

Socrates/ 'Then I shall repeat the question which I asked before, that we may go on where we left off in our inquiry into the relative advantages of justice and injustice. A statement was made that injustice is more powerful and

stronger than justice. But, now that justice is ranked with wisdom and virtue, it will, I imagine, easily be seen to be stronger than injustice, since injustice is ranked with ignorance. No one could any longer fail to recognize that. However, I have no desire, Thrasymachus, to settle the matter in such an off-hand way. I would rather examine it in some such manner as this: Is it not a fact that unjust cities exist, that they attempt to subdue other cities unjustly, that they enslave them and hold many of them in subjection?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Surely, and this will be peculiarly the work of the best city, of that which is most perfectly unjust.'

Socrates/ 'I understand, that was your theory. But this is what I am considering. Will 'the city which becomes master of another attain the position without the aid of justice, or in such a case is justice indispensable?'

Thrasymachus/ 'If your recent statement that justice is wisdom be true, then justice is indispensable; but if mine be true, then injustice.'

Socrates/ 'I am delighted, Thrasymachus, that you are not content to nod and shake your head, but give most excellent answers.'

Thrasymachus/ 'I do it to please you.'

Socrates/ 'It is very good of you. But please me still more by telling me whether you think that a city, or an army, or a band of robbers or thieves, or any other company which pursue some unjust end in common, would be able to effect anything if they were unjust to one another?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Of course not.'

Socrates/ 'What if they were not unjust? Would they effect more?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'The explanation is, I suppose, Thrasymachus, that injustice and hatred make men quarrel and fight with one another, while justice makes them friendly and of one mind. Is not that the case?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Let us suppose so, as I don't want to differ from you.'

Socrates/ 'It is very good of you, my friend; but tell me this: Is it the function of injustice to implant hatred wherever it be? Whether it makes its appearance among freemen or slaves, will it not make them hate and quarrel with one another, and make them incapable of joint action?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'What if it makes its appearance in a company of two? Will they not disagree and hate and be enemies one of the other and of the just?'

Thrasymachus/ 'They will.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my admirable friend, if injustice appears in a single individual, will it lose its power or retain it unimpaired?'

Thrasymachus/ 'We will suppose that it retains it.'

Socrates/ 'Then, does not injustice seem to have some such power as this? Wherever it appears, whether in city, tribe, army, or anywhere else, by arousing dissension and division it makes that which possesses it, firstly, incapable of united action; secondly, the enemy of itself, of everything that opposes it, and of the just. Is not that so?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And I fancy that when it exists in an individual it will do the same, and produce its natural effect. Firstly, it will make him at strife and not of one mind with himself, and incapable of action. Secondly, it will make him the enemy of himself and of the just. Is that the case?

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And the gods are just, my friend?'

Thrasymachus/ 'We may presume so.'

Socrates/ 'Then the unjust man, Thrasymachus, will be the enemy, the just the friend of the gods.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Feast on your argument, and be of good cheer. I shall certainly not oppose you. I don't want to displease the company.'

Socrates/ 'Come, then, crown my feast for me by answering as you are doing. Certain things we have discovered. The just are shown to be the wiser, the better, and the more capable in action; the unjust are unable even to act together. And when we say that any vigorous joint action is the work of unjust men, our language is not altogether accurate. If they had been thoroughly unjust, they could not have kept their hands off one another. Clearly they must have possessed justice of a sort, enough to keep them from exercising their injustice on each other at the same time as on their victims. They did what they did by reason of their justice, and their injustice partially disabled them in the pursuit of their unjust purposes. For the thorough villains who are perfectly unjust, are also perfectly incapable of action. That I see to be true. The truth of your original statement I do not see. But now we have to consider what we postponed for subsequent discussion, whether the just live better and are happier than the unjust. Now this is, think, already proved by what we have said. Nevertheless we must consider it more fully. For the subject of our argument is no trifling matter. It is the question of the right manner of life.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Consider, then.'

Socrates/ Socrates: 'I am doing so. Tell me, do you think that a horse has a function?

Thrasymachus/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ Would you define the function of a horse or of anything else as that work for which it is the indispensable or the best instrument?

Thrasymachus/ 'I do not understand.'

Socrates/ 'Let me explain. Can you see with anything but your eyes?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Of course not.'

Socrates/ 'Or hear with anything but your ears?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then could we not justly describe seeing and hearing as the functions of eyes and ears?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly.

Socrates/ 'Again, could not a vine shoot be cut with a carving-knife or with a chisel or with many other instruments?

Thrasymachus/ 'Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ 'But with no instrument so well, I imagine, as with a pruning-knife, which is made for the purpose?

Thrasymachus/ 'True.

Socrates/ 'Then shall we not call vine-dressing the function of the pruning-knife?

Thrasymachus/ 'We shall.

Socrates/ 'Now, I fancy, you will understand better what I wanted a moment ago when I asked whether the function of each thing is that for which it is the indispensable or the best instrument.

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes. I understand, and I agree with that definition.

Socrates/ 'Good. Now do you not think that everything which has a function has also a corresponding virtue? To

revert to our previous instances. We say that the eyes have a function, have they not?

Thrasymachus/ 'They have.'

Socrates/ 'Then have not the eyes a virtue also?

Thrasymachus/ 'They have.'

Socrates/ 'Again, the ears were found to have a function, were they not?

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes.

Socrates/ 'Then they have a virtue also?

Thrasymachus/ 'They have.'

Socrates/ 'Can we say the same of everything else?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Come now, could the eyes perform their proper function well if they were without their proper virtue, but had the corresponding vice instead?'

Thrasymachus/ 'How could they? You mean probably blindness instead of sight.'

Socrates/ 'I mean, whatever their virtue be. I am not inquiring into that here. My question is whether things perform their own function well by reason of their proper virtue, badly by reason of the corresponding vice?'

Thrasymachus/ 'It is as you say.'

Socrates/ 'Then if ears are deprived of their proper virtue, will they not perform their proper function badly?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then may we make this principle of general application?'

Thrasymachus/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'Come, then, consider this point next. Has the soul a function which nothing else upon earth can perform save itself? For example, to superintend and rule and advise

and so on. Is there anything except the soul to which we could assign these acts as its peculiar functions?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Nothing.'

Socrates/ 'Then what of life? Shall we declare it to be a function of the soul?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'And do we say that the soul has a virtue?'

Thrasymachus/ 'We do.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Thrasymachus, could the soul, if deprived of its proper virtue, perform its proper functions well? Or is that impossible?'

Thrasymachus/ 'It is impossible.'

Socrates/ 'Of necessity an evil soul must rule and superintend badly, but a good soul will do all these things well?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Of necessity.'

Socrates/ 'But have we not agreed that justice is a virtue of the soul, and injustice a vice?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Yes, we have.'

Socrates/ 'Then the just soul and the just man will live well, but the unjust badly?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Apparently, according to your argument.'

Socrates/ 'Again, he that lives well is blessed and happy, he that lives badly the opposite?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Agreed.'

Socrates/ 'But it is not profitable to be miserable, but to be happy?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Undoubtedly.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my noble Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profitable than justice?'

Thrasymachus/ 'Well, Socrates, let that be your entertainment for the feast of Bendis.'

Socrates/ 'I have you to thank for it, Thrasymachus, since you became gentle with me, and stopped being disagreeable. But I have no satisfaction in my feast. That is my fault, not yours. I am like those greedy fellows who before they have properly enjoyed what is before them leave it to snatch at and taste every dish that comes their way. I have done the same. We left the original object of our inquiry, the definition of justice, before we had discovered it, and went off to consider whether it is a vice and ignorance, or wisdom and virtue. Then another argument appeared, to the effect that injustice is more profitable than justice. And I could not refrain from leaving what we were at for this further point, so that now the result of our conversation is that I know nothing. For when I do not know what justice is, I am hardly likely to know whether it is a virtue or not, or whether he that possesses it is unhappy or happy.'

Book 2.

Socrates/ With these words I thought that I had finished. But this, it appeared, was after all only a prelude, for Glaucon with his usual fearlessness would not accept Thrasymachus' refutation, but said:

Glaucon/ 'Socrates, are you content with the appearance of conviction, or do you wish really to convince us that to be just is in every way better than to be unjust?'

Socrates/ 'I should certainly prefer, really to convince you if I could.'

Glaucon/ 'Well, you do not effect your desire. Tell me now, how do you classify things we call good? Do you think that there are some which we would gladly have, not for their consequences, but because we appreciate them for their own sake; as, for example, enjoyment and those harmless pleasures which produce no further effects beyond the mere pleasurable experience?'

Socrates/ 'I certainly think, that there are some like that.'

Glaucon/ 'Secondly, there are some which we prize both for themselves and for their consequences as, for example, thought and sight and health. These and similar good things we appreciate for a twofold reason.'

Socrates/ 'Yes.'

Glaucon/ 'Do you recognize a third class of good things, which includes gymnastic exercises, the undergoing of medical treatment, the practice of medicine, and the other forms of money-making? These are things which we call troublesome but advantageous. We should never take them for themselves, but we accept them for the sake of the rewards and other consequences which they bring.'

Socrates/ 'There is certainly, a third class of that description. What then?

Glaucon/ 'In which class, do you place justice?'

Socrates/ 'In the fairest class, I fancy, amongst those which he, who would be blessed, must love both for their own sake and for their consequences.'

Glaucon/ That is not the opinion of most people. They place it in the troublesome class of good things, which must be pursued for the sake of the reward and the high place in public opinion which they bring, but which in themselves are irksome and to be avoided.'

Socrates/ 'I know that people think so. It is on those grounds that Thrasymachus has always criticized justice and praised injustice. But I am apparently a slow pupil.

Glaucon/ 'Well, as Thrasymachus has spoken, let me speak also, and see then whether you are still of the same opinion. Thrasymachus you charmed like a snake, I think, and he gave in sooner than he need have done, but I am not yet satisfied with the exposition either of justice or injustice. I want to know what each is, and what power each has of itself when existing by itself in the soul; their rewards and their consequences may be left out of account. And if you agree, I shall proceed in this way. I shall renew Thrasymachus' argument. First, I shall state what is said to be the nature and origin of justice. Then, secondly, I shall assert that all who practice it do so unwillingly, and that they do so not because justice is good, but because it is indispensable. And, thirdly, that this conduct of theirs is reasonable; for the life of the unjust man is far better than that of the just, according to their statement. I myself, Socrates, am not at all of this opinion. But I get confused; my ears are dinned with the arguments of Thrasymachus and countless others; but from none have I heard as yet the argument in defense of justice, and its superiority to injustice, as I want to hear it. For I want to hear the praises

of justice for its own sake, and I have the greatest hopes that I shall do so from you. I shall speak vehemently therefore in favor of the unjust life, and in doing so I shall show you the way in which I want to hear you condemning injustice and praising justice. Now, do you like my proposal?'

Socrates/ 'Most certainly I do, for on what subject would a man of sense more gladly converse time and again?

Glaucon/ 'I am delighted to hear you say so. Listen, then, and I shall begin as I proposed with the nature and origin of justice. By nature, men say, to do injustice is good, to suffer it evil, but there is more evil in suffering injustice than there is good in inflicting it. Therefore when men act unjustly towards one another, and thus experience both the doing and the suffering, those amongst them who are unable to compass the one and escape the other, come to this opinion: that it is more profitable that they should mutually agree neither to inflict injustice nor to suffer it. Hence men began to establish laws and covenants with one another, and they called what the law prescribed lawful and just. This, then, is the origin and nature of justice. It is a mean between the best—doing injustice with impunity—and the worst—suffering injustice without possibility of requital. Thus justice, being a mean between those extremes, is looked upon with favor, not because it is good, but because the inability to inflict injustice makes it valuable. For no one who had the power to inflict the injustice and was anything of a man would ever make a contract of mutual abstention from injustice with anyone else. He would be mad if he did. Such, Socrates, is the nature of justice, and such is its origin, according to the popular account.

'Now, that those who practice justice do so unwillingly and from inability to inflict, will be seen most clearly if we make the following supposition. Suppose we take the just and the unjust man and give each power to do whatever he

will, and then follow them and see where each is led by his desires. We shall catch the just man following undisguisedly the very same road as the unjust. He would be led on by his desire to outdo his fellows: every nature naturally pursues that as good, though law compels it to turn aside and reverence equality. The impunity I refer to would be best exemplified if they could have the power possessed by the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian in the story. For they say that he was a shepherd, a servant of the reigning king of Lydia. There was a great storm of rain and an earthquake where he was feeding his flock: the ground was rent, and a chasm appeared. In amazement he looked in, then descended into the chasm, and saw there many marvelous things which the story enumerates. Among them was a horse of bronze, hollow, with windows in its sides. He looked in and saw inside a dead body, which seemed of almost superhuman size. On the hand was a golden ring. He took this and nothing besides, then came away. When the shepherds held their monthly gathering at which they arranged for the sending of their report on the flocks to the king, he came with the ring on his finger. As he was sitting with the others he happened to turn round the bezel of the ring till it came to the inside of his hand. On his doing so he became invisible to his companions, and they talked of him as of an absent man. In astonishment he touched his ring again and turned the bezel back to the outside of his hand. As he turned it he became visible again. Then having noticed this he tried whether this power really lay in the ring, and he found that he became invisible when he turned the bezel inwards, visible when he turned it outwards. When he had made this discovery he at once contrived to be one of the messengers sent to the king. Arriving at the palace he seduced the queen, plotted with her against the king, killed him, and so obtained the crown.

‘Now, if there were two such rings, and the just man took one and the unjust the other, no one, it is thought, would be of such adamantine nature as to abide in justice and have the strength to abstain from theft, and to keep his hands from the goods of others, when it would be in his power to steal anything he wished from the very marketplace with impunity, to enter men’s houses and have intercourse with whom he would, to kill or to set free whomsoever he pleased; in short, to walk among men as a god. And, in so doing, the just man would act precisely as the unjust. Both would follow the same path. This, surely, may be cited as strong evidence that no man is just willingly, but only on compulsion. Justice is not a good to the individual, for everyone is unjust whenever he thinks injustice possible. Every man thinks that injustice is more profitable to the individual than justice, and thinks rightly, according to the supporters of this theory; for if any man who possessed this power we have described should yet refuse to do unjustly or to rob his fellows, all who knew of his conduct would think him the most miserable and foolish of men, but they would praise him to each other’s faces, their fear of suffering injustice extorting that deceit from them. So much, then, for that. Now this question concerning the life of these two men we shall be able to decide aright only by contrasting the extremes of justice and injustice. How shall we make our contrast? In this way. Let us abstract nothing from the injustice of the unjust or from the justice of the just; each shall be perfect in his own way of life. Firstly, then, the unjust man shall be like a clever craftsman. The skillful captain or doctor can discern what is possible and what is impossible in his art. He attempts the one and leaves the other alone; and if by any chance he makes a mistake, he is able to retrieve it. Similarly the unjust man, if he is to be thoroughly unjust, shall show discernment in his unjust

deeds, and shall not be found out. If he is caught, we must consider him a failure; for it is the last word in injustice to seem just without being it. To the perfectly unjust man, then, we must give perfect injustice, and abstract nothing from it. We must allow him to do the fullest injustice and be reputed truly just. If ever he makes a mistake, he must be able to retrieve it. If any of his unjust deeds are brought to light, his eloquence will be convincing in his favor. He will be able to use force where force is needed, thanks to his courage, his strength, and his resources of friends and wealth. Such is the unjust man. Beside him, in accordance with the argument, let us place our just man, a simple and noble character, one who, as Aeschylus says, desires not to seem, but to be good. The semblance, indeed, we must take from him; for if he is reputed just, he will enjoy the honors and rewards that such a reputation earns, and thus it will not be apparent, it is objected, whether he is just for justice' sake or the honors' and rewards' sake. He must be stripped of everything except justice, and made the very counterpart of the other man. He shall do no injustice, and be reputed altogether unjust that his justice may be tested as being proof against ill repute and its consequences, and he shall go on his way unchanged till death, all his life seeming unjust but being just. Thus these two will have come to the extremes of justice and of injustice, and we may judge which of them is the happier.'

Socrates/ 'Hallo, my dear Glaucon, how energetically you are scouring these two for judgment, as if they were a pair of statues.'

Glaucon/ 'I am doing my best. Well, given two such characters, it is not difficult now, I fancy, to go on to discover what sort of life awaits each of them. Let me describe it. If my description is rather harsh, remember, Socrates, that those who praise injustice above justice are responsible, and

not I. They will say that our just man will be scourged, racked, fettered, will have his eyes burnt out, and at last, after all manner of suffering, will be crucified, and will learn that he ought to desire not to be but to seem just; for those words of Aeschylus applied much more truly to the unjust man. For it is the unjust man in reality, they will say, who, as his practice is akin to truth and his life not ruled by appearances, desires not to seem but to be unjust;

> And from the deep-ploughed furrow of his heart
> Reaps harvest rich of goodly purposes.

For, firstly, his semblance of justice brings him rule in his city. Then he may marry and give in marriage as he pleases; he may contract or enter into partnership with whom he will, and since he has no scruples against unjust dealings, he can besides make large profits. Therefore, when he enters into a contest, whether public or private, he comes out victorious and gets the better of his enemies. By so doing he becomes rich, helps his friends and harms his enemies, and on the gods he bestows sacrifices and offerings fitting and magnificent. Far better than the just man can he serve the gods or whatsoever man he pleases. So that even the love of the gods is more appropriately his than the just man's. Thus they say, Socrates, that at the hands of gods and men life is made richer for the unjust than for the just.'

Socrates/ After Glaucon had spoken, I was going to say something in reply, when his brother Adeimantus said:

Adeimantus/ 'You do not imagine, I hope, Socrates, that the argument has been adequately expressed?'

Socrates/ 'Why, has it not?'

Adeimantus/ 'What most needed saying has been omitted.'

Socrates/ 'Well, you know the proverb, "Let brother help brother.' So if Glaucon falls short, you must come to his aid.

I must admit he has said enough to throw me and make me quite incapable of coming to the aid of justice.'

Adeimantus/ 'Nonsense. But listen to what I have to say. For we must also examine the arguments on the other side, those which praise justice and condemn injustice, and we shall see more clearly what I think Glaucon means. For parents and all who have anyone to care for, when they exhort their children and say that it is right to be just, do not praise justice itself, but the reputation it brings. Their desire is that their children may seem just, and may thus obtain the rewards that reputation brings to the just man—offices of state and advantageous marriages, and all the benefits which Glaucon has been enumerating. Even higher than this do these persons rate the importance of seeming; for they cast the esteem of the gods into the scale, and can tell of countless benefits which they say the gods give to the pious. The noble Hesiod and Homer are with them here. The first tells what the gods do for the just. First of their oak trees:

> Acorns grow on the branches, and honey is found in the tree trunks;
>
> Rich in wool are their flocks, bowed down by the weight of their fleeces.

and they have many other similar blessings. And Homer says much the same. Talking of someone he speaks of him as:

> Like a never ill-deserving king,
>
> Whose equal hand impartially doth temper
>
> Greatness and Goodness: to whom therefore bears
>
> The black earth store of all grain, trees confers
>
> Cracking with burthen, long-lived herds creates,
>
> All which the sea with her sorts emulates;

and still more delightful than these are the blessings which Musaeus and his son bestow on the just men from the gods; for they take them in their story to Hades, where they seat them on couches and prepare a banquet for the saints, making them spend all their time garlanded and drunken, as though they thought an eternity of drunkenness the fairest reward of virtue. Others make out the rewards of the gods to be even more far-reaching than these; for they say that a man who is holy and abides by his oath, leaves children's children for a posterity behind him. In these and other similar ways they sing the praises of justice. But the wicked and unjust they bury in a muddy mire in Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve. In life, too, they bring them into ill repute; and all the punishments which in Glaucon's description were suffered by those who are just but reputed to be unjust, all these, they say, tall upon the unjust. More than that they do not say. This is their praise and their condemnation of each.

'Further, Socrates, consider another way of speaking of justice and injustice which we find in ordinary conversation and in poetry. All in unison sing that temperance and justice are beautiful, but hard and troublesome, whilst their opposites are pleasant and easy of attainment, and only bad in appearance and by legal convention. Unjust deeds, they say, are on the whole more profitable than just. They have no hesitation in pronouncing wicked men happy if they are rich and powerful, or in giving them honors, both public and private; while they dishonor or slight all who are weak and poor, though they acknowledge them to be the better men. The stories they tell of the attitude of the gods towards virtue are the most astonishing of all. They say that the gods have actually given misfortunes and a life of sorrow to many good men, and the opposite to many evil. Mendicant priests and soothsayers go the round of rich men's doors and persuade

them that they have power from the gods, whereby, if any sin has been committed by a man or his ancestors, they can heal it by charms and sacrifices performed to the accompaniment of feasting and pleasure, and if any man wishes to injure an enemy, at a small cost he may harm just and unjust indifferently; for with their incantations and magic formulae they say they can persuade the gods to serve their will. To support all these assertions they quote the poets. Some tell of the easiness of vice in such passages as this:

> Easy of choice is evil and pleasant it is in the choosing.
> Very smooth is the way and close beside us it lieth.
> But sweat the gods have ordained must be ours in the getting of virtue.

and a long journey too on a rough and uphill road. Others quote Homer to prove that men can turn the gods from their will, as when he says:

> The gods themselves are flexible:
> Perfumes, benign devotions, savors of offerings burned,
> And holy rites the engines are with which their hearts are turned
> By men that pray to them, whose faith their sins have falsified.

And they produce a crowd of books by Musaeus and Orpheus, the descendants of the moon and the Muses, as they say. These are their liturgies, and they persuade not only individuals, but whole cities, that there are modes of redemption and purification from sins for the living and for the departed also, by means of sacrifices and pleasurable amusements which they call mysteries. These redeem us from the evils of the other world; if they are neglected, peril awaits us. Now, my dear Socrates, when concerning the way in which gods and men honor virtue and vice, we find statements such as these made repeatedly and in the same

tenor, what can we think will be their effect on the souls of those who hear them, young men of good natural dispositions who, like bees, fly from one statement to another, gather from them all an answer to the question: What must a man be, and what paths must he take, if he would live the best possible life? Naturally he will say to himself in the words of Pindar, "Shall I by justice or by crooked wiles ascend the higher wall" and so fortify myself for life? For what do men say? If I am just, unless I also seem just, I gain no advantage, but manifest toil and pains. But if I am unjust and have acquired the appearance of justice, a heavenly life, they say, is mine. Well, then, since seeming, as the wise men show me, does violence even to truth and is the lord of happiness, I must turn to it with all my heart. The fore-court of my house of life I must adorn with the presentment of virtue, but behind the walls I shall hide the crafty subtle Reynard whom that wise Archilochus loved. "But," someone says, "it is not easy to be bad and never be found out." No, we answer, and nothing else that is great is easy. Still, if we would be happy, this is the path we must follow. The tracks of the argument point this way. That we may not be found out, we shall organize clubs and fellowships, and there are masters of persuasion who impart the wisdom of the public assembly and of the law courts. By their help persuasion and force will be our weapons, and we shall pay no penalty for our aggrandizement. "But the gods you can neither cheat nor force." But if they do not exist, or if they have no concern with men, why should we care whether we cheat them or not? while if there are gods who concern themselves with men, we know and have heard nothing of them save from the lore and the genealogies of the poets, and it is they who say that they can be turned from their will and persuaded "by prayer, slaying of victims and offerings," and we must believe them altogether or not at all.

If we are to believe them, it is best to practice injustice and then make sacrifice from our ill-gotten gains. For if we are just, all that we shall get is immunity from the penalties of heaven, but we shall lose the gains of injustice. But if we are unjust, we shall make those gains ours, and by making entreaty for our sin and transgression we shall persuade the gods and get off without punishment. “But in Hades we shall be punished for our unjust deeds of this life, we or our children’s., children.” But the young man will make his calculations and reply: My dear sir, the mysteries and the gods of redemption are of great power So say the greatest of cities and the poets who are the children of gods, and the prophets who came from the gods and tell us that such things be.

‘Now, on what grounds can we still prefer justice to the greatest injustice? For if we combine injustice with a spurious decorum we shall fare according to our mind with gods and men alike, both in life and death. That is the report of the many and of the best authorities on the subject. Now after all that has been said, Socrates, how can it be contrived that a man should wish to honor justice if he has any power of mind, or wealth, or body, or birth? Will he not smile when he hears its praises? So that if any man can prove the falsehood of what we have said and has certain knowledge that justice is best, still he will surely be very ready to excuse those who are unjust, and will not be angry with them. He knows that a man may by divine grace of nature dislike injustice or may have acquired knowledge and so avoid it, but that apart from these no one is just of his own will, and it is by reason of cowardice or age or some other weakness that men condemn the injustice which they cannot practice. The truth of this is manifest. Of such men the first to attain to power is the first to practice injustice to the measure of his ability. And the cause of it all is nothing else than this,

to put it in the words which Glaucon used to you at the beginning of the argument, Socrates: “Excellent sir, of all you who profess yourselves praisers of justice, from the heroes of old whose words have come down to us, to the men of to-day, not one of you has ever condemned injustice or praised justice for anything but their reputations, their values in men’s eyes, and their rewards. But what each does of itself by the power of its own nature, when dwelling in the heart of him who possesses it, hidden from gods and men alike: that no one has ever thoroughly considered either in poetry or in prose: nor shown that injustice is the greatest of evils that the soul contains within herself, and justice the greatest good. Had you all from the beginning spoken in that strain, and so persuaded us even from our youth, we should not be all watching our neighbors to prevent them from committing injustice. Each man would himself be his own best guard, in his fear lest by doing unjustly he should have portion with the greatest of evils.” That, Socrates, and even more perhaps, is what Thrasymachus, and possibly others with him, would say concerning justice and injustice, ignorantly, as I conceive, reversing the inherent power of each. Now I, for I have no wish to deceive you, have put their case as vehemently as I can, from a desire to hear you contradict them. So do not be content with proving to us in your argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but show what effect each has in him who possesses it, that makes the one in itself and for itself good, and the other bad. Abstract the reputation of each, as Glaucon urged. For unless you abstract from each its proper reputation, and give it one that does not belong to it, we shall say that you are praising not the reality but the appearance of justice, and condemning not the reality but the appearance of injustice; that your advice is that we should be unjust and not be found out; and that you agree with Thrasymachus

that justice is the good of another, the advantage of the stronger, while injustice is advantageous and profitable to oneself, but disadvantageous to the weaker. Now you have agreed that justice belongs to the class of the greatest goods, those that are worthy of acquisition for the sake of their consequences, but very much more for their own sake. You have ranked it with sight, hearing, thought, health, and with all other goods which are genuine and real, good in their own nature, not for the reputation they bring. Now therefore praise justice in this; show how in itself and by itself it benefits its possessor, and how injustice harms him, and leave rewards and reputations for others to praise. For I can put up with others praising justice and condemning injustice in this way, eulogizing and reviling the respective reputations and rewards they bring, but not with your doing so, unless you insist on it, for you have spent all your life in this one inquiry. Therefore do not be content with proving to us that justice is stronger than injustice, but show what effect they each have on their possessors that makes them in themselves and by themselves, whether or not they be hid from gods and men, the one good and the other bad.'

Socrates/ I have always admired the characters of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but when I had heard this I was quite extraordinarily pleased, and said: 'Well named was your father, and happily did Glaucon's lover describe you in the opening line of the verses he wrote, when you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara:

Sons of Ariston, children divine of a famous father.

That seems to me very true, my friends. For there is assuredly something divine in you, if you are not persuaded that injustice is better than justice when you can speak so eloquently on its behalf. And I think that you really are not persuaded. I conclude so from your general character. For to judge by your arguments alone I should distrust you. But

the greater my confidence in you, the less do I feel that I know how to meet the situation. I cannot come to the rescue. I do not think it is in me. Indeed you convince me of it. For I thought I had proved that justice is better than injustice in my argument with Thrasymachus, which you have rejected. And yet I cannot refuse to come to the rescue. I fear it would be impious were I to stand by and refuse aid while justice was being reviled, and did not come to her rescue so long as there was breath in my body, and I had voice to speak. It is best therefore that I should succor her as well as I can.'

Glaucon and the others implored me by all means to come to the rescue, and not let the argument drop, but to investigate what justice and injustice are, and what is the truth about their advantages. So said what seemed to me best.

'The search in which we are engaged is no easy matter, but needs sharp eyes, I see. Therefore, as we are not clever people, I think, that we had best adopt a method of this kind. If persons of not very sharp eyesight were given the task of reading small letters at a considerable distance, and one of them noticed that the same inscription was written up elsewhere in larger letters and on a larger space, they would, I imagine, consider it a lucky find, and would first read the larger letters and then examine whether the smaller ones were the same.

Adeimantus/ 'That is certainly true. But, Socrates, what do you see in our search after justice that is analogous to that?'

Socrates/ 'I shall tell you. Justice, we say, is the attribute of an individual, but also of a whole city, is it not?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And is not a city greater than an individual?'

Adeimantus/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'Then perhaps justice may exist in greater proportions in the greater space, and be easier to discover. So if you are willing, we shall begin our inquiry as to its nature in cities, and after that let us continue our inquiry in the individual also, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less.'

Adeimantus/ 'I think your proposal is excellent.'

Socrates/ 'Now, if in our argument we were to watch a city in the making, should we not see its justice and injustice in the making also?'

Adeimantus/ 'Very probably.'

Socrates/ 'And when we have done this, may we not hope that we shall more easily see that which we are seeking?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you think we should proceed with our attempt? I warn you that, in my opinion, it will be no small task, so take care how you make up your minds.'

Adeimantus/ 'They are made up, will you please proceed?'

Socrates/ 'The origin of a city, is, in my opinion, due to the fact that no one of us is sufficient for himself, but each is in need of many things. Or do you think there is any other cause for the founding of cities?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, none.'

Socrates/ 'Then men, being in want of many things, gather into one settlement many partners and helpers; one taking to himself one man, and another, another, to satisfy their diverse needs, and to this common settlement we give the name of city. Is not that so?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And when they exchange with one another, giving or receiving as the case may be, does not each man think that such exchange is to his own good?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ To me, then. Let us in our argument construct the city from the beginning. Apparently it will be the outcome of our need?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'But the first and greatest of our needs is the provision of food to support existence and life?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'The second the provision of a dwelling-place, and the third of clothing, and so on?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'Come, then, how will our city be able to supply a sufficiency of all those things? Will it not be by having one man a farmer, another a builder, and a third a weaver? Shall we add a shoemaker, and perhaps another provider of bodily needs?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then the city of bare necessity will consist of four or five men?'

Adeimantus/ 'Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, should each of these men place his own work at the disposal of all in common? For example, should our one farmer provide com for four and spend fourfold time and labor on the provision of com, and then share it with the rest; or should he pay no attention to the others, and provide only a fourth part of the com for himself in a fourth of the time, and spend the other three-fourths of his time in providing a house, clothes, and shoes? Should he not have the trouble of sharing with the others, but rather provide with his own hands what he wants for himself?'

Adeimantus/ 'The first alternative, Socrates, is perhaps the easier.'

Socrates/ 'Well, it is certainly not strange that it is. For as you were speaking, I myself was thinking that, in the first place, no two of us are by nature altogether alike. Our capacities differ. Some are fit for one work, some for another. Do you agree?'

Adeimantus/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ Well, then, would better work be done on the principle of one man many trades, or of one man one trade?'

Adeimantus/ 'One man one trade is better.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, for I fancy that it is also evident that, in work, opportunities which we pass by are lost.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is evident.'

Socrates/ 'I fancy that things to be done will not wait the good time of the doer. Rather the doer must wait on the opportunity for action, and not leave the doing of it for his idle moments.'

Adeimantus/ 'He must.'

Socrates/ 'And so more tasks of each kind are accomplished, and the work is better and is done more easily when each man works at the one craft for which nature fits him, that being free from all other occupations he may wait on its opportunities.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is certainly the case.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Adeimantus, we need more citizens than four to provide the above-mentioned necessities. For the fanner, naturally, will not make his own plough if it is to be a good one, nor his mattock, nor any of the other farming tools. No more will the builder, who also needs many tools. And the same will hold of the weaver and the shoemaker, will it not?'

Adeimantus/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Then carpenters and smiths and many other artisans of that kind will become members of our little city, and make it populous?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Yet it would not be so very large if we added herdsmen and shepherds and others of that class, that the farmers may have oxen for ploughing, and both builders and farmer may have yoke animals for their carting, and that the weavers and shoemakers may have skins and wool.'

Adeimantus/ 'Nor so very small if so well provided.'

Socrates/ 'Again, it will be almost impossible to have our city so situated that it will need no imports.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that will be impossible.'

Socrates/ 'Then it will need more men still to bring it what it needs from other cities?'

Adeimantus/ 'It will.'

Socrates/ 'And if they are to get what they need from other people, their agent must take with him something that those others want. If he goes empty-handed, he will return empty-handed, will he not?'

Adeimantus/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'Then the workers of our city must not only make enough for home consumption; they must also produce goods of the number and kind required by other people?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, they must.'

Socrates/ 'Then our city will need more farmers, and more of all the other craftsmen?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And among the rest it will need more agents who are to import and export the different kinds of goods. These are merchants, are they not?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'We shall need merchants, then?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And if the commerce is over sea, we shall need a host of others who are experts in sea-trading.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, there will be many of them.'

Socrates/ 'Again, in the city itself how will men exchange the produce of their labors with one another? For this was the original reason of our establishing the principle of community and founding a city.'

Adeimantus/ 'Clearly, by selling and buying.'

Socrates/ 'This will give us a market-place, and money as a token for the sake of exchange.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then if the farmer or any other craftsman brings his produce into the market-place, and meets there none who wish to exchange their goods with him, is he to sit idle in the market-place when he might be working?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly not. There are men who have taken note of this, and devote themselves to this service. In well-governed cities they are usually those who are weakest in body, and incapable of any other work. They have to stay there in the market-place and exchange money for goods with those who want to sell, and goods for money with those who want to buy.'

Socrates/ 'Then, this necessity brings shopkeepers into our city. We give the name of shopkeepers, do we not, to those who serve buyers and sellers in their stations at the market-place, but the name of merchants to those who travel from city to city?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then are there not other agents also who have no mental gifts to make them at all worthy to share in the community, but who have bodily strength sufficient for hard labor? They sell the use of their strength, and the price they get for it being called hire, they are known, I fancy, as hired laborers?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then these hired laborers, too, serve to complete our city?'

Adeimantus/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Adeimantus, has our city now grown to its perfection?'

Adeimantus/ 'Perhaps.'

Socrates/ 'Then, where in it shall we find justice and injustice? With which of the elements we have noticed did they make their entry?'

Adeimantus/ 'I cannot see how they came in, Socrates, unless we find them somewhere in the mutual needs of these same persons.'

Socrates/ 'Well, perhaps you are right. But let us consider the matter and not draw back. And first, let us consider what will be the manner of life of men so equipped. Will they not spend their time in the production of com and wine and clothing and shoes? And they will build themselves houses; in summer they will generally work without their coats and shoes, but in winter they will be well clothed and shod. For food they will make meal from their barley and flour from their wheat, and kneading and baking them they will heap their noble scones and loaves on reeds or fresh leaves, and lying on couches of bryony and myrtle boughs will feast wit. their children, drink wine after their repast, crown their heads with garlands, and sing hymns to the gods. So they will live with one another in happiness, not begetting

children above their means, and guarding against the danger of poverty or war.'

Here Glaucon interrupted and said:

Glaucon/ 'Apparently you give your men dry bread to feast on.'

Socrates/ 'You are right, I forgot that they would have a relish with it. They will have salt and olives and cheese, and they will have boiled dishes with onions and such vegetables as one gets in the country. And I expect we must allow them a dessert of figs, and peas and beans, and they will roast myrtle berries and acorns at the fire, and drink their wine in moderation. Leading so peaceful and healthy a life they will naturally attain to a good old age, and at death leave their children to live as they have done.'

Glaucon/ 'Why, if you had been founding a city of pigs, Socrates, this is just how you would have fattened them.

Socrates/ 'Well, Glaucon, how must they live?'

Glaucon/ 'In an ordinary decent manner. If they are not to be miserable, I think they must have couches to lie on and tables to eat from, and the ordinary dishes and dessert of modem life.'

Socrates/ 'Very well. I understand. We are considering, apparently, the making not of a city merely, but of a luxurious city. And perhaps there is no harm in doing so. From that kind, too, we shall soon learn, if we examine it, how justice and injustice arise in cities. I, for my part, think that the city I have described is the true one, what we may call the city of health. But if you wish, let us also inspect a city which is suffering from inflammation. There is no reason why we should not. Well, then, for some people the arrangements we have made will not be enough. The mode of living will not satisfy them. They shall have couches and tables and other furniture; rich dishes too, and fragrant oils

and perfumes, and courtesans and sweetmeats, and many varieties of each. Then again we must make more than a bare provision for those necessities we mentioned at the first, houses and clothes and shoes. We must start painting and embroidery, and collect gold and ivory, and so on, must re not?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must make our city larger. For the healthy city will not now suffice. We need one swollen in size, and full of a multitude of things which necessity would not introduce into cities. There will be all kinds of hunters and there will be the imitators; one crowd of imitators in figure and color, and another of imitators in music; poets and their servants, rhapsodists, actors, dancers and theatrical agents; the makers of all kinds of articles, of those used for women's adornment, for example. Then, too, we shall need more servants; or do you think we can do without footmen, wet-nurses, dry-nurses, lady's maids, barbers, and cooks and confectioners, besides? Then we shall want swineherds too; we had none in our former city—there was no need—but we shall need them along with all the others for this city. And we shall need great quantities of all kinds of cattle if people are to eat them. Shall we not?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then if we lead this kind of life we shall require doctors far more often than we should have done in the first city?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then I dare say even the land which was sufficient to support the first population will be now insufficient and too small?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then if we are to have enough for pasture and plough' land, we must take a slice from our neighbors' territory. And they will want to do the same to ours, if they also overpass the bounds of necessity and plunge into reckless pursuit of wealth?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that must happen, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we go to war at that point, Glaucon, or what will happen?'

Glaucon/ 'We shall go to war.'

Socrates/ 'And we need not say at present whether the effects of war are good or bad. Let us only notice that we have found the origin of war in those passions which are most responsible for all the evils that come upon cities and the men that dwell in them.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my friend, our city will need to be still greater, and by no small amount either, but by a whole army, It will defend all the substance and wealth we have described, and will march out and fight the invaders.'

Glaucon/ 'Why, are they not capable of doing that themselves?'

Socrates/ 'Certainly not, if you and the rest of us were right in the principle we agreed upon when we were shaping the city. I think we agreed, if you remember, that it was impossible for one man to work well at many crafts.'

Glaucon/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Well, does not the business of war seem a matter of craftsmanship?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then ought we to be more solicitous for the craft of shoemaking than for the craft of war?'

Glaucon/ 'By no means.'

Socrates/ 'But did we not forbid our shoemaker to attempt to be at the same time a farmer or a weaver or house-builder? He was to be a shoemaker only, in order that our shoe-making work might be well done. So with all the others: we gave each man one trade, that for which nature had fitted him. Nothing else was to occupy his time, but he was to spend his life working at that, using all his opportunities to the best advantage and letting none go by. And is not efficiency in war more important than anything else? Or is it such a simple profession that a farmer or a shoemaker, or any other craftsman, can be a soldier in the intervals of his craft, though no one in the world would find that practice in his leisure moments or anything short of studying the game from his youth would make him a good draught or dice player? Is he to take up a shield, or any other of the weapons and tools of war, and in a single day to become an efficient antagonist in a heavy-armed engagement or in any other kind of battle, though the mere handling of any other tools will never make a craftsman or an athlete, and though tools are useless to the man who has not acquired the special knowledge and gone through the proper training for their use?'

Glaucon/ Yes, tools that taught their own use would be worth having.'

Socrates/ 'Then, because the work of our guardians is the most important of all, it will demand the most exclusive attention and the greatest skill and practice.'

Glaucon/ 'I certainly think so.'

Socrates/ 'And will it not need also a nature fitted for this profession?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then it will be our business to do our best to select the proper persons and to determine the proper character required for the guardians of the city?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, we shall have to do that.'

Socrates/ 'Well, certainly it is no trivial task we have undertaken, but we must be brave and do all in our power.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, we must.'

Socrates/ 'Do you not think, then, that so far as their fitness for guarding is concerned, a noble youth and a well-bred dog are very much alike?'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'I mean, for example, that both must be sharp-sighted, quick of foot to pursue the moment they perceive, and strong enough to make captures and overcome opposition when necessary.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes. all these qualities are required.'

Socrates/ 'And since they are good fighters, they must certainly be brave.'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'But will either horse or dog or any animal be brave if it is not spirited? Have you not observed that spirit is unconquerable and irresistible? Every soul possessed by it will meet any danger fearless and unshrinking.'

Glaucon/ 'I have noticed that.'

Socrates/ 'Then we are quite clear as to what must be the bodily characteristics of our guardians?

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And as to their mental qualities, we know they must be spirited.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Glaucon, with such natures as these, how are they to be prevented from behaving savagely towards one another and the other citizens?'

Glaucon/ 'By Zeus, that will not be easy.'

Socrates/ 'Still we must have them gentle to their fellows and fierce to their enemies. If we can't effect that, they will prevent the enemy from destroying the city by doing it first themselves.'

Glaucon/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'What then are we to do? Where shall we find a character at once gentle and high-spirited? For a gentle nature is surely the antithesis of a spirited one?

Glaucon/ 'So it appears.'

Socrates/ 'Nevertheless, if either is lacking, we shall certainly not have a good guardian. But this combination is apparently unattainable, and so you see it follows that a good guardian is an impossibility.'

Glaucon/ 'It looks like it.'

Socrates/ I was perplexed, but reflecting on what had gone before I said, 'We certainly deserve to be in difficulties, for we have forsaken the simile we set before ourselves.'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?

Socrates/ 'Have we not noticed that natures are to be found possessed of those opposite qualities, for all that we thought them non-existent?'

Glaucon/ 'Where?'

Socrates/ 'In many animals, but perhaps best in that with which we compared our guardian. Well-bred dogs, you surely know, are naturally of that disposition—as gentle as possible to their friends and those whom they know, but the very opposite to strangers.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, I know that.'

Socrates/ 'Then, we may assume that the character we seek in our guardian is possible, and not contrary to nature?'

Glaucon/ 'I think we may.'

Socrates/ 'Do you think, then, that there is another quality indispensable to the guardian? The spirited element is not enough; he must be of a philosophical nature as well.'

Glaucon/ 'What are you saying? I don't understand.'

Socrates/ 'You will notice this other quality in dogs. It certainly is surprising in the creatures.'

Glaucon/ 'What quality?'

Socrates/ 'Why, when dogs see a stranger, without any provocation they get angry; but if they see someone they know, they welcome him, even though they have received no kindness at his hands. Have you never wondered at that?'

Glaucon/ 'I have hardly thought of it before. But that certainly is how they behave.'

Socrates/ 'Well, but this instinct in the dog is a very fine thing, and genuinely philosophical.'

Glaucon/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'Why, he distinguishes between a friendly and an unfriendly face, simply by the fact that he knows the one and is ignorant of the other. Now, how could the creature be anything but fond of learning when knowledge and ignorance are its criterion to distinguish between the friendly and the strange?'

Glaucon/ 'How, indeed?'

Socrates/ 'Well, but is it not the same thing to be fond of learning and to be philosophical?'

Glaucon/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we confidently apply this to man? If he is to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, he must be by nature philosophical and fond of learning.'

Glaucon/ 'Let us do so.'

Socrates/ 'Then he who is to be a good and noble guardian of our city will be by nature philosophical and spirited, and quick and strong.

Glaucon/ 'Yes, he will be all those things.'

Socrates/ 'This, then, will be his original character. Now, how shall we rear and educate these guardians? Will this inquiry help us in discovering the object of all our search, namely, how justice and injustice arise in a city? We don't want to miss anything, and yet we mustn't be tedious.

Glaucon's brother answered:

Adeimantus/ 'I for one most certainly anticipate that a consideration of this question will help us.

Socrates/ 'In that case, my dear Adeimantus, we must certainly go on with it, even though it should prove rather lengthy.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, we must.'

Socrates/ 'Come, then, we shall be like idle story-tellers in a story, and our tale shall be the education of these men.

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, by all means.'

Socrates/ 'Well, what is our system of education to be? Is it not difficult to improve on what has been worked out through long generations? We have gymnastics for the body, and music for the soul.

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.

Socrates/ 'Then we shall begin our education with music before gymnastics, shall we not?

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.

Socrates/ 'Do you include literature in music, or not?'

Adeimantus/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Are there not two kinds of literature—true and false?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Must our education include both, or should we begin with the false?'

Adeimantus/ 'I don't understand what you mean.'

Socrates/ 'Do you not understand, that we begin by telling stories to children? These surely are, as a general rule, false, though there may be some truth in them. But we tell the children stories before we give them gymnastic exercises.

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.

Socrates/ 'But that is what I said—literature is to come before gymnastics.

Adeimantus/ 'You were right.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you know that the most important part of every task is the beginning of it, especially when we are dealing with anything young and tender? For then it can be most easily molded, and whatever impression anyone cares to stamp upon it sinks in.'

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we carelessly and without more ado allow our children to hear any casual stories told by any casual persons, and so to receive into their souls views of life for the most part at variance with those which we think they ought to hold when they come to man's estate?

Adeimantus/ 'No, we shall certainly not allow that.'

Socrates/ 'Our first duty then, it seems, is to set a watch over the makers of stories, to select every beautiful story they make, and reject any that are not beautiful. Then we shall persuade nurses and mothers to tell those selected stories

to the children. Thus will they shape their souls with stories far more than they can shape their bodies with their hands. But we shall have to throw away most of the stories they tell now.'

Adeimantus/ 'What kind do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'In the big stories we can discern the little; for both big and little must bear the same form, and have the same effect. Do you not agree?

Adeimantus/ 'I do. but I don't see any more what you mean by the big stories.'

Socrates/ 'Those, that Hesiod and Homer and the other poets have told us; for surely they have composed untrue stories, and have told, and do tell them, to men.'

Adeimantus/ 'But what kind do you mean, and what fault do you find in them?

Socrates/ 'A fault, that deserves immediate and emphatic condemnation, especially if the untruth have no beauty in it.'

Adeimantus/ 'What is that?

Socrates/ 'When any man in describing the character of gods and heroes does it badly, like an artist whose drawing is absolutely unlike the things he wishes to draw.'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, it is certainly right that stories of that kind should be condemned; but what do you mean, and to what do you refer?

Socrates/ 'Well, firstly, the poet, who told the greatest of falsehoods of the greatest of beings, told a falsehood with no beauty in it, when he said that Ouranos did what Hesiod said he did, and that Kronos took vengeance on him. And as for the deeds of Kronos, and what he suffered at his son's hands, even if these stories are true, I should not think we could so lightly repeat them to the young and foolish. It were

best to be silent about them, or if they had to be told, it should be done under the seal of silence to as few hearers as possible, and after the sacrifice not of the mystic pig but some great and almost unprocurable victim, so that very few would hear the story.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, those are certainly hard stories.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, Adeimantus, and stories that are not to be told in our city. We must not let a young man hear that in committing the most awful crimes or in requiting an unjust father's misdeeds with every conceivable cruelty, he would be doing nothing extraordinary, but only acting like the chiefest and greatest of the gods.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, certainly not. I too think it inexpedient to tell such stories.'

Socrates/ 'And we shall strictly forbid, all stories of gods making war on or plotting against or fighting other gods. To begin with, they are not true; and besides, those who are to guard our city must think it the most deadly sin to quarrel easily with one another. The fights of the giants and the other many and varied strifes of gods and heroes with kinsfolk and friends must not be told them in story or woven on their tapestry. But if we can in any way find stories to persuade them that no citizen has ever hated another, and that such a thing is impious, it is these rather that our old men and women must tell to the young children, and when they grow older, the poets must be compelled to make stories for them of a like nature. But the binding of Hera by her son, or the hurling of Hephaestus from heaven by his father, when his mother was being beaten and he tried to defend her, and all the tales of the battles of the giants that Homer has made, these stories we shall not receive into our city, whether their purport be allegorical or not. For the child is unable to discriminate between what is allegory and what is

not; whatever he receives and believes at that early age is apt to become permanent and indelible. For these reasons, perhaps, we must do everything in our power to contrive that the first stories our children are told shall teach virtue in the fairest way.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is reasonable. But if anyone were to ask us for examples of these stories and in what works they are told, how should we reply?'

Socrates/ 'Adeimantus, you and I at this juncture are not poets, but founders of a city. The founders ought to know the canons in accordance with which the poets should tell their stories, and which they are not to be allowed to transgress, but they need not themselves compose stories.'

Adeimantus/ 'True, but this is just what I wish to know. What are the canons for stories about the gods?'

Socrates/ 'Something like this. If a poet tells of God in epic, lyric, or tragedy, he must surely represent him as he actually is.'

Adeimantus/ Yes, he must.'

Socrates/ 'But is not God truly good, and must he not be described as such?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes. Why do you ask?'

Socrates/ 'Well, nothing that is good is harmful, is it?'

Adeimantus/ 'I think not.'

Socrates/ 'And does that which is not harmful do harm?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'And does that which does no harm, do any evil?'

Adeimantus/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Then would that which does no evil cause any evil?'

Adeimantus/ 'How could it?'

Socrates/ 'Well, is the good beneficial?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And does it cause good fortune?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then the good does not cause all things; it is responsible for the things that are good, but not responsible for the evil?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is certainly true.'

Socrates/ 'Nor can God, since he is good, cause all things, as most people say. He is responsible for a few things that happen to men, but for many he is not, for the good things we enjoy are much fewer than the evil. The former we must attribute to none else but God; but for the evil we must find some other causes, not God.'

Adeimantus/ 'That seems to me very true.'

Socrates/ 'Then, we must have nothing to do with the mistake of Homer or of any other poet who makes the foolish misstatement that;

> Two tuns of gifts there lie
> In Zeus' gate, one of good, one ill.

which when Zeus mixes for any man;

> One while he frolics, one while mourns.

but as for the man who gets no mixture but only of the second;

> Sad hunger in th' abundant earth doth toss him to and fro;

nor with the statement that Zeus is to us;

> The giver both of woe and weal

And we shall not praise anyone who says that Zeus and Athene were responsible for Pandarus' violation of the oaths and treaties, or that Themis and Zeus caused strife and

division among the gods, nor shall we allow the young to hear the words of Aeschylus, when he says;

> God sends a curse on mortals
> When he would utterly destroy a house.

But if anyone makes a poem of the sufferings of Niobe, as is the play from which those lines are taken, or of the history of the children of Pelops, or the Trojan war, or any similar story, either he must not be allowed to say that these were the deeds of God, or if he says that, he must find some such explanation as we are now looking for. He must say that God did what was just and good, and the sufferers were benefited by punishment. We must not allow the poet to say that those who were punished were miserable, and that God made them so. But we must allow them to say that the bad were miserable because they needed punishment, and were benefited by being punished at God's hand. We must contend with all our might against the assertion that God, who is good, is the author of evil to any man. No one shall say that in our city if it is to have good laws, and no one shall hear it, neither young nor old. Neither in meter nor without shall it be told. For to tell such things is impious, and they are neither to our advantage nor self-consistent in the telling.'

Adeimantus/ 'I vote with you for this law. I like it.'

Socrates/ 'This, then, will be one of our canons concerning the gods, in accordance with which our speakers must speak and our poets compose, namely, that God is not the author of all things, but of the good alone.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is sufficiently proved.'

Socrates/ 'Well, what of this for the second? Do you think that God is a magician who of deliberate purpose appears in different forms at different times; that sometimes he actually leaves his own form and passes into many different shapes,

and at other times deceives us and creates in us illusions of that kind; or do you think that God is simple, and of all beings abides most steadfast in his own form?'

Adeimantus/ 'I can't answer all at once.'

Socrates/ 'Well, answer me this, if anything departs from its own form, must not the change arise in itself or be caused by something without?'

Adeimantus/ 'It must.'

Socrates/ 'Well, are not the most perfect things least altered and moved by any outside influence? Take, for example, the alterations effected in the body by food and drink and exertion, or in every plant by sun and wind and similar causes. Does not the healthiest and strongest body suffer least alteration?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then would not the bravest and wisest soul be least disturbed or altered by any outside effect?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And, again, the same holds good of manufactured articles—furniture, houses, and clothes. Those that are well made and in good condition suffer least alteration from time or other influences?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'Then everything that is at its best, either in nature or in art, or both, suffers least change from without?'

Adeimantus/ 'So it appears.'

Socrates/ 'But surely God and the divine nature are in every way perfect?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Therefore God would least of all take on many shapes through external influence?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, least of all.'

Socrates/ 'Then would he change and alter himself?'

Adeimantus/ 'If he changes at all, that must clearly be the manner of it.'

Socrates/ 'Then would God in changing himself become better and fairer, or worse and uglier?'

Adeimantus/ 'He must become worse, if he changes at all. For we certainly cannot say that God is lacking in any excellence or beauty.'

Socrates/ 'You are perfectly right. That being so, Adeimantus, do you think that anyone, God or man would deliberately make himself in any way worse than he was before?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is impossible.'

Socrates/ 'Then, it is also impossible for a god to wish to alter himself, but as is natural, every god having the utmost beauty and excellence, abides ever simple in his own shape.'

Adeimantus/ 'That seems to me conclusively proven.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my good sir, let none of the poets tell us that;

> Like such poor stranger pilgrims do the gods.
> All shapes assuming, glide through towns and towers.

and let no one tell us lies about Proteus and Thetis, or introduce either in tragedy or other poetry Hera transformed, disguised as a priestess collecting alms;

> For the life-giving of Inachus, river of Argos.

And we will have nothing to do with the many other lies of that sort. And the mothers are not to be persuaded by the poets into frightening their children with evil stories that forsooth there are certain gods that go about at night in many strange shapes. If they do, they will both blaspheme the gods and make their children cowardly.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, that must not be allowed.'

Socrates/ 'But, are the gods such that while they do not really change, they make themselves appear to us to have different forms, deceiving us by their magic?'

Adeimantus/ 'Possibly.'

Socrates/ 'What! would God wish to lie by spoken or acted illusion?'

Adeimantus/ 'I do not know.'

Socrates/ 'Do you not know, that all gods and men hate the true lie, if we may use the expression?'

Adeimantus/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'This, no one deliberately wishes to lie in the most vital part of him about the most vital matters. Everyone fears above all to harbor a lie in that quarter.'

Adeimantus/ 'I don't yet understand.'

Socrates/ 'That is because you think I am uttering some mysterious truth. All I am saying is that to lie, and be the victim of a lie, and to be ignorant in the soul concerning reality, to hold and possess falsehood there, is the last thing any man would desire. Men hate falsehood in such a case above all.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But this that I have just mentioned may be most accurately called the true lie, namely, the ignorance in the soul of him who is deluded. For the spoken lie is an imitation of this state in the soul, an image of it which arises afterwards and is not a wholly unmixed lie. Is it not so?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then the real lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?'

Adeimantus/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'Then what of the spoken lie? Is it sometimes useful to certain people, and therefore not deserving of

hatred? Is it not useful against enemies, and a good remedy to divert so-called friends from any evil intention they may form in madness or folly? Again, in the stories of which we have just been speaking, when we do not know the truth of those ancient happenings, but make the falsehood as near the truth as possible, is our action not useful?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, certainly that is true.'

Socrates/ 'And for which of these reasons is falsehood useful to God? Will he be seeking to make a lie like the truth because he does not know ancient history?'

Adeimantus/ 'That would be ridiculous.'

Socrates/ 'There is nothing of the lying poet in God, then?'

Adeimantus/ 'I think not.'

Socrates/ 'Would he lie from fear of his enemies?'

Adeimantus/ "'Far from it.'

Socrates/ 'Or because of the folly or madness of his friends?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, no fool or madman is a friend of the gods.'

Socrates/ 'Then there are no reasons why God should lie?'

Adeimantus/ 'None.'

Socrates/ 'Then the nature of gods and spirits is altogether apart from falsehood?'

Adeimantus/ 'Most assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'In that God is simple and true in word and deed, he does not change himself; nor does he delude others, either in fantasies or words, or by sending signs, whether in waking moments or in dreams?'

Adeimantus/ 'I think so myself, after what you have said.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you agree, that our second canon determining all speaking and writing about the gods is that

they are not magicians, and do not change themselves, or deceive us by lies, either in word or deed?'

Adeimantus/ 'I agree.'

Socrates/ 'Then though we find much to praise in Homer, we should not praise him for his story of the sending of the dream to Agamemnon by Zeus; nor shall we praise the passage in Aeschylus where Thetis says that Apollo sang at her wedding, dwelling on her happy motherhood:

> The span of life from sickness free,
> And telling all my fate that gods had blest,
> He sang a song of gladness to my heart.
> I dreamed the lips of Phoebus could not lie
> Being divine, touched with the seer's skill.
> But he the singer, he the wedding guest.
> The same who sang these words, is he who slew My own dear son.

When anyone says such things about the gods, we shall be angry, and shall not give him a chorus; nor shall we allow our teachers to use his poems to instruct the young, if our guardians are to be god-fearing and godlike so far as man may be?'

Adeimantus/ 'Decidedly, I agree with those canons, and would use them as laws.'

Book 3.

Socrates/ 'So much, then, for stories of the gods. We have settled, it seems, which of them our young children may hear and which they may not, if they are to grow up to honor the gods and their parents, and to hold friendship dear.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, and I think that our conclusions are right.'

Socrates/ 'Come, then, if they are to be brave, must they not be told such stories as will make them have no fear of death? Or do you think that any man was ever brave who had this fear in his heart?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, indeed, not I.'

Socrates/ 'Well, but do you think that anyone who believes that Hades exists, and is a terrible place, will be without this fear, and that he will be ready in battle to choose death rather than defeat and slavery?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then, it seems, we must prescribe for intending poets concerning those stories also, and tell them that they must not simply abuse Hades, but rather praise it. For their stories, as ordinarily told, are neither true nor useful to those who are to be warriors.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, we must do that.'

Socrates/ 'Then we shall begin with the following verse and score out all passages like it:

> I rather wish to live on earth a swain,
> Or serve a swain for hire that scarce can gain
> Bread to sustain him, than, that life once gone.
> Of all the dead sway the imperial throne;

or;

> And so his house so dim,

So loathsome, filthy, and abhorred of all the gods beside.
Should open both to gods and men;

and;

O ye gods, I see we have a soul
In th' under-dwellings, and a kind of man-resembling idol;
The soul's seat yet, all matter left, stays with the carcass here;

and;

That he alone
May sing truth's solid wisdom, and not one
Prove more than shade in his comparison;

and;

His soul took instant wing,
And to the house that hath no lights descended, sorrowings
For his sad late, to leave him young and in his ablest age;

and;

Like matter vaporous
The spirit vanished under earth and murmured in his stoop;

and;

And as amid the desolate retreat
Of some vast cavern, made the sacred seat
Of austere spirits, bats with breasts and wings
Clasp fast the walls, and each to other clings.
But swept off from their coverts, up they rise
And fly with murmurs in amazeful guise
About the cavern: so these, grumbling, rose
And flockt together.

We shall bid Homer and the other poets not be angry if we strike out these passages and all like them, not that they are not poetic, or that they are not enjoyed by most people, but that the more poetic they are, the less must they be heard by boys and men who are to be free, fearing slavery more than death.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must also get rid of all the fearful and terrifying titles belonging to those subjects, 'wailing Cocytus,' and 'loathed Styx,' and 'infernals,' and 'sapless dead,' and all the words of that type, the very sound of which is enough to make men shiver. These will probably be useful enough for other purposes, but for our guardians we are afraid that this shivering fear will make them more emotional and softer than they ought to be.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, your fear is justifiable.'

Socrates/ 'Shall we strike them out, then?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And must we speak and write in the opposite strain?'

Adeimantus/ 'Clearly.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we also strike out the weepings and wailings of famous men?

Adeimantus/ 'These must go with the others.'

Socrates/ 'But consider, whether we are justified in striking them out. We assert that the good man will not think that death is terrible for another good man who is his comrade.'

Adeimantus/ 'We do.'

Socrates/ 'Then he will not weep for him as for one who has suffered any terrible thing?'

Adeimantus/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'We may even say this, that such a man most of all has within himself that which makes a good life possible. Far better than ordinary people can he do without others.'

Adeimantus/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Then for him of all people there is least that is terrible in losing a son or a brother, or in the loss of money, or any other of his possessions?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, least for him.'

Socrates/ 'When any such misfortune comes upon him, he does not bewail it as other men do, but bears it as patiently as may be?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then may we justifiably strike out the lamentations of famous heroes, and give them to women, to bad women and cowardly men, that those whom we are bringing up to guard our city may be ashamed to imitate them?'

Adeimantus/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Again, we shall request Homer and the other poets not to represent Achilles, the son of a goddess;

> As lying prostrate, now his side and now his face upturned.
>
> Now on his bosom fallen.

then starting upright and wandering unsteadily by the shore of the harvestless sea; nor as lifting with both his hands the black mold and pouring it on his head; nor as weeping and lamenting on the many other occasions and in the diverse manners depicted by Homer; nor are they to describe Priam, who was closely descended from the gods:

> Entreating, and all filed with tumbling, calling on
>
> Each man by name.

Still more earnestly we shall request them not to represent the gods making lament and saying:

> Hapless I brought forth unhappily
> The best of all the sons of men.

But if they speak of the gods, they must not dare so to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him say:

> Oh, ill sight
> A man I love much, I see forced in most unworthy flight
> About the city. My heart grieves;

or;

> Ah, woe is me since fate decrees that this Menoetius' son
> Shall slay Sarpedon whom I hold of all mankind most dear.

For, my dear Adeimantus, if our young were to take such passages seriously, instead of laughing at them as bad poetry, unworthy of their subjects, it would be difficult to make them feel that they themselves, who are but men, are above those actions, or to make them rebuke themselves if it should occur to them also to say or do such things. They would lose their sense of shame and their hardihood, and weep and lament loudly over the most trifling misfortunes.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is most true.'

Socrates/ 'And that we must prevent, as our argument has taught us, and we shall follow it till someone shows us a better.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, it must be prevented.'

Socrates/ 'Next, our guardians ought not to be ready laughers; for when any man indulges in excessive laughter, it is almost always followed by an equally violent reaction.'

Adeimantus/ 'So I think.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must not allow any poet to represent men f repute as overcome by laughter, much less to represent gods in such a case.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, much less.'

Socrates/ 'Then we shall not allow Homer to speak thus of the gods:

> A laughter never left,
> Shook all the blessed deities, to see the lame so deft
> At that cup service.

Your argument will not allow that.'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, if you like to call it mine, it will not.'

Socrates/ 'Further, a high value must be placed upon truth. For if we were right in what we said a little while ago, and falsehood is really useless to the gods, and useful to men only as a medicine, clearly the use of medicine must be confined to our doctors. Laymen must have nothing to do with it.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is clear.'

Socrates/ 'Then it pertains to the guardians of the city, and to them alone, to tell falsehoods, to deceive either enemies or citizens for the city's welfare. To all other persons such conduct is forbidden, and we shall say that, for a private citizen to tell a falsehood to such rulers as these, is a crime more serious but the same in principle as for a patient to deceive his doctor, or a pupil his training-master concerning his bodily health, or for a sailor to tell his captain an untruth about the ship or the crew in describing his own condition or that of his shipmates.'

Adeimantus/ 'Most true.'

Socrates/ 'Then if the governor finds any private person in the city telling falsehood, any;

> Of such as craftsmen are

A seer, a doctor or a carpenter.

he will punish him as the introducer of a practice as subversive and destructive of a city as of a ship.'

Adeimantus/ 'He will, if his deeds answer to his words.'

Socrates/ 'Next, will our young men need to be temperate?

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Speaking generally, is not this the greater part of temperance, that men should be subject to the rulers, and make subject to themselves the pleasures of drink and love and food?'

Adeimantus/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'Then I fancy that we shall approve of such speeches as that which Homer puts into the mouth of Diomedes:

Suppress thine anger's powers,
Good friend, and hear why refrained.

and the verses which follow:

'The Greeks charged silent, and like men, bestowed their thrifty breath,
Their silence uttering their awe of those that them controlled.'

with other passages of a like nature?

Adeimantus/ 'Excellent.'

Socrates/ 'Well, what of this verse:

Thou ever steeped in wine, dog's face, with heart but of a hart.

and those that follow it, and all the impertinences of private men to rulers, whether actually spoken or related in poetry, are they excellent?

Adeimantus/ 'They are not.'

Socrates/ 'No. I do not fancy the hearing of them will help young men to be temperate. It may give them pleasure of another kind. That would not surprise me. How do you think about it?'

Adeimantus/ 'As you do.'

Socrates/ 'Again, when the wisest of men is represented as saying that the finest sight in the world to him is;

> A wine-page waiting; tables crowned with meat,
> Set close to guests that are to use it skilled;
> The cupboards furnisht, and the cups still filled.

do you think that is calculated to induce self-control in the young man who hears it, any more than the verse;

> To die
> The death of Famine is a misery
> Past all death loathsome;

or the story that Zeus, when all the other gods and men were sleeping, kept awake to carry out what he had purposed, and then forgot all in the eagerness of his lust, and was so maddened by the sight of Hera that he would not wait till they returned into their chamber, but wished to enjoy her there and then, saying that he had never been so hot with desire, not even in their first stolen meetings which were hidden from their dear parents; or the story of the binding of Ares and Aphrodite by Hephaestus in a similar affair?'

Adeimantus/ 'On my word, I think such stories are not conducive to self-restraint.'

Socrates/ 'But if there be any deeds of perfect endurance, done by famous men among us, or told of them in poetry, these we must see and hear, as, for example;

> He chid his angry spirit, and beat his breast.
> And said, Forbear, my mind, and think on this:
> There hath been time when bitterer agonies Have tried thy patience."'

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Our heroes, again, must not be fond of money, or men who would take a bribe.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then they shall not be told that Gifts persuade gods, gifts reverend kings persuade; nor must we praise Phoenix, Achilles' tutor, nor allow that he spoke wisely when he advised him to help the Achaeans if they gave him gifts, but without the gifts not to relent from his wrath; nor shall we suppose nor admit of Achilles himself that he was so fond of money as to take gifts from Agamemnon, or to be willing to restore the body of Hector only if he were paid for it?'

Adeimantus/ It is certainly not just, to praise deeds of that description.'

Socrates/ 'Though, my admiration for Homer makes me hesitate to say it, nevertheless it is impious to speak such things of Achilles, or to believe them on the report of others, or to believe that he said to Apollo;

> It is thou
> That putt'st dishonor thus on me, thou worst of deities.
> Held I the measure in my hand, I should requite thee dear;

or that he resisted obstinately, and was ready to fight with the river, who was a god; or that he said of his hair, which was sacred to the other river, Spercheius;

> My friend's hands shall to the Stygian shore
> Convey these tresses.

when his friend Patroclus was dead: that he said and did thus, we must not believe. And as for the dragging of Hector's body round the tomb of Patroclus, and the slaughter of the prisoners on the pyre, all these tales we shall declare to be untrue. We shall not suffer our guardians to believe that Achilles, whose parents were a goddess and Peleus the

wisest of men and the grandson of Zeus, and who had been educated by the sage Chiron, was so full of confusion that in his heart were two most contrary diseases, meanness and love of money, and overweening contempt of gods and men.'

Adeimantus/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Further, let us neither believe nor allow men to say that Theseus, the son of Poseidon, and Peirithous, the son of Zeus, ever attempted such terrible rapes, or that any son of god or hero dared to do the terrible and impious deeds of which those false stories tell. Rather let us compel our poets to say either that they were not the authors of those deeds, or that they were not the sons of gods—one or other. They are not to try to persuade our young men that the gods beget evil, or that heroes are no better than common men. As we said originally, these stories are both impious and untrue; for we have proved that evils cannot come from the gods.'

Adeimantus/ 'We have.'

Socrates/ 'And these stories are also harmful to those who hear them; for every man will excuse his own wickedness, being persuaded that like deeds have been, and are now, done by;

> The gods' own offspring,
> Near kin to Zeus, who high on Ida's mount
> To Zeus, their father, feed the altar flame,
> And still within their veins runs blood divine.

For these reasons we must stop such stories lest they breed in our young men a ready disposition to evil.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then what class of literature is still left for this discussion of ours as to what may and what may not be treated of in poetry? We have stated how the poets must

write of the gods and of the lesser deities and heroes, and of those in Hades?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then does not the remaining class consist of stories about men?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is evident.'

Socrates/ 'But it is impossible for us, my friend, to lay down rules for them at present.'

Adeimantus/ 'Why?'

Socrates/ 'Because I fancy that we shall say that in what they tell of men, poets and makers of stories are most wrong when they say that many unjust men are happy, many just men miserable, that injustice is profitable if it be not detected, and justice the good of another, but a man's own loss. I fancy, too, that we shall forbid them to make statements of that kind, and shall order them to make songs and stories to the contrary effect. Do you not think so?'

Adeimantus/ 'I am certain of it.'

Socrates/ 'Well, if you admit that I am right, shall I say that you admit what we have been after all this time?'

Adeimantus/ 'Your assumption is correct.'

Socrates/ 'When we have discovered the nature of justice, and have found that it is naturally profitable to him who possesses it, whether he have the reputation of a just man or no, shall we not then agree that stories which deal with men must be of the nature we have indicated?'

Adeimantus/ 'Most true.'

Socrates/ 'Then that may suffice for the subject-matter. We must now, I fancy, examine the question of diction, and then we shall have thoroughly examined both what the poets are to say and how they are to say it.'

Adeimantus/ 'I don't understand what you mean by that.'

Socrates/ 'But we must see that you do. Perhaps you will grasp it better in this way. Is not everything which is said by story-tellers or poets a narration of past, present, or future events?'

Adeimantus/ 'What else?'

Socrates/ 'Then do they not use either simple narration or imitative narration, or both?'

Adeimantus/ 'That again, I need to have explained to me.'

Socrates/ 'I am evidently a ridiculously obscure teacher. But as poor speakers do, I shall leave the general principle alone, and taking a particular example try to make my meaning clear to you. You know the beginning of the Iliad where the poet says that Chryses asks Agamemnon to ransom his daughter and he angrily refuses, and then Chryses, since his request is refused, prays to the god against the Achaeans?

Adeimantus/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Well, you know that up to the lines;

> And made suit to all, but most to the commands
> Of both th' Atrides who most ruled.

the poet speaks in his own person, and does not try to make us think that the speaker is anyone but himself; but in the passage after that he speaks as though he were himself Chryses, and tries as hard as he can to make us think that the speaker is not Homer, but the old priest. And all the rest of the narrative concerning the events in Ilium and in Ithaca, and all the Odyssey is written in much the same way.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And is it not narrative when the poet presents each speech and the parts in between?

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'But when he speaks in the person of another, shall we not say that he then always makes his style as nearly as possible like that of the man whom he has announced to be speaking?

Adeimantus/ 'We shall, of course.'

Socrates/ 'But if a man makes himself either in voice or in look like another man, does he not imitate that man?

Adeimantus/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'Then in such cases, it appears, Homer and the other poets carry on the narration by means of imitation?

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Now if the poet never concealed his own person, his whole poem and narration would be without imitation. To prevent you from saying that you still don't understand, I shall tell you how this would work out. After Homer has told how Chryses came bearing gifts to ransom his daughter, and how he made supplication to the Achaeans, and especially to the chiefs, if after that he had spoken, not as if he had been transformed into Chryses, but as if he were still Homer, that, you know, would not have been imitation, but simple narration. It would have gone in some such way as this. I shall not put it in meter, as I am no poet. The priest came and prayed that the gods might grant to them the capture of Troy and a safe return, and entreated them to ransom his daughter, taking the gifts he offered in fear of the god. And when he had spoken, the others reverenced his words and gave assent; but Agamemnon was angry and told him to go away and not to come back, or his sacred staff and the fillets of the god would not protect him. He said that Chryses daughter should grow old with him in Argos before he would ransom her, and told Chryses to go away and to not make him angry if he wanted to get home safe. The old man when he heard this was afraid

and went away in silence; but when he left the army behind him, he prayed earnestly to Apollo, calling on the god by his titles, and putting him in remembrance, and asking to be repaid if ever he had made him an acceptable offering by building his temple or sacrificing victims. In return for these services, he prayed that the Achaeans might be made to pay for his tears by the arrows of the god. Thus, my friend, it becomes simple narration without imitation.'

Adeimantus/ 'I understand.'

Socrates/ 'You will understand, then, That we have the opposite form to this, when the words of the poet between the speeches are struck out, and only the alternating dialogue is left.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, I understand. That happens in tragedy.'

Socrates/ 'Your supposition, is quite correct, and I fancy that now I can make you see what before I could not, namely that all poetry and story-telling may be said to be in one of three forms: the first, where imitation is employed throughout, is, as you suggest, tragedy and comedy; in the second, the poet tells his own story—the best example of that is perhaps the dithyramb; in the third, both imitation and simple narration are used—it is found in epic and in several other kinds of poetry. I hope that you follow me.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, I now understand what you meant.'

Socrates/ 'Then let me remind you that we have said before that we were agreed as to the proper subjects of poetry, but had still to consider its proper manner.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, I remember.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, this is what I was trying to say, that we must come to an agreement as to whether we should allow our poets to make their narrations by means of imitation, or partly by imitation and partly by the other

method, in which case we should have to determine where each method should be used, or whether we should forbid imitation altogether.'

Adeimantus/ 'I think, that you are considering whether we shall admit tragedy and comedy into the city or not.'

Socrates/ 'Possibly, but possibly even more than that. I don't myself know as yet. We must go where the wind of the argument carries us.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, you say well.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Adeimantus, consider whether our guardians ought to be imitative or not. Does not the answer follow from what we have said already, that each man can practice well one profession but not many, and that if he attempts more, and meddles with many, he will fail in all to attain creditable distinction?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is certainly the case.'

Socrates/ 'Then will not the same argument apply to imitation? The same man cannot imitate many things as well as one.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then he will hardly be able to practice any worthy profession and at the same time imitate many things and be imitative, since as a matter of fact the same persons are not successful even in two forms of imitation that seem very closely allied, in writing tragedy and comedy, for example. Did you not describe these as forms of imitation?

Adeimantus/ 'I did, and you are right. The same writers are never successful in both.'

Socrates/ 'Nor can anyone be both a rhapsodist and an actor with any success.

Adeimantus/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'We even find that tragedy and comedy cannot be played by the same actor. And all these are forms of imitation, are they not?'

Adeimantus/ 'They are.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Adeimantus, human nature seems to me to be split up into even smaller subdivisions, so that a man is unable to imitate many things well, or to do well the things themselves of which the imitations are likenesses.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is perfectly true.'

Socrates/ 'Then if we are to be faithful to our original position, that our guardians must be released from all other handicrafts to be in all earnestness craftsmen of the freedom of the city, and must do nothing that does not contribute to this end, then they must neither do nor imitate anything else. And if they imitate, they must imitate from childhood subjects befitting their vocation, brave, temperate, pious, free men, and the like; but meanness and any other ugly thing they must neither do nor be able to imitate, lest from the imitation they become infected with the reality. Have you not noticed that the practice of imitation, if it is begun in youth and persisted in, leaves its impress upon character and nature, on body and voice and mind?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then we shall not allow persons for whom we say we care, who are men, and men who must grow up good, to imitate a woman, whether she be young or old. either railing at her husband, or striving and vaunting herself against the gods, thinking that she is happy, or overcome by misfortune, or grief, or tears; much less shall we allow them to imitate one who is ill, or in love, or in labor.'

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Nor may they imitate slaves, male or female, doing servile actions.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, they may not.'

Socrates/ 'Nor, it would follow, may they imitate bad men or cowards, or men doing actions of the contrary nature to those we described, reviling and caricaturing one another, using abominable language, whether drunk or sober, or committing any other faults of speech or action characteristic of that class of men in their personal demeanor and their relations with others. I think, too, that they must not get into the habit of making themselves resemble madmen, either in word or action. They must know madmen and bad men and women, but they must neither do nor imitate any of their actions.'

Adeimantus/ 'Most true.'

Socrates/ 'Further, may they imitate smiths or any other craftsmen at their trade, or men rowing in triremes or their boatswains, or anything else of that kind?

Adeimantus/ 'How should they, when they are not to be allowed even to pay attention to any of those things?'

Socrates/ 'Then will they imitate horses neighing, and bulls bellowing, and rivers gurgling, and seas crashing, and thunder, and all those things?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, we have already forbidden them to be mad tor to make themselves like madmen.'

Socrates/ 'Then, if I understand your meaning, there is one form of diction and narration which would be used by the truly noble and good man when he needed to say anything, and another different form which a man of the opposite nature and breeding would find congenial, and which he would use.'

Adeimantus/ 'What are these?'

Socrates/ 'The man of measured character in the first place, when he came in his narration to the speech or action of a good man, would, I think, wish to speak in the good

man's person, and would not be ashamed of that kind of imitation. He would imitate the good man with especial thoroughness in his cautious and wise actions, less carefully and to a less degree when he was overcome by disease, or love, or by drunkenness, or any other misfortune. But when he comes to someone unworthy of him, he will not be willing to liken himself seriously to his inferior. He may for a little when he is doing a good action, but apart from that he will be ashamed, partly because he is not in the way of imitating such people, but also from a repugnance to molding and conforming himself to the morals of inferior men whom he deliberately despises; unless it be for mere amusement.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is likely.'

Socrates/ 'Then he will use the form of narration which we described a little while ago, which is used in Homer. His manner of speech will partake both of imitation and simple narration, and only a small part of the whole will be imitation. Am I not right?'

Adeimantus/ Yes, certainly, such must be the model for such a speaker.'

Socrates/ 'Then, as for the man of a different character, the more contemptible he is, the more will he imitate everything without discrimination and think nothing beneath him, so that he will attempt in sober earnest, and before a large audience, to imitate everything, as we said a moment ago—thunder and the noise of the wind, and of hail, and of axles and of pulleys; the notes of trumpets and flutes, and fifes and all manner of instruments; the barking of dogs and the bleating of sheep, and the cries of birds. And so his manner of speech will all involve imitation of voice and form, with possibly a little simple narration.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is inevitable.'

Socrates/ 'Then these, are the two classes of diction?'

Adeimantus/ 'They are.'

Socrates/ 'Then of the two, may we not say that the first involves no violent changes, and if it be given a musical mode and rhythm in accord with the diction, it may be performed correctly in almost the same mode throughout; that is, since character is so uniform, in one musical mode, and also in a similarly unchanging rhythm.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is certainly the case.'

Socrates/ 'Then what of the other kind? Does it not require just the opposite for its proper expression, all musical modes and all different rhythms, so many and manifold are its transitions?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is very true.'

Socrates/ 'Do not all poets and writers hit upon one or other of those modes of diction, or on a mixture of both?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is inevitable.'

Socrates/ 'What than shall we do? Shall we admit into our city all those different styles, or one or other of those primary styles, or the mixture?'

Adeimantus/ 'If my opinion prevails, we shall admit the simple imitator of the good man.'

Socrates/ 'But, Adeimantus, the mixed style is certainly attractive, while the opposite style to that which you have chosen is much the most popular with children and their attendants, and with the vulgar mass.'

Adeimantus/ 'Popular it may be.'

Socrates/ 'But perhaps, you will say that it is not befitting in our city where no man is twofold or manifold, since each does his own work, and that only.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, it is not befitting.'

Socrates/ 'Therefore is this not the only city where we shall find the shoemaker actually a shoemaker, and not sea-

captain and maker of shoes in one; the farmer a farmer, and not adding jury work to his farming; and the soldier a soldier, and not money-maker and soldier in one, and so with them all?'

Adeimantus/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Then apparently if there comes to our city a man so wise that he can turn into everything under the sun and imitate every conceivable object, when he offers to show off himself and his poems to us, we shall do obeisance to him as to a sacred, wonderful, and agreeable person; but we shall say that we have no such man in our city, and the law forbids there being one, and we shall anoint him with myrrh, and crown him with a wreath of sacred wool, and send him off to another city, and for ourselves we shall employ a more austere and less attractive poet and story-teller, whose poetry will be to our profit, who will imitate for us the diction of the good man, and in saying what he has to say will conform to those canons which we laid down originally when we were undertaking 'the task of educating the soldiers?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, we shall do that, if it lies in our power.'

Socrates/ 'Here, then, we have apparently completely finished with that branch of music which relates to literature and stories. We have discovered both subject and manner.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, I think with you.'

Socrates/ 'Then after that, we have left the manner of song and melody.'

Adeimantus/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'Well, would not anyone without further consideration see what we should have to say as to the proper nature of these elements, if we are to be consistent with what has gone before?'

Glaucon laughing, said;

Glaucon/ 'Then, Socrates, I am apparently no one; for at this moment I can't infer with any assurance what kinds we ought to allow, though I have my suspicions.'

Socrates/ 'Well, in any case, you can at least say with assurance that a song is composed of three elements—words, musical mode, and rhythm.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that is so.'

Socrates/ 'Well, as for the words, will they in any way differ from words that are not to go with music so far as concerns their conformity to those canons of subject and manner which we announced a little while ago?'

Glaucon/ 'No, they will not.'

Socrates/ 'And should not the musical mode and the rhythm accord with the words?'

Glaucon/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'But we said that in our poems we want no weepings and lamentations.'

Glaucon/ 'No, certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'What are the wailful modes? Tell me. You are musical.'

Glaucon/ 'Mixed Lydian and Hyperlydian, and some other similar ones.'

Socrates/ 'Then these we must dismiss, must we not? For even in the training of virtuous women they are useless, much more so in the training of men.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then are not drunkenness, effeminacy, and idleness most unseemly in guardians?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Which are the soft and convivial modes?'

Glaucon/ 'There are Ionian and Lydian modes which are called slack.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my friend, shall we use those for men who are warriors?'

Glaucon/ 'By no means. You seem to have Dorian and Phrygian left.'

Socrates/ 'I do not know these modes, but leave us the mode which will fittingly imitate the tones and accents of a man who is brave in battle and in every difficult and dangerous task, who, if he fails, or sees before him wounds or death, or falls into any other misfortune, always graces with his fate, disciplined and resolute. Another shall imitate a man in the actions of peace, where his choice has scope and he is free from compulsion: when he is persuading or entreating a god in prayer, or a man by instruction and advice, or when he is attending to the requests, or instruction, or persuasion of another. It shall imitate a man who in all these circumstances acts according to his liking, never puffing himself up, but in all his actions, and in his acceptance of their consequences, is ever prudent and restrained. These musical modes, two in number, one of compulsion, the other of free will, which imitate in the fairest manner the tones of the unfortunate and the fortunate, of the prudent and the brave, these you may leave to us.'

Glaucon/ 'But, you are asking for just those which I mentioned a little while ago.

Socrates/ 'Then, we shall not require for our songs and melodies a variety of strings or sudden changes of modulation?

Glaucon/ 'I think not.'

Socrates/ 'Then we shall not maintain the makers of harps and dulcimers, and of all instruments which are many-stringed and many-keyed?'

Glaucon/ 'I think not.'

Socrates/ 'Then will you allow flute makers and flute players into the city? Has not the flute more notes than any other instrument, and are not those many-keyed instruments really imitations of the flute?'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'You have left, the lyre and the zither, which will be useful in town, and in the fields the herdsmen may have a pipe.'

Glaucon/ 'So the argument tells us.'

Socrates/ 'We are making no innovation, when we prefer Apollo and Apollo's instruments to Marsyas and his instruments.'

Glaucon/ 'No, by Zeus, I think we are not.'

Socrates/ 'Now, by the dog, here have we been purging the city which we said before was too luxurious, and we never noticed it.'

Glaucon/ 'Well, it was very wise of us.'

Socrates/ 'Come, then, and let us finish our purgation. After musical modes comes the canon of rhythm, according to which we must not aim at a variety of rhythms with all kinds of metrical feet, but must discover what are the rhythms of an orderly and brave life. When we have done so, we must make our meter and our melody to suit the words describing such a life, and not make words to suit meter and melody. Which these rhythms are, it is your business to tell us, as you told us of the musical modes.'

Glaucon/ 'But, my good sir, I can't tell you. I know that there are three kinds of rhythm from which the measures are woven, just as in tones I could on examination discover four kinds which, are the basis of all musical modes. But which imitate which kind of life I can't tell you.

Socrates/ 'Well, we shall consult Damon on this subject, and ask him which metrical feet are fitter to express meanness and pride, or madness or other evil, and which rhythms must be kept to express the opposite qualities. I fancy that I have heard him using the expressions "warlike," "complex," "dactyl," and "heroic" of a rhythm. He arranged it in a way I do not understand, and showed the balance of the rise and fall of the feet as the rhythm passed from short to long, and I fancy that he called one foot an iambus and another a trochee, and assigned them longs and shorts. In some of them I think his praise and blame referred to the tempo of the separate foot as much as to the whole rhythm, or perhaps it was to the combined effect of both; I cannot say definitely. But these matters, as I said, we may leave to Damon, for to settle them would take a great deal of discussion; or do you think otherwise?'

Glaucon/ 'Not I, assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'But this you can settle, that grace and awkwardness accompany a good and a bad rhythm, can you not?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'But goodness and badness of rhythm follow the diction. The good rhythm is assimilated to a beautiful style, and bad rhythm to the opposite; and so with goodness and badness of music, since, as we said, rhythm and musical mode conform to the words, not the words to them.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, they must follow the words.'

Socrates/ 'Then what of the style and the subject? Do they not conform to the character of the soul?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And the others conform to the styler'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then good speech and good music, and grace and good rhythm, follow good nature, not that silliness which we call good nature in compliment, but the mind that is really well and nobly constituted in character.'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ Then if our young men are to do their own work, must they not follow after these?'

Glaucon/ 'They must.'

Socrates/ 'But painting and all craftsmanship are, we know, imbued with these; so are weaving and embroidery, architecture and the making of all other articles; so too is the body and other living things. All these show either grace or absence of grace. And absence of grace and bad rhythm and bad harmony are sisters to bad words and bad nature, while their opposites are sisters and copies of the opposite, a wise and good nature.'

Glaucon/ That is certainly the case.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must speak to our poets and compel them to impress upon their poems only the image of the good, or not to make poetry in our city. And we must speak to the other craftsmen and forbid them to leave the impress of that which is evil in character, unrestrained, mean and ugly, on their likenesses of living creatures, or their houses, or on anything else which they make. He that cannot obey must not be allowed to ply his trade in our city. For we would not have our guardians reared among images of evil as in a foul pasture, and there day by day and little by little gather many impressions from all that surrounds them, taking them all in until at last a great mass of evil gathers in their inmost souls, and they know it not. No, we must seek out those craftsmen who have the happy gift of tracing out the nature of the fair and graceful, that our young men may dwell as in a health-giving region where all that surrounds

them is beneficent, whencesoever from fair works of art there smite upon their eyes and ears an affluence like a wind bringing health from happy regions, which, though they know it not, leads them from their earliest years into likeness and friendship and harmony with the principle of beauty.'

Glaucon/ 'A nobler manner of education, there could not be.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Glaucon, is not musical education of paramount importance for those reasons, because rhythm and harmony enter most powerfully into the innermost part of the soul and lay forcible hands upon it, bearing grace with them, so making graceful him who is rightly trained, and him who is not, the reverse? Is it not a further reason that he who has been rightly trained in music would be quick to observe all works of art that were defective or ugly, and all natural objects that failed in beauty? They would displease him, and rightly; but beautiful things he would praise, and receiving them with joy into his soul, would be nourished by them and become noble and good. Ugly things he would rightly condemn, and hate even in his youth before he was capable of reason; but when reason comes he would welcome her as one he knows, with whom his training has made him familiar.

Glaucon/ ' Yes, I think that those are the purposes of education in music.

Socrates/ 'Now, in learning to read, we had become fairly proficient by the time that we could recognize the few letters that there are, in all the different words in which they are scattered about: when we never passed them over, either in a big word or a small, as though they were not worth noticing, but were anxious to distinguish them everywhere, knowing that we should be no scholars until we had got thus far.'

Glaucon/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Is it not also true that we shall not know the images of letters, supposing they are to be seen in water or in mirrors, before we know the letters themselves? The same skill and practice is needed in either case?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then by heaven, is it not true that in the same way neither we ourselves shall become musical, nor will the guardians whom we say we have to educate, until we can recognize the forms of temperance and courage and liberality and high-mindedness, and those which are akin to them, and also their opposites, wherever they are scattered about, until we discern them wherever they are to be found, both the forms and their images, never slighting them in big things or in small, but believing that the same skill and practice is needed to discern both form and image?'

Glaucon/ 'That certainly follows.'

Socrates/ 'Then, could he that has eyes to see have ever a fairer sight than a man in whom beautiful gifts of soul are combined with the expressions of those gifts in outward form, corresponding and harmonious to them because made in the same mold of beauty?'

Glaucon/ 'No, never.'

Socrates/ 'And that which is fairest is most to be beloved, is it not?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then the truly musical person will love them who come nearest to this ideal, but him in whom there is dissonance they will not love.'

Glaucon/ 'No, at least not if there be any defect in his soul, but if it be a bodily defect, he may manage almost to welcome it.'

Socrates/ 'I understand, you say so because you have or have had a favorite of this kind, and I acquiesce. But tell me this. Has excess of pleasure anything in common with temperance?'

Glaucon/ 'How could it have? It unsettles the mind as surely as pain.'

Socrates/ 'With other virtue, then?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'With insolence and wantonness, perhaps?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that it has.'

Socrates/ 'Can you name any pleasure more excessive and more intense than sexual pleasure?'

Glaucon/ 'I cannot, nor any more maddening either.'

Socrates/ 'But does not true love really consist in loving in a temperate and musical spirit that which is orderly and beautiful?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then nothing that is maddening or touched with licentiousness must be brought near true love, must it?'

Glaucon/ 'It must not.'

Socrates/ 'Then the pleasure we have mentioned must not come near the lover and his favorites, nor must they partake of it if they love and are loved truly?'

Glaucon/ 'By Zeus, no, Socrates, it must not come near them.'

Socrates/ 'It seems, then, that in the city we are founding you will lay down a law that the lover may kiss his beloved, may frequent his society and embrace him, as though he were his son, if he so persuade him, for beauty's sake, but in all else his relations with the person he affects shall be such that they shall never be suspected of going beyond this.

If he acts otherwise, he shall draw upon himself the reproach of bad taste and vulgarity.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then, do you agree with me that our discussion of music is finished? And it has come to an end at the proper place. For music surely ought to end with the love of the beautiful?'

Glaucon/ 'I agree.'

Socrates/ 'After music, the young men are to be trained in gymnastic?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Well, in this as well as in music they must be carefully trained all their lives from their earliest years. The true view of the case, as I think, is more or less this. See whether you agree with me. It is not my opinion that a healthy body by its excellence makes the soul good. The opposite is the case. A good soul by its excellence makes the body as good as it can be. What is your opinion?'

Glaucon/ 'I think the same.'

Socrates/ 'Then if, when we have carefully looked after the understanding, we leave to it the settlement of the details of bodily training, and content ourselves with laying down general principles, shall we not have acted rightly? That will be shorter.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'We have already said that drunkenness is to be avoided. The last thing we can allow is that a guardian should fie drunk and not know where in the world he is.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, it is absurd t at a guardian should need to be guarded.'

Socrates/ 'What about food? Our heroes are athletes entered for the greatest of contests, are they not?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then will the habit of body of the ordinary trained athlete suit them?'

Glaucon/ 'Possibly.'

Socrates/ 'Well, theirs is a sleepy kind of regimen, and dangerous to the health. Do you not notice that those trained athletes sleep their whole life through, and contract serious and severe illnesses whenever they depart in the smallest respect from their prescribed diet?'

Glaucon/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Then for our warrior athletes, we need some more subtle system of training, for they must be sleepless as watch-dogs, and of very sharp sight and hearing. In their campaigns they will have to put up with frequent changes in the water they drink and the food they eat; with changes, too, in the weather, from sultry heat to storms. They must not, then, be of delicate health.

Glaucon/ 'I think with you.'

Socrates/ 'Then will not the best gymnastic be sister to the simple music which we described a little while ago?'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'A good gymnastic, especially that assigned to warriors, must surely be simple?

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And that is a lesson that we may learn from Homer. For you know that when his heroes are on active service he does not provide fish for their banquets, and that though they were encamped by the sea at the Hellespont; nor does he give them boiled dishes, but only roasted meats, which would be, of course, most convenient for soldiers; for you may say it is everywhere easier to use the fire alone than to carry pots about.'

Glaucon/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'Homer, too, I fancy, has never mentioned sauces. And all other trainers know this too, do they not? If you want to be in good condition you must abstain from all dainties o{that sort?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, and they do well in knowing and abstaining.'

Socrates/ 'Then if you think so, you will not, I imagine, recommend Syracusan living and the Sicilian variety of foods?

Glaucon/ 'I think not.'

Socrates/ 'And you will say that the damsels of Corinth should not be too dear to men who purpose to keep in good condition?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Will you find fault also with the reputed delicacies of Athenian confectionery?'

Glaucon/ 'Of necessity.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, I fancy that we should not go wrong in comparing such manners of eating and living to the music and singing produced on many-keyed instruments and in all rhythms.'

Glaucon/ 'Indeed, we should not.'

Socrates/ 'And may we not say that diversity, as it there engendered licentiousness, here engenders disease, while simplicity in music breeds temperance in souls, and in gymnastic health in bodies?'

Glaucon/ 'That is most true.'

Socrates/ 'And when licentiousness and disease are rife in a city, do not the courts of justice and the dispensaries have their doors always open; and do not law and medicine

begin to give themselves airs, when great numbers even of free men are their eager devotees?'

Glaucon/ 'No doubt.'

Socrates/ 'But when not only the lower and working classes in a city, but even those who have pretensions to a liberal education, require skilled doctors and lawyers, is not that the strongest possible proof that a vicious and ugly system of education rules there? Does it not seem disgraceful, and a sure sign of lack of culture, that they should be compelled to resort to justice which they get from others whom they make their masters and judges, and that they should not rely on their own resources?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, it is most disgraceful.'

Socrates/ 'But do you not think one thing even more disgraceful, namely, when a man not only spends the greater part of his life in the law courts as either defendant or plaintiff, but is so vulgar as to be actually persuaded to plume himself on the fact, believing himself to be a clever villain, so well up to every turn and trick of the game, that he can wriggle out triumphantly in the end and get off scot-free; when he does all this for trifling and unimportant ends, not knowing how much nobler and better it is so to lead one's life as never to be dependent on a drowsy juryman?'

Glaucon/ 'You are right. that is even more disgraceful.'

Socrates/ 'And do you not think it disgraceful when men need medical treatment, not for wounds or because of epidemics, but because the idle, dissolute manner of life which we have described fills them with humors and winds till they are like pools of water, and the smart sons of Asclepius have to invent new names for diseases—"flatulence" and "catarrh"?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, those really are new and extraordinary names for illnesses.'

Socrates/ 'And of a kind, that were not, I imagine, used by Asclepius. My evidence for that is, that his sons at Troy found no fault with the maiden who gave the wounded Eurypylus a potion of Pramnian wine with barley and scraped cheese sprinkled on it, though that certainly sounds inflammatory, nor did they rebuke Patroclus, who was curing him, for allowing it.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, it is certainly an extraordinary potion for a wounded man.'

Socrates/ 'Not so extraordinary, if you observe that the sons of Asclepius, according to report, did not until the time of Herodicus resort to this coddling of diseases which is characteristic of modern medicine. Herodicus was a trainer who fell into bad health, and by a combination of gymnastic and medicine worried away to nothing first and chiefly himself, and then many others after him.'

Glaucon/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'By making death a long process. His disease was mortal, and he could not, I imagine, cure himself, but he kept dancing attendance on it, gave up all his business, and spent his life in cures, worrying to death at the smallest departure from his regular diet, so that through his science he came to old age and died hard.'

Glaucon/ 'Well, that was a fine reward for his skill.'

Socrates/ 'It was natural enough, for a man who did not know that it was neither from ignorance nor want of practical experience that Asclepius did not reveal this form of medicine to his descendants, but because he knew that in all well-regulated communities each man has a special work assigned to him in the state, which he must do, and no one has time to spend life in being ill and being cured. We see how absurd this is in the case of artisans, but we don't see

its absurdity in the case of those who are supposed to be happy—the rich.'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'When a carpenter is ill, he expects his doctor to give him medicine which will expel the disease by vomiting or purging, or to cauterize or cut the wound and set him right. If anyone prescribes him a long course of treatment with head bandages and so on, he says at once that he has no time to be ill, and that it does not pay him to live like that, giving all his attention to his illness and neglecting his proper work. At that he bids that doctor good-day, and goes back to his ordinary way of life, regains his health, and lives on doing his work; or if his body is not strong enough to carry him through, he dies, and is released from troubles.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that is the medical treatment befitting a man of that class.'

Socrates/ 'And is not the reason for it, that he has work to do, and if he is not doing it, it doesn't pay him to live?'

Glaucon/ 'Clearly.'

Socrates/ 'Then the rich man, as we say, has no such proper work which he must do if he is to find life worth living.'

Glaucon/ 'So they say.'

Socrates/ 'Then you do not listen to Phocylides, when he says that as soon as a man has got a means of livelihood he ought to practice virtue.'

Glaucon/ 'I think he should begin even before that.'

Socrates/ 'Well, we need not quarrel with him on that point, but let us assure ourselves whether this practice of virtue is incumbent on the rich, so that life is not worth living to the man who does not practice it, or whether valetudinarianism, while it makes carpentering and other

crafts which require attention of mind impossible, does not stand in the way of following the advice of Phocylides.'

Glaucon/ 'But assuredly it does. This excessive care of the body, which goes beyond what gymnastic admits, is perhaps worse than anything. It is equally harassing to a man in business, in a campaign, or in magisterial office at home.'

Socrates/ 'And the worst part of it is, that it makes a man ill-disposed for any kind of study, for reflection and inward meditation. It causes constant suggestions of headaches and dizziness, for which philosophy is blamed, so that it is always in the way in so far as virtue is practiced and tested by study. It is always making a man fancy himself ill and be continually worrying about his health.'

Glaucon/ 'That is true enough.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we say that Asclepius knew this and revealed the science of medicine for men who had naturally sound bodies and who lived a sound life, but who had some specific isolated malady? He expelled their maladies by drugs or by surgery, and ordered them to go on living in their usual way so that the affairs of state should take no harm. But he was not prepared to deal with bodies that were diseased through and through; he would not attempt special courses of treatment, draining off a little here, and pouring in a little there, which would give a man a long and miserable life, and let him, beget children, probably as diseased as himself. He was of opinion that it was not right to treat a man who could not live in his ordinary round of duties, such a man being useless to himself and to the state.'

Glaucon/ 'You make Asclepius a statesman.'

Socrates/ 'Obviously, and don't you observe that because he was so, his sons showed themselves good fighters at Troy, and practiced medicine in the way I describe? Do you not

remember how they treated the wound which Menelaus got from Pandarus:

> How first from it the clottered blood they sucked.
> Then medicines, wondrously composed, applied;

but they gave him no more instructions than they did Eurypylus, as to what he should eat or drink afterwards? Their medicines, they thought, would cure men who, before they got their wound, had been healthy and orderly in their manner of life, even if they happened to drink the next moment a compound of meal and wine and cheese; but the lives of the constitutionally diseased and intemperate they considered useless to the patients themselves and to the rest of the world. Their art was not meant for such people, and they were not to be treated, though they were richer than Midas.'

Glaucon/ 'You make out the sons of Asclepius to have been fine fellows.'

Socrates/ 'That is but right, though the tragedians and Pindar disregard us, and say that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, but was induced by an offer of money to raise to life a rich man who was already dead, for which deed he was struck by a thunderbolt. But in accordance with what we said before, we shall not believe both these statements of theirs. If he was the son of a god, he was not, we shall say, greedy of gain; and if he was greedy of gain, he was not the son of a god.'

Glaucon/ 'That is perfectly right. But what do you say to this, Socrates? You must get good doctors in your city, must you not? Well, surely the best doctors will be those who have had the largest practice among both the healthy and the diseased, and similarly the best judges will be those who have associated with men of every type of character?'

Socrates/ 'Certainly, if they are really good. But do you know to whom I think that term applies?

Glaucon/ 'Perhaps you will tell me.'

Socrates/ 'Well, I shall try, but you have applied the same argument to two quite different things.'

Glaucon/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'You would certainly, make very clever doctors of men who from their earliest years, besides acquiring scientific knowledge, had come in contact with very many cases, including those which were very much diseased, and who had themselves suffered from every malady, and were not constitutionally very healthy. Because they do not, I fancy, cure the body with the body. If that were so, it would not do for their own bodies to be unhealthy or for them to become ill; but they cure the body with the mind, and if the mind is evil, or has become so, it cannot cure anything properly.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'But the judge, my friend, rules mind with mind, and that we cannot allow to be trained from earliest years in company with minds that are evil, and to have itself committed all manner of iniquity, in order that it may draw sharp inferences as to the guilt of others from its own self-knowledge, as is allowable in the case of bodily diseases. No, if a man's mind is to be noble and good, and to judge just deeds in a sound way, he must from early years have been without experience of or part in evil dispositions. It is for this reason that good men show themselves in youth to be simple-minded and easily deceived by the wicked, because there is nothing in their own hearts of like nature to the thoughts of evil men, with which they might compare them.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that is markedly their experience.'

Socrates/ 'And for that reason, a good judge must not be young, but old, one who has learned late in life the nature of wickedness, not from taking note of the wickedness dwelling in his own heart, but from having learned to understand wickedness in the hearts of others, so that he has knowledge, though not personal experience of how evil it is.'

Glaucon/ 'Such a man, would be a most noble judge.'

Socrates/ 'And a good one also, which was the point of your question; for he that has a good mind is good. But that clever and suspicious fellow, who has himself done many evil deeds, and thinks himself a wise rascal, appears a master of cunning whilst he has to deal with men of his own kidney, thanks to those inward patterns by which he judges; but when he comes into contact with good men older than himself, he appears but a fool, stupidly incredulous and ignorant of a healthy moral character, since he has no pattern of any such thing in his heart. But as he comes across bad more often than good, he is thought by himself and other people to be more a wise man than a fool.'

Glaucon/ 'That is very true.'

Socrates/ 'Then, for a good and wise judge we must look, not to this man, but to the other. For vice can never know both virtue and herself, while virtue in a well-educated nature will in course of time attain to scientific knowledge at once of herself and of vice. So the virtuous man, it appears to me, and not the wicked makes the wise judge.'

Glaucon/ 'I think with you.'

Socrates/ 'Then along with such judges you will give the city doctors such as we described, and the two professions will tend the souls and bodies of such of your citizens as are of sound nature; but for the rest, they will permit the unsound in body to die, and actually put to death those who are incurably corrupt in soul.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, we have seen that that is best both for the sufferers themselves and for the city.'

Socrates/ 'Your young men, it is clear, will be chary of incurring any need of law, since they will be trained in that simple music which, we have declared, engenders temperance.'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And he that is trained in music will follow the same path in his pursuit of gymnastic, and may, if he will, be independent of medicine except in extreme cases.'

Glaucon/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'Unlike other athletes who diet and exercise themselves to gain strength of body, he will endure the exercises and toils of gymnastic rather to stimulate the spirited part of his soul than to make himself strong.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Glaucon, may we say that the purpose of those who established a joint education in music and gymnastic was not, as some people think, that they might tend the body with the one and the soul with the other?'

Glaucon/ 'What was it then?

Socrates/ 'It is more likely, that both music and gymnastic are meant especially for the soul.'

Glaucon/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'Have you never noticed, how a lifelong training in gymnastic without music affects the character, or what is the effect of the opposite training?'

Glaucon/ 'To what do you refer?'

Socrates/ 'To fierceness and hardness on the one hand, and softness and gentleness on the other.'

Glaucon/ 'I know, exclusive devotion to gymnastic turns men out fiercer than need be, while the same devotion to music makes them softer than is good for them.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, it is the spirited element in their nature that produces the fierceness; well-trained it would be bravery, but if it is strained over much it will turn into hardness and surliness, and naturally enough.'

Glaucon/ 'I agree with you.'

Socrates/ 'Then is not gentleness involved in the philosophic nature; but if it relaxes too much into gentleness, the temperament will be made too soft, while the right training will make it both gentle and orderly, will it not?'

Glaucon/ 'It will.'

Socrates/ 'Now we assert that our guardians must have both those elements of character?'

Glaucon/ 'They must.'

Socrates/ 'Then must not these be made to accord with one another?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And when this accordance has been reached, is not the soul both temperate and brave?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But when there is discord, is not the soul cowardly and boorish?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then when any man lets music flute his soul away, and pour flooding into his mind through his ears, as through a funnel, those sweet and soft and mournful melodies which we have described, till he spends his whole life piping and cloying himself with sound, that man at first tempers the spirited element in him, as steel is tempered,

and makes it useful instead of useless and hard; but if he continues without ceasing to beguile that element, after a time he begins to dissolve and melt it away, till he pours out his spirit in a stream, cuts as it were the sinews of his soul, and makes of it "a feeble warrior."

Glaucon/ 'That is very true.'

Socrates/ 'And if, he has at the beginning received from nature a spiritless soul, this process is rapid; if a spirited, he makes his spirit weak, and easily swayed this way and that, provoked and extinguished quickly and by trifles. Such men instead of spirited become cross and irritable, full of bad temper.'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But what is the result of hard gymnastic exercise and good living, with no participation in music and philosophy? Is not the first result that a man being sound in body is filled with understanding and spirit and becomes braver than he has ever been before?

Glaucon/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'But what if he continues exclusively in this course, and has no fellowship whatever with the Muses? If there were ever in his soul any love of learning, then since it is starved of all knowledge and inquiry, and is debarred from discourse and all music, does it not become weak and deaf and blind, being never roused and never fed, and having its senses unpurged?'

Glaucon/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'Then such a man, I fancy, becomes a hater of reason, and unmusical. He no longer uses the persuasiveness of discourse, but accomplishes all his ends by violence and fierceness, like a brute beast, and lives in ignorance and ineptitude, devoid of all rhythm and grace.'

Glaucon/ 'That is precisely what happens.'

Socrates/ 'Then seemingly for those two elements of the soul, the spirited and the philosophic, God, I should say, has given men the two arts, music and gymnastic. Only incidentally do they serve soul and body. Their purpose is to tune these two elements into harmony with one another by slackening or tightening, till the proper pitch be reached.'

Glaucon/ 'So it would appear.'

Socrates/ 'Then we shall rightly name as the perfect master of music and understander of harmony not him who can attune the strings, but him who can most fairly mix music and gymnastic and apply them in the most perfect measure to the soul.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, and with reason, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Glaucon, shall we not need such an one in our city to be always our minister, if the constitution is to be preserved?

Glaucon/ 'Yes, we can have no greater need than that.

Socrates/ 'So much, then, for our outlines of education and upbringing; for why need we lay down for these men laws for their dances, for hunting and the chase, and for their gymnastic contests and their horse-racing? It is surely clear enough that these must be in accord with what we have already prescribed. To work that out is now no difficult matter.'

Glaucon/ 'Perhaps not.'

Socrates/ 'Good. Now what is the next question we have to settle? Is it not who of these citizens are to rule, and who are to be ruled?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Well, is it not obvious that the older men must rule, and the younger be ruled?'

Glaucon/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'And the best of the older men?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Are not those who are best at farming the best of the farmers?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then in the present case, since we must have the best of guardians, must we not have those who are best at guarding the city?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'For this purpose must they not be intelligent and capable, and, moreover, careful of the city?'

Glaucon/ 'They must.'

Socrates/ 'A man cares best for what he loves?'

Glaucon/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'And a man will be most likely to love that whose interests he thinks are bound up with his own, whose prosperity he fancies entails his own prosperity, whose adversity his adversity?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then from among the guardians we must select those men who we think, on inquiry, have excelled all their life long in doing zealously whatever they thought was for the city's interests, and in refusing resolutely to do what they thought was to its harm?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, these are the men we want.'

Socrates/ 'We must watch them, I think, at every stage of life and see that they hold fast to their doctrine, that neither witchcraft nor violence makes them forget and abandon the belief that they must do what is best for the city.

Glaucon/ 'Of what abandonment do you speak?'

Socrates/ 'I shall tell you. The loss of belief by the mind may be willing or unwilling. A man who has learnt better, loses his false belief willingly; all true beliefs, on the other hand, are lost unwillingly.'

Glaucon/ 'I understand voluntary loss; involuntary loss you must explain to me.'

Socrates/ 'Don't you understand, or do you not think with me; that men lose good things unwillingly, bad things willingly; or that to be deceived as to the truth is bad, and to think what is true is good? Or do you not think that to believe what is, is to think truly?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, you are right, and I think that men lose a true belief unwillingly.'

Socrates/ 'It is taken from them by theft, or witchcraft, or violence, is it not?'

Glaucon/ 'Again, I fail to understand.'

Socrates/ 'My language, I am afraid, is high-flown and obscure. I call it theft when men are persuaded out of their opinion, or when they forget it; for time in the one case, and argument in the other, robs them of their belief without their knowing what is happening. Now, do you understand?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then I call it violence when pain or suffering makes men change their beliefs.'

Glaucon/ 'That too I understand, and you are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then I fancy that you would say with me that the bewitched are those who change their beliefs under the beguilement of pleasure or the pressure of fear?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, all things that deceive may be said to bewitch.'

Socrates/ 'Then, as I said a moment ago, we must discover who are the best guardians of the doctrine that is

in them, that they must do whatever they think at any time best for the city. We must watch them from their earliest childhood, and set them tasks in which there are the strongest temptations to forget or be cheated out of their devotion to the city. We must select those that are tenacious of memory and hard to deceive, the others we must reject. Do you agree?

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'We must impose upon them, too, labors, and vexations, and contests, and watch for the same things there.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then, we must prepare for them a contest of the third kind, a trial in resistance to witchcraft, and watch them then. As men try whether colts are easily frightened by taking them near noises and alarming sounds, so we must bring our men, while still young, into the midst of terrors, and then again plunge them into pleasures, testing them more hardly than gold is tested in the fire; and if one appears in all things gracious and a resister of enchantment, if he is a good guardian of himself and the music he has learnt, if he bears himself in all his trials with rhythm and harmony, such a man would be of the greatest service to himself and to the city. Therefore we must elect as ruler and guardian of the city him who as boy and youth and man has been tested and has come out without stain, and render him honors in life and after death, giving him the highest rewards of public burial and other memorials. The others we must reject. Some such method as that, Glaucon, seems to me the best for the election and appointment of rulers and guardians. I give the outline only without accurate details.'

Glaucon/ 'My opinion is much the same.'

Socrates/ 'Then is it really most correct to give these the name of perfect guardians, inasmuch as they watch over both enemies without and friends at home, taking care that the first shall be unable, and the second unwilling, to do harm; and to call the young men, whom we formerly counted as guardians, auxiliaries, and upholders of the doctrines of the rulers?'

Glaucon/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, can we contrive anything in the way of those necessary lies of which we spoke a little while ago, so that by means of one noble falsehood we may convince, preferably the rulers themselves, but in any case the rest of the citizens?'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'It is no novelty, but of Phoenician origin, and has happened in many places before this, according to the accredited stories of the poets, but we have never had it, and I am not sure whether we could. It would need a great deal of persuasion to get it believed.'

Glaucon/ 'You seem very shy of divulging it.'

Socrates/ 'You will understand why I am shy, when I have told it you.'

Glaucon/ 'Out with it, and don't be afraid.'

Socrates/ 'Well, I will, though I don't know how I am to find the courage or the words to tell you; and I shall try first to convince the rulers themselves and the soldiers, and then the rest of the city, that all our training and education of them, all those things which they thought they experienced, were only dreams. In reality all that time they were under the earth, being fashioned and trained, and they themselves, their arms and all their possessions, were being manufactured, and when they had been made quite ready, this earth, their mother, sent them up to the surface. Now,

therefore, they must watch over the land in which they dwell, as their mother and nurse, and defend her against all invaders, and look upon the other citizens as their brothers and children of the same soil.'

Glaucon/ 'You had reason, to be so long ashamed of telling your falsehood.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, you are no doubt right; but still listen to the rest of the tale. "You in this city are all brothers." so we shall tell our tale to them, "but God as he was fashioning you, put gold in those of you who are capable of ruling; hence they are deserving of most reverence. He put silver in the auxiliaries, and iron and copper in the farmers and the other craftsmen. For the most part your children are of the same nature as yourselves, but because you are all akin, sometimes from gold will come a silver offspring, or from silver a gold, and so on all round. Therefore the first and weightiest command of God to the rulers is this—that more than aught else they be good guardians of and watch zealously over the offspring, seeing which of those metals is mixed in their souls; if their own offspring has an admixture of copper or iron, they must show no pity, but giving it the honor proper to its nature, set it among the artisans or the farmers; and if on the other hand in these classes children are born with an admixture of gold and silver, they shall do them honor and appoint the first to be guardians, the second to be auxiliaries. For there is an oracle that the city shall perish when it is guarded by iron or copper." Can you suggest any contrivance by which they may be made to believe this story?'

Glaucon/ 'No, I see no hope of succeeding with your original citizens, but possibly their sons and their descendants, and subsequent generations, might believe it.'

Socrates/ 'Well, even that would have a good effect in making them care more for the city and for each other; for I think I understand what you mean. 'This will be as the popular voice shall determine. But for our part, now that we have armed these children of the soil, let us lead them forth with the guardians at their head. They shall march forth and examine which is the best place in the city for a camp, selecting a site from which they can at once control any disobedience to the law within the city, and repel all attacks from without if any enemy comes upon them like a wolf on the fold. Let them make their camp, offer sacrifices to the proper gods, and then make their arrangements for sleeping. Do you agree?'

Glaucon/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Their sleeping places should suffice to protect them from storms and heat, should they not?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely. For you are talking of their houses.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, but the houses of soldiers, not of money-grubbers.'

Glaucon/ 'What is the difference you imply?'

Socrates/ 'I shall try to tell you. You know how terrible and disgraceful it is for shepherds to keep dogs to guard their flocks which are so badly bred or trained that from want of discipline or hunger, or from some other evil in their nature, they will dare to worry the sheep, and act like wolves rather than dogs?'

Glaucon/ 'It is terrible. Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must take every precaution against our auxiliaries acting in this way to the citizens, since they are stronger than they, and behaving like fierce masters rather than loving allies?'

Glaucon/ 'We must.'

Socrates/ 'Is not a really noble education the best possible precaution?'

Glaucon/ 'Well, they have that.'

Socrates/ 'Well, we need not go into that now, my dear Glaucon, but we must insist on what I have just mentioned, namely, that they must have the right kind of education, whatever that may be, if they are to have what will do more than anything else to make them gentle to one another and to those they guard.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, you are right.'

Socrates/ 'But besides this education, any man of sense will tell us that their houses and their other arrangements must be so regulated as in no way to discourage them from being the best of guardians, or to incite them to maltreat the rest of the citizens.'

Glaucon/ 'And he will tell us rightly.'

Socrates/ 'Consider, then, whether their manner of life and their dwelling-places must be of some such fashion as this if they are to answer our description. In the first place, no one shall have any private property, unless it is absolutely necessary. Secondly, no one shall have dwelling-place or storehouse which anyone who pleases may not freely enter. To supply the proper necessities of men who are warrior athletes, and both prudent and courageous, they shall receive from the other citizens a fixed reward for their guardianship, large enough to support them for a year and leave nothing over. They shall live in common, taking their meals at the public tables, as in an army. As for silver and gold, we shall tell them that they have the divine metals always in their hearts, given them by the gods, and have no need of men's silver and gold; nay, that it is an act of impiety to pollute their possession of the divine gold by conjoining it with the mortal; for many unholy deeds are done for the

common currency, but the coinage in their souls is unsullied. They alone in all the city are not allowed to handle or touch silver and gold, or to be under the same roof with it, or hold it in their hands, or drink out of gold and silver vessels; this will be their salvation, and the salvation of the city. But if at any time they acquire land or houses or money of their own, and are men of business and farmers instead of guardians, they will become the hated masters instead of the allies of the other citizens. They will live their life, hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, always in greater and more intense fear of the citizens within than of the enemies without, rushing to the very brink of destruction, and the city with them. For all those reasons, shall we not say that this is the manner in which our guardians must be provided with houses and other necessaries, and shall we legislate accordingly?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Book 4.

Socrates/ Here Adeimantus interposed with the remark:

Adeimantus/ 'How, Socrates, will you answer a possible objection that you are not making these men so very happy, and that this unhappiness is their own fault? Really the city belongs to them, and yet they enjoy none of the advantages of other rulers. These own lands, build fine and magnificent houses, which they furnish with an equal magnificence; they make their own sacrifices to the gods and indulge in hospitality, and, briefly, to come to what you mentioned, are in possession of silver and gold and everything that is thought essential to a state of blessedness. But your rulers, the objector will say, seem established in the city just like paid auxiliaries, nothing but a garrison.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, and you may go on and say that they only get their food, and no wages in addition to it, like the other (citizens; so that if they want to travel at their own expense, they will be unable; they will have nothing to give a mistress, no money to spend on anything they may happen to want, like the men who are ordinarily thought happy; you omit these counts and many like them from your indictment.'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, let those be added.'

Socrates/ 'Then, you ask, how shall I reply?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'I fancy, that we shall find what to say, if we proceed along the path we have followed up to now. For we shall say that while it would not surprise us if even under these conditions these men were extremely happy, still our purpose in founding the city was not to make anyone class in it surpassingly happy, but to make the city as a whole as happy as possible. For it was our idea that in such a city we should most certainly find justice, as we should find injustice in the worst governed city, and by inspecting both

we hoped to decide our old question. And now we are, we think, constructing the happy city, not in a partial way by making happy a few people in it, but by making the whole city happy.

When we have done we shall examine the opposite city. If we were painting a statue and someone came and criticized us on the grounds that we were not putting the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the statue—for the eyes, which are the most beautiful part of the body, would not be painted purple, but black—we should be thought to reply reasonably to such a critic if we said: "My dear good sir, don't imagine that we ought to paint eyes so beautiful that they don't look like eyes at all, or paint any of the other limbs in that manner. You must consider if, by giving each part its proper color, we make the whole beautiful. Just so in the case before us, do not force us to give the guardians happiness of a kind that will make them anything rather than guardians. For we know quite well that we might clothe the farmers in glorious robes, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and tell them to cultivate the land at their pleasure; and we might have the potters recline in a graceful row by the fire, drinking and feasting, and turning their wheel when they felt inclined to do their work, and put all the others in a similar state of rapture; so making the whole city, no doubt, quite extraordinarily happy. Give us no advice of that kind, because if we take it, the farmer will not be a farmer, nor the potter a potter; no one in all the professions of which the state.-is made up will follow his profession. But the consequences in these cases are less important. For that cobblers should degenerate and be corrupt, and pretend to be what they are not, inflicts no very serious Harm on the city, but if the guardians of the laws and the state are such in seeming only, not in reality, then you may be sure that they will utterly destroy the whole city

just as they alone have power to make it prosperous and happy." We, that is, are making true guardians, who will be the last to harm the city; your objector offers us men like farmers, fitted not for a state but to be merry revelers at some congenial gathering, and cannot be speaking of a city at all. We then have to consider whether in establishing the guardians we are to aim at giving them as much happiness as possible, or whether we ought rather to turn our attention to giving happiness to the whole city, in which case we must compel the auxiliaries and guardians to second our efforts, and we must persuade them to be as skillful at their own business as lies in their power, and similarly with all the others. And when the whole city is thus increasing and prosperous, we may allow each class to partake of such happiness as their nature allows.'

Adeimantus/ 'Your words, seem to me excellent.'

Socrates/ 'Then, will you equally approve of the companion remark I make to that?

Adeimantus/ 'What is that?

Socrates/ 'Consider whether this is what corrupts the other craftsmen, so that they become not only corrupt, but bad workmen.

Adeimantus/ 'To what do you refer?

Socrates/ 'Riches and poverty.'

Adeimantus/ 'In what way?

Socrates/ 'In this way. Do you think that a potter who has come into money will want to go on with his craft?

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Will he not become more idle and careless than he was before?

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, much more.

Socrates/ 'And that will make him a worse potter?

Adeimantus/ 'Yes; a much worse potter too.

Socrates/ 'Then, to take the other case, if poverty prevents him from buying tools or anything else required for his craft his work will be inferior, and he will make worse craftsmen of his sons or apprentices?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.

Socrates/ 'Then both poverty and riches produce worse handicraft and worse craftsmen?

Adeimantus/ 'Evidently.

Socrates/ 'Then it seems we have found some other things against whose secret entrance into the city the guardians must take every precaution.

Adeimantus/ 'What are they?

Socrates/ 'Riches and poverty; for the one produces luxury and idleness and revolution, the other revolution and meanness and villainy besides.

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly. But, Socrates, think of this: How will our city be able to carry on war if it has no money, especially if it is forced to fight a city which is large and rich?

Socrates/ 'Clearly, to fight one such city will be rather hard, but to fight two will be easier.

Adeimantus/ 'What do you mean?

Socrates/ 'Well, 'in the first place you will allow that our men will be warrior athletes fighting against rich men?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, of course.'

Socrates/ 'Well, Adeimantus, don't you think that one perfectly trained boxer is an easy match for two fat wealthy men who can't box?'

Adeimantus/ 'Not for both at once, perhaps.'

Socrates/ 'Not if he can start to run away and then wheel round and plant a blow on the man who happens to be in front, and go on repeating these tactics in the stifling heat?

Would not such a fighter beat more than two such opponents?'

Adeimantus/ 'Indeed, it would not be surprising.'

Socrates/ 'And do you not think that the rich know more, both theoretically and practically, about boxing than about war?'

Adeimantus/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Then the chances are that our athletes will be an easy match for two or three times their number?'

Adeimantus/ 'I agree. I think what you say is just.'

Socrates/ 'Then suppose they send an embassy to one of the cities and quite truthfully say, "We do not use gold or silver; we are not permitted to possess them, but you are. Ally yourselves with us therefore, and you may have the wealth of the other city.' Do you imagine that any man who heard this proposal would prefer to fight against the lean and wiry dogs rather than to fight with them against fat and tender sheep?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, I think not. But, take care that the amassing of the wealth of all the other cities by one does not involve danger to the city without wealth.'

Socrates/ 'It is certainly a happy idea of yours, to think that we can give the name of city to any but such an one as we have been organizing.'

Adeimantus/ 'Why not?'

Socrates/ 'You must give the others a grander title. For each of them, as the saying runs, is no city, but cities upon cities; two at the least, each other's enemies, the city of the poor and the city of the rich; and in either of these is a vast number of cities which you will be entirely wrong to treat as one. But if you treat them as many, and hand over to one class the property and offices, and even the persons of the

other classes, you will always have many allies and few enemies. And so long as your city is governed wisely on the lines we have laid down, it will be the largest of all. I don't mean the most famous, but really the largest, even though it have only a thousand fighting men. For you will not easily find anyone city of this size among Hellenes or barbarians, though you will find many that seem to be many times the size. Do you agree with me?'

Adeimantus/ 'Most assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'Our guardians, then, will find here the fairest standard by which to regulate, the size of the city. They may then set apart land in proportion, and let the rest alone.'

Adeimantus/ 'What standard?'

Socrates/ 'This, in my opinion. The city may go on increasing so long as it can grow without losing its unity, but no further.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is excellent.'

Socrates/ 'Then we shall lay this further command upon the guardians, that they take every precaution that the city be neither small nor of illusory greatness, but of sufficient size and unity.'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, that is certainly a trifling task.'

Socrates/ 'Here is another, still more trifling. We mentioned it before, when we said that it would be necessary to remove any inferior child that was born to the guardians and place it in another class, and to promote to the guardian class any noble children born among the other classes. This was intended to show that the other citizens as well as the guardians must be set each to the task for which nature has fitted him, one man one task, that so each citizen doing his own particular work may become one man and not many, and thus the whole city may grow to be not many cities, but one.'

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is a smaller affair than the former.'

Socrates/ 'Really, my good Adeimantus, those tasks we are imposing upon them are not numerous or great, as anyone would allow, but quite trifling, so long as they observe the proverbial one great thing: I should rather call it sufficient than great.'

Adeimantus/ 'What is that?'

Socrates/ 'Education, and upbringing. For if they are all educated and become reasonable men, they will easily understand all those matters and all the other details which we now pass over—the possession of wives, and questions of marriage and the begetting of children: in all these things they will see that the proverb, "Friends' goods are common goods," must be realized as far as possible.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that must be perfectly right.'

Socrates/ 'Then, once our city is well started, it goes on growing as a circle round itself; for an honest upbringing and education by their preserving force create good natures, and honest natures laying hold on such an education grow better and better, and, like other animals, their breeding qualities improve at the same time.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is likely enough.'

Socrates/ 'In a word, the overseers of the city must devote them' selves to this principle, preserving it from secret destruction, and guarding it with all care—the principle, namely, that there shall be no innovation of the established order in gymnastic and music. They must watch over this with all possible care, fearing when they hear such words as;

> For men more praise
> That which is newest of the minstrel's lays.

lest, perchance, someone thinks the poet means, not new songs, but a new fashion of songs, and praises that. But he must neither praise such a novelty nor understand this to

be the poet's meaning. He must beware of changing to a new kind of music, for the change always involves far-reaching danger. Any alteration in the modes of music is always followed by alteration in the most fundamental laws of the state. So says Damon, and I believe him.'

Adeimantus/ 'You may put me down also as a believer.'

Socrates/ 'Then, here it would seem, in music, the guardians must erect their guard-house.'

Adeimantus/ 'The first beginnings of lawlessness in music are very hard to detect.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, it is looked on as an amusement which can do no harm.'

Adeimantus/ 'All it does, is gradually to establish and quietly to insinuate itself into manners and customs. From these it issues in greater force and penetrates men's mutual dealings; from mutual dealings it advances, with the utmost insolence, Socrates, to laws and constitutions, till in the end it overturns all things public and private.'

Socrates/ 'Well. Is that the case?'

Adeimantus/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'Then, as we were trying to say at the beginning, must not our children be set to more law-inspired amusements? For when amusements are lawless the children are the same, and it is impossible that they should grow up law-abiding and good men.'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then when the children make a good start in their amusements, and through music are inspired with loyalty, the result is the very reverse of that which you have described. Loyalty pervades the whole state, fostering its growth and restoring any institutions that may have fallen into decay.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is true.'

Socrates/ 'And this new generation bring to light those regulations that are thought unimportant, which their predecessors had allowed to fall into neglect.'

Adeimantus/ 'Which?'

Socrates/ 'Such, for example, as to exact of young men a proper silence in presence of their elders, befitting behavior in offering seats to others, and in rising to make room for them, and attention to parents, along with other rules concerning the mode of wearing the hair, concerning dress, shoes, and the other details of personal appearance. Do you agree with me?

Adeimantus/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'To lay down laws on such matters would, I think, be foolish. They are not established or maintained by force or written legislation.'

Adeimantus/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'The probability is, Adeimantus, that the direction given by education will determine the course of all that follows. Does not like always call like after it?

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And the end I think we may expect to be someone, complete, and grand result, whether good or the reverse.'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then for these reasons, I should not attempt to legislate on such matters.'

Adeimantus/ 'And quite rightly.'

Socrates/ 'Then in heaven's name, what of those market troubles about contracts which the various classes make with one another in the market, and, if you please, about the contracts of craftsmen; what of libels, assaults, the bringing

of lawsuits, and the empanelling of juries, and all such exaction or payment of dues as may be necessary in markets and harbors, and, in a word, all market, city, and harbor regulations, and the like—are we to venture to legislate in these matters?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, in these matters there is no need to dictate to true men. They will easily find for themselves most of the legislation required.

Socrates/ 'Yes, my friend, if God grant them the preservation of those laws which we have already enumerated.'

Adeimantus/ 'Without that good fortune, they will spend their lives always legislating on such-like things, and always making reforms, ever hopeful of attaining the ideal.'

Socrates/ 'You mean, that they will live like men who are ill and too intemperate to consent to give up their unhealthy mode of life?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Such men truly live a charming life. They are doctored and get no better, but only add to the complications and extent of their disease, always hopeful that some doctor will recommend a remedy which will make them well.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, those are just the symptoms of that type of invalid.'

Socrates/ 'Further, is not this a delightful trait of theirs, that they consider as their worst enemy him who tells them the truth, that until they give up their drunkenness and gluttony and chambering and idleness, no drugs or cauteries or surgery, no incantations or charms or anything else will be of any use to them?'

Adeimantus/ 'Not very delightful. There is nothing delightful in being angry when you are given good advice.'

Socrates/ 'You are not an admirer of those men apparently?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, not.'

Socrates/ 'Then neither will you admire the city as a whole which behaves as we have been describing. Do you not think that such invalids find their counterpart in those badly governed cities in which citizens are warned on pain of death against disturbing the whole constitution of the city, but in which anyone who serves them most agreeably under their existing constitution, who pleases them by servility and by anticipating and by cleverly executing their wishes, will be taken for a good man and profoundly wise, and will be held in honor by them?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, they seem to me to be the counterpart, and I don't in any way praise them.'

Socrates/ 'What of those individuals who are willing and eager to serve such cities? Do you not admire their courage and irresponsibility?'

Adeimantus/ 'I do, except when they are deluded by them and fancy themselves genuine statesmen, because the mob praises them.'

Socrates/ 'What do you mean? Can you not excuse these men? Do you think it possible if a man who knows nothing of measurement, that when many other equally ignorant persons tell him he is a six-footer, he should not adopt their opinion of him?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, that is impossible.'

Socrates/ 'Well, don't be vexed with them, for surely the most delightful of all are the public who go on legislating as we described and setting things to rights, always imagining that they will find some way of stopping fraud in contracts and those other difficulties which I mentioned a moment ago, not knowing that they are but beheading the Hydra.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is exactly what they are doing.'

Socrates/ 'I, for my part, should not have thought that the genuine legislator need trouble himself with those branches of law and constitution either in an ill or in a well governed city. In the first, because they are useless, and effect nothing; in the second, because some of them are discoverable by anyone, and the rest result naturally from the original institutions.'

Adeimantus/ 'Then, what still remains for us in the way of legislation?'

Socrates/ 'For us, nothing; but for the Delphian Apollo, the first, and chiefest, and fairest objects of legislation.'

Adeimantus/ 'Which?'

Socrates/ 'Building of temples, and sacrifices, and other service of gods and daemons and heroes, and burials of the dead, and all the rites which we must fulfill to propitiate the departed. For of such matters we ourselves know nothing, and in founding our city, if we are wise, we shall take no advice and ask for no guidance save from our national guide. For surely this god, as he gives his guidance from his seat on the Omphalos in the center of the earth, is the national guide of all men.'

Adeimantus/ ' Your words are good. Let us do as you suggest.'

Socrates/ 'Then, son of Ariston, your city is now established. The next step is to search within it, getting light for your purpose whence you may. You must look yourself, and summon your brother and Polemarchus and the rest to help you, in the hope that we may see where justice is and where injustice, and how they differ from one another, and which must be chosen by him who would be happy, whether his actions be hid or revealed to all gods and men.'

Adeimantus/ 'You are talking nonsense.' 'For you promised to conduct the search, saying that it would be an act of impiety on your part to refuse to help justice with all the means at your command.'

Socrates/ 'That is true. I must do as I promised, but you must help too.'

Adeimantus/ 'But of course.'

Socrates/ 'I hope, to make the discovery in this way. I imagine that our city, as it has been rightly established, is perfectly good?'

Adeimantus/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'Then obviously it is wise, and brave, and temperate and just?'

Adeimantus/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'Then if we discover any of those virtues in the city, the undiscovered will make up the remainder?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Just as with any other four, if we were looking for one of them in something, we should o satisfied if we recognized that one first of all; but if, on the other hand, we detected the other three first, that in itself would mean that the object of our search had been discovered. For, then, dearly it could only be the remainder.'

Adeimantus/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then since the objects of our present inquiry are four, ought we not to adopt this method?'

Adeimantus/ 'Clearly.'

Socrates/ 'Now, in the present case, I think that wisdom is the first to be apparent, and here we are confronted with a paradox.'

Adeimantus/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'This city which we have described is, I think, really wise. For it is prudent in deliberation, is it not?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And this faculty of prudent deliberation is clearly a kind of knowledge. For obviously it is by reason of knowledge and not of ignorance that their deliberations are prudent.'

Adeimantus/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'But there are in the city many and various kinds of knowledge?

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then does the knowledge of the carpenter make us call the city wise and prudent?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly not. Such knowledge makes us call it a city of good carpentry.'

Socrates/ 'Then the city is not to be called wise because of the knowledge it possesses about wooden vessels and its deliberation on their proper manufacture?

Adeimantus/ 'No, indeed.'

Socrates/ 'Then is its knowledge about vessels of brass, or any other knowledge about things of that sort, more relevant?

Adeimantus/ 'No; no knowledge of that kind at all.'

Socrates/ 'And its knowledge of the mode of raising crops from the soil is relevant to the question of its being a successful agricultural state, but not to the question of its being wise?

Adeimantus/ 'I agree.'

Socrates/ 'Then, in the city which we have just founded is there any knowledge among any of its citizens in virtue of which it deliberates not over any of the constituents in the

city, but over the whole city, considering what is its best policy, both internal and external?

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, there is.'

Socrates/ 'What is it, and with whom is it found?

Adeimantus/ 'It is nothing but the knowledge of guarding, and it is found among those rulers whom we have just named perfect guardians.'

Socrates/ 'Then what do you call the city in virtue of this knowledge?

Adeimantus/ 'I call it prudent in deliberation and really wise.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you think, that in our city the brass-smiths or these true guardians will be in a majority?

Adeimantus/ 'The brass-smiths, easily.'

Socrates/ 'Then of all the different classes, whose names indicate the knowledge they possess, will not the guardians be the least numerous of all?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, much the least numerous.'

Socrates/ 'Then a city founded in accordance with nature will be wise as a whole in virtue of the smallest class and part of itself, and of the knowledge possessed by that, the presiding and ruling part. And this class, whose office it is to partake of the one and only kind of knowledge to which belongs the name of wisdom, is, as we see, naturally the least numerous?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is very true.'

Socrates/ 'Here, then, we have somehow or other discovered one of the four and its seat in the city.

Adeimantus/ 'For my part, I think it has been made out satisfactorily.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, it is not very hard to perceive courage and the part of the city in which it was found and from which the city deserves to be called courageous.'

Adeimantus/ 'How is it to be perceived, then?'

Socrates/ 'Who, in calling a city cowardly or courageous would think of considering any except that part which fights and makes war on its behalf?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, no one would consider any but that.'

Socrates/ 'Whether the rest in the city are cowardly or brave, does not, I imagine, determine the character of the city one way or the other.'

Adeimantus/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Then a city is courageous in virtue of a part of itself, in that it has in that part power to preserve throughout the belief as to the things to be feared, which they are and what their nature, in accordance with the declaration of the lawgiver in the system of education Is not this what you call courage?'

Adeimantus/ 'I have not quite understood what you said. Will you say it again?'

Socrates/ 'I mean, that courage is a kind of safe-keeping.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes; but what kind?'

Socrates/ 'The safe-keeping of the belief produced by law, through education, concerning the number and nature of things to be feared. By preserving throughout I meant preserving it and never losing it in pains and in pleasures, in desires and in fears. I will, if you like, illustrate it by a figure which seems to me to be apt.'

Adeimantus/ 'Please do.'

Socrates/ 'You know, then, that when dyers want to dye wool purple they first select from wools of different colors one particular kind, namely white; they then prepare the wool,

treating it most elaborately in order that it may take the color as well as possible, and then finally they put it in the dye. Wool that is dyed in this manner takes the dye in a most lasting way; no washing, whether with or without solvents, can take out the color. But you know what happens when these precautions are neglected, when colors other than white are selected for dyeing, or when the white wool is not treated beforehand.'

Adeimantus/ 'I do. the color washes out in a ridiculous way.'

Socrates/ 'Then, you may conceive that we, too, were following some such method to the best of our power when we selected the soldiers and educated them in music and gymnastic. Our purpose simply was that they should be dyed with the laws as beautifully as possible, so that with their possession of the proper nature and education their belief both concerning things to be feared and other matters should be lasting. Their color would then be impervious to those terribly effective solvents—pleasure, which works more powerfully than any potash or lye, and pain, and fear, and desire, which are stronger than any solvent in the world. Such a power of preserving throughout the right and lawful belief concerning what is and what is not to be feared I define as courage, and give it that name if you do not object.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, certainly not. for I fancy that mere right opinion on these same matters such is not the result of education but the expression of an animal and slavish nature, you are very far from thinking legitimate or from calling courage.'

Socrates/ 'You are perfectly right.'

Adeimantus/ 'Then I accept this account of courage.'

Socrates/ 'Accept it, at least, as an account of the courage of a city, and you will not go wrong. We shall discuss it more

satisfactorily later, if you please. As it is, we have been looking, not for courage, but for justice, and therefore, I imagine, we have done enough for our investigation of the former.'

Adeimantus/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then we have still two things left to discover in the city—temperance and, finally, the main object of all our inquiry, justice.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Not to give ourselves further trouble over temperance, how shall we find justice?'

Adeimantus/ 'I certainly have no notion, and in any case I have no desire to discover it first if we are to have no further inquiry into temperance. What I personally should prefer is that you should first examine that.'

Socrates/ 'Certainly. I am very glad to do so. I should be churlish to refuse.'

Adeimantus/ 'Go on then with the examination.'

Socrates/ 'I will. At first sight it is more like a harmony or a musical mode than the former virtues.'

Adeimantus/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'Temperance, is surely an ordering and a control of certain pleasures and desires, as is declared by the common but mysterious expression that a man is master of himself; and there are other similar expressions which give a clue to its nature. Do you not agree?'

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But is not "master of himself" a ridiculous phrase? For he that is master of himself will surely also be slave of himself, and he that is slave, master; for the same person is mentioned in all these phrases.'

Adeimantus/ 'Undoubtedly.'

Socrates/ 'This expression, however, seems to me to mean that there is in the man himself, that is, in his soul, a better and a worse, and when the better has by nature control of the worse, then, as we say, the man is master of himself; for the expression is one of approval. When, on the other hand, in consequence of bad training, or the influence of associates, the better is weaker than the worse, and is overcome by its superior numbers, this is condemned as something disgraceful, and the man who is in this condition is called slave to himself, and intemperate.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is a probable explanation.'

Socrates/ 'Consider then, our new city, and you will find one of those conditions realized in it; for you will grant that it may be justly called master of itself if the terms "temperate" and "master of itself" are to be applied to that wherein the better rules the worse?'

Adeimantus/ 'I have considered, and find that you are right.'

Socrates/ 'We may say further that of desires and pleasures and pains, the many and diverse will be found especially in children and women and slaves, and in the vulgar herd among nominal freemen.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But the simple and orderly desires which are guided by reason, and which accompany intelligence and right belief, you will find in a small number of men, in those who have the best natures and have received the best education.'

Adeimantus/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you not see this latter condition of things in your city, where the desires which reign in the vulgar herd are mastered by the desires and the wisdom residing in the cultivated minority?'

Adeimantus/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Then if any city ought to be called master of pleasures and desires, and master of itself, it is this one?

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And for all these reasons must it not be called temperate also?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, indeed.'

Socrates/ 'And further, in no other city as in this one are both rulers and ruled inspired with the same belief as to who ought to rule. Do you not think so?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly I do.'

Socrates/ 'Then in whom among such citizens will you say that temperance is to be found? In the rulers, or in the ruled?

Adeimantus/ 'In both, surely.'

Socrates/ 'You see, then, that it was a clever divination of ours to say that temperance is like a harmony?

Adeimantus/ 'Why, pray?

Socrates/ 'Because temperance in its action is not like courage and wisdom. The wisdom and the courage which make the city wise and courageous reside each in a particular part, but temperance is spread through the whole alike, setting in unison of the octave the weakest and the strongest and the middle class—a unison of wisdom, if you would have that; and strength, if you would have that; of numbers also, and wealth, and any other such element. So that we may most justly say that this unanimity is temperance, the concord of the naturally worse and the naturally better as to which should rule in the city or in the individual.'

Adeimantus/ 'I entirely agree with you.'

Socrates/ 'Good. Then we have descried in the city three out of the four; at least so it appears. As for the last principle which completes the virtue possessed by the city, what will it be? Obviously it will be justice.'

Adeimantus/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'Now then, Glaucon, like hunters we must stand round the cover and watch carefully, lest by any chance justice escape us and vanish into obscurity; for it is quite plain that it is there somewhere. Do you look and make a zealous search, and possibly you may see it before I do, and point it out to me.'

Adeimantus/ 'I wish I could. But I shall think you are treating me fairly enough if you let me follow, so that I can see what is pointed out to me.'

Socrates/ 'Offer prayer with me, and come on.'

Adeimantus/ 'I will do so. But. do you lead.'

Socrates/ 'Truly, the ground is difficult and overgrown. It is dark too, and the cover is thick. Nevertheless on we must go.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, we must.'

Socrates/ I looked about me and cried, 'Joy, joy, Glaucon, we seem to be on the track, and I don't think the game will altogether escape.'

Adeimantus/ 'Good news.'

Socrates/ 'Well, really, we are being stupid.'

Adeimantus/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'Why, my good sir, it appears that the quarry has been rolling before our feet the whole time, and we have never seen it, but have made utter fools of ourselves. Just as people sometimes go about looking for a thing which they are holding in their hands, we have been gazing somewhere

miles away instead of looking at the thing before us, and quite probably that is how it has escaped us.'

Adeimantus/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'I mean, that we seem to have been mentioning it and hearing it mentioned all this time without realizing that we were in a way describing it ourselves.'

Adeimantus/ 'A long preface, for one anxious to hear.'

Socrates/ 'Well, listen, and hear whether there is anything in what I say. For at the beginning when we were founding our city, the principle which we then stated should rule throughout, or at least a form of it, was, I think, justice. We stated surely, and, if you remember, have often repeated our statement, that each individual should pursue that work in this city for which his nature was naturally most fitted, each one man doing one work.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, we did.'

Socrates/ 'But we have often said ourselves, and heard others saying, that to mind one's own business and not be meddlesome is justice.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, we have.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, my friend, this in some form or other is what justice seems to be, minding one's own business. Do you know how I infer this?'

Adeimantus/ 'Do tell me.'

Socrates/ 'We have examined, temperance and courage and wisdom, and I think that the remaining virtue in the city is that which enabled all these to find a place in it, and after they have appeared preserves them so long as it is present in the city. But we said that if we found the first three, the remaining one would be justice.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'But, if we had to decide which of those virtues by its presence does most to make the city good, it would be hard to say whether it is the unanimity of rulers and ruled, or the preservation of lawful belief concerning what is and what is not to be feared, that makes its appearance among the soldiers, or the wisdom and guardianship of the rulers, which most contributes to the city's goodness; or whether, finally, it is not this principle abiding in child and woman, in slave and freeman and artisan, in ruler and ruled, that each minded his own business, one man one work, and was not meddlesome.'

Adeimantus/ 'It is, in truth, a hard question.'

Socrates/ 'Then apparently the principle of each man doing his own business in a city competes in promoting that city's virtue with its wisdom and temperance and courage?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But would you not affirm that the principle which competes with these in promoting a city's virtue is justice?'

Adeimantus/ 'Most assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'Consider now whether this point of view brings us to the same conclusion. Will you make the rulers in the city judge law-suits?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And in their decisions will not their aim be merely to prevent either party having what belongs to others or being deprived of what is then own?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that will be their aim.'

Socrates/ 'On the assumption that that is just?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'So from this point of view the possession and practice of what belongs to us and is our own would be acknowledged to be justice?'

Adeimantus/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Consider, now, whether you agree with me. Do you think it will do any notable harm to the city if a builder attempts a shoemaker's work, or a shoemaker a builder's, or if they take one another's tools or pay, or even if the same man try to do both, and there is a general interchange in such professions?'

Adeimantus/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'But I fancy when he that is by nature a craftsman or a money-maker of some kind is so elated by his wealth, or his numerous supporters, or his bodily strength, or some such qualities, that he essays to enter the warrior class; or when one of the warriors aspires to the counseling and guardian class when he is unworthy of it, and these take one another's tools and privileges, or when the same man tries to combine all these offices, then, I fancy, you think with me that such change and meddling among those classes is death to the city.'

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Our classes are three, and meddling and interchange among them is the greatest of injuries to the city, and might justly be described as the extreme of evil-doing.'

Adeimantus/ 'It is exactly as you say.'

Socrates/ 'Then will you not admit that the worst kind of evil-doing to one's own city is injustice?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'This then is injustice; and conversely the opposite of this—when each class, money-makers,

auxiliaries, and guardians, attends to what belongs to it, each doing its own work in the city—will be justice, and will make the city just.'

Adeimantus/ 'I certainly think, it is as you say.'

Socrates/ 'Don't let us state it quite positively yet. If this conception is also admitted by us to be justice, when applied to each individual man, we shall then assent. For what need we say more? But if it is not, then we shall search for something else. Let us now complete the inquiry which we undertook in the belief that if we first managed to perceive justice in some bigger thing which possessed it, it would then be easier to see its nature in an individual. We thought that a city was a thing of this sort, and we therefore founded the best we could, knowing that justice would be found in the good city. Let us now apply to the individual the conception that has been revealed to us there, and if the result is consistent, so much the better. But if something different is revealed in the individual, then we shall go back to the city and test it there. And perhaps by looking at the two side by side, and rubbing them together, we may make justice blaze out, like fire from two sticks, and when it is revealed, we shall set it firmly in our minds.'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, there is method in your proposal, and we must follow it.'

Socrates/ 'Then, when to two things, a greater and a smaller, we give the same name, will they, m so far as they are called the same, be unlike or like?'

Adeimantus/ 'Like.'

Socrates/ 'Then, so far as the mere form of justice is concerned; the just man will in no way differ from the just city, but will be the same?'

Adeimantus/ 'He will.'

Socrates/ 'But it has been seen that a city is just when the three types of natures in it do each their own work, and that it is also temperate, courageous, and wise through other similar affections and conditions of those three lands.'

Adeimantus/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Then similarly, my friend, we shall expect that the individual has these same forms in his soul, and the same affections of them, if he is rightly called by the same name as the city.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is inevitable.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my good friend, we have stumbled upon a trifling little inquiry as to whether these three forms of natures exist in the soul or not.'

Adeimantus/ 'It certainly does not seem to me to be trifling. But perhaps, Socrates, the common saying is true, that the beautiful is difficult.'

Socrates/ 'It appears so. And if you want to know my opinion, Glaucon, I don't think that we shall ever settle this whole question accurately by our present methods. The road which leads to that result is longer and more toilsome, but perhaps we can manage to come up to the standard of our previous statements and inquiries.

Adeimantus/ 'Shall we not be content with that? It will be quite good enough for me at this moment.

Socrates/ 'Well, then, it will be quite sufficient for me also.'

Adeimantus/ 'Don't give up, then, but begin your inquiry.

Socrates/ 'Well, are we not absolutely compelled to admit that there are in each one of us the same kinds and characteristics as there are in the city? For how else could they have got there? It would be ridiculous to imagine that among peoples who bear the reputation for being spirited,

like the inhabitants of Thrace, Scythia, and the north generally, the spirited character in their states does not come from the individual citizens, or that it is otherwise with the love of learning which would be chiefly ascribed to this country, or with the love of riches, which people would especially attribute to the Phoenicians and the inhabitants of Egypt.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then we may take this as a fact, and one not hard to comprehend?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, it is not.'

Socrates/ 'But this is a hard question, whether in our actions we always use the same element, or whether there are different ones which are used for different purposes. Do we, that is, learn with one and feel anger with another of the elements within, us and with a third desire the pleasures of food and drink and propagation, and so on; whenever we have an impulse to action, do we employ the whole soul on each of these different occasions? These are the questions which are hard to determine satisfactorily.'

Adeimantus/ 'I agree with you.'

Socrates/ 'Then let us try this method of ascertaining whether these elements are identical with one another, or different.'

Adeimantus/ 'What method?'

Socrates/ 'It is obvious that the same thing will not at one and the same time, in the same part of it, and in the same relation, do two opposite things or be in two opposite states; so that if we find such conjunction of opposites in these elements, we may be sure that they are not one, but several.'

Adeimantus/ 'Good.'

Socrates/ 'Now consider what I say.'

Adeimantus/ 'Speak on.'

Socrates/ 'Can the same thing, at one and the same time, and in the same part of it, be at rest and in motion?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Let us come to a more exact understanding. If we go too fast we may fall into ambiguities. If someone were to say of a man who was standing still, but moving his arms and his head, that the same man was at the same time at rest and in motion, we should say, I fancy, that this was not a proper description, but that one part of him was at rest and another in motion. Is not that the case?'

Adeimantus/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'Well, if our friend were to become still more subtle, and make the pretty point that peg-tops are at one and the same time at rest and in motion throughout, when they spin with their pegs fixed to the same place, and that the same is true of anything else which revolves in a fixed spot, we should agree, on the ground that the parts in respect of which they are at rest and in motion on these occasions are different. We should say rather that they have an axis and a circumference and in respect of the axis are at rest, inasmuch as they do not lean to one side, but in respect of the circumference they revolve. But if, while they are revolving, they at the same time incline the axis either to the right or the left, or forward or backward, then they are in no sense at rest.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is perfectly correct.'

Socrates/ 'Then none of those objections will frighten us, nor in any way persuade us that under any circumstances anyone and the same thing could at one and the same time, in the same part of it, and in the same relation, be acted upon in two opposite ways, or be two opposite things, or produce two opposite effects?

Adeimantus/ 'No, I shall certainly not be persuaded.'

Socrates/ 'In any case, we don't want to be compelled to examine in detail all difficulties of this kind, and to waste our time in establishing their falsehood; and so we may proceed on the assumption that what we have said is right, agreeing that if at any time we have to change our opinion, all the consequences of our assumption shall be considered invalid?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is our best method.'

Socrates/ 'Now, would you say that assent and dissent, the seeking after an object and the refusal to take it, attraction and repulsion, and so on, are mutual opposites? Whether they are actions or passions makes no difference?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, they are opposites.'

Socrates/ 'Then, would you say thirst and hunger and the desires generally, including also willing and wishing, may be classed with the former of those general terms just mentioned? For example, would you not admit that the soul of him who desires seeks after that which he desires, whatever it may be, or attracts to himself that which he wishes to have, or, again, so far as he is willing that something should be given him, his soul longing for its accomplishment nods assent to this as though she were asked a question and were replying to herself?'

Adeimantus/ 'I should.'

Socrates/ 'Again, shall we not class not wishing and not willing and not desiring with repulsion and rejection, and all those opposed general terms?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'This being so, shall we say that there is a class of desires, and that what we call thirst and hunger are the most marked of those?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'The first is a desire for drink; the second, for food?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then will thirst, so far as it is thirst, be a desire in the soul for anything more than drink? Is thirst, that is to say, thirst of hot drink or of cold, or of much drink or of little, or, in a word, of drink of a particular kind? Or is the desire for cold drink the additional result of heat and thirst combined, and for hot drink the result of cold and thirst? And again, does the desire for much drink arise when the thirst is much owing to the presence of muchness, and for little drink when the thirst is little? That is, is the mere state of being thirsty ever a desire for anything besides its natural object, namely, drink, and similarly with hunger and the desire for food?'

Adeimantus/ 'In that way, each mere desire is a desire only for its mere natural object, while the desires for this or that kind of object are the result of additions.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, let no one take us unaware and vex us with the objection that no man desires drink only but good drink, or food only but good food. For all men, they say, desire things that are good Therefore, since thirst is a desire, it will be a desire for something good—drink, or whatever it may be—and similarly with other desires?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, there might seem to be something in that objection.'

Socrates/ 'But surely, wherever you have terms which imply something else, the qualified terms, I think, imply a qualified, and the simple unqualified terms a simple.'

Adeimantus/ 'I don't understand.'

Socrates/ 'Do you not understand, that the greater implies, that is, is greater than, something?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Implies the less?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And the much greater the much less? Does it not?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And the sometimes greater the sometimes less, and the future greater the future less?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then does not "the more" in this way imply "the less," and "the double" "the half," and so on, "the heavier" "the lighter," and "the swifter" "the slower," and also "the hot" "the cold," and similarly with similar epithets?'

Adeimantus/ 'Assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'Then does the same apply to the various kinds of knowledge? Mere knowledge implies the mere knowable, however we ought to describe the object of knowledge, but knowledge of a particular quality implies an object of a particular quality. For example, when a science of building houses arose, was it not distinguished from the other sciences and called the science of building?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And was that not because it was of a particular quality, like none of the others?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And did it not get this particular quality from the particular quality of its objects? And does not the same apply to the other trades and sciences?'

Adeimantus/ 'It does.'

Socrates/ 'Then you may take it that this was my meaning, if you now understand, that when you have terms that imply another, the simple imply the simple, the

qualified the qualified. I don't in the least mean that the relatives are of the same quality as their correlatives, that the science of the healthy and the diseased, for example, is healthy and diseased, or the science of the evil and the good is evil and good, but as soon as you had a science which was not of the mere knowable, but of an object of a particular quality, in this case healthy and diseased, then the science in its turn assumed a particular quality, and the result was that it was no longer called simply science, but the quality was added, and it was called medical science.'

Adeimantus/ 'I understand, and I think you are right.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, will you not agree that thirst, in being what it is, is one of those things which imply another? Thirst, of course, implies'——

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, it implies drink.'

Socrates/ 'Then a particular quality of thirst implies a particular quality of drink, but thirst pure and simple does not imply much or little, or good or bad drink, or, in a word, any particular quality of drink, but thirst and nothing more implies drink and nothing more.'

Adeimantus/ 'Assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'Then the soul of the thirsty man, in so far as it is thirsty, wants only to drink, and longs and strives after this?'

Adeimantus/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'Then if there is anything which holds it back when it is thirsty, will it not be something in it distinct from that which thirsts and which drives it like a beast to drink? For surely, as we said, the same thing does not at one and the same time with the same part of itself and in the same relation do opposite things?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Just as, I fancy, it is incorrect to say of an archer that his hands are at one and the same time drawing the bow towards him and thrusting it away. We ought rather to say that one hand is thrusting it away, and the other drawing it towards him.'

Adeimantus/ 'Assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'Now, can we say that people are sometimes thirsty and yet decline to drink?'

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly. that often happens with many people.'

Socrates/ 'Then what are we to say about them?' 'Must we not say that there is that' in their soul which orders them to drink, and there is that which hinders them from drinking, the latter being distinct from, and master of, the former?'

Adeimantus/ 'I certainly think so.'

Socrates/ 'May we say then that that which hinders in these cases, whenever it arises in the soul, is produced there by reasoning, while the impulses leading and dragging the soul are engendered by particular conditions and diseases?'

Adeimantus/ 'Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'Then we shall have reason, in affirming that these are two and distinct from one another. The first, that with which the soul reasons, we shall call the rational part; the second, that with which it loves, and hungers, and thirsts, and flutters round the other desires, we shall call the irrational and desiring part, the companion of various indulgences and pleasures.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, we have good cause to think so.'

Socrates/ 'Let us assume then that we have distinguished these two parts in the soul. Now is spirit, or that by which

we feel indignant, a third part, or, if not, with which of these two is it naturally connected?'

Adeimantus/ 'Possibly, with the second, the desiring element.'

Socrates/ 'Well, I rely on a story which I once heard, how Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was coming up from the Peiraeus, close to the outer side of the north wall, when he saw some dead bodies lying near the executioner, and he felt a desire to look at them, and at the same time felt disgust at the thought, and tried to turn aside. For some time he fought with himself and put his hand over his eyes, but in the end the desire got the better of him, and opening his eyes wide with his fingers he ran forward to the bodies, saying, 'There you are, curse you, have your fill of the lovely spectacle.'"

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, I have heard the story myself.'

Socrates/ 'But observe, that the story shows that anger sometimes fights against the desires, which implies that they are distinct principles.'

Adeimantus/ 'It does.'

Socrates/ 'And do we not often notice on other occasions, when a man is forced by his desires against his reason, that he abuses himself, and is indignant with that within him which is constraining him? In such a case there is strife between two principles, and the spirit appears as an ally of the reason. But I fancy that you will not assert that you have ever noticed either in yourself or in anyone else the other phenomenon, the spirit siding with the desires when the reason decides that they are not to interfere with it.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, assuredly not.'

Socrates/ 'Well, when a man thinks he is in the wrong, what then? Is it not the case that the nobler he is the less is he capable of being angry because he is made to suffer hunger and cold, or anything else, at the hands of him whom

he conceives to be inflicting a just punishment; in other words his spirit declines to be roused against his punisher?'

Adeimantus/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'But what of a man who thinks he is wronged? Does he not then fume and chafe and fight on the side of what he believes to be just? Though he suffer hunger and cold and every kind of privation, he perseveres till he conquers, and never desists from his noble indignation, until he has either accomplished his purpose or perished, or until reason within him calls him back as a shepherd calls his dog, and he relents.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, it is much as you describe it. And indeed in our city we have made the auxiliaries subject to the rulers like sheep-dogs of the city's shepherds.'

Socrates/ 'You understand beautifully what I mean. But consider this further point.'

Adeimantus/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'Our present view of the spirited element is the opposite of what we held a while ago. For we then thought that it was in some way of the nature of desire, but we now say that it is anything but that. Rather in the war of the soul it ranges itself on the side of the rational part.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then is it distinct from this also, or is it a form of the rational element, so that there are not three kinds in the soul, but two—the rational and the desiring? Or, as the city was composed of three classes—money-making, auxiliary, and counseling—is there likewise in the soul also this third element of spiritedness, which is the natural auxiliary of the rational, so long as it is not corrupted by evil upbringing?'

Adeimantus/ 'It must be a third part.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, if it appears to be distinct from the rational, as it has been seen to be from the desiring element.'

Adeimantus/ 'But that is easily seen. You may observe that in children: from their earliest years they are full of spirit, but some of them seem to me never to acquire reason, and most of them only do so quite late.'

Socrates/ 'On my word, that is well said; and the truth of your remarks is confirmed by considering animals. And besides this evidence there is the case which we mentioned some time ago, to which Homer witnesses in the words:

> He chid his angry spirit and beat his breast.

For in this passage Homer clearly distinguishes between two principles, and depicts the one, which reasons concerning the better and the worse, rebuking the other for its unreasoning anger.'

Adeimantus/ 'You are perfectly right.'

Socrates/ 'Well, after a hard fight for it we have swum to shore, and are pretty well agreed that there are in a city and in the soul of each individual the same three kinds.'

Adeimantus/ 'We have.'

Socrates/ 'Then does it not now follow that the individual will be wise in the same way and by reason of the same element as the city?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And the city will be courageous by reason of the same element and in the same way as the individual is courageous, and both will have all the other elements of virtue in the same way?'

Adeimantus/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'Then finally, Glaucon, we shall say that a man is just in the manner in which a city was just.'

Adeimantus/ 'That, too, follows inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'But we have surely not forgotten that the city was just by reason of the three classes within it each doing their own work?'

Adeimantus/ 'I think we have not forgotten.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must bear in mind that each one of us will be just and doing his own work if the parts within him are doing severally their own work?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes. Certainly we must bear that in mind.'

Socrates/ 'Then is it not befitting that the rational part should rule, inasmuch as it is wise and has foresight for the whole soul, and that the spirited part should be its subject and ally?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But is it not the case, as we said, that a blending of music and gymnastic will make these elements harmonious, inciting and nourishing the reason by noble words and instruction, and slackening the other by soothing admonition, taming it by harmony and rhythm?'

Adeimantus/ 'Undoubtedly.'

Socrates/ 'And these two so nurtured, truly taught and trained in their own offices, will be set over the desiring element, which of a truth makes the greatest part of each man's soul, and is by nature insatiably covetous. Over it they will keep guard lest it fill itself with the false pleasures of the body, and becoming great and strong no longer attend to its own work, but try to get the rule and mastery over those matters that do not belong to it, and so quite overturn the life of the whole.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And would not these two, also be the best guards of the whole soul and of the body against external enemies, the rational element giving counsel and the other

fighting its battles, following its ruler, and bravely executing its purposes?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And I fancy that we call the individual courageous in this part of him, when the spirited element preserves, in spite of pains and pleasures, the precepts of reason concerning what is and what is not to be feared?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is right.'

Socrates/ 'And we call him wise by reason of that other small part, that in him which rules and issues these precepts, that which possesses in itself knowledge of what is advantageous to each and all of those three principles?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Further, do we not call him temperate by reason of the friendship and harmony of these elements, when the ruler and the two subjects are agreed that the rational element must rule, and there is no rebellion against it?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly. temperance in a city or in an individual is nothing else than this.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, the individual will be just in virtue of our oft-repeated principle, and in that way?'

Adeimantus/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'What then? Do we find justice at all dimmer to our eyes or different from what it was seen to be in the city?'

Adeimantus/ 'I certainly do not think so.'

Socrates/ 'Well, we can make perfectly sure, if there be any doubt lingering in our souls, by comparing our result with common notions.'

Adeimantus/ 'To which do you refer?

Socrates/ 'For example, if we were discussing this city, and the man who by nature and training is like to it, and

had to decide whether such an one would appropriate gold or silver which had been left in his trust, do you think that anyone would believe that he would do it more readily than men of another nature?'

Adeimantus/ 'No one.'

Socrates/ 'And would he not also keep himself clear of sacrilege, and theft, and of being false to his friends or a traitor to his city?'

Adeimantus/ 'He would.'

Socrates/ 'And of course he will never be in any way guilty of bad faith in oaths or in any other compact?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely not.'

Socrates/ 'And he is the last man who would be capable of adultery and neglect of parents and want of observance to the gods?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'And is not the reason for all this that each of the elements within him keeps to its own work in regard to ruling and being ruled?'

Adeimantus/ 'That and nothing else.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you still seek justice elsewhere than in this power which produces men and cities of such a character?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, not I.'

Socrates/ 'Then that of which we dreamed has now its perfect fulfillment; I mean, the suspicion we expressed that at the very beginning of our construction of the city we stumbled by some divine providence upon a principle and type of justice?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes; certainly.'

Socrates/ 'For in point of fact, Glaucon, there was an image of justice in the principle that he whom nature

intended for a shoemaker should attend to shoemaking and nothing else, and that the carpenter should do carpentry, and so on; and that is why it helped us.'

Adeimantus/ 'Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'And in truth justice, as it appears, is something of this kind. But it does not concern a man's management of his own external affairs, but. his internal management of his soul, his truest self and his truest possessions. The just man does not allow the different principles within him to do other work than their own, nor the distinct classes in his soul to interfere with one another; but in the truest sense he sets his house in order, gaining the mastery over himself; and becoming on good terms with himself through discipline, he joins in harmony those different elements, like three terms in a musical scale—lowest and highest and intermediate, and any others that may lie between those—and binding together all these elements he molds the many within him into one, temperate and harmonious. In this spirit he lives; whether he is money-making or attending to the wants of his body, whether he is engaged in politics or on business transactions of his own, throughout he considers and calls just and beautiful all conduct which pursues and helps to create this attitude of mind. The knowledge which superintends these actions is for him wisdom, while any conduct which tends to destroy this attitude is for him unjust, and the belief which inspires it ignorance.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is most certainly true, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Good. Then if we declare that we have discovered the just man and the just city, and justice which rules in them, I fancy that we shall not be thought to be speaking altogether falsely.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, by heaven!'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we make this declaration?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Let it be done then. And now think we have to inquire into injustice?'

Adeimantus/ Clearly.'

Socrates/ 'Must not it be a kind of quarrel between those three—a meddlesomeness and interference and rebellion of one part of the soul against the whole that it may gain a rule over it to which it has no right; while the whole is such by nature that that part ought to be a slave, and the other part, which is of the royal class, ought not? Such a state of affairs, I fancy, and the disturbance and confusion of these principles, we shall declare to constitute injustice and incontinence, and cowardice and ignorance, and, in a word, all wickedness.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, precisely so.'

Socrates/ 'Then, since injustice and justice are now revealed to us, is it not quite clear what it is to act unjustly and to be unjust, and what it is also to act justly?

Adeimantus/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'Clearly, they do not differ from healthy and diseased conditions. As those are to the body, so are acting justly and acting unjustly to the soul.

Adeimantus/ 'How?

Socrates/ 'Surely healthy conditions produce health, and diseased conditions disease?

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.

Socrates/ 'Well, does not just action likewise produce justice, and unjust action injustice?

Adeimantus/ 'Necessarily.

Socrates/ 'Now to produce health is to put the various parts of the body in their natural relations of authority or

subservience to one another, while to produce disease is to disturb this natural relation.

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.

Socrates/ 'Then to produce justice, is to put the parts of the soul in their natural relations of authority or subservience, while to produce injustice is to disturb this natural relation, is it not?

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then virtue, seemingly, will be a kind of health and beauty and good condition of the soul, vice a disease and ugliness and weakness.

Adeimantus/ 'That is true.'

Socrates/ 'Then do not fair practices conduce to the acquisition of virtue, ugly practices to the acquisition of vice?

Adeimantus/ 'Necessarily.

Socrates/ 'There now apparently remains for us to inquire whether it is profitable to act justly and follow fair practices and be just, and that whether the just man is recognized as such or not, or whether acting unjustly and being unjust is profitable, even if the unjust man is not punished, or reformed by correction.'

Adeimantus/ 'But, Socrates, this inquiry seems to me ridiculous at this stage, now that we have reached those respective conclusions about justice and injustice. People think that when the constitution of the body is ruined life is not worth living, not with all the foods and drinks and wealth and dominion in the world; and are we to believe that, when the constitution of the very principle of our life is in confusion and ruin, life is then worth living, though a man do whatever he please—unless only he find some means of escaping from vice and injustice, and of acquiring justice and virtue?'

Socrates/ 'Yes, it is ridiculous. Still, since we have got to a position where we can perceive the truth of this most clearly, we must not give up.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, most certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Come here, then, and look with me on the different forms of vice as I conceive them, or as many of them as are worth observing.'

Adeimantus/ 'Say on, I follow.'

Socrates/ 'Well, I look out from the mountain top to which we have climbed in our argument, and see that there is one form of virtue but innumerable forms of vice, and among them four that are specially worthy of mention.'

Adeimantus/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'There will probably be, as many varieties of sods forming specific kinds as there are similar varieties of political constitutions.'

Adeimantus/ 'And how many are there?'

Socrates/ 'Five varieties of constitution, and five of souls.'

Adeimantus/ 'Tell us which they are.'

Socrates/ 'I will. One variety of constitution will be that which we have described, though it may have two names. It will be called a monarchy when there is one man of surpassing excellence among the rulers; when there are more than one, it will be called an aristocracy.'

Adeimantus/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'This, then, I designate as one form; for whether there are several rulers or only one will not make them disturb any fundamental law of the city, so long as they observe the nurture and education which we have described.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, naturally not.'

Book 5.

Socrates/ 'Good and right, then, do I call such a city and constitution, and such a man; and the others, since this is right, I call bad and mistaken, whether they deal with the government of cities or the organization of the character of the individual, and they may be arranged in four varieties of vice.'

Adeimantus/ 'What are they?'

Socrates/ I was going on to deal with them in order as they appeared to me to develop from one to the other, when Polemarchus, who was sitting some little way from Adeimantus, stretched out his hand, and taking hold of him by the garment high up near the shoulder, drew him to him, and leaning forward whispered something in his ear of which we only heard the following:

Polemarchus/ 'Shall we let be, or what shall we do?'

Socrates/ Adeimantus, quite loud said;

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ What in particular, are you not going to let be?'

Adeimantus/ 'You.'

Socrates/ 'Because of what particular remark of mine?'

Adeimantus/ 'We think. that you are shirking and are cheating us out of a whole division of the subject, and a most important one, which you don't want to go through. You thought that we should not notice that trifling remark of yours, that it would be obvious to everyone that as concerns women and children friends have things in common.'

Socrates/ 'Well, was I not right, Adeimantus?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes. But like the rest, this "right" needs explanation. We must know by what method this community is to be carried out. For there are many possibilities. Do not, therefore, pass over the plan which you propose. We have

been waiting all this time expecting that you would certainly tell us of the conditions of begetting children, and how they will be reared after they are born, and would explain all this community of wives and children of which you talk. For we conceived that it would make a great or rather the whole difference to the constitution whether it was rightly or wrongly managed. But now that you are taking up another constitution without handling these questions satisfactorily, we came to the resolve which you heard, that we should not let you be till you had discussed these questions as you did the rest.'

Glaucon/ 'You may put me down, as voting for that resolution.'

Thrasymachus/ 'It's all right.' 'You may consider, Socrates, that we have passed it unanimously.'

Socrates/ 'What a deed you have done, in fastening upon me! What a long discussion about the constitution you are starting again from the very beginning! I was rejoicing in the thought that I had finished with it by this time, and quite content that what I said then should be accepted and allowed to pass. You don't know what a swarm of discussions you are rousing by reviving these topics now. I saw them and let them alone before, to save you endless trouble.'

Thrasymachus/ 'Why, do you imagine that we have come here to find an El Dorado, and not precisely to listen to discussions?'

Socrates/ 'No doubt, but of a reasonable length.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, but, Socrates, to men of understanding their whole life is a reasonable time to listen to such discussions. But never mind about us. For yourself, do not weary of answering our questions on these subjects, and choose whatever method you think best to explain what kind

of community our guardians will observe concerning the children and the women, and the nurture of the children while they are young in the period between their birth and their education. That, indeed, is considered the most troublesome business of all. Try, then, to tell us in what manner it must be arranged.'

Socrates/ 'It is no easy matter to discuss, my sanguine friend. There are many more points in it which will tax your confidence than in the subjects of our previous discussions. In the first place, the practical possibility of my proposals will not be believed, and, secondly, it will also be doubted whether on the assumption of their being completely carried out they are actually the most desirable And for these reasons I have some hesitation in having anything to do with them, for fear, my dear friend, that the argument may seem to be an idle dream.'

Glaucon/ 'Have no hesitation, for your audience are neither without understanding nor incredulous nor unfriendly.'

Socrates/ 'My good sir, are you really seeking to encourage me by those words?'

Glaucon/ 'I am.'

Socrates/ 'Well, their effect is precisely the opposite. If I were confident that I was speaking with knowledge, your encouragement would be excellent. For to speak with knowledge of the truth about matters dear to us and of the highest importance among men of understanding who are our friends is a thing that may be done with assurance and safety. But to bring forward proposals when one is still incredulous and inquiring, as I am doing now, that is a dangerous and alarming task. Not that I am: afraid of making myself ridiculous. To be so were childish. But I am afraid of slipping from the truth, and being overthrown just

where a false step is most to be dreaded, and not only falling myself, but dragging my friends after me. And I bow to Nemesis, Glaucon, touching what I am about to say. For I do believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver concerning noble and good and just laws. This venture, therefore, is better made among enemies than among friends. So you see how well you encourage me.'

Glaucon smiled and said;

Glaucon/ 'Well, Socrates, if we suffer anything amiss from the discussion, we acquit you and pronounce you guiltless of our blood and not our deceiver. So take courage and say on.'

Socrates/ 'Well, in cases of homicide he that is acquitted is free from guilt, according to the law. And if in that case, it is likely that he will be in this.'

Glaucon/ 'For these reasons, say on.'

Socrates/ 'We must go back, then, and say what perhaps should have been said in its proper place. However, it may be right after the men have played their part that the women should come on in their turn, especially when you demand it in this way. For men who are, by nature and education, such as we have described, there is, in my opinion, no right possession or use of children and women except along the lines on which we originally started them. We tried in our argument, if you remember, to make our men like guardians of a flock.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then let us follow this up and give corresponding rules for birth and nurture, and see whether we approve the result or not.'

Glaucon/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'In this way. Do we think that the females of watchdogs ought to watch as well as the males, ought to

hunt with them, and generally share their occupations, or should they be kept indoors in the kennels, on the ground that breeding and rearing the puppies disables them for anything else, while the hard work and all the care of the flocks is reserved for the males?

Glaucon/ 'They should share in everything. Only we treat the females as the weaker and the males as the stronger.'

Socrates/ 'Can you, use any living creature for the same work as another unless you rear and train it in the same way?'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Then if we employ women at the same tasks as men, we must give them the same instruction?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'The men were given music and gymnastic.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must assign to the women also these two arts, and the art of war in addition, and treat them in the same way.'

Glaucon/ 'That follows from what you say.'

Socrates/ 'Possibly, if our words are translated into action, these proposals may seem to involve many ridiculous breaches of etiquette.'

Glaucon/ 'They certainly will.'

Socrates/ 'Which of them do you find most ridiculous? Is it not obviously the notion of women exercising in the palaestra naked along with men, and not only young women, but positively the older also, just like those old men in the gymnasia who keep up their devotion to gymnastic though they are wrinkled and ugly?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, most certainly. It would appear ridiculous, at least under present conditions.'

Socrates/ 'Well, as we have started the subject we must not be afraid of the gibes of fine gentlemen of all the different things they will say against such a change taking place in the gymnasia, in music, and not least, in the bearing of arms, and horse-riding.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'But since we have begun the subject we must go on over the rougher ground of this law of ours, and request these jesters to stop minding their own business and to be serious. We shall remind them that it is not long since the Greeks thought it ugly and ridiculous to see men naked, as most barbarian races do now, and that when gymnastics were introduced first by the Cretans, and later by the Lacedaemonians, the witty men of the day had the opportunity of making fun of all these things. Do you agree with me?'

Glaucon/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'But I fancy when they found from experience that it was better to strip than to cover up the body, then too what had seemed ridiculous to the eye disappeared before the face of the arguments showing what was best; and this proved that he is a fool who thinks that anything but the bad is ridiculous, and tries to raise a laugh by regarding any spectacle, except that of folly and evil, as ludicrous, or indeed he who aims seriously at any standard of beauty which he may set up for himself, except the good.'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But must we not first come to an agreement as to whether these proposals are practical or not, and allow anyone, whether he is a jester or a serious person, to raise the question whether female human nature is capable of sharing with the male in all his occupations, or in none of them, or whether it is capable of some and not of others, and

to ask in the last case to which of these classes warfare belongs? Would not this naturally be the best beginning, and lead to the best conclusion?'

Glaucon/ 'Much the best.'

Socrates/ 'Then, shall we on behalf of these other people put the question to ourselves, that the other side may not be besieged without having defenders?

Glaucon/ 'There is nothing to hinder us.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we say on their behalf: "Socrates and Glaucon, there is no need for others to raise an objection against you. For in the beginning of your settlement of the city, you yourselves admitted that each should, as nature provides, do his own work, one person one work."'

Glaucon/ 'I think we did. How could we do otherwise?'

Socrates/ "'But is not a woman by nature very different from a man?"'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly she is different.'

Socrates/ "'And ought not different tasks to be assigned to different individuals in accordance with the nature of each?"'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ "'Then are you not mistaken and inconsistent now in maintaining, as you do, that men and women should do the same things, seeing that they have widely different natures?" Will you be able to offer any defense to that, my wonderful friend?'

Glaucon/ 'It is certainly not easy just at the moment. But I shall have to ask you, as I do now, to interpret our argument also, whatever it is.'

Socrates/ 'This, Glaucon, with many other similar difficulties, is what I have foreseen all this time. For that was why I was afraid, and hesitated to touch on the law

concerning the possession and nurture of women and children.'

Glaucon/ 'I don't wonder. By Zeus, no, it is not an easy task.'

Socrates/ 'It is not. But the truth is, whether a man falls into a small swimming-bath or into the middle of the mighty ocean, he has to swim all the same.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, we must strike out and try to get safe out of the argument, in the hope of a dolphin taking us up, or of some other impossible means of salvation.'

Glaucon/ 'It looks like it.'

Socrates/ 'Come, then, let us see whether we can possibly find a way out. We admit that different natures ought to do different things, and that the natures of a man and of a woman are different, but now we say that these different natures should do the same things. Is that the accusation against us?'

Glaucon/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'A noble thing, Glaucon, is the power of the art of controversy.'

Glaucon/ 'Why do you say so?'

Socrates/ 'Because, many people seem to me to fall into it quite against their will, and to think that discussion which is really contention, because they cannot examine the subject of their argument by analyzing its various forms, but will urge their contradiction of what has been said in reliance on the mere sound of the word, dealing with one another by contention, and not by scientific argument.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that happens with very many people. But does it touch us at this moment?'

Socrates/ 'Most certainly it does, for we seem, quite against our will, to be dealing with controversial arguments.'

Glaucon/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'When we insist that what are not the same natures ought not to have the same pursuits, we cling to the verbal point most bravely and contentiously, but we have never inquired at all of what kind were the sameness and the difference and with reference to what we were then distinguishing them, when we proposed to give different pursuits to different natures, and the same pursuits to the same natures.'

Glaucon/ 'No, we did not inquire.'

Socrates/ 'In the same way, we might evidently ask ourselves whether bald and hairy men had the same or opposite natures; and, agreeing that they have opposite natures, might forbid hairy men to be shoemakers if bald men are, or forbid bald men if hairy men are.'

Glaucon/ 'Well, that would be ridiculous.'

Socrates/ 'But would it not be ridiculous, simply because, in that proposition, we did not mean same and different in general? Our rule was only directed against that particular form of likeness and difference which concerns those particular pursuits. We meant, for example, that the soul possessed of medical capacity and a doctor have the same nature. Do you agree with me?'

Glaucon/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'But a doctor and a carpenter have different natures.'

Glaucon/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'Then, if we find either the male or the female sex excelling the other in any art or other pursuit, then we shall say that this particular pursuit must be assigned to

one and not to the other; but if we find that the difference simply consists in this, that the female conceives and the male begets, we shall not allow that that goes any way to prove that a woman differs from a man with reference to the subject of which we are speaking, and we shall still consider that our guardians and their wives ought to follow the same pursuits.'

Glaucon/ 'And quite rightly.'

Socrates/ 'Is not our next step to invite the supporters of the contrary opinion to show us in reference to what art or what pursuit among all those required for the service of the city, the nature of men and women is not the same, but different?'

Glaucon/ 'That is certainly just.'

Socrates/ Perhaps others might make the same reply as was made by you a little while ago, that it is not easy to give a satisfactory answer at the moment, but that it would not be difficult after consideration.'

Glaucon/ 'They might.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we request our objector to follow us, in the hope that we may prove to him that there is no occupation in the organization of the city which is peculiar to women?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ '"Come, then," we shall say to him, "answer this. When you say that one man has a natural talent for anything, and another is naturally unfitted for it, do you mean that the first learns it easily, while the second learns it with difficulty? that the first, after a little study, would find out much for himself in the subject which he has studied; but the second, in spite of much study and practice, would not even keep what he had learned? that in the one the mind would be well served by the bodily powers, in the other it

would be thwarted? Are not these the only signs by which you meant to determine in any case natural talent or the want of it?"'

Glaucon/ 'No one, will name any others.'

Socrates/ 'Then, do you know any human occupation in which the male sex does not in all these particulars surpass the female? Need I bore you by referring to weaving and the making of pastry and preserves, in which, indeed, the female sex is considered to excel, and where their discomfiture is most laughed at?'

Glaucon/ 'What you say is true. Speaking generally, the one sex is easily beaten by the other all round. There are indeed many cases of women being better than men in many different employments, but, as a general rule, it is as you say.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my friend, there is not one of those pursuits by which the city is ordered which belongs to women as women, or to men as men; but natural aptitudes are equally distributed in both kinds of creatures. Women naturally participate in all occupations, and so do men; but in all women are weaker than men.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Shall we, then, assign all occupations to men and none to women?'

Glaucon/ 'Of course not.'

Socrates/ 'But we shall say, I fancy, that one woman is by nature fit for medicine, and another not; one musical, and another unmusical?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And is not one woman a lover of gymnastic and of war, and another unwarlike and no lover of gymnastic?'

Glaucon/ 'I should think so.'

Socrates/ 'And one a lover and another a hater of wisdom; one spirited, another spiritless?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then one woman will be capable of being a guardian and another not. For did we not select just this nature for our men guardians?'

Glaucon/ 'We did.'

Socrates/ 'Then for the purposes of guarding the city the nature of men and women is the same, except that women are naturally weaker, men naturally stronger?'

Glaucon/ 'Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must select women of the necessary character to share the life of men of like character and guard the city along with them, inasmuch as they are capable and of a kindred nature?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then must we not assign the same occupations to the same natures?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'So we are come round to what we said before, and allow that there is nothing unnatural in assigning music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then our legislation has not been an impracticable dream, seeing that we have made our law in accordance with nature? Present conditions which depart from this are evidently much more a departure from nature.'

Glaucon/ 'Evidently.'

Socrates/ 'Now were we not inquiring whether our proposals are practicable and desirable?'

Glaucon/ 'We were.'

Socrates/ 'And we are agreed that they are practicable?

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must next come to an agreement on their desirability?'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'Then surely if women are to become fit to be guardians, we shall not have one education to make guardians of the men and another for the women, especially when education will have the same nature to work upon?'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'What is your opinion in a question like this?

Glaucon/ 'Like what?'

Socrates/ 'How do you conceive to yourself one man as better and another as worse? or do you think that all are alike?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then, in this city which we were founding, do you think that our guardians, who have received the education we have described, will be better men than the shoemakers who have been trained in shoemaking?'

Glaucon/ 'The question is ridiculous.'

Socrates/ 'I understand. Then are not these the best of all the citizens?'

Glaucon/ 'Much the best.'

Socrates/ 'Further, will not these women be the best of the women?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, much the best also.'

Socrates/ 'Then is anything better for a city than that it should contain the best possible men and women?'

Glaucon/ 'Nothing.'

Socrates/ 'But will not music and gymnastic, employed as we have described, bring about this result?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then we have laid down laws for the city which are not only practicable, but also desirable?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must make the wives of our guardians strip, for they will clothe themselves with excellence instead of garments, and we must make them take their share in war and the other duties of guarding the city, and let them do nothing else. Only of these we must the lighter to the women, because of the weakness of the sex. And the man who laughs at naked women, when their exercise has the best as its aim, plucks from his wisdom the unripe fruit of laughter, and has no notion apparently at what he laughs or what he does. For in truth the common saying will ever be the fairest saying, that the useful is beautiful and the harmful ugly.'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'This, then, is one wave which, we may say, has been surmounted in our discussion of the law for women. We have, without being swamped, managed to reach the conclusion that our men and women guardians must follow all pursuits in common: rather the argument somehow comes to an agreement with itself that its proposals are practical and advantageous.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly. it is a small wave that you are surmounting.'

Socrates/ 'You will say that it is no great one, when you see the next.'

Glaucon/ 'Say on, and let me see it,'

Socrates/ 'This new law, follows, I fancy, the one we have just had, and all those that went before.'

Glaucon/ 'What is it?'

Socrates/ 'That these women should be all of them wives in common of all these men, and that no woman should live with any man privately, and that their children too should be common, and the parent should not know his own offspring nor the child its parent.'

Glaucon/ 'This, is much more formidable than the other. It is much harder to believe in its being practicable or advantageous.'

Socrates/ 'I don't think, so far as the question of advantage is concerned, there could be much dispute as to its being the greatest blessing to have both wives and children common, if it were possible. But I fancy that there might be keen controversy as to whether the proposal is practicable or not.'

Glaucon/ 'Both points might very easily be disputed.'

Socrates/ 'Then we shall have to face an alliance of arguments. I was expecting that I should run away from one if you agreed as to the advantage of the proposal, and then I should be left with the question whether it was practicable or not.'

Glaucon/ 'Well, you have not managed to run away, but have been caught; prepare, therefore, to defend both points.'

Socrates/ 'I must pay the penalty. But grant me this favor. Let me keep holiday, like those lazy-minded men who are wont to feast themselves on their own thoughts when they are travelling alone. Such men, you know, do not wait to discover the means of attaining the object of their desires. They let that question alone to save themselves the weariness of deliberating about what is practicable and what is not. They suppose that they have what they desire, and

then proceed to arrange the remainder of the business, and amuse themselves by enumerating all that they will do when their desire is realized, so making their already lazy minds even lazier. I, too, now am yielding to laziness, and I wish to defer the first question as to the practicability of these proposals and consider it later. In the meantime, if you will allow me, I shall assume their practicability, and examine what arrangements the rulers will make when these proposals are put into practice, and show that their realization will be of the greatest possible benefit to both city and guardians. I shall try thoroughly to discuss these points with you first, and leave the others till later, if you will allow me.'

Glaucon/ 'I will, so begin your discussion.'

Socrates/ 'I imagine, that if our rulers are worthy of the name, and if their auxiliaries are the same, that the latter will be willing to carry out their orders, and the former in giving their orders will themselves obey the laws, or where we leave them discretion, will be faithful to their spirit.'

Glaucon/ 'Naturally.'

Socrates/ 'Then you, the lawgiver, as you have selected the men, will select the women, choosing as far as possible those of a similar nature, and place them together. Both sexes will live together, with common houses and common meals, no one possessing any private property; and associating with one another in the gymnasia and in the rest of their daily life, they will be led, I imagine, by an inherent necessity to form alliances. Do you not think that this will be inevitable?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes. not by geometric but by lovers' necessity, which, perhaps, is stronger than the other in its power to persuade and constrain the mass of men.'

Socrates/ 'You are right. But next, Glaucon, promiscuous unions or anything of that kind would be a profanation in a state of happy citizens, and the guardians will not allow it.'

Glaucon/ 'No, it would not be just.'

Socrates/ 'Then clearly we shall next see to making the marriages as sacred as possible, and this sanctity will attach to those which are most advantageous.'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'How then will they be most advantageous? Tell me this, Glaucon. I see that you have in your house hunting dogs and a great many game birds. Tell me, I conjure you, have you paid any attention to their unions and breeding?'

Glaucon/ 'In what respect?'

Socrates/ 'Firstly, though they are all well-bred, are there not some which are, or prove themselves to be, the best?'

Glaucon/ 'There are.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you breed from all alike, or are you anxious to breed as far as possible from the best of them?'

Glaucon/ 'From the best of them.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you breed from those that are very young or very old, or as far as possible from those that are in their prime?'

Glaucon/ 'From those in their prime.'

Socrates/ 'And if you did not breed in this way, are you of opinion that the stock of birds and dogs would greatly deteriorate?'

Glaucon/ 'I am.'

Socrates/ 'What is your opinion in regard to horses and other living creatures? Would it be different with them?'

Glaucon/ 'The idea is absurd.'

Socrates/ 'Good heavens, my dear friend, what surpassing excellence we need in our rulers, if the same principles apply to the human race!'

Glaucon/ 'They certainly do. What then?'

Socrates/ 'Because, they will have to administer a great deal of medicine. You know that for cases where medicine is not needed, and the constitution will respond to a diet, we think a quite ordinary doctor good enough; but when medicine has to be administered, we know that a much more courageous doctor is needed.'

Glaucon/ 'True. But what is your point?'

Socrates/ 'This. It seems that our rulers will have to administer a great quantity of falsehood and deceit for the benefit of the ruled. For we said, if you remember, that all such practices were useful in the form of medicine.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, and we were right.'

Socrates/ 'And the rightness of it seems to find special application in marriages and the begetting of children.'

Glaucon/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'From our admissions, it follows that the best of both sexes ought to be brought together as often as possible, the worst as seldom as possible, and that we should rear the offspring of the first, but not the offspring of the second, if our herd is to reach the highest perfection, and all these arrangements must be secret from all save the rulers if the herd of guardians is to be as free as possible from dissension.'

Glaucon/ 'You are perfectly right.'

Socrates/ 'We must then have statutory festivals, at which we shall bring together the brides and bridegrooms. There should be accompanying sacrifices, and our poets must compose strains in honor of the marriages which take

place. But the number of marriages we shall place under the control of the rulers, that they may as far as possible keep the population at the same level, having regard to wars and disease and all such ravages, and also taking care to the best of their power that our city become neither great nor small.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'They must invent, I fancy, some ingenious system of lots, so that those less worthy persons who are rejected when the couples are brought together may on each occasion blame their luck, and not the rulers.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And surely to our young men who acquit themselves well in war or other duties we may give, along with other rewards and prizes, a more unrestricted right of cohabitation in order that there may be a colorable excuse for such fathers having as many children as possible.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then the children as they are born will be taken in charge by the officers appointed for the purpose, whether these are men or women, or both. For of course offices also are common to men and women.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'The children of good parents, I suppose, they will put into the rearing pen, handing them over to nurses who will live apart in a particular portion of the city; but the children of inferior parents and all defective children that are born to the others they will put out of sight in secrecy and mystery, as is befitting.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, they must, if the race of guardians is to be pure.'

Socrates/ 'And will not these officers also superintend the rearing of the children, bringing the mothers to the nursery

when their breasts are full, and taking every precaution to prevent any woman knowing her own child, and providing wet-nurses if the mothers are not enough; and will they not take care that the mothers do not give too much time to suckling the children, and assign night watches and all troublesome duties to nurses and attendants?'

Glaucon/ 'As you describe it, child-bearing will be a very easy matter for the wives of the guardians.

Socrates/ 'So it ought to be. Let us now discuss the next point in our proposals. We said that children must be born from parents in their prime.

Glaucon/ 'True.

Socrates/ 'Then do you agree with me that on an average a woman is in her prime for twenty years, and a man for thirty?

Glaucon/ 'Which twenty, and which thirty?

Socrates/ 'For a woman, the proper time is to begin at twenty years and bear children for the city until she is forty; for a man the proper time to begin is when he has seen "the swiftest prime of his running go by, and to beget children far the state until fifty-five.

Glaucon/ 'Yes, in both cases that is the period of their prime both in body and mind.

Socrates/ 'Therefore if a man above or below these ages meddles with the begetting of children for the commonwealth, we shall declare this to be a transgression both impious and unjust; he is raising up a son for the state who, though his birth be secret, will not be born the child of the sacrifices and prayers which the priests and priestesses and the whole city will offer, when on each occasion of marriage they pray that the children may be ever better and more useful than their good and useful parents; but he will be born in darkness, the child of dire incontinence.

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'And the same law will apply, if a man who is still of an age to be a father meddles with a woman of marriageable age when the ruler has not joined them. We shall say that he is giving to the city a child that is a bastard, unauthorized and unholy.

Glaucon/ 'You are perfectly right.'

Socrates/ 'Then I fancy that when the men and women have passed the age of having children we shall, of course, leave them at liberty to associate with whomsoever they please; except that a man must not associate with his daughter or his mother, or his granddaughter or grandmother; and the women we shall allow to associate with anyone but a son or a father, or grandson or grandfather; and all this only after we have exhorted them to be very careful that no child, if one should be so conceived, should see the light; but if one should by any chance force its way to the light, they must dispose of it on the understanding that such an offspring is not to be reared.'

Glaucon/ 'These are certainly reasonable proposals. But how will they distinguish one another's fathers and daughters, and the relations you have just mentioned?'

Socrates/ 'They will not do so. But all the children that are born in the tenth month, and also in the seventh, after a man's bridal day, will be called by him, if male his sons, and if female his daughters, and they will call him father, and similarly he will call the offspring of his generation grandchildren, and they again will call him and his fellow-bridegrooms and brides grandfathers and grandmothers; and, lastly, those born in the time when their fathers and mothers were having children will be called brothers and sisters, so that in accordance with what we said a moment ago, they will not associate with one another; but the law

may allow the union of brothers and sisters if the lot falls in that way, and the priestess of Apollo approves.'

Glaucon/ 'Quite right.'

Socrates/ 'Such, then, Glaucon, is the community of wives and children for the guardians of your city. Its consistency with the rest of the constitution and its pre-eminent desirability we must go on to establish from the argument. Do you agree?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, by all means.'

Socrates/ 'Then is not the first step in our search agreement that we should ask ourselves what is the greatest good that we can mention for the equipment of our city, at which the lawgiver must aim in his legislation, and what the greatest evil; and then we may inquire whether the institutions we have described fit into our outline of the good and are contrary to our outline of the evil?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Can we mention any greater evil to a city than that which rends it asunder and makes it not one city but many? or any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?'

Glaucon/ 'We cannot.'

Socrates/ 'Then does not communion in pleasure and pain bind the city together, when, as far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike over the same births and the same deaths?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'On the other hand, is not individuality in these feelings a dissolving force, when one part of the citizens are smitten with grief and the other transported with joy over the same experiences of the city or its inhabitants?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And does not this state of things result when such words as "mine" and "not mine," "another's" and "not another's," are not pronounced in the city in concert?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, indeed.'

Socrates/ 'Then that city is best governed, whichever it may be, in which the largest number of men agree in applying these words, "mine" or "not mine," to the same thing?'

Glaucon/ 'Very much so.'

Socrates/ 'And is it not this that is nearest the condition of a single individual? For consider, when anyone of us hurts his finger, the whole fellowship of body and soul which is bound into a single organization, namely, that of the ruling power within it, feels the hurt, and is all in pain at once, whole and hurt part together. And so we say that the man has a pain in his finger. And in regard to any part of the human body whatever, may not the same account be given of the pain felt when a part is hurt, and of the pleasure felt when it is at ease?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes. And to return to your question, the life of the best governed city comes very near to this condition.'

Socrates/ 'Then I fancy that when an individual citizen has any experience, whether good or bad, such a city will most certainly declare that experience its own, and the whole city will share his joy or his sorrow.'

Glaucon/ 'That must certainly be the case if the city has good laws.'

Socrates/ 'It will now be time for us, to return to our own city and examine whether in it we shall find the conclusions of our argument most strikingly realized, or whether in this point some other city surpasses it."

Glaucon/ 'Yes, we must do so.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, ill this city, as in the rest, there are rulers and people, are there not?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And do not these all call each other citizens?

Glaucon/ 'Surely.

Socrates/ 'But in other cities, what do the people call the rulers besides citizens?

Glaucon/ 'In many cities they call them masters, but in democratic cities simply rulers.

Socrates/ 'What of the people in our city? What do they call the rulers besides citizens?

Glaucon/ 'Saviors and helpers.'

Socrates/ 'And what do these call the people?

Glaucon/ 'Wage payers and supporters.

Socrates/ 'But what do the rulers in other cities call the people?

Glaucon/ 'Slaves.'

Socrates/ 'And what do the rulers call each other?

Glaucon/ 'Fellow-rulers.'

Socrates/ 'And in our city?

Glaucon/ 'Fellow-guardians.

Socrates/ 'Then can we say of a rule, in other cities that he may address one of his fellow-rulers as a kinsman and another as a stranger?

Glaucon/ 'Yes, many might.

Socrates/ 'Then does he not think and speak of the kinsman as belonging to him, and of the stranger as not belonging?

Glaucon/ 'Yes.

Socrates/ 'But what of your guardians? Could any of them think of or address one of his fellow-guardians as a stranger?

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not, for in everyone he meets he will think he has a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter, or grandchild or grandparent.

Socrates/ 'Excellent. But answer me this also. Will your law prescribe for them only names of kinship, or must all their actions be in accordance with these names? In their behavior towards their fathers must they not observe all that the law prescribes for this relation—reverence, filial care, and the proper obedience to parents—or else suffer at the hands of God and man? For he who acts otherwise profanes heaven and wrongs man. Will not those sayings be sung by all the citizens, and sound in their ears from their earliest childhood with reference to those who are pointed out to them as fathers and other relatives?'

Glaucon/ 'They will. It would be ridiculous if with their lips alone they uttered the names whilst they neglected the acts of friendship.'

Socrates/ 'Then in this city above all others, when anyone meets with good fortune or with bad they will join in uttering the words of which I have just spoken, saying "It is well with mine" or "It is ill with mine."'

Glaucon/ 'Very true.'

Socrates/ 'Did we not say that upon this belief and its expression followed a community in pleasures and pains?'

Glaucon/ 'We did, and we were right.'

Socrates/ 'Then will not our citizens most truly have community in the same thing, that to which they will apply the name "mine," and having such community, will they not most truly have community of pleasure and pain?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And besides the general arrangements of the state, is not the guardians' community of wives and children a cause of this?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly it is.'

Socrates/ 'But you remember that when we likened a well-established city to the relation of a body and its members in its feelings of pleasure and pain, we agreed that this was the greatest good that could come to it.'

Glaucon/ 'And we were right.'

Socrates/ 'Then we have proved the auxiliaries' community of wives and children to be a cause of the greatest good that a city can have?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly we have.'

Socrates/ 'Then in this we are also consistent with our former remarks. For we said, did we not, that if they were to be guardians in reality they must not have houses or land or any other possession of their own, but must receive what they need for sustenance from the other citizens as wages for their guardianship, and lay it out in common?

Glaucon/ 'We were right.'

Socrates/ 'Then am I correct in saying that these regulations, together with our former statements, will do still more to make them true guardians, and prevent the disruption of the city which would result if each man gave the name of "mine" not to the same but to different things; if all took what they could get for themselves, and dragged it off to their different private houses; if each called a different wife and different children his own, and thus implanted in the city the individual pleasures and griefs of individuals: rather they will have one single belief concerning what is their own and be all concerned in the same purpose, and so will all be, as far as is possible, simultaneously affected by pleasure and pain?'

Glaucon/ 'That is perfectly true.'

Socrates/ 'Further, will not lawsuits and prosecutions almost have disappeared if their own persons are their only private property and everything else is common? Will they not, therefore, be free from all those quarrels that arise among men from the possession of money, or children, or kinsmen?'

Glaucon/ 'It is quite inevitable that they should.'

Socrates/ 'Further, no actions for forcible seizure or for assault will rightly arise among them; for we shall declare, I suppose, that it is honorable and just for equals to defend themselves against equals, so compelling them to keep themselves in condition.'

Glaucon/ 'That is right.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, and here is a further reason why this law is right. When any man is angry with another, if he may vent his anger in this way he is less likely to make a serious quarrel of it.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Further, we shall authorize the elder to rule over and chastise all the younger.'

Glaucon/ 'Clearly.'

Socrates/ 'Also a younger man will never dare to strike or in any other way do violence to an older unless at the command of the guardians. That we may reasonably expect. And I fancy that he will not do him dishonor in any other way. For two guardians will be strong enough to prevent him—fear and shame—the shame that forbids him to lay hands on his parents, and the fear that the others will come to the rescue of the injured man, whose sons and brothers and fathers they are.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that will be the result.'

Socrates/ 'Then in every way our laws will make these men dwell at peace with one another?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, to a large extent.'

Socrates/ 'Then if they are free from dissension, there is no fear of the rest of the city quarrelling either with them or with one another?'

Glaucon/ 'No, certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'I am almost ashamed to go on and mention the petty evils which they will escape. The poor will no longer need to flatter the rich; they will be free from all the perplexities and worries of bringing up children and making an income which are entailed in the upkeep of a household—the borrowing and repudiation, the scraping together of money to give to their wives and servants to manage for them. The nature and extent of men's sufferings over these matters are obvious, and ignoble too, not deserving mention.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, they are obvious even to the blind.'

Socrates/ 'Then they will be rid of all those troubles, and their life will be more blessed than the blissful life of Olympian victors.'

Glaucon/ 'How?

Socrates/ 'Well, the happiness of Olympian victors consists in but a Small portion of the blessings of our guardians. For the guardians victory is nobler and their public maintenance more complete. For the victory they win is the salvation of the whole city, and sustenance and all that life requires is the crown given to them and to their children. Their own city gives them privileges in their lifetime, and after death a fitting burial.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, these are noble gifts.'

Socrates/ 'But do you remember, that a little while ago we were troubled by someone's objecting that we were not making our guardians happy, who with power to have all the wealth of the citizens had actually nothing? We replied, did we not, that we should examine this question later if it came in our way, but that at the moment we were making our guardians real guardians and making the city as happy as we could, not confining ourselves to one class in the city and making that happy?'

Glaucon/ 'I remember.'

Socrates/ 'Then, since the life of the auxiliaries is seen to be far nobler and better than that of Olympian victors, can we possibly think it on a level with the life of shoemakers or any other craftsmen, or with the life of farmers?'

Glaucon/ 'I think not.'

Socrates/ 'No, but we may justly say now, what I said then, that if our guardians try to be happy in such a way that they cease to be guardians, if they will not be satisfied with a life so moderate and secure, a life which, as we say, is the best, if an insensate and childish notion about happiness possesses their souls and impels them, because of the power they possess, to make everything in the city their own, then they will know how truly wise Hesiod was when he said "the half is greater than the whole."

Glaucon/ 'Yes, if they take my advice they will remain true to the life we have described.

Socrates/ 'Then do you agree, to this community of women with men in education, in the care of the children and guardianship of the other citizens, and that they must both remain in the city and go out to war, guard and hunt with the men like dogs, and as far as possible take their full share in everything, and that by so doing their actions will

be most desirable and not contrary to the natural relations of male and female or their natural community?'

Glaucon/ 'I agree.'

Socrates/ 'Then, have we now only left for consideration whether the establishment of this community is as possible among men as it is among other living creatures, and in what way it is possible?'

Glaucon/ 'That is the question with which I was going to interrupt you. You have forestalled me.'

Socrates/ 'We need not speak about war, for it is obvious, I fancy, what will be the manner of their wars.'

Glaucon/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'Both sexes will go to war together, and will take with them such of the children as are strong enough, that, like the children of other craftsmen, they may have a sight of what they will have to do when they are grown up. Besides looking on, they will have to give the general help and service required in war, and assist their fathers and mothers. Have you not noticed this in the various crafts, that the children of potters, for example, have to spend a long time in looking on and helping before they start making pots?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And ought they to be more careful in training their children in experience of, and acquaintance with, their duties than are the guardians?'

Glaucon/ 'No, that would be ridiculous.'

Socrates/ 'And, besides, every creature fights more bravely in the presence of its offspring?'

Glaucon/ 'That is so. But, Socrates, there will be considerable danger in the case of those defeats which are common in war, that both they and their children will fall, and the rest of the city be unable to recover.'

Socrates/ 'That is true. But, in the first place, do you think that we should always try to avoid the possibilities of danger?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then if we must have danger, had we not better have it when success will mean improvement?'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'But do you think it unimportant whether the men who are to be warriors should, or should not, see warfare when they are children, and not worth some risk?'

Glaucon/ 'No, it certainly is important for the purpose you mention.'

Socrates/ 'We must arrange, then, that the children should see war, and contrive that they shall do so safely. In that way all will be right, will it not?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Well, in the first place, will not their fathers know and understand, as far as men may, which expeditions are dangerous, and which are not?'

Glaucon/ 'That is probable.'

Socrates/ 'And they will take the children to the latter, but be careful not to take them to the former kind?'

Glaucon/ 'Rightly so.'

Socrates/ 'And, no doubt, they will set rulers over them, and those not the meanest of the citizens; men of experience and mature age shall be their guides and tutors?'

Glaucon/ 'That is only proper.'

Socrates/ 'Still we may object that many things fall out quite contrary to expectation.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then in view of such contingencies, my friend, our children must from the first be given wings, in order that, in case of necessity, they may fly away and escape.'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'We must set them on horseback, in their earliest years, and when we have had them taught to ride, must take them to view the fighting mounted not on spirited chargers, but on the fleetest and most docile horses we can find. For in this way they will get the best view of the work for which they are destined, and, in case of necessity, will most securely make their escape, following in the train of their grown-up tutors,'

Glaucon/ 'I think you are right.'

Socrates/ 'To come now to war regulations, how should you have your soldiers disposed to one another and to their enemies? Am I right in my ideas?'

Glaucon/ 'Tell me what they are.'

Socrates/ 'If any of them deserts his rank, throws away his arms, or does any cowardly action of that sort, must he not be degraded to a craftsman or a farmer?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And him who is taken alive by the enemy, shall we not present to his captors to use their catch as they please?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But when a man has done bravely and distinguished himself, do you not think that, in the first place, he ought to be crowned on the field by each in turn of the youths and children who are serving with -he army?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly I do.'

Socrates/ 'And shaken by the hand.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that also.'

Socrates/ 'But I fancy that in this you will no longer agree with me.'

Glaucon/ 'In what?'

Socrates/ 'In the suggestion that he should kiss and be kissed by each in turn.'

Glaucon/ 'I am for that, most strongly of everything. And I make this addition to the law, that, as long as the campaign lasts, no one whom he wishes to kiss may say him nay, in order that if any soldier be in love, whether with male or female, he may be more eager to carry off the prize of velour.'

Socrates/ 'Excellent. And we have already mentioned that there are more marriages arranged for a brave man than for the others, and more frequent selections of such men than of the others, in order that as many children as possible may be obtained from such a father.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, we have.'

Socrates/ 'For that matter, we have it on Homer's authority that it is just to honor brave youths in this way. For Homer says that Ajax when he had distinguished himself in battle received as a reward "whole chines of beef," implying that this was a proper way of honoring a brave man in the prime of his manhood, a reward which was a mark of honor, and at the same time would increase his physical strength.'

Glaucon/ 'You are perfectly right.'

Socrates/ 'Then on this point we shall follow Homer. At sacrifices, and on all similar occasions, we shall honor the brave according to their degree of merit, not only with hymns and the rewards we have just mentioned, but also with "special seat and special meat and fuller goblets," that we may while honoring our brave men and women, also discipline them.'

Glaucon/ 'Your remarks are excellent.'

Socrates/ 'Good. And when men are killed in a campaign, shall we not say, in the first place, that he who has made a glorious end belongs to the golden race?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly we shall.'

Socrates/ 'And on the death of men of this race shall we not say with Hesiod that

> As holy spirits they dwell on earth and guard
> Humanity, kind warders off of evil?

Glaucon/ 'Yes, we shall.'

Socrates/ 'And shall we not inquire of the god how to order the sepulture of sacred and divine persons, and with what special ceremonies, and bury them with the rites the god advises?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely we shall.'

Socrates/ 'And for all time to come shall we not render service and worship at their tombs, as at the tombs of demigods? And shall we ordain the same rites for any of those who have been judged of surpassing excellence of life when they die of old age, or from any other cause?'

Glaucon/ 'That is but just.'

Socrates/ 'Further, how will our soldiers deal with their enemies?'

Glaucon/ 'To what does your question refer?'

Socrates/ 'Well, in the first place, take the practice of enslavement. Do you think it just that Greek cities should enslave Greeks? or should they make it their rule, and enforce the same in other cities, to spare all of the Greek race, fearing their own enslavement by the barbarians?'

Glaucon/ 'That is beyond all comparison the better course.'

Socrates/ 'And do you agree that they must not hold Greeks in slavery, and must advise the rest of Greece to follow their example?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly. Their energies would thus be directed more against the barbarians and less against their countrymen.'

Socrates/ 'Further, is it well after victory to strip the slain of anything except their arms? Does not this give cowards a pretext for keeping out of the fighting line on the excuse that, when they are stooping over the dead, they are engaged in necessary work; and have not many armies been lost by this practice of spoiling?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Do you not think it mean and avaricious to spoil a dead body, and the sign of a small feminine mind, when your foe is dead and flown away, leaving only that with which he has fought, to think that his body is your enemy? Are men who do so any better, in your opinion, than dogs who worry the stones that are thrown at them and do not touch him who throws them?'

Glaucon/ 'Not a bit better.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must let alone the spoiling of the dead or prevention of the removal of the fallen?

Glaucon/ 'Yes, assuredly we must let that well alone.'

Socrates/ 'Nor, of course, must we carry the arms to the temples to dedicate them there—certainly not the arms of Greeks, if we have any thought for the goodwill of the rest of Greece. Rather we shall be afraid of polluting the temples by bringing to them the spoils of our kinsmen, unless, indeed, the god instructs us otherwise.'

Glaucon/ 'That is very right.'

Socrates/ 'Consider now the practices of ravaging Greek territory or burning homesteads. What attitude will your soldiers adopt to those practices in warfare?'

Glaucon/ 'I should like to hear your opinion on the subject.'

Socrates/ 'I think, that they would refrain from both these practices, and would be content with taking the yearly harvest. Shall I give you my reasons?'

Glaucon/ 'Please do.'

Socrates/ 'It appears to me that war and sedition, as they are two in name, are also two in reality. For the words are applied to differences arising in two things—namely, in what is akin or related, and what is foreign or alien. Sedition is the name given to the enmity of what is akin; war that given to the enmity of what is alien.'

Glaucon/ 'That is a very just mode of speaking.'

Socrates/ 'Then see if this is also justly spoken. I declare the Greek race to be akin and related to themselves, but foreign and alien to the barbarians.'

Glaucon/ 'And you say well.'

Socrates/ 'Then when Greeks and barbarians fight, we shall say that they are natural enemies, warring against one another, and this enmity is to be called war; but when Greeks fight with Greeks, we shall declare that naturally they are friends, and that when anything of this kind occurs, Greece is sick and attacked by sedition, and this kind of enmity is to be called sedition.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, I agree to view the matter in this way.'

Socrates/ 'Now observe, what happens in the case of what is ordinarily called sedition. When anything of this kind occurs and a city is divided against itself, if one faction ravages the territory or burns the homesteads of the other,

the sedition is thought to be sinful, and both parties are looked upon as unpatriotic. If they were not they would never have dared to mangle the land which is their nurse and mother. But it is considered reasonable that the victors should carry off the crops from their adversaries, but that they should feel that they are not always going to be at war, but will someday be reconciled.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, this feeling betokens a far more civilized condition than the other.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, will not the city of which you are founder be Greek?'

Glaucon/ 'It must be.'

Socrates/ 'Then its citizens will be good and civilized?'

Glaucon/ 'Very much so.'

Socrates/ 'And patriotic Greeks, too, will they not, who will consider all Greece as their own country, and share in the common festivals with the rest of Greece?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then will they consider a difference with Greeks to be a difference with kinsmen, and therefore sedition? They will certainly not call it a war.'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'And will they not prosecute their quarrel in the hope of being eventually reconciled?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'They will therefore correct them in a friendly spirit, and chastise them without any intention of enslaving or destroying them, since they are their correctors, not their enemies?'

Glaucon/ Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then none who are Greeks will ravage Greece or burn homesteads. They will never consider all the

inhabitants of a city, men, women, and children, to be their foes, but only those few who are responsible for the quarrel. And for all those reasons, since the majority in any city are their friends, they will not consent to ravage their land or destroy their houses. They will prosecute their quarrel only until the guilty parties are compelled by the sufferings of the innocent to give satisfaction for their offence.'

Glaucon/ 'I agree, that our citizens should adopt this behavior towards their opponents, and they should believe to barbarians as Greeks now behave to one another.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we prescribe this law to the guardians, that they must neither ravage territory nor burn homesteads?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, we will; and we will assume that this and the former enactments are excellent. But really, Socrates, if we allow you to go on in this way, I think you will never come to the question which you postponed some time ago before you entered on all these topics—the question whether this constitution is realizable, and if so, in what way it could ever come into being. For, as far as your contention is concerned—that if it could, nothing but advantage would result to the city where it was found—I not only agree with you, but can offer some additional arguments which you omit. They would fight most valiantly against their enemies, as they would be very unlikely to desert one another, acknowledging each other as brothers, fathers, or sons, and calling each other by these names. And if their womankind fought with them—whether in the same ranks or posted behind as a reserve to strike terror into their enemies, and to give assistance wherever it might be wanted—then I know that they would be absolutely invincible. Also, I see all the advantages which they would enjoy at home, which you have omitted. Now, since I acknowledge that they would have all those advantages, and thousands more, were this

constitution realized, you need not go on describing it in fuller detail, but let us now try to persuade ourselves on this point: Is the city realizable? If so, how? And we may leave the other question alone.

Socrates/ 'What a sudden attack you have made upon my argument, and what little mercy you have on my hesitation! Perhaps you are not aware that, after I have just managed to escape those two waves, you are bringing down on me the greatest and the most formidable of the three. When you see and hear what it is, you will certainly forgive me for my natural hesitation and my fear of stating or trying to inquire into an argument so paradoxical.'

Glaucon/ 'The more you talk like that, the less we shall excuse you from stating how this constitution can be realized. So begin without delay.'

Socrates/ 'Well, first of all, we must remember that it is a search after the nature of justice that has brought us to this point.'

Glaucon/ 'We must. What about it?'

Socrates/ 'Nothing. Only if we discover what justice is like, shall we expect that the just man must in no way differ from this conception, but be in every respect the same as justice is? or shall we be content if he comes very close to it, and partakes of it more than anyone else?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, we shall be content with that.'

Socrates/ 'It was in order to have a standard, that we were inquiring what justice itself is like, and what the perfectly just man would be like, if he should come into existence, and were inquiring similarly as to injustice and the perfectly unjust man. We wanted to be able to see how those two men appeared to us to enjoy happiness or its opposite, so that we might be compelled to acknowledge concerning ourselves that he who resembles them most closely will also have a lot

most closely resembling theirs. We had no desire to prove that these standards could be realized.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that is true.'

Socrates/ 'Now, do you think any les well of an artist who has painted a pattern of what the most beautiful man would be like, with everything correct in the composition, because he cannot prove that such a man might possibly exist?'

Glaucon/ 'No, certainly I do not.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, were not we two fashioning in argument a pattern of a good city?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you think any less of our words because we cannot prove that it is possible to found a city of the manner we have described?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely not.'

Socrates/ 'That is the truth of the matter. But if to please you I must exert myself and show in what especial way and under what conditions it can be most nearly realized, you must make me these same admissions with a view to this demonstration.'

Glaucon/ 'What admissions?'

Socrates/ 'Can anything be done as it is spoken, or is it nature that action should lay less hold of truth than speech, though not everyone thinks so? Do you agree or not?'

Glaucon/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Then in that case do not compel me to show that what we have decided in our argument could in all respects be reproduced in experience. If we manage to discover how a city could be organized in any close correspondence to our description, then you must allow that we have discovered that your commands could be realized. Will you not be content with that? I certainly should be.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, I will.'

Socrates/ 'Then, next, apparently we must try to discover and demonstrate what evil practice in the cities of to-day prevents them from being organized in this way, and what is the smallest change by which a city might arrive at this manner of constitution. We shall hope confine ourselves to a single change, or, if that is impossible, to two, or if that will not suffice, to changes as few in number, and small in their effect, as is possible.'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Well, there is one change, which I think we could prove would bring about the revolution. It is certainly neither a small nor an easy change, but it is possible.

Glaucon/ 'What is it?'

Socrates/ 'Now, I am at the very topic which we likened to the greatest wave. Spoken,, however, it shall be, even though it is likely to deluge me with laughter and ridicule, like a wave breaking in merriment. Consider then what I am about to say.'

Glaucon/ 'Say on.'

Socrates/ 'Unless, philosophers bear kingly rule in cities, or those who are now called kings and princes become genuine and adequate philosophers, and political power and philosophy are brought together, and unless the numerous natures who at present pursue either politics or philosophy, the one to the exclusion of the other, are forcibly debarred from this behavior, there will be no respite from evil, my dear Glaucon, for cities, nor, I fancy, for humanity; nor will this constitution, which we have just described in our argument, come to that realization which is possible for it and see the light of day. It is this which has for so long made me hesitate to speak. I saw how paradoxical it would sound. For it is

given to few to perceive that no other constitution could ever bring happiness either to states or individuals.'

Glaucon/ 'After venturing on a statement like that, Socrates, you may expect that many most redoubtable assailants will wait for no more, but will pull off their coats and, snatching the first weapon that comes to hand, rush at you in tremendous eagerness, ready to do all kinds of extraordinary deeds. Unless you can keep them off by your argument and escape them, you will learn to your cost what flouting means.'

Socrates/ 'Have you not brought all this upon me?'

Glaucon/ 'I have, and I was right to do so. Still I shall not betray you, but defend you by what means I can. I can give you sympathy and encouragement, and perhaps answer you a little more carefully than another might. That is the sort of assistance you will get, so you must endeavor on those terms to prove to the skeptics that what you say is true.'

Socrates/ 'I must, especially when you offer me such a valuable alliance. Now I think that if we are in any way to escape the opponents you mention, it is essential that we should define to them what we mean by "philosophers" when we venture to say that they ought to rule, because, when the distinction is made, a defense will be possible if it is shown that some persons are by nature fitted to embrace philosophy and take the lead in a city, while the others are not fitted to embrace it, but only to follow their leader.'

Glaucon/ 'Definition would be opportune.'

Socrates/ 'Come, then, follow after me in the hope that in some way or other we may expound our notion satisfactorily.'

Glaucon/ 'Lead on.'

Socrates/ 'Must I remind you, or do you remember that if we say that a man is a lover of anything, if the expression is

rightly used, it must be shown, not that he loves one part of it and not another, but that he cares for the whole of it?'

Glaucon/ 'I need to be reminded apparently, for I do not exactly remember.'

Socrates/ 'Now, Glaucon, you are the last person who should say that. An amorous man ought not to forget that a boy-loving amorous person is in some way or other stirred and attracted by all who are in their bloom. He thinks they all deserve his attention and caresses. Is not that the way of you gentlemen with the fair? A snub-nosed boy you praise and call charming, another's hooked beak you call kingly, a third, who is between the two extremes, you describe as beautifully proportioned; dark boys are manly to look upon, fair are the children of the gods. Where do you think the name of "honey-pale" comes from, if not from the excuses of a lover who could put up with paleness when he found it in the cheek of youth? In a word, you make every kind of excuse and invent every conceivable name sooner than reject any that are in the flower and bloom of life.'

Glaucon/ 'You choose to cite me as an example of how amorous persons behave. but I agree for the argument's sake.'

Socrates/ 'Further, do you not observe lovers of wine behaving in the same way, gladly accepting any wine on any excuse?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And you find the same, I imagine, in lovers of honor or ambitious men. If they can't be generals, they are glad to be subalterns. If they cannot win the honor of the great and good, they are content to be honored by the mean and contemptible, since they have an indiscriminate appetite for honor.'

Glaucon/ 'That is perfectly true.'

Socrates/ 'Then is this true, or not? If we say that a man has an appetite for anything, shall we assert that he has an appetite for the whole class that the term includes, not for one part of it to the exclusion of another?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, for the whole class.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we not also say that the lover of wisdom or the philosopher has an appetite for wisdom, not for some to the exclusion of other wisdom, but for all?'

Glaucon/ ' True.'

Socrates/ 'Then the man who grumbles at his lessons, especially when he is young and cannot yet distinguish between what is profitable and what is not, we shall not call fond of learning or a philosopher, any more than we say that a man who is nice about his food is hungry or has an appetite for food; him we call, not a lover of food, but a bad feeder.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, and we shall be right.'

Socrates/ 'But the man who tastes eagerly every kind of learning, who sets himself readily to his lessons and can never have enough, him we shall justly call a lover of wisdom and a philosopher, shall we not?'

Glaucon/ 'Of such people you will have many and strange examples. For all lovers of sights seem to me to be included because of their joy in learning; and lovers of sounds, too, are the most astonishing people to class as philosophers. They would not willingly attend philosophic discussions or any such occasions, but as though they had hired out their ears to listen to any and every chorus they run about at the Dionysia, not missing a single performance in town or country. Shall we give the name of philosophers to all these, and to others who have a similar taste for learning, and to the masters of the petty crafts?

Socrates/ 'By no means. We shall say that they are counterfeit philosophers.'

Glaucon/ 'Then whom do you mean by the term true philosophers?'

Socrates/ 'Those, who love to see the truth.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that is certainly right. But what do you mean by that?'

Socrates/ 'It is not easy to explain to anyone else, but I fancy that you will agree with me in this.'

Glaucon/ 'In what?'

Socrates/ Since beautiful is opposite to ugly, these are two.'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then since they are two, each is one?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And the same holds of just and unjust, good and bad, and all forms. Each in itself is one, but by reason of their community with actions and bodies, and with each other, they appear everywhere, and each seems many.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'In this way, then, I make my distinction. On one side put those we have just mentioned, lovers of sights and lovers of crafts and men of action, and then on the other those with whom the argument is concerned, who alone are rightly called philosophers.'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'Well, the lovers of sounds and of sights admire beautiful sounds and colors and figures and all things fashioned out of such, but their understanding is incapable of seeing or admiring the nature of real beauty.'

Glaucon/ 'That is certainly the case.'

Socrates/ 'Then will not those who are capable of approaching the real beauty, and of seeing it as itself, be few in number?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, indeed.'

Socrates/ 'But if a man recognizes that there are beautiful things, but disbelieves in real beauty, and cannot follow should another lead him to the knowledge of it, do you think that such an one leads a waking or a dreaming life? For, consider, is not a man dreaming, whether he is asleep or awake, when he thinks a likeness of anything to be not a likeness, but the reality which it resembles?'

Glaucon/ 'I certainly, should say that such a man was dreaming.'

Socrates/ 'But what of him who, contrariwise, recognizes a certain real beauty, and is able to discern both it and the objects which participate in it, and does not take the participating objects for it or it for them, do you think he leads a waking or a dreaming life?'

Glaucon/ 'A waking life, most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then may we not justly say that his understanding is knowledge because he knows, while the other's is belief because he only believes?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then what shall we do if this person is angry with us because we say that he believes but does not know and if he disputes the truth of our statement? Shall we be able to appease him and gently persuade him, without letting him know that he is barely sane?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, we must.'

Socrates/ 'Come, then, consider what we shall say to him. Shall we make inquiries of him in this way, and say that we do not grudge any knowledge he may have, but shall be very

glad to see that he knows something? “But tell me this,” we shall say, “does he that knows, know something or nothing?” Do you answer me for him.’

Glaucon/ ‘I shall answer, that he knows something.’

Socrates/ ‘Something which is, or something which is not?’

Glaucon/ ‘Something which is. For how could that which is not be known?’

Socrates/ ‘Then are we sure of this, in however many ways we look at it, that what is completely, is completely knowable, and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable?’

Glaucon/ ‘Perfectly sure.’

Socrates/ ‘Good. Then if there be something so constituted as both to be and not to be, will it not lie between what absolutely is and what in all ways is not?’

Glaucon/ ‘It will.’

Socrates/ Then knowledge is set over that which is, and ignorance of necessity over that which is not; and over this that is between, must we not now seek for something between ignorance and knowledge, if there is such a thing?’

Glaucon/ ‘Certainly.’

Socrates/ ‘But do we say that belief is anything?’

Glaucon/ ‘Surely.’

Socrates/ A power distinct from knowledge, or identical with it?’

Glaucon/ ‘Distinct.’

Socrates/ ‘Then belief is set over one thing and knowledge over another, each according to its own power?’

Glaucon/ ‘Yes.’

Socrates/ Then is it not the nature of knowledge, being set over that which is, to know how it is? But first, I think we had better make this distinction.'

Glaucon/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'We shall say that powers are a certain general class of existences, by means of which, indeed, we and every other thing can do what we can. Sight and hearing, for example, I call powers. Perhaps you understand what I have in mind.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, I understand.'

Socrates/ 'Then listen to my opinion about them. In a power I see no color or figure, or any such attributes as many other things have and in reference to which I distinguish them to myself as differing from one another. In a power I look only to that over which it is, and to what it effects, and on this principle I used the term power in each case; and any powers which are set over the same thing, and have the same effect, I call the same; if they are over different things and have different effects, I call them different. What is your practice? Do you do the same?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then come back to this point, my excellent friend. Do you call knowledge a power, or, if not, in what class do you place it?'

Glaucon/ 'It is a power, and the strongest of all powers.'

Socrates/ 'Further, shall we call belief a power, or place it in some other class?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not the latter. For that by which we are able to believe, is nothing else than belief.'

Socrates/ 'But a little time ago you admitted that knowledge and belief are not the same.'

Glaucon/ 'How could any sensible man identify the infallible with the fallible?'

Socrates/ 'Good. Then clearly we have agreed that belief is distinct from knowledge?'

Glaucon/ 'We have.'

Socrates/ 'Then each of them has by nature a distinct power over distinct things?'

Glaucon/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'But knowledge surely is set over that which is, to know how it is?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'While the part of belief, we assert, is to believe?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Does it believe the same thing as knowledge knows; and can what is known and what is believed be the same; or is that impossible?'

Glaucon/ 'Its impossibility follows from our admissions. If different powers are by nature set over different objects, and if belief and knowledge are both powers, each, as we assert, distinct from the other, it is incompatible with this that what is known and what is believed should be the same.'

Socrates/ 'Then if that which is, is known, what is believed will be something different from that which is?

Glaucon/ 'It will.'

Socrates/ 'Then will belief believe that which is not? Or is it impossible even to believe that which is not? Consider. Does not he who believes fix his belief on something? or is it possible to believe and yet to believe nothing?

Glaucon/ 'That is impossible.'

Socrates/ 'Then will he who believes, believe some one thing?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But that which is not, would be most accurately described not as one thing, but as nothing, would it not?

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then do we not necessarily assign ignorance to not being and knowledge to being?

Glaucon/ 'That is right.'

Socrates/ 'Then belief will believe neither being nor not being?

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'And neither ignorance nor knowledge can be belief?'

Glaucon/ 'Naturally not.'

Socrates/ 'Then is belief something beyond these, surpassing knowledge in certainty or ignorance in uncertainty?

Glaucon/ 'No.

Socrates/ 'Rather, 'do you think belief darker than knowledge and brighter than ignorance?

Glaucon/ 'Yes, very much so.'

Socrates/ 'Then does it lie within the limits of the two?

Glaucon/ 'Yes.

Socrates/ 'Then belief is between these two?

Glaucon/ 'Just so.

Socrates/ 'Then did we not say a little while ago that if we found anything which was and was not at the same time, it would lie between what absolutely is and what thoroughly is not, and that set over it would be neither knowledge nor ignorance, but that which was found to be between ignorance and knowledge?

Glaucon/ 'Yes, and we were right.

Socrates/ 'But have we not now found something between these two, which we call belief?'

Glaucon/ 'We have.'

Socrates/ 'Then apparently we have still left to find that which partakes of both being and not being and which could not rightly be described as either absolutely, and if we find it, we shall with justice be able to say that this is what is believed, so assigning extremes to extremes and mean to mean. Is not that the case?'

Glaucon/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'Then this having been established, I shall say, That worthy who thinks that there is no real beauty and no Form of real beauty eternal and invariable, but recognizes many beautifuls, let him speak and answer—this lover of sights who will let no one say that the beautiful, and the just, and so on are one. "Of all these many beautifuls, "O most excellent sir," we shall say, "is there any that will not appear ugly? or of the justs any that will not appear unjust? or of the holies any that will not appear unholy?"

Glaucon/ 'No, they must appear somehow both beautiful and ugly, just and unjust, and so on with them all.'

Socrates/ 'What of the many doubles? May they not appear halves just as much as doubles?'

Glaucon/ 'They may.'

Socrates/ 'And so with the things which we call great and small, and light and heavy, can one of those opposites be attributed to them any more than the other?'

Glaucon/ 'No, at any moment every one of them may have both attributed to it.'

Socrates/ 'Then is each of those many more really that which one may assert it to be than it is not?'

Glaucon/ 'This is like the puzzles one hears at dinner, and the children's riddle about the eunuch and his throw at the bat, where there is a catch about the eunuch and the bat, and what he threw at it, and what it was sitting on. For there is a puzzle here too, and none of the many can be fixedly conceived as either being or as not being, or as both being and not being, or as neither.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you know what to do with them, or have you any better place to put them than between being and not being? For they will not appear in greater darkness than that which is not, by exceeding it in not being, nor in greater light than that which is, by exceeding it in being.'

Glaucon/ 'Perfectly true.'

Socrates/ 'Then we have apparently discovered that the multitude's multitudinous formulae concerning the beautiful and so on tumble about somewhere between what is not and what absolutely is?'

Glaucon/ 'We have.'

Socrates/ 'But we agreed, if any such thing should be discovered, that we should have to call it the object of belief, not the object of knowledge, this shifting intermediate world being apprehended by the intermediate faculty.'

Glaucon/ 'We did.'

Socrates/ 'Then we shall say that those who look at many beautifuls, but do not see real beauty, and are unable to follow another's guidance to it, and who see many justs but not real justice, and so on, these throughout believe but know nothing of what they believe?'

Glaucon/ 'The conclusion is inevitable.'

Socrates/ 'But what are we to say of those who look at all the invariable unchanging realities? Do they not know rather than believe?'

Glaucon/ 'That conclusion too is inevitable.'

Socrates/ 'Then may we not also say that they will admire and love the objects of knowledge, while the others love the objects of belief? For do you not remember that we said that these loved and admired beautiful sounds and colors and the like, but real beauty they will not tolerate as being anything?'

Glaucon/ 'I remember.'

Socrates/ 'Then we shall not be wrong in calling them lovers of belief rather than lovers of wisdom or philosophers? Will they be very angry with us if we say that?'

Glaucon/ 'No, not if they take my advice. for it is not right to be angry at the truth.'

Socrates/ But shall we call those who admire in each case the reality that is, not lovers of belief, but philosophers?'

Glaucon/ 'Most assuredly.'

Book 6.

Socrates/ 'The philosophers and the non-philosophers, Glaucon. have gone through a somewhat lengthy argument, and have after some difficulty at last revealed their respective natures.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, in a short argument it would not perhaps have been easy.'

Socrates/ 'I think not, and I still think that it could be better set forth if we had only to speak on this one point and had not to discuss all the many remaining questions which are before us in our inquiry as to the difference between the just and the unjust life.'

Glaucon/ 'What, then, have we to discuss after this?'

Socrates/ 'What but what comes next in order? As those are philosophers who are able to grasp that which is always invariable and unchanging, while those are not who cannot do this but are all abroad among all sorts of aspects of many objects, which of these ought to be leaders of the city?

Glaucon/ 'What would be a reasonable answer to that question?'

Socrates/ We must make guardians whichever of the two appear able to guard the laws and institutions of the city.'

Glaucon/ 'Rightly so.'

Socrates/ 'But can there be any question whether a blind or a sharp-sighted watchman should guard a thing?'

Glaucon/ 'There cannot.'

Socrates/ 'Then are they any better than blind who are always and in every case without the knowledge of that which really is, who have no distinct pattern in their soul, and cannot look away, like painters, to the perfect truth, and contemplate the standard which they have yonder with the greatest care, before they prescribe the earthly notions

concerning things beautiful and just and good, when such prescription is necessary, and who cannot guard and preserve them when once prescribed?'

Glaucon/ 'No, assuredly they are not much better than blind.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we appoint them guardians rather than those who have come to know every reality, and who are at the same time no whit behind the others in experience or any other part of virtue?

Glaucon/ 'It would be ridiculous, to choose anyone else if they do not fall behind in other ways. For this very thing in which they excel is about the most important of all.

Socrates/ 'Then shall we discuss in what manner the same persons will be able to fulfill both requirements?

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.

Socrates/ 'That is, as we said at the beginning of this argument, we must first of all have a thorough knowledge of their nature, and I fancy that if we agree satisfactorily on that point, we shall agree also that the same persons may fulfill these requirements, and that they and they alone ought to be leaders of our city.

Glaucon/ 'In what way?

Socrates/ 'Concerning philosophic natures we may surely agree to this, that they are lovers of whatever learning will reveal to them anything of that reality which always is, and is not driven to and fro by generation and decay.

Glaucon/ 'We may.

Socrates/ 'And to this also, that they are lovers of all that reality, and willingly resign no part of it, whether great or small, esteemed or slighted, like the lovers of honor or the amorous whom we described a little while ago.

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Consider, now, whether those who are to be such as we described must have in their nature this further quality.

Glaucon/ 'What is that?

Socrates/ 'Truthfulness; that is, a determination never voluntarily to receive what is false, but to hate it and to love the truth.

Glaucon/ 'That is probable.

Socrates/ 'It is not only probable, my friend, but absolutely inevitable that he who is naturally amorous of anything should look with affection on all that is akin and related to the beloved object.

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'And can you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth?

Glaucon/ 'Surely not.'

Socrates/ Then is it possible that the same nature should be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not.

Socrates/ 'Then he that is really a lover of learning must from his earliest years strive with all his heart after all truth?'

Glaucon/ 'I quite agree.'

Socrates/ 'But we know that whenever any man's desires flow in full current towards anyone object, like a stream that has had a channel dug for it, towards all other objects they flow the more feebly?'

Glaucon/ ' Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then when the current of a man's desires has set towards the sciences and all learning, I fancy they will be concerned with the pleasure of the mind itself in itself, and

will desert the pleasures that come through the body, if he is not feignedly but truly a philosopher?'

Glaucon/ 'That is certainly inevitable.'

Socrates/ 'Such a man, moreover, will be temperate and in no way covetous; for he is the last man in the world to pursue with eagerness those aims for the sake of which men love wealth and lavish expenditure.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Further, when you would decide between the philosophic and the non-philosophic nature, you must consider this point also.'

Glaucon/ 'What is that?'

Socrates/ 'You must look out for any secret inclination to meanness. For surely smallness is the most inapt quality for a mind destined ever to reach out after the divine and the human in its wholeness and its totality.'

Glaucon/ 'Very true.'

Socrates/ 'And do you fancy that an understanding endowed with loftiness and the power of looking out over all time and all being can attach any great importance to our human life?'

Glaucon/ 'That is impossible.'

Socrates/ 'Then will such an one regard death as anything to be feared?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'But a cowardly and mean nature will probably have no participation in true philosophy?'

Glaucon/ 'No, I think not.'

Socrates/ 'Further, can a man of well-balanced mind, who is neither covetous nor mean, nor a coward, nor a boaster, be by any possibility hard to deal with or unjust?'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Then in looking for the philosophic and the non-philosophic soul you will examine in early youth whether the mind is just and gentle, or unsociable and. savage?'

Glaucon/ Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And this again you will not neglect, I fancy.'

Glaucon/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'Whether the mind is ready or slow to learn. Do you expect that anyone will have a proper affection for that which he practices with pain and in which he makes small progress with great exertions?'

Glaucon/ 'No, that would be impossible.'

Socrates/ 'What if he could retain nothing that he had learned, being full of forgetfulness? Could he be other than empty of knowledge?'

Glaucon/ No.'

Socrates/ 'And if he labors to no profit, do you not think that in the end he will be compelled to hate himself and his unprofitable practice?'

Glaucon/ ' Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then let us not include a forgetful soul among those that are really philosophical, but demand rather that the philosophical soul shall be of retentive memory.'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Further, we shall say that the unmusical and the ungracious nature tends only to excess?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But do you think truth akin to excess or to measure?'

Glaucon/ 'To measure.'

Socrates/ Then let us seek for an understanding endowed also with natural measure and grace, whose innate disposition will bear it easily to the Form of every reality.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, let us.'

Socrates/ 'Now, then, do you think that the qualities we have enumerated are in any way unnecessary for the soul or inconsistent if it is to participate sufficiently and perfectly in that which is?'

Glaucon/ 'No, they are absolutely necessary.'

Socrates/ 'Then can you find any fault in a profession which cannot be adequately practiced by any who are not naturally of retentive memory, ready learners, lofty-minded, and gracious, lovers and kinsmen of truth, justice, courage, and temperance?

Glaucon/ 'Momus himself, could find no fault with it.'

Socrates/ 'Then, when such characters are perfected by education and mature years, would you not entrust the city to their sole charge?

Adeimantus/ 'No one, Socrates, could possibly object to what you say. But here is more or less the experience of those who from time to time hear what you now say: they think that through their want of skill in asking and answering questions the argument leads them a little astray at every question, and when all those littles are added together at the end of the discussion they become aware that the lapse is immense and quite subversive of their original position. Just as a clever draught player will in the end of the game shut up an unskillful player in a comer so that he can't move, so they feel that by the end of the argument they are shut in a corner and can't speak at this other kind of draughts which is played with arguments for counters. For they are not in the least more inclined to think that the truth is with you. I speak with reference to our present condition.

Anyone would agree that at each question you ask he cannot oppose you with words, but as a matter of fact he sees that of those who devote themselves to philosophy—not those who study it in youth as a means to general culture and then give it up, but those who spend a considerable time on it—the most are very queer creatures if not rascally knaves, and the best of them seem from this profession which you praise to have achieved the result that they are useless to their country.'

Socrates/ When I heard his remarks I replied;

'Then do you consider these accusations false?'

Adeimantus/ 'I don't know, but I should like to hear your opinion.'

Socrates/ 'You may hear that I think them true.'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, how can it be right to say that states will have no respite from evil till philosophers rule in them, when we admit that they are useless to their cities?'

Socrates/ 'Your question, must be answered by a similitude.'

Adeimantus/ 'And I suppose that you are not accustomed to speak in similitudes?'

Socrates/ Never mind that. Would you mock me after getting me into an argument so hard of demonstration? But hear my simile that you may see the more how greedy I am of making them. The best of these men suffer in relation to their cities a fate so hard that there is no one thing that can be compared with it. We must defend them and describe their fate by a simile compounded from many sources, as painters paint goat-stags and the like by fusing creatures together. Conceive something of this kind happening on board ship, on one ship or on several. The master is bigger and stronger than all the crew, but rather deaf and shortsighted. His seamanship is as deficient as his hearing.

The sailors are quarrelling about the navigation. Each man thinks that he ought to navigate, though up to that time he has never studied the art, and cannot name his instructor or the time of his apprenticeship. They go further and say that navigation cannot be taught, and are ready to cut in pieces him who says that it can. They crowd round the solitary master, entreating him and offering him every inducement to entrust them with the helm. Occasionally when they fail to persuade him and others succeed, they kill those others and throw them overboard, overpower the noble master by mandragora or drink or in some other way, and bind him hand and foot. Then they rule the ship and make free with the cargo, and so drinking and feasting make just such a voyage as might be expected of men like them. Further, they complement anyone who has the skill to contrive how they may persuade or compel the master to set them over the ship, and call him a good seaman, a navigator, and a master of seamanship; any other kind of man they despise as useless. They have no notion that the true navigator must attend to the year and the seasons, to the sky and the stars and the winds, and all that concerns his craft, if he is really going to be fit to rule a ship. They do not believe that it is possible for anyone to acquire by skill or practice the art of getting control of the helm, whether there is opposition or not, and at the same time to master the art of steering. If ships were managed in that way, do you not think that the true navigator would certainly be called a star-gazer and a useless babbler by the crews of ships of that description?

Adeimantus/ Yes, certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Now, I fancy, that if you examine the simile you will not fail to see the resemblances to cities in their attitude towards true philosophers, and you will understand what I mean.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then propound this parable to your friend, who is astonished that philosophers are not honored in cities, and try to persuade him that it would be much more astonishing if they were.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, I will.'

Socrates/ 'Show him that you are right in saying that the best of the students of philosophy are useless to the world; but bid him blame for this uselessness not the good philosophers, but those who do not use them. For it is not natural that the navigator should entreat the sailors to be ruled by him, or that the wise should wait at rich men's doors. The author of that sneer spoke false. The truth established by nature is that he who is ill, whether he be rich or poor, ought to wait at the doctor's door, and every man who needs to be ruled at the door of him who can rule. The ruler, if he is really good for anything, ought not to request his subjects to be ruled. But under present political conditions you will not be wrong in likening the rulers to the sailors we have just described, and those whom they call useless talkers in the air to the true navigators.'

Adeimantus/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'For these reasons and under these conditions it is difficult for the best of professions to win 'teem from those who follow contrary courses. But far the greatest and most serious scandal to philosophy arises from its professed followers, whom the accuser of philosophy describes when, as you say, he declares that most of those who woo philosophy are rascally knaves, and the best of them are useless; which statement of yours I admitted to be true. Did I not?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then have we explained the uselessness of the good philosophers?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we next explain why the majority are necessarily rascals, and try to show, if we can, that this is not the fault of philosophy either?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then let us listen and speak in turn, first reminding ourselves of our description of the natural character essential to him who is to turn out a noble, good man. Truth, if you remember, was first of all his leader. He has to follow her at all times and in all ways, or be a braggart and have no part in true philosophy.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that was what we said.'

Socrates/ 'But is not this one point we have mentioned very inconsistent with our present ideas about him?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we not make a reasonable defense when we say that the true lover of learning naturally strove toward what is, and would not abide by the many particulars that are believed to be, but went forward, undiscouraged, and did not cease from his passion until he grasped the nature of each reality that is, with that part of his soul which is fitted to lay hold of such by reason of its affinity with it; whereby being come near to and married with true being, and begetting reason and truth, he came to knowledge and true life and nourishment, and then, and only then, ceased from the travail of his soul?'

Adeimantus/ 'That defense is as reasonable as possible.'

Socrates/ 'Well, will this man have any love of falsehood, or will he on the contrary hate it?'

Adeimantus/ 'He will hate it.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, I fancy we shall never declare that when truth was leader an evil chorus followed in her train.'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely not.'

Socrates/ 'No, a sound and just disposition attended her, and after went temperance.'

Adeimantus/ You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then why need I begin again and marshal all the attendant train of the philosophic nature, insisting on their necessity? For you remember that, akin to those, came courage, loftiness of spirit, readiness of learning, and memory. Then you interposed and said that everyone would be forced to agree to what we were saying, but that if he left the argument and cast his eyes on the men to whom it referred, he could say that of those he saw some were useless, and most were thorough villains. We are examining the reasons for this misrepresentation, and are now considering why the majority are villains, and for that reason we have again referred to and been forced to define the nature of the true philosophers.'

Adeimantus/ That is so.'

Socrates/ 'Then, we must observe the corruptions of this nature, and see how in many men it is destroyed; only a small number escape; these are they who are described not as rascals, but as useless. Next we must observe the natures that imitate the philosophic and establish themselves in its profession, and see what manner of souls these are who presume to a pursuit too high and too good for them, who by their varied blunders have brought on philosophy everywhere and all the world over the reputation you describe.'

Adeimantus/ 'What are the corruptions to which you refer?'

Socrates/ 'I shall try to describe them to you if I can. But I fancy that anyone will grant us this, that natures such as we have described, endowed with all the qualities which we have just prescribed for him who is to be a complete philosopher, are few and far between among mankind. Do you agree with me?

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then consider how many and how great are the causes of destruction to those rare souls.'

Adeimantus/ ' What are they? '

Socrates/ 'One you will be extremely surprised to hear. Each of those very qualities which we praised as belonging to the philosophic nature destroys the soul possessing them and draws it away from philosophy—I mean courage, temperance, and the rest.'

Adeimantus/ 'That certainly sounds strain.'

Socrates/ 'Not only those, but all things which are called good destroy and pervert the soul—beauty, riches, strength of body, powerful connections in a city, and all similar things. You understand the general type of the things I mean?'

Adeimantus/ 'I do, but I should like to grasp your meaning more precisely.'

Socrates/ 'Well, grasp the notion of them as a whole, and what has been said about them will become perfectly clear and not seem paradoxical.'

Adeimantus/ 'What do you mean me to do?'

Socrates/ 'In the case of all seeds or growing things, whether plants or animals, we know, that anyone which does not receive its proper nutriment, climate, or habitat, fails in its proper virtues the more strikingly the stronger it

is; for evil is of course more contrary to good than to what is not good.'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then I fancy it is according to reason that the best of natures deteriorates more seriously from uncongenial nutriment than an inferior nature?'

Adeimantus/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Adeimantus, shall we not also say that similarly the most richly endowed natures, if they receive a bad upbringing, become surpassingly evil? Or do you fancy that great crimes and unmixed wickedness come from a feeble nature and not rather from a noble nature ruined by education, while a weak nature will never be the author of great good or great evil?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, it is as you say.'.

Socrates/ 'Then I think that this nature which we have ascribed to the philosopher, if it receives proper instruction, must of necessity develop and attain to all virtue; but if it is not sown and planted in proper soil and does not get its nutriment therefrom, its course will be the very opposite, unless one of the gods comes to the rescue. Or do you hold the opinion of the public that there are any appreciable number of young men corrupted by sophists, or that it is individual sophists who corrupt them? Are not those who say this themselves the greatest sophists, who most carefully educate and fashion to the character they want both young and old, men and women?'

Adeimantus/ 'When, pray?'

Socrates/ 'When,' I answered, 'they sit down together in large numbers in the assemblies or the law courts, or the theatres or camps, or any other place where crowds come together, and proceed with great noise and confusion to find fault with some of the things that are being said or done and

to praise others, their fault-finding and their praise being equally extravagant, shouting and clapping their hands till the rocks and the place in which they are join with them and echo back redoubled the uproar of their condemnation and their praise. Amid such a scene where, think you, is a young man's heart? What private education will hold out and not be swamped by such a volume of condemnation and praise, and swept down stream wherever such a current takes it, till he calls beautiful and ugly what they do, acts as they do, and becomes like them?'

Adeimantus/ ' It is quite inevitable, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, and we have not yet mentioned the mightiest compulsion.'

Adeimantus/ 'What is that?'

Socrates/ 'The practical inducements offered by these educators and sophists when their words have no effect. Do you not know that they punish the disobedient with dishonor, fines, and death?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, assuredly they do.'

Socrates/ 'And do you think that any other sophist could prevail, or any individual's arguments which had a contrary tendency?'

Adeimantus/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'No, the very attempt would be utter folly. For there is not, and never has been, nor ever will be, a character produced by education whose virtue has prevailed and stood out against the instruction of the many—not humanly speaking, my friend, for with God, as they say, all things are possible. For you must certainly know that while the constitution of states is what it is, if anything is preserved and made what it ought to be, you will not be wrong in ascribing that salvation to divine providence.'

Adeimantus/ 'I am quite of that opinion.'

Socrates/ 'Then go on to be of this opinion also.'

Adeimantus/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'That each of those salaried individuals whom the public call sophists and regard as their rivals, teaches nothing but those beliefs which the multitude express in their assemblies, and this they call wisdom. T+ is as though a man who is keeper of a huge and powerful beast had got to know its tempers and its desires, how best to approach and how best to handle it, when it has its sulkiest and when its mildest moods and what causes them, on what occasions it is in the habit of uttering its various cries, and what sounds will soothe or provoke it. Now, suppose him, after he had got to know all these things from long experience of the animal, to call this knowledge wisdom, and systematizing it into an art to take to teaching. He has no true knowledge as to which of these beliefs and desires is beautiful or ugly, good or bad, just or unjust. He employs all these 's in accordance with the opinions of the mighty beast, calling things that please it good, things that displease it bad. Other reason for his use of these terms he has none, but calls what is compulsory just and good. He has never perceived, nor could he teach another, the vast difference which really exists between the nature of the compulsory and the good. In heaven's name, do you not think that a man like that would make a strange instructor?'

Adeimantus/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Well, do you think he differs at all from one who thinks that careful attention to the whims and pleasures of great promiscuous crowds is wisdom, whether in painting or music, or finally in politics? This is certain, that if a man mixes with the many and offers for their approval a poem or other work of art, or a public service, and makes them his arbiters of taste more than is absolutely

necessary, the fatal necessity is laid upon him of doing whatever they approve. But have you ever heard any of them offering any evidence that is not ridiculous to show that what they approve is really good and beautiful?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, and I don't expect to hear any.'

Socrates/ 'Then having observed so much, remember this. Is it possible that the multitude will endure, or believe in, the existence of beauty itself, or of any reality itself? They only admit the existence of many beautifuls, and many particulars.'

Adeimantus/ 'It is certainly impossible.'

Socrates/ 'Then a multitude cannot be philosophical?'

Adeimantus/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'And it is inevitable that the philosophers should incur their censure?'

Adeimantus/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'And the censure of those individuals who mix with the mob and try to please it?'

Adeimantus/ 'Clearly.'

Socrates/ 'Then considering this, do you see any chance of salvation for a philosophic nature, by which it may abide in its profession and reach its goal? Consider our previous admissions. We agreed that readiness to learn and a good memory and courage and loftiness of soul were marks of this nature.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But will not such an one from his earliest years be first in everything, especially if he has a body to match his mind?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then, I fancy, his kinsmen and his fellow-citizens will wish to employ him, when he grows older, in their own affairs?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then they will lay at his feet their supplications and honors, making sure of securing his future power by timely flattery?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is certainly what ordinarily happens.'

Socrates/ 'Then what do you think he will do in such circumstances, especially if he happens to belong to a great city, and is one of her rich and noble citizens, and is also beautiful to look upon and tall? Will he not be filled with impossible ambitions, and think that he will be capable of ruling both Greeks and foreigners, and so highly exalt himself, and be full of self-importance and conceit without sense?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And if, when he is sinking into this condition, someone comes to him and quietly tells him the truth, that there is no mind in him, and that he needs it, but cannot get it without serving for it, do you think that amid such evil influences it will be easy for him to listen?

Adeimantus/ 'Far from it.'

Socrates/ 'But if, by reason of his natural goodness, and the affinity of what is said with his nature, he does somehow understand and let himself be turned round and drawn to philosophy, how do you imagine those others will behave when they think that they are losing his help and companionship? Will they not do anything, leaving nothing unsaid and nothing undone, from private intrigue to public prosecution, to prevent him from being persuaded, and to disable his adviser from persuading him?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is quite inevitable.'

Socrates/ 'Then is it possible that he will become a philosopher?

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'You see, then, that I was not wrong in saying that the very elements of the philosophic nature become, as a result of bad training, in a certain sense a cause of the desertion of the pursuit of philosophy, as do such so-called good things as riches and all outward pomp and state?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, you were quite right.'

Socrates/ 'This, then, my fine fellow, is the course of destruction. It is in this way that the best of natures is so often spoiled for the best of vocations. And, as we say, this appears seldom enough. From these men come those who commit the greatest crimes against cities and individuals, as from them come benefactors also when the current sets that way. But a little nature never does anything great either to city or to individual man.'

Adeimantus/ ' Very true.'

Socrates/ 'So those to whom philosophy most belongs have deserted her, and lead a false and alien, life, leaving her desolate and unwed, and other unworthy suitors have swooped down upon this defenseless ward, and disgraced and brought reproach upon her—the reproach of which you speak when you say that of her associates some are worthless, but most are deserving of heavy punishment.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, certainly, that is what is said.'

Socrates/ 'And quite naturally too. For other feeble creatures see this territory bare of inhabitants, but rich with noble names and titles, and as escaped prisoners betake themselves to the temples, so they eagerly escape from their handicrafts and betake themselves to philosophy whenever they show themselves particularly smart at their own little trade. For though philosophy is in this plight, nevertheless

there is still left to her a reputation outshining that of the other arts. And this many covet whose natures are imperfect, and whose trades and handicrafts, as they have disfigured their bodies, so, too, have battered and mutilated their souls, by reason of their sordidness. That is what must happen, is it not?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you think, that they are different to look upon from a little bald tinker who has come into money, and has just had his chains knocked off, had a bath, put a new coat on his back, and has got himself up as a bridegroom, who means to take advantage of the poverty and loneliness of his master's daughter to marry her?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, not very different.'

Socrates/ 'And what children can we expect of such parents? They will be bastards and weaklings, will they not?'

Adeimantus/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'Then when those who are unworthy of instruction unworthily approach and associate with her, what thoughts and beliefs will be their children? Will they not be such as really deserve to be called sophisms—nothing that is genuine or has part in true thought?'

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Adeimantus, a very small band is left of those who worthily associate with philosophy: possibly a noble and well-nurtured character saved by exile, which in the absence of corrupting influences has been true to its own nature and stayed by philosophy, or a great soul born in a small city, and so despising and looking beyond politics; and possibly one or two noble natures might come to philosophy from some other art which they rightly despised. Then, again, the bridle of our comrade Theages might have constraining power. For Theages has all the endowments

that might have induced him to desert philosophy except bodily health, and his feebleness of body keeps him from a political life. Of my own safeguard, the heavenly sign, we need not speak. For few, if any, before my time have had that. Now those who have become members of this small band, and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of their prize, can all discern the madness of the many and the almost universal rottenness of all political actions. The philosopher sees that he has no ally with whose aid he might go and defend the right with a chance of safety. He is like a man in a den of wild beasts. Share their injustice he will not. He is not strong enough to hold out alone where all are savages. He would lose his life before he could do any benefit to the city or his friends, and so be equally useless to himself and to the world. Weighing all these considerations he holds his peace and does his own work, like a man in a storm sheltering behind a wall from the driving wind of dust and hail. He sees other men filled with lawlessness, and is content if by any means he may live his life here unspotted by injustice and evil deeds till with fair hope he take his departure in peace and goodwill.

Adeimantus/ 'Well, he will certainly have accomplished not the least of things when he takes his departure.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, but not the greatest unless he finds a constitution suited to him. For in a suitable constitution he will grow more himself, and succor both his own and the public fortunes. I think, then, that we have sufficiently discussed the reasons why philosophy is slandered, and shown their injustice. Have you anything to add?'

Adeimantus/ 'Not on that point. But which of our present-day constitutions do you call suited to philosophy?'

Socrates/ 'None. That is my complaint—that no present-day constitution is worthy of the philosophic nature, which

is therefore warped and changed. As a seed from abroad sown in a foreign soil loses its type under the new influence and passes into the native species, even so this nature cannot now preserve its own powers, but degenerates into an alien character. But if it should find the constitution that is best, even as it is best, then it will show that it is truly divine, while all else, natures and institutions alike, are human. You will now, of course, ask what this constitution is?

Adeimantus/ 'You are wrong. I was not going to ask that question, but whether it is the city which we have just been founding, or another?'

Socrates/ 'It is the same in all points but one. But even at the time we said that there would also have to be in the city some power possessing the same understanding of the constitution as you, the legislator, had when you prescribed its laws.'

Adeimantus/ 'We did.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, but not distinctly enough, in fear of these topics and the long and difficult demonstration of them which your insistence has realized, since even what remains is by no means our easiest subject.'

Adeimantus/ 'What is that?'

Socrates/ 'In what way a city may handle philosophy without being destroyed by it; for all great things are perilous, and it is true, as the proverb says, that beautiful things are hard.'

Adeimantus/ 'Nevertheless, let this be made clear and the demonstration so completed.'

Socrates/ 'Not want of will, but want of ability may hinder me. You will see my zeal with your own eyes. Consider now the zeal and hardihood of my words when I say that a city

must deal with this pursuit in just the opposite way from that now followed.'

Adeimantus/ 'How?

Socrates/ 'At present, those who engage in philosophy at all are mere striplings just past their boyhood; before they enter upon housekeeping and business they dally with the hardest part of the subject (by the hardest part I mean dialectic), and then take themselves off. And they, forsooth, are regarded as accomplished in philosophy, and in later years, if they do consent on invitation to listen to others who study philosophy, they esteem it a great condescension, thinking that it ought to be regarded as an occasional pastime. Towards old age all but a very few of them give out altogether even more effectually than the sun of Heraclitus, for they never take fire again.'

Adeimantus/ 'Then what is the proper course?'

Socrates/ 'Just the opposite. When they are striplings and children they should partake in culture and training which is fit for striplings, and give good heed to their bodies while they are growing up to manhood, so preparing them to serve philosophy. When the years advance in which the soul begins to reach maturity, their mental exercise must be keener. But when their physical strength begins to wane, and is past political and military duties, then, and not till then, should they range the sacred fields at will and do nothing else unless casually, if they are to live happily and after death to crown the life they have lived with a fitting destiny in the world below.'

Adeimantus/ 'Truly, Socrates.' think you speak with enthusiasm. But I fancy that many of your hearers oppose you with even more enthusiasm, and are not in the least likely to agree, Thrasymachus among the first of them.'

Socrates/ 'Don't try to make bad blood between Thrasymachus and me, when we have so lately become friends—not that we were enemies before; for we shall in no way relax our endeavors until we persuade Thrasymachus, and the rest with him, or do them some good for that life when they shall be born again and enjoy similar discourses to these.'

Adeimantus/ 'That will not be long.'

Socrates/ 'No, no time at all compared to eternity. But that most people should not agree to what we are saying need not surprise us, for they have never yet seen our proposals in practice. Phrases they have seen somewhat resembling these patched and pieced into consistency, not falling into spontaneous harmony like ours. But a man fashioned into the most perfect possible conformity and likeness to virtue in word and in deed, ruling in a city like to himself, that they have never seen, neither once nor many times. Do you think so?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Nor, my wonderful friend, have they listened enough to noble and free discourses, where truth is sought after intently in every way for the sake of knowledge, and a wide berth is given to smart controversial arguments which seek only after seeming and controversy, whether in public trials or private gatherings.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, to the first they have not listened.'

Socrates/ 'It was for these reasons, and because we foresaw these results, that on that former occasion, though we were afraid, yet truth constrained us and we said that neither city nor constitution, no, nor yet an individual man, will ever be perfect, until fortune grants that some necessity encompass the philosophers, those few who are not evil but who are now called useless, so that whether they will or not

they take charge of the city, and find the city obedient to them, or until upon those who now hold dominions and kingdoms or upon their sons some breath of heaven sends a true love of true philosophy. To suppose that either or both of these alternatives is impossible I maintain to be quite unreasonable. If they are, then we may be justly ridiculed as speaking what are merely idle dreams. Is it so?

Adeimantus/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'But if some compulsion to take charge of a city has ever, in the infinite time that is past, descended upon those who are pre-eminent in philosophy, or if it exists now in some barbarian region far removed from our vision, or if it ever arises in the future, then we are ready to contend in argument that the constitution we have described has arisen, exists, and will arise when the Muse of philosophy becomes mistress of a city. That she should do so is not impossible, nor are the things we describe impossible. But we admit that they are hard.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, I agree with you.'

Socrates/ 'But the many, you will say, do not agree?

Adeimantus/ 'Perhaps.'

Socrates/ 'My good friend, do not condemn the many so severely. They will change their opinion if you are kind to them, and do not quarrel with them, but wipe away the reproach of philosophy by showing them whom you mean by philosophers, and by defining, as we did lately, their nature and practice. Then they will not think that you mean what they now imagine. Do you think that anyone who is considerate and gentle can be angry with one who will not quarrel, or feel malicious towards one who will not bear malice? I will anticipate your answer, and say that a few may be as rude as that, but not most people.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, I entirely agree with you.'

Socrates/ 'Then agree with me in this also, that the unkind disposition of the many towards philosophy is the fault of those outsiders who have burst in like drunken revelers where they have no right, who abuse and wrangle with one another, and spend their whole time in personalities and in behavior that is entirely unfitting to philosophy.

Adeimantus/ 'It certainly is.'

Socrates/ 'For, Adeimantus, he that truly keeps his understanding bent on the realities has no time to look down at the affairs of men, to fight and become full of malice and hate. Such men rather look upon and behold a world of the definite and uniform, where doing or suffering injustice is unknown, and all is governed by order and reason. This they imitate, and become as far as possible like to it. Or do you think it in any way possible that a man should not imitate that with which he lovingly associates?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, it is impossible.'

Socrates/ 'Then the philosopher associating with what is divine and ordered becomes ordered and divine as far as mortal may, though there will always be someone to pick holes?

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.

Socrates/ 'Then, if some necessity comes upon him, not only to mold himself, but to put into practice in men's characters, and to realize in individual and city his heavenly vision, do you think that he will be a bad craftsman of temperance and justice and the whole virtue of the people?

Adeimantus/ 'No, certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then if the many come to understand that our words concerning him are true, will they still quarrel with the philosophers, and still be incredulous when we say that

a city will never know happiness unless its draftsmen are artists who have as their pattern the divine?

Adeimantus/ 'They will not be angry if they understand. But what is the manner of this draftsmanship?

Socrates/ 'They will take as their canvas, a city and human character, and first they will make their canvas clean—not at all an easy matter. But you know that it is just here that they will be different from all others. They will not consent to lay a finger on city or individual, or draft laws, until they are given, or can make for themselves, a clean canvas.

Adeimantus/ 'And they will be right.'

Socrates/ 'Then after this, do you think they would sketch the outline of the city?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then I fancy in their work their eyes will turn from model to picture, and from picture to model. They will look at natural justice and beauty and temperance and all the other virtues, and produce the human copy after their likeness, so combining and mixing from various institutions the color and likeness of true manhood, taking hints from that realization of it in men which Homer has called godly and godlike?'

Adeimantus/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Sometimes I fancy they will rub out, sometimes they will make their drawing again, until they have made human character as dear to God as human character can be.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.' it will be the fairest of drawings.'

Socrates/ 'Then, are we now beginning to persuade those who you said were rushing furiously upon us that such a painter of constitutions is to be found in the man whom we

were then praising to them. They were angry when we proposed to hand over cities to him; when they hear our present explanation, will they be any milder?'

Adeimantus/ 'Much milder, if they are sensible.'

Socrates/ 'But what ground for objection can they have? Can they say that philosophers are not lovers of what is and of truth?'

Adeimantus/ 'That would be too ridiculous.'

Socrates/ 'Or that their nature, as we have described it, is not akin to that which is best?'

Adeimantus/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Then can they say that such a nature, set among appropriate institutions, will not become more perfectly good and philosophical than any other? Will they prefer those whom we have discarded?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, surely not.'

Socrates/ 'Then will they still be furious when we say that until the race of philosophers become masters of a city there will be no cessation of evils for city or citizens, nor will the constitution which we are picturing in word receive fulfillment in deed?'

Adeimantus/ 'Perhaps, they will be less so.'

Socrates/ 'If you please, let us not only say "less," but that they are perfectly pacified and convinced, that we may at least shame them into agreement.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Well, let us suppose that they are so far convinced. Will anyone further object that kings or rulers would not by any chance have sons whose natures are philosophical?'

Adeimantus/ 'No one.'

Socrates/ 'But can it be said that though they are born philosophical their corruption is quite inevitable? That their salvation is difficult, we ourselves agree. But can anyone contend that in all time no one of them all will ever be saved?

Adeimantus/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'But, though only one arises and has a city obedient to him, that is enough to perfect all those things of which we now despair?'

Adeimantus/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'For if he is ruler, and lays down the laws and institutions which we have described, it is surely not impossible that the citizens should consent to carry them out?'

Adeimantus/ 'By no means.'

Socrates/ 'Then is it anything extraordinary and impossible that others should approve?'

Adeimantus/ 'I think not.'

Socrates/ 'And I fancy that we have already sufficiently shown that these proposals, if they are practicable, are certainly desirable?'

Adeimantus/ 'We have.'

Socrates/ 'Then this seems to be our position in regard to this legislation. Our proposals are desirable if they could be realized, and their realization is difficult but not impossible.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is our position.'

Socrates/ 'Then since we have with difficulty brought this question to a conclusion, we must discuss what remains, namely, in what manner and by means of what studies and institutions the saviors of the constitution will come to exist in our city; and, further, at what ages they are to enter upon their various studies and duties?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, we must.'

Socrates/ 'I got nothing, out of my wisdom in leaving aside some time ago the troublesome question of the possession of wives, and the birth of children, and the establishment of the rulers, because I knew that the perfectly true arrangement is unpopular and difficult of realization. For none the less the necessity of discussing these questions has now come upon me. The question of the wives and children we have finished, but we must now pursue from the beginning the question of the rulers. We said, if you remember, that they must show themselves lovers of their city. They were to be tested in pleasures and pains, and were to show that no toils or fears or any other change made them unfaithful. He that failed was to be rejected, but he that always emerged unsullied, like gold tried in the fire, was to be made ruler, and privileges and rewards were to be his in life and after death. That was more or less what we said, though the argument (for fear of raising the question now before us) kept turning aside and veiling its face.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is perfectly true. I remember.'

Socrates/ hesitated, my friend, to speak what I have now already ventured. But let me venture to say this also, that we must make our most perfect guardians philosophers.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, let that be said.'

Socrates/ 'Consider now how few you will naturally have; for of that nature which we describe as necessary to them, the elements very seldom choose to appear together. In most cases the philosophic nature is torn asunder.'

Adeimantus/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'Readiness to learn, memory, sagacity, quickness, and such qualities, together with spirit and high-mindedness, are, as you know, not often found along with the disposition to live soberly a quiet and steadfast life. Men

with these gifts are carried by their sharpness hither and thither, and all steadiness goes from them.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is true.'

Socrates/ 'Then, on the other hand, those steadfast characters who do not lightly change, who are trusted and employed with confidence, and who in war are not easily moved to fear, retain their immobility in their studies. They are as slow to move and slow to learn as though they were torpid, and are full of sleep and yawns whenever they have to toil at anything of the kind.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'But we declare that the guardians must partake of both these sets of qualities in full and fair degree, or else have no portion in the special education, nor in honor nor office.'

Adeimantus/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you think that this will happen very rarely?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'We must test this nature in the toils and fears and pleasures we have described, and we may now say also what we then omitted; we must exercise it in many studies, and observe whether it is able to endure even the greatest studies, or whether it will flinch as others flinch in other trials.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, it is good that we should make such observations. But what do you mean by "the greatest studies"?'

Socrates/ 'You surely remember, that we drew conclusions concerning the respective definitions of justice and temperance, and courage and wisdom, by distinguishing three elements in the soul?'

Adeimantus/ 'If I did not remember that, I should not deserve to hear what remains.'

Socrates/ 'Well, do you remember what had preceded that?'

Adeimantus/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'We said that if we were to perceive them in the best possible way, there was another longer route to be taken by which we should find them revealed to us, but that it was possible to give a demonstration on a level with our previous arguments. You said this would do; and so we said then what, in my opinion, was not quite accurate—whether it was accurate enough for you is for you to say.'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, I certainly thought that you gave us good measure, and so did the others.'

Socrates/ 'But, my friend, short measure in such cases or in any case is never good measure; for there can be no imperfect measure of anything. But occasionally some people fancy that enough has been done, and that there is no need for further inquiry.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, people often take that attitude from laziness.'

Socrates/ 'But, surely, that is an attitude not at all wanted for a guardian of a city and its laws?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is likely enough.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my friend, our guardian must go round by the longer route, and work as hard at study as at gymnastic; otherwise, as we were saying, he will never reach the completion of the study which is the greatest of all and which concerns him most closely.'

Adeimantus/ 'Then are not these the greatest? Is there any still greater than justice and the virtues we have discussed?

Socrates/ 'Certainly there is, and further, we must not be content with a sketch of these virtues, which is all we have seen as yet. We should not neglect their most perfect elaboration. Is it not ridiculous to make every effort after preciseness and accuracy in other matters of little importance, and yet not to demand the greatest accuracy in subjects of the greatest importance?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, indeed. But as to what you call the greatest study, and what you conceive to be its subject, do you suppose that anyone will let you off without asking what they are? '

Socrates/ 'Certainly not, please ask. As a matter of fact, you have heard it quite often, but now you either don't understand, or want to bother me again by your persistency I expect that that is the explanation. For you have often heard that the Form of the good is the greatest study, and is that by whose use just things and the rest become helpful and useful. Now you certainly know that I was going to say this, and also that we have no proper knowledge of the Form of the good. And if we don't know it, though we should have the fullest knowledge possible of all else, you know that that would be of no use to us, any more than is the possession of anything without the good. Or do you think there is any advantage in universal possession if it is not good, or in understanding the whole world except the good, and understanding nothing that is good and beautiful?'

Adeimantus/ 'By heaven, not.'

Socrates/ 'Then this, too, you know, that the many think the good is pleasure, and the more enlightened think it is intelligence?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Also, my friend, that those latter can't reply when we ask "what intelligence?" and are forced in the end to say 'intelligence of the good"?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, it is a ridiculous answer.'

Socrates/ 'Surely it is, if they reproach us for not knowing the good, and then repeat the word "good' as though we did know it. For they say that it is intelligent of good, as though we understood what they mean when they solemnly utter the word "good."'

Adeimantus/ 'That is perfectly true.'

Socrates/ 'Then what of those who make pleasure the good? Are they any less astray than the others? Are not they, too, compelled to acknowledge that there are bad pleasures?'

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then the result is that they acknowledge the same thing to be both good and bad. Is not that the case?

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then is it not evident that there are many and formidable difficulties in the subject?'

Adeimantus/ ' Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Further, is it not evident that many people will choose what seems just and beautiful, and will be content to do and have and express what so seems, even though it actually is not, just and beautiful? But seeming good never yet contented any man. Here all seek the reality and the semblance is treated by everyone with contempt.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'This, then, is that which every soul pursues, the motive of all its actions. That it is something, the soul divines, but what it is, she can never in her perplexity fully comprehend. She has no steady confidence concerning it, as she has about other things, and therefore she loses any

advantage she might have got from these. Concerning a subject so great and so important, can we say that the best men in our city, those to whom we shall entrust everything, ought to be unenlightened?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'I think, in any case, that if a man does not know how particular instances of justice and beauty are also good, these just and beautiful things will find in him a worthless guardian. For I divine that no man will know them thoroughly until he has acquired this knowledge.'

Adeimantus/ 'You divine excellently.'

Socrates/ 'Then will our constitution be set in proper order if such a guardian, one who has this knowledge, directs it?'

Adeimantus/ 'Inevitably. But for yourself, Socrates, do you say that the good is knowledge, or pleasure, or something else?'

Socrates/ 'Yes, that is like you. You have made it perfectly clear all this while that you wouldn't be content with other people's opinions on these matters.'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, Socrates, it does not seem to me right to be ready to repeat other people's opinions and never your own when you have given so much time to these subjects.'

Socrates/ 'Well, do you think it right to make pretensions to knowledge where one has none?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, certainly not to make pretensions to knowledge; but it is right that you should be prepared to state what you think, as being what you think.

Socrates/ 'But have you not observed, that beliefs which are not founded on knowledge are all ill-favored? The best of them are blind. Do you think that men who unintelligently

believe what is true are any better than blind men going the right road?

Adeimantus/ 'No better.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you want us to look at ill-favored, blind, and crooked things when we might hear shining and beautiful things from others?'

Glaucon/ 'Now, by heavens, Socrates, don't stop as if you were at the end. We shall be quite content if you discuss the good in the same way as you have discussed justice, and temperance, and the other virtues.

Socrates/ 'Well, yes, my friend, I shall be quite content myself. But I am afraid that I shall not manage it, and if I have the courage to try, my awkwardness will be laughed at. But, my very good friends, let us leave for the moment the question of what the good actually is. To reach what is now in my mind seems too ambitious for our present attempt. But I am ready to state what seems to me to be an offspring of the good, and extremely like it, if the proposal pleases you; if not, I will leave it alone.

Glaucon/ 'Please state it, and you will render your account of the parent another time.

Socrates/ 'I wish, I could pay and you could collect the parent sum, and I did not have to put you off with the increase like this. Still, take this increase and offspring of the good itself. But be careful that I do not unwittingly deceive you by giving you a false account of the increase.

Glaucon/ 'We shall take as good care as we can. Will you only state it?

Socrates/ 'Yes. But we must first come to an agreement by my reminding you of what we said before and have often stated elsewhere.'

Glaucon/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'We say, and make the distinction in our thought, that there are many beautifuls and many goods, and so on.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And on the other hand, we set up also a real beauty and a real good, and so on with all the things we before set up as many, and we put each now under one Form, holding that there is but one Form of each, and we call that "that which each is."'

Glaucon/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'The first we say are seen but are not thought, while the Forms are thought but are not seen.'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly:'

Socrates/ 'With what in ourselves do we see what is seen?'

Glaucon/ 'With sight.'

Socrates/ 'And do we not also, hear what is heard with nearing, and perceive with the other senses all sensible objects?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Now, have you noticed, how the fashioner of the senses has made the power of seeing and being seen in much the most marvelous way?'

Glaucon/ 'I don't know that I have.'

Socrates/ 'Well, look at it like this. Is there anything of another kind which is required for hearing and sound if the one is to hear and the other to be heard, so that in the absence of this third thing, hearing will not hear and sound not be heard?'

Glaucon/ 'Nothing.'

Socrates/ 'And I fancy, that there are not many other faculties, if there are any, which require anything of this sort. Can you name any?'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'But do you not observe that the power of sight and being seen requires this?'

Glaucon/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'Surely when there is sight in the eyes, and the man who has sight tries to use it, and there is color in the visible objects, still you know that unless a quite different third thing which exists just for this end is also present, sight will see nothing, and color will be invisible.'

Glaucon/ 'To what do you refer?'

Socrates/ 'It is what you call light.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then the sense of sight and the power of being seen are joined together by a yoke nobler in no small degree than the bond which unites other yoke-fellows, inasmuch as light is not ignoble"

Glaucon/ 'It is very far from being that.'

Socrates/ 'Then whom of the gods in heaven can you name as the author of this, whose light makes our sight see in the fairest manner, and makes what is seen be seen?

Glaucon/ 'Him whom you and all others would name. For your question clearly refers to the sun.

Socrates/ 'Then is not sight by its nature in this relation towards this god?

Glaucon/ ' In what relation?

Socrates/ 'Neither sight itself, nor that in which it arises, which we call the eye, is the sun.

Glaucon/ 'No, of course not.

Socrates/ 'But I fancy that of all the organs of the senses it is most like the sun.

Glaucon/ 'Very much so.'

Socrates/ 'And does it not possess the power which it has, by the sun's dispensation, as an effluence from it?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.

Socrates/ 'Then the sun is not sight, is it; but, being the cause of sight, it is seen by the same?

Glaucon/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'Then you may say, that this is my statement concerning the offspring of the good, that which the good has produced analogous to itself, which in the visible world bears the same relation to sight and what is seen, as in the intelligible the good bears to mind and what is thought.

Glaucon/ 'How? Explain to me still further.

Socrates/ 'You know, that when a man turns his eyes not to those objects on whose colors the light of day is shining, but to those where the lights of night shine, his eyes grow dim and appear almost blind, as though pure sight were not in them?

Glaucon/ 'Yes, certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But when they look at objects on which the sun is shining, I fancy that these same eyes see distinctly, and it becomes manifest that sight is in them?

Glaucon/ 'Surely.

Socrates/ 'Now consider the soul in this same manner. When it is stayed upon that on which truth and being are shining, it understands and knows and is seen to have reason. But when it is stayed on that which is mingled with darkness, that which is coming into being and passing away, then it believes and grows confused as its beliefs waver up and down, and has the appearance of being without reason.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, it has.'

Socrates/ 'This, then, which imparts truth to the things that are known and the power of knowing to the knower, you

may affirm to be the Form of the good. It is the cause of knowledge and truth, and you may conceive it as being known, but while knowledge and truth are both beautiful, you will be right in thinking it other and fairer than these. And as in the other world it is right to think light and sight sun-like, but not right to think them the sun, so here it is right to think both knowledge and truth like the good, but not right to think either of them the good. The state or nature of the good must be honored still more highly.'

Glaucon/ 'You speak of an incalculable beauty.' if it gives knowledge and truth, and itself excels them in beauty. Surely you do not mean that this is pleasure?'

Socrates/ 'Do not blaspheme. Rather consider its image in this further aspect.'

Glaucon/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'I fancy that you will say that the sun gives to visible objects not only the power of being seen, but also their generation and growth and nourishment, not being itself generation.'

Glaucon/ 'Of course not.'

Socrates/ 'Then you may say of the objects of knowledge that not only their being known comes from the good, but their existence and being also come from it, though the good is not itself being but transcends even being in dignity and power?'

Glaucon said very comically;

Glaucon/ 'By Apollo, a miraculous transcendence.'

Socrates/ 'Well, it is your fault, you compelled me to say what I think about it.'

Glaucon/ 'Don't stop, please, or at any rate complete the simile of the sun if you have still anything to say.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, I still have many things to say.'

Glaucon/ 'Well, don't omit the smallest thing.'

Socrates/ 'I fancy, that I shall omit much. But nevertheless I shall not, if I can help it, omit anything which can be brought forward now.'

Glaucon/ 'Do not.'

Socrates/ 'Consider, then, that, as we say, the Sun and the Good are two; the one is king of the intelligible class and sphere, the other of the visible. I do not say king of heaven, lest you should think I was playing with words. Now, have you those two classes, visible and intelligible?'

Glaucon/ 'I have.'

Socrates/ 'Now, take a line divided into two unequal segments, and divide each segment in the same proportion, and suppose the first segment to belong to the visible, and the second to the intelligible. The different segments will represent in their comparative clearness and obscurity—in the visible sphere, the first segment images. By images I mean, firstly shadows, secondly, reflections in water, and in things that are close-grained, smooth, and bright, and all similar things, if you understand.

Glaucon/ 'Yes, I understand.'

Socrates/ 'Make the second segment that whereof this first is an image, ordinary living creatures, everything that grows and everything that is made.'

Glaucon/ 'I have done so.'

Socrates/ 'Then will you also, consent to say that, in respect of truth and falsehood, the section has been made so that the copy stands in the same relation to that of which it is a copy, as that which is believed to that which is known?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, certainly I will.'

Socrates/ 'Then consider further how the intelligible segment must be divided.'

Glaucon/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'Thus. In the one subdivision the soul is forced to conduct her search from hypotheses, using as images the things which were in the first segment the objects of imitation, proceeding not to a beginning but to an end; while in the other, that which leads to a beginning that has no hypothesis, she starts from a hypothesis, without using the images used in the first, and conducts her inquiry simply and solely by the Forms themselves.'

Glaucon/ 'I have not quite understood what you say.'

Socrates/ 'Then have it again. You will understand the more easily for what has been already said. I fancy that you know that those who study geometry and calculation and similar subjects, take as hypotheses the odd and the even, and figures, and three kinds of angles, and other similar things in each different inquiry. They make them into hypotheses as though they knew them, and will give no further account of them either to themselves or to others on the ground that they are plain to everyone. Starting from these, they go on till they arrive by agreement at the original object of their inquiry.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that I know.'

Socrates/ 'Then you know that they use the visible squares and figures, and make their arguments about them, though they are not thinking about them, but about those things of which the visible are images. Their arguments concern the real square and a real diagonal, not the diagonal which they draw, and so with everything. The actual things which they model and draw, which again have their shadows and images in the water, these they now use as images in their turn, seeking to see those very realities which cannot be seen except by the understanding.'

Glaucon/ 'That is true.'

Socrates/ 'Therefore I described this class as intelligible; but I said that the soul is compelled to use hypotheses in its investigation of it, and does not go to a beginning, since it is unable to step out of and beyond hypotheses, but uses as images those originals from which images were made by the objects lower down, and which in comparison with those remoter objects are esteemed and honored as distinct and clear.'

Glaucon/ 'I understand, that you speak of the subject of geometrical investigations and the kindred arts.'

Socrates/ 'Then by the other segment of the intelligible you may understand me to mean that which the mere reasoning process grasps by the power of dialectic, treating its hypotheses not as first principles, but as literally hypotheses, that is, as stepping-stones and starting-points, until it comes as far as that which is not hypothesis, to the first principle of everything. This it grasps, and then reversing its procedure takes hold of that which takes hold of this first principle, until it so completes its descent. It never uses the help of any sensible object at all, but using only the Forms themselves it descends to them, and with Forms it ends.'

Glaucon/ 'I understand. Not quite satisfactorily, for I think you are describing an arduous task; but I see that you wish to distinguish that part of the real and the intelligible which is considered by the science of dialectic, as truer than that which is the object of what are called the arts. These have their hypotheses as first principles, and though their students are obliged to study them with the understanding, not with the senses, still, inasmuch as they do not make their inquiries with reference to a first principle, but by starting from hypotheses, you think that they do not exercise intelligence on these subjects, although with a first principle they are intelligible. This faculty in geometricians and such

people you seem to call understanding and not intelligence, on the ground that understanding lies somewhere between belief and intelligence.'

Socrates/ 'Your demonstration is quite satisfactory. Now assume with me that corresponding to these four segments there are four states which arise in the soul. To the highest segment assign intelligence, to the second understanding, to the third faith, and to the last imagining. Then arrange these proportionately, and consider them to have such a degree of clearness as their objects have of truth.'

Glaucon/ 'I understand, and agree and arrange them as you propose.'

Book 7.

Socrates/ Then after this, liken our nature in its education and want of education, to a condition which I may thus describe. Picture men in an underground cave-dwelling, with a long entrance reaching up towards the light along the whole width of the cave; in this they lie from their childhood, their legs and necks in chains, so that they stay where they are and look only in front of them, as the chain prevents their turning their heads round. Some way off, and higher up, a fire is burning behind them, and between the lire and the prisoners is a road on higher ground. Imagine a wall built along this road, like the screen which showmen have in front of the audience, over which they show the puppets.'

Glaucon/ 'I have it.'

Socrates/ 'Then picture also men carrying along this wall all kinds of articles which overtop it, statues of men and other creatures in stone and wood and other materials; naturally some of the carriers are speaking, others are silent.'

Glaucon/ 'A strange image and strange prisoners.'

Socrates/ 'They are like ourselves. For in the first place do you think that such men would have seen anything of themselves or of each other except the shadows thrown by the fire on the wall of the cave opposite to them?'

Glaucon/ 'How could they, if all their life they had been forced to keep their heads motionless?'

Socrates/ 'What would they have seen of the things carried along the wall? Would it not be the same?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then if they were able to talk with one another, do you not think that they would suppose what they saw to be the real things?'

Glaucon/ 'Necessarily.'

Socrates/ 'Then what if there were in their prison an echo from the opposite wall? When anyone of those passing by spoke, do you imagine that they could help thinking that the voice came from the shadow passing before them?'

Glaucon/ 'No, certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then most assuredly, the only truth that such men would conceive would be the shadows of those manufactured articles?'

Glaucon/ 'That is quite inevitable.'

Socrates/ 'Then consider, the manner of their release from their bonds and the cure of their folly, supposing that they attained their natural destiny in some such way as this. Let us suppose one of them released, and forced suddenly to stand up and turn his head, and walk and look towards the light. Let us suppose also that all these actions gave him pain, and that he was too dazed to see the objects whose shadows he had been watching before. What do you think he would say if he were told by someone that before he had been seeing mere foolish phantoms, while now he was nearer to being, and was turned to what in a higher degree is, and was looking more directly at it? And further, if each of the several figures passing by were pointed out to him, and he were asked to say what each was, do you not think that he would be perplexed, and would imagine that the things he had seen before were truer than those now pointed out to him?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, much truer.'

Socrates/ 'Then if he were forced to look at the light itself, would not his eyes ache, and would he not try to escape and

turn back to things which he could look at, and think that they were really more distinct than the things shown him?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But, if someone were to drag him out up the steep and rugged ascent, and did not let go till he had been dragged up to the light of the sun, would not his forced journey be one of pain and annoyance; and when he came to the light, would not his eyes be so full of the glare that he would not be able to see a single one of the objects we now call true?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly, not all at once.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, I fancy that he would need time before he could see things in the world above. At first he would most easily see shadows, then the reflections in water of men and everything else, and, finally, the things themselves. After that he could look at the heavenly bodies and the sky itself by night, turning his eyes to the light of the stars and the moon more easily than to the sun or to the sun's light by day?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then, last of all, I fancy he would be able to look at the sun and observe its nature, not its appearances in water or on alien material, but the very sun itself in its own place?'

Glaucon/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'And that done, he would then come to infer concerning it that it is the sun which produces the seasons and years, and controls everything in the sphere of the visible, and is in a manner the author of all those things which he and his fellow-prisoners used to see?'

Glaucon/ 'It is clear that this will be his next conclusion.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, if he is reminded of his original abode and its wisdom, and those who were then his fellow-prisoners, do you not think he will pity them and count himself happy in the change?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Now suppose that those prisoners had had among themselves a system of honors and commendations, that prizes were granted to the man who had the keenest eye for passing objects and the best memory for which usually came first, and which second, and which came together, and who could most cleverly conjecture from this what was likely to come in the future, do you think that our friend would think longingly of those prizes and envy the men whom the prisoners honor and set in authority? Would he not rather feel what Homer describes, and wish earnestly;

> To live on earth a swain,
> Or serve a swain for hire.

or suffer anything rather than be so the victim of seeming and live in their way?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, I certainly think that he would endure anything rather than that.'

Socrates/ 'Then consider this point. If this man were to descend again and take his seat in his old place, would not his eyes be full of darkness because he had just come out of the sunlight?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And suppose that he had again to take part with the prisoners there in the old contest of distinguishing between the shadows, while his sight was confused and before his eyes had got steady (and it might take them quite a considerable time to get used to the darkness), would not men laugh at him, and say that having gone up above he had come back with his sight ruined, so that it was not

worthwhile even to try to go up? And do you not think that they would kill him who tried to release them and bear them up, if they could lay hands on him, and slay him?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Now this simile, my dear Glaucon, must be applied in all its parts to what we said before; the sphere revealed by sight being contrasted with the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire therein with the power of the sun. If you will set the upward ascent and the seeing of the things in the upper world with the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible sphere, you will have my surmise; and that is what you are anxious to have. Whether it be actually true, God knows. But this is how it appears to me. In the world of knowledge the Form of the good is perceived last and with difficulty, but when it is seen it must be inferred that it is the cause of all that is right and beautiful in all things, producing in the visible world light and the lord of light, and being itself lord in the intelligible world and the giver of truth and reason, and this Form of the good must be seen by whosoever would act wisely in public or in private.'

Glaucon/ 'I agree with you, so far as I am capable.'

Socrates/ 'Come, then, and agree with me in this also; and don't be surprised that they who have come thus far are unwilling to trouble themselves with mortal affairs, and that their souls are ever eager to dwell above. For this is but natural if the image we have related is true.'

Glaucon/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you think it at all surprising, if one who has come from divine visions to human miseries plays a sorry part and appears very ridiculous when, with eyes still confused and before he has got properly used to the darkness that is round him, he is compelled to contend in law courts or elsewhere concerning the shadows of the just

or the images which throw those shadows, or to dispute concerning the manner in which those images are conceived by men who have never seen real justice?'

Glaucon/ 'No, it is anything but surprising.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, a sensible man would remember that the eyes may be confused in two ways, and for two reasons—by a change from light to darkness, or from darkness to light. He will consider that the same may happen with the soul, and when he sees a soul in trouble and unable to perceive, he will not laugh without thinking; rather he will examine whether it has come from a brighter light and is dim because it is not accustomed to the darkness, or whether it is on its way from ignorance to greater brightness and is dazzled with the greater brilliance; and so he will count the first happy in its condition and its life, but the second he will pity, and if he please to laugh at it, his laughter will be less ridiculous than that of him who laughs at the soul that has come from the light above.'

Glaucon/ 'You speak with great fairness.'

Socrates/ 'Then, if these things be true, we must think thus on the subject before us—that education is not what certain of its professors declare it to be. They say, if you remember, that they put knowledge in the soul where no knowledge has been, if men put sight into blind eyes.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, they do.'

Socrates/ 'But our present argument, shows that there resides in each man's soul this faculty and the instrument wherewith he learns, and that it is just as if the eye could not turn from darkness to light unless the whole body turned with it; so this faculty and instrument must be wheeled round together with the whole soul away from that which is becoming, until it is able to look upon and to endure being

and the brightest blaze of being; and that we declare to be the good. Do we not?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Education, then, will be an art of doing this, an art of conversion, and will consider in what manner the soul will be turned round most easily and effectively. Its aim will not be to implant vision in the instrument of sight. It will regard it as already possessing that, but as being turned in a wrong direction, and not looking where it ought, and it will try to set this right.'

Glaucon/ 'That seems probable.'

Socrates/ 'Now most of the virtues which are commonly said to belong to the soul seem to resemble the bodily virtues. They seem to be really implanted by habit and exercise where they have not previously existed. But the virtue of wisdom evidently does in reality belong to something much more divine, which never loses its power, but which from conversion becomes useful and advantageous, or again useless and harmful. Or have you never noticed how shrewd are the little eyes of the souls of those men who are reputed vicious but clever, and how sharply they see through the things to which they are directed? Their soul's vision is not feeble, but is forced to serve evil, and therefore the more sharply it sees, the more evil things it does.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Now suppose, that from their earliest years such natures had been under the knife and had had cut off from them those growths, heavy as lead, which partake of the nature of becoming, which gluttony with its greeds and pleasures has fastened upon them and which drag downwards their soul's vision; if they had been released from those encumbrances and turned round to the things that

are true, the very same souls in those very same men would see them as sharply and keenly as they see the things towards which they are now directed.'

Glaucon/ 'That would be but natural.'

Socrates/ 'And is this not also natural and inevitable from our previous remarks, that the city would never be properly governed either by men who are uneducated and without experience in truth, or by men who are allowed to spend all their lives in the process of education? The first have no single mark in their lives at which they should aim in all that they do for themselves or for the state; the second will not act without compulsion, imagining that they have been transplanted to the islands of the blest without waiting for death.'

Glaucon/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Then it will be our task as founders, to compel the best natures to proceed to that study which we declared a little while ago to be the highest, to perceive the good, and to make that ascent we spoke of; and when they have done so, and looked long enough, then we must not allow them the liberty which they now enjoy.'

Glaucon/ 'What is that?'

Socrates/ 'The liberty, of staying there, and refusing to descend again to the prisoners and to share with them in toils and honors, whether they be mean or exalted.'

Glaucon/ 'What! are we to do them an injustice, and force on them a worse life when a better is possible for them?'

Socrates/ 'You have forgotten again, my friend, that it is not the law's concern that anyone class in a state should live surpassingly well. Rather it contrives a good life for the whole state, harmonizing the citizens by persuasion and compulsion, and making them share with one another the advantage which each class can contribute to the

community. It is the law which produces such men in the city; not in order to leave each man free to turn where he will, but that it may itself use them to bind the city together.'

Glaucon/ 'True, I had forgotten.'

Socrates/ 'Consider further, Glaucon, that we shall not really do an injustice to the philosophers who arise in our city, but can speak justly when we proceed to compel them to watch over and care for the others. "It is quite reasonable,' we shall say, "that the philosophers who arise in other cities should not share in their toils. For there they are spontaneous growths, and their city's constitution has only hampered them, and it seems fair that the self-sown plant which is debtor to no man for its culture should not be eager to pay the price of its culture to anybody. But you we have begotten for the city as well as for yourselves to be like leaders and kings in a hive. You have received a better and more thorough education than those other philosophers, and are more capable of participating in both public life and philosophy. You must, therefore, descend by turns to dwell with the rest of the city, and must be accustomed to see the dark objects; for when you are accustomed, you will be able to see a thousand times better than those who dwell there, and you will know what each of the images is, and of what it is an image, because you have seen the truth of what is beautiful and just and good. And so your and our city will become a waking reality, and not a dream like most existing cities, which are peopled by men fighting about shadows and quarrelling for office as though that were a notable good. Whereas the truth surely is this, that that city wherein those who are to rule are least anxious for office must have the best and most stable constitution, and where you have the contrary disposition in your rulers you will have the contrary result."

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you fancy that our nurselings when they hear this will disobey us, and will refuse to take their turn in sharing in the labors of the city, while for the most of their time they dwell with one another in the world of light?'

Glaucon/ 'Impossible. It is a just demand, and they are just. And assuredly each of them will take up office as a compulsory duty, reversing the attitude of those who now rule in cities.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, that is so, my friend. If you can discover a life for those who are to rule, better than ruling, then for you a well-governed city is possible. For there alone the rulers will be those who are truly rich, not in money, but in the proper wealth of the happy man, a good and wise life. But this is impossible where men who are poor and hungry for goods of their own undertake public affairs, imagining that it is from these that their good is to be snatched; for then office becomes a thing to be fought for, and such a civil and intestine war destroys the combatants, and the whole state with them.'

Glaucon/ 'Most true.'

Socrates/ 'Then, do you know, any life where political office is despised except the life of true philosophy?'

Glaucon/ 'No, certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Office must not be wooed by those who love her, or you will have rival lovers fighting?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then are there any whom you can compel to undertake the guardianship of the state except those who are wisest in what pertains to the best government of the city, and who also possess honors of a different kind and a nobler life than that of the statesmen?

Glaucon/ 'None.'

Socrates/ 'And now, do you wish us to consider the manner in which such men will arise in the state, and how they will be brought up to the light, just as certain heroes are said to have ascended from Hades to the gods above?'

Glaucon/ 'Of course I do.'

Socrates/ 'And this would seem to be not the mere spinning of a coin, but the conversion of a soul from a day as dark as night to the true ascent which leads towards being, which we shall declare to be true philosophy.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then must we not consider what study has this effect?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then what study, Glaucon, will draw the soul away from becoming to being? As I ask, this occurs to me. Did we not say that these rulers when young had to be warrior athletes?'

Glaucon/ 'We did.'

Socrates/ 'Then the study of which we are in search must have this further quality?'

Glaucon/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'It must be not without use to warriors.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly, if possible.'

Socrates/ 'Now in our former plan they were trained in music and gymnastic?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But gymnastic surely has to do with the becoming and perishing, for it presides over the increase and decay of the body?'

Glaucon/ 'Evidently.'

Socrates/ 'Then this will not be the study we seek?'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Then will it be music as we formerly described it?'

Glaucon/ 'But that, if you remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic. It trained the guardians by the influence of habit, and gave them not knowledge but a kind of harmoniousness by means of harmony, and rhythmical grace by means of rhythm. On its literary side it had another set of similar characteristics, both in its fables and in those of its tales which were true. There was in it no study leading to anything of the kind which you are seeking.'

Socrates/ 'You remind me most accurately. It had, in truth, nothing of the kind. But, my wonderful Glaucon, what will fulfill our requirements? For the crafts, we surely agreed, are mechanical?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely. But is there any kind of study left, outside of music and gymnastic and the crafts?'

Socrates/ 'If we have nothing left to choose outside of those, see if we can choose something of universal application.'

Glaucon/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'Well, this common study, for example, which is used by all crafts, all modes of thought and sciences, and which everyone must begin by learning.'

Glaucon/ 'What is it?'

Socrates/ 'This trifling study, of distinguishing the one and the two and the three. I give it the general name of arithmetic and calculation. Is it not the case that every art and science is compelled to take some share in this?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'The art of war along with them?'

Glaucon/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'Yes. Palamedes, whenever he occurs in tragedy, is always exposing Agamemnon as a most ridiculous general. He says that he, Palamedes, invented number and then marshaled the ranks of the army at Ilium and counted the ships and everything else as though they had been uncounted before, and as though apparently Agamemnon didn't know how many feet he had, since he could not count. So what sort of a general do you think he could have been?'

Glaucon/ 'A strange one, if that was true.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we not decide, that the ability to calculate and count is a study essential for a man in war?

Glaucon/ 'Most essential, if he is to understand anything about drill, or even if he is to be a man at all.'

Socrates/ 'Are you struck with the same feature in this study as I am?'

Glaucon/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'It seems to be one of those studies we are seeking, which naturally lead to knowing, though nobody uses it rightly, a study which wholly draws us towards being.'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'I shall try, to make plain my opinion on the matter. I distinguish to myself certain things as leading and others as not leading in the direction of which we are speaking. You must consider them along with me and agree or disagree. Then we shall see more clearly whether it is as I divine.'

Glaucon/ 'Explain, then.'

Socrates/ 'I will explain, that there are some things in sensation which do not stimulate the intelligence to inquiry because the judgment of sensation upon them is

satisfactory, and others which positively insist upon the intelligence inquiring into them, because sensation gives no satisfactory result.'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously, you mean objects seen at a distance and painting in perspective.'

Socrates/ 'You have not quite taken my meaning.'

Glaucon/ 'What then do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'The not stimulating, are those which do not at once pass over into a contrary perception. I class as stimulating those which do so pass, where the perception, whether it be of a near or distant object, indicates no one thing more than its contrary. You will understand more clearly what I mean in this way. Here, say, are three fingers, the little finger, the middle finger, and the third.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'You may conceive that I am speaking of them as seen from close at hand. Now, will you please consider this question about them?'

Glaucon/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'Each of these surely appears equally a finger, and so far as that is concerned, it makes no difference whether the one we are looking at is the middle or one of the extremes, whether it is black or white, thick or thin, and so on. For in all these points the ordinary mind is not compelled to ask of the intelligence, "Then what is a finger?" For sight has not at any stage suddenly informed the mind that the finger is the opposite of a finger.'

Glaucon/ 'No, certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then, such an experience naturally does not stimulate or arouse the intelligence.'

Glaucon/ 'Naturally not.'

Socrates/ 'But, on the other hand, does sight see adequately the bigness or the smallness of the fingers, and does it make no difference whether anyone of them is in the middle or on the outside? The same question may be asked of the perception of thickness and thinness or softness find hardness in the sensation of touch. And are not the communications of the other senses similarly defective? Is not this the procedure with each of them? In the first place, is not the perception which deals with the hard also compelled to deal with the soft, so that it announces to the soul that it perceives the same thing to be hard and soft?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then in such cases. must not the soul be at a loss as to what information the perception is conveying by "hard," since it calls the same thing also soft, and what the perception of light and heavy by "light" and "heavy," if it tells of the heavy as light and of the light as heavy?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.' these are strange communications for the mind to receive, and call for inquiry.'

Socrates/ 'Then naturally in such cases, the mind summons calculation and intelligence to its aid, and tries to consider whether each of the matters announced is one or two?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And if two, does not each of these two appear distinct from the other, and one?

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then if each is one and both together are two, the mind will understand the two as separate; for if they were not separate, it would not have understood them as two, but as one?'

Glaucon/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Now, sight also, we say, saw big and little, only not separate, but as a confused something. Is that not so?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But in order to make this dear the intelligence was compelled in its turn to see big and little, but in the opposite way from sight, not confused, but distinct.'

Glaucon/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Then is it not from some such reason that it first occurs to us to ask, "Then what is 'the big' and 'the little?'

Glaucon/ 'Assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'And thus we distinguish on the one hand what is thought, and on the other what is seen?'

Glaucon/ 'Most true.'

Socrates/ 'Then this is what I was trying to express a moment ago when said that some things stimulate the understanding and some do not, and defined as stimulating those things which strike upon the senses along with their opposites; those which do not, as not rousing the intelligence.'

Glaucon/ 'I now understand, and I agree.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, to which of those do number and the one seem to belong?'

Glaucon/ 'I cannot make up my mind.'

Socrates/ 'Come! draw an inference from our previous remarks. If the one, itself and by itself, is seen or apprehended by any other of the senses adequately, then like the finger we spoke of, it will not have the quality of drawing towards being. But if some contradiction is always seen along with it, so that it seems no more one than the opposite of one, then this will necessitate the critic, and the soul will necessarily in this case be at a loss, and will have

to make search, setting the intelligence within it in motion, and to ask, "What then is the one itself?" and so the studying of the one will be of those things which lead on and turn us round to the sight of that which is.

Glaucon/ 'Yes, and the seeing of the one has this quality in a marked degree, for we see the same thing at the same time as one and infinite in number.'

Socrates/ 'Then if this is the case with the one, is it not the same with all number?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'But calculation and arithmetic are throughout concerned with number?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then they are seen to lead towards truth?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, in a pre-eminent degree.'

Socrates/ 'Then here apparently we have one of the studies which we are seeking. For this study is essential to a warrior for his drill, and to a philosopher, because he must rise above becoming and lay hold on being if he is ever to become a reasonable arithmetician.'

Glaucon/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'But our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then it will be fitting, Glaucon, to prescribe this study by law, and to persuade those who are to share in the highest affairs of the city to take to calculation, and embrace it in no amateur spirit. They must go on until they arrive by the help of sheer intelligence at a vision of the nature of numbers, practicing it not like merchants and peddlers for the sake of buying and selling, but for the

purposes of war, and of an easier conversion of the soul itself from becoming to truth and being.'

Glaucon/ 'Most excellent words.'

Socrates/ 'Further it strikes me, now that we have mentioned the study of calculation, how elegant it is and in what manifold ways it helps our desires if it is pursued not for commercial ends but for the sake of knowledge.'

Glaucon/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'In this way which we have just been mentioning. It powerfully draws the soul above, and forces it to reason concerning the numbers themselves, not allowing any discussion which presents to the soul numbers with bodies that can be seen or touched. You know how it is with skilled mathematicians? If anyone in an argument attempts to dissect the one, they laugh at him, and will not allow it. If you cut it up, they multiply it, taking good care that the one shall never appear not as one but as many parts.'

Glaucon/ 'That is perfectly true.'

Socrates/ 'Then what, Glaucon, if you were to say to them, "My wonderful friend, what sort of numbers are you discussing in which the one answers your claims, in which each 'one' is equal to every other 'one' without the smallest difference and contains within itself no parts?" How do you think they would reply?'

Glaucon/ 'I fancy by saying that they are talking about those numbers which can be apprehended by the understanding alone, but in no other way.'

Socrates/ 'Do you see, then, my friend, that this study may fairly be thought necessary for us, since we find that it necessitates that the soul shall apply intelligence itself to truth itself?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, indeed. it does that in a very marked degree. '

Socrates/ 'Further, have you ever noticed that those who have a natural capacity for calculation are, generally speaking, naturally quick at all kinds of study; while men of slow intellect, if they are trained and exercised in arithmetic, if they get nothing else from it, at least all improve and become sharper than they were before?

Glaucon/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'And I fancy you will not easily find many studies which are more trouble to learn and practice than this one?'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Then for all these reasons we must not neglect the study, but those who have the best natures must be trained in it?'

Glaucon/ 'I agree.'

Socrates/ 'Then let that be one point settled. Secondly, let us examine whether the study which borders on arithmetic suits us.'

Glaucon/ 'What is that? Do you mean geometry?'

Socrates/ 'Just that.'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously, so much of it as applies to warlike operations is suitable. In pitching camp, occupying positions, closing up or deploying an army, and generally in executing other maneuvers on the field of battle or on the march, it will make a difference whether a man is a geometrician or not.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, but for such purposes quite a little geometry and calculation is sufficient. For the greater and the more advanced portion we must consider whether it tends to the other result, to making it easier to perceive the Form of the good. All things have this tendency, we say, if they compel the soul to turn towards that region which

contains that most blissful sphere of being which it is most necessary for the soul to see.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then if it compels us to behold being, it is suitable; if to behold becoming, it is unsuitable?'

Glaucon/ 'That is our statement.'

Socrates/ 'But none who have even a slight acquaintance with geometry, will deny that the nature of this science is in exact contradiction to the arguments used in it by its professors.'

Glaucon/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'Well, they talk in most ridiculous and beggarly fashion; for they speak like men of business, and as though all their demonstrations had a practical aim, with their talk of squaring and applying and adding, and so on. But surely the whole study is carried on for the sake of knowledge.'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then must we not admit this further point?'

Glaucon/ 'What?

Socrates/ 'That it is for the knowledge of that which always is, not of that which at some particular place and time is becoming and perishing.'

Glaucon/ 'That may well be agreed. For geometrical knowledge is of that which always is.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my fine fellow, it will draw the souls towards truth and complete the philosophic understanding, making us raise upwards what now we wrongly direct downwards?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, it will do that as far as may be.'

Socrates/ 'Then you must prescribe, as far as may be, that those in your City Beautiful shall in no way neglect

geometry. Its accidental advantages also are by no means unimportant.'

Glaucon/ 'Which?

Socrates/ 'Those you mentioned, which concern war. And, for that matter, in all forms of study where we wish to ensure ready understanding, we know perfectly well that there is all the difference in the world between one who has studied geometry and one who has not.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, certainly, all the difference.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we decide upon this as a second study for our young men?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we put astronomy, third? Do you agree?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly I do. An attentive observation of the times of months and years is suitable not only for agriculture and navigation, but also for generalship no less.'

Socrates/ 'You are a charming fellow. You seem to be afraid that the multitude will think you are prescribing useless studies. And indeed it is no simple matter, but quite difficult, to believe that in these studies some instrument in each man's soul, which was being destroyed and blinded by other pursuits, is here purged and rekindled—a salvation more precious than that of thousands of eyes. For with this instrument alone is truth perceived. Now those who agree with us in this will most vehemently approve of your proposals, but those who have never perceived this truth will naturally think that you are talking nonsense. For they cannot see any other advantage in those studies worth mentioning. So make up your mind with which party you are arguing, or whether you are not concerned with one or the other of them but will carry on the argument chiefly for your

own satisfaction, though you have no objection if anyone else gets any advantage from it.'

Glaucon/ 'I choose the latter alternative, to speak and ask and answer chiefly for my own satisfaction.'

Socrates/ 'Fall back, then, for we made a mistake a moment ago in deciding what came next to geometry.'

Glaucon/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'After plane geometry, we took solids already in revolution before solids by themselves. But it is right after the second increase to take the third, and that is surely concerned with cubic increase and bodies with depth?

Glaucon/ 'It is. But those problems, Socrates, seem to be still unsolved.

Socrates/ 'There are two reasons for that. They are difficult, and are only feebly investigated, because no city holds them in honor; and, besides, their investigators need a superintendent; without him they will come to no solutions. To find such a man is hard enough; but when you have found him, as things are at present the investigators in the science would be too conceited to obey him. But if the whole city should co-operate with the superintendent and pay honor to the study, then they would obey, and the real nature of those problems would be brought to light as the result of steady and vigorous investigation. For even now, though the public despise and discourage the subject, and its investigators do not understand it? usefulness, nevertheless in spite of all these obstacles it makes progress, such is the charm of the study; and it would be in no way surprising if its problems were explained.

Glaucon/ 'Yes, there is an extraordinary charm about the subject. But tell me more clearly what you meant a moment ago. You defined geometry, I think, as the investigation of the plane?'

Socrates/ 'Yes.'

Glaucon/ 'Then at first, you put astronomy next to it, but afterwards you drew back?'

Socrates/ 'Yes, in my hurry to get through everything quickly I only go more slowly. The inquiry into the dimension of depth comes next; but I left it out because it is so ridiculously investigated, and after geometry named astronomy, which is the motion of solids.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then, let us put astronomy fourth, on the supposition that the study that is now neglected will exist if the city takes it up.'

Glaucon/ 'That is reasonable. You rebuked me a moment ago, Socrates, for my inept praise of astronomy. But now I can praise it from the point of view from which you pursue it. For it seems perfectly obvious to me that astronomy, at any rate, compels the soul to look on high, and from things here leads it yonder.'

Socrates/ 'Possibly, it is obvious to everyone but myself. For I don't think as you do.'

Glaucon/ 'But how then?

Socrates/ 'In the way in which those who would lead us to philosophy now pursue the study, it seems to me simply to make men look downwards.'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'You seem to me, to display a fine assurance in your conception of the nature of the study which deals with things above. Apparently you would think that a man was using his reason and not his eyes, if he learnt something by gazing at a carved ceiling with his head bent back. Possibly you are right to think so, and I am a simple fool. But I cannot think of any other study as one that makes the soul look on

high except that which is concerned with being and the unseen. If anyone attempts to learn anything which is perceivable—his open mouth may yawn upwards or his closed mouth purse downwards, it makes no difference. He, I declare, will never learn. For such things do not admit of knowledge, and his soul is looking downwards and not up, though you may stretch him on his back on the ground or float him in the sea for his studies.'

Glaucon/ 'I am justly punished. You were right to rebuke me. But what then did you mean by saying that astronomy ought to be studied on a system very different from the present one, if its students were to learn anything of value for our purposes?'

Socrates/ 'This. These ornaments of the heavens, since they adorn a visible sky, should be thought to be the most beautiful and to have the most perfect nature amongst visible things, but to fall far short of those true adornments, those movements wherewith pure velocity and pure retardation, in true number and in all true figures, are moved in relation to each other, and wherewith they also move that which is within them, which matters are to be apprehended by reason and understanding, but not by sight. Do you disagree?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then, we must use the adornments of heaven as models in our study of those true ornaments, as though we had come across diagrams drawn and elaborated with surpassing skill by Daedalus or some other artist or draughtsman. For surely any competent geometrician on seeing such diagrams would think that they were most beautifully executed, but would consider it ridiculous to examine them seriously with any hope of finding in them the truths of equality or duplicity or any other ratio.'

Glaucon/ 'How could it help being ridiculous?'

Socrates/ 'Then, do you fancy that he who is really an astronomer will not feel the same when he contemplates the motions of the stars? He will think that heaven and what it contains have been composed by heaven's creator with the utmost beauty that the composition of such things allows; but in respect to the relations of night and day, of days and months, and months and years, and of the other stars to sun and moon and to each other, do you not think that he will regard with astonishment the man who considers that these objects, bodily and visible as they are, are ever invariable and never decline from their courses, and will think it absurd to make enormous efforts to apprehend the truth of these matters?'

Glaucon/ 'Well, I certainly think so now, as I listen to your words.'

Socrates/ 'Astronomy, then, like geometry, we shall pursue by the help of problems, and leave the starry heavens alone; if we hope truly to apprehend it, and turn the natural intelligence of the soul from uselessness to use.'

Glaucon/ 'The task you prescribe, is far beyond the present methods of astronomical study.'

Socrates/ 'Well, I fancy, that our other prescriptions will be in the same manner if we are of any use as legislators. Now, have you any suitable study to suggest?'

Glaucon/ 'No, not at this moment.'

Socrates/ 'Motion presents, not one, but several forms, I imagine. The wise will perhaps be able to name the full list. But even I can distinguish two.'

Glaucon/ 'What are they?'

Socrates/ 'One we have had, the other is its counterpart.'

Glaucon/ 'What is it?'

Socrates/ 'Apparently, as the eyes are fixed on astronomy, so are the ears on harmonics, and these are sister sciences as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with them. Do we not?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then, since the subject is complicated, let us inquire of them what they say on these matters, and whether they have any other information to give us. And throughout we shall look after our special interest.

Glaucon/ 'What is that?'

Socrates/ 'That those, whom we are to bring up, shall not attempt to study anything in those sciences which is imperfect and which does not always reach to that point at which all things ought to arrive, as we have just been saying about astronomy. Do you not know that the same sort of thing happens in harmonics? Men expend fruitless labor, just as they do in astronomy, in measuring audible tones and chords.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, by heaven, and what fools they make of themselves, talking of "densities" and what not, and straining their ears as if they were trying to catch a sound which was somewhere in the neighborhood; and some declare that they can hear another note between two already distinguished, and this is the smallest interval, and should be made the unit of measurement; and others disagree and say that it is not a new note, and both parties put their ears before their reason.'

Socrates/ 'You are talking of those fine fellows, who persecute and torture the strings, racking them upon pegs. But I shall not weary you with my simile by telling you of the blows they inflict with the plectrum and the accusations they bring, and of the strings' denials and blusterings. I leave that, and declare that I don't mean these people, but the

Pythagoreans, whom we have just said we should question about harmonics. For they behave like astronomers; they try to find the numbers in audible consonances, and do not rise to problems, to examining what numbers are and what numbers are not consonant, and for what reasons.'

Glaucon/ 'That would be a more than human inquiry.'

Socrates/ 'In any case, it is useful in the search for the beautiful and the good, but if it is pursued in any other way, it is useless.'

Glaucon/ 'That is likely enough.'

Socrates/ 'Now I imagine, that if the inquiry into all those studies which we have described comes to the consideration of their community with and relations to one another, and considers how these different sciences are akin, then our labors will contribute to the purposes we have in view, and we shall not toil in vain; but on any other assumption we shall.'

Glaucon/ 'I venture to prophesy the same, but you describe a very long task, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Do you say that of the prelude, or of what? Do we not know that all these studies are but the prelude of the real melody which is to be studied? You surely don't think that men who are clever in these sciences are dialecticians?'

Glaucon/ 'By heavens, no, at least only a very few of those I have met.'

Socrates/ 'But, do you think that men who are unable to give and receive reasons ever know anything of what we say they ought to know?'

Glaucon/ 'There again I answer no.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Glaucon, is this not at last the real melody played by dialectic? It is intelligible, and its copy is the power of sight which we described as at length

endeavoring to look at the real animals, then at the real stars, and finally at the real sun. So too when anyone tries by dialectic through the discourse of reason unaided by any of the senses to attain to what each reality is, and desists not until by sheer intelligence he apprehends the reality of good, then he stands at the real goal of the intelligible world, as the man in our simile stood at the goal of the visible.'

Glaucon/ 'Assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you not call this progress dialectic?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then, the release of the prisoners from bondage, the turning round from the shadows to the images and the light, the ascent from the cave to the sunlight, and that stage in the world above when they are still unable to look at animals and plants and the light of the sun, but can look at the divine reflections in water and the shadows of real things, instead of the shadows of images thrown by a light which is itself but an image compared with the sun—this is accomplished by all that pursuit of those arts which we have mentioned. It leads what is best in the soul up to the vision of what is best in things that are, just as in our simile the clearest organ of the body was led up to the vision of the brightest object in the bodily and visible world.'

Glaucon/ 'I accept your statements. All the same, they certainly seem to me hard to accept, though in another sense it is 'hard not to accept them. Nevertheless let us assume that the truth is as you state it; we need not be content with what we hear now, but must return to the subject often in the future. And now let us proceed to the real melody, and describe it as we have described the prelude. Tell us, therefore, what is the character of the power of dialectic, into what forms is it divided, and, finally, what are its methods.

For these probably would lead to that point where a rest from the way and an end of his journeying awaits the traveler.'

Socrates/ 'Dear Glaucon, you will not yet be able to follow me—though not from any want of zeal on my part—but you would see no longer an image of that of which we are speaking, but the very truth—at least as it appears to me. Whether it is actually so or not need not trouble us further now, but, that there is something of this sort to see, we must insist, must we not?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And also that the power of dialectic alone would reveal it, and only to one who has experience of the studies we have described, and that in no other way is this possible?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, on that we may insist.'

Socrates/ 'In any case, no one will object to our saying that it is some further method which endeavors in every case systematically to apprehend concerning each reality that which it is. But all the other arts are concerned with beliefs and desires of men, or are directed towards becomings and compositions, or towards the care of growing or composite things. And as for the exceptions which we declared to partake in a measure of being, the art of geometry and those which follow it, we sec that these dream about being. They cannot behold it with waking eyes so long as they use hypotheses and leave them uncivilized, without being able to give an account of them. For if a man's first principle is one he does not know, and his final conclusion and the intermediate stages are compounded out of that which he does not know, what possibility is there of such an agreement ever becoming knowledge?'

Glaucon/ 'None.'

Socrates/ 'Then the dialectical method alone, proceeds in this way, destroying its hypotheses to get to the first principle of all and make itself secure. It finds the eye of the soul embedded in what is really a swamp of barbarism and gently draws and raised it upwards, using the arts which we have enumerated as handmaids in the work of conversion. These we have often from force of habit called knowledge, but they need another name, implying more brightness than belief, and more obscurity than knowledge. I think we previously called this understanding—but we are not, I think, disputing about a name. The subjects which we are considering are too important for that.'

Glaucon/ 'No, we are not.'

Socrates/ 'But will words which manifest somehow the quality of clear speaking in the soul be enough?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then it will suffice, if as formerly we call the first division knowledge, the second understanding, the third faith, and the fourth conjecture, the last two together belief and the first two intelligence; and say that belief deals with becoming as intelligence with being; also that as being is to becoming, so is intelligence to belief; and as intelligence is to belief, so is knowledge to faith and understanding to conjecture. The proportion of the objects to which these apply, and the division of the spheres of the believed and the intelligible, we may leave alone, Glaucon, to avoid arguments many times as long as those we have had already.'

Glaucon/ 'Well, as far as I can follow you, I certainly agree on those points.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you call a dialectician him who always takes account of the reality? And will you not say that he who cannot do this, in so far as he cannot give account to himself or to another, has no intelligence on that subject?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly I should.'

Socrates/ 'Then it is the same in regard to the good. Unless a man can abstract the Form of the good from all else and distinguish it by analysis, unless he makes it run the gauntlet of every proof, and is eager to try it by the test not of seeming but of reality, and finally, unless be emerges from it all with his principle not overthrown, then will you not say that he does not know the real good any other good, and if by any chance he grasps any image of it, he does so in belief but not by knowledge: he dreams and drowses through his present life, and, before ever awaking here, goes to his final slumber in Hades?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, assuredly, I shall stoutly maintain all those statements.

Socrates/ 'Then certainly if you ever had the actual rearing of those children of yours whose training and education you are now discussing, you would not allow them, I imagine, to be mere irrational quantities, if they are to rule in the city and control affairs of state?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then will you ordain that they must pay special attention to this branch of education which will teach them to ask questions and give answers most scientifically?

Glaucon/ 'With your help, I shall.

Socrates/ 'Now, do you not think, that we have placed dialectic like a coping-stone on the top of our studies, and that there is no other study which deserves to be put above it, and that the series is at last complete?

Glaucon/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'You are left, then, with a question of distribution, the question, namely, as to the persons to whom, and the manner in which, we shall assign these studies?'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'Do you remember the sort of men we chose in our former selection of the magistrates?'

Glaucon/ 'Of course I do.'

Socrates/ 'Then thus far, consider that such natures are the ones to be selected. We must give preference to the steadiest, the bravest, and, as far as possible, the best looking. But, further, we have not only to look out for men of noble and sturdy morals, they must also have natural gifs suitable for our scheme of education.'

Glaucon/ 'Then what do you determine these to be?'

Socrates/ 'They must have keenness for their studies, my excellent friend, and find no difficulty in learning; for the soul plays the coward far more readily in severe study than in gymnastics. The exertion comes more home to it, being peculiar to itself, and not shared by the body.'

Glaucon/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'The man of our search must also have a good memory, an unchangeable purpose, and an unflagging love of work. How else do you imagine that a man will consent to crown his bodily labors by all this study and practice?'

Glaucon/ 'No one but a man of exceptional natural abilities would do it.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, the reason for men's mistaken view, and for the disgrace under which philosophy now suffers, is, as we said before, that men apply themselves to it without considering their unworthiness. But it should be the privilege only of the genuine sons of philosophy, not of bastards.'

Glaucon/ 'What do mean?'

Socrates/ 'In the first place, he that is to study philosophy must not be lame in his love of work—zealous in the one half

of it, and lazy in the other. And that is the description of a man who is fond of gymnastics and of hunting, and loves all bodily labors, but does not love study, is not fond of listening to others or of inquiring for himself, but hates any labor of that kina. And he whose love of work has taken the opposite direction is also halt.'

Glaucon/ 'That is most true.'

Socrates/ 'Similarly, in reference to truth, shall we not class as deformed a soul which, though it hates the lie told on purpose, and cannot endure it in itself, and is very angry when other people are deceitful, nevertheless is quite complacent to involuntary falsehood, and is not angry when it is found in a state of ignorance, but wallows in it like a bestial hog?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then by reference to temperance, and courage, and high-mindedness, and all t; " elements of virtue we must most carefully distinguish between the true-born and the bastard. For if an individual or a city does not know how to observe carefully all these matters, they unwittingly employ cripples and bastards as friends or rulers in any of these services for which they have occasion.

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that is certainly the case.'

Socrates/ 'Then we must take all these precautions most carefully. Because if to this weighty study and severe discipline we bring men sound of limb and of sound mind, and train them therein, justice herself will find no fault with us, and we shall preserve the city and the constitution; but if we bring men of another stamp, the event will be in all respects the opposite, and we shall swamp philosophy in another flood of ridicule.'

Glaucon/ 'That would be disgraceful.'

Socrates/ 'Certainly. But probably I made myself ridiculous just now?'

Glaucon/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'I forgot, that we are playing, and I spoke too earnestly. For as I spoke I glanced at philosophy, and seeing her so undeservedly spurned and contemned, I think I got angry, and said what I said too severely, as though had lost my temper with those who are responsible for it.'

Glaucon/ 'No, by heaven, that did not strike me as I listened to you.'

Socrates/ 'But it did me as I spoke. But do not let us forget this point, that though in our former selection we chose old men, that will not now be possible. For we cannot agree with Solon that anyone can learn much when he is old. An old man can sooner run than learn. All severe and frequent toil belongs to youth.'

Glaucon/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'Calculation, then, and geometry, and all those preliminary studies which must pave the way for dialectic, should be set before our guardians when they are boys, and in such a fashion as will not seem compulsory.'

Glaucon/ 'Why so?

Socrates/ 'Because, the free man should learn no study under bondage. And while enforced bodily labors do no harm to the body, study forced on the mind will not abide there.'

Glaucon/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my excellent friend, train your children in their studies not by compulsion but by games, and you will be better able to see the natural abilities of each.'

Glaucon/ 'What you say is reasonable.'

Socrates/ 'Do you remember that we declared that even in battles the children must be taken on horseback to look

on, and must be taken near the fighting line if safety allowed, and have their taste of blood like puppies?'

Glaucon/ 'I remember.'

Socrates/ 'Then he, who in all those toils and studies and alarms proves himself the readiest on every occasion will be put on a select list.'

Glaucon/ 'At what age?'

Socrates/ 'When they are released from the necessary gymnastics. For in the two or three years occupied in those it will be impossible to do anything else. For weariness and sleep are foes to study. And at the same time the proficiency shown in gymnastics will be one of our tests, and that not the least important.'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then after this, from their twentieth year those who have been selected shall have special privileges, and the studies which they have come across at random in their education as children, they must now bring together so that they will have a general view of their kinship with one another and with the nature of Being.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, such knowledge alone is abiding in those who possess it.'

Socrates/ 'And it is also, the best test of a dialectical or non-dialectical nature. For the power of seeing things as a whole distinguishes the dialectician.'

Glaucon/ 'I agree.'

Socrates/ 'Then you will have to watch these tests, and see who best come up to our requirements, and are persevering in their studies, and persevering in battle and the other duties the law imposes upon them; and then when they are past thirty you must select those out of "the selected." and give them greater privileges, and by testing

their power in dialectic examine which of them can do without his eyes and his other senses and approach in truth to real being. And this is a task requiring the greatest care, my friend.'

Glaucon/ 'Why specially so?'

Socrates/ 'Do you not see, how serious is the evil from which dialectic is suffering at the present time?'

Glaucon/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'Surely, it is filled with lawlessness.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then are you at all surprised that this should happen to its students; and can you not forgive them?'

Glaucon/ 'Why particularly?'

Socrates/ 'Suppose, a child, brought up in wealthy surroundings as a member of a widely connected d distinguished family to which he thought he belonged, and surrounded by flatterers, and suppose that when he came to manhood he discovered that he was not the son of his self-styled parents, but could not find his real father and mother, can you divine the differences in his behavior towards his flatterers and towards his spurious parents in the periods before and after his knowledge of his substitution? Or will you listen to my divination?'

Glaucon/ 'I will.'

Socrates/ 'I divine then, that so long as he does not know the truth he will reverence his supposed father and mother and other relations more than his flatterers; he will devote his attention to the former rather than to the latter, will see that they lack nothing, and be careful not to trespass against them in word or deed, and not to disobey them on important questions.'

Glaucon/ 'Probably.'

Socrates/ 'But when he discovers the facts, I suspect that his reverence and respect will gradually be transferred from his supposed parents to his flatterers, that he will follow the suggestions of the latter more than he did before, will regulate his life by their standard, and openly associate with them, and, unless he has an exceptionally generous nature, will entirely neglect his former father and his other reputed relatives?

Glaucon/ 'You describe just what would happen. But how does this simile apply to students of reasoning?'

Socrates/ 'In this way. You know that from our childhood we have beliefs concerning things just and beautiful. We have been brought up in them; they have been like parents to us, and we obey and honor them.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Now opposed to those are certain pleasurable pursuits which flatter our soul and strive to draw it after them, but can induce no man of any strength of character to follow them. Such men honor the beliefs of their fathers, and follow after them.'

Glaucon/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'Then, suppose that at this stage a question comes before the man as to what is the beautiful. He gives the answer he has heard from the lawgiver, and the argument proves him wrong. This happens again and again, and in all kinds of ways, till he is reduced to the opinion that what he has believed in is no more beautiful than ugly; and he comes to the same opinion about just and good, and the things he held in highest reverence. When this has happened, what kind of honor or obedience do you think he will pay these principles?'

Glaucon/ 'It is inevitable, that he will no longer honor or obey them in the same way.'

Socrates/ 'Then, when he does not think those principles so deserving of reverence, or so near to him as he did formerly, and cannot find the true principles, can he naturally turn to any but the flattering life?'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Then I fancy he will seem to have given up lawfulness for lawlessness.

Glaucon/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'Then, the fate of those who study dialectic is natural, and deserves, as I said, our full forgiveness?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, and our pity.'

Socrates/ 'Then if your thirty-year-olds are not to become objects of this pity, will you not have to take great precautions how you meddle with dialectic?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then is not this one precaution we can always observe: we can prevent them from tasting dialectic while they are young? For I fancy that you must have seen young lads at their first taste of dialectic; how they treat it as a game, and use it only for purposes of contradiction? They imitate those who refute them, and refute others in their turn, delighting, like puppies, in dragging about and pulling to pieces with words whoever happens to be near them.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, they are wonderful.'

Socrates/ 'Then when they have refuted many people, and been refuted by many, they quickly and decisively come to a rejection of all their previous opinions, and thus both they and the whole cause of philosophy are discredited in the eyes of the world.'

Glaucon/ 'Most true.'

Socrates/ 'But an older man, will not want to catch this madness. He will imitate him who wishes to converse and

consider the truth, rather than the jester who employs it for amusement and contradiction. He will have greater discretion, and will make the pursuit more instead of less honorable.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'And have not all our previous remarks been meant to ensure that those to whom arguments are to be allowed shall be of orderly and steady natures, and to prevent the approach of the casual and the unfit which prevails now?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then for the acquisition of dialectic, is it sufficient if the student perseveres in constant and intense study to the exclusion of everything else, in the same way as he was disciplined in bodily exercises, but for twice the number of years?'

Glaucon/ 'Do you mean six or four?'

Socrates/ 'It is of no consequence. Say five. And after that you will have to force them down into the cave again, and compel them to take command in war and in such offices as pertain to the young, in order that they may not come short of others in practical experience. And still in these pursuits also you must test them and see whether they abide steadfastly every kind of temptation, or whether they give way in anything.'

Glaucon/ 'What time do you give for this?'

Socrates/ 'Fifteen years. And when they are fifty, those who have come safely through, and have always triumphed throughout in word and deed, must at last be taken to the goal; they must be compelled to look upon that which gives light to all, and turn the gleam of their soul upon it and see the real good; then using that as the pattern for the rest of their life, they must take their turn in ordering city and

individuals and their own lives; the most of their time they will spend in philosophy, but when their turn comes, they will endure the toil of directing politics and being rulers for the sake of their city, regarding such action not as anything noble but as a compulsion laid upon them; and so each generation, having trained up others like to themselves whom they can leave to be the city's guardians, will depart to the islands of the blest and dwell there. The city shall establish monuments and sacrifices to them, if the Pythian allows, honoring them as demigods, if not as happy and divine.'

Glaucon/ 'You have finished off your ruling men most beautifully, Socrates, like a sculptor.'

Socrates/ 'And the ruling women also, Glaucon, for don't imagine that anything I have said applies any more to men than to women, so long as we have women of adequate natural gifts.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right, since they will share alike with the men in all things, as we described.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, do you agree that our words concerning city and constitution are not mere pious prayers; that our proposals are difficult, but are somehow practicable, and that in no other way than we have described; when those who are truly philosophers, either one or more of them, become rulers in a state and despise the present objects of men's ambitions, thinking them worthless and mean; when holding precious the right and the prizes which it gives, and giving the chiefest and most essential place to justice, they serve and foster it, and so set their own city to rights?'

Glaucon/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'They must send into the country, all in the city who are more than ten years old, and so get the children out

of the moral influences of their parents, and train them in their own customs and laws, which are those we have enumerated. And will not a city and constitution, such as we have described, be thus most quickly and easily established, and enjoy happiness, and greatly benefit the nation in which it is found?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely. and I think, Socrates, that you have described well how, if ever, it would come into being.'

Socrates/ 'Then is not our discourse concerning this city, and the man who is like to it, now at last complete? For surely it is obvious what sort of nature we shall demand of him?'

Glaucon/ 'It is. and as for our subject, I think it is completed.'

Book 8.

Socrates/ 'Good. We have agreed, then, Glaucon, that in the city whose constitution is to be perfect, wives and children and all education will be in common; so will warlike and peaceful occupations; and those who have shown themselves best in philosophy and war are to be their kings.'

Glaucon/ 'We have.'

Socrates/ 'We have also agreed to the proposal that when the rulers are established they shall assemble the soldiers, and settle them in dwellings such as we prescribed, dwellings common to all, and with nothing private for anyone. And besides this we also, if you remember, came to an agreement about the manner of their holding property.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, I remember, that we thought that no one should possess any of those things which now constitute ordinary people's property; rather they were to be like warrior athletes and guardians, and to receive yearly sustenance for their needs from the other citizens as salary for their guardianship, and were to look after themselves and the rest of the city.'

Socrates/ 'Your account is correct. But come, we completed that subject, so let us go back to where we started this digression, and resume our old path.'

Glaucon/ 'That is not difficult. You were practically at the point at which you are now. You were saying that we had completed our discussion of the city, and that you ranked as good the city so described and the man who was like it, even though you could apparently have told us of a still more beautiful city and man. But in any case, you said that since this city was right, all others were faulty. Of the other constitutions you said, I remember, that there were four forms worth considering, whose mistakes ought to be noticed; there were also men corresponding to them, all of

whom we were to observe, in order that we might come to an agreement as to which was the best and which the worst man, and thus might consider whether the best was the happiest and the worst the most miserable or not. And while I was asking you which you meant by the four constitutions, Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted, and then you took up the discussion which has brought us to this point.'

Socrates/ 'Most accurately remembered.'

Glaucon/ 'But now, like a wrestler, get back to your original grip. Now that I am asking you the same question, try to tell us what you were then going to say.'

Socrates/ 'I will if I can.'

Glaucon/ 'In any case, I am anxious to hear for myself which are the four forms of government you meant.'

Socrates/ 'There is no difficulty in your hearing. The forms of government, of which I speak, and which have distinct names, are these. There is the one which most people praise, the well-known Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitution; second in the list, and second in esteem, is a constitution fraught with many evils, called oligarchy. Set over against it and next in order, comes democracy; then tyranny the glorious, the chiefest of them all, is the fourth and final disease of a city. Do you know any other form of constitution which belongs to a distinct and manifest class? For the family governments and the sovereignties which are bought with money and other such constitutions are more or less intermediates to those four. They are found among barbarians and Hellenes alike.

Glaucon/ 'Yes, you hear of many extraordinary forms.'

Socrates/ 'But do you realize, that the specific types of men and of constitutions must be equal in number? Or do you imagine that constitutions grow at random "from tree or

stone," and not from those characters of the men in the cities which preponderate and draw the rest of the city after them?'

Glaucon/ 'I certainly do not think they have any other source than that.'

Socrates/ 'Then if the characters of cities are five, the dispositions of soul in individuals will be five also?'

Glaucon/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'We have already described the man who is like aristocracy, and declared him to be just and good?'

Glaucon/ 'We have.'

Socrates/ 'Then must we not now go through the worse men—first, the contentious and ambitious man, who corresponds to the Laconian constitution, and after him the oligarchic and the democratic and the tyrannic man, that we may see the most unjust and set him over against the most just, and so may complete our inquiry of how pure justice stands to pure injustice in respect to the happiness and misery of him who possesses them, and so either be convinced by Thrasymachus and pursue injustice, or by the argument which is now coming into view and follow justice?'

Glaucon/ 'By all means let us do as you propose.'

Socrates/ We began by examining characters in constitutions before we examined them in individuals, because that was the more luminous method. Should we now, therefore, first examine the ambitious constitution—I call it that because I know of no other name in use; we must call it either timocracy or timarchy; after that shall we consider the man corresponding to it; then oligarchy and the oligarchic man; and after that shall we first look at democracy, and then observe the democratic man; and, fourthly, go into the tyrannically governed city and see it, and in turn look into the tyrannic soul, and then endeavor

to give a competent decision on the question we have proposed?'

Glaucon/ 'That would ensure reasonable observation and judgment.'

Socrates/ Come, then, let us try to explain how timocracy will arise out of aristocracy. Is it not a universal fact, that a change in any constitution originates in those who hold office when dissension arises actually within the governing power; while so long as they are of one mind, however few they may be, the city cannot be changed?'

Glaucon/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'How then, Glaucon, will our city be changed, and how will the auxiliaries and the rulers come to dissension with each other and among themselves? Or shall we, like Homer, pray the Muses to tell us how first dissension befell, and shall we say that treating us with jest and banter as though we were children they assume a lofty tragic style and an appearance of seriousness?

Glaucon/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'In some such words as these: "That a city so constituted should change is difficult; but since decay is the lot of everything that has come into being, even this constitution will not abide forever, but will be dissolved. And its dissolution will be as follows: To all living things, not only to plants that grow in the earth, but also to animals that live upon its surface, come times of fertility or barrenness of soul and body as often as their revolutions complete for each species the circumferences of circles, which are short for the short-lived, and long for the long-lived. Now those whom you have trained to be leaders of the city, in spite of their wisdom will not be able by calculation and perception to manage the production of offspring in your race so that it shall either be good or not be at all, but it will escape them, and they will

some time or other beget children wrongly. For a divine creature there is a period comprehended by a perfect number; but for a human creature the number is the first in which multiplications of roots and squares (which contain three distances and four limits of numbers that make like and unlike, wax and wane) make all things consistent and rational with one another. Of which numbers, three multiplied by four and by five, and raised to the fourth power, produces two harmonies: the one is a square so many times a hundred; the other a rectangle on the one side of a hundred squares of rational diameters of five diminished by one or of irrational by two, on the other of a hundred cubes of three. This complete geometrical number is lord over better and worse births; and when your guardians, through their ignorance of it, join brides and bridegrooms at inopportune seasons, their children will not have good natures or enjoy good fortune. The best of them will be appointed by their predecessors, but when they come into their fathers' powers, they will be unworthy, and, although guardians, will begin to neglect us. First of all music will be esteemed too lightly by them and then gymnastic, and so your young men will come to forget the Muses. Beginning in this way, they will show themselves indifferent guardians in the task of assaying your different races, which are the same as Hesiod's gold and silver and bronze and iron. So iron will be mixed with silver and bronze with gold, and inequality and inharmonious discrepancy will arise, results which always produce war and strife wherever they occur. Such we must declare to be the ancestry of sedition wherever she arises."'

Glaucon/ 'And we must declare their answer to be correct.'

Socrates/ 'Of course, the Muses' answer must be.'

Glaucon/ 'Then what will the Muses say after that?'

Socrates/ 'When sedition had arisen, the two pairs of races began to pull different ways, the iron and bronze to money-making and possession of land and houses and gold and silver; the others, the gold and silver, since they were not in want but rich by nature, led their souls towards virtue and the old constitution. After violent conflict they came to a compromise, and distributed land and houses for private enjoyment. Those whom formerly they had protected as free men, friends and supporters, they then enslaved and treated as serfs and servants, reserving to themselves war and the duty of guarding the others.'

Glaucon/ 'I think.' that this is the origin of that revolution.'

Socrates/ 'Then, will not this constitution be midway between an aristocracy and an oligarchy?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Such, then, will be the revolution. But after revolution, how will it be governed? Is it not obvious that in some respects it will imitate the earlier constitution, and in others oligarchy, inasmuch as it lies between them, and that it will also have some features of its own?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then in reverence towards rulers, in the abstention of its warrior element from husbandry, handicrafts, and other forms of money-making, in the establishment of common meals, and in bestowing attention on gymnastic and the exercise of war, in all these matters will it not imitate the easier constitution?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But will it not have many features of this kind peculiar to itself? It will distrust the wise as rulers, for its wise men will now be of mixed character, not simple and sincere as before; it will prefer spirited and more

straightforward men, made more for war than for peace, will have a great admiration for military tricks and stratagems, and will always be engaging in war?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Further, these men will be avaricious like the citizens in oligarchies, with a fierce secret passion for gold and silver. They will have storehouses and treasuries of their own where they will store their wealth in secret. They will be ringed round with dwellings, mere private nests where they may squander a lavish expenditure on their wives and whomsoever they please.'

Glaucon/ 'Very true.'

Socrates/ 'Further, they will be sparing of their money, reverencing it as men do whose money-getting is in secret, but their desires will make them enjoy spending other men's money. They will pluck the fruits of pleasure in secret, running away from the law, like boys running away from their father. Compulsion and not persuasion will have controlled their education, because they have neglected the true Muse, who is accompanied by reason and philosophy, and have honored gymnastic above music.'

Glaucon/ 'You describe, a constitution compounded throughout of good and evil.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, it is a compound. But one single feature is conspicuous in it, which arises from the prevalence of the spirited element, and that is rivalry and ambition.'

Glaucon/ 'That is certainly the case.'

Socrates/ 'Such, then, would be the origin and character of this constitution. We must merely sketch it in outline without giving an exhaustive and accurate description, because even a sketch will be enough to give us sight of the most just and the most unjust man. A description that

included all constitutions and all types of character, and omitted no detail, would be impossibly long.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'Then who is the man corresponding to this constitution? What will be his origin and character?'

Adeimantus/ 'I fancy that in his emulous nature he will come somewhere near our friend Glaucon.'

Socrates/ 'Perhaps. But I think that his nature is unlike Glaucon's in these respects.'

Adeimantus/ 'In which?'

Socrates/ 'He must be harder, and rather less musical, with an appreciation for music and for speeches, but no orator. He will be inclined to be cruel to slaves, not having the properly educated man's contempt for them. To free men he will be civil, to his rulers zealously obedient. Loving rule and honor, he will claim them not for speech or any such qualification, but for warlike deeds and warrior qualities. He will be a lover of gymnastic and of hunting.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is the character produced in that constitution.'

Socrates/ 'Again, will he not despise money when he is young, but as he gets older become more and more fond of it by reason of his participation in the character of the avaricious man, and because, since he has abandoned his best guardian, his virtue is not unalloyed?'

Adeimantus/ Who is that guardian?'

Socrates/ 'Reason conjoined with music. That alone, when it has entered into a man, abides with him through life, and is the savior of his virtue.

Adeimantus/ 'A fair speech.'

Socrates/ 'Then such, is the character of the timocratic young man, and he is like the timocratic city.'

Adeimantus/ Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'He arises, in some such way as this. He is the son of a good father, who, as sometimes happens, lives in an ill-governed city, and avoids political honors and office and litigation and all those things in which the active politician delights, and who is content to be got the better of if only he is not bothered.'

Adeimantus/ 'Then how does the son become what he is?'

Socrates/ 'Firstly, he hears his mother complaining that her husband is not one of the rulers, and that in consequence other women are set above her. Then she sees that her husband does not trouble himself much about money, and does not fight and wrangle in lawsuits or in the assembly but takes all these matters very calmly, and she perceives that he is always attending to himself, treating her neither with marked reverence nor marked disrespect. All these things make her angry, and she tells her son that his father is unmanly and utterly casual, and treats him to all the many varied complaints which women love to make on such matters.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, they are numerous enough and characteristic of women.'

Socrates/ 'Then you know, that even the servants of such men, who are supposed to be friends of the family, sometimes say the same sort of things to the children if they see the father refusing to proceed against a man who owes him money or has done him an injustice; they exhort the son to take vengeance on them all when he is grown up, and to be more of a man than his father. And outside of his family he sees and hears the same sort of thing: those who mind their own business in the city are called simpletons and held of no account, while those who do not are praised and honored. The young man sees these things and hears this

talk, and yet also hears his father's words, and from an intimate position sees his father's ways of life, and contrasts them with the ways of other men, and so is pulled by the two forces this way and that. His father waters and makes to grow the reasoning element in his soul, while the others nourish the desiring and the spirited elements. In the end, inasmuch as he is not naturally a bad man, but has known bad company, he arrives under the impulsion of these two forces at a middle position, and gives over the rule within him to the middle element, the contentious and spirited, and becomes a lofty-minded and ambitious man.

Adeimantus/ 'An excellent description of his origin.'

Socrates/ 'There, then, we have the second city and the second man.'

Adeimantus/ 'We have.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we now talk like Aeschylus, of "another man against another city set," though perhaps in accordance with our plan we should take the city first?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then oligarchy, I suppose, will be the next constitution?'

Adeimantus/ 'What kind of government do you mean by oligarchy?'

Socrates/ 'The constitution, which rests on property valuation, where the rich rule, and a poor man is debarred from office.'

Adeimantus/ 'I understand.'

Socrates/ 'Then must we first declare how the change from timocracy to oligarchy comes about?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Well, surely that is clear even to a blind man.'

Adeimantus/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'That treasure house, where each man stores his gold is the ruin of timocracy. For they begin by discovering ways of spending their money, and stretch the laws till they and their wives flout them.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is probable.'

Socrates/ 'Then I fancy they watch and try to outrival one another till they make the whole population like themselves?'

Adeimantus/ 'Probably.'

Socrates/ 'From that point, they make steady progress in money-making, and the more they honor money the less they honor virtue. Is there not this strife between wealth and virtue; they always incline in opposite ways in the scales of the balance?

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then when in a city wealth and the wealthy are honored, virtue and the good are slighted?'

Adeimantus/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'But men devote themselves to anything that is honored, and neglect anything that is slighted?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then in process of time, from men who love victory and honor they become lovers of money-getting and of money; they give their praise and admiration to the rich man, and elect him to rule over them, but the poor man they slight?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then they lay down a law which is the distinguishing feature of an oligarchic constitution. They prescribe a sum of money varying in amount as the oligarchy is more or less extreme, and proclaim all disqualified for office whose means do not amount to the prescribed sum.

Either the proposal is put through by force of arms, or by threats and terrorism they manage to get an oligarchic constitution established without actual conflict. Is not that so?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then this is more or less the way in which it is established?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes. But what is the character of the constitution? and what are the defects which we declared it to have?'

Socrates/ 'Well, the first is this, its distinguishing feature is bad. For, consider, if anyone appointed captains of ships on the principle of property qualifications and refused a ship to a poor man were he ever so skillful a navigator'—

Adeimantus/ 'They would make a poor kind of cruise. That's plain.'

Socrates/ 'And does not the same apply to the government of anything else?'

Adeimantus/ 'I fancy so.'

Socrates/ 'Is a city an exception? or does it hold of a city as well?'

Adeimantus/ 'Anything but an exception, inasmuch as, of all things, a city's government is the most difficult and most important.'

Socrates/ 'Then oligarchy will have this one great defect?

Adeimantus/ 'Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'But is this any less a defect?'

Adeimantus/ 'Which?'

Socrates/ 'Such a city must of necessity be not one but two—the city of the rich and the city of the poor—rich and poor dwelling within the same walls, and always conspiring against one another.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, by heavens, that is not less.'

Socrates/ 'And this again is not very pleasing: in all probability they will be unable to carry on a war because they are forced either to arm the common people and use them—and then they will stand more in fear of them than of the enemy—or if they don't do this, to prove themselves even in their fighting to be truly a government of few. And to add to their difficulties their love of money will make them unwilling to pay war taxes.'

Adeimantus/ 'No, that is not pleasing.'

Socrates/ 'Further, do you think it right (we attacked the practice before) that in this constitution the same men will play many parts, be farmers and money-makers and warriors?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'But now consider whether of all those evils this is not the greatest—and it is an evil which becomes possible for the first time in this city.'

Adeimantus/ 'What is that?'

Socrates/ 'It is possible for a man to part with all that he has and for another to get possession of his goods; and then when his property is gone for him to live in the city, playing no part therein, being neither money-maker, craftsman, knight, nor hoplite, but dubbed pauper and penniless.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, this is the first city where that is possible.'

Socrates/ 'In oligarchic states such things are not forbidden. If they were, there would not be plutocrats or paupers,'

Adeimantus/ 'That is true.'

Socrates/ 'Then consider this. All the time that this man was rich and was spending his money, did the city benefit

thereby in any of those departments we have mentioned? Or while he had the appearance of a ruler, was he in reality neither ruler nor servant of the city—only a spender of what he had?

Adeimantus/ 'Yes. He seemed to be a ruler, but was nothing but a spender.'

Socrates/ 'May we say this of him—that as a drone is produced in a cell to plague the hive, so is he produced in a household; a drone to plague the city?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Further, Adeimantus, has not God created the drones that fly without stings, but the drones that walk he has created, some stingless, but some with terrible stings; to the stingless drones belong those who die paupers in their old age, to those with stings all who are called criminals?'

Adeimantus/ 'Very true.'

Socrates/ 'Then it is obvious that in a city where you see paupers there are also concealed somewhere about thieves and cut-purses, and temple-robbers, and contrivers of all such evils.'

Adeimantus/ 'It is obvious.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you not see paupers in oligarchic cities?'

Adeimantus/ 'Except for the rulers you see almost no one else.'

Socrates/ 'Then we do not imagine, do we, that there are also many criminals in these cities, armed with stings, whom the government deliberately keeps in check by force?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, but we do.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we say that such men are produced in that city through want of education, and bad nurture, and bad government?'

Adeimantus/ 'We shall.'

Socrates/ 'Then this will be the character of the oligarchic city, and these, and possibly more than these, the evils it possesses?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, more or less.'

Socrates/ 'Then let that, complete for us this constitution which we call an oligarchy which elects its rulers on a property qualification. Next, let us examine the man that resembles it, how he is produced, and what, when produced, he is like.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then does this truly describe the change from that timocratic to an oligarchical man?'

Adeimantus/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'He has a son who at first is zealous for his father and follows in his footsteps, but then he sees him suddenly broken upon the city as a ship is broken on a reef, so that he and all his possessions go to the bottom—he has been general or held some other high office; sycophants get up a prosecution against him, and he is put to death or banished or disgraced, and all his fortune confiscated.

Adeimantus/ 'That is likely enough.'

Socrates/ 'Then seeing and suffering such things, my friend, and having lost his possessions, he suddenly, I fancy, becomes afraid; he drives ambition and the spirited element headlong from its throne in his soul; poverty makes him humble, and he turns greedily to money-making, and by hard work and careful saving he accumulates a fortune. Do you not conceive that such a man then seats the desiring and moneymaking element upon that throne, and makes it a mighty king within him, setting crowns upon its head and adorning it with chains of office and swords of state?'

Adeimantus/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ But the reasoning and the spirited elements, I imagine, he makes squat upon the ground beneath it, one here and the other there, and enslaves them. So that the first is allowed to reason of or consider nothing but how money may breed more money, while the second may admire or honor nothing but wealth and the wealthy, and be zealous for nothing but the acquisition of money and anything that may lead thereto.'

Adeimantus/ 'There is no other way, in which a young man who loves honor can become so swiftly and thoroughly a lover of money.'

Socrates/ 'Then is this man, oligarchic?'

Adeimantus/ 'In any case the man who preceded him was like the constitution which preceded oligarchy.'

Socrates/ 'Well, let us consider if he would be like oligarchy.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, let us.'

Socrates/ 'In the first place, then, will he not be so in the very high place he gives to money?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And, further, surely in that he is niggardly and a hard worker, satisfying only his necessary desires, and refraining from any other expenditure. His other desires he regards as frivolous, and keeps in subjection.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'He is somewhat squalid in appearance, and there is nothing which he does not turn to his profit; he is a man to make a fortune and get the praise of the multitude for it. Would not he be like the constitution we have described?'

Adeimantus/ 'I certainly think so. In any case, both he and the city give high honor to money.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, for I fancy that he has not spent much thought on education?'

Adeimantus/ 'I think not, for if he had, he would not have made a blind god the ruler of his chorus, and given him highest honor.'

Socrates/ 'Good. Now consider this point. Shall we not say that owing to his lack of culture drone-like desires grow up within him, some pauper and some criminal, and only his care for other things holds them forcibly in check?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then, do you know where to look if you want to see these men's evil deeds?'

Adeimantus/ 'Where?'

Socrates/ 'Look to their guardianship of orphans, or any occasion that may come to them of securing a large impunity for injustice.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is true.'

Socrates/ 'And does not this show that in his other transactions, where his reputation depends on his preserving an appearance of justice, he controls other evil desires within him by a self-constraint that is virtuous after a fashion? He does not persuade them that this is the better course, nor does he assuage them by reason but by necessity and fear, because he is afraid to lose what he has already.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then, in good truth, my friend, in most of these men, when they have to spend other people's money, you will discover desires which are of kin to the drone.'

Adeimantus/ 'That you certainly will.'

Socrates/ 'Then such a man would not be without discord in himself; he would not be one man but two. Yet on the whole his better desires would control the worse.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'And for this reason, I fancy, he would be more respectable than many men, but the true virtue of a simple and harmonious soul would be far beyond him.'

Adeimantus/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'And surely when matched with his fellow-citizens in any contest for victory or other honorable rivalry the niggardly man is a poor antagonist. He won't spend money to win glory in such contests, because he is afraid of arousing his spendthrift desires and summoning them to fight and strive for victory along with him. So like a true oligarch he makes war with a small part of his forces, and is usually beaten and keeps his money.

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then can we any longer disbelieve, that the niggardly and money-making man is set over against the oligarchic city, being like to it?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'We have next to consider, apparently, how democracy arises, and what is its nature when it has arisen, in order that we may then come to know the character of the democratic man, and set him up for judgment.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is our most consistent course.'

Socrates/ 'Then does not the change from oligarchy to democracy, come about in some such way as this, as the result of the uncontrolled pursuit of that which oligarchy has made its good, namely, the necessity of becoming as rich as possible?'

Adeimantus/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'I imagine that since the position of the rulers in that city depends upon their great wealth, they will not be prepared to pass laws forbidding their dissolute young men to spend and waste their substance; for they hope by buying up their possessions and by lending them money on them to become richer and more esteemed than ever.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is certainly the case.'

Socrates/ 'Then is it not now obvious that it is impossible in this city to honor wealth, and at the same time to preserve proper discipline among the citizens? One or the other must be neglected.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is fairly obvious.'

Socrates/ 'In oligarchies, therefore, by their negligence and tolerance of evil living the citizens have sometimes driven men of no common stamp to poverty?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And then, I imagine, these men settle in the city with their stings and their weapons, some of them debtors, some disenfranchised, some both, and hate and plot against the men who have got possession of their goods, and long for revolution?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is so'.'

Socrates/ 'Meanwhile the money-makers fix their eyes on the ground and pretend not to see them, and go on stabbing with their money anyone of the other citizens who fails in the struggle, levying their interest till it exceeds by many times the parent sum, and so make the drone and the beggar common in the city?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, they certainly will be common.'

Socrates/ 'And when this evil in the city is beginning to break into a flame, they are not prepared to extinguish it either in the way we mentioned, by laying down restrictions

as to how a man may dispose of his money, or in this way, by using another law which will solve such difficulties.'

Adeimantus/ 'What is that?'

Socrates/ 'It follows the one we have described, and compels the citizens to give heed to virtue. For if anyone would ordain that the greater number of voluntary contracts should not be enforceable, the money-making in the city would be less shameless, and there would be a scantier crop of those evils we have just described.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, much scantier.'

Socrates/ 'These, then, are the reasons which inspire this treatment of the ruled by the rulers in this city; while as for themselves and their families, are not their young men luxurious and idle in body and in mind, lazy, and able to offer but weak resistance to pleasures and pains?'

Adeimantus/ 'What else?'

Socrates/ 'And they themselves, with no thought but for the making of money, and as little concerned about virtue as are the poor?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then these things being so, when rulers and ruled meet one another—it may be in the public highways or other places of meeting, at festivals or on a campaign; they may be fellow-sailors or fellow-soldiers, and see one another in the face of danger—in these circumstances will the poor be despised by the rich? Will it not rather often happen that the poor man, sturdy and bronzed with the sun, will be set in battle next a rich man who has lived an indoor life, and has more fat about him than ought to be; he will see him puffing and despairing, and come to the conclusion, will he not, that these men are rich, because they, the poor, are cowards, and so when they meet together by themselves one

man will say to another, “The men are in our hands, for they are good for nothing”?’

Adeimantus/ ‘I am quite sure, that they will do so.’

Socrates/ ‘Then just as a sickly body needs to receive only a small shock from without to make it actually ill, and sometimes is at strife with itself even without external impulsion, even so does the city, which is like it in condition, fall ill and make war on itself on the slightest excuse, when assistance is called in from without by one or the other party from an oligarchical or a democratic city: or does it not sometimes break into civil strife even without external assistance?’

Adeimantus/ ‘That is certainly the case.’

Socrates/ ‘Then a democracy, I fancy, comes into being when the poor have gained the day; some of the opposite party they kill, some they banish, with the rest they share citizenship and office on equal terms; and, as a general rule, office in the city is given by lot.

Adeimantus/ ‘Yes, that is the establishment of democracy, whether it is effected by actual force of arms, or by the other party yielding from fear.

Socrates/ ‘Then in what fashion will they live? and what will be the nature of such a constitution? For, obviously, a man of similar character will turn out to be democratic.’

Adeimantus/ ‘Obviously.’

Socrates/ ‘Then, first and foremost, they are free, the city is crammed with liberty and freedom of speech, and there is permission to do there whatever anyone desires?’

Adeimantus/ ‘So they say.’

Socrates/ ‘Then clearly where the permissive principle rules, each man will arrange his own life to suit himself?’

Adeimantus/ ‘Clearly.’

Socrates/ 'Then this constitution, I fancy, will be distinguished by the wonderful variety of men in it?'

Adeimantus/ Surely.'

Socrates/ 'It will turn out to be the fairest of constitutions. Like a garment of many colors of every shade and variety, this constitution will be variegated with every character, and be most fair to look upon; and possibly, just as children and women admire many-colored things, so many people will judge this city to be fairest of all.'

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly they will.'

Socrates/ 'And, it certainly is, my wonderful friend, a handy place to look for a constitution.'

Adeimantus/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'The permissive principle allows it all kinds of constitutions, and it seems as if the man who wanted to found a city, as we have just been doing, ought to step into the democratic city and choose the style that suited him. You may go to this universal provider of constitutions, make your choice, and found your city.'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, he will certainly find no lack of patterns.'

Socrates/ 'In this city, there is no necessity to rule even if you are capable of ruling, or to be ruled if you don't want, or to be at war because the rest of the city is, or where the rest of the city is at peace, to observe peace if you don't wish to; if there is a law forbidding you to be a magistrate or a judge, that is no reason why you should not be both magistrate and judge if you have a mind to. Is that not a life of heavenly pleasure for the time?'

Adeimantus/ 'Perhaps.' for the time.'

Socrates/ 'And is not the placid good temper of some of their condemned criminals beautiful? Under this

constitution, when they have been sentenced to death or exile, they let it make no difference, but stay on and stroll about the streets; and have you never noticed how the culprit saunters round, and no one pays any attention or sees him, just as though he were a spirit from the departed?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, and such a number of them too.'

Socrates/ 'Then think of the considerateness of the city, its entire superiority to trifles, its disregard of all those things we spoke of so proudly when we were founding our city; we said that, except from altogether extraordinary natures, no one could turn out a good man unless his earliest years were given to noble games, and he gave himself wholly to noble pursuits. Is it not sublime how this city tramples all such things under foot, and is supremely indifferent as to what life a man has led before he enters politics? If only he asserts his zeal for the multitude, it is ready to honor him.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, it is perfectly splendid.'

Socrates/ 'Then these and others of a like kind will be the marks of a democracy. It will be, apparently, a pleasant constitution, with no rulers and plenty of variety, distributing its peculiar kind of equality to equals and unequals impartially.'

Adeimantus/ ' Yes, what you say is notorious.

Socrates/ 'Consider now, who is the individual resembling it; or, as in the case of the constitution, shall we first consider how he originates?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Is it not in this manner? I fancy he would be the son of that thrifty and oligarchic man, and be brought up under his father's eye and in his father's way of life, would he not?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Like his father, holding down by force those desires within him which are prodigal and not money-making? They are called the unnecessary desires?'

Adeimantus/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'Then, in order to avoid any obscurity in our argument, shall we first distinguish the necessary and the unnecessary desires?'

Adeimantus/ 'Please.'

Socrates/ 'Then should we not rightly call necessary those which cannot be denied and those whose gratification does us good? Our nature must seek after both those kinds. Is not that so?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then we may justly give these the title of necessary?'

Adeimantus/ 'We may.'

Socrates/ 'Further, those of which we may get rid by dint of youthful training, and whose presence, moreover, does no good, and those which actually do harm, should we do well to call unnecessary?'

Adeimantus/ 'We should.'

Socrates/ 'Shall we select an example of each class as they exist, in order that we may have a general idea of them?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, we had better.'

Socrates/ 'Then would not the desire for eating within the limits of health and good condition, that is, the desire merely of bread and meat, be necessary?'

Adeimantus/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'The desire for bread, I fancy, is necessary for both reasons: it does good, and it can't be done without while life lasts?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And the desire for meat is necessary in so far as it contributes to a-good condition of body?'

Adeimantus/ ' Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'What of desire that goes beyond those limits, desire for other foods than those we have mentioned? Most men, by dint of early discipline and training, can get rid of it. It is bad for the body, and bad for the insight and temperance of the soul. Would it not rightly be called unnecessary?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, most rightly.'

Socrates/ 'Then may we not say that such desires are spendthrift, while those we mentioned before are profit-making, inasmuch as they are profitable for work?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And shall we say the same of sexual and other desires?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And by that epithet of "drone" we used a moment ago, did we not mean the man who is full of such pleasures and desires, and who is ruled by the unnecessary desires, while he who is ruled by the necessary is the niggardly and oligarchic man?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Let us now return, to the change from the oligarchic to the democratic man. This seems to me its usual course.'

Adeimantus/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'When a young man who has been brought up as we described a moment ago, in an uncultured and niggardly atmosphere, has once tasted the drones' honey, and keeps company with fierce and terrible beasts of prey, men who can fashion pleasures of all kinds and tones and

varieties, then you may picture the beginning of the revolution within him, the oligarchy in his soul turning into a democracy.'

Adeimantus/ 'That must be so.'

Socrates/ 'As revolution broke out in the city when one of its factions was helped by an alliance of kindred spirits from without, does not the revolution begin similarly in the young man when one faction of the desires within him gets help from a kindred and similar class of desires without?'

Adeimantus/ 'Most assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'And I fancy there will be a counter alliance to support the oligarchic element within him; possibly it may come from his father, possibly from the advice and scoldings of the rest of his family; and then arise sedition and counter sedition, and strife within and against himself?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'It has sometimes happened, I fancy, that the democratic element yields to the oligarchic; some of the desires are either destroyed or banished, a semblance of reverence is established in the young man's soul, and order is restored?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that sometimes happens.'

Socrates/ 'But in time other desires kindred to those that had been banished were nourished in secret, because his father did not know how to bring him up, and they became many and strong?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, it often happens so.'

Socrates/ 'These turned to the same bad company as before, and their secret intercourse bred a swarm of children?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then in the end, I imagine, they seized the acropolis of the young man's soul, finding it empty of learning or fair practices or true thoughts, the best guardians and protectors in the hearts of men whom the gods love?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that they are.'

Socrates/ 'Since these were wanting, false and braggart thoughts and beliefs, I fancy, ran up and seized upon that place within him?'

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then does he not turn again to the land of those Lotus-eaters and openly take up his abode there? And if his relations offer any help to the niggardly principle in his soul, these braggart thoughts hut the gates of the palace wall within him, and will not allow the allies entry, nor admit in embassy wise words of wise seniors. They fight that principle and master it; reverence they name simple folly, and drive it out, a dishonored fugitive; temperance they call cowardice, and expel with insult and contempt; moderation and an orderly expenditure they pretend to be boorishness and meanness, and calling a crowd of useless desires to help them, drive them over the frontier?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is very true.'

Socrates/ 'Having made this clearance they purify the soul of which they are in possession with solemn rites of initiation, and when that is done they bring back insolence and lawlessness and profligacy and shamelessness, crowned with garlands and in bright array, accompanied by a thronging chorus singing their praises and heaping flatteries upon them; calling insolence good breeding, lawlessness liberty, profligacy magnificence, and shamelessness bravery. Is it not in some such way as this, that the young man

deserts an upbringing in necessary desires for the freedom and license of those that are unnecessary and useless?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is very clearly the case.'

Socrates/ 'Then in his life henceforth I fancy he divides his expenditure of money, trouble, and time equally between necessary and unnecessary pleasures. He may be fortunate, and not have been driven past all bounds in that divine rage; perhaps, also, when he is older, and the worst of the tumult is over, he may receive back again some of the exiles, and not give himself over wholly to the invaders. Then he will establish a fashion of equality between pleasure and pleasure in this life. Each as it comes has the authority of the lot behind it, and, until he is satisfied, he surrenders to it the rule over himself and then passes it on to another. He dishonors none, and encourages all alike.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But, he will not receive nor suffer within the ramparts the true reasoning of anyone who asserts that some pleasures spring from the desires that are good and noble, but others from those that are evil, and that the former should be fostered and honored, and the latter disciplined and enslaved. To all such remarks he shakes his head, and says that all are alike and deserving of equal honor.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is exactly how that sort of man behaves.'

Socrates/ 'And this is his life. Day after day he gratifies the pleasures as they come—now fluting down the primrose path of wine, now given over to teetotalism and banting; one day in hard training, the next slacking and idling, and the third playing the philosopher. Often he will take to politics, leap to his feet and do or say whatever comes into his head; or he conceives an admiration for a general, and his interests

are in war; or for a man of business, and straightway that is his line. He knows no order or necessity in life; but he calls life as he conceives it pleasant and free and divinely blessed, and is ever faithful to it.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is a perfect description, of the life of a man to whom all laws are equal.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, I fancy that this man has within him all sorts and conditions of men; he is the fair man of many colors, like the democratic city. His is the life that many men and many women envy; almost all constitutions and ways of behavior are contained within it.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is he.'

Socrates/ 'Then may we put this man over against the democratic, city and justly call him democratic?'

Adeimantus/ 'We may.'

Socrates/ 'Then there still remain to us, the fairest constitution and the fairest man—tyranny and the tyrant?'

Adeimantus/ 'Just so.'

Socrates/ 'Come now, dear friend, what is the nature of tyranny? As to its origin, it is fairly obvious that it is a transformation of democracy.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is obvious.'

Socrates/ 'Does not democracy become tyranny in the same sort of way as oligarchy becomes democracy?'

Adeimantus/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'The oligarchies set a good before themselves and made it the principle of oligarchy, that good being wealth. Is not that so?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But the excess of wealth, and the neglect of all else but money-making, destroyed oligarchy?'

Adeimantus/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'And does not the excess of the good as conceived by democracy dissolve it in its turn?'

Adeimantus/ 'What good is that?'

Socrates/ 'Liberty. In a democratic city men will tell you that liberty is their fairest possession, and that therefore theirs is the only city where a man who has a free nature can rightly dwell.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is a sentiment you hear very often.'

Socrates/ 'Now, does not the excess of this quality, as I was saying a moment ago, and the neglect of everything else for it, subvert this constitution, and make men ready to want a tyranny?'

Adeimantus/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'The democratic city is athirst for the wine of liberty, and they that are set over it to fill its cup with that wine may be evil; and so I fancy it takes more of unmixed liberty than is proper and gets drunk, and then if its rulers are not absolutely obliging in giving it liberty in plenty, it chastises them and accuses them of being wicked oligarchs.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that it does.'

Socrates/ 'Those that are obedient to the rulers, it reviles as willing slaves and nobodies, but bestows honor and praise in public and in private on rulers who are like their subjects, and subjects who are like their rulers. In such a state will not liberty inevitably go beyond all bounds?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And lawlessness, my friend, will make its way down into private homes, and end by implanting itself in the very animals.'

Adeimantus/ 'How does that show itself?'

Socrates/ 'Well, the father, for example, accustoms himself to become like his child and to fear his sons, and the son in his desire for freedom becomes like his father and has no fear or reverence for his parent. Metic is like citizen, and citizen like metic, and stranger like both.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that happens.'

Socrates/ 'And there are other trifles of this kind. The schoolmaster fears and flatters his pupils, and the pupils despise both their schoolmasters and their tutors. And altogether, the young act like their seniors, and compete with them in speech and in action; while the old men condescend to the young and become triumphs of versatility and wit, imitating their juniors in order to avoid the appearance of being sour or despotic.'

Adeimantus/ 'Very true.'

Socrates/ 'But, my friend, the last stage of this wealth of liberty exhibited by such a city is reached when men and women, who have been sold as slaves, are every whit as free as those who bought them. And we almost forgot to mention the wonderful equality of law and the liberty that prevails in the mutual relations of men and women.'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, in the words of Aeschylus, "shall we utter what is on our lips?"'

Socrates/ 'Certainly, and that is what I am doing. No one who has not seen it would believe how much freer is the life of the domestic animals in this state than elsewhere. Why, the very dogs take the proverb literally, and are like their mistresses; and there arise also horses and asses who have learnt a wonderfully free and glorious way of walking, and run into everyone they meet in the streets unless he gets out of their way; and everything else in the state is equally full of liberty.'

Adeimantus/ 'No need to tell me that. I often suffer from such animals when I am going into the country.'

Socrates/ 'But do you observe, that the main result of all these things, taken together, is that it makes the souls of the citizens so sensitive that they take offence, and will not put up with the faintest suspicion of slavery that anyone may introduce? For, finally, you know they set entirely at naught both unwritten and written laws, so afraid are they of any kind of master?

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, I know that.'

Socrates/ 'Then this, my friend, with all its beauty and youthful insolence, is the government from which, in my opinion, springs tyranny.'

Adeimantus/ 'It is insolent enough. But what is the next stage in the process?'

Socrates/ 'That disease that appeared in oligarchy and destroyed it, appears in this city likewise, gains in size and strength, profiting by the permission accorded to it, and enslaves democracy. In truth, any kind of excessive action is wont to lead to excessive reaction. This is true of the weather, of plants and of bodies, and not least of constitutions.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is likely enough.'

Socrates/ 'Excessive liberty, then, is lively to give place to nothing else than excessive slavery, born in individual and state?'

Adeimantus/ 'Probably.'

Socrates/ 'Then probably, tyranny arises from no other constitution than democracy, severest and most cruel slavery following, I fancy, the extreme of liberty.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is reasonable.'

Socrates/ 'But I imagine, that was not what you wanted to know; you were asking, rather, what is the disease which is found both in oligarchy and democracy, and which enslaves the latter?'

Adeimantus/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'I was referring, to that class of idle and dissolute men; some of them are desperately brave and leaders of the whole, the rest are more cowardly and follow. We compared them to drones, the first to stinged, the second to stingless?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, and we were right.'

Socrates/ 'Now those two classes, when they arise, make a disturbance in the whole constitution, just as phlegm and bile disturb the body; and he who is a good doctor and lawgiver of a city must take as careful precautions against them as the wise bee-keeper does against drones. His first care must be not to let them get into the city; and his second, if he is frustrated in the first, to cut them out as quickly as possible, combs and all.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, by heaven, that he must assuredly do.'

Socrates/ 'Now shall we proceed in this way?' 'It will give us a more discerning view of our problem.'

Adeimantus/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'Let us divide the democratic city in our argument into three parts, as it is divided in fact. The class we have described makes one, and that, you know, by reason of the permissive principle, flourishes as much here as in the oligarchic city.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'But it is much fiercer in the democracy.'

Adeimantus/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'In the oligarchy it is not held in honor, but is excluded from office; it has therefore nothing to exercise itself upon, and no opportunity of becoming strong. But in a democracy, you know, this class practically rules the state. The fiercest of them speak and act, and the rest crowd buzzing round the platform and won't hear of any opposition, so that almost everything in this constitution is managed by the drones.'

Adeimantus/ 'It is indeed.'

Socrates/ 'Another class of this nature may always be distinguished in the crowd.'

Adeimantus/ 'What is that?'

Socrates/ 'Of all the men engaged in making money, those that are of a most orderly nature usually become the richest, do they not?'

Adeimantus/ 'Probably.'

Socrates/ 'Then from them, I imagine, honey oozes for the drones in greatest profusion and readiness?'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, no one could squeeze honey from the poor.

Socrates/ Then these rich men, I fancy, are called the drones' garden?'

Adeimantus/ 'Something like that.'

Socrates/ 'The people would form a third class including all who work with their hands and take no part in affairs, who have got but few possessions. And in a democracy this class, when it is assembled, is the most numerous and most powerful.'

Adeimantus/ 'It is. But it won't come to the assembly often unless it gets a share of the honey.'

Socrates/ 'And therefore it always gets a share, so long as the leaders can manage to plunder the propertied classes,

divide the spoil among the people, and yet keep the biggest share for themselves.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, those are the terms on which it shares.'

Socrates/ Those who are plundered, I fancy, are forced to defend themselves, in speeches before the people and in any other way they can contrive?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And then even if they have no thought of revolution, they are accused by their opponents of plotting against the public and of being oligarchs.'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And in the end, when they see the public doing their best to injure them, not from wanton malice but because it is ignorant and is led away by their detractors, then indeed, whether they like it or not, they become oligarchs in good earnest. Not that they do this deliberately. This evil also is engendered by the drone's sting.'

Adeimantus/ 'That it certainly is.'

Socrates/ 'Thereupon follow impeachments, and judgments, and contests between man and man?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And is it not the invariable custom of the public to put one man in high presidency over them, and to foster and strengthen him till he becomes great?'

Adeimantus/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'This then is clear, that when a tyrant is begotten he springs from this root of presidency, and from nowhere else.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is clear.'

Socrates/ 'Then what is the beginning of the change from president to tyrant? Is it not obviously when the president

begins to follow the story which is told concerning the temples of Zeus Lycaeus in Arcadia?'

Adeimantus/ 'What is that?'

Socrates/ 'That he who tasted the human flesh which had been cut up with the other sacrifices must of necessity become a wolf. Have you heard the legend?

Adeimantus/ 'I have.'

Socrates/ 'And he who is president of the people finds a mob more than ready to obey him, and does not keep his hands from the blood of his kindred. He heaps unjust accusations on them—a favorite device—hales them before the courts, and murders them, with unholy tongue and mouth tasting his brothers' blood. He exiles and kills and throws out hints of cancelled debts and divided land. After this, is there not a fateful necessity upon him either to be slain by his enemies or to be a tyrant, and become a wolf instead of a man?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, a powerful necessity.'

Socrates/ 'This, then, is the man who makes war upon the propertied classes?

Adeimantus/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'Does he become a full-blown tyrant when he has been banished and has forced his return in the face of his enemies' opposition?'

Adeimantus/ 'Clearly.'

Socrates/ 'But if these are unable to procure his banishment or death by accusing him to the city, they then conspire to murder him in secret?'

Adeimantus/ 'That happens often enough.'

Socrates/ 'Thereupon all who have gone thus far hit upon the tyrant's special request of which we have heard so

much—they ask the public for a guard for their person, that the people's champion may be preserved to them.'

Adeimantus/ 'That they do.'

Socrates/ 'And the people, I fancy, give it; they fear for him, and are confident for themselves?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, indeed.'

Socrates/ 'And when this comes to the notice of a man who has money, and along with his money a name for being a hater of the people, then, my friend, to quote the words of the oracle given to Croesus:

> By Hermus' pebbled shore he flees.
> Stays not, and feels no shame to run in fear.'

Adeimantus/ 'If he did, he would not get another chance of feeling shame.'

Socrates/ 'No, I fancy that if he is caught, he is killed?'

Adeimantus/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'But as for our president himself he obviously does not fall "a glorious victim." but after casting down many rivals takes his stand upon the chariot of the state; he is no longer a president, but a finished and perfect tyrant.'

Adeimantus/ 'What else?'

Socrates/ 'Shall we now, describe the happiness of this man and of the city in which such a mortal finds himself?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly. let us do so.'

Socrates/ 'In the early days, has he not a smile and a welcome for every man he meets; he denies that he is a tyrant, and is full of promises to the individual and to the public; he grants release from debts, distributes lands to the public and to his party, and pretends to be gracious and good-natured to all?'

Adeimantus/ 'That he must do.'

Socrates/ 'But soon he disposes of his enemies without the city, coming to a compromise with some and killing others, and when he is no longer troubled by them, then, I fancy, he begins to stir up one war after another in order to keep the public in need of a general?'

Adeimantus/ 'That is likely enough.'

Socrates/ 'He also hopes, does he not, that the taxes they have to pay will impoverish them, so that they will be compelled to give their minds to getting their daily bread, and not to conspiring against him?'

Adeimantus/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'And if there are, as I fancy there may be, some whom he suspects of harboring free thoughts and of being prepared not to submit to his rule, does he not hope to find an excuse for surrendering them to the enemy, and so destroying them? Do not all those reasons compel the tyrant to be always stirring up war?'

Adeimantus/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'And compel him also, because of his actions, to be pre pared to be more and more disliked by the citizens?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And is it not inevitable that of those who have helped to establish him in power, and who are in positions of influence, some, that is to say, the bravest of them, will speak freely both against him and against each other, and express their dissatisfaction with the course of events?'

Adeimantus/ 'Probably.'

Socrates/ 'And the tyrant, if he hopes to rule, must weed out all such persons, until he has left no one of any account, whether friend or foe?'

Adeimantus/ 'Clearly.'

Socrates/ 'He must have a sharp eye also for the man who is courageous or high-minded or wise or wealthy; and it is his great happiness to have to be the enemy of all such whether he likes it or not, and plot against them until he purges the city of their presence.'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely a noble purification.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, just the reverse of medical purgation. For doctors remove the worst and leave the best; he does the opposite.'

Adeimantus/ 'Apparently he must do it, if he is to rule.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, he is bound by a most blessed necessity, which ordains that he shall live with a crowd of worthless creatures, and be hated by them, or not live at all.'

Adeimantus/ 'That it does.'

Socrates/ 'And as by these actions he becomes more and more unpopular with the citizens, will he not need a more numerous and loyal bodyguard?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'But who will these loyal persons be? and where will he get them?'

Adeimantus/ 'They will come flying in numbers without the asking, if he pays them.'

Socrates/ 'By the dog, you seem to be talking of a kind of drone imported from abroad, and most miscellaneous in character.'

Adeimantus/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'And whom will he get from the city itself? Or will he not go so far as that?'

Adeimantus/ 'So far as what?'

Socrates/ 'As to rob the citizens of their slaves, set them free, and enroll them in his bodyguard.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly he will, for they will be his most loyal adherents.'

Socrates/ 'What a glorious and blessed thing, is a tyrant as you describe him, if these are his friends and faithful followers when he has got his former associates out of the way.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, these are his friends.'

Socrates/ 'Then, he enjoys the admiration of those followers and the company of the new-made citizens, but decent men hate and avoid him.'

Adeimantus/ 'What else could they do?'

Socrates/ 'It is not without reason, that tragedy in general is thought wise, and Euripides a master of tragedy.'

Adeimantus/ 'Why?'

Socrates/ 'Because he made that remark which betrays a deep understanding, that tyrants are wise by reason of the companionship of the wise, and by "the wise" he obviously meant the tyrant's associates.'

Adeimantus/ 'He also praises tyranny as equal to godhead, and there are many other similar statements made by Euripides and other poets.'

Socrates/ 'And yet, those tragic poets, since they are wise, will excuse us and those who follow our constitution, though we intend to refuse them entrance into our city because they are praisers of tyrants.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, I think the best of them will excuse us.'

Socrates/ 'They go round all the other cities, I fancy, get together great crowds, and hire men with beautiful, sonorous, and persuasive voices, and all that they may draw the constitutions to tyranny and democracy.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is very true.'

Socrates/ 'In return for these services, moreover, they get reward and honor, mostly, of course, from tyrants, but also from democracies. But as they climb higher up the hill of constitutions, their honor becomes less and less, until they have to stop for want of breath.'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But we have digressed from our subject. Let us turn again to the tyrant's army, that beautiful, numerous, many-colored, and ever-changing body, and consider how it will be supported.'

Adeimantus/ 'It is clear, that he will sell all the sacred property in the city's temples, and spend the whole of the money, and so be able to demand lighter taxes from the public.'

Socrates/ 'What will he do when this source of revenue is exhausted?

Adeimantus/ 'Clearly, he and his drink-mates, his comrades and his mistresses, will live on the paternal inheritance.'

Socrates/ 'I understand. The public that begat the tyrant will support him and his companions?'

Adeimantus/ 'It will be sternly compelled to do so.'

Socrates/ 'But what do you say to this? Suppose the public begin to grumble, and say that it is not just that a grown-up son should be supported by his father—the other way about is the right way—and that they did not give him birth and set him where he is in order that when he grew to greatness they should become slaves of their own slaves and support him and their slaves and other rabble; they hoped under his presidency to be freed from the rich and the so-called gentlemanly party in the city; and they now therefore order him and his companions to leave the city, as a father

might drive his son and his rabble of boon companions from the house.'

Adeimantus/ 'Then, by Zeus, the public will learn what a monster they have begotten, and welcomed, and made to grow, and what kind of match it is for them. They will find that they are weak, and those they are trying to drive out are strong.'

Socrates/ 'What do you mean?' 'Will the tyrant dare to put compulsion on his parent, and to beat him if he resists?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, after he has managed to disarm him.'

Socrates/ 'The tyrant as you describe him, is a parricide and a cruel guardian of the aged, and now at last, apparently, we have come to acknowledged tyranny; the public, as they say in the proverb, in trying to escape from the smoke of servitude to free men has fallen into the fire of the dominion of slaves: instead of the plentiful and unseasonable liberty which it once enjoyed, it has clothed itself with the hardest and bitterest servitude to slaves?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, that is exactly the course of events.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, shall we not be right in saying that we have given an adequate description of the change from democracy to tyranny, and of the nature of tyranny when that change is accomplished?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, a perfectly adequate one.'

Book 9.

Socrates/ 'Then now at last, the tyrannical man is left for us to consider, his change from the democratic man, his character after the change is accomplished, and his mode of life, whether miserable or blessed?;

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, he is left.'

Socrates/ 'Do you know, what I still feel to be missing?

Adeimantus/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'I don't think that we have adequately specified the number and nature of the desires. And till this defect is remedied, there will be more obscurity than there ought to be in our investigation.'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, it is not too late.'

Socrates/ 'No, certainly not. Will you consider what it is that I want to understand about the desires? It is this. Of the unnecessary pleasures and desires, some seem to me to be unlawful. They are probably innate in everyone, but if disciplined by law and by the better desires, with the assistance of reason, they may in some men be entirely eradicated, or at least left few and weak, while in other men they are stronger and more numerous.'

Adeimantus/ 'And what are those desires?'

Socrates/ 'Those that are active during sleep. When the rest of the soul, the reasoning, gentle, and ruling part of it, is asleep, then the bestial and savage part, when it has had its fill of food or wine, begins to leap about, pushes sleep aside, and tries to go and gratify its instincts, you know how in such a state it will dare everything, as though it were freed and released from all shame or discernment. It does not shrink from attempting incestual intercourse, in its dream, with a mother or with any man or god or beast. It is ready for any deed of blood, and there is no unhallowed food it will

not eat. In a word, it falls short of no extreme of folly or shamelessness.'

Adeimantus/ 'That is very true.'

Socrates/ But I fancy that a man who is of healthy body and sound mind, before he goes to sleep, stirs up the reasoning part within him and feasts it on noble arguments and problems, and so comes to peace and understanding with himself. The desiring element he neither starves nor surfeits in order that it may go to sleep and not trouble the best part with its joy or with its sorrow, but may leave it undisturbed, alone by itself, to inquire into and stretch out after the apprehension of what it does not know, whether of things past or present or future. In the same way also he soothes the spirited element, and will not go to sleep with his spirit stirred into activity in anger against any man. These two elements he sets at rest, and the third, in which thought abides, he arouses, and so takes his repose. In such case you know that he comes nearer to grasping truth than at any other time, and the visions of his dreams are never unlawful.'

Adeimantus/ 'I think it is absolutely as you say.'

Socrates/ 'In what we were saying we have gone rather beyond the immediate point. What we want to be sure of is this, that a terrible, fierce, and lawless class of desires exists in every man, even in those of us who have every appearance of being decent people. Its existence is revealed in dreams. Consider whether you agree with me and think I am right.'

Adeimantus/ 'I agree.'

Socrates/ 'And remember how we described the man of the people. His origin, if you recollect, lay in an early training under a parsimonious father, one who honored only the moneymaking desires, and slighted those that are

unnecessary and that would not exist but for purposes of amusement and display. Is that right?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'He associates with a smarter set of men, who are full of the desires we have just described, and plunges into all their insolent kind of conduct in disgust at his father's parsimony. But he has a better nature than his corrupters, and so is drawn both ways until he settles down to a compromise between the two modes of life. He takes his pleasure from either side in what he conceives as moderation, and leads a life which is neither mean nor lawless, having, from an oligarch, become a man of the people.'

Adeimantus/ 'That was and is, my opinion concerning such a man.'

Socrates/ 'Now suppose, this man in his turn grown old, with a. young son who has been trained in his father's ways of life.'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Now suppose, further, that he is subjected to the same influences as his father was, and is drawn into entire unlawfulness, which his seducers call entire liberty; suppose, too, that his father and his other relatives come to the assistance of these middle desires, while his companions rally to the help of the other side. When these terrible magicians and tyrant-makers have given up hope of securing their hold on the young man in any other way, they contrive to implant within him a love that shall preside over the idle desires which consume whatever is given them—some winged and mighty drone. Do you think love in such men could be anything else?'

Adeimantus/ 'No, nothing but that.'

Socrates/ 'Then the other desires buzz round it. They have their fill of incense and myrrh, and garlands and wine, and all the pleasures that run riot in these assemblies. Feeding and fattening the drone to the utmost of their power, they implant in him the sting of longing; when this is done, this president of the soul has madness as his bodyguard and runs amuck: if he finds within the man any beliefs or desires that make pretense of decency and have still some sense of shame, he kills them or drives them beyond his borders, until he has made a clearance of temperance, and introduced madness to fill its place.'

Adeimantus/ 'Your description of the origin of the tyrannical man is perfect.'

Socrates/ 'Then, was it not because of this that Love has always been called a tyrant?'

Adeimantus/ 'Probably.'

Socrates/ 'Has not a drunken man also a tyrannical spirit, my friend?'

Adeimantus/ 'He has.'

Socrates/ 'He who is mad and deranged, moreover, aspires to rule both men and gods alike, and imagines that he is quite capable of doing it?'

Adeimantus/ 'He does.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my wonderful friend, whenever you find a man whom' nature or an evil life, or both, have made drunken and lustful and mad, there you have a tyrannical man, in the strictest sense, come into being.'

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'This apparently is the origin of the tyrannical man. Now, how does he live?'

Adeimantus/ 'As they say about riddles, I give it up. Tell me yourself.

Socrates/ 'I will. The next stage, I fancy, with those in whose souls a tyrant love dwells ruling all therein, is a time of feasting and rioting and reveling and mistresses, and all such follies.'

Adeimantus/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'Then does not every day and night produce a thick crop of terrible desires whose wants are many?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, thick it is.'

Socrates/ 'Then any revenue there may be is speedily consumed?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And the next step is borrowing and encroachment on his capital?'

Adeimantus/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'When all resources are becoming exhausted, is it not inevitable that the crowded greedy nest full of desires will begin to clamor; and these men are driven by the goads of other desires, but above all by Love himself, whose spearsmen and bodyguard all the others are, and they run riot, looking for anyone with money whom they can rob by cheating or by force?'

Adeimantus/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'The man is compelled to plunder from every source or be racked by pains and aches?'

Adeimantus/ 'He is.'

Socrates/ 'As the new pleasures that arose within him were set above the old and stole their share, will not the man likewise set himself above his father and mother, who are his elders, rob them, and divide his parents' goods when he has spent his own?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But if they won't make their money over to him, will he not try to cheat and deceive his parents?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And if he fails in that, he will take to robbery and force?

Adeimantus/ 'I think so.'

Socrates/ 'But, my wonderful friend, if the old man and woman resist and show fight, will he then desist and abstain from any tyrannical deed?'

Adeimantus/ 'Well, I have not much hope for that man's parents.'

Socrates/ 'Good heavens, Adeimantus, when it is a choice between a mistress whom he has loved for a day, and who has no claim upon him, and his mother, whom he has loved all his life, and who has every claim upon him, or between a fair youth to whom he is bound by no ties, the friend of a day, and his aged father, whose youth is gone, who is bound to him by the closest ties and is the oldest of his friends, do you really think that he will beat his parents, and make them the slaves of persons such as those, if he brings such under his roof?'

Adeimantus/ 'Yes, assuredly he will.'

Socrates/ 'How divinely blessed it seems to be, to have a tyrannical son.'

Adeimantus/ 'It is indeed.'

Socrates/ 'Well, when he is coming to an end of his father's and mother's goods and has now a great swarm of pleasures gathered within him, will he not first begin to busy himself with the walls of other people's houses, or with the cloaks of evening pedestrians, and after that take to cleaning out a temple or two? And all this time the old beliefs which he had as a boy about right and wrong, and accounted just,

will be held in subjection by those which are but newly released from slavery, who form Love's bodyguard and rule with him. Once they were let loose in sleep when he dreamed, in the time when he was still under laws and a father and had a democratic government in his soul. But when Love established his tyranny over him, he became for always, and in waking reality, the man he used occasionally to be in his dreams. And now he will stick at no frightful murder, no unhallowed food or dreadful deed, but Love dwells tyrannically within him in all lawlessness and anarchy. He is sole ruler, and will lead the man in whom he dwells as in a city, into any kind of daring, by which he will support himself and his rabble following, the immigrants whom the man's evil companions have introduced, and the native born whom evil ways of life have released and set free. Is not that the life of such a man?'

Adeimantus/ 'It is.

Socrates/ 'And if the number of such men in a city is small, and the rest of the population is law-abiding, they emigrate and become some other tyrant's bodyguard or serve as mercenaries, if war is going on anywhere. But if the times are times of peace and security, then they stay in the city and commit petty crimes.'

Adeimantus/ 'What kind of crimes do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'Well, they are thieves, burglars, cutpurses, pickpockets, temple robbers, kidnappers. Sometimes, if they have a ready tongue, they take to corrupt practices, and give false witness and take bribes.

Adeimantus/ 'Well, these are small evils, if there are only a few of them.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, because small is small in comparison with great, and all those crimes, in their effect on a city's wretchedness and misery, don't, as they say, come near a

tyrant. For when a city comes to contain many such men, and others who will follow their lead, and they find out how numerous they are, it is then that, helped by the folly of the public, they produce a tyrant, him who of them all has the greatest and mightiest tyrant within himself.'

Adeimantus/ 'Naturally, for he will be the most tyrannical.'

Socrates/ 'All this if men yield without a struggle. But if the city will not submit to him, then as he once chastised his father and mother, so he will now, if he can, chastise his fatherland. He will import a new band of followers, and will have and hold enslaved his once loved fatherland, or motherland, as the Cretans call it. And this is where the desire of this man ends.'

Adeimantus/ 'Truly, it is.'

Socrates/ 'Then this, is the character revealed by these men in private life before they obtain power. Firstly, for their company they associate with men who flatter them and will do anything to please them; or if they want a favor from any man, they will take to cringing themselves; to gain their end they will cut any figure that is required, and be more than kin; once the favor is granted, they are strangers again.

Adeimantus/ 'That is very true.'

Socrates/ 'So they live their life long, no man's friend, but always one man's master or another's slave. True liberty and friendship the tyrannic nature never tastes.'

Adeimantus/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'May we not rightly call such men faithless?'

Adeimantus/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And as unjust as men may be, if the definition of justice we arrived at some time ago was correct?'

Adeimantus/ 'It certainly was that.'

Socrates/ 'Then let us sum up the worst of men. He is surely the man who expresses in waking reality the character we attributed to a man in his dreams?'

Adeimantus/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And this man is found in him who being in his own nature most tyrannical wields solitary rule, and the longer he leads a tyrant's life, the more surely does he become the man we have described.'

Glaucon, taking his turn in the conversation said;

Glaucon/ 'That is inevitable.'

Socrates/ 'Now, will he who stands revealed the wickedest of men, be shown to be also the most miserable? And will he who has borne tyrant rule longest and most triumphantly have been in truth the longest and most emphatically miserable? Though the multitude will always have varying opinions about him.'

Glaucon/ 'It is inevitable, that things should be as you say.'

Socrates/ 'Then, will not the tyrannical man and the city governed by a tyrant be set over against one another as alike, a man of the people against a democratic city, and so on with the others?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then in respect to virtue and happiness, the same relations will hold between man and man as between city and city, will they not?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'How does the city governed by a tyrant compare in virtue with the kingly city as we originally described it?'

Glaucon/ 'They are exact opposites. The one is the best of cities, the other the worst.'

Socrates/ 'I shall not ask which is which, for that is obvious. Do you give the same decision regarding their happiness or misery, or not? Don't let us be dazzled by gazing at the individual tyrant or a few of his followers. We must enter the city and examine the whole of it. So let us creep in and take a look all round, and then give our opinion.'

Glaucon/ 'Your claim is perfectly just. It is obvious to any man that there is no more wretched city than that governed by a tyrant, none happier than the royal city.'

Socrates/ 'Now if I make the same claim concerning the individual man, shall I not be right in demanding that he alone shall give his judgment on them whose thought can enter in and discern each man's heart, who is not like a child dazzled by what he sees from the outside—the circumstance and pomp of tyranny which is assumed for the benefit of the outside world—but who can look through right to the heart? May I not also claim that it is right for all of us to listen to the man who is able to judge, who has lived under the same roof with the tyrant, who has been by his side while he lived his ordinary family life at home and has observed his behavior to the different members of his family (among whom, if anywhere, he may be seen stripped of his stage trappings), and who has seen him also in public dangers; and may we not summon him who has seen all this to declare to us how the tyrant compares with the others in respect of happiness and virtue?'

Glaucon/ 'That also is perfectly fair.'

Socrates/ 'Shall we, then, pretend, that we are among those who are able to judge, or have met with such, in order that we may have someone to answer our questions?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Come now, consider the question in this way. Keep in your mind the likeness of man and city, and so, examining them point by point, enumerate the characteristics of each in turn.'

Glaucon/ 'To which do you refer?

Socrates/ 'Well, to begin with a city. Do you call the tyrant-governed city free or a slave?'

Glaucon/ 'As much a slave as it could possibly be.'

Socrates/ 'Then do you see therein masters and freemen?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, a few. But almost all therein, and certainly all the best element, is in dishonorable and wretched servitude.'

Socrates/ 'Then if the man is like the city, must not the same disposition be found in him, and will not his soul be full of extreme slavery and lack of freedom, and all the most respectable elements in it be slaves, and a small part, and that the most wicked and the most mad, be master?'

Glaucon/ 'That is inevitable.'

Socrates/ 'Well, will you call such a soul free or a slave?'

Glaucon/ 'I call it a slave, of course.'

Socrates/ 'But does not the slave city which is governed by a tyrant have least power of doing what it wants?'

Glaucon/ 'Much the least.'

Socrates/ 'Then the tyrant-governed soul will have least power of doing what it wants, or what the whole soul wants? It will ever be dragged about by a madness of desire, and be full of confusion and remorse?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Must the tyrant-governed city be rich or poor?'

Glaucon/ 'Poor.'

Socrates/ 'Then the tyrannical soul also must be always poverty-stricken and unsatisfied?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Moreover, must not such a city and such a man be full of fear?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, very much so.'

Socrates/ 'And in any other city, do you think that weepings and gnashings of teeth, lamentation and pain, will be more abundant?'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Or more abundant in any individual than in this tyrannical man who is maddened by desires and lusts?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'And it was your view of all those facts, and others like them, I imagine, that made you judge this city the most wretched of cities?'

Glaucon/ 'Was I not right?'

Socrates/ 'You certainly were. But in view of these same facts, what have you to say of the tyrannical man?'

Glaucon/ 'That he is by far the most miserable of all men.'

Socrates/ 'In making that remark you are no longer right.'

Glaucon/ 'How is that?'

Socrates/ 'In him we have not yet come to the most miserable.'

Glaucon/ 'Then when shall we?'

Socrates/ 'This man will seem to you perhaps eve;: ore miserable.'

Glaucon/ 'What man?'

Socrates/ 'He, who, being of tyrannical nature, does not lead his life in private, but is unfortunate, and is led by circumstances to be a tyrant.'

Glaucon/ 'From what we have said before, I conjecture, that you are right.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, but it is not enough to fancy such things. You must examine them very carefully by the method we have agreed upon. For our inquiry is concerned with the greatest of questions—a good and an evil life.'

Glaucon/ 'You are perfectly right.'

Socrates/ 'Then consider whether there is anything in what I say. It seems to me that in our inquiry on this matter we must get light from the following sources.'

Glaucon/ 'From which?'

Socrates/ 'By examining each of those rich individuals in cities who own a great number of slaves; for they have this point of similarity with tyrants, that they are rulers of many. No doubt the tyrant has the best of it in point of numbers?'

Glaucon/ 'He has.'

Socrates/ 'You know, I suppose, that they live unconcernedly, and are not afraid of their servants?'

Glaucon/ 'Well, is there anything for them to fear?'

Socrates/ 'Nothing, but do you see why that is?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes. The whole city gives assistance to each individual.'

Socrates/ 'Excellent. But supposing one of the gods were to take a man who possesses fifty slaves or even more, and were to lift him and his wife and children out of the city and put him down, with all his property and his slaves, in a desert place where there would be no free men to come to his assistance, do you not suppose that he would be in the most terrible fright in apprehension lest he and his children and his wife should be killed by their servants?'

Glaucon/ 'In the worst of frights.'

Socrates/ 'Would he not then be compelled to pay court to some of those his slaves, to make them many promises, and to set them free, quite against his desire, and so to stand revealed as his own servants' toady?'

Glaucon/ 'He would certainly have to do so or die.'

Socrates/ 'And supposing the gods were to plant around him large colonies of neighbors who wouldn't tolerate any man claiming to be another's master, and who punished with the severest penalties any such person they might lay hands on?'

Glaucon/ 'In that case, I imagine that he would be in an even greater extremity of evil, ringed round by none but enemies.'

Socrates/ 'Is not this the prison-house in which the tyrant is bound? He has the nature we have described, full of thronging and diverse fears and lusts. He has a greedy soul, and yet he is the only man in the city who may not travel or go to see the things which all free men want to see. He lives hidden away in his house for all the world like a woman, thinking with envy of any of the other citizens who travel abroad and see things worth seeing.'

Glaucon/ 'Assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'Greater then by evils such as these is the harvest of the man, who having an evil constitution in his own soul, which tyrannical condition you have just judged to be most miserable of all, does not live as a private individual, but is compelled by some chance to be a tyrant, and when he cannot master himself, must try to rule others. You might as well compel a man with his body diseased and unable to control itself to have no private life, but to pass his days in public gymnastic contests and battles.

Glaucon/ 'Your comparison is exact and perfectly true, Socrates.'

Socrates/ 'Then, my dear Glaucon, is not his condition altogether miserable, and does not the tyrant lead a life still harder than that which you pronounced hardest of all?

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then in good truth, and for all that anyone may think, he who is really a tyrant is really a slave, the humblest cringer and servant, and a toady of the sorriest rascals. His desires he never satisfies, but to any man who can see his whole soul he appears in the barest want and truly poor. All his life long he is full of fear, a mass of convulsive movements and pains, if he is like the constitution of the city over which he rules. And he is, is he not?

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And besides all these things, shall we further assign to this man what we talked of before? It is inevitable that because of his rule he should be and should go on becoming more and more envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, the welcomer and fosterer of every vice, and that with all these qualities he must be himself the most unfortunate of men, and must make his neighbors like him.'

Glaucon/ 'No sensible man will dispute your assertion.'

Socrates/ 'Well, now, the time has come, and, like the judge in the final contest, you must give your decision as to who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and give all the five their places in order, the royal man, the timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical.'

Glaucon/ 'The decision is easy. For I place them as though I were judging tragic choruses, in the order in which they came upon the stage, with respect to virtue and vice, happiness and its opposite.'

Socrates/ 'Shall we hire a herald, or shall I announce myself that the son of Ariston has judged the best and

justest man to be the happiest, and declared him to be the most kingly, bearing kingly rule over himself, while the worst and most unjust man he judges to be the most miserable, and declares him to be that man, whoever he is, who being in himself most tyrannical is also tyrant of his city.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, announce that.'

Socrates/ 'May I add, that this holds whether their characters are known to or hidden from all gods and men?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, do.'

Socrates/ 'Good. We may take that as one demonstration. Now see whether you think there is anything in this second one.'

Glaucon/ 'What is it?'

Socrates/ 'Since the soul of each individual, is, like the city, divided into three forms, it will admit, I think, of yet another demonstration.'

Glaucon/ 'What is it?'

Socrates/ 'It is this. Belonging to these three forms there appear to me to be three pleasures, one special pleasure attaching to each particular form, and so with desires and principles of rule.'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'There is, first, that by which a man learns, secondly, that by which he is angry. The third contains such varied forms within it that we could find no one special name for it, but named it after the greatest and strongest thing in it. For we called it the desiring form because of the intensity of the desires concerned with food and drink and sex and so on; and we also called it money-loving, because such desires are usually satisfied with the help of money.'

Glaucon/ 'And we were right.'

Socrates/ 'And if we were further to say that its pleasure and love is in gain, would not that be our best way of getting a satisfactory general expression to use in our argument, so that we should know what we were talking about when we referred to this part of the soul; and if we named it the money-loving or the gain-loving form, should we not be right?'

Glaucon/ 'I certainly think so.'

Socrates/ 'Further, did we not say that the spirited element is ever wholly bent on mastery and victory and fame?'

Glaucon/ 'We did.'

Socrates/ 'Then should we be right in calling it the victory-loving and the honor-loving form?'

Glaucon/ 'Quite right.'

Socrates/ 'And, lastly, as to the part with which we learn, it is obvious to everyone that it is forever straining to know where the truth lies, and cares for money and reputation less than the others.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, much less.'

Socrates/ 'Will it be right if we call it learning-loving and philosophic?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And men's hearts, are ruled, are they not, some by this last element, others by one of the other two, as the case may be?'

Glaucon/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'Then it is for these reasons that we say that of men also there are three primary classes—the lovers of wisdom, the lovers of victory, and the lover of gain?'

Glaucon/ 'Exactly so.'

Socrates/ 'Then there are also three kinds of pleasures, one for each of the three?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Now do you know, that if you were to ask three such men, each in turn, which of these lives is the most pleasant, each would extol his own life most highly? The money-maker will say, will he not, that, compared with the pleasures of gain, the pleasures of honor or of learning are worthless except in so far as they bring in money?'

Glaucon/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'And is not the lover of honor the same? Does he not consider that the pleasures of money-making are rather vulgar, and those of learning, on the other hand, except in so far as learning brings honor, mere smoke and nonsense?'

Glaucon/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'Then how shall we imagine that the philosopher regards the other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing where the truth lies and of being always in a state akin to knowledge when he is learning? For him there can be no comparison, can there? He will call the others in good truth compulsory pleasures. He has no need for them, but they are forced upon him.

Glaucon/ 'Should we not make quite certain of that?

Socrates/ 'Well, when the discussion concerns the pleasures, and in fact the whole life, of each type of man, and the question at issue is not their relative nobility or disgracefulness, their goodness or badness, but simply and solely which is most pleasant and least painful, how can we know which of the three speaks most truly?'

Glaucon/ 'I can't say.'

Socrates/ 'Well, look at the matter in this way. What is wanted for a judgment that is to turn out to be right? Is it not experience and insight and reason? Can you have any better test than these?'

Glaucon/ 'Of course not.'

Socrates/ 'Now, consider. There are those three men. Which of them has had most experience of all these pleasures? Do you think that the gain-lover learns the nature of truth and acquires more experience of the pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain?'

Glaucon/ 'The cases are very different. For the latter must of necessity start in childhood by testing both the other kinds; whereas there is no compulsion on the gain-lover to learn the nature of reality and taste the sweetness of this pleasure or to have any experience of it. Nay, if he had the best will in the world, he would find it no easy matter.'

Socrates/ 'Then the philosopher, far excels the gain-lover in his experience of both pleasures?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And the lover of honor also? Or has he less experience of the pleasures of honor than the other has of the pleasure derived from wisdom?

Glaucon/ 'No, honor comes to them all if they accomplish their several aims. For the rich man is honored by many. So is the brave and the wise man. So that all have experience of the pleasure which comes from being honored and know its nature; but it is impossible for anyone but the philosopher to taste the pleasure contained in the vision of being.'

Socrates/ 'Then so far as experience is concerned, he will judge best of the three men?'

Glaucon/ 'Far the best.'

Socrates/ ‘And his experience alone will involve insight?’

Glaucon/ ‘Certainly.’

Socrates/ ‘And, lastly, as to the necessary instrument of judgment, it is not the instrument of the gain-lover or of the honor-lover, but of the philosopher?’

Glaucon/ ‘What is that instrument?’

Socrates/ ‘Surely we said that judgment must be made by means of reasoning?’

Glaucon/ ‘Yes.’

Socrates/ ‘But reasoning is this man’s especial instrument?’

Glaucon/ ‘Surely.’

Socrates/ ‘Now, if what is being judged were best judged by means of wealth and profit, the praise and blame of the gain-lover would necessarily be the truest?’

Glaucon/ ‘Necessarily.’

Socrates/ ‘Or if by means of honor and victory and courage, the praise of the honor- and victory-lover would be truest?’

Glaucon/ ‘Obviously.’

Socrates/ ‘But since they are best judged by means of experience and insight and reason—?’

Glaucon/ ‘It is inevitable, that the praise of the philosopher and lover of reason should be truest.’

Socrates/ ‘Then of these three pleasures, will not that be the pleasantest which belongs to the part of the soul wherewith we learn, and pleasantest also the life of him amongst us in whom this part rules?’

Glaucon/ ‘How else? The wise man’s praise is decisive, and he praises his own life.’

Socrates/ 'What life and what pleasure does the judge declare to come second?'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously the pleasure of the warrior and the honor-lover, for that is nearer him than the pleasure of the moneymaker.'

Socrates/ 'Then the gain-lover's apparently comes last?'

Glaucon/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'Then that makes twice running, and the just man has twice conquered the unjust. And now a third time in this Olympian conflict to Zeus the Savior and Zeus the Olympian! Observe that the pleasure of the others beside that of the wise man is not altogether true or pure, but a sort of shadow picture, as I seem to have heard some wise man say. Now this will be the chiefest and most decisive of our falls.'

Glaucon/ 'It will. But what do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'If you will answer as I ask, I shall discover.'

Glaucon/ 'Then ask.'

Socrates/ 'Tell me then. Do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And do we say that there is such a thing as feeling neither pleasure nor pain?

Glaucon/ 'We do.'

Socrates/ It is a mean between the two, and is a kind of rest of the soul from these feelings. Is not that how you describe it?'

Glaucon/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'Now, do you remember, how sick persons talk when they are ill?'

Glaucon/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'They say that there is nothing more pleasant than being well, but before they fell ill they never noticed how very pleasant it was.'

Glaucon/ 'I remember.'

Socrates/ 'Do you not also hear men who are in great pain saying that there is nothing pleasanter than respite from torment?'

Glaucon/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'But there are many other similar circumstances, I imagine, in which you find men who are suffering pain extolling as the greatest of pleasures not joy, but the absence of pain and relief from their condition.'

Glaucon/ 'Well, perhaps in those circumstances this state of rest becomes pleasant and desirable.'

Socrates/ 'And when a man leaves off feeling pleasure, the respite from pleasure will be painful.'

Glaucon/ 'Perhaps.'

Socrates/ 'Then this state of rest which we asserted a moment ago to lie between the two, will be both pleasure and pain at times?'

Glaucon/ 'Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'But is it possible that what is neither one nor the other should become both?'

Glaucon/ 'I don't think so.'

Socrates/ 'Further, are not both pleasure and pain as they arise in the soul a kind of movement?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And has not that which is neither painful nor pleasant just been shown to be rest, and to lie between these two?'

Glaucon/ 'It has.'

Socrates/ Then is it possible to be right in thinking the absence of suffering pleasant, or the absence of joy terrible?'

Glaucon/ 'It is impossible.'

Socrates/ 'Then this state of rest, compared to suffering is not but appears to be pleasure, and compared to pleasure is not but appears to be suffering? In comparison with the reality of pleasure there is nothing solid in these visions; only a kind of magic?'

Glaucon/ 'That is certainly the result of the argument.'

Socrates/ 'And consider pleasures, which do not come out of pains—for I don't want you to imagine in this instance that, in the nature of things, pleasure is cessation from pain, and pain cessation from pleasure.'

Glaucon/ 'What instance, and what kind of pleasure do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'There are many of them, but you will get the best example if you consider the pleasures of smell. For they arise in extraordinary intensity in a moment without any preceding pain, and on their cessation leave no pain behind them.'

Glaucon/ 'That is perfectly true.'

Socrates/ 'Then do not let us believe that the release from pain is pure pleasure, or from pleasure pure pain.'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Nevertheless, those so-called pleasures which make their way to the soul through the body, or at least the most and the greatest of them, are of this class, releases from pain.'

Glaucon/ 'They are.'

Socrates/ 'And is it the same with anticipatory pleasures and pains which arise from expectation of pleasure and pain in the future?'

Glaucon/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'Do you know the nature of such feelings, and what they are like?'

Glaucon/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'Do you conceive, that the above, the below, and the middle exist in nature?'

Glaucon/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'And do you imagine that a man who was being lifted from the below to the middle would not think that he was being carried above? And if he stood in the middle, and looked down to the place he came from, could he think that he was anywhere but in the above, if he had not seen the real above?'

Glaucon/ 'Upon my word, I don't think that in those circumstances he could suppose anything else.'

Socrates/ 'If he were carried back again, would he not suppose that he was being carried below, and suppose truly?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And all this would be the result of his lack of experience of the true above and middle and below?'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'And would it surprise you that those also who lack experience of truth have unsound doctrines on many subjects, and as regards pleasure, pain and the intermediary state are so situated that when they come in contact with pain their suppositions are true, and they do really feel pain; but when they change from pain to the intermediary state, then they have an intense conviction that they are experiencing satisfaction and pleasure? Like men who contrast black with grey, because they have not seen white,

so they contrast pain with want of pain, because they have not experienced pleasure, and are deceived.'

Glaucon/ 'No, by Zeus. I should be much more surprised if that were not the case.'

Socrates/ 'Consider the question in this light. Are not hunger and thirst and so on what may be called emptinesses; they are empty conditions of the body?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And is not ignorance and folly likewise an emptiness—an empty condition of the soul?'

Glaucon/ 'Assuredly.'

Socrates/ 'Then will not he who receives food and strengthens his mind be filled?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'But which is the truer filling, to be filled with what is less or with what is more real?'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously with what is more real.'

Socrates/ 'And which class of things do you think has greater participation in pure being, the class containing bread and drink and meat and food generally, or the class containing true belief and knowledge and mind and, in short, all virtue? Decide in this way. Do you think that what is connected with the unchanging and immortal and with truth and which takes from these its character and its origin, is more real than what is connected with the ever-changing and the mortal, and which takes from these its character and its origin?'

Glaucon/ 'That which is connected with the unchanging far excels the other.'

Socrates/ 'Does the being of the unchanging partake of being any more than of knowledge?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Or more than of truth?'

Glaucon/ 'Once again—no.'

Socrates/ 'Less participation in truth means less participation in being, does it not?'

Glaucon/ Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'Then, speaking generally, do not those kinds of things which are concerned with the care of the body partake less of truth and being than those concerned with the care of the soul?'

Glaucon/ 'Very much less.'

Socrates/ 'And do you not think similarly of the relation of the body itself with the soul?'

Glaucon/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Then that which is filled with things that more really are, and which is itself more real, is more really filled than that which is filled with what less really is, and which is itself less real, is it not?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Now, if to be filled with what nature demands is pleasant, that which is more really filled with more real things will make a man rejoice more really and truly with true pleasure; while that which receives what is less real will be filled less really and certainly, and will receive more untrustworthy and less true pleasure.'

Glaucon/ 'That is quite inevitable.'

Socrates/ 'Then they who have no experience of insight and virtue, but spend their whole time in reveling and such-like, are carried apparently from the middle to below and back again, and wander so all their life from one to the other; but never once have they gone beyond and seen or been carried to the true above, nor have they been really filled with what is real, nor tasted steadfast and pure pleasure. Like

beasts of the field their eyes look ever downward, their heads are bent to the ground and to the table, and so like beasts they guzzle and satisfy their lusts, and in their greedy struggle for such pleasures they butt and kick with horns and hoofs of iron, and kill each other because they cannot be satisfied, inasmuch as what they are trying to fill is not the real and continent part of themselves, nor is what they are putting into it real.'

Glaucon/ 'Truly perfect, Socrates, is your utterance regarding the life of the vulgar.'

Socrates/ 'Then must not the pleasures they live among be mixed with pains, images and shadow outlines of the true pleasure, and take their color from the contrast of their setting? Thus both pleasures and pains have an appearance of intensity, and implant in the foolish mad desires for themselves, and are the objects of strife, like the image of Helen which Stesichorus says the men at Troy fought over in their ignorance of the truth?

Glaucon/ 'It is quite inevitable, that their life should be more or less like that.'

Socrates/ 'Further, must not the same sort of thing, hold good of the spirited element if any man follow it with his whole heart, pursuing after a surfeit of honor and victory to the neglect of reason and understanding; satisfying his love of honor by envy, or his love of victory by violence, or his spirit by bad temper?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, the same must hold of that also.'

Socrates/ 'But may we not take heart, and say even of those desires which are concerned with the love of gain and the love of victory, that if they follow after knowledge and reason, and pursuing pleasures in their company, accept those which insight points out, they will then, because they are following truth, receive the truest pleasures that they are

capable of receiving, and those also that are their own> since that which is best for each thing is also most truly its own?

Glaucon/ 'Yes, its very own.'

Socrates/ 'Then when the whole soul follows without dissension the philosophic part, not only may each part do its own work throughout and be just, but each may gather its own pleasures, the best and the truest of which it is capable?'

Glaucon/ 'Exactly so.'

Socrates/ 'But when one of the other two gets the upper hand, the result is that it does not contrive to gain its own pleasure, but even forces the others to pursue after a pleasure which is foreign to them and untrue?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And will not this be especially the behavior of the elements farthest removed from philosophy and reason?'

Glaucon/ 'It will.'

Socrates/ 'And is not that farthest removed from reason which is farthest removed from law and order?'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'But have not the lustful and tyrannical desires been shown to be the farthest removed?'

Glaucon/ 'Very much the farthest.'

Socrates/ 'While the kingly and orderly desires are nearest?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'In that case, I imagine, the tyrant will be farthest from true and intimate pleasure, and the king nearest?'

Glaucon/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'And the tyrant, will lead the most unpleasant, the king the most pleasant of lives?'

Glaucon/ 'That is quite inevitable.'

Socrates/ 'Now do you know, how much more unpleasant the tyrant's life is than the king's?'

Glaucon/ 'Tell me.'

Socrates/ 'There are apparently three pleasures, one genuine and two bastard, and the tyrant in his flight from law and reason goes to the very extremes of the bastard pleasures and beyond them, and lives with a bodyguard of slave-pleasures, and it is not very easy to say how great his inferiority is, but perhaps it may be expressed in this way.'

Glaucon/ 'How?'

Socrates/ 'The tyrant is third removed from the oligarchic man, is he not? For the man of the people came between them.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then if what we have said is true, he will live with an image of pleasure the third remove in truthfulness from that of the oligarch.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ But taking the aristocratic and kingly man as one, the oligarchical is in his turn third from the kingly man.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, third.'

Socrates/ 'Then the tyrant, is removed from true pleasure three times three?'

Glaucon/ 'Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'The image of tyrannical pleasure, according to the number of the distance, will be in two dimensions, it seems?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But if we square and cube it is obvious how great the interval becomes.'

Glaucon/ 'Obvious, no doubt, to an arithmetician.'

Socrates/ 'Then if conversely anyone wants to say how far the king is removed from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will find on completing the multiplication that he lives seven hundred and twenty-nine times more pleasantly, and the tyrant the same number of times more miserably.'

Glaucon/ 'You have made a marvelous calculation, of the difference of the two men, the just and the unjust, in respect of pleasure and pain.

Socrates/ 'Yes, but it is true as well, and also a suitable number for men's lives, since days and nights and months and years are suitable.'

Glaucon/ 'That they certainly are.'

Socrates/ 'Now if the good and just man by so much surpasses the evil and unjust man in pleasure, is it not incalculable how greatly he will conquer him in grace of life and beauty and virtue?'

Glaucon/ 'Incalculable indeed.'

Socrates/ Good. Now since we have come to this point in our argument, let us refer to the original statements which brought us here. It was stated, if you remember, that injustice is profitable to the perfectly unjust man, who is reputed to be just. Was not that the statement?'

Glaucon/ 'It was.'

Socrates/ 'Now, let us join argument with the author of this statement, since we have come to an agreement concerning the respective effects of unjust and just conduct.'

Glaucon/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'We shall mold in words an image of the soul, and he who said these things will realize what he has said.'

Glaucon/ 'What kind of an image?'

Socrates/ 'An image, like one of those old-time natures we hear of in fable—Chimaera or Scylla or Cerberus, or the many others which are said to have combined several forms in one nature.

Glaucon/ 'Yes, there are these stories.'

Socrates/ 'Fashion me, therefore, one form of a many-colored and many-headed beast. There is a ring of heads both of tame and wild beasts, and it can change them and produce them out of itself at will.'

Glaucon/ 'That is clever molder's work. Still, words are easier to work in than wax and such materials, so you may suppose it done.'

Socrates/ 'Then give me two more forms, one of a lion and one of a man. But the first form of all is to be the largest, and the second, second largest.'

Glaucon/ 'That, is easier, and is done.

Socrates/ 'Now join these three into one so that somehow or other they have a common nature.

Glaucon/ 'They are joined.'

Socrates/ 'Now outside mold round about them an individual image—that of a man—so that to him who cannot see within, but looks only at the outer shell, the whole appears one living creature, and that a man.

Glaucon/ 'That is done.'

Socrates/ 'Now to him who says that injustice pays this man, and that just conduct is not to his advantage, let us declare that he is really saying that it pays him to feast and make strong the many-formed monster and the lion and the lion's belongings, and to starve and weaken the man, so that he is dragged about wherever either of these takes him, and

cannot teach them to become used to or fond of one another, but must let them bite and fight and devour one another.

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that is exactly what the praise of injustice comes to.

Socrates/ 'On the other hand, would not he who declares that justice pays say that we ought to do and say such things as will make the man within have strongest control over the whole man and look after the many-headed monster like a gardener, fostering and nursing the tame heads, and with the help of the lion nature preventing the wild ones from sprouting; he will care for all in common, and will help them by making them friendly to each other and to himself?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that is just what the praiser of justice says.'

Socrates/ 'Then from every point of view, the praiser of justice would speak truly, and the praiser of injustice falsely. Whether we look to pleasure or good report or advantage, he who praises justice speaks with truth, but as for him who blames it, there is no soundness or knowledge in his blame.'

Glaucon/ 'I think not. none whatever.'

Socrates/ 'Well, let us be gently persuasive (for his mistake is not of his own will), and ask him: "My dear good sir, may we not say that men's opinions on what is noble and disgraceful have the following origin: the noble actions are those which put the wild-beast parts of the soul under the control of the man, or perhaps we should say of the divine element, while those which enslave the human to the wild part are disgraceful?" Will he agree or not?'

Glaucon/ 'He will, if he takes my advice.'

Socrates/ 'Then will this argument allow that it can profit any man to get gold unjustly; for the result is something like this—he gets the money, but on condition of enslaving the best part of himself to the vilest? Now if he had got the money

by selling his son or his daughter as a slave, and that into the hands of cruel and evil men, it would not have paid him to get mountains of gold on these terms: and if he enslaves the divinest part of himself to the most ungodly and the most abominable, and has no pity upon it, is he not then a miserable wretch, and does he not buy his gold on terms of far more terrible death than Eriphyle, who got her necklace at the price of her husband's life?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, far more terrible.' 'I will answer you for him.'

Socrates/ 'And do you suppose that this is the reason why licentiousness has always been condemned, because it means that that dangerous, that great and many-formed monster is given more freedom than he ought to have?'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'And are not obstinacy and bad temper condemned because the lion and the serpent elements are increased and strengthened unfittingly?

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And are not luxury and softness condemned because of their relaxing and slackening effect on that same element when they implant cowardice in it?

Glaucon/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'And toadying and meanness, because the mean man subordinates this same spirited element to the mob-like beast, and accustoms it from early years to be flouted for the sake of money and the beast's insatiable greed. and to become a monkey and not a lion?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And why do you think that mechanical work and work with one's hands are matters of reproach? Is it not because in some people the element of the best is naturally

weak, unable to rule the monsters within them, and only capable of learning how to pamper them?'

Glaucon/ 'Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'Well, then, is it not in order that even these men may be ruled by something resembling the principle that rules in the best man, that we say they must be the slaves of that best man in whom the divine dwells; not that we agree with the opinion Thrasymachus had of the governed, and suppose that the slave ought to be ruled to his hurt, but we think that it is better for every man to be ruled by divinity and insight? It is best, of course, when he possesses that within him, but if he does not, it had better be put over him from without, and then all men, being guided the same principle, will be equals and friends as far as may be.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that is right.'

Socrates/ 'And the law, by being an ally of all in the city, makes it quite plain that it approves something of this kind. So does the way in which children are ruled. We do not allow them to be free until we have set up a constitution in them, as you might in a city, and until by nourishing the best in them we have provided a guardian to bear rule within them which is like and can take the place of our ruling principle, and then we give them their liberty.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then under what conditions, Glaucon, or for what reasons can we say that there is profit in injustice, or licentiousness, or disgraceful conduct, when by them a man acquires more money or more power of any kind, and with it becomes a worse man?'

Glaucon/ 'Under no conditions.'

Socrates/ 'Then how will it profit him who acts unjustly to avoid discovery and punishment? If a man is not found

out, does he not become still more wicked, while if he is discovered and punished the beast in him is laid to rest and tamed; the humane part is liberated, and the whole soul is set in the direction of the best nature, and so along with insight acquiring temperance and justice achieves a condition more precious than the condition of the body which with health acquires strength and beauty; in proportion as soul is more precious than body?'

Glaucon/ 'That is certainly the case.'

Socrates/ 'Then will not the man of understanding live with all his powers strained to this end? First of all, will he not reverence such studies as will fashion his soul after this pattern, and spurn all others?'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'And, secondly, as for the condition and nourishment of his body, he will not give that over to the pleasure of the beast and of unreason and turn his life in that direction; nor yet will health be his idea); nor will he set great store in being strong or healthy or beautiful, unless with these he can also be temperate; but he will always make manifest that for him harmony of body has its purpose in unison of soul.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that he will, if he is to be truly musical.'

Socrates/ 'And will he not for the same purpose, observe order and unison in the acquisition of wealth? He will not be dazzled by what the crowd call blessedness, and heap up the mass of his wealth beyond all bounds, and so possess boundless evils?'

Glaucon/ 'I think not.'

Socrates/ 'No, he will fix his eyes on the constitution within him, and keep watch that nothing therein is shaken by excess or poverty of bodily substance, and in adding to or

spending that substance he will observe this guiding principle to the best of his power.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly he will.'

Socrates/ 'And in regard to honors also, he will keep his eyes on the same end; some, which he thinks will make him a better man, he will gladly participate in and taste, but in public and in private he will fly from those which he thinks will disturb the condition of his soul.

Glaucon/ 'If that is his concern, he will not want to be a politician.

Socrates/ 'Yes, by the dog, he will, at least in his own city; not perhaps in the country of his birth, unless some divine chance falls out.

Glaucon/ 'I understand. You speak of the city whose foundation we have been describing, which has its being in words; for there is no spot on earth, I imagine, where it exists.

Socrates/ 'No, but perhaps it is laid up in heaven as a pattern for him who wills to see, and seeing, to found a city in himself. Whether it exists anywhere or ever will exist, is no matter. His conduct will be an expression of the laws of that city alone, and of no other.'

Glaucon/ 'That is likely enough.'

Book 10.

Socrates/ 'There are a great many things about the city, which make me think in how extraordinarily sound a manner we have founded it; but I feel this most especially when I think about poetry.'

Glaucon/ 'To what do you refer?'

Socrates/ 'To our refusal to admit all imitative poetry. Now that we have distinguished the different elements of the soul, it appears, I think, to be more obvious than ever that this refusal should be absolute.'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'Between ourselves—and don't denounce me to the tragic poets and all the other imitators—all such things seem to pollute the understanding of those who hear them, unless they possess a knowledge of their real nature; that is an antidote.'

Glaucon/ 'What makes you say this?'

Socrates/ 'It must be uttered, though a certain love and reverence for Homer which I have had from my childhood would forbid my speaking. For surely of all those noble tragic poets he is the master and the leader. Still I must not honor a man more than I honor truth, but must utter what I have to say.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then listen, or rather answer.'

Glaucon/ 'Ask your question.'

Socrates/ 'Could you tell me the general nature of imitation? For I don't myself quite understand what it sets out to be.'

Glaucon/ 'Then it is likely, is it not, that I shall understand?'

Socrates/ 'There would be nothing out of the way if you did. Dull eyes have often beaten sharp ones.'

Glaucon/ 'So they have. But if I had any opinion, I should not be at all eager to express it in your presence. So do you consider yourself.'

Socrates/ 'Shall we begin the inquiry according to our ordinary method? We have been in the habit, if you remember, of positing a Form, wherever we use the same name in many instances, one Form for each "many." Do you understand?'

Glaucon/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'And shall we take whatever "many" you please. For example, if this will do. there are many beds and tables.'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'But for these articles there are two Forms, one of a bed and one of a table?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And have we not also been in the habit of saying, that it is by looking at the Form that the manufacturer of each article makes the beds or the tables which we use, and so with other things? For no manufacturer manufactures the actual Form, does he?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Now consider this manufacturer. What would you call him?'

Glaucon/ 'Whom?'

Socrates/ 'He who by himself makes all things which are made by all the different craftsmen.'

Glaucon/ 'A marvelous clever fellow!'

Socrates/ 'Wait a little, and you will soon say that with more reason. For this same craftsman is not only able to make all manufactured articles, but he makes all things that

grow from the earth and fashions all living creatures, himself with the rest of them, and, not content with that, fashions earth and heaven, and gods and all things in heaven, or in Hades under the earth.'

Glaucon/ 'What a perfectly marvelous genius!'

Socrates/ 'Do you not believe me?' 'Tell me. Do you think there is no such manufacturer at all, or do you think that a man might be in a certain manner a maker of all these things and in another manner not? Don't you see that you yourself could make all these things in a certain manner?'

Glaucon/ 'And what is that manner?'

Socrates/ 'It is not hard, but a frequent and easy mode of manufacture. It is most easily done perhaps if you take a mirror and turn it round to all sides. You will soon make a sun and stars, the earth, yourself, and other living creatures, manufactured articles and plants, and everything we have just described.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, make them in appearance, but surely not as they are in truth.'

Socrates/ 'Your remark is excellent, and just what the argument wants. For the painter also, I imagine, is one of these manufacturers. Is he not?

Glaucon/ 'Surely.

Socrates/ 'But you will say, I fancy, that what he makes, he does not make truly. Though the painter also makes a bed in a manner, does he not?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, he, like the other, makes a bed in appearance.

Socrates/ 'What of the carpenter? But did you not say that he makes, not the Form which we asserted to be that which a bed is, but a particular bed?

Glaucon/ 'Yes, I said so.

Socrates/ 'Now, if he does not make what is, he will not make the real, but something which is of the same nature with but is not the real. And if anyone were to say that the work of the carpenter or of any other craftsman was perfectly real, he would probably not be speaking the truth, would he?'

Glaucon/ 'No, at least not in the opinion of persons acquainted with this kind of reasoning.'

Socrates/ 'Then let us not be surprised if the manufactured article is also somewhat indistinct as compared with truth.'

Glaucon/ 'No.

Socrates/ 'Shall we then, 'take these as examples in our search after the nature of the imitator?

Glaucon/ 'If you please.'

Socrates/ 'Now there are these three beds, first the bed which exists in nature, which we should say, I fancy, was made by God Should we not?'

Glaucon/ 'By God, I fancy.'

Socrates/ 'And one made by the carpenter?

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And one made by the painter?

Glaucon/ 'Yes, let us suppose so.'

Socrates/ 'Painter, carpenter, and God, these three are set over the three classes of beds.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, these three.'

Socrates/ 'And God, whether because he so willed or because there was some necessity upon him not to make more than one bed in nature, made that one which is the reality of a bed and only that. But two or more such beds were never produced by God, and never will be.'

Glaucon/ 'How is that?

Socrates/ 'Because, if God should make even no more than two, then yet another would be revealed whose Form the first two would express, and this, and not the two, would be the reality of a bed.'

Glaucon/ 'You are right.'

Socrates/ 'And God, I imagine, knew this, and wished to be really maker of a bed that really was and not only a particular manufacturer of a particular bed, and therefore produced this one natural bed.'

Glaucon/ 'Probably.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we call him the "nature maker" of this thing, or something of that kind?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that is only just, when his making of this and all other things is nature's making of them.'

Socrates/ 'What of the carpenter? Do you call him a manufacturer of a bed?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And you call the painter also a manufacturer and maker of the same kind of thing?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'Then what is he of a bed?'

Glaucon/ 'I think, that he would be most fairly described as an imitator of what the other two manufacture.

Socrates/ 'Good. You call him an imitator who is concerned with that which is begotten three removes from nature?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And the tragedian, since he is an imitator, will be then one whose nature is third from the king and from the truth, and all the other imitators will be like him?'

Glaucon/ 'That seems probable.'

Socrates/ 'Then we are agreed as to the imitator. But tell me this about the painter. Do you think that he tries to imitate each reality in nature, or the works of the manufacturers?'

Glaucon/ 'The works of the manufacturers.'

Socrates/ 'To imitate them as they are, or as they appear? You must make this further distinction.'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'This. Does a bed really differ from itself when you look at it from the side or from straight in front or from any other point of view, or does it remain the same but appear different? And so with other things.'

Glaucon/ 'The second alternative is right. It appears, but is not different.'

Socrates/ 'Now consider this point. Which of these two governs the drawing of any subject? Is drawing an attempt to imitate the real as it is, or the appearance as it appears? Is it an imitation of an appearance or of a truth?'

Glaucon/ 'Of an appearance.'

Socrates/ 'Imitation, then, is far from the truth, and apparently it manages to make all things just because it attacks only a small part of each, and that an image. The painter, for example, will paint us, we say, a shoemaker, a carpenter, and all other workmen, though he has no knowledge whatever of their crafts. But nevertheless, if he is a good painter, he may paint a carpenter and show the thing at some distance, and so cheat children and stupid men into thinking it is really a carpenter.'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Well, my friend, I imagine that we must come to this conclusion about all these matters. When anyone announces to us that he has met a man who knows all

handicrafts, and who of all the things known by each separate individual has a more exact knowledge than any of them, to such a person we must reply that he is more or less of a fool, and has apparently met with a wizard and imitator, and been cheated into thinking the man possessed of universal wisdom, all because he could not distinguish knowledge and lack of knowledge and imitation.'

Glaucon/ 'Very true.'

Socrates/ 'And after this, we must examine tragedy, and Homer its leader, since people tell us that tragedians know all arts and all things human that relate to virtue and vice and things divine. For a good poet, they say, if he is to make a beautiful poem on his subject, must do so with knowledge of that subject, or fail altogether. We must then inquire whether these persons have met with the imitators and been cheated, and, on seeing their productions, have failed to perceive that they are three removes from being, and can easily be made without knowledge of the truth—for their productions are appearances and not realities—or whether there is something in what they say, and good poets really have knowledge of those subjects of which their descriptions are approved by common opinion.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, this must certainly be investigated.'

Socrates/ 'Now, do you suppose that if any man could make both the object of imitation and the image, that he would trouble to set himself down to the manufacture of images, and would put this power in the forefront of his life as his best possession?'

Glaucon/ 'Not.'

Socrates/ 'But, I imagine, if he had true knowledge of those things which he also imitates, he would be much more zealous in the doing than in the imitation of them, and would try to leave many beautiful deeds as memorials behind him.

He would much rather be the hero whose praises are sung than the poet who sings them.'

Glaucon/ 'I think so. The honor and benefit are far greater.'

Socrates/ 'Well, on other questions we may give up the idea of calling Homer or any other poet to account, by asking whether any of them had medical knowledge, and was not merely an imitator of medical discourses; where are the people whom any poet, ancient or modern, is said to have restored to health, as Asclepius did; what students of medicine they have left behind them to match the descendants of Asclepius.

And so with the other arts we may refrain from such questions, and let be. But when Homer tries to tell of the mightiest and most noble things, of wars and generalship and government of cities and the education of man, then it is only fair we should question him, and inquire: "My dear Homer, if, as you say, you are not thrice removed from truth concerning virtue, a manufacturer of an image, and what we have called an imitator; if you are but twice removed, and can know what practices make men better individuals and better citizens, can you not mention a city to which you gave a better government, such as Lycurgus gave to Lacedaemon, and many other persons to many cities great and small? Does any city name you a good lawgiver and its benefactor? So Italy and Sicily name Charondas, and we Solon. "Who so names you?" Will he be able to mention one?'

Glaucon/ 'I think not. Why, even the devotees of Homer don't say that.'

Socrates/ 'But is there an account of any war in that time which was well waged under the command or advice of Homer?'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Well, is there mention of many inventions, contrivances of use in handicrafts or in any other branch of action, which would show that he was a clever practical man, like Thales of Miletus, or Anarcharsis the Scythian?'

Glaucon/ 'No, nothing of the kind.'

Socrates/ 'Well, if there is no mention of public services, do we hear that Homer in his lifetime was guide and educator to certain individuals, who loved him for the inspiration of his society, and who handed down to those who came after them a Homeric way of life? Such was Pythagoras. For that master was greatly loved for such reasons, and his successors even up to the present day talk of the Pythagorean manner of life, and seem somehow to be quite distinct from other people.'

Glaucon/ 'No, we do not hear of anything of that kind. For if the stories about Homer are true, Socrates, his companion Creophylus would as an example of education be even funnier than his funny name. For they say that Homer was very much neglected in his lifetime, not to speak of what happened afterwards.'

Socrates/ 'Yes, so they say. But consider, Glaucon, if Homer had really been able to educate men and make them better, if he had attained not merely to imitation but to knowledge of these subjects, would he not have made many disciples and been honored and loved by them? Why, Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Ceos and many others can by their private intercourse inspire their followers with the belief that they will be unable to rule either their households or their city unless these masters superintend their education, and for this wisdom of theirs they are so devotedly loved, that their disciples almost insist on carrying them about shoulder high. Now if Homer had been able to help men to be virtuous, would the men of the time have

allowed him and Hesiod to wander about singing their songs; would they not have laid hold of them as more precious than gold, and compelled them to dwell at home with them; or if they had not succeeded in that, would they not have taken the direction of their education into their own hands and followed them wherever they went until they had got adequate instruction?'

Glaucon/ "I think, Socrates, that what you say is most certainly true.'

Socrates/ 'Then may we lay down that, beginning with Homer, all the poets are imitators of images of virtue and of all the other subjects on which they write, and do not lay hold of truth; rather, as we said a moment ago, the painter will produce what seems to be a shoemaker, though he himself has no understanding of shoemaking, and his spectators have none, but judge only by color and form?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And so, I imagine, we shall say that the poet also by means of words and sentences reproduces the colors, as it were, of the several arts, having only enough understanding to imitate; and he too has his spectators who judge by words and think if anyone in meter and rhythm and musical mode describes shoemaking or generalship or any other subject, that what is said is good. Such is the great magical power which these things possess. For when the works of the poets are stripped of the colors that music gives them, and are spoken simply and by themselves, I fancy that you know what they look like. I dare say you have noticed?

Glaucon/ 'I have.'

Socrates/ 'Might we not compare them, to faces with the freshness of youth but without real beauty when they suffer change and have lost their early bloom?

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Come, then, consider this. The maker of the image, the imitator, we say, has no understanding of what is, but only of what appears; is it not so?

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But let us not leave the question half stated, but consider it adequately.'

Glaucon/ 'Speak on.'

Socrates/ 'Will a painter, say, paint reins and bridle?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'But a saddler and a smith will make them?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Does the painter know what the reins and the bridle ought to be like? Or is it the case that not even the smith and the saddler, who made them, know that, but only the horseman, the man who knows how to use them?'

Glaucon/ 'Very true.'

Socrates/ 'And shall we not say the same about everything?'

Glaucon/ 'What?'

Socrates/ 'That there are three arts concerned with each thing—one that uses, one that makes, and one that imitates?

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then are the virtue and beauty and correctness of every manufactured article and living creature and action determined by any other consideration than the use for which each is designed by art or nature?'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'Then it is quite inevitable that the user of each thing should have most experience of it, and should be the person to inform the maker what are the good and bad

points of the instrument as he uses it. For example, the flute-player informs the flute-maker about the flutes which are to serve him in his fluting; he will prescribe how they ought to be made, and the maker will serve him.'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'Then he who knows gives information about good and bad flutes, and the other will make them, relying on his statements?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then the maker of any article will have a right belief concerning its beauty or badness, which he derives from his association with the knower, and from listening, as he is compelled to do, to what the knower says; but the user has knowledge?

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Now will the imitator have knowledge derived from use as to whether or not the subjects which he paints are beautiful and right, or will he have right belief derived from compulsory intercourse with the man who knows and from being told how he ought to depict them?'

Glaucon/ 'Neither.'

Socrates/ 'Then the imitator will neither know nor have right belief concerning the beauty or the defects of the subjects of his imitation?'

Glaucon/ 'Apparently not.'

Socrates/ 'Then the poetic imitator will be charming in his wisdom on the subjects of his poetry?'

Glaucon/ 'Not so very charming.'

Socrates/ 'For all that he will imitate without knowing wherein each thing is bad or good; but he will probably imitate what appears to be beautiful to ordinary and ignorant people?

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then apparently we have come to a thorough agreement on this, that the imitative man has no knowledge of any value on the subjects of his imitation; that imitation is a form of amusement and not a serious occupation; and that those who write tragic poetry in iambics and hexameters are all imitators in the highest degree?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'By Zeus, is not this imitation concerned with something that is third from the truth?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And what is it in man on which it exercises such effect as it has?'

Glaucon/ 'What kind of thing do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'Something of this sort. You know that the same magnitude seen from a distance and from near at hand does not appear to us to be the same?'

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'And the same thing appears bent when seen in water and straight when taken out of it, or both concave and convex, owing to a perversion of the vision by colors, and there is quite evidently a general confusion on this matter in our soul. It is this affection of our nature on which drawing in perspective relies to try all its magic arts upon us; and so it is in jugglery, and many other similar contrivances.'

Glaucon/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'And have not measurement and counting and weighing been shown to render most charming assistance in these difficulties? For the rule in our minds of the apparently larger or smaller or more or heavier, they substitute the rule of that which has counted or measured, or, if you like, weighed?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And this will be the work of the reasoning element in the soul?'

Glaucon/ 'It will.'

Socrates/ 'But when this element has made its measurements several times, and announces of any two things that one is greater or less than the other, or that they are equal, you have opposite conclusions about the same things appearing simultaneously.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Now did we not say that it was impossible for the same element to come simultaneously to opposite conclusions about the some things?

Glaucon/ 'We did, and rightly.'

Socrates/ 'Then that in the soul whose judgments disagree with the measurements, will not be the same as that whose judgments are in accordance with them?

Glaucon/ 'No.'

Socrates/ 'But that which relies on Calculation and measurement will be the best element in the soul?'

Glaucon/ 'Of course.'

Socrates/ 'Then that which opposes it will be one of the beggarly elements in us?'

Glaucon/ 'Inevitably.'

Socrates/ 'This was the point which I wanted to settle when I said that drawing and in fact all imitation produces its own work quite removed from truth, and also associates with that element in us which is removed from insight, and is its companion, and is friend to no healthy or true purpose.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly,'

Socrates/ 'Then imitation is a beggar wedded to a beggar and producing beggarly children?'

Glaucon/ 'Apparently.'

Socrates/ 'Does this apply only to visual imitation, or also to imitation by sound, which we call poetry?'

Glaucon/ 'Naturally to that also.'

Socrates/ 'Well, let us not rely on the natural analogy in painting but turn to that actual element of the understanding with which poetic imitation associates and see whether it is bad or good.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, we must.'

Socrates/ 'Let us put it in this way. Imitation, we say, imitates men acting compulsorily or voluntarily, thinking that in the event they have done well or ill, and throughout either feeling pain or rejoicing. Is there anything else besides that?'

Glaucon/ 'Nothing.'

Socrates/ 'Now in all this process, is a man in one and the same disposition of mind? Or just as in seeing he was in a state of dissension, and had in himself simultaneous and opposing beliefs about the same things, so likewise in conduct is he not also at dissension and war with himself? And I may remind you that there is no need for us now to come to an agreement on this; for in the previous discussion on all these points we came to an agreement that our soul is full of countless simultaneous oppositions of this kind.'

Glaucon/ 'We were right.'

Socrates/ 'We were. But I think we must now discuss what we then omitted.'

Glaucon/ 'What is that?'

Socrates/ 'We said at that time, if you remember, that a reasonable man, if he meets with a misfortune, like the loss of a son or anything else which he holds very dear, will bear it much more easily than other people.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Now let us consider this point. Will he feel no sorrow at all; or if that is an impossibility, will he show some sort of moderation in his grief?'

Glaucon/ 'The second alternative is nearer the truth.'

Socrates/ 'Now tell me this about him. Do you fancy that he will fight and contend with his grief better when he is under the observation of his fellows, or when he is alone by himself in solitude?

Glaucon/ 'Much belter, when he is under observation.'

Socrates/ 'Yes. When he is alone I imagine he will utter many cries of which he would be ashamed if there were anyone to hear him, and do many things which he would not allow anyone to see him doing.'

Glaucon/ 'That is so.'

Socrates/ 'Now is not that which encourages him to resist, reason and law, while that which draws him to his sufferings is the affliction itself?'

Glaucon/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'And since there is in the man impulsion in contrary directions in regard to the same thing at the same time, we must say that the impulsions are two.'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'And the one is ready to obey the law and follow its guidance?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Now the law says that it is best to take misfortunes as quietly as possible and not to grieve, because the good and evil in such matters are not certain, and to take them hardly makes things no better for the future; because no human affairs are worth taking very seriously; and, finally, because grief is a hindrance to that state of mind to

which we should come in our troubles as quickly as possible.'

Glaucon/ 'To what do you refer?'

Socrates/ A man should take thought, on what has come to pass, and as we regulate our play by the fall of the dice, so he should regulate his affairs in the light of what has fallen out, as reason ordains will be best. We should not be like children who, when they have stumbled, go on holding the injured part and shrieking, but should always accustom the soul to turn as quickly as possible to the healing and restoring of that which is fallen and diseased, making lamentation to disappear before medicine.

Glaucon/ 'That certainly would be the most correct attitude to misfortune.'

Socrates/ 'Now the best part in us, we say, wishes to follow this reasoning.'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'Then shall we not say that that element which impels us to recall our affliction and to lament, and which can never have enough of such things, is unreasoning and idle and a lover of cowardice?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, we shall.'

Socrates/ 'Now the one, the complaining element, lends itself to much and diverse imitation, but the prudent and quiet character, which is always at one with itself, is not easily imitated, nor when imitated is it easily understood, especially in crowded audiences when men of every character flock to the theatre. For them it is the imitation of a disposition with which they are not familiar.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then obviously it is not this character in the soul towards which the imitative poet is by nature set, or

which his wisdom is bent on pleasing, since he is to win a great reputation with the common people, but rather the peevish and diverse character, because it is such a good object of imitation?'

Glaucon/ 'Obviously.'

Socrates/ 'Then we may now justly lay hold of the poet and set him over against the painter; for he resembles him in producing what has little value for truth, and also in associating with a similar part of the soul, which is not the best. And so we may now with justice refuse to allow him entrance to a city which is to be well governed, because he arouses and fosters and strengthens this part of the soul and destroys the reasoning part. Like one who gives a city over into the hands of villains, and destroys the better citizens, so we shall say that the imitative poet likewise implants an evil constitution in the soul of each individual; he gratifies the foolish element in it, that which cannot distinguish between great and small but thinks that the same things are sometimes great and sometimes small, and he manufactures images very far removed from the truth.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'But we have not yet stated our mightiest accusation against imitation. For its power of corrupting even the good, all but a few, is surely most terrible of all.'

Glaucon/ 'Surely, if it does actually do that.'

Socrates/ 'Listen and consider. Take the best of us listening to Homer or any other of the tragic poets, when he is imitating a hero in grief and spinning out a long melancholy lamentation or imitating men singing and disfiguring themselves in grief: you know that he gives us pleasure, and we give ourselves up to following him; we sympathize and are seriously impressed, and praise as a good poet whoever most affects us in this way.'

Glaucon/ 'I know we do.'

Socrates/ 'But when an intimate sorrow comes to any of us, you notice that we pride ourselves on the opposite kind of behavior, on being able to bear it with quiet and endurance, as though this were playing a man's part, and the other behavior, which we then praised, were playing a woman's.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Then is the praise rightly given?' 'Is it right to look at a man being what we ourselves should not wish to be without shame, and so far from feeling disgust, to enjoy and praise the performance?'

Glaucon/ 'No, by Zeus, it does not seem reasonable.'

Socrates/ 'That is right, if you look at it in that way.'

Glaucon/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'If you consider that the element, which in our own intimate misfortunes is held down by force and stinted of its fill of weeping and lamentation, those things which it is its nature to desire, is the very part which the poets satisfy and please; while what by nature is best in us, for "t of being adequately trained either by reason or by habit, relaxes its watch over the weeping element. The sorrows which it beholds are not its own, and if another man with pretensions to virtue grieves more than he might, there is no disgrace for it in praising and pitying him, but there is, it thinks, the actual profit of the pleasure, and therefore it will not consent to lose that pleasure by despising the whole poem. For it is given to few, I fancy, to reflect that other men's sorrows contribute to our own. For if we feed the element of pity on others' misfortunes and make:, it strong, it is not easy to control it in our own.'

Glaucon/ 'Very true.'

Socrates/ 'And does not the same argument apply to the humorous? You may take an extraordinary pleasure in hearing at a representation of comedy or in a circle of friends jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and will not hate them for their vileness; but are you not doing just what you did in tragic performances? It was by reason, again, that you held down that in you which wanted to jest, because you feared to be thought a buffoon, and now you let it free and pamper it at these performances, with the result that often you have quite unconsciously gone the length of being a comic poet in your own conduct?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And with regard to sexual desires, and anger, and all feelings of desire and pain and pleasure in the soul, which we say follow all our actions, you observe that poetic imitation produces all these effects in us. They should be withered, and it waters them and makes them grow. It makes them rule over us, when they ought to be subjects if we are to become better and happier, instead of worse and more miserable.'

Glaucon/ 'I can't disagree with you.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Glaucon, when you find Homer's admirers saying that this poet has educated Hellas, and that in questions of human conduct and culture a man ought to read and study Homer, and organize his whole life in accordance with the teaching of this poet, you must be friendly and kind to such people—they are as good as they know how to be—and agree that Homer is the most poetical and the first of the tragic poets, but be quite sure in your mind that only such specimens of poetry as are hymns to the gods or praises of good men are to be received into a city. If you receive the pleasure-seasoned Muse of song and epic, pleasure and pain will be kings in your city instead of law

and the principle which at all times has been decided by the community to be best.'

Glaucon/ 'Very true.'

Socrates/ •Let it, then, be our defense now that we have recurred to the subject of poetry, that it was only to be expected that we should expel poetry from the city, such being her nature. The argument compelled us. And let us tell her also, in case she should accuse us of brutality and boorishness, that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry. Phrases like "the bitch that at her master yelps." "the yelping hound that in assemblies of the fools exalts its head," "the conquering rabble of the over wise," the statement that "the men of subtle thought are beggars all," and many others are signs of this ancient antagonism. Nevertheless, let us state that if the pleasure-producing poetry and imitation has any arguments to show that she is in her right place in a well-governed city, we shall be very glad to receive her back again. We are conscious of the charm she exercises upon us. Only to betray the truth as it appears to us is impious. Do not you, my friend, also feel her magic charm, especially when she speaks with Homer's lips?'

Glaucon/ 'Very much so.'

Socrates/ 'Then is it not just that she should return on those conditions, after she has published her defense in lyrical or any other meter?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And we might also allow her champions, who are not poets, but lovers of poetry, to publish a prose defense on her behalf, showing that she is not only pleasant but also useful for political constitutions and for human life, and we shall listen with friendly feelings. For it will be to our profit if she is made out to be not only pleasant, but useful.'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly to our profit.'

Socrates/ 'But if not, my dear comrade, then, as men who have loved but have come to the conclusion that their love is unprofitable, though it may cost a struggle, yet turn away; so likewise, though by reason of the love for such poetry that our nurture in beautiful constitutions has bred in us we shall be glad of any manifestation of her goodness and truth, yet until she is able to defend herself, we will not listen to her without repeating to ourselves as a charm this argument of ours and this incantation, for fear of falling again into that childish love which is still shared by the many. We shall chant, therefore, that this poetry is not to be taken seriously, as though it were a solemn performance which had to do with truth, but that he who hears it is to keep watch on it, fearful for the city in his soul, and that we must lay down these laws concerning poetry which we have described.'

Glaucon/ 'I entirely agree with you.'

Socrates/ 'For much is at stake, my dear Glaucon, more than people think, in a man's becoming good or bad; and therefore he must not be seduced by honor or money or any office, or even by poetry, to dare to neglect justice and the rest of virtue.'

Glaucon/ 'What we have said makes me agree with you. and I think everyone else would do the same.'

Socrates/ 'And yet, we have not described the greatest prizes and rewards reserved for virtue.'

Glaucon/ 'You must be speaking of some unexampled greatness, if there are others greater than those already enumerated.'

Socrates/ 'What could be great in a brief space of time?' 'For surely the whole time from childhood to old age is compared to all time brief and short?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Well, do you think that an immortal thing should take thought for a time no longer than the span of life and not for all time?'

Glaucon/ 'I agree with you. But why do you say this?'

Socrates/ 'Have you not perceived, that our soul is immortal, and never perishes?' He looked at me, and said in amazement;

Glaucon/ 'By Zeus, not I. Can you say that?'

Socrates/ 'Can! I must. And I think you will go with me. It is not difficult.'

Glaucon/ 'It is to me. But I should be very glad to hear this easy thing.'

Socrates/ Well, you may.'

Glaucon/ 'Then speak.'

Socrates/ 'Do you talk of a good and an evil?'

Glaucon/ 'I do.'

Socrates/ 'Do you conceive them as I do?'

Glaucon/ 'In what way?'

Socrates/ 'That which destroys and corrupts everything is the evil; that which preserves and benefits, the good.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Further, do you talk of an evil and a good belonging to each thing? For example, there is ophthalmia for eyes, disease for the whole body, mold for bread, rot for wood, rust for brass and iron; and, as I say, all things have each their natural evil and disease?'

Glaucon/ 'I agree.'

Socrates/ 'When one of these evils comes upon anything, does it not cause defects in that on which it settles, and finally altogether dissolve and destroy it?'

Glaucon/ 'Surely.'

Socrates/ 'But each thing is destroyed by its own natural evil and badness, and if that does not destroy it there is nothing else that can harm it. For the good will certainly never destroy it, nor will that which is neither evil nor good.'

Glaucon/ How could it?'

Socrates/ 'Then if we discover anything among existences which has its own evil which makes it worse, and find that this evil is unable to destroy and dissolve it, shall we not then know that of a thing so constituted there is no destruction?

Glaucon/ 'Yes, that is probable.'

Socrates/ 'Now, has the soul that which makes it evil?

Glaucon/ 'Of course. All the things we have described—injustice and licentiousness, and cowardice and ignorance.'

Socrates/ 'But does anyone of these dissolve and destroy the soul? And see that we are not cheated into thinking that the unjust and foolish man when he is caught in his evil conduct is then destroyed by injustice, the proper badness of his soul. Consider the question in this way. Disease, which is the badness of the body, makes the body waste away and dissolve till it is no longer a body; and so all things which we mentioned a moment ago are brought to nothing by their own evil, which takes its seat within them, and so destroys them. Is it not so?

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'Come, now, and consider the soul in the same way. Does injustice and vice in general when it dwells in the soul destroy it by having its seat and abode there, and make it wither away until it brings it down to death and parts soul from body?

Glaucon/ 'No, certainly not.'

Socrates/ 'But it is unreasonable, that the badness of any' thing else should destroy it, when its own badness does not?

Glaucon/ 'It is.'

Socrates/ 'Now consider, Glaucon, that we do not think that the body must be destroyed by the badness of articles of food, whatever that may be—age or rottenness or anything else. But if the badness of articles of food produces in the body an evil condition of body, then we say that the body has been destroyed by its own evil, which is disease resulting from the bad food. But we shall never allow that body, which is one thing, is destroyed by the badness of food, which is another, unless the evil of the other produces the natural intimate evil of the first.'

Glaucon/ 'What you say is perfectly right.'

Socrates/ 'But according to the same argument, unless the badness of the body produces in the soul badness of the soul, we shall not allow that the soul is destroyed by the evil of another thing without the action of its own peculiar badness, so that one thing is destroyed by the evil of another.'

Glaucon/ 'That is reasonable.'

Socrates/ 'Then either let us prove that our argument is unsound, or, until that be done, let us say that the soul is never in the least destroyed by fever, or any disease, or by the edge of the sword, not if you cut the body into the smallest pieces, unless it is demonstrated that these sufferings of the body make the soul more unjust and more impious. Let us not allow anyone to say that the soul, or anything else, can be destroyed by an alien evil occurring in something else while its own peculiar evil does not occur in it.'

Glaucon/ 'But nobody will ever prove, that when men die, death makes their souls more unjust.'

Socrates/ 'And if anyone, dares to face the argument, and to say that death makes a man worse and more unjust, simply so as not to be compelled to admit that our souls are immortal, then we may fairly claim, if what he says is true, that injustice is as mortal as disease to its possessor, and that because the power to kill is part of its nature, those who take it should die by it, the most unjust dying quicker, the less unjust more slowly; whereas, as it is, the unjust are killed by other people punishing them because of their injustice.'

Glaucon/ 'By Zeus, injustice will not then appear so very terrible, if it is mortal to him that receives it: for that would be a respite from evil. But I fancy, rather, that we shall find just the opposite—that injustice kills other people to the best of its power, but makes its possessor even more alive than before, and not only alive, but always awake; so very far is it from being mortal, apparently.'

Socrates/ 'Well said. For when the soul cannot be killed and destroyed by its own badness and its own evil, it will be a long time before the evil which is ordained for the destruction of something different will kill it or anything else than that ordained thing.'

Glaucon/ A long time, naturally enough.'

Socrates/ 'Then when there is no one evil, whether belonging to itself or another, which destroys the soul, it must obviously exist always, and if it exists always, be immortal.'

Glaucon/ 'It must.'

Socrates/ 'Well, we may suppose that that is the case, and if it is, you will notice that there will always be the same number of souls. For, of course, they could not become fewer

by any being destroyed, nor, again, could they become more numerous. If anything immortal increased, that would involve, you know, the mortal becoming immortal, so that finally everything would be immortal.'

Glaucon/ 'True.'

Socrates/ 'But, let us not believe this, which the argument will not allow, or that the soul in its truest nature is such as to be full of great diversity and inequality and difference from itself.'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean?'

Socrates/ 'Everlastingness, cannot easily be a property of a thing which is compounds out of many, and that not with the fairest composition; and yet such the soul has appeared to us to be.'

Glaucon/ 'No, it is not likely.'

Socrates/ 'Yet our recent argument and the other proofs compel us to the conclusion that the soul is immortal. But if we are to see it as it is in truth, we ought not to see it as we do at present, polluted by the association of the body and other evils; we ought to behold it properly by the help of reason, as it is when it is purified, and then we shall find it far more lovely, and shall discern more clearly justices and injustices and all that we have described. But in the meantime we have declared the truth regarding it as it appears at present. For we have looked upon the soul as men who saw the sea god Glaucus. His original nature was no longer easily visible. The old limbs were broken off or worn away and all deformed by the force of the waves, while he was overgrown with shell-fish and seaweed and stones, so that to look at he might have been any kind of beast instead of what he really was. So do we look upon the soul reduced to this condition by countless evils. But we must turn our eyes yonder, Glaucon.'

Glaucon/ 'Whither?'

Socrates/ 'To the soul's love of wisdom, and observe what she apprehends, and after what company she strives, led on by her kinship to the divine and immortal and that whichever is; and what she would become if she followed this with her whole being, and by this impulsion were rescued from the sea in which she lies now, and could strike off the stones and shell-fish that cover her; for now she feasts upon earth, and from those feastings that men call happy there has grown upon her a covering of earth and stone, thick and rough. Then one might see her true nature, whether it is manifold or single, or how and in what manner she is constituted. Meanwhile, I imagine, we have given a fair description of the states and varieties which she manifests in human life?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'And now, have we not in our argument cleared away all other objections? In especial we have not praised the rewards and reputation of justice as you said was done by Hesiod and Homer, but have found that justice itself is best for the soul itself—found, too, that the soul must act justly whether she have the ring of Gyges or not; yes, though she have with that ring the cap of darkness.'

Glaucon/ 'What you say is very true.'

Socrates/ 'Then, Glaucon, can there now be any harm in our going further and restoring to justice and the rest of virtue the rewards, in their proper number and kinds, which it renders to the soul at the hands of gods and men, both in a man's lifetime and after he is dead?'

Glaucon/ 'None whatever.'

Socrates/ 'Then will you give me back what you borrowed from me in the discussion?'

Glaucon/ 'What do you mean in particular?'

Socrates/ 'I allowed to you that the just man should appear unjust, and the unjust just. For you asked that even supposing those things could not be concealed from gods and men, we should yet grant, for the sake of argument, that they could, in order to judge between justice pure and simple and injustice pure and simple. Do you not remember?'

Glaucon/ 'It would be unjust of me did I not.'

Socrates/ 'Well, now that judgment has been given, I demand back for justice that we too should agree to give her the reputation which she actually enjoys with gods and men, that she may get even those prizes of victory which she acquires from seeding and bestows on those who possess her. For we have found that she really gives the good things which come from being, and does not deceive those who really accept her.'

Glaucon/ 'Your demand is just.'

Socrates/ 'In that case, will you first of all allow that the gods are not deceived as to the natures of the two men?'

Glaucon/ 'We will.'

Socrates/ 'Then if they are not, the one man will be loved by the gods, the other hated, as we agreed originally?'

Glaucon/ 'Yes.'

Socrates/ 'And shall we not agree that to those whom the gods love, all things which come from the hands of the gods are as good as they can be, except perhaps for some evil which has been necessitated by sin in a previous existence?'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then must we not assume the same for the just man, that though he live in poverty, in disease, or any other seeming evil, these things will in the end work out well for him either in life or after death. For surely the gods do not neglect him who will bestir himself to become just, and

by the practice of virtue to make himself as like God as man may.'

Glaucon/ 'It is only natural, that God should not neglect him who is like himself.'

Socrates/ 'Then ought we not to suppose the opposite of the unjust?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then at the hands of gods the just man will get some such prizes as these?'

Glaucon/ 'That is at any rate my opinion.'

Socrates/ 'And what at the hands of men?' 'Does not the case stand thus if we must state the fact? Do not the clever unjust men act like those runners who run well from the top end of the course to the bottom, but not from the bottom to the top; at the start they leap off at a great pace, but at the finish are laughed off the course and go away, their ears sunk down to their shoulders, and no crown on their heads. But the true runners run to a finish, receive their prizes, and are crowned. Is it not usually the same with the just? At the end of every action and partnership, and at the end of life, they win a good report and carry off prizes at men's hands.'

Glaucon/ 'Certainly.'

Socrates/ 'Then will you suffer me to say of them what you yourself said of the unjust? For I shall say that the just, when they advance in years, will hold office in their city if they desire office, will take a wife from what family they please and give in marriage to whom they will; and all the things you said of the unjust I now say of the just. And I shall say also of the unjust that most of them, though they may not be found out while they are young, are caught at, the end of their course and are laughed to scorn. When they become old men they are miserably insulted by strangers and townsmen, they are scourged and suffer all those

punishments—racking and burning—which you truly described as cruel. You may suppose me to enumerate them all. Will you suffer what I am saying?'

Glaucon/ 'Most certainly, for your words are just.'

Socrates/ 'Then such, will be the prizes and rewards and gifts which the just man has at the hands of gods and men during his life, besides those advantages given by justice itself.'

Glaucon/ 'Yes, and they are fair and steadfast.'

Socrates/ 'But these, are nothing in number or greatness compared with those which await each man after death. And these must be heard in order that each man may receive in full the words that the argument owes him.'

Glaucon/ 'Speak on. There are few things I should be more glad to hear.'

Socrates/ 'I shall tell you, a story, not of Alcinous, but of a valiant man, Er, son of Armenius, of the race of Pamphylia. Once upon a time he fell in battle. On the tenth day they took up the dead, who were now stinking, but his body was found fresh. They took him home, and were going to bury him when on the twelfth day he came to life as he was lying on the pyre. When he had revived, he told them what he had seen yonder. His soul, he said, departed from him, and journeyed along with a great company, until they arrived at a certain ghostly place where there were two openings in the earth side by side, and opposite them and above two openings in the heaven. In the middle sat judges. These, when they had given their judgment, ordered the just to take the road to the right, which led upward through heaven, first binding tablets on them in front signifying their judgments. The unjust they ordered to take the road to the left, which led downward. They also had tablets signifying all that they had done bound on their backs. When it came to his turn

they told him that it was laid upon him to be a messenger to men concerning the things that were there, and they ordered him to listen to and look at everything in the place. Then he saw their souls departing, after judgment had been delivered upon them, by one of the openings of heaven and one of earth; by the other two souls were arriving, on the one side coming up out of the earth, travel-stained and dusty, on the other coming down from heaven, shining pure. They all seemed on their arrival to have come a long journey, and were glad to turn aside into the meadow. There they encamped as in an assembly, and those who were acquaintances recognized one another. They who had come out of the earth inquired of the others concerning the things above, and those from heaven inquired of the first in their turn concerning the things that had happened to them. So they discoursed with one another, some weeping and lamenting as they called to mind all that they had suffered and seen, both much and terrible, in their journey below the earth, a journey of a thousand years, while the others, who had come from heaven, recounted the extraordinary beauty of their happiness and their vision. There were many things, Glaucon, which would take long to relate. But this, he said, was the sum of it. For all the unjust deeds that each man has ever done, and for all the men to whom he has done injustice, he pays penalty in due course, ten times for each (now this is once in every hundred years, for so long is the span of human life), in order that he may pay a tenfold ransom for his wrongdoing. If there be any who have caused the deaths of many men, either by betraying cities or armies, or by casting men into slavery, or taking part in any other villainy, for all these crimes they suffer torments tenfold for each; and on the other hand, if they have done any deeds of kindness and have been just and holy, they get their reward on the same terms. Concerning infants who died as soon as

they were born, or had lived but a short time, there were other things he said not worth remembering. For impiety or piety to gods and to parents and for murder there were still greater requitals, which he described.

'For he said that he stood by while one man asked another where Ardiaeus the Great was. Now this Ardiaeus had been tyrant in a city of Pamphylia a thousand years before that time; he had killed his old father and his elder brother, and had wrought many other impious deeds, so it was related. And he said that he who was questioned replied: "He has not come, nor will he come hither. For this was one of the terrible sights we saw. When we were near the mouth and were about to go up, and had endured all our sufferings but this, suddenly we saw Ardiaeus and others with him. Most of them were tyrants, but there were also some private persons of the number of those who were great sinners. They thought that they were at last going to ascend, but the mouth would not receive them, and whenever anyone of those who had sunk into incurable wickedness, or anyone who had not paid his punishment in full, tried to ascend, the mouth bellowed. And then," he said, "fierce men, like coals of fire to look upon, who were standing by and had heard the sound, came forward, and some they took in their arms and dragged away, but Ardiaeus and others they bound hand and foot and head, threw them down, and flayed them. They dragged them out of the way to a place apart, and there carded them on thorns, saying to all that passed that they were being taken away to be plunged into Tartarus, and explaining why this was done to them. After that," he said, "though many and diverse fears had come upon us, this was above them all. Each man feared that the voice would sound for him as he ascended, and it was with great joy that each went up without the mouth breaking silence." Now, of this kind, he said, were the punishments and penalties, and the rewards

corresponded to them. Each company passed seven days in the meadow, and on the eighth they had to rise up and go on their way, and after four days they came to a place whence they could look down on a straight beam of light, extended like a pillar through heaven and earth, more like the rainbow than anything else, but brighter and purer. To this they came after a day's journey, and there from the middle of the light they saw extended from heaven the ends of the chains which compose it. For this light chains heaven, holding together the whole circumference as under-girders bind a trireme. And from those ends is hung the spindle of Necessity, by means of which all the circles revolve. Now the shaft and hook thereof are of adamant, but the whorl is partly of adamant, partly of other materials. And the whorl is of this fashion. In shape it is like an ordinary whorl, but from his description you must conceive of it as one great whorl with the inside completely cut out, and another similar but smaller whorl fitted into it, and within that a third, and within that a fourth, and then four others, fitted into one another like puzzle boxes. For there are eight whorls in all, fitted into one another, their upper rims showing in circles, so that they make up the continuous surface of one whorl round the shaft, and the shaft pierces right through the middle of the eighth. The circle made by the rim of the first and outside whorl is the broadest, that of the sixth the second broadest, that of the fourth third, of the eighth fourth, of the seventh fifth, of the fifth sixth, of the third seventh, and that of the second eighth broadest. The circle of the greatest is of many colors, the circle of the seventh is the brightest, the eighth gets its color from the seventh shining upon it, the second and the fifth are very like each other, being ruddier than the others; the third is the whitest, the fourth is fiery red, and the sixth is second in whiteness. The whole spindle turns round with one circling motion, but

as the whole revolves the seven inside circles spin round smoothly in an opposite direction to the whole Of these the eighth turns fastest, and after it come the seventh, sixth, and fifth, all three at the same pace. Third in swiftness, so it seemed to them, circles the fourth, the third fourth, and the second fifth. The whole spindle is turned on the knees of Necessity. On the top of each circle sits a siren, who is carried round with the circle, uttering one note at one pitch, and the eight together make up a single harmony. Roundabout at equal distances others are seated, three in number, each on a throne. These are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos. They are clothed in white and have garlands on their heads, and they sing to the accompaniment of the sirens' harmony, Lachesis of what has been, Clotho of what is, and Atropos of what shall be. And Clotho from time to time lays her right hand on the outer circumference and helps to push it round, while Atropos does the same to the inner circles with her left hand; but Lachesis touches inner and outer with each hand in turn. Now the souls, when they came thither, had to go at once to Lachesis. Then a prophet first marshaled them in order, and then taking lots and patterns of lives from the lap of Lachesis, mounted upon a high pulpit and spoke: 'The word, of the daughter of Necessity, maid Lachesis. Souls of a day, here begins another circle that bears the mortal race to death. The angel will not cast lots for you, but you shall choose your angel. Let him whose lot falls first have first choice of a life to which he shall be bound by Necessity. But virtue has no master, and as a man honors or despises her, so will he have more of her or less. The responsibility is on him that chooses. There is none on God."

'So saying, the prophet cast the lots to all, and each man took up the lot that fell beside him, except Er. Him the prophet forbade. And as each took it up he knew what order

in the lot he had obtained. And after this the prophet laid on the ground before them the patterns of lives, many more patterns than there were persons present. Now there were patterns of all kinds. There were lives of all living creatures, and with them all human lives. Among them were tyrannies, some lasting, others destroyed in mid-course and ending in poverty and exile and beggary. There were lives of famous men also, some famed for their comeliness and beauty, or for their strength and prowess, others for their lineage and the virtues of their ancestors; similarly there were lives of unknown men; and also the lives of women. But there was no determination of soul, because of necessity the soul becomes different according as she chooses a different life. All other things were mixed with each other, and with wealth and poverty; some with disease and some with health, and there were also mean conditions of these things. And it is here, it seems, my dear Glaucon, that man's greatest danger lies; and for those reasons we must give all heed that each of us, putting aside all other learning, may search after and study this alone, if in any way he may be able to learn and discover who will give him capacity and knowledge to discern the good and the evil in life, and always and everywhere to choose the better according to his ability. He will reckon up all the things we have just mentioned, taking them both together and separately, and estimate their contribution to virtue of life; and so he will know what of good or evil is worked by beauty, whether mixed with poverty or riches, and with what disposition of soul these are good and with what bad; and what of good or evil is worked by noble birth or ignoble birth, by private or public station, by strength or weakness of body, by learning or ignorance, and by all such properties as concern the soul, both natural and acquired, in their combinations with one another, so that he may be able to put all these considerations together, and looking to

the nature of the soul may choose the worse or the better life, calling that worse which will lead the soul into greater injustice, and that better which will lead it into greater justice. But all other considerations he will leave alone. For we have seen that this is the greatest choice both for life and beyond it. And a man when he goes to the other world must have this belief like adamant within him, in order that there also he may be unmoved by riches and evils of that sort, and may not by falling into tyranny or some such course of action, both commit and himself suffer in greater degree evils many and incurable, but may have knowledge to choose always the life that lies in the middle and avoid the extremes on both sides, both in this life, so far as he may, and in the life to come. For so, man wins his greatest happiness.

'Now the messenger from yonder went on with his tale, and told how the prophet spoke thus: "Even for him that comes last, if he choose with understanding, and take heed in his life, there is laid up a life that is not evil, with which he may be content. Let not him who hath first choice be careless, or him who hath last downhearted."

'He said that when the prophet had thus spoken, he who had drawn first came forward and chose the mightiest of tyrannies, and from folly and greed he chose without making a thorough examination, and so did not notice that in his choice it was fated that he should devour his own children and suffer other evil things. So when he came to examine it at his leisure he began to gash his breast and bewail his choice, not abiding by the warnings of the prophet. For he did not blame himself for his evils, but chance and the angels and everything rather than himself. Now he was of those who had come from heaven, and had lived in his former life in a well-ordered city and had participated in virtue by habit and not by philosophy. Generally speaking,

not the least part of those who were caught in this way had come from heaven, for they had not been disciplined by labors; while of those from earth, the most, because they had themselves endured labors, and had seen the labors of others, were in no hurry to make their choice. For these reasons, and because of the fortune of the lot, most souls had a change of evil and good. For if any man always steadfastly pursues philosophy whenever he comes to life in this world, and if the lot of choice falls to him not among the last, it appears, from what we are told from yonder, not only that he will be happy in this life, but that his journey from here to the world beyond and back again to this world will not be along the rough and underground track, but along the smooth and heavenly way.

And he said that it was a sight worth seeing to behold the several souls choose their lives. And a piteous and a laughable and amazing sight it was also. The choice was mostly governed by what they had been accustomed to in their former life. He said that he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus' choosing the life of a swan; his death at the hands of women had so made him hate the whole race, that he would not consent to be born of woman. The soul of Thamyras he saw choosing the life of a nightingale, he also saw a swan turning to choose a human life, and other musical creatures doing the same. The soul that had the twentieth choice took a lion's life. It was the soul of Ajax, the son of Telamon, who refused to become a man because he remembered the judgment concerning the armor. After him came the soul of Agamemnon. He also hated the human race by reason of his sufferings, and took in exchange the life of an eagle. The soul of Atalanta obtained her choice somewhere in the middle, and catching sight of the great honors of a man who was an athlete could not pass them by, but made that her choice. After her he saw the soul of Epeus,

son of Panopeus, passing into the nature of a working woman. Quite among the last he saw the soul of the ridiculous Thersites becoming a monkey. It so happened that the soul of Odysseus came forward to choose the very last of all. He remembered his former labors and had ceased from his ambition and so he spent a long time going round looking for the life of a private and obscure man. At last he found it lying about, ignored by everyone else; and when he saw it he took it gladly, and said that he would have made the same choice if the lot had fallen to him first. Similarly all the other animals changed into men and into each other, the unjust into fierce, and the just into tame animals, and there were all possible combinations.

'And when all the souls had chosen their lives they went unto Lachesis in the order of their choosing. And she gave each the angel he had chosen to be a guard throughout his life and to accomplish his choice. The angel first led the soul towards Clotho, passing it under her hand and under the sweep of the whirling spindle, so ratifying the fate which the man had chosen in his turn. He touched the spindle, and then led the soul on to where Atropos was spinning, so that the threads might be made unalterable. Thence the man went without turning under the throne of Necessity, and after coming out on the other side he first waited for the others to pass through, and then all proceeded through terrible burning heat to the plain of Lethe where grew no plants nor any trees. At last they encamped at evening by the river of Forgetfulness, whose water no pitcher may hold. All had to drink a certain measure of this water, but those who were not preserved by wisdom drank more than the measure. Each as he drank it forgot everything. Then they went to sleep, and it was midnight; there was thunder and an earthquake, and at once they were carried up from thence along different ways to their birth, shooting like stars. But

he himself had been forbidden to drink of the water. When or how he returned to the body he did not know, but he suddenly opened his eyes and saw it was morning and he was lying on the pyre.

'And so, Glaucon, the tale was preserved and did not perish, and it will preserve us if we take heed to it, and cross the river of Lethe safely, and keep our souls undefiled. But if you will listen to me, and believe that the soul is immortal and able to endure all evil and all good, we shall always hold to the upper road, and in every way follow justice and wisdom. So we shall be friends to ourselves and to the gods, both while we remain here and when, like victorious athletes who go about adding to their prizes, we receive the rewards of our justice; and here, and in the journey of a thousand years which I have described to you, we shall fare well.'

Republic.

Translated by Paul Shorey.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Cephalus, Glaucon, Thrasymachus,
Adeimantus, Cleitophon, Polemarchus, Boy.

Book 1.

Socrates/ I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions to the goddess, and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival, since this was its inauguration.

I thought the procession of the citizens very fine, but it was no better than the show made by the marching of the Thracian contingent.

After we had said our prayers and seen the spectacle we were starting for town when Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, caught sight of us from a distance as we were hastening homeward and ordered his boy run and bid us to wait for him, and the boy caught hold of my himation from behind and said;

Boy/ Polemarchus wants you to wait.

Socrates/ And I turned around and asked where his master was.

Boy/ There he is, behind you, coming this way. Wait for him.

Glaucon/ So we will.

Socrates/ And shortly after Polemarchus came up and Adimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and a few others apparently from the procession.

Whereupon Polemarchus said;

Polemarchus/ Socrates, you appear to have turned your faces townward and to be going to leave us.

Socrates/ Not a bad guess.

Polemarchus/ But you see how many we are?

Socrates/ Surely.

Polemarchus/ You must either then prove yourselves the better men or stay here.

Socrates/ Why, is there not left, the alternative of our persuading you that you ought to let us go?

Polemarchus/ But *could* you persuade us, if we refused to listen?

Glaucon/ No how.

Polemarchus/ Well, we won't listen, and you might as well make up your minds to it.

Adeimantus/ Do you mean to say, that you haven't heard that there is to be a torchlight race this evening on horseback in honor of the goddess?

Socrates/ On horseback? That is a new idea. Will they carry torches and pass them along to one another as they race with the horses, or how do you mean?

Polemarchus/ That's the way of it, and, besides, there is to be a night festival which will be worth seeing. For after dinner we will get up and go out and see the sights and meet a lot of the lads there and have good talk. So stay and do as we ask.

Glaucon/ It looks as if we should have to stay.

Socrates/ Well, if it so be, so be it.

—So we went with them to Polemarchus' house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, yes, and Thrasymachus, too, of Chalcedon, and Charmantides of the deme of Paeania, and Clitophon,

the son of Aristonymus. And the father of Polemarchus, Cephalus, was also at home.

And I thought him much aged, for it was a long time since I had seen him. He was sitting on a sort of chair with cushions and he had a chaplet on his head, for he had just finished sacrificing in the court. So we went and sat down beside him, for there were seats there disposed in a circle.

As soon as he saw me Cephalus greeted me and said;

Cephalus/ You are not a very frequent visitor, Socrates. You don't often come down to the Piraeus to see us. That is not right. For if I were still able to make the a journey up to town easily there would be no need of your resorting hither, but we would go to visit you. But as it is you should not space too widely your visits here. For I would have you know that, for my part, as the satisfactions of the body decay, in the same measure my desire for the pleasures of good talk and my delight in them increase. Don't refuse then, but be yourself a companion to these lads and make our house your resort and regard us as your very good friends and intimates.

Socrates/ Why, yes, Cephalus, and I enjoy talking with the very aged. For to my thinking we have to learn of them as it were from wayfarers who have preceded us on a road on which we too, it may be, must sometime fare—what it is like. Is it rough and hard-going or easy and pleasant to travel? And so now I would fain learn of you what you think of this thing, now that your time has come to it, the thing that the poets call 'the threshold of old age.' Is it a hard part of life to bear or what report have you to make of it?

Cephalus/ Yes, indeed, Socrates, I will tell you my own feeling about it. For it often happens that some of us elders of about the same age come together and verify the old saw of like to like. At these reunions most of us make lament, longing for the lost joys of youth and recalling to mind the

pleasures of wine, women, and feasts, and other things thereto appertaining, and they repine in the belief that the greatest things have been taken from them and that then they lived well and now it is no life at all. And some of them complain of the indignities that friends and kinsmen put upon old age and thereto recite a doleful litany of all the miseries for which they blame old age. But in my opinion, Socrates, they do not put the blame on the real cause. For if it were the cause I too should have had the same experience so far as old age is concerned, and so would all others who have come to this time of life. But in fact I have ere now met with others who do not feel in this way, and in particular I remember hearing Sophocles the poet greeted by a fellow who asked, How about your service of Aphrodite, Sophocles—is your natural force still unabated? And he replied, Hush, man, most gladly have I escaped this thing you talk of, as if I had run away from a raging and savage beast of a master. I thought it a good answer then and now I think so still more. For in very truth there comes to old age a great tranquility in such matters and a blessed release. When the fierce tensions of the passions and desires relax, then is the word of Sophocles approved, and we are rid of many and mad masters. But indeed, in respect of these complaints and in the matter of our relations with kinsmen and friends there is just one cause, Socrates—not old age, but the character of the man. For if men are temperate and cheerful even old age is only moderately burdensome. But if the reverse, old age, Socrates, and youth are hard for such dispositions.

Socrates/ And I was filled with admiration for the man by these words, and desirous of hearing more I tried to draw him out and said, I fancy, Cephalus, that most people, when they hear you talk in this way, are not convinced but think that you bear old age lightly not because of your character

but because of your wealth, for the rich, they say, have many consolations.

Cephalus/ You are right, They don't accept my view and there is something in their objection, though not so much as they suppose. But the retort of Themistocles comes in pat here, who, when a man from the little island of Seriphus grew abusive and told him that he owed his fame not to himself but to the city from which he came, replied that neither would he himself ever have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus nor the other if he had been an Athenian. And the same principle applies excellently to those who not being rich take old age hard, for neither would the reasonable man find it altogether easy to endure old age conjoined with poverty, nor would the unreasonable man by the attainment of riches ever attain to self-contentment and a cheerful temper.

Socrates/ May I ask, Cephalus, whether you inherited most of your possessions or acquired them yourself?

Cephalus/ Acquired, really? As a money-maker, I hold a place somewhere halfway between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather and namesake inherited about as much property as I now possess and multiplied it many times, my father Lysanias reduced it below the present amount, and I am content if I shall leave the estate to these boys not less but by some slight measure more than my inheritance.

Socrates/ The reason I asked, is that you appear to me not to be over-fond of money. And that is generally the case with those who have not earned it themselves. But those who have themselves acquired it have a double reason in comparison with other men for loving it. For just as poets feel complacency about their own poems and fathers about their own sons, so men who have made money take this

money seriously as their own creation and they also value it for its uses as other people do. So they are hard to talk to since they are unwilling to commend anything except wealth.

Cephalus/ You are right.

Socrates/ I assuredly am. But tell me further this. What do you regard as the greatest benefit you have enjoyed from the possession of property?

Cephalus/ Something, which I might not easily bring many to believe if I told them. For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man begins to realize that he is going to die, he is filled with apprehensions and concern about matters that before did not occur to him. The tales that are told of the world below and how the men who have done wrong here must pay the penalty there, though he may have laughed them down hitherto, then begin to torture his soul with the doubt that there may be some truth in them. And apart from that the man himself either from the weakness of old age or possibly as being now nearer to the things beyond has a somewhat clearer view of them. Be that as it may, he is filled with doubt, surmises, and alarms and begins to reckon up and consider whether he has ever wronged anyone. Now he to whom the ledger of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts up even from his dreams like a child again and again in affright and his days are haunted by anticipations of worse to come. But on him who is conscious of no wrong that he has done a sweet hope ever attends and a goodly, to be nurse of his old age, as Pindar too says. For a beautiful saying it is, Socrates, of the poet that when a man lives out his days in justice and piety, 'sweet companion with him, to cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanies hope, who chiefly rules the changeful mind of mortals.' That is a fine saying and an admirable. It is for this, then, that I affirm that the possession of wealth is of most value, not it may be

to every man but to the good man. Not to cheat any man even unintentionally or play him false, not remaining in debt to a god for some sacrifice or to a man for money, so to depart in fear to that other world—to this result the possession of property contributes not a little. It has also many other uses. But, setting one thing against another, I would lay it down, Socrates, that for a man of sense this is the chief service of wealth.

Socrates/ An admirable sentiment, Cephalus. But speaking of this very thing, justice, are we to affirm thus without qualification that it is truth telling and paying back what one has received from anyone, or may these very actions sometimes be just and sometimes unjust? I mean, for example, as everyone I presume would admit, if one took over weapons from a friend who was in his right mind and then the lender should go mad and demand them back, that we ought not to return them in that case and that he who did so return them would not be acting justly—nor yet would he who chose to speak nothing but the truth to one who was in that state.

Cephalus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Then this is not the definition of justice—to tell the truth and return what one has received.

Polemarchus/ Nay, but it is, Socrates.

Socrates/ said Polemarchus breaking in;

Polemarchus/ if indeed we are to put any faith in Simonides.

Cephalus/ Very well, indeed I make over the whole argument to you. For it is time for me to attend the sacrifices.

Socrates/ Well, is not Polemarchus the heir of everything that is yours?

Cephalus/ Certainly!

Socrates/ said he with a laugh, and at the same time went out to the sacred rites.

—Tell me, then, you the inheritor of the argument, what it is that you affirm that Simonides says and rightly says about justice.

Polemarchus/ That it is just, to render to each his due. In saying this I think he speaks well.

Socrates/ I must admit, that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. For he is a wise and inspired man. But just what he may mean by this you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a deposit to anyone whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet what the man deposited is due to him in a sense, is it not?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But rendered to him it ought not to be by any manner of means when he demands it not being in his right mind.

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ It is then something other than this that Simonides must, as it seems, mean by the saying that it is just to render back what is due.

Polemarchus/ Something else in very deed, for he believes that friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil.

Socrates/ I see. You mean that he does not render what is due or owing who returns a deposit of gold if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are friends. Isn't that what you say Simonides means?

Polemarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But how about this—should one not render to enemies what is their due?

Polemarchus/ By all means, what is due and owing to them, and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil.

Socrates/ It was a riddling definition of justice, then, that Simonides gave after the manner of poets, for while his meaning, it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what befits him, the name that he gave to this was 'the due.'

Polemarchus/ What else do you suppose?

Socrates/ In heaven's name! Suppose someone had questioned him thus. Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what is called the art of medicine? What do you take it would have been his answer?

Polemarchus/ Obviously, the art that renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks.

Socrates/ And the art that renders to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art?

Polemarchus/ Seasoning to meats.

Socrates/ Good. In the same way tell me the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice.

Polemarchus/ If we are to follow the previous examples, Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies.

Socrates/ To do good to friends and evil to enemies, then, is justice in his meaning?

Polemarchus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Who then is the most able when they are ill to benefit friends and harm enemies in respect to disease and health?

Polemarchus/ The physician.

Socrates/ And who navigators in respect of the perils of the sea?

Polemarchus/ The pilot.

Socrates/ Well then, the just man, in what action and for what work is he the most competent to benefit friends and harm enemies?

Polemarchus/ In making war and as an ally, I should say.

Socrates/ Very well. But now if they are not sick, friend Polemarchus, the physician is useless to them.

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And so to those who are not at sea the pilot.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Shall we also say this, that for those who are not at war the just man is useless?

Polemarchus/ By no means.

Socrates/ There is a use then even in peace for justice?

Polemarchus/ Yes, it is useful.

Socrates/ But so is agriculture, isn't it?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Namely, for the getting of a harvest?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But likewise the cobbler's art?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting of shoes.

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then tell me, for the service and getting of what would you say that justice is useful in time of peace?

Polemarchus/ In engagements and dealings, Socrates.

Socrates/ And by dealings do you mean associations, partnerships, or something else?

Polemarchus/ Associations, of course.

Socrates/ Is it the just man, then, who is a good and useful associate and partner in the placing of draughts or the draughts player?

Polemarchus/ The player.

Socrates/ And in the placing of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful and better associate than the builder?

Polemarchus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then what is the association in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist as a harpist is better than the just man for striking the chords?

Polemarchus/ For money dealings, I think.

Socrates/ Except, I presume, Polemarchus, for the use of money when there is occasion to buy in common or sell a horse. Then, I take it, the man who knows horses, isn't it so?

Polemarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And again, if it is a vessel, the shipwright or the pilot.

Polemarchus/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ What then is the use of money in common for which a just man is the better partner?

Polemarchus/ When it is to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates.

Socrates/ You mean when it is to be put to no use but is to lie idle?

Polemarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then it is when money is useless that justice is useful in relation to it?

Polemarchus/ It looks that way.

Socrates/ And similarly when a scythe is to be kept safe, then justice is useful both in public and private. But when it is to be used, the vine-dresser's art is useful?

Polemarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And so you will have to say that when a shield and a lyre are to be kept and put to no use, justice is useful, but when they are to be made use of, the military art and music.

Polemarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And so in all other cases, in the use of each thing, justice is useless but in its uselessness useful?

Polemarchus/ It looks that way.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, justice cannot be a thing of much worth if it is useful only for things out of use and useless. But let us consider this point. Is not the man who is most skillful to strike or inflict a blow in a fight, whether as a boxer or elsewhere, also the most wary to guard against a blow?

Polemarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Is it not also true that he who best knows how to guard against disease is also most cunning to communicate it and escape detection?

Polemarchus/ I think so.

Socrates/ But again, the very same man is a good guardian of an army who is good at stealing a march upon the enemy in respect of their designs and proceedings generally.

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Of whatsoever, then, anyone is a skillful guardian, of that he is also a skillful thief?

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ If then the just man is an expert in guarding money he is an expert in stealing it.

Polemarchus/ The argument certainly points that way.

Socrates/ A kind of thief then the just man it seems has turned out to be, and it is likely that you acquired this idea from Homer. For he regards with complacency Autolycus, the maternal uncle of Odysseus, and says, 'he was gifted beyond all men in thievery and perjury.' So justice, according to you and Homer and Simonides, seems to be a kind of stealing, with the qualification that it is for the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies. Isn't that what you meant?

Polemarchus/ No, by Zeus. I no longer know what I did mean. Yet this I still believe, that justice benefits friends and harms enemies.

Socrates/ May I ask whether by friends you mean those who seem to a man to be worthy or those who really are so, even if they do not seem, and similarly of enemies?

Polemarchus/ It is likely, that men will love those whom they suppose to be good and dislike those whom they deem bad.

Socrates/ Do not men make mistakes in this matter so that many seem good to them who are not and the reverse?

Polemarchus/ They do.

Socrates/ For those, then, who thus err the good are their enemies and the bad their friends?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But all the same it is then just for them to benefit the bad and injure the good?

Polemarchus/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ But again, the good are just and incapable of injustice.

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ On your reasoning then it is just to wrong those who do no injustice.

Polemarchus/ Nay, nay, Socrates, the reasoning can't be right.

Socrates/ Then, it is just to harm the unjust and benefit the just.

Polemarchus/ That seems a better conclusion than the other.

Socrates/ It will work out, then, for many, Polemarchus, who have misjudged men that it is just to harm their friends, for they have got bad ones, and to benefit their enemies, for they are good. And so we shall find ourselves saying the very opposite of what we affirmed Simonides to mean.

Polemarchus/ Most certainly, it does work out so. But let us change our ground, for it looks as if we were wrong in the notion we took up about the friend and the enemy.

Socrates/ What notion, Polemarchus?

Polemarchus/ That the man who seems to us good is the friend.

Socrates/ And to what shall we change it now?

Polemarchus/ That the man who both seems and is good is the friend, but that he who seems but is not really so seems but is not really the friend. And there will be the same assumption about the enemy.

Socrates/ Then on this view it appears the friend will be the good man and the bad the enemy.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition. We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we are to

add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad?

Polemarchus/ By all means, that, I think, would be the right way to put it.

Socrates/ Is it then, the part of a good man to harm anybody whatsoever?

Polemarchus/ Certainly it is. A man ought to harm those who are both bad and his enemies.

Socrates/ When horses are harmed does it make them better or worse?

Polemarchus/ Worse.

Socrates/ In respect of the excellence or virtue of dogs or that of horses?

Polemarchus/ Of horses.

Socrates/ And do not also dogs when harmed become worse in respect of canine and not of equine virtue?

Polemarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And men, my dear fellow, must we not say that when they are harmed it is in respect of the distinctive excellence or virtue of man that they become worse?

Polemarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And is not justice the specific virtue of man?

Polemarchus/ That too must be granted.

Socrates/ Then it must also be admitted, my friend, that men who are harmed become more unjust.

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Do musicians then make men unmusical by the art of music?

Polemarchus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Well, do horsemen by horsemanship unfit men for dealing with horses?

Polemarchus/ No.

Socrates/ By justice then do the just make men unjust, or in sum do the good by virtue make men bad?

Polemarchus/ Nay, it is impossible.

Socrates/ It is not, I take it, the function of heat to chill but of its opposite.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite.

Polemarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Nor yet of the good to harm but of its opposite.

Polemarchus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But the just man is good?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It is not then the function of the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend or anyone else, but of his opposite, the unjust.

Polemarchus/ I think you are altogether right, Socrates.

Socrates/ If, then, anyone affirms that it is just to render to each his due and he means by this that injury and harm is what is due to his enemies from the just man and benefits to his friends, he was no truly wise man who said it. For what he meant was not true. For it has been made clear to us that in no case is it just to harm anyone.

Polemarchus/ I concede it.

Socrates/ We will take up arms against him, then, you and I together, if anyone affirms that either Simonides or Bias or Pittacus or any other of the wise and blessed said such a thing.

Polemarchus/ I, for my part, am ready to join in the battle with you.

Socrates/ Do you know, to whom I think the saying belongs—this statement that it is just to benefit friends and harm enemies?

Polemarchus/ To whom?

Socrates/ I think it was the saying of Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban or some other rich man who had great power in his own conceit.

Polemarchus/ That is most true.

Socrates/ Very well, since it has been made clear that this too is not justice and the just, what else is there that we might say justice to be?

—Now Thrasymachus, even while we were conversing, had been trying several times to break in and lay hold of the discussion but he was restrained by those who sat by him who wished to hear the argument out. But when we came to a pause after I had said this, he couldn't any longer hold his peace. But gathering himself up like a wild beast he hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces. And Polemarchus and I were frightened and fluttered apart.

—He bawled out into our midst;

Thrasymachus/ What balderdash is this that you have been talking, and why do you Simple Simons truckle and give way to one another? But if you really wish, Socrates, to know what the just is, don't merely ask questions or plume yourself upon controverting any answer that anyone gives—since your acumen has perceived that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them—but do you yourself answer and tell what you say the just is. And don't you be telling me that it is that which ought to be, or the beneficial or the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous, but express clearly and precisely whatever you say. For I won't take from you any such drivel as that!

Socrates/ And I, when I heard him, was dismayed, and looking upon him was filled with fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at him before he did at me I should have lost my voice. But as it is, at the very moment when he began to be exasperated by the course of the argument I glanced at him first, so that I became capable of answering him, and said with a slight tremor, Thrasymachus, don't be harsh with us. If I, and my friend, have made mistakes in the consideration of the question, rest assured that it is unwillingly that we err. For you surely must not suppose that while, if our quest were for gold, we would never willingly truckle to one another and make concessions in the search and so spoil our chances of finding it, yet that when we are searching for justice, a thing more precious than much fine gold, we should then be so foolish as to give way to one another and not rather do our serious best to have it discovered. You surely must not suppose that, my friend. But you see it is our lack of ability that is at fault. It is pity then that we should far more reasonably receive from clever fellows like you than severity.

And he, on hearing this, gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said;

Thrasymachus/ Ye gods! Here we have the well-known irony of Socrates, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you.

Socrates/ That's because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so you knew very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve, and in putting the question warned him, Don't you be telling me, fellow, that twelve is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won't accept any such drivel as that from you as an answer—it was obvious, I fancy, to you that no one could give an answer

to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he had said to you, Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is one of these, but must I say something different from the truth, or what do you mean? —What would have been your answer to him?

Thrasymachus/ Humph! How very like the two cases are!

Socrates/ There is nothing to prevent it. Yet even granted that they are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him, whether we forbid him or whether we don't?

Thrasymachus/ Is that, then, what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden answers?

Socrates/ I shouldn't be surprised, if on reflection that would be my view.

Thrasymachus/ What then, if I show you another answer about justice a differing from all these, a better one—what penalty do you think you deserve?

Socrates/ Why, what else, than that which it befits anyone who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer.

Thrasymachus/ I like your simplicity. But in addition to 'learning' you must pay a fine of money.

Socrates/ Well, I will when I have got it.

Glaucon/ It is there. If money is all that stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will all contribute for Socrates.

Thrasymachus/ Oh yes, of course, so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies.

Socrates/ Why, how, my dear fellow, could anybody answer if in the first place he did not know and did not even profess to know, and secondly, even if he had some notion of the matter, he had been told by a man of weight that he mustn't give any of his suppositions as an answer? Nay, it is more reasonable that you should be the speaker. For you do affirm that you know and are able to tell. Don't be obstinate, but do me the favor to reply and don't be chary of your wisdom, and instruct Glaucon here and the rest of us.

—When I had spoken thus Glaucon and the others urged him not to be obstinate. It was quite plain that Thrasymachus was eager to speak in order that he might do himself credit, since he believed that he had a most excellent answer to our question. But he demurred and pretended to make a point of my being the respondent. Finally he gave way and then said;

Thrasymachus/ Here you have the wisdom of Socrates, to refuse himself to teach, but go about and learn from others and not even pay thanks therefore.

Socrates/ That I learn from others, you said truly, Thrasymachus. But in saying that I do not pay thanks you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able. And I am able only to bestow praise. For money I lack. But that I praise right willingly those who appear to speak well you will well know forthwith as soon as you have given your answer. For I think that you will speak well.

Thrasymachus/ Hearken and hear then. I affirm that the just is nothing else than the advantage of the stronger. Well, why don't you applaud? Nay, you'll do anything but that.

Socrates/ Provided only I first understand your meaning, for I don't yet apprehend it. The advantage of the stronger is what you affirm the just to be. But what in the world do you mean by this? I presume you don't intend to affirm this, that

if Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are and the flesh of beef is advantageous for him, for his body, this viand is also for us who are weaker than he both advantageous and just.

Thrasymachus/ You are a buffoon, Socrates, and take my statement in the most detrimental sense.

Socrates/ Not at all, my dear fellow. I only want you to make your meaning plainer.

Thrasymachus/ Don't you know then, that some cities are governed by tyrants, in others democracy rules, in others aristocracy?

Socrates/ Assuredly.

Thrasymachus/ And is not this the thing that is strong and has the mastery in each—the ruling party?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Thrasymachus/ And each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their—the rulers'—advantage and the man who deviates from this law they chastise as a lawbreaker and a wrongdoer. This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states—the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere, the advantage of the stronger.

Socrates/ Now, I have learned your meaning, but whether it is true or not I have to try to learn. The advantageous, then, is also your reply, Thrasymachus, to the question, what is the just—though you forbade me to give that answer. But you add thereto that of the stronger.

Thrasymachus/ A trifling addition perhaps you think it.

Socrates/ It is not yet clear whether it is a big one either, but that we must inquire whether what you say is true is clear. For since I too admit that the just is something that is of advantage—but you are for making an addition and affirm it to be the advantage of the stronger, while I don't profess to know—we must pursue the inquiry.

Thrasymachus/ Inquire away.

Socrates/ I will do so. Tell me, then, you affirm also, do you not, that obedience to rulers is just?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ May I ask whether the rulers in the various states are infallible or capable sometimes of error?

Thrasymachus/ Surely, they are liable to err.

Socrates/ Then in their attempts at legislation they enact some laws rightly and some not rightly, do they not?

Thrasymachus/ So I suppose.

Socrates/ And by rightly we are to understand for their advantage, and by wrongly to their disadvantage? Do you mean that or not?

Thrasymachus/ That.

Socrates/ But whatever they enact must be performed by their subjects and is justice?

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then on your theory it is just not only to do what is the advantage of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his advantage.

Thrasymachus/ What's that you're saying?

Socrates/ What you yourself are saying, I think. Let us consider it more closely. Have we not agreed that the rulers in giving orders to the ruled sometimes mistake their own

advantage, and that whatever the rulers enjoin it is just for the subjects to perform? Was not that admitted?

Thrasymachus/ I think it was.

Socrates/ Then you will have to think, that to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger has been admitted by you to be just in the case when the rulers unwittingly enjoin what is bad for themselves, while you affirm that it is just for the others to do what they enjoined. In that way does not this conclusion inevitably follow, my most sapient Thrasymachus, that it is just to do the very opposite of what you say? For it is in that case surely the disadvantage of the stronger or superior that the inferior are commanded to perform.

Polemarchus/ Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, nothing could be more conclusive.

Clitophon/ Of course, if you are his witness.

Polemarchus/ What need is there of a witness? Thrasymachus himself admits that the rulers sometimes enjoin what is evil for themselves and yet says that it is just for the subjects to do this.

Clitophon/ That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasymachus laid it down that it is just to obey the orders of the rulers.

Polemarchus/ Yes, Clitophon, but he also took the position that the advantage of the stronger is just. And after these two assumptions he again admitted that the stronger sometimes bid the inferior and their subjects do what is to the disadvantage of the rulers. And from these admissions the just would no more be the advantage of the stronger than the contrary.

Clitophon/ Oh well, by the advantage of the superior he meant what the superior supposed to be for his advantage. This was what the inferior had to do, and that this is the just was his position.

Polemarchus/ That isn't what he said.

Socrates/ Never mind, Polemarchus. But if that is Thrasymachus' present meaning, let us take it from him in that sense. So tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you intended to say, that the just is the advantage of the superior as it appears to the superior whether it really is or not? Are we to say this was your meaning?

Thrasymachus/ Not in the least, Do you suppose that I call one who is in error a superior when he errs?

Socrates/ I certainly did suppose that you meant that, when you agreed that rulers are not infallible but sometimes make mistakes.

Thrasymachus/ That is because you argue like a pettifogger, Socrates. Why, to take the nearest example, do you call one who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet that is what we say literally—we say that the physician erred, and the calculator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these in so far as he is that which we entitle him never errs, so that, speaking precisely, since you are such a stickler for precision, no craftsman errs. For it is when his knowledge abandons him that he who goes wrong goes wrong—when he is not a craftsman. So that no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake then when he is a ruler, though everybody would use the expression that the physician made a mistake and the ruler erred. It is in this loose way of speaking, then, that you must take the answer I gave you a little while ago. But the most precise statement is that other, that the ruler in so far forth as ruler does not err, and not erring he enacts what is best for himself, and this the subject must do, so that, even as I

meant from the start, I say the just is to do what is for the advantage of the stronger.

Socrates/ So then, Thrasymachus, my manner of argument seems to you pettifogging?

Thrasymachus/ It does.

Socrates/ You think, do you, that it was with malice aforethought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I asked that question?

Thrasymachus/ I don't think it, I know it, and you won't make anything by it, for you won't get the better of me by stealth and, failing stealth, you are not of the force to beat me in debate.

Socrates/ Bless your soul, I wouldn't even attempt such a thing. But that nothing of the sort may spring up between us again, define in which sense you take the ruler and stronger. Do you mean the so-called ruler or that ruler in the precise sense of whom you were just now telling us, and for whose advantage as being the superior it will be just for the inferior to act?

Thrasymachus/ I mean the ruler in the very most precise sense of the word, Now bring on against this your cavils and your shyster's tricks if you are able. I ask no quarter. But you'll find yourself unable.

Socrates/ Why, do you suppose, that I am so mad as to try to beard a lion and try the pettifogger on Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ You did try it just now, paltry fellow though you be.

Socrates/ Something too much of this sort of thing. But tell me, your physician in the precise sense, of whom you were just now speaking, is he a money-maker, an earner of fees, or a healer of the sick? And remember to speak of the physician who is really such.

Thrasymachus/ A healer of the sick.

Socrates/ And what of the pilot—the pilot rightly so called—is he a ruler of sailors or a sailor?

Thrasymachus/ A ruler of sailors.

Socrates/ We don't, I fancy, have to take into account the fact that he actually sails in the ship, nor is he to be denominated a sailor. For it is not in respect of his sailing that he is called a pilot but in respect of his art and his ruling of the sailors.

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ Then for each of them is there not a something that is for his advantage?

Thrasymachus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And is it not also true, that the art naturally exists for this, to discover and provide for each his advantage?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, for this.

Socrates/ Is there, then, for each of the arts any other advantage than to be as perfect as possible?

Thrasymachus/ What do you mean by that question?

Socrates/ Just as if, you should ask me whether it is enough for the body to be the body or whether it stands in need of something else, I would reply, By all means it stands in need. That is the reason why the art of medicine has now been invented, because the body is defective and such defect is unsatisfactory. To provide for this, then, what is advantageous, that is the end for which the art was devised. Do you think that would be a correct answer, or not?

Thrasymachus/ Correct.

Socrates/ But how about this? Is the medical art itself defective or faulty, or has any other art any need of some virtue, quality, or excellence—as the eyes of vision, the ears

of hearing—and for this reason is there need of some art over them that will consider and provide what is advantageous for these very ends? Does there exist in the art itself some defect and does each art require another art to consider its advantage and is there need of still another for the considering art and so on ad infinitum, or will the art look out for its own advantage? Or is it a fact that it needs neither itself nor another art to consider its advantage and provide against its deficiency? For there is no defect or error at all that dwells in any art. Nor does it befit an art to seek the advantage of anything else than that of its object. But the art itself is free from all harm and admixture of evil, and is right so long as each art is precisely and entirely that which it is. And consider the matter in that 'precise' way of speaking. Is it so or not?

Thrasymachus/ It appears to be so.

Socrates/ Then medicine, does not consider the advantage of medicine but of the body?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor horsemanship of horsemanship but of horses, nor does any other art look out for itself—for it has no need—but for that of which it is the art.

Thrasymachus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts do hold rule and are stronger than that of which they are the arts.

He conceded this but it went very hard.

Then no art considers or enjoins the advantage of the stronger but every art that of the weaker which is ruled by it.

—This too he was finally brought to admit though he tried to contest it.

—Can we deny, then, that neither does any physician in so far as he is a physician seek or enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of the patient? For we have agreed that the physician, 'precisely' speaking, is a ruler and governor of bodies and not a moneymaker. Did we agree on that?

—He assented.

And so the 'precise' pilot is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor?

—That was admitted.

—Then that sort of a pilot and ruler will not consider and enjoin the advantage of the pilot but that of the sailor whose ruler he is.

—He assented reluctantly.

—Then, Thrasymachus, neither does anyone in any office of rule in so far as he is a ruler consider and enjoin his own advantage but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft, and he keeps his eyes fixed on that and on what is advantageous and suitable to that in all that he says and does.

—When we had come to this point in the discussion and it was apparent to everybody that his formula of justice had suffered a reversal of form, Thrasymachus, instead of replying, said;

Thrasymachus/ Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?

Socrates/ What do you mean? Why didn't you answer me instead of asking such a question?

Thrasymachus/ Because, she lets her little snotty run about driveling and doesn't wipe your face clean, though you need it badly, if she can't get you to know the difference between the shepherd and the sheep.

Socrates/ And what, pray, makes you think that?

Thrasymachus/ Because you think that the shepherds and the neatherds are considering the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with anything else in view than the good of their masters and themselves. And by the same token you seem to suppose that the rulers in our cities, I mean the real rulers, differ at all in their thoughts of the governed from a man's attitude toward his sheep or that they think of anything else night and day than the sources of their own profit. And you are so far out concerning the just and justice and the unjust and injustice that you don't know that justice and the just are literally the other fellow's good—the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and serves—while injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in every sense of the word and just, and they being thus ruled do what is for his advantage who is the stronger and make him happy by serving him, but themselves by no manner of means. And you must look at the matter, my simple-minded Socrates, in this way, that the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relation with the unjust. To begin with, in their business dealings in any joint undertaking of the two you will never find that the just man has the advantage over the unjust at the dissolution of the partnership but that he always has the worst of it. Then again, in their relations with the state, if there are direct taxes or contributions to be paid, the just man contributes more from an equal estate and the other less, and when there is a distribution the one gains much and the other nothing. And so when each holds office, apart from any other loss the just man must count on his own affairs' falling into disorder through neglect, while because of his justice he makes no profit from the state, and thereto he will displease his friends and his acquaintances by his unwillingness to serve them unjustly. But to the unjust man

all the opposite advantages accrue. I mean, of course, the one I was just speaking of, the man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale. Consider this type of man, then, if you wish to judge how much more profitable it is to him personally to be unjust than to be just. And the easiest way of all to understand this matter will be to turn to the most consummate form of injustice which makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. And this is tyranny, which both by stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others, both sacred and profane, both private and public, not little by little but at one swoop. For each several part of such wrongdoing the malefactor who fails to escape detection is fined and incurs the extreme of contumely, for temple robbers, kidnapers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves are the appellations of those who commit these several forms of injustice. But when in addition to the property of the citizens men kidnap and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of these opprobrious names they are pronounced happy and blessed not only by their fellow citizens but by all who hear the story of the man who has committed complete and entire injustice. For it is not the fear of doing but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who revile injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while the unjust is what profits a man's self and is for his advantage.

Socrates/ After this Thrasymachus was minded to depart when like a bathman he had poured his speech in a sudden flood over our ears. But the company would not suffer him and were insistent that he should remain and render an account of what he had said. And I was particularly urgent

and said, I am surprised at you, Thrasymachus. After hurling such a doctrine at us, can it be that you propose to depart without staying to teach us properly or learn yourself whether this thing is so or not? Do you think it a small matter that you are attempting to determine and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us would make living most worthwhile?

Thrasymachus/ Well, do I deny it?

Socrates/ You seem to, or else to care nothing for us and so feel no concern whether we are going to live worse or better lives in our ignorance of what you affirm that you know. Nay, my good fellow, do your best to make the matter clear to us also—it will be no bad investment for you, any benefit that you bestow on such a company as this. For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced; neither do I think that injustice is more profitable than justice, not even If one gives it free scope and does not hinder it of its will. But, suppose, sir, a man to be unjust and to be able to act unjustly either because he is not detected or can maintain it by violence. All the same he does not convince me that it is more profitable than justice. Now it may be that there is someone else among us who feels in this way and that I am not the only one. Persuade us, then, my dear fellow, convince us satisfactorily that we are ill advised in preferring justice to injustice.

Thrasymachus/ And how am I to persuade you? If you are not convinced by what I just now was saying, what more can I do for you? Shall I take the argument and ram it into your head?

Socrates/ Heaven forbid! Don't do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand by it, or if you shift your ground change openly and don't try to deceive us. But, as it is, you see, Thrasymachus—let us return to the

previous examples—you see that while you began by taking the physician in the true sense of the word, you did not think fit afterward to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd, not with regard to what is best for the sheep, but as if he were a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good cheer, or again with a view to the sale of them, as if he were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of the shepherd surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which it is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are surely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd's art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of rule in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared for by it, alike in political and private rule. Why, do you think that the rulers and holders of office in our cities—the true rulers—willingly hold office and rule?

Thrasymachus/ I don't think, I know right well they do.

Socrates/ But what of other forms of rule, Thrasymachus? Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule? Men demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule. Tell me this. We ordinarily say, do we not, that each of the arts is different from others because its power or function is different? And, my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some result, don't answer counter to your real belief.

Thrasymachus/ Well, yes, that is what renders it different.

Socrates/ And does not each art also yield us benefit that is peculiar to itself and not general, as for example medicine health, the pilot's art safety at sea, and the other arts similarly?

Thrasymachus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And does not the wage earner's art yield wages? For that is its function. Would you identify medicine and the pilot's art? Or if you please to discriminate 'precisely' as you proposed, none the more if a pilot regains his health because a sea voyage is good for him, no whit the more, I say, for this reason do you call his art medicine, do you?

Thrasymachus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Neither, I take it, do you call wage earning medicine if a man earning wages is in health.

Thrasymachus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ But what of this? Do you call medicine wage earning, if a man when giving treatment earns wages?

Thrasymachus/ No.

Socrates/ And did we not agree that the benefit derived from each art is peculiar to it?

Thrasymachus/ So be it.

Socrates/ Any common or general benefit that all craftsmen receive, then, they obviously derive from their common use of some further identical thing.

Thrasymachus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ And we say that the benefit of earning wages accrues to the craftsmen from their further exercise of the wage-earning art.

—He assented reluctantly.

Then the benefit, the receiving of wages, does not accrue to each from his own art. But if we are to consider it 'precisely,' medicine produces health but the fee-earning art

the pay, and architecture a house but the fee-earning art accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others—each performs its own task and benefits that over which it is set. But unless pay is added to it, is there any benefit which the craftsman receives from the craft?

Thrasymachus/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Does he then bestow no benefit either when he works for nothing?

Thrasymachus/ I'll say he does.

Socrates/ Then, Thrasymachus, is not this immediately apparent, that no art or office provides what is beneficial for itself—but as we said long ago it provides and enjoins what is beneficial to its subject, considering the advantage of that, the weaker, and not the advantage of the stronger? That was why, friend Thrasymachus, I was just now saying that no one of his own will chooses to hold rule and office and take other people's troubles in hand to straighten them out, but everybody expects pay for that, because he who is to exercise the art rightly never does what is best for himself or enjoins it when he gives commands according to the art, but what is best for the subject. That is the reason, it seems, why pay must be provided for those who are to consent to rule, either in the form of money or honor or a penalty if they refuse.

Glaucon/ What do you mean by that, Socrates? The two wages I recognize, but the penalty you speak of and described as a form of wage I don't understand.

Socrates/ Then, you don't understand the wages of the best men for the sake of which the finest spirits hold office and rule when they consent to do so. Don't you know that to be covetous of honor and covetous of money is said to be and is a reproach?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Well, then, that is why the good are not willing to rule either for the sake of money or of honor. They do not wish to collect pay openly for their service of rule and be styled hirelings, nor to take it by stealth from their office and be called thieves, nor yet for the sake of honor, for they are not covetous of honor. So there must be imposed some compulsion and penalty to constrain them to rule if they are to consent to hold office. That is perhaps why to seek office oneself and not await compulsion is thought disgraceful. But the chief penalty is to be governed by someone worse if a man will not himself hold office and rule. It is from fear of this, as it appears to me, that the better sort hold office when they do, and then they go to it not in the expectation of enjoyment nor as to a good thing, but as to a necessary evil and because they are unable to turn it over to better men than themselves or to their like. For we may venture to say that, if there should be a city of good men only, immunity from office holding would be as eagerly contended for as office is now, and there it would be made plain that in very truth the true ruler does not naturally seek his own advantage but that of the ruled, so that every man of understanding would rather choose to be benefited by another than to be bothered with benefiting him. This point then I by no means concede to Thrasymachus, that justice is the advantage of the superior. But that we will reserve for another occasion. A far weightier matter seems to me Thrasymachus' present statement, his assertion that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. Which now do you choose, Glaucon? And which seems to you to be the truer statement?

Glaucon/ That the life of the just man is more profitable, I say.

Socrates/ Did you hear, all the goods that Thrasymachus just now enumerated for the life of the unjust man?

Glaucon/ I heard, but I am not convinced.

Socrates/ Do you wish us then to try to persuade him, supposing we can find a way, that what he says is not true?

Glaucon/ Of course I wish it.

Socrates/ If then we oppose him in a set speech enumerating in turn the advantages of being just and he replies and we rejoin, we shall have to count up and measure the goods listed in the respective speeches and we shall forthwith be in need of judges to decide between us. But if, as in the preceding discussion, we come to terms with one another as to what we admit in the inquiry, we shall be ourselves both judges and pleaders.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Which method do you like better?

Glaucon/ This one.

Socrates/ Come then, Thrasymachus, go back to the beginning and answer us. You affirm that perfect and complete injustice is more profitable than justice that is complete.

Thrasymachus/ I affirm it, and have told you my reasons.

Socrates/ Tell me then how you would express yourself on this point about them. You call one of them, I presume, a virtue and the other a vice?

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Justice the virtue and injustice the vice?

Thrasymachus/ It is likely, you innocent, when I say that injustice pays and justice doesn't pay.

Socrates/ But what then, pray?

Thrasymachus/ The opposite.

Socrates/ What! Justice vice?

Thrasymachus/ No, but a most noble simplicity or goodness of heart.

Socrates/ Then do you call injustice badness of heart?

Thrasymachus/ No, but goodness of judgment.

Socrates/ Do you also, Thrasymachus, regard the unjust as intelligent and good?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, if they are capable of complete injustice, and are able to subject to themselves cities and tribes of men. But you probably suppose that I mean those who take purses. There is profit to be sure even in that sort of thing, if it goes undetected. But such things are not worth taking into the account, but only what I just described.

Socrates/ I am not unaware of your meaning in that, but this is what surprised me, that you should range injustice under the head of virtue and wisdom, and justice in the opposite class.

Thrasymachus/ Well, I do so class them.

Socrates/ That, is a stiffer proposition, my friend, and if you are going as far as that it is hard to know what to answer. For if your position were that injustice is profitable yet you conceded it to be vicious and disgraceful as some other disputants do, there would be a chance for an argument on conventional principles. But, as it is, you obviously are going to affirm that it is honorable and strong and you will attach to it all the other qualities that we were assigning to the just, since you don't shrink from putting it in the category of virtue and wisdom.

Thrasymachus/ You are a most veritable prophet.

Socrates/ Well, I mustn't flinch from following out the logic of the inquiry, so long as I conceive you to be saying what you think. For now, Thrasymachus, I absolutely believe that you are not 'mocking' us but telling us your real opinions about the truth.

Thrasymachus/ What difference does it make to you, whether I believe it or not? Why don't you test the argument?

Socrates/ No difference, but here is something I want you to tell me in addition to what you have said. Do you think the just man would want to overreach or exceed another just man?

Thrasymachus/ By no means, Otherwise he would not be the delightful simpleton that he is.

Socrates/ And would he exceed or overreach or go beyond the just action?

Thrasymachus/ Not that either.

Socrates/ But how would he treat the unjust man—would he deem it proper and just to outdo, overreach, or go beyond him or would he not?

Thrasymachus/ He would, but he wouldn't be able to.

Socrates/ That is not my question, but whether it is not the fact that the just man does not claim or wish to outdo the just man but only the unjust?

Thrasymachus/ That is the case.

Socrates/ How about the unjust then? Does he claim to overreach and outdo the just man and the just action?

Thrasymachus/ Of course, since he claims to overreach and get the better of everything.

Socrates/ Then the unjust man will overreach and outdo also both the unjust man and the unjust action, and all his endeavor will be to get the most in everything for himself.

Thrasymachus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Let us put it in this way. The just man does not seek to take advantage of his like but of his unlike, but the unjust man of both.

Thrasymachus/ Admirably put.

Socrates/ But the unjust man is intelligent and good and the just man neither.

Thrasymachus/ That, too, is right.

Socrates/ Is it not also true, that the unjust man is like the intelligent and good and the just man is not?

Thrasymachus/ Of course, being such he will be like to such and the other not.

Socrates/ Excellent. Then each is such as that to which he is like.

Thrasymachus/ What else do you suppose?

Socrates/ Very well, Thrasymachus, but do you recognize that one man is a musician and another unmusical?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ Which is the intelligent and which the unintelligent?

Thrasymachus/ The musician, I presume, is the intelligent and the unmusical the unintelligent.

Socrates/ And is he not good in the things in which he is intelligent and bad in the things in which he is unintelligent?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same of the physician?

Thrasymachus/ The same.

Socrates/ Do you think then, my friend, that any musician in the tuning of a lyre would want to overreach another musician in the tightening and relaxing of the strings or would claim and think fit to exceed or outdo him?

Thrasymachus/ I do not.

Socrates/ But would he the unmusical man?

Thrasymachus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And how about the medical man? In prescribing food and drink would he want to outdo the medical man or the medical procedure?

Thrasymachus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ But he would the unmedical man?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Consider then with regard to all forms of knowledge and ignorance whether you think that anyone who knows would choose to do or say other or more than what another who knows would do or say, and not rather exactly what his like would do in the same action.

Thrasymachus/ Why, perhaps it must be so, in such cases.

Socrates/ But what of the ignorant man—of him who does not know? Would he not overreach or outdo equally the knower and the ignorant?

Thrasymachus/ It may be.

Socrates/ But the one who knows is wise?

Thrasymachus/ I'll say so.

Socrates/ And the wise is good?

Thrasymachus/ I'll say so.

Socrates/ Then he who is good and wise will not wish to overreach his like but his unlike and opposite.

Thrasymachus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But the bad man and the ignoramus will overreach both like and unlike?

Thrasymachus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ And does not our unjust man, Thrasymachus, overreach both unlike and like? Did you not say that?

Thrasymachus/ I did.

Socrates/ But the just man will not overreach his like but only his unlike?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the just man is like the wise and good, and the unjust is like the bad and the ignoramus.

Thrasymachus/ It seems likely.

Socrates/ But furthermore we agreed that each is such as that to which he is like.

Thrasymachus/ Yes, we did.

Socrates/ Then the just man has turned out on our hands to be good and wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant.

—Thrasymachus made all these admissions not as I now lightly narrate them, but with much balking and reluctance and prodigious sweating, it being summer, and it was then I beheld what I had never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing. But when we did reach our conclusion that justice is virtue and wisdom and injustice vice and ignorance, Good, let this be taken as established. But we were also affirming that injustice is a strong and potent thing. Don't you remember, Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ I remember, but I don't agree with what you are now saying either and I have an answer to it, but if I were to attempt to state it, I know very well that you would say that I was delivering a harangue. Either then allow me to speak at such length as I desire, or, if you prefer to ask questions, go on questioning and I, as we do for old wives telling their tales, will say, 'Very good,' and will nod assent and dissent.

Socrates/ No, no, not counter to your own belief.

Thrasymachus/ Yes, to please you, since you don't allow me freedom of speech. And yet what more do you want?

Socrates/ Nothing, indeed, but if this is what you propose to do, do it, and I will ask the questions.

Thrasymachus/ Ask on, then.

Socrates/ This, then, is the question I ask, the same as before, so that our inquiry may proceed in sequence. What is the nature of injustice as compared with justice? For the statement made, I believe, was that injustice is a more potent and stronger thing than justice. But now, if justice is wisdom and virtue, it will easily, I take it, be shown to be also a stronger thing than injustice, since injustice is ignorance—no one could now fail to recognize that—but what I want is not quite so simple as that. I wish, Thrasymachus, to consider it in some such fashion as this. A city, you would say, may be unjust and try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection.

Thrasymachus/ Certainly, and this is what the best state will chiefly do, the state whose injustice is most complete.

Socrates/ I understand, that this was your view. But the point that I am considering is this, whether the city that thus shows itself superior to another will have this power without justice or whether she must of necessity combine it with justice.

Thrasymachus/ If, what you were just now saying holds good, that justice is wisdom, with justice; if it is as I said, with injustice.

Socrates/ Admirable, Thrasymachus. You not only nod assent and dissent, but give excellent answers.

Thrasymachus/ I am trying to please you.

Socrates/ Very kind of you. But please me in one thing more and tell me this. Do you think that a city, an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any other group that attempted any

action in common, could accomplish anything if they wronged one another?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But if they didn't, wouldn't they be more likely to?

Thrasymachus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so?

Thrasymachus/ So be it, not to differ from you.

Socrates/ That is good of you, my friend, but tell me this. If it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either among free men or slaves, cause them to hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable of effective action in common?

Thrasymachus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Suppose, then, it springs up between two, will they not be at outs with and hate each other and be enemies both to one another and to the just?

Thrasymachus/ They will.

Socrates/ And then will you tell me that if injustice arises in one it will lose its force and function or will it nonetheless keep it?

Thrasymachus/ Have it that it keeps it.

Socrates/ And is it not apparent that its force is such that wherever it is found in city, family, camp, or in anything else, it first renders the thing incapable of cooperation with itself owing to faction and difference, and secondly an enemy to itself and to its opposite in every case, the just? Isn't that so?

Thrasymachus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then in the individual too, I presume, its presence will operate all these effects which it is its nature to produce. It will in the first place make him incapable of accomplishing anything because of inner faction and lack of self-agreement, and then an enemy to himself and to the just. Is it not so?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But, my friend, the gods too are just.

Thrasymachus/ Have it that they are.

Socrates/ So to the gods also, it seems, the unjust man will be hateful, but the just man dear.

Thrasymachus/ Revel in your discourse, without fear, for I shall not oppose you, so as not to offend your partisans here.

Socrates/ Fill up the measure of my feast, then, and complete it for me, by continuing to answer as you have been doing. Now that the just appear to be wiser and better and more capable of action and the unjust incapable of any common action, and that if we ever say that any men who are unjust have vigorously combined to put something over, our statement is not altogether true, for they would not have kept their hands from one another if they had been thoroughly unjust, but it is obvious that there was in them some justice which prevented them from wronging at the same time one another too as well as those whom they attacked. And by dint of this they accomplished whatever they did and set out to do injustice only half corrupted by injustice, since utter rascals completely unjust are completely incapable of effective action—all this I understand to be the truth, and not what you originally laid down. But whether it is also true that the just have a better life than the unjust and are happier, which is the question we afterward proposed for examination, is what we now have

to consider. It appears even now that they are, I think, from what has already been said. But all the same we must examine it more carefully. For it is no ordinary matter that we are discussing, but the right conduct of life.

Thrasymachus/ Proceed with your inquiry.

Socrates/ I proceed. Tell me then—would you say that a horse has a specific work or function?

Thrasymachus/ I would.

Socrates/ Would you be willing to define the work of a horse or of anything else to be that which one can do only with it or best with it?

Thrasymachus/ I don't understand.

Socrates/ Well, take it this way. Is there anything else with which you can see except the eyes?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Again, could you hear with anything but ears?

Thrasymachus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Would you not rightly say that these are the functions of these organs?

Thrasymachus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Once more, you could use a dirk to trim vine branches and a knife and many other instruments.

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But nothing so well, I take it, as a pruning knife fashioned for this purpose.

Thrasymachus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Must we not then assume this to be the work or function of that?

Thrasymachus/ We must.

Socrates/ You will now, then, I fancy, better apprehend the meaning of my question when I asked whether that is

not the work of a thing which it only or it better than anything else can perform.

Thrasymachus/ Well, I do understand, and agree that the work of anything is that.

Socrates/ Very good. Do you not also think that there is a specific virtue or excellence of everything for which a specific work or function is appointed? Let us return to the same examples. The eyes we say have a function?

Thrasymachus/ They have.

Socrates/ Is there also a virtue of the eyes?

Thrasymachus/ There is.

Socrates/ And was there not a function of the ears?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And so also a virtue?

Thrasymachus/ Also a virtue.

Socrates/ And what of all other things? Is the case not the same?

Thrasymachus/ The same.

Socrates/ Take note now. Could the eyes possibly fulfill their function well if they lacked their own proper excellence and had in its stead the defect?

Thrasymachus/ How could they? For I presume you meant blindness instead of vision.

Socrates/ Whatever, the excellence may be. For I have not yet come to that question, but am only asking whether whatever operates will not do its own work well by its own virtue and badly by its own defect.

Thrasymachus/ That much, you may safely affirm to be true.

Socrates/ Then the ears, too, if deprived of their own virtue will do their work ill?

Thrasymachus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And do we then apply the same principle to all things?

Thrasymachus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then next consider this. The soul, has it a work which you couldn't accomplish with anything else in the world, as for example, management, rule, deliberation, and the like? Is there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they were its peculiar work?

Thrasymachus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ And again life? Shall we say that too is the function of the soul?

Thrasymachus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And do we not also say that there is an excellence or virtue of the soul?

Thrasymachus/ We do.

Socrates/ Will the soul ever accomplish its own work well if deprived of its own virtue, or is this impossible?

Thrasymachus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Of necessity, then, a bad soul will govern and manage things badly while the good soul will in all these things do well.

Thrasymachus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul is justice and its defect injustice?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, we did.

Socrates/ The just soul and the just man then will live well and the unjust ill?

Thrasymachus/ So it appears, by your reasoning.

Socrates/ But furthermore, he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not the contrary.

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable.

Thrasymachus/ So be it.

Socrates/ But it surely does not pay to be miserable, but to be happy.

Thrasymachus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Never, then, most worshipful Thrasymachus, can injustice be more profitable than justice.

Thrasymachus/ Let this complete your entertainment, Socrates, at the festival of Bendis.

Socrates/ A feast furnished by you, Thrasymachus, now that you have become gentle with me and are no longer angry. I have not dined well, however—by my own fault, not yours. But just as gluttons snatch at every dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly enjoyed the preceding, so I, methinks, before finding the first object of our inquiry—what justice is—let go of that and set out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue. And again, when later the view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other topic. So that for me the present outcome of the discussion is that I know nothing. For if I don't know what the just is, I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy.

Book 2.

Socrates/ When I had said this, I supposed that I was done with the subject, but it all turned out to be only a prelude. For Glaucon, who is always an intrepid, enterprising spirit in everything, would not on this occasion acquiesce in Thrasymachus' abandonment of his case, but said;

Glaucon/ Socrates, is it your desire to seem to have persuaded us or really to persuade us that it is without exception better to be just than unjust?

Socrates/ Really, if the choice rested with me.

Glaucon/ Well, then, you are not doing what you wish. For tell me, do you agree that there is a kind of good which we would choose to possess, not from desire for its aftereffects, but welcoming it for its own sake? As, for example, joy and such pleasures as are harmless and nothing results from them afterward save to have and to hold the enjoyment.

Socrates/ I recognize that kind.

Glaucon/ And again a kind that we love both for its own sake and for its consequences, such as understanding, sight, and health? For these I presume we welcome for both reasons.

Socrates/ Yes.

Glaucon/ And can you discern a third form of good under which fall exercise and being healed when sick and the art of healing and the making of money generally? For of them we would say that they are laborious and painful yet beneficial, and for their own sake we would not accept them, but only for the rewards and other benefits that accrue from a them.

Socrates/ Why yes, I must admit this third class also. But what of it?

Glaucon/ In which of these classes do you place justice?

Socrates/ In my opinion, it belongs in the fairest class, that which a man who is to be happy must love both for its own sake and for the results.

Glaucon/ Yet the multitude, do not think so, but that it belongs to the toilsome class of things that must be practiced for the sake of rewards and repute due to opinion but that in itself is to be shunned as an affliction.

Socrates/ I am aware, that that is the general opinion and Thrasymachus has for some time been disparaging it as such and praising injustice. But I, it seems, am somewhat slow to learn.

Glaucon/ Come now, hear what I too have to say and see if you agree with me. For Thrasymachus seems to me to have given up to you too soon, as if he were a serpent that you had charmed, but I am not yet satisfied with the proof that has been offered about justice and injustice. For what I desire is to hear what each of them is and what potency and effect each has in and of itself dwelling in the soul, but to dismiss their rewards and consequences. This, then, is what I propose to do, with your concurrence. I will renew the argument of Thrasymachus and will first state what men say is the nature and origin of justice, secondly, that all who practice it do so reluctantly, regarding it as something necessary and not as a good, and thirdly, that they have plausible grounds for thus acting, since forsooth the life of the unjust man is far better than that of the just man—as they say, though I, Socrates, don't believe it. Yet I am disconcerted when my ears are dinned by the arguments of Thrasymachus and innumerable others. But the case for justice, to prove that it is better than injustice, I have never

yet heard stated by any as I desire to hear it. What I desire is to hear an encomium on justice in and by itself. And I think I am most likely to get that from you. For which reason I will lay myself out in praise of the life of injustice, and in so speaking will give you an example of the manner in which I desire to hear from you in turn the dispraise of injustice and the praise of justice. Consider whether my proposal pleases you.

Socrates/ Nothing could please me more, for on what subject would a man of sense rather delight to hold and hear discourse again and again?

Glaucon/ That is excellent, and now listen to what I said would be the first topic—the nature and origin of justice.

By nature, they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than the excess of good in doing wrong, so that when men do wrong and are wronged by one another and taste of both, those who lack the power to avoid the one and take the other determine that it is for their profit to make a compact with one another neither to commit nor to suffer injustice, and that this is the beginning of legislation and of covenants between men, and that they name the commandment of the law the lawful and the just, and that this is the genesis and essential nature of justice—a compromise between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent to get one's revenge. Justice, they tell us, being midway between the two, is accepted and approved, not as a real good, but as a thing honored in the lack of vigor to do injustice, since anyone who had the power to do it and was in reality 'a man' would never make a compact with anybody neither to wrong nor to be wronged, for he would be mad. The nature, then, of justice is this and such as this,

Socrates, and such are the conditions in which it originates, according to the theory.

But as for the second point, that those who practice it do so unwillingly and from want of power to commit injustice, we shall be most likely to apprehend that if we entertain some such supposition as this in thought—if we grant to both the just and the unjust license and power to do whatever they please, and then accompany them in imagination and see whither desire will conduct them. We should then catch the just man in the very act of resorting to the same conduct as the unjust man because of the self-advantage which every creature by its nature pursues as a good, while by the convention of law it is forcibly diverted to paying honor to 'equality.' The license that I mean would be most nearly such as would result from supposing them to have the power which men say once came to the ancestor a of Gyges the Lydian. They relate that he was a shepherd in the service of the ruler at that time of Lydia, and that after a great deluge of rain and an earthquake the ground opened and a chasm appeared in the place where he was pasturing, and they say that he saw and wondered and went down into the chasm. And the story goes that he beheld other marvels there and a hollow bronze horse with little doors, and that he peeped in and saw a corpse within, as it seemed, of more than mortal stature, and that there was nothing else but a gold ring on its hand, which he took off, and so went forth. And when the shepherds held their customary assembly to make their monthly report to the king about the flocks, he also attended, wearing the ring. So as he sat there it chanced that he turned the cullet of the ring toward himself, toward the inner part of his hand, and when this took place they say that he became invisible to those who sat by him and they spoke of him as absent, and that he was amazed, and again fumbling with the ring turned the cullet outward and so

became visible. On noting this he experimented with the ring to see if it possessed this virtue, and he found the result to be that when he turned the cullet inward he became invisible, and when outward visible, and becoming aware of this, he immediately managed things so that he became one of the messengers who went up to the king, and on coming there he seduced the king's wife and with her aid set upon the king and slew him and possessed his kingdom.

If now there should be two such rings, and the just man should put on one and the unjust the other, no one could be found, it would seem, of such adamantine temper as to persevere in justice and endure to refrain his hands from the possessions of others and not touch them, though he might with impunity take what he wished even from the market place, and enter into houses and lie with whom he pleased, and slay and loose from bonds whomsoever he would, and in all other things conduct himself among mankind as the equal of a god. And in so acting he would do no differently from the other man, but both would pursue the same course. And yet this is a great proof, one might argue, that no one is just of his own will but only from constraint, in the belief that justice is not his personal good, inasmuch as every man, when he supposes himself to have the power to do wrong, does wrong. For that there is far more profit for him personally in injustice than in justice is what every man believes, and believes truly, as the proponent of this theory will maintain. For if anyone who had got such a license within his grasp should refuse to do any wrong or lay his hands on others' possessions, he would be regarded as most pitiable and a great fool by all who took note of it, though they would praise him before one another's faces, deceiving one another because of their fear of suffering injustice. So much for this point.

But to come now to the decision between our two kinds of life, if we separate the most completely just and the most completely unjust man, we shall be able to decide rightly, but if not, not. How, then, is this separation to be made? Thus. We must subtract nothing of his injustice from the unjust man or of his justice from the just, but assume the perfection of each in his own mode of conduct. In the first place, the unjust man must act as clever craftsmen do. A first-rate pilot or physician, for example, feels the difference between impossibilities and possibilities in his art and attempts the one and lets the others go, and then, too, if he does happen to trip, he is equal to correcting his error. Similarly, the unjust man who attempts injustice rightly must be supposed to escape detection if he is to be altogether unjust, and we must regard the man who is caught as a bungler. For the height of injustice is to seem just without being so. To the perfectly unjust man, then, we must assign perfect injustice and withhold nothing of it, but we must allow him, while committing the greatest wrongs, to have secured for himself the greatest reputation for justice, and if he does happen to trip, we must concede to him the power to correct his mistakes by his ability to speak persuasively if any of his misdeeds come to light, and when force is needed, to employ force by reason of his manly spirit and vigor and his provision of friends and money. And when we have set up an unjust man of this character, our theory must set the just man at his side—a simple and noble man, who, in the phrase of Aeschylus, does not wish to seem but to be good. Then we must deprive him of the seeming. For if he is going to be thought just he will have honors and gifts because of that esteem. We cannot be sure in that case whether he is just for justice' sake or for the sake of the gifts and the honors. So we must strip him bare of everything but justice and make his state the opposite of his imagined counterpart.

Though doing no wrong he must have the repute of the greatest injustice, so that he may be put to the test as regards justice through not softening because of ill repute and the consequences thereof. But let him hold on his course unchangeable even unto death, seeming all his life to be unjust though being just, so that, both men attaining to the limit, the one of injustice, the other of justice, we may pass judgment which of the two is the happier.

Socrates/ Bless me, my dear Glaucon. How strenuously you polish off each of your two men for the competition for the prize as if it were a statue!

Glaucon/ To the best of my ability, and if such is the nature of the two, it becomes an easy matter, I fancy, to unfold the tale of the sort of life that awaits each. We must tell it, then, and even if my language is somewhat rude and brutal, you must not suppose, Socrates, that it is I who speak thus, but those who commend injustice above justice. What they will say is this, that such being his disposition the just man will have to endure the lash, the rack, chains, the branding iron in his eyes, and finally, after every extremity of suffering, he will be crucified, and so will learn his lesson that not to be but to seem just is what we ought to desire. And the saying of Aeschylus was, it seems, far more correctly applicable to the unjust man. For it is literally true, they will say, that the unjust man, as pursuing what clings closely to reality, to truth, and not regulating his life by opinion, desires not to seem but to be unjust;

> Exploiting the deep furrows of his wit
> From which there grows the fruit of counsels shrewd.

first office and rule in the state because of his reputation for justice, then a wife from any family he chooses, and the giving of his children in marriage to whomsoever he pleases, dealings and partnerships with whom he will, and in all

these transactions advantage and profit for himself because he has no squeamishness about committing injustice. And so they say that if he enters into lawsuits, public or private, he wins and gets the better of his opponents, and, getting the better, is rich and benefits his friends and harms his enemies, and he performs sacrifices and dedicates votive offerings to the gods adequately and magnificently, and he serves and pays court to men whom he favors and to the gods far better than the just man, so that he may reasonably expect the favor of heaven also to fall rather to him than to the just. So much better they say, Socrates, is the life that is prepared for the unjust man from gods and men than that which awaits the just.

Socrates/ When Glaucon had thus spoken, I had a mind to make some

reply thereto, but his brother Adimantus said;

Adeimantus/ You surely don't suppose, Socrates, that the statement of the case is complete?

Socrates/ Why, what else?

Adeimantus/ The very most essential point, has not been mentioned.

Socrates/ Then, the proverb has it, let a brother help a man'—and so, if Glaucon omits any word or deed, do you come to his aid. Though for my part what he has already said is quite enough to overthrow me and incapacitate me for coming to the rescue of justice.

Adeimantus/ Nonsense, but listen to this further point. We must set forth the reasoning and the language of the opposite party, of those who commend justice and dispraise injustice, if what I conceive to be Glaucon's meaning is to be made more clear. Fathers, when they address exhortations to their sons, and all those who have others in their charge, urge the necessity of being just, not by praising justice itself,

but the good repute with mankind that accrues from it, the object that they hold before us being that by seeming to be just the man may get from the reputation office and alliances and all the good things that Glaucon just now enumerated as coming to the unjust man from his good name. But those people draw out still further this topic of reputation. For, throwing in good standing with the gods, they have no lack of blessings to describe, which they affirm the gods give to pious men, even as the worthy Hesiod and Homer declare—the one that the gods make the oaks bear for the just

> Acorns on topmost branches and swarms of bees on their mid-trunks.

and he tells how the

> Flocks of the fleece-bearing sheep are laden and weighted with soft wool.

and of many other blessings akin to these, and similarly the other poet;

> Even as when a good king, who rules in the fear of the high gods,
>
> Upholds justice and right, and the black earth yields him her foison,
>
> Barley and wheat, and his trees are laden and weighted with fair fruits,
>
> Increase comes to his flocks and the ocean is teeming with fishes.

And Musaeus and his son have a more excellent song than these of the blessings that the gods bestow on the righteous. For they conduct them to the house of Hades in their tale and arrange a symposium of the saints, where, reclined on couches and crowned with wreaths, they entertain the time henceforth with wine, as if the fairest mead of virtue were an everlasting drunk. And others extend still further the rewards of virtue from the gods. For they say that the children's children of the pious and oath-keeping man and

his race thereafter never fail. Such and suchlike are their praises of justice. But the impious and the unjust they bury in mud in the house of Hades and compel them to fetch water in a sieve, and, while they still live, they bring them into evil repute, and all the sufferings that Glaucon enumerated as befalling just men who are thought to be unjust, these they recite about the unjust, but they have nothing else to say. Such is the praise and the censure of the just and of the unjust.

Consider further, Socrates, another kind of language about justice and injustice employed by both laymen and poets. All with one accord reiterate that soberness and righteousness are fair and honorable, to be sure, but unpleasant and laborious, while licentiousness and injustice are pleasant and easy to win and are only in opinion and by convention disgraceful. They say that injustice pays better than justice, for the most part, and they do not scruple to felicitate bad men who are rich or have other kinds of power and to do them honor in public and private, and to dishonor and disregard those who are in any way weak or poor, even while admitting that they are better men than the others. But the strangest of all these speeches are the things they say about the gods and virtue—how it is that the gods themselves assign to many good men misfortunes and an evil life, but to their opposites a contrary lot, and begging priests and soothsayers go to rich men's doors and make them believe that they by means of sacrifices and incantations have accumulated a treasure of power from the gods that can expiate and cure with pleasurable festivals any misdeed of a man or his ancestors, and that if a man wishes to harm an enemy, at slight cost he will be enabled to injure just and unjust alike, since they are masters of spells and enchantments that constrain the gods to serve their end.

And for all these sayings they cite the poets as witnesses, with regard to the ease and plentifulness of vice, quoting;

> Evildoing in plenty a man shall find for the seeking.
> Smooth is the way, and it lies near at hand and is easy to enter,
> But on the pathway of virtue the gods put sweat from the first step.

and a certain long and uphill road. And others cite Homer as a witness to the beguiling of gods by men, since he too said;

> The gods themselves are moved by prayers,
> And men by sacrifice and soothing vows,
> And incense and libation turn their wills
> Praying, whene'er they have sinned and made transgression.

And they produce a bushel of books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and of the Muses, as they affirm, and these books they use in their ritual, and make not only ordinary men but states believe that there really are remissions of sins and purifications for deeds of injustice, by means of sacrifice and pleasant sport for the living, and that there are also special rites for the defunct, which they call functions, that deliver us from evils in that other world, while terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice.

What, Socrates, do we suppose is the effect of all such sayings about the esteem in which men and gods hold virtue and vice upon the souls that hear them, the souls of young men who are quick-witted and capable of flitting, as it were, from one expression of opinion to another and inferring from them all the character and the path whereby a man would lead the best life? Such a youth would most likely put to himself the question Pindar asks, 'Is it by justice or by crooked deceit that I the higher tower shall scale and so live

my life out in fenced and guarded security?' The consequences of my being just are, unless I likewise seem so, not assets, they say, but liabilities, labor, and total loss, but if I am unjust and have procured myself a reputation for justice, a godlike life is promised. Then since it is 'the seeming,' as the wise men show me, that 'masters the reality' and is lord of happiness, to this I must devote myself without reserve. For a front and a show I must draw about myself a shadow outline of virtue, but trail behind me the fox of the most sage Archilochus, shifty and bent on gain. Nay, 'tis objected, it is not easy for a wrongdoer always to lie hid. Neither is any other big thing facile, we shall reply. But all the same if we expect to be happy, we must pursue the path to which the footprints of our arguments point. For with a view to lying hid we will organize societies and political clubs, and there are teachers of cajolery who impart the arts of the popular assembly and the courtroom, so that, partly by persuasion, partly by force, we shall contrive to overreach with impunity. But against the gods, it may be said, neither secrecy nor force can avail. Well, if there are no gods, or they do not concern themselves with the doings of men, neither need we concern ourselves with eluding their observation. If they do exist and pay heed, we know and hear of them only from such discourses and from the poets who have described their pedigrees. But these same authorities tell us that the gods are capable of being persuaded and swerved from their course by 'sacrifice and soothing vows' and dedications. We must believe them in both or neither. And if we are to believe them, the thing to do is to commit injustice and offer sacrifice from the fruits of our wrongdoing. For if we are just, we shall, it is true, be unscathed by the gods, but we shall be putting away from us the profits of injustice, but if we are unjust, we shall win those profits, and, by the importunity of our prayers, when we transgress and sin we shall

persuade them and escape scot-free. Yes, it will be objected, but we shall be brought to judgment in the world below for our unjust deeds here, we or our children's children. Nay, my dear sir, our calculating friend will say, here again the rites for the dead have much efficacy, and the absolving divinities, as the greatest cities declare, and the sons of gods, who became the poets and prophets of the gods, and who reveal that this is the truth.

On what further ground, then, could we prefer justice to supreme injustice? If we combine this with a counterfeit decorum, we shall prosper to our heart's desire, with gods and men, in life and death, as the words of the multitude and of men of the highest authority declare. In consequence, then, of all that has been said, what possibility is there, Socrates, that any man who has the power of any resources of mind, money, body, or family should consent to honor justice and not rather laugh when he hears her praised? In sooth, if anyone is able to show the falsity of these arguments, and has come to know with sufficient assurance that justice is best, he feels much indulgence for the unjust, and is not angry with them, but is aware that except a man by inborn divinity of his nature disdains injustice, or, having won to knowledge, refrains from it, no one else is willingly just, but that it is from lack of manly spirit or from old age or some other weakness that men dispraise injustice, lacking the power to practice it. The fact is patent. For no sooner does such a one come into the power than he works injustice to the extent of his ability.

And the sole cause of all this is the fact that was the starting point of this entire plea of my friend here and of myself to you, Socrates, pointing out how strange it is that of all you self-styled advocates of justice, from the heroes of old whose discourses survive to the men of the present day, not one has ever censured injustice or commended justice

otherwise than in respect of the repute, the honors, and the gifts that accrue from each. But what each one of them is in itself, by its own inherent force, when it is within the soul of the possessor and escapes the eyes of both gods and men, no one has ever adequately set forth in poetry or prose—the proof that the one is the greatest of all evils that the soul contains within itself, while justice is the greatest good. For if you had all spoken in this way from the beginning and from our youth up had sought to convince us, we should not now be guarding against one another's injustice, but each would be his own best guardian, for fear lest by working injustice he should dwell in communion with the greatest of evils.

This, Socrates, and perhaps even more than this, Thrasymachus and haply another might say in pleas for and against justice and injustice, inverting their true potencies, as I believe, grossly. But I—for I have no reason to hide anything from you—am laying myself out to the utmost on the theory, because I wish to hear its refutation from you. Do not merely show us by argument that justice is superior to injustice, but make clear to us what each in and of itself does to its possessor, whereby the one is evil and the other good. But do away with the repute of both, as Glaucon urged. For, unless you take away from either the true repute and attach to each the false, we shall say that it is not justice that you are praising but the semblance, nor injustice that you censure, but the seeming, and that you really are exhorting us to be unjust but conceal it, and that you are at one with Thrasymachus in the opinion that justice is the other man's good, the advantage of the stronger, and that injustice is advantageous and profitable to oneself but disadvantageous to the inferior. Since, then, you have admitted that justice belongs to the class of those highest goods which are desirable both for their consequences and

still more for their own sake, as sight, hearing, intelligence, yes and health too, and all other goods that are productive by their very nature and not by opinion, this is what I would have you praise about justice—the benefit which it and the harm which injustice inherently works upon its possessor. But the rewards and the honors that depend on opinion, leave to others to praise. For while I would listen to others who thus commended justice and disparaged injustice, bestowing their praise and their blame on the reputation and the rewards of either, I could not accept that sort of thing from you unless you say I must, because you have passed your entire life in the consideration of this very matter. Do not, then, I repeat, merely prove to us in argument the superiority of justice to injustice, but show us what it is that each inherently does to its possessor—whether he does or does not escape the eyes of gods and men—whereby the one is good and the other evil.

Socrates/ While I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adimantus, I was especially pleased by their words on this occasion, and said, It was excellently spoken of you, sons of the man we know, in the beginning of the elegy which the admirer of Glaucon wrote when you distinguished yourselves in the battle of Megara—'Sons of Ariston, whose race from a glorious sire is godlike.' This, my friends, I think, was well said. For there must indeed be a touch of the godlike in your disposition if you are not convinced that injustice is preferable to justice though you can plead its case in such fashion. And I believe that you are really not convinced. I infer this from your general character, since from your words alone I should have distrusted you. But the more I trust you the more I am at a loss what to make of the matter. I do not know how I can come to the rescue. For I doubt my ability for the reason that you have not accepted the arguments whereby I thought I proved

against Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice. Nor yet again do I know how I can refuse to come to the rescue. For I fear lest it be actually impious to stand idly by when justice is reviled and be fainthearted and not defend her so long as one has breath and can utter his voice. The best thing, then, is to aid her as best I can.

—Glaucon, then, and the rest besought me by all means to come to the rescue and not to drop the argument but to pursue to the end the investigation as to the nature of each and the truth about their respective advantages. I said then as I thought, The inquiry we are undertaking is no easy one but calls for keen vision, as it seems to me. So, since we are not clever persons, I think we should employ the method of search that we should use if we, with not very keen vision, were bidden to read small letters from a distance, and then someone had observed that these same letters exist elsewhere larger and on a larger surface. We should have accounted it a godsend, I fancy, to be allowed to read those letters first, and then examine the smaller, if they are the same.

Adeimantus/ Quite so, but what analogy to this do you detect in the inquiry about justice?

Socrates/ I will tell you. There is a justice of one man, we say, and, I suppose, also of an entire city?

Adeimantus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Is not the city larger than the man?

Adeimantus/ It is larger.

Socrates/ Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the larger object, and more easy to apprehend. If it please you, then, let us first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less.

Adeimantus/ I think that is a good suggestion.

Socrates/ If, then, our argument should observe the origin of a state, we should see also the origin of justice and injustice in it?

Adeimantus/ It may be.

Socrates/ And if this is done, we may expect to find more easily what we are seeking?

Adeimantus/ Much more.

Socrates/ Shall we try it, then, and go through with it? I fancy it is no slight task. Reflect, then.

Adeimantus/ We have reflected. Proceed and don't refuse.

Socrates/ The origin of the city, then, in my opinion, is to be found in the fact that we do not severally suffice for our own needs, but each of us lacks many things. Do you think any other principle establishes the state?

Adeimantus/ No other.

Socrates/ As a result of this, then, one man calling in another for one service and another for another, we, being in need of many things, gather many into one place of abode as associates and helpers. and to this dwelling together we give the name city or state, do we not?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And between one man and another there is an interchange of giving, if it so happens, and taking, because each supposes this to be better for himself.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come, then, let us create a city from the beginning, in our theory. Its real creator, as it appears, will be our needs.

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Now the first and chief of our needs is the provision of food for existence and life.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ The second is housing and the third is raiment and that sort of thing.

Adeimantus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, how our city will suffice for the provision of all these things. Will there not be a farmer for one, and a builder, and then again a weaver? And shall we add thereto a cobbler and some other purveyor for the needs of the body?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The indispensable minimum of a city, then, would consist of four or five men.

Adeimantus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ What of this, then? Shall each of these contribute his work for the common use of all? I mean, shall the farmer, who is one, provide food for four and spend fourfold time and toil on the production of food and share it with the others, or shall he take no thought for them and provide a fourth portion of the food for himself alone in a quarter of the time and employ the other three-quarters, the one in the provision of a house, the other of a garment, the other of shoes, and not have the bother of associating with other people, but, himself for himself, mind his own affairs?

Adeimantus/ But, perhaps, Socrates, the former way is easier.

Socrates/ It would not, by Zeus, be at all strange, for now that you have mentioned it, it occurs to me myself that, to begin with, our several natures are not all alike but different. One man is naturally fitted for one task, and another for another. Don't you think so?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Again, would one man do better working at many tasks or one at one?

Adeimantus/ One at one.

Socrates/ And, furthermore, this, I fancy, is obvious—that if one lets slip the right season, the favorable moment in any task, the work is spoiled.

Adeimantus/ Obvious.

Socrates/ That, I take it, is because the business will not wait upon the leisure of the workman, but the workman must attend to it as his main affair, and not as a by-work.

Adeimantus/ He must indeed.

Socrates/ The result, then, is that more things are produced, and better and more easily when one man performs one task according to his nature, at the right moment, and at leisure from other occupations.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then, Adimantus, we need more than four citizens for the provision of the things we have mentioned. For the farmer, it appears, will not make his own plow if it is to be a good one, nor his hoe, nor his other agricultural implements, nor will the builder, who also needs many, and similarly the weaver and cobbler.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Carpenters, then, and smiths and many similar craftsmen, associating themselves with our hamlet, will enlarge it considerably.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Yet it still wouldn't be very large even if we should add to them neatherds and shepherds and other herders, so that the farmers might have cattle for plowing, and the builders oxen to use with the farmers for transportation, and the weavers and cobblers hides and fleeces for their use.

Adeimantus/ It wouldn't be a small city, either, if it had all these.

Socrates/ But further, it is practically impossible to establish the city in a region where it will not need imports.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ There will be a further need, then, of those who will bring in from some other city what it requires.

Adeimantus/ There will.

Socrates/ And again, if our servitor goes forth empty-handed, not taking with him any of the things needed by those from whom they procure what they themselves require, he will come back with empty hands, will he not?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then their home production must not merely suffice for themselves but in quality and quantity meet the needs of those of whom they have need.

Adeimantus/ It must.

Socrates/ So our city will require more farmers and other craftsmen.

Adeimantus/ Yes, more.

Socrates/ And also of other ministrants who are to export and import the merchandise. These are traders, are they not?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ We shall also need traders, then.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And if the trading is carried on by sea, we shall need quite a number of others who are expert in maritime business.

Adeimantus/ Quite a number.

Socrates/ But again, within the city itself how will they share with one another the products of their labor? This was the very purpose of our association and establishment of a state.

Adeimantus/ Obviously, by buying and selling.

Socrates/ A market place, then, and money as a token for the purpose of exchange will be the result of this.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ If, then, the farmer or any other craftsman taking his products to the market place does not arrive at the same time with those who desire to exchange with him, is he to sit idle in the market place and lose time from his own work?

Adeimantus/ By no means, but there are men who see this need and appoint themselves for this service—in well-conducted cities they are generally those who are weakest in body and those who are useless for any other task. They must wait there in the agora and exchange money for goods with those who wish to sell, and goods for money with as many as desire to buy.

Socrates/ This need, then, creates the class of shopkeepers in our city. Or is not 'shopkeepers' the name we give to those who, planted in the agora, serve us in buying and selling, while we call those who roam from city to city merchants?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And there are, furthermore, I believe, other servitors who in the things of the mind are not altogether worthy of our fellowship, but whose strength of body is sufficient for toil; so they, selling the use of this strength and calling the price wages, are designated, I believe, 'wage earners,' are they not?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Wage earners, then, it seems, are the complement that helps to fill up the state.

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Has our city, then, Adimantus, reached its full growth, and is it complete?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Where, then, can justice and injustice be found in it? And along with which of the constituents that we have considered do they come into the state?

Adeimantus/ I cannot conceive, Socrates, unless it be in some need that those very constituents have of one another.

Socrates/ Perhaps that is a good suggestion. We must examine it and not hold back.

—First of all, then, let us consider what will be the manner of life of men thus provided. Will they not make bread and wine and garments and shoes? And they will build themselves houses and carry on their work in summer for the most part unclad and unshod and in winter clothed and shod sufficiently. And for their nourishment they will provide meal from their barley and flour from their wheat, and kneading and cooking these they will serve noble cakes and loaves on some arrangement of reeds or clean leaves. And, reclined on rustic beds strewed with bryony and myrtle, they will feast with their children, drinking of their wine thereto, garlanded and singing hymns to the gods in pleasant fellowship, not begetting offspring beyond their means lest they fall into poverty or war.

—Here Glaucon broke in.

Glaucon/ No relishes apparently, for the men you describe as feasting.

Socrates/ True, I forgot that they will also have relishes—salt, of course, and olives and cheese, and onions and

greens, the sort of things they boil in the country, they will boil up together. But for dessert we will serve them figs and chick-peas and beans, and they will toast myrtle berries and acorns before the fire, washing them down with moderate potations. And so, living in peace and health, they will probably die in old age and hand on a like life to their off-spring.

Glaucon/ And If you were founding a city of pigs, Socrates, what other fodder than this would you provide?

Socrates/ Why, what would you have, Glaucon?

Glaucon/ What is customary. They must recline on couches, I presume, if they are not to be uncomfortable, and dine from tables and have dishes and sweetmeats such as are now in use.

Socrates/ Good. I understand. It is not merely the origin of a city, it seems, that we are considering but the origin of a luxurious city. Perhaps that isn't such a bad suggestion, either. For by observation of such a city it may be we could discern the origin of justice and injustice in states. The true state I believe to be the one we have described—the healthy state, as it were. But if it is your pleasure that we contemplate also a fevered state, there is nothing to hinder. For there are some, it appears, who will not be contented with this sort of fare or with this way of life, but couches will have to be added thereto and tables and other furniture, yes, and relishes and myrrh and incense and girls and cakes—all sorts of all of them. And the requirements we first mentioned, houses and garments and shoes, will no longer be confined to necessities, but we must set painting to work and embroidery, and procure gold and ivory and similar adornments, must we not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then shall we not have to enlarge the city again? For that healthy state is no longer sufficient, but we must proceed to swell out its bulk and fill it up with a multitude of things that exceed the requirements of necessity in states, as, for example, the entire class of huntsmen, and the imitators, many of them occupied with figures and colors and many with music—the poets and their assistants, rhapsodists, actors, chorus dancers, contractors—and the manufacturers of all kinds of articles, especially those that have to do with women's adornment. And so we shall also want more servitors. Don't you think that we shall need tutors, nurses wet and dry, beauty-shop ladies, barbers, and yet again cooks and chefs? And we shall have need, further, of swineherds; there were none of these creatures in our former city, for we had no need of them, but in this city there will be this further need. And we shall also require other cattle in great numbers if they are to be eaten, shall we not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Doctors, too, are something whose services we shall be much more likely to require if we live thus than as before?

Glaucon/ Much.

Socrates/ And the territory, I presume, that was then sufficient to feed the then population, from being adequate will become too small. Is that so or not?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Then we shall have to cut out a cantle of our neighbor's land if we are to have enough for pasture and plowing, and they in turn of ours if they too abandon themselves to the unlimited acquisition of wealth, disregarding the limit set by our necessary wants.

Glaucon/ Inevitably, Socrates.

Socrates/ We shall go to war as the next step, Glaucon—or what will happen?

Glaucon/ What you say.

Socrates/ And we are not yet to speak, of any evil or good effect of war, but only to affirm that we have further discovered the origin of war, namely, from those things from which the greatest disasters, public and private, come to states when they come.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, we must still further enlarge our city by no small increment, but by a whole army, that will march forth and fight it out with assailants in defense of all our wealth and the luxuries we have just described.

Glaucon/ How so? Are the citizens themselves not sufficient for that?

Socrates/ Not if you, and we all were right in the admission we made when we were molding our city. We surely agreed, if you remember, that it is impossible for one man to do the work of many arts well.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Well, then, don't you think that the business of fighting is an art and a profession?

Glaucon/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ Should our concern be greater, then, for the cobbler's art than for the art of war?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Can we suppose, then, that while we were at pains to prevent the cobbler from attempting to be at the same time a farmer, a weaver, or a builder instead of just a cobbler, to the end that we might have the cobbler's business well done, and similarly assigned to each and every one man one occupation, for which he was fit and naturally adapted

and at which he was to work all his days, at leisure from other pursuits and not letting slip the right moments for doing the work well, and that yet we are in doubt whether the right accomplishment of the business of war is not of supreme moment? Is it so easy that a man who is cultivating the soil will be at the same time a soldier and one who is practicing cobbling or any other trade, though no man in the world could make himself a competent expert at draughts or the dice who did not practice that and nothing else from childhood but treated it as an occasional business? And are we to believe that a man who takes in hand a shield or any other instrument of war springs upon that very day a competent combatant in heavy armor or in any other form of warfare—though no other tool will make a man be an artist or an athlete by his taking it in hand, nor will it be of any service to those who have neither acquired the science of it nor sufficiently practiced themselves in its use?

Glaucon/ Great indeed, would be the value of tools in that case!

Socrates/ Then, in the same degree that the task of our guardians is the greatest of all, it would require more leisure than any other business and the greatest science and training.

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ Does it not also require a nature adapted to that very pursuit?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ It becomes our task, then, it seems, if we are able, to select which and what kind of natures are suited for the guardianship of a state.

Glaucon/ Yes, ours.

Socrates/ Upon my word, it is no light task that we have taken upon ourselves. But we must not faint so far as our strength allows.

Glaucon/ No, we mustn't.

Socrates/ Do you think, that there is any difference between the nature of a well-bred hound for this watchdog's work and that of a wellborn lad?

Glaucon/ What point have you in mind?

Socrates/ I mean that each of them must be keen of perception, quick in pursuit of what it has apprehended, and strong too if it has to fight it out with its captive.

Glaucon/ Why, yes, there is need of all these qualities.

Socrates/ And it must, further, be brave if it is to fight well.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And will a creature be ready to be brave that is not high-spirited, whether horse or dog or anything else? Have you never observed what an irresistible and invincible thing is spirit, the presence of which makes every soul in the face of everything fearless and unconquerable?

Glaucon/ I have.

Socrates/ The physical qualities of the guardian, then, are obvious.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And also those of his soul, namely that he must be of high spirit.

Glaucon/ Yes, this too.

Socrates/ How then, Glaucon, will they escape being savage to one another and to the other citizens if this is to be their nature?

Glaucon/ Not easily, by Zeus.

Socrates/ And yet we must have them gentle to their friends and harsh to their enemies; otherwise they will not await their destruction at the hands of others, but will be first themselves in bringing it about.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ What, then, are we to do? Where shall we discover a disposition that is at once gentle and great-spirited? For there appears to be an opposition between the spirited type and the gentle nature.

Glaucon/ There does.

Socrates/ But yet if one lacks either of these qualities, a good guardian he never can be. But these requirements resemble impossibilities, and so the result is that a good guardian is impossible.

Glaucon/ It seems likely.

Socrates/ And I was at a standstill, and after reconsidering what we had been saying, We deserve to be at a loss, my friend, for we have lost sight of the comparison that we set before ourselves.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ We failed to note that there are after all such natures as we thought impossible, endowed with these opposite qualities.

Glaucon/ Where?

Socrates/ It may be observed in other animals, but especially in that which we likened to the guardian. You surely have observed in well-bred hounds that their natural disposition is to be most gentle to their familiars and those whom they recognize, but the contrary to those whom they do not know.

Glaucon/ I am aware of that.

Socrates/ The thing is possible, then, and it is not an unnatural requirement that we are looking for in our guardian.

Glaucon/ It seems not.

Socrates/ And does it seem to you that our guardian-to-be will also need, in addition to the being high-spirited, the further quality of having the love of wisdom in his nature?

Glaucon/ How so? I don't apprehend your meaning.

Socrates/ This too, is something that you will discover in dogs and which is worth our wonder in the creature.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That the sight of an unknown person angers him before he has suffered any injury, but an acquaintance he will fawn upon though he has never received any kindness from him. Have you never marveled at that?

Glaucon/ I never paid any attention to the matter before now, but that he acts in some such way is obvious.

Socrates/ But surely that is an exquisite trait of his nature and one that shows a true love of wisdom.

Glaucon/ In what respect, pray?

Socrates/ In respect, that he distinguishes a friendly from a hostile aspect by nothing save his apprehension of the one and his failure to recognize the other. How, I ask you, can the love of learning be denied to a creature whose criterion of the friendly and the alien is intelligence and ignorance?

Glaucon/ It certainly cannot.

Socrates/ But you will admit, that the love of learning and the love of wisdom are the same?

Glaucon/ The same.

Socrates/ Then may we not confidently lay it down, in the case of man too, that if he is to be in some sort gentle to

friends and familiars he must be by nature a lover of wisdom and of learning?

Glaucon/ Let us so assume.

Socrates/ The love of wisdom, then, and high spirit and quickness and strength will be combined for us in the nature of him who is to be a good and true guardian of the state.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Such, then, would be the basis of his character. But the rearing of these men and their education, how shall we manage that? And will the consideration of this topic advance us in any way toward discerning what is the object of our entire inquiry—the origin of justice and injustice in a state—our aim must be to omit nothing of a sufficient discussion, and yet not to draw it out to tiresome length?

—And Glaucon's brother replied;

Adeimantus/ Certainly, I expect that this inquiry will bring us nearer to that end.

Socrates/ Certainly, then, my dear Adimantus, we must not abandon it even if it prove to be rather long.

Adeimantus/ No, we must not.

Socrates/ Come, then, just as if we were telling stories or fables and had ample leisure, let us educate these men in our discourse.

Adeimantus/ So we must.

Socrates/ What, then, is our education? Or is it hard to find a better than that which long time has discovered—which is, I suppose, gymnastics for the body, and for the soul, music?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ And shall we not begin education in music earlier than in gymnastics?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And under music you include tales, do you not?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ And tales are of two species, the one true and the other false?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And education must make use of both, but first of the false?

Adeimantus/ I don't understand your meaning.

Socrates/ Don't you understand, that we begin by telling children fables, and the fable is, taken as a whole, false, but there is truth in it also? And we make use of fable with children before gymnastics.

Adeimantus/ That is so.

Socrates/ That, then, is what I meant by saying that we must take up music before gymnastics.

Adeimantus/ You were right.

Socrates/ Do you not know, then, that the beginning in every task is the chief thing, especially for any creature that is young and tender? For it is then that it is best molded and takes the impression that one wishes to stamp upon it.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, thus lightly suffer our children to listen to any chance stories fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds opinions for the most part contrary to those that we shall think it desirable for them to hold when they are grown up?

Adeimantus/ By no manner of means will we allow it.

Socrates/ We must begin, then, it seems, by a censorship over our story-and what they do well we must pass and what not, reject. And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to the children and so shape their

souls by these stories far rather than their bodies by their hands. But most of the stories they now tell we must reject.

Adeimantus/ What sort of stories?

Socrates/ The example of the greater stories, will show us the lesser also. For surely the pattern must be the same, and the greater and the less must have a like tendency. Don't you think so?

Adeimantus/ I do, but I don't apprehend which you mean by the greater, either.

Socrates/ Those, that Hesiod and Homer and the other poets related to us. These, methinks, composed false stories which they told and still tell to mankind.

Adeimantus/ Of what sort? And with what in them do you find fault?

Socrates/ With that, which one ought first and chiefly to blame, especially if the lie is not a pretty one.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ When anyone images badly in his speech the true nature of gods and heroes, like a painter whose portraits bear no resemblance to his models.

Adeimantus/ It is certainly right to condemn things like that, but just what do we mean and what particular things?

Socrates/ There is, first of all, the greatest lie about the things of greatest concernment, which was no pretty invention of him who told how Uranus did what Hesiod says he did to Cronus, and how Cronus in turn took his revenge, and then there are the doings and sufferings of Cronus at the hands of his son. Even if they were true I should not think that they ought to be thus lightly told to thoughtless young persons. But the best way would be to bury them in silence, and if there were some necessity for relating them, only a very small audience should be admitted under pledge

of secrecy and after sacrificing, not a pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim, to the end that as few as possible should have heard these tales.

Adeimantus/ Why, yes, such stories are hard sayings.

Socrates/ Yes, and they are not to be told, Adimantus, in our city, nor is it to be said in the hearing of a young man that in doing the utmost wrong he would do nothing to surprise anybody, nor again in punishing his father's wrongdoings to the limit, but would only be following the example of the first and greatest of the gods.

Adeimantus/ No, by heaven, I do not myself think that they are fit to be told.

Socrates/ Neither must we admit at all, that gods war with gods and plot against one another and contend—for it is not true either—if we wish our future guardians to deem nothing more shameful than lightly to fall out with one another. Still less must we make battles of gods and giants the subject for them of stories and embroideries, and other enmities many and manifold of gods and heroes toward their kith and kin. But if there is any likelihood of our persuading them that no citizen ever quarreled with his fellow citizen and that the very idea of it is an impiety, that is the sort of thing that ought rather to be said by their elders, men and women, to children from the beginning and as they grow older, and we must compel the poets to keep close to this in their compositions. But Hera's fetterings by her son and the hurling out of heaven of Hephaestus by his father when he was trying to save his mother from a beating, and the battles of the gods in Homer's verse are things that we must not admit into our city either wrought in allegory or without allegory. For the young are not able to distinguish what is and what is not allegory, but whatever opinions are taken into the mind at that age are wont to prove indelible and

unalterable. For which reason, maybe, we should do our utmost that the first stories that they hear should be so composed as to bring the fairest lessons of virtue to their ears.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is reasonable, but if again someone should ask us to be specific and say what these compositions may be and what are the tales, what could we name?

Socrates/ Adimantus, we are not poets, you and I at present, but founders of a state. And to founders it pertains to know the patterns on which poets must compose their fables and from which their poems must not be allowed to deviate, but the founders are not required themselves to compose fables.

Adeimantus/ Right, but this very thing—the patterns or norms of right speech about the gods—what would they be?

Socrates/ Something like this. The true quality of God we must always surely attribute to him whether we compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse.

Adeimantus/ We must.

Socrates/ And is not God of course good in reality and always to be spoken of as such?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But further, no good thing is harmful, is it?

Adeimantus/ I think not.

Socrates/ Can what is not harmful harm?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Can that which does not harm do any evil?

Adeimantus/ Not that either.

Socrates/ But that which does no evil would not be cause of any evil either?

Adeimantus/ How could it?

Socrates/ Once more, is the good beneficent?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is the cause, then, of welfare?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the good is not the cause of all things, but of things that are well it is the cause—of things that are ill it is blameless.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Neither, then, could God, since he is good, be, as the multitude say, the cause of all things, but for mankind he is the cause of few things, but of many things not the cause. For good things are far fewer with us than evil, and for the good we must assume no other cause than God, but the cause of evil we must look for in other things and not in God.

Adeimantus/ What you say seems to me most true.

Socrates/ Then, we must not accept from Homer or any other poet the folly of such error as this about the gods, when he says;

> Two urns stand on the floor of the palace of Zeus and are filled with
>
> Dooms he allots, one of blessings, the other of gifts that are evil.

And to whomsoever Zeus gives of both commingled

> Now upon evil he chances and now again good is his portion.

But the man for whom he does not blend the lots, but to whom he gives unmixed evil;

> Hunger devouring drives him, a wanderer over the wide world.

Nor will we tolerate the saying that;

> Zeus is dispenser alike of good and of evil to mortals.

But as to the violation of the oaths and the truce by Pandarus, if anyone affirms it to have been brought about by the action of Athena and Zeus, we will not approve, nor that the strife and contention of the gods were the doing of Themis and Zeus, nor again must we permit our youth to hear what Aeschylus says;

> A god implants the guilty cause in men When he would utterly destroy a house.

But if any poets compose a 'Sorrows of Niobe,' the poem that contains these iambics, or a tale of the Pelopidae or of Troy, or anything else of the kind, we must either forbid them to say that these woes are the work of God, or they must devise some such interpretation as we now require, and must declare that what God did was righteous and good, and they were benefited by their chastisement. But that they were miserable who paid the penalty, and that the doer of this was God, is a thing that the poet must not be suffered to say. If on the other hand he should say that for needing chastisement the wicked were miserable and that in paying the penalty they were benefited by God, that we must allow. But as to saying that God, who is good, becomes the cause of evil to anyone, we must contend in every way that neither should anyone assert this in his own city if it is to be well governed, nor anyone hear it, neither younger nor older, neither telling a story in meter or without meter, for neither would the saying of such things, if they are said, be holy, nor would they be profitable to us or concordant with themselves.

Adeimantus/ I cast my vote with yours for this law, and am well pleased with it.

Socrates/ This, then, will be one of the laws and patterns concerning the gods to which speakers and poets will be required to conform, that God is not the cause of all things, but only of the good.

Adeimantus/ And an entirely satisfactory one.

Socrates/ And what of this, the second? Do you think that God is a wizard and capable of manifesting himself by design, now in one aspect, now in another, at one time himself changing and altering his shape in many transformations and at another deceiving us and causing us to believe such things about him, or that he is simple and less likely than anything else to depart from his own form?

Adeimantus/ I cannot say offhand.

Socrates/ But what of this? If anything went out from its own form, would it not be displaced and changed, either by itself or by something else?

Adeimantus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Is it not true that to be altered and moved by something else happens least to things that are in the best condition, as, for example, a body by food and drink and toil, and plants by the heat of the sun and winds and similar influences—is it not true that the healthiest and strongest is least altered?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is it not the soul that is bravest and most intelligent that would be least disturbed and altered by any external affection?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And, again, it is surely true of all composite implements, edifices, and habiliments, by parity of reasoning, that those which are well made and in good condition are least liable to be changed by time and other influences.

Adeimantus/ That is so.

Socrates/ It is universally true, then, that that which is in the best state by nature or art or both admits least alteration by something else.

Adeimantus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But God, surely, and everything that belongs to God, is in every way in the best possible state.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ From this point of view, then, it would be least of all likely that there would be many forms in God.

Adeimantus/ Least indeed.

Socrates/ But would he transform and alter himself?

Adeimantus/ Obviously, if he is altered.

Socrates/ Then does he change himself for the better and to something fairer, or for the worse and to something uglier than himself?

Adeimantus/ It must necessarily, be for the worse if he is changed. For we surely will not say that God is deficient in either beauty or excellence.

Socrates/ Most rightly spoken. And if that were his condition, do you think, Adimantus, that anyone god or man would of his own will worsen himself in any way?

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ It is impossible then, even for a god to wish to alter himself, but, as it appears, each of them, being the fairest and best possible, abides forever simply in his own form.

Adeimantus/ An absolutely necessary conclusion to my thinking.

Socrates/ No poet then, my good friend, must be allowed to tell us that 'The gods, in the likeness of strangers, many disguises assume as they visit the cities of mortals.' Nor must anyone tell falsehoods about Proteus and Thetis, nor

in any tragedy or in other poems bring in Hera disguised as a priestess collecting alms 'for the life-giving sons of Inachus, the Argive stream.' And many similar falsehoods they must not tell. Nor again must mothers under the influence of such poets terrify their children with harmful tales, how there are certain gods whose apparitions haunt the night in the likeness of many strangers from all manner of lands, lest while they speak evil of the gods they at the same time make cowards of the children.

Adeimantus/ They must not.

Socrates/ But, may we suppose that while the gods themselves are incapable of change they cause us to fancy that they appear in many shapes deceiving and practicing magic upon us?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Consider. Would a god wish to deceive, or lie, by presenting in either word or action what is only appearance?

Adeimantus/ I don't know.

Socrates/ Don't you know, that the veritable lie, if the expression is permissible, is a thing that all gods and men abhor?

Adeimantus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ his, that falsehood in the most vital part of themselves, and about their most vital concerns, is something that no one willingly accepts, but it is there above all that everyone fears it.

Adeimantus/ I don't understand yet either.

Socrates/ That is because you suspect me of some grand meaning, but what I mean is, that deception in the soul about realities, to have been deceived and to be blindly ignorant and to have and hold the falsehood there, is what

all men would least of all accept, and it is in that case that they loathe it most of all.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But surely it would be most wholly right, as I was just now saying, to describe this as in very truth falsehood—ignorance namely in the soul of the man deceived. For the falsehood in words is a copy of the affection in the soul, an after rising image of it and not an altogether unmixed falsehood. Is not that so?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Essential falsehood, then, is hated not only by gods but by men.

Adeimantus/ I agree.

Socrates/ But what of the falsehood in words—when and for whom is it serviceable so as not to merit abhorrence? Will it not be against enemies? And when any of those whom we call friends owing to madness or folly attempts to do some wrong, does it not then become useful to avert the evil–as a medicine? And also in the fables of which we were just now speaking, owing to our ignorance of the truth about antiquity, we liken the false to the true as far as we may and so make it edifying.

Adeimantus/ We most certainly do.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, on which of these grounds falsehood would be serviceable to God. Would he because of his ignorance of antiquity make false likenesses of it?

Adeimantus/ An absurd supposition, that.

Socrates/ Then there is no lying poet in God.

Adeimantus/ I think not.

Socrates/ Well then, would it be through fear of his enemies that he would lie?

Adeimantus/ Far from it.

Socrates/ Would it be because of the folly or madness of his friends?

Adeimantus/ Nay, no fool or madman is a friend of God.

Socrates/ Then there is no motive for God to deceive.

Adeimantus/ None.

Socrates/ So from every point of view the divine and the divinity are free from falsehood.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then God is altogether simple and true in deed and word, and neither changes himself nor deceives others by visions or words or the sending of signs in waking or in dreams.

Adeimantus/ I myself think so, when I hear you say it.

Socrates/ You concur then, in this as our second norm or canon for speech and poetry about the gods—that neither are they wizards in shape shifting nor do they mislead us by falsehoods in words or deed?

Adeimantus/ I concur.

Socrates/ Then, though there are many other things that we praise in Homer, this we will not applaud, the sending of the dream by Zeus to Agamemnon, nor shall we approve of Aeschylus when his Thetis avers that Apollo, singing at her wedding, 'foretold the happy fortunes of her issue,'

> Their days prolonged, from pain and sickness free,
> And rounding out the tale of heaven's blessings,
> Raised the proud paean, making glad my heart.
> And I believed that Phoebus' mouth divine,
> Filled with the breath of prophecy, could not lie.
> But he himself, the singer, himself who sat
> At meat with us, himself who promised all,
> Is now himself the slayer of my son.

When anyone says that sort of thing about the gods, we shall be wroth with him, we will refuse him a chorus. Neither will we allow teachers to use him for the education of the young if our guardians are to be god-fearing men and godlike in so far as that is possible for humanity.

Adeimantus/ By all means, I accept these norms and would use them as canons and laws.

Book 3.

Socrates/ Concerning the gods then, this is the sort of thing that we must allow or not allow them to hear from childhood up, if they are to honor the gods and their fathers and mothers, and not to hold their friendship with one another in light esteem.

Adeimantus/ That was our view and I believe it right.

Socrates/ What then of this? If they are to be brave, must we not extend our prescription to include also the sayings that will make them least likely to fear death? Or do you suppose that anyone could ever become brave who had that dread in his heart?

Adeimantus/ No indeed, I do not.

Socrates/ And again, if he believes in the reality of the underworld and its terrors, do you think that any man will be fearless of death and in battle will prefer death to defeat and slavery?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then it seems we must exercise supervision also, in the matter of such tales as these, over those who undertake to supply them and request them not to dispraise in this undiscriminating fashion the life in Hades but rather praise it, since what they now tell us is neither true nor edifying to men who are destined to be warriors.

Adeimantus/ Yes, we must.

Socrates/ Then, beginning with this verse we will expunge everything of the same kind;

> Liefer were I in the fields up above to be serf to another
> Tiller of some poor plot which yields him a scanty subsistence,

Than to be ruler and king over all the dead who have perished.

and this;

Lest unto men and immortals the homes of the dead be uncovered

Horrible, noisome, dank, that the gods too hold in abhorrence.

and;

Ah me! So, it is true that e'en in the dwellings of Hades

Spirit there is and wraith, but within there is no understanding.

and this [of Tiresias];

Sole to have wisdom and wit, but the others are shadowy phantoms.

and;

Forth from his limbs unwilling his spirit flitted to Hades,

Wailing its doom and its lustihood lost and the May of its manhood.

and;

Under the earth like a vapor vanished the gibbering soul.

and;

Even as bats in the hollow of some mysterious grotto

Fly with a flitter-mouse shriek when one of them falls from the cluster,

Whereby they hold to the rock and are clinging the one to the other,

Flitted their gibbering ghosts.

We will beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we cancel those and all similar passages, not that they are not poetic and pleasing to most hearers, but because the more poetic they are the less are they suited to the ears of boys

and men who are destined to be free and to be more afraid of slavery than of death.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then we must further taboo in these matters the entire vocabulary of terror and fear, Cocytus named of lamentation loud, abhorred Styx, the flood of deadly hate, the people of the infernal pit and of the charnel house, and all other terms of this type, whose very names send a shudder through all the hearers every year. And they may be excellent for other purposes, but we are in fear for our guardians lest the habit of such thrills make them more sensitive and soft than we would have them.

Adeimantus/ And we are right in so fearing.

Socrates/ We must remove those things then?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the opposite type to them is what we must require in speech and in verse?

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And shall we also do away with the wailings and lamentations of men of repute?

Adeimantus/ That necessarily follows, from the other.

Socrates/ Consider, whether we shall be right in thus getting rid of them or not. What we affirm is that a good man will not think that for a good man, whose friend he also is, death is a terrible thing.

Adeimantus/ Yes, we say that.

Socrates/ Then it would not be for his friend's sake as if he had suffered something dreadful that he would make lament.

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But we also say this, that such a one is most of all men sufficient unto himself for a good life and is

distinguished from other men in having least need of anybody else.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Least of all then to him is it a terrible thing to lose son or brother or his wealth or anything of the sort.

Adeimantus/ Least of all.

Socrates/ Then he makes the least lament and bears it most moderately when any such misfortune overtakes him.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then we should be right in doing away with the lamentations of men of note and in attributing them to women, and not to the most worthy of them either, and to inferior men, in order that those whom we say we are breeding for the guardianship of the land may disdain to act like these.

Adeimantus/ We should be right.

Socrates/ Again then we shall request Homer and the other poets not to portray Achilles, the son of a goddess, as, 'lying now on his side, and then again on his back, and again on his face,' and then rising up and 'drifting distraught on the shore of the waste unharvested ocean,' nor as clutching with both hands the sooty dust and strewing it over his head, nor as weeping and lamenting in the measure and manner attributed to him by the poet, nor yet Priam, near kinsman of the gods, making supplication and rolling in the dung, 'calling aloud unto each, by name to each man appealing.' And yet more than this shall we beg of them at least not to describe the gods as lamenting and crying, 'Ah, woe is me, woeful mother who bore to my sorrow the bravest,' and if they will so picture the gods, at least not to have the effrontery to present so unlikely a likeness of the supreme god as to make him say;

> Out on it, dear to my heart is the man whose pursuit around Troy town
> I must behold with my eyes while my spirit is grieving within me.

and;

> Ah, woe is me! Of all men to me is Sarpedon the dearest,
> Fated to fall by the hands of Patroclus, Menoetius' offspring.

For if, dear Adimantus, our young men should seriously incline to listen to such tales and not laugh at them as unworthy utterances, still less likely would any man be to think such conduct unworthy of himself and to rebuke himself if it occurred to him to do or say anything of that kind, but without shame or restraint full many a dirge for trifles would he chant and many a lament.

Adeimantus/ You say most truly.

Socrates/ But that must not be, as our reasoning but now showed us, in which we must put our trust until someone convinces us with a better reason.

Adeimantus/ No, it must not be.

Socrates/ Again, they must not be prone to laughter. For ordinarily when one abandons himself to violent laughter his condition provokes a violent reaction.

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then if anyone represents men of worth as overpowered by laughter we must not accept it, much less if gods.

Adeimantus/ Much indeed.

Socrates/ Then we must not accept from Homer such sayings as these either about the gods;

> Quenchless then was the laughter that rose from the blessed immortals

When they beheld Hephaestus officiously puffing and panting.

Adeimantus/ We must not accept them on your view.

Socrates/ If it pleases you to call it mine, At any rate we must not accept them. But further we must surely prize truth most highly. For if we were right in what we were just saying and falsehood is in very deed useless to gods, but to men useful as a remedy or form of medicine, it is obvious that such a thing must be assigned to physicians, and laymen should have nothing to do with it.

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ The rulers then of the city may, if anybody, fitly lie on account of enemies or citizens for the benefit of the state; no others may have anything to do with it. But for a layman to lie to rulers of that kind we shall affirm to be as great a sin, nay a greater, than it is for a patient not to tell his physician or an athlete his trainer the truth about his bodily condition, or for a man to deceive the pilot about the ship and the sailors as to the real condition of himself or a fellow sailor, and how they fare.

Most true.

Socrates/ If then the ruler catches anybody else in the city lying, any of the craftsmen, 'whether a prophet or healer of sickness or joiner of timbers,' he will chastise him for introducing a practice as subversive and destructive of a state as it is of a ship.

Adeimantus/ He will, if deed follows upon word.

Socrates/ Again, will our lads not need the virtue of self-control?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And for the multitude are not the main points of self-control these—to be obedient to their rulers and

themselves to be rulers over the bodily appetites and pleasures of food, drink, and the rest?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then, I take it, we will think well said such sayings as that of Homer's Diomedes;

> Friend, sit down and be silent and hark to the word of my bidding.

and what follows;

> Breathing high spirit the Greeks marched silently fearing their captains.

and all similar passages.

Adeimantus/ Yes, well said.

Socrates/ But what of this sort of thing;

> Heavy with wine, with the eyes of a dog and the heart of a fleet deer.

and the lines that follow? Are these well—and other impertinences in prose or verse of private citizens to their rulers?

Adeimantus/ They are not well.

Socrates/ They certainly are not suitable for youth to hear for the inculcation of self-control. But if from another point of view they yield some pleasure we must not be surprised, or what is your view of it?

Adeimantus/ This.

Socrates/ Again, to represent the wisest man as saying that this seems to him the fairest thing in the world;

> When the bounteous tables are standing
> Laden with bread and with meat and the cupbearer ladles the sweet wine
> Out of the mixer and bears it and empties it into the beakers.

do you think the hearing of that sort of thing will conduce to a young man's temperance or self-control? Or this?

> Hunger is the most piteous death that a mortal may suffer.

Or to hear how Zeus lightly forgot all the designs which he devised, awake while the other gods and men slept, because of the excitement of his passions, and was so overcome by the sight of Hera that he is not even willing to go to their chamber, but wants to lie with her there on the ground and says that he is possessed by a fiercer desire than when they first consorted with one another, 'deceiving their dear parents'? Nor will it profit them to hear of Hephaestus' fettering of Ares and Aphrodite for a like motive.

Adeimantus/ No, by Zeus, I don't think it will.

Socrates/ But any words or deeds of endurance in the face of all odds attributed to famous men are suitable for our youth to see represented and to hear, such as;

> He smote his breast and chided thus his heart,
> Endure, my heart, for worse hast thou endured.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ It is certain that we cannot allow our men to be accepters of bribes or greedy for gain.

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then they must not chant, 'Gifts move the gods and gifts persuade dread kings.' Nor should we approve Achilles' attendant Phoenix as speaking fairly when he counseled him if he received gifts for it to defend the Achaeans, but without gifts not to lay aside his wrath. Nor shall we think it proper nor admit that Achilles himself was so greedy as to accept gifts from Agamemnon and again to give up a dead body after receiving payment but otherwise to refuse.

Adeimantus/ It is not right, to commend such conduct.

Socrates/ But, for Homer's sake, I hesitate to say that it is positively impious to affirm such things of Achilles and to

believe them when told by others, or again to believe that he said to Apollo;

> Me thou hast balked, far-darter, the most pernicious of all gods,
> Mightily would I requite thee if only my hands had the power.

and how he was disobedient to the river, who was a god, and was ready to fight with him, and again that he said of the locks of his hair, consecrated to the other river, Spercheus;

> This let me give to take with him my hair to the hero, Patroclus.

who was a dead body. And that he did so we must not believe. And again the trailings of Hector's body round the grave of Patroclus and the slaughter of the living captives upon his pyre, all these we will affirm to be lies, nor will we suffer our youth to believe that Achilles, the son of a goddess and of Peleus, the most chaste of men, grandson of Zeus, and himself bred under the care of the most sage Chiron, was of so perturbed a spirit as to be affected with two contradictory maladies, the greed that becomes no free man and at the same time overweening arrogance toward gods and men.

Adeimantus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Neither, then, must we believe this, or suffer it to be said, that Theseus, the son of Poseidon, and Pirithous, the son of Zeus, attempted such dreadful rapes, nor that any other child of a god or hero would have brought himself to accomplish the terrible and impious deeds that they now falsely relate of them. But we must constrain the poets either to deny that these are their deeds or that they are the children of gods, but not to make both statements or attempt to persuade our youth that the gods are the begetters of evil, and that heroes are no better than men. For, as we were saying, such utterances are both impious and false. For we

proved, I take it, that for evil to arise from gods is an impossibility.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And they are furthermore harmful to those that hear them. For every man will be very lenient with his own misdeeds if he is convinced that such are and were the actions of;

> The near-sown seed of gods,
> Close kin to Zeus, for whom on Ida's top
> Ancestral altars flame to highest heaven,
> Nor in their lifeblood fails the fire divine.

For which cause we must put down such fables, lest they breed in our youth great laxity in turpitude.

Adeimantus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ What type of discourse remains for our definition of our prescriptions and proscriptions? We have declared the right way of speaking about gods and daemons and heroes and that other world?

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ Speech, then, about men would be the remainder.

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ It is impossible for us, my friend, to place this here.

Adeimantus/ Why?

Socrates/ Because I presume we are going to say that so it is that both poets and writers of prose speak wrongly about men in matters of greatest moment, saying that there are many examples of men who, though unjust, are happy, and of just men who are wretched, and that there is profit in injustice if it be concealed, and that justice is the other man's good and your own loss, and I presume that we shall

forbid them to say this sort of thing and command them to sing and fable the opposite. Don't you think so?

Adeimantus/ Nay, I well know it.

Socrates/ Then, if you admit that I am right, I will say that you have conceded the original point of our inquiry?

Adeimantus/ Rightly apprehended.

Socrates/ Then, as regards men, that speech must be of this kind, that is a point that we will agree upon when we have discovered the nature of justice and the proof that it is profitable to its possessor whether he does or does not appear to be just.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ So this concludes the topic of tales. That of diction, I take it, is to be considered next. So we shall have completely examined both the matter and the manner of speech.

Adeimantus/ I don't understand what you mean by this.

Socrates/ Well, we must have you understand. Perhaps you will be more likely to apprehend it thus. Is not everything that is said by fabulists or poets a narration of past, present, or future things?

Adeimantus/ What else could it be?

Socrates/ Do not they proceed either by pure narration or by a narrative that is effected through imitation, or by both?

Adeimantus/ This too, I still need to have made plainer.

Socrates/ I seem to be a ridiculous and obscure teacher. So, like men who are unable to express themselves I won't try to speak in wholes and universals but will separate off a particular part and by the example of that try to show you my meaning. Tell me, do you know the first lines of the Iliad in which the poet says that Chryses implored Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that the king was angry and

that Chryses, failing of his request, imprecated curses on the Achaeans in his prayers to the god?

You know then that as far as these verses;

> And prayed unto all the Achaeans.
>
> Chiefly to Atreus's sons, twin leaders who marshaled the people.

the poet himself is the speaker and does not even attempt to suggest to us that anyone but himself is speaking. But what follows he delivers as if he were himself Chryses and tries as far as may be to make us feel that not Homer is the speaker, but the priest, an old man. And in this manner he has carried on nearly all the rest of his narration about affairs in Ilium, all that happened in Ithaca, and the entire *Odyssey*.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Now, it is narration, is it not, both when he presents the several speeches and the matter between the speeches?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But when he delivers a speech as if he were someone else, shall we not say that he then assimilates thereby his own diction as far as possible to that of the person whom he announces as about to speak?

Adeimantus/ We shall, obviously.

Socrates/ And is not likening oneself to another in speech or bodily bearing an imitation of him to whom one likens oneself?

Adeimantus/ Surely.

Socrates/ In such case then, it appears, he and the other poets effect their narration through imitation.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But if the poet should conceal himself nowhere, then his entire poetizing and narration would have been

accomplished without imitation. And lest you may say again that you don't understand, I will explain to you how this would be done. If Homer, after telling us that Chryses came with the ransom of his daughter and as a suppliant of the Achaeans but chiefly of the kings, had gone on speaking not as if made or being Chryses but still as Homer, you are aware that it would not be imitation but narration, pure and simple. It would have been somewhat in this wise. I will state it without meter for I am not a poet. The priest came and prayed that to them the gods should grant to take Troy and come safely home, but that they should accept the ransom and release his daughter, out of reverence for the god, and when he had thus spoken the others were of reverent mind and approved, but Agamemnon was angry and bade him depart and not come again lest the scepter and the fillets of the god should not avail him. And ere his daughter should be released, she would grow old in Argos with himself, and he ordered him to be off and not vex him if he wished to get home safe. And the old man on hearing this was frightened and departed in silence, and having gone apart from the camp he prayed at length to Apollo, invoking the appellations of the god, and reminding him of and asking requital for any of his gifts that had found favor whether in the building of temples or the sacrifice of victims. In return for these things he prayed that the Achaeans should suffer for his tears by the god's shafts.

Socrates/ It is in this way, my dear fellow, that without imitation simple narration results.

Adeimantus/ I understand.

Socrates/ Understand then, that the opposite of this arises when one removes the words of the poet between and leaves the alternation of speeches.

Adeimantus/ This too I understand, It is what happens in tragedy.

Socrates/ You have conceived me most rightly, and now I think I can make plain to you what I was unable to before, that there is one kind of poetry and tale telling which works wholly through imitation, as you remarked, tragedy and comedy, and another which employs the recital of the poet himself, best exemplified, I presume, in the dithyramb, and there is again that which employs both, in epic poetry and in many other places, if you apprehend me.

Adeimantus/ I understand now, what you then meant.

Socrates/ Recall then also the preceding statement that we were done with the 'what' of speech and still had to consider the 'how.'

Adeimantus/ I remember.

Socrates/ What I meant then was just this, that we must reach a decision whether we are to suffer our poets to narrate as imitators or in part as imitators and in part not, and what sort of things in each case, or not allow them to imitate at all.

Adeimantus/ I divine, that you are considering whether we shall admit tragedy and comedy into our city or not.

Socrates/ Perhaps, and perhaps even more than that. For I certainly do not yet know myself, but whithersoever the wind, as it were, of the argument blows, there lies our course.

Adeimantus/ Well said.

Socrates/ This then, Adimantus, is the point we must keep in view. Do we wish our guardians to be good mimics or not? Or is this also a consequence of what we said before, that each one could practice well only one pursuit and not many, but if he attempted the latter, dabbling in many things, he would fail of distinction in all?

Adeimantus/ Of course it is.

Socrates/ And does not the same rule hold for imitation, that the same man is not able to imitate many things well as he can one?

Adeimantus/ No, he is not.

Socrates/ Still less, then, will he be able to combine the practice of any worthy pursuit with the imitation of many things and the quality of a mimic, since, unless I mistake, the same men cannot practice well at once even the two forms of imitation that appear most nearly akin, as the writing of tragedy and comedy. Did you not just now call these two imitations?

Adeimantus/ I did, and you are right in saying that the same men are not able to succeed in both.

Socrates/ Nor yet to be at once good rhapsodists and actors?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ But neither can the same men be actors for tragedies and comedies—and all these are imitations, are they not?

Adeimantus/ Yes, imitations.

Socrates/ And to still smaller coinage than this, in my opinion, Adimantus, proceeds the fractioning of human faculty, so as to be incapable of imitating many things or of doing the things themselves of which the imitations are likenesses.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ If, then, we are to maintain our original principle, that our guardians, released from all other crafts, are to be expert craftsmen of civic liberty, and pursue nothing else that does not conduce to this, it would not be fitting for these to do nor yet to imitate anything else. But if

they imitate they should from childhood up imitate what is appropriate to them—men, that is, who are brave, sober, pious, free, and all things of that kind—but things unbecoming the free man they should neither do nor be clever at imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from the imitation they imbibe the reality. Or have you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle down into habits and second nature in the body, the speech, and the thought?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ We will not then allow our charges, whom we expect to prove good men, being men, to play the parts of women and imitate a woman young or old wrangling with her husband, defying heaven, loudly boasting, fortunate in her own conceit, or involved in misfortune and possessed by grief and lamentation—still less a woman that is sick, in love, or in labor.

Adeimantus/ Most certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor may they imitate slaves, female and male, doing the offices of slaves.

Adeimantus/ No, not that either.

Socrates/ Nor yet, as it seems, bad men who are cowards and who do the opposite of the things we just now spoke of, reviling and lampooning one another, speaking foul words in their cups or when sober and in other ways sinning against themselves and others in word and deed after the fashion of such men. And I take it they must not form the habit of likening themselves to madmen either in words nor yet in deeds. For while knowledge they must have both of mad and bad men and women, they must do and imitate nothing of this kind.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ What of this? Are they to imitate smiths and other craftsmen or the rowers of triremes and those who call the time to them or other things connected therewith?

Adeimantus/ How could they, since it will be forbidden them even to pay any attention to such things?

Socrates/ Well, then, neighing horses and lowing bulls, and the noise of rivers and the roar of the sea and the thunder and everything of that kind—will they imitate these?

Adeimantus/ Nay, they have been forbidden, to be mad or liken themselves to madmen.

Socrates/ If, then, I understand your meaning, there is a form of diction and narrative in which the really good and true man would narrate anything that he had to say, and another form unlike this to which the man of the opposite birth and breeding would cleave and in which he would tell his story.

Adeimantus/ What are these forms?

Socrates/ A man of the right sort, I think, when he comes in the course of his narrative to some word or act of a good man will be willing to impersonate the other in reporting it, and will feel no shame at that kind of mimicry, by preference imitating the good man when he acts steadfastly and sensibly, and less and more reluctantly when he is upset by sickness or love or drunkenness or any other mishap. But when he comes to someone unworthy of himself, he will not wish to liken himself in earnest to one who is inferior, except in the few cases where he is doing something good, but will be embarrassed both because he is unpracticed in the mimicry of such characters, and also because he shrinks in distaste from molding and fitting himself to the types of baser things. His mind disdains them, unless it be for jest.

Adeimantus/ Naturally.

Socrates/ Then the narrative that he will employ will be of the kind that we just now illustrated by the verses of Homer, and his diction will be one that partakes of both, of imitation and simple narration, but there will be a small portion of imitation in a long discourse—or is there nothing in what I say?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed, that is the type and pattern of such a speaker.

Socrates/ Then, the other kind of speaker, the more debased he is the less will he shrink from imitating anything and everything. He will think nothing unworthy of himself, so that he will attempt, seriously and in the presence of many, to imitate all things, including those we just now mentioned—claps of thunder, and the noise of wind and hail and axles and pulleys, and the notes of trumpets and flutes and Panpipes, and the sounds of all instruments, and the cries of dogs, sheep, and birds—and so his style will depend wholly on imitation in voice and gesture, or will contain but a little of pure narration.

Adeimantus/ That too follows of necessity.

Socrates/ These, then, were the two types of diction of which I was speaking.

Adeimantus/ There are those two.

Socrates/ Now does not one of the two involve slight variations, and if we assign a suitable pitch and rhythm to the diction, is not the result that the right speaker speaks almost on the same note and in one cadence—for the changes are slight—and similarly in a rhythm of nearly the same kind?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But what of the other type? Does it not require the opposite, every kind of pitch and all rhythms, if it too is

to have appropriate expression, since it involves manifold forms of variation?

Adeimantus/ Emphatically so.

Socrates/ And do all poets and speakers hit upon one type or the other of diction or some blend which they combine of both?

Adeimantus/ They must.

Socrates/ What, then, are we to do? Shall we admit all of these into the city, or one of the unmixed types, or the mixed type?

Adeimantus/ If my vote prevails, the unmixed imitator of the good.

Socrates/ Nay, but the mixed type also is pleasing, Adimantus, and far most pleasing to boys and their tutors and the great mob is the opposite of your choice.

Adeimantus/ Most pleasing it is.

Socrates/ But perhaps, you would affirm it to be ill suited to our polity, because there is no twofold or manifold man among us, since every man does one thing.

Adeimantus/ It is not suited.

Socrates/ And is this not the reason why such a city is the only one in which we shall find the cobbler a cobbler and not a pilot in addition to his cobbling, and the farmer a farmer and not a judge added to his farming, and the soldier a soldier and not a money-maker in addition to his soldiery, and so of all the rest?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ If a man, then, it seems, who was capable by his cunning of assuming every kind of shape and imitating all things should arrive in our city, bringing with himself the poems which he wished to exhibit, we should fall down and worship him as a holy and wondrous and delightful creature,

but should say to him that there is no man of that kind among us in our city, nor is it lawful for such a man to arise among us, and we should send him away to another city, after pouring myrrh down over his head and crowning him with fillets of wool, but we ourselves, for our souls' good, should continue to employ the more austere and less delightful poet and taleteller, who would imitate the diction of the good man and would tell his tale in the patterns which we prescribed in the beginning, when we set out to educate our soldiers.

Adeimantus/ We certainly should do that if it rested with us.

Socrates/ And now, my friend, we may say that we have completely finished the part of music that concerns speeches and tales. For we have set forth what is to be said and how it is to be said.

Adeimantus/ I think so too.

Socrates/ After this, then, comes the manner of song and tunes?

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And having gone thus far, could not everybody discover what we must say of their character in order to conform to what has already been said?

Glaucon/ I am afraid that 'everybody' does not include me;

Socrates/ Laughed Glaucon.

Glaucon/ I cannot sufficiently divine offhand what we ought to say, though I have a suspicion.

Socrates/ You certainly, I presume, have a sufficient understanding of this—that the song is composed of three things, the words, the tune, and the rhythm?

Glaucon/ Yes, that much.

Socrates/ And so far as it is words, it surely in no manner differs from words not sung in the requirement of conformity to the patterns and manner that we have prescribed?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And again, the music and the rhythm must follow the speech.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But we said we did not require dirges and lamentations in words.

Glaucon/ We do not.

Socrates/ What, then, are the dirge like modes of music? Tell me, for you are a musician.

Glaucon/ The mixed Lydian, and the tense or higher Lydian, and similar modes.

Socrates/ These, then, we must do away with. For they are useless even to women who are to make the best of themselves, let alone to men.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But again, drunkenness is a thing most unbefitting guardians, and so is softness and sloth.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ What, then, are the soft and convivial modes?

Glaucon/ There are certain Ionian and also Lydian modes that are called lax.

Socrates/ Will you make any use of them for warriors?

Glaucon/ None at all, but it would seem that you have left the Dorian and the Phrygian.

Socrates/ I don't know the musical modes, but leave us that mode that would fittingly imitate the utterances and the accents of a brave man who is engaged in warfare or in any enforced business, and who, when he has failed, either

meeting wounds or death or having fallen into some other mishap, in all these conditions confronts fortune with steadfast endurance and repels her strokes. And another for such a man engaged in works of peace, not enforced but voluntary, either trying to persuade somebody of something and imploring him—whether it be a god, through prayer, or a man, by teaching and admonition—or contrariwise yielding himself to another who is petitioning or teaching him or trying to change his opinions, and in consequence faring according to his wish, and not bearing himself arrogantly, but in all this acting modestly and moderately and acquiescing in the outcome. Leave us these two modes—the enforced and the voluntary—that will best imitate the utterances of men failing or succeeding, the temperate, the brave—leave us these.

Glaucon/ Well, you are asking me to leave none other than those I just spoke of.

Socrates/ Then, we shall not need in our songs and airs instruments of many strings or whose compass includes all the harmonies.

Glaucon/ Not in my opinion.

Socrates/ Then we shall not maintain makers of triangles and harps and all a other many-stringed and polyharmonic instruments.

Glaucon/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Well, will you admit to the city flute makers and flute players? Or is not the flute the most 'many-stringed' of instruments and do not the panharmonics themselves imitate it?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ You have left, the lyre and the cithara. These are useful in the city, and in the fields the shepherds would have a little piccolo to pipe on.

Glaucon/ So our argument indicates.

Socrates/ We are not innovating, my friend, in preferring Apollo and the instruments of Apollo to Marsyas and his instruments.

Glaucon/ No, by heaven! I think not.

Socrates/ And by the dog, we have all unawares purged the city which a little while ago we said was luxurious.

Glaucon/ In that we show our good sense.

Socrates/ Come then, let us complete the purification. For upon harmonies would follow the consideration of rhythms; we must not pursue complexity nor great variety in the basic movements, but must observe what are the rhythms of a life that is orderly and brave, and after observing them require the foot and the air to conform to that kind of man's speech and not the speech to the foot and the tune. What those rhythms would be, it is for you to tell us as you did the musical modes.

Glaucon/ Nay, in faith, I cannot tell. For that there are some three forms from which the feet are combined, just as there are four in the notes of the voice whence come all harmonies, is a thing that I have observed and could tell. But which are imitations of which sort of life, I am unable to say.

Socrates/ Well, on this point we will take counsel with Damon, too, as to which are the feet appropriate to illiberality, and insolence or madness or other evils, and what rhythms we must leave for their opposites. And I believe I have heard him obscurely speaking of a foot that he called the enoplios, a composite foot, and a dactyl and a heroic foot, which he arranged, I know not how, to be equal up and down in the interchange of long and short, and unless I am mistaken he used the term iambic, and there was another foot that he called the trochaic, and he added

the quantities long and short. And in some of these, I believe, he censured and commended the tempo of the foot no less than the rhythm itself, or else some combination of the two, I can't say. But, as I said, let this matter be postponed for Damon's consideration. For to determine the truth of these would require no little discourse. Do you think otherwise?

Glaucon/ No, by heaven, I do not.

Socrates/ But this you are able to determine—that seemliness and unseemliness are attendant upon the good rhythm and the bad.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And, further, that good rhythm and bad rhythm accompany, the one fair diction, assimilating itself thereto. and the other the opposite, and so of the apt and the unapt, if, as we were just now saying, the rhythm and harmony follow the words and not the words these.

Glaucon/ They certainly must follow the speech.

Socrates/ And what of the manner of the diction, and the speech? Do they not follow and conform to the disposition of the soul?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And all the rest to the diction?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Good speech, then, good accord, and good grace, and good rhythm wait upon a good disposition, not that weakness of head which we euphemistically style goodness of heart, but the truly good and fair disposition of the character and the mind.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And must not our youth pursue these everywhere if they are to do what it is truly theirs to do?

Glaucon/ They must indeed.

Socrates/ And there is surely much of these qualities in painting and in all similar craftsmanship—weaving is full of them and embroidery and architecture and likewise the manufacture of household furnishings and thereto the natural bodies of animals and plants as well. For in all these there is grace or gracelessness. And gracelessness and evil rhythm and disharmony are akin to evil speaking and the evil temper, but the opposites are the symbols and the kin of the opposites, the sober and good disposition.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is it, then, only the poets that we must supervise and compel to embody in their poems the semblance of the good character or else not write poetry among us, or must we keep watch over the other craftsmen, and forbid them to represent the evil disposition, the licentious, the illiberal, the graceless, either in the likeness of living creatures or in buildings or in any other product of their art, on penalty, if unable to obey, of being forbidden to practice their art among us, that our guardians may not be bred among symbols of evil, as it were in a pasturage of poisonous herbs, lest grazing freely and cropping from many such day by day they little by little and all unawares accumulate and build up a huge mass of evil in their own souls. But we must look for those craftsmen who by the happy gift of nature are capable of following the trail of true beauty and grace, that our young men, dwelling as it were in a salubrious region, may receive benefit from all things about them, whence the influence that emanates from works of beauty may waft itself to eye or ear like a breeze that brings from wholesome places health, and so from earliest childhood insensibly guide them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason.

Glaucon/ Yes, that would be far the best education for them.

Socrates/ And is it not for this reason, Glaucon, that education in music is most sovereign, because more than anything else rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and otherwise the contrary? And further, because omissions and the failure of beauty in things badly made or grown would be most quickly perceived by one who was properly educated in music, and so, feeling distaste rightly, he would praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into his soul to foster its growth and become himself beautiful and good. The ugly he would rightly disapprove of and hate while still young and yet unable to apprehend the reason, but when reason came the man thus nurtured would be the first to give her welcome, for by this affinity he would know her.

Glaucon/ I certainly think, that such is the cause of education in music.

Socrates/ It is, then, as it was when we learned our letters and felt that we knew them sufficiently only when the separate letters did not elude us, appearing as few elements in all the combinations that convey them, and when we did not disregard them in small things or great and think it unnecessary to recognize them, but were eager to distinguish them everywhere, in the belief that we should never be literate and letter-perfect till we could do this.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And is it not also true that if there are any likenesses of letters reflected in water or mirrors, we shall never know them until we know the originals, but such knowledge belongs to the same art and discipline?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then, by heaven, am I not right in saying that by the same token we shall never be true musicians, either—neither we nor the guardians that we have undertaken to educate—until we are able to recognize the forms of soberness, courage, liberality, and high-mindedness, and all their kindred and their opposites, too, in all the combinations that contain and convey them, and to apprehend them and their images wherever found, disregarding them neither in trifles nor in great things, but believing the knowledge of them to belong to the same art and discipline?

Glaucon/ The conclusion is inevitable.

Socrates/ Then, when there is a coincidence of a beautiful disposition in the soul and corresponding and harmonious beauties of the same type in the bodily form—is not this the fairest spectacle for one who is capable of its contemplation?

Glaucon/ Far the fairest.

Socrates/ And surely the fairest is the most lovable.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ The true musician, then, would love by preference persons of this sort, but if there were disharmony he would not love this.

Glaucon/ No, not if there was a defect in the soul, but if it were in the body he would bear with it and still be willing to bestow his love.

Socrates/ I understand, that you have or have had favorites of this sort and I grant your distinction. But tell me this—can there be any communion between soberness and extravagant pleasure?

Glaucon/ How could there be, since such pleasure puts a man beside himself no less than pain?

Socrates/ Or between it and virtue generally?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But is there between pleasure and insolence and license?

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Do you know of greater or keener pleasure than that associated with Aphrodite?

Glaucon/ I don't, nor yet of any more insane.

Socrates/ But is not the right love a sober and harmonious love of the orderly and the beautiful?

Glaucon/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ Then nothing of madness, nothing akin to license, must be allowed to come nigh the right love?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ Then this kind of pleasure may not come nigh, nor may lover and beloved who rightly love and are loved have anything to do with it?

Glaucon/ No, by heaven, Socrates, it must not come nigh them.

Socrates/ Thus, then, as it seems, you will lay down the law in the city that we are founding, that the lover may kiss and pass the time with and touch the beloved as a father would a son, for honorable ends, if he persuade him. But otherwise he must so associate with the objects of his care that there should never be any suspicion of anything further, on penalty of being stigmatized for want of taste and true musical culture.

Glaucon/ Even so.

Socrates/ Do you not agree, then, that our discourse on music has come to an end? It has certainly made a fitting end, for surely the end and consummation of culture is the love of the beautiful.

Glaucon/ I concur.

Socrates/ After music our youth are to be educated by gymnastics?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ In this too they must be carefully trained from boyhood through life, and the way of it is this, I believe, but consider it yourself too. For I, for my part, do not believe that a sound body by its excellence makes the soul good, but on the contrary that a good soul by its virtue renders the body the best that is possible. What is your opinion?

Glaucon/ I think so too.

Socrates/ Then if we should sufficiently train the mind and turn over to it the minutiae of the care of the body, and content ourselves with merely indicating the norms or patterns, not to make a long story of it, we should be acting rightly?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ From intoxication we said that they must abstain. For a guardian is surely the last person in the world to whom it is allowable to get drunk and not know where on earth he is.

Glaucon/ Yes, it would be absurd that a guardian should need a guard.

Socrates/ What next about their food? These men are athletes in the greatest of contests, are they not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is, then, the bodily habit of the athletes we see about us suitable for such?

Glaucon/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Nay, that is a drowsy habit and precarious for health. Don't you observe that they sleep away their lives, and that if they depart ever so little from their prescribed

regimen these athletes are liable to great and violent diseases?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then, we need some more ingenious form of training for our athletes of war, since these must be as it were sleepless hounds, and have the keenest possible perceptions of sight and hearing, and in their campaigns undergo many changes in their drinking water, their food, and in exposure to the heat of the sun and to storms, without disturbance of their health.

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ Would not, then, the best gymnastics be akin to the music that we were just now describing?

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ It would be a simple and flexible gymnastic training, and especially so in the training for war.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ One could learn that, even from Homer. For you are aware that in the banqueting of the heroes on campaign he does not feast them on fish, though they are at the seaside on the Hellespont, nor on boiled meat, but only on roast, which is what soldiers could most easily procure. For everywhere, one may say, it is of easier provision to use the bare fire than to convey pots and pans along.

Glaucon/ Indeed it is.

Socrates/ Neither, as I believe, does Homer ever make mention of sweetmeats. Is not that something which all men in training understand—that if one is to keep his body in good condition he must abstain from such things altogether?

Glaucon/ They are right, in that they know it and do abstain.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, if you think this is the right way, you apparently do not approve of a Syracusan table and the Sicilian variety of dishes.

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ You would frown, then, on a little Corinthian maid as the chère amie of men who were to keep themselves fit?

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And also on the seeming delights of Attic pastry?

Glaucon/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ In general, I take it, if we likened that kind of food and regimen to music and song expressed in the panharmonic mode and in every variety of rhythm it would be a fair comparison.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And there variety engendered licentiousness, did it not, but here disease, while simplicity in music begets sobriety in the souls, and in gymnastic training it begets health in bodies?

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And when licentiousness and disease multiply in a city, are not many courts of law and dispensaries opened? And the arts of chicane and medicine give themselves airs when even free men in great numbers take them very seriously.

Glaucon/ How can they help it?

Socrates/ Will you be able to find a surer proof of an evil and shameful state of education in a city than the necessity of first-rate physicians and judges, not only for the base and mechanical, but for those who claim to have been bred in the fashion of free men? Do you not think it disgraceful and

a notable mark of bad breeding to have to make use of a justice imported from others, who thus become your masters and judges, from lack of such qualities in yourself?

Glaucon/ The most shameful thing in the world.

Socrates/ Is it? Or is this still more shameful—when a man not only wears out the better part of his days in the courts of law as defendant or accuser, but from the lack of all true sense of values is led to plume himself on this very thing, as being a smart fellow to 'put over' an unjust act and cunningly to try every dodge and practice, every evasion, and wriggle out of every hold in defeating justice, and that too for trifles and worthless things, because he does not know how much nobler and better it is to arrange his life so as to have no need of a nodding juryman?

Glaucon/ That is, still more shameful than the other.

Socrates/ And to require medicine, not merely for wounds or the incidence of some seasonal maladies, but, because of sloth and such a regimen as we described, to fill one's body up with winds and humors like a marsh and compel the ingenious sons of Asclepius to invent for diseases such names as fluxes and flatulences—don't you think that disgraceful?

Glaucon/ Those surely are, newfangled and monstrous strange names of diseases.

Socrates/ There was nothing of the kind, I fancy, in the days of Asclepius. I infer this from the fact that at Troy his sons did not find fault with the damsel who gave to the wounded Eurypylus to drink a posset of Pramnian wine plentifully sprinkled with barley and gratings of cheese, inflammatory ingredients of a surety, nor did they censure Patroclus, who was in charge of the case.

Glaucon/ It was indeed, a strange potion for a man in that condition.

Socrates/ Not so strange, if you reflect that the former Asclepiads made no use of our modern coddling medication of diseases before the time of Herodicus. But Herodicus was a trainer and became a valetudinarian, and blended gymnastics and medicine, for the torment first and chiefly of himself and then of many successors.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ By lingering out his death. For living in perpetual observance of his malady, which was incurable, he was not able to effect a cure, but lived through his days unfit for the business of life, suffering the tortures of the damned if he departed a whit from his fixed regimen. And struggling against death, by reason of his science he won the prize of a doting old age.

Glaucon/ A noble prize indeed for his science.

Socrates/ The appropriate one, for a man who did not know that it was not from ignorance or inacquaintance with this type of medicine that Asclepius did not discover it to his descendants, but because he knew that for all well-governed peoples there is a work assigned to each man in the city which he must perform, and no one has leisure to be sick and doctor himself all his days. And this we absurdly enough perceive in the case of a craftsman, but don't see in the case of the rich and so-called fortunate.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ A carpenter, when he is sick expects his physician to give him a drug which will operate as an emetic on the disease, or to get rid of it by purging or the use of cautery or the knife. But if anyone prescribes for him a long course of treatment with swathings about the head and their accompaniments, he hastily says that he has no leisure to be sick, and that such a life of preoccupation with his illness and neglect of the work that lies before him isn't worth living.

And thereupon he bids farewell to that kind of physician, enters upon his customary way of life, regains his health, and lives attending to his affairs—or, if his body is not equal to the strain, he dies and is freed from all his troubles.

Glaucon/ For such a man, that appears to be the right use of medicine.

Socrates/ And is not the reason, that he had a task and that life wasn't worth acceptance on condition of not doing his work?

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ But the rich man, we say, has no such appointed task, the necessity of abstaining from which renders life intolerable.

Glaucon/ I haven't heard of any.

Socrates/ Why, haven't you heard that saying of Phocylides, that after a man has 'made his pile' he ought to practice virtue?

Glaucon/ Before, too, I fancy.

Socrates/ Let us not quarrel with him on that point, but inform ourselves whether this virtue is something for the rich man to practice, and life is intolerable if he does not, or whether we are to suppose that while valetudinarianism is a hindrance to single-minded attention to carpentry and the other arts, it is no obstacle to the fulfillment of Phocylides' exhortation.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed, this excessive care for the body that goes beyond simple gymnastics is about the greatest of all obstacles.

Socrates/ For it is troublesome in household affairs and military service and sedentary offices in the city. And, chief of all, it puts difficulties in the way of any kind of instruction, thinking, or private meditation forever imagining headaches

and dizziness and attributing their origin to philosophy. So that wherever this kind of virtue is practiced and tested it is in every way a hindrance. For it makes the man always fancy himself sick and never cease from anguishing about his body.

Glaucon/ Naturally.

Socrates/ Then shall we not say that it was because Asclepius knew this, that for those who were by nature and course of life sound of body but had some localized disease, that for such, I say, and for this habit he revealed the art of medicine, and, driving out their disease by drugs and surgery, prescribed for them their customary regimen in order not to interfere with their civic duties, but that, when bodies were diseased inwardly and throughout, he did not attempt by diet and by gradual evacuations and infusions to prolong a wretched existence for the man and have him beget in all likelihood similar wretched offspring? But if a man was incapable of living in the established round and order of life, he did not think it worthwhile to treat him, since such a fellow is of no use either to himself or to the state.

Glaucon/ A most politic Asclepius you're telling us of.

Socrates/ Obviously, that was his character. And his sons too, don't you see that at Troy they proved themselves good fighting men and practiced medicine as I described it? Don't you remember that in the case of Menelaus too. from the wound that Pandarus inflicted 'they sucked the blood, and soothing simples sprinkled'? But what he was to eat or drink thereafter they no more prescribed than for Eurypylus, taking it for granted that the remedies sufficed to heal men who before their wounds were healthy and temperate in diet even if they did happen for the nonce to drink a posset. But they thought that the life of a man constitutionally sickly and intemperate was of no use to himself or others, and that

the art of medicine should not be for such nor should they be given treatment even if they were richer than Midas.

Glaucon/ Very ingenious fellows, you make out these sons of Asclepius to be.

Socrates/ 'Tis fitting, and yet in disregard of our principles the tragedians and Pindar affirm that Asclepius, though he was the son of Apollo, was bribed by gold to heal a man already at the point of death, and that for this cause he was struck by the lightning. But we in accordance with the aforesaid principles refuse to believe both statements. If he was the son of a god he was not avaricious, we will insist, and if he was greedy of gain he was not the son of a god.

Glaucon/ That much, is most certainly true. But what have you to say to this, Socrates? Must we not have good physicians in our city? And they would be the most likely to be good who had treated the greatest number of healthy and diseased men, and so good judges would be those who had associated with all sorts and conditions of men.

Socrates/ Most assuredly I want them good, but do you know whom I regard as such?

Glaucon/ I'll know if you tell.

Socrates/ Well, I will try. You, however, have put unlike cases in one question.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Physicians, it is true, would prove most skilled if, from childhood up, in addition to learning the principles of the art they had familiarized themselves with the greatest possible number of the most sickly bodies, and if they themselves had suffered all diseases and were not of very healthy constitution. For you see they do not treat the body by the body. If they did, it would not be allowable for their bodies to be or to have been in evil condition. But they treat

the body with the mind—and it is not competent for a mind that is or has been evil to treat anything well.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ But a judge, mark you, my friend, rules soul with soul and it is not allowable for a soul to have been bred from youth up among evil souls and to have grown familiar with them, and itself to have run the gauntlet of every kind of wrongdoing and injustice so as quickly to infer from itself the misdeeds of others as it might diseases in the body, but it must have been inexperienced in evil natures and uncontaminated by them while young, if it is to be truly fair and good and judge soundly of justice. For which cause the better sort seem to be simpleminded in youth and are easily deceived by the wicked, since they do not have within themselves patterns answering to the affections of the bad.

Glaucon/ That is indeed their experience.

Socrates/ Therefore it is, that the good judge must not be a youth but an old man, a late learner of the nature of injustice, one who has not become aware of it as a property in his own soul, but one who has through the long years trained himself to understand it as an alien thing in alien souls, and to discern how great an evil it is by the instrument of mere knowledge and not by experience of his own.

Glaucon/ That at any rate, appears to be the noblest kind of judge.

Socrates/ And what is more, a good one, which was the gist of your question. For he who has a good soul is good. But that cunning fellow quick to suspect evil. and who has himself done many unjust acts and who thinks himself a smart trickster, when he associates with his like does appear to be clever, being on his guard and fixing his eyes on the patterns within himself. But when the time comes for him to mingle with the good and his elders, then on the contrary he

appears stupid. He is unseasonably distrustful and he cannot recognize a sound character because he has no such pattern in himself. But since he more often meets with the bad than the good, he seems to himself and to others to be rather wise than foolish.

Glaucon/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Well then, such a one must not be our ideal of the good and wise judge but the former. For while badness could never come to know both virtue and itself, native virtue through education will at last acquire the science of both itself and badness. This one, then, as I think, is the man who proves to be wise and not the bad man.

Glaucon/ And I concur.

Socrates/ Then will you not establish by law in your city such an art of medicine as we have described in conjunction with this kind of justice? And these arts will care for the bodies and souls of such of your citizens as are truly wellborn, but those who are not, such as are defective in body, they will suffer to die, and those who are evil-natured and incurable in soul they will themselves put to death.

Glaucon/ This certainly, has been shown to be the best thing for the sufferers themselves and for the state.

Socrates/ And so your youths, employing that simple music which we said engendered sobriety will, it is clear, guard themselves against falling into the need of the justice of the courtroom.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And will not our musician, pursuing the same trail in his use of gymnastics, if he please, get to have no need of medicine save when indispensable?

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ And even the exercises and toils of gymnastics he will undertake with a view to the spirited part of his nature to arouse that rather than for mere strength, unlike ordinary athletes, who treat diet and exercise only as a means to muscle.

Glaucon/ Nothing could be truer.

Socrates/ Then may we not say, Glaucon, that those who established an education in music and gymnastics had not the purpose in view that some attribute to them in so instituting, namely to treat the body by one and the soul by the other?

Glaucon/ But what?

Socrates/ It seems likely, that they ordained both chiefly for the soul's sake.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Have you not observed, the effect on the disposition of the mind itself of lifelong devotion to gymnastics with total neglect of music? Or the disposition of those of the opposite habit?

Glaucon/ In what respect do you mean?

Socrates/ In respect of savagery and hardness or, on the other hand, of softness and gentleness?

Glaucon/ I have observed, that the devotees of unmitigated gymnastics turn out more brutal than they should be and those of music softer than is good for them.

Socrates/ And surely, this savagery is a quality derived from the high-spirited element in our nature, which, if rightly trained, becomes brave, but if overstrained, would naturally become hard and harsh.

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ And again, is not the gentleness a quality which the philosophical nature would yield? This if relaxed too far

would be softer than is desirable but if rightly trained gentle and orderly?

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ But our requirement, we say, is that the guardians should possess both natures.

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ And must they not be harmoniously adjusted to one another?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And the soul of the man thus attuned is sober and brave?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And that of the ill-adjusted is cowardly and rude?

Glaucon/ It surely is.

Socrates/ Now when a man abandons himself to music, to play upon him and pour into his soul as it were through the funnel of his ears those sweet, soft, and dirge like airs of which we were just now speaking, and gives his entire time to the warblings and blandishments of song, the first result is that the principle of high spirit, if he had it, is softened like iron and is made useful instead of useless and brittle. But when he continues the practice without remission and is spellbound, the effect begins to be that he melts and liquefies till he completely dissolves away his spirit, cuts out as it were the very sinews of his soul and makes of himself a 'feeble warrior.'

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And if, he has to begin with a spiritless nature he reaches this result quickly, but if a high-spirited, by weakening the spirit he makes it unstable, quickly irritated by slight stimuli, and as quickly quelled. The outcome is that

such men are choleric and irascible instead of high-spirited, and are peevish and discontented.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ On the other hand, if a man toils hard at gymnastics and eats right lustily and holds no truck with music and philosophy, does he not at first get very fit and full of pride and high spirit and become more brave and bold than he was?

Glaucon/ He does indeed.

Socrates/ But what if he does nothing but this and has no contact with the Muse in any way? Is not the result that even if there was some principle of the love of knowledge in his soul, since it tastes of no instruction nor of any inquiry and does not participate in any discussion or any other form of culture, it becomes feeble, deaf, and blind, because it is not aroused or fed nor are its perceptions purified and quickened?

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ And so such a man, I take it, becomes a misologist and a stranger to the Muses. He no longer makes any use of persuasion by speech but achieves all his ends like a beast by violence and savagery, and in his brute ignorance and ineptitude lives a life of disharmony and gracelessness.

Glaucon/ That is entirely true.

Socrates/ For these two, then, it seems there are two arts which I would say some god gave to mankind, music and gymnastics for the service of the high-spirited principle and the love of knowledge in them—not for the soul and the body except incidentally, but for the harmonious adjustment of these two principles by the proper degree of tension and relaxation of each.

Glaucon/ Yes, so it appears.

Socrates/ Then he who best blends gymnastics with music and applies them most suitably to the soul is the man whom we should most rightly pronounce to be the most perfect and harmonious musician, far rather than the one who brings the strings into unison with one another.

Glaucon/ That seems likely, Socrates.

Socrates/ And shall we not also need in our city, Glaucon, a permanent overseer of this kind if its constitution is to be preserved?

Glaucon/ We most certainly shall.

Socrates/ Such would be the outlines of their education and breeding. For why should one recite the list of the dances of such citizens, their hunts and chases with hounds, their athletic contests and races? It is pretty plain that they must conform to these principles and there is no longer any difficulty in discovering them.

Glaucon/ There is, it may be, no difficulty.

Socrates/ Very well. What, then, have we next to determine? Is it not which ones among them shall be the rulers and the ruled?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ That the rulers must be the elder and the ruled the younger is obvious.

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ And that the rulers must be their best?

Glaucon/ This too.

Socrates/ And do not the best of the farmers prove the best farmers?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in this case, since we want them to be the best of the guardians, must they not be the best guardians, the most regardful of the state?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ They must then to begin with be intelligent in such matters and capable, and furthermore careful of the interests of the state?

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ But one would be most likely to be careful of that which he loved.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And again, one would be most likely to love that whose interests he supposed to coincide with his own, and thought that when it prospered he too would prosper and if not, the contrary.

Glaucon/ So it is.

Socrates/ Then we must pick out from the other guardians such men as to our observation appear most inclined through the entire course of their lives to be zealous to do what they think for the interest of the state, and who would be least likely to consent to do the opposite.

Glaucon/ That would be a suitable choice.

Socrates/ I think, then, we shall have to observe them at every period of life, to see if they are conservators and guardians of this conviction in their minds and never by sorcery nor by force can be brought to expel from their souls unawares this conviction that they must do what is best for the state.

Glaucon/ What do you mean by the 'expelling'?

Socrates/ I will tell you. It seems to me that the exit of a belief from the mind is either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary is the departure of the false belief from one who learns better, involuntary that of every true belief.

Glaucon/ The voluntary, I understand, but I need instruction about the involuntary.

Socrates/ How now, don't you agree with me in thinking that men are unwillingly deprived of good things but willingly of evil? Or is it not an evil to be deceived in respect of the truth and a good to possess truth? And don't you think that to opine the things that are is to possess the truth?

Glaucon/ Why, yes, you are right, and I agree that men are unwillingly deprived of true opinions.

Socrates/ And doesn't this happen to them by theft, by the spells of sorcery, or by force?

Glaucon/ I don't understand now either.

Socrates/ I must be talking in high tragic style. By those who have their opinions stolen from them I mean those who are over-persuaded and those who forget, because in the one case time, in the other argument strips them unawares of their beliefs. Now I presume you understand, do you not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, by those who are constrained or forced I mean those whom some pain or suffering compels to change their minds.

Glaucon/ That too I understand and you are right.

Socrates/ And the victims of sorcery I am sure you too would say are they who alter their opinions under the spell of pleasure or terrified by some fear.

Glaucon/ Yes, everything that deceives appears to cast a spell upon the mind.

Socrates/ Well then, as I was just saying, we must look for those who are the best guardians of the indwelling conviction that what they have to do is what they at any time believe to be best for the state. Then we must observe them from childhood up and propose for them tasks in which one would be most likely to forget this principle or be deceived, and he whose memory is sure and who cannot be beguiled

we must accept and the other kind we must cross off from our list. Is not that so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And again we must subject them to toils and pains and competitions in which we have to watch for the same traits.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Then, must we not institute a third kind of competitive test with regard to sorcery and observe them in that? Just as men conduct colts to noises and uproar to see if they are liable to take fright, so we must bring these lads while young into fears and again pass them into pleasures, testing them much more carefully than men do gold in the fire, to see if the man remains immune to such witchcraft and preserves his composure throughout, a good guardian of himself and the culture which he has received, maintaining the true rhythm and harmony of his being in all those conditions, and the character that would make him most useful to himself and to the state. And he who as boy, lad, and man endures the test and issues from it unspoiled we must establish as ruler over our city and its guardian, and bestow rewards upon him in life, and in death the allotment of the supreme honors of burial rites and other memorials. But the man of the other type we must reject. Such, appears to me, Glaucon, the general notion of our selection and appointment of rulers and guardians as sketched in outline, but not drawn out in detail.

Glaucon/ I too, think much the same.

Socrates/ Then would it not truly be most proper to designate these as guardians in the full sense of the word, watchers against foemen without and friends within, so that the latter shall not wish and the former shall not be able to work harm, but to name those youths whom we were calling

guardians just now helpers and aids for the decrees of the rulers?

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ How, then, might we contrive one of those opportune falsehoods of which we were just now speaking, so as by one noble lie to persuade if possible the rulers themselves, but failing that the rest of the city?

Glaucon/ What kind of a fiction do you mean?

Socrates/ Nothing unprecedented, but a sort of Phoenician tale, something that has happened ere now in many parts of the world, as the poets aver and have induced men to believe, but that has not happened and perhaps would not be likely to happen in our day and demanding no little persuasion to make it believable.

Glaucon/ You act like one who shrinks from telling his thought.

Socrates/ You will think that I have right good reason for shrinking when I have told.

Glaucon/ Say on, and don't be afraid.

Socrates/ Very well, I will. And yet I hardly know how to find the audacity or the words to speak and undertake to persuade first the rulers themselves and the soldiers and then the rest of the city that in good sooth all our training and educating of them were things that they imagined and that happened to them as it were in a dream, but that in reality at that time they were down within the earth being molded and fostered themselves while their weapons and the rest of their equipment were being fashioned. And when they were quite finished the earth as being their mother delivered them, and now as if their land were their mother and their nurse they ought to take thought for her and defend her against any attack and regard the other citizens as their brothers and children of the selfsame earth.

Glaucon/ It is not for nothing, that you were so bashful about coming out with your lie.

Socrates/ It was quite natural that I should be, but all the same hear the rest of the story. While all of you in the city are brothers, we will say in our tale, yet God in fashioning those of you who are fitted to hold rule mingled gold in their generation, for which reason they are the most precious—but in the helpers silver, and iron and brass in the farmers and other craftsmen. And as you are all akin, though for the most part you will breed after your kinds, it may sometimes happen that a golden father would beget a silver son and that a golden offspring would come from a silver sire and that the rest would in like manner be born of one another. So that the first and chief injunction that the god lays upon the rulers is that of nothing else are they to be such careful guardians and so intently observant as of the intermixture of these metals in the souls of their offspring, and if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass or iron they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them out among the artisans or the farmers. And again, if from these there are born sons with unexpected gold or silver in their composition they shall honor such and bid them go up higher, some to the office of guardian, some to the assistantship, alleging that there is an oracle that the state shall then be overthrown when the man of iron or brass is its guardian. Do you see any way of getting them to believe this tale?

Glaucon/ No, not these themselves, but I do their sons and successors and the rest of mankind who come after.

Socrates/ Well, even that would have a good effect in making them more inclined to care for the state and one another. For I think I apprehend your meaning. And this shall fall out as tradition guides. But let us arm these sons

of earth and conduct them under the leadership of their rulers. And when they have arrived they must look out for the fairest site in the city for their encampment, a position from which they could best hold down rebellion against the laws from within and repel aggression from without as of a wolf against the fold. And after they have encamped and sacrificed to the proper gods they must make their lairs, must they not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And these must be of a character to keep out the cold in winter and be sufficient in summer?

Glaucon/ Of course. For I presume you are speaking of their houses.

Socrates/ Yes, the houses of soldiers, not of money-makers.

Glaucon/ What distinction do you intend by that?

Socrates/ I will try to tell you. It is surely the most monstrous and shameful thing in the world for shepherds to breed the dogs who are to help them with their flocks in such wise and of such a nature that from indiscipline or hunger or some other evil condition the dogs themselves shall attack the sheep and injure them and be likened to wolves instead of dogs.

Glaucon/ A terrible thing, indeed.

Socrates/ Must we not then guard by every means in our power against our helpers' treating the citizens in any such way and, because they are the stronger, converting themselves from benign assistants into savage masters?

Glaucon/ We must.

Socrates/ And would they not have been provided with the chief safeguard if their education has really been a good one?

Glaucon/ But it surely has.

Socrates/ That, dear Glaucon, we may not properly affirm, but what we were just now saying we may, that they must have the right education, whatever it is, if they are to have what will do most to make them gentle to one another and to their charges.

Glaucon/ That is right.

Socrates/ In addition, moreover, to such an education a thoughtful man would affirm that their houses and the possessions provided for them ought to be such as not to interfere with the best performance of their own work as guardians and not to incite them to wrong the other citizens.

Glaucon/ He will rightly affirm that.

Socrates/ Consider then, whether, if that is to be their character. their habitations and ways of life must not be something after this fashion. In the first place, none must possess any private property save the indispensable. Secondly, none must have any habitation or treasure house which is not open for all to enter at will. Their food, in such quantities as are needful for athletes of war sober and brave, they must receive as an agreed stipend from the other citizens as the wages of their guardianship, so measured that there shall be neither superfluity at the end of the year nor any lack. And resorting to a common mess like soldiers on campaign they will live together. Gold and silver, we will tell them, they have of the divine quality from the gods always in their souls, and they have no need of the metal of men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and contaminate that heavenly possession with the acquisition of mortal gold, since many impious deeds have been done about the coin of the multitude, while that which dwells within them is unsullied. But for these only of all the dwellers in the city it is not lawful to handle gold and silver

and to touch them nor yet to come under the same roof with them, nor to hang them as ornaments on their limbs nor to drink from silver and gold. So living they would save themselves and save their city. But whenever they shall acquire for themselves land of their own and houses and coin, they will be householders and farmers instead of guardians, and will be transformed from the helpers of their fellow citizens to their enemies and masters, and so in hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass their days fearing far more and rather the townsmen within than the foemen without—and then even then laying the course of near shipwreck for themselves and the state. For all these reasons, let us declare that such must be the provision for our guardians in lodging and other respects and so legislate. Shall we not?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Book 4.

Socrates/ And Adimantus broke in and said;

Adeimantus/ What will be your defense, Socrates, if anyone objects that you are not making these men very happy, and that through their own fault? For the city really belongs to them and yet they get no enjoyment out of it as ordinary men do by owning lands and building fine big houses and providing them with suitable furniture and winning the favor of the gods by private sacrifices and entertaining guests and enjoying too those possessions which you just now spoke of, gold and silver and all that is customary for those who are expecting to be happy. But they seem, one might say, to be established in idleness in the city, exactly like hired mercenaries, with nothing to do but keep guard.

Socrates/ Yes, and what is more, they serve for board wages and do not even receive pay in addition to their food as others do, so that they will not even be able to take a journey on their own account, if they wish to, or make presents to their mistresses, or spend money in other directions according to their desires like the men who are thought to be happy. These and many similar counts of the indictment you are omitting.

Adeimantus/ Well, assume these counts too.

Socrates/ What then will be our apology you ask?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ By following the same path I think we shall find what to reply. For we shall say that while it would not surprise us if these men thus living prove to be the most happy, yet the object on which we fixed our eyes in the establishment of our state was not the exceptional happiness of anyone class but the greatest possible happiness of the city as a whole. For we thought that in a

state so constituted we should be most likely to discover justice as we should injustice in the worst-governed state, and that when we had made these out we could pass judgment on the issue of our long inquiry. Our first task then, we take it, is to mold the model of a happy state—we are not isolating a small class in it and postulating their happiness, but that of the city as a whole. But the opposite type of state we will consider presently. It is as if we were coloring a statue and someone approached and censured us, saying that we did not apply the most beautiful pigments to the most beautiful parts of the image, since the eyes, which are the most beautiful part, have not been painted with purple but with black. We should think it a reasonable justification to reply, Don't expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so fine that they will not be like eyes at all, nor the other parts, but observe whether by assigning what is proper to each we render the whole beautiful. And so in the present case you must not require us to attach to the guardians a happiness that will make them anything but guardians. For in like manner we could clothe the farmers in robes of state and deck them with gold and bid them cultivate the soil at their pleasure, and we could make the potters recline on couches from left to right before the fire drinking toasts and feasting with their wheel alongside to potter with when they are so disposed, and we can make all the others happy in the same fashion, so that thus the entire city may be happy. But urge us not to this, since, if we yield, the farmer will not be a farmer nor the potter a potter, nor will any other of the types that constitute a state keep its form. However, for the others it matters less. For cobblers who deteriorate and are spoiled and pretend to be the workmen that they are not are no great danger to a state. But guardians of laws and of the city who are not what they pretend to be, but only seem, destroy utterly, I would have you note, the entire state, and

on the other hand, they alone are decisive of its good government and happiness. If then we are forming true guardians and keepers of our liberties, men least likely to harm the commonwealth, but the proponent of the other ideal is thinking of farmers and 'happy' feasters as it were in a festival and not in a civic community, he would have something else in mind than a state. Consider, then, whether our aim in establishing the guardians is the greatest possible happiness among them or whether that is something we must look to see develop in the city as a whole, but these helpers and guardians are to be constrained and persuaded to do what will make them the best craftsmen in their own work, and similarly all the rest. And so, as the entire city develops and is ordered well, each class is to be left to the share of happiness that its nature comports.

Adeimantus/ Well, I think you are right.

Socrates/ And will you then, also think me reasonable in another point akin to this?

Adeimantus/ What pray?

Socrates/ Consider whether these are the causes that corrupt other craftsmen too so as positively to spoil them.

Adeimantus/ What causes?

Socrates/ Wealth and poverty.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ Thus! Do you think a potter who grew rich would any longer be willing to give his mind to his craft?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ But will he become more idle and negligent than he was?

Adeimantus/ Far more.

Socrates/ Then he becomes a worse potter?

Adeimantus/ Far worse too.

Socrates/ And yet again, if from poverty he is unable to provide himself with tools and other requirements of his art, the work that he turns out will be worse, and he will also make inferior workmen of his sons or any others whom he teaches.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ From both causes, then, poverty and wealth, the products of the arts deteriorate, and so do the artisans?

Adeimantus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Here, then, is a second group of things, it seems, that our guardians must guard against and do all in their power to keep from slipping into the city without their knowledge.

Adeimantus/ What are they?

Socrates/ Wealth and poverty, since the one brings luxury, idleness, and innovation, and the other illiberality and the evil of bad workmanship in addition to innovation.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly, Yet here is a point for your consideration, Socrates—how our city, possessing no wealth, will be able to wage war, especially if compelled to fight a large and wealthy state.

Socrates/ Obviously, it would be rather difficult to fight one such, but easier to fight two.

Adeimantus/ What did you mean by that?

Socrates/ Tell me first, whether, if they have to fight, they will not be fighting as athletes of war against men of wealth?

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is true.

Socrates/ Answer me then, Adimantus. Do you not think that one boxer perfectly trained in the art could easily fight two fat rich men who knew nothing of it?

Adeimantus/ Not at the same time perhaps.

Socrates/ Not even, if he were allowed to retreat and then turn and strike the one who came up first, and if he repeated the procedure many times under a burning and stifling sun? Would not such a fighter down even a number of such opponents?

Adeimantus/ Doubtless, it wouldn't be surprising if he did.

Socrates/ Well, don't you think that the rich have more of the skill and practice of boxing than of the art of war?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ It will be easy, then, for our athletes in all probability to fight with double and triple their number.

Adeimantus/ I shall have to concede the point, for I believe you are right.

Socrates/ Well then, if they send an embassy to the other city and say what is in fact true, 'We make no use of gold and silver nor is it lawful for us, but it is for you; do then join us in the war and keep the spoils of the enemy'—do you suppose any who heard such a proposal would choose to fight against hard and wiry hounds rather than with the aid of the hounds against fat and tender sheep?

Adeimantus/ I think not. Yet consider whether the accumulation of all the wealth of other cities in one does not involve danger for the state that has no wealth.

Socrates/ What happy innocence, to suppose that you can properly use the name city of any other than the one we are constructing.

Adeimantus/ Why, what should we say?

Socrates/ A greater predication, must be applied to the others. For they are each one of them many cities, not a city, as it goes in the game. There are two at the least at enmity with one another, the city of the rich and the city of the poor,

and in each of these there are many. If you deal with them as one you will altogether miss the mark, but if you treat them as a multiplicity by offering to the one faction the property, the power, the very persons of the other, you will continue always to have few enemies and many allies. And so long as your city is governed soberly in the order just laid down, it will be the greatest of cities. I do not mean greatest in repute, but in reality, even though it have only a thousand defenders. For a city of this size that is really one you will not easily discover either among Greeks or barbarians—but of those that seem so you will find many and many times the size of this. Or do you think otherwise?

Adeimantus/ No, indeed I don't.

Socrates/ Would not this, then, be the best rule and measure for our governors of the proper size of the city and of the territory that they should mark off for a city of that size and seek no more?

Adeimantus/ What is the measure?

Socrates/ I think, that they should let it grow so long as in its growth it consents to remain a unity, but no further.

Adeimantus/ Excellent.

Socrates/ Then is not this still another injunction that we should lay upon our guardians, to keep guard in every way that the city shall not be too small, nor great only in seeming, but that it shall be a sufficient city and one?

Adeimantus/ That behest will perhaps be an easy one for them.

Socrates/ And still easier, haply, is this that we mentioned before when we said that if a degenerate offspring was born to the guardians he must be sent away to the other classes, and likewise if a superior to the others he must be enrolled among the guardians, and the purport of all this was that the other citizens too must be sent to the task for

which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity.

Adeimantus/ Why yes, this is even more trifling than that.

Socrates/ These are not, my good Adimantus, as one might suppose, numerous and difficult injunctions that we are imposing upon them, but they are all easy, provided they guard, as the saying is, the one great thing—or instead of great let us call it sufficient.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Their education and nurture. For if a right education makes of them reasonable men they will easily discover everything of this kind—and other principles that we now pass over, as that the possession of wives and marriage, and the procreation of children and all that sort of thing should be made as far as possible the proverbial goods of friends that are common.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that would be the best way.

Socrates/ And, moreover, the state, if it once starts well, proceeds as it were in a cycle of growth. I mean that a sound nurture and education if kept up create good natures in the state, and sound natures in turn receiving an education of this sort develop into better men than their predecessors both for other purposes and for the production of offspring, as among animals also.

Adeimantus/ It is probable.

Socrates/ To put it briefly, then, it is to this that the overseers of our state must cleave and be watchful against its insensible corruption. They must throughout be watchful against innovations in music and gymnastics counter to the established order, and to the best of their power guard against them, fearing when anyone says that that song is

most regarded among men 'which hovers newest on the singer's lips,' lest haply it be supposed that the poet means not new songs but a new way of song and is commending this. But we must not praise that sort of thing nor conceive it to be the poet's meaning. For a change to a new type of music is something to beware of as a hazard of all our fortunes. For the modes of music are never disturbed without unsettling of the most fundamental political and social conventions, as Damon affirms and as I am convinced.

Adeimantus/ Set me too down in the number of the convinced.

Socrates/ It is here, then, in music, as it seems, that our guardians must build their guardhouse and post of watch.

Adeimantus/ It is certain, that this is the kind of lawlessness that easily insinuates itself unobserved.

Socrates/ Yes, because it is supposed to be only a form of play and to work no harm.

Adeimantus/ Nor does it work any, except that by gradual infiltration it softly overflows upon the characters and pursuits of men and from these issues forth grown greater to attack their business dealings, and from these relations it proceeds against the laws and the constitution with wanton license, Socrates, till finally it overthrows all things public and private.

Socrates/ Well, are these things so?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then, as we were saying in the beginning, our youth must join in a more law-abiding play, since, if play grows lawless and the children likewise, it is impossible that they should grow up to be men of serious temper and lawful spirit.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And so we may reason that when children in their earliest play are imbued with the spirit of law and order through their music, the opposite of the former supposition happens—this spirit waits upon them in all things and fosters their growth, and restores and sets up again whatever was overthrown in the other type of state.

Adeimantus/ True indeed.

Socrates/ Then such men rediscover for themselves those seemingly trifling conventions which their predecessors abolished altogether.

Adeimantus/ Of what sort?

Socrates/ Such things as the becoming silence of the young in the presence of their elders, the giving place to them and rising up before them, and dutiful service of parents, and the cut of the hair and the garments and the fashion of the footgear, and in general the deportment of the body and everything of the kind. Don't you think so?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Yet to enact them into laws would, I think, be silly. For such laws are not obeyed nor would they last, being enacted only in words and on paper.

Adeimantus/ How could they?

Socrates/ At any rate, Adimantus, the direction of the education from whence one starts is likely to determine the quality of what follows. Does not like ever summon like?

Adeimantus/ Surely.

Socrates/ And the final outcome, I presume, we would say is one complete and vigorous product of good or the reverse.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ For my part, then, for these reasons I would not go on to try to legislate on such matters.

Adeimantus/ With good reason.

Socrates/ But what, in heaven's name, about business matters, the deals that men make with one another in the agora—and, if you please, contracts with workmen and actions for foul language and assault, the filing of declarations, the impaneling of juries, the payment and exaction of any dues that may be needful in markets or harbors and in general market, police, or harbor regulations and the like—can we bring ourselves to legislate about these?

Adeimantus/ Nay, 'twould not be fitting, to dictate to good and honorable men. For most of the enactments that are needed about these things they will easily, I presume, discover.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, provided God grants them the preservation of the principles of law that we have already discussed.

Adeimantus/ Failing that, they will pass their lives multiplying such petty laws and amending them in the expectation of attaining what is best.

Socrates/ You mean, that the life of such citizens will resemble that of men who are sick, yet from intemperance are unwilling to abandon their unwholesome regimen.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And truly, these latter go on in a most charming fashion. For with all their doctoring they accomplish nothing except to complicate and augment their maladies. And they are always hoping that someone will recommend a panacea that will restore their health.

Adeimantus/ A perfect description, of the state of such invalids.

Socrates/ And isn't this a charming trait in them, that they hate most in all the world him who tells them the truth, that until a man stops drinking and gorging and wenching

and idling, neither drugs nor cautery nor the knife, no, nor spells nor periapts nor anything of that kind will be of any avail?

Adeimantus/ Not altogether charming, for there is no grace or charm in being angry with him who speaks well.

Socrates/ You do not seem to be an admirer of such people.

Adeimantus/ No, by heaven, I am not.

Socrates/ Neither then, if an entire city, as we were just now saying, acts in this way, will it have your approval, or don't you think that the way of such invalids is precisely that of those cities which being badly governed forewarn their citizens not to meddle with the general constitution of the state, denouncing death to whosoever attempts that—while whoever most agreeably serves them governed as they are and who curries favor with them by fawning upon them and anticipating their desires and by his cleverness in gratifying them, him they will account the good man, the man wise in worthwhile things, the man they will delight to honor?

Adeimantus/ Yes, I think their conduct is identical, and I don't approve it in the very least.

Socrates/ And what again of those who are willing and eager to serve such states? Don't you admire their valiance and lighthearted irresponsibility?

Adeimantus/ I do, except those who are actually deluded and suppose themselves to be in truth statesmen because they are praised by the many.

Socrates/ What do you mean? Can't you make allowances for the men? Do you think it possible for a man who does not know how to measure when a multitude of others equally ignorant assure him that he is four cubits tall not to suppose this to be the fact about himself?

Adeimantus/ Why no, I don't think that.

Socrates/ Then don't be harsh with them. For surely such fellows are the most charming spectacle in the world when they enact and amend such laws as we just now described and are perpetually expecting to find a way of putting an end to frauds in business and in the other matters of which I was speaking because they can't see that they are in very truth trying to cut off a Hydra's head.

Adeimantus/ Indeed, that is exactly what they are doing.

I, then, should not have supposed that the true lawgiver ought to work out matters of that kind in the laws and the constitution of either an ill-governed or a well-governed state—in the one because they are useless and accomplish nothing, in the other because some of them anybody could discover and others will result spontaneously from the pursuits already described.

Adeimantus/ What part of legislation, then, is still left for us?

Socrates/ For us nothing, but for the Apollo of Delphi, the chief, the fairest, and the first of enactments.

Adeimantus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The founding of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods, daemons, and heroes, and likewise the burial of the dead and the services we must render to the dwellers in the world beyond to keep them gracious. For of such matters we neither know anything nor in the founding of our city if we are wise shall we entrust them to any other or make use of any other interpreter than the god of our fathers. For this god surely is in such matters for all mankind the interpreter of the religion of their fathers who from his seat in the middle and at the very navel of the earth delivers his interpretation.

Adeimantus/ Excellently said, and that is what we must do.

Socrates/ At last, then, son of Ariston, your city may be considered as established. The next thing is to procure a sufficient light somewhere and to look yourself, and call in the aid of your brother and of Polemarchus and the rest, if we may in any wise discover where justice and injustice should be in it, wherein they differ from one another, and which of the two he must have who is to be happy, alike whether his condition is known or not known to all gods and men.

Glaucon/ Nonsense, you promised that you would carry on the search yourself, admitting that it would be impious for you not to come to the aid of justice by every means in your power.

Socrates/ A true reminder, and I must do so, but you also must lend a hand.

Glaucon/ Well, we will.

Socrates/ I expect then, that we shall find it in this way. I think our city, if it has been rightly founded, is good in the full sense of the word.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Clearly, then, it will be wise, brave, sober, and just.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then if we find any of these qualities in it, the remainder will be that which we have not found?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ Take the case of any four other things. If we were looking for anyone of them in anything and recognized the object of our search first, that would have been enough for us, but if we had recognized the other three first, that in itself would have made known to us the thing we were

seeking. For plainly there was nothing left for it to be but the remainder.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And so, since these are four, we must conduct the search in the same way.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And, moreover, the first thing that I think I clearly see therein is the wisdom, and there is something odd about that, it appears.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Wise in very deed I think the city that we have described is, for it is well counseled, is it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And surely this very thing, good counsel, is a form of wisdom. For it is not by ignorance but by knowledge that men counsel well.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ But there are many and manifold knowledges or sciences in the city.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Is it then owing to the science of her carpenters that a city is to be called wise and well advised?

Glaucon/ By no means for that, but rather mistress of the arts of building.

Socrates/ Then a city is not to be styled wise because of the deliberations of the science of wooden utensils for their best production?

Glaucon/ No, I grant you.

Socrates/ Is it, then, because of that of brass implements or any other of that kind?

Glaucon/ None whatsoever.

Socrates/ Nor yet because of the science of the production of crops from the soil, but the name it takes from that is agricultural.

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then, is there any science in the city just founded by us residing in any of its citizens which does not take counsel about some particular thing in the city but about the city as a whole and the betterment of its relations with itself and other states?

Glaucon/ Why, yes, there is.

Socrates/ What is it, and in whom is it found?

Glaucon/ It is the science of guardianship or government and it is to be found in those rulers to whom we just now gave the name of guardians in the full sense of the word.

Socrates/ And what term then do you apply to the city because of this knowledge?

Glaucon/ Well-advised, and truly wise.

Socrates/ Which class, then, do you suppose will be the more numerous in our city, the smiths or these true guardians?

Glaucon/ The smiths, by far.

Socrates/ And would not these rulers be the smallest of all the groups of those who possess special knowledge and receive distinctive appellations?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ Then it is by virtue of its smallest class and minutest part of itself, and the wisdom that resides therein, in the part which takes the lead and rules, that a city established on principles of nature would be wise as a whole. And as it appears these are by nature the fewest, the class to which it pertains to partake of the knowledge which alone of all forms of knowledge deserves the name of wisdom.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ This one of our four, then, we have, I know not how, discovered, the thing itself and its place in the state.

Glaucon/ I certainly think, that it has been discovered sufficiently.

Socrates/ But again there is no difficulty in seeing bravery itself and the part of the city in which it resides for which the city is called brave.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Who, in calling a city cowardly or brave would fix his eyes on any other part of it than that which defends it and wages war in its behalf?

Glaucon/ No one at all.

Socrates/ For the reason, I take it, that the cowardice or the bravery of the other inhabitants does not determine for it the one quality or the other.

Glaucon/ It does not.

Socrates/ Bravery too, then, belongs to a city by virtue of a part of itself owing to its possession in that part of a quality that under all conditions will preserve the conviction that things to be feared are precisely those which and such as the lawgiver inculcated in their education. Is not that what you call bravery?

Glaucon/ I don't altogether understand what you said, but say it again.

Socrates/ A kind of conservation, is what I mean by bravery.

Glaucon/ What sort of a conservation?

Socrates/ The conservation of the conviction which the law has created by education about fearful things—what and what sort of things are to be feared. And by the phrase 'under all conditions' I mean that the brave man preserves it both

in pain and pleasures and in desires and fears and does not expel it from his soul. And I may illustrate it by a similitude if you please.

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ You are aware that dyers when they wish to dye wool so as to hold the purple hue begin by selecting from the many colors there be the one nature of the white and then give it a careful preparatory treatment so that it will take the hue in the best way, and after the treatment, then and then only, dip it in the dye. And things that are dyed by this process become fast-colored and washing either with or without lyes cannot take away the sheen of their hues. But otherwise you know what happens to them, whether anyone dips other colors or even these without the preparatory treatment.

Glaucon/ I know, that they present a ridiculous and washed-out appearance.

Socrates/ By this analogy, then, you must conceive what we too to the best of our ability were doing when we selected our soldiers and educated them in music and exercises of the body. The sole aim of our contrivance was that they should be convinced and receive our laws like a dye as it were, so that their belief and faith might be fast-colored about both the things that are to be feared and all other things because of the fitness of their nature and nurture, and that so their dyes might not be washed out by those lyes that have such dread power to scour our faiths away, pleasure more potent than any detergent or abstergent to accomplish this, and pain and fear, and desire more sure than any lye. This power in the soul, then, this unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief about things to be and not to be feared is what I call and would assume to be courage, unless you have something different to say.

Glaucon/ No, nothing, for I presume that you consider mere right opinion about the same matters not produced by education, that which may manifest itself in a beast or a slave, to have little or nothing to do with law and that you would call it by another name than courage.

Socrates/ That is most true.

Glaucon/ Well then, I accept this as bravery.

Socrates/ Do so, and you will be right, with the reservation that it is the courage of a citizen. Some other time, if it please you, we will discuss it more fully. At present we were not seeking this but justice, and for the purpose of that inquiry I believe we have done enough.

Glaucon/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ Two things still remain, to make out in our city, soberness and the object of the whole inquiry, justice.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ If there were only some way to discover justice so that we need not further concern ourselves about soberness.

Glaucon/ Well, I, for my part, neither know of any such way nor would I wish justice to be discovered first if that means that we are not to go on to the consideration of soberness. But if you desire to please me, consider this before that.

Socrates/ It would certainly be very wrong of me not to desire it.

Glaucon/ Go on with the inquiry then.

Socrates/ I must go on, and viewed from here it bears more likeness to a kind of concord and harmony than the other virtues did.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Soberness is a kind of beautiful order and a continence of certain pleasures and appetites, as they say, using the phrase 'master of himself' I know not how, and there are other similar expressions that as it were point us to the same trail. Is that not so?

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Now the phrase 'master of himself' is an absurdity, is it not? For he who is master of himself would also be subject to himself, and he who is subject to himself would be master. For the same person is spoken of in all these expressions.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But, the intended meaning of this way of speaking appears to me to be that the soul of a man within him has a better part and a worse part, and the expression self-mastery means the control of the worse by the naturally better part. It is, at any rate, a term of praise. But when, because of bad breeding or some association, the better part, which is the smaller, is dominated by the multitude of the worse, I think that our speech censures this as a reproach, and calls the man in this plight unself-controlled and licentious.

Glaucon/ That seems likely.

Socrates/ Turn your eyes now upon our new city, and you will find one of these conditions existent in it. For you will say that it is justly spoken of as master of itself if that in which the superior rules the inferior is to be called sober and self-mastered.

Glaucon/ I do turn my eyes upon it, and it is as you say.

Socrates/ And again, the mob of motley appetites and pleasures and pains one would find chiefly in children and women and slaves and in the base rabble of those who are free men in name.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But the simple and moderate appetites which with the aid of reason and right opinion are guided by consideration you will find in few and those the best born and best educated.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And do you not find this too in your city and a domination there of the desires in the multitude and the rabble by the desires and the wisdom that dwell in the minority of the better sort?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ If, then, there is any city that deserves to be described as master of its pleasures and desires and self-mastered, this one merits that designation.

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ And is it not also to be called sober in all these respects?

Glaucon/ Indeed it is.

Socrates/ And yet again, if there is any city in which the rulers and the ruled are of one mind as to who ought to rule, that condition will be found in this. Don't you think so?

Glaucon/ I most emphatically do.

Socrates/ In which class of the citizens, then, will you say that the virtue of soberness has its seat when this is their condition? In the rulers or in the ruled?

Glaucon/ In both, I suppose.

Socrates/ Do you see then, that our intuition was not a bad one just now that discerned a likeness between soberness and a kind of harmony?

Glaucon/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, which residing in separate parts respectively

made the city, the one wise and the other brave. That is not the way of soberness, but it extends literally through the entire gamut throughout, bringing about the unison in the same chant of the strongest, the weakest, and the intermediate, whether in wisdom or, if you please, in strength, or for that matter in numbers, wealth, or any similar criterion. So that we should be quite right in affirming this unanimity to be soberness, the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule in both the state and the individual.

Glaucon/ I entirely concur.

Socrates/ Very well, we have made out these three forms in our city to the best of our present judgment. What can be the remaining form that would give the city still another virtue? For it is obvious that the remainder is justice.

Glaucon/ Obvious.

Socrates/ Now then, Glaucon, is the time for us like huntsmen to surround the covert and keep close watch that justice may not slip through and get away from us and vanish from our sight. It plainly must be somewhere hereabout. Keep your eyes open then and do your best to descry it. You may see it before I do and point it out to me.

Glaucon/ Would that I could, but I think rather that if you find in me one who can follow you and discern what you point out to him you will be making a very fair use of me.

Socrates/ Pray for success then, and follow along with me.

Glaucon/ That I will do, only lead on.

Socrates/ And truly, it appears to be an inaccessible place, lying in deep shadows.

Glaucon/ It certainly is a dark covert, not easy to beat up.

Socrates/ But all the same, on we must go.

Glaucon/ Yes, on.

Socrates/ And I caught view and gave a halloo and said, Glaucon, I think we have found its trail and I don't believe it will get away from us.

Glaucon/ I am glad to hear that.

Socrates/ Truly, we were slackers indeed.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, all the time, bless your heart, the thing apparently was tumbling about our feet from the start and yet we couldn't see it, but were most ludicrous, like people who sometimes hunt for what they hold in their hands. So we did not turn our eyes upon it, but looked off into the distance, which was perhaps the reason it escaped us.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ This, that it seems to me that though we were speaking of it and hearing about it all the time we did not understand ourselves or realize that we were speaking of it in a sense.

Glaucon/ That is a tedious prologue, for an eager listener.

Socrates/ Listen then, and learn if there is anything in what I say. For what we laid down in the beginning as a universal requirement when we were founding our city, this I think, or some form of this, is justice. And what we did lay down, and often said, if you recall, was that each one man must perform one social service in the state for which his nature was best adapted.

Glaucon/ Yes, we said that.

Socrates/ And again, that to do one's own business and not to be a busybody is justice is a saying that we have heard from many and have very often repeated ourselves.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ This, then, my friend, if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice, this principle of doing one's own business. Do you know whence I infer this?

Glaucon/ No, but tell me.

Socrates/ I think that this is the remaining virtue in the state after our consideration of soberness, courage, and intelligence, a quality which made it possible for them all to grow up in the body politic and which when they have sprung up preserves them as long as it is present. And I hardly need to remind you that we said that justice would be the residue after we had found the other three.

Glaucon/ That is an unavoidable conclusion.

Socrates/ But moreover, if we were required to decide what it is whose indwelling presence will contribute most to making our city good, it would be a difficult decision whether it was the unanimity of rulers and ruled or the conservation in the minds of the soldiers of the convictions produced by law as to what things are or are not to be feared, or the watchful intelligence that resides in the guardians, or whether this is the chief cause of its goodness, the principle embodied in child, woman, slave, free, artisan, ruler, and ruled, that each performed his one task as one man and was not a versatile busybody.

Glaucon/ Hard to decide indeed.

Socrates/ A thing, then, that in its contribution to the excellence of a state vies with and rivals its wisdom, its soberness, its bravery, is this principle of everyone in it doing his own task.

Glaucon/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ And is not justice the name you would have to give to the principle that rivals these as conducting to the virtue of a state?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Consider it in this wise too, if so you will be convinced. Will you not assign the conduct of lawsuits in your state to the rulers?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Will not this be the chief aim of their decisions, that no one shall have what belongs to others or be deprived of his own?

Glaucon/ Nothing else but this.

Socrates/ On the assumption that this is just?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ From this point of view too, then, the having and doing of one's own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice.

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ Consider now whether you agree with me. A carpenter undertaking to do the work of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter or their interchange of one another's tools or honors or even the attempt of the same man to do both—the confounding of all other functions would not, think you, greatly injure a state, would it?

Glaucon/ Not much.

Socrates/ But when, I fancy, one who is by nature an artisan or some kind of money-maker tempted and incited by wealth or command of votes or bodily strength or some similar advantage tries to enter into the class of the soldiers or one of the soldiers into the class of counselors and guardians, for which he is not fitted, and these interchange their tools and their honors or when the same man undertakes all these functions at once, then, I take it, you too believe that this kind of substitution and meddlesomeness is the ruin of a state.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ The interference with one another's business, then, of three existent classes, and the substitution of the one for the other, is the greatest injury to a state and would most rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly works it harm.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ And the thing that works the greatest harm to one's own state, will you not pronounce to be injustice?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ This, then, is injustice. Again, let us put it in this way. The proper functioning of the money-makers, the helpers, and the guardians, each doing his own work in the state, being the reverse of that just described, would be justice and would render the city just.

Glaucon/ I think the case is thus and no otherwise.

Socrates/ Let us not yet affirm it quite fixedly, but if this form, when applied to the individual man, is accepted there also as a definition of justice, we will then concede the point—for what else will there be to say? But if not, then we will look for something else. But now let us work out the inquiry in which we supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there, we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man. And we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best city in our power, well knowing that in the good city it would of course be found. What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual arid, if it is confirmed, all will be well. But if something different manifests itself in the individual, we will return again to the state and test it there and it may be that, by examining them side by side and rubbing them against one another, as it were from the fire sticks we may cause the

spark of justice to flash forth, and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds.

Glaucon/ Well, that seems a sound method and that is what we must do.

Socrates/ Then, if you call a thing by the same name whether it is big or little, is it unlike in the way in which it is called the same or like?

Glaucon/ Like.

Socrates/ Then a just man too will not differ at all from a just city in respect of the very form of justice, but will be like it.

Glaucon/ Yes, like.

Socrates/ But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain other affections and habits of these three kinds.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, we shall thus expect the individual also to have these same forms in his soul, and by reason of identical affections of these with those in the city to receive properly the same appellations.

Glaucon/ Inevitable.

Socrates/ Goodness gracious, here is another trifling inquiry into which we have plunged, the question whether the soul really contains these three forms in itself or not.

Glaucon/ It does not seem to me at all trifling, for perhaps, Socrates, the saying is true that 'fine things are difficult.'

Socrates/ Apparently, and let me tell you, Glaucon, that in my opinion we shall never apprehend this matter accurately from such methods as we are now employing in

discussion. For there is another longer and harder way that conducts to this. Yet we may perhaps discuss it on the level of our previous statements and inquiries.

Glaucon/ May we not acquiesce in that? I for my part should be quite satisfied with that for the present.

Socrates/ And I surely should be more than satisfied.

Glaucon/ Don't you weary then, but go on with the inquiry.

Socrates/ Is it not, then, impossible for us to avoid admitting this much, that the same forms and qualities are to be found in each one of us that are in the state? They could not get there from any other source. It would be absurd to suppose that the element of high spirit was not derived in states from the private citizens who are reputed to have this quality, as the populations of the Thracian and Scythian lands and generally of northern regions, or the quality of love of knowledge, which would chiefly be attributed to the region where we dwell, or the love of money which we might say is not least likely to be found in Phoenicians and the population of Egypt.

Glaucon/ One certainly might.

Socrates/ This is the fact then, and there is no difficulty in recognizing it.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But the matter begins to be difficult when you ask whether we do all these things with the same thing or whether there are three things and we do one thing with one and one with another—learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of nutrition and generation and their kind, or whether it is with the entire soul that we function in each case when we once begin. That is what is really hard to determine properly.

Glaucon/ I think so too.

Socrates/ Let us then attempt to define the boundary and decide whether they are identical with one another in this way.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time. So that if ever we find these contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it was not the same thing functioning but a plurality.

Glaucon/ Very well.

Socrates/ Consider, then, what I am saying.

Glaucon/ Say on.

Socrates/ Is it possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect to be at rest and in motion?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Let us have our understanding still more precise, lest as we proceed we become involved in dispute. If anyone should say of a man standing still but moving his hands and head that the same man is at the same time at rest and in motion we should not, I take it, regard that as the right way of expressing it, but rather that a part of him is at rest and a part in motion. Is not that so?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Then if the disputant should carry the jest still further with the subtlety that tops at any rate stand still as a whole at the same time that they are in motion when with the peg fixed in one point they revolve, and that the same is true of any other case of circular motion about the same spot—we should reject the statement on the ground that the repose and the movement in such cases were not in relation to the same parts of the objects. But we would say that there

was a straight line and a circumference in them and that in respect of the straight line they are standing still since they do not incline to either side, but in respect of the circumference they move in a circle, but that when as they revolve they incline the perpendicular to right or left or forward or back, then they are in no wise at rest.

Glaucon/ And that would be right.

Socrates/ No such remarks then will disconcert us or any whit the more make us believe that it is ever possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect and the same relation to suffer, be, or do opposites.

Glaucon/ They will not me, I am sure.

Socrates/ All the same, that we may not be forced to examine at tedious length the entire list of such contentions and convince ourselves that they are false, let us proceed on the hypothesis that this is so, with the understanding that, if it ever appear otherwise, everything that results from the assumption shall be invalidated.

Glaucon/ That is what we must do.

Socrates/ Will you not then, set down as opposed to one another assent and dissent, and the endeavor after a thing to the rejection of it, and embracing to repelling—do not these and all things like these belong to the class of opposite actions or passions, it will make no difference which?

Glaucon/ None, but they are opposites.

Socrates/ What then, of thirst and hunger and the appetites generally, and again consenting and willing—would you not put them all somewhere in the classes just described? Will you not say, for example, that the soul of one who desires either strives for that which he desires or draws toward its embrace what it wishes to accrue to it, or again, in so far as it wills that anything be presented to it, nods

assent to itself thereon as if someone put the question, striving toward its attainment?

Glaucon/ I would say so.

Socrates/ But what of not-willing and not-consenting nor yet desiring? Shall we not put these under the soul's rejection and repulsion from itself and generally into the opposite class from all the former?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ This being so, shall we say that the desires constitute a class and that the most conspicuous members of that class are what we call thirst and hunger?

Glaucon/ We shall.

Socrates/ Is not the one desire of drink, the other of food?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then in so far as it is thirst, would it be of anything more than that of which we say it is a desire in the soul? I mean is thirst, thirst for hot drink or cold or much or little or in a word for a draught of any particular quality, or is it the fact that if heat is attached to the thirst it would further render the desire—a desire of cold, and if cold of hot? But if owing to the presence of muchness the thirst is much it would render it a thirst for much and if little for little. But mere thirst will never be desire of anything else than that of which it is its nature to be, mere drink, and so hunger of food.

Glaucon/ That is so, Each desire in itself is of that thing only of which it is its nature to be. The epithets belong to the quality—such or such.

Socrates/ Let no one then, disconcert us when off our guard with the objection that everybody desires not drink but good drink and not food but good food, because, the argument will run, all men desire good, and so, if thirst is

desire, it would be of good drink or of good whatsoever it is, and so similarly of other desires.

Glaucon/ Why, there perhaps would seem to be something in that objection.

Socrates/ But I need hardly remind you, that of relative terms those that are somehow qualified are related to a qualified correlate, those that are severally just themselves to a correlate that is just itself.

Glaucon/ I don't understand.

Socrates/ Don't you understand, that the greater is such as to be greater than something?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not than the less?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the much greater than the much less. Is that not so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And may we add the onetime greater than the onetime less and that which will be greater than that which will be less?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ And similarly of the more toward the fewer, and the double toward the half and of all like cases, and again of the heavier toward the lighter, the swifter toward the slower, and yet again of the hot toward the cold and all cases of that kind—does not the same hold?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But what of the sciences? Is not the way of it the same? Science, which is just that, is of knowledge which is just that, or is of whatsoever we must assume the correlate of science to be. But a particular science of a particular kind is of some particular thing of a particular kind. I mean

something like this. As there was a science of making a house it differed from other sciences so as to be named architecture.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Was not this by reason of its being of a certain kind such as no other of all the rest?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And was it not because it was of something of a certain kind that it itself became a certain kind of science? And similarly of the other arts and sciences?

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ This then, if haply you now understand, is what you must say I then meant, by the statement that of all things that are such as to be of something, those that are just themselves only are of things just themselves only, but things of a certain kind are of things of a kind. And I don't at all mean that they are of the same kind as the things of which they are, so that we are to suppose that the science of health and disease is a healthy and diseased science and that of evil and good, evil and good. I only mean that as science became the science not of just the thing of which science is but of some particular kind of thing, namely, of health and disease, the result was that it itself became some kind of science and this caused it to be no longer called simply science but, with the addition of the particular kind, medical science.

Glaucon/ I understand, and agree that it is so.

Socrates/ To return to thirst, then, will you not class it with the things that are of something and say that it is what it is in relation to something—and it is, I presume, thirst?

Glaucon/ I will, namely of drink.

Socrates/ Then if the drink is of a certain kind, so is the thirst, but thirst that is just thirst is neither of much nor little nor good nor bad, nor in a word of any kind, but just thirst is naturally of just drink only.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ The soul of the thirsty then, in so far as it thirsts, wishes nothing else than to drink, and yearns for this and its impulse is toward this.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Then if anything draws it back when thirsty it must be something different in it from that which thirsts and drives it like a beast to drink. For it cannot be, we say, that the same thing with the same part of itself at the same time acts in opposite ways about the same thing.

Glaucon/ We must admit that it does not.

Socrates/ So I fancy it is not well said of the archer that his hands at the same time thrust away the bow and draw it nigh, but we should rather say that there is one hand that puts it away and another that draws it to.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Are we to say, then, that some men sometimes though thirsty refuse to drink?

Glaucon/ We are indeed, many and often.

Socrates/ What then, should one affirm about them? Is it not that there is a something in the soul that bids them drink and a something that forbids, a different something that masters that which bids?

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ And is it not the fact that that which inhibits such actions arises when it arises from the calculations of reason, but the impulses which draw and drag come through affections and diseases?

Glaucon/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Not unreasonably, shall we claim that they are two and different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby it reckons and reasons the rational, and that with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter and titillation of other desires, the irrational and appetitive—companion of various repletions and pleasures.

Glaucon/ It would not be unreasonable but quite natural, for us to think this.

Socrates/ These two forms, then, let us assume to have been marked off as actually existing in the soul. But now the thumos, or principle of high spirit, that with which we feel anger, is it a third, or would it be identical in nature with one of these?

Glaucon/ Perhaps, with one of these, the appetitive.

Socrates/ But, I once heard a story which I believe, that Leontius the son of Aglaion, on his way up from the Piraeus under the outer side of the northern wall, becoming aware of dead bodies that lay at the place of public execution at the same time felt a desire to see them and a repugnance and aversion, and that for a time he resisted and veiled his head, but overpowered in despite of all by his desire, with wide staring eyes he rushed up to the corpses and cried, There, ye wretches, take your fill of the fine spectacle!

Glaucon/ I too, have heard the story.

Socrates/ Yet, surely, this anecdote, signifies that the principle of anger sometimes fights against desires as an alien thing against an alien.

Glaucon/ Yes, it does.

Socrates/ And do we not, on many other occasions observe when his desires constrain a man contrary to his reason that he reviles himself and is angry with that within which masters him, and that as it were in a faction of two

parties the high spirit of such a man becomes the ally of his reason? But its making common cause with the desires against the reason when reason whispers low, Thou must not—that, I think, is a kind of thing you would not affirm ever to have perceived in yourself, nor, I fancy, in anybody else either.

Glaucon/ No, by heaven.

Socrates/ Again, when a man thinks himself to be in the wrong, is it not true that the nobler he is the less is he capable of anger though suffering hunger and cold and whatsoever else at the hands of him whom he believes to be acting justly therein, and as I say his spirit refuses to be aroused against such a one?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But what when a man believes himself to be wronged? Does not his spirit in that case seethe and grow fierce—and also because of his suffering hunger, cold, and the like—and make itself the ally of what he judges just? And in noble souls it endures and wins the victory and will not let go until either it achieves its purpose, or death ends all, or, as a dog is called back by a shepherd, it is called back by the reason within and calmed.

Glaucon/ Your similitude is perfect, and it confirms our former statements that the helpers are as it were dogs subject to the rulers who are as it were the shepherds of the city.

Socrates/ You apprehend my meaning excellently. But do you also take note of this?

Glaucon/ Of what?

Socrates/ That what we now think about the spirited element is just the opposite of our recent surmise. For then we supposed it to be a part of the appetitive, but now, far

from that, we say that, in the factions of the soul, it much rather marshals itself on the side of the reason.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Is it then distinct from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there are not three but two kinds in the soul, the rational and the appetitive? Or just as in the city there were three existing kinds that composed its structure, the money-makers, the helpers, the counselors, so also in the soul does there exist a third kind, this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture?

Glaucon/ We have to assume it as a third.

Socrates/ Yes, provided it shall have been shown to be something different from the rational, as it has been shown to be other than the appetitive.

Glaucon/ That is not hard to be shown, for that much one can see in children, that they are from their very birth chock-full of rage and high spirit, but as for reason, some of them, to my thinking, never participate in it, and the majority quite late.

Socrates/ Yes, by heaven, excellently said, and further, one could see in animals that what you say is true. And to these instances we may add the testimony of Homer quoted above, 'He smote his breast and chided thus his heart.' For there Homer has clearly represented that in us which has reflected about the better and the worse as rebuking that which feels unreasoning anger as if it were a distinct and different thing.

Glaucon/ You are entirely right.

Socrates/ Through these waters, then, we have with difficulty made our way and we are fairly agreed that the same kinds equal in number are to be found in the state and in the soul of each one of us.

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then does not the necessity of our former postulate immediately follow, that as and whereby the state was wise, so and thereby is the individual wise?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ And so whereby and as the individual is brave, thereby and so is the state brave, and that both should have all the other constituents of virtue in the same way?

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Just too, then, Glaucon, I presume we shall say a man is in the same way in which a city was just.

Glaucon/ That too is quite inevitable.

Socrates/ But we surely cannot have forgotten this, that the state was just by reason of each of the three classes found in it fulfilling its own function.

Glaucon/ I don't think we have forgotten.

Socrates/ We must remember, then, that each of us also in whom the several parts within him perform each their own task—he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair.

Glaucon/ We must indeed remember.

Socrates/ Does it not belong to the rational part to rule, being wise and exercising forethought in behalf of the entire soul, and to the principle of high spirit to be subject to this and its ally?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Then is it not, as we said, the blending of music and gymnastics that will render them concordant, intensifying and fostering the one with fair words and teachings and relaxing and soothing and making gentle the other by harmony and rhythm?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And these two, thus reared and having learned and been educated to do their own work in the true sense of the phrase, will preside over the appetitive part which is the mass of the soul in each of us and the most insatiate by nature of wealth. They will keep watch upon it, lest, by being filled and infected with the so-called pleasures associated with the body and so waxing big and strong, it may not keep to its own work but may undertake to enslave and rule over the classes which it is not fitting that it should, and so overturn the entire life of all.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Would not these two, then, best keep guard against enemies from without also in behalf of the entire soul and body, the one taking counsel, the other giving battle, attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the ruler's designs?

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ Brave, too, then, I take it, we call each individual by virtue of this part in him, when, namely, his high spirit preserves in the midst of pains and pleasures the rule handed down by the reason as to what is or is not to be feared.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ But wise by that small part that ruled in him and handed down these commands, by its possession in turn within it of the knowledge of what is beneficial for each and for the whole, the community composed of the three.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And again, was he not sober by reason of the friendship and concord of these same parts, when, namely, the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in the belief that the reason ought to rule, and do not raise faction against it?

Glaucon/ The virtue of soberness certainly, is nothing else than this, whether in a city or an individual.

Socrates/ But surely, now, a man is just by that which and in the way we have so often described.

Glaucon/ That is altogether necessary.

Socrates/ Well then, has our idea of justice in any way lost the edge of its contour so as to look like anything else than precisely what it showed itself to be in the state?

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ We might, completely confirm your reply and our own conviction thus, if anything in our minds still disputes our definition—by applying commonplace and vulgar tests to it.

Glaucon/ What are these?

Socrates/ For example, if an answer were demanded to the question concerning that city and the man whose birth and breeding was in harmony with it, whether we believe that such a man, entrusted with a deposit of gold or silver, would withhold it and embezzle it, who do you suppose would think that he would be more likely so to act than men of a different kind?

Glaucon/ No one would.

Socrates/ And would not he be far removed from sacrilege and theft and betrayal of comrades in private life or of the state in public?

Glaucon/ He would.

Socrates/ And, moreover, he would not be in any way faithless either in the keeping of his oaths or in other agreements.

Glaucon/ How could he?

Socrates/ Adultery, surely, and neglect of parents and of the due service of the gods would pertain to anyone rather than to such a man.

Glaucon/ To anyone indeed.

Socrates/ And is not the cause of this to be found in the fact that each of the principles within him does its own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled?

Glaucon/ Yes, that and nothing else.

Socrates/ Do you still, then, look for justice to be anything else than this potency which provides men and cities of this sort?

Glaucon/ No, by heaven, I do not.

Socrates/ Finished, then, is our dream and perfected—the surmise we spoke of, that, by some providence, at the very beginning of our foundation of the state, we chanced to hit upon the original principle and a sort of type of justice.

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ It really was, it seems, Glaucon, which is why it helps, a sort of adumbration of justice, this principle that it is right for the cobbler by nature to cobble and occupy himself with nothing else, and the carpenter to practice carpentry, and similarly all others.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But the truth of the matter was, as it seems, that justice is indeed something of this kind, yet not in regard to the doing of one's own business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns one's self, and the things of one's self. It means that a man must not suffer the principles in his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose well of what in the true sense of the word is properly his own, and having first

attained to self-mastery and beautiful order within himself, and having harmonized these three principles, the notes or intervals of three terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the mean, and all others there may be between them, and having linked and bound all three together and made of himself a unit, one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison, he should then and then only turn to practice if he find ought to do either in the getting of wealth or the tendance of the body or it may be in political action or private business—in all such doings believing and naming the just and honorable action to be that which preserves and helps to produce this condition of soul, and wisdom the science that presides over such conduct, and believing and naming the unjust action to be that which-ever tends to overthrow this spiritual constitution, and brutish ignorance to be the opinion that in turn presides over this.

Glaucon/ What you say is entirely true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, if we should affirm that we had found the just man and state and what justice really is in them, I think we should not be much mistaken.

Glaucon/ No indeed, we should not.

Socrates/ Shall we affirm it, then?

Glaucon/ Let us so affirm.

Socrates/ So be it, then. Next after this, I take it, we must consider injustice.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Must not this be a kind of civil war of these three principles, their meddlesomeness and interference with one another's functions, and the revolt of one part against the whole of the soul that it may hold therein a rule which does not belong to it, since its nature is such that it befits it to serve as a slave to the ruling principle? Something of this sort, I fancy, is what we shall say, and that the

confusion of these principles and their straying from their proper course is injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and brutish ignorance and, in general, all turpitude.

Glaucon/ Precisely this.

Socrates/ Then, to act unjustly and be unjust and in turn to act justly—the meaning of all these terms becomes at once plain and clear, since injustice and justice are so.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Because, these are in the soul what the healthful and the diseaseful are in the body; there is no difference.

Glaucon/ In what respect?

Socrates/ Healthful things surely engender health and diseaseful disease.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then does not doing just acts engender justice and unjust injustice?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ But to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of dominating and being dominated by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary to nature.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is so.

Socrates/ And is it not likewise the production of justice in the soul to establish its principles in the natural relation of controlling and being controlled by one another, while injustice is to cause the one to rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature?

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health and beauty and good condition of the soul, and vice would be disease, ugliness, and weakness.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ Then is it not also true that beautiful and honorable pursuits tend to the winning of virtue and the ugly to vice?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And now at last, it seems, it remains for us to consider whether it is profitable to do justice and practice honorable pursuits and be just, whether one is known to be such or not, or whether injustice profits, and to be unjust, if only a man escape punishment and is not bettered by chastisement.

Glaucon/ Nay, Socrates, I think that from this point on our inquiry becomes an absurdity—if, while life is admittedly intolerable with a ruined constitution of body even though accompanied by all the food and drink and wealth and power in the world, we are yet to be asked to suppose that, when the very nature and constitution of that whereby we live is disordered and corrupted, life is going to be worth living, if a man can only do as he pleases, and pleases to do anything save that which will rid him of evil and injustice and make him possessed of justice and virtue—now that the two have been shown to be as we have described them.

Socrates/ Yes, it is absurd, but nevertheless, now that we have won to this height, we must not grow weary in endeavoring to discover with the utmost possible clearness that these things are so.

Glaucon/ That is the last thing in the world we must do.

Socrates/ Come up here then, that you may see how many are the kinds of evil, I mean those that it is worthwhile to observe and distinguish.

Glaucon/ I am with you, Only do you say on.

Socrates/ And truly, now that we have come to this height of argument I seem to see as from a point of outlook that there is one form of excellence, and that the forms of evil are infinite, yet that there are some four among them that it is worthwhile to take note of.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ As many as are the varieties of political constitutions that constitute specific types, so many, it seems likely, are the characters of soul.

Glaucon/ How many, pray?

Socrates/ There are five kinds of constitutions, and five kinds of soul.

Glaucon/ Tell me what they are.

Socrates/ I tell you, that one way of government would be the constitution that we have just expounded, but the names that might be applied to it are two. If one man of surpassing merit rose among the rulers, it would be denominated royalty; if more than one, aristocracy.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Well, then, this is one of the forms I have in mind. For neither would a number of such men, nor one if he arose among them, alter to any extent worth mentioning the laws of our city—if he preserved the breeding and the education that we have described.

Glaucon/ It is not likely.

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Socrates/ To such a city, then, or constitution I apply the terms good and right—and to the corresponding kind of man—but the others I describe as bad and mistaken, if this one is right, in respect both to the administration of states and to the formation of the character of the individual soul, they falling under four forms of badness.

Glaucon/ What are these?

Socrates/ And I was going on to enumerate them in what seemed to me the order of their evolution from one another, when Polemarchus—he sat at some little distance from Adimantus—stretched forth his hand, and, taking hold of his garment from above by the shoulder, drew the other toward him and, leaning forward himself, spoke a few words in his ear, of which we overheard nothing else save only this.

Polemarchus/ Shall we let him off, then, or what shall we do?

Socrates/ Raising his voice, Adimantus said:

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ What, pray, is it that you are not letting off?

Adeimantus/ You.

Socrates/ And for what special reason, pray?

Adeimantus/ We think you are a slacker, and are trying to cheat us out of a whole division, and that not the least, of the argument to avoid the trouble of expounding it, and expect to 'get away with it' by observing thus lightly that, of course, in respect to women and children it is obvious to everybody that the possessions of friends will be in common.

Socrates/ Well, isn't that right, Adimantus?

Adeimantus/ Yes, but this word 'right, ' like other things, requires defining as to the way and manner of such a community. There might be many ways. Don't, then, pass

over the one that you have in mind. For we have long been lying in wait for you, expecting that you would say something both of the procreation of children and their bringing-up, and would explain the whole matter of the community of women and children of which you speak. We think that the right or wrong management of this makes a great difference, all the difference in the world, in the constitution of a state; so now, since you are beginning on another constitution before sufficiently defining this, we are firmly resolved, as you overheard, not to let you go till you have expounded all this as fully as you did the rest.

Glaucon/ Set me down, too, as voting this ticket.

Thrasymachus/ Surely, you may consider it a joint resolution of us all, Socrates.

Socrates/ What a thing you have done, in thus challenging me! What a huge debate you have started afresh, as it were, about this polity, in the supposed completion of which I was rejoicing, being only too glad to have it accepted as I then set it forth! You don't realize what a swarm of arguments you are stirring up by this demand, which I foresaw and evaded to save us no end of trouble.

Thrasymachus/ Well, do you suppose this company has come here to prospect for gold and not to listen to discussions?

Socrates/ Yes, in measure.

Glaucon/ Nay, Socrates, the measure of listening to such discussions is the whole of life for reasonable men. So don't consider us, and do not you yourself grow weary in explaining to us what we ask for, your views as to how this communion of wives and children among our guardians will be managed, and also about the rearing of the children while still young in the interval between birth and formal schooling

which is thought to be the most difficult part of education. Try, then, to tell us what must be the manner of it.

Socrates/ It is not an easy thing to expound, my dear fellow, for even more than the provisions that precede it, it raises many doubts. For one might doubt whether what is proposed is possible and, even conceding the possibility, one might still be skeptical whether it is best. For which reason one, as it were, shrinks from touching on the matter lest the theory be regarded as nothing but a 'wish-thought,' my dear friend.

Glaucon/ Do not shrink, for your hearers will not be inconsiderate nor distrustful nor hostile.

Socrates/ My good fellow, is that remark intended to encourage me?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Well then, it has just the contrary effect. For, if I were confident that I was speaking with knowledge, it would be an excellent encouragement. For there are both safety and boldness in speaking the truth with knowledge about our greatest and dearest concerns to those who are both wise and dear. But to speak when one doubts himself and is seeking while he talks, as I am doing, is a fearful and slippery venture. The fear is not of being laughed at, for that is childish, but, lest, missing the truth, I fall down and drag my friends with me in matters where it most imports not to stumble. So I salute Nemesis, Glaucon, in what I am about to say. For, indeed, I believe that involuntary homicide is a lesser fault than to mislead opinion about the honorable, the good, and the just. This is a risk that it is better to run with enemies than with friends, so that your encouragement is none.

—And Glaucon, with a laugh, said;

Glaucon/ Nay, Socrates, if any false note in the argument does us any harm, we release you as in a homicide case, and warrant you pure of hand and no deceiver of us. So speak on with confidence.

Socrates/ Well, he who is released in that case is counted pure as the law bids, and, presumably, if there, here too.

Glaucon/ Speak on, then, for all this objection.

Socrates/ We must return then, and say now what perhaps ought to have been said in due sequence there. But maybe this way is right, that after the completion of the male drama we should in turn go through with the female, especially since you are so urgent.

—For men, then, born and bred as we described, there is in my opinion no other right possession and use of children and women than that which accords with the start we gave them. Our endeavor, I believe, was to establish these men in our discourse as the guardians of a flock?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us preserve the analogy, then, and assign them a generation and breeding answering to it, and see if it suits us or not.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ In this. Do we expect the females of watchdogs to join in guarding what the males guard and to hunt with them and share all their pursuits or do we expect the females to stay indoors as being incapacitated by the bearing and the breeding of the whelps while the males toil and have all the care of the flock?

Glaucon/ They have all things in common, except that we treat the females as weaker and the males as stronger.

Socrates/ Is it possible, then, to employ any creature for the same ends as another if you do not assign it the same nurture and education?

Glaucon/ It is not possible.

Socrates/ If, then, we are to use the women for the same things as the men, we must also teach them the same things.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now music together with gymnastics was the training we gave the men.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we must assign these two arts to the women also and the offices of war and employ them in the same way.

Glaucon/ It would seem likely from what you say.

Socrates/ Perhaps, then, the contrast with present custom would make much in our proposals look ridiculous if our words are to be realized in fact.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ What then, is the funniest thing you note in them? Is it not obviously the women exercising unclad in the palaestra together with the men, not only the young, but even the older, like old men in gymnasiums, when, though wrinkled and unpleasant to look at, they still persist in exercising?

Glaucon/ Yes, on my word, it would seem ridiculous under present conditions.

Socrates/ Then, since we have set out to speak our minds, we must not fear all the gibes with which the wits would greet so great a revolution, and the sort of things they would say about gymnastics and culture, and most of all about the bearing of arms and the bestriding of horses.

Glaucon/ You're right.

Socrates/ But since we have begun we must go forward to the rough part of our law, after begging these fellows not to mind their own business but to be serious, and reminding them that it is not long since the Greeks thought it disgraceful and ridiculous, as most of the barbarians do now, for men to be seen naked. And when the practice of athletics began, first with the Cretans and then with the Lacedaemonians, it was open to the wits of that time to make fun of these practices, don't you think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ But when, I take it, experience showed that it is better to strip than to veil all things of this sort, then the laughter of the eyes faded away before that which reason revealed to be best, and this made it plain that he talks idly who deems anything else ridiculous but evil, and who tries to raise a laugh by looking to any other pattern of absurdity than that of folly and wrong or sets up any other standard of the beautiful as a mark for his seriousness than the good.

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Then is not the first thing that we have to agree upon with regard to these proposals whether they are possible or not? And we must throw open the debate to anyone who wishes either in jest or in earnest to raise the question whether female human nature is capable of sharing with the male all tasks or none at all, or some but not others, and under which of these heads this business of war falls. Would not this be that best beginning which would naturally and proverbially lead to the best end?

Glaucon/ Far the best.

Socrates/ Shall we then conduct the debate with ourselves in behalf of those others so that the case of the other side may not be taken defenseless and go by default?

Glaucon/ Nothing hinders.

Socrates/ Shall we say then in their behalf, There is no need, Socrates and Glaucon, of others disputing against you, for you yourselves at the beginning of the foundation of your city agreed that each one ought to mind as his own business the one thing for which he was fitted by nature? We did so agree, I think, certainly! Can it be denied then that there is by nature a great difference between men and women? Surely there is. Is it not fitting, then, that a different function should be appointed for each corresponding to this difference of nature? Certainly. How, then, can you deny that you are mistaken and in contradiction with yourselves when you turn around and affirm that the men and the women ought to do the same thing, though their natures are so far apart? Can you surprise me with an answer to that question?

Glaucon/ Not easily on this sudden challenge, but I will and do beg you to lend your voice to the plea in our behalf, whatever it may be.

Socrates/ These and many similar difficulties, Glaucon, I foresaw and feared, and so shrank from touching on the law concerning the getting and breeding of women and children.

Glaucon/ It does not seem an easy thing, by heaven, no, by heaven.

Socrates/ No, it is not, but the fact is that whether one tumbles into a little diving pool or plump into the great sea he swims all the same.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then we, too, must swim and try to escape out of the sea of argument in the hope that either some dolphin will take us on its back or some other desperate rescue.

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Come then, consider, if we can find a way out. We did agree that different natures should have differing

pursuits and that the natures of men and women differ. And yet now we affirm that these differing natures should have the same pursuits. That is the indictment?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ What a grand thing, Glaucon, is the power of the art of contradiction!

Glaucon/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because, many appear to me to fall into it even against their wills, and to suppose that they are not wrangling but arguing, owing to their inability to apply the proper divisions and distinctions to the subject under consideration. They pursue purely verbal oppositions, practicing eristic, not dialectic on one another.

Glaucon/ Yes, this does happen to many, but does this observation apply to us too at present?

Socrates/ Absolutely. At any rate I am afraid that we are unawares slipping into contentiousness.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ The principle that natures not the same ought not to share in the same pursuits we are following up most manfully and eristically in the literal and verbal sense, but we did not delay to consider at all what particular kind of diversity and identity of nature we had in mind and with reference to what we were trying to define it when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to the same.

Glaucon/ No, we didn't consider that.

Socrates/ Wherefore, by the same token, we might ask ourselves whether the natures of bald and long-haired men are the same and not, rather, the contrary. And, after agreeing that they were opposed, we might, if the bald cobbled, forbid the long-haired to do so, or vice versa.

Glaucon/ That would be ridiculous.

Socrates/ Would it be so, for any other reason than that we did not then posit likeness and difference of nature in any and every sense, but were paying heed solely to the kind of diversity and homogeneity that was pertinent to the pursuits themselves? We meant, for example, that a man and a woman who have a physician's mind have the same nature. Don't you think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ But that a man physician and a man carpenter have different natures?

Glaucon/ Certainly, I suppose.

Socrates/ Similarly, then, if it appears that the male and the female sex have distinct qualifications for any arts or pursuits, we shall affirm that they ought to be assigned respectively to each. But if it appears that they differ only in just this respect that the female bears and the male begets, we shall say that no proof has yet been produced that the woman differs from the man for our purposes, but we shall continue to think that our guardians and their wives ought to follow the same pursuits.

GLAUCON : And rightly.

Socrates/ Then, is it not the next thing to bid our opponent tell us precisely for what art or pursuit concerned with the conduct of a state the woman's nature differs from the man's?

Glaucon/ That would be at any rate fair.

Socrates/ Perhaps, then, someone else, too, might say what you were saying a while ago, that it is not easy to find a satisfactory answer on a sudden, but that with time for reflection there is no difficulty.

Glaucon/ He might say that.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, beg the raiser of such objections to follow us, if we may perhaps prove able to make it plain to him that there is no pursuit connected with the administration of a state that is peculiar to woman?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Come then, we shall say to him, answer our question. Was this the basis of your distinction between the man naturally gifted for anything and the one not so gifted—that the one learned easily, the other with difficulty, that the one with slight instruction could discover much for himself in the matter studied, but the other, after much instruction and drill, could not even remember what he had learned, and that the bodily faculties of the one adequately served his mind, while, for the other, the body was a hindrance? Were there any other points than these by which you distinguish the well-endowed man in every subject and the poorly endowed?

Glaucon/ No one, will be able to name any others.

Socrates/ Do you know, then, of anything practiced by mankind in which the masculine sex does not surpass the female on all these points? Must we make a long story of it by alleging weaving and the watching of pancakes and the

boiling pot, whereon the sex plumes itself and wherein its defeat will expose it to most laughter?

Glaucon/ You are right, that the one sex is far surpassed by the other in everything, one may say. Many women, it is true, are better than many men in many things, but broadly speaking, it is as you say.

Socrates/ Then there is no pursuit of the administrators of a state that belongs to a woman because she is a woman or to a man because he is a man. But the natural capacities are distributed alike among both creatures, and women naturally share in all pursuits and men in all—yet for all the woman is weaker than the man.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, assign them all to men and nothing to women?

Glaucon/ How could we?

Socrates/ We shall rather, I take it, say that one woman has the nature of a physician and another not, and one is by nature musical, and another unmusical?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ Can we, then, deny that one woman is naturally athletic and warlike and another unwarlike and averse to gymnastics?

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ And again, one a lover, another a hater, of wisdom? And one high-spirited, and the other lacking spirit?

Glaucon/ That also is true.

Socrates/ Then it is likewise true that one woman has the qualities of a guardian and another not. Were not these the natural qualities of the men also whom we selected for guardians?

Glaucon/ They were.

Socrates/ The women and the men, then, have the same nature in respect to the guardianship of the state, save in so far as the one is weaker, the other stronger.

Glaucon/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Women of this kind, then, must be selected to cohabit with men of this kind and to serve with them as guardians since they are capable of it and akin by nature.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And to the same natures must we not assign the same pursuits?

Glaucon/ The same.

Socrates/ We come round, then, to our previous statement, and agree that it does not run counter to nature to assign music and gymnastics to the wives of the guardians.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Our legislation, then, was not impracticable or utopian, since the law we proposed accorded with nature. Rather, the other way of doing things, prevalent today, proves, as it seems, unnatural.

Glaucon/ Apparently.

Socrates/ The object of our inquiry was the possibility and the desirability of what we were proposing?

Glaucon/ It was.

Socrates/ That it is possible has been admitted.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ The next point to be agreed upon is that it is the best way.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ For the production of a female guardian, then, our education will not be one thing for men and another for

women, especially since the nature which we hand over to it is the same.

Glaucon/ There will be no difference.

Socrates/ How are you minded, now, in this matter?

Glaucon/ In what?

Socrates/ In the matter of supposing some men to be better and some worse, or do you think them all alike?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ In the city, then, that we are founding, which do you think will prove the better men, the guardians receiving the education which we have described or the cobblers educated by the art of cobbling?

Glaucon/ An absurd question.

Socrates/ I understand, and are not these the best of all the citizens?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And will not these women be the best of all the women?

Glaucon/ They, too, by far.

Socrates/ Is there anything better for a state than the generation in it of the best possible women and men?

Glaucon/ There is not.

Socrates/ And this, music and gymnastics applied as we described will effect.

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ Then the institution we proposed is not only possible but the best for the state.

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ The women of the guardians, then, must strip, since they will be clothed with virtue as a garment, and must take their part with the men in war and the other duties of

civic guardianship and have no other occupation. But in these very duties lighter tasks must be assigned to the women than to the men because of their weakness as a class. But the man who ridicules unclad women, exercising because it is best that they should, 'plucks the unripe fruit' of laughter and does not know, it appears, the end of his laughter nor what he would be at. For the fairest thing that is said or ever will be said is this, that the helpful is fair and the harmful foul.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ In this matter, then, of the regulation of women, we may say that we have surmounted one of the waves of our paradox and have not been quite swept away by it in ordaining that our guardians and female guardians must have all pursuits in common, but that in some sort the argument concurs with itself in the assurance that what it proposes is both possible and beneficial.

Glaucon/ It is no slight wave that you are thus escaping.

Socrates/ You will not think it a great one, when you have seen the one that follows.

Glaucon/ Say on then and show me.

Socrates/ This, and all that precedes has for its sequel, in my opinion, the following law.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That these women shall all be common to all these men, and that none shall cohabit with any privately, and that the children shall be common, and that no parent shall know its own offspring nor any child its parent.

Glaucon/ This is a far bigger paradox than the other, and provokes more distrust as to its possibility and its utility.

Socrates/ I presume, that there would be no debate about its utility, no denial that the community of women and

children would be the greatest good, supposing it possible. But I take it that its possibility or the contrary would be the chief topic of contention.

Glaucon/ Both, would be right sharply debated.

Socrates/ You mean, that I have to meet a coalition of arguments. But I expected to escape from one of them, and that if you agreed that the thing was beneficial, it would remain for me to speak only of its feasibility.

Glaucon/ You have not escaped detection, in your attempted flight, but you must render an account of both.

Socrates/ I must pay the penalty, yet do me this much grace. Permit me to take a holiday, just as men of lazy minds are wont to feast themselves on their own thoughts when they walk alone. Such persons, without waiting to discover how their desires may be realized, dismiss that topic to save themselves the labor of deliberating about possibilities and impossibilities, assume their wish fulfilled, and proceed to work out the details in imagination, and take pleasure in portraying what they will do when it is realized, thus making still more idle a mind that is idle without that. I too now succumb to this weakness and desire to postpone and examine later the question of feasibility, but will at present assume that, and will, with your permission, inquire how the rulers will work out the details in practice, and try to show that nothing could be more beneficial to the state and its guardians than the effective operation of our plan. This is what I would try to consider first together with you, and thereafter the other topic, if you allow it.

Glaucon/ I do allow it, Proceed with the inquiry.

Socrates/ I think, then, that the rulers, if they are to deserve that name, and their helpers likewise, will, the one, be willing to accept orders, and the other, to give them, in

some things obeying our laws, and imitating them in others which we leave to their discretion.

Glaucon/ Presumably.

Socrates/ You, then, the lawgiver, have picked these men and similarly will select to give over to them women as nearly as possible of the same nature. And they, having houses and meals in common, and no private possessions of that kind, will dwell together, and being commingled in gymnastics and in all their life and education, will be conducted by innate necessity to sexual union. Is not what I say a necessary consequence?

Glaucon/ Not by the necessities of geometry, but by those of love, which are perhaps keener and more potent than the other to persuade and constrain the multitude.

Socrates/ They are, indeed. But next, Glaucon, disorder and promiscuity in these unions or in anything else they do would be an unhallowed thing in a happy state and the rulers will not suffer it.

Glaucon/ It would not be right.

Socrates/ Obviously, then, we must arrange marriages, sacramental so far as may be. And the most sacred marriages would be those that were most beneficial.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ How, then, would the greatest benefit result? Tell me this, Glaucon. I see that you have in your house hunting dogs and a number of pedigreed cocks. Have you ever considered something about their unions and procreations?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ In the first place, among these themselves, although they are a select breed, do not some prove better than the rest?

Glaucon/ They do.

Socrates/ Do you then breed from all indiscriminately, or are you careful to breed from the best?

Glaucon/ From the best.

Socrates/ And, again, do you breed from the youngest or the oldest, or, so far as may be, from those in their prime?

Glaucon/ From those in their prime.

Socrates/ And if they are not thus bred, you expect, do you not, that your birds' breed and hounds will greatly degenerate?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And what of horses and other animals? Is it otherwise with them?

Glaucon/ It would be strange if it were.

Socrates/ Gracious, dear friend, how imperative, then, is our need of the highest skill in our rulers, if the principle holds also for mankind.

Glaucon/ Well, it does, but what of it?

Socrates/ This, that they will have to employ many of those drugs of which we were speaking. We thought that an inferior physician sufficed for bodies that do not need drugs but yield to diet and regimen. But when it is necessary to prescribe drugs we know that a more enterprising and venturesome physician is required.

Glaucon/ True, but what is the pertinency?

Socrates/ This. It seems likely that our rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception for the benefit of their subjects. We said, I believe, that the use of that sort of thing was in the category of medicine.

Glaucon/ And that was right.

Socrates/ In our marriages, then, and the procreation of children, it seems there will be no slight need of this kind of 'right.'

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ It follows from our former admissions, that the best men must cohabit with the best women in as many cases as possible and the worst with the worst in the fewest, and that the offspring of the one must be reared and that of the other not, if the flock is to be as perfect as possible. And the way in which all this is brought to pass must be unknown to any but the rulers, if, again, the herd of guardians is to be as free as possible from dissension.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ We shall, then, have to ordain certain festivals and sacrifices, in which we shall bring together the brides and the bridegrooms, and our poets must compose hymns suitable to the marriages that then take place. But the number of the marriages we will leave to the discretion of the rulers, that they may keep the number of the citizens as nearly as may be the same, taking into account wars and diseases and all such considerations, and that, so far as possible, our city may not grow too great or too small.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Certain ingenious lots, then, I suppose, must be devised so that the inferior man at each conjugation may blame chance and not the rulers.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And on the young men, surely, who excel in war and other pursuits we must bestow honors and prizes, and, in particular, the opportunity of more frequent intercourse with the women, which will at the same time be a plausible pretext for having them beget as many of the children as possible.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And the children thus born will be taken over by the officials appointed for this, men or women or both, since, I take it, the official posts too are common to women and men.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ The offspring of the good, I suppose, they will take to the pen or creche, to certain nurses who live apart in a quarter of the city, but the offspring of the inferior, and any of those of the other sort who are born defective, they will properly dispose of in secret, so that no one will know what has become of them.

Glaucon/ That is the condition, of preserving the purity of the guardians' breed.

Socrates/ They will also supervise the nursing of the children, conducting the mothers to the pen when their breasts are full, but employing every device to prevent anyone from recognizing her own infant. And they will provide others who have milk if the mothers are insufficient. But they will take care that the mothers themselves shall not suckle too long, and the trouble of wakeful nights and similar burdens they will devolve upon the nurses, wet and dry.

Glaucon/ You are making maternity a soft job for the women of the guardians.

Socrates/ It ought to be, but let us pursue our design. We said that the offspring should come from parents in their prime.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Do you agree that the period of the prime may be fairly estimated at twenty years for a woman and thirty for a man?

Glaucon/ How do you reckon it?

Socrates/ The women, beginning at the age of twenty, shall bear for the state to the age of forty, and the man shall beget for the state from the time he passes his prime in swiftness in running to the age of fifty-five.

Glaucon/ That is, the maturity and prime for both of body and mind.

Socrates/ Then, if anyone older or younger than the prescribed age meddles with procreation for the state, we shall say that his error is an impiety and an injustice, since he is begetting for the city a child whose birth, if it escapes discovery, will not be attended by the sacrifices and the prayers which the priests and priestesses and the entire city prefer at the ceremonial marriages, that ever better offspring may spring from good sires and from fathers helpful to the state sons more helpful still. But this child will be born in darkness and conceived in foul incontinence.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And the same rule will apply, if any of those still within the age of procreation goes in to a woman of that age with whom the ruler has not paired him. We shall say that he is imposing on the state a baseborn, uncertified, and unhallowed child.

Glaucon/ Most rightly.

Socrates/ But when, I take it, the men and the women have passed the age of lawful procreation, we shall leave the men free to form such relations with whomsoever they please, except daughter and mother and their direct descendants and ascendants, and likewise the women, save with son and father, and so on, first admonishing them preferably not even to bring to light anything whatever thus conceived, but if they are unable to prevent a birth to dispose

of it on the understanding that we cannot rear such an offspring.

Glaucon/ All that sounds reasonable, but how are they to distinguish one another's fathers and daughters, and the other degrees of kin that you have just mentioned?

Socrates/ They won't, except that a man will call all male offspring born in the tenth and in the seventh month after he became a bridegroom his sons, and all female, daughters, and they will call him father. And, similarly, he will call their offspring his grandchildren and they will call his group grandfathers and grandmothers. And all children born in the period in which their fathers and mothers were procreating will regard one another as brothers and sisters. This will suffice for the prohibitions of intercourse of which we just now spoke. But the law will allow brothers and sisters to cohabit if the lot so falls out and the Delphic oracle approves.

Glaucon/ Quite right.

Socrates/ This, then, Glaucon, is the manner of the community of wives and children among the guardians. That it is consistent with the rest of our polity and by far the best way is the next point that we must get confirmed by the argument. Is not that so?

Glaucon/ It is, indeed.

Socrates/ Is not the logical first step toward such an agreement to ask ourselves what we could name as the greatest good for the constitution of a state and the proper aim of a lawgiver in his legislation, and what would be the greatest evil, and then to consider whether the proposals we have just set forth fit into the footprints of the good and do not suit those of the evil?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that distracts it and makes it many instead of one,

or a greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?

Glaucon/ We do not.

Socrates/ Is not, then, the community of pleasure and pain the tie that binds, when, so far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike at the same births and deaths?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But the individualization of these feelings is a dissolvent, when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings to the city and its inhabitants?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as 'mine' and 'not mine,' and similarly with regard to the word 'alien'?

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression 'mine' and 'not mine' of the same things in the same way.

Glaucon/ Much the best.

Socrates/ And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man. For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connections stretching to the soul for 'integration' with the dominant part is made aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any other member of the man the same statement holds, alike for a part that labors in pain or is eased by pleasure.

Glaucon/ The same, and, to return to your question, the best-governed state most nearly resembles such an organism.

Socrates/ That is the kind of a state, then, I presume, that, when anyone of the citizens suffers aught of good or evil, will be most likely to speak of the part that suffers as its own and will share the pleasure or the pain as a whole.

Glaucon/ Inevitably, if it is well governed.

Socrates/ It is time, to return to our city and observe whether it, rather than any other, embodies the qualities agreed upon in our argument.

Glaucon/ We must.

Socrates/ Well, then, there are to be found in other cities rulers and the people as in our city, are there not?

Glaucon/ There are.

Socrates/ Will not all these address one another as fellow citizens?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But in addition to citizens, what do the people in other states call their rulers?

Glaucon/ In most cities, masters, in democratic cities, just this—rulers.

Socrates/ But what of the people in our city. In addition to citizens, what do they call their rulers?

Glaucon/ Saviors and helpers.

Socrates/ And what term do these apply to the people?

Glaucon/ Payers of their wage and supporters.

Socrates/ And how do the rulers in other states denominate the populace?

Glaucon/ Slaves.

Socrates/ And how do the rulers describe one another?

Glaucon/ Co-rulers.

Socrates/ And ours?

Glaucon/ Co-guardians.

Socrates/ Can you tell me whether any of the rulers in other states would speak of some of their corulers as 'belonging' and others as outsiders?

Glaucon/ Yes, many would.

Socrates/ And such a one thinks and speaks of the one that 'belongs' as his own, doesn't he, and of the outsider as not his own?

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ But what of your guardians? Could any of them think or speak of his co-guardian as an outsider?

Glaucon/ By no means, for no matter whom he meets, he will feel that he is meeting a brother, a sister, a father, a mother, a son, a daughter, or the offspring or forebears of these.

Socrates/ Excellent, but tell me this further. Will it be merely the names of this kinship that you have prescribed for them or must all their actions conform to the names in all customary observance toward fathers and in awe and care and obedience for parents, if they look for the favor of either gods or men, since any other behavior would be neither just nor pious? Shall these be the unanimous oracular voices that they hear from all the people, or shall some other kind of teaching beset the ears of your children from their birth, both concerning what is due to those who are pointed out as their fathers and to their other kin?

Glaucon/ These, for it would be absurd for them merely to pronounce with their lips the names of kinship without the deeds.

Socrates/ Then, in this city more than in any other, when one citizen fares well or ill, men will pronounce in unison the word of which we spoke, It is mine that does well, or, It is mine that does ill.

Glaucon/ That is most true.

Socrates/ And did we not say that this conviction and way of speech brings with it a community in pleasures and pains?

Glaucon/ And rightly, too.

Socrates/ Then these citizens, above all others, will have one and the same thing in common which they will name mine, and by virtue of this communion they will have their pleasures and pains in common.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And is not the cause of this, besides the general constitution of the state, the community of wives and children among the guardians?

Glaucon/ It will certainly be the chief cause.

Socrates/ But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well-governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts.

Glaucon/ And we were right in so agreeing.

Socrates/ Then it is the greatest blessing for a state of which the community of women and children among the helpers has been shown to be the cause.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And this is consistent with what we said before. For we said, I believe, that these helpers must not possess houses of their own or land or any other property, but that they should receive from the other citizens for their support the wage of their guardianship and all spend it in common. That was the condition of their being true guardians.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Is it not true, then, as I am trying to say, that those former and these present prescriptions tend to make them still more truly guardians and prevent them from

distracting the city by referring mine not to the same but to different things, one man dragging off to his own house anything he is able to acquire apart from the rest, and another doing the same to his own separate house, and having women and children apart, thus introducing into the state the pleasures and pains of individuals? They should all rather, we said, share one conviction about their own, tend to one goal, and so far as practicable have one experience of pleasure and pain.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then will not lawsuits and accusations against one another vanish, one may say, from among them, because they have nothing in private possession but their bodies, but all else in common? So that we can count on their being free from the dissensions that arise among men from the possession of property, children, and kin.

Glaucon/ They will necessarily be quit of these.

Socrates/ And again, there could not rightly arise among them any lawsuit for assault or bodily injury. For as between age-fellows we shall say that self-defense is honorable and just, thereby compelling them to keep their bodies in condition.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And there will be the further advantage in such a law that an angry man, satisfying his anger in such wise, would be less likely to carry the quarrel to further extremes.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ As for an older man, he will always have the charge of ruling and chastising the younger.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Again, it is plain that the young man, except by command of the rulers, will probably not do violence to an

elder or strike him, or, I take it, dishonor him in any other way. There being the two competent guardians to prevent that, fear and awe, awe restraining him from laying hands on one who may be his parent, and fear in that the others will rush to the aid of the sufferer, some as sons, some as brothers, some as fathers.

Glaucon/ That is the way it works out.

Socrates/ Then in all cases the laws will leave these men to dwell in peace together.

Glaucon/ Great peace.

Socrates/ And if these are free from dissensions among themselves, there is no fear that the rest of the city will ever start faction against them or with one another.

Glaucon/ No, there is not.

Socrates/ But I hesitate, so unseemly are they, even to mention the pettiest troubles of which they would be rid, the flatterings of the rich, the embarrassments and pains of the poor in the bringing-up of their children and the procuring of money for the necessities of life for their households, the borrowings, the repudiations, all the devices with which they acquire what they deposit with wives and servitors to husband, and all the indignities that they endure in such matters, which are obvious and ignoble and not deserving of mention.

Glaucon/ Even a blind man can see these.

Socrates/ From all these, then, they will be finally free, and they will live a happier life than that men count most happy, the life of the victors at Olympia.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ The things for which those are felicitated are a small part of what is secured for these. Their victory is fairer and their public support more complete. For the prize of

victory that they win is the salvation of the entire state, the fillet that binds their brows is the public support of themselves and their children—they receive honor from the city while they live and when they die a worthy burial.

Glaucon/ A fair guerdon, indeed.

Socrates/ Do you recall, that in the preceding argument the objection of somebody or other rebuked us for not making our guardians happy, since, though it was in their power to have everything of the citizens, they had nothing, and we, I believe, replied that this was a consideration to which we would return if occasion offered, but that at present we were making our guardians, guardians and the city as a whole as happy as possible, and that we were not modeling our ideal of happiness with reference to anyone class?

Glaucon/ I do remember.

Socrates/ Well then, since now the life of our helpers has been shown to be far fairer and better than that of the victors at Olympia, need we compare it with the life of cobblers and other craftsmen and farmers?

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ But further, we may fairly repeat what I was saying then also, that if the guardian shall strive for a kind of happiness that will unmake him as a guardian and shall not be content with the way of life that is so moderate and secure and, as we affirm, the best, but if some senseless and childish opinion about happiness shall beset him and impel him to use his power to appropriate everything in the city for himself, then he will find out that Hesiod was indeed wise, who said that the half was in some sort more than the whole.

Glaucon/ If he accepts my counsel, he will abide in this way of life.

Socrates/ You accept, then, as we have described it, this partnership of the women with our men in the matter of education and children and the guardianship of the other citizens, and you admit that both within the city and when they go forth to war they ought to keep guard together and hunt together as it were like hounds, and have all things in a every way, so far as possible, in common, and that so doing they will do what is for the best and nothing that is contrary to female human nature in comparison with male or to their natural fellowship with one another.

Glaucon/ I do admit it.

Socrates/ Then, is not the thing that it remains to determine this, whether, namely, it is possible for such a community to be brought about among men as it is in the other animals, and in what way it is possible?

Glaucon/ You have anticipated, the point I was about to raise.

Socrates/ For as for their wars, the manner in which they will conduct them is too obvious for discussion.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ It is obvious that they will march out together, and, what is more, will conduct their children to war when they are sturdy, in order that, like the children of other craftsmen, they may observe the processes of which they must be masters in their maturity, and in addition to looking on they must assist and minister in all the business of war and serve their fathers and mothers. Or have you never noticed the practice in the arts, how for example the sons of potters look on as helpers a long time before they put their hands to the clay?

Glaucon/ They do, indeed.

Socrates/ Should these then be more concerned than our guardians to train the children by observation and experience of what is to be their proper business?

Glaucon/ That would be ridiculous.

Socrates/ But, further, when it comes to fighting, every creature will do better in the presence of its offspring?

Glaucon/ That is so, but the risk, Socrates, is not slight, in the event of disasters such as may happen in war, that, losing their children as well as themselves, they make it impossible for the remnant of the state to recover.

Socrates/ What you say is true, but, in the first place, is it your idea that the one thing for which we must provide is the avoidance of all danger?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ And, if they must incur danger, should it not be for something in which success will make them better?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Do you think it makes a slight difference and not worth some risk whether men who are to be warriors do or do not observe war as boys?

Glaucon/ No, it makes a great difference for the purpose of which you speak.

Socrates/ Starting, then, from this assumption that we are to make the boys spectators of war, we must further contrive security for them and all will be well, will it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ To begin with, then, will not the fathers be, humanly speaking, not ignorant of war and shrewd judges of which campaigns are hazardous and which not?

Glaucon/ Presumably.

Socrates/ They will take the boys with them to the one and avoid the others?

Glaucon/ Rightly.

Socrates/ And for officers, I presume, they will put in charge of them not those who are good for nothing else but men who by age and experience are qualified to serve at once as leaders and as case-takers of children.

Glaucon/ Yes, that would be the proper way.

Socrates/ Still, we may object, it is the unexpected that happens to many in many cases.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ To provide against such chances, then, we must wing the children from the start so that if need arises they may fly away and escape.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ We must mount them when very young, and first have them taught to ride, and then conduct them to the scene of war, not on mettlesome war steeds, but on the swiftest and gentlest horses possible, for thus they will have the best view of their own future business and also, if need arises, will most securely escape to safety in the train of elder guides.

Glaucon/ I think you are right.

Socrates/ But now what of the conduct of war? What should be the attitude of the soldiers to one another and the enemy? Am I right in my notions or not?

Glaucon/ Tell me what notions.

Socrates/ Anyone of them who deserts his post, or flings away his weapons, or is guilty of any similar act of cowardice, should be reduced to the artisan or farmer class, should he not?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And anyone who is taken alive by the enemy we will make a present of to his captors, shall we not, to deal with their catch as they please?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And don't you agree that the one who wins the prize of valor and distinguishes himself shall first be crowned by his fellows in the campaign, by the lads and boys each in turn?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And be greeted with the right hand?

Glaucon/ That, too.

Socrates/ But I presume you wouldn't go as far as this?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That he should kiss and be kissed by everyone?

Glaucon/ By all means, and I add to the law the provision that during that campaign none whom he wishes to kiss be allowed to refuse, so that if one is in love with anyone, male or female, he may be the more eager to win the prize.

Socrates/ Excellent, and we have already said that the opportunity of marriage will be more readily provided for the good man, and that he will be more frequently selected than the others for participation in that sort of thing, in order that as many children as possible may be born from such stock.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ But, furthermore, we may cite Homer too for the justice of honoring in such ways the valiant among our youth. For Homer says that Ajax, who had distinguished himself in the war, was honored with the long chine, assuming that the most fitting meed for a brave man in the prime of his youth is that from which both honor and strength will accrue to him.

Glaucon/ Most rightly.

Socrates/ We will then, take Homer as our guide in this at least. We, too, at sacrifices and on other like occasions, will reward the good so far as they have proved themselves good with hymns and the other privileges of which we have just spoken, and also with 'seats of honor and meat and full cups,' so as to combine physical training with honor for the good, both men and women.

Glaucon/ Nothing could be better.

Socrates/ Very well, and of those who die on campaign, if anyone's death has been especially glorious, shall we not, to begin with, affirm that he belongs to the golden race?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And shall we not believe Hesiod who tells us that when men of this race die, so it is that they become

> Hallowed spirits dwelling on earth, averters of evil,
> Guardians watchful and good of articulate-speaking mortals?

Glaucon/ We certainly shall believe him.

Socrates/ We will inquire of Apollo, then, how and with what distinction we are to bury men of more than human, of divine, qualities, and deal with them according to his response.

Glaucon/ How can we do otherwise?

Socrates/ And ever after we will bestow on their graves the tendance and worship paid to spirits divine. And we will practice the same observance when any who have been adjudged exceptionally good in the ordinary course of life die of old age or otherwise?

Glaucon/ That will surely be right.

Socrates/ But again, how will our soldiers conduct themselves toward enemies?

Glaucon/ In what respect?

Socrates/ First, in the matter of making slaves of the defeated, do you think it right for Greeks to reduce Greek cities to slavery, or rather that, so far as they are able, they should not suffer any other city to do so, but should accustom Greeks to spare Greeks, foreseeing the danger of enslavement by the barbarians?

Glaucon/ Sparing them is wholly and altogether the better.

Socrates/ They are not, then, themselves to own Greek slaves, either, and they should advise the other Greeks not to?

Glaucon/ By all means, At any rate in that way they would be more likely to turn against the barbarians and keep their hands from one another.

Socrates/ And how about stripping the dead after victory of anything except their weapons—is that well? Does it not furnish a pretext to cowards not to advance on the living foe, as if they were doing something needful when poking about the dead? Has not this snatching at the spoils ere now destroyed many an army?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And don't you think it illiberal and greedy to plunder a corpse, and is it not the mark of a womanish and petty spirit to deem the body of the dead an enemy when the real foeman has flown away and left behind only the instrument with which he fought? Do you see any difference between such conduct and that of the dogs who snarl at the stones that hit them but don't touch the thrower?

Glaucon/ Not the slightest.

Socrates/ We must abandon, then, the plundering of corpses and the refusal to permit their burial.

Glaucon/ By heaven, we certainly must.

Socrates/ And again, we will not take weapons to the temples for dedicatory offerings, especially the weapons of Greeks, if we are at all concerned to preserve friendly relations with the other Greeks. Rather we shall fear that there is pollution in bringing such offerings to the temples from our kind unless in a case where the god bids otherwise.

Glaucon/ Most rightly.

Socrates/ And in the matter of devastating the land of Greeks and burning their houses, how will your soldiers deal with their enemies? I would gladly hear your opinion of that.

Socrates/ In my view, they ought to do neither, but confine themselves to taking away the annual harvest. Shall I tell you why?

Glaucon/ Do.

Socrates/ In my opinion, just as we have the two terms, war and faction, so there are also two things, distinguished by two differentiae. The two things I mean are the friendly and kindred on the one hand and the alien and foreign on the other. Now the term employed for the hostility of the friendly is faction, and for that of the alien is war.

Glaucon/ What you say is in nothing beside the mark.

Socrates/ Consider, then, if this goes to the mark. I affirm that the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to the barbarian.

Glaucon/ Rightly.

Socrates/ We shall then say that Greeks fight and wage war with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature, and that war is the fit name for this enmity and hatred. Greeks, however, we shall say, are still by nature the friends of Greeks when they act in this way, but that Greece is sick in that case and divided by faction, and faction is the name we must give to that enmity.

Glaucon/ I will allow you that habit of speech.

Socrates/ Then observe, that when anything of this sort occurs in faction, as the word is now used, and a state is divided against itself, if either party devastates the land and burns the houses of the other such factional strife is thought to be an accursed thing and neither party to be true patriots. Otherwise, they would never have endured thus to outrage their nurse and mother. But the moderate and reasonable thing is thought to be that the victors shall take away the crops of the vanquished, but that their temper shall be that of men who expect to be reconciled and not always to wage war.

Glaucon/ That way of feeling, is far less savage than the other.

Socrates/ Well, then, is not the city that you are founding to be a Greek city?

Glaucon/ It must be.

Socrates/ Will they then not be good and gentle?

Glaucon/ Indeed they will.

Socrates/ And won't they be philhellenes, lovers of Greeks, and will they not regard all Greece as their own and not renounce their part in the holy places common to all Greeks?

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Will they not then regard any difference with Greeks who are their own people as a form of faction and refuse even to speak of it as war?

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And they will conduct their quarrels always looking forward to a reconciliation?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ They will correct them, then, for their own good, not chastising them with a view to their enslavement or their destruction, but acting as correctors, not as enemies.

Glaucon/ They will.

Socrates/ They will not, being Greeks, ravage Greek territory nor burn habitations, and they will not admit that in any city all the population are their enemies, men, women, and children, but will say that only a few at any time are their foes, those, namely, who are to blame for the quarrel. And on all these considerations they will not be willing to lay waste the soil, since the majority are their friends, nor to destroy the houses, but will carry the conflict only to the point of compelling the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the suffering of the innocent.

Glaucon/ I, agree that our citizens ought to deal with their Greek opponents on this wise, while treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks.

Socrates/ Shall we lay down this law also, then, for our guardians, that they are not to lay waste the land or burn the houses?

Glaucon/ Let us so decree, and assume that this and our preceding prescriptions are right. But I fear, Socrates, that, if you are allowed to go on in this fashion, you will never get to speak of the matter you put aside in order to say all this, namely, the possibility of such a polity coming into existence, and the way in which it could be brought to pass. I too am ready to admit that if it could be realized everything would be lovely for the state that had it, and I will add what you passed by, that they would also be most successful in war because they would be least likely to desert one another, knowing and addressing each other by the names of brothers, fathers, sons. And if the females should also join

in their campaigns, whether in the ranks or marshaled behind to intimidate the enemy, or as reserves in case of need, I recognize that all this too would make them irresistible. And at home, also, I observe all the benefits that you omit to mention. But, taking it for granted that I concede these and countless other advantages, consequent on the realization of this polity, don't labor that point further, but let us at once proceed to try to convince ourselves of just this, that it is possible and how it is possible, dismissing everything else.

Socrates/ This is a sudden assault, indeed, that you have made on my theory, without any regard for my natural hesitation. Perhaps you don't realize that when I have hardly escaped the first two waves, you are now rolling up against me the 'great third wave' of paradox, the worst of all. When you have seen and heard that, you will be very ready to be lenient, recognizing that I had good reason after all for shrinking and fearing to enter upon the discussion of so paradoxical a notion.

Glaucon/ The more such excuses you offer, the less you will be released by us from telling in what way the realization of this polity is possible. Speak on, then, and do not put us off.

Socrates/ The first thing to recall, then, is that it was the inquiry into the nature of justice and injustice that brought us to this pass.

Glaucon/ Yes, but what of it?

Socrates/ Oh, nothing, only this. If we do discover what justice is, are we to demand that the just man shall differ from it in no respect, but shall conform in every way to the ideal? Or will it suffice us if he approximate to it as nearly as possible and partake of it more than others?

Glaucon/ That will content us.

Socrates/ A pattern, then, was what we wanted when we were inquiring into the nature of ideal justice and asking what would be the character of the perfectly just man, supposing him to exist, and, likewise, in regard to injustice and the completely unjust man. We wished to fix our eyes upon them as types and models, so that whatever we discerned in them of happiness or the reverse would necessarily apply to ourselves in the sense that whosoever is likest them will have the allotment most like to theirs. Our purpose was not to demonstrate the possibility of the realization of these ideals.

Glaucon/ In that, you speak truly.

Socrates/ Do you think, then, that he would be any the less a good painter, who, after portraying a pattern of the ideally beautiful man and omitting no touch required for the perfection of the picture, should not be able to prove that it is actually possible for such a man to exist?

Glaucon/ Not I, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Then were not we, as we say, trying to create in words the pattern of a good state?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do you think, then, that our words are any the less well-spoken if we find ourselves unable to prove that it is possible for a state to be governed in accordance with our words?

Glaucon/ Of course not.

Socrates/ That, then, is the truth of the matter. But if, to please you, we must do our best to show how most probably and in what respect these things would be most nearly realized, again, with a view to such a demonstration, grant me the same point.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Is it possible for anything to be realized in deed as it is spoken in word, or is it the nature of things that action should partake of exact truth less than speech, even if some deny it? Do you admit it or not?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then don't insist, that I must exhibit as realized in action precisely what we expounded in words. But if we can discover how a state might be constituted most nearly answering to our description, you must say that we have discovered that possibility of realization which you demanded. Will you not be content if you get this? I for my part would.

Glaucon/ And I too.

Socrates/ Next, it seems, we must try to discover and point out what it is that is now badly managed in our cities, and that prevents them from being so governed, and what is the smallest change that would bring a state to this manner of government, preferably a change in one thing, if not, then in two, and, failing that, the fewest possible in number and the slightest in potency.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ There is one change, then, which I think that we can show would bring about the desired transformation. It is not a slight or an easy thing but it is possible.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ I am on the very verge, of what we likened to the greatest wave of paradox. But say it I will, even if, to keep the figure, it is likely to wash us away on billows of laughter and scorn. Listen.

Glaucon/ I am all attention.

Socrates/ Unless, either philosophers become kings in our states or those whom we now call our kings and rulers

take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and there is a conjunction of these two things, political power and philosophical intelligence, while the motley horde of the natures who at present pursue either apart from the other are compulsorily excluded, there can be no cessation of troubles, dear Glaucon, for our states, nor, I fancy, for the human race either. Nor, until this happens, will this constitution which we have been expounding in theory ever be put into practice within the limits of possibility and see the light of the sun. But this is the thing that has made me so long shrink from speaking out, because I saw that it would be a very paradoxical saying. For it is not easy to see that there is no other way of happiness either for private or public life.

Glaucon/ Whereupon Socrates, after hurling at us such an utterance and statement as that, you must expect to be attacked by a great multitude of our men of light and leading, who forthwith will, so to speak, cast off their garments and strip and, snatching the first weapon that comes to hand, rush at you with might and main, prepared to do dreadful deeds. And if you don't find words to defend yourself against them, and escape their assault, then to be scorned and flouted will in very truth be the penalty you will have to pay.

Socrates/ And isn't it you, that have brought this upon me and are to blame?

Glaucon/ And a good thing, too, but I won't let you down, and will defend you with what I can. I can do so with my good will and my encouragement, and perhaps I might answer your questions more suitably than another. So, with such an aid to back you, try to make it plain to the doubters that the truth is as you say.

Socrates/ I must try, since you proffer so strong an alliance. I think it requisite, then, if we are to escape the assailants you speak of, that we should define for them whom we mean by the philosophers, who we dare to say ought to be our rulers. When these are clearly discriminated it will be possible to defend ourselves by showing that to them by their very nature belong the study of philosophy and political leadership, while it befits the other sort to let philosophy alone and to follow their leader.

Glaucon/ It is high time, to produce your definition.

Socrates/ Come, then, follow me on this line, if we may in some fashion or other explain our meaning.

Glaucon/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Must I remind you, then, or do you remember, that when we affirm that a man is a lover of something, it must be apparent that he is fond of all of it? It will not do to say that some of it he likes and some does not.

Glaucon/ I think you will have to remind me, for I don't apprehend at all.

Socrates/ That reply, Glaucon, befitted another rather than you. It does not become a lover to forget that all adolescents in some sort sting and stir the amorous lover of youth and appear to him deserving of his attention and desirable. Is not that your 'reaction' to the fair? One, because his nose is uptilted, you will praise as piquant, the beak of another you pronounce right royal, the intermediate type you say strikes the harmonious mean, the swarthy are of manly aspect, the white are children of the gods divinely fair, and as for honey-hued, do you suppose the very word is anything but the euphemistic invention of some lover who can feel no distaste for sallowness when it accompanies the blooming time of youth? And, in short, there is no pretext you do not allege and there is nothing you shrink from

saying to justify you in not rejecting any who are in the bloom of their prime.

Glaucon/ If it is your pleasure, to take me as your example of this trait in lovers, I admit it for the sake of the argument.

Socrates/ Again, do you not observe the same thing in the lovers of wine? They welcome every wine on any pretext.

Glaucon/ They do, indeed.

Socrates/ And so I take it you have observed that men who are covetous of honor, if they can't get themselves elected generals, are captains of a company. And if they can't be honored by great men and dignitaries, are satisfied with honor from little men and nobodies. But honor they desire and must have.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Admit, then, or reject my proposition. When we say a man is keen about something, shall we say that he has an appetite for the whole class or that he desires only a part and a part not?

Glaucon/ The whole.

Socrates/ Then the lover of wisdom, too, we shall affirm, desires all wisdom, not a part and a part not.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The student, then, who is finical about his studies, especially when he is young and cannot yet know by reason what is useful and what is not, we shall say is not a lover of learning or a lover of wisdom, just as we say that one who is dainty about his food is not really hungry, has not an appetite for food, and is not a lover of food, but a poor feeder.

Glaucon/ We shall rightly say so.

Socrates/ But the one who feels no distaste in sampling every study, and who attacks his task of learning gladly and cannot get enough of it, him we shall justly pronounce the lover of wisdom, the philosopher, shall we not?

—To which Glaucon replied;

Glaucon/ You will then be giving the name to a numerous and strange band, for all the lovers of spectacles are what they are, I fancy, by virtue of their delight in learning something. And those who always want to hear some new thing are a very queer lot to be reckoned among philosophers. You couldn't induce them to attend a serious debate or any such entertainment, but as if they had farmed out their ears to listen to every chorus in the land, they run about to all the Dionysiac festivals, never missing one, either in the towns or in the country villages. Are we to designate all these, then, and similar folk and all the practitioners of the minor arts as philosophers?

Socrates/ Not at all, but they do bear a certain likeness to philosophers.

Glaucon/ Whom do you mean, then, by the true philosophers?

Socrates/ Those for whom the truth is the spectacle of which they are enamored.

Glaucon/ Right again, but in what sense do you mean it?

Socrates/ It would be by no means easy to explain it to another, but I think that you will grant me this.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That since the fair and honorable is the opposite of the base and ugly, they are two.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And since they are two, each is one.

Glaucon/ That also.

Socrates/ And in respect of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and all the ideas or forms, the same statement holds, that in itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communion with actions and bodies and with one another they present themselves everywhere, each as a multiplicity of aspects.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ This, then, is my division. I set apart and distinguish those of whom you were just speaking, the lovers of spectacles and the arts, and men of action, and separate from them again those with whom our argument is concerned and who alone deserve the appellation of philosophers or lovers of wisdom.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ The lovers of sounds and sights, delight in beautiful tones and colors and shapes and in everything that art fashions out of these, but their thought is incapable of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the beautiful in itself.

Glaucon/ Why, yes, that is so.

Socrates/ And on the other hand, will not those be few who would be able to approach beauty itself and contemplate it in and by itself?

Glaucon/ They would, indeed.

Socrates/ He, then, who believes in beautiful things, but neither believes in beauty itself nor is able to follow when someone tries to guide him to the knowledge of it—do you think that his life is a dream or a waking? Just consider. Is not the dream state, whether the man is asleep or awake, just this—the mistaking of resemblance for identity?

Glaucon/ I should certainly call that dreaming.

Socrates/ Well, then, take the opposite case, the man whose thought recognizes a beauty in itself, and is able to distinguish that self-beautiful

and the things that participate in it, and neither supposes the participants to be it nor it the participants—is his life, in your opinion, a waking or a dream state?

Glaucon/ He is very much awake.

Socrates/ Could we not rightly, then, call the mental state of the one as knowing, knowledge, and that of the other as opining, opinion?

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Suppose, now, he who we say opines but does not know should be angry and challenge our statement as not true—can we find any way of soothing him and gently winning him over, without telling him too plainly that he is not in his right mind?

Glaucon/ We must try.

Socrates/ Come, then, consider what we are to say to him, or would you have us question him in this fashion—premising that if he knows anything, nobody grudges it him, but we should be very glad to see him knowing something—but tell us this, Does he who knows know something or nothing? Do you reply in his behalf.

Glaucon/ I will reply, that he knows something.

Socrates/ Is it something that is or is not?

Glaucon/ That is. How could that which is not be known?

Socrates/ We are sufficiently assured of this, then, even if we should examine it from every point of view, that that which entirely is, is entirely knowable, and that which in no way is, is in every way unknowable?

Glaucon/ Most sufficiently.

Socrates/ Good. If a thing, then, is so conditioned as both to be and not to be, would it not lie between that which absolutely and unqualifiedly is and that which in no way is?

Glaucon/ Between.

Socrates/ Then since knowledge pertains to that which is and ignorance of necessity to that which is not, for that which lies between we must seek for something between nescience and science, if such a thing there be.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Is there a thing which we call opinion?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ Is it a different faculty from science or the same?

Glaucon/ A different.

Socrates/ Then opinion is set over one thing and science over another, each by virtue of its own distinctive power or faculty.

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ May we say, then, that science is naturally related to that which is, to know that and how that which is, is? But rather, before we proceed, I think we must draw the following distinctions.

Glaucon/ What ones?

Socrates/ Shall we say that faculties, powers, abilities are a class of entities by virtue of which we and all other things are able to do what we or they are able to do? I mean that sight and hearing, for example, are faculties, if so be that you understand the class or type that I am trying to describe.

Glaucon/ I understand.

Socrates/ Hear, then, my notion about them. In a faculty I cannot see any color or shape or similar mark such as those on which in many other cases I fix my eyes in

discriminating in my thought one thing from another. But in the case of a faculty I look to one thing only—that to which it is related and what it effects, and it is in this way that I come to call each one of them a faculty, and that which is related to the same thing and accomplishes the same thing I call the same faculty, and that to another I call other. How about you, what is your practice?

Glaucon/ The same.

Socrates/ To return, then, my friend, to science or true knowledge, do you say that it is a faculty and a power, or in what class do you put it?

Glaucon/ Into this, the most potent of all faculties.

Socrates/ And opinion—shall we assign it to some other class than faculty?

Glaucon/ By no means, for that by which we are able to opine is nothing else than the faculty of opinion.

But not long ago you agreed that science and opinion are not identical.

Socrates/ How could any rational man affirm the identity of the infallible with the fallible?

Socrates/ Excellent, and we are plainly agreed that opinion is a different thing from scientific knowledge.

Glaucon/ Yes, different.

Socrates/ Each of them, then, since it has a different power, is related to a different object.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Science, I presume, to that which is, to know the condition of that which is?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But opinion, we say, opines.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does it opine the same thing that science knows, and will the knowable and the opinable be identical, or is that impossible?

Glaucon/ Impossible by our admissions, If different faculties are naturally related to different objects and both opinion and science are faculties, but each different from the other, as we say—these admissions do not leave place for the identity of the knowable and the opinable.

Socrates/ Then, if that which is a knowable, something other than that which is would be the opinable.

Glaucon/ Something else.

Socrates/ Does it opine that which is not, or is it impossible even to opine that which is not? Reflect. Does not he who opines bring his opinion to bear upon something or shall we reverse ourselves and say that it is possible to opine, yet opine nothing?

Glaucon/ That is impossible.

Socrates/ Then he who opines, opines some one thing?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But surely that which is not could not be designated as some one thing, but most rightly as nothing at all.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ To that which is not we of necessity assigned nescience, and to that which is, knowledge.

Glaucon/ Rightly.

Socrates/ Then neither that which is nor that which is not is the object of opinion.

Glaucon/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Then opinion would be neither nescience nor knowledge.

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Is it then a faculty outside of these, exceeding either knowledge in lucidity or ignorance in obscurity?

Glaucon/ It is neither.

Socrates/ But do you deem opinion something darker than knowledge but brighter than ignorance?

Glaucon/ Much so.

Socrates/ And does it lie within the boundaries of the two?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then opinion would be between the two.

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Were we not saying a little while ago that if anything should turn up such that it both is and is not, that sort of thing would lie between that which purely and absolutely is and that which wholly is not, and that the faculty correlated with it would be neither science nor nescience, but that which should appear to hold a place correspondingly between nescience and science.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And now there has turned up between these two the thing that we call opinion.

Glaucon/ There has.

Socrates/ It would remain, then, as it seems, for us to discover that which partakes of both, of *to be* and *not to be*, and that could not be rightly designated either in its exclusive purity, so that, if it shall be discovered, we may justly pronounce it to be the opinable, thus assigning extremes to extremes and the intermediate to the intermediate. Is not that so?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ This much premised, let him tell me, I will say, let him answer me, that good fellow who does not think there

is a beautiful in itself or any idea of beauty in itself always remaining the same and unchanged, but who does believe in many beautiful things—the lover of spectacles, I mean, who cannot endure to hear anybody say that the beautiful is one and the just one, and so of other things—and this will be our question. My good fellow, is there anyone of these many fair and honorable things that will not sometimes appear ugly and base? And of the just things, that will not seem unjust? And of the pious things, that will not seem impious?

Glaucon/ No, it is inevitable, that they would appear to be both beautiful in a way and ugly, and so with all the other things you asked about.

Socrates/ And again, do the many double things appear any the less halves than doubles?

Glaucon/ None the less.

Socrates/ And likewise of the great and the small things, the light and the heavy things—will they admit these predicates any more than their opposites?

Glaucon/ No, each of them will always hold of, partake of, both.

Socrates/ Then is each of these multiples rather than it *is not* that which one affirms it to be?

Glaucon/ They are like those jesters who palter with us in a double sense at banquets, and resemble the children's riddle about the eunuch and his hitting of the bat—with what and as it sat on what they signify that he struck it. For these things too equivocate, and it is impossible to conceive firmly anyone of them to be or not to be or both or neither.

Glaucon/ Do you know what to do with them, then? And can you find a better place to put them than that midway between existence or essence and the not to be? For we shall surely not discover a darker region than not-being that they

should still more not be, nor a brighter than being that they should still more be.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ We would seem to have found, then, that the many conventions of the many about the fair and honorable and other things are tumbled about in the mid-region between that which is not and that which is in the true and absolute sense.

Glaucon/ We have so found it.

Socrates/ But we agreed in advance that if anything of that sort should be discovered, it must be denominated opinable, not knowable, the wanderer between being caught by the faculty that is betwixt and between.

Glaucon/ We did.

Socrates/ shall affirm, then, that those who view many beautiful things but do not see the beautiful itself and are unable to follow another's guidance to it, and many just things, but not justice itself, and so in all cases—we shall say that such men have opinions about all things, but know nothing of the things they opine.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And, on the other hand, what of those who contemplate the very things themselves in each case, ever remaining the same and unchanged—shall we not say that they know and do not merely opine?

Glaucon/ That, too, necessarily follows.

Socrates/ Shall we not also say that the one welcomes to his thought and loves the things subject to knowledge and the other those to opinion? Do we not remember that we said that those loved and regarded tones and beautiful colors and the like, but they could not endure the notion of the reality of the beautiful itself?

Glaucon/ We do remember.

Socrates/ Shall we then offend their ears if we call them doxophilists rather than philosophers and will they be very angry if we so speak?

Glaucon/ Not if they heed my counsel, for to be angry with truth is not lawful.

Socrates/ Then to those who in each and every kind welcome the true being, lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion is the name we must give.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Book 6.

Socrates/ So now, Glaucon, our argument after winding a long and weary way has at last made clear to us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom and who are not.

Glaucon/ Yes, a shorter way is perhaps not feasible.

Socrates/ Apparently not. I, at any rate, think that the matter would have been made still plainer if we had had nothing but this to speak of, and if there were not so many things left which our purpose of discerning the difference between the just and the unjust life requires us to discuss.

Glaucon/ What, then, comes next?

Socrates/ What else, but the next in order? Since the philosophers are those who are capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging, while those who are incapable of this, but lose themselves and wander amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state?

Glaucon/ What, then, would be a fair statement of the matter?

Socrates/ Whichever, appear competent to guard the laws and pure suits of society, these we should establish as guardians.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Is this, then, clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight?

Glaucon/ Of course it is clear.

Socrates/ Do you think, then, that there is any appreciable difference between the blind and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their eyes on the

absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of it establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful, the just, and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those that are established?

Glaucon/ No, by heaven, there is not much difference.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our guardians, rather than those who have learned to know the ideal reality of things and who do not fall short of the others in experience and are not second to them in any part of virtue?

Glaucon/ It would be strange indeed, to choose others than the philosophers, provided they were not deficient in those other respects, for this very knowledge of the ideal would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities.

Socrates/ Then what we have to say is how it would be possible for the same persons to have both qualifications, is it not?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then, as we were saying at the beginning of this discussion, the first thing to understand is the nature that they must have from birth, and I think that if we sufficiently agree on this we shall also agree that the combination of qualities that we seek belongs to the same persons, and that we need no others for guardians of states than these.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ We must accept as agreed this trait of the philosophical nature, that it is ever enamored of the kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering between the two poles of generation and decay.

Glaucon/ Let us take that as agreed.

Socrates/ And, further, that their desire is for the whole of it and that they do not willingly renounce a small or a great, a more precious or a less honored, part of it. That was the point of our former illustration drawn from lovers and men covetous of honor.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Consider, then, next whether the men who are to meet our requirements must not have this further quality in their natures.

Glaucon/ What quality?

Socrates/ The spirit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ It is not only likely, my friend, but there is every necessity that he who is by nature enamored of anything should cherish all that is akin and pertaining to the object of his love.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Could you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Then can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and of falsehood?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every form.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But, again, we surely are aware that when in a man the desires incline strongly to anyone thing, they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted into another channel.

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ So, when a man's desires have been taught to flow in the channel of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be concerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body is the instrument, if the man is a true and not a sham philosopher.

Glaucon/ That is quite necessary.

Socrates/ Such a man will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth, for the things for the sake of which money and great expenditure are eagerly sought others may take seriously, but not he.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ And there is this further point to be considered in distinguishing the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature.

Glaucon/ What point?

Socrates/ You must not overlook any touch of illiberality. For nothing can be more contrary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that is ever to seek integrity and wholeness in all things human and divine.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Do you think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the contemplation of all time and all existence can deem this life of man a thing of great concern?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible?

Glaucon/ Least of all.

Socrates/ Then a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could have no part in genuine philosophy.

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a lover of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bargains?

Impossible.

This too, then, is a point that in your discrimination of the philosophical and unphilosophical soul you will observe—whether the man is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial and savage.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Nor will you overlook this, I fancy.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you suppose that anyone could properly love a task which he performed painfully and with little result from much toil?

Glaucon/ That could not be.

Socrates/ And if he could not keep what he learned, being steeped in oblivion, could he fail to be void of knowledge?

Glaucon/ How could he?

Socrates/ And so, having all his labor for naught, will he not finally be constrained to loathe himself and that occupation?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ The forgetful soul, then, we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good memory.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But assuredly we should not say that the want of harmony and seemliness in a nature conduces to anything else than the want of measure and proportion.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do you think that truth is akin to measure and proportion or to disproportion?

Glaucon/ To proportion.

Socrates/ Then in addition to our other requirements we look for a mind endowed with measure and grace, whose native disposition will make it easily guided to the aspect of the ideal reality in all things.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, is there any flaw in the argument? Have we not proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and compatible with one another for the soul that is to have a sufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?

Glaucon/ Nay, most necessary.

Socrates/ Is there any fault, then, that you can find with a pursuit which a man could not properly practice unless he were by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent, gracious, friendly, and akin to truth, justice, bravery, and sobriety?

Glaucon/ Momus himself, could not find fault with such a combination.

Socrates/ Well, then, when men of this sort are perfected by education and maturity of age, would you not entrust the state solely to them?

—And Adimantus said;

Adeimantus/ No one, Socrates, would be able to controvert these statements of yours. But, all the same, those who occasionally hear you argue thus feel in this way. They think that owing to their inexperience in the game of question and answer they are at every question led astray a little bit by the argument, and when these bits are accumulated at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is

their fall, and the apparent contradiction of what they at first said, and that just as by expert draughts players the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a move, so they are finally blocked and have their mouths stopped by this other game of draughts played not with counters but with words; yet the truth is not affected by that outcome. I say this with reference to the present case, for in this instance one might say that he is unable in words to contend against you at each question, but that when it comes to facts he sees that of those who turn to philosophy, not merely touching upon it to complete their education and dropping it while still young, but lingering too long in the study of it, the majority become cranks, not to say rascals, and those accounted the finest spirits among them are still rendered useless to society by the pursuit which you commend.

Socrates/ And I, on hearing this, said, Do you think that they are mistaken in saying so?

Adeimantus/ I don't know, but I would gladly hear your opinion.

Socrates/ You may hear, then, that I think that what they say is true.

Adeimantus/ How, then, can it be right to say that our cities will never be freed from their evils until the philosophers, whom we admit to be useless to them, become their rulers?

Socrates/ Your question, requires an answer expressed in a comparison or parable.

Adeimantus/ And you, of course, are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!

Socrates/ So, you are making fun of me after driving me into such an impasse of argument. But, all the same, hear my comparison so that you may still better see how I strain after imagery. For so cruel is the condition of the better sort

in relation to the state that there is no single thing like it in nature. But to find a likeness for it and a defense for them one must bring together many things in such a combination as painters mix when they portray goat stags and similar creatures. Conceive this sort of thing happening either on many ships or on one. Picture a shipmaster in height and strength surpassing all others on the ship, but who is slightly deaf and of similarly impaired vision, and whose knowledge of navigation is on a par with his sight and hearing. Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with one another for control of the helm, each claiming that it is his right to steer though he has never learned the art and cannot point out his teacher or any time when he studied it. And what is more, they affirm that it cannot be taught at all, but they are ready to make mincemeat of anyone who says that it can be taught, and meanwhile they are always clustered about the shipmaster importuning him and sticking at nothing to induce him to turn over the helm to them. And sometimes, if they fail and others get his ear, they put the others to death or cast them out from the ship, and then, after binding and stupefying the worthy shipmaster with mandragora or intoxication or otherwise, they take command of the ship, consume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make such a voyage of it as is to be expected from such, and as if that were not enough, they praise and celebrate as a navigator, a pilot, a master of ship craft, the man who is most cunning to lend a hand in persuading or constraining the shipmaster to let them rule, while the man who lacks this craft they censure as useless. They have no suspicion that the true pilot must give his attention to the time of the year, the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all that pertains to his art if he is to be a true ruler of a ship, and that he does not believe that there is any art or science of seizing the helm with or without the consent of

others, or any possibility of mastering this alleged art and the practice of it at the same time with the science of navigation. With such goings on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot would in very deed be called a stargazer, an idle babbler, a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this fashion?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ You take my meaning, I presume, and do not require us to put the comparison to the proof and show that the condition we have described is the exact counterpart of the relation of the state to the true philosophers.

Adeimantus/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ To begin with, then, teach this parable to the man who is surprised that philosophers are not honored in our cities, and try to convince him that it would be far more surprising if they were honored.

Adeimantus/ I will teach him.

Socrates/ And say to him further, You are right in affirming that the finest spirits among the philosophers are of no service to the multitude. But bid him blame for this uselessness, not the finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make use of them. For it is not the natural course of things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be ruled by him or that wise men should go to the doors of the rich. The author of that epigram was a liar. But the true nature of things is that whether the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the door of the physician, and everyone who needs to be governed to the door of the man who knows how to govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good for anything. But you will make no mistake in likening our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we were just

describing, and those whom these call useless and stargazing ideologists to the true pilots.

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Hence, and under these conditions, we cannot expect that the noblest pursuit should be highly esteemed by those whose way of life is quite the contrary. But far the greatest and chief disparagement of philosophy is brought upon it by the pretenders to that way of life, those whom you had in mind when you affirmed that the accuser of philosophy says that the majority of her followers are rascals and the better sort useless, while I admitted that what you said was true. Is not that so?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Have we not, then, explained the cause of the uselessness of the better sort?

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ Shall we next set forth the inevitableness of the degeneracy of the majority, and try to show if we can that philosophy is not to be blamed for this either?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Let us begin, then, what we have to say and hear by recalling the starting point of our description of the nature which he who is to be a scholar and gentleman must have from birth. The leader of the choir for him, if you recollect, was truth. That he was to seek always and altogether, on pain of being an impostor without part or lot in true philosophy.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that was said.

Socrates/ Is not this one point quite contrary to the prevailing opinion about him?

Adeimantus/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ Will it not be a fair plea in his defense to say that it was the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive emulously for true being and that he would not linger over the many particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with the nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs to lay hold on that kind of reality—the part akin to it, namely—and through that approaching it, and consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge, and truly live and grow, and so find surcease from his travail of soul, but not before?

Adeimantus/ No plea could be fairer.

Socrates/ Well, then, will such a man love falsehood, or, quite the contrary, hate it?

Adeimantus/ Hate it.

Socrates/ When truth led the way, no choir of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow in its train.

Adeimantus/ How could it?

Socrates/ But rather a sound and just character, which is accompanied by temperance.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ What need, then, of repeating from the beginning our proof of the necessary order of the choir that attends on the philosophical nature? You surely remember that we found pertaining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul, aptness to learn, memory. And when you interposed the objection that though everybody will be compelled to admit our statements, yet, if we abandoned mere words and fixed our eyes on the persons to whom the words referred, everyone would say that he actually saw some of them to be useless and most of them base with all baseness—it was in our search for the cause of this ill repute that we came to

the present question. Why is it that the majority are bad? And, for the sake of this, we took up again the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it must necessarily be?

Adeimantus/ That is so.

Socrates/ We have, then, to contemplate the causes of the corruption of this nature in the majority, while a small part escapes, even those whom men call not bad but useless. And after that in turn we are to observe those who imitate this nature and usurp its pursuits, and see what types of souls they are that thus entering upon a way of life which is too high for them and exceeds their powers, by the many discords and disharmonies of their conduct everywhere and among all men, bring upon philosophy the repute of which you speak.

Adeimantus/ Of what corruptions are you speaking?

Socrates/ I will try, to explain them to you if I can. I think everyone will grant us this point, that a nature such as we just now postulated for the perfect philosopher is a rare growth among men and is found in only a few. Don't you think so?

Adeimantus/ Most emphatically.

Socrates/ Observe, then, the number and magnitude of the things that operate to destroy these few.

Adeimantus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The most surprising fact of all is that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from philosophy. I am speaking of bravery, sobriety, and the entire list.

Adeimantus/ That does sound like a paradox.

Socrates/ Furthermore, all the so-called goods corrupt and divert, beauty and wealth and strength of body and

powerful family connections in the city and all things akin to them—you get my general meaning?

Adeimantus/ I do, and I would gladly hear a more precise statement of it.

Socrates/ Well, grasp it rightly as a general proposition and the matter will be clear and the preceding statement will not seem to you so strange.

Adeimantus/ How do you bid me proceed?

Socrates/ We know it to be universally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable or animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it falls short of its proper perfection when deprived of the food, the season, the place that suits it. For evil is more opposed to the good than to the not-good.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ So it is, I take it, natural that the best nature should fare worse than the inferior under conditions of nurture unsuited to it.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Then, Adimantus, shall we not similarly affirm that the best endowed souls become worse than the others under a bad education? Or do you suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight nature and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its nurture, while a weak nature will never be the cause of anything great, either for good or evil?

Adeimantus/ No, that is the case.

Socrates/ Then the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to consummate excellence, but, if it be sown and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue. Or are you too one of the multitude who believe

that there are young men who are corrupted by the Sophists, and that there are Sophists in private life who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning, and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this strain who are the chief Sophists and educate most effectively and mold to their own heart's desire young and old, men and women?

Adeimantus/ When?

Socrates/ Why, when, the multitude are seated together in assemblies or in courtrooms or theaters or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamor and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about reechoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise. In such case how do you think the young man's heart, as the saying is, is moved within him? What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm the same things that they do to be honorable and base, and will do as they do, and be even such as they?

Adeimantus/ That is quite inevitable, Socrates.

Socrates/ And, moreover, we have not yet mentioned the chief necessity and compulsion.

Adeimantus/ What is it?

Socrates/ That which these 'educators' and Sophists impose by action when their words fail to convince. Don't you know that they chastise the recalcitrant with loss of civic rights and fines and death?

Adeimantus/ They most emphatically do.

Socrates/ What other Sophist, then, or what private teaching do you think will prevail in opposition to these?

Adeimantus/ None, I fancy.

Socrates/ No, the very attempt is the height of folly. For there is not, never has been, and never will be a divergent type of character and virtue created by an education running counter to theirs—humanly speaking, I mean, my friend. For the divine, as the proverb says, all rules fail. And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and turns out well in the present condition of society and government, in saying that the providence of God preserves it you will not be speaking ill.

Adeimantus/ Neither do I think otherwise.

Socrates/ Then, think this also in addition.

Adeimantus/ What?

Socrates/ Each of these private teachers who work for pay, whom the politicians call Sophists and regard as their rivals, inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the multitude which they opine when they are assembled and calls this knowledge wisdom. It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humors and desires of a great strong beast which he had in his keeping, how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle, yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse of time should call it wisdom, and should construct thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires is honorable or base, good or evil, just or unjust, but should apply all these terms to the judgments of the great beast, calling the things that pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render of them, but should call what is necessary just and honorable, never having observed how great is the real

difference between the necessary and the good, and being incapable of explaining it to another. Do you not think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange educator?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you suppose that there is any difference between such a one and the man who thinks that it is wisdom to have learned to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley multitude in their assembly, whether about painting or music or, for that matter, politics? For if a man associates with these and offers and exhibits to them his poetry or any other product of his craft or any political service, and grants the mob authority over himself more than is unavoidable, the proverbial necessity of Diomedes will compel him to give the public what it likes, but that what it likes is really good and honorable, have you ever heard an attempted proof of this that is not simply ridiculous?

Adeimantus/ No, and I fancy I never shall hear it either.

Socrates/ Bearing all this in mind, recall our former question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars?

Adeimantus/ Not in the least.

Socrates/ Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom, is impossible for the multitude.

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ It is inevitable, then, that those who philosophize should be censured by them.

Adeimantus/ Inevitable.

Socrates/ And so likewise by those laymen who, associating with the mob, desire to curry favor with it.

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ From this point of view do you see any salvation that will suffer the born philosopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the end? Consider it in the light of what we said before. We agreed that quickness in learning, memory, courage, and magnificence were the traits of this nature.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then even as a boy among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the nature of his body matches the soul.

Adeimantus/ How could he fail to do so?

Socrates/ His kinsmen and fellow citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then they will fawn upon him with petitions and honors, anticipating and flattering the power that will be his.

Adeimantus/ That certainly is the usual way.

Socrates/ How, then, do you think such a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and wellborn therein, and thereto handsome and tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes, and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians, and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense?

Adeimantus/ He surely will.

Socrates/ And if to a man in this state of mind someone gently comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave to win it, do you think it will be easy for

him to lend an ear to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings?

Adeimantus/ Far from it.

Socrates/ And even supposing, that owing to a fortunate disposition and his affinity for the words of admonition one such youth apprehends something and is moved and drawn toward philosophy, what do we suppose will be the conduct of those who think that they are losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word or deed that they will stick at to keep him from being persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts it, both by private intrigue and public prosecution in the court?

Adeimantus/ That is inevitable.

Socrates/ Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to philosophize?

Adeimantus/ None at all.

Socrates/ Do you see, then, that we were not wrong in saying that the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding, and so do the so-called goods—riches and all such instrumentalities?

Adeimantus/ No, it was rightly said.

Socrates/ Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, is the destruction and corruption of the most excellent nature, which is rare enough in any case, as we affirm. And it is from men of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel, but a small nature never does anything great to a man or a city.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Those, then, to whom she properly belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy forlorn and unwed, themselves live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooers rush in and defile her as an orphan bereft of her kin, and attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of no account and the many accountable for many evils.

Adeimantus/ Why, yes, that is what they do say.

Socrates/ And plausibly, for other manikins, observing that the place is unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions, just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical arts to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft. For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity, and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated by their vulgar occupations even as their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Is not the picture which they present, precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master's daughter who has fallen into poverty and abandonment?

Adeimantus/ There is no difference at all.

Socrates/ Of what sort will probably be the offspring of such parents? Will they not be bastard and base?

Adeimantus/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ And so when men unfit for culture approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily, what sort of

ideas and opinions shall we say they beget? Will they not produce what may in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ There is a very small remnant, then, Adimantus, of those who consort worthily with philosophy, some wellborn and well-bred nature, it may be, held in check by exile, and so in the absence of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born in a little town scorns and disregards its parochial affairs, and a small group perhaps might by natural affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they justly disdain, and the bridle of our companion Theages also might operate as a restraint. For in the case of Theages all other conditions were at hand for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly habit of body keeping him out of politics holds him back. My own case, the divine sign, is hardly worth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to few or none before me. And those who have been of this little company and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics, and that there is no ally with whose aid the champion of justice could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts, unwilling to share their misdeeds and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his friends or the state, come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others—for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall in a storm and blast

of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take his departure with fair hope, serene and well content when the end comes.

Adeimantus/ Well, that is no very slight thing to have achieved before taking his departure.

Socrates/ He would not have accomplished any very great thing either, if it were not his fortune to live in a state adapted to his nature. In such a state only will he himself rather attain his full stature and together with his own preserve the commonweal. The causes and the injustice of the calumniation of philosophy, I think, have been fairly set forth, unless you have something to add.

Adeimantus/ No, I have nothing further to offer, on that point. But which of our present governments do you think is suitable for philosophy?

Socrates/ None whatever, but the very ground of my complaint is that no polity of today is worthy of the philosophical nature. This is just the cause of its perversion and alteration; as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont to be overcome and die out into the native growth, so this kind does not preserve its own quality but falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But if ever it finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then will it be apparent that this was in truth divine and all the others human in their natures and practices. Obviously then you are next going to ask what is this best form of government.

Adeimantus/ Wrong, I was going to ask not that but whether it is this one that we have described in our establishment of a state or another.

Socrates/ In other respects it is this one, but there is one special further point that we mentioned even then, namely,

that there would always have to be resident in such a state an element having the same conception of its constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing its laws.

Adeimantus/ That was said.

Socrates/ But it was not sufficiently explained, from fear of those objections on your part which have shown that the demonstration of it is long and difficult. And apart from that the remainder of the exposition is by no means easy.

Adeimantus/ Just what do you mean?

Socrates/ The manner in which a state that occupies itself with philosophy can escape destruction. For all great things are precarious and, as the proverb truly says, 'fine things are hard.'

Adeimantus/ All the same, our exposition must be completed by making this plain.

Socrates/ It will be no lack of will, but if anything, a lack of ability, that would prevent that. But you shall observe for yourself my zeal. And note again how zealously and recklessly I am prepared to say that the state ought to take up this pursuit in just the reverse of our present fashion.

Adeimantus/ In what way?

Socrates/ At present, those who do take it up are youths, just out of boyhood, who in the interval before they engage in business and money-making approach the most difficult part of it, and then drop it—and these are regarded forsooth as the best exemplars of philosophy. By the most difficult part I mean discussion. In later life they think they have done much if, when invited, they deign to listen to the philosophical discussions of others. That sort of thing they think should be by-work. And toward old age, with few exceptions, their light is quenched more completely than the sun of Heraclitus, inasmuch as it is never rekindled.

Adeimantus/ And what should they do?

Socrates/ Just the reverse. While they are lads and boys they should occupy themselves with an education and a culture suitable to youth, and while their bodies are growing to manhood take right good care of them, thus securing a basis and a support for the intellectual life. But with the advance of age, when the soul begins to attain its maturity, they should make its exercises more severe, and when the bodily strength declines and they are past the age of political and military service, then at last they should be given free range of the pasture and do nothing but philosophize, except incidentally, if they are to live happily, and, when the end has come, crown the life they have lived with a consonant destiny in that other world.

Adeimantus/ You really seem to be very much in earnest, Socrates, Yet I think most of your hearers are even more earnest in their opposition and will not be in the least convinced, beginning with Thrasymachus.

Socrates/ Do not try to breed a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus, who have just become friends and were not enemies before either. For we will spare no effort until we either convince him and the rest or achieve something that will profit them when they come to that life in which they will be born again and meet with such discussions as these.

Adeimantus/ A brief time your forecast contemplates.

Socrates/ Nay, nothing at all, as compared with eternity. However, the unwillingness of the multitude to believe what you say is nothing surprising. For of the thing here spoken they have never beheld a token, but only the forced and artificial chiming of word and phrase, not spontaneous and accidental as has happened here. But the figure of a man 'equilibrated' and 'assimilated' to virtue's self perfectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and holding rule in a city of

like quality, that is a thing they have never seen in one case or in many. Do you think they have?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Neither, my dear fellow, have they ever seriously inclined to hearken to fair and free discussions whose sole endeavor was to search out the truth at any cost for knowledge's sake, and which dwell apart and salute from afar all the subtleties and cavils that lead to naught but opinion and strife in courtroom and in private talk.

Adeimantus/ They have not.

Socrates/ For this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our fears declared under compulsion of the truth that neither city nor polity nor man either will ever be perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they wish it or not, and constrains the citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine inspiration a genuine passion for true philosophy takes possession either of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty or of themselves. To affirm that either or both of these things cannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite unreasonable. Only in that case could we be justly ridiculed as uttering things as futile as daydreams are. Is not that so?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past, or now are in some barbaric region far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will be realized when this philosophical Muse has taken control of the state. It is not a thing impossible to

happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult we too admit.

Adeimantus/ I also think so.

Socrates/ But the multitude—are you going to say? — does not think so.

Adeimantus/ That may be.

Socrates/ My dear fellow, do not thus absolutely condemn the multitude. They will surely be of another mind if in no spirit of contention but soothingly and endeavoring to do away with the dispraise of learning you point out to them whom you mean by philosophers, and define as we recently did their nature and their pursuits so that the people may not suppose you to mean those of whom they are thinking. Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you still going to deny that they will change their opinion and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone is ungentle to the gentle or grudging to the ungrudging if he himself is ungrudging and mild? I will anticipate you and reply that I think that only in some few and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or harsh a temper to be found.

Adeimantus/ And I, you may be assured, concur.

Socrates/ And do you not also concur in this very point that the blame for this harsh attitude of the many toward philosophy falls on that riotous crew who have burst in where they do not belong, wrangling with one another, filled with spite, and always talking about persons, a thing least befitting philosophy?

Adeimantus/ Least of all, indeed.

Socrates/ For surely, Adimantus, the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities has no leisure to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging

order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with admiration?

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Then the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man. But calumny is plentiful everywhere.

Adeimantus/ Yes, truly.

Socrates/ If, then, some compulsion is laid upon him to practice stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there, and not merely to mold and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ But if the multitude become aware that what we are saying of the philosopher is true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will they distrust our statement that no city could ever be blessed unless its lineaments were traced by artists who used the heavenly model?

Adeimantus/ They will not be harsh, if they perceive that. But tell me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in mind?

Socrates/ They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate

before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean.

Adeimantus/ And they would be right.

Socrates/ And thereafter, do you not think that they would sketch the figure of the constitution?

Adeimantus/ Surely.

Socrates/ And then, I take it, in the course of the work they would glance frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things, and alternately at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling and blending from various pursuits that hue of the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgment from that likeness of humanity which Homer too called, when it appeared in men, the image and likeness of God.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ And they would erase one touch or stroke and paint it another until in the measure of the possible they had made the characters of men pleasing and dear to God as may be.

Adeimantus/ That at any rate would be the fairest painting.

Socrates/ Are we then making any impression on those who you said were advancing to attack us with might and main? Can we convince them that such a political artist of character and such a painter exists as the one we then were praising when our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them, and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear what we are now saying?

Adeimantus/ Much gentler, if they are reasonable.

Socrates/ How can they controvert it? Will they deny that the lovers of wisdom are lovers of reality and truth?

Adeimantus/ That would be monstrous.

Socrates/ Or that their nature as we have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best?

Adeimantus/ Not that either.

Socrates/ Well, then, can they deny that such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will be perfectly good and philosophical so far as that can be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of those whom we have excluded?

Adeimantus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when we declare that, until the philosophical class wins control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city or citizens nor will the polity which we fable in words be brought to pass in deed?

Adeimantus/ They will perhaps be less so.

Socrates/ Instead of less so, may we not say that they have been altogether tamed and convinced, so that for very shame, if for no other reason, they may assent?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us assume, then, that they are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that there is no chance that the offspring of kings and rulers should be born with the philosophical nature?

Adeimantus/ Not one.

Socrates/ And can anyone prove that if so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The difficulty of their salvation we too concede, but that in all the course of time not one of all could be saved, will anyone maintain that?

Adeimantus/ How could he?

Socrates/ But surely, the occurrence of one such is enough, if he has a state which obeys him, to realize all that now seems so incredible.

Adeimantus/ Yes, one is enough.

Socrates/ For if such a ruler, ordains the laws and institutions that we have described it is surely not impossible that the citizens should be content to carry them out.

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Would it, then, be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the opinion to which we have come?

Adeimantus/ I think not.

Socrates/ And further that these things are best, if possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently shown.

Adeimantus/ Yes, sufficiently.

Socrates/ Our present opinion, then, about this legislation is that our plan would be best if it could be realized and that this realization is difficult yet not impossible.

Adeimantus/ That is the conclusion.

Socrates/ This difficulty disposed of, we have next to speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers of the constitution will form a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take up each study.

Adeimantus/ Yes, we have to speak of that.

Socrates/ I gained nothing, by my cunning in omitting heretofore the distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children and the appointment of rulers—because I knew that the absolutely true and right way would provoke censure and is difficult of realization—for now I am nonetheless compelled to discuss them. The matter of the women and children has been disposed of, but the education of the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from the starting point. We were saying, if you recollect, that they

must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested in pleasures and pains, and make it apparent that they do not abandon this fixed faith under stress of labors or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must be rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire, is to be established as ruler and to receive honors in life and after death and prizes as well. Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face in fear of starting our present debate.

Adeimantus/ Most true, I remember.

Socrates/ We shrank, my friend, from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect guardians we must establish philosophers.

Adeimantus/ Yes, assume it to have been said.

Socrates/ Note, then, that they will naturally be few, for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to grow in one, but for the most part these qualities are found apart.

Adeimantus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension, and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives, but such men, by reason of their quickness, are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them.

Adeimantus/ You speak truly.

Socrates/ And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way when confronted with studies. They are

not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed, and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest education nor in honors nor in rule.

Adeimantus/ And rightly.

Socrates/ Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke, and we have also now to speak of a point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies or whether it will faint and flinch as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body.

Adeimantus/ hat is certainly the right way of looking at it, But what do you understand by the greatest studies?

Socrates/ You remember, I presume, that after distinguishing three kinds in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery, and wisdom severally.

Adeimantus/ If I did not remember, I should not deserve to hear the rest.

Socrates/ Do you also remember what was said before this?

Adeimantus/ What?

Socrates/ We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way was

requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say.

Adeimantus/ Well, it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently to the rest of the company.

Socrates/ Nay, my friend, a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything, though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough and that there is no need of further inquiry.

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed, many experience this because of their sloth.

Socrates/ An experience, that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws.

Adeimantus/ That seems likely.

Socrates/ Then, such a one must go around the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body, or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him.

Adeimantus/ Why, are not these things the greatest? But is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described?

Socrates/ There is not only something greater, but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve to attain to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest matters?

Adeimantus/ It would indeed, but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned?

Socrates/ By no means, but do you ask the question. You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good by reference to which just things and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as no possession either is of any avail without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good?

Adeimantus/ No, by Zeus, I do not.

Socrates/ But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure to be the good, and the finer spirits intelligence or knowledge.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good.

Adeimantus/ Most absurdly.

Socrates/ Is it not absurd, if while taunting us with our ignorance of good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good, as if

we understood their meaning when they utter the word 'good.'

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures?

Adeimantus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same things to be both good and bad, are they not?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes about it?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here?

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ That, then, which every soul pursues and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition of its reality, but yet baffled and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things, and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things—in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens to whose hands we are to entrust all things?

Adeimantus/ Least of all.

Socrates/ I fancy, at any rate, that the just and the honorable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known, will not have secured a guardian of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this.

Adeimantus/ You surmise well.

Socrates/ Then our constitution will have its perfect and definitive organization only when such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it.

Adeimantus/ Necessarily, But you yourself, Socrates, do you think that knowledge is the good or pleasure or something else and different?

Socrates/ What a man it is. You made it very plain long ago that you would not be satisfied with what others think about it.

Adeimantus/ Why, it does not seem right to me either, Socrates, to be ready to state the opinions of others but not one's own when one has occupied himself with the matter so long.

Socrates/ But then, do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know?

Adeimantus/ By no means, as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell us his opinion what he opines.

Socrates/ Nay, have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge are ugly things? The best of them are blind. Or do you think that those who hold some true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way?

Adeimantus/ They do not differ at all.

Socrates/ Is it, then, ugly things that you prefer to contemplate, things blind and crooked, when you might hear from others what is luminous and fair?

Glaucon/ Nay, in heaven's name, Socrates, do not draw back, as it were, at the very goal. For it will content us if you explain the good even as you set forth the nature of justice, sobriety, and the other virtues.

Socrates/ It will right well content me, my dear fellow, but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughingstock. Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself, for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight today. But of what seems to be the offspring of the good and most nearly made in its likeness I am willing to speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the matter drop.

Glaucon/ Well, speak on, for you will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time.

Socrates/ I could wish, that I were able to make and you to receive the payment and not merely as now the interest. But at any rate receive this interest and the offspring of the good. Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false reckoning of the interest.

Glaucon/ We will do our best, to be on our guard. Only speak on.

Socrates/ Yes, after first coming to an understanding with you and reminding you of what has been said here before and often on other occasions.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ We predicate 'to be' of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them severally that they are, and so define them in our speech.

Glaucon/ We do.

Socrates/ And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about

and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ With which of the parts of ourselves, with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible things?

Glaucon/ With sight.

Socrates/ And do we not, hear audibles with hearing, and perceive all sensibles with the other senses?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ Have you ever observed, how much the greatest expenditure the creator of the senses has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen?

Glaucon/ Why, no, I have not.

Socrates/ Well, look at it thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium so that the one may hear and the other be heard, in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard?

Glaucon/ They need nothing.

Socrates/ Neither, I fancy, do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort. Or do you know of any?

Glaucon/ Not I.

Socrates/ But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though color be present, yet without the presence of a third thing specifically and

naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colors will remain invisible.

Glaucon/ What is this thing of which you speak?

Socrates/ The thing, that you call light.

Glaucon/ You say truly.

Socrates/ The bond, then, that yokes together visibility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no slight form than that which unites the other pairs, if light is not without honor.

Glaucon/ It surely is far from being so.

Socrates/ Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen?

Glaucon/ Why, the one that you too and other people mean, for your question evidently refers to the sun.

Socrates/ Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the sun.

Glaucon/ Why, no.

Socrates/ But it is, I think, the most sun-like of all the instruments of sense.

Glaucon/ By far the most.

Socrates/ And does it not receive the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause thereof is beheld by vision itself?

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good which the good begot to stand in a proportion with itself. As the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision.

Glaucon/ How is that? Explain further.

Socrates/ You are aware, that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colors the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ But when, I take it, they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason, but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason.

Glaucon/ Yes, it does.

Socrates/ This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known. Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still than these you will think rightly of it. But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration it is right to deem light and vision

sun-like, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform, but to think that either of them is the good is not right. Still higher honor belongs to the possession and habit of the good.

Glaucon/ An inconceivable beauty you speak of, if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surely cannot mean that it is pleasure.

Socrates/ Hush, but examine the similitude of it still further in this way.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation.

Glaucon/ Of course not.

Socrates/ In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power.

—And Glaucon very ludicrously said;

Glaucon/ Heaven save us, hyperbole can no further go.

Socrates/ The fault is yours, for compelling me to utter my thoughts about it.

Glaucon/ And don't desist, but at least expound the similitude of the sun, if there is anything that you are omitting.

Socrates/ Why, certainly, I am omitting a great deal.

Glaucon/ Well, don't omit the least bit.

Socrates/ I fancy, that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out.

Glaucon/ Do not.

Socrates/ Conceive then, as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eyeball, not to say the sky-ball, but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible.

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided into two unequal sections and cut each section again in the same ratio—the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order—and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections of the visible world, images. By images I mean, first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth, and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend.

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man.

Glaucon/ I so assume it.

Socrates/ Would you be willing to say, that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion—as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that of which it is a likeness?

Glaucon/ I certainly would.

Socrates/ Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption, and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas only and progressing systematically through ideas.

Glaucon/ I don't fully understand what you mean by this.

Socrates/ Well, I will try again, for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of them to themselves or others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out.

Glaucon/ Certainly, I know that.

Socrates/ And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw? And so in all cases. The very things which they mold and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things

they treat in their turn as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only by the mind.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true, but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter are esteemed as clear and held in honor.

Glaucon/ I understand, that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts.

Socrates/ Understand then, that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason itself lays hold of by the power of dialectic, treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses. underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.

Glaucon/ I understand, not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting points. And though it is true that those who

contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding and not their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true intelligence about them although the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason.

Socrates/ Your interpretation is quite sufficient. And now, answering to these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul—intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the second, belief for the third, and for the last, picture thinking or conjecture—and arrange them in a proportion, considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality.

Glaucon/ I understand, I concur and arrange them as you bid.

Book 7.

Socrates/ Next, compare our nature in respect of education and its lack to such an experience as this. Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean cavern with a long entrance open to the light on its entire width. Conceive them as having their legs and necks fettered from childhood, so that they remain in the same spot, able to look forward only, and prevented by the fetters from turning their heads. Picture further the light from a fire burning higher up and at a distance behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them a road along which a low wall has been built, as the exhibitors of puppet shows have partitions before the men themselves, above which they show the puppets.

Glaucon/ All that I see.

Socrates/ See also, then, men carrying past the wall implements of all kinds that rise above the wall, and human images and shapes of animals as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material, some of these bearers presumably speaking and others silent.

Glaucon/ A strange image you speak of, and strange prisoners.

Socrates/ Like to us. For, to begin with, tell me do you think that these men would have seen anything of themselves or of one another except the shadows cast from the fire on the wall of the cave that fronted them?

Glaucon/ How could they, if they were compelled to hold their heads unmoved through life?

Socrates/ And again, would not the same be true of the objects carried past them?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ If then they were able to talk to one another, do you not think that they would suppose that in naming the things that they saw they were naming the passing objects?

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And if their prison had an echo from the wall opposite them, when one of the passers-by uttered a sound, do you think that they would suppose anything else than the passing shadow to be the speaker?

Glaucon/ By Zeus, I do not.

Socrates/ Then in every way such prisoners would deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the artificial objects.

Glaucon/ Quite inevitably.

Socrates/ Consider, then, what would be the manner of the release and healing from these bonds and this folly if in the course of nature something of this sort should happen to them. When one was freed from his fetters and compelled to stand up suddenly and turn his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes to the light, and in doing all this felt pain and, because of the dazzle and glitter of the light, was unable to discern the objects whose shadows he formerly saw, what do you suppose would be his answer if someone told him that what he had seen before was all a cheat and an illusion, but that now, being nearer to reality and turned toward more real things, he saw more truly? And if also one should point out to him each of the passing objects and constrain him by questions to say what it is, do you not think that he would be at a loss and that he would regard what he formerly saw as more real than the things now pointed out to him?

Glaucon/ Far more real.

Socrates/ And if he were compelled to look at the light itself, would not that pain his eyes, and would he not turn

away and flee to those things which he is able to discern and regard them as in very deed more clear and exact than the objects pointed out?

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ And if, someone should drag him thence by force up the ascent which is rough and steep, and not let him go before he had drawn him out into the light of the sun, do you not think that he would find it painful to be so haled along, and would chafe at it, and when he came out into the light, that his eyes would be filled with its beams so that he would not be able to see even one of the things that we call real?

Glaucon/ Why, no, not immediately.

Socrates/ Then there would be need of habituation, I take it, to enable him to see the things higher up. And at first he would most easily discern the shadows and, after that, the likenesses or reflections in water of men and other things, and later, the things themselves, and from these he would go on to contemplate the appearances in the heavens and heaven itself, more easily by night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than by day the sun and the sun's light.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And so, finally, I suppose, he would be able to look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting, but in and by itself in its own place.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And at this point he would infer and conclude that this it is that provides the seasons and the courses of the year and presides over all things in the visible region, and is in some sort the cause of all these things that they had seen.

Glaucon/ Obviously, that would be the next step.

Socrates/ Well then, if he recalled to mind his first habitation and what passed for wisdom there, and his fellow bondsmen, do you not think that he would count himself happy in the change and pity them?

Glaucon/ He would indeed.

Socrates/ And if there had been honors and commendations among them which they bestowed on one another and prizes for the man who is quickest to make out the shadows as they pass and best able to remember their customary precedences, sequences, and coexistences, and so most successful in guessing at what was to come, do you think he would be very keen about such rewards, and that he would envy and emulate those who were honored by these prisoners and lorded it among them, or that he would feel with Homer and greatly prefer while living on earth to be serf of another, a landless man, and endure anything rather than opine with them and live that life?

Glaucon/ Yes, I think that he would choose to endure anything rather than such a life.

Socrates/ And consider this also. If such a one should go down again and take his old place would he not get his eyes full of darkness, thus suddenly coming out of the sunlight?

Glaucon/ He would indeed.

Socrates/ Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prisoners in 'evaluating' these shadows while his vision was still dim and before his eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time required for habituation would not be very short—would he not provoke laughter, and would it not be said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with his eyes ruined and that it was not worthwhile even to attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they not kill him?

Glaucon/ They certainly would.

Socrates/ This image then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a whole to all that has been said, likening the region revealed through sight to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of the things above is the soul's ascension to the intelligible region, you will not miss my surmise, since that is what you desire to hear. But Gods knows whether it is true. But, at any rate, my dream as it appears to me is that in the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of good, and that when seen it must needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely in private or public must have caught sight of this.

Glaucon/ I concur, so far as I am able.

Socrates/ Come then, and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who have attained to this height are not willing to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and the yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point, too, the likeness of our image holds.

Glaucon/ Yes, it is likely.

Socrates/ And again, do you think it at all strange, if a man returning from divine contemplations to the petty miseries of men cuts a sorry figure and appears most ridiculous, if, while still blinking through the gloom, and before he has become sufficiently accustomed to the environing darkness, he is compelled in courtrooms or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of justice or the

images that cast the shadows and to wrangle in debate about the notions of these things in the minds of those who have never seen justice itself?

Glaucon/ It would be by no means strange.

Socrates/ But a sensible man, would remember that there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light, and, believing that the same thing happens to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to discern something, he would not laugh unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming from a brighter life its vision was obscured by the unfamiliar darkness, or whether the passage from the deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world and the greater brightness had dazzled its vision. And so he would deem the one happy in its experience and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laughable than that at the expense of the soul that had come down from the light above.

Glaucon/ That is a very fair statement.

Socrates/ Then, if this is true, our view of these matters must be this, that education is not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in their professions. What they aver is that they can put true knowledge into a soul that does not possess it, as if they were inserting vision into blind eyes.

Glaucon/ They do indeed.

Socrates/ But our present argument indicates, that the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that could not be converted to the light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so this organ of knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the entire soul, like the scene-

shifting periactus in the theater, until the soul is able to endure the contemplation of essence and the brightest region of being. And this, we say, is the good, do we not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Of this very thing, then, there might be an art, an art of the speediest and most effective shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of producing vision in it, but on the assumption that it possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and does not look where it should, an art of bringing this about.

Glaucon/ Yes, that seems likely.

Socrates/ Then the other so-called virtues of the soul do seem akin to those of the body. For it is true that where they do not preexist, they are afterward created by habit and practice. But the excellence of thought, it seems, is certainly of a more divine quality, a thing that never loses its potency, but, according to the direction of its conversion, becomes useful and beneficent, or, again, useless and harmful. Have you never observed in those who are popularly spoken of as bad, but smart men how keen is the vision of the little soul, how quick it is to discern the things that interest it, a proof that it is not a poor vision which it has, but one forcibly enlisted in the service of evil, so that the sharper its sight the more mischief it accomplishes?

Glaucon/ I certainly have.

Socrates/ Observe then, that this part of such a soul, if it had been hammered from childhood, and had thus been struck free of the leaden weights, so to speak, of our birth and becoming, which attaching themselves to it by food and similar pleasures and gluttonies turn downward the vision of the soul—if, I say, freed from these, it had suffered a conversion toward the things that are real and true, that same faculty of the same men would have been most keen

in its vision of the higher things, just as it is for the things toward which it is now turned.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Well, then, is not this also likely and a necessary consequence of what has been said, that neither could men who are uneducated and inexperienced in truth ever adequately preside over a state, nor could those who had been permitted to linger on to the end in the pursuit of culture—the one because they have no single aim and purpose in life to which all their actions, public and private, must be directed, and the others, because they will not voluntarily engage in action, believing that while still living they have been transported to the Islands of the Blessed?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ It is the duty of us, the founders, then, to compel the best natures to attain the knowledge which we pronounced the greatest, and to win to the vision of the good, to scale that ascent, and when they have reached the heights and taken an adequate view, we must not allow what is now permitted.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ That they should linger there, and refuse to go down again among those bondsmen and share their labors and honors, whether they are of less or of greater worth.

Glaucon/ Do you mean to say that we must do them this wrong, and compel them to live an inferior life when the better is in their power?

Socrates/ You have again forgotten, my friend, that the law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce this condition in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion, and requiring them to impart to one another any benefit which they are severally

able to bestow upon the community, and that it itself creates such men in the state, not that it may allow each to take what course pleases him, but with a view to using them for the binding together of the commonwealth.

Glaucon/ True, I did forget it.

Socrates/ Observe, then, Glaucon, that we shall not be wronging, either, the philosophers who arise among us, but that we can justify our action when we constrain them to take charge of the other citizens and be their guardians. For we will say to them that it is natural that men of similar quality who spring up in other cities should not share in the labors there. For they grow up spontaneously from no volition of the government in the several states, and it is justice that the self-grown, indebted to none for its breeding, should not be zealous either to pay to anyone the price of its nurture. But you we have engendered for yourselves and the rest of the city to be, as it were, king bees and leaders in the hive. You have received a better and more complete education than the others, and you are more capable of sharing both ways of life. Down you must go then, each in his turn, to the habitation of the others and accustom yourselves to the observation of the obscure things there. For once habituated you will discern them infinitely better than the dwellers there, and you will know what each of the 'idols' is and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good. So our city will be governed by us and you with waking minds, and not, as most cities now which are inhabited and ruled darkly as in a dream by men who fight one another for shadows and wrangle for office as if that were a great good, when the truth is that the city in which those who are to rule are least eager to hold office must needs be best administered and most free from dissension, and the state

that gets the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Will our alumni, then, disobey us when we tell them this, and will they refuse to share in the labors of state each in his turn while permitted to dwell most of the time with one another in that purer world?

Glaucon/ Impossible, for we shall be imposing just commands on men who are just. Yet they will assuredly approach office as an unavoidable necessity, and in the opposite temper from that of the present rulers in our cities.

Socrates/ For the fact is, dear friend, if you can discover a better way of life than office holding for your future rulers, a well-governed city becomes a possibility. For only in such a state will those rule who are really rich, not in gold, but in the wealth that makes happiness—a good and wise life. But if, being beggars and starvelings from lack of goods of their own, they turn to affairs of state thinking that it is thence that they should grasp their own good, then it is impossible. For when office and rule become the prizes of contention, such a civil and internecine strife destroys the office seekers themselves and the city as well.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Can you name any other type or ideal of life that looks with scorn on political office except the life of true philosophers?

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ But what we require, is that those who take office should not be lovers of rule. Otherwise there will be a contest with rival lovers.

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ What others, then, will you compel to undertake the guardianship of the city than those who have most intelligence of the principles that are the means of good government and who possess distinctions of another kind and a life that is preferable to the political life?

Glaucon/ No others.

Socrates/ Would you, then, have us proceed to consider how such men may be produced in a state and how they may be led upward to the light even as some are fabled to have ascended from Hades to the gods?

Glaucon/ Of course I would.

Socrates/ So this, it seems, would not be the whirling of the shell in the children's game, but a conversion and turning about of the soul from a day whose light is darkness to the veritable day—that ascension to reality of our parable which we will affirm to be true philosophy.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Must we not, then, consider what studies have the power to effect this?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ What, then, Glaucon, would be the study that would draw the soul away from the world of becoming to the world of being? A thought strikes me while I speak. Did we not say that these men in youth must be athletes of war?

Glaucon/ We did.

Socrates/ Then the study for which we are seeking must have this additional qualification.

Glaucon/ What one?

Socrates/ That it be not useless to soldiers.

Glaucon/ Why, yes, it must, if that is possible.

Socrates/ But in our previous account they were educated in gymnastics and music.

Glaucon/ They were.

Socrates/ And gymnastics, I take it, is devoted to that which grows and perishes, for it presides over the growth and decay of the body.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Then this cannot be the study that we seek.

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ Is it, then, music, so far as we have already described it?

Glaucon/ Nay, that, was the counterpart of gymnastics, if you remember. It educated the guardians through habits, imparting by the melody a certain harmony of spirit that is not science, and by the rhythm measure and grace, and also qualities akin to these in the words of tales that are fables and those that are more nearly true. But it included no study that tended to any such good as you are now seeking.

Socrates/ Your recollection is most exact, for in fact it had nothing of the kind. But in heaven's name, Glaucon, what study could there be of that kind? For all the arts were in our opinion base and mechanical.

Glaucon/ Surely, and yet what other study is left apart from music, gymnastics, and the arts?

Socrates/ Come, if we are unable to discover anything outside of these, let us take something that applies to all alike.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Why, for example, this common thing that all arts and forms of thought and all sciences employ, and which is among the first things that everybody must learn.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ This trifling matter, of distinguishing one and two and three. I mean, in sum, number and calculation. Is

it not true of them that every art and science must necessarily partake of them?

Glaucon/ Indeed it is.

Socrates/ The art of war too?

Glaucon/ Most necessarily.

Socrates/ Certainly, then, Palamedes in the play is always making Agamemnon appear a most ridiculous general. Have you not noticed that he affirms that by the invention of number he marshaled the troops in the army at Troy in ranks and companies and enumerated the ships and everything else as if before that they had not been counted, and Agamemnon apparently did not know how many feet he had if he couldn't count? And yet what sort of a general do you think he would be in that case?

Glaucon/ A very queer one in my opinion, if that was true.

Socrates/ Shall we not, then, set down as a study requisite for a soldier the ability to reckon and number?

Glaucon/ Most certainly, if he is to know anything whatever of the ordering of his troops—or rather if he is to be a man at all.

Socrates/ Do you observe then, in this study what I do?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ It seems likely that it is one of those studies which we are seeking that naturally conduce to the awakening of thought, but that no one makes the right use of it, though it really does tend to draw the mind to essence and reality.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I will try, to show you at least my opinion. Do you keep watch and observe the things I distinguish in my mind as being or not being conducive to our purpose, and

either concur or dissent, in order that here too we may see more clearly whether my surmise is right.

Glaucon/ Point them out.

Socrates/ I do point them out, if you can discern that some reports of our perceptions do not provoke thought to reconsideration because the judgment of them by sensation seems adequate, while others always invite the intellect to reflection because the sensation yields nothing that can be trusted.

Glaucon/ You obviously mean distant appearances, and shadow painting.

Socrates/ You have quite missed my meaning.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ The experiences that do not provoke thought are those that do not at the same time issue in a contradictory perception. Those that do have that effect I set down as provocatives, when the perception no more manifests one thing than its contrary, alike whether its impact comes from nearby or afar. An illustration will make my meaning plain. Here, we say, are three fingers, the little finger, the second, and the middle.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Assume that I speak of them as seen near at hand. But this is the point that you are to consider.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Each one of them appears to be equally a finger, and in this respect it makes no difference whether it is observed as intermediate or at either extreme, whether it is white or black, thick or thin, or of any other quality of this kind. For in none of these cases is the soul of most men impelled to question the reason and to ask what in the world

is a finger, since the faculty of sight never signifies to it at the same time that the finger is the opposite of a finger.

Glaucon/ Why, no, it does not.

Socrates/ Then, it is to be expected that such a perception will not provoke or awaken reflection and thought.

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ But now, what about the bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our vision's view of them adequate, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them is situated outside or in the middle, and similarly of the relation of touch, to thickness and thinness, softness and hardness? And are not the other senses also defective in their reports of such things? Or is the operation of each of them as follows? In the first place, the sensation that is set over the hard is of necessity related also to the soft, and it reports to the soul that the same thing is both hard and soft to its perception.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ Then, is not this again a case where the soul must be at a loss as to what significance for it the sensation of hardness has, if the sense reports the same thing as also soft? And, similarly, as to what the sensation of light and heavy means by light and heavy, if it reports the heavy as light, and the light as heavy?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed, these communications to the soul are strange and invite reconsideration.

Socrates/ Naturally, then, it is in such cases as these that the soul first summons to its aid the calculating reason and tries to consider whether each of the things reported to it is one or two.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if it appears to be two, each of the two is a distinct unit.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ If, then, each is one and both two, the very meaning of 'two' is that the soul will conceive them as distinct. For if they were not separable, it would not have been thinking of two, but of one.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Sight too saw the great and the small, we say, not separated but confounded. Is not that so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And for the clarification of this, the intelligence is compelled to contemplate the great and small, not thus confounded but as distinct entities, in the opposite way from sensation.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And is it not in some such experience as this that the question first occurs to us, What in the world, then, is the great and the small?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And this is the origin of the designation intelligible for the one, and visible for the other.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ This, then, is just what I was trying to explain a little while ago when I said that some things are provocative of thought and some are not, defining as provocative things that impinge upon the senses together with their opposites, while those that do not I said do not tend to awaken reflection.

Glaucon/ Well, now I understand, and agree.

Glaucon/ To which class, then, do you think number and the one belong?

Glaucon/ I cannot conceive.

Socrates/ Well, reason it out from what has already been said. For, if unity is adequately seen by itself or apprehended by some other sensation, it would not tend to draw the mind to the apprehension of essence, as we were explaining in the case of the finger. But if some contradiction is always seen coincidentally with it so that it no more appears to be one than the opposite, there would forthwith be need of something to judge between them, and it would compel the soul to be at a loss and to inquire, by arousing thought in itself, and to ask, whatever then is the one as such, and thus the study of unity will be one of the studies that guide and convert the soul to the contemplation of true being.

Glaucon/ But surely, the visual perception of it does especially involve this. For we see the same thing at once as one and as an indefinite plurality.

Socrates/ Then if this is true of the one, the same holds of all number, does it not?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But, further, reckoning and the science of arithmetic are wholly concerned with number.

Glaucon/ They are, indeed.

Socrates/ And the qualities of number appear to lead to the apprehension of truth.

Glaucon/ Beyond anything.

Socrates/ Then, as it seems, these would be among the studies that we are seeking. For a soldier must learn them in order to marshal his troops, and a philosopher because he must rise out of the region of generation and lay hold on essence or he can never become a true reckoner.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ And our guardian is soldier and philosopher in one.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ It is befitting, then, Glaucon, that this branch of learning should be prescribed by our law and that we should induce those who are to share the highest functions of state to enter upon that study of calculation and take hold of it, not as amateurs, but to follow it up until they attain to the contemplation of the nature of number, by pure thought, not for the purpose of buying and selling, as if they were preparing to be merchants or hucksters, but for the uses of war and for facilitating the conversion of the soul itself from the world of generation to essence and truth.

Glaucon/ Excellently said.

Socrates/ And, further, it occurs to me, now that the study of reckoning has been mentioned, that there is something fine in it, and that it is useful for our purpose in many ways, provided it is pursued for the sake of knowledge and not for huckstering.

Glaucon/ In what respect?

Socrates/ Why, in respect of the very point of which we were speaking, that it strongly directs the soul upward and compels it to discourse about pure numbers, never acquiescing if anyone proffers to it in the discussion numbers attached to visible and tangible bodies. For you are doubtless aware that experts in this study, if anyone attempts to cut up the 'one' in argument, laugh at him and refuse to allow it, but if you mince it up, they multiply, always on guard lest the one should appear to be not one but a multiplicity of parts.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Suppose now, Glaucon, someone were to ask them, My good friends, what numbers are these you are

talking about, in which the one is such as you postulate, each unity equal to every other without the slightest difference and admitting no division into parts? What do you think would be their answer?

Glaucon/ This, I think—that they are speaking of units which can only be conceived by thought, and which it is not possible to deal with in any other way.

Socrates/ You see, then, my friend, that this branch of study really seems to be indispensable for us, since it plainly compels the soul to employ pure thought with a view to truth itself.

Glaucon/ It most emphatically does.

Socrates/ Again, have you ever noticed this, that natural reckoners are by nature quick in virtually all their studies? And the slow, if they are trained and drilled in this, even if no other benefit results, all improve and become quicker than they were?

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ And, further, as I believe, studies that demand more toil in the learning and practice than this we shall not discover easily nor find many of them.

Glaucon/ You will not, in fact.

Socrates/ Then, for all these reasons, we must not neglect this study, but must use it in the education of the best-endowed natures.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Assuming this one point to be established, let us in the second place consider whether the study that comes next is suited to our purpose.

Glaucon/ What is that? Do you mean geometry?

Socrates/ Precisely that.

Glaucon/ So much of it, as applies to the conduct of war is obviously suitable. For in dealing with encampments and the occupation of strong places and the bringing of troops into column and line and all the other formations of an army in actual battle and on the march, an officer who had studied geometry would be a very different person from what he would be if he had not.

Socrates/ But still, for such purposes a slight modicum of geometry and calculation would suffice. What we have to consider is whether the greater and more advanced part of it tends to facilitate the apprehension of the idea of good. That tendency, we affirm, is to be found in all studies that force the soul to turn its vision round to the region where dwells the most blessed part of reality, which it is imperative that it should behold.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Then if it compels the soul to contemplate essence, it is suitable; if genesis, it is not.

Glaucon/ So we affirm.

Socrates/ This at least, will not be disputed by those who have even a slight acquaintance with geometry, that this science is in direct contradiction with the language employed in it by its adepts.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Their language is most ludicrous, though they cannot help it, for they speak as if they were doing something and as if all their words were directed toward action. For all their talk is of squaring and applying and adding and the like, whereas in fact the real object of the entire study is pure knowledge.

Glaucon/ That is absolutely true.

Socrates/ And must we not agree on a further point?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That it is the knowledge of that which always is, and not of a something which at some time comes into being and passes away.

Glaucon/ That is readily admitted, for geometry is the knowledge of the eternally existent.

Socrates/ Then, my good friend, it would tend to draw the soul to truth, and would be productive of a philosophical attitude of mind, directing upward the faculties that now wrongly are turned earthward.

Glaucon/ Nothing is surer.

Socrates/ Then nothing is surer, than that we must require that the men of your fair city shall never neglect geometry, for even the by-products of such study are not slight.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ What you mentioned, its uses in war, and also we are aware that for the better reception of all studies there will be an immeasurable difference between the student who has been imbued with geometry and the one who has not.

Glaucon/ Immense indeed, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, lay this down as a second branch of study for our lads?

Glaucon/ Let us do so.

Socrates/ Shall we set down astronomy as a third, or do you dissent?

Glaucon/ I certainly agree, for quickness of perception about the seasons and the courses of the months and the years is serviceable, not only to agriculture and navigation, but still more to the military art.

Socrates/ I am amused, at your apparent fear lest the multitude may suppose you to be recommending useless

studies. It is indeed no trifling task, but very difficult to realize that there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that is purified and kindled afresh by such studies when it has been destroyed and blinded by our ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes, for by it only is reality beheld. Those who share this faith will think your words superlatively true. But those who have and have had no inkling of it will naturally think them all moonshine. For they can see no other benefit from such pursuits worth mentioning. Decide, then, on the spot, to which party you address yourself. Or are you speaking to neither, but chiefly carrying on the discussion for your own sake, without however grudging any other who may be able to profit by it?

Glaucon/ This is the alternative I choose, that it is for my own sake chiefly that I speak and ask questions and reply.

Socrates/ Fall back a little, then, for we just now did not rightly select the study that comes next after geometry.

Glaucon/ What was our mistake?

Socrates/ After plane surfaces, we went on to solids in revolution before studying them in themselves. The right way is next in order after the second dimension to take the third. This, I suppose, is the dimension of cubes and of everything that has depth.

Glaucon/ Why, yes, it is, but this subject, Socrates, does not appear to have been investigated yet.

Socrates/ There are two causes of that. First, inasmuch as no city holds them in honor, these inquiries are languidly pursued owing to their difficulty. And secondly, the investigators need a director, who is indispensable for success and who, to begin with, is not easy to find, and then, if he could be found, as things are now, seekers in this field would be too arrogant to submit to his guidance. But if the

state as a whole should join in superintending these studies and honor them, these specialists would accept advice, and continuous and strenuous investigation would bring out the truth. Since even now, lightly esteemed as they are by the multitude and hampered by the ignorance of their students as to the true reasons for pursuing them, they nevertheless in the face of all these obstacles force their way by their inherent charm and it would not surprise us if the truth about them were made apparent.

Glaucon/ It is true, that they do possess an extraordinary attractiveness and charm. But explain more clearly what you were just speaking of. The investigation of plane surfaces, I presume, you took to be geometry?

Socrates/ Yes.

Glaucon/ And then, at first you took astronomy next and then you drew back.

Socrates/ Yes, for in my haste to be done I was making less speed. For, while the next thing in order is the study of the third dimension or solids, I passed it over because of our absurd neglect to investigate it, and mentioned next after geometry astronomy, which deals with the movements of solids.

Glaucon/ That is right.

Socrates/ Then, as our fourth study, let us set down astronomy, assuming that this science, the discussion of which has been passed over, is available, provided, that is, that the state pursues it.

Glaucon/ That is likely, and instead of the vulgar utilitarian commendation of astronomy, for which you just now rebuked me, Socrates, I now will praise it on your principles. For it is obvious to everybody, I think that this study certainly compels the soul to look upward and leads it away from things here to those higher things.

Socrates/ It may be obvious to everybody except me, for I do not think so.

Glaucon/ What do you think?

Socrates/ As it is now handled by those who are trying to lead us up to philosophy, I think that it turns the soul's gaze very much downward.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ You seem to me in your thought to put a most liberal interpretation on the 'study of higher things,' for apparently if anyone with back-thrown head should learn something by staring at decorations on a ceiling, you would regard him as contemplating them with the higher reason and not with the eyes. Perhaps you are right and I am a simpleton. For I, for my part, am unable to suppose that any other study turns the soul's gaze upward than that which deals with being and the invisible. But if anyone tries to learn about the things of sense, whether gaping up or blinking down, I would never say that he really learns—for nothing of the kind admits of true knowledge—nor would I say that his soul looks up, but down, even though he study floating on his back on sea or land.

Glaucon/ A fair retort, Your rebuke is deserved. But how, then, did you mean that astronomy ought to be taught contrary to the present fashion if it is to be learned in a way to conduce to our purpose?

Socrates/ Thus. These sparks that paint the sky, since they are decorations on a visible surface, we must regard, to be sure, as the fairest and most exact of material things, but we must recognize that they fall far short of the truth, the movements, namely, of real speed and real slowness in true number and in all true figures both in relation to one another and as vehicles of the things they carry and contain. These

can be apprehended only by reason and thought, but not by sight, or do you think otherwise?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Then, we must use the blazonry of the heavens as patterns to aid in the study of those realities, just as one would do who chanced upon diagrams drawn with special care and elaboration by Daedalus or some other craftsman or painter. For anyone acquainted with geometry who saw such designs would admit the beauty of the workmanship, but would think it absurd to examine them seriously in the expectation of finding in them the absolute truth with regard to equals or doubles or any other ratio.

Glaucon/ How could it be otherwise than absurd?

Socrates/ Do you not think, that one who was an astronomer in very truth would feel in the same way when he turned his eyes upon the movements of the stars? He will be willing to concede that the artisan of heaven fashioned it and all that it contains in the best possible manner for such a fabric. But when it comes to the proportions of day and night, and of their relation to the month, and that of the month to the year, and of the other stars to these and one another, do you not suppose that he will regard as a very strange fellow the man who believes that these things go on forever without change or the least deviation—though they possess bodies and are visible objects—and that his unremitting quest is the realities of these things?

Glaucon/ I at least do think so, now that I hear it from you.

Socrates/ It is by means of problems, then, as in the study of geometry, that we will pursue astronomy too, and we will let be the things in the heavens, if we are to have a part in the true science of astronomy and so convert to right

use from uselessness that natural indwelling intelligence of the soul.

Glaucon/ You enjoin a task, that will multiply the labor of our present study of astronomy many times.

Socrates/ And I fancy, that our other injunctions will be of the same kind if we are of any use as lawgivers. However, what suitable studies have you to suggest?

Glaucon/ Nothing, thus offhand.

Socrates/ Yet, surely, motion in general provides not one but many forms or species, according to my opinion. To enumerate them all will perhaps be the task of a wise man, but even to us two of them are apparent.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ In addition to astronomy, its counterpart.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ We may venture to suppose, that as the eyes are framed for astronomy so the ears are framed for the movements of harmony, and these are in some sort kindred sciences, as the Pythagoreans affirm and we admit, do we not, Glaucon?

Glaucon/ We do.

Socrates/ Then, since the task is so great, shall we not inquire of them what their opinion is and whether they have anything to add? And we in all this will be on the watch for what concerns us.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ To prevent our fosterlings from attempting to learn anything that does not conduce to the end we have in view, and does not always come out at what we said ought to be the goal of everything, as we were just now saying about astronomy. Or do you not know that they repeat the same procedure in the case of harmonies? They transfer it

to hearing and measure audible concords and sounds against one another, expending much useless labor just as the astronomers do.

Glaucon/ Yes, by heaven, and most absurdly too. They talk of something they call minims and, laying their ears alongside, as if trying to catch a voice from next door, some affirm that they can hear a note between and that this is the least interval and the unit of measurement, while others insist that the strings now render identical sounds, both preferring their ears to their minds.

Socrates/ You, are speaking of the worthies who vex and torture the strings and rack them on the pegs, but—not to draw out the comparison with strokes of the plectrum and the musician's complaints of too responsive and too reluctant strings—I drop the figure, and tell you that I do not mean these people, but those others whom we just now said we would interrogate about harmony. Their method exactly corresponds to that of the astronomer, for the numbers they seek are those found in these heard concords, but they do not ascend to generalized problems and the consideration which numbers are inherently concordant and which not and why in each case.

Glaucon/ A superhuman task.

Socrates/ Say, rather, useful, for the investigation of the beautiful and the good, but if otherwise pursued, useless.

Glaucon/ That is likely.

Socrates/ And what is more, I take it that if the investigation of all these studies goes far enough to bring out their community and kinship with one another, and to infer their affinities, then to busy ourselves with them contributes to our desired end, and the labor taken is not lost, but otherwise it is vain.

Glaucon/ I too so surmise, but it is a huge task of which you speak, Socrates.

Socrates/ Are you talking about the prelude, or what? Or do we not know that all this is but the preamble of the law itself, the prelude of the strain that we have to apprehend? For you surely do not suppose that experts in these matters are reasoners and dialecticians?

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus, except a very few whom I have met.

Socrates/ But have you ever supposed, that men who could not render and exact an account of opinions in discussion would ever know anything of the things we say must be known?

Glaucon/ No is surely the answer to that too.

Socrates/ This, then, at last, Glaucon, is the very law which dialectic recites, the strain which it executes, of which, though it belongs to the intelligible, we may see an imitation in the progress of the faculty of vision, as we described its endeavor to look at living things themselves and the stars themselves and finally at the very sun. In like manner, when anyone by dialectic attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense to find his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible, as the other in our parable came to the goal of the visible.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ What, then, will you not call this progress of thought dialectic?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ And the release from bonds, and the conversion from the shadows to the images that cast them and to the light and the ascent from the subterranean cavern to the world above, and there the persisting inability to look

directly at animals and plants and the light of the sun, but the ability to see the phantasms created by God in water and shadows of objects that are real and not merely, as before, the shadows of images cast through a light which, compared with the sun, is as unreal as they—all this procedure of the arts and sciences that we have described indicates their power to lead the best part of the soul up to the contemplation of what is best among realities, as in our parable the clearest organ in the body was turned to the contemplation of what is brightest in the corporeal and visible region.

Glaucon/ I accept this, as the truth, and yet it appears to me very hard to accept, and again, from another point of view, hard to reject. Nevertheless, since we have not to hear it at this time only, but are to repeat it often hereafter, let us assume that these things are as now has been said, and proceed to the melody itself, and go through with it as we have gone through the prelude. Tell me, then, what is the nature of this faculty of dialectic? Into what divisions does it fall? And what are its ways? For it is these, it seems, that would bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest on the road and then come to the end of our journeying.

Socrates/ You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further, though on my part there will be no lack of good will. And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me—though whether rightly or not I may not properly affirm. But that something like this is what we have to see, I must affirm. Is not that so?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ And may we not also declare that nothing less than the power of dialectic could reveal this, and that only

to one experienced in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other wise possible?

Glaucon/ That, too, we may properly affirm.

Socrates/ This, at any rate, no one will maintain in dispute against us, that there is any other way of inquiry that attempts systematically and in all cases to determine what each thing really is. But all the other arts have for their object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly concerned with generation and composition or with the service and tendance of the things that grow and are put together, while the remnant which we said did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry and the studies that accompany it—are, as we see, dreaming about being, but the clear waking vision of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the assumptions which they employ undisturbed and cannot give any account of them. For where the starting point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known, what possibility is there that assent in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge or science?

Glaucon/ None.

Socrates/ Then, is not dialectic the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is literally true that when the eye of the soul is sunk in the barbaric slough of the Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as helpers and cooperators in this conversion the studies and sciences which we enumerated, which we called sciences often from habit, though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness than opinion and more obscurity than science. 'Understanding,' I believe, was the term we employed. But I presume we shall not dispute about the

name when things of such moment lie before us for consideration.

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Are you satisfied, then, as before, to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth conjecture or picture thought—and the last two collectively opinion, and the first two intellection, opinion dealing with generation, and intellection with essence, and this relation being expressed in the proportion : as essence is to generation, so is intellection to opinion, and as intellection is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to image thinking or surmise? But the relation between their objective correlates and the division into two parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the intelligible, let us dismiss, Glaucon, lest it involve us in discussion many times as long as the preceding.

Glaucon/ Well, I agree with you about the rest of it, so far as I am able to follow.

Socrates/ And do you not also give the name dialectician to the man who is able to exact an account of the essence of each thing? And will you not say that the one who is unable to do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an account to himself and others, does not possess full reason and intelligence about the matter?

Glaucon/ How could I say that he does?

Socrates/ And is not this true of the good likewise—that the man who is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea of the good, and who cannot, as it were in battle, running the gauntlet of all tests, and striving to examine everything by essential reality and not by opinion, hold on his way through all this without tripping in his reasoning—the man who lacks this power, you will say, does not really

know the good itself or any particular good, but if he apprehends any adumbration of it, his contact with it is by opinion, not by knowledge, and dreaming and dozing through his present life, before he awakens here he will arrive at the house of Hades and fall asleep forever?

Glaucon/ Yes, by Zeus, all this I will stoutly affirm.

Socrates/ But, surely, if you should ever nurture in fact your children whom you are now nurturing and educating in word, you would not suffer them, I presume, to hold rule in the state, and determine the greatest matters, being themselves as irrational as the lines so called in geometry.

Glaucon/ Why, no.

Socrates/ Then you will provide by law that they shall give special heed to the discipline that will enable them to ask and answer questions in the most scientific manner?

Glaucon/ I will so legislate, in conjunction with you.

Socrates/ Do you agree, then, that we have set dialectic above all other studies to be as it were the coping stone—and that no other higher kind of study could rightly be placed above it, but that our discussion of studies is now complete?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ The distribution, then, remains, to whom we are to assign these studies and in what way.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Do you remember, then, the kind of man we chose in our former selection of rulers?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ In most respects, then, you must suppose that we have to choose those same natures. The most stable, the most brave and enterprising are to be preferred, and, so far as practicable, the most comely. But in addition we must

now require that they not only be virile and vigorous in temper, but that they possess also the gifts of nature suitable to this type of education.

Glaucon/ What qualities are you distinguishing?

Socrates/ They must have, my friend, to begin with, a certain keenness for study, and must not learn with difficulty. For souls are much more likely to flinch and faint in severe studies than in gymnastics, because the toil touches them more nearly, being peculiar to them and not shared with the body.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And we must demand a good memory and doggedness and industry in every sense of the word. Otherwise how do you suppose anyone will consent both to undergo all the toils of the body and to complete so great a course of study and discipline?

Glaucon/ No one could, unless most happily endowed.

Socrates/ Our present mistake, and the disesteem that has in consequence fallen upon philosophy are, as I said before, caused by the unfitness of her associates and wooers. They should not have been bastards but true scions.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ In the first place, the aspirant to philosophy must not limp in his industry, in the one half of him loving, in the other shunning, toil. This happens when anyone is a lover of gymnastics and hunting and all the labors of the body, yet is not fond of learning or of listening or inquiring, but in all such matters hates work. And he too is lame whose industry is one-sided in the reverse way.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Likewise in respect of truth, we shall regard as maimed in precisely the same way the soul that hates the

voluntary lie and is troubled by it in its own self and greatly angered by it in others, but cheerfully accepts the involuntary falsehood and is not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge, but wallows in the mud of ignorance as insensitively as a pig.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And with reference to sobriety, and bravery and loftiness of soul and all the parts of virtue, we must especially be on our guard to distinguish the baseborn from the trueborn. For when the knowledge necessary to make such discriminations is lacking in individual or state, they unawares employ at random for any of these purposes the crippled and baseborn natures, as their friends or rulers.

Glaucon/ It is so indeed.

Socrates/ But we, must be on our guard in all such cases, since, if we bring men sound of limb and mind to so great a study and so severe a training, justice herself will have no fault to find with us, and we shall preserve the state and our polity. But, if we introduce into it the other sort, the outcome will be just the opposite, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule upon philosophy.

Glaucon/ That would indeed be shameful.

Socrates/ Most certainly, but here again I am making myself a little ridiculous.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ I forgot, that we were jesting, and I spoke with too great intensity. For, while speaking, I turned my eyes upon philosophy, and when I saw how she is undeservedly reviled, I was revolted, and, as if in anger, spoke too earnestly to those who are in fault.

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus, not too earnestly for me as a hearer.

Socrates/ But too much so for me as a speaker. But this we must not forget, that in our former selection we chose old men, but in this one that will not do. For we must not take Solon's word for it that growing old a man is able to learn many things. He is less able to do that than to run a race. To the young belong all heavy and frequent labors.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Now, all this study of reckoning and geometry and all the preliminary studies that are indispensable preparation for dialectic must be presented to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory instruction.

Glaucon/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because, a free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly, for while bodily labors performed under constraint do not harm the body, nothing that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Do not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies by compulsion but by play. That will also better enable you to discern the natural capacities of each.

Glaucon/ There is reason in that.

Socrates/ And do you not remember, that we also declared that we must conduct the children to war on horseback to be spectators, and wherever it may be safe, bring them to the front and give them a taste of blood as we do with whelps?

Glaucon/ I do remember.

Socrates/ And those who as time goes on show the most facility in all these toils and studies and alarms are to be selected and enrolled on a list.

Glaucon/ At what age?

Socrates/ When they are released from their prescribed gymnastics. For that period, whether it be two or three years, incapacitates them for other occupations. For great fatigue and much sleep are the foes of study, and moreover one of our tests of them, and not the least, will be their behavior in their physical exercises.

Glaucon/ Surely it is.

Socrates/ After this period, those who are given preference from the twenty-year class will receive greater honors than the others, and they will be required to gather the studies which they disconnectedly pursued as children in their former education into a comprehensive survey of their affinities with one another and with the nature of things.

Glaucon/ That, at any rate, is the only instruction that abides with those who receive it.

Socrates/ And it is also, the chief test of the dialectic nature and its opposite. For he who can view things in their connection is a dialectician; he who cannot, is not.

Glaucon/ I concur.

Socrates/ With these qualities in mind, it will be your task to make a selection of those who manifest them best from the group who are steadfast in their studies and in war and in all lawful requirements, and when they have passed the thirtieth year to promote them, by a second selection from those preferred in the first, to still greater honors, and to prove and test them by the power of dialectic to see which of them is able to disregard the eyes and other senses and go on to being itself in company with truth. And at this point, my friend, the greatest care is requisite.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Do you not note, how great is the harm caused by our present treatment of dialectic?

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ Its practitioners are infected with lawlessness.

Glaucon/ They are indeed.

Socrates/ Do you suppose, that there is anything surprising in this state of mind, and do you not think it pardonable?

Glaucon/ In what way, pray?

Socrates/ Their case, resembles that of a supposititious son reared in abundant wealth and a great and numerous family amid many flatterers, who on arriving at manhood should become aware that he is not the child of those who call themselves his parents, and should not be able to find his true father and mother. Can you divine what would be his feelings toward the flatterers and his supposed parents in the time when he did not know the truth about his adoption, and, again, when he knew it? Or would you like to hear my surmise?

Glaucon/ I would.

Socrates/ Well, then, my surmise is, that he would be more likely to honor his reputed father and mother and other kin than the flatterers, and that there would be less likelihood of his allowing them to lack for anything, and that he would be less inclined to do or say to them anything unlawful, and less liable to disobey them in great matters than to disobey the flatterers—during the time when he did not know the truth.

Glaucon/ It is probable.

Socrates/ But when he found out the truth, I surmise that he would grow more remiss in honor and devotion to them and pay more regard to the flatterers, whom he would heed more than before and would henceforth live by their rule, associating with them openly, while for that former

father and his adoptive kin he would not care at all, unless he was naturally of a very good disposition.

Glaucon/ All that you say, would be likely to happen. But what is the pertinency of this comparison to the novices of dialectic?

Socrates/ It is this. We have, I take it, certain convictions from childhood about the just and the honorable, in which, in obedience and honor to them, we have been bred as children under their parents.

Glaucon/ Yes, we have.

Socrates/ And are there not other practices going counter to these, that have pleasures attached to them and that flatter and solicit our souls, but do not win over men of any decency; but they continue to hold in honor the teachings of their fathers and obey them?

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ Well, then, when a man of this kind is met by the question, What is the honorable? and on his giving the answer which he learned from the lawgiver, the argument confutes him, and by many and various refutations upsets his faith and makes him believe that this thing is no more honorable than it is base, and when he has had the same experience about the just and the good and everything that he chiefly held in esteem, how do you suppose that he will conduct himself thereafter in the matter of respect and obedience to this traditional morality?

Glaucon/ It is inevitable, that he will not continue to honor and obey as before.

Socrates/ And then, when he ceases to honor these principles and to think that they are binding on him, and cannot discover the true principles, will he be likely to adopt any other way of life than that which flatters his desires?

Glaucon/ He will not.

Socrates/ He will, then, seem to have become a rebel to law and convention instead of the conformer that he was.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And is not this experience of those who take up dialectic in this fashion to be expected and, as I just now said, deserving of much leniency?

Glaucon/ Yes, and of pity too.

Socrates/ Then that we may not have to pity thus your thirty-year-old disciples, must you not take every precaution when you introduce them to the study of dialectic?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And is it not one chief safeguard not to suffer them to taste of it while young? For I fancy you have not failed to observe that lads, when they first get a taste of disputation, misuse it as a form of sport, always employing it contentiously, and, imitating confuters, they themselves confute others. They delight like puppies in pulling about and tearing with words all who approach them.

Glaucon/ Exceedingly so.

Socrates/ And when they have themselves confuted many and been confuted by many, they quickly fall into a violent distrust of all that they formerly held true, and the outcome is that they themselves and the whole business of philosophy are discredited with other men.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ But an older man will not share this craze, but will rather choose to imitate the one who consents to examine truth dialectically than the one who makes a jest and a sport of mere contradiction, and so he will himself be more reasonable and moderate, and bring credit rather than discredit upon his pursuit.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And were not all our preceding statements made with a view to this precaution—our requirement that those permitted to take part in such discussions must have orderly and stable natures, instead of the present practice of admitting to it any chance and unsuitable applicant?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Is it enough, then, to devote to the continuous and strenuous study of dialectic undisturbed by anything else, as in the corresponding discipline in bodily exercises, twice as many years as were allotted to that?

Glaucon/ Do you mean six or four?

Socrates/ Well, set it down as five. For after that you will have to send them down into the cave again, and compel them to hold commands in war and the other offices suitable to youth, so that they may not fall short of the other type in experience either. And in these offices, too, they are to be tested to see whether they will remain steadfast under diverse solicitations or whether they will flinch and swerve.

Glaucon/ How much time do you allow for that?

Socrates/ Fifteen years, and at the age of fifty those who have survived the tests and approved themselves altogether the best in every task and form of knowledge must be brought at last to the goal. We shall require them to turn upward the vision of their souls and fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all, and when they have thus beheld the good itself they shall use it as a pattern for the right ordering of the state and the citizens and themselves throughout the remainder of their lives, each in his turn, devoting the greater part of their time to the study of philosophy, but when the turn comes for each, toiling in the service of the state and holding office for the city's sake, regarding the task not as a fine thing but a necessity. And so, when each generation has educated others like

themselves to take their place as guardians of the state, they shall depart to the Islands of the Blessed and there dwell. And the state shall establish public memorials and sacrifices for them as to divinities if the Pythian oracle approves or, if not, as to divine and godlike men.

Glaucon/ A most beautiful finish, Socrates, you have put upon your rulers, as if you were a statuary.

Socrates/ And on the women too, Glaucon, for you must not suppose that my words apply to the men more than to all women who arise among them endowed with the requisite qualities.

Glaucon/ That is right, if they are to share equally in all things with the men as we laid it down.

Socrates/ Well, then, do you admit that our notion of the state and its polity is not altogether a daydream, but that though it is difficult, it is in a way possible and in no other way than that described—when genuine philosophers, many or one, becoming masters of the state scorn the present honors, regarding them as illiberal and worthless, but prize the right and the honors that come from that above all things, and regarding justice as the chief and the one indispensable thing, in the service and maintenance of that reorganize and administer their city?

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ All inhabitants above the age of ten, they will send out into the fields, and they will take over the children, remove them from the manners and habits of their parents, and bring them up in their own customs and laws which will be such as we have described. This is the speediest and easiest way in which such a city and constitution as we have portrayed could be established and prosper and bring most benefit to the people among whom it arises.

Glaucon/ Much the easiest, and I think you have well explained the manner of its realization if it should ever be realized.

Socrates/ Then, have we not now said enough about this state and the corresponding type of man—for it is evident what our conception of him will be?

Glaucon/ It is evident, and, to answer your question, I think we have finished.

Book 8.

Socrates/ Very good. We are agreed then, Glaucon, that the state which is to achieve the height of good government must have community of wives and children and all education, and also that the pursuits of men and women must be the same in peace and war, and that the rulers or kings over them are to be those who have approved themselves the best in both war and philosophy.

Glaucon/ We are agreed.

Socrates/ And we further granted this, that when the rulers are established in office they shall conduct these soldiers and settle them in habitations such as we described, that have nothing private for anybody but are common for all, and in addition to such habitations we agreed, if you remember, what should be the nature of their possessions.

Glaucon/ Why, yes, I remember, that we thought it right that none of them should have anything that ordinary men now possess, but that, being as it were athletes of war and guardians, they should receive from the others as pay for their guardianship each year their yearly sustenance, and devote their entire attention to the care of themselves and the state.

Socrates/ That is right. But now that we have finished this topic let us recall the point at which we entered on the digression that has brought us here, so that we may proceed on our way again by the same path.

Glaucon/ That is easy, for at that time, almost exactly as now, on the supposition that you had finished the description of the city, you were going on to say that you assumed such a city as you then described and the corresponding type of man to be good, and that too though, as it appears, you had a still finer city and type of man to tell of, but at any rate you were saying that the others are

aberrations, if this city is right. But regarding the other constitutions, my recollection is that you said there were four species worth speaking of and observing their defects and the corresponding types of men, in order that when we had seen them all and come to an agreement about the best and the worst man, we might determine whether the best is the happiest and the worst most wretched or whether it is otherwise. And when I was asking what were the four constitutions you had in mind, Polemarchus and Adimantus thereupon broke in, and that was how you took up the discussion again and brought it to this point.

Socrates/ Your memory is most exact.

Glaucon/ A second time then, as in a wrestling match, offer me the same hold, and when I repeat my question try to tell me what you were then about to say.

Socrates/ I will if I can.

Glaucon/ And indeed, I am eager myself to hear what four forms of government you meant.

Socrates/ There will be no difficulty about that. For those I mean are precisely those that have names in common usage—that which the many praise, your Cretan and Spartan constitution, and the second in place and in honor, that which is called oligarchy, a constitution teeming with many ills, and its sequent counterpart and opponent, democracy, and then the noble tyranny surpassing them all, the fourth and final malady of a state. Can you mention any other type of government, I mean any other that constitutes a distinct species? For, no doubt, there are hereditary principalities and purchased kingships, and similar intermediate constitutions which one could find in even greater numbers among the barbarians than among the Greeks.

Glaucon/ Certainly many strange ones are reported.

Socrates/ Are you aware, then, that there must be as many types of character among men as there are forms of government? Or do you suppose that constitutions spring from the proverbial oak or rock and not from the characters of the citizens, which, as it were, by their momentum and weight in the scales draw other things after them?

Glaucon/ They could not possibly come from any other source.

Socrates/ Then if the forms of government are five, the patterns of individual souls must be five also.

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ Now we have already described the man corresponding to aristocracy or the government of the best, whom we aver to be the truly good and just man.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ Must we not, then, next after this, survey the inferior types, the man who is contentious and covetous of honor, corresponding to the Laconian constitution, and the oligarchic man in turn, and the democratic and the tyrannical, in order that, after observing the most unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just, and complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure justice and pure injustice in respect of the happiness and unhappiness of the possessor, so that we may either follow the counsel of Thrasymachus and pursue injustice or the present argument and pursue justice?

Glaucon/ Assuredly, that is what we have to do.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, as we began by examining moral qualities in states before individuals, as being more manifest there, so now consider first the constitution based on the love of honor? I do not know of any special name for it in use. We must call it either timocracy or timarchy. And then in connection with this we will consider the man of that

type, and thereafter oligarchy and the oligarch, and again, fixing our eyes on democracy, we will contemplate the democratic man, and fourthly, after coming to the city ruled by a tyrant and observing it, we will in turn take a look into the tyrannical soul, and so try to make ourselves competent judges of the question before us.

Glaucon/ That would be at least a systematic and consistent way of conducting the observation and the decision.

Socrates/ Come, then, let us try to tell in what way a timocracy would arise out of an aristocracy. Or is this the simple and unvarying rule, that in every form of government revolution takes its start from the ruling class itself, when dissension arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself, however small it be, innovation is impossible?

Glaucon/ Yes, that is so.

Socrates/ How, then, Glaucon, will disturbance arise in our city, and how will our helpers and rulers fall out and be at odds with one another and themselves? Shall we, like Homer, invoke the Muses to tell 'how faction first fell upon them,' and say that these goddesses playing with us and teasing us as if we were children address us in lofty, mock-serious tragic style?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Somewhat in this fashion. Hard in truth it is for a state thus constituted to be shaken and disturbed, but since for everything that has come into being destruction is appointed, not even such a fabric as this will abide for all time, but it shall surely be dissolved, and this is the manner of its dissolution. Not only for plants that grow from the earth but also for animals that live upon it there is a cycle of bearing and barrenness for soul and body as often as the revolutions of their orbs come full circle, in brief courses for

the short-lived and oppositely for the opposite. But the laws of prosperous birth or infertility for your race, the men you have bred to be your rulers will not for all their wisdom ascertain by reasoning combined with sensation, but they will escape them, and there will be a time when they will beget children out of season. Now for divine begettings there is a period comprehended by a perfect number, and for mortal by the first in which augmentations dominating and dominated when they have attained to three distances and four limits of the assimilating and the dissimilating, the waxing and the waning, render all things conversable and commensurable with one another, whereof a basal four thirds wedded to the pempad yields two harmonies at the third augmentation, the one the product of equal factors taken one hundred times, the other of equal length one way but oblong—one dimension of a hundred numbers determined by the rational diameters of the pempad lacking one in each case, or of the irrational lacking two; the other dimension of a hundred cubes of the triad. And this entire geometric number is determinative of this thing, of better and inferior births. And when your guardians, missing this, bring together brides and bridegrooms unseasonably, the offspring will not be wellborn or fortunate. Of such offspring the previous generation will establish the best, to be sure, in office, but still these, being unworthy, and having entered in turn into the powers of their fathers, will first as guardians begin to neglect us, paying too little heed to music and then to gymnastics, so that our young men will deteriorate in their culture, and the rulers selected from them will not approve themselves very efficient guardians for testing Hesiod's and our races of gold, silver, bronze, and iron. And this intermixture of the iron with the silver and the bronze with the gold will engender unlikeness and an unharmonious unevenness, things that always beget war and enmity

wherever they arise. 'Of this lineage, look you,' we must aver the dissension to be, wherever it occurs and always.

Glaucon/ 'And rightly too,' we shall affirm that the Muses answer.

Socrates/ They must needs, since they are Muses.

Glaucon/ Well, then, what do the Muses say next?

Socrates/ When strife arose, the two groups were pulling against each other, the iron and bronze toward money-making and the acquisition of land and houses and gold and silver, and the other two, the golden and silver, not being poor, but by nature rich in their souls, were trying to draw them back to virtue and their original constitution, and thus, striving and contending against one another, they compromised on the plan of distributing and taking for themselves the land and the houses, enslaving and subjecting as *perioeci* and serfs their former friends and supporters, of whose freedom they had been the guardians, and occupying themselves with war and keeping watch over these subjects.

Glaucon/ I think, that this is the starting point of the transformation.

Socrates/ Would not this polity, then, be in some sort intermediate between aristocracy and oligarchy?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ By this change, then, it would arise. But after the change what will be its way of life? Is it not obvious that in some things it will imitate the preceding polity, in some the oligarchy, since it is intermediate, and that it will also have some qualities peculiar to itself?

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then in honoring its rulers and in the abstention of its warrior class from farming and handicraft

and money-making in general, and in the provision of common public tables and the devotion to physical training and expertness in the game and contest of war—in these traits it will copy the preceding state?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But in its fear to admit clever men to office, since the men it has of this kind are no longer simple and strenuous but of mixed strain, and in its inclining rather to the more high-spirited and simple-minded type, who are better suited for war than for peace, and in honoring the stratagems and contrivances of war and occupying itself with war most of the time—in these respects for the most part its qualities will be peculiar to itself?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Such men, will be avid of wealth, like those in an oligarchy, and will cherish a fierce secret lust for gold and silver, owning storehouses and private treasuries where they may hide them away, and also the enclosures of their homes, literal private love nests in which they can lavish their wealth on their women and any others they please with great expenditure.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And will they not be stingy about money, since they prize it and are not allowed to possess it openly, prodigal of others' wealth because of their appetites, enjoying their pleasures stealthily, and running away from the law as boys from a father, since they have not been educated by persuasion but by force because of their neglect of the true Muse, the companion of discussion and philosophy, and because of their preference of gymnastics to music?

Glaucon/ You perfectly describe, a polity that is a mixture of good and evil.

Socrates/ Why, yes, the elements have been mixed, but the most conspicuous feature in it is one thing only, due to the predominance of the high-spirited element, namely contentiousness and covetousness of honor.

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Such, then, would be the origin and nature of this polity if we may merely outline the figure of a constitution in words and not elaborate it precisely, since even the sketch will suffice to show us the most just and the most unjust type of man, and it would be an impracticable task to set forth all forms of government without omitting any, and all customs and qualities of men.

Glaucon/ Quite right.

Socrates/ What, then, is the man that corresponds to this constitution? What is his origin and what his nature?

Adeimantus/ I fancy, that he comes rather close to Glaucon here in point of contentiousness.

Socrates/ Perhaps, in that, but I do not think their natures are alike in the following respects.

Adeimantus/ In what?

Socrates/ He will have to be somewhat self-willed and lacking in culture, yet a lover of music and fond of listening to talk and speeches, though by no means himself a rhetorician. And to slaves such a one would be harsh, not scorning them as the really educated do, but he would be gentle with the freeborn and very submissive to officials, a lover of office and of honor, not basing his claim to office on ability to speak or anything of that sort but on his exploits in war or preparation for war, and he would be a devotee of gymnastics and hunting.

Adeimantus/ Why, yes, that is the spirit of that polity.

Socrates/ And would not such a man be disdainful of wealth too in his youth, but the older he grew the more he would love it because of his participation in the covetous nature and because his virtue is not sincere and pure since it lacks the best guardian?

Adeimantus/ What guardian?

Socrates/ Reason, blended with culture, which is the only indwelling preserver of virtue throughout life in the soul that possesses it.

Adeimantus/ Well said.

Socrates/ This is the character, of the timocratic youth, resembling the city that bears his name.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ His origin is somewhat on this wise. Sometimes he is the young son of a good father who lives in a badly governed state and avoids honors and office and lawsuits and all such meddlesomeness and is willing to forbear something of his rights in order to escape trouble.

Adeimantus/ How does he originate?

Socrates/ Why, when, to begin with, he hears his mother complaining that her husband is not one of the rulers and for that reason she is slighted among the other women, and when she sees that her husband is not much concerned about money and does not fight and brawl in private lawsuits and in the public assembly, but takes all such matters lightly, and when she observes that he is self-absorbed in his thoughts and neither regards nor disregards her overmuch, and in consequence of all this laments and tells the boy that his father is too slack and no kind of a man, with all the other complaints with which women nag in such cases.

Adeimantus/ Many indeed, and after their kind.

Socrates/ You are aware, then, that the very house slaves of such men, if they are loyal and friendly, privately say the same sort of things to the sons, and if they observe a debtor or any other wrong-doer whom the father does not prosecute, they urge the boy to punish all such when he grows to manhood and prove himself more of a man than his father, and when the lad goes out he hears and sees the same sort of thing. Men who mind their own affairs in the city are spoken of as simpletons and are held in slight esteem, while meddlers who mind other people's affairs are honored and praised. Then it is that the youth, hearing and seeing such things, and on the other hand listening to the words of his father, and with a near view of his pursuits contrasted with those of other men, is solicited by both, his father watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle in his soul and the others the appetitive and the passionate; and as he is not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications, under these two solicitations he comes to a compromise and turns over the government in his soul to the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man haughty of soul and covetous of honor.

Adeimantus/ You have, I think, most exactly described his origin.

Socrates/ Then, we have our second polity and second type of man.

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ Shall we then, as Aeschylus would say, tell of another champion before another gate, or rather, in accordance with our plan, the city first?

Adeimantus/ That, by all means.

Socrates/ The next polity, I believe, would be oligarchy.

Adeimantus/ And what kind of a regime, do you understand by oligarchy?

Socrates/ That based on a property qualification, wherein the rich hold office and the poor man is excluded.

Adeimantus/ I understand.

Socrates/ Then, is not the first thing to speak of how timocracy passes over into this?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And truly, the manner of the change is plain even to the proverbial blind man.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ That treasure house which each possesses filled with gold destroys that polity, for first they invent ways of expenditure for themselves and pervert the laws to this end, and neither they nor their wives obey them.

Adeimantus/ That is likely.

Socrates/ And then, I take it, by observing and emulating one another they bring the majority of them to this way of thinking.

Adeimantus/ That is likely.

Socrates/ And so, as time goes on, and they advance in the pursuit of wealth, the more they hold that in honor the less they honor virtue. May not the opposition of wealth and virtue be conceived as if each lay in the scale of a balance inclining opposite ways?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ So, when wealth is honored in a state, and the wealthy, virtue and the good are less honored.

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And that which men at any time honor they practice, and what is not honored is neglected.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Thus, finally, from being lovers of victory and lovers of honor they become lovers of gain getting and of money, and they commend and admire the rich man and put him in office but despise the man who is poor.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And is it not then that they pass a law defining the limits of an oligarchic polity, prescribing a sum of money, a larger sum where it is more of an oligarchy, where it is less a smaller, and proclaiming that no man shall hold office whose property does not come up to the required valuation? And this law they either put through by force of arms, or without resorting to that they establish their government by terrorization. Is not that the way of it?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ The establishment then, one may say, is in this wise.

Adeimantus/ Yes, but what is the character of this constitution, and what are the defects that we said it had?

Socrates/ To begin with, consider the nature of its constitutive and defining principle. Suppose men should appoint the pilots of ships in this way, by property qualification, and not allow a poor man to navigate, even if he were a better pilot.

Adeimantus/ A sorry voyage they would make of it.

Socrates/ And is not the same true of any other form of rule?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Except of a city, or does it hold for a city too?

Adeimantus/ Most of all, by as much as that is the greatest and most difficult rule of all.

Socrates/ Here, then, is one very great defect in oligarchy.

Adeimantus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Well, and is this a smaller one?

Adeimantus/ What?

Socrates/ That such a city should of necessity be not one, but two, a city of the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together, and always plotting against one another.

Adeimantus/ No, by Zeus, it is not a bit smaller.

Socrates/ Nor, further, can we approve of this—the likelihood that they will not be able to wage war, because of the necessity of either arming and employing the multitude, and fearing them more than the enemy, or else, if they do not make use of them, of finding themselves on the field of battle, oligarchs indeed, and rulers over a few. And to this must be added their reluctance to contribute money, because they are lovers of money.

Adeimantus/ No, indeed, that is not admirable.

Socrates/ And what of the trait we found fault with long ago—the fact that in such a state the citizens are busybodies and Jacks-of-all-trades, farmers, financiers, and soldiers all in one? Do you think that is right?

Adeimantus/ By no manner of means.

Socrates/ Consider now whether this polity is not the first that admits that which is the greatest of all such evils.

Adeimantus/ What?

Socrates/ The allowing a man to sell all his possessions, which another is permitted to acquire, and after selling them to go on living in the city, but as no part of it, neither a money-maker, nor a craftsman, nor a knight, nor a foot soldier, but classified only as a pauper and a dependent.

Adeimantus/ This is the first.

Socrates/ There certainly is no prohibition of that sort of thing in oligarchic states. Otherwise some of their citizens

would not be excessively rich, and others out-and-out paupers.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ But observe this. When such a fellow was spending his wealth, was he then of any more use to the state in the matters of which we were speaking, or did he merely seem to belong to the ruling class, while in reality he was neither ruler nor helper in the state, but only a consumer of goods?

Adeimantus/ It is so, He only seemed, but was just a spendthrift.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, say of him that as the drone springs up in the cell, a pest of the hive, so such a man grows up in his home, a pest of the state?

Adeimantus/ By all means, Socrates.

Socrates/ And has not God, Adimantus, left the drones which have wings and fly stingless one and all, while of the drones here who travel afoot he has made some stingless but has armed others with terrible stings? And from the stingless finally issue beggars in old age, but from those furnished with stings all that are denominated malefactors?

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ It is plain, then, that wherever you see beggars in a city, there are somewhere in the neighborhood concealed thieves and cut-purses and temple robbers and similar artists in crime.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Well, then, in oligarchic cities do you not see beggars?

Adeimantus/ Nearly all are such, except the ruling class.

Socrates/ Are we not to suppose, then, that there are also many criminals in them furnished with stings, whom the rulers by their surveillance forcibly restrain?

Adeimantus/ We must think so.

Socrates/ And shall we not say that the presence of such citizens is the result of a defective culture and bad breeding and a wrong constitution of the state?

Adeimantus/ We shall.

Socrates/ Well, at any rate such would be the character of the oligarchic state, and these, or perhaps even more than these, would be the evils that afflict it.

Adeimantus/ Pretty nearly these.

Socrates/ Then, let us regard as disposed of the constitution called oligarchy, whose rulers are determined by a property qualification. And next we are to consider the man who resembles it—how he arises and what after that his character is.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Is not the transition from that timocratic youth to the oligarchic type mostly on this wise?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ When a son born to the timocratic man at first emulates his father, and follows in his footsteps, and then sees him suddenly dashed, as a ship on a reef, against the state, and making complete wreckage of both his possessions and himself—perhaps he has been a general, or has held some other important office, and has then been dragged into court by mischievous sycophants and put to death or banished or outlawed and has lost all his property—

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ And the son, my friend, after seeing and suffering these things, and losing his property, grows timid,

I fancy, and forthwith thrusts headlong from his bosom's throne that principle of love of honor and that high spirit, and being humbled by poverty turns to the getting of money, and greedily and stingily and little by little by thrift and hard work collects property. Do you not suppose that such a one will then establish on that throne the principle of appetite and avarice, and set it up as the great king in his soul, adorned with tiaras and collars of gold, and girt with the Persian sword?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ And under this domination he will force the rational and high-spirited principles to crouch lowly to right and left as slaves, and will allow the one to calculate and consider nothing but the ways of making more money from a little, and the other to admire and honor nothing but riches and rich men, and to take pride in nothing but the possession of wealth and whatever contributes to that?

Adeimantus/ There is no other transformation so swift and sure of the ambitious youth into the avaricious type.

Socrates/ Is this, then, our oligarchic man?

Adeimantus/ He is developed, at any rate, out of a man resembling the constitution from which the oligarchy sprang.

Socrates/ Let us see, then, whether he will have a like character.

Adeimantus/ Let us see.

Socrates/ Would he not, in the first place, resemble it in prizing wealth above everything?

Adeimantus/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ And also by being thrifty and laborious, satisfying only his own necessary appetites and desires and

not providing for expenditure on other things, but subduing his other appetites as vain and unprofitable?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ He would be a squalid fellow, looking for a surplus of profit in everything, and a hoarder, the type the multitude approves. Would not this be the character of the man who corresponds to such a polity?

Adeimantus/ I certainly think so, Property, at any rate, is the thing most esteemed by that state and that kind of man.

Socrates/ That, I take it, is because he has never turned his thoughts to true culture.

Adeimantus/ I think not, else he would not have made the blind one leader of his choir and first in honor.

Socrates/ Well said. But consider this. Shall we not say that owing to this lack of culture the appetites of the drone spring up in him, some the beggarly, others the rascally, but that they are forcibly restrained by his general self-surveillance and self-control?

Adeimantus/ We shall indeed.

Socrates/ Do you know, then, to what you must look to discern the rascalities of such men?

Adeimantus/ To what?

Socrates/ To guardianships of orphans, and any such opportunities of doing injustice with impunity.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And is it not apparent by this that in other dealings, where he enjoys the repute of a seeming just man, he by some better element in himself forcibly keeps down other evil desires dwelling within, not persuading them that it 'is better not' nor taming them by reason, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his possessions generally.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Yes, by Zeus, my friend. In most of them, when there is occasion to spend the money of others, you will discover the existence of drone-like appetites.

Adeimantus/ Most emphatically.

Socrates/ Such a man, then, would not be free from internal dissension. He would not be really one, but in some sort a double man. Yet for the most part, his better desires would have the upper hand over the worse.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ And for this reason, I presume, such a man would be more seemly, more respectable, than many others, but the true virtue of a soul in unison and harmony with itself would escape him and dwell afar.

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ And again, the thrifty stingy man would be a feeble competitor personally in the city for any prize of victory or in any other honorable emulation. He is unwilling to spend money for fame and rivalries of that sort, and, fearing to awaken his prodigal desires and call them into alliance for the winning of the victory, he fights in true oligarchic fashion with a small part of his resources and is defeated for the most part and—finds himself rich!

Adeimantus/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ Have we any further doubt, then, as to the correspondence and resemblance between the thrifty and money-making man and the oligarchic state?

Adeimantus/ None.

Socrates/ We have next to consider, it seems, the origin and nature of democracy, that we may next learn the character of that type of man and range him beside the others for our judgment.

Adeimantus/ That would at least be a consistent procedure.

Socrates/ Then, is not the transition from oligarchy to democracy effected in some such way as this—by the insatiate greed for that which it set before itself as the good, the attainment of the greatest possible wealth?

Adeimantus/ In what way?

Socrates/ Why, since its rulers owe their offices to their wealth, they are not willing to prohibit by law the prodigals who arise among the youth from spending and wasting their substance. Their object is, by lending money on the property of such men, and buying it in, to become still richer and more esteemed.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And is it not at once apparent in a state that this honoring of wealth is incompatible with a sober and temperate citizenship, but that one or the other of these two ideals is inevitably neglected.

Adeimantus/ That is pretty clear.

Socrates/ And such negligence and encouragement of licentiousness in oligarchies not infrequently has reduced to poverty men of no ignoble quality.

Adeimantus/ It surely has.

Socrates/ And there they sit, I fancy, within the city, furnished with stings, that is, arms, some burdened with debt, others disfranchised, others both, hating and conspiring against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of the citizens, and eager for revolution.

Adeimantus/ 'Tis so.

Socrates/ But these money-makers with down-bent heads, pretending not even to see them, but inserting the sting of their money into any of the remainder who do not

resist, and harvesting from them in interest as it were a manifold progeny of the parent sum, foster the drone and pauper element in the state.

Adeimantus/ They do indeed multiply it.

Socrates/ And they are not willing to quench the evil as it bursts into flame either by way of a law prohibiting a man from doing as he likes with his own, or in this way, by a second law that does away with such abuses.

Adeimantus/ What law?

Socrates/ The law that is next best, and compels the citizens to pay heed to virtue. For if a law commanded that most voluntary contracts should be at the contractor's risk, the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless in the state and fewer of the evils of which we spoke just now would grow up there.

Adeimantus/ Much fewer.

Socrates/ But as it is, and for all these reasons, this is the plight to which the rulers in the state reduce their subjects, and as for themselves and their offspring, do they not make the young spoiled wantons averse to toil of body and mind, and too soft to stand up against pleasure and pain, and mere idlers?

Adeimantus/ Surely.

Socrates/ And do they not fasten upon themselves the habit of neglect of everything except the making of money, and as complete an indifference to virtue as the paupers exhibit?

Adeimantus/ Little they care.

Socrates/ And when, thus conditioned, the rulers and the ruled are brought together on the march, in wayfaring, or in some other common undertaking, either a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or fellow soldiers or, for that

matter, in actual battle, and observe one another, then the poor are not in the least scorned by the rich, but on the contrary, do you not suppose it often happens that when a lean, sinewy, sunburned pauper is stationed in battle beside a rich man bred in the shade, and burdened with superfluous flesh, and sees him panting and helpless—do you not suppose he will think that such fellows keep their wealth by the cowardice of the poor, and that when the latter are together in private, one will pass the word to another, 'our men are good for nothing'?

Adeimantus/ Nay, I know very well that they do.

Socrates/ And just as an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulse from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even without that, all the man is one internal war, in like manner does not the corresponding type of state need only a slight occasion, the one party bringing in allies from an oligarchic state, or the other from a democratic, to become diseased and wage war with itself, and sometimes even apart from any external impulse faction arises?

Adeimantus/ Most emphatically.

Socrates/ And a democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share in both citizenship and offices—and for the most part these offices are assigned by lot.

Adeimantus/ Why, yes, that is the constitution of democracy alike whether it is established by force of arms or by terrorism resulting in the withdrawal of one of the parties.

Socrates/ What, then, is the manner of their life and what is the quality of such a constitution? For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn out to be a democratic sort of man.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ To begin with, are they not free? And is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? And has not every man license to do as he likes?

Adeimantus/ So it is said.

Socrates/ And where there is such license, it is obvious that everyone would arrange a plan for leading his own life in the way that pleases him.

Adeimantus/ Obvious.

Socrates/ All sorts and conditions of men, then, would arise in this polity more than in any other?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Possibly, this is the most beautiful of polities; as a garment of many colors, embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like boys and women when they see bright-colored things.

Adeimantus/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ Yes, and it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a constitution.

Adeimantus/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because, owing to this license, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and select the model that pleases him, as if in a bazaar of constitutions, and after making his choice, establish his own.

Adeimantus/ Perhaps at any rate, he would not be at a loss for patterns.

Socrates/ And the freedom from all compulsion to hold office in such a city, even if you are qualified, or again, to submit to rule, unless you please, or to make war when the

rest are at war, or to keep the peace when the others do so, unless you desire peace, and again, the liberty, in defiance of any law that forbids you, to hold office and sit on juries nonetheless, if it occurs to you to do so, is not all that a heavenly and delicious entertainment for the time being?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps, for so long.

Socrates/ And is not the placability of some convicted criminals exquisite? Or have you never seen in such a state men condemned to death or exile who nonetheless stay on, and go to and fro among the people, and as if no one saw or heeded him, the man slips in and out like a revenant?

Adeimantus/ Yes, many.

Socrates/ And the tolerance of democracy, its superiority to all our meticulous requirements, its disdain for our solemn pronouncements made when we were founding our city, that except in the case of transcendent natural gifts no one could ever become a good man unless from childhood his play and all his pursuits were concerned with things fair and good—how superbly it tramples underfoot all such ideals, caring nothing from what practices and way of life a man turns to politics, but honoring him if only he says that he loves the people!

Adeimantus/ It is a noble polity, indeed!

Socrates/ These and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, and it would, it seems, be a delightful form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike!

Adeimantus/ Yes, everybody knows that.

Socrates/ Observe, then, the corresponding private character. Or must we first, as in the case of the polity, consider the origin of the type?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is not this, then, the way of it? Our thrifty oligarchic man would have a son bred in his father's ways.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary.

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites?

Adeimantus/ Let us do so.

Socrates/ Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary, and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction. Is not that so?

Adeimantus/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Then we shall rightly use the word 'necessary' of them?

Adeimantus/ Rightly.

Socrates/ And what of the desires from which a man could free himself by discipline from youth up, and whose presence in the soul does no good and in some cases harm? Should we not fairly call all such unnecessary?

Adeimantus/ Fairly indeed.

Socrates/ Let us select an example of either kind, so that we may apprehend the type.

Adeimantus/ Let us do so.

Socrates/ Would not the desire of eating to keep in health and condition and the appetite for mere bread and relishes be necessary?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ The appetite for bread is necessary in both respects, in that it is beneficial and in that if it fails we die.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the desire for relishes, so far as it conduces to fitness?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And should we not rightly pronounce unnecessary the appetite that exceeds these and seeks other varieties of food, and that by correction and training from youth up can be got rid of in most cases and is harmful to the body and a hindrance to the soul's attainment of intelligence and sobriety?

Adeimantus/ Nay, most rightly.

Socrates/ And may we not call the one group the spendthrift desires and the other the profitable, because they help production?

Adeimantus/ Surely.

Socrates/ And we shall say the same of sexual and other appetites?

Adeimantus/ The same.

Socrates/ And were we not saying that the man whom we nicknamed the drone is the man who teems with such pleasures and appetites, and who is governed by his unnecessary desires, while the one who is ruled by his necessary appetites is the thrifty oligarchic man?

Adeimantus/ Why, surely.

Socrates/ To return, then, we have to tell how the democratic man develops from the oligarchic type. I think it is usually in this way.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ When a youth, bred in the illiberal and niggardly fashion that we were describing, gets a taste of the

honey of the drones and associates with fierce and cunning creatures who know how to purvey pleasures of every kind and variety and condition, there you must doubtless conceive is the beginning of the transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into democracy.

Adeimantus/ Quite inevitably.

Socrates/ May we not say that just as the revolution in the city was brought about by the aid of an alliance from outside, coming to the support of the similar and corresponding party in the state, so the youth is revolutionized when a like and kindred group of appetites from outside comes to the aid of one of the parties in his soul?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And if, I take it, a counter-alliance comes to the rescue of the oligarchic part of his soul, either it may be from his father or from his other kin, who admonish and reproach him, then there arise faction and counter-faction and internal strife in the man with himself.

Adeimantus/ Surely.

Socrates/ And sometimes, I suppose, the democratic element retires before the oligarchic, some of its appetites having been destroyed and others expelled, and a sense of awe and reverence grows up in the young man's soul and order is restored.

Adeimantus/ That sometimes happens.

Socrates/ And sometimes, again, another brood of desires akin to those expelled are stealthily nurtured to take their place, owing to the father's ignorance of true education, and wax numerous and strong.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is wont to be the way of it.

Socrates/ And they tug and pull back to the same associations and in secret intercourse engender a multitude.

Adeimantus/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ And in the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel of the young man's soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honorable pursuits and true discourses, which are the best watchmen and guardians in the minds of men who are dear to the gods.

Adeimantus/ Much the best.

Socrates/ And then false and braggart words and opinions charge up the height and take their place and occupy that part of such a youth.

Adeimantus/ They do indeed.

Socrates/ And then he returns, does he not, to those lotus-eaters and without disguise lives openly with them. And if any support comes from his kin to the thrifty element in his soul, those braggart discourses close the gates of the royal fortress within him and refuse admission to the auxiliary force itself, and will not grant audience as to envoys to the words of older friends in private life. And they themselves prevail in the conflict, and naming reverence and awe 'folly' thrust it forth, a dishonored fugitive. And temperance they call 'want of manhood' and banish it with contumely, and they teach that moderation and orderly expenditure are 'rusticity' and 'illiberality,' and they combine with a gang of unprofitable and harmful appetites to drive them over the border.

Adeimantus/ They do indeed.

Socrates/ And when they have emptied and purged of all these the soul of the youth that they have thus possessed and occupied, and whom they are initiating with these magnificent and costly rites, they proceed to lead home from exile insolence and anarchy and prodigality and

shamelessness, resplendent in a great attendant choir and crowned with garlands, and in celebration of their praises they euphemistically denominate insolence 'good breeding,' license 'liberty,' prodigality 'magnificence,' and shamelessness 'manly spirit.' And is it not in some such way as this that in his youth the transformation takes place from the restriction to necessary desires in his education to the liberation and release of his unnecessary and harmful desires?

Adeimantus/ Yes, your description is most vivid.

Socrates/ Then, in his subsequent life, I take it, such a one expends money and toil and time no more on his necessary than on his unnecessary pleasures. But if it is his good fortune that the period of storm and stress does not last too long, and as he grows older the fiercest tumult within him passes, and he receives back a part of the banished elements and does not abandon himself altogether to the invasion of the others, then he establishes and maintains all his pleasures on a footing of equality, forsooth, and so lives turning over the guardhouse of his soul to each as it happens along until it is sated, as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in turn to another, disdaining none but fostering them all equally.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And he does not accept or admit into the guardhouse the words of truth when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise from honorable and good desires, and others from those that are base, and that we ought to practice and esteem the one and control and subdue the others, but he shakes his head at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed.

Adeimantus/ Such is indeed his state of mind and his conduct.

Socrates/ And does he not, also live out his life in this fashion, day by day indulging the appetite of the day, now winebibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute and again drinking only water and dieting, and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up and says and does whatever enters his head. And if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the end.

Adeimantus/ That is a perfect description, of a devotee of equality.

Socrates/ I certainly think, that he is a manifold man stuffed with most excellent differences, and that like that city he is the fair and many-colored one whom many a man and woman would count fortunate in his life, as containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is so.

Socrates/ Shall we definitely assert, then, that such a man is to be ranged with democracy and would properly be designated as democratic?

Adeimantus/ Let that be his place.

Socrates/ And now, the fairest polity and the fairest man remain for us to describe, the tyranny and the tyrant.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, tell me, dear friend, how tyranny arises. That it is an outgrowth of democracy is fairly plain.

Adeimantus/ Yes, plain.

Socrates/ Is it, then, in a sense, in the same way in which democracy arises out of oligarchy that tyranny arises from democracy?

Adeimantus/ How is that?

Socrates/ The good that they proposed to themselves and that was the cause of the establishment of oligarchy—it was wealth, was it not?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, then, the insatiate lust for wealth and the neglect of everything else for the sake of money-making were the cause of its undoing.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And is not the avidity of democracy for that which is its definition and criterion of good the thing which dissolves it too?

Adeimantus/ What do you say its criterion to be?

Socrates/ Liberty, for you may hear it said that this is best managed in a democratic city, and for this reason that is the only city in which a man of free spirit will care to live.

Adeimantus/ Why, yes, you hear that saying everywhere.

Socrates/ Then, as I was about to observe, is it not the excess and greed of this and the neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this constitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of a dictatorship?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ Why, when a democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cup-bearers for its leaders and is intoxicated by drinking too deep of that unmixed wine, and then, if its so-called governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly, it chastises them and accuses them of being accursed oligarchs.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is what they do.

Socrates/ But those who obey the rulers, it reviles as willing slaves and men of naught, but it commends and honors in public and private rulers who resemble subjects and subjects who are like rulers. Is it not inevitable that in such a state the spirit of liberty should go to all lengths?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And this anarchic temper, my friend, must penetrate into private homes and finally enter into the very animals.

Adeimantus/ Just what do we mean by that?

Socrates/ Why, the father habitually tries to resemble the child and is afraid of his sons, and the son likens himself to the father and feels no awe or fear of his parents, so that he may be forsooth a free man. And the resident alien feels himself equal to the citizen and the citizen to him, and the foreigner likewise.

Adeimantus/ Yes, these things do happen.

Socrates/ They do, and such other trifles as these. The teacher in such case fears and fawns upon the pupils, and the pupils pay no heed to the teacher or to their overseers either. And in general the young ape their elders and vie with them in speech and action, while the old, accommodating themselves to the young, are full of pleasantry and graciousness, imitating the young for fear they may be thought disagreeable and authoritative.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And the climax of popular liberty, my friend, is attained in such a city when the purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free than the owners who paid for them. And I almost forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal rights in the relation of men to women and women to men.

Adeimantus/ Shall we not, then, in Aeschylean phrase, say 'whatever rises to our lips'?

Socrates/ Certainly, so I will. Without experience of it no one would believe how much freer the very beasts subject to men are in such a city than elsewhere. The dogs literally verify the adage and 'like their mistresses become.' And likewise the horses and asses are wont to hold on their way with the utmost freedom and dignity, bumping into everyone who meets them and who does not step aside. And so all things everywhere are just bursting with the spirit of liberty.

Adeimantus/ It is my own dream you are telling me, for it often happens to me when I go to the country.

Socrates/ And do you note that the sum total of all these items when footed up is that they render the souls of the citizens so sensitive that they chafe at the slightest suggestion of servitude and will not endure it? For you are aware that they finally pay no heed even to the laws written or unwritten, so that forsooth they may have no master anywhere over them.

Adeimantus/ I know it very well.

Socrates/ This, then, my friend, is the fine and vigorous root from which tyranny grows, in my opinion.

Adeimantus/ Vigorous indeed, but what next?

Socrates/ The same malady, that, arising in oligarchy, destroyed it, this more widely diffused and more violent as a result of this license, enslaves democracy. And in truth, any excess is wont to bring about a corresponding reaction to the opposite in the seasons, in plants, in animal bodies, and most especially in political societies.

Adeimantus/ Probably.

Socrates/ And so the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is probable.

Socrates/ Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution than democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude.

Adeimantus/ That is reasonable.

Socrates/ That, however, I believe, was not your question, but what identical malady arising in democracy as well as in oligarchy enslaves it?

Adeimantus/ You say truly.

Socrates/ That then, was what I had in mind, the class of idle and spendthrift men, the most enterprising and vigorous portion being leaders and the less manly spirits followers. We were likening them to drones, some equipped with stings and others stingless.

Adeimantus/ And rightly too.

Socrates/ These two kinds, then, when they arise in any state, create a disturbance like that produced in the body by phlegm and gall. And so a good physician and lawgiver must be on his guard from afar against the two kinds, like a prudent apiarist, first and chiefly to prevent their springing up, but if they do arise to have them as quickly as may be cut out, cells and all.

Adeimantus/ Yes, by Zeus, by all means.

Socrates/ Then let us take it in this way, so that we may contemplate our purpose more distinctly.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ Let us in our theory make a tripartite division of the democratic state, which is in fact its structure. One such class, as we have described, grows up in it because of the license, no less than in the oligarchic state.

Adeimantus/ That is so.

Socrates/ But it is far fiercer in this state than in that.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ There, because it is not held in honor, but is kept out of office, it is not exercised and does not grow vigorous. But in a democracy this is the dominating class, with rare exceptions, and the fiercest part of it makes speeches and transacts business, and the remainder swarms and settles about the speaker's stand and keeps up a buzzing and tolerates no dissent, so that everything with slight exceptions is administered by that class in such a state.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And so from time to time there emerges or is secreted from the multitude another group of this sort.

Adeimantus/ What sort?

Socrates/ When all are pursuing wealth the most orderly and thrifty natures for the most part become the richest.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Then they are the most abundant supply of honey for the drones, and it is the easiest to extract.

Adeimantus/ Why, yes, how could one squeeze it out of those who have little?

Socrates/ The capitalistic class is, I take it, the name by which they are designated—the pasture of the drones.

Adeimantus/ Pretty much so.

Socrates/ And the third class, composing the 'people,' would comprise all quiet cultivators of their own farms who possess little property. This is the largest and most potent group in a democracy when it meets in assembly.

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is, but it will not often do that, unless it gets a share of the honey.

Socrates/ Well, does it not always share, to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in distributing to

the people what they take from the well-to-do, to keep the lion's share for themselves?

Adeimantus/ Why, yes, it shares in that sense.

Socrates/ And so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in the assembly and any action in their power.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And thereupon the charge is brought against them by the other party, though they may have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting against the people, and it is said that they are oligarchs.

Adeimantus/ Surely.

Socrates/ And then finally, when they see the people, not of its own will but through misapprehension, and being misled by the calumniators, attempting to wrong them, why then, whether they wish it or not, they become in very deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is engendered by those drones which sting them.

Adeimantus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ And then there ensue impeachments and judgments and lawsuits on either side.

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And is it not always the way of a demos to put forward one man as its special champion and protector and cherish and magnify him?

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ This, then, is plain, that when a tyrant arises he sprouts from a protectorate root and from nothing else.

Adeimantus/ Very plain.

Socrates/ What, then, is the starting point of the transformation of a protector into a tyrant? Is it not

obviously when the protector's acts begin to reproduce the legend that is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia?

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ The story goes that he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims is inevitably transformed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale?

Adeimantus/ I have.

Socrates/ And is it not true that in like manner a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile mob, does not withhold his hand from the shedding of tribal blood, but by the customary unjust accusations brings a citizen into court and assassinates him, blotting out a human life, and with unhallowed tongue and lips that have tasted kindred blood, banishes and slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the partition of lands—is it not the inevitable consequence and a decree of fate that such a one be either slain by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed from a man into a wolf?

Adeimantus/ It is quite inevitable.

Socrates/ He it is, who becomes the leader of faction against the possessors of property.

Adeimantus/ Yes, he.

Socrates/ May it not happen that he is driven into exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies, returns a finished tyrant?

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And if they are unable to expel him or bring about his death by calumniating him to the people, they plot to assassinate him by stealth.

Adeimantus/ That is certainly wont to happen.

Socrates/ And thereupon those who have reached this stage devise that famous petition of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard to make their city safe for the friend of democracy.

Adeimantus/ They do indeed.

Socrates/ And the people grant it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned for themselves.

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And when he sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth the repute of hostility to democracy, then in the words of the oracle delivered to Croesus, 'By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermus, swift is his flight; he stays not nor blushes to show the white feather.'

Adeimantus/ No, for he would never get a second chance to blush.

Socrates/ And he who is caught, methinks, is delivered to his death.

Adeimantus/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ And then obviously that protector does not lie prostrate, 'mighty with far-flung limbs,' in Homeric overthrow, but overthrowing many others towers in the car of state transformed from a protector into a perfect and finished tyrant.

Adeimantus/ What else is likely?

Socrates/ Shall we, then, portray the happiness, of the man and the state in which such a creature arises?

Adeimantus/ By all means let us describe it.

Socrates/ Then at the start and in the first days does he not smile upon all men and greet everybody he meets and deny that he is a tyrant, and promise many things in private and public, and having freed men from debts, and

distributed lands to the people and his own associates, he affects a gracious and gentle manner to all?

Adeimantus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ But when, I suppose, he has come to terms with some of his exiled enemies and has got others destroyed and is no longer disturbed by them, in the first place he is always stirring up some war so that the people may be in need of a leader.

Adeimantus/ That is likely.

Socrates/ And also that being impoverished by war taxes they may have to devote themselves to their daily business and be less likely to plot against him?

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And if, I presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who will not suffer his domination, his further object is to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing them to the enemy? From all these motives a tyrant is compelled to be always provoking wars?

Adeimantus/ Yes, he is compelled to do so.

Socrates/ And by such conduct will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the citizens?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And is it not likely that some of those who helped to establish and now share in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one another—such of them as happen to be the bravest?

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is likely.

Socrates/ Then the tyrant must do away with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has left no one of any worth, friend or foe.

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ He must look sharp to see, then, who is brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich, and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against them all until he purge the city.

Adeimantus/ A fine purgation.

Socrates/ Yes, just the opposite of that which physicians practice on our bodies. For while they remove the worst and leave the best, he does the reverse.

Adeimantus/ Yes, for apparently he must, if he is to keep his power.

Socrates/ Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds him, which bids him dwell for the most part with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his life.

Adeimantus/ Such it is.

Socrates/ And would he not, the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have the greater need of more and more trustworthy bodyguards?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Whom, then, may he trust, and whence shall he fetch them?

Adeimantus/ Unbidden, they will wing their way to him in great numbers if he furnish their wage.

Socrates/ Drones, by the dog, I think you are talking of again, an alien and motley crew.

Adeimantus/ You think rightly.

Socrates/ But what of the home supply, would he not choose to employ that?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ By taking their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and enlisting them in his bodyguard.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly, since these are those whom he can most trust.

Socrates/ Truly, this tyrant business is a blessed thing on your showing, if such are the friends and 'trusties' he must employ after destroying his former associates.

Adeimantus/ But such are indeed those he does make use of.

Socrates/ And these companions admire him, and these new citizens are his associates, while the better sort hate and avoid him.

Adeimantus/ Why should they not?

Socrates/ Not for nothing, is tragedy in general esteemed wise, and Euripides beyond other tragedians.

Adeimantus/ Why, pray?

Socrates/ Because among other utterances of pregnant thought 'Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.' He meant evidently that these associates of the tyrant are the wise.

Adeimantus/ Yes, he and the other poets, call the tyrant's power 'likest God's' and praise it in many other ways.

Socrates/ Wherefore, being wise as they are, the poets of tragedy will pardon us and those whose politics resemble ours for not admitting them into our polity, since they hymn the praises of tyranny.

Adeimantus/ I think, that the subtle minds among them will pardon us.

Socrates/ But going about to other cities, I fancy, collecting crowds and hiring fine, loud, persuasive voices, they draw the polities toward tyrannies or democracies.

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And, further, they are paid and honored for this, chiefly, as is to be expected, by tyrants, and secondly

by democracy. But the higher they go, breasting constitution hill, the more their honor fails, as it were from lack of breath unable to proceed.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But this, is a digression. Let us return to that fair, multitudinous, diversified, and ever-changing bodyguard of the tyrant and tell how it will be supported.

Adeimantus/ Obviously, if there are sacred treasures in the city he will spend these as long as they last and the property of those he has destroyed, thus requiring smaller contributions from the populace.

Socrates/ But what when these resources fail?

Adeimantus/ Clearly, his father's estate will have to support him and his wassailers, his fellows and his she-fellows.

Socrates/ I understand, that the people which begot the tyrant will have to feed him and his companions.

Adeimantus/ It cannot escape from that.

Socrates/ And what have you to say, in case the people protests and says that it is not right that a grown-up son should be supported by his father, but the reverse, and that it did not beget and establish him in order that, when he had grown great, it, in servitude to its own slaves, should feed him and the slaves together with a nondescript rabble of aliens, but in order that, with him for protector, it might be liberated from the rule of the rich and the so-called 'better classes,' and that it now bids him and his crew depart from the city as a father expels from his house a son together with troublesome revelers?

Adeimantus/ The demos, by Zeus, will then learn to its cost what it is and what a creature it begot and cherished and bred to greatness, and that in its weakness it tries to expel the stronger.

Socrates/ What do you mean? Will the tyrant dare to use force against his father, and, if he does not yield, to strike him?

Adeimantus/ Yes, after he has once taken from him his arms.

Socrates/ A very parricide, you make the tyrant out to be, and a cruel nurse of old age, and, as it seems, this is at last tyranny open and avowed, and, as the saying goes, the demos trying to escape the smoke of submission to the free would have plunged into the fire of enslavement to slaves, and in exchange for that excessive and unseasonable liberty has clothed itself in the garb of the most cruel and bitter servile servitude.

Adeimantus/ Yes indeed, that is just what happens.

Socrates/ Well, then, shall we not be fairly justified in saying that we have sufficiently described the transformation of a democracy into a tyranny and the nature of the tyranny itself?

Adeimantus/ Quite sufficiently.

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Socrates/ There remains for consideration, the tyrannical man himself—the manner of his development out of the democratic type and his character and the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy.

Adeimantus/ Why, yes, he still remains.

Socrates/ Do you know, then, what it is that I still miss?

Adeimantus/ What?

Socrates/ In the matter of our desires I do not think we sufficiently distinguished their nature and number. And so long as this is lacking our inquiry will lack clearness.

Adeimantus/ Well, will our consideration of them not still be opportune?

Socrates/ By all means. And observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. It is this. Of our unnecessary pleasures and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous.

Adeimantus/ What desires do you mean?

Socrates/ Those, that are awakened in sleep when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts. You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother in fancy or with anyone else, man, god, or brute. It is ready for any

foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly and shamelessness.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But when, I suppose, a man's condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appetitive part, so that it may be lulled to sleep and not disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out toward and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present, or future, and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall asleep with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case he is most likely to apprehend truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless.

Adeimantus/ I certainly think so.

Socrates/ This description has carried us too far, but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable, a terrible, fierce, and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say, and whether you admit it.

Adeimantus/ Well, I do.

Socrates/ Now recall our characterization of the democratic man. His development was determined by his education from youth under a thrifty father who approved only the acquisitive appetites and disapproved the unnecessary ones whose object is entertainment and display. Is not that so?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by association with more sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he is impelled toward every form of insolence and outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father's niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his corrupters, being drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise between the two tendencies, and indulging and enjoying each in moderation, forsooth, as he supposes, he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless, now transformed from an oligarch to a democrat.

Adeimantus/ That was and is our belief about this type.

Socrates/ Assume, then, again, that such a man when he is older has a son bred in turn in his ways of life.

Adeimantus/ I so assume.

Socrates/ And suppose the experience of his father to be repeated in his case. He is drawn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by his seducers complete freedom. His father and his other kin lend support to these compromise appetites while the others lend theirs to the opposite group. And when these dread magi and kingmakers come to realize that they have no hope of controlling the youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in his soul a ruling passion to be the protector of his idle and prodigal appetites, a monstrous winged drone. Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is aught else?

Adeimantus/ Nothing but that.

Socrates/ And when the other appetites, buzzing about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings, why then this protector of the soul has madness for his bodyguard and runs amuck, and if it

finds in the man any opinions or appetites accounted worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges him of sobriety and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside.

Adeimantus/ A perfect description, of the generation of the tyrannical man.

Socrates/ And is not this analogy, the reason why Love has long since been called a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ That may well be.

Socrates/ And does not a drunken man, my friend, have something of this tyrannical temper?

Adeimantus/ Yes, he has.

Socrates/ And again the madman, the deranged man, attempts and expects to rule over not only men but gods.

Adeimantus/ Yes indeed, he does.

Socrates/ Then a man becomes tyrannical in the full sense of the word, my friend, when either by nature or by habits or by both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Such, it seems, is his origin and character, but what is his manner of life?

Adeimantus/ As the wits say, you shall tell me.

Socrates/ I do, for, I take it, next there are among them feasts and carousals and reveling and courtesans and all the doings of those whose souls are entirely swayed by the indwelling tyrant Eros.

Adeimantus/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ And do not many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things?

Adeimantus/ Many indeed.

Socrates/ And so any revenues there may be are quickly expended.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And after this there are borrowings and levyings upon the estate?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlings of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit or violence?

Adeimantus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every source or else be afflicted with great travail and pain.

Adeimantus/ He is.

Socrates/ And just as the new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of his soul and robbed them, so he himself. though younger, will claim the right to get the better of his father and mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father's estate.

Of course, what else?

Socrates/ And if they resist him, would he not at first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if he failed in that, would he not next seize it by force?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ I am not without my fears, for the parents of such a one.

Socrates/ Nay, Adimantus, in heaven's name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a newly found belle amie bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother, his by necessity and from his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found bel ami, not necessary to his life, he would rain blows upon the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends? And would he subject them to those new favorites if he brought them under the same roof?

Adeimantus/ Yes, by Zeus.

Socrates/ A most blessed lot it seems to be, to be the parent of a tyrant son.

Adeimantus/ It does indeed.

Socrates/ And again, when the resources of his father and mother are exhausted and fail such a one, and the swarm of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands on the wall of someone's house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweep of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honorable and the base, the opinions accounted just, will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep, when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul. But now, when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is

continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole autocrat, will urge the polity, so to speak, of him in whom it dwells to dare anything and everything in order to find support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen, in part introduced from outside by evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one?

Adeimantus/ It is this.

Socrates/ And if, there are only a few of this kind in a city, and the others, the multitude as a whole, are sober-minded, the few go forth into exile and serve some tyrant elsewhere as bodyguard or become mercenaries in any war there may be. But if they spring up in time of peace and tranquility they stay right there in the city and effect many small evils.

Adeimantus/ What kind of evils do you mean?

Socrates/ Oh, they just steal, break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their garments, plunder temples, and kidnap, and if they are fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear false witness and take bribes.

Adeimantus/ Yes, small evils indeed, if the men of this sort are few.

Socrates/ Why, yes, for small evils are relatively small compared with great, and in respect of the corruption and misery of a state all of them together, as the saying goes, don't come within hail of the mischief done by a tyrant. For when men of this sort and their followers become numerous in a state and realize their numbers, then it is they who, in conjunction with the folly of the people, create a tyrant out

of that one of them who has the greatest and mightiest tyrant in his own soul.

Adeimantus/ Naturally, for he would be the most tyrannical.

Socrates/ Then if the people yield willingly—'tis well, but if the city resists him, then, just as in the previous case the man chastised his mother and his father, so now in turn will he chastise his fatherland if he can, bringing in new boon companions beneath whose sway he will hold and keep enslaved his once dear motherland—as the Cretans name her—and fatherland. And this would be the end of such a man's desire.

Adeimantus/ Yes, this, just this.

Socrates/ Then, is not this the character of such men in private life and before they rule the state—to begin with, they associate with flatterers, who are ready to do anything to serve them, or, if they themselves want something, they themselves fawn and shrink from no contortion or abasement in protest of their friendship, though, once the object gained, they sing another tune.

Adeimantus/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ Throughout their lives, then, they never know what it is to be the friends of anybody. They are always either masters or slaves, but the tyrannical nature never tastes freedom or true friendship.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ May we not rightly call such men faithless?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Yes, and unjust to the last degree, if we were right in our previous agreement about the nature of justice.

Adeimantus/ But surely, we were right.

Socrates/ Let us sum up, then, the most evil type of man. He is, I presume, the man who, in his waking hours, has the qualities we found in his dream state.

Adeimantus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And he is developed from the man who, being by nature most of a tyrant, achieves sole power, and the longer he lives as an actual tyrant the stronger this quality becomes.

Glaucon taking up the argument interjected.

Glaucon/ Inevitably

Socrates/ And shall we find, that the man who is shown to be the most evil will also be the most miserable, and the man who is most of a tyrant for the longest time is most and longest miserable in sober truth? Yet the many have many opinions.

Glaucon/ That much, certainly, must needs be true.

Socrates/ Does not the tyrannical man, correspond to the tyrannical state in similitude, the democratic to the democratic and the others likewise?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ And may we not infer that the relation of state to state in respect of virtue and happiness is the same as that of the man to the man?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ What is, then, in respect of virtue, the relation of a city ruled by a tyrant to a royal city as we first described it?

Glaucon/ They are direct contraries, The one is the best, the other the worst.

Socrates/ I'll not ask which is which, because that is obvious. But again in respect of happiness and wretchedness, is your estimate the same or different? And

let us not be dazzled by fixing our eyes on that one man, the tyrant, or a few of his court, but let us enter into and survey the entire city, as is right, and declare our opinion only after we have so dived to its uttermost recesses and contemplated its life as a whole.

Glaucon/ That is a fair challenge, and it is clear to everybody that there is no city more wretched than that in which a tyrant rules, and none more happy than that governed by a true king.

Socrates/ And would it not also be a fair challenge, to ask you to accept as the only proper judge of the two men the one who is able in thought to enter with understanding into the very soul and temper of a man, and who is not like a child viewing him from outside, overawed by the tyrants' great attendance, and the pomp and circumstance which they assume in the eyes of the world, but is able to see through it all? And what if I should assume, then, that the man to whom we ought all to listen is he who has this capacity of judgment and who has lived under the same roof with a tyrant and has witnessed his conduct in his own home and observed in person his dealings with his intimates in each instance where he would best be seen stripped of his vesture of tragedy, and who had likewise observed his behavior in the hazards of his public life—and if we should ask the man who has seen all this to be the messenger to report on the happiness or misery of the tyrant as compared with other men?

Glaucon/ That also would be a most just challenge.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, make believe, that we are of those who are thus able to judge and who have ere now lived with tyrants, so that we may have someone to answer our questions?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Come, then, examine it thus. Recall the general likeness between the city and the man, and then observe in turn what happens to each of them.

Glaucon/ What things?

Socrates/ In the first place, will you call the state governed by a tyrant free or enslaved, speaking of it as a state?

Glaucon/ Utterly enslaved.

Socrates/ And yet you see in it masters and free men.

Glaucon/ I see, a small portion of such, but the entirety, so to speak, and the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved.

Socrates/ If, then, the man resembles the state, must not the same proportion obtain in him, and his soul teem with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and the most frenzied, plays the despot?

Glaucon/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ Then will you say that such a soul is enslaved or free?

Glaucon/ Enslaved, I should suppose.

Socrates/ Again, does not the enslaved and tyrannized city least of all do what it really wishes?

Glaucon/ Decidedly so.

Socrates/ Then the tyrannized soul—to speak of the soul as a whole—also will least of all do what it wishes, but being always perforce driven and drawn by the gadfly of desire it will be full of confusion and repentance.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And must the tyrannized city be rich or poor?

Glaucon/ Poor.

Socrates/ Then the tyrant soul also must of necessity always be needy and suffer from unfulfilled desire.

Glaucon/ So it is.

Socrates/ And again, must not such a city, as well as such a man, be full of terrors and alarms?

Glaucon/ It must indeed.

Socrates/ And do you think you will find more lamentations and groans and wailing and anguish in any other city?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ And so of man, do you think these things will more abound in any other than in this tyrant type, that is maddened by its desires and passions?

Glaucon/ How could it be so?

Socrates/ In view of all these and other like considerations, then, I take it, you judged that this city is the most miserable of cities.

Glaucon/ And was I not right?

Socrates/ Yes, indeed. But of the tyrant man, what have you to say in view of these same things?

Glaucon/ That he is far and away the most miserable of all.

Socrates/ I cannot admit, that you are right in that too.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ This one, I take it, has not yet attained the acme of misery.

Glaucon/ Then who has?

Socrates/ Perhaps you will regard the one I am about to name as still more wretched.

Glaucon/ What one?

Socrates/ The one, who, being of tyrannical temper, does not live out his life in private station but is so unfortunate that by some unhappy chance he is enabled to become an actual tyrant.

Glaucon/ I infer from what has already been said, that you speak truly.

Socrates/ Yes, but it is not enough to suppose such things. We must examine them thoroughly by reason and an argument such as this. For our inquiry concerns the greatest of all things, the good life or the bad life.

Glaucon/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Consider, then, if there is anything in what I say. For I think we must get a notion of the matter from these examples.

Glaucon/ From which?

Socrates/ From individual wealthy private citizens in our states who possess many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in being rulers over many, only the tyrant's numbers are greater.

Glaucon/ Yes, they are.

Socrates/ You are aware, then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their slaves?

Glaucon/ What should they fear?

Socrates/ Nothing, but do you perceive the reason why?

Glaucon/ Yes, because the entire state is ready to defend each citizen.

Socrates/ You are right. But now suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or more slaves and waft him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no free man could come to his rescue. What

and how great would be his fear, do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves?

Glaucon/ The greatest in the world, if you ask me.

Socrates/ And would he not forthwith find it necessary to fawn upon some of the slaves and make them many promises and emancipate them, though nothing would be further from his wish? And so he would turn out to be the flatterer of his own servants.

Glaucon/ He would certainly have to, or else perish.

Socrates/ But now suppose, that god established round about him numerous neighbors who would not tolerate the claim of one man to be master of another, but would inflict the utmost penalties on any such person on whom they could lay their hands.

Glaucon/ I think, that his plight would be still more desperate, encompassed by nothing but enemies.

Socrates/ And is not that the sort of prison house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites? Yet greedy and avid of spirit as he is, he only of the citizens may not travel abroad or view any of the sacred festivals that other free men yearn to see, but he must live for the most part cowering in the recesses of his house like a woman, envying among the other citizens anyone who goes abroad and sees any good thing.

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And does not such a harvest of ills measure the difference between the man who is merely ill governed in his own soul, the man of tyrannical temper, whom you just now judged to be most miserable, and the man who, having this disposition, does not live out his life in private station but is constrained by some ill-hap to become an actual tyrant, and while unable to control himself attempts to rule over others,

as if a man with a sick and incontinent body should not live the private life but should be compelled to pass his days in contention and strife with other persons?

Glaucon/ Your analogy is most apt and true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Is not that then, dear Glaucon, a most unhappy experience in every way? And is not the tyrant's life still worse than that which was judged by you to be the worst?

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Then it is the truth, though some may deny it, that the real tyrant is really enslaved to cringings and servitudes beyond compare, a flatterer of the basest men, and that, so far from finding even the least satisfaction for his desires, he is in need of most things, and is a poor man in very truth, as is apparent if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety. And throughout his life he teems with terrors and is full of convulsions and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition of the city which he rules, and he is like it, is he not?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and, by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was, envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel and nurse of all iniquity, and so in consequence be himself most unhappy and make all about him so?

Glaucon/ No man of sense will gainsay that.

Socrates/ Come then, now at last, even as the judge of last instance pronounces, so do you declare who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and similarly judge the others, all five in succession, the royal, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical man.

Glaucon/ Nay, the decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its contrary.

Socrates/ Shall we hire a herald, then, or shall I myself make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best man and the most righteous to be the happiest, and that he is the one who is the most kingly and a king over himself, and declared that the most evil and most unjust is the most unhappy, who again is the man who, having the most of the tyrannical temper in himself, becomes most of a tyrant over himself and over the state?

Glaucon/ Let it have been so proclaimed by you.

Socrates/ Shall I add the clause 'alike whether their character is known to all men and gods or is not known'?

Glaucon/ Add that to the proclamation.

Socrates/ Very good. This, then, would be one of our proofs, but examine this second one and see if there is anything in it.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ Since, corresponding to the three types in the city, the soul also is tripartite, it will admit, I think, of another demonstration also.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ The following. The three parts have also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and controls.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ One part, we say, is that with which a man learns, one is that with which he feels anger. But the third part, owing to its manifold forms, we could not easily designate by anyone distinctive name, but gave it the name

of its chief and strongest element, for we called it the appetitive part because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love and their accompaniments, and likewise the money-loving part, because money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such desires.

Glaucon/ And rightly.

Socrates/ And if we should also say that its pleasure and its love were for gain or profit, should we not thus best bring it together under one head in our discourse so as to understand each other when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving and gain-loving part?

Glaucon/ I, at any rate, think so.

Socrates/ And, again, of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance and victory and good repute?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part and that which is covetous of honor?

Glaucon/ Most appropriately.

Socrates/ But surely it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavor of the part by which we learn is ever toward knowledge of the truth of things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and reputation.

Glaucon/ Much the least.

Socrates/ Lover of learning and lover of wisdom would be suitable designations for that.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Is it not also true, that the ruling principle of men's souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two, as it may happen?

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ And that is why we say that the primary classes of men also are three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory, and the lover of gain.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ And also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively to each?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Are you aware, then, that if you should choose to ask men of these three classes, each in turn, which is the most pleasurable of these lives, each will chiefly commend his own? The financier will affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honor or of learning are of no value except in so far as they produce money.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And what of the lover of honor? Does he not regard the pleasure that comes from money as vulgar and low, and again that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge confers honor, mere fume and moonshine.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ And what, are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other pleasures compared with the delight of knowing the truth and the reality, and being always occupied with that while he learns? Will he not think them far removed from true pleasure, and call them literally the pleasures of necessity, since he would have no use for them if necessity were not laid upon him?

Glaucon/ We may be sure of that.

Socrates/ Since, then, there is contention between the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves, not merely as to which is the more honorable or the more base, or the worse or the better, but which is actually the more

pleasurable or free from pain, how could we determine which of them speaks most truly?

Glaucon/ In faith, I cannot tell.

Socrates/ Well, consider it thus. By what are things to be judged, if they are to be judged rightly? Is it not by experience, intelligence, and discussion? Or could anyone name a better criterion than these?

Glaucon/ How could he?

Socrates/ Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of gain by study of the very nature of truth has more experience of the pleasure that knowledge yields than the philosopher has of that which results from gain?

Glaucon/ There is a vast difference, for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds of pleasure from childhood, but the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of tasting or experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure of learning the true natures of things, but he cannot easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it.

Socrates/ The lover of wisdom, then, far surpasses the lover of gain in experience of both kinds of pleasure.

Glaucon/ Yes, far.

Socrates/ And how does he compare with the lover of honor? Is he more unacquainted with the pleasure of being honored than that other with that which comes from knowledge?

Glaucon/ Nay, honor, if they achieve their several objects, attends them all, for the rich man is honored by many and the brave man and the wise, so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure that honor brings, but it is impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to have savored the

delight that the contemplation of true being and reality brings.

Socrates/ Then, so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three.

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And again, he is the only one whose experience will have been accompanied by intelligence.

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ And yet again, that which is the instrument, or ὀργανον, of judgment is the instrument, not of the lover of gain or of the lover of honor, but of the lover of wisdom.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ It was by means of words and discussion that we said the judgment must be reached, was it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And they are the instrument mainly of the philosopher.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now if wealth and profit were the best criteria by which things are judged, the things praised and censured by the lover of gain would necessarily be truest and most real.

Glaucon/ Quite necessarily.

Socrates/ And if honor, victory, and courage, would it not be the things praised by the lover of honor and victory?

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ But since the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion, what follows?

Glaucon/ Of necessity, that the things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion are most valid and true.

Socrates/ There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of that part of the soul whereby we learn is the sweetest, and the life of the man in whom that part dominates is the most pleasurable.

Glaucon/ How could it be otherwise?

At any rate the man of intelligence speaks with authority when he commends his own life.

Socrates/ And to what life and to what pleasure, does the judge assign the second place?

Glaucon/ Obviously to that of the warrior and honor-loving type, for it is nearer to the first than is the life of the money-maker.

Socrates/ And so the last place belongs to the lover of gain, as it seems.

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ That, then, would be two points in succession and two victories for the just man over the unjust. And now for the third in the Olympian fashion to the savior and to Olympian Zeus—observe that other pleasure than that of the intelligence is not altogether even real or pure, but is a kind of scene painting, as I seem to have heard from some wise man, and yet this would be the greatest and most decisive overthrow.

Glaucon/ Much the greatest. But what do you mean?

Socrates/ I shall discover it, if you will answer my questions while I seek.

Glaucon/ Ask, then.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure?

Glaucon/ We certainly do.

Socrates/ And is there not such a thing as a neutral state?

Glaucon/ There is.

Socrates/ Is it not intermediate between them, and in the mean, being a kind of quietude of the soul in these respects? Or is not that your notion of it?

Glaucon/ It is that.

Socrates/ Do you not recall the things men say in sickness?

Glaucon/ What sort of things?

Socrates/ Why, that after all there is nothing sweeter than to be well, though they were not aware that it is the highest pleasure before they were ill.

Glaucon/ I remember.

Socrates/ And do you not hear men afflicted with severe pain saying that there is no greater pleasure than the cessation of this suffering?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And you perceive, I presume, many similar conditions in which men while suffering pain praise freedom from pain and relief from that as the highest pleasure, and not positive delight.

Glaucon/ Yes, for this in such cases is perhaps what is felt as pleasurable and acceptable—peace.

Socrates/ And so, when a man's delight comes to an end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful.

Glaucon/ It may be so.

Socrates/ What, then, we just now described as the intermediate state between the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain and pleasure.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Is it really possible for that which is neither to become both?

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ And further, both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion, are they not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And did we not just now see that to feel neither pain nor pleasure is a quietude of the soul and an intermediate state between the two?

Glaucon/ Yes, we did.

Socrates/ How, then, can it be right to think the absence of pain pleasure, or the absence of joy painful?

Glaucon/ In no way.

Socrates/ This is not a reality, then, but an illusion. In such case the quietude in juxtaposition with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the pleasure pain. And these illusions have no real bearing on the truth of pleasure, but are a kind of jugglery.

Glaucon/ So at any rate our argument signifies.

Socrates/ Take a look, then, at pleasures which do not follow on pain, so that you may not haply suppose for the present that it is the nature of pleasure to be a cessation from pain and pain from pleasure.

Glaucon/ Where shall I look, and what pleasures do you mean?

Socrates/ There are many others, and especially, if you please to note them, the pleasures connected with smell. For these with no antecedent pain suddenly attain an indescribable intensity, and their cessation leaves no pain after them.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Let us not believe, then, that the riddance of pain is pure pleasure or that of pleasure pain.

Glaucon/ No, we must not.

Socrates/ Yet, surely, the affections that find their way through the body to the soul and are called pleasures are, we may say, the most and the greatest of them, of this type, in some sort releases from pain.

Glaucon/ Yes, they are.

Socrates/ And is not this also the character of the anticipatory pleasures and pains that precede them and arise from the expectation of them?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Do you know, then, what their quality is and what they most resemble?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Do you think that there is such a thing in nature as up and down and in the middle?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you suppose, then, that anyone who is transported from below to the center would have any other opinion than that he was moving upward? And if he took his stand at the center and looked in the direction from which he had been transported, do you think he would suppose himself to be anywhere but above, never having seen that which is really above?

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus, I do not think that such a person would have any other notion.

Socrates/ And if he were borne back, he would both think himself to be moving downward and would think truly.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And would not all this happen to him because of his non-acquaintance with the true and real up and down and middle?

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Would it surprise you, then, if similarly men without experience of truth and reality hold unsound opinions about many other matters, and are so disposed toward pleasure and pain and the intermediate neutral condition that, when they are moved in the direction of the painful, they truly think themselves to be, and really are, in a state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that they are approaching fulfillment and pleasure, and just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing gray with black, so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain?

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus, it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were not so.

Socrates/ In this way, then, consider it. Are not hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or emptinesses of the bodily habit?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ And is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness of the habit of the soul?

Glaucon/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ And he who partakes of nourishment and he who gets wisdom fills the void and is filled?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And which is the truer filling and fulfillment, that of the less or of the more real being?

Glaucon/ Evidently that of the more real.

Socrates/ And which of the two groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion, knowledge and reason, and, in sum, all the things that are more excellent? Form your judgment thus.

Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a thing?

Glaucon/ That which cleaves to what is ever the same far surpasses.

Socrates/ Does the essence of that which never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of knowledge?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Or of truth and reality?

Glaucon/ Not of that, either.

Socrates/ And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or existence?

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And is it not generally true that the kinds concerned with the service of the body partake less of truth and reality than those that serve the soul?

Glaucon/ Much less.

Socrates/ And do you not think that the same holds of the body itself in comparison with the soul?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly filled and satisfied than that which being itself less real is filled with more unreal things?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ If, then, to be filled with what befits nature is pleasure, then that which is more really filled with real things would more really and truly cause us to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes of the less truly existent

would be less truly and surely filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure.

Glaucon/ Most inevitably.

Socrates/ Then those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to feastings and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the center, and so sway and roam to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle, grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights, and in their greed kicking and butting one another with horns and hoofs of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part of their souls.

Glaucon/ You describe in quite oracular style, Socrates, the life of the multitude.

Socrates/ And are not the pleasures with which they dwell inevitably commingled with pains, phantoms of true pleasure, illusions of scene painting, so colored by contrary juxtaposition as to seem intense in either kind, and to beget mad loves of themselves in senseless souls, and to be fought for, as Stesichorus says the wraith of Helen was fought for at Troy through ignorance of the truth?

Glaucon/ It is quite inevitable, that it should be so.

Socrates/ So, again, must not the like hold of the high-spirited element, whenever a man succeeds in satisfying that part of his nature—his covetousness of honor by envy, his love of victory by violence, his ill temper by indulgence in

anger, pursuing these ends without regard to consideration and reason?

Glaucon/ The same sort of thing, must necessarily happen in this case too.

Socrates/ Then, may we not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them, take only those pleasures which reason approves, will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest pleasures, so far as that is possible for them, and also the pleasures that are proper to them and their own, if for everything that which is best may be said to be most its 'own'?

Glaucon/ But indeed, it is most truly its very own.

Socrates/ Then when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is not filled with inner dissension, the result for each part is that it in all other respects keeps to its own task and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best pleasures and, so far as such a thing is possible, the truest.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ And so when one of the other two gets the mastery the result for it is that it does not find its own proper pleasure and constrains the others to pursue an alien pleasure and not the true.

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ And would not that which is furthest removed from philosophy and reason be most likely to produce this effect?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And is not that furthest removed from reason which is furthest from law and order?

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And was it not made plain that the furthest removed are the erotic and tyrannical appetites?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And least so the royal and orderly?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the tyrant's place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest remove from true and proper pleasure, and the king's at the least.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Then the tyrant's life will be least pleasurable and the king's most.

Glaucon/ There is every necessity of that.

Socrates/ Do you know, then, how much less pleasurably the tyrant lives than the king?

Glaucon/ I'll know if you tell me.

Socrates/ There being as it appears three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious, the tyrant in his flight from law and reason crosses the border beyond the spurious, cohabits with certain slavish, mercenary pleasures, and the measure of his inferiority is not easy to express except perhaps thus.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ The tyrant, I believe, we found at the third remove from the oligarch, for the democrat came between.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And would he not also dwell with a phantom of pleasure in respect of reality three stages removed from that other, if all that we have said is true?

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ And the oligarch in turn is at the third remove from the royal man if we assume the identity of the aristocrat and the king.

Glaucon/ Yes, the third.

Socrates/ Three times three, then, by numerical measure is the interval that separates the tyrant from true pleasure.

Glaucon/ Apparently.

Socrates/ The phantom of the tyrant's pleasure is then by longitudinal mensuration a plane number.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But by squaring and cubing it is clear what the interval of this separation becomes.

Glaucon/ It is clear, to a reckoner.

Socrates/ Then taking it the other way about, if one tries to express the extent of the interval between the king and the tyrant in respect of true pleasure he will find on completion of the multiplication that he lives seven hundred and twenty-nine times as happily and that the tyrant's life is more painful by the same distance.

Glaucon/ An overwhelming and baffling calculation, of the difference between the just and the unjust man in respect of pleasure and pain!

Socrates/ And what is more, it is a true number and pertinent to the lives of men if days and nights and months and years pertain to them.

Glaucon/ They certainly do.

Socrates/ Then if in point of pleasure the victory of the good and just man over the bad and unjust is so great as this, he will surpass him inconceivably in decency and beauty of life and virtue.

Glaucon/ Inconceivably indeed, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Very good. And now that we have come to this point in the argument, let us take up again the statement with which we began and that has brought us to this pass. It was, I believe, averred that injustice is profitable to the completely unjust man who is reputed just. Was not that the proposition?

Glaucon/ Yes, that.

Socrates/ Let us, then, reason with its proponent now that we have agreed on the essential nature of injustice and just conduct.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ By fashioning in our discourse a symbolic image of the soul, that the maintainer of that proposition may see precisely what it is that he was saying.

Glaucon/ What sort of an image?

Socrates/ One of those natures that the ancient fables tell of, as that of the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one.

Glaucon/ Yes, they do tell of them.

Socrates/ Mold, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths.

Glaucon/ It is the task of a cunning artist, but nevertheless, since speech is more plastic than wax and other such media, assume that it has been so fashioned.

Socrates/ Then fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and let the first be far the largest and the second, second in size.

Glaucon/ That is easier, and is done.

Socrates/ Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together.

Glaucon/ They are so united.

Socrates/ Then mold about them outside the likeness of one, that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable to look within but who can see only the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man.

Glaucon/ The sheath is made fast about him.

Socrates/ Let us then say to the speaker who avers that it pays this man to be unjust, and that to do justice is not for his advantage, that he is affirming nothing else than that it profits him to feast and make strong the multifarious beast and the lion and all that pertains to the lion, but to starve the man and so enfeeble him that he can be pulled about whithersoever either of the others drag him, and not to familiarize or reconcile with one another the two creatures but suffer them to bite and fight and devour one another.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is precisely what the panegyrist of injustice will be found to say.

Socrates/ And on the other hand, he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and words should tend to give the man within us complete domination over the entire man and make him take charge of the many-headed beast—like a farmer who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of the wild—and he will make an ally of the lion's nature, and caring for all the beasts alike will first make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so foster their growth.

Glaucon/ Yes, that in turn is precisely the meaning of the man who commends justice.

Socrates/ From every point of view, then, the panegyrist of justice speaks truly and the panegyrist of injustice falsely. For whether we consider pleasure, reputation, or profit, he

who commends justice speaks the truth, while there is no soundness or real knowledge of what he censures in him who disparages it.

Glaucon/ None whatever, I think.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, try to persuade him gently, for he does not willingly err, by questioning him thus. Dear friend, should we not also say that the things which law and custom deem fair or foul have been accounted so for a like reason—the fair and honorable things being those that subject the brutish part of our nature to that which is human in us, or rather, it may be, to that which is divine, while the foul and base are the things that enslave the gentle nature to the wild? Will he assent or not?

Glaucon/ He will if he is counseled by me.

Socrates/ Can it profit any man in the light of this thought to accept gold unjustly if the result is to be that by the acceptance he enslaves the best part of himself to the worst? Or is it conceivable that, while, if the taking of the gold enslaved his son or daughter and that too to fierce and evil men, it would not profit him, no matter how large the sum, yet that, if the result is to be the ruthless enslavement of the divinest part of himself to the most despicable and godless part, he is not to be deemed wretched and is not taking the golden bribe much more disastrously than Eriphyle did when she received the necklace as the price of her husband's life?

Glaucon/ Far more, for I will answer you in his behalf.

Socrates/ And do you not think that the reason for the old objection to licentiousness is similarly because that sort of thing emancipates that dread, that huge and manifold beast overmuch?

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And do we not censure self-will and irascibility when they foster and intensify disproportionately the element of the lion and the snake in us?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And do we not reprobate luxury and effeminacy for their loosening and relaxation of this same element when they engender cowardice in it?

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ And flattery and illiberality when they reduce this same high-spirited element under the rule of the mob-like beast and habituate it for the sake of wealth and the unbridled lusts of the beast to endure all manner of contumely from youth up and become an ape instead of a lion?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And why do you suppose that 'base mechanic' handicraft is a term of reproach? Shall we not say that it is solely when the best part is naturally weak in a man so that it cannot govern and control the brood of beasts within him but can only serve them and can learn nothing but the ways of flattering them?

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then is it not in order that such a one may have a like government with the best man that we say he ought to be the slave of that best man who has within himself the divine governing principle, not because we suppose, as Thrasymachus did in the case of subjects, that the slave should be governed for his own harm, but on the ground that it is better for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and guidance are the same?

Glaucon/ Yes, and rightly so.

Socrates/ And it is plain, that this is the purpose of the law, which is the ally of all classes in the state, and this is the aim of our control of children, our not leaving them free before we have established, so to speak, a constitutional government within them and, by fostering the best element in them with the aid of the like in ourselves, have set up in its place a similar guardian and ruler in the child, and then, and then only, we leave it free.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is plain.

Socrates/ In what way, then, Glaucon, and on what principle, shall we say that it profits a man to be unjust or licentious or do any shameful thing that will make him a worse man, but otherwise will bring him more wealth or power?

Glaucon/ In no way.

Socrates/ And how that it pays him to escape detection in wrongdoing and not pay the penalty? Or is it not true that he who evades detection becomes a still worse man, while in the one who is discovered and chastened the brutish part is lulled and tamed and the gentle part liberated, and the entire soul, returning to its nature at the best, attains to a much more precious condition in acquiring sobriety and righteousness together with wisdom, than the body does when it gains strength and beauty conjoined with health, even as the soul is more precious than the body?

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Then the wise man will bend all his endeavors to this end throughout his life; he will, to begin with, prize the studies that will give this quality to his soul and disprize the others.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And then, he not only will not abandon the habit and nurture of his body to the brutish and irrational pleasure and live with his face set in that direction, but he will not even make health his chief aim, nor give the first place to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful unless these things are likely to bring with them soberness of spirit, but he will always be found attuning the harmonies of his body for the sake of the concord in his soul.

Glaucon/ By all means, if he is to be a true musician.

Socrates/ And will he not deal likewise with the ordering and harmonizing of his possessions? He will not let himself be dazzled by the felicitations of the multitude and pile up the mass of his wealth without measure, involving himself in measureless ills.

Glaucon/ No, I think not.

Socrates/ He will rather, keep his eyes fixed on the constitution in his soul, and taking care and watching lest he disturb anything there either by excess or deficiency of wealth, will so steer his course and add to or detract from his wealth on this principle, so far as may be.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ And in the matter of honors and office too this will be his guiding principle. He will gladly take part in and enjoy those which he thinks will make him a better man, but in public and private life he will shun those that may overthrow the established habit of his soul.

Glaucon/ Then, if that is his chief concern, he will not willingly take part in politics.

Socrates/ Yes, by the dog, in his own city he certainly will, yet perhaps not in the city of his birth, except in some providential conjuncture.

Glaucon/ I understand, You mean the city whose establishment we have described, the city whose home is in the ideal, for I think that it can be found nowhere on earth.

Socrates/ Well, perhaps there is a pattern of it laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen. But it makes no difference whether it exists now or ever will come into being. The politics of this city only will be his and of none other.

Glaucon/ That seems probable.

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Socrates/ And truly, many other considerations assure me that we were entirely right in our organization of the state, and especially, I think, in the matter of poetry.

Glaucon/ What about it?

Socrates/ In refusing to admit at all so much of it as is imitative, for that it is certainly not to be received is, I think, still more plainly apparent now that we have distinguished the several parts of the soul.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Why, between ourselves—for you will not betray me to the tragic poets and all other imitators—that kind of art seems to be a corruption of the mind of all listeners who do not possess as an antidote a knowledge of its real nature.

Glaucon/ What is your idea in saying this?

Socrates/ I must speak out, though a certain love and reverence for Homer that has possessed me from a boy would stay me from speaking. For he appears to have been the first teacher and beginner of all these beauties of tragedy. Yet all the same we must not honor a man above truth, but, as I say, speak our minds.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Listen, then, or rather, answer my question.

Glaucon/ Ask it.

Socrates/ Could you tell me in general what imitation is? For neither do I myself quite apprehend what it would be at.

Glaucon/ It is likely, then, that I should apprehend!

Socrates/ It would be nothing strange, since it often happens that the dimmer vision sees things in advance of the keener.

Glaucon/ That is so, but in your presence I could not even be eager to try to state anything that appears to me, but do you yourself consider it.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, start the inquiry at this point by our customary procedure? We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form in the case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name. Do you not understand?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please; for example, there are many couches and tables.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But these utensils imply, I suppose, only two ideas or forms, one of a couch and one of a table.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are we not also in the habit of saying that the craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eyes on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the couches and in the other the tables that we use, and similarly of other things? For surely no craftsman makes the idea itself. How could he?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But now consider what name you would give to this craftsman.

Glaucon/ What one?

Socrates/ Him who makes all the things that all handicraftsmen severally produce.

Glaucon/ A truly clever and wondrous man you tell of.

Socrates/ Ah, but wait, and you will say so indeed, for this same handicraftsman is not only able to make all implements, but he produces all plants and animals,

including himself, and thereto earth and heaven and the gods and all things in heaven and in Hades under the earth.

Glaucon/ A most marvelous Sophist.

Socrates/ Are you incredulous? Tell me, do you deny altogether the possibility of such a craftsman, or do you admit that in a sense there could be such a creator of all these things, and in another sense not? Or do you not perceive that you yourself would be able to make all these things in a way?

Glaucon/ And in what way, I ask you.

Socrates/ There is no difficulty, but it is something that the craftsman can make everywhere and quickly. You could do it most quickly if you should choose to take a mirror and carry it about everywhere. You will speedily produce the sun and all the things in the sky, and speedily the earth and yourself and the other animals and implements and plants and all the objects of which we just now spoke.

Glaucon/ Yes, the appearance of them, but not the reality and the truth.

Socrates/ Excellent, and you come to the aid of the argument opportunely. For I take it that the painter too belongs to this class of producers, does he not?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But you will say, I suppose, that his creations are not real and true. And yet, after a fashion, the painter too makes a couch, does he not?

Glaucon/ Yes, the appearance of one, he too.

Socrates/ What of the cabinetmaker? Were you not just now saying that he does not make the idea or form which we say is the real couch, the couch in itself, but only some particular couch?

Glaucon/ Yes, I was.

Socrates/ Then if he does not make that which really is, he could not be said to make real being but something that resembles real being but is not that. But if anyone should say that being in the complete sense belongs to the work of the cabinetmaker or to that of any other handicraftsman, it seems that he would say what is not true.

Glaucon/ That would be the view, of those who are versed in this kind of reasoning.

Socrates/ We must not be surprised, then, if this too is only a dim adumbration in comparison with reality.

Glaucon/ No, we must not.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, use these very examples in our quest for the true nature of this imitator?

Glaucon/ If you please.

Socrates/ We get, then, these three couches, one, that in nature, which, I take it, we would say that God produces, or who else?

Glaucon/ No one, I think.

Socrates/ And then there was one which the carpenter made.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And one which the painter. Is not that so?

Glaucon/ So be it.

Socrates/ The painter, then, the cabinetmaker, and God, there are these three presiding over three kinds of couches.

Glaucon/ Yes, three.

Socrates/ Now God, whether because he so willed or because some compulsion was laid upon him not to make more than one couch in nature, so wrought and created one only, the couch which really and in itself is. But two or more such were never created by God and never will come into being.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Because, if he should make only two, there would again appear one of which they both would possess the form or idea, and that would be the couch that really is in and of itself, and not the other two.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ God, then, I take it, knowing this and wishing to be the real author of the couch that has real being and not of some particular couch, nor yet a particular cabinetmaker, produced it in nature unique.

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, call him its true and natural begetter, or something of the kind?

Glaucon/ That would certainly be right, since it is by and in nature that he has made this and all other things.

Socrates/ And what of the carpenter? Shall we not call him the creator of a couch?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Shall we also say that the painter is the creator and maker of that sort of thing?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ What will you say he is in relation to the couch.

Glaucon/ This, seems to me the most reasonable designation for him, that he is the imitator of the thing which those others produce.

Socrates/ Very good. The producer of the product three removes from nature you call the imitator?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ This, then, will apply to the maker of tragedies also, if he is an imitator and is in his nature three removes from the king and the truth, as are all other imitators.

Glaucon/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ We are in agreement, then, about the imitator. But tell me now this about the painter. Do you think that what he tries to imitate is in each case that thing itself in nature or the works of the craftsmen?

Glaucon/ The works of the craftsmen.

Socrates/ Is it the reality of them or the appearance? Define that further point.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ This. Does a couch differ from itself according as you view it from the side or the front or in any other way? Or does it differ not at all in fact though it appears different, and so of other things?

Glaucon/ That is the way of it, It appears other but differs not at all.

Socrates/ Consider, then, this very point. To which is painting directed in every case, to the imitation of reality as it is or of appearance as it appears? Is it an imitation of a phantasm or of the truth?

Glaucon/ Of a phantasm.

Socrates/ Then the mimetic art is far removed from truth, and this, it seems, is the reason why it can produce everything, because it touches or lays hold of only a small part of the object and that a phantom, as, for example, a painter, we say, will paint us a cobbler, a carpenter, and other craftsmen, though he himself has no expertness in any of these arts, but nevertheless if he were a good painter, by exhibiting at a distance his picture of a carpenter he would deceive children and foolish men, and make them believe it to be a real carpenter.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But for all that, my friend, this, I take it, is what we ought to bear in mind in all such cases. When anyone reports to us of someone, that he has met a man who knows all the crafts and everything else that men severally know, and that there is nothing that he does not know more exactly than anybody else, our tacit rejoinder must be a that he is a simple fellow, who apparently has met some magician or sleight-of-hand man and imitator and has been deceived by him into the belief that he is all-wise, because of his own inability to put to the proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance, and imitation.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then, have we not next to scrutinize tragedy and its leader Homer, since some people tell us that these poets know all the arts and all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all things divine? For the good poet, if he is to poetize things rightly, must, they argue, create with knowledge or else be unable to create. So we must consider whether these critics have not fallen in with such imitators and been deceived by them, so that looking upon their works they cannot perceive that these are three removes from reality, and easy to produce without knowledge of the truth. For it is phantoms, not realities, that they produce. Or is there something in their claim, and do good poets really know the things about which the multitude fancy they speak well?

Glaucon/ We certainly must examine the matter.

Socrates/ Do you suppose, then, that if a man were able to produce both the exemplar and the semblance, he would be eager to abandon himself to the fashioning of phantoms and set this in the forefront of his life as the best thing he had?

Glaucon/ I do not.

Socrates/ But, I take it, if he had genuine knowledge of the things he imitates he would far rather devote himself to real things than to the imitation of them, and would endeavor to leave after him many noble deeds and works as memorials of himself, and would be more eager to be the theme of praise than the praiser.

Glaucon/ I think so, for there is no parity in the honor and the gain.

Socrates/ Let us not, then, demand a reckoning from Homer or any other of the poets on other matters by asking them, if anyone of them was a physician and not merely an imitator of a physician's talk, what men any poet, old or new, is reported to have restored to health as Asclepius did, or what disciples of the medical art he left after him as Asclepius did his descendants, and let us dismiss the other arts and not question them about them. But concerning the greatest and finest things of which Homer undertakes to speak, wars and generalship and the administration of cities and the education of men, it surely is fair to question him and ask, 'Friend Homer, if you are not at the third remove from truth and reality in human excellence, being merely that creator of phantoms whom we defined as the imitator, but if you are even in the second place and were capable of knowing what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what city was better governed owing to you, even as Lacedaemon was because of Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small because of other legislators. But what city credits you with having been a good legislator and having benefited them? Italy and Sicily say this of Charondas and we of Solon. But who says it of you?' Will he be able to name any?

Glaucon/ I think not. At any rate none is mentioned even by the Homeridae themselves.

Socrates/ Well, then, is there any tradition of a war in Homer's time that was well conducted by his command or counsel?

Glaucon/ None.

Socrates/ Well, then, as might be expected of a man wise in practical affairs, are many and ingenious inventions for the arts and business of life reported of Homer as they are of 'Males the Milesian and Anacharsis the Scythian?

Glaucon/ Nothing whatever of the sort.

Socrates/ Well, then, if no public service is credited to him, is Homer reported while he lived to have been a guide in education to men who took pleasure in associating with him and transmitted to posterity a certain Homeric way of life just as Pythagoras was himself especially honored for this, and his successors, even to this day, denominating a certain way of life the Pythagorean, are distinguished among their contemporaries?

Glaucon/ No, nothing of this sort either is reported, for Creophylus, Socrates, the friend of Homer, would perhaps be even more ridiculous than his name as a representative of Homeric culture and education, if what is said about Homer is true. For the tradition is that Homer was completely neglected in his own lifetime by that friend of the flesh.

Socrates/ Why, yes, that is the tradition, but do you suppose, Glaucon, that, if Homer had really been able to educate men and make them better and had possessed not the art of imitation but real knowledge, he would not have acquired many companions and been honored and loved by them? But are we to believe that while Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Ceos and many others are able by private teaching to impress upon their contemporaries the conviction that they will not be capable of governing their

homes or the city unless they put them in charge of their education, and make themselves so beloved for this wisdom that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders, yet, forsooth, that Homer's contemporaries, if he had been able to help men to achieve excellence, would have suffered him or Hesiod to roam about rhapsodizing and would not have clung to them far rather than to their gold, and constrained them to dwell with them in their homes, or failing to persuade them, would themselves have escorted them wheresoever they went until they should have sufficiently imbibed their culture?

Glaucon/ What you say seems to me to be altogether true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, lay it down that all the poetic tribe, beginning with Homer, are imitators of images of excellence and of the other things that they 'create,' and do not lay hold on truth, but, as we were just now saying, the painter will fashion, himself knowing nothing of the cobbler's art, what appears to be a cobbler to him and likewise to those who know nothing but judge only by forms and colors?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And similarly, I suppose, we shall say that the poet himself, knowing nothing but how to imitate, lays on with words and phrases the colors of the several arts in such fashion that others equally ignorant, who see things only through words, will deem his words most excellent, whether he speak in rhythm, meter, and harmony about cobbling or generalship or anything whatever. So mighty is the spell that these adornments naturally exercise, though when they are stripped bare of their musical coloring and taken by themselves, I think you know what sort of a showing these sayings of the poets make. For you, I believe, have observed them.

Glaucon/ I have.

Socrates/ Do they not, resemble the faces of adolescents, young but not really beautiful, when the bloom of youth abandons them?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Come, then, consider this point. The creator of the phantom, the imitator, we say, knows nothing of the reality but only the appearance. Is not that so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us not, then, leave it half said but consider it fully.

Glaucon/ Speak on.

Socrates/ The painter, we say, will paint both reins and a bit.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the maker will be the cobbler and the smith.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Does the painter, then, know the proper quality of reins and bit? Or does not even the maker, the cobbler, and the smith know that, but only the man who understands the use of these things, the horseman?

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And shall we not say that the same holds true of everything?

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ That there are some three arts concerned with everything, the user's art, the maker's, and the imitator's.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now do not the excellence, the beauty, the rightness of every implement, living thing, and action refer

solely to the use for which each is made or by nature adapted?

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ It quite necessarily follows, then, that the user of anything is the one who knows most of it by experience, and that he reports to the maker the good or bad effects in use of the thing he uses. As, for example, the flute player reports to the flute maker which flutes respond and serve rightly in flute playing, and will order the kind that must be made, and the other will obey and serve him.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ The one, then, possessing knowledge, reports about the goodness or the badness of the flutes, and the other, believing, will make them.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then in respect of the same implement the maker will have right belief about its excellence and defects from association with the man who knows and being compelled to listen to him, but the user will have true knowledge.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And will the imitator from experience or use have knowledge whether the things he portrays are or are not beautiful and right, or will he, from compulsory association with the man who knows and taking orders from him for the right making of them, have right opinion?

Glaucon/ Neither.

Socrates/ Then the imitator will neither know nor opine rightly concerning the beauty or the badness of his imitations.

Glaucon/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Most charming, then, would be the state of mind of the poetical imitator in respect of true wisdom about his creations.

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Yet still he will nonetheless imitate, though in every case he does not know in what way the thing is bad or good. But, as it seems, the thing he will imitate will be the thing that appears beautiful to the ignorant multitude.

Glaucon/ Why, what else?

Socrates/ On this, then, as it seems, we are fairly agreed, that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning of the things he imitates, but that imitation is a form of play, not to be taken seriously, and that those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambics or heroic verse, are all altogether imitators.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ In heaven's name, then, this business of imitation is concerned with the third remove from truth, is it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now again, to what element in man is its function and potency related?

Glaucon/ Of what are you speaking?

Socrates/ Of this. The same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and from far does not appear equal.

Glaucon/ Why, no.

Socrates/ And the same things appear bent and straight to those who view them in water and out, or concave and convex, owing to similar errors of vision about colors, and there is obviously every confusion of this sort in our souls. And so scene painting in its exploitation of s weakness of our

nature falls nothing short of witchcraft, and so do jugglery and many other such contrivances.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And have not measuring and numbering and weighing proved to be most gracious aids to prevent the domination in our soul of the apparently greater or less or more or heavier, and to give the control to that which has reckoned and numbered or even weighed?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But this surely would be the function of the part of the soul that reasons and calculates.

Glaucon/ Why, yes, of that.

Socrates/ And often when this has measured and declares that certain things are larger or that some are smaller than the others or equal, there is at the same time an appearance of the contrary.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And did we not say that it is impossible for the same thing at one time to hold contradictory opinions about the same thing?

Glaucon/ And we were right in affirming that.

Socrates/ The part of the soul, then, that opines in contradiction of measurement could not be the same with that which conforms to it.

Glaucon/ Why, no.

Socrates/ But, further, that which puts its trust in measurement and reckoning must be the best part of the soul.

Glaucon/ Surely.

Socrates/ Then that which opposes it must belong to the inferior elements of the soul.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ This, then, was what I wished to have agreed upon when I said that poetry, and in general the mimetic art, produces a product that is far removed from truth in the accomplishment of its task, and associates with the part in us that is remote from intelligence, and is its companion and friend for no sound and true purpose.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Mimetic art, then, is an inferior thing cohabiting with an inferior and engendering inferior offspring.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Does that, hold only for vision or does it apply also to hearing and to what we call poetry?

Glaucon/ Presumably, to that also.

Socrates/ Let us not, then, trust solely to the plausible analogy from painting, but let us approach in turn that part of the mind to which mimetic poetry appeals and see whether it is the inferior or the nobly serious part.

So we must.

Socrates/ Let us, then, put the question thus. Mimetic poetry, we say, imitates human beings acting under compulsion or voluntarily, and as a result of their actions supposing themselves to have fared well or ill and in all this feeling either grief or joy. Did we find anything else but this?

Glaucon/ Nothing.

Socrates/ Is a man, then, in all this of one mind with himself, or just as in the domain of sight there was faction and strife and he held within himself contrary opinions at the same time about the same things, so also in our actions there is division and strife of the man with himself? But I recall that there is no need now of our seeking agreement on this point, for in our former discussion we were sufficiently

agreed that our soul at anyone moment teems with countless such self-contradictions.

Glaucon/ Rightly.

Socrates/ Yes, rightly, but what we then omitted must now, I think, be set forth.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ When a good and reasonable man, experiences such a stroke of fortune as the loss of a son or anything else that he holds most dear, we said, I believe, then too, that he will bear it more easily than the other sort.

Glaucon/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But now let us consider this. Will he feel no pain, or, since that is impossible, shall we say that he will in some sort be moderate in his grief?

Glaucon/ That, is rather the truth.

Socrates/ Tell me now this about him. Do you think he will be more likely to resist and fight against his grief when he is observed by his equals or when he is in solitude alone by himself?

Glaucon/ He will be much more restrained, when he is on view.

Socrates/ But when left alone, I fancy, he will permit himself many utterances which, if heard by another, would put him to shame, and will do many things which he would not consent to have another see him doing.

Glaucon/ So it is.

Socrates/ Now is it not reason and law that exhorts him to resist, while that which urges him to give way to his grief is the bare feeling itself?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And where there are two opposite impulses in a man at the same time about the same thing we say that there must needs be two things in him.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And is not the one prepared to follow the guidance of the law as the law leads and directs?

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ The law, I suppose, declares that it is best to keep quiet as far as possible in calamity and not to chafe and repine, because we cannot know what is really good and evil in such things and it advantages us nothing to take them hard, and nothing in mortal life is worthy of great concern, and our grieving checks the very thing we need to come to our aid as quickly as possible in such case.

Glaucon/ What thing, do you mean?

Socrates/ To deliberate, about what has happened to us, and, as it were in the fall of the dice, to determine the movements of our affairs with reference to the numbers that turn up, in the way that reason indicates would be the best, and, instead of stumbling like children, clapping one's hands to the stricken spot and wasting the time in wailing, ever to accustom the soul to devote itself at once to the curing of the hurt and the raising up of what has fallen, banishing threnody by therapy.

Glaucon/ That certainly, would be the best way to face misfortune and deal with it.

Socrates/ Then, we say, the best part of us is willing to conform to these precepts of reason.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And shall we not say that the part of us that leads us to dwell in memory on our suffering and impels us to lamentation, and cannot get enough of that sort of thing,

is the irrational and idle part of us, the associate of cowardice?

Glaucon/ Yes, we will say that.

Socrates/ And does not the fretful part of us present many and varied occasions for imitation, while the intelligent and temperate disposition, always remaining approximately the same, is neither easy to imitate nor to be understood when imitated, especially by a nondescript mob assembled in the theater? For the representation imitates a type that is alien to them.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And is it not obvious that the nature of the mimetic poet is not related to this better part of the soul and his cunning is not framed to please it, if he is to win favor with the multitude, but is devoted to the fretful and complicated type of character because it is easy to imitate?

Glaucon/ It is obvious.

Socrates/ This consideration, then, makes it right for us to proceed to lay hold of him and set him down as the counterpart of the painter, for he resembles him in that his creations are inferior in respect of reality, and the fact that his appeal is to the inferior part of the soul and not to the best part is another point of resemblance. And so we may at last say that we should be justified in not admitting him into a well-ordered state, because he stimulates and fosters this element in the soul, and by strengthening it tends to destroy the rational part, just as when in a state one puts bad men in power and turns the city over to them and ruins the better sort. Precisely in the same manner we shall say that the mimetic poet sets up in each individual soul a vicious constitution by fashioning phantoms far removed from reality, and by currying favor with the senseless element that

cannot distinguish the greater from the less, but calls the same thing now one, now the other.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But we have not yet brought our chief accusation against it. Its power to corrupt, with rare exceptions, even the better sort is surely the chief cause for alarm.

Glaucon/ How could it be otherwise, if it really does that?

Socrates/ Listen and reflect. I think you know that the very best of us, when we hear Homer or some other of the makers of tragedy imitating one of the heroes who is in grief, and is delivering a long tirade in his lamentations or chanting and beating his breast, feel pleasure, and abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and eagerness, and we praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way.

Glaucon/ I do know it, of course.

Socrates/ But when in our own lives some affliction comes to us, you are also aware that we plume ourselves upon the opposite, on our ability to remain calm and endure, in the belief that this is the conduct of a man, and what we were praising in the theater that of a woman.

Glaucon/ I do note that.

Socrates/ Do you think, then, that this praise is rightfully bestowed when, contemplating a character that we would not accept but would be ashamed of in ourselves, we do not abominate it but take pleasure and approve?

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus, it does not seem reasonable.

Socrates/ Oh yes, if you would consider it in this way.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ If you would reflect that the part of the soul that in the former case, in our own misfortunes, was forcibly

restrained, and that has hungered for tears and a good cry and satisfaction, because it is its nature to desire these things, is the element in us that the poets satisfy and delight, and that the best element in our nature, since it has never been properly educated by reason or even by habit, then relaxes its guard over the plaintive part, inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others and it is no shame to it to praise and pity another who, claiming to be a good man, abandons himself to excess in his grief, but it thinks this vicarious pleasure is so much clear gain, and would not consent to forfeit it by disdaining the poem altogether. That is, I think, because few are capable of reflecting that what we enjoy in others will inevitably react upon ourselves. For after feeding fat the emotion of pity there, it is not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Does not the same principle apply to the laughable, namely, that if in comic representations, or for that matter in private talk, you take intense pleasure in buffooneries that you would blush to practice yourself, and do not detest them as base, you are doing the same thing as in the case of the pathetic? For here again what your reason, for fear of the reputation of buffoonery, restrained in yourself when it fain would play the clown, you release in turn, and so, fostering its youthful impudence, let yourself go so far that often ere you are aware you become yourself a comedian in private.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And so in regard to the emotions of sex and anger, and all the appetites and pains and pleasures of the soul which we say accompany all our actions, the effect of poetic imitation is the same. For it waters and fosters these feelings when what we ought to do is to dry them up, and it

establishes them as our rulers when they ought to be ruled, to the end that we may be better and happier men instead of worse and more miserable.

Glaucon/ I cannot deny it.

Socrates/ Then, Glaucon, when you meet encomiasts of Homer who tell us that this poet has been the educator of Hellas, and that for the conduct and refinement of human life he is worthy of our study and devotion, and that we should order our entire lives by the guidance of this poet, we must love and salute them as doing the best they can, and concede to them that Homer is the most poetic of poets and the first of tragedians, but we must know the truth, that we can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the praises of good men. For if you grant admission to the honeyed Muse in lyric or epic, pleasure and pain will be lords of your city instead of law and that which shall from time to time have approved itself to the general reason as the best.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Let us, then, conclude our return to the topic of poetry and our apology, and affirm that we really had good grounds then for dismissing her from our city, since such was her character. For reason constrained us. And let us further say to her, lest she condemn us for harshness and rusticity, that there is from of old a quarrel between philosophy and poetry. For such expressions as 'the yelping hound barking at her master and mighty in the idle babble of fools,' and 'the mob that masters those who are too wise for their own good,' and the subtle thinkers who reason that after all they are poor, and countless others are tokens of this ancient enmity. But nevertheless let it be declared that, if the mimetic and dulcet poetry can show any reason for her existence in a well-governed state, we would gladly admit

her, since we ourselves are very conscious of her spell. But all the same it would be impious to betray what we believe to be the truth. Is not that so, friend? Do not you yourself feel her magic and especially when Homer is her interpreter?

Glaucon/ Greatly.

Socrates/ Then may she not justly return from this exile after she has pleaded her defense, whether in lyric or other measure?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And we would allow her advocates who are not poets but lovers of poetry to plead her cause in prose without meter, and show that she is not only delightful but beneficial to orderly government and all the life of man. And we shall listen benevolently, for it will be clear gain for us if it can be shown that she bestows not only pleasure but benefit.

Glaucon/ How could we help being the gainers?

Socrates/ But if not, my friend, even as men who have fallen in love, if they think that the love is not good for them, hard though it be, nevertheless refrain, so we, owing to the love of this kind of poetry inbred in us by our education in these fine polities of ours, will gladly have the best possible case made out for her goodness and truth, but so long as she is unable to make good her defense we shall chant over to ourselves as we listen the reasons that we have given as a countercharm to her spell, to preserve us from slipping back into the childish loves of the multitude, for we have come to see that we must not take such poetry seriously as a serious thing that lays hold on truth, but that he who lends an ear to it must be on his guard fearing for the polity in his soul and must believe what we have said about poetry.

Glaucon/ By all means, I concur.

Socrates/ Yes, for great is the struggle, dear Glaucon, a far greater contest than we think it, that determines whether

a man prove good or bad, so that not the lure of honor or wealth or any office, no, nor of poetry either, should incite us to be careless of righteousness and all excellence.

Glaucon/ I agree with you, in view of what we have set forth, and I think that anyone else would do so too.

Socrates/ And yet, the greatest rewards of virtue and the prizes proposed for her we have not set forth.

Glaucon/ You must have in mind an inconceivable magnitude, if there are other things greater than those of which we have spoken.

Socrates/ What great thing, could there be in a little time? For surely the whole time from the boy to the old man would be small compared with all time.

Glaucon/ Nay, it is nothing.

Socrates/ What then? Do you think that an immortal thing ought to be seriously concerned for such a little time, and not rather for all time?

Glaucon/ I think so, but what is this that you have in mind?

Socrates/ Have you never perceived, that our soul is immortal and never perishes? And he, looking me full in the face in amazement, said;

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus, not I, but are you able to declare this?

Socrates/ I certainly ought to be, and I think you too can, for it is nothing hard.

Glaucon/ It is for me, and I would gladly hear from you this thing that is not hard.

Socrates/ Listen.

Glaucon/ Just speak on.

Socrates/ You speak of good and evil, do you not?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Is your notion of them the same as mine?

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ That which destroys and corrupts in every case is the evil; that which preserves and benefits is the good.

Glaucon/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ How about this? Do you say that there is for everything its special good and evil, as for example for the eyes ophthalmia, for the entire body disease, for grain mildew, rotting for wood, rust for bronze and iron, and, as I say, for practically everything its congenital evil and disease?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then when one of these evils comes to anything does it not make the thing to which it attaches itself bad, and finally disintegrate and destroy it?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then the congenital evil of each thing and its own vice destroys it, or if that is not going to destroy it, nothing else remains that could, for obviously the good will never destroy anything, nor yet again will that which is neutral and neither good nor evil.

Glaucon/ How could it?

Socrates/ If, then, we discover anything that has an evil which vitiates it, yet is not able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not thereupon know that of a thing so constituted there can be no destruction?

Glaucon/ That seems likely.

Socrates/ Well, then, has not the soul something that makes it evil?

Glaucon/ Indeed it has, all the things that we were just now enumerating, injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and ignorance.

Socrates/ Does anyone of these things dissolve and destroy it? And reflect, lest we be misled by supposing that when an unjust and foolish man is taken in his injustice he is then destroyed by the injustice, which is the vice of soul. But conceive it thus. Just as the vice of body which is disease wastes and destroys it so that it no longer is a body at all, in like manner in all the examples of which we spoke it is the specific evil which, by attaching itself to the thing and dwelling in it with power to corrupt, reduces it to nonentity. Is not that so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Come, then, and consider the soul in the same way. Do injustice and other wickedness dwelling in it, by their indwelling and attachment to it, corrupt and wither it till they bring it to death and separate it from the body?

Glaucon/ They certainly do not do that.

Socrates/ But surely, it is unreasonable to suppose that the vice of something else destroys a thing while its own does not.

Glaucon/ Yes, unreasonable.

Socrates/ For observe, Glaucon, that we do not think it proper to say of the body either that it is destroyed by the badness of foods themselves, whether it be staleness or rottenness or whatever it is, but when the badness of the foods themselves engenders in the body the defect of body, then we shall say that it is destroyed owing to these foods, but by its own vice, which is disease. But the body being one thing and the foods something else, we shall never expect the body to be destroyed by their badness, that is by an alien evil that has not produced in it the evil that belongs to it by nature.

Glaucon/ You are entirely right.

Socrates/ On the same principle, if the badness of the body does not produce in the soul the soul's badness we shall never expect the soul to be destroyed by an alien evil apart from its own defect—one thing, that is, by the evil of another.

Glaucon/ That is reasonable.

Socrates/ Either, then, we must refute this and show that we are mistaken, or, so long as it remains unrefuted, we must never say that by fever or any other disease, or yet by the knife at the throat or the chopping to bits of the entire body, there is any more likelihood of the soul perishing because of these things, until it is proved that owing to these affections of the body the soul itself becomes more unjust and unholy. But when an evil of something else occurs in a different thing and the evil that belongs to the thing is not engendered in it, we must not suffer it to be said that the soul or anything else is in this way destroyed.

Glaucon/ But you may be sure, that nobody will ever prove this, that the souls of the dying are made more unjust by death.

Socrates/ But if anyone, dares to come to grips with the argument and say, in order to avoid being forced to admit the soul's immortality, that a dying man does become more wicked and unjust, we will postulate that, if what he says is true, injustice must be fatal to its possessor as if it were a disease, and that those who catch it die because it kills them by its own inherent nature, those who have most of it quickest, and those who have less more slowly, and not, as now in fact happens, that the unjust die owing to this but by the action of others who inflict the penalty.

Glaucon/ Nay, by Zeus, injustice will not appear a very terrible thing after all if it is going to be fatal to its possessor, for that would be a release from all troubles. But I rather

think it will prove to be quite the contrary, something that kills others when it can, but renders its possessor very lively indeed, and not only lively but wakeful, so far, I ween, does it dwell from deadliness.

Socrates/ You say well, for when the natural vice and the evil proper to it cannot kill and destroy the soul, still less will the evil appointed for the destruction of another thing destroy the soul or anything else, except that for which it is appointed.

Glaucon/ Still less indeed, in all probability.

Socrates/ Then since it is not destroyed by any evil whatever, either its own or alien, it is evident that it must necessarily exist always, and that if it always exists it is immortal.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Let this, then, be assumed to be so. But if it is so, you will observe that these souls must always be the same. For if none perishes they could not, I suppose, become fewer nor yet more numerous. For if any class of immortal things increased you are aware that its increase would come from the mortal and all things would end by becoming immortal.

Glaucon/ You say truly.

Socrates/ But, we must not suppose this, for reason will not suffer it, nor yet must we think that in its truest nature the soul is the kind of thing that teems with infinite diversity and unlikeness and contradiction in and with itself.

Glaucon/ How am Ito understand that?

Socrates/ It is not easy, for a thing to be immortal that is composed of many elements not put together in the best way, as now appeared to us to be the case with the soul.

Glaucon/ It is not likely.

Socrates/ Well, then, that the soul is immortal our recent argument and our other proofs would constrain us to admit. But to know its true nature we must view it not marred by communion with the body and other miseries as we now contemplate it, but consider adequately in the light of reason what it is when it is purified, and then you will find it to be a far more beautiful thing and will more clearly distinguish justice and injustice and all the matters that we have now discussed. But though we have stated the truth of its present appearance, its condition as we have now contemplated it resembles that of the sea god Glaucus whose first nature can hardly be made out by those who catch glimpses of him, because the original members of his body are broken off and mutilated and crushed and in every way marred by the waves, and other parts have attached themselves to him, accretions of shells and seaweed and rocks, so that he is more like any wild creature than what he was by nature—even such, I say, is our vision of the soul marred by countless evils. But we must look elsewhere, Glaucon.

Glaucon/ here?

Socrates/ To its love of wisdom. And we must note the things of which it has apprehensions, and the associations for which it yearns, as being itself akin to the divine and the immortal and to eternal being, and so consider what it might be if it followed the gleam unreservedly and were raised by this impulse out of the depths of this sea in which it is now sunk, and were cleansed and scraped free of the rocks and barnacles which, because it now feasts on earth, cling to it in wild profusion of earthy and stony accretion by reason of these feastings that are accounted happy. And then one might see whether in its real nature it is manifold or single in its simplicity, or what is the truth about it and how. But for the present we have, I think, fairly well described its

sufferings and the forms it assumes in this human life of ours.

Glaucon/ We certainly have.

Socrates/ Then, we have met all the other demands of the argument, and we have not invoked the rewards and reputes of justice as you said Homer and Hesiod do, but we have proved that justice in itself is the best thing for the soul itself, and that the soul ought to do justice whether it possess the ring of Gyges or not, or the helmet of Hades to boot.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then, Glaucon, there can no longer be any objection, can there, to our assigning to justice and virtue generally, in addition, all the various rewards and wages that they bring to the soul from men and gods, both while the man still lives and after his death?

Glaucon/ There certainly can be none.

Socrates/ Will you, then, return to me what you borrowed in the argument?

Glaucon/ What, pray?

Socrates/ I granted to you that the just man should seem and be thought to be unjust and the unjust just, for you thought that, even if the concealment of these things from gods and men was an impossibility in fact, nevertheless it ought to be conceded for the sake of the argument, in order that the decision might be made between absolute justice and absolute injustice. Or do you not remember?

Glaucon/ It would be unjust of me, if I did not.

Socrates/ Well, then, now that they have been compared and judged, I demand back from you in behalf of justice the repute that she in fact enjoys from gods and men, and I ask that we admit that she is thus esteemed in order that she may gather in the prizes which she wins from the seeming

and bestows on her possessors, since she has been proved to bestow the blessings that come from the reality and not to deceive those who truly seek and win her.

Glaucon/ That is a just demand.

Socrates/ Then, will not the first of these restorations be that the gods certainly are not unaware of the true character of each of the two, the just and the unjust?

Glaucon/ We will restore that.

Socrates/ And if they are not concealed, the one will be dear to the gods and the other hateful to them, as we agreed in the beginning.

Glaucon/ That is so.

Socrates/ And shall we not agree that all things that come from the gods work together for the best for him that is dear to the gods, apart from the inevitable evil caused by sin in a former life?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ This, then, must be our conviction about the just man, that whether he fall into poverty or disease or any other supposed evil, for him all these things will finally prove good, both in life and in death. For by the gods assuredly that man will never be neglected who is willing and eager to be righteous, and by the practice of virtue to be likened unto God so far as that is possible for man.

Glaucon/ It is reasonable, that such a one should not be neglected by his like.

Socrates/ And must we not think the opposite of the unjust man?

Glaucon/ Most emphatically.

Socrates/ Such then are the prizes of victory which the gods bestow upon the just.

Glaucon/ So I think, at any rate.

Socrates/ But what, does he receive from men? Is not this the case, if we are now to present the reality? Do not your smart but wicked men fare as those racers do who run well from the scratch but not back from the turn? They bound nimbly away at the start, but in the end are laughed to scorn and run off the field uncrowned and with their ears on their shoulders. But the true runners when they have come to the goal receive the prizes and bear away the crown. Is not this the usual outcome for the just also, that toward the end of every action and association and of life as a whole they have honor and bear away the prizes from men?

Glaucon/ So it is indeed.

Socrates/ Will you, then, bear with me if I say of them all that you said of the unjust? For I am going to say that the just, when they become older, hold the offices in their own city if they choose, marry from what families they will, and give their children in marriage to what families they please, and everything that you said of the one I now repeat of the other, and in turn I will say of the unjust that the most of them, even if they escape detection in youth, at the end of their course are caught and derided, and their old age is made miserable by the contumelies of strangers and townsfolk. They are lashed and suffer all things which you truly said are unfit for ears polite. Suppose yourself to have heard from me a repetition of all that they suffer. But, as I say, consider whether you will bear with me.

Glaucon/ Assuredly, for what you say is just.

Socrates/ Such then while he lives are the prizes, the wages, and the gifts that the just man receives from gods and men in addition to those blessings which justice herself bestowed.

Glaucon/ And right fair and abiding rewards.

Socrates/ Well, these, are nothing in number and magnitude compared with those that await both after death. And we must listen to the tale of them, in order that each may have received in full what is due to be said of him by our argument.

Glaucon/ Tell me, since there are not many things to which I would more gladly listen.

Socrates/ It is not, let me tell you, the tale to Alcinous told that I shall unfold, but the tale of a warrior bold, Er, the son of Armenius, by race a Pamphylian. He once upon a time was slain in battle, and when the corpses were taken up on the tenth day already decayed, was found intact, and having been brought home, at the moment of his funeral, on the twelfth day as he lay upon the pyre, revived, and after coming to life related what, he had seen in the world beyond. He said that when his soul went forth from his body he journeyed with a great company and that they came to a mysterious region where there were two openings side by side in the earth, and above and over against them in the heaven two others, and that judges were sitting between these, and that after every judgment they bade the righteous journey to the right and upward through the heaven with tokens attached to them in front of the judgment passed upon them, and the unjust to take the road to the left and downward, they too wearing behind signs of all that had befallen them, and that when he himself drew near they told him that he must be the messenger to mankind to tell them of that other world, and they charged him to give ear and to observe everything in the place. And so he said that here he saw, by each opening of heaven and earth, the souls departing after judgment had been passed upon them, while, by the other pair of openings, there came up from the one in the earth souls full of squalor and dust, and from the second there came down from heaven a second procession of souls

clean and pure, and that those which arrived from time to time appeared to have come as it were from a long journey and gladly departed to the meadow and encamped there as at a festival, and acquaintances greeted one another, and those which came from the earth questioned the others about conditions up yonder, and those from heaven asked how it fared with those others. And they told their stories to one another, the one lamenting and wailing as they recalled how many and how dreadful things they had suffered and seen in their journey beneath the earth—it lasted a thousand years—while those from heaven related their delights and visions of a beauty beyond words. To tell it all, Glaucon, would take all our time, but the sum, was this. For all the wrongs they had ever done to anyone and all whom they had severally wronged they had paid the penalty in turn tenfold for each, and the measure of this was by periods of a hundred years each, so that on the assumption that this was the length of human life the punishment might be ten times the crime—as for example that if anyone had been the cause of many deaths or had betrayed cities and armies and reduced them to slavery, or had been participant in any other iniquity, they might receive in requital pains tenfold for each of these wrongs, and again if any had done deeds of kindness and been just and holy men they might receive their due reward in the same measure. And other things not worthy of record he said of those who had just been born and lived but a short time, and he had still greater requitals to tell of piety and impiety toward the gods and parents and of self-slaughter. For he said that he stood by when one was questioned by another, 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' Now this Ardiaeus had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia just a thousand years before that time and had put to death his old father and his elder brother, and had done many other unholy deeds, as was the report. So he said that the

one questioned replied, 'He has not come,' 'nor will he be likely to come here. For indeed this was one of the dreadful sights we beheld; when we were near the mouth and about to issue forth and all our other sufferings were ended, we suddenly caught sight of him and of others, the most of them, I may say, tyrants. But there were some of private station, of those who had committed great crimes. And when these supposed that at last they were about to go up and out, the mouth would not receive them, but it bellowed when anyone of the incurably wicked or of those who had not completed their punishment tried to come up. And thereupon,' 'savage men of fiery aspect who stood by and took note of the voice laid hold on them and bore them away. But Ardiaeus and others they bound hand and foot and head and flung down and flayed them and dragged them by the wayside, carding them on thorns and signifying to those who from time to time passed by for what cause they were borne away, and that they were to be hurled into Tartarus.'

And then, though many and manifold dread things had befallen them, this fear exceeded all—lest each one should hear the voice when he tried to go up, and each went up most gladly when it had kept silence. And the judgments and penalties were somewhat after this manner, and the blessings were their counterparts.

But when seven days had elapsed for each group in the meadow, they were required to rise up on the eighth and journey on, and they came in four days to a spot whence they discerned, extended from above throughout the heaven and the earth, a straight light like a pillar, most nearly resembling the rainbow, but brighter and purer. To this they came after going forward a day's journey, and they saw there at the middle of the light the extremities of its fastenings stretched from heaven, for this light was the girdle of the heavens like the undergirders of triremes, holding together

in like manner the entire revolving vault. And from the extremities was stretched the spindle of Necessity, through which all the orbits turned. Its staff and its hook were made of adamant, and the whorl of these and other kinds was commingled. And the nature of the whorl was this. Its shape was that of those in our world, but from his description we must conceive it to be as if in one great whorl, hollow and scooped out, there lay enclosed, right through, another like it but smaller, fitting into it as boxes that fit into one another, and in like manner another, a third, and a fourth, and four others, for there were eight of the whorls in all, lying within one another, showing their rims as circles from above and forming the continuous back of a single whorl about the shaft, which was driven home through the middle of the eighth. Now the first and outmost whorl had the broadest circular rim, that of the sixth was second, and third was that of the fourth, and fourth was that of the eighth, fifth that of the seventh, sixth that of the fifth, seventh that of the third, eighth that of the second. And that of the greatest was spangled, that of the seventh brightest, that of the eighth took its color from the seventh, which shone upon it. The colors of the second and fifth were like one another and more yellow than the two former. The third had the whitest color, and the fourth was of a slightly ruddy hue; the sixth was second in whiteness. The staff turned as a whole in a circle with the same movement, but within the whole as it revolved the seven inner circles revolved gently in the opposite direction to the whole, and of these seven the eighth moved most swiftly, and next and together with one another the seventh, sixth, and fifth, and third in swiftness, as it appeared to them, moved the fourth with returns upon itself, and fourth the third and fifth the second. And the spindle turned on the knees of Necessity, and up above on each of the rims of the circles a Siren stood, borne around in its

revolution and uttering one sound, one note, and from all the eight there was the concord of a single harmony. And there were three others who sat round about at equal intervals, each one on her throne, the Fates, daughters of Necessity, clad in white vestments with filleted heads, Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, who sang in unison with the music of the Sirens, Lachesis singing the things that were, Clotho the things that are, and Atropos the things that are to be. And Clotho with the touch of her right hand helped to turn the outer circumference of the spindle, pausing from time to time. Atropos with her left hand in like manner helped to turn the inner circles, and Lachesis alternately with either hand lent a hand to each.

Now when they arrived they were straightway bidden to go before Lachesis, and then a certain prophet first marshaled them in orderly intervals, and thereupon took from the lap of Lachesis lots and patterns of lives and went up to a lofty platform and spoke, 'This is the word of Lachesis, the maiden daughter of Necessity, "Souls that live for a day, now is the beginning of another cycle of mortal generation where birth is the beacon of death. No divinity shall cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own deity. Let him to whom falls the first lot first select a life to which he shall cleave of necessity. But virtue has no master over her, and each shall have more or less of her as he honors her or does her despite. The blame is his who chooses. God is blameless. "' So saying, the prophet flung the lots out among them all, and each took up the lot that fell by his side, except himself; him as they did not permit. And whoever took up a lot saw plainly what number he had drawn. And after this again the prophet placed the patterns of lives before them on the ground, far more numerous than the assembly. They were of every variety, for there were lives of all kinds of animals and all sorts of human lives, for there were

tyrannies among them, some uninterrupted till the end and others destroyed midway and issuing in penuries and exiles and beggaries, and there were lives of men of repute for their forms and beauty and bodily strength otherwise and prowess and the high birth and the virtues of their ancestors, and others of ill repute in the same things, and similarly of women. But there was no determination of the quality of soul, because the choice of a different life inevitably determined a different character. But all other things were commingled with one another and with wealth and poverty and sickness and health and the intermediate conditions.

And there, dear Glaucon, it appears, is the supreme hazard for a man. And this is the chief reason why it should be our main concern that each of us, neglecting all other studies, should seek after and study this thing—if in any way he may be able to learn of and discover the man who will give him the ability and the knowledge to distinguish the life that is good from that which is bad, and always and everywhere to choose the best that the conditions allow, and, taking into account all the things of which we have spoken and estimating the effect on the goodness of his life of their conjunction or their severance, to know how beauty commingled with poverty or wealth and combined with what habit of soul operates for good or for evil, and what are the effects of high and low birth and private station and office and strength and weakness and quickness of apprehension and dullness and all similar natural and acquired habits of the soul, when blended and combined with one another, so that with consideration of all these things he will be able to make a reasoned choice between the better and the worse life, with his eyes fixed on the nature of his soul, naming the worse life that which will tend to make it more unjust and the better that which will make it more just. But all other

considerations he will dismiss, for we have seen that this is the best choice, both for life and death. And a man must take with him to the house of death an adamantine faith in this, that even there he may be undazzled by riches and similar trumpery, and may not precipitate himself into tyrannies and similar doings and so work many evils past cure and suffer still greater himself, but may know how always to choose in such things the life that is seated in the mean and shun the excess in either direction, both in this world so far as may be and in all the life to come, for this is the greatest happiness for man.

And at that time also the messenger from that other world reported that the prophet spoke thus. 'Even for him who comes forward last, if he make his choice wisely and live strenuously, there is reserved an acceptable life, no evil one. Let not the foremost in the choice be heedless nor the last be discouraged.' When the prophet had thus spoken he said that the drawer of the first lot at once sprang to seize the greatest tyranny, and that in his folly and greed he chose it without sufficient examination, and failed to observe that it involved the fate of eating his own children, and other horrors, and that when he inspected it at leisure he beat his breast and bewailed his choice, not abiding by the forewarning of the prophet. For he did not blame himself for his woes, but fortune and the gods and anything except himself. He was one of those who had come down from heaven, a man who had lived in a well-ordered polity in his former existence, participating in virtue by habit and not by philosophy, and one may perhaps say that a majority of those who were thus caught were of the company that had come from heaven, inasmuch as they were unexercised in suffering. But the most of those who came up from the earth, since they had themselves suffered and seen the sufferings of others, did not make their choice precipitately. For which

reason also there was an interchange of good and evil for most of the souls, as well as because of the chances of the lot. Yet if at each return to the life of this world a man loved wisdom sanely, and the lot of his choice did not fall out among the last, we may venture to affirm, from what was reported thence, that not only will he be happy here but that the path of his journey thither and the return to this world will not be underground and rough but smooth and through the heavens. For he said that it was a sight worth seeing to observe how the several souls selected their lives. He said it was a strange, pitiful, and ridiculous spectacle, as the choice was determined for the most part by the habits of their former lives. He saw the soul that had been Orpheus', selecting the life of a swan, because from hatred of the tribe of women, owing to his death at their hands, it was unwilling to be conceived and born of a woman. He saw the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale, and he saw a swan changing to the choice of the life of man, and similarly other musical animals. The soul that drew the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion; it was the soul of Ajax, the son of Telamon, which, because it remembered the adjudication of the arms of Achilles, was unwilling to become a man. The next, the soul of Agamemnon, likewise from hatred of the human race because of its sufferings, substituted the life of an eagle. Drawing one of the middle lots the soul of Atalanta caught sight of the great honors attached to an athlete's life and could not pass them by but snatched at them. After her, he saw the soul of Epeus, the son of Panopeus, entering into the nature of an arts and crafts woman. Far off in the rear he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites clothing itself in the body of an ape. And it fell out that the soul of Odysseus drew the last lot of all and came to make its choice, and, from memory of its former toils having flung away ambition, went about for a long time in quest of the life of an ordinary citizen

who minded his own business, and with difficulty found it lying in some corner disregarded by the others, and upon seeing it said that it would have done the same had it drawn the first lot, and chose it gladly. And in like manner, of the other beasts some entered into men and into one another, the unjust into wild creatures, the just transformed to tame, and there was every kind of mixture and combination.

But when, to conclude, all the souls had chosen their lives in the order of their lots, they were marshaled and went before Lachesis.

And she sent with each, as the guardian of his life and the fulfiller of his choice, the genius that he had chosen, and this divinity led the soul first to Clotho, under her hand and her turning of the spindle to ratify the destiny of his lot and choice, and after contact with her the genius again led the soul to the spinning of Atropos to make the web of its destiny irreversible, and then without a backward look it passed beneath the throne of Necessity. And after it had passed through that, when the others also had passed, they all journeyed to the Plain of Oblivion, through a terrible and stifling heat, for it was bare of trees and all plants, and there they camped at eventide by the River of Forgetfulness, whose waters no vessel can contain. They were all required to drink a measure of the water, and those who were not saved by their good sense drank more than the measure, and each one as he drank forgot all things. And after they had fallen asleep and it was the middle of the night, there was a sound of thunder and a quaking of the earth, and they were suddenly wafted thence, one this way, one that, upward to their birth like shooting stars. Er himself, was not allowed to drink of the water, yet how and in what way he returned to the body he said he did not know, but suddenly recovering his sight he saw himself at dawn lying on the funeral pyre.

And so, Glaucon, the tale was saved, as the saying is, and was not lost. And it will save us if we believe it, and we shall safely cross the River of Lethe, and keep our soul unspotted from the world. But if we are guided by me we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever, that we may be dear to ourselves and to the gods both during our sojourn here and when we receive our reward, as the victors in the games go about to gather in theirs. And thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you, we shall fare well.

The Republic.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Glauco

Cephalus, Adimantus

Polemarchus, Thrasymachus

THE WHOLE IS A RECITAL BY SOCRATES.

The Scene *is in the House of* Cephalus, *at the Piræum.*

Book 1.

Socrates/ I went down yesterday to the Piræum, with Glauco, the son of Aristo, to pay my devotion to the Goddess; and desirous, at the same time, to observe in what manner they would celebrate the festival, as they were now to do it for the first time. The procession of our own countrymen seemed to me to be indeed beautiful; yet that of the Thracians appeared no less proper. After we had paid our devotion, and seen the solemnity, we were returning to the city; when Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, observing us at a distance hurrying home, ordered his boy to run and desire us to wait for him: and the boy, taking hold of my robe behind;

Boy/ Polemarchus, desires you to wait.

Socrates/ I turned about, and asked where he was.

Boy/ He is coming up, after you; but do you wait for him.

Glaucon/ We will wait.

Socrates/ And soon afterwards came Polemarchus, and Adimantus the brother of Glauco, and Niceratus the son of Nicias, and some others as from the procession. Then said Polemarchus;

Polemarchus/ Socrates! you seem to me to be hurrying to the city.

Socrates/ You conjecture, not amiss.

Polemarchus/ Do you not see, then, how many there are of us?

Socrates/ Undoubtedly I do.

Polemarchus/ Therefore, now, you must, either be stronger than these, or you must stay here.

Socrates/ Is there not, one way still remaining? May we not persuade you that you must let us go?

Polemarchus/ Can you be able to persuade such as will not hear?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Adeimantus/ Then, as if we are not to hear, determine accordingly. But do you not know, that there is to be an illumination in the evening, on horse-back, to the goddess?

Socrates/ On horse-back? That is new. Are they to have torches, and give them to one another, contending together with their horses? or how do you mean?

Polemarchus/ Just so. And besides, they will perform a nocturnal solemnity worth seeing. For we shall rise after supper, and see the nocturnal solemnity, and shall be there with many of the youth, and converse together: But do you stay, and do not do otherwise.

Glaucon/ It seems proper, then, that we should stay.

Socrates/ Nay, if it seem so, we ought to do it.

We went home therefore to Polemarchus's house; and there we found both Lysias and Euthydemus, brothers of Polemarchus; likewise Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, and Charmantides the Pæoneian, and Clitipho the son of Aristonimus; Cephalus the father of Polemarchus was likewise in the house; he seemed to me to be far advanced in

years, for I had not seen him for a long time. He was sitting crowned, on a certain couch and seat; for he had been offering sacrifice in the hall. So we sat down by him; for some seats were placed there in a circle. Immediately, then, when Cephalus saw me, he saluted me, and said;

Cephalus/ Socrates, you do not often come down to us to the Piræum, nevertheless you ought to do it; for, were I still able easily to go up to the city, you should not need to come hither, but we would be with you. But now you should come hither more frequently: for I assure you that, with relation to myself, as the pleasures respecting the body languish, the desire and pleasure of conversation increase. Do not fail, then to make a party often with these youths, and come hither to us, as to your friends and intimate acquaintance.

Socrates/ And, truly, Cephalus, I take pleasure in conversing with those who are very far advanced in years; for it appears to me proper, that we learn from them, as from persons who have gone before us, what the road is which it is likely we have to travel; whether rough and difficult, or plain and easy. And I would gladly learn from you, as you are now arrived at that time of life which the poets call the threshold of old-age, what your opinion of it is; whether you consider it to be a grievous part of life, or what you announce it to be?

Cephalus/ And I will tell you, Socrates, what is really my opinion; for we frequently meet together in one place, several of us who are of the same age, observing the old proverb. Most of us, therefore, when assembled, lament their state, when they feel a want of the pleasures of youth, and call to their remembrance the delights of love, of drinking, and feasting, and some others akin to these: and they express indignation, as if they were bereaved of some mighty things. In those days, they say, they lived well, but now they do not live at all: some of them, too, bemoan the contempt which

old-age meets with from their acquaintance: and on this account also they lament old-age, which is to them the cause of so many ills. But these men, Socrates, seem not to me to blame the real cause; for, if this were the cause, I likewise should have suffered the same things on account of old-age; and all others, even as many as have arrived at these years: whereas I have met with several who are not thus affected; and particularly was once with Sophocles the poet, when he was asked by someone, How, Sophocles, are you affected towards the pleasures of love? are you still able to enjoy them? Softly, friend, most gladly, indeed, have I escaped from these pleasures, as from some furious and savage master. He seemed to me to speak well at that time, and no less so now: for, certainly, there is in old-age abundance of peace and freedom from such things; for, when the appetites cease to be vehement, and are become easy, what Sophocles said certainly happens; we are delivered from very many, and those too insane masters. But with relation to these things, and those likewise respecting our acquaintance, there is one and the same cause; which is not old-age, Socrates, but manners: for, if indeed they are discreet and moderate, even old-age is but moderately burthensome: if not, both old-age, Socrates, and youth are grievous to such.

Socrates/ Being delighted to hear him say these things, and wishing him to discourse further, I urged him, and said, I think, Cephalus, the multitude will not agree with you in those things; but will imagine that you bear old-age easily, not from manners, but from possessing much wealth; for the rich, say they, have many consolations.

Cephalus/ You say true, they do not agree with me; and there is something in what they say; but, however, not so much as they imagine. But the saying of Themistocles was just; who, when the Seriphian reviled him, and said that he was honored, not on his own account, but on that of his

country, replied, “That neither would himself have been renowned had he been a Seriphian, nor would he, had he been an Athenian.” The same saying is justly applicable to those who are not rich, and who bear old-age with uneasiness, ‘That neither would the worthy man, were he poor, bear old-age quite easily; nor would he who is unworthy, though enriched, ever be agreeable to himself.’

Socrates/ But, whether, Cephalus, was the greater part of what you possess, left you; or have you acquired it?

Cephalus/ Somewhat, Socrates, I have acquired: as to money-getting, I am in a medium between my grandfather and my father: for my grandfather, of the same name with me, who was left almost as much substance as I possess at present, made it many times as much again; but my father Lysanias made it yet less than it is now: I am satisfied if I leave my sons here, no less, but some little more than I received.

Socrates/ I asked you, for this reason, because you seem to me to love riches moderately; and those generally do so who have not acquired them: but those who have acquired them are doubly fond of them: for, as poets love their own poems, and as parents love their children, in the same manner, those who have enriched themselves value their riches as a work of their own, as well as for the utilities they afford, for which riches are valued by others.

Cephalus/ You say true.

Socrates/ It is entirely so. But further, tell me this: What do you think is the greatest good derived from the possession of much substance?

Cephalus/ That, probably, of which I shall not persuade the multitude. For be assured, Socrates, that after a man begins to think he is soon to die, he feels a fear and concern about things which before gave him no uneasiness: for those

stories concerning a future state, which represent that the man who has done injustice here must there be punished, though formerly ridiculed, do then trouble his soul with apprehensions that they may be true; and the man, either through the infirmity of old-age, or as being now more near those things, views them more attentively: he becomes therefore full of suspicion and dread; and considers, and reviews, whether he has, in anything, injured anyone. He then who finds in his life much of iniquity, and is wakened from sleep, as children by repeated calls, is afraid, and lives in miserable hope. But the man who is not conscious of any iniquity.

> Still pleasing hope, sweet nourisher of age!
> Attends—

as Pindar says. This, Socrates, he has beautifully expressed; that, whoever lives a life of justice and holiness.

> Sweet hope, the nourisher of age, his heart
> Delighting, with him lives; which most of all
> Governs the many veering thoughts of man.

So that he says well, and very admirably; wherefore, for this purpose, I deem the possession of riches to be chiefly valuable; not to every man, but to the man of worth: for the possession of riches contributes considerably to free us from being tempted to cheat or deceive; and from being obliged to depart thither in a terror, when either indebted in sacrifices to God, or in money to man. It has many other advantages besides; but, for my part, Socrates, I deem riches to be most advantageous to a man of understanding, chiefly in this respect.

Socrates/ You speak most handsomely, Cephalus. But with respect to this very thing, justice: Whether shall we call it truth, simply, and the restoring of what one man has received from another? or shall we say that the very same

things may sometimes be done justly, and sometimes unjustly? My meaning is this: Everyone would somehow own, that if a man should receive arms from his friend who was of a sound mind, it would not be proper to restore such things if he should demand them when mad; nor would the restorer be just: nor again would he be just, who, to a man in such a condition, should willingly tell all the truth.

Cephalus/ You say right.

Socrates/ This, then, to speak the truth, and restore what one hath received, is not the definition of justice?

Polemarchus/ It is not, Socrates, if at least we may give any credit to Simonides.

Cephalus/ However that be, I give up, this conversation to you; for I must now go to take care of the sacred rites.

Socrates/ Is not Polemarchus, your heir?

Cephalus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ He smiling departed to the sacred rites. —

Tell me, then, you who are heir in the conversation, what is it which, according to you, Simonides says so well concerning justice?

Polemarchus/ That to give everyone his due, is just; in saying this, he seems to me to say well.

Socrates/ It is, indeed, not easy to disbelieve Simonides, for he is a wise and divine man; but what his meaning may be in this, you, Polemarchus, probably know it, but I do not; for it is plain he does not mean what we were saying just now; that, when one deposits with another anything, it is to be given, back to him when he asks for it again in his madness: yet what has been deposited is in some respect, at least, due; is it not?

Polemarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ But yet, it is not at all, by any means, then, to be restored, when anyone asks for it in his madness.

Polemarchus/ It is not.

Socrates/ Simonides then, as it should seem, says something different from this, that to deliver up what is due, is just?

Polemarchus/ Something different, truly: for he thinks that friends ought to do their friends some good, but no ill.

Socrates/ I understand. He who restores gold deposited with him, if to restore and receive it be hurtful, and the restorer and receiver be friends, does not give what is due. Is not this what you allege Simonides says?

Polemarchus/ Surely.

Socrates/ But what? are we to give our enemies too, what may chance to be due to them?

Polemarchus/ By all means, what is due to them; and from an enemy, to an enemy, there is due, I imagine, what is fitting, that is, some evil.

Socrates/ Simonides, then, as it should seem, expressed what is just, enigmatically, and after the manner of the poets; for he well understood, as it appears, that this was just, to give everyone what was fitting for him, and this he called his due.

Polemarchus/ But, what, is your opinion?

Socrates/ Truly, if anyone should ask him thus: Simonides, what is the art, which, dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due, is called medicine? what would he answer us, do you think?

Polemarchus/ That art, surely, which dispenses drugs, and prescribes regimen of meats and drinks to bodies.

Socrates/ And what is the art, which, dispensing to certain things something fitting and due, is called cookery?

Polemarchus/ The art which gives seasonings to victuals.

Socrates/ Be it so. What then is that art, which, dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due, may be called justice?

Polemarchus/ If we ought to be any way directed, Socrates, by what is said above, it is the art which dispenses good offices to friends, and injuries to enemies.

Socrates/ To do good, then, to friends, and ill to enemies, he calls justice?

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Who, then, is most able to do good, to his friends, when they are diseased, and ill to his enemies, with respect to sickness and health?

Polemarchus/ The physician.

Socrates/ And who, when they fail, with respect to the danger of the sea?

Polemarchus/ The pilot.

Socrates/ But as to the just man, in what business, and with respect to what action, is he most able to serve his friends, and to hurt his enemies?

Polemarchus/ It seems to me, in fighting in alliance with the one, and against the other.

Socrates/ Be it so. But, surely, the physician is useless, Polemarchus, to those, at least, who are not sick?

Polemarchus/ It is true.

Socrates/ And the pilot, to those who do not sail?

Polemarchus/ He is.

Socrates/ And is the just man, in like manner, useless to those who are not at war?

Polemarchus/ I can by no means think that he is.

Socrates/ Justice, then, is useful likewise in time of peace.

Polemarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ And so is agriculture, is it not?

Polemarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Towards the possession of grain?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not shoe-making likewise useful?

Polemarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Towards the possession of shoes, you will say, I imagine.

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what, now? For the use, or possession of what, would you say that justice were useful in time of peace?

Polemarchus/ For co-partnerships, Socrates.

Socrates/ You call co-partnerships, joint companies, or what else?

Polemarchus/ Joint companies, certainly.

Socrates/ Whether, then, is the just man, or the dice-player, a good and useful co-partner, for playing at dice?

Polemarchus/ The dice-player.

Socrates/ But, in the laying of tiles or stones, is the just man a more useful and a better partner than the mason?

Polemarchus/ By no means.

Socrates/ In what joint company, now, is the just man a better co-partner than the harper, as the harper is better than the just man for touching the strings of a harp?

Polemarchus/ In a joint company about money, as I imagine.

Socrates/ And yet it is likely, Polemarchus, that with regard to the making use of money, when it is necessary jointly to buy or sell a horse, the jockey, as I imagine, is then the better co-partner. Is he not?

Polemarchus/ He would appear so.

Socrates/ And with respect to a ship, the ship-wright, or ship-master?

Polemarchus/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ When then is it, with respect to the joint application of money, that the just man is more useful than others?

Polemarchus/ When it is to be deposited, and be safe, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you not mean, when there is no need to use it, but to let it lie?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ When money then is useless, justice is useful with regard to it?

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ And when a pruning-hook is to be kept, justice is useful, both for a community, and for a particular person: but when it is to be used, the art of vine-dressing is useful.

Polemarchus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And you will say that, when a buckler, or a harp, is to be kept, and not to be used, then justice is useful; but when they are to be used, then the military, and the musical art?

Polemarchus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And with reference to all other things, when they are to be used, justice is useless; but when they are not to be used, it is useful?

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Justice, then, my friend! can be no very important matter, if it is useful only in respect of things, which are not to be used. But let us consider this matter: Is not he who is the most dexterous at striking, whether in battle or in boxing, the same likewise in defending himself?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not he who is dexterous in warding off and shunning a distemper, most dexterous too in bringing it on?

Polemarchus/ So I imagine.

Socrates/ And he too the best guardian of a camp, who can steal the counsels, and the other operations of the enemy?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Of whatever, then, anyone is a good guardian, of that likewise he is a dexterous thief.

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ If therefore the just man be dexterous in guarding money, he is dexterous likewise in stealing?

Polemarchus/ So it would appear, from this reasoning.

Socrates/ The just man, then, has appeared to be a sort of thief; and you seem to have learned this from Homer; for he admires Autolycus, the grandfather of Ulysses by his mother, and says that he was distinguished beyond all men for thefts and oaths. It seems, then, according to you, and according to Homer and Simonides, that justice is a sort of thieving, for the profit indeed of friends, and for the hurt of enemies. Did not you say so?

Polemarchus/ No, by no means; nor indeed do I know any longer what I said; yet I still think that justice profits friends, and hurts enemies.

Socrates/ But, whether do you pronounce such to be friends, as seem to be honest? or, such as are so, though they do not seem; and in the same way as to enemies?

Polemarchus/ It is reasonable, to love those whom a man deems to be honest; and to hate those whom he deems to be wicked.

Socrates/ But do not men mistake in this; so as that many who are not honest appear so to them, and many contrariwise?

Polemarchus/ They do mistake.

Socrates/ To such, then the good are enemies, and the bad are friends?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But, however, it is then just for them to profit the bad; and to hurt the good.

Polemarchus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But the good are likewise just, and such as do no ill.

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ But, according to your speech, it is just to do ill to those who do no ill.

Polemarchus/ By no means, Socrates; for the speech seems to be wicked.

Socrates/ It is just, then, to hurt the unjust, and to profit the just.

Polemarchus/ This speech appears more handsome than the other.

Socrates/ Then, it will happen, Polemarchus, to many, — to as many indeed of mankind as have misjudged, that it shall be just to hurt their friends, who are really bad; and to profit their enemies, who are really good; and so we shall say the very reverse of what we affirmed Simonides said?

Polemarchus/ It does, indeed, happen so.

Socrates/ But let us define again; for we seem not to have rightly defined a friend and an enemy. How were they defined, Polemarchus?

Polemarchus/ That he who seems honest is a friend.

Socrates/ But how shall we now define?

Polemarchus/ That he who seems, and likewise is honest, is a friend; but he who seems honest, yet is not, seems, yet is not a friend.

Socrates/ And we must admit the distinction about an enemy to be the very same. The good man, according to this speech, will, as it seems, be the friend; and the wicked man, the enemy.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you now require us to describe what is just, as we did before, when we said it was just to do good to a friend, and ill to an enemy? Or shall we add to the definition, and now say, that it is just to do good to a friend, when he is good; and ill to an enemy, when he is bad?

Polemarchus/ This last, seems to me to be perfectly well expressed.

Socrates/ Is it, then, the part of a just man to hurt any man?

Polemarchus/ By all means, he ought to hurt the wicked, and his enemies.

Socrates/ But, do horses, when they are hurt, become better or worse?

Polemarchus/ Worse.

Socrates/ Whether in the virtue of dogs, or of horses?

Polemarchus/ In that of horses.

Socrates/ And, do not dogs, when they are hurt, become worse in the virtue of dogs, and not of horses?

Polemarchus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And shall we not in like manner, my friend, say that men, when they are hurt, become worse in the virtue of a man?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But is not justice the virtue of a man?

Polemarchus/ Of necessity this likewise.

Socrates/ Of necessity then, friend, those men who are hurt must become more unjust.

Polemarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But can musicians, by music, make men unmusical?

Polemarchus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Or horsemen, by horsemanship, make men unskilled in horsemanship?

Polemarchus/ It cannot be.

Socrates/ Or can the just, by justice, make men unjust? Or in general, can the good, by virtue, make men wicked?

Polemarchus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ For, it is not, as I imagine, the effect of heat, to make cold, but of its contrary.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor is it the effect of drought, to make moist; but its contrary.

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Neither is it the part of a good man, to hurt; but of his contrary.

Polemarchus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But, the just is good.

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Neither, then, is it the part of a just man, Polemarchus, to hurt either friend, or any other, but the part of his contrary, the unjust man.

Polemarchus/ In all respects, you seem to me, Socrates, to say true.

Socrates/ If, then, anyone says that it is just to give everyone his due, and thinks this with himself, that hurt is due to enemies from a just man, and profit to his friend; he was not wise who said so, for he spoke not the truth. For it has nowhere appeared to us, that any just man hurts anyone.

Polemarchus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Let us jointly contend, then, if anyone shall say that a Simonides, a Bias, a Pittacus, said so; or any other of those wise and happy men.

Polemarchus/ I am ready, to join in the fight.

Socrates/ But do you know, whose saying I fancy it is, That it is just to profit friends, and hurt enemies?

Polemarchus/ Whose?

Socrates/ I fancy it is the saying of Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenius the Theban; or some other rich man, who thought himself able to accomplish great things.

Polemarchus/ You say most true.

Socrates/ Be it so. But as this has not appeared to be justice, nor the just, what else may one assert it to be?

Thrasymachus frequently, during our reasoning, rushed in the midst, to lay hold of the discourse; but was hindered by those who sat near him, and who wanted to hear the conversation to an end. But, when we paused, and I had said these things, he was no longer quiet; but, collecting himself as a wild beast, he came upon us as if he would have torn

us in pieces. Both Polemarchus and I, being frightened, were thrown into the utmost consternation: but he, roaring out in the midst:

Thrasymachus/ What trifling, Socrates, is this which long ago possesses you; and why do you thus play the fool together, yielding mutually to one another? But, if you truly want to know what is just, ask not questions only, nor value yourself in confuting, when anyone answers you anything; (knowing this, that it is easier to ask than to answer;) but answer yourself, and tell what it is you call just. And you are not to tell me that it is what is fit; nor what is due, nor what is profitable, nor what is gainful, nor what is advantageous; but, what you mean tell plainly and accurately; for I will not allow it, if you speak such trifles as these.

Socrates/ When I heard this, I was astonished, and, looking at him, was frightened; and I should have become speechless, I imagine, if I had not perceived him before he perceived me. But I had observed him first, when he began to grow fierce at our reasoning; so that I was now able to answer him, and said, trembling: Thrasymachus! be not hard on us; for, if we mistake in our inquiries, Polemarchus and I, be well assured that we mistake unwittingly: for think not that, in searching for gold, we would never willingly yield to one another in the search, and mar the finding it; but that, searching for justice, an affair far more valuable than a great deal of gold, we should yet foolishly yield to each other, and not labor, friend, with the utmost ardor, that we may discover what it really is. But I am afraid we are not able to discover it. It is more reasonable, then, that we be pitied, than be used hardly by you who are men of ability. Having heard this, he laughed aloud in a very coarse manner, and said;

Thrasymachus/ By Hercules! this is Socrates' wonted irony. This I both knew and foretold to these, here, that you never incline to answer if anyone ask you anything.

Socrates/ You are a wise man, therefore, Thrasymachus. For you knew well, that if you asked anyone, How many is twelve? and, when you ask, should previously tell him, You are not, friend, to tell me that twelve is twice six; nor that it is three times four; nor that it is four times three; for I will not admit it, if you trifle in such a manner; —I fancy it is plain to you that no man would answer one asking in such a way. But if he should say to you, Wonderful Thrasymachus! how do you mean? May I answer in none of those ways you have told me; not even though the real and true answer happen to be one of them, but I am to say something else than the truth? Or, how is it you mean? What would you say to him in answer to these things?

Thrasymachus/ If they were alike, I should give an answer; but how are they alike?

Socrates/ Nothing hinders it; but, though they were not alike, but should appear so to him who was asked, would he the less readily answer what appeared to him; whether we forbade him or not?

Thrasymachus/ And will you do so now? Will you say in answer some of these things which I forbid you to say?

Socrates/ I should not wonder I did, if it should appear so to me on inquiry.

Thrasymachus/ What then, if I shall show you another and a better answer, besides all these about justice; what will you deserve to suffer?

Socrates/ What else, but what is proper for the ignorant to suffer? And it is proper for them to learn somewhere from a wise man. I shall therefore deserve to suffer this.

Thrasymachus/ You are pleasant now, but together with the learning, do you pay money likewise.

Socrates/ Shall it not be after I have got it?

Glaucon/ But it is here; so as to money, Thrasymachus, say on; for all of us will advance for Socrates.

Thrasymachus/ I truly imagine so, that Socrates may go on in his wonted manner; not answer himself, but, when another answers, he may take up the discourse, and confute.

Socrates/ How, most excellent Thrasymachus, can a man answer? In the first place, when he neither knows, nor says he knows; and, then, if he have any opinion about these matters, he is forbid by no mean man to advance any of his opinions. But it is more reasonable that you speak, as you say you know, and can tell us: Do not decline then, but oblige me in answering, and do not grudge to instruct Glauco here, and the rest of the company. When I had said this, both Glauco and the rest of the company entreated him not to decline it. And Thrasymachus appeared plainly desirous to speak, in order to gain applause; reckoning he had a very fine answer to make; yet pretended to be earnest that I should be the answerer, but at last he agreed. And then;

Thrasymachus/ This, is the wisdom of Socrates: Unwilling himself to teach, he goes about learning from others, and gives no thanks for it.

Socrates/ That, indeed, I learn from others, Thrasymachus, is true; but in saying that I do not give thanks for it, you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able; and I am only able to commend them; for money I have not: and how readily I do this, when anyone appears to me to speak well, you shall perfectly know this moment, when you make an answer; for I imagine you are to speak well.

Thrasymachus/ Hear then; for I say, that what is just, is nothing else but the advantage of the more powerful. But why do not you commend? You are unwilling.

Socrates/ Let me learn first, what you say; for as yet I do not understand it. The advantage of the more powerful, you say, is what is just. What is this which you now say, Thrasymachus? For you certainly do not mean such a thing as this: If Polydamus, the wrestler, be more powerful than we; and if beef be beneficial for his body, that this food is likewise both just and advantageous for us, who are weaker than he.

Thrasymachus/ You are most impudent, Socrates, and lay hold of my speech on that side where you may do it the greatest hurt.

Socrates/ By no means, most excellent Thrasymachus, but tell more plainly what is your meaning.

Thrasymachus/ Do not you then know, that, with reference to states, some are tyrannical; others democratical; and others aristocratical?

Socrates/ Why are they not?

Thrasymachus/ And is not the governing pact in each state the more powerful?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Thrasymachus/ And every government makes laws for its own advantage; a democracy, democratic laws; a tyranny, tyrannic; and others the same way. And when they have made them, they show that to be just for the governed, which is advantageous for themselves; and they punish the transgressor of this as one acting contrary both to law and justice. This, then, most excellent Socrates, is what I say, that, in all states, what is just, and what is advantageous for the established government, are the same; it hath the power. So that it appears to him who reasons rightly, that, in all

cases, what is the advantage of the more powerful, the same is just.

Socrates/ Now I have learned, what you say. But whether it be true, or not, I shall endeavor to learn. What is advantageous, then, Thrasymachus, you yourself have affirmed to be likewise just; though you forbid me to give this answer; but, indeed, you have added to it that of the more powerful.

Thrasymachus/ Probably, but a small addition.

Socrates/ It is not yet manifest, whether it is small or great; but it is manifest that this is to be considered, whether you speak the truth; since I too acknowledge that what is just is somewhat that is advantageous: but you add to it, and say, that it is that of the more powerful. This I do not know, but it is to be considered.

Thrasymachus/ Consider then.

Socrates/ That, shall be done. And tell me, do not you say that it is just to obey governors?

Thrasymachus/ I say so.

Socrates/ Whether are the governors in the several states infallible? or are they capable of erring?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly, they are liable to err.

Socrates/ Do they not, then, when they attempt to make laws, make some of them right, and some of them not right?

Thrasymachus/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ To make them right, is it not to make them advantageous for themselves; and to make them not right, disadvantageous? Or what is it you mean?

Thrasymachus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And what they enact is to be observed by the governed, and this is what is just?

Thrasymachus/ Why not?

Socrates/ It is, then, according to your reasoning, not only just to do what is advantageous for the more powerful; but also to do the contrary, what is not advantageous.

Thrasymachus/ What do you say?

Socrates/ The same, I imagine, that you say yourself. But let us consider better: have we not acknowledged that governors, in enjoining the governed to do certain things, may sometimes mistake what is best for themselves; and that what the governors enjoin is just for the governed to do? Have not these things been acknowledged?

Thrasymachus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Think, also, then, that you have acknowledged that it is just to do what is disadvantageous to governors, and the more powerful; since governors unwillingly enjoin what is ill for themselves; and you say that it is just for the others to do what these enjoin. Must it not then, most wise Thrasymachus, necessarily happen, that, by this means, it may be just to do the contrary of what you say? For that which is the disadvantage of the more powerful, is sometimes enjoined the inferiors to do?

Polemarchus/ Yes, indeed, Socrates, these things are most manifest.

Clitophon/ Yes, if you bear him witness.

Socrates/ What need, of a witness? For Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that governors do indeed sometimes enjoin what is ill for themselves; but that it is just for the governed to do these things. For it has, Polemarchus, been established by Thrasymachus, to be just to do what is enjoined by the governors; and he has likewise, Clitipho, established that to be just, which is the advantage of the more powerful; and, having established both these things, he has acknowledged likewise, that the more powerful sometimes enjoin the inferiors and governed to do what is

disadvantageous for themselves; and, from these concessions, the advantage of the more powerful can no more be just than the disadvantage.

Clitophon/ But, he said the advantage of the more powerful; that is, what the more powerful judged to be advantageous to himself; that this was to be done by the inferior, and this he established as just.

Polemarchus/ But, it was not said so.

Socrates/ There is no difference, Polemarchus. But, if Thrasymachus says so now, we shall allow him to do it. And tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you meant to say was just? The advantage of the more powerful, such as appeared so to the more powerful, whether it is advantageous, or is not. Shall we say that you spoke thus?

Thrasymachus/ By no means. For, do you imagine I call him the more powerful who misjudges, at the time he misjudges?

Socrates/ I thought, you said this, when you acknowledged that governors were not infallible; but that in some things they even erred.

Thrasymachus/ You are a sycophant, in reasoning, Socrates. For, do you now call him who mistakes about the management of the sick, a physician; as to that very thing in which he mistakes? or, him, who mistakes in reasoning, a reasoner, when he errs, and with reference to that very error? But, I imagine, we say, in common language, that the physician erred; that the reasoner erred, and the grammarian: Thus, however, I imagine, that each of these, as far as he is what we call him, errs not at any time: So that, according to accurate discourse (since you discourse accurately), none of the artists errs: for he who errs, errs by departing from science; and, in this, he is no artist: So that no artist, or wise man, or governor errs; in so far as he is a

governor. Yet anyone may say the physician erred; the governor erred: Imagine then, it was in this way I now answered you. But the most accurate answer is this: That the governor, in as far as he is governor, errs not; and, as he does not err, he enacts that which is best for himself; and this is to be observed by the governed: So that what I said from the beginning, I maintain, is just—To do what is the advantage of the more powerful.

Socrates/ Be it so, Thrasymachus! Do I appear to you to act the sycophant?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly, indeed.

Socrates/ For you imagine that I spoke as I did, insidiously, and to abuse you.

Thrasymachus/ I know it well, but you shall gain nothing by it; for, whether you abuse me in a concealed manner, or otherwise, you shall not be able to overcome me by your reasoning.

Socrates/ I shall not attempt it, happy Thrasymachus! But, that nothing of this kind may happen to us again, define, whether you speak of a governor, and the more powerful, according to common, or according to accurate discourse, as you now said, whose advantage, as he is the more powerful, it shall be just for the inferior to observe.

Thrasymachus/ I speak of him, who, in the most accurate discourse, is governor. For this, now, abuse me, and act the sycophant, if you are able. I do not shun you; but you cannot do it.

Socrates/ Do you imagine me, to be so mad as to attempt to shave a lion, and act the sycophant with Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ You have now, attempted it, but with no effect.

Socrates/ Enough, of this. But tell me, with reference to him, who, accurately speaking, is a physician, whom you

now mentioned, whether is he a gainer of money, or one who takes care of the sick? and speak of him who is really a physician.

Thrasymachus/ He is one who takes care, of the sick.

Socrates/ But what of the pilot, who is a pilot, truly? Whether is he the governor of the sailors, or a sailor?

Thrasymachus/ The governor of the sailors.

Socrates/ That, I think, is not to be considered, that he sails in the ship; nor that he is called a sailor; for it is not for his sailing that he is called pilot, but for his art, and his governing the sailors.

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ Is there not then something advantageous to each of these?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And does not art, naturally tend to this, to seek out and afford to everything its advantage?

Thrasymachus/ It tends to this.

Socrates/ Is there, now, anything else advantageous to each of the arts, but to be the most perfect possible?

Thrasymachus/ How ask you this?

Socrates/ As, if you asked me, whether it sufficed the body to be body, or if it stood in need of anything, —I would say, that it stood in need of something else. For this reason is the medicinal art invented, because the body is infirm, and is not sufficient for itself in such a state; in order therefore to afford it things for its advantage, for this purpose, art has been provided. Do I seem to you, to say right, or not, in speaking in this manner?

Thrasymachus/ Right.

Socrates/ But what now? This medicinal art itself, or any other, is it imperfect, so long as it is wanting in a certain

virtue? As the eyes, when they want seeing; and the ears, hearing; and, for these reasons have they need of a certain art, to perceive, and afford them what is advantageous for these purposes? And is there, still, in art itself, some imperfection; and does every art stand in need of another art, to perceive what is advantageous to it, and this stand in need of another, in like manner, and so on, to infinity? Or shall each art perceive what is advantageous to itself; and stand in need neither of itself, nor of another, to perceive what is for its advantage, with reference to its own imperfection? For there is no imperfection, nor error, in any art. Nor does it belong to it to seek what is advantageous to anything, but to that of which it is the art. But it is, itself, infallible, and pure, being in the right. So long as each art is an accurate whole, whatever it is. And consider now, according to that accurate discourse, whether it be thus, or otherwise.

Thrasymachus/ Thus, it appears.

Socrates/ The medicinal art, then, does not consider what is advantageous to the medicinal art, but to the body.

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor the art of managing horses, what is advantageous for that art; but what is advantageous for horses. Nor does any other art consider what is advantageous for itself, (For it hath no need,) but what is advantageous for that of which it is the art?

Thrasymachus/ So, it appears.

Socrates/ But, Thrasymachus, the arts rule and govern that of which they are the arts. He yielded this, but with great difficulty. No science, then, considers the advantage of the more powerful, nor enjoins it; but that of the inferior, and of what is governed. He consented to these things at last, though he attempted to contend about them, but

afterwards he consented. Why, then, no physician, so far as he is a physician, considers what is advantageous for the physician, nor enjoins it; but what it advantageous for the sick; for it has been agreed, that the accurate physician is one who takes care of sick bodies, and not an amasser of wealth. Has it not been agreed? He assented. And likewise that the accurate pilot is the governor of the sailors, and not a sailor?

Thrasymachus/ It has been agreed.

Socrates/ Such a pilot, then, and governor will not consider and enjoin what is the advantage of the pilot, but what is advantageous to the sailor, and the governed. He consented, with difficulty. Nor, yet, Thrasymachus, does any other, in any government, as far as he is a governor, consider or enjoin his own advantage, but that of the governed, and of those to whom he ministers; and, with an eye to this, and to what is advantageous and suitable to this, he both says what he says, and does what he does. When we were at this part of the discourse, and it was evident to all that the definition of what was just, stood now on the contrary side, Thrasymachus, instead of replying;

Thrasymachus/ Tell me, Socrates, have you a nurse?

Socrates/ What, ought you not rather to answer, than ask such things?

Thrasymachus/ Because, she neglects you when your nose is stuffed, and does not wipe it when it needs it, you who understand neither what is meant by sheep, nor by shepherd.

Socrates/ For what now is all this?

Thrasymachus/ Because you think that shepherds, and neatherds, ought to consider the good of the sheep, or oxen, to fatten them, and to minister to them, having in their eye, something besides their master's good and their own. And

you fancy that those who govern in cities, those who govern truly, are somehow otherwise affected towards the governed than one is towards sheep; and that they are attentive, day and night, to somewhat else than this, how they shall be gainers themselves; and so far are you from the notion of the just and of justice, and of the unjust and injustice, that you do not know that both justice and the just are, in reality, a foreign good, the advantage of the more powerful, and of the governor; but properly, the hurt of the subject, and the inferior; and injustice is the contrary. And justice governs such as are truly simple and just; and the governed do what is for the governor's advantage, he being more powerful, and ministering to him, promote his happiness, but by no means their own. You must thus consider it, most simple Socrates! that, on all occasions, the just man gets less than the unjust. First, in co-partnerships with one another, where the one joins in company with the other, you never can find, on the dissolving of the company, that the just man gets more than the unjust, but less: Then, in civil affairs, where there are taxes to be paid from equal substance; the just man pays more, the other less. But when there is anything to be gained, the one gains nothing, but the gain of the other is great: For, when each of them governs in any public magistracy this, if no other loss, befalls the just man, that his domestic affairs, at least, are in a worse situation through his neglect; and that he gains nothing from the public, because he is just: Add to this, that he comes to be hated by his domestics and acquaintance, when at no time he will serve them beyond what is just; But all these things are quite otherwise with the unjust; such an one, I mean, as I now mentioned; one who has it greatly in his power to become rich. Consider him, then, if you would judge how much more it is for his private advantage to be unjust than just, and you will most easily understand it if you come to

the most finished injustice; such as renders the unjust man most happy, but the injured, and those who are unwilling to do injustice, most wretched; and that is tyranny, which takes away the goods of others, both by secret fraud, and by open violence; both things sacred and holy, both private and public, and these not by degrees, but all at once. In all particular cases of such crimes, when one, committing injustice, is not concealed, he is punished, and suffers the greatest ignominy. For according to the several kinds of the wickedness they commit, they are called sacrilegious, robbers, house-breakers, pilferers, thieves. But when anyone, besides these thefts of the substance of his citizens, shall steal and enslave the citizens themselves; instead of those disgraceful names, he is called happy and blest; not by his citizens alone, but likewise by others, as many as are informed that he has committed the most consummate wickedness. For such as revile wickedness, revile it not because they are afraid of doing, but because they are afraid of suffering, unjust things. And thus, Socrates, injustice, when in sufficient measure, is both more powerful, more free, and hath more absolute command than justice: and, (as I said at the beginning,) the advantage of the more powerful, is justice; but injustice is the profit and advantage of oneself.

Socrates/ Thrasymachus having said these things, inclined to go away; like a bath-keeper after he had poured into our ears this rapid and long discourse. These, however, who were present, would not suffer him, but forced him to stay, and give an account of what he had said. I too myself earnestly entreated him, and said, divine Thrasymachus! after throwing in upon us so strange a discourse, do you intend to go away before you teach us sufficiently, or learn yourself, whether the case be as you say, or otherwise? Do you imagine you attempt to determine a small matter, and

not the guide of life, by which, each of us being conducted, may lead the most happy life.

Thrasymachus/ But I imagine, that this is otherwise.

Socrates/ You seem truly, to care nothing for us; nor to be any way concerned, whether we shall live well or ill, whilst we are ignorant of what you say you know: But, good Thrasymachus, be readily disposed to show it also to us, nor will the favor be ill placed, whatever you shall bestow on so many of us as are now present. And I, for my own part, tell you, that I am not persuaded, nor do I think that injustice is more profitable than justice; not although it should be permitted to exert itself, and be no way hindered from doing whatever it should incline. But, good Thrasymachus, let him be unjust, let him be able to do unjustly, either in secret, or by force, yet will you not persuade me at least that injustice is more profitable than justice, and probably some other of us here is of the same mind, and I am not single. Convince us then, blest Thrasymachus! that we imagine wrong, when we value justice more than injustice.

Thrasymachus/ But how, shall I convince you? For, if I have not convinced you by what I have said already, what shall I further do for you? shall I enter into your soul, and put my reasoning within you?

Socrates/ God forbid, you shall not do that. But, first of all, whatever you have said, abide by it: or, if you do change, change openly; and do not deceive us. For now you see, Thrasymachus, (for let us still consider what is said above,) that when you first defined the true physician, you did not afterwards think it needful that the true shepherd should, strictly, upon the like principles, keep his flock; but you fancy that, as a shepherd, he may feed his flock, not regarding what is best for the sheep, but as some glutton, who is going to feast on them at some entertainment; or yet

to dispose of them as a merchant; and not a shepherd. But the shepherd-art hath certainly no other care, but of that for which it is ordained, to afford it what is best: for its own affairs are already sufficiently provided for; so as to be in the very best state while it needs nothing of the shepherd-art. In the same manner, I at least imagined, there was a necessity for agreeing with us in this, that every government, in as far as it is government, considers what is best for nothing else but for the governed, and those under its charge; both in political and private government. But do you imagine that governors in cities, such as are truly governors, govern willingly?

Thrasymachus/ Truly, as for that, I not only imagine it, but am quite certain.

Socrates/ Why now, Thrasymachus, do you not perceive, as to all other governments, that no one undertakes them willingly, but they ask a reward; as the profit arising from governing is not to be to themselves, but to the governed? Or, tell me this now? do not we say that every particular art is in this distinct, in having a distinct power? And now, blest Thrasymachus, answer not differently from your sentiments, that we may make some progress.

Thrasymachus/ In this, it is distinct.

Socrates/ And does not each of them afford us a certain distinct advantage, and not a common one? As the medicinal affords health, the pilot art, preservation in sailing; and the others in like manner.

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And does not the mercenary art afford a reward, for this is its power? Or, do you call both the medicinal art, and the pilot art, one and the same? Or, rather, if you will define them accurately, as you proposed; though one in piloting recover his health, because sailing

agrees with him, you will not the more on this account call it the medicinal art?

Thrasymachus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Nor will you, I imagine, call the mercenary art the medicinal, though one in gaining a reward, recover his health.

Thrasymachus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ What now? Will you call the medicinal, the mercenary art, if one in performing a cure gain a reward?

Thrasymachus/ No.

Socrates/ Have we not acknowledged, then, that there is a distinct advantage of every art?

Thrasymachus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ What is that advantage, then, with which all artists in common are advantaged? It is plain it must be in using something common to all that they are advantaged by it.

Thrasymachus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Yet we say that artists are profited in receiving a reward arising to them from the increase of a lucrative art. He agreed with difficulty. Has not, then, everyone this advantage in his art, the receiving a reward. Yet, if we are to consider accurately, the medicinal art produces health, and the mercenary art a reward; masonry, a house, and, the mercenary art accompanying it, a reward. And all the others, in like manner, everyone produces its own work, and benefits that for which it was ordained; but, if it meet not with a reward, what is the artist advantaged by his art?

Thrasymachus/ It does not appear.

Socrates/ But does he then no service when he works without reward?

Thrasymachus/ I think he does.

Socrates/ Is not this, then, now evident, Thrasymachus, that no art, nor government, provides what is advantageous for itself; but, as I said long ago, provides and enjoins what is advantageous for the governed; having in view the profit of the inferior, and not that of the more powerful. And, for these reasons, friend Thrasymachus, I likewise said now, that no one is willing to govern, and to undertake to rectify the ills of others, but asks a reward for it; because, whoever will perform the art handsomely, never acts what is best for himself, in ruling according to art, but what is best for the governed; and on this account, it seems, a reward must be given to those who shall be willing to govern; either money, or honor; or punishment, if they will not govern.

Glaucon/ How say you, Socrates; two of the rewards I understand; but this punishment you speak of, and here you mention it in place of a reward, I know not.

Socrates/ You know not, then, the reward of the best of men, on account of which the most worthy govern, when they consent to govern. Or, do you not know, that to be ambitious and covetous, is both deemed a reproach, and really is so?

Glaucon/ I know.

Socrates/ For those reasons, then, good men are not willing to govern, neither for money, nor for honor; for they are neither willing to be called mercenary, in openly receiving a reward for governing, nor to be called thieves, in taking, clandestinely from those under their government; as little are they willing, to govern for honor, for they are not ambitious. —Of necessity then, there must be said on them a fine, that they may consent to govern. And hence, it seems, it hath been accounted dishonorable to enter on government willingly, and not by constraint. And the greatest part of the punishment is to be governed by a base person, if one

himself is not willing to govern: and the good seem to me to govern from a fear of this, when they do govern: and then, they enter on the government, not as on anything good, or as what they are to reap advantage by, but as on a necessary task, and finding none better than themselves, nor like them to entrust with the government: since it would appear that, if there was a city of good men, the contest would be, not to be in the government, as at present it is, to govern: And hence it would be manifest, that he who is indeed the true governor, does not aim at his own advantage, but at that of the governed; so that every understanding man would rather choose to be served, than to have trouble in serving another. This, therefore, I, for my part, will never yield to Thrasymachus; that justice is the advantage of the more powerful; but this we shall consider afterwards. What Thrasymachus says now, seems to me of much more importance, when he says that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. You, then, Glauco, which side do you choose; and which seems to you most agreeable to truth?

Glaucon/ The life of the just, I, for my part, deem to be the more profitable.

Socrates/ Have you heard, how many good things Thrasymachus just now enumerated in the life of the unjust?

Glaucon/ I heard, but am not persuaded.

Socrates/ Are you willing, then, that we should persuade him, (if we be able any how to find arguments), that there is no truth in what he says?

Glaucon/ Why not.

Socrates/ If then, pulling on the other side, we advance argument for argument, how many good things there are in being just, and then again, he on the other side, we shall

need a third person to compute and estimate what each shall have said on either side; and we shall likewise need some judges to determine the matter. But, if, as now, assenting to one another, we consider these things; we shall be both judges and pleaders ourselves.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Which way, then, do you choose?

Glaucon/ This way.

Socrates/ Come then, Thrasymachus, answer us from the beginning. Do you say that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, indeed, I say so. And the reasons for it I have enumerated.

Socrates/ Come now, do you ever affirm anything of this kind concerning them? Do you call one of them, virtue; and the other, vice?

Thrasymachus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Is not then, justice, virtue; and injustice, vice?

Thrasymachus/ Very likely, most pleasant Socrates! after I say that injustice is profitable; but justice is not;

Socrates/ What then?

Thrasymachus/ The contrary.

Socrates/ Is it justice you call vice?

Thrasymachus/ No, but I call it, altogether genuine simplicity.

Socrates/ Do you, then, call injustice, cunning?

Thrasymachus/ No, but I call it sagacity.

Socrates/ Do the unjust seem to you, Thrasymachus, to be both prudent and good?

Thrasymachus/ Such, at least, as are able to do injustice in perfection; such as are able to subject to themselves

states and nations; but you probably imagine I speak of those who cut purses: Even such things as these, are profitable if concealed; but such only as I now mentioned are of any worth.

Socrates/ I understand, what you want to say: But this I have wondered at, that you should deem injustice to be a part of virtue and of wisdom and justice among their contraries.

Thrasymachus/ But I do deem it altogether so.

Socrates/ Your meaning, is now more determined, friend, and it is no longer easy for one to find what to say against it: for, if when you had set forth injustice as profitable, you had still allowed it to be vice or ugly, as some others do, we should have had something to say, speaking according to the received opinions: But now, it is plain, you will call it beautiful and powerful; and all those other things you will attribute to it which we attribute to the just man, since you have dared to class it with virtue and wisdom.

Thrasymachus/ You conjecture, most true.

Socrates/ But, however, I must not grudge, to pursue our inquiry so long as I conceive you speak as you think; for to me you plainly seem now, Thrasymachus, not to be in irony, but to speak what you think concerning the truth.

Thrasymachus/ What is the difference to you, whether I think so or not, if you do not confute my reasoning;

Socrates/ None at all. But endeavor, further, to answer me this likewise—Does a just man seem to you desirous to have more than another just man?

Thrasymachus/ By no means; for otherwise he would not be courteous and simple, as we now supposed him.

Socrates/ But what, will he not desire it in a just action?

Thrasymachus/ Not even in a just action.

Socrates/ But, whether would he deem it proper to exceed the unjust man and count it just? or would he not?

Thrasymachus/ He would, both count it just and deem it proper but would not be able to effect it.

Socrates/ That, I do not ask. But, whether a just man would neither deem it proper, nor incline to exceed a just man, but would deem it proper to exceed the unjust?

Thrasymachus/ This last, is what he would incline to do.

Socrates/ But what would the unjust man do? Would he deem it proper to exceed the just man even in a just action?

Thrasymachus/ Why not, he who deems it proper to exceed all others.

Socrates/ Will not then the unjust man desire to exceed the unjust man likewise, and in an unjust action; and contend that he himself receive more than all others?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Thus, we say, then, the just man does not desire to exceed one like himself, but one unlike. But the unjust man desires to exceed both, one like, and one unlike himself.

Thrasymachus/ You have spoken, perfectly well.

Socrates/ But, the unjust man is both wise and good; but the just man is neither.

Thrasymachus/ This, too, is well said.

Socrates/ Is not, then, the unjust man like the wise and the good, and the just man unlike?

Thrasymachus/ Must he not, be like them, being such an one as we have supposed;

Socrates/ And he who is otherwise, be unlike them?

Thrasymachus/ Excellently.

Socrates/ Each of them is indeed such as those he resembles.

Thrasymachus/ What else?

Socrates/ Be it so, Thrasymachus, Call you one man musical and another unmusical?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ Which of the two call you wise and which unwise?

Thrasymachus/ I call the musical, wise, and the unmusical, unwise.

Socrates/ Is he not good in as much as he is wise, and ill in as much as he is unwise?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what as to the physician? Is not the case the same?

Thrasymachus/ The same.

Socrates/ Do you imagine, then, most excellent Thrasymachus, that any musician, in tuning a harp, wants to exceed, or deems it proper to have more skill than a man who is a musician, with reference to the intention or remission of the strings?

Thrasymachus/ I am not of that opinion.

Socrates/ But what say you of exceeding a man who is no musician?

Thrasymachus/ Of necessity, he will deem it proper to exceed him.

Socrates/ And what as to the physician? In presenting a regimen of meats or drinks does he want to exceed another physician in medical cases?

Thrasymachus/ No indeed.

Socrates/ But to exceed one who is no physician?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And as to all science and ignorance does anyone appear to you intelligent who wants to grasp at or do or say more than another intelligent in the art; and not to do the same things, in the same affair, which one equally intelligent with himself doth?

Thrasymachus/ Probably there is a necessity, it be so.

Socrates/ But what, as to him who is ignorant; will not he want to exceed the intelligent and the ignorant both alike?

Thrasymachus/ Probably.

Socrates/ But the intelligent is wise?

Thrasymachus/ I say so.

Socrates/ And the wise is good?

Thrasymachus/ I say so.

Socrates/ But the good and the wise will not want to exceed one like himself; but the unlike and contrary?

Thrasymachus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But the evil and the ignorant wants to exceed both one like himself and his opposite?

Thrasymachus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Why, then, Thrasymachus, the unjust. desires to exceed both one unlike and one like himself. Do not you say so?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ But the just man will not desire to exceed one like himself, but one unlike?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The just man, then, resembles the wise and the good; and the unjust resembles the evil and the ignorant.

Thrasymachus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But we acknowledged that each of them was such as that which they resembled.

Thrasymachus/ We acknowledged so, indeed.

Socrates/ The just man, then, has appeared to us to be good and wise; and the unjust to be ignorant and depraved. Thrasymachus now confessed all these things not easily, as I now narrate them, but dragged and with difficulty and prodigious sweat, it being now the summer season. And I then saw, but never before, Thrasymachus blush. After we had acknowledged that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice was vice and ignorance, well, let this remain so. But we said likewise that injustice was powerful. Do not you remember, Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ I remember. But what you now say does not please me; and I have some what to say concerning it which I well know you would call declaiming if I should advance it; either, then, suffer me to say what I incline, or if you incline to ask, do it; and I shall answer you "be it so," as to old women telling stories; and shall assent and dissent.

Socrates/ By no means, contrary to your own opinion.

Thrasymachus/ Just to please you; since you will not allow me to speak. But do you want anything further?

Socrates/ Nothing, truly: but if you are to do thus, do; I shall ask.

Thrasymachus/ Ask then.

Socrates/ This, then, I ask, which I did just now; (that we may in an orderly way see through our discourse,) of what kind is justice, compared with injustice; for it was surely said that injustice was more powerful and stronger than justice.

Thrasymachus/ It was so said just now.

Socrates/ But, if justice be both virtue and wisdom, it will easily, I imagine, appear to be likewise more powerful than injustice; since injustice is ignorance; of this now none can be ignorant. But I am willing, for my own part, Thrasymachus, to consider it not simply in this manner, but somehow thus. Might you not say that a state was unjust, and attempted to enslave other states unjustly, and did enslave them; and had many states in slavery under itself?

Thrasymachus/ Why not: and the best state will chiefly do this, and such as is most completely unjust.

Socrates/ I understand, that this was your speech; but I consider this in it; —Whether this state, which becomes more powerful than the other state, shall hold this power without justice, or must it of necessity be with justice?

Thrasymachus/ With justice, if indeed, as you now said, justice be wisdom; but, if as I said, with injustice.

Socrates/ I am much delighted, Thrasymachus that you do not merely assent and dissent, but that you answer so handsomely.

Thrasymachus/ I do, it to gratify you.

Socrates/ That is obliging in you. But gratify me in this likewise, and tell me; do you imagine that a city, or camp, or robbers, or thieves, or any other community, such as jointly undertakes to do anything unjustly, is able to effectuate anything if they injure one another?

Thrasymachus/ No indeed.

Socrates/ But what, if they do not injure one another; will they not do better?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For injustice, somehow, Thrasymachus, brings seditions, and hatreds, and fightings among them; but justice affords harmony and friendship. Does it not?

Thrasymachus/ Be it so, that I may not differ from you.

Socrates/ You are very obliging, most excellent Thrasymachus! But tell me this. If this be the work of injustice, wherever it is, to create hatred, will it not then, when happening among free men and slaves, make them hate one another, and grow seditious, and become impotent to do anything together in company?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what, in the case of injustice between any two men, will they not differ, and hate, and become enemies to one another, and to just men?

Thrasymachus/ They will become so.

Socrates/ If now, wonderful Thrasymachus, injustice be in one, whether does it lose its power, or will it no less retain it?

Thrasymachus/ Let it, no less retain it.

Socrates/ Does it not then appear to have such a power as this—That wherever it is, whether in a city, or tribe, or camp, or wherever else, in the first place, it renders it unable for action in itself, through seditions and differences; and, besides, makes it an enemy to itself, and to every opponent, and to the just? Is it not thus?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And, when injustice is in one man, it will have, I imagine, all these effects, which it is natural for it to produce. In the first place, it will render him unable for action whilst he is in sedition and disagreement with himself; and next as he is an enemy both to himself, and to the just. Is it not so?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the Gods, friend, are likewise just.

Thrasymachus/ Let them be so.

Socrates/ The unjust man then, Thrasymachus, shall be an enemy also to the Gods; and the just man, a friend.

Thrasymachus/ Feast yourself, with the reasoning boldly; for I will not oppose you, that I may not render myself odious to these Gods.

Socrates/ Come then, and complete to me this feast; answering as you were doing just now: for the just already appear to be wiser, and better, and more powerful to act; but the unjust are not able to act anything, with one another: and what we said with reference to those who are unjust, — that they are ever at any time able strenuously to act jointly together; this we spoke not altogether true, for they would not spare one another; being thoroughly unjust; but it is plain that there was in them justice, which made them refrain from injuring one another, and those of their party; and by this justice they performed what they did. And they rushed on unjust actions, through injustice; being half wicked; since those who are completely wicked, and perfectly unjust, are likewise perfectly unable to act. This then I understand is the case with reference to these matters, and not as you were establishing at first. But whether the just live better than the unjust, and are more happy (which we proposed to consider afterwards), is now to be considered; and they appear to do so even at present, as I imagine, at least, from what has been said. Let us, however, consider it further. For the discourse is not about an accidental thing, but about this, in what manner we ought to live.

Thrasymachus/ Consider then.

Socrates/ I am considering, and tell me; does there anything seem to you to be the work of a horse?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Would you not call that the work of a horse, or of anyone else, which one does with him only, or in the best manner?

Thrasymachus/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Thus then: Do you see with anything else but the eyes?

Thrasymachus/ No indeed.

Socrates/ What now, could you hear with anything but the ears?

Thrasymachus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Do we not justly then call these things the works of these?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what, could not you with a sword, a knife, and many other things, cut off a branch of a vine?

Thrasymachus/ Why not?

Socrates/ But with nothing, at least I imagine, so handsomely, as with a pruning-hook, which is made for that purpose: shall we not then settle this to be its work?

Thrasymachus/ We shall then settle it.

Socrates/ I imagine, then, you may now understand better what I was asking when I inquired whether the work of each thing were not that which it alone performs, or performs in the best manner.

Thrasymachus/ I understand you; and this does seem to me to be the work of each thing.

Socrates/ Be it so. And is there not likewise a virtue belonging to everything to which there is a certain work assigned? But let us go over again the same things: We say there is a work belonging to the eyes?

Thrasymachus/ There is.

Socrates/ And is there not a virtue also belonging to the eyes?

Thrasymachus/ A virtue also.

Socrates/ Well then, was there any work of the ears?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is there not then a virtue also?

Thrasymachus/ A virtue also.

Socrates/ And what as to all other things? Is it not thus?

Thrasymachus/ It is.

Socrates/ But come, could the eyes ever handsomely perform their work, not having their own proper virtue; but, instead of virtue, having vice?

Thrasymachus/ How could they, for you probably mean their having blindness instead of sight.

Socrates/ Whatever, be their virtue, for I do not ask this; but, whether it be with their own proper virtue that they handsomely perform their own proper work, whatever things are performed, and by their vice, unhandsomely?

Thrasymachus/ In this at least, you say true.

Socrates/ And will not the ears likewise, when deprived of their virtue, perform their work ill?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do we settle all other things according to the same reasoning?

Thrasymachus/ So I imagine.

Socrates/ Come, then, after these things, consider this. Is there belonging to the soul a certain work, which, with no one other being whatever, you can perform; such as this, to care for, to govern, to consult, and all such things; is there any other than the soul, to whom we may justly ascribe them, and say they properly belong to it?

Thrasymachus/ No other. But what of this?

Socrates/ To live; shall we say it is the work of the soul?

Thrasymachus/ Most especially.

Socrates/ Do not we say, then, that there is some virtue of the soul, likewise?

Thrasymachus/ We say so.

Socrates/ And shall, then, the soul, ever at all, Thrasymachus, perform her works handsomely, whilst deprived of her proper virtue? or, is this impossible?

Thrasymachus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Of necessity, then, a depraved soul must in a bad manner govern, and take care of things; and a good soul perform all these things well.

Thrasymachus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ But did not we agree that justice was the virtue of the soul; and injustice its vice?

Thrasymachus/ We did agree.

Socrates/ Why, then, the just soul, and the just man, shall live well; and the unjust, ill.

Thrasymachus/ It appears so, according to your reasoning.

Socrates/ But, surely, he who lives well is both blessed and happy, and he who does not is the opposite.

Thrasymachus/ Why not?

Socrates/ The just, then, is happy; and the unjust, miserable.

Thrasymachus/ Let them be so.

Socrates/ But it is not advantageous to be miserable, but to be happy.

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ At no time, then, blest Thrasymachus, is injustice more advantageous than justice.

Thrasymachus/ Thus, now, Socrates, have you been feasted in Diana's festival.

Socrates/ By you, truly, I have, Thrasymachus; since you are grown meek, and have ceased to be troublesome: I have not feasted handsomely, owing to myself, and not to you: But as voracious guests, snatching still what is bringing before them, taste of it before they have sufficiently enjoyed what went before; so I, as I imagine, before I have found what we first inquired into, —what justice is, —have left this, hurrying to inquire concerning it, whether it be vice and ignorance, or wisdom and virtue. And, a discourse afterwards falling in, that injustice was more profitable than justice, I could not refrain from coming to this from the other: So that, from the dialogue, I have now come to know nothing; for whilst I do not know what justice is, I shall hardly know whether it be some virtue or not, and whether he who possesses it be unhappy or happy.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

Book 2.

Socrates/ When I had said these things, I imagined that the debate was at an end; but this it seems was only the introduction: for Glauco, as he is on all occasions most courageous, so truly at that time did not approve of Thrasymachus in giving up the debate; but said;

Glaucon/ Socrates, do you wish to seem to have persuaded us, or to have persuaded us in reality, that in every respect it is better to be just than unjust?

Socrates/ I would choose, to do it in reality, if it depended on me.

Glaucon/ You do not then, do what you desire. For, tell me, does there appear to you any good of this kind, such as we would choose to have; not regarding the consequences, but embracing it for its own sake? as joy, and such pleasures as are harmless; though nothing else arises afterwards from these pleasures, than that the possession gives us delight.

Socrates/ There seems to me, to be something of this kind.

Glaucon/ But what? is there something too, which we both love for its own sake, and also for what arises from it? as wisdom, sight, and health; for we somehow embrace these things on both accounts.

Socrates/ Yes.

Glaucon/ But do you perceive, a third species of good, among which is bodily labor, to be healed when sick, to practice physic, or other lucrative employment? for we say, those things are troublesome, but that they profit us; and we should not choose these things for their own sake, but on account of the rewards and those other advantages which arise from them.

Socrates/ There is then, indeed, likewise this third kind.

Glaucon/ But what now? in which of these, do you place justice?

Socrates/ I imagine, in the most handsome; which, both on its own account, and for the sake of what arises from it, is desired by the man who is in pursuit of happiness.

Glaucon/ It does not, however, seem so to them any, but to be of the troublesome kind, which is pursued for the sake of glory, and on account of rewards and honors; but on its own account is to be shunned, as being difficult.

Socrates/ I know, that it seems so, and it was in this view that Thrasymachus sometimes since despised it, and commended injustice; but it seems I am one of those who are dull in learning.

Glaucon/ Come then, hear me likewise, if this be agreeable to you; for Thrasymachus seems to me to have been charmed by you, like an adder, sooner than was proper: but, with respect to myself, the proof has not yet been made to my satisfaction, in reference to either of the two; for I desire to hear what each is, and what power it has by itself, when in the soul—bidding farewell to the rewards, and the consequences arising from them. I will proceed, therefore, in this manner, if it seem proper to you: I will renew the speech of Thrasymachus; and, first of all, I will tell you what they say justice is, and whence it arises; and, secondly, that all those who pursue it pursue it unwillingly, as necessary, but not as good; thirdly, that they do this reasonably; for, as they say, the life of an unjust man is much better than that of the just. Although, for my own part, to me, Socrates, it does not yet appear so; I am, however, in doubt, having my ears stunned in hearing Thrasymachus and innumerable others. But I have never, hitherto, heard from anyone such a discourse as I wish to hear concerning justice, as being better than injustice: I wish then to hear it

commended, as it is in itself, and I most especially imagine I shall hear this from you: wherefore, pulling oppositely, I shall speak in commendation of an unjust life; and, in speaking, shall show you in what manner I want to hear you condemn injustice, and commend justice. But see if what I say be agreeable to you.

Socrates/ Extremely so; for what would any man of intellect delight more to speak, and to hear of frequently?

Glaucon/ You speak most handsomely. And hear what I said I was first to speak of; what justice is, and whence it arises; for they say that, according to nature, to do injustice is good; but to suffer injustice is bad; but that the evil which arises from suffering injustice is greater than the good which arises from doing it: so that, after men had done one another injustice, and likewise suffered it, and had experienced both, it seemed proper to those who were not able to shun the one, and choose the other, to agree among themselves, neither to do injustice, nor to be injured: and that hence laws began to be established, and their compacts; and that which was enjoined by law they denominated lawful and just; and that this is the origin and essence of justice: being in the middle between what is best, when he who does injustice is not punished, and of what is worst, when the injured person is unable to punish; and that justice, being thus in the middle of both these, is desired, not as good, but is held in honor from an imbecility in doing injustice: for the man who had ability to do so would never, if really a man, agree with anyone either to injure, or to be injured; for otherwise he were mad. This then, Socrates, and of such a kind as this, is the nature of justice; and this, as they say, is its origin. And we shall best perceive that these who pursue it pursue it unwillingly, and from an impotence to injure if we imagine in our mind such a case as this: Let us give liberty to each of them, both to the just and to the unjust, to do whatever

they incline; and then let us follow them, observing how their inclination will lead each of them. We should then find the just man, with full inclination, going the same way with the unjust, through a desire of having more than others. This, every nature is made to pursue as good, but by law is forcibly led to an equality. And the liberty which I speak of may be chiefly of this kind; if they happened to have such a power, as they say happened once to Gyges, the progenitor of Lydus: for they say that he was the hired shepherd of the then governor of Lydia; and that a prodigious rain and earthquake happening, part of the earth was rent, and an opening made in the place where he pastured her flocks; that when he beheld, and wondered, he descended, and saw many other wonders, which are mythologically transmitted to us, and a brazen horse likewise hollow and with doors; and, on looking in, he saw within, a dead body larger in appearance than that of a man, which had nothing else upon it but a gold ring on its hand; which ring he took off, and came up again. That when there was a convention of the shepherds, as usual, for reporting to the king what related to their flocks, he also came, having the ring: and whilst he sat with the others, he happened to turn the stone of the ring to the inner part of his hand; and when this was done he became invisible to those who sat by, and they talked of him as absent: that he wondered, and, again handling his ring, turned the stone outward, and on this became visible; and that, having observed this, he made trial of the ring whether it had this power: and that it happened, that on turning the stone inward he became invisible, and on turning it outward he became visible. That, perceiving this, he instantly managed so as to be made one of the embassy to the king, and that on his arrival he debauched his wife; and, with her, assaulting the king, killed him, and possessed the kingdom. If now, there were two such rings, and the just man had the

one, and the unjust the other, none, it seems, would be so adamantine as to persevere in justice, and dare to refrain from the things of others, and not to touch them, whilst it was in his power to take, even from the forum, without fear, whatever he pleased; to enter into houses, and embrace anyone he pleased; to kill, and to loose from chains, whom he pleased; and to do all other things with the same power as a God among men: —acting in this manner, he is in no respect different from the other; but both of them go the same road. This now, one may say, is a strong proof that no one is just from choice, but by constraint; as it is not a good merely in itself, since everyone does injustice wherever he imagines he is able to do it; for every man thinks that injustice is, to the particular person, more profitable than justice; and he thinks justly, according to this way of reasoning: since, if anyone with such a liberty would never do any injustice, nor touch the things of others, he would be deemed by men of sense to be most wretched, and most void of understanding; yet would they commend him before one another, imposing on each other from a fear of being injured. Thus much, then, concerning these things. But, with reference to the difference of their lives whom we speak of, we shall be able to discern aright, if we set apart by themselves the most just man, and the most unjust, and not otherwise; and now, what is this separation? Let us take from the unjust man nothing of injustice, nor of justice from the just man; but let us make each of them perfect in his own profession. And first, as to the unjust man, let him act as the able artists; as a complete pilot, or physician, he comprehends the possible and the impossible in the art; the one he attempts, and the other he relinquishes; and, if he fail in anything, he is able to rectify it: so, in like manner, the unjust man attempting pieces of injustice in a dexterous manner, let him be concealed, if he intend to be exceedingly

unjust; but, if he be caught, let him be deemed worthless: for the most complete injustice is, to seem just, not being so. We must give then to the completely unjust the most complete injustice; and not take from him, but allow him, whilst doing the greatest injustice, to procure to himself the highest reputation for justice; and, if in anything he fail, let him be able to rectify it: and let him be able to speak so as to persuade if anything of his injustice be spread abroad: let him be able to do by force, what requires force, through his courage and strength, and by means of his friends and his wealth: and having supposed him to be such an one as this, let us place the just man beside him, in our reasoning, a simple and ingenuous man, desiring, according to Æschylus, not the appearance but the reality of goodness: let us take from him the appearance of goodness; for, if he shall appear to be just, he shall have honors and rewards; and thus it may be uncertain whether he be such for the sake of justice, or on account of the rewards and honors: let him be stripped of everything but justice, and be made completely contrary to the other; whilst he does no injustice, let him have the reputation of doing the greatest; that he may be tortured for justice, not yielding to reproach, and such things as arise from it, but may be immoveable till death; appearing indeed to be unjust through life, yet being really just; that so both of them arriving at the utmost pitch, the one of justice, and the other of injustice, we may judge which of them is the happier.

Socrates/ Strange! friend Glauco, how strenuously you purify each of the men, as a statue which is to be judged of!

Glaucon/ As much, as I am able: whilst then they continue to be such, there will not, as I imagine, be any further difficulty to observe what kind of life remains to each of them.

Socrates/ It must therefore be told.

Glaucon/ And if possibly it should be told with greater rusticity, imagine not, Socrates, that it is I who tell it, but those who commend injustice preferably to justice; and they will say these things: That the just man, being of this disposition, will be scourged, tormented, fettered, have his eyes burnt, and lastly, having suffered all manner of evils, will be crucified; and he shall know, that he should not desire the reality but the appearance of justice: and that it is much more proper to pronounce that saying of Æschylus, concerning the unjust man: for they will in reality say that the unjust man, as being in pursuit of what is real, and living not according to the opinion of men, wants not to have the appearance but the reality of injustice:

> Reaping the hollow furrow of his mind.
> Whence all his glorious councils blossom forth.

In the first place, he holds the magistracy in the state, being thought to be just; next, he marries wherever he inclines, and matches his children with whom he pleases; he joins in partnership and company with whom he inclines; and, besides all this, he will succeed in all his projects for gain; as he does not scruple to do injustice: when then he engages in competitions, he will both in private and in public surpass and exceed his adversaries; and by this means he will be rich, and serve his friends, and hurt his enemies: and he will amply and magnificently render sacrifices and offerings to the Gods, and will honor the Gods, and such men as he chooses, much better than the just man. From whence they reckon, that it is likely he will be more beloved of the Gods than the just man. Thus, they say, Socrates, that both with Gods and men there is a better life prepared for the unjust man than for the just.

Socrates/ When Glauco had said these things, I had a design to say something in reply. But his brother Adimantus said—

Adeimantus/ Socrates, you do not imagine there is yet enough said on the argument.

Socrates/ What further then?

Adeimantus/ That has not yet been spoken, which ought most especially to have been mentioned.

Socrates/ Why then, the proverb is, A brother is help at hand. So do you assist, if he has failed in anything. Though what has been said by him is sufficient to throw me down, and make me unable to succor justice.

Adeimantus/ You say nothing. But hear this further. For we must go through all the arguments opposite to what he has said, which commend justice and condemn injustice, that what Glauco seems to me to intend may be more manifest. Now, parents surely tell and exhort their sons, as do all those who have the care of any, that it is necessary to be just; not commending justice in itself, but the honors arising from it; that whilst a man is reputed to be just, he may obtain by this reputation magistracies and marriages, and whatever Glauco just now enumerated as the consequence of being reputed just: but these men carry this matter of reputation somewhat further; for, throwing in the approbation of the Gods, they have unspeakable blessings to enumerate to holy persons; which, they say, the Gods bestow. As the generous Hesiod and Homer say, the one, that the Gods cause the oaks to produce to just men

> Acorns at top, and in the middle bees;
> Their woolly sheep are laden with their fleece;

and a great many other good things of the same nature. In like manner, the other.

> The blameless king, who holds a God-like name.
> Finds his black should both wheat and barley bear;
> With fruit his trees are laden, and his flocks
> Bring forth with ease; the sea affords him fish.

But Musæus and his son tell us that the Gods give just men more splendid blessings than these; for, carrying them in his poem into Hades, and placing them in company with holy men at a feast prepared for them, they crown them, and make them pass the whole of their time in drinking, deeming eternal inebriation the finest reward of virtue. But some carry the rewards from the Gods still further; for they say that the offspring of the holy, and the faithful, and their children's children, still remain. With these things, and such as these, they commend justice. But the unholy and unjust they bury in Hades, in a kind of mud, and compel them to carry water in a sieve; and make them, even whilst alive, to live in infamy. Whatever punishments were assigned by Glauco to the just, whilst they were reputed unjust, these they assign to the unjust, but mention no others. This now is the way in which they commend and discommend them severally: but besides this, Socrates, consider another kind of reasoning concerning justice and injustice, mentioned both privately and by the poets: for all of them with one mouth celebrate temperance and justice as indeed excellent, but yet difficult and laborious; and intemperance and injustice as indeed pleasant and easy to attain; but, by opinion only, and by law, abominable: and they say that for the most part unjust actions are more profitable than just. And they are gladly willing, both in public and private, to pay honor to wicked rich men, and such as have power of any kind, and to pronounce them happy, but to contemn and overlook those who are any how weak and poor, even whilst they acknowledge them to be better than the others. But, of all these speeches, the most marvelous are those concerning the Gods, and virtue: as if even the Gods gave to many good men misfortunes and an evil life, and to contrary persons a contrary fate: and mountebanks and prophets, frequenting the gates of the rich, persuade them that they have a power

granted them by the Gods, of expiating by sacrifices and songs, with pleasures and with feastings, if any injustice has been committed by anyone, or his forefathers: and if he wishes to blast any enemy at a small expense, he shall injure the just in the same manner as the unjust; by certain blandishments and bonds, as they say, persuading the Gods to succor them: and to all these discourses they bring the poets as witnesses; who, mentioning the proneness to vice, say.

> How vice at once, and easily is gain'd;
> The way is smooth, and very nigh it dwells;
> Sweat before virtue stands, so Heav'n ordain'd—

and a certain long and steep way. Others make Homer witness how the Gods are prevailed upon by men, because he says.

> The Gods themselves are turn'd
> With sacrifices and appealing vows;
> Fat off'rings and libation them persuade;
> And for transgressions suppliant pray'r atones.

They show likewise many books of Musæus and Orpheus, the offspring; as they say, of the Moon, and of the Muses; according to which they perform their sacred rites, persuading not only private persons, but states likewise, that there are absolutions and purgations from iniquities by means of sacrifices, sports and pleasures; and this, for the benefit both of the living and of the dead: these they call the mysteries which absolve us from evils there; but they assert that dreadful things await those who do not offer sacrifice. All these, and so many things of the kind, friend Socrates, being said of virtue and vice, and their reward both with men and Gods; what do we imagine the souls of our youth do, when they hear them; such of them as are well born, and able as it were to rush into all these things which are said,

and from all to deliberate, in what sort of character and in what sort of road one may best pass through life? It is likely he might say to himself, according to that of Pindar.

> Whether shall I the lofty wall
> Of justice try to scale;
> Or, hedg'd within the guileful maze
> Of vice, encircled dwell?

For, according to what is said, though I be just, if I be not reputed so, there shall be no profit, but manifest troubles and punishments. But the unjust man, who procures to himself the character of justice, is said to have a divine life. Since then the appearance surpasses the reality, as wise men demonstrate to me, and is the primary part of happiness, ought I not to turn wholly to it; and to draw round myself as a covering, and picture, the image of virtue; but to draw after me the cunning and versatile fox of the most wise Archilochus? But perhaps someone will say, It is not easy, being wicked, always to be concealed. Neither is anything else easy (will we say) which is great. But, however, if we would be happy, thither let us go where the vestiges of the reasonings lead us. For, in order to be concealed, we will make conjurations and associations together; and there are masters of persuasion, who teach a popular and political wisdom; by which means, whilst partly by persuasion and partly by force we seize more than our due, we shall not be punished. But, surely, to be concealed from the Gods, or to overpower them, is impossible.

If then they are not, or care not about human affairs, we need not have any concern about being concealed: but if they really are, and care for us, we neither know nor have heard of them otherwise than from traditions, and from the poets who write their genealogies; and these very persons tell us, that they are to be moved and persuaded by sacrifices, and appeasing vows, and offerings; both of which we are to

believe, or neither. If then we are to believe both, we may do injustice, and of the fruits of our injustice offer sacrifice. If we be just, we shall indeed be unpunished by the Gods; but then we shall not have the gains of injustice. But if we be unjust, we shall make gain; and after we have transgressed and offended, we shall appease them by offerings, and be liberated from punishment. But we shall be punished in the other world for our unjust doings here; either we ourselves, or our children's children. But, friend, will the reasoner say, the mysteries can do much; the Gods are exorable, as say the mightiest states, and the children of the Gods, the poets; who are also their prophets, and who declare that these things are so. For what reason, then, should we still prefer justice before the greatest injustice; which if we shall attain to with any deceiving appearance, we shall fare according to our mind, both with reference to Gods and men, both living and dying, according to the speech now mentioned of many and excellent men? From all that has been said, by what means, O Socrates, shall he incline to honor justice, who has any ability of fortune or of wealth, of body or of birth, and not laugh when he hears it commended? So that, though a man were able even to show what we have said to be false, and fully understood that justice is better, he will, however, abundantly pardon and not be angry with the unjust; for he knows, that unless one from a divine nature abhor to do injustice, or from acquired knowledge abstain from it, no one of others is willingly just; but either through cowardice, old-age, or some other weakness, condemns the doing injustice when unable to do it. That it is so is plain. For the first of these who arrives at power is the first to do injustice, as far as he is able. And the reason of all this is no other than that from whence all this discourse proceeded, Socrates, because, O wonderful man! among all those of you that call yourselves the commenders of justice, beginning from those

ancient heroes of whom any accounts are left to the men of the present time, no one hath at any time condemned injustice, nor commended justice, otherwise than regarding the reputations, honors and rewards arising from them: but no one has hitherto sufficiently examined, neither in poetry nor in prose discourse, either of them in itself, and subsisting by its own power, in the soul of him who possesses it, and concealed from both Gods and men: how that the one is the greatest of all the evils which the soul hath within it, and justice the greatest good: for, if it had thus from the beginning been spoken of by you all, and you had so persuaded us from our youth, we should not need to watch over our neighbor lest he should do us injustice, but every man would have been the best guardian over himself, afraid lest in doing injustice he should dwell with the greatest evil. These things now, Socrates, and probably much more than these, Thrasymachus or some other might say of justice and injustice, inverting their power, disagreeably as I imagine for my own part. But I (for I want to conceal nothing from you) being desirous to hear you on the opposite side, speak the best I am able, pulling the contrary way. Do not, therefore, only show us in your reasoning that justice is better than injustice; but in what manner each of them by itself, affecting the mind, is, the one evil, and the other good. And take away all opinions, as Glauco likewise enjoined: for, if you do not take away the false opinions on both sides, and add the true ones, we will say you do not commend justice, but the appearance; nor condemn being unjust, but the appearance; that you advise the unjust man to conceal himself; and that you assent to Thrasymachus that justice is a foreign good; the profit of the more powerful; and that injustice is the profit and advantage of oneself, but unprofitable to the inferior. Wherefore, now, after you have acknowledged that justice is among the

greatest goods, and such as are worthy to be possessed for what arises from them, and much more in themselves, and for their own sake; such as sight, hearing, wisdom, health, and such other goods as are real in their own nature, and not merely in opinion; in the same manner commend justice; how, in itself, it profits the owner, and injustice hurts him. And leave to others to commend the rewards and opinions; for I could bear with others in this way, commending justice, and condemning injustice, celebrating and reviling their opinions and rewards; but not with you (unless you desire me), because you have passed the whole of life considering nothing else but this. Show us, then, in your discourse, not only that justice is better than injustice; but in what manner each of them by itself affecting the owner, whether he be concealed or not concealed from Gods and men, is, the one good, and the other evil.

Socrates/ On hearing these things, as I always indeed was pleased with the disposition of Glauco and Adimantus, so at that time I was perfectly delighted, and replied: It was not ill said concerning you, sons of that worthy man, by the lover of Glauco, who wrote the beginning of the Elegies, when, celebrating your behavior at the battle of Megara, he sang.

> Aristo's sons! of an illustrious man.
> The race divine.

This, friend, seems to be well said; for you are truly affected in a divine manner, if you are not persuaded that injustice is better than justice, and yet are able to speak thus in its defense: and to me you seem, truly, not to be persuaded; and I reason from the whole of your other behavior, since, according to your present speeches at least, I should distrust you. But the more I can trust you, the more I am in doubt what argument I shall use. For I can neither think of any assistance I have to give (for I seem to be unable, and my

mark is, that you do not accept of what I said to Thrasymachus when I imagined I showed that justice was better than injustice), nor yet can I think of giving no assistance; for I am afraid lest it be an unholy thing to desert justice when I am present, and see it accused, and not assist it whilst I breathe and am able to speak. It is best then to succor it in such a manner as I can. Hereupon Glauco and the rest entreated me, by all means, to assist, and not relinquish the discourse; but to search thoroughly what each of them is, and which way the truth lies, as to their respective advantage. I then said what appeared to me: That the inquiry we were attempting was not contemptible, but was that of one who was sharp-sighted, as I imagined. Since then, we are not very expert, it seems proper to make the inquiry concerning this matter, in such a manner as if it were ordered those who are not very sharp-sighted, to read small letters at a distance; and one should afterwards understand, that the same letters are greater somewhere else, and in a larger field: it would appear eligible, I imagine, first to read these, and thus come to consider the lesser, if they happen to be the same.

Adeimantus/ Perfectly right. But what of this kind, Socrates, do you perceive in the inquiry concerning justice?

Socrates/ I shall tell you. Do not we say there is justice in one man, and there is likewise justice in a whole state?

Adeimantus/ It is certainly so.

Socrates/ Is not a state a greater object than one man?

Adeimantus/ Greater.

Socrates/ It is likely, then, that justice should be greater in what is greater, and be more easy to be understood: we shall first, then, if you incline, inquire what it is in states; and then, after the same manner, we shall consider it in each

individual, contemplating the similitude of the greater in the idea of the lesser.

Adeimantus/ You seem to me, to say right.

Socrates/ If then, we contemplate, in our discourse, a state existing, shall we not perceive its justice and injustice existing?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ And is there not ground to hope, if this exists, that we shall more easily find what we seek for?

Adeimantus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ It seems, then, we ought to attempt to succeed, for I imagine this to be a work of no small importance. Consider then.

Adeimantus/ We are considering, and do you no otherwise.

Socrates/ A city, then, as I imagine, takes its rise from this, that none of us happens to be self-sufficient, but is indigent of many things; or, do you imagine there is any other origin of building a city?

Adeimantus/ None other.

Socrates/ Thus, then, one taking in one person for one indigence, and another for another; as they stand in need of many things, they assemble into one habitation many companions and assistants; and to this joint-habitation we give the name city, do we not?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And they mutually exchange with one another, each judging that, if he either gives or takes in exchange, it will be for his advantage.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come, then, let us, in our discourse, make a city from the beginning. And, it seems, our indigence has made it.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ But the first and the greatest of wants is the preparation of food, in order to subsist and live.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ The second is of lodging. The third of clothing; and such like.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ But, come, how shall the city be able to make so great a provision? Shall not one be a husbandman, another a mason, some other a weaver? or, shall we add to them a shoe-maker, or some other of those who minister to the necessaries of the body?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So that the most indigent city might consist of four or five men?

Adeimantus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But, what now? must each of those do his work for them all in common? As, the husbandman, being one, shall he prepare food for four; and consume quadruple time, and labor, in preparing food, and sharing it with others? or, neglecting them, shall he for himself alone make the fourth part of this food, in the fourth part of the time? and, of the other three parts of time, shall he employ one in the preparation of a house, the other in that of clothing, the other of shoes, and not give himself trouble in sharing with others, but do his own affairs by himself?

Adeimantus/ —And probably, Socrates, this way is more easy than the other.

Socrates/ No, certainly; it were absurd. For, whilst you are speaking, I consider that we are born not perfectly resembling one another, but differing in disposition; one being fitted for doing one thing, and another for doing another: does it not seem so to you?

Adeimantus/ It does.

Socrates/ But, what now? Whether will a man do better, if, being one, he works in many arts, or in one?

Adeimantus/ When in one.

Socrates/ But this, I imagine, is also plain; that if one miss the season of any work, it is ruined.

Adeimantus/ That is plain.

Socrates/ For, I imagine, the work will not wait upon the leisure of the workman; but of necessity the workman must attend close upon the work, and not in the way of a by-job.

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And hence it appears, that more will be done, and better, and with greater ease, when everyone does but one thing, according to their genius, and in proper season, and freed from other things.

Adeimantus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ But we need certainly, Adimantus, more citizens than four, for those provisions we mentioned: for the husbandman, it would seem, will not make a plough for himself, if it is to be handsome; nor yet a spade, nor other instruments of agriculture: as little will the mason; for he, likewise, needs many things: and in the same way, the weaver and the shoe-maker also. Is it not so?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Joiners, then, and smiths, and other such workmen, being admitted into our little city, make it throng.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But it would be no very great matter, neither, if we did not give them neatherds likewise, and shepherds, and those other herdsmen; in order that both the husbandmen may have oxen for ploughing, and that the masons, with the help of the husbandmen, may use the cattle for their carriages; and that the weavers likewise, and the shoe-makers, may have hides and wool.

Adeimantus/ Nor yet, would it be a very small city, having all these.

Socrates/ But, it is almost impossible to set down such a city in any such place as that it shall need no importations.

Adeimantus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ It will then certainly want others still, who may import from another state what it needs.

Adeimantus/ It will want them.

Socrates/ And surely this service would be empty, if it carry out nothing which these want, from whom they import what they need themselves. It goes out empty in such a case, does it not?

Adeimantus/ To me it seems so.

Socrates/ But the city ought not only to make what is sufficient for itself; but such things, and so much also, as may answer for those things which they need.

Adeimantus/ It ought.

Socrates/ Our city, then, certainly wants a great many more husbandmen and other workmen?

Adeimantus/ A great many more.

Socrates/ And other servants besides, to import and export the several things; and these are merchants, are they not?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ We shall then want merchants likewise?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And if the merchandise is by sea, it will want many others; such as are skillful in sea affairs.

Adeimantus/ Many others, truly.

Socrates/ But what as to the city within itself? How will they exchange with one another the things which they have each of them worked; and for the sake of which, making a community, they have built a city?

Adeimantus/ It is plain, in selling and buying.

Socrates/ Hence we must have a forum, and money, as a symbol, for the sake of exchange.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If now the husbandman, or any other workman, bring any of his work to the forum, but come not at the same time with those who want to make exchange with him, must he not, desisting from his work, sit idly in the forum?

Adeimantus/ By no means. But there are some who, observing this, set themselves to this service; and, in well-regulated cities, they are mostly such as are weakest in their body, and unfit to do any other work. There they are to attend about the forum, to give money in exchange for such things as any may want to sell; and things in exchange for money to such as want to buy.

Socrates/ This indigence, procures our city a race of shopkeepers; for, do not we call shopkeepers, those who, fixed in the forum, serve both in selling and buying? but such as travel to other cities we call merchants.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ There are still, as I imagine, certain other ministers, who, though unfit to serve the public in things which require understanding, have yet strength of body

sufficient for labor, who selling the use of their strength, and calling the reward of it hire, are called, as I imagine, hirelings: are they not?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Hirelings then are, it seems, the complement of the city?

Adeimantus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Has our city now, Adimantus, already so increased upon us as to be complete?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Where now, at all, should justice and injustice be in it; and, in which of the things that we have considered does it appear to exist?

Adeimantus/ I do not know, Socrates, if it be not in a certain use, somehow, of these things with one another.

Socrates/ Perhaps, you say right. But we must consider it, and not be weary. First, then, let us consider after what manner those who are thus procured shall be supported. Is it any other way than by making bread and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and building houses? In summer, indeed, they will work for the most part without clothes and shoes; and, in winter, they will be sufficiently furnished with clothes and shoes; they will be nourished, partly with barley, making meal of it, and partly with wheat, making loaves, boiling part and toasting part, putting fine loaves and cakes over a fire of stubble, or over dried leaves; and resting themselves on couches, strawed with smilax and myrtle leaves, they and their children will feast; drinking wine, and crowned, and singing to the Gods, they will pleasantly live together, begetting children, not beyond their substance, guarding against poverty or war.

Glaucon/ You make the men to feast, as it appears, without meats.

Socrates/ You say true; for I forget that they shall have meats likewise. They shall have salt, and olives, and cheese; and they shall boil bulbous roots, and herbs of the field; and we let before them desserts of figs, and vetches, and beans; and they will toast at the fire myrtle berries, and the berries of the beech-tree; drinking in moderation, and thus passing their life in peace and health; and dying, as is likely, in old-age, they will leave to their children another such life.

Glaucon/ If you had been making, Socrates, a city of hogs, what else would you have fed them with but with these things?

Socrates/ But how should we do, Glauco?

Glaucon/ What is usually done. They must, as I imagine, have their beds, and tables, and meats, and desserts, as we now have, if they are not to be miserable.

Socrates/ Be it so; I understand you. We consider, it seems, not only how a city may exist, but how a luxurious city: and perhaps it is not amiss; for, in considering such an one, we may probably see how justice and injustice have their origin in cities. But the true city seems to me to be such an one as we have described; like one who is healthy; but if you incline that we likewise consider a city that is corpulent, nothing hinders it. For these things will not, it seems, please some; nor this sort of life satisfy them; but there shall be beds, and tables, and all other furniture; seasonings, ointments, and perfumes; mistresses, and confections, and various kinds of all these. And we must no longer consider as alone necessary what we mentioned at the first; houses, and clothes, and shoes; but painting too, and all the curious arts must be set a-going, and carving, and gold, and ivory; and all these things must be procured, must they not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Must not the city, then, be larger? For that healthy one is no longer sufficient, but is already full of luxury, and of a crowd of such as are no way necessary to cities; such as all kinds of sportsmen, and the imitative artists, many of them imitating in figures and colors, and others in music: poets too, and their ministers, rhapsodists, actors, dancers, undertakers, workmen of all sorts of instruments; and what has reference to female ornaments, as well as other things. We shall need likewise many more servants. Do not you think they will require pedagogues, and nurses, and tutors, hairdressers, barbers, victualer too, and cooks? And further still, we shall want swineherds likewise: of these there were none in the other city, (for there needed not) but in this we shall want these, and many other sorts of herds likewise, if any eat the several animals, shall we not?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ Shall we not then, in this manner of Life, be much more in need of physicians than formerly?

Glaucon/ Much more.

Socrates/ And the country, which was then sufficient to support the inhabitants, will, instead of being sufficient, become too little; or how shall we say?

Glaucon/ In this way.

Socrates/ Must we not then encroach upon the neighboring country, if we want to have sufficient for plough and pasture, and they, in like manner, on us, if they likewise suffer themselves to accumulate wealth to infinity; going beyond the boundary of necessities?

Glaucon/ There is great necessity for it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we afterwards fight, Glauco, or how shall we do?

Glaucon/ We shall certainly.

Socrates/ But we say nothing, whether war does any evil, or any good; but thus much only, that we have found the origin of war: from whence, most especially, arise the greatest mischiefs to states, both private and public.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ We shall need, then, friend, still a larger city; not for a small, but for a large army, who, in going out, may fight with those who assault them, for their whole substance, and everything we have now mentioned.

Glaucon/ What, are not these sufficient to fight?

Socrates/ No; if you, at least, and all of us, have rightly agreed, when we formed our city: and we agreed, if you remember, that it was impossible for one to perform many arts handsomely.

Glaucon/ You say true.

Socrates/ What, then, as to that contest of war; does it not appear to require art?

Glaucon/ Very much.

Socrates/ Ought we then to take more care of the art of shoe-making than of the art of making war?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But we charged the shoe-maker neither to undertake at the same time to be a husbandman, nor a weaver, nor a mason, but a shoe-maker; that the work of that art may be done for us handsomely: and, in like manner, we allotted to every one of the rest one thing, to which the genius of each led him, and what each took care of, freed from other things, to do it well, applying to it the whole of his life, and not neglecting the seasons of working. And now, as to the affairs of war, whether is it of the greatest importance, that they be well performed? Or, is this so easy a thing, that one may be a husbandman, and likewise a

soldier, and shoe-maker; or be employed in any other art? But not even at chess, or dice, can one ever play skillfully, unless he study this very thing from his childhood, and not make it a by-work. Or, shall one, taking a spear, or any other of the warlike arms and instruments, become instantly an expert combatant, in an encounter in arms, or in any other relating to war? And, shall the taking up of no other instrument make a workman, or a wrestler, nor be useful to him who has neither the knowledge of that particular thing, nor has bestowed the study sufficient for its attainment?

Glaucon/ Such instruments, would truly be very valuable.

Socrates/ By how much then, this work of guards is one of the greatest importance, by so much it should require the greatest leisure from other things, and likewise the greatest art and study.

Glaucon/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ And shall it not likewise require a competent genius for this profession?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ It should surely be our business, as it seems, if we be able, to choose who and what kind of geniuses are competent for the guardianship of the city.

Glaucon/ Ours, indeed.

Socrates/ We have truly, undertaken no mean business; but, however, we are not to despair, so long at least as we have any ability.

Glaucon/ No indeed.

Socrates/ Do you think then, that the genius of a generous whelp differs anything for guardianship, from that of a generous youth?

Glaucon/ What is it you say?

Socrates/ It is this. Must not each of them be acute in the perception, swift to pursue what they perceive, and strong likewise if there is need to conquer what they shall catch?

Glaucon/ There is need, of all these.

Socrates/ And surely he must be brave likewise, if he fight well.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But will he be brave who is not spirited, whether it is a horse, a dog, or any other animal? Or, have you not observed, that the spirit is somewhat insurmountable and invincible; by the presence of which every soul is, in respect of all things whatever, unterrified and unconquerable?

Glaucon/ I have observed it. It is plain then what sort of a guard we ought to have, with reference to his body. Yes, and with reference to his soul, that he should be spirited. This likewise is plain.

Socrates/ How then, Glauco, will they not be savage towards one another and the other citizens, being of such a temper?

Glaucon/ No truly, not easily.

Socrates/ But yet it is necessary, that towards their friends they be meek, and fierce towards their enemies; for otherwise they will not wait till others destroy them; but they will prevent them, doing it themselves.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ What then, shall we do? Where shall we find, at once, the mild and the magnanimous temper? For the mild disposition is somehow opposite to the spirited.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But, however, if he be deprived of either of these, he cannot be a good guardian; for it seems to be

impossible; and thus it appears, that a good guardian is an impossible thing.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ After hesitating and considering what had passed: Justly, friend, are we in doubt; for we have departed from that image which we first established. How say you? have we not observed, that there are truly such tempers as we were not imagining, who have these opposite things?

Glaucon/ Where then?

Socrates/ One may see it in other animals, and not a little in that one with which we compared our guardian. For this, you know, is the natural temper of generous dogs, to be most mild towards their domestics and their acquaintance, but the reverse to those they know not.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ This then, is possible; and it is not against nature that we require our guardian to be such an one.

Glaucon/ It seems not.

Socrates/ Are you, further, of this opinion, that he who is to be our guardian should, besides being spirited, be a philosopher likewise?

Glaucon/ How? for I do not understand you.

Socrates/ This, likewise, you will observe in the dogs; and it is worthy of admiration in the brute.

Glaucon/ As what?

Socrates/ He is angry at whatever unknown person he sees, though he hath never suffered any ill from him before; but he is fond of whatever acquaintance he sees, though he has never at any time received any good from him. Have you not wondered at this?

Glaucon/ I never, much attended to it before; but, that he does this, is plain. But, indeed, this affection of his nature

seems to be an excellent disposition, and truly philosophical. As how?

Socrates/ As, it distinguishes between a friendly and unfriendly aspect, by nothing else but this, that it knows the one, but is ignorant of the other. How, now, should not this be deemed the love of learning, which distinguishes what is friendly and what is foreign, by knowledge and ignorance?

Glaucon/ It can no way be shown why it should not.

Socrates/ But, however, to be a lover of learning, and a philosopher, are the same.

Glaucon/ The same.

Socrates/ May we not then boldly settle it, That in man too, if anyone is to be of a mild disposition towards his domestics and acquaintance, he must be a philosopher and a lover of learning?

Glaucon/ Let us settle it.

Socrates/ He then who is to be a good and worthy guardian for us, of the city, shall be a philosopher, and spirited, and swift, and strong in his disposition.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Let then our guardian, be such an one. But in what manner shall these be educated for us, and instructed? And will the consideration of this be of any assistance in perceiving that for the sake of which we consider everything else? In what manner justice and injustice arise in the city, that we may not omit a necessary part of the discourse; nor consider what is superfluous?

The brother of Glauco said:

Adeimantus/ I, for my part, greatly expect that this inquiry will be of assistance to that.

Socrates/ Truly, friend Adimantus, it is not to be omitted, though it should happen to be somewhat tedious.

Adeimantus/ No, truly.

Socrates/ Come then, let us, as if we were talking in the way of fable, and at our leisure, educate these men in our reasoning.

Adeimantus/ It must be done.

Socrates/ What then is the education? Or, is it difficult to find a better than that which was found long ago, which is, gymnastic for the body, and music for the mind?

Adeimantus/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ Shall we not then, first, begin with instructing them in music, rather than in gymnastic?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ When you say music, you mean discourses, do you not? I do: but of discourses there are two kinds; the one true, and the other false.

Adeimantus/ There are.

Socrates/ And they must be educated in them both, and first in the false.

Adeimantus/ I do not understand, what you mean.

Socrates/ Do not you understand, that we first of all tell children fables? And this part of music, somehow, to speak in the general, is false; yet there is truth in them; and we accustom children to fables before their gymnastic exercises.

Adeimantus/ We do so.

Socrates/ This then is what I meant, when I said that children were to begin music before gymnastic.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ And do you not know that the beginning of every work is of the greatest importance, especially to anyone young and tender? for then truly, in the easiest manner, is formed and taken on the impression which one inclines to imprint on every individual.

Adeimantus/ It is entirely so.

Socrates/ Shall we then suffer the children to hear any kind of fables composed by any kind of persons; and to receive, for the most part, into their minds, opinions contrary to those we judge they ought to have when they are grown up?

Adeimantus/ We shall by no means suffer it.

Socrates/ First of all, then, we must preside over the fable-makers. And whatever beautiful fable they make must be chosen; and what are otherwise must be rejected; and we shall persuade the nurses and mothers to tell the children such fables as shall be chosen; and to fashion their minds by fables much more than their bodies by their hands. But the most of what they tell them at present must be thrown out.

Adeimantus/ As what?

Socrates/ In the greater ones, we shall see the lesser likewise. For the fashion of them must be the same; and both the greater and the lesser must have the same kind of power. Do not you think so?

Adeimantus/ I do: but I do not at all understand which you call the greater one?

Socrates/ Those, which Hesiod and Homer tell us, and the other poets. For they composed false fables to mankind, and told them as they do still.

Adeimantus/ Which, do you mean, and what is it you blame in them?

Socrates/ That, which first of all and most especially ought to be blamed, when one does not falsify handsomely.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ When one, in his composition, gives ill representations of the nature of Gods and heroes: as a

painter drawing a picture in no respect resembling what he wished to paint.

Adeimantus/ It is right, to blame such things as these. But how have they failed, say we, and as to what?

Socrates/ First of all, with reference to that greatest lie, and matters of the greatest importance, he did not lie handsomely, who told how Heaven did what Hesiod says he did; and then again how Saturn punished him, and what Saturn did, and what he suffered from his son: For though these things were true, yet I should not imagine they ought to be so plainly told to the unwise and the young, but ought much rather to be concealed. But if there were a necessity to tell them, they should be heard in secrecy, by as few as possible; after they had sacrificed not a hog, but some great and wonderful sacrifice, that thus the fewest possible might chance to hear them.

Adeimantus/ These fables, are indeed truly hurtful.

Socrates/ And not to be mentioned, Adimantus, in our city. Nor is it to be said in the hearing of a youth, that he who does the most extreme wickedness does nothing strange; nor he who in every shape punishes his unjust father, but that he does the same as the first and the greatest of the Gods.

Adeimantus/ No truly, these things do not seem to me proper to be said.

Socrates/ Nor, universally, must it be told how Gods war with Gods, and plot and fight against one another, (for such assertions are not true,)—if, at least, those who are to guard the city for us ought to account it the most shameful thing to hate one another on slight grounds. As little ought we to tell in fables, and embellish to them, the battles of the giants; and many other all-various feuds, both of the Gods and heroes, with their own kindred and relations. But if we are

at all to persuade them that at no time should one citizen hate another, and that it is unholy; such things as these are rather to be said to them immediately when they are children, by the old men and women, and by those well advanced in life; and the poets are to be obliged to compose agreeably to these things. But Hera fettered by her son, and Vulcan hurled from heaven by his father for going to assist his mother when beaten, and all those battles of the Gods which Homer has composed, must not be admitted into the city; whether they be composed in the way of allegory, or without allegory; for the young person is not able to judge what is allegory and what is not: but whatever opinions he receives at such an age are with difficulty washed away, and are generally immoveable. On these accounts, one would imagine, that, of all things, we should endeavor that what they are first to hear be composed in the most handsome manner for exciting them to virtue.

Adeimantus/ There is reason for it. But, if anyone now should ask us concerning these, what they are, and what kind of fables they are, which should we name?

Socrates/ Adimantus, you and I are not poets at present, but founders of a city; and it belongs to the founders to know the models according to which the poets are to compose their fables; contrary to which if they compose, they are not to be tolerated; but it belongs not to us to make fables for them.

Adeimantus/ Right. But as to this very thing, the models concerning theology, which are they?

Socrates/ Some such as these. God is always to be represented such as he is, whether one represent him in epic, in song, or in tragedy.

Adeimantus/ This, ought to be done.

Socrates/ Is not God essentially good, and is he not to be described as such?

Adeimantus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ But nothing which is good is hurtful; is it?

Adeimantus/ It does not appear to me that it is.

Socrates/ Does, then, that which is not hurtful ever do hurt?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Does that which does, no hurt do any evil?

Adeimantus/ Nor this neither.

Socrates/ And what does no evil cannot be the cause of any evil.

Adeimantus/ How can it?

Socrates/ But what? Good is beneficial.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is, then, the cause of welfare?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Good, therefore, is not the cause of all things, but the cause of those things which are in a right state; but is not the cause of those things which are in a wrong.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Neither, then, can God, since he is good, be the cause of all things, as the many say, but he is the cause of a few things to men; but of many things he is not the cause; for our good things are much fewer than our evil: and no other than God is the cause of our good things; but of our evils we must not make God the cause, but seek for some other.

Adeimantus/ You seem to me, to speak most true.

Socrates/ We must not, then, either admit Homer or any other poet trespassing so foolishly with reference to the Gods, and saying, how;

Two vessels on Jove's threshold ever stand,

The source of evil one, and one of good.
The man whose lot Jove mingles out of both,
By good and ill alternately is rul'd.
But he whose portion is unmingled ill,
O'er sacred earth by famine dire is driv'n.

Nor that Zeus is the dispenser of our good and evil. Nor, if anyone say that the violation of oaths and treaties by Pandarus was effected by Minerva and Zeus, shall we commend it. Nor that dissension among the Gods, and judgment by Themis and Zeus. Nor yet must we suffer the youth to hear what Æschylus says; how;

Whenever God inclines to raze
A house, himself contrives a cause.

But, if anyone make poetical compositions, in which are these iambics, the sufferings of Niobe, of the Pelopides, or the Trojans, or others of a like nature, we must either not suffer them to say they are the works of God; or, if of God, we must find that reason for them which we now require, and we must say that God did what was just and good; and that they were benefited by being chastised: but we must not suffer a poet to say, that they are miserable who are punished; and that it is God who does these things. But if they say that the wicked, as being miserable, needed correction; and that, in being punished, they were profited by God, we may suffer the assertion. But, to say that God, who is good, is the cause of ill to anyone, this we must by all means oppose, nor suffer anyone to say so in his city; if he wishes to have it well regulated. Nor must we permit anyone, either young or old, to hear such things told in fable, either in verse or prose; as they are neither agreeable to sanctity to be told, nor profitable to us, nor consistent with themselves.

Adeimantus/ I vote along with you, in this law, and it pleases me.

Socrates/ This, then, may be one of the laws and models with reference to the Gods: by which it shall be necessary that those who speak, and who compose, shall compose and say that God is not the cause of all things, but of good.

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed, it is necessary. But what as to this second law?

Socrates/ Think you that God is a buffoon, and insidiously appears, at different times, in different shapes; sometimes like himself; and, at other times, changing his appearance into many shapes; sometimes deceiving us, and making us conceive false opinions of him? Or, do you conceive him to be simple, and departing the least of all things from his proper form?

Adeimantus/ I cannot, at present, at least, say so.

Socrates/ But what as to this? If anything be changed from its proper form, is there not a necessity that it be changed by itself, or by another?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Are not those things which are in the best state, least of all changed and moved by any other thing? as the body, by meats and drinks, and labors: and every vegetable by tempests and winds, and such like accidents. Is not the most sound and vigorous least of all changed?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ And as to the soul itself, will not any perturbation from without, least of all disorder and change the most brave and wise?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And surely, somehow, all vessels which are made, and buildings, and vestments, according to the same reasoning, such as are properly worked, and in a right state, are least changed by time, or other accidents?

Adeimantus/ They are so, indeed.

Socrates/ Everything then which is in a good state, either by nature, or art, or both, receives the smallest change from anything else.

Adeimantus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But God, and everything belonging to divinity, are in the best state.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ In this way, then, God should least of all have many shapes. Least of all, truly. But should he change and alter himself?

Adeimantus/ It is plain, if he be changed at all.

Socrates/ Whether then will he change himself to the better and to the more handsome, or to the worse, and the more deformed?

Adeimantus/ Of necessity, to the worse, if he be changed at all; for we shall never at any time say, that God is any way deficient with respect to beauty or excellence.

Socrates/ You say most right. And this being so; do you imagine, Adimantus, that anyone, either of Gods or men, would willingly make himself any way worse?

Adeimantus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ It is impossible, then, for a God to desire to change himself; but each of them, being most beautiful and excellent, continues always, to the utmost of his power, invariably in his own form.

Adeimantus/ This appears to me, at least, wholly necessary.

Socrates/ Let not, then, most excellent Adimantus, any of the poets tell us, how the Gods;

> ……at times resembling foreign guests,
> Wander o'er cities in all-various forms.

Nor let anyone belie Proteus and Thetis. Nor bring in Hera, in tragedies or other poems, as having transformed herself like a priestess, and collecting for the life sustaining sons of Inachus the Argive River. Nor let them tell us many other such lies. Nor let the mothers, persuaded by them, affright their children, telling the stories wrong; as, that certain Gods wander by night;

Resembling various guests, in various forms.

that they may not, at one and the same time, blaspheme against the Gods, and render their children more dastardly.

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ But are the Gods, such as, though in themselves they never change, yet make us imagine they appear in various forms, deceiving us, and playing the mountebanks?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ But what, can a God cheat; holding forth a phantasm, either in word or deed?

Adeimantus/ I do not know.

Socrates/ Do not you know, that what is truly a cheat, if we may be allowed to say so, both all the Gods and men abhor?

Adeimantus/ How do you say?

Socrates/ Thus: That to offer: a cheat to the most principal part of themselves, and that about their most principal interests, is what none willingly incline to do; but, of all things, everyone is most afraid of possessing a cheat there.

Adeimantus/ Neither as yet, do I understand you.

Socrates/ Because, you think I am saying something venerable: but I am saying, that to cheat the soul concerning realities, and to be so cheated, and to be ignorant, and there

to have obtained and to keep a cheat, is what everyone would least of all choose; and a cheat in the soul is what they most especially hate.

Adeimantus/ Most especially.

Socrates/ But this, as I was now saying, might most justly be called a true cheat, —ignorance in the soul of the cheated person: since a cheat in words is but a kind of imitation of what the soul feels; and an image afterwards arising, and not altogether a pure cheat. Is it not so?

Adeimantus/ Entirely.

Socrates/ But this real lie is not only hated of the Gods, but of men likewise.

Adeimantus/ So it appears. But what now?

Socrates/ With respect to the cheat in words, when has it something of utility, so as not to deserve hatred? Is it not when employed towards our enemies; and some even of those called our friends; when in madness, or other distemper, they attempt to do some mischief? In that case, for a dissuasive, as a drug, it is useful. And in those fables we were now mentioning, as we know not how the truth stands concerning ancient things, making a lie resembling the truth, we render it useful as much as possible. It is, perfectly so. In which then of these cases is a lie useful to God? Whether does he make a lie resembling the truth, as being ignorant of ancient things?

Adeimantus/ That were ridiculous.

Socrates/ God is not then a lying poet. I do not think it. But should he make a lie through fear of his enemies? Far from it. But on account of the folly or madness of his kindred?

Adeimantus/ But, none of the foolish and mad are the friends of God.

Socrates/ There is then no occasion at all for God to make a lie.

Adeimantus/ There is none.

Socrates/ The divine and God-like nature is then, in all respects, without a lie?

Adeimantus/ Altogether.

Socrates/ God then is simple and true, both in word and deed; neither is he changed himself, nor does he deceive others; neither by visions, nor by discourse, nor by the pomp of signs; neither when we are awake, nor when we sleep.

Adeimantus/ So it appears, to me, at least whilst you are speaking.

Socrates/ You agree then, that this shall be the second model, by which we are to speak and to compose concerning the Gods: that they are neither mountebanks, to change themselves; nor to mislead us by lies, either in word or deed?

Adeimantus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Whilst then we commend many other things in Homer, this we shall not commend, the dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon; neither shall we commend Æschylus, when he makes Thetis say that Apollo had sung at her marriage, that;

A comely offspring she should raise,
From sickness free, of lengthened days:
Apollo, singing all my fate,
And praising high my God-like state,
Rejoic'd my heart; and 'twas my hope,
That all was true Apollo spoke:
But he, who, at my marriage feast,
Extoll'd me thus, and was my guest;
He who did thus my fate explain,
Is he who now my son hath slain.

When anyone says such things as these of the Gods, we shall show displeasure, and not afford the chorus: nor shall we suffer teachers to make use of such things in the education of the youth; if our guardians are to be pious, and divine men, as far as it is possible for man to be.

Adeimantus/ I agree with you, perfectly, as to these models; and we may use them as laws.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

Book 3.

Socrates/ These things indeed then, and such as these, are, as it seems, what are to be heard, and not heard, concerning the Gods, immediately from childhood, by those who are to honor the Gods and their parents, and who are not to despise friendship with one another.

Adeimantus/ And I imagine, that these things have appeared right.

Socrates/ But, what now? If they are to be brave, must not these things be narrated to them, and such other likewise as may render them least of all afraid of death? Or, do you imagine that anyone can ever be brave whilst he has this fear within him?

Adeimantus/ Not I, truly.

Socrates/ But what? do you think that anyone can be void of a fear of death, whilst he imagines that there is Hades, and that it is dreadful; and, that in battles he will choose death before defeat and slavery?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ We ought then, as it seems, to give orders likewise to those who under take to discourse about fables of this kind; and to entreat them not to reproach thus in general the things in Hades, but rather to commend them; as they say neither what is true, nor what is profitable to those who are to be soldiers.

Adeimantus/ We ought indeed.

Socrates/ Beginning then, at this verse, we shall leave out all of such kind, as this;

> I'd rather, as a rustic slave, submit
> To some mean man, who had but scanty fare,
> Than govern all the wretched shades below.

And that;

The house, to mortals and immortals, seems
Dreadful and squalid; and what Gods abhor;

And;

O strange! in Pluto's dreary realms to find
Soul and its image, but no spark of mind.

And;

He's wise alone, the rest are flutt'ring shades.

And;

The soul to Hades from its members fled;
And, leaving youth and manhood, wail'd its fate.

And;

……the soul, like smoke, down to the shades
Fled howling….

And;

As, in the hollow of a spacious cave,
The owls fly screaming; if one chance to fall
Down from the rock, they all confus'dly fly;
So these together howling went….

We shall request Homer and the other poets not to be indignant if we raze these things, and such as these; not that they are not poetical, and pleasant to many to be heard; but, the more poetical they are, the less ought they to be heard by children, and men who ought to be free, and more afraid of slavery than of death.

Adeimantus/ By all means, truly.

Socrates/ Further, are not all dreadful and frightful names about these things likewise to be rejected? Cocytus, and Styx, those in the infernal regions, and the dead, and such other appellations, in this form, such as terrify all who hear them. These may perhaps, serve some other purpose: but we are afraid for our guardians; lest, by such a terror,

they be rendered more effeminate and soft than they ought to be.

Adeimantus/ We are rightly afraid of it.

Socrates/ Are these then to be taken away?

Adeimantus/ They are.

Socrates/ And they must speak and compose on a contrary model.

Adeimantus/ That is plain.

Socrates/ We shall take away likewise the bewailing and lamentations of illustrious men.

Adeimantus/ This is necessary, if what is above be so.

Socrates/ Consider then, whether we rightly take away, or not. And do not we say, that the worthy man will imagine that to die is not a dreadful thing to the worthy man whose companion he is?

Adeimantus/ We say so.

Socrates/ Neither then will he lament over him, at least, as if his friend suffered something dreadful.

Adeimantus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ And we say this likewise, that such an one is most of all sufficient in himself, for the purpose of living happily, and that, in a distinguished manner from others, he is least of all indigent.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ It is to him, then, the least dreadful to be deprived of a son, a brother, wealth, or any other of such-like things.

Adeimantus/ Least of all, indeed.

Socrates/ So that he will least: of all lament; but endure, in the mildest manner, when any such misfortune befalls him.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We shall rightly then take away the lamentations of famous men, and assign them to the women, but not to the better sort, and to such of the men as are dastardly; that so those whom we propose to educate for the guardianship of the country may disdain to make lamentations of this kind.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ We shall again then entreat Homer, and the other poets, not to say in their compositions, that Achilles, the son of a Goddess;

> Lay sometimes on his side, and then anon
> Supine; then grov'ling; rising then again,
> Lamenting wander'd on the barren shore.

Nor how;

> .... with both his hands
> He pour'd the burning dust upon his head.

Nor the rest of his lamentation, and bewailing; such and so great as he has composed. Nor that Priam, so near to the Gods, so meanly supplicated, and rolled himself in the dirt: "Calling on every soldier by his name."

But still much more must we entreat them not to make the Gods, at least, to bewail, and say;

> Ah wretched me! unfortunately brave
> A son I bore.

And if they are not thus to bring in the Gods, far less should they dare to represent the greatest of the Gods in so unbecoming a manner as this:

> How dear a man, around the town pursu'd,
> Mine eyes behold! for which my heart is griev'd:
> Ah me! 'tis fated that Patroclus kill
> Sarpedon whom, of all men, most I love.

For, if, friend Adimantus, our youth should seriously hear such things as these, and not laugh at them as spoken most unsuitably, hardly would anyone think it unworthy of himself, of himself being a man, or check himself, if he should happen either to say or to do anything of the kind; but, without any shame or endurance, would, on small sufferings, sing many lamentations and moans.

Adeimantus/ You say most true.

Socrates/ They must not, therefore, do in this manner, as our reasoning now has evinced to us; which we must believe, till someone persuade us by some better.

Adeimantus/ They must not, indeed.

Socrates/ But, surely, neither ought we to be given to excessive laughter; for, where a man gives himself to violent laughter, such a disposition commonly requires a violent change.

Adeimantus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Nor, if anyone shall represent worthy men as overcome, by laughter, must we allow it, much less if he thus represent the Gods.

Adeimantus/ Much less, indeed.

Socrates/ Neither, then, shall we receive such things as these from Homer, concerning the Gods:

> Vulcan ministrant when the Gods beheld,
> Amidst them laughter unextinguish'd rose.

This is not to be admitted, according to your reasoning.

Adeimantus/ If you incline, to call it my reasoning; this, indeed, is not to be admitted.

Socrates/ But surely the truth is much more to be valued. For, if lately we reasoned right, and if indeed a lie be unprofitable to the Gods, but useful to men, in the way of a drug, it is plain that such a thing is to be entrusted only to

the physicians, but not to be touched by private persons. It is plain. It belongs then to the governors of the city, if to any others, to make a lie, with reference either to enemies or citizens, for the good of the city; but none of the rest must venture on such a thing. But for a private person to tell a lie to such governors; we will call it the same, and even a greater offence, than for the patient to tell a lie to the physician; or for the man who learns his exercises, not to tell his master the truth as to the indispositions of his body: or for one not to tell the pilot the real state of things, respecting the ship and sailors, in what condition himself and the other sailors are.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But if you find in the city anyone else making a lie;

> ……of those who artists are,
> Or prophet, or physician, or who make
> The shafts of spears….

you shall punish them, as introducing a practice subversive and destructive of the city, as of a ship.

Adeimantus/ We must do so; if indeed it is upon speech that actions are completed.

Socrates/ But what? shall not our youth have need of temperance?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are not such things as these the principal parts of temperance? that they be obedient to their governors; that the governors themselves be temperate in drinking, feasting, and in venereal pleasures. And we shall say, I imagine, that such things as these are well spoken, which Diomed says in Homer:

> Sit thou in silence, and obey my speech.

And what follows; thus;

The Greeks march'd on in silence, breathing force;
Revering their commanders; ……

and such like.

Adeimantus/ Well spoken.

Socrates/ But what as to these? "Thou drunkard with dog's eyes, and heart of deer;" and all of this kind, are these, or such other juvenile things, which any private person may say against their governors, spoken handsomely?

Adeimantus/ Not handsomely.

Socrates/ For I do not imagine that when they are heard they are fit to promote temperance in youth; and though they may afford a pleasure of a different kind, it is no wonder. But what do you think?

Adeimantus/ Just the same way.

Socrates/ But what of this? To make the wisest man say, that it appears to him to be the most beautiful of all things;

……to see the tables full
Of flesh and dainties, and the butler bear
The wine in flagons, and fill up the cup:

is this proper for a youth to hear, in order to obtain a command over himself? Or yet this?

……most miserable it is,
To die of famine, and have adverse fate.

Or that Zeus, through desire of venereal pleasures, easily forgetting all those things which he alone awake revolved in his mind, whilst other Gods and men were asleep, was so struck, on seeing Hera, as not even to be willing to come into the house, but wanted to embrace her on the ground; and at the same time declaring that he is possessed with such desire, as exceeded what he felt on their first connection with each other;

……Hid from their parents dear.

Nor yet how Mars and Venus were bound by Vulcan, and other such things.

No, by Zeus. These things do not seem fit.

Socrates/ But if any instances of self-denial, with respect to all these things be told, and practiced by eminent men, these are to be beheld and heard. Such as this:

> He beat his breast and thus reprov'd his heart:
> Endure, my heart! thou heavier fate hail borne.

By all means, we should do thus.

Neither must we suffer men to receive bribes, nor to be covetous.

By no means.

Nor must we sing to them, that

> Gifts gain the Gods and venerable kings.

Nor must we commend Phœnix, the tutor of Achilles, as if he spoke with moderation, in counseling him to accept of presents, and assist the Greeks; but, without presents, not to desist from his wrath. Neither shall we commend Achilles, nor approve of his being so covetous as to receive presents from Agamemnon; and likewise a ransom to give up the dead body of Hector, but not incline to do it otherwise.

Adeimantus/ It is not right, to commend such things as these.

Socrates/ I am unwilling, for Homer's sake, to say it, That neither is it lawful that these things, at least, be said against Achilles, nor that they be believed, when said by others; nor, again, that he spoke thus to Apollo:

> Me thou hast injur'd, thou, far-darting God!
> Most baneful of the powers divine! But know,
> "Were I possest of power, then vengeance should be mine.

And how disobedient he was to the river, though a divinity, and was ready to fight; and again, he says to the river Sperchius, with his sacred locks;

> Thy lock to great Patroclus I could give,
> Who now is dead.....

Nor are we to believe he did this. And again, the dragging Hector round the sepulcher of Patroclus, and the slaughtering the captives at his funeral pile, —that all these things are true, we will not say; nor will we suffer our people to be persuaded that Achilles, the son of a Goddess, and of Peleus the most temperate of men and the third from Zeus, and educated by the most wise Chiron was full of such disorder as to have within him two distempers opposite to one another, —the illiberal and covetous disposition, and a contempt both of Gods and of men.

Adeimantus/ You say right.

Socrates/ Neither, let us be persuaded of these things; nor suffer any to say that Theseus the son of Neptune, and Pirithous the son of Zeus, were impelled to perpetrate such dire rapines; nor that any son of another deity, nor any hero, would dare to do horrible and impious deeds; such as the lies of the poets ascribe to them: but let us compel the poets either to say that these are not the actions of these persons, or that these persons are not the children of the Gods; and not to say both. Nor let us suffer them to attempt to persuade our youth that the Gods create evil; and that heroes are in no respect better than men. For, as we said formerly, these things are neither holy nor true: for we have elsewhere shown, that it is impossible that evil should proceed from the Gods.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ And these things are truly hurtful, to the hearers, at least. For everyone will pardon his own depravity,

when he is persuaded that even the near relations of the Gods do and have done things of the same kind: such as are near to Zeus.

> Who, on the top of Ida, have up-rear'd
> To parent Zeus an altar; —

And.

> Whose blood derived from Gods is not extinct.

On which accounts all such fables must be suppressed; lest they create in our youth a powerful habit of wickedness.

Adeimantus/ We must do so, by all means.

Socrates/ What other species of discourses, have we still remaining, now whilst we are determining what ought to be spoken, and what not? We have already mentioned in what manner we ought to speak of the Gods, and likewise of dæmons and heroes; and of what relates to Hades.

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Should not, then, what yet remains seem to be concerning men?

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ But it is impossible for us, friend, to regulate this at present.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ Because, I think, we shall say that the poets and orators speak amiss concerning the greatest affairs of men: as, That most men are unjust, and, notwithstanding this, are happy; and that the just are miserable; and that it is profitable for one to do unjustly, when he is concealed; and that justice is gain indeed to others, but the loss of the just man himself: these, and innumerable other such things, we will forbid them to say; and enjoin them to sing, and compose in fable, the contrary to these. Do not you think so?

Adeimantus/ I know it well.

Socrates/ If then you acknowledge that I say right, shall I not say that you have acknowledged what all along we seek for?

Adeimantus/ You judge right;

Socrates/ Shall we not then grant that such discourses are to be spoken concerning men, whenever we shall have discovered what justice is; and how in its nature it is profitable to the just man to be such, whether he appear to be such or not?

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Concerning the discourses, then, let this suffice. We must now consider, as I imagine, the manner of discourse. And then we shall have completely considered, both what is to be spoken, and the manner how.

Adeimantus/ But I do not understand what you say.

Socrates/ But, it is needful you should. And perhaps you will rather understand it in this way. Is not everything told by the mythologists, or poets, a narrative of the past, present, or future?

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And do not they execute it, either by simple narration, or imitation, or by both?

Adeimantus/ This too, I want to understand more plainly.

Socrates/ I seem, to be a ridiculous and obscure instructor. Therefore, like those who are unable to speak, I will endeavor to explain, not the whole, but, taking up a particular part, show my meaning by this particular. And tell me, Do not you know the beginning of the Iliad? where the poet says that Chryses entreated Agamemnon to set free his daughter; but that he was displeased that Chryses, when he did not succeed, prayed against the Greeks to the God.

Adeimantus/ I know.

Socrates/ You know, then, that down to these verses;

> .....The Grecians all he pray'd;
> But chief the two commanders, Atreus' sons—

the poet himself speaks, and does not attempt to divert our attention elsewhere; as if any other person were speaking: but what he says after this, he says as if he himself were Chryses, and endeavors as much as possible to make us imagine that the speaker is not Homer, but the priest, an old man; and that in this manner he has composed almost the whole narrative of what happened at Troy, and in Ithaca, and all the adventures in the whole Odyssey.

Adeimantus/ It is certainly so.

Socrates/ Is it not then narration, when he tells the several speeches? and likewise when he tells what intervenes between the speeches?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ But when he makes any speech in the person of another, do not we say that then he assimilates his speech, as much as possible, to each person whom he introduces as speaking?

Adeimantus/ We say so, do we not?

Socrates/ And is not the assimilating one's self to another, either in voice or figure, the imitating him to whom one assimilates himself?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ In such a manner as this, then, it seems, both he and the other poets perform the narrative by means of imitation.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But if the poet did not at all conceal himself, his whole action and narrative would be without imitation. And that you may not say you do not again understand how

this should be, I shall tell you. If Homer, after relating how Chryses came with his daughter's ransom, beseeching the Greeks, but chiefly the kings, had spoken afterwards, not as Chryses, but still as Homer, you know it would not have been imitation, but simple narration. And it would have been somehow thus: (I shall speak without meter, for I am no poet:) The priest came and prayed, that the Gods might grant they should take Troy, and return base; and begged them to restore him his daughter, accepting the presents, and revering the God. When he had said this, all the rest showed respect, and consented; but Agamemnon was enraged, charging him to depart instantly, and not to return again; lest his scepter and the garlands of the God should be of no avail; and told him, that before he would restore his daughter she should grow old with him in Argos; but ordered him to be gone, and not to irritate him, that he might get home in safety. The old man upon hearing this was afraid, and went away in silence. And when he was retired from the camp he made many supplications to Apollo, rehearsing the names of the God, and reminding him and beseeching him, that if ever he had made any acceptable donation in the building of temples, or the offering of sacrifices, —for the sake of these, to avenge his tears upon the Greeks with his arrows. Thus, friend, the narration is simple, without imitation.

Adeimantus/ I understand.

Socrates/ Understand then, that the opposite of this happens, when one, taking away the poet's part between the speeches, leaves the speeches themselves.

Adeimantus/ This, I likewise understand, that a thing of this kind takes place respecting tragedies.

Socrates/ You apprehend perfectly well. And I think that I now make plain to you what I could not before; that in

poetry, and likewise in mythology, one kind is wholly by imitation, such as you say tragedy and comedy are; and another kind by the narration of the poet himself: and you will find this kind most especially in the dithyrambus: and another again by both; as in epic poetry, and in many other cases besides, if you understand me. I understand now, what you meant before. And remember too, that before that we were saying that we had already mentioned what things were to be spoken; but that it yet remained to be considered in what manner they were to be spoken.

Adeimantus/ I remember, indeed.

Socrates/ This then, is what I was saying, that it were necessary we agreed whether we shall suffer the poets to make narratives to us in the way of imitation; or, partly in the way of imitation, and partly not; and, what in each way; or, if they are not to use imitation at all.

Adeimantus/ I conjecture, you are to consider whether we shall receive tragedy and comedy into our city, or not.

Socrates/ Perhaps, and something more too; for I do not as yet know, indeed; but wherever our reasoning, as a gale, bears us, there we must go.

Adeimantus/ And truly, you say well.

Socrates/ Consider this now, Adimantus, whether our guardians ought to practice imitation, or not. Or does this follow from what is above? That each one may handsomely perform one business, but many he cannot: or, if he shall attempt it, in grasping at many things, he shall fail in all; so as to be remarkable in none.

Adeimantus/ Why shall he not?

Socrates/ And is not the reason the same concerning imitation? That one man is not so able to imitate many things well, as one.

Adeimantus/ He is not.

Socrates/ Hardly then shall he perform any part of the more eminent employments, and at the same time imitate many things, and be an imitator; since the same persons are not able to perform handsomely imitations of two different kinds, which seem to resemble each other; as, for instance, they cannot succeed both in comedy and tragedy: or, did you not lately call these two, imitations?

Adeimantus/ I did; and you say true, that the same persons cannot succeed in them.

Socrates/ Nor can they, at the same time, be rhapsodists and actors.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Nor can the same persons be actors in comedies and in tragedies. And all these are imitations, are they not?

Adeimantus/ Imitations.

Socrates/ The genius of man seems to me, Adimantus, to be shut up within still lesser bounds than these; so that it is unable to imitate handsomely many things, or do these very things, of which even the imitations are the resemblances.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ If therefore we are to hold to our first reasoning, that our guardians, unoccupied in any manufacture whatever, ought to be the most accurate manufacturers of the liberty of the city, and to mind nothing but what has some reference to this; it were surely proper, they neither did nor imitated anything else; but, if they shall imitate at all, to imitate immediately from their childhood such things as are correspondent to these; brave, temperate, holy, free men, and all such things as these; —but neither to do, nor to be desirous of imitating, things illiberal or base, lest from imitating they come to be really such. Or have you not

observed, that imitations, if from earliest youth they be continued onwards for a long time, are established into the manners and natural temper, both with reference to the body and voice, and likewise the dianoëtic power?

Adeimantus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ We will not surely allow, those we profess to take care of, and who ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, either young or old, either reviling her husband, or quarrelling with the Gods, or speaking boastingly when she imagines herself happy; nor yet to imitate her in her misfortunes, sorrows, and lamentations, when sick, or in love, or in child-bed labor. We shall be far from permitting this.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Nor to imitate man- or maid-servants in doing what belongs to servants.

Adeimantus/ Nor this neither.

Socrates/ Nor yet to imitate depraved men, as it seems, such as are dastardly, and do the contrary of what we have now been mentioning; reviling and railing at one another; and speaking abominable things, either intoxicated or sober, or any other things such as persons of this sort are guilty of, either in words or actions, either with respect to themselves or one another. Neither must they accustom themselves to resemble mad-men, in words or actions. Even the mad and wicked are to be known, both the men and the women; but none of their actions are to be done, or imitated.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But what? are they to imitate such as work in brass, or any other handicrafts, or such as are employed in rowing boats, or such as command these; or anything else appertaining to these things?

Adeimantus/ How can they, as they are not to be allowed to give application to any of those things?

Socrates/ But what? shall they imitate horses neighing, or bulls lowing, or rivers murmuring, or the sea roaring, or thunder, and all such like things?

Adeimantus/ We have forbidden them, to be mad, or to resemble mad-men.

Socrates/ If then I understand, what you say, there is a certain kind of speech, and of narration, in which he who is truly a good and worthy man expresses himself when it is necessary for him to say anything; and another kind again unlike to this, which he who has been born and educated in an opposite manner always possesses, and in which he expresses himself.

Adeimantus/ But of what kind are these?

Socrates/ It appears to me, that the worthy man, when he comes in his narrative to any speech or action of a good man, will willingly tell it as if he were himself the man, and will not be ashamed of such an imitation; most especially when he imitates a good man acting prudently and without error, and failing seldom, and but little, through diseases, or love, intoxication, or any other misfortune. But when he comes to anything unworthy of himself, he will not be studious to resemble himself to that which is worse, unless for a short time when it produces some good; but will be ashamed, both as he is unpracticed in the imitation of such character a as these, and likewise as he grudges to degrade himself and stand among the models of baser characters, disdaining it in his dianoëtic part, and doing it only for amusement.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ He will not then make use of such a narrative as we lately mentioned, with reference to the compositions

of Homer: but his composition will participate of both imitation and the other narrative; and but a small part of it will be imitation, in a great quantity of plain narrative. Do I seem to say anything, or nothing at all?

Adeimantus/ You express, perfectly well what ought to be the model of such an orator.

Socrates/ And, on the other hand, will not the man, who is not such an one, the more depraved he is, be the readier to rehearse everything whatever; and not think anything unworthy of him? so that he will undertake to imitate everything in earnest, and likewise in the presence of many; and such things also as we now mentioned; thunderings, and noises of winds and tempests, and of axles, and wheels, and trumpets, and pipes, and whistles, and sounds of all manner of instruments, and voices of dogs too, and of sheep, and of birds. And the whole expression of all these things shall be by imitation in voices and gestures, having but a small part of it narration.

Adeimantus/ This too, must happen of necessity.

Socrates/ These now, I called the two kinds of diction.

Adeimantus/ They are so.

Socrates/ But has not the one of these small variations? And if the orator afford the becoming harmony and measure to the diction, where he speaks with propriety, the discourse is almost after one and the same manner, and in one harmony; for the variations are but small, and in a measure which accordingly is somehow similar.

Adeimantus/ It is indeed, entirely so.

Socrates/ But what as to the other kind? Does it not require the contrary, all kinds of harmony, all kinds of measure, if it is to be naturally expressed, as it has all sorts of variations? It is perfectly so. Do not now all the poets, and

such as speak in any kind, make use of either one or other of these models of diction, or of one compounded of both?

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ What then shall we do? Whether shall we admit into our city all of these; or one of the unmixed, or the one compounded?

Adeimantus/ If my opinion, prevail, that uncompounded one, which is imitative of what is worthy.

Socrates/ But surely, Adimantus, the mixed is pleasant, at least. And the opposite of what you choose is by far the most pleasant to children and pedagogues, and the crowd.

Adeimantus/ It is most pleasant.

Socrates/ But you will not, probably, think it suitable to our government, because with us no man is to attend to two or more employments, but to be quite simple, as everyone does one thing.

Adeimantus/ It is not indeed suitable.

Socrates/ Shall we not then find that in such a city alone, a shoe-maker is only a shoe-maker, and not a pilot along with shoe-making, and that the husbandman is only a husbandman, and not a judge along with husbandry; and that the soldier is a soldier, and not a money-maker besides: and all others in the same way?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And it would appear, that if a man, who, through wisdom, were able to become everything, and to imitate everything, should come into our city, and should wish to show us his poems, we should revere him as a sacred, admirable, and pleasant person: but we should tell him, that there is no such person with us, in our city, nor is there any such allowed to be: and we should send him to some other city, pouring oil on his head, and crowning him

with wool: but we use a more austere poet, and mythologist, for our advantage, who may imitate to us the diction of the worthy manner; and may say whatever he says, according to those models which we established by law a first, when we undertook the education of our soldiers.

Adeimantus/ So we should do, if it depended on us.

Socrates/ It appears, friend, that we have now thoroughly discussed that part of music respecting oratory and fable; for we have already told what is to be spoken, and in what manner.

Adeimantus/ It appears so to me likewise.

Socrates/ Does it not yet remain, that we speak of the manner of song, and of melodies?

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ May not anyone discover what we must say of these things; and of what kind these ought to be, if we are to be consistent with what is above mentioned?

Here Glauco laughing: said:

Glaucon/ But I appear, Socrates, to be a stranger to all these matters, for I am not able at present to guess at what we ought to say: I suspect, however.

Socrates/ You are certainly, fully able to say this in the first place, that melody is composed of three things; of sentiment, harmony, and rhythm.

Glaucon/ Yes, this I can say.

Socrates/ And that the part which consists in the sentiment differs in nothing from that sentiment which is not sung, in this respect, that it ought to be performed upon the same models, as we just now said, and in the same manner.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And surely, then, the harmony and rhythm ought to correspond to the sentiment.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But we observed there was no occasion for wailings and lamentations in compositions.

Glaucon/ No occasion, truly.

Socrates/ Which then are the querulous harmonies? Tell me, for you are a musician.

Glaucon/ The mixed Lydian, and the sharp Lydian; and some others of this kind.

Socrates/ Are not these, then, to be rejected? for they are unprofitable even to women, such as are worthy, and much more to men.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But intoxication is most unbecoming our guardians; and effeminacy and idleness.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ Which then are the effeminate and convivial harmonies?

Glaucon/ The Ionic, and the Lydian, which are called relaxing.

Socrates/ Can you make any use of these, my friend, for military men?

Glaucon/ By no means. But, it seems, you have yet remaining the Doric, and the Phrygian.

Socrates/ I do not know, the harmonies; but leave that harmony, which may, in a becoming manner, imitate the voice and accents of a truly brave man, going on in a military action, and every rough adventure; and bearing his fortune in a determinate and persevering manner, when he fails of success, rushes on wounds, or deaths, or falls into any other distress: and leave that kind of harmony likewise, which is

suited to what is peaceable; where there is no violence, but everything is voluntary; where a man either persuades or beseeches anyone, about anything, either God by prayer, or man by instruction and admonition: or, on the other hand, where one submits himself to another, who beseeches, instructs, and persuades; and, in all these things, ads according to intellect, and does not behave haughtily; demeaning himself soberly and moderately; gladly embracing whatever may happen: leave then these two harmonies, the vehement and the voluntary; which, in the most handsome manner, imitate the voice of the unfortunate and of the fortunate, of the moderate and of the brave.

Glaucon/ You desire, to leave no others but those I now mentioned.

Socrates/ We shall not then, have any need of a great many strings, nor of the Panamanian in our songs and melodies.

Glaucon/ It appears to me, we shall not.

Socrates/ We shall not nourish, then, such workmen as make harps and spinets, and all those instruments which consist of many strings, and produce a variety of harmony.

Glaucon/ We shall not, as it appears.

Socrates/ But what? Will you admit into your city such workmen as make pipes, or pipers? for, are not the instruments which consist of the greatest number of strings, and those that produce all kinds of harmony, imitations of the pipe?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ There are left you still, the lyre and the harp, as useful for your city, and there might likewise be some need for shepherds in the fields.

Glaucon/ Thus reason, shows us.

Socrates/ We then, do nothing dire, if we prefer Apollo, and Apollo's instruments, to Marsyas, and the instruments of that eminent musician.

Glaucon/ Truly, we do not appear to do it.

Socrates/ And by the dog, we have unawares cleansed again our city, which we said was become luxurious.

Glaucon/ And we have wisely done it.

Socrates/ Come then, and let us cleanse what remains; for what concerns rhythm should be suitable to our harmonies; that our citizens pursue not such rhythms as are diversified, and have a variety of cadences; but observe what are the rhythms of a decent and manly life, and, whilst they observe these, make the foot and the melody subservient to sentiment of such a kind; and not the sentiment subservient to the foot and melody. But what these rhythms are, is your business to tell, as you have done the harmonies.

Glaucon/ But by Zeus, I cannot tell. That there are three species of which the notes are composed, as there are four in sounds, whence the whole of harmony, I can say, as I have observed it: but which are the imitations of one kind of life, and which of another, I am not able to tell.

Socrates/ But these things, we must consider with Damon's assistance: what notes are suitable to illiberality and insolence, to madness or other ill disposition; and what notes are proper for their opposites. And I remember, but not distinctly, to have heard him calling a certain warrior, composite, a dactyl, and heroic measure; ornamenting him I do not know how, making him equal above and below, in breadth and length: and he called one, as I imagine, Iambus, and another Trochæus, He adapted, besides, the lengths and shortnesses; and, in some of these, I believe, he blamed and commended the measure of the foot, no less than the

numbers themselves, or something compounded of both; for I cannot speak of these things; because, as I said, they are to be thrown upon Damon. To speak distinctly, indeed, on these matters, would require no small discourse: do not you think so?

Glaucon/ Not a small one, truly.

Socrates/ But can you determine this, that the propriety or impropriety corresponds to the good or ill rhythm?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But, with respect to the good or ill rhythm, the one corresponds to handsome expression, conforming itself to it; and the other to the reverse. And, in the same way, as to the harmonious, and the discordant: since the rhythm and harmony are subservient to the sentiment, as we just now said; and not the sentiment to these.

Glaucon/ These, indeed, are to be subservient to the sentiment.

Socrates/ But what? As to the manner of expression, and as to the sentiment itself, must it not correspond to the temper of the soul?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ And all other things correspond to the expression.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ So that the beauty of expression, fine consonancy, and propriety, and excellence of numbers, are subservient to the good disposition; not that stupidity, which in complaisant language we call good temper; but the dianoëtic part, truly adorned with excellent and beautiful manners.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Must not these things be always pursued by the youth, if they are to mind their business?

Glaucon/ They are indeed to be pursued.

Socrates/ But painting too is somehow full of these things; and every other workmanship of the kind; and weaving is full of these; and carving, and architecture, and all workmanship of every kind of vessels: as is moreover the nature of bodies, and of all vegetables: for in all these there is propriety, and impropriety; and the impropriety, discord, and dissonance, are the sisters of ill expression, and depraved manners; and their opposites are the sisters, and imitations, of sober and worthy manners.

Glaucon/ 'Tis entirely so.

Socrates/ Are we then to give injunctions to the poets alone, and oblige them to work into their poems the image of the worthy manners, or not to compose at all with us? or are we to enjoin all other workmen likewise; and restrain this ill, undisciplined, illiberal, indecent manner, that they exhibit it neither in the representations of animals, in buildings, nor in any other workmanship? or, that he who is not able to do this, be not suffered to work with us? lest our guardians, being educated in the midst of ill representations, as in an ill pasture, by every day plucking and eating much of different things, by little and little contract, imperceptibly, some mighty evil in their soul. But we must seek for such workmen as are able, by the help of a good natural genius, to investigate the nature of the beautiful and the decent: that our youth, dwelling as it were in a healthful place, may be profited on all sides; whence, from the beautiful works, something will be conveyed to the sight and hearing, as a breeze bringing health from salutary places; imperceptibly leading them on directly from childhood, to the resemblance, friendship, and harmony with right reason.

Glaucon/ They should thus, said he be educated in the most handsome manner by far.

Socrates/ On these accounts therefore, Glauco, is not education in music of the greatest importance, because rhythm and harmony enter in the strongest manner into the inward part of the soul, and most powerfully affect it, introducing at the same time decorum, and making everyone decent if he is properly educated, and the reverse if he is not? And moreover, because the man who has here been educated as he ought, perceives in the quickest manner whatever workmanship is defective, and whatever execution is unhandsome, or whatever productions are of that kind; and being disgusted in a proper manner, he will praise what is beautiful, rejoicing in it; and, receiving it into his soul, be nourished by it, and become a worthy and good man: but whatever is base, he will in a proper manner despise, and hate, whilst yet he is young, and before he is able to be a partaker of reason; and when reason comes, such an one as has been thus educated will embrace it, recognizing it perfectly well, from its intimate familiarity with him.

Glaucon/ It appears to me, that education in music is for the sake of such things as these.

Socrates/ Just as, with reference to letters we are then sufficiently instructed when we are not ignorant of the elements, which are but few in number, wherever they are concerned; and when we do not despise them more or less as unnecessary to be observed, but by all means endeavor to understand them thoroughly, as it is impossible for us to be literary men till we do thus.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And if the images of letters appeared anywhere, either in water or in mirrors, should we not know them

before we knew the letters themselves? or does this belong to the same art and study?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Is it indeed then according as I say? that we shall never become musicians, neither we ourselves, nor those guardians we say we are to educate, before we understand the images of temperance, fortitude, liberality, and magnificence, and the other sister virtues; and, on the other hand again, the contraries of these, which are everywhere to be met with; and observe them wheresoever they are, both the virtues themselves, and the images of them, and despise them neither in small nor in great instances; but let us believe that this belongs to the same art and study.

Glaucon/ There is, great necessity for it.

Socrates/ Must not then, the person who shall have in his soul beautiful manners, and in his appearance whatever is proportionable, and corresponding to these, partaking of the same impression, be the most beautiful spectacle to anyone who is able to behold it?

Glaucon/ Exceedingly so.

Socrates/ But what is most beautiful is most lovely.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ He who is musical should surely love those men who are most eminently of this kind; but if one be unharmonious he shall not love him.

Glaucon/ He shall not, if the person be any way defective as to his soul: if indeed it were in his body, he would bear with it, so as to be willing to associate with him.

Socrates/ I understand, that your favorites are or have been of this kind.

Glaucon/ And I agree to it.

Socrates/ But tell me this, Is there any communion between temperance and excessive pleasure?

Glaucon/ How can there? for such pleasure causes a privation of intellect no less than grief.

Socrates/ But has it communion with any other virtue?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But what, has it communion with insolence and intemperance?

Glaucon/ Most of all.

Socrates/ Can you mention a greater and more acute pleasure than that respecting venereal concerns?

Glaucon/ I cannot, nor yet one that is more insane.

Socrates/ But the right love is of such a nature as to love the beautiful, and the handsome, in a temperate and a musical manner.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Nothing then which is insane, or allied to intemperance, is to approach to a right love. Neither must pleasure approach to it; nor must the lover, and the person he loves, have communion with it, where they love and are beloved in a right manner.

Glaucon/ No truly; they must not, Socrates, approach to these.

Socrates/ Thus then, as appears, you will establish by law, in the city which is to be established, that the lover is to love, to converse, and associate with the objects of his love, as with his son, for the sake of virtue, if he gain the consent: and as to everything besides, that everyone so converse with him whose love he solicits, as never to appear to associate for anything beyond what is now mentioned; and that otherwise he shall undergo the reproach of being unmusical, and unacquainted with the beautiful.

Glaucon/ It must be thus.

Socrates/ Does then, the discourse concerning music seem to you to be finished? For it has terminated where it ought to terminate, as the affairs of music ought, somehow, to terminate in the love of the beautiful.

Glaucon/ I agree. But, after music, our youth are to be educated in gymnastic.

Socrates/ But what? It is surely necessary that in this likewise they be accurately disciplined, from their infancy through the whole of life. For the matter, as I imagine, is somehow thus: but do you also consider. For it does not appear to me that whatever body is found, doth, by its own virtue, render the soul good; but contrariwise, that a good soul, by its virtue, renders the body the best which is possible: but how does it appear to you?

Glaucon/ In the same manner to me likewise.

Socrates/ If then, when we have sufficiently cultivated the dianoëtic part, we shall commit to it the accurate management of the concerns of the body; shall not we, as we are only laying down models, (that we may not enlarge) act in a right manner?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ We say then, that they are to abstain from intoxication; for it is more allowable to any, than to a guardian, to be intoxicated, and not to know where he is.

Glaucon/ It were ridiculous, that the guardian should stand in need of a guardian.

Socrates/ But what as to meats? For these men are wrestlers in the noblest combat: are they not?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ Would not then the bodily plight of the wrestlers be proper for such as these?

Glaucon/ Probably.

Socrates/ But, it is of a drowsy kind, and dubious as to health: or, do you not observe, that they sleep out their life? and, if they depart but a little from their appointed diet, such wrestlers become greatly and extremely diseased.

Glaucon/ I perceive it.

Socrates/ But some more elegant exercise, is requisite for our military wrestlers; who, as dogs, ought to be wakeful, and to see, and to hear in the most acute manner; and, in their expeditions, to endure many changes of water and of food, of heat and of cold, that so they may not have a dubious state of health.

Glaucon/ To me it appears so.

Socrates/ Is not then the best gymnastic a kind of sister to the simple music, which we a little before described?

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ That the gymnastic is to be simple and moderate, and of that kind most especially which pertains to war.

Glaucon/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ Even from Homer, one may learn these things: for you know, that in their warlike expeditions, at the entertainments of their heroes, he never feasts them with fishes, and that even whilst they were by the sea at the Hellespont, nor yet with boiled flesh, but only with roast, as what soldiers can most easily procure: for, in short, one can everywhere more easily make use of fire, than carry vessels about.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Neither does Homer, as I imagine, anywhere make mention of seasonings: and this is what the other wrestlers understand, that the body which is to be in good

habit must abstain from all these things. They rightly understand, and abstain. You do not then, friend, as appears, approve of the Syracusian table, and the Sicilian variety of meats, since this other appears to you to be right?

Glaucon/ I do not, as appears.

Socrates/ You will likewise disapprove of a Corinthian girl, as a mistress, for those who are to be of a good habit of body.

Glaucon/ By all means, truly.

Socrates/ And likewise of those delicacies, as they are reckoned, of Attic confections.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ For all feeding and dieting of this kind, if we compare it to the melody and song produced in the Panamanian, and in all rhythms, shall not the companion be just?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ And does not the diversity in that case create intemperance, and here disease? But simplicity, as to music, creates in the soul temperance; and, as to gymnastic, health in the body.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And when intemperance and diseases multiply in the city, shall we not have many halls of justice and of medicine opened? And will not the arts of justice and of medicine be in request, when many free persons shall earnestly apply to them?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But can you adduce any greater argument of an ill and base education in a city, than that there should be need of physicians and supreme magistrates, and that not only for the contemptible and low handicrafts, but for

those who boast of having been educated in a liberal manner? Or, does it not appear to be base, and a great sign of want of education, to be obliged to observe justice pronounced on us by others, as our masters and judges, and to have no sense of it in ourselves?

Glaucon/ Of all things, this, is the most base.

Socrates/ And do you not, deem this to be more base still; when one not only spends a great part of life in courts of justice, as defendant and plaintiff; but, from his ignorance of the beautiful, imagines that he becomes renowned for this very thing; as being dexterous in doing injustice, and able to turn himself through all sorts of windings, and, using every kind of subterfuge, thinks to escape so as to evade justice; and all this for the sake of small and contemptible things; being ignorant how much better and more handsome it were so to regulate his life as not to stand in need of a sleepy judge?

Glaucon/ This, is still more base than the other.

Socrates/ And to stand in need of the medicinal art, not on account of wounds, or some incidental epidemic distempers, but through sloth, and such a diet as we mentioned, being filled with rheums and wind, like lakes; obliging the skillful sons of Æsculapius to invent new names for diseases, such as dropsies and catarrhs. Do not you think this abominable?

Glaucon/ These are truly, very new and strange names of diseases.

Socrates/ Such, as were not, I imagine, in the days of Æsculapius: and I conjecture so from this, that when Eurypylus was wounded at Troy, and was getting Pramnian wine to drink with much flour in it, with the addition of cheese; (all which seem to be phlegmatic,) the sons of

Æsculapius neither blamed the woman who presented it, nor reprehended Patroclus, who had presented the cure.

Glaucon/ And surely the potion, is absurd for one in such a case.

Socrates/ No if you consider, that, as they tell us, the descendants of Æsculapius did not, before the days of Herodicus, practice this method of cure now in use, which puts the patient on a regimen: but Herodicus being a teacher of youth, and at the same time infirm in his health, mixing gymnastic and medicine together, he made himself most uneasy in the first place, and afterwards many others besides.

Glaucon/ After what manner?

Socrates/ In procuring to himself, a lingering death; for, whilst he was constantly attentive to his disease, which was mortal, he was not able, as I imagine, to cure himself; though, neglecting everything besides, he was still using medicines; and thus he passed his life, still in the greatest uneasiness if he departed in the least from his accustomed diet; and through this wisdom of his, struggling long with death, he arrived at old-age.

Glaucon/ A mighty reward, he reaped of his art!

Socrates/ Such as became one, who did not understand that it was not from ignorance or inexperience of this method of cure that Æsculapius did not discover it to his descendants; but because he knew that, in all well-regulated states, there was some certain work enjoined everyone in the city, which was necessary to be done, and that no one was to be allowed to have the leisure of being sick through the whole of life, and to be attentive only to the taking of medicines. This we may pleasantly observe in the case of laboring people; but we do not observe it in the case of the rich, and such as are counted happy.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ A smith, when he falls sick, thinks it fit to take from the physician some potion, to throw up his disease, or purge it downwards, or, by means of caustic or amputation, to be freed from the trouble: but if anyone prescribe for him a long regimen, putting caps on his head, and other such things, he quickly tells him that he has not leisure to lie sick, nor does it avail him to live in this manner, attentive to his trouble, and negligent of his proper work; and so, bidding such a physician farewell, he returns to his ordinary diet; and, if he recovers his health, he continues to manage his own affairs; but if his body be not able to support the disease, he dies, and is freed from troubles.

Glaucon/ It seems proper, for such an one to use the medicinal art in this manner.

Socrates/ Is it not, because he has a certain business, which if he does not perform, it is not for his advantage to live?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ But the rich man, as we say, has no such work allotted him, from which if he be obliged to refrain, life is not worth the having.

Glaucon/ He is surely said at least to have none.

Socrates/ For you do not, attend to what Phocylides says; that one ought still, whilst there is life, to practice virtue.

Glaucon/ I think, we attended to that formerly.

Socrates/ Let us by no means, differ from him in this. But let us inform ourselves whether this excessive attention to one's disease is to be the business of the rich; and that life is not worth keeping, if he does not give this attention; for that such a life is indeed a hindrance of the mind's application to masonry and other arts; but, with respect to the exhortation of Phocylides, it is no hindrance.

Glaucon/ Yes, by Zeus, it is, and that in the greatest degree when this excessive care of the body goes beyond gymnastic.

Socrates/ Neither does it agree with attention to private economy, or military expeditions, or sedentary magistracies in the city. But what is of the greatest moment is, that such application to health is ill fitted for any sort of learning, and inquiry, and study, by one's self, whilst one is perpetually dreading certain pains and swimmings of the head, and blaming philosophy as occasioning them; so that where there is this attention to health it is a great obstacle to the practice of virtue and improvement in it; for it makes us always imagine that we are ill, and always complain of the body.

Glaucon/ That is likely.

Socrates/ And shall we not say that Æsculapius too understood these things, when to persons of a healthful constitution, and such as used a wholesome diet, but were afflicted by some particular disease, to these and to such a constitution he prescribed medicine, repelling their diseases by drugs and incisions, and enjoined them their accustomed diet, that the public might suffer no damage? But he did not attempt, by extenuating or nourishing diet, to cure such constitutions as were wholly diseased within; as it would but afford a long and miserable life to the man himself, and the descendants which would spring from him would probably be of the same kind: for he did not imagine the man ought to be cured who could not live in the ordinary course, as he would be neither profitable to himself nor to the state.

Glaucon/ You make Æsculapius, a politician.

Socrates/ It is plain. And his sons may show that he was so. Or do you not see, that at Troy they excelled in war, and likewise practiced medicine in the way I mention? Or do not

you remember, that when Menelaus was wounded by Pandarus, they

Wash'd off the blood, and soft'ning drugs applied?

But, as to what was necessary for him to eat or drink afterwards, they prescribed for him no more than for Eurypylus; deeming external applications sufficient to heal men, who, before they were wounded, were healthful and moderate in their diet, whatever mixture they happened to have drunk at the time. But they judged, that to have a diseased constitution, and to live an intemperate life, was neither profitable to the men themselves nor to others; and that their art ought not to be employed on these, nor to minister to them, not even though they were richer than Midas.

Glaucon/ You make, the sons of Æsculapius truly ingenious.

Socrates/ It is proper; though in opposition to us the writers of tragedy, and Pindar, call indeed Æsculapius the son of Apollo, but say that he was prevailed on by gold to undertake the cure of a rich man, who was already in a deadly state; for which, truly, he was even struck with a thunderbolt: but we, agreeably to what has been formerly said, will not believe them as to both these things; but will aver, that if he was the son of the God, he was not given to filthy lucre; or, if he were given to filthy lucre, he was not a son of the God.

Glaucon/ These things, are most right. But what do you say, Socrates, as to this? Is it not necessary to provide good physicians for the state? and must not these, most likely, be such who have been conversant with the greatest number of healthy and of sickly people? and these, in like manner, be the best judges, who have been conversant with all sorts of dispositions?

Socrates/ I mean now, those who are very good. But do you know whom I deem to be such?

Glaucon/ If you tell me.

Socrates/ I shall endeavor to do it; but you inquire in one question about two different things.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ Physicians, would become most expert, if, beginning from their infancy, they would, in learning the art, be conversant with the greatest number of bodies, and these the most sickly; and labored themselves under all manner of diseases, and by natural constitution were not quite healthful; for it is not by the body, I imagine, that they cure the body; (else their own bodies could at no time be admitted to be of an ill constitution,) but they cure the body by the soul; which, whilst it is of an ill constitution, is not capable to perform well any cure.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ But the judge, friend, governs the soul by the soul; which, if from its childhood it has been educated with depraved souls, has been conversant with them, and has itself done all manner of evil, it is not able to come out from among them, so as accurately, by itself, to judge of the evils of others, as happens in the diseases of the body; but it must in its youth be inexperienced and unpolluted with evil manners, if it means to be good and beautiful itself, and to judge foundry of what is just. And hence the virtuous in their youth appear simple, and easily deceived by the unjust, as they have not within themselves dispositions similar to those of the wicked.

Glaucon/ And surely this at least, they do often suffer extremely.

Socrates/ For which reason, the good judge is not to be a young man, but an old, having been late in learning

wickedness, what it is; perceiving it not as a kindred possession, residing in his own soul, but as a foreign one, in the souls of others, which he has for a long time studied, and has understood what sort of an evil it is, by the help of science rather than by proper experience.

Glaucon/ Such an one, is like to be the most noble judge.

Socrates/ And likewise a good one; which was what you required. For he who has a good soul is good. But the other notable and suspicious man, who has committed much of iniquity himself, when indeed he converts with his like, being thought to be subtle and wise, he appears a notable man, being extremely cautious, having an eye to those models which he has within himself; but when he approaches the good, and the more aged, he appears foolish, suspicious out of season, and ignorant of integrity of manners, as having within no models of such a kind: but however, being more frequently conversant with the wicked than with the wise, he appears, both to himself and others, to be more wise, rather than more ignorant.

Glaucon/ This, is perfectly true.

Socrates/ We must not, therefore, look for such an one to be a wise and good judge, but the former one; for indeed vice can never at all know both itself and virtue. But virtue, where the temper is instructed by time, shall attain to the knowledge of both itself and depravity. This one, then, and not the wicked, as it appears to me, is the wise man.

Glaucon/ And I, am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ Will you not then establish in the city such a method of medicine as we have mentioned, along with such a method of judicature as shall carefully preserve for you those of your citizens who are naturally well disposed both in mind and in body? and with respect to those who are otherwise, such as are so in their bodies, they shall suffer to

die; but such as are of an evil nature, and incurable with respect to their soul, these they shall themselves put to death?

Glaucon/ This, has appeared to be best, both for those who suffer it and for the city.

Socrates/ And it is plain, that your youth will be afraid of needing this judiciary, whilst they are employed in that simple music, which, we say, generates temperance.

Glaucon/ Why will they not?

Socrates/ And, according to the very same steps of reasoning, the musician who is willing to pursue gymnastic, will choose to do it so as not to require any medicine unless there be necessity.

Glaucon/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ And he will perform his exercises, and his labors, rather looking to the irascible part of his nature, and exciting it by labor, than to strength; and not as the other wrestlers, who eat and drink and engage in labors for the sake of bodily strength.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ Why then, Glauco, they who propose to teach music and gymnastic, propose these things, not, for what some imagine, to cure the body by the one, and the soul by the other.

Glaucon/ What then?

Socrates/ They seem, to propose them both chiefly on the soul's account.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ Do not you perceive, how those are affected as to their dianoëtic part, who have all their life been conversant with gymnastic, but have never applied to

music? or how those are affected who have lived in a method the reverse of this?

Glaucon/ What, do you speak of?

Socrates/ Of rusticity, and fierceness, and again of softness and mildness.

Glaucon/ I know, that those who apply themselves immoderately to gymnastic, become more rustic than is proper; and those again who attend to music alone, are more soft than is becoming: for them to be.

Socrates/ And surely, this rusticity, at least, may impart an irascibility of nature, and, when rightly disciplined, may become fortitude; but, when carried further than is becoming, may, as is likely, be both more fierce and troublesome.

Glaucon/ So it appears to me.

Socrates/ But what? does not the philosophic temper partake of the mild? And when this disposition is carried too far, may it not prove more soft than is becoming; but, when rightly disciplined, be really mild and comely?

Glaucon/ These things are so.

Socrates/ But we say that our guardians ought to have both these dispositions.

Glaucon/ They ought.

Socrates/ Ought not then these to be adapted to one another?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ And the soul in which they are thus adapted is temperate and brave.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But the soul in which they are not adapted, is cowardly and savage.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And when one yields up himself to be soothed with the charms of music, and pours into his soul through his ears, as through a pipe, those we denominated the soft, effeminate, and plaintive harmonies, and spends the whole of his life chanting and ravished with melody; such an one, at the first, if he has anything irascible, softens it like iron, and, from being useless and fierce, renders it profitable. But when still persisting he does not desist, but enchants his soul, after this, it melts and dissolves him, till it liquefies his anger, and cuts out, as it were, the nerves of his soul, and renders him an effeminate warrior.

Glaucon/ It is certainly so indeed.

Socrates/ But if, he had from the beginning a temper void of irascibility, this he quickly effectuates; but, if irascible, it renders the mind weak, and easily turned, so as instantly to be enraged at trifles, and again the rage is extinguished: so that, from being irascible, they become outrageous and passionate, and full of the morose.

Glaucon/ So indeed it happens.

Socrates/ But what now? If one labor much in gymnastic, and feast extremely well, but apply not to music and philosophy; shall he not, in the first place, having his body in a good condition, be filled with prudence and courage, and become more brave than he was before?

Glaucon/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ But what, when he does nothing else; nor participates in anything which is music-like, though there were any love of learning in his soul, as it neither tastes of any study, nor bears a share in any inquiry nor reasoning, nor anything besides which is musical, must it not become feeble, and deaf, and blind, as his perceptions are neither awakened, nor nourished, nor refined?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Such an one then becomes, as I imagine, a reason-hater, and unmusical; and by no means can be persuaded to anything by reasoning, but is carried to everything by force and savageness, as a wild beast; and thus he lives in ignorance and barbarity, out of measure, and unpolished.

Glaucon/ It is, entirely so.

Socrates/ Corresponding then to these two tempers, I would say, that some God, as appears, has given men two arts, those of music and gymnastic, in reference to the irascible and the philosophic temper; not for the soul and body, otherwise than as a by-work, but for that other purpose, that those two tempers might be adapted to one another; being stretched and slackened as far as is fit.

Glaucon/ So indeed it appears.

Socrates/ Whoever then shall in the most handsome manner mingle gymnastic with music, and have these in the justest measure in his soul, him we shall most properly call the most completely musical, and of the best harmony; far more than the man who adjusts to one another musical strings.

Glaucon/ Most reasonably, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall we not then, Glauco, always have need of such a president for our state, if our government is to be preserved? We shall most especially have need of this. Those then may be the models of education and discipline. For why should one go over the dances, the huntings of wild beasts, both with dogs and with nets, the wrestlings and the horse-races proper for such persons? For it is nearly manifest that these naturally follow of course, and it is no difficult matter to find them.

Glaucon/ It is indeed, not difficult.

Socrates/ Be it so. But what follows next? What was next to be determined by us. Was it, which of these shall govern, and be governed?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ Is it not plain that the elder ought to be governors, and the younger to be the governed?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And is it not likewise plain, that the best of them are to govern?

Glaucon/ This too is plain.

Socrates/ But are not the best husbandmen the most assiduous in agriculture?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ If now our guardians are the best, will they not be most vigilant over the city?

Glaucon/ They will.

Socrates/ Must we not for this purpose make them prudent, and able, and careful likewise of the city?

Glaucon/ We must do so.

Socrates/ But one would seem to be most careful of that which he happens to love. Undoubtedly. And one shall most especially love that to which he thinks the same things are profitable which are so to himself, and with whose good estate he thinks his own connected; and where he is of a contrary opinion, he will be contrariwise affected.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ We must choose then from the other guardians such men as shall most of all others appear to us, on observation, to do with the greatest cheerfulness, through the whole of life, whatever they think advantageous for the state, and what appears to be disadvantageous they will not do by any means.

Glaucon/ These are the most proper.

Socrates/ It truly appears to me, that they ought to be observed through every stage of their life, if they be tenacious of this opinion, so as that neither fraud nor force make them inconsiderately throw out this opinion, that they ought to do what is best for the state.

Glaucon/ What throwing out do you mean?

Socrates/ I will tell you. An opinion seems to me to depart from the dianoëtic part voluntarily or involuntarily. A false opinion departs voluntarily from him who unlearns it; but every true opinion departs involuntarily.

Glaucon/ The case of the voluntary one, I understand; but that of the involuntary I want to learn.

Socrates/ What now? Do not you think, that men are involuntarily deprived of good things; but voluntarily of evil things? Or, is it not an evil to deviate from the truth, and a good to form true opinion? Or, does it not appear to you, that to conceive of things as they really are, is to form true opinion?

Glaucon/ You say rightly indeed.

Socrates/ They do seem to me to be deprived unwillingly of true opinion. Do they not then suffer this, either in the way of theft, enchantment, or force?

Glaucon/ I do not now, understand you.

Socrates/ I seem, to speak theatrically. But, I say, those have their opinions stolen away, who are persuaded to change their opinions, and also those who forget them; in the one case, they are imperceptibly taken away by time, and in the other by reasoning. Do you now understand in any measure?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And those, I say, have their opinions forced from them, whom grief or agony obliges to change them. This, I understand, and you say right. And those, I imagine, you will say, are enchanted out of their opinions, who change them, being bewitched by pleasure, or seduced by fear, being afraid of something.

Glaucon/ It seems, that everything magically beguiles which deceives us.

Socrates/ That then which I was now mentioning must be sought for: who are the best guardians of this opinion; that that is to be done which is best for the state: and they must be observed immediately from their childhood, setting before them such pieces of work in which they may most readily forget a thing of this kind, and be deluded; and he who is mindful, and hard to be deluded, is to be chosen, and he who is otherwise is to be rejected. Is it not so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we must appoint them trials of labors and of pains, in which we must observe the same things.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Must we not, appoint them a third contest, that of the mountebank kind; and observe them as those do, who, when they lead on young horses against noises and tumults, observe whether they are frightened? So must they, whilst young, be led into dreadful things, and again be thrown into pleasures, trying them more than gold in the fire, whether one is hard to be beguiled with mountebank tricks, and appear composed amidst all, being a good guardian of himself, and of that music which he learned, showing himself in all these things to be in just measure and harmony. Being of such a kind as this, he would truly be of the greatest advantage both to himself and to the state. And the man who in childhood, in youth, and in manhood, has

been thus tried, and has come out pure, is to be appointed governor and guardian of the state; and honors are to be paid him whilst alive, and when dead he should receive the highest rewards of public funeral and other memorials. And he who is not such an one is to be rejected. Of such a kind, Glauco, as it appears to me, is to be the choice and establishment of our governors and guardians, as in a sketch, and not accurately.

Glaucon/ And I, am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ Is it not then truly most just, to call these the most complete guardians, both with reference to enemies abroad, and to friends at home; so as that the one shall not have the will, nor the other have the power to do any mischief? And the youth (whom we now called guardians) will be allies and auxiliaries to the decrees of the governors.

Glaucon/ I imagine so.

Socrates/ What now, may be the contrivance of those lies, which are made on occasion, and of which we were lately saying that it is a most generous part, in making lies, to persuade the governors themselves most especially; or, if not these, the rest of the state?

Glaucon/ What sort do you mean?

Socrates/ Nothing new, but somewhat Phoenician, which has frequently happened heretofore, as the poets tell us, and have persuaded us, but has not happened in our times, nor do I know if ever it shall happen: to persuade one of it surely requires a subtitle persuasion.

Glaucon/ How like you are, to one who is a verse to speak!

Socrates/ I shall appear, to be a verse with very good reason, after I tell it.

Glaucon/ Speak, and do not fear.

Socrates/ I speak then, though I know not with what courage, and using what expressions, I shall tell it. And I shall attempt, first of all, to persuade the governors themselves, and the soldiers, and afterwards the rest of the state, that, whatever we educated and instructed them in, all these particulars seemed to happen to them and to befall them as dreams; but that they were in truth at that time formed and educated within the earth; both they themselves, and their armor and their other utensils, being there likewise fabricated. And after they were completely fashioned, that the earth, who is their mother, brought them forth; and now they ought to be affected towards the country where they are, as to their mother and nurse; to defend her, if any invade her; and to consider the rest of the citizens as being their brothers, and sprung from their mother earth.

Glaucon/ It was not without reason, that some time since you was ashamed to tell this falsehood.

Socrates/ I had truly reason, But hear however the rest of the fable. All of you now in the state are brothers (as we shall tell them in way of fable); but the God, when he formed you, mixed gold in the formation of such of you as are able to govern; therefore are they the most honorable. And silver, in such as are auxiliaries; and iron and brass in the husbandmen and other handicrafts. As you are all of the same kind, you for the most part resemble one another: and it sometimes happens, that of the gold is generated the silver, and of the silver there is a golden descendant; and thus every different way are they generated of one another. The God gives in charge, first of all, and chiefly to the governors, that of nothing are they to be so good guardians, nor are they so strongly to keep watch over anything, as over their children; to know what of those principles is mixed in their souls; and if their descendant shall be of the brazen or iron kind, they shall by no means have compassion; but,

assigning him honor proportioned to his natural temper, they shall push him down to the craftsmen or husbandmen. And if again any from among these shall be born of a golden or silver kind, they shall pay them honor, and prefer them; those to the guardianship, and these to the auxiliary rank: it being pronounced by the oracle, that the state is then to perish when iron or brass shall have the guardianship of it. Have you now any contrivance to persuade them of this fable?

Glaucon/ None, to persuade these men themselves; but I can contrive how that their sons and posterity, and all mankind afterwards shall believe it.

Socrates/ Even this, would do well towards making them more concerned about the state, and one another; for I almost understand what you say. And this truly will lead the same way as the oracle. But let us, having armed these earthborn sons, lead them forwards under their leaders; and when they are come into the city, let them consider where it is best to place their camp, so as best to keep in order those who are within, if anyone should want to disobey the laws; and likewise defend against those without, if any enemy, as a wolf, should come upon the fold. And when they have marked out their camp, and performed sacrifices to the proper divinities, let them erect their tents: or, how are they to do?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Shall they not be such as may be sufficient to defend them, both from winter and summer?

Glaucon/ Why not? for you seem, to mean houses.

Socrates/ Yes, but military ones; not such as are costly.

Glaucon/ What do you say, is the difference between the one and the other?

Socrates/ I will endeavor, to tell you; for, of all things, it is the most dreadful, and the most shameful to shepherds, to breed such kind of dogs, and in such a manner, as auxiliaries of the flocks, as either through intemperance or famine, or some other ill disposition, the dogs themselves should attempt to hurt the sheep; and, instead of dogs, resemble wolves.

Glaucon/ That is dreadful, why is it not?

Socrates/ Must we not then, by all means, take care lest our allies do such a thing towards our citizens, as they are more powerful; and, instead of generous allies, resemble savage lords?

Glaucon/ We must take care.

Socrates/ Would they not be prepared, as to the greatest part of the care, if they were really well educated?

Glaucon/ But they are so at least.

Socrates/ That is not proper to be confidently affirmed, friend Glauco; but that is proper which we were now saying, that they ought to have good education, whatever it is, if they are to have what is of the greatest consequence towards rendering them mild, both among themselves and towards those who are guarded by them.

Glaucon/ Very right.

Socrates/ Besides then this education, anyone of understanding would say, that their houses, and all their other substance, ought to be so contrived, as not to hinder their guardians from being the very best of men, and not to stir them up to injure the other citizens.

Glaucon/ And he will say true.

Socrates/ If then they intend to be such, consider, whether they ought to live and dwell in some such manner as this: First, then, let none possess any substance

privately, unless there be the greatest necessity for it: next, let none have any dwelling, or store-house, into which whoever inclines may not enter: as for necessaries, let them be such as temperate and brave warriors may require; and as they are instituted by the other citizens, let them receive such a reward of their guardianship, as to have neither overplus nor deficiency at the year's end. Let them have public meals, as in encampments, and live in common. They must be told, that they have from the Gods a divine gold and silver at all times in their souls; and have no need of the human. And that it were profane to pollute the possession of the divine kind, by mixing it with the possession of this mortal gold; because the money of the vulgar has produced many impious deeds, but that of these men is incorruptible. And of all the men in the city, they alone are not allowed to handle or touch gold and silver; nor to bring it under their roof; nor carry it about with them; nor to drink out of silver or gold: and that thus they are to preserve themselves and the state. But whenever they shall possess lands, and houses, and money, in a private way, they shall become stewards and farmers instead of guardians, hateful lords instead of allies to the other citizens: hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they shall pass the whole of their life; much oftener and more afraid of the enemies from within than from without, they and the rest of the state hastening speedily to destruction. For all which reasons, let us affirm, that our guardians are thus to be constituted with reference both to their houses and to other things. And let us settle these things by law. Shall we?

Glaucon/ By all means.

THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

Book 4.

Socrates/ Adimantus hereupon replying;

Adeimantus/ What now, Socrates, will you say in your own defense, if one shall say that you do not make these men very happy? for, though it is owing to these men that the city really exists, yet they enjoy no advantage in the city, such as others do who possess lands, build beautiful and large houses, purchase suitable furniture, offer sacrifices at their own expense, give public entertainments to strangers, and possess what you was now mentioning, gold and silver, and everything which is reckoned to contribute towards the rendering men happy. But one may readily say, that, like hired auxiliaries, they seem to possess nothing in the city but the employment of keeping guard.

Socrates/ Yes; and that too only for their maintenance, without receiving, as all others do, any reward besides. So that they are not allowed so much as to travel privately anywhere abroad, though they should incline to it; nor to bestow money on others, nor to spend it in such other methods as those do who are counted happy. These and many such things you leave out of the accusation.

Adeimantus/ But let these things too, be charged against them.

Socrates/ You ask then, what we shall say in our defense?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Whilst we go on in the same road, we shall find, as I imagine, what may be said: for we shall say, that it were nothing strange if these men, even in these circumstances, should be the happiest possible. Yet it was not with an eye to this that we established the city; to have anyone tribe in it remarkably happy beyond the rest; but that the whole city might be in the happiest condition; for we judged, that in such an one we should most especially find justice, and

injustice in the city the worst established: and that, upon thoroughly examining these, we should determine what we have for some time been in search of. Now then, as I imagine, we are forming a happy state, not selecting some few persons to make them alone happy; but are establishing the universal happiness of the whole: and we shall next consider a state which is the reverse. As if then we were painting human figures, and one approaching should blame us, saying, that we do not place the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the creature; for that the eyes, the most beautiful part, were not painted with purple, but with black; should we not seem to apologize sufficiently to him, by saying, Wonderful critic! do not imagine that we ought to paint the eyes beautiful, in such a way as that they would not appear to be eyes; and so with reference to all other parts. But consider, whether, in giving each particular part its due, we make the whole beautiful. And so now, do not oblige us to confer such a happiness on our guardians as shall make them anything rather than guardians: for we know too, how to array the husbandmen in rich and costly robes, and to enjoin them to cultivate the ground only with a view to pleasure; and in like manner, those who make earthen ware, to lie at their ease by the fire, to drink and feast, neglecting the wheel, and working only so much as they incline: and we know how to confer a felicity of this nature on every individual, in order to render the whole state happy. But do not advise us to act after this manner; since, if we obey you, neither would the husbandman really be a husbandman, nor the potter be a potter; nor would any other really be of any of those professions of which the city is composed. But, as to others, it is of less consequence; for, when shoe-makers become bad, and are degenerate, and profess to be shoe-makers when they are not, no great mischief happens to the state: but when the guardians of the

law and of the state are not so in reality, but only in appearance, you see how they entirely destroy the whole constitution; if they alone shall have the privilege of an affluent and happy life. If we then are for appointing men who shall be really guardians of the city, the least of all hurtful to it; and he who makes the objection is for having them rather as certain farmers, and as in a festival-meeting, not in a city, certain public entertainers, indulging in jollity, he must mean something else than a city: we must then consider whether we establish guardians with this view, that they may have the greatest happiness; or if we establish them with a view to the happiness of the whole city, let us see whether this takes place; and let us oblige these allies and guardians to do this, and we must persuade them they shall thus become the best performers of their own particular work; and we must act towards all others in the same manner. And thus the whole city being increased, and well constituted, let us allow the several tribes to participate of happiness as their natures admit.

Adeimantus/ You seem to me, to say well.

Socrates/ Shall I appear to you, to speak right in what is akin to this?

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Consider whether other artificers are corrupted by these things, so as to be made bad workmen.

Adeimantus/ What things do you mean?

Socrates/ Riches, and poverty.

Adeimantus/ As how?

Socrates/ Thus: Does the potter, after he becomes rich, seem still to mind his art?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ But will he not become more idle and careless than formerly?

Adeimantus/ Much more so.

Socrates/ Shall he not then become a more unskillful potter?

Adeimantus/ Much more so, likewise.

Socrates/ And surely, being unable through poverty to furnish himself with tools, or anything else requisite to his art, his workmanship shall be more imperfectly executed, and his sons, or those others whom he instructs, shall be inferior artists.

Adeimantus/ How should they not?

Socrates/ Through both these, now, poverty and riches, the workmanship in the arts is rendered less perfect, and the artists themselves become less expert.

Adeimantus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ We have then, it seems, discovered other things, which our guardians must by all means watch against, that they may in no respect escape their notice, and steal into the city.

Adeimantus/ What kind of things are these?

Socrates/ Riches, and poverty: as the one is productive of luxury, idleness, and a love of novelty; and the other, besides a love of novelty, is illiberal, and productive of mischief.

Adeimantus/ They are entirely so. But consider this, Socrates. How shall our city be able to engage in war, since she is possessed of no money, especially if she be obliged to wage war against a great and opulent state?

Socrates/ It is plain, that to fight against one of this kind is somewhat difficult; but to fight against two is a more easy matter.

Adeimantus/ How say you?

Socrates/ First of all, now, if they have at all occasion to fight, will they not, being expert in the art of war, fight against rich men?

Adeimantus/ They will.

Socrates/ What then, Adimantus, do not you think that one boxer, who is fitted out in the best manner possible for this exercise, is easily able to fight against two who are not expert boxers, but, on the contrary, are rich and unwieldy?

Adeimantus/ He would not perhaps easily fight with both at once.

Socrates/ Would he not, though he had it in his power to retire a little, and then turn on the one who should he the furthest advanced towards him, and strike him, and by doing this frequently in the sun and heat? Might not a person of this kind easily defeat many such as these?

Adeimantus/ Certainly; that would be no great wonder.

Socrates/ But do not you think that the rich have more knowledge and experience of boxing than of the military art?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Easily then, as it plainly appears, will our athletics combat with double and triple their number.

Adeimantus/ I will agree with you; for you seem to me to say right.

Socrates/ But what if they should send an embassy to another state, informing them of the true situation of the affair, telling them, We make no use of gold or silver, neither is it lawful for us to use them, but with you it is lawful; if then you become our allies in the war, you will receive the spoils of all the other states: do you imagine that any, on hearing these things, would choose to fight against strong and resolute dogs, rather than in alliance with the dogs to fight against fat and tender sheep?

Adeimantus/ I do not think it; but, if the riches of others be amassed into one state, see that it does not endanger that which is poor.

Socrates/ You are happy, that you imagine any other deserves to be called a state besides such an one as we have established.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ We must give others, a more magnificent appellation; for each of them consists of many states, and is not one, as is said in way of irony: for there are always in them two parties at war with each other, the poor and the rich; and in each of these again there are very many: to which if you apply as to one, you are mistaken entirely; but if, as to many, you put one part in possession of the goods and power of another, or even deliver up the one to the other, you shall always have the many for your allies, and the few for enemies; and, so long as your state shall continue temperately, as now established, it shall be the greatest. I do not say it shall be accounted so, but shall be really the greatest, though its defenders were no more than one thousand; for one state so great you will not easily find, either among the Greeks or Barbarians, but many which are accounted many times larger than such an one as this. Are you of a different opinion?

Adeimantus/ No, truly.

Socrates/ Might not this, then, be the best mark for our rulers how large to make the city, and what extent of ground to mark off for it in proportion to its bulk, without attending to anything further?

Adeimantus/ What mark?

Socrates/ I imagine, this: So long as the city, on its increase, continues to be one, so long it may be increased, but not beyond it.

Adeimantus/ Very right.

Socrates/ Shall we not then lay this further injunction on our guardians, to take care by all means that the city be neither small nor great, but of moderate extent, and be one city?

Adeimantus/ We shall probably, enjoin them a trifling affair.

Socrates/ A more trifling affair still than this, is that we mentioned above, when we observed, that if any descendant of the guardians be depraved, he ought to be dismissed to the other classes; and if any descendant of the others be worthy, he is to be raised to the rank of the guardians; and this was intended to show that all the other citizens ought to apply themselves each to that particular art for which he has a natural genius, that so everyone minding his own proper work may not be many, but be one; and so likewise the whole state may become one, and not be many.

Adeimantus/ This indeed, is still a more trifling matter than the other.

Socrates/ We do not here, good Adimantus, as one may imagine, enjoin them many and great matters, but such as are all trifling, if they take care of one grand point, as the saying is, or rather that which is sufficient in place of the grand.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Education, and nurture; for If, being well educated, they become temperate men, they will easily see through all these things, and such other things as we omit at present, respecting women, marriages, and the propagation of the species. For these things ought all, according to the proverb, to be made entirely common among friends.

Adeimantus/ That, would be most right.

Socrates/ And surely, if once a republic is set a-going, it proceeds happily, increasing as a circle. And whilst good education and nurture are preserved, they produce good geniuses; and good geniuses, partaking of such education, produce still better than the former, as well in other respects as with reference to propagation, as in the case of other animals.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ To speak then briefly, this the guardians of the state must oppose, that it may not, escaping their notice, hurt the constitution; nay, above all things, they must guard against this, not to make any innovations in gymnastic and music, contrary to the established order of the state, but to maintain this order as much as possible; being afraid lest, whilst a man adopts that poetical expression;

> .....men most admire that song,
> Which most partakes of novelty.

one should frequently imagine, that the poet means not new songs, but a new method of the song, and should commend this. Such a thing is neither to be commended nor admitted; for, to receive a new kind of music is to be guarded against, as endangering the whole of the constitution: for never are the measures of music altered without the greatest politic laws, according to Damon, with whom I agree.

Adeimantus/ You may place me likewise, among those who are of that opinion.

Socrates/ We must erect then, some barrier, as would seem, somewhere here, for our guardians themselves, with regard to music.

Adeimantus/ A transgression here, easily indeed steals in imperceptibly.

Socrates/ It does, in the way of diversion, and as productive of no mischief.

Adeimantus/ For neither indeed does it produce any other, but that becoming familiar by degrees it insensibly runs into the manners and pursuits; and from thence, in intercourse of dealings one with another, it becomes greater; and from this intercourse it enters into laws and policies with much impudence, Socrates, till at last it overturns all things, both private and public.

Socrates/ Well, let it be allowed to be so.

Adeimantus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ Ought not then our children, as I said at the beginning, to receive directly from their infancy an education more agreeable to the laws of the constitution? because, if their education be such as is contrary to law, and the children be of such a nature themselves, it is impossible that they should ever grow up to be worthy men, and observant of the laws.

Adeimantus/ Why, is it not?

Socrates/ But when handsome amusements are appointed them from their infancy, and when, by means of the music, they embrace that amusement which is according to law (contrariwise to those others), this music attends them in everything else, and grows with them, and raises up in the city whatever formerly was fallen down.

Adeimantus/ It is true, indeed.

Socrates/ And these men, discover those establishments which appear trifling, and which those others destroyed altogether.

Adeimantus/ What establishments?

Socrates/ Such as these: Silence of the younger before the elder, which is proper; and the giving them place, and rising up before them, and reverence of parents; likewise what shaving, what clothes and shoes are proper, with the

whole dress of the body, and everything else of the kind. Are you not of this opinion?

Adeimantus/ I am.

Socrates/ But to establish these things by law, would, I imagine, be a silly thing, nor is it done anywhere; nor would it stand, though established both by word and writing.

Adeimantus/ For, how is it possible?

Socrates/ It seems then, Adimantus, that a man's character and conduct will always be according to his education, let him apply himself afterwards to what he will: or, does not the like always produce the like?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ And we may say, I imagine, that at last it arrives at somewhat complete and vigorous, either good, or what is the reverse.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ I would not then, for these reasons, as yet, undertake to settle by law such things as these.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ But what now, by the gods, as to those laws relative to matters of exchange, and to their traffic one with another in the forum, and, if you please, their traffic likewise among their handicrafts, their scandals, bodily hurt, and raising of lawsuits; their institution of judges, and likewise such imports and payments of taxes as may be necessary either in the forum or at shores; or in general whatever laws are municipal, civil, or marine, or what other laws there may be of this kind; shall we dare to establish any of these?

Adeimantus/ It is improper, to prescribe these to good and worthy men; for they will easily find out the most of them, such as ought to be established by law.

Socrates/ Yes, friend, if at least God grant them the preservation of the laws we formerly explained.

Adeimantus/ And if not, they will spend the whole of their life making and amending many such laws as these, imagining that they shall thus attain to that which is best.

Socrates/ You say that such as these shall lead a life, like those who are sick, and at the same time unwilling, through intemperance, to quit an unwholesome diet.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And these truly must live very pleasantly; for, though they deal with physicians, they gain nothing, but render their diseases greater and more complex; and they still hope, that when anyone recommends any medicine to them, they shall, by means of it, be made whole.

Adeimantus/ This is entirely the situation of such diseased persons as these.

Socrates/ But what, is not this pleasant in them? to count that man the most hateful of all, who tells them the truth; that, till one give over drunkenness and gluttony, and unchaste pleasure, and laziness, neither drugs nor caustics, nor amputations, nor charms, nor applications, nor any other such things as these, will be of any avail.

Adeimantus/ That, is not quite pleasant; for to be enraged at one who tells us what is right, has nothing pleasant in it.

Socrates/ You are no admirer, as it would seem, of this sort of men.

Adeimantus/ No, truly.

Socrates/ Neither then, though the whole of the city (as we were lately saying) should do such a thing, would you commend them: or, is not the same thing which is done by these people, done by all those cities, which, being ill-governed, enjoin their citizens not to alter any part of the

constitution, for that whoever shall do such a thing is to be put to death; but, that whoever shall with the greatest cheerfulness reverence those who govern in this fashion, and shall gratify them in the most obsequious manner; and, anticipating their desires, be most dexterous in satisfying them, shall be reckoned both worthy and wise in matters of highest importance; and be held by them in the greatest honor?

Adeimantus/ They seem to me at least, to do the very same thing, and by no means do I commend them.

Socrates/ But what again as to those who desire to have the management of such states, and are even fond of it, are you not delighted with their courage and dexterity? I am; excepting such as are imposed on by them, and fancy that they are really politicians, because they are commended as such by the multitude.

Adeimantus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Do you not pardon those men? Or do you even think it is possible for a man who cannot measure himself, when he hears many other such men telling him that he is four cubits, not to believe this of himself?

Adeimantus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Then be not angry in this case; for such men as these are of all the most ridiculous, since, always making laws about such things as we now mentioned, and always amending, they imagine that they shall find some period of these frauds respecting commerce, and those other things I now spoke of, being ignorant that they are in reality attempting to destroy a hydra.

Adeimantus/ They are surely, doing nothing else.

Socrates/ I imagine then, that a true lawgiver ought not to give himself much disturbance about such a species of laws and police, either in an ill or well-regulated state; in the

one, because it is unprofitable and of no avail; in the other, because anyone can find out some of the laws, and others of them flow of course from the habits arising from their early education.

Adeimantus/ What part then of the institutions of law, have we yet remaining?

Socrates/ To us indeed there is nothing remaining; but, however, to the Delphian Apollo there remains the greatest, noblest, and most important of legal institutions.

Adeimantus/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ The institutions of temples, sacrifices, and other worship of the Gods, dæmons, and heroes; likewise the depositing the dead, and what other rites ought to be performed to them, so as to make them propitious. For truly such things as these, we ourselves neither know; nor, in founding the state, will we entrust them to any other, if we be wise; nor will we make use of any other interpreter, except the God of the country. For this God is the interpreter in every country to all men in these things, who interprets to them sitting in the middle of the earth.

Adeimantus/ And it is well established, and we must do accordingly.

Socrates/ Thus now, son of Aristo, is the city established for you. And, in the next place, having procured somehow sufficient light, do you yourself observe, and call on your brother and on Polemarchus and these others to assist us, if by any means we may at all perceive where justice is, and where injustice; and in what respect they differ from each other: and which of them the man ought to acquire, who proposes to himself to be happy, whether he be concealed or not concealed both from Gods and men.

Glaucon/ But you say nothing to the purpose; for you yourself promised to inquire into this, deeming it impious for

you not to assist the cause of justice by every possible means.

Socrates/ It is true, what you remind me of, and I must do accordingly. But it is proper that you too should assist in the inquiry.

Glaucon/ We shall do so.

Socrates/ I hope then, to discover it in this manner. I think that our city, if it be rightly established, is perfectly good.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Then it is plain, that it is wise, and brave, and temperate, and just.

Glaucon/ It manifestly is so.

Socrates/ Whichever then of these we shall find in it, shall there not remain behind that which is not found?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ For as if we were in quest of one, of any other four, in anything whatever, if we discovered this one at the first, we would be satisfied; but if we should first discover the other three from this itself, that which we were inquiring after would be known; for it is plain it would be no other but that which remained.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ Since then there are in our state those four above mentioned, shall we not inquire about them, according to the same manner?

Glaucon/ It is plain we ought.

Socrates/ First of all, then, to me at least, wisdom appears to be conspicuous in it; and concerning it there appears something very uncommon.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ Surely this city which we have described appears to me to be wise, for its councils are wise; are they not?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ And surely this very thing, the ability of counseling well, is plainly a certain science; for men nowhere counsel well through ignorance, but through science.

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ But there are many and various species of science in the state.

Glaucon/ Why, are there not?

Socrates/ Is it then from the science of the carpenters, that the state is to be denominated wise and well-counseled?

Glaucon/ By no means from this, is it said to be wise, but to be mechanical.

Socrates/ Is then the state to be denominated wise, when it consults wisely through its knowledge in utensils of wood, how to have these in the best manner possible?

Glaucon/ Nor this neither.

Socrates/ But what, is it for its knowledge of these in brass, or for anything else of this kind?

Glaucon/ For none of these.

Socrates/ Nor yet for its knowledge of the fruits of the earth is it said to be wise, but to be skilled in agriculture.

Glaucon/ It seems so to me.

Socrates/ But what, is there any science among any of the citizens in this city which we have founded, which deliberates, not about any particular thing in the city, but about the whole, how it may, in the best manner, behave towards itself, and towards other cities?

Glaucon/ There is truly.

Socrates/ What is it, and among whom is it to be found?

Glaucon/ This very guardianship, is it, and it is among these governors, whom we lately denominated complete guardians.

Socrates/ What now do you denominate the state on account of this knowledge?

Glaucon/ Well-counseled, and really wise.

Socrates/ Whether then, do you imagine the brass-smiths, or these true guardians, will be most numerous in the state?

Glaucon/ The brass-smiths, will be much more numerous.

Socrates/ And of all, as many as, having any knowledge are of any account, will not these guardians be the fewest in number?

Glaucon/ By much.

Socrates/ From this smallest tribe then, and part of the state, and from that presiding and governing science in it, is the whole city wisely established according to nature; and this tribe, as it appears, is by nature the smallest, to whom it belongs to share in this science, which of all others ought alone to be denominated wisdom.

Glaucon/ You say, perfectly true.

Socrates/ This one, then, of the four, we have found, I know not how, both what it is, and in what part of the state it resides.

Glaucon/ And it seems to me, to be sufficiently described.

Socrates/ But surely as to fortitude, at least, it is no difficult matter, both to find out itself, and the particular part of the city in which it resides, on account of which virtue the city is denominated brave.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ Doth anyone, call a city brave or cowardly, with reference to any other than that particular part of it which makes war and fights in its defense?

Glaucon/ No one, calls it such, with reference to any other part.

Socrates/ For I do not think, that the other tribes who are in it, whether they be cowardly or brave, have power to render the city either the one or the other.

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ The city then is brave likewise in one particular part of itself, because it has within it a power of such a nature as shall always preserve their opinions about things which are dreadful, that they are both these very things, and of the very same kind which the lawgiver inculcated on them in their education? Do not you call this fortitude?

Glaucon/ I have not, entirely comprehended what you say; but tell it over again.

Socrates/ I call fortitude, a certain preservative.

Glaucon/ What sort of preservative?

Socrates/ A preservative of opinion formed by law in a course of education about things which, are dreadful, what these are, and of what kind: I called it a preservative at all times, because they were to retain it in pains and in pleasures, in desires and fears, and never to cast it off; and, if you are willing, I shall liken it to what in my opinion it bears a near resemblance.

Glaucon/ I am willing.

Socrates/ Do not you know then, that the dyers, when they want to dye their wool, so as to be of a purple color, out of all the colors they first make choice of the white; and then, with no trifling apparatus, they prepare and manage it, so as best of all to take on the purest color, and thus they dye

it; and whatever is tinged in this manner is of an indelible dye; and no washing, either without or with soap, is able to take away the pure color: but such wool as is not managed in this manner, you know what sort it proves, whether one is dyeing other colors, or this, without the due preparation beforehand.

Glaucon/ I know, that they are easily washed out, and are ridiculous.

Socrates/ Imagine then, that we too, according to our ability, were aiming at such a thing as this, when we were choosing out our soldiers, and were instructing them in music and gymnastic: and do not imagine we had anything else in view, but that, in obedience to us, they should in the best manner imbibe the laws as a color; in order that their opinion, about what is dreadful, and about other things, might be indelible, both by means of natural temper and suitable education: and that these washes, however powerful in effacing, may not be able to wash away their dye, pleasure, which is more powerful in effecting this than all soap and ashes, pain and fear, and desire, which exceed every other cosmetic. Such a power now, and perpetual preservation of right opinion, and such as is according to law, about things which are dreadful, and which are not, I call and constitute fortitude, unless you offer something else.

Glaucon/ But I offer, nothing else: for you seem to me to reckon that such right opinion of these things, as arises without education, is both savage and servile, and not at all according to law, and you call it something else than fortitude.

Socrates/ You say most true.

Glaucon/ I admit then, that this is fortitude.

Socrates/ Admit it further, to be political fortitude, and you shall admit rightly: but, if you please, we shall inquire about it more perfectly another time; for, at present, it is not this, but justice we were seeking; and with regard to the inquiry concerning this, it has, in my opinion, been carried far enough.

Glaucon/ You speak very well.

Socrates/ There yet remain, two things in the city which we must search out: both temperance, and that for the sake of which we have been searching after all the rest, to wit, justice.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ How now can we find out justice, that we may not be further troubled about temperance?

Glaucon/ I truly neither know, nor do I wish it to appear first, if we are to dismiss altogether the consideration of temperance; but, if you please to gratify me, consider this before the other.

Socrates/ I am indeed pleased, if I be not doing an injury.

Glaucon/ Consider then.

Socrates/ We must consider; and as it appears from this point of view, it seems to resemble a certain symphony and harmony more than those things formerly mentioned.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Temperance, is somehow a certain ornament, and a government, as they say, of certain pleasures and desires; and to appear superior to oneself, I know not how, and other such things, are mentioned as vestiges of it; are they not?

Glaucon/ These are the principal vestiges of it.

Socrates/ Is not then the expression, 'superior to oneself,' ridiculous? For he who is superior to himself must somehow

be likewise inferior to himself, and the inferior be the superior; for the same person is spoken of in all these cases.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But to me, the expression seems to denote, that in the same man, with respect to his soul, there is one part better, and another worse; and that when the part more excellent in his nature is that which governs the inferior part, this is called being superior to himself, and expresses a commendation; but when through ill education, or any kind of converse, that better part, which is smaller, is conquered by the crowd, the worse part; this, by way of reproach, both expresses blame, and denotes the person thus affected to be inferior to himself, and altogether licentious.

Glaucon/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Observe then, our new city, and you shall find one of these in it: for you will own, it may justly be said to be superior to itself, if, where the better part governs the worse, that state is said to be temperate, and superior to itself.

Glaucon/ I observe, and you say true.

Socrates/ And surely one may find a great many and various desires and pleasures and pains more especially among children and women and domestics, and among the greatest and most depraved part of those who are called free.

Glaucon/ It is perfectly so.

Socrates/ But the simple and the moderate desires, and such as are led by intellect, and the judgment of right opinion, you will meet with both in the few, and those of the best natural temper, and of the best education.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And do not you see those things in our city, that there too the desires of the many, and of the baser part, are governed by the desires and by the prudence of the smaller and more moderate part?

Glaucon/ I see it.

Socrates/ If then any city ought to be called superior to pleasures and desires, and to itself, this one is to be called so.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And is it not on all these accounts temperate?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And if, in any other city, there is the same opinion in the governors and the governed about this point, who ought to govern, it is to be found in this, do not you think so?

Glaucon/ I am strongly of that opinion.

Socrates/ In whom then of the citizens will you say that temperance resides, when they are thus affected, in the governors, or the governed?

Glaucon/ In both of them somehow.

Socrates/ You see then, that we justly conjectured of late, that temperance resembles a kind of harmony.

Glaucon/ For what?

Socrates/ Because not as fortitude and wisdom, which reside each of them in a certain part, the one of them making the city wise, and the other courageous, not after this manner doth it render the city temperate; but it is naturally diffused through the whole, connecting the weakest, and those in the middle, all in one symphony, either as to wisdom if you will, or if you will in strength, or in substance, or in any other of those things; so that most justly may we say, that this concord is temperance: a symphony of that which

is naturally the worse and the better part, with reference to this, which of them ought to govern in the city, and in every individual.

Glaucon/ I am entirely, of the same opinion.

Socrates/ Be it so then. There are now three things in the city, it would seem, clearly discovered: but with respect to that other species which remains, by which the city partakes of virtue; what at all can it be? Is it not plain that it is justice?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ Ought we not now, Glauco, like some huntsmen, to surround the thicket, carefully attending lest justice somehow escape, and, disappearing, remain undiscovered? For it is plain that she is somewhere here. Look, therefore, and be eager to perceive her, if any how you see her sooner than I, and point her out to me.

Glaucon/ I wish I could; but if you employ me as an attendant rather, and one who is able to perceive what is pointed out to him, you will treat me perfectly well.

Socrates/ Follow, after you have offered prayers along with me.

Glaucon/ I will do so; only, lead you the way.

Socrates/ To me this seems, to be a place somehow of difficult access, and shady: It is therefore dark, and difficult to be scrutinized; we must however go on.

Glaucon/ We must go.

Socrates/ Iö! Iö! Glauco, we seem to have somewhat which appears to be a footstep; and I imagine that something shall not very long escape us.

Glaucon/ You tell good news.

Socrates/ We are truly, of a slow disposition.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ It appears, O blessed man! to have been long since rolling at our feet, from the beginning, and we perceived it not, but made the most ridiculous figure, like those who seek sometimes for what they have in their hand; so we did not perceive it, but were looking somewhere off at a distance, and in this way perhaps it escaped us.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ Thus, that we seem to me to have been speaking and hearing of it long since, and not to understand ourselves, that in some measure we expressed it.

Glaucon/ A long preamble, to one who is eager to hear.

Socrates/ Hear then, if I say anything. For that which we at first established, when we regulated the city, as what ought always to be done, that, as it appears to me, or a species of it, is justice. For we somewhere established it, and often spoke of it, if you remember; that everyone ought to apply himself to one thing, relating to the city, to which his genius was naturally most adapted.

Glaucon/ We did speak of it.

Socrates/ And that to do one's own affairs, and not to be pragmatical, is justice. This we have both heard from many others, and have often spoken of it ourselves.

Glaucon/ We have indeed spoken of it.

Socrates/ This then, friend. I, appears to be in a certain manner justice; to do one's own affairs. Do you know whence I conjecture this?

Glaucon/ No; but tell.

Socrates/ Besides those things we have already considered in the city, viz. temperance, fortitude, and wisdom; this, seems to remain, which gives power to all these, both to have a being in the state, and, whilst they exist

in it, to afford it safety; and we said too, that justice would be that which would remain, if we found the other three.

Glaucon/ There is necessity for it.

Socrates/ But if, it be necessary to judge which of these, when subsisting in the city, shall in the greatest measure render it good; it would be difficult to determine whether the agreement between the governors and the governed, or the maintaining of sound opinion by the soldiers about what things are dreadful, and what are not; or wisdom and guardianship in the rulers; or whether this, when it exists in the city, renders it in the greatest measure good, viz. when child and woman, bond and free, artificer, magistrate and subject, when everyone does their own affairs, and is not pragmatical.

Glaucon/ It is difficult to determine: How should it not be so?

Socrates/ This power then, by which everyone in the city performs his own office, is co-rival it seems for the perfection of the city, along with its wisdom, temperance, and fortitude.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ Will you not then constitute justice to be this co-rival with these, for the perfection of the city?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Consider it likewise in this manner, whether it shall thus appear to you. Will you enjoin the rulers to give just decisions in judgment?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But will they give just judgment, if they aim at anything preferable to this, that no one shall have what belongs to others, nor be deprived of his own?

Glaucon/ No; but they can only give just judgment, when they aim at this.

Socrates/ And do they not aim at this as being just?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And thus justice is acknowledged to be the habitual practice of one's own proper and natural work.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ See then if you agree with me. If a carpenter take in hand to do the work of a shoe-maker, or a shoe-maker the work of a carpenter, or exchange either their utensils or prices; or if the same man take in hand to do both, and all else be exchanged; do you imagine the state would be anyway greatly injured?

Glaucon/ Not very much.

Socrates/ But I imagine, that when one who is a craftsman, or who is born to any lucrative employment, shall, afterwards being puffed up by riches, by the mob, or by strength, or any other such thing, attempt to go into the rank of counselor and guardian, when unworthy of it; and when these shall exchange utensils and rewards with one another; or when the same man shall take in hand to do all these things at once; then I imagine you will be of opinion that this interchange of these things, and this variety of employments practiced by one, is the destruction of the state.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Pragmaticalness then in these three species, and their change into one another, is the greatest hurt to the state, and may most justly be called its depravity.

Glaucon/ It may so truly.

Socrates/ But will not you say that injustice is the greatest ill of the state?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ This then is injustice. But let us again speak of it in this manner. When the craftsman, the auxiliary and the guardian-band do their proper work, each of them doing their own work in the city; this is the contrary of the other, that is justice, and renders the city just.

Glaucon/ It seems to me, to be no otherwise than thus.

Socrates/ But let us not, affirm it very strongly: but if it shall be allowed us that this species of these, when it enters into any individual, is likewise justice in him, we shall then be agreed; (for what shall we say?) if not, we shall consider something else. But now let us finish that speculation, which we thought proper, when we judged that, if we attempted, first to contemplate justice in some of the greater objects which possess it, it would more easily be seen in one man; and a city appeared to us to be the most proper object of this kind. And so we established the very best we could, well knowing that justice would be in a good one. Let us now transfer and apply to a single person what has there appeared to us with, respect to a whole city: and, if the same things correspond, it shall be well; but, if anything different appear in the individual, going back again to the city, we shall put it to the proof; and, instantly considering them, when placed by one another, and striking them, we shall make justice shine out as from flints; and, when it is become manifest, we shall firmly establish it among ourselves.

Glaucon/ You say quite in the right way, and we must do so.

Socrates/ Why then, when we denominate anything the same, though different in degrees, is it dissimilar in that respect in which we call it the same, or is it similar?

Glaucon/ It is similar.

Socrates/ The just man then, will differ nothing from the just city, according to the idea of justice, but will be similar to it.

Glaucon/ He will be similar to it.

Socrates/ But indeed with respect to this inquiry, the city at least appeared then to be just, when the three species of dispositions in it did each of them its own work, viz. the temperate, the brave, and the wise, by virtue of their own proper natures, and not according to any other affections and habits.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And shall we not, friend, judge it proper, that the individual, who has in his soul the same principles (viz. temperance, fortitude, wisdom), shall, from having the same affections with those in the city, be called by the same names?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ We have again, O wonderful man! fallen into no mean speculation concerning the soul; whether it contain in itself those three principles or not.

Glaucon/ Into no mean one, as I imagine. And it is likely, Socrates, that the common saying is true, that things excellent are difficult.

Socrates/ It appears so. But know well, Glauco, that, according to my opinion, we shall never comprehend this matter accurately, in the methods we are now using in these reasonings, for the road leading to it is greater and longer: we may however, it is likely, speak of it in such a manner as may be worthy of our former disquisitions and speculations.

Glaucon/ Is not that desirable? This would satisfy me for my own part, at present, at least.

Socrates/ This, shall to me too be quite sufficient.

Glaucon/ Do not then give over, but pursue your inquiry.

Socrates/ Are we not, then, under a necessity, of acknowledging that there are in every one of us the same forms and manners which are in the city? for from nowhere else did they arrive thither. For it were ridiculous if one should imagine that the irascible disposition did not arise from the individuals in cities, who have this blemish, as those of Thrace, Scythia, and, in some measure, almost all the higher region; and the same thing may be said with respect to the love of learning, which one may chiefly ascribe to this country or with reference to the love of riches, which we may say prevailed especially among the Phœnicians and the inhabitants of Egypt.

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ This then is so; nor is it difficult to be known.

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ But this is difficult to determine, whether we perform each of these by the same power; or, as they are three, we perform one by one power, and another by another; that is, we learn by one, we are angry by another, and by a certain third we desire those pleasures relating to nutrition and propagation, and the other pleasures of affinity to these. Or do we, in each of these, when we apply to them, act with the whole soul?

Glaucon/ These things are difficult to be determined in a manner worthy of the subject. So it seems to me.

Socrates/ Let us then, in this manner, attempt to determine these things, whether they are the same with one another, or different. How are we to do it?

Glaucon/ It is plain, that one and the same thing cannot, at one and the same time, do or suffer contrary things in the same respect, and with reference to the same object; so that, if we anywhere find these circumstances existing among

them, we shall know that it was not one and the same thing, but several.

Socrates/ Be it so. Consider then what I am saying.

Glaucon/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Is it possible for the same thing to stand and to be moved at once in the same respect?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Let us determine this more accurately still; lest, as we proceed, we be any way uncertain about it. For, if one should say that when a man stands, yet moves his hands and his head, that the same person at once stands and is moved, we should not, I imagine, think it proper to speak in this manner; but that one part of him stood, and another part was moved. Should we not speaking this manner?

Glaucon/ In this manner.

Socrates/ But if one who says these things should, in a more jocose humor still, and facetiously caviling, allege that tops stand wholly, and are at the same time moved, when their center is fixed on one point, and they are whirled about, —or that anything else going round in a circle in the same position doth this, —we should not admit it, as it is not in the same respect that they stand still and are moved: but we should say, that they have in them the straight line and the periphery; and that, with relation to the straight line, they stood; (for towards no side they declined); but with relation to the periphery, they moved in a circle. But, when its perpendicularity declines either to the right or left hand, forwards or backwards, whilst it is at the same time whirling round; then in no respect doth it stand.

Glaucon/ Very right.

Socrates/ Nothing then of this kind shall move us, when it is said: nor shall anyone persuade us, as if anything, being one and the same thing, could do and suffer contraries at

one and the same time, with reference to the same object, and in the same respect.

Glaucon/ He shall not persuade me.

Socrates/ But however, that we may not be obliged to be tedious in going over all these quibbles, and in evincing them to be false, let us proceed on this supposition, that so it is; after we have agreed that, if at any time these things appear otherwise than as we now settle them, we shall yield up again all we shall gain by it.

Glaucon/ It is necessary, to do so.

Socrates/ Would not you then, deem these things among those which are opposite to one another; whether they be actions or passions, for in this there is no difference; to assent, to wit, and to dissent, to desire to obtain a thing, and to reject it; to bring towards oneself, and to push away?

Glaucon/ I would deem these, among the things which are opposite to each other.

Socrates/ What then, with respect to thirsting, to hungering, and in general with respect to all the passions; and further, to desire, to will, and all these, may they not somehow be placed among those species which have now been mentioned? As for example, will you not always say that the soul of one who has desire goes out after that which it desires, or brings near to it that which it wishes to have? Or again, in so far as it wants something to be afforded it, like one who only sees an object, that it intimates by signs, to have it brought near, desiring the actual possession of it?

Glaucon/ I would say so.

Socrates/ But what, to be unwilling, not to wish, nor to desire. shall we not deem these of the same kind, as to push away from the soul, and drive off, and everything else which is opposite to the former?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ This being the case, shall we say there is a certain species of the desires? and that the most conspicuous are those which we call thirst and hunger?

Glaucon/ We shall say so.

Socrates/ Is not the one the desire of drinking, and the other of eating?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is it then, when considered as thirst, a desire in the soul of something further than of drink?

Glaucon/ It is according to the nature of the thirst.

Socrates/ Is there then a thirst of a hot drink, or of a cold, of much or of little, or in short of some particular kind of drink? for, if there be any heat accompanying the thirst, it readily occasions a desire of a cold drink; but if cold accompanies it, then there is excited a desire of a warm drink: if the thirst be great, through many circumstances, it occasions a desire of much drink, but if small, a desire of a little drink: but the desire itself to thirst never creates the desire of anything else, but of drink itself, as its nature prompts; and in like manner of the appetite of hunger with relation to meat.

Glaucon/ Thus every desire, in itself, is of that alone of which it is the desire; but to be a desire of such or such a particular species, are adventitious circumstances.

Socrates/ Let not then anyone, create us any trouble, as if we were inadvertent; that no one desired drink, but good drink; or meat, but good meat: for indeed all men desire that which is good. If then thirst be a desire, it is of what is good; whether it be of drink, or of whatever else it is the desire. And in the same way of all the other, desires.

Glaucon/ Perhaps, the man who should mention these things would seem to say something material.

Socrates/ But however, whatever things are of such a nature as to belong to any genus, have a general reference to the genus; but each particular of these refers to a particular species of that genus.

Glaucon/ I have not understood you.

Socrates/ Have you not understood, that greater is of such a kind as to be greater than somewhat?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Is it not greater than the lesser?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which is considerably greater than that which is considerably lesser; is it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that which was formerly greater than that which was formerly lesser; and that which is to be greater than that which is to be lesser?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ And after the same manner, what is more numerous with respect to what is less numerous, and what is double with reference to what is half, and all such like things; and further, what is heavier with respect to lighter, and swifter to slower, and further still, hot to cold; and all such like things, are they not after this manner?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But what as to the sciences? Is not the case the same? For, science itself is the science of learning itself, or of whatever else you think proper to make it the science: but a certain particular science, and of such a particular kind, refers to a certain particular object, and of such a kind. What I mean is this. After the science of building houses arose, did it not separate from other sciences, so as to be called architecture?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ Was it not from its being of such a kind as none of others were?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Was it not then from its being the art of such a particular thing, that itself became such a particular art? And all other arts and sciences in like manner?

Glaucon/ They are so.

Socrates/ Allow then, that this is what I wanted to express, if you have now understood it; where things are considered as having reference to other things, generals alone refer to generals, and particulars to particulars. I do not however say that the science altogether resembles that of which it is the science; (as if, for example, the science of healthy and sickly were itself healthy and sickly; or that the science of good and evil were itself good and evil.) But as science is not constituted the science of that thing in general of which it is the science, but only of a certain quality of it (to wit, of its healthy and sickly state), so itself comes to be a certain particular science; and this causes it to be called no longer simply a science, but the medicinal science; the particular species to which it belongs being superadded.

Glaucon/ I have understood you, and it appears to me to be so.

Socrates/ But will not you, make thirst now, whatever it be, to be one of those things which respect somewhat else, considered as what it is, and it is surely thirst?

Glaucon/ I will, and it respects drink.

Socrates/ And does not a particular thirst desire a particular drink? But thirst in general is neither of much nor of little, nor of good nor bad, nor, in one word, of any particular kind; but of drink in general alone is thirst in general naturally the desire.

Glaucon/ Entirely so, indeed.

Socrates/ The soul of the man then who thirsts, so far as he thirsts, inclines for nothing further than to drink; this he desires, to this he hastens.

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ If then, at any time anything draw back the thirsting soul, it must be some different part of it from that which thirsts, and leads it as a wild beast to drink: for, have we not said that it is impossible for the same thing, in the same respects, and with the same parts of it, to do at once contrary things?

Glaucon/ It is indeed impossible.

Socrates/ In the same manner, I imagine, as it is not proper to say of an archer, that his hands at once push out and likewise pull in the bow; but that the one hand is that which pushes out, and the other that which pulls in.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But whether may we say, that there are some who when athirst are not willing to drink?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed, there are many, and many times that is the case.

Socrates/ What now, may one say of these persons? Might it not be said, that there was in their soul somewhat prompting them to drink, and likewise something hindering them, different from the other, and superior to the prompting principle?

Glaucon/ It seems so to me.

Socrates/ Does not then the restraining principle arise from reason when it arises; but those which push, and drive forwards, proceed from passions and diseases?

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ We shall then, not unreasonably account these to be two, and different from one another; calling the one part which reasons, the rational part of the soul; but that part with which it loves, and hungers, and thirsts, and those other appetites, the irrational and concupiscible part, the friend of certain gratifications and pleasures.

Glaucon/ We shall not; but we may most reasonably consider them in this light.

Socrates/ Let these then, be allowed to be distinct species in the soul. But as to that of anger, is it a third principle, or has it affinity to one of those two?

Glaucon/ Perhaps it has, to the concupiscible part.

Socrates/ But I believe, what I have somewhere heard, how that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, as he returned from the Pyræum, perceived some dead bodies lying in the sewer, below the outside of the north wall, and had both a desire to look at them, and at the same time was averse from it, and turned himself away; and for a while he struggled with his desire, and covered his eyes; but, at last, being overcome by his appetite, with eager eyes, running towards the dead bodies, Lo now, you wretched eyes! glut yourselves with this fine spectacle.

Glaucon/ I too, have heard it.

Socrates/ This speech now, shows that anger sometimes opposes the appetites, as being different one from another.

Glaucon/ It shows it, indeed.

Socrates/ And do not we often perceive, when, the appetites compel anyone contrary to reason, that he reproaches himself, and is angry at the compelling principle within him? And when the rational and concupiscible are in a state of sedition, anger in such a person becomes as it were an ally to reason: but when the appetite goes along with reason, then anger gives no opposition. You will say, I

imagine, that you have perceived nothing of this kind in yourself at any time, nor yet in another.

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ What now, when: one imagines he does an injury, the more generous he is, is he not so much the less apt to be angry, when he suffers hunger and cold, or any other such things, from one who inflicts, as he imagines, these things with, justice? And, as I have said, his anger will not incline him to rise up against such an one.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But what? when a man imagines he is injured, does not anger in such an one burn? is he not indignant? and does he not fight, as an ally, on the side of what appears to be just? and under all the sufferings of hunger, cold, and such like, does he not bear up? and conquer; and cease not from his generous toils, till either he accomplish, them, or die, or be restrained by the rational principle within him, like a dog by the shepherd, and is rendered mild?

Glaucon/ It perfectly resembles, what you say; for, in our city, we appointed the auxiliaries to be obedient, as dogs, to the rulers of the city, as to shepherds.

Socrates/ You rightly understand, what I would say. But have you besides considered this?

Glaucon/ As what?

Socrates/ That here the reverse appears concerning the irascible from that in the former case: for there we were deeming it the same with the concupiscible; but now we say it is far from it; or that, in the sedition of the soul, it much rather joins its arms with the rational part.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Is it then as something different from it, or as a species of the rational? so as that there are not three

species, but only two in the soul, the rational and concupiscible. Or, as there were three species which completed the city, the lucrative, the auxiliary, the legislative; so, in the soul, this irascible is a third thing, naturally an auxiliary to the rational, if it be not corrupted by bad education?

Glaucon/ Of necessity it is, a third.

Socrates/ Yes, if at least it appear to be any way different from the rational, as it appeared to be distinct from the concupiscible. But that is not difficult, to be seen. For one may see this, even in little children, that immediately from their infancy they are full of anger; but some appear, to me at least, never at all to participate of reason; and the most arrive at it but late.

Glaucon/ Yes, truly, you say right.

Socrates/ And one may yet further observe in the brute creatures, that what you say is really the case: and besides this, it is likewise attested by what we formerly mentioned from Homer;

> His breast he struck, and thus his heart reproved.

For, in that passage, Homer has plainly made one part reprehend another; the part which reasons about good and evil, reprehend the part which is unreasonably angry.

Glaucon/ You say perfectly right.

Socrates/ These things, we have with difficulty agreed to; and it is now sufficiently acknowledged, that the same species of principles as are in a city are in every individual, and in the same number.

Glaucon/ They are so.

Socrates/ Must it not therefore of necessity follow, that after what manner the city was wise, and in what respect, after the same manner, and in the same respect, is the individual wise also.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ And in what respects, and after what manner, the individual is brave, in the same respect, and after the same manner, is a city brave. And so in all other respects, both of them are the same as to virtue.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And I think, Glauco, we shall say that a man is just in the same way as we said a city was so? This likewise is quite necessary. But have we not somehow forgot this, that the city was just, when everyone of the three species in it did each its own work?

Glaucon/ We do not appear to me, to have forgot it.

Socrates/ We must then remember likewise, that each one of us will be just, and do his own work, when he doth his own affairs within himself.

Glaucon/ We must, carefully remember it.

Socrates/ Is it not then proper that the rational part should govern, as it is wise, and hath the care of the whole soul? and that the irascible part should be obedient, and an auxiliary of the other?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Shall not then the mixture, as we observed, of music and gymnastic make these two harmonious, raising and nourishing the one with beautiful reasonings and disciplines, and unbending the other, soothing and rendering it mild by harmony and rhythm?

Glaucon/ Most perfectly.

Socrates/ And when those two are in this manner nourished, and have been truly taught, and instructed in their own affairs, let them be set over the concupiscible part, which in everyone is the greater part of the soul, and in its nature most insatiably desirous of being gratified: and let

them take care of this part, lest, being filled with these bodily pleasures, as they are called, it become great and vigorous, and do not its own work, but attempt to enslave and rule over those it ought not, and overturn the whole life of all in general.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And might he not, by this principle, guard likewise in the best manner against enemies from without, by its influence both over the whole soul and body likewise, the one deliberating, and the other fighting in obedience to its leader, and executing with fortitude the things deliberated?

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ And I think that we call a man brave, when, through all the pains and pleasures of life, the irascible part preserves the opinion dictated by reason concerning what is terrible, and what is not.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And we call him wise, from that small part which governs in him, and dictates these things, having in it the knowledge of what is advantageous for each one, and for the whole community of the three themselves.

Glaucon/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ But what, do we not call him temperate, moreover, from the friendship and harmony of these very things, when the governing and governed agree in one, that reason ought to govern, and when they do not raise sedition?

Glaucon/ Temperance, is no other than this, both as to the city and the individual.

Socrates/ But, as we have often said, he shall be just, by these things, and in this manner.

Glaucon/ It is quite necessary.

Socrates/ What then, has anything blunted us, that we should think justice to be anything else than what it has appeared to be in a city?

Glaucon/ Nothing appears to me at least, to have done it.

Socrates/ But in this manner, let us, by all means, confirm ourselves, if there yet remain any doubt in the soul, that can be an objection to this principle, by bringing the man into difficult circumstances.

Glaucon/ As what?

Socrates/ Such as this: if we were obliged to declare concerning such a city, and concerning a man born and educated conformably to it, whether we thought such a one, when entrusted with gold or silver, would embezzle it; do you imagine that anyone would think such a one would do it sooner than those who are not of such a kind?

Glaucon/ No one.

Socrates/ Will not such a one then be free of sacrileges, thefts, treacheries, against companions in private, or the city in public?

Glaucon/ He will be free.

Socrates/ Nor will he ever, in any shape, be faithless, either as to his oaths, or other declarations.

Glaucon/ How can he?

Socrates/ Adulteries, and neglect of parents, impiety against the Gods, will belong to everyone else, sooner than to such an one.

Glaucon/ They will belong to everyone else, truly.

Socrates/ And is not this the cause of all these things, that, of all the parts within him, each one thing does its own work, as to governing and being, governed?

Glaucon/ This, is it, and nothing else.

Socrates/ Do you desire justice to be anything else, but such a power as produces such men and cities?

Glaucon/ Not I, truly, for my part.

Socrates/ Our dream then which we conjectured is at last accomplished that when we first began to build our city, we seemed, by some God's assistance, to have got to a beginning and pattern of justice.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And that, Glauco, was a certain image of justice, according to which, it behooved the man who was fitted by nature for the office of a shoe-maker, to perform properly that office, and to do nothing else, and he who is a carpenter to perform that office, and all others in the same way.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And of such a kind truly was justice, as it appeared to us, I do not mean as to external action, but concerning that which is really internal, relating to the man himself, and those things which are properly his own; not allowing any principle in himself to attempt to do what belongs to others, nor the principles to be pragmatical, engaging in one another's affairs; but in reality well establishing his own proper affairs, and holding the government of himself, adorning himself, and becoming his own friend, and attuning those three principles in the most natural manner, as three musical strings, base, tenor, and treble, or whatever others may chance to intervene. Thus he will be led to combine, all these together, and become of many an entire one, temperate and attuned, and in that manner to perform whatever is done, either in the way of acquiring wealth, or concerning the management of the body, or any public affair or private bargain; and in all these cases to account and call that action just and handsome,

which always sustains and promotes this habit; and to call the knowledge which presides over this action, wisdom: but to call that an unjust action which dissolves this habit, and the opinion which presides over this, folly.

Glaucon/ You say perfectly true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Be it so. If then we should say that we have found out a just man and city, and what justice is in them, I do not think we should seem to be altogether telling a lie.

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ May we say so?

Glaucon/ We may say it.

Socrates/ Be it so. But we were next, I think, to consider injustice.

Glaucon/ That is plain.

Socrates/ Must it not then be some sedition among the three principles, some Pragmaticalness and intermeddling in things foreign to their proper business, and an insurrection of someone principle against the whole soul, to govern in it when it does not belong to it, but which is of such a nature, as what really ought to be in subjection to the governing principle? I imagine then we shall call their tumult and mistake by such names as these, injustice, intemperance, cowardice and folly, and in general all vice.

Glaucon/ These things, are so.

Socrates/ To do injustice then, and to be injurious, and likewise to do justly, all these must be very manifest, if, to wit, injustice and justice are so.

Glaucon/ As how?

Socrates/ Because they are no way different from what is salutary or noxious: as these are in the body, so are the others in the soul.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Such things as are healthy constitute health, and such as are noxious produce disease.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And must not the doing justly produce justice, and doing unjustly produce injustice?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ But to produce health, is to establish all in the body according to nature; to govern and to be governed of one another; and to produce disease, is to govern and be governed, one part by another, contrary to nature.

Glaucon/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ Then again, to produce justice, is it not to establish all in the soul according to nature, to govern and be governed by one another? And injustice is to govern and be governed by one another, contrary to nature.

Glaucon/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ Virtue then, it seems, is a sort, of health, and beauty, and good habit of the soul; and vice the disease, and deformity, and infirmity.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ Do not then honorable pursuits lead to the acquisition of virtue? but dishonorable ones to that of vice?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ What remains then for us, as seems, to consider, is, whether it be profitable to do justly, and to pursue what is honorable, and to be just; whether a man under such a character be unknown or not? Or to do unjustly, and to be unjust, though one be never punished, nor by chastisement become better?

Glaucon/ But, Socrates, this speculation seems now, to me at least, to be ridiculous. For If, when the nature of the body is corrupted, it be thought that life is not worth having,

not even though one had all kinds of meats and drinks, all kind of wealth, all kind of dominion; when the nature of that by which we live is disordered, and thoroughly corrupted, shall life then be worth having, though one can do everything else which he inclines, except ascertaining, how he shall be liberated from vice and injustice, and acquire justice and virtue, since, to wit, both these things have appeared as we have represented them?

Socrates/ It would be truly ridiculous. But, however, as we have arrived at such a point as enables us most distinctly to perceive that these things are so, we must not be weary.

Glaucon/ We must, by Zeus, the least of all things desist.

Socrates/ Come then, that you may likewise see how many principles vice possesses, principles which, as I imagine, are worthy of attention.

Glaucon/ I attend, only tell me.

Socrates/ And truly now, since we have reached this part of our discourse, it appears to me as from a lofty place of survey, that there is one principle of virtue, but those of vice are infinite. Of which there are four, which deserve to be mentioned.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ There seem to be as many species of soul as there are of republics.

Glaucon/ How many then?

Socrates/ There are five, of republics, and five of the soul.

Glaucon/ Tell, what these are.

Socrates/ I say, that this, which we have gone through, is one species of a republic; and it may have a two-fold appellation; for, if among the rulers there be one surpassing the rest, it may be called a Monarchy; if there be several, an Aristocracy.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ I call this then, one species; for, whether they be several, or but one, who govern, they will never alter the principal laws of the city; observing the nurture and education we have described.

Glaucon/ It is not likely.

THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.

Book 5.

Socrates/ I denominate then indeed both such a city and republic, and such a man as we have described, good and upright; and if this republic be an upright one, I deem the others bad and erroneous, both as to the regulations in cities, and the establishing the temper of soul of individuals, and that in four species of depravity.

Glaucon/ Of what kind are these?

Socrates/ I was then proceeding to mention them in order, as they appeared to me to rise out of one another: but Polemarchus stretching out his hand (for he sat a little further off than Adimantus) caught him by the robe at his shoulder, and drew him near; and, bending himself towards him, spoke something in a whisper, of which we heard nothing but this:

Polemarchus/ Shall we let pass then? or what shall we do?

Socrates/ Adeimantus, speaking now aloud;

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ What then will not you let pass?

Adeimantus/ You, for it was to you I alluded. You seem to us to be growing negligent, and to steal a whole branch of the discourse, and that not the least considerable, that you may not have the trouble of going through it; and you imagine that you escaped our notice, when you made this speech so simply, viz. that, both as to, wives and children, it is manifest to everyone that these things will be common among friends.

Socrates/ Did not I say right, Adimantus?

Adeimantus/ Yes: but this, which was rightly said, like other parts of your discourse, requires explanation: to show what is the manner of their being common; for there may be

many kinds of it. Do not omit then to tell which is the method you spoke of; for we have been in expectation for some time past, imagining you would, on some occasion, make mention of the propagation of children, in what way they should be propagated; and, when they are born, how they should be nurtured; and everything relative to what you spoke concerning wives and children being in common; for we imagine, that it is of considerable, nay, of the utmost importance to the state, when this is rightly performed, or otherwise. But now when you are entering on the consideration of another constitution, before you have sufficiently discussed these things, it seemed proper to us what you now heard, not to let you pass, before you went over all these things, as you did the others.

Glaucon/ And you may count me too, as joining in this vote.

Thrasymachus/ You may easily judge, Socrates, that this is the opinion of us all.

Socrates/ What is this, you have done, laying hold of me? What a mighty discourse do you again raise, as you did at the beginning, about a republic, in which I was rejoicing as having now completed it, being pleased if anyone would have let these things pass, and been content with what was then said! But you know not what a swarm of reasonings you raise by what you now challenge, which I foreseeing passed by at that time, lest it should occasion great disturbance.

Thrasymachus/ What then, do you imagine that these are now come hither to melt gold, and not to hear reasonings?

Socrates/ Yes, but in measure.

Glaucon/ The whole of life, Socrates, is with the wise, the measure of hearing such reasonings as these. But pass what relates to us, and do not at all grudge to explain your opinion concerning the object of our inquiry, —What sort of

community of wives and children is to be observed by our guardians, and concerning the nurture of the latter while very young, in the period between their generation and their education, which seems to be the most troublesome of all. Endeavor then to tell us in what manner it should be done.

Socrates/ It is not easy, happy Glauco, to go through these things; for there are many of them hard to be believed, whether the things we say be possible; and though they could easily be effected, whether they would be for the best might still be doubted: wherefore, dear companion, I grudge somewhat to touch on these things, lest our reasonings appear to be rather what were to be wished for, than what could take place.

Glaucon/ Do not at all grudge; for your hearers are neither stupid, nor incredulous, nor ill-affected towards you.

Socrates/ Do you say this, most excellent Glauco, with a desire to encourage me?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then your discourse has a quite contrary effect; for, if I trusted to myself, that I understood what I am to say, your encouragement would do well. For one who understands the truth, about the greatest and the most interesting affairs, speaks with safety and confidence among the wise and friendly; but to be diffident of oneself, and doubtful of the truth, and at the same time to be haranguing as I do now, is both dreadful and dangerous; not only lest he should be exposed to ridicule (for that is but a trifling thing), but lest that, mistaking the truth, I not only fall myself, but draw my friends along with me into an error about things in which we ought least of all to be mistaken. I adore therefore Adrastia, for the sake of what, Glauco, I am going to say. For I trust it is a smaller offence to be a man-slayer without intention, than to be an impostor with regard to what is good

and excellent, just and lawful: and it were better to hazard such a thing among enemies than friends; so that you must give me better encouragement.

Then Glauco, laughing:

Glaucon/ But, Socrates, if we suffer anything amiss from your discourse, we shall acquit you as clear of any man-slaughter, and as no impostor: so proceed boldly.

Socrates/ But indeed, he who is acquitted at a court of justice is deemed clear of the crime, as the law says; and if it be so in that case, 'tis reasonable it should be so in this.

Glaucon/ For this reason then, proceed.

Socrates/ We must now, return again to what it seems should, according to method, have been recited before; and perhaps it is right to proceed in this manner, that, after having entirely finished the drama reflecting the men, we go over that which concerns the women; especially since you challenge me to proceed in this manner. For, in my opinion, men who have been born and educated in such a manner as we have described, can have no right possession and enjoyment of children and wives, but in pursuing the same track in which we have proceeded from the beginning; for we have endeavored, in our reasoning, to form somehow men as the guardians of a flock.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ Let us proceed then, having established likewise affairs relating to propagation and education in a manner similar to that of the males; and let us consider whether it be proper for us to do so or not.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Thus: Whether shall we judge it proper for the females of our guardian dogs, to watch likewise in the same manner as the males do, and to hunt along with them, and do everything else in common? Or shall we judge it proper

for them to manage domestic affairs within doors, as being unable for the other exercises, because of the bringing forth and the nursing the whelps; and the males to labor, and to have the whole care of the flocks?

Glaucon/ They are to do all, in common. Only we are to employ the females as the weaker, and the males as the stronger.

Socrates/ Is it possible then, to employ any creature for the same purposes with another, unless you give it the same nurture and education as you give the other?

Glaucon/ It is not possible.

Socrates/ If then we shall employ the women for the same purposes as we do the men, must we not likewise teach them the same things?

Glaucon/ We must.

Socrates/ Were not both music and gymnastic bestowed on the males?

Glaucon/ They were.

Socrates/ These two arts therefore, and those likewise relating to war, must be bestowed also on the women, and they must be employed about the same things.

Glaucon/ It is reasonable, from what you say.

Socrates/ Yet as these things are contrary perhaps to custom, many of these things we are now speaking of may appear ridiculous, if practiced in the way we mention.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ What, do you perceive as the most ridiculous part? Or is it plainly because that you see the women naked in the Palæstra wrestling with the men, and not only the young women, but even the more advanced in years, in the same manner as old men in the wrestling-schools, when

they are wrinkled, and not at all handsome to the eye, yet still fond of the exercises?

Glaucon/ Yes, by Zeus. Because it might indeed appear ridiculous, at least as matters stand at present.

Socrates/ Must we not therefore, since we have entered upon this discourse, be afraid of the raillery's of the men of pleasantry, whatever things they may say with regard to such a revolution being introduced, as well in gymnastic as in music, and particularly in the use of arms, and the management of horses?

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ But since we have entered on this discourse, we must go to the rigor of the law, and beg these men not to follow their own customs, but to think seriously, and remember, that it is not long ago since these things appeared base and ridiculous to the Greeks, which are only so now to the most of the barbarians: such as to see naked men. And when first the Cretans, and afterwards the Lacedæmonians, began their exercises, it was in the power of the men of humor of that time to turn all these things into ridicule. Do not you think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ But I imagine, that when upon experience it appeared better to strip themselves of all these things, than to be wrapped in them, what was ridiculous indeed to the eye, was removed by the idea of the best, mentioned in our reasoning; and this too showed manifestly, that he is a fool who deems anything ridiculous but what is bad, and attempts to rally upon any other idea of the ridiculous but that of the foolish and the vicious, or to be serious in any other pursuit but that of the good.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Is not this then first of all to be agreed on, whether these things be possible or not? And we must allow it to be a matter of dispute, if anyone, either in jest or earnest, incline to doubt, whether the human nature in the female sex be able, in everything, to bear a share with the male? or if it be not in any one thing? or if it be able in some things, but not in others? and among which of these are the affairs of war? Would not the man who thus sets out in the most: handsome manner conclude too, as it seems, most handsomely?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ Are you willing, then, that we ourselves, instead of others, dispute about these things, that the opposite side may not be destitute of a defense?

Glaucon/ Nothing hinders.

Socrates/ Let us then say this for them: That there is no need, Socrates and Glauco, of others to dispute with you about this matter; for yourselves in the beginning of your establishment, when you established your city, agreed, that it was necessary for each individual to practice one business, according to their several genius.

Glaucon/ I think we acknowledged it; for why should they not?

Socrates/ Does not then the genius of the male differ widely from that of the female?

Glaucon/ Why does it not differ?

Socrates/ And is it not fit to enjoin each a different work, according to their genius?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ Are not you then in the wrong now, and contradict yourselves, when you say that men and women ought to do the same things, whilst their nature is extremely

different? Can you in answer to these objections, admirable Glauco, make any defense?

Glaucon/ It is not quite an easy matter, to do it immediately; but I will entreat you, and do now entreat you, to go through the arguments on our side, whatever they may be.

Socrates/ These are the things, Glauco, and many other such like, which I long ago foreseeing, was both afraid and backward to touch on the law concerning the possession of wives, and the education of children.

Glaucon/ It is not easy, by Zeus.

Socrates/ It is not. But the case is thus: If a man fall into a small fish-pond, or into the middle of the greatest sea, he must still swim in the one no less than in the other.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Must not we swim then, and endeavor to escape from this reasoning, expecting that either some dolphin is to carry us out, or that we shall have some other remarkable deliverance?

Glaucon/ It seems we must do so.

Socrates/ Come then, let us see if we can anywhere find an out-gate; for we did acknowledge that different natures ought to study different things; but the nature of man and woman is different; yet now we say that different natures ought to study the same things: these are the things which you accuse us of.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ How generous, Glauco, is the power of the art of contradicting!

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Because, many seem to fall into it unwillingly, and imagine that they are not caviling, but reasoning truly,

because they are not able to understand the subject, by dividing it into its proper parts; and under this arguing will pursue the opposite of their subject, using caviling instead of reasoning.

Glaucon/ This is indeed, the case with many; but does it at present extend likewise to us?

Socrates/ Entirely so. We seem then unwillingly to have fallen into a contradiction.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Because we have very strenuously and very keenly asserted, that when the nature is not the same, they ought not to have the same employments; but we have not in any respect considered what is the characteristic of the sameness or diversity of nature, nor to what it points: we stopped then, when we had assigned different pursuits to different natures, and to the same natures the same pursuits.

Glaucon/ We have never indeed, considered it.

Socrates/ It is therefore, still in our power, as appears, to question ourselves, whether the nature of the bald, or of those who wear their hair, be the same, and not different? And after we should agree that it was different, whether, if the bald made shoes, we should allow those who wear hair to make them? or, if those who wear hair made them, whether we should allow the others?

Glaucon/ That were ridiculous.

Socrates/ Is it in any other respect, ridiculous then, that we did not wholly determine the sameness and diversity of nature, but attended only to that species of diversity and sameness which respects the employments themselves; just as we say that the physician, and the man who has a medical soul, have one and the same nature? Do not you think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ But that the physician and architect have a different nature.

Glaucon/ Entirely.

Socrates/ And so, of the nature of men and of women, if it appear different, in respect to any art, or other employment, we shall say, that this different employment is to be assigned to each separately. But if their nature appear different only in this, that the female brings forth, and the male begets, we shall not say that this has at all shown the men to be different from the woman in the respect we speak of. But we shall still be of opinion, that both our guardians and their wives ought to pursue the same employments.

Glaucon/ And with reason.

Socrates/ Shall we not then henceforth desire anyone who says the contrary, to instruct us in this point, what is that art or study respecting the establishment of a city, where the nature of the man and woman is not the same, but different?

Glaucon/ It is reasonable, truly.

Socrates/ Possibly someone may say, as you was saying some time since, that it is not easy to tell this sufficiently on the sudden, but that it is not difficult to one who has considered it.

Glaucon/ One might indeed say so.

Socrates/ Are you willing then that we desire such an opponent to listen to us, if by any means we shall show him that there is in the administration of the city no employment peculiar to the women?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Come on then, (shall we say to him) answer us. Is not this your meaning? That one man has a good genius for anything, and another a bad, in this respect, that the one

learns anything easily, and the other with difficulty; and the one with a little instruction discovers much in what he learns; but the other, when he obtains much instruction and care, does not retain even what he has learned: with the one, the body is duly subservient to the mind; with the other, it opposes its improvement: are there any other marks than these by which you would determine one to have a good genius for anything, and another to have a bad one?

Glaucon/ No one, would mention any other.

Socrates/ Know you then of anything which is managed by mankind, with reference to which the men have not all these marks in a more excellent degree than the women? Or, should we not be tedious, if we mentioned particularly the weaving art, and the dressing pot-herbs and victuals, in which the female genius seems to be somewhat considerable, and is most: ridiculous where it is surpassed?

Glaucon/ You say true, that in the general, in everything the one genius is superior to the other, yet there are many women who in many things excel many men: but, on the whole, it is as you say.

Socrates/ There is not then, my friend, any office among the whole inhabitants of the city peculiar to the woman, considered as woman, nor to the man, considered as man; but the geniuses are indiscriminately diffused through both: the woman is naturally fitted for sharing in all offices, and so is the man; but in all the woman is weaker than the man.

Glaucon/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ Shall we then commit everything to the care of the men, and nothing to the care of the women?

Glaucon/ How shall we do so?

Socrates/ It is therefore, I imagine, as we say, that one woman too is fitted by natural genius for being a physician,

and another is not; one is naturally a musician, and another is not?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ And one is naturally fitted for gymnastic, and another is not; one is fitted for war, and another is not.

Glaucon/ I at least am of this opinion.

Socrates/ And is not one likewise a lover of philosophy, and another averse to it; one of high spirits, and another of low?

Glaucon/ This likewise is true.

Socrates/ And has not one woman a natural genius for being a guardian, and another not? And have not we made choice of such a genius as this for our guardian men?

Glaucon/ Of such a genius as this.

Socrates/ The nature then of the woman and of the man for the guardianship of the city is the same, only that the one is weaker, and the other stronger.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And such women as these are to be chosen to dwell with these men, and be guardians along with them, as they are naturally fit for them, and of a kindred genius.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And must not the same employments be assigned to the same natures?

Glaucon/ The same.

Socrates/ We are now arrived by a circular progression at what we formerly mentioned; and, we allow that it is not contrary to nature, to appoint for the wives of our guardians music and gymnastic.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ We are not then establishing things impossible, or such as can only be wished for, since we establish the law according to nature; and what is at present contrary to these things, is contrary to nature rather, as appears.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Was not our inquiry to hear of what was possible and best?

Glaucon/ It was.

Socrates/ And we have agreed, that these things are possible.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ And we must next agree, that they are best.

Glaucon/ It is plain we must.

Socrates/ In order therefore to make a guardian woman, at least the education will not be different from that of the men, especially as she has received the same natural genius.

Glaucon/ It will not be different.

Socrates/ What do you think then of such an opinion as this?

Glaucon/ Of what?

Socrates/ That of imagining with yourself one man to be better, and another worse, —or do you deem them to be all alike?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ In the city now which we establish, whether do you judge, that our guardians with this education we have described, or shoe-makers with education in their art, will be rendered the better men?

Glaucon/ The question, is ridiculous.

Socrates/ I understand you. But what? Of all the other citizens, are not they the best?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ But what? Will not these women too be the best, of women?

Glaucon/ They will be so, by far.

Socrates/ Is there anything better in a city than that both the women and the men be rendered the very best?

Glaucon/ There is not.

Socrates/ This then will be effected by music and gymnastic, being afforded them according as we have described.

Glaucon/ Why will it not?

Socrates/ We have then established a law which is not only possible, but moreover best for the state.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ The wives, then, of our guardians must be unclothed, since they are to put on virtue for clothes; and they must bear a part in war, and the other guardianship of the city, and do nothing else. But the lightest part of these services is to be allotted to the women rather than to the men, on account of the weakness of their sex. And the man who laughs at naked women, whilst performing the exercises for the sake of what is best, reaps the empty fruit of a ridiculous wisdom, and in no respect knows, as appears, at what he laughs, nor why he does it. For that ever was and will be deemed a noble saying, That what is profitable is beautiful, and what is hurtful is base.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Let us say then, that we have escaped one wave; as it were, having thus settled the law with respect to the women, without being wholly overwhelmed, ordaining that our male and female guardians are to manage all things in common: but our reasoning has been consistent with

itself, as it respects both what is possible and likewise advantageous.

Glaucon/ It is truly no small wave you have escaped.

Socrates/ You will not, call it a great one, when you see what follows.

Glaucon/ Mention it, that I may see.

Socrates/ That law, and those others formerly mentioned, are adopted, as I imagine, by the following.

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ That these women must all be common to all these men, and that no one woman dwell with any man privately, and that their children likewise be common; that neither the parent know his own children, nor the children their parent.

Glaucon/ This is much greater than the other, as to the incredibility, both of its being possible, and at the same time advantageous.

Socrates/ I do not believe, that anyone will doubt of its utility, at least, as if it were not the greatest good to have the women and children in common, if it were but possible. But I think the greatest question will be, whether it be possible or not?

Glaucon/ One may very readily, dispute as to both.

Socrates/ You mention, a crowd of disputes. But I thought that I should at least have escaped from the one, if its utility had been agreed on, and that it should have only remained to consider its possibility.

Glaucon/ But you have not, escaped unobserved; give then an account of both.

Socrates/ I must then, submit to a trial. But, however, indulge me thus far: allow me to feast myself, as those are wont to feast themselves who are sluggish in their dianoëtic

part, when they walk alone. For men of this sort, sometimes before they find out how they shall attain what they desire; waving that inquiry, that they may not fatigue themselves in deliberating about the possibility or impossibility of it, suppose they have obtained what they desire, and then go through what remains. And they delight in running over what they will do when their desire is obtained, rendering their soul, otherwise indolent, more indolent still, I am now effeminate after this manner, and wish to defer those debates, and to inquire afterwards whether these things be possible. But at present, holding them possible, if you allow me, I will consider in what manner our rulers shall regulate these things, when they take place, that they may be done in the most advantageous manner, both to the state and the guardians. These things I shall endeavor, in the first place, to go over with your assistance, and the others afterwards, if you allow me.

Glaucon/ I allow, and inquire accordingly.

Socrates/ I imagine then, that if our rulers are worthy of that name, and in like manner these who are their auxiliaries, their ministers in the government, the latter will be disposed to do whatever is enjoined them, and the former will be ready to command; enjoining them some things in direct obedience to the law, and imitating the law in whatever things are entrusted to them.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Do you now, who are their lawgiver, in the same manner as you have chosen out the men, choose out likewise the women, making their genius as similar as possible: and as they dwell and eat together in common; and as no one possesses any of these things privately, they will meet together; and being mingled in their exercises and other conversation, they will be led from an innate necessity, as I

imagine, to mutual embraces. Do not I seem to say what will necessarily happen?

Glaucon/ Not, by any geometrical, but amatory necessity, which seems to be more pungent than the other, to persuade and draw the bulk of mankind.

Socrates/ Much more. But after this, Glauco, to mix together in a disorderly manner, or to do anything else, is neither holy in a city of happy persons, nor will the rulers permit it.

Glaucon/ It were not just.

Socrates/ It is plain then, that after this we must make marriages as much as possible sacred; but the most advantageous would be sacred.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ How then shall they be most advantageous? Tell me that, Glauco, for I see in your houses dogs of chase, and a great many excellent birds. Have you then indeed ever attended at all, in any respect, to their marriages, and the propagation of their species?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ First of all, that among these, although they be excellent themselves, are there not some who are most excellent?

Glaucon/ There are.

Socrates/ Whether then do you breed from all of them alike? or are you careful to breed chiefly from the best?

Glaucon/ From the best.

Socrates/ But how?

Glaucon/ From the youngest or from the oldest, or from those who are most in their prime?

Socrates/ From those in their prime. And if the breed be not of this kind, you reckon that the race of birds and dogs greatly degenerates.

Glaucon/ I reckon so.

Socrates/ And what think you as to horses, and other animals? is the case any otherwise with respect to these?

Glaucon/ That, were absurd.

Socrates/ Strange, my friend! What extremely perfect governors must we have, if the case be the same with respect to the human race!

Glaucon/ However, it is so; but what then?

Socrates/ Because there is a necessity, for their using many medicines: for where bodies have no occasion for medicines, but are ready to subject themselves to a regimen of diet, we reckon that a weaker physician may suffice; but when there is a necessity for medicines, we know that a more able physician is then requisite.

Glaucon/ True; but with what view do you say this?

Socrates/ With this view. It appears that our rulers are obliged to use much fiction and deceit for the advantage of the governed; and we said somewhere, that all these things were useful in the way of medicines. And rightly. This piece of right now seems not to be the most inconsiderable in marriages, and the propagation of children.

Glaucon/ How now?

Socrates/ It is proper, from what we have acknowledged, that the best men embrace for the most part the best women; and the most depraved men, on the contrary, the most depraved women; and the offspring of the former is to be educated, but not that of the latter, if you desire to have the flock of the most perfect kind; and this must be performed in such a manner as to escape the notice of all but the

governors themselves, if you would have the whole herd of the guardians to be as free from sedition as possible.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ Shall there not then be some festivals by law established, in which we shall draw together the brides and bridegrooms? Sacrifices too must be performed, and hymns composed by our poets suitable to the marriages which are making. But the number of the marriages we shall commit to the rulers, that as much as possible they may preserve the same number of men, having an eye to the wars, diseases, and everything else of this kind, and that as far as possible our city may be neither too great nor too little.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And certain lots too, I imagine, should be made so artificial, that the depraved man may, on every embrace, accuse his fortune, and not the governors.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And those of the youth who distinguish themselves, whether in war or anywhere else, ought to have rewards and prizes given them, and the most ample liberty of embracing women, that so, under this pretext likewise, the greatest number of children may be generated of such persons.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And shall the children always as they are born be received by magistrates appointed for these purposes, whether men or women, or both? for the magistracies are in common to women as to men.

Glaucon/ They are so.

Socrates/ And when they receive the children of worthy persons, they will carry them, I imagine, to the nursery, to certain nurses dwelling apart in a certain place of the city.

But the children of the more depraved, and such others as are any way same, they will hide in some secret and obscure place, as is proper. If they want, the race of guardians to be pure. And shall not these take care likewise of their nursing, in bringing to the nursery the mothers when their breasts are full, practicing every art, that no one know her own child, and in providing others who have milk, if these shall prove insufficient? And they shall likewise take care of these nurses, that they suckle a competent time: and they shall appoint the nurses and keepers to be wakeful, and to take every other necessary toil.

Glaucon/ You speak, of great ease to the wives of our guardians, in the breeding of children.

Socrates/ It is fit. But let us in the next place discuss that which we chiefly intended. We said that true offspring ought to be generated of persons in their prime. Are you then of opinion with me, that the proper season of vigor is twenty years to a woman, and thirty to a man?

Glaucon/ Of what continuance are these seasons?

Socrates/ The woman, beginning at twenty, is to bear children to the state until the age of forty; and the man, after he has passed the most raging part of his course, from that period, is to beget children to the state until the age of fifty-five.

Glaucon/ This indeed is the acme, in both sexes, both of body and of mind.

Socrates/ If then anyone who is older or younger than these shall meddle in generating for the public, we shall say the trespass is neither holy nor just, as he begets to the state a child, which, if it be concealed, is born and grows up not from sacrifices and prayers, (which, upon every marriage, the priestesses and priests, and the whole of the city, shall offer, that the descendants of the good may be still more

good, and from useful descendants still more useful may arise); but is born from darkness, and with a dreadful intemperance.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And the law, must be the same. If any of those men, who are yet of the age for generating, shall touch women of a proper age, without the concurrence of the magistrate, we shall consider him as having raised to the state a bastardly, illegitimate and unhallowed child.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ And I imagine, that when the women and men exceed the age of generating, we shall permit the men to cohabit with any woman they incline, besides their daughter and mother, and those who are the children of their daughters, or those upwards from their mother: and so likewise the women to embrace any but a son and father, and the children of these, either downwards or upwards: all this liberty we will allow them, after we have enjoined them to attend carefully, in the first place, if anything should be conceived, not to bring it to the light; but if, by any accident, it should be brought forth, to expose it as a creature for which no provision is made.

Glaucon/ All these things, are reasonably said.

Socrates/ But how shall fathers and daughters, and those other relations you now mentioned, be known of one another?

Glaucon/ They shall not be known at all.

Socrates/ But from the day on which anyone is a bridegroom, whatever children are born in the tenth or in the seventh month; after it, all these he shall call, the male his sons, and the female his daughters, and they shall call him father. And in the same way again, he shall call the children of these grandchildren, and they again shall call

them grandfathers, and grandmothers: and those who were born in that period in which their fathers and mothers were begetting children, they shall call sisters and brothers, so as not to touch each other, as I just now said. But the law shall allow brothers and sisters to live together, if their lot so fall out, and the Pythian oracle give consent.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ This, Glauco, and such as this, is the community of women and children, among your city guardians: and that it is both consonant to the other parts of our polity, and by far the best, we must, in the next place, establish from reason; or how shall we do?

Glaucon/ Just so, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Did not we then agree on this at the beginning? to inquire what we can mention as the greatest good with relation to the establishment of a state, with an eye to which the lawgiver ought to enact the laws, and what is the greatest evil; and then to inquire, whether what we have hitherto gone over contributes towards leading us in the steps of this good, and away from that evil?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Is there, then, any greater ill to a city than that which lacerates it; and, instead of one, makes it many? Or, is there any greater good than that which binds it together, and makes it one?

Glaucon/ There is not.

Socrates/ Does not then the communion of pleasure and pain bind them together, when the whole of the citizens as much as possible rejoice and mourn in the same manner, for the same things when they are obtained, and when they are lost?

Glaucon/ By all means so.

Socrates/ But a separate feeling of these things destroys it, when some of the citizens are extremely grieved, and others extremely glad, at the same sufferings of the city, or of those who are in it.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ Does not then such an evil as the following arise from this, when they do not all jointly in the state pronounce these words, mine, and not mine? And will not that city be best regulated, when every individual, with regard to the concerns of another, in the same way with him, pronounces these words, mine, and not mine?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And it is such as comes nearest to one man. As when our finger is any how hurt; the whole common feeling spread through the body to the soul, with one coordination of its governing part, perceives it, and the entire whole mourns along with the distressed part: and so we say that the man is distressed in his finger: and the reasoning is the same as to any other part of a man, both with respect to grief, when any part is in pain; or with respect to pleasure, when any part is at ease.

Glaucon/ It is the same.

Socrates/ And to return to your question, the city which comes nearest to this is governed in the best manner; and when anyone of the citizens receives any good or ill, such a city, I imagine, will most especially say, that she herself receives it, and the whole city rejoice or mourn together.

Glaucon/ Of necessity, this must prevail in a city governed by good laws.

Socrates/ It may be time for us to go back to our city, and consider how those things are in it which we have agreed on in our reasoning, whether they prevail most in our city, or more in some other.

Glaucon/ We must do so.

Socrates/ What now? Are there not, in other cities, governors and people? And are there not likewise in this?

Glaucon/ There are.

Socrates/ And will not all these call one another citizens?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But besides this of citizens, what does the people call their governors in other states?

Glaucon/ Masters or lords in most states, and, in democracies, this very name, governors.

Socrates/ But in our city, besides that of citizens, what does the people call their governors?

Glaucon/ Their preservers, and helpers.

Socrates/ And what do they call the people?

Glaucon/ Rewarders, and nourishers.

Socrates/ And in other cities, what do the governors call their people?

Glaucon/ Slaves.

Socrates/ And what do the governors call one another?

Glaucon/ Fellow rulers.

Socrates/ And ours, what?

Glaucon/ Fellow guardians.

Socrates/ Can you tell, whether anyone of the governors in other cities can address one of their fellow governors as his kinsman, and another as a stranger?

Glaucon/ Very many so.

Socrates/ Does he not then reckon and call the kindred one his own, and the stranger one as not his own?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But how is it with your guardians? Is there so much as anyone of them, who can deem and call anyone of their fellow guardians a stranger?

Glaucon/ By no means; for, with whomsoever anyone meets, he reckons he meets with a brother or sister, a father or mother, a son or daughter, or the descendants or ancestors of these.

Socrates/ You speak most beautifully. But further, tell me this likewise, whether will you only establish among them, by law, these kindred names? or will you also enjoin them to perform all their actions in conformity to these names? With respect to parents, whatever the law enjoins to be performed to parents, such as reverence, and care, and obedience. And that otherwise it will not be for his advantage, neither in the sight of Gods nor of men, as he acts what is neither holy nor just, if he do other things than these. Shall these, or any other speeches from all our citizens, resound directly in the ears of our children, both concerning their parents, whom anyone shall point out to them, and concerning other relations?

Glaucon/ These things shall be said; for it were ridiculous, if friendly names alone resounded, without any actions accompanying them.

Socrates/ Of all cities, then, there will be the greatest harmony in it, when anyone individual is either well or ill, as to the expression we lately mentioned, viz. mine is well, or mine is ill.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Did not we say too, that their common pleasures and pains will accompany this opinion and expression?

Glaucon/ And we said rightly.

Socrates/ Will not then our citizens most especially have this in common which they call my own; and, having this in common, they will of all others most especially have in common pleasure and pain?

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And along with the other parts of the constitution, is not the community of women and children among the guardians the cause of these things?

Glaucon/ This is it most especially.

Socrates/ But we agreed, that this was the greatest good of a city, likening a well-established city to a body, in its being affected with the pleasure and pain of any part.

Glaucon/ And we rightly, agreed on this.

Socrates/ This community, then, of women and children among our auxiliaries, has appeared to us to be the cause of the greatest good to the city.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And surely we agree at least with what went before; for we somewhere said, that they ought neither to have houses of their own, nor land, nor any possession; but, receiving their subsistence from others, as a reward for their guardianship, they should all spend it in common, if they intended really to be guardians.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Do not therefore, as I say, both these things which were formerly mentioned, and still more what we now speak of, render them real guardians, and prevent the city from being lacerated, by their not at all calling one and the same thing their own; but one, one thing, and another, another; one drawing to his own house whatever he can possess, separate from others, and another to his, which is different from the other; and having both wives and children

different, which occasion different pleasures and pains, which are private, as belonging to private persons: but being of one opinion concerning their home, and all of them pointing towards the same thing, as far as possible, to have one common feeling of pleasure and pain?

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ But what? shall lawsuits and accusations against one another be banished from among them, so to speak, by their possessing nothing as private property but their body, and everything else being common, from whence they shall be liberated from all those disturbances which men raise about money, children or relations?

Glaucon/ They will of necessity be liberated from these.

Socrates/ Neither indeed can there be reasonably among them any actions raised for violence or unseemly treatment. For, making the protection of their persons a necessary thing, we will own it to be handsome and just for those of equal age to help one another.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And this law, hath this right in it likewise: that if anyone be in a passion, gratifying his passion in this manner, he is less apt to raise greater seditions.

Glaucon/ It is entirely so.

Socrates/ The elder shall be enjoined both to govern and to chastise the younger.

Glaucon/ That is plain.

Socrates/ And surely the younger, as becomes them, shall never attempt to beat the elder, or in any other way to offer violence to him, unless appointed by the governors; nor will they, I imagine, in any sort, dishonor them; for there are sufficient guardians to hinder it, both fear and reverence; — reverence on the one hand restraining them from assaulting,

as it were, their parents, and fear on the other; lest others shall assist the sufferer; some as sons, others as brothers, and others as fathers.

Glaucon/ It happens so.

Socrates/ In every respect then, as far as relates to the laws, the men shall live peaceably with one another.

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And while these have no seditions among themselves, there is no danger of any other city raising disturbance against these, or that they shall split into factions.

Glaucon/ There is not.

Socrates/ As for the lesser evils, from which surely they will be freed, I do not choose, because of the impropriety of it, so much as to mention them. That flattery of the rich; that indigence and solicitude in the education of their children, and in procuring money for the necessary support of their family, which is the portion of the poor; sometimes borrowing, and sometimes being despised, and sometimes using all manner of shifts, in procuring provisions, which they give to the management of their wives and domestics: how many slavish and mean things, my friend, they suffer in all these respects, are not even worthy to be mentioned.

Glaucon/ And they are manifest, to one blind.

Socrates/ They will be delivered from all these things, and will live more blessedly than that most blessed life which those live who gain the prize in the Olympic games.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Those are esteemed happy, on account of a small part of what these enjoy. But the victory of these is more noble, and their maintenance from the public is more complete; for the victory they gain is the safety of the whole

city; and both they and their children are crowned with their maintenance, and all the other necessaries of life, as laurels, and receive honor from their city while alive, and at their death an honorable funeral.

Glaucon/ The most noble rewards!

Socrates/ Do you remember then, that in our former reasonings, I do not know who it was objected to us, that we were not making our guardians happy, who, though they had it in their power to have the whole wealth of their citizens, had nevertheless nothing at all? and we proposed to consider of this afterwards, if it fell in our way; but that at the present we were making our guardians only guardians, and the city itself as happy as possible, but without regarding one particular tribe in it, with a view to make it happy.

Glaucon/ I remember it.

Socrates/ What think you now of the life of our auxiliaries, which appears far more noble and happy than that of those who gain the prize at the Olympic games? It does not at all appear to resemble the life of the leather-cutter, the handicraft, or farmer.

Glaucon/ I do not think it.

Socrates/ But however, it is proper that I mention here what I likewise said on a former occasion, that if the guardian shall attempt to be happy in such a way as to be no longer, a guardian, nor be content with this moderate, and steady, and, as we say, best life; but, being seized with a foolish and youthful opinion about happiness, shall, because he has it in his power, be driven to make himself the master of everything in the city, he shall know that Hesiod was truly wise, in saying that the half is somehow more than the whole.

Glaucon/ If he take me, for his counselor, he will remain in such a life.

Socrates/ You allow then, that the women act in common with the men, as we have explained, with respect to education and the breeding of children, and the guardianship of the other citizens; both in remaining in the city, and in going forth to war; and that along with the men they ought to keep guard, and to hunt like dogs, and in every case to take a share in all things as far as they can; and that while they do these things they will do what is best, and no way contrary to the nature of the female, with respect to the male, by which nature they are made to act jointly with one another.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Does not then this, remain to be discussed, whether It be possible that this community take place among men likewise, as among other animals? and how far it is possible.

Glaucon/ You have prevented me, in mentioning what I was going to ask.

Socrates/ For, with relation to warlike affairs, it is plain, I imagine, how they will fight.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ That they will jointly go out on their military expeditions, and besides will carry along with them such of their children as are grown up, that, like those of other artists, they may see what it will be necessary for them to practice when they are grown up; and, besides seeing, that they may serve and administer in everything with relation to the war, and assist both their fathers and mothers. Or, have you not observed what happens in the common arts? as for instance, that the children, of the potters, ministering to

them for a long time, look on before they apply themselves to the making earthen ware?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Whether now are these or our guardians to instruct their children with greater care, by the practice and view of what belongs to their office?

Glaucon/ To suppose those, should take greater care than our guardians, were ridiculous. But every creature fights more remarkably in the presence of its offspring. The case is so; but there is no small danger, Socrates, when they are defeated, as is often the case in war, that when their children, as well as themselves, are cut off, it shall be impossible to raise another city.

Socrates/ You say true; but you imagine we ought, first of all, to take care never to run any risk.

Glaucon/ No, by no means.

Socrates/ What then, if they are at all to hazard themselves in any case, is it not where, if they succeed, they shall become better men?

Glaucon/ That is plain.

Socrates/ But do you imagine it a small matter, and not worthy of the risk, whether children, who are destined to be military men, see affairs relating to war, or not?

Glaucon/ No; it is a matter of consequence with respect to what you mention.

Socrates/ We must, then, first endeavor to make our children spectators of the war, but contrive for them a place of safety—and then it shall do well, shall it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And shall not then, our parents, in the first place, as being men, not be ignorant, but understand which of the camps are, and which are not dangerous?

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ And they shall bring them into the one, but with respect to the other they will be on their guard.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And they will probably set governors over them; not such as are the most depraved, but such as by experience and years are able leaders and pedagogues.

Glaucon/ It is very proper.

Socrates/ But we will say many things have happened contrary to expectation.

Glaucon/ Very many.

Socrates/ With reference therefore to such events as these, it is proper that whilst they are children they procure wings, that so, in any necessity, they may escape by flight.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ They must, when extremely young, be mounted on horses, and taught to ride on horse-back, and brought to see the battle, not on high-mettled and warlike horses, but on the fleetest, and those that are the most obedient to the rein; for thus they shall, in the best manner, observe their proper work, and, on any necessity, shall escape with the greatest safety, following the aged leaders.

Glaucon/ You seem to me, to say right.

Socrates/ But what, as to the affairs of war? how are you to manage your soldiers, both with respect to one another and their enemies? have I imagined rightly or not?

Glaucon/ As to what?

Socrates/ That whoever of them, leaves his rank, throws away his arms, or does any such thing from cowardice, must he not be made a handicraft, or land-laborer?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And shall not the man who is taken alive by the enemy be given gratis to any who incline to employ him in the country just as they please?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And are you of opinion, that he who gains a character, and excels, ought, in the first place, in the expedition itself, to be crowned in some measure by everyone of the youths and boys who are his fellow soldiers? or think you otherwise?

Glaucon/ I am of opinion, for my part, they ought to be crowned.

Socrates/ But what, and get the right hand likewise?

Glaucon/ This likewise.

Socrates/ But this further, I imagine, you are not yet satisfied about.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That they embrace and be embraced by everyone.

Glaucon/ They should most of all others: and I will add to this law, that whilst they are upon this expedition no one shall be allowed to refute them, whoever they incline to embrace, that if any happen to be in love with anyone, male or female, he may be the more animated to win the prizes.

Socrates/ Very well; for we have already said that there are more marriages provided for the good citizen than for others, and more frequent choice in such matters allowed them than others, that the descendants of such an one may be as numerous as possible.

Glaucon/ We have already said so.

Socrates/ But surely, even according to Homer's opinion, it is just that such of the youth as are brave be honored in this way. For Homer says that Ajax, who excelled in war, was

rewarded with a large share at the entertainments, this being the most natural reward to a brave man in the bloom of youth, by which he at the same time acquired honor and strength.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ We shall then obey Homer, at least, in these things. And we shall honor the good, both at our sacrifices, and on all such occasions, in as far as they appear to be deserving, with hymns likewise, and with those things we lately mentioned; and besides these things, with seats, and dishes, and full cup; that at the same time we may both honor and exercise the virtue of worthy men and women.

Glaucon/ You say most admirably well.

Socrates/ Be it so. If anyone of those who die in the army shall have distinguished himself, shall we not, in the first place, say that he is of the golden race?

Glaucon/ Most especially.

Socrates/ And shall we not believe Hesiod, telling us, that when any of these die;

> Good, holy, earthly dæmons, they become,
> Expelling evils, guardians of mankind?

Glaucon/ We shall believe him.

Socrates/ And we shall ask the oracle in what manner we ought to bury dæmoniacal and divine men, and with what marks of distinction; and thus shall we bury them in that very manner which shall be explained.

Glaucon/ Why shall we not?

Socrates/ And we shall in all after time reverence and worship their tombs as those of dæmons. And we shall enact by law, that the same things be performed, and in the same manner, to any who shall have been deemed to have

remarkably distinguished themselves in life, when they die of old-age, or anything else?

Glaucon/ It is right.

Socrates/ But what now? How shall our soldiers behave towards enemies?

Glaucon/ As to what?

Socrates/ First, as to bringing into slavery. Do you think it just that Greeks should enslave Greek cities? or rather, as far as they are able, not suffer any other to do it, and accustom themselves to this, to be sparing of the Grecian tribe, being greatly on their guard against being enslaved by the Barbarians?

Glaucon/ It is, in general, and in every particular case, best to be sparing.

Socrates/ Are they not to acquire any Grecian slave themselves, and to counsel the other Greeks to act in the same manner?

Glaucon/ By all means. They will the more, at least, by such a conduct, turn themselves against the Barbarians, and abstain from one another.

Socrates/ But what? To strip the dead, of anything but their arms after they conquer them, is it handsome or not? It gives a pretense to cowards not to go against the enemy who is alive, as being necessarily occupied when they are thus employed about the one who is dead; and many armies have been lost by this plundering.

Glaucon/ Very many.

Socrates/ And does it not appear to you to be illiberal and sordid, and the part of a womanish and little mind, to strip the dead body, and deem the body of the deceased an enemy, when the enemy is fled off, and there is only left behind that with which he sought? Or, do you imagine that they who act

in this manner do any way different from dogs, who are in a rage at the stones which are thrown at them, not touching the man who throws them?

Glaucon/ Not in the least.

Socrates/ We must let alone then this stripping the dead, and these hindrances arising from the carrying off booty.

Glaucon/ Truly, these must be banished.

Socrates/ Nor shall we at any time bring the arms into the temples, as if we were to dedicate them, at least not the arms of Grecians, if we have any concern to obtain the benevolence of the other Greeks: but we shall rather be afraid, lest it should be a kind of profanation to bring into the temple such things as these from our own kinsman, unless the oracle shall say otherwise.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ But what, with reference to the laying waste Grecian lands, and burning of houses, how shall your soldiers behave towards their enemies?

Glaucon/ I should be glad, to hear you signifying your opinion.

Socrates/ Truly then, in my opinion, neither of these ought to be done, but only one year's produce to be carried off. And would you have me tell you the reason why this should be done?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ It appears to me, that as these two words, war and sedition, are different, so they are two different things which are signified by them: I call them two different things, because the one is domestic and akin, the other foreign and strange. When hatred is among ourselves, it is called sedition; when it respects foreigners, it is called war.

Glaucon/ What you say, is no way unreasonable.

Socrates/ But consider now, if I say this likewise reasonably: for I aver that the Greek nation is friendly and akin to itself, but is foreign and strange to the Barbarian.

Glaucon/ This too is right.

Socrates/ When then the Greeks fight with the Barbarians, and the Barbarians with the Greeks, we shall say they wage war, and are naturally enemies; and this hatred is to be called war. But when Greeks do any such thing to Greeks, we shall say that they are friends by nature, and that Greece in such a case is distempered, and in sedition; and such a hatred is to be called a sedition.

Glaucon/ I agree, to account for it in the same manner.

Socrates/ Consider then, that in the sedition now mentioned, wherever such a thing happens, and the city is disjointed, if they sequester the lands, and burn the houses of one another, how destructive the sedition appears, and neither of them seem to be lovers of their country: for otherwise they would never dare to say waste their nurse and mother; but it would suffice the victors to carry off the fruits of the vanquished, and to consider they are to be reconciled, and not perpetually to be at war.

Glaucon/ This indeed is by much a more mild sentiment than the other.

Socrates/ But what now? Is not this city you are establishing a Greek one?

Glaucon/ It should be so.

Socrates/ And shall not they be good and mild?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And shall they not be lovers of Greeks? And shall they not account Greece akin to them? And shall they not have the same religious rites with the rest of the Greeks?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ A difference then with Greeks, as with kinsmen, will they not denominate a sedition, and not a war?

Glaucon/ They will.

Socrates/ And they will behave as those who are to be reconciled.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ They shall then be mild and moderate, not punishing so far as to enslave or destroy, since they are moderate, and not hostile.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Neither then, as they are Greeks, will they sequester Grecian lands, nor burn their houses; nor will they allow that in every city all are their enemies, men, women, and children; but that always a few only are enemies, the authors of the quarrel: and on all these accounts they will neither choose to say waste lands, as the greatest number are their friends; nor will they overturn the houses, but will carry on the war so far as till the guilty be obliged by the innocent, whom they distress, to make reparation.

Glaucon/ I agree, that we ought to behave so towards our own citizens when we are set against one another; and to behave so towards the Barbarians as the Greeks at present do to one another.

Socrates/ Let us then likewise establish this law for our guardians, —neither to say waste the lands, nor burn the houses.

Glaucon/ Let us establish it, and this further, that these things, and those too you mentioned formerly, are right: but it appears to me, Socrates, if one is to allow you to speak in this manner, that you will never remember what you formerly passed by, when you entered on all that you have now said; viz. how far such a government is possible? and in what way it is at all possible? For, if it be at all possible, I

will allow that all these good things will belong to that city, and the following likewise which you have omitted; —that they will, in the best manner, fight against their enemies, and of all others least abandon one another, recognizing these names, and calling one another by these, —fathers, sons, and brothers; and if the female shall encamp along with them, whether in the same rank, or drawn up behind them, that they will strike terror into the enemies, and at the same time assist if ever there be necessity for it, I know that in this way they will entirely be invincible. And I plainly see too what advantages they have at home, which we have omitted. But speak no more about this government, as I allow that all these, and ten thousand other things, will belong to it, if it actually exist. But let us endeavor to persuade one another of this itself, whether it be possible, and in what respect it is so; and let us omit those other things.

Socrates/ You have suddenly, made an assault on my reasoning, and make no allowance for one who is fighting; for perhaps you do not advert, that, with difficulty, I am escaped from two waves, and now you are bringing upon me the greatest and most dangerous of the three. After you have seen and heard this, you will entirely forgive me; allowing, that I with reason grudged, and was afraid to mention so great a paradox, and undertake to examine it.

Glaucon/ The more, you mention these things, the less will you be freed from explaining in what respect this government is possible. Proceed then, and do not delay.

Socrates/ Must not this then, in the first place, be remembered, that we are come hither in search of justice, what it is? and what injustice is?

Glaucon/ It must. But what is this to the purpose?

Socrates/ Nothing. But if we discover what justice is, shall we then judge that the just man ought in no respect to differ from it, but in every respect to be such as justice is? and shall we be satisfied if he approach the nearest to it, and, of all others, partake of it the most?

Glaucon/ We shall, be thus satisfied.

Socrates/ As a model then, we were inquiring into this, what kind of thing justice is; and we likewise were in quest of a just man; and considered what sort of man he should be, if he did exist. We likewise inquired what injustice is, and what too the most unjust men—in order that, looking into these two models, what kind of men they appeared with respect to happiness and its opposite, we might be obliged to acknowledge concerning ourselves that whoever should most resemble them in character shall have a fortune the most resembling theirs; and not for this end, to show that these things are possible or not.

Glaucon/ In this, you say true.

Socrates/ Do you imagine then that the painter is in any degree the less excellent, who having painted a model of the most beautiful man, and brought everything fully into his piece, is yet unable to show that such a man does really exist?

Glaucon/ By Zeus, I do not.

Socrates/ What then, have we not made in our reasonings (shall we say) a model of a good city?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Have we then spoken anything the worse, do you imagine, on this account, that we are not able to show, that it is possible for a city to be established such as we have described?

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ This then, is the truth of the case. But if truly I must now likewise, on your account, hasten to this, to show how especially, and in what respects, it is most possible, in order to this discovery, you must again grant the same things as formerly.

Glaucon/ What things?

Socrates/ Is it possible for anything to be executed so perfectly as it is described? or, is such the nature of practice, that it approaches not so near the truth as theory, though some may think otherwise? But whether will you allow this or not?

Glaucon/ I allow it.

Socrates/ Do not then oblige me to show you all these things, and in every respect, existing in fact, so perfectly as we have described in our reasoning; but if we be able to find out how a city may be established the nearest possible to what we have mentioned, you will say we have discovered that these things which you require are possible? Or will you not even be satisfied if this be obtained? For my own part, I should be satisfied.

Glaucon/ And I too.

Socrates/ We are now, it seems, in the next place, to endeavor to find out and to show what, at all, is the evil which is now practiced in cities through which they are not established in this manner we have described; and what is that smallest change, which, if made, would bring the city to this model of government; and let us chiefly see, if this can be effected by the change of one thing, if not by the change of two, if not that, by the change of the fewest things in number, and the smallest in power.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Upon the change then of one thing, I am able I think to show that the state can fall into this model of

government. But the change is not indeed small nor easy, yet it is possible.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ I am now come, to what I compared to the greatest wave: and it shall now be mentioned, though, like a breaking wave, it should overwhelm us with excessive laughter and unbelief. But consider what I am going to say.

Glaucon/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Unless either philosophers, govern in cities, or those who are at present called kings and governors philosophize genuinely and sufficiently, and these two, the political power and philosophy, unite in one; and till the bulk of those who at present pursue each of these separately are of necessity excluded, there shall be no end, Glauco, to the miseries of cities, nor yet, as I imagine, to those of the human race; nor till then shall ever this republic, which we have gone over in our reasonings, spring up to a possibility, and behold the light of the sun. But this is that which all along made me grudge to mention it, that I saw what a paradox I was to utter: For it is difficult to be convinced that no other but this republic can enjoy happiness, whether public or private.

Glaucon/ You have thrown out, Socrates, such an expression and argument, as you may imagine will bring on you a great many, and these courageous to such a degree as to put off their clothes, and naked to snatch whatever weapon fortune affords each of them; and, as if they were to perform prodigies, rush upon you in battle array. And unless, mowing them down with argument, you make your escape, you will pay for it by suffering most severe ridicule.

Socrates/ And are not you the cause of all this?

Glaucon/ But in acting handsomely at least. However, in this affair, I will not betray you, but defend you with such

things as I am able. And I am able both by my goodwill and by encouraging you, and probably I will answer your questions more carefully than any other; only do you endeavor, with the help of such an assistant, to show those who are backward to believe these things, that the case really is as you represent it.

Socrates/ I must endeavor, since even you afford so great an alliance. And here it seems to me to be necessary, if we are any how to make our escape from those you mention, accurately to define to them what kind of men these are whom we call philosophers, when we dare to assert that they alone ought to govern, in order that, when they are made perfectly manifest, anyone may be able to defend himself, when he asserts that to these it naturally belongs both to apply themselves to philosophy, and likewise to take upon them the government of the state: but others are to apply themselves neither to philosophy nor government, but to obey their leader.

Glaucon/ It is proper, to define them.

Socrates/ Come then, follow me this way, if together any how we shall sufficiently explain this matter.

Glaucon/ Lead on then.

Socrates/ Will it then be needful, to remind you, or do you remember it, that when we say of anyone, that he loves anything, when we speak with propriety, he must not appear to love one part of it, and not another, but to have an affection for the whole?

Glaucon/ I need, it seems, to be put in mind; for I do not understand it perfectly.

Socrates/ It might become another, Glauco, to say what you say; but it does not become a man who is a lover, to forget that all those who are in their bloom sting somehow, and give emotion to one who is amorous, and a lover, as they

are deemed worthy both of respect and of being saluted. Or do you not behave in this manner towards the beautiful? One, because flat-nosed, shall be called agreeable, and be commended by you; and the hook-nose of the other, you say, is princely; and that which is in the middle of these is according to the exactest symmetry: the black are said to be manly to behold; and the fair to be the children of the Gods: —but this appellation of pale green, do you imagine it is the invention of any other than of a flattering lover, and one who easily bears with the paleness, provided it is in the bloom of youth? And, in one word, you make all kinds of pretenses and say everything so as never to reject anyone who is of a blooming age?

Glaucon/ If you incline to judge by me of other lovers, that they act in this manner, I agree to it for the sake of the argument.

Socrates/ And what, with respect to the lovers of wine; do you not observe them acting in the same manner, cheerfully drinking every kind of wine upon every pretext?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And you perceive, as I imagine, that the ambitious likewise, if they cannot obtain the command of a whole army, will take the third command; and, if they cannot be honored by greater and better men, are content if they be honored by the lower and more contemptible, being desirous of honor at any rate?

Glaucon/ It is perfectly so.

Socrates/ Agree to this or not: if we say, one is desirous of anything, shall we say that he desires the whole species, or that he desires one part of it, but not another?

Glaucon/ The whole.

Socrates/ Shall we not then likewise say, that the philosopher is desirous of wisdom, and that not of one part only, but of the whole?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ He then who is averse to disciplines, especially if he be young, and has not at all understanding to discern what is good, and what is otherwise, shall not be called a lover of learning, nor a philosopher; in the same manner as we say of one who is disgusted with meats, that he neither hungers after nor desires meats, nor is a lover but a hater of them.

Glaucon/ And we shall say right.

Socrates/ But the man who readily inclines to taste of every discipline, and with pleasure enters on the study of it, and is insatiable of it, this man we shall with justice call a philosopher: shall we not?

Glaucon/ There will be many such philosophers as those very absurd: for all your lovers of shows appear to me to be of this kind, from their taking a pleasure in learning; and your story lovers are the most stupid of all to be reckoned among philosophers at least. These indeed would not willingly attend on such reasonings, and such a disquisition as this. But yet, as if they had hired out their ears to listen to every chorus, they run about to the Bacchanalia, omitting neither those of cities nor villages. Shall all these then, and others studious of such things, and those who apply to the inferior arts, be called by us philosophers?

Socrates/ By no means, but resembling philosophers.

Glaucon/ But whom, do you call the true ones?

Socrates/ Those, who are desirous of discerning the truth.

Glaucon/ This likewise, is right. But how do you mean?

Socrates/ It is not easy, to tell it to another; but you, I imagine, will agree with me in this.

Glaucon/ In what?

Socrates/ That since the beautiful is opposite to the deformed, these are two things.

Glaucon/ Why are they not?

Socrates/ And if they are two, then each of them is one.

Glaucon/ This also is granted.

Socrates/ And the reasoning is the same concerning justice and injustice, good and evil. And concerning every other species of things the argument is the same—that each of them is one in itself, but appears to be many, being everywhere diversified by their communication with action and body, and with one another.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ In this manner then, I separate these, and set apart those you now mentioned, the lovers of public shows, of handicrafts, and mechanics; and then apart from these I set those of whom we discourse at present, whom alone we may properly call philosophers.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ The lovers of common stories and of spectacles delight in fine sounds, colors, and figures, and everything which is compounded of these; but the nature of beauty itself their dianoëtic part is unable to discern and admire.

Glaucon/ Indeed the case is so.

Socrates/ But as to those then who are able to approach this beauty itself, and to behold it as it is in itself, must they not be few in number?

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ He then who accounts some things beautiful, but neither knows beauty itself, nor is able to follow if one

were to lead him to the knowledge of it, does he seem to you to live in a dream, or to be awake? Consider now, what is it to dream? Is it not this, when a man, whether asleep or awake, imagines the similitude of a thing is not the similitude, but really the thing itself which it resembles?

Glaucon/ I for my part would aver, that such a person is really in a dream.

Socrates/ But what now as to him who judges opposite to this, who understands what beauty is itself, and is able to discern both it and such things as participate of it, and neither deems the participants to be beauty, nor beauty to be the participants? whether does such an one seem to you to live awake, or in a dream?

Glaucon/ Perfectly awake.

Socrates/ May we not then properly call this man's dianoëtic perception, as he really knows, knowledge, but that of the other, opinion, as he only opines?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But what if the person who we say only opines things, but does not really know them, be enraged at us, and dispute with us, alleging that what we say is not true; shall we have any method of soothing and persuading him, in a gentle manner, by concealing that he is not in a sound state?

Glaucon/ At least there is need of it.

Socrates/ Come now, consider what we shall say to him. Or do you incline we shall thus interrogate him? telling him, that if he knows anything, no one envies him for it, but we shall gladly see him possessed of some knowledge; but only tell us this, does the man who has knowledge, know something or nothing? Do you now answer me for him?

Glaucon/ I will answer, that he knows something.

Socrates/ Whether something which really exists, or which does not?

Glaucon/ What does really exist: for how can that be known which has no real existence?

Socrates/ We have then examined this sufficiently, though we might have considered it more fully; that what really is, may be really known; but what does not at all exist, cannot at all be known.

Glaucon/ We have examined it most sufficiently.

Socrates/ Be it so. But if there be anything of such a kind, as both to be and not to be, must it not lie between that which perfectly is, and that which is not at all?

Glaucon/ Between them.

Socrates/ As to what really is, then, is there not knowledge? and as to that which is not at all, is there not of necessity ignorance? And for that which is between these, we must seek for something between ignorance and science, if there be any such thing.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Do we say then that opinion is anything?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ Whether is it a different power from science, or the same?

Glaucon/ Different.

Socrates/ Is opinion then conversant about one thing, and science about another, by virtue of the same power, or each of them by virtue of a power of its own?

Glaucon/ This last.

Socrates/ Is not the power of science conversant about what really exist, to know that it is? Or rather it seems to me to be necessary to distinguish in this manner.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ We shall say, that powers are a certain species of real existences, by which we can both do whatever we can do, and every being else whatever it can do. Thus, I say, that seeing and hearing are among these powers, if you understand what I mean to call a species.

Glaucon/ I understand.

Socrates/ Hear then what appears to me concerning them. For I do not see any color of a power, nor figure, nor any of such qualities, as of many other things, with reference to which I distinguish some things with myself, that they are different from one another. But as to power, I regard that alone about which it is conversant, and what it effects; and on this account I have called each of these a power. And the power which is conversant about and effects one and the same thing, I call the same power, but that conversant about and effecting a different thing, I call a different power: but what say you? In what manner do you call it?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But come again, excellent Glauco, whether do you say that science is itself a certain power, or to what class do you refer it?

Glaucon/ I refer it to this class of power, as it is of all powers the most strong. But what now?

Socrates/ Shall we refer opinion to power, or to some other species?

Glaucon/ By no means to power; for that by which we form opinions is nothing else but opinion.

Socrates/ But you owned some time since, that science and opinion were not the same.

Glaucon/ How, can ever anyone who possesses intellect reduce under one, that which is infallible, and that which is not infallible?

Socrates/ You say right. And it is plain that we have allowed opinion to be a different thing from science.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ Each of them then has naturally a different power over a different thing.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Science has a power over being itself, in knowing real existence, how it exists.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But we say that opinion opines.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Whether does it know the same thing which science knows? and shall that which is known, and that which is opined, be the same? or is this impossible?

Glaucon/ Impossible, from what we have allowed: since they are naturally powers of different things, and both of them are powers, opinion and science, and each of them different from the other, as we have said from these things it cannot be, that what is opined is the same with that which is known.

Socrates/ If then being itself be known, must it not be different from the being which is perceived by opinion?

Glaucon/ Different.

Socrates/ Does he then who opines, opine that which has no existence? Or is it impossible to opine that which doth not exist at all? Consider now, does not the man who opines, refer his opinion to somewhat? Or is it possible to opine, and yet opine nothing at all?

Glaucon/ Impossible.

Socrates/ But whoever opines, opines some one thing.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But surely that which does not exist, cannot be called anyone thing, but most properly nothing at all.

Glaucon/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ But we necessarily referred ignorance to that which does not exist, but knowledge to real existence.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Neither therefore does he opine being, nor yet that which is not.

Glaucon/ He does not.

Socrates/ Opinion then is neither knowledge, nor is it ignorance.

Glaucon/ It appears it is not.

Socrates/ Does it then exceed these, either knowledge in perspicuity, or ignorance in obscurity?

Glaucon/ It does neither.

Socrates/ But does opinion, seem to you to be more obscure than knowledge, but more perspicuous than ignorance?

Glaucon/ By much.

Socrates/ But does it lie between them both then?

Glaucon/ It does.

Socrates/ Opinion then is in the middle of these two.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And have we not already said, that if anything appeared of such a kind, as at the same time to be, and yet not to be, such a thing would lie between that which has really an existence, and that which does not at all exist, and that neither science nor ignorance would be conversant about it, but that which appeared to be between ignorance and science?

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ And now that which we call opinion, has appeared to be between them.

Glaucon/ It has appeared.

Socrates/ It yet remains for us, as it seems, to discover that which participates, of both these, of being, and of non-being, and which with propriety can be called neither of them perfectly, that if it appear to be that which is opined, we may justly call it so, assigning to the extremes what is extreme, and to the middle what is in the middle. Shall we not do thus?

Glaucon/ Thus.

Socrates/ These things being determined, let this worthy man, I will say, tell and answer me, he who reckons that beauty, and a certain idea of beauty there is none, always the same, and in the same respects; but this lover of beautiful objects reckons there are many beautiful things, but can never endure to be told that there is one beautiful, and one just, and so of others. Of all these many things, excellent man! shall we say to him, is there any which will not appear deformed, and of those just which will not appear unjust, of those holy which will not appear profane?

Glaucon/ No; but of necessity, the beautiful things themselves must in some respects appear even deformed, and others in like manner.

Socrates/ But what? many things which are double, or two-fold, do they less really appear to be halves than doubles?

Glaucon/ No less.

Socrates/ And things great and small, light and heavy, shall they be denominated what we call them, any more than the opposite?

Glaucon/ No; but each of them, always participates of both.

Socrates/ Whether then is each of these many things that which it is said to be, or is it not?

Glaucon/ It is like their riddles at feasts, and the riddle of children about the eunuch's striking the bat, puzzling one another in what manner and how far he strikes it. For all these things have a double meaning, and it is impossible to know accurately that they are, or are not, that they are both, or neither of the two.

Socrates/ How can you do with them then? or have you a better class for them than a medium between being and non-being? For nothing seems more obscure than non-being in respect of having no being at all, nor more perspicuous than being in respect of real being.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ We have then discovered, it seems, that most of the maxims of the multitude concerning the beautiful, and those other things, roll somehow between being and non-being.

Glaucon/ We have accurately discovered it.

Socrates/ But we formerly agreed, that if any such thing should appear, it ought to be called that which is opined, and not what is known; and that which fluctuates between the two is to be perceived by the power between the two.

Glaucon/ We agreed.

Socrates/ Those then who contemplate many beautiful things, but who never perceive beauty itself, nor are able to follow another leading them to it; and many just things, but never justice itself, and all other things in like manner, we will say that they opine all things, but know none of the things which they opine.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ But what now? Those who perceive each of the things themselves, always existing in the same manner, and in the same respect, shall we not say that they know, and do not opine?

Glaucon/ Of necessity this likewise.

Socrates/ And shall we not say, that these embrace and love the things of which they have knowledge, and the others the things of which they have opinion? Or do we not remember, that we said they beheld and loved fine sounds and colors, and such things; but that beauty itself they do not admit of as any real being?

Glaucon/ We remember.

Socrates/ Shall we then act wrong in calling them lovers of opinion, rather than philosophers? And yet they will be greatly enraged at us if we call them so.

Glaucon/ Not, if they be persuaded by me; for it is not lawful to be enraged at the truth.

Socrates/ Those then who admire everything which has a real being, are to be called philosophers, and not lovers of opinion.

Glaucon/ By all means.

THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

Book 6.

Socrates/ Those now who are philosophers, Glauco, and those who are not, have, through a long compass of discourse, with difficulty discovered themselves what they severally are.

Glaucon/ Because, perhaps, it was not easy, in a short one.

Socrates/ So it appears. But I still think they would have better discovered themselves, if it had been requisite to speak concerning this alone, and not to have discussed that multitude of other things, when we were to consider what difference there is between a just life and an unjust.

Glaucon/ What then, are we to treat of next?

Socrates/ What else, but of that which is next in order? Since those are philosophers who are able to pass into contact with that which always subsists similarly according to the same; but those who are not able to accomplish this, but who wander amidst many things, and such as are every way shifting, are not philosophers; which of these ought to be the governors of the city?

Glaucon/ Which way, shall we determine in this, and determine reasonably?

Socrates/ Whichever of them, appear capable of preserving the laws and institutions of cities, these are to be made guardians.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ This now, is certainly plain; whether a blind or quick-sighted guardian be proper for guarding anything.

Glaucon/ Why is it not plain?

Socrates/ Whether then do those appear to you to differ from the blind, who are in reality deprived of the knowledge of each particular being, and have neither a clear paradigm

in their soul, nor are able, as painters looking up to the truest paradigm, and always referring themselves thither, and contemplating it in the most accurate manner possible, to establish here too in like manner just maxims of the beautiful, and just, and good, if there be occasion to establish them, and to guard and preserve such as are already established?

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus.

Socrates/ They do not differ much. Shall we then appoint those to be guardians, or those who know each being, and who in experience are nothing behind those others, nor inferior to them in any other part of virtue?

Glaucon/ It were absurd, to choose others, at least if these are not deficient in other things; for in this, which is almost the greatest, they excel.

Socrates/ Shall we not then speak to this point, —In what manner the same persons shall be able to have both the one and the other of those things?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ It is then first of all necessary, as we observed in the beginning of this discourse, thoroughly to understand their genius; and I think if we sufficiently agree respecting it, we shall likewise agree that the same persons be able to possess both these things, and that no others but these ought to be the governors of cities.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Let this now be agreed among us concerning the philosophic geniuses, that they are always desirous of such learning as may discover to them that essence which always is, and is not changed by generation or corruption.

Glaucon/ Let it be agreed.

Socrates/ And likewise, that they are desirous of the whole of such learning, and that they will not willingly omit any part of it, neither small nor great, more honorable or more dishonorable, as we formerly observed concerning the ambitious, and concerning lovers.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ Consider then, in the next place, if, besides what we have mentioned, it be necessary that this also should subsist in the genius of those who are to be such as we have described.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That they be void of falsehood, nor willingly at any time receive a lie; but hate it, and love the truth.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ It is not only likely, my friend, but is perfectly necessary, that one who is naturally in love with anything should love everything allied and belonging to the objects of his affection.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Can you then find anything more allied to wisdom than truth?

Glaucon/ How can we?

Socrates/ Is it possible then that the same genius can be philosophic, and at the same time a lover of falsehood?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ He then who is in reality a lover of learning, ought immediately from his infancy to be in the greatest measure desirous of all truth.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But we know somehow, that whoever has his desires vehemently verging to one thing, has them upon this

very account weaker as to other things, as a current diverted from its channel.

Glaucon/ Why are they not?

Socrates/ But whosoever hath his desires running out after learning, and everything of this kind, would be conversant, I think, about the pleasure of the soul itself, and would forsake those pleasures which arise from the body, provided he be not a counterfeit, but some real philosopher.

Glaucon/ This follows by a mighty necessity.

Socrates/ And such an one is moderate, and by no means a lover of money. For the reasons why money is with so much trouble anxiously sought after, have weight with any other than such an one to make him solicitous.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And surely somehow you must likewise consider this when you are to judge what is a philosophic genius, and what is not.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That it do not without your knowledge partake of an illiberal turn: for pusillanimity is most opposite to a soul which is always to pursue earnestly the whole and everything of that which is divine and human.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Do you then suppose that he who possesses magnificent conceptions in his dianoëtic part, and a contemplation of the whole of time, and the whole of being, can possibly consider human life as a thing of great consequence.

Glaucon/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Such an one then will not account death anything terrible.

Glaucon/ Least of all.

Socrates/ A cowardly and illiberal genius, then, will not, it seems, readily participate of true philosophy.

Glaucon/ It does not appear to me that it will.

Socrates/ What now, can the moderate man, and one who is not a lover of money, nor illiberal, nor arrogant, nor cowardly, ever possibly be an ill co-partner, or unjust?

Glaucon/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ And you will likewise consider this, when you are viewing from its infancy what is the philosophic soul, and what is not, whether it be just and mild, or unsocial and savage.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Neither indeed, as I think, will you omit this.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Whether it learn with facility or difficulty. Or do you expect that ever anyone will love anything sufficiently, in performing which he performs with uneasiness and with difficulty, making small progress?

Glaucon/ It cannot be.

Socrates/ But what if he can retain nothing of what he learns, being quite forgetful, is it possible for him not to be void of science?

Glaucon/ How is it possible?

Socrates/ And when he labors unprofitably, do you not imagine he will be obliged at last to hate both himself and such practice?

Glaucon/ Why must he not?

Socrates/ We shall never then reckon a forgetful soul among those who are thoroughly philosophic, but we shall require it to be of a good memory.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ But never shall we say this at least, that an unmusical and indecent genius leads anywhere else but towards intemperance.

Glaucon/ Where else?

Socrates/ But whether do you reckon truth allied to intemperance or to temperance?

Glaucon/ To temperance.

Socrates/ Let us require then among other things a dianoëtic part naturally temperate and graceful, as a proper guide towards spontaneously attaining the idea of each particular being.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ What now? Do we not in some measure seem to you to have discussed the necessary qualifications, and such as are consequent to each other, in a soul which is to apprehend being sufficiently, and in perfection?

Glaucon/ The most necessary.

Socrates/ Is it possible then for you in any measure to blame such a study as this, which a man can never be able sufficiently to apply to, unless he be naturally possessed of a good memory, learn with facility, be magnificent, graceful, and the friend and ally of truth, justice, fortitude and temperance?

Glaucon/ Not even Momus himself, could find fault with such a study.

Socrates/ But, will it not be to these alone, when they are perfected by education and age, that you will entrust the city?

Adeimantus/ Indeed, Socrates, no one is able to contradict you as to these things; but all who hear you at any time advancing what you do at present, are somehow affected in this manner. Being led off a little by your

reasoning on each question, through their inexperience in this method of question and answer, when all these littles are collected together, at the close of your reasonings, they reckon that the mistake appears considerable, and the contrary of their first concessions; and like those who play at talus with such as are dexterous, but are themselves unskillful, they are in the end shut up, and can do no more; so your hearers have nothing to say, being shut up by this other kind of game, not with pieces, but with your reasonings. Though the truth at least is not by this any way advanced: I say this with reference to the present inquiry; for one may tell you that he has nothing to oppose to each of your questions by way of argument, but that in fact he sees that all those who plunge into philosophy, applying to it not with this view, that being early instructed they may be liberated from it when in their prime, but that they may continue in it much longer, become the most of them quite awkward, not to say altogether depraved; and those of them who appear the most worthy, do yet suffer thus much from this study you so much commend, that they become useless to the public.

Socrates/ When I had heard this, Do you imagine then, that such as say these things are telling a falsehood?

Adeimantus/ I do not know, but would gladly hear your opinion.

Socrates/ You would then hear that they appear to me to say true.

Adeimantus/ How then, is it right to say that the miseries of cities shall never have an end till they be governed by philosophers, whom we are now acknowledging to be useless to them?

Socrates/ You ask a question, which needs an answer through an image.

Adeimantus/ And you, are not wont, I think, to speak through images.

Socrates/ Be it so. You jest now, when you have brought me on a subject which is so difficult to be explained. But attend to the image, that you may see further with what difficulty I assimilate; for the sufferings of the most worthy philosophers in the management of public affairs are so grievous, that there is not anyone other suffering so severe: but in making our simile, and in apologizing for them, we must collect from many particulars, in the same manner as painters mix the figures of two different animals together, and paint a creature which is both goat and stag in one, and others of this kind. Conceive now that such an one as this is the pilot of a fleet, or of a single ship, one who exceeds all in the ship, both in bulk and in strength, but is somewhat deaf, and sees in like manner but a short way, and whose skill in sea affairs is much of the same kind. Conceive likewise that the sailors are all in sedition among themselves, contending for the pilotship, each imagining he ought to be pilot, though he never learned the art, nor is able to show who was his master, nor at what time he learned it. That besides this, all of them say that the art itself cannot be taught, and are ready to cut in pieces anyone who says that it can. Imagine further, that they continually surround the pilot himself, begging, and doing everything that he may put the helm into their hands; and that even sometimes when they are not so successful in persuading him as others are, they either kill these others, or throw them overboard; and after they have by mandragora, or wine, or some other thing, rendered the noble pilot incapable, they manage the ship with the assistance of the crew, and whilst they drink and feast in this manner, they sail as it may be expected of such people. And besides these things, if anyone be dexterous in assisting them to get the government into their

own hands, and in setting aside the pilot, either by persuasion or force, they commend such an one, calling him sailor and pilot, and intelligent in navigation; but they contemn as useless everyone who is not of this kind, whilst they never in the least think that the true pilot must necessarily pay attention to the year, the seasons, the heavens, and stars, and winds, and everything belonging to the art, if he intends to be a governor of a ship in reality: but the art and practice of governing men, whether some be willing or not, they think impossible for a man to attain in conjunction with the art of navigation. Whilst affairs are in this situation with regard to the ships, do you not think that the true pilot will be called by the sailors aboard of ships fitted out in this manner, a star-gazer, insignificant, and unprofitable to them?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ I think then, that you will not want any explanation of the image, to see that it represents how they are affected in cities towards true philosophers, but that you understand what I say.

Adeimantus/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ First of all then with respect to this, if anyone wonders that philosophers are not honored in cities, teach him our image, and endeavor to persuade him that it would be much more wonderful if they were honored.

Adeimantus/ I will teach him so.

Socrates/ And further, that it is indeed true, what you now was observing, that the best of those who apply to philosophy are useless to the bulk of mankind; but however, for this, bid them blame such as make no use of these philosophers, and not these philosophers themselves. For it is not natural for the pilot to entreat the sailors to allow him to govern them, nor for the wise to be resorting to the gates

of the rich. But whoever pleasantly said this was mistaken; for this is truly the natural method, that whoever is sick, whether rich or poor, must of necessity go to the gates of the physician, and whoever wants to be governed must wait on him who is able to govern; for it is not natural that the governor who is really of any value should entreat the governed to subject themselves to his government. But you will not greatly err, when you compare our present political governors to those sailors we now mentioned, and those who are called by them insignificant and star-gazers to those who are truly pilots.

Adeimantus/ Most right.

Socrates/ From hence then it would seem that the best pursuit is not likely to be held in esteem among those who pursue studies of an opposite nature; but by far the greatest and most violent accusation of philosophy is occasioned by means of those who profess to study it; the most of whom, you say, your accuser of philosophy calls altogether depraved, and the very best of them of no advantage to the state; and I agreed that you say the truth, did I not?

Adeimantus/ You did.

Socrates/ And have we not fully explained the cause why the best of them are of no advantage?

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ Would you choose then, that we should in the next place explain the reason why the most of them must of necessity be depraved, and that we endeavor to demonstrate, that of this, philosophy is by no means the cause.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Let us attend then, and begin our reasoning, calling to mind what we formerly observed concerning the natural genius which necessarily belongs to the good and

worthy. —And what was a leading part in it, if you remember, was truth, which he must by all means wholly pursue, or else be a vain boaster, and never partake of true philosophy.

Adeimantus/ It was so said.

Socrates/ Is not this one part of his character perfectly contrary to the present opinions of him?

Adeimantus/ It is very much so.

Socrates/ Will it not then be no small defense, if we be able to show that the true lover of learning is naturally made to aspire to the knowledge of real being, and not to rest in the many particular things which are the objects of opinion, but goes on, and is not blunted, nor ceases from his love of truth till he comes into contact with the nature of everything which is, by that part of the soul whose office it is to come into contact with a thing of this kind. But it is the office of that part of the soul which is allied to real being; to which when this true lover of learning approaches, and is mingled with it, having generated intellect and truth, he will then have true knowledge, and truly live and be nourished, and then he becomes liberated from the pains of parturition, but not before.

Adeimantus/ This, will be a most reasonable defense.

Socrates/ What now, will it be the part of such an one to love falsehood, or, entirely the contrary, to hate it?

Adeimantus/ To hate it.

Socrates/ But whilst truth indeed leads the way, we can never, I think, say that any band of evils follows in her train.

Adeimantus/ How can we?

Socrates/ But, on the contrary, we may aver that she is followed by sound and moderate manners, and such as are accompanied with temperance.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ Why, now, need we go over again and range in order the whole qualities of the philosophic genius? for you no doubt remember that there belong to men of this character fortitude, magnanimity, facility of learning, and memory: and when you replied that everyone would be obliged to agree to what we said, we quitted that subject, and turned to that which is the subject of discourse at present, on your saying that you observed some of the philosophers were insignificant, and many of them altogether depraved. And while we were examining into the cause of that calumny, we are now come to this, whence it is that many of them are depraved. And on this account we have gone over again the genius of true philosophers, and have necessarily defined what it is.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ It is necessary now, that we consider the corruptions of this genius, and in what manner it is destroyed in the most; but one small particular escapes us: who those are that they call not depraved, but useless. And next, what those geniuses are which counterfeit the philosophic nature, and pretend to its pursuit: and what is the nature of those souls who aspire to a pursuit which does not belong to them, and is above their reach: for these, by their manifold errors, have everywhere, and among all men, introduced this opinion of philosophy which you mention.

Adeimantus/ What sort of corruptions, do you mean?

Socrates/ I shall endeavor to rehearse them, if I be able. And this now, I think, everyone will allow us, that such a genius, with all those qualifications we have enjoined one who is to be a perfect philosopher, rarely arises among men, and that there are but few of them: do not you think so?

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And of those few, consider how many and how great are the causes of corruption.

Adeimantus/ What are they?

Socrates/ That which is most of all wonderful to hear, that each of those things we commended in the genius of a philosopher, corrupts the soul which possesses them, and withdraws it from philosophy; fortitude, I mean, and temperance, and all those other qualifications which we have discussed.

Adeimantus/ That is strange to hear.

Socrates/ And further still, besides these things, all those which are commonly called good, such as beauty, riches, strength of body, a powerful alliance in the city, and everything akin to these, corrupt and withdraw it from philosophy; for you have now a specimen of what I mean.

Adeimantus/ I have; and would gladly understand more accurately what you say.

Socrates/ Understand then, the whole of it aright, and it will appear manifest, and what we formerly said will not seem to be absurd.

Adeimantus/ How then, do you bid me act?

Socrates/ With respect to every kind of seed, or plant, whether of vegetables or animals, we know, that whatever does not meet with the proper nourishment, nor season, nor place belonging to it, the more vigorous it is by nature, the more it is defective in the excellencies of its kind; for evil is more contrary to good, than to that which is not good.

Adeimantus/ Why is it not?

Socrates/ It is then reasonable, I think, that the best genius, when meeting with nourishment foreign to it, shall be more changed to what is evil, than a bad genius.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ And shall we not, Adimantus, in the same manner, say that souls naturally the best, when they meet with bad education, become remarkably depraved? Or do you think that great iniquity, and the extremist wickedness, arise from a weak genius, and not from a vigorous one ruined in its education; but that an imbecile genius will never be the cause either of mighty good or evil?

Adeimantus/ I do not think it will, but the case is as you say.

Socrates/ If then this philosophic genius, which we have established, meet with suitable instruction, it will, I think, necessarily grow up, and attain to every virtue; but if, when sown in an improper soil, it grow up and be nourished accordingly, it will on the other hand become perfectly the reverse, unless someone of the Gods afford it assistance. Or do you think, with the multitude, that certain of the youth are corrupted by the sophists, and that the corruptors are certain private sophists, which is worthy of our notice? Or think you rather, that the persons who say these things are themselves the greatest sophists, conveying their instruction in the most powerful manner, and rendering young and old, men and women, such as they wish to be?

Adeimantus/ When do they effect this?

Socrates/ When many of them, are set down, crowded together in an assembly, in their courts of justice, the theatre, or the camp, or any other public meeting of the people, with much tumult they blame some of the speeches and actions, and commend others, roaring and vociferating the one and the other beyond measure. And besides this, the rocks and the place where they are resounding, the tumult is redoubled, whilst they thus blame and applaud. In such a situation now, what kind of heart, as we say, do you think the youth are to have? Or what private instruction can make

him withstand, so as not to be perfectly overwhelmed by such blame or applause, and, giving way, be borne along the stream wherever it carries him, and say that things are beautiful and base, according as these people say, and pursue the things they pursue, and become of the very same kind himself?

Adeimantus/ This, must by an abundant necessity happen, Socrates.

Socrates/ But, we have not yet mentioned, what must of the greatest necessity be the case.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That which these instructors and sophists superadd by action, not being able to persuade by speech: or, do you not know, that they punish with disgraces, and fines, and deaths, the man whom they cannot persuade?

Adeimantus/ I know that, extremely well.

Socrates/ What other sophist then, or what private reasonings do you think capable, drawing opposite to these, to overpower them?

Adeimantus/ I know none.

Socrates/ But is it not besides, great folly even to attempt it? For there neither is, nor was, nor ever can be, a different method of attaining virtue, besides this education by these sophists. I mean a human method, my friend; for a divine one, according to the proverb, I keep out of the question: for you must know well, with respect to whatever temper is preserved, and becomes such as it ought to be in such a constitution of politics, that you will not say amiss when you say that it is preserved by a divine destiny.

Adeimantus/ Nor and, of a different opinion.

Socrates/ But further now, besides these things, you must likewise be of this opinion.

Adeimantus/ Of what?

Socrates/ That each of these private hirelings, which these men call sophists, and deem the rivals of their art, teach no other things but those dogmas of the vulgar, which they approve when they are assembled together, and call it wisdom. Just as if a man had learned what were the wrathful emotions and desires of a great and strong animal he were nourishing, how it must be approached, how touched, and when it is most fierce or most mild; and from what causes, and the sounds which on these several occasions it was wont to utter, and at what sounds uttered by another, the animal is rendered both mild and savage; and, having learned all these things by associating with the animal for a long time, should call this wisdom; and, as if he had established an art, should apply himself to the teaching it; whilst yet, with reference to these dogmas and desires, he knows not in reality what is beautiful, or base, or good, or ill, or just, or unjust, but should pronounce all these according to the opinions of the great animal, calling those things good in which it delighted, and that evil with which it was vexed, and should have no other measure as to these things. Let us likewise suppose that he calls those things which are necessary, beautiful and just, but that he hath never discovered himself, nor is able to show to another, the nature of the necessary and the good, how much they really differ from each other. Whilst he is such an one, does he not, by Zeus, appear to you an absurd teacher?

Adeimantus/ To me he appears so.

Socrates/ And from this man, think you, does he any way differ, who deems it wisdom to have understood the auger and the pleasures of the multitude, and of assemblies of all kinds of men, whether with relation to painting, music, or politics? For, if anyone converses with these, and shows them either a poem, or any other production of art, or piece

of administration respecting the city, and makes the multitude the judges of it, he is under what is called a Diomedæan necessity, which is above all other necessities, of doing whatever they commend. But to show that these things are in reality good and beautiful, have you at any time heard any of them advance a reason that was not quite ridiculous?

Adeimantus/ Nor do I think, I ever shall.

Socrates/ Whilst you attend then to all these things, bear this in mind, that the multitude never will admit or reckon that there is the one beautiful itself, and not many beautifuls, one *thing itself which has a single subsistence*, and not many such things.

Adeimantus/ They will be the, last to do so.

Socrates/ It is impossible then for the multitude to be philosophers.

Adeimantus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And those who philosophize must of necessity be reproached by them.

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And likewise by those private persons, who, in conversing with the multitude, desire to please them.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ From, this state of things, now, what safety do you see for the philosophic genius to continue in its pursuit, and arrive at perfection? And consider from what was formerly said, for we have allowed that facility in learning, memory, fortitude, and magnanimity belong to this genius.

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ And shall not such an one, of all men, immediately be the first in everything, especially if he has a body naturally adapted to the soul?

Adeimantus/ Why shall he not?

Socrates/ And when he becomes more advanced in age, his kindred and citizens, I think, will incline to employ him in their affairs.

Adeimantus/ Why will they not?

Socrates/ And making supplications to him, and paying him homage, they will submit to him, and anticipate and flatter beforehand his growing power.

Adeimantus/ Thus, it usually happens.

Socrates/ What now, do you think such an one will do, in such a case, especially if he happen to belong to a great city, and be rich, and of a noble descent, and withal beautiful and of a large stature? Will he not be filled with extravagant hopes, deeming himself capable of managing both the affairs of Greeks and Barbarians, and on these accounts carry himself loftily, without any solid judgment, full of ostentation and vain conceit?

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ If one should gently approach a man of this disposition, and tell him the truth, that he has no judgment, yet needs it; but that it is not to be acquired but by one who subjects himself to this acquisition, do you think that, with all these evils about him, he would be ready to hearken?

Adeimantus/ Far from it.

Socrates/ If now, through a good natural temper, and an innate disposition to reason, anyone should somehow be made sensible, and be bent and drawn towards philosophy, what do we imagine those others will do, when they reckon they shall lose his company, and the benefit which they received from him? Will they not by every action, and every speech, say and do everything to the man not to suffer himself to be persuaded; and to his adviser, to render him

incapable by ensnaring him in private, and bringing him to public trial?

Adeimantus/ This, must of necessity happen.

Socrates/ Is it likely now such an one will philosophize?

Adeimantus/ Not altogether.

Socrates/ You see then, that we were not wrong when we said that even the very parts of the philosophic genius, when they meet with bad education, are in some measure the cause of a falling off from this pursuit, as well as those vulgarly reputed goods, riches, and all furniture of this kind.

Adeimantus/ We were not, but it was rightly said.

Socrates/ Such then, admirable friend! is the ruin, such and so great the corruption of the best genius for the noblest pursuit, and which besides but rarely happens, as we observed; and from among such as these are the men who do the greatest mischiefs to cities, and to private persons, and likewise they who do the greatest good, such as happen to be drawn to this side. But a little genius never did anything remarkable to anyone, neither to a private person nor to a city.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ These indeed, then, whose business it chiefly was to apply to philosophy, having thus fallen off, leaving her desolate and imperfect, lead themselves a life neither becoming nor genuine; whilst other unworthy persons, intruding themselves on philosophy, abandoned in a manner by her kindred, have disgraced her, and loaded her with reproaches, such as these you say her reproachers reproach her with: viz. that of those who converse with her, some are of no value, and most of them worthy of the greatest punishments.

Adeimantus/ These things, are commonly said.

Socrates/ And with reason, they are said. For other contemptible men seeing the field unoccupied, and that the possession of it is attended with dignities and honorable names, like persons who make their escape from prisons to temples, these likewise gladly leap from their handicrafts to philosophy; I mean such of them as are of the greatest address in their own little art. For, even in this situation of philosophy, her remaining dignity, in comparison with all the other arts, still surpasses in magnificence; of which dignity many are desirous, who by natural disposition are unfit for it, and whose bodies are not only deformed by their arts and handicrafts, but whose souls also are in like manner confused, and crushed by their servile works. Must it not of necessity be so?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Does it then appear to you, that they are any way different in appearance from a blacksmith, who has made a little money, bald and puny, recently liberated from chains, and washed in the bath, with a new robe on him, just decked out as a bridegroom, presuming to marry the daughter of his master, encouraged by the poverty and forlorn circumstances with which he sees him oppressed?

Adeimantus/ There is, no great difference.

Socrates/ What sort of a race must such as these produce? Must it not be bastardly and abject?

Adeimantus/ By an abundant necessity.

Socrates/ But what now? When men who are unworthy of instruction apply to it, and are conversant in it, in an unworthy manner, what kind of sentiments and opinions shall we say are produced? Must they not be such as ought properly to be termed sophisms, and which possess nothing genuine, or worthy of true prudence?

Adeimantus/ By all means so.

Socrates/ A very small number now, Adimantus, remains of those who worthily are conversant in philosophy, who happen either to be detained somehow in banishment, and whose generous and well cultivated disposition persists in the study of philosophy, being removed from everything which tends to corrupt it; or else when? in a small city, a mighty soul arises, who despising the honors of the state entirely neglects them, and likewise with justice despising any small thing arising from the other arts, his well-born soul returns to philosophy. These the bridle of our friend Theagis will be sufficient to restrain; for all other things conspire to withdraw Theagis from philosophy, but the care of his health excluding him from politics makes him attentive to that alone. For as to my genius, it is not worthwhile to mention the dæmoniacal sign; for certainly it has happened heretofore to but one other, or to none at all. And even of these few, such as are tasting, and have tasted, how sweet and blessed the acquisition of philosophy is, and have withal sufficiently seen the madness of the multitude, and how none of them, as I may say, effects anything salutary in the affairs of cities, and that there is no ally with whom a man might go to the assistance of the just and be base; but that he is like one sailing among wild beasts, being neither willing to join them in injustice, nor able, as he is but one, to oppose the whole savage crew; but, before he can benefit the city or his friends, is destroyed, and is unprofitable both to himself and others: reasoning on all these things, lying quiet, and attending to his own affairs, as in a tempest, when the dust is driven, and the sea agitated by winds, standing under a wall, beholding others overwhelmed in iniquity, he is satisfied if he shall himself anyhow pass his life here pure from injustice and unholy deeds, and make his exit hence in good hopes cheerful and benignant. And he shall make his exit, after having done

none of the smallest matters. Nor the greatest neither, whilst he has not met with a republic that is suitable to him; for, in a suitable one, he shall both make a greater proficiency himself, and shall preserve the affairs of private persons as well as of the public. It appears then, to me, that we have now sufficiently told whence it happens that philosophy is accused, and that it is so unjustly, unless you have something else to offer.

Adeimantus/ But, I say nothing further about this point. But which of the present republics do you say is adapted to philosophy?

Socrates/ Not one indeed; but this is what I complain of, that there is no constitution of a city at present worthy of the philosophic genius, which is therefore turned and altered, as a foreign seed sown in an improper soil, which degenerates to what is usually produced in that soil. After the same manner this race, as it has not at present its proper power, degenerates to a foreign species: but should it meet with the best republic, as it is the best in itself, then shall it indeed discover that it is really divine, and that all besides are human, both as to their genius and their pursuits. But now you seem plainly to be going to ask which is this republic.

Adeimantus/ You are mistaken; for this I was not going to ask: but whether it was this which we have described in establishing our city, or another.

Socrates/ As to other things, it is this one, and this very thing was then mentioned, that there must always be in the city something which shall have the same regard for the republic which you the legislator have when you establish the laws.

Adeimantus/ It was mentioned.

Socrates/ But it was not, made sufficiently plain, through fears which preoccupied you, when you signified that the illustration of the thing would be both tedious and difficult; and it is not indeed altogether easy to discuss what remains.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ In what manner a city shall attempt philosophy and not be destroyed; for all grand things are dangerous, and, as the saying is, fine things are truly difficult.

Adeimantus/ But however, let our disquisition be completed in making this evident.

Socrates/ Want of inclination, shall not hinder, though want of ability may. And being present, you shall know my alacrity, and consider now how readily and adventurously I am going to say, that a city ought to attempt this study in a way opposite to that at present.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ At present, those who engage in it are striplings, who immediately from their childhood, amidst their domestic affairs and lucrative employments, apply themselves to the most abstruse parts of philosophy, and then they depart most consummate philosophers. I call the most difficult part, that respecting the art of reasoning. And in all after time, if, when they are invited by others who practice this art, they are pleased to become hearers, they think it a great condescension, reckoning they ought to do it as a by-work: —but when they approach to old-age, besides some few, they are extinguished much more than the Heraclitean sun, because they are never again rekindled.

Adeimantus/ But how should they act?

Socrates/ Quite the reverse. Whilst they are lads and boys they should apply to juvenile instruction and philosophy, and, in taking proper care of their body, whilst it shoots and grows to firmness, provide for philosophy a proper assistant:

and then, as that age advances in which the soul begins to be perfected, they ought vigorously to apply to her exercises; and when strength decays, and is no longer adapted for civil and military employments, they should then be dismissed, and live at pleasure, and, excepting a by-work, do nothing else but philosophize, if they propose to live happy, and, when they die, to possess in the other world a destiny adapted to the life they have led in this.

Adeimantus/ How truly, Socrates, do you seem to me to speak with zeal! Yet, I think, the greater part of your hearers will still more zealously oppose you, and by no means be persuaded, and that Thrasymachus will be the first of them.

Socrates/ Do not divide, Thrasymachus and me, who are now become friends; nor were we enemies heretofore. For we shall no way desist from our attempts, till we either persuade both him and the rest, or make some advances towards that life at which when they arrive they shall again meet with such discourses as these.

Adeimantus/ You have spoken, but a short time.

Socrates/ None at all, with respect at least to the whole of time: but that the multitude are not persuaded by what is said, is not wonderful; for they have never at any time seen existing what has now been mentioned, but rather such discourses as have been industriously composed, and have not fallen in spontaneously as these do at present. But as for the man who has arrived at the model of virtue, and is rendered similar to it in the most perfect manner possible both in word and in deed, they have never at any time seen such a man, neither one nor more of the kind. Or do you think they have?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Neither yet, O blessed man! have they sufficiently attended to beautiful and liberal reasonings, so

as ardently to investigate the truth, by every method, for the sake of knowing it, saluting only at a distance such intricate and contentions debates, as tend to nothing else but to opinion and strife, both in their courts of justice and in their private meetings.

Adeimantus/ The case is just so.

Socrates/ On these accounts then, and foreseeing these things, we were formerly afraid. However, being compelled by the truth, we did assert, that neither city nor republic, nor even a man in the same way, would ever become perfect, till some necessity of fortune oblige these few philosophers, who are at present called not depraved, but useless, to take the government of the city whether they will or not, and compel the city to be obedient to them; or till the sons of those who are now in the offices of power and magistracies, or they themselves, by some divine inspiration, be possessed with a genuine love of genuine philosophy: and I aver that no one has reason to think that either of these, or both, are impossible; for thus might we justly be laughed at, as saying things which are otherwise only similar to wishes. Is it not so?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ If then, in the infinite series of past ages, the greatest necessity has obliged men that have arrived at the summit of philosophy to take the government of a state, or such men now govern in some barbarous region, remote from our observation, or shall hereafter, we are ready in that case to contend in our reasoning, that this republic we have described has existed and subsists, and shall arise at least when this our muse shall obtain the government of the state: for this is neither impossible to happen, nor do we speak of impossibilities, though we ourselves confess that they are difficult.

Adeimantus/ I am likewise, of the same opinion.

Socrates/ But you will say, that the multitude do not think so too.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ O blessed man! do not thus altogether accuse the multitude; but, whatever opinion they may have, without upbraiding them, but rather encouraging them, and removing the reproach thrown on philosophy, point out to them the persons you call philosophers, and define distinctly, as at present, both their genius and their pursuits, that they may not think you speak of such as they call philosophers; or, if they mean the same men, you will tell them they have conceived a different opinion of the men from what you have, and give very different answers about them from yours. Or, do you think that one man can be enraged at another, who is not in a passion? or, that a man shall envy the envious, who is himself both void of envy, and is of a mild disposition? —I will prevent you, and say that I think there is in some few such a naturally bad temper, but not in the greater part of mankind.

Adeimantus/ I likewise, think so.

Socrates/ Are you not then of the same opinion with me in this? That these men are the cause of the multitude being ill affected towards philosophy, who openly revile what is no way becoming them, behaving in a scoffing and distasteful manner towards the multitude, always making discourses about particular men, and doing what is least of all becoming philosophy.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ For somehow, Adimantus, the man at least who really applies his dianoëtic part to true being, has not leisure to look down to the little affairs of mankind, and, in fighting with them, to be filled with envy and ill nature; but,

beholding and contemplating such objects as are orderly, and always subsist in the same manner, such as neither injure nor are injured by each other, but are in all respects beautiful, and according to reason, these he imitates and resembles as far as possible; or, do you think it possible by any contrivance that a man should not imitate that, in conversing with which he is filled with admiration?

Adeimantus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ The philosopher then who converses with that which is decorous and divine, as far as is possible for man, becomes himself decorous and divine. But calumny is powerful in everything.

Adeimantus/ It is entirely so.

Socrates/ If then, he be under any necessity, not merely of forming himself alone, but likewise of endeavoring to introduce anything he beholds there among mankind, in order to form their manners, both in private and in public life, would he prove, think you, a bad artist of temperance and of justice, and of every social virtue?

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ But if now the multitude perceive that we say the truth of such an one, will they be angry at philosophers, and disbelieve us when we say, that the city can never otherwise be happy unless it be drawn by those painters who follow a divine original?

Adeimantus/ They will not be angry, if they perceive so: but what method of painting do you mean?

Socrates/ When they have obtained, the city and the manners of men as their canvass, they would first make it pure; which is not altogether an easy matter. But in this, you know, they differ from others, that they are unwilling to meddle either with a private man or city, or to prescribe laws,

till once they either receive these pure, or purify them themselves.

Adeimantus/ And rightly.

Socrates/ And after this, do not you think they will draw a sketch of the republic?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Afterwards, I think, as they proceed in their work, they will frequently look both ways, both to what is naturally just and beautiful, and temperate and the like; and likewise again to that which they can establish among mankind, blending and compounding their human form from different human characters and pursuits, drawing from this which Homer calls the divine likeness, and the divine resemblance subsisting among men.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ They will then, I think, strike out one thing and insert another, till they have rendered human manners, as far as is possible, dear to the Gods.

Adeimantus/ It will thus, be the most beautiful picture.

Socrates/ Do we now then, any way persuade these men, who, you said, were coming upon us in battle array, that such a painter of republics is the man we then recommended to them, and on whose account they were enraged at us, that we committed cities to him, and will they now be more mild when they hear us mentioning it?

Adeimantus/ Certainly, if they be wise: for what is there now they can further question?

Socrates/ Will they say that philosophers are not lovers of real being and of truth?

Adeimantus/ That, were absurd.

Socrates/ Or that their genius, as we described it, is not allied to that which is best?

Adeimantus/ Nor this neither.

Socrates/ What then? Whilst their genius is such as this, and meets with suitable exercises, shall it not become perfectly good and philosophic, if any other be so? or, will you say those will be more so whom we set aside?

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Will they still then be enraged at us when we say that till the philosophic race have the government of the city, neither the miseries of the city nor of the citizens shall have an end, nor shall this republic, which we speak of in the way of fable, arrive in reality at perfection?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps, they will be less enraged.

Socrates/ Are you willing then, that we say not of them they are less enraged at us, but that they are altogether appeased, and persuaded, that if we make no more of them, they may at least consent by their blushing?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Let them then, be persuaded of this. But is there anyone who will call this into question, that those of the philosophic genius do not usually spring from kings and sovereigns?

Adeimantus/ Not one, would allege that.

Socrates/ And though they were born with a philosophic genius, one may say they are under a great necessity of being corrupted; for indeed that it is a difficult matter for these geniuses to be preserved untainted, even we ourselves agree. But that in the infinite series of time, of the whole of the human race, there should never be so much as a single one preserved pure and untainted, is there any who will contend?

Adeimantus/ How can there be anyone?

Socrates/ But surely, a single one is sufficient, if he exists, and has a city subject to him, to accomplish everything now so much disbelieved.

Adeimantus/ He is sufficient.

Socrates/ And when the governor, has established the laws and customs we have recited, it is not at all impossible that the citizens should be willing to obey him.

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ But is it wonderful or impossible, that what appears to us should also appear to others?

Adeimantus/ I do not think it.

Socrates/ And that these things are best, if they be possible, we have sufficiently, as I think, explained in the preceding part of our discourse.

Adeimantus/ Sufficiently indeed.

Socrates/ Now then it seems we are agreed about our legislation; that the laws we mention are the best, if they could exist; but that it is difficult to establish them, not, however, impossible.

Adeimantus/ We are agreed.

Socrates/ After this has with difficulty been brought to a conclusion, shall we not in the next place consider what follows? In what manner, and from what disciplines and studies, they shall become the preservers of our republic? and in what periods of life they shall each of them apply to the several branches of education?

Adeimantus/ We must indeed consider that.

Socrates/ I acted not wisely, when in the former part of our discourse I left untouched the difficulty attending the possession of women, and the propagation of the species, and the establishing governors, knowing with what envy and difficulty they must be introduced, or be carried no further

than theory. For now we are under no less a necessity of discussing these things at present. What relates to women and children is already finished; and we must now go over again, as from the beginning, what refers to governors. We said, if you remember, that they should appear to be lovers of the city, and be tried both by pleasures and by pains, and appear to quit this dogma neither through toils nor fears, nor any other change; and that he who was not able to do this was to be rejected; but he who came forth altogether pure, as gold tried in the fire, was to be appointed ruler, and to have honors and rewards paid him both alive and dead. Such were the things we said whilst our reasoning passed over, and concealed itself, as afraid to rouse the present argument.

Adeimantus/ You say most truly, for I remember, it.

Socrates/ For I was averse, my friend, to say, what I must now venture to assert; but now we must even dare to assert this: that the most complete guardians must be made philosophers.

Adeimantus/ Let this be agreed upon.

Socrates/ But consider that you will probably have but few of them: for such a genius as we said they must of necessity have, is wont but seldom in all its parts to meet in one man; but its different parts generally spring up in different persons.

Adeimantus/ How do you say?

Socrates/ That such as learn with facility, have a good memory, are sagacious and acute, and endued with whatever qualifications are allied to these, are not at the same time strenuous and magnificent in their dianoëtic part, so as to live orderly, with quietness and liability, but that such are carried by their acuteness wherever it happens, and everything that is stable departs from them.

Adeimantus/ You say true.

Socrates/ With regard then to these firm habits of the mind, which are not at all versatile, and which one might rather employ as trusty, and which are difficult to be moved at dangers in war, are they not of the same temper with reference to learning? They move heavily, and with difficulty learn, as if they were benumbed, and are oppressed with sleep and yawning, when they are obliged to labor at anything of this kind.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ But we said that he must partake of both these well and handsomely, or else he ought not to share in the most accurate education, nor magistracy, nor honors of the state.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ Do not you think this will but rarely happen?

Adeimantus/ How should it not?

Socrates/ They must be tried then both in the things we formerly mentioned in labors, in fears, and in pleasures; and likewise in what we then passed over, and are now mentioning; we must exercise them in various kinds of learning, whilst we consider whether their genius be capable of sustaining the greatest disciplines, or whether it fails, as those who fail in the other things.

Adeimantus/ It is proper now, to consider this question at least in this manner.

Socrates/ But what do you call the greatest disciplines? You remember in some measure, that when we had distinguished the soul into three parts, we determined concerning justice, temperance, fortitude, and wisdom, what each of them is.

Adeimantus/ If I did not remember, it were just I should not hear what remains.

Socrates/ Do you likewise remember what was said before that?

Adeimantus/ What was it?

Socrates/ We somewhere said, that it was possible to behold these in their most beautiful forms, but that the journey would be a tedious which he must make, who would see them conspicuously; that it was possible, however, to approach towards them in the way of our demonstrations above mentioned; and you said that these were sufficient; so what was then advanced came to be spoken far short, in my own opinion, of accuracy; but, if agreeably to you, you may say so.

Adeimantus/ To me at least, they seemed to be discussed in measure; and the rest seemed to think so too.

Socrates/ But, friend, in speaking of things of this kind, such a measure as leaves out any part whatever of the truth is not altogether in measure. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything. Though some at times are of opinion, that things are sufficiently well when thus circumstanced, and that there is no necessity for further inquiry.

Adeimantus/ Very many, are thus affected through indolence.

Socrates/ But the guardian of the city and of the laws, has least of all need of that passion.

Adeimantus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Such an one, then, my friend, must make the more ample circuit, and labor no less in learning than in the exercises: otherwise, as we were now saying, he will never arrive at the perfection of the greatest and most suitable learning.

Adeimantus/ But are not these, the greatest? Or is there yet anything greater than justice, and those virtues which we discussed?

Socrates/ There is something greater. And even of these we must not contemplate only the rude description, but we must not omit the highest finishing. Or is it not ridiculous in other things of small account to employ our whole labor, and strive to have them the most accurate and perfect, and not deem the highest and most important affairs worthy of our highest attention, in order to render them the most perfect?

Adeimantus/ The sentiment, is very just. But, however, do you think, that anyone will dismiss you without asking you, what indeed is this greatest discipline, and about what is it conversant, when you call it so?

Socrates/ Not at all, but do you yourself ask me; for assuredly you have not seldom heard it, and at present you either do not attend, or you intend to occasion me trouble in raising opposition. This I rather think, since you have often heard at least, that the idea of the good is the greatest discipline: which idea when justice and the other virtues employ, they become useful and advantageous. You now almost know that this is what I mean to say, and besides this, that we do not sufficiently know that idea, and that without this knowledge, though we understood everything else in the highest degree, you know that it is of no advantage to us: in the same manner as it would avail us nothing though we possessed anything whatever without the possession of the good: or do you think there is any greater profit in possessing all things without the possession of the good, than in knowing all things without the knowledge of the good, knowing nothing at all that is beautiful and good?

Adeimantus/ By Zeus, not I.

Socrates/ But surely this too at least you know, that to the multitude pleasure seems to be the good; and to the more elegant it seems to be prudence.

Adeimantus/ And very ridiculously.

Socrates/ How indeed can it be otherwise? if, when they upbraid us that we know not what is the good, they tell us that they know, and call it the prudence of what is good, as if we understood what they say when they pronounce the word good.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But what? those who define pleasure to be good, do they less err than the others? or are not these too obliged to confess that pleasures are evil?

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ It happens then, I think, that they acknowledge the same things are both good and evil, do they not?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Is it not evident, then, that there are great and manifold doubts about it?

Adeimantus/ Why are there not?

Socrates/ But what? is it not also evident, that with reference to things just and beautiful, the multitude choose the apparent, even though they be not really so? yet they act, and possess, and appear to possess them; but the acquisition of goods, that were only the apparent, never yet satisfied anyone; but in this they seek what is real, and here everyone despises what is only the apparent.

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ This then is that which every soul pursues, and for the sake of this it does everything, prophesying that it is something, but being dubious, and unable to comprehend sufficiently what it is, and to possess the same stable belief

respecting it as of other things; and thus are they unsuccessful also in other things, if there be in them any profit. About a thing now of such a kind, and of such mighty consequence, shall we say that even these our best men in the city, and to whom we commit the management of everything, shall be thus in the dark?

Adeimantus/ As little at least as possible.

Socrates/ I think then, that whilst it is unknown in what manner the just and beautiful are good, they are not of any great value to a guardian to possess, if it be likely he shall know these, whilst he is ignorant of this; but I prophesy that no one will arrive at the knowledge of these before he sufficiently knows what the good is.

Adeimantus/ You prophesy well.

Socrates/ Shall not then our republic be completely adorned, if such a guardian be placed over it as is scientifically knowing in these things?

Adeimantus/ It must of necessity. But with respect to yourself, whether, Socrates, do you say that the good is science, or pleasure, or something else besides these?

Socrates/ You was ever, a worthy man, and manifestly showed of old that you was not to be satisfied with the opinions of others about these things.

Adeimantus/ Nor does it appear to me just, Socrates, that a man should be able to relate the dogmas of others, but not his own, after having spent so much time in inquiring about these particulars.

Socrates/ But what, does it then appear to you just for a man to speak of things of which he is ignorant, as if he knew them?

Adeimantus/ By no means, as if he knew them; yet however, according as he thinks, those things which he thinks he should be willing to tell us.

Socrates/ But what, have you not observed of opinions void of science how deformed they all are, and that the best of them are blind? Or do those who without intellect form right opinion seem to you, ill any respect, to differ from those who are blind, and at the same time walk straight on the road?

Adeimantus/ In no respect.

Socrates/ Are you willing, then, that we should examine things deformed, blind, and crooked, having it in our power to hear from others what is clear and beautiful?

Glaucon/ Do not, by Zeus, Socrates, desist at the end; for it will suffice us, if in the same way as you have spoken of justice and temperance, and those other virtues, you likewise discourse concerning the good.

Socrates/ And I too shall be very well satisfied, my friend; but I am afraid I shall not be able; and, by appearing readily disposed. I shall incur the ridicule of the unmannerly. But, O blessed man! let us at present dismiss this inquiry, what the good is; (For it appears to me a greater thing than we can arrive at, according to our present impulse,) but I am willing to tell you what the offspring of the good appears to be, and what most resembles it, if this be agreeable to you; and if not, I shall dismiss it.

Glaucon/ But tell us; for you shall afterwards explain to us what the father is.

Socrates/ I could wish, both that I were able to give that explanation, and you to receive it, and not as now the offspring only. Receive now then this child and offspring of the good itself. Yet take care however that unwillingly I deceive you not, in any respect, giving an adulterate account of this offspring.

Glaucon/ We shall take care, to the best of our ability; only tell us.

Socrates/ I shall tell, then, after we have thoroughly assented, and I have reminded you of what was mentioned in our preceding discourse, and has, been frequently said on other occasions.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ That there are many things, beautiful, and many good, and each of these we say is so, and we distinguish them in our reasoning.

Glaucon/ We say so.

Socrates/ But as to the beautiful itself, and the good itself, and in like manner concerning all those things which we then considered as many, now again establishing them according to one idea of each particular, as being one, we assign to each that appellation which belongs to it; and these indeed we say are seen by the eye, but are not objects of intellectual perception; but that the ideas are perceived by the intellect, but are not seen by the eye.

Glaucon/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ By what part then of ourselves do we see things visible?

Glaucon/ By the sight.

Socrates/ And is it not, by hearing, that we perceive what is heard; and by the other senses, all the other objects of sense?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But have you not observed, with regard to the artificer of the senses, how he has formed the power of sight, and of being visible, in the most perfect manner?

Glaucon/ I have not entirely perceived it.

Socrates/ But consider it in this manner. Is there any other species, which hearing and sound require, in order that the one may hear, and the other be heard, which third

thing if it be not present, the one shall not hear, and the other not be heard?

Glaucon/ There is nothing.

Socrates/ Imagine then, that neither do many others (that I may not say none) require any such thing: or can you mention anyone that does require it?

Glaucon/ Not I.

Socrates/ But with reference to the sense of seeing, and the object of sight, do not you perceive that they require something?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ When there is sight in the eyes, and when he who has it attempts to use it, and when there is color in the objects before him, unless there concur some third genus, naturally formed for the purpose, you know that the sight will see nothing, and the colors will be invisible.

Glaucon/ What is that you speak of?

Socrates/ What you call light.

Glaucon/ You say true.

Socrates/ This species then is not despicable; and by no small idea are the sense of seeing, and the power of being seen, connected together; but by a bond the most honorable of all bonds, if light be not dishonorable. But it is far, from being dishonorable. Whom then of the Gods in heaven can you assign as the cause of this, that light makes our sight to see, and visible objects to be seen, in the best manner?

Glaucon/ The same as you, and others do; for it is evident that you mean the sun.

Socrates/ Is not the sight then naturally formed in this manner with reference to this God?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ The sight is not the sun, nor is that the sun in which sight is ingenerated, which we call the eye.

Glaucon/ It is not.

Socrates/ But yet I think that of all the organs of sense it is most solar-form.

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And the power which it possesses, does it not possess as dispensed and flowing from hence?

Glaucon/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ Is not then the sun, which indeed is not light itself, yet as it is the cause of it, seen by sight itself?

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ Conceive then, that this is what I called the offspring of *the good*, which *the good* generates, analogous to itself; and that what this is in the intelligible place, with respect to intellect, and the objects of intellect, that the sun is in the visible place with respect to sight and visible things.

Glaucon/ How is it? explain to me yet further.

Socrates/ You know that the eyes, when they are no longer directed towards objects whose colors are shone upon by the light of day, but by the splendor of the night, grow dim, and appear almost blind, as if they had in them no pure sight.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But when they turn to objects which the sun illuminates, then I think they see clearly, and in those very eyes there appears now to be light.

Glaucon/ There does.

Socrates/ Understand then, in the same manner, with reference to the soul. When it firmly adheres to that which truth and real being enlighten, then it understands and knows it, and appears to possess intellect: but when it

adheres to that which is blended with darkness, which is generated, and which perishes, it is then conversant with opinion, its vision becomes blunted, it wanders from one opinion to another, and resembles one without intellect. It has such a resemblance. That therefore which imparts truth to what is known, and dispenses the power to him who knows, you may call the idea of the good, being the cause of science and of truth, as being known through intellect. And as both these two, knowledge and truth, are so beautiful, when you think that the good is something different, you and still more beautiful than these, you shall think aright. Science and truth here are as light and sight there, which we rightly judged to be solar-form, but that we were not to think they were the sun. So here it is right to judge, that both these partake of the form of the good; but to suppose that either of them is the good, is not right, but the good itself is worthy of still greater honor.

Glaucon/ You speak, of an inestimable beauty, since it affords science and truth, but is itself superior to these in beauty. And you never anywhere said that it was pleasure.

Socrates/ Predict better things, and in this manner rather consider its image yet further.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ You will say, I think, that the sun imparts to things which are seen, not only their visibility, but likewise their generation, growth and nourishment, not being itself generation.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ We may say, therefore, that things which are known have not only this from the good, that they are known, but likewise that their being and essence are thence derived, whilst the good itself is not essence, but beyond

essence, transcending it both in dignity and in power. Here Glauco, laughing very much, said;

Glaucon/ By Apollo this is a divine transcendency indeed!

Socrates/ You yourself, are the cause, having obliged me to relate what appears to me respecting it.

Glaucon/ And by no means, stop, if something does not hinder you, but again discuss the resemblance relating to the sun, if you have omitted anything.

Socrates/ But I omit, many things.

Glaucon/ Do not omit, the smallest particular.

Socrates/ I think, that much will be omitted: however, as far I am able at present, I shall not willingly omit anything.

Glaucon/ Do not.

Socrates/ Understand then, that we say these are two; and that the one reigns over the intelligible genus and place, and the other over the visible, not to say the heavens, lest I should seem to you to employ sophistry in the expression: you understand then these two species, the visible and the intelligible?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ As if then you took a line, cut into two unequal parts, and cut over again each section according to the same ratio, both that of the visible species, and that of the intelligible, you will then have perspicuity and obscurity placed by each other. In the visible species you will have in one section images: but I call images, in the first place, shadows, in the next, the appearances in water, and such as subsist in bodies which are dense, polished and bright, and everything of this kind, if you understand me.

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Suppose now the other section of the visible which this resembles, such as the animals around us, and every kind of plant, and whatever has a composite nature.

Glaucon/ I suppose it.

Socrates/ Are you willing then that this section appear to be divided into true and untrue? And that the same proportion, which the object of opinion has to the object of knowledge, the very same proportion has the resemblance to that of which it is the resemblance?

Glaucon/ I am, indeed, extremely willing.

Socrates/ But consider now again the section of the intelligible, how it was divided.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ That with respect to one part of it, the soul uses the former sections as images; and is obliged to investigate from hypotheses, not proceeding to the beginning, but to the conclusion: and the other part, again, is that where the soul proceeds from hypothesis to an unhypothetical principle, and without those images about it, by the species themselves, makes its way through them.

Glaucon/ I have not, sufficiently understood you in these things.

Socrates/ But again, for you will more easily understand me, these things having been premised. For I think you are not ignorant, that those who are conversant in geometry, and computations, and such like, after they have laid down hypotheses of the odd and the even, and figures, and three species of angles, and other things the sisters of these, according to each method, they then proceed upon these things as known, having laid down all these as hypotheses, and do not give any further reason about them, neither to themselves nor others, as being things obvious to all. But,

beginning from these, they directly discuss the rest, and with full consent end at that which their inquiry pursued.

Glaucon/ I know this, perfectly well.

Socrates/ And do you not likewise know, that when they use the visible species, and reason about them, their dianoëtic power is not employed about these species, but about those of which they are the resemblances, employing; their reasonings about the square itself, and the diameter itself, and not about that which they describe? And, in the same manner, with reference to other particulars, those very things which they form and describe, in which number, shadows and images in water are to be reckoned, these they use as images, seeking to behold those very things, which a man can no otherwise see than by his dianoëtic part.

Glaucon/ You say true.

Socrates/ This then I called a species of the intelligible; but observed that the soul was obliged to use hypotheses in the investigation of it, not going back to the principle, as not being able to ascend higher than hypotheses, but made use of images formed from things below, to lead to those above, as perspicuous, as objects of opinion, and distinct from the things themselves.

Glaucon/ I understand, that you speak of things pertaining to the geometrical, and other sister arts.

Socrates/ Understand now, that by the other section of the intelligible, I mean that which reason itself attains, making hypotheses by its own reasoning power, not as principles, but really hypotheses, as steps and handles, that, proceeding as far as to that which is unhypothetical, viz. the principle of the universe, and coming into contact with it, again adhering to those things which adhere to the principle, it may thus descend to the end; using nowhere anything which is sensible, but forms themselves, proceeding through

some to others, and at length in forms terminating its progression.

Glaucon/ I understand, but not sufficiently. For you seem to me to speak of an arduous undertaking: but you want, however, to determine that the perception of real being, and that which is intelligible, by the science of reasoning, are more conspicuous than the discoveries made by the arts, as they are called, which have hypotheses for their first principles; and that those who behold these are obliged to behold them with their dianoëtic power, and not with their senses. But as they are not able to perceive, by ascending to the principle, but from hypotheses, they appear to you not to possess intellect respecting them, though they are intelligible in conjunction with the principle. You also appear to me to call the habit of geometrical and such like concerns, the dianoëtic part, and not intellect; the dianoëtic part subsisting between opinion and intellect.

Socrates/ You have comprehended, most sufficiently: and conceive now, that corresponding to the four sections there are these four passions in the soul; intelligence answering to the highest, the dianoëtic part to the second; and assign faith to the third; and to the last assimilation. Arrange them likewise analogously; conceiving that as their objects participate of truth, so these participate of perspicuity.

Glaucon/ I understand, and I assent, and I arrange them as you say.

THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

Book 7.

Socrates/ After these things now, assimilate, with reference to erudition, and the want of erudition, our nature to such a condition as follows. Consider men as in a subterraneous habitation, resembling a cave, with its entrance expanding to the light, and answering to the whole extent of the cave. Suppose them to have been in this cave from their childhood, with chains both on their legs and necks, so as to remain there, and only be able to look before them, but by the chain incapable to turn their heads round. Suppose them likewise to have the light of a fire, burning far above and behind them and that between the fire and the fettered men there is a road above. Along this road, observe a low wall built, like that which hedges in the stage of mountebanks on which they exhibit their wonderful tricks.

Glaucon/ I observe it.

Socrates/ Behold now, along this wall, men bearing all sorts of utensils, raised above the wall, and human statues, and other animals, in wood and stone, and furniture of every kind. And, as is likely, some of those who are carrying these are speaking, and others silent.

Glaucon/ You mention, a wonderful comparison, and wonderful fettered men.

Socrates/ But such, however, as resemble us; for, in the first place, do you think that such as these see anything of themselves, or of one another, but the shadows formed by the fire, falling on the opposite part of the cave? How can they, if through the whole of life they be under a necessity, at least, of having their heads unmoved? But what do they see of what is carrying along? Is it not the very same?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ If then they were able to converse with one another, do not you think they would deem it proper to give names to those very things which they saw before them?

Glaucon/ Of necessity they must.

Socrates/ And what if the opposite part of this prison had an echo, when any of those who passed along spoke, do you imagine they would reckon that what spoke was anything else than the passing shadow?

Glaucon/ Not I, by Zeus!

Socrates/ Such as these then, will entirely judge that there is nothing true but the shadows of utensils.

Glaucon/ By an abundant necessity.

Socrates/ With reference then, both to their freedom from these chains, and their cure of this ignorance, consider the nature of it, if such a thing should happen to them. When anyone should be loosed, and obliged on a sudden to rise up, turn round his neck, and walk and look up towards the light; and in doing all these things should be pained, and unable, from the splendors, to behold the things of which he formerly saw the shadows, what do you think he would say, if one should tell him that formerly he had seen trifles, but now, being somewhat nearer to reality, and turned toward what was more real, he saw with more rectitude; and so, pointing out to him each of the things passing along, should question him, and oblige him to tell what it were; do not you think he would be both in doubt, and would deem what he had formerly seen to be more true than what was now pointed out to him?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And if he should oblige him to look to the light itself, would not he find pain in his eyes, and shun it; and, turning to such things as he is able to behold, reckon that these are really more clear than those pointed out?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But if one, should drag him from thence violently through a rough and steep ascent, and never stop till he drew him up to the light of the sun, would he not, whilst he was thus drawn, both be in torment, and be filled with indignation? And after he had even come to the light, having his eyes filled with splendor, he would be able to see none of these things now called true.

Glaucon/ He would not, suddenly at least.

Socrates/ But he would require, I think, to be accustomed to it some time, if he were to perceive things above. And, first of all, he would most easily perceive shadows, afterwards the images of men and of other things in water, and after that the things themselves. And, with reference to these, he would more easily see the things in the heavens, and the heavens themselves, by looking in the night to the light of the stars, and the moon, than by day looking on the sun, and the light of the sun.

Glaucon/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ And, last of all, he may be able, I think, to perceive and contemplate the sun himself, not in water, nor resemblances of him, in a foreign seat, but himself by himself, in his own proper region.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And after this, he would now reason with himself concerning him, that it is he who gives the seasons, and years, and governs all things in the visible place; and that of all those things which he formerly saw, he is in a certain manner the cause.

Glaucon/ It is evident, that after these things he may arrive at such reasonings as these.

Socrates/ But what? when he remembers his first habitation, and the wisdom which was there, and those who

were then his companions in bonds, do you not think he will esteem himself happy by the change, and pity them? And that greatly. And if there were there any honors and encomiums and rewards among themselves, for him who most acutely perceived what passed along, and best remembered which of them were wont to pass foremost. which latest, and which of them went together; and from these observations were most able to presage what was to happen; does it appear to you that he will be desirous of such honors, or envy those who among these are honored, and in power? Or, will he not rather wish to suffer that of Homer, and vehemently desire

> As laborer to some ignoble man
> To work for hire.....

and rather suffer anything than to possess such opinions, and live after such a manner?

Glaucon/ I think so, that he would suffer, and embrace anything rather than live in that manner.

Socrates/ But consider this further: If such an one should descend, and sit down again in the same seat, would not his eyes be filled with darkness, in consequence of coming suddenly from the sun?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And should he now again be obliged to give his opinion of those shadows, and to dispute about them with those who are there eternally chained, whilst yet his eyes were dazzled, and before they recovered their former state, (which would not be effected in a short time) would he not afford them laughter? and would it not be said of him, that, having ascended, he was returned with vitiated eyes, and that it was not proper even to attempt to go above, and that whoever should attempt to liberate them, and lead them up,

if ever they were able to get him into their hands, should be put to death?

Glaucon/ They would by all means, put him to death.

Socrates/ The whole of this image now, friend Glauco, is to be applied to our preceding discourse; for, if you compare this region, which is seen by the sight, to the habitation of the prison; and the light of the fire in it, to the power of the sun; and the ascent above, and the vision of things above, to the soul's ascent into the intelligible place; you will apprehend my meaning, since you want to hear it. But God knows whether it be true. Appearances then present themselves to my view as follows. In the intelligible place, the idea of the good is the last object of vision, and is scarcely to be seen; but if it be seen, we must collect by reasoning that it is the cause to all of everything right and beautiful, generating in the visible place, light, and its lord the sun; and in the intelligible place, it is itself the lord, producing truth and intellect; and this must be beheld by him who is to act wisely, either privately or in public.

Glaucon/ I agree with you, as far as I am able.

Socrates/ Come now, and agree with me likewise in this. And do not wonder that such as arrive hither are unwilling to act in human affairs, but their souls always hasten to converse with things above; for it is somehow reasonable it should be so, if these things take place according to our above-mentioned image.

Glaucon/ It is indeed reasonable.

Socrates/ But what? do you think that this is anything wonderful, that when a man comes from divine contemplations to human evils, he should behave awkwardly and appear extremely ridiculous, whilst he is yet dazzled, and is obliged, before he is sufficiently accustomed to the present darkness, to contend in courts of justice, or

elsewhere, about the shadows of justice, or those statues which occasion the shadows; and to dispute about this point, how these things are apprehended by those who have never at any time beheld justice itself?

Glaucon/ This is not at all wonderful.

Socrates/ But if a man possesses intellect, he must remember, that there is a twofold disturbance of the sight, and arising from two causes, when we betake ourselves from light to darkness, and from darkness to light: and when a man considers that these very things happen with reference also to the soul, whenever he sees anyone disturbed, and unable to perceive anything, he will not laugh in an unreasonable manner, but will consider, whether the soul, coming from a more splendid life, be darkened by ignorance, or, going from abundant ignorance to one more luminous, be filled with the dazzling splendor, and so will congratulate the one on its fate and life, and compassionate the life and fate of the other. And if he wishes to laugh at the soul that goes from darkness to light, his laughter would be less improper, than if he were to laugh at the soul which descends from the light to darkness.

Glaucon/ You say very reasonably.

Socrates/ It is proper then, that we judge of them after such a manner as this, if those things be true. That education is not such a thing as some announce it to be; for they somehow say, that whilst there is no science in the soul, they will insert it, as if they were inserting sight in blind eyes.

Glaucon/ They say so.

Socrates/ But our present reasoning, now shows, that this power being in the soul of everyone, and the organ by which everyone learns, and being in the same condition as the eye, if it were unable otherwise, than with the whole body, to turn from darkness to light, must, in like manner,

with the whole soul, be turned from generation, till it be able to endure the contemplation of being itself, and the most splendid of being; and this we call the good. Do we not?

Glaucon/ We do.

Socrates/ This then, would appear to be the art of his conversion, in what manner he shall, with greatest ease and advantage, be turned. Not to implant in him the power of seeing, but considering him as possessed of it, only improperly situated, and not looking at what he ought, to contrive some method by which this may be accomplished.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ The other virtues now then of the soul, as they are called, seem to be somewhat resembling those of the body (for when, in reality, they were not in it formerly, they are afterwards produced in it by habits and exercises); but that of wisdom, as it seems, happens to be of a nature somewhat more divine than any other; as it never loses its power, but, according as it is turned, is useful and advantageous, or useless and hurtful. Or have you not observed of those who are said to be wicked, yet wise, how sharply the little soul sees, and how acutely it comprehends everything to which it is turned, as having no contemptible sight, but compelled to be subservient to wickedness: so that the more acutely it sees, so much the more productive is it of wickedness?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But however, with reference to this part of such a genius; if, immediately from childhood, it should be stripped of everything allied to generation, as leaden weights, and of all those pleasures and lusts which relate to feastings and such like, which turn the sight of the soul to things downwards; from all these, if the soul, being freed, should turn itself towards truth, the very same principle in

the same men would most acutely see those things as it now does these to which it is turned.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ But what? is not this likely, and necessarily deduced from what has been mentioned? that neither those who are uninstructed and unacquainted with truth can ever sufficiently take care of the city; nor yet those who allow themselves to spend the whole of their time in learning. The former, because they have no one scope in life, aiming at which they ought to do whatever they do, both in private and in public; and the latter, because they are not willing to manage civil affairs, thinking that whilst they are yet alive, they inhabit the islands of the blessed.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ It is our business then, to oblige those of the inhabitants who have the best geniuses, to apply to that learning which we formerly said was the greatest, both to view the good, and to ascend that ascent; and when they have ascended and sufficiently viewed it, we are not to allow them what is now allowed them.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ To continue there, and be unwilling to descend again to those fettered men, or share with them in their toils and honors, whether more trifling or more important.

Glaucon/ Shall we then, act unjustly towards them, and make them live a worse life when they have it in their power to live a better?

Socrates/ You have again forgot, friend, that this is not the legislator's concern, in what manner anyone tribe in the city shall live remarkably happy; but this he endeavors to effectuate in the whole city, connecting the citizens together; and by necessity, and by persuasion, making them share the advantage with one another with which they are severally

able to benefit the community: and the legislator, when he makes such men in the city, does it not that he may permit them to go where each may incline, but that himself may employ them for connecting the city together.

Glaucon/ True, I forgot, indeed.

Socrates/ Consider then, Glauco, that we shall no way injure the philosophers who arise among us, but tell them what is just, when we oblige them to take care of others, and to be guardians. We will allow indeed, that those who in other cities become philosophers, with reason do not participate of the toils of public offices in the state (for they spring up of themselves, the policy of each city opposing them, and it is just, that what springs of itself, owing its growth to none, should not be forward to pay for its nurture to anyone); but you have we generated both for yourselves, and for the rest of the state, as the leaders and kings in a hive, and have educated you better, and in a more perfect manner than they, and made you more capable of sharing both in the rewards and labors attending public offices. Everyone then must, in part, descend to the dwelling of the others, and accustom himself to behold obscure objects: for, when you are accustomed to them, you will infinitely better perceive things there, and will fully know the several images what they are, and of what, from your having perceived the truth concerning things beautiful, and just, and good. And thus, as a real vision, both to us and you, shall the city he inhabited, and not as a dream, as most cities are at present inhabited by such as both fight with one another about shadows, and raise sedition about governing, as if it were some mighty good. But the truth is as follows: In whatever city those who are to govern, are the most averse to undertake government, that city, of necessity, will be the best established, and the most free from sedition and that

city, whose governors are of a contrary character, will be in a contrary condition.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Do you think then that our pupils will disobey us, when they hear these injunctions, and be unwilling to labor jointly in the city, each bearing a part, but spend the most of their time with one another, free from public affairs?

Glaucon/ Impossible. For we prescribe just things to just men. And each of them enters on magistracy from this consideration beyond all others, that they are under a necessity of governing after a manner contrary to all the present governors of all other cities.

Socrates/ For thus it is, my companion, if you discover a life for those who are to be our governors, better than that of governing, then it will be possible for you to have the city well established; for in it alone shall those govern who are truly rich, not in gold, but in that in which a happy man ought to be rich, in a good and prudent life. But if, whilst they are poor, and destitute of goods of their own, they come to the public, thinking they ought thence to pillage good, it is not possible to have the city rightly established. For the contest being who shall govern, such a war being domestic, and within them, it destroys both themselves and the rest of the city.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Have you then, any other kind of life which despises public magistracies, but that of true philosophy? No, by Zeus! But, however, they ought at least not to be fond of governing who enter on it, otherwise the rivals will fight about it.

Glaucon/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ Whom else then will you oblige to enter on the guardianship of the city, but such as are most intelligent in

those things by which the city is best established, and who have other honors, and a life better than the political one?

Glaucon/ No others.

Socrates/ Are you willing then, that we now consider this, by what means such men shall be produced, and how one shall bring them into the light, as some are said, from Hades, to have ascended to the Gods?

Glaucon/ Why should I not be willing?

Socrates/ This now, as it seems, is not the turning of a shell; but the conversion of the soul coming from some benighted day, to the true re-ascent to real being, which we say is true philosophy.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Ought we not then to consider which of the disciplines possesses such a power?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ What now, Glauco, may that discipline of the soul be, which draws her from that which is generated towards being itself? But this I consider whilst I am speaking. Did not we indeed say, that it was necessary for them, whilst young, to be wrestlers in war?

Glaucon/ We said so.

Socrates/ It is proper then, that this discipline likewise be added to that which is now the object of our inquiry. Which? Not to be useless to military men. It must indeed, be added if possible. They were somewhere in our former discourse instructed by us in gymnastic and music.

Glaucon/ They were.

Socrates/ Gymnastic indeed somehow respects what is generated and destroyed, For it presides over the increase and corruption of body.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ This then cannot be the discipline which we investigate.

Glaucon/ It cannot.

Socrates/ Is it music then, such as we formerly described?

Glaucon/ But it was, as a counterpart of gymnastic, if you remember, by habits instructing our guardians, imparting no science, but only with respect to harmony, a certain propriety, and with regard to rhythm, a certain propriety of rhythm, and in discourses, certain other habits the sisters of these, both in such discourses as are fabulous, and in such as are nearer to truth. But as to a discipline respecting such a good as you now investigate, there was nothing of this in that music.

Socrates/ You have, most accurately, reminded me; for it treated, in reality, of no such thing. But, divine Glauco, what may this discipline be? For all the arts have somehow appeared to be mechanical and illiberal.

Glaucon/ How should they not? And what other discipline remains distinct from music, gymnastic, and the arts?

Socrates/ Come, if we have nothing yet further besides these to take, let us take something in these which extends over them all.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ Such as this general thing, which all arts, and dianoëtic powers, and sciences employ, and which everyone ought, in the first place, necessarily to learn.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ This trifling thing, to know completely one, and two, and three: I call this summarily number, and computation. Or is it not thus with reference to these, that

every art, and likewise every science, must of necessity participate of these?

Glaucon/ They must of necessity.

Socrates/ And must not the art of war likewise participate of them?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Palamedes then, in the tragedies, shows everywhere Agamemnon to have been at least a most ridiculous general; or have you not observed how he says, that having invented numeration, he adjusted the ranks in the camp at Troy, and numbered up both the ships, and all the other forces which were not numbered before; and Agamemnon, as it seems, did not even know how many foot he had, as he understood not how to number them: but what kind of general do you imagine him to be?

Glaucon/ Some absurd one, for my part, if this were true.

Socrates/ Is there any other discipline then, which we shall establish as more necessary to a military man, than to be able to compute and to number?

Glaucon/ This most of all, if he would any way understand how to range his troops, and still more if he is to be a man.

Socrates/ Do you perceive then, with regard to this discipline the same thing as I do?

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ It seems to belong to those things which we are investigating, which naturally lead to intelligence, but that no one uses it aright, being entirely a conductor towards real being.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ I shall endeavor, to explain at least my own opinion. With reference to those things which I distinguish

with myself into such as lead towards intelligence, and such as do not, do you consider them along with me, and either agree or dissent, in order that we may more distinctly see, whether this be such as I conjecture respecting it.

Glaucon/ Show me.

Socrates/ I show you then, if you perceive some things with relation to the senses, which call not intelligence to the inquiry, as they are sufficiently determined by sense, but other things which by all means call upon it to inquire, as sense does nothing sane.

Glaucon/ You plainly mean, such things as appear at a distance, and such as are painted.

Socrates/ You have not altogether, apprehended my meaning.

Glaucon/ Which then, do you mean?

Socrates/ Those things, call not upon intelligence, which do not issue in a contrary sensation at one and the same time; but such as issue in this manner, I establish to be those which call upon intelligence: since here sense manifests the one sensation no more than its contrary, whether it meet with it near, or at a distance. But you will understand my meaning more plainly in this manner. These, we say, are three fingers, the little finger, the next to it, and the middle finger.

Glaucon/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ Consider me then as speaking of them when seen near, and take notice of this concerning them.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Each of them alike appears to be a finger, and in this there is no difference, whether it be seen in the middle or in the end; whether it be white or black, thick or slender, or anything else of this kind; for in all these, the soul of the

multitude is under no necessity to question their intellect: what is a finger; for never does sight itself at the same time intimate finger to be finger, and its contrary.

Glaucon/ It does not.

Socrates/ Is it not likely then, that such a case as this at least shall neither call upon nor excite intelligence?

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ But what? with reference to their being great and small, does the sight sufficiently perceive this, and makes it no difference to it, that one of them is situated in the middle, or at the end; and in like manner with reference to their thickness and slenderness, their softness and hardness, does the touch sufficiently perceive these things; and in like manner the other senses, do they no way defectively manifest such things? Or does each of them act in this manner? First of all, must not that sense which relates to hard, of necessity relate likewise to soft; and feeling these, it reports to the soul, as if both hard and soft were one and the same?

Glaucon/ It does.

Socrates/ And must not then the soul again, in such cases, of necessity be in doubt, what the sense points out to it as hard, since it calls the same thing soft likewise; and so with reference to the sense relating to light and heavy; the soul must be in doubt what is light and what is heavy; if the sense intimates that heavy is light, and that light is heavy?

Glaucon/ These at least, are truly absurd reports to the soul, and stand in need of examination.

Socrates/ It is likely then, that first of all, in such cases as these, the soul, calling in reason and intelligence, endeavors to discover, whether the things reported be one, or whether they be two.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ And if they appear to be two, each of them appears to be one, and distinct from the other.

Glaucon/ It does.

Socrates/ And if each of them be one, and both of them two, he will by intelligence perceive two distinct; for, if they were not distinct, he could not perceive two, but only one.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ The sight in like manner, we say, perceives great and small, but not as distinct from each other, but as something confused, Does it not?

Glaucon/ It does.

Socrates/ In order to obtain perspicuity in this affair, intelligence is obliged again to consider great and small, not as confused, but distinct, after a manner contrary to the sense of sight.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And is it not from hence, somehow, that it begins to question us, What then is great, and what is small?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And so we have called the one intelligible, and the other visible.

Glaucon/ Very right.

Socrates/ This then is what I was just now endeavoring to express, when I said, that some things call on the dianoëtic part, and others do not: and such as fall on the sense at the same time with their contraries, I define to be such as require intelligence, but such as do not, do not excite intelligence.

Glaucon/ I understand now, and it appears so to me.

Socrates/ What now? with reference to number and unity, to which of the two classes do you think they belong?

Glaucon/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ But reason by analogy, from what we have already said: for, if unity be of itself sufficiently seen, or be apprehended by any other sense, it will not lead towards real being, as we said concerning finger. But if there be always seen at the same time something contrary to it, so as that it shall no more appear unity than the contrary, it would then require someone to judge of it: and the soul would be under a necessity to doubt within itself, and to inquire, exciting the conception within itself, and to interrogate it what this unity is. And thus the discipline which relates to unity would be of the class of those which lead, and turn the soul to the contemplation of real being.

Glaucon/ But indeed this at least, is what the very sight of it effects in no small degree: for we behold the same thing, at one and the same time, as one and as an infinite multitude.

Socrates/ And if this be the case with reference to unity, will not every number be affected in the same manner?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But surely both computation and arithmetic wholly relate to number.

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ These then seem to lead to truth.

Glaucon/ Transcendently so.

Socrates/ They belong then, as it seems, to those disciplines which we are investigating. For the soldier must necessarily learn these things, for the disposing of his ranks; and the philosopher for the attaining to real being, emerging from generation, or he can never become a reasoner.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ But our guardian at least happens to be both a soldier and a philosopher.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ It were proper then, Glauco, to establish by law this discipline, and to persuade those who are to manage the greatest affairs of the city to apply to computation, and study it, not in a common way, but till by intelligence itself they arrive at the contemplation of the nature of numbers, not for the sake of buying, nor of selling, as merchants and retailers, but both for war, and for facility in the energies of the soul itself, and its conversion from generation to truth and essence.

Glaucon/ Most beautifully said.

Socrates/ And surely now, I perceive likewise, at present whilst this discipline respecting computations is mentioned, how elegant it is, and every way advantageous towards our purpose, if one applies to it for the sake of knowledge, and not with a view to traffic!

Glaucon/ Which way?

Socrates/ This very thing which we now mentioned, how vehemently does it somehow lead up the soul, and compel it to reason about numbers themselves, by no means admitting, if a man in reasoning with it shall produce numbers which have visible and tangible bodies! For you know of some who are skilled in these things, and who, if a man in reasoning should attempt to divide unity itself, would both ridicule him, and not admit it; but if you divide it into parts, they multiply them, afraid lest anyhow unity should appear not to be unity, but many parts.

Glaucon/ You say, most true.

Socrates/ What think you now, Glauco, if one should ask them: O admirable men! about what kind of numbers are you reasoning? in which there is unity, such as you think fit to approve, each whole equal to each whole, and not differing

in the smallest degree, having no part in itself, what do you think they would answer?

Glaucon/ This, as I suppose; that they mean such numbers as can be conceived by the dianoëtic part alone, but cannot be comprehended in any other way.

Socrates/ You see then, my friend, that in reality this discipline appears to be necessary for us, since it seems to compel the soul to employ intelligence itself in the perception of truth itself.

Glaucon/ And surely now it effects this in a very powerful degree.

Socrates/ But what? have you hitherto considered this? that those who are naturally skilled in computation appear to be acute in all disciplines; and such as are naturally slow, if they be instructed and exercised in this, though they derive no other advantage, yet at the same time all of them proceed so far as to become more acute than they were before.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ And surely, as I think, you will not easily find anything, and not at all many, which occasion greater labor to the learner and student than this.

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ On all these accounts, then, this discipline is not to be omitted. but the best geniuses are to be instructed in it.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Let this one thing then, be established among us; and, in the next place, let us consider if that which is consequent to this in any respect pertains to us.

Glaucon/ What is it? or, do you mean geometry?

Socrates/ That very thing.

Glaucon/ As far, as it relates to warlike affairs, it is plain that it belongs to us; for, as to encampments, and the occupying of ground, contracting and extending an army, and all those figures into which they form armies, both in battles and in marches, the same man would differ from himself when he is a geometrician, and when he is not.

Socrates/ But surely now, for such purposes as these, some little geometry and some portion of computation might suffice: but we must inquire, whether much of it, and great advances in it, would contribute anything to this great end, to make us more easily perceive the idea of the good. And we say that everything contributes to this, that obliges the soul to turn itself towards that region in which is the most divine of being, which it must by all means perceive.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ If therefore it compel the soul to contemplate essence, it belongs to us; but if it oblige it to contemplate generation, it does not belong to us.

Glaucon/ We say so indeed.

Socrates/ Those then who are but a little conversant in geometry, will not dispute with us this point at least, that this science is perfectly contrary to the common modes of speech, employed in it by those who practice it.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ They speak somehow very ridiculously, and through necessity: for all the discourse they employ in it appears to be with a view to operation, and to practice. Thus they speak of making a square, of prolonging, of adjoining, and the like. But yet the whole of this discipline is somehow studied for the sake of knowledge.

Glaucon/ By all means indeed.

Socrates/ Must not this further be assented to?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That it is the knowledge of that which always is, and not of that which is sometimes generated and destroyed. This, must be granted; for geometrical knowledge is of that which always is It would seem then, generous Glauco, to draw the soul towards truth, and to be productive of a dianoëtic energy adapted to a philosopher, so as to raise this power of the soul to things above, instead of causing it improperly, as at present, to contemplate things below.

Glaucon/ As much as possible.

Socrates/ As much as possible then, must we give orders, that those in this most beautiful city of yours by no means omit geometry; for even its by-works are not inconsiderable.

Glaucon/ What by-works?

Socrates/ Those, which you mentioned relating to war; and indeed with reference to all disciplines, as to the understanding of them more handsomely, we know somehow, that the having learned geometry or not, makes every way an entire difference.

Glaucon/ Everyway, by Zeus!

Socrates/ Let us then establish this second discipline for the youth.

Glaucon/ Let us establish it.

Socrates/ But what? shall we, in the third place, establish astronomy? or are you of a different opinion?

Glaucon/ I am, of the same: for to be well skilled in the seasons of months and years, belongs not only to agriculture and navigation, but equally to the military art.

Socrates/ You are pleasant, as you seem to be afraid of the multitude, lest you should appear to enjoin useless disciplines: but this is not altogether a contemptible thing, though it is difficult to persuade them, that by each of these

disciplines a certain organ of the soul is both purified and resuscitated, which is blinded and buried by studies of another kind; an organ better worth saving than ten thousand eyes, since truth is perceived by this alone. To such therefore as are of the same opinion, you will very readily appear to reason admirably well: but such as have never observed this will probably think you say nothing at all: for they perceive no other advantage in these things worthy of attention. Consider now from this point, with which of these two you will reason; or carry on the reasonings with neither of them, but principally for your own sake, yet envy not another, if anyone shall be able to be benefited by them.

Glaucon/ In this manner, I choose, on my own account principally both to reason, and to question and answer.

Socrates/ Come then, let us go back again: for we have not rightly taken that which is consequent to geometry.

Glaucon/ How have we taken?

Socrates/ After a plain surface, we have taken a solid, moving in a circle, before we considered it by itself: but if we had proceeded rightly we should have taken the third argument immediately after the second, and that is somehow the argument of cubes, and what participates of depth.

Glaucon/ It is so. But these things, Socrates, seem not yet to be discovered.

Socrates/ The reason of it, is two-fold. Because there is no city which sufficiently honors them, they are slightly investigated, being difficult; and besides, those who do investigate them want a leader, without which they cannot discover them. And this leader is in the first place hard to be obtained; and when he is obtained, as things are at present, those who investigate these particulars, as they conceive

magnificently of themselves, will not obey him. But if the whole city presided over these things, and held them in esteem, such as inquired into them would be obedient, and their inquiries, being carried on with assiduity and vigor, would discover themselves what they were since even now, whilst they are on the one hand despised and mutilated by the multitude, and on the other by those who study them without being able to give any account of their utility, they yet forcibly, under all these disadvantages, increase through their native grace: nor is it wonderful that they do so.

Glaucon/ Because truly, this grace is very remarkable. But tell me more plainly what you were just now saying; for somehow that study which respects a plain surface you called geometry.

Socrates/ I did. And then, you mentioned astronomy in the first place after it. But afterwards you drew back. Because, whilst I am hastening, to discuss all things rapidly, I advance more slowly. For that augment by depth which was next according to method we passed over, because the investigation of it is ridiculous; and after geometry we mentioned astronomy, which is the circular motion of a solid.

Glaucon/ You say right.

Socrates/ We establish then, astronomy as the fourth discipline, supposing that to subsist which we have now omitted, if the city shall enter upon it.

Glaucon/ It is reasonable. And now that you agree with me, Socrates, I proceed in my commendation of astronomy, which you formerly reproved as unseasonable. For it is evident, I conceive, to everyone, that this discipline compels the soul to look to that which is above, and from the things here conducts it thither.

Socrates/ It is probable, that it is evident to everyone but to me. For to me it does not appear so.

Glaucon/ How then do you think of it?

Socrates/ In the way it is now pursued by those who introduce it into philosophy, it entirely makes the soul to look downwards.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ You seem to me, to have formed with yourself no ignoble opinion of the discipline respecting things above, what it is: for you seem to think, that if anyone contemplates the various bodies in the firmament, and, by earnestly looking up, apprehends everything, you think that he has intelligence of these things; and does not merely see them with his eyes; and perhaps you judge right, and I foolishly. For I, on the other hand, am not able to conceive, that any other discipline can make the soul look upwards, but that which respects being, and that which is invisible; and if a man undertakes to learn anything of sensible objects, whether he gape upwards, or bellow downwards, never shall I say that he learns; for I aver he has no science of these things, nor shall I say that his soul looks upwards, but downwards, even though he should learn lying on his back, either at land or at sea.

Glaucon/ I am punished; for you have justly reproved me. But which was the proper way, said you, of learning astronomy different from the methods adopted at present, if they mean to learn it with advantage for the purposes we speak of?

Socrates/ In this manner, that these variegated bodies in the heavens, as they are varied in a visible subject, be deemed the most beautiful and the most accurate of the kind, but far inferior to real beings, according to those orbits in which real velocity, and real slowness, in true number,

and in all true figures, are carried with respect to one another, and carry all things that are within them. Which things truly are to be comprehended by reason and the dianoëtic power, but not by sight; or do you think they can?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Is not then, that variety in the heavens to be made use of as a paradigm for learning those real things, in the same manner as if one should meet with geometrical figures, drawn remarkably well and elaborately by Dædalus, or some other artist or painter? For a man who was skilled in geometry, on seeing these, would truly think the workmanship most excellent, yet would esteem it ridiculous to consider these things seriously, as if from thence he were to learn the truth, as to what were in equal, in duplicate, or in any other proportion.

Glaucon/ Why would it not be ridiculous?

Socrates/ And do not you then think, that he who is truly an astronomer is affected in the same manner, when he looks up to the orbits of the planets? And that he reckons that the heavens and all in them are indeed established by the demiurgus of the heavens, in the most beautiful manner possible for such works to be established; but would not he deem him absurd, who should imagine that this proportion of night with day, and of both these to a month, and of a month to a year, and of other stars to such like things, and towards one another, existed always in the same manner, and in no way suffered any change, though they have a body, and are visible; and search by every method to apprehend the truth of these things?

Glaucon/ So it appears to me, whilst I am hearing you.

Socrates/ Let us then make use of problems, in the study of astronomy, as in geometry. And let us dismiss the heavenly bodies, if we intend truly to apprehend astronomy,

and render profitable instead of unprofitable that part of the soul which is naturally wise.

Glaucon/ You truly enjoin a much harder task on astronomers, than is enjoined them at present.

Socrates/ And I think, that we must likewise enjoin other things, in the same manner, if we are to be of any service as lawgivers. But can you suggest any of the proper disciplines?

Glaucon/ I can suggest none, at present at least.

Socrates/ Lation, as it appears to me, affords us not one indeed, but many species of discipline. All of which any wise man can probably tell; but those which occur to me are two.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ Together with this, there is its counterpart.

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ As the eyes, seem to be fitted to astronomy, so the ears seem to be fitted to harmonious lation. And these seem to be sister sciences to one another, both as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glauco, agree with them, or how shall we do?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Shall we not, since this is their great work, inquire how they speak concerning them—and, if there be any other thing besides these, inquire into it likewise? But above all these things, we will still guard that which is our own.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ That those we educate never attempt at any time to learn any of those things in an imperfect manner, and not pointing always at that mark to which all ought to be directed: as we now mentioned with reference to astronomy. Or do not you know that they do the same thing with regard to harmony, as in astronomy? For, whilst they

measure one with another the symphonies and sounds which are heard, they labor like the astronomers unprofitably.

Glaucon/ Nay, by the gods, and ridiculously too, whilst they frequently repeat certain notes, and listen with their ears to catch the sound as from a neighboring place; and some of them say they hear some middle note, but that the interval which measures them is the smallest; and others again doubt this, and say that the notes are the same as were sounded before; and both parties subject the intellect to the ears.

Socrates/ But you speak, of the lucrative musicians, who perpetually harass and torment their strings, and turn them on the pegs. But that the comparison may not be too tedious, I shall say nothing of their complaints of the strings, their refusals and stubbornness, but bring the image to an end. But I say we ought not to choose these to speak of harmony, but those true musicians whom we mentioned. For these do the same things here as the others did in astronomy; for in these symphonies which are heard, they search for numbers, but they pass not thence to the problems, to inquire what numbers are symphonious, and what are not, and the reason why they are either the one or the other.

Glaucon/ You speak, of a divine work.

Socrates/ It is then indeed profitable, in the search of the beautiful and good, but if pursued in another manner it is unprofitable.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ But I think, that the proper method of inquiry into all these things, if it reach their communion and alliance with each other, and reason in what respects they are akin to one another, will contribute something to what we want, and our labor will not be unprofitable; otherwise it will.

Glaucon/ I likewise, prophesy the same thing. But you speak, Socrates, of a very mighty work.

Socrates/ Do you mean the introduction, or what else? Or do we not know that all these things are introductory to the law itself? which we ought to learn; for even those that are skilled in dialectic do not appear expert as to these things.

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus, unless a very few of all I have met with.

Socrates/ But whilst they are not able, to impart and receive reason, will they ever be able to know anything of what we say is necessary to be known?

Glaucon/ Never will they be able to do this.

Socrates/ Is not this itself then, Glauco, the law? To give perfection to dialectic; which being intelligible, may be said to be imitated by the power of sight; which power endeavors, as we observed, first to look at animals, then at the stars, and last of all at the sun himself. So when anyone attempts to discuss a subject without any of the senses, by reasoning he is impelled to that which each particular is; and if he does not desist till he apprehends by intelligence what is the good itself, he then arrives at the end of the intelligible, as the other does at the end of the visible.

Glaucon/ Entirely so. What now? Do not you call this progression dialectic?

Socrates/ What else? And now, as in our former comparison you had the liberation from chains, and turning from shadows towards images, and the light, and an ascent from the cavern to the sun; and when there, the looking at images in water, from an inability at first to behold animals and plants, and the light of the sun; so here you have the contemplation of divine phantasm, and the shadows of real beings, and not the shadows of images shadowed out by

another light of a similar kind, as by the sun. And all this business respecting the arts which we have discussed, has this power, to lead back again that which is best in the soul, to the contemplation of that which is best in beings; as in the former case, that which is brightest in the body is led to that which is most splendid in the corporeal and visible place.

Glaucon/ I admit, of these things; though truly it appears to me extremely difficult to admit of them, and in another respect it is difficult not to admit of them. But however (for we shall hear these things not only now at present, but often again discuss them), establishing these things as now expressed, let us go to the law itself, and discuss it as we have finished the introduction. Say then what is the mode of the power of dialectic, and into what species is it divided, and what are the paths leading to it? For these, it is likely, conduct us to that place, at which when we are arrived, we shall find a resting-place, and the end of the journey.

Socrates/ You will not as yet, friend Glauco, be able to follow; for otherwise no zeal should be wanting on my part; nor should you any longer only see the image of that of which we are speaking, but the truth itself. But this is what to me at least it appears; whether it be so in reality or not, this it is not proper strenuously to affirm; but that indeed it is somewhat of this kind may be strenuously affirmed. May it not?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ And further that it is the power of dialectic alone, which can discover this to one who is skilled in the things we have discussed, and that by no other power it is possible.

Glaucon/ This also, we may strenuously affirm.

Socrates/ This at least no one, will dispute with us: That no other method can attempt to comprehend, in any orderly way, what each particular being is; for all the other arts respect either the opinions and desires of men, or generations, and compositions, or are all employed in the culture of things generated and compounded. Those others, which we said participated somewhat of being, geometry, and such as are connected with her, we see as dreaming indeed about being; but it is impossible for them to have a true vision, so long as employing hypotheses they preserve these immoveable, without being able to assign a reason for their subsistence. For where the principle is that which is unknown, and the conclusion and intermediate steps are connected with that unknown principle, by what contrivance can an assent of such a kind ever become science?

Glaucon/ By none.

Socrates/ Does not then, the dialectic method proceed in this way alone, to the principle itself, removing all hypotheses, that it may firmly establish it, and gradually drawing and leading upwards the eye of the soul, which was truly buried in a certain barbaric mire, using as assistants and circular leaders those arts we have mentioned, which through custom we frequently call sciences, but which require another appellation more clear than opinion, but more obscure than science? We have somewhere in the former part of our discourse termed it the dianoëtic power. But the controversy is not, as it appears to me, about a name, with those who inquire into things of such great importance as those now before us.

Glaucon/ It is not.

Socrates/ Do you agree then, as formerly, to call the first part science, the second the dianoëtic power, the third faith, and the fourth assimilation? and both these last opinion?

and the two former intelligence? And that opinion is employed about generation, and intelligence about essence? Likewise, that as essence is to generation, so is intelligence to opinion, science to faith, and the dianoëtic power to assimilation? But as for the analogy of the things which these powers respect, and the two-fold division of each, viz. of the object of opinion, and of intellect, these we omit, Glauco, that we may not be more prolix here than in our former reasonings.

Glaucon/ As for me, with reference to those other things, as far as I am able to follow, I am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ But do not you call him skilled in dialectic, who apprehends the reason of the essence of each particular: And as for the man who is not able to give a reason to himself and to another, so far as he is not able, so far will you not say he wants intelligence of the thing?

Glaucon/ Why should I not say so?

Socrates/ And is not the case the same with reference to the good? Whosoever cannot define it by reason, separating the idea of the good from all others, and as in a battle piercing through all arguments, eagerly driving to confute, not according to opinion, but according to essence, and in all these marching forward with undeviating reason, —such an one knows nothing of the good itself, nor of any good whatever: but if he has attained to any image of the good, we must say he has attained to it by opinion, not by science; that in the present life he is sleeping, and conversant with dreams; and that before he is roused he will descend to Hades, and there be profoundly and perfectly said asleep.

Glaucon/ By Zeus, I will strongly aver all these things.

Socrates/ But surely you will not, I think, allow your own children at least whom you nourished and educated in reasoning, if ever in reality you educate them, to have the

supreme government of the most important affairs in the state, whilst they are void of reason, as letters of the alphabet.

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ You will then lay down this to them as a law: That in a most especial manner they attain to that part of education, by which they may become able to question and answer in the most scientific manner.

Glaucon/ I will settle it by law, with your assistance at least.

Socrates/ Does it then appear to you, that dialectic is to be placed on high as a bulwark to disciplines? and that no other discipline can with propriety be raised higher than this; but that everything respecting disciplines is now finished?

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ There now remains for you, the distribution: To whom shall we assign these disciplines, and after what manner?

Glaucon/ That is evident.

Socrates/ Do you remember then our former election of rulers, what kind we chose?

Glaucon/ How should I not?

Socrates/ As to other things then, conceive, that such geniuses as these ought to be selected. For the most firm and brave are to be preferred, and, as far as possible, the most graceful; and besides, we must not only seek for those whose manners are generous and stern, but they must be possessed of every other natural disposition conducive to this education.

Glaucon/ Which dispositions do you recommend?

Socrates/ They must have, O blessed man! acuteness with respect to disciplines, that they may not learn with difficulty. For souls are much more intimidated in robust disciplines, than in strenuous exercises of the body; for their proper labor, and which is not in common with the body, is more domestic to them.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And we must seek for one of good memory, untainted, and every way laborious: or how else do you think anyone will be willing to endure the fatigue of the body, and to accomplish at the same time such learning and study?

Glaucon/ No one, unless he be in all respects of a naturally good disposition.

Socrates/ The mistake then about philosophy, and the contempt of it, have been occasioned through these things, because, as I formerly said, it is not applied to in a manner suitable to its dignity: For it ought not to be applied to by the bastardly, but the legitimate.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ In the first place, he who is to apply to philosophy ought not, to be lame as to his love of labor, being laborious in some things, and averse to labor in others. But this takes place when a man loves wrestling and hunting, and all exercises of the body, but is not a lover of learning, and loves neither to hear nor to inquire, but in all these respects has an aversion to labor. He likewise is lame, in a different manner from this man, who dislikes all bodily exercise.

Glaucon/ You say most true.

Socrates/ And shall we not, in like manner account that soul lame as to truth, which hates indeed a voluntary falsehood, and bears it ill in itself, and is beyond measure enraged when others tell a lie; but easily admits the

involuntary lie; and, though at any time it be found ignorant, is not displeased, but like a savage sow willingly wallows in ignorance?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And in like manner, as to temperance and fortitude, and magnanimity, and all the parts of virtue, we must no less carefully attend to what is bastardly, and what is legitimate; for when either any private person or city understands not how to attend to all these things, they unawares employ the lame and the bastardly for whatever they have occasion; private persons employ them as friends, and cities as governors.

Glaucon/ The case is entirely so.

Socrates/ But we, must beware of all such things; for, if we take such as are entire in body and in mind for such extensive learning, and exercise and instruct them, justice: herself will not blame us, and we shall preserve both the city and its constitution: but if we introduce persons of a different description into these affairs, we shall do everything the reverse, and bring philosophy under still greater ridicule.

Glaucon/ That indeed were shameful.

Socrates/ Certainly. But I myself seem at present to be somewhat ridiculous.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ I forgot, that we were amusing ourselves, and spoke with too great keenness; for, whilst I was speaking, I looked towards philosophy; and seeing her most unworthily abused, I seem to have been filled with indignation, and, as being enraged at those who are the cause of it, to have spoken more earnestly what I said.

Glaucon/ No truly, not to me your hearer at least.

Socrates/ But for me, the speaker. But let us not forget this, that in our former election we made choice of old men; but in this election it will not be allowed us. For we must not believe Solon, that one who is old is able to learn many things; but he is less able to effect this than to run. All mighty and numerous labors belong to the young.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Everything then relating to arithmetic and geometry, and all that previous instruction which they should be taught before they learn dialectic, ought to be set before them whilst they are children, and that method of teaching observed, which will make them learn without compulsion.

Glaucon/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because, a free man ought to learn no discipline with slavery: for the labors of the body when endured through compulsion render the body nothing worse: but no compelled discipline is lasting in the soul.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Do not then, O best of men! compel boys in their learning; but train them up, amusing themselves, that you may be better able to discern to what the genius of each naturally tends.

Glaucon/ What you say, is reasonable.

Socrates/ Do not you remember then, that we said the boys are even to be carried to war, as spectators, on horse-back, and that they are to be brought nearer, if they can with safety, and like young hounds taste the blood?

Glaucon/ I remember.

Socrates/ Whoever then, shall appear the most forward in all these labors, disciplines, and terrors, are to be selected into a certain number.

Glaucon/ At what age?

Socrates/ When they have, finished their necessary exercises; for during this time, whilst it continues, for two or three years, it is impossible to accomplish anything else; for fatigue and sleep are enemies to learning; and this too is none of the least of their trials, what each of them appears to be in his exercises.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And after this period, let such as formerly have been selected of the age of twenty receive greater honors than others, and let those disciplines which in their youth they learned separately, be brought before them in one view, that they may see the alliance of the disciplines with each other, and with, the nature of real being.

Glaucon/ This discipline indeed will alone, remain, firm in those in whom it is ingenerated.

Socrates/ And this, is the greatest trial for distinguishing between those geniuses which are naturally fitted for dialectic, and those which are not. He who perceives, this alliance is skilled in dialectic; he who does not, is not.

Glaucon/ I am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ It will then be necessary for you, after you have observed these things, and seen who are most approved in these, being stable in disciplines, and stable in war, and in the other things established by law, to make choice of such after they exceed thirty years, selecting from those chosen formerly, and advance them to greater honors. You must likewise observe them, trying them by the power of dialectic so as to ascertain which of them without the assistance of his eyes, or any other sense, is able to proceed with truth to being itself. And here, my companion, is a work of great caution.

Glaucon/ In what principally?

Socrates/ Do not you perceive, the evil which at present attends dialectic, how great it is?

Glaucon/ What is it, you mean?

Socrates/ How it is somehow, full of what is contrary to law.

Glaucon/ Greatly so.

Socrates/ Do you think then, they suffer some wonderful thing, and will you not forgive them?

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Just as if, a certain supposititious child were educated in great opulence in a rich and noble family, and amidst many flatterers, and should perceive, when grown up to manhood, that he is not descended of those who are said to be his parents, but yet should not discover his real parents; can you divine how such an one would be affected both towards his flatterers, and towards his supposed parents, both at the time when he knew nothing of the cheat, and at that time again when he came to perceive it? Or are you willing to hear me while I presage it?

Glaucon/ I am willing.

Socrates/ I prophesy then, that he will pay more honor to his father and mother, and his other supposed relations, than to the flatterers, and that he will less neglect them when they are in any want, and be less apt to do or say anything amiss to them, and in matters of consequence be less disobedient to them than to these flatterers, during that period in which he knows not the truth.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ But when he perceives the real state of the affair, I again prophesy, he will then slacken in his honor and respect for them, and attend to the flatterers, and be remarkably more persuaded by them now than formerly,

and truly live according to their manner, converting with them openly. But for that father, and those supposed relations, if he be not of an entirely good natural disposition, he will have no regard.

Glaucon/ You say everything, as it would happen.

Socrates/ But in what manner does this comparison respect those who are conversant with dialectic?

Glaucon/ In this.

Socrates/ We have certain dogmas from our childhood concerning things just and beautiful, in which we have been nourished as by parents, obeying and honoring them.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ Are there not likewise other pursuits opposite to these, with pleasures flattering our souls, and drawing them towards these? They do not however persuade those who are in any degree moderate, but they honor those their relations, and obey them.

Glaucon/ These things are so.

Socrates/ What now, when to one who is thus affected the question is proposed, What is the beautiful? and when he, answering what he has heard from the lawgiver, is refuted by reason; and reason frequently and every way convincing him, reduces him to the opinion, that this is no more beautiful than it is deformed; and in the same manner, as to what is just and good, and whatever else he held in highest esteem, what do you think such an one will after this do, with regard to these things, as to honoring and obeying them?

Glaucon/ Of necessity, he will neither honor nor obey them any longer in the same manner as formerly.

Socrates/ When then he no longer deems, these things honorable, and allied to him as formerly, and cannot

discover those which really are so, is it possible he can readily join himself to any other life than the flattering one?

Glaucon/ It is not possible.

Socrates/ And from being an observer of the law, he shall, I think, appear to be a transgressor.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Is it not likely then, that those shall be thus affected who in this situation apply to reasoning, and that they should deserve, as I was just now saying, great forgiveness?

Glaucon/ And pity too.

Socrates/ Whilst you take care then, lest this compassionable case befall these of the age of thirty, ought they not by every method to apply themselves to reasoning?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is not this one prudent caution? that they taste not reasonings, whilst they are young: for you have not forgot, I suppose, that the youth, when they first taste of reasonings, abuse them in the way of amusement, whilst they employ them always for the purpose of contradiction. And imitating those who are refuters, they themselves refute others, delighting like whelps in dragging and tearing to pieces, in their reasonings, those always who are near them.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And after they have confuted many, and been themselves confuted by many, do they not vehemently and speedily lay aside all the opinions they formerly possessed? And by these means they themselves, and the whole of philosophy, are calumniated by others.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ But he who is of a riper age, will not be disposed to share in such a madness, but will rather imitate him who

inclines to reason and inquire after truth, than one who, for the sake of diversion, amuses himself, and contradicts. He will likewise be more modest himself, and render the practice of disputing more honorable instead of being more dishonorable.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Were not then all our former remarks rightly made, in the way of precaution, as to this point, that those geniuses ought to be decent and stable, to whom dialectic is to be imparted, and not as at present, when every common genius, and such as is not at all proper, is admitted to it?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Will not then the double of the former period suffice a man to remain in acquiring the art of dialectic with perseverance and application, and doing nothing else but in way of counterpart exercising himself in all bodily exercises?

Glaucon/ Do you mean six years, or four?

Socrates/ 'Tis of no consequence, make it five. After this you must compel them to descend to that cave again, and oblige them to govern both in things relating to war, and such other magistracies as require youth, that the, may not fall short of others in experience. And they must be still further tried among these, whether, being drawn to every different quarter, they will continue firm, or whether they will in any measure be drawn aside.

Glaucon/ And for how long a time, do you appoint this?

Socrates/ For fifteen years. And when they are of the age of fifty, such of them as are preserved, and as have excelled in all these things, in actions, and in the sciences, are now to be led to the end, and are to be obliged, inclining the ray of their soul, to look towards that which imparts light to all things, and, when they have viewed the good itself, to use it as a paradigm, each of them, in their turn, in adorning both

the city and private persons, and themselves, during the remainder of their life. For the most part indeed they must be occupied in philosophy; and when it is their turn, they must toil in political affairs, and take the government, each for the good of the city, performing this office, not as anything honorable, but as a thing necessary. And after they have educated others in the same manner still, and lest such as resemble themselves to be the guardians of the city, they depart to inhabit the islands of the blest. But the city will publicly erect for them monuments, and offer sacrifices, if the oracle assent, as to superior beings; and if it do not, as to happy and divine men.

Glaucon/ You have, Socrates, like a statuary, made our governors all-beautiful.

Socrates/ And our governesses likewise, Glauco. For do not suppose that I have spoken what I have said any more concerning the men than concerning the women, —such of them as are of a sufficient genius.

Glaucon/ Right, if at least they are to share in all things equally with the men, as we related.

Socrates/ What then, do you agree, that with reference to the city and republic, we have not altogether spoken what can only be considered as wishes; but such things as are indeed difficult, yet possible in a certain respect, and in no other way than what has been mentioned, viz. when those who are truly philosophers, whether more of them or a single one, becoming governors in a city, shall despise those present honors, considering them as illiberal and of no value; but esteeming rectitude and the honors, which are derived from it above all things; accounting the just as a thing of all others the greatest, and most absolutely necessary; and ministering to it, and, increasing it, thoroughly regulate the constitution of their own city?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ As many, of the more advanced in life as have lived ten years in the city they will send into the country, and, removing their children away from those habits which the domestics possess at present, they will educate them in their own manners and laws, which are what we formerly mentioned: and the city and republic we have described being thus established in the speediest and easiest manner, it will both be happy itself, and be of the greatest advantage to that people among whom it is established.

Glaucon/ Very much so indeed. And you seem to me, Socrates, to have told very well how this city shall arise, if it arise at all.

Socrates/ Are not now then, our discourses sufficient both concerning such a city as this, and concerning a man similar to it? For it is also now evident what kind of a man we shall say he ought to be.

Glaucon/ It is evident; and your inquiry seems to me to be at an end.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.

Book 8.

Socrates/ Be it so. These things, Glauco, we have now assented to; that in this city, which is to be established in a perfect manner, the women are to be common, the children common, and likewise the whole of education. In like manner, their employments both in peace and war are to be common; and their kings are to be such as excel all others both in philosophy and in the arts of war.

Glaucon/ These things, have been assented to.

Socrates/ And surely we likewise granted, that when the governors are marching with the soldiers, and settle themselves, they shall dwell in such habitations as we formerly mentioned, which have nothing peculiar to anyone, but are common to all: and besides these houses, we likewise, if you remember, agreed what sort of possessions they shall have.

Glaucon/ I remember, that we were of opinion, none of them ought to possess anything as others do at present; but, as wrestlers in war and guardians, they were to receive a reward for their guardianship from others, or a yearly maintenance on these accounts, and were to take care of themselves and the rest of the city.

Socrates/ You say right. But since we have finished this, let us recollect whence we made this digression; that we may now proceed again in the same way.

Glaucon/ That is not difficult: for you were mentioning much the same things of the city with those you have done at present; saying that you considered such a city to be good, as it was at that time described, and the man to be good who resembles it; whilst yet it seems you are able to describe a better city, and a better man. And you said moreover, that all the others were wrong, if this was right. Of the other republics, you said, as I remember, there were four species,

which deserved to be considered, and to have the errors in them, and the lawless people in them, observed; in order that when we have beheld the whole of them, and when we have agreed which is the best, and which is the worst man, we may inquire whether the best man be the happiest, and the worst the most miserable, or otherwise. And when I asked you, which you call the four republics, Polemarchus and Adimantus hereupon interrupted; and you, in this manner having resumed the subject, are come to this part of the reasoning.

Socrates/ You have recollected, most accurately.

Glaucon/ Again therefore afford me the same opportunity, and, whilst I ask you the same question, endeavor to say what you then intended to assert.

Socrates/ If indeed I am able.

Glaucon/ And I am truly desirous, for my part, to hear which you call the four republics.

Socrates/ You shall hear that, without difficulty. For they are these I mention, and they have names too. There is that which is commended by many, the Cretan and the Spartan. There is, secondly, that which has a secondary praise, called Oligarchy, a republic full of many evils; that which is different from this, and follows next in order, a Democracy; and then genuine Tyranny, different from all these, the fourth and last disease of a city. Or have you any other form of a republic belonging to any distinct: species? For your little principalities and venal kingdoms, and such like republics, are somehow of a middle kind between these, and one may find of them as many among the barbarians as among the Greeks.

Glaucon/ They are indeed, said to be very many, and very strange ones.

Socrates/ Do you know now, that there is somehow a necessity that there be as many species of men as of republics? Or do you imagine that republics are generated somehow of an oak, or a rock, and not of the manners of those who are in the city, to which, as into a current, everything else likewise is drawn?

Glaucon/ By no means do I imagine, they are generated from anything but from hence.

Socrates/ If then there be five species of cities, the species of souls in individuals shall be likewise five.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ We have already discussed that which resembles an Aristocracy, which we have rightly pronounced to be both good and just.

Glaucon/ We have so.

Socrates/ Are we now, in the next place, to go over the worse species, the contentious and the ambitious man, who is formed according to the Spartan republic; then him resembling an Oligarchy; and then the Democratic and the Tyrannic, that we may contemplate the most unjust, and oppose him to the most just, that our inquiry may be completed? viz. how the most finished justice is in comparison of the most finished injustice, as to the happiness or misery of the possessor? that so we may either follow injustice, being persuaded by Thrasymachus, or justice, yielding to the present reasoning?

Glaucon/ By all means, we must do so.

Socrates/ Shall we then, in the same manner as we began, consider the manners in republics, before we consider them in private persons, as being there more conspicuous? And according to this method the ambitious republic is first to be considered (for I have no other name to call it by, but it may be denominated either a Timocracy, or

a Timarchy), and together with it we shall counter a man resembling it; afterwards we shall consider an Oligarchy, and a man resembling Oligarchy; then again, when we have viewed a Democracy, we shall contemplate a Democratic man; and then in the fourth place, when we come to Tyranny, and contemplate it, and likewise a tyrannic soul, we shall endeavor to become competent judges of what we proposed.

Glaucon/ Both our contemplation and judgment, would in this manner at least be agreeable to reason.

Socrates/ Come then, let us endeavor to relate in what manner a Timocracy arises out of an Aristocracy. Or is not this plain, that every republic changes, by means of that part which possesses the magistracies, when in this itself there arises sedition; but whilst this agrees with itself, though the state be extremely small, it is impossible to be changed?

Glaucon/ It is so, indeed.

Socrates/ How then, Glauco, shall our city be changed? Or in what shape shall our allies and rulers fall into sedition with one another, and among themselves? Or are you willing, that, like Homer, we invoke the Mules to tell us, "How first sedition rose?"—And man we say, that whilst they talk tragically, playing with us, and rallying us as children, they yet talk seriously and sublimely?

Glaucon/ In what manner?

Socrates/ Somehow thus. It is indeed difficult for a city thus constituted to be changed. But as everything which is generated is obnoxious to corruption, neither will such a constitution as this remain forever, but be dissolved. And its dissolution is this. Not only with respect to terrestrial plants, but likewise in terrestrial animals, a fertility and sterility of soul as well as of body takes place, when the revolutions of the heavenly bodies complete the periphery of their

respective orbits; which are shorter to the shorter lived, and contrariwise to such as are the contrary: and with reference to the fertility and sterility of our race, although those are wise that you have educated to be governors of cities, yet will they never, by reason in conjunction with sense, observe the proper seasons, but overlook them, and sometimes generate children when they ought not. But the period to that which is divinely generated is that which the perfect number comprehends; and to that which is generated by man, that in which the augmentations surpassing and surpassed, when they shall have received three restitutions and four boundaries of things assimilating and dissimilating, increasing and decreasing, shall render all things correspondent and effable; of which the sesquiternian progeny, when conjoined with the pentad, and thrice increased, affords two harmonies. One of these, the equally equal, a hundred times a hundred; but the other, of equal length indeed, but more oblong, is of a hundred numbers from effable diameters of pentads, each being deficient by unity, and from two numbers that are ineffable; and from a hundred cubes of the triad. But the whole geometric number of this kind is the author of better and worse generations. Of which when our governors being ignorant, join our couples together unseasonably, the children shall neither be of a good genius, nor fortunate. And though the former governors shall install the best of them in the office, they nevertheless being unworthy of it, and coming to have guardianship, in the first place esteeming music less than they ought, and in the next place the gymnic exercises. Hence our youth will become less acquainted with music. And the guardians which shall be appointed from among these will not be altogether expert guardians, to distinguish, according to Hesiod and us, the several species of geniuses, the golden, the silver, the brazen, and the iron: but whilst iron is mixed

with silver and brass with gold, dissimilitude arises, and unharmonious inequality. And when these arise, wherever they prevail, they perpetually generate war and enmity. To such a race of men as this, we must suppose them to say, that sedition belongs whenever it happens to rise.

Glaucon/ And we shall say that they have answered justly.

Socrates/ And of necessity, for they are Muses.

Glaucon/ What then, do the Muses say next?

Socrates/ When sedition is risen, two of the species of geniuses, the iron and the brazen, will be drawn to gain, and the acquisition of lands and houses, of gold and silver. But the golden and the silver geniuses, as they are not in want, but naturally rich, will lead souls towards virtue and the original constitution; yet as they live in a violent manner, and raw contrary to one another, they will make an agreement to divide their lands and houses between them, and to dwell apart from one another: and then enslaving those who were formerly kept by them as freemen, as friends, and tutors, they will keep them as domestics and slaves, for service in war and for their own protection.

Glaucon/ This revolution, seems to me thus to arise.

Socrates/ Shall not then this republic, be somewhat in the middle between an Aristocracy and Oligarchy?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the change shall happen in this manner, and on this change what sort of life shall it lead? Or is it not plain, that in some things it shall imitate the former republic, and in others Oligarchy, as being in the middle of the two, and shall likewise have somewhat peculiar to itself?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Shall they not then, in honoring their rulers, and in this that their military abstain from agriculture, from mechanical and other gainful employments, in their establishing common meals, and in studying both gymnastic exercises and contests of war, in all these things shall they not imitate the former republic?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But in this, that they are afraid to bring wise men into the magistracy, as having no longer any such as are truly simple and inflexible, but such as are of a mixed kind; and in that they incline for those who are more forward and rough, whose natural genius is rather fitted for war than peace, and in that they esteem tricks and stratagems, and spend the whole of their time in continual war, in all these respects shall it not have many things peculiar to itself?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And such as these, shall be desirous of wealth, as those who live in Oligarchies, and in an illiberal manner, value gold and silver concealed in darkness, as having repositories of their own, and domestic treasuries, where they hoard and hide them, and have their houses circularly enclosed, where, as in nests altogether peculiar, they squander everything profusely, together with their wives and such others as they fancy.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And will they not likewise be sparing of their substance, as valuing it highly, and acquiring it not in an open manner, but love to squander the substance of others, through their dissoluteness, and secretly indulging their pleasures? They will likewise fly from the law, as children from their father, who have been educated not by persuasion but by force, having neglected the true muse, which is

accompanied with reason and philosophy, and honored gymnastic more than music.

Glaucon/ You describe entirely, a mixed republic, compounded of good and ill.

Socrates/ It is indeed mixed. One thing is most remarkable in it, from the prevalence of the irascible temper, contention, and ambition.

Glaucon/ Exceedingly.

Socrates/ Does not then, this republic arise in this manner? And is it not of such a kind as this, as far as the form of a republic can be described in words where there is not perfect accuracy; as it suffices us to contemplate in description likewise the most just and the most unjust man; and it were a work of prodigious length to discuss all republics, and all the various manners of men, without omitting anything?

Glaucon/ Very right.

Socrates/ What now will the man be who corresponds to this republic? how shall he be formed, and of what kind?

Adeimantus/ I think, he will be somewhat like Glauco here, at least in a love of contention.

Socrates/ Perhaps, as to this particular. But in other respects he does not seem to me to have a natural resemblance of him.

Adeimantus/ In what?

Socrates/ He must necessarily, be more arrogant, and unapt to music, but fond of it: and fond of hearing, but by no means a rhetorician: and such an one will be rough towards certain slaves, without despising them, as he does who is sufficiently educated. He will be mild towards such as are free, and extremely submissive to governors; a lover of dominion, and a lover of honor, not thinking it proper to

govern by eloquence, nor anything of the kind, but by political management and military performances, being a lover of gymnastic and hunting.

Adeimantus/ This indeed, is the temper of that republic.

Socrates/ And shall not such an one, despise money, whilst he is young? But the older he grows, the more he will always value it, because he partakes of the covetous genius, and is not sincerely affected towards virtue, because destitute of the best guardian.

Adeimantus/ Of what guardian?

Socrates/ Reason, accompanied with music, which being the only inbred preservative of virtue, dwells with the possessor through the whole of life.

Adeimantus/ You say well.

Socrates/ And surely at least such a timocratic youth, resembles such a city.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And such an one, is formed somehow in this manner. He happens sometimes to be the young son of a worthy father, who dwells in an ill regulated city, and who shuns honors and magistracies, and lawsuits, and all such public business, and is willing to live neglected in obscurity, that he may have no trouble.

Adeimantus/ In what manner then, is he formed?

Socrates/ When first of all, he hears his mother venting her indignation, because her husband is not in the magistracy, and complaining that she is on this account neglected among other women, and that she observes him not extremely attentive to the acquisition of wealth, not fighting and reviling privately and publicly in courts of justice; but behaving on all these occasions indolently, and perceiving him always attentive to himself, and treating her

neither with extreme respect nor contempt; on all these accounts, being filled with indignation, she tells her son that his father is unmanly, and extremely remiss, and such other things as wives are wont to cant over concerning such husbands.

Adeimantus/ They are very many, truly, and very much in their spirit.

Socrates/ And you know, that the domestics likewise of such families, such of them as appear good-natured, sometimes privately say the same things to the sons; and if they see anyone either owing money whom the father does not file at law, or in any other way doing injustice, they exhort him to punish all such persons when he comes to be a man, and to be more of a man than his father. And when he goes abroad, he hears other such like things. And he sees that such in the city as attend to their own affairs are called simple, and held in little esteem, and that such as do not attend to their affairs are both honored and commended. The young man now hearing and seeing all these things, and then again hearing the speeches of his father, and observing his pursuits in a near view, in comparison with those of others; being drawn by both these, his father watering and increasing the rational part in his soul, and these others the concupiscible and irascible; and being naturally no bad man, but spoiled by the bad conversations of others, he is brought to a mean between the two, and delivers up the government within himself to a middle power, that which is fond of contention and irascible, and so he becomes a haughty and ambitious man.

Adeimantus/ You seem, to have accurately explained the formation of such an one.

Socrates/ We have now then, the second republic and the second man.

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ Shall we not after this say with Æschylus?

"With different cities diff'rent men accord."

Or, rather, according to our plan, shall we first establish the cities?

Adeimantus/ By all means so.

Socrates/ It would be an Oligarchy then, I think, which succeeds this republic.

Adeimantus/ But what constitution, is it you call an Oligarchy?

Socrates/ That republic, which is founded on men's valuations, in which the rich bear rule, and the poor have no share in the government.

Adeimantus/ I understand.

Socrates/ Must we not relate, first, how the change is made from a Timocracy to an Oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ We must.

Socrates/ And surely at least how this change is made, is manifest even to the blind.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ That treasury, which everyone has filled with gold destroys such a republic; for, first of all, they find out for themselves methods of expense, and to this purpose strain the laws, both they and their wives disobeying them.

Adeimantus/ That is likely.

Socrates/ And afterwards, I think, one observing another, and coming to rival one another, the multitude of them are rendered of this kind.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ And from hence then, proceeding still to a greater desire of acquiring wealth, the more honorable they

account this to be, the more will virtue be thought dishonorable: or is not virtue so different from wealth, that, if each of them be placed in the opposite arm of a balance, they always weigh opposite to each other?

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But whilst wealth and the wealthy are honored in the city, both virtue and the good must be more dishonored.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And what is honored is always pursued, and what is dishonored is neglected.

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Instead then of contentious and ambitious men, they will at last become lovers of gain and of wealth: and they will praise and admire the rich, and bring them into the magistracy, but the poor man they will despise.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do they not then make laws, marking out the boundary of the Oligarchic constitution, and regulating the quantity of Oligarchic power according to the quantity of wealth, more to the more wealthy, and less to the less, intimating that he who has not the valuation settled by law is to have no share in the government? And do they not transact these things violently, by force of arms, or establish such a republic after they have previously terrified them? Is it not thus?

Adeimantus/ Thus indeed.

Socrates/ This then in short is the constitution.

Adeimantus/ It is. But what now is the nature of the republic, and what are the faults we ascribed to it?

Socrates/ First of all, this very thing, the constitution itself, what think you of this? For consider, if a man should

in this manner appoint pilots of ships, according to their valuations, but never entrust one with a poor man, though better skilled in piloting, what would be the consequence?

Adeimantus/ They would, make very bad navigation.

Socrates/ And is it not in the same manner with reference to any other thing, or any government whatever?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Is it so in all cases but in a city? or is it so with reference to a city likewise?

Adeimantus/ There most especially, in as much as it is the most difficult, and the greatest government.

Socrates/ Oligarchy then would seem to have this, which is so great a fault.

Adeimantus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But what? Is this fault anything less?

Adeimantus/ What?

Socrates/ That such a city is not one, but of necessity two; one consisting of the poor, and the other of the rich, dwelling in one place, and always plotting against one another.

Adeimantus/ By Zeus, it is in no respect less.

Socrates/ But surely neither is this a handsome thing, to be incapable to wage any war, because of the necessity they are under, either of employing the armed multitude, and of dreading them more than the enemy themselves; or not employing them, to appear in battle itself truly Oligarchic, and at the same time to be unwilling to advance money for the public service, through a natural disposition of covetousness.

Adeimantus/ This is not handsome.

Socrates/ But what? with reference to what we long ago condemned, the engaging in a multiplicity of different things,

the same persons, at the same time, attending in such a republic to agriculture, lucrative employments, and military affairs, does this appear to be right?

Adeimantus/ Not in any degree.

Socrates/ But see now whether this form of republic be the first which introduces this greatest of all evils.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That one shall be allowed to dispose of the whole of his effects, and another to purchase them from him, and the seller be allowed to dwell in the city, whilst he belongs to no one class in the city, and is neither called a maker of money, nor mechanic, nor horseman, nor foot-soldier, but poor and destitute.

Adeimantus/ It is the first.

Socrates/ But yet such an one shall not be prohibited in Oligarchic governments; for otherwise some of them would not be over-rich, and others altogether poor.

Adeimantus/ Right.

Socrates/ But consider this likewise. When such a rich man as this is spends of his substance, was it of any more advantage to the city with reference to the purposes we now mentioned? or did he appear to be indeed one of the magistrates, but was in truth neither magistrate of the city, nor servant to it, but a waster of substance?

Adeimantus/ So he appeared. He was nothing but a waster.

Socrates/ Are you willing then, that we say of him, that as when a drone is in a bee-hive, it is the disease of the swarm; in like manner such an one, when a drone in his house, is the disease of the city?

Adeimantus/ Entirely so, Socrates.

Socrates/ And has not God, Adimantus, made all the winged drones without any sting; but these with feet, some of them without stings, and some of them with dreadful stings? And of those who are without stings, are they who continue poor to old-age; and of those who have stings, are all these who are called mischievous.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ It is plain then, that in a city where you observe there are poor, there are somewhere in that place concealed thieves and purse-cutters, and sacrilegious persons, and workers of all other such evils.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ What then? Do not you perceive poor people in cities under Oligarchic government?

Adeimantus/ They are almost all so, except the governors.

Socrates/ And do we not think, that there are many mischievous persons in them with stings, whom the magistracy by diligence and by force restrains?

Adeimantus/ We think so indeed.

Socrates/ And shall we not say, that through want of education, through bad nurture, and a corrupt constitution of state, such sort of persons are there produced?

Adeimantus/ We shall say so.

Socrates/ Is not then the city which is under Oligarchy of such a kind as this, and hath it not such evils as these, and probably more too?

Adeimantus/ It is nearly so.

Socrates/ We have now finished, this republic likewise, which they call Oligarchy, having its governors according to valuation. And let us now consider the man who resembles it, in what manner he arises, and what sort of man he is.

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And is not the change from the Timocratic to the Oligarchic chiefly in this manner?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ When such a one has a son, first of all, he both emulates his father, and follows his steps; afterwards he sees him, on a sudden, dashed on the city, as on a rock, and wasting both his substance and himself, either in the office of a general, or some other principal magistracy; then falling into courts of justice, destroyed by sycophants, and either put to death, or stripped of his dignities, disgraced, and losing all his substance.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ When he has seen and suffered those things, friend, and has lost his substance, he instantly in a terror pushes headlong from the throne of his soul that ambitious and animated disposition, and, being humbled by his poverty, turns his attention to gain, lives meanly and sparingly, and, applying to work, collects wealth. Or do you not think that such a man will then seat in that throne the covetous and avaricious disposition, and make it a mighty king within himself, begirt with tiaras, and bracelets, and scepters?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ But he, I imagine, having placed both the rational and the ambitious disposition low on the ground on either side, and having enslaved them under it, the one he allows to reason on nothing, nor ever to inquire, but in what way lesser substance shall be made greater; and the other again he permits to admire and honor nothing but riches and the rich, and to receive honor on no other account but the acquisition of money, or whatever contributes towards it.

Adeimantus/ There is no other change, of an ambitious youth to a covetous one so sudden and so powerful as this.

Socrates/ Is not this, then, the Oligarchic man? And the change into such an one is from a man resembling that republic from which the Oligarchic republic arises. Let us consider, now, if he any way resembles it.

Adeimantus/ Let us consider.

Socrates/ Does he not, in the first place, resemble it in valuing money above all things?

Adeimantus/ Why does he not?

Socrates/ And surely at least in being sparing and laborious, satisfying only his necessary desires, and not allowing of any other expenses, but subduing the other desires as foolish.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And being, an emaciated man, and making gain of everything, a man intent on hoarding, such as the multitude extols—will not this be the man who resembles such a republic?

Adeimantus/ It appears so to me. Riches then must be most valued both by the city and by such a man.

Socrates/ For I do not think, that such a man has attended to education.

Adeimantus/ I do not think he has; for he would not have taken a blind one to be the leader of his life.

Socrates/ But further still, consider this attentively, Shall we not say that there are in him, from the want of education, the desires of the drone, some of them beggarly, and some of them mischievous, forcibly kept in by some other pursuit?

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Do you know then, where you will best observe their wickedness?

Adeimantus/ Where?

Socrates/ In their tutelages of orphans, or in whatever else of this kind comes in their way, where they have it much in their power to do injustice.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And is not this now manifest, that in every other commerce of life, wherever such an one acts so as to be approved, appearing to be just, and, by a certain moderate behavior, restrains the other wrong desires within him, he does so, not from any persuasion that it is not better to indulge them, nor from sober reason, but from necessity and fear, trembling for the rest of his substance.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And truly, friend, you shall find in most of them desires partaking of the nature of the drone, where there is occasion to spend the property of others.

Adeimantus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Such a one as this, then, will not be without sedition within himself; nor be one, but a kind of double man; he will, however, have for the most part desires governing other desires, the better governing the worse.

Adeimantus/ It is so.

Socrates/ And on these accounts such a one, as I imagine, will be more decent than many others, but the true virtue of a harmonized and confident soul would far escape him.

Adeimantus/ It appears so to me.

Socrates/ And the parsimonious man will, in private life, be but a poor rival for any victory, or in any contest of the honorable kind. And being unwilling, for the sake of good reputation, or for any such contests, to spend his substance, being afraid to waken up expensive desires, or any alliance

or contest of this kind, fighting with a small part of his forces in an Oligarchic manner, he is generally defeated, and increases his wealth.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Do we then yet hesitate, to rank the covetous and parsimonious man as most of all resembling the city under Oligarchic government?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Democracy now, as seems, is next to be considered, in what manner it arises, and what kind of man it produces when arisen; that, understanding the nature of such a man, we may bring him to a trial. We shall in this method, proceed consistently with ourselves. Is not, the change from Oligarchy to Democracy produced in some such way as this, through the insatiable desire of the proposed good, viz. the desire of becoming as rich as possible?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ As those who are its governors govern on account of their possessing great riches, they will be unwilling, I think, to restrain by law such of the youth as are dissolute from having the liberty of squandering and wasting their substance; that so, by purchasing the substance of such persons, and lending them on usury, they may still become both richer, and be held in greater honor.

Adeimantus/ They will be more unwilling than any other.

Socrates/ And is not this already manifest in the city, that it is impossible for the citizens to esteem riches, and at the same time sufficiently possess temperance, but either the one or the other must of necessity be neglected?

Adeimantus/ It is abundantly plain.

Socrates/ But whilst in Oligarchies they neglect education, and suffer the youth to grow licentious, they are

sometimes under a necessity of becoming poor, and these such as are of no ungenerous disposition.

Adeimantus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And these, I imagine, fit in the city, fitted both with slings and with armor, some of them in debt, others in contempt, others in both, hating and conspiring against those who possess their substance, and others likewise, being desirous of a change.

Adeimantus/ These things are so.

Socrates/ But the money-catchers still brooding over it, and not seeming to observe these; wherever they see any of the rest giving way, they wound them by throwing money into their hands, and, drawing to themselves exorbitant usury, fill the city with drones, and the poor.

Adeimantus/ How is it possible they should not?

Socrates/ Nor yet, when so great an evil is burning in the city, are they willing to extinguish it, not even by that method, restraining anyone from spending his substance at pleasure; nor yet to take that method, by which, according to the second law, such disorder might be removed.

Adeimantus/ According to which?

Socrates/ According to that, which after the other is secondary, obliging the citizens to pay attention to virtue; for, if one should enjoin them to traffic much in the way of voluntary commerce, and upon their own hazard, they would in a less shameful way make money in the city, and likewise less of those evils we have now mentioned would arise in it.

Adeimantus/ Much less.

Socrates/ But at present, by means of all these things, the governors render the governed of this kind. And do they not render both themselves and all belonging to them, and

the youth likewise, luxurious and idle with respect to all the exercises of body and of mind, and effeminate in bearing both pleasures and pains, and likewise indolent?

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ As to themselves, they neglect everything but the acquisition of wealth, and pay no more attention to virtue than the poor do.

Adeimantus/ They do not indeed.

Socrates/ After they are trained up in this manner, when these governors and their subjects meet together either on the road in their journeying, or in any other meetings, either at public spectacles, or military marches, either when fellow-sailors or fellow-soldiers, or when they see one another in common dangers, by no means are the poor in these cases contemned by the rich; but very often a robust fellow poor and sun-burnt, when he has his rank in battle beside a rich man bred up in the shade, and swoln with a great deal of adventitious flesh, and sees him panting for breath and in agony, do not you imagine that he thinks it is through their own fault that such fellows grow rich, and that they say to one another, when they meet in private, that our rich men are good for nothing at all?

Adeimantus/ I know very well, that they do so.

Socrates/ For, as a diseased body needs but the smallest shock from without to render it sickly, and sometimes without any impression from without is in sedition with itself, will not in like manner a city resembling it in these things, on the smallest occasion from without, when either the one party forms an alliance with the Oligarchic, or the other with the Democratic, be sickly, and fight with itself, and, sometimes without these things from abroad, be in sedition?

Adeimantus/ And extremely so.

Socrates/ A Democracy then, I think, arises when the poor prevailing over the rich kill some, and banish others, and share the places in the republic, and the magistracies equally among the remainder, and for the most part the magistracies are disposed in it by lot.

Adeimantus/ This truly, is the establishment of a Democracy, whether it arise by force of arms, or from others withdrawing themselves through fear.

Socrates/ In what manner now, do these live, and what sort of a republic is this? for it is plain that a man of this kind will appear some Democratic man.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ Is not then the city, in the first place, full of all freedom of action, and of speech, and of liberty, to do in it what anyone inclines?

Adeimantus/ So truly it is said at least.

Socrates/ And wherever there is liberty, it is plain that everyone will regulate his own method of life in whatever way he pleases.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And I think that in such a republic most especially there would arise men of all kinds.

Adeimantus/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ This, seems to be the finest of all republics. As a variegated robe diversified with all kinds of flowers, so this republic, variegated with all sorts of manners, appears the finest.

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And it is likely, that the multitude judge this republic to be the best, like children and women gazing at variegated things.

Adeimantus/ Very likely.

Socrates/ And it is very proper at least, O blessed man! to search for a republic in such a state as this.

Adeimantus/ How now?

Socrates/ Because it contains all kinds of republics on account of liberty; and it appears necessary for anyone who wants to constitute a city, as we do at present, to come to a Democratic city, as to a general fair of republics, and choose that form which he fancies.

Adeimantus/ It is likely indeed, he would not be in want of models.

Socrates/ But what now, is not this a divine and sweet manner of life for the present: To be under no necessity in such a city to govern, not though you were able to govern, nor yet to be subject unless you incline, nor to be engaged in war when others are, nor to live in peace when others do so unless you be desirous of peace; and though there be a law restraining you from governing or administering justice, to govern nevertheless, and administer justice, if you incline?

Adeimantus/ It is likely; it is pleasant for the present at least.

Socrates/ But what now, is not the meekness of some of those who are condemned very curious? Or have you not as yet observed, in such a republic, men condemned to death or banishment, yet nevertheless continuing still, and walking up and down openly; and as if no one attended to or observed him, the condemned man returns like a hero?

Adeimantus/ I have observed very many.

Socrates/ But is not this indulgence of the city very generous, not to mention the small regard, and even contempt, it shows for all those things we celebrated so much when we settled our city, as that unless a man had an extraordinary genius, he never would become a good man,

unless when a child he were instantly educated in things handsome, and should diligently apply to all these things? how magnanimously does it despise all these things, and not regard from what kind of pursuits a man comes to act in political affairs, but honors him if he only says he is well affected towards the multitude?

Adeimantus/ This contempt, is very generous indeed.

Socrates/ These now, and such things as are akin to these, are to be found in a Democracy; and it will be, as it appears, a pleasant sort of republic, anarchical, and variegated, distributing a certain equality to all alike without distinction.

Adeimantus/ What you say, is perfectly manifest.

Socrates/ Consider now, what kind of man such an one is in private; or, first, must we not consider, as we did with respect to the republic, in what manner he arises?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And does he not in this manner arise, viz. from that parsimonious one, who was under the Oligarchy as a son, I think, trained up by his father in his manners?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Such a one by force governs his own pleasures, those of them which are expensive, and tend not to the acquisition of wealth, and which are called unnecessary.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ Are you willing then, that we may not reason in the dark, first to determine what desires are necessary, and what are not?

Adeimantus/ I am willing.

Socrates/ May not such be justly called necessary, which we are not able to remove, and such as when gratified are of

advantage to us? For both these kinds our nature is under a necessity to pursue; is it not?

Adeimantus/ Very strongly.

Socrates/ This then we shall justly say makes the necessary part in our desires.

Adeimantus/ Justly.

Socrates/ But what now? Such desires as a man may banish, if he study it from his youth, and such as whilst they remain do no good, if we say of these that they are not necessary, shall we not say right?

Adeimantus/ Right indeed.

Socrates/ Let us select a paradigm of each of them, that we may understand by an example what they are.

Adeimantus/ It is proper.

Socrates/ Is not the desire of eating, so far as is conducive to health and a good habit of body; and the desire of food and victuals, of the necessary kind?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ The desire of food at least is indeed necessary on both accounts, as meat is advantageous, and as the want of it must bring life to an end altogether.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ And the desire of victuals is likewise necessary, if it anyhow contribute anything towards the good habit of the body.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what? Such desire even of these things as goes beyond these purposes, or such desire as respects other meats than these, and yet is capable of being curbed in youth, and, by being disciplined, to be removed from many things, and which is hurtful both to the body, and hurtful to the soul with reference to her attaining wisdom and

temperance, may not such desire be rightly called unnecessary?

Adeimantus/ Most rightly, indeed.

Socrates/ And may we not call these expensive likewise, and the others frugal, as they are conducive towards the actions of life?

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ In the same manner, surely, shall we say of venereal desires, and the others.

Adeimantus/ In the same manner.

Socrates/ And did we not, by him whom we just now denominated the drone, mean one who was full of such desires and pleasures, and was governed by such as are unnecessary? but that he who was under the necessary ones was the parsimonious and Oligarchic?

Adeimantus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Let us again mention, how the Democratic arises from the Oligarchic; and to me he appears to arise in great measure thus.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ When a young man nurtured, as we now mentioned, without proper instruction, and in a parsimonious manner, comes to taste the honey of the drones, and associates with those vehement and terrible creatures who are able to procure all sorts of pleasures, and every way diversified, and from every quarter; —thence conceive there is somehow the beginning of a change in him from the Oligarchic to the Democratic.

Adeimantus/ There is great necessity for it.

Socrates/ And as the city was changed by the assistance of an alliance from without with one party of it with which it was akin, will not the youth be changed in the same manner,

by the assistance of one species of desires from without, to another within him which resembles it, and is allied to it?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And I imagine at least, if by any alliance there be given counter-assistance to the Oligarchic party within him, either anyhow by his father, or by others of the family, both admonishing and upbraiding him, then truly arises sedition, and oppression, and a fight within him with himself.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And sometimes indeed, I think, the Democratic party yields to the Oligarchic, and some of the desires are destroyed, but others retire, on a certain modesty being ingenerated in the soul of the youth, and he again becomes cultivated.

Adeimantus/ This sometimes takes place.

Socrates/ And again, I conceive, that when some desires retire, there are others allied to them which grow up, and, through inattention to the father's instruction, become both many and powerful.

Adeimantus/ This is usually the case.

Socrates/ And do they not draw towards intimacies among themselves, and, meeting privately together, generate a multitude?

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And at length, I think, they seize the citadel of the soul of the youth, finding it evacuated both of beautiful disciplines and pursuits, and of true reasoning, which are the best guardians and preservers in the dianoëtic part of men beloved of the Gods.

Adeimantus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And then indeed false and arrogant reasonings and opinions, rushing up in their stead, possess the same place in such a one.

Adeimantus/ Vehemently so.

Socrates/ And does he not now again, on coming among those Lotophagi, dwell with them openly? And if any assistance comes from his friends to the parsimonious part of his soul, those arrogant reasonings, shutting the gates of the royal wall against it, neither give entrance to this alliance, nor to the ambassadorial admonitions of private old men; but, fighting against these, hold the government themselves. And denominating modesty stupidity, they thrust it out disgracefully as a fugitive, and temperance they call unmanliness, and, abusing it most shamefully, expel it. Persuading themselves likewise that moderation, and decent expense, are no other than rusticity and illiberality, they banish them from their territories, with many other and unprofitable desires.

Adeimantus/ Vehemently so.

Socrates/ Having emptied and purified from all these desires the soul that is detained by them, and is initiated in the great mysteries, they next lead in, with encomiums and applauses, insolence and anarchy, luxury and impudence, shining with a great retinue, and crowned. And insolence, indeed, they denominate education; anarchy they call liberty; luxury, magnificence; and impudence, manhood. Is it not, somehow in this manner, that a youth changes from one bred up with the necessary desires into the licentiousness and remissness of the unnecessary and unprofitable pleasures?

Adeimantus/ And very plainly so.

Socrates/ And such a one, I think, after this leads his life, expending his substance, his labor, and his time, no more

on the necessary than the unnecessary pleasures: and if he be fortunate, and not excessively debauched, when he is somewhat more advanced in years, and when the great crowd of desires is over, he admits a part of those which were expelled, and does not deliver himself wholly up to such as had entrusted, but regulates his pleasures by a sort of equality, and so lives delivering up the government of himself to every incidental desire as it may happen, till it be satisfied, and then to another, undervaluing none of them, but indulging them all alike.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And such a one, does not listen to true reasoning, nor admit it into the citadel, if any should tell him that there are some pleasures of the worthy and the good desires, and others of the depraved, and that he ought to pursue and honor those, but to chastise and enslave these. But, in all these cases, he dissents, and says that they are all alike, and ought to be held in equal honor.

Adeimantus/ Whoever is thus affected, vehemently acts in this manner.

Socrates/ And does he not live, from day to day, gratifying after this manner every incidental desire, sometimes indulging himself in intoxication, and in music, sometimes drinking water, and extenuating himself by abstinence; and then again attending to the gymnic exercises? Sometimes too he is quite indolent and careless about everything; then again he applies as it were to philosophy; many times he acts the part of a politician, and in a desultory manner says and does whatever happens. If at any time he affects to imitate any of the military tribe, thither he is carried; or of the mercantile, then again hither; nor is his life regulated by any order, or any necessity, but, deeming this kind of life pleasant, and free, and blessed, he follows it throughout.

Adeimantus/ You have entirely, discussed the life of one who places all laws whatever on a level.

Socrates/ I imagine at least, that he is multiform, and full of very different manners; and that, like the city, he is fine, and variegated, and that very many men and women would desire to imitate his life, as he contains in himself a great many patterns of republics and of manners.

Adeimantus/ He does.

Socrates/ What now? Shall such a man as this be arranged as resembling a Democracy, as he may truly be called Democratic?

Adeimantus/ Let him be so arranged.

Socrates/ But it yet remains that we discuss, the most excellent republic, and the most excellent man, viz. Tyranny, and the Tyrant.

Adeimantus/ It does.

Socrates/ Come then, my dear companion! in what manner does Tyranny arise? For it is almost plain that the change is from Democracy. It is plain. Does not Tyranny arise in the same manner from Democracy, as Democracy does from Oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ What did Oligarchy, propose as its good, and according to what was it constituted? It was with a view to become extremely rich, was it not?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ An insatiable desire then of riches, and a neglect of other things, through attention to the acquisition of wealth, destroys it.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And with reference to that which Democracy denominates good, an insatiable thirst of it destroys it likewise?

Adeimantus/ But what is it you say it denominates good?

Socrates/ Liberty. For this you are told is most beautiful in a city which is under a Democracy, and that for the sake of liberty anyone who is naturally free chooses to live in it alone.

Adeimantus/ This word Liberty, is indeed often mentioned.

Socrates/ Does not then, as I was going to say, the insatiable desire of this, and the neglect of other things, change even this republic, and prepare it to stand in need of a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ When a city, is under a Democracy, and is thirsting after liberty, and happens to have bad cupbearers appointed it, and becomes intoxicated with an unmixed draught of it beyond what is necessary, it punishes even the governors if they will not be entirely tame, and afford abundant liberty, accusing them as corrupted, and Oligarchic.

Adeimantus/ They do this.

Socrates/ But such as are obedient to magistrates they abuse, as willing slaves, and good for nothing, and, both in private and in public, commend and honor magistrates who resemble subjects, and subjects who resemble magistrates; must they not therefore necessarily in such a city arrive at the summit of liberty?

Adeimantus/ How is it possible they should not?

Socrates/ And must not this inbred anarchy, my friend, descend into private families, and in the end reach even the brutes?

Adeimantus/ How, do we assert such a thing as this?

Socrates/ Just as if, a father should accustom himself to resemble a child, and to be afraid of his sons, and the son accustom himself to resemble his father, and neither to revere nor to stand in awe of his parents, that so indeed he may be free, as if a stranger were to be equaled with a citizen, and a citizen with a stranger, and, in like manner, a foreigner.

Adeimantus/ It is just so.

Socrates/ These things, and other little things of a like nature happen. The teacher in such a city fears and flatters the scholars, and the scholars despise their teachers and their tutors in like manner: and in general the youth resemble the more advanced in years, and contend with them both in words and deeds: and the old men, sitting down with the young, are full of merriment and pleasantry, mimicking the youth, that they may not appear to be morose and despotic.

Adeimantus/ It is entirely so.

Socrates/ But that extreme liberty of the multitude, how great it is in such a city as this, when the men and women slaves are no less free than those who purchase them, and how great an equality and liberty the wives have with their husbands, and husbands with their wives, we have almost forgotten to mention.

Adeimantus/ Shall we not then, according to Æschylus, say whatever now comes into our mouth?

Socrates/ By all means; and accordingly I do speak thus: With reference even to brutes, such of them as are under the care of men, how much more free they are in such a city, he

who has not experienced it will not easily believe: for indeed even the puppies, according to the proverb, resemble their mistresses; and the horses and asses are accustomed to go freely and gracefully, marching up against anyone they meet on the road, unless he give way; and many other such things thus happen full of liberty.

Adeimantus/ You tell me, my dream; for I have often met with this when going into the country.

Socrates/ But do you observe, what is the sum of all these things collected together, how delicate it makes the soul of the citizens, so that, if anyone bring near to them anything pertaining to slavery, they are filled with indignation, and cannot endure it. And do you know, that at length they regard not even the laws, written or unwritten, that no one by any means whatever may become their masters?

Adeimantus/ I know it well.

Socrates/ This now, friend, is that government so beautiful and youthful, whence Tyranny springs, as it appears to me.

Adeimantus/ Youthful truly; but what follows this?

Socrates/ The same thing, which, springing up as a disease in an Oligarchy, destroyed it; the same arising here in a greater and more powerful manner, through its licentiousness, enslaves the Democracy: and in reality, the doing anything to excess usually occasions a mighty change to the reverse: for thus it is in seasons, in vegetable and in animal bodies, and in republics as much as in anything.

Adeimantus/ It is probable.

Socrates/ And excessive liberty seems to change into nothing else but excessive slavery, both with a private person and a city.

Adeimantus/ It is probable, indeed.

Socrates/ It is probable then, that out of no other republic is Tyranny constituted than a Democracy; out of the most excessive liberty I conceive the greatest and most savage slavery.

Adeimantus/ It is reasonable, to think so.

Socrates/ But this I think, was not what you was asking; but what that disease is which enslaves Democracy, resembling that which destroys Oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ You say true.

Socrates/ That then, I called the race of idle and profuse men, one part of which was more brave, and were leaders, the other more cowardly, and followed. And we compared them to drones; some to such as have stings, others to such as have none.

Adeimantus/ And rightly.

Socrates/ These two now, springing up in any republic, raise disturbance, as phlegm and bile in a natural body. And it behooves a wise physician and lawgiver of a city, no less than a wise bee-master, to be afraid of these, at a great distance principally, that they never get in; but, if they have entered, that they be in the speediest manner possible cut off, together with their very cells.

Adeimantus/ Yes, by Zeus, by all means.

Socrates/ Let us take it then, in this manner, that we may see more distinctly what we want. In what manner? Let us divide in our reasoning a Democratic city into three parts, as it really is; for one such species as the above grows through licentiousness in it no less than in the Oligarchic.

Adeimantus/ It does so.

Socrates/ But it is much more fierce at least in this than in that.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ In an Oligarchy, because it is not in places of honor, but is debarred from the magistracies, it is unexercised, and does not become strong. But in a Democracy this, excepting a few, is somehow the presiding party, and now it says and does the most outrageous things, and then again approaching courts of justice, it makes a humming noise, and cannot endure any other to speak different from it; so that all things, some few excepted, in such a republic, are administered by such a party.

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ Some other party now, such as this, is always separated from the multitude.

Adeimantus/ Which?

Socrates/ Whilst the whole are somehow engaged in the pursuit of gain, such as are naturally the most temperate become for the most part the wealthiest.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ And hence, I think, the greatest quantity of honey, and what comes with the greatest ease, is pressed out of these by the drones.

Adeimantus/ For how, can anyone press out of those who have but little?

Socrates/ Such wealthy people, I think, are called the pasture of the drones.

Adeimantus/ Nearly so.

Socrates/ And the people will be a sort of third species, such of them as mind their own affairs, and meddle not with any others, who have not much substance, but yet are the most numerous, and the most prevalent in a Democracy, whenever it is fully assembled.

Adeimantus/ It is so; but this it will not wish to do often, if it does not obtain some share of the honey.

Socrates/ Does it not always obtain a share, as far as their leaders are able, robbing those that have property, and giving to the people that they may have the most themselves?

Adeimantus/ They are indeed, sharers in this manner.

Socrates/ These then who are thus despoiled are obliged to defend themselves, saying and doing all they can among the people.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Others then give them occasion to form designs against the people, though they should have no inclination to introduce a change of government, and so they are Oligarchic.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ But at length, after they see that the people, not of their own accord, but being ignorant and imposed on by those slanderers, attempt to injure them, —do they not then indeed, whether they will or not, become truly Oligarchic? yet not spontaneously, but this mischief likewise is generated by that drone stinging them.

Adeimantus/ Extremely so, indeed.

Socrates/ And so they have accusations, lawsuits, and contests one with another.

Adeimantus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And are not the people accustomed always to place someone, in a conspicuous manner, over themselves, and to cherish him, and greatly increase his power?

Adeimantus/ They are.

Socrates/ And this, is plain, that whenever a tyrant arises it is from this presiding root, and from nothing else, that he blossoms.

Adeimantus/ This is extremely manifest.

Socrates/ What is the beginning then of the change from a president into a tyrant? Or is it plain, that it is after the president begins to do the same thing with that in the fable, which is told in relation to the temple of Lycæan Zeus, to whom was dedicated the wolf in Arcadia?

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That whoever tasted human entrails which were mixed with those of other sacrifices, necessarily became a wolf. Have you not heard the story?

Adeimantus/ I have.

Socrates/ And must not he, in the same manner, who being president of the people, and receiving an extremely submissive multitude, abstains not from kindred blood, but unjustly accusing them, (of such things as they are wont) and bringing them into courts of justice, stains himself with bloodshed, taking away the life of a man, and, with unhallowed tongue and mouth, tasting kindred blood, and besides this, banishes and (says, and proposes the abolition of debts, and division of lands, —must not such an one, of necessity, and as it is destined, be either destroyed by his enemies, or exercise tyranny, and, from being a man, become a wolf?

Adeimantus/ Of great necessity.

Socrates/ This is he now, who becomes seditious towards those who have property, and, when he fails, he goes against his enemies with open force, and becomes an accomplished tyrant.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And if they be unable to expel him, or to put him to death, on an accusation before the city, they truly conspire to cut him off privately by a violent death.

Adeimantus/ It is wont indeed, to happen so.

Socrates/ And, on this account, all those who mount up to tyranny invent this celebrated tyrannical demand, to demand of the people certain guards for their person, that the assistance of the people may be secured to them. Of this, they take special care. And they grant them, I imagine, being afraid of his safety, but secure as to their own.

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And when a man who has property, and who along with his property has the crime of hating the people, observes this, —he then, my friend, according to the answer of the oracle to Crœsus;

> … To craggy Hermus flies,
> Nor stays, nor fears to be a coward deemed….

Adeimantus/ Because he would not, be in fear again a second time.

Socrates/ But he at least, I imagine, who is caught, is put to death.

Of necessity. It is plain, then, that this president of the city does not himself behave like a truly great man, in a manner truly great, but, hurling down many others, sits in his chair a consummate tyrant of the city, instead of a president.

Adeimantus/ Why is he not?

Socrates/ Shall we consider now, the happiness of the man, and of the city in which such a mortal arises?

Adeimantus/ By all means, let us consider it.

Socrates/ Does he not then, in the first days, and for the first season, smile, and salute everyone he meets; says he is no tyrant, and promises many things, both in private and in public; and frees from debts, and distributes land both to the people in general, and to those about him, and affects to be mild and patriotic towards all?

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ But when, I think, he has reconciled to himself some of his foreign enemies, and destroyed others, and there is tranquility with reference to these, he in the first place always raises some wars, in order that the people may be in need of a leader.

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ And is it not likewise with this view, that, being rendered poor by payment of taxes, they may be under a necessity of becoming intent on daily sustenance, and may be less ready to conspire against him?

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And, I think, if he suspects that any of those who are of a free spirit will not allow him to govern, —in order to have some pretext for destroying them, he exposes them to the enemy; on all these accounts a tyrant is always under a necessity of raising war.

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And, whilst he is doing these things, he must readily become more hateful to his citizens.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ And must not some of those who have been promoted along with him, and who are in power, speak out freely both towards him, and among themselves, finding fault with the transactions, such of them as are of a more manly spirit?

Adeimantus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ It behooves the tyrant, then, to cut off all these, if he means to govern, till he leave no one, either of friends or foes, worth anything.

Adeimantus/ It is plain.

Socrates/ He must then carefully observe who is courageous, who is magnanimous, who wise, who rich; and in this manner is he happy, that willing, or not willing, he is under a necessity of being an enemy to all such as these; and to lay snares till he purify the city.

Adeimantus/ A beautiful purification.

Socrates/ Yes, the reverse of what physicians do with respect to animal bodies; for they, taking away what is worst, leave the best; but he does the contrary.

Adeimantus/ Because it seems, he must of necessity do so, if he is to govern.

Socrates/ In a blessed necessity, then, truly, is he bound, which obliges him either to live with many depraved people, and to be hated too by them, or not to live at all.

Adeimantus/ In such necessity he is.

Socrates/ And the more he is hated by his citizens whilst he does these things, shall he not so much the more want a greater number of guards, and more faithful ones?

Adeimantus/ How is it possible he should not?

Socrates/ Who then are the faithful, and from whence shall he send for them?

Adeimantus/ Many, of their own accord, will come flying, if he give them hire.

Socrates/ You seem, by the dog, again to mention certain drones foreign and multiform.

Adeimantus/ You imagine right.

Socrates/ But those at home, would he not incline to have them also as guards?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ After he has taken away the citizens, to give the slaves their liberty, and make of them guards about his person.

Adeimantus/ By all means; for these are the most faithful to him.

Socrates/ What a blessed possession, is this which you mention belonging to the tyrant, if he employ such friends and faithful men, after having destroyed those former ones!

Adeimantus/ But surely such at least, he does employ.

Socrates/ And such companions, admire him, and the new citizens accompany him: but the worthy men both hate and fly from him.

Adeimantus/ Why should they not?

Socrates/ It is not without reason, that tragedy in the general is thought a wise thing, and that Euripides is thought to excel in it.

Adeimantus/ For what?

Socrates/ Because he uttered this, which is the mark of a condensed conception, "That tyrants are wise, by the conversation of the wise," and he plainly said those were wise with whom they hold converse.

Adeimantus/ And he commends too, Tyranny as a divine thing, and says a great many other things of it, as do likewise the other poets.

Socrates/ Those composers then of tragedy, as they are wise, will forgive us, and such as establish the government of cities in a manner nearly resembling ours, in not admitting them into our republic as being panegyrists of Tyranny.

Adeimantus/ I think, such of them at least as are more polite will forgive us.

Socrates/ But going about among other cities, I think, and drawing together the crowds, and putting to sale their fine, magnificent and persuasive words, they will draw over the republics to Tyrannies and Democracies.

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And do they not further receive rewards, and are they not honored chiefly by Tyrants, as is natural, and in the next place by Democracy? But the further on they advance towards the republics, the reverse of these, their honor forsakes them the more, as if it were disabled by an asthma to advance.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Thus far, we have digressed: but now again let us mention in what manner that army of the Tyrant, which is so beautiful, so numerous and multiform, and no way the same, shall be maintained.

Adeimantus/ It is plain, that if at any time there be any sacred things in the city, these they will spend, that so what they sell for may still answer their demands, and the people be obliged to pay in the lighter taxes.

Socrates/ But what will they do when these fail them?

Adeimantus/ It is plain, that he and his intoxicated companions, and his associates, male and female, will be maintained out of the paternal inheritance.

Socrates/ I understand, that the people who have made the Tyrant will nourish him and his companions.

Adeimantus/ They are under great necessity.

Socrates/ How do you say? What if the people be enraged, and say that it is not just, that the son who is arrived at maturity be maintained by the father, but contrariwise that the father be maintained by the son; and that they did not make and establish him for this purpose, to be a slave to his slaves when he should be grown up, and to maintain him and his slaves with their other turbulent attendants; but in order that they might be set at liberty from the rich in the city, who are also called the good and worthy, by having placed him over them? And now they order him and his

companions to leave the city, as a father drives out of the house his son with his turbulent drunken companions.

Adeimantus/ Then, by Zeus, shall the people, know what a beast they are themselves, and what a beast they have generated, and embraced, and nurtured, and that whilst they are the weaker they attempt to drive out the stronger.

Socrates/ How do you say? Will the Tyrant dare to offer violence to his father, and, if he cannot persuade him, will he strike him?

Adeimantus/ Yes, even stripping him of his armor.

Socrates/ You call, the Tyrant a parricide and a miserable nourisher of old-age: and yet, as it is probable, Tyranny would really seem to be of this kind; and according to the saying, the people defending themselves against the smoke of slavery amid free men, have fallen into the slavish fire of despotism; instead of that excessive and unseasonable liberty, embracing the most rigorous and the most wretched slavery of bondmen.

Adeimantus/ These things, happen very much so.

Socrates/ What then, shall we not speak modestly, if we say that we have sufficiently shown how Tyranny arises out of Democracy, and what it is when it does arise?

Adeimantus/ Very sufficiently.

THE END OF THE EIGHTH BOOK.

Book 9.

Socrates/ The tyrannical man himself, remains yet to be considered, in what manner he arises out of the Democratic, and, when he does arise, what kind of man he is, and what kind of life he leads, whether miserable or blessed.

Adeimantus/ He indeed yet remains.

Socrates/ Do you know, what I still want?

Adeimantus/ What is it?

Socrates/ We do not appear to me to have sufficiently distinguished with respect to the desires; of what kind they are, and how many; and whilst this is defective, the inquiry we make will be less evident.

Adeimantus/ May it not be done opportunely yet?

Socrates/ Certainly. And consider what it is I wish to know about them; for it is this: Of those pleasures and desires which are not necessary, some appear to me to be repugnant to law: these indeed seem to be ingenerated in everyone; but being punished by the laws, and the better desires, in conjunction with reason, they either forsake some men altogether, or are less numerous and feeble; in others they are more powerful, and more numerous.

Adeimantus/ Will you inform me what these are?

Socrates/ Such, as are excited in sleep; when the other part of the soul, such as is rational and mild, and which governs in it, is asleep, and the part which is savage and rustic, being filled with meats or intoxication, frisks about, and, driving away sleep, seeks to go and accomplish its practices. In such a one you know it dares to do everything, as being loosed, and disengaged from all modesty and prudence: For it scruples not the embraces, as it imagines, of a mother, or of anyone else, whether of Gods, of men, or of hearts; nor to kill anyone, nor to abstain from any sort of

meat, —and, in one word, is wanting in no folly nor impudence.

Adeimantus/ You say most true.

Socrates/ But I imagine, when a man is in health, and lives temperately, and goes to sleep, having excited the rational part, and feasted it with worthy reasonings and inquiries, coming to an unanimity with himself; and allowing that part of the soul which is desiderative neither to be starved nor glutted, that it may lie quiet, and give no disturbance to the part which is best, either by its joy or grief, but suffer it by itself alone and pure to inquire, and desire to apprehend what it knows not, either something of what has existed, or of what now exists, or what will exist hereafter; and having likewise soothed the irascible part, not suffering it to be hurried by anything, to transports of anger, and to fall asleep with agitated passion: but having quieted these two parts of the soul, and excited the third part, in which wisdom resides, shall in this manner take rest; —by such an one you know the truth is chiefly apprehended, and the visions of his dreams are then least of all repugnant to law. I am altogether, of this opinion. We have, indeed, been carried a little too far in mentioning these things. But what we want to be known is this, that there is in everyone a certain species of desires which is terrible, savage, and irregular, even in some who entirely seem to us to be moderate. And this species becomes indeed manifest in sleep. But consider if there appear to be anything in what I say, and if you agree with me.

Adeimantus/ But I agree.

Socrates/ Recollect now what kind of man we said the Democratic one was: for he was somehow educated from his infancy under a parsimonious father, who valued the avaricious desires alone; but such as were not necessary,

but rose only through a love of amusement and finery, he despised.

Adeimantus/ Was he not?

Socrates/ Yes. But, being conversant with those who are more refined, and such as are full of those desires we now mentioned, running into their manner, and all sort of insolence, from a detestation of his father's parsimony; — however, having a better natural temper than those who corrupt him, and being drawn opposite ways, he settles into a manner which is situated in the middle of both; and participating moderately, as he imagines, of each of them, he leads a life neither illiberal nor licentious, becoming a Democratic from an Oligarchic man. This was, and is our opinion of such an one. Suppose now again, that when such a one is become old, his young son is educated in his manners. I suppose it. And suppose, too, the same things happening to him as to his father; that he is drawn into all kinds of licentiousness, which is termed however by such as draw him off the most complete liberty; and that his father and all the domestics are aiding to those desires which are in the middle, and others also lend their assistance. But when those dire magicians and tyrant-makers have no hopes of retaining the youth in their power any other way, they contrive to excite in him a certain love which presides over the indolent desires, and such as minister readily to their pleasures, which love is a certain winged and large drone; or do you think that the love of these things is anything else?

Adeimantus/ I think, it is no other than this.

Socrates/ And when other desires make a humming noise about him, full of their odors and perfumes, and crowns, and wines, and those pleasures of the most dissolute kind which belong to such co-partnerships; and, being increased and cherished, add a sting of desire to the drone, then truly he

is surrounded with madness as a life-guard, and that president of the soul rages with frenzy; and if he find in himself any opinions or desires which seem to be good, and which yet retain modesty, he kills them, and pushes them from him, till he be cleansed of temperance, and is filled with additional madness.

Adeimantus/ You describe perfectly, the formation of a tyrannical man.

Socrates/ Is it not, on such an account as this, that, of old, Love is said to be a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ And, my friend, has not a drunken man likewise somewhat of a tyrannical spirit?

Adeimantus/ He has indeed.

Socrates/ And surely at least he who is mad, and is disturbed in his mind, undertakes and hopes to be able to govern not only men, but likewise the Gods.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ The tyrannical character then, O divine man! becomes so in perfection, when either by temper, or by his pursuits, or by both, he becomes intoxicated, and in love, and melancholy.

Adeimantus/ Perfectly so, indeed.

Socrates/ Such a one, it seems, then, arises in this manner. But in what manner does he live?

Adeimantus/ As they say in their plays, that you will tell me likewise.

Socrates/ I tell then. For I think that after this there are feastings among them, and retellings, and banquetings, and mistresses, and all such things as may be expected among those where Love the tyrant dwelling within governs all in the soul.

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Every day and night, therefore, do there not blossom forth many and dreadful desires, indigent of many things?

Adeimantus/ Many indeed.

Socrates/ And if they have any supplies, they are soon spent.

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And after this there is borrowing and pillaging of substance.

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And when everything fails them, is there not a necessity that the desires, on the one hand, nestling in the mind, shall give frequent and powerful cries; and the men, on the other hand, being driven as by slings, both by the other desires, and more especially by love itself, commanding all the others as its life-guards, shall rage with frenzy, and search what anyone possesses which they are able, by deceit or violence, to carry away?

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ They must of necessity therefore be plundering from every quarter, or be tormented with great agonies and pains.

Adeimantus/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And as with such a man his new pleasures possess more than his ancient ones, and take away what belonged to them, shall not he deem it proper in the same manner, that himself, being young, should have more than his father and mother, and take away from them, and, if he has spent his own portion, encroach on that of his parents?

Adeimantus/ Why will he not?

Socrates/ And if they do not allow him, will he not first endeavor to pilfer from and beguile his parents?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And where he is not able to do this, will he not in the next place use rapine and violence?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ But, O wonderful man! when the old man and the old woman oppose and fight, will he not revere them, and beware of doing anything tyrannical?

Adeimantus/ I, for my part, am not quite secure, with reference to the safety of the parents of such an one.

Socrates/ But by Zeus, Adimantus, do you think that, for the sake of a newly beloved and unnecessary mistress, such a one would give up his anciently beloved and necessary mother; or, for the sake of a blooming youth newly beloved, and not necessary, give up his decayed, his necessary and aged father, the most ancient of all his friends, to stripes, and suffer these to be enslaved by those others, if he should bring them into the same house?

Adeimantus/ Yes, by Zeus, I do.

Socrates/ It seems, to be an extremely blessed thing to beget a tyrannical son.

Adeimantus/ Not altogether so.

Socrates/ But what, when the substance of his father and mother fails such an one, and when now there is the greatest swarm of pleasures assembled in him, shall he not first break into some house, or late at night strip some one of his coat, and after this shall he not rifle some temple; and in all these actions, those desires newly loosed from slavery, and become as the guards of love, shall along with him rule over those ancient opinions he had from his infancy, the established decisions concerning good and evil; these

desires which heretofore were only loose from their slavery in sleep, when he was as yet under the laws, and his father when under Democratic government, now when he is tyrannized over by love, such as he rarely was when asleep, such shall he be always when awake; and from no horrid slaughter, or food, or deed of any kind, shall he abstain. But that tyrannical love within him, living without any restraint of law or government, as being sole monarch itself, will lead on the man it possesses, as a city, to every mad attempt, whence he may support himself, and the crowd about him; which partly enters from without, from ill company, and, partly through their manners and his own, is become unrestrained and licentious. Or is not this the life of such a one?

Adeimantus/ It is this truly.

Socrates/ And if there be, but a few such in the city, and the rest of the multitude be sober, they go out and serve as guards to some other tyrant, or assist him for hire, if there be any war; but if they remain in peace and quiet, they commit at home in the city a great many small mischiefs.

Adeimantus/ Which do you mean?

Socrates/ Such as these: they steal, break open houses, cut purses, strip people of their clothes, rifle temples, make people slaves; and where they can speak they sometimes turn false informers, and give false testimony, and take gifts.

Adeimantus/ You call these, small mischiefs, if there be but a few such persons.

Socrates/ What is small, is small in comparison of great. And all those things, with regard to the tyrant, when compared with the wickedness and misery of the city, do not, as the saying is, come near the mark; for when there are many such in the city, and others accompanying them, and when they perceive their own number, then these are they

who, through the foolishness of the people, establish as tyrant the man who among them has himself most of the tyrant, and in the greatest strength, within his soul.

Adeimantus/ It is probable indeed; for he will be most tyrannical.

Socrates/ Will he not be so, if they voluntarily submit to him? But if the city will not allow him, in the same manner as he formerly used violence to his father and mother, so now again will he chastise his country if he be able; and bringing in other young people, he will keep and nourish under subjection to these, his formerly beloved mother- and father-country, as the Cretans say? And this will be the issue of such a man's desire.

Adeimantus/ It will be entirely this.

Socrates/ But do not these, become such as this, first in private, and before they govern? In the first place, by the company they keep, either converting with their own flatterers, and such as are ready to minister to them in everything; or, if they need anything themselves, falling down to those they converse with, they dare to assume every appearance as friends; but, after they have gained their purpose, they act as enemies.

Adeimantus/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ Thus they pass the whole of their life, never friends to anyone, but always either domineering, or enslaved to another. But liberty and true friendship the tyrannic disposition never tastes.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ May we not then rightly call these men faithless?

Adeimantus/ Why not? and surely we may call them most of all unjust, if we have rightly agreed about justice, in our former reasonings, what it is.

Socrates/ But we did rightly agree. Let us finish then, our worst man. He would then seem such a one awake, as we described as asleep.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And does not that man become such a one, who being most tyrannical by natural temper, is in possession of supreme power, and the longer time he lives in tyranny, the more he becomes such a one?

Glaucon, taking up the discourse, interjected;

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And will not the man, who appears the most wicked, appear likewise the most wretched; and he who shall tyrannize for the longest time, and in the greatest measure, shall he not in reality, in the greatest measure, and for the longest time, be such a one? But as many men as many minds.

Glaucon/ Of necessity, these things at least must be so.

Socrates/ And would this Tyrannic man differ anything, as to similitude, when compared with the city under tyranny, and the Democratic man when compared with the city under democracy, and after the same manner with respect to others?

Glaucon/ How should they?

Socrates/ As city then is to city, as to virtue and happiness, will not man be to man in the same way?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ What then? How is the city which is tyrannized over, in respect of that under kingly government, such as we at the first described?

Glaucon/ Quite the reverse; for the one is the best, and the other is the worst.

Socrates/ I will not ask, which you mean, For it is plain; but do you judge in the same way, or otherwise, as to their happiness and misery? And let us not be struck with admiration, whilst we regard the tyrant alone, or some few about him; but let us, as we ought to do, enter into the whole of the city, and consider it; and going through every part, and viewing it, let us declare our opinion.

Glaucon/ You propose rightly. And it is evident to everyone that there is no city more wretched than that which is under Tyranny, nor any more happy than that under regal power.

Socrates/ If now, I should propose the same things with respect to the men, should I rightly propose, whilst I account him worthy to judge about them, who is able, by his dianoëtic power, to enter within, and see through the temper of the man, and who may not, as a child beholding the outside, be struck with admiration of tyrannical pomp, which he makes a show of to those without, but may sufficiently see through him? If then I should be of opinion, that all of us ought to hear such a one, who, having dwelt with the man in the same house, and having been along with him in his actions in his family, is able to judge in what manner he behaves to each of his domestics, (in which most especially a man appears stripped of theatrical shows,) and likewise in public dangers; after he has observed all these things, we shall bid him declare, how the Tyrant is as to happiness and misery, in comparison of others.

Glaucon/ You would advise to these things, most properly.

Socrates/ Are you willing then, that we pretend to be ourselves of the number of those who are thus able to judge, and that we have already met with such men, that we may have one who shall answer our questions?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Come then, consider in this manner. Recollect the resemblance of the city, and the man, to one another, and, thus considering each of them apart, relate the passions of each.

Glaucon/ Which passions?

Socrates/ To begin first, with the city. Do you call the one under Tyranny, either free or enslaved?

Glaucon/ Slavish, in the greatest degree possible.

Socrates/ And yet, surely, at least, you see in it masters and freemen.

Glaucon/ I see, some small part so. But the whole in it, in the general, and the most excellent part, is disgracefully and miserably slavish.

Socrates/ If then the man, resembles the city, is it not necessary that there be the same regulation in him likewise; and that his soul be full of the greatest slavery and illiberality; and that these parts of his soul, which are the noblest, be enslaved, and that some small part, which is most wicked and frantic, is master?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ What now? will you say that such a soul is slavish, or free?

Glaucon/ Slavish somehow, I say.

Socrates/ But does not then the city which is slavish, and tyrannized over, least of all do what it inclines?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And will not the soul too, which is tyrannized over, least of all do what it shall incline, to speak of the whole soul; but, hurried violently by some stinging passion, be full of tumult and inconstancy?

Glaucon/ How should not it be so?

Socrates/ But whether will the city which is tyrannized over be necessarily rich or poor?

Glaucon/ Poor.

Socrates/ And the soul under Tyranny be of necessity likewise indigent and insatiable?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But what? Must not such a city, and such a man, of necessity be full of fear?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Do you think you will find more lamentations, and groans, and weepings, and torments, in any other city?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But with reference to a man, do you think that these things are greater in any other than in this tyrannical one, who madly rages by his desires and lusts?

Glaucon/ How can they?

Socrates/ It is then on consideration of all these things, and other such as these, I think, that you have deemed this city the most wretched of cities?

Glaucon/ And have I not deemed right?

Socrates/ Extremely so. But what say you again with reference to the tyrannical man, when you consider these things?

Glaucon/ That he is by far, the most wretched of all others.

Socrates/ You do not as yet say this rightly.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ I do not as yet think, that he is such in the greatest degree.

Glaucon/ But who then is so?

Socrates/ The following will probably appear to you to be yet more miserable than the other.

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ He, who, being naturally tyrannical, leads not a private life, but is unfortunate, and through some misfortune is led to become a Tyrant.

Glaucon/ I conjecture, from what was formerly mentioned, that you say true.

Socrates/ It is so. But we ought not merely to conjecture about matters of such importance as these, but most thoroughly to inquire into them by reasoning of this kind: for the inquiry is concerning a thing of the greatest consequence, a good life and a bad.

Glaucon/ Most right.

Socrates/ Consider then whether there be anything in what I say; for, in considering this question, I am of opinion that we ought to perceive it from these things.

Glaucon/ From what?

Socrates/ From every individual of private men, viz. such of them as are rich, and possess many slaves; for those have this resemblance at least of Tyrants, that they rule over many, with this difference, that the Tyrant has a great multitude.

Glaucon/ There is this difference.

Socrates/ You know then that these live securely, and are not afraid of their domestics.

Glaucon/ What should they be afraid of?

Socrates/ Nothing; but do you consider the reason?

Glaucon/ Yes. It is because the whole city gives assistance to each particular private man.

Socrates/ You say right. But what now? If some God should list a man who had fifty slaves or upwards out of the

city, both him, and his wife and children, and set him down in a desert, with his other substance, and his domestics, where no free-man was to give him assistance, —in what kind of fear, and in how great, do you imagine he would be about himself, his children and wife, lest they should be destroyed by the domestics?

Glaucon/ In the greatest possible, I imagine.

Socrates/ Would he not be obliged even to flatter some of the very slaves, and promise them many things, to set them at liberty when there was no occasion for it; and appear to be himself a flatterer of servants?

Glaucon/ He is under great necessity, to do so, or be destroyed.

Socrates/ But what, if the God should settle round him many other neighbors, who could not endure if anyone should pretend to lord it over another; but, if they anywhere found such a one, should punish him with the extremist rigor?

Glaucon/ I imagine, that he would be still more distressed, thus beset by every kind of enemies.

Socrates/ And in such a prison-house is not the Tyrant bound, being such, by disposition, as we have mentioned, full of many and most various fears and loves of all kinds? And whilst he has in his soul the greatest desire, he alone of all in the city is neither allowed to go anywhere abroad, nor to see such things as other men are desirous of; but, creeping into his house, lives mostly as a woman, envying the other citizens if any of them go abroad, and see any good.

Glaucon/ It is entirely so.

Socrates/ And besides such evils as these, does not the man reap still more of them, who, being under ill policy within himself, (which you just now deemed to be the most wretched Tyranny,) lives not as a private person, but

through some fortune is obliged to act the tyrant, and, without holding the government of himself, attempts to govern others, as if one with a body diseased, and unable to support itself, were obliged to live not in a private way, but in wrestling and fighting against other bodies?

Glaucon/ You say, Socrates, what is altogether most likely and true.

Socrates/ Is not then, friend Glauco, this condition altogether miserable? and does not the Tyrant live more miserably still, than the man deemed by you to live most miserably?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ True it is then, though one may fancy otherwise, that the truly tyrannical man is truly slavish with respect to the greatest flatteries and slaveries, and is a flatterer of the most abandoned men; nor does he ever in the smallest degree obtain the gratification of his desires, but is of all the most indigent of most things, and appears poor indeed, if a man knows how to contemplate his whole soul; and full of seat through the whole of life, being filled with anxieties and griefs, if indeed he resembles the constitution of that city which he governs. But he does resemble it. Does he not?

Glaucon/ Extremely.

Socrates/ And shall we not, besides these things, likewise ascribe to this man what we formerly mentioned, that he must necessarily be, and, by governing still, become more than formerly envious, faithless, unjust, unfriendly, unholy, and a general recipient and nourisher of all wickedness; and from all these things be most especially unhappy himself, and then render all about him unhappy likewise?

Glaucon/ No one, who hath understanding will contradict you.

Socrates/ Come now, as a judge who pronounces, after considering all, so do you tell me, who, according to your opinion, is the first as to happiness, and who second, and the rest in order, they being? five in all? The Regal, the Timocratic, the Oligarchic, the Democratic, and the Tyrannic.

Glaucon/ But the judgment, is easy; for, as if I had entered among them, I judge of them as of public performers, by their virtue and vice, and by their happiness, and its contrary.

Socrates/ Shall we then hire a Herald? Or shall I myself declare that the son of Ariston hath judged the best and justest man to be the happiest; (and that this is the man who hath most of the regal spirit, and rules himself with a kingly power;) and that the worst and the most unjust is the most wretched; and that he again happens to be the man who is most tyrannical, who in the greatest degree tyrannizes over himself, and the city?

Glaucon/ Let it be published by you.

Socrates/ Shall I add, whether they be unknown to be such or not both to all men and Gods?

Glaucon/ Add it.

Socrates/ Be it so: this would seem to be one proof of ours. And this, if you are of the same opinion, must be the second.

Glaucon/ Which is it?

Socrates/ Since the soul, of every individual is divided into three parts, in the same manner as the city was divided, it will, in my opinion, afford a second proof.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ It is this. Of the three parts of the soul, there appear to me to be three pleasures, one peculiar to each. And the desires and governments are in the same manner.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ There is one part, we said, by which a man learns, and another by which he is irascible; the third is so multiform, we are unable to express it by one word peculiar to itself, but we denominated it from that which is greatest and most impetuous in it; for we called it the desiderative, on account of the impetuosity of the desires relative to meat, drink, and venereal pleasures, and whatever others belong to these; and we called it avaricious likewise, because it is by means of wealth most especially that such desires are accomplished.

Glaucon/ And we said rightly.

Socrates/ If then we say that its pleasure and delight are in gain, shall we not best of all reduce it under one head in our discourse, so as to express something to ourselves, when we make mention of this part of the soul? and, calling it the covetous, and the desirous of gain, shall we not term it properly?

Glaucon/ So it appears to me.

Socrates/ But what? Do not we say that the irascible ought to be; wholly impelled to superiority, victory, and applause?

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ If then we term it the contentious and ambitious, will it not be accurately expressed?

Glaucon/ Most accurately.

Socrates/ But it is evident to everyone, that the part of the soul, by which we learn, is wholly intent always to know

the truth; and as to wealth and glory, it cares for these least of all.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ When we call it then the desirous of learning, and the philosophic, we shall call it according to propriety.

Glaucon/ How should we not?

Socrates/ And do not these, govern in souls, one of them in some, and in others another, as it happens?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ On this account then, we said there were three original species of men; the philosophic, the ambitious, and the avaricious.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And that there were likewise three species of pleasures, one subject to each of these.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ You know then, that if you were to ask these three men, each of them apart, which of these lives is the most pleasant, each would most of all commend his own. And the avaricious will say, that in comparison with the pleasure of acquiring wealth, that arising from honor, or from learning, is of no value, unless one make money by them.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And what says the ambitious? Does not he deem the pleasure arising from making money a sort of burthen? And likewise that arising from learning, unless learning bring him honor, does he not deem it smoke and trifling?

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ And we shall suppose the philosopher, to deem the other pleasures as nothing in comparison of that of

knowing the truth, how it is, and that whilst he is always employed in learning something of this kind, he is not very remote from pleasure; but that he calls the other pleasures truly necessary, as wanting nothing of the others, but where there is a necessity for it.

Glaucon/ This, we must well understand.

Socrates/ When therefore, these several lives, and the respective pleasure of each, dispute among themselves, not with reference to living more worthily or more basely, or worse or better; but merely with reference to this of living more pleasantly, or on the contrary more painfully, —how can we know which of them speaks most conformably to truth?

Glaucon/ I am not quite able, to tell.

Socrates/ But consider it thus. By what ought we to judge of whatever is to be rightly judged of? Is it not by experience, by prudence, and by reason? Or has anyone a better criterion than these?

Glaucon/ How can he?

Socrates/ Consider now; of the three men, who is the most experienced in all the pleasures? Whether does it appear to you that the avaricious man, in learning truth itself, what it is, is more experienced in the pleasure arising from knowledge, than the philosopher is in that arising from the acquisition of wealth?

Glaucon/ There is, a great difference: for the philosopher, beginning from his childhood, must, of necessity, taste the other pleasures; but what it is to know real beings, and how sweet this pleasure is, the lucrative man has no necessity of tasting, or of becoming experienced in; but rather, when he earnestly endeavors to effect this, it is no easy matter.

Socrates/ The philosopher then, far surpasses the lucrative man, at least in experience of both the pleasures.

Glaucon/ Far indeed.

Socrates/ But what with reference to the ambitious man? Is he more experienced in the pleasure arising from honor, than the philosopher is in that arising from intellectual energy?

Glaucon/ Honor, attends all of them, if they obtain each of them what they aim at: for the rich man is honored by many, and so is the brave, and the wise; so, as to that of honor, what sort of pleasure it is, all of them have the experience. But in the contemplation of being itself, what pleasure there is, it is impossible for any other than the philosopher to have tasted.

Socrates/ On account of experience then, he of all men judges the best.

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And surely, along with prudence at least, he alone becomes experienced.

Glaucon/ Why should he not?

Socrates/ But even the organ by which these pleasures must be judged is not the organ of the lucrative, nor of the ambitious, but of the philosopher.

Glaucon/ Which is it?

Socrates/ We said somewhere, that they must be judged of by reason, did we not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But reasoning is chiefly the organ of the philosopher.

Glaucon/ How should it not?

Socrates/ If then the things to be determined were best determined by riches and gain, what the lucrative man commended, or despised, would of necessity be most agreeable to truth.

Glaucon/ Entirely.

Socrates/ And if by honor, and victory and bravery, must it not be as the ambitious and contentious man determined?

Glaucon/ It is evident.

Socrates/ But since it is, by experience, and prudence, and reason, —of necessity, what the philosopher and the lover of reason commends must be the most true. Of the three pleasures, then, that is the most pleasant which belongs to that part of the soul by which we learn most, and he among us in whom this part governs lives the most pleasant life.

Glaucon/ How can it, be otherwise? For the wise man, being the sovereign commender, commends his own life.

Socrates/ But which life, does our judge pronounce the second, and which the second pleasure?

Glaucon/ It is plain, that of the war-like and ambitious man; for this is nearer to his own than that of the lucrative.

Socrates/ And that of the covetous, as it appears, is last of all.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ These things now have thus succeeded one another in order. And the just man has twice now overcome the unjust. The third victory now, as at the Olympic games, is sacred to Olympic Zeus, the savior; for consider, that the pleasure of the others is not every way genuine, but that of the wise man is: nor are they pure, but somehow shadowed over, as I appear to, myself to have heard from one of the wise men. And this truly would be the greatest and most complete downfall of the unjust.

Glaucon/ Extremely so. But how do you mean?

Socrates/ I shall thus trace it out, whilst in searching you answer my questions.

Glaucon/ Ask then.

Socrates/ Tell me then, do we not say that pain is opposite to pleasure?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And do we not say likewise, that to feel neither pleasure nor pain is somewhat?

Glaucon/ We say it is.

Socrates/ That being in the middle of both; these, it is a certain tranquility of the soul with reference to them. Do you not thus understand it?

Glaucon/ Thus.

Socrates/ Do you not remember, the speeches of the diseased, which they utter in their sickness?

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ How that nothing is more pleasant than health, but that it escaped their notice before they became sick, that it was the most pleasant.

Glaucon/ I remember it.

Socrates/ And are you not wont to hear those who are under any acute pain say, that there is nothing more pleasant than a cessation from pain?

Glaucon/ I am wont to hear them.

Socrates/ And you may perceive in men, I imagine, the same thing, when they are in many other such like circumstances, where, when in pain, they extol a freedom from pain, and the tranquility of such a state, as being the most pleasant, and do not extol that of feeling joy.

Glaucon/ Because this, it is likely, becomes at that time pleasant and desirable tranquility.

Socrates/ And when anyone ceases, to feel joy, this tranquility from pleasure will be painful.

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ This tranquility, then, which we just now said was between the two, will at times become each of these, pain and pleasure.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ But is it truly possible, that what is neither of the two should become both?

Glaucon/ It does not appear to me that it is.

Socrates/ And surely at least, when anything pleasant or anything painful is in the soul, both sensations are a certain motion; are they not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But did not that which is neither painful nor pleasant appear just now to be tranquility, and in the middle of these two?

Glaucon/ It appears so, indeed.

Socrates/ How is it right, then, to deem it pleasant not to be in pain, or painful not to enjoy pleasure?

Glaucon/ It is by no means right.

Socrates/ In these cases, then, tranquility is not really so, but it appears pleasant in respect of the painful, and painful in respect of the pleasant. And there is nothing, genuine in these appearances as to the truth of pleasure, but a certain magical delusion.

Glaucon/ As our reasoning shows.

Socrates/ Consider then, the pleasures which do not arise from the cessation of pains, that you may not frequently in the present discourse suppose that these two naturally thus subsist, viz. that pleasure is the cessation of pain, and pain the cessation of pleasure.

Glaucon/ How, and which pleasures do you mean?

Socrates/ There are many others, but chiefly if you wish to consider the pleasures from; smells; for these, without any preceding pain, are on a sudden immensely great, and, when they cease, they leave no pain behind them.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Let us not then be persuaded that pure pleasure is the removal of pain, or pain the removal of pleasure.

Glaucon/ Let us not.

Socrates/ But yet, those which extend through the body to the soul, and which are called pleasures, the greatest part of them almost, and the most considerable, are of this species, certain cessations of pain.

Glaucon/ They are so.

Socrates/ And are not the preconceptions of pleasure and pain, which arise in the mind from the expectation of these things, of the same kind?

Glaucon/ Of the same.

Socrates/ Do you know then, what kind they are of, and what they chiefly resemble?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Do you reckon, there is any such thing in nature as this, the above, the below, and the middle?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you think then that anyone, when he is brought from the below to the middle, imagines anything else than that he is brought to the above? and when he stands in the middle, and looks down whence he was brought, will he imagine he is anywhere else than above, whilst yet he has not seen the true above?

Glaucon/ By Zeus, I do not think that such an one will imagine otherwise.

Socrates/ But if he should again, be carried to the below, he would conjecture he was carried to the below, and would conjecture according to truth.

Glaucon/ How should he not?

Socrates/ Would he not be affected in all these respects, from his not having experience in what is really above, and in the middle, and below?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ Would you wonder then, that whilst men are inexperienced in the truth, they have unsound opinions about many other things, —and that as to pleasure and pain, and what is between these, they are likewise affected in this same manner? So that, even when they are brought to what is painful, they imagine truly, and are truly pained; but when from pain they are brought to the middle, they strongly imagine that they are arrived at fullness of pleasure. In the same manner as those who along with the black color look at the gray, through inexperience of the white, are deceived; so those who consider pain along with a freedom from pain, are deceived through inexperience of pleasure.

Glaucon/ By Zeus, I should not wonder, but much rather if it were not so.

Socrates/ But consider it, in this manner. Are not hunger and thirst, and such like, certain emptinesses in the bodily habit?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ And are not ignorance and folly an emptiness in the habit of the soul?

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And is not the one filled when it receives food, and the other when it possesses intellect?

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But which is the more real repletion, that of the less, or that of the more real being?

Glaucon/ It is plain, that of the more real.

Socrates/ Which species, then, do you think, participates most of a more pure essence; whether these which participate of bread and drink, and meat, and all such sort of nourishment; or that species which participates of true opinion and science, and intellect, and, in short, of all virtue? But judge of it in this manner. That which adheres to what is always similar, and immortal, and true, and is so itself, and arises in what is such, does it appear to you to have more of the reality of being, than that which adheres to what is never similar, and is mortal, which is so itself, and is generated in a thing of this kind?

Glaucon/ This, differs much from that which is always similar.

Socrates/ Does then the essence of that which is always similar participate more of essence than of science?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But what with relation to truth? Nor of this neither. If it participate less of truth, does it not likewise do so of essence?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ In short, then, do not the genera relating to the care of the body participate less of truth and essence, than those relating to the care of the soul?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And the body less than the soul; do you not think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Is not that which is filled with more real beings, and is itself a more real being, in reality more truly filled than

that which is filled with less real beings, and is itself a less real being?

Glaucon/ How should it not?

Socrates/ If then it be pleasant to be filled with what is suitable to nature, that which is in reality filled, and with more real being, must be made both more really and more truly to enjoy true pleasure; but that which participates of less real being, must be less truly and firmly filled, and participates of a more uncertain and less genuine pleasure.

Glaucon/ Most necessarily.

Socrates/ Such then as are unacquainted with wisdom and virtue, and are always conversant in feastings and such like, are carried as it appears to the below, and back again to the middle, and there they wander for life. But never, passing beyond this, do they look towards the true above, nor are carried to it; nor are they ever really filled with real being; nor have they ever tasted solid and pure pleasure; but, after the manner of brutes looking always downwards, and bowed towards earth and their tables, they live feeding and coupling; and from a lust of these things, kicking and pushing at one another with iron horns and hoofs, they perish through their insatiableness, as those who are filling with unreal being that which is no real being, nor friendly to themselves.

Glaucon/ You pronounce most perfectly, Socrates, as from an oracle, the life of the multitude.

Socrates/ Must they not then, of necessity, be conversant with pleasures mixed with pains, images of the true pleasure, shadowed over, and colored by their position beside each other? so that both their pleasures and pains will appear vehement, and engender their mad passions in the foolish. Hence also they must fight about these things,

as Stesichorus says those at Troy fought about the image of Helen, through ignorance of the true one.

Glaucon/ Of necessity, something of this kind must take place. And what as to the irascible part of the soul?

Socrates/ Must not other such like things happen, wherever anyone gratifies it, either in the way of envy, through ambition, or in the way of violence, through contentiousness, or in the way of anger, through moroseness, pursuing a glut of honor, of conquest, and of anger, both without reason, and without intelligence?

Glaucon/ Such things as these, must necessarily happen with reference to this part of the soul.

Socrates/ What then, shall we boldly say concerning all the pleasures, both respecting the avaricious and the ambitious part, that such of them as are obedient to science and reason, and, in conjunction with these, pursue and obtain the pleasures of which the prudent part of the soul is the leader, shall obtain the truest pleasures, as far as it is possible for them to attain true pleasure, and in as much as they follow truth, pleasures which are properly their own; if indeed what is best for everyone be most properly his own?

Glaucon/ But surely it is most properly, his own.

Socrates/ When then the whole soul is obedient to the philosophic part, and there is no sedition in it, then every part in other respects performs its proper business, and is just, and also reaps its own pleasures, and such as are the best, and as far as is possible the most true.

Glaucon/ Certainly, indeed.

Socrates/ But when any of the others governs, it happens that it neither attains its own pleasures, and it compels the other parts to pursue a pleasure foreign to them, and not at all true.

Glaucon/ It does so.

Socrates/ Do not then the parts which are the most remote from philosophy and reason most especially effectuate such things?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And is not that which is most remote from law and order, likewise most remote from reason?

Glaucon/ It plainly is.

Socrates/ And have not the amorous and the tyrannical desires appeared to be most remote from law and order?

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And the royal and the moderate ones, the least remote?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ The tyrant then, I think, shall be the most remote from true pleasure, and such as is most properly his own, and the other shall be the least.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ And the tyrant, shall lead a life the most unpleasant, and the king the most pleasant.

Glaucon/ Of great necessity.

Socrates/ Do you know then, how much more unpleasant a life the tyrant leads than the king?

Glaucon/ If you tell me.

Socrates/ As there are three pleasures, as it appears, One genuine, and two illegitimate; the Tyrant in carrying the illegitimate to extremity, and flying from law and reason, dwells with slavish pleasures as his life-guards, and how far he is inferior is not easily to be told, unless it may be done in this manner.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ The Tyrant is somehow the third remote from the Oligarchic character; for the Democratic was in the middle between them.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does he not then dwell with the third image of pleasure, distant from him with reference to truth, if our former reasonings be true?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But the Oligarchic is the third again from the Royal, if we suppose the Aristocratic and the Royal the same.

Glaucon/ He is the third.

Socrates/ The Tyrant then, is remote from true pleasure, the third from the third.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ A plain surface then, may be the image of tyrannical pleasure, as to the computation of length.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But as to power, and the third augment, it is manifest by how great a distance it is remote.

Glaucon/ It is manifest, to the computer at least.

Socrates/ If now, conversely, anyone shall say the King is distant from the Tyrant as to truth of pleasure, as much as is the distance of 9, and 20, and 700, shall he not, on completing the multiplication, find him leading the more pleasant life, and the Tyrant the more wretched one, by this same distance?

Glaucon/ You have heaped up, a prodigious account of the difference between these two men, the just and the unjust, with reference to pleasure and pain.

Socrates/ Yet the numbers are true, and corresponding to their lives, if indeed days, and nights, and months, and years, correspond to them.

Glaucon/ But these, do correspond to them.

Socrates/ If then the good and just man surpasses so far the evil and unjust man in pleasure, in what a prodigious degree further shall he surpass him in decorum of life, in beauty and in virtue!

Glaucon/ In a prodigious degree, by Zeus.

Socrates/ Be it so. Since now we are come to this part of our argument, let us recapitulate what we first said, on account of which we have come hither: and it was somewhere said, that it was advantageous to do injustice, if one were completely unjust, but were reputed just. Was it not so said?

Glaucon/ It was indeed.

Socrates/ Now then, let us settle this point, since we have now settled the other, with reference to acting justly and unjustly, what power each of these possesses in itself.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Let us in our reasoning fashion an image of the soul, that the man who said those things may know what he said.

Glaucon/ What kind of image?

Socrates/ One of those creatures, which are fabled to have been of old, as that of Chimæra, of Scylla, of Cerberus; and many others are spoken of, where many particular natures existed together in one.

Glaucon/ They are spoken of indeed.

Socrates/ Form now one figure of a creature, various, and many-headed, having all around heads of tame creatures, and of wild, and having power in itself of changing all these heads, and of breeding them out of itself.

Glaucon/ This is the work, of a skillful former: however, as the formation is easier in reasoning, than in wax and such like, let it be formed.

Socrates/ Let there be now one other figure of a lion and one of a man; but let the first be by far the greatest, and the second be the second in bulk.

Glaucon/ These are easy, and they are formed.

Socrates/ Conjoin now these three in one, so as to exist somehow with one another.

Glaucon/ They are conjoined.

Socrates/ Form now around them the external appearance of one of them, that of the man; so that to one who is not able to see what is within, but who perceives only the external covering, the man may appear one creature.

Glaucon/ This is formed around.

Socrates/ Let us now tell him, who asserts that it is profitable to this man to do injustice, but to do justice is unprofitable, that he asserts nothing else, than that it is profitable for him to feast the multiform creature, and to make it strong; and likewise the lion, and what respects the lion, whilst the man he kills with famine, and renders weak, so as to be dragged whichever way either of those drag him; and that he will also find it advantageous never to accustom the one to live in harmony with the other, nor to make them friends, but suffer them to be biting one another, and to fight and devour each other.

Glaucon/ He, who commends the doing injustice, undoubtedly asserts these things.

Socrates/ And does not he again, who says it is profitable to do justice, say that he ought to do and to say such things by which the inner man shall come to have the most entire command of the man, and, as a tiller of the ground, shall take care of the many-headed creature, cherishing the mild

ones, and nourishing them, and hindering the wild ones from growing up, taking the nature of the lion as his ally, and, having a common care for all, make them friendly to one another, and to himself, and so nourish them?

Glaucon/ He who commends justice undoubtedly says such things as these.

Socrates/ In all respects, then, he who commends justice would seem to speak the truth, but he who commends injustice, to speak what is false; for, with regard to pleasure, and applause, and profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, and he who discommends it speaks nothing genuine. Nor does he discommend with understanding what he discommends.

Glaucon/ Not at all, as appears to me at least.

Socrates/ Let us then in a mild manner persuade him (for it is not willingly he errs), asking him, O blessed man! do not we say that the maxims of things beautiful and base become so, upon such accounts as these? Those are good which subject the brutal part of our nature most to the man, or rather perhaps to that which is divine: but those are evil which enslave the mild part of our nature to the brutal. Will he agree with us? or how?

Glaucon/ He will, if he be advised by me.

Socrates/ Is there then, anyone, whom it avails, from this reasoning, to take gold unjustly, if something of this kind happens, if, whilst he takes the money, he at the same time subjects the best part of himself to the worst? Or, ifs taking gold, he should enslave a son or daughter, and that even to savage and wicked men, shall we not say this would not avail him, not though he should receive for it a prodigious sum? But if he enslaves the most divine part of himself to the most impious and most polluted part, without any pity, is he not wretched? and does he not take a gift of gold to his far more

dreadful ruin, than Euriphyle did when she received the necklace for her husband's life?

Glaucon/ By far; for I will answer you for the man.

Socrates/ And do you not think that to be intemperate, has of old been discommended on such accounts as these, because that in such a one that terrible, great and multiform beast was indulged more than was meet?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And are not arrogance and moroseness blamed, when the lion and the serpentine disposition increases and stretches beyond measure?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And are not luxury and effeminacy blamed because of the remissness and looseness of this disposition, when it engenders in the man cowardice?

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ Are not flattery and illiberality blamed, when anyone makes this irascible part itself subject to the brutal crew, and, for the sake of wealth and its insatiable lust, accustoms the irascible to be affronted from its youth, and instead of a lion to become an ape?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But why is it, do you think, that mechanical arts and handicrafts are despicable? Shall we say it is on any other account than this, that when a man has the form of that which is best in his soul naturally weak, so as not to be able to govern the creatures within himself, but to minister to them, he is able only to learn what flatters them?

Glaucon/ It is likely.

Socrates/ In order then that such a one may be governed in the same manner as the best man, is, do we not say that he must be the servant of one who is the best, and who has

within him the divine governor? not at all conceiving that he should be governed to the hurt of the subject (as Thrasymachus imagined) but, as it is best for everyone to be governed, by one divine and wise, most especially possessing it as his own within him, if not subjecting himself to it externally; that as far as possible we may all resemble one another and be friends, governed by one and the same?

Glaucon/ Rightly, indeed.

Socrates/ And law at least, plainly shows it intends such a thing, being an ally to all in the city; as does likewise the government of children, in not allowing them to be free till we establish in them a proper government, as in a city; and having cultivated that in them which is best, by that which is best in ourselves, we establish a similar guardian and governor for youth, and then truly we set it free.

Glaucon/ It shows indeed.

Socrates/ In what way then shall we say, Glauco, and according to what reasoning, that it is profitable to do injustice, to be intemperate, or to do anything base, by which a man shall indeed become more wicked, but yet shall acquire more wealth, or any kind of power?

Glaucon/ In no way.

Socrates/ But how shall we say it is profitable for the unjust to be concealed, and not to suffer punishment? or does he not indeed, who is concealed, still become more wicked? but he who is not concealed, and is punished, has the brutal part quieted, and made mild, and the mild part set at liberty. And the whole soul being settled in the best temper, in possessing temperance and justice, with wisdom, acquires a more valuable habit than the body does, in acquiring vigor and beauty, with a sound constitution; in as far as the soul is more valuable than the body.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Shall not everyone then, who possesses intellect, regulate his life in extending the whole of his powers hither, in the first place, honoring those disciplines which will render his soul of this kind, and despising all other things?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And next, with reference to a good habit of body and its nourishment, he will spend his life in attention to these, not that he may indulge the brutal and irrational pleasure; nor yet with a view to health, nor, principally regarding this, to become strong and healthy, and beautiful, unless by means of these he is to become temperate likewise: but he always appears to adjust the harmony of the body for the sake of the symphony which is in the soul.

Glaucon/ By all means, if indeed he is to be truly musical.

Socrates/ That arrangement then, and symphony arising from the possession of wealth, and that vulgar magnificence, he will not, in consequence of being astonished with the felicity of the multitude, increase to infinity, and bring on himself infinite evils.

Glaucon/ I do not think it.

Socrates/ But looking, to that polity within himself, and taking dare that nothing there be moved out of its place, through the greatness or smallness of his property, governing in this manner as far as he is able, he will add to his substance, and spend out of it.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ He will regard honors likewise in the same manner; some he will willingly partake of, and taste, which he judges will render him a better man, but those which he thinks would dissolve that habit of soul which subsists within him, he will fly from both in private and in public.

Glaucon/ He will not then, be willing to act in polities, if he takes care of this.

Socrates/ Yes truly, in his own city, and greatly too. But not probably in his country, unless some divine fortune befall him.

Glaucon/ I understand. You mean in the city we have now established, which exists in our reasoning, since it is nowhere on earth, at least, as I imagine.

Socrates/ But in heaven, probably, there is a model of it, for anyone who inclines to contemplate it, and on contemplating to regulate himself accordingly; and it is of no consequence to him, whether it does exist anywhere, or shall ever exist here. He does the duties of this city alone, and of no other.

Glaucon/ It is reasonable.

THE END OF THE NINTH BOOK.

Book 10.

Socrates/ I observe, with reference to many other things, that we have established a city in a right manner, beyond what all others have done, and among these establishments, I mean that respecting poetry as none of the least.

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ That no part of it which is imitative be by any means admitted. For it appears, now most of all, and with greatest perspicuity, that it is not to be admitted, since the several forms of the soul have been distinguished apart from one another.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ That I may tell it as to you, (for you will not accuse me to the composers of tragedy, and the rest of the imitative kind) all such things as these seem to be the ruin of the dianoëtic part of the hearers, viz. of such of them as have not a medicine to enable them to discern their peculiar nature.

Glaucon/ From what consideration, do you say so?

Socrates/ It must be spoken, although a certain friendship, at least, and reverence for Homer, which I have had from my childhood, restrains me from telling it; for he seems truly both to have been the first teacher and leader of all these good composers of tragedy: but the man must not be honored preferably to the truth. But what I mean must, be spoken.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Hear me then, or rather answer me.

Glaucon/ Ask.

Socrates/ Can you tell me perfectly, what at all imitation is? for I do not myself altogether understand what it means.

Glaucon/ And shall I then any how understand it?

Socrates/ That would be no way strange; since those who are dim-sighted perceive many things sooner than those who see more clearly.

Glaucon/ The case is so; but whilst you are present, I should not be able to adventure to tell, even though something did appear to me.

Socrates/ But consider it yourself. Are you willing then, that we hence begin our inquiry in our usual method? for we were wont to suppose a certain species with respect, to many individuals, to which we give the same name; or do you not understand me?

Glaucon/ I understand.

Socrates/ Let us suppose now such among the many, as you please; as, for example, there are many beds and tables, if you please.

Glaucon/ Why are there not?

Socrates/ But the ideas, at least respecting these pieces of furniture, are two; one of bed, and one of table.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are we not wont to say, that the workmen of each of these species of furniture, looking towards the idea, make in this manner, the one the beds, and the other the tables which we use? and all other things after the same manner. For no one of the artists makes, at least, the idea itself; for how can he?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But see now whether you call such a one as this an artist?

Glaucon/ Which?

Socrates/ One who does all such things, as each manual artificer does.

Glaucon/ You mention some skillful and wonderful man.

Socrates/ Not yet, at least; but you will much more say so presently; for this same mechanic is not only able to make all sorts of utensils, but he makes also everything which springs from the earth, and he makes all sorts of animals, himself as well as others: and besides these things, he makes the earth, and heaven, and the Gods, and all things in heaven, and in Hades under the earth.

Glaucon/ You mention, a perfectly wonderful sophist.

Socrates/ You do not believe me; but tell me, does it appear to you that there is not any such artist? or that, in one respect, he is the maker of all these things, and in another he is not? or do you not perceive that even you yourself might be able to make all these things, in a certain manner at least?

Glaucon/ And what, is this manner?

Socrates/ It is not difficult, but is performed in many ways, and quickly; but in the quickest manner of all, if you choose to take a mirror, and carry it round everywhere; for then you will quickly make the sun, and the things in the heavens, quickly the earth, quickly yourself, and the other animals, and utensils, and vegetables, and all that was now mentioned.

Glaucon/ Yes, the appearances, but not however the real things.

Socrates/ You come well, and seasonably, with your remark; for I imagine that the painter too is one of these artists.

Glaucon/ Is he not?

Socrates/ How is it possible he should not? But you will say, I think, that he does not make what he makes, true, although the painter too, in a certain manner, at least, makes a bed, does he not?

Glaucon/ Yes, he too makes only the appearance. But what with reference to the bed-maker? Did you not indeed say, just now, that he does not make the form which we say exists, which is bed, but a particular bed?

Socrates/ I said so indeed. If then he does not make that which is, he does not make real being, but some such thing as being, but not being itself: but if anyone should say, that the work of a bed-maker, or of any other handicraft, were real being, he would seem not to say true.

Glaucon/ He would, as it must appear to those who are conversant in such kind of reasonings.

Socrates/ Let us not then at all wonder if this likewise happen to be somewhat obscure with reference to the truth.

Glaucon/ Let us not.

Socrates/ Are you willing then, that, with reference to these very things, we inquire concerning the imitator, who he really is?

Glaucon/ If you are willing.

Socrates/ Are there not then these three sorts of beds? One which exists in nature, and which we may say, as I imagine, God made, or who else?

Glaucon/ None, I think.

Socrates/ And one which the joiner makes.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And one which the painter makes. Is it not so?

Glaucon/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Now the painter, the bed-maker, God, these three preside over three species of beds.

Glaucon/ They are three, indeed.

Socrates/ But God, whether it were that he was not willing, or whether there was some necessity for it, that he should not make but one bed in nature, made this one only,

which is really bed; but two such, or more, have never been produced by God, nor ever will be produced.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Because, if he had made but two, again one would have appeared, the form of which both these two would have possessed, and that form would be, that which is bed, and not those two.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ God then, I think, knowing these things, and willing to be the maker of bed, really, and really existing, but not of any particular bed, nor to be any particular bed-maker, produced but one in nature.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Are you willing, then, that we call him the planter of this, or something of this kind?

Glaucon/ It is just, since he has, in their nature, made both this, and all other things.

Socrates/ But what as to the joiner? Is not he the workman of a bed?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is the painter, too, the workman and maker of such a work?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But what will you say he is with relation to bed?

Glaucon/ This, as it appears to me, we may most reasonably call him, the imitator of what these are the workmen of.

Socrates/ Be it so; you call him then the imitator who makes what is generated the third from nature?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And this the composer of tragedy shall be likewise, since he is an imitator, rising as a sort of third from the King and the truth; and in like manner all other imitators.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ We have agreed then as to the imitator; but tell me this concerning the painter, whether do you think he undertakes to imitate each particular thing in nature, or the works of artists?

Glaucon/ The works of artists.

Socrates/ Whether, such as they really are, or such as they appear? Determine this further.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ Thus. Does a bed differ anything from itself, whether he view it obliquely, or directly opposite, or in any particular position? or, does it differ nothing, but only appears different, and in the same way as to other things?

Glaucon/ Thus, it appears, but differs nothing.

Socrates/ Consider this too, with reference to which of the two does painting work, in each particular work; whether with reference to real being, to imitate it as it really is, or with reference to what is apparent, as it appears; and whether is it the imitation of appearance, or of truth?

Glaucon/ Of appearance.

Socrates/ The imitative art, then, is far from the truth: and on this account, it seems, he is able to make these things, because he is able to attain but to some small part of each particular, and that but an image. Thus we say that a painter will paint us a shoe-maker, a joiner, and other artists, though he be skilled in none of those arts; yet he will be able to deceive children and ignorant people, if he be a

good painter, when he paints a joiner, and shows him at a distance, so far as to make them imagine he is a real joiner.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ But this, I think, my friend, we must consider with reference to all these things; that when anyone tells us of such a painter, that he has met with a man who is skilled in all manner of workmanship, and everything else which every several artist understands, and that there is nothing which he does not know more accurately than any other person, we ought to reply to such an one, that he is a simple man, and that it seems, having met with some magician, and mimic, he has been deceived; so that he has appeared to him to know everything, from his own incapacity to distinguish between science, and ignorance, and imitation.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Ought we not then, in the next place, to consider tragedy, and its leader, Homer? since we hear from some, that these poets understand all arts, and all human affairs, respecting virtue and vice, and likewise all divine things; for a good poet must necessarily compose with knowledge, if he means to compose well what he composes, else he is not able to compose. It behooves us then to consider whether these who have met with those imitators have been deceived, and on viewing their works have not perceived that they are the third distant from real being, and that their works are such as can easily be made by one who knows not the truth (for they make phantasms, and not real beings); or whether they do say something to the purpose, and that the good poets in reality have knowledge in those things which they seem to the multitude to express with elegance.

Glaucon/ By all means, this is to be inquired into.

Socrates/ Do you think then, that if anyone were able to make both of these, that which is imitated, and likewise the image, he would allow himself seriously to apply to the workmanship of the images, and propose this to himself as the best thing in life?

Glaucon/ I do not.

Socrates/ But if he were in reality intelligent in these things which he imitates, he would far rather, I think, seriously apply himself to the things than to the imitations, and would endeavor to leave behind him many and beautiful actions, as monuments of himself, and would study rather to be himself the person commended than the encomiast.

Glaucon/ I think so; for neither is the honor nor the profit equal.

Socrates/ As to other things, then, let us not call them to account, asking Homer or any other of the poets, whether any of them were any way skilled in medicine, and not an imitator only of medical discourses, for which of the ancient or latter poets is said to have restored any to health, as Æsculapius did? or what students in medicine has any left behind him, as he did his descendants? Nor let us ask them concerning the other arts, but dismiss them: but with reference to those greatest and most beautiful things which Homer attempts to speak of, concerning wars and armies, and constitutions of cities, and the education belonging to men, it is just, somehow, to question him, whilst we demand of him: Friend Homer, if you be not the third from the truth with regard to virtue, being the workman of an image (which we have defined an imitator to be), but the second, and are able to discern what pursuits render men better or worse, both in private and public, tell us which of the cities has been by you better constituted, as Lacedæmon was by Lycurgus, and many other both great and small cities by

many others, but what city acknowledges you to have been a good lawgiver, and to have been of advantage to them. Italy and Sicily acknowledge Charondas, and we Solon; but will anyone acknowledge you as the benefactor of any city?

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ It is not then pretended even by the Homerics themselves. But what war in Homer's days is recorded to have been well conducted by him as leader, or counselor?

Glaucon/ Not one.

Socrates/ But what are his discoveries? as among the works of a wise man there are many discoveries and inventions spoken of, respecting the arts, and other affairs; as of Thales the Milesian, and of Anacharsis the Scythian.

Glaucon/ By no means is there any such thing.

Socrates/ But if not in a public manner, is Homer said to have lived as a private tutor to any who delighted in his conversation, and have delivered down to posterity a certain Homeric manner of life? in like manner as Pythagoras was remarkably beloved on this account, and, even to this day, such as denominate themselves from the Pythagorean manner of life appear to be somehow eminent beyond others.

Glaucon/ Neither is there, anything of this kind related of Homer. For Creophilus, Socrates, the companion of Homer, may probably appear more ridiculous still in his education, than in his name, if what is said of Homer be true. For it is said that he was greatly neglected when he lived under Homer's tuition.

Socrates/ It is said indeed. But do you think, Glauco, that if Homer had been able to educate men, and to render them better, as being capable not only to imitate with respect to these things, but to understand them, would he not then have procured himself many companions, and have been honored and beloved by them? But Protagoras the Abderite,

and Prodicus the Chian, and many others, are able to persuade the men of their times, conversing with them privately, that they will neither be able to govern their family, nor yet their city, unless they themselves preside over their education; and for this wisdom of theirs, they are so exceedingly beloved, that their companions almost carry them about on their heads. Would then the men of Homer's time have left him or Hesiod to go about ringing their songs, if he had been able to profit men in the way of virtue; and not rather have retained him with gold, and obliged him to stay with them? or, if they could not persuade him, would they not as scholars have followed him everywhere, till they had obtained sufficient education?

Glaucon/ You seem to me, Socrates, to say what is in every respect true.

Socrates/ Shall we not then establish this point, —That all the poetical men, beginning with Homer, are imitators of the images of virtue, and of other things about which they compose, but that they do not attain to the truth: but as we just now said, a painter who himself knows nothing about the making of shoes, will draw a shoemaker, who shall appear to be real to such as are not intelligent, but who view according to the color and figures?

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ In the same manner, I think, we shall say that the poet colors over with his names and words certain colors of the several arts, whilst he understands nothing himself, but merely imitates, so as to others such as himself who view things in his compositions, he appears to have knowledge: and if he says anything about shoemaking in measure, rhythm and harmony, he seems to speak perfectly well, and in like manner if of an expedition, or of anything else: so great an enchantment have these things naturally, since you

know, I think, in what manner poetical things appear when stript of musical coloring, and expressed apart by themselves, for you have somewhere beheld it.

Glaucon/ I have.

Socrates/ Do they not, resemble the faces of people who are in their prime, but who are not beautiful, such as they appear when their bloom forsakes them?

Glaucon/ Entirely.

Socrates/ Come now, and consider this. The maker of the image, whom we call the imitator, knows nothing of real being, but only of that which is apparent. Is it not so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us not then leave it expressed by halves, but let us sufficiently perceive it.

Glaucon/ Say on.

Socrates/ A painter, we say, will paint reins, and a bridle.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the leather-cutter, and the smith, will make them.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Does then the painter understand what kind of reins and bridle there ought to be? or not even he who makes them, the smith, nor the leather-cutter, but he who knows how to use them, the horseman alone?

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Shall we not say it is so in everything else?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ That with reference to each particular thing, there are these three arts. That which is to use it, that which is to make it, and that which is to imitate it.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Are then the virtue, and the beauty, and the rectitude of every utensil, and animal, and action, for nothing else but for the use for which each particular was made, or generated?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ By a great necessity, then, he who uses each particular must be the most skillful, and be able to tell the maker what he makes good or bad, with reference to the use for which he uses it: thus, for example, a player on the pipe tells the pipe-maker concerning pipes, what things are of service towards the playing on the pipe, and he will give orders how he ought to make them, but the workman does not so.

Glaucon/ How should it be otherwise?

Socrates/ Does not the one then, being intelligent, pronounce concerning good and bad pipes, and the other, believing him, make accordingly?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ With reference then to one and the same instrument, the maker shall have right opinion concerning its beauty or deformity, whilst he is conversant with one who is intelligent, and is obliged to hear from the intelligent; but he who uses it shall have science.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But whether shall the imitator have science from using the things he paints, whether they be handsome and right, or otherwise? or shall he have right opinion from his being necessarily conversant with the intelligent, and from being enjoined in what manner he ought to paint?

Glaucon/ Neither of the two.

Socrates/ The imitator then shall have neither knowledge, nor right opinion about what he imitates with reference to beauty or deformity.

Glaucon/ It appears not.

Socrates/ The imitator then should be very agreeable in his imitation, with regard to wisdom, concerning what he paints.

Glaucon/ Not entirely.

Socrates/ But however he will imitate at least, without knowing concerning each particular in what respect it is ill or good; but it is likely that he will imitate such as appears to be beautiful to the multitude, and those who know nothing.

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ We have now, indeed, sufficiently, as it appears, at least, settled these things: That the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning in those things which he imitates, but that imitation is a sort of amusement, and not a serious affair. And likewise that those who apply to tragic poetry in iambics and heroics, are all imitators in the highest degree.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But, by Zeus, this of imitation is somehow in the third degree from the truth. Is it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ To what part then of man does it belong, having the power it possesses? What part do you speak of?

Glaucon/ Of such as this.

Socrates/ The same magnitude perceived by sight, does not appear in the same manner, near, and at a distance.

Glaucon/ It does not.

Socrates/ And the same things appear crooked and straight, when we look at them in water, and out of water, and concave and convex, through the error of the sight, as to colors. All this disturbance is manifest in the soul; and this infirmity of our nature painting attacks, and leaves nothing of magical seduction unattempted, together with the wonder-working art, and many other such-like devices.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And have not the arts of measuring, numbering, and weighing, appeared to be most ingenious helps in these things, that so the apparent greater or less, the apparent more or heavier, may not govern us, but the numbered, the measured, and the weighed?

Glaucon/ How should it be otherwise?

Socrates/ But this again is, at least, the work of the rational part in the soul.

Glaucon/ It is so, indeed.

Socrates/ But whilst reason often measures and declares some things to be greater or less than other things, or equal, the contrary appears at the same time with reference to these things.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But did not we say that it was impossible for the same person to have contrary opinions about the same things at the same time?

Glaucon/ And thus far we said rightly.

Socrates/ That part of the soul, then, which judges contrary to the measure, would seem not to be the same with that which judges according to the measure.

Glaucon/ It would not.

Socrates/ But surely, at least, that which trusts to measure and computation would seem to be the best part of the soul.

Glaucon/ Why not?

Socrates/ That then which opposes itself to this will be some one of the depraved parts of us.

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ It was this then I wished should be agreed upon, when I said that painting, and in short imitation, being far from the truth, delight in their own work, conversing with that part in us which is far from wisdom, and are its companion and friend, to no sound nor genuine purpose.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Imitation then, being depraved in itself, and joining with that which is depraved, generates depraved things.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Whether, is the case thus, with reference to the imitation which is by the sight only, or is it likewise so with reference to that by hearing, which we call poetry?

Glaucon/ Likely as to this also.

Socrates/ We shall not therefore, trust to the appearance in painting, but we shall proceed to the consideration of the dianoëtic part with which the imitation through poetry is conversant, and see whether it is depraved or worthy.

Glaucon/ It must be done.

Socrates/ Let us proceed then thus: Poetic imitation, we say, imitates men acting either voluntarily or involuntarily; and imagining that in their acting they have done either well or ill, and in all these cases receiving either pain or pleasure: Does it any more than this?

Glaucon/ No more.

Socrates/ In all these, now, does the man agree with himself? or, as he disagreed with reference to sight, and had contrary opinions in himself of the same things at one and the same time, does he, in the same manner, disagree likewise in his actions, and fight with himself? But I recollect that there is no occasion for us to settle this at least; for, in our reasonings above, we sufficiently determined all these things, that our soul is full of a thousand such contrarieties existing in it.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Right indeed; but it appears to me necessary to discuss now, what was then omitted.

Glaucon/ As what?

Socrates/ We said somewhere formerly, that a good man, when he meets with such a fortune as the loss of a son, or of anything else which he values the most, will bear it of all men the easiest.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But let us now consider this further, —whether will he not grieve at all, or is this indeed impossible, but he will, however, moderate his grief?

Glaucon/ The truth, is rather this last.

Socrates/ But tell me this now concerning him, whether do you think that he will struggle more with grief and oppose it, when he is observed by his equals, or when he is in solitude, alone by himself?

Glaucon/ Much more, when he is observed.

Socrates/ But when alone, he will venture, I think, to utter many things, which, if anyone heard him, he would be ashamed of, and he will do many things which he would not wish anyone saw him doing.

Glaucon/ It is so.

Socrates/ Is it not then reason and law which command him to restrain his grief, —but what drags him to grief is the passion itself?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ As then there is in the man an opposite conduct, with regard to the same thing, at one and the same time, we must necessarily say that he has two conductors.

Glaucon/ What else?

Socrates/ And shall we not say that one of them is ready to obey the law wherever law leads him?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Law in a manner says that it is best in misfortunes to have the greatest tranquility possible, and not to bear them ill; since the good and evil of such things as these is not manifest, and since no advantage follows the bearing these things ill; and as nothing of human affairs is worthy of great concern; and, besides, their grief proves a hindrance to that in them which we ought to have most at hand.

Glaucon/ What is it, you speak of?

Socrates/ To deliberate, on the event; and, as on a throw of the dice, to regulate his affairs according to what casts up, in whatever way reason shall declare to be best: and not as children when they fall, to lie still, and waste the time in crying; but always to accustom the soul to apply in the speediest manner to heal and rectify what was fallen and sick, dismissing lamentation. One would thus, behave in the best manner in every condition. And did not we say that the best part is willing to follow this which is rational?

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ And shall not we say that the part which leads to the remembrance of the affliction, and to wailings, and is insatiably given to these, is irrational, and idle, and a friend to cowardice?

Glaucon/ We shall say so truly.

Socrates/ Is not then the grieving part that which admits of much and of various imitation? But the prudent and tranquil part, which is always uniform with itself, is neither easily imitated, nor, when imitated, easily understood, especially by a popular assembly, where all sorts of men are assembled together in a theatre. For it is the imitation of a disposition which is foreign to them.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ It is plain, then, that the imitative poet is not made for such a part of the soul as this. Nor is his skill fitted to please it, if he means to gain the applause of the multitude. But he applies to the passionate and the multiform part, as it is easily imitated.

Glaucon/ It is plain.

Socrates/ May we not then, with justice, lay hold of the imitative poet, and place him as correspondent to the painter? for he resembles him, both because, as to truth, he effects but depraved things, and in this too he resembles him, in being conversant with a different part of the soul from that which is best. And thus we may, with justice, not admit him into our city which is to be well regulated, because he excites and nourishes this part of the soul, and, strengthening it, destroys the rational. And as he who in a city makes the wicked powerful, betrays the city, and destroys the best men, in the same manner we shall say that the imitative poet establishes a bad republic in the soul of each individual, gratifying the foolish part of it, which neither discerns what is great, nor what is little, but deems

the same things sometimes great, and sometimes small, forming little images in its own imagination, altogether remote from the truth.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ But we have not however as yet brought the greatest accusation against it: for that is, somehow, a very dreadful one, that it is able to corrupt even the good, if it be not a very few excepted.

Glaucon/ How should it not, since it acts in this manner?

Socrates/ But hear now, and consider; for somehow, the best of us, when we hear Homer, or any of the tragic writers, imitating some of the heroes when in grief, pouring forth long speeches in their sorrow, bewailing and beating their breasts, you know we are delighted; and, yielding ourselves, we follow along, and, sympathizing with them, seriously commend him as an able poet whoever most affects us in this manner.

Glaucon/ I know it.

Socrates/ But when any domestic grief befalls any of us, you perceive, on the other hand, that we value ourselves on the opposite behavior, if we can be quiet, and endure, this being the part of a man, but that of a woman, which in the other case we commended.

Glaucon/ I perceive it.

Socrates/ Is this commendation then, a handsome one, when we see such a man as one would not deign to be oneself, but would be ashamed of, not to abominate but to delight in him, and commend him?

Glaucon/ No, by Zeus; it appears unreasonable.

Socrates/ Certainly, if you consider it, in this manner.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ If you consider that the part of us, which in our private misfortunes is forcibly restrained, and is kept from weeping and bewailing to the full, being by nature of such a kind as is desirous of these, is the very part which is by the poets filled and gratified: but that part in us, which is naturally the best, being not sufficiently instructed, either by reason or habit, grows remiss in its guardianship over the bewailing part, by attending to the sufferings of others, and deems it no way disgraceful to itself, to commend and pity one who grieves immoderately, whilst he professes to be a good man. But this it thinks it gains, even pleasure, which it would not choose to be deprived of, by despising the whole of the poem. For, I think, it falls to the share of few to be able to consider, that what we feel with respect to the fortunes of others, must necessarily be felt with respect to our own. Since it is not easy for a man to bear up under his own misfortunes, who strongly cherishes the bewailing disposition over those of others.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And is not the reasoning the same with reference to the ridiculous? For when you hear, in imitation by comedy, or in private conversation, what you would be ashamed to do yourself to excite laughter, and are delighted with it, and imitate it, you do the same thing here as in the tragic: for that part, which, when it wanted to excite laughter, was formerly restrained by reason from a fear of incurring the character of scurrility, by now letting loose, and allowing there to grow vigorous, you are often imperceptibly brought to be in your own behavior a buffoon.

Glaucon/ Extremely so.

Socrates/ And the case is the same as to venereal pleasures, and anger, and the whole of the passions, as well the sorrowful as the joyful, which truly, we have said, attend

us in every action; that the poetical imitation of these has the same effect upon us; for it nourishes and waters those things which ought to be parched, and constitutes as our governor, those which ought to be governed, in order to our becoming better and happier, instead of being worse and more miserable.

Glaucon/ I can say no otherwise.

Socrates/ When therefore, Glauco, you meet with the encomiasts of Homer, who tell how this poet instructed Greece, and that he deserves to be taken as a matter to teach a man both the management and the knowledge of human affairs, and that a man should regulate the whole of his life according to this poet, we should indeed love and embrace such people, as being the best they are able; and agree with them that Homer is most poetical, and the first of tragic writers: but they must know, that hymns to the Gods, and the praises of worthy actions, are alone to be admitted into the city. But if it should admit the pleasurable muse likewise, in songs, or verses, you would have pleasure and pain reigning in the city, instead of law, and that reason which always appears best to the community.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Let these things now, be our apology, when we recollect what we have said with reference to poetry, that we then very properly dismissed it From our republic, since it is such as is now described: for reason obliged us. And let us tell it further, lest it accuse us of a certain roughness, and rusticity, that there is an ancient variance between philosophy and poetry; for such verses as these;

> That bawling bitch, which at her mistress barks.

And;

> He's great in empty eloquence of fools.

And;

On trifles still they plod, because they ‘re poor;

and a thousand such like, are marks of an ancient opposition between them. But nevertheless let it be said, that if anyone can assign a reason why the poetry and the imitation which are calculated for pleasure ought to be in a well-regulated city, we, for our part, shall gladly admit them, as we are at least conscious to ourselves that we are charmed by them. But to betray what appears to be truth, were an unholy thing. For are not you yourself, my friend, charmed by this imitation, and most especially when you see it performed by Homer?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Is it not just, then, that we introduce it apologizing for itself, either in song, or in any other measure?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ And we may at least grant, somehow, even to its defenders, such as are not poets, but lovers of poetry, to speak in its behalf, without verse, and show that it is not only pleasant, but profitable for republics, and for human life; and we shall hear with pleasure, for we shall gain somewhat if it shall appear not only pleasant but also profitable.

Glaucon/ How is it possible we should not gain?

Socrates/ And if it happen otherwise, my friend, we shall do as those who have been in love when they deem their love unprofitable, —they desist, though with violence: so we in like manner, through this inborn love of such poetry that prevails in our best republics, shall be well pleased to see it appear to be the best and truest: and we shall hear it till it is able to make no further apology. But we shall take along with us this discourse which we have held, as a counter-charm, and incantation, being afraid to fall back again into a childish and vulgar love. We may perceive then that we are

not to be much in earnest about such poetry as this, as if it were a serious affair, and approached to the truth; but the hearer is to beware of it, and to be afraid for the republic within himself, and to entertain those opinions of poetry which we mentioned.

Glaucon/ I entirely agree.

Socrates/ For great, friend Glauco, mighty is the contest, and not such as it appears, to become a good or a bad man: so as not to be moved, either through honor, or riches, or any magistracy, or poetic imitation, ever to neglect justice, and the other virtues.

Glaucon/ I agree with you, from what we have discussed, and so I think will any other.

Socrates/ But we have not yet, discussed the greatest prize of virtue, and the rewards laid up for her.

Glaucon/ You speak of some prodigious greatness, if there be other greater than those mentioned.

Socrates/ But what is there, can be great in a little time? for all this period from infancy to old age is but little in respect of the whole.

Glaucon/ Nothing at all indeed.

Socrates/ What then? Do you think an immortal being ought to be much concerned about such a period, and not about the whole of time?

Glaucon/ I think, about the whole. But why do you mention this?

Socrates/ Have you not perceived, that our soul is immortal, and never perishes?

Glaucon, looking at me, and wondering, said:

Glaucon/ By Zeus, not I indeed. But are you able to show this?

Socrates/ I should otherwise act unjustly. And I think you yourself can show it, for it is in no respect difficult.

Glaucon/ To me at least, it is difficult; but I would willingly hear from you this which is not difficult.

Socrates/ You shall hear then.

Glaucon/ Only speak.

Socrates/ Is there not something, which you call good, and something which you call evil?

Glaucon/ I own it.

Socrates/ Do you then conceive of them in the same manner as I do?

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ That which destroys and corrupts everything is the evil, and what preserves and profits it is the good.

Glaucon/ I do. But what?

Socrates/ Do you not say, there is something which is good, and something which is bad, to each particular? as blindness to the eyes, and disease to every animal body, blasting to corns, rottenness to wood, rust to brass and iron, and, as I am saying, almost everything has its connate evil, and disease?

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ And when anything of this kind befalls anything, does it not render that which it befalls base, and in the end dissolves and destroys it?

Glaucon/ How should it not?

Socrates/ Its own connate evil then and baseness destroys each particular; or, if this does not destroy it, nothing else can ever destroy it. For that which is good can never destroy anything, nor yet that which is neither good nor evil.

Glaucon/ How can they?

Socrates/ If then we shall be able to find, among beings, anyone which has indeed some evil which renders it base, but is not however able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not then know that a being thus constituted cannot be destroyed at all?

Glaucon/ So, it appears.

Socrates/ What then? Is there not something which renders the soul evil?

Glaucon/ Certainly; all these things which we have now mentioned, injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

Socrates/ But does then any of these dissolve and destroy it? And attend now, that we may not be imposed on, in thinking that an unjust and foolish man, when he is detected acting unjustly, is then destroyed through his injustice, which is the baseness of his soul: but consider it thus. As disease, which is the baseness of animal body, dissolves and destroys body, and reduces it to be no longer that body; so all those things we mentioned, being destroyed by their own proper evil adhering to them and possessing them, are reduced to a nonexistence. Is it not so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Consider now the soul in the same manner. Does injustice, or other vice, possessing it, by possessing, and adhering to it, corrupt and deface it, till, bringing it to death, it separates it from the body?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ But it were absurd, that anything should be destroyed by the baseness of another, but not by its own.

Glaucon/ Absurd.

Socrates/ For consider, Glauco, that neither by the baseness of victuals, whether it be their moldiness, or rottenness, or whatever else, do we imagine our body can be

destroyed; but if this baseness in them create in the body a depravity of the body, we will say that, through their means, the body is destroyed by its own evil, which is disease. But we will never allow that by the baseness of food, which is one thing, the body, which is another thing, can ever by this foreign evil, without creating in it its own peculiar evil, be at any time, destroyed.

Glaucon/ You say most right.

Socrates/ According to the same reasoning, then, unless the baseness of the body create a baseness of the soul, let us never allow that the soul can be destroyed by an evil which is foreign, without its own peculiar evil, one thing by the evil of another.

Glaucon/ There is reason for it.

Socrates/ Let us then either refute these things as not good reasoning; or, so long as they are unrefuted, let us at no time say, that the soul shall be ever in any degree the more destroyed, either by burning fever, or by any other disease, or by slaughter, not even though a man should cut the whole body into the smallest parts possible, till someone show that, through these sufferings of the body, the soul herself becomes more unjust and unholy. But we will never allow it to be said, that when a foreign evil befalls anything, whilst its own proper evil is not within it, either the soul or anything else is destroyed.

Glaucon/ But this at least, no one can ever show, that the souls of those who die are by death rendered more unjust.

Socrates/ But if anyone, shall dare to contend with us in reasoning; and, in order that he may not be obliged to own that souls are immortal, should say, that when a man dies he becomes more wicked and unjust, we shall somehow justly demand of him to show, if he says true in telling us

this, that injustice is deadly to the possessor, as a disease; and that those who embrace it are destroyed by it as by a disease destructive in its own nature—those most speedily who embrace it most, and those more slowly who embrace it less. And not as at present, where the unjust die having this punishment inflicted on them by others.

Glaucon/ By Zeus, injustice would not appear perfectly dreadful, if it were deadly to him who practices it (for that were a deliverance from evil); but I rather think it will appear to be altogether the reverse, destroying others as far as it can, but rendering the unjust extremely alive, and, in conjunction with being alive, wakeful likewise; so far, as it seems, does it dwell from being deadly.

Socrates/ You say well; for, when a man's own wickedness and peculiar evil is insufficient to kill and destroy the soul, hardly can that evil, which aims at the destruction of another, destroy a soul, or anything else but what it is aimed against.

Glaucon/ Hardly indeed, as appears to me at least.

Socrates/ Since therefore it is destroyed by no one evil, neither peculiar nor foreign, is it not plain that, of necessity, it always is? and, if it always is, it is immortal?

Glaucon/ Of necessity.

Socrates/ Let this then, be fixed in this manner. And if it be, you will perceive that the same souls will always remain, for their number will never become less, none being destroyed, nor will it become greater; for if, anyhow, the number of immortals was made greater, you know it would take from the mortal, and in the end all would be immortal.

Glaucon/ You say true.

Socrates/ But let us not, think that this will be the case, (for reason will not allow of it) nor yet that the soul in its

truest nature is of such a kind as to be full of much variety, dissimilitude, and difference, considered in itself.

Glaucon/ How do you say?

Socrates/ That cannot easily, be eternal which is compounded of many things, and which has not the most beautiful composition, as hath now appeared to us to be the case with reference to the soul.

Glaucon/ It is not likely.

Socrates/ That the soul then is something immortal, both our present reasonings, and others too, may oblige us to own; but in order to know what kind of being the soul is, in truth, one ought not to contemplate it as it is damaged both by its conjunction with the body, and by other evils, as we now behold it, but such as it is when become pure, such it must by reasoning be fully contemplated; and he (who does this) will find it far more beautiful at least, and will more plainly see through justice, and injustice, and everything which we have now discussed. We are now telling the truth concerning it, such as it appears at present. We have seen it, indeed, in the same condition in which they see the marine Glaucus, where they cannot easily perceive his ancient nature, because the ancient members of his body are partly broken off, and others are worn away; and he is altogether damaged by the waves: and, besides this, other things are grown to him, such as shell fish, sea weed, and stones: so that he in every respect resembles a beast, rather than what he naturally was. In such a condition do we behold the soul under a thousand evils. But we ought, Glauco, to behold it there.

Glaucon/ Where?

Socrates/ In its philosophy; and to observe to what it applies, and what intimacies it affects, as being allied to that which is divine, immortal, and eternal; and what it would

become, if it pursued wholly a thing of this kind, and were by this pursuit brought out of that sea in which it now is, and had the stones and shell fish shaken off from it, which, at present, as it is fed on earth, render its nature, in a great measure, earthy, stony, and savage, through those aliments, which are said to procure felicity. And then might one behold its true nature, whether multiform, or uniform, and everything concerning it. But we have, I think, sufficiently discussed its passions, and forms in human life.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Have we not now, discussed everything else in our reasonings, though we have not produced those rewards and honors of justice (as you say Hesiod and Homer do)? but we find justice itself to be the best reward to the soul; and that it ought to do what is just, whether it have or have not Gyges' ring, and, together with such a ring, the helmet likewise of Pluto.

Glaucon/ You say most true.

Socrates/ Will it not now then, Glauco, be attended with no envy, if, besides these, we add those rewards to justice and the other virtues, which are bestowed on the soul by men and Gods, both whilst the man is alive, and after he is dead?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Will you then restore me what you borrowed in the reasoning?

Glaucon/ What, chiefly?

Socrates/ I granted you, that the just man should be deemed unjust, and the unjust be deemed to be just. For you were of opinion, that though it were not possible that these things should be concealed from Gods and men, it should however be granted, for the sake of the argument,

that justice in itself might be compared with injustice in itself; or do you not remember it?

Glaucon/ I should, indeed, be unjust, if I did not.

Socrates/ Now after the judgment is over, I demand again, in behalf of justice, that as you allow it to be indeed esteemed both by Gods and men, you likewise allow it to have the same good reputation, that it may also receive those prizes of victory, which it acquires from the reputation of justice, and bestows on those who possess it; since it has already appeared to bestow those good things which arise from really being just, and that it does not deceive those who truly embrace it.

Glaucon/ You demand what is just.

Socrates/ Will you not then, in the first place, restore me this? That it is not concealed from the Gods, what kind of man each of the two is.

Glaucon/ We will grant it.

Socrates/ And if they be not concealed, one of them will be beloved of the Gods, and one of them hated, as we agreed in the beginning.

Glaucon/ We did so.

Socrates/ And shall we not agree, that as to the man who is beloved of the Gods, whatever comes to him from the Gods will all be the best possible, unless he has some necessary ill from former miscarriage.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ We are then to think in this manner of the just man, That if he happen to be in poverty, or in diseases, or in any other of those seeming evils, these things to him issue in something good, either whilst alive, or dead. For never at any time is he neglected by the Gods who inclines earnestly

to endeavor to become just, and practices virtue as far as it is possible for man to resemble God.

Glaucon/ It is reasonable, that such an one should not be neglected by him whom he resembles.

Socrates/ And are we not to think the reverse of these things concerning the unjust man?

Glaucon/ Entirely.

Socrates/ Such, then, would seem to be the prizes which the just man receives from the Gods.

Glaucon/ Such they are indeed in my opinion.

Socrates/ But what, do they receive from men? Is not the case thus? (if we are to suppose the truth). Do not cunning and unjust men do the same thing as those racers, who run well at the beginning, but not so at the end? for at the first they briskly leap forward, but in the end they become ridiculous, and, with their ears on their neck, they run off without any reward. But such as are true racers, arriving at the end, both receive the prizes, and are crowned. Does it not happen thus for the most part as to just men? that at the end of every action and intercourse of life they are both held in esteem, and receive rewards from men.

Glaucon/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ You will then suffer me to say of these what you yourself said of the unjust. For I will aver now, that the just, when they are grown up, shall arrive at power if they desire magistracies, they shall marry where they incline, and shall settle their children in marriage agreeably to their wishes; and everything else you mentioned concerning the others, I now say concerning these. And on the other hand I will say of the unjust, that the most of them, though they may be concealed whilst they are young, yet being caught at the end of the race, are ridiculous, and, when they become old, are wretched and ridiculed, and shall be scourged both by

foreigners and citizens, and they shall afterwards be tortured, and burnt; which you said were terrible things, and you spoke the truth. Imagine you hear from me that they suffer all these things. But see if you will admit of what I say.

Glaucon/ Entirely, for you say what is just.

Socrates/ Such as these now, are the prizes, the rewards and gifts, which a just man receives in his lifetime, both from Gods and men; besides those good things which justice contains in itself.

Glaucon/ And they are extremely beautiful, and likewise permanent.

Socrates/ But these now, are nothing in number or magnitude, when compared with those which await each of the two at death. And these things must likewise be heard, that each of them may completely have what is their due in the reasoning.

Glaucon/ You may say on, not as to a hearer who has heard much, but as to one who hears with pleasure.

Socrates/ But, however, I will not, tell you the apologue of Alcinus; but that, indeed, of a brave man, Erus the son of Armenius, by descent a Pamphylian; who happening on a time to die in battle, when the dead were on the tenth day carried off, already corrupted, he was taken up sound; and being carried home, as he was about to be buried on the twelfth day, when said on the funeral pile, he revived; and being revived, he told what he saw in the other state, and said: That after his soul left the body, it went with many others, and that they came to a certain dæmoniacal place, where there were two chasms in the earth, near to each other, and two other openings in the heavens opposite to them, and that the judges sat between these. That when they gave judgment, they commanded the just to go to the right hand, and upwards through the heaven, fixing before them

the accounts of the judgment pronounced; but the unjust they commanded to the left, and downwards, and these likewise had behind them the accounts of all they had done. But on his coming before the judges, they said, it behooved him to be a messenger to men concerning things there, and they commanded him to hear, and to contemplate everything in the place. And that he saw here, through two openings, one of the heaven, and one of the earth, the souls departing, after they were there judged; and through the other two openings he saw, rising through the one out of the earth, souls full of squalidness and dust; and through the other, he saw other souls descending pure from heaven; and that always on their arrival they seemed as if they came from a long journey, and that they gladly went to rest themselves in the meadow, as in a public assembly, and saluted one another, such as were acquainted, and that those who rose out of the earth asked the others concerning the things above, and those from heaven asked them concerning the things below, and that they told one another: those wailing and weeping whilst they called to mind, what and how many things they suffered and saw in their journey under the earth; (For it was a journey of a thousand years) and that these again from heaven explained their enjoyments, and spectacles of immense beauty. To narrate many of them, Glauco, would take much time; but this, was the sum, that, whatever unjust actions any had committed, and how many soever anyone had injured, they were punished for all these separately tenfold, and that it was in each, according to the rate of an hundred years, the life of man being considered as so long, that they might suffer tenfold punishment for the injustice they had done. So that if any had been the cause of many deaths, either by betraying cities or armies, or bringing men into slavery, or being confederates in any other wickedness, for each of all these they reaped tenfold

sufferings; and if, again, they had benefited any by good deeds, and had been just and holy, they were rewarded according to their deserts. Of those who died very young, and lived but a little time, he told what was not worth relating in respect of other things. But of impiety and piety towards the Gods and parents, and of suicide, he told the more remarkable retributions. For he said he was present when one was asked by another, where the great Aridæus was? This Aridæus had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia a thousand years before that time, and had killed his aged father, and his elder brother, and had done many other unhallowed deeds, as it was reported: and he said, the one who was asked, replied: He neither comes, nor ever will come hither. For we then surely saw this likewise among other dreadful spectacles: When we were near the mouth of the opening, and were about to ascend after having suffered everything else, we beheld both him on a sudden, and others likewise, most of whom were tyrants, and some private persons who had committed great iniquity, whom, when they imagined they were to ascend, the mouth of the opening did not admit, but bellowed when any of those who were so polluted with wickedness, or who had not been sufficiently punished, attempted to ascend. And then, fierce men, and fiery to the view, standing by, and understanding the bellowing, took them and led them apart, Aridæus and the rest, binding their hands and their feet, and, thrusting down their head, and pulling off their skin, dragged them to an outer road, tearing them on thorns; declaring always to those who passed by, on what accounts they suffered these things, and that they were carrying them to be thrown into Tartarus. And hence, that amidst all their various terrors, this terror surpassed, lest the mouth should bellow, and that when it was silent everyone most gladly ascended. And that the punishments and torments were such as these, and

their rewards were the reverse of these. He also added, that everyone, after they had been seven days in the meadow, arising thence, it was requisite for them to depart on the eighth day, and arrive at another place on the fourth day after, whence they perceived from above through the whole heaven and earth, a light extended as a pillar, mostly resembling the rainbow, but more splendid and pure; at which they arrived in one day's journey; and thence they perceived, through the middle of the light from heaven, the extremities of its ligatures extended; as this light was the best of heaven, like the transverse beams of ships keeping the whole circumference united. That from the extremities the distaff of necessity is extended, by which all the revolutions were turned round, whose spindle and point were both of adamant, but its whirl mixed of this and of other things; and that the nature of the whirl was of such a kind, as to its figure, as is anyone we see here. But you must conceive it, from what he said, to be of such a kind as this: as if in some great hollow whirl, carved throughout, there was such another, but lesser, within it, adapted to it, like casks fitted one within another; and in the same manner a third, and a fourth, and four others, for that the whirls were eight in all, as circles one within another, having their lips appearing upwards, and forming round the spindle one united convexity of one whirl; that the spindle was driven through the middle of the eight; and that the first and outmost whirl had the widest circumference in the lip, that the sixth had the second wide, and that of the fourth is the third wide, and the fourth wide that of the eighth, and the fifth wide that of the seventh, the sixth wide that of the fifth, and the seventh wide that of the third, and the eighth wide that of the second. Likewise that the circle of the largest is variegated, that of the seventh is the brightest, and that of the eighth hath its color from the shining of the seventh; that

of the second and fifth resemble each other, but are more yellow than the rest. But the third hath the whitest color, the fourth is reddish; the second in whiteness surpasses the sixth; and that the distaff must turn round in a circle with the whole it carries; and whilst the whole is turning round, the seven inner circles are gently turned round in a contrary motion to the whole. Again, that of these, the eighth moves the swiftest; and next to it, and equal to one another, the seventh, the sixth, and the fifth; and that the third went in a motion which as appeared to them completed its circle in the same way as the fourth. The fourth in swiftness was the third, and the fifth was the second, and it was turned round on the knees of necessity. And that on each of its circles there was seated a Syren on the upper side, carried round, and uttering one voice variegated by diverse modulations. But that the whole of them, being eight, composed one harmony. That there were other three sitting round at equal distance one from another, each on a throne, the daughters of Necessity, the Fates, in white vestments, and having crowns on their heads; Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, singing to the harmony of the Sirens; Lachesis singing the past, Clotho the present, and Atropos the future. And that Clotho, at certain intervals, with her right hand said hold of the spindle, and along with her mother turned about the outer circle. And Atropos, in like manner, turned the inner ones with her left hand. And that Lachesis touched both of these, severally, with either hand. After they arrive here, it is necessary for them to go directly to Lachesis. That then a certain prophet first of all ranges them in order, and afterwards taking the lots, and the models of lives, from the knees of Lachesis, and ascending a lofty tribunal, he says: —The speech of the virgin Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity: Souls of a day! The beginning of another period of men of mortal race. The dæmon shall not receive you as his

lot, but you shall choose the dæmon: He who draws the first, let him first make choice of a life, to which he must of necessity adhere: Virtue is independent, which everyone shall partake of, more or less, according as he honors or dishonors her: the cause is in him who makes the choice, and God is blameless. That when he had said these things, he threw on all of them the lots, and that each took up the one which fell beside him, and that he was allowed to take no other. And that when he had taken it, he knew what number he had drawn. That after this he placed on the ground before them the models of lives, many more than those we see at present. And that they were all-various. For there were lives of all sorts of animals, and human lives of every kind. And that among these there were tyrannies also, some of them perpetual, and others destroyed in the midst of their greatness, and ending in poverty, banishment, and want. That there were also lives of renowned men, some for their appearance as to beauty, strength, and agility; and others for their descent, and the virtues of their ancestors. There were the lives of renowned women in the same manner. But that there was no disposition of soul among these models, because of necessity, on choosing a different life, it becomes different itself. As to other things, riches and poverty, sickness and health, they were mixed with one another, and some were in a middle station between these.

There then, as appears, friend Glauco, is the whole danger of man. And hence this of all things is most to be studied, in what manner every one of us, omitting other disciplines, shall become an inquirer and learner in this study, if, by any means, he be able to learn and find out who will make him expert and intelligent to discern a good life, and a bad; and to choose everywhere, and at all times, the best of what is possible, considering all the things now mentioned, both compounded and separated from one

another, what they are with respect to the virtue of life. And to understand what good or evil beauty operates when mixed with poverty, or riches, and with this or the other habit of soul; and what is effected by noble and ignoble descent, by privacy, and by public station, by strength and weakness, docility and indocility, and everything else of the kind which naturally pertains to the soul, and likewise of what is acquired, when blended one with another; so as to be able from all these things to compute, and, having an eye to the nature of the soul, to comprehend both the worse and the better life, pronouncing that to be the worse which shall lead the soul to become more unjust, and that to be the better life which shall lead it to become more just, and to dismiss every other consideration. For we have seen, that in life, and in death, this is the best choice. But it is necessary that a man should have this opinion firm as an adamant in him, when he departs to Hades, that there also he may be unmoved by riches, or any such evils, and may not, falling into tyrannies, and other such practices, do many and incurable mischiefs, and himself suffer still greater: but may know how to choose always the middle life, as to these things, and to shun the extremes on either hand, both in this life as far as is possible, and in the whole of hereafter. For thus man becomes most happy. —That then the messenger from the other world further told, how that the prophet spoke thus: Even to him who comes last, choosing with judgment, and living consistently, there is prepared a desirable life; not bad. Let neither him who is first be negligent in his choice, nor let him who is last despair. He said, that when the prophet had spoken these things, the first who drew a lot ran instantly and chose the greatest tyranny, but through folly and insatiableness had not sufficiently examined all things on making his choice, but was ignorant that in this life there was this destiny, the

devouring of his own children, and other evils; and that afterwards, when he had considered it at leisure he wailed and lamented his choice, not having observed the admonitions of the prophet above mentioned. For that he did not accuse himself, as the author of his misfortunes, but fortune and the dæmons, and everything instead of himself. He added, that he was one of those who came from heaven, who had in his former life lived in a regulated republic, and had been virtuous by custom without philosophy. And that, in short, among these there were not a few who came from heaven, as being unexercised in trials. But that the most of those who came from earth, as they had endured hardships themselves, and had seen others in hardships, did not precipitantly make their choice. And hence, and through the fortune of the lot, to most souls there was an exchange of good and evil things. Since, if one should always, whenever he comes into this life, soundly philosophize, and the lot of election should not fall on him the very last, it would seem, from what has been told us from thence, that he shall be happy not only here, but when he goes hence, and his journey hither back again shall not be earthy, and rugged, but smooth and heavenly. This spectacle, was worthy to behold, in what manner the several souls made choice of their lives. For it was pitiful and ridiculous and wonderful to behold, as each for the most part chose according to the habit of their former life. For he told, that he saw the soul which was formerly the soul of Orpheus making choice of the life of a swan, through hatred of woman-kind, being unwilling to be born of woman on account of the death he suffered from them. He saw likewise the soul of Thamyris making choice of the life of a nightingale. And he saw also a swan turning to the choice of human life; and other musical animals in a similar manner, as is likely. And that he saw one soul, in making its choice, choosing the life of a lion; and

that it was the soul of Telamonian Ajax, shunning to become a man, remembering the judgment given with reference to the armor. That after this he saw the soul of Agamemnon, which, in hatred also of the human kind, on account of his misfortunes, exchanged it for the life of an eagle. And that he saw the soul of Atalante choosing her lot amidst the rest, and, having attentively observed the great honors paid an athletic man, was unable to pass by this lot, but took it. Next to this, he saw the soul of Epæus the Panopean going into the nature of a skillful workwoman. And that far off, among the last, he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites assuming the ape. And that by chance he saw the soul of Ulysses, who had drawn its lot last of all, going to make its choice: that in remembrance of its former toils, and tired of ambition, it went about a long time seeking the life of a private man of no business, and with difficulty found it lying somewhere, neglected by the rest. And that on seeing this life, it said, that it would have made the same choice even if it had obtained the first lot, —and joyfully chose it. That in like manner the souls of wild beasts went into men, and men again into beasts: the unjust changing into wild beasts, and the just into tame; and that they were blended by all sorts of mixtures. After therefore all the souls had chosen their lives according as they drew their lots, they all went in order to Lachesis, and that she gave to everyone the dæmon he chose, and sent him along with him to be the guardian of his life, and the accomplisher of what he had chosen. —That first of all he conducts the soul to Clotho, to ratify under her hand, and by the whirl of the vortex of her spindle, the destiny it had chosen by lot: and after being with her, he leads it back again to the spinning of Atropos, who makes the destinies irreversible. And that from hence they proceed directly under the throne of Necessity; and that after he had passed by it, as all the others passed, they all of them

marched into the plain of Lethe amidst dreadful heat and scorching, for he said that it is void of trees and everything that the earth produces. That when night came on, they encamped beside the river Amelete, whose water no vessel contains. Of this water all of them must necessarily drink a certain measure, and such of them as are not preserved by prudence drink more than the measure, and that he who drinks always forgets everything. But after they were said asleep, and it became midnight, there was thunder, and an earthquake, and they were thence on a sudden carried upwards, someone way, and some another, approaching to generation like stars. But that he himself was forbidden to drink of the water. Where, however, and in what manner, he came into his body, he was entirely ignorant; but suddenly looking up in the morning, he saw himself already said on the funeral pile. And this fable, Glauco, hath been preserved, and is not lost, and it may preserve us, if we are persuaded by it; for thus we shall happily pass over the river Lethe, and shall not contaminate the soul. But if the company will be persuaded by me; considering the soul to be immortal, and able to bear all evil, and all good, we shall always persevere in the road which leads above; and shall by all means pursue justice in conjunction with prudence, in order that we may be friends both to ourselves, and to the Gods, both whilst we remain here, and when we receive its rewards, like victors assembled together; and we shall, both here, and in that journey of a thousand years which we have described, enjoy a happy life.

THE END OF THE TENTH AND LAST BOOK OF THE REPUBLIC.

The Republic Of Plato.

Translated by

John Llewelyn Davies

and.

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Persons of the Dialog

Socrates; Servant; Polemarchus; Glaucon; Adeimantus; Cephalus; Thrasymachus; Cleitophon.

Book 1.

Socrates/ I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, to offer up prayer to the goddess, and also from a wish to see how the festival, then to be held for the first time, would be celebrated. I was very much pleased with the native Athenian procession; though that of the Thracians appeared to be no less brilliant. We had finished our prayers, and satisfied our curiosity, and were returning to the city, when Polemarchus the son of Cephalus caught sight of us at a distance, as we were on our way towards home, and told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant came behind me, took hold of my cloak, and said;

Boy/ Polemarchus bids you wait.

Socrates/ I turned round and asked him where his master was.

Boy/ There he is, coming on behind; pray wait for him.

Glaucon/ We will wait.

Socrates/ Soon afterwards Polemarchus came up, with Adeimantus the brother of Glaucon, and Niceratus the son of Nicias, and a few other persons, apparently coming away from the procession.

Socrates/ Polemarchus instantly began;

Polemarchus/ Socrates, if I am not deceived, you are taking your departure for the city.

Socrates/ You are not wrong in your conjecture.

Polemarchus/ Well, do you see what a large body we are?

Socrates/ Certainly I do.

Polemarchus/ Then either prove yourselves the stronger party, or else stay where you are.

Socrates/ No; there is still an alternative; suppose we persuade you that you ought to let us go.

Polemarchus/ Could you possibly persuade us, if we refused to listen?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Polemarchus/ Make up your minds then that we shall refuse to listen.

Socrates/ Here Adeimantus interposed, and said;

Adeimantus/ Are you not aware that towards evening there will be a torch-race on horseback in honor of the goddess?

Socrates/ On horseback! that is a novelty. Will they carry torches, and pass them on to one another, while the horses are racing? or how do you mean?

Polemarchus/ As you say; besides, there will be a night-festival, which it will be worthwhile to look at. We will rise after dinner, and go out to see this festival; and there we shall meet with many of our young men, with whom we can converse. Therefore stay, and do not refuse us.

Glaucon/ It seems we shall have to stay.

Socrates/ Well, if you like, let us do so.

We went therefore home with Polemarchus, and found there his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and, along with

them, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, and Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon the son of Aristonymus. Polemarchus' father, Cephalus, was also in the house. I thought him looking very much aged; for it was long since I had seen him. He was sitting upon a cushioned chair, with a garland upon his head, as he happened to have been sacrificing in the court. We found seats placed round him; so we sat down there by his side. The moment Cephalus saw me, he greeted me, and said;

Cephalus/ It is seldom indeed, Socrates, that you pay us a visit at the Piraeus; you ought to come oftener. If I were still strong enough to walk with ease to the city, there would be no occasion for your coming here, because we should go to you. But as it is, you ought to come here more frequently. For I assure you that I find the decay of the mere bodily pleasures accompanied by a proportionate growth in my appetite for philosophical conversation and in the pleasure I derive from it. Therefore do not refuse my request, but let these young men have the benefit of your society, and come often to see us as thoroughly intimate friends.

Socrates/ To tell you the truth, Cephalus, I delight in conversing with very old persons. For as they have gone before us on the road over which perhaps we also shall have to travel, I think we ought to try to learn from them what the nature of that road is, whether it be rough and difficult, or smooth and easy. And now that you have arrived at that period of life, which poets call the threshold of Age, there is no one whose opinion I would more gladly ask. Is life painful at that age, or what report do you make of it?

Cephalus/ I will certainly tell you, Socrates, what my own experience of it is. I and a few other people of my own age are in the habit of frequently meeting together, true to the old proverb. On these occasions, most of us give way to lamentations, and regret the pleasures of youth, and call up

the memory of amours and drinking parties and banquets and similar proceedings. They are grievously discontented at the loss of what they consider great privileges, and describe themselves as living well in those days, whereas now, by their own account, they cannot be said to live at all. Some also complain of the manner in which their relations insult their infirmities, and make this a ground for reproaching old age with the many miseries it occasions them. But in my opinion, Socrates, these persons miss the true cause of their unhappiness. For if old age were the cause, the same discomforts would have been also felt by me, as an old man, and by every other person that has reached that period of life. But, as it is, I have before now met with several old men who expressed themselves quite in a different manner; and in particular I may mention Sophocles the poet, who was once asked in my presence, How do you feel about love, Sophocles? are you still capable of it? to which he replied, Hush! if you please; to my great delight I have escaped from it, and feel as if I had escaped from a frantic and savage master. I thought then, as I do now, that he spoke wisely. For unquestionably old age brings us profound repose and freedom from this and other passions. When the appetites have abated, and their force is diminished, the description of Sophocles is perfectly realized. It is like being delivered from a multitude of furious masters. But the complaints on this score, as well as the troubles with relatives, may all be referred to one cause, and that is, not the age, Socrates, but the character, of the men. If they possess well-regulated minds and easy tempers, old age itself is no intolerable burden; if they are differently constituted, why in that case, Socrates, they find even youth as irksome to them as old age.

Socrates/ I admired these remarks of Cephalus, and wishing him to go on talking, I endeavored to draw him out by saying; I fancy, Cephalus, that people do not generally

acquiesce in these views of yours, because they think that it is not your character, but your great wealth, that enables you to bear with old age. For the rich, it is said, have many consolations.

Cephalus/ True, they will not believe me; and they are partly right, though not so right as they suppose. There is great truth in the reply of Themistocles to the Seriphian who tauntingly told him, that his reputation was due not to himself, but to his country; should not have become famous, if I had been a native of Seriphus; neither would you, if you had been an Athenian. And to those who, not being rich, are impatient under old age, it may be said with equal justice, that while on the one hand, a good man cannot be altogether cheerful under old age and poverty combined, so on the other, no wealth can ever make a bad man at peace with himself.

Socrates/ But has your property, Cephalus, been chiefly inherited or acquired?

Cephalus/ Have I acquired it, do you say, Socrates? Why, in the conduct of money matters, I stand midway between my grandfather and my father. My grandfather, whose name I bear, inherited nearly as much property as I now possess, and increased it till it was many times as large; while my father Lysanias brought it down even below what it now is. For my part, I shall be content to leave it to these my sons not less, but if anything rather larger, than it was when it came into my hands.

Socrates/ I asked the question, because you seemed to me to be not very fond of money; which is generally the case with those who have not made it themselves; whereas those who have made it, are twice as much attached to it as other people. For just as poets love their own works, and fathers their own children, in the same way those who have created

a fortune value their money, not merely for its uses, like other persons, but because it is their own production. This makes them moreover disagreeable companions, because they will praise nothing but riches.

Cephalus/ It is true.

Socrates/ Indeed it is. But let me ask you one more question. What do you think is the greatest advantage that you have derived from being wealthy?

Cephalus/ If I mention it, I shall perhaps get few persons to agree with me. Be assured, Socrates, that when a man is nearly persuaded that he is going to die, he feels alarmed and concerned about things which never affected him before. Till then he has laughed at those stories about the departed, which tell us that he who has done wrong here must suffer for it in the other world; but now his mind is tormented with a fear that these stories may possibly be true. And either owing to the infirmity of old age, or because he is now nearer to the confines of the future state, he has a clearer insight into those mysteries. However that may be, he becomes full of misgiving and apprehension, and sets himself to the task of calculating and reflecting whether he has done any wrong to anyone. Hereupon, if he finds his life full of unjust deeds, he is apt to start out of sleep in terror, as children do, and he lives haunted by gloomy anticipations. But if his conscience reproaches him with no injustice, he enjoys the abiding presence of sweet Hope, that kind nurse of old age, as Pindar calls it. For indeed, Socrates, those are beautiful words of his, in which he says of the man who has lived a just and holy life, Sweet Hope is his companion, cheering his heart, the nurse of age, Hope, which, more than aught else, steers the capricious will of mortal men. There is really a wonderful truth in this description. And it is this consideration, as I hold, that makes riches chiefly valuable, I do not say to everybody, but at any rate to the good. For

they contribute greatly to our preservation from even unintentional deceit or falsehood, and from that alarm which would attend our departure to the other world, if we owed any sacrifices to a god, or any money to a man. They have also many other uses. But after weighing them all separately, Socrates, I am inclined to consider this service as anything but the least important which riches can render to a wise and sensible man.

Socrates/ You have spoken admirably, Cephalus. But what are we to understand by that very quality, justice, to which you refer? Are we to define it as neither more nor less than veracity and restitution of what one man has received from another; or is it possible for actions of this very nature to be sometimes just and sometimes unjust? For example, everyone, I suppose, would admit, that, if a man, while in the possession of his senses, were to place dangerous weapons in the hands of a friend, and afterwards in a fit of madness to demand them back, such a deposit ought not to be restored, and that his friend would not be a just man if he either returned the weapons, or consented to tell the whole truth to one so circumstanced.

Cephalus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Then it is no true definition of justice to say that it consists in speaking the truth and restoring what one has received.

Polemarchus/ Nay but it is, Socrates, at least if we are at all to believe Simonides.

Cephalus/ Very well, I will just leave the discussion to you. It is time for me to attend to the sacrifices.

Socrates/ Then Polemarchus inherits your share in it, does he not?

Cephalus/ Certainly!

Socrates/ with a smile; Cephalus immediately withdrew to the sacrifices.

Answer me then, you that are the heir to the discussion; What do you maintain to be the correct account of justice, as given by Simonides?

Polemarchus/ That to restore to each man what is his due, is just. To me it seems that Simonides is right in giving this account of the matter.

Socrates/ Well, certainly it is not an easy matter to disbelieve Simonides; for he is a wise and inspired man. But what he means by his words, you, Polemarchus, may perhaps understand, though I do not. It is clear that he does not mean what we were saying just now, namely, that property given by one person in trust to another, is to be returned to the donor, if he asks for it in a state of insanity. And yet I conclude that property given in trust is due to the truster. Is it not?

Polemarchus/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ But, when the person who asks for it is not in his senses, it must not be returned on any account, must it?

Polemarchus/ True, it must not.

Socrates/ Then it would seem that Simonides means something different from this, when he says that it is just to restore what is due.

Polemarchus/ Most certainly he does; for he declares that the debt of friend to friend is to do good to one another, and not harm.

Socrates/ I understand; the person who returns money to a depositor does not restore what is due, if the repayment on the one side, and the receipt on the other, prove to be injurious, and if the two parties are friends. Is not this, according to you, the meaning of Simonides?

Polemarchus/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ Well; must we restore to our enemies whatever happens to be due to them?

Polemarchus/ Yes, no doubt, what is due to them; and the debt of enemy to enemy is, I imagine, harm; because harm is at the same time appropriate to such a relation.

Socrates/ So then it would seem that Simonides, after the manner of poets, employed a riddle to describe the nature of justice; for apparently he thought that justice consisted in rendering to each man that which is appropriate to him, which he called his due. But here let me entreat you to give me your opinion. Suppose that consequently someone had asked him the following question; That being the case, Simonides, what due and appropriate thing is rendered by the art called medicine, and what are the recipients? what answer do you think he would have returned us?

Polemarchus/ Obviously he would have said that bodies are the recipients, and drugs, meats, and drinks, the things rendered.

Socrates/ And what due and appropriate thing is rendered by the art called cookery, and what are the recipients?

Polemarchus/ Seasoning is the thing rendered; dishes are the recipients.

Socrates/ Good; then what is the thing rendered by the art that we are to call justice, and who are the recipients?

Polemarchus/ If we are to be at all guided by our previous statements, Socrates, assistance and harm are the things rendered, friends and enemies the recipients.

Socrates/ Then, by justice, Simonides means doing good to our friends, and harm to our enemies, does he?

Polemarchus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Now, in cases of illness, who is best able to do good to friends and harm to enemies, with reference to health and disease?

Polemarchus/ A physician.

Socrates/ And, on a voyage, who is best able to do good to friends and harm to enemies, with reference to the perils of the sea?

Polemarchus/ A pilot.

Socrates/ Well; in what transaction, and with reference to what object, is the just man best able to help his friends and injure his enemies?

Polemarchus/ In the transactions of war, I imagine, as the ally of the former, and the antagonist of the latter.

Socrates/ Good. You will grant, my dear Polemarchus, that a physician is useless to persons in sound health.

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And a pilot to persons on shore.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is the just man, also, useless to those who are not at war?

Polemarchus/ I do not quite think that.

Socrates/ Then justice is useful in time of peace too, is it?

Polemarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ And so is agriculture, is it not?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ That is to say, as a means of acquiring the fruits of the earth.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And further, the shoemakers art is also useful, is it not?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ As a means of acquiring shoes, I suppose you will say.

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, of what does justice, according to you, promote the use or acquisition in time of peace?

Polemarchus/ Of covenants, Socrates.

Socrates/ And by covenants do you understand co-partnerships; or something different?

Polemarchus/ Co-partnerships, certainly.

Socrates/ Then is it the just man, or the skillful draught-player, that makes a good and useful partner in playing draughts?

Polemarchus/ The draught-player.

Socrates/ Well; in bricklaying and stonemasonry is the just man a more useful and a better partner than the regular builder?

Polemarchus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Well then, in what partnership is the just man superior to the harp-player, in the sense in which the harp-player is a better partner than the just man in playing music?

Polemarchus/ In a money-partnership, I think.

Socrates/ Excepting perhaps, Polemarchus, when the object is to lay out money; as when a horse is to be bought or sold by the partners; in which case, I imagine, the horse-dealer is better. Is he not?

Polemarchus/ Apparently he is.

Socrates/ And again, when a ship is to be bought or sold, the ship-wright or pilot is better.

Polemarchus/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ That being the case, when does the opportunity arrive for that joint use of silver or gold, in which the just man is more useful than anyone else?

Polemarchus/ When you want to place your money in trust and have it safe, Socrates.

Socrates/ That is to say, when it is to be laid by, and not to be put to any use?

Polemarchus/ Just so.

Socrates/ So that justice can only be usefully applied to money when the money is useless?

Polemarchus/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ In the same way, when you want to keep a pruning-hook, justice is useful whether you be in partnership or not; but when you want to use it, justice gives place to the art of the vinedresser?

Polemarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Do you also maintain that, when you want to keep a shield or a lyre without using them, justice is useful; but when you want to use them, you require the art of the soldier or of the musician?

Polemarchus/ I must.

Socrates/ And so of everything else; justice is useless when a thing is in use, but useful when it is out of use?

Polemarchus/ So it would seem.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, justice cannot be a very valuable thing if it is only useful as applied to things useless. But let us continue the inquiry thus. Is not the man who is most expert in dealing blows in an encounter, whether pugilistic or otherwise, also most expert in parrying blows?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not also true that whoever is expert in repelling a disease, and evading its attack, is also extremely expert in producing it in others?

Polemarchus/ I think so.

Socrates/ And undoubtedly a man is well able to guard an army, when he has also a talent for stealing the enemies plans and all his other operations.

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ That is to say, a man can guard expertly whatever he can thieve expertly.

Polemarchus/ So it would seem.

Socrates/ Hence, if the just man is expert in guarding money, he is also expert in stealing it.

Polemarchus/ I confess the argument points that way.

Socrates/ Then, to all appearance, it turns out that the just man is a kind of thief; a doctrine which you have probably learnt from Homer, with whom Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, is a favorite, because, as the poet says, he outdid all men in thievishness and perjury. Justice therefore, according to you, Homer, and Simonides, appears to be a kind of art of stealing, whose object, however, is to help ones friends and injure ones enemies. Was not this your meaning?

Polemarchus/ Most certainly it was not; but I no longer know what I did mean. However, it is still my opinion that it is justice to help ones friends, and hurt ones enemies.

Socrates/ Should you describe a man's friends as those who seem to him to be, or those who really are, honest men, though they may not seem so? And do you define a man's enemies on the same principle?

Polemarchus/ I should certainly expect a man to love all whom he thinks honest, and hate all whom he thinks wicked.

Socrates/ But do not people make mistakes in this matter, and fancy many persons to be honest who are not really honest, and many wicked who are not really wicked?

Polemarchus/ They do.

Socrates/ Then to such persons the good are enemies, and the bad are friends, are they not?

Polemarchus/ Certainly they are.

Socrates/ And, notwithstanding this, it is just for such persons at such times to help the wicked, and to injure the good.

Polemarchus/ Apparently it is.

Socrates/ Yet surely the good are just, and injustice is foreign to their nature.

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Then, according to your doctrine, it is just to do evil to those who commit no injustice.

Polemarchus/ Heaven forbid it, Socrates; for that looks like a wicked doctrine.

Socrates/ Then it is just, to injure the unjust and to assist the just.

Polemarchus/ That is evidently a better theory than the former.

Socrates/ In that case, Polemarchus, the result will be that, in those numerous instances in which people have thoroughly mistaken their men, it is just for these mistaken persons to injure their friends, because in their eyes they are wicked; and to help their enemies, because they are good.

And thus our statement will be in direct opposition to the meaning which we assigned to Simonides.

Polemarchus/ That consequence certainly follows. But let us change our positions; for very probably our definition of friend and enemy was incorrect.

Socrates/ What was our definition, Polemarchus?

Polemarchus/ That a friend is one who seems to be an honest man.

Socrates/ And what is to be our new definition?

Polemarchus/ That a friend is one who not only seems to be, but really is, an honest man; whereas the man who seems to be, but is not honest, is not really a friend, but only seems one. And I define an enemy on the same principle.

Socrates/ Then, by this way of speaking, the good man will, in all likelihood, be a friend, and the wicked an enemy.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then you would have us attach to the idea of justice more than we at first included in it, when we called it just to do good to our friend and evil to our enemy. We are now, if I understand you, to make an addition to this, and render it thus, It is just to do good to our friend if he is a good man and to hurt our enemy if he is a bad man.

Polemarchus/ Precisely so; I think that this would be a right statement.

Socrates/ Now is it the act of a just man, to hurt anybody?

Polemarchus/ Certainly it is; that is to say, it is his duty to hurt those who are both wicked, and enemies of his.

Socrates/ Are horses made better, or worse, by being hurt?

Polemarchus/ Worse.

Socrates/ Worse with reference to the excellence of dogs, or that of horses?

Polemarchus/ That of horses.

Socrates/ Are dogs in the same way made worse by being hurt, with reference to the excellence of dogs, and not of horses?

Polemarchus/ Unquestionably they are.

Socrates/ And must we not, on the same principle, assert, my friend, that men, by being hurt, are lowered in the scale of human excellence?

Polemarchus/ Indeed we must.

Socrates/ But is not justice a human excellence?

Polemarchus/ Undoubtedly it is.

Socrates/ And therefore, my friend, those men who are hurt must needs be rendered less just.

Polemarchus/ So it would seem.

Socrates/ Can musicians, by the art of music, make men unmusical?

Polemarchus/ They cannot.

Socrates/ Can riding-masters, by the art of riding, make men bad riders?

Polemarchus/ No.

Socrates/ But if so, can the just by justice make men unjust? In short, can the good by goodness make men bad?

Polemarchus/ No, it is impossible.

Socrates/ True; for, if I am not mistaken, it is the property, not of warmth, but of its opposite, to make things cold.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And it is the property not of drought, but of its opposite, to make things wet.

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then it is the property not of good, but of its opposite, to hurt.

Polemarchus/ Apparently it is.

Socrates/ Well, is the just man good?

Polemarchus/ Certainly he is.

Socrates/ Then, Polemarchus, it is the property, not of the just man, but of his opposite, the unjust man, to hurt either friend or any other creature.

Polemarchus/ You seem to me to be perfectly right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Hence if anyone asserts that it is just to render to every man his due, and if he understands by this, that what is due on the part of the just man is injury to his enemies, and assistance to his friends, the assertion is that of an unwise man. For the doctrine is untrue; because we have discovered that, in no instance, is it just to injure anybody.

Polemarchus/ I grant you are right.

Socrates/ Then you and I will make common cause against anyone who shall attribute this doctrine to Simonides, or Bias, or Pittacus, or any other wise and highly-favored man.

Polemarchus/ Very good; I, for one, am quite ready to take my share of the fighting.

Socrates/ Pray do you know to whom I refer the authorship of this saying, that it is just to help our friends, and hurt our enemies?

Polemarchus/ To whom?

Socrates/ I attribute it to Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich man who thought himself very powerful.

Polemarchus/ You are perfectly right.

Socrates/ Well, but as we have again failed to discover the true definition of justice and the just, what other definition can one propose?

While we were still in the middle of our discussion, Thrasymachus was, more than once, bent on interrupting the conversation with objections; but he was checked on each occasion by those who sat by, who wished to hear the argument out. However, when I had made this last remark and we had come to a pause, he could restrain himself no longer, but, gathering himself up like a wild beast, he sprang upon us, as if he would tear us in pieces. I and Polemarchus were terrified and startled; while Thrasymachus, raising his voice to the company, said;

Thrasymachus/ What nonsense has possessed you and Polemarchus all this time, Socrates? And why do you play the fool together with your mutual complaisance? No? if you really wish to understand what justice is, do not confine yourself to asking questions, and making a display of refuting the answers that are returned, (for you are aware that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them); but give us an answer also yourself, and tell us what you assert justice to be, and let me beg you to beware of defining it as the obligatory, or the advantageous, or the profitable, or the lucrative, or the expedient; but whatever your definition may be, let it be clear and precise; for I will not accept your answer, if you talk such trash as that.

Socrates/ When I heard this speech, I was astounded, and gazed at the speaker in terror; and I think if I had not set eyes on him before he eyed me, I should have been struck dumb. But, as it was, when he began to be exasperated by the conversation, I had looked him in the face first; so that I was enabled to reply to him, and said with a slight tremble;

Do not be hard upon us. If I and Polemarchus are making mistakes in our examination of the subject, be assured that the error is involuntary. You do not suppose that, if we were looking for a piece of gold, we should ever willingly be so complaisant to one another in the search as to spoil the chance of finding it; and therefore, pray do not suppose that, in seeking for justice, which is a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, we should give way to one another so weakly as you describe, instead of doing our very best to bring it to light. You, my friend, may think so, if you choose; but my belief is that the subject is beyond our powers. Surely then we might very reasonably expect to be pitied, not harshly treated, by such clever men as you.

When he had heard my reply, he burst out laughing very scornfully, and said;

Thrasymachus/ O Hercules! here is an instance of that mock-humility which Socrates affects. I knew how it would be, and warned the company that you would refuse to answer, and would feign ignorance, and do anything rather than reply, if anyone asked you a question.

Socrates/ Yes, you are a wise man, Thrasymachus; and therefore you were well aware that, if you asked a person what factors make the number 12, and at the same time warned him thus; Please to beware of telling me that 12 is twice 6, or 3 times 4, or 6 times 2, or 4 times 3; for I will not take such nonsense from you; you were well aware, I dare say, that no one would give an answer to such an inquirer. But suppose the person replied to you thus; Thrasymachus, explain yourself; am I to be precluded from all these answers which you have denounced? What, my good sir! even if one of these is the real answer, am I still to be precluded from giving it, and am I to make a statement that is at variance with the truth? or what is your meaning? What reply should you make to this inquiry?

Thrasymachus/ Oh, indeed! as if the two cases were alike!

Socrates/ There is nothing to prevent their being so. However, suppose they are not alike; still if one of these answers seems the right one to the person questioned, do you think that our forbidding it, or not, will affect his determination to give the answer which he believes to be the correct one?

Thrasymachus/ Do you not mean that this is what you are going to do? You will give one of the answers on which I have put a veto?

Socrates/ It would not surprise me if I did; supposing I thought right to do so, after reflection.

Thrasymachus/ Then, what if I produce another answer on the subject of justice, unlike those I denounced, and superior to them all? What punishment do you think you merit?

Socrates/ Simply the punishment which it is proper for the unenlightened to submit to; and that is, I conceive, to be instructed by the enlightened. This, then, is the punishment which I, among others, deserve to suffer.

Thrasymachus/ Really you are a pleasant person. But, besides being instructed, you must make me a payment.

Socrates/ I will, when I have any money.

Glaucon/ But you have. So, as far as money is a consideration, speak on, Thrasymachus. We will all contribute for Socrates.

Thrasymachus/ Oh, to be sure! in order that Socrates, I suppose, may pursue his, usual plan of refusing to propound an answer himself, while he criticizes and refutes the answers given by other people.

Socrates/ My excellent friend, how can an answer be given by a person who, in the first place, does not, and

confesses he does not, know what to answer; and who, in the next place, if he has any thoughts upon the subject, has been forbidden by a man of no common parts to give utterance to any of his fancies? No, it is more natural that you should be the speaker; because you profess to know the subject, and to have something to say. Therefore do not decline; but gratify me by answering, and do not grudge to instruct Glaucon and the rest of the company as well.

When I had said this, Glaucon and the others begged him to comply. Now it was evident that Thrasymachus was eager to speak, in order that he might gain glory, because he thought himself in possession of a very fine answer. But he affected to contend for my being the respondent. At last he gave in, and then said;

Thrasymachus/ This, forsooth, is the wisdom of Socrates! He will not give instruction himself, but he goes about and learns from others, without even showing gratitude for their lessons.

Socrates/ As for my learning from others, Thrasymachus, there you speak truth; but it is false of you to say that I pay no gratitude in return. I do pay all I can; and, as I have no money, I can only give praise. How readily I do this, if in my judgment a person speaks well, you will very soon find, when you make your answer; for I expect you to speak well.

Thrasymachus/ Then listen. My doctrine is, that justice is simply the interest of the stronger. Well; why do you not praise me? No, you refuse.

Socrates/ Not so; I am only waiting to understand your meaning, which at present I do not see. You say that the interest of the stronger is just. What in the world do you mean by this, Thrasymachus? You do not, I presume, mean anything like this, that, if Polydamas. the athlete, is stronger than we are, and if it is for his interest to eat beef in order to

strengthen his body, such food is for the interest of us weaker men, and therefore is just.

Thrasymachus/ This is scandalous, Socrates; you understand my doctrine in the sense in which you can damage it most.

Socrates/ No, no, my excellent friend; but state your meaning more clearly.

Thrasymachus/ So you are not aware, that some cities are governed by an autocrat, and others by a democracy, and others by an aristocracy?

Socrates/ Of course I am.

Thrasymachus/ In every city does not superior strength reside in the ruling body?

Socrates/ Certainly it does.

Thrasymachus/ And further, each government has its laws framed to suit its own interests; a democracy making democratical laws; an autocrat despotic laws, and so on. Now by this procedure these governments have pronounced that what is for the interest of themselves is just for their subjects; and whoever deviates from this, is chastised by them as guilty of illegality and injustice. Therefore, my good sir, my meaning is, that in all cities the same thing, namely, the interest of the established government, is just. And superior strength, I presume, is to be found on the side of government. So that the conclusion of right reasoning is that the same thing, namely, the interest of the stronger, is everywhere just.

Socrates/ Now I understand your meaning, and I will endeavor to make out whether it is true or not. So then, Thrasymachus, you yourself in your answer have defined justice as interest, though you forbade my giving any such reply. To be sure, you have made an addition, and describe it as the interest of the stronger.

Thrasymachus/ Yes; quite a trifling addition, perhaps.

Socrates/ It remains to be seen, whether it is an important one. But this much is certain, that we are bound to examine into the correctness of your doctrine. For we both admit that justice is in harmony with interest; but you lengthen this into the assertion that justice is the interest of the stronger; to which I demur. Therefore we are certainly bound to study the subject.

Thrasymachus/ Pray do so.

Socrates/ It shall be done. Be so good as to answer this question. You doubtless also maintain that it is just to obey the rulers?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ Are the rulers infallible in each several city, or are they liable to make a few mistakes?

Thrasymachus/ No doubt they are liable to make mistakes.

Socrates/ And therefore, when they undertake to frame laws, is their work sometimes rightly, and sometimes wrongly done?

Thrasymachus/ I should suppose so.

Socrates/ Do rightly and wrongly mean, respectively, legislating for, and against, their own interests? Or how do you state it?

Thrasymachus/ Just as you do.

Socrates/ And do you maintain that whatever has been enacted by the rulers must be obeyed by their subjects, and that this is justice?

Thrasymachus/ Unquestionably I do.

Socrates/ Then, according to your argument, it is not only just to do what makes for the interest of the stronger, but

also to do what runs counter to his interest, in other words, the opposite of the former.

Thrasymachus/ What are you saying?

Socrates/ What you say, I believe. But let us examine the point more thoroughly. Has it not been admitted that, when the rulers enjoin certain acts upon their subjects, they are sometimes thoroughly mistaken as to what is best for themselves; and that, whatever is enjoined by them, it is just for their subjects to obey? Has not this been admitted?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ Then let me tell you, that you have also admitted the justice of doing what runs counter to the interest of the ruling and stronger body on every occasion when this body unintentionally enjoins what is injurious to itself, so long as you maintain that it is just for the subjects to obey, in every instance, the injunctions of their rulers. In that case, O most wise Thrasymachus, must it not follow of course, that it is just to act in direct opposition to your theory? For, obviously, it is enjoined upon the weaker to do what is prejudicial to the interest of the stronger.

Polemarchus/ Yes, indeed, Socrates; that is perfectly clear.

Clitophon/ No doubt, if you appear as a witness in Socrates behalf.

Polemarchus/ Nay, what do we want witnesses for? Thrasymachus himself admits that the rulers sometimes enjoin what is bad for themselves; and that it is just for their subjects to obey such injunctions.

Clitophon/ No, Polemarchus; Thrasymachus laid it down that to do what the rulers command is just.

Polemarchus/ Yes, Cleitophon; and he also laid it down that the interest of the stronger is just. And having laid down these two positions, he further admitted that the stronger

party sometimes orders its weaker subjects to do what is prejudicial to its own interests. And the consequence of these admissions is, that what is for the interest of the stronger ill be not a bit more just than what is not for his interest.

Clitophon/ But, by the interest of the stronger he meant, what the stronger conceived to be for his own interest. His position was, that this must be done by the weaker, and that this is the notion of justice.

Polemarchus/ That was not what he said.

Socrates/ It does not matter, Polemarchus; if Thrasymachus chooses to state his theory in that way now, let us make no objection to his doing so.

Tell me, then, Thrasymachus; was this the definition you meant to give of justice, that it is what seems to the stronger to be the interest of the stronger, whether it be really for his interest or not? Shall we take that as your account of it?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not; do you think I should call a man who is mistaken, at the time of his mistake, the stronger?

Socrates/ Why I thought that you said as much, when you admitted that rulers are not infallible, but do really commit some mistakes.

Thrasymachus/ You are a quibbler, Socrates, in argument; do you call, now, that man a physician who is in error about the treatment of the sick, with strict reference to his error? Or do you call another an accountant, who makes a mistake in a calculation, at the time of his mistake, and with reference to that mistake? We say, to be sure, in so many words that the physician was in error, and the accountant or the writer was in error; but in fact each of these, I imagine, in so far as he is what we call him, never falls into error. So that, to speak with precise accuracy, since

you require such preciseness of language, no craftsman errs. For it is through a failure of knowledge that a man errs, and to that extent he is no craftsman; so that whether as craftsman, or philosopher, or ruler, no one errs while he actually is what he professes to be; although it would be universally said that such a physician was in error, or such a ruler was in error. In this sense I would have you to understand my own recent answer. But the statement, if expressed with perfect accuracy, would be, that a ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, never errs, and that, so long as this is the case, he enacts what is best for himself, and that this is what the subject has to do. Therefore, as I began with saying, I call it just to do what is for the interest of the stronger.

Socrates/ Very good, Thrasymachus; you think me a quibbler, do you?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, a thorough quibbler.

Socrates/ Do you think that I put you those questions with a mischievous intent to damage your position in the argument?

Thrasymachus/ Nay, I am quite sure of it. However you shall gain nothing by it; for you shall neither injure me by taking me unawares, nor will you be able to overpower me by open argument.

Socrates/ I should not think of attempting it, my excellent friend; But that nothing of this kind may occur again, state whether you employ the words ruler and stronger in the popular sense of them, or in that strict signification of which you were speaking just now, when you say that it is just for the weaker to do what is for the interest of the ruler as being the stronger.

Thrasymachus/ I mean a ruler in the strictest sense of the word. So now try your powers of quibbling and mischief; I ask for no mercy. But your attempts will be ineffectual.

Socrates/ Why, do you suppose I should be so mad as to attempt to beard a lion, or play off quibbles on a Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ At any rate you tried it just now, though you failed utterly.

Socrates/ Enough of this banter. Tell me this; is the physician of whom you spoke as being strictly a physician, a maker of money, or a healer of the sick? Take care you speak of the genuine physician.

Thrasymachus/ A healer of the sick.

Socrates/ And what of a pilot? Is the true pilot a sailor or a commander of sailors?

Thrasymachus/ A commander of sailors.

Socrates/ There is no need, I imagine, to take into the account his being on board the ship, nor should he be called a sailor; for it is not in virtue of his being on board that he has the name of pilot, but in virtue of his art and of his authority over the sailors.

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ Has not each of these persons an interest of his own?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is it not the proper end of their art to seek and procure what is for the interest of each of them?

Thrasymachus/ It is.

Socrates/ Have the arts severally any other interest to pursue than their own highest perfection?

Thrasymachus/ What does your question mean?

Socrates/ Why, if you were to ask me whether it is sufficient for a man's body to be a body, or whether it stands in need of something additional, I should say, Certainly it does. To this fact the discovery of the healing art is due,

because the body is defective, and it is not enough for it to be a body. Therefore the art of healing has been put in requisition to procure what the interests of the body require. Should I be right, think you, in so expressing myself, or not?

Thrasymachus/ You would be right.

Socrates/ Well then, is the art of healing itself defective, or does any art whatever require a certain additional virtue; as eyes require sight, and ears hearing, so that these organs need a certain art which shall investigate and provide what is conducive to these ends; is there, I ask, any defectiveness in an art as such, so that every art should require another art to consider its interests, and this other provisional art a third, with a similar function, and so on, without limit? Or will it investigate its own interest? Or is it unnecessary either for itself, or for any other art, to inquire into the appropriate remedy for its own defects because there are no defects or faults in any art, and because it is not the duty of an art to seek the interests of aught, save that to which, as an art, it belongs, being itself free from hurt and blemish as a true art, so long as it continues strictly and-in its integrity what it is? View the question according to the strict meaning of terms, as we agreed; is it so or otherwise?

Thrasymachus/ Apparently it is so.

Socrates/ Then the art of healing does not consider the interest of the art of healing, but the interest of the body.

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor horsemanship what is good for horsemanship, but for horses; nor does any other art seek its own interest, (for it has no wants), but the good of that to which as an art it belongs.

Thrasymachus/ Apparently it is so.

Socrates/ Well, but you will grant, Thrasymachus, that an art governs and is stronger than that of which it is the art.

He assented, with great reluctance, to this proposition.

Then no science investigates or enjoins the interest of the stronger, but the interest of the weaker, its subject.

To this also he at last assented, though he attempted to show fight about it. After gaining his admission, I proceeded; Then is it not also true, that no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers or enjoins what is for the physicians interest, but that all seek the good of their patients? For we have agreed that a physician strictly so called, is a ruler of bodies, and not a maker of money; have we not?

He allowed that we had.

And that a pilot strictly so called is a commander of sailors, and not a sailor?

Thrasymachus/ We have.

Socrates/ Then this kind of pilot and commander will not seek and enjoin the pilots interest, but that of the sailor and the subordinate.

He reluctantly gave his assent.

And thus, Thrasymachus, all who are in any place of command, in so far as they are rulers, neither consider nor enjoin their own interest, but that of the subjects for whom they exercise their craft; and in all that they do or say, they act with an exclusive view to them, and to what is good and proper for them.

When we had arrived at this stage of the discussion, and it had become evident to all that the explanation of justice was completely reversed, Thrasymachus, instead of making any answer, said;

Thrasymachus/ Tell me, Socrates, have you a nurse?

Socrates/ Why? I rejoined; had you not better answer my questions than make inquiries of that sort?

Thrasymachus/ Why because she leaves you to drivel, and omits to wipe your nose when you require it, so that in consequence of her neglect you cannot even distinguish between sheep and shepherd.

Socrates/ For what particular reason do you think so?

Thrasymachus/ Because you think that shepherds and herdsmen regard the good of their sheep and of their oxen, and fatten them and take care of them with other views than to benefit their masters and themselves; and you actually imagine that the rulers in states, those I mean who are really rulers, are otherwise minded towards their subjects than as one would feel towards sheep, or that they think of anything else by night and by day than how they may secure their own advantage. And you are so far wrong in your notions respecting justice and injustice, the just and the unjust, that you do not know that the former is really the good of another, that is to say the interest of the stronger and of the ruler, but your own loss, where you are the subordinate and the servant; whereas injustice is the reverse, governing those that are really simpleminded and just, so that they, as subjects, do what is for the interest of the unjust man who is stronger than they, and promote his happiness by their services, but not their own in the least degree. You may see by the following considerations, my most simple Socrates, that a just man everywhere has the worst of it, compared with an unjust man. In the first place, in their mutual dealings, wherever a just man enters into partnership with an unjust man, you will find that at the dissolution of the partnership the just man never has more than the unjust man but always less. Then again in their dealings with the state, when there is a property-tax to pay, the just man will pay more and the unjust less, on the same amount of

property; and when there is anything to receive, the one gets nothing, while the other makes great gains. And whenever either of them holds any office of authority, if the just man suffers no other loss, at least his private affairs fall into disorder through want of attention to them, while his principles forbid his deriving any benefit from the public money; and besides this, it is his fate to offend his friends and acquaintances every time that he refuses to serve them at the expense of justice. But with the unjust man everything is reversed. I am speaking of the case I mentioned just now, of an unjust man who has the power to grasp on an extensive scale. To him you must direct your attention, if you wish to judge how much more profitable it is to a man's own self to be unjust than to be just. And you will learn this truth with the greatest ease, if you turn your attention to the most consummate form of injustice, which, while it makes the wrong-doer most happy, makes those who are wronged, and will not retaliate, most miserable. This form is a despotism, which proceeds not by small degrees, but by wholesale, in its open or fraudulent appropriation of the property of others, whether it be sacred or profane, public or private; perpetrating offences, which if a person commits in detail and is found out, he becomes liable to a penalty and incurs deep disgrace; for partial offenders in this class of crimes are called sacrilegious, men-stealers, burglars, thieves, and robbers. But when a man not only seizes the property of his fellow-citizens but captures and enslaves their persons also, instead of those dishonorable titles he is called happy and highly favored, not only by the men of his own city, but also by all others who hear of the comprehensive injustice which he has wrought. For when people abuse injustice, they do so because they are afraid, not of committing it, but of suffering it. Thus it is, Socrates, that injustice, realized on an adequate scale, is a stronger, a more liberal, and a more

lordly thing than justice; and as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger; injustice, a thing profitable and advantageous to oneself.

Socrates/ When he had made this speech, Thrasymachus intended to take his departure, after deluging our ears like a bathing-man with this copious and unbroken flood of words. Our companions however would not let him go, but obliged him to stay and answer for his doctrines. I myself also was especially urgent in my entreaties, exclaiming, Really, my good Thrasymachus, after flinging us such a speech as this, are you intending to take your leave, before you have satisfactorily taught us, or learnt yourself, whether your theory is right or wrong? Do you think you are undertaking to settle some insignificant question, and not the principles on which each of us must conduct his life in order to lead the most profitable existence?

Thrasymachus/ Why that is not a true statement of the case, in my opinion.

Socrates/ So it seems, or else that you are quite indifferent about us, and feel no concern whether we shall live the better or the worse for our ignorance of what you profess to know. But pray vouchsafe, my good sir, to impart your knowledge to us also; any benefit you confer on such a large party as we are will surely be no bad investment. For I tell you plainly for my own part that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe that injustice is more profitable than justice, even if it be let alone and suffered to work its will unchecked. On the contrary, my good sir, let there be an unjust man, and let him have full power, to practice injustice, either by evading detection or by overpowering opposition, still I am not convinced that such a course is more profitable than justice. This, perhaps, is the feeling of some others amongst us, as well as mine. Pray then convince

us satisfactorily, my highly-gifted friend, that we are not well advised in valuing justice above injustice.

Thrasymachus/ But how, can I persuade you? If you are not convinced by my recent statements what more can I do for you? must I take the doctrine and thrust it into your mind?

Socrates/ Heaven forbid you should do that; but in the first place, abide by what you say, or if you change your ground, change it openly without deceiving us. As it is, Thrasymachus, (for we must not yet take leave of our former investigations,) you see that having first defined the meaning of the genuine physician, you did not think it necessary afterwards to adhere strictly to the genuine shepherd. On the contrary, you suppose him to feed his sheep, in so far as he is a shepherd, not with an eye to what is best for the flock, but, like a votary of feasting who is going to give an entertainment, with an eye to the good cheer, or else to their sale, like a money-maker, and not like a shepherd. Whereas the only concern of the shepherds art is, I presume, how it shall procure what is best for that, of which-it is the appointed guardian; since as far as concerns its own perfection, sufficient provision is made, I suppose, for that, so long as it is all that is implied in its title; and so I confess I thought we were obliged just now to admit that every government, in so far as it is a government, looks solely to the advantage of that which is governed and tended by it, whether that government be of a public or a private nature. But what is your opinion? do you think that the rulers in states, who really rule, do so willingly?

Thrasymachus/ No, I do not think it, I am sure of it.

Socrates/ What, Thrasymachus, do you not observe that no one consents to take upon himself the common state-offices, if he can help it, but that they all ask to be paid on

the assumption that the advantages of their government will not accrue to themselves, but to the governed? For answer me this question; Do we not say without hesitation, that every art is distinguished from other arts by having a distinctive faculty? Be so good, my dear sir, as not to answer contrary to your opinion, or we shall make no progress.

Thrasymachus/ Yes; that is what distinguishes it.

Socrates/ And does not each of them provide us with some special and peculiar benefit? the art of healing, for example, giving us health, that of piloting safety at sea, and so on?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then is there not an art of wages which provides us with wages, this being its proper faculty? Or do you call the art of healing and that of piloting identical? Or, if you choose to employ strict definitions as you engaged to do, the fact of a man's regaining his health while acting as a pilot, through the beneficial effects of the sea-voyage, would not make you call the art of the pilot a healing art, would it?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor would you so describe the art of wages, I fancy, supposing a person to keep his health while in the receipt of wages.

Thrasymachus/ No.

Socrates/ Well then, would you call the physicians art a mercenary art, if fees be taken for medical attendance?

Thrasymachus/ No.

Socrates/ Did we not allow that the benefit of each art was peculiar to itself?

Thrasymachus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Then whatever benefit accrues in common to the professors of all arts, is clearly derived from a common use of someone and the same thing.

Thrasymachus/ So it would seem.

Socrates/ And we further maintain, that if these persons are benefited by earning wages, they owe it to their use of the art of wages, in addition to that which they profess.

He reluctantly assented.

Then this advantage, the receipt of pay, does not come to each from his own art, but, strictly considered, the art of healing produces health, and the art of wages pay; the art of house-building produces a house, while the art of wages follows it and produces pay; and so of all the rest; each works its own work, and benefits that which is its appointed object. If, however, an art be practiced without pay, does the professor of it derive any benefit from his art?

Thrasymachus/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Does he also confer no benefit, when he works gratuitously?

Thrasymachus/ Nay, I suppose he does confer benefit.

Socrates/ So far then, Thrasymachus, we see clearly, that ah art or a government never provides that which is profitable for itself, but as we said some time ago, it provides and enjoins what is profitable for the subject, looking to his interest who is the weaker, and not to the interest of the stronger. It was for these reasons that I said just now, my dear Thrasymachus, that no one will voluntarily take office, or assume the duty of correcting the disorders of others, but that all ask wages for the work, because one who is to prosper in his art never practices or prescribes what is best for himself, but only what is best for the subject, so long as he acts within the limits of his art; and on these grounds, apparently, wages must be given to make men willing to hold

office, in the shape of money or honor, or of punishment, in case of refusal.

Glaucon/ What do you mean, Socrates? I understand two out of the three kinds of wages; but, what the punishment is, and how you could describe it as playing the part of wages, I do not comprehend.

Socrates/ Then you do not comprehend, the wages of the best men, which induce the most virtuous to hold office, when they consent to do so. Do you not know that to be ambitious and covetous is considered a disgrace, and really is a disgrace?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ For this reason, then, good men will not consent to hold an office of power, either for the sake of money or for that of honor; for they neither wish to get the name of hirelings by openly exacting hire for their duties, nor of thieves by using their power to obtain it secretly; nor yet will they take office for the sake of honor, for they are not ambitious. Therefore compulsion and the fear of a penalty must be brought to bear upon them, to make them consent to hold office; which is probably the reason why it is thought dishonorable to accept power willingly without waiting to be compelled. Now the heaviest of all penalties is to be governed by a worse man, in case of one's own refusal to govern; and it is the fear of this, I believe, which induces virtuous men to take the posts of government; and when they do so, they enter upon their administration, not with any idea of coming into a good thing, but as an unavoidable necessity, not expecting to enjoy themselves in it, but because they cannot find any person better or no worse than themselves, to whom they can commit it. For the probability is, that if there were a city composed of none but good men, it would be an object of competition to avoid the possession of power, just as now

it is to obtain it; and then it would become clearly evident that it is not the nature of the genuine ruler to look to his own interest, but to that of the subject; so that every judicious man would choose to be the recipient of benefits, rather than to have the trouble of conferring them upon others. Therefore I will on no account concede to Thrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger. However we will resume this inquiry hereafter, for Thrasymachus now affirms that the life of the unjust man is better than the life of the just man; and this assertion seems to me of much greater importance than the other. Which side do you take, Glaucon? and which do you think the truer statement?

Glaucon/ I for my part hold, that the life of the just man is the more advantageous.

Socrates/ Did you hear, what a long list of attractions Thrasymachus just now attributed to the life of the unjust man?

Glaucon/ I did, but I am not convinced.

Socrates/ Should you then like us to convince him, if we can find any means of doing so, that what he says is not true?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly I should.

Socrates/ If then we adopt the plan of matching argument against argument, we enumerating all the advantages of being just, and Thrasymachus replying, and we again putting in a rejoinder, it will be necessary to count and measure the advantages which are claimed on both sides; and eventually we shall want a jury to give a verdict between us; but if we proceed in our inquiries, as we lately did, by the method of mutual admissions, we shall combine in our own persons the functions of jury and advocate.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Which plan, then, do you prefer?

Glaucon/ The latter.

Socrates/ Come then, Thrasymachus, let us start anew, and oblige us by answering; Do you assert that a perfect, injustice is more profitable than an equally perfect justice?

Thrasymachus/ Most decidedly I do; and I have said why.

Socrates/ Pray how do you describe them under another aspect? Probably you call one of them a virtue, and the other a vice?

Thrasymachus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ That is, justice a virtue, and injustice a vice?

Thrasymachus/ A likely thing, my facetious friend, when I assert that injustice is profitable, and justice the reverse.

Socrates/ Then what do you say?

Thrasymachus/ Just the contrary.

Socrates/ Do you call justice a vice?

Thrasymachus/ No; but I call it very egregious good nature.

Socrates/ Then do you call injustice ill nature?

Thrasymachus/ No; I call it good policy.

Socrates/ Do you think, Thrasymachus, that the unjust are positively wise and good?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, those who are able to practice injustice on the complete scale, having the power to reduce whole cities and nations of men to subjection. You, perhaps, imagine that I am speaking of the cut-purse tribe; and I certainly allow that even deeds like theirs are profitable if they escape detection; but they are not worthy to be considered in comparison with those I have just mentioned.

Socrates/ I quite understand what you mean; but I did wonder at your ranking injustice under the heads of virtue and wisdom, and justice under the opposites.

Thrasymachus/ Well, I do so rank them, without hesitation.

Socrates/ You have now taken up a more stubborn position, my friend, and it is no longer easy to know what to say. If after laying down the position that injustice is profitable, you had still admitted it to be a vice and a baseness, as some others do, we should have had an answer to give, speaking according to generally received notions; but now it is plain enough that you will maintain it to be beautiful, and strong, and will ascribe to it all the qualities which we have been in the habit of ascribing to justice, seeing that you have actually ventured to rank it as a portion of virtue and of wisdom.

Thrasymachus/ You divine most correctly.

Socrates/ Nevertheless, I must not shrink from pursuing the inquiry and the argument, so long as I suppose that you are saying what you think; for if I am not mistaken, Thrasymachus, you are really not bantering now, but saying what you think to be the truth.

Thrasymachus/ What difference does it make to you whether I think it true or not? Can you not assail the argument?

Socrates/ It makes none. But will you Endeavor to answer me one more question? Do you think that a just man would wish to go beyond a just man in anything?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not; for then he would not be so charmingly simple as he is.

Socrates/ Would a just man go beyond a just line of conduct?

Thrasymachus/ No, not beyond that either.

Socrates/ But would he go beyond an unjust man without scruple, and think it just to do so, or would he not think it just?

Thrasymachus/ He would think it just, and would not scruple to do it, but he would not be able.

Socrates/ Nay, that was not my question; but whether a just man both resolves and desires to go beyond an unjust man, but not beyond a just man?

Thrasymachus/ Well, it is so.

Socrates/ But how is it with the unjust man? Would he take upon himself to go beyond a just man and a just line of conduct?

Thrasymachus/ Undoubtedly, when he takes upon himself to go beyond all and in everything.

Socrates/ Then will not the unjust man also go beyond another unjust man and an unjust action, and struggle that he may himself obtain more than anyone else?

Thrasymachus/ He will.

Socrates/ Then let us put it in this form; The just man goes not beyond his like, but his unlike; the unjust man goes beyond both his like and his unlike?

Thrasymachus/ Very well said.

Socrates/ And further, the unjust man is wise and good, the just man is neither.

Thrasymachus/ Well-spoken again.

Socrates/ Does not the unjust man further resemble the wise and the good, whereas the just man does not resemble them?

Thrasymachus/ Why, of course, a man of a certain character must resemble others of that character; whereas one who is of a different character will not resemble them.

Socrates/ Very good; then the character of each is identical with that of those whom he resembles.

Thrasymachus/ Why, what else would you have?

Socrates/ Very well, Thrasymachus; do you call one man musical, and another unmusical?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ Which of them do you call wise, and which unwise?

Thrasymachus/ The musical man, of course, I call wise, and the unmusical, unwise.

Socrates/ Do you also say that wherein a man is wise, in that he is good, and wherein unwise, bad?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do you speak in the same manner of a medical man?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you think then, my excellent friend, that a musician, when he is tuning a lyre, would wish to go beyond a musician in the tightening or loosening of the strings, or would claim to have the advantage of him?

Thrasymachus/ I do not.

Socrates/ Would he wish to have the advantage of an unmusical person?

Thrasymachus/ Unquestionably he would.

Socrates/ How would a medical man act? would he wish to go beyond a medical man or medical practice in a question of diet?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But beyond an unprofessional man he would?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Consider now, looking at every kind of knowledge and ignorance, whether you think that any scientific man whatever would, by his own consent, choose to do or say more than another scientific man, and not the same that one like himself would do in the same matter.

Thrasymachus/ Well, perhaps the latter view is necessarily the true one.

Socrates/ But what do you say to the unscientific person? would he not go beyond the scientific and the unscientific alike?

Thrasymachus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ And the scientific person is wise?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the wise man is good.

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then a good and a wise man will not wish to go beyond his like, but his unlike and opposite?

Thrasymachus/ So it would seem.

Socrates/ But a bad and an ignorant man will go beyond both his like and his opposite.

Thrasymachus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Well then, Thrasymachus, does not our unjust man go beyond both his like and his unlike? was not that your statement?

Thrasymachus/ It was.

Socrates/ But the just man will not go beyond his like, but only beyond his unlike?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Consequently the just man resembles the wise and the good, whereas the unjust man resembles the bad and the ignorant.

Thrasymachus/ So it would seem.

Socrates/ But we agreed, you know, that the character of each of them is identical with the character of those whom he resembles.

Thrasymachus/ We did.

Socrates/ Consequently we have made the discovery, that the just man is wise and good, and the unjust man ignorant and bad.

Thrasymachus had made all these admissions, not in the easy manner in which I now relate them, but reluctantly and after much resistance, in the course of which he perspired profusely, as it was hot weather to boot; on that occasion also I saw what I had never seen before Thrasymachus blushing. But when we had thus mutually agreed that justice was a part of virtue and of wisdom, and injustice of vice and ignorance, I proceeded thus;

Very good; we will consider this point settled; but we said, you know, that injustice was also strong. Do you not remember it, Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ I do; but for my part I am not satisfied with your last conclusions, and I know what I could say on the subject. But if were to express my thoughts, I am sure you would say that I was declaiming. Take your choice then; either allow me to say as much as I please, or if you prefer asking questions, do so; and I will do with you as we do with old women when they tell us stories; I will say Good, and nod my head or shake it, as the occasion requires.

Socrates/ If so, pray do no violence to your own opinions.

Thrasymachus/ Anything to please you, as you will not allow me to speak. What else would you have?

Socrates/ Nothing, I assure you; but if you will do this, do so; and I will ask questions.

Thrasymachus/ Proceed then.

Socrates/ Well then, I will repeat the question which I put to you just now, that our inquiry may be carried out continuously; namely, what sort of a thing justice is compared with injustice. It was said, I think, that injustice is more powerful and stronger than justice; but now, seeing that justice is both wisdom and virtue, and injustice is ignorance, it may easily be shown, I imagine, that justice is likewise stronger than injustice. No one can now fail to see this. But I do not wish to settle the question in that absolute way, Thrasymachus, but I would investigate it in the following manner; Should you admit that a city may be unjust, and that it may unjustly attempt to enslave other cities, and so succeed in so doing, and hold man in such slavery to itself?

Thrasymachus/ Undoubtedly I should; and this will be more frequently done by the-best city, that is, the one that is most completely unjust, than by any other.

Socrates/ I understand, that this is your position. But the question which I wish to consider is, whether the city that becomes the mistress of another city, will have this power without the aid of justice, or whether justice will be indispensable to it.

Thrasymachus/ If, as you said just now, justice is wisdom, justice must lend her aid; but if it is as I said, injustice must lend hers.

Socrates/ I am quite delighted to find, Thrasymachus, that you are not content merely to nod and shake your head, but give exceedingly good answers.

Thrasymachus/ I do it to indulge you.

Socrates/ You are very good; but pray indulge me so far as to say, whether you think that either a city, or an army, or a band of thieves or robbers, or any other body of men, pursuing certain unjust ends in common, could succeed in any enterprise if they were to deal unjustly with one another?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ If they refrain from such conduct, towards one another, will they not be more likely to succeed?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Because, I presume, Thrasymachus, injustice breeds divisions and animosities and broils between man and man, while justice creates unanimity and friendship; does it not?

Thrasymachus/ Be it so, that I may not quarrel with you.

Socrates/ Truly I am very much obliged to you, my excellent friend; but pray tell me this; if the working of injustice is to implant hatred wherever it exists, will not the presence of it, whether among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate one another, and to form parties, and disable them from acting together in concert?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, and if it exist in two persons, will they not quarrel and hate one another, and be enemies each to the other, and both to the just?

Thrasymachus/ They will.

Socrates/ And supposing, my admirable friend, that injustice has taken up its residence in a single individual, will it lose its proper power, or retain it just the same?

Thrasymachus/ We will say it retains it.

Socrates/ And does not its power appear to be of such a nature, as to make any subject in which it resides, whether

it be city, or family, or army, or anything else whatsoever, unable to act and moreover hostile both to itself and to everything that opposes it, and to the just? Is it not so?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ Then, if it appears in an individual also, it will produce all these its natural results; in the first place it will make him unable to act because of inward strife and division; in the next place, it will make him an enemy to himself and to the just, will it not?

Thrasymachus/ It will.

Socrates/ And the gods, my friend, are just?

Thrasymachus/ We will suppose they are.

Socrates/ Then to the gods also will the unjust man be an enemy, and the just a friend.

Thrasymachus/ Feast on your argument, to your hearts content; I will not oppose you, or I shall give offence to the company.

Socrates/ Be so good, as to make my entertainment complete by continuing to answer as you have now been doing. I am aware, indeed, that the just are shown to be wiser, and better, and more able to act than the unjust, who are indeed, incapable of any combined action. Nay, we do not speak with entire accuracy when we say that any party of unjust men ever acted vigorously in concert together; for, had they been thoroughly unjust, they could not have kept their hands off each other. But it is obvious that there was some justice at work in them, which made them refrain at any rate from injuring, at one and the same moment, both their comrades and the objects of their attacks, and which enabled them to achieve what they did achieve; and that their injustice partly disabled them, even in the pursuit of their unjust ends, since those who are complete villains, and thoroughly unjust, are also thoroughly unable to act. I learn

that all this is true, and that the doctrine which you at first propounded is not true. But whether the just also live a better life, and are happier than the unjust, is a question which we proposed to consider next, and which we now have to investigate. Now, for my part, I think it is already apparent, from what we have said, that they do; nevertheless, we must examine the point still more carefully. For we are debating no trivial question, but the manner in which a man ought to live.

Thrasymachus/ Pray consider it.

Socrates/ I will. Tell me, do you think there is such a thing as a horses function?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ Would you, then, describe the function of a horse, or of anything else whatever, as that work, for the accomplishment of which it is either the sole or the best instrument?

Thrasymachus/ I do not understand.

Socrates/ Look at it this way. Can you see with anything besides eyes?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Can you hear with anything besides ears?

Thrasymachus/ No.

Socrates/ Then should we not justly say that seeing and hearing are the functions of these organs?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Again, you might cut off a vine-shoot with a carving knife, or chisel, or many other tools?

Thrasymachus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But with no tool, I imagine, so well as with the pruning knife made for the purpose.

Thrasymachus/ True.

Socrates/ Then shall we not define pruning to be the function of the pruning knife?

Thrasymachus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Now then, I think, you will better understand what I wished to learn from you just now, when I asked whether the function of a thing is not that work for the accomplishment of which it is either the sole or the best instrument?

Thrasymachus/ I do understand, and I believe that this is in every case the function of a thing.

Socrates/ Very well; do you not also think that everything which has an appointed function has also a proper-virtue? Let us revert to the same instances; we say that the eyes have a function?

Thrasymachus/ They have.

Socrates/ Then have the eyes a virtue also?

Thrasymachus/ They have.

Socrates/ And the ears; did we assign them a function?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then have they a virtue also?

Thrasymachus/ They have.

Socrates/ And is it the same with all other things;

Thrasymachus/ The same.

Socrates/ Attend then; Do you suppose that the eyes could discharge their own function well if they had not their own proper virtue, that virtue being replaced by a vice?

Thrasymachus/ How could they? You mean, probably, if sight is replaced by blindness.

Socrates/ I mean, whatever their virtue be; for I am not come to that question yet. At present I am asking whether it is through their own peculiar virtue that things perform their

proper functions well, and through their own peculiar vice that they perform them ill?

Thrasymachus/ You cannot be wrong in that.

Socrates/ Then if the ears lose their own virtue, will they execute their functions ill?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ May we include all other things under the same proposition?

Thrasymachus/ I think we may.

Socrates/ Come, then, consider this point next. Has the soul any function which could not be executed by means of anything else whatsoever? For example, could we in justice assign superintendence and government, deliberation and the like, to anything but the soul, or should we pronounce them to be peculiar to it?

Thrasymachus/ We could ascribe them to nothing else.

Socrates/ Again, shall we declare life to be a function of the soul?

Thrasymachus/ Decidedly.

Socrates/ Do we not also maintain that the soul has a virtue?

Thrasymachus/ We do.

Socrates/ Then can it ever so happen, Thrasymachus, that the soul will perform its functions well when destitute of its own peculiar virtue, or is that impossible?

Thrasymachus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Then a bad soul must needs exercise authority and superintendence ill, and a good soul must do all these things well.

Thrasymachus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Now did we not grant that justice was a virtue of the soul, and injustice a vice?

Thrasymachus/ We did.

Socrates/ Consequently the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man ill?

Thrasymachus/ Apparently, according to your argument.

Socrates/ And you will allow that he who lives well is blessed and happy, and that he who lives otherwise is the reverse.

Thrasymachus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Consequently the just man is happy, and the unjust man miserable.

Thrasymachus/ Let us suppose them to be so.

Socrates/ But surely it is not misery, but happiness, that is advantageous.

Thrasymachus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Never then, my excellent Thrasymachus, is injustice more advantageous than justice.

Thrasymachus/ Well, Socrates, let this be your entertainment for the feast of Bendis.

Socrates/ I have to thank you for it, Thrasymachus, because you recovered your temper, and left off being angry with me. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained; but that was my own fault, and not yours; for as your gourmands seize upon every new dish as it goes round, and taste its contents before they have had a reasonable enjoyment of its predecessor, so I seem to myself to have left the question which we were at first examining, concerning the real nature of justice, before we had found out the answer to it, in order to rush to the inquiry whether this unknown thing is a vice and an ignorance, or a virtue and a wisdom; and again, when a new theory, that injustice is

more profitable than justice, was subsequently started, I could not refrain from passing from the other to this, so that at present the result of our conversation is that I know nothing; for while I do not know what justice is, I am little likely to know whether it is in fact a virtue or not, or whether its owner is happy or unhappy.

Book 2.

Socrates/ When I had made these remarks I thought we had done with discussing; whereas it seems it was only a prelude. For Glaucon, with that eminent courage which he displays on all occasions, would not acquiesce in the retreat of Thrasymachus, and began thus;

Glaucon/ Socrates, do you wish really to convince us that it is on every account better to be just than to be unjust, or only to seem to have convinced us?

Socrates/ If it were in my power, I should prefer convincing you really.

Glaucon/ Then, you are not doing what you wish. Let me ask you; Is there, in your opinion, a class of good things of such a kind that we are glad to possess them, not because we desire their consequences, but simply welcoming them for their own sake? Take, for example, the feelings of enjoyment and all those pleasures that are harmless, and that are followed by no result in the after time, beyond simple enjoyment in their possession.

Socrates/ Yes, I certainly think there is a class of this description.

Glaucon/ Well, is there another class, do you think, of those which we value, both for their own sake and for their results? Such as intelligence, and sight, and health; all of which are welcome, I apprehend, on both accounts.

Socrates/ Yes.

Glaucon/ And do you further recognize a third class of good things, which would include gymnastic training, and submission to medical treatment in illness, as well as the practice of medicine, and all other means of making money? Things like these we should describe as irksome, and yet beneficial to us; and while we should reject them viewed simply in themselves, we accept them for the sake of the

emoluments, and of the other consequences which result from them.

Socrates/ Yes, undoubtedly there is such a third class also; but what then?

Glaucon/ In which of these classes do you place justice?

Socrates/ I should say in the highest; that is, among the good things which will be valued by one who is in the pursuit of true happiness, alike for their own sake and for their consequences.

Glaucon/ Then your opinion is not that of the many, by whom justice is ranked in the irksome class, as a thing which in itself, and for its own sake, is disagreeable and repulsive, but which it is well to practice for the credit of it, with an eye to emolument and a good name.

Socrates/ I know it is so; and under this idea Thrasymachus has been for a long time disparaging justice and praising injustice. But apparently I am a dull scholar.

Glaucon/ Pray then listen to my proposal, and tell me whether you agree to it. Thrasymachus appears to me to have yielded like a snake to your fascination sooner than he heed have done; but for my part I am not satisfied as yet with the exposition that has been given of justice and injustice; for I long to be told what they respectively are, and what force they exert, taken simply by themselves, when residing in the soul, dismissing the consideration of their rewards and other consequences. This shall be my plan then, if you do not object; I will revive Thrasymachus' argument, and will first state the common view respecting the nature and origin of justice; in the second place, I will maintain that all who practice it do so against their will, because it is indispensable, not because it is a good thing; and thirdly, that they act reasonably in so doing, because the life of the unjust man is, as men say, far better than that

of the just. Not that I think so myself, Socrates; only my ears are so dinned with what I hear from Thrasymachus and a thousand others, that I am puzzled. Now I have never heard the argument for the superiority of justice over injustice maintained to my satisfaction; for I should like to hear a panegyric upon it, considered simply in itself; and from you if from anyone, I should expect such a treatment of the subject. Therefore I will speak as forcibly as I can in praise of an unjust life, and I shall thus give you a specimen of the manner in which I wish to hear you afterwards censure injustice and commend justice. See whether you approve of my plan.

Socrates/ Indeed I do; for on what other subject could a sensible man like better to talk and to hear others talk, again and again?

Glaucon/ Admirably spoken! So now listen to me while I speak on my first theme, the nature and the origin of justice.

To commit injustice is, they say, in its nature, a good thing, and to suffer it an evil thing; but the evil of the latter exceeds the good of the former; and so, after the twofold experience of both doing and suffering injustice, those who cannot avoid the latter and compass the former find it expedient to make a compact of mutual abstinence from injustice. Hence arose legislation and contracts between man and man, and hence it became the custom to call that which the law enjoined just, as well as lawful. Such, they tell us, is justice, and so it came into being; and it stands midway between that which is best, to commit injustice with impunity, and that which is worst, to suffer injustice without any power of retaliating. And being a mean between these two extremes, the principle of justice is regarded with satisfaction, not as a positive good, but because the inability to commit injustice has rendered it valuable; for they say that one who had it in his power to be unjust, and who

deserved the name of a man, would never be so weak as to contract with anyone that both the parties should abstain from injustice. Such is the current account, Socrates, of the nature of justice, and of the circumstances in which it originated.

The truth of my second statement that men practice justice unwillingly, and because they lack the power to violate it, will be most readily perceived, if we make a supposition like the following. Let us give full liberty to the just man and to the unjust alike, to do whatever they please, and then let us follow them, and see whither the inclination of each will lead him. In that case we shall surprise the just man in the act of travelling in the same direction as the unjust, owing to that covetous desire, the gratification of which every creature naturally pursues as a good, only that it is forced out of its path by law, and constrained to respect the principle of equality. That full liberty of action would, perhaps, be most effectually realized if they were invested with a power which they say was in old time possessed by the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian. He was a shepherd, so the story runs, in the service of the reigning sovereign of Lydia, when one day a violent storm of rain fell, the ground was rent asunder by an earthquake, and a yawning gulf appeared on the spot where he was feeding his flocks. Seeing what had happened, and wondering at it, he went down into the gulf, and among other marvelous objects he saw, as the legend relates, a hollow brazen horse, with windows in its sides, through which he looked, and beheld in the interior a corpse, apparently of superhuman size; from which he took nothing but a golden ring off the hand, and therewith made his way out. Now when the usual meeting of the shepherds occurred, for the purpose of sending to the king their monthly report of the state of his flocks, this shepherd came with the rest, wearing the ring. And, as he was seated with

the company, he happened to turn the hoop of the ring round towards himself, till it came to the inside of his hand. Whereupon he became invisible to his neighbors, who fell to talking about him as if he were gone away. While he was marveling at this, he again began playing with the ring, and turned the hoop to the outside, upon which he became once more visible. Having noticed this effect, he made experiments with the ring, to see whether it possessed this virtue; and so it was, that when he turned the hoop inwards he became invisible, and when he turned it outwards he was again visible. After this discovery, he immediately contrived to be appointed one of the messengers to carry the report to the king; and upon his arrival he seduced the queen, and, conspiring with her, slew the king, and took possession of the throne.

If then there were two such rings in existence, and if the just and the unjust man were each to put on one, it is to be thought that no one would be so steeled against temptation as to abide in the practice of justice, and resolutely to abstain from touching the property of his neighbors, when he had it in his power to help himself without fear to anything he pleased in the market, or to go into private houses and have intercourse with whom he would, or to kill and release from prison according to his own pleasure, and in everything else to act among men with the power of a god. And in thus following out his desires the just man will be doing precisely what the unjust man would do; and so they would both be pursuing the same path. Surely this will be allowed to be strong evidence that none are just willingly, but only by compulsion, because to be just is not a good to the individual; for all violate justice whenever they imagine that there is nothing to hinder them. And they do so because everyone thinks that, in the individual case, injustice is much more profitable than justice; and they are right in so

thinking, as the advocate of this doctrine will maintain. For if anyone having this license within his grasp were to refuse to do any injustice, or to touch the property of others, all who were aware of it would think him a most pitiful and irrational creature, though they would praise him before each other's faces, to impose on one another, through their fear of being treated with injustice. And so much for this topic.

But in actually deciding between the lives of the two persons in question, we shall be enabled to arrive at a correct conclusion, by contrasting together the thoroughly just and the thoroughly unjust man, and only by so doing. Well then, how are we to contrast them? In this way. Let us make no deduction either from the injustice of the unjust, or from the justice of the just, but let us suppose each to be perfect in his own line of conduct. First of all then, the unjust man must act as skillful craftsmen do. For a first-rate pilot or physician perceives the difference between what is practicable and what is impracticable in his art, and while he attempts the former, he lets the latter alone; and moreover, should he happen to make a false step, he is able to recover himself. In the same way, if we are to form a conception of a consummately unjust man, we must suppose that he makes no mistake in the prosecution of his unjust enterprises, and that he escapes detection; but if he be found out, we must look upon him as a bungler; for it is the perfection of injustice to seem just without really being so. We must therefore grant to the perfectly unjust man, without any deduction, the most perfect injustice; and we must concede to him, that while committing the grossest acts of injustice he has won himself the highest reputation for justice; and that should he make a false step, he is able to recover himself, partly by a talent for speaking with effect, in case he be called in question for any of his misdeeds, and

partly because his courage and strength, and his command of friends and money, enable him to employ force with success, whenever force is required. Such being our unjust man, let us, in pursuance of the argument, place the just man by his side, a man of true simplicity and nobleness, resolved, as Aeschylus says, not to seem, but to be, good. We must certainly take away the seeming; for if he be thought to be a just man, he will have honors and gifts on the strength of this reputation, so that it will be uncertain whether it is for justices sake, or for the sake of the gifts and honors, that he is what he is. Yes; we must strip him bare of everything but justice, and make his whole case the reverse of the former. Without being guilty of one unjust act, let him have the worst reputation for injustice, so that his virtue may be thoroughly tested, and shown to be proof against infamy and all its consequences; and let him go on till the day of his death, steadfast in his justice, but with a lifelong reputation for injustice, in order that, having brought both the men to the utmost limits of justice and of injustice respectively, we may then give judgment as to which of the two is the happier.

Socrates/ Good heavens! my dear Glaucon, how vigorously you work, scouring the two characters clean for our judgment, like a pair of statues.

Glaucon/ I do it as well as I can. And after describing the men as we have done, there will be no further difficulty, I imagine, in proceeding to sketch the kind of life which awaits them respectively. Let me therefore describe it. And if the description be somewhat coarse, do not regard it as mine, Socrates, but as coming from those who commend injustice above justice. They will say that in such a situation the just man will be scourged, racked, fettered, will have his eyes burnt out, and at last, after suffering every kind of torture, will be crucified; and thus learn that it is best to resolve, not

to be, but to seem, just. Indeed those words of Aeschylus are far more applicable to the unjust man than to the just. For it is in fact the unjust man, they will maintain, inasmuch as he devotes himself to a course which is allied to reality, and does not live with an eye to appearances, who is resolved not to seem, but to be, unjust;

> Reaping a harvest of wise purposes,
> Sown in the fruitful furrows of his mind;

being enabled first of all to hold offices of state through his reputation for justice, and in the next place to choose a wife wherever he will, and marry his children into whatever family he pleases, to enter into contracts and join in partnership with anyone he likes, and besides all this, to enrich himself by large profits, because he is not too nice to commit a fraud. Therefore, whenever he engages in a contest, whether public or private, he defeats and overreaches his enemies, and by so doing grows rich, and is enabled to benefit his friends and injure his enemies, and to offer sacrifices and dedicate gifts to the gods in magnificent abundance; and thus having greatly the advantage of the just man in the means of paying court to the gods, as well as to such men as he chooses, he is also more likely than the just man, as far as probabilities go, to enjoy the favor of heaven. And therefore they affirm, Socrates, that a better provision is made both by gods and men for the life of the unjust, than for the life of the just.

Socrates/ When Glaucon had said this, before I could make the reply I was meditating, his brother Adeimantus exclaimed;

Adeimantus/ You surely do not suppose, Socrates, that the doctrine has been satisfactorily expounded.

Socrates/ Why not, pray?

Adeimantus/ The very point which it was most important to urge has been omitted.

Socrates/ Well then, according to the proverb, May a brother be present to help one, it is for you to supply his deficiencies, if there are any, by your assistance. But indeed, for my part, what Glaucon has said is enough to prostrate me, and put it out of my power to come up to the rescue of justice.

Adeimantus/ You are not in earnest; pray listen to the following argument also; for we must now go through those representations which, reversing the declarations of Glaucon, commend justice and disparage injustice, in order to bring out more clearly what I take to be his meaning. Now I apprehend that when parents and others set forth the duty of being just, and impress it upon their children or those in whom they feel an interest, they do not praise justice in itself, but only the respectability which it gives; their object being that a reputation for justice may be gained, and that this reputation may bring in the preferment, the marriages, and the other good things which Glaucon has just told us are secured to the just man by his high character. And these persons carry the advantages of a good name still further; for, by introducing the good opinion of the gods, they are enabled to describe innumerable blessings which the gods, they say, grant to the pious, as the excellent Hesiod tells us, and Homer too; the former saying, that the gods cause the oak-trees of the just

> On their tops to hear acorns, and swarms of bees in the middle;
>
> Also their wool-laden sheep sink under the weight of their fleeces;

with many other good things of the same sort; while the latter, in a similar passage, speaks of one;

> Like to a blameless king, who, godlike in virtue and wisdom,
> Justice ever maintains; whose rich land fruitfully yields him
> Harvests of barley and wheat, and his orchards are heavy with fruitage;
> Strong are the young of his flocks; and the sea gives him fish in abundance.

But the blessings which Musaeus and his son Eumolpus represent the gods as bestowing upon the just, are still more delectable than these; for they bring them to the abode of Hades, and describe them as reclining on couches at a banquet of the pious, and with garlands on their heads spending all eternity in wine-bibbing, the fairest reward of virtue being, in their estimation, an everlasting carousal. Others, again, do not stop even here in their enumeration of the rewards bestowed by the gods; for they tell us that the man who is pious and true to his oath leaves children's children and a posterity to follow him. Such, among others, are the commendations which they lavish upon justice. The ungodly, on the other hand, and the unjust, they plunge into a swamp in Hades, and condemn them to carry water in a sieve; and while they are still alive, they bring them into evil repute, and inflict upon the unjust precisely those punishments which Glaucon enumerated as the lot of the just who are reputed to be unjust, more they cannot. Such is their method of praising the one character and condemning the other.

Once more, Socrates, take into consideration another and a different mode of speaking with regard to justice and injustice, which we meet with both in common life and in the poets. All as with one mouth proclaim, that to be temperate and just is an admirable thing certainly, but at the same time a hard and an irksome one; while

intemperance and injustice are pleasant things and of easy acquisition, and only rendered base by law and public opinion. But they say that honesty is in general less profitable than dishonesty, and they do not hesitate to call wicked men happy, and to honor them both in public and in private, when they are rich or possess other sources of power, and on the other hand to treat with dishonor and contempt those who are in any way feeble or poor, even while they admit that the latter are better men than the former. But of all their statements the most wonderful are those which relate to the gods and to virtue; according to which even the gods allot to many good men a calamitous and an evil life, and to men of the opposite character an opposite portion. And there are quacks and soothsayers who flock to the rich man's doors, and try to persuade him that they have a power at command, which they procure from heaven, and which enables them, by sacrifices and incantations performed amid feasting and indulgence, to make amends for any crime committed either by the individual himself or by his ancestors; and. that, should he desire to do a mischief to anyone, it may be done at a trifling expense, whether the object of his hostility be a just or an unjust man; for they profess that by certain invocations and spells they can prevail upon the gods to do their bidding. And in support of all these assertions they produce the evidence of poets; some, to exhibit the facilities of vice, quoting the words;

> Whoso wickedness seeks, may even in masses obtain it Easily.
>
> Smooth is the way, and short, for nigh is her dwelling.
>
> Virtue, Heav'n has ordained, shall be reached by the sweat of the forehead.

and by a long and up-hill road; while others, to prove that the gods may be turned from their purpose by men, adduce the testimony of Homer, who has said;

> Yea, even the gods do yield to entreaty;
> Therefore to them men offer both victims and meek supplications,
> Incense and melting fat, and turn them from anger to mercy;
> Sending up sorrowful prayers, when trespass and sin is committed.

And they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, children, as they say, of Selene and of the Muses, which form their ritual, persuading not individuals merely, but whole cities also, that men may be absolved and purified from crimes, both while they are still alive and even after their decease, by means of certain sacrifices and pleasurable amusements which they call Mysteries; which deliver us from the torments of the other world, while the neglect of them is punished by an awful doom.

Adeimantus/ When views like these, my dear Socrates, are proclaimed and repeated with so much variety, concerning the honors in which virtue and vice are respectively held by gods and men, what can we suppose is the effect produced on the minds of all those young men of good natural parts who are able, after skimming like birds, as it were, over all that they hear, to draw conclusions from it, respecting the character which a man must possess, and the path in which he must walk, in order to live the best possible life? In all probability a young man would say to himself in the words of Pindar, Shall I by justice or by crooked wiles climb to a loftier stronghold, and, having thus fenced myself about, live my life? For common opinion declares that to be just without being also thought just, is no advantage to me, but only entails manifest trouble and loss; whereas if I am unjust and get myself a name for justice, an unspeakably happy life is promised me. Very well

then; since the outward semblance, as the wise inform me, overpowers the inward reality, and is the sovereign dispenser of felicity, to this I must of course wholly devote myself; I must draw round about me a picture of virtue to serve as a frontage and exterior, but behind me I must trail the fox, of which that most clever Archilochus tells us, with its cunning and shiftiness. Yes but, it will be objected, it is not an easy matter always to conceal ones wickedness. No, we shall reply, nor yet is anything else easy that is great; nevertheless, if happiness is to be our goal, this must be our path, as the steps of the argument indicate. To assist in keeping up the deception, we will form secret societies and clubs. There are, moreover, teachers of persuasion, who impart skill in popular and forensic oratory; and so by fair means or by foul, we shall gain our ends, and carry on our dishonest proceedings with impunity. Nay but, it is urged, neither evasion nor violence can succeed with the gods. Well, but if they either do not exist, or do not concern themselves with the affairs of men, why need we concern ourselves to evade their observation? But if they do exist, and do pay attention to us, we know nothing and have heard nothing of them from any other quarter than the current traditions and the genealogies of poets; and these very authorities state that the gods are beings who may be wrought upon and diverted from their purpose by sacrifices and meek supplications and votive offerings. Therefore we must believe them in both statements or in neither. If we are to believe them, we will act unjustly, and offer sacrifices from the proceeds of our crimes. For if we are just, we shall, it is true, escape punishment at the hands of the gods, but we renounce the profits which accrue from injustice; but if we are unjust, we shall not only make these gains, but also by putting up prayers when we transgress and sin, we shall prevail upon the gods to let us go unscathed. But then, it is

again objected, in Hades we shall pay the just penalty for the crimes committed here, either in our own persons or in those of our children's children. Nay but, my friend, the champion of the argument will continue, the mystic rites, again, are very powerful, and the absolving divinities, as we are told by the mightiest cities, and by the sons of the gods who have appeared as poets and inspired prophets, who inform us that these things are so.

What consideration, therefore, remains which should induce us to prefer justice to the greatest injustice? Since if we combine injustice with a spurious decorum, we shall fare to our liking with the gods and with men, in this life and the next, according to the most numerous and the highest authorities. Considering all that has been said, by what device, Socrates, can a man who has any advantages, either of high talent, or wealth, or personal appearance, or birth, bring himself to honor justice, instead of smiling when he hears it praised? Indeed, if there is anyone who is able to show the falsity of what we have said, and who is fully convinced that justice is best, far from being angry with the unjust, he doubtless makes great allowance for them, knowing that, with the exception of those who may possibly refrain from injustice through the disgust of a godlike nature or from the acquisition of genuine knowledge, there is certainly no one else who is willingly just; but it is from cowardice, or age, or some other infirmity, that men condemn injustice, simply because they lack the power to commit it. And the truth of this is proved by the fact, that the first of these people who comes to power is the first to commit injustice, to the extent of his ability.

And the cause of all this is simply that fact, which my brother and I both stated at the very commencement of this address to you, Socrates, saying; With much respect be it spoken, you who profess to be admirers of justice, beginning

with the heroes of old, of whom accounts have descended to the present generation, have every one of you, without exception, made the praise of justice and condemnation of injustice turn solely upon the reputation and honor and gifts resulting from them; but what each is in itself, by its own peculiar force as it resides in the soul of its possessor, unseen either by gods or men, has never, in poetry or in prose been adequately discussed, so as to show that injustice is the greatest bane that a soul can receive into itself, and justice the greatest blessing. Had this been the language held by you all from the first, and had you tried to persuade us of this from our childhood, we should not be on the watch to check one another in the commission of injustice, because everyone would be his own watchman, fearful lest by committing injustice he might attach to himself the greatest of evils.

All this, Socrates, and perhaps still more than this, would be put forward respecting justice and injustice, by Thrasymachus, and I dare say by others also; thus ignorantly reversing, in my opinion, the inherent efficacy of each. For my own part, I confess (for I do not want to hide anything from you) that I have a great desire to hear you defend the opposite view, and therefore I have exerted myself to speak as forcibly as I can. So do not limit your argument to the proposition, that justice is superior to injustice, but show us what is that influence exerted by each of them on its possessor, whereby the one is in itself a blessing, and the other a bane; and deduct the estimation in which the two are held, as Glaucon urged you to do. For if you omit to withdraw from each quality its true reputation and to add the false, we shall declare that you are praising, not the reality, but the semblance of justice, and blaming, not the reality, but the semblance of injustice; that your advice, in fact, is to be unjust without being found out, and that you

hold with Thrasymachus, that justice is another man's good, being for the interest of the stronger; injustice a man's own interest and advantage, but against the interest of the weaker. Since then you have allowed that justice belongs to the highest class of good things, the possession of which is valuable, both for the sake of their results, and also in a higher degree for their own sake, such as sight, hearing, intelligence, health, and everything else which is genuinely good in its own nature and not merely reputed to be good, select for commendation this particular feature of justice, I mean the benefit which in itself it confers on its possessor, in contrast with the harm which injustice inflicts. The rewards and reputations leave to others to praise; because in others I can tolerate this mode of praising justice and condemning injustice, which consists in eulogizing or reviling the reputations and the rewards which are connected with them; but in you I cannot, unless you require it, because you have spent your whole life in investigating such questions, and such only. Therefore do not content yourself with proving to us that justice is better than injustice; but show us what is that influence exerted by each on its possessor, by which, whether gods and men see it or not, the one is in itself a blessing, and the other a bane.

Socrates/ Much as I had always admired the talents both of Glaucon and Adeimantus, I confess that on this occasion I was quite charmed with what I had heard; so I said; Fitly indeed did Glaucon's admirer address you, ye sons of the man there named, in the first line of his elegiac poem, after you had distinguished yourselves in the battle of Megara, saying;

Race of a famous man, ye godlike sons of Ariston.

There seems to me to be great truth in this epithet, my friends; for there is something truly god-like in the state of your minds, if you are not convinced that injustice is better

than justice, when you can plead its cause so well. I do believe that you really are not convinced of it. But I infer it from your general character; for judging merely from your statements I should have distrusted you; but the more I place confidence in you, the more I am perplexed how to deal with the case; for though I do not know how I am to render assistance, having learnt how unequal I am to the task from your rejection of my answer to Thrasymachus, wherein I imagined that I had demonstrated that justice is better than injustice; yet, on the other hand, I dare not refuse my assistance; because I am afraid that it might be positively sinful in me, when I hear Justice evil spoken of in my presence, to lose heart and desert her, so long as breath and utterance are left in me. My best plan, therefore, is to succor her in such fashion as I can.

Thereupon Glaucon, and all the rest with him, requested me by all means to give my assistance, and not to let the conversation drop, but thoroughly to investigate the real nature of justice and injustice, and which is the true doctrine with regard to their respective advantages. So I said what I really felt;

The inquiry we are undertaking is no trivial one, but demands a keen sight, according to my notion of it Therefore, since I am not a clever person, I think we had better adopt a mode of inquiry which may be thus illustrated. Suppose we had been ordered to read small writing at a distance, not having very good eye-sight, and that one of us discovered that the same writing was to be found somewhere else in larger letters, and upon a larger space, we should have looked upon it as a piece of luck, I imagine, that we could read the latter first, and then examine the smaller, and observe whether the two were alike.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly we should, but what parallel can you see to this, Socrates, in our inquiry after justice?

Socrates/ I will tell you. We speak of justice as residing in an individual mind, and as residing also in an entire city, do we not?

Adeimantus/ Certainly we do.

Socrates/ Well, a city is larger than one man.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Perhaps, then, justice may exist in larger proportions in the greater subject, and thus be easier to discover; so, if you please, let us first investigate its character in cities; afterwards let us apply the same inquiry to the individual, looking for the counterpart of the greater as it exists in the form of the less.

Adeimantus/ Indeed, I think your plan is a good one.

Socrates/ If then we were to trace in thought the gradual formation of a city, should we also see the growth of its justice or of its injustice?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps we should.

Socrates/ Then, if this were done, might we not hope to see more easily the object of our search?

Adeimantus/ Yes, much more easily.

Socrates/ Is it your advice, then, that we should attempt to carry out our plan? It is no trifling task, I imagine; therefore consider it well.

Adeimantus/ We have considered it; yes, do so by all means.

Socrates/ Well then, the formation of a city is due, as I imagine, to this fact, that we are not individually independent, Init have many wants. Or would you assign any other cause for the founding of cities?

Adeimantus/ No, I agree with you.

Socrates/ Thus it is, then, that owing to our many wants, and because each seeks the aid of others to supply his

various requirements, we gather many associates and helpers into one dwelling-place, and give to this joint dwelling the name of city. Is it so?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And everyone who gives or takes in exchange, whatever it be that he exchanges, does so from a belief that he is consulting his own interest.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now then, let us construct our imaginary city from the beginning. It will owe its construction, it appears, to our natural wants.

Adeimantus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Well, but the first and most pressing of all wants is that of sustenance to enable us to exist as living creatures.

Adeimantus/ Most decidedly.

Socrates/ Our second want would be that of a house, and our third that of clothing and the like.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Then let us know what will render our city adequate to the supply of so many things. Must we not begin with a husbandman for one, and a house-builder, and besides these a weaver? Will these suffice, or shall we add to them a shoemaker, and perhaps one or two more of the class of people who minister to our bodily wants?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then the smallest possible city will consist of four or five men.

Adeimantus/ So we see.

Socrates/ To proceed then; ought each of these to place his own work at the disposal of the community, so that the single husbandman, for example, shall provide food for four,

spending four times the amount of time and labor upon the preparation of food, and sharing it with others; or must he be regardless of them, and produce far his own consumption alone the fourth part of this quantity of food, in a fourth part of the time, spending the other three parts, one in making his house, another in procuring himself clothes, and the third in providing himself with shoes, saving himself the trouble of sharing with others, and doing his own business by himself, and for himself?

Adeimantus/ Well, Socrates, perhaps the former plan is the easier of the two.

Socrates/ Really, it is not improbable; for I recollect, myself, after your answer, that, in the first place, no two persons are born exactly alike, but each differs from each in natural endowments, one being suited for one occupation, and another for another. Do you not think so?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Well; when is a man likely to succeed best? When he divides his exertions among many trades, or when he devotes himself exclusively to one?

Adeimantus/ When he devotes himself to one.

Socrates/ Again, it is also clear, I imagine, that if a person lets the right moment for any work go by, it never returns.

Adeimantus/ It is quite clear.

Socrates/ For the thing to be done does not choose. I imagine, to tarry the leisure of the doer, but the doer must be at the beck of the thing to be done, and not treat it as a secondary affair.

Adeimantus/ He must.

Socrates/ From these considerations it follows, that all things will be produced in superior quantity and quality, and with greater ease, when each man works at a single

occupation, in accordance with his natural gifts, and at the right moment, without meddling with anything else.

Adeimantus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ More than four citizens, then, Adeimantus, are needed to provide the requisites which we named. For the husbandman, it appears, will not make his own plough, if it is to be a good one, nor his mattock, nor any of the other tools employed in agriculture. No more will the builder make the numerous tools which he also requires; and so of the weaver and the shoemaker.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Then we shall have carpenters and smiths, and many other artisans of the kind, who will become members of our little state, and create a population.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Still it will not yet be very large, supposing we add to them neatherds and shepherds, and the rest of that class, in order that the husbandmen may have oxen for ploughing, and the house-builders, as well as the husbandmen; beasts of burden for draught, and the weavers and shoemakers wool and leather.

Adeimantus/ It will not be a small state, either, if it contains all these.

Socrates/ Moreover, it is scarcely possible to plant the actual city in a place where it will have no need of imports.

Adeimantus/ No, it is impossible.

Socrates/ Then it will further require a new class of persons to bring from other cities all that it requires.

Adeimantus/ It will.

Socrates/ Well, but if the agent goes empty-handed, carrying with him none of the commodities in demand among those people from whom our state is to procure what

it requires, he will also come empty-handed away; will he not?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then it must produce at home not only enough for itself, but also articles of the right kind and quantity to accommodate those whose services it needs.

Adeimantus/ It must.

Socrates/ Then our city requires larger numbers both of husbandmen and other craftsmen.

Adeimantus/ Yes, it does.

Socrates/ And among the rest it will need more of those agents also, who are to export and import the several commodities; and these are merchants, are they not?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we shall require merchants also.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if the traffic is carried on by sea, there will be a further demand for a considerable number of other persons, who are skilled in the practice of navigation.

Adeimantus/ A considerable number, undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But now tell me; in the city itself how are they to exchange their several productions? For it was to promote this exchange, you know, that we formed the community, and so founded our state.

Adeimantus/ Manifestly, by buying and selling.

Socrates/ Then this will give rise to a market and a currency, for the sake of exchange.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Suppose then that the husbandman, or one of the other craftsmen, should come with some of his produce into the market, at a time when none of those who wish to

make an exchange with him are there, is he to leave his occupation and sit idle in the market-place?

Adeimantus/ By no means; there are persons who, with an eye to this contingency, undertake the service required; and these in well-regulated states are, generally speaking, persons of excessive physical weakness, who are of no use in other kinds of labor. Their business is to remain on the spot in the market, and give money for goods to those who want to sell, and goods for money to those who want to buy.

Socrates/ This demand, then, causes a class of retail dealers to spring up in our city. For do we not give the name of retail dealers to those who station themselves in the market, to minister to buying and selling, applying the term merchants to those who go about from city to city?

Adeimantus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ In addition to these, I imagine, there is also another class of operatives, consisting of those whose mental qualifications do not recommend them as associates, but whose bodily strength is equal to hard labor; these, selling the use of their strength and calling the price of it hire, are thence named, I believe, hired laborers. Is it not so?

Adeimantus/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Then hired laborers also form, as it seems, a complementary portion of a state.

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Shall we say then, Adeimantus, that our city has at length grown to its full stature?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Where then, I wonder, shall we find justice and injustice in it? With which of these elements that we have contemplated, has it simultaneously made its entrance?

Adeimantus/ I have no notion, Socrates, unless perhaps it be discoverable somewhere in the mutual relations of these same persons.

Socrates/ Well, perhaps you are right. We must investigate the matter, and not flinch from the task.

Let us consider then, in the first place, what kind of life will be led by persons thus provided. I presume they will produce corn and wine, and clothes and shoes, and build themselves houses; and in summer, no doubt, they will generally work without their coats and shoes, while in winter they will be suitably clothed and shod. And they will live, I suppose, on barley and wheat, baking cakes of the meal, and kneading loaves of the flour. And spreading these excellent cakes and loaves upon mats of straw or on clean leaves, and themselves reclining on rude beds of yew or myrtle-boughs, they will make merry, themselves and their children, drinking their wine, wearing garlands, and singing the praises of the gods, enjoying one another's society, and not begetting children beyond their means, through a prudent fear of poverty or war.

Glaucon here interrupted me, remarking;

Glaucon/ Apparently you describe your men as feasting without anything to relish their bread.

Socrates/ True, I had forgotten; of course they will have something to relish their food; salt, no doubt, and olives and cheese, together with the country fare of boiled onions and cabbage. We shall also set before them a dessert, I imagine, of figs and peas and beans; and they may roast myrtle-berries and beech-nuts at the fire, taking wine with their fruit in moderation. And thus passing their days in

tranquility and sound health, they will, in all probability, live to an advanced age, and dying, bequeath to their children a life in which their own will be reproduced.

Glaucon/ Why Socrates, if you were founding a community of swine, this is just the style in which you would feed them up!

Socrates/ How then, would you have them live, Glaucon?

Glaucon/ In a civilized manner. They ought to recline on couches, I should think, if they are not to have a hard life of it, and dine off tables, and have the usual dishes and dessert of a modern dinner.

Socrates/ Very good; I understand. Apparently we are considering the growth not of a city merely, but of a luxurious city. I dare say it is not a bad plan; for by this extension of our inquiry we shall perhaps discover how it is that justice and injustice take root in cities. Now it appears to me that the city which we have described is the genuine and, so to speak, healthy city. But if you wish us also to contemplate a city that is suffering from inflammation, there is nothing to hinder us. Some people will not be satisfied, it seems, with the fare or the mode of life which we have described, but must have, in addition, couches and tables and every other article of furniture, as well as viands, and fragrant oils, and perfumes, and courtesans, and confectionery; and all these in plentiful variety. Moreover, we must not limit ourselves now to essentials in those articles which we specified at first, I mean houses and clothes and shoes, but we must set painting and embroidery to work, and acquire gold and ivory, and all similar valuables; must we not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we shall also have to enlarge our city, for our first or healthy city will not now be of sufficient size, but

requires to be increased in bulk, and filled out with a multitude of callings, which do not exist in cities to satisfy any natural want; for example, the whole class of hunters, and all who practice imitative arts, including many who use forms and colors, and many who use music, poets also, with those of whom the poet makes use, rhapsodists, actors, dancers, contractors; lastly, the manufacturers of all sorts of articles, and among others those which form part of a woman's dress. We shall similarly require more personal servants, shall we not? that is to say, tutors, wet-nurses, dry-nurses, tire-women, barbers, and cooks moreover and confectioners? Swineherds again are among the additions we shall require, a class of persons not to be found, because not wanted, in our former city, but needed among the rest in this. We shall also need great quantities of all kinds of cattle, for those who may wish to eat them; shall we not?

Glaucon/ Of course we shall.

Socrates/ Then shall we not experience the need of medical men also, to a much greater extent under this than under the former regime?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ The country too, I presume, which was formerly adequate to the support of its then inhabitants will be now too small, and adequate no longer. Shall we say so?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then must we not cut ourselves a slice of our neighbors territory, if we are to have land enough both for pasture and tillage, while they will do the same to ours, if they, like us, permit themselves to overstep the limit of necessaries, and plunge into the unbounded acquisition of wealth?

Glaucon/ It must inevitably be so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Will our next step be to go to war, Glaucon, or how will it be?

Glaucon/ As you say.

Socrates/ At this stage of our inquiry let us avoid asserting either that war does good or that it does harm, confining ourselves to this statement, that we have further traced the origin of war to causes which are the most fruitful sources of whatever evils befall a state, either in its corporate capacity, or in its individual members.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Once more then, my friend, our state must receive an accession of no trifling extent, I mean that of a whole army, which must go forth and do battle with all invaders in defense of its entire property, and of the persons whom we were just now describing.

Glaucon/ How? are not those persons sufficient of themselves?

Socrates/ They are not, if you and all the rest of us were right in the admissions which we made, when we were modeling our state. We admitted, I think, if you remember, that it was impossible for one man to work well at many professions.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Well then, is not the business of war looked upon as a profession in itself?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And have we not as much reason to concern ourselves about the trade of war as about the trade of shoemaking?

Glaucon/ Quite as much.

Socrates/ But we cautioned the shoemaker, you know, against attempting to be an agriculturist or a weaver or a

builder besides, with a view to our shoemaking work being well done; and to every other artisan we assigned in like manner one occupation, namely, that for which he was naturally fitted, and in which, if he let other things alone, and wrought at it all his time without neglecting his opportunities, he was likely to prove a successful workman. Now is it not of the greatest moment that the work of war should be well done? Or is it so easy, that anyone can succeed in it and be at the same time a husbandman or a shoemaker or a laborer at any other trade whatever, although there is no one in the world who could become a good draught-player or dice-player by merely taking up the game at unoccupied moments, instead of pursuing it as his especial study from his childhood? And will it be enough for a man merely to handle a shield or any other of the arms and implements of war, to be straightway competent to play his part well that very day in an engagement of heavy troops or in any other military service, although the mere handling of any other instrument will never make anyone a true craftsman or athlete, nor will such instrument be even useful to one who has neither learnt its capabilities nor exercised himself sufficiently in its practical applications.

Glaucon/ If it were so, these implements of war would be very valuable.

Socrates/ In proportion, then, to the importance of the work which these guardians have to do, will, it require peculiar freedom from other engagements, as well as extraordinary skill and attention.

Adeimantus/ I quite think so.

Socrates/ Will it not also require natural endowments suited to this particular occupation?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then, apparently, it will belong to us to choose out, if we can, that especial order of natural endowments which qualifies its possessors for the guardianship of a state.

Glaucon/ Certainly; it belongs to us.

Socrates/ Then, I assure you, we have taken upon ourselves no trifling task; nevertheless, there must be no flinching, so long as our strength holds out.

Glaucon/ No, there must not.

Socrates/ Do you think then, that there is any difference, in the qualities required for keeping guard, between a well-bred dog and a gallant young man?

Glaucon/ I do not quite understand you.

Socrates/ Why, I suppose, for instance, they ought both of them to be quick to discover an enemy, and swift to overtake him when discovered, and strong also, in case they have to fight when they have come up with him.

Glaucon/ Certainly, all these qualities are required.

Socrates/ Moreover, they must be brave if they are to fight well.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But will either a horse, or a dog, or any other animal, be likely to be brave if it is not spirited? or have you failed to observe what an irresistible and unconquerable thing spirit is, so that under its influence every creature will be fearless and unconquerable in the face of any danger?

Glaucon/ I have observed it.

Socrates/ We know then what bodily qualities are required in our guardian.

Glaucon/ We do.

Socrates/ And also what qualities of the mind, namely, that he must be spirited.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ How then, Glaucon, if such be their natural disposition, are they to be kept from behaving fiercely to one another, and to the rest of the citizens?

Glaucon/ Really it will be difficult to obviate that.

Socrates/ Nevertheless, they certainly ought to be gentle to their friends, and dangerous only to their enemies; else they will not wait for others to destroy them, but will be the first to do it for themselves.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ What then shall we do? Where shall we find a character at once gentle and high-spirited? For I suppose a gentle nature is the opposite of a spirited one?

Glaucon/ Apparently it is.

Socrates/ Nevertheless a man who is devoid of either gentleness or spirit cannot possibly make a good guardian. And as they seem to be incompatible, the result is, that a good guardian is an impossibility.

Glaucon/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ Here then I was perplexed, but having reconsidered our conversation, I said, We deserve, my friend, to be puzzled; for we have deserted the illustration which we set before us.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ It never struck us, that after all there are natures, though we fancied there were none, which combine these opposite qualities.

Glaucon/ Pray where is such a combination to be found?

Socrates/ You may see it in several animals, but particularly in the one which we ourselves compared to our guardian. For I suppose you know that it is the natural disposition of well-bred dogs to be perfectly gentle to their friends and acquaintance, but the reverse to strangers.

Glaucon/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ Therefore the thing is possible; and we are not contradicting nature in our endeavor to give such a character to our guardian.

Glaucon/ So it would seem.

Socrates/ Then is it your opinion, that in one who is to make a good guardian it is further required that his character should be philosophical as well as high-spirited?

Glaucon/ How so? I do not understand you.

Socrates/ You will notice in dogs this other trait, which is really marvelous in the creature.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ Whenever they see a stranger they are irritated before they have been provoked by any ill-usage; but when they see an acquaintance they welcome him, though they may never have experienced any kindness at his hands. Has this never excited your wonder?

Glaucon/ I never paid any attention to it hitherto; but no doubt they do behave so.

Socrates/ Well, but this instinct is a very clever thing in the dog, and a genuine philosophic symptom.

Glaucon/ How so, pray?

Socrates/ Why, because the only mark by which he distinguishes between the appearance of a friend and that of an enemy is, that he knows the former and is ignorant of the latter. How, I ask, can the creature be other than fond of learning when it makes knowledge and ignorance the criteria of the familiar and the strange?

Glaucon/ Beyond a question, it must be fond of learning.

Socrates/ Well, is not the love of learning identical with a philosophical disposition?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Shall we not then assert with confidence in the case of a man also, that if he is to show a gentle disposition towards his relatives and acquaintances, he must have a turn for learning and philosophy?

Glaucon/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Then in our judgment the man whose natural gifts promise to make him a perfect guardian of the state will be philosophical, high-spirited, swift-footed, and strong.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly he will.

Socrates/ This then will be the original character of our guardians. But in what way shall we rear and educate them? And will the investigation of this point help us on towards discovering that which is the object of all our speculations, namely, the manner in which justice and injustice grow up in a state? For I wish us neither to omit anything useful, nor to occupy ourselves with anything redundant, in our inquiry.

Hereupon Glaucon's brother observed;

Adeimantus/ Well, for my part, I fully anticipate that this inquiry will promote our object.

Socrates/ If so, we must certainly not give it up, my dear Adeimantus, even though it should prove somewhat long.

Adeimantus/ Indeed we must not.

Socrates/ Come then, like idle story-tellers in a story, let us describe the education of our men.

Adeimantus/ Yes, let us do so.

Socrates/ What then is the education to be? Perhaps we could hardly find a better than that which the experience of the past has already discovered, which consists, I believe, in gymnastic for the body, and music for the mind.

Adeimantus/ It does.

Socrates/ Shall we not then begin our course of education with music rather than with gymnastic?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly we shall.

Socrates/ Under the term music, do you include narratives, or not?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ And of narratives there are two kinds, the true and the false.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And must we instruct our pupils in both, but in the false first?

Adeimantus/ I do not understand what you mean.

Socrates/ Do you not understand that we begin with children by telling them fables? And these, I suppose, to speak generally, are false, though they contain some truths; and we employ such fables in the treatment of children at an earlier period than gymnastic exercises.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ That is what I meant when I said that music ought to be taken up before gymnastic.

Adeimantus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Then are you aware, that in every work the beginning is the most important part, especially in dealing with anything young and tender? for that is the time when any impression, which one may desire to communicate, is most readily stamped and taken.

Adeimantus/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Shall we then permit our children without scruple to hear any fables composed by any authors indifferently, and so to receive into their minds opinions generally the reverse of those which, when they are grown to manhood, we shall think they ought to entertain?

Adeimantus/ No, we shall not permit it on any account.

Socrates/ Then apparently our first duty will be to exercise a superintendence over the authors of fables, selecting their good productions, and rejecting the bad. And the selected fables we shall advise our nurses and mothers to repeat to their children, that they may thus mold their minds with the fables even more than they shape their bodies with the hand. But we shall have to repudiate the greater part of those which are now in vogue.

Adeimantus/ Which do you mean?

Socrates/ In the greater fables, we shall also discern the less. For the general character and tendency of both the greater and the less must doubtless be identical Do you not think so?

Adeimantus/ I do; but I am equally uncertain which you mean by the greater.

Socrates/ I mean the stories which Hesiod, and Homer, and the other poets, tell us. For they, I imagine, have composed fictitious narratives which they told, and yet tell, to men.

Adeimantus/ Pray what kind of fables do you mean, and what is the fault that you find with them?

Socrates/ A fault, which deserves the earliest and gravest condemnation, especially if the fiction has no beauty.

Adeimantus/ What is this fault?

Socrates/ It is whenever an author gives a bad representation of the characters of gods and heroes, like a painter whose picture should bear no resemblance to the objects he wishes to imitate.

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is quite right to condemn such faults; but pray explain further what we mean, and give some instances.

Socrates/ In the first place, the poet who conceived the boldest fiction on the highest subjects invented an ugly story, when he told how Uranus acted as Hesiod declares he did, and also how Cronus had his revenge upon him. And again, even if the deeds of Cronus, and his sons treatment of him, were authentic facts, it would not have been right, I should have thought, to tell them without the least reserve to young and thoughtless persons; on the contrary, it would be best to suppress them altogether; or, if for some reason they must be told, they should be imparted under the seal of secrecy to as few hearers as possible, and after the sacrifice, not of a pig, but of some rare and costly victim, which might aid to the utmost in restricting their number.

Adeimantus/ Certainly, these are offensive stories.

Socrates/ They are; and therefore, Adeimantus, they must not be repeated in our city. No; we must not tell a youthful listener that he will be doing nothing extraordinary if he commit the foulest crimes, nor yet if he chastise the crimes of a father in the most unscrupulous manner, but will simply be doing what the first and greatest of the gods have done before him.

Adeimantus/ I assure you, I quite agree with you as to the impropriety of such stories.

Socrates/ Nor yet, is it proper to say in any case what is indeed untrue that gods wage war against gods, and intrigue and fight among themselves; that is, if the future guardians of our state are to deem it a most disgraceful thing to quarrel lightly with one another; far less ought we to select as subjects for fiction and embroidery, the battles of the giants, and numerous other feuds of all sorts, in which gods and heroes fight against their own kith and kin. But if there is

any possibility of persuading them, that to quarrel with ones fellow is a sin of which no member of a state was ever guilty, such ought rather to be the language held to our children from the first, by old men and old women, and all elderly persons; and such is the strain in which our poets must be compelled to write. But stories like the chaining of Hera by her son, and the flinging of Hephasstus out of heaven for trying to take his mother's part when his father was beating her, and all those battles of the gods which are to be found in Homer, must be refused admittance into our state, whether they be allegorical or not. For a child cannot discriminate between what is allegory and what is not; and whatever at that age is adopted as a matter of belief, has a tendency to become fixed and indelible, and therefore, perhaps, we ought to esteem it of the greatest importance that the fictions which children first hear should be adapted in the most perfect manner to the promotion of virtue.

Adeimantus/ There is certainly reason in this. But if anyone were to proceed to ask us what these fictions are, and what the fables which convey them, how should we answer him?

Socrates/ My dear Adeimantus, you and I are not poets, on the present occasion, but founders of a state. And founders ought certainly to know the molds in which their poets are to cast their fictions, and from which they must not be suffered to deviate; but they are not bound to compose tales themselves.

Adeimantus/ You are right; but to use your own words, what should these mounds be in the case of Theology?

Socrates/ I think they may be described as follows; It is right, I presume, always to represent God as he really is, whether the poet describe him in an epic or a lyrical or a dramatic poem.

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is right.

Socrates/ Then surely God is good in reality, and is to be so represented?

Adeimantus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Well, but nothing that is good is hurtful, is it?

Adeimantus/ I think not.

Socrates/ And does that which is not hurtful hurt?

Adeimantus/ By no means.

Socrates/ And does that which hurts not, do any evil?

Adeimantus/ I answer as before, no.

Socrates/ And that which does no evil cannot be the cause of any evil either?

Adeimantus/ How should it be?

Socrates/ Well; is that which is good beneficial?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then it is a cause of well-being?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then that which is good is not the cause of all things, but only of what is as it should be, being guiltless of originating evil.

Adeimantus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ If that be so, then God, inasmuch as he is good, cannot be the cause of all things, according to the common doctrine. On the contrary, he is the author of only a small part of human affairs; of the larger part he is not the author; for our evil things far outnumber our good things; and the good things we must ascribe to no other than God, while we must seek elsewhere, and not in him, the causes of the evil things.

Adeimantus/ That seems to me the exact truth.

Socrates/ Then we must express our disapprobation, if Homer, or any other poet, is guilty of such a foolish blunder about the gods, as to tell us that two jars

> By Zeus at his threshold are planted;
> All good fortunes the one, all evil the other contained!

And that he for whom Zeus mixes and gives of both;

> One day lights on evil, and one day meets with blessing;

but as for the man for whom there is no mixture, but who receives of one sort only;

> Him over Gods wide earth fell ravenous hunger pursues.

Nor must we admit that;

> Zeus hath been made unto men both of weal and of woe the dispenser.

And if anyone assert that the violation of oaths and treaties, of which Pandarus was the author, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, we shall refuse our approbation; nor can we allow it to be said that the strife and trial of strength between the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, nor, again, must we let our young people hear that, in the words of Aeschylus;

> When to destruction God will plague a house,
> He plants among its members guilt and sin.

But if a poet writes about the sufferings of Niobe, as Aeschylus does in the play from which I have taken these lines, or the calamities of the house of Pelops, or the disasters at Troy, or any similar occurrences, either we must not allow him to call them the work of a god, or if they are to be so called, he must find out a theory to account for them, such as that for which we are now searching, and must say, that what the god did was righteous and good, and the sufferers were chastened for their profit; but we cannot allow

the poet to say, that a god was the author of a punishment which made the objects of it miserable. No; if he should say that because the wicked are miserable, these men needed chastisement, and the infliction of it by the god was a benefit to them, we shall make no objection; but as to asserting that God, who is good, becomes the author of evil to any, we must do battle uncompromisingly for the principle, that fictions conveying such a doctrine as this, whether in verse or in prose, shall neither be recited or heard in the city, by any member of it, young or old, if it is to be a well-regulated city; because such language may not be used without irreverence, and is moreover both injurious to us and self-contradictory.

Adeimantus/ I vote with you, for this law, which pleases me.

Socrates/ Then one of those theological laws or molds, in accordance with which we shall require our speakers to speak, and our authors to write, will be to this effect, that God is not the author of all things, but only of such as are good.

Adeimantus/ You have proved it quite satisfactorily.

Socrates/ Well, here is a second for you to consider. Do you think that God is a wizard, and likely to appear for special purposes in different forms at different times, sometimes actually assuming such forms, and altering his own person into a variety of shapes, and sometimes deceiving us and making us believe that such a transformation has taken place; or do you think that he is of a simple essence, and that it is the most unlikely thing that he should ever go out of his own proper form?

Adeimantus/ I cannot answer you all at once.

Socrates/ Then answer me this; If anything passes out of its proper form must not the change be produced either by itself or some other thing?

Adeimantus/ It must.

Socrates/ And is it not the case that changes and motions, communicated by anything else, affect least the things that are best? For instance, the body is changed by meat and drink and exertion, and every plant by sunshine and wind, and similar influences; but is not the change slightest in the plant or the body which is healthiest and strongest?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly it is.

Socrates/ So of the mind, is it not the bravest and the wisest that will be the least disturbed and altered by any influence from without?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Moreover, I conceive that the same principle applies to all manufactured things, such as furniture, houses, and clothes; those that are well made and in good condition, are least altered by time and other influences.

Adeimantus/ That is true.

Socrates/ So that everything which is good either by nature or by art, or by both, is least liable to be changed by another thing.

Adeimantus/ So it would seem.

Socrates/ But surely God and the things of God are in every way most excellent.

Adeimantus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Then God will be very unlikely to assume many shapes through external influence.

Adeimantus/ Very unlikely indeed.

Socrates/ But will he change and alter himself?

Adeimantus/ Clearly he must, if he alters at all.

Socrates/ Does he then, by changing himself, attain to something better and fairer, or to something worse and less beautiful than himself?

Adeimantus/ Something worse, necessarily, if he alters at all; for we shall not, I presume, affirm that there is any imperfection in the beauty or the goodness of God.

Socrates/ You are perfectly correct; and this being the case, do you think, Adeimantus, that any god or any man would voluntarily make himself worse than he is, in any respect?

Adeimantus/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Then it is also impossible for a god to be willing to change himself, and therefore it would seem that every god, inasmuch as he is perfect to the utmost in beauty and goodness, abides ever simply and without variation in his own form.

Adeimantus/ The inference is inevitable, I think.

Socrates/ Then, my dear friend, let no poet tell us that;

> Gods in the likeness of wandering strangers,
> Bodied in manifold forms, go roaming from city to city.

And let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, or introduce in tragedies or any other poems, Hera transformed, collecting in the guise of a priestess;

> Alms for the life-giving children of Inachus, river of Argos.

Not to mention many other similar falsehoods, which we must interdict. And once more, let not our mothers be persuaded by these poets into scaring their children by injudicious stories, telling them how certain gods go about by night in the likeness of strangers from every land; that they may not by one and the same act defame the gods, and foster timidity in their children.

Adeimantus/ No, let that be forbidden.

Socrates/ But perhaps, though the gods have no tendency to change in themselves, they induce us, by deception and magic, to believe that they appear in various forms.

Adeimantus/ Perhaps they do.

Socrates/ Would a god consent to lie, think you, either in word, or by an act, such as that of putting a phantom before our eyes?

Adeimantus/ I am not sure.

Socrates/ Are you not sure that a genuine lie, if I may be allowed the expression, is hated by all gods and by all men?

Adeimantus/ I do not know what you mean.

Socrates/ I mean, that to lie with the highest part of himself, and concerning the highest subjects, is what no one voluntarily consents to do; on the contrary, everyone fears above all things to harbor a lie in that quarter.

Adeimantus/ I do not even yet understand you.

Socrates/ Because you think I have some mysterious meaning; whereas what I mean is simply this; that to lie, or be the victim of a lie, and to be without knowledge, in the mind and concerning absolute realities, and in that quarter to harbor and possess the lie, is the last thing any man would consent to; for all men hold in especial abhorrence an untruth in a place like that.

Adeimantus/ Yes, in most especial abhorrence.

Socrates/ Well, but, as I was saying just now, this is what might most correctly be called a genuine lie, namely, ignorance residing in the mind of the deluded person. For the spoken lie is a kind of imitation and embodiment of the anterior mental affection, and not a pure, unalloyed falsity; or am I wrong?

Adeimantus/ No, you are perfectly right.

Socrates/ Then a real lie is hated not only by gods, but likewise by men.

Adeimantus/ So I think.

Socrates/ Once more; when and to whom is the verbal falsehood useful, and therefore undeserving of hatred? Is it not when we are dealing with an enemy? Or when those that are called our friends attempt to do something mischievous in a fit of lunacy or madness of any kind, is it not then that a lie is useful, like a medicine, to turn them from their purpose? And in the legendary tales of which we were talking just now, is it not our ignorance of the true history of ancient times which renders falsehood useful to us, as the closest attainable copy of the truth?

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is exactly the case.

Socrates/ Then on which of these grounds is lying useful to God? Will he lie for the sake of approximation, because he knows not the things of old?

Adeimantus/ No; that would be indeed ridiculous.

Socrates/ Then there is no place in God for the poets falsehood.

Adeimantus/ I think not.

Socrates/ Then will he lie through fear of his enemies?

Adeimantus/ Far from it.

Socrates/ Or because his friends are foolish or mad?

Adeimantus/ Nay; no fool or madman is a friend of the gods.

Socrates/ Then there is no inducement for a god to lie.

Adeimantus/ There is not.

Socrates/ In every way then the nature of gods and godlike beings is incapable of falsehood.

Adeimantus/ Yes, wholly so.

Socrates/ God then is a Being of perfect simplicity and truth, both in deed and word, and neither changes in himself nor imposes upon others, either by apparitions, or by words, or by sending signs, whether in dreams or in waking moments.

Adeimantus/ I believe it to be so myself, after what you have stated.

Socrates/ Then do you grant that a second principle, in accordance with which all speaking and writing about the gods must be molded, is this; That the gods neither metamorphose themselves like wizards, nor mislead us by falsehoods expressed either in word or act?

Adeimantus/ I do grant it.

Socrates/ Then while we commend much in Homer, we shall refuse to commend the story of the dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon, as well as that passage in Aeschylus, where Thetis says that Apollo singing at her marriage;

> Dwelt on my happy motherhood,
> The life from sickness free, and lengthened years.
> Then ail-inclusively he blest my lot,
> Favored of heaven, in strains that cheer'd my soul.
> And I too fondly deem'd those lips divine
> Sacred to truth, fraught with prophetic skill;
> But he himself who sang, the marriage-guest
> Himself, who spoke all this, t'was even he
> That slew my son.

When a poet holds such language concerning the gods, we shall be angry with him, and refuse him a chorus, neither shall we allow our teachers to use his writings for the instruction of the young, if we would have our guardians grow up to be as godlike and god-fearing as it is possible for man to be.

Adeimantus/ I entirely acquiesce. in the propriety of these principles, and would adopt them as laws.

Book 3.

Socrates/ Concerning the gods, then, such, as it would appear, is the language to be held, and such the language to be forbidden, in the hearing of all, from childhood upwards, who are hereafter to honor the gods and their parents, and,, to set no small value on mutual friendship.

Adeimantus/ Yes; and I think our views are correct.

Socrates/ To proceed then; if we intend our citizens to be brave, must we not add to this such lessons as arc likely to preserve them most effectually from being afraid of death? or do you think a man can ever become brave who is haunted by the fear of death?

Adeimantus/ No, indeed, I do not.

Socrates/ Well, do you imagine that a believer in Hades and its terrors will be free from all fear of death, and in the day of battle will prefer it to defeat and slavery?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then apparently we must assume a control over those who undertake to set forth these fables, as well as the others, requesting them not to revile the other world in that unqualified manner, but rather to speak well of it, because such language is neither true, nor beneficial to men who are intended to be warlike.

Adeimantus/ We certainly must.

Socrates/ Then we shall expunge the following passage, and with it all that are like it;

> I would e'en be a villein, and drudge on the lands of a master,
>
> Under a portionless wight, whose garner was scantily furnished,
>
> Sooner than reign supreme in the realm of the dead that have perished.

And this;

And those chambers be seen both by mortal men and immortals,
Terrible, dank, and moldering, even to gods an abhorrence.

And;

Well-a-day! Truly there are, yea e'en in the dwellings of Hades,
Souls and phantom forms; but no understanding is in them.

And;

Wisdom is his alone, mid the flitting and shadowy phantoms.

And;

Vanish'd the soul from the limbs, and flew to the nethermost Hades,
Sadly her destiny wailing, cut off in the ripeness of manhood.

And;

Gibbering, under the ground his spirit fled, like a vapor.

And;

As when bats, in the depth of a caverns awful recesses,
Haply if one fall off from the rock where they hang in a cluster,
Squealing flutter about, and still cling fast to each other,
Thus did the ghosts move squealing together.

These verses, and all that are like them, we shall entreat Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we erase, not because they are unpoetical, or otherwise than agreeable to the ear of most men; but because, in proportion as they are more poetical, so much the less ought they to be recited in the hearing of boys and men, whom we require to be freemen, fearing slavery more than death.

Adeimantus/ By all means let us do so.

Socrates/ Then we must likewise cast away all those terrible and alarming names which belong to these subjects, the Cocytuses, and Styxes, and infernals, and anatomies, and all other words coined after this stamp, the mention of which makes men shudder to the last degree with fear. I dare say that for some other purpose they may be useful; but we are afraid for our guardians, lest the terrors in question should render them more spiritless and effeminate than they ought to be.

Adeimantus/ And our fears are not groundless.

Socrates/ So then we are to discard those expressions, are we?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And to speak and write after the model which is the reverse of this?

Adeimantus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Then shall we also strike out the weeping and the wailings of the heroes of renown?

Adeimantus/ Yes, we must, if we strike out the former.

Socrates/ Just consider, whether we shall be right or not in striking them out. What we maintain is, that a good man will not look upon death as a dreadful thing for another good man, whose friend he also is, to undergo.

Adeimantus/ We do maintain it.

Socrates/ Then if so, he will not lament over such a person as if some dreadful disaster had befallen him.

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Moreover, we say this also, that such a man contains within himself, in the highest degree, whatever is necessary for a happy life, and is distinguished from the rest

of the world by his peculiar independence of external resources.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Then it is less dreadful to him than to anyone to lose a son, or a brother, or worldly wealth, or anything else of that kind.

Adeimantus/ Indeed it is.

Socrates/ If so, he is also less likely than anyone to complain, and will rather bear it with all meekness, whenever any such calamity has overtaken him.

Adeimantus/ Yes, quite so.

Socrates/ Then we shall do well to strike out the dirges put in the mouths of famous men, and make them over to women (and those not the best of their sex), and to the baser sort of men, in order that those whom we profess to be training up to be the guardians of their country may scorn to act like such persons.

Adeimantus/ It will be well to do so.

Socrates/ Then once more, we shall request Homer and the other poets not to represent Achilles, the son of a goddess, as tossing now on his side, and now once more on his back, now on his face; and then as rising up and pacing in frenzy the shore of the waste untamable ocean; nor yet as taking in both hands black burnt-out ashes, and pouring them over his head; nor as otherwise indulging in all that weeping and wailing which Homer has attributed to him; and not to describe Priam, whose near ancestor was a god, as making supplication, and;

> Rolling in dung, and by name to every man loudly appealing;

and still more earnestly we shall beg them, whatever they do, not to represent the gods as complaining and saying;

> Wretch that I am! who bare to my sorrow the bravest of children.

or, if they will not so far respect all the gods, at least we shall entreat them not to presume to draw so unlike a picture of the highest of the gods, as to make him say;

> Well-a-day! Him whom I love, pursued round the walls of the city.

Thus with these eyes I behold, and my heart is troubled within me.

And;

> Ah! woes me for the doom, that the dearest of mortals, Sarpedon,
> Must by Patroclus, Menoetius son, be slain in the combat.

For if, my dear Adeimantus, our young men were to listen seriously to such accounts, instead of laughing at them as unworthy descriptions, it would be very unlikely that anyone of them should look upon himself, that is but a man, as above such behavior, and rebuke himself if he were ever betrayed into it, either in word or act, nay rather, unchecked by shame or fortitude, he will chant a multitude of dirges and laments over even trivial misfortunes.

Adeimantus/ You speak with great truth.

Socrates/ But he ought not so to do, as we have just been taught by our argument; to which we must give heed, until someone can persuade us by another and a better one.

Adeimantus/ Certainly, he ought not.

Socrates/ Again, our guardians ought not to be given to laughter, for when anyone indulges in violent laughter, such excess almost universally invites an equally violent reaction.

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then if a poet represents even men of any consideration as overcome by laughter, our approval must be with; held; much more if gods are so described.

Adeimantus/ Much more indeed.

Socrates/ That being the case, we shall not allow Homer to speak of the gods in such terms as the following;

> Straight mid the blessed gods brake forth
> unquenchable laughter,
> When they beheld Hephaestus go bustling from
> chamber to chamber.

We must not sanction such language, according to your principles.

Adeimantus/ If you like to call them mine; no doubt we must not sanction them.

Socrates/ But again, a high value must be set also upon truth. For if we were right in what we said just now, and falsehood is really useless to the gods, and only useful to men in the way of a medicine, it is plain that such an agent must be kept in the hands of physicians, and that unprofessional men must not meddle with it.

Adeimantus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ To the rulers of the state then, if to any, it belongs of right to use falsehood, to deceive either enemies or their own citizens, for the good of the state; and no one else may meddle with this privilege. Nay, for a private person to tell a lie to such magistrates, we shall maintain to be at least as great a mistake as for a patient to deceive his physician, or a pupil his training-master, concerning the state of his own body; or for a sailor to tell an untruth to a pilot concerning the ship and the crew, in describing his own condition or that of any of his fellow-sailors.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ If then the authorities find anyone else guilty of lying in the city;

> Any of those that be craftsmen,
> Prophet and seer, or healer of hurts, or worker in timber.

they will punish him for introducing a practice as pernicious and subversive in a state as in a ship.

Adeimantus/ Yes, if performance follow upon profession.

Socrates/ Once more, will not our young men need to be temperate?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly they will.

Socrates/ And does not sobriety, as generally understood, imply the following principal elements; first, that men be obedient to their governors; and secondly, that they be themselves able to govern the pleasures which are gratified in eating, and drinking, and love?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then we shall approve, I imagine, of all language like that which Homer puts in the mouth of Diomedes;

> Friend, sit down in silence, and give good heed to our sayings.

and of the lines that follow;

> Wrath-breathing march'd the Achaians,
> Silently dreading their captains;

and of everything else of the same kind.

Adeimantus/ Yes, we shall.

Socrates/ But can we approve of such language as this;

> Drunken sot, who the face of a dog and the heart of a deer hast.

and of what follows, and all the other insolent expressions which in prose or in poetry are put into the mouths of inferiors towards those in authority?

Adeimantus/ No, we cannot.

Socrates/ Because, I imagine, they do not tend to promote sobriety in youth. If on other accounts they give any gratification we need not be surprised. Is this your opinion?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ But tell me; when the wisest of men is represented as saying that it appears to him the finest sight in the world, when

> Tables are loaded Both with bread and with flesh, and the cup-bearers draw from the wine-bowl
>
> Sparkling draughts, which they carry around, and replenish the goblets;

do you think that being told this will aid a young man in acquiring self-control? or this

> Tis most wretched by famine to die, and ones doom to encounter.

Or what do you think of representing Zeus as so readily forgetting, in the eagerness of his desire, all that he had been meditating, as he watched alone, while all others, gods and men, were asleep; and so smitten at the sight of Hera, that he would not even defer the gratification of his passion till they should enter into their chamber, saying that he was possessed by a stronger passion than even then, when at first they met without the knowledge of their dear parents? And what say you to the story a how Ares and Aphrodite were bound in fetters by Hephaestus in consequence of a similar proceeding?

Adeimantus/ Upon my word, such stories strike me as. very improper to be told.

Socrates/ But whatever acts of fortitude under all trials in deed and word are ascribed to men of renown, these we will contemplate and listen to, as for instance;

> Smiting his breast, to his heart thus spoke he in accents of chiding,
>
> Patience, I pray thee, my heart; thou hast borne even worse provocation.

Adeimantus/ Yes, by all means.

Socrates/ Further, we must not permit our men, I presume, to be receivers of bribes or lovers of money?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then we must not sing to them that

> Gods are persuaded by gifts, by gifts dread kings are persuaded.

Nor must we praise Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, or allow that he spoke with wisdom when he advised him to aid the Achasans if he received presents from them, but without presents not to dismiss his anger. And we shall not believe or allow that Achilles himself was so avaricious as to take gifts from Agamemnon, and at another time to give up a dead body only on condition of receiving a price for it.

Adeimantus/ No; it is not right to commend such stories.

Socrates/ It is only my regard to Homer, that makes me slow to assert that it is a positive sin to say these things of Achilles, or to believe them when others say them; or again, to believe that he said to Apollo;

> Thou, far-worker, hast harmed me, no god so destructive as thou art;
>
> Verily, had I the power, I would take vengeance upon thee;

and that he behaved in so refractory a manner to the river, who was a god, as to be prepared to fight with him; and that

he said of the hair that was consecrated to the other river Spercheius;

> Fain would I offer this hair as a gift to the hero Patroclus.

who was then a corpse, and that he fulfilled his purpose; all these tales are not to be believed. And again, all the stories of his dragging Hector round the tomb of Patroclus, and of his immolation of the captives on the funeral pile, we shall unhesitatingly declare untrue; and we shall not allow our young men to be persuaded that Achilles, the son of a goddess and of Peleus, who was a most discreet prince, and third in descent from Zeus, and the pupil of Cheiron, that wisest of teachers, was yet such a compound of confusions, as to combine in himself two such opposite maladies as mean covetousness and arrogant contempt of gods and men.

Adeimantus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Then let us not believe, once more, or allow it to be said, that Theseus the son of Poseidon, and Peirithous the son of Zeus, went forth to commit so dire a rape; nor that any other god-sprung hero could have ventured to perpetrate such dreadful impieties as at the present day are falsely ascribed to them; rather let us oblige our poets to admit, either that the deeds in question were not their deeds, or else that they were not children of gods; but let them beware of combining the two assertions, and of attempting to make our young men believe that the gods are parents of evil, and that heroes are no better than common men; for, as we said above, these statements are at once irreverent and untrue; for we have proved, I believe, that evils cannot originate with the gods.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly we have.

Socrates/ And besides, such language is pernicious to the hearers; for everyone will be indulgent to vice in himself, if

he is convinced that such were and still are the practices of those who are;

> Kinsfolk of gods, not far from Zeus himself,
> Whose is the altar to ancestral Zeus
> Upon the hill of Ida, in the sky;
> And still within their veins flows blood divine.

On these accounts we must suppress such fables, lest they engender in our young men a great aptitude for wickedness.

Adeimantus/ I entirely agree with you.

Socrates/ What class then still remains, to complete our description of the kinds of narratives which may or may not be circulated? We have already stated what rules must be regarded in speaking of the gods, and the demigods, and heroes, and the souls of the departed.

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ Then the mode of speaking about men will be the remaining subject, will it not?

Adeimantus/ Yes, obviously.

Socrates/ It is quite impossible, my friend, to settle this at the present stage of our inquiry.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ Because, I imagine, we shall assert that in fact poets and writers of prose are alike in error in the most important particulars, when they speak of men, making out that many are happy, though unjust, and many just, yet miserable, and that injustice is profitable if it be not found out, whereas justice is a gain to your neighbor, but a loss to yourself; and I imagine we shall forbid the use of such language, and lay our commands on all writers to express the very opposite sentiments in their songs and their legends. Do you not think so?

Adeimantus/ Nay, I am sure of it.

Socrates/ Then, as soon as you admit that I am right in that, shall I not fairly maintain that you have admitted the very proposition which is the subject of our inquiry?

Adeimantus/ Your assumption is correct.

Socrates/ Then must we not postpone coming to an agreement as to the terms to be employed in speaking of men, till we have first discovered the real nature of justice, and proved that it is naturally profitable to its possessor, whether he have the character of being just or not?

Adeimantus/ You are perfectly right.

Socrates/ Let us then here close our discussion of the subject matter of narratives; our next task, I imagine, is to investigate the question of their form; and this done, we shall have thoroughly considered both what ought to be said, and the mode of saying it.

Adeimantus/ I do not understand what you mean by that.

Socrates/ Well, but it is important that you should. Perhaps you will see it better when I put it in this way. May not all the compositions of poets or legend-writers be described as narrations of past, present, or future events?

Adeimantus/ What else could they be?

Socrates/ Then does not the author obtain his object, either by narration simple, or by narration conveyed through the medium of imitation, or by a mixture of both?

Adeimantus/ This also, still requires to be made more intelligible to me.

Socrates/ Apparently I am a ridiculously unintelligible teacher. I will therefore proceed like a man who has not the gift of making speeches; I will not attempt the general question, but I will detach a particular instance, and endeavor thereby to make my meaning clear to you. Tell me then, are you well acquainted with the beginning of the Iliad,

in which the poet tells us that Chryses besought Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that Agamemnon was angry with him; whereupon Chryses, finding his suit denied, prayed to his god to avenge him on the Achaeans?

Adeimantus/ I am.

Socrates/ You know then that down to the lines;

> He petitioned all the Achaeans,
>
> Chiefly the twain that marshaled the host, the children of Atreus.

the poet speaks in his own person, and does not even attempt to divert our thoughts into supposing that the speaker is any other than himself; but in what follows he speaks in the person of Chryses, and endeavors, so far as he can, to make us believe that it is not Homer who is speaking, but the aged priest. And in this style, as nearly as may be, he has constructed all the rest of his narrative of the Trojan war, as well as of the events that took place in Ithaca, and throughout the Odyssey.

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ It is equally narration, is it not, whether the poet is reciting the occasional speeches, or describing the intermediate events?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly it is.

Socrates/ But when he delivers a speech in the character of another man, shall we not say that on every such occasion he aims at the closest resemblance in style to the person introduced as the speaker?

Adeimantus/ We shall, of course.

Socrates/ And when one man assumes a resemblance to another, in voice or look, is not that imitation?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly it is.

Socrates/ Then in such a case it appears that both Homer and other poets carry on the narration through the medium of imitation.

Adeimantus/ Certainly they do.

Socrates/ But if the poet nowhere concealed his own personality, he would have completed his composition and narration wholly without imitation. That you may not say again that you do not understand how this would be, I will tell you. If Homer, after saying that Chryses came, bringing his daughters ransom, in the character of a suppliant to the Achaeans, and above all to the kings, had continued to speak, not as if he had become Chryses, but as if he were Homer still, that, you know, would have been not imitation, but simple narration. The story would have run in something like the following manner. I shall tell it in prose, for I am no poet. The priest came and prayed that the gods might grant to the Greeks the capture of Troy, and a safe return, if only they would release unto him his daughter, accepting the ransom, and reverencing his god. And when he had thus spoken, all the rest were moved with awe, and were willing to consent; but Agamemnon was wroth, and charged him to depart, and come again no more, lest the staff and the wreaths of the god should avail him naught; and ere his daughter should be set free, he said, she should grow old with him in Argos; so he bade him be gone, and avoid provoking him, if he wished to reach home unhurt. And the old man, when he heard it, was afraid, and went away in silence; but when he was clear of the camp he prayed much to Apollo, calling upon the god by his titles, and putting him in remembrance, and asking to be repaid, if ever he had presented an acceptable offering to him in the building of temples or the sacrifice of oblations; in consideration of which things he prayed that he would avenge his tears upon

the Achaeans, by shooting his arrows among them. In this, my friend, we have simple narration without imitation.

Adeimantus/ I understand.

Socrates/ I would further have you understand, that the opposite result ensues, when you strike out the poets own words that stand between the speeches, leaving only the alternate dialogue.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I understand; tragedies are a case of this sort.

Socrates/ You are perfectly right in your supposition. Now I think I can make you see clearly what before I could not, that one branch of poetry and legend-writing consists wholly of imitation, that is, as you say, tragedy and comedy; another branch employs the simple recital of the poet in his own person, and is chiefly to be found, I imagine, in dithyrambic poetry; while a third employs both recital and imitation, as is seen in the construction of epic poems, and in many other instances, if I make you understand me.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I quite comprehend now what you meant by that first remark.

Socrates/ Now then recall what we said previously; which was, that having settled the question of the matter of composition, it only remained for us to consider the manner.

Adeimantus/ I remember.

Socrates/ This then was precisely what I meant; that it was incumbent on us to come to an agreement, whether we should allow our poets, in telling their story, to employ imitation exclusively, or partially, (and, if so, by what criterion they should be guided,) or not at all.

Adeimantus/ I divine, that you are speculating whether we shall admit tragedy and comedy into our city, or not.

Socrates/ It may be so; and it may be that other claims will be questioned besides those of tragedy and comedy; in fact, I do not yet know myself; but we must go where the argument carries us, as a vessel runs before the wind.

Adeimantus/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ Here then is a question for you to consider, Adeimantus, Ought our guardians to be apt imitators, or not? Or does it follow, from our previous admissions, that any individual may pursue with success one calling, but not many; or, if he attempts this, by his meddling with many he will fail in all, so far as to gain no distinction in any?

Adeimantus/ That would undoubtedly be the case.

Socrates/ Does not the same principle apply to imitation, or can the same person imitate many things as well as he can imitate one?

Adeimantus/ Certainly he cannot.

Socrates/ It is very improbable, then, that one who is engaged in any important calling, will at the same time know how to imitate a variety of things, and be a successful imitator; for even two branches of imitation, which are thought to be closely allied, are more, I believe, than can be successfully pursued together by the same person; as, for instance, the writing of comedy and of tragedy, which you described just now as imitations, did you not?

Adeimantus/ I did; and you are right in saying that the same persons cannot succeed in both.

Socrates/ Nor yet can a man combine the professions of a reciter of epic poetry and an actor.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Nay, the same actor cannot even play both Tragedy and Comedy; and all these are arts of imitation, are they not?

Adeimantus/ They are.

Socrates/ And human nature appears to me, Adeimantus, to be split up into yet more minute subdivisions than these, so that a man is unable to imitate many things well, or to do the things themselves of which the imitations are likenesses.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ If then we are to maintain our first view, that our guardians ought to be released from every other craft, that they may acquire consummate skill in the art of creating their countries freedom, and may follow no other occupation but such as tends to this result, it will not be desirable for them either to practice or to imitate anything else; or if they do imitate, let them imitate from very childhood whatever is proper to their profession, brave, sober, religious, honorable men, and the like, but meanness, and every other kind of baseness, let them neither practice nor be skilled to imitate, lest from the imitation they be infected with the reality. For have you not perceived that imitations, whether of bodily gestures, tones of voice, or modes of thought, if they be persevered in from an early age, are apt to grow into habits and a second nature?

Adeimantus/ Certainly I have.

Socrates/ Then we shall not permit those in whom we profess to take an interest, and whom we desire to become good men, to imitate a woman, being themselves men, whether she be young or old, either reviling a man, or striving and vaunting against the gods, in the belief of her own felicity; or taken up with misfortunes, and griefs, and complaints; much more shall we forbid them to imitate one that is ill, or in love, or in labor.

Adeimantus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Again, they must not be permitted to imitate slaves of either sex engaged in the occupations of slaves.

Adeimantus/ No, they must not.

Socrates/ Nor yet bad men, it would seem, such as cowards, and generally those whose conduct is the reverse of what we described just now; men in the act of abusing and caricaturing one another, and uttering ribaldry, whether drunk or sober, or committing any of those offences against others, or amongst themselves, of which such men both in word and in deed are wont to be guilty. I think also that we must not accustom them to liken themselves to madmen, in word or in act. For though it is right they should know mad and wicked people of both sexes, they ought not to act like them, nor give imitations of them.

Adeimantus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Again, may they imitate smiths or any other craftsmen, working at their trade, or rowers pulling at the oars in a galley, or their strokesmen, or anything else of the kind?

Adeimantus/ Impossible, since they are not to be permitted even to pay attention to any of these occupations.

Socrates/ Once more, shall they give imitations of horses neighing and bulls bellowing, or of roaring rivers and sounding seas, and claps of thunder, or of any such phenomena?

Adeimantus/ Nay, we have forbidden them either to be mad themselves, or to liken themselves to madmen.

Socrates/ If then I understand what you mean, there is a certain kind of style in narration which an honorable and accomplished man will adopt, whenever he is called upon to narrate anything; and another kind, unlike the former, to which a man who by nature and education is of the opposite character, will on such occasions always adhere.

Adeimantus/ Pray what are the two kinds?

Socrates/ The former, or the man of well-regulated character, when he comes, in telling a story, to a speech or action of a good man, will, I think, like to report it as if he were himself the subject of the narrative, and will not be ashamed of this kind of imitation, preferring to imitate the good man when his conduct is steady and sensible, and doing so less frequently and faithfully when he has been thrown off his balance by sickness or love, or it may be by intoxication or some other misfortune; but when he comes to a character that is unworthy of him, instead of being willing seriously to liken himself to his inferior, except perhaps for a short time, when the man is performing a good action, he will be ashamed to do it, partly because he has had no practice in imitating such characters, and partly, because in his deliberate contempt for them he disdains to mold and cast himself after the models of baser men, unless it be for mere pastime.

Adeimantus/ So one would expect.

Socrates/ Then will he not use that style of narration which we described a little while since by referring to the poems of Homer, so that his style will partake both of imitation and of ordinary narration, the former however making but a small part of a long discourse? Or am I quite wrong?

Adeimantus/ Nay, you describe accurately what must be the model of such a speaker.

Socrates/ Then again, the man who is not of this character, the more contemptible he is, will be the more inclined to omit nothing in his narration, and to think nothing too low for him, so that he will attempt, seriously and in the presence of many hearers, to imitate everything without exception, even the phenomena we mentioned just

now, claps of thunder and the noise of wind and of hail, and of wheels and pulleys, and the sounds of trumpets and flutes and pipes and all manner of instruments; nay, even the barking of dogs, the bleating of sheep, and the notes of birds; and his style will either consist wholly of the imitation of sounds and forms, or will comprise but a small modicum of narration.

Adeimantus/ This must also inevitably be the case.

Socrates/ These then are the two kinds of style which I meant.

Adeimantus/ True, there are two such styles.

Socrates/ Do you see then that the transitions which occur in one of the two are trifling; and if you can adapt a suitable harmony and rhythm to the style, it is nearly possible for correct recitation to proceed without change of style and in one harmony, the transitions being inconsiderable, and also in a similarly unchanging rhythm?

Adeimantus/ That is precisely the case.

Socrates/ Well, and does not the other kind require, on the contrary, all sorts of harmonies and rhythms, if in its turn it is to be appropriately recited, owing to the infinite variety of its transitions?

Adeimantus/ Most decidedly it does.

Socrates/ Then do all poets and all who narrate anything fall into one or other of these two types of style, or else into one which is formed by blending these two together?

Adeimantus/ They must.

Socrates/ What shall we do then? Shall we admit all the three types into our state, or only one of them, that is to say, either the composite type, or else one or other of the uncompounded?

Adeimantus/ If my judgment is to prevail, we shall admit only the pure and simple type which imitates the virtuous man.

Socrates/ Nevertheless, Adeimantus, there is an attraction about the composite type; while by far the most attractive of all, to children and the attendants of children and to the vulgar mass, is the opposite of that which you prefer.

Adeimantus/ It is true.

Socrates/ But perhaps you will say that it is not in harmony with the genius of our commonwealth, because with us there is no twofold or manifold man, since everyone has one single occupation.

Adeimantus/ You are quite right; it would not be in harmony.

Socrates/ And is not this the reason why in a state like ours, and in no other, we shall find the shoemaker a shoemaker, and not a pilot in addition, and the husbandman a husbandman, and not a juryman in addition, and the soldier a soldier, and not a tradesman in addition; and so on throughout?

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ It is probable then, that if a man should arrive in our city, so clever as to be able to assume any character and imitate any object, and should propose to make a public display of his talents and his productions, we shall pay him reverence as a sacred, admirable, and charming personage, but we shall tell him that in our state there is no one like him, and that our law excludes such characters, and we shall send him away to another city after pouring perfumed oil upon his head, and crowning him with woolen fillets; but for ourselves, we shall employ, for the sake of our real good, that more austere and less fascinating poet and legend-

writer, who will imitate for us the style of the virtuous man, and will cast his narratives in those molds which we prescribed at the outset, when we were engaged with the training of our soldiers.

Adeimantus/ We shall certainly do so, if it be in our power.

Socrates/ Now then, my dear friend, it would seem that we have completely done with that branch of music which relates to fabulous and other narratives; for we have described both what is to be said, and how it is to be said.

Adeimantus/ I think so too.

Socrates/ Then our next subject, is that of melody and songs, is it not?

Adeimantus/ Clearly it is.

Socrates/ Then can it be difficult now for anyone to discover what we ought to say about them and their proper character, if we are to be consistent with our previous conclusions?

Here Glaucon smiled, and said;

Glaucon/ Then I am afraid that I, Socrates, do not come under the term anyone; that is, I cannot this moment come to a satisfactory conclusion as to what kinds we must sanction, though I have my suspicions.

Socrates/ I presume, at all events, you feel quite able to affirm so much as this, that a song consists of three parts, the words, the harmony, and the rhythm.

Glaucon/ Yes, I can affirm that.

Socrates/ Then I presume that between the words of a song and words not set to music there is no difference, so far as concerns the propriety of their being composed in accordance with the types which we lately appointed, and in the same manner.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And you will grant that the harmony and the rhythm ought to follow the words.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But we said, you know, that in the case of words we did not require dirges and complaints.

Glaucon/ No, we do not.

Socrates/ Which then are the plaintive harmonies? tell me, for you are musical.

Glaucon/ Mixed Lydian and Hyperlydian, and such as are like these.

Socrates/ These then must be discarded; for they are useless even to women that are to be virtuously given, not to say to men.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And you will grant that drunkenness, effeminacy, and idleness are most unbecoming things in guardians.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly they are.

Socrates/ Which of the harmonies then are effeminate and convivial?

Glaucon/ The Ionian and the Lydian, which are called lax.

Socrates/ Will you employ these then, my friend, in the training of men of war?

Glaucon/ By no means; and if I mistake not, you have only the Dorian and the Phrygian left you.

Socrates/ I do not know the harmonies myself; only see you leave me that particular harmony which will suitably represent the tones and accents of a brave man engaged in a feat of arms, or in any violent operation, who, if he fails of success, or encounters wounds and death, or falls into any other calamity, in all such contingencies with unflinching

endurance parries the blows of fortune; leave me also another harmony, expressive of the feelings of one who is engaged in an occupation not violent, but peaceful and unconstrained; it may be, using persuasion and entreaty, addressing either a prayer to a god, or instruction and advice to a man; or, on the other hand, lending himself to the prayers or advice or persuasion of another, and after this succeeding to his wish; and not behaving arrogantly, but acting in all these circumstances with soberness and moderation, and in the same spirit acquiescing in every result. Leave me these two harmonies, the one violent, the other tranquil, such as shall best imitate the tones of men in adversity and in prosperity, in a temperate and in a courageous mood.

Glaucon/ Well, you are recommending me to leave precisely those which I just mentioned.

Socrates/ Then we shall not require for our songs and instrumental accompaniments a variety of strings, or an instrument embracing all harmonies.

Glaucon/ I believe not.

Socrates/ Then we shall not maintain the makers of harps or dulcimers, or any instrument that has many strings and serves for many harmonies.

Glaucon/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ But will you admit into your city flute-makers and flute-players? or am I right in saying that the flute has more strings than any other instrument, and that the panharmonium itself is only an imitation of the flute?

Glaucon/ Manifestly you are right.

Socrates/ Then you have the lyre and the guitar remaining, which will be of service in the town; while in the country the herdsmen will have some kind of pipe.

Glaucon/ So at least the argument indicates to us.

Socrates/ Surely we are guilty of no innovation, my friend, in preferring Apollo and Apollos instruments to Marsyas and his instruments.

Glaucon/ No, I really think we are not.

Socrates/ Well, I protest, we have been unconsciously purging the city, which we said just now was in too Luxurious a condition.

Glaucon/ And we have done wisely.

Socrates/ Come then, let us finish our purgation. Next after the harmonies will follow our law of rhythms, to the effect that we must not aim at a variety of them, or study all movements indiscriminately, but observe what are the natural rhythms of a well-regulated and manly life, and when we have discovered these we must compel the foot and the music to suit themselves to the sense of such a life, and not the sense to suit itself to the foot and the music. But what these rhythms may be, it is your business to explain, as you did the harmonies.

Glaucon/ Nay, but in good faith, I cannot tell. I certainly could say, from what I have observed, that there are three principal kinds into which all movements may be analyzed, as in the case of sounds there are four kinds into which all harmonies may be resolved; but which kinds of rhythm express which kinds of life, I cannot say.

Socrates/ Well, we will call in Damon to our counsels upon the question, what movements are akin to meanness and insolence, or to madness and other vices, and what rhythms are to be left as expressive of the opposite qualities. But I fancy that I have heard him indistinctly alluding to a certain complex warlike rhythm, and another that was daclylic, and a third heroic, arranging them I know not how, and showing that the rise and fall of each foot balance one another, by resolving them into short and long syllables; and

he gave the name iambus to a certain foot, if I am not wrong, and trochee to another, affixing to them long and short marks. And in some of these, I think, he would blame or praise the march of the foot no less than the rhythm, or perhaps the two taken together; for I cannot speak positively. But let these questions, as I said before, be referred to Damon; for to settle them would require no short discussion; or do you think differently?

Glaucon/ No, indeed I do not.

Socrates/ But this point at least you can settle, that grace and awkwardness accompany a good or a bad rhythm?

Glaucon/ Of course they do.

Socrates/ And good and bad rhythm are, by a process of assimilation, results of a good style and its opposite respectively; and the same may be said of good and bad harmony, that is to say, if rhythm and harmony are to suit themselves to the words, as was asserted just now, and not the words to them.

Glaucon/ No doubt they must suit themselves to the words.

Socrates/ But what do you say of the style and the words? are they not determined by the moral disposition of the soul?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly they are.

Socrates/ And is all the rest determined by the style?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then good language and good harmony and grace and good rhythm all depend upon a good nature, by which I do not mean that silliness which by courtesy we call Good-nature, but a mind that is really well and nobly constituted in its moral character.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Then must not our young men on all occasions pursue these qualities, if we intend them to perform their proper work?

Glaucon/ Yes, they must.

Socrates/ And such qualities, I presume, enter largely into painting and all similar workmanship, into weaving and embroidery, into architecture, as well as the whole manufacture of utensils in general; nay, into the constitution of living bodies, and of all plants; for in all these things gracefulness or ungracefulness finds place. And the absence of grace, and rhythm, and harmony, is closely allied to an evil style, and an evil character; whereas their presence is allied to, and expressive of, the opposite character, which is brave and sober-minded.

Glaucon/ You are entirely right.

Socrates/ This being the case, ought we to confine ourselves to superintending our poets, and compelling them to impress on their productions the likeness of a good moral character, on pain of not composing among us; or ought we to extend our superintendence to the professors of every other craft as well, and forbid them to impress those signs of an evil nature, of dissoluteness, of meanness, and of ungracefulness, either on the likenesses of living creatures, or on buildings, or any other work of their hands; altogether interdicting such as cannot do otherwise from working in our city, that our guardians may not be reared amongst images of vice, as upon unwholesome pastures, culling much every day by little and little from many places, and feeding upon it, until they insensibly accumulate a large mass of evil in their inmost souls? Ought we not, on the contrary, to seek out artists of another stamp, who by the power of genius can trace out the nature of the fair and the graceful, that our young men, dwelling as it were in a

healthful region, may drink in good from every quarter, whence any emanation from noble works may strike upon their eye or their ear, like a gale wafting health from salubrious lands, and win them imperceptibly from their earliest childhood into resemblance, love, and harmony with the true beauty of reason?

Glaucon/ Such a nurture, would be by far the best.

Socrates/ Is it then, Glaucon, on these accounts that we attach such supreme importance to a musical education, because rhythm and harmony sink most deeply into the recesses of the soul, and take most powerful hold of it, bringing gracefulness in their train, and making a man graceful if he be rightly nurtured, but if not, the reverse? and also because he that has been duly nurtured therein will have the keenest eye for defects, whether in the failures of art, or the misgrowths of nature; and feeling a most just disdain for them, will commend beautiful objects, and gladly receive them into his soul, and feed upon them, and grow to be noble and good; whereas he will rightly censure and hate all repulsive objects, even in his childhood, before he is able to be reasoned with; and when reason comes, he will welcome her most cordially who can recognize her by the instinct of relationship, and because he has been thus nurtured?

Glaucon/ I have no doubt, that such are the reasons for a musical education.

Socrates/ You know, that in learning to read we were considered tolerably perfect, as soon as we could be sure of recognizing the few letters there are, scattered about in all existing words, and that we never treated them with disrespect in either a small word or a great, as if it did not

signify to notice them, but were anxious to distinguish them everywhere, believing that we should be no scholars till we were thus qualified.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Is it not also true that we shall not know the images of letters, as reflected either in still water or in a mirror, until we know the letters themselves, because the knowledge of both the reflections and the originals belongs to the same art and study?

Glaucon/ It is perfectly true.

Socrates/ Tell me then, I pray you, to pass from my illustration to the things illustrated, shall we in like manner never become truly musical, neither ourselves, nor the guardians whom we say we are to instruct, until we know the essential forms Of temperance and courage and liberality and munificence, and all that are akin to these, and their opposites also, wherever they are scattered about, and discern them wherever they are to be found, themselves and their images, never slighting them either in small things or in great, but believing the knowledge of the forms and of their images to belong to the same art and study?

Glaucon/ It must inevitably be so.

Socrates/ Surely, then, to him who has an eye to see, there can be no fairer spectacle than that of a man who combines the possession of moral beauty in his soul with outward beauty of form, corresponding and harmonizing with the former, because the same great pattern enters into both. There can be none so fair. And you will grant that what is fairest is loveliest?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly it is.

Socrates/ Then the truly musical person will love those who combine most perfectly moral and physical beauty, but will not love anyone in whom there is dissonance.

Glaucon/ No, not if there be any defect in the soul; but if it is only a bodily blemish, he may so bear with it as to be willing to regard it with complacency.

Socrates/ I understand, that you have now, or have had, a favorite of this kind; so I give way. But tell me this; has pleasure in excess any fellowship with temperance?

Glaucon/ How can it have, when it unsettles the mind no less than pain?

Socrates/ Has it any with virtue generally?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well; has it anything in common with wantonness and licentiousness?

Glaucon/ Most assuredly it has.

Socrates/ Can you mention any pleasure that is greater and more violent than that which accompanies the indulgence of the passion of love?

Glaucon/ I cannot; nor yet one that is more akin to madness.

Socrates/ But is it not the nature of legitimate love to desire an orderly and beautiful object in a sober and harmonious temper?

Glaucon/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ Then nothing akin to madness or licentiousness must approach legitimate love?

Glaucon/ It must not.

Socrates/ Then the pleasure in question must not approach it, nor must a lover and his beloved, whose affections are rightly given and returned, have anything to do with it.

Glaucon/ They must not, indeed, Socrates.

Socrates/ Apparently then, in the state we are organizing, you will legislate to this effect, that though a lover may be

attached to a favorite, and frequent his society, and embrace him as a son, for his beauties sake, if he can gain his consent; yet in other matters he shall so regulate his intercourse with the person he affect, as that he shall never be suspected of extending his familiarity beyond this, on pain of being censured for vulgarity and want of taste, if he acts otherwise.

Glaucon/ We shall do so.

Socrates/ Do you then think with me that our theory of music is now complete? At all events, it has ended where it ought to end; for music, I imagine, ought to end in the love of the beautiful.

Glaucon/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ Gymnastic will hold the next place to music in the education of our young men.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ No doubt a careful training in gymnastic, as well as in music, ought to begin with their childhood, and go on through all their life. But the following is the true view of the case, in my opinion; see what you think of it. My belief is, not that a good body will by its own excellence, make the soul good; but on the contrary, that a good soul will by its excellence render the body as perfect as it can be; but what is your view?

Glaucon/ The same as yours.

Socrates/ Then if we were first to administer the requisite treatment to the mind, and then to charge it with the task of prescribing details with reference to the body, contenting ourselves with indicating no more than the general principles, in order to avoid prolixity, should we be doing right?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ We have already said that the persons in question must refrain from drunkenness; for a guardian is the last person in the world, I should think, to be allowed to get drunk, and not know where he is.

Glaucon/ Truly it would be ridiculous for a guardian to require guard.

Socrates/ But about eating; our men are combatants in a most important arena, are they not?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ Then will the habit of body which is cultivated by the trained fighters of the palaestra be suitable to such persons?

Glaucon/ Perhaps it will.

Socrates/ Well, but this is a sleepy kind of regimen, and produces a precarious state of health. For do you not observe that men in the regular training sleep their life away, and if they depart only slightly from the prescribed diet, are attacked by serious maladies in their worst form?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then a better conceived regimen is required for our athletes of war, who must be wakeful like watch-dogs, and possess the utmost quickness both of eye and ear, and who are so exposed, when on service, to variations in the water they drink and the rest of their food, and to vicissitudes of sultry heats and wintry storms, that it will not do for them to be of precarious health.

Glaucon/ I believe you are right.

Socrates/ Then will the best gymnastic be sister to the music which we described a little while ago?

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ It will, I imagine, be a simple moderate system, especially that assigned to our fighting men.

Glaucon/ What will it be like?

Socrates/ On these points we may take a lesson even from Homer. You know that at the repasts of his heroes, when they are in the field, he never sets fish before them, although they are upon the shore of the Hellespont, nor yet boiled meat, but only roast, which soldiers could of course procure most readily; for anywhere, one may say, there is less difficulty in using mere fire than in carrying about pots and pans.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Neither has Homer, if I remember right, ever said a word about sauces. However, this is as well known, I believe, to all that are in training, as to Homer, that a man who desires to be in good condition must abstain from all such indulgences; is it not?

Glaucon/ They do know it, and are right in abstaining from them.

Socrates/ Then apparently, my good friend, you do not approve of a Syracusan table, and of a Sicilian variety of dishes, if you hold such abstinence to be right.

Glaucon/ I think I do not.

Socrates/ Then you also disapprove of a taste for the damsels of Corinth, in men who are to be in good bodily condition.

Glaucon/ Most assuredly I do.

Socrates/ Then do you also condemn those celebrated delicacies, our Athenian confectionery?

Glaucon/ Of course I do.

Socrates/ In fact, it would not be amiss, I imagine, to compare this whole system of feeding and living to that kind of music and singing which is adapted to the panharmonium, and composed in every variety of rhythm.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly it would be a just comparison.

Socrates/ Is it not true, then, that as in music variety begat dissoluteness in the soul, so here it begets disease in the body, while simplicity in gymnastic is as productive of health, as in music it was productive of temperance?

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ But when dissoluteness and diseases abound in a city, are not law-courts and surgeries opened in abundance, and do not law and physic begin to hold their heads high, when numbers even of well-born persons devote themselves with eagerness to these professions?

Glaucon/ What else can we expect?

Socrates/ But where can you find a more signal proof that a low and vicious education prevails in a state, than in the fact that first-rate physicians and jurymen are in request, not merely among base-born mechanics, but even among those who lay claim to the birth and breeding of gentlemen? Does it not seem to you a scandalous thing, and a strong proof of defective education, to be obliged to import justice from others, in the character of lords and judges, in consequence of the scanty supply at home?

Glaucon/ Nothing can be more scandalous.

Socrates/ Do you think it at all less scandalous, when a man not only consumes the greater part of his life in courts of law as plaintiff or defendant, but actually has the vulgarity to plume himself upon this very fact, boasting of being an adept in crime, and such a master of tricks and turns, of maneuver and evasion, as always to be able to wriggle out of the grasp of justice, and escape from punishment, and that for the sake of worthless trifles, not knowing how much nobler and better it were so to order his life as never to stand in need of a sleepy judge?

Glaucon/ Nay, this is even a greater scandal than the other.

Socrates/ And do you not hold it disgraceful to require medical aid, unless it be for a wound, or an attack of illness incidental to the time of year, to require it, I mean, owing to our laziness, and the life we lead, and to get ourselves so stuffed with humors and wind, like quagmires, as to compel the clever sons of Asclepius to call diseases by such names as flatulence and catarrh.

Glaucon/ To be sure these are very strange and newfangled names for disorders.

Socrates/ Such as did not exist, I imagine, in Asclepius's time. So I infer, because at Troy, when Eurypylus was wounded, his sons did not blame the woman who gave him a draught of Pramnian wine, with a plentiful sprinkling of barley-meal, and with cheese grated over it, which you know would be thought an inflammatory mixture, nor did they rebuke Patroclus who dressed his wounds.

Glaucon/ Certainly, it was a strange potion for a man in his state.

Socrates/ Not if you consider that formerly, till the time of Herodicus, as we are told, the disciples of Asclepius did not employ our present system of medicine, which waits upon diseases as the son of a rich man is waited on by his attendant. But Herodicus, who was a training-master, and fell into bad health, made such a compound of physic and gymnastic, that he first and chiefly worried out himself, and then many others after him.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ By rendering his death a lingering one. For he followed his disease, which was a mortal one, step by step, and while he was unable, as I imagine, to cure himself, he devoted his whole time to the business of doctoring himself;

living continually in torment, if ever he deviated from his usual diet; and thus struggling against death, was brought by his cleverness to old age.

Glaucon/ A noble prize for his art to win him!

Socrates/ It is what one might expect, from a person ignorant that it was not because Asclepius did not know, or had not tried this kind of medical treatment, that he never discovered it to his descendants; but because he was aware that in all well-regulated communities each has a work assigned to him in the state, which he must needs do, and that no one has leisure to spend his life as an invalid in the doctors hands; a fact which we perceive in the case of the laboring population, but which, with ludicrous inconsistency, we fail to detect in the case of those who are reputed rich and happy.

Glaucon/ How is that?

Socrates/ When a carpenter is ill, he expects to receive a draught from his doctor, that will expel the disease by vomiting or purging, or else to get rid of it by cauterizing, or a surgical operation; but if anyone were to prescribe to him a long course of diet, and to order bandages for his head, with other treatment to correspond, he would soon tell such a medical adviser that he had no time to be ill, and that it was not worth his while to live in this way, devoting his mind to his malady, and neglecting his proper occupation; and then wishing the physician a good morning, he would enter upon his usual course of life, and either regain his health and live in the performance of his business; or, should his constitution prove unable to bear up, death puts an end to his troubles.

Glaucon/ Yes; and for a man in that station of life this is thought the proper use to make of medical assistance.

Socrates/ Is it because he had a work to do, which, if he failed to perform, it was not worth his while to live?

Glaucon/ Manifestly.

Socrates/ But the rich man, as we say, has no appointed work of such a character, that, if compelled to leave it undone, life is to him not worth having.

Glaucon/ No; it is supposed he has not.

Socrates/ Then you do not listen to Phocylides, when he says;

> that so soon as a man has got whereon to live, then he ought to practice virtue.

Glaucon/ Yes, and before that too, I should think.

Socrates/ Let us have no quarrel with him on this subject; but let us inform ourselves whether the rich have to practice virtue so that, if they do not, life is worthless to them; or, whether valetudinarianism, though an obstacle to mental application in carpentering and the other arts, forms no impediment to the fulfillment of the precept of Phocylides.

Glaucon/ Nay, in very truth, I believe there is no greater impediment to it than that excessive care of the body which extends beyond gymnastic; for it is alike harassing to a man, whether he be engaged in domestic business, or serving in the field, or sitting as a magistrate at home.

Socrates/ But quite the worst of it is, that it is a grievous hindrance to studies of all kinds, and reflection, and inward meditation, being ever apprehensive of some headache, or dizziness, which it accuses philosophy of producing; and therefore in so far as virtue is practiced and proved by intellectual study, it is a sheer obstacle to it; for it makes a man always fancy himself ill, and never lets him rest from the pangs of anxiety about his health.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is the natural effect of it.

Socrates/ Then must we not maintain that Asclepius, knowing all this, revealed the healing art for the benefit of those whose constitutions were naturally sound, and had not been impaired by their habits of life, but who were suffering from some specific complaint, and that he used to expel their disorders by drugs and the use of the knife, without interrupting their customary avocations, that he might not damage the interests of the state; but that where the constitution was thoroughly diseased to the core, he would not attempt to protract a miserable existence by a studied regimen, drawing off from the system, and again pouring into it a little at a time, and suffer his patients to beget children, in all probability as diseased as themselves; thinking medical treatment ill bestowed on one who could not live in his regular round of duties, since such a person is of no use either to himself or to the state?

Glaucon/ You make out Asclepius to have been a profound statesman.

Socrates/ Clearly so; and because he was a man of that description, his sons, as you must have observed, proved themselves brave men in the battle before Troy, and also employed the healing art in the manner I have described. Or have you forgotten that when Menelaus had been wounded by the spear of Pandarus;

> Sucking the blood from the gash, they laid mild simples upon it.

But what he was to eat or drink after this, they no more prescribed in his case than that of Eurypylus, knowing that the simples were sufficient to cure men who before receiving the wounds were healthy and regular in their mode of life, even if they happened to drink the next moment a compound of meal, wine, and cheese; but as for the constitutionally diseased and the intemperate, they thought the existence of such a man no gain either to himself or to others, believing

that their art was not meant for persons of that sort, and that it would be wrong to attempt their cure, even if they were richer than Midas.

Glaucon/ The sons of Asclepius were, by your account, very shrewd fellows.

Socrates/ And it was meet they should be. And yet the tragedians, and Pindar, dissent from us; and while they assert that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, declare that he was induced by a bribe of gold to raise to life a rich man who was already dead, which was indeed the cause of his being smitten by a thunderbolt. But we, agreeably to our principles, cannot believe both these statements of theirs; on the contrary, we shall maintain, that if he was the son of a god, he was not covetous; if he was covetous, he was not the son of a god.

Glaucon/ In that, we shall be perfectly right. But what say you, Socrates, on this point? ought we not to have good physicians in our city? Now the best physicians, I imagine, will be those who have had the largest practice both among the healthy and among the diseased; just as the best jurors in like manner will be those who have mixed with men of all varieties of character.

Socrates/ Decidedly, I am for having good ones; but do you know whom I consider such?

Glaucon/ I shall if you inform me.

Socrates/ I will try to do so; but your question, I must premise, spoke of two dissimilar things in the same words.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Physicians, it is true, would acquire the greatest expertness if from their childhood upwards they not only studied their profession, but also came in contact with the greatest number of the worst cases, and had personal experience of every kind of malady, and were naturally not

very healthy. For it is not the physicians body, I imagine, which cures the bodies of others; if it were, it could not-be suffered at any time to be, or to become, diseased; but his mind, which cannot direct any treatment skillfully, if it has become, or always was, depraved.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ But a juror, my friend, governs mind by mind; his mind therefore cannot be suffered to be reared from a tender age among vicious minds, and to associate with them,, and to run the whole round of crimes in its own experience, in order to be quick at inferring the guilt of others from its own self-knowledge, as is allowable in the case of bodily disorders; on the contrary, it ought from his early youth to have been free from all experience and taint of evil habits, if it is to be qualified by its own thorough excellence to administer sound justice. And this is the reason why good people, when young, appear to be simple and easy victims to the impositions of bad men, because they have not in their own consciousness examples of like passions with the wicked.

Glaucon/ Yes, they are exceedingly liable to such imposition.

Socrates/ Therefore, to make a good juror a man must not be young, but old; and his knowledge of what injustice is should be acquired late in life, not by observing it as an inmate of his own soul, but by long practice in discerning its baneful nature, as it exists out of himself in the souls of others; in other words, guided by knowledge, not by personal experience.

Glaucon/ Certainly, that would seem to be the noblest style of juror.

Socrates/ Yes, and a good one too, which is the point in question; for he that has a good soul is good. But your smart

and suspicious juryman, who has been guilty himself of many crimes, and fancies himself knowing and clever, so long as he has to deal with men like himself, betrays astonishing wariness, thanks to those inward examples which he has ever in sight; but when he comes into communication with men of years and virtue, he shows himself to be no better than a fool, with his mistimed suspicions, and his ignorance of a healthy character, which are the consequences of his not possessing any example of such a phenomenon. But as he falls in oftener with wicked than with good men, he seems both to himself and others to be rather clever than foolish.

Glaucon/ That is most true.

Socrates/ It is not then in a man of this stamp that we must look for our good and wise juror, but in one of the former class. For vice can never know both itself and virtue; but virtue, in a well-instructed nature, will in time acquire a knowledge at once of itself and of vice. The virtuous man therefore, in my opinion, and not the vicious man, will make the wise judge.

Glaucon/ I quite agree with you.

Socrates/ Then will you not establish in your city the two faculties, of medicine and of law, each having the character we have described, to bestow their services on those only of the citizens whose bodily and mental constitutions are sound and good, leaving those that are otherwise in body to die, and actually putting to death those who are naturally corrupt and incurable in soul?

Glaucon/ Yes; this has been proved to be the best course both for the patients themselves and for the state.

Socrates/ As for the young men, it is clear that they will be cautious how they incur any need of law, so long as they use that simple kind of music which, as we stated, generates sobriety in the soul.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ If then the accomplished student of music follow this same track in the pursuit of gymnastic, may he not, if he pleases, so far succeed as to be independent of the medical art except in extreme cases?

Glaucon/ I think he may.

Socrates/ Moreover, in the exercises and toils which he imposes upon himself, his object will be rather to stimulate the spirited element of his nature than to gain strength; and he will not, like athletes in general, take the prescribed food and exercise merely for the sake of muscular power.

Glaucon/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ Then, Glaucon, am I also right in saying that those who establish a system of education in music and gymnastic, are not actuated by the purpose which some persons attribute to them, of applying the one to the improvement of the soul, the other to that of the body?

Glaucon/ Why what can be their object, if this is not?

Socrates/ Probably they introduce both mainly for the sake of the soul.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Do you not observe the characteristics which distinguish the minds of those who have been familiar with gymnastic all their lives, without any acquaintance with music? and again, of those whose condition is the reverse of this?

Glaucon/ To what do you allude?

Socrates/ To the roughness and hardness which mark the one, and the softness and gentleness which mark the other.

Glaucon/ O yes. Those who have devoted themselves to gymnastic exclusively, become ruder than they ought to be; while those who have devoted themselves to music are made softer than is good for them.

Socrates/ We know, however, that rudeness is the natural product of the spirited element, which, if rightly nurtured, will be brave; but, if strained to an improper pitch, will in all probability become harsh and disagreeable.

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ Well, and will not gentleness be a property of the philosophic temperament? and a property which, if too much indulged, will produce in it an excess of softness; but which, rightly nurtured, will render it gentle and orderly?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But we say that our guardians ought to combine both these temperaments.

Glaucon/ They ought.

Socrates/ Then must they not be mutually harmonized?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ And where this harmony exists, the soul is both temperate and brave?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And where it is wanting, the soul is cowardly and coarse?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Accordingly, when a man surrenders himself to music and flute-playing, and suffers his soul to be flooded through the funnel of his ears with those sweet and soft and plaintive harmonies of which we just spoke, and spends his

whole life in warbling and delighting himself with song, such a man at the outset tempers like steel whatever portion of the spirited element he possesses, and makes it useful instead of brittle and useless; if, however, he relaxes not in his devotion, but yields to the enchantment, he then begins to liquefy and waste away, till the spirit is melted out of him, and the sinews of his soul are extirpated, and he is made a feeble wielder of the lance.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ And if he has received a spiritless soul originally from the hand of nature, this result is soon brought to pass; but if the contrary, he so enfeebles his spirit as to render it easily swayed, quickly kindled and quickly slaked by trifling causes. Consequently, such persons, instead of being spirited, are made choleric and irritable, and the prey of morose tempers.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Well, but if, on the other hand, he devotes himself to hard labor in gymnastic, and indulges to his heart's content in good living, while he keeps aloof from music and philosophy, does not the excellent condition of his body at first inspire him with self-confidence and spirit, and make him surpass himself in courage?

Glaucon/ Yes, that it does.

Socrates/ But what is the consequence of thus engaging in this one occupation, to the total exclusion of the Muses influence? Even supposing him to have possessed at first some taste for learning, yet if that taste is never fed with knowledge or inquiry, and takes no part in rational discourse or any intellectual pursuits, does it not become weak and deaf and blind, from the want of stimulus and nourishment, and because its senses are never thoroughly purged?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Consequently such a man becomes a hater of discussion, I imagine, and an illiterate person; and abandoning the use of rational persuasion, he settles all his business like a wild beast by violence and roughness, and lives in ignorance and awkwardness, with no symmetry and no grace.

Glaucon/ That is exactly the case.

Socrates/ To correct; then, as it would appear, these two exclusive temperaments, the spirited and the philosophic, some god, as I for my part shall maintain, has given to men two arts, music and gymnastic, not for soul and body distinctively, except in a secondary way, but expressly for those two temperaments, in order that by the increase or relaxation of the tension to the due pitch they may be brought into mutual accord.

Glaucon/ So it would appear.

Socrates/ Then whosoever can best blend gymnastic with music, and bring both to bear on the mind most judiciously, such a man we shall justly call perfect in music, and a master of true harmony, much rather than the artist who tunes the strings of the lyre.

Glaucon/ Yes, and with good reason, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then will not some such overseer be always needed in our state, Glaucon, if our commonwealth is designed to endure?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed, such an officer will be quite indispensable.

Socrates/ Such then will be the outlines of our system of education and training. For why should one enter into details respecting the dances which will be in vogue in a state like ours, the hunting and field-exercises, or the sports of the gymnasium and the race-course? It is tolerably clear

that these must correspond with the foregoing outlines, and there will be no further difficulty in discovering them.

Glaucon/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ Very good; then what will be the next point for us to settle? is it not this, which of the persons so educated are to be the rulers, and which the subjects?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably it is.

Socrates/ There can be no doubt that the rulers must be the elderly men, and the subjects the younger.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And also that the rulers must be the best men among them.

Glaucon/ True again.

Socrates/ Are not the best agriculturists those who are most agricultural?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ In the present case, as we require the best guardians, shall we not find them in those who are most capable of guarding a state?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then for this purpose must they not be intelligent and powerful, and, moreover, careful of the state?

Glaucon/ They must.

Socrates/ And a man will be most careful of that which he loves?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And assuredly he will love that most whose interests he regards as identical with his own, and in whose prosperity or adversity he believes his own fortunes to be involved.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Then we must select from the whole body of guardians those individuals who appear to us, after due observation, to be remarkable above others for the zeal with which, through their whole life, they have done what they have thought advantageous to the state, and inflexibly refused to do what they thought the reverse.

Glaucon/ Yes, these are the suitable persons.

Socrates/ Then I think we must watch them at every stage of their life, to see if they are tenacious guardians of this conviction, and never bewitched or forced into a forgetful abandonment of the belief that they ought to do what is best for the state.

Glaucon/ What is this abandonment you speak of?

Socrates/ I will tell you. Opinions appear to me to quit the mind either by a voluntary or involuntary act; a false opinion by a voluntary act, when the holder learns his error; but a true opinion invariably by an involuntary act.

Glaucon/ I understand the notion of a voluntary abandonment, but I have yet to learn the meaning of the involuntary.

Socrates/ Well, then, do you not agree with me, that men are deprived of good things against their will, of evil things with their will? And is it not an evil thing to be the victim of a lie, and a good thing to possess the truth? And do you not think that a man is in possession of the truth when his opinions represent things as they are?

Glaucon/ Yes, you are right; and I believe that men are deprived of a true opinion against their will.

Socrates/ Then, when this happens, must it not be owing either to theft, or witchcraft, or violence?

Glaucon/ I do not even now understand.

Socrates/ I am afraid I use language as obscure as tragedy. By those who have a theft practiced on them, I mean such as are argued out of, or forget, their belief, because, in the one case argument, and in the other, time, privily carries off their opinion. Now, I fancy, you understand?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ By those who have violence done to them I mean all whose opinions are changed by pain or grief.

Glaucon/ That too I understand, and I think you are right.

Socrates/ And those who are bewitched, you would yourself, I believe, assert to be those who change their opinion either through the seductions of pleasure or under the pressure of fear.

Glaucon/ Yes; everything that deceives may be said to bewitch.

Socrates/ Then, as I said just now, we must inquire who are the best guardians of this inward conviction, that they must always do that which they think best for the state. We must watch them, I say, from their earliest childhood, giving them actions to perform in which people would be most likely to forget, or be beguiled of, such a belief, and then we must select those whose memory is tenacious, and who are proof against deceit, and exclude the rest. Must we not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ We must also appoint them labors, and vexations, and contests, in which we must watch for the same symptoms of character.

Glaucon/ Rightly so.

Socrates/ And, as a third kind of test, we must try them with witchcraft, and observe their behavior; and, just as young horses are taken into the presence of noise and

tumult, to see whether they are timid, so must we bring our men, while still young, into the midst of objects of terror, and presently transfer them to scenes of pleasure, trying them much more thoroughly than gold is tried in the fire, to find whether they show themselves under all circumstances inaccessible to witchcraft, and seemly in their bearing, good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have been taught, approving themselves on every occasion true to the laws of rhythm and harmony, and acting in such a way as would render them most useful to themselves and the state. And whoever, from time to time, after being put to the proof, as a child, as a youth, and as a man, comes forth uninjured from the trial, must be appointed a ruler and guardian of the city, and must receive honors in life and in death, and be admitted to the highest privileges, in the way of funeral rites and other tributes to his memory. And all who are the reverse of this character must be rejected. Such appears to me, Glaucon, to be the true method of selecting and appointing our rulers and guardians, described simply in outline, without accuracy in detail.

Glaucon/ I am pretty much of your mind.

Socrates/ Is it then really most correct to give to these the name of perfect guardians, as being qualified to take care that their friends at home shall not wish, and their enemies abroad not be able, to do any mischief; and to call the young men, whom up to this time we entitled guardians, auxiliaries, whose office it is to support the resolutions of the rulers?

Glaucon/ I quite think so.

Socrates/ This being the case, can we contrive any ingenious mode of bringing into play one of those seasonable falsehoods of which we lately spoke, so that, propounding a single spirited fiction, we may bring even the rulers

themselves, if possible, to believe it, or if not them, the rest of the city?

Glaucon/ What kind of fiction?

Socrates/ Nothing new, but a Phoenician story, which has been realized often before now, as the poets tell and mankind believe, but which in our time has not been, nor, so far as I know, is likely to be realized, and for which it would require large powers of persuasion to obtain credit.

Glaucon/ You seem very reluctant to tell it.

Socrates/ You will think my reluctance very natural when I have told it.

Glaucon/ Speak out boldly and without fear.

Socrates/ Well I will; and yet I hardly know where I shall find the courage or where the words to express myself. I shall try, I say, to persuade first the rulers themselves and the military class, and after them the rest of the city, that when we were training and instructing them, they only fancied, as in dreams, that all this was happening to them and about them, while in reality they were in course of formation and training in the bowels of the earth, where they themselves, their armor, and the rest of their equipments were manufactured, and from whence, as soon as they were thoroughly elaborated, the earth, their real mother, sent them up to its surface; and, consequently, that they ought now to take thought for the land in which they dwell, as their mother and nurse, and repel all attacks upon it, and to feel towards their fellow-citizens as brother children of the soil.

Glaucon/ It was not without reason that you were so long ashamed to tell us your fiction.

Socrates/ I dare say; nevertheless, hear the rest of the story. We shall tell our people, in mythical language; You are doubtless all brethren, as many as inhabit the city, but the God who created you mixed gold in the composition of such

of you as are qualified to rule, which gives them the highest value; while in the auxiliaries he made silver an ingredient, assigning iron and copper to the cultivators of the soil and the other workmen. Therefore, inasmuch as you are all related to one another, although your children will generally resemble their parents, yet sometimes a golden parent will produce a silver child, and a silver parent a golden child, and so on, each producing any. The rulers therefore have received this in charge first and above all from the gods, to observe nothing more closely, in their character of vigilant guardians, than the children that are born, to see which of these metals enters into the composition of their souls; and if a child be born in their class with an alloy of copper or iron, they are to have no manner of pity upon it, but giving it the value that belongs to its nature, they are to thrust it away into the class of artisans or agriculturists; and if again among these a child be born with any admixture of gold or silver, when they have assayed it, they are to raise it either to the class of guardians, or to that of auxiliaries; because there is an oracle which declares that the city shall then perish when it is guarded by iron or copper. Can you suggest any device by which we can make them believe this fiction?

Glaucon/ None at all by which we could persuade the men with whom we begin our new state; but I think their sons, and the next generation, and all subsequent generations, might be taught to believe it.

Socrates/ Well, even this might have a good effect towards making them care more for the city and for one another; for I think I understand what you mean. However, we will leave this fiction to its fate; but for our part, when we have armed these children of the soil, let us lead them forward under the command of their officers, till they arrive at the city; then let them look around them to discover the most eligible position for their camp, from which they may best coerce the

inhabitants, if there be any disposition to refuse obedience to the laws, and repel foreigners, if an enemy should come down like a wolf on the fold. And when they have pitched their camp, and offered sacrifices to the proper divinities, let them arrange their sleeping-places. Is all this right?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ And these sleeping-places must be such as will keep out the weather both in winter and summer, must they not?

Glaucon/ Certainly; you mean dwelling-houses, if I am not mistaken.

Socrates/ I do; but the dwelling-houses of soldiers, not of moneyed men.

Glaucon/ What is the difference which you imply?

Socrates/ I will endeavor to explain it to you. I presume it would be a most monstrous and scandalous proceeding in shepherds to keep for the protection of their flocks such a breed of dogs, or so to treat them, that owing to unruly tempers, or hunger, or any bad propensity whatever, the dogs themselves should begin to worry the sheep, and behave more like wolves than dogs.

Glaucon/ It would be monstrous, undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then must we not take every precaution that our auxiliary class, being stronger than the other citizens, may not act towards them in a similar fashion, and so resemble savage monsters rather than friendly allies?

Glaucon/ We must.

Socrates/ And will they not be furnished with the best of safeguards, if they are really well educated?

Glaucon/ Nay, but they are that already.

Socrates/ It is not worthwhile now to insist upon that point, my dear Glaucon; but it is most necessary to maintain

what we said this minute, that they must have the right education, whatever it may be, if they are to have what will be most effectual in rendering them gentle to one another, and to those whom they guard.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But besides this education a rational man would say that their dwellings and their circumstances generally should be arranged on such a scale as shall neither prevent them from being perfect guardians, nor provoke them to do mischief to the other citizens.

Glaucon/ He will say so with truth.

Socrates/ Consider then, whether the following plan is the right one for their lives and their dwellings, if they are to be of the character I have described. In the first place, no one should possess any private property, if it can possibly be avoided; secondly, no one should have a dwelling or storehouse into which all who please may not enter; whatever necessaries are required by temperate and courageous men, who are trained to war, they should receive by regular appointment from their fellow-citizens, as wages for their services, and the amount should be such as to leave neither a surplus on the years consumption nor a deficit; and they should attend common messes and live together as men do in a camp; as for gold and silver, we must tell them that they are in perpetual possession of a divine species of the precious metals placed in their souls by the gods themselves, and therefore have no need of the earthly ore; that in fact it would be profanation to pollute their spiritual riches by mixing them with the possession of mortal gold, because the worlds coinage has been the cause of countless impieties, whereas theirs is undefiled; therefore to them, as distinguished from the rest of the people, it is forbidden to handle or touch gold and silver, or enter under the same roof

with them, or to wear them on their dresses, or to drink out of the precious metals. If they follow these rules, they will be safe themselves and the saviors of the city; but whenever they come to possess lands, and houses, and money of their own, they will be householders and cultivators instead of guardians, and will become hostile masters of their fellow-citizens rather than their allies; and so they will spend their whole lives, hating and hated, plotting and plotted against, standing in more frequent and intense alarm of their enemies at home than of their enemies abroad; by which time they and the rest of the city will be running on the very brink of ruin. On all these accounts, shall we say that the foregoing is the right arrangement of the houses and other concerns of our guardians, and shall we legislate accordingly; or not?

Glaucon/ Yes, by all means.

Book 4.

Socrates/ Here Adeimantus interposed, inquiring;

Adeimantus/ Then what defense will you make, Socrates, if anyone protests that you are not making the men of this class particularly happy? when it is their own fault, too, if they are not; for the city really belongs to them, and yet they derive no advantage from it, as others do, who own lands and build fine large houses, and furnish them in corresponding style, and perform private sacrifices to the gods, and entertain their friends, and, in fact, as you said just now, possess gold and silver, and everything that is usually considered necessary to happiness; nay, they appear to be posted in the city, as it might be said, precisely like mercenary troops, wholly occupied in garrison duties.

Socrates/ Yes, and for this they are only fed, and do not receive pay in addition to their rations, like the rest, so that it will be out of their power to take any journeys on their own account, should they wish to do so, or to make presents to mistresses, or to lay out money in the gratification of any other desire, after the plan of those who are considered happy. These and many similar counts you leave out of the indictment.

Adeimantus/ Well, let us suppose these to be included in the charge. What defense then shall we make, say you?

Socrates/ Yes. By travelling the same road as before, we shall find, I think, what to say. We shall reply that, though it would not surprise us, if even this class in the given circumstances were very happy, yet that our object in the construction of our state is not to make anyone class preeminently happy, but to make the whole state as happy as it can be made. For we thought that in such a state we should be most likely to discover justice, as, on the other hand, in the worst-regulated state we should be most likely

to discover injustice, and that after having observed them we might decide the question we have been so long investigating. At present, we believe we are forming the happy state, not by selecting a few of its members and making them happy, but by making the whole so. Presently we shall examine a state of the opposite kind. Now, if someone came up to us while we were painting statues, and blamed us for not putting the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the body, because the eyes, being the most beautiful part, were not painted purple, but black, we should think it a sufficient defense to reply, Pray, sir, do not suppose that we ought to make the eyes so beautiful as not to look like eyes, nor the other parts in like manner, but observe whether, by giving to every part what properly belongs to it, we make the whole beautiful. In the same way do not, in the present instance, compel us to attach to our guardians such a species of happiness as shall make them anything but guardians. For we are well aware that we might, on the same principle, clothe our cultivators in long robes, and put golden coronets on their heads, and bid them till the land at their pleasure; and that we might stretch our potters at their ease on couches before the fire, to drink and make merry, placing the wheel by their side, with directions to ply their trade just so far as they should feel it agreeable; and that we might dispense this kind of bliss to all the rest, so that the entire city might thus be happy. But give not such advice to us; since, if we comply with your recommendation, the cultivator will be no cultivator, the potter no potter; nor will any of those professions, which make up a state, maintain its proper character. For the other occupations it matters less; for in cobblers, incompetency and degeneracy and pretense without the reality, are not dangerous to a state; but when guardians of the laws and of the state are such in appearance only, and not in reality, you

see that they radically destroy the whole state, as, on the other hand, they alone can create public prosperity and happiness. If then, while we aim at making genuine guardians, who shall be as far as possible from doing mischief to the state, the supposed objector makes a class who would be cultivators and as it were jovial feasters at a holiday gathering, rather than citizens of a state, he will be describing something which is not a state. We should examine then whether our object in constituting our guardians should be to secure to them the greatest possible amount of happiness, or whether our duty, as regards happiness, is to see if our state as a whole enjoys it, persuading or compelling these our auxiliaries and guardians to study only how to make themselves the best possible workmen at their own occupation, and treating all the rest in like manner, and thus, while the whole city grows and becomes prosperously organized, permitting each class to partake of as much happiness as the nature of the case allows to it.

Adeimantus/ I think, that what you say is quite right.

Socrates/ I wonder whether you will think the proposition that is sister to the last satisfactory also.

Adeimantus/ What may that be?

Socrates/ Consider whether the other craftsmen are similarly injured and spoiled by these agencies.

Adeimantus/ What agencies do you mean?

Socrates/ Wealth, and poverty.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ Thus; Do you think that a potter after he has grown rich will care to attend to his trade any longer?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But he will become more idle and careless than he was before?

Adeimantus/ Yes, much more.

Socrates/ Then does he not become a worse potter?

Adeimantus/ Yes, a much worse potter too.

Socrates/ On the other hand, if he is prevented by poverty from providing himself with tools or any other requisite of his trade, he will produce inferior articles, and his sons or apprentices will not be taught their trade so well.

Adeimantus/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ Then both these conditions, riches and poverty, deteriorate the productions of the artisans, and the artisans themselves.

Adeimantus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Then apparently we have found some other objects for the vigilance of our guardians, who must take every precaution that they may never evade their watch and steal into the city.

Adeimantus/ What are these?

Socrates/ Wealth, and poverty; because the former produces luxury and idleness and innovation, and the latter, meanness and bad workmanship as well as innovation.

Adeimantus/ Exactly so. But on the other hand, consider, Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, if it possesses no wealth, especially in the case of its being compelled to take the field against a rich and populous state.

Socrates/ Obviously, against one such state it will be hard for it to carry on war, but against two it will be easier.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ In the first place, if they are obliged to fight, will not their antagonists be rich men, while they themselves are trained soldiers?

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is true so far.

Socrates/ What then, Adeimantus? Do you not believe that one pugilist trained in the most perfect manner to his work would find it easy to fight with two rich and fat men, who do not understand boxing?

Adeimantus/ Not with both at once, perhaps.

Socrates/ What not if he were able to give ground till one of his assailants was in advance of the other, and then to rally and attack him, repeating these tallies frequently under a burning sun? Could not such a combatant worst even more than two such antagonists?

Adeimantus/ Indeed, there would be nothing very surprising in it.

Socrates/ And do you not think that the rich are better acquainted, both theoretically and practically, with boxing, than with the art of war?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Then in all probability our trained soldiers will find no difficulty in fighting double or treble their own number.

Adeimantus/ I shall give in to you; for I believe you are right.

Socrates/ But suppose they were to send an embassy to one of the two cities, and to say, what would be true, We make no use of gold and silver, nor is it allowed among us, though it is among you; therefore join your forces with ours, and let the property of the other people be yours; do you think that any persons, after being told this, would choose to wage war against lean and wiry dogs, instead of making common cause with the dogs against fat and tender sheep?

Adeimantus/ I fancy not. But may not the accumulation of the wealth of the other party in one city be fraught with danger to the city which is not wealthy?

Socrates/ I congratulate you, on your idea, that it is proper to describe as a city any that is not the counterpart of that which we were organizing.

Adeimantus/ Why, what would you have?

Socrates/ The others ought to be called by some grander name; for each of them is very many cities, and not a city, as they say in the game. In any case, there are two, hostile one to the other, the city of the poor, and the city of the rich; and each of these contains very many cities; and if you deal with them as one, you will find yourself thoroughly mistaken; but if you treat them as many, and give to one class the property and the power, or even the persons of another, you will always have many allies and few enemies. And so long as your city is governed discreetly on the principles recently laid down, it will be very large; I do not mean that it will enjoy that reputation, but really and truly it will be very large, even if its army consists of no more than a thousand men. For you will not easily find one city as large as that, either among the Greeks or among the barbarians, though you may find many cities which seem to be several times as large. Do you think differently?

Adeimantus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ This then, will also serve as the best standard for our governors to adopt, in regulating the size of the state, and the amount of land which they should mark off for a state of the due size, leaving the rest alone.

Adeimantus/ What is the standard?

Socrates/ The following I conceive; so long as the city can grow without abandoning its unity, up to that point it may be allowed to grow, but not beyond it.

Adeimantus/ A very good rule;

Socrates/ Then we shall lay this additional injunction upon our guardians, to take every precaution that the city be neither small nor in appearance large, but characterized by sufficiency and unity.

Adeimantus/ A trivial duty, perhaps, to impose upon them.

Socrates/ We will add, another yet more trivial than this, which we touched upon before, when we said that it would be right to send away any inferior child that might be born among the guardians, and place it in another class; and if a child of peculiar excellence were born in the other classes, to place him among the guardians. This was intended to intimate that the other citizens also ought to be set to the work for which nature has respectively qualified them, each to someone work, that so each practicing his single occupation may become not many men, but one, and that thus the whole city may grow to be one city and not many cities.

Adeimantus/ Yes, this is a smaller affair than the former.

Socrates/ Really, my good Adeimantus, these injunctions of ours are not, as one might suppose, a number of arduous tasks, but they will all be inconsiderable, if the guardians diligently observe the one great point, as the saying is, though it should rather be called sufficient than great.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Education, and rearing. For if by a good education they be made reasonable men, they will readily see through all these questions, as well as others which we pass by for the present, such as the relations between the sexes, marriage, and the procreation of children; in all which things they will see that the proverb ought, as far as

possible, to be followed, which says that among friends everything is common property.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that would be the most correct plan.

Socrates/ And indeed, if a state has once started well, it exhibits a kind of circular progress in its growth. Adherence to a good system of nurture and education creates good natures, and good natures, receiving the assistance of a good education, grow still better than they were, their breeding qualities improving among the rest, as is also seen in the lower animals.

Adeimantus/ Yes, naturally so.

Socrates/ To speak briefly, therefore, the overseers of the state must hold fast to this principle, not allowing it to be impaired without their knowledge, but guarding it above everything; the principle, I mean, which forbids any innovation, in either gymnastic or music, upon the established order, requiring it, on the contrary, to be most strictly maintained, from a fear lest, when it is said that men care most for the song;

> Which being newest is sung, and its music encircles the singers.

it might perhaps be imagined that the poet is speaking not of new songs, but of a new style of music, and novelty should accordingly be commended. Whereas novelty ought not to be commended, nor ought the words to be so understood. For the introduction of a new kind of music must be shunned as imperiling the whole state; since styles of music are never disturbed without affecting the most important political institutions; at least so Damon affirms, and I believe him.

Adeimantus/ Pray include me too among the believers in this doctrine.

Socrates/ Then to all appearance, it is here in music that our guardians should erect their guard-house.

Adeimantus/ At any rate, it is here that lawlessness easily creeps in unawares.

Socrates/ Yes, in the guise of amusement, and professing to do no mischief.

Adeimantus/ No, and it does none, except that gradually gaining a lodgment it quietly insinuates itself into manners and customs; and from these it issues in greater force, and makes its way into mutual compacts; and from compacts it goes on to attack laws and constitutions, displaying the utmost impudence, Socrates, until it ends by overturning everything, both in public and in private.

Socrates/ Good; is this so?

Adeimantus/ I think it is.

Socrates/ Then, as we said in the beginning, must not our children from the very first be restricted to more lawful amusements, because when amusements are lawless, and children take after them, it is impossible for such children to grow into loyal and virtuous men?

Adeimantus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Accordingly, when our children, beginning with right diversions, have received loyalty into their minds by the instrumentality of music, the result is the exact reverse of the former; for loyalty accompanies them into everything and promotes their progress, and raises up again any state institution which might happen to have been cast down.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is true.

Socrates/ Consequently such persons make the discovery even of those trifling regulations, as they are held to be, which had all been lost by those whom we described before.

Adeimantus/ What regulations do you mean?

Socrates/ Those, for example, which require the young to maintain a decorous silence in the presence of their elders,

stooping to them, and rising up at their entrance, and paying every attention to their parents; together with regulations as to the mode of wearing the hair, the style of dress and shoes, and personal decoration in general, and everything else of the same kind. Is not this your opinion?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ But to legislate on these matters would be foolish, I think; it is never done, I believe; nor could express verbal legislation on such points ever be permanent.

Adeimantus/ How could it be?

Socrates/ At any rate, it is probable, Adeimantus, that the bent given by education will determine all that follows. For does not like always invite like?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly it does.

Socrates/ And so we should expect our system at last, I fancy, to end in some complete and grand result, whether this result be good or the reverse.

Adeimantus/ We certainly should.

Socrates/ On these grounds I should not attempt to extend our legislation to points like those.

Adeimantus/ With good reason.

Socrates/ But again, do tell me, as to those common business transactions between private individuals in the market, including, if you please, the contracts of artisans, libels, assaults, law-proceedings, and the impaneling of juries, or again, questions relating to tariffs, and the collection of such customs as may be necessary in the markets or in the harbors, and generally all regulations of the market, the police, the custom-house, and the like; shall we condescend to legislate at all on such matters?

Adeimantus/ No, it is not worthwhile to give directions on these points to good and cultivated men; for in most cases

they will have little difficulty in discovering all the legislation required.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, if God enable them to maintain the laws which we have already discussed.

Adeimantus/ Otherwise, they will spend their lives in continually enabling and amending numerous laws on such subjects, expecting to attain to perfection.

Socrates/ You mean that such persons will live as those do who are in bad health, and yet, from their want of self-restraint, cannot make up their minds to relinquish a pernicious course of life.

Adeimantus/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ And truly such people lead a charming life! always in the doctor's hands, they make no progress, but only complicate and aggravate their maladies; and yet they are always hoping that someone will recommend them a medicine which shall cure them.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is just the case with invalids of this kind.

Socrates/ Again, is it not charming that they should regard as their greatest enemy anyone who tells them the truth, and assures them that till they give up their drunkenness, gluttony, and debauchery, and laziness, no drugs, nor any use of caustic or the knife, nor yet charms, or amulets, or anything of the kind, will do them any good?

Adeimantus/ It is not so very charming; for there is no charm in being angry with one who gives good advice.

Socrates/ You do not seem to approve of such people.

Adeimantus/ No, indeed, I do not.

Socrates/ Then, if so, should a whole city, as we were saying just now, act. in a similar manner, it will not receive your approbation; and does it not appear to you that states

do act like such individuals, when having a bad form of government they forewarn their citizens not to disturb the constitution, under pain of death to all who attempt to do so; while anyone who can serve them most agreeably under their existing polity, and curry favor by fawning upon them and anticipating their wishes, being also clever in satisfying these wishes, he forsooth will be esteemed an excellent man, and full of profound wisdom, and will be honored at their hands?

Adeimantus/ Yes; for my part, I see no difference between the two cases, and I cannot in the least approve of such conduct.

Socrates/ On the other hand, do you not admire the courage and dexterity of those who are willing and anxious to serve such cities?

Adeimantus/ I do, except when they are deluded by them into fancying themselves real statesmen, because they are praised by the many.

Socrates/ What do you say? Do you not make allowances for them? do you suppose it is possible for a man who knows nothing of measurement, when many other equally ignorant persons tell him that he is six feet high, not to believe it himself?

Adeimantus/ No, that is impossible.

Socrates/ Then be not angry with them; for indeed these are the most amusing people in the world, who imagine that with their everlasting enactments and amendments concerning the matters we lately described, they will find some way of putting down the knaveries that are practiced in contracts, and those other embarrassments which I detailed just now, little thinking that they are in reality only cutting off the heads of a Hydra.

Adeimantus/ It is true, they are no better employed.

Socrates/ For my part, therefore, I should not have thought it incumbent upon the genuine legislator to trouble himself with these branches of law and government, whether his state be ill or well organized; in the former case, because such regulations are useless, and do no good; and in the latter, because some of them may be discovered by any person whatever, and others will follow spontaneously as a result of previous training.

Adeimantus/ What then, still remains for us as legislators to do?

Socrates/ For us, nothing; but for the Delphian Apollo there will remain the most important, the noblest, and the highest acts of legislation.

Adeimantus/ What are these?

Socrates/ The erection of temples and the appointment of sacrifices and other ceremonies in honor of the gods and demigods and heroes, and likewise the mode of burning the dead, and all the observances which we must adopt, in order to propitiate the inhabitants of the other world. These are subjects which we do not understand ourselves, and about which, in founding a state, we shall, if we are wise, listen to no other advice or exposition, except that of our ancient national expositor. For it is this God, I apprehend, expounding from his seat on the Omphalos, at the earths center, who is the national expositor to all men on such subjects.

Adeimantus/ You are quite right; this is what we ought to do.

Socrates/ Then the organization of our state is now complete, son of Ariston; and the next thing for you to do is to examine it, furnishing yourself with the necessary light from any quarter you can, and calling to your aid your

brother and Polemarchus and the rest, in order to try if we can see where justice may be found in it, and where injustice, and wherein they differ the one from the other, and which of the two the man who desires to be happy ought to possess, whether all gods and men know it or not.

Glaucon/ That will not do; it was you that engaged to make the inquiry, on the ground that you would be guilty of a sin if you refused to justice all the aid in your power.

Socrates/ I recoiled that it was as you say; and I must so do, but you also must assist me.

Glaucon/ We will.

Socrates/ I am in hopes, then, that we may find the object of our search thus. I imagine that our state, being rightly organized, is a perfectly good state.

Glaucon/ It must be.

Socrates/ Then obviously it is wise and brave and temperate and just.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Then if we can find some of these qualities in the state, there will be a remainder consisting of the undiscovered qualities.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Suppose then that there were any other four things, contained in any subject, and that we were in search of one of them. If we discovered this before the other three, we should be satisfied; but if we recognized the other three first, the thing sought for would by this very fact have been found; for it is plain that it could only be the remainder.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Ought we not to adopt this mode of inquiry in the case before us, since the qualities in question are also four in number?

Glaucon/ Clearly we ought.

Socrates/ To begin then; in the first place wisdom seems to be plainly discernible in our subject; and in connection with it a paradoxical fact presents itself.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ The state which we have described is really wise, if I am not mistaken, inasmuch as it is prudent in counsel, is it not?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ And this very quality, prudence in counsel, is evidently a kind of knowledge; for it is not ignorance, I imagine, but knowledge, that makes men deliberate prudently.

Glaucon/ Evidently.

Socrates/ But there are many different kinds of knowledge in the state.

Glaucon/ Unquestionably there are.

Socrates/ Is it then in virtue of the knowledge of its carpenters that the state is to be described as wise, or prudent in counsel?

Glaucon/ Certainly not; for in virtue of such knowledge it could only be called a city of good carpentry.

Socrates/ Then it is not the knowledge it employs in considering how vessels of wood may best be made, that will justify us in calling our city wise.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well, is it the knowledge which has to do with vessels of brass, or any other of this kind?

Glaucon/ No, none whatever.

Socrates/ Neither will a knowledge of the mode of raising produce from the soil give a state the claim to the title of wise, but only to that of a successful agricultural state.

Glaucon/ So I think.

Socrates/ Tell me, then, does our newly-organized state contain any kind of knowledge, residing in any section of the citizens, which takes measures, not in behalf of anything in the state, but in behalf of the state as a whole, devising in what manner its internal and foreign relations may best be regulated?

Glaucon/ Certainly it does.

Socrates/ What is this knowledge, and in whom does it reside?

Glaucon/ It is our protective science, and it resides in that governing class whom we denominated just now perfect guardians.

Socrates/ Then in virtue of this knowledge what do you call the state?

Glaucon/ I call it prudent in counsel and truly wise.

Socrates/ Which do you suppose will be the more numerous class in our state, the braziers, or these genuine guardians?

Glaucon/ The braziers will far outnumber the others.

Socrates/ Then will the guardians be the smallest of all the classes possessing this or that branch of knowledge, and bearing this or that name in consequence?

Glaucon/ Yes, much the smallest.

Socrates/ Then it is the knowledge residing in its smallest class or section, that is to say, in the predominant and ruling body, which entitles a state, organized agreeably to nature, to be called wise as a whole; and that class whose right and duty it is to partake of the knowledge which alone of all kinds of knowledge is properly called wisdom, is naturally, as it appears, the least numerous body in the state.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Here then we have made out, in some way or other, one of the four qualities, and the part of the state in which it is seated.

Glaucon/ To my mind, it has been made out satisfactorily.

Socrates/ Again, there can assuredly be no great difficulty in discerning the quality of courage, and the class in which it resides, and which entitles the state to be called brave.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ In pronouncing a city to be cowardly or brave, who would look to any but that portion of it which fights in its defense and takes the field in its behalf?

Glaucon/ No one would look to anything else.

Socrates/ No; and for this reason, I imagine, that the cowardice or courage of the state itself is not necessarily implied in that of the other classes.

Glaucon/ No, it is not.

Socrates/ Then a city is brave as well as wise, in virtue of a certain portion of itself, because it has in that portion a power which can without intermission keep safe the right opinion concerning things to be feared, which teaches that they are such as the legislator has declared in the prescribed education.. Is not this what you call courage?

Glaucon/ I did not quite understand what you said; be so good as to repeat it.

Socrates/ I say that courage is a kind of safe keeping.

Glaucon/ What kind of safe keeping?

Socrates/ The safe keeping of the opinion created by law through education, which teaches what things and what kind of things are to be feared. And when I spoke of keeping it safe without intermission, I meant that it was to be thoroughly preserved alike in moments of pain and of

pleasure, of desire and of fear, and never to be cast away. And if you like, I will illustrate it by a comparison which seems to me an apt one.

Glaucon/ I should like it.

Socrates/ Well then, you know that dyers, when they wish to dye wool so as to give it the true sea-purple, first select from the numerous colors one variety, that of white wool, and then subject it to much careful preparatory dressing, that it may take the color as brilliantly as possible; after which they proceed to dye it. And when the wool has been dyed on this system, its color is indelible, and no washing either with or without soap can rob it of its brilliancy. But when this course has not been pursued, you know the results, whether this or any other color be dyed without previous preparation.

Glaucon/ I know that the dye washes out in a ridiculous way.

Socrates/ You may understand from this what we were laboring. to the best of our ability, to bring about, when we were selecting our soldiers and training them in music and gymnastic. Imagine that we were only contriving how they might be best wrought upon to take as it were the color of the laws, in order that their opinion concerning things to be feared, and on all other subjects, might be indelible, owing to their congenial nature and appropriate training, and that their color might not be washed out by such terribly efficacious detergents as pleasure, which works more powerfully than any potash or lye, and pain, and fear, and desire, which are more potent than any other solvent in the world. This power, therefore, to hold fast continually the right and lawful opinion concerning things to be feared and things not to be feared, I define to be courage, and call it by that name, if you do not object.

Glaucon/ No, I do not; for when the right opinion on these matters is held without education, as by beasts and slaves, you would not, I think, regard it as altogether legitimate, and you would give it some other name than courage.

Socrates/ Most true.

Glaucon/ Then I accept this account of courage.

Socrates/ Do so, at least as an account of the courage of citizens, and you will be right. On a future occasion, if you like, we will go into this question more fully; at present it is beside our inquiry, the object of which is justice; we have done enough therefore, I imagine, for the investigation of courage.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Two things, I proceeded, now remain, that we must look for in the state, temperance, and that which is the cause of all these investigations, justice.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Well, not to trouble ourselves any further about temperance, is there any way by which we can discover justice?

Glaucon/ For my part, I do not know, nor do I wish justice to be brought to light first, if we are to make no further inquiry after temperance; so, if you wish to gratify me, examine into the latter, before you proceed to the former.

Socrates/ Indeed, I do wish it, as I am an honest man.

Glaucon/ Proceed then with the examination.

Socrates/ I will; and from our present point of view, temperance has more the appearance of a concord or harmony, than the former qualities had.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Temperance is, I imagine, a kind of order and a mastery, as men say, over certain pleasures and desires.

Thus we plainly hear people talking of a man being master of himself, in some sense or other; and other similar expressions are used, in which we may trace a print of the thing. Is it not so?

Glaucon/ Most certainly it is.

Socrates/ But is not the expression master of himself a ridiculous one? For the man who is master of himself will also, I presume, be the slave of himself, and the slave will be the master. For the subject of all these phrases is the same person.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Well, it appears to me that the meaning of the expression is, that in the man himself, that is, in his soul, there resides a good principle and a bad, and when the naturally good principle is master of the bad, this state of things is described by the term master of himself; certainly it is a term of praise; but when in consequence of evil training, or the influence of associates, the smaller force of the good principle is overpowered by the superior numbers of the bad, the person so situated is described in terms of reproach and condemnation, as a slave of self, and a dissolute person.

Glaucon/ Yes, this seems a likely account of it.

Socrates/ Now turn your eyes towards our new state, and you will find one of these conditions realized in it; for you will allow that it may fairly be called master of itself, if temperance and self-mastery may be predicated of that in which the good principle governs the bad.

Glaucon/ I am looking as you direct, and I acknowledge the truth of what you say.

Socrates/ It will further be admitted that those desires, and pleasures, and pains, which are many and various, will

be chiefly found in children, and women, and servants; and in the vulgar mass also among nominal freemen.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ On the other hand, those simple and moderate desires, which go hand in hand with intellect and right opinion, under the guidance of reasoning, will be found in a small number of men, that is, in those of the best natural endowments, and the best education.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Do you not see that the parallel to this exists in your state; in other words, that the desires of the vulgar many are there controlled by the desires and the wisdom of the cultivated few?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ If any state then may be described as master of itself, its pleasures and its desires, ours may be so characterized.

Glaucon/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ May we not then also call it temperate, on all these accounts?

Glaucon/ Surely we may.

Socrates/ And again, if there is any city in which the governors and the governed are unanimous on the question who ought to govern, such unanimity will exist in ours. Do you not think so?

Glaucon/ Most assuredly I do.

Socrates/ In which of the two classes of citizens will you say that temperance resides, when they are in this condition? in the rulers or in the subjects?

Glaucon/ In both I fancy.

Socrates/ Do you see, then, that we were not bad prophets when we divined just now that temperance resembled a kind of harmony?

Glaucon/ Why, pray?

Socrates/ Because it does not operate like courage and wisdom, which, by residing in particular sections of the state, make it brave and wise respectively; but spreads throughout the whole in literal diapason, producing a unison between the weakest and the strongest and the middle class, whether you measure by the standard of intelligence, or bodily strength, or numbers, or wealth, or anything else of the kind; so that we shall be fully justified in pronouncing temperance to be that unanimity, which we described as a concord between the naturally better element and the naturally worse, whether in a state or in a single person, as to which of the two has the right to govern.

Glaucon/ I fully agree with you.

Socrates/ Very well; we have discerned in our state three out of the four principles; at least such is our present impression. Now what will that remaining principle be through which the state will further participate in virtue? for this, we may be sure, is justice.

Glaucon/ Evidently it is.

Socrates/ Now then, Glaucon, we must be like hunters surrounding a cover, and must give close attention that justice may nowhere escape us and disappear from our view; for it is manifest that she is somewhere here; so look for her, and strive to gain a sight of her, for perhaps you may discover her first, and give the alarm to me.

Glaucon/ I wish I might; but you will use me quite well enough, if, instead of that, you will treat me as one who is following your steps, and is able to see what is pointed out to him.

Socrates/ Follow me then, after joining your prayers with mine.

Glaucon/ I will do so; only do you lead the way.

Socrates/ Truly, the ground seems to be hard to traverse, and covered with wood; at all events it is dark and difficult to explore; but still we must on.

Glaucon/ Yes, that we must.

Socrates/ Here I caught a glimpse, and exclaimed, Ho! ho! Glaucon, here is something that looks like a track, and I believe the game will not altogether escape us.

Glaucon/ That is good news.

Socrates/ Upon my word, we are in a most foolish predicament.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, my good sir, it appears that what we were looking for has been all this time rolling before our feet, and we never saw it, but did the most ridiculous thing. Just as people at times go about looking for something which they hold in their hands, so we, instead of fixing our eyes upon the thing itself, kept gazing at some point in the distance, and this was probably the reason why it eluded our search.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ This; that I believe we were conversing of it together, without understanding that we were in a manner describing it ourselves.

Glaucon/ Your preface seems long to one who is anxious for the explanation.

Socrates/ Well then, listen, and judge whether I am right or not. What at the commencement we laid down as a universal rule of action, when we were founding our state, this, if I mistake not, or some modification of it, is justice. I think we affirmed, if you recollect, and frequently repeated,

that every individual ought to have someone occupation in the state, which should be that to which his natural capacity was best adapted.

Glaucon/ We did say so.

Socrates/ And again, we have often heard people say, that to mind one's own business, and not be meddlesome, is justice; and we have often said the same thing ourselves.

Glaucon/ We have said so.

Socrates/ Then it would seem, my friend, that to do one's own business, in some shape or other, is justice. Do you know whence I infer this?

Glaucon/ No; be so good as to tell me.

Socrates/ I think that the remainder left in the state, after eliminating the qualities which we have considered, I mean temperance, and courage, and wisdom, must be that which made their entrance into it possible, and which preserves them there so long as they exist in it. Now we affirmed that the remaining quality, when three out of the four were found, would be justice.

Glaucon/ Yes, unquestionably it would.

Socrates/ If, however, it were required to decide which of these qualities will have most influence in perfecting by its presence the virtue of our state, it would be difficult to determine; whether it will be the harmony of opinion between the governors and the governed, or the faithful adherence on the part of the soldiers to the lawful belief concerning the things which are, and the things which are not, to be feared; or the existence of wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers; or whether the virtue of the state may not be chiefly traced to the presence of that fourth

principle in every child and woman, in every slave, freeman, and artisan, in the ruler and in the subject, requiring each to do his own work, and not meddle with many things.

Glaucon/ It would be a difficult point to settle, unquestionably.

Socrates/ Thus it appears that, in promoting the virtue of a state, the power that makes each member of it do his own work, may compete with its wisdom, and its temperance, and its courage.

Glaucon/ Decidedly it may.

Socrates/ But if there is a principle which rivals these qualities in promoting the virtue of a state, will you not determine it to be justice?

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Consider the question in another light, and see whether you will come to the same conclusion. Will you assign to the rulers of the state the adjudication of law-suits?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Will not their judgments be guided, above everything, by the desire that no one may appropriate what belongs to others, nor be deprived of what is his own?

Glaucon/ Yes, that will be their main study.

Socrates/ Because that is just?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Thus, according to this view also, it will be granted that to have and do what belongs to us and is our own, is justice.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Now observe whether you hold the same opinion that I do. If a carpenter should undertake to execute the work of a shoemaker, or a shoemaker that of a carpenter,

either by interchanging their tools and distinctions, or by the same person undertaking both trades, with all the changes involved in it, do you think it would greatly damage the state?

Glaucon/ Not very greatly.

Socrates/ But when one whom nature has made an artisan, or a producer of any other kind, is so elated by wealth, or a large connection, or bodily strength, or any similar advantages, as to intrude himself into the class of the warriors; or when a warrior intrudes himself into the class of the senators and guardians, of which he is unworthy, and when these interchange their tools and their distinctions, or when one and the same person attempts to discharge all these duties at once, then, I imagine, you will agree with me, that such change and meddling among these will be ruinous to the state.

Glaucon/ Most assuredly they will.

Socrates/ Then any intermeddling in the three classes, or change from one to another, would inflict great damage on the state, and may with perfect propriety be described as in the strongest sense a doing of evil.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And will you not admit that evil-doing of the worst kind towards one's own state is injustice?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ This then is injustice. On the other hand, let us state that, conversely, adherence to their own business on the part of the industrious, the military, and the guardian classes, each of these doing its own work in the state, is justice, and will render the state just.

Glaucon/ I fully coincide, in this view.

Socrates/ Let us not state it yet quite positively; but if we find, on applying this conception to the individual man, that there too it is admitted to constitute justice, we will then yield our assent for what more can we say? but if not, in that case we will institute a new inquiry. At present, however, let us complete the investigation which we undertook in the belief that, if we first endeavored to contemplate justice in some larger subject which contains it, we should find it easier to discern its nature in the individual man. Such a subject we recognized in a state, and accordingly we organized the best we could, being sure that justice must reside in a good city. The view, therefore, which presented itself to us there, let us now apply to the individual; and if it be admitted, we shall be satisfied; but if we should find something different in the case of the individual, we will again go back to our city, and put our theory to the test. And perhaps by considering the two cases side by side, and rubbing them together, we may cause justice to flash out from the contact, like fire from dry bits of wood, and when it has become visible to us, may settle it firmly in our own minds.

Glaucon/ There is method in your proposal, and so let us do.

Socrates/ I proceeded therefore to ask; When two things, a greater and a less, are called by a common name, are they, in so far as the common name applies, unlike or like?

Glaucon/ Like.

Socrates/ Then a just man will not differ from a just state, so far as the idea of justice is involved, but the two will be like.

Glaucon/ They will.

Socrates/ Well, but we resolved that a state was just, when the three classes of characters present in it were

severally occupied in doing their proper work; and that it was temperate, and brave, and wise, in consequence of certain affections and conditions of these same classes.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, we shall also adjudge, in the case of the individual man, that, supposing him to possess in his soul the same generic parts, he is rightly entitled to the same names as the state, in virtue of affections of these parts identical with those of the classes in the state.

Glaucon/ It must inevitably be so.

Socrates/ Once more then, my excellent friend, we have stumbled on an easy question concerning the nature of the soul, namely, whether it contains these three generic parts or not.

Glaucon/ Not so very easy a question, I think; but perhaps, Socrates, the common saying is true, that the beautiful is difficult.

Socrates/ It would appear so; and I tell you plainly, Glaucon, that in my opinion we shall never attain to exact truth on this subject, by such methods as we are employing in our present discussion. However, the path that leads to that goal is too long and toilsome; and I dare say we may arrive at the truth by our present methods, in a manner not unworthy of our former arguments and speculations. Shall we not be content with that?

Glaucon/ For my part it would satisfy me for the present.

Socrates/ Well, certainly it will be quite enough for me.

Glaucon/ Do not flag then, but proceed with the inquiry.

Socrates/ Tell me then, can we possibly refuse to admit that there exist in each of us the same generic parts and characteristics as are found in the state? For I presume the state has not received them from any other source. It would

be ridiculous to imagine that the presence of the spirited element in cities is not to be traced to individuals, wherever this character is imputed to the people, as it is to the natives of Thrace, and Scythia, and generally speaking, of the northern countries; or the love of knowledge, which would be chiefly attributed to our own country; or the love of riches, which people would especially connect with the Phoenicians and the Egyptians.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ This then is a fact so far, and one which it is not difficult to apprehend.

Glaucon/ No, it is not.

Socrates/ But here begins a difficulty. Are all our actions alike performed by the one predominant faculty, or are there three faculties operating severally in our different actions? Do we learn with one internal faculty, and become angry with another, and with a third feel desire for all the pleasures connected with eating and drinking, and the propagation of the species; or upon every impulse to action, do we perform these several operations with the whole soul? The difficulty will consist in settling these points in a satisfactory manner.

Glaucon/ I think so too.

Socrates/ Let us try therefore the following plan, in order to ascertain whether the faculties engaged are distinct or identical.

Glaucon/ What is your plan?

Socrates/ It is manifest that the same thing cannot do two opposite things, or be in two opposite states, in the same part of it, and with reference to the same object; so that where we find these phenomena occurring, we shall know that the subjects of them are not identical, but more than one.

Glaucon/ Very well.

Socrates/ Now consider what I say.

Glaucon/ Speak on.

Socrates/ Is it possible for the same thing to be at the same time, and in the same part of it, at rest and in motion?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Let us come to a still more exact understanding, lest we should chance to differ as we proceed. If it were said of a man who is standing still, but moving his hands and his head, that the same individual is at the same time at rest and in motion, we should not, I imagine, allow this to be a correct way of speaking, but should say, that part of the man is at rest, and part in motion; should we not?

Glaucon/ We should.

Socrates/ And if the objector should indulge in yet further pleasantries, so far refining as to say, that at any rate a top is wholly at rest and in motion at the same time, when it spins with its peg fixed on a given spot, or that anything else revolving in the same place, is an instance of the same thing, we should reject his illustration, because in such cases the things are not both stationary and in motion in respect of the same parts of them; and we should reply, that they contain an axis and a circumference, and that in respect of the axis they are stationary, inasmuch as they do not lean to any side; but in respect of the circumference they are moving round and round; but if, while the rotatory motion continues, the axis at the same time inclines to the right or to the left, forwards or backwards, then they cannot be said in any sense to be at rest.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then no objection of that kind will alarm us, or tend at all to convince us that it is ever possible for one and the same thing, at the same time, in the same part of it, and

relatively to the same object, to be acted upon in two opposite ways, or to be two opposite things, or to produce two opposite effects.

Glaucon/ I can answer for myself.

Socrates/ However, that we may not be compelled to spend time in discussing all such objections, and convincing ourselves that they are unsound, let us assume this to be the fact, and proceed forwards, with the understanding that, if ever we take a different view of this matter, all the conclusions founded on this assumption will fall to the ground.

Glaucon/ Yes, that will be the best way.

Socrates/ Well then, would you place assent and dissent, the seeking after an object and the refusal of it attraction and repulsion, and the like, in the class of mutual opposites? Whether they be active or passive processes will not affect the question.

Glaucon/ Yes, I should.

Socrates/ Well, would you not, without exception, include hunger and thirst, and the desires generally, and likewise willing and wishing, somewhere under the former of those general terms just mentioned? For instance, would you not say that the mind of a man under the influence of desire always either seeks after the object of desire, or attracts to itself that which it wishes to have; or again, so far as it wills the possession of anything, it assents inwardly thereto, as though it were asked a question, longing for the accomplishment of its wish?

Glaucon/ I should.

Socrates/ Again; shall we not class disinclination, unwillingness, and dislike, under the head of mental rejection and repulsion, and of general terms wholly opposed to the former?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ This being the case, shall we say that desires form a class, the most marked of which are what we call thirst and hunger?

Glaucon/ We shall.

Socrates/ The one being a desire of drink, and the other of food?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Can thirst then, so far as it is thirst, be an internal desire of anything more than drink? That is to say, is thirst, as such, a thirst for hot drink or cold, for much or little, or, in one word, for any particular kind of drink? Or, will it not rather be true that, if there be heat combined with the thirst, the desire of cold drink will be superadded to it, and if there be cold, of hot drink; and if owing to the presence of muchness the thirst be great, the desire of much will be added, and if little, the desire of little; but that thirst in itself cannot be a desire of anything else than its natural object, which is simple drink, or again, hunger, of anything but food?

Glaucon/ You are right; every desire in itself has to do with its natural object in its simply abstract form, but the accessories of the desire determine the quality of the object.

Socrates/ Let not anyone, for want of consideration on our part, disturb us by the objection, that no one desires drink simply, but good drink, nor food simply, but good food; because, since all desire good things, if thirst is a desire, it must be a desire of something good, whether that something, which is its object, be drink or anything else; an argument which applies to all the desires.

Glaucon/ True, there might seem to be something in the objection.

Socrates/ Recollect, however, that in the case of all essentially correlative terms, when the first member of the relation is qualified, the second is also qualified, if I am not mistaken; when the first is abstract, the second is also abstract.

Glaucon/ I do not understand you.

Socrates/ Do you not understand that greater is a relative term, implying another term?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It implies a less, does it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And a much greater implies a much less, does it not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does a once greater also imply a once less, and a future greater a future less?

Glaucon/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ Does not the same reasoning apply to the correlative terms, more and fewer, double and half, and all relations of quantity; also to the terms, heavier and lighter, quicker and slower; and likewise to cold and hot land all similar epithets?

Glaucon/ Certainly it does.

Socrates/ But how is it with the various branches of scientific knowledge? Does not the same principle hold? That is, knowledge in the abstract is knowledge simply of the knowable, or of whatever that be called which is the object of knowledge; but a particular science, of a particular kind, has a particular object of a particular kind. To explain my meaning; as soon as a science of the construction of houses arose, was it not distinguished from other sciences, and therefore called the science of building?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And is it not because it is of a particular character, which no other science possesses?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is not its particular character derived from the particular character of its object? and may we not say the same of all the other arts and sciences?

Glaucon/ We may.

Socrates/ This then you are to regard as having been my meaning before; provided, that is, you now understand that in the case of all correlative terms, if the first member of the relation is abstract, the second is also abstract; if the second is qualified, the first is also qualified. I do not mean to say that the qualities of the two are identical, as for instance, that the science of health is healthy, and the science of disease diseased; or that the science of evil things is evil, and of good things good; but as soon as science, instead of limiting itself to the abstract object of science, became related to a particular kind of object, namely, in the present case, the conditions of health and disease, the result was that the science also came to be qualified in a certain manner, so that it was no longer called simply science, but, by the addition of a qualifying epithet, medical science.

Glaucon/ I understand, and I think what you say is true.

Socrates/ To recur to the case of thirst, I continued, do you not consider this to be one of the things whose nature it is to have an object correlative with themselves, assuming that there is such a thing as thirst?

Glaucon/ I do, and its object is drink.

Socrates/ Then, for any particular kind of drink there is a particular kind of thirst; but thirst in the abstract is neither for much drink, nor for little, neither for good drink

nor for bad, nor, in one word, for any kind of drink, but simply and absolutely thirst for drink, is it not?

Glaucon/ Most decidedly so.

Socrates/ Then the soul of a thirsty man, in so far as he is thirsty, has no other wish than to drink; but this it desires, and towards this it is impelled.

Glaucon/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Therefore, whenever anything pulls back a soul that is under the influence of thirst, it will be something in the soul distinct from the principle which thirsts, and which drives it like a beast to drink; for we hold it to be impossible that the same thing should, at the same time, with the same part of itself, in reference to the same object, be doing two opposite things.

Glaucon/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ Just as, I imagine, it would not be right to say of the bowman, that his hands are at the same time drawing the bow towards him, and pushing it from him; the fact being, that one of his hands pushes it from him, and the other pulls it to him.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Now, can we say that people sometimes are thirsty, and yet do not wish to drink?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly; it often happens to many people.

Socrates/ What then can one say of them, except that their soul contains one principle which commands, and another which forbids them to drink, the latter being distinct from and stronger than the former?

Glaucon/ That is my opinion.

Socrates/ Whenever the authority which forbids such indulgences grows up in the soul, is it not engendered there by reasoning; while the powers which lead and draw the mind towards them, owe their presence to passive and morbid states?

Glaucon/ It would appear so.

Socrates/ Then we shall have reasonable grounds for assuming that these are two principles distinct one from the other, and for giving to that part of the soul with which it reasons the title of the rational principle, and to that part with which it loves and hungers and thirsts, and experiences the flutter of the other desires, the title of the irrational and concupiscent principle, the ally of sundry indulgences and pleasures.

Glaucon/ Yes; it will not be unreasonable to think so.

Socrates/ Let us consider it settled, then, that these two specific parts exist in the soul. But now, will spirit, or that by which we feel indignant, constitute a third distinct part? If not, with which of the two former has it a natural affinity?

Glaucon/ Perhaps with the concupiscent principle.

Socrates/ But I was once told a story, which I can quite believe, to the effect, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, as he was walking up from the Piraeus, and approaching the northern wall from the outside, observed some dead bodies on the ground, and the executioner standing by them. He immediately felt a desire to look at them, but at the same time loathing the thought he tried to divert himself from it. For some time he struggled with himself, and covered his eyes, till at length, over-mastered by the desire, he opened his eyes wide with his fingers, and running up to the bodies, exclaimed, There! you wretches! gaze your fill at the beautiful spectacle!

Glaucon/ I have heard the anecdote too.

Socrates/ This story, however, indicates that anger sometimes fights against the desires, which implies that they are two distinct principles.

Glaucon/ True, it does indicate that.

Socrates/ And do we not often observe in other cases that when a man is overpowered by the desires against the dictates of his reason, he reviles himself, and resents the violence thus exerted within him, and that, in this struggle of contending parties, the spirit sides with the reason? But that it should make common cause with the desires, when the reason pronounces that they ought not to act against itself, is a thing which I suppose you will not profess to have experienced yourself, nor yet, I imagine, have you ever noticed it in anyone else.

Glaucon/ No, I am sure I have not.

Socrates/ Well, and when anyone thinks he is in the wrong, is he not, in proportion to the nobleness of his character, so much the less able to be angry at being made to surfer hunger or cold or any similar pain at the hands of him whom he thinks justified in so treating him; his spirit, as I describe it, refusing to be roused against his punisher?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ On the other hand, when anyone thinks he is wronged, does he not instantly boil and chafe, and enlist himself on the side of what he thinks to be justice; and whatever extremities of hunger and cold and the like he may have to suffer, does he not endure till he conquers, never ceasing from his noble efforts, till he has either gained his point, or perished in the attempt, or been recalled and calmed by the voice of reason within, as a dog is called off by a shepherd?

Glaucon/ Yes, the case answers very closely to your description; and in fact, in our city we made the auxiliaries,

like sheep-dogs, subject to the rulers, who are as it were the shepherds of the state.

Socrates/ You rightly understand my meaning. But try whether you also apprehend my next observation.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ That our recent view of the spirited principle is exactly reversed. Then we thought it had something of the concupiscent character, but now we say that, far from this being the case, it much more readily takes arms on the side of the rational principle in the party conflict of the soul.

Glaucon/ Decidedly it does.

Socrates/ Is it then distinct from this principle also; or is it only a modification of it, thus making two instead of three distinct principles in the soul, namely, the rational and the concupiscent? Or ought we to say that, as the state was held together by three great classes, the producing class, the auxiliary, and the deliberative, so also in the soul the spirited principle constitutes a third element, the natural ally of the rational principle, if it be not corrupted by evil training?

Glaucon/ It must be a third.

Socrates/ Yes; if it shall appear to be distinct from the rational principle, as we found it different from the concupiscent.

Glaucon/ Nay, that will easily appear. For even in little children anyone may see this, that from their very birth they have plenty of spirit, whereas reason is a principle to which most men only attain after many years, and some, in my opinion, never.

Socrates/ Upon my word you have well said. In brute beasts also one may see what you describe exemplified. And besides, that passage in Homer, which we quoted on a former occasion, will support our view;

> Smiting his breast, to his heart thus spoke he in accents of chiding.

For in this line Homer has distinctly made a difference between the two principles, representing that which had considered the good or the evil of the action as rebuking that which was indulging in unreflecting resentment.

Glaucon/ You are perfectly right.

Socrates/ Here then, after a hard struggle, we have, though with difficulty, reached the land; and we are pretty well satisfied that there are corresponding divisions, equal in number, in a state, and in the soul of every individual.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then does it not necessarily follow that, as and whereby the state was wise, so and thereby the individual is wise?

Glaucon/ Without doubt it does.

Socrates/ And that as and whereby the individual is brave, so and thereby is the state brave; and that everything conducing to virtue which is possessed by the one, finds its counterpart in the other?

Glaucon/ It must be so.

Socrates/ Then we shall also assert. I imagine, Glaucon, that a man is just, in the same way in which we found the state to be just.

Glaucon/ This too is a necessary corollary.

Socrates/ But surely we have not allowed ourselves to forget, that what makes the state just, is the fact of each of the three classes therein doing its own work.

Glaucon/ No; I think we have not forgotten this.

Socrates/ We must bear in mind, then, that each of us also, if his inward faculties do severally their proper work,

will, in virtue of that, be a just man, and a doer of his proper work.

Glaucon/ Certainly, it must be borne in mind.

Socrates/ Is it not then essentially the province of the rational principle to command, inasmuch as it is wise, and has to exercise forethought in behalf of the entire soul, and the province of the spirited principle to be its subject and ally?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And will not the combination of music and gymnastic bring them, as we said, into unison; elevating and fostering the one with lofty discourses and scientific teachings, and lowering the tone of the other by soothing address, till its wildness has been tamed by harmony and rhythm?

Glaucon/ Yes, precisely so.

Socrates/ And so these two, having been thus trained, and having truly learnt their parts and received a real education, will exercise control over the concupiscent principle, which in every man forms the largest portion of the soul, and is by nature most insatiably covetous. And they will watch it narrowly, that it may not so batten upon what are called the pleasures of the body, as to grow large and strong, and forthwith refuse to do its proper work, and even aspire to absolute dominion over the classes which it has no right according to its kind to govern, thus overturning fundamentally the life of all.

Glaucon/ Certainly they will.

Socrates/ And would not these two principles be the best qualified to guard the entire soul and body against enemies from without; the one taking counsel, and the other fighting its battles, in obedience to the governing power, to whose designs it gives effect by its bravery?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ In like manner, I think, we call an individual brave, in virtue of the spirited element of his nature, when this part of him holds fast, through pain and pleasure, the instructions of the reason as to what is to be feared, and what is not.

Glaucon/ Yes, and rightly.

Socrates/ And we call him wise, in virtue of that small part which reigns within him, and issues these instructions, and which also in its turn contains within itself a true knowledge of what is advantageous for the whole community composed of these three principles, and for each member of it.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Again, do we not call a man temperate, in virtue of the friendship and harmony of these same principles, that is to say, when the two that are governed agree with that which governs in regarding the rational principle as the rightful sovereign, and set up no opposition to its authority?

Glaucon/ Certainly; temperance is nothing else than this, whether in state or individual.

Socrates/ Lastly, a man will be just, in the way and by the means which we have repeatedly described.

Glaucon/ Unquestionably he will.

Socrates/ Tell me then, do we find any indistinctness in our view of justice, which makes us regard it as something different from what we found it to be in the state?

Glaucon/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ Because we might thoroughly confirm our opinion, if we have any lingering doubts in our minds, by applying commonplace examples to it.

Glaucon/ What kind of examples do you mean?

Socrates/ For example, if in speaking of our ideal state, and of an individual who in nature and training resembles it, we were required to declare whether we think that such an individual would repudiate a deposit of gold or silver committed to his charge, do you suppose that anyone would think him more likely to do such a deed than other men who are not such as he is?

Glaucon/ No one would think so.

Socrates/ And will he not also be clear of suspicion of sacrilege, and of theft, and of being either false to his friends, or a traitor to his country?

Glaucon/ He will.

Socrates/ Moreover, he will be wholly incapable of bad faith, in the case of an oath or of any other kind of compact.

Glaucon/ Clearly he will.

Socrates/ Again, he is the last person in the world to be guilty of adultery, or neglect of parents, or indifference to the worship of the gods.

Glaucon/ Certainly he is.

Socrates/ And is not all this attributable to the fact that each of his inward principles keeps to his own work in regard to the relations of ruler and subject?

Glaucon/ Yes, it may be entirely attributed to this.

Socrates/ Do you still seek then for any other account of justice than that it is the power which creates such men and such states?

Glaucon/ No, assuredly I do not.

Socrates/ Then our dream is completely realized, or that suspicion which we expressed, that at the very commencement of the work of constructing our state we were led by some divine intervention, as it would seem, to a kind of rudimentary type of justice.

Glaucon/ Yes, it certainly is.

Socrates/ And so there really was, Glaucon, a rude outline of justice (and hence its utility) in the principle that it is right for a man whom nature intended for a shoemaker to confine himself to shoemaking, and for a man who has a turn for carpentering to do carpenters work, and so on.

Glaucon/ It appears so.

Socrates/ The truth being that justice is indeed, to all appearance, something of the kind, only that, instead of dealing with a man's outward performance of his own work, it has to do with that inward performance of it, which truly concerns the man himself, and his own interests; so that the just man will not permit the several principles within him to do any work but their own, nor allow the distinct classes in his soul to interfere with each other, but will really set his house in order; and having gained the mastery over himself, will so regulate his own character as to be on good terms with himself, and to set those three principles in tune together, as if they were verily three chords of a harmony, a higher and a lower and a middle, and whatever may lie between these; and after he has bound all these together, and reduced the many elements of his nature to a real unity, as a temperate and duly harmonized man, he will then at length proceed to do whatever he may have to do, whether it involve the acquisition of property or attention to the wants of his body, whether it be a state affair or a business transaction of his own; in all which he will believe and profess that the just and honorable course is that which preserves and assists in creating the aforesaid habit of mind, and that the genuine knowledge which presides over such conduct is wisdom; while on the other hand, he will hold that an unjust action is one which tends to destroy this habit, and that the mere opinion which presides over unjust conduct, is folly.

Glaucon/ What you say is thoroughly true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Very good; if we were to say we have discovered the just man and the just state, and what justice is as found in them, it would not be thought, I imagine, to be an altogether false statement.

Glaucon/ No, indeed, it would not.

Socrates/ Shall we say so then?

Glaucon/ We will.

Socrates/ Be it so. In the next place we have to investigate, I imagine, what injustice is.

Glaucon/ Evidently we have.

Socrates/ Must it not then, as the reverse of justice, be a state of strife between the three principles, and the disposition to meddle and interfere, and the insurrection of a part of the mind against the whole, this part aspiring to the supreme power within the mind, to which it has no right, its proper place and destination being, on the contrary, to do service to any member of the rightfully dominant class? Such doings as these, I imagine, and the confusion and bewilderment of the aforesaid principles, will, in our opinion, constitute injustice, and licentiousness, and cowardice, and folly, and, in one word, all vice.

Glaucon/ Yes, precisely so.

Socrates/ And is it not now quite clear to us what it is to act unjustly, and to be unjust, and, on the other hand, what it is to act justly, knowing as we do the nature of justice and injustice?

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Because these phenomena in the soul are exactly like the phenomena of health and disease in the body.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ The conditions of health, I presume, produce health, and those of disease engender disease.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ In the same way, does not the practice of justice beget the habit of justice, and the practice of injustice the habit of injustice?

Glaucon/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ Now to produce health is so to constitute the bodily forces as that they shall master and be mastered by one another in accordance with nature; and to produce disease is to make them govern and be governed by one another in a way which violates nature.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Similarly, will it not be true that to beget justice is so to constitute the powers of the soul that they shall master and be mastered by one another in accordance with nature, and that to beget injustice is to make them govern and be governed by one another in a way which violates nature?

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then virtue, it appears, will be a kind of health and beauty, and good habit of the soul; and vice will be a disease, and deformity, and sickness of it.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And may we not add that all fair practices tend to the acquisition of virtue, and all foul practices to that of vice?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly they do.

Socrates/ What now remains for us, apparently, is to inquire whether it is also profitable to aft justly, and to pursue honorable aims, and to be just, whether a man be known to be such or not, or to act unjustly, and to be

unjust, if one suffer no punishment, and be not made a better man by chastisement.

Glaucon/ Nay, Socrates, to me, I confess, the inquiry begins to assume a ludicrous appearance, now that the real nature of justice and injustice has presented itself to us in the light described above. Do people think that when the constitution of the body is ruined, life is not worth having, though you may command all varieties of food and drink, and possess endless wealth and power; and shall we be told that, when the constitution of that very principle whereby we live is going to rack and ruin, life is still worth having, let a man do what he will, if that is excepted which will enable him to get rid of vice and injustice, and to acquire virtue and justice?

Socrates/ Yes, it is ludicrous; still, as we have arrived at this point, we must not lose heart, till we have ascertained, in the clearest possible manner, the correctness of our conclusions.

Glaucon/ No, indeed; anything rather than lose heart.

Socrates/ Come with me, then, that you may see how many varieties of vice there are, according to my belief, looking only at those which are worth the survey.

Glaucon/ I follow you; only tell me.

Socrates/ Well, I can see as it were from a watch-tower, now that we have ascended to this lofty stage in the argument, that while there is only one form of virtue, there are infinite varieties of vice, of which four in particular deserve to be noticed.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ It would seem that there are as many characters of mind, as there are distinctive forms of government.

Glaucon/ Pray how many are they?

Socrates/ There are five forms of government, and five characters of mind.

Glaucon/ Tell me what these are.

Socrates/ I will; one form of government will be that which we have been describing, and it may be called by two different names; should there arise among the governing body one man excelling the rest, it will be called a kingdom; if there be more than one of equal excellence, it will be entitled an aristocracy.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ This then I call one form; for whether the supreme power be in the hands of one or many, the important laws of the state will not be disturbed, if their training and education be such as we have described.

Glaucon/ So we may justly expect.

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Socrates/ Such then is the state or constitution which I call good and right, and such is the good man; and if this one be right, I must call the rest bad and wrong; applying these terms both to the organization of states, and to the formation of individual character; and the vicious forms are reducible to four varieties.

Glaucon/ Pray, what are these?

Socrates/ Hereupon I was proceeding to speak of them in order, as they appeared to me to pass severally into one another; when Polemarchus, who was seated a little further off than Adeimantus, put out his hand to take hold of his brothers dress high up near the shoulder, drew him towards himself, and leaning forwards whispered a few words into his ear, of which we only caught the following;

Adeimantus/ Shall we let him off then, or what shall we do?

Socrates/ Adeimantus, beginning to speak aloud.

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Pray what may that be which you are not going to let off?

Adeimantus/ You.

Socrates/ And why, pray?

Adeimantus/ We have an idea that you are lagging, and stealing a whole section, and that a very important one, out of the subject, in order to avoid handling it; and we suppose you fancied that we should not notice your passing it over with the very slight remark, that everyone would see that the rule, among friends everything is common property, would apply to the women and children.

Socrates/ Well, and was I not right, Adeimantus?

Adeimantus/ Yes; but this word right, like the rest, needs explanation. We must be told on what plan, among the many possible ones, this community of property is to be carried out. Do not therefore omit to tell us what plan you propose. For we have been long waiting in the expectation that you would specify the conditions under which children are to be begotten, and the manner of rearing them after they are born, and, in fact, that you would give a complete description of the community of women and children intended by you; for we are of opinion, that the mode of carrying out this idea, according as it is right or wrong, will be a matter of great, or rather of vital importance, to a commonwealth. So, finding that you are taking in hand another form of government, before you have satisfactorily settled these points, we have come to the resolution which you overheard, not to let you go till you have discussed all these questions as fully as the others.

Glaucon/ Add my vote also, as a supporter of this motion.

Thrasymachus/ In short, Socrates, you may look upon us as unanimous in this resolution.

Socrates/ What a deed have you done! in thus laying hands upon me. What a large question are you again raising, as if we were beginning anew, on the subject of our commonwealth! I was rejoicing in the idea of having already done with it, and was only too glad that those points should be let alone, and accepted as they were then delivered. You little know what a swarm of questions you are rousing by calling in these topics; but I saw at the time how the case stood, and therefore let the subject go by, lest it should occasion us endless trouble.

Thrasymachus/ How? do you suppose that we are come here on a gold-hunting errand, and not expressly to hear a philosophical discussion?

Socrates/ Yes, one of reasonable length.

Glaucon/ True, Socrates; and in the eyes of sensible people their whole life is but a reasonable time for hearing such discussions. So never mind us; but pray do not grow tired yourself of stating your views on the subjects about which we were asking, I mean, as to the nature of this community of wives and children, which is to subsist among our guardians; and as to the training of the young, in the interval between their birth and education, which is considered the most troublesome business of all. Try to explain to us on what principle this is to be conducted.

Socrates/ It is no easy matter, my gifted friend, to discuss this question; for it is beset by incredulity, even more than our previous doctrines. In the first place, the practicability of our plans will not be believed; and in the next place, supposing them to be most completely carried out, their desirableness will be questioned. And that is why I feel a reluctance to grapple with the subject, lest I should be thought, my dear friend, to be indulging in a merely visionary speculation.

Glaucon/ You need feel no reluctance; for your auditors are neither stupid, nor incredulous, nor unfriendly.

Socrates/ My excellent friend, did you wish to encourage me by your assurance?

Glaucon/ I did.

Socrates/ Then, let me tell you, you have done just the contrary. If I were confident of my own knowledge of the subject, your encouragement would have been well and good; for to speak on the most momentous and interesting topics in the company of intelligent friends, is a thing that may be done with courage and safety, if one really knows the subject; but to broach a theory while one is still in the position of a doubting inquirer, as I am going to do, is a

slippery course, and makes me afraid, not of being laughed at, that would be childish, but lest I should miss my footing upon the truth, and falling, drag my friends down with me, and that upon ground on which a false step is especially to be dreaded. I pray that the divine Nemesis may not overtake me, Glaucon, for what I am going to say; for I verily believe it is a more venial offence to be the involuntary cause of death to a man, than to deceive him concerning noble and good and just institutions. Such a risk it were better to run among enemies than among friends; so that you are happy in your choice of encouragement.

At this Glaucon laughed, and said;

Glaucon/ Well, Socrates, should your theory do us any harm, our blood shall not be upon your head; we absolve you from the guilt of deceiving us; therefore speak boldly.

Socrates/ To be sure, the law tells us that, when a man has been absolved from an offence, he is clean even in the next world; and therefore, in all probability, in this world also.

Glaucon/ Very well then, let not this fear hinder you from proceeding.

Socrates/ I must recur, then, to a portion of our subject which perhaps I ought to have discussed before in its proper place. But after all, the present order may be the best; the men having quite played out their piece, we proceed with the performance of the women; especially since this is the order of your challenge.

For men born and educated as we have described, the only right method, in my opinion, of acquiring and treating children and wives will be found in following out that original impulse which we communicated to them. The aim of our

theory was, I believe, to make our men as it were guardians of a flock.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Let us keep on the same track, and give corresponding rules for the propagation of the species, and for rearing the young; and let us observe whether we find them suitable or not.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Thus. Do we think that the females of watch-dogs ought to guard the flock along with the males, and hunt with them, and share in all their other duties; or that the females ought to stay at home, because they are disabled by having to breed and rear the cubs, while the males are to labor and be charged with all the care of the flocks?

Glaucon/ We expect them to share in whatever is to be done; only we treat the females as the weaker, and the males as the stronger.

Socrates/ Is it possible to use animals for the same work, if you do not give them the same training and education?

Glaucon/ It is not.

Socrates/ If then we are to employ the women in the same duties; as the men, we must give them the same instructions.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ To the men we gave music and gymnastic.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we must train the women also in the same two arts, giving them besides a military education, and treating them in the same way as the men.

Glaucon/ It follows naturally from what you say.

Socrates/ Perhaps many of the details of the question before us might appear unusually ridiculous, if carried out in the manner proposed.

Glaucon/ No doubt they would.

Socrates/ Which of them do you find the most ridiculous? Is it not obviously the notion of the women exercising naked in the schools with the men, and not only the young women, but even those of an advanced age, just like those old men in the gymnasia, who, in spite of wrinkles and ugliness, still keep up their fondness for active exercises?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed; at the present day that would appear truly ridiculous.

Socrates/ Well then, as we have started the subject, we must not be afraid of the numerous jests which worthy men may make upon the notion of carrying out such a change in reference to the gymnasia and music; and above all, in the wearing of armor and riding on horseback.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ On the contrary, as we have begun the discussion, we must travel on to the rougher ground of our law, entreating these witty men to leave off their usual practice, and try to be serious; and reminding them that not long since it was thought discreditable and ridiculous among the Greeks, as it is now among most barbarian nations, for men to be seen naked. And when the Cretans first, and after them the Lacedaemonians, began the practice of gymnastic exercises, the wits of the time had it in their power to make sport of those novelties. Do you not think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ But when experience had shown that it was better to strip than to cover up the body, and when the ridiculous effect, which this plan had to the eye, had given way before the arguments establishing its superiority, it was

at the same time, as I imagine, demonstrated, that he is a fool who thinks anything ridiculous but that which is evil, and who attempts to raise a laugh by assuming any object to be ridiculous but that which is unwise and evil; or who chooses for the aim of his serious admiration any other mark save that which is good.

Glaucon/ Most assuredly.

Socrates/ Must we not then first come to an agreement as to whether the regulations proposed are practicable or not, and give to anyone, whether of a jocose or serious turn, an opportunity of raising the question, whether the nature of the human female is such as to enable her to share in all the employments of the male, or whether she is wholly unequal to any, or equal to some and not to others; and if so, to which class military service belongs? Will not this be the way to make the best beginning, and, in all probability, the best ending also?

Glaucon/ Yes, quite so.

Socrates/ Would you like, then, that we should argue against ourselves in behalf of an objector, that the adverse position may not be undefended against our attack?

Glaucon/ There is no reason why we should not.

Socrates/ Then let us say in his behalf, Socrates and Glaucon, there is no need for others to advance anything against you; for you yourselves, at the beginning of your scheme for constructing a state, admitted that every individual therein ought, in accordance with nature, to do the one work which belongs to him. We did admit this, I imagine; how could we do otherwise? Can you deny that there is a very marked difference between the nature of woman and that of man?

Glaucon/ Of course there is a difference.

Socrates/ Then is it not fitting to assign to each sex a different work, appropriate to its peculiar nature?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then if so, you must be in error now, and be contradicting yourselves when you go on to say, that men and women ought to engage in the same occupations, when their natures are so widely diverse? Shall you have any answer to make to that objection, my clever friend?

Glaucon/ It is not so very easy to find one at a moment's notice; but I shall apply to you, and I do so now, to state what the arguments on our side are, and to expound them for us.

Socrates/ These objections, Glaucon, and many others like them, are what I anticipated all along; and that is why I was afraid and reluctant to meddle with the law that regulates the possession of the women and children, and the rearing of the latter.

Glaucon/ To say the truth, it does seem no easy task.

Socrates/ Why no; but the fact is, that whether you fall into a small swimming-bath, or into the middle of the great ocean, you have to swim all the same.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Then is it not best for us, in the present instance, to strike out and endeavor to emerge in safety from the discussion, in the hope that either a dolphin may take us on his back, or some other unlooked-for deliverance present itself?

Glaucon/ It would seem so.

Socrates/ Come then, let us see if we can find the way out. We admitted, you say, that different natures ought to have different occupations, and that the natures of men and women are different; but now we maintain that these

different natures ought to engage in the same occupations. Is this your charge against us?

Glaucon/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Truly, Glaucon, the power of the art of controversy is a very extraordinary one.

Glaucon/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because it seems to me that many fall into it even against their will, and fancy they are discussing, when they are merely debating, because they cannot distinguish the meanings of a term, in their investigation of any question, but carry on their opposition to what is stated, by attacking the mere words, employing the art of debate, and not that of philosophical discussion.

Glaucon/ This is no doubt the case with many; does it apply to us at the present moment?

Socrates/ Most assuredly it does; at any rate there is every appearance of our having fallen unintentionally into a verbal controversy.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ We are pressing hard upon the mere letter of the dogma, that different natures ought not to engage in the same pursuits, in the most courageous style of verbal debate, but we have wholly forgotten to consider in what senses the words the same nature and different natures were employed, and what we had in view in our definition, when we assigned different pursuits to different natures, and the same pursuits to the same natures.

Glaucon/ It is true we have not considered that.

Socrates/ That being the case, it is open to us apparently to ask ourselves whether bald men and long-haired men are of the same or of opposite natures, and after admitting the latter to be the case, we may say that if bald men make

shoes, long-haired men must not be suffered to make them, or if the long-haired men make them, the others must be forbidden to do so.

Glaucon/ Nay, that would be ridiculous.

Socrates/ Would it be ridiculous, except for the reason that we were not then using the words, the same and different, in a universal sense, being engaged only with that particular species of likeness and difference which applied directly to the pursuits in question? For example, we said that two men who were mentally qualified for the medical profession, possessed the same nature. Do you not think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And that a man who would make a good physician had a different nature from one who would make a good carpenter.

Glaucon/ Of course he has.

Socrates/ If, then, the male and the female sex appear to differ in reference to any art, or other occupation, we shall say that such occupation must be appropriated to the one or the other; but if we find the difference between the sexes to consist simply in the parts they respectively bear in the propagation of the species, we shall assert that it has not yet been by any means demonstrated that the difference between man and woman touches our purpose; on the contrary, we shall still think it proper for our guardians and their wives to engage in the same pursuits.

Glaucon/ And rightly.

Socrates/ Shall we not proceed to call upon our opponents to inform us what is that particular art or occupation connected with the organization of a state, in reference to which the nature of a man and a woman are not the same, but diverse?

Glaucon/ We certainly are entitled to do so.

Socrates/ Well, perhaps it might be pleaded by others, as it was a little while ago by you, that it is not easy to give a satisfactory answer at a moment's notice; but that, with time for consideration, it would not be difficult to do so.

Glaucon/ True, it might.

Socrates/ Would you like us then to beg the author of such objections to accompany us, to see if we can show him that no occupation which belongs to the ordering of a state is peculiar to women?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ Well then, we will address him thus; Pray tell us whether, when you say that one man possesses talents for a particular study, and that another is without them, you mean that the former learns it easily, the latter with difficulty; and that the one with little instruction can find out much for himself in the subject he has studied, whereas the other after much teaching and practice cannot even retain what he has learnt; and that the mind of the one is duly aided, that of the other thwarted, by the bodily powers? Are not these the only marks by which you define the possession and the want of natural talents, for any pursuit?

Glaucon/ Everyone will say yes.

Socrates/ Well then, do you know of any branch of human industry in which the female sex is not inferior in these respects to the male? or need we go the length of specifying the art of weaving, and the manufacture of pastry and preserves, in which women are thought to excel, and in which their discomfiture is most laughed at?

Glaucon/ You are perfectly right, that in almost every employment the one sex is vastly superior to the other. There are many women, no doubt, who are better in many things than many men; but, speaking generally, it is as you say.

Socrates/ I conclude then, my friend, that none of the occupations which comprehend the ordering of a state belong to woman as woman, nor yet to man as man; but natural gifts are to be found here and there, in both sexes alike; and, so far as her nature is concerned, the woman is admissible to all pursuits as well as the man; though in all of them the woman is weaker than the man.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Shall we then appropriate all duties to men, and none to women?

Glaucon/ How can we?

Socrates/ On the contrary, we shall hold, I imagine, that one woman may have talents for medicine, and another be without them; and that one may be musical, and another unmusical.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And shall we not also say, that one woman may have qualifications for gymnastic exercises, and for war, and another be unwarlike, and without a taste for gymnastics?

Glaucon/ I think we shall.

Socrates/ Again, may there not be a love of knowledge in one, and a distaste for it in another? and may not one be spirited, and another spiritless?

Glaucon/ True again.

Socrates/ If that be so, there are some women who are fit, and others who are unfit, for the office of guardians. For were not those the qualities that we selected, in the case of the men, as marking their fitness for that office?

Glaucon/ Yes, they were.

Socrates/ Then as far as the guardianship of a state is concerned, there is no difference between the natures of the

man and of the woman, but only various degrees of weakness and strength.

Glaucon/ Apparently there is none.

Socrates/ Then we shall have to select duly qualified women also, to share in the life and official labors of the duly qualified men; since we find that they are competent to the work, and of kindred nature with the men.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ And must we not assign the same pursuit to the same natures?

Glaucon/ We must.

Socrates/ Then we are now brought round by a circuit to our former position, and we admit that it is no violation of nature to assign music and gymnastic to the wives of our guardians.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Then our intended legislation was not impracticable, or visionary, since the proposed law was in accordance with nature; rather it is the existing usage, contravening this of ours, that to all appearance contravenes nature.

Glaucon/ So it appears.

Socrates/ Our inquiry was, whether the proposed arrangement would be practicable, and whether it was the most desirable one. was it not?

Glaucon/ It was.

Socrates/ Are we quite agreed that it is practicable?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the next point to be settled is, that it is also the most desirable arrangement?

Glaucon/ Yes, obviously.

Socrates/ Very well; if the question is how to render a woman fit for the office of guardian, we shall not have one education for men, and another for women, especially as the nature to be wrought upon is the same in both cases.

Glaucon/ No. the education will be the same.

Socrates/ Well then, I should like to have your opinion on the following question.

Glaucon/ Pray what is it?

Socrates/ On what principle do you in your own mind estimate one man as better than another? or do you look upon all as equal?

Glaucon/ Certainly I do not.

Socrates/ Then in our ideal state which of the two classes have, in your opinion, been made the better men, the guardians educated as we have described, or the shoemakers brought up to shoemaking?

Glaucon/ It is ridiculous to ask.

Socrates/ I understand you; but tell me, are not these the best of all the citizens?

Glaucon/ Yes, by far.

Socrates/ And will not these women be better than all the other women?

Glaucon/ Yes, by far, again.

Socrates/ Can there be anything better for a state than that it should contain the best possible men and women?

Glaucon/ There cannot.

Socrates/ And this result will be brought about by music and gymnastic Employed as we described?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then our intended regulation is not only practicable, but also one most desirable for the state.

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Then the wives of our guardians must strip for their exercises, inasmuch as they will put on virtue instead of raiment, and must bear their part in war and the other duties comprised in the guardianship of the state, and must engage in no other occupations; though of these tasks the lighter parts must be given to the women rather than to the men, in consideration of the weakness of their sex. But as for the man who laughs at the idea of undressed women going through gymnastic exercises, as a means of realizing what is most perfect, his ridicule is but unripe fruit plucked from the tree of wisdom, and he knows not, to all appearance, what he is laughing at or what he is doing; for it is and ever will be a most excellent maxim, that the useful is noble, and the hurtful base.

Glaucon/ Most assuredly it is.

Socrates/ Here then is one wave, as I may call it, which we may perhaps consider ourselves to have surmounted, in our discussion of the law relating to women; so that, instead of our being altogether swamped by our assertion that it is the duty of our male and female guardians to have all their pursuits in common, our theory is found to be in a manner at one with itself as to the practicability and advisableness of its plan.

Glaucon/ Yes indeed, it is no insignificant wave that you have surmounted.

Socrates/ You will not call it a large one, when you see the next.

Glaucon/ Pray go on, and let me see it.

Socrates/ The last law and those which preceded it involve, as I conceive, another to this effect.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ That these women shall be, without exception, the common wives of these men, and that no one shall have a wife of his own; likewise that the children shall be common, and that the parent shall not know his child, nor the child his parent.

Glaucon/ This law, is much more likely than the former to excite distrust both as to its practicability and as to its advisableness.

Socrates/ As to the latter, I think no one could deny that it would be an immense advantage for the wives and children to be common to all, if it were possible; but I expect there would be most controversy about the practicability of the scheme.

Glaucon/ Both points might very well be controverted.

Socrates/ Then there will be a junction of discussions. I thought I should run away and get off from one of them, if you agreed to the utility of the plan, so that I should only have to discuss its feasibility.

Glaucon/ But you were found out in your attempt to escape; so please to render an account on both heads.

Socrates/ I must submit to justice. Grant me however this one favor; permit me to take a holiday, like one of those men of indolent minds, who are wont to feast themselves on their own thoughts, whenever they travel alone. Such persons, you know, before they have found out any means of effecting their wishes, pass that by, to avoid the fatigue of thinking whether such wishes are practicable or not, and assume that what they desire is already theirs; after which they proceed to arrange the remainder of the business, and please themselves with running over what they mean to do under the assumed circumstances, thus aggravating the indolence of an already indolent mind. So at this moment I too am yielding to laziness, and am desirous of putting off

for subsequent investigation the question of possibility; and for the present assuming the possibility, I shall inquire, if you will give me leave, what arrangements the governing body will make when our rule is carried out, endeavoring also to show that in practice it would be the most advantageous of all things, both to the state and to its guardians. These points I will first endeavor to examine thoroughly in company with you, and take the others afterwards, if you give me your leave.

Glaucon/ You have my permission. So proceed with the inquiry.

Socrates/ I think then, that if our rulers shall prove worthy of the name, and their auxiliaries likewise, the latter will be willing to execute the orders they receive, and the former, in issuing those orders, will themselves yield implicit obedience to our laws; and in whatever cases we have left the details to them, will endeavor to carry out their spirit.

Glaucon/ So we may expect.

Socrates/ It will be your duty, therefore, as their lawgiver, to select the women just as you selected the men, and to place them together, taking care, as far as possible, that they shall be of similar nature. Now inasmuch as the dwellings and mess-tables are all common, and no one possesses anything in the shape of private property, both sexes will live together, and in consequence of their indiscriminate association in active exercises, and in the rest of their daily life, they will be led, I imagine, by a constraining instinct to form alliances. Do you not think this will be inevitable?

Glaucon/ The necessity truly will not be that of mathematical demonstration, but that of love, which perhaps is more constraining than the other in its power to persuade and draw after it the mass of men.

Socrates/ Quite so. But in the next place, Glaucon, irregular alliances, or indeed irregularity of any kind, would be a profanation among the members of a happy city, and will not be permitted by the magistrates.

Glaucon/ And rightly so.

Socrates/ Manifestly then our next care will be to make the marriage-union as sacred a thing as we possibly can; and this sanctity will attach to the marriages which are most for the public good.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Then tell me, Glaucon, how this end is to be attained. For I know you keep in your house both sporting dogs, and a great number of game birds. I conjure you, therefore, to inform me whether you have paid any attention to the intercourse and the breeding of these animals.

Glaucon/ In what respect?

Socrates/ In the first place, though all are well-bred, are there not some which are, or grow to be, superior to the rest?

Glaucon/ There are.

Socrates/ Do you then breed from all alike, or are you anxious to breed as much as possible from the best?

Glaucon/ From the best.

Socrates/ And at what age? when they are very young, or very old, or when they are in their prime?

Glaucon/ When they are in their prime.

Socrates/ And if you were to pursue a different course, do you think your breed of birds and dogs would degenerate very much?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Do you think it would be different with horses, or any other animals?

Glaucon/ Certainly not; it would be absurd to suppose it.

Socrates/ Good heavens! my dear friend, what very first-rate men our rulers ought to be, if the analogy hold with regard to the human race.

Glaucon/ Well, it certainly does; but why first-rate?

Socrates/ Because they will be obliged to use medicine to a great extent. Now you know when invalids do not require medicine, but are willing to submit to a regimen, we think an ordinary doctor good enough for them; but when it is necessary to administer medicines, we know that a more able physician must be called in.

Glaucon/ True; but how does this apply?

Socrates/ Thus. It is probable that our rulers will be compelled to have recourse to a good deal of falsehood and deceit for the benefit of their subjects. And, if you recollect, we said that all such practices were useful in the character of medicine.

Glaucon/ Yes, and we were right.

Socrates/ Well then, it appears that this right principle applies particularly to the questions of marriage and propagation.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ It follows from what has been already granted, that the best of both sexes ought to be brought together as often as possible, and the worst as seldom as possible, and that the issue of the former unions ought to be reared, and that of the latter abandoned, if the flock is to attain to first-rate excellence; and these proceedings ought to be kept a secret from all but the magistrates themselves, if the herd of guardians is also to be as free as possible from internal strife.

Glaucon/ You are perfectly right.

Socrates/ Then we shall have to ordain certain festivals, at which we shall bring together the brides and the bridegrooms, and we must have sacrifices performed, and hymns composed by our poets in strains appropriate to the occasion; but the number of marriages we shall place under the control of the magistrates, in order that they may, as far as they can, keep the population at the same point, taking into consideration the effects of war and disease, and all such agents, that our city may, to the best of our power, be prevented from becoming either too great or too small.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ We must therefore contrive an ingenious system of lots, I fancy, in order that those inferior persons, of whom I spoke, may impute the manner in which couples are united, to chance, and not to the magistrates.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And those of our young men who distinguish themselves in the field or elsewhere, will receive, along with other privileges and rewards, more liberal permission to associate with the women, in order that, under color of this pretext, the greatest number of children may be the issue of such parents.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ And, as fast as the children are born, they will be received by the officers appointed for the purpose, whether men or women, or both; for I presume that the state-offices also will be held in common both by men and women.

Glaucon/ They will.

Socrates/ Well, these officers, I suppose, will take the children of good parents, and place them in the general nursery under the charge of certain nurses, living apart in a particular quarter of the city; while the issue of inferior

parents, and all imperfect children that are born to the others, will be concealed, as is fitting, in some mysterious and unknown hiding-place.

Glaucon/ Yes, if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure.

Socrates/ And will not these same officers have to superintend the rearing of the children, bringing the mothers to the nursery when their breasts are full, but taking every precaution that no mother shall know her own child, and providing other women that have milk, if the mothers nave not enough; and must they not take care to limit the time during which the mothers are to suckle the children, committing the task of sitting up at night, and the other troubles incident to infancy, to nurses and attendants?

Glaucon/ You make child-bearing a very easy business for the wives of the guardians.

Socrates/ Yes, and so it ought to be. Now let us proceed to the next object of our interest. We said, you remember, that the children ought to be the issue of parents who are still in their prime.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And do you agree with me that the prime of life may be reasonably reckoned at a period of twenty years for a woman, and thirty for a man?

Glaucon/ Where do you place these years?

Socrates/ I should make it the rule for a woman to bear children to the state from her twentieth to her fortieth year; and for a man, after getting over the sharpest burst in the race of life, thenceforward to beget children to the state until he is fifty-five years old.

Glaucon/ Doubtless, in both sexes, this is the period of their prime, both of body and mind.

Socrates/ If then a man who is either above or under this age shall meddle with the business of begetting children for the commonwealth, we shall declare his act to be an offence against religion and justice; inasmuch as he is raising up a child for the state, who, should detection be avoided, instead of having been begotten under the sanction of those sacrifices and prayers, which are to be offered up at every marriage ceremonial, by priests and priestesses, and the whole city, to the effect that the children to be born may ever be more virtuous and more useful than their virtuous and useful parents, will have been conceived under cover of darkness by the aid of dire incontinence.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ The same law will hold should a man, who is still of an age to be a father, meddle with a woman, who is also of the proper age, without the introduction of the magistrate; for we shall accuse him of raising up to the state an illegitimate, unsponsored, and unhallowed child.

Glaucon/ You are perfectly right.

Socrates/ But as soon as the women and the men are past the prescribed age, we shall allow the latter, I imagine, to associate freely with whomsoever they please, so that it be not a daughter, or mother, or daughters child, or grandmother; and in like manner we shall permit the women to associate with any man, except a son or a father, or one of their relations in the direct line, ascending or descending; but only after giving them strict orders to do their best, if possible, to prevent any child, haply so conceived, from seeing the light, but if that cannot sometimes be helped, to dispose of the infant on the understanding that the fruit of such a union is not to be reared.

Glaucon/ That too is a reasonable plan; but how are they to distinguish fathers, and daughters, and the relations you described just now?

Socrates/ Not at all; only, all the children that are born between the seventh and tenth month from the day on which one of their number was married, are to be called by him, if male, his sons, if female, his daughters; and they shall call him father, and their children he shall call his grandchildren; these again shall call him and his fellow-bridegrooms and brides, grandfathers and grandmothers; likewise all shall regard as brothers and sisters those that were born in the period during which their own fathers and mothers were bringing them into the world; and as we said just now, all these shall refrain from touching one another. But the law will allow intercourse between brothers and sisters, if the lot chances to fall that way, and if the Delphian priestess also gives it her sanction.

Glaucon/ That is quite right.

Socrates/ Such will be the character, Glaucon, of the community of women and children that is to prevail among the guardians of your state. The argument must now go on to establish that the plan is in keeping with the rest of our polity, and quite the best conceivable arrangement. Or can you propose any other course?

Glaucon/ Do as you say, by all means.

Socrates/ Will not the first step to an agreement on this point between us be, to ask ourselves what we can name as the highest perfection in the constitution of a state, at which the legislator ought to aim in making his laws, and what as the greatest evil; and the next, to inquire whether the plan we described just now fits into our outline of the perfection, and is out of keeping with our sketch of the evil?

Glaucon/ Most decidedly.

Socrates/ Do we know then of any greater evil to the state, than that which should tear it asunder, and make it into a multitude of states instead of one? Or of any higher perfection than that which should bind it together, and make it one?

Glaucon/ We do not.

Socrates/ Well, then, does not a community of feeling in pleasure and pain bind the citizens together, when they all, so far as is possible, rejoice and grieve alike, at the same gains and the same losses?

Glaucon/ Most assuredly it does.

Socrates/ And does not isolation in these feelings produce disunion, when some are much pleased and others equally grieved, at the same events affecting the city and its inmates?

Glaucon/ Of course it does.

Socrates/ And does not this state of things arise when the words mine and not mine are not pronounced by all simultaneously in the city? and when there is the same discrepancy in the use of the word another's?

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ That city then is best conducted in which the largest proportion of citizens apply the words mine and not mine similarly to the same objects.

Glaucon/ Yes, much the best.

Socrates/ Or, in other words, that city which comes nearest to the condition of an individual man. Thus, when one of our fingers is hurt, the whole fellowship that spreads through the body up to the soul, and there forms an organized unity under the governing principle, is sensible of

the hurt, and there is a universal and simultaneous feeling of pain in sympathy with the wounded part; and therefore we say that the man has a pain in his finger; and in speaking of any part of our frame whatsoever, the same account may be given of the pain felt when it suffers, and the pleasure felt when it is easy.

Glaucon/ The same, no doubt; and to return to your question, there is a very close analogy between such a case and the condition of the best-governed state.

Socrates/ Then I fancy that, when any good or evil happens to one of the citizens, a state such as we are describing will be more likely than another to regard the affected member as a part of itself, and to sympathize as a whole with his pleasure or his pain.

Glaucon/ It must do so, if it be well ordered.

Socrates/ It will now be time, for us to go back to our state, and to take notice whether it possesses in the highest degree the qualities to which our inquiry has unanimously brought us, or is surpassed therein by some other state.

Glaucon/ We had better do so.

Socrates/ Well then, other states, and ours like the rest, contain magistrates and a commonalty, do they not?

Glaucon/ They do.

Socrates/ And they will all address one another as citizens?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But besides calling them citizens, how does the commonalty in other states style its magistrates?

Glaucon/ In most cases it styles them masters, but in democracies simply magistrates.

Socrates/ But in our state, what name besides that of citizens does the commonalty bestow on the magistrates?

Glaucon/ It calls them preservers and auxiliaries.

Socrates/ And what do they call the people?

Glaucon/ Paymasters and maintainers.

Socrates/ And in other states the magistrates call the people, what?

Glaucon/ Servants.

Socrates/ And what do the magistrates call one another?

Glaucon/ Fellow-magistrates.

Socrates/ And ours?

Glaucon/ Fellow-guardians.

Socrates/ Can you say whether in other states a magistrate, speaking of his fellow-magistrates, might describe one of them as a relative, and another as a stranger?

Glaucon/ Yes, many might.

Socrates/ And in so doing, does he not regard and speak of the former as belonging to himself, and the latter as not belonging to himself?

Glaucon/ He does.

Socrates/ Well, could any of your guardians regard or describe one of his fellow-guardians as a stranger?

Glaucon/ Certainly not; for they must look upon everyone whom they meet as either a brother, or a sister, or a father, or a mother, or a son, or a daughter, or one of the children or parents of these.

Socrates/ Excellently said; but answer me one more question; shall you be satisfied with instituting family names, or shall you further require them to act in every instance in accordance with the names, enjoining in the treatment of the fathers, all that it is usual to enjoin towards fathers, as that a child shall honor, succor, and be subject to his parents, otherwise it will be worse for him both before

heaven and before men; inasmuch as his conduct, if he acts differently, will be an outrage upon religion and justice? Will you have these commandments, or any others, sounded from the first by all the citizens in the ears of the children, with reference to those who are pointed out to them as fathers, and to all other relations?

Glaucon/ These, certainly; for it would be ridiculous if family names were merely uttered with the lips, without actions to correspond.

Socrates/ This then is the state, above all others, in which, when good or evil betides an individual, every member will with one accord apply the expressions spoken of just now, saying, It is well with mine, or It is ill with mine.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ And did we not say that a general sympathy in pleasure and in pain goes hand in hand with this mode of thinking and speaking?

Glaucon/ Yes, and we said so rightly.

Socrates/ Then will not our citizens be remarkable for sharing in the same interest, which they will call mine, and, having this common interest, thereby possess in a remarkable degree a community in pleasure and pain?

Glaucon/ Yes, in a very remarkable degree.

Socrates/ Well, is not this owing, among the other features of our constitution, to the fact that our guardians hold their wives and children in common?

Glaucon/ Yes, mainly to this.

Socrates/ But, if you remember, we admitted this to be the highest perfection in a state, comparing the condition of a well-ordered state to the relation of a body to its members in the matter of pleasure and pain.

Glaucon/ Yes; and we were right in our admission.

Socrates/ Then we have discovered that the highest perfection of the state is due to the community of wives and children, which is to prevail among our auxiliaries.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ And in this arrangement we were moreover consistent with our former conclusions; for I believe we said that all private property, whether in houses, or lands, or anything else, must be forbidden to our guardians, who are to receive a maintenance from the rest of the citizens, as the wages of their office, and to lay it out in common, if they are destined to be guardians indeed.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Well then, will not the regulations laid down before, and still more those we are now describing, make men genuine guardians, and prevent them from tearing the city asunder by applying the term mine each to a different object, instead of all to the same, and by severally dragging to their several distinct abodes whatever they can acquire independently of the rest, and, amongst other things, separate wives and children, thus creating exclusive pleasures and pains by their exclusive interests; causing them, on the contrary, to tend unitedly to a common center, by the fact of holding but one opinion concerning what is their own, and thus to be, as far as is possible, simultaneously affected by pleasure and pain?

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Further, will not all lawsuits and prosecutions disappear, so to speak, from among them, seeing that there is nothing which a man can call his own except his body, all other things being common property? And will not this deliver them from all those feuds which are occasioned among men by the separate possession of money and children and kindred?

Glaucon/ They cannot fail to be rid of them.

Socrates/ Moreover, there will be, by rights, no actions for forcible seizure, or for assault and battery among them. For we shall probably maintain that to defend oneself against an assailant of one's own age, is consistent both with honor and justice, recognizing the necessity of taking care of the person.

Glaucon/ Rightly so.

Socrates/ There is also this advantage, in such a law; if anyone should happen to fall into a passion with another, he would find a vent for his anger by a personal encounter, and thus the quarrel will be less likely to assume a more serious character.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ An older person, however, will be authorized to command and chastise any that are younger than himself.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And surely it is to be expected that no younger man will presume either to strike or otherwise do violence to an elder, unless the magistrates commission him to do so. Nor yet, I think, will a young man insult his seniors in any other way; for there are two warders that will effectually interpose, namely, fear and shame; shame restraining him from laying violent hands on one whom he regards as a parent, and fear, lest the person attacked should be succored by the rest, in the character of sons, brothers, and fathers.

Glaucon/ Yes, those will be the results of our regulations.

Socrates/ Then in every way the laws will secure mutual peace among our men.

Glaucon/ Yes, in a high degree.

Socrates/ But if the men of this class be free from internal dissensions, there is no danger that the rest of the citizens will quarrel either with them or with one another.

Glaucon/ No, there is not.

Socrates/ There are, moreover, evils of a very petty nature, and so mean that I scruple even to mention them, from which they will be exempt; I allude to the flatteries paid by the poor to the rich, and those embarrassments and vexations which beset men in rearing a family, and in the acquisition of the money that is needed for the bare maintenance of domestics, now borrowing and now repudiating, and by indiscriminate means procuring property which they place in the hands of their wives and servants, and entrust to their management; all the troubles that these circumstances occasion, my dear friend, are obvious enough, and besides they are ignoble, and do not deserve to be described.

Glaucon/ True, they are obvious even to the blind.

Socrates/ While they are free from all these evils, they will live a life more blessed than that blissful life which is the lot of conquerors at the Olympian games.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, the happiness ascribed to these comprehends but a small part of the blessings enjoyed by our men, whose victory is as much more glorious as their public maintenance is more complete. The victory they win is the preservation of the whole state, and while living they receive crowns and privileges from their country in the shape of maintenance and all that life requires, themselves and their children, and when they die they are admitted to an honorable interment.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed, these are glorious privileges.

Socrates/ Do you remember then, that some time back we were accused by some objector of not making our guardians happy, because, with the power to take all that the citizens had, they possessed nothing of their own? To which we replied, I believe, that we would consider that point hereafter, if it should fall in our way; but that our object then was to make our guardians really guardians, and the state itself as happy as we could, without any idea of fixing our attention on anyone class, and providing happiness for it?

Glaucon/ I remember.

Socrates/ Well, but as we have now found that the life of the auxiliaries is much more glorious and more desirable than that of Olympian victors, can it be thought that the life of the shoemakers or any other artisans, or that of the agriculturists, is in any sense comparable to it?

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ However it is but right to repeat here what I said at the time, that if ever our guardians attempt to make themselves happy in such a way that they cease to be guardians, if, instead of being satisfied with a life merely moderate and stable, such as we think the best, they become possessed with a silly and childish notion of happiness, impelling them to use their power to appropriate all the good things in the city, they will discover that Hesiod was truly wise when he said that in a certain sense the half is more than the whole.

Glaucon/ If they take my advice they will abide by the life assigned to them.

Socrates/ Then you concede the principle, that the women are to be put upon the same footing as the men, according to our description, in education, in bearing children and in watching over the other citizens, and that, whether they remain at home or are sent into the field, they

are to share the duties of guardianship with the men, and join with them in the chase like dogs, and have everything in common with them so far as is at all possible, and that in so doing they will be following the most desirable course, and not violating the natural relation which ought to govern the mutual fellowship of the sexes?

Glaucon/ I do concede all this.

Socrates/ Then does it not remain for us, to determine whether this community can possibly subsist among men, as it can among other animals, and what are the conditions of its possibility?

Glaucon/ You have anticipated me in a suggestion I was about to make.

Socrates/ As for their warlike operations, I suppose it is easy to see how they will be conducted.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Why, both sexes will take the field together, and they will also carry with them to the wars such of their children as are strong enough, in order that, like the children of all other craftsmen, they may be spectators of those occupations in which, when grown up, they will themselves be engaged; and they will require them, besides looking on, to act as servants and attendants in all the duties of war, and to wait upon their fathers and mothers. You have doubtless observed in the various trades, how the children of potters, for example, look on and fetch and carry for their parents, long before they put their own hand to the making of pots.

Glaucon/ Certainly, I have.

Socrates/ Shall potters then show more carefulness than our guardians in educating their children, by making them see and practice their proper duties?

Glaucon/ No, that would be indeed ridiculous.

Socrates/ Then, again, every creature will fight with peculiar courage in the presence of its offspring.

Glaucon/ True; but there is considerable danger, Socrates, in case of one of those reverses which are common in war, that the children may be sacrificed with the parents, and so the rest of the city be weakened beyond the power of recovery.

Socrates/ That is quite true. But let me ask you, in the first place, whether you think we are bound to take measures to avoid every possible danger?

Glaucon/ By no means.

Socrates/ Well, if danger is ever to be encountered, ought it not to be in a case in which success will be a means of improvement?

Glaucon/ Manifestly it ought.

Socrates/ And do you regard it as a point too unimportant to justify the risk, whether those whose manhood is to be passed in the profession of arms, see something of war in their childhood, or not?

Glaucon/ Nay, it is certainly important for the purpose you describe.

Socrates/ Then it must be a fixed rule to make the children spectators of war, and also to contrive some plan for insuring their safety; and then all will be well, will it not?

Glaucon/ It will.

Socrates/ Now, in the first place, will not their fathers be intelligent and sagacious judges, so far as men can be, as to what campaigns are likely to prove dangerous and what the reverse?

Glaucon/ In all probability they will.

Socrates/ If so, they will carry their children to the latter, while they will be cautious about taking them to the former.

Glaucon/ Rightly so.

Socrates/ And I presume they will set officers over them, not chosen for their worthlessness, but men qualified by experience and age to be their guides and tutors.

Glaucon/ It is fit they should.

Socrates/ Still we must admit that many people have met with results contradicting their expectation.

Glaucon/ Yes, very frequently.

Socrates/ Then, to meet such emergencies, my dear friend, we must provide our children from the first with wings, to enable them, in case of necessity, to fly away and escape.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ We must put them on horseback at the earliest possible age, and when we have had them taught to ride, we must take them to see the fighting, mounted, not on spirited animals, or good chargers, but on horses selected for speed and docility. For by this plan they will obtain the best view of their future occupation, and at the same time will be most secure of making good their escape in case of need, following in the train of leaders of mature years.

Glaucon/ I think your plan is the right one.

Socrates/ To come now to the rules of military service; on what footing are your soldiers to be, both among themselves, and as regards the enemy? Tell me whether I am right in my views or not.

Glaucon/ Let me know what they may be.

Socrates/ If one of the soldiers deserts his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any such act of cowardice, must we not degrade him to the rank of an artisan, or an agricultural laborer?

Glaucon/ Decidedly.

Socrates/ And if a soldier falls alive into the hands of the enemy, ought we not to make a present of him to anyone that will have him, to do what he pleases with his booty?

Glaucon/ Yes, by all means.

Socrates/ But if a soldier highly distinguishes himself and gains himself credit, ought he not, think you, in the first place, while the army is still in the field, to be crowned with a garland by each of the youths and children in turn, among his comrades in arms?

Glaucon/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ And shaken by the hand?

Glaucon/ Yes, and shaken by the hand.

Socrates/ But I suppose you will hardly extend your approbation to my next proposition.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ That he should kiss and be kissed by them all.

Glaucon/ Most certainly I do; and I would add to the law, that during the continuance of the campaign, no one whom he has a mind to kiss be permitted to refuse him the satisfaction; in order that, if any soldier happens to entertain an admiration for either a male or a female comrade, he may be the more stimulated to carry off the meed of velour.

Socrates/ Good; and we have already said that a brave man will be allowed to enter into marriage-relations more frequently than others will, and to exercise more than the usual liberty of choice in such matters, so that as many children as possible may be obtained from a father of this character.

Glaucon/ True, we did say so.

Socrates/ Again there are other honors with which, even according to Homer, it is just to reward those young men that distinguish themselves by good conduct. Homer says

that Ajax having won renown in the war, received by way of distinction whole chines of beef; it being considered that an honor which, besides the glory of it, would augment his physical strength, was peculiar!, appropriate to a brave man in the prime of his manhood.

Glaucon/ A very just idea.

Socrates/ Then in this point at least we will follow the suggestion of Homer. We too, at our sacrificial feasts and all similar entertainments, will honor our meritorious soldiers, according to the degree of merit they have displayed, not only with hymns and the privileges we have just slated, but also with goblets full to the brim, and meats and places of honor, intending thereby not only to do honor to our brave men and women, but also to promote their training.

Glaucon/ An excellent plan.

Socrates/ Very good; and when there are any killed in a campaign, shall we not in the first place give out that those who fell with honor belong to the golden race?

Glaucon/ Most assuredly we shall.

Socrates/ And shall we not believe in Hesiod's doctrine, that when any of this race die;

> They into spirits are changed, earth-haunting,
> beneficent, holy,
> Mighty to screen us from harm,
> and of speech-gifted men the protectors?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly we shall.

Socrates/ Shall we then inquire of the oracle how and with what distinctions we ought to inter men of superhuman and godlike mold, and then proceed to inter them, in the manner and with the ceremonies that the oracle prescribes?

Glaucon/ Of course we shall.

Socrates/ And for the future, shall we regard their sepulchers as those of superior beings, and pay them the due respect; and worship? and shall we observe these same practices, whenever any citizen, who has been esteemed eminent for his bravery during his lifetime, dies of old age or from any other cause?

Glaucon/ Certainly, it is but just to do so.

Socrates/ Again, what will be the conduct of our soldiers in dealing with their enemies?

Glaucon/ In what respects?

Socrates/ In the first place, take the custom of making slaves. Does it seem just for Greeks to make slaves of the freemen of Grecian cities? Ought they not rather to do what they can to prevent the practice, and to introduce the custom of sparing their own race, from a prudent fear of being reduced to bondage by the barbarians?

Glaucon/ The latter is the better course beyond all comparison.

Socrates/ Then it is better also not even to have Greek slaves in their possession, and to advise the other Greeks against the practice.

Glaucon/ Decidedly so; their thoughts would then be more turned against the barbarians, and they would be less likely to molest one another.

Socrates/ Again; is it well to strip the slain, after a victory, of anything except their arms? Or does not the practice offer an excuse to cowards for not facing those who are still fighting, so long as they can pretend that they are in the way of their duty, when they are stooping to rifle a dead body? and have not many armies before now been destroyed through this habit of pillaging?

Glaucon/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ And does it not seem a piece of ignoble avarice to plunder the dead, and is it not the sign of a womanish and petty mind to regard with hostile feelings the body of a dead man, when the real enemy has flown away, leaving only the instrument wherewith he fought? Are those who thus act any better, think you, than dogs which growl at the stones that have been thrown at them, but let the person who threw them alone?

Glaucon/ No, not one bit better.

Socrates/ Then must we banish the practices of stripping the dead, and interfering with the removal of the bodies?

Glaucon/ Yes, we must indeed.

Socrates/ Neither, I presume, shall we carry the arms of our enemies to the temples, to dedicate them there, especially the arms of Greeks, if we care to cultivate a good understanding with the rest of the Greeks; on the contrary, we shall be fearful of desecrating a temple, if we carry to it such trophies won from our own brethren; that is to say, unless the god of the oracle shall pronounce a different judgment.

Glaucon/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ Well, and how will your soldiers behave towards their enemies in the matter of ravaging the lands and burning the houses of Greeks?

Glaucon/ I should like to hear your own opinion on the subject.

Socrates/ For my part, then, I confess I disapprove of both these practices, and should only allow the annual crop to be carried off. Would you like me to tell you my reasons?

Glaucon/ I should.

Socrates/ It appears to me, that as there are two names in use, war and sedition, so there are two things

representing two distinct kinds of disagreement. In the one case the parties are friends and relations, in the other, aliens and foreigners. Now when hostility exists among the former, it is called sedition; when between strangers, it is called war.

Glaucon/ There is nothing unreasonable in what you say.

Socrates/ Observe whether what I am going to add is equally reasonable; I affirm that all the members of the Greek race are brethren and kinsmen to one another, but aliens and foreigners to the barbarian world.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Therefore when Greeks and barbarians fight together, we shall describe them as natural enemies, warring against one another; and to this kind of hostility we shall give the name of war; but when Greeks are on this sort of footing with Greeks, we shall say that they are natural friends, but that in the case supposed Greece is in a morbid state of civil conflict; and to this kind of hostility we shall give the name of sedition.

Glaucon/ I quite assent to this view.

Socrates/ Then bear in mind, that in what is now confessedly called sedition, wherever this state of things arises and a city is divided, if each party ravage the lands and burn the houses of the other, the conflict is thought a sinful one, and both parties are looked upon as unpatriotic; for had they been patriotic, they would never have had the heart to mangle their nurse and mother. But it is thought that the victorious party cannot in fairness do more than carry off the crops of its adversaries, and ought to feel that they will one day be reconciled again, and not continue at war forever.

Glaucon/ Yes; this feeling betokens a far more humanized condition than the other.

Socrates/ Very good, and is not the city you are founding to be a Grecian city?

Glaucon/ It certainly should be.

Socrates/ Then will not its citizens be gentle and humane?

Glaucon/ Certainly they will.

Socrates/ And will they not be patriotic Greeks, looking upon all Hellas as their own country, and sharing with their fellow-countrymen in the rites of a common religion?

Glaucon/ Most certainly they will.

Socrates/ Thus regarding all the Greeks as their brethren, will they not look upon a quarrel with them in the light of a sedition, and refuse it the name of a war?

Glaucon/ They will.

Socrates/ And therefore feel, throughout the quarrel, like persons who are presently to be reconciled?

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ They will, therefore, correct them in a friendly spirit, and chastise them without any thought of enslaving or destroying them, simply as schoolmasters, not as enemies.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Then being Greeks, they will not devastate Greece, nor burn houses, nor admit that all the men, women, and children in a city are their foes; always confining this name to those few who were the authors of the quarrel. And on all these accounts they will refrain from laying waste the land, or razing the houses, because the owners are in most cases their friends; and they will push the quarrel only thus far, till the innocent have done justice upon the guilty who plague them.

Socrates/ I readily admit, that our citizens ought to adopt these rules in their conduct towards their adversaries; while I would have them behave to barbarians as the Greeks now behave to one another.

Glaucon/ Then are we to add to our enactments a law forbidding our guardians either to ravage lands or set houses on fire?

Socrates/ Let us do so; and let us assume that both this and our former regulations are right.

Glaucon/ But I really think, Socrates, that if you be permitted to go on in this way, you will never recollect what you put aside some time ago before you entered on all these questions, namely, the task of showing that this constitution of things is possible, and how it might be realized. For in proof of the assertion that, if it were realized, it would ensure all kinds of advantages to a city which was the seat of it, I can myself adduce facts which you have omitted, as, that such soldiers would fight to perfection against their enemies, in consequence of the unwillingness to desert one another which would arise from their knowing one another as brothers, fathers, or sons, and using these endearing names familiarly; and if the female sex were to serve in the army, whether in the same ranks with the men, or posted as a reserve behind, to strike terror into the enemy and render assistance at any point in case of need, I know that this would render them quite invincible; moreover, I see all the advantages, omitted by you, which they would enjoy at home. But as I fully admit the presence of all these merits and a thousand others in this constitution, if it were brought into existence, you need describe it no further. Rather let us try now to convince ourselves of this, that the thing is practicable, and how it is practicable, leaving all other questions to themselves.

Socrates/ What a sudden onslaught, you have made upon my argument! you have no compassion upon my uneasy loitering. Perhaps you do not know that after I have barely surmounted the first two waves, you are now bringing down upon me the third breaker, which is the most mountainous and formidable of the three; but when you have seen or rather heard it, you will think my conduct quite excusable, and you will allow that I had good reasons for hesitating and trembling to broach a theory so startling, and to undertake the investigation of it.

Glaucon/ The more you talk in this strain, the less likely shall we be to let you off from explaining how this constitution is possible. So proceed with your explanation, and let us have no more delay.

Socrates/ Well, then, in the first place we ought not to forget that we have been brought to this point by an inquiry into the nature of justice and injustice.

Glaucon/ True; but what of that?

Socrates/ Why nothing. But, if we find out what justice is, shall we expect the character of a just man not to differ in any point from that of justice itself, but to be its perfect counterpart? Or shall we be content provided he comes as near it as is possible, and partakes more largely of it than the rest of the world?

Glaucon/ The latter; we shall be content.

Socrates/ Then the design of our investigations into the nature of justice in itself, and the character of the perfectly just man, as well as the possibility of his existence, and likewise into the nature of injustice, and the character of the perfectly unjust man, was to use them as patterns, so that by looking upon the two men, and observing how they stand in reference to happiness and its opposite, we might be compelled to admit in our own case, that he who resembles

them most closely in character, will also have a lot most closely resembling theirs; but it was not our intention to demonstrate the possibility of these things in practice.

Glaucon/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Do you think any the worse of the merits of an artist, who has painted a beau ideal of human beauty, and has left nothing lacking in the picture, because he cannot prove that such a man as he has painted might possibly exist?

Glaucon/ No, indeed, I do not.

Socrates/ Well, were not we likewise professing to construct in theory the pattern of a perfect state?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Then will our theory suffer at all in your good opinion, if we cannot prove that it is possible for a city to be organized in the manner proposed?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ This then is the true state of the case; but if for your gratification I am to exert myself also to show in what especial way and on what conditions our ideal might best be realized, I must ask you, with a view to this demonstration, to grant over again your former admissions.

Glaucon/ Which do you mean?

Socrates/ In any case, can a theoretical sketch be perfectly realized in practice? or is it a law of nature that performance can never hit the truth so closely as theory? Never mind if some think otherwise; but tell me whether you admit the fact or not.

Glaucon/ I do admit it.

Socrates/ Then do not impose upon me the duty of exhibiting all our theory realized with precise accuracy in fact; but if we succeed in finding out how a state may be

organized in very close accordance with our description, you must admit that we have discovered the possibility of realizing the plan which you require me to consider. Shall you not be content if you gain thus much? for my own part I shall be.

Glaucon/ So shall I.

Socrates/ Then our next step apparently must be, to endeavor to search out and demonstrate what there is now amiss in the working of our states, preventing their being regulated in the manner described, and what is the smallest change that would enable a state to assume this form of constitution, confining ourselves, if possible, to a single change; if not, to two; or else, to such as are fewest in number and least important in their influence.

Glaucon/ Let us by all means endeavor so to do.

Socrates/ Well, there is one change by which, as I think we might show, the required revolution would be secured; but it is certainly neither a small nor an easy change, though it is a possible one.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ I am now on the point of confronting that very statement which we compared to the huge wave. Nevertheless it shall be spoken, even if it is to deluge me, literally like an exploding wave, with laughter and infamy. Pay attention to what I am going to say.

Glaucon/ Say on.

Socrates/ Unless it happen either that philosophers acquire the kingly power in states, or that those who are now called kings and potentates, be imbued with a sufficient measure of genuine philosophy, that is to say, unless political power and philosophy be united in the same person, most of those minds which at present pursue one to the exclusion of the other being peremptorily debarred from

either, there will be no deliverance, my dear Glaucon, for cities, nor yet, I believe, for the human race; neither can the commonwealth, which we have now sketched in theory, ever till then grow into a possibility, and see the light of day. But a consciousness how entirely this would contradict the common opinion made me all along so reluctant to give expression to it; for it is difficult to see that there is no other way by which happiness can be attained, by the state or by the individual.

Glaucon/ The language and sentiments, Socrates, to which you have just given utterance, are of such a nature, that you may expect large numbers of by no means contemptible assailants to rush desperately upon you without a moments delay, after throwing off their upper garments, as it were, and grasping, in that state, the first offensive weapon that comes in their way, to do signal execution upon you; so that if you fail to repel them with the weapons of argument, and make your escape, you will certainly suffer the penalty of being well jeered.

Socrates/ Well, was it not you that brought all this upon me?

Glaucon/ Yes, and I did quite right. But I promise not to desert you; on the contrary, I will assist you with the weapons at my disposal, which are, good-will and encouragement; and perhaps in my answers I may show more address than another. Therefore, relying on this assistance, endeavor to show to the incredulous that what you say is true.

Socrates/ I must make the attempt, since you offer me such a valuable alliance. Now, if we are to have a chance of escaping from the assailants you speak of, I think it essential to give them our definition of philosophers, and show whom we mean, when we venture to assert that such persons

ought to govern; in order that, their character having been made thoroughly apparent, we may be able to defend ourselves by demonstrating that it is the natural province of these men to embrace philosophy, and take the lead in a state, and the province of all others to let philosophy alone, and follow the lead of the former.

Glaucon/ Yes, it is a fit time, to give this definition.

Socrates/ Come then, follow my steps, and let us try if we can in some way or other satisfactorily expound our notion.

Glaucon/ Lead on.

Socrates/ Will it be necessary to remind you, or do you remember without it, that when we state that a man loves some object, we are bound to show, if the statement be correct, that he does not love one part of that object to the exclusion of another, but that he takes delight in the whole?

Glaucon/ I require to be reminded, it seems; for I do not quite understand you.

Socrates/ Such a confession, Glaucon, would have been more appropriate in another person. A man of your amorous nature ought not to forget that a boy-loving, susceptible person is in some way or other attracted and excited by the charms of all who are in their bloom, and thinks they all deserve his attentions and addresses. Is not this the manner in which you behave to your favorites? You will praise a boy with a turned-up nose as having a winning look; the hooked nose of another you consider kinglike; while a third, whose nose is between the two extremes, has a beautifully-proportioned face; the dark, you say, have a manly look, the fair are children of the gods; and who do you suppose coined the phrase olive pale but a lover who could palliate and easily put up with paleness, when he found it on the cheek of youth? In one word, you invent all kinds of excuses, and

employ every variety of expression, sooner than reject any that are in the flower and prime of life.

Glaucon/ If you wish, to found on my case an assertion that the amatively disposed thus act, I will allow you to do so for the arguments sake.

Socrates/ To take another illustration; do you not observe that those who are fond of wine behave in a precisely similar manner, finding some excuse or other to admire every sort of wine?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And you doubtless have seen how persons who love honor will command a company, if they cannot lead an army, and in default of being honored by great and important personages, are glad to receive the respect of the little and the insignificant; so covetous are they of honor in any shape.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Then answer me yes or no to this; when we describe a man as having a longing for something, are we to assert that he longs after the whole class that the term includes, or only after one part, to the exclusion of another?

Glaucon/ He longs after the whole.

Socrates/ Then shall we not maintain that the philosopher, or the lover of wisdom, is one who longs for wisdom, not partially, but wholly?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ So that if a person makes difficulties about his studies, especially while he is young and unable to discriminate between what is profitable and what is not, we shall pronounce him to be no lover of learning or of wisdom;

just as when a man is nice about his eating, we deny that he is hungry or desirous of food, and instead of describing him as fond of eating, we call him a bad feeder.

Glaucon/ Yes, and we shall be right in doing so.

Socrates/ On the other hand, when a man is ready and willing to taste every kind of knowledge, and addresses himself joyfully to his studies with an appetite which never can be satiated, we shall justly call such a person a philosopher, shall we not?

Glaucon/ You will find your description includes a great number and a strange company. All the lovers of sights, I conclude, are philosophers, because they take pleasure in acquiring knowledge; and those who delight in hearing are a very singular set to reckon among philosophers, those, I mean, who will never, if they can help it, be present at a philosophical discussion, or any similar entertainment, but are unfailing attendants at every Dionysian festival, whether held in town or country, and run about as if they had let out their ears on hire to listen to all the choruses of the season. Are we then to give the title of philosophers to all these people, as well as to others who have a taste for any similar studies, and to the professors of small arts?

Socrates/ Certainly not; we must call them counterfeit philosophers.

Glaucon/ And whom, do you call genuine philosophers?

Socrates/ Those who love to see truth.

Glaucon/ In that, you cannot be wrong; but will you explain what you mean?

Socrates/ That would be not at all easy, with a different questioner; but you, I imagine, will make me the admission I require.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ That since beauty is the opposite of deformity, they are two things.

Glaucon/ Of course they are.

Socrates/ Then since they are two, each of them taken separately is one thing.

Glaucon/ That also is true.

Socrates/ The same thing may be said likewise of justice and injustice, good and evil, and all general conceptions. Each of them in itself is one thing, but by the intermixture with actions and bodies and with one another, through which they are everywhere made visible, each appears to be many things.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ By the help of this principle, then, I draw a distinction between those whom you described just now as lovers of sights, lovers of arts, and practical persons, on the one hand, and on the other, those about whom we are now inquiring, to whom alone we can rightly give the name of philosophers.

Glaucon/ Explain what you mean.

Socrates/ Why, I suppose that those who love seeing and hearing admire beautiful sounds, and colors, and forms, and all artistic products into which these enter; but the nature of beauty in itself their understanding is unable to behold and embrace.

Glaucon/ Yes, it certainly is as you say.

Socrates/ But those who are capable of reaching to the independent contemplation of abstract beauty will be rare exceptions, will they not?

Glaucon/ They will indeed.

Socrates/ Therefore if a man recognizes the existence of beautiful things, but disbelieves in abstract beauty, and has

not the power to follow should another lead the way to the knowledge of it, is his life, think you, a dreaming or a waking one? Just consider. Is it not dreaming when a person, whether asleep or awake, mistakes the likeness of anything for the real thing of which it is a likeness?

Glaucon/ I confess I should say that a person in that predicament was dreaming.

Socrates/ Take again the opposite case, of one who acknowledges an abstract beauty, and has the power to discern both this essence and the objects into which it enters, and who never mistakes such objects for the essence, nor the essence for the objects; does such a person, think you, live a dreaming or a waking life?

Glaucon/ A waking life, undoubtedly.

Socrates/ If so, shall we not be right in calling the mental process of the latter knowledge, because he really knows; and that of the former, opinion, because he merely opines?

Glaucon/ Yes, perfectly right.

Socrates/ Well then, should this person, whom we describe as opining, but not knowing, grow wroth with us, and contend that what we say is not true, shall we be able to appease his indignation and gently convince him, disguising from him the fact that he is in an unsound state?

Glaucon/ That were certainly desirable.

Socrates/ Come then, consider what we are to say to him. Would you like us to make certain inquiries of him, premising that if he really does know anything, we shall not in the least grudge him his knowledge? on the contrary, we shall be truly glad to find that it is so. But answer us this question, we shall say; When a man knows, does he know something or nothing? Be so good, Glaucon, as to make answer in his behalf.

Glaucon/ My answer will be, that he knows something.

Socrates/ Something that exists, or does not exist?

Glaucon/ Something that exists; for how could a thing that does not exist be known?

Socrates/ Are we then quite sure of this fact, in whatever variety of ways we might examine it, that what completely exists may be completely known, whereas that which has no existence at all must be wholly unknown?

Glaucon/ We are perfectly sure of it.

Socrates/ Good; now, if there be anything so constituted, as at the same time to be and not to be, must it not lie somewhere between the purely existent and the absolutely nonexistent?

Glaucon/ It must.

Socrates/ Well then, as knowledge is correlative to the existent, and the negation of knowledge necessarily to the nonexistent, must we not try to find something intermediate between science and ignorance, if there is anything of the kind, to correspond to this that is intermediate between the existent and the non-existent?

Glaucon/ Yes, by all means.

Socrates/ Do we speak of opinion as a something?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly we do.

Socrates/ Do we consider it a faculty distinct from science or identical with it?

Glaucon/ Distinct from it.

Socrates/ Therefore opinion is appointed to one province and science to another, each acting according to its own peculiar power.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Is it not the nature of science, as correlative to the existent, to know how the existent exists? But first there is a distinction which I think it necessary to establish.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ We shall hold that faculties, as a certain general class, are the things whereby we, and every other thing, are able to do whatever we can do; for example, I call sight and hearing faculties, if you happen to understand the special conception which I wish to describe.

Glaucon/ I do understand it.

Socrates/ Then let me tell you what view I take of them. In a faculty I do not see either color, or form, or any of those qualities that I observe in many other things, by regarding which I can in many cases distinguish to myself between one thing and another. No, in a faculty I look only to its province and its function, and thus I am led to call it in each case by this name, pronouncing those faculties to be identical whose provinces and functions are identical, and those diverse whose provinces and functions are diverse. But pray, how do you proceed?

Glaucon/ Just in the same way.

Socrates/ Now then, return with me, my excellent friend. Under what general term do you class science? Do you make it a faculty?

Glaucon/ Yes I do; it is of all the faculties the most powerful.

Socrates/ Well, is opinion a faculty; or are we to refer it to some other denomination?

Glaucon/ Not to any other; for that whereby we are able to opine, can only be opinion.

Socrates/ Well, but a little while ago you admitted that science and opinion are not identical.

Glaucon/ Why how could a sensible man identify the fallible with the infallible?

Socrates/ Very good; so we are clearly agreed that opinion is a thing distinct, from science?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ If so, each of them has by its nature a different province, and a different efficacy.

Glaucon/ The inference is inevitable.

Socrates/ Science, I believe, has for its province to know the nature of the existent.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the province of opinion is, we say, to opine.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does opinion take cognizance of precisely that material which science knows? In other words, is the object matter of opinion identical with that of science? or is that impossible?

Glaucon/ It is impossible, after the admissions we have made; that is, if it be granted that different faculties have different provinces, and that both opinion and science are faculties, and that the two are distinct, all which we affirm. These premises make it impossible to identify the object-matter of science and that of opinion.

Socrates/ Then, if the existent is the object-matter of knowledge, that of opinion must be something other than the existent?

Glaucon/ It must.

Socrates/ Well then, does opinion exercise itself upon the nonexistent, or is it impossible to apprehend even in opinion that which does not exist? Consider does not the person opining carry his thought towards something? Or is it possible to have an opinion, but an opinion about nothing?

Glaucon/ It is impossible.

Socrates/ Then the person who opines has an opinion about some one thing?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, but the non-existent could not be called some one thing; it might, on the contrary; with the greatest truth be styled nothing.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ But to the non-existent we were constrained to assign ignorance, and to the existent, knowledge.

Glaucon/ And rightly.

Socrates/ Then neither the existent nor the non-existent is the object of opinion?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ Therefore opinion cannot be either ignorance or knowledge.

Glaucon/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Then does it lie beyond either of these, so as to surpass either knowledge in certainty or ignorance in uncertainty?

Glaucon/ It does neither.

Socrates/ Then tell me, do you look upon opinion as something more dusky than knowledge, more luminous than ignorance?

Glaucon/ Yes, it is strongly so distinguished from either.

Socrates/ And does it lie within these extremes?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then opinion must be something between the two.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Now a little while back, did we not say, that if anything could be found so constituted as at the same time

to be and not to be, it must lie between the purely existent and the absolutely not existent, and must be the object neither of science nor yet of ignorance, but of a third faculty, which should be similarly discovered in the interval between science and ignorance?

Glaucon/ We did.

Socrates/ But now we have discovered between these two a faculty which we call opinion.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ It will remain then for us, apparently, to find what that is which partakes both of being and of not being, and which cannot be rightly said to be either of these absolutely; in order that, should it discover itself to us, we may justly proclaim it to be the object of opinion; thus assigning extremes to extremes, and means to means. Am I not right?

Glaucon/ You are.

Socrates/ These positions then being laid down, I shall proceed to interrogate that worthy man who denies the existence of anything absolutely beautiful, or any form of abstract beauty, which forever continues the same and unchangeable, though he acknowledges a variety of beautiful objects, that lover of sights, who cannot endure to be told that beauty is one, and justice one, and so on of the rest; My good sir, I shall say, of all these beautiful things, is there one which may not appear ugly? Of all these just things, is there one which may not appear unjust? Or of these holy things, one which may not appear unholy?

Glaucon/ No; they must inevitably appear in a certain sense both fair and foul, both just and unjust, both holy and unholy.

Socrates/ Again, may not the many double things be considered halves just as well as doubles?

Glaucon/ Just as well.

Socrates/ In the same way, have the things which we describe as great, small, light, heavy, any better claim to these titles, than to their opposites?

Glaucon/ No, they will always be equally entitled to either.

Socrates/ Would it be more correct, then, to predicate of those many objects, that each of them is, or is not, that which it is said to be?

Glaucon/ You remind me of the conundrums with a contradiction in them, that are proposed at table, and of the children's riddle about the eunuch who threw at the bat, hinting darkly with what he hit it, and on what it sat; for the things in question have the same ambiguous character, and one cannot positively conceive of them as either being or not being, as both being and not being, or as neither.

Socrates/ Can you tell then, what to do with them, or where they may be better put than in the interspace between being and not being? For I presume they will not appear either darker than the non-existent, and so more non-existent, or more luminous than the existent, and therefore more existent.

Glaucon/ You are perfectly right.

Socrates/ Hence we have discovered, apparently, that the mass of notions, current among the mass of men, about beauty, justice, and the rest, roam about between the confines of pure existence and pure non-existence.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ And we before admitted, that if anything of this kind should be brought to light, it ought to be described as the object of opinion, and not of knowledge, these intermediate rovers being caught by the intermediate faculty.

Glaucon/ We did make this admission.

Socrates/ Therefore, when people have an eye for a multitude of beautiful objects, but can neither see beauty in itself, nor follow those who would lead them to it, when they behold number of just things, but not justice in itself, and so in every instance, we shall say they have in every case an opinion, but no real knowledge of the things about which they opine.

Glaucon/ It is a necessary inference.

Socrates/ But what, on the other hand, must we say of those who contemplate things as they are in themselves, and as they exist ever permanent and immutable? Shall we not speak of them as knowing, not opining?

Glaucon/ That also is a necessary inference.

Socrates/ Then shall we not assert that such persons admire and love the objects of knowledge, the others, the objects of opinion? For we have not forgotten, have we, that we spoke of these latter as loving and looking upon beautiful sounds and colors and the like, while they will not hear of the existence of an abstract beauty?

Glaucon/ We have not forgotten it.

Socrates/ Shall we commit any fault then, if we call these people philodoxical rather than philosophical, that is to say, lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom? And will they be very much offended with us for telling them so?

Glaucon/ No, not if they will take my advice; for it is wrong to be offended with the truth.

Socrates/ Those therefore that set their affections on that which in each case really exists, we must call not philodoxical, but philosophical?

Glaucon/ Yes, by all means.

Book 6.

Socrates/ Thus, Glaucon, after pursuing a lengthened inquiry we have, not without difficulty, discovered who are true philosophers and who are not.

Glaucon/ Yes; probably it was not easy to abridge the inquiry.

Socrates/ Apparently not. However, that may be, I think, for my part, that the result would have been brought out still more clearly, if we had to speak of this only, without discussing the many points that still await our notice, if we wish to ascertain wherein the superiority of a righteous over an unrighteous life consists.

Glaucon/ Then what are we to do next?

Socrates/ We have only to take the step next in order. Since those who are able to apprehend the eternal and immutable, are philosophers, while those who are incapable of this and who wander in the region of change and multiformity, are not philosophers, which of the two, tell me, ought to be governors of a state?

Glaucon/ What must I reply, if I am to do justice to the question?

Socrates/ Ask yourself which of the two are to be thought capable of guarding the laws and customs of states, and let these be appointed guardians.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Can there be any question as to whether a blind man, or one with quick sight, is the right person to guard and keep anything?

Glaucon/ There can be no question about it.

Socrates/ Then do you think that there is a particle of difference between the condition of blind persons, and the state of those who are absolutely destitute of the knowledge

of things as they really are, and who possess in their Soul no distinct exemplar, and cannot, like painters, fix; their eyes on perfect truth as a perpetual standard of reference, to be contemplated with the minutest care, before they proceed to deal with earthly canons about things beautiful and just and good, laying them down where they are required, and where they already exist watching over their preservation?

Glaucon/ No, indeed, there is not much difference.

Socrates/ Shall we then appoint such persons to the office of guardians, in preference to those who not only have gained a knowledge of each thing in its reality, but in practical skill are not inferior to the former, and come behind them in no other department of excellence?

Glaucon/ Why, if these latter are not wanting in the other qualifications, it would be perfectly absurd to choose any others. For just the point in which they are superior may be said to be the most important of all.

Socrates/ Then shall we proceed to explain how the same persons will be enabled to possess both qualifications?

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ If so, we must begin by gaining a thorough insight into their proper character, as we said at the outset of this discussion. And I think, if we agree tolerably on that point, we shall also agree that the two qualifications may be united in the same persons, and that such characters, and no others, are the proper governors of states.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ With regard to the philosophic nature, let us take for granted that its possessors are ever enamored of all learning, that will reveal to them somewhat of that real and permanent existence, which is exempt from the vicissitudes of generation and decay.

Glaucon/ Let it be granted.

Socrates/ Again, let us also assume that they are enamored of the whole of that real existence, and willingly resign no part of it, be it small or great, honored or slighted; as we showed on a previous occasion, in speaking of the ambitious and the amorous.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Now then proceed to consider, whether we ought not to find a third feature in the character of those who are to realize our description.

Glaucon/ What feature do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean truthfulness, that is, a determination never to admit falsehood in any shape, if it can be helped, but to abhor it, and love the truth.

Glaucon/ Yes, it is probable we shall find it.

Socrates/ Nay, my friend, it is not only probable, but absolutely inevitable, that one who is by nature prone to any passion, should be well pleased with everything that is bound by the closest ties to the beloved object.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And can you find anything allied to wisdom more closely than truth?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And is it possible for the same nature to love wisdom, and at the same time love falsehood?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably it is not.

Socrates/ Consequently, the genuine lover of knowledge must, from his youth up, strive intensely after all truth.

Glaucon/ Yes, he must thoroughly.

Socrates/ Well, but we cannot doubt that when a person's desires set strongly in one direction, they run with

corresponding feebleness in every other channel, like a stream whose waters have been diverted into another bed.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly they do.

Socrates/ So that when the current has set towards science, and all its branches, a man's desires will, I fancy, hovel around pleasures that are purely mental, abandoning those in which the body is instrumental, provided that the man's love of wisdom is real, not artificial.

Glaucon/ It cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ Again, such a person will be temperate and thoroughly uncovetous; for he is the last person in the world to value those objects, which make men anxious for money at any cost.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Once more, there is another point which you ought to take into consideration, when you are endeavoring to distinguish a philosophic from an unphilosophic character.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ You must take care not to overlook any taint of meanness. For surely little-mindedness thwarts above everything the soul that is destined ever to aspire to grasp truth, both divine and human, in its integrity and universality.

Glaucon/ That is most true.

Socrates/ And do you think that a spirit full of lofty thoughts, and privileged to contemplate all time, and all existence, can possibly attach any great importance to this life?

Glaucon/ No, it is impossible.

Socrates/ Then such a person will not regard death as a formidable thing, will he?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ So that a mean and cowardly character can have no part, as it seems, in true philosophy.

Glaucon/ I think it cannot.

Socrates/ What then? Can the man whose mind is well-regulated, and free from covetousness, meanness, pretentiousness, and cowardice, be by any possibility hard to deal with or unjust?

Glaucon/ No; it is impossible.

Socrates/ Therefore, when you are noticing the indications of a philosophical or unphilosophical temper, you must also observe in early youth whether the mind is just and gentle, or unsociable and fierce.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ There is still another point, which I think you must certainly not omit.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ Whether the mind in question is quick or slow at learning. For you can never expect; a person to take a decent delight in an occupation which he goes through with pain, and in which he makes small progress with great exertion?

Glaucon/ No, it would be impossible.

Socrates/ Again, if he can remember nothing of what he has learned, can he fail, being thus full of forgetfulness, to be void of knowledge?

Glaucon/ No, he cannot.

Socrates/ Then, will not his fruitless toil, think you, compel him at last to hate both himself and such employment?

Glaucon/ Doubtless it will.

Socrates/ Let us never, then, admit a forgetful mind into the ranks of those that are counted worthy of philosophy; but let us look out for a good memory as a requisite for such admission.

Glaucon/ Yes, by all means.

Socrates/ Again, we should certainly say that the tendency of an unrefined and awkward nature is wholly towards disproportion.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do you think that truth is akin to disproportion, or to proportion?

Glaucon/ To proportion.

Socrates/ In addition, then, to our other acquirements, let us search for a mind naturally well-proportioned and graceful, whose native instincts will permit it to be easily led to apprehend the Forms of things as they really are.

Glaucon/ By all means.

Socrates/ What then? Do you think that the qualities which we have enumerated are in any way unnecessary or inconsistent with one another, provided the soul is to attain unto full and satisfactory possession of real existence?

Glaucon/ On the contrary, they are most strictly necessary.

Socrates/ Then can you find any fault with an employment which requires of a man who would pursue it satisfactorily, that nature shall have given him a retentive memory, and made him quick at learning, lofty-minded and graceful, the friend and brother of truth, justice, fortitude, and temperance?

Glaucon/ No; the very Genius of criticism could find no fault with such an employment.

Socrates/ Well, can you hesitate to entrust such characters with the sole management of state affairs, when time and education have made them ripe for the task?

Here Adeimantus interposed and said;

Adeimantus/ It is true, Socrates, that no one can dispute these conclusions; but still, every time that such theories are propounded by you, the hearers feel certain misgivings of the following kind. They fancy that, from want of practice in your method of question and answer, they are at each question led a little astray by the reasoning, until, at the close of the discussion, these little divergences are found to amount to a serious false step, which makes them contradict their original notions. And, as unskillful draught-players are in the end hemmed into a corner by the skillful, till they cannot make a move, just in the same way your hearers conceive themselves to be at last hemmed in and reduced to silence by this novel kind of draughts, played with words instead of counters. For they are not at all the more convinced that the conclusion to which they are brought is the true one. And, in saying this, I have the present occasion before my eye. For at this moment a person will tell you, that though at each question he cannot oppose you with words, yet in practice he sees that all the students of philosophy, who have devoted themselves to it for any length of time, instead of taking it up for educational purposes and relinquishing it while still young, in most cases become exceedingly eccentric, not to say quite depraved, while even those who appear the most respectable are notwithstanding so far the worse for the pursuit which you commend, that they become useless to their country.

Socrates/ When he had said this;

Then do you think this objection untrue?

Adeimantus/ I am not sure; but I should be glad to hear what you think of it.

Socrates/ Let me tell you, that I hold it to be a true objection.

Adeimantus/ How then can it be right to assert that the miseries of our cities will find no relief, until those philosophers who, on our own admission, are useless to them, become their rulers?

Socrates/ You are asking a question, which I must answer by the help of an illustration.

Adeimantus/ And you, I suppose, have not been in the habit of employing illustrations.

Socrates/ Ah! you rally me, do you, now that you have got me upon a subject in which demonstration is so difficult? However, listen to the illustration, that you may see still better how stingy I am with the work. So cruel is the position in which those respectable men are placed, in reference to their states, that there is no single thing whose position is analogous to theirs. Consequently I have to collect materials from several quarters for the imaginary case which I am to use in their defense, like painters when they paint goat-stags and similar monsters.

Figure to yourself a fleet, or a single ship, in which the state of affairs on board is as follows. The captain, you are to suppose, is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but rather deaf, and rather short-sighted, and correspondingly deficient in nautical skill; and the sailors are quarrelling together about the pilotage, each of them thinking he has a right to steer the vessel, although up to that moment he has never studied the art, and cannot name his instructor, or the time when he served his apprenticeship; more than this, they assert that it is a thing which positively cannot be taught, and are even ready to tear in pieces the person who

affirms that it can; meanwhile they crowd incessantly round the person of the captain, begging and beseeching him with every importunity to entrust the helm to them; and occasionally, failing to persuade him, while others succeed better, these disappointed candidates kill their successful rivals, or fling them overboard, and, after binding the high-spirited captain hand and foot with mandragora or strong drink, or disabling him by some other contrivance, they remain masters of the ship, and apply its contents to their own purposes, and pass their time at sea in drinking and feasting, as you might expect with such a crew; and besides all this, they complement with the title of able seaman, excellent pilot, skillful navigator, any sailor that can second them cleverly in either persuading or forcing the captain into installing them in command of the ship, while they condemn as useless everyone whose talents are of a different order, having no notion that the true pilot must devote his attention to the year and its seasons, to the sky, and the stars, and the winds, and all that concerns his art, if he intends to be really fit to command a ship; and thinking it impossible to acquire and practice, along with the pilots art, the art of maintaining the pilots authority whether some of the crew like it or not. Such being the state of things on board, do you not think that the pilot who is really master of his craft is sure to be called a useless, star-gazing babbler by the mariners who form the crews of ships so circumstanced?

Adeimantus/ Yes, that he will.

Socrates/ Well, I suppose you do not require to see my illustration passed in review, to remind you that it is a true picture of our cities in so far as their disposition towards philosophers is concerned; on the contrary, I think you understand my meaning.

Adeimantus/ Yes, quite.

Socrates/ That being the case, when a person expresses his astonishment that philosophers are not respected in our cities, begin by telling him our illustration, and endeavor to persuade him that it would be far more astonishing if they were respected.

Adeimantus/ Well, I will.

Socrates/ And go on to tell him that he is right in saying that the most respectable of the proficients in philosophy are of no use to the world; only recommend him to lay the fault of it not on these good people themselves, but upon those who decline their services. For it is not in the nature of things that a pilot should petition the sailors to submit to his authority, or that the wise should wait at the rich man's door. No, the author of that witticism was wrong; for the real truth is, that, just as a sick man, be he rich or poor, must attend at the physicians door, so all who require to be governed must attend at the gate of him who is. able to govern, it being against nature that the ruler, supposing him to be really good for anything, should have to entreat his subjects to submit to his rule. In fact, you will not be wrong, if you compare the statesmen of our time to the sailors whom we were just now describing, and the useless visionary talkers, as they are called by our politicians, to the veritable pilots.

Adeimantus/ You are perfectly right.

Socrates/ Under these circumstances, and amongst men like these, it is not easy for that noblest of occupations to be in good repute with those to whose pursuits it is directly opposed. But far the most grievous and most obstinate misconstruction, under which Philosophy labors, is due to her professed followers; who are doubtless the persons meant by the accuser of Philosophy, when he declares, as you tell us, that most of those who approach her are utterly

depraved, while even her best pupils are useless; to the truth of which remark I assented, did I not?

Adeimantus/ Yes, you did.

Socrates/ We have explained the reason why the good are useless, have we not?

Adeimantus/ Certainly we have.

Socrates/ Would you have us proceed next to discuss the question, why the majority are inevitably depraved, and to endeavor to show, if we can, that of this also philosophy is guiltless?

Adeimantus/ Yes, by all means.

Socrates/ Let us then speak and listen alternately, recurring to the point where we were describing what ought to be the natural character of one who is to turn out a perfectly accomplished and virtuous man. The first and leading feature in such a person's character was, if you recollect, truth, which he was bound to pursue with the most absolute devotion, at the risk, should he be found an impostor, of being denied all share in true philosophy.

Adeimantus/ Yes, we said so.

Socrates/ Well, does not this point, for one, run strongly counter to the received opinion upon the subject?

Adeimantus/ Certainly it does.

Socrates/ Then shall we not be making a reasonably good defense, if we say that the natural tendency of the real lover of knowledge is to strain every nerve to reach real existence; and that far from resting at those multitudinous particular phenomena whose existence falls within the region of opinion, he presses on, undiscouraged, and desists not from his passion, till he has apprehended the nature of each thing as it really is, with that part of his soul whose property it is to lay hold of such objects, in virtue of its affinity to them;

and that having, by means of this, verily approached and held intercourse with that which verily exists, he begets wisdom and truth, so that then, and not till then, he knows, enjoys true life, and receives true nourishment, and is at length released from his travail-pangs?

Adeimantus/ The defense will be the best possible.

Socrates/ Well, will such a person be tinged with any love of falsehood? Will he not. on the contrary, be imbued with a positive hatred of it?

Adeimantus/ He will.

Socrates/ Now, if truth leads the way, we can never admit that a train of evils follows her steps.

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ On the contrary, we shall assert that she is attended by a sound and just disposition, followed in its turn by sobriety.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And surely we need not repeat our demonstrations, and marshal over again the remaining retinue of the philosophic character. For we found, as you doubtless remember, that the natural accompaniments of the preceding are manliness, loftiness of spirit, a quick apprehension, and a good memory. Upon this you objected, that, though everyone will be compelled to assent to our conclusions, still when one comes to drop the argument and turn his eyes simply to the persons who are the subjects of it, he will assert his conviction that a few are merely useless, the majority totally depraved. We therefore inquired into the grounds of this prejudice, and have now arrived at the question, why are the majority depraved? And this was the reason why we took up again the character of the real philosophers and found ourselves compelled to define it.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ We must, therefore, study the pernicious influences which destroy this character in many persons, and from which only a few escape, who, you tell me, are styled useless, though not depraved. And then we must take into consideration the natures which imitate the truly philosophical, and settle down into the same pursuits, showing what they are mentally, and how they enter upon a profession which is too good and too high for them, and commit such a variety of blunders, that they have everywhere and with all the world attached to philosophy the reputation you describe.

Adeimantus/ But what, are the pernicious influences to which you refer?

Socrates/ I will try to describe them to you, if I can. Everyone will agree with us in this, I think, that such a character, possessing all those qualities which we assigned to it but now as essential to a full capacity for philosophy, is of rare and uncommon growth amongst men. Or do you think otherwise?

Adeimantus/ No, indeed I do not.

Socrates/ Then consider how many fatal dangers beset these rare characters.

Adeimantus/ Pray what are they?

Socrates/ The thing which sounds most marvelous is this, that every one of the qualities commended by us has a tendency to vitiate and distract from philosophy the soul which possesses it. I allude to manliness, temperance, and all the characteristics which we have discussed.

Adeimantus/ It does sound strange.

Socrates/ And then, in addition to this, all the reputed advantages of beauty, wealth, strength of body, powerful connections in a state, and all their accompaniments,

exercise a corrupting and a distracting influence. Now I have given you an outline of my meaning.

Adeimantus/ You have; and I shall be glad to learn it more in detail.

Socrates/ Only grasp it as a whole aright, and it will present itself to you in a clear light, and my previous remarks will not appear so strange.

Adeimantus/ What do you tell me to do?

Socrates/ In the case of all seeds, and of everything that grows, whether vegetable or animal, we know that whatever fails to find its appropriate nourishment, season, and soil, will lack its proper virtues the more, in proportion as it is more vigorous. For evil is, I presume, more opposed to what is good than to what is not good.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Hence I think we may reasonably conclude that the finest natures get more harm, than those of an inferior sort, when exposed to an ungenial nutriment.

Adeimantus/ Yes, we may.

Socrates/ Then may we not assert, Adeimantus, that minds, naturally of the highest order, do in like manner, if they happen to be ill-trained, become peculiarly wicked? Or do you think that great crimes and unalloyed depravity spring, not, as I suppose, from a splendid character ruined by improper treatment, but from a worthless one; and that a feeble nature will ever produce anything great, whether good or evil?

Adeimantus/ No, I think with you.

Socrates/ Well then, the nature which we appropriated to the philosopher, must, I think, provided it meets with proper instruction, grow and attain to all excellence; but if it be sown, planted, and nourished on an ungenial soil, it is sure

to run into the very opposite vices, unless some deity should providentially interpose. Or do you hold, with the multitude, that there are certain individuals corrupted by sophists in their youth, and certain individual sophists who corrupt in a private- capacity to any considerable extent? Do you not rather think that those who hold this language are themselves the greatest of sophists, training most elaborately, and finishing to their own liking, both young and old, men and women?

Adeimantus/ Pray when?

Socrates/ Whenever they crowd to the popular assembly, the law-courts, the theatres, the camp, or any other public gathering of large bodies, and there sit in a dense and uproarious mass to censure some of the things said or done, and applaud others, always in excess; shouting and clapping, till, in addition to their own noise, the rocks and the place wherein they are echo back redoubled the uproar of their censure and applause. At such a moment, how is a young man, think you, to retain his self-possession? Can any private education that he has received hold out against such a torrent of censure and applause, and avoid being swept away down the stream, wherever it may lead, until he is brought to adopt the language of these men as to what is honorable and dishonorable, and to imitate all their practices, and to become their very counterpart?

Adeimantus/ It is the sure consequence, Socrates.

Socrates/ However, I proceeded, we have not yet mentioned the surest influence at work.

Adeimantus/ What is that?

Socrates/ It is one which these schoolmasters and sophists bring into actual practice, if their words fail of success. For you cannot be ignorant that they chastise the disobedient with disfranchisement, and fines, and death.

Adeimantus/ They do, most decidedly.

Socrates/ Then what other sophist, think you, or what private instructions of an opposite tenor, can prevail over these influences?

Adeimantus/ None can, I imagine.

Socrates/ No, they cannot; nay, the very attempt would be mere folly. For there is not, has not been, and indeed there never can be, a character that will regard virtue with different feelings, if trained in close contact with the education which popular assemblies impart. I am speaking humanly, my friend; for by all means let us except Providence, as the proverb says. For you may be well assured, that you will not be wrong in asserting that whatever has been preserved, and made what it ought to be, while the constitution of states is what it is, has been preserved by a divine interposition.

Adeimantus/ I am quite of that opinion.

Socrates/ Then I would further have you add the following to the list of your opinions.

Adeimantus/ What is it?

Socrates/ That all those mercenary adventurers who, as we know, are called sophists by the multitude, and regarded as rivals, really teach nothing but the opinions of the majority to which expression is given when large masses are collected, and dignify them with the title of wisdom. As well might a person investigate the caprices and desires of some huge and powerful monster in his keeping, studying how it is to be approached, and how handled, at what times and under what circumstances it becomes most dangerous, or most gentle on what occasions it is in the habit of uttering its various cries, and further, what sounds uttered by another person soothe or exasperate it, and when he has mastered all these particulars, by long continued

intercourse, as well might he call his results wisdom, systematize them into an art, and open a school, though in reality he is wholly ignorant which of these humors and desires is fair, and which foul, which good and which evil, which just and which unjust; and therefore is content to affix all these names to the fancies of the huge animal, calling what it likes good, and what it dislikes evil, without being able to render any other account of them, nay, giving the titles of just and fair to things done under compulsion, because he has not discerned himself, and therefore cannot point out to others, that wide distinction which really holds between the nature of the compulsory and the good. Tell me, in heavens name, do you not think that such a person would make a strange instructor?

Adeimantus/ Yes, I do think so.

Socrates/ And do you think that there is any difference between such a person and the man who makes wisdom consist in having studied the whim and pleasures of the assembled many-headed multitude, whether in painting, or in music, or finally in politics? For though it be true, that if a man mix with the many, and ask their judgment on some poem, or other work of art, or service rendered to the state, thus putting himself in their power further than he is obliged, he finds himself irresistibly compelled to do whatever they command; yet tell me if you have ever in your life heard anyone of them offer an argument which was not ridiculous, to prove that what the multitude commands is really good and fair?

Adeimantus/ No; and I think I never shall.

Socrates/ Then if you have laid all this to heart, let me remind you of another point; will it be possible for the multitude to tolerate or believe in the existence of an essential beauty, as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful

objects; or in the existence of any essential Form, as opposed to the variety of its particular manifestations?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then the multitude cannot be philosophical.

Adeimantus/ It cannot.

Socrates/ And consequently the professors of philosophy are sure to be condemned by it.

Adeimantus/ They are.

Socrates/ And of course by those private adventurers who associate with the mob, and desire to please it.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Such being the case, what salvation do you see for a philosophic character that will enable it to persist in its vocation till it has reached the goal? Take our previous conclusions into your consideration; we agreed, you know, that a quick apprehension, a good memory, a manly and a lofty spirit, are qualities of the philosophic character.

Adeimantus/ Yes, we did.

Socrates/ Then, will not such a person, from his childhood, be first in everything; especially if his bodily are equal to his mental endowments?

Adeimantus/ To be sure he will.

Socrates/ Then, I fancy, his friends and fellow-citizens will wish, when he grows older, to use him for their own purposes.

Adeimantus/ Doubtless.

Socrates/ Consequently they will fall down at his feet with prayers and compliments, securing and flattering by anticipation his future power.

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is certainly a common case.

Socrates/ Then how do you expect such a person to behave under these circumstances, above all, if he happen to be a rich and high-born member of a powerful state, and of a tall and goodly presence besides? Will he not be full of extravagant hopes, and conceive himself competent to direct the affairs of Greeks and foreigners, and make that an excuse for giving himself lofty airs, till he is swollen with self-importance and empty senseless conceit?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly he will.

Socrates/ While he is in this frame of mind, suppose someone approaches him gently, and tells him, what is quite true, that there is no real wisdom in him, and that he stands in need of it, and that without slaving for its acquisition it cannot be gained; do you think it an easy matter to gain his attention in the midst of such evil influences?

Adeimantus/ No, it is very far from easy.

Socrates/ If, however, thanks to an excellent nature and an inborn taste for philosophic inquiry, one such individual shall haply take heed, and allow himself to be bent and drawn towards philosophy, what do we think will be the behavior of those who count upon losing his services and his companionship? Will they leave a word unsaid, or a deed undone, that can possibly prevent the pupil from yielding, or the master from succeeding in his persuasions, calling in private machinations and public prosecutions? Will it be possible, then, for such a person to be a student of philosophy?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Thus you see, do you not, how right we were in saying, that in fact the very ingredients of the philosophic character, when subjected to an injurious treatment, are in a manner the causes of a man's falling away from the pursuit

of philosophy; to which result the reputed advantages of wealth, and all outward pomp and state, likewise contribute.

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed, it was a true observation.

Socrates/ This, then, my excellent friend, is the ruin, such and so grievous is the corruption of the finest character with reference to the noblest pursuit, a character too which is, besides, rarely to be met with, as we affirm. And in the ranks of this class, beyond a doubt, are to be found both those men who inflict the greatest injury on states and individuals, and also those who labor for their good, when the tide turns that way; whereas a little mind never influences in any great degree either individuals or states.

Adeimantus/ That is very true.

Socrates/ Thus it comes to pass that those, who, as her nearest relatives, are most bound to espouse Philosophy, fall away, and leave her desolate and inconsummate; and while for their part they live a life unsuited to them and unreal. Philosophy, bereft as it were of relatives, is exposed to the advances of a different class of persons unworthy of her, who bring her to shame, and fasten on her those reproaches, with which you tell me she is loaded, to the effect that her associates are either worth nothing, or, as in the majority of cases, deserving of heavy punishment.

Adeimantus/ Why certainly that is the common remark.

Socrates/ Yes, and a natural remark. For other puny men, seeing this field open, albeit rich in grand names and showy titles, are only too thankful to desert their trades and rush into philosophy, like criminals who break out of prison and run for refuge to a temple, whenever they happen to show remarkable address in their own despicable profession. For though all this is come upon philosophy, nevertheless the rank and splendor which she still retains far transcend those of any other profession; and these are

coveted by many whose natural talents were defective from the first, and whose souls have since been so grievously marred and enervated by their life of drudgery, as their bodies have been disfigured by their trades and crafts. Must not that be the case?

Adeimantus/ Certainly it must.

Socrates/ And does their appearance strike you as much better than that of a little bald-headed tinker, who has made some money, has had his chains just knocked off, has been washed in a bath, dressed out in a new coat, and got up as a bridegroom, in which character, owing to his masters poverty and destitution, he is on the point of marrying his daughter?

Adeimantus/ I see no difference at all between the two cases.

Socrates/ Then what may we expect the issue of such a match to be like? Will it not be a baseborn and worthless progeny?

Adeimantus/ It cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ Well, and when those, who are all unworthy of instruction, draw near and hold intercourse with her beyond their deserts, how must we describe the character of those notions and opinions which are the issue of such a connection? May they not be called, with the utmost propriety, sophisms a spurious brood, without one trace of genuine insight?

Yes, precisely so.

Socrates/ Hence, Adeimantus, those who worthily associate with philosophy form a very small remainder, made up, I conceive, either of noble and well-trained characters, condemned to exile, who, in the absence of all pernicious influences, have been true to their nature, and continued steadfast to philosophy; or of some large-minded

men, bred in petty states, who have looked down with contempt upon the politics of their country. Possibly, too, a small section may have come to her from other professions, which natural gifts have justified them in despising. Moreover, the bridle which curbs our friend Theages may be equally efficacious in other instances. For Theages is kept in check by ill-health, which excludes him from a public life, though in all other respects he has every inducement to desert philosophy. I need not mention the supernatural sign, which restrains me; for I fancy it has been granted to few, if any, before my time. Now he who has become a member of this little band, and has tasted how sweet and blessed his treasure is, and has watched the madness of the many, with the full assurance that there is scarcely a person who takes a single judicious step in his public life, and that there is no ally with whom he may safely march to the succor of the just; nay, that, should he attempt it, he will be like a man that has fallen among wild beasts, unwilling to join in their iniquities, and unable singly to resist the fury of all, and therefore destined to perish before he can be of any service to his country or his friends and do no good to himself or anyone else; having, I say, weighed all this, such a man keeps quiet and confines himself to his own concerns, like one who takes shelter behind a wall on a stormy day, when the wind is driving before it a hurricane of dust and rain; and when from his retreat he sees the infection of lawlessness spreading over the rest of mankind, he is well content, if he can in any way live his life here untainted in his own person by unrighteousness and unholy deeds, and, when the time for his release arrives, take his departure amid bright hopes with cheerfulness and serenity.

Adeimantus/ Well, he will certainly have effected before his departure not the least important objects. Nor yet, the most important, if he fail to find a political constitution

suited to him; for under such a constitution, he will not only himself reach a higher stage of growth, but he will also secure his countries welfare together with his own.

Socrates/ Well then, the causes of the prejudice against philosophy, and the injustice of this prejudice, have in my opinion been satisfactorily disposed of, unless you have anything to add.

Adeimantus/ No, I have nothing more to say on this head; but which of the constitutions of our time is the one that you call suited to philosophy?

Socrates/ There is not one that I can call so; nay, what I complain of is precisely this, that no state, as now constituted, is a worthy sphere for a philosophic nature. Hence that nature becomes warped and deteriorated. For just as the seed of a rare exotic when sown in a foreign soil, habitually becomes enfeebled and loses its essential character, and eventually passes into a common plant of the country; so this kind of character at the present day, failing to preserve its peculiar virtues, degenerates into tendencies that are not its own; but if it could only find the most perfect constitution, answering to itself as the most perfect of characters, it will then give proof that it is the true divine type; whereas all other kinds of character and of vocation are merely human. Now I make no doubt you will proceed to ask me what this constitution is.

Adeimantus/ You are mistaken; what I was going to ask was, whether you were thinking of this constitution, whose organization we have discussed, or of another.

Socrates/ The same, in all points but one; and this one point was alluded to during the discussion, when we said that it would be necessary to have constantly present in the state some authority, that should view the constitution in

the very light in which you, the legislator, viewed it, when you framed the laws.

Adeimantus/ True, it was alluded to.

Socrates/ But it was not sufficiently developed, because I was alarmed by your objections, which showed that the demonstration of it would be tedious and difficult; for it is by no means the easiest part of the discussion that is left.

Adeimantus/ What is that part?

Socrates/ To show in what way a state may handle philosophy without incurring utter destruction. For we know that all great things are hazardous, and, according to the proverb, beautiful things are indeed hard of attainment.

Adeimantus/ Nevertheless, let this point be cleared up, in order that the demonstration may be complete.

Socrates/ The hindrance, if any, will arise, not from want of will, but from want of power. My zeal, at any rate, you shall see with your own eyes. For observe at once with what reckless zeal I proceed to assert, that a state ought to deal with the pursuit of philosophy on a plan the very reverse of that now in vogue.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ At present, those who pursue philosophy at all are mere striplings just emerged from boyhood, who take it up in the intervals of housekeeping and business; and, after just dipping into the most abstruse part of the study, (by which I mean Dialectic), abandon the pursuit altogether, and these are the most advanced philosophers; and ever afterwards, if. on being invited, they consent to listen to others whose attention is devoted to it, they think it a great condescension, because they imagine that philosophy ought

to be made a mere secondary occupation; and on the approach of old age, all but a very few are extinguished far more effectually than the sun of Heracleitus, inasmuch as they are not, like it, rekindled.

Adeimantus/ And pray what is the right plan?

Socrates/ Just the opposite. In youth and boyhood they ought to be put through a course of training in philosophy, suited to their years; and while their bodies are growing up to manhood, especial attention should be paid to them, as a serviceable acquisition in the cause of philosophy. At the approach of that period, during which the mind begins to attain its maturity, the mental exercises ought to be rendered more severe. Finally, when their bodily powers begin to fail, and they are released from public duties and military service, from that time forward they ought to lead a dedicated life, and consecrate themselves to this one pursuit, if they are to live happily on earth, and after death to crown the life they have led with a corresponding destiny in another world.

Adeimantus/ Well, indeed, Socrates, I do not doubt your zeal. But I expect most of your hearers, beginning with Thrasymachus, to oppose you with still greater zeal, and express their unqualified dissent.

Socrates/ Do not make a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus, when we have just become friends; though I do not mean to say that we were enemies before. I shall leave nothing untried, until I have either won him over to my way of thinking, along with the rest, or have achieved something for their good in that future state, should they ever happen, in a second existence, to encounter similar discussions.

Adeimantus/ Truly a trifling adjournment!

Socrates/ Rather speak of it as a nothing, compared with all time. However, it need not surprise us that most people

disbelieve in my doctrines; for they have never yet seen our present theory realized. No, what is much more likely is, that they have met with proposals somewhat resembling ours, but forced expressly into appearing of a piece with one another, instead of falling spontaneously into agreement, as in the present case. They have never yet seen, in either one or more instances, a man molded into the most perfect possible conformity and likeness to virtue, both in words and in works, reigning in a state as perfect. as himself. Or do you think they have?

Adeimantus/ No, indeed I do not.

Socrates/ And further, my dear friend, they have not listened often enough to discussions of an elevated and liberal tone, confined to the strenuous investigation of truth by all possible means, simply for the sake of knowing it; and which therefore will, both in private disquisitions and in public trials, keep at a respectful distance from those subtleties and special pleadings, whose sole aim it is to prolong debate, and elicit applause.

Adeimantus/ You are right again.

Socrates/ It was for these reasons, and in anticipation of these results, that, notwithstanding my fears, I was constrained by the force of truth on a former occasion to assert, that no state, or constitution, or individual either, can ever become perfect, until these few philosophers, who are at present described as useless though not depraved, find themselves accidentally compelled, whether they like it or not, to accept the charge of a state, which in its turn finds itself compelled to be obedient to them; or until the present sovereigns and kings, or their sons, are divinely inspired with a genuine love of genuine philosophy. Now to assert the impossibility of both or either of these contingencies, I for my part pronounce irrational. If they are impossible, we may

fairly be held up to derision as mere visionary theorists. Am I not right?

Adeimantus/ You are.

Socrates/ If, then, persons of first-rate philosophical attainments, either in the countless ages that are past have been, or in some foreign clime, far beyond the limits of our horizon, at the present moment are, or hereafter shall be, constrained by some fate to undertake the charge of a state, I am prepared to argue to the death in defense of this assertion, that the constitution described has existed, does exist, yea and will exist, wherever the Muse aforesaid has become mistress of a state. For its realization is no impossibility, nor are our speculations impracticable; though their difficulty is even by us acknowledged.

Adeimantus/ I am of the same opinion.

Socrates/ But are you prepared to say, that the majority, on the contrary, entertain a different opinion?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ My excellent friend, beware how you bring so heavy a charge against the multitude. No doubt they will change their minds, if you avoid controversy, and endeavor with all gentleness to remove their prejudice against the love of learning, by showing them whom you understand by philosophers, and defining, as we have just done, their nature and cultivation, that they may not suppose you to mean such characters as are uppermost in their own thoughts; or shall you venture to maintain that, even if they look at them from your point of view, they will entertain a different opinion from yours, and return another sort of answer? In other words, do you think that an unmalicious and gentle person can quarrel with one who is not quarrelsome, or feel malice towards one who is not malicious? I will anticipate you with the declaration that, in

my opinion, a disposition so perverse may be found in some few cases, but not in the majority of mankind.

Adeimantus/ I am myself entirely of your opinion.

Socrates/ Then are you not also of my opinion on just this point, that the ill-will which the multitude bear to philosophy is to be traced to those who have forced their way in, like tipsy men, where they had no concern, and who abuse one another and delight in picking quarrels, and are always discoursing about persons, conduct peculiarly unsuitable to philosophy?

Adeimantus/ Very unsuitable.

Socrates/ For surely, Adeimantus, he who has his thoughts truly set on the things that really exist, cannot even spare time to look down upon the occupations of men, and, by disputing with them, catch the infection of malice and hostility. On the contrary, he devotes all his time to the contemplation of certain well-adjusted and changeless objects; and beholding how they neither wrong nor are wronged by each other, but are all obedient to order and in harmony with reason, he studies to imitate and resemble them as closely as he can. Or do you think it possible for a man to avoid imitating that with which he reverently associates?

Adeimantus/ No, it is impossible.

Socrates/ Hence the philosopher, by associating with what is godlike and orderly, becomes, as far as is permitted to man, orderly and godlike himself; though here, as everywhere, there is room for misconstruction.

Adeimantus/ Indeed, you are right.

Socrates/ So that, if he ever finds himself compelled to study how he may introduce into the habits of men, both in public and in private life, the things that draw his notice in that higher region, and to mold others as well as himself, do

you think that he will prove an indifferent artist in the production of temperance and justice and all public virtue?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well, but if the multitude are made sensible that our description is a correct one, will they really be angry with the philosophers, and will they discredit our assertion, that a state can only attain to true happiness, if it be delineated by painters who copy the divine original?

Adeimantus/ They will not be angry, if they are made sensible of the fact. But pray how do you mean them to sketch it?

Socrates/ They will take for their canvas, a state and the moral nature of mankind, and begin by making a clean surface; which is by no means an easy task. However you are aware, that at the very outset they will differ from all other artists in this respect, that they will refuse to meddle with man or city, and hesitate to pencil laws, until they have either found a clear canvas, or made it clear by their own exertions.

Adeimantus/ Yes, and they are right.

Socrates/ In the next place, do you not suppose that they will sketch in outline the form of their constitution?

Adeimantus/ Doubtless they will.

Socrates/ Their next step, I fancy, will be to fill up this outline; and in doing this they will often turn their eyes to this side and to that, first to the ideal forms of justice, beauty, temperance, and the like, and then to the notions current among mankind; and thus, by mingling and combining the results of their studies, they will work in the true human complexion, guided by those realizations of it among men, which, if you remember, even Homer has described as godly and godlike.

Adeimantus/ You are right.

Socrates/ And, I imagine, they will go on rubbing out here and repainting there, until they have done all in their power to make the moral character of men as pleasing as may be in the eye of heaven.

Adeimantus/ Well, certainly their picture will be a very beautiful one.

Socrates/ Do we then, make any progress in persuading those assailants, who by your account were marching stoutly to attack us, that such a painter of constitutions is to be found in the man whom we praised lately in their hearing, and who occasioned their displeasure, because we proposed to deliver up our cities into his hands? And do they feel rather less exasperation at being told the same thing now?

Adeimantus/ Yes, much less, if they are wise.

Socrates/ I think so too; for pray, how will they be able to dispute our position? Can they deny that philosophers are enamored of real existence and of truth?

Adeimantus/ No, it would be indeed ridiculous to do that.

Socrates/ Well; can they maintain that their character, such as we have described it, is not intimately allied to perfection?

Adeimantus/ No, they cannot.

Socrates/ Once more; will they tell us that such a character, placed within reach of its appropriate studies, will fail to become as thoroughly good and philosophical as any character can become? Or will they give the preference to those whom we discarded?

Adeimantus/ Surely not.

Socrates/ Will they then persist in their anger, when I assert that, till the class of philosophers be invested with the supreme authority in a state, such state and its citizens will

find no deliverance from evil, and the fabulous constitution which we are describing will not be actually realized?

Adeimantus/ Probably they will grow less angry.

Socrates/ What do you say to our assuming, not merely that they are less angry, but that they are perfectly pacified and convinced, in order that we may shame them into acquiescence, if nothing else will do?

Adeimantus/ By all means assume it.

Socrates/ Well then, let us regard these persons as convinced so far. But, in the next place, will anybody maintain that kings and sovereigns cannot by any possibility beget sons gifted with a philosophic nature?

Adeimantus/ No one in the world will maintain that.

Socrates/ And can anyone assert, that, if born with such a nature, they must necessarily be corrupted? I grant that their preservation is a difficult matter; but I ask, is there anyone who will maintain that in the whole course of time not one of all the number can ever be preserved from contamination?

Adeimantus/ Who could maintain that?

Socrates/ Well but, one such person, with a submissive state, has it in his power to realize all that is now discredited.

Adeimantus/ True, he has.

Socrates/ For, surely, if a ruler establishes the laws and customs which we have detailed, it is, I presume, not impossible for the citizens to consent to carry them out.

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And, pray, would it be a miracle, beyond the verge of possibility, if what we think right were thought right by others also?

Adeimantus/ For my part I think not.

Socrates/ But I believe we have quite convinced ourselves, in the foregoing discussion, that our plan, if possible, is the best.

Adeimantus/ Yes, quite.

Socrates/ So that the conclusion, apparently, to which we are now brought with regard to our legislation, is, that what we propose is best, if it can be realized; and that to realize it is difficult, but certainly not impossible.

Adeimantus/ True, that is our conclusion.

Socrates/ Well, then, this part of the subject having been laboriously completed, shall we proceed to discuss the questions still remaining, in what way, and by the help of what pursuits and studies, we shall secure the presence of a body of men capable of preserving the constitution unimpaired, and what must be the age at which these studies are severally undertaken?

Adeimantus/ Let us do so by all means.

Socrates/ I have gained nothing, by my old scheme of omitting the troublesome questions involved in the treatment of the women and children, and the appointment of the magistrates; which 1 was induced to leave out from knowing what odium the perfectly correct method would incur, and how difficult it would be to carry into effect. Notwithstanding all my precautions, the moment has now arrived when these points must be discussed. It is true the question of the women and children has been already settled, but the inquiry concerning the magistrates must be pursued quite afresh. In describing them, we said, if you recollect, that, in order to place their patriotism beyond the reach of suspicion, they must be tested by pleasure and by pain, and proved never to have deserted their principles in the midst of toil and danger and every vicissitude of fortune, on pain of forfeiting their position if their powers of

endurance fail; and that whoever comes forth from the trial without a flaw, like gold tried in the fire, must be appointed to office, and receive, during life and after death, privileges and rewards. This was pretty nearly the drift of our language, which, from fear of awakening the question now pending, turned aside and hid its face.

Adeimantus/ Your account is quite correct; I remember perfectly.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, I shrank from making assertions which 1 have since hazarded; but now let me venture upon this declaration, that we must make the most perfect philosophers guardians.

Adeimantus/ We hear you.

Socrates/ Now consider what a small supply of these men you will, in all probability, find. For the various members of that character, which we described as essential to philosophers, will seldom grow incorporate; in most cases that character grows disjointed.

Adeimantus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ You are aware that persons endowed with a quick comprehension, a good memory, sagacity, acuteness, and their attendant qualities, do not readily grow up to be at the same time so noble and lofty-minded, as to consent to live a regular, calm, and steady life; on the contrary, such persons are drifted by their acuteness hither and thither, and all steadiness vanishes from their life.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ On the other hand, those steady and invariable characters, whose trustiness makes one anxious to employ them, and who in war are slow to take alarm, behave in the same way when pursuing their studies; that is to say, they are torpid and stupid, as if they were benumbed, and are

constantly dozing and yawning, whenever they have to toil at anything of the kind.

Adeimantus/ That is true.

Socrates/ But we declare that, unless a person possesses a pretty fair amount of both qualifications, he must be debarred all access to the strictest education, to honor, and to government.

Adeimantus/ We are right.

Socrates/ Then do you not anticipate a scanty supply of such characters?

Adeimantus/ Most assuredly I do.

Socrates/ Hence we must not be content with testing their behavior in the toils, dangers, and pleasures, which we mentioned before; but we must go on to try them in ways which we then omitted, exercising them in a variety of studies, and observing whether their character will be able to support the highest subjects, or whether it will flinch from the trial, like those who flinch under other circumstances.

Adeimantus/ No doubt it is proper to examine them in this way. But pray which do you mean by the highest subjects?

Socrates/ I presume you remember, that, after separating the soul into three specific parts, we deduced the several natures of justice, temperance, fortitude, and wisdom?

Adeimantus/ Why, if I did not remember, I should deserve not to hear the rest of the discussion.

Socrates/ Do you also remember the remark which preceded that deduction?

Adeimantus/ Pray what was it?

Socrates/ We remarked, I believe, that to obtain the best possible view of the question, we should have to take a different and a longer route, which would bring us to a

thorough insight into the subject; still that it would be possible to subjoin a demonstration of the question, flowing from our previous conclusions. Thereupon you said that such a demonstration would satisfy you; and then followed those investigations, which, to my own mind, were deficient in exactness; but you can tell me whether they contented you.

Adeimantus/ Well, to speak for myself, I thought them fair in point of measure; and certainly the rest of the party held the same opinion.

Socrates/ But, my friend, no measure of such a subject, which falls perceptibly short of the truth, can be said to be quite fair; for nothing imperfect is a measure of anything; though people sometimes fancy that enough has been done, and that there is no call for further investigation.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is a very common habit, and arises from indolence.

Socrates/ Yes, but it is a habit remarkably undesirable in the guardian of a state and its laws.

Adeimantus/ So I should suppose.

Socrates/ That being the case, my friend, such a person must go round by that longer route, and must labor as devotedly in his studies as in his bodily exercises. Otherwise, as we were saying just now, he will never reach the goal of that highest science, which is most peculiarly his own.

Adeimantus/ What! are not these the highest? Is there still something higher than justice and those other things which we have discussed?

Socrates/ Even so; and here we must not contemplate a rude outline, as we have been doing; on the contrary, we

must be satisfied with nothing short of the most complete elaboration. For would it not be ridiculous to exert oneself on other subjects of small value, taking all imaginable pains to bring them to the most exact and spotless perfection; and at the same time to ignore the claim of the highest subjects to a corresponding exactitude of the highest order?

Adeimantus/ The sentiment is a very just one. But do you suppose that anyone would let you go without asking what that science is which you call the highest, and of what it treats?

Socrates/ Certainly not; so put the question yourself. Assuredly you have heard the answer many a time; but at this moment either you have forgotten it, or else you intend to find me employment by raising objections. 1 incline to the latter opinion; for you have often been told that the essential Form of the Good is the highest object of science, and that this essence, by blending with just things and all other created objects, renders them useful and advantageous. And at this moment you can scarcely doubt that I am going to assert this, and to assert, besides, that we are not sufficiently acquainted with this essence. And if so, if, I say, we know everything else perfectly, without knowing this, you are aware that it will profit us nothing; just as it would be equally profitless to possess everything without possessing what is good. Or do you imagine it would be a gain to possess all possessable things, with the single exception of things good; or to apprehend every conceivable object, without apprehending what is good, in other words, to be destitute of every good and beautiful conception?

Adeimantus/ Not I, believe me.

Socrates/ Moreover, you doubtless know besides, that the chief good is supposed by the multitude to be pleasure, by the more enlightened, insight?

Adeimantus/ Of course I know that.

Socrates/ And you are aware, my friend, that the advocates of this latter opinion are unable to explain what they mean by insight, and are compelled at last to explain it as insight into that which is good.

Adeimantus/ Yes, they are in a ludicrous difficulty.

Socrates/ They certainly are; since they reproach us with ignorance of that which is good, and then speak to us the next moment as if we knew what it was. For they tell us that the chief good is insight into good, assuming that we understand their meaning, as soon as they have uttered the term good.

Adeimantus/ It is perfectly true.

Socrates/ Again; are not those, whose definition identifies pleasure with good, just as much infected with error as the preceding? For they are forced to admit the existence of evil pleasures, are they not?

Adeimantus/ Certainly they are.

Socrates/ From which it follows, I should suppose, that they must admit the same thing to be both good and evil. Does it not?

Adeimantus/ Certainly it does.

Socrates/ Then is it not evident that this is a subject often and severely disputed?

Adeimantus/ Doubtless it is.

Socrates/ Once more; is it not evident, that though many persons would be ready to do and seem to do, or to possess and seem to possess, what seems just and beautiful, without really being so; yet, when you come to things good, no one is content to acquire what only seems such; on the contrary, everybody seeks the reality, and semblances are here, if nowhere else, treated with universal contempt?

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is quite evident.

Socrates/ This good, then, which every soul pursues, as the end of all its actions, divining its existence, but perplexed and unable to apprehend satisfactorily its nature, or to enjoy that steady confidence in relation to it, which it does enjoy in relation to other things, and therefore doomed to forfeit any advantage which it might have derived from those same things; are we to maintain that, on a subject of such overwhelming importance, the blindness we have described is a desirable feature in the character of those best members of the state in whose hands even-thing is to be placed?

Adeimantus/ Most certainly not.

Socrates/ At any rate, if it be not known in what way just things and beautiful things come to be also good, I imagine that such things will not possess a very valuable guardian in the person of him who is ignorant on this point. And I. surmise that none will know the just and the beautiful satisfactorily till he knows the good.

Adeimantus/ You are right in your surmises.

Socrates/ Then will not the arrangement of our constitution be perfect, provided it be overlooked by a guardian who is scientifically acquainted with these subjects?

Adeimantus/ Unquestionably it will. But pray, Socrates, do you assert the chief good to be science or pleasure or something different from either?

Socrates/ Ho, ho, my friend! I saw long ago that you would certainly not put up with the opinions of other people on these subjects.

Adeimantus/ Why, Socrates, it appears to me to be positively wrong in one who has devoted so much time to these questions, to be able to state the opinions of others, without being able to state his own.

Socrates/ Well, do you think it right to speak with an air of information on subjects on which one is not well informed?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not with an air of information; but I think it right to be willing to state ones opinion for what it is worth.

Socrates/ Well, but have you not noticed that opinions divorced from science are all ill-favored? At the best they are blind. Or do you conceive that those who, unaided by the pure reason, entertain a correct opinion, are at all superior to blind men, who manage to keep the straight path?

Adeimantus/ Not at all superior.

Socrates/ Then is it your desire to contemplate objects that are ill-favored, blind, and crooked, when it is in your power to learn from other people about bright and beautiful things?

Glaucon/ I implore you, Socrates, not to hang back, as if you had come to the end. We shall be content even if you only discuss the subject of the chief good in the style in which you discussed justice, temperance, and the rest.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, and I likewise should be thoroughly content. But I distrust my own powers, and I feel afraid that my awkward zeal will subject me to ridicule. No, my good sirs; let us put aside, for the present at any rate, all inquiry into the real nature of the chief good. For, methinks, it is beyond the measure of this our enterprise to find the way to what is, after all, only my present opinion on the subject. But I am willing to talk to you about that which appears to be an off-shoot of the chief good, and bears the strongest resemblance to it, provided it is also agreeable to you; but if it is not, I will let it alone.

Glaucon/ Nay, tell us about it. You shall remain in our debt for an account of the parent.

Socrates/ I wish that could pay, and you receive, the parent sum, instead of having to content ourselves with the interest springing from it. However, here I present you with the fruit and scion of the essential good. Only take care that I do not involuntarily impose upon you by handing in a forged account of this offspring.

Glaucon/ We will take all the care we can; only proceed.

Socrates/ I will do so, as soon as we have come to a settlement together, and you have been reminded of certain statements made in a previous part of our conversation, and renewed before now again and again.

Glaucon/ Pray what statements?

Socrates/ In the course of the discussion we have distinctly maintained the existence of a multiplicity of things that are beautiful, and good, and so on.

Glaucon/ True, we have.

Socrates/ And also the existence of an essential beauty, and an essential good, and so on; reducing all those things which before we regarded as manifold, to a single form and a single entity in each case, and addressing each as an independent being.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ And we assert that the former address themselves to the eye, and not to the pure reason; whereas the forms address themselves to the reason, and not to the eye.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now with what part of ourselves do we see visible objects?

Glaucon/ With the eye-sight.

Socrates/ In the same way we hear sounds with the hearing, and perceive everything sensible with the other senses, do we not?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then have you noticed with what transcendent costliness the architect of the senses has wrought out the faculty of seeing and being seen?

Glaucon/ Not exactly.

Socrates/ Well then, look at it in this light. Is there any other kind of thing, which the ear and the voice require, to enable the one to hear, and the other to be heard, in the absence of which third thing the one will not hear, and the other will not be heard?

Glaucon/ No, there is not.

Socrates/ And I believe that very few, if any, of the other senses require any such third thing. Can you mention one that does?

Glaucon/ No, I cannot.

Socrates/ But do you not perceive that, in the case of vision and visible objects, there is a demand for something additional?

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, granting that vision is seated in the eye, and that the owner of it is attempting to use it, and that color is resident in the objects, still, unless there be present a third kind of thing, devoted to this especial purpose, you are aware that the eyesight will see nothing, and the colors will be invisible.

Glaucon/ Pray what is the third thing to which you refer?

Socrates/ Of course I refer to what you call light.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Hence it appears, that of all the pairs aforesaid, the sense of sight, and the faculty of being seen, are coupled by the noblest link, whose nature is anything but insignificant, unless light is an ignoble thing.

Glaucon/ No, indeed; it is very far from being ignoble.

Socrates/ To whom, then, of the gods in heaven can you refer as the author and dispenser of this blessing? And whose light is it that enables our sight to see so excellently well, and makes visible objects appear?

Glaucon/ There can be but one opinion on the subject; your question evidently alludes to the sun.

Socrates/ Then the relation subsisting between the eyesight and this deity is of the following nature, is it not?

Glaucon/ Describe it.

Socrates/ Neither the sight itself, nor the eye, which is the seat of sight, can be identified with the sun.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And yet, of all the organs of sensation, the eye, methinks, bears the closest resemblance to the sun.

Glaucon/ Yes, quite so.

Socrates/ Further, is not the faculty which the eye possesses dispensed to it from the sun, and held by it as something adventitious?

Glaucon/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ Then is it not also true, that the sun, though not identical with sight, is nevertheless the cause of sight, and is moreover seen by its aid?

Glaucon/ Yes, quite true.

Socrates/ Well then, believe that I meant the sun, when I spoke of the offspring of the chief good, begotten by it in a certain resemblance to itself, that is to say, bearing the same relation in the visible world to sight and its objects, which

the chief good bears in the intellectual world to pure reason and its objects.

Glaucon/ How so? Be so good as to explain it to me more at length.

Socrates/ Are you aware, that whenever a person makes an end of looking at objects, upon which the light of day is shedding color, and looks instead at objects colored by the light of the moon and stars, his eyes grow dim and appear almost blind, as if they were not the seat of distinct vision?

Glaucon/ I am fully aware of it.

Socrates/ But whenever the same person looks at objects on which the sun is shining, these very eyes, I believe, see clearly, and are evidently the seat of distinct vision?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably it is so.

Socrates/ Just in the same way understand the condition of the soul to be as follows. Whenever it has fastened upon an object, over which truth and real existence are shining, it seizes that object by an act of reason, and knows it, and thus proves itself to be possessed of reason; but whenever it has fixed upon objects that are blent with darkness, the world of birth and death, then it rests in opinion, and its sight grows dim, as its opinions shift backwards and forwards, and it has the appearance of being destitute of reason.

Glaucon/ True, it has.

Socrates/ Now, this power, which supplies the objects of real knowledge with the truth that is in them, and which renders to him who knows them the faculty of knowing them, you must consider to be the essential Form of Good, and you must regard it as the origin of science, and of truth, so far as the latter comes within the range of knowledge; and though knowledge and truth are both very beautiful things, you will be right in looking upon good as something distinct from them, and even more beautiful. And just as, in the

analogous case, it is right to regard light and vision as resembling the sun, but wrong to identify them with the sun; so, in the case of science and truth, it is right to regard both of them as resembling good, but wrong to identify either of them with good; because, on the contrary, the quality of the good ought to have a still higher value set upon it.

Glaucon/ That implies an inexpressible beauty, if it not only is the source of science and truth, but also surpasses them in beauty; for, I presume, you do not mean by it pleasure.

Socrates/ Hush! not a word of that. But you had better examine the illustration further, as follows.

Glaucon/ Show me how.

Socrates/ I think you will admit that the sun ministers to visible objects, not only the faculty of being seen, but also their vitality, growth, and nutriment, though it is not itself equivalent to vitality.

Glaucon/ Of course it is not.

Socrates/ Then admit that, in like manner, the objects of knowledge not only derive from the good the gift of being known, but are further endowed by it with a real and essential existence; though the good, far from being identical with real existence, actually transcends it in dignity and power.

Hereupon Glaucon exclaimed with a very amusing air;

Glaucon/ Good heavens! what a miraculous superiority!

Socrates/ Well, you are the person to blame, because you compel me to state my opinions on the subject.

Glaucon/ Nay, let me entreat you not to stop, till you have at all events gone over again your similitude of the sun, if you are leaving anything out.

Socrates/ Well, to say the truth, I am leaving out a great deal.

Glaucon/ Then pray do not omit even a trifle.

Socrates/ I fancy I shall leave much unsaid; however, if I can help it under the circumstances, I will not intentionally make any omission.

Glaucon/ Pray do not.

Socrates/ Now understand that, according to us, there are two powers reigning, one over an intellectual, and the other over a visible region and class of objects; if I were to use the term firmament you might think I was playing on the word. Well then, are you in possession of these as two kinds, one visible, the other intellectual?

Glaucon/ Yes, I am.

Socrates/ Suppose you take a line divided into two unequal parts, one to represent the visible class of objects, the other the intellectual, and divide each part again into two segments on the same scale. Then, if you make the lengths of the segments represent degrees of distinctness or indistinctness, one of the two segments of the part which stands for the visible world will represent all images; meaning by images, first of all, shadows; and, in the next place, reflections in water, and in close-grained, smooth, bright substances, and everything of the kind, if you understand me.

Glaucon/ Yes, I do understand.

Socrates/ Let the other segment stand for the real objects corresponding to these images, namely, the animals about us, and the whole world of nature and of art.

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ Would you also consent to say that, with reference to this class, there is, in point of truth and

untruthfulness, the same distinction between the copy and the original, that there is between what is matter of opinion and what is matter of knowledge?

Glaucon/ Certainly I should.

Socrates/ Then let us proceed to consider how we must divide that part of the whole line which represents the intellectual world.

Glaucon/ How must we do it?

Socrates/ Thus; one segment of it will represent what the soul is compelled to investigate by the aid of the segments of the other part, which it employs as images, starting from hypotheses, and travelling not to a first principle, but to a conclusion. The other segment will represent the objects of the soul, as it makes its way from an hypothesis to a first principle which is not hypothetical, unaided by those images which the former division employs, and shaping its journey by the sole help of real essential forms.

Glaucon/ I have not understood your description so well as I could wish.

Socrates/ Then we will try again. You will understand me more easily when I have made some previous observations. I think you know that the students of subjects like geometry and calculation, assume by way of materials, in each investigation, all odd and even numbers, figures, three kinds of angles, and other similar data. These things they are supposed to know, and having adopted them as hypotheses, they decline to give any account of them, either to themselves or to others, on the assumption that they are self-evident; and, making these their starting point, they proceed to travel through the remainder of the subject, and arrive at last, with perfect unanimity, at that which they have proposed as the object of investigation.

Glaucon/ I am perfectly aware of the fact.

Socrates/ Then you also know that they summon to their aid visible forms, and discourse about them, though their thoughts are busy not with these forms, but with their originals, and though they discourse not with a view to the particular square and diameter which they draw, but with a view to the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on. For while they employ by way of images those figures and diagrams aforesaid, which again have their shadows and images in water, they are really endeavoring to behold those abstractions which a person can only see with the eye of thought.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ This, then, was the class of things which I called intellectual; but I said that the soul is constrained to employ hypotheses while engaged in the investigation of them, not travelling to a first principle, (because it is unable to step out of, and mount above, its hypotheses,) but using, as images, just the copies that are presented by things below, which copies, as compared with the originals, are vulgarly esteemed distinct and valued accordingly.

Glaucon/ I understand you to be speaking of the subject-matter of the various branches of geometry and the kindred arts.

Socrates/ Again, by the second segment of the intellectual world understand me to mean all that the mere reasoning process apprehends by the force of dialectic, when it avails itself of hypotheses not as first principles, but as genuine hypotheses, that is to say, as stepping-stones and impulses, whereby it may force its way up to something that is not hypothetical, and arrive at the first principle of everything, and seize it in its grasp; which done, it turns round, and takes hold of that which takes hold of this first principle, till at last it comes down to a conclusion, calling in the aid of no

sensible object whatever, but simply employing abstract, self-subsisting forms, and terminating in the same.

Glaucon/ I do not understand you so well as I could wish, for I believe you to be describing an arduous task; but at any rate I understand that you wish to declare distinctly, that the field of real existence and pure intellect, as contemplated by the science of dialectic, is more certain than the field investigated by what are called the arts, in which hypotheses constitute first principles, which the students are compelled, it is true, to contemplate with the mind and not with the senses; but, at the same time, as they do not come back, in the course of inquiry, to a first principle, but push on from hypothetical premises, you think that they do not exercise pure reason on the questions that engage them, although taken in connection with a first principle these questions come within the domain of the pure reason. And I believe you apply the term understanding, not pure reason, to the mental habit of such people as geometricians, regarding understanding as something intermediate between opinion and pure reason.

Socrates/ You have taken in my meaning most satisfactorily; and I beg you will accept these four mental states, as corresponding to the four segments, namely pure reason corresponding to the highest, understanding to the second, belief to the third, and conjecture to the last; and pray arrange them in gradation, and believe them to partake of distinctness in a degree corresponding to the truth of their respective objects.

Glaucon/ I understand you. I quite agree with you, and will arrange them as you desire.

Book 7.

Socrates/ Now then, go on to compare our natural condition, so far as education and ignorance are concerned, to a state of things like the following. Imagine a number of men living in an underground cavernous chamber, with an entrance open to the light, extending along the entire length of the cavern, in which they have been confined, from their childhood, with their legs and necks so shackled, that they are obliged to sit still and look straight forwards, because their chains render it impossible for them to turn their heads round; and imagine a bright fire burning some way off, above and behind them, and an elevated roadway passing between the fire and the prisoners, with a low wall built along it, like the screens which conjurors put up in front of their audience, and above which they exhibit their wonders.

Glaucon/ I have it.

Socrates/ Also figure to yourself a number of persons walking behind this wall, and carrying with them statues of men, and images of other animals, wrought in wood and stone and all kinds of materials, together with various other articles, which overtop the wall; and, as you might expect, let some of the passers-by be talking, and others silent.

Glaucon/ You are describing a strange scene, and strange prisoners.

Socrates/ They resemble us. For let me ask you, in the first place, whether persons so confined could have seen anything of themselves or of each other, beyond the shadows thrown by the fire upon the part of the cavern facing them?

Glaucon/ Certainly not, if you suppose them to have been compelled all their lifetime to keep their heads unmoved.

Socrates/ And is not their knowledge of the things carried past them equally limited?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably it is.

Socrates/ And if they were able to converse with one another, do you not think that they would be in the habit of giving names to the objects which they saw before them?

Glaucon/ Doubtless they would.

Socrates/ Again; if their prison-house returned an echo from the part facing them, whenever one of the passers-by opened his lips, to what, let me ask you, could they refer the voice, if not to the shadow which was passing?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably they would refer it to that.

Socrates/ Then surely such persons would hold the shadows of those manufactured articles to be the only realities.

Glaucon/ Without a doubt they would.

Socrates/ Now consider what would happen if the course of nature brought them a release from their fetters, and a remedy for their foolishness, in the following manner. Let us suppose that one of them has been released, and compelled suddenly to stand up, and turn his neck round and walk with open eyes towards the light; and let us suppose that he goes through all these actions with pain, and that the dazzling splendor renders him incapable of discerning those objects of which he used formerly to see the shadows. What answer should you expect him to make, if someone were to tell him that in those days he was watching foolish phantoms, but that now he is somewhat nearer to reality, and is turned towards things more real, and sees more correctly; above all, if he were to point out to him the several objects that are passing by, and question him, and compel him to answer what they are? Should you not expect him to be puzzled, and to regard his old visions as truer than the objects now forced upon his notice?

Glaucon/ Yes, much truer.

Socrates/ And if he were further compelled to gaze at the light itself, would not his eyes, think you, be distressed, and would he not shrink and turn away to the things which he could see distinctly, and consider them to be really clearer than the things pointed out to him?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ And if someone were to drag him violently up the rough and steep ascent from the cavern, and refuse to let him go till he had drawn him out into the light of the sun, would he not, think you, be vexed and indignant at such treatment, and on reaching the light, would he not find his eyes so dazzled by the glare as to be incapable of making out so much as one of the objects that are now called true?

Glaucon/ Yes, he would find it so at first.

Socrates/ Hence, I suppose, habit will be necessary to enable him to perceive objects in that upper world. At first he will be most successful in distinguishing shadows; then he will discern the reflections of men and other things in water, and afterwards the realities; and after this he will raise his eyes to encounter the light of the moon and stars, finding it less difficult to study the heavenly bodies and the heaven itself by night, than the sun and the suns light by day.

Glaucon/ Doubtless.

Socrates/ Last of all, I imagine, he will be able to observe and contemplate the nature of the sun, not as it appears in water or on alien ground, but as it is in itself in its own territory.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ His next step will be to draw the conclusion, that the sun is the author of the seasons and the years, and the guardian of all things in the visible world, and in a

manner the cause of all those things which he and his companions used to see.

Glaucon/ Obviously, this will be his next step.

Socrates/ What then? When he recalls to mind his first habitation, and the wisdom of the place, and his old fellow prisoners, do you not think he will congratulate himself on the change, and pity them?

Glaucon/ Assuredly he will.

Socrates/ And if it was their practice in those days to receive honor and commendations one from another, and to give prizes to him who had the keenest eye for a passing object, and who remembered best all that used to precede and follow and accompany it, and from these data divined most ably what was going to come next, do you fancy that he will covet these prizes, and envy those who receive honor and exercise authority among them? Do you not rather imagine that he will feel what Homer describes, and wish extremely and be ready to go through anything, rather than entertain those opinions, and live in that fashion?

Glaucon/ For my own part, I am quite of that opinion. I believe he would consent to go through anything rather than live in that way.

Socrates/ And now consider what would happen if such a man were to descend again and seat himself on his old seat? Coming so suddenly out of the sun, would he not find his eyes blinded with the gloom of the place?

Glaucon/ Certainly, he would.

Socrates/ And if he were forced to deliver his opinion again, touching the shadows aforesaid, and to enter the lists against those who had always been prisoners, while his sight continued dim, and his eyes unsteady, and if this process of initiation lasted a considerable time, would he not be made a laughingstock, and would it not be said of him, that he had

gone up only to come back again with his eyesight destroyed, and that it was not worthwhile even to attempt the ascent? And if anyone endeavored to set them free and carry them to the light, would they not go so far as to put him to death, if they could only manage to get him into their power?

Glaucon/ Yes, that they would.

Socrates/ Now this imaginary case, my dear Glaucon, you must apply in all its parts to our former statements, by comparing the region which the eye reveals, to the prison house, and the light of the fire therein to the power of the sun; and if, by the upward ascent and the contemplation of the upper world, you understand the mounting of the soul into the intellectual region, you will hit the tendency of my own surmises, since you desire to be told what they are; though, indeed, God only knows whether they are correct. But, be that as it may, the view which I take of the subject is to the following effect. In the world of knowledge, the essential Form of Good is the limit of our inquiries, and can barely be perceived; but, when perceived, we cannot help concluding that it is in every case the source of all that is bright and beautiful, in the visible world giving birth to light and its master, and in the intellectual world dispensing, immediately and with full authority, truth and reason; and that whosoever would act wisely, either in private or in public, must set this Form of Good before his eyes.

Glaucon/ To the best of my power, I quite agree with you.

Socrates/ That being the case, pray agree with me on another point, and do not be surprised, that those who have climbed so high are unwilling to take a part in the affairs of men, because their souls are ever loath to desert that upper region. For how could it be otherwise, if the preceding simile is indeed a correct representation of their case?

Glaucon/ True, it could scarcely be otherwise.

Socrates/ Well; do you think it a marvelous thing, that a person, who has just quitted the contemplation of divine objects for the study of human infirmities, should betray awkwardness, and appear very ridiculous, when with his sight still dazed, and before he has become sufficiently habituated to the darkness that reigns around, he finds himself compelled to contend in courts of law, or elsewhere, about the shadows of justice, or images which throw the shadows, and to enter the lists in questions involving the arbitrary suppositions entertained by those who have never yet had a glimpse of the essential features of justice?

Glaucon/ No, it is anything but marvelous.

Socrates/ Right; for a sensible man will recollect that the eyes may be confused in two distinct ways and from two distinct causes, that is to say, by sudden transitions either from light to darkness, or from darkness to light. And, believing the same idea to be applicable to the soul, whenever such a person sees a case in which the mind is perplexed and unable to distinguish objects, he will not laugh irrationally, but he will examine whether it has just quitted a brighter life, and has been blinded by the novelty of darkness, or whether it has come from the depths of ignorance into a more brilliant life, and has been dazzled by the unusual splendor; and not till then will he congratulate the one upon its life and condition, and compassionate the other; and if he chooses to laugh at it, such laughter will be less ridiculous than that which is raised at the expense of the soul that has descended from the light of a higher region.

Glaucon/ You speak with great judgment.

Socrates/ Hence, if this be true, we cannot avoid adopting the belief, that the real nature of education is at variance with the account given of it by certain of its professors, who pretend, I believe, to infuse into the mind a knowledge of

which it was destitute, just as sight might be instilled into blinded eyes.

Glaucon/ True; such are their pretensions.

Socrates/ Whereas, our present argument shows us that there is a faculty residing in the soul of each person, and an instrument enabling each of us to learn; and that, just as we might suppose it to be impossible to turn the eye round from darkness to light without turning the whole body, so must this faculty, or this instrument, be wheeled round, in company with the entire soul, from the perishing world, until it be enabled to endure the contemplation of the real world and the brightest part thereof, which, according to us, is the Form of Good. Am I not right?

Glaucon/ You are.

Socrates/ Hence, this very process of revolution must give rise to an art, teaching in what way the change will most easily and most effectually be brought about. Its object will not be to generate in the person the power of seeing. On the contrary, it assumes that he possesses it, though he is turned in a wrong direction, and does not look towards the right quarter; and its aim is to remedy this defect.

Glaucon/ So it would appear.

Socrates/ Hence, while, on the one hand, the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to resemble those of the body, inasmuch as they really do not pre-exist in the soul, but are formed in it in the course of time by habit and exercise; the virtue of wisdom, on the other hand, does most certainly appertain, as it would appear, to a more divine substance, which never loses its energy, but by change of position becomes useful and serviceable, or else remains useless and injurious. For you must, ere this, have noticed how keen-sighted are the puny souls of those who have the reputation of being clever but vicious, and how sharply they see through

the things to which they are directed, thus proving that their powers of vision are by no means feeble, though they have been compelled to become the servants of wickedness, so that the more sharply they see, the more numerous are the evils which they work.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed it is the case.

Socrates/ But, if from earliest childhood these characters had been shorn and stripped of those leaden, earthborn weights, which grow and cling to the pleasures of eating and gluttonous enjoyments of a similar nature, and keep the eye of the soul turned upon the things below; if, I repeat, they had been released from these snares, and turned round to look at objects that are true, then these very same souls of these very same men would have had as keen an eye for such pursuits as they actually have for those in which they are now engaged.

Glaucon/ Yes, probably it would be so.

Socrates/ Once more; is it not also probable, or rather is it not a necessary corollary to our previous remarks, that neither those who are uneducated and ignorant of truth, nor those who are suffered to linger over their education all their life, can ever be competent overseers of a state, the former, because they have no single mark in life, which they are to constitute the end and aim of all their conduct both in private and in public; the latter, because they will not act without compulsion, fancying that, while yet alive, they have been translated to the islands of the blest.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ It is, therefore, our task, to constrain the noblest characters in our colony to arrive at that science which we formerly pronounced the highest, and to set eyes upon the good, and to mount that ascent we spoke of; and, when they have mounted and looked long enough, we must

take care to refuse them that liberty which is at present permitted them.

Glaucon/ Pray what is that?

Socrates/ The liberty of staying where they are, and refusing to descend again to those prisoners, or partake of their toils and honors, be they mean or be they exalted.

Glaucon/ Then are we to do them a wrong, and make them live a life that is worse than the one within their reach?

Socrates/ You have again forgotten, my friend, that law does not ask itself how someone class in a state is to live extraordinarily well. On the contrary, it tries to bring about this result in the entire state; for which purpose it links the citizens together by persuasion and by constraint, makes them share with one another the benefit which each individual can contribute to the common weal, and does actually create men of this exalted character in the state, not with the intention of letting them go each on his own way, but with the intention of turning them to account in its plans for the consolidation of the state.

Glaucon/ True; I had forgotten.

Socrates/ Therefore reflect, Glaucon, that far from wronging the future philosophers of our state, we shall only be treating them with strict justice, if we put them under the additional obligation of watching over their fellow-citizens, and taking care of them. We shall say; It is with good reason that your compeers elsewhere refuse to share in the labors of their respective states. For they take root in a city spontaneously, in defiance of the prevailing constitution; and it is but fair that a self-sown plant, which is indebted to no one for support, should have no inclination to pay to anybody wages for attendance. But in your case, it is we that have begotten you for the state as well as for yourselves, to be like leaders and kings of a hive. better and more perfectly

trained than the rest, and more capable of playing a part in both modes of life. You must therefore descend by turns, and associate with the rest of the community, and you must habituate yourselves to the contemplation of these obscure objects. For, when habituated, you will see a thousand times better than the residents, and you will recognize what each image is, and what is its original, because you have seen the realities of which beautiful and just and good things are copies. And in this way you and we shall find that the life of the state is a substance, and not a phantom like the life of our present states, which are mostly composed of men who fight among themselves for shadows, and are at feud for the administration of affairs, which they regard as a great boon. Whereas I conceive the truth stands thus; That city in which the destined rulers are least eager to rule, will inevitably be governed in the best and least factious manner, and a contrary result will ensue if the rulers are of a contrary disposition.

Glaucon/ You are perfectly right.

Socrates/ And do you imagine that our pupils, when addressed in this way, will disobey our commands, and refuse to toil with us in the state by turns, while they spend most of their time together in that bright region?

Glaucon/ Impossible; for certainly it is a just command, and those who are to obey it are just men. No; doubtless each of them will enter upon his administration as an unavoidable duty, conduct the reverse of that pursued by the present rulers in each state.

Socrates/ True, my friend; the case stands thus. If you can invent for the destined rulers a life better than ruling, you may possibly realize a well-governed city; for only in such a city will the rulers be those who are really rich, not in gold, but in a wise and virtuous life, which is the wealth

essential to a happy man. But if beggars, and persons who hunger after private advantages, take the reins of the state, with the idea that they are privileged to snatch advantage from their power, all goes wrong. For the post of magistrate is thus made an object of strife; and civil and intestine conflicts of this nature, ruin not only the contending parties, but also the rest of the state.

Glaucon/ That is most true.

Socrates/ And can you mention any life which contemns state offices, except the life of true philosophy?

Glaucon/ No indeed, I cannot.

Socrates/ Well, but the task of government must be undertaken by persons not enamored of it; otherwise, their rivals will dispute their claim.

Glaucon/ Unquestionably it must.

Socrates/ Then what other persons will you compel to enter upon the duties of guardians of the state, if you discard those who understand most profoundly the means of attaining the highest excellence in the administration of a country, and who also possess honors of a different stamp, and a nobler life than that of a statesman?

Glaucon/ I shall not discard them; I shall address myself only to them.

Socrates/ And now would you have us proceed to consider in what way such persons are to arise in the state, and how they are to be carried up to the light, like those heroes who are said to have ascended up to heaven from the nether world?

Glaucon/ Certainly I would have you do so.

Socrates/ Apparently this is a question involving not the mere turning of a shell, but the revolution of a soul, which is traversing a road leading from a kind of night-like day up

to a true day of real existence; and this road we shall doubtless declare to be true philosophy.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Then must we not consider what branch of study possesses the power required?

Glaucon/ Certainly we must.

Socrates/ Then, Glaucon, can you tell me of a science which ends to draw the soul from the fleeting to the real? Whilst I speak, I bethink myself that we certainly said, did we not, that our pupils must be trained in their youth to war?

Glaucon/ Yes, we did say so.

Socrates/ Then the science, which we are in quest of, must possess this feature as well as the former.

Glaucon/ What feature?

Socrates/ That it can be turned to use by warlike men.

Glaucon/ That is certainly advisable, if it be practicable.

Socrates/ Now in the foregoing discussion we were for training our pupils through the agency of music and gymnastic.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Gymnastic, I believe, is engaged upon the changeable and perishing; for it presides over the growth and waste of the body.

Glaucon/ That is evident.

Socrates/ Hence gymnastic cannot be the study for which we are looking.

Glaucon/ No, it cannot.

Socrates/ But what do you say to music, considered in the extent in which we previously discussed it?

Glaucon/ Nay, music was only the counterpart of gymnastic, if you remember; for it trained our guardians by the influence of habit, and imparted to them, not science, but a kind of harmoniousness by means of harmony, and a kind of measuredness by means of measure; and in the subjects which it treated, whether fabulous or true, it presented another series of kindred characteristics; but it contained no branch of study tending to any advantage resembling the one of which you are now in quest.

Socrates/ Your memory is very exact; for music really did possess nothing of the kind. But, my excellent Glaucon, where are we to find the thing we want? All the useful arts, I believe, we thought degrading.

Glaucon/ Unquestionably we did; yet what other study is there still remaining, apart from music and gymnastic and the useful arts?

Socrates/ Come then, if we can find nothing beyond and independent of these, let us take one of those studies which are of universal application.

Glaucon/ Pray which?

Socrates/ That general one, for example, of which all arts, trains of thought, and sciences, avail themselves; and which is also one of the first things that everyone must learn.

Glaucon/ Tell me the nature of it.

Socrates/ I allude to that common process of distinguishing the numbers, one, two, and three. And I call it briefly, Number and Calculation. For may it not be said of these, that every art and science is compelled to crave a share in them?

Glaucon/ Certainly it may.

Socrates/ And is not the science of war one of the number?

Glaucon/ Beyond a doubt it is.

Socrates/ To take an example from tragedy, I proceeded; Palamedes on all occasions makes out that Agamemnon was a very ridiculous general. For you have remarked, have you not, that he claims, by the invention of numbers, to have marshaled the ranks of the army at Troy, and to have counted over the ships and everything else, as if such things had been uncounted before his time, and as if Agamemnon had been even ignorant how many feet he had, which would naturally be the case, if he did not know how to count? Yet what do you think of Agamemnon as a general?

Glaucon/ He was a strange one in my opinion, if this story be true.

Socrates/ Then can we help concluding, that to be able to calculate and count is a piece of knowledge indispensable to a warrior?

Glaucon/ Yes, most indispensable, if he is to understand how to handle troops at all, or rather, if he is to be anything of a man.

Socrates/ And does your notion of this science coincide with mine?

Glaucon/ Pray what is your notion?

Socrates/ It seems to be by nature one of those studies leading to reflection, of which we are in quest; but no one appears to make the right use of it, as a thing which tends wholly to draw us towards real existence.

Glaucon/ Explain your meaning.

Socrates/ I will endeavor to make my own opinion clear to you. And you, on your side, must join me in studying those things, which I distinguish in my own mind as conducive, or not, to the end in view, and express your assent or dissent; in order that we may see more clearly, in

the next place, whether I am right in my surmises as to the nature of this science.

Glaucon/ Pray go on with your distinctions.

Socrates/ I will. If you observe, some of the objects of our perceptions do not stimulate the reflection into exercise, because they appear thoroughly appreciated by the perception; whereas others urge the reflection strenuously to examine them, because the perception appears to produce an unsound result.

Glaucon/ It is plain you are talking of objects seen at a distance, and painting in perspective.

Socrates/ You have not quite hit my meaning.

Glaucon/ Then pray what sort of objects do you mean?

Socrates/ I regard as non-stimulants all the objects which do not end by giving us at the same moment two contradictory perceptions. On the other hand, all the objects which do end in that way I consider stimulants, meaning those cases in which the perception, whether incident from a near or a distant object, communicates two equally vivid, but contradictory impressions. You will understand my meaning more clearly thus; Here you have three fingers, you say, the little finger, the middle, and the third.

Glaucon/ Very good.

Socrates/ Well, suppose me to be speaking of them as they appear on a close inspection. Now here is the point which I wish you to examine with reference to them.

Glaucon/ Pray what is it?

Socrates/ It is evident that they are all equally fingers; and, so far, it makes no difference whether the one we are looking at be in the middle or outside, whether it be white or black, thick or thin, and so on. For, so long as we confine ourselves to these points, the mind seldom feels compelled

to ask the reflection, what is a finger? Because in no instance has the sight informed the mind at the same moment, that the finger is the opposite of a finger.

Glaucon/ No, certainly not.

Socrates/ Then, naturally, such impressions cannot be stimulating or awakening to the reflection.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But how is it, pray, with the relative sizes of the fingers? Does the sight distinguish them satisfactorily, and does it make no difference to it, whether the position of one of them be in the middle, or at the outside? And in like manner, does the touch estimate thickness and thinness, softness and hardness, satisfactorily? And is there no defect in the similar communications of the other senses? Or, rather do they not all proceed thus? To begin with the perception which takes cognizance of hard things; is it not constrained to take cognizance also of soft things, and does it not intimate to the mind, that it feels the same thing to be both hard and soft?

Glaucon/ It does.

Socrates/ In such cases, then, must not the mind be at a loss to know what this perception means by hard, since it declares the same thing to be also soft; and what the perception of weight means by light and heavy, when it informs the mind that the heavy is light, and the light heavy?

Glaucon/ Why yes; such interpretations will be strange to the mind, and will require examination.

Socrates/ Hence it is natural for the mind in such circumstances to call in the aid of reasoning and reflection, and to endeavor to make out whether each announcement is single or double.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Should it incline to the latter view, is it not evident that each part of every announcement has a unity and character of its own?

Glaucon/ It is evident.

Socrates/ If then each is one, and both together make two, the mind will conclude that the two are separable. For if they were inseparable, it could only conclude that they are one, not two.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Well; the sense of sight, we say, gave us an impression, in which the sensations of great and small were confounded, instead of being separated. Am I not right?

Glaucon/ You are.

Socrates/ But, on the other hand, reflection, reversing the process of the sight, was compelled, in order to make the sensible impression clear, to look at great and small as things distinct, not confounded.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then is it not some contradiction of this kind that first prompts us to ask, What then, after all, is greatness. and what smallness?

Glaucon/ No doubt it is.

Socrates/ And thus we are led to distinguish between objects of reflection and objects of sight.

Glaucon/ Most rightly so.

Socrates/ This, then, was the meaning which I was just now attempting to convey, when I said that some objects tend to stimulate thought, while others have no bias towards awakening reflection, placing in the former category everything that strikes upon the senses in conjunction with its immediate opposite; and in the latter, everything of which this cannot be said.

Glaucon/ Now I understand you; and I agree with you.

Socrates/ Well; to which of the two classes do you think that number and unity belong?

Glaucon/ I cannot make up my mind.

Socrates/ Indeed! Let our previous remarks help you to a conclusion. If unity, in and by itself, is thoroughly grasped by the sight or any other sense, like the finger we spoke of, it cannot possess the quality of drawing the mind towards real existence. But if some contradiction is always combined with it in all its manifestations, making it appear the opposite of unity quite as much as unity itself, in that case a critic will be immediately required, and the mind will be compelled to puzzle over the difficulty, and stir up the inward faculty of thought to the investigation, and put the question, What, after all, is unity in itself? And thus the study of the unit will be one of the things which turn and lead us to the contemplation of real existence.

Glaucon/ You are right; the observation of the unit does certainly possess this property in no common degree; for the same thing presents at the same moment the appearance of one thing, and an infinity of things.

Socrates/ Then, if this is the case with the unit, is it not also the case with all numbers without exception?

Glaucon/ Doubtless it is.

Socrates/ Well, but calculation and arithmetic treat of number exclusively.

Glaucon/ Certainly they do.

Socrates/ And, apparently, they conduct us to truth.

Glaucon/ Yes, in a manner quite extraordinary.

Socrates/ Hence it would appear that the science of numbers must be one of the studies of which we are in quest. For the military man finds a knowledge of it indispensable

in drawing up his troops, and the philosopher must study it because he is bound to rise above the changing and cling to the real, on pain of never becoming a skillful reasoner.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But our guardian, as it happens, is both soldier and philosopher.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly he is.

Socrates/ Therefore, Glaucon, it will be proper to enforce the study by legislative enactment, and to persuade those who are destined to take part in the weightiest affairs of state, to study calculation and devote themselves to it, not like amateurs, but perseveringly, until, by the aid of pure reason, they have attained to the contemplation of the nature of numbers, not cultivating it with a view to buying and selling, as merchants or shopkeepers, but for purposes of war, and to facilitate the conversion of the soul itself from the changeable to the true and the real.

Glaucon/ What you say is admirable.

Socrates/ Indeed, talking of this science which treats of calculation, it has only just occurred to me how elegant it is, and how valuable it may be to us in many ways in carrying out our wishes, provided it be pursued for the sake of knowledge, and not for purposes of trade.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Because, as we were saying just now, it mightily draws the soul upwards, and compels it to reason about abstract numbers, steadily declining the discussion when any numbers are proposed which have bodies that can be seen and touched. For I presume you are aware that good mathematicians ridicule and disallow any attempt to part the unit in the course of argument; and if you divide it into pieces, like small change, they multiply it back again, and

take every precaution to prevent the unit from ever losing its unity, and presenting an appearance of multiplicity.

Glaucon/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Now suppose, Glaucon, that someone were to ask them the following question; My excellent friends, what kind of numbers are you discussing? Where are the numbers in which the unit realizes your description of it, which is, that every unit is equal, each to each, without the smallest difference, and contains within itself no parts? What answer should you expect them to make?

Glaucon/ If you ask me, I should expect them to say, that the numbers about which they talk, are only capable of being conceived in thought, and cannot be dealt with in any other way.

Socrates/ Then, my friend, do you see that this science is, in all likelihood, absolutely necessary to us, since it evidently obliges the mind to employ the pure intelligence in the pursuit of pure truth?

Glaucon/ It certainly possesses this quality in an eminent degree.

Socrates/ Again; have you ever noticed that those who have a turn for arithmetic are, with scarcely an exception, naturally quick at all sciences; and that men of slow intellect, if they be trained and exercised in this study, even supposing they derive no other benefit from it, at any rate progress so far as to become invariably quicker than they were before?

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ And I am pretty sure, also, that you will not easily find many sciences that give the learner and student so much trouble and toil as arithmetic.

Glaucon/ No, certainly you will not.

Socrates/ Then on all these accounts, so far from rejecting this science, we must employ it in the education of the finest characters.

Glaucon/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ Then let us consider this as one point settled. In the Second place, let us inquire whether we ought to concern ourselves about the science which borders on arithmetic.

Glaucon/ What is that? Do you mean geometry?

Socrates/ Even so.

Glaucon/ It is obvious, that all that part of it which bears upon strategy does concern us. For in encamping, in occupying positions, in closing up and deploying troops, and in executing all the other maneuvers of an army in the field of battle or on the march, it will make every difference to a military man, whether he is a good geometrician, or not.

Socrates/ Nevertheless, a trifling knowledge of geometry and calculation will suffice for these purposes. The question is, whether the larger and more advanced part of the study tends at all to facilitate our contemplation of the essential Form of Good. Now, according to us, this is the tendency of everything that compels the soul to transfer itself to that region in which is contained the most blissful part of that real existence, which it is of the highest importance for it to behold.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Consequently if geometry compels the soul to contemplate real existence, it does concern us; but if it only forces the changeful and perishing upon our notice, it does not concern us.

Glaucon/ Yes, so we affirm.

Socrates/ Well then, on one point at any rate we shall encounter no opposition from those who are even slightly acquainted with geometry, when we assert that this science holds a position which flatly contradicts the language employed by those who handle it.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ They talk, I believe, in a very ridiculous and poverty stricken style. For they speak invariably of squaring, and producing, and adding, and so on, as if they were engaged in some business, and as if all their propositions had a practical end in view; whereas in reality I conceive that the science is pursued wholly for the sake of knowledge.

Glaucon/ Assuredly it is.

Socrates/ There is still a point about which we must be agreed, is there not?

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ That the science is pursued for the sake of the knowledge of what eternally exists, and not of what comes for a moment into existence, and then perishes.

Glaucon/ We shall soon be agreed about that. Geometry, no doubt, is a knowledge of what eternally exists.

Socrates/ If that be so, my excellent friend, geometry must tend to draw the soul towards truth, and to give the finishing stroke to the philosophic spirit, thus contributing to raise up what, at present, we so wrongly keep down.

Glaucon/ Yes, it will do so most forcibly.

Socrates/ Then you must, in the most forcible manner, direct the citizens of your beautiful city on no account to fail to apply themselves to geometry. For even its secondary advantages are not trifling.

Glaucon/ Pray what are they?

Socrates/ Not to mention those which you specified as bearing upon the conduct of war, I would insist particularly upon the fact, of which we are assured, that, where a ready reception of any kind of learning is an object, it will make all and every difference whether the pupil has applied himself to geometry or not.

Glaucon/ Yes, undoubtedly it will.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, impose this, as a secondary study, upon our young men?

Glaucon/ Yes, let us do so.

Socrates/ Again; shall we make astronomy a third study? or do you disapprove?

Glaucon/ I quite approve of it. For to have an intimate acquaintance with seasons, and months, and years, is an advantage not only to the agriculturist and the navigator, but also, in an equal degree, to the general.

Socrates/ You amuse me by your evident alarm lest the multitude should think that you insist upon useless studies. Yet indeed it is no easy matter, but on the contrary a very difficult one, to believe that in the midst of these studies an organ of our souls is being purged from the blindness, and quickened from the deadness, occasioned by other pursuits, an organ whose preservation is of more importance than a thousand eyes; because only by it can truth be seen. Consequently, those who think with us will bestow unqualified approbation on the studies you prescribe; while those who have no inkling at all of this doctrine, will think them valueless, because they see no considerable advantage to be gained from them beyond their practical applications. Therefore consider at once with which of the two parties you are conversing; or else, if you are carrying on the discussion chiefly on your own account, without any reference to either

party, you surely will not grudge another man any advantage which he may derive from the conversation.

Glaucon/ I prefer the latter course; I mean to speak, put my questions, and give my answers, chiefly on my own account.

Socrates/ Then take a step backwards. We were wrong a moment ago in what we took as the science next in order to geometry.

Glaucon/ What did we take?

Socrates/ Why, after considering plane surfaces, we proceeded to take solids in a state of revolution, before considering solids in themselves. Whereas the correct way is, proceed from two dimensions to three; which brings us, I believe, to cubical dimensions, and figures into which thickness enters.

Glaucon/ True, Socrates; but these subjects, I think, have not yet been explored.

Socrates/ They have not; and for two reasons. In the first place, they are difficult problems, and but feebly investigated, because no state holds them in estimation; and, in the second place, those who do investigate them stand in need of a superintendent, without whom they will make no discoveries. Now, to find such a person is a hard task to begin with; and then, supposing one were found, as matters stand now, the pride of those who are inquisitive about the subject would prevent their listening to his suggestions. But if a state, in its corporate capacity, were to pay honor to the study, and constitute itself superintendent thereof, these students would yield obedience, and the real nature of the subject, thus continuously and vigorously investigated, would be brought to light. For even now, slighted and curtailed as it is not only by the many, but also

by professed inquirers, who can give no account of the extent of its usefulness, it nevertheless makes progress, in spite of all these obstacles, by its inherent elegance; and I should not be at all surprised if its difficulties were cleared up. There certainly is a peculiar fascination about it.

Glaucon/ But pray explain more clearly what you were saying just now. I think you defined geometry as the investigation of plane surfaces.

Socrates/ I did.

Glaucon/ You then proceeded to place astronomy next to geometry; though afterwards you drew back.

Socrates/ Yes, the more I haste to travel over the ground, the worse I speed. The investigation of space of three dimensions succeeds to plane geometry; but because it is studied absurdly, I passed it over, and spoke of astronomy, which implies motion of solid bodies, as the next step after geometry.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Then let us assign the fourth place in our studies to astronomy, regarding the existence of the science now omitted as only waiting for the time when a state shall take it up.

Glaucon/ It is a reasonable idea, Socrates. And to return to the rebuke which you gave me a little while ago for my vulgar commendation of astronomy, I can now praise the plan on which you pursue it. For I suppose it is clear to everyone, that astronomy at all events compels the soul to look upwards, and draws it from the things of this world to the other.

Socrates/ It is not clear to me, though perhaps it may be to everyone else; for that is not my opinion.

Glaucon/ Then what is your opinion?

Socrates/ It seems to me that astronomy, as now handled by those who embark on philosophy, positively makes the soul look downwards.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ I think you have betrayed no want of intrepidity in the conception you have formed of the true nature of that learning which deals with the things above. For probably, if a person were to throw his head back, and learn something from the contemplation of a carved ceiling, you would suppose him to be contemplating it, not with his eyes, but with his reason. Now, perhaps your notion is right, and mine foolish. For my own part, I cannot conceive that any science makes the soul look upwards, unless it has to do with the real and invisible. It makes no difference whether a person stares stupidly at the sky, or looks with half-shut eyes upon the ground; so long as he is trying to study any sensible object, I deny that he can ever be said to have learned anything, because no objects of sense admit of scientific treatment; and I maintain that his soul is looking downwards, not upwards, though he may be lying on his back, like a swimmer, to study, either in the sea, or on dry land.

Glaucon/ I am rightly punished; for I deserved your rebuke. But pray what did you mean by saying that astronomy ought to be studied on a system very different from the present one, if it is to be studied profitably for the purposes that we have in view?

Socrates/ I will tell you. Since this fretted sky is still a part of the visible world, we are bound to regard it, though the most beautiful and perfect of visible things, as far inferior nevertheless to those true revolutions, which real velocity, and real slowness, existing in true number, and in all true forms, accomplish relatively to each other, carrying with

them all that they contain; which are verily apprehensible by reason and thought, but not by sight. Or do you think differently?

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Therefore we must employ that fretted sky as a pattern or plan to forward the study which aims at those higher objects, just as we might employ diagrams, which fell in our way, curiously drawn and elaborated by Daedalus or some other artist or draughtsman. For, I imagine, a person acquainted with geometry, on seeing such diagrams, would think them most beautifully finished, but would hold it ridiculous to study them seriously in the hope of detecting thereby the truths of equality, or duplicity, or any other ratio.

Glaucon/ No doubt it would be ridiculous.

Socrates/ And do you not think that the genuine astronomer will view with the same feelings the motions of the stars? That is to say, will he not regard the heaven itself, and the bodies which it contains, as framed by the heavenly architect with the utmost beauty of which such works are susceptible? But as to the proportion which the day bears to the night, both to the month, the month to the year, and the other stars to the sun and moon, and to one another, will he not, think you, look down upon the man who believes such corporeal and visible objects to be changeless and exempt from all perturbations; and will he not hold it absurd to bestow extra ordinary pains on the endeavor to apprehend their true condition?

Glaucon/ Yes, I quite think so, now that I hear you suggest it.

Socrates/ Hence, we shall pursue astronomy with the help of problems, just as we pursue geometry; but we shall let the heavenly bodies alone, if it is our design to become

really acquainted with astronomy, and by that means to convert the natural intelligence of the soul from a useless into a useful possession.

Glaucon/ The plan which you prescribe is, I am confident, many times more laborious than the present mode of studying astronomy.

Socrates/ Yes; and I imagine we shall prescribe everything else on the same scale, if we are to be of any use as legislators. But to proceed; what other science in point can you suggest?

Glaucon/ I cannot suggest any, on such short notice.

Socrates/ Well, motion, if I am not mistaken, admits of certainly more than one variety; a perfect enumeration of these varieties may perhaps be supplied by some learned philosopher. Those which are manifest to people like us are two in number.

Glaucon/ Pray what are they?

Socrates/ We have already described one; the other is its counterpart.

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ It would seem, that our ears were intended to detect harmonious movements, just as our eyes were intended to detect the motions of the heavenly bodies; and that these constitute in a manner two sister sciences, as the Pythagoreans assert, and as we, Glaucon, are ready to grant. If not, what other course do we take?

Glaucon/ We take the course you mentioned first; we grant the fact.

Socrates/ Then, as the business promises to be a long one, we will consult the Pythagoreans upon this question, and perhaps upon some other questions too, maintaining, meanwhile, our own principle intact.

Glaucon/ What principle do you mean?

Socrates/ Never to let our pupils attempt to study any imperfect branch of these sciences, or anything that ever fails to arrive ultimately at that point which all things ought to reach, as we said just now in treating of astronomy. For you can scarcely be ignorant that harmony also is treated just like astronomy in this, that its professors, like the astronomers, are content to measure the notes and concords distinguished by the ear, one against another, and therefore toil without result.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed, and they make themselves quite ridiculous. They talk about repetitions, and apply their ears closely, as if they were bent on extracting a note from their neighbors; and then one party asserts that an intermediate sound can still be detected, which is the smallest interval, and ought to be the unit of measure; while the other party contends that now the sounds are identical, both alike postponing their reason to their ears.

Socrates/ I see you are alluding to those good men who tease and torture the chords, and rack them upon the pegs. But not to make the metaphor too long by enlarging upon the blows given by the plectrum, and the peevishness, reserve and frowardness of the strings, I here abandon this style, and tell you that I do not mean these persons, but those whom we resolved but now to consult on the subject of harmony. For they act just like the astronomers; that is, they investigate the numerical relations subsisting between these audible concords, but they refuse to apply themselves to problems, with the object of examining what numbers are, and what numbers are not, consonant, and what is the reason of the difference.

Glaucon/ Why the work you describe would require faculties more than human.

Socrates/ Call it, rather, a work useful in the search after the beautiful and the good, though useless if pursued with other ends.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is not unlikely.

Socrates/ In addition to this, if the study of all these sciences which we have enumerated, should ever bring us to their mutual association and relationship, and teach us the nature of the ties which bind them together, I believe that the diligent treatment of them will forward the objects which we have in view, and that the labor, which otherwise would be fruitless, will be well bestowed.

Glaucon/ I have the same presentiment, Socrates. But the work you speak of is a very great one.

Socrates/ Do you allude to the prelude? or to what? Surely we do not require to be reminded that all this is but the prelude to the actual hymn, which we have to learn? For I presume you do not look upon the proficients in these studies as dialecticians.

Glaucon/ No, indeed I do not; bating a very few exceptions that have fallen in my way.

Socrates/ But of course you do not suppose that persons unable to take a part in the discussion of first principles, can be said to know a particle of the things which we affirm they ought to know.

Glaucon/ No, that again is not my opinion.

Socrates/ Then, Glaucon, have we not here the actual hymn, of which dialectical reasoning is the consummation? This hymn, falling as it does within the domain of the intellect, can only be imitated by the faculty of sight; which, as we said, strives to look steadily, first at material animals, then at the stars themselves, and last of all at the very sun itself. In the same way, whenever a person strives, by the help of dialectic, to start in pursuit of every reality by a

simple process of reason, independent of all sensuous information, never flinching, until by an act of the pure intelligence he has grasped the real nature of good, he arrives at the very end of the intellectual world, just as the last-mentioned person arrived at the end of the visible world.

Glaucon/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ And this course you name dialectic, do you not?

Glaucon/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ On the other hand, the release of the prisoners from their chains, and their transition from the shadows of the images to the images themselves and to the light, and their ascent from the cavern into the sunshine; and, when there, the fact of their being able to look, not at the animals and vegetables and the suns light, but still only at their reflections in water, which are indeed divine and shadows of things real, instead of being shadows of images thrown by a light which may itself be called an image, when compared with the sun; these points, I say, find their counterpart in all this pursuit of the abovementioned arts, which possesses this power of elevating the noblest part of the soul, and advancing it towards the contemplation of that which is most excellent in the things that really exist, just as in the other case the clearest organ of the body was furthered to the contemplation of that which is brightest in the corporeal and visible region.

Glaucon/ For myself, I accept this statement. And yet I must confess that I find it hard to accept; though at the same time, looking at it in another way, I find it hard to deny. However, as the discussion of it need not be confined to the present occasion, but may be repeated on many future occasions, let us assume the truth of your present theory, and so proceed to the hymn itself, and discuss it, as we have

discussed the prelude. Tell us, therefore, what is the general character of the faculty of dialectic, and into what specific parts it is divided, and lastly what are its methods. For these methods will, in all likelihood, be the roads that lead to the very spot where we are to close our march, and rest from our journey.

Socrates/ My dear Glaucon, you would not be able to follow me further, though on my part there should be no lack of willingness. You would no longer be looking at the similitude of that whereof we speak, but at the truth itself, in the shape in which it appears to me. Whether I am right or not, I dare not go so far as to decide positively; but I suppose I am warranted in affirming that we are not far wrong.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly you are.

Socrates/ And may I not also affirm, that the faculty of dialectic can alone reveal the truth to one who is master of the sciences which we have just enumerated; and that in no other way is such knowledge possible?

Glaucon/ Yes, on that point also you are warranted in speaking positively.

Socrates/ At any rate, no one will contradict us when we assert that there is no other method which attempts systematically to form a conception of the real nature of each individual thing. On the contrary, all the arts, with a few exceptions, are wholly addressed to the opinions and wants of men, or else concern themselves about the production and composition of bodies, or the treatment of things which grow and are compounded. And as for these few exceptions, such as geometry and its accompanying sciences, which, according to us, in some small degree apprehend what is real, we find that, though they may dream about real existence, they cannot behold it in a waking state, so long as

they use hypotheses which they leave unexamined, and of which they can give no account. For when a person assumes a first principle which he does not know, on which unknown first principle depends the web of intermediate propositions, and the final conclusion, by what possibility can such mere admissions ever constitute science?

Glaucon/ It is indeed impossible.

Socrates/ Hence the dialectic method, and that alone, adopts the following course. It carries back its hypotheses to the very first principle of all, in order to establish them firmly; and finding the eye of the soul absolutely buried in a swamp of barbarous ignorance, it gently draws and raises it upwards, employing as handmaids in this work of revolution the arts which we have discussed. These we have often called sciences, because it is customary to do so, but they require another name, betokening greater clearness than opinion, but less distinctness than science. On some former occasion we fixed upon the term understanding to express this mental process. But it appears to me to be no part of our business to dispute about a name, when we have proposed to ourselves the consideration of such important subjects.

Glaucon/ You are quite right; we only want a name which when applied to a mental state shall indicate clearly what phenomena it describes.

Socrates/ Indeed I am content, to call as before the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth conjecture, the two latter jointly constituting opinion, and the two former intelligence. Opinion deals with the changing, intelligence with the real; and as the real is to the changing, so is intelligence to opinion; and as intelligence is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to conjecture. But the analogy between the objects of these mental acts, and the twofold division of the

provinces of opinion and of intelligence, we had better omit, Glaucon, to prevent burdening ourselves with discussions far outnumbering all the former.

Glaucon/ Well, I certainly agree with you upon those other points, so far as I can follow you.

Socrates/ Do you also give the title of Dialectician to the person who takes thoughtful account of the essence of each thing? And will you admit that, so far as a person has no such account to give to himself and to others, so far he fails to exercise pure reason upon the subject?

Glaucon/ Yes, I cannot doubt it.

Socrates/ Then shall you not also hold the same language concerning the good? Unless a person can strictly define by a process of thought the essential Form of the Good, abstracted from everything else; and unless he can fight his way as it were through all objections, studying to disprove them not by the rules of opinion, but by those of real existence; and unless in all these conflicts he travels to his conclusion without making one false step in his train of thought, unless he does all this, shall you not assert that he knows neither the essence of good, nor any other good thing; and that any phantom of it, which he may chance to apprehend, is the fruit of opinion and not of science; and that he dreams and sleeps away his present life, and never wakes on this side of that future world, in which he is doomed to sleep forever?

Glaucon/ Yes; I shall most decidedly assert all this.

Socrates/ Then certainly, if you ever had the actual training of those children of yours, whose nature and education you are theoretically superintending, I cannot suppose that you would allow them to be magistrates in the state with authority to decide the weightiest matters, while they are as irrational as the strokes of a pen.

Glaucon/ No, indeed I should not.

Socrates/ You will pass a law, no doubt, ordering them to apply themselves especially to that education which will enable them to use the weapons of the dialectician most scientifically?

Glaucon/ I shall, with your help.

Socrates/ Then does it not seem to you that dialectic lies, like a coping-stone, upon the top of the sciences, and that it would be wrong to place any other science above it, because the series is now complete?

Glaucon/ Yes, I believe you are right.

Socrates/ Hence, it only remains for you to fix upon the persons to whom we are to assign these studies, and the principle of their distribution.

Glaucon/ That is evidently the case.

Socrates/ Do you remember what kind of persons we selected, when we were choosing the magistrates some time ago?

Glaucon/ Of course I do.

Socrates/ Well, I would have you regard the qualities we mentioned, as so far entitling their owners to be selected; that is to say, we are bound to prefer the most steady, the most manful, and, as far as we can, the most comely. But in addition to this, besides requiring in them a noble and resolute moral nature, they must also possess such qualifications as are favorable to this system of education.

Glaucon/ Pray which do you determine these to be?

Socrates/ They must bring with them a piercing eye for their studies, my excellent friend, and they must learn with ease. For assuredly severe studies try the mettle of the mind

much more than bodily exercises; because the labor comes more home to it in the former case, as it is limited to the mind, instead of being shared by the body.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Then we must include in the objects of our search a good memory, a dauntless demeanor, and a thorough love of work. Else, how can you expect to induce a man to go through with his bodily labors, and to learn and practice so much besides?

Glaucon/ No; we can hold out no inducement to a man who does not possess talents of the highest order.

Socrates/ At any rate, it is certain that the false view of philosophy which at present prevails, and the disrepute into which she has fallen, may be traced, as I said before, to the fact, that people apply themselves to philosophy without any regard to their own demerits; whereas the study of he is the privilege of her genuine sons, to the exclusion of the baseborn.

Glaucon/ What do you mean by genuine?

Socrates/ In the first place, he that would study her must not halt in his love of work. He must not be half-laborious, and half-indolent, which is the case when a man loves exercise, and the chase, and all bodily toil, but dislikes study, and feels an aversion for listening and inquiring, and in fact hates all intellectual labor. On the other hand, those people are equally halt whose love of work has taken the opposite form.

Glaucon/ What you say is perfectly true.

Socrates/ In the same way, may we not affirm that a soul is crippled with reference to truth, if, while it hates voluntary falsehood, and cannot endure it in itself, and is exceedingly indignant when other people are guilty of an untruth, it nevertheless calmly accepts involuntary falsehood, and

instead of being distressed when its lack of knowledge is detected, is fain to wallow in ignorance with the complacency of a brutal hog?

Glaucon/ No doubt you are right.

Socrates/ Above all, we must watch the genuine and the baseborn on the side of temperance, fortitude, loftiness of mind, and all the separate virtues. For whenever states or private persons have no eye for qualities like these, they unwittingly employ, as magistrates or as friends, men who are halt and illegitimate in one or other of these respects.

Glaucon/ Unquestionably it is so.

Socrates/ Hence we, on our side, must take every precaution in all matters of this description. For, if we can procure persons sound in limb, and sound in mind, and train them up under the influence of these lofty studies and severe discipline, justice herself will find no fault with us, and we shall preserve our state and constitution; whereas, if we select pupils of a different stamp, our success will be turned into failure, and we shall draw down upon philosophy a still heavier storm of ridicule.

Glaucon/ That would be indeed a disgrace.

Socrates/ It certainly would. But very likely I made myself ridiculous just this minute.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ I forgot, that we were not serious, and spoke too earnestly. For, as I spoke, I looked towards Philosophy, and seeing her assailed with unmerited contumely, I was so indignant, and so angry with those who are responsible for it, that I believe I expressed myself too seriously.

Glaucon/ No, indeed you did not; at least, in listening, I did not think so.

Socrates/ Well, in speaking, it struck me that I did. But, to proceed, let us not forget, that it will be impossible in this instance to select persons advanced in years, as we did in the former. For we must not be persuaded by Solon into thinking that a man, as he grows old, can learn many things. On the contrary, an old man can sooner run than learn; and the wide range of severe labors must fall wholly on the young.

Glaucon/ Unquestionably so.

Socrates/ Arithmetic, therefore, and geometry, and all the branches of that preliminary education which is to pave the way for dialectic, must be taught our pupils in their childhood; care being taken to convey instruction in such a shape as not to make it compulsory upon them to learn.

Glaucon/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because, no trace of slavery ought to mix with the studies of the freeborn man. For the constrained performance of bodily labors does, it is true, exert no evil influence upon the body; but in the case of the mind, no study, pursued under compulsion, remains rooted in the memory.

Glaucon/ That is true.

Socrates/ Hence, my excellent friend, you must train the children to their studies in a playful manner, and without any air of constraint, with the further object of discerning more readily the natural bent of their respective characters.

Glaucon/ Your advice is reasonable.

Socrates/ Do you remember our saying that the children must also be taken on horseback within sight of actual war; and that, on any safe occasion, they must be brought into the field, and made to taste blood, like young hounds?

Glaucon/ I do remember it.

Socrates/ Accordingly we must make a select list, including everyone who has displayed remarkable self-possession in the midst of all these labors, studies, and dangers.

Glaucon/ At what age must that be done?

Socrates/ As soon as they are released from the necessary bodily exercises, during which, whether they last two or three years, nothing else can be done. For weariness and sleep are enemies to study. And, besides, the behavior of each in his exercises is one of the tests of character, and a very important one too.

Glaucon/ Doubtless it is.

Socrates/ After this period, these choice characters, selected from the ranks of the young men of twenty, must receive higher honors than the rest; and the detached sciences in which they were educated as children must be brought within the compass of a single survey, to show the co-relation which exists between them, and the nature of real existence.

Glaucon/ Certainly this is the only kind of instruction which will be found abiding, when it has once effected an entrance.

Socrates/ Yes, and it is also a most powerful criterion of the dialectic character. For according as a man can survey a subject as a whole or not, he is, or is not, a dialectician.

Glaucon/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ Hence it will be your duty to have an eye to those who show the greatest ability in these questions, and the greatest firmness, not only in study, but also in war and the other branches of discipline; and when they are thirty years old and upwards, you must select them out of the ranks of your picked men, and raise them to greater honors, and try them by the test of- dialectic ability, in order to see

who is able to divest himself of his eyes and his other senses, and advance in company with truth towards real existence. And here it is, my friend, that great caution is required.

Glaucon/ For what special reason?

Socrates/ Do you not perceive, what an immense evil at present accompanies dialectic?

Glaucon/ Pray what is it?

Socrates/ Insubordination, with which I believe dialecticians to be tainted.

Glaucon/ Indeed you are right.

Socrates/ Are you at all surprised at the fact, and do you make no allowance for the persons in question?

Glaucon/ Pray explain yourself.

Socrates/ By way of parallel case, figure to yourself a supposititious child, brought up in the midst of great wealth, and extensive connections of high family, and surrounded by flatterers; and suppose him, on arriving at manhood, to learn that his alleged parents are not his real parents, though he cannot discover the latter. Can you guess what would be his behavior towards his flatterers and towards his spurious parents, first while he was ignorant of the fact of his substitution, and secondly when he became aware of it? or would you like to listen to my own conjectures?

Glaucon/ I should.

Socrates/ Well, I suspect that, so long as he is ignorant of the truth, he will honor his father and his mother and his other apparent relations, more than his flatterers; and that he will not allow the former to want anything so quickly as the latter; and that he will be more likely to be guilty of insubordination in word or deed and of disobedience in important things towards his flatterers, than towards his supposed parents.

Glaucon/ Probably he will.

Socrates/ On the other hand, I suspect that, after he has learned the truth, his esteem and regard for his parents will be diminished, while his respect for his flatterers will be heightened, to whom he will now listen very much more than before, and proceed to live as they would have him live, associating with them undisguisedly, and wholly abandoning all concern for that fictitious father, and those pretended relations, unless his disposition is remarkably good.

Glaucon/ Your description is perfectly true to nature. But how does this comparison bear upon those who apply themselves to dialectic?

Socrates/ I will tell you. We have, I believe, from childhood decided opinions about things just and beautiful; and we have been bred up to obey and honor these opinions, just as we have grown up in submission to our parents.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Now these opinions are combated by certain pleasurable pursuits, which flatter our soul and try to draw it over to their side; though they fail to persuade us, if we are at all virtuous; in which case, we honor those ancestral opinions, and continue loyal to them.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Well, but when such a person is met by the question, what is beauty? and having given the answer, which he used to hear from the legislator, is confuted by the dialectic process; and when frequent and various defeats have forced him to believe that there is as much deformity as beauty in what he calls beauty, and that justice, goodness, and all the things, which he used to honor most, are in the like predicament, how do you think he will behave

thenceforth towards his old opinions, so far as respect and obedience are concerned?

Glaucon/ Of course he will not pay them the same respect or the same obedience as before.

Socrates/ And so long as he neither honors nor acknowledges his former belief, as he used to do, while at the same time he fails to discover the true principles, is not that flattering life the only one to which he will be likely to attach himself?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ In other words, he will appear, I suppose, to have abandoned his loyalty, and to have become lawless.

Glaucon/ There cannot be a doubt of it.

Socrates/ Well now, is not this a condition of the students of dialectic a natural one, and, as I said just now, does it not deserve to be treated with great forbearance?

Glaucon/ Yes, and with pity too.

Socrates/ Then in order that you may not have to feel this pity for those men of thirty, must you not use every precaution in introducing them to dialectic?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And will it not be one great precaution to forbid their meddling with it while young? For I suppose you have noticed, that whenever boys taste dialectic for the first time, they pervert it into an amusement, and always employ it for purposes of contradiction, and imitate in their own persons the artifices of those who study refutation, delighting, like puppies, in pulling and tearing to pieces with logic anyone who comes near them.

Glaucon/ They do, to an extravagant extent.

Socrates/ Hence, when they have experienced many triumphs and many defeats, they fall, quickly and

vehemently, into an utter disbelief of their former sentiments; and thereby both they and the whole cause of philosophy have been prejudiced in the eyes of the world.

Glaucon/ That is perfectly true.

Socrates/ The man of more advanced years, on the contrary, will not suffer himself to be led away by such madness; but will imitate those who are resolved to discuss and examine truth, rather than those who play at contradiction for amusement; and, as a consequence of his superior discretion, will increase, instead of diminishing, the general respect for the pursuit.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Again; were we not studying precaution throughout, when we said some time back, that the characters, which are to be initiated into dialectic, must be stable and orderly, in opposition to the present system, which allows anybody, however unfit, to enter the field?

Glaucon/ Certainly we were.

Socrates/ Would it suffice, then, for the acquisition of dialectic, that a man should continue constantly and strenuously devoted to the study, resigning every other pursuit for it, just as, in its turn, he resigned everything for gymnastic, during a period twice as long as that which he bestowed on his bodily exercises?

Glaucon/ Do you mean six years, or four?

Socrates/ It does not matter much; say five. After this you will have to send them down again into the cavern we described, and compel them to take commands in war, and to hold such offices as befit young men, that they may also keep up with their neighbors in practical address. And here again you must put them to the test, to see whether they will continue steadfast notwithstanding every seduction, or whether possibly they may be a little shaken.

Glaucon/ And how long a time do you assign for this?

Socrates/ Fifteen years. Then, as soon as they are fifty years old, those who have passed safely through all temptations, and who have won every distinction in every branch whether of action or of science, must be forthwith introduced to their final task, and must be constrained to lift up the eye of the soul, and fix it upon that which gives light to all things; and having surveyed the essence of good, they must take it as a pattern, to be copied in that work of regulating their country and their fellow-citizens and themselves, which is to occupy each in turn during the rest of life; and though they are to pass most of their time in philosophical pursuits, yet each, when his turn comes, is to devote himself to the hard duties of public life, and hold office for their countries sake, not as a desirable, but as an unavoidable occupation; and thus having trained up a constant supply of others like themselves to fill their place as guardians of the state, they will depart and take up their abode in the islands of the blessed. And the state will put up monuments to their memory at the public expense, and offer sacrifices to them, as demigods, if the Pythian oracle will authorize it, or at least as highly-favored and godlike men.

Glaucon/ Like a sculptor, Socrates, you have finished off the leading men in a style of faultless beauty.

Socrates/ Say leading women too, Glaucon. For do not suppose that my remarks were intended to apply at all more to men than to women, so long as we can find women whose talents are equal to the situation.

Glaucon/ You are right, if they are to share with the men in everything on a footing of equality, according to our account.

Socrates/ Well then, do you agree that our theory of the state and constitution is not a mere aspiration, but, though

full of difficulties, capable of realization in one way, and only one, which, as we have said, requires that one, if not more, of the true philosophers shall be invested with full authority in a state, and contemn the honors of the present day, in the belief that they are mean and worthless; and that, deeply impressed with the supreme importance of right and of the honors to be derived from it, and regarding justice as the highest and most binding of all obligations, he shall, as the special servant and admirer of justice, carry out a thorough reform in his own state.

Glaucon/ How is that to be done?

Socrates/ All who are above ten years old in the city must be dispatched into the country, and their children must be taken and bred up beyond the influence of that common character, which their parents among others possess, in the manners and laws of the true philosophers, the nature of which we have described above; and, tell me, will not this be the quickest and easiest way to enable a state and a constitution, such as we have represented, to establish itself and prosper, and at the same time be a blessing to the nation in which it has taken root?

Glaucon/ Yes, quite so; and I believe, Socrates, you have stated correctly the means that would be employed, if such a constitution were ever realized.

Socrates/ And have we not by this time discussed to satiety this state, and the individual that resembles it? For I presume it is also clear what sort of person we shall expect him to be.

Glaucon/ It is clear; and the present inquiry is, I believe, concluded.

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Socrates/ Very well; then we agree, Glaucon, upon these points, namely that, if the constitution of a state is to be carried to perfection, it must recognize a community of women, a community of children, and of education in all its branches; and, in like manner, a community of pursuits in war and in peace; and that its kings must be those who have shown the greatest ability in philosophy and the greatest aptitude for war.

Glaucon/ Yes, we agree so far.

Socrates/ In addition to this, we also admitted, that as soon as the rulers have established their position, they are to take the soldiers, and settle them in dwelling-places of a certain description; in which, by our direction, no private rights are admitted, but which are the common property of all. And, besides determining the nature of their dwellings, we also determined, if you recollect, how far they were to be permitted to have anything, which they could call their own.

Glaucon/ Yes, I recollect that we pronounced against their holding any such property as is commonly held at the present day, and decided that, in their capacity of trained soldiers and guardians, they ought to receive in return for their guardianship year by year from the other citizens the maintenance required by their position, and devote their attention to the whole state including themselves.

Socrates/ You are right. But, now that we have concluded this subject, let us recall to mind the point from which we diverged, in order that we may resume our old route.

Glaucon/ That will not be difficult. You were talking pretty much as you are now doing, giving us to understand that you had finished the discussion of the commonwealth, and saying that you applied the term good to such a state as you had then described, and to the man who resembled it;

though, as it would seem, you had it in your power to tell us of a still more excellent state, and of a still more excellent man. At the same time, you declared that, if your state were right, all others must be wrong. Of the remaining constitutions I remember you mentioned four principal varieties, which you said it might be worthwhile to consider, noticing their faults, and observing in their turn the men who resemble them; in order that, after viewing them all and agreeing as to the best and the worst man, we might examine whether, or not, the best is happiest, and the worst most wretched. And on my asking you to specify the four constitutions, to which you alluded, we were interrupted by Polemarchus and Adeimantus; and thereupon you took up the discussion which has brought you to this point.

Socrates/ Your memory is perfectly correct.

Glaucon/ Then allow me to grapple with you, like a wrestler, in my old attitude; and, when I repeat my former question, exert yourself to give me the answer which was then upon your lips.

Socrates/ I will do my best.

Glaucon/ Well, it is my particular desire to be told what are the four constitutions to which you referred.

Socrates/ I shall find no difficulty in answering your question. The constitutions to which I allude, and to which in fact special names have been given, are the following. First, we have the constitution of Crete and Sparta, which has the general voice in its favor. Second in order, as in estimation, stands oligarchy, as it is called, a commonwealth fraught with many evils. Then comes democracy, which is the adversary and successor of oligarchy; and, finally, that glorious thing, despotism, which differs from all the preceding, and constitutes the fourth and worst disease of a state. I suppose you cannot tell me of any other form of

polity, which stands conspicuously by itself in kind? For I believe we may regard as minor links in the series just given all principalities and purchased sovereignties and similar constitutions, which are to be found fully as often among the barbarians as among the Greeks.

Glaucon/ Yes, we certainly hear of many strange instances of them.

Socrates/ Now are you aware that the varieties of human character and the varieties of existing constitutions must be exactly equal in point of number? Or do you imagine that constitutions grow upon a tree or rock, instead of springing out of the moral dispositions of the members of each state, according as this or that disposition turns the scale as it were, and drags everything else in its wake?

Glaucon/ I believe the latter to be their sole origin.

Socrates/ Consequently if there are five varieties of commonwealth, there must be also five varieties of mental constitution among individuals.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We have already discussed the man who resembles aristocracy, whom we rightly affirm to be both good and just.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ Then must we proceed to describe those inferior men, to wit, the contentious and ambitious man, answering to the Spartan constitution; and likewise the oligarchical, and the democratical, and the despotic man; in order that we may get a view of the most unjust man, and contrast him with the most just; and so may complete our inquiry into the respective merits of pure justice and pure injustice, so far as the happiness or misery of their possessors is concerned; in order that we may either listen

to Thrasymachus and pursue injustice, or yield to the argument which is coming into view, and follow after justice?

Glaucon/ We ought by all means so to do.

Socrates/ Well then, as our practice from the first has been to examine moral characteristics in the state prior to doing so in the individual, because such a method conduces to greater clearness; so, if you please, we will begin on the present occasion by examining the ambitious constitution (I do not know of any other name in use; we must call it Timocracy, or Timarchy) and, with this in sight, we will proceed to examine the ambitious man, and then go on to oligarchy and the oligarchical man; and next, after looking at democracy, we will contemplate the democratical man; and lastly, we will enter into a city which is governed by a despot and observe it, and then look into the soul which is its counterpart, and so endeavor to become competent judges of the question proposed.

Glaucon/ There would at least be sound reason in such a method of observing and deciding.

Socrates/ Come then, let us endeavor to describe how timocracy will grow out of aristocracy. May we not lay down the rule, that changes in any constitution originate, without exception, in the governing body, and only when that body becomes the seat of dissensions? For, so long as it continues unanimous, it cannot be shaken, though it be very insignificant in point of numbers.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is true.

Socrates/ Then pray, Glaucon, how will our state be shaken, and in what way will divisions arise either between the auxiliaries and the magistrates, or in these bodies themselves? Would you have us pray to the Muses, like Homer, to tell us, How first division entered; and would you have us describe them as talking in tragic, high-flown style,

playing with us as children, and jesting, while they pretend to speak seriously?

Glaucon/ What will their answer be?

Socrates/ Something to this effect; It is indeed difficult for a state, thus constituted, to be shaken. But since everything that has come into being must one day perish, even a system like ours will not endure for all time, but must suffer dissolution. The dissolution will be as follows; Not only the vegetable, but also the animal kingdom, is liable to alternations of fertility and barrenness, mental and bodily; and these alternations are coincident with certain cyclical revolutions, which vary in each case in length according to the length of life of the particular thing. Now, as touching the fruitfulness and barrenness of your own race, though the persons, whom you have trained to be governors of the state, are men of wisdom; yet, in despite of all observation and calculation, they will miss the propitious time. It will give them the slip, and they will beget children on wrong occasions. Now the cycle of a divine race is contained in a perfect number; but the cycle of a human race is expressed by a geometrical number, on which depends the good or bad quality of the births. And when your guardians, from ignorance of this, arrange unseasonable marriages, the children of such marriages will not be well-endowed or fortunate. The best of them will be established in power by their predecessors; but nevertheless they will be unworthy of it; and having entered upon the functions of their fathers, they will first of all begin to slight us, in defiance of their duties as guardians, and underrate music first, and then gymnastic. Thus your young men will grow up worse educated; and, in consequence of this. magistrates will take office who will fail in their duty of discriminating Hesiod's races and yours, that is to say the golden and silver and brazen and iron. And this mixture of iron with silver and of

brass with gold will breed inequality and incongruous irregularity; and, wherever these take root, their growth always produces enmity and war. So that we may positively assert that the rise of such a generation will invariably be marked by divisions.

Glaucon/ Yes, and we shall allow that the answer of the Muses is the right one.

Socrates/ How could it be otherwise, when the Muses speak?

Glaucon/ And what do the Muses say next?

Socrates/ As soon as a division had arisen, the two parties would be likely to diverge rapidly, the races of iron and brass inclining to money-making and the acquisition of land and houses, of silver and gold; while the other two richly endowed races would, in the absence of all poverty, turn their minds to virtue and the ancient constitution of things. But the violence of their mutual contentions would induce the two parties to come to an agreement, on the understanding that they should divide and appropriate the land and houses, and enslave their formerly free wards, friends, and maintainers, from thenceforth to be held as an inferior tribe and as servants, and apply themselves to war and their own protection.

Glaucon/ I believe you have described correctly the passage to timocracy.

Socrates/ Then will not this constitution be a kind of mean between aristocracy and oligarchy?

Glaucon/ Assuredly it will.

Socrates/ Such being the passage, how will the state in question conduct itself after the change? Is it not obvious that, being a mean between its former constitution and oligarchy, it will imitate partly the one, and partly the other, besides having some peculiarities of its own?

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Then, in the respect which the warrior class will pay to the magistrates, and in the abstinence of that class from agriculture, handicrafts, and all other pursuits of gain, and in the establishment of public messes, and devotion to gymnastic and the training which war requires, in all such points it will imitate the former constitution, will it not?

Glaucon/ It will.

Socrates/ But in its fear of installing the wise in office, because the wise men in its possession are no longer men of sufficiently simple and sterling stuff, but of compound nature, and in its degenerate inclination towards men of spirit and of a narrower character, with a greater turn for war than for peace, and in the value which it set upon the arts and stratagems which war calls out, and in the incessant hostilities which it carries on, in most of these points it will have a character of its own, will it not?

Glaucon/ It will.

Socrates/ Again, such persons will, like the members of oligarchies, be covetous of wealth, and will have a passionate but concealed regard for gold and silver, from the fact of their owning storehouses and private treasuries, in which they can deposit and secrete their riches, and also walled houses, which are verily private nests, wherein they may spend with a lavish hand on wives or any other object that may please them.

Glaucon/ Most true.

Socrates/ Hence, while their covetous nature makes them prodigal of other people's money, they will at the same time be parsimonious of their own, because they value it and have to conceal the possession of it; and they will enjoy their pleasures in secret, shunning the law as boys shun their father, because they have been trained not by persuasion

but by force, inasmuch as they have slighted the true muse, that goes hand in hand with profound philosophical inquiry, and have honored gymnastic above music.

Glaucon/ You are certainly describing a constitution which is a compound of good and evil.

Socrates/ Yes, it is a compound; but, owing to the preponderance of the spirited element, there is one thing in particular which it exhibits in the clearest colors, and that is party-spirit and the love of distinction.

Glaucon/ Yes, decidedly it does.

Socrates/ Such, then, will be the origin, and such, or nearly such, the character of this constitution, if we are satisfied to sketch a theoretical outline of its form, without perfectly elaborating it, which we need not do, because we can distinguish sufficiently even from such a sketch the most just and the most unjust man, and because it is a work of hopeless length to discuss without any omission every constitution and every character.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Who then is the man that answers to this constitution; what is his origin, and what his character?

Adeimantus/ I imagine, that, as a man of party-spirit, he must rather closely resemble our friend Glaucon.

Socrates/ Perhaps so, as a party-man; but in the following points I do not think that his nature and Glaucon's correspond.

Adeimantus/ What are these points?

Socrates/ He must be more self-willed than Glaucon, and rather less fond of literature; still he must be studious, and fond of listening, but no speaker. A person of this character will not despise slaves, like the perfectly educated man. though he will behave harshly to them and at the same time

gently to the free-born. He will also be exceedingly obedient to the magistrates, with a passion for distinction and command, to which he lays claim not on the ground of oratory or anything of the kind, but on the ground of deeds of arms and exploits congenial to war, devoted as he is to bodily exercise and field-sports.

Adeimantus/ True, this is the character of the corresponding commonwealth.

Socrates/ In addition to this, will not such a person in his younger days despise wealth? but, as he grows older, will he not be always paying it more respect, because he has a touch of the nature of the money-lover, and because his virtue is not free from blemish, owing to his having parted from the best guardian?

Adeimantus/ Who is that guardian?

Socrates/ Rational inquiry, blended with music; for this alone by its presence and indwelling can preserve its owner in the possession of life-long virtue.

Adeimantus/ It is well said.

Socrates/ Such we find to be the character of the timocratic young man, who resembles the timocratic state.

Adeimantus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Again, his origin, may be traced as follows. He is the youthful son of an excellent father, who living, as is not uncommon, in a city where the constitution is defective, avoids honors and offices and litigation and all similar marks of a restless spirit, and is willing to suffer loss rather than get into trouble.

Adeimantus/ Pray describe the formation of such a character.

Socrates/ It dates. from the time when the son listens to his mother's complaint, who is looked down upon by the

other women, because her husband is not a member of the government, and who also sees that he does not concern himself much about money, and will not fight and rail as a litigant in the law-courts or in the public assemblies, to all which things he exhibits great indifference; and who further perceives that he is always inwardly reflecting, and that he pays no great respect to herself, though he offers her no disrespect; for all which reasons she is vexed, and tells her son that his father is nothing of a man and culpably inactive, not to mention all the other choice expressions which women are in the habit of lavishing on such men.

Adeimantus/ Ay, they have indeed plenty to say that is quite in keeping with their own character.

Socrates/ And no doubt you are aware, that the servants also of such persons servants who seem to have their masters interests at heart do sometimes privately make similar observations to the sons; and that, if they see a man in debt to the father, or wronging him in any other way, and no proceedings taken against him, they exhort the son, when he is grown up, to take revenge on all such people, and be more of a man than his father. Likewise, when the son goes abroad, he hears and sees other instances of the same thing. He hears the quiet and unmeddlesome called simpletons in the city, and sees that they are held in small esteem; while the busybodies are honored and commended. Thereupon the young man, hearing and seeing all this, and on the other hand listening to his father's conversation and narrowly examining his pursuits side by side with those of other men, is pulled two ways by two influences. On the one hand his father is watering and nursing the rational element in his soul, and on the other hand everyone else is watering and nursing the appetitive and the spirited element of his nature; and because, though his disposition is not that of a bad man, he nevertheless has mixed in the bad society of others,

he is drawn by these combined influences into a middle ground, where he delivers up the government of himself to that middle element which is hot-tempered and contentious, and turns out a high-spirited, ambitious man.

Adeimantus/ It appears to me, that you have exactly described the production of such a character.

Socrates/ Then we are in possession of the second constitution, and the second man.

Adeimantus/ We are.

Socrates/ Must we not then, to use the words of Aeschylus, proceed to describe

> Another man matched with another state?

Or rather, according to our plan, must we not begin with the state?

Adeimantus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Well; I think that the constitution which comes next in order will be oligarchy.

Adeimantus/ Pray what kind of constitution do you mean by an oligarchy?

Socrates/ A constitution grounded upon a property qualification, in which the wealthy rule, while the poor have no part in the government.

Adeimantus/ I understand.

Socrates/ Ought we not to describe the first steps in the transition from timarchy to oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ We ought.

Socrates/ Well, no doubt even a blind man could find out how the transition is brought about.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ It is the influx of gold into those private treasuries that ruins the constitution just described. For the first result of this is that the owners invent ways of spending

their money, and pervert the laws with that intent, and disobey them in their own persons, and in the persons of their wives.

Adeimantus/ It would be strange if they did not.

Socrates/ They then proceed, if I am not mistaken, to eye one another with jealous looks, and to enter upon a course of rivalry, which stamps the same character on the general body of which they are members.

Adeimantus/ It is what we might expect.

Socrates/ And thenceforth they press forward on the path of money-getting, losing their esteem for virtue in proportion as the esteem for wealth grows upon them. For can you deny that there is such a gulf between wealth and virtue, that, when weighed as it were in the two scales of a balance, one of the two always falls, as the other rises?

Adeimantus/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Consequently when wealth and the wealthy are honored in a state, virtue and the virtuous sink in estimation.

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And what is honored at any time is practiced, and what is dishonored is neglected.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Hence, instead of being contentious and ambitious, such persons end by becoming lovers of gain and covetous; and while they commend and admire and confer office upon the wealthy, they despise the poor.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly they do.

Socrates/ So that at length they pass a law, which is the essence of an oligarchical constitution, by which they agree upon a certain sum, which is larger or smaller according to

the strength of the oligarchical principle, and forbid any share in the government to those who have not property up to the stipulated amount. And they bring about these measures by violence with arms in their hands, if they have not previously succeeded in establishing the proposed constitution by the alarm which they have inspired? Or am I wrong?

Adeimantus/ No, you are right.

Socrates/ And this, in a word, is the establishment of oligarchy.

Adeimantus/ True; but pray what is the character of the constitution. and what are the faults which we attributed to it?

Socrates/ Its first fault, lies in the very nature of its essential law. For consider what would be the result, if we elected our pilots on this principle of a property qualification, refusing the post to the poor man, though he were a better pilot.

Adeimantus/ We should make sad work with the voyage.

Socrates/ Does not this apply to any management of anything else whatever?

Adeimantus/ Yes, I think so.

Socrates/ Do you except a state? or do you include it?

Adeimantus/ I include it most especially, in consideration of the superior difficulty and importance of its management.

Socrates/ Then here is one of the faults of oligarchy, and that a grievous one.

Adeimantus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ Again; is the following fault at all less grievous than the first?

Adeimantus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Why, that such a city must necessarily lose its unity and become two cities, one comprising the rich, and the other the poor; who reside together on the same ground, and are always plotting against one another.

Adeimantus/ Why this fault, I am sure, is quite as bad as the former.

Socrates/ Once again; it is certainly not a commendable thing that they should be incapable (as they probably will be) of waging any war; the fact being that, if they arm and employ the populace, they cannot help dreading them more than the enemy; whereas, if they hesitate to employ them, they must appear veritable oligarchs in the actual battle; to which we must add that their love of money renders them unwilling to pay war-taxes.

Adeimantus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Again; to return to a point against which we were inveighing some time ago, do you think it right that the same persons should be engaged at the same time in the various occupations of agriculture, trade, and war, which is the case under such a constitution?

Adeimantus/ No; there is nothing to be said for it.

Socrates/ Now, consider whether the following evil, which is greater than all the others, is not admitted by this constitution, and by none of the preceding.

Adeimantus/ What is it?

Socrates/ I allude to the practice of allowing one person to sell all his property, and another to acquire it, the former owner living in the city without being a recognized portion of the state, either as trader, artisan, trooper, or foot-soldier; but described as a destitute man, and a pauper.

Adeimantus/ None of the preceding constitutions admitted such a practice.

Socrates/ To say the least, such a casualty is not prohibited in cities whose constitution is oligarchical. Otherwise it would be impossible for some persons to be extravagantly rich, while others are utter paupers.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Let me ask you to examine another point. At the time when such a man was spending money in his wealthy days, was he one whit more useful to the state for the purposes which we were just now specifying? Or was it the case, that though he seemed to be one of the government, he was really neither governor nor servant of the state, but only a consumer of its resources?

Adeimantus/ The latter is the true account. He seemed what you say; but he was really only a consumer.

Socrates/ Then would you have us assert that, as the drone grows up in the hive to be the plague of the bees, so also does such a man grow up as a drone in his house, to be the plague of the state?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly, Socrates, he does.

Socrates/ And is it not true, Adeimantus, that, though God has provided none of the flying drones with stings, he has made only some of these walking drones stingless, while to some he has given formidable stings? and that while the stingless ones end in an old age of beggary, the stinging drones, on the contrary, furnish out of their ranks all who bear the name of criminals?

Adeimantus/ It is most true.

Socrates/ It is quite clear then, that, whenever you see beggars in a city, you may be certain that in the same place lurk thieves, cutpurses, temple-robbers, and the instruments of all similar crimes.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Well, and in oligarchical states do you not see beggars?

Adeimantus/ Ye; almost all are beggars except the governors.

Socrates/ Then is it, or is it not, our opinion, that there are also many evil doers in such states, armed with stings, whom the magistrates are careful to keep down by main force?

Adeimantus/ Certainly it is our opinion.

Socrates/ Then shall we not assert that the cause which produces such persons therein is want of education, and bad training, and a bad condition of the commonwealth?

Adeimantus/ Yes, we shall.

Socrates/ Well then, this, or something like it, will be the character of a state governed by an oligarchy; and it will contain quite as many evils, if not more.

Adeimantus/ You are near the mark.

Socrates/ Then let us close our account here of this commonwealth which is called oligarchy, and which takes its governors by a property qualification; and let us proceed to examine how the man who resembles it grows up, and what he is when he has grown up.

Adeimantus/ By all means let us do so.

Socrates/ Tell me then, is the transition from the timocratic man, whom we have described, to the oligarchical, effected thus, or nearly thus?

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ The timocratic man has a son, who at first emulates his father and follows his steps; and then suddenly sees him founder on the state as on a sunken rock, and his property and his person thrown overboard, sees him, after commanding his countries armies or holding some other

high office, brought to trial, damaged by lying informers, and either put to death, or banished, or disfranchised, and all his substance taken from him.

Adeimantus/ All this might very well happen.

Socrates/ Well, my friend, the instant the son has seen and felt this, and lost his property, he becomes alarmed, I suppose, and thrusts ambition and that high-spirited element headforemost from the throne of his heart; and being humbled by poverty he turns to money-getting, makes mean and petty savings, and by working hard accumulates wealth. Do you not think that such a person does then install on that throne the appetitive and covetous element, and make of it an eastern monarch within himself, adorning it with diadem and collar, and girding the scimitar by its side?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ But the rational and the high-spirited elements, I think, he sets down on the ground below it, on this side and on that, as subjects and slaves, forbidding the former to investigate or reason about anything, save how to multiply riches, and forbidding the latter to admire or esteem anything save wealth and the wealthy, or to be ambitious after a single object save the acquisition of riches, and whatever else may conduce to this.

Adeimantus/ There can be no other transformation of an ambitious into a covetous young man so speedy and so thorough.

Socrates/ Then tell me, is such a person oligarchical?

Adeimantus/ Well, at any rate the man from whom he is by transformation derived, resembled the constitution which was the antecedent of oligarchy.

Socrates/ Let us examine whether he will resemble oligarchy.

Adeimantus/ Yes, let us.

Socrates/ Well then, first of all, will he not resemble oligarchy in setting the highest value on riches?

Adeimantus/ Assuredly he will.

Socrates/ And also in the fact that he is parsimonious and hardworking, satisfying only his necessary appetites, and refusing himself all other expenses, and subjugating his other desires as idle.

Adeimantus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ In other words, he is a sordid man, making a profit out of everything, and given to hoarding; one of those persons who are positively commended by the great body of men. Or am I wrong in supposing that such will be the man who resembles the constitution we have just described?

Adeimantus/ If you ask me, I think you are right. At any rate, the oligarchical state, as well as the person under discussion, values money above everything.

Socrates/ The reason being, I believe, that such a man has taken no pains with his education.

Adeimantus/ I fancy he has not; else he would not have appointed, nor would he so highly honor, a blind leader of the chorus.

Socrates/ Very true. And now let me ask you to consider whether we must not assert that drone-like appetites, which are either beggarly or criminal, grow up in him owing to his want of education, and that these appetites are forcibly held down by other prudential considerations.

Adeimantus/ Certainly we must assert it.

Socrates/ And do you know where you must look in order to see their evil deeds?

Adeimantus/ Where?

Socrates/ You must look to occasions where they are guardians of orphans, and to any similar accidents which put it completely in their power to act unjustly.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Then is it not clear from this, that in his other contracts, in which his apparent justice secures him a good name, such a person is holding down by a kind of constrained moderation a class of evil appetites that are within him, which he does not tame by reason, or convince that it would be wrong to gratify them, but which circumstances and his own apprehensions teach him to suppress, because he trembles for the rest of his substance?

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is quite clear.

Socrates/ Indeed, my friend, I am quite sure that, when these people have to spend what is not their own, you will find that most of them possess the appetites akin to the drone.

Adeimantus/ Most decidedly they do.

Socrates/ Hence such a person, far from being at peace within himself, will be a double-minded, not a single-minded, man; though he will generally find his lower appetites vanquished by his higher.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And for these reasons, I think, such a person will present a better outside than many; but the genuine virtue of a soul attuned to concord and harmony will fly somewhere far away from him.

Adeimantus/ So I think.

Socrates/ And no doubt the parsimonious man makes a miserable rival as a private citizen, when a prize or any other honorable distinction is contested; for he will not spend money to win himself renown in such matches, from fear of

exciting his expensive appetites by inviting them to share in the struggle and the rivalry; so that in fact he follows the practice of an oligarchy in employing only some few parts of himself in his wars, and in most cases spares hi and submits to defeat.

Adeimantus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Then are we still incredulous, as to the similarity and correspondence subsisting between the oligarchical state and the parsimonious money-hunter?

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ And now we must proceed, I should suppose, to examine in what way democracy arises, and what is its character when it has arisen; in order that once again we may discover the character of the corresponding man, and place him by our side for judgment.

Adeimantus/ Yes, if we would act consistently, we must take that course.

Socrates/ Is not the transition from oligarchy to democracy brought about by an intemperate craving for extravagant wealth, which is publicly acknowledged to be the greatest of blessings, and the attainment of which is considered a duty, the transition itself taking the following form?

Adeimantus/ Pray describe it.

Socrates/ Since the power of the rulers in an oligarchical state is, I believe, wholly due to their great wealth, they are unwilling to put the licentious young men of their time under restraint, to the extent of rendering it illegal for them to run through their property; because they hope, by purchasing the possessions of such persons, and by lending money to them, to make themselves still richer and more honored.

Adeimantus/ Most unquestionably.

Socrates/ And is it not manifest by this time, that it is impossible for the citizens of a state to honor wealth, and at the same time acquire a proper amount of temperance; because they cannot avoid neglecting either the one or the other?

Adeimantus/ It is pretty well manifest.

Socrates/ Hence the rulers in such states, by their reckless admission of unrestrained license, not unfrequently compel men of noble birth to become poor.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that they do.

Socrates/ And the persons thus impoverished lurk, I should suppose, in the city, harnessed and armed with stings, some owing debts, and others disfranchised, and others laboring under both misfortunes, hating and plotting against the new owners of their property, and against all who are better off than themselves, and enamored of revolution.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ These capitalists, on the other hand, keep prying after their own interests, and apparently do not see their enemies; and, whenever one of the remainder yields them opportunity, they wound him by infusing their poisonous money, and then recover interest many times as great as the parent sum, and thus make the drone and the beggar multiply in the state.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that they do.

Socrates/ And they cannot make up their minds to extinguish this great evil, either by that cauterizing operation of prohibiting people from disposing of their property at their own pleasure, or by employing another method, which provides by a different law for the removal of such dangers.

Adeimantus/ Pray what law do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean one which is next best to the former, and which constrains the citizens to apply themselves to virtue. For if it be enacted that voluntary contracts be as a general rule entered into at the proper risk of the contractor, people will be less shameless in their money-dealings in the city, and such evils as we have just now described will be of less common growth therein.

Adeimantus/ Yes, much less common.

Socrates/ But as it is, the various inducements I have mentioned encourage the governing body in the state to handle their subjects in this ungentle way. On the other hand, if we look at the rulers themselves and their children, do we not see that the young men are made luxurious and indolent both in body and mind, and so idle and effeminate that they cannot resist pleasure and encounter pain?

Adeimantus/ Unquestionably they are.

Socrates/ And that their seniors are indifferent to everything except making money, and as careless about virtue as the poor themselves?

Adeimantus/ Certainly they are.

Socrates/ In this state of things, when the rulers and their subjects encounter one another either in travelling or in some other common occupation, whether it be a pilgrimage or a military expedition, in which they are fellow-sailors or fellow-soldiers; or when they are witnesses of one another's behavior in moments of danger, in which the poor can, by no possibility, be despised by the rich, because it often happens that a rich man, nursed in luxury and surfeited with abundance, finds himself posted in battle by the side of some lean and sun-burnt poor man, to whom by his labored breathing he betrays his sore distress; when, I repeat, all this takes place, do you imagine that these poor men can avoid thinking, that it is through their own

cowardice that such incapable people are wealthy, or that they can refrain from repeating to one another, when they meet in private, Our governors are naught?

Adeimantus/ Nay, I am quite sure that they do so.

Socrates/ Now just as a sickly body requires but a small additional impulse from without to bring on an attack of illness, and sometimes even without any external provocation is divided against itself; so, in the same way, does not this city, whose condition is identical with that of a diseased body, require only the slight excuse of an external alliance introduced by the one party from an oligarchical city, or by the other from a democratical, to bring on an acute disease and an inward battle? and is it not sometimes, even without such external influences, distracted by factions?

Adeimantus/ Most decidedly it is.

Socrates/ Democracy, then, I think, arises, whenever the poor win the day, killing some of the opposite party, expelling others, and admitting the remainder to an equal participation in civic rights and offices; and most commonly the offices in such a state are given by lot.

Adeimantus/ Yes, you have described correctly the establishment of democracy, whether it be effected by an actual appeal to arms, or by the terrified withdrawal of the other party.

Socrates/ And now tell me, in what style these persons administer the state, and what is the character of this third constitution. For obviously we shall find the corresponding man marked, to a certain extent, with the same features.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ First of all, are they not free, and does not liberty of act and speech abound in the city, and has not a man license therein to do what he will?

Adeimantus/ Yes, so we are told.

Socrates/ And clearly, where such license is permitted, every citizen will arrange his own manner of life as suits his pleasure.

Adeimantus/ Clearly he will.

Socrates/ Hence I should suppose, that in this commonwealth there will be the greatest diversity of character. Unquestionably there will.

Socrates/ Possibly, this constitution may be the most beautiful of all. Embroidered as it is with every kind of character, it may be thought as beautiful as a colored dress embroidered with every kind of flower. And perhaps, I added, as children and women admire dresses of many colors, so many persons will decide in favor of this commonwealth, as the most beautiful.

Adeimantus/ No doubt many will.

Socrates/ Yes, my excellent friend; and it would be a good plan to explore it, if we were in search of a commonwealth.

Adeimantus/ Why, pray?

Socrates/ Because it contains every kind of commonwealth in consequence of that license of which I spoke; and perhaps a person wishing to found a state, as we were just now doing, ought to go into a democratical city, as a bazaar of commonwealths, and choose out the character that takes his fancy, and then found his state according to the choice he has made.

Adeimantus/ We may safely say that he is not likely to be at a loss for patterns.

Socrates/ Again, consider that, in this state, you are not obliged to hold office though your talents may be equal to

the task; and that you need not submit to government, if you dislike it, or go to war when your fellow-citizens are at war, or keep peace when they are doing so, if you do not want peace; and again, consider that, though a law forbids your holding office or sitting on a jury, you may nevertheless do both the one and the other, should it occur to you to do so; and now tell me, is not such a course of life divinely pleasant for the moment?

Adeimantus/ Yes perhaps it is, for the moment.

Socrates/ Once more. Is not the meekness of some of those who have been tried in a court of law exquisite? Or have you failed to notice in such a commonwealth how men, who have been condemned to death or exile, stay all the same, and walk about the streets, and parade like heroes, as if no one saw or cared?

Adeimantus/ I have seen many instances of it.

Socrates/ And is there not something splendid in the forbearance of such a commonwealth, and in its entire superiority to petty considerations? Nay, it positively scorns the doctrine, which, when we were founding our state, we laid down with an air of importance, to the effect that no one, who is not endowed with an extraordinary nature, can ever become a good man, unless from his earliest childhood he plays among beautiful objects and studies all beautiful things. How magnificently it tramples all this underfoot, without troubling itself in the least about the previous pursuits of those who enter on a political course, whom it raises to honor, if they only assert that they wish well to the commons.

Adeimantus/ Yes, it behaves very grandly.

Socrates/ These, then, will be some of the features of democracy, to which we might add others of the same family; and it will be, in all likelihood, an agreeable, lawless, parti-

colored commonwealth, dealing with all alike on a footing of equality, whether they be really equal or not.

Adeimantus/ The facts you mention are notorious.

Socrates/ And now let me ask you to examine the character of the corresponding individual. Or must we begin, as in the case of the commonwealth, by investigating his origin?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then am I not right in supposing that he will be the son of the parsimonious and oligarchical man, bred up under his father's eye, and in his father's character?

Adeimantus/ Doubtless he will.

Socrates/ And this son, like the father, will put a violent constraint upon those pleasures within him that tend to extravagance and not to money-getting; which, you know, are called unnecessary pleasures.

Adeimantus/ Clearly he will.

Socrates/ Now, that we may not talk in the dark, would you like us first to define the necessary and unnecessary appetites?

Adeimantus/ I should.

Socrates/ May we not justly apply the term necessary to those appetites which we cannot get rid of, and to those whose satisfaction does us good? For our nature cannot help feeling both these classes of desires, can it?

Adeimantus/ Certainly it cannot.

Socrates/ Then we shall be justified in predicating necessity of them.

Adeimantus/ We shall.

Socrates/ Again; shall we not be right, if we assert all those appetites to be unnecessary, which we can put away from us by early training; and the presence of which,

besides, never does us any good, and in some cases does positive harm?

Adeimantus/ Yes, we shall be right.

Socrates/ Would it not be as well to select an example of the existing appetites of each kind, in order that we may gain a general idea of them?

Adeimantus/ Decidedly it would.

Socrates/ Will not the appetite for food, (that is to say, simple bread and meat), within the bounds of health and a good habit of body, be a necessary appetite?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ The appetite for bread at least is surely necessary by a double claim, as being not only beneficial, but also indispensable to the support of life.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ On the other hand, the appetite for meat is necessary, so far as it may contribute advantageously to a good habit of body.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Again; the appetite for other viands of a less simple kind, of which by early correction and training most people can rid themselves, and which is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul, in its endeavors after wisdom and temperance, may be rightly styled an unnecessary appetite, may it not?

Adeimantus/ Yes, most rightly.

Socrates/ And must we not assert that the appetites of this second class are also expensive, whereas the others contribute to money-making, because they are a help towards production?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Can we say the same of the passion of love and the other appetites?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now did we not describe the man, to whom we lately gave the name of drone, as one burdened with those expensive pleasures and desires, and governed by the unnecessary appetites; while we described the man, who is governed by the necessary, as parsimonious and oligarchical?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly we did.

Socrates/ Let us now return, and explain how the oligarchical man is transformed into the democratical.

Adeimantus/ How is it?

Socrates/ I would have you suppose that the commencement of a young man's transition from inward oligarchy to democracy dates from the moment when, after being brought up. as we were saying just now, in ignorance and parsimony, he has tasted the honey of the drones, and made acquaintance with fiery and terrible wild beasts, who are able to procure him all kinds of pleasures, of a varied and manifold nature.

Adeimantus/ It cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ And may we say that, just as the state was transformed by the assistance afforded by a foreign alliance to one of the two parties, in virtue of a common character; so, in the same way, the young man is transformed by the analogous assistance from without, afforded by a certain species of appetites to one of the two parties present with him, in virtue of a real affinity and similarity?

Adeimantus/ Assuredly we may.

Socrates/ And should the oligarchical element within him be supported by some counter-alliance, derived perhaps

from his father, or perhaps from his other relations, who rebuke and reproach him, then, I imagine, there ensues a genuine struggle of parties and an inward battling with himself.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And occasionally, I fancy, the democratical interest yields to the oligarchical, and certain of the appetites are either cut to pieces or expelled, owing to the presence of a sense of shame in the young man's mind; and order is once more restored.

Adeimantus/ Yes, this does take place sometimes.

Socrates/ But some new appetites, I conclude, akin to those expelled, are privily nursed up, and, owing to the lack of science in his father's training, become numerous and strong.

Adeimantus/ Yes, this is generally the case.

Socrates/ And these appetites, of course, draw him to his old associates, and by their secret communications engender in him a multitude of others.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And finally, I imagine, they seize upon the citadel of the young man's heart, because they perceive it to be destitute of sound knowledge and beautiful studies and true theories, which verily keep the best watch and ward in the minds of men who are the favorites of heaven.

Adeimantus/ Yes, quite the best.

Socrates/ And to supply their place, I fancy, false and presumptuous theories and opinions start up in the man, and secure this post aforesaid.

Adeimantus/ That they do.

Socrates/ Does he not, in consequence, return to those Lotos eaters, and dwell with them without disguise; and if

his relatives send any assistance to the parsimonious element of his soul, do not those presumptuous theories close the gates of the royal fortress within him, and not only refuse an entrance to the actual auxiliary force, but even decline to admit an embassy of individuals in the shape of admonitions from elder persons; and do they not fight in person and gain the day; and stigmatizing the sense of shame as folly, do they not thrust it out to an ignominious exile, and expel temperance with insults under the name of cowardice; and do they not prove, by the aid of many useless appetites, that moderation and orderly expenditure are boorish and illiberal, and banish them as such beyond the border?

Adeimantus/ Most certainly they do.

Socrates/ And no doubt, when by the discharge of these virtues they have purified the soul of him who is now in their power, and is being initiated by them into the great mysteries, they proceed at once to restore Insolence, and Disorder, and Licentiousness, and Shamelessness, in great splendor, accompanied by a numerous retinue, and with crowns on their heads, extolling them, and calling them by soft names, describing Insolence as Good breeding, and Disorder as Freedom, and Licentiousness as Magnificence, and Shamelessness as Bravery. Is not this I asked, pretty much the way in which the man who is brought up in the gratification only of necessary appetites alters so far in his youth as to liberate from servitude and control the unnecessary and injurious pleasures?

Adeimantus/ Yes, very evidently it is.

Socrates/ From that day forward a man of this description spends, I should suppose, just as much money and labor and time on unnecessary as upon necessary pleasures. But, should he be so fortunate as to set a limit to

his wildness, and, as he grows older, when the tumult of passion has mostly gone by, should he go so far as to readmit to a certain extent portions of the banished, and not surrender himself wholly to the invaders, in that case, it is the habit of his life to make no distinction between his pleasures, but to suffer himself to be led by the passing pleasure which chance as it were throws in his way, and to turn to another, when the first is satisfied. scorning none, but fostering all alike.

Adeimantus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Yes; and whenever he is told that though some pleasures belong to the appetites which are good and honorable, others belong to the evil appetites; and that the former ought to be practiced and respected, but the latter chastised and enslaved, he does not receive this true doctrine, or admit it into his castle. On the contrary, at all these assertions he shakes his head, and maintains that all appetites are alike, and ought to be equally respected.

Adeimantus/ Yes, this is precisely his condition, and his behavior.

Socrates/ Hence, he lives from day to day to the end, in the gratification of the casual appetite, now drinking himself drunk to the sound of music, and presently putting himself under training; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, and then living like a student of philosophy. And often he takes a part in public affairs, and starting up, speaks and acts according to the impulse of the moment. Now he follows eagerly in the steps of certain great generals, because he covets their distinctions; and anon he takes to trade, because he envies the successful trader. And there is no order or constraining rule in his life; but he calls this life of his pleasant, and liberal, and happy, and follows it out to the end.

Adeimantus/ Well, you have certainly described a life that might be led by a man whose motto is Liberty and Equality.

Socrates/ Yes; and I conceive it to be also a multitudinous life, replete with very many characters; and I imagine that this is the man who, by the beautiful variety of his nature, answers to the city which we described; a man whose life many men and many women would envy, and who contains within him very many exemplars of commonwealths and characters.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ What then? May we place this man opposite democracy, in the belief that he may be rightly addressed as democratical?

Adeimantus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ It only remains for us, to describe the most beautiful of all commonwealths, and the most beautiful of all men, that is to say, despotism and the despot.

Adeimantus/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ Come then, my dear friend, tell me in what way despotism arises. That it is a transformation of democracy, is all but obvious.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Then does democracy give birth to despotism, precisely in the way in which oligarchy gave birth to democracy?

Adeimantus/ Explain this.

Socrates/ The thing which oligarchy professed to regard as supremely good, and which was instrumental in establishing it, was excessive wealth; was it not?

Adeimantus/ It was.

Socrates/ Well, it was the insatiable craving for wealth, and the disregard of everything else for the sake of money-making, that destroyed oligarchy.

Adeimantus/ True, it was.

Socrates/ Then may we say that democracy, like oligarchy, is destroyed by its insatiable craving for the object which it defines to be supremely good?

Adeimantus/ And what according to you, is that object?

Socrates/ Freedom. For I imagine that in a democratical city you will be told that it has, in freedom, the most beautiful of possessions, and that therefore such a city is the only fit abode for the man who is a freeman by nature.

Adeimantus/ Why certainly such language is very much in fashion.

Socrates/ To return, then, to the remark which I was trying to make a moment ago; am I right in saying that the insatiable craving for a single object and the disregard of all else transform democracy as well as oligarchy, and pave the way, as a matter of course, for despotism?

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ Whenever a democratical city which is thirsting for freedom has fallen under the presidency of a set of wicked toastmasters, and has quaffed the wine of liberty untempered far beyond the due measure, it proceeds, I should imagine, to arraign its rulers as accursed oligarchs, and chastises them on that plea, unless they become very submissive, and supply it with freedom in copious draughts.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is what is done.

Socrates/ And likewise it insults those who are obedient to the rulers with the titles of willing slaves and worthless fellows; while the rulers who carry themselves like subjects, and the subjects who carry themselves like rulers, it does r

both privately and publicly, commend and honor. Must it not follow that in such a city freedom goes all lengths?

Adeimantus/ Of course it must.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend; and does not the prevailing anarchy steal into private houses, and spread on every side, till at last it takes root even among the brute creation?

Adeimantus/ What are we to understand by this?

Socrates/ I mean, for example, that a father accustoms himself to behave like a child, and stands in awe of his sons, and that a son behaves himself like a father, and ceases to respect or fear his parents, with the professed object of proving his freedom. And I mean that citizens, and resident aliens, and foreigners, are all perfectly equal.

Adeimantus/ You are right as to the results of such a state of things.

Socrates/ I have told you some of the results; let me tell you a few more trifles of the kind. The schoolmaster, in these circumstances, fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters and also their tutors. And, speaking generally, the young copy their elders, and enter the lists with them both in talking and in acting; and the old men condescend so far as to abound in wit and pleasantry, in imitation of the young, in order, by their own account, to avoid the imputation of being morose or domineering.

Adeimantus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ But the extreme limit, my friend, to which the freedom of the populace grows in such a commonwealth is only attained when the purchased slaves of both sexes are just as free as the purchasers. Also I had almost forgotten to mention to what extent this liberty and equality is carried in the mutual relations subsisting between men and women.

Adeimantus/ Then, in the words of Aeschylus, shall we not give utterance to that which is already on our lips?

Socrates/ By all means. I, for one, am doing so, when I tell you that no one could believe, without positive experience, how much more free the domestic animals are under this government than any other. For verily the hound, according to the proverb, is like the mistress of the house; and truly even horses and asses adopt a gait expressive of remarkable freedom and dignity, and run at anybody who meets them in the streets, if he does not get out of their way; and all the other animals become in the same way gorged with freedom.

Adeimantus/ It is my own dream that you are repeating to me. This often happens to me when I walk into the country.

Socrates/ Now putting all these things together, do you perceive that they amount to this, that the soul of the citizens is rendered so sensitive as to be indignant and impatient at the smallest symptom of slavery? For surely you are aware that they end by making light of the laws themselves, whether statute or customary, in order that, as they say, they may not have the shadow of a master.

Adeimantus/ I am very well aware of it.

Socrates/ This then, my friend, if I am not mistaken, is the beginning, so fair and gay, out of which despotism grows.

Adeimantus/ Gay, indeed! But what is the next step?

Socrates/ That very disease, which broke out in oligarchy and ruined it, appears in democracy also with increased strength and virulence, aggravated by the license of the place, and occasions its enslavement. Indeed, to do anything in excess seldom fails to provoke a violent reaction to the opposite extreme, not only in the seasons of the year and in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, but also especially in commonwealths.

Adeimantus/ This is only natural.

Socrates/ Thus, excessive freedom is unlikely to pass into anything but excessive slavery, in the case of states as well as of individuals.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Hence, in all likelihood, democracy, and only democracy, lays the foundation of despotism; that is to say, the most intense freedom lays the foundation for the heaviest and the fiercest slavery.

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is a reasonable statement.

Socrates/ However, this, I think, was not your question; you were asking, what is this disease, which fastens upon democracy as well as upon oligarchy, and reduces the former to bondage.

Adeimantus/ That was my question.

Socrates/ Well then, I alluded to that class of idle and extravagant men, in which the bravest lead and the more cowardly follow. We compared them, if you recollect, to stinging and stingless drones, respectively.

Adeimantus/ Yes, and rightly so.

Socrates/ Now the presence of these two classes, like phlegm and bile in the body, breeds in every commonwealth disturbance. Therefore a skillful physician and legislator, just like a cunning bee-keeper, must take measures in advance, if possible, to prevent their presence; but, should they make their appearance, he must have them cut out, as quickly as possible, along with the combs themselves.

Adeimantus/ That must he, without a doubt.

Socrates/ Then let us handle the matter thus, in order that we may see more distinctly what we wish to see.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ Let us suppose a democratic state to be divided, as is really the case, into three parts. The class of people we have described constitutes, I believe, one of these divisions, and is generated by license in a democratical as abundantly as in an oligarchical state.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ But it is much more keen in the former than in the latter.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ In the latter it is despised, and excluded from office, and therefore proves untrained and feeble. But in democracy it is, I conceive, with a few exceptions, the sole presiding body; and its keenest members speak and act, while the residue sit on the benches round, and hum applause, and will not brook any opposite statement; so that all the concerns of such a commonwealth are, with some trifling exceptions, in the hands of this body.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ In addition to this, a second body is being constantly severed from the mass.

Adeimantus/ What is it like?

Socrates/ If all are occupied in amassing riches, I presume that those who are most orderly by nature generally become wealthiest.

Adeimantus/ It is likely to be so.

Socrates/ Hence I conclude, that out of these persons, the readiest and most copious supply of honey is squeezed for the drones.

Adeimantus/ To be sure; how could honey be squeezed out of the poor?

Socrates/ And they are called wealthy, which means, I suppose, that they are the provender of the drones.

Adeimantus/ Pretty nearly so.

Socrates/ The third class will consist of those members of the commonalty who work with their own hands, and do not meddle with politics, and are not very well off. And this class is, in a democracy, the most numerous and the most important of all, when collected.

Adeimantus/ True; but it will seldom collect, unless it receives a share of the honey.

Socrates/ And therefore it always does receive a share; with this proviso, that its leaders, while depriving the moneyed class of their substance, and making division of it among the commons, manage, if possible, to keep the largest share for themselves.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly, with that proviso, it does get a share.

Socrates/ Now these despoiled persons are compelled, I imagine, to defend themselves, by speaking before the commonalty, and acting to the best of their ability.

Adeimantus/ Of course they are.

Socrates/ And, for this behavior, even if they do not desire a revolution, they are accused by the opposite party of plotting against the commons, and of being oligarchs.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Therefore in the end, when they see that from want of information and in consequence of the artful misrepresentations of their calumniators the commons are unwittingly bent on wronging them, from that moment forward, whether they wish it or not, they become, as a matter of course, veritable oligarchs. For this evil, amongst others, is engendered in them by the sting of that drone of which we spoke.

Adeimantus/ Yes, precisely so.

Socrates/ Hence arise impeachments, prosecutions, and trials, directed by each party against the other.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is it not always the practice of the commons to select a special champion of their cause, whom they maintain and exalt to greatness?

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is their practice.

Socrates/ Then, obviously, whenever a despot grows up, his origin may be traced wholly to this championship, which is the stem from which he shoots.

Adeimantus/ That is quite obvious.

Socrates/ And what are the first steps in the transformation of the champion into a tyrant? Can we doubt that the change dates from the time when the champion has begun to act like the man in that legend which is current in reference to the temple of Lycasan Zeus in Arcadia?

Adeimantus/ What legend?

Socrates/ According to it, the worshipper who tasted the one human entrails, which was minced up with the other entrails of other victims, was inevitably metamorphosed into a wolf. Have you never heard the story?

Adeimantus/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ In like manner, should the commons champion find the populace so very compliant that he need make no scruple of shedding kindred blood, should he, with unrighteous charges, as is the wont of such persons, prosecute his victims and render himself blood-guilty, making away with human life, and tasting the blood of his fellows with unholy tongue and lips, should he banish, and kill, and give the signal for cancelling debts and redistributing the land; is it not from thenceforth the inevitable destiny of such a man either to be destroyed by

his enemies, or to become a tyrant, and be metamorphosed from a man into a wolf?

Adeimantus/ There is no escape from the alternative.

Socrates/ Such is the fate of the man who is at feud with the moneyed class.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ And if he is banished, and afterwards restored in despite of his enemies, does he not return a finished tyrant?

Adeimantus/ Obviously he does.

Socrates/ And if his enemies find themselves unable to expel him, or to put him to death, by accusing him to the state, in that case they take measures to remove him secretly by a violent end.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is the usual expedient.

Socrates/ In order to prevent this, those who have gone so far always adopt that notorious device of the tyrant, which consists in asking the commons for a body-guard, in order that the peoples friend may not be lost to them.

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ And the commons, I imagine, grant the request; for they are alarmed on his account, while they are confident on their own.

Adeimantus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Consequently, when this is observed by a man who has wealth, and with his wealth the character of being a hater of democracy, forthwith, in accordance with the oracle given to Croesus;

> By the pebbly bed of the Hermus,
> Flies he, and halts no more, nor shuns the reproach of a coward.

Adeimantus/ Why, he would not have the chance of shunning it a second time.

Socrates/ And those that are arrested are given up to death, I imagine.

Adeimantus/ Of course they are.

Socrates/ But as for that champion himself, it is quite clear that far from being laid with his huge form hugely prostrate, he has overthrown many another man, and stands in the chariot of the state, metamorphosed from a champion into a consummate tyrant.

Adeimantus/ Yes, there is no help for it.

Socrates/ Pray, are we to discuss the happiness both of the man himself, and of the city in which such a mortal resides?

Adeimantus/ By all means let us do so.

Socrates/ Well, in his early days, and at the beginning of his despotism, has he not a smile and a greeting for everybody that he meets, and does he not repudiate the idea of his being a tyrant, and promise largely both in public and in private; and is it not his practice to remit debts, and make grants of land to the commons and to his own partisans, while he pretends to be mild and gracious to all?

Adeimantus/ It cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ But as soon as he has relieved himself of his exiled enemies, by becoming reconciled to some, and by destroying others, his first measure is, I imagine, to be constantly exciting wars, in order that the commons may stand in need of a leader.

Adeimantus/ It is his natural course.

Socrates/ Is it not further his intention so to impoverish his subjects by war-taxes, as to constrain them to devote

themselves to the requirements of the day, and thus render them less likely to plot against himself?

Adeimantus/ Manifestly it is.

Socrates/ And am I not right in supposing that, should he suspect any persons of harboring a spirit of freedom that will not suffer him to reign in peace, it is his intention to throw them in the way of the enemy, and so get rid of them without suspicion? For all these reasons must not a tyrant be always stirring up war?

Adeimantus/ He must.

Socrates/ Then is it not the obvious result of such a course, that he gets more and more detested by the citizens?

Adeimantus/ Of course it is.

Socrates/ And does it not follow that a few of the boldest of his influential partisans speak their mind fearlessly to him and to one another, and find fault with his policy?

Adeimantus/ So one would expect.

Socrates/ Now, if the tyrant is to keep up his authority, he must put all these people quietly out of the way, until he has left himself not a friend nor an enemy who is worth anything.

Adeimantus/ Certainly he must.

Socrates/ Then he must keenly notice who is manly, who high minded, who prudent, who wealthy. And in such a happy condition is he, that, whether he wishes it or not, he is compelled to be the enemy of all these, and to plot against them, till he has purged them out of the city.

Adeimantus/ What a glorious purification!

Socrates/ Yes, it runs directly counter to the process by which the physician purges the body. For the physician removes what is bad, and leaves what is good; but the tyrant removes the good, and leaves the bad.

Adeimantus/ Why, apparently, it is his only course, if he wishes to reign.

Socrates/ In fact he is bound in the chains of a delightful necessity, which orders him either to live amongst persons the majority of whom are good for nothing, and to live hated by them, or else to cease to exist.

Adeimantus/ That is the alternative.

Socrates/ Hence, in proportion as he grows more and more detested by the citizens for such conduct, he will require a more numerous and a more trusty body-guard, will he not?

Adeimantus/ Of course he will.

Socrates/ And pray, whom can he trust? and from whence will he procure faithful retainers?

Adeimantus/ Oh, they will come in flocks spontaneously, if he pays them their wages.

Socrates/ By my word, I believe you are thinking of another miscellaneous swarm of foreign drones.

Adeimantus/ You are not mistaken.

Socrates/ But would he hesitate to enlist recruits on the spot?

Adeimantus/ By what process?

Socrates/ By taking their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them, and enrolling them in his own body-guard.

Adeimantus/ Most decidedly he would not hesitate; for indeed such persons are really his most trusty adherents.

Socrates/ A tyrant is, indeed, a divinely happy creature, according to your account, if he adopts such men as friends and faithful adherents, after he has destroyed those former ones.

Adeimantus/ Well, he certainly does take this course.

Socrates/ And do not these comrades of his admire him highly, and do not the young citizens associate with him, while the good hate and shun him?

Adeimantus/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ It is not without reason, that people regard tragedy on the whole as wise, and Euripides as a master therein.

Adeimantus/ Pray why?

Socrates/ Because, among other remarks, he has made the following, which shows a thoughtful mind, tyrants are wise by converse with the wise. And he clearly meant by the wise, those with whom the tyrant associates.

Adeimantus/ Yes, and, as one of its numerous merits, tyranny is extolled as something godlike, by the other poets as well as by Euripides.

Socrates/ This being the case, the writers of tragedy, like wise men as they are, will excuse us, and those who copy our commonwealth, for refusing them admittance into the state, because they are panegyrists of tyranny.

Adeimantus/ I imagine that, at any rate, all polite tragedians will excuse us.

Socrates/ At the same time, I believe, they will make the round of the other states, gather together the populace, hire fine, loud, persuasive voices; and so draw over the commonwealths to tyranny and democracy.

Adeimantus/ To be sure they will.

Socrates/ And for these services they are, moreover, paid and honored, by tyrants chiefly, as we should expect, and to a smaller extent by democracy. But in proportion as they advance higher up the hill of commonwealths, their honor flags more and more, as if it were prevented from mounting by loss of breath.

Adeimantus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ However, this is a digression. Let us return to the inquiry, how that army of the tyrant, that goodly, large, diversified, and ever-changing army, is to be supported.

Adeimantus/ It is clear, that, if there be sacred property in the city, the tyrant will expend it; and that, to whatever extent the produce of such sales from time to time can be made available, the war-taxes, which the commons are compelled to pay, will be proportionally diminished.

Socrates/ But what is he to do when this resource fails?

Adeimantus/ Evidently he will draw on his parents estate for the maintenance of himself and his boon-companions, his messmates and his mistresses.

Socrates/ I understand you. You mean that the commonalty, that begat the tyrant, will maintain him and his companions.

Adeimantus/ It cannot avoid doing so.

Socrates/ But pray explain yourself. Suppose the commons resent this notion, and assert, that it is unjust for a father to have to maintain a grown-up son, since, on the contrary, the son ought to maintain the father; and that they had begotten and installed him not with the intent, that, when he was grown big, they should be made the slaves of their own slaves, and maintain him and them with a mob of others, but with the intent that, under his championship, they should be emancipated from the rich men of the state, and the gentlemen, as they are called; and suppose they now bid him depart out of the city, together with his friends, like a father expelling a son from home along with some riotous boon-companions? What then?

Adeimantus/ Why the commons will then, at length, most certainly discover how feeble they are in comparison with the nursling which they have begotten and cherished and

exalted, and that, in ejecting him, they are the weaker expelling the stronger.

Socrates/ What! Will the tyrant venture to lay violent hands on his father, and beat him if he refuses to comply with his wishes?

Adeimantus/ Yes, that he will, when he has taken away his father's weapons.

Socrates/ You make out that a tyrant is a parricide, and a hardhearted nurse of old age; and, apparently, the government will henceforth be an open and avowed tyranny; and, according to the proverb, the commons, flying from the frying-pan of the service of free men, will have fallen into the fire of a despotism exercised by slaves; in other words, they will have exchanged that vast and unseasonable liberty for the new dress of the harshest and bitterest of all slaveries.

Adeimantus/ No doubt that is the course of events.

Socrates/ Well then, will anyone be disposed to disagree with us, if we assert that we have discussed satisfactorily the transition from democracy to tyranny, and the character of the latter when established?

Adeimantus/ We have done so quite satisfactorily.

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Socrates/ It only remains for us, to inquire how the democratical man is transformed into the tyrannical; and what is the character of the latter after the change; and whether his manner of living is happy, or the reverse.

Adeimantus/ True, this case is still remaining.

Socrates/ Then do you know, what I am still desiderating?

Adeimantus/ What is it?

Socrates/ I think that the number and nature of the appetites has not been satisfactorily defined; and while this deficiency continues, the inquiry upon which we are entering will be wrapped in obscurity.

Adeimantus/ It is not too late to supply the deficiency, is it?

Socrates/ Certainly it is not. Observe the peculiarity which I wish to notice in. the case before us. It is this. Some of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites are, if I mistake not, unlawful; and these would appear to form an original part of every man; though, in the case of some persons, under the correction of the laws and the higher appetites aided by reason, they either wholly disappear, or only a few weak ones remain; while, in the case of others, they continue strong and numerous.

Adeimantus/ And pray what are the appetites to which you refer?

Socrates/ I refer to those appetites which bestir themselves in sleep; when, during the slumbers of that other part of the soul, which is rational and tamed and master of the former, the wild animal part, sated with meat or drink, becomes rampant, and pushing sleep away, endeavors to set out after the gratification of its own proper character. You know that in such moments there is nothing that it dares

not do, released and delivered as it is from any sense of shame and reflection. It does not shrink from attempting in fancy unholy intercourse with a mother, or with any man or deity or animal whatever; and it does not hesitate to commit the foulest murder, or to indulge itself in the most defiling meats. In one word, there is no limit either to its folly or its audacity.

Adeimantus/ Your description is perfectly true.

Socrates/ But, I imagine, whenever a man's personal habit is healthful and temperate, and when before betaking himself to rest, he has stimulated the rational part of him, and feasted it on beautiful discussions and high inquiries, by means of close and inward reflection; while, on the other hand, he has neither stinted nor gorged the appetitive part in order that it may sleep instead of troubling with its joys or its griefs that highest part, which may thus be permitted to pursue its studies in purity and independence, and to strain forward till it perceives something till then unknown, either past, present, or future; and when, in like manner, he has calmed the spirited element by avoiding every burst of passion, which would send him to sleep with his spirit stirred, when, I say, he proceeds to rest, with two elements out of the three quieted, and the third, wherein wisdom resides, aroused, you are aware that, at such moments, he is best able to apprehend truth, and that the visions, which present themselves in his dreams, are then anything but unlawful.

Adeimantus/ I perfectly coincide in your opinion.

Socrates/ Well, we have been carried too far out of our way, in order to make these remarks. What we wish to recognize is, that apparently a terrible species of wild and lawless appetites resides in every one of us, even when in some cases we have the appearance of being perfectly self-

restrained. And this fact, it seems, becomes evident in sleep. Pray consider whether you think me right, and agree with me.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I do agree.

Socrates/ Remember then the character which we ascribed to the man of the people. The history of his origin was, I believe, that he had been trained up from early years under the eye of a parsimonious father, who respected only the money-making appetites, and despised those unnecessary appetites which have for their object amusement and display. Am I not right?

Adeimantus/ You are.

Socrates/ By intercourse with more fashionable men, replete with those appetites which we just now discussed, he had run, like them, into utter riot, in detestation of his father's parsimony; but, as he possessed a better disposition than his corrupters, he? was drawn in two directions, and ended I by adopting an intermediate character; and while enjoying every pleasure in perfect moderation, as he imagined, he lived a life which was neither illiberal nor unlawful, and was thus transformed from an oligarchical into a democratical man.

Adeimantus/ Yes, this was and is our opinion touching such a person.

Socrates/ Well then, figure to yourself that this man has grown old in his turn, and that a young son is being bred up again in his habits.

Adeimantus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Imagine further, that he takes to the same courses that his father did that he is seduced into an utter violation of law, or, to use the language of his seducers, into perfect freedom, and that his father and his other relations bring support to these intermediate appetites, which is met

by counter support on the other side; and when these terrible sorcerers and tyrant-makers have despaired of securing the young man by other spells, imagine that they contrive to engender in him some passion, to champion those idle appetites which divide among themselves all that offers for distribution; and this passion you may describe as a kind of huge, winged drone; for how else can you describe the passion entertained by such men?

Adeimantus/ I cannot describe it otherwise.

Socrates/ This done, the other appetites, fraught with incense and perfumes and garlands and wines and the loose pleasures which form part of such convivialities, begin to buzz around this drone, and exalt and nurse him to the uttermost, till they have engendered in him the sting of desire; and from that moment forward this champion of the soul, with frenzy for his body-guard, is goaded on to madness; and if he detects within himself any opinions or appetites which are regarded as good, and which still feel a sense of shame, he destroys them or thrusts them from his presence, until he has purged out temperance, and filled himself with alien frenzy.

Adeimantus/ You exactly describe the generation of a tyrannical man.

Socrates/ Is not this the reason why love has of old been called a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ Probably it is.

Socrates/ Also, my friend, does not a drunken man possess what may be called a tyrannical spirit?

Adeimantus/ He does.

Socrates/ And we know that an insane, or deranged person, expects to be able to lord it not only over men, but even over gods, and attempts to do so.

Adeimantus/ Certainly he does.

Socrates/ So, my excellent friend, a man becomes strictly tyrannical, whenever, by nature, or by habit, or by both together, he has fallen under the dominion of wine, or love, or insanity.

Adeimantus/ Yes, precisely so.

Socrates/ Such is his origin, apparently, and such his nature; but pray how does he live?

Adeimantus/ As they say in the game, you must tell me that.

Socrates/ Be it so. Well, if I am not mistaken, from henceforth feasts and revels and banquets and mistresses, and everything of the kind, become the order of the day with persons whose minds are wholly under the pilotage of an indwelling tyrant passion.

Adeimantus/ It must be so.

Socrates/ And do not many frightful appetites, that abound in wants, shoot up by their side every day and every night?

Adeimantus/ Yes, many indeed.

Socrates/ So that all existing revenues are soon spent.

Adeimantus/ Of course they are.

Socrates/ Then follow schemes for raising money, and consequent loss of property.

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And when every resource has failed, must not those violent appetites, which have nestled thickly within, lift up their voices? And goaded on, as these people are, by their appetites, and specially by that ruling passion under which all the rest serve as body-guard, must they not, in a frenzy of rage, look out for some man of substance whom they may rob by fraud or violence?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed, they must.

Socrates/ So that if they cannot pillage in every quarter, they are constrained to suffer grievous throes and pangs.

Adeimantus/ They are.

Socrates/ Now, just as the inward pleasures of later growth overreached the original pleasures and took away what belonged to them, in the same way will not the man himself determine to overreach his father and mother, though he is younger than they, and to help himself at their expense out of his father's property, if he has expended his own share?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly he will.

Socrates/ And if his parents oppose his designs, will he not attempt in the first instance to cheat and outwit them?

Adeimantus/ Assuredly he will.

Socrates/ And whenever that is impossible, will he proceed to robbery and violence?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then if his aged father and mother hold out against him and offer resistance, will he be so scrupulous as to shrink from playing the tyrant?

Adeimantus/ I am not altogether without my fears for the parents of such a man.

Socrates/ Nay but, Adeimantus, I beseech you to consider that his attachment to his unnecessary and unconnected mistress is new, while his love for his very own indispensable mother is old, and that his affection for his unnecessary and unconnected friend who is in the bloom of youth, is of recent date compared with that for his very own father, his oldest friend, faded and aged as he is; and, this being the case, can you believe that he would beat his mother and father for the sake of his mistress and his friend, and that he would make

the former the slaves of the latter, if he brought them into the same house?

Adeimantus/ Upon my word I believe he would.

Socrates/ Then to all appearance it is a most delightful thing to be the parents of a tyrannical son.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that it is.

Socrates/ Well; but, when the property of his father and mother begins to fall the son, while at the same time the swarm of pleasures has mustered thick within him, will not his first exploit be to break into a house or strip some benighted traveler of his clothes, and will he not afterwards proceed to sweep off the contents of some temple? And in the meantime those old and, in common estimation, just opinions, which he held from childhood on the subject of base and noble actions, will be defeated by those opinions which have been just emancipated from slavery, aided by that ruling passion whose body-guard they form, opinions which, so long as he was subject to the laws and to his father, and while his inward constitution was democratical, used to be emancipated only in the dreams of sleep. But, now that this passion has become his absolute lord and master, that character, which used to be his only in dreams, and at rare intervals, has become his constant waking state. There is not a dire murder, a forbidden meat, or an unholy act, from which he will restrain himself; but this passion that lives and reigns within him, in the midst of utter disrule and lawlessness, will, by virtue of its sole supremacy, seduce its possessor, as in the case of a state, into unbounded recklessness, to procure means for the maintenance of itself and its attendant rout, which has partly made entrance from without as a result of wicked companionship, and partly been liberated and released from restraint within by the adoption of similar habits, and by the agency of the passion

itself. Or am I wrong in my description of the life of such a man?

Adeimantus/ No, you are right.

Socrates/ And if, a city contains only a few such characters, the rest of the population being sober-minded, these people quit the place and enlist in the body-guard of some other tyrant, or else serve as mercenaries in any war that may be going on. But if they live in a time of peace and quiet, they commit many small mischiefs on the spot in the city.

Adeimantus/ Such as what, pray?

Socrates/ Such as theft, burglary, cutting purses, stealing clothes, sacrilege, kidnapping; and sometimes they turn informers, if they have a talent for speaking, and perjure themselves, and take bribes.

Adeimantus/ True, these are small mischiefs, if the perpetrators are few in number.

Socrates/ Things that are small, are small comparatively; and assuredly all these mischiefs, in their bearings on the corruption and misery of a state; do not, as the proverb says, nearly come up to the mark of a tyrant. For whenever such persons, and others, their close retainers, become numerous in a state, and perceive their own numbers, then, assisted by the folly of the commonalty, these men prove the parents of the tyrant, who is simply that one of their number whose own soul contains the mightiest and hugest tyrant.

Adeimantus/ So one might expect, because such a person must have most of the tyrant about him.

Socrates/ Consequently if the citizens yield willing obedience, all goes smoothly. But should the state prove refractory, the tyrant will chastise, if he can, his fatherland, just as in the former case he chastised his mother and father; and to do this, he will summon to his assistance

youthful comrades, under whose imperious authority he will hold and keep his once-loved mother-country, as the Cretans call it, or father-land. And this will be the consummation of the appetite of such a person.

Adeimantus/ Assuredly it will.

Socrates/ And do not these persons display the same character in private, even before they attain to power? In the first place, in their intercourse with others, is it not the case either that all their associates are their flatterers and creatures, or that, if they want anything from anybody, they go down on their knees for it, and do not blush to assume all the appearances of intimate friendship, whereas when they have gained their point they become distant and estranged?

Adeimantus/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Thus all their life long they live friendless, and always either masters or slaves; for a tyrant nature can never taste real freedom and friendship.

Adeimantus/ Certainly it cannot.

Socrates/ Then shall we not be right if we call such persons faithless?

Adeimantus/ Undoubtedly we shall.

Socrates/ And not only faithless, but also supremely unjust, if we were right in our former conclusions as to the nature of justice.

Adeimantus/ And certainly we were right.

Socrates/ Then let us describe summarily the most wicked man. He is one whose real and waking state is the very counterpart of the ideal and dreamlike description which we have given.

Adeimantus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Such is the end of the man, who, with a nature profoundly tyrannical, gains absolute power; and the longer his life of tyranny lasts, the more exactly does he answer to our description.

Glaucon/ That is unquestionably true.

Socrates/ That being the case, will not the man, who shall be proved to be most vicious, be thereby proved to be also most miserable? And will it not be apparent that the man, whose tyranny has lasted longest in the intensest form, has really been for the longest time most intensely vicious and miserable, notwithstanding the variety of opinions entertained by the mass of people?

Glaucon/ Yes, that much is certain.

Socrates/ And can we help regarding the tyrannical man as the counterpart and representative of the state which is under the sway of a tyrant, the democratical man of the democratical state, and so on?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably we cannot.

Socrates/ Hence, as city is to city in point of virtue and happiness, so also is man to man; is it not so?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly it is.

Socrates/ Then, in point of virtue, how does a city under a tyrant stand as compared with a city under such a kingly government, as we at first described?

Glaucon/ They are the very opposite of one another; one is supremely virtuous, and the other supremely wicked.

Socrates/ I shall not ask you which is which, because that is obvious. But do you decide the question of happiness and misery in the same way, or not? And here let us not be dazzled by looking only at the tyrant, who is merely a unit in the mass, or at a few of his immediate retainers; but, as it is our duty to enter and survey the state as a whole, let us,

before giving our opinion, creep into every part of it and look about.

Glaucon/ Well, your proposal is a just one; indeed, it is clear to everybody, that a city governed by a tyrant is the most miserable of cities; whereas a city under kingly rule is the happiest of cities.

Socrates/ Then shall I not do right, if, in discussing the corresponding men, I make the same proposal, and recognize only his verdict, who can in thought penetrate into a man's character, and look through it, and who does not, like a child, scrutinize the exterior, till he is dazzled by the artificial glitter which the tyrannical man carries on the outside, but on the contrary sees through it all thoroughly? Suppose I give it as my opinion, that we are all bound to listen to the judge, who is not only capable of passing sentence, but has also lived in the same place with the person in question, and has been an eye-witness of his goings on at home, and of his bearing towards the several members of his family, wherein he will be most thoroughly stripped of the theatrical garb, and also of his behavior in public perils; and suppose we bid him take all these particulars into consideration, and then pronounce, how, on the score of happiness and misery, the tyrant stands as compared with the other men?

Glaucon/ This proposal, would be also a most just one.

Socrates/ Then, in order that we may have some person who will reply to our questions, should you wish us to claim a place among those who, besides being competent to deliver judgment, have before new encountered people of this description?

Glaucon/ Yes, I should.

Socrates/ Come then, let me beg you to consider the question in the following light. Bearing in mind the similarity that subsists between the state and the man, examine them singly in turn, and tell me the circumstances in which each is placed.

Glaucon/ To what circumstances do you refer?

Socrates/ To begin with the state, do you predicate freedom or slavery of one which is under the dominion of a tyrant?

Glaucon/ Consummate slavery.

Socrates/ And yet you see it contains masters and freemen.

Glaucon/ True, it does contain a few such persons; but the mass of the inhabitants, I might say, and the best of them are reduced to an ignominious and miserable servitude.

Socrates/ Now, since the man resembles the state, must not the same order of things exist in him also, and must not his soul be freighted with abundance of slavery and servility, those parts of it, which were the best, being enslaved, while a small part, and that the most corrupt and insane, is dominant?

Glaucon/ It must be so.

Socrates/ If so, will such a soul, by your account, be bond or free?

Glaucon/ I should certainly say the former.

Socrates/ To return, is not the city, which is enslaved to a tyrant, utterly precluded from acting as it likes?

Glaucon/ Yes, quite so.

Socrates/ Then the soul also, which is the seat of a tyranny, considered as a whole will be very far from doing whatever it wishes. On the contrary it will be always dragged

by the brute force of passionate desire, and will be filled with confusion and remorse.

Glaucon/ Beyond a doubt.

Socrates/ And must the city which is the seat of a tyranny be rich or poor?

Glaucon/ It must be poor.

Socrates/ Then the tyrannical soul also must be always poverty stricken and craving.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Again; must not such a city and such a man be, as a matter of course, a prey to fear?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Do you expect to find in any other city more weeping and wailing and lamentation and grief?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And to return to the individual, do you imagine such things to exist in anyone so abundantly as in this tyrannical man, who is maddened by appetites and longings?

Glaucon/ Why, how could they?

Socrates/ Looking then, I suppose, at all these facts, and others like them, you have decided that the city is the most miserable of cities.

Glaucon/ And am I not right?

Socrates/ You are very right. But once more, looking at the same facts, what account do you give of the tyrannical man?

Glaucon/ I should say that he is quite the most miserable of all men.

Socrates/ There you are no longer right.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ I believe, that this person is still not the most miserable of all.

Glaucon/ Then who is?

Socrates/ You will perhaps think the following person even more miserable.

Glaucon/ Describe him.

Socrates/ I refer to the man who, being tyrannical, is prevented from living a private life, because he is so unfortunate as to have the post of tyrant, by some mischance, procured for him.

Glaucon/ I infer from the previous remarks that you are right.

Socrates/ Yes; but you must not be content with surmises here; on the contrary, you must examine the subject thoroughly by such a process of reasoning as we are pursuing. For surely the point under investigation is of the highest moment, being as it is the choice between a good and an evil life.

Glaucon/ That is perfectly true.

Socrates/ Observe, then, whether I am right. It appears to me that, in examining the question, we ought to begin our inquiry with the following considerations.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ We must begin by considering the individual case of those private members of cities who are wealthy and possess many slaves. For they have this point in common with the tyrant, that they rule over many persons. The difference lies in the greater number of his subjects.

Glaucon/ Yes, it does.

Socrates/ And now, are you aware that such persons are confident and do not fear their servants?

Glaucon/ Yes; what should make them fear them?

Socrates/ Nothing; but do you understand the reason of it?

Glaucon/ Yes; it is because all the city supports each individual.

Socrates/ You are right. Well, but if some deity were to lift out of the city a single individual, possessed of fifty slaves or more, and were to plant him with his wife and children in some desert along with the rest of his substance and his servants, where none of the freemen would be likely to help him, would he not be seized, think you, with an indescribable terror lest he and his wife and children should be murdered by his servants?

Glaucon/ Yes, with utter terror, I think.

Socrates/ And would he not be compelled from that time forward to coax some of his very slaves, and to promise largely, and emancipate them without any excuse for it? In fact, would he not appear in the light of an abject flatterer of his attendants?

Glaucon/ He is doomed to death if he fails to do so.

Socrates/ But what if heaven had surrounded him with a multitude of other neighbors, who would not endure that one person should claim the rights of a master over another, but punished with the utmost severity any such person whom they caught?

Glaucon/ In that case he would be, I imagine, involved still further in an utterly evil plight, because he is hemmed in by a ring of warders, all of whom are his enemies.

Socrates/ And is not the tyrant a prisoner in a similar prison? For if his nature is such as we have described, he is replete with multitudinous terrors and longings of every kind; and, though he has a greedy and inquisitive soul, is he not the only citizen that is precluded from travelling or setting eyes upon all those objects which every freeman

desires to see? Does he not bury himself in his house, and live for the most part the life of a woman, while he positively envies all other citizens who travel abroad and see grand sights?

Glaucon/ Yes, assuredly he does.

Socrates/ Such being his evil condition, a larger harvest of misery is reaped by that person, who, with an evil inward constitution like that of the tyrannical man, to whom you just now ascribed consummate wretchedness, is forced out of private life, and constrained by some accident to assume despotic power, thus undertaking to rule others when he cannot govern himself, just like a person who with a diseased and incontinent body is compelled to pass his life, not in retirement, but in wrestling and contending with other persons.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly, Socrates, the cases are very similar, and your account is very true.

Socrates/ Then, my dear Glaucon, is not the condition of the tyrant utterly wretched, and does he not live a life which is even more intolerable than that of the man who, by your verdict, lives most intolerably?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ So, whatever may be thought, a very tyrant is in real truth a very slave in the most abject and intense shape, and a flatterer of the most vicious; and, so far from satisfying his cravings in the smallest degree, he stands in utmost need of numberless things, and is in good truth a pauper, in the eyes of one who knows how to contemplate the soul as a whole; and all his life long he is loaded with terrors, and full of convulsions and pangs, if he resembles the disposition of the state over which he rules; and he does resemble it, does he not?

Glaucon/ Certainly he does.

Socrates/ Then we shall also, in addition to this, ascribe to the man what we stated before, namely, that he cannot help being, and, in virtue of his power, becoming more and more envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impure, and the host and nurse of every vice; and, in consequence of all this, he must in the first place be unhappy in himself, and in the next place he must make those who are near him as unhappy as himself.

Glaucon/ No sensible man will contradict you.

Socrates/ Then pray go on and, like the judge who passes sentence after going through the whole case, declare forthwith who is first, in your opinion, in point of happiness, and who second, and so on, arranging all the five men in order, the kingly, the timocratical, the oligarchical, the democratical, the tyrannical.

Glaucon/ Well, the decision is an easy one. I arrange them, like choruses, in the order of their entrance, in point of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, hire a herald, or shall I make proclamation in person, that the son of Ariston has given his sentence to the effect that he is the happiest man who is best and justest, that is, who is most kingly, and who rules over himself royally; whereas he is the most wretched man who is worst and most unjust, that is, who is most tyrannical, and who plays the tyrant to the greatest perfection both over himself and over a city?

Glaucon/ Let such be your proclamation.

Socrates/ And am I to add to my proclamation, that it makes no difference whether all men and gods find out their characters, or not?

Glaucon/ Do so.

Socrates/ Very well; this will make one demonstration for us. The following must make a second, if it shall be approved.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ Since the soul of each individual has been divided into three parts corresponding to the three classes in the state, our position will admit, I think, of a second demonstration.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ It is the following. As there are three parts, so there appear to me to be three pleasures, one appropriate to each part; and similarly three appetites, and governing principles.

Glaucon/ Explain yourself.

Socrates/ According to us, one part was the organ whereby a man learns, and another that whereby he shows spirit. The third was so multiform that we were unable to address it by a single appropriate name; so we named it after that which is its most important and strongest characteristic. We called it appetitive, on account of the violence of the appetites of hunger, thirst, and sex, and all their accompaniments; and we called it peculiarly money-loving, because money is the chief agent in the gratification of such appetites.

Glaucon/ Yes, we were right.

Socrates/ Then if we were to assert that the pleasure and the affection of this third part have gain for their object, would not this be the best summary of the facts upon which we should be likely to settle by force of argument, as a means of conveying a clear idea to our minds, whenever we spoke of this part of the soul? and shall we not be right in calling it money-loving and gain-loving?

Glaucon/ I confess I think so.

Socrates/ Again, do we not maintain that the spirited part is wholly bent on winning power and victory and celebrity?

Glaucon/ Certainly we do.

Socrates/ Then would the title of strife-loving and honor-loving be appropriate to it?

Glaucon/ Yes, most appropriate.

Socrates/ Well, but with regard to the part by which we learn, it is obvious to everyone that its entire and constant aim is to know how the truth stands, and that this of all the elements of our nature feels the least concern about wealth and reputation.

Glaucon/ Yes, quite the least.

Socrates/ Then shall we not do well to call it knowledge-loving and wisdom-loving?

Glaucon/ Of course we shall.

Socrates/ Does not this last reign in the souls of some persons, while in the souls of other people one or other of the two former, according to circumstances, is dominant?

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ And for these reasons may we assert that men may be primarily classed under the three heads of lovers of wisdom, of strife, and of gain?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ And that there are three kinds of pleasures, respectively underlying the three classes?

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Now are you aware, that if you choose to ask three such men each in his turn, which of these lives is pleasantest, each will extol his own beyond the others? Thus the money-making man will tell you, that compared with the pleasures of gain, the pleasures of being honored or of

acquiring knowledge are worthless, except in so far as they can produce money.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But what of the honor-loving man? Does he not look upon the pleasure derived from money as a vulgar one, while, on the other hand, he regards the pleasure derived from learning as a mere vapor and absurdity, unless honor be the fruit of it?

Glaucon/ That is precisely the case.

Socrates/ And must we not suppose that the lover of wisdom regards all the other pleasures as, by comparison, very far inferior to the pleasure of knowing how the truth stands, and of being constantly occupied with this pursuit of knowledge; and that he calls those other pleasures strictly necessary, because, if they were not necessary, he would feel no desire for them?

Glaucon/ We may be certain that it is so.

Socrates/ Then whenever a dispute is raised as to the pleasures of each kind and the life itself of each class, not in reference to degrees of beauty and deformity, of morality and immorality, but in reference merely to their position in the scale of pleasure, and freedom from pain, how can we know which of the three men speaks most truly?

Glaucon/ I am not quite prepared to answer.

Socrates/ Well; look at the question in this light. What must be the instrument employed in passing a judgment, in order that such a judgment maybe correct? Must it not be experience, wisdom, and reasoning? or can one find a better organ of judging than these?

Glaucon/ Of course we cannot.

Socrates/ Then observe. Of the three men, which is the best acquainted by experience with all the pleasures which

we have mentioned? Does the lover of gain study the nature of real truth to such an extent as to be, in your opinion, acquainted with the pleasure of knowledge better than the lover of wisdom is acquainted with the pleasure of gain?

Glaucon/ There is a great difference. The lover of wisdom is compelled to taste the pleasures of gain from his childhood; whereas the lover of gain is not compelled to study the nature of the things that really exist, and thus to taste the sweetness of this pleasure, and become acquainted with it; rather I should say, it is not easy for him to do this, even if he has the inclination.

Socrates/ Hence, the lover of wisdom is far superior to the lover of gain in practical acquaintance with both the pleasures.

Glaucon/ He is indeed.

Socrates/ But what of the lover of honor? Is he acquainted with the pleasure of wisdom as thoroughly as the lover of wisdom is acquainted with the pleasure of honor?

Glaucon/ Nay; honor waits upon them all, if each works out the object of his pursuit. For the rich man is honored by many people, as well as the courageous and the wise; so that all are acquainted with the nature of the pleasure to be derived from the fact of being honored. But the nature of the pleasure to be found in the contemplation of truth, none can have tasted, except the lover of wisdom.

Socrates/ Then, as far as practical acquaintance goes, the lover of wisdom is the best judge of the three.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Also we know that he alone can lay claim to wisdom as well as experience.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Once more; the organ by which judgment is passed is an organ belonging, not to the lover of gain or of honor, but to the lover of wisdom.

Glaucon/ What is that organ?

Socrates/ We stated, I believe, that judgment must be passed by means of reasoning. Did we not?

Glaucon/ We did.

Socrates/ And reasoning is in an especial degree, the organ of the lover of wisdom.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Consequently, if wealth and gain were the best instruments for deciding questions as they arise, the praise and the censure of the lover of gain would necessarily be most true.

Glaucon/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And if honor, victory, and courage, were the best instruments for the purpose, the sentence of the lover of honor and of strife would be most true, would it not?

Glaucon/ Obviously it would.

Socrates/ But since experience, wisdom, and reasoning, are the best instruments, what then?

Glaucon/ Why of course, the praise of the lover of wisdom and of reasoning is the truest.

Socrates/ Then, if the pleasures are three in number, will the pleasure of this part of the soul, by which we learn, be pleasantest? and will the life of that man amongst us, in whom this part is dominant, be also most pleasant?

Glaucon/ Unquestionably it will; at any rate, the man of wisdom is fully authorized to praise his own life.

Socrates/ And what life, does the judge pronounce second, and what pleasure second?

Glaucon/ Obviously, the pleasure of the warlike and honor loving man. For it approaches the first more nearly than the pleasure of the money-making man does.

Socrates/ Then the pleasure of the lover of gain is to be placed last, as it appears.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Thus will the unjust man be twice in succession foiled, and twice conquered by the just. And now for the third and last time, address yourself, like a combatant in the great games, to Olympian Zeus, the Preserver, and observe that in the pleasure of all but the wise man there is something positively unreal and ungenuine, and slight as the rude outline of a picture, as I think I have been told by some learned man. And let me say, that a fall in this bout will be the heaviest and most decisive of all.

Glaucon/ Quite so; but explain yourself.

Socrates/ I shall find what we want, if you will respond while I prosecute the inquiry.

Glaucon/ Put your questions by all means.

Socrates/ Tell me then, do we not assert that pain is the opposite of pleasure?

Glaucon/ Assuredly we do.

Socrates/ And also that there is such a thing as a simultaneous absence both of pleasure and of pain?

Glaucon/ Certainly there is.

Socrates/ In other words, you admit that there is a point midway between the two at which the mind reposes from both. Is not that your meaning?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Have you forgotten the language which people hold when they are ill?

Glaucon/ Give me a specimen of it.

Socrates/ They tell us that nothing is pleasanter than health, but that, before they were ill, they had not found out its supreme pleasantness.

Glaucon/ I remember.

Socrates/ Do you not also hear persons who are in excessive pain say, that nothing is so pleasant as relief from pain?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And I think you find that, on many other similar occasions, persons, when they are uneasy, extol as supremely pleasant, not positive joy, but the absence of, and repose from, uneasiness.

Glaucon/ True; and perhaps the reason is, that at such times this relief does become positively pleasant and delightful.

Socrates/ In the same way we might expect, that when a person's joy has ceased, the repose from pleasure will be painful.

Glaucon/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Thus the repose, which we described just now as midway between pleasure and pain, must be now one, now the other.

Glaucon/ So it would seem.

Socrates/ Can that, which is neither pleasure nor pain, become both?

Glaucon/ I think not.

Socrates/ Again, pleasure and pain, when present in the mind, are both of them emotions, are they not?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ But was not the simultaneous absence of pleasure and of pain shown just now to indicate a state of undoubted repose, midway between the two?

Glaucon/ It was.

Socrates/ Then how can it be right to regard the absence of pain as pleasant, or the absence of pleasure as painful?

Glaucon/ It cannot be right.

Socrates/ Hence, the repose felt at the times we speak of is not really, but only appears to be, pleasant by the side of what is painful, and painful by the side of what is pleasant; and these representations will in no instance stand the test of comparison with veritable pleasure, because they are only a species of enchantment.

Glaucon/ I confess that the argument points to that conclusion.

Socrates/ In the next place turn your eyes to pleasures which do not grow out of pains, to prevent your imagining, as perhaps at the present moment you might do, that it is a law of nature that pleasure should be a cessation of pain, and pain a cessation of pleasure.

Glaucon/ Pray where am I to look, and what pleasures do you mean?

Socrates/ Among many others, you may, if you will, take as the best example for your consideration the pleasures of smell; which, without the existence of any previous uneasiness, spring up suddenly in extraordinary intensity, and when they are over, leave no pain behind.

Glaucon/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Then do not let us be persuaded that genuine pleasure consists in the release from pain, or that genuine pain consists in the release from pleasure.

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ But it is certain that, speaking roughly, most of the so-called pleasures which reach the mind through the

body, and the keenest of them, belong to this species; that is to say, they are a kind of release from pain.

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ Does not the same remark apply to those pleasures and pains of anticipation which precede them?

Glaucon/ It does.

Socrates/ Now, are you aware what the character of these pleasures is, and what they most resemble?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Do you believe that there is in the nature of things a real Above, and Below, and an Intermediate?

Glaucon/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ And do you imagine that a person, carried from below to that intermediate position, could help fancying that he is being carried above? And when he is stationary in that situation, and looks to the place from whence he has been carried, do you imagine that he can help supposing his position to be above, if he has not seen the real Above?

Glaucon/ For my own part, I assure you I cannot imagine how such a person is to think differently.

Socrates/ Well, supposing him to be carried to his old place, would he think that he is being carried below, and would he be right in so thinking?

Glaucon/ Of course he would.

Socrates/ And will not all this happen to him, because he is not acquainted with the real Above, and Between, and Below?

Glaucon/ Obviously it will.

Socrates/ Then can you wonder, that persons unacquainted with truth, besides holding a multitude of other unsound opinions, stand to pleasure and pain and their intermediate, in such a position, that though when

they are carried to what is painful, they form a correct opinion of their condition, and are really in pain; yet, when they are carried from pain to the middle point between pain and pleasure, they obstinately imagine that they have arrived at fullness of pleasure, which they have never experienced, and consequently are deceived by contrasting pain with the absence of pain, like persons who, not knowing white, contrast gray with black, and take it for white?

Glaucon/ No, indeed, I cannot wonder at it; nay, I should wonder much more if it were not so.

Socrates/ Well, consider the question in another light. Are not hunger and thirst, and similar sensations, a kind of emptiness of the bodily constitution?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Similarly, are not ignorance and folly an emptiness of the mental constitution?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Will not the man who eats, and the man who gets understanding, be filled?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And will fullness, induced by a real substance, be more true or less true than that induced by a less real substance?

Glaucon/ Obviously, the more real the substance, the more true is the fullness.

Socrates/ Then do you think that pure being enters more largely into the constitution of the class of substances like bread and meat and drink, and food generally, than into the constitution of that species of things which includes true opinion and science and understanding, and in a word, all virtue? In forming your judgment look at the matter thus. Do you believe that real existence is essentially the attribute

of that which is closely connected with the unchanging and immortal and with truth, and which is itself unchanging and immortal, and appears in substances like itself; or, is it rather the attribute of that which is closely connected with the changeful and mortal, and which is itself changeful and mortal, and appears in things of kindred mold?

Glaucon/ It is the attribute of the former in a very superior degree.

Socrates/ And does science enter at all less largely, than real existence, into the substance of the unchanging?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well, does truth enter less largely?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ That is to say, if truth enters less largely, real existence enters less largely also?

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Speaking universally, does not the cultivation of the body in all its branches contain truth and real existence in a less degree than the cultivation of the soul in all its branches?

Glaucon/ Yes, in a much less degree.

Socrates/ And do you not regard the body itself as less true and real than the soul?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And is not that, which is filled with substances more real, and which is itself more real, really more filled than that which is filled with things less real, and which is itself less real?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly it is.

Socrates/ Hence, as it is pleasant to a subject to be filled with the things that are naturally appropriate to it, that subject which is really more filled, and filled with real

substances, will in a more real and true sense be productive of true pleasure; whereas that subject which partakes of things less real, will be less really and less securely filled, and will participate in a less true and less trustworthy pleasure.

Glaucon/ The conclusion is absolutely inevitable.

Socrates/ Those, therefore, who are unacquainted with wisdom and virtue, and who spend their time in perpetual banqueting and similar indulgences, arc carried down, as it appears, and back again only as far as the midway point on the upward road; and between these limits they roam their life long, without ever overstepping them so as to look up towards, or be carried to, the true Above; and they have never been really filled with what is real, or tasted sure and unmingled pleasure; but, like cattle, they are always looking downwards, and hanging their heads to the ground, and poking them into their dining-tables. while they graze and get fat and propagate their species; and, to satiate their greedy desire for these enjoyments, they kick and butt with hoofs and horns of iron, till they kill one another under the influence of ravenous appetites; because they fill with things unreal the unreal and incontinent part of their nature.

Glaucon/ Certainly, Socrates, you describe like an oracle the life of the majority of persons.

Socrates/ And does it not follow that they consort with pleasures mingled with pain which are mere phantoms and rude outlines of the true pleasure, and which are so colored by simple juxtaposition to pain, that they appear in each case to be extravagantly great, and beget a frantic passion for themselves in the breasts of the foolish people, and are made subjects of contention, like that phantom of Helen, for which, according to Stesichorus, the combatants at Troy fought, in ignorance of the true Helen?

Glaucon/ Such a state of things, follows as a matter of course.

Socrates/ And now to come to the spirited element. Must not the consequences be exactly similar, whenever a man labors for the gratification of this part of his nature, either in the shape of jealousy from motives of ambition, or in the shape of violence from love of strife, or in the shape of anger out of discontent, while he pursues after honor and victory and anger to his own satisfaction, without reflection and without sound sense?

Glaucon/ The consequences in this case also must necessarily be similar.

Socrates/ And what is the inference? May we assert confidently, that of all the appetites with which the gain-loving and honor-loving elements are conversant, those which follow the leading of science and reason, and along with them pursue the pleasures which wisdom directs, till they find them, will find not only the truest pleasures that they can possibly find, in consequence of their devotion to truth, but also the pleasures appropriate to them, since what is best for each is also most appropriate?

Glaucon/ Yes, no doubt it is most appropriate.

Socrates/ Hence, so long as the whole soul follows the guidance of the wisdom-loving element without any dissension, each part can not only do its own proper work in all respects, or in other words, be just; but, moreover, it can enjoy its own proper pleasures, in the best and truest shape possible.

Glaucon/ Yes, precisely so.

Socrates/ On the other hand, whenever either of the two other elements has gained the mastery, it is fated not only

to miss the discovery of its own pleasure, but also to constrain the other principles to pursue an alien and untrue pleasure.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Well, the further a thing is removed from philosophy and reason, the more likely will it be to produce such evil effects, will it not?

Glaucon/ Yes, much more likely.

Socrates/ And that is furthest removed from reason which is furthest removed from law and order, is it not?

Glaucon/ Quite obviously.

Socrates/ And have not the passionate or tyrannical appetites been proved to be furthest removed from law and order?

Glaucon/ Yes, quite the furthest.

Socrates/ Whereas the kingly and regular appetites stand nearest to law and order, do they not?

Glaucon/ They do.

Socrates/ Hence, if I am not mistaken, the tyrant will be furthest from, and the king nearest to, true and specially appropriate pleasure.

Glaucon/ It is undeniable.

Socrates/ And therefore the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most pleasantly.

Glaucon/ It is quite undeniable.

Socrates/ And pray are you aware of the extent to which the discomfort of the tyrants life exceeds that of the kings?

Glaucon/ I wait for you to tell me.

Socrates/ There are three pleasures, it appears, one genuine, and two spurious. Now the tyrant has trespassed beyond these last, has fled from law and reason, and lives

with a bodyguard of slavish pleasures; and the extent of his inferiority is hard indeed to state, unless perhaps it may be stated thus.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ Reckoning from the oligarchical man, the tyrant stands third, I believe, in the descending line; for the democratical man stood between.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, if our former remarks were true, must not the pleasure with which he consorts, be, so far as truth is concerned, a copy of a copy, the original of which is in the possession of the oligarchical man?

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Again, reckoning from the kingly man, the oligarchical in his turn stands third in the descending line, supposing us to identify the aristocratical and the kingly?

Glaucon/ True, he does.

Socrates/ Therefore the tyrant is thrice three times removed from true pleasure.

Glaucon/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ Then it seems that tyrannical pleasure may be represented geometrically by a square number, 9.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ And by squaring and cubing, it is made quite clear to what a great distance the tyrant is removed.

Glaucon/ Yes, to an arithmetician it is.

Socrates/ Conversely, if you wish to state the distance at which the king stands from the tyrant in point of reality of pleasure, by working out the multiplication you will find that the former lives 729 times more pleasantly than the latter, or that the latter lives more painfully than the former in the same proportion.

Glaucon/ You have brought out an extraordinary result in calculating the difference between the just man and the unjust, on the score of pleasure and pain.

Socrates/ Well, I am sure that the number is correct, and applicable to human life, if days and nights and months and years are applicable thereto.

Glaucon/ And no doubt they are.

Socrates/ Then if the good and just man so far surpasses the wicked and unjust in point of pleasure, will he not surpass him incalculably more in gracefulness of life, in beauty, and in virtue?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed he will, incalculably.

Socrates/ Well, then, now that we have arrived at this stage of the argument, let us resume that first discussion which brought us hither. It was stated, I believe, that injustice is profitable to the man who is consummately unjust, while he is reputed to be just. Or am I wrong about the statement?

Glaucon/ No, you are right.

Socrates/ This is the moment for arguing with the author of this remark, now that we have come to an agreement as to the respective effects of a course of injustice, and of a course of justice.

Glaucon/ How must we proceed?

Socrates/ We must mold in fancy a representation of the soul, in order that the speaker may perceive what his remark amounts to.

Glaucon/ What kind of representation is it to be?

Socrates/ We must represent to ourselves, a creature like one of those which, according to the legend, existed in old times, such as Chimera, and Scylla, and Cerberus, not to mention a host of other monsters, in the case of which we

are told that several generic forms have grown together and coalesced into one.

Glaucon/ True, we do hear such stories.

Socrates/ Well, mold in the first place the form of a motley many-headed monster, furnished with a ring of heads of tame and wild animals, which he can produce by turns in every instance out of himself.

Glaucon/ It requires a cunning modeler to do so; nevertheless, since fancy is more plastic than wax and substances as pliable as wax, suppose it done.

Socrates/ Now proceed, secondly, to mold the form of a lion, and, thirdly, the form of a man. But let the first be much the greatest of the three, and the second next to it.

Glaucon/ That is easier; it is done.

Socrates/ Now combine the three into one, so as to make them grow together to a certain extent.

Glaucon/ I have done so.

Socrates/ Lastly, invest them externally with the form of one of the three, namely, the man, so that the person who cannot see inside, and only notices the outside skin, may fancy that it is one single animal, to wit, a man.

Glaucon/ I have done it.

Socrates/ And now to the person who asserts that it is profitable for this creature min to be unrighteous, and that it is not for his interest to do justice, let us reply that his assertion amounts to this, that it is profitable for him to feast and strengthen the multifarious monster and the lion and its members, and to starve and enfeeble the man to such an extent as to leave him at the mercy of the guidance of either of the other two, without making any attempt to habituate or reconcile them to one another, but leaving them together to bite and struggle and devour each other.

Glaucon/ True, the person who praises injustice will certainly in effect say this.

Socrates/ On the other hand, will not the advocate of the profitableness of justice assert that actions and words ought to be such as will enable the inward man to have the firmest control over the entire man, and, with the lion for his ally, to cultivate, like a husbandman, the many-headed beast, nursing and rearing the tame parts of it, and checking the growth of the wild; and thus to pursue his training on the principle of concerning himself for all jointly. and reconciling them to one another and to himself?

Glaucon/ Yes, these again are precisely the assertions of the person who praises justice.

Socrates/ Then in every way the panegyrist of justice will speak the truth, while the panegyrist of injustice will lie. For whether you look at pleasure, at reputation, or at advantage, the panegyrist of the righteous man speaks truth, whereas all the criticisms of his enemy are unsound and ignorant.

Glaucon/ I am thoroughly of that opinion.

Socrates/ Let us therefore try to win him over mildly (for his error is involuntary), and let us put this question to him; My good friend, may we not assert that the practices which are held to be fair and foul, are fair or foul according as thy either subjugate the brutal parts of our nature to the man, perhaps I should rather say, to the divine part, o. make the tame part the servant and slave of the wild? Will he say, yes? or how will he reply?

Glaucon/ He will say yes, if he will take my advice.

Socrates/ Then according to this argument, can it be profitable for anyone to take gold unjustly, since the consequence is, that, in the moment of taking the gold, he is enslaving the best part of him to the most vile? or, it being admitted that, had he taken gold to sell a son or a daughter

into slavery, and a slavery among wild and wicked masters, it could have done him no good to receive even an immense sum for such a purpose; will it be argued that, if he ruthlessly enslaves the divinest part of himself to the most ungodly and accursed, he is not a miserable man, and is not being bribed to a far more awful destruction than Eriphyle, when she took the necklace as the price of her husband's life?

Glaucon/ I will reply in his behalf; it is indeed much more awful.

Socrates/ And do you not think that intemperance, again, has been censured time out of mind for the reason that, during its outbreaks, that great and multiform beast, which is so terrible, receives more liberty than it ought to have?

Glaucon/ Obviously, you are right.

Socrates/ And are not the terms, self-will and discontent, used to convey a reproof, whenever the lion-like and serpentine creature is exalted and enhanced out of all harmony?

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Again, are not luxury and effeminacy censured because they relax and unnerve this same creature, by begetting cowardice in him?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly they are.

Socrates/ And are not the reproachful names of flattery and servility bestowed, whenever a person subjugates this same spirited animal to the turbulent monster, and, to gratify the latter's insatiable craving for money, trains the former from the first, by a long course of insult, to become an ape instead of a lion?

Glaucon/ Certainly you are right.

Socrates/ And why, let me ask you, are coarseness and vulgarity considered- discreditable? May we not assert that these terms imply that the most excellent element in the person, to whom they are attributed, is naturally weak, so that instead of being able to govern the creatures within him, he pays them court, and can only learn how to flatter them?

Glaucon/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ Then, in order that such a person may be governed by an authority similar to that by which the best man is governed, do we not maintain that he ought to be made the servant of that best man, in whom the divine element is supreme? We do not indeed imagine that the servant ought to be governed to his own detriment, which Thrasymachus held to be the lot of the subject; on the contrary, we believe it to be better for everyone to be governed by a wise and divine power, which ought, if possible, to be seated in the man's own heart, the only alternative being to impose it from without; in order that we may be all alike, so far as nature permits, and mutual friends, from the fact of being steered by the same pilot.

Glaucon/ Yes, that is quite right.

Socrates/ And this, is plainly the intention of law, that common friend of all the members of a state. and also of the government of children, which consists in withholding their freedom, until the time when we have formed in a constitution in them, as we should in a city, and until, by cultivating the noblest principle of their nature, we have established in their hearts a guardian and a sovereign, the very counterpart of our own; from which time forward we suffer them to go free.

Glaucon/ Yes that is plain.

Socrates/ Then pray, Glaucon, on what principle, and by what line of argument, can we maintain that it is profitable

for a man to be unjust, or intemperate, or to commit any disgraceful act, which will sink him deeper in vice, though he may increase his wealth thereby, or acquire additional power?

Glaucon/ We cannot maintain that doctrine on any ground.

Socrates/ And by what argument can we uphold the advantages of disguising the commission of injustice, and escaping the penalties of it? Am I not right in supposing that the man, who thus escapes detection, grows still more vicious than before; whereas if he is found out and punished, the brute part of him is quenched and tamed, and the tame part is liberated, and the whole soul is molded to the loftiest disposition, and thus, through the acquisition of temperance and justice combined with wisdom, attains to a condition which is more precious than that attained by a body endowed with strength and beauty and health, in the exact proportion in which the soul is more precious than the body?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed, you are right.

Socrates/ Hence I conclude, the man of understanding will direct all his energies through life to this one object; his plan being, in the first place, to honor those studies which will impress this high character upon his soul, while at the same time he slights all others.

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And as for his bodily habit and bodily support, in the second place, far from living devoted to the indulgence of brute irrational pleasure, he will show that even health is not an object with him, and that he does not attach preeminent importance to the acquisition of strength or health or beauty, unless they are likely to make him temperate; because, in keeping the harmony of the body in

tune, his constant aim is to preserve the symphony which resides in the soul.

Glaucon/ Yes, no doubt it is, if he intends to be a genuine votary of music.

Socrates/ Will he not also show how strictly he upholds that system and concord which ought to be maintained in the acquisition of wealth? And will he not avoid being dazzled by the congratulations of the crowd into multiplying infinitely the bulk of his wealth, which would bring him endless trouble?

Glaucon/ I think he will.

Socrates/ On the contrary, an anxious reference to his inward constitution, and a watchful care that none of its parts be pushed from their propriety owing to a superabundance or scantiness of substance, will be the principles by which, to the best of his ability, he will steer his course in adding to, or spending out of, his property.

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ And, once more, in reference to honors, with the same standard constantly before his eyes, he will be glad to taste and partake of those which he thinks will make him a better man; whereas he will shun, in private and in public, those which he thinks likely to break up his existing condition.

Glaucon/ If that is his chief concern, I suppose he will not consent to interfere with politics.

Socrates/ By my faith, you are wrong; for he certainly will, at least, in his own city, though perhaps not in his native land, unless some providential accident should occur.

Glaucon/ I understand. He will do so, you mean, in the city whose organization we have now completed, and which is confined to the region of speculation; for I do not believe it is to be found anywhere on earth.

Socrates/ Well, perhaps in heaven there is laid up a pattern of it for him who wishes to behold it, and, beholding, to organize himself accordingly. And the question of its present or future existence on earth is quite unimportant. For in any case he will adopt the practices of such a city, to the exclusion of those of every other.

Glaucon/ Probably he will.

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Socrates/ I must say that, while I am led by a variety of considerations to believe that we were unquestionably right in our plans for organizing the state, I feel this conviction most strongly when I think of our regulations about poetry.

Glaucon/ What was the nature of them?

Socrates/ They were to the effect that we ought on no account to admit that branch of poetry which is imitative; and now that the specific parts of the soul have been each separately defined, the conviction that such poetry must be unhesitatingly refused admittance, is to my mind even clearer than it was before.

Glaucon/ Explain what you mean.

Socrates/ I am quite sure that you will not denounce me to the tragedians, and the whole company of imitative poets, and therefore I do not mind saying to you, that all imitative poetry would seem to be detrimental to the understanding of those hearers who do not possess the antidote in a knowledge of its real nature.

Glaucon/ Pray what is the purport of your remarks?

Socrates/ I must speak my mind, although I confess I am checked by a kind of affectionate respect for Homer, of which I have been conscious since I was a child. For of all those beautiful tragic poets he seems to have been the original master and guide. But it would be wrong to honor a man at the expense of truth, and therefore I must, as I said, speak out.

Glaucon/ By all means do so.

Socrates/ Listen then, or rather reply.

Glaucon/ Put your questions.

Socrates/ Can you give me any account of the nature of imitation generally? For I assure you I am at a loss myself to understand its real meaning.

Glaucon/ And so you expect me to understand it.

Socrates/ It would not be extraordinary if you did; for it often happens that shortsighted people make out objects sooner than quick-sighted.

Glaucon/ True; but in your presence, if I did make a discovery, I should not have the courage to mention it; therefore look yourself.

Socrates/ Well, is it your wish that we should pursue our usual course in the outset of our investigation? We have, I believe, been in the habit of assuming the existence, in each instance, of someone Form, which includes the numerous particular things to which we apply the same name. Do you understand, or not?

Glaucon/ I do understand.

Socrates/ Then let us, on the present occasion, take anyone of those numerous things that suits your pleasure. For example, if this instance suits you, there are, of course, many beds and many tables.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But of Forms in connection with these articles, there are, I believe, only two, one the Form of a bed, and one that of a table.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Have we not also been accustomed to say that the manufacturer of each of these articles is looking at the Form while he is constructing the beds or the tables which we employ, or whatever it may be? For, of course, no manufacturer constructs the Form itself; because that is impossible.

Glaucon/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ But pray consider how you will describe the following workman.

Glaucon/ To whom do you allude?

Socrates/ I allude to the workman who constructs all the articles which come within the province of the whole class of artisans.

Glaucon/ You are talking of a marvelously clever man.

Socrates/ Wait a little, and you will have better reasons for saying so. Besides being able to construct all manufactured articles, the same artisan produces everything that grows out of the ground, and creates all living things, himself among others; and, in addition to this, heaven and earth and the gods and all the heavenly bodies and all the beings of the nether world are his workmanship.

Glaucon/ What an extraordinarily ingenious person you are describing!

Socrates/ You are incredulous, are you? Then tell me; Do you think that the existence of such an architect is a complete impossibility? or do you believe that in one way there could, and in another way there could not, be a manufacturer of such a variety of things? Do you not perceive that, in a kind of way, even you yourself could construe! this multiplicity of objects?

Glaucon/ Pray what is this way?

Socrates/ Far from being difficult; it is a rapid method, and admits of many variations. Perhaps the most rapid way of all would be to take a mirror, and turn it round in every direction. You will not be long in making the sun and the heavenly bodies, nor in making the earth, nor in making yourself, and every other living thing, and all inanimate objects, and plants, and everything that we mentioned just now.

Glaucon/ Yes, we can produce so many appearances, but assuredly not truly existing things.

Socrates/ Right; and your observation is just to the point. Now, in my opinion, the painter also belongs to this class of architects. Does he not?

Glaucon/ Certainly he does.

Socrates/ But I suppose you will say that all his creations are unreal. And yet the painter too, in a kind of way, constructs a bed. Or am I wrong?

Glaucon/ Yes, the painter too constructs a bed in appearance.

Socrates/ But what of the manufacturer of beds? Did you not certainly say a minute ago, that he did not construct the Form, which, according to our doctrine, constitutes the reality of a bed, but only a particular bed?

Glaucon/ Yes, I did say so.

Socrates/ Consequently, if he does not construct what really exists, must we not say that he does not construct a real thing, but only something like the reality, but still unreal? And if anyone were to describe the work of the bed-wright, or of any other artisan, as perfectly real, his account of the matter would be, in all probability, untrue, would it not?

Glaucon/ Yes, in the opinion of those who are versed in such discussions as these.

Socrates/ Then let us not be at all surprised at finding that things as substantial as a bed are shadowy objects when contrasted with reality.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Should you like us to employ these illustrations in our inquiry into the real nature of an imitator?

Glaucon/ If you please.

Socrates/ Well, here we have three sorts of beds; of which one exists in the nature of things; and this we shall attribute, if I am not mistaken, to the workmanship of God. If not, to whom can we attribute it?

Glaucon/ We can only attribute it to Him, I think.

Socrates/ The second is made by the upholsterer.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the third is the production of the painter. Is it not?

Glaucon/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Thus we have three kinds of beds, and three superintendents of their manufacture, the painter, the upholsterer, God.

Glaucon/ Yes, three.

Socrates/ Now whether it was that God did not choose to make more than one bed, or that by a species of necessity he was precluded from making more than one in the universe, he has at any rate made only one, which is the absolute essential Bed. But two, or more than two, such beds have not been created by God, and never will be.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Because, if God had made only two, a single bed would again have made its appearance, whose Form would enter into the other two in their turn; and this would be the absolute essential Bed, and not the two.

Glaucon/ You are right.

Socrates/ Knowing this, I should suppose, and wishing to be the real maker of the really existing bed, and not a certain indefinite manufacturer of a certain indefinite bed, God created a single such Bed.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then are you in favor of our addressing Him as the Creator, for example, of this object?

Glaucon/ Yes, it is but just to do so, seeing that by creation He has made both this, and everything else.

Socrates/ And what of the upholsterer? Must we not style him the artificer of a bed?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ May we go on to call the painter, the artificer and maker of this same article?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then, by your account, what is he with reference to a bed?

Glaucon/ In my opinion he might most justly be styled the imitator of that of which the other two are artificers.

Socrates/ Well, then, do you call the author of that which is twice removed from the thing as it was created, an imitator?.

Glaucon/ Yes, exactly so.

Socrates/ Hence, since the tragedian is an imitator, we may predicate of him likewise, that he, along with all the other imitators, is the third in descent from the sovereign and from truth.

Glaucon/ So it would appear.

Socrates/ Then we are unanimous as to the nature of the imitator. But answer me one question about the painter. Do you suppose that a painter attempts to imitate the originally created object, or the productions of the artificer?

Glaucon/ The latter.

Socrates/ As they really exist, or as they appear? Define this further.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean this; when you look at a bed sideways, or in front, or from any other position whatever, does it alter its identity at all, or does it continue really the same, though it appears changed? And so of everything else?

Glaucon/ The latter is the true account; it appears different, but it is not really changed.

Socrates/ Now this is the point which I wish you to consider. To which of the two is painting, in every instance, directed! Does it study to imitate the real nature of real objects, or the apparent nature of appearances? In other words, is it an imitation of a phantasm, or of truth?

Glaucon/ Of the former.

Socrates/ The imitative art, then, is, I conceive, completely divorced from truth; and, apparently, it is enabled to effect so much, because it only seizes upon an object in a small part of its extent, and that small part is unsubstantial. For example, we say the painter will paint us a shoemaker, a carpenter, or any other craftsman, without knowing anything about their trades; and, notwithstanding this ignorance on his part, let him be but a good painter, and if he paints a carpenter and displays his picture at a distance, he will deceive children and silly people by making them think that it really is a carpenter.

Glaucon/ No doubt he will.

Socrates/ Be that as it may, I will tell you, my friend, how I think we ought to feel in all such cases. Whenever a person tells us that he has fallen in with a man who is acquainted with all the crafts, and who sums up in his own person all the knowledge possessed by other people singly, to a degree of accuracy which no one can surpass, we must reply to our informant, that he is a silly fellow, and has, apparently, fallen in with a juggler and mimic, whom he has been deceived into thinking omniscient, because he was himself

incapable of discriminating between science, and ignorance, and imitation.

Glaucon/ That is most true.

Socrates/ And now, we must proceed to consider the case of tragedy and its leader, Homer; because we are told by some persons, that dramatic poets are acquainted not only with all arts, but with all things human which bear upon virtue and vice, and also with things divine. For, to write well, a good poet must, they say, possess a knowledge of his subject, or else he could not write at all. Hence we must inquire, whether the poets, whom these people have encountered, are mere imitators, who have so far imposed upon the spectators, that, when they behold their performances, they fail to perceive that these productions are twice removed from reality, and easily worked out by a person unacquainted with the truth, because they are phantoms, and not realities; or whether our informants are so far right, that good poets do really know the subjects about which they seem to the multitude to speak well.

Glaucon/ Yes, we must by all means investigate the matter.

Socrates/ Well then, do you think, that, if a man could produce both the original and the representation, he would give himself up seriously to the manufacture of the representations, and make this the object of his life, under the idea that lie professes a most noble purpose?

Glaucon/ I do not think so.

Socrates/ On the contrary, if he were truly instructed as to the nature of the things which he imitates, he would, I imagine, bestow far more industry upon real actions than upon the imitations, and he would endeavor to leave behind him a number of excellent works, as memorials of himself,

and would be more anxious to be the panegyrized than the panegyrist.

Glaucon/ I agree with you; for the honor and the profit are much greater in the one case than in the other.

Socrates/ Now, on ordinary subjects, let us not demand an explanation from Homer or any other poet, by asking why, if any of the ancient or modern poets were adepts in the healing art and not mere imitators of the physicians language, they have not the credit of having effected any cures like Asclepius, or of having left behind them a body of scholars in physic, as Asclepius left his descendants; neither let us question them concerning the other arts, which may be dismissed from the discussion. But concerning those grandest and most beautiful subjects which Homer undertakes to treat, such as war, and the conduct of campaigns, and the administration of cities, and the education of man, it is surely just to institute an inquiry, and ask the question, thus; My dear Homer, if you are really only once removed from the truth, with reference to virtue, instead of being twice removed, and the manufacturer of a phantom, according to our definition of an imitator; and if you used to be able to distinguish between the pursuits which make men better or worse, in private and in public; tell us, what city owes a better constitution to you, as Lacedaemon owes hers to Lycurgus, and as many cities, great and small, owe theirs to many other legislators? What state attributes to you the benefits derived from a good code of laws? Italy and Sicily recognize Charondas in this capacity, and we Solon. But what state recognizes you? Will he be able to mention any?

Glaucon/ I think not; at least we are not told any tale of the kind even by the very poets who claim him as their ancestor.

Socrates/ Well then, does the story go that any war in Homers time was brought to a happy termination under his command, or by his advice?

Glaucon/ No, not one.

Socrates/ Well, is he said to have been, like Thales the Milesian and Anacharsis the Scythian, the author of a number of ingenious inventions, bearing upon the useful arts or other practical matters, which would convey the impression of his having been a man of wisdom in the active duties of life?

Glaucon/ No, certainly nothing of the sort is said of him.

Socrates/ Well then, is it reported of Homer that, though not a public man, he nevertheless in his lifetime personally conducted, in private, the education of certain disciples, who used to delight in his society, and handed down to posterity an Homeric way of living; just as Pythagoras was in an extraordinary degree beloved personally as a companion, not to mention that his successors, who to this day call their mode of living by his name, are considered to a certain extent conspicuous in the world?

Glaucon/ No, Socrates; nothing of this kind either is reported of him. Indeed, if the stories about Homer are true, the education of his friend Creophylus might possibly be thought even more ridiculous than his name. For we are told that even Creophylus neglected Homer singularly in his lifetime.

Socrates/ No doubt that is the story. But do you suppose, Glaucon, that, if Homer had been really able to educate men and make them better, from the fact of being capable not merely of imitating but of knowing the subjects in question, he could have failed to attract to his side a multitude of companions, who would have loved and honored him? For so long as Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and

a host of other persons, can, as we see, persuade the men of their day by private intercourse, that they will be incapable of managing their own house and city, unless they superintend their education; and so long as the wisdom, implied in this, insures to these teachers an affection so unbounded, that they are almost carried about on the shoulders of their companions; is it conceivable that, if Homer and Hesiod were really capable of improving men in virtue, they should have been suffered by their contemporaries to travel about reciting? Is it not more likely that they would have been hugged more closely than gold, and constrained to stay at home with their countrymen? or else, if this favor were refused, that they would have been escorted in their wanderings, till their disciples had received a satisfactory education?

Glaucon/ I believe you are unquestionably right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then must we not conclude that all writers of poetry, beginning with Homer, copy unsubstantial images of every subject about which they write, including virtue, and do not grasp the truth? In fact, as we were saying just now, will not the painter, without understanding anything about shoemaking, paint what will be taken for a shoemaker by those who are as ignorant on the subject as himself, and who judge by the colors and forms?

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly he will.

Socrates/ And just in the same way, I fancy, we shall assert that the poet, as well as the painter, lays on a species of colors, in the shape of verbs and nouns, to represent the several professions, of which he only understands enough to be able to imitate them; so that if he writes in meter, rhythm, and harmony, about shoemaking, or about generalship, or about any subject whatever, people who are as ignorant as

himself, and who judge merely by the form of expression, look upon his poetry as very excellent. So powerful is the charm which these musical appliances naturally possess. For I suppose you know what a poor appearance the works of poets present, when they have been stripped of their musical coloring, and are rehearsed in their proper nakedness. Doubtless you have observed the fact.

Glaucon/ Yes, I have.

Socrates/ Does it not remind one of the withered appearance presented by the countenances of those who have once been blooming without being beautiful, whenever their bloom has deserted them?

Glaucon/ Precisely so.

Socrates/ Now let me ask you to examine the following point. According to us, the maker of the image, that is, the imitator, understands only the appearance, and not the reality. Is it not so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do not let us leave the matter half explained, but let us examine it satisfactorily.

Glaucon/ Proceed.

Socrates/ A painter, by our account, will paint a bit and bridle, will he not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ But the bridle and bit will be made by the saddler and the smith, will they not?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then does the painter understand how the bit and bridle ought to be shaped? Or is it the case, that even the makers, the smith and the saddler, are ignorant on this

subject, which is only understood by the rider, who knows how to use the things in question?

Glaucon/ That is the true state of the case.

Socrates/ Then may we not assert that all things are in the same predicament?

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ May we not assert that each single thing involves three particular arts, the province of the first being to use the thing, of the second to produce it, of the third to imitate it?

Glaucon/ Yes, we may.

Socrates/ Are not the excellence, beauty, and correctness of every manufactured article, or living creature, or action, to be tried only by a reference to the purpose intended in their construction, or in their natural constitution?

Glaucon/ True, they are.

Socrates/ Hence the man who makes use of a thing must necessarily be best acquainted with it, and must in the course of using it keep the maker informed as to the success or failure of its performances. For example, a flute-player, no doubt, informs a flute-maker about the flutes which he employs in the exercise of his art, and will direct him how they ought to be made; and the flute-maker will submit to his directions.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ The one has a thorough acquaintance with good and bad flutes, and conveys information, upon which the other relies, and will make accordingly; is not that the case?

Glaucon/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Hence, the maker of the instrument will entertain a correct belief with regard to its beauty or

badness, by holding communication with the person who has a thorough acquaintance with the subject, and by being compelled to listen to his instructions; whereas the user of the same instrument will possess science on these points.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ But which of the two will the imitator possess? Will he, by actually using the things he describes, know scientifically, whether his productions are beautiful and right, or not; or will he entertain correct opinion, from being compelled to put himself in communication with the man of real knowledge, and to submit to his directions as to the style in which he ought to work?

Glaucon/ Neither.

Socrates/ That is to say, the imitator will neither know scientifically, nor entertain correct opinions with reference to the beauty or badness of the things which he imitates.

Glaucon/ It seems not.

Socrates/ The poetical imitator will be charmingly wise upon the subjects which he treats.

Glaucon/ Not exactly.

Socrates/ However, he will go on imitating, notwithstanding his being thoroughly ignorant as to what constitutes a thing good or bad. Nay, apparently he will copy the vague notions of beauty which prevail among the uninformed multitude.

Glaucon/ Yes, what else can he copy?

Socrates/ Then, to all appearance, we are pretty well agreed so far as this, that the imitative person knows nothing of importance about the things which he imitates, and that therefore imitation is an amusement and not a serious business; and that those who cultivate tragic poetry

in iambic or in epic verse are without exception in the highest possible degree imitators.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Then, in the name of heaven, does not this process of imitation deal with something twice removed from the truth? Answer me.

Glaucon/ It does.

Socrates/ But pray how do you describe that part of human nature on which it exercises the power which it possesses?

Glaucon/ Explain what part you mean.

Socrates/ I will. Objects of the same size, I believe, appear to us to vary in magnitude according to their distance from our eyes.

Glaucon/ They do.

Socrates/ And things which look bent under water appear straight when taken out of the water; and the same objects look either concave or convex, owing to mistakes of another kind about colors to which the eye is liable; and clearly there exists in the soul a kind of utter confusion of this sort. And it is just this natural infirmity of ours which is assailed with every species of witchcraft by the art of drawing, as well as by jugglery, and the numerous other inventions of the same sort.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And have not the processes of measuring and counting and weighing made their appearance most agreeably to aid us in dispelling these tricks of fancy, and to overthrow within us the power of vague notions of degrees of magnitude, quantity, and weight, and establish the control of the principle, which has calculated, or measured, or weighed?

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And surely this must be the work of the rational element in the soul.

Glaucon/ Yes, certainly it must.

Socrates/ But when this element, after frequent measuring, informs us that one thing is greater or less than, or equal to, another thing, it is contradicted at the same moment by the appearance which the same things present.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Did we not assert the impossibility of entertaining, at the same time and with the same part of us, contradictory opinions with reference to the same things?

Glaucon/ Yes, and we were right in asserting it.

Socrates/ Then that part of the soul, whose opinion runs counter to the measurements, cannot be identical with that part which agrees with them.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But surely that part, which relies on measurement and calculation, must be the best part of the soul.

Glaucon/ Doubtless it must.

Socrates/ Hence, that which contradicts this part must be one of the inferior elements of our nature.

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ This was the point which I wished to settle between us, when I said that painting, or to speak generally, the whole art of imitation, is busy about a work which is far removed from truth; and that it associates moreover with that part of us, which is far removed from wisdom, and is its mistress and friend for no wholesome or true purpose.

Glaucon/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Thus the art of imitation is the worthless mistress of a worthless friend, and the parent of a worthless progeny.

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Does this apply only to the imitation which addresses itself to the eye? or may we extend it to that which addresses itself to the ear, which I believe we name poetry?

Glaucon/ Probably we may.

Socrates/ Well, do not let us rely only on the probable evidence derived from painting, but let us prosecute further inquiries into that very part of the intellect, with which the imitative art of poetry associates, and let us examine whether it is worthless or good.

Glaucon/ Yes, we ought to do so.

Socrates/ Let us state the case thus. The imitative art, if we are right, imitates men who are engaged in voluntary or involuntary actions, and who, according to the result of their actions, think themselves well off or the reverse; and who, in the midst of all these circumstances, are conscious either of joy or of grief. Is there anything to be added to this?

Glaucon/ No, nothing.

Socrates/ Now, in this variety of circumstances, is a man's state one of unanimity? Or is he at feud and war with himself in his actions, just as he was at feud and entertained contradictory opinions at the same moment about the same subjects, where his sight was concerned? But I remember, that on this subject we need not come to an agreement now; for we settled all this satisfactorily in the past conversations, in which we admitted that our soul is fraught with an infinite number of these simultaneous contradictions.

Glaucon/ We were right.

Socrates/ Yes, we were. But there was something then omitted, which I think it is now necessary to discuss.

Glaucon/ What was that?

Socrates/ We said, I believe, at the time, that a good man, if he meet with a misfortune, like that of losing a son or anything else that he values most highly, will bear it more easily than anyone else.

Glaucon/ Certainly he will.

Socrates/ But now, let us further examine, whether he will feel no sorrow at all, or whether, this being impossible, he will observe some kind of moderation in grief.

Glaucon/ The latter is the truer account.

Socrates/ Now let me ask you a question about him. Do you think he will fight against his grief and resist it most, when the eyes of his equals are upon him, or when he is alone by himself in solitude?

Glaucon/ He will do so much more, I imagine, when he is observed.

Socrates/ But when he is alone, I fancy, he will venture to say much, which he would be ashamed to say in the hearing of another person, and he will do much, which he would not like anyone to see him doing.

Glaucon/ Just so.

Socrates/ Now that which urges him to resist his grief is reason and law, is it not? while that which prompts him to indulge it is the affliction itself?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But when there are two opposite attractions in a man at the same time in reference to the same thing, he must, according to our doctrine, be a double man.

Glaucon/ Of course he must.

Socrates/ Is not one part of him prepared to obey the directions of law?

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ Law, I believe, tells him that it is best to keep as quiet as possible in misfortunes, and check all feelings of discontent; because we cannot estimate the amount of good and evil contained in these visitations, and at the same time impatience does not help us forwards; and because none of the affairs of this life deserve very serious anxiety, while grief stands in the way of that behavior which we ought to adopt in our troubles without a moments delay.

Glaucon/ To what do you allude?

Socrates/ It is our duty to think over the event that has taken place, and to arrange our affairs to meet the emergency in the way which reason pronounces best, like the player who moves his pieces according to the dice which he has thrown; and, instead of hugging the wounded part, like children after a fall, and continuing to roar, we ought ever to habituate the soul to turn with all speed to the task of healing and righting the fallen and diseased part, thus putting a stop to lamentation by the aid of medicine.

Glaucon/ Certainly that would be the best behavior under misfortune.

Socrates/ Then the better part of us, we say, consents to be led by such reasoning.

Glaucon/ Obviously it does.

Socrates/ On the other hand, shall we not maintain, that the element which prompts us to think of, and grieve over, our misfortune, and which has an insatiable appetite for lamentations, is irrational and idle, and the friend of cowardice?

Glaucon/ Certainly we shall.

Socrates/ This being the case, the peevish temper furnishes an infinite variety of materials for imitation; whereas the temper, which is wise and calm, is so constantly uniform and unchanging, that it is not easily imitated; and, when imitated, it is not easily understood, especially by a general gathering of all sorts of persons, collected in a theatre. For these people witness the imitation of a state which, if I am not mistaken, is far from being their own.

Glaucon/ It is, unquestionably.

Socrates/ Hence it is clear, that the imitative poet has, in the nature of things, nothing to do with this calm temper of soul, and that his wisdom is not set on pleasing it, if he is intended to gain a reputation in the world; but his business is with the peevish and changeful temper, because it is easily imitated.

Glaucon/ That is clear.

Socrates/ Then we shall be justified now in laying hands on him, and placing him on a level with the painter. For he resembles the painter in producing things that are worthless when tried by the standard of truth; and he resembles him also-in this, that he holds intercourse with a part of the soul which is like himself, and not with the best part. And, this being the case, we shall henceforth be justified in refusing to admit him into a state that would fain enjoy a good constitution, because he excites and feeds and strengthens this worthless part of the soul, and thus destroys the rational part; like a person who should strengthen the hands of the dissolute members of a state and raise them to supreme power, and at the same time bring the educated class to destruction. Precisely in the same way we shall assert that the imitative poet likewise implants an evil constitution in the soul of each individual, by gratifying that senseless part which, instead of distinguishing the greater

from the less, regards the same things now as great, and now as small, and manufactures fantastic phantoms that are very widely removed from truth.

Glaucon/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ But still, we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our indictment. For that poetry should be able to damage the great majority even of good men, is, I conceive, a crime of the deepest dye.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly it is, if the indictment can be sustained.

Socrates/ Attend, and then judge. The best of us, I believe, while listening to the passages in which Homer or one of the tragedians represents some suffering hero, who spins out a long speech in his lamentations, or perhaps some persons engaged in beating their breasts and bemoaning themselves in song, are delighted, as you know, and give ourselves up to be led along, and sympathize with the sufferer, and earnestly praise as a good poet the writer who can bring us as much as possible into this frame of mind.

Glaucon/ I know it, of course.

Socrates/ But, on the other hand, whenever sorrow comes home to one of us, you are aware that we pride ourselves upon the opposite conduct; that is, we glory in being able to endure with calmness, because, in our estimation, this behavior is manly, while the other which we praised before is womanish.

Glaucon/ I am aware of it.

Socrates/ Then is this praise rightly bestowed? I mean, is it right to feel pleasure and bestow praise, instead of being disgusted, when one sees a man behaving as one would scorn and blush to behave oneself?

Glaucon/ No, indeed, this does not seem reasonable.

Socrates/ It does not, if you look at it in another light.

Glaucon/ In what light?

Socrates/ If you consider that the part which is forcibly held down when those calamities of our own occur, and which has hungered for the privilege of weeping and bewailing itself fully and without stint, because it is its nature to covet this satisfaction, is the very part that is fed to satiety by the poets, and delights in those descriptions; and that, meanwhile, that part of us which is naturally the noblest, from not having been sufficiently trained by reason and by habit, relaxes in its watch over this querulous part, because it is surveying the afflictions of others, and because it is not discreditable to itself to praise and compassionate another man, who professes to be good, though his grief is ill-timed. In fact, it looks upon the pleasure as so much clear gain, and will not allow itself to be deprived of it by a contempt for the whole poem. For it is given, I think, only to a few to reflect that the conduct of other people must necessarily influence our own, and that it is no easy matter, after feeding the strength of the principle of pity upon the sufferings of others, to keep it under restraint when we suffer ourselves.

Glaucon/ That is most true.

Socrates/ Does not the same reasoning apply also to jokes which you would yourself be ashamed to make, but which in comic representations, or even in private life, you will be very well pleased to hear, and will not hate as immoral, acting in this just as you acted in your pity? For on such occasions you give the rein to that element, which, in your own case, you check by reason, when it would fain create laughter, because you dread the reputation of a buffoon; and, having thus given it strength and spirit, you

have often, in your own conduct, been unconsciously seduced into adopting the character of a comic poet.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ And in the case of love, and anger, and all the mental sensations of desire, grief, and pleasure, which, as we hold, accompany all our actions, is it not true that poetic imitation works upon us similar effects? For it waters and cherishes these emotions, which ought to wither with drought, and constitutes them our rulers, when they ought to be our subjects, if we wish to become better and happier instead of worse and more miserable.

Glaucon/ I cannot deny it.

Socrates/ Then, Glaucon, whenever you meet with eulogists of Homer, who tell you that he has educated Greece, and that he deserves to be taken up and studied with an eye to the administration and guidance of human affairs, and that a man ought to regulate the tenor of his whole life by this poets directions, it will be your duty to greet them affectionately as excellent men to the best of their ability, and to admit that Homer is first and greatest among tragic poets; but you must not forget, that, with the single exception of hymns to the gods and panegyrics on the good, no poetry ought to be admitted into a state. For if you determine to admit the highly-seasoned muse of lyric or epic poetry, pleasure and pain will have sovereign power in your state, instead of law and those principles which, by the general consent of all time, are most conformable to reason.

Glaucon/ That is perfectly true.

Socrates/ Having recurred to the subject of poetry, let this defense serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in banishing from our state a pursuit which has

the tendencies we have described; for, in doing so, we were yielding to reason. But that poetry may not charge us with being, to a certain extent, harsh and rough. let us address her and say, that there is a quarrel of long standing between philosophy and poetry. For those lines;

> That yelping cur, which at its master barks, and,
> Mighty he is in the vain talk of fools, and,
> The lordly mob of god-wise folks, and,
> Poor are those subtle thinkers;

and a thousand others, are marks of an old antagonism between the two. But nevertheless let us admit, that, if the poetry whose end is to please, and imitation, can give any reasons to show that they ought to exist in a well-constituted state, we for our part will gladly welcome them home again. For we are conscious of being enchanted by such poetry ourselves; though it would be a sin to betray what seems to us the cause of truth. Am I not right in supposing that you, my friend, are enchanted by poetry, especially when you contemplate it under Homers guidance?

Glaucon/ Yes, I am, powerfully.

Socrates/ Then is it not just that the sentence of exile should remain in force against poetry, until she has made her defense either in lyrical or in some other measure?

Glaucon/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ And I suppose we shall also allow those of her patrons who are lovers of poetry without being poets, to advocate her cause in prose by maintaining that poetry is not only pleasurable, but also profitable in its bearings upon governments, and upon human life; and we shall listen favorably. For we shall be gainers, I presume, if poetry can be proved to be profitable as well as pleasurable.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly we shall be gainers.

Socrates/ But if not, why in that case, my dear friend, we must take a lesson from those persons who, after becoming enamored of an object, deny their passion at any cost, if they think it injurious; for though the love of such poetry which has grown up in us under the training of our admirable constitutions, will make us cordially desirous that it should appear perfectly excellent and true, still, so long as it is unable to make good its defense we shall protect ourselves, as we listen, by inwardly repeating, like a charm, the argument which we have just brought to a close, and we shall be on our guard against falling anew into that childish passion, which most people acknowledge. At any rate, we have learned that we must not make a serious pursuit of such poetry, in the belief that it grasps truth and is good; on the contrary, the listener, apprehending danger to the constitution within him, is bound to be on his guard against it, and to adopt the opinion which we have expressed on the subject.

Glaucon/ I thoroughly agree with you.

Socrates/ Indeed, my dear Glaucon, the choice between becoming a good or a bad man involves a great stake, yes, a greater stake than people suppose. Therefore it is wrong to be heedless of justice and the rest of virtue, under the excitement of honor, or wealth, or power, or even of poetry.

Glaucon/ I agree with you, at the conclusion of our inquiry; and I fancy everyone else will do the same.

Socrates/ And yet, we have not discussed the principal wages of virtue, and the greatest of the prizes that are held out to it.

Glaucon/ If there are others greater than those already mentioned, they must be of extraordinary magnitude.

Socrates/ But how, can anything great be compressed into a brief space of time? And the whole interval between

Childhood and old age is brief, I conceive, compared to eternity.

Glaucon/ Rather describe it as nothing.

Socrates/ What then? Do you think that it is the duty of an immortal thing to trouble itself about this insignificant interval, and not about eternity?

Glaucon/ I think it ought to concern itself about eternity; but what do you mean by this?

Socrates/ Have you not learned, that our soul is immortal, and never dies?

Glaucon looked at me, and said in amazement;

Glaucon/ No, really, have not; but can you maintain this doctrine?

Socrates/ Yes, as I am an honest man; and I think you could also. It is quite easy to do it.

Glaucon/ Not to me; at the same time I should be glad to hear from you what by your account is so easy.

Socrates/ Be so good as to listen.

Glaucon/ Proceed, by all means.

Socrates/ Do you call one thing good, and another evil?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And do we hold the same opinion as to the meaning of the two terms?

Glaucon/ What opinion do you hold?

Socrates/ I hold that the term evil comprises everything that destroys and corrupts, and the term good, everything that preserves and benefits.

Glaucon/ So do I.

Socrates/ Again; do you maintain that everything has its evil, and its good? Do you say, for example, that the eyes are liable to the evil of ophthalmia, the entire body to disease,

corn to mildew, timber to rot, copper and iron to rust, or, in other words, that almost everything is liable to some connatural evil and malady?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And is it not the case that, whenever an object is attacked by one of these maladies, it is impaired, and, in the end, completely broken up and destroyed by it?

Glaucon/ Doubtless it is so.

Socrates/ Hence everything is destroyed by its own connatural evil and vice; otherwise, if it be not destroyed by this, there is nothing else that can corrupt it. For that which is good will never destroy anything, nor yet that which is neither good nor evil.

Glaucon/ Of course not.

Socrates/ If then we can find among existing things one which is liable to a particular evil, which can indeed mar it, but cannot break it up or destroy it, shall we not be at once certain that a thing so constituted can never perish?

Glaucon/ That would be a reasonable conclusion.

Socrates/ Well, then, is not the soul liable to a malady which renders it evil?

Glaucon/ Certainly it is; all those things which we were lately discussing, injustice, intemperance, cowardice, and ignorance, produce that result.

Socrates/ That being the case, does anyone of these things bring about the dissolution and destruction of the soul? Turn it over well in your mind, that we may not be misled by supposing that, when the crimes of the unjust and foolish man are found out, he is destroyed by his injustice, which is a depraved state of the soul. No, consider the case thus. The depravity of the body, that is to say, disease, wastes and destroys the body, and reduces it to a state in

which it ceases to be a body; and all the things, which we named just now, are brought by their own proper vice, which corrupts them by its adhesion or indwelling, to a state in which they cease to exist. I am right, am I not?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then proceed to examine the soul on the same method. Is it true that, when injustice and other vices reside in the soul, they corrupt and wither it by contact or indwelling, until they have brought it to death, and severed it from the body?

Glaucon/ Certainly, they do not produce that effect.

Socrates/ Well but, on the other hand, it is irrational to suppose that a thing can be destroyed by the depravity of another thing, though it cannot be destroyed by its own.

Glaucon/ True, it is irrational.

Socrates/ Yes it is, Glaucon; for you must remember that we do not imagine that a body is to be destroyed by the proper depravity of its food, whatever that may be, whether moldiness or rottenness or anything else. But if the depravity of the food itself produces in the body a disorder proper to the body, we shall assert that the body has been destroyed by its food remotely, but by its own proper vice, or disease, immediately; and we shall always disclaim the notion that the body can be corrupted by the depravity of its food, which is a different thing from the body, that is to say, the notion that the body can be corrupted by an alien evil, without the introduction of its own native evil.

Glaucon/ You are perfectly correct;.

Socrates/ Then according to the same reasoning, unless depravity of body introduces into the soul depravity of soul, let us never suppose that the soul can be destroyed by an alien evil without the presence of its own peculiar disease;

for that would be to suppose that one thing can be destroyed by the evil of another thing.

Glaucon/ That is a reasonable statement.

Socrates/ Well then, let us either refute this doctrine and point out our mistake, or else, so long as it remains unrefuted, let us never assert that a fever, or any other disease, or fatal violence, or even the act of cutting up the entire body into the smallest possible pieces, can have any tendency to destroy the soul, until it has been demonstrated, that, in consequence of this treatment of the body, the soul itself becomes more unjust and more unholy. For, so long as a thing is exempt from its own proper evil, while an evil foreign to it appears in another subject, let us not allow it to be said that this thing, whether it be a soul or anything else, is in danger of being destroyed.

Glaucon/ Well, certainly no one will ever prove that the souls of the dying become more unjust in consequence of death.

Socrates/ But in case anyone should venture to encounter the argument, and to assert that the dying man becomes more depraved and unjust, in order to save himself from being compelled to admit that the soul is immortal, I suppose we shall infer that, if the objector is right, injustice is as fatal as a disease to its possessor; and we shall expect those who catch this essentially deadly disorder to die by its agency, quickly or slowly, according to the violence of the attack; instead of finding, as we do at present, that the unjust are put to death in consequence of their injustice, by the agency of other people who punish them for their crimes.

Glaucon/ Then really, injustice cannot be thought such a very dreadful thing, if it is to be fatal to its owner; because in that case it will be a release from evils. But I am inclined to think that, on the contrary, we shall find that it kills other

people if it can, while it endows its possessor with peculiar vitality, and with sleeplessness as well as vitality. So widely and permanently is it removed, to all appearance, from any tendency to destroy its owner.

Socrates/ You say well. For surely when the soul cannot be killed and destroyed by its own depravity and its own evil, hardly will the evil, which is charged with the destruction of another thing, destroy a soul or anything else, beyond its own appropriate object.

Glaucon/ Yes, hardly; at least that is the natural inference.

Socrates/ Hence, as it is destroyed by no evil at all, whether foreign to it or its own, it is clear that the soul must be always existing, and therefore immortal.

Glaucon/ It must.

Socrates/ Well then, let us consider this proved. And, if so, you understand that the souls that exist must be always the same. For, if none be destroyed, they cannot become fewer. Nor yet can they become more numerous; because if any class of things immortal became more numerous you know that something mortal must have contributed to swell its numbers; in which case, everything would finally be immortal.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ But reason will forbid our entertaining this opinion, which we must therefore disavow. On the other hand, do not let us imagine that the soul in its essential nature, and viewed by itself, can possibly be fraught with abundance of variety, unlikeness, and disagreement.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ A thing cannot easily be eternal, as we have just proved the soul to be, if it is compounded of many parts, and if the mode of composition employed is not the very best.

Glaucon/ Probably it cannot.

Socrates/ Now the immortality of the soul has been established beyond the reach of doubt by our recent argument, to which other demonstrations might be added; but to understand its real nature, we must look at it, not, as we are now doing, after it has been marred by its association with the body, and by other evils; but we must carefully contemplate it by the aid of reasoning, when it appears in unsullied purity; and then its surpassing beauty will be discovered, and the nature of justice and injustice, along with all the questions which we have now discussed, will be far more clearly discerned. As it is, we have given a true account of the soul in its present appearance. But we have looked at it in a state like that of the sea god Glaucus; whose original nature can no longer be readily discerned by the eye, because the old members of his body have been either broken off, or crushed and in every way marred by the action of the waves, and because extraneous substances, like shellfish and seaweed and stones, have grown to him. so that he bears a closer resemblance to any wild beast whatever than to his natural self. The soul, as we are contemplating it, has been reduced to a similar state by a thousand evils. But we ought to fix our attention on one part of it exclusively, Glaucon.

Glaucon/ On what part?

Socrates/ On its love of wisdom, that we may learn to what it clings, and with what it desires to have intercourse, in virtue of its close connection with the divine, the immortal, and the eternal; and what it would become if it invariably pursued the divine, and were, by the impulse thence derived, lifted out of the sea in which it now is, and disencumbered of the stones and shellfish and that uncouth multitude of earthy and rocky substances, with which, because earth has been its food, it is now overgrown in

consequence of those banquetings which are called felicitous. And then we should see whether it is essentially multiform or uniform, or otherwise constituted, and how. But at present we have, if I am not mistaken, discussed pretty thoroughly its affections and manifestations in human life.

Glaucon/ Yes, undoubtedly we have.

Socrates/ And have we not, divested ourselves of all secondary considerations in the course of the argument; and, without introducing the rewards and the reputation which justice confers, as you said that Homer and Hesiod do, have we not found that justice, taken by itself, is best for the soul, also taken by itself, and that the soul is bound to practice just actions, whether it possess the ring of Gyges, and, in addition to this ring, the helmet of Hades, or not?

Glaucon/ It is most true that we have done so.

Socrates/ Then may we now, Glaucon, proceed without offence to take into account those great and abundant rewards, which justice, along with the rest of virtue, wins to the soul from gods and men, not only during a man's lifetime, but also after his death?

Glaucon/ Yes, undoubtedly we may.

Socrates/ Will you repay me what you borrowed in the course of the argument?

Glaucon/ Pray what did I borrow?

Socrates/ I granted to you that the just man should have the reputation of being unjust, and the unjust man the reputation of being just. For you were of opinion, that, even if it were impossible that the true state of the case should be concealed both from men and gods, still this ought to be granted for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. You remember, do you not?

Glaucon/ Indeed, I should be in fault if I did not.

Socrates/ But, now that judgment has been passed upon them, I, in my turn, demand in behalf of justice, that we should admit the estimation, in which she is held, to be what it really is, both among gods and among men; in order that she may receive the prizes of victory, which she earns by her outward appearance and bestows upon those who possess her, now that it has been proved that the blessings derived from really being just are given by her, without any deception, to those who truly receive her.

Glaucon/ Your demand is a just one.

Socrates/ Then will you not first restore to me this admission, that the gods at least are not mistaken as to the real character of the just and the unjust man?

Glaucon/ We will.

Socrates/ That being the case, the one will be dear to me gods, and the other hateful in their sight, as we also agreed originally.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And shall we not agree that all things which come from the gods, come in the best possible shape to the man whom they love, unless some past sin has already doomed him to a certain amount of suffering?

Glaucon/ Certainly they do.

Socrates/ Hence, in the case of the just man, we must assume that, whether poverty be his lot, or sickness, or any other reputed evil, all will work for his final advantage, either in this life, or in the next. For, unquestionably, the gods can never neglect a man who determines to strive earnestly to

become just, and by the practice of virtue to grow as much like God as man is permitted to do.

Glaucon/ No, such a man is not likely to be neglected by one whom he resembles.

Socrates/ But, in the case of the unjust man, must we not entertain the opposite opinion?

Glaucon/ Certainly we must.

Socrates/ Then these will be the prizes bestowed by the gods upon the just man.

Glaucon/ So it seems to me, at all events.

Socrates/ But what, do men bestow on him? Does not the case stand thus, if we are to set down the truth? Do not those clever unjust men behave like runners who run well from the starting-place to the turning post, but flag from thence to the goal? They start off briskly, but end by making themselves ridiculous, and slink away crestfallen and uncrowned. But the really good runners receive the prize at the end of the course, and are crowned. Is not this also generally the case with the just? Towards the close of every action, every social relation, and life itself, do they not gain a good name, and win the prizes from the hands of their fellow-men?

Glaucon/ Certainly they do.

Socrates/ Then will you suffer me to say of them what you said of the unjust? For I shall not hesitate to declare that the just, when they are advanced in years, hold office, if they like, in their own city, and marry into what families they please, and wed their daughters to whomsoever they choose. In a word, I now say of the just all that you said of the unjust. On the other hand, I likewise affirm of the unjust, that the greater part of them, even if they escape detection in their youth, are found out and turned into ridicule at the end of their course; and that, as they grow old, they are insulted in

their misery by strangers as well as by their fellow-citizens, and forced to submit to the scourge, and finally to the rack and the heated iron, which you rightly described as barbarous treatment. Imagine yourself to have been told by me that they undergo all those inflictions. And now. as I said, consider whether you will suffer me to speak in this way.

Glaucon/ Undoubtedly I shall; for your statement is just.

Socrates/ Such then, will be the prizes, the rewards, and the gifts, which are bestowed on the just man, in his lifetime, by gods and by men, in addition to those good things which justice of itself placed in his possession.

Glaucon/ Yes, and they are very magnificent, as well as very certain.

Socrates/ These, however, are nothing, in number or in magnitude, compared with the lot that awaits the just and the unjust after death. And this must be described, in order that we may award to each the complement of recompense, which the argument is bound to set forth.

Glaucon/ Speak on; there are few things that I would more gladly hear.

Socrates/ Well, I will tell you a tale, not like that of Odysseus to Alcinous, but of what once happened to a brave man, Er the son of Armenius, a native of Pamphylia, who, according to story, was killed in battle. When the bodies of the slain were taken up ten days afterwards for burial in a state of decomposition, Ers body was found to be still fresh. He was carried home, and was on the point of being interred, when, on the twelfth day after his death, as he lay on the funeral-pyre, he came to life again, and then proceeded to describe what he had seen in the other world. His story was, that when the soul had gone out of him, it travelled in company with many others, till they came to a mysterious place, in which were two gaps, adjoining one another, in the

earth, and exactly opposite them two gaps above in the heaven. Between these gaps sate judges, who, after passing sentence, commanded the just to take the road to the right upwards through the heaven, and fastened in front of them some symbol of the judgment that had been given; while the unjust were ordered to take the road downwards to the left, and also carried behind them evidence of all their evil deeds. When he came to the place himself, he was told that he would have to carry to men a report of the proceedings of that other world; and he was admonished to listen, and watch everything that went on there. So he looked, and beheld the souls on one side taking their departure at one of the gaps in the heaven and the corresponding gap in the earth, after judgment had been passed upon them; while at the two other gaps he saw them arriving, squalid and dusty, or pure and bright, according as they ascended from earth, or descended from heaven. Each soul, as it arrived, wore a travel-stained appearance, and gladly went away into the meadow and there took up quarters, as people do when some great festival is pending. Greetings passed between all that were known to one another; and those who had descended from heaven were questioned about heaven by those who had risen out of the earth; while the latter were questioned by the former about earth. Those who were come from earth told their tale with lamentations and tears, as they bethought them of all the dreadful things that they had seen and suffered in their subterranean journey, which they said had lasted a thousand years; while those who were come from heaven described enjoyments and sights of marvelous beauty. It would take a long time, Glaucon, to repeat at length the many particulars of their stories; but, according to Er, the main points were the following. For everyone of all the crimes, and all the personal injuries, committed by them, they suffered tenfold retribution when the turn for it

came. The cycle of punishment recommenced every century, because the length of human life was estimated at a hundred years, the object being to make them pay the penalty for each offence ten times over. Thus, all who had been guilty of a number of murders, or had betrayed and enslaved cities and armies, or had been accomplices in any other villainy, were intended to undergo tenfold sufferings for all and each of their offences; while, on the other hand, those who had done any charitable acts, and had shown themselves just and holy, were meant to receive on the same principle their due reward. With regard to those whose death followed close upon their birth, he gave some particulars which need not be recorded. But, according to his narrative, the punishment for impiety, disobedience to parents, and the murder of near relations, was unusually severe; and the reward for piety and obedience unusually great. For he was within hearing, he said, when one of the spirits asked another where Ardiaeus the Great was. Now this Ardiaeus had been sovereign in a city of Pamphylia, a thousand years before that time, and was said to have put his aged father and elder brother to death, besides committing a number of other wicked actions. The spirit to whom the question was addressed, replied, he is not come, and is not likely to come hither. For this, you must know, was one of the terrible sights that we beheld. When we were close to the aperture, and were on the point of ascending, after having undergone all our other sufferings, we suddenly came in sight of Ardiaeus and others, of whom the greater part, I think I may say, had been despots; though it is true there were also a few private persons, who had once been reckoned among enormous criminals. These people, when they thought themselves sure of ascending immediately, were repulsed by the aperture, which bellowed whenever one of these incurable sinners, or anybody who had not fully expiated his

offences, attempted to ascend. Thereupon certain fierce and fiery-looking men, who were in attendance and understood the meaning of the sound, seized some of them by the waist and carried them off; but Ardiaeus and others were bound, hand and foot and head, and thrown down, and flayed with scourges, and dragged out by the wayside, and carded, like wool, upon thorn-bushes; and those who were passing by at the time were informed why they were put to this torture, and that they were being carried away in order to be flung into Tartarus. We had already gone through a great variety of alarms, but none of them were equal to the terror that then seized us, lest that sound should be uttered when any of us tried to go up; and most glad we all were to ascend, when it was not heard. This will convey an idea of the penalties and the tortures; while the rewards were precisely the opposite. When seven days had elapsed since the arrival of the spirits in the meadow, they were compelled to leave the place, when their time came, and set out on the eighth day, and travel three days, till they arrived on the fourth at a place, from whence they looked down upon a straight pillar of light, stretching across the whole heaven and earth, more like the rainbow than anything else, only brighter and clearer. This they reached, when they had gone forward a day's journey; and, arriving at the center of the light, they saw that its extremities were fastened by chains to the sky. For this light binds the sky together, like the hawser that strengthens a trireme, and thus holds together the whole revolving universe. To the extremities is fastened the distaff of Necessity, by means of which all the revolutions of the universe are kept up. The shaft and hook of this distaff are made of steel; the whorl is a compound of steel and other materials. The nature of the whorl may be thus described. In shape it is like an ordinary whorl; but from Ers account we must picture it to ourselves under the form of a large

hollow whorl, scooped out right through, into which a similar, but smaller, whorl is nicely inserted, like those boxes which fit into one another. In the same way a third whorl is inserted within the second, a fourth within the third, and so on to four more. For in all, there are eight whorls, inserted into one another, each concentric circle showing its rim above the next outer, and all together forming one solid whorl embracing the shaft, which is passed right through the center of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the broadest rim; the sixth has the next broadest; then comes the fourth; then the eighth; then the seventh; then the fifth; then the third; and the second has the narrowest rim. The rim of the greatest whorl exhibits a variety of colors; that of the seventh is most brilliant; that of the eighth derives its color from the reflected light of the seventh; that of the second and that of the fifth are similar, but of a deeper color than the others; the third has the palest color; the fourth is rather red; and the sixth is almost as pale as the third. Now the distaff as a whole spins round with uniform velocity; but while the whole revolves, the seven inner circles travel slowly round in the opposite direction; and of them the eighth moves quickest, and after it the seventh, sixth and fifth, which revolve together; the fourth, as it appeared to them, completes its revolution with a velocity inferior to the last mentioned; the third ranks fourth in speed; and the second, fifth. The distaff spins round upon the knees of Necessity. Upon each of its circles stands a siren, who travels round with the circle, uttering one note in one tone; and from all the eight notes there results a single harmony. At equal distances around sit three other personages, each on a throne. These are the daughters of Necessity, the Fates, Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos; who, clothed in white robes, with garlands on their heads, chant to the music of the sirens, Lachesis the events of the past,

Clotho those of the present, Atropos those of the future. Clotho with her right hand takes hold of the outermost rim of the distaff, and twirls it altogether, at intervals; and Atropos with her left hand twirls the inner circles in like manner; while Lachesis takes hold of each in turn with either hand. Now the souls, immediately on their arrival, were required to go to Lachesis. An interpreter first of all marshaled them in order, and then having taken from the lap of Lachesis a number of lots and plans of life, mounted; high pulpit, and spoke as follows; Thus saith the maiden Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Ye short-lived souls, a new generation of men shall here begin the cycle of its mortal existence. Your destiny shall not be allotted to you, but you shall choose it for yourselves. Let him who draws the first lot be the first to choose a life, which shall be his irrevocably. Virtue owns no master; he who honors her shall have more of her, and he who slights her, less. The responsibility lies with the chooser. Heaven is guiltless. Having said this, he threw the lots down upon the crowd; and each spirit took up the one which fell by his side, except Er himself, who was forbidden to do so. Each, as he took up his lot, saw what number he had drawn. This done, the plans of life, which far outnumbered the souls that were present, were laid before them on the ground. They were of every kind. There were lives of all living things, and among them every sort of human life. They included sovereignties, of which some were permanent, and others were abruptly terminated and ended in poverty and exile and beggary. There were also lives of famous men, renowned either for beauty of person and feature, for bodily strength and skill in games, or else for high birth and the merits of ancestors; and in the same way there were lives of undistinguished men, and likewise lives of celebrated and uncelebrated women. But no settled character of soul was included in them, because with the

change of life, the soul inevitably becomes changed itself. But in every other respect the materials were very variously combined, wealth appearing here, and poverty there; disease here, and health there; and here again a mean between these extremes. This, my dear Glaucon, is apparently the moment when everything is at stake with a man; and for this reason, above all others, it is the duty of each of us diligently to investigate and study, to the neglect of every other subject, that science which may haply enable a man to learn and discover, who will render him so instructed as to be able to discriminate between a good and an evil life, and according to his means to choose, always and everywhere, that better life, by carefully calculating the influence which the things just mentioned, in combination or in separation, have upon real excellence of life; and who will teach him to understand what evil or good is wrought by beauty tempered with poverty or wealth, and how the result is affected by the state of soul which enters into the combination; and what is the consequence of blending together such ingredients as high or humble birth, private or public life, bodily strength or weakness, readiness or slowness of apprehension, and everything else of the kind, whether naturally belonging to the soul or accidentally acquired by it; so as to be able to form a judgment from all these data combined, and, with an eye steadily fixed on the nature of the soul, to choose between the good and the evil life, giving the name of evil to the life which will draw the soul into becoming more unjust, and the name of good to the life which will lead it to become more just, and bidding farewell to every other consideration. For we have seen that in life and in death it is best to choose thus. With iron resolution must he hold fast this opinion when he enters the future world, in order that, there as well as here, he may escape being dazzled by wealth and similar evils; and may not plunge into usurpations or other

corresponding courses of action, to the inevitable detriment of others, and to his own still heavier affliction; but may know how to select that life which always steers a middle course between such extremes, and to shun excess on either side to the best of his power, not only in this life, but also in that which is to come. For, by acting thus, he is sure to become a most happy man.

To return; the messenger from the other world reported that on the same occasion the Interpreter spoke to this effect; Even the last comer, if he chooses with discretion and lives strenuously, will find in store for him a life that is anything but bad, with which he may well be content. Let not the first choose carelessly, or the last despond. As soon as he had said these words, the one who had drawn the first lot advanced, and chose the most absolute despotism he could find; but so thoughtless was he, and greedy, that he had not carefully examined every point before making his choice; so that he failed to remark that he was fated therein, amongst other calamities, to devour his own children. Therefore, when he had studied it at his leisure, he began to beat his breast and bewail his choice; and, disregarding the previous admonitions of the Interpreter, he laid the blame of his misfortune not upon himself, but upon Fortune and Destiny, and upon anybody sooner than himself. He was one of those who had come from heaven, and had lived during his former life under a well-ordered constitution, and hence a measure of virtue had fallen to his share through the influence of habit, unaided by philosophy. Indeed, according to Ers account, more than half the persons similarly deluded, had come from heaven; which is to be explained by the fact of their never having felt the discipline of trouble. For the majority of those who came from the earth did not make their choice in this careless manner, because they had known affliction themselves, and had seen it in others. On

this account, and also through the chances of the lot, most of the souls exchanged an evil destiny for a good, or a good destiny for an evil. But if a man were always to study wisdom soundly, whenever he entered upon his career on earth, and if it fell to his lot to choose anywhere but among the very last, there is every probability, to judge by the account brought from the other world, that he would not only be happy while on earth, but also that he would travel from this world to the other and back again, not along a rough and subterranean, but along a smooth and heavenly road. It was a truly wonderful sight, he said, to watch how each soul selected its. life, a sight, at once melancholy, and ludicrous, and strange. The experience of their former life generally guided the choice. Thus, he saw the soul, which had once been that of Orpheus, choosing the life of a swan, because from having been put to death by women, he detested the whole race so much, that he would not consent to be conceived and born of a woman. And he saw the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale. He saw also a swan changing its nature, and selecting the life of a man; and its example was followed by other musical animals. The soul that drew the twentieth lot chose a lion's life. It was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who shrunk from becoming a man, because he recollected the decision respecting the arms of Achilles. He was followed by the soul of Agamemnon, who had been also taught by his sufferings to hate mankind so bitterly, that he adopted in exchange an eagle's life. The soul of Atalanta, which had drawn one of the middle lots, beholding the great honors attached to the life of an athlete, could not resist the temptation to take it up. Then he saw the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus, assuming the nature of a skillful work-woman. And in the distance, among the last, he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites putting on the exterior of an ape. It so happened that the soul of Odysseus

had drawn the last lot of all. When he came up to choose, the memory of his former sufferings had so abated his ambition, that he went about a long time looking for a quiet retired life, which with great trouble he discovered lying about, and thrown contemptuously aside by the others. As soon as he saw it, he chose it gladly, and said that he would have done the same, if he had even drawn the first lot. In like manner some of the other animals passed into men, and into one another, the unjust passing into the wild, and the just into the tame; and every kind of mixture ensued.

Now, when all the souls had chosen their lives in the order of the lots, they advanced in their turn to Lachesis, who dispatched with each of them the Destiny he had selected, to guard his life and satisfy his choice. This Destiny first led the soul to Clotho in such a way as to pass beneath her hand and the whirling motion of the distaff, and thus ratified the fate which each had chosen in the order of precedence. After touching her, the same Destiny led the soul next to the spinning of Atropos, and thus rendered the doom of Clotho irreversible. From thence the souls passed straightforward under the throne of Necessity. When the rest had passed through it, Er himself also passed through; and they all travelled into the plain of Forgetfulness, through dreadful suffocating heat, the ground being destitute of trees and of all vegetation. As the evening came on, they took up their quarters by the bank of the river of Indifference, whose water cannot be held in any vessel. All persons are compelled to drink a certain quantity of the water; but those who are not preserved by prudence drink more than the quantity; and each, as he drinks, forgets everything. When they had gone to rest, and it was now midnight, there was a clap of thunder and an earthquake; and in a moment the souls were carried up to their birth, this way and that, like shooting stars. Er himself was prevented from drinking any of the water; but

how, and by what road, he reached his body, he knew not; only he knew that he suddenly opened his eyes at dawn, and found himself laid out upon the funeral-pyre.

And thus, Glaucon, the tale was preserved, and did not perish; and it may also preserve us, if we will listen to its warnings; in which case we shall pass prosperously across the river of Lethe, and not defile our souls. Indeed, if we follow my advice, believing the soul to be immortal, and to possess the power of entertaining all evil, as well as all good, we shall ever hold fast the upward road, and devotedly cultivate justice combined with wisdom; in order that we may be loved by one another and by the gods, not only during our stay on earth, but also when, like conquerors in the games collecting the presents of their admirers, we receive the prizes of virtue; and, in order that both in this life and during the journey of a thousand years which we have described, we may never cease to prosper.

THE END.

Republic

Translated by G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve.

Socrates, Cephalus, Glaucon, Thrasymachus, Adeimantus, Cleitophon, Polemarchus, Boy

Book 1

Socrates/ I went down to the Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, the son of Ariston. I wanted to say a prayer to the goddess, and I was also curious to see how they would manage the festival, since they were holding it for the first time. I thought the procession of the local residents was a fine one and that the one conducted by the Thracians was no less outstanding. After we had said our prayer and seen the procession, we started back towards Athens. Polemarchus saw us from a distance as we were setting off for home and told his slave to run and ask us to wait for him. The slave caught hold of my cloak from behind:

Boy/ Polemarchus wants you to wait.

Socrates/ I turned around and asked where Polemarchus was.

Boy/ He's coming up behind you, please wait for him.

Glaucon/ All right, we will.

Socrates/ Just then Polemarchus caught up with us. Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, was with him and so were Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and some others, all of whom were apparently on their way from the procession.

Polemarchus/ It looks to me, Socrates, as if you two are starting off for Athens.

Socrates/ It looks the way it is, then.

Polemarchus/ Do you see how many we are?

Socrates/ I do.

Polemarchus/ Well, you must either prove stronger than we are, or you will have to stay here.

Socrates/ Isn't there another alternative, namely, that we persuade you to let us go?

Polemarchus/ But could you persuade us, if we won't listen?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Polemarchus/ Well, we won't listen; you'd better make up your mind to that.

Adeimantus/ Don't you know, that there is to be a torch race on horseback for the goddess tonight?

Socrates/ On horseback? That's something new. Are they going to race on horseback and hand the torches on in relays, or what?

Polemarchus/ In relays, and there will be an all-night festival that will be well worth seeing. After dinner, we'll go out to look at it. We'll be joined there by many of the young men, and we'll talk. So don't go; stay.

Glaucon/ It seems, that we'll have to stay.

Socrates/ If you think so, then we must.

So we went to Polemarchus' house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Charmantides of Paeania, and Clitophon the son of Aristonymus. Polemarchus' father, Cephalus, was also there, and I thought he looked quite old, as I hadn't seen him for some time. He was sitting on a sort of cushioned chair with a wreath on his head, as he had been offering a sacrifice in the courtyard. There was a circle of chairs, and we sat down by him.

As soon as he saw me, Cephalus welcomed me and said:

Cephalus/ Socrates, you don't come down to the Piraeus to see us as often as you should. If it were still easy for me to walk to town, you wouldn't have to come here; we'd come to you. But, as it is, you ought to come here more often, for you should know that as the physical pleasures wither away, my desire for conversation and its pleasures grows. So do as I say: Stay with these young men now, but come regularly to see us, just as you would to friends or relatives.

Socrates/ Indeed, Cephalus, I enjoy talking with the very old, for we should ask them, as we might ask those who have travelled a road that we too will probably have to follow, what kind of road it is, whether rough and difficult or smooth and easy. And I'd gladly find out from you what you think about this, as you have reached the point in life the poets call "the threshold of old age." Is it a difficult time? What is your report about it?

Cephalus/ By god, Socrates, I'll tell you exactly what I think. A number of us, who are more or less the same age, often get together in accordance with the old saying. When we meet, the majority complain about the lost pleasures they remember from their youth, those of sex, drinking parties, feasts, and the other things that go along with them, and they get angry as if they had been deprived of important things and had lived well then but are now hardly living at all. Some others moan about the abuse heaped on old people by their relatives, and because of this they repeat over and over that old age is the cause of many evils. But I don't think they blame the real cause, Socrates, for if old age were really the cause, I should have suffered in the same way and so should everyone else of my age. But as it is, I've met some who don't feel like that in the least. Indeed, I was once present when someone asked the poet Sophocles: "How are you as far as sex goes, Sophocles? Can you still make love with a woman?" "Quiet, man," the poet replied, "I am very

glad to have escaped from all that, like a slave who has escaped from a savage and tyrannical master." I thought at the time that he was right, and I still do, for old age brings peace and freedom from all such things. When the appetites relax and cease to importune us, everything Sophocles said comes to pass, and we escape from many mad masters. In these matters and in those concerning relatives, the real cause isn't old age, Socrates, but the way people live. If they are moderate and contented, old age, too, is only moderately onerous; if they aren't, both old age and youth are hard to bear.

Socrates/ I admired him for saying that and I wanted him to tell me more, so I urged him on: When you say things like that, Cephalus, I suppose that the majority of people don't agree, they think that you bear old age more easily not because of the way you live but because you're wealthy, for the wealthy, they say, have many consolations.

Cephalus/ That's true; they don't agree. And there is something in what they say, though not as much as they think. Themistocles' retort is relevant here. When someone from Seriphus insulted him by saying that his high reputation was due to his city and not to himself, he replied that, had he been a Seriphian, he wouldn't be famous, but neither would the other even if he had been an Athenian. The same applies to those who aren't rich and find old age hard to bear: A good person wouldn't easily bear old age if he were poor, but a bad one wouldn't be at peace with himself even if he were wealthy.

Socrates/ Did you inherit most of your wealth, Cephalus, or did you make it for yourself?

Cephalus/ What did I make for myself, Socrates, you ask. As a money-maker I'm in a sort of mean between my grandfather and my father. My grandfather and namesake

inherited about the same amount of wealth as I possess but multiplied it many times. My father, Lysanias, however, diminished that amount to even less than I have now. As for me, I'm satisfied to leave my sons here not less but a little more than I inherited.

Socrates/ The reason I asked is that you don't seem to love money too much. And those who haven't made their own money are usually like you. But those who have made it for themselves are twice as fond of it as those who haven't. Just as poets love their poems and fathers love their children, so those who have made their own money don't just care about it because it's useful, as other people do, but because it's something they've made themselves. This makes them poor company, for they haven't a good word to say about anything except money.

Cephalus/ That's true.

Socrates/ It certainly is. But tell me something else. What's the greatest good you've received from being very wealthy?

Cephalus/ What I have to say probably wouldn't persuade most people. But you know, Socrates, that when someone thinks his end is near, he becomes frightened and concerned about things he didn't fear before. It's then that the stories we're told about Hades, about how people who've been unjust here must pay the penalty there—stories he used to make fun of—twist his soul this way and that for fear they're true. And whether because of the weakness of old age or because he is now closer to what happens in Hades and has a clearer view of it, or whatever it is, he is filled with foreboding and fear, and he examines himself to see whether he has been unjust to anyone. If he finds many injustices in his life, he awakes from sleep in terror, as children do, and lives in anticipation of bad things to come. But someone who

knows that he hasn't been unjust has sweet good hope as his constant companion—a nurse to his old age, as Pindar says, for he puts it charmingly, Socrates, when he says that when someone lives a just and pious life;

> Sweet hope is in his heart,
> Nurse and companion to his age.
> Hope, captain of the ever-twisting
> Minds of mortal men.

How wonderfully well he puts that. It's in this connection that wealth is most valuable, I'd say, not for every man but for a decent and orderly one. Wealth can do a lot to save us from having to cheat or deceive someone against our will and from having to depart for that other place in fear because we owe sacrifice to a god or money to a person. It has many other uses, but, benefit for benefit, I'd say that this is how it is most useful to a man of any understanding.

Socrates/ A fine sentiment, Cephalus, but, speaking of this very thing itself, namely, justice, are we to say unconditionally that it is speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred? Or is doing these things sometimes just, sometimes unjust? I mean this sort of thing, for example: Everyone would surely agree that if a sane man lends weapons to a friend and then asks for them back when he is out of his mind, the friend shouldn't return them, and wouldn't be acting justly if he did. Nor should anyone be willing to tell the whole truth to someone who is out of his mind.

Cephalus/ That's true.

Socrates/ Then the definition of justice isn't speaking the truth and repaying what one has borrowed.

Polemarchus/ It certainly is, Socrates, if indeed we're to trust Simonides at all.

Cephalus/ Well, then, I'll hand over the argument to you, as I have to look after the sacrifice.

Polemarchus/ So, am I then to be your heir in everything?

Cephalus/ You certainly are!

Socrates/ Cephalus said, laughing, and off he went to the sacrifice.

Then tell us, heir to the argument, just what Simonides stated about justice that you consider correct.

Polemarchus/ He stated that it is just to give to each what is owed to him. And it's a fine saying, in my view.

Socrates/ Well, now, it isn't easy to doubt Simonides, for he's a wise and godlike man. But what exactly does he mean? Perhaps you know, Polemarchus, but I don't understand him. Clearly, he doesn't mean what we said a moment ago, that it is just to give back whatever a person has lent to you, even if he's out of his mind when he asks for it. And yet what he has lent to you is surely something that's owed to him, isn't it?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But it is absolutely not to be given to him when he's out of his mind?

Polemarchus/ That's true.

Socrates/ Then it seems that Simonides must have meant something different when he says that to return what is owed is just.

Polemarchus/ Something different indeed, by god. He means that friends owe it to their friends to do good for them, never harm.

Socrates/ I follow you. Someone doesn't give a lender back what he's owed by giving him gold, if doing so would be harmful, and both he and the lender are friends. Isn't that what you think Simonides meant?

Polemarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ But what about this? Should one also give one's enemies whatever is owed to them?

Polemarchus/ By all means, one should give them what is owed to them. And in my view what enemies owe to each other is appropriately and precisely—something bad.

Socrates/ It seems then that Simonides was speaking in riddles—just like a poet! —when he said what justice is, for he thought it just to give to each what is appropriate to him, and this is what he called giving him what is owed to him.

Polemarchus/ What else did you think he meant?

Socrates/ Then what do you think he'd answer if someone asked him: "Simonides, which of the things that are owed or that are appropriate for someone or something to have does the craft we call medicine give, and to whom or what does it give them?"

Polemarchus/ It's clear that it gives medicines, food, and drink to bodies.

Socrates/ And what owed or appropriate things does the craft we call cooking give, and to whom or what does it give them?

Polemarchus/ It gives seasonings to food.

Socrates/ Good. Now, what does the craft we call justice give, and to whom or what does it give it?

Polemarchus/ If we are to follow the previous answers, Socrates, it gives benefits to friends and does harm to enemies.

Socrates/ Simonides means, then, that to treat friends well and enemies badly is justice?

Polemarchus/ I believe so.

Socrates/ And who is most capable of treating friends well and enemies badly in matters of disease and health?

Polemarchus/ A doctor.

Socrates/ And who can do so best in a storm at sea?

Polemarchus/ A ship's captain.

Socrates/ What about the just person? In what actions and what work is he most capable of benefiting friends and harming enemies?

Polemarchus/ In wars and alliances, I suppose.

Socrates/ All right. Now, when people aren't sick, Polemarchus, a doctor is useless to them?

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And so is a ship's captain to those who aren't sailing?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And to people who aren't at war, a just man is useless?

Polemarchus/ No, I don't think that at all.

Socrates/ Justice is also useful in peacetime, then?

Polemarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ And so is farming, isn't it?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ For getting produce?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And shoemaking as well?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ For getting shoes, I think you'd say?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, what is justice useful for getting and using in peacetime?

Polemarchus/ Contracts, Socrates.

Socrates/ And by contracts do you mean partnerships, or what?

Polemarchus/ I mean partnerships.

Socrates/ Is someone a good and useful partner in a game of checkers because he's just or because he's a checkers player?

Polemarchus/ Because he's a checkers player.

Socrates/ And in laying bricks and stones, is a just person a better and more useful partner than a builder?

Polemarchus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ In what kind of partnership, then, is a just person a better partner than a builder or a lyre-player, in the way that a lyre-player is better than a just person at hitting the right notes?

Polemarchus/ In money matters, I think.

Socrates/ Except perhaps, Polemarchus, in using money, for whenever one needs to buy a horse jointly, I think a horse breeder is a more useful partner, isn't he?

Polemarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And when one needs to buy a boat, it's a boat-builder or a ship's captain?

Polemarchus/ Probably.

Socrates/ In what joint use of silver or gold, then, is a just person a more useful partner than the others?

Polemarchus/ When it must be deposited for safekeeping, Socrates.

Socrates/ You mean whenever there is no need to use them but only to keep them?

Polemarchus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then it is when money isn't being used that justice is useful for it?

Polemarchus/ I'm afraid so.

Socrates/ And whenever one needs to keep a pruning knife safe, but not to use it, justice is useful both in partnerships and for the individual. When you need to use it, however, it is skill at vine pruning that's useful?

Polemarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ You'll agree, then, that when one needs to keep a shield or a lyre safe and not to use them, justice is a useful thing, but when you need to use them, it is soldiery or musicianship that's useful?

Polemarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And so, too, with everything else, justice is useless when they are in use but useful when they aren't?

Polemarchus/ It looks that way.

Socrates/ In that case, justice isn't worth much, since it is only useful for useless things. But let's look into the following point. Isn't the person most able to land a blow, whether in boxing or any other kind of fight, also most able to guard against it?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the one who is most able to guard against disease is also most able to produce it unnoticed?

Polemarchus/ So it seems to me, anyway.

Socrates/ And the one who is the best guardian of an army is the very one who can steal the enemy's plans and dispositions?

Polemarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Whenever someone is a clever guardian, then, he is also a clever thief.

Polemarchus/ Probably so.

Socrates/ If a just person is clever at guarding money, therefore, he must also be clever at stealing it.

Polemarchus/ According to our argument, at any rate.

Socrates/ A just person has turned out then, it seems, to be a kind of thief. Maybe you learned this from Homer, for he's fond of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, whom he describes as better than everyone at lying and stealing. According to you, Homer, and Simonides, then, justice seems to be some sort of craft of stealing, one that benefits friends and harms enemies. Isn't that what you meant?

Polemarchus/ No, by god, it isn't. I don't know any more what I did mean, but I still believe that to benefit one's friends and harm one's enemies is justice.

Socrates/ Speaking of friends, do you mean those a person believes to be good and useful to him or those who actually are good and useful, even if he doesn't think they are, and similarly with enemies?

Polemarchus/ Probably, one loves those one considers good and useful and hates those one considers bad and harmful.

Socrates/ But surely people often make mistakes about this, believing many people to be good and useful when they aren't, and making the opposite mistake about enemies?

Polemarchus/ They do indeed.

Socrates/ And then good people are their enemies and bad ones their friends?

Polemarchus/ That's right.

Socrates/ And so it's just to benefit bad people and harm good ones?

Polemarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ But good people are just and able to do no wrong?

Polemarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Then, according to your account, it's just to do bad things to those who do no injustice.

Polemarchus/ No, that's not just at all, Socrates; my account must be a bad one.

Socrates/ It's just, then, is it, to harm unjust people and benefit just ones?

Polemarchus/ That's obviously a more attractive view than the other one, anyway.

Socrates/ Then, it follows, Polemarchus, that it is just for the many, who are mistaken in their judgment, to harm their friends, who are bad, and benefit their enemies, who are good. And so we arrive at a conclusion opposite to what we said Simonides meant.

Polemarchus/ That certainly follows. But let's change our definition, for it seems that we didn't define friends and enemies correctly.

Socrates/ How did we define them, Polemarchus?

Polemarchus/ We said that a friend is someone who is believed to be useful.

Socrates/ And how are we to change that now?

Polemarchus/ Someone who is both believed to be useful and is useful is a friend; someone who is believed to be useful but isn't, is believed to be a friend but isn't. And the same for the enemy.

Socrates/ According to this account, then, a good person will be a friend and a bad one an enemy.

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So you want us to add something to what we said before about justice, when we said that it is just to treat friends well and enemies badly. You want us to add to this that it is just to treat well a friend who is good and to harm an enemy who is bad?

Polemarchus/ Right. That seems fine to me.

Socrates/ Is it, then, the role of a just man to harm anyone?

Polemarchus/ Certainly, he must harm those who are both bad and enemies.

Socrates/ Do horses become better or worse when they are harmed?

Polemarchus/ Worse.

Socrates/ With respect to the virtue that makes dogs good or the one that makes horses good?

Polemarchus/ The one that makes horses good.

Socrates/ And when dogs are harmed, they become worse in the virtue that makes dogs good, not horses?

Polemarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Then won't we say the same about human beings, too, that when they are harmed they become worse in human virtue?

Polemarchus/ Indeed.

Socrates/ But isn't justice human virtue?

Polemarchus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Then people who are harmed must become more unjust?

Polemarchus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Can musicians make people unmusical through music?

Polemarchus/ They cannot.

Socrates/ Or horsemen make people unhorseman-like through horsemanship?

Polemarchus/ No.

Socrates/ Well, then, can those who are just make people unjust through justice? In a word, can those who are good make people bad through virtue?

Polemarchus/ They cannot.

Socrates/ It isn't the function of heat to cool things but of its opposite?

Polemarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nor the function of dryness to make things wet but of its opposite?

Polemarchus/ Indeed.

Socrates/ Nor the function of goodness to harm but of its opposite?

Polemarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And a just person is good?

Polemarchus/ Indeed.

Socrates/ Then, Polemarchus, it isn't the function of a just person to harm a friend or anyone else, rather it is the function of his opposite, an unjust person?

Polemarchus/ In my view that's completely true, Socrates.

Socrates/ If anyone tells us, then, that it is just to give to each what he's owed and understands by this that a just man should harm his enemies and benefit his friends, he isn't wise to say it, since what he says isn't true, for it has become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone?

Polemarchus/ I agree.

Socrates/ You and I shall fight as partners, then, against anyone who tells us that Simonides, Bias, Pittacus, or any of our other wise and blessedly happy men said this.

Polemarchus/ I, at any rate, am willing to be your partner in the battle.

Socrates/ Do you know to whom I think the saying belongs that it is just to benefit friends and harm enemies?

Polemarchus/ Who?

Socrates/ I think it belongs to Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenias of Corinth, or some other wealthy man who believed himself to have great power.

Polemarchus/ That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ All right, since it has become apparent that justice and the just aren't what such people say they are, what else could they be?

While we were speaking, Thrasymachus had tried many times to take over the discussion but was restrained by those sitting near him, who wanted to hear our argument to the end. When we paused after what I'd just said, however, he couldn't keep quiet any longer. He coiled himself up like a wild beast about to spring, and he hurled himself at us as if to tear us to pieces.

Polemarchus and I were frightened and flustered as he roared into our midst:

Thrasymachus/ What nonsense have you two been talking, Socrates? Why do you act like idiots by giving way to one another? If you truly want to know what justice is, don't just ask questions and then refute the answers simply to satisfy your competitiveness or love of honor. You know very well that it is easier to ask questions than answer them. Give an answer yourself, and tell us what you say the just is. And don't tell me that it's the right, the beneficial, the profitable, the gainful, or the advantageous, but tell me clearly and exactly what you mean; for I won't accept such nonsense from you.

Socrates/ His words startled me, and, looking at him, I was afraid. And I think that if I hadn't seen him before he stared at me, I'd have been dumbstruck. But as it was, I

happened to look at him just as our discussion began to exasperate him, so I was able to answer, and, trembling a little, I said: Don't be too hard on us, Thrasymachus, for if Polemarchus and I made an error in our investigation, you should know that we did so unwillingly. If we were searching for gold, we'd never willingly give way to each other, if by doing so we'd destroy our chance of finding it. So don't think that in searching for justice, a thing more valuable than even a large quantity of gold, we'd mindlessly give way to one another or be less than completely serious about finding it. You surely mustn't think that, but rather—as I do—that we're incapable of finding it. Hence it's surely far more appropriate for us to be pitied by you clever people than to be given rough treatment.

When he heard that, he gave a loud, sarcastic laugh.

Thrasymachus/ By Heracles, that's just Socrates' usual irony. I knew, and I said so to these people earlier, that you'd be unwilling to answer and that, if someone questioned you, you'd be ironical and do anything rather than give an answer.

Socrates/ That's because you're a clever fellow, Thrasymachus. You knew very well that if you ask someone how much twelve is, and, as you ask, you warn him by saying "Don't tell me, man, that twelve is twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, for I won't accept such nonsense," then you'll see clearly, I think, that no one could answer a question framed like that. And if he said to you: "What are you saying, Thrasymachus, am I not to give any of the answers you mention, not even if twelve happens to be one of those things? I'm amazed. Do you want me to say something other than the truth? Or do you mean something else?" What answer would you give him?

Thrasymachus/ Well, so you think the two cases are alike?

Socrates/ Why shouldn't they be alike? But even if they aren't alike, yet seem so to the person you asked, do you think him any less likely to give the answer that seems right to him, whether we forbid him to or not?

Thrasymachus/ Is that what you're going to do, give one of the forbidden answers?

Socrates/ I wouldn't be surprised—provided that it's the one that seems right to me after I've investigated the matter.

Thrasymachus/ What if I show you a different answer about justice than all these—and a better one? What would you deserve then?

Socrates/ What else than the appropriate penalty for one who doesn't know, namely, to learn from the one who does know? Therefore, that's what I deserve.

Thrasymachus/ You amuse me, but in addition to learning, you must pay a fine.

Socrates/ I will as soon as I have some money.

Glaucon/ He has some already. If it's a matter of money, speak, Thrasymachus, for we'll all contribute for Socrates.

Thrasymachus/ I know, so that Socrates can carry on as usual. He gives no answer himself, and then, when someone else does give one, he takes up the argument and refutes it.

Socrates/ How can someone give an answer, when he doesn't know it and doesn't claim to know it, and when an eminent man forbids him to express the opinion he has? It's much more appropriate for you to answer, since you say you know and can tell us. So do it as a favor to me, and don't begrudge your teaching to Glaucon and the others.

While I was saying this, Glaucon and the others begged him to speak. It was obvious that Thrasymachus thought he

had a fine answer and that he wanted to earn their admiration by giving it, but he pretended that he wanted to indulge his love of victory by forcing me to answer. However, he agreed in the end, and then said:

Thrasymachus/ There you have Socrates' wisdom; he himself isn't willing to teach, but he goes around learning from others and isn't even grateful to them.

Socrates/ When you say that I learn from others you are right, Thrasymachus, but when you say that I'm not grateful, that isn't true. I show what gratitude I can, but since I have no money, I can give only praise. But just how enthusiastically I give it when someone seems to me to speak well, you'll know as soon as you've answered, for I think that you will speak well.

Thrasymachus/ Listen, then. I say that justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger. Well, why don't you praise me? But then you'd do anything to avoid having to do that.

Socrates/ I must first understand you, for I don't yet know what you mean. The advantage of the stronger, you say, is just. What do you mean, Thrasymachus? Surely you don't mean something like this: Polydamus, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are; it is to his advantage to eat beef to build up his physical strength; therefore, this food is also advantageous and just for us who are weaker than he is?

Thrasymachus/ You disgust me, Socrates. Your trick is to take hold of the argument at the point where you can do it the most harm.

Socrates/ Not at all, but tell us more clearly what you mean.

Thrasymachus/ Don't you know that some cities are ruled by a tyranny, some by a democracy, and some by an aristocracy?

Socrates/ Of course.

Thrasymachus/ And in each city this element is stronger, namely, the ruler?

Socrates/ Certainly.

Thrasymachus/ And each makes laws to its own advantage. Democracy makes democratic laws, tyranny makes tyrannical laws, and so on with the others. And they declare what they have made—what is to their own advantage—to be just for their subjects, and they punish anyone who goes against this as lawless and unjust. This, then, is what I say justice is, the same in all cities, the advantage of the established rule. Since the established rule is surely stronger, anyone who reasons correctly will conclude that the just is the same everywhere, namely, the advantage of the stronger.

Socrates/ Now I see what you mean. Whether it's true or not, I'll try to find out. But you yourself have answered that the just is the advantageous, Thrasymachus, whereas you forbade that answer to me. True, you've added "of the stronger" to it.

Thrasymachus/ And I suppose you think that's an insignificant addition.

Socrates/ It isn't clear yet whether it's significant. But it is clear that we must investigate to see whether or not it's true. I agree that the just is some kind of advantage. But you add that it's of the stronger. I don't know about that. We'll have to look into it.

Thrasymachus/ Go ahead and look.

Socrates/ We will. Tell me, don't you also say that it is just to obey the rulers?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ And are the rulers in all cities infallible, or are they liable to error?

Thrasymachus/ No doubt they are liable to error.

Socrates/ When they undertake to make laws, therefore, they make some correctly, others incorrectly?

Thrasymachus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ And a law is correct if it prescribes what is to the rulers' own advantage and incorrect if it prescribes what is to their disadvantage? Is that what you mean?

Thrasymachus/ It is.

Socrates/ And whatever laws they make must be obeyed by their subjects, and this is justice?

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then, according to your account, it is just to do not only what is to the advantage of the stronger, but also the opposite, what is not to their advantage.

Thrasymachus/ What are you saying?

Socrates/ The same as you. But let's examine it more fully. Haven't we agreed that, in giving orders to their subjects, the rulers are sometimes in error as to what is best for themselves, and yet that it is just for their subjects to do whatever their rulers order? Haven't we agreed to that much?

Thrasymachus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then you must also think that you have agreed that it is just to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and those who are stronger, whenever they unintentionally order what is bad for themselves. But you also say that it is just for the others to obey the orders they give. You're terribly clever, Thrasymachus, but doesn't it necessarily follow that it is just to do the opposite of what you said, since the weaker

are then ordered to do what is disadvantageous to the stronger?

Polemarchus/ By god, Socrates, that's quite clear.

Clitophon/ If you are to be his witness anyway.

Polemarchus/ Who needs a witness? Thrasymachus himself agrees that the rulers sometimes order what is bad for themselves and that it is just for the others to do it.

Clitophon/ That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasymachus maintained that it is just to obey the orders of the rulers.

Polemarchus/ He also maintained, Clitophon, that the advantage of the stronger is just. And having maintained both principles he went on to agree that the stronger sometimes gives orders to those who are weaker than he is—in other words, to his subjects—that are disadvantageous to the stronger himself. From these agreements it follows that what is to the advantage of the stronger is no more just than what is not to his advantage.

Clitophon/ But, he said that the advantage of the stronger is what the stronger believes to be his advantage. This is what the weaker must do, and this is what he maintained the just to be.

Polemarchus/ That isn't what he said.

Socrates/ It makes no difference, Polemarchus. If Thrasymachus wants to put it that way now, let's accept it. Tell me, Thrasymachus, is this what you wanted to say the just is, namely, what the stronger believes to be to his advantage, whether it is in fact to his advantage or not? Is that what we are to say you mean?

Thrasymachus/ Not at all. Do you think I'd call someone who is in error stronger at the very moment he errs?

Socrates/ I did think that was what you meant when you agreed that the rulers aren't infallible but are liable to error.

Thrasymachus/ That's because you are a false witness in arguments, Socrates. When someone makes an error in the treatment of patients, do you call him a doctor in regard to that very error? Or when someone makes an error in accounting, do you call him an accountant in regard to that very error in calculation? I think that we express ourselves in words that, taken literally, do say that a doctor is in error, or an accountant, or a grammarian. But each of these, insofar as he is what we call him, never errs, so that, according to the precise account (and you are a stickler for precise accounts), no craftsman ever errs. It's when his knowledge fails him that he makes an error, and in regard to that error he is no craftsman. No craftsman, expert, or ruler makes an error at the moment when he is ruling, even though everyone will say that a physician or a ruler makes errors. It's in this loose way that you must also take the answer I gave earlier. But the most precise answer is this. A ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, never makes errors and unerringly decrees what is best for himself, and this his subject must do. Thus, as I said from the first, it is just to do what is to the advantage of the stronger.

Socrates/ All right, Thrasymachus, so you think I'm a false witness?

Thrasymachus/ You certainly are.

Socrates/ And you think that I asked the questions I did in order to harm you in the argument?

Thrasymachus/ I know it very well, but it won't do you any good. You'll never be able to trick me, so you can't harm me that way, and without trickery you'll never be able to overpower me in argument.

Socrates/ I wouldn't so much as try, Thrasymachus. But in order to prevent this sort of thing from happening again, define clearly whether it is the ruler and stronger in the

ordinary sense or in the precise sense whose advantage you said it is just for the weaker to promote as the advantage of the stronger.

Thrasymachus/ I mean the ruler in the most precise sense. Now practice your harm-doing and false witnessing on that if you can—I ask no concessions from you—but you certainly won't be able to.

Socrates/ Do you think that I'm crazy enough to try to shave a lion or to bear false witness against Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ You certainly tried just now, though you were a loser at that too.

Socrates/ Enough of this. Tell me: Is a doctor in the precise sense, whom you mentioned before, a money-maker or someone who treats the sick? Tell me about the one who is really a doctor.

Thrasymachus/ He's the one who treats the sick.

Socrates/ What about a ship's captain? Is a captain in the precise sense a ruler of sailors or a sailor?

Thrasymachus/ A ruler of sailors.

Socrates/ We shouldn't, I think, take into account the fact that he sails in a ship, and he shouldn't be called a sailor for that reason, for it isn't because of his sailing that he is called a ship's captain, but because of his craft and his rule over sailors?

Thrasymachus/ That's true.

Socrates/ And is there something advantageous to each of these, that is, to bodies and to sailors?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And aren't the respective crafts by nature set over them to seek and provide what is to their advantage?

Thrasymachus/ They are.

Socrates/ And is there any advantage for each of the crafts themselves except to be as complete or perfect as possible?

Thrasymachus/ What are you asking?

Socrates/ This: If you asked me whether our bodies are sufficient in themselves, or whether they need something else, I'd answer: “They certainly have needs. And because of this, because our bodies are deficient rather than self-sufficient, the craft of medicine has now been discovered. The craft of medicine was developed to provide what is advantageous for a body.” Do you think that I’m right in saying this or not?

Thrasymachus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Now, is medicine deficient? Does a craft need some further virtue, as the eyes are in need of sight, and the ears of hearing, so that another craft is needed to seek and provide what is advantageous to them? Does a craft itself have some similar deficiency, so that each craft needs another, to seek out what is to its advantage? And does the craft that does the seeking need still another, and so on without end? Or does each seek out what is to its own advantage by itself? Or does it need neither itself nor another craft to seek out what is advantageous to it, because of its own deficiencies? Or is it that there is no deficiency or error in any craft? That it isn’t appropriate for any craft to seek what is to the advantage of anything except that of which it is the craft? And that, since it is itself correct, it is without either fault or impurity, as long as it is wholly and precisely the craft that it is? Consider this with the preciseness of language you mentioned. Is it so or not?

Thrasymachus/ It appears to be so.

Socrates/ Medicine doesn’t seek its own advantage, then, but that of the body?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And horse-breeding doesn't seek its own advantage, but that of horses? Indeed, no other craft seeks its own advantage—for it has no further needs—but the advantage of that of which it is the craft?

Thrasymachus/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ Now, surely, Thrasymachus, the crafts rule over and are stronger than the things of which they are the crafts?

Very reluctantly, he conceded this as well.

Socrates/ No kind of knowledge seeks or orders what is advantageous to itself, then, but what is advantageous to the weaker, which is subject to it.

He tried to fight this conclusion, but he conceded it in the end. And after he had, I said: Surely, then, no doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, seeks or orders what is advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to his patient? We agreed that a doctor in the precise sense is a ruler of bodies, not a money-maker. Wasn't that agreed?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So a ship's captain in the precise sense is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor?

Thrasymachus/ That's what we agreed.

Socrates/ Doesn't it follow that a ship's captain or ruler won't seek and order what is advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to a sailor?

He reluctantly agreed.

Socrates/ So, then, Thrasymachus, no one in any position of rule, insofar as he is a ruler, seeks or orders what is advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to his subjects; the ones of whom he is himself the craftsman. It is to his subjects and what is advantageous and proper to them

that he looks, and everything he says and does he says and does for them.

When we reached this point in the argument, and it was clear to all that his account of justice had turned into its opposite, instead of answering, Thrasymachus said:

Thrasymachus/ Tell me, Socrates, do you still have a wet nurse?

Socrates/ What's this? Hadn't you better answer my questions rather than asking me such things?

Thrasymachus/ Because she's letting you run around with a snotty nose, and doesn't wipe it when she needs to! Why, for all she cares, you don't even know about sheep and shepherds.

Socrates/ Just what is it I don't know?

Thrasymachus/ You think that shepherds and cowherds seek the good of their sheep and cattle, and fatten them and take care of them, looking to something other than their master's good and their own. Moreover, you believe that rulers in cities—true rulers, that is—think about their subjects differently than one does about sheep, and that night and day they think of something besides their own advantage. You are so far from understanding about justice and what's just, about injustice and what's unjust, that you don't realize that justice is really the good of another, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys and serves. Injustice is the opposite, it rules the truly simple and just, and those it rules do what is to the advantage of the other and stronger, and they make the one they serve happy, but themselves not at all. You must look at it as follows, my most simple Socrates: A just man always gets less than an unjust one. First, in their contracts with one another, you'll never find, when the partnership ends, that a just partner has got more than an unjust one, but

less. Second, in matters relating to the city, when taxes are to be paid, a just man pays more on the same property, an unjust one less, but when the city is giving out refunds, a just man gets nothing, while an unjust one makes a large profit. Finally, when each of them holds a ruling position in some public office, a just person, even if he isn't penalized in other ways, finds that his private affairs deteriorate because he has to neglect them, that he gains no advantage from the public purse because of his justice, and that he's hated by his relatives and acquaintances when he's unwilling to do them an unjust favor. The opposite is true of an unjust man in every respect. Therefore, I repeat what I said before: A person of great power outdoes everyone else. Consider him if you want to figure out how much more advantageous it is for the individual to be just rather than unjust. You'll understand this most easily if you turn your thoughts to the most complete injustice, the one that makes the doer of injustice happiest and the sufferers of it, who are unwilling to do injustice, most wretched. This is tyranny, which through stealth or force appropriates the property of others, whether sacred or profane, public or private, not little by little, but all at once. If someone commits only one part of injustice and is caught, he's punished and greatly reproached—such partly unjust people are called temple-robbers, kidnappers, housebreakers, robbers, and thieves when they commit these crimes. But when someone, in addition to appropriating their possessions, kidnaps and enslaves the citizens as well, instead of these shameful names he is called happy and blessed, not only by the citizens themselves, but by all who learn that he has done the whole of injustice. Those who reproach injustice do so because they are afraid not of doing it but of suffering it. So, Socrates, injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice. And, as I

said from the first, justice is what is advantageous to the stronger, while injustice is to one's own profit and advantage.

Socrates/ Having emptied this great flood of words into our ears all at once like a bath attendant, Thrasymachus intended to leave. But those present didn't let him and made him stay to give an account of what he had said. I too begged him to stay, and I said to him: After hurling such a speech at us, Thrasymachus, do you intend to leave before adequately instructing us or finding out whether you are right or not? Or do you think it a small matter to determine which whole way of life would make living most worthwhile for each of us?

Thrasymachus/ Is that what I seem to you to think?

Socrates/ Either that, or else you care nothing for us and aren't worried about whether we'll live better or worse lives because of our ignorance of what you say you know. So show some willingness to teach it to us. It wouldn't be a bad investment for you to be the benefactor of a group as large as ours. For my own part, I'll tell you that I am not persuaded. I don't believe that injustice is more profitable than justice, not even if you give it full scope and put no obstacles in its way. Suppose that there is an unjust person, and suppose he does have the power to do injustice, whether by trickery or open warfare; nonetheless, he doesn't persuade me that injustice is more profitable than justice. Perhaps someone here, besides myself, feels the same as I do. So come now, and persuade us that we are wrong to esteem justice more highly than injustice in planning our lives.

Thrasymachus/ And how am I to persuade you, if you aren't persuaded by what I said just now? What more can I

do? Am I to take my argument and pour it into your very soul?

Socrates/ God forbid! Don't do that! But, first, stick to what you've said, and then, if you change your position, do it openly and don't deceive us. You see, Thrasymachus, that having defined the true doctor—to continue examining the things you said before—you didn't consider it necessary later to keep a precise guard on the true shepherd. You think that, insofar as he's a shepherd, he fattens sheep, not looking to what is best for the sheep but to a banquet, like a guest about to be entertained at a feast, or to a future sale, like a money-maker rather than a shepherd. Shepherding is concerned only to provide what is best for the things it is set over, and it is itself adequately provided with all it needs to be at its best when it doesn't fall short in any way of being the craft of shepherding. That's why I thought it necessary for us to agree before that every kind of rule, insofar as it rules, doesn't seek anything other than what is best for the things it rules and cares for, and this is true both of public and private kinds of rule. But do you think that those who rule cities, the true rulers, rule willingly?

Thrasymachus/ I don't think it, by god, I know it.

Socrates/ But, Thrasymachus, don't you realize that in other kinds of rule no one wants to rule for its own sake, but they ask for pay, thinking that their ruling will benefit not themselves but their subjects? Tell me, doesn't every craft differ from every other in having a different function? Please don't answer contrary to what you believe, so that we can come to some definite conclusion.

Thrasymachus/ Yes, that's what differentiates them.

Socrates/ And each craft benefits us in its own peculiar way, different from the others. For example, medicine gives

us health, navigation gives us safety while sailing, and so on with the others?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And wage-earning gives us wages, for this is its function? Or would you call medicine the same as navigation? Indeed, if you want to define matters precisely, as you proposed, even if someone who is a ship's captain becomes healthy because sailing is advantageous to his health, you wouldn't for that reason call his craft medicine?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor would you call wage-earning medicine, even if someone becomes healthy while earning wages?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Nor would you call medicine wage-earning, even if someone earns pay while healing?

Thrasymachus/ No.

Socrates/ We are agreed, then, that each craft brings its own peculiar benefit?

Thrasymachus/ It does.

Socrates/ Then whatever benefit all craftsmen receive in common must clearly result from their joint practice of some additional craft that benefits each of them?

Thrasymachus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And we say that the additional craft in question, which benefits the craftsmen by earning them wages, is the craft of wage-earning?

He reluctantly agreed.

Then this benefit, receiving wages, doesn't result from their own craft, but rather, if we're to examine this precisely, medicine provides health, and wage-earning provides wages; house-building provides a house, and wage-earning, which accompanies it, provides a wage; and so on with the other

crafts. Each of them does its own work and benefits the things it is set over. So, if wages aren't added, is there any benefit that the craftsman gets from his craft?

Thrasymachus/ Apparently none.

Socrates/ But he still provides a benefit when he works for nothing?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, I think he does.

Socrates/ Then, it is clear now, Thrasymachus, that no craft or rule provides for its own advantage, but, as we've been saying for some time, it provides and orders for its subject and aims at its advantage, that of the weaker, not of the stronger. That's why I said just now, Thrasymachus, that no one willingly chooses to rule and to take other people's troubles in hand and straighten them out, but each asks for wages; for anyone who intends to practice his craft well never does or orders what is best for himself—at least not when he orders as his craft prescribes—but what is best for his subject. It is because of this, it seems, that wages must be provided to a person if he's to be willing to rule, whether in the form of money or honor or a penalty if he refuses.

Glaucon/ What do you mean, Socrates? I know the first two kinds of wages, but I don't understand what penalty you mean or how you can call it a wage.

Socrates/ Then you don't understand the best people's kind of wages, the kind that moves the most decent to rule, when they are willing to rule at all. Don't you know that the love of honor and the love of money are despised, and rightly so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Therefore good people won't be willing to rule for the sake of either money or honor. They don't want to be paid wages openly for ruling and get called hired hands, nor to take them in secret from their rule and be called thieves.

And they won't rule for the sake of honor, because they aren't ambitious honor-lovers. So, if they're to be willing to rule, some compulsion or punishment must be brought to bear on them—perhaps that's why it is thought shameful to seek to rule before one is compelled to. Now, the greatest punishment, if one isn't willing to rule, is to be ruled by someone worse than oneself. And I think that it's fear of this that makes decent people rule when they do. They approach ruling not as something good or something to be enjoyed, but as something necessary, since it can't be entrusted to anyone better than—or even as good as—themselves. In a city of good men, if it came into being, the citizens would fight in order not to rule, just as they do now in order to rule. There it would be quite clear that anyone who is really a true ruler doesn't by nature seek his own advantage but that of his subjects. And everyone, knowing this, would rather be benefited by others than take the trouble to benefit them. So I can't at all agree with Thrasymachus that justice is the advantage of the stronger—but we'll look further into that another time. What Thrasymachus is now saying—that the life of an unjust person is better than that of a just one—seems to be of far greater importance. Which life would you choose, Glaucon? And which of our views do you consider truer?

Glaucon/ I certainly think that the life of a just person is more profitable.

Socrates/ Did you hear all of the good things Thrasymachus listed a moment ago for the unjust life?

Glaucon/ I heard, but I wasn't persuaded.

Socrates/ Then, do you want us to persuade him, if we're able to find a way, that what he says isn't true?

Glaucon/ Of course I do.

Socrates/ If we oppose him with a parallel speech about the blessings of the just life, and then he replies, and then we do, we'd have to count and measure the good things mentioned on each side, and we'd need a jury to decide the case. But if, on the other hand, we investigate the question, as we've been doing, by seeking agreement with each other, we ourselves can be both jury and advocates at once.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Which approach do you prefer?

Glaucon/ The second.

Socrates/ Come, then, Thrasymachus, answer us from the beginning. You say that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice?

Thrasymachus/ I certainly do say that, and I've told you why.

Socrates/ Well, then, what do you say about this? Do you call one of the two a virtue and the other a vice?

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ That is to say, you call justice a virtue and injustice a vice?

Thrasymachus/ That's hardly likely, since I say that injustice is profitable and justice isn't.

Socrates/ Then, what exactly do you say?

Thrasymachus/ The opposite.

Socrates/ That justice is a vice?

Thrasymachus/ No, just very high-minded simplicity.

Socrates/ Then do you call being unjust being low-minded?

Thrasymachus/ No, I call it good judgment.

Socrates/ You consider unjust people, then, Thrasymachus, to be clever and good?

Thrasymachus/ Yes, those who are completely unjust, who can bring cities and whole communities under their power. Perhaps, you think I meant pickpockets? Not that such crimes aren't also profitable, if they're not found out, but they aren't worth mentioning by comparison to what I'm talking about.

Socrates/ I'm not unaware of what you want to say. But I wonder about this: Do you really include injustice with virtue and wisdom, and justice with their opposites?

Thrasymachus/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ That's harder, and it isn't easy now to know what to say. If you had declared that injustice is more profitable, but agreed that it is a vice or shameful, as some others do, we could have discussed the matter on the basis of conventional beliefs. But now, obviously, you'll say that injustice is fine and strong and apply to it all the attributes we used to apply to justice, since you dare to include it with virtue and wisdom.

Thrasymachus/ You've divined my views exactly.

Socrates/ Nonetheless, we mustn't shrink from pursuing the argument and looking into this, just as long as I take you to be saying what you really think. And I believe that you aren't joking now, Thrasymachus, but are saying what you believe to be the truth.

Thrasymachus/ What difference does it make to you, whether I believe it or not? It's my account you're supposed to be refuting.

Socrates/ It makes no difference. But try to answer this further question: Do you think that a just person wants to outdo someone else who's just?

Thrasymachus/ Not at all, for he wouldn't then be as polite and innocent as he is.

Socrates/ Or to outdo someone who does a just action?

Thrasymachus/ No, he doesn't even want to do that.

Socrates/ And does he claim that he deserves to outdo an unjust person and believe that it is just for him to do so, or doesn't he believe that?

Thrasymachus/ He'd want to outdo him, and he'd claim to deserve to do so, but he wouldn't be able.

Socrates/ That's not what I asked, but whether a just person wants to outdo an unjust person but not a just one, thinking that this is what he deserves?

Thrasymachus/ He does.

Socrates/ What about an unjust person? Does he claim that he deserves to outdo a just person or someone who does a just action?

Thrasymachus/ Of course he does; he thinks he deserves to outdo everyone.

Socrates/ Then will an unjust person also outdo an unjust person or someone who does an unjust action, and will he strive to get the most he can for himself from everyone?

Thrasymachus/ He will.

Socrates/ Then, let's put it this way: A just person doesn't outdo someone like himself but someone unlike himself, whereas an unjust person outdoes both like and unlike.

Thrasymachus/ Very well put.

Socrates/ An unjust person is clever and good, and a just one is neither?

Thrasymachus/ That's well put, too.

Socrates/ It follows, then, that an unjust person is like clever and good people, while the other isn't?

Thrasymachus/ Of course that's so. How could he fail to be like them when he has their qualities, while the other isn't like them?

Socrates/ Fine. Then each of them has the qualities of the people he's like?

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ All right, Thrasymachus. Do you call one person musical and another nonmusical?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ Which of them is clever in music, and which isn't?

Thrasymachus/ The musical one is clever, of course, and the other isn't.

Socrates/ And the things he's clever in, he's good in, and the things he isn't clever in, he's bad in?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Isn't the same true of a doctor?

Thrasymachus/ It is.

Socrates/ Do you think that a musician, in tuning his lyre and in tightening and loosening the strings, wants to outdo another musician, claiming that this is what he deserves?

Thrasymachus/ I do not.

Socrates/ But he does want to outdo a nonmusician?

Thrasymachus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ What about a doctor? Does he, when prescribing food and drink, want to outdo another doctor or someone who does the action that medicine prescribes?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But he does want to outdo a nondoctor?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ In any branch of knowledge or ignorance, do you think that a knowledgeable person would intentionally try to outdo other knowledgeable people or say something

better or different than they do, rather than doing or saying the very same thing as those like him?

Thrasymachus/ Well, perhaps it must be as you say.

Socrates/ And what about an ignorant person? Doesn't he want to outdo both a knowledgeable person and an ignorant one?

Thrasymachus/ Probably.

Socrates/ A knowledgeable person is clever?

Thrasymachus/ I agree.

Socrates/ And a clever one is good?

Thrasymachus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Therefore, a good and clever person doesn't want to outdo those like himself but those who are unlike him and his opposite.

Thrasymachus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ But a bad and ignorant person wants to outdo both his like and his opposite.

Thrasymachus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Now, Thrasymachus, we found that an unjust person tries to outdo those like him and those unlike him? Didn't you say that?

Thrasymachus/ I did.

Socrates/ And that a just person won't outdo his like but his unlike?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, a just person is like a clever and good one, and an unjust is like an ignorant and bad one.

Thrasymachus/ It looks that way.

Socrates/ Moreover, we agreed that each has the qualities of the one he resembles.

Thrasymachus/ Yes, we did.

Socrates/ Then, a just person has turned out to be good and clever, and an unjust one ignorant and bad.

Thrasymachus agreed to all this, not easily as I'm telling it, but reluctantly, with toil, trouble, and—since it was summer—a quantity of sweat that was a wonder to behold. And then I saw something I'd never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing. But, in any case, after we'd agreed that justice is virtue and wisdom and that injustice is vice and ignorance, I said: All right, let's take that as established. But we also said that injustice is powerful, or don't you remember that, Thrasymachus?

Thrasymachus/ I remember, but I'm not satisfied with what you're now saying. I could make a speech about it, but, if I did, I know that you'd accuse me of engaging in oratory. So either allow me to speak, or, if you want to ask questions, go ahead, and I'll say, "All right," and nod yes and no, as one does to old wives' tales.

Socrates/ Don't do that, contrary to your own opinion.

Thrasymachus/ I'll answer so as to please you, since you won't let me make a speech. What else do you want?

Socrates/ Nothing, by god. But if that's what you're going to do, go ahead and do it. I'll ask my questions.

Thrasymachus/ Ask ahead.

Socrates/ I'll ask what I asked before, so that we may proceed with our argument about justice and injustice in an orderly fashion, for surely it was claimed that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice. But, now, if justice is indeed wisdom and virtue, it will easily be shown to be stronger than injustice, since injustice is ignorance (no one could now be ignorant of that). However, I don't want to state the matter so unconditionally, Thrasymachus, but to look into it in some such way as this. Would you say that it is

unjust for a city to try to enslave other cities unjustly and to hold them in subjection when it has enslaved many of them?

Thrasymachus/ Of course, that's what the best city will especially do, the one that is most completely unjust.

Socrates/ I understand that's your position, but the point I want to examine is this: Will the city that becomes stronger than another achieve this power without justice, or will it need the help of justice?

Thrasymachus/ If what you said a moment ago stands, and justice is cleverness or wisdom, it will need the help of justice, but if things are as I stated, it will need the help of injustice.

Socrates/ I'm impressed, Thrasymachus, that you don't merely nod yes or no but give very fine answers.

Thrasymachus/ That's because I'm trying to please you.

Socrates/ You're doing well at it, too. So please me some more by answering this question: Do you think that a city, an army, a band of robbers or thieves, or any other tribe with a common unjust purpose would be able to achieve it if they were unjust to each other?

Thrasymachus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ What if they weren't unjust to one another? Would they achieve more?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Injustice, Thrasymachus, causes civil war, hatred, and fighting among themselves, while justice brings friendship and a sense of common purpose. Isn't that so?

Thrasymachus/ Let it be so, in order not to disagree with you.

Socrates/ You're still doing well on that front. So tell me this: If the effect of injustice is to produce hatred wherever it occurs, then, whenever it arises, whether among free men or

slaves, won't it cause them to hate one another, engage in civil war, and prevent them from achieving any common purpose?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ What if it arises between two people? Won't they be at odds, hate each other, and be enemies to one another and to just people?

Thrasymachus/ They will.

Socrates/ Does injustice lose its power to cause dissension when it arises within a single individual, or will it preserve it intact?

Thrasymachus/ Let it preserve it intact.

Socrates/ Apparently, then, injustice has the power, first, to make whatever it arises in—whether it is a city, a family, an army, or anything else—incapable of achieving anything as a unit, because of the civil wars and differences it creates, and, second, it makes that unit an enemy to itself and to what is in every way its opposite, namely, justice. Isn't that so?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And even in a single individual, it has by its nature the very same effect. First, it makes him incapable of achieving anything, because he is in a state of civil war and not of one mind; second, it makes him his own enemy, as well as the enemy of just people. Hasn't it that effect?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the gods too are just?

Thrasymachus/ Let it be so.

Socrates/ So an unjust person is also an enemy of the gods, Thrasymachus, while a just person is their friend?

Thrasymachus/ Enjoy your banquet of words! Have no fear, I won't oppose you. That would make these people hate me.

Socrates/ Come, then, complete the banquet for me by continuing to answer as you've been doing. We have shown that just people are cleverer and more capable of doing things, while unjust ones aren't even able to act together, for when we speak of a powerful achievement by unjust men acting together, what we say isn't altogether true. They would never have been able to keep their hands off each other if they were completely unjust. But clearly there must have been some sort of justice in them that at least prevented them from doing injustice among themselves at the same time as they were doing it to others. And it was this that enabled them to achieve what they did. When they started doing unjust things, they were only halfway corrupted by their injustice (for those who are all bad and completely unjust are completely incapable of accomplishing anything). These are the things I understand to hold, not the ones you first maintained. We must now examine, as we proposed before, whether just people also live better and are happier than unjust ones. I think it's clear already that this is so, but we must look into it further, since the argument concerns no ordinary topic but the way we ought to live.

Thrasymachus/ Go ahead and look.

Socrates/ I will. Tell me, do you think there is such a thing as the function of a horse?

Thrasymachus/ I do.

Socrates/ And would you define the function of a horse or of anything else as that which one can do only with it or best with it?

Thrasymachus/ I don't understand.

Socrates/ Let me put it this way: Is it possible to see with anything other than eyes?

Thrasymachus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Or to hear with anything other than ears?

Thrasymachus/ No.

Socrates/ Then, we are right to say that seeing and hearing are the functions of eyes and ears?

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ What about this? Could you use a dagger or a carving knife or lots of other things in pruning a vine?

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But wouldn't you do a finer job with a pruning knife designed for the purpose than with anything else?

Thrasymachus/ You would.

Socrates/ Then shall we take pruning to be its function?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, I think you'll understand what I was asking earlier when I asked whether the function of each thing is what it alone can do or what it does better than anything else.

Thrasymachus/ I understand, and I think that this is the function of each.

Socrates/ All right. Does each thing to which a particular function is assigned also have a virtue? Let's go over the same ground again. We say that eyes have some function?

Thrasymachus/ They do.

Socrates/ So there is also a virtue of eyes?

Thrasymachus/ There is.

Socrates/ And ears have a function?

Thrasymachus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So there is also a virtue of ears?

Thrasymachus/ There is.

Socrates/ And all other things are the same, aren't they?

Thrasymachus/ They are.

Socrates/ And could eyes perform their function well if they lacked their peculiar virtue and had the vice instead?

Thrasymachus/ How could they, for don't you mean if they had blindness instead of sight?

Socrates/ Whatever their virtue is, for I'm not now asking about that but about whether anything that has a function performs it well by means of its own peculiar virtue and badly by means of its vice?

Thrasymachus/ That's true, it does.

Socrates/ So ears, too, deprived of their own virtue, perform their function badly?

Thrasymachus/ That's right.

Socrates/ And the same could be said about everything else?

Thrasymachus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Come, then, and let's consider this: Is there some function of a soul that you couldn't perform with anything else, for example, taking care of things, ruling, deliberating, and the like? Is there anything other than a soul to which you could rightly assign these, and say that they are its peculiar function?

Thrasymachus/ No, none of them.

Socrates/ What of living? Isn't that a function of a soul?

Thrasymachus/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ And don't we also say that there is a virtue of a soul?

Thrasymachus/ We do.

Socrates/ Then, will a soul ever perform its function well, Thrasymachus, if it is deprived of its own peculiar virtue, or is that impossible?

Thrasymachus/ It's impossible.

Socrates/ Doesn't it follow, then, that a bad soul rules and takes care of things badly and that a good soul does all these things well?

Thrasymachus/ It does.

Socrates/ Now, we agreed that justice is a soul's virtue, and injustice its vice?

Thrasymachus/ We did.

Socrates/ Then, it follows that a just soul and a just man will live well, and an unjust one badly.

Thrasymachus/ Apparently so, according to your argument.

Socrates/ And surely anyone who lives well is blessed and happy, and anyone who doesn't is the opposite.

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Therefore, a just person is happy, and an unjust one wretched.

Thrasymachus/ So be it.

Socrates/ It profits no one to be wretched but to be happy.

Thrasymachus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And so, Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profitable than justice.

Thrasymachus/ Let that be your banquet, Socrates, at the feast of Bendis.

Socrates/ Given by you, Thrasymachus, after you became gentle and ceased to give me rough treatment. Yet I haven't had a fine banquet. But that's my fault not yours. I seem to have behaved like a glutton, snatching at every dish that

passes and tasting it before properly savoring its predecessor. Before finding the answer to our first inquiry about what justice is, I let that go and turned to investigate whether it is a kind of vice and ignorance or a kind of wisdom and virtue. Then an argument came up about injustice being more profitable than justice, and I couldn't refrain from abandoning the previous one and following up on that. Hence the result of the discussion, as far as I'm concerned, is that I know nothing, for when I don't know what justice is, I'll hardly know whether it is a kind of virtue or not, or whether a person who has it is happy or unhappy.

Book 2

Socrates/ When I said this, I thought I had done with the discussion, but it turned out to have been only a prelude. Glaucon showed his characteristic courage on this occasion too and refused to accept Thrasymachus' abandonment of the argument.

Glaucon/ Socrates, do you want to seem to have persuaded us that it is better in every way to be just than unjust, or do you want truly to convince us of this?

Socrates/ I want truly to convince you, if I can.

Glaucon/ Well, then, you certainly aren't doing what you want. Tell me, do you think there is a kind of good we welcome, not because we desire what comes from it, but because we welcome it for its own sake—joy, for example, and all the harmless pleasures that have no results beyond the joy of having them?

Socrates/ Certainly, I think there are such things.

Glaucon/ And is there a kind of good we like for its own sake and also for the sake of what comes from it—knowing, for example, and seeing and being healthy? We welcome such things, I suppose, on both counts.

Socrates/ Yes.

Glaucon/ And do you also see a third kind of good, such as physical training, medical treatment when sick, medicine itself, and the other ways of making money? We'd say that these are onerous but beneficial to us, and we wouldn't choose them for their own sakes, but for the sake of the rewards and other things that come from them.

Socrates/ There is also this third kind. But what of it?

Glaucon/ Where do you put justice?

Socrates/ I myself put it among the finest goods, as something to be valued by anyone who is going to be blessed with happiness, both because of itself and because of what comes from it.

Glaucon/ That isn't most people's opinion. They' say that justice belongs to the onerous kind, and is to be practiced for the sake of the rewards and popularity that come from a reputation for justice, but is to be avoided because of itself as something burdensome.

Socrates/ I know that's the general opinion. Thrasymachus faulted justice on these grounds a moment ago and praised injustice, but it seems that I'm a slow learner.

Glaucon/ Come, then, and listen to me as well, and see whether you still have that problem, for I think that Thrasymachus gave up before he had to, charmed by you as if he were a snake. But I'm not yet satisfied by the argument on either side. I want to know what justice and injustice are and what power each itself has when it's by itself in the soul. I want to leave out of account their rewards and what comes from each of them. So, if you agree, I'll renew the argument of Thrasymachus. First, I'll state what kind of thing people consider justice to be and what its origins are. Second, I'll argue that all who practice it do so unwillingly, as something necessary, not as something good. Third, I'll argue that they have good reason to act as they do, for the life of an unjust person is, they say, much better than that of a just one.

It isn't, Socrates, that I believe any of that myself. I'm perplexed, indeed, and my ears are deafened listening to Thrasymachus and countless others. But I've yet to hear anyone defend justice in the way I want, proving that it is better than injustice. I want to hear it praised by itself, and I think that I'm most likely to hear this from you. Therefore,

I'm going to speak at length in praise of the unjust life, and in doing so I'll show you the way I want to hear you praising justice and denouncing injustice. But see whether you want me to do that or not.

Socrates/ I want that most of all. Indeed, what subject could someone with any understanding enjoy discussing more often?

Glaucon/ Excellent. Then let's discuss the first subject I mentioned—what justice is and what its origins are.

They say that to do injustice is naturally good and to suffer injustice bad, but that the badness of suffering it so far exceeds the goodness of doing it that those who have done and suffered injustice and tasted both, but who lack the power to do it and avoid suffering it, decide that it is profitable to come to an agreement with each other neither to do injustice nor to suffer it. As a result, they begin to make laws and covenants, and what the law commands they call lawful and just. This, they say, is the origin and essence of justice. It is intermediate between the best and the worst. The best is to do injustice without paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer it without being able to take revenge. Justice is a mean between these two extremes. People value it not as a good but because they are too weak to do injustice with impunity. Someone who has the power to do this, however, and is a true man wouldn't make an agreement with anyone not to do injustice in order not to suffer it. For him that would be madness. This is the nature of justice, according to the argument, Socrates, and these are its natural origins.

We can see most clearly that those who practice justice do it unwillingly and because they lack the power to do injustice, if in our thoughts we grant to a just and an unjust person the freedom to do whatever they like. We can then

follow both of them and see where their desires would lead. And we'll catch the just person red-handed travelling the same road as the unjust. The reason for this is the desire to outdo others and get more and more. This is what anyone's nature naturally pursues as good, but nature is forced by law into the perversion of treating fairness with respect.

The freedom I mentioned would be most easily realized if both people had the power they say the ancestor of Gyges of Lydia possessed. The story goes that he was a shepherd in the service of the ruler of Lydia. There was a violent thunderstorm, and an earthquake broke open the ground and created a chasm at the place where he was tending his sheep. Seeing this, he was filled with amazement and went down into it. And there, in addition to many other wonders of which we're told, he saw a hollow bronze horse. There were window-like openings in it, and, peeping in, he saw a corpse, which seemed to be of more than human size, wearing nothing but a gold ring on its finger. He took the ring and came out of the chasm. He wore the ring at the usual monthly meeting that reported to the king on the state of the flocks. And as he was sitting among the others, he happened to turn the setting of the ring towards himself to the inside of his hand. When he did this, he became invisible to those sitting near him, and they went on talking as if he had gone. He wondered at this, and, fingering the ring, he turned the setting outwards again and became visible. So he experimented with the ring to test whether it indeed had this power—and it did. If he turned the setting inward, he became invisible; if he turned it outward, he became visible again. When he realized this, he at once arranged to become one of the messengers sent to report to the king. And when he arrived there, he seduced the king's wife, attacked the king with her help, killed him, and took over the kingdom.

Let's suppose, then, that there were two such rings, one worn by a just and the other by an unjust person. Now, no one, it seems, would be so incorruptible that he would stay on the path of justice or stay away from other people's property, when he could take whatever he wanted from the marketplace with impunity, go into people's houses and have sex with anyone he wished, kill or release from prison anyone he wished, and do all the other things that would make him like a god among humans. Rather his actions would be in no way different from those of an unjust person, and both would follow the same path. This, some would say, is a great proof that one is never just willingly but only when compelled to be. No one believes justice to be a good when it is kept private, since, wherever either person thinks he can do injustice with impunity, he does it. Indeed, every man believes that injustice is far more profitable to himself than justice. And any exponent of this argument will say he's right, for someone who didn't want to do injustice, given this sort of opportunity, and who didn't touch other people's property would be thought wretched and stupid by everyone aware of the situation, though, of course, they' praise him in public, deceiving each other for fear of suffering injustice. So much for my second topic.

As for the choice between the lives we're discussing, we'll be able to make a correct judgment about that only if we separate the most just and the most unjust. Otherwise we won't be able to do it. Here's the separation I have in mind. We'll subtract nothing from the injustice of an unjust person and nothing from the justice of a just one, but we'll take each to be complete in his own way of life. First, therefore, we must suppose that an unjust person will act as clever craftsmen do: A first-rate captain or doctor, for example, knows the difference between what his craft can and can't do. He attempts the first but lets the second go by, and if he

happens to slip, he can put things right. In the same way, an unjust person's successful attempts at injustice must remain undetected, if he is to be fully unjust. Anyone who is caught should be thought inept, for the extreme of injustice is to be believed to be just without being just. And our completely unjust person must be given complete injustice; nothing may be subtracted from it. We must allow that, while doing the greatest injustice, he has nonetheless provided himself with the greatest reputation for justice. If he happens to make a slip, he must be able to put it right. If any of his unjust activities should be discovered, he must be able to speak persuasively or to use force. And if force is needed, he must have the help of courage and strength and of the substantial wealth and friends with which he has provided himself.

Having hypothesized such a person, let's now in our argument put beside him a just man, who is simple and noble and who, as Aeschylus says, doesn't want to be believed to be good but to be so. We must take away his reputation, for a reputation for justice would bring him honor and rewards, so that it wouldn't be clear whether he is just for the sake of justice itself or for the sake of those honors and rewards. We must strip him of everything except justice and make his situation the opposite of an unjust person's. Though he does no injustice, he must have the greatest reputation for it, so that his justice may be tested full-strength and not diluted by wrongdoing and what comes from it. Let him stay like that unchanged until he dies—just, but all his life believed to be unjust. In this way, both will reach the extremes, the one of justice and the other of injustice, and we'll be able to judge which of them is happier.

Socrates/ Whew! Glaucon, how vigorously you've scoured each of the men for our competition, just as you would a pair of statues for an art competition.

Glaucon/ I do the best I can. Since the two are as I've described, in any case, it shouldn't be difficult to complete the account of the kind of life that awaits each of them, but it must be done. And if what I say sounds crude, Socrates, remember that it isn't I who speak but those who praise injustice at the expense of justice. They'll say that a just person in such circumstances will be whipped, stretched on a rack, chained, blinded with fire, and, at the end, when he has suffered every kind of evil, he'll be impaled, and will realize then that one shouldn't want to be just but to be believed to be just. Indeed, Aeschylus' words are far more correctly applied to unjust people than to just ones, for the supporters of injustice will say that a really unjust person, having a way of life based on the truth about things and not living in accordance with opinion, doesn't want simply to be believed to be unjust but actually to be so—

> Harvesting a deep furrow in his mind,
> Where wise counsels propagate.

He rules his city because of his reputation for justice; he marries into any family he wishes; he gives his children in marriage to anyone he wishes; he has contracts and partnerships with anyone he wants; and besides benefiting himself in all these ways, he profits because he has no scruples about doing injustice. In any contest, public or private, he's the winner and outdoes his enemies. And by outdoing them, he becomes wealthy, benefiting his friends and harming his enemies. He makes adequate sacrifices to the gods and sets up magnificent offerings to them. He takes better care of the gods, therefore, (and, indeed, of the human beings he's fond of) than a just person does. Hence it's likely that the gods, in turn, will take better care of him than of a just person. That's what they say, Socrates, that gods and humans provide a better life for unjust people than for just ones.

Socrates/ When Glaucon had said this, I had it in mind to respond, but his brother Adeimantus intervened:

Adeimantus/ You surely don't think that the position has been adequately stated?

Socrates/ Why not?

Adeimantus/ The most important thing to say hasn't been said yet.

Socrates/ Well, then, a man's brother must stand by him, as the saying goes. If Glaucon has omitted something, you must help him. Yet what he has said is enough to throw me to the canvas and make me unable to come to the aid of justice.

Adeimantus/ Nonsense. Hear what more I have to say, for we should also fully explore the arguments that are opposed to the ones Glaucon gave, the ones that praise justice and find fault with injustice, so that what I take to be his intention may be clearer.

When fathers speak to their sons, they say that one must be just, as do all the others who have charge of anyone. But they don't praise justice itself, only the high reputations it leads to and the consequences of being thought to be just, such as the public offices, marriages, and other things Glaucon listed. But they elaborate even further on the consequences of reputation. By bringing in the esteem of the gods, they are able to talk about the abundant good things that they themselves and the noble Hesiod and Homer say that the gods give to the pious, for Hesiod says that the gods make the oak trees

> Bear acorns at the top and bees in the middle
> And make fleecy sheep heavy laden with wool

for the just, and tells of many other good things akin to these. And Homer is similar:

> When a good king, in his piety,

> Upholds justice, the black earth bears
> Wheat and barley for him, and his trees are heavy with fruit.
> His sheep bear lambs unfailingly, and the sea yields up its fish.

Musaeus and his son make the gods give the just more headstrong goods than these. In their stories, they lead the just to Hades, seat them on couches, provide them with a symposium of pious people, crown them with wreaths, and make them spend all their time drinking—as if they thought drunkenness was the finest wage of virtue. Others stretch even further the wages that virtue receives from the gods, for they say that someone who is pious and keeps his promises leaves his children's children and a whole race behind him. In these and other similar ways, they praise justice. They bury the impious and unjust in mud in Hades; force them to carry water in a sieve; bring them into bad repute while they're still alive, and all those penalties that Glaucon gave to the just person they give to the unjust. But they have nothing else to say. This, then, is the way people praise justice and find fault with injustice.

Besides this, Socrates, consider another form of argument about justice and injustice employed both by private individuals and by poets. All go on repeating with one voice that justice and moderation are fine things, but hard and onerous, while licentiousness and injustice are sweet and easy to acquire and are shameful only in opinion and law. They add that unjust deeds are for the most part more profitable than just ones, and, whether in public or private, they willingly honor vicious people who have wealth and other types of power and declare them to be happy. But they dishonor and disregard the weak and the poor, even though they agree that they are better than the others.

But the most wonderful of all these arguments concerns what they have to say about the gods and virtue. They say that the gods, too, assign misfortune and a bad life to many good people, and the opposite fate to their opposites. Begging priests and prophets frequent the doors of the rich and persuade them that they possess a god-given power founded on sacrifices and incantations. If the rich person or any of his ancestors has committed an injustice, they can fix it with pleasant rituals. Moreover, if he wishes to injure some enemy, then, at little expense, he'll be able to harm just and unjust alike, for by means of spells and enchantments they can persuade the gods to serve them. And the poets are brought forward as witnesses to all these accounts. Some harp on the ease of vice, as follows:

> Vice in abundance is easy to get;
> The road is smooth and begins beside you,
> But the gods have put sweat between us and virtue.

and a road that is long, rough, and steep. Others quote Homer to bear witness that the gods can be influenced by humans, since he said:

> The gods themselves can be swayed by prayer,
> And with sacrifices and soothing promises,
> Incense and libations, human beings turn them from their purpose
> When someone has transgressed and sinned.

And they present a noisy throng of books by Musaeus and Orpheus, offspring as they say of Selene and the Muses, in accordance with which they perform their rituals. And they persuade not only individuals but whole cities that the unjust deeds of the living or the dead can be absolved or purified through ritual sacrifices and pleasant games. These initiations, as they call them, free people from punishment hereafter, while a terrible fate awaits those who have not performed the rituals.

When all such sayings about the attitudes of gods and humans to virtue and vice are so often repeated, Socrates, what effect do you suppose they have on the souls of young people? I mean those who are clever and are able to flit from one of these sayings to another, so to speak, and gather from them an impression of what sort of person he should be and of how best to travel the road of life. He would surely ask himself Pindar's question, "Should I by justice or by crooked deceit scale this high wall and live my life guarded and secure?" And he'll answer: "The various sayings suggest that there is no advantage in my being just if I'm not also thought just, while the troubles and penalties of being just are apparent. But they tell me that an unjust person, who has secured for himself a reputation for justice, lives the life of a god. Since, then, 'opinion forcibly overcomes truth' and 'controls happiness,' as the wise men say, I must surely turn entirely to it. I should create a facade of illusory virtue around me to deceive those who come near, but keep behind it the greedy and crafty fox of the wise Archilochus."

"But surely," someone will object, "it isn't easy for vice to remain always hidden." We'll reply that nothing great is easy. And, in any case, if we're to be happy, we must follow the path indicated in these accounts. To remain undiscovered we'll form secret societies and political clubs. And there are teachers of persuasion to make us clever in dealing with assemblies and law courts. Therefore, using persuasion in one place and force in another, we'll outdo others without paying a penalty.

"What about the gods? Surely, we can't hide from them or use violent force against them!" Well, if the gods don't exist or don't concern themselves with human affairs, why should we worry at all about hiding from them? If they do exist and do concern themselves with us, we've learned all we know about them from the laws and the poets who give their

genealogies—nowhere else. But these are the very people who tell us that the gods can be persuaded and influenced by sacrifices, gentle prayers, and offerings. Hence, we should believe them on both matters or neither. If we believe them, we should be unjust and offer sacrifices from the fruits of our injustice. If we are just, our only gain is not to be punished by the gods, since we lose the profits of injustice. But if we are unjust, we get the profits of our crimes and transgressions and afterwards persuade the gods by prayer and escape without punishment.

"But in Hades won't we pay the penalty for crimes committed here, either ourselves or our children's children?" "My friend," the young man will say as he does his calculation, "mystery rites have great power and the gods have great power of absolution. The greatest cities tell us this, as do those children of the gods who have become poets and prophets."

Why, then, should we still choose justice over the greatest injustice? Many eminent authorities agree that, if we practice such injustice with a false facade, we'll do well at the hands of gods and humans, living and dying as we've a mind to. So, given all that has been said, Socrates, how is it possible for anyone of any power—whether of mind, wealth, body, or birth—to be willing to honor justice and not laugh aloud when he hears it praised? Indeed, if anyone can show that what we've said is false and has adequate knowledge that justice is best, he'll surely be full not of anger but of forgiveness for the unjust. He knows that, apart from someone of godlike character who is disgusted by injustice or one who has gained knowledge and avoids injustice for that reason, no one is just willingly. Through cowardice or old age or some other weakness, people do indeed object to injustice. But it's obvious that they do so only because they

lack the power to do injustice, for the first of them to acquire it is the first to do as much injustice as he can.

And all of this has no other cause than the one that led Glaucon and me to say to you: “Socrates, of all of you who claim to praise justice, from the original heroes of old whose words survive, to the men of the present day, not one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except by mentioning the reputations, honors, and rewards that are their consequences. No one has ever adequately described what each itself does of its own power by its presence in the soul of the person who possesses it, even if it remains hidden from gods and humans. No one, whether in poetry or in private conversations, has adequately argued that injustice is the worst thing a soul can have in it and that justice is the greatest good. If you had treated the subject in this way and persuaded us from youth, we wouldn’t now be guarding against one another’s injustices, but each would be his own best guardian, afraid that by doing injustice he'd be living with the worst thing possible.”

Thrasymachus/ or anyone else might say what we’ve said, Socrates, or maybe even more, in discussing justice and injustice—crudely inverting their powers, in my opinion. And, frankly, it’s because I want to hear the opposite from you that I speak with all the force I can muster. So don’t merely give us a theoretical argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but tell us what each itself does, because of its own powers, to someone who possesses it, that makes injustice bad and justice good. Follow Glaucon’s advice, and don’t take reputations into account, for if you don’t deprive justice and injustice of their true reputations and attach false ones to them, we’ll say that you are not praising them but their reputations and that you’re encouraging us to be unjust in secret. In that case, we’ll say that you agree with Thrasymachus that justice is the good of another, the

advantage of the stronger, while injustice is one's own advantage and profit, though not the advantage of the weaker.

You agree that justice is one of the greatest goods, the ones that are worth getting for the sake of what comes from them, but much more so for their own sake, such as seeing, hearing, knowing, being healthy, and all other goods that are fruitful by their own nature and not simply because of reputation. Therefore, praise justice as a good of that kind, explaining how—because of its very self—it benefits its possessors and how injustice harms them. Leave wages and reputations for others to praise.

Others would satisfy me if they praised justice and blamed injustice in that way, extolling the wages of one and denigrating those of the other. But you, unless you order me to be satisfied, wouldn't, for you've spent your whole life investigating this and nothing else. Don't, then, give us only a theoretical argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but show what effect each has because of itself on the person who has it—the one for good and the other for bad—whether it remains hidden from gods and human beings or not.

Socrates/ While I'd always admired the natures of Glaucon and Adeimantus, I was especially pleased on this occasion, and I said: You are the sons of a great man, and Glaucon's lover began his elegy well when he wrote, celebrating your achievements at the battle of Megara;

> Sons of Ariston, godlike offspring of a famous man.

That's well said in my opinion, for you must indeed be affected by the divine if you're not convinced that injustice is better than justice and yet can speak on its behalf as you have done. And I believe that you really are unconvinced by your own words. I infer this from the way you live, for if I had

only your words to go on, I wouldn't trust you. The more I trust you, however, the more I'm at a loss as to what to do. I don't see how I can be of help. Indeed, I believe I'm incapable of it. And here's my evidence. I thought what I said to Thrasymachus showed that justice is better than injustice, but you won't accept it from me. On the other hand, I don't see how I can refuse my help, for I fear that it may even be impious to have breath in one's body and the ability to speak and yet to stand idly by and not defend justice when it is being prosecuted. So the best course is to give justice any assistance I can.

Glaucon and the others begged me not to abandon the argument but to help in every way to track down what justice and injustice are and what the truth about their benefits is. So I told them what I had in mind: The investigation we're undertaking is not an easy one but requires keen eyesight. Therefore, since we aren't clever people, we should adopt the method of investigation that we'd use if, lacking keen eyesight, we were told to read small letters from a distance and then noticed that the same letters existed elsewhere in a larger size and on a larger surface. We'd consider it a godsend, I think, to be allowed to read the larger ones first and then to examine the smaller ones, to see whether they really are the same.

Adeimantus/ That's certainly true, but how is this case similar to our investigation of justice?

Socrates/ I'll tell you. We say, don't we, that there is the justice of a single man and also the justice of a whole city?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And a city is larger than a single man?

Adeimantus/ It is larger.

Socrates/ Perhaps, then, there is more justice in the larger thing, and it will be easier to learn what it is. So, if

you're willing, let's first find out what sort of thing justice is in a city and afterwards look for it in the individual, observing the ways in which the smaller is similar to the larger.

Adeimantus/ That seems fine to me.

Socrates/ If we could watch a city coming to be in theory, wouldn't we also see its justice coming to be, and its injustice as well?

Adeimantus/ Probably so.

Socrates/ And when that process is completed, we can hope to find what we are looking for more easily?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Do you think we should try to carry it out, then? It's no small task, in my view. So think it over.

Adeimantus/ We have already. Don't even consider doing anything else.

Socrates/ I think a city comes to be because none of us is self-sufficient, but we all need many things. Do you think that a city is founded on any other principle?

Adeimantus/ No.

Socrates/ And because people need many things, and because one person calls on a second out of one need and on a third out of a different need, many people gather in a single place to live together as partners and helpers. And such a settlement is called a city. Isn't that so?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ And if they share things with one another, giving and taking, they do so because each believes that this is better for himself?

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Come, then, let's create a city in theory from its beginnings. And it's our needs, it seems, that will create it.

Adeimantus/ It is, indeed.

Socrates/ Surely our first and greatest need is to provide food to sustain life.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Our second is for shelter, and our third for clothes and such.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ How, then, will a city be able to provide all this? Won't one person have to be a farmer, another a builder, and another a weaver? And shouldn't we add a cobbler and someone else to provide medical care?

Adeimantus/ All right.

Socrates/ So the essential minimum for a city is four or five men?

Adeimantus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And what about this? Must each of them contribute his own work for the common use of all? For example, will a farmer provide food for everyone, spending quadruple the time and labor to provide food to be shared by them all? Or will he not bother about that, producing one quarter the food in one quarter the time, and spending the other three quarters, one in building a house, one in the production of clothes, and one in making shoes, not troubling to associate with the others, but minding his own business on his own?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps, Socrates, the way you suggested first would be easier than the other.

Socrates/ That certainly wouldn't be surprising, for, even as you were speaking it occurred to me that, in the first place, we aren't all born alike, but each of us differs somewhat in nature from the others, one being suited to one task, another to another. Or don't you think so?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Second, does one person do a better job if he practices many crafts or—since he's one person himself—if he practices one?

Adeimantus/ If he practices one.

Socrates/ It's clear, at any rate, I think, that if one misses the right moment in anything, the work is spoiled.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ That's because the thing to be done won't wait on the leisure of the doer, but the doer must of necessity pay close attention to his work rather than treating it as a secondary occupation.

Adeimantus/ Yes, he must.

Socrates/ The result, then, is that more plentiful and better-quality goods are more easily produced if each person does one thing for which he is naturally suited, does it at the right time, and is released from having to do any of the others.

Adeimantus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Then, Adeimantus, we're going to need more than four citizens to provide the things we've mentioned, for a farmer won't make his own plough, not if it's to be a good one, nor his hoe, nor any of his other farming tools. Neither will a builder—and he, too, needs lots of things. And the same is true of a weaver and a cobbler, isn't it?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Hence, carpenters, metal workers, and many other craftsmen of that sort will share our little city and make it bigger.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Yet it won't be a huge settlement even if we add cowherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen in order that the

farmers have cows to do their ploughing, the builders have oxen to share with the farmers in hauling their materials, and the weavers and cobblers have hides and fleeces to use.

Adeimantus/ It won't be a small one either, if it has to hold all those.

Socrates/ Moreover, it's almost impossible to establish a city in a place where nothing has to be imported.

Adeimantus/ Indeed it is.

Socrates/ So we'll need yet further people to import from other cities whatever is needed.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if an importer goes empty-handed to another city, without a cargo of the things needed by the city from which he's to bring back what his own city needs, he'll come away empty-handed, won't he?

Adeimantus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Therefore our citizens must not only produce enough for themselves at home but also goods of the right quality and quantity to satisfy the requirements of others.

Adeimantus/ They must.

Socrates/ So we'll need more farmers and other craftsmen in our city.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And others to take care of imports and exports. And they're called merchants, aren't they?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So we'll need merchants, too.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if the trade is by sea, we'll need a good many others who know how to sail.

Adeimantus/ A good many, indeed.

Socrates/ And how will those in the city itself share the things that each produces? It was for the sake of this that we made their partnership and founded their city.

Adeimantus/ Clearly, they must do it by buying and selling.

Socrates/ Then we'll need a marketplace and a currency for such exchange.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If a farmer or any other craftsman brings some of his products to market, and he doesn't arrive at the same time as those who want to exchange things with him, is he to sit idly in the marketplace, away from his own work?

Adeimantus/ Not at all. There'll be people who'll notice this and provide the requisite service—in well-organized cities they'll usually be those whose bodies are weakest and who aren't fit to do any other work. They'll stay around the market exchanging money for the goods of those who have something to sell and then exchanging those goods for the money of those who want them.

Socrates/ Then, to fill this need there will have to be retailers in our city, for aren't those who establish themselves in the marketplace to provide this service of buying and selling called retailers, while those who travel between cities are called merchants?

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ There are other servants, I think, whose minds alone wouldn't qualify them for membership in our society but whose bodies are strong enough for labor. These sell the use of their strength for a price called a wage and hence are themselves called wage-earners. Isn't that so?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So wage-earners complete our city?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Well, Adeimantus, has our city grown to completeness, then?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps it has.

Socrates/ Then where are justice and injustice to be found in it? With which of the things we examined did they come in?

Adeimantus/ I've no idea, Socrates, unless it was somewhere in some need that these people have of one another.

Socrates/ You may be right, but we must look into it and not grow weary. First, then, let's see what sort of life our citizens will lead when they've been provided for in the way we have been describing. They'll produce bread, wine, clothes, and shoes, won't they? They'll build houses, work naked and barefoot in the summer, and wear adequate clothing and shoes in the winter. For food, they'll knead and cook the flour and meal they've made from wheat and barley. They'll put their honest cakes and loaves on reeds or clean leaves, and, reclining on beds strewn with yew and myrtle, they'll feast with their children, drink their wine, and, crowned with wreaths, hymn the gods. They'll enjoy sex with one another but bear no more children than their resources allow, lest they fall into either poverty or war.

Glaucon/ It seems that you make your people feast without any delicacies.

Socrates/ True enough, I was forgetting that they'll obviously need salt, olives, cheese, boiled roots, and vegetables of the sort they cook in the country. We'll give them desserts, too, of course, consisting of figs, chickpeas, and beans, and they'll roast myrtle and acorns before the fire, drinking moderately. And so they'll live in peace and

good health, and when they die at a ripe old age, they'll bequeath a similar life to their children.

Glaucon/ If you were founding a city for pigs, Socrates, wouldn't you fatten them on the same diet?

Socrates/ Then how should I feed these people, Glaucon?

Glaucon/ In the conventional way. If they aren't to suffer hardship, they should recline on proper couches, dine at a table, and have the delicacies and desserts that people have nowadays.

Socrates/ All right, I understand. It isn't merely the origin of a city that we're considering, it seems, but the origin of a luxurious city. And that may not be a bad idea, for by examining it, we might very well see how justice and injustice grow up in cities. Yet the true city, in my opinion, is the one we've described, the healthy one, as it were. But let's study a city with a fever, if that's what you want. There's nothing to stop us. The things I mentioned earlier and the way of life I described won't satisfy some people, it seems, but couches, tables, and other furniture will have to be added, and, of course, all sorts of delicacies, perfumed oils, incense, prostitutes, and pastries. We mustn't provide them only with the necessities we mentioned at first, such as houses, clothes, and shoes, but painting and embroidery must be begun, and gold, ivory, and the like acquired. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we must enlarge our city, for the healthy one is no longer adequate. We must increase it in size and fill it with a multitude of things that go beyond what is necessary for a city—hunters, for example, and artists or imitators, many of whom work with shapes and colors, many with music. And there'll be poets and their assistants, actors, choral dancers, contractors, and makers of all kinds

of devices, including, among other things, those needed for the adornment of women. And so we'll need more servants, too. Or don't you think that we'll need tutors, wet nurses, nannies, beauticians, barbers, chefs, cooks, and swineherds? We didn't need any of these in our earlier city, but we'll need them in this one. And we'll also need many more cattle, won't we, if the people are going to eat meat?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if we live like that, we'll have a far greater need for doctors than we did before?

Glaucon/ Much greater.

Socrates/ And the land, I suppose, that used to be adequate to feed the population we had then, will cease to be adequate and become too small. What do you think?

Glaucon/ The same.

Socrates/ Then we'll have to seize some of our neighbors' land if we're to have enough pasture and ploughland. And won't our neighbors want to seize part of ours as well, if they too have surrendered themselves to the endless acquisition of money and have overstepped the limit of their necessities?

Glaucon/ That's completely inevitable, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then our next step will be war, Glaucon, won't it?

Glaucon/ It will.

Socrates/ We won't say yet whether the effects of war are good or bad but only that we've now found the origins of war. It comes from those same desires that are most of all responsible for the bad things that happen to cities and the individuals in them.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then the city must be further enlarged, and not just by a small number, either, but by a whole army, which

will do battle with the invaders in defense of the city's substantial wealth and all the other things we mentioned.

Glaucon/ Why aren't the citizens themselves adequate for that purpose?

Socrates/ They won't be, if the agreement you and the rest of us made when we were founding the city was a good one, for surely we agreed, if you remember, that it's impossible for a single person to practice many crafts or professions well.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ Well, then, don't you think that warfare is a profession?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then should we be more concerned about cobbling than about warfare?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ But we prevented a cobbler from trying to be a farmer, weaver, or builder at the same time and said that he must remain a cobbler in order to produce fine work. And each of the others, too, was to work all his life at a single trade for which he had a natural aptitude and keep away from all the others, so as not to miss the right moment to practice his own work well. Now, isn't it of the greatest importance that warfare be practiced well? And is fighting a war so easy that a farmer or a cobbler or any other craftsman can be a soldier at the same time? Though no one can become so much as a good player of checkers or dice if he considers it only as a sideline and doesn't practice it from childhood. Or can someone pick up a shield or any other weapon or tool of war and immediately perform adequately in an infantry battle or any other kind? No other tool makes anyone who picks it up a craftsman or champion unless he

has acquired the requisite knowledge and has had sufficient practice.

Glaucon/ If tools could make anyone who picked them up an expert, they' be valuable indeed.

Socrates/ Then to the degree that the work of the guardians is most important, it requires most freedom from other things and the greatest skill and devotion.

Glaucon/ I should think so.

Socrates/ And doesn't it also require a person whose nature is suited to that way of life?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then our job, it seems, is to select, if we can, the kind of nature suited to guard the city.

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ By god, it's no trivial task that we've taken on. But insofar as we are able, we mustn't shrink from it.

Glaucon/ No, we mustn't.

Socrates/ Do you think that, when it comes to guarding, there is any difference between the nature of a pedigree young dog and that of a well-born youth?

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Well, each needs keen senses, speed to catch what it sees, and strength in case it has to fight it out with what it captures.

Glaucon/ They both need all these things.

Socrates/ And each must be courageous if indeed he's to fight well.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And will a horse, a dog, or any other animal be courageous, if he isn't spirited? Or haven't you noticed just

how invincible and unbeatable spirit is, so that its presence makes the whole soul fearless and unconquerable?

Glaucon/ I have noticed that.

Socrates/ The physical qualities of the guardians are clear, then.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And as far as their souls are concerned, they must be spirited.

Glaucon/ That too.

Socrates/ But if they have natures like that, Glaucon, won't they be savage to each other and to the rest of the citizens?

Glaucon/ By god, it will be hard for them to be anything else.

Socrates/ Yet surely they must be gentle to their own people and harsh to the enemy. If they aren't, they won't wait around for others to destroy the city but will do it themselves first.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ What are we to do, then? Where are we to find a character that is both gentle and high-spirited at the same time? After all, a gentle nature is the opposite of a spirited one.

Glaucon/ Apparently.

Socrates/ If someone lacks either gentleness or spirit, he can't be a good guardian. Yet it seems impossible to combine them. It follows that a good guardian cannot exist.

Glaucon/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ I couldn't see a way out, but on reexamining what had gone before, I said: We deserve to be stuck, for we've lost sight of the analogy we put forward.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ We overlooked the fact that there are natures of the sort we thought impossible, natures in which these opposites are indeed combined.

Glaucon/ Where?

Socrates/ You can see them in other animals, too, but especially in the one to which we compared the guardian, for you know, of course, that a pedigree dog naturally has a character of this sort—he is gentle as can be to those he's used to and knows, but the opposite to those he doesn't know.

Glaucon/ I do know that.

Socrates/ So the combination we want is possible after all, and our search for the good guardian is not contrary to nature.

Glaucon/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Then do you think that our future guardian, besides being spirited, must also be by nature philosophical?

Glaucon/ How do you mean? I don't understand.

Socrates/ It's something else you see in dogs, and it makes you wonder at the animal.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ When a dog sees someone it doesn't know, it gets angry before anything bad happens to it. But when it knows someone, it welcomes him, even if it has never received anything good from him. Haven't you ever wondered at that?

Glaucon/ I've never paid any attention to it, but obviously that is the way a dog behaves.

Socrates/ Surely this is a refined quality in its nature and one that is truly philosophical.

Glaucon/ In what way philosophical?

Socrates/ Because it judges anything it sees to be either a friend or an enemy, on no other basis than that it knows the one and doesn't know the other. And how could it be anything besides a lover of learning, if it defines what is its own and what is alien to it in terms of knowledge and ignorance?

Glaucon/ It couldn't.

Socrates/ But surely the love of learning is the same thing as philosophy or the love of wisdom?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Then, may we confidently assume in the case of a human being, too, that if he is to be gentle toward his own and those he knows, he must be a lover of learning and wisdom?

Glaucon/ We may.

Socrates/ Philosophy, spirit, speed, and strength must all, then, be combined in the nature of anyone who is to be a fine and good guardian of our city.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Then those are the traits a potential guardian would need at the outset. But how are we to bring him up and educate him? Will inquiry into that topic bring us any closer to the goal of our inquiry, which is to discover the origins of justice and injustice in a city? We want our account to be adequate, but we don't want it to be any longer than necessary.

Adeimantus/ I certainly expect, that such inquiry will further our goal.

Socrates/ Then, by god, Adeimantus, we mustn't leave it out, even if it turns out to be a somewhat lengthy affair.

Adeimantus/ No, we mustn't.

Socrates/ Come, then, and just as if we had the leisure to make up stories, let's describe in theory how to educate our men.

Adeimantus/ All right.

Socrates/ What will their education be? Or is it hard to find anything better than that which has developed over a long period—physical training for bodies and music and poetry for the soul?

Adeimantus/ Yes, it would be hard.

Socrates/ Now, we start education in music and poetry before physical training, don't we?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Do you include stories under music and poetry?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Aren't there two kinds of story, one true and the other false?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And mustn't our men be educated in both, but first in false ones?

Adeimantus/ I don't understand what you mean.

Socrates/ Don't you understand that we first tell stories to children? These are false, on the whole, though they have some truth in them. And we tell them to small children before physical training begins.

Adeimantus/ That's true.

Socrates/ And that's what I meant by saying that we must deal with music and poetry before physical training.

Adeimantus/ All right.

Socrates/ You know, don't you, that the beginning of any process is most important, especially for anything young and

tender? It's at that time that it is most malleable and takes on any pattern one wishes to impress on it.

Adeimantus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then shall we carelessly allow the children to hear any old stories, told by just anyone, and to take beliefs into their souls that are for the most part opposite to the ones we think they should hold when they are grown up?

Adeimantus/ We certainly won't.

Socrates/ Then we must first of all, it seems, supervise the storytellers. We'll select their stories whenever they are fine or beautiful and reject them when they aren't. And we'll persuade nurses and mothers to tell their children the ones we have selected, since they will shape their children's souls with stories much more than they shape their bodies by handling them. Many of the stories they tell now, however, must be thrown out.

Adeimantus/ Which ones do you mean?

Socrates/ We'll first look at the major stories, and by seeing how to deal with them, we'll see how to deal with the minor ones as well, for they exhibit the same pattern and have the same effects whether they're famous or not. Don't you think so?

Adeimantus/ I do, but I don't know which ones you're calling major.

Socrates/ Those that Homer, Hesiod, and other poets tell us, for surely they composed false stories, told them to people, and are still telling them.

Adeimantus/ Which stories do you mean, and what fault do you find in them?

Socrates/ The fault one ought to find first and foremost, especially if the falsehood isn't well told.

Adeimantus/ For example?

Socrates/ When a story gives a bad image of what the gods and heroes are like, the way a painter does whose picture is not at all like the things he's trying to paint.

Adeimantus/ You're right to object to that. But what sort of thing in particular do you have in mind?

Socrates/ First, telling the greatest falsehood about the most important things doesn't make a fine story—I mean Hesiod telling us about how Uranus behaved, how Cronus punished him for it, and how he was in turn punished by his own son. But even if it were true, it should be passed over in silence, not told to foolish young people. And if, for some reason, it has to be told, only a very few people—pledged to secrecy and after sacrificing not just a pig but something great and scarce—should hear it, so that their number is kept as small as possible.

Adeimantus/ Yes, such stories are hard to deal with.

Socrates/ And they shouldn't be told in our city, Adeimantus. Nor should a young person hear it said that in committing the worst crimes he's doing nothing out of the ordinary, or that if he inflicts every kind of punishment on an unjust father, he's only doing the same as the first and greatest of the gods.

Adeimantus/ No, by god, I don't think myself that these stories are fit to be told.

Socrates/ Indeed, if we want the guardians of our city to think that it's shameful to be easily provoked into hating one another, we mustn't allow any stories about gods warring, fighting, or plotting against one another, for they aren't true. The battles of gods and giants, and all the various stories of the gods hating their families or friends, should neither be told nor even woven in embroideries. If we're to persuade our people that no citizen has ever hated another and that it's impious to do so, then that's what should be told to children

from the beginning by old men and women; and as these children grow older, poets should be compelled to tell them the same sort of thing. We won't admit stories into our city—whether allegorical or not—about Hera being chained by her son, nor about Hephaestus being hurled from heaven by his father when he tried to help his mother, who was being beaten, nor about the battle of the gods in Homer. The young can't distinguish what is allegorical from what isn't, and the opinions they absorb at that age are hard to erase and apt to become unalterable. For these reasons, then, we should probably take the utmost care to insure that the first stories they hear about virtue are the best ones for them to hear.

Adeimantus/ That's reasonable. But if someone asked us what stories these are, what should we say?

Socrates/ You and I, Adeimantus, aren't poets, but we are founding a city. And it's appropriate for the founders to know the patterns on which poets must base their stories and from which they mustn't deviate. But we aren't actually going to compose their poems for them.

Adeimantus/ All right. But what precisely are the patterns for theology or stories about the gods?

Socrates/ Something like this: Whether in epic, lyric, or tragedy, a god must always be represented as he is.

Adeimantus/ Indeed, he must.

Socrates/ Now, a god is really good, isn't he, and must be described as such?

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And surely nothing good is harmful, is it?

Adeimantus/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ And can what isn't harmful do harm?

Adeimantus/ Never.

Socrates/ Or can what does no harm do anything bad?

Adeimantus/ No.

Socrates/ And can what does nothing bad be the cause of anything bad?

Adeimantus/ How could it?

Socrates/ Moreover, the good is beneficial?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It is the cause of doing well?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The good isn't the cause of all things, then, but only of good ones; it isn't the cause of bad ones.

Adeimantus/ I agree entirely.

Socrates/ Therefore, since a god is good, he is not—as most people claim—the cause of everything that happens to human beings but of only a few things, for good things are fewer than bad ones in our lives. He alone is responsible for the good things, but we must find some other cause for the bad ones, not a god.

Adeimantus/ That's very true, and I believe it.

Socrates/ Then we won't accept from anyone the foolish mistake Homer makes about the gods when he says:

> There are two urns at the threshold of Zeus,
> One filled with good fates, the other with bad ones....

and the person to whom he gives a mixture of these

> Sometimes meets with a bad fate, sometimes with good.

but the one who receives his fate entirely from the second urn;

> Evil famine drives him over the divine earth.

We won't grant either that Zeus is for us;

> The distributor of both good and bad.

And as to the breaking of the promised truce by Pandarus, if anyone tells us that it was brought about by Athena and

Zeus or that Themis and Zeus were responsible for strife and contention among the gods, we will not praise him. Nor will we allow the young to hear the words of Aeschylus:

> A god makes mortals guilty
> When he wants utterly to destroy a house.

And if anyone composes a poem about the sufferings of Niobe, such as the one in which these lines occur, or about the house of Pelops, or the tale of Troy, or anything else of that kind, we must require him to say that these things are not the work of a god. Or, if they are, then poets must look for the kind of account of them that we are now seeking, and say that the actions of the gods are good and just, and that those they punish are benefited thereby. We won't allow poets to say that the punished are made wretched and that it was a god who made them so. But we will allow them to say that bad people are wretched because they are in need of punishment and that, in paying the penalty, they are benefited by the gods. And, as for saying that a god, who is himself good, is the cause of bad things, we'll fight that in every way, and we won't allow anyone to say it in his own city, if it's to be well governed, or anyone to hear it either—whether young or old, whether in verse or prose. These stories are not pious, not advantageous to us, and not consistent with one another.

Adeimantus/ I like your law, and I'll vote for it.

Socrates/ This, then, is one of the laws or patterns concerning the gods to which speakers and poets must conform, namely, that a god isn't the cause of all things but only of good ones.

Adeimantus/ And it's a fully satisfactory law.

Socrates/ What about this second law? Do you think that a god is a sorcerer, able to appear in different forms at different times, sometimes changing himself from his own

form into many shapes, sometimes deceiving us by making us think that he has done it? Or do you think he's simple and least of all likely to step out of his own form?

Adeimantus/ I can't say offhand.

Socrates/ Well, what about this? If he steps out of his own form, mustn't he either change himself or be changed by something else?

Adeimantus/ He must.

Socrates/ But the best things are least liable to alteration or change, aren't they? For example, isn't the healthiest and strongest body least changed by food, drink, and labor, or the healthiest and strongest plant by sun, wind, and the like?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And the most courageous and most rational soul is least disturbed or altered by any outside affection?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the same account is true of all artifacts, furniture, houses, and clothes. The ones that are good and well-made are least altered by time or anything else that happens to them.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Whatever is in good condition, then, whether by nature or craft or both, admits least of being changed by anything else.

Adeimantus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Now, surely a god and what belongs to him are in every way in the best condition.

Adeimantus/ How could they fail to be?

Socrates/ Then a god would be least likely to have many shapes.

Adeimantus/ Indeed.

Socrates/ Then does he change or alter himself?

Adeimantus/ Clearly he does, if indeed he is altered at all.

Socrates/ Would he change himself into something better and more beautiful than himself or something worse and uglier?

Adeimantus/ It would have to be into something worse, if he's changed at all, for surely we won't say that a god is deficient in either beauty or virtue.

Socrates/ Absolutely right. And do you think, Adeimantus, that anyone, whether god or human, would deliberately make himself worse in any way?

Adeimantus/ No, that's impossible.

Socrates/ Is it impossible, then, for gods to want to alter themselves? Since they are the most beautiful and best possible, it seems that each always and unconditionally retains his own shape.

Adeimantus/ That seems entirely necessary to me.

Socrates/ Then let no poet tell us about Proteus or Thetis, or say that;

> The gods, in the likeness of strangers from foreign lands,
>
> Adopt every sort of shape and visit our cities.

Nor must they present Hera, in their tragedies or other poems, as a priestess collecting alms for;

> the life-giving sons of the Argive river Inachus.

or tell us other stories of that sort. Nor must mothers, believing bad stories about the gods wandering at night in the shapes of strangers from foreign lands, terrify their children with them. Such stories blaspheme the gods and, at the same time, make children more cowardly.

Adeimantus/ They mustn't be told.

Socrates/ But though the gods are unable to change, do they nonetheless make us believe that they appear in all sorts of ways, deceiving us through sorcery?

Adeimantus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ What? Would a god be willing to be false, either in word or deed, by presenting an illusion?

Adeimantus/ I don't know.

Socrates/ Don't you know that a true falsehood, if one may call it that, is hated by all gods and humans?

Adeimantus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that no one is willing to tell falsehoods to the most important part of himself about the most important things, but of all places he is most afraid to have falsehood there.

Adeimantus/ I still don't understand.

Socrates/ That's because you think I'm saying something deep. I simply mean that to be false to one's soul about the things that are, to be ignorant and to have and hold falsehood there, is what everyone would least of all accept, for everyone hates a falsehood in that place most of all.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Surely, as I said just now, this would be most correctly called true falsehood—ignorance in the soul of someone who has been told a falsehood. Falsehood in words is a kind of imitation of this affection in the soul, an image of it that comes into being after it and is not a pure falsehood. Isn't that so?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the thing that is really a falsehood is hated not only by the gods but by human beings as well.

Adeimantus/ It seems so to me.

Socrates/ What about falsehood in words? When and to whom is it useful and so not deserving of hatred? Isn't it useful against one's enemies? And when any of our so-called friends are attempting, through madness or ignorance, to do something bad, isn't it a useful drug for preventing them? It is also useful in the case of those stories we were just talking about, the ones we tell because we don't know the truth about those ancient events involving the gods. By making a falsehood as much like the truth as we can, don't we also make it useful?

Adeimantus/ We certainly do.

Socrates/ Then in which of these ways could a falsehood be useful to a god? Would he make false likenesses of ancient events because of his ignorance of them?

Adeimantus/ It would be ridiculous to think that.

Socrates/ Then there is nothing of the false poet in a god?

Adeimantus/ Not in my view.

Socrates/ Would he be false, then, through fear of his enemies?

Adeimantus/ Far from it.

Socrates/ Because of the ignorance or madness of his family or friends, then?

Adeimantus/ No one who is ignorant or mad is a friend of the gods.

Socrates/ Then there's no reason for a god to speak falsely?

Adeimantus/ None.

Socrates/ Therefore the daemonic and the divine are in every way free from falsehood.

Adeimantus/ Completely.

Socrates/ A god, then, is simple and true in word and deed. He doesn't change himself or deceive others by images, words, or signs, whether in visions or in dreams.

Adeimantus/ That's what I thought as soon as I heard you say it.

Socrates/ You agree, then, that this is our second pattern for speaking or composing poems about the gods: They are not sorcerers who change themselves, nor do they mislead us by falsehoods in words or deeds.

Adeimantus/ I agree.

Socrates/ So, even though we praise many things in Homer, we won't approve of the dream Zeus sent to Agamemnon, nor of Aeschylus when he makes Thetis say that Apollo sang in prophecy at her wedding:

> About the good fortune my children would have,
> Free of disease throughout their long lives,
> And of all the blessings that the friendship of the gods would bring me,
> I hoped that Phoebus' divine mouth would be free of falsehood,
> Endowed as it is with the craft of prophecy.
> But the very god who sang, the one at the feast,
> The one who said all this, he himself it is
> Who killed my son.

Whenever anyone says such things about a god, we'll be angry with him, refuse him a chorus, and not allow his poetry to be used in the education of the young, so that our guardians will be as god-fearing and godlike as human beings can be.

Adeimantus/ I completely endorse these patterns, and I would enact them as laws.

Book 3

Socrates/ Such, then, are the kinds of stories that I think future guardians should and should not hear about the gods from childhood on, if they are to honor the gods and their parents and not take their friendship with one another lightly.

Adeimantus/ I'm sure we're right about that, at any rate.

Socrates/ What if they are to be courageous as well? Shouldn't they be told stories that will make them least afraid of death? Or do you think that anyone ever becomes courageous if he's possessed by this fear?

Adeimantus/ No, I certainly don't.

Socrates/ And can someone be unafraid of death, preferring it to defeat in battle or slavery, if he believes in a Hades full of terrors?

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Then we must supervise such stories and those who tell them, and ask them not to disparage the life in Hades in this unconditional way, but rather to praise it, since what they now say is neither true nor beneficial to future warriors.

Adeimantus/ We must.

Socrates/ Then we'll expunge all that sort of disparagement, beginning with the following lines:

> I would rather labor on earth in service to another,
> To a man who is landless, with little to live on,
> Than be king over all the dead.

and also these:

> He feared that his home should appear to gods and men
> Dreadful, dank, and hated even by the gods.

and;

> Alas, there survives in the Halls of Hades
> A soul, a mere phantasm, with its wits completely gone.

and this:

> And he alone could think; the others are flitting shadows.

and;

> The soul, leaving his limbs, made its way to Hades,
> Lamenting its fate, leaving manhood and youth behind.

and these:

> His soul went below the earth like smoke,
> Screeching as it went…

and;

> As when bats in an awful cave
> Fly around screeching if one of them falls
> From the cluster on the ceiling, all clinging to one another,
> So their souls went screeching…

We'll ask Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we delete these passages and all similar ones. It isn't that they aren't poetic and pleasing to the majority of hearers but that, the more poetic they are, the less they should be heard by children or by men who are supposed to be free and to fear slavery more than death.

Adeimantus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And the frightening and dreadful names for the underworld must be struck out, for example, "Cocytus" and "Styx," and also the names for the dead, for example, "those below" and "the sapless ones," and all those names of things in the underworld that make everyone who hears them shudder. They may be all well and good for other purposes,

but we are afraid that our guardians will be made softer and more malleable by such shudders.

Adeimantus/ And our fear is justified.

Socrates/ Then such passages are to be struck out?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And poets must follow the opposite pattern in speaking and writing?

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Must we also delete the lamentations and pitiful speeches of famous men?

Adeimantus/ We must, if indeed what we said before is compelling.

Socrates/ Consider though whether we are right to delete them or not. We surely say that a decent man doesn't think that death is a terrible thing for someone decent to suffer—even for someone who happens to be his friend.

Adeimantus/ We do say that.

Socrates/ Then he won't mourn for him as for someone who has suffered a terrible fate.

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ We also say that a decent person is most self-sufficient in living well and, above all others, has the least need of anyone else.

Adeimantus/ That's true.

Socrates/ Then it's less dreadful for him than for anyone else to be deprived of his son, brother, possessions, or any other such things.

Adeimantus/ Much less.

Socrates/ Then he'll least give way to lamentations and bear misfortune most quietly when it strikes.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We'd be right, then, to delete the lamentations of famous men, leaving them to women (and not even to good women, either) and to cowardly men, so that those we say we are training to guard our city will disdain to act like that.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Again, then, we'll ask Homer and the other poets not to represent Achilles, the son of a goddess, as

> Lying now on his side, now on his back, now again
> On his belly; then standing up to wander distracted
> This way and that on the shore of the unharvested sea.

Nor to make him pick up ashes in both hands and pour them over his head, weeping and lamenting in the ways he does in Homer. Nor to represent Priam, a close descendant of the gods, as entreating his men and;

> Rolling around in dung,
> Calling upon each man by name.

And we'll ask them even more earnestly not to make the gods lament and say:

> Alas, unfortunate that I am, wretched mother of a great son.

But, if they do make the gods do such things, at least they mustn't dare to represent the greatest of the gods as behaving in so unlikely a fashion as to say:

> Alas, with my own eyes I see a man who is most dear to me
> Chased around the city, and my heart laments.

or;

> Woe is me, that Sarpedon, who is most dear to me, should be
> Fated to be killed by Patroclus, the son of Menoetius…

If our young people, Adeimantus, listen to these stories without ridiculing them as not worth hearing, it's hardly likely that they'll consider the things described in them to be

unworthy of mere human beings like themselves or that they'll rebuke themselves for doing or saying similar things when misfortune strikes. Instead, they'll feel neither shame nor restraint but groan and lament at even insignificant misfortunes.

Adeimantus/ What you say is completely true.

Socrates/ Then, as the argument has demonstrated—and we must remain persuaded by it until someone shows us a better one—they mustn't behave like that.

Adeimantus/ No, they mustn't.

Socrates/ Moreover, they mustn't be lovers of laughter either, for whenever anyone indulges in violent laughter, a violent change of mood is likely to follow.

Adeimantus/ So I believe.

Socrates/ Then, if someone represents worthwhile people as overcome by laughter, we won't approve, and we'll approve even less if they represent gods that way.

Adeimantus/ Much less.

Socrates/ Then we won't approve of Homer saying things like this about the gods:

> And unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods
> As they saw Hephaestus limping through the hall.

Adeimantus/ According to your argument, such things must be rejected.

Socrates/ If you want to call it mine, but they must be rejected in any case.

Moreover, we have to be concerned about truth as well, for if what we said just now is correct, and falsehood, though of no use to the gods, is useful to people as a form of drug, clearly we must allow only doctors to use it, not private citizens.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then if it is appropriate for anyone to use falsehoods for the good of the city, because of the actions of either enemies or citizens, it is the rulers. But everyone else must keep away from them, because for a private citizen to lie to a ruler is just as bad a mistake as for a sick person or athlete not to tell the truth to his doctor or trainer about his physical condition or for a sailor not to tell the captain the facts about his own condition or that of the ship and the rest of its crew—indeed it is a worse mistake than either of these.

Adeimantus/ That's completely true.

Socrates/ And if the ruler catches someone else telling falsehoods in the city—

> Anyone of the craftsmen,
> Whether a prophet, a doctor who heals the sick, or a maker of spears

—he'll punish him for introducing something as subversive and destructive to a city as it would be to a ship.

Adeimantus/ He will, if practice is to follow theory.

Socrates/ What about moderation? Won't our young people also need that?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And aren't these the most important aspects of moderation for the majority of people, namely, to obey the rulers and to rule the pleasures of drink, sex, and food for themselves?

Adeimantus/ That's my opinion at any rate.

Socrates/ Then we'll say that the words of Homer's Diomedes are well put:

> Sit down in silence, my friend, and be persuaded by me.

and so is what follows:

> The Achaeans, breathing eagerness for battle,
> Marched in silence, fearing their commanders.

and all other such things.

Those are well put.

But what about this?

> Wine-bibber, with the eyes of a dog and the heart of a deer.

and the rest, is it—or any other headstrong words spoken in prose or poetry by private citizens against their rulers—well put?

Adeimantus/ No, they aren't.

Socrates/ I don't think they are suitable for young people to hear—not, in any case, with a view to making them moderate. Though it isn't surprising that they are pleasing enough in other ways. What do you think?

Adeimantus/ The same as you.

Socrates/ What about making the cleverest man say that the finest thing of all is when The tables are well laden With bread and meat, and the wine-bearer

> Draws wine from the mixing bowl and pours it in the cups.

or

> Death by starvation is the most pitiful fate.

Do you think that such things make for self-control in young people? Or what about having Zeus, when all the other gods are asleep and he alone is awake, easily forget all his plans because of sexual desire and be so overcome by the sight of Hera that he doesn't even want to go inside but wants to possess her there on the ground, saying that his desire for her is even greater than it was when—without their parents' knowledge—they were first lovers? Or what about the chaining together of Ares and Aphrodite by Hephaestus—also the result of sexual passion?

Adeimantus/ No, by god, none of that seems suitable to me.

Socrates/ But if, on the other hand, there are words or deeds of famous men, who are exhibiting endurance in the face of everything, surely they must be seen or heard. For example;

> He struck his chest and spoke to his heart:
>
> "Endure, my heart, you've suffered more shameful things than this."

Adeimantus/ They certainly must.

Socrates/ Now, we mustn't allow our men to be money-lovers or to be bribable with gifts.

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then the poets mustn't sing to them:

> Gifts persuade gods, and gifts persuade revered kings.

Nor must Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, be praised as speaking with moderation when he advises him to take the gifts and defend the Achaeans, but not to give up his anger without gifts. Nor should we think such things to be worthy of Achilles himself. Nor should we agree that he was such a money-lover that he would accept the gifts of Agamemnon or release the corpse of Hector for a ransom but not otherwise.

Adeimantus/ It certainly isn't right to praise such things.

Socrates/ It is only out of respect for Homer, indeed, that I hesitate to say that it is positively impious to accuse Achilles of such things or to believe others who say them. Or to make him address Apollo in these words:

> You've injured me, Far shooter, most deadly of the gods;
>
> And I'd punish you, if I had the power.

Or to say that he disobeyed the river—a god—and was ready to fight it, or that he consecrated hair to the dead Patroclus, which was already consecrated to a different river,

Spercheius. It isn't to be believed that he did any of these. Nor is it true that he dragged the dead Hector around the tomb of Patroclus or massacred the captives on his pyre. So we'll deny that. Nor will we allow our people to believe that Achilles, who was the son of a goddess and of Peleus (the most moderate of men and the grandson of Zeus) and who was brought up by the most wise Chiron, was so full of inner turmoil as to have two diseases in his soul—slavishness accompanied by the love of money, on the one hand, and arrogance towards gods and humans, on the other.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ We certainly won't believe such things, nor will we allow it to be said that Theseus, the son of Poseidon, and Pirithous, the son of Zeus, engaged in terrible kidnappings, or that any other hero and son of a god dared to do any of the terrible and impious deeds that they are now falsely said to have done. We'll compel the poets either to deny that the heroes did such things or else to deny that they were children of the gods. They mustn't say both or attempt to persuade our young people that the gods bring about evil or that heroes are no better than humans. As we said earlier, these things are both impious and untrue, for we demonstrated that it is impossible for the gods to produce bad things.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Moreover, these stories are harmful to people who hear them, for everyone will be ready to excuse himself when he's bad, if he is persuaded that similar things both are being done now and have been done in the past by;

> Close descendants of the gods,
> Those near to Zeus, to whom belongs
> The ancestral altar high up on Mount Ida,
> In whom the blood of daemons has not weakened.

For that reason, we must put a stop to such stories, lest they produce in the youth a strong inclination to do bad things.

Adeimantus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Now, isn't there a kind of story whose content we haven't yet discussed? So far we've said how one should speak about gods, heroes, daemons, and things in Hades.

Adeimantus/ We have.

Socrates/ Then what's left is how to deal with stories about human beings, isn't it?

Adeimantus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ But we can't settle that matter at present.

Adeimantus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because I think we'll say that what poets and prose-writers tell us about the most important matters concerning human beings is bad. They say that many unjust people are happy and many just ones wretched, that injustice is profitable if it escapes detection, and that justice is another's good but one's own loss. I think we'll prohibit these stories and order the poets to compose the opposite kind of poetry and tell the opposite kind of tales. Don't you think so?

Adeimantus/ I know so.

Socrates/ But if you agree that what I said is correct, couldn't I reply that you've agreed to the very point that is in question in our whole discussion?

Adeimantus/ And you'd be right to make that reply.

Socrates/ Then we'll agree about what stories should be told about human beings only when we've discovered what sort of thing justice is and how by nature it profits the one who has it, whether he is believed to be just or not.

Adeimantus/ That's very true.

Socrates/ This concludes our discussion of the content of stories. We should now, I think, investigate their style, for we'll then have fully investigated both what should be said and how it should be said.

Adeimantus/ I don't understand what you mean.

Socrates/ But you must. Maybe you'll understand it better if I put it this way. Isn't everything said by poets and storytellers a narrative about past, present, or future events?

Adeimantus/ What else could it be?

Socrates/ And aren't these narratives either narrative alone, or narrative through imitation, or both?

Adeimantus/ I need a clearer understanding of that as well.

Socrates/ I seem to be a ridiculously unclear teacher. So, like those who are incompetent at speaking, I won't try to deal with the matter as a whole, but I'll take up a part and use it as an example to make plain what I want to say. Tell me, do you know the beginning of the Iliad, where the poet tells us that Chryses begs Agamemnon to release his daughter, that Agamemnon harshly rejects him, and that, having failed, Chryses prays to the god against the Achaeans?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ You know, then, that up to the lines:

> And he begged all the Achaeans,
> But especially the two sons of Atreus, the commanders of the army.

the poet himself is speaking and doesn't attempt to get us to think that the speaker is someone other than himself. After this, however, he speaks as if he were Chryses and tries as far as possible to make us think that the speaker isn't Homer but the priest himself—an old man. And he composes pretty

well all the rest of his narrative about events in Troy, Ithaca, and the whole Odyssey in this way.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Now, the speeches he makes and the parts between them are both narrative?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But when he makes a speech as if he were someone else, won't we say that he makes his own style as much like that of the indicated speaker as possible?

Adeimantus/ We certainly will.

Socrates/ Now, to make oneself like someone else in voice or appearance is to imitate the person one makes oneself like.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ In these passages, then, it seems that he and the other poets effect their narrative through imitation.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ If the poet never hid himself, the whole of his poem would be narrative without imitation. In order to prevent you from saying again that you don't understand, I'll show you what this would be like. If Homer said that Chryses came with a ransom for his daughter to supplicate the Achaeans, especially the kings, and after that didn't speak as if he had become Chryses, but still as Homer, there would be no imitation but rather simple narrative. It would have gone something like this—I'll speak without meter since I'm no poet: "And the priest came and prayed that the gods would allow them to capture Troy and be safe afterwards, that they' accept the ransom and free his daughter, and thus show reverence for the god. When he'd said this, the others showed their respect for the priest and consented. But Agamemnon was angry and ordered him to leave and never

to return, lest his priestly wand and the wreaths of the god should fail to protect him. He said that, before freeing the daughter, he'd grow old in Argos by her side. He told Chryses to go away and not to make him angry, if he wanted to get home safely. When the old man heard this, he was frightened and went off in silence. But when he'd left the camp he prayed at length to Apollo, calling him by his various titles and reminding him of his own services to him. If any of those services had been found pleasing, whether it was the building of temples or the sacrifice of victims, he asked in return that the arrows of the god should make the Achaeans pay for his tears." That is the way we get simple narrative without imitation.

Adeimantus/ I understand.

Socrates/ Then also understand that the opposite occurs when one omits the words between the speeches and leaves the speeches by themselves.

Adeimantus/ I understand that too. Tragedies are like that.

Socrates/ That's absolutely right. And now I think that I can make clear to you what I couldn't before. One kind of poetry and story-telling employs only imitation—tragedy and comedy, as you say. Another kind employs only narration by the poet himself—you find this most of all in dithyrambs. A third kind uses both—as in epic poetry and many other places, if you follow me.

Adeimantus/ Now I understand what you were trying to say.

Socrates/ Remember, too, that before all that we said that we had dealt with what must be said in stories, but that we had yet to investigate how it must be said.

Adeimantus/ Yes, I remember.

Socrates/ Well, this, more precisely, is what I meant: We need to come to an agreement about whether we'll allow poets to narrate through imitation, and, if so, whether they are to imitate some things but not others—and what things these are, or whether they are not to imitate at all.

Adeimantus/ I divine that you're looking into the question of whether or not we'll allow tragedy and comedy into our city.

Socrates/ Perhaps, and perhaps even more than that, for I myself really don't know yet, but whatever direction the argument blows us, that's where we must go.

Adeimantus/ Fine.

Socrates/ Then, consider, Adeimantus, whether our guardians should be imitators or not. Or does this also follow from our earlier statement that each individual would do a fine job of one occupation, not of many, and that if he tried the latter and dabbled in many things, he'd surely fail to achieve distinction in any of them?

Adeimantus/ He would indeed.

Socrates/ Then, doesn't the same argument also hold for imitation—a single individual can't imitate many things as well as he can imitate one?

Adeimantus/ No, he can't.

Socrates/ Then, he'll hardly be able to pursue any worthwhile way of life while at the same time imitating many things and being an imitator. Even in the case of two kinds of imitation that are thought to be closely akin, such as tragedy and comedy, the same people aren't able to do both of them well. Did you not just say that these were both imitations?

Adeimantus/ I did, and you're quite right that the same people can't do both.

Socrates/ Nor can they be both rhapsodes and actors.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ Indeed, not even the same actors are used for tragedy and comedy. Yet all these are imitations, aren't they?

Adeimantus/ They are.

Socrates/ And human nature, Adeimantus, seems to me to be minted in even smaller coins than these, so that it can neither imitate many things well nor do the actions themselves, of which those imitations are likenesses.

Adeimantus/ That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ Then, if we're to preserve our first argument, that our guardians must be kept away from all other crafts so as to be the craftsmen of the city's freedom, and be exclusively that, and do nothing at all except what contributes to it, they must neither do nor imitate anything else. If they do imitate, they must imitate from childhood what is appropriate for them, namely, people who are courageous, self-controlled, pious, and free, and their actions. They mustn't be clever at doing or imitating slavish or shameful actions, lest from enjoying the imitation, they come to enjoy the reality. Or haven't you noticed that imitations practiced from youth become part of nature and settle into habits of gesture, voice, and thought?

Adeimantus/ I have indeed.

Socrates/ Then we won't allow those for whom we profess to care, and who must grow into good men, to imitate either a young woman or an older one, or one abusing her husband, quarreling with the gods, or bragging because she thinks herself happy, or one suffering misfortune and possessed by sorrows and lamentations, and even less one who is ill, in love, or in labor.

Adeimantus/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ Nor must they imitate either male or female slaves doing slavish things.

Adeimantus/ No, they mustn't.

Socrates/ Nor bad men, it seems, who are cowards and are doing the opposite of what we described earlier, namely, libeling and ridiculing each other, using shameful language while drunk or sober, or wronging themselves and others, whether in word or deed, in the various other ways that are typical of such people. They mustn't become accustomed to making themselves like madmen in either word or deed, for, though they must know about mad and vicious men and women, they must neither do nor imitate anything they do.

Adeimantus/ That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ Should they imitate metal workers or other craftsmen, or those who row in triremes, or their time-keepers, or anything else connected with ships?

Adeimantus/ How could they, since they aren't to concern themselves with any of those occupations?

Socrates/ And what about this? Will they imitate neighing horses, bellowing bulls, roaring rivers, the crashing sea, thunder, or anything of that sort?

Adeimantus/ They are forbidden to be mad or to imitate mad people.

Socrates/ If I understand what you mean, there is one kind of style and narrative that someone who is really a gentleman would use whenever he wanted to narrate something, and another kind, unlike this one, which his opposite by nature and education would favor, and in which he would narrate.

Adeimantus/ Which styles are those?

Socrates/ Well, I think that when a moderate man comes upon the words or actions of a good man in his narrative,

he'll be willing to report them as if he were that man himself, and he won't be ashamed of that kind of imitation. He'll imitate this good man most when he's acting in a faultless and intelligent manner, but he'll do so less, and with more reluctance, when the good man is upset by disease, sexual passion, drunkenness, or some other misfortune. When he comes upon a character unworthy of himself, however, he'll be unwilling to make himself seriously resemble that inferior character—except perhaps for a brief period in which he's doing something good. Rather he'll be ashamed to do something like that, both because he's unpracticed in the imitation of such people and because he can't stand to shape and mold himself according to a worse pattern. He despises this in his mind, unless it's just done in play.

Adeimantus/ That seems likely.

Socrates/ He'll therefore use the kind of narrative we described in dealing with the Homeric epics a moment ago. His style will participate both in imitation and in the other kind of narrative, but there'll be only a little bit of imitation in a long story? Or is there nothing in what I say?

Adeimantus/ That's precisely how the pattern for such a speaker must be.

Socrates/ As for someone who is not of this sort, the more inferior he is, the more willing he'll be to narrate anything and to consider nothing unworthy of himself. As a result, he'll undertake to imitate seriously and before a large audience all the things we just mentioned—thunder, the sounds of wind, hail, axles, pulleys, trumpets, flutes, pipes, and all the other instruments, even the cries of dogs, sheep, and birds. And this man's style will consist entirely of imitation in voice and gesture, or else include only a small bit of plain narrative.

Adeimantus/ That too is certain.

Socrates/ These, then, are the two kinds of style I was talking about.

Adeimantus/ There are these two.

Socrates/ The first of these styles involves little variation, so that if someone provides a musical mode and rhythm appropriate to it, won't the one who speaks correctly remain—with a few minor changes—pretty well within that mode and rhythm throughout?

Adeimantus/ That's precisely what he'll do.

Socrates/ What about the other kind of style? Doesn't it require the opposite if it is to speak appropriately, namely, all kinds of musical modes and all kinds of rhythms, because it contains every type of variation?

Adeimantus/ That's exactly right.

Socrates/ Do all poets and speakers adopt one or other of these patterns of style or a mixture of both?

Adeimantus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ What are we to do, then? Shall we admit all these into our city, only one of the pure kinds, or the mixed one?

Adeimantus/ If my opinion is to prevail, we'll admit only the pure imitator of a decent person.

Socrates/ And yet, Adeimantus, the mixed style is pleasant. Indeed, it is by far the most pleasing to children, their tutors, and the vast majority of people.

Adeimantus/ Yes, it is the most pleasing.

Socrates/ But perhaps you don't think that it harmonizes with our constitution, because no one in our city is two or more people simultaneously, since each does only one job.

Adeimantus/ Indeed, it doesn't harmonize.

Socrates/ And isn't it because of this that it's only in our city that we'll find a cobbler who is a cobbler and not also a

captain along with his cobbling, and a farmer who is a farmer and not also a juror along with his farming, and a soldier who is a soldier and not a money-maker in addition to his soldiering, and so with them all?

Adeimantus/ That's true.

Socrates/ It seems, then, that if a man, who through clever training can become anything and imitate anything, should arrive in our city, wanting to give a performance of his poems, we should bow down before him as someone holy, wonderful, and pleasing, but we should tell him that there is no one like him in our city and that it isn't lawful for there to be. We should pour myrrh on his head, crown him with wreaths, and send him away to another city. But, for our own good, we ourselves should employ a more austere and less pleasure-giving poet and storyteller, one who would imitate the speech of a decent person and who would tell his stories in accordance with the patterns we laid down when we first undertook the education of our soldiers.

Adeimantus/ That is certainly what we'd do if it were up to us.

Socrates/ It's likely, then, that we have now completed our discussion of the part of music and poetry that concerns speech and stories, for we've spoken both of what is to be said and of how it is to be said.

Adeimantus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Doesn't it remain, then, to discuss lyric odes and songs?

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And couldn't anyone discover what we would say about them, given that it has to be in tune with what we've already said?

Glaucon laughed and said:

Glaucon/ I'm afraid, Socrates, that I'm not to be included under "anyone," for I don't have a good enough idea at the moment of what we're to say. Of course, I have my suspicions.

Socrates/ Nonetheless, you know that, in the first place, a song consists of three elements—words, harmonic mode, and rhythm.

Glaucon/ Yes, I do know that.

Socrates/ As far as words are concerned, they are no different in songs than they are when not set to music, so mustn't they conform in the same way to the patterns we established just now?

Glaucon/ They must.

Socrates/ Further, the mode and rhythm must fit the words.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And we said that we no longer needed dirges and lamentations among our words.

Glaucon/ We did, indeed.

Socrates/ What are the lamenting modes, then? You tell me, since you're musical.

Glaucon/ The mixo-Lydian, the syntono-Lydian, and some others of that sort.

Socrates/ Aren't they to be excluded, then? They're useless even to decent women, let alone to men.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Drunkenness, softness, and idleness are also most inappropriate for our guardians.

Glaucon/ How could they not be?

Socrates/ What, then, are the soft modes suitable for drinking-parties?

Glaucon/ The Ionian and those Lydian modes that are said to be relaxed.

Socrates/ Could you ever use these to make people warriors?

Glaucon/ Never. And now all you have left is the Dorian and Phrygian modes.

Socrates/ I don't know all the musical modes. Just leave me the mode that would suitably imitate the tone and rhythm of a courageous person who is active in battle or doing other violent deeds, or who is failing and facing wounds, death, or some other misfortune, and who, in all these circumstances, is fighting off his fate steadily and with self-control. Leave me also another mode, that of someone engaged in a peaceful, unforced, voluntary action, persuading someone or asking a favor of a god in prayer or of a human being through teaching and exhortation, or, on the other hand, of someone submitting to the supplications of another who is teaching him and trying to get him to change his mind, and who, in all these circumstances, is acting with moderation and self-control, not with arrogance but with understanding, and is content with the outcome. Leave me, then, these two modes, which will best imitate the violent or voluntary tones of voice of those who are moderate and courageous, whether in good fortune or in bad.

Glaucon/ The modes you're asking for are the very ones I mentioned.

Socrates/ Well, then, we'll have no need for polyharmonic or multi-stringed instruments to accompany our odes and songs.

Glaucon/ It doesn't seem so to me at least.

Socrates/ Then we won't need the craftsmen who make triangular lutes, harps, and all other such multi-stringed and polyharmonic instruments.

Glaucon/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ What about flute-makers and flute-players? Will you allow them into the city? Or isn't the flute the most "many-stringed" of all? And aren't the panharmonic instruments all imitations of it?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ The lyre and the cithara are left, then, as useful in the city, while in the country, there' be some sort of pipe for the shepherds to play.

Glaucon/ That is what our argument shows, at least.

Socrates/ Well, we certainly aren't doing anything new in preferring Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his.

Glaucon/ By god, it doesn't seem as though we are.

Socrates/ And, by the dog, without being aware of it, we've been purifying the city we recently said was luxurious.

Glaucon/ That's because we're being moderate.

Socrates/ Then let's purify the rest. The next topic after musical modes is the regulation of meter. We shouldn't strive to have either subtlety or great variety in meter. Rather, we should try to discover what are the rhythms of someone who leads an ordered and courageous life and then adapt the meter and the tune to his words, not his words to them. What these rhythms actually are is for you to say, just as in the case of the modes.

Glaucon/ I really don't know what to say. I can tell you from observation that there are three basic kinds of metrical feet out of which the others are constructed, just as there are four in the case of modes. But I can't tell you which sort imitates which sort of life.

Socrates/ Then we'll consult with Damon as to which metrical feet are suited to slavishness, insolence, madness, and the other vices and which are suited to their opposites.

I think I've heard him talking about an enoplion, which is a composite metrical phrase (although I'm not clear on this), and also about dactylic or heroic meter, which he arranged, I don't know how, to be equal up and down in the interchange of long and short. I think he called one foot an iambus, another a trochee, assigning a long and a short to both of them. In the case of some of these, I think he approved or disapproved of the tempo of the foot as much as of the rhythm itself, or of some combination of the two—I can't tell you which. But, as I said, we'll leave these things to Damon, since to mark off the different kinds would require a long argument. Or do you think we should try it?

Glaucon/ No, I certainly don't.

Socrates/ But you can discern, can't you, that grace and gracelessness follow good and bad rhythm respectively?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Further, if, as we said just now, rhythm and mode must conform to the words and not vice versa, then good rhythm follows fine words and is similar to them, while bad rhythm follows the opposite kind of words, and the same for harmony and disharmony.

Glaucon/ To be sure, these things must conform to the words.

Socrates/ What about the style and content of the words themselves? Don't they conform to the character of the speaker's soul?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And the rest conform to the words?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then fine words, harmony, grace, and rhythm follow simplicity of character—and I do not mean this in the sense in which we use "simplicity" as a euphemism for

“simple-mindedness”—but I mean the sort of fine and good character that has developed in accordance with an intelligent plan.

Glaucon/ That’s absolutely certain.

Socrates/ And must not our young people everywhere aim at these, if they are to do their own work?

Glaucon/ They must, indeed.

Socrates/ Now, surely painting is full of these qualities, as are all the crafts similar to it; weaving is full of them, and so are embroidery, architecture, and the crafts that produce all the other furnishings. Our bodily nature is full of them, as are the natures of all growing things, for in all of these there is grace and gracelessness. And gracelessness, bad rhythm, and disharmony are akin to bad words and bad character, while their opposites are akin to and are imitations of the opposite, a moderate and good character.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Is it, then, only poets we have to supervise, compelling them to make an image of a good character in their poems or else not to compose them among us? Or are we also to give orders to other craftsmen, forbidding them to represent—whether in pictures, buildings, or any other works—a character that is vicious, unrestrained, slavish, and graceless? Are we to allow someone who cannot follow these instructions to work among us, so that our guardians will be brought up on images of evil, as if in a meadow of bad grass, where they crop and graze in many different places every day until, little by little, they unwittingly accumulate a large evil in their souls? Or must we rather seek out craftsmen who are by nature able to pursue what is fine and graceful in their work, so that our young people will live in a healthy place and be benefited on all sides, and so that something of those fine works will strike their eyes and ears

like a breeze that brings health from a good place, leading them unwittingly, from childhood on, to resemblance, friendship, and harmony with the beauty of reason?

Glaucon/ The latter would be by far the best education for them.

Socrates/ Aren't these the reasons, Glaucon, that education in music and poetry is most important? First, because rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul more than anything else, affecting it most strongly and bringing it grace, so that if someone is properly educated in music and poetry, it makes him graceful, but if not, then the opposite. Second, because anyone who has been properly educated in music and poetry will sense it acutely when something has been omitted from a thing and when it hasn't been finely crafted or finely made by nature. And since he has the right distastes, he'll praise fine things, be pleased by them, receive them into his soul, and, being nurtured by them, become fine and good. He'll rightly object to what is shameful, hating it while he's still young and unable to grasp the reason, but, having been educated in this way, he will welcome the reason when it comes and recognize it easily because of its kinship with himself.

Glaucon/ Yes, I agree that those are the reasons to provide education in music and poetry.

Socrates/ It's just the way it was with learning how to read. Our ability wasn't adequate until we realized that there are only a few letters that occur in all sorts of different combinations, and that—whether written large or small—they were worthy of our attention, so that we picked them out eagerly wherever they occurred, knowing that we wouldn't be competent readers until we knew our letters.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And isn't it also true that if there are images of letters reflected in mirrors or water, we won't know them until we know the letters themselves, for both abilities are parts of the same craft and discipline?

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Then, by the gods, am I not right in saying that neither we, nor the guardians we are raising, will be educated in music and poetry until we know the different forms of moderation, courage, frankness, high-mindedness, and all their kindred, and their opposites too, which are moving around everywhere, and see them in the things in which they are, both themselves and their images, and do not disregard them, whether they are written on small things or large, but accept that the knowledge of both large and small letters is part of the same craft and discipline?

Glaucon/ That's absolutely essential.

Socrates/ Therefore, if someone's soul has a fine and beautiful character and his body matches it in beauty and is thus in harmony with it, so that both share in the same pattern, wouldn't that be the most beautiful sight for anyone who has eyes to see?

Glaucon/ It certainly would.

Socrates/ And isn't what is most beautiful also most loveable?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And a musical person would love such people most of all, but he wouldn't love anyone who lacked harmony?

Glaucon/ No, he wouldn't, at least not if the defect was in the soul, but if it was only in the body, he'd put up with it and be willing to embrace the boy who had it.

Socrates/ I gather that you love or have loved such a boy yourself, and I agree with you. Tell me this, however: Is excessive pleasure compatible with moderation?

Glaucon/ How can it be, since it drives one mad just as much as pain does?

Socrates/ What about with the rest of virtue?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ Well, then, is it compatible with violence and licentiousness?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Can you think of a greater or keener pleasure than sexual pleasure?

Glaucon/ I can't—or a madder one either.

Socrates/ But the right kind of love is by nature the love of order and beauty that has been moderated by education in music and poetry?

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Therefore, the right kind of love has nothing mad or licentious about it?

Glaucon/ No, it hasn't.

Socrates/ Then sexual pleasure mustn't come into it, and the lover and the boy he loves must have no share in it, if they are to love and be loved in the right way?

Glaucon/ By god, no, Socrates, it mustn't come into it.

Socrates/ It seems, then, that you'll lay it down as a law in the city we're establishing that if a lover can persuade a boy to let him, then he may kiss him, be with him, and touch him, as a father would a son, for the sake of what is fine and beautiful, but—turning to the other things—his association with the one he cares about must never seem to go any further than this, otherwise he will be reproached as

untrained in music and poetry and lacking in appreciation for what is fine and beautiful.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Does it seem to you that we've now completed our account of education in music and poetry? Anyway, it has ended where it ought to end, for it ought to end in the love of the fine and beautiful.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ After music and poetry, our young people must be given physical training.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ In this, too, they must have careful education from childhood throughout life. The matter stands, I believe, something like this—but you, too, should look into it. It seems to me that a fit body doesn't by its own virtue make the soul good, but instead that the opposite is true—a good soul by its own virtue makes the body as good as possible. How does it seem to you?

Glaucon/ The same.

Socrates/ Then, if we have devoted sufficient care to the mind, wouldn't we be right, in order to avoid having to do too much talking, to entrust it with the detailed supervision of the body, while we indicate only the general patterns to be followed?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ We said that our prospective guardians must avoid drunkenness, for it is less appropriate for a guardian to be drunk and not to know where on earth he is than it is for anyone else.

Glaucon/ It would be absurd for a guardian to need a guardian.

Socrates/ What about food? Aren't these men athletes in the greatest contest?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ Then would the regimen currently prescribed for athletes in training be suitable for them?

Glaucon/ Perhaps it would.

Socrates/ Yet it seems to result in sluggishness and to be of doubtful value for health. Or haven't you noticed that these athletes sleep their lives away and that, if they deviate even a little from their orderly regimen, they become seriously and violently ill?

Glaucon/ I have noticed that.

Socrates/ Then our warrior athletes need a more sophisticated kind of training. They must be like sleepless hounds, able to see and hear as keenly as possible and to endure frequent changes of water and food, as well as summer and winter weather on their campaigns, without faltering in health.

Glaucon/ That's how it seems to me, too.

Socrates/ Now, isn't the best physical training akin to the simple music and poetry we were describing a moment ago?

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean a simple and decent physical training, particularly the kind involved in training for war.

Glaucon/ What would it be like?

Socrates/ You might learn about such things from Homer. You know that, when his heroes are campaigning, he doesn't give them fish to banquet on, even though they are by the sea in the Hellespont, nor boiled meat either. Instead, he gives them only roasted meat, which is the kind most easily available to soldiers, for it's easier nearly everywhere to use fire alone than to carry pots and pans.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Nor, I believe, does Homer mention sweet desserts anywhere. Indeed, aren't even the other athletes aware that, if one's body is to be sound, one must keep away from all such things?

Glaucon/ They're right to be aware of it, at any rate, and to avoid such things.

Socrates/ If you think that, then it seems that you don't approve of Syracusan cuisine or of Sicilian-style dishes.

Glaucon/ I do not.

Socrates/ Then you also object to Corinthian girlfriends for men who are to be in good physical condition.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ What about the reputed delights of Attic pastries?

Glaucon/ I certainly object to them, too.

Socrates/ I believe that we'd be right to compare this diet and this entire life-style to the kinds of lyric odes and songs that are composed in all sorts of modes and rhythms.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Just as embellishment in the one gives rise to licentiousness, doesn't it give rise to illness in the other? But simplicity in music and poetry makes for moderation in the soul, and in physical training it makes for bodily health?

Glaucon/ That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ And as licentiousness and disease breed in the city, aren't many law courts and hospitals opened? And don't medicine and law give themselves solemn airs when even large numbers of free men take them very seriously?

Glaucon/ How could it be otherwise?

Socrates/ Yet could you find a greater sign of bad and shameful education in a city than that the need for skilled

doctors and lawyers is felt not only by inferior people and craftsmen but by those who claim to have been brought up in the manner of free men? Don't you think it's shameful and a great sign of vulgarity to be forced to make use of a justice imposed by others, as masters and judges, because you are unable to deal with the situation yourself?

Glaucon/ I think that's the most shameful thing of all.

Socrates/ Yet isn't it even more shameful when someone not only spends a good part of his life in court defending himself or prosecuting someone else but, through inexperience of what is fine, is persuaded to take pride in being clever at doing injustice and then exploiting every loophole and trick to escape conviction—and all for the sake of little worthless things and because he's ignorant of how much better and finer it is to arrange one's own life so as to have no need of finding a sleepy or inattentive judge?

Glaucon/ This case is even more shameful than the other.

Socrates/ And doesn't it seem shameful to you to need medical help, not for wounds or because of some seasonal illness, but because, through idleness and the life-style we've described, one is full of gas and phlegm like a stagnant swamp, so that sophisticated Asclepiad doctors are forced to come up with names like "flatulence" and "catarrh" to describe one's diseases?

Glaucon/ It does. And those certainly are strange new names for diseases.

Socrates/ Indeed, I don't suppose that they even existed in the time of Asclepius himself. I take it as a proof of this that his sons at Troy didn't criticize either the woman who treated Eurypylus when he was wounded, or Patroclus who prescribed the treatment, which consisted of Pramnian wine with barley meal and grated cheese sprinkled on it, though such treatment is now thought to cause inflammation.

Glaucon/ Yet it's a strange drink to give someone in that condition.

Socrates/ Not if you recall that they say that the kind of modern medicine that plays nursemaid to the disease wasn't used by the Asclepiads before Herodicus. He was a physical trainer who became ill, so he mixed physical training with medicine and wore out first himself and then many others as well.

Glaucon/ How did he do that?

Socrates/ By making his dying a lengthy process. Always tending his mortal illness, he was nonetheless, it seems, unable to cure it, so he lived out his life under medical treatment, with no leisure for anything else whatever. If he departed even a little from his accustomed regimen, he became completely worn out, but because his skill made dying difficult, he lived into old age.

Glaucon/ That's a fine prize for his skill.

Socrates/ One that's appropriate for someone who didn't know that it wasn't because he was ignorant or inexperienced that Asclepius failed to teach this type of medicine to his sons, but because he knew that everyone in a well-regulated city has his own work to do and that no one has the leisure to be ill and under treatment all his life. It's absurd that we recognize this to be true of craftsmen while failing to recognize that it's equally true of those who are wealthy and supposedly happy.

Glaucon/ How is that?

Socrates/ When a carpenter is ill, he expects to receive an emetic or a purge from his doctor or to get rid of his disease through surgery or cautery. If anyone prescribed a lengthy regimen to him, telling him that he should rest with his head bandaged and so on, he'd soon reply that he had no leisure to be ill and that life is no use to him if he has to neglect his

work and always be concerned with his illness. After that he'd bid good-bye to his doctor, resume his usual way of life, and either recover his health or, if his body couldn't withstand the illness, he'd die and escape his troubles.

Glaucon/ It is believed to be appropriate for someone like that to use medicine in this way.

Socrates/ Is that because his life is of no profit to him if he doesn't do his work?

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ But the rich person, we say, has no work that would make his life unlivable if he couldn't do it.

Glaucon/ That's what people say, at least.

Socrates/ That's because you haven't heard the saying of Phocylides that, once you have the means of life, you must practice virtue.

Glaucon/ I think he must also practice virtue before that.

Socrates/ We won't quarrel with Phocylides about this. But let's try to find out whether the rich person must indeed practice virtue and whether his life is not worth living if he doesn't or whether tending an illness, while it is an obstacle to applying oneself to carpentry and the other crafts, is no obstacle whatever to taking Phocylides' advice.

Glaucon/ But excessive care of the body, over and above physical training, is pretty well the biggest obstacle of all. It's troublesome in managing a household, in military service, and even in a sedentary public office.

Socrates/ Yet the most important of all, surely, is that it makes any kind of learning, thought, or private meditation difficult, for it's always imagining some headaches or dizziness and accusing philosophy of causing them. Hence, wherever this kind of virtue is practiced and examined,

excessive care of the body hinders it, for it makes a person think he's ill and be all the time concerned about his body.

Glaucon/ It probably does.

Socrates/ Therefore, won't we say that Asclepius knew this, and that he taught medicine for those whose bodies are healthy in their natures and habits but have some specific disease? His medicine is for these people with these habits. He cured them of their disease with drugs or surgery and then ordered them to live their usual life so as not to harm their city's affairs. But for those whose bodies were riddled with disease, he didn't attempt to prescribe a regimen, drawing off a little here and pouring in a little there, in order to make their life a prolonged misery and enable them to produce offspring in all probability like themselves. He didn't think that he should treat someone who couldn't live a normal life, since such a person would be of no profit either to himself or to the city.

Glaucon/ The Asclepius you're talking about was quite a statesman.

Socrates/ Clearly. And don't you see that because he was a statesman his sons turned out to be good men at Troy, practicing medicine as I say they did? Don't you remember that they "sucked out the blood and applied gentle potions" to the wound Pandarus inflicted on Menelaus, but without prescribing what he should eat or drink after that, any more than they did for Eurypylus? They considered their drugs to be sufficient to cure men who were healthy and living an orderly life before being wounded, even if they happened to drink wine mixed with barley and cheese right after receiving their wounds. But they didn't consider the lives of those who were by nature sick and licentious to be profitable either to themselves or to anyone else. Medicine isn't intended for

such people and they shouldn't be treated, not even if they're richer than Midas.

Glaucon/ The sons of Asclepius you're talking about were indeed very sophisticated.

Socrates/ Appropriately so. But Pindar and the tragedians don't agree with us. They say that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, that he was bribed with gold to heal a rich man, who was already dying, and that he was killed by lightning for doing so. But, in view of what we said before, we won't believe this. We'll say that if Asclepius was the son of a god, he was not a money-grubber, and that if he was a money-grubber, he was not the son of a god.

Glaucon/ That's right. But what do you say about the following, Socrates? Don't we need to have good doctors in our city? And the best will surely be those who have handled the greatest number of sick and of healthy people. In the same way, the best judges will be those who have associated with people whose natures are of every kind.

Socrates/ I agree that the doctors and judges must be good. But do you know the kind I consider to be so?

Glaucon/ If you'll tell me.

Socrates/ I'll try. But you ask about things that aren't alike in the same question.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ The cleverest doctors are those who, in addition to learning their craft, have had contact with the greatest number of very sick bodies from childhood on, have themselves experienced every illness, and aren't very healthy by nature, for they don't treat bodies with their bodies, I suppose—if they did, we wouldn't allow their bodies to be or become bad. Rather they treat the body with their souls, and it isn't possible for the soul to treat anything well, if it is or has been bad itself.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ As for the judge, he does rule other souls with his own soul. And it isn't possible for a soul to be nurtured among vicious souls from childhood, to associate with them, to indulge in every kind of injustice, and come through it able to judge other people's injustices from its own case, as it can diseases of the body. Rather, if it's to be fine and good, and a sound judge of just things, it must itself remain pure and have no experience of bad character while it's young. That's the reason, indeed, that decent people appear simple and easily deceived by unjust ones when they are young. It's because they have no models in themselves of the evil experiences of the vicious to guide their judgments.

Glaucon/ That's certainly so.

Socrates/ Therefore, a good judge must not be a young person but an old one, who has learned late in life what injustice is like and who has become aware of it not as something at home in his own soul, but as something alien and present in others, someone who, after a long time, has recognized that injustice is bad by nature, not from his own experience of it, but through knowledge.

Glaucon/ Such a judge would be the most noble one of all.

Socrates/ And he'd be good, too, which was what you asked, for someone who has a good soul is good. The clever and suspicious person, on the other hand, who has committed many injustices himself and thinks himself a wise villain, appears clever in the company of those like himself, because he's on his guard and is guided by the models within himself. But when he meets with good older people, he's seen to be stupid, distrustful at the wrong time, and ignorant of what a sound character is, since he has no model of this within himself. But since he meets vicious

people more often than good ones, he seems to be clever rather than unlearned, both to himself and to others.

Glaucon/ That's completely true.

Socrates/ Then we mustn't look for the good judge among people like that but among the sort we described earlier. A vicious person would never know either himself or a virtuous one, whereas a naturally virtuous person, when educated, will in time acquire knowledge of both virtue and vice. And it is someone like that who becomes wise, in my view, and not the bad person.

Glaucon/ I agree with you.

Socrates/ Then won't you legislate in our city for the kind of medicine we mentioned and for this kind of judging, so that together they'll look after those who are naturally well endowed in body and soul? But as for the ones whose bodies are naturally unhealthy or whose souls are incurably evil, won't they let the former die of their own accord and put the latter to death?

Glaucon/ That seems to be best both for the ones who suffer such treatment and for the city.

Socrates/ However, our young people, since they practice that simple sort of music and poetry that we said produces moderation, will plainly be wary of coming to need a judge.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And won't a person who's educated in music and poetry pursue physical training in the same way, and choose to make no use of medicine except when unavoidable?

Glaucon/ I believe so.

Socrates/ He'll work at physical exercises in order to arouse the spirited part of his nature, rather than to acquire the physical strength for which other athletes diet and labor.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ Then, Glaucon, did those who established education in music and poetry and in physical training do so with the aim that people attribute to them, which is to take care of the body with the latter and the soul with the former, or with some other aim?

Glaucon/ What other aim do you mean?

Socrates/ It looks as though they established both chiefly for the sake of the soul.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Haven't you noticed the effect that lifelong physical training, unaccompanied by any training in music and poetry, has on the mind, or the effect of the opposite, music and poetry without physical training?

Glaucon/ What effects are you talking about?

Socrates/ Savagery and toughness in the one case and softness and over cultivation in the other.

Glaucon/ I get the point. You mean that those who devote themselves exclusively to physical training turn out to be more savage than they should, while those who devote themselves to music and poetry turn out to be softer than is good for them?

Socrates/ Moreover, the source of the savageness is the spirited part of one's nature. Rightly nurtured, it becomes courageous, but if it's overstrained, it's likely to become hard and harsh.

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ And isn't it the philosophic part of one's nature that provides the cultivation? If it is relaxed too far, it becomes softer than it should, but if properly nurtured, it is cultivated and orderly.

Glaucon/ So it is.

Socrates/ Now, we say that our guardians must have both these natures.

Glaucon/ They must indeed.

Socrates/ And mustn't the two be harmonized with each other?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if this harmony is achieved, the soul is both moderate and courageous?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But if it is inharmonious, it is cowardly and savage?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Therefore, when someone gives music an opportunity to charm his soul with the flute and to pour those sweet, soft, and plaintive tunes we mentioned through his ear, as through a funnel, when he spends his whole life humming them and delighting in them, then, at first, whatever spirit he has is softened, just as iron is tempered, and from being hard and useless, it is made useful. But if he keeps at it unrelentingly and is beguiled by the music, after a time his spirit is melted and dissolved until it vanishes, and the very sinews of his soul are cut out and he becomes "a feeble warrior."

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And if he had a spiritless nature from the first, this process is soon completed. But if he had a spirited nature, his spirit becomes weak and unstable, flaring up at trifles and extinguished as easily. The result is that such people become quick-tempered, prone to anger, and filled with discontent, rather than spirited.

Glaucon/ That's certainly true.

Socrates/ What about someone who works hard at physical training and eats well but never touches music or philosophy? Isn't he in good physical condition at first, full of resolution and spirit? And doesn't he become more courageous than he was before?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what happens if he does nothing else and never associates with the Muse? Doesn't whatever love of learning he might have had in his soul soon become enfeebled, deaf, and blind, because he never tastes any learning or investigation or partakes of any discussion or any of the rest of music and poetry, to nurture or arouse it?

Glaucon/ It does seem to be that way.

Socrates/ I believe that someone like that becomes a hater of reason and of music. He no longer makes any use of persuasion but bulls his way through every situation by force and savagery like a wild animal, living in ignorance and stupidity without either rhythm or grace.

Glaucon/ That's most certainly how he'll live.

Socrates/ It seems, then, that a god has given music and physical training to human beings not, except incidentally, for the body and the soul but for the spirited and wisdom-loving parts of the soul itself, in order that these might be in harmony with one another, each being stretched and relaxed to the appropriate degree.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Then the person who achieves the finest blend of music and physical training and impresses it on his soul in the most measured way is the one we'd most correctly call completely harmonious and trained in music, much more so than the one who merely harmonizes the strings of his instrument.

Glaucon/ That's certainly so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, won't we always need this sort of person as an overseer in our city, Glaucon, if indeed its constitution is to be preserved?

Glaucon/ It seems that we'll need someone like that most of all.

Socrates/ These, then, are the patterns for education and upbringing. Should we enumerate the dances of these people, or their hunts, chases with hounds, athletic contests, and horse races? Surely, they're no longer hard to discover, since it's pretty clear that they must follow the patterns we've already established.

Glaucon/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ All right, then what's the next thing we have to determine? Isn't it which of these same people will rule and which be ruled?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, isn't it obvious that the rulers must be older and the ruled younger?

Glaucon/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ And mustn't the rulers also be the best of them?

Glaucon/ That, too.

Socrates/ And aren't the best farmers the ones who are best at farming?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, as the rulers must be the best of the guardians, mustn't they be the ones who are best at guarding the city?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, in the first place, mustn't they be knowledgeable and capable, and mustn't they care for the city?

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Now, one cares most for what one loves.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And someone loves something most of all when he believes that the same things are advantageous to it as to himself and supposes that if it does well, he'll do well, and that if it does badly, then he'll do badly too.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then we must choose from among our guardians those men who, upon examination, seem most of all to believe throughout their lives that they must eagerly pursue what is advantageous to the city and be wholly unwilling to do the opposite.

Glaucon/ Such people would be suitable for the job at any rate.

Socrates/ I think we must observe them at all ages to see whether they are guardians of this conviction and make sure that neither compulsion nor magic spells will get them to discard or forget their belief that they must do what is best for the city.

Glaucon/ What do you mean by discarding?

Socrates/ I'll tell you. I think the discarding of a belief is either voluntary or involuntary—voluntary when one learns that the belief is false, involuntary in the case of all true beliefs.

Glaucon/ I understand voluntary discarding but not involuntary.

Socrates/ What's that? Don't you know that people are voluntarily deprived of bad things, but involuntarily deprived of good ones? And isn't being deceived about the truth a bad thing, while possessing the truth is good? Or don't you think that to believe the things that are is to possess the truth?

Glaucon/ That's right, and I do think that people are involuntarily deprived of true opinions.

Socrates/ But can't they also be so deprived by theft, magic spells, and compulsion?

Glaucon/ Now, I don't understand again.

Socrates/ I'm afraid I must be talking like a tragic poet! By "the victims of theft" I mean those who are persuaded to change their minds or those who forget, because time, in the latter case, and argument, in the former, takes away their opinions without their realizing it. Do you understand now?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ By "the compelled" I mean those whom pain or suffering causes to change their mind.

Glaucon/ I understand that, and you're right.

Socrates/ The "victims of magic," I think you'd agree, are those who change their mind because they are under the spell of pleasure or fear.

Glaucon/ It seems to me that everything that deceives does so by casting a spell.

Socrates/ Then, as I said just now, we must find out who are the best guardians of their conviction that they must always do what they believe to be best for the city. We must keep them under observation from childhood and set them tasks that are most likely to make them forget such a conviction or be deceived out of it, and we must select whoever keeps on remembering it and isn't easily deceived, and reject the others. Do you agree?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we must subject them to labors, pains, and contests in which we can watch for these traits.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then we must also set up a competition for the third way in which people are deprived of their convictions, namely, magic. Like those who lead colts into noise and tumult to see if they're afraid, we must expose our young people to fears and pleasures, testing them more thoroughly than gold is tested by fire. If someone is hard to put under a spell, is apparently gracious in everything, is a good guardian of himself and the music and poetry he has learned, and if he always shows himself to be rhythmical and harmonious, then he is the best person both for himself and for the city. Anyone who is tested in this way as a child, youth, and adult, and always comes out of it untainted, is to be made a ruler as well as a guardian; he is to be honored in life and to receive after his death the most prized tombs and memorials. But anyone who fails to prove himself in this way is to be rejected. It seems to me, Glaucon, that rulers and guardians must be selected and appointed in some such way as this, though we've provided only a general pattern and not the exact details.

Glaucon/ It also seems to me that they must be selected in this sort of way.

Socrates/ Then, isn't it truly most correct to call these people complete guardians, since they will guard against external enemies and internal friends, so that the one will lack the power and the other the desire to harm the city? The young people we've hitherto called guardians we'll now call auxiliaries and supporters of the guardians' convictions.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ How, then, could we devise one of those useful falsehoods we were talking about a while ago, one noble falsehood that would, in the best case, persuade even the rulers, but if that's not possible, then the others in the city?

Glaucon/ What sort of falsehood?

Socrates/ Nothing new, but a Phoenician story which describes something that has happened in many places. At least, that's what the poets say, and they've persuaded many people to believe it too. It hasn't happened among us, and I don't even know if it could. It would certainly take a lot of persuasion to get people to believe it.

Glaucon/ You seem hesitant to tell the story.

Socrates/ When you hear it, you'll realize that I have every reason to hesitate.

Glaucon/ Speak, and don't be afraid.

Socrates/ I'll tell it, then, though I don't know where I'll get the audacity or even what words I'll use. I'll first try to persuade the rulers and the soldiers and then the rest of the city that the upbringing and the education we gave them, and the experiences that went with them, were a sort of dream, that in fact they themselves, their weapons, and the other craftsmen's tools were at that time really being fashioned and nurtured inside the earth, and that when the work was completed, the earth, who is their mother, delivered all of them up into the world. Therefore, if anyone attacks the land in which they live, they must plan on its behalf and defend it as their mother and nurse and think of the other citizens as their earthborn brothers.

Glaucon/ It isn't for nothing that you were so shy about telling your falsehood.

Socrates/ Appropriately so. Nevertheless, listen to the rest of the story. "All of you in the city are brothers," we'll say to them in telling our story, "but the god who made you mixed some gold into those who are adequately equipped to rule, because they are most valuable. He put silver in those who are auxiliaries and iron and bronze in the farmers and other craftsmen. For the most part you will produce children like yourselves, but, because you are all related, a silver

child will occasionally be born from a golden parent, and vice versa, and all the others from each other. So the first and most important command from the god to the rulers is that there is nothing that they must guard better or watch more carefully than the mixture of metals in the souls of the next generation. If an offspring of theirs should be found to have a mixture of iron or bronze, they must not pity him in any way, but give him the rank appropriate to his nature and drive him out to join the craftsmen and farmers. But if an offspring of these people is found to have a mixture of gold or silver, they will honor him and take him up to join the guardians or the auxiliaries, for there is an oracle which says that the city will be ruined if it ever has an iron or a bronze guardian." So, do you have any device that will make our citizens believe this story?

Glaucon/ I can't see any way to make them believe it themselves, but perhaps there is one in the case of their sons and later generations and all the other people who come after them.

Socrates/ I understand pretty much what you mean, but even that would help to make them care more for the city and each other. However, let's leave this matter wherever tradition takes it. And let's now arm our earthborn and lead them forth with their rulers in charge. And as they march, let them look for the best place in the city to have their camp, a site from which they can most easily control those within, if anyone is unwilling to obey the laws, or repel any outside enemy who comes like a wolf upon the flock. And when they have established their camp and made the requisite sacrifices, they must see to their sleeping quarters. What do you say?

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ And won't these quarters protect them adequately both in winter and summer?

Glaucon/ Of course, for it seems to me that you mean their housing.

Socrates/ Yes, but housing for soldiers, not for money-makers.

Glaucon/ How do you mean to distinguish these from one another?

Socrates/ I'll try to tell you. The most terrible and most shameful thing of all is for a shepherd to rear dogs as auxiliaries to help him with his flocks in such a way that, through licentiousness, hunger, or some other bad trait of character, they do evil to the sheep and become like wolves instead of dogs.

Glaucon/ That's certainly a terrible thing.

Socrates/ Isn't it necessary, therefore, to guard in every way against our auxiliaries doing anything like that to the citizens because they are stronger, thereby becoming savage masters instead of kindly allies?

Glaucon/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ And wouldn't a really good education endow them with the greatest caution in this regard?

Glaucon/ But surely they have had an education like that.

Socrates/ Perhaps we shouldn't assert this dogmatically, Glaucon. What we can assert is what we were saying, just now, that they must have the right education, whatever it is, if they are to have what will most make them gentle to each other and to those they are guarding.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Now, someone with some understanding might say that, besides this education, they must also have the

kind of housing and other property that will neither prevent them from being the best guardians nor encourage them to do evil to the other citizens.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ Consider, then, whether or not they should live in some such way as this, if they're to be the kind of men we described. First, none of them should possess any private property beyond what is wholly necessary. Second, none of them should have a house or storeroom that isn't open for all to enter at will. Third, whatever sustenance moderate and courageous warrior-athletes require in order to have neither shortfall nor surplus in a given year they'll receive by taxation on the other citizens as a salary for their guardianship. Fourth, they'll have common messes and live together like soldiers in a camp. We'll tell them that they always have gold and silver of a divine sort in their souls as a gift from the gods and so have no further need of human gold. Indeed, we'll tell them that it's impious for them to defile this divine possession by any admixture of such gold, because many impious deeds have been done that involve the currency used by ordinary people, while their own is pure. Hence, for them alone among the city's population, it is unlawful to touch or handle gold or silver. They mustn't be under the same roof as it, wear it as jewelry, or drink from gold or silver goblets. In this way they' save both themselves and the city. But if they acquire private land, houses, and currency themselves, they'll be household managers and farmers instead of guardians—hostile masters of the other citizens instead of their allies. They'll spend their whole lives hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, more afraid of internal than of external enemies, and they'll hasten both themselves and the whole city to almost immediate ruin. For all these reasons, let's say that the

guardians must be provided with housing and the rest in this way, and establish this as a law. Or don't you agree?

Glaucon/ I certainly do.

Book 4

Socrates/ And Adeimantus interrupted:

Adeimantus/ How would you defend yourself, Socrates, if someone told you that you aren't making these men very happy and that it's their own fault? The city really belongs to them, yet they derive no good from it. Others own land, build fine big houses, acquire furnishings to go along with them, make their own private sacrifices to the gods, entertain guests, and also, of course, possess what you were talking about just now, gold and silver and all the things that are thought to belong to people who are blessedly happy. But one might well say that your guardians are simply settled in the city like mercenaries and that all they do is watch over it.

Socrates/ Yes, and what's more, they work simply for their keep and get no extra wages as the others do. Hence, if they want to take a private trip away from the city, they won't be able to; they'll have nothing to give to their mistresses, nothing to spend in whatever other ways they wish, as people do who are considered happy. You've omitted these and a host of other, similar facts from your charge.

Adeimantus/ Well, let them be added to the charge as well.

Socrates/ Then, are you asking how we should defend ourselves?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ I think we'll discover what to say if we follow the same path as before. We'll say that it wouldn't be surprising if these people were happiest just as they are, but that, in establishing our city, we aren't aiming to make anyone group outstandingly happy but to make the whole city so, as far as possible. We thought that we'd find justice

most easily in such a city and injustice, by contrast, in the one that is governed worst and that, by observing both cities, we'd be able to judge the question we've been inquiring into for so long. We take ourselves, then, to be fashioning the happy city, not picking out a few happy people and putting them in it, but making the whole city happy. (We'll look at the opposite city soon.)

Suppose, then, that someone came up to us while we were painting a statue and objected that, because we had painted the eyes (which are the most beautiful part) black rather than purple, we had not applied the most beautiful colors to the most beautiful parts of the statue. We'd think it reasonable to offer the following defense: "You mustn't expect us to paint the eyes so beautifully that they no longer appear to be eyes at all, and the same with the other parts. Rather you must look to see whether by dealing with each part appropriately, we are making the whole statue beautiful." Similarly, you mustn't force us to give our guardians the kind of happiness that would make them something other than guardians. We know how to clothe the farmers in purple robes, festoon them with gold jewelry, and tell them to work the land whenever they please. We know how to settle our potters on couches by the fire, feasting and passing the wine around, with their wheel beside them for whenever they want to make pots. And we can make all the others happy in the same way, so that the whole city is happy. Don't urge us to do this, however, for if we do, a farmer wouldn't be a farmer, nor a potter a potter, and none of the others would keep to the patterns of work that give rise to a city. Now, if cobblers become inferior and corrupt and claim to be what they are not, that won't do much harm to the city. Hence, as far as they and the others like them are concerned, our argument carries less weight. But if the guardians of our laws and city are merely believed to be

guardians but are not, you surely see that they'll destroy the city utterly, just as they alone have the opportunity to govern it well and make it happy.

If we are making true guardians, then, who are least likely to do evil to the city, and if the one who brought the charge is talking about farmers and banqueters who are happy as they would be at a festival rather than in a city, then he isn't talking about a city at all, but about something else.

With this in mind, we should consider whether in setting up our guardians we are aiming to give them the greatest happiness, or whether—since our aim is to see that the city as a whole has the greatest happiness—we must compel and persuade the auxiliaries and guardians to follow our other policy and be the best possible craftsmen at their own work, and the same with all the others. In this way, with the whole city developing and being governed well, we must leave it to nature to provide each group with its share of happiness.

Adeimantus/ I think you put that very well.

Socrates/ Will you also think that I'm putting things well when I make the next point, which is closely akin to this one?

Adeimantus/ Which one exactly?

Socrates/ Consider whether or not the following things corrupt the other workers, so that they become bad.

Adeimantus/ What things?

Socrates/ Wealth and poverty.

Adeimantus/ How do they corrupt the other workers?

Socrates/ Like this. Do you think that a potter who has become wealthy will still be willing to pay attention to his craft?

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Won't he become more idle and careless than he was?

Adeimantus/ Much more.

Socrates/ Then won't he become a worse potter?

Adeimantus/ Far worse.

Socrates/ And surely if poverty prevents him from having tools or any of the other things he needs for his craft, he'll produce poorer work and will teach his sons, or anyone else he teaches, to be worse craftsmen.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ So poverty and wealth make a craftsman and his products worse.

Adeimantus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ It seems, then, that we've found other things that our guardians must guard against in every way, to prevent them from slipping into the city unnoticed.

Adeimantus/ What are they?

Socrates/ Both wealth and poverty. The former makes for luxury, idleness, and revolution; the latter for slavishness, bad work, and revolution as well.

Adeimantus/ That's certainly true. But consider this, Socrates: If our city hasn't got any money, how will it be able to fight a war, especially if it has to fight against a great and wealthy city?

Socrates/ Obviously, it will be harder to fight one such city and easier to fight two.

Adeimantus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ First of all, if our city has to fight a city of the sort you mention, won't it be a case of warrior-athletes fighting against rich men?

Adeimantus/ Yes, as far as that goes.

Socrates/ Well, then, Adeimantus, don't you think that one boxer who has had the best possible training could easily fight two rich and fat nonboxers?

Adeimantus/ Maybe not at the same time.

Socrates/ Not even by escaping from them and then turning and hitting the one who caught up with him first, and doing this repeatedly in stifling heat and sun? Wouldn't he, in his condition, be able to handle even more than two such people?

Adeimantus/ That certainly wouldn't be surprising.

Socrates/ And don't you think that the rich have more knowledge and experience of boxing than of how to fight a war?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Then in all likelihood our athletes will easily be able to fight twice or three times their own numbers in a war.

Adeimantus/ I agree, for I think what you say is right.

Socrates/ What if they sent envoys to another city and told them the following truth: "We have no use for gold or silver, and it isn't lawful for us to possess them, so join us in this war, and you can take the property of those who oppose us for yourselves." Do you think that anyone hearing this would choose to fight hard, lean dogs, rather than to join them in fighting fat and tender sheep?

Adeimantus/ No, I don't. But if the wealth of all the cities came to be gathered in a single one, watch out that it doesn't endanger your nonwealthy city.

Socrates/ You're happily innocent if you think that anything other than the kind of city we are founding deserves to be called a city.

Adeimantus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ We'll have to find a greater title for the others because each of them is a great many cities, not a city, as they say in the game. At any rate, each of them consists of two cities at war with one another, that of the poor and that of the rich, and each of these contains a great many. If you approach them as one city, you'll be making a big mistake. But if you approach them as many and offer to give to the one city the money, power, and indeed the very inhabitants of the other, you'll always find many allies and few enemies. And as long as your own city is moderately governed in the way that we've just arranged, it will, even if it has only a thousand men to fight for it, be the greatest. Not in reputation; I don't mean that, but the greatest in fact. Indeed, you won't find a city as great as this one among either Greeks or barbarians, although many that are many times its size may seem to be as great. Do you disagree?

Adeimantus/ No, I certainly don't.

Socrates/ Then this would also be the best limit for our guardians to put on the size of the city. And they should mark off enough land for a city that size and let the rest go.

Adeimantus/ What limit is that?

Socrates/ I suppose the following one. As long as it is willing to remain one city, it may continue to grow, but it cannot grow beyond that point.

Adeimantus/ That is a good limit.

Socrates/ Then, we'll give our guardians this further order, namely, to guard in every way against the city's being either small or great in reputation instead of being sufficient in size and one in number.

Adeimantus/ At any rate, that order will be fairly easy for them to follow.

Socrates/ And the one we mentioned earlier is even easier, when we said that, if an offspring of the guardians is

inferior, he must be sent off to join the other citizens and that, if the others have an able offspring, he must join the guardians. This was meant to make clear that each of the other citizens is to be directed to what he is naturally suited for, so that, doing the one work that is his own, he will become not many but one, and the whole city will itself be naturally one not many.

Adeimantus/ That is easier than the other.

Socrates/ These orders we give them, Adeimantus, are neither as numerous nor as important as one might think. Indeed, they are all insignificant, provided, as the saying goes, that they guard the one great thing, though I'd rather call it sufficient than great.

Adeimantus/ What's that?

Socrates/ Their education and upbringing, for if by being well educated they become reasonable men, they will easily see these things for themselves, as well as all the other things we are omitting, for example, that marriage, the having of wives, and the procreation of children must be governed as far as possible by the old proverb: Friends possess everything in common.

Adeimantus/ That would be best.

Socrates/ And surely, once our city gets a good start, it will go on growing in a cycle. Good education and upbringing, when they are preserved, produce good natures, and useful natures, who are in turn well educated, grow up even better than their predecessors, both in their offspring and in other respects, just like other animals.

Adeimantus/ That's likely.

Socrates/ To put it briefly, those in charge must cling to education and see that it isn't corrupted without their noticing it, guarding it against everything. Above all, they must guard as carefully as they can against any innovation

in music and poetry or in physical training that is counter to the established order. And they should dread to hear anyone say:

> People care most for the song
> That is newest from the singer's lips.

Someone might praise such a saying, thinking that the poet meant not new songs but new ways of singing. Such a thing shouldn't be praised, and the poet shouldn't be taken to have meant it, for the guardians must beware of changing to a new form of music, since it threatens the whole system. As Damon says, and I am convinced, the musical modes are never changed without change in the most important of a city's laws.

Adeimantus/ You can count me among the convinced as well.

Socrates/ Then it seems, that it is in music and poetry that our guardians must build their bulwark.

Adeimantus/ At any rate, lawlessness easily creeps in there unnoticed.

Socrates/ Yes, as if music and poetry were only play and did no harm at all.

Adeimantus/ It is harmless—except, of course, that when lawlessness has established itself there, it flows over little by little into characters and ways of life. Then, greatly increased, it steps out into private contracts, and from private contracts, Socrates, it makes its insolent way into the laws and government, until in the end it overthrows everything, public and private.

Socrates/ Well, is that the way it goes?

Adeimantus/ I think so.

Socrates/ Then, as we said at first, our children's games must from the very beginning be more law-abiding, for if

their games become lawless, and the children follow suit, isn't it impossible for them to grow up into good and law-abiding men?

Adeimantus/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ But when children play the right games from the beginning and absorb lawfulness from music and poetry, it follows them in everything and fosters their growth, correcting anything in the city that may have gone wrong before—in other words, the very opposite of what happens where the games are lawless.

Adeimantus/ That's true.

Socrates/ These people will also discover the seemingly insignificant conventions their predecessors have destroyed.

Adeimantus/ Which ones?

Socrates/ Things like this: When it is proper for the young to be silent in front of their elders, when they should make way for them or stand up in their presence, the care of parents, hair styles, the clothes and shoes to wear, deportment, and everything else of that sort. Don't you agree?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ I think it's foolish to legislate about such things. Verbal or written decrees will never make them come about or last.

Adeimantus/ How could they?

Socrates/ At any rate, Adeimantus, it looks as though the start of someone's education determines what follows. Doesn't like always encourage like?

Adeimantus/ It does.

Socrates/ And the final outcome of education, I suppose we'd say, is a single newly finished person, who is either good or the opposite.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ That's why I wouldn't go on to try to legislate about such things.

Adeimantus/ And with good reason.

Socrates/ Then, by the gods, what about market business, such as the private contracts people make with one another in the marketplace, for example, or contracts with manual laborers, cases of insult or injury, the bringing of lawsuits, the establishing of juries, the payment and assessment of whatever dues are necessary in markets and harbors, the regulation of market, city, harbor, and the rest—should we bring ourselves to legislate about any of these?

Adeimantus/ It isn't appropriate to dictate to men who are fine and good. They'll easily find out for themselves whatever needs to be legislated about such things.

Socrates/ Yes, provided that a god grants that the laws we have already described are preserved.

Adeimantus/ If not, they'll spend their lives enacting a lot of other laws and then amending them, believing that in this way they'll attain the best.

Socrates/ You mean they'll live like those sick people who, through licentiousness, aren't willing to abandon their harmful way of life?

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ And such people carry on in an altogether amusing fashion, don't they? Their medical treatment achieves nothing, except that their illness becomes worse and more complicated, and they're always hoping that someone will recommend some new medicine to cure them.

Adeimantus/ That's exactly what happens to people like that.

Socrates/ And isn't it also amusing that they consider their worst enemy to be the person who tells them the truth, namely, that until they give up drunkenness, overeating, lechery, and idleness, no medicine, cautery, or surgery, no charms, amulets, or anything else of that kind will do them any good?

Adeimantus/ It isn't amusing at all, for it isn't amusing to treat someone harshly when he's telling the truth.

Socrates/ You don't seem to approve of such men.

Adeimantus/ I certainly don't, by god.

Socrates/ Then, you won't approve either if a whole city behaves in that way, as we said. Don't you think that cities that are badly governed behave exactly like this when they warn their citizens not to disturb the city's whole political establishment on pain of death? The person who is honored and considered clever and wise in important matters by such badly governed cities is the one who serves them most pleasantly, indulges them, flatters them, anticipates their wishes, and is clever at fulfilling them.

Adeimantus/ Cities certainly do seem to behave in that way, and I don't approve of it at all.

Socrates/ What about those who are willing and eager to serve such cities? Don't you admire their courage and readiness?

Adeimantus/ I do, except for those who are deceived by majority approval into believing that they are true statesmen.

Socrates/ What do you mean? Have you no sympathy for such men? Or do you think it's possible for someone who is ignorant of measurement not to believe it himself when many others who are similarly ignorant tell him that he is six feet tall?

Adeimantus/ No, I don't think that.

Socrates/ Then don't be too hard on them, for such people are surely the most amusing of all. They pass laws on the subjects we've just been enumerating and then amend them, and they always think they'll find a way to put a stop to cheating on contracts and the other things I mentioned, not realizing that they're really just cutting off a Hydra's head.

Adeimantus/ Yet that's all they're doing.

Socrates/ I'd have thought, then, that the true lawgiver oughtn't to bother with that form of law or constitution, either in a badly governed city or in a well-governed one—in the former, because it's useless and accomplishes nothing; in the latter, because anyone could discover some of these things, while the others follow automatically from the ways of life we established.

Adeimantus/ What is now left for us to deal with under the heading of legislation?

Socrates/ For us nothing, but for the Delphic Apollo it remains to enact the greatest, finest, and first of laws.

Adeimantus/ What laws are those?

Socrates/ Those having to do with the establishing of temples, sacrifices, and other forms of service to gods, daemons, and heroes, the burial of the dead, and the services that ensure their favor. We have no knowledge of these things, and in establishing our city, if we have any understanding, we won't be persuaded to trust them to anyone other than the ancestral guide. And this god, sitting upon the rock at the center of the earth, is without a doubt the ancestral guide on these matters for all people.

Adeimantus/ Nicely put. And that's what we must do.

Socrates/ Well, son of Ariston, your city might now be said to be established. The next step is to get an adequate light somewhere and to call upon your brother as well as

Polemarchus and the others, so as to look inside it and see where the justice and the injustice might be in it, what the difference between them is, and which of the two the person who is to be happy should possess, whether its possession is unnoticed by all the gods and human beings or not.

Glaucon/ You're talking nonsense. You promised to look for them yourself because you said it was impious for you not to come to the rescue of justice in every way you could.

Socrates/ That's true, and I must do what I promised, but you'll have to help.

Glaucon/ We will.

Socrates/ I hope to find it in this way. I think our city, if indeed it has been correctly founded, is completely good.

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Clearly, then, it is wise, courageous, moderate, and just.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then, if we find any of these in it, what's left over will be the ones we haven't found?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Therefore, as with any other four things, if we were looking for anyone of them in something and recognized it first, that would be enough for us, but if we recognized the other three first, this itself would be sufficient to enable us to recognize what we are looking for. Clearly it couldn't be anything other than what's left over.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Therefore, since there are four virtues, mustn't we look for them in the same way?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Now, the first thing I think I can see clearly in the city is wisdom, and there seems to be something odd about it.

Glaucon/ What's that?

Socrates/ I think that the city we described is really wise. And that's because it has good judgment, isn't it?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, this very thing, good judgment, is clearly some kind of knowledge, for it's through knowledge, not ignorance, that people judge well.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But there are many kinds of knowledge in the city.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Is it because of the knowledge possessed by its carpenters, then, that the city is to be called wise and sound in judgment?

Glaucon/ Not at all. It's called skilled in carpentry because of that.

Socrates/ Then it isn't to be called wise because of the knowledge by which it arranges to have the best wooden implements.

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ What about the knowledge of bronze items or the like?

Glaucon/ It isn't because of any knowledge of that sort.

Socrates/ Nor because of the knowledge of how to raise a harvest from the earth, for it's called skilled in farming because of that.

Glaucon/ I should think so.

Socrates/ Then, is there some knowledge possessed by some of the citizens in the city we just founded that doesn't judge about any particular matter but about the city as a whole and the maintenance of good relations, both internally and with other cities?

Glaucon/ There is indeed.

Socrates/ What is this knowledge, and who has it?

Glaucon/ It is guardianship, and it is possessed by those rulers we just now called complete guardians.

Socrates/ Then, what does this knowledge entitle you to say about the city?

Glaucon/ That it has good judgment and is really wise.

Socrates/ Who do you think that there will be more of in our city, metal-workers or these true guardians?

Glaucon/ There will be far more metal-workers.

Socrates/ Indeed, of all those who are called by a certain name because they have some kind of knowledge, aren't the guardians the least numerous?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ Then, a whole city established according to nature would be wise because of the smallest class and part in it, namely, the governing or ruling one. And to this class, which seems to be by nature the smallest, belongs a share of the knowledge that alone among all the other kinds of knowledge is to be called wisdom.

Glaucon/ That's completely true.

Socrates/ Then we've found one of the four virtues, as well as its place in the city, though I don't know how we found it.

Glaucon/ Our way of finding it seems good enough to me.

Socrates/ And surely courage and the part of the city it's in, the part on account of which the city is called courageous, aren't difficult to see.

Glaucon/ How is that?

Socrates/ Who, in calling the city cowardly or courageous, would look anywhere other than to the part of it that fights and does battle on its behalf?

Glaucon/ No one would look anywhere else.

Socrates/ At any rate, I don't think that the courage or cowardice of its other citizens would cause the city itself to be called either courageous or cowardly.

Glaucon/ No, it wouldn't.

Socrates/ The city is courageous, then, because of a part of itself that has the power to preserve through everything its belief about what things are to be feared, namely, that they are the things and kinds of things that the lawgiver declared to be such in the course of educating it. Or don't you call that courage?

Glaucon/ I don't completely understand what you mean. Please, say it again.

Socrates/ I mean that courage is a kind of preservation.

Glaucon/ What sort of preservation?

Socrates/ That preservation of the belief that has been inculcated by the law through education about what things and sorts of things are to be feared. And by preserving this belief "through everything," I mean preserving it and not abandoning it because of pains, pleasures, desires, or fears. If you like, I'll compare it to something I think it resembles.

Glaucon/ I'd like that.

Socrates/ You know that dyers, who want to dye wool purple, first pick out from the many colors of wool the one that is naturally white, then they carefully prepare this in

various ways, so that it will absorb the color as well as possible, and only at that point do they apply the purple dye. When something is dyed in this way, the color is fast—no amount of washing, whether with soap or without it, can remove it. But you also know what happens to material if it hasn't been dyed in this way, but instead is dyed purple or some other color without careful preparation.

Glaucon/ I know that it looks washed out and ridiculous.

Socrates/ Then, you should understand that, as far as we could, we were doing something similar when we selected our soldiers and educated them in music and physical training. What we were contriving was nothing other than this: That because they had the proper nature and upbringing, they would absorb the laws in the finest possible way, just like a dye, so that their belief about what they should fear and all the rest would become so fast that even such extremely effective detergents as pleasure, pain, fear, and desire wouldn't wash it out—and pleasure is much more potent than any powder, washing soda, or soap. This power to preserve through everything the correct and law-inculcated belief about what is to be feared and what isn't is what I call courage, unless, of course, you say otherwise.

Glaucon/ I have nothing different to say, for I assume that you don't consider the correct belief about these same things, which you find in animals and slaves, and which is not the result of education, to be inculcated by law, and that you don't call it courage but something else.

Socrates/ That's absolutely true.

Glaucon/ Then I accept your account of courage.

Socrates/ Accept it instead as my account of civic courage, and you will be right. We'll discuss courage more fully some other time, if you like. At present, our inquiry

concerns not it but justice. And what we've said is sufficient for that purpose.

Glaucon/ You're quite right.

Socrates/ There are now two things left for us to find in the city, namely, moderation and—the goal of our entire inquiry—justice.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Is there a way we could find justice so as not to have to bother with moderation any further?

Glaucon/ I don't know any, and I wouldn't want justice to appear first if that means that we won't investigate moderation. So if you want to please me, look for the latter first.

Socrates/ I'm certainly willing. It would be wrong not to be.

Glaucon/ Look, then.

Socrates/ We will. Seen from here, it is more like a kind of consonance and harmony than the previous ones.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ Moderation is surely a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires. People indicate as much when they use the phrase "self-control" and other similar phrases. I don't know just what they mean by them, but they are, so to speak, like tracks or clues that moderation has left behind in language. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Yet isn't the expression "self-control" ridiculous? The stronger self that does the controlling is the same as the weaker self that gets controlled, so that only one person is referred to in all such expressions.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Nonetheless, the expression is apparently trying to indicate that, in the soul of that very person, there is a better part and a worse one and that, whenever the naturally better part is in control of the worse, this is expressed by saying that the person is self-controlled or master of himself. At any rate, one praises someone by calling him self-controlled. But when, on the other hand, the smaller and better part is overpowered by the larger, because of bad upbringing or bad company, this is called being self-defeated or licentious and is a reproach.

Glaucon/ Appropriately so.

Socrates/ Take a look at our new city, and you'll find one of these in it. You'll say that it is rightly called self-controlled, if indeed something in which the better rules the worse is properly called moderate and self-controlled.

Glaucon/ I am looking, and what you say is true.

Socrates/ Now, one finds all kinds of diverse desires, pleasures, and pains, mostly in children, women, household slaves, and in those of the inferior majority who are called free.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ But you meet with the desires that are simple, measured, and directed by calculation in accordance with understanding and correct belief only in the few people who are born with the best natures and receive the best education.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ Then, don't you see that in your city, too, the desires of the inferior many are controlled by the wisdom and desires of the superior few?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Therefore, if any city is said to be in control of itself and of its pleasures and desires, it is this one.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And isn't it, therefore, also moderate because of all this?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ And, further, if indeed the ruler and the ruled in any city share the same belief about who should rule, it is in this one. Or don't you agree?

Glaucon/ I agree entirely.

Socrates/ And when the citizens agree in this way, in which of them do you say moderation is located? In the ruler or the ruled?

Glaucon/ I suppose in both.

Socrates/ Then, you see how right we were to divine that moderation resembles a kind of harmony?

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Because, unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in one part, making the city brave and wise respectively, moderation spreads throughout the whole. It makes the weakest, the strongest, and those in between—whether in regard to reason, physical strength, numbers, wealth, or anything else—all sing the same song together. And this unanimity, this agreement between the naturally worse and the naturally better as to which of the two is to rule both in the city and in each one, is rightly called moderation.

Glaucon/ I agree completely.

Socrates/ All right. We've now found, at least from the point of view of our present beliefs, three out of the four virtues in our city. So what kind of virtue is left, then, that

makes the city share even further in virtue? Surely, it's clear that it is justice.

Glaucon/ That is clear.

Socrates/ Then, Glaucon, we must station ourselves like hunters surrounding a wood and focus our understanding, so that justice doesn't escape us and vanish into obscurity, for obviously it's around here somewhere. So look and try eagerly to catch sight of it, and if you happen to see it before I do, you can tell me about it.

Glaucon/ I wish I could, but you'll make better use of me if you take me to be a follower who can see things when you point them out to him.

Socrates/ Follow, then, and join me in a prayer.

Glaucon/ I'll do that, just so long as you lead.

Socrates/ I certainly will, though the place seems to be impenetrable and full of shadows. It is certainly dark and hard to search though. But all the same, we must go on.

Glaucon/ Indeed we must.

Socrates/ And then I caught sight of something. Ah ha! Glaucon, it looks as though there's a track here, so it seems that our quarry won't altogether escape us.

Glaucon/ That's good news.

Socrates/ Either that, or we've just been stupid.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ Because what we are looking for seems to have been rolling around at our feet from the very beginning, and we didn't see it, which was ridiculous of us. Just as people sometimes search for the very thing they are holding in their hands, so we didn't look in the right direction but gazed off into the distance, and that's probably why we didn't notice it.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that, though we've been talking and hearing about it for a long time, I think we didn't understand what we were saying or that, in a way, we were talking about justice.

Glaucon/ That's a long prelude for someone who wants to hear the answer.

Socrates/ Then listen and see whether there's anything in what I say. Justice, I think, is exactly what we said must be established throughout the city when we were founding it—either that or some form of it. We stated, and often repeated, if you remember, that everyone must practice one of the occupations in the city for which he is naturally best suited.

Glaucon/ Yes, we did keep saying that.

Socrates/ Moreover, we've heard many people say and have often said ourselves that justice is doing one's own work and not meddling with what isn't one's own.

Glaucon/ Yes, we have.

Socrates/ Then, it turns out that this doing one's own work—provided that it comes to be in a certain way—is justice. And do you know what I take as evidence of this?

Glaucon/ No, tell me.

Socrates/ I think that this is what was left over in the city when moderation, courage, and wisdom have been found. It is the power that makes it possible for them to grow in the city and that preserves them when they've grown for as long as it remains there itself. And of course we said that justice would be what was left over when we had found the other three.

Glaucon/ Yes, that must be so.

Socrates/ And surely, if we had to decide which of the four will make the city good by its presence, it would be a

hard decision. Is it the agreement in belief between the rulers and the ruled? Or the preservation among the soldiers of the law-inspired belief about what is to be feared and what isn't? Or the wisdom and guardianship of the rulers? Or is it, above all, the fact that every child, woman, slave, freeman, craftsman, ruler, and ruled each does his own work and doesn't meddle with what is other people's?

Glaucon/ How could this fail to be a hard decision?

Socrates/ It seems, then, that the power that consists in everyone's doing his own work rivals wisdom, moderation, and courage in its contribution to the virtue of the city.

Glaucon/ It certainly does.

Socrates/ And wouldn't you call this rival to the others in its contribution to the city's virtue justice?

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Look at it this way if you want to be convinced. Won't you order your rulers to act as judges in the city's courts?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And won't their sole aim in delivering judgments be that no citizen should have what belongs to another or be deprived of what is his own?

Glaucon/ They'll have no aim but that.

Socrates/ Because that is just?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Therefore, from this point of view also, the having and doing of one's own would be accepted as justice.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Consider, then, and see whether you agree with me about this. If a carpenter attempts to do the work of a cobbler, or a cobbler that of a carpenter, or they exchange their tools or honors with one another, or if the same person

tries to do both jobs, and all other such exchanges are made, do you think that does any great harm to the city?

Glaucon/ Not much.

Socrates/ But I suppose that when someone, who is by nature a craftsman or some other kind of money-maker, is puffed up by wealth, or by having a majority of votes, or by his own strength, or by some other such thing, and attempts to enter the class of soldiers, or one of the unworthy soldiers tries to enter that of the judges and guardians, and these exchange their tools and honors, or when the same person tries to do all these things at once, then I think you'll agree that these exchanges and this sort of meddling bring the city to ruin.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Meddling and exchange between these three classes, then, is the greatest harm that can happen to the city and would rightly be called the worst thing someone could do to it.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And wouldn't you say that the worst thing that someone could do to his city is injustice?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then, that exchange and meddling is injustice. Or to put it the other way around: For the money-making, auxiliary, and guardian classes each to do its own work in the city, is the opposite. That's justice, isn't it, and makes the city just?

Glaucon/ I agree. Justice is that and nothing else.

Socrates/ Let's not take that as secure just yet, but if we find that the same form, when it comes to be in each individual person, is accepted as justice there as well, we can assent to it. What else can we say? But if that isn't what

we find, we must look for something else to be justice. For the moment, however, let's complete the present inquiry. We thought that, if we first tried to observe justice in some larger thing that possessed it, this would make it easier to observe in a single individual. We agreed that this larger thing is a city, and so we established the best city we could, knowing well that justice would be in one that was good. So, let's apply what has come to light in the city to an individual, and if it is accepted there, all will be well. But if something different is found in the individual, then we must go back and test that on the city. And if we do this, and compare them side by side, we might well make justice light up as if we were rubbing fire-sticks together. And, when it has come to light, we can get a secure grip on it for ourselves.

Glaucon/ You're following the road we set, and we must do as you say.

Socrates/ Well, then, are things called by the same name, whether they are bigger or smaller than one another, like or unlike with respect to that to which that name applies?

Glaucon/ Alike.

Socrates/ Then a just man won't differ at all from a just city in respect to the form of justice; rather he'll be like the city.

Glaucon/ He will.

Socrates/ But a city was thought to be just when each of the three natural classes within it did its own work, and it was thought to be moderate, courageous, and wise because of certain other conditions and states of theirs.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ Then, if an individual has these same three parts in his soul, we will expect him to be correctly called by the same names as the city if he has the same conditions in them.

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Then once again we've come upon an easy question, namely, does the soul have these three parts in it or not?

Glaucon/ It doesn't look easy to me. Perhaps, Socrates, there's some truth in the old saying that everything fine is difficult.

Socrates/ Apparently so. But you should know, Glaucon, that, in my opinion, we will never get a precise answer using our present methods of argument—although there is another longer and fuller road that does lead to such an answer. But perhaps we can get an answer that's up to the standard of our previous statements and inquiries.

Glaucon/ Isn't that satisfactory? It would be enough for me at present.

Socrates/ In that case, it will be fully enough for me too.

Glaucon/ Then don't weary, but go on with the inquiry.

Socrates/ Well, then, we are surely compelled to agree that each of us has within himself the same parts and characteristics as the city? Where else would they come from? It would be ridiculous for anyone to think that spiritedness didn't come to be in cities from such individuals as the Thracians, Scythians, and others who live to the north of us who are held to possess spirit, or that the same isn't true of the love of learning, which is mostly associated with our part of the world, or of the love of money, which one might say is conspicuously displayed by the Phoenicians and Egyptians.

Glaucon/ It would.

Socrates/ That's the way it is, anyway, and it isn't hard to understand.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But this is hard. Do we do these things with the same part of ourselves, or do we do them with three different parts? Do we learn with one part, get angry with another, and with some third part desire the pleasures of food, drink, sex, and the others that are closely akin to them? Or, when we set out after something, do we act with the whole of our soul, in each case? This is what's hard to determine in a way that's up to the standards of our argument.

Glaucon/ I think so too.

Socrates/ Well, then, let's try to determine in that way whether these parts are the same or different.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ It is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. So, if we ever find this happening in the soul, we'll know that we aren't dealing with one thing but many.

Glaucon/ All right.

Socrates/ Then consider what I'm about to say.

Glaucon/ Say on.

Socrates/ Is it possible for the same thing to stand still and move at the same time in the same part of itself?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Let's make our agreement more precise in order to avoid disputes later on. If someone said that a person who is standing still but moving his hands and head is moving and standing still at the same time, we wouldn't consider, I think, that he ought to put it like that. What he ought to say is that one part of the person is standing still and another part is moving. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ And if our interlocutor became even more amusing and was sophisticated enough to say that whole spinning tops stand still and move at the same time when the peg is fixed in the same place and they revolve, and that the same is true of anything else moving in a circular motion on the same spot, we wouldn't agree, because it isn't with respect to the same parts of themselves that such things both stand still and move. We'd say that they have an axis and a circumference and that with respect to the axis they stand still, since they don't wobble to either side, while with respect to the circumference they move in a circle. But if they do wobble to the left or right, front or back, while they are spinning, we'd say that they aren't standing still in any way.

Glaucon/ And we'd be right.

Socrates/ No such statement will disturb us, then, or make us believe that the same thing can be, do, or undergo opposites, at the same time, in the same respect, and in relation to the same thing.

Glaucon/ They won't make me believe it, at least.

Socrates/ Nevertheless, in order to avoid going through all these objections one by one and taking a long time to prove them all untrue, let's hypothesize that this is correct and carry on. But we agree that if it should ever be shown to be incorrect, all the consequences we've drawn from it will also be lost.

Glaucon/ We should agree to that.

Socrates/ Then wouldn't you consider all the following, whether they are doings or under-goings, as pairs of opposites: Assent and dissent, wanting to have something and rejecting it, taking something and pushing it away?

Glaucon/ Yes, they are opposites.

Socrates/ What about these? Wouldn't you include thirst, hunger, the appetites as a whole, and wishing and willing

somewhere in the class we mentioned? Wouldn't you say that the soul of someone who has an appetite for a thing wants what he has an appetite for and takes to himself what it is his will to have, and that insofar as he wishes something to be given to him, his soul, since it desires this to come about, nods assent to it as if in answer to a question?

Glaucon/ I would.

Socrates/ What about not willing, not wishing, and not having an appetite? Aren't these among the very opposites—cases in which the soul pushes and drives things away?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then won't we say that there is a class of things called appetites and that the clearest examples are hunger and thirst?

Glaucon/ We will.

Socrates/ One of these is for food and the other for drink?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, insofar as it is thirst, is it an appetite in the soul for more than that for which we say that it is the appetite? For example, is thirst, thirst for hot drink or cold, or much drink or little, or, in a word, for drink of a certain sort? Or isn't it rather that, where heat is present as well as thirst, it causes the appetite to be for something cold as well, and where cold for something hot, and where there is much thirst because of the presence of muchness, it will cause the desire to be for much, and where little for little? But thirst itself will never be for anything other than what it is in its nature to be for, namely, drink itself, and hunger for food.

Glaucon/ That's the way it is, each appetite itself is only for its natural object, while the appetite for something of a certain sort depends on additions.

Socrates/ Therefore, let no one catch us unprepared or disturb us by claiming that no one has an appetite for drink but rather good drink, nor food but good food, on the grounds that everyone after all has appetite for good things, so that if thirst is an appetite, it will be an appetite for good drink or whatever, and similarly with the others.

Glaucon/ All the same, the person who says that has a point.

Socrates/ But it seems to me that, in the case of all things that are related to something, those that are of a particular sort are related to a particular sort of thing, while those that are merely themselves are related to a thing that is merely itself.

Glaucon/ I don't understand.

Socrates/ Don't you understand that the greater is such as to be greater than something?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Than the less?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the much greater than the much less, isn't that so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the once greater to the once less? And the going-to-be greater than the going-to-be less?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And isn't the same true of the more and the fewer, the double and the half, heavier and lighter, faster and slower, the hot and the cold, and all other such things?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And what about the various kinds of knowledge? Doesn't the same apply? Knowledge itself is knowledge of what can be learned itself (or whatever it is that

knowledge is of), while a particular sort of knowledge is of a particular sort of thing. For example, when knowledge of building houses came to be, didn't it differ from the other kinds of knowledge, and so was called knowledge of building?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And wasn't that because it was a different sort of knowledge from all the others?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And wasn't it because it was of a particular sort of thing that it itself became a particular sort of knowledge? And isn't this true of all crafts and kinds of knowledge?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Well, then, this is what I was trying to say—if you understand it now—when I said that of all things that are related to something, those that are merely themselves are related to things that are merely themselves, while those that are of a particular sort are related to things of a particular sort. However, I don't mean that the sorts in question have to be the same for them both. For example, knowledge of health or disease isn't healthy or diseased, and knowledge of good and bad doesn't itself become good or bad. I mean that, when knowledge became, not knowledge of the thing itself that knowledge is of, but knowledge of something of a particular sort, the result was that it itself became a particular sort of knowledge, and this caused it to be no longer called knowledge without qualification, but—with the addition of the relevant sort—medical knowledge or whatever.

Glaucon/ I understand, and I think that that's the way it is.

Socrates/ Then as for thirst, wouldn't you include it among things that are related to something? Surely thirst is related to…

Glaucon/ I know it's related to drink.

Socrates/ Therefore a particular sort of thirst is for a particular sort of drink. But thirst itself isn't for much or little, good or bad, or, in a word, for drink of a particular sort. Rather, thirst itself is in its nature only for drink itself.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Hence the soul of the thirsty person, insofar as he's thirsty, doesn't wish anything else but to drink, and it wants this and is impelled towards it.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Therefore, if something draws it back when it is thirsting, wouldn't that be something different in it from whatever thirsts and drives it like a beast to drink? It can't be, we say, that the same thing, with the same part of itself, in relation to the same, at the same time, does opposite things.

Glaucon/ No, it can't.

Socrates/ In the same way, I suppose, it's wrong to say of the archer that his hands at the same time push the bow away and draw it towards him. We ought to say that one hand pushes it away and the other draws it towards him.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Now, would we assert that sometimes there are thirsty people who don't wish to drink?

Glaucon/ Certainly, it happens often to many different people.

Socrates/ What, then, should one say about them? Isn't it that there is something in their soul, bidding them to

drink, and something different, forbidding them to do so, that overrules the thing that bids?

Glaucon/ I think so.

Socrates/ Doesn't that which forbids in such cases come into play—if it comes into play at all—as a result of rational calculation, while what drives and drags them to drink is a result of feelings and diseases?

Glaucon/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Hence it isn't unreasonable for us to claim that they are two, and different from one another. We'll call the part of the soul with which it calculates the rational part and the part with which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited by other appetites the irrational appetitive part, companion of certain indulgences and pleasures.

Glaucon/ Yes. Indeed, that's a reasonable thing to think.

Socrates/ Then, let these two parts be distinguished in the soul. Now, is the spirited part by which we get angry a third part or is it of the same nature as either of the other two?

Glaucon/ Perhaps it's like the appetitive part.

Socrates/ But I've heard something relevant to this, and I believe it. Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the North Wall when he saw some corpses lying at the executioner's feet. He had an appetite to look at them but at the same time he was disgusted and turned away. For a time he struggled with himself and covered his face, but, finally, overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, "Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!"

Glaucon/ I've heard that story myself.

Socrates/ It certainly proves that anger sometimes makes war against the appetites, as one thing against another. Besides, don't we often notice in other cases that when appetite forces someone contrary to rational calculation, he reproaches himself and gets angry with that in him that's doing the forcing, so that of the two factions that are fighting a civil war, so to speak, spirit allies itself with reason? But I don't think you can say that you've ever seen spirit, either in yourself or anyone else, ally itself with an appetite to do what reason has decided must not be done.

Glaucon/ No, by god, I haven't.

Socrates/ What happens when a person thinks that he has done something unjust? Isn't it true that the nobler he is, the less he resents it if he suffers hunger, cold, or the like at the hands of someone whom he believes to be inflicting this on him justly, and won't his spirit, as I say, refuse to be aroused?

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ But what happens if, instead, he believes that someone has been unjust to him? Isn't the spirit within him boiling and angry, fighting for what he believes to be just? Won't it endure hunger, cold, and the like and keep on till it is victorious, not ceasing from noble actions until it either wins, dies, or calms down, called to heel by the reason within him, like a dog by a shepherd?

Glaucon/ Spirit is certainly like that. And, of course, we made the auxiliaries in our city like dogs obedient to the rulers, who are themselves like shepherds of a city.

Socrates/ You well understand what I'm trying to say. But also reflect on this further point.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ The position of the spirited part seems to be the opposite of what we thought before. Then we thought of it as

something appetitive, but now we say that it is far from being that, for in the civil war in the soul it aligns itself far more with the rational part.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Then is it also different from the rational part, or is it some form of it, so that there are two parts in the soul—the rational and the appetitive—instead of three? Or rather, just as there were three classes in the city that held it together, the money-making, the auxiliary, and the deliberative, is the spirited part a third thing in the soul that is by nature the helper of the rational part, provided that it hasn't been corrupted by a bad upbringing?

Glaucon/ It must be a third.

Socrates/ Yes, provided that we can show it is different from the rational part, as we saw earlier it was from the appetitive one.

Glaucon/ It isn't difficult to show that it is different. Even in small children, one can see that they are full of spirit right from birth, while as far as rational calculation is concerned, some never seem to get a share of it, while the majority do so quite late.

Socrates/ That's really well put. And in animals too one can see that what you say is true. Besides, our earlier quotation from Homer bears it out, where he says;

> He struck his chest and spoke to his heart.

For here Homer clearly represents the part that has calculated about better and worse as different from the part that is angry without calculation.

Glaucon/ That's exactly right.

Socrates/ Well, then, we've now made our difficult way through a sea of argument. We are pretty much agreed that the same number and the same kinds of classes as are in the city are also in the soul of each individual.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ Therefore, it necessarily follows that the individual is wise in the same way and in the same part of himself as the city.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And isn't the individual courageous in the same way and in the same part of himself as the city? And isn't everything else that has to do with virtue the same in both?

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Moreover, Glaucon, I suppose we'll say that a man is just in the same way as a city.

Glaucon/ That too is entirely necessary.

Socrates/ And we surely haven't forgotten that the city was just because each of the three classes in it was doing its own work.

Glaucon/ I don't think we could forget that.

Socrates/ Then we must also remember that each one of us in whom each part is doing its own work will himself be just and do his own.

Glaucon/ Of course, we must.

Socrates/ Therefore, isn't it appropriate for the rational part to rule, since it is really wise and exercises foresight on behalf of the whole soul, and for the spirited part to obey it and be its ally?

Glaucon/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ And isn't it, as we were saying, a mixture of music and poetry, on the one hand, and physical training, on the other, that makes the two parts harmonious, stretching and nurturing the rational part with fine words and learning, relaxing the other part through soothing stories, and making it gentle by means of harmony and rhythm?

Glaucon/ That's precisely it.

Socrates/ And these two, having been nurtured in this way, and having truly learned their own roles and been educated in them, will govern the appetitive part, which is the largest part in each person's soul and is by nature most insatiable for money. They'll watch over it to see that it isn't filled with the so-called pleasures of the body and that it doesn't become so big and strong that it no longer does its own work but attempts to enslave and rule over the classes it isn't fitted to rule, thereby overturning everyone's whole life.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then, wouldn't these two parts also do the finest job of guarding the whole soul and body against external enemies—reason by planning, spirit by fighting, following its leader, and carrying out the leader's decisions through its courage?

Glaucon/ Yes, that's true.

Socrates/ And it is because of the spirited part, I suppose, that we call a single individual courageous, namely, when it preserves through pains and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what isn't.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And we'll call him wise because of that small part of himself that rules in him and makes those declarations and has within it the knowledge of what is advantageous for each part and for the whole soul, which is the community of all three parts.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And isn't he moderate because of the friendly and harmonious relations between these same parts, namely, when the ruler and the ruled believe in common that

the rational part should rule and don't engage in civil war against it?

Glaucon/ Moderation is surely nothing other than that, both in the city and in the individual.

Socrates/ And, of course, a person will be just because of what we've so often mentioned, and in that way.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Well, then, is the justice in us at all indistinct? Does it seem to be something different from what we found in the city?

Glaucon/ It doesn't seem so to me.

Socrates/ If there are still any doubts in our soul about this, we could dispel them altogether by appealing to ordinary cases.

Glaucon/ Which ones?

Socrates/ For example, if we had to come to an agreement about whether someone similar in nature and training to our city had embezzled a deposit of gold or silver that he had accepted, who do you think would consider him to have done it rather than someone who isn't like him?

Glaucon/ No one.

Socrates/ And would he have anything to do with temple robberies, thefts, betrayals of friends in private life or of cities in public life?

Glaucon/ No, nothing.

Socrates/ And he'd be in no way untrustworthy in keeping an oath or other agreement.

Glaucon/ How could he be?

Socrates/ And adultery, disrespect for parents, and neglect of the gods would be more in keeping with every other kind of character than his.

Glaucon/ With everyone.

Socrates/ And isn't the cause of all this that every part within him does its own work, whether it's ruling or being ruled?

Glaucon/ Yes, that and nothing else.

Socrates/ Then, are you still looking for justice to be something other than this power, the one that produces men and cities of the sort we've described?

Glaucon/ No, I certainly am not.

Socrates/ Then the dream we had has been completely fulfilled—our suspicion that, with the help of some god, we had hit upon the origin and pattern of justice right at the beginning in founding our city.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Indeed, Glaucon, the principle that it is right for someone who is by nature a cobbler to practice cobblery and nothing else, for the carpenter to practice carpentry, and the same for the others is a sort of image of justice—that's why it's beneficial.

Glaucon/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And in truth justice is, it seems, something of this sort. However, it isn't concerned with someone's doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, with what is truly himself and his own. One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other. He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself. He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale—high, low, and middle. He binds together those parts and any others there may be in between, and from having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious. Only then does he act. And when he does anything, whether acquiring wealth, taking care of

his body, engaging in politics, or in private contracts—in all of these, he believes that the action is just and fine that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and calls it so, and regards as wisdom the knowledge that oversees such actions. And he believes that the action that destroys this harmony is unjust, and calls it so, and regards the belief that oversees it as ignorance.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, then, if we claim to have found the just man, the just city, and what the justice is that is in them, I don't suppose that we'll seem to be telling a complete falsehood.

Glaucon/ No, we certainly won't.

Socrates/ Shall we claim it, then?

Glaucon/ We shall.

Socrates/ So be it. Now, I suppose we must look for injustice.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Surely, it must be a kind of civil war between the three parts, a meddling and doing of another's work, a rebellion by some part against the whole soul in order to rule it inappropriately. The rebellious part is by nature suited to be a slave, while the other part is not a slave but belongs to the ruling class. We'll say something like that, I suppose, and that the turmoil and straying of these parts are injustice, licentiousness, cowardice, ignorance, and, in a word, the whole of vice.

Glaucon/ That's what they are.

Socrates/ So, if justice and injustice are really clear enough to us, then acting justly, acting unjustly, and doing injustice are also clear.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Because just and unjust actions are no different for the soul than healthy and unhealthy things are for the body.

Glaucon/ In what way?

Socrates/ Healthy things produce health, unhealthy ones disease.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And don't just actions produce justice in the soul and unjust ones injustice?

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ To produce health is to establish the components of the body in a natural relation of control and being controlled, one by another, while to produce disease is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled contrary to nature.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then, isn't to produce justice to establish the parts of the soul in a natural relation of control, one by another, while to produce injustice is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled contrary to nature?

Glaucon/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Virtue seems, then, to be a kind of health, fine condition, and well-being of the soul, while vice is disease, shameful condition, and weakness.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ And don't fine ways of living lead one to the possession of virtue, shameful ones to vice?

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ So it now remains, it seems, to inquire whether it is more profitable to act justly, live in a fine way, and be just, whether one is known to be so or not, or to act unjustly

and be unjust, provided that one doesn't pay the penalty and become better as a result of punishment.

Glaucon/ But, Socrates, this inquiry looks ridiculous to me now that justice and injustice have been shown to be as we have described. Even if one has every kind of food and drink, lots of money, and every sort of power to rule, life is thought to be not worth living when the body's nature is ruined. So even if someone can do whatever he wishes, except what will free him from vice and injustice and make him acquire justice and virtue, how can it be worth living when his soul—the very thing by which he lives—is ruined and in turmoil?

Socrates/ Yes, it is ridiculous. Nevertheless, now that we've come far enough to be able to see most clearly that this is so, we mustn't give up.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely the last thing we must do.

Socrates/ Then come here, so that you can see how many forms of vice there are, anyhow that I consider worthy of examination.

Glaucon/ I'm following you, just tell me.

Socrates/ Well, from the vantage point we've reached in our argument, it seems to me that there is one form of virtue and an unlimited number of forms of vice, four of which are worth mentioning.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ It seems likely that there are as many types of soul as there are specific types of political constitution.

Glaucon/ How many is that?

Socrates/ Five forms of constitution and five of souls.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ One is the constitution we've been describing. And it has two names. If one outstanding man emerges

among the rulers, it's called a kingship; if more than one, it's called an aristocracy.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ Therefore, I say that this is one form of constitution. Whether one man emerges or many, none of the significant laws of the city would be changed, if they followed the upbringing and education we described.

Glaucon/ Probably not.

Book 5

Socrates/ This is the kind of city and constitution, then, that I call good and correct, and so too is this kind of man. And if indeed this is the correct kind, all the others—whether as city governments or as organizations of the individual soul—are bad and mistaken. Their badness is of four kinds.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ I was going to enumerate them and explain how I thought they developed out of one another, but Polemarchus, who was sitting a little further away than Adeimantus, extended his hand and took hold of the latter's cloak by the shoulder from above. He drew Adeimantus towards him, while he himself leaned forward and said something to him. We overheard nothing of what he said except the words "Shall we let it go, or what?" Adeimantus, now, speaking aloud said;

Adeimantus/ We certainly won't let it go.

Socrates/ And I asked: What is it that you won't let go?

Adeimantus/ You.

Socrates/ For what reason in particular?

Adeimantus/ We think that you're slacking off and that you've cheated us out of a whole important section of the discussion in order to avoid having to deal with it. You thought we wouldn't notice when you said—as though it were something trivial—that, as regards wives and children, anyone could see that the possessions of friends should be held in common.

Socrates/ But isn't that right, Adeimantus?

Adeimantus/ Yes it is. But this "right," like the other things we've discussed, requires an explanation—in this case, an explanation of the manner in which they are to be

held in common, for there may be many ways of doing this. So don't omit telling us about the particular one you mean. We've been waiting for some time, indeed, for you to tell us about the production of children—how they'll be produced and, once born, how they'll be brought up—and about the whole subject of having wives and children in common. We think that this makes a considerable difference—indeed all the difference—to whether a constitution is correct or not. So now, since you are beginning to describe another constitution before having adequately discussed these things, we are resolved, as you overheard, not to let you off until you explain all this as fully as the rest.

Glaucon/ Include me, as a partner in this resolution.

Thrasymachus/ In fact, Socrates, you can take this as the resolution of all of us.

Socrates/ What a thing you've done, in stopping me! What an argument you've started up again from the very beginning, as it were, about the constitution! I was delighted to think that it had already been described and was content to have these things accepted as they were stated before. You don't realize what a swarm of arguments you've stirred up by calling me to account now. I saw the swarm and passed the topic by in order to save us a lot of trouble.

Thrasymachus/ Well, are we here to search for gold or to listen to an argument?

Socrates/ The latter, but within reason.

Glaucon/ It's within reason, Socrates, for people with any understanding to listen to an argument of this kind their whole life long. So don't mind about us, and don't get tired yourself. Rather, tell us at length what your thoughts are on the topic we inquired about, namely, what the common possession of wives and children will amount to for the guardians and how the children will be brought up while

they're still small, for the time between birth and the beginning of education seems to be the most difficult period of all. So try to tell us what the manner of this upbringing must be.

Socrates/ It isn't an easy subject to explain, for it raises even more incredulity than the topics we've discussed so far. People may not believe that what we say is possible or that, even if it could be brought about, it would be for the best. It's for this reason that I hesitated to bring it up, namely, that our argument might seem to be no more than wishful thinking.

Glaucon/ Then don't hesitate, for your audience isn't inconsiderate, incredulous, or hostile.

Socrates/ Are you trying to encourage me by saying that?

Glaucon/ I am.

Socrates/ Well, you're doing the opposite. Your encouragement would be fine, if I could be sure I was speaking with knowledge, for one can feel both secure and confident when one knows the truth about the dearest and most important things and speaks about them among those who are themselves wise and dear friends. But to speak, as I'm doing, at a time when one is unsure of oneself and searching for the truth, is a frightening and insecure thing to do. I'm not afraid of being laughed at—that would be childish indeed. But I am afraid that, if I slip from the truth, just where it's most important not to, I'll not only fall myself but drag my friends down as well. So I bow to Adrastea for what I'm going to say, for I suspect that it's a lesser crime to kill someone involuntarily than to mislead people about fine, good, and just institutions. Since it's better to run this risk among enemies than among friends, you've well and truly encouraged me!

Glaucon laughed and said:

Glaucon/ Well, Socrates, if we suffer from any false note you strike in the argument, we'll release you and absolve you of any guilt as in a homicide case: your hands are clean, and you have not deceived us. So take courage and speak.

Socrates/ I will, for the law says that someone who kills involuntarily is free of guilt when he's absolved by the injured party. So it's surely reasonable to think the same is true in my case as well.

Glaucon/ With that as your defense, speak.

Socrates/ Then I'll have to go back to what should perhaps have been said in sequence, although it may be that this way of doing things is in fact right and that after the completion of the male drama, so to speak, we should then go through the female one—especially as you insist on it so urgently.

For men born and educated as we've described there is, in my opinion, no right way to acquire and use women and children other than by following the road on which we started them. We attempted, in the argument, to set up the men as guardians of the herd.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then let's give them a birth and rearing consistent with that and see whether it suits us or not.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ As follows: Do we think that the wives of our guardian watchdogs should guard what the males guard, hunt with them, and do everything else in common with them? Or should we keep the women at home, as incapable of doing this, since they must bear and rear the puppies, while the males work and have the entire care of the flock?

Glaucon/ Everything should be in common, except that the females are weaker and the males stronger.

Socrates/ And is it possible to use any animals for the same things if you don't give them the same upbringing and education?

Glaucon/ No, it isn't.

Socrates/ Therefore, if we use the women for the same things as the men, they must also be taught the same things.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now, we gave the men music and poetry and physical training.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then we must give these two crafts, as well as those having to do with warfare, to the women also to use in the same way as the men use them.

Glaucon/ That seems to follow from what you say.

Socrates/ But perhaps much of what we are saying, since it is contrary to custom, would incite ridicule if it were carried out in practice as we've described.

Glaucon/ It certainly would.

Socrates/ What is the most ridiculous thing that you see in it? Isn't it obviously the women exercising naked in the palestras with the men? And not just the young women, but the older ones too—like old men in gymnasiums who, even though their bodies are wrinkled and not pleasant to look at, still love to do physical training.

Glaucon/ Yes, that would look really ridiculous as things stand at present.

Socrates/ But surely, now that we've started to speak about this, we mustn't fear the various jokes that wits will make about this kind of change in music and poetry, physical training, and—last but not least—in bearing arms and riding horses.

Glaucon/ You're right.

Socrates/ And now that we've begun to speak about this, we must move on to the tougher part of the law, begging these people not to be silly (though that is their own work!) but to take the matter seriously. They should remember that it wasn't very long ago that the Greeks themselves thought it shameful and ridiculous (as the majority of the barbarians still do) for even men to be seen naked and that when the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians began the gymnasiums, the wits of those times could also have ridiculed it all. Or don't you think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ But I think that, after it was found in practice to be better to strip than to cover up all those parts, then what was ridiculous to the eyes faded away in the face of what argument showed to be the best. This makes it clear that it's foolish to think that anything besides the bad is ridiculous or to try to raise a laugh at the sight of anything besides what's stupid or bad or (putting it the other way around) it's foolish to take seriously any standard of what is fine and beautiful other than the good.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely certain.

Socrates/ However, mustn't we first agree about whether our proposals are possible or not? And mustn't we give to anyone who wishes the opportunity to question us—whether in jest or in earnest—about whether female human nature can share all the tasks of that of the male, or none of them, or some but not others, and to ask in which class the waging of war belongs? Wouldn't this, as the best beginning, also be likely to result in the best conclusion?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Shall we give the argument against ourselves, then, on behalf of those who share these reservations, so that their side of the question doesn't fall by default?

Glaucon/ There's no reason not to.

Socrates/ Then let's say this on their behalf: "Socrates and Glaucon, there's no need for others to argue with you, for you yourselves, when you began to found your city, agreed that each must do his own work in accordance with his nature."

Glaucon/ And I think we certainly did agree to that.

Socrates/ "Can you deny that a woman is by nature very different from a man?"

Glaucon/ Of course not.

Socrates/ "And isn't it appropriate to assign different work to each in accordance with its nature?"

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ "How is it, then, that you aren't mistaken and contradicting yourselves when you say that men and women must do the same things, when their natures are so completely separate and distinct?"

Glaucon/ Do you have any defense against that attack?

Socrates/ It isn't easy to think of one on the spur of the moment, so I'll ask you to explain the argument on our side as well, whatever it is.

This and many other such things, Glaucon, which I foresaw earlier, were what I was afraid of, so that I hesitated to tackle the law concerning the possession and upbringing of women and children.

Glaucon/ By god, it doesn't seem to be an easy topic.

Socrates/ It isn't. But the fact is that whether someone falls into a small diving pool or into the middle of the biggest ocean, he must swim all the same.

Glaucon/ He certainly must.

Socrates/ Then we must swim too, and try to save ourselves from the sea of argument, hoping that a dolphin

will pick us up or that we'll be rescued by some other desperate means.

Glaucon/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Come, then. Let's see if we can find a way out. We've agreed that different natures must follow different ways of life and that the natures of men and women are different. But now we say that those different natures must follow the same way of life. Isn't that the accusation brought against us?

Glaucon/ That's it exactly.

Socrates/ Ah! Glaucon, great is the power of the craft of disputation.

Glaucon/ Why is that?

Socrates/ Because many fall into it against their wills. They think they are having not a quarrel but a conversation, because they are unable to examine what has been said by dividing it up according to forms. Hence, they pursue mere verbal contradictions of what has been said and have a quarrel rather than a conversation.

Glaucon/ That does happen to lots of people, but it isn't happening to us at the moment, is it?

Socrates/ It most certainly is, for it looks to me, at any rate, as though we are falling into disputation against our will.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ We're bravely, but in a quarrelsome and merely verbal fashion, pursuing the principle that natures that aren't the same must follow different ways of life. But when we assigned different ways of life to different natures and the same ones to the same, we didn't at all examine the form of natural difference and sameness we had in mind or in what regard we were distinguishing them.

Glaucon/ No, we didn't look into that.

Socrates/ Therefore, we might just as well, it seems, ask ourselves whether the natures of bald and long-haired men are the same or opposite. And, when we agree that they are opposite, then, if the bald ones are cobblers, we ought to forbid the long-haired ones to be cobblers, and if the long-haired ones are cobblers, we ought to forbid this to the bald ones.

Glaucon/ That would indeed be ridiculous.

Socrates/ And aren't we in this ridiculous position because at that time we did not introduce every form of difference and sameness in nature, but focused on the one form of sameness and difference that was relevant to the particular ways of life themselves? We meant, for example, that a male and female doctor have souls of the same nature. Or don't you think so?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ But a doctor and a carpenter have different ones?

Glaucon/ Completely different, surely.

Socrates/ Therefore, if the male sex is seen to be different from the female with regard to a particular craft or way of life, we'll say that the relevant one must be assigned to it. But if it's apparent that they differ only in this respect, that the females bear children while the males beget them, we'll say that there has been no kind of proof that women are different from men with respect to what we're talking about, and we'll continue to believe that our guardians and their wives must have the same way of life.

Glaucon/ And rightly so.

Socrates/ Next, we'll tell anyone who holds the opposite view to instruct us in this: With regard to what craft or way

of life involved in the constitution of the city are the natures of men and women not the same but different?

Glaucon/ That's a fair question, at any rate.

Socrates/ And perhaps he'd say, just as you did a moment ago, that it isn't easy to give an immediate answer, but with enough consideration it should not be difficult.

Glaucon/ Yes, he might say that.

Socrates/ Shall we ask the one who raises this objection to follow us and see whether we can show him that no way of life concerned with the management of the city is peculiar to women?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ "Come, now," we'll say to him, "give us an answer: Is this what you meant by one person being naturally well suited for something and another being naturally unsuited? That the one learned it easily, the other with difficulty; that the one, after only a brief period of instruction, was able to find out things for himself, while the other, after much instruction, couldn't even remember what he'd learned; that the body of the one adequately served his thought, while the body of the other opposed his. Are there any other things besides these by which you distinguished those who are naturally well suited for anything from those who are not?"

Glaucon/ No one will claim that there are any others.

Socrates/ Do you know of anything practiced by human beings in which the male sex isn't superior to the female in all these ways? Or must we make a long story of it by mentioning weaving, baking cakes, and cooking vegetables, in which the female sex is believed to excel and in which it is most ridiculous of all for it to be inferior?

Glaucon/ It's true that one sex is much superior to the other in pretty well everything, although many women are

better than many men in many things. But on the whole it is as you say.

Socrates/ Then there is no way of life concerned with the management of the city that belongs to a woman because she's a woman or to a man because he's a man, but the various natures are distributed in the same way in both creatures. Women share by nature in every way of life just as men do, but in all of them women are weaker than men.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then shall we assign all of them to men and none to women?

Glaucon/ How can we?

Socrates/ We'll say, I suppose, that one woman is a doctor, another not, and that one is musical by nature, another not.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And, therefore, won't one be athletic or warlike, while another is unwarlike and no lover of physical training?

Glaucon/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Further, isn't one woman philosophical or a lover of wisdom, while another hates wisdom? And isn't one spirited and another spiritless?

Glaucon/ That too.

Socrates/ So one woman may have a guardian nature and another not, for wasn't it qualities of this sort that we looked for in the natures of the men we selected as guardians?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Therefore, men and women are by nature the same with respect to guarding the city, except to the extent that one is weaker and the other stronger.

Glaucon/ Apparently.

Socrates/ Then women of this sort must be chosen along with men of the same sort to live with them and share their guardianship, seeing that they are adequate for the task and akin to the men in nature.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And mustn't we assign the same way of life to the same natures?

Glaucon/ We must.

Socrates/ We've come round, then, to what we said before and have agreed that it isn't against nature to assign an education in music, poetry, and physical training to the wives of the guardians.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Then we're not legislating impossibilities or indulging in mere wishful thinking, since the law we established is in accord with nature. It's rather the way things are at present that seems to be against nature.

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Now, weren't we trying to determine whether our proposals were both possible and optimal?

Glaucon/ Yes, we were.

Socrates/ And haven't we now agreed that they're possible?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then mustn't we next reach agreement about whether or not they're optimal?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Should we have one kind of education to produce women guardians, then, and another to produce men, especially as they have the same natures to begin with?

Glaucon/ No.

Socrates/ Then, what do you think about this?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ About one man being better and another worse. Or do you think they're all alike?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ In the city we're establishing, who do you think will prove to be better men, the guardians, who receive the education we've described, or the cobblers, who are educated in cobblery?

Glaucon/ Your question is ridiculous.

Socrates/ I understand. Indeed, aren't the guardians the best of the citizens?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And what about the female guardians? Aren't they the best of the women?

Glaucon/ They're by far the best.

Socrates/ Is there anything better for a city than having the best possible men and women as its citizens?

Glaucon/ There isn't.

Socrates/ And isn't it music and poetry and physical training, lending their support in the way we described, that bring this about?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then the law we've established isn't only possible; it is also optimal for a city?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then the guardian women must strip for physical training, since they'll wear virtue or excellence instead of clothes. They must share in war and the other guardians' duties in the city and do nothing else. But the lighter parts must be assigned to them because of the

weakness of their sex. And the man who laughs at naked women doing physical training for the sake of what is best is "plucking the unripe fruit" of laughter and doesn't know, it seems, what he's laughing at or what he's doing, for it is and always will be the finest saying that the beneficial is beautiful, while the harmful is ugly.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Can we say, then, that we've escaped one wave of criticism in our discussion of the law about women, that we haven't been altogether swept away by laying it down that male and female guardians must share their entire way of life, and that our argument is consistent when it states that this is both possible and beneficial?

Glaucon/ And it's certainly no small wave that you've escaped.

Socrates/ You won't think that it's so big when you get a look at the next one.

Glaucon/ Tell me about it, and I'll decide.

Socrates/ I suppose that the following law goes along with the last one and the others that preceded it.

Glaucon/ Which one?

Socrates/ That all these women are to belong in common to all the men, that none are to live privately with any man, and that the children, too, are to be possessed in common, so that no parent will know his own offspring or any child his parent.

Glaucon/ This wave is far bigger than the other, for there's doubt both about its possibility and about whether or not it's beneficial.

Socrates/ I don't think that its being beneficial would be disputed or that it would be denied that the common possession of women and children would be the greatest

good, if indeed it is possible. But I think that there would be a lot of disagreement about whether or not it is possible.

Glaucon/ There could very well be dispute about both.

Socrates/ You mean that I'll have to face a coalition of arguments. I thought I'd escape one of them, if you believed that the proposal was beneficial, and that I'd have only the one about whether or not it's possible left to deal with.

Glaucon/ But you didn't escape unobserved, so you have to give an argument for both.

Socrates/ Well, then, I'll have to accept my punishment. But do me this favor. Let me, as if on a holiday, do what lazy people do who feast on their own thoughts when out for a solitary walk. Instead of finding out how something they desire might actually come about, these people pass that over, so as to avoid tiring deliberations about what's possible and what isn't. They assume that what they desire is available and proceed to arrange the rest, taking pleasure in thinking through everything they'll do when they have what they want, thereby making their lazy souls even lazier. I'm getting soft myself at the moment, so I want to delay consideration of the feasibility of our proposal until later. With your permission, I'll assume that it's feasible and examine how the rulers will arrange these matters when they come to pass. And I'll try to show that nothing could be more beneficial to the city and its guardians than those arrangements. These are the things I'll examine with you first, and I'll deal with the other question later, but only if you'll permit me to do it this way.

Glaucon/ You have my permission, so carry on with your examination.

Socrates/ I suppose that our rulers and auxiliaries—if indeed they're worthy of the names—will be willing to command and to obey respectively. In some cases, the rulers

will themselves be obeying our laws, and in others, namely, the ones we leave to their discretion, they'll give directions that are in the spirit of our laws.

Glaucon/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Then you, as their lawgiver, will select women just as you did men, with natures as similar to theirs as possible, and hand them over to the men. And since they have common dwellings and meals, rather than private ones, and live together and mix together both in physical training and in the rest of their upbringing, they will, I suppose, be driven by innate necessity to have sex with one another. Or don't you think we're talking about necessities here?

Glaucon/ The necessities aren't geometrical but erotic, and they're probably better than the others at persuading and compelling the majority of people.

Socrates/ That's right. But the next point, Glaucon, is that promiscuity is impious in a city of happy people, and the rulers won't allow it.

Glaucon/ No, for it isn't right.

Socrates/ Then it's clear that our next task must be to make marriage as sacred as possible. And the sacred marriages will be those that are most beneficial.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ How, then, will they be most beneficial? Tell me this, Glaucon: I see that you have hunting dogs and quite a flock of noble fighting birds at home. Have you noticed anything about their mating and breeding?

Glaucon/ Like what?

Socrates/ In the first place, although they're all noble, aren't there some that are the best and prove themselves to be so?

Glaucon/ There are.

Socrates/ Do you breed them all alike, or do you try to breed from the best as much as possible?

Glaucon/ I try to breed from the best.

Socrates/ And do you breed from the youngest or the oldest or from those in their prime?

Glaucon/ From those in their prime.

Socrates/ And do you think that if they weren't bred in this way, your stock of birds and dogs would get much worse?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ What about horses and other animals? Are things any different with them?

Glaucon/ It would be strange if they were.

Socrates/ Dear me! If this also holds true of human beings, our need for excellent rulers is indeed extreme.

Glaucon/ It does hold of them. But what of it?

Socrates/ Because our rulers will then have to use a lot of drugs. And while an inferior doctor is adequate for people who are willing to follow a regimen and don't need drugs, when drugs are needed, we know that a bolder doctor is required.

Glaucon/ That's true. But what exactly do you have in mind?

Socrates/ I mean that it looks as though our rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception for the benefit of those they rule. And we said that all such falsehoods are useful as a form of drug.

Glaucon/ And we were right.

Socrates/ Well, it seems we were right, especially where marriages and the producing of children are concerned.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ It follows from our previous agreements, first, that the best men must have sex with the best women as frequently as possible, while the opposite is true of the most inferior men and women, and, second, that if our herd is to be of the highest possible quality, the former's offspring must be reared but not the latter's. And this must all be brought about without being noticed by anyone except the rulers, so that our herd of guardians remains as free from dissension as possible.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ Therefore certain festivals and sacrifices will be established by law at which we'll bring the brides and grooms together, and we'll direct our poets to compose appropriate hymns for the marriages that take place. We'll leave the number of marriages for the rulers to decide, but their aim will be to keep the number of males as stable as they can, taking into account war, disease, and similar factors, so that the city will, as far as possible, become neither too big nor too small.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then there'll have to be some sophisticated lotteries introduced, so that at each marriage the inferior people we mentioned will blame luck rather than the rulers when they aren't chosen.

Glaucon/ There will.

Socrates/ And among other prizes and rewards the young men who are good in war or other things must be given permission to have sex with the women more often, since this will also be a good pretext for having them father as many of the children as possible.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And then, as the children are born, they'll be taken over by the officials appointed for the purpose, who

may be either men or women or both, since our offices are open to both sexes.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ I think they'll take the children of good parents to the nurses in charge of the rearing pen situated in a separate part of the city, but the children of inferior parents, or any child of the others that is born defective, they'll hide in a secret and unknown place, as is appropriate.

Glaucon/ It is, if indeed the guardian breed is to remain pure.

Socrates/ And won't the nurses also see to it that the mothers are brought to the rearing pen when their breasts have milk, taking every precaution to insure that no mother knows her own child and providing wet nurses if the mother's milk is insufficient? And won't they take care that the mothers suckle the children for only a reasonable amount of time and that the care of sleepless children and all other such troublesome duties are taken over by the wet nurses and other attendants?

Glaucon/ You're making it very easy for the wives of the guardians to have children.

Socrates/ And that's only proper. So let's take up the next thing we proposed. We said that the children's parents should be in their prime.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ Do you share the view that a woman's prime lasts about twenty years and a man's about thirty?

Glaucon/ Which years are those?

Socrates/ A woman is to bear children for the city from the age of twenty to the age of forty, a man from the time that he passes his peak as a runner until he reaches fifty-five.

Glaucon/ At any rate, that's the physical and mental prime for both.

Socrates/ Then, if a man who is younger or older than that engages in reproduction for the community, we'll say that his offense is neither pious nor just, for the child he begets for the city, if it remains hidden, will be born in darkness, through a dangerous weakness of will, and without the benefit of the sacrifices and prayers offered at every marriage festival, in which the priests and priestesses, together with the entire city, ask that the children of good and beneficial parents may always prove themselves still better and more beneficial.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ The same law will apply if a man still of begetting years has a child with a woman of child-bearing age without the sanction of the rulers. We'll say that he brings to the city an illegitimate, unauthorized, and unhallowed child.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ However, I think that when women and men have passed the age of having children, we'll leave them free to have sex with whomever they wish, with these exceptions: For a man—his daughter, his mother, his daughter's children, and his mother's ancestors; for a woman—her son and his descendants, her father and his ancestors. Having received these instructions, they should be very careful not to let a single fetus see the light of day, but if one is conceived and forces its way to the light, they must deal with it in the knowledge that no nurture is available for it.

Glaucon/ That's certainly sensible. But how will they recognize their fathers and daughters and the others you mentioned?

Socrates/ They have no way of knowing. But a man will call all the children born in the tenth or seventh month after he became a bridegroom his sons, if they're male, and his daughters, if they're female, and they'll call him father. He'll call their children his grandchildren, and they'll call the group to which he belongs grandfathers and grandmothers. And those who were born at the same time as their mothers and fathers were having children they'll call their brothers and sisters. Thus, as we were saying, the relevant groups will avoid sexual relations with each other. But the law will allow brothers and sisters to have sex with one another if the lottery works out that way and the Pythia approves.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ This, then, Glaucon, is how the guardians of your city have their wives and children in common. We must now confirm that this arrangement is both consistent with the rest of the constitution and by far the best. Or how else are we to proceed?

Glaucon/ In just that way.

Socrates/ Then isn't the first step towards agreement to ask ourselves what we say is the greatest good in designing the city—the good at which the legislator aims in making the laws—and what is the greatest evil? And isn't the next step to examine whether the system we've just described fits into the tracks of the good and not into those of the bad?

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Is there any greater evil we can mention for a city than that which tears it apart and makes it many instead of one? Or any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?

Glaucon/ There isn't.

Socrates/ And when, as far as possible, all the citizens rejoice and are pained by the same successes and failures,

doesn't this sharing of pleasures and pains bind the city together?

Glaucon/ It most certainly does.

Socrates/ But when some suffer greatly, while others rejoice greatly, at the same things happening to the city or its people, doesn't this privatization of pleasures and pains dissolve the city?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And isn't that what happens whenever such words as "mine" and "not mine" aren't used in unison? And similarly with "someone else's"?

Glaucon/ Precisely.

Socrates/ Then, is the best-governed city the one in which most people say "mine" and "not mine" about the same things in the same way?

Glaucon/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ What about the city that is most like a single person? For example, when one of us hurts his finger, the entire organism that binds body and soul together into a single system under the ruling part within it is aware of this, and the whole feels the pain together with the part that suffers. That's why we say that the man has a pain in his finger. And the same can be said about any part of a man, with regard either to the pain it suffers or to the pleasure it experiences when it finds relief.

Glaucon/ Certainly. And, as for your question, the city with the best government is most like such a person.

Socrates/ Then, whenever anything good or bad happens to a single one of its citizens, such a city above all others will say that the affected part is its own and will share in the pleasure or pain as a whole.

Glaucon/ If it has good laws, that must be so.

Socrates/ It's time now to return to our own city, to look there for the features we've agreed on, and to determine whether it or some other city possesses them to the greatest degree.

Glaucon/ Then that's what we must do.

Socrates/ What about those other cities? Aren't there rulers and people in them, as well as in ours?

Glaucon/ There are.

Socrates/ Besides fellow citizens, what do the people call the rulers in those other cities?

Glaucon/ In many they call them despots, but in democracies they are called just this—rulers.

Socrates/ What about the people in our city? Besides fellow citizens, what do they call their rulers?

Glaucon/ Preservers and auxiliaries.

Socrates/ And what do they in turn call the people?

Glaucon/ Providers of upkeep and wages.

Socrates/ What do the rulers call the people in other cities?

Glaucon/ Slaves.

Socrates/ And what do the rulers call each other?

Glaucon/ Co-rulers.

Socrates/ And ours?

Glaucon/ Co-guardians.

Socrates/ Can you tell me whether a ruler in those other cities could address some of his co-rulers as his kinsmen and others as outsiders?

Glaucon/ Yes, many could.

Socrates/ And doesn't he consider his kinsman to be his own, and doesn't he address him as such, while he considers the outsider not to be his own?

Glaucon/ He does.

Socrates/ What about your guardians? Could any of them consider a co-guardian as an outsider or address him as such?

Glaucon/ There's no way he could, for when he meets anyone of them, he'll hold that he's meeting a brother or sister, a father or mother, a son or daughter, or some ancestor or descendant of theirs.

Socrates/ You put that very well. But tell me this: Will your laws require them simply to use these kinship names or also to do all the things that go along with the names? Must they show to their "fathers" the respect, solicitude, and obedience we show to our parents by law? Won't they fare worse at the hands of gods and humans, as people whose actions are neither pious nor just, if they do otherwise? Will these be the oracular sayings they hear from all the citizens from their childhood on, or will they hear something else about their fathers—or the ones they're told are their fathers—and other relatives?

Glaucon/ The former. It would be absurd if they only mouthed kinship names without doing the things that go along with them.

Socrates/ Therefore, in our city more than in any other, they'll speak in unison the words we mentioned a moment ago. When anyone of them is doing well or badly, they'll say that "mine" is doing well or that "mine" is doing badly.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ Now, didn't we say that the having and expressing of this conviction is closely followed by the having of pleasures and pains in common?

Glaucon/ Yes, and we were right.

Socrates/ Then won't our citizens, more than any others, have the same thing in common, the one they call "mine"?

And, having that in common, won't they, more than any others, have common pleasures and pains?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And, in addition to the other institutions, the cause of this is the having of wives and children in common by the guardians?

Glaucon/ That more than anything else is the cause.

Socrates/ But we agreed that the having of pains and pleasures in common is the greatest good for a city, and we characterized a well-governed city in terms of the body's reaction to pain or pleasure in anyone of its parts.

Glaucon/ And we were right to agree.

Socrates/ Then, the cause of the greatest good for our city has been shown to be the having of wives and children in common by the auxiliaries.

Glaucon/ It has.

Socrates/ And, of course, this is consistent with what we said before, for we said somewhere that, if they're going to be guardians, they mustn't have private houses, property, or possessions, but must receive their upkeep from the other citizens as a wage for their guardianship and enjoy it in common.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then isn't it true, just as I claimed, that what we are saying now, taken together with what we said before, makes even better guardians out of them and prevents them from tearing the city apart by not calling the same thing "mine"? If different people apply the term to different things, one would drag into his own house whatever he could separate from the others, and another would drag things into a different house to a different wife and children, and this would make for private pleasures and pains at private

things. But our people, on the other hand, will think of the same things as their own, aim at the same goal, and, as far as possible, feel pleasure and pain in unison.

Glaucon/ Precisely.

Socrates/ And what about lawsuits and mutual accusations? Won't they pretty well disappear from among them, because they have everything in common except their own bodies? Hence they'll be spared all the dissension that arises between people because of the possession of money, children, and families.

Glaucon/ They'll necessarily be spared it.

Socrates/ Nor could any lawsuits for insult or injury justly occur among them, for we'll declare that it's a fine and just thing for people to defend themselves against others of the same age, since this will compel them to stay in good physical shape.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ This law is also correct for another reason: If a spirited person vents his anger in this way, it will be less likely to lead him into more serious disputes.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But an older person will be authorized to rule and punish all the younger ones.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And surely it's also obvious that a younger person won't strike or do any sort of violence to an older one or fail to show him respect in other ways, unless the rulers command it, for there are two guardians sufficient to prevent him from doing such things—shame and fear. Shame will prevent him from laying a hand on his parents, and so will the fear that the others would come to the aid of the victim,

some as his sons, some as his brothers, and some as his fathers.

Glaucon/ That's the effect they'll have.

Socrates/ Then, in all cases, won't the laws induce men to live at peace with one another?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And if there's no discord among the guardians, there's no danger that the rest of the city will break into civil war, either with them or among themselves.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ I hesitate to mention, since they're so unseemly, the pettiest of the evils the guardians would therefore escape: The poor man's flattery of the rich, the perplexities and sufferings involved in bringing up children and in making the money necessary to feed the household, getting into debt, paying it off, and in some way or other providing enough money to hand over to their wives and household slaves to manage. All of the various troubles men endure in these matters are obvious, ignoble, and not worth discussing.

Glaucon/ They're obvious even to the blind.

Socrates/ They'll be free of all these, and they'll live a life more blessedly happy than that of the victors in the Olympian games.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ The Olympian victors are considered happy on account of only a small part of what is available to our guardians, for the guardians' victory is even greater, and their upkeep from public funds more complete. The victory they gain is the preservation of the whole city, and the crown of victory that they and their children receive is their upkeep and all the necessities of life. They receive rewards from their

own city while they live, and at their death they're given a worthy burial.

Glaucon/ Those are very good things.

Socrates/ Do you remember that, earlier in our discussion, someone—I forget who—shocked us by saying that we hadn't made our guardians happy, that it was possible for them to have everything that belongs to the citizens, yet they had nothing? We said, I think, that if this happened to come up at some point, we'd look into it then, but that our concern at the time was to make our guardians true guardians and the city the happiest we could, rather than looking to anyone group within it and molding it for happiness.

Glaucon/ I remember.

Socrates/ Well, then, if the life of our auxiliaries is apparently much finer and better than that of Olympian victors, is there any need to compare it to the lives of cobblers, farmers, or other craftsmen?

Glaucon/ Not in my opinion.

Socrates/ Then it's surely right to repeat here what I said then: If a guardian seeks happiness in such a way that he's no longer a guardian and isn't satisfied with a life that's moderate, stable, and—as we say—best, but a silly, adolescent idea of happiness seizes him and incites him to use his power to take everything in the city for himself, he'll come to know the true wisdom of Hesiod's saying that somehow "the half is worth more than the whole."

Glaucon/ If he takes my advice, he'll keep to his own life-style.

Socrates/ You agree, then, that the women and men should associate with one another in education, in things having to do with children, and in guarding the other citizens in the way we've described; that both when they remain in

the city and when they go to war, they must guard together and hunt together like dogs and share in everything as far as possible; and that by doing so they'll be doing what's best and not something contrary either to woman's nature as compared with man's or to the natural association of men and women with one another.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then doesn't it remain for us to determine whether it's possible to bring about this association among human beings, as it is among animals, and to say just how it might be done?

Glaucon/ You took the words right out of my mouth.

Socrates/ As far as war is concerned, I think it's clear how they will wage it.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Men and women will campaign together. They'll take the sturdy children with them, so that, like the children of other craftsmen, they can see what they'll have to do when they grow up. But in addition to observing, they can serve and assist in everything to do with the war and help their mothers and fathers. Haven't you noticed in the other crafts how the children of potters, for example, assist and observe for a long time before actually making any pots?

Glaucon/ I have indeed.

Socrates/ And should these craftsmen take more care in training their children by appropriate experience and observation than the guardians?

Glaucon/ Of course not; that would be completely ridiculous.

Socrates/ Besides, every animal fights better in the presence of its young.

Glaucon/ That's so. But, Socrates, there's a considerable danger that in a defeat—and such things are likely to happen in a war—they'll lose their children's lives as well as their own, making it impossible for the rest of the city to recover.

Socrates/ What you say is true. But do you think that the first thing we should provide for is the avoidance of all danger?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Well, then, if people will probably have to face some danger, shouldn't it be the sort that will make them better if they come through it successfully?

Glaucon/ Obviously.

Socrates/ And do you think that whether or not men who are going to be warriors observe warfare when they're still boys makes such a small difference that it isn't worth the danger of having them do it?

Glaucon/ No, it does make a difference to what you're talking about.

Socrates/ On the assumption, then, that the children are to be observers of war, if we can contrive some way to keep them secure, everything will be fine, won't it?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, then, in the first place, their fathers won't be ignorant, will they, about which campaigns are dangerous and which are not, but rather as knowledgeable about this as any human beings can be?

Glaucon/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Then they'll take the children to some campaigns and not to others?

Glaucon/ Correct.

Socrates/ And they'll put officers in charge of them whose age and experience qualifies them to be leaders and tutors?

Glaucon/ Appropriately so.

Socrates/ But, as we say, the unexpected often occurs.

Glaucon/ Indeed.

Socrates/ With this in mind, we must provide the children with wings when they're small, so that they can fly away and escape.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ We must mount them on horses as early as possible—not on spirited or aggressive horses, but on very fast and manageable ones—and when they've learned to ride, they must be taken to observe a war. In this way, they'll get the best look at their own work and, if the need arises, make the securest possible escape to safety, following their older guides.

Glaucon/ I think you're right.

Socrates/ What about warfare itself? What attitude should your soldiers have to each other and to the enemy? Are my views about this right or not?

Glaucon/ First, tell me what they are.

Socrates/ If one of them leaves his post or throws away his shield or does anything else of that sort through cowardice, shouldn't he be reduced to being a craftsman or farmer?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And shouldn't anyone who is captured alive be left to his captors as a gift to do with as they wish?

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ But don't you think that anyone who distinguishes himself and earns high esteem should, while still on the campaign, first be crowned with wreaths by each

of the adolescents and children who accompany the expedition?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And what about shaken by the right hand?

Glaucon/ That too.

Socrates/ But I suppose that you wouldn't go this far?

Glaucon/ Namely?

Socrates/ That he should kiss and be kissed by each of them.

Glaucon/ That most of all. And I'd add this to the law: As long as the campaign lasts, no one he wants to kiss shall be allowed to refuse, for then, if one of them happens to be in love with another, whether male or female, he'll be all the more eager to win the rewards of valor.

Socrates/ Excellent. And we've already stated that, since he's a good person, more marriages will be available to him, and he'll be selected for such things more frequently than the others, so that he'll beget as many children as possible.

Glaucon/ Yes, we did say that.

Socrates/ Indeed, according to Homer too, it is just to honor in such ways those young people who are good, for he says that Ajax, when he distinguished himself in battle, "was rewarded with the long cut off the backbone." And that's an appropriate honor for a courageous young man, since it will both honor him and increase his strength.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ Then we'll follow Homer in these matters at least. And insofar as good people have shown themselves to be good, we'll honor them at sacrifices and all such occasions with hymns, "seats of honor, meats, and well-filled cups of wine," and in all the other ways we mentioned, so

that, in addition to honoring good men and women, we'll continue to train them.

Glaucon/ That's excellent.

Socrates/ All right. And as for those who died on the campaign, won't we say, first of all, that, if their deaths were distinguished, they belong to the golden race?

Glaucon/ That above all.

Socrates/ And won't we believe with Hesiod that, whenever any of that race die, they become;

> Sacred daemons living upon the earth,
> Noble spirits, protectors against evil, guardians of articulate mortals?

Glaucon/ We'll certainly believe that.

Socrates/ Then we'll inquire from the god what kind of distinguished funeral we should give to daemonic and godlike people, and we'll follow his instructions.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And for the remainder of time, we'll care for their graves and worship at them as we would at those of daemons. And we'll follow the same rites for anyone whom we judge to have lived an outstandingly good life, whether he died of old age or in some other way.

Glaucon/ That is only just.

Socrates/ Now, what about enemies? How will our soldiers deal with them?

Glaucon/ In what respect?

Socrates/ First, enslavement. Do you think it is just for Greeks to enslave Greek cities, or, as far as they can, should they not even allow other cities to do so, and make a habit of sparing the Greek race, as a precaution against being enslaved by the barbarians?

Glaucon/ It's altogether and in every way best to spare the Greek race.

Socrates/ Then isn't it also best for the guardians not to acquire a Greek slave and to advise the other Greeks not to do so either?

Glaucon/ Absolutely. In that way they' be more likely to turn against the barbarians and keep their hands off one another.

Socrates/ What about despoiling the dead? Is it a good thing to strip the dead of anything besides their armor after a victory? Or don't cowards make this an excuse for not facing the enemy—as if they were doing something of vital importance in bending over a corpse? And haven't many armies been lost because of such plundering?

Glaucon/ Indeed, they have.

Socrates/ Don't you think it's slavish and money-loving to strip a corpse? Isn't it small-minded and womanish to regard the body as your enemy, when the enemy himself has flitted away, leaving behind only the instrument with which he fought? Or do you think such behavior any different from that of dogs who get angry with the stone that hits them and leave the thrower alone?

Glaucon/ It's no different at all.

Socrates/ Then may our soldiers strip corpses or refuse the enemy permission to pick up their dead?

Glaucon/ No, by god, they certainly may not.

Socrates/ Moreover, we won't take enemy arms to the temples as offerings, and if we care about the goodwill of other Greeks, we especially won't do this with their arms. Rather we'd be afraid of polluting the temples if we brought them such things from our own people, unless, of course, the god tells us otherwise.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ What about ravaging the land of the Greeks and burning their houses? Will your soldiers do things of this sort to their enemies?

Glaucon/ I'd like to hear your opinion about that.

Socrates/ Well, I think they should do neither of these things but destroy the year's harvest only. Do you want me to tell you why?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ It seems to me that as we have two names, "war" and "civil war," so there are two things and the names apply to two kinds of disagreements arising in them. The two things I'm referring to are what is one's own and akin, on the one hand, and what's foreign and strange, on the other. The name "civil war" applies to hostilities with one's own, while "war" applies to hostilities with strangers.

Glaucon/ That's certainly to the point.

Socrates/ Then see whether this is also to the point: I say that the Greek race is its own and akin, but is strange and foreign to barbarians.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then when Greeks do battle with barbarians or barbarians with Greeks, we'll say that they're natural enemies and that such hostilities are to be called war. But when Greeks fight with Greeks, we'll say that they are natural friends and that in such circumstances Greece is sick and divided into factions and that such hostilities are to be called civil war.

Glaucon/ I, at any rate, agree to think of it that way.

Socrates/ Now, notice that, wherever something of the sort that's currently called civil war occurs and a city is divided, if either party ravages the land of the others and

burns their houses, it's thought that this is abominable and that neither party loves their city, since otherwise they' never have ravaged their very nurse and mother. However, it is thought appropriate for the victors to carry off the harvest of the vanquished. Nonetheless, their attitude of mind should be that of people who'll one day be reconciled and who won't always be at war.

Glaucon/ This way of thinking is far more civilized than the other.

Socrates/ What about the city you're founding? It is Greek, isn't it?

Glaucon/ It has to be.

Socrates/ Then, won't your citizens be good and civilized?

Glaucon/ Indeed they will.

Socrates/ Then, won't they love Greece? Won't they consider Greece as their own and share the religion of the other Greeks?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Then won't they consider their differences with Greeks—people who are their own—not as war but as civil war?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And won't they quarrel like people who know that one day they'll be reconciled?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then they'll moderate their foes in a friendly spirit, not punish them with enslavement and destruction, for they're moderators, not enemies.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And being Greeks, they won't ravage Greece or burn her houses, nor will they agree that in any of her cities all the inhabitants—men, women, and children—are their

enemies, but that whatever differences arise are caused by the few enemies that any city inevitably contains. Because of this, because the majority are friendly, they won't ravage the country or destroy the houses, and they'll continue their quarrel only to the point at which those who caused it are forced to pay the penalty by those who were its innocent victims.

Glaucon/ I agree that this is the way our citizens must treat their enemies, and they must treat barbarians the way Greeks currently treat each other.

Socrates/ Then shall we also impose this law on the guardians: Neither ravage the country nor burn the houses?

Glaucon/ Consider it imposed. And let's also assume that this law and its predecessors are all fine. But I think, Socrates, that if we let you go on speaking about this subject, you'll never remember the one you set aside in order to say all this, namely, whether it's possible for this constitution to come into being and in what way it could be brought about. I agree that, if it existed, all the things we've mentioned would be good for the city in which they occurred. And I'll add some that you've left out. The guardians would be excellent fighters against an enemy because they' be least likely to desert each other, since they know each other as brothers, fathers, and sons, and call each other by those names. Moreover, if their women joined their campaigns, either in the same ranks or positioned in the rear to frighten the enemy and in case their help should ever be needed, I know that this would make them quite unbeatable. And I also see all the good things that they' have at home that you've omitted. Take it that I agree that all these things would happen, as well as innumerable others, if this kind of constitution came into being, and say no more on that subject. But rather let's now try to convince ourselves that it is possible and how it is possible, and let the rest go.

Socrates/ This is a sudden attack that you've made on my argument, and you show no sympathy for my delay. Perhaps you don't realize that, just as I've barely escaped from the first two waves of objections, you're bringing the third—the biggest and most difficult one—down upon me. When you see and hear it, you'll surely be completely sympathetic, and recognize that it was, after all, appropriate for me to hesitate and be afraid to state and look into so paradoxical a view.

Glaucon/ The more you speak like that, the less we'll let you off from telling us how it's possible for this constitution to come into being. So speak instead of wasting time.

Socrates/ Well, then, we must first remember that we got to this point while trying to discover what justice and injustice are like.

Glaucon/ We must. But what of it?

Socrates/ Nothing. But if we discover what justice is like, will we also maintain that the just man is in no way different from the just itself, so that he is like justice in every respect? Or will we be satisfied if he comes as close to it as possible and participates in it far more than anyone else?

Glaucon/ We'll be satisfied with that.

Socrates/ Then it was in order to have a model that we were trying to discover what justice itself is like and what the completely just man would be like, if he came into being, and what kind of man he'd be if he did, and likewise with regard to injustice and the most unjust man. We thought that, by looking at how their relationship to happiness and its opposite seemed to us, we'd also be compelled to agree about ourselves as well, that the one who was most like them would have a portion of happiness most like theirs. But we weren't trying to discover these things in order to prove that it's possible for them to come into being.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ Do you think that someone is a worse painter if, having painted a model of what the finest and most beautiful human being would be like and having rendered every detail of his picture adequately, he could not prove that such a man could come into being?

Glaucon/ No, by god, I don't.

Socrates/ Then what about our own case? Didn't we say that we were making a theoretical model of a good city?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So do you think that our discussion will be any less reasonable if we can't prove that it's possible to found a city that's the same as the one in our theory?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Then that's the truth of the matter. But if, in order to please you, I must also be willing to show how and under what conditions it would most be possible to found such a city, then you should agree to make the same concessions to me, in turn, for the purposes of this demonstration.

Glaucon/ Which ones?

Socrates/ Is it possible to do anything in practice the same as in theory? Or is it in the nature of practice to grasp truth less well than theory does, even if some people don't think so? Will you first agree to this or not?

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Then don't compel me to show that what we've described in theory can come into being exactly as we've described it. Rather, if we're able to discover how a city could come to be governed in a way that most closely approximates our description, let's say that we've shown what you ordered us to show, namely, that it's possible for our city to come to

be. Or wouldn't you be satisfied with that? I would be satisfied with it.

Glaucon/ So would I.

Socrates/ Then next, it seems, we should try to discover and point out what's now badly done in cities that keeps them from being governed in that way and what's the smallest change that would enable our city to reach our sort of constitution—one change, if possible, or if not one, two, and if not two, then the fewest in number and the least extensive.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ There is one change we could point to that, in my opinion, would accomplish this. It's certainly neither small nor easy, but it is possible.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ Well, I've now come to what we likened to the greatest wave. But I shall say what I have to say, even if the wave is a wave of laughter that will simply drown me in ridicule and contempt. So listen to what I'm going to say.

Glaucon/ Say on.

Socrates/ Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evils, Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race. And, until this happens, the constitution we've been describing in theory will never be born to the fullest extent possible or see the light of the sun. It's because I saw how very paradoxical this statement would be that I hesitated to make it for so long, for it's hard to face up to the fact that there can be no happiness, either public or private, in any other city.

Glaucon/ Socrates, after hurling a speech and statement like that at us, you must expect that a great many people (and not undistinguished ones either) will cast off their cloaks and, stripped for action, snatch any available weapon, and make a determined rush at you, ready to do terrible things. So, unless you can hold them off by argument and escape, you really will pay the penalty of general derision.

Socrates/ Well, you are the one that brought this on me.

Glaucon/ And I was right to do it. However, I won't betray you, but rather defend you in any way I can—by goodwill, by urging you on, and perhaps by being able to give you more appropriate answers than someone else. So, with the promise of this assistance, try to show the unbelievers that things are as you say they are.

Socrates/ I must try it, then, especially since you agree to be so great an ally. If we're to escape from the people you mention, I think we need to define for them who the philosophers are that we dare to say must rule. And once that's clear, we should be able to defend ourselves by showing that the people we mean are fitted by nature both to engage in philosophy and to rule in a city, while the rest are naturally fitted to leave philosophy alone and follow their leader.

Glaucon/ This would be a good time to give that definition.

Socrates/ Come, then, follow me, and we'll see whether or not there's some way to set it out adequately.

Glaucon/ Lead on.

Socrates/ Do you need to be reminded or do you remember that, if it's rightly said that someone loves something, then he mustn't love one part of it and not another, but he must love all of it?

Glaucon/ I think you'll have to remind me, for I don't understand it at all.

Socrates/ That would be an appropriate response, Glaucon, for somebody else to make. But it isn't appropriate for an erotically inclined man to forget that all boys in the bloom of youth pique the interest of a lover of boys and arouse him and that all seem worthy of his care and pleasure. Or isn't that the way you people behave to fine and beautiful boys? You praise a snub-nosed one as cute, a hook-nosed one you say is regal, one in between is well proportioned, dark ones look manly, and pale ones are children of the gods. And as for a honey-colored boy, do you think that this very term is anything but the euphemistic coinage of a lover who found it easy to tolerate sallowness, provided it was accompanied by the bloom of youth? In a word, you find all kinds of terms and excuses so as not to reject anyone whose flower is in bloom.

Glaucon/ If you insist on taking me as your example of what erotically inclined men do, then, for the sake of the argument, I agree.

Socrates/ Further, don't you see wine-lovers behave in the same way? Don't they love every kind of wine and find any excuse to enjoy it?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And I think you see honor-lovers, if they can't be generals, be captains, and, if they can't be honored by people of importance and dignity, they put up with being honored by insignificant and inferior ones, for they desire the whole of honor.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then do you agree to this or not? When we say that someone desires something, do we mean that he desires

everything of that kind or that he desires one part of it but not another?

Glaucon/ We mean he desires everything.

Socrates/ Then won't we also say that the philosopher doesn't desire one part of wisdom rather than another, but desires the whole thing?

Glaucon/ Yes, that's true.

Socrates/ And as for the one who's choosy about what he learns, especially if he's young and can't yet give an account of what is useful and what isn't, we won't say that he is a lover of learning or a philosopher, for we wouldn't say that someone who's choosy about his food is hungry or has an appetite for food or is a lover of food—instead, we'd say that he is a bad eater.

Glaucon/ And we'd be right to say it.

Socrates/ But the one who readily and willingly tries all kinds of learning, who turns gladly to learning and is insatiable for it, is rightly called a philosopher, isn't he?

Glaucon/ Then many strange people will be philosophers, for the lovers of sights seem to be included, since they take pleasure in learning things. And the lovers of sounds are very strange people to include as philosophers, for they would never willingly attend a serious discussion or spend their time that way, yet they run around to all the Dionysiac festivals, omitting none, whether in cities or villages, as if their ears were under contract to listen to every chorus. Are we to say that these people—and those who learn similar things or petty crafts—are philosophers?

Socrates/ No, but they are like philosophers.

Glaucon/ And who are the true philosophers?

Socrates/ Those who love the sight of truth.

Glaucon/ That's right, but what exactly do you mean by it?

Socrates/ It would not be easy to explain to someone else, but I think that you will agree to this.

Glaucon/ To what?

Socrates/ Since the beautiful is the opposite of the ugly, they are two.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And since they are two, each is one?

Glaucon/ I grant that also.

Socrates/ And the same account is true of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and all the forms. Each of them is itself one, but because they manifest themselves everywhere in association with actions, bodies, and one another, each of them appears to be many.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ So, I draw this distinction: On one side are those you just now called lovers of sights, lovers of crafts, and practical people; on the other side are those we are arguing about and whom one would alone call philosophers.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ The lovers of sights and sounds like beautiful sounds, colors, shapes, and everything fashioned out of them, but their thought is unable to see and embrace the nature of the beautiful itself.

Glaucon/ That's for sure.

Socrates/ In fact, there are very few people who would be able to reach the beautiful itself and see it by itself. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

What about someone who believes in beautiful things, but doesn't believe in the beautiful itself and isn't able to follow

anyone who could lead him to the knowledge of it? Don't you think he is living in a dream rather than a wakened state? Isn't this dreaming: whether asleep or awake, to think that a likeness is not a likeness but rather the thing itself that it is like?

Glaucon/ I certainly think that someone who does that is dreaming.

Socrates/ But someone who, to take the opposite case, believes in the beautiful itself, can see both it and the things that participate in it and doesn't believe that the participants are it or that it itself is the participants—is he living in a dream or is he awake?

Glaucon/ He's very much awake.

Socrates/ So we'd be right to call his thought knowledge, since he knows, but we should call the other person's thought opinion, since he opines?

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ What if the person who has opinion but not knowledge is angry with us and disputes the truth of what we are saying? Is there some way to console him and persuade him gently, while hiding from him that he isn't in his right mind?

Glaucon/ There must be.

Socrates/ Consider, then, what we'll say to him. Won't we question him like this? First, we'll tell him that nobody begrudges him any knowledge he may have and that we'd be delighted to discover that he knows something. Then we'll say: "Tell us, does the person who knows know something or nothing?" You answer for him.

Glaucon/ He knows something.

Socrates/ Something that is or something that is not?

Glaucon/ Something that is, for how could something that is not be known?

Socrates/ Then we have an adequate grasp of this: No matter how many ways we examine it, what is completely is completely knowable and what is in no way is in every way unknowable?

Glaucon/ A most adequate one.

Socrates/ Good. Now, if anything is such as to be and also not to be, won't it be intermediate between what purely is and what in no way is?

Glaucon/ Yes, it's intermediate.

Socrates/ Then, as knowledge is set over what is, while ignorance is of necessity set over what is not, mustn't we find an intermediate between knowledge and ignorance to be set over what is intermediate between what is and what is not, if there is such a thing?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do we say that opinion is something?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ A different power from knowledge or the same?

Glaucon/ A different one.

Socrates/ Opinion, then, is set over one thing, and knowledge over another, according to the power of each.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ Now, isn't knowledge by its nature set over what is, to know it as it is? But first maybe we'd better be a bit more explicit.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Powers are a class of the things that are that enable us—or anything else for that matter—to do whatever we are capable of doing. Sight, for example, and hearing are

among the powers, if you understand the kind of thing I'm referring to.

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Here's what I think about them. A power has neither color nor shape nor any feature of the sort that many other things have and that I use to distinguish those things from one another. In the case of a power, I use only what it is set over and what it does, and by reference to these I call each the power it is: What is set over the same things and does the same I call the same power; what is set over something different and does something different I call a different one. Do you agree?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then let's back up. Is knowledge a power, or what class would you put it in?

Glaucon/ It's a power, the strongest of them all.

Socrates/ And what about opinion, is it a power or some other kind of thing?

Glaucon/ It's a power as well, for it is what enables us to opine.

Socrates/ A moment ago you agreed that knowledge and opinion aren't the same.

Glaucon/ How could a person with any understanding think that a fallible power is the same as an infallible one?

Socrates/ Right. Then we agree that opinion is clearly different from knowledge.

Glaucon/ It is different.

Socrates/ Hence each of them is by nature set over something different and does something different?

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Knowledge is set over what is, to know it as it is?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And opinion opines?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does it opine the very thing that knowledge knows, so that the knowable and the opinable are the same, or is this impossible?

Glaucon/ It's impossible, given what we agreed, for if a different power is set over something different, and opinion and knowledge are different powers, then the knowable and the opinable cannot be the same.

Socrates/ Then, if what is, is knowable, the opinable must be something other than what is?

Glaucon/ It must.

Socrates/ Do we, then, opine what is not? Or is it impossible to opine what is not? Think about this. Doesn't someone who opines set his opinion over something? Or is it possible to opine, yet to opine nothing?

Glaucon/ It's impossible.

Socrates/ But someone who opines, opines some one thing?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Surely the most accurate word for that which is not isn't "one thing" but "nothing"?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But we had to set ignorance over what is not and knowledge over what is?

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ So someone opines neither what is nor what is not?

Glaucon/ How could it be otherwise?

Socrates/ Then opinion is neither ignorance nor knowledge?

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Then does it go beyond either of these? Is it clearer than knowledge or darker than ignorance?

Glaucon/ No, neither.

Socrates/ Is opinion, then, darker than knowledge but clearer than ignorance?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Then it lies between them?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ So opinion is intermediate between those two?

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Now, we said that, if something could be shown, as it were, to be and not to be at the same time, it would be intermediate between what purely is and what in every way is not, and that neither knowledge nor ignorance would be set over it, but something intermediate between ignorance and knowledge?

Glaucon/ Correct.

Socrates/ And now the thing we call opinion has emerged as being intermediate between them?

Glaucon/ It has.

Socrates/ Apparently, then, it only remains for us to find what participates in both being and not being and cannot correctly be called purely one or the other, in order that, if there is such a thing, we can rightly call it the opinable, thereby setting the extremes over the extremes and the intermediate over the intermediate. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Now that these points have been established, I want to address a question to our friend who doesn't believe in the beautiful itself or any form of the beautiful itself that remains always the same in all respects but who does believe in the many beautiful things—the lover of sights who wouldn't allow anyone to say that the beautiful itself is one or that the just is one or any of the rest: "My dear fellow," we'll say, "of all the many beautiful things, is there one that will not also appear ugly? Or is there one of those just things that will not also appear unjust? Or one of those pious things that will not also appear impious?"

Glaucon/ There isn't one, for it is necessary that they appear to be beautiful in a way and also to be ugly in a way, and the same with the other things you asked about.

Socrates/ What about the many doubles? Do they appear any the less halves than doubles?

Glaucon/ Not one.

Socrates/ So, with the many bigs and smalls and lights and heavies, is anyone of them anymore the thing someone says it is than its opposite?

Glaucon/ No, each of them always participates in both opposites.

Socrates/ Is anyone of the manys what someone says it is, then, any more than it is not what he says it is?

Glaucon/ No, they are like the ambiguities one is entertained with at dinner parties or like the children's riddle about the eunuch who threw something at a bat—the one about what he threw at it and what it was in, for they are ambiguous, and one cannot understand them as fixedly being or fixedly not being or as both or as neither.

Socrates/ Then do you know how to deal with them? Or can you find a more appropriate place to put them than intermediate between being and not being? Surely, they

can't be more than what is or not be more than what is not, for apparently nothing is darker than what is not or clearer than what is.

Glaucon/ Very true.

Socrates/ We've now discovered, it seems, that according to the many conventions of the majority of people about beauty and the others, they are rolling around as intermediates between what is not and what purely is.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ And we agreed earlier that anything of that kind would have to be called the opinable, not the knowable—the wandering intermediate grasped by the intermediate power.

Glaucon/ We did.

Socrates/ As for those who study the many beautiful things but do not see the beautiful itself and are incapable of following another who leads them to it, who see many just things but not the just itself, and so with everything—these people, we shall say, opine everything but have no knowledge of anything they opine.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ What about the ones who in each case study the things themselves that are always the same in every respect? Won't we say that they know and don't opine?

Glaucon/ That's necessary too.

Socrates/ Shall we say, then, that these people love and embrace the things that knowledge is set over, as the others do the things that opinion is set over? Remember we said that the latter saw and loved beautiful sounds and colors and the like but wouldn't allow the beautiful itself to be anything?

Glaucon/ We remember, all right.

Socrates/ We won't be in error, then, if we call such people lovers of opinion rather than philosophers or lovers of wisdom and knowledge? Will they be angry with us if we call them that?

Glaucon/ Not if they take my advice, for it isn't right to be angry with those who speak the truth.

Socrates/ As for those who in each case embrace the thing itself, we must call them philosophers, not lovers of opinion?

Glaucon/ Most definitely.

Book 6

Socrates/ And so, Glaucon, after a somewhat lengthy and difficult discussion, both the philosophers and the non-philosophers have revealed who they are.

Glaucon/ It probably wouldn't have been easy, to have them do it in a shorter one.

Socrates/ Apparently not. But for my part, I think that the matter would have been better illuminated if we had only it to discuss and not all the other things that remain to be treated in order to discover the difference between the just life and the unjust one.

Glaucon/ What's our next topic?

Socrates/ What else but the one that's next in order? Since those who are able to grasp what is always the same in all respects are philosophers, while those who are not able to do so and who wander among the many things that vary in every sort of way are not philosophers, which of the two should be the leaders in a city?

Glaucon/ What would be a sensible answer to that?

Socrates/ We should establish as guardians those who are clearly capable of guarding the laws and the ways of life of the city.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And isn't it clear that the guardian who is to keep watch over everything should be keen-sighted rather than blind?

Glaucon/ Of course it's clear.

Socrates/ Do you think, then, that there's any difference between the blind and those who are really deprived of the knowledge of each thing that is? The latter have no clear model in their souls, and so they cannot—in the manner of painters—look to what is most true, make constant

reference to it, and study it as exactly as possible. Hence they cannot establish here on earth conventions about what is fine or just or good, when they need to be established, or guard and preserve them, once they have been established.

Glaucon/ No, by god, there isn't much difference between them.

Socrates/ Should we, then, make these blind people our guardians or rather those who know each thing that is and who are not inferior to the others, either in experience or in any other part of virtue?

Glaucon/ It would be absurd to choose anyone but philosophers, if indeed they're not inferior in these ways, for the respect in which they are superior is pretty well the most important one.

Socrates/ Then shouldn't we explain how it is possible for someone to have both these sorts of qualities?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then, as we said at the beginning of this discussion, it is necessary to understand the nature of philosophers first, for I think that, if we can reach adequate agreement about that, we'll also agree that the same people can have both qualities and that no one but they should be leaders in cities.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ Let's agree that philosophic natures always love the sort of learning that makes clear to them some feature of the being that always is and does not wander around between coming to be and decaying.

And further, let's agree that, like the honor-lovers and erotically inclined men we described before, they love all such learning and are not willing to give up any part of it, whether large or small, more valuable or less so.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Consider next whether the people we're describing must also have this in their nature.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ They must be without falsehood—they must refuse to accept what is false, hate it, and have a love for the truth.

Glaucon/ That's a reasonable addition, at any rate.

Socrates/ It's not only reasonable, it's entirely necessary, for it's necessary for a man who is erotically inclined by nature to love everything akin to or belonging to the boy he loves.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And could you find anything that belongs more to wisdom than truth does?

Glaucon/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Then is it possible for the same nature to be a philosopher—a lover of wisdom—and a lover of falsehood?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Then someone who loves learning must above all strive for every kind of truth from childhood on.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Now, we surely know that, when someone's desires incline strongly for one thing, they are thereby weakened for others, just like a stream that has been partly diverted into another channel.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then, when someone's desires flow towards learning and everything of that sort, he'd be concerned, I suppose, with the pleasures of the soul itself by itself, and he'd abandon those pleasures that come through the body—

if indeed he is a true philosopher and not merely a counterfeit one.

Glaucon/ That's completely necessary.

Socrates/ Then surely such a person is moderate and not at all a money-lover. It's appropriate for others to take seriously the things for which money and large expenditures are needed, but not for him.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And of course there's also this to consider when you are judging whether a nature is philosophic or not.

Glaucon/ What's that?

Socrates/ If it is at all slavish, you should not overlook that fact, for pettiness is altogether incompatible with a soul that is always reaching out to grasp everything both divine and human as a whole.

Glaucon/ That's completely true.

Socrates/ And will a thinker high-minded enough to study all time and all being consider human life to be something important?

Glaucon/ He couldn't possibly.

Socrates/ Then will he consider death to be a terrible thing?

Glaucon/ He least of all.

Socrates/ Then it seems a cowardly and slavish nature will take no part in true philosophy.

Glaucon/ Not in my opinion.

Socrates/ And is there any way that an orderly person, who isn't money-loving, slavish, a boaster, or a coward, could become unreliable or unjust?

Glaucon/ There isn't.

Socrates/ Moreover, when you are looking to see whether a soul is philosophic or not, you'll look to see whether it is just and gentle, from youth on, or savage and hard to associate with.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And here's something I think you won't leave out.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ Whether he's a slow learner or a fast one. Or do you ever expect anyone to love something when it pains him to do it and when much effort brings only small return?

Glaucon/ No, it couldn't happen.

Socrates/ And what if he could retain nothing of what he learned, because he was full of forgetfulness? Could he fail to be empty of knowledge?

Glaucon/ How could he?

Socrates/ Then don't you think that, if he's laboring in vain, he'd inevitably come to hate both himself and that activity in the end?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then let's never include a forgetful soul among those who are sufficiently philosophical for our purposes, but look for one with a good memory.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Now, we'd certainly say that the unmusical and graceless element in a person's nature draws him to lack of due measure.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And do you think that truth is akin to what lacks due measure or to what is measured?

Glaucon/ To what is measured.

Socrates/ Then, in addition to those other things, let's look for someone whose thought is by nature measured and graceful and is easily led to the form of each thing that is.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, then, don't you think the properties we've enumerated are compatible with one another and that each is necessary to a soul that is to have an adequate and complete grasp of that which is?

Glaucon/ They're all completely necessary.

Socrates/ Is there any objection you can find, then, to a way of life that no one can adequately follow unless he's by nature good at remembering, quick to learn, high-minded, graceful, and a friend and relative of truth, justice, courage, and moderation?

Glaucon/ Not even Momus could find one.

Socrates/ When such people have reached maturity in age and education, wouldn't you entrust the city to them and to them alone?

And Adeimantus replied:

Adeimantus/ No one would be able to contradict the things you've said, Socrates, but on each occasion that you say them, your hearers are affected in some such way as this. They think that, because they're inexperienced in asking and answering questions, they're led astray a little bit by the argument at every question and that, when these little bits are added together at the end of the discussion, great is their fall, as the opposite of what they said at the outset comes to light. Just as inexperienced checkers players are trapped by the experts in the end and can't make a move, so they too are trapped in the end and have nothing to say in this different kind of checkers, which is played not with disks but with words. Yet the truth isn't affected by this outcome. I say this with a view to the present case, for

someone might well say now that he's unable to oppose you as you ask each of your questions, yet he sees that of all those who take up philosophy—not those who merely dabble in it while still young in order to complete their upbringing and then drop it, but those who continue in it for a longer time—the greatest number become cranks, not to say completely vicious, while those who seem completely decent are rendered useless to the city because of the studies you recommend.

Socrates/ When I'd heard him out, I said: Do you think that what these people say is false?

Adeimantus/ I don't know, but I'd be glad to hear what you think.

Socrates/ You' hear that they seem to me to speak the truth.

Adeimantus/ How, then, can it be true to say that there will be no end to evils in our cities until philosophers—people we agree to be useless—rule in them?

Socrates/ The question you ask needs to be answered by means of an image or simile.

Adeimantus/ And you, of course, aren't used to speaking in similes!

Socrates/ So! Are you making fun of me now that you've landed me with a claim that's so hard to establish? In any case, listen to my simile, and you'll appreciate all the more how greedy for images I am. What the most decent people experience in relation to their city is so hard to bear that there's no other single experience like it. Hence to find an image of it and a defense for them, I must construct it from many sources, just as painters paint goat-stags by combining the features of different things. Imagine, then, that something like the following happens on a ship or on many ships. The ship-owner is bigger and stronger than

everyone else on board, but he's hard of hearing, a bit short-sighted, and his knowledge of seafaring is equally deficient. The sailors are quarreling with one another about steering the ship, each of them thinking that he should be the captain, even though he's never learned the art of navigation, cannot point to anyone who taught it to him, or to a time when he learned it. Indeed, they claim that it isn't teachable and are ready to cut to pieces anyone who says that it is. They're always crowding around the ship-owner, begging him and doing everything possible to get him to turn the rudder over to them. And sometimes, if they don't succeed in persuading him, they execute the ones who do succeed or throw them overboard, and then, having stupefied their noble ship-owner with drugs, wine, or in some other way, they rule the ship, using up what's in it and sailing in the way that people like that are prone to do. Moreover, they call the person who is clever at persuading or forcing the ship-owner to let them rule a "navigator," a "captain," and "one who knows ships," and dismiss anyone else as useless. They don't understand that a true captain must pay attention to the seasons of the year, the sky, the stars, the winds, and all that pertains to his craft, if he's really to be the ruler of a ship. And they don't believe there is any craft that would enable him to determine how he should steer the ship, whether the others want him to or not, or any possibility of mastering this alleged craft or of practicing it at the same time as the craft of navigation. Don't you think that the true captain will be called a real stargazer, a babbler, and a good-for-nothing by those who sail in ships governed in that way, in which such things happen?

Adeimantus/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ I don't think that you need to examine the simile in detail to see that the ships resemble cities and their

attitude to the true philosophers, but you already understand what I mean.

Adeimantus/ Indeed, I do.

Socrates/ Then first tell this simile to anyone who wonders why philosophers aren't honored in the cities, and try to persuade him that there would be far more cause for wonder if they were honored.

Adeimantus/ I will tell him.

Socrates/ Next tell him that what he says is true, that the best among the philosophers are useless to the majority. Tell him not to blame those decent people for this but the ones who don't make use of them. It isn't natural for the captain to beg the sailors to be ruled by him nor for the wise to knock at the doors of the rich—the man who came up with that wisecrack made a mistake. The natural thing is for the sick person, rich or poor, to knock at the doctor's door, and for anyone who needs to be ruled to knock at the door of the one who can rule him. It isn't for the ruler, if he's truly any use, to beg the others to accept his rule. Tell him that he'll make no mistake in likening those who rule in our cities at present to the sailors we mentioned just now, and those who are called useless stargazers to the true captains.

Adeimantus/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ Therefore, it isn't easy for the best ways of life to be highly esteemed by people who, as in these circumstances, follow the opposite ways. By far the greatest and most serious slander on philosophy, however, results from those who profess to follow the philosophic way of life. I mean those of whom the prosecutor of philosophy declared that the greatest number are completely vicious and the most decent useless. And I admitted that what he said was true, didn't I?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And haven't we explained why the decent ones are useless?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ Then, do you next want us to discuss why it's inevitable that the greater number are vicious and to try to show, if we can, that philosophy isn't responsible for this either?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then, let's begin our dialogue by reminding ourselves of the point at which we began to discuss the nature that someone must have if he is to become a fine and good person. First of all, if you remember, he had to be guided by the truth and always pursue it in every way, or else he'd really be a boaster, with no share at all in true philosophy.

Adeimantus/ That's what was said.

Socrates/ And isn't this view completely contrary to the opinions currently held about him?

Adeimantus/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ Then, won't it be reasonable for us to plead in his defense that it is the nature of the real lover of learning to struggle toward what is, not to remain with any of the many things that are believed to be, that, as he moves on, he neither loses nor lessens his erotic love until he grasps the being of each nature itself with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it, because of its kinship with it, and that, once getting near what really is and having intercourse with it and having begotten understanding and truth, he knows, truly lives, is nourished, and—at that point, but not before—is relieved from the pains of giving birth?

Adeimantus/ That is the most reasonable defense possible.

Socrates/ Well, then, will such a person have any part in the love of falsehood, or will he entirely hate it?

Adeimantus/ He'll hate it.

Socrates/ And if truth led the way, we'd never say, I suppose, that a chorus of evils could ever follow in its train.

Adeimantus/ How could it?

Socrates/ But rather a healthy and just character, with moderation following it.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ What need is there, then, to marshal all over again from the beginning the members of the philosophic nature's chorus in their inevitable array? Remember that courage, high-mindedness, ease in learning, and a good memory all belong to it. Then you objected, saying that anyone would be compelled to agree with what we said, but that, if he abandoned the argument and looked at the very people the argument is about, he'd say that some of them were useless, while the majority had every kind of vice. So we examined the reason for this slander and have now arrived at the point of explaining why the majority of them are bad. And it's for this reason that we've again taken up the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it necessarily has to be.

Adeimantus/ That's true.

Socrates/ We must now look at the ways in which this nature is corrupted, how it's destroyed in many people, while a small number (the ones that are called useless rather than bad) escape. After that, we must look in turn at the natures of the souls that imitate the philosophic nature and establish themselves in its way of life, so as to see what the people are like who thereby arrive at a way of life they are unworthy of and that is beyond them and who, because they

often strike false notes, bring upon philosophy the reputation that you said it has with everyone everywhere.

Adeimantus/ In what ways are they corrupted?

Socrates/ I'll try to enumerate them for you if I can. I suppose that everyone would agree that only a few natures possess all the qualities that we just now said were essential to becoming a complete philosopher and that seldom occur naturally among human beings. Or don't you think so?

Adeimantus/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ Consider, then, the many important ways in which these few can be corrupted.

Adeimantus/ What are they?

Socrates/ What will surprise you most, when you hear it, is that each of the things we praised in that nature tends to corrupt the soul that has it and to drag it away from philosophy. I mean courage, moderation, and the other things we mentioned.

Adeimantus/ That does sound strange.

Socrates/ Furthermore, all the things that are said to be good also corrupt it and drag it away—beauty, wealth, physical strength, relatives who are powerful in the city, and all that goes with these. You understand what I have in mind?

Adeimantus/ I do, and I'd be glad to learn even more about it.

Socrates/ If you correctly grasp the general point I'm after, it will be clear to you, and what I've said before won't seem so strange.

Adeimantus/ What do you want me to do?

Socrates/ We know that the more vigorous any seed, developing plant, or animal is, the more it is deficient in the things that are appropriate for it to have when it is deprived

of suitable food, season, or location. For the bad is more opposed to the good than is the merely not good.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then it's reasonable to say that the best nature fares worse, when unsuitably nurtured, than an ordinary one.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Then won't we say the same thing about souls too, Adeimantus, that those with the best natures become outstandingly bad when they receive a bad upbringing? Or do you think that great injustices and pure wickedness originate in an ordinary nature rather than in a vigorous one that has been corrupted by its upbringing? Or that a weak nature is ever the cause of either great good or great evil?

Adeimantus/ No, you're right.

Socrates/ Now, I think that the philosophic nature as we defined it will inevitably grow to possess every virtue if it happens to receive appropriate instruction, but if it is sown, planted, and grown in an inappropriate environment, it will develop in quite the opposite way, unless some god happens to come to its rescue. Or do you agree with the general opinion that certain young people are actually corrupted by sophists—that there are certain sophists with significant influence on the young who corrupt them through private teaching? Isn't it rather the very people who say this who are the greatest sophists of all, since they educate most completely, turning young and old, men and women, into precisely the kind of people they want them to be?

Adeimantus/ When do they do that?

Socrates/ When many of them are sitting together in assemblies, courts, theaters, army camps, or in some other public gathering of the crowd, they object very loudly and excessively to some of the things that are said or done and

approve others in the same way, shouting and clapping, so that the very rocks and surroundings echo the din of their praise or blame and double it. In circumstances like that, what is the effect, as they say, on a young person's heart? What private training can hold out and not be swept away by that kind of praise or blame and be carried by the flood wherever it goes, so that he'll say that the same things are beautiful or ugly as the crowd does, follow the same way of life as they do, and be the same sort of person as they are?

Adeimantus/ He will be under great compulsion to do so, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet we haven't mentioned the greatest compulsion of all.

Adeimantus/ What's that?

Socrates/ It's what these educators and sophists impose by their actions if their words fail to persuade. Or don't you know that they punish anyone who isn't persuaded, with disenfranchisement, fines, or death?

Adeimantus/ They most certainly do.

Socrates/ What other sophist, then, or what private conversations do you think will prevail in opposition to these?

Adeimantus/ I don't suppose that any will.

Socrates/ No, indeed, it would be very foolish even to try to oppose them, for there isn't now, hasn't been in the past, nor ever will be in the future anyone with a character so unusual that he has been educated to virtue in spite of the contrary education he received from the mob—I mean, a human character; the divine, as the saying goes, is an exception to the rule. You should realize that if anyone is saved and becomes what he ought to be under our present constitutions, he has been saved—you might rightly say—by a divine dispensation.

Adeimantus/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well, then, you should also agree to this.

Adeimantus/ What?

Socrates/ Not one of those paid private teachers, whom the people call sophists and consider to be their rivals in craft, teaches anything other than the convictions that the majority express when they are gathered together. Indeed, these are precisely what the sophists call wisdom. It's as if someone were learning the moods and appetites of a huge, strong beast that he's rearing—how to approach and handle it, when it is most difficult to deal with or most gentle and what makes it so, what sounds it utters in either condition, and what sounds soothe or anger it. Having learned all this through tending the beast over a period of time, he calls this knack wisdom, gathers his information together as if it were a craft, and starts to teach it. In truth, he knows nothing about which of these convictions is fine or shameful, good or bad, just or unjust, but he applies all these names in accordance with how the beast reacts—calling what it enjoys good and what angers it bad. He has no other account to give of these terms. And he calls what he is compelled to do just and fine, for he hasn't seen and cannot show anyone else how much compulsion and goodness really differ. Don't you think, by god, that someone like that is a strange educator?

Adeimantus/ I do indeed.

Socrates/ Then does this person seem any different from the one who believes that it is wisdom to understand the moods and pleasures of a majority gathered from all quarters, whether they concern painting, music, or, for that matter, politics? If anyone approaches the majority to exhibit his poetry or some other piece of craftsmanship or his service to the city and gives them mastery over him to any

degree beyond what's unavoidable, he'll be under Diomedean compulsion, as it's called, to do the sort of thing of which they approve. But have you ever heard anyone presenting an argument that such things are truly good and beautiful that wasn't absolutely ridiculous?

Adeimantus/ No, and I don't expect ever to hear one.

Socrates/ Keeping all this in mind, recall the following question: Can the majority in any way tolerate or accept the reality of the beautiful itself, as opposed to the many beautiful things, or the reality of each thing itself, as opposed to the corresponding many?

Adeimantus/ Not in any way.

Socrates/ Then the majority cannot be philosophic.

Adeimantus/ They cannot.

Socrates/ Hence they inevitably disapprove of those who practice philosophy?

Adeimantus/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ And so do all those private individuals who associate with the majority and try to please them.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then, because of all that, do you see any salvation for someone who is by nature a philosopher, to insure that he'll practice philosophy correctly to the end? Think about what we've said before. We agreed that ease in learning, a good memory, courage, and high-mindedness belong to the philosophic nature.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And won't someone with a nature like that be first among the children in everything, especially if his body has a nature that matches that of his soul?

Adeimantus/ How could he not be?

Socrates/ Then I suppose that, as he gets older, his family and fellow citizens will want to make use of him in connection with their own affairs.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Therefore they'll pay court to him with their requests and honors, trying by their flattery to secure for themselves ahead of time the power that is going to be his.

Adeimantus/ That's what usually happens, at any rate.

Socrates/ What do you think someone like that will do in such circumstances, especially if he happens to be from a great city, in which he's rich, well-born, good-looking, and tall? Won't he be filled with impractical expectations and think himself capable of managing the affairs, not only of the Greeks, but of the barbarians as well? And as a result, won't he exalt himself to great heights and be brimming with pretension and pride that is empty and lacks understanding?

Adeimantus/ He certainly will.

Socrates/ And if someone approaches a young man in that condition and gently tells him the truth, namely, that that there's no understanding in him, that he needs it, and that it can't be acquired unless he works like a slave to attain it, do you think that it will be easy for him to listen when he's in the midst of so many evils?

Adeimantus/ Far from it.

Socrates/ And even if a young man of that sort somehow sees the point and is guided and drawn to philosophy because of his noble nature and his kinship with reason, what do you think those people will do, if they believe that they're losing their use of him and his companionship? Is there anything they won't do or say to him to prevent him from being persuaded? Or anything they won't do or say about his persuader—whether plotting against him in

private or publicly bringing him into court—to prevent him from such persuasion?

Adeimantus/ There certainly isn't.

Socrates/ Then, is there any chance that such a person will practice philosophy?

Adeimantus/ None at all.

Socrates/ Do you see, then, that we weren't wrong to say that, when someone with a philosophic nature is badly brought up, the very components of his nature—together with the other so-called goods, such as wealth and other similar advantages—are themselves in a way the cause of his falling away from the philosophic way of life?

Adeimantus/ I do, and what we said was right.

Socrates/ These, then, are the many ways in which the best nature—which is already rare enough, as we said—is destroyed and corrupted, so that it cannot follow the best way of life. And it is among these men that we find the ones who do the greatest evils to cities and individuals and also—if they happen to be swept that way by the current—the greatest good, for a petty nature will never do anything great, either to an individual or a city.

Adeimantus/ That's very true.

Socrates/ When these men, for whom philosophy is most appropriate, fall away from her, they leave her desolate and unwed, and they themselves lead lives that are inappropriate and untrue. Then others, who are unworthy of her, come to her as to an orphan deprived of the protection of kinsmen and disgrace her. These are the ones who are responsible for the reproaches that you say are cast upon philosophy by those who revile her, namely, that some of those who consort with her are useless, while the majority deserve to suffer many bad things.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is indeed what is said.

Socrates/ And it's a reasonable thing to say, for other little men—the ones who are most sophisticated at their own little crafts—seeing that this position, which is full of fine names and adornments, is vacated, leap gladly from those little crafts to philosophy, like prisoners escaping from jail who take refuge in a temple. Despite her present poor state, philosophy is still more high-minded than these other crafts, so that many people with defective natures desire to possess her, even though their souls are cramped and spoiled by the mechanical nature of their work, in just the way that their bodies are mutilated by their crafts and labors. Isn't that inevitable?

Adeimantus/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ Don't you think that a man of this sort looks exactly like a little bald-headed tinker who has come into some money and, having been just released from jail, has taken a bath, put on a new cloak, got himself up as a bridegroom, and is about to marry the boss's daughter because she is poor and abandoned?

Adeimantus/ They're exactly the same.

Socrates/ And what kind of children will that marriage produce? Won't they be illegitimate and inferior?

Adeimantus/ They have to be.

Socrates/ What about when men who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily? What kinds of thoughts and opinions are we to say they beget? Won't they truly be what are properly called sophisms, things that have nothing genuine about them or worthy of being called true wisdom?

Adeimantus/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ Then there remains, Adeimantus, only a very small group who consort with philosophy in a way that's worthy of her: A noble and well brought-up character, for

example, kept down by exile, who remains with philosophy according to his nature because there is no one to corrupt him, or a great soul living in a small city, who disdains the city's affairs and looks beyond them. A very few might be drawn to philosophy from other crafts that they rightly despise because they have good natures. And some might be held back by the bridle that restrains our friend Theages—for he's in every way qualified to be tempted away from philosophy, but his physical illness restrains him by keeping him out of politics. Finally, my own case is hardly worth mentioning—my daemonic sign—because it has happened to no one before me, or to only a very few. Now, the members of this small group have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and at the same time they've also seen the madness of the majority and realized, in a word, that hardly anyone acts sanely in public affairs and that there is no ally with whom they might go to the aid of justice and survive, that instead they' perish before they could profit either their city or their friends and be useless both to themselves and to others, just like a man who has fallen among wild animals and is neither willing to join them in doing injustice nor sufficiently strong to oppose the general savagery alone. Taking all this into account, they lead a quiet life and do their own work. Thus, like someone who takes refuge under a little wall from a storm of dust or hail driven by the wind, the philosopher—seeing others filled with lawlessness—is satisfied if he can somehow lead his present life free from injustice and impious acts and depart from it with good hope, blameless and content.

Adeimantus/ Well, that's no small thing for him to have accomplished before departing.

Socrates/ But it isn't the greatest either, since he didn't chance upon a constitution that suits him. Under a suitable one, his own growth will be fuller, and he'll save the

community as well as himself. It seems to me that we've now sensibly discussed the reasons why philosophy is slandered and why the slanderer is unjust—unless, of course, you have something to add.

Adeimantus/ I have nothing to add on that point. But which of our present constitutions do you think is suitable for philosophers?

Socrates/ None of them. That's exactly my complaint: None of our present constitutions is worthy of the philosophic nature, and, as a result, this nature is perverted and altered, for, just as a foreign seed, sown in alien ground, is likely to be overcome by the native species and to fade away among them, so the philosophic nature fails to develop its full power and declines into a different character. But if it were to find the best constitution, as it is itself the best, it would be clear that it is really divine and that other natures and ways of life are merely human. Obviously you're going to ask next what the best constitution is.

Adeimantus/ You're wrong there; I wasn't going to ask that, but whether it was the constitution we described when we were founding our city or some other one.

Socrates/ In the other respects, it is that one. But we said even then that there must always be some people in the city who have a theory of the constitution, the same one that guided you, the lawgiver, when you made the laws.

Adeimantus/ We did say that.

Socrates/ Yes, but we didn't emphasize it sufficiently, for fear of what your objections have made plain, namely, that its proof would be long and difficult. And indeed what remains is by no means easy to go through.

Adeimantus/ What's that?

Socrates/ How a city can engage in philosophy without being destroyed, for all great things are prone to fall, and, as the saying goes, fine things are really hard to achieve.

Adeimantus/ Nevertheless, to complete our discussion, we'll have to get clear about this.

Socrates/ If anything prevents us from doing it, it won't be lack of willingness but lack of ability. At least you'll see how willing I am, for notice again how enthusiastically and recklessly I say that the manner in which a city ought to take up the philosophic way of life is the opposite of what it does at present.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ At present, those who study philosophy do so as young men who have just left childhood behind and have yet to take up household management and money-making. But just when they reach the hardest part—I mean the part that has to do with giving a rational account—they abandon it and are regarded as fully trained in philosophy. In later life, they think they're doing well if they are willing to be in an invited audience when others are doing philosophy, for they think they should do this only as a sideline. And, with a few exceptions, by the time they reach old age, their eagerness for philosophy is quenched more thoroughly than the sun of Heraclitus, which is never rekindled.

Adeimantus/ What should they do?

Socrates/ Entirely the opposite. As youths and children, they should put their minds to youthful education and philosophy and take care of their bodies at a time when they are growing into manhood, so as to acquire a helper for philosophy. As they grow older and their souls begin to reach maturity, they should increase their mental exercises. Then, when their strength begins to fail and they have retired from politics and military service, they should graze freely in the

pastures of philosophy and do nothing else—I mean the ones who are to live happily and, in death, add a fitting destiny in that other place to the life they have lived.

Adeimantus/ You seem to be speaking with true enthusiasm, Socrates. But I'm sure that most of your hearers, beginning with Thrasymachus, will oppose you with even greater enthusiasm and not be at all convinced.

Socrates/ Don't slander Thrasymachus and me just as we've become friends—not that we were enemies before. We won't relax our efforts until we either convince him and the others or, at any rate, do something that may benefit them in a later incarnation, when, reborn, they happen upon these arguments again.

Adeimantus/ That's a short time you're talking about!

Socrates/ It's nothing compared to the whole of time. All the same, it's no wonder that the majority of people aren't convinced by our arguments, for they've never seen a man that fits our plan (and the rhymes of this sort they have heard are usually intended and not, like this one, the product of mere chance). That is to say, they've never seen a man or a number of men who themselves rhymed with virtue, were assimilated to it as far as possible, and ruled in a city of the same type. Or do you think they have?

Adeimantus/ I don't think so at all.

Socrates/ Nor have they listened sufficiently to fine and free arguments that search out the truth in every way for the sake of knowledge but that keep away from the sophistications and eristic quibbles that, both in public trials and in private gatherings, aim at nothing except reputation and disputation.

Adeimantus/ No, they haven't.

Socrates/ It was because of this, because we foresaw these difficulties, that we were afraid. Nonetheless, we were

compelled by the truth to say that no city, constitution, or individual man will ever become perfect until either some chance event compels those few philosophers who aren't vicious (the ones who are now called useless) to take charge of a city, whether they want to or not, and compels the city to obey them, or until a god inspires the present rulers and kings or their offspring with a true erotic love for true philosophy. Now, it cannot be reasonably maintained, in my view, that either of these things is impossible, but if it could, we'd be justly ridiculed for indulging in wishful thinking. Isn't that so?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Then, if in the limitless past, those who were foremost in philosophy were forced to take charge of a city or if this is happening now in some foreign place far beyond our ken or if it will happen in the future, we are prepared to maintain our argument that, at whatever time the muse of philosophy controls a city, the constitution we've described will also exist at that time, whether it is past, present, or future. Since it is not impossible for this to happen, we are not speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult for it to happen, however, we agree ourselves.

Adeimantus/ That's my opinion, anyway.

Socrates/ But the majority don't share your opinion—is that what you are going to say?

Adeimantus/ They probably don't.

Socrates/ You should not make such wholesale charges against the majority, for they'll no doubt come to a different opinion, if instead of indulging your love of victory at their expense, you soothe them and try to remove their slanderous prejudice against the love of learning, by pointing out what you mean by a philosopher and by defining the philosophic nature and way of life, as we did just now, so that they'll

realize that you don't mean the same people as they do. And if they once see it your way, even you will say that they'll have a different opinion from the one you just attributed to them and will answer differently. Or do you think that anyone who is gentle and without malice is harsh with someone who is neither irritable nor malicious? I'll anticipate your answer and say that a few people may have such a harsh character, but not the majority.

Adeimantus/ And, of course, I agree.

Socrates/ Then don't you also agree that the harshness the majority exhibit towards philosophy is caused by those outsiders who don't belong and who've burst in like a band of revelers, always abusing one another, indulging their love of quarrels, and arguing about human beings in a way that is wholly inappropriate to philosophy?

Adeimantus/ I do indeed.

Socrates/ No one whose thoughts are truly directed towards the things that are, Adeimantus, has the leisure to look down at human affairs or to be filled with envy and hatred by competing with people. Instead, as he looks at and studies things that are organized and always the same, that neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it, being all in a rational order, he imitates them and tries to become as like them as he can. Or do you think that someone can consort with things he admires without imitating them?

Adeimantus/ I do not. It's impossible.

Socrates/ Then the philosopher, by consorting with what is ordered and divine and despite all the slanders around that say otherwise, himself becomes as divine and ordered as a human being can.

Adeimantus/ That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ And if he should come to be compelled to put what he sees there into people's characters, whether into a

single person or into a populace, instead of shaping only his own, do you think that he will be a poor craftsman of moderation, justice, and the whole of popular virtue?

Adeimantus/ He least of all.

Socrates/ And when the majority realize that what we are saying about the philosopher is true, will they be harsh with him or mistrust us when we say that the city will never find happiness until its outline is sketched by painters who use the divine model?

Adeimantus/ They won't be harsh, if indeed they realize this. But what sort of sketch do you mean?

Socrates/ They' take the city and the characters of human beings as their sketching slate, but first they' wipe it clean—which isn't at all an easy thing to do. And you should know that this is the plain difference between them and others, namely, that they refuse to take either an individual or a city in hand or to write laws, unless they receive a clean slate or are allowed to clean it themselves.

Adeimantus/ And they' be right to refuse.

Socrates/ Then don't you think they' next sketch the outline of the constitution?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And I suppose that, as they work, they' look often in each direction, towards the natures of justice, beauty, moderation, and the like, on the one hand, and towards those they're trying to put into human beings, on the other. And in this way they' mix and blend the various ways of life in the city until they produced a human image based on what Homer too called "the divine form and image" when it occurred among human beings.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ They' erase one thing, I suppose, and draw in another until they' made characters for human beings that the gods would love as much as possible.

Adeimantus/ At any rate, that would certainly result in the finest sketch.

Socrates/ Then is this at all persuasive to those you said were straining to attack us—that the person we were praising is really a painter of constitutions? They were angry because we entrusted the city to him: Are they any calmer, now that they've heard what we had to say?

Adeimantus/ They'll be much calmer, if they have any moderation.

Socrates/ Indeed, how could they possibly dispute it? Will they deny that philosophers are lovers of what is or of the truth?

Adeimantus/ That would be absurd.

Socrates/ Or that their nature as we've described it is close to the best?

Adeimantus/ They can't deny that either.

Socrates/ Or that such a nature, if it follows its own way of life, isn't as completely good and philosophic as any other? Or that the people we excluded are more so?

Adeimantus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then will they still be angry when we say that, until philosophers take control of a city, there'll be no respite from evil for either city or citizens, and the constitution we've been describing in theory will never be completed in practice?

Adeimantus/ They'll probably be less angry.

Socrates/ Then if it's all right with you, let's not say that they'll simply be less angry but that they'll become altogether

gentle and persuaded, so that they'll be shamed into agreeing with us, if nothing else.

Adeimantus/ It's all right with me.

Socrates/ Let's assume, therefore, that they've been convinced on this point. Will anyone dispute our view that the offspring of kings or rulers could be born with philosophic natures?

Adeimantus/ No one would do that.

Socrates/ Could anyone claim that, if such offspring are born, they'll inevitably be corrupted? We agree ourselves that it's hard for them to be saved from corruption, but could anyone claim that in the whole of time not one of them could be saved?

Adeimantus/ How could he?

Socrates/ But surely one such individual would be sufficient to bring to completion all the things that now seem so incredible, provided that his city obeys him.

Adeimantus/ One would be sufficient.

Socrates/ If a ruler established the laws and ways of life we've described, it is surely not impossible that the citizens would be willing to carry them out.

Adeimantus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ And would it be either astonishing or impossible that others should think as we do?

Adeimantus/ I don't suppose it would.

Socrates/ But I think our earlier discussion was sufficient to show that these arrangements are best, if only they are possible.

Adeimantus/ Indeed it was.

Socrates/ Then we can now conclude that this legislation is best, if only it is possible, and that, while it is hard for it to come about, it is not impossible.

Adeimantus/ We can.

Socrates/ Now that this difficulty has been disposed of, we must deal with what remains, namely, how the saviors of our constitution will come to be in the city, what subjects and ways of life will cause them to come into being, and at what ages they'll take each of them up.

Adeimantus/ Indeed we must.

Socrates/ It wasn't very clever of me to omit from our earlier discussion the troublesome topics of acquiring wives, begetting children, and appointing rulers, just because I knew that the whole truth would provoke resentment and would be hard to bring about in practice, for as it turned out, I had to go through these matters anyway. The subject of women and children has been adequately dealt with, but that of the rulers has to be taken up again from the beginning. We said, if you remember, that they must show themselves to be lovers of their city when tested by pleasure and pain and that they must hold on to their resolve through labors, fears, and all other adversities. Anyone who was incapable of doing so was to be rejected, while anyone who came through unchanged—like gold tested in a fire—was to be made ruler and receive prizes both while he lived and after his death. These were the sort of things we were saying while our argument, afraid of stirring up the very problems that now confront us, veiled its face and slipped by.

Adeimantus/ That's very true; I do remember it.

Socrates/ We hesitated to say the things we've now dared to say anyway. So let's now also dare to say that those who are to be made our guardians in the most exact sense of the term must be philosophers.

Adeimantus/ Let's do it.

Socrates/ Then you should understand that there will probably be only a few of them, for they have to have the

nature we described, and its parts mostly grow in separation and are rarely found in the same person.

Adeimantus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ You know that ease of learning, good memory, quick wits, smartness, youthful passion, high-mindedness, and all the other things that go along with these are rarely willing to grow together in a mind that will choose an orderly life that is quiet and completely stable, for the people who possess the former traits are carried by their quick wits wherever chance leads them and have no stability at all.

Adeimantus/ That's true.

Socrates/ On the other hand, people with stable characters, who don't change easily, who aren't easily frightened in battle, and whom one would employ because of their greater reliability, exhibit similar traits when it comes to learning: They are as hard to move and teach as people whose brains have become numb, and they are filled with sleep and yawning whenever they have to learn anything.

Adeimantus/ That's so.

Socrates/ Yet we say that someone must have a fine and goodly share of both characters, or he won't receive the truest education, honors, or rule.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then, don't you think that such people will be rare?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Therefore they must be tested in the labors, fears, and pleasures we mentioned previously. But they must also be exercised in many other subjects—which we didn't mention but are adding now—to see whether they can

tolerate the most important subjects or will shrink from them like the cowards who shrink from other tests.

Adeimantus/ It's appropriate to examine them like that. But what do you mean by the most important subjects?

Socrates/ Do you remember when we distinguished three parts in the soul, in order to help bring out what justice, moderation, courage, and wisdom each is?

Adeimantus/ If I didn't remember that, it wouldn't be just for me to hear the rest.

Socrates/ What about what preceded it?

Adeimantus/ What was that?

Socrates/ We said, I believe, that, in order to get the finest possible view of these matters, we would need to take a longer road that would make them plain to anyone who took it but that it was possible to give demonstrations of what they are that would be up to the standard of the previous argument. And you said that that would be satisfactory. So it seems to me that our discussion at that time fell short of exactness, but whether or not it satisfied you is for you to say.

Adeimantus/ I thought you gave us good measure and so, apparently, did the others.

Socrates/ Any measure of such things that falls short in any way of that which is, is not good measure, for nothing incomplete is the measure of anything, although people are sometimes of the opinion that an incomplete treatment is nonetheless adequate and makes further investigation unnecessary.

Adeimantus/ Indeed, laziness causes many people to think that.

Socrates/ It is a thought that a guardian of a city and its laws can well do without.

Adeimantus/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Well, then, he must take the longer road and put as much effort into learning as into physical training, for otherwise, as we were just saying, he will never reach the goal of the most important subject and the most appropriate one for him to learn.

Adeimantus/ Aren't these virtues, then, the most important things? Is there anything even more important than justice and the other virtues we discussed?

Socrates/ There is something more important. However, even for the virtues themselves, it isn't enough to look at a mere sketch, as we did before, while neglecting the most complete account. It's ridiculous, isn't it, to strain every nerve to attain the utmost exactness and clarity about other things of little value and not to consider the most important things worthy of the greatest exactness?

Adeimantus/ It certainly is. But do you think that anyone is going to let you off without asking you what this most important subject is and what it concerns?

Socrates/ No, indeed, and you can ask me too. You've certainly heard the answer often enough, but now either you aren't thinking or you intend to make trouble for me again by interrupting. And I suspect the latter, for you've often heard it said that the form of the good is the most important thing to learn about and that it's by their relation to it that just things and the others become useful and beneficial. You know very well now that I am going to say this, and, besides, that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And you also know that, if we don't know it, even the fullest possible knowledge of other things is of no benefit to us, any more than if we acquire any possession without the good of it. Or do you think that it is any advantage to have every kind of

possession without the good of it? Or to know everything except the good, thereby knowing nothing fine or good?

Adeimantus/ No, by god, I don't.

Socrates/ Furthermore, you certainly know that the majority believe that pleasure is the good, while the more sophisticated believe that it is knowledge.

Adeimantus/ Indeed I do.

Socrates/ And you know that those who believe this can't tell us what sort of knowledge it is, however, but in the end are forced to say that it is knowledge of the good.

Adeimantus/ And that's ridiculous.

Socrates/ Of course it is. They blame us for not knowing the good and then turn around and talk to us as if we did know it. They say that it is knowledge of the good—as if we understood what they're speaking about when they utter the word "good."

Adeimantus/ That's completely true.

Socrates/ What about those who define the good as pleasure? Are they any less full of confusion than the others? Aren't even they forced to admit that there are bad pleasures?

Adeimantus/ Most definitely.

Socrates/ So, I think, they have to agree that the same things are both good and bad. Isn't that true?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ It's clear, then, isn't it, why there are many large controversies about this?

Adeimantus/ How could it be otherwise?

Socrates/ And isn't this also clear? In the case of just and beautiful things, many people are content with what are believed to be so, even if they aren't really so, and they act, acquire, and form their own beliefs on that basis. Nobody is

satisfied to acquire things that are merely believed to be good, however, but everyone wants the things that really are good and disdains mere belief here.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Every soul pursues the good and does whatever it does for its sake. It divines that the good is something but it is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it is or acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has about other things, and so it misses the benefit, if any, that even those other things may give. Will we allow the best people in the city, to whom we entrust everything, to be so in the dark about something of this kind and of this importance?

Adeimantus/ That's the last thing we'd do.

Socrates/ I don't suppose, at least, that just and fine things will have acquired much of a guardian in someone who doesn't even know in what way they are good. And I divine that no one will have adequate knowledge of them until he knows this.

Adeimantus/ You've divined well.

Socrates/ But won't our constitution be perfectly ordered, if a guardian who knows these things is in charge of it?

Adeimantus/ Necessarily. But, Socrates, you must also tell us whether you consider the good to be knowledge or pleasure or something else altogether.

Socrates/ What a man! It's been clear for some time that other people's opinions about these matters wouldn't satisfy you.

Adeimantus/ Well, Socrates, it doesn't seem right to me for you to be willing to state other people's convictions but not your own, especially when you've spent so much time occupied with these matters.

Socrates/ What? Do you think it's right to talk about things one doesn't know as if one does know them?

Adeimantus/ Not as if one knows them, but one ought to be willing to state one's opinions as such.

Socrates/ What? Haven't you noticed that opinions without knowledge are shameful and ugly things? The best of them are blind—or do you think that those who express a true opinion without understanding are any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road?

Adeimantus/ They're no different.

Socrates/ Do you want to look at shameful, blind, and crooked things, then, when you might hear illuminating and fine ones from other people?

Adeimantus/ By god, Socrates, don't desert us with the end almost in sight. We'll be satisfied if you discuss the good as you discussed justice, moderation, and the rest.

Socrates/ That, my friend, would satisfy me too, but I'm afraid that I won't be up to it and that I'll disgrace myself and look ridiculous by trying. So let's abandon the quest for what the good itself is for the time being, for even to arrive at my own view about it is too big a topic for the discussion we are now started on. But I am willing to tell you about what is apparently an offspring of the good and most like it. Is that agreeable to you, or would you rather we let the whole matter drop?

Adeimantus/ It is. The story about the father remains a debt you'll pay another time.

Socrates/ I wish that I could pay the debt in full, and you receive it instead of just the interest. So here, then, is this child and offspring of the good. But be careful that I don't somehow deceive you unintentionally by giving you an illegitimate account of the child.

Adeimantus/ We'll be as careful as possible, so speak on.

Socrates/ I will when we've come to an agreement and recalled some things that we've already said both here and many other times.

Adeimantus/ Which ones?

Socrates/ We say that there are many beautiful things and many good things, and so on for each kind, and in this way we distinguish them in words.

Adeimantus/ We do.

Socrates/ And beauty itself and good itself and all the things that we thereby set down as many, reversing ourselves, we set down according to a single form of each, believing that there is but one, and call it "the being" of each.

Adeimantus/ That's true.

Socrates/ And we say that the many beautiful things and the rest are visible but not intelligible, while the forms are intelligible but not visible.

Adeimantus/ That's completely true.

Socrates/ With what part of ourselves do we see visible things?

Adeimantus/ With our sight.

Socrates/ And so audible things are heard by hearing, and with our other senses we perceive all the other perceptible things.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Have you considered how lavish the maker of our senses was in making the power to see and be seen?

Adeimantus/ I can't say I have.

Socrates/ Well, consider it this way. Do hearing and sound need another kind of thing in order for the former to hear and the latter to be heard, a third thing in whose absence the one won't hear or the other be heard?

Adeimantus/ No, they need nothing else.

Socrates/ And if there are any others that need such a thing, there can't be many of them. Can you think of one?

Adeimantus/ I can't.

Socrates/ You don't realize that sight and the visible have such a need?

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ Sight may be present in the eyes, and the one who has it may try to use it, and colors may be present in things, but unless a third kind of thing is present, which is naturally adapted for this very purpose, you know that sight will see nothing, and the colors will remain unseen.

Adeimantus/ What kind of thing do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean what you call light.

Adeimantus/ You're right.

Socrates/ Then it isn't an insignificant kind of link that connects the sense of sight and the power to be seen—it is a more valuable link than any other linked things have got, if indeed light is something valuable.

Adeimantus/ And, of course, it's very valuable.

Socrates/ Which of the gods in heaven would you name as the cause and controller of this, the one whose light causes our sight to see in the best way and the visible things to be seen?

Adeimantus/ The same one you and others would name. Obviously, the answer to your question is the sun.

Socrates/ And isn't sight by nature related to that god in this way?

Adeimantus/ Which way?

Socrates/ Sight isn't the sun, neither sight itself nor that in which it comes to be, namely, the eye.

Adeimantus/ No, it certainly isn't.

Socrates/ But I think that it is the most sun like of the senses.

Adeimantus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And it receives from the sun the power it has, just like an influx from an overflowing treasury.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The sun is not sight, but isn't it the cause of sight itself and seen by it?

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Let's say, then, that this is what I called the offspring of the good, which the good begot as its analogue. What the good itself is in the intelligible realm, in relation to understanding and intelligible things, the sun is in the visible realm, in relation to sight and visible things.

Adeimantus/ How? Explain a bit more.

Socrates/ You know that, when we turn our eyes to things whose colors are no longer in the light of day but in the gloom of night, the eyes are dimmed and seem nearly blind, as if clear vision were no longer in them.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Yet whenever one turns them on things illuminated by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears in those very same eyes?

Adeimantus/ Indeed.

Socrates/ Well, understand the soul in the same way: When it focuses on something illuminated by truth and what is, it understands, knows, and apparently possesses understanding, but when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what comes to be and passes away, it opines and is dimmed, changes its opinions this way and that, and seems bereft of understanding.

Adeimantus/ It does seem that way.

Socrates/ So that what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good. And though it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge. Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they. In the visible realm, light and sight are rightly considered sun like, but it is wrong to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to think of knowledge and truth as good-like but wrong to think that either of them is the good—for the good is yet more prized.

Adeimantus/ This is an inconceivably beautiful thing you're talking about, if it provides both knowledge and truth and is superior to them in beauty. You surely don't think that a thing like that could be pleasure.

Socrates/ Hush! Let's examine its image in more detail as follows.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ You'll be willing to say, I think, that the sun not only provides visible things with the power to be seen but also with coming to be, growth, and nourishment, although it is not itself coming to be.

Adeimantus/ How could it be?

Socrates/ Therefore, you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge owe their being known to the good, but their being is also due to it, although the good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power.

And Glaucon comically said:

Glaucon/ By Apollo, what a daemonic superiority!

Socrates/ It's your own fault; you forced me to tell you my opinion about it.

Glaucon/ And I don't want you to stop either. So continue to explain its similarity to the sun, if you've omitted anything.

Socrates/ I'm certainly omitting a lot.

Glaucon/ Well, don't, not even the smallest thing.

Socrates/ I think I'll have to omit a fair bit, but, as far as is possible at the moment, I won't omit anything voluntarily.

Glaucon/ Don't.

Socrates/ Understand, then, that, as we said, there are these two things, one sovereign of the intelligible kind and place, the other of the visible (I don't say "of heaven" so as not to seem to you to be playing the sophist with the name). In any case, you have two kinds of thing, visible and intelligible.

Glaucon/ Right.

Socrates/ It is like a line divided into two unequal sections. Then divide each section—namely, that of the visible and that of the intelligible—in the same ratio as the line. In terms now of relative clarity and opacity, one subsection of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, first, shadows, then reflections in water and in all close-packed, smooth, and shiny materials, and everything of that sort, if you understand.

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ In the other subsection of the visible, put the originals of these images, namely, the animals around us, all the plants, and the whole class of manufactured things.

Glaucon/ Consider them put.

Socrates/ Would you be willing to say that, as regards truth and untruth, the division is in this proportion: As the opinable is to the knowable, so the likeness is to the thing that it is like?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Consider now how the section of the intelligible is to be divided.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ As follows: In one subsection, the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is forced to investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle but to a conclusion. In the other subsection, however, it makes its way to a first principle that is not a hypothesis, proceeding from a hypothesis but without the images used in the previous subsection, using forms themselves and making its investigation through them.

Glaucon/ I don't yet fully understand what you mean.

Socrates/ Let's try again. You'll understand it more easily after the following preamble. I think you know that students of geometry, calculation, and the like hypothesize the odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles, and other things akin to these in each of their investigations, as if they knew them. They make these their hypotheses and don't think it necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves or to others, as if they were clear to everyone. And going from these first principles through the remaining steps, they arrive in full agreement.

Glaucon/ I certainly know that much.

Socrates/ Then you also know that, although they use visible figures and make claims about them, their thought isn't directed to them but to those other things that they are like. They make their claims for the sake of square itself and the diagonal itself, not the diagonal they draw, and similarly with the others. These figures that they make and draw, of which shadows and reflections in water are images, they now in turn use as images, in seeking to see those others themselves that one cannot see except by means of thought.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ This, then, is the kind of thing that, on the one hand, I said is intelligible, and, on the other, is such that the soul is forced to use hypotheses in the investigation of it, not travelling up to a first principle, since it cannot reach beyond its hypotheses, but using as images those very things of which images were made in the section below, and which, by comparison to their images, were thought to be clear and to be valued as such.

Glaucon/ I understand that you mean what happens in geometry and related sciences.

Socrates/ Then also understand that, by the other subsection of the intelligible, I mean that which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic. It does not consider these hypotheses as first principles but truly as hypotheses—but as stepping stones to take off from, enabling it to reach the unhypothetical first principle of everything. Having grasped this principle, it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion without making use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves, moving on from forms to forms, and ending in forms.

Glaucon/ I understand, if not yet adequately (for in my opinion you're speaking of an enormous task), that you want to distinguish the intelligible part of that which is, the part studied by the science of dialectic, as clearer than the part studied by the so-called sciences, for which their hypotheses are first principles. And although those who study the objects of these sciences are forced to do so by means of thought rather than sense perception, still, because they do not go back to a genuine first principle, but proceed from hypotheses, you don't think that they understand them, even though, given such a principle, they are intelligible. And you seem to me to call the state of the geometers thought

but not understanding, thought being intermediate between opinion and understanding.

Socrates/ Your exposition is most adequate. Thus there are four such conditions in the soul, corresponding to the four subsections of our line: Understanding for the highest, thought for the second, belief for the third, and imaging for the last. Arrange them in a ratio, and consider that each shares in clarity to the degree that the subsection it is set over shares in truth.

Glaucon/ I understand, agree, and arrange them as you say.

Book 7

Socrates/ Next, compare the effect of education and of the lack of it on our nature to an experience like this: Imagine human beings living in an underground, cave-like dwelling, with an entrance a long way up, which is both open to the light and as wide as the cave itself. They've been there since childhood, fixed in the same place, with their necks and legs fettered, able to see only in front of them, because their bonds prevent them from turning their heads around. Light is provided by a fire burning far above and behind them. Also, behind them, but on higher ground, there is a path stretching between them and the fire. Imagine that along this path a low wall has been built, like the screen in front of puppeteers above which they show their puppets.

Glaucon/ I'm imagining it.

Socrates/ Then also imagine that there are people along the wall, carrying all kinds of artifacts that project above it—statues of people and other animals, made out of stone, wood, and every material. And, as you'd expect, some of the carriers are talking, and some are silent.

Glaucon/ It's a strange image you're describing, and strange prisoners.

Socrates/ They're like us. Do you suppose, first of all, that these prisoners see anything of themselves and one another besides the shadows that the fire casts on the wall in front of them?

Glaucon/ How could they, if they have to keep their heads motionless throughout life?

Socrates/ What about the things being carried along the wall? Isn't the same true of them?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if they could talk to one another, don't you think they' suppose that the names they used applied to the things they see passing before them?

Glaucon/ They' have to.

Socrates/ And what if their prison also had an echo from the wall facing them? Don't you think they' believe that the shadows passing in front of them were talking whenever one of the carriers passing along the wall was doing so?

Glaucon/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ Then the prisoners would in every way believe that the truth is nothing other than the shadows of those artifacts.

Glaucon/ They must surely believe that.

Socrates/ Consider, then, what being released from their bonds and cured of their ignorance would naturally be like, if something like this came to pass. When one of them was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his head, walk, and look up toward the light, he'd be pained and dazzled and unable to see the things whose shadows he'd seen before. What do you think he'd say, if we told him that what he'd seen before was inconsequential, but that now—because he is a bit closer to the things that are and is turned towards things that are more—he sees more correctly? Or, to put it another way, if we pointed to each of the things passing by, asked him what each of them is, and compelled him to answer, don't you think he'd be at a loss and that he'd believe that the things he saw earlier were truer than the ones he was now being shown?

Glaucon/ Much truer.

Socrates/ And if someone compelled him to look at the light itself, wouldn't his eyes hurt, and wouldn't he turn around and flee towards the things he's able to see, believing that they're really clearer than the ones he's being shown?

Glaucon/ He would.

Socrates/ And if someone dragged him away from there by force, up the rough, steep path, and didn't let him go until he had dragged him into the sunlight, wouldn't he be pained and irritated at being treated that way? And when he came into the light, with the sun filling his eyes, wouldn't he be unable to see a single one of the things now said to be true?

Glaucon/ He would be unable to see them, at least at first.

Socrates/ I suppose, then, that he'd need time to get adjusted before he could see things in the world above. At first, he'd see shadows most easily, then images of men and other things in water, then the things themselves. Of these, he'd be able to study the things in the sky and the sky itself more easily at night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than during the day, looking at the sun and the light of the sun.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Finally, I suppose, he'd be able to see the sun, not images of it in water or some alien place, but the sun itself, in its own place, and be able to study it.

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ And at this point he would infer and conclude that the sun provides the seasons and the years, governs everything in the visible world, and is in some way the cause of all the things that he used to see.

Glaucon/ It's clear that would be his next step.

Socrates/ What about when he reminds himself of his first dwelling place, his fellow prisoners, and what passed for wisdom there? Don't you think that he'd count himself happy for the change and pity the others?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if there had been any honors, praises, or prizes among them for the one who was sharpest at identifying the shadows as they passed by and who best remembered which usually came earlier, which later, and which simultaneously, and who could thus best divine the future, do you think that our man would desire these rewards or envy those among the prisoners who were honored and held power? Instead, wouldn't he feel, with Homer, that he'd much prefer to "work the earth as a serf to another, one without possessions," and go through any sufferings, rather than share their opinions and live as they do?

Glaucon/ I suppose he would rather suffer anything than live like that.

Socrates/ Consider this too. If this man went down into the cave again and sat down in his same seat, wouldn't his eyes—coming suddenly out of the sun like that—be filled with darkness?

Glaucon/ They certainly would.

Socrates/ And before his eyes had recovered—and the adjustment would not be quick—while his vision was still dim, if he had to compete again with the perpetual prisoners in recognizing the shadows, wouldn't he invite ridicule? Wouldn't it be said of him that he'd returned from his upward journey with his eyesight ruined and that it isn't worthwhile even to try to travel upward? And, as for anyone who tried to free them and lead them upward, if they could somehow get their hands on him, wouldn't they kill him?

Glaucon/ They certainly would.

Socrates/ This whole image, Glaucon, must be fitted together with what we said before. The visible realm should be likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire inside it to the power of the sun. And if you interpret the

upward journey and the study of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you'll grasp what I hope to convey, since that is what you wanted to hear about. Whether it's true or not, only the god knows. But this is how I see it: In the knowable realm, the form of the good is the last thing to be seen, and it is reached only with difficulty. Once one has seen it, however, one must conclude that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything, that it produces both light and its source in the visible realm, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth and understanding, so that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it.

Glaucon/ I have the same thought, at least as far as I'm able.

Socrates/ Come, then, share with me this thought also: It isn't surprising that the ones who get to this point are unwilling to occupy themselves with human affairs and that their souls are always pressing upwards, eager to spend their time above, for, after all, this is surely what we'd expect, if indeed things fit the image I described before.

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ What about what happens when someone turns from divine study to the evils of human life? Do you think it's surprising, since his sight is still dim, and he hasn't yet become accustomed to the darkness around him, that he behaves awkwardly and appears completely ridiculous if he's compelled, either in the courts or elsewhere, to contend about the shadows of justice or the statues of which they are the shadows and to dispute about the way these things are understood by people who have never seen justice itself?

Glaucon/ That's not surprising at all.

Socrates/ No, it isn't. But anyone with any understanding would remember that the eyes may be confused in two ways and from two causes, namely, when they've come from the light into the darkness and when they've come from the darkness into the light. Realizing that the same applies to the soul, when someone sees a soul disturbed and unable to see something, he won't laugh mindlessly, but he'll take into consideration whether it has come from a brighter life and is dimmed through not having yet become accustomed to the dark or whether it has come from greater ignorance into greater light and is dazzled by the increased brilliance. Then he'll declare the first soul happy in its experience and life, and he'll pity the latter—but even if he chose to make fun of it, at least he'd be less ridiculous than if he laughed at a soul that has come from the light above.

Glaucon/ What you say is very reasonable.

Socrates/ If that's true, then here's what we must think about these matters: Education isn't what some people declare it to be, namely, putting knowledge into souls that lack it, like putting sight into blind eyes.

Glaucon/ They do say that.

Socrates/ But our present discussion, on the other hand, shows that the power to learn is present in everyone's soul and that the instrument with which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light without turning the whole body. This instrument cannot be turned around from that which is coming into being without turning the whole soul until it is able to study that which is and the brightest thing that is, namely, the one we call the good. Isn't that right?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then education is the craft concerned with doing this very thing, this turning around, and with how the

soul can most easily and effectively be made to do it. It isn't the craft of putting sight into the soul. Education takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn't turned the right way or looking where it ought to look, and it tries to redirect it appropriately.

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Now, it looks as though the other so-called virtues of the soul are akin to those of the body, for they really aren't there beforehand but are added later by habit and practice. However, the virtue of reason seems to belong above all to something more divine, which never loses its power but is either useful and beneficial or useless and harmful, depending on the way it is turned. Or have you never noticed this about people who are said to be vicious but clever, how keen the vision of their little souls is and how sharply it distinguishes the things it is turned towards? This shows that its sight isn't inferior but rather is forced to serve evil ends, so that the sharper it sees, the more evil it accomplishes.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ However, if a nature of this sort had been hammered at from childhood and freed from the bonds of kinship with becoming, which have been fastened to it by feasting, greed, and other such pleasures and which, like leaden weights, pull its vision downwards—if, being rid of these, it turned to look at true things, then I say that the same soul of the same person would see these most sharply, just as it now does the things it is presently turned towards.

Glaucon/ Probably so.

Socrates/ And what about the uneducated who have no experience of truth? Isn't it likely—indeed, doesn't it follow necessarily from what was said before—that they will never adequately govern a city? But neither would those who've

been allowed to spend their whole lives being educated. The former would fail because they don't have a single goal at which all their actions, public and private, inevitably aim; the latter would fail because they' refuse to act, thinking that they had settled while still alive in the faraway Isles of the Blessed.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ It is our task as founders, then, to compel the best natures to reach the study we said before is the most important, namely, to make the ascent and see the good. But when they've made it and looked sufficiently, we mustn't allow them to do what they're allowed to do today.

Glaucon/ What's that?

Socrates/ To stay there and refuse to go down again to the prisoners in the cave and share their labors and honors, whether they are of less worth or of greater.

Glaucon/ Then are we to do them an injustice by making them live a worse life when they could live a better one?

Socrates/ You are forgetting again that it isn't the law's concern to make anyone class in the city outstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness throughout the city by bringing the citizens into harmony with each other through persuasion or compulsion and by making them share with each other the benefits that each class can confer on the community. The law produces such people in the city, not in order to allow them to turn in whatever direction they want, but to make use of them to bind the city together.

Glaucon/ That's true, I had forgotten.

Socrates/ Observe, then, Glaucon, that we won't be doing an injustice to those who've become philosophers in our city and that what we'll say to them, when we compel them to guard and care for the others, will be just. We'll say: "When people like you come to be in other cities, they're justified in

not sharing in their city's labors, for they've grown there spontaneously, against the will of the constitution. And what grows of its own accord and owes no debt for its upbringing has justice on its side when it isn't keen to pay anyone for that upbringing. But we've made you kings in our city and leaders of the swarm, as it were, both for yourselves and for the rest of the city. You're better and more completely educated than the others and are better able to share in both types of life. Therefore each of you in turn must go down to live in the common dwelling place of the others and grow accustomed to seeing in the dark. When you are used to it, you'll see vastly better than the people there. And because you've seen the truth about fine, just, and good things, you'll know each image for what it is and also that of which it is the image. Thus, for you and for us, the city will be governed, not like the majority of cities nowadays, by people who fight over shadows and struggle against one another in order to rule—as if that were a great good—but by people who are awake rather than dreaming, for the truth is surely this: A city whose prospective rulers are least eager to rule must of necessity be most free from civil war, whereas a city with the opposite kind of rulers is governed in the opposite way."

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Then do you think that those we've nurtured will disobey us and refuse to share the labors of the city, each in turn, while living the greater part of their time with one another in the pure realm?

Glaucon/ It isn't possible, for we'll be giving just orders to just people. Each of them will certainly go to rule as to something compulsory, however, which is exactly the opposite of what's done by those who now rule in each city.

Socrates/ This is how it is. If you can find a way of life that's better than ruling for the prospective rulers, your well-

governed city will become a possibility, for only in it will the truly rich rule—not those who are rich in gold but those who are rich in the wealth that the happy must have, namely, a good and rational life. But if beggars hungry for private goods go into public life, thinking that the good is there for the seizing, then the well-governed city is impossible, for then ruling is something fought over, and this civil and domestic war destroys these people and the rest of the city as well.

Glaucon/ That's very true.

Socrates/ Can you name any life that despises political rule besides that of the true philosopher?

Glaucon/ No, by god, I can't.

Socrates/ But surely it is those who are not lovers of ruling who must rule, for if they don't, the lovers of it, who are rivals, will fight over it.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then who will you compel to become guardians of the city, if not those who have the best understanding of what matters for good government and who have other honors than political ones, and a better life as well?

Glaucon/ No one.

Socrates/ Do you want us to consider now how such people will come to be in our city and how—just as some are said to have gone up from Hades to the gods—we'll lead them up to the light?

Glaucon/ Of course I do.

Socrates/ This isn't, it seems, a matter of tossing a coin, but of turning a soul from a day that is a kind of night to the true day—the ascent to what is, which we say is true philosophy.

Glaucon/ Indeed.

Socrates/ Then mustn't we try to discover the subjects that have the power to bring this about?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ So what subject is it, Glaucon, that draws the soul from the realm of becoming to the realm of what is? And it occurs to me as I'm speaking that we said, didn't we, that it is necessary for the prospective rulers to be athletes in war when they're young?

Glaucon/ Yes, we did.

Socrates/ Then the subject we're looking for must also have this characteristic in addition to the former one.

Glaucon/ Which one?

Socrates/ It mustn't be useless to warlike men.

Glaucon/ If it's at all possible, it mustn't.

Socrates/ Now, prior to this, we educated them in music and poetry and physical training.

Glaucon/ We did.

Socrates/ And physical training is concerned with what comes into being and dies, for it oversees the growth and decay of the body.

Glaucon/ Apparently.

Socrates/ So it couldn't be the subject we're looking for.

Glaucon/ No, it couldn't.

Socrates/ Then, could it be the music and poetry we described before?

Glaucon/ But that, if you remember, is just the counterpart of physical training. It educated the guardians through habits. Its harmonies gave them a certain harmoniousness, not knowledge; its rhythms gave them a certain rhythmical quality; and its stories, whether fictional or nearer the truth, cultivated other habits akin to these.

But as for the subject you're looking for now, there's nothing like that in music and poetry.

Socrates/ Your reminder is exactly to the point; there's really nothing like that in music and poetry. But, Glaucon, what is there that does have this? The crafts all seem to be base or mechanical.

Glaucon/ How could they be otherwise? But apart from music and poetry, physical training, and the crafts, what subject is left?

Socrates/ Well, if we can't find anything apart from these, let's consider one of the subjects that touches all of them.

Glaucon/ What sort of thing?

Socrates/ For example, that common thing that every craft, every type of thought, and every science uses and that is among the first compulsory subjects for everyone.

Glaucon/ What's that?

Socrates/ That inconsequential matter of distinguishing the one, the two, and the three. In short, I mean number and calculation, for isn't it true that every craft and science must have a share in that?

Glaucon/ They certainly must.

Socrates/ Then so must warfare.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ In the tragedies, at any rate, Palamedes is always showing up Agamemnon as a totally ridiculous general. Haven't you noticed? He says that, by inventing numbers, he established how many troops there were in the Trojan army and counted their ships and everything else—implying that they were uncounted before and that Agamemnon (if indeed he didn't know how to count) didn't even know how many feet he had? What kind of general do you think that made him?

Glaucon/ A very strange one, if that's true.

Socrates/ Then won't we set down this subject as compulsory for a warrior, so that he is able to count and calculate?

Glaucon/ More compulsory than anything. If, that is, he's to understand anything about setting his troops in order or if he's even to be properly human.

Socrates/ Then do you notice the same thing about this subject that I do?

Glaucon/ What's that?

Socrates/ That this turns out to be one of the subjects we were looking for that naturally lead to understanding. But no one uses it correctly, namely, as something that is really fitted in every way to draw one towards being.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I'll try to make my view clear as follows: I'll distinguish for myself the things that do or don't lead in the direction we mentioned, and you must study them along with me and either agree or disagree, and that way we may come to know more clearly whether things are indeed as I divine.

Glaucon/ Point them out.

Socrates/ I'll point out, then, if you can grasp it, that some sense perceptions don't summon the understanding to look into them, because the judgment of sense perception is itself adequate, while others encourage it in every way to look into them, because sense perception seems to produce no sound result.

Glaucon/ You're obviously referring to things appearing in the distance and to *trompe l'oeil* paintings.

Socrates/ You're not quite getting my meaning.

Glaucon/ Then what do you mean?

Socrates/ The ones that don't summon the understanding are all those that don't go off into opposite perceptions at the same time. But the ones that do go off in that way I call summoners—whenever sense perception doesn't declare one thing any more than its opposite, no matter whether the object striking the senses is near at hand or far away. You'll understand my meaning better if I put it this way: These, we say, are three fingers—the smallest, the second, and the middle finger.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Assume that I'm talking about them as being seen from close by. Now, this is my question about them.

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ It's apparent that each of them is equally a finger, and it makes no difference in this regard whether the finger is seen to be in the middle or at either end, whether it is dark or pale, thick or thin, or anything else of that sort, for in all these cases, an ordinary soul isn't compelled to ask the understanding what a finger is, since sight doesn't suggest to it that a finger is at the same time the opposite of a finger.

Glaucon/ No, it doesn't.

Socrates/ Therefore, it isn't likely that anything of that sort would summon or awaken the understanding.

Glaucon/ No, it isn't.

Socrates/ But what about the bigness and smallness of fingers? Does sight perceive them adequately? Does it make no difference to it whether the finger is in the middle or at the end? And is it the same with the sense of touch, as regards the thick and the thin, the hard and the soft? And do the other senses reveal such things clearly and adequately? Doesn't each of them rather do the following: The sense set over the hard is, in the first place, of necessity

also set over the soft, and it reports to the soul that the same thing is perceived by it to be both hard and soft?

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And isn't it necessary that in such cases the soul is puzzled as to what this sense means by the hard, if it indicates that the same thing is also soft, or what it means by the light and the heavy, if it indicates that the heavy is light, or the light, heavy?

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed, these are strange reports for the soul to receive, and they do demand to be looked into.

Socrates/ Then it's likely that in such cases the soul, summoning calculation and understanding, first tries to determine whether each of the things announced to it is one or two.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ If it's evidently two, won't each be evidently distinct and one?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, if each is one, and both two, the soul will understand that the two are separate, for it wouldn't understand the inseparable to be two, but rather one.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Sight, however, saw the big and small, not as separate, but as mixed up together. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in order to get clear about all this, understanding was compelled to see the big and the small, not as mixed up together, but as separate—the opposite way from sight.

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And isn't it from these cases that it first occurs to us to ask what the big is and what the small is?

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And, because of this, we called the one the intelligible and the other the visible.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ This, then, is what I was trying to express before, when I said that some things summon thought, while others don't. Those that strike the relevant sense at the same time as their opposites I call summoners, those that don't do this do not awaken understanding.

Glaucon/ Now I understand, and I think you're right.

Socrates/ Well, then, to which of them do number and the one belong?

Glaucon/ I don't know.

Socrates/ Reason it out from what was said before. If the one is adequately seen itself by itself or is so perceived by any of the other senses, then, as we were saying in the case of fingers, it wouldn't draw the soul towards being. But if something opposite to it is always seen at the same time, so that nothing is apparently any more one than the opposite of one, then something would be needed to judge the matter. The soul would then be puzzled, would look for an answer, would stir up its understanding, and would ask what the one itself is. And so this would be among the subjects that lead the soul and turn it around towards the study of that which is.

Glaucon/ But surely the sight of the one does possess this characteristic to a remarkable degree, for we see the same thing to be both one and an unlimited number at the same time.

Socrates/ Then, if this is true of the one, won't it also be true of all numbers?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, calculation and arithmetic are wholly concerned with numbers.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then evidently they lead us towards truth.

Glaucon/ Super naturally so.

Socrates/ Then they belong, it seems, to the subjects we're seeking. They are compulsory for warriors because of their orderly ranks and for philosophers because they have to learn to rise up out of becoming and grasp being, if they are ever to become rational.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And our guardian must be both a warrior and a philosopher.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then it would be appropriate, Glaucon, to legislate this subject for those who are going to share in the highest offices in the city and to persuade them to turn to calculation and take it up, not as laymen do, but staying with it until they reach the study of the natures of the numbers by means of understanding itself, nor like tradesmen and retailers, for the sake of buying and selling, but for the sake of war and for ease in turning the soul around, away from becoming and towards truth and being.

Glaucon/ Well put.

Socrates/ Moreover, it strikes me, now that it has been mentioned, how sophisticated the subject of calculation is and in how many ways it is useful for our purposes, provided that one practices it for the sake of knowing rather than trading.

Glaucon/ How is it useful?

Socrates/ In the very way we were talking about. It leads the soul forcibly upward and compels it to discuss the

numbers themselves, never permitting anyone to propose for discussion numbers attached to visible or tangible bodies. You know what those who are clever in these matters are like: If, in the course of the argument, someone tries to divide the one itself, they laugh and won't permit it. If you divide it, they multiply it, taking care that one thing never be found to be many parts rather than one.

Glaucon/ That's very true.

Socrates/ Then what do you think would happen, Glaucon, if someone were to ask them: "What kind of numbers are you talking about, in which the one is as you assume it to be, each one equal to every other, without the least difference and containing no internal parts?"

Glaucon/ I think they' answer that they are talking about those numbers that can be grasped only in thought and can't be dealt with in any other way.

Socrates/ Then do you see that it's likely that this subject really is compulsory for us, since it apparently compels the soul to use understanding itself on the truth itself?

Glaucon/ Indeed, it most certainly does do that.

Socrates/ And what about those who are naturally good at calculation or reasoning? Have you already noticed that they're naturally sharp, so to speak, in all subjects, and that those who are slow at it, if they're educated and exercised in it, even if they're benefited in no other way, nonetheless improve and become generally sharper than they were?

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ Moreover, I don't think you'll easily find subjects that are harder to learn or practice than this.

Glaucon/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Then, for all these reasons, this subject isn't to be neglected, and the best natures must be educated in it.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Let that, then, be one of our subjects. Second, let's consider whether the subject that comes next is also appropriate for our purposes.

Glaucon/ What subject is that? Do you mean geometry?

Socrates/ That's the very one I had in mind.

Glaucon/ Insofar as it pertains to war, it's obviously appropriate, for when it comes to setting up camp, occupying a region, concentrating troops, deploying them, or with regard to any of the other formations an army adopts in battle or on the march, it makes all the difference whether someone is a geometer or not.

Socrates/ But, for things like that, even a little geometry—or calculation for that matter—would suffice. What we need to consider is whether the greater and more advanced part of it tends to make it easier to see the form of the good. And we say that anything has that tendency if it compels the soul to turn itself around towards the region in which lies the happiest of the things that are, the one the soul must see at any cost.

Glaucon/ You're right.

Socrates/ Therefore, if geometry compels the soul to study being, it's appropriate, but if it compels it to study becoming, it's inappropriate.

Glaucon/ So we've said, at any rate.

Socrates/ Now, no one with even a little experience of geometry will dispute that this science is entirely the opposite of what is said about it in the accounts of its practitioners.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ They give ridiculous accounts of it, though they can't help it, for they speak like practical men, and all their

accounts refer to doing things. They talk of “squaring,” “applying,” “adding,” and the like, whereas the entire subject is pursued for the sake of knowledge.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And mustn’t we also agree on a further point?

Glaucon/ What is that?

Socrates/ That their accounts are for the sake of knowing what always is, not what comes into being and passes away.

Glaucon/ That’s easy to agree to, for geometry is knowledge of what always is.

Socrates/ Then it draws the soul towards truth and produces philosophic thought by directing upwards what we now wrongly direct downwards.

Glaucon/ As far as anything possibly can.

Socrates/ Then as far as we possibly can, we must require those in your fine city not to neglect geometry in any way, for even its by-products are not insignificant.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ The ones concerned with war that you mentioned. But we also surely know that, when it comes to better understanding any subject, there is a world of difference between someone who has grasped geometry and someone who hasn’t.

Glaucon/ Yes, by god, a world of difference.

Socrates/ Then shall we set this down as a second subject for the young?

Glaucon/ Let’s do so.

Socrates/ And what about astronomy? Shall we make it the third? Or do you disagree?

Glaucon/ That’s fine with me, for a better awareness of the seasons, months, and years is no less appropriate for a general than for a farmer or navigator.

Socrates/ You amuse me: You're like someone who's afraid that the majority will think he is prescribing useless subjects. It's no easy task—indeed it's very difficult—to realize that in every soul there is an instrument that is purified and rekindled by such subjects when it has been blinded and destroyed by other ways of life, an instrument that it is more important to preserve than ten thousand eyes, since only with it can the truth be seen. Those who share your belief that this is so will think you're speaking incredibly well, while those who've never been aware of it will probably think you're talking nonsense, since they see no benefit worth mentioning in these subjects. So decide right now which group you're addressing. Or are your arguments for neither of them but mostly for your own sake—though you won't begrudge anyone else whatever benefit he's able to get from them?

Glaucon/ The latter: I want to speak, question, and answer mostly for my own sake.

Socrates/ Then let's fall back to our earlier position, for we were wrong just now about the subject that comes after geometry.

Glaucon/ What was our error?

Socrates/ After plane surfaces, we went on to revolving solids before dealing with solids by themselves. But the right thing to do is to take up the third dimension right after the second. And this, I suppose, consists of cubes and of whatever shares in depth.

Glaucon/ You're right, Socrates, but this subject hasn't been developed yet.

Socrates/ There are two reasons for that: First, because no city values it, this difficult subject is little researched. Second, the researchers need a director, for, without one, they won't discover anything. To begin with, such a director

is hard to find, and, then, even if he could be found, those who currently do research in this field would be too arrogant to follow him. If an entire city helped him to supervise it, however, and took the lead in valuing it, then he would be followed. And, if the subject was consistently and vigorously pursued, it would soon be developed. Even now, when it isn't valued and is held in contempt by the majority and is pursued by researchers who are unable to give an account of its usefulness, nevertheless, in spite of all these handicaps, the force of its charm has caused it to develop somewhat, so that it wouldn't be surprising if it were further developed even as things stand.

Glaucon/ The subject has outstanding charm. But explain more clearly what you were saying just now. The subject that deals with plane surfaces you took to be geometry.

Socrates/ Yes.

Glaucon/ And at first you put astronomy after it, but later you went back on that.

Socrates/ In my haste to go through them all, I've only progressed more slowly. The subject dealing with the dimension of depth was next. But because it is in a ridiculous state, I passed it by and spoke of astronomy (which deals with the motion of things having depth) after geometry.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Let's then put astronomy as the fourth subject, on the assumption that solid geometry will be available if a city takes it up.

Glaucon/ That seems reasonable. And since you reproached me before for praising astronomy in a vulgar manner, I'll now praise it your way, for I think it's clear to

everyone that astronomy compels the soul to look upward and leads it from things here to things there.

Socrates/ It may be obvious to everyone except me, but that's not my view about it.

Glaucon/ Then what is your view?

Socrates/ As it's practiced today by those who teach philosophy, it makes the soul look very much downward.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ In my opinion, your conception of "higher studies" is a good deal too generous, for if someone were to study something by leaning his head back and studying ornaments on a ceiling, it looks as though you'd say he's studying not with his eyes but with his understanding. Perhaps you're right, and I'm foolish, but I can't conceive of any subject making the soul look upward except one concerned with that which is, and that which is, is invisible. If anyone attempts to learn something about sensible things, whether by gaping upward or squinting downward, I'd claim—since there's no knowledge of such things—that he never learns anything and that, even if he studies lying on his back on the ground or floating on it in the sea, his soul is looking not up but down.

Glaucon/ You're right to reproach me, and I've been justly punished, but what did you mean when you said that astronomy must be learned in a different way from the way in which it is learned at present if it is to be a useful subject for our purposes?

Socrates/ It's like this: We should consider the decorations in the sky to be the most beautiful and most exact of visible things, seeing that they're embroidered on a visible surface. But we should consider their motions to fall far short of the true ones—motions that are really fast or slow as measured in true numbers, that trace out true

geometrical figures, that are all in relation to one another, and that are the true motions of the things carried along in them. And these, of course, must be grasped by reason and thought, not by sight. Or do you think otherwise?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Therefore, we should use the embroidery in the sky as a model in the study of these other things. If someone experienced in geometry were to come upon plans very carefully drawn and worked out by Daedalus or some other craftsman or artist, he'd consider them to be very finely executed, but he'd think it ridiculous to examine them seriously in order to find the truth in them about the equal, the double, or any other ratio.

Glaucon/ How could it be anything other than ridiculous?

Socrates/ Then don't you think that a real astronomer will feel the same when he looks at the motions of the stars? He'll believe that the craftsman of the heavens arranged them and all that's in them in the finest way possible for such things. But as for the ratio of night to day, of days to a month, of a month to a year, or of the motions of the stars to any of them or to each other, don't you think he'll consider it strange to believe that they're always the same and never deviate anywhere at all or to try in any sort of way to grasp the truth about them, since they're connected to body and visible?

Glaucon/ That's my opinion anyway, now that I hear it from you.

Socrates/ Then if, by really taking part in astronomy, we're to make the naturally intelligent part of the soul useful instead of useless, let's study astronomy by means of problems, as we do geometry, and leave the things in the sky alone.

Glaucon/ The task you're prescribing is a lot harder than anything now attempted in astronomy.

Socrates/ And I suppose that, if we are to be of any benefit as lawgivers, our prescriptions for the other subjects will be of the same kind. But have you any other appropriate subject to suggest?

Glaucon/ Not offhand.

Socrates/ Well, there isn't just one form of motion but several. Perhaps a wise person could list them all, but there are two that are evident even to us.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ Besides the one we've discussed, there is also its counterpart.

Glaucon/ What's that?

Socrates/ It's likely that, as the eyes fasten on astronomical motions, so the ears fasten on harmonic ones, and that the sciences of astronomy and harmonics are closely akin. This is what the Pythagoreans say, Glaucon, and we agree, don't we?

Glaucon/ We do.

Socrates/ Therefore, since the subject is so huge, shouldn't we ask them what they have to say about harmonic motions and whether there is anything else besides them, all the while keeping our own goal squarely in view?

Glaucon/ What's that?

Socrates/ That those whom we are rearing should never try to learn anything incomplete, anything that doesn't reach the end that everything should reach—the end we mentioned just now in the case of astronomy. Or don't you know that people do something similar in harmonics? Measuring

audible consonances and sounds against one another, they labor in vain, just like present-day astronomers.

Glaucon/ Yes, by the gods, and pretty ridiculous they are too. They talk about something they call a "dense interval" or quartertone—putting their ears to their instruments like someone trying to overhear what the neighbors are saying. And some say that they hear a tone in between and that it is the shortest interval by which they must measure, while others argue that this tone sounds the same as a quarter tone. Both put ears before understanding.

Socrates/ You mean those excellent fellows who torment their strings, torturing them, and stretching them on pegs. I won't draw out the analogy by speaking of blows with the plectrum or the accusations or denials and boastings on the part of the strings; instead I'll cut it short by saying that these aren't the people I'm talking about. The ones I mean are the ones we just said we were going to question about harmonics, for they do the same as the astronomers. They seek out the numbers that are to be found in these audible consonances, but they do not make the ascent to problems. They don't investigate, for example, which numbers are consonant and which aren't or what the explanation is of each.

Glaucon/ But that would be a superhuman task.

Socrates/ Yet it's useful in the search for the beautiful and the good. But pursued for any other purpose, it's useless.

Glaucon/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Moreover, I take it that, if inquiry into all the subjects we've mentioned brings out their association and relationship with one another and draws conclusions about their kinship, it does contribute something to our goal and isn't labor in vain, but that otherwise it is in vain.

Glaucon/ I, too, divine that this is true. But you're still talking about a very big task, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you mean the prelude, or what? Or don't you know that all these subjects are merely preludes to the song itself that must also be learned? Surely you don't think that people who are clever in these matters are dialecticians.

Glaucon/ No, by god, I don't. Although I have met a few exceptions.

Socrates/ But did it ever seem to you that those who can neither give nor follow an account know anything at all of the things we say they must know?

Glaucon/ My answer to that is also no.

Socrates/ Then isn't this at last, Glaucon, the song that dialectic sings? It is intelligible, but it is imitated by the power of sight. We said that sight tries at last to look at the animals themselves, the stars themselves, and, in the end, at the sun itself. In the same way, whenever someone tries through argument and apart from all sense perceptions to find the being itself of each thing and doesn't give up until he grasps the good itself with understanding itself, he reaches the end of the intelligible, just as the other reached the end of the visible.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And what about this journey? Don't you call it dialectic?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then the release from bonds and the turning around from shadows to statues and the light of the fire and, then, the way up out of the cave to the sunlight and, there, the continuing inability to look at the animals, the plants, and the light of the sun, but the newly acquired ability to look at divine images in water and shadows of the things that are, rather than, as before, merely at shadows of statues

thrown by another source of light that is itself a shadow in relation to the sun—all this business of the crafts we've mentioned has the power to awaken the best part of the soul and lead it upward to the study of the best among the things that are, just as, before, the clearest thing in the body was led to the brightest thing in the bodily and visible realm.

Glaucon/ I accept that this is so, even though it seems very hard to accept in one way and hard not to accept in another. All the same, since we'll have to return to these things often in the future, rather than having to hear them just once now, let's assume that what you've said is so and turn to the song itself, discussing it in the same way as we did the prelude. So tell us: what is the sort of power dialectic has, what forms is it divided into, and what paths does it follow? For these lead at last, it seems, towards that place which is a rest from the road, so to speak, and an end of journeying for the one who reaches it.

Socrates/ You won't be able to follow me any longer, Glaucon, even though there is no lack of eagerness on my part to lead you, for you would no longer be seeing an image of what we're describing, but the truth itself. At any rate, that's how it seems to me. That it is really so is not worth insisting on any further. But that there is some such thing to be seen, that is something we must insist on. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And mustn't we also insist that the power of dialectic could reveal it only to someone experienced in the subjects we've described and that it cannot reveal it in any other way?

Glaucon/ That too is worth insisting on.

Socrates/ At any rate, no one will dispute it when we say that there is no other inquiry that systematically attempts to

grasp with respect to each thing itself what the being of it is, for all the other crafts are concerned with human opinions and desires, with growing or construction, or with the care of growing or constructed things. And as for the rest, I mean geometry and the subjects that follow it, we described them as to some extent grasping what is, for we saw that, while they do dream about what is, they are unable to command a waking view of it as long as they make use of hypotheses that they leave untouched and that they cannot give any account of. What mechanism could possibly turn any agreement into knowledge when it begins with something unknown and puts together the conclusion and the steps in between from what is unknown?

Glaucon/ None.

Socrates/ Therefore, dialectic is the only inquiry that travels this road, doing away with hypotheses and proceeding to the first principle itself, so as to be secure. And when the eye of the soul is really buried in a sort of barbaric bog, dialectic gently pulls it out and leads it upwards, using the crafts we described to help it and cooperate with it in turning the soul around. From force of habit, we've often called these crafts sciences or kinds of knowledge, but they need another name, clearer than opinion, darker than knowledge. We called them thought somewhere before. But I presume that we won't dispute about a name when we have so many more important matters to investigate.

Glaucon/ Of course not.

Socrates/ It will therefore be enough to call the first section knowledge, the second thought, the third belief, and the fourth imaging, just as we did before. The last two together we call opinion, the other two, intellect. Opinion is concerned with becoming, intellect with being. And as being is to becoming, so intellect is to opinion, and as intellect is

to opinion, so knowledge is to belief and thought to imaging. But as for the ratios between the things these are set over and the division of either the opinable or the intelligible section into two, let's pass them by, Glaucon, lest they involve us in arguments many times longer than the ones we've already gone through.

Glaucon/ I agree with you about the others in any case, insofar as I'm able to follow.

Socrates/ Then, do you call someone who is able to give an account of the being of each thing dialectical? But insofar as he's unable to give an account of something, either to himself or to another, do you deny that he has any understanding of it?

Glaucon/ How could I do anything else?

Socrates/ Then the same applies to the good. Unless someone can distinguish in an account the form of the good from everything else, can survive all refutation, as if in a battle, striving to judge things not in accordance with opinion but in accordance with being, and can come through all this with his account still intact, you'll say that he doesn't know the good itself or any other good. And if he gets hold of some image of it, you'll say that it's through opinion, not knowledge, for he is dreaming and asleep throughout his present life, and, before he wakes up here, he will arrive in Hades and go to sleep forever.

Glaucon/ Yes, by god, I'll certainly say all of that.

Socrates/ Then, as for those children of yours whom you're rearing and educating in theory, if you ever reared them in fact, I don't think that you'd allow them to rule in your city or be responsible for the most important things while they are as irrational as incommensurable lines.

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then you'll legislate that they are to give most attention to the education that will enable them to ask and answer questions most knowledgeably?

Glaucon/ I'll legislate it along with you.

Socrates/ Then do you think that we've placed dialectic at the top of the other subjects like a coping stone and that no other subject can rightly be placed above it, but that our account of the subjects that a future ruler must learn has come to an end?

Glaucon/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Then it remains for you to deal with the distribution of these subjects, with the question of to whom we'll assign them and in what way.

Glaucon/ That's clearly next.

Socrates/ Do you remember what sort of people we chose in our earlier selection of rulers?

Glaucon/ Of course I do.

Socrates/ In the other respects, the same natures have to be chosen: we have to select the most stable, the most courageous, and as far as possible the most graceful. In addition, we must look not only for people who have a noble and tough character but for those who have the natural qualities conducive to this education of ours.

Glaucon/ Which ones exactly?

Socrates/ They must be keen on the subjects and learn them easily, for people's souls give up much more easily in hard study than in physical training, since the pain—being peculiar to them and not shared with their body—is more their own.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ We must also look for someone who has got a good memory, is persistent, and is in every way a lover of

hard work. How else do you think he'd be willing to carry out both the requisite bodily labors and also complete so much study and practice?

Glaucon/ Nobody would, unless his nature was in every way a good one.

Socrates/ In any case, the present error, which as we said before explains why philosophy isn't valued, is that she's taken up by people who are unworthy of her, for illegitimate students shouldn't be allowed to take her up, but only legitimate ones.

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ In the first place, no student should be lame in his love of hard work, really loving one half of it, and hating the other half. This happens when someone is a lover of physical training, hunting, or any kind of bodily labor and isn't a lover of learning, listening, or inquiry, but hates the work involved in them. And someone whose love of hard work tends in the opposite direction is also lame.

Glaucon/ That's very true.

Socrates/ Similarly with regard to truth, won't we say that a soul is maimed if it hates a voluntary falsehood, cannot endure to have one in itself, and is greatly angered when it exists in others, but is nonetheless content to accept an involuntary falsehood, isn't angry when it is caught being ignorant, and bears its lack of learning easily, wallowing in it like a pig?

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And with regard to moderation, courage, high-mindedness, and all the other parts of virtue, it is also important to distinguish the illegitimate from the legitimate, for when either a city or an individual doesn't know how to do this, it unwittingly employs the lame and illegitimate as friends or rulers for whatever services it wants done.

Glaucon/ That's just how it is.

Socrates/ So we must be careful in all these matters, for if we bring people who are sound of limb and mind to so great a subject and training, and educate them in it, even justice itself won't blame us, and we'll save the city and its constitution. But if we bring people of a different sort, we'll do the opposite, and let loose an even greater flood of ridicule upon philosophy.

Glaucon/ And it would be shameful to do that.

Socrates/ It certainly would. But I seem to have done something a bit ridiculous myself just now.

Glaucon/ What's that?

Socrates/ I forgot that we were only playing, and so I spoke too vehemently. But I looked upon philosophy as I spoke, and seeing her undeservedly besmirched, I seem to have lost my temper and said what I had to say too earnestly, as if I were angry with those responsible for it.

Glaucon/ That certainly wasn't my impression as I listened to you.

Socrates/ But it was mine as I was speaking. In any case, let's not forget that in our earlier selection we chose older people but that that isn't permitted in this one, for we mustn't believe Solon when he says that as someone grows older he's able to learn a lot. He can do that even less well than he can run races, for all great and numerous labors belong to the young.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Therefore, calculation, geometry, and all the preliminary education required for dialectic must be offered to the future rulers in childhood, and not in the shape of compulsory learning either.

Glaucon/ Why's that?

Socrates/ Because no free person should learn anything like a slave. Forced bodily labor does no harm to the body, but nothing taught by force stays in the soul.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ Then don't use force to train the children in these subjects; use play instead. That way you'll also see better what each of them is naturally fitted for.

Glaucon/ That seems reasonable.

Socrates/ Do you remember that we stated that the children were to be led into war on horseback as observers and that, wherever it is safe to do so, they should be brought close and taste blood, like puppies?

Glaucon/ I remember.

Socrates/ In all these things—in labors, studies, and fears—the ones who always show the greatest aptitude are to be inscribed on a list.

Glaucon/ At what age?

Socrates/ When they're released from compulsory physical training, for during that period, whether it's two or three years, young people are incapable of doing anything else, since weariness and sleep are enemies of learning. At the same time, how they fare in this physical training is itself an important test.

Glaucon/ Of course it is.

Socrates/ And after that, that is to say, from the age of twenty, those who are chosen will also receive more honors than the others. Moreover, the subjects they learned in no particular order as children they must now bring together to form a unified vision of their kinship both with one another and with the nature of that which is.

Glaucon/ At any rate, only learning of that sort holds firm in those who receive it.

Socrates/ It is also the greatest test of who is naturally dialectical and who isn't, for anyone who can achieve a unified vision is dialectical, and anyone who can't isn't.

Glaucon/ I agree.

Socrates/ Well, then, you'll have to look out for the ones who most of all have this ability in them and who also remain steadfast in their studies, in war, and in the other activities laid down by law. And after they have reached their thirtieth year, you'll select them in turn from among those chosen earlier and assign them yet greater honors. Then you'll have to test them by means of the power of dialectic, to discover which of them can relinquish his eyes and other senses, going on with the help of truth to that which by itself is. And this is a task that requires great care.

Glaucon/ What's the main reason for that?

Socrates/ Don't you realize what a great evil comes from dialectic as it is currently practiced?

Glaucon/ What evil is that?

Socrates/ Those who practice it are filled with lawlessness.

Glaucon/ They certainly are.

Socrates/ Do you think it's surprising that this happens to them? Aren't you sympathetic?

Glaucon/ Why isn't it surprising? And why should I be sympathetic?

Socrates/ Because it's like the case of a child brought up surrounded by much wealth and many flatterers in a great and numerous family, who finds out, when he has become a man, that he isn't the child of his professed parents and that he can't discover his real ones. Can you divine what the attitude of someone like that would be to the flatterers, on the one hand, and to his supposed parents, on the other,

before he knew about his parentage, and what it would be when he found out? Or would you rather hear what I divine about it?

Glaucon/ I'd rather hear your views.

Socrates/ Well, then, I divine that during the time that he didn't know the truth, he'd honor his father, mother, and the rest of his supposed family more than he would the flatterers, that he'd pay greater attention to their needs, be less likely to treat them lawlessly in word or deed, and be more likely to obey them than the flatterers in any matters of importance.

Glaucon/ Probably so.

Socrates/ When he became aware of the truth, however, his honor and enthusiasm would lessen for his family and increase for the flatterers, he'd obey the latter far more than before, begin to live in the way that they did, and keep company with them openly, and, unless he was very decent by nature, he'd eventually care nothing for that father of his or any of the rest of his supposed family.

Glaucon/ All this would probably happen as you say, but in what way is it an image of those who take up arguments?

Socrates/ As follows. We hold from childhood certain convictions about just and fine things; we're brought up with them as with our parents, we obey and honor them.

Glaucon/ Indeed, we do.

Socrates/ There are other ways of living, however, opposite to these and full of pleasures, that flatter the soul and attract it to themselves but which don't persuade sensible people, who continue to honor and obey the convictions of their fathers.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And then a questioner comes along and asks someone of this sort, “What is the fine?” And, when he answers what he has heard from the traditional lawgiver, the argument refutes him, and by refuting him often and in many places shakes him from his convictions, and makes him believe that the fine is no more fine than shameful, and the same with the just, the good, and the things he honored most. What do you think his attitude will be then to honoring and obeying his earlier convictions?

Glaucon/ Of necessity he won’t honor or obey them in the same way.

Socrates/ Then, when he no longer honors and obeys those convictions and can’t discover the true ones, will he be likely to adopt any other way of life than that which flatters him?

Glaucon/ No, he won’t.

Socrates/ And so, I suppose, from being law-abiding he becomes lawless.

Glaucon/ Inevitably.

Socrates/ Then, as I asked before, isn’t it only to be expected that this is what happens to those who take up arguments in this way, and don’t they therefore deserve a lot of sympathy?

Glaucon/ Yes, and they deserve pity too.

Socrates/ Then, if you don’t want your thirty-year-olds to be objects of such pity, you’ll have to be extremely careful about how you introduce them to arguments.

Glaucon/ That’s right.

Socrates/ And isn’t it one lasting precaution not to let them taste arguments while they’re young? I don’t suppose that it has escaped your notice that, when young people get their first taste of arguments, they misuse it by treating it as

a kind of game of contradiction. They imitate those who've refuted them by refuting others themselves, and, like puppies, they enjoy dragging and tearing those around them with their arguments.

Glaucon/ They're excessively fond of it.

Socrates/ Then, when they've refuted many and been refuted by them in turn, they forcefully and quickly fall into disbelieving what they believed before. And, as a result, they themselves and the whole of philosophy are discredited in the eyes of others.

Glaucon/ That's very true.

Socrates/ But an older person won't want to take part in such madness. He'll imitate someone who is willing to engage in discussion in order to look for the truth, rather than someone who plays at contradiction for sport. He'll be more sensible himself and will bring honor rather than discredit to the philosophical way of life.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And when we said before that those allowed to take part in arguments should be orderly and steady by nature, not as nowadays, when even the unfit are allowed to engage in them—wasn't all that also said as a precaution?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then if someone continuously, strenuously, and exclusively devotes himself to participation in arguments, exercising himself in them just as he did in the bodily physical training, which is their counterpart, would that be enough?

Glaucon/ Do you mean six years or four?

Socrates/ It doesn't matter. Make it five. And after that, you must make them go down into the cave again, and compel them to take command in matters of war and occupy

the other offices suitable for young people, so that they won't be inferior to the others in experience. But in these, too, they must be tested to see whether they'll remain steadfast when they're pulled this way and that or shift their ground.

Glaucon/ How much time do you allow for that?

Socrates/ Fifteen years. Then, at the age of fifty, those who've survived the tests and been successful both in practical matters and in the sciences must be led to the goal and compelled to lift up the radiant light of their souls to what itself provides light for everything. And once they've seen the good itself, they must each in turn put the city, its citizens, and themselves in order, using it as their model. Each of them will spend most of his time with philosophy, but, when his turn comes, he must labor in politics and rule for the city's sake, not as if he were doing something fine, but rather something that has to be done. Then, having educated others like himself to take his place as guardians of the city, he will depart for the Isles of the Blessed and dwell there. And, if the Pythia agrees, the city will publicly establish memorials and sacrifices to him as a daemon, but if not, then as a happy and divine human being.

Glaucon/ Like a sculptor, Socrates, you've produced ruling men that are completely fine.

Socrates/ And ruling women, too, Glaucon, for you mustn't think that what I've said applies any more to men than it does to women who are born with the appropriate natures.

Glaucon/ That's right, if indeed they are to share everything equally with the men, as we said they should.

Socrates/ Then, do you agree that the things we've said about the city and its constitution aren't altogether wishful thinking, that it's hard for them to come about, but not impossible? And do you also agree that they can come about

only in the way we indicated, namely, when one or more true philosophers come to power in a city, who despise present honors, thinking them slavish and worthless, and who prize what is right and the honors that come from it above everything, and regard justice as the most important and most essential thing, serving it and increasing it as they set their city in order?

Glaucon/ How will they do that?

Socrates/ They'll send everyone in the city who is over ten years old into the country. Then they'll take possession of the children, who are now free from the ethos of their parents, and bring them up in their own customs and laws, which are the ones we've described. This is the quickest and easiest way for the city and constitution we've discussed to be established, become happy, and bring most benefit to the people among whom it's established.

Glaucon/ That's by far the quickest and easiest way. And in my opinion, Socrates, you've described well how it would come into being, if it ever did.

Socrates/ Then, isn't that enough about this city and the man who is like it? Surely it is clear what sort of man we'll say he has to be.

Glaucon/ It is clear. And as for your question, I think that we have reached the end of this topic.

Book 8

Socrates/ Well, then, Glaucon, we've agreed to the following: If a city is to achieve the height of good government, wives must be in common, children and all their education must be in common, their way of life, whether in peace or war, must be in common, and their kings must be those among them who have proved to be best, both in philosophy and in warfare.

Glaucon/ We have agreed to that.

Socrates/ Moreover, we also agreed that, as soon as the rulers are established, they will lead the soldiers and settle them in the kind of dwellings we described, which are in no way private but common to all. And we also agreed, if you remember, what kind of possessions they will have.

Glaucon/ I remember that we thought that none of them should acquire any of the things that the other rulers now do but that, as athletes of war and guardians, they should receive their yearly upkeep from the other citizens as a wage for their guardianship and look after themselves and the rest of the city.

Socrates/ That's right. But since we have completed this discussion, let's recall the point at which we began the digression that brought us here, so that we can continue on the same path from where we left off.

Glaucon/ That isn't difficult, for, much the same as now, you were talking as if you had completed the description of the city. You said that you would class both the city you described and the man who is like it as good, even though, as it seems, you had a still finer city and man to tell us about. But, in any case, you said that, if this city was the right one, the others were faulty. You said, if I remember, that there were four types of constitution remaining that are worth discussing, each with faults that we should observe,

and we should do the same for the people who are like them. Our aim was to observe them all, agree which man is best and which worst, and then determine whether the best is happiest and the worst most wretched or whether it's otherwise. I was asking you which four constitutions you had in mind when Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted. And that's when you took up the discussion that led here.

Socrates/ That's absolutely right.

Glaucon/ Well, then, like a wrestler, give me the same hold again, and when I ask the same question, try to give the answer you were about to give before.

Socrates/ If I can.

Glaucon/ I'd at least like to hear what four constitutions you meant.

Socrates/ That won't be difficult since they're the ones for which we have names. First, there's the constitution praised by most people, namely, the Cretan or Laconian. The second, which is also second in the praise it receives, is called oligarchy and is filled with a host of evils. The next in order, and antagonistic to it, is democracy. And finally there is genuine tyranny, surpassing all of them, the fourth and last of the diseased cities. Or can you think of another type of constitution—I mean another whose form is distinct from these? Dynasties and purchased kingships and other constitutions of that sort, which one finds no less among the barbarians than among the Greeks, are somewhere intermediate between these four.

Glaucon/ At any event, many strange ones are indeed talked about.

Socrates/ And do you realize that of necessity there are as many forms of human character as there are of constitutions? Or do you think that constitutions are born

“from oak or rock” and not from the characters of the people who live in the cities governed by them, which tip the scales, so to speak, and drag the rest along with them?

Glaucon/ No, I don’t believe they come from anywhere else.

Socrates/ Then, if there are five forms of city, there must also be five forms of the individual soul.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, we’ve already described the one that’s like aristocracy, which is rightly said to be good and just.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ Then mustn’t we next go through the inferior ones, namely, the victory-loving and honor-loving (which corresponds to the Laconian form of constitution), followed by the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical, so that, having discovered the most unjust of all, we can oppose him to the most just? In this way, we can complete our investigation into how pure justice and pure injustice stand, with regard to the happiness or wretchedness of those who possess them, and either be persuaded by Thrasymachus to practice injustice or by the argument that is now coming to light to practice justice.

Glaucon/ That’s absolutely what we have to do.

Socrates/ Then, just as we began by looking for the virtues of character in a constitution, before looking for them in the individual, thinking that they’ be clearer in the former, shouldn’t we first examine the honor-loving constitution? I don’t know what other name there is for it, but it should be called either timocracy or timarchy. Then shouldn’t we examine an individual who is related to that constitution, and, after that, oligarchy and an oligarchic person, and democracy and a democratic person? And finally, having come to a city under a tyrant and having examined it,

shouldn't we look into a tyrannical soul, trying in this way to become adequate judges of the topic we proposed to ourselves?

Glaucon/ That would be a reasonable way for us to go about observing and judging, at any rate.

Socrates/ Well, then, let's try to explain how timocracy emerges from aristocracy. Or is it a simple principle that the cause of change in any constitution is civil war breaking out within the ruling group itself, but that if this group—however small it is—remains of one mind, the constitution cannot be changed?

Glaucon/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ How, then, Glaucon, will our city be changed? How will civil war arise, either between the auxiliaries and the rulers or within either group? Or do you want us to be like Homer and pray to the Muses to tell us "how civil war first broke out?" And shall we say that they speak to us in tragic tones, as if they were in earnest, playing and jesting with us as if we were children?

Glaucon/ What will they say?

Socrates/ Something like this. "It is hard for a city composed in this way to change, but everything that comes into being must decay. Not even a constitution such as this will last forever. It, too, must face dissolution. And this is how it will be dissolved. All plants that grow in the earth, and also all animals that grow upon it, have periods of fruitfulness and barrenness of both soul and body as often as the revolutions complete the circumferences of their circles. These circumferences are short for the short-lived, and the opposite for their opposites. Now, the people you have educated to be leaders in your city, even though they are wise, still won't, through calculation together with sense perception, hit upon the fertility and barrenness of the

human species, but it will escape them, and so they will at some time beget children when they ought not to do so. For the birth of a divine creature, there is a cycle comprehended by a perfect number. For a human being, it is the first number in which are found root and square increases, comprehending three lengths and four terms, of elements that make things like and unlike, that cause them to increase and decrease, and that render all things mutually agreeable and rational in their relations to one another. Of these elements, four and three, married with five, give two harmonies when thrice increased. One of them is a square, so many times a hundred. The other is of equal length one way but oblong. One of its sides is one hundred squares of the rational diameter of five diminished by one each or one hundred squares of the irrational diameter diminished by two each. The other side is a hundred cubes of three. This whole geometrical number controls better and worse births. And when your rulers, through ignorance of these births, join brides and grooms at the wrong time, the children will be neither good natured nor fortunate. The older generation will choose the best of these children but they are unworthy nevertheless, and when they acquire their fathers' powers, they will begin, as guardians, to neglect us Muses. First, they will have less consideration for music and poetry than they ought, then they will neglect physical training, so that your young people will become less well educated in music and poetry. Hence, rulers chosen from among them won't be able to guard well the testing of the golden, silver, bronze, and iron races, which are Hesiod's and your own. The intermixing of iron with silver and bronze with gold that results will engender lack of likeness and unharmonious inequality, and these always breed war and hostility wherever they arise. Civil war, we declare, is always and everywhere 'of this lineage'."

Glaucon/ And we'll declare that what the Muses say is right.

Socrates/ It must be, since they're Muses.

Glaucon/ What do the Muses say after that?

Socrates/ Once civil war breaks out, both the iron and bronze types pull the constitution towards money-making and the acquisition of land, houses, gold, and silver, while both the gold and silver types—not being poor, but by nature rich or rich in their souls—lead the constitution towards virtue and the old order. And thus striving and struggling with one another, they compromise on a middle way: They distribute the land and houses as private property, enslave and hold as serfs and servants those whom they previously guarded as free friends and providers of upkeep, and occupy themselves with war and with guarding against those whom they've enslaved.

Glaucon/ I think that is the way this transformation begins.

Socrates/ Then, isn't this constitution a sort of midpoint between aristocracy and oligarchy?

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Then, if that's its place in the transformation, how will it be managed after the change? Isn't it obvious that it will imitate the aristocratic constitution in some respects and oligarchy in others, since it's between them, and that it will also have some features of its own?

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ The rulers will be respected; the fighting class will be prevented from taking part in farming, manual labor, or other ways of making money; it will eat communally and devote itself to physical training and training for war; and in all such ways, won't the constitution be like the aristocratic one?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ On the other hand, it will be afraid to appoint wise people as rulers, on the grounds that they are no longer simple and earnest but mixed, and will incline towards spirited and simpler people, who are more naturally suited for war than peace; it will value the tricks and stratagems of war and spend all its time making war. Aren't most of these qualities peculiar to it?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Such people will desire money just as those in oligarchies do, passionately adoring gold and silver in secret. They will possess private treasuries and storehouses, where they can keep it hidden, and have houses to enclose them, like private nests, where they can spend lavishly either on women or on anyone else they wish.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ They'll be mean with their own money, since they value it and are not allowed to acquire it openly, but they'll love to spend other people's because of their appetites. They'll enjoy their pleasures in secret, running away from the law like boys from their father, for since they've neglected the true Muse—that of discussion and philosophy—and have valued physical training more than music and poetry, they haven't been educated by persuasion but by force.

Glaucon/ The constitution you're discussing is certainly a mixture of good and bad.

Socrates/ Yes, it is mixed, but because of the predominance of the spirited element, one thing alone is most manifest in it, namely, the love of victory and the love of honor.

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ This, then, is the way this constitution would come into being and what it would be like, for, after all, we're

only sketching the shape of the constitution in theory, not giving an exact account of it, since even from a sketch we'll be able to discern the most just and the most unjust person. And, besides, it would be an intolerably long task to describe every constitution and every character without omitting any detail.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then who is the man that corresponds to this constitution? How does he come to be, and what sort of man is he?

Glaucon/ I think, that he'd be very like Glaucon here, as far as the love of victory is concerned.

Socrates/ In that respect, he might be, but, in the following ones, I don't think his nature would be similar.

Glaucon/ Which ones?

Socrates/ He'd be more obstinate and less well trained in music and poetry, though he's a lover of it, and he'd love to listen to speeches and arguments, though he's by no means a rhetorician. He'd be harsh to his slaves rather than merely looking down on them as an adequately educated person does. He'd be gentle to free people and very obedient to rulers, being himself a lover of ruling and a lover of honor. However, he doesn't base his claim to rule on his ability as a speaker or anything like that, but, as he's a lover of physical training and a lover of hunting, on his abilities and exploits in warfare and warlike activities.

Glaucon/ Yes, that's the character that corresponds to this constitution.

Socrates/ Wouldn't such a person despise money when he's young but love it more and more as he grows older, because he shares in the money-loving nature and isn't pure in his attitude to virtue? And isn't that because he lacks the best of guardians?

Glaucon/ What guardian is that?

Socrates/ Reason, mixed with music and poetry, for it alone dwells within the person who possesses it as the lifelong preserver of his virtue.

Glaucon/ Well put.

Socrates/ That, then, is a timocratic youth; he resembles the corresponding city.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And he comes into being in some such way as this. He's the son of a good father who lives in a city that isn't well governed, who avoids honors, office, lawsuits, and all such meddling in other people's affairs, and who is even willing to be put at a disadvantage in order to avoid trouble.

Glaucon/ Then how does he come to be timocratic?

Socrates/ When he listens, first, to his mother complaining that her husband isn't one of the rulers and that she's at a disadvantage among the other women as a result. Then she sees that he's not very concerned about money and that he doesn't fight back when he's insulted, whether in private or in public in the courts, but is indifferent to everything of that sort. She also sees him concentrating his mind on his own thoughts, neither honoring nor dishonoring her overmuch. Angered by all this, she tells her son that his father is unmanly, too easy-going, and all the other things that women repeat over and over again in such cases.

Glaucon/ Yes, it's like them to have many such complaints.

Socrates/ You know, too, that the servants of men like that—the ones who are thought to be well disposed to the family—also say similar things to the son in private. When they see the father failing to prosecute someone who owes him money or has wronged him in some other way, they urge

the son to take revenge on all such people when he grows up and to be more of a man than his father. The boy hears and sees the same kind of things when he goes out: Those in the city who do their own work are called fools and held to be of little account, while those who meddle in other people's affairs are honored and praised. The young man hears and sees all this, but he also listens to what his father says, observes what he does from close at hand, and compares his ways of living with those of the others. So he's pulled by both. His father nourishes the rational part of his soul and makes it grow; the others nourish the spirited and appetitive parts. Because he isn't a bad man by nature but keeps bad company, when he's pulled in these two ways, he settles in the middle and surrenders the rule over himself to the middle part—the victory-loving and spirited part—and becomes a proud and honor-loving man.

Glaucon/ I certainly think that you've given a full account of how this sort of man comes to be.

Socrates/ Then we now have the second constitution and the second man.

Glaucon/ We have.

Socrates/ Then shall we next talk, as Aeschylus says, of "another man ordered like another city," or shall we follow our plan and talk about the city first?

Glaucon/ We must follow our plan.

Socrates/ And I suppose that the one that comes after the present constitution is oligarchy.

Glaucon/ And what kind of constitution would you call oligarchy?

Socrates/ The constitution based on a property assessment, in which the rich rule, and the poor man has no share in ruling.

Glaucon/ I understand.

Socrates/ So mustn't we first explain how timarchy is transformed into oligarchy?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And surely the manner of this transformation is clear even to the blind.

Glaucon/ What is it like?

Socrates/ The treasure house filled with gold, which each possesses, destroys the constitution. First, they find ways of spending money for themselves, then they stretch the laws relating to this, then they and their wives disobey the laws altogether.

Glaucon/ They would do that.

Socrates/ And as one person sees another doing this and emulates him, they make the majority of the others like themselves.

Glaucon/ They do.

Socrates/ From there they proceed further into money-making, and the more they value it, the less they value virtue. Or aren't virtue and wealth so opposed that if they were set on a scales, they' always incline in opposite directions?

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ So, when wealth and the wealthy are valued or honored in a city, virtue and good people are valued less.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And what is valued is always practiced, and what isn't valued is neglected.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then, in the end, victory-loving and honor-loving men become lovers of making money, or money-lovers. And they praise and admire wealthy people and appoint them as rulers, while they dishonor poor ones.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then, don't they pass a law that is characteristic of an oligarchic constitution, one that establishes a wealth qualification—higher where the constitution is more oligarchic, less where it's less so—and proclaims that those whose property doesn't reach the stated amount aren't qualified to rule? And they either put this through by force of arms, or else, before it comes to that, they terrorize the people and establish their constitution that way. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ Of course it is.

Socrates/ Generally speaking, then, that's the way this kind of constitution is established.

Glaucon/ Yes, but what is its character? And what are the faults that we said it contained?

Socrates/ First of all, the very thing that defines it is one, for what would happen if someone were to choose the captains of ships by their wealth, refusing to entrust the ship to a poor person even if he was a better captain?

Glaucon/ They would make a poor voyage of it.

Socrates/ And isn't the same true of the rule of anything else whatsoever?

Glaucon/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Except a city? Or does it also apply to a city?

Glaucon/ To it most of all, since it's the most difficult and most important kind of rule.

Socrates/ That, then, is one major fault in oligarchy.

Glaucon/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And what about this second fault? Is it any smaller than the other?

Glaucon/ What fault?

Socrates/ That of necessity it isn't one city but two—one of the poor and one of the rich—living in the same place and always plotting against one another.

Glaucon/ By god, that's just as big a fault as the first.

Socrates/ And the following is hardly a fine quality either, namely, that oligarchs probably aren't able to fight a war, for they' be compelled either to arm and use the majority, and so have more to fear from them than the enemy, or not to use them and show up as true oligarchs—few in number—on the battlefield. At the same time, they' be unwilling to pay mercenaries, because of their love of money.

Glaucon/ That certainly isn't a fine quality either.

Socrates/ And what about the meddling in other people's affairs that we condemned before? Under this constitution, won't the same people be farmers, money-makers, and soldiers simultaneously? And do you think it's right for things to be that way?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Now, let's see whether this constitution is the first to admit the greatest of all evils.

Glaucon/ Which one is that?

Socrates/ Allowing someone to sell all his possessions and someone else to buy them and then allowing the one who has sold them to go on living in the city, while belonging to none of its parts, for he's neither a money-maker, a craftsman, a member of the cavalry, or a hoplite, but a poor person without means.

Glaucon/ It is the first to allow that.

Socrates/ At any rate, this sort of thing is not forbidden in oligarchies. If it were, some of their citizens wouldn't be excessively rich, while others are totally impoverished.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Now, think about this. When the person who sells all his possessions was rich and spending his money, was he of any greater use to the city in the ways we've just mentioned than when he'd spent it all? Or did he merely seem to be one of the rulers of the city, while in truth he was neither ruler nor subject there, but only a squanderer of his property?

Glaucon/ That's right. He seemed to be part of the city, but he was nothing but a squanderer.

Socrates/ Should we say, then, that, as a drone exists in a cell and is an affliction to the hive, so this person is a drone in the house and an affliction to the city?

Glaucon/ That's certainly right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Hasn't the god made all the winged drones stingless, Adeimantus, as well as some wingless ones, while other wingless ones have dangerous stings? And don't the stingless ones continue as beggars into old age, while those with stings become what we call evildoers?

Adeimantus/ That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ Clearly, then, in any city where you see beggars, there are thieves, pickpockets, temple-robbers, and all such evildoers hidden.

Adeimantus/ That is clear.

Socrates/ What about oligarchic cities? Don't you see beggars in them?

Adeimantus/ Almost everyone except the rulers is a beggar there.

Socrates/ Then mustn't we suppose that they also include many evildoers with stings, whom the rulers carefully keep in check by force?

Adeimantus/ We certainly must.

Socrates/ And shall we say that the presence of such people is the result of lack of education, bad rearing, and a bad constitutional arrangement?

Adeimantus/ We shall.

Socrates/ This, then, or something like it, is the oligarchic city. It contains all these evils and probably others in addition.

Adeimantus/ That's pretty well what it's like.

Socrates/ Then, let's take it that we've disposed of the constitution called oligarchy—I mean the one that gets its rulers on the basis of a property assessment—and let's examine the man who is like it, both how he comes to be and what sort of man he is.

Adeimantus/ All right.

Socrates/ Doesn't the transformation from the timocrat we described to an oligarch occur mostly in this way?

Adeimantus/ Which way?

Socrates/ The timocrat's son at first emulates his father and follows in his footsteps. Then he suddenly sees him crashing against the city like a ship against a reef, spilling out all his possessions, even his life. He had held a generalship or some other high office, was brought to court by false witnesses, and was either put to death or exiled or was disenfranchised and had all his property confiscated.

Adeimantus/ That's quite likely.

Socrates/ The son sees all this, suffers from it, loses his property, and, fearing for his life, immediately drives from the throne in his own soul the honor-loving and spirited part that ruled there. Humbled by poverty, he turns greedily to making money, and, little by little, saving and working, he amasses property. Don't you think that this person would establish his appetitive and money-making part on the

throne, setting it up as a great king within himself, adorning it with golden tiaras and collars and girding it with Persian swords?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ He makes the rational and spirited parts sit on the ground beneath appetite, one on either side, reducing them to slaves. He won't allow the first to reason about or examine anything except how a little money can be made into great wealth. And he won't allow the second to value or admire anything but wealth and wealthy people or to have any ambition other than the acquisition of wealth or whatever might contribute to getting it.

Adeimantus/ There is no other transformation of a young man who is an honor-lover into one who is a money-lover that's as swift and sure as this.

Socrates/ Then isn't this an oligarchic man?

Adeimantus/ Surely, he developed out of a man who resembled the constitution from which oligarchy came.

Socrates/ Then let's consider whether he resembles the oligarchic constitution?

Adeimantus/ All right.

Socrates/ Doesn't he resemble it, in the first place, by attaching the greatest importance to money?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And, further, by being a thrifty worker, who satisfies only his necessary appetites, makes no other expenditures, and enslaves his other desires as vain.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ A somewhat squalid fellow, who makes a profit from everything and hoards it—the sort the majority admires. Isn't this the man who resembles such a constitution?

Adeimantus/ That's my opinion, anyway. At any rate, money is valued above everything by both the city and the man.

Socrates/ I don't suppose that such a man pays any attention to education.

Adeimantus/ Not in my view, for, if he did, he wouldn't have chosen a blind leader for his chorus and honored him most.

Socrates/ Good. But consider this: Won't we say that, because of his lack of education, the dronish appetites—some beggarly and others evil—exist in him, but that they're forcibly held in check by his carefulness?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do you know where you should look to see the evildoings of such people?

Adeimantus/ Where?

Socrates/ To the guardianship of orphans or something like that, where they have ample opportunity to do injustice with impunity.

Adeimantus/ True.

Socrates/ And doesn't this make it clear that, in those other contractual obligations, where he has a good reputation and is thought to be just, he's forcibly holding his other evil appetites in check by means of some decent part of himself? He holds them in check, not by persuading them that it's better not to act on them or taming them with arguments, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his other possessions.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ And, by god, you'll find that most of them have appetites akin to those of the drone, once they have other people's money to spend.

Adeimantus/ You certainly will.

Socrates/ Then someone like that wouldn't be entirely free from internal civil war and wouldn't be one but in some way two, though generally his better desires are in control of his worse.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ For this reason, he'd be more respectable than many, but the true virtue of a single-minded and harmonious soul far escapes him.

Adeimantus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ Further, this thrifty man is a poor individual contestant for victory in a city or for any other fine and much-honored thing, for he's not willing to spend money for the sake of a fine reputation or on contests for such things. He's afraid to arouse his appetites for spending or to call on them as allies to obtain victory, so he fights like an oligarch, with only a few of his resources. Hence he's mostly defeated but remains rich.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then have we any further doubt that a thrifty money-maker is like an oligarchic city?

Adeimantus/ None at all.

Socrates/ It seems, then, that we must next consider democracy, how it comes into being, and what character it has when it does, so that, knowing in turn the character of a man who resembles it, we can present him for judgment.

Adeimantus/ That would be quite consistent with what we've been doing.

Socrates/ Well, isn't the city changed from an oligarchy to a democracy in some such way as this, because of its insatiable desire to attain what it has set before itself as the good, namely, the need to become as rich as possible?

Adeimantus/ In what way?

Socrates/ Since those who rule in the city do so because they own a lot, I suppose they're unwilling to enact laws to prevent young people who've had no discipline from spending and wasting their wealth, so that by making loans to them, secured by the young people's property, and then calling those loans in, they themselves become even richer and more honored.

Adeimantus/ That's their favorite thing to do.

Socrates/ So isn't it clear by now that it is impossible for a city to honor wealth and at the same time for its citizens to acquire moderation, but one or the other is inevitably neglected?

Adeimantus/ That's pretty clear.

Socrates/ Because of this neglect and because they encourage bad discipline, oligarchies not infrequently reduce people of no common stamp to poverty.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ And these people sit idle in the city, I suppose, with their stings and weapons—some in debt, some disenfranchised, some both—hating those who've acquired their property, plotting against them and others, and longing for a revolution.

Adeimantus/ They do.

Socrates/ The money-makers, on the other hand, with their eyes on the ground, pretend not to see these people, and by lending money they disable any of the remainder who resist, exact as interest many times the principal sum, and so create a considerable number of drones and beggars in the city.

Adeimantus/ A considerable number indeed.

Socrates/ In any case, they are unwilling to quench this kind of evil as it flares up in the city, either in the way we mentioned, by preventing people from doing whatever they like with their own property or by another law which would also solve the problem.

Adeimantus/ What law?

Socrates/ The second-best one, which compels the citizens to care about virtue by prescribing that the majority of voluntary contracts be entered into at the lender's own risk, for lenders would be less shameless then in their pursuit of money in the city and fewer of those evils we were mentioning just now would develop.

Adeimantus/ Far fewer.

Socrates/ But as it is, for all these reasons, the rulers in the city treat their subjects in the way we described. But as for themselves and their children, don't they make their young fond of luxury, incapable of effort either mental or physical, too soft to stand up to pleasures or pains, and idle besides?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And don't they themselves neglect everything except making money, caring no more for virtue than the poor do?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But when rulers and subjects in this condition meet on a journey or some other common undertaking—it might be a festival, an embassy, or a campaign, or they might be shipmates or fellow soldiers—and see one another in danger, in these circumstances are the poor in any way despised by the rich? Or rather isn't it often the case that a poor man, lean and suntanned, stands in battle next to a rich man, reared in the shade and carrying a lot of excess flesh, and sees him panting and at a loss? And don't you

think that he'd consider that it's through the cowardice of the poor that such people are rich and that one poor man would say to another when they met in private: "These people are at our mercy; they're good for nothing"?

Adeimantus/ I know very well that's what they would do.

Socrates/ Then, as a sick body needs only a slight shock from outside to become ill and is sometimes at civil war with itself even without this, so a city in the same condition needs only a small pretext—such as one side bringing in allies from an oligarchy or the other from a democracy—to fall ill and to fight with itself and is sometimes in a state of civil war even without any external influence.

Adeimantus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And I suppose that democracy comes about when the poor are victorious, killing some of their opponents and expelling others, and giving the rest an equal share in ruling under the constitution, and for the most part assigning people to positions of rule by lot.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that's how democracy is established, whether by force of arms or because those on the opposing side are frightened into exile.

Socrates/ Then how do these people live? What sort of constitution do they have? It's clear that a man who is like it will be democratic.

Adeimantus/ That is clear.

Socrates/ First of all, then, aren't they free? And isn't the city full of freedom and freedom of speech? And doesn't everyone in it have the license to do what he wants?

Adeimantus/ That's what they say, at any rate.

Socrates/ And where people have this license, it's clear that each of them will arrange his own life in whatever manner pleases him.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ Then I suppose that it's most of all under this constitution that one finds people of all varieties.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then it looks as though this is the finest or most beautiful of the constitutions, for, like a coat embroidered with every kind of ornament, this city, embroidered with every kind of character type, would seem to be the most beautiful. And many people would probably judge it to be so, as women and children do when they see something multicolored.

Adeimantus/ They certainly would.

Socrates/ It's also a convenient place to look for a constitution.

Adeimantus/ Why's that?

Socrates/ Because it contains all kinds of constitutions on account of the license it gives its citizens. So it looks as though anyone who wants to put a city in order, as we were doing, should probably go to a democracy, as to a supermarket of constitutions, pick out whatever pleases him, and establish that.

Adeimantus/ He probably wouldn't be at a loss for models, at any rate.

Socrates/ In this city, there is no requirement to rule, even if you're capable of it, or again to be ruled if you don't want to be, or to be at war when the others are, or at peace unless you happen to want it. And there is no requirement in the least that you not serve in public office as a juror, if you happen to want to serve, even if there is a law forbidding you to do so. Isn't that a divine and pleasant life, while it lasts?

Adeimantus/ It probably is—while it lasts.

Socrates/ And what about the calm of some of their condemned criminals? Isn't that a sign of sophistication? Or have you never seen people who've been condemned to death or exile under such a constitution stay on at the center of things, strolling around like the ghosts of dead heroes, without anyone staring at them or giving them a thought?

Adeimantus/ Yes, I've seen it a lot.

Socrates/ And what about the city's tolerance? Isn't it so completely lacking in small-mindedness that it utterly despises the things we took so seriously when we were founding our city, namely, that unless someone had transcendent natural gifts, he'd never become good unless he played the right games and followed a fine way of life from early childhood? Isn't it magnificent the way it tramples all this underfoot, by giving no thought to what someone was doing before he entered public life and by honoring him if only he tells them that he wishes the majority well?

Adeimantus/ Yes, it's altogether splendid!

Socrates/ Then these and others like them are the characteristics of democracy. And it would seem to be a pleasant constitution, which lacks rulers but not variety and which distributes a sort of equality to both equals and unequals alike.

Adeimantus/ We certainly know what you mean.

Socrates/ Consider, then, what private individual resembles it. Or should we first inquire, as we did with the city, how he comes to be?

Adeimantus/ Yes, we should.

Socrates/ Well, doesn't it happen like this? Wouldn't the son of that thrifty oligarch be brought up in his father's ways?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then he too rules his spendthrift pleasures by force—the ones that aren't money-making and are called unnecessary.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But, so as not to discuss this in the dark, do you want us first to define which desires are necessary and which aren't?

Adeimantus/ I do.

Socrates/ Aren't those we can't desist from and those whose satisfaction benefits us rightly called necessary, for we are by nature compelled to satisfy them both? Isn't that so?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ So we'd be right to apply the term "necessary" to them?

Adeimantus/ We would.

Socrates/ What about those that someone could get rid of if he practiced from youth on, those whose presence leads to no good or even to the opposite? If we said that all of them were unnecessary, would we be right?

Adeimantus/ We would.

Socrates/ Let's pick an example of each, so that we can grasp the patterns they exhibit.

Adeimantus/ We should do that.

Socrates/ Aren't the following desires necessary: the desire to eat to the point of health and well-being and the desire for bread and delicacies?

Adeimantus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ The desire for bread is necessary on both counts; it's beneficial, and unless it's satisfied, we die.

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The desire for delicacies is also necessary to the extent that it's beneficial to well-being.

Adeimantus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ What about the desire that goes beyond these and seeks other sorts of foods, that most people can get rid of, if it's restrained and educated while they're young, and that's harmful both to the body and to the reason and moderation of the soul? Would it be rightly called unnecessary?

Adeimantus/ It would indeed.

Socrates/ Then wouldn't we also say that such desires are spendthrift, while the earlier ones are money-making, because they profit our various projects?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And won't we say the same about the desire for sex and about other desires?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And didn't we say that the person we just now called a drone is full of such pleasures and desires, since he is ruled by the unnecessary ones, while a thrifty oligarch is ruled by his necessary desires?

Adeimantus/ We certainly did.

Socrates/ Let's go back, then, and explain how the democratic man develops out of the oligarchic one. It seems to me as though it mostly happens as follows.

Adeimantus/ How?

Socrates/ When a young man, who is reared in the miserly and uneducated manner we described, tastes the honey of the drones and associates with wild and dangerous creatures who can provide every variety of multicolored pleasure in every sort of way, this, as you might suppose, is the beginning of his transformation from having an

oligarchic constitution within him to having a democratic one.

Adeimantus/ It's inevitable that this is how it starts.

Socrates/ And just as the city changed when one party received help from like-minded people outside, doesn't the young man change when one party of his desires receives help from external desires that are akin to them and of the same form?

Adeimantus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And I suppose that, if any contrary help comes to the oligarchic party within him, whether from his father or from the rest of his household, who exhort and reproach him, then there's civil war and counterrevolution within him, and he battles against himself.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Sometimes the democratic party yields to the oligarchic, so that some of the young man's appetites are overcome, others are expelled, a kind of shame rises in his soul, and order is restored.

Adeimantus/ That does sometimes happen.

Socrates/ But I suppose that, as desires are expelled, others akin to them are being nurtured unawares, and because of his father's ignorance about how to bring him up, they grow numerous and strong.

Adeimantus/ That's what tends to happen.

Socrates/ These desires draw him back into the same bad company and in secret intercourse breed a multitude of others.

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And, seeing the citadel of the young man's soul empty of knowledge, fine ways of living, and words of truth (which are the best watchmen and guardians of the thoughts

of those men whom the gods love), they finally occupy that citadel themselves.

Adeimantus/ They certainly do.

Socrates/ And in the absence of these guardians, false and boastful words and beliefs rush up and occupy this part of him.

Adeimantus/ Indeed, they do.

Socrates/ Won't he then return to these lotus-eaters and live with them openly? And if some help comes to the thrifty part of his soul from his household, won't these boastful words close the gates of the royal wall within him to prevent these allies from entering and refuse even to receive the words of older private individuals as ambassadors? Doing battle and controlling things themselves, won't they call reverence foolishness and moderation cowardice, abusing them and casting them out beyond the frontiers like disenfranchised exiles? And won't they persuade the young man that measured and orderly expenditure is boorish and mean, and, joining with many useless desires, won't they expel it across the border?

Adeimantus/ They certainly will.

Socrates/ Having thus emptied and purged these from the soul of the one they've possessed and initiated in splendid rites, they proceed to return insolence, anarchy, extravagance, and shamelessness from exile in a blaze of torchlight, wreathing them in garlands and accompanying them with a vast chorus of followers. They praise the returning exiles and give them fine names, calling insolence good breeding, anarchy freedom, extravagance magnificence, and shamelessness courage. Isn't it in some such way as this that someone who is young changes, after being brought up with necessary desires, to the liberation and release of useless and unnecessary pleasures?

Adeimantus/ Yes, that's clearly the way it happens.

Socrates/ And I suppose that after that he spends as much money, effort, and time on unnecessary pleasures as on necessary ones. If he's lucky, and his frenzy doesn't go too far, when he grows older, and the great tumult within him has spent itself, he welcomes back some of the exiles, ceases to surrender himself completely to the newcomers, and puts his pleasures on an equal footing. And so he lives, always surrendering rule over himself to whichever desire comes along, as if it were chosen by lot. And when that is satisfied, he surrenders the rule to another, not disdaining any but satisfying them all equally.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ And he doesn't admit any word of truth into the guardhouse, for if someone tells him that some pleasures belong to fine and good desires and others to evil ones and that he must pursue and value the former and restrain and enslave the latter, he denies all this and declares that all pleasures are equal and must be valued equally.

Adeimantus/ That's just what someone in that condition would do.

Socrates/ And so he lives on, yielding day by day to the desire at hand. Sometimes he drinks heavily while listening to the flute; at other times, he drinks only water and is on a diet; sometimes he goes in for physical training; at other times, he's idle and neglects everything; and sometimes he even occupies himself with what he takes to be philosophy. He often engages in politics, leaping up from his seat and saying and doing whatever comes into his mind. If he happens to admire soldiers, he's carried in that direction, if money-makers, in that one. There's neither order nor necessity in his life, but he calls it pleasant, free, and blessedly happy, and he follows it for as long as he lives.

Adeimantus/ You've perfectly described the life of a man who believes in legal equality.

Socrates/ I also suppose that he's a complex man, full of all sorts of characters, fine and multicolored, just like the democratic city, and that many men and women might envy his life, since it contains the most models of constitutions and ways of living.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then shall we set this man beside democracy as one who is rightly called democratic?

Adeimantus/ Let's do so.

Socrates/ The finest constitution and the finest man remain for us to discuss, namely, tyranny and a tyrannical man.

Adeimantus/ They certainly do.

Socrates/ Come, then, how does tyranny come into being? It's fairly clear that it evolves from democracy.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ And doesn't it evolve from democracy in much the same way that democracy does from oligarchy?

Adeimantus/ What way is that?

Socrates/ The good that oligarchy puts before itself and because of which it is established is wealth, isn't it?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And its insatiable desire for wealth and its neglect of other things for the sake of money-making is what destroyed it, isn't it?

Adeimantus/ That's true.

Socrates/ And isn't democracy's insatiable desire for what it defines as the good also what destroys it?

Adeimantus/ What do you think it defines as the good?

Socrates/ Freedom: Surely, you'd hear a democratic city say that this is the finest thing it has, so that as a result it is the only city worth living in for someone who is by nature free.

Adeimantus/ Yes, you often hear that.

Socrates/ Then, as I was about to say, doesn't the insatiable desire for freedom and the neglect of other things change this constitution and put it in need of a dictatorship?

Adeimantus/ In what way?

Socrates/ I suppose that, when a democratic city, athirst for freedom, happens to get bad cupbearers for its leaders, so that it gets drunk by drinking more than it should of the unmixed wine of freedom, then, unless the rulers are very pliable and provide plenty of that freedom, they are punished by the city and accused of being accursed oligarchs.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is what it does.

Socrates/ It insults those who obey the rulers as willing slaves and good-for-nothings and praises and honors, both in public and in private, rulers who behave like subjects and subjects who behave like rulers. And isn't it inevitable that freedom should go to all lengths in such a city?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ It makes its way into private households and in the end breeds anarchy even among the animals.

Adeimantus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that a father accustoms himself to behave like a child and fear his sons, while the son behaves like a father, feeling neither shame nor fear in front of his parents, in order to be free. A resident alien or a foreign visitor is made equal to a citizen, and he is their equal.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is what happens.

Socrates/ It does. And so do other little things of the same sort. A teacher in such a community is afraid of his students and flatters them, while the students despise their teachers or tutors. And, in general, the young imitate their elders and compete with them in word and deed, while the old stoop to the level of the young and are full of play and pleasantry, imitating the young for fear of appearing disagreeable and authoritarian.

Adeimantus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ The utmost freedom for the majority is reached in such a city when bought slaves, both male and female, are no less free than those who bought them. And I almost forgot to mention the extent of the legal equality of men and women and of the freedom in the relations between them.

Adeimantus/ What about the animals? Are we, with Aeschylus, going to "say whatever it was that came to our lips just now" about them?

Socrates/ Certainly. I put it this way: No one who hasn't experienced it would believe how much freer domestic animals are in a democratic city than anywhere else. As the proverb says, dogs become like their mistresses; horses and donkeys are accustomed to roam freely and proudly along the streets, bumping into anyone who doesn't get out of their way; and all the rest are equally full of freedom.

Adeimantus/ You're telling me what I already know. I've often experienced that sort of thing while travelling in the country.

Socrates/ To sum up: Do you notice how all these things together make the citizens' souls so sensitive that, if anyone even puts upon himself the least degree of slavery, they become angry and cannot endure it. And in the end, as you know, they take no notice of the laws, whether written or unwritten, in order to avoid having any master at all.

Adeimantus/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ This, then, is the fine and impetuous origin from which tyranny seems to me to evolve.

Adeimantus/ It is certainly impetuous. But what comes next?

Socrates/ The same disease that developed in oligarchy and destroyed it also develops here, but it is more widespread and virulent because of the general permissiveness, and it eventually enslaves democracy. In fact, excessive action in one direction usually sets up a reaction in the opposite direction. This happens in seasons, in plants, in bodies, and, last but not least, in constitutions.

Adeimantus/ That's to be expected.

Socrates/ Extreme freedom can't be expected to lead to Anything but a change to extreme slavery, whether for a private individual or for a city.

Adeimantus/ No, it can't.

Socrates/ Then I don't suppose that tyranny evolves from any constitution other than democracy—the most severe and cruel slavery from the utmost freedom.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that's reasonable.

Socrates/ But I don't think that was your question. You asked what was the disease that developed in oligarchy and also in democracy, enslaving it.

Adeimantus/ That's true.

Socrates/ And what I had in mind as an answer was that class of idle and extravagant men, whose bravest members are leaders and the more cowardly ones followers. We compared them to stinged and stingless drones, respectively.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Now, these two groups cause problems in any constitution, just as phlegm and bile do in the body. And it's

against them that the good doctor and lawgiver of a city must take advance precautions, first, to prevent their presence and, second, to cut them out of the hive as quickly as possible, cells and all, if they should happen to be present.

Adeimantus/ Yes, by god, he must cut them out altogether.

Socrates/ Then let's take up the question in the following way, so that we can see what we want more clearly.

Adeimantus/ In what way?

Socrates/ Let's divide a democratic city into three parts in theory, this being the way that it is in fact divided. One part is this class of idlers, that grows here no less than in an oligarchy, because of the general permissiveness.

Adeimantus/ So it does.

Socrates/ But it is far fiercer in democracy than in the other.

Adeimantus/ How so?

Socrates/ In an oligarchy it is fierce because it's disdained, but since it is prevented from having a share in ruling, it doesn't get any exercise and doesn't become vigorous. In a democracy, however, with a few exceptions, this class is the dominant one. Its fiercest members do all the talking and acting, while the rest settle near the speaker's platform and buzz and refuse to tolerate the opposition of another speaker, so that, under a democratic constitution, with the few exceptions I referred to before, this class manages everything.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then there's a second class that always distinguishes itself from the majority of people.

Adeimantus/ Which is that?

Socrates/ When everybody is trying to make money, those who are naturally most organized generally become the wealthiest.

Adeimantus/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Then they would provide the most honey for the drones and the honey that is most easily extractable by them.

Adeimantus/ Yes, for how could anyone extract it from those who have very little?

Socrates/ Then I suppose that these rich people are called drone-fodder.

Adeimantus/ Something like that.

Socrates/ The people—those who work with their own hands—are the third class. They take no part in politics and have few possessions, but, when they are assembled, they are the largest and most powerful class in a democracy.

Adeimantus/ They are. But they aren't willing to assemble often unless they get a share of the honey.

Socrates/ And they always do get a share, though the leaders, in taking the wealth of the rich and distributing it to the people, keep the greater part for themselves.

Adeimantus/ Yes, that is the way the people get their share.

Socrates/ And I suppose that those whose wealth is taken away are compelled to defend themselves by speaking before the people and doing whatever else they can.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And they're accused by the drones of plotting against the people and of being oligarchs, even if they have no desire for revolution at all.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ So in the end, when they see the people trying to harm them, they truly do become oligarchs and embrace oligarchy's evils, whether they want to or not. But neither group does these things willingly. Rather the people act as they do because they are ignorant and are deceived by the drones, and the rich act as they do because they are driven to it by the stinging of those same drones.

Adeimantus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And then there are impeachments, judgments, and trials on both sides.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Now, aren't the people always in the habit of setting up one man as their special champion, nurturing him and making him great?

Adeimantus/ They are.

Socrates/ And it's clear that, when a tyrant arises, this special leadership is the sole root from which he sprouts.

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ What is the beginning of the transformation from leader of the people to tyrant? Isn't it clear that it happens when the leader begins to behave like the man in the story told about the temple of the Lycean Zeus in Arcadia?

Adeimantus/ What story is that?

Socrates/ That anyone who tastes the one piece of human innards that's chopped up with those of other sacrificial victims must inevitably become a wolf. Haven't you heard that story?

Adeimantus/ I have.

Socrates/ Then doesn't the same happen with a leader of the people who dominates a docile mob and doesn't restrain himself from spilling kindred blood? He brings someone to

trial on false charges and murders him (as tyrants so often do), and, by thus blotting out a human life, his impious tongue and lips taste kindred citizen blood. He banishes some, kills others, and drops hints to the people about the cancellation of debts and the redistribution of land. And because of these things, isn't a man like that inevitably fated either to be killed by his enemies or to be transformed from a man into a wolf by becoming a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ It's completely inevitable.

Socrates/ He's the one who stirs up civil wars against the rich.

Adeimantus/ He is.

Socrates/ And if he's exiled but manages, despite his enemies, to return, doesn't he come back as a full-fledged tyrant?

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And if these enemies are unable to expel him or to put him to death by accusing him before the city, they plot secretly to kill him.

Adeimantus/ That's usually what happens at least.

Socrates/ And all who've reached this stage soon discover the famous request of the tyrant, namely, that the people give him a bodyguard to keep their defender safe for them.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ And the people give it to him, I suppose, because they are afraid for his safety but aren't worried at all about their own.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ And when a wealthy man sees this and is charged with being an enemy of the people because of his wealth, then, as the oracle to Croesus put it, he;

Flees to the banks of the many-pebbled Hermus,

> Neither staying put nor being ashamed of his cowardice.

He wouldn't get a second chance of being ashamed.

Adeimantus/ That's true, for if he was caught, he'd be executed.

Socrates/ He most certainly would.

But, as for the leader, he doesn't lie on the ground "mighty in his might," but, having brought down many others, he stands in the city's chariot, a complete tyrant rather than a leader.

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ Then let's describe the happiness of this man and of the city in which a mortal like him comes to be.

Adeimantus/ Certainly, let's do so.

Socrates/ During the first days of his reign and for some time after, won't he smile in welcome at anyone he meets, saying that he's no tyrant, making all sorts of promises both in public and in private, freeing the people from debt, redistributing the land to them and to his followers, and pretending to be gracious and gentle to all?

Adeimantus/ He'd have to.

Socrates/ But I suppose that, when he has dealt with his exiled enemies by making peace with some and destroying others, so that all is quiet on that front, the first thing he does is to stir up a war, so that the people will continue to feel the need of a leader.

Adeimantus/ Probably so.

Socrates/ But also so that they'll become poor through having to pay war taxes, for that way they'll have to concern themselves with their daily needs and be less likely to plot against him.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Besides, if he suspects some people of having thoughts of freedom and of not favoring his rule, can't he find a pretext for putting them at the mercy of the enemy in order to destroy them? And for all these reasons, isn't it necessary for a tyrant to be always stirring up war?

Adeimantus/ It is.

Socrates/ And because of this, isn't he all the more readily hated by the citizens?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Moreover, don't the bravest of those who helped to establish his tyranny and who hold positions of power within it speak freely to each other and to him, criticizing what's happening?

Adeimantus/ They probably do.

Socrates/ Then the tyrant will have to do away with all of them if he intends to rule, until he's left with neither friend nor enemy of any worth.

Adeimantus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ He must, therefore, keep a sharp lookout for anyone who is brave, large-minded, knowledgeable, or rich. And so happy is he that he must be the enemy of them all, whether he wants to be or not, and plot against them until he has purged them from the city.

Adeimantus/ That's a fine sort of purge!

Socrates/ Yes, for it's the opposite of the one that doctors perform on the body. They draw off the worst and leave the best, but he does just the opposite.

Adeimantus/ Yet I expect he'll have to do this, if he's really going to rule.

Socrates/ It's a blessedly happy necessity he's bound by, since it requires him either to live with the inferior majority, even though they hate him, or not to live at all.

Adeimantus/ Yet that's exactly his condition.

Socrates/ And won't he need a larger and more loyal bodyguard, the more his actions make the citizens hate him?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And who will these trustworthy people be? And where will he get them from?

Adeimantus/ They'll come swarming of their own accord, if he pays them.

Socrates/ Drones, by the dog! All manner of foreign drones! That's what I think you're talking about.

Adeimantus/ You're right.

Socrates/ But what about in the city itself? Wouldn't he be willing…

Adeimantus/ Willing to what?

Socrates/ To deprive citizens of their slaves by freeing them and enlisting them in his bodyguard?

Adeimantus/ He certainly would, since they' be likely to prove most loyal to him.

Socrates/ What a blessedly happy sort of fellow you make the tyrant out to be, if these are the sort of people he employs as friends and loyal followers after he's done away with the earlier ones.

Adeimantus/ Nonetheless, they're the sort he employs.

Socrates/ And these companions and new citizens admire and associate with him, while the decent people hate and avoid him.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ It isn't for nothing, then, that tragedy in general has the reputation of being wise and that Euripides is thought to be outstandingly so.

Adeimantus/ Why's that?

Socrates/ Because among other shrewd things he said that “tyrants are wise who associate with the wise.” And by “the wise” he clearly means the sort of people that we’ve seen to be the tyrant’s associates.

Adeimantus/ Yes. And he and the other poets eulogize tyranny as godlike and say lots of other such things about it.

Socrates/ Then, surely, since the tragic poets are wise, they’ll forgive us and those whose constitutions resemble ours, if we don’t admit them into our city, since they praise tyranny.

Adeimantus/ I suppose that the more sophisticated among them will.

Socrates/ And so I suppose that they go around to other cities, draw crowds, hire people with fine, big, persuasive voices, and lead their constitutions to tyranny and democracy.

Adeimantus/ They do indeed.

Socrates/ And besides this, they receive wages and honors, especially—as one might expect—from the tyrants and, in second place, from the democracies, but the higher they go on the ascending scale of constitutions, the more their honor falls off, as if unable to keep up with them for lack of breath.

Adeimantus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ But we digress. So let’s return to that fine, numerous, diverse, and ever-changing bodyguard of the tyrant and explain how he’ll pay for it.

Adeimantus/ Clearly, if there are sacred treasuries in the city, he’ll use them for as long as they last, as well as the property of the people he has destroyed, thus requiring smaller taxes from the people.

Socrates/ What about when these give out?

Adeimantus/ Clearly, both he and his fellow revelers—his companions, male or female—will have to feed off his father's estate.

Socrates/ I understand. You mean that the people, who fathered the tyrant, will have to feed him and his companions.

Adeimantus/ They'll be forced to do so.

Socrates/ And what would you have to say about this? What if the people get angry and say, first, that it isn't just for a grown-up son to be fed by his father but, on the contrary, for the father to be fed by his son; second, that they didn't father him and establish him in power so that, when he'd become strong, they' be enslaved to their own slave and have to feed both him and his slaves, along with other assorted rabble, but because they hoped that, with him as their leader, they' be free from the rich and the so-called fine and good people in the city; third, that they therefore order him and his companions to leave the city, just as a father might drive a son and his troublesome fellow revelers from his house?

Adeimantus/ Then, by god, the people will come to know what kind of creature they have fathered, welcomed, and made strong and that they are the weaker trying to drive out the stronger.

Socrates/ What do you mean? Will the tyrant dare to use violence against his father or to hit him if he doesn't obey?

Adeimantus/ Yes—once he's taken away his father's weapons.

Socrates/ You mean that the tyrant is a parricide and a harsh nurse of old age, that his rule has become an acknowledged tyranny at last, and that—as the saying goes—by trying to avoid the frying pan of enslavement to free

men, the people have fallen into the fire of having slaves as their masters, and that in the place of the great but inappropriate freedom they enjoyed under democracy, they have put upon themselves the harshest and most bitter slavery to slaves.

Adeimantus/ That's exactly what I mean.

Socrates/ Well, then, aren't we justified in saying that we have adequately described how tyranny evolves from democracy and what it's like when it has come into being?

Adeimantus/ We certainly are.

Book 9

Socrates/ It remains, to consider the tyrannical man himself, how he evolves from a democrat, what he is like when he has come into being, and whether he is wretched or blessedly happy.

Adeimantus/ Yes, he is the one who is still missing.

Socrates/ And do you know what else I think is still missing?

Adeimantus/ What?

Socrates/ I don't think we have adequately distinguished the kinds and numbers of our desires, and, if that subject isn't adequately dealt with, our entire investigation will be less clear.

Adeimantus/ Well, isn't now as fine a time as any to discuss the matter?

Socrates/ It certainly is. Consider, then, what I want to know about our desires. It's this: Some of our unnecessary pleasures and desires seem to me to be lawless. They are probably present in everyone, but they are held in check by the laws and by the better desires in alliance with reason. In a few people, they have been eliminated entirely or only a few weak ones remain, while in others they are stronger and more numerous.

Adeimantus/ What desires do you mean?

Socrates/ Those that are awakened in sleep, when the rest of the soul—the rational, gentle, and ruling part—slumbers. Then the beastly and savage part, full of food and drink, casts off sleep and seeks to find a way to gratify itself. You know that there is nothing it won't dare to do at such a time, free of all control by shame or reason. It doesn't shrink from trying to have sex with a mother, as it supposes, or with anyone else at all, whether man, god, or beast. It will commit

any foul murder, and there is no food it refuses to eat. In a word, it omits no act of folly or shamelessness.

Adeimantus/ That's completely true.

Socrates/ On the other hand, I suppose that someone who is healthy and moderate with himself goes to sleep only after having done the following: First, he rouses his rational part and feasts it on fine arguments and speculations; second, he neither starves nor feasts his appetites, so that they will slumber and not disturb his best part with either their pleasure or their pain, but they'll leave it alone, pure and by itself, to get on with its investigations, to yearn after and perceive something, it knows not what, whether it is past, present, or future; third, he soothes his spirited part in the same way, for example, by not falling asleep with his spirit still aroused after an outburst of anger. And when he has quieted these two parts and aroused the third, in which reason resides, and so takes his rest, you know that it is then that he best grasps the truth and that the visions that appear in his dreams are least lawless.

Adeimantus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ However, we've been carried away from what we wanted to establish, which is this: Our dreams make it clear that there is a dangerous, wild, and lawless form of desire in everyone, even in those of us who seem to be entirely moderate or measured. See whether you think I'm talking sense and whether or not you agree with me.

Adeimantus/ I do agree.

Socrates/ Recall, then, what we said a democratic man is like. He was produced by being brought up from youth by a thrifty father who valued only those desires that make money and who despised the unnecessary ones that aim at frivolity and display. Isn't that right?

Adeimantus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by associating with more sophisticated men, who are full of the latter desires, he starts to indulge in every kind of insolence and to adopt their form of behavior, because of his hatred of his father's thrift. But, because he has a better nature than his corrupters, he is pulled in both directions and settles down in the middle between his father's way of life and theirs. And enjoying each in moderation, as he supposes, he leads a life that is neither slavish nor lawless and from having been oligarchic he becomes democratic.

Adeimantus/ That was and is our opinion about this type of man.

Socrates/ Suppose now that this man has in turn become older and that he has a son who is brought up in his father's ethos.

Adeimantus/ All right.

Socrates/ And further suppose that the same things that happened to his father now happen to him. First, he is led to all the kinds of lawlessness that those who are leading him call freedom. Then his father and the rest of the household come to the aid of the middle desires, while the others help the other ones. Then, when those clever enchanters and tyrant-makers have no hope of keeping hold of the young man in any other way, they contrive to plant in him a powerful erotic love, like a great winged drone, to be the leader of those idle desires that spend whatever is at hand. Or do you think that erotic love is anything other than an enormous drone in such people?

Adeimantus/ I don't think that it could be anything else.

Socrates/ And when the other desires—filled with incense, myrrh, wreaths, wine, and the other pleasures found in their company—buzz around the drone, nurturing it and making it grow as large as possible, they plant the

sting of longing in it. Then this leader of the soul adopts madness as its bodyguard and becomes frenzied. If it finds any beliefs or desires in the man that are thought to be good or that still have some shame, it destroys them and throws them out, until it's purged him of moderation and filled him with imported madness.

Adeimantus/ You've perfectly described the evolution of a tyrannical man.

Socrates/ Is this the reason that erotic love has long been called a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ It looks that way.

Socrates/ Then doesn't a drunken man have something of a tyrannical mind?

Adeimantus/ Yes, he has.

Socrates/ And a man who is mad and deranged attempts to rule not just human beings, but gods as well, and expects that he will be able to succeed.

Adeimantus/ He certainly does.

Socrates/ Then a man becomes tyrannical in the precise sense of the term when either his nature or his way of life or both of them together make him drunk, filled with erotic desire, and mad.

Adeimantus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ This, then, it seems, is how a tyrannical man comes to be. But what way does he live?

Adeimantus/ No doubt you're going to tell me, just as posers of riddles usually do.

Socrates/ I am. I think that someone in whom the tyrant of erotic love dwells and in whom it directs everything next goes in for feasts, revelries, luxuries, girlfriends, and all that sort of thing.

Adeimantus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And don't many terrible desires grow up day and night beside the tyrannical one, needing many things to satisfy them?

Adeimantus/ Indeed they do.

Socrates/ Hence any income someone like that has is soon spent.

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then borrowing follows, and expenditure of capital.

Adeimantus/ What else?

Socrates/ And when everything is gone, won't the violent crowd of desires that has nested within him inevitably shout in protest? And driven by the stings of the other desires and especially by erotic love itself (which leads all of them as its bodyguard), won't he become frenzied and look to see who possesses anything that he could take, by either deceit or force?

Adeimantus/ He certainly will.

Socrates/ Consequently, he must acquire wealth from every source or live in great pain and suffering.

Adeimantus/ He must.

Socrates/ And just as the pleasures that are latecomers outdo the older ones and steal away their satisfactions, won't the man himself think that he deserves to outdo his father and mother, even though he is younger than they are—to take and spend his father's wealth when he's spent his own share?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if they won't give it to him, won't he first try to steal it from them by deceitful means?

Adeimantus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if that doesn't work, wouldn't he seize it by force?

Adeimantus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ And if the old man and woman put up a fight, would he be careful to refrain from acting like a tyrant?

Adeimantus/ I'm not very optimistic about their fate, if they do.

Socrates/ But, good god, Adeimantus, do you think he'd sacrifice his long-loved and irreplaceable mother for a recently acquired girlfriend whom he can do without? Or that for the sake of a newfound and replaceable boyfriend in the bloom of youth, he'd strike his aged and irreplaceable father, his oldest friend? Or that he'd make his parents the slaves of these others, if he brought them under the same roof?

Adeimantus/ Yes, indeed he would.

Socrates/ It seems to be a very great blessing to produce a tyrannical son!

Adeimantus/ It certainly does!

Socrates/ What about when the possessions of his father and mother give out? With that great swarm of pleasures inside him, won't he first try to break into someone's house or snatch someone's coat late at night? Then won't he try to loot a temple? And in all this, the old traditional opinions that he had held from childhood about what is fine or shameful—opinions that are accounted just—are overcome by the opinions, newly released from slavery, that are now the bodyguard of erotic love and hold sway along with it. When he himself was subject to the laws and his father and had a democratic constitution within him, these opinions used only to be freed in sleep. Now, however, under the tyranny of erotic love, he has permanently become while awake what he used to become occasionally while asleep,

and he won't hold back from any terrible murder or from any kind of food or act. But, rather, erotic love lives like a tyrant within him, in complete anarchy and lawlessness as his sole ruler, and drives him, as if he were a city, to dare anything that will provide sustenance for itself and the unruly mob around it (some of whose members have come in from the outside as a result of his keeping bad company, while others have come from within, freed and let loose by his own bad habits). Isn't this the life that a tyrannical man leads?

Adeimantus/ It is indeed.

Socrates/ Now, if there are only a few such men in a city, and the rest of the people are moderate, this mob will leave the city in order to act as a bodyguard to some other tyrant or to serve as mercenaries if there happens to be a war going on somewhere. But if they chance to live in a time of peace and quiet, they'll remain in the city and bring about lots of little evils.

Adeimantus/ What sort of evils do you mean?

Socrates/ They steal, break into houses, snatch purses, steal clothes, rob temples, and sell people into slavery. Sometimes, if they are good speakers, they become sycophants and bear false witness and accept bribes.

Adeimantus/ These evils are small, provided that there happen to be only a few such people.

Socrates/ Yes, for small things are small by comparison to big ones. And when it comes to producing wickedness and misery in a city, all these evils together don't, as the saying goes, come within a mile of the rule of a tyrant. But when such people become numerous and conscious of their numbers, it is they—aided by the foolishness of the people—who create a tyrant. And he, more than any of them, has in his soul the greatest and strongest tyrant of all.

Adeimantus/ Naturally, for he'd be the most tyrannical.

Socrates/ That's if the city happens to yield willingly, but if it resists him, then, just as he once chastised his mother and father, he'll now chastise his fatherland, if he can, by bringing in new friends and making his fatherland and his dear old motherland (as the Cretans call it) their slaves and keeping them that way, for this is surely the end at which such a man's desires are directed.

Adeimantus/ It most certainly is.

Socrates/ Now, in private life, before a tyrannical man attains power, isn't he this sort of person—one who associates primarily with flatterers who are ready to obey him in everything? Or if he himself happens to need anything from other people, isn't he willing to fawn on them and make every gesture of friendship, as if he were dealing with his own family? But once he gets what he wants, don't they become strangers again?

Adeimantus/ Yes, they certainly do.

Socrates/ So someone with a tyrannical nature lives his whole life without being friends with anyone, always a master to one man or a slave to another and never getting a taste of either freedom or true friendship.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ Wouldn't we be right to call someone like that untrustworthy?

Adeimantus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And isn't he as unjust as anyone can be? If indeed what we earlier agreed about justice was right.

Adeimantus/ And it certainly was right.

Socrates/ Then, let's sum up the worst type of man: His waking life is like the nightmare we described earlier.

Adeimantus/ That's right.

Socrates/ And he evolves from someone by nature most tyrannical who achieves sole rule. And the longer he remains tyrant, the more like the nightmare he becomes.

Glaucon taking over the argument said;

Glaucon/ That's inevitable, taking over the argument.

Socrates/ Well, then, isn't the man who is clearly most vicious also clearly most wretched? And isn't the one who for the longest time is most of all a tyrant, most wretched for the longest time? If, that is to say, truth rather than majority opinion is to settle these questions.

Glaucon/ That much is certain, at any rate.

Socrates/ And isn't a tyrannical man like a city ruled by a tyrant, a democratic man like a city ruled by a democracy, and similarly with the others?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And won't the relations between the cities with respect to virtue and happiness be the same as those between the men?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then how does the city ruled by a tyrant compare to the city ruled by kings that we described first?

Glaucon/ They are total opposites: one is the best, and the other the worst.

Socrates/ I won't ask you which is which, since it's obvious. But is your judgment the same with regard to their happiness and wretchedness? And let's not be dazzled by looking at one man—a tyrant—or at the few who surround him, but since it is essential to go into the city and study the whole of it, let's not give our opinion, till we've gone down and looked into every corner.

Glaucon/ That's right, for it's clear to everyone that there is no city more wretched than one ruled by a tyrant and none more happy than one ruled by kings.

Socrates/ Would I be right, then, to make the same challenge about the individuals, assuming, first, that the person who is fit to judge them is someone who in thought can go down into a person's character and examine it thoroughly, someone who doesn't judge from outside, the way a child does, who is dazzled by the facade that tyrants adopt for the outside world to see, but is able to see right through that sort of thing? And, second, that he's someone—since we'd all listen to him if he were—who is competent to judge, because he has lived in the same house with a tyrant and witnessed his behavior at home and his treatment of each member of his household when he is stripped of his theatrical facade, and has also seen how he behaves when in danger from the people? Shouldn't we ask the person who has seen all that to tell us how the tyrant compares to the others in happiness and wretchedness?

Glaucon/ That's also right.

Socrates/ Then do you want us to pretend that we are among those who can give such a judgment and that we have already met tyrannical people, so that we'll have someone to answer our questions?

Glaucon/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ Come, then, and look at it this way for me: Bearing in mind the resemblance between the city and the man, look at each in turn and describe its condition.

Glaucon/ What kinds of things do you want me to describe?

Socrates/ First, speaking of the city, would you say that a tyrannical city is free or enslaved?

Glaucon/ It is as enslaved as it is possible to be.

Socrates/ Yet you see in it people who are masters and free.

Glaucon/ I do see a few like that, but the whole city, so to speak, and the most decent part of it are wretched, dishonored slaves.

Socrates/ Then, if man and city are alike, mustn't the same structure be in him too? And mustn't his soul be full of slavery and unfreedom, with the most decent parts enslaved and with a small part, the maddest and most vicious, as their master?

Glaucon/ It must.

Socrates/ What will you say about such a soul then? Is it free or slave?

Glaucon/ Slave, of course.

Socrates/ And isn't the enslaved and tyrannical city least likely to do what it wants?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then a tyrannical soul—I'm talking about the whole soul—will also be least likely to do what it wants and, forcibly driven by the stings of a dronish gadfly, will be full of disorder and regret.

Glaucon/ How could it be anything else?

Socrates/ Is a tyrannically ruled city rich or poor?

Glaucon/ Poor.

Socrates/ Then a tyrannical soul, too, must always be poor and unsatisfiable.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ What about fear? Aren't a tyrannical city and man full of it?

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And do you think that you'll find more wailing, groaning, lamenting, and grieving in any other city?

Glaucon/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then, are such things more common in anyone besides a tyrannical man, who is maddened by his desires and erotic loves?

Glaucon/ How could they be?

Socrates/ It is in view of all these things, I suppose, and others like them, that you judged this to be the most wretched of cities.

Glaucon/ And wasn't I right?

Socrates/ Of course you were. But what do you say about a tyrannical man, when you look at these same things?

Glaucon/ He's by far the most wretched of all of them.

Socrates/ There you're no longer right.

Glaucon/ How is that?

Socrates/ I don't think that this man has yet reached the extreme of wretchedness.

Glaucon/ Then who has?

Socrates/ Perhaps you'll agree that this next case is even more wretched.

Glaucon/ Which one?

Socrates/ The one who is tyrannical but doesn't live a private life, because some misfortune provides him with the opportunity to become an actual tyrant.

Glaucon/ On the basis of what was said before, I assume that what you say is true.

Socrates/ Yes, but in matters of this sort, it isn't enough just to assume these things; one needs to investigate carefully the two men in question by means of argument, for

the investigation concerns the most important thing, namely, the good life and the bad one.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ Then consider whether I'm talking sense or not, for I think our investigation will be helped by the following examples.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ We should look at all the wealthy private citizens in our cities who have many slaves, for, like a tyrant, they rule over many, although not over so many as he does.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And you know that they're secure and do not fear their slaves.

Glaucon/ What have they got to be afraid of?

Socrates/ Nothing. And do you know why?

Glaucon/ Yes. It's because the whole city is ready to defend each of its individual citizens.

Socrates/ You're right. But what if some god were to lift one of these men, his fifty or more slaves, and his wife and children out of the city and deposit him with his slaves and other property in a deserted place, where no free person could come to his assistance? How frightened would he be that he himself and his wife and children would be killed by the slaves?

Glaucon/ Very frightened indeed.

Socrates/ And wouldn't he be compelled to fawn on some of his own slaves, promise them lots of things, and free them, even though he didn't want to? And wouldn't he himself have become a panderer to slaves?

Glaucon/ He'd have to or else be killed.

Socrates/ What if the god were to settle many other neighbors around him, who wouldn't tolerate anyone to

claim that he was the master of another and who would inflict the worst punishments on anyone they caught doing it?

Glaucon/ I suppose that he'd have even worse troubles, since he'd be surrounded by nothing but vigilant enemies.

Socrates/ And isn't this the kind of prison in which the tyrant is held—the one whose nature is such as we have described it, filled with fears and erotic loves of all kinds? Even though his soul is really greedy for it, he's the only one in the whole city who can't travel abroad or see the sights that other free people want to see. Instead, he lives like a woman, mostly confined to his own house, and envying any other citizen who happens to travel abroad and see something worthwhile.

Glaucon/ That's entirely so.

Socrates/ Then, isn't this harvest of evils a measure of the difference between a tyrannical man who is badly governed on the inside—whom you judged to be most wretched just now—and one who doesn't live a private life but is compelled by some chance to be a tyrant, who tries to rule others when he can't even control himself. He's just like an exhausted body without any self-control, which, instead of living privately, is compelled to compete and fight with other bodies all its life.

Glaucon/ That's exactly what he's like, Socrates, and what you say is absolutely true.

Socrates/ And so, Glaucon, isn't this a completely wretched condition to be in, and doesn't the reigning tyrant have an even harder life than the one you judged to be hardest?

Glaucon/ He certainly does.

Socrates/ In truth, then, and whatever some people may think, a real tyrant is really a slave, compelled to engage in

the worst kind of fawning, slavery, and pandering to the worst kind of people. He's so far from satisfying his desires in any way that it is clear—if one happens to know that one must study his whole soul—that he's in the greatest need of most things and truly poor. And, if indeed his state is like that of the city he rules, then he's full of fear, convulsions, and pains throughout his life. And it is like it, isn't it?

Glaucon/ Of course it is.

Socrates/ And we'll also attribute to the man what we mentioned before, namely, that he is inevitably envious, untrustworthy, unjust, friendless, impious, host and nurse to every kind of vice, and that his ruling makes him even more so. And because of all these, he is extremely unfortunate and goes on to make those near him like himself.

Glaucon/ No one with any understanding could possibly contradict you.

Socrates/ Come, then, and like the judge who makes the final decision, tell me who among the five—the king, the timocrat, the oligarch, the democrat, and the tyrant—is first in happiness, who second, and so on in order.

Glaucon/ That's easy. I rank them in virtue and vice, in happiness and its opposite, in the order of their appearance, as I might judge choruses.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, hire a herald, or shall I myself announce that the son of Ariston has given as his verdict that the best, the most just, and the most happy is the most kingly, who rules like a king over himself, and that the worst, the most unjust, and the most wretched is the most tyrannical, who most tyrannizes himself and the city he rules?

Glaucon/ Let it be so announced.

Socrates/ And shall I add to the announcement that it holds, whether these things remain hidden from every god and human being or not?

Glaucon/ Add it.

Socrates/ Good. Then that is one of our proofs. And there' be a second, if you happen to think that there is anything in this.

Glaucon/ In what?

Socrates/ In the fact that the soul of each individual is divided into three parts, in just the way that a city is, for that's the reason I think that there is another proof.

Glaucon/ What is it?

Socrates/ This: it seems to me that there are three pleasures corresponding to the three parts of the soul, one peculiar to each part, and similarly with desires and kinds of rule.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ The first, we say, is the part with which a person learns, and the second the part with which he gets angry. As for the third, we had no one special name for it, since it's multiform, so we named it after the biggest and strongest thing in it. Hence we called it the appetitive part, because of the intensity of its appetites for food, drink, sex, and all the things associated with them, but we also called it the money-loving part, because such appetites are most easily satisfied by means of money.

Glaucon/ And rightly so.

Socrates/ Then, if we said that its pleasure and love are for profit, wouldn't that best determine its central feature for the purposes of our argument and insure that we are clear about what we mean when we speak of this part of the soul,

and wouldn't we be right to call it money-loving and profit-loving?

Glaucon/ That's how it seems to me, at least.

Socrates/ What about the spirited part? Don't we say that it is wholly dedicated to the pursuit of control, victory, and high repute?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then wouldn't it be appropriate for us to call it victory-loving and honor-loving?

Glaucon/ It would be most appropriate.

Socrates/ Now, it is clear to everyone that the part with which we learn is always wholly straining to know where the truth lies and that, of the three parts, it cares least for money and reputation.

Glaucon/ By far the least.

Socrates/ Then wouldn't it be appropriate for us to call it learning-loving and philosophical?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And doesn't this part rule in some people's souls, while one of the other parts—whichever it happens to be—rules in other people's?

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And isn't that the reason we say that there are three primary kinds of people: philosophic, victory-loving, and profit-loving?

Glaucon/ That's it precisely.

Socrates/ And also three forms of pleasure, one assigned to each of them?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do you realize that, if you chose to ask three such people in turn to tell you which of their lives is

most pleasant, each would give the highest praise to his own? Won't a money-maker say that the pleasure of being honored and that of learning are worthless compared to that of making a profit, if he gets no money from them?

Glaucon/ He will.

Socrates/ What about an honor-lover? Doesn't he think that the pleasure of making money is vulgar and that the pleasure of learning—except insofar as it brings him honor—is smoke and nonsense?

Glaucon/ He does.

Socrates/ And as for a philosopher, what do you suppose he thinks the other pleasures are worth compared to that of knowing where the truth lies and always being in some such pleasant condition while learning? Won't he think that they are far behind? And won't he call them really necessary, since he'd have no need for them if they weren't necessary for life?

Glaucon/ He will: we can be sure of that.

Socrates/ Then, since there's a dispute between the different forms of pleasure and between the lives themselves, not about which way of living is finer or more shameful or better or worse, but about which is more pleasant and less painful, how are we to know which of them is speaking most truly?

Glaucon/ Don't ask me.

Socrates/ Look at it this way: How are we to judge things if we want to judge them well? Isn't it by experience, reason, and argument? Or could anyone have better criteria than these?

Glaucon/ How could he?

Socrates/ Consider, then: Which of the three men has most experience of the pleasures we mentioned? Does a

profit-lover learn what the truth itself is like or acquire more experience of the pleasure of knowing it than a philosopher does of making a profit?

Glaucon/ There's a big difference between them. A philosopher has of necessity tasted the other pleasures since childhood, but it isn't necessary for a profit-lover to taste or experience the pleasure of learning the nature of the things that are and how sweet it is. Indeed, even if he were eager to taste it, he couldn't easily do so.

Socrates/ Then a philosopher is far superior to a profit-lover in his experience of both their pleasures.

Glaucon/ He certainly is.

Socrates/ What about an honor-lover? Has he more experience of the pleasure of knowing than a philosopher has of the pleasure of being honored?

Glaucon/ No, for honor comes to each of them, provided that he accomplishes his aim. A rich man is honored by many people, so is a courageous one and a wise one, but the pleasure of studying the things that are cannot be tasted by anyone except a philosopher.

Socrates/ Then, as far as experience goes, he is the finest judge of the three.

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And he alone has gained his experience in the company of reason.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Moreover, the instrument one must use to judge isn't the instrument of a profit-lover or an honor-lover but a philosopher.

Glaucon/ What instrument is that?

Socrates/ Arguments, for didn't we say that we must judge by means of them?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And argument is a philosopher's instrument most of all.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, if wealth and profit were the best means of judging things, the praise and blame of a profit-lover would necessarily be truest.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And if honor, victory, and courage were the best means, wouldn't it be the praise and blame of an honor-lover?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But since the best means are experience, reason, and argument…

The praise of a wisdom-lover and argument-lover is necessarily truest.

Then, of the three pleasures, the most pleasant is that of the part of the soul with which we learn, and the one in whom that part rules has the most pleasant life.

Glaucon/ How could it be otherwise? A person with knowledge at least speaks with authority when he praises his own life.

Socrates/ To what life and to what pleasure does the judge give second place?

Glaucon/ Clearly, he gives it to those of a warrior and honor-lover, since they're closer to his own than those of a money-maker.

Socrates/ Then the life and pleasure of a profit-lover come last, it seems.

Glaucon/ Of course they do.

Socrates/ These, then, are two proofs in a row, and the just person has defeated the unjust one in both. The third is

dedicated in Olympic fashion to Olympian Zeus the Savior. Observe then that, apart from those of a knowledgeable person, the other pleasures are neither entirely true nor pure but are like a shadow-painting, as I think I've heard some wise person say. And yet, if this were true, it would be the greatest and most decisive of the overthrows.

Glaucon/ It certainly would. But what exactly do you mean?

Socrates/ I'll find out, if I ask the questions, and you answer.

Glaucon/ Ask, then.

Socrates/ Tell me, don't we say that pain is the opposite of pleasure?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is there such a thing as feeling neither pleasure nor pain?

Glaucon/ There is.

Socrates/ Isn't it intermediate between these two, a sort of calm of the soul by comparison to them? Or don't you think of it that way?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you recall what sick people say when they're ill?

Glaucon/ Which saying of theirs do you have in mind?

Socrates/ That nothing gives more pleasure than being healthy, but that they hadn't realized that it was most pleasant until they fell ill.

Glaucon/ I do recall that.

Socrates/ And haven't you also heard those who are in great pain say that nothing is more pleasant than the cessation of their suffering?

Glaucon/ I have.

Socrates/ And there are many similar circumstances, I suppose, in which you find people in pain praising, not enjoyment, but the absence of pain and relief from it as most pleasant.

Glaucon/ That may be because at such times a state of calm becomes pleasant enough to content them.

Socrates/ And when someone ceases to feel pleasure, this calm will be painful to him.

Glaucon/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Then the calm we described as being intermediate between pleasure and pain will sometimes be both.

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Now, is it possible for that which is neither to become both?

Glaucon/ Not in my view.

Socrates/ Moreover, the coming to be of either the pleasant or the painful in the soul is a sort of motion, isn't it?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And didn't what is neither painful nor pleasant come to light just now as a calm state, intermediate between them?

Glaucon/ Yes, it did.

Socrates/ Then, how can it be right to think that the absence of pain is pleasure or that the absence of pleasure is pain?

Glaucon/ There's no way it can be.

Socrates/ Then it isn't right. But when the calm is next to the painful it appears pleasant, and when it is next to the pleasant it appears painful. However, there is nothing sound

in these appearances as far as the truth about pleasure is concerned, only some kind of magic.

Glaucon/ That's what the argument suggests, at any rate.

Socrates/ Take a look at the pleasures that don't come out of pains, so that you won't suppose in their case also that it is the nature of pleasure to be the cessation of pain or of pain to be the cessation of pleasure.

Glaucon/ Where am I to look? What pleasures do you mean?

Socrates/ The pleasures of smell are especially good examples to take note of, for they suddenly become very intense without being preceded by pain, and when they cease they leave no pain behind. But there are plenty of other examples as well.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ Then let no one persuade us that pure pleasure is relief from pain or that pure pain is relief from pleasure.

Glaucon/ No, let's not.

Socrates/ However, most of the so-called pleasures that reach the soul through the body, as well as the most intense ones are of this form—they are some kind of relief from pain.

Glaucon/ Yes, they are.

Socrates/ And aren't the pleasures and pains of anticipation, which arise from the expectation of future pleasures or pains, also of this form?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ Do you know what kind of thing they are and what they most resemble?

Glaucon/ No, what is it?

Socrates/ Do you believe that there is an up, a down, and a middle in nature?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you think that someone who was brought from down below to the middle would have any other belief than that he was moving upward? And if he stood in the middle and saw where he had come from, would he believe that he was anywhere other than the upper region, since he hasn't seen the one that is truly upper?

Glaucon/ By god, I don't see how he could think anything else.

Socrates/ And if he was brought back, wouldn't he suppose that he was being brought down? And wouldn't he be right?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then wouldn't all this happen to him because he is inexperienced in what is really and truly up, down, and in the middle?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Is it any surprise, then, if those who are inexperienced in the truth have unsound opinions about lots of other things as well, or that they are so disposed to pleasure, pain, and the intermediate state that, when they descend to the painful, they believe truly and are really in pain, but that, when they ascend from the painful to the intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached fulfillment and pleasure? They are inexperienced in pleasure and so are deceived when they compare pain to painlessness, just as they would be if they compared black to gray without having experienced white.

Glaucon/ No, by god, I wouldn't be surprised. In fact, I'd be very surprised if it were any other way.

Adeimantus/ Think of it this way: Aren't hunger, thirst, and the like some sort of empty states of the body?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ And aren't ignorance and lack of sense empty states of the soul?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And wouldn't someone who partakes of nourishment or strengthens his understanding be filled?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Does the truer filling up fill you with that which is less or that which is more?

Glaucon/ Clearly, it's with that which is more.

Socrates/ And which kinds partake more of pure being? Kinds of filling up such as filling up with bread or drink or delicacies or food in general? Or the kind of filling up that is with true belief, knowledge, understanding, and, in sum, with all of virtue? Judge it this way: That which is related to what is always the same, immortal, and true, is itself of that kind, and comes to be in something of that kind—this is more, don't you think, than that which is related to what is never the same and mortal, is itself of that kind, and comes to be in something of that kind?

Glaucon/ That which is related to what is always the same is far more.

Socrates/ And does the being of what is always the same participate more in being than in knowledge?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Or more than in truth?

Glaucon/ Not that either.

Socrates/ And if less in truth, then less in being also?

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And isn't it generally true that the kinds of filling up that are concerned with the care of the body share less in truth and being than those concerned with the care of the soul?

Glaucon/ Yes, much less.

Socrates/ And don't you think that the same holds of the body in comparison to the soul?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And isn't that which is more, and is filled with things that are more, really more filled than that which is less, and is filled with things that are less?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Therefore, if being filled with what is appropriate to our nature is pleasure, that which is more filled with things that are more enjoys more really and truly a more true pleasure, while that which partakes of things that are less is less truly and surely filled and partakes of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely inevitable.

Socrates/ Therefore, those who have no experience of reason or virtue, but are always occupied with feasts and the like, are brought down and then back up to the middle, as it seems, and wander in this way throughout their lives, never reaching beyond this to what is truly higher up, never looking up at it or being brought up to it, and so they aren't filled with that which really is and never taste any stable or pure pleasure. Instead, they always look down at the ground like cattle, and, with their heads bent over the dinner table, they feed, fatten, and fornicate. To outdo others in these things, they kick and butt them with iron horns and hooves, killing each other, because their desires are insatiable. For the part that they're trying to fill is like a vessel full of holes, and neither it nor the things they are trying to fill it with are among the things that are.

Glaucon/ Socrates, you've exactly described the life of the majority of people, just like an oracle.

Socrates/ Then isn't it necessary for these people to live with pleasures that are mixed with pains, mere images and shadow-paintings of true pleasures? And doesn't the juxtaposition of these pleasures and pains make them appear intense, so that they give rise to mad erotic passions in the foolish, and are fought over in just the way that Stesichorus tells us the phantom of Helen was fought over at Troy by men ignorant of the truth?

Glaucon/ Something like that must be what happens.

Socrates/ And what about the spirited part? Mustn't similar things happen to someone who satisfies it? Doesn't his love of honor make him envious and his love of victory make him violent, so that he pursues the satisfaction of his anger and of his desires for honors and victories without calculation or understanding?

Glaucon/ Such things must happen to him as well.

Socrates/ Then can't we confidently assert that those desires of even the money-loving and honor-loving parts that follow knowledge and argument and pursue with their help those pleasures that reason approves will attain the truest pleasures possible for them, because they follow truth, and the ones that are most their own, if indeed what is best for each thing is most its own?

Glaucon/ And indeed it is best.

Socrates/ Therefore, when the entire soul follows the philosophic part, and there is no civil war in it, each part of it does its own work exclusively and is just, and in particular it enjoys its own pleasures, the best and truest pleasures possible for it.

Adeimantus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ But when one of the other parts gains control, it won't be able to secure its own pleasure and will compel the other parts to pursue an alien and untrue pleasure.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And aren't the parts that are most distant from philosophy and reason the ones most likely to do this sort of compelling?

Glaucon/ They're much more likely.

Socrates/ And isn't whatever is most distant from reason also most distant from law and order?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And didn't the erotic and tyrannical desires emerge as most distant from these things?

Glaucon/ By far.

Socrates/ And weren't the kingly and orderly ones least distant?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then I suppose that a tyrant will be most distant from a pleasure that is both true and his own and that a king will be least distant.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ So a tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and a king most pleasantly.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Do you know how much more unpleasant a tyrant's life is than a king's?

Glaucon/ I will if you tell me.

Socrates/ There are, it seems, three pleasures, one genuine and two illegitimate, and a tyrant is at the extreme end of the illegitimate ones, since he flees both law and reason and lives with a bodyguard of certain slavish pleasures. But it isn't easy, all the same, to say just how inferior he is to a king, except perhaps as follows. A tyrant is somehow third from an oligarch, for a democrat was between them.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, if what we said before is true, doesn't he live with an image of pleasure that is third from an oligarch's with respect to truth?

Glaucon/ He does.

Socrates/ Now, an oligarch, in turn, is third from a king, if we identify a king and an aristocrat.

Glaucon/ Yes, he's third.

Socrates/ So a tyrant is three times three times removed from true pleasure.

Glaucon/ Apparently so.

Socrates/ It seems then, on the basis of the magnitude of its number, that the image of tyrannical pleasure is a plane figure.

Glaucon/ Exactly.

Socrates/ But then it's clear that, by squaring and cubing it, we'll discover how far a tyrant's pleasure is from that of a king.

Glaucon/ It is clear to a mathematician, at any rate.

Socrates/ Then, turning it the other way around, if someone wants to say how far a king's pleasure is from a tyrant's, he'll find, if he completes the calculation, that a king lives seven hundred and twenty-nine times more pleasantly than a tyrant and that a tyrant is the same number of times more wretched.

Glaucon/ That's an amazing calculation of the difference between the pleasure and pain of the two men, the just and the unjust.

Socrates/ Yet it's a true one, and one appropriate to human lives, if indeed days, nights, months, and years are appropriate to them.

Glaucon/ And of course they are appropriate.

Socrates/ Then, if a good and just person's life is that much more pleasant than the life of a bad and unjust person, won't its grace, fineness, and virtue be incalculably greater?

Glaucon/ By god, it certainly will.

Socrates/ All right, then. Since we've reached this point in the argument, let's return to the first things we said, since they are what led us here. I think someone said at some point that injustice profits a completely unjust person who is believed to be just. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ Now, let's discuss this with him, since we've agreed on the respective powers that injustice and justice have.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ By fashioning an image of the soul in words, so that the person who says this sort of thing will know what he is saying.

Glaucon/ What sort of image?

Socrates/ One like those creatures that legends tell us used to come into being in ancient times, such as the Chimera, Scylla, Cerberus, or any of the multitude of others in which many different kinds of things are said to have grown together naturally into one.

Glaucon/ Yes, the legends do tell us of such things.

Socrates/ Well, then, fashion a single kind of multicolored beast with a ring of many heads that it can grow and change at will—some from gentle, some from savage animals.

Glaucon/ That's work for a clever artist. However, since words are more malleable than wax and the like, consider it done.

Socrates/ Then fashion one other kind, that of a lion, and another of a human being. But make the first much the largest and the other second to it in size.

Glaucon/ That's easier—the sculpting is done.

Socrates/ Now join the three of them into one, so that that they somehow grow together naturally.

Glaucon/ They're joined.

Socrates/ Then, fashion around them the image of one of them, that of a human being so that anyone who sees only the outer covering and not what's inside will think it is a single creature, a human being.

Glaucon/ It's done.

Socrates/ Then, if someone maintains that injustice profits this human being and that doing just things brings no advantage, let's tell him that he is simply saying that it is beneficial for him, first, to feed the multiform beast well and make it strong, and also the lion and all that pertains to him; second, to starve and weaken the human being within, so that he is dragged along wherever either of the other two leads; and, third, to leave the parts to bite and kill one another rather than accustoming them to each other and making them friendly.

Glaucon/ Yes, that's absolutely what someone who praises injustice is saying.

Socrates/ But, on the other hand, wouldn't someone who maintains that just things are profitable be saying, first, that all our words and deeds should insure that the human being within this human being has the most control; second, that he should take care of the many-headed beast as a farmer does his animals, feeding and domesticating the gentle heads and preventing the savage ones from growing; and, third, that he should make the lion's nature his ally, care for the community of all his parts, and bring them up in such a

way that they will be friends with each other and with himself?

Glaucon/ Yes, that's exactly what someone who praises justice is saying.

Socrates/ From every point of view, then, anyone who praises justice speaks truly, and anyone who praises injustice speaks falsely. Whether we look at the matter from the point of view of pleasure, good reputation, or advantage, a praiser of justice tells the truth, while one who condemns it has nothing sound to say and condemns without knowing what he is condemning.

Glaucon/ In my opinion, at least, he knows nothing about it.

Socrates/ Then let's persuade him gently—for he isn't wrong of his own will—by asking him these questions. Should we say that this is the original basis for the conventions about what is fine and what is shameful? Fine things are those that subordinate the beastlike parts of our nature to the human—or better, perhaps, to the divine; shameful ones are those that enslave the gentle to the savage? Will he agree or what?

Glaucon/ He will, if he takes my advice.

Socrates/ In light of this argument, can it profit anyone to acquire gold unjustly if, by doing so, he enslaves the best part of himself to the most vicious? If he got the gold by enslaving his son or daughter to savage and evil men, it wouldn't profit him, no matter how much gold he got. How, then, could he fail to be wretched if he pitilessly enslaves the most divine part of himself to the most godless and polluted one and accepts golden gifts in return for a more terrible destruction than Eriphyle's when she took the necklace in return for her husband's soul?

Glaucon/ A much more terrible one. I'll answer for him.

Socrates/ And don't you think that licentiousness has long been condemned for just these reasons, namely, that because of it, that terrible, large, and multiform beast is let loose more than it should be?

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And aren't stubbornness and irritability condemned because they inharmoniously increase and stretch the lion-like and snake-like part?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And aren't luxury and softness condemned because the slackening and loosening of this same part produce cowardice in it?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And aren't flattery and slavishness condemned because they subject the spirited part to the mob-like beast, accustoming it from youth on to being insulted for the sake of the money needed to satisfy the beast's insatiable appetites, so that it becomes an ape instead of a lion?

Glaucon/ They certainly are.

Socrates/ Why do you think that the condition of a manual worker is despised? Or is it for any other reason than that, when the best part is naturally weak in someone, it can't rule the beasts within him but can only serve them and learn to flatter them?

Glaucon/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Therefore, to insure that someone like that is ruled by something similar to what rules the best person, we say that he ought to be the slave of that best person who has a divine ruler within himself. It isn't to harm the slave that we say he must be ruled, which is what Thrasymachus thought to be true of all subjects, but because it is better for everyone to be ruled by divine reason, preferably within

himself and his own, otherwise imposed from without, so that as far as possible all will be alike and friends, governed by the same thing.

Glaucon/ Yes, that's right.

Socrates/ This is clearly the aim of the law, which is the ally of everyone. But it's also our aim in ruling our children, we don't allow them to be free until we establish a constitution in them, just as in a city, and—by fostering their best part with our own—equip them with a guardian and ruler similar to our own to take our place. Then, and only then, we set them free.

Glaucon/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Then how can we maintain or argue, Glaucon, that injustice, licentiousness, and doing shameful things are profitable to anyone, since, even though he may acquire more money or other sort of power from them, they make him more vicious?

Glaucon/ There's no way we can.

Socrates/ Or that to do injustice without being discovered and having to pay the penalty is profitable? Doesn't the one who remains undiscovered become even more vicious, while the bestial part of the one who is discovered is calmed and tamed and his gentle part freed, so that his entire soul settles into its best nature, acquires moderation, justice, and reason, and attains a more valuable state than that of having a fine, strong, healthy body, since the soul itself is more valuable than the body?

Glaucon/ That's absolutely certain.

Socrates/ Then won't a person of understanding direct all his efforts to attaining that state of his soul? First, he'll value the studies that produce it and despise the others.

Glaucon/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Second, he won't entrust the condition and nurture of his body to the irrational pleasure of the beast within or turn his life in that direction, but neither will he make health his aim or assign first place to being strong, healthy, and beautiful, unless he happens to acquire moderation as a result. Rather, it's clear that he will always cultivate the harmony of his body for the sake of the consonance in his soul.

Glaucon/ He certainly will, if indeed he's to be truly trained in music and poetry.

Socrates/ Will he also keep order and consonance in his acquisition of money, with that same end in view? Or, even though he isn't dazzled by the size of the majority into accepting their idea of blessed happiness, will he increase his wealth without limit and so have unlimited evils?

Glaucon/ Not in my view.

Socrates/ Rather, he'll look to the constitution within him and guard against disturbing anything in it, either by too much money or too little. And, in this way, he'll direct both the increase and expenditure of his wealth, as far as he can.

Glaucon/ That's exactly what he'll do.

Socrates/ And he'll look to the same thing where honors are concerned. He'll willingly share in and taste those that he believes will make him better, but he'll avoid any public or private honor that might overthrow the established condition of his soul.

Glaucon/ If that's his chief concern, he won't be willing to take part in politics.

Socrates/ Yes, by the dog, he certainly will, at least in his own kind of city. But he may not be willing to do so in his fatherland, unless some divine good luck chances to be his.

Glaucon/ I understand. You mean that he'll be willing to take part in the politics of the city we were founding and

describing, the one that exists in theory, for I don't think it exists anywhere on earth.

Socrates/ But perhaps, there is a model of it in heaven, for anyone who wants to look at it and to make himself its citizen on the strength of what he sees. It makes no difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere, for he would take part in the practical affairs of that city and no other.

Glaucon/ Probably so.

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Socrates/ Indeed, our city has many features that assure me that we were entirely right in founding it as we did, and, when I say this, I'm especially thinking of poetry.

Glaucon/ What about it in particular?

Socrates/ That we didn't admit any that is imitative. Now that we have distinguished the separate parts of the soul, it is even clearer, I think, that such poetry should be altogether excluded.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Between ourselves—for you won't denounce me to the tragic poets or any of the other imitative ones—all such poetry is likely to distort the thought of anyone who hears it, unless he has the knowledge of what it is really like, as a drug to counteract it.

Glaucon/ What exactly do you have in mind in saying this?

Socrates/ I'll tell you, even though the love and respect I've had for Homer since I was a child make me hesitate to speak, for he seems to have been the first teacher and leader of all these fine tragedians. All the same, no one is to be honored or valued more than the truth. So, as I say, it must be told.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Listen then, or, rather, answer.

Glaucon/ Ask and I will.

Socrates/ Could you tell me what imitation in general is? I don't entirely understand what sort of thing imitations are trying to be.

Glaucon/ Is it likely, then, that I'll understand?

Socrates/ That wouldn't be so strange, for people with bad eyesight often see things before those whose eyesight is keener.

Glaucon/ That's so, but even if something occurred to me, I wouldn't be eager to talk about it in front of you. So I'd rather that you did the looking.

Socrates/ Do you want us to begin our examination, then, by adopting our usual procedure? As you know, we customarily hypothesize a single form in connection with each of the many things to which we apply the same name. Or don't you understand?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ Then let's now take any of the manys you like. For example, there are many beds and tables.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But there are only two forms of such furniture, one of the bed and one of the table.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And don't we also customarily say that their makers look towards the appropriate form in making the beds or tables we use, and similarly in the other cases? Surely no craftsman makes the form itself. How could he?

Glaucon/ There's no way he could.

Socrates/ Well, then, see what you'd call this craftsman?

Glaucon/ Which one?

Socrates/ The one who makes all the things that all the other kinds of craftsmen severally make.

Glaucon/ That's a clever and wonderful fellow you're talking about.

Socrates/ Wait a minute, and you'll have even more reason to say that, for this same craftsman is able to make, not only all kinds of furniture, but all plants that grow from

the earth, all animals (including himself), the earth itself, the heavens, the gods, all the things in the heavens and in Hades beneath the earth.

Glaucon/ He'd be amazingly clever!

Socrates/ You don't believe me? Tell me, do you think that there's no way any craftsman could make all these things, or that in one way he could and in another he couldn't? Don't you see that there is a way in which you yourself could make all of them?

Glaucon/ What way is that?

Socrates/ It isn't hard: You could do it quickly and in lots of places, especially if you were willing to carry a mirror with you, for that's the quickest way of all. With it you can quickly make the sun, the things in the heavens, the earth, yourself, the other animals, manufactured items, plants, and everything else mentioned just now.

Glaucon/ Yes, I could make them appear, but I couldn't make the things themselves as they truly are.

Socrates/ Well put! You've extracted the point that's crucial to the argument. I suppose that the painter too belongs to this class of makers, doesn't he?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ But I suppose you'll say that he doesn't truly make the things he makes. Yet, in a certain way, the painter does make a bed, doesn't he?

Glaucon/ Yes, he makes the appearance of one.

Socrates/ What about the carpenter? Didn't you just say that he doesn't make the form—which is our term for the being of a bed—but only a bed?

Glaucon/ Yes, I did say that.

Socrates/ Now, if he doesn't make the being of a bed, he isn't making that which is, but something which is like that

which is, but is not it. So, if someone were to say that the work of a carpenter or any other craftsman is completely that which is, wouldn't he risk saying what isn't true?

Glaucon/ That, at least, would be the opinion of those who busy themselves with arguments of this sort.

Socrates/ Then let's not be surprised if the carpenter's bed, too, turns out to be a somewhat dark affair in comparison to the true one.

Glaucon/ All right.

Socrates/ Then, do you want us to try to discover what an imitator is by reference to these same examples?

Glaucon/ I do, if you do.

Socrates/ We get, then, these three kinds of beds. The first is in nature a bed, and I suppose we'd say that a god makes it, or does someone else make it?

Glaucon/ No one else, I suppose.

Socrates/ The second is the work of a carpenter.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the third is the one the painter makes. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ It is.

Socrates/ Then the painter, carpenter, and god correspond to three kinds of bed?

Glaucon/ Yes, three.

Socrates/ Now, the god, either because he didn't want to or because it was necessary for him not to do so, didn't make more than one bed in nature, but only one, the very one that is the being of a bed. Two or more of these have not been made by the god and never will be.

Glaucon/ Why is that?

Socrates/ Because, if he made only two, then again one would come to light whose form they in turn would both possess, and that would be the one that is the being of a bed and not the other two.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ The god knew this, I think, and wishing to be the real maker of the truly real bed and not just a maker of a bed, he made it to be one in nature.

Glaucon/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Do you want us to call him its natural maker or something like that?

Glaucon/ It would be right to do so, at any rate, since he is by nature the maker of this and everything else.

Socrates/ What about a carpenter? Isn't he the maker of a bed?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is a painter also a craftsman and maker of such things?

Glaucon/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Then what do you think he does do to a bed?

Glaucon/ He imitates it. He is an imitator of what the others make. That, in my view, is the most reasonable thing to call him.

Socrates/ All right. Then wouldn't you call someone whose product is third from the natural one an imitator?

Glaucon/ I most certainly would.

Socrates/ Then this will also be true of a tragedian, if indeed he is an imitator. He is by nature third from the king and the truth, as are all other imitators.

Glaucon/ It looks that way.

Socrates/ We're agreed about imitators, then. Now, tell me this about a painter. Do you think he tries in each case to imitate the thing itself in nature or the works of craftsmen?

Glaucon/ The works of craftsmen.

Socrates/ As they are or as they appear? You must be clear about that.

Glaucon/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Like this. If you look at a bed from the side or the front or from anywhere else is it a different bed each time? Or does it only appear different, without being at all different? And is that also the case with other things?

Glaucon/ That's the way it is—it appears different without being so.

Socrates/ Then consider this very point: What does painting do in each case? Does it imitate that which is as it is, or does it imitate that which appears as it appears? Is it an imitation of appearances or of truth?

Glaucon/ Of appearances.

Socrates/ Then imitation is far removed from the truth, for it touches only a small part of each thing and a part that is itself only an image. And that, it seems, is why it can produce everything. For example, we say that a painter can paint a cobbler, a carpenter, or any other craftsman, even though he knows nothing about these crafts. Nevertheless, if he is a good painter and displays his painting of a carpenter at a distance, he can deceive children and foolish people into thinking that it is truly a carpenter.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then this, I suppose, is what we must bear in mind in all these cases. Hence, whenever someone tells us that he has met a person who knows all the crafts as well as

all the other things that anyone else knows and that his knowledge of any subject is more exact than any of theirs is, we must assume that we're talking to a simple-minded fellow who has apparently encountered some sort of magician or imitator and been deceived into thinking him omniscient and that the reason he has been deceived is that he himself can't distinguish between knowledge, ignorance, and imitation.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ Then, we must consider tragedy and its leader, Homer. The reason is this: We hear some people say that poets know all crafts, all human affairs concerned with virtue and vice, and all about the gods as well. They say that if a good poet produces fine poetry, he must have knowledge of the things he writes about, or else he wouldn't be able to produce it at all. Hence, we have to look to see whether those who tell us this have encountered these imitators and have been so deceived by them that they don't realize that their works are at the third remove from that which is and are easily produced without knowledge of the truth (since they are only images, not things that are), or whether there is something in what these people say, and good poets really do have knowledge of the things most people think they write so well about.

Glaucon/ We certainly must look into it.

Socrates/ Do you think that someone who could make both the thing imitated and its image would allow himself to be serious about making images and put this at the forefront of his life as the best thing to do?

Glaucon/ No, I don't.

Socrates/ I suppose that, if he truly had knowledge of the things he imitates, he'd be much more serious about actions than about imitations of them, would try to leave behind

many fine deeds as memorials to himself, and would be more eager to be the subject of a eulogy than the author of one.

Glaucon/ I suppose so, for these things certainly aren't equally valuable or equally beneficial either.

Socrates/ Then let's not demand an account of any of these professions from Homer or the other poets. Let's not ask whether any of them is a doctor rather than an imitator of what doctors say, or whether any poet of the old or new school has made anyone healthy as Asclepius did, or whether he has left any students of medicine behind as Asclepius did his sons. And let's not ask them about the other crafts either. Let's pass over all that. But about the most important and most beautiful things of which Homer undertakes to speak—warfare, generalship, city government, and people's education—about these it is fair to question him, asking him this: "Homer, if you're not third from the truth about virtue, the sort of craftsman of images that we defined an imitator to be, but if you're even second and capable of knowing what ways of life make people better in private or in public, then tell us which cities are better governed because of you, as Sparta is because of Lycurgus, and as many others—big and small—are because of many other men? What city gives you credit for being a good lawgiver who benefited it, as Italy and Sicily do to Charondas, and as we do to Solon? Who gives such credit to you?" Will he be able to name one?

Glaucon/ I suppose not, for not even the Homeridae make that claim for him.

Socrates/ Well, then, is any war in Homer's time remembered that was won because of his generalship and advice?

Glaucon/ None.

Socrates/ Or, as befits a wise man, are many inventions and useful devices in the crafts or sciences attributed to Homer, as they are to Thales of Miletus and Anacharsis the Scythian?

Glaucon/ There's nothing of that kind at all.

Socrates/ Then, if there's nothing of a public nature, are we told that, when Homer was alive, he was a leader in the education of certain people who took pleasure in associating with him in private and that he passed on a Homeric way of life to those who came after him, just as Pythagoras did? Pythagoras is particularly loved for this, and even today his followers are conspicuous for what they call the Pythagorean way of life.

Glaucon/ Again, we're told nothing of this kind about Homer. If the stories about him are true, Socrates, his companion, Creophylus, seems to have been an even more ridiculous example of education than his name suggests, for they tell us that while Homer was alive, Creophylus completely neglected him.

Socrates/ They do tell us that. But, Glaucon, if Homer had really been able to educate people and make them better, if he'd known about these things and not merely about how to imitate them, wouldn't he have had many companions and been loved and honored by them? Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, and a great many others are able to convince anyone who associates with them in private that he wouldn't be able to manage his household or city unless they themselves supervise his education, and they are so intensely loved because of this wisdom of theirs that their disciples do everything but carry them around on their shoulders. So do you suppose that, if Homer had been able to benefit people and make them more virtuous, his companions would have allowed either him or Hesiod to

wander around as rhapsodes? Instead, wouldn't they have clung tighter to them than to gold and compelled them to live with them in their homes, or, if they failed to persuade them to do so, wouldn't they have followed them wherever they went until they had received sufficient education?

Glaucon/ It seems to me, Socrates, that what you say is entirely true.

Socrates/ Then shall we conclude that all poetic imitators, beginning with Homer, imitate images of virtue and all the other things they write about and have no grasp of the truth? As we were saying just now, a painter, though he knows nothing about cobblery, can make what seems to be a cobbler to those who know as little about it as he does and who judge things by their colors and shapes.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And in the same way, I suppose we'll say that a poetic imitator uses words and phrases to paint colored pictures of each of the crafts. He himself knows nothing about them, but he imitates them in such a way that others, as ignorant as he, who judge by words, will think he speaks extremely well about cobblery or generalship or anything else whatever, provided—so great is the natural charm of these things—that he speaks with meter, rhythm, and harmony, for if you strip a poet's works of their musical colorings and take them by themselves, I think you know what they look like. You've surely seen them.

Glaucon/ I certainly have.

Socrates/ Don't they resemble the faces of young boys who are neither fine nor beautiful after the bloom of youth has left them?

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Now, consider this. We say that a maker of an image—an imitator—knows nothing about that which is but only about its appearance. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then let's not leave the discussion of this point halfway, but examine it fully.

Glaucon/ Go ahead.

Socrates/ Don't we say that a painter paints reins and a mouth-bit?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And that a cobbler and a metal-worker makes them?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then, does a painter know how the reins and mouth-bit have to be? Or is it the case that even a cobbler and metal-worker who make them don't know this, but only someone who knows how to use them, namely, a horseman?

Glaucon/ That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ And won't we say that the same holds for everything?

Glaucon/ What?

Socrates/ That for each thing there are these three crafts, one that uses it, one that makes it, and one that imitates it?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then aren't the virtue or excellence, the beauty and correctness of each manufactured item, living creature, and action related to nothing but the use for which each is made or naturally adapted?

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ It's wholly necessary, therefore, that a user of each thing has most experience of it and that he tell a maker

which of his products performs well or badly in actual use. A flute-player, for example, tells a flute-maker about the flutes that respond well in actual playing and prescribes what kind of flutes he is to make, while the maker follows his instructions.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then doesn't the one who knows give instructions about good and bad flutes, and doesn't the other rely on him in making them?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Therefore, a maker—through associating with and having to listen to the one who knows—has right opinion about whether something he makes is fine or bad, but the one who knows is the user.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Does an imitator have knowledge of whether the things he makes are fine or right through having made use of them, or does he have right opinion about them through having to consort with the one who knows and being told how he is to paint them?

Glaucon/ Neither.

Socrates/ Therefore an imitator has neither knowledge nor right opinion about whether the things he makes are fine or bad.

Glaucon/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Then a poetic imitator is an accomplished fellow when it comes to wisdom about the subjects of his poetry!

Glaucon/ Hardly.

Socrates/ Nonetheless, he'll go on imitating, even though he doesn't know the good or bad qualities of anything, but

what he'll imitate, it seems, is what appears fine or beautiful to the majority of people who know nothing.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ It seems, then, that we're fairly well agreed that an imitator has no worthwhile knowledge of the things he imitates, that imitation is a kind of game and not something to be taken seriously, and that all the tragic poets, whether they write in iambics or hexameters, are as imitative as they could possibly be.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ Then is this kind of imitation concerned with something that is third from the truth, or what?

Glaucon/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ And on which of a person's parts does it exert its power?

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ This: Something looked at from close at hand doesn't seem to be the same size as it does when it is looked at from a distance.

Glaucon/ No, it doesn't.

Socrates/ And something looks crooked when seen in water and straight when seen out of it, while something else looks both concave and convex because our eyes are deceived by its colors, and every other similar sort of confusion is clearly present in our soul. And it is because they exploit this weakness in our nature that *trompe l'oeil* painting, conjuring, and other forms of trickery have powers that are little short of magical.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ And don't measuring, counting, and weighing give us most welcome assistance in these cases, so that we aren't ruled by something's looking bigger, smaller, more

numerous, or heavier, but by calculation, measurement, or weighing?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ And calculating, measuring, and weighing are the work of the rational part of the soul.

Glaucon/ They are.

Socrates/ But when this part has measured and has indicated that some things are larger or smaller or the same size as others, the opposite appears to it at the same time.

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ And didn't we say that it is impossible for the same thing to believe opposites about the same thing at the same time?

Glaucon/ We did, and we were right to say it.

Socrates/ Then the part of the soul that forms a belief contrary to the measurements couldn't be the same as the part that believes in accord with them.

Glaucon/ No, it couldn't.

Socrates/ Now, the part that puts its trust in measurement and calculation is the best part of the soul.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Therefore, the part that opposes it is one of the inferior parts in us.

Glaucon/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ This, then, is what I wanted to get agreement about when I said that painting and imitation as a whole produce work that is far from the truth, namely, that imitation really consorts with a part of us that is far from reason, and the result of their being friends and companions is neither sound nor true.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ Then imitation is an inferior thing that consorts with another inferior thing to produce an inferior offspring.

Glaucon/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Does this apply only to the imitations we see, or does it also apply to the ones we hear—the ones we call poetry?

Glaucon/ It probably applies to poetry as well.

Socrates/ However, we mustn't rely solely on a mere probability based on the analogy with painting; instead, we must go directly to the part of our thought with which poetic imitations consort and see whether it is inferior or something to be taken seriously.

Glaucon/ Yes, we must.

Socrates/ Then let's set about it as follows. We say that imitative poetry imitates human beings acting voluntarily or under compulsion, who believe that, as a result of these actions, they are doing either well or badly and who experience either pleasure or pain in all this. Does it imitate anything apart from this?

Glaucon/ Nothing.

Socrates/ Then is a person of one mind in all these circumstances? Or, just as he was at war with himself in matters of sight and held opposite beliefs about the same thing at the same time, does he also fight with himself and engage in civil war with himself in matters of action? But there is really no need for us to reach agreement on this question now, for I remember that we already came to an adequate conclusion about all these things in our earlier arguments, when we said that our soul is full of a myriad of such oppositions at the same time.

Glaucon/ And rightly so.

Socrates/ It was right, but I think we omitted some things then that we must now discuss.

Glaucon/ What are they?

Socrates/ We also mentioned somewhere before that, if a decent man happens to lose his son or some other prized possession, he'll bear it more easily than the other sorts of people.

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But now let's consider this. Will he not grieve at all, or, if that's impossible, will he be somehow measured in his response to pain?

Glaucon/ The latter is closer to the truth.

Socrates/ Now, tell me this about him: Will he fight his pain and put up more resistance to it when his equals can see him or when he's alone by himself in solitude?

Glaucon/ He'll fight it far more when he's being seen.

Socrates/ But when he's alone I suppose he'll venture to say and do lots of things that he'd be ashamed to be heard saying or seen doing.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And isn't it reason and law that tells him to resist his pain, while his experience of it tells him to give in?

Glaucon/ True.

Socrates/ And when there are two opposite inclinations in a person in relation to the same thing at the same time, we say that he must also have two parts.

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Isn't one part ready to obey the law wherever it leads him?

Glaucon/ How so?

Socrates/ The law says, doesn't it, that it is best to keep as quiet as possible in misfortunes and not get excited about them? First, it isn't clear whether such things will turn out to be good or bad in the end; second, it doesn't make the future any better to take them hard; third, human affairs aren't worth taking very seriously; and, finally, grief prevents the very thing we most need in such circumstances from coming into play as quickly as possible.

Glaucon/ What are you referring to?

Socrates/ Deliberation. We must accept what has happened as we would the fall of the dice, and then arrange our affairs in whatever way reason determines to be best. We mustn't hug the hurt part and spend our time weeping and wailing like children when they trip. Instead, we should always accustom our souls to turn as quickly as possible to healing the disease and putting the disaster right, replacing lamentation with cure.

Glaucon/ That would be the best way to deal with misfortune, at any rate.

Socrates/ Accordingly, we say that it is the best part of us that is willing to follow this rational calculation.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Then won't we also say that the part that leads us to dwell on our misfortunes and to lamentation, and that can never get enough of these things, is irrational, idle, and a friend of cowardice?

Glaucon/ We certainly will.

Socrates/ Now, this excitable character admits of many multicolored imitations. But a rational and quiet character, which always remains pretty well the same, is neither easy to imitate nor easy to understand when imitated, especially not by a crowd consisting of all sorts of people gathered

together at a theater festival, for the experience being imitated is alien to them.

Glaucon/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Clearly, then, an imitative poet isn't by nature related to the part of the soul that rules in such a character, and, if he's to attain a good reputation with the majority of people, his cleverness isn't directed to pleasing it. Instead, he's related to the excitable and multicolored character, since it is easy to imitate.

Glaucon/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Therefore, we'd be right to take him and put him beside a painter as his counterpart. Like a painter, he produces work that is inferior with respect to truth and that appeals to a part of the soul that is similarly inferior rather than to the best part. So we were right not to admit him into a city that is to be well-governed, for he arouses, nourishes, and strengthens this part of the soul and so destroys the rational one, in just the way that someone destroys the better sort of citizens when he strengthens the vicious ones and surrenders the city to them. Similarly, we'll say that an imitative poet puts a bad constitution in the soul of each individual by making images that are far removed from the truth and by gratifying the irrational part, which cannot distinguish the large and the small but believes that the same things are large at one time and small at another.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ However, we haven't yet brought the most serious charge against imitation, namely, that with a few rare exceptions it is able to corrupt even decent people, for that's surely an altogether terrible thing.

Glaucon/ It certainly is, if indeed it can do that.

Socrates/ Listen, then, and consider whether it can or not. When even the best of us hear Homer or some other

tragedian imitating one of the heroes sorrowing and making a long lamenting speech or singing and beating his breast, you know that we enjoy it, give ourselves up to following it, sympathize with the hero, take his sufferings seriously, and praise as a good poet the one who affects us most in this way.

Glaucon/ Of course we do.

Socrates/ But when one of us suffers a private loss, you realize that the opposite happens. We pride ourselves if we are able to keep quiet and master our grief, for we think that this is the manly thing to do and that the behavior we praised before is womanish.

Glaucon/ I do realize that.

Socrates/ Then are we right to praise it? Is it right to look at someone behaving in a way that we would consider unworthy and shameful and to enjoy and praise it rather than being disgusted by it?

Glaucon/ No, by god, that doesn't seem reasonable.

Socrates/ No, at least not if you look at it in the following way.

Glaucon/ How?

Socrates/ If you reflect, first, that the part of the soul that is forcibly controlled in our private misfortunes and that hungers for the satisfaction of weeping and wailing, because it desires these things by nature, is the very part that receives satisfaction and enjoyment from poets, and, second, that the part of ourselves that is best by nature, since it hasn't been adequately educated either by reason or habit, relaxes its guard over the lamenting part when it is watching the sufferings of somebody else. The reason it does so is this: It thinks that there is no shame involved for it in praising and pitying another man who, in spite of his claim to goodness, grieves excessively. Indeed, it thinks that there is

a definite gain involved in doing so, namely, pleasure. And it wouldn't want to be deprived of that by despising the whole poem. I suppose that only a few are able to figure out that enjoyment of other people's sufferings is necessarily transferred to our own and that the pitying part, if it is nourished and strengthened on the sufferings of others, won't be easily held in check when we ourselves suffer.

Glaucon/ That's very true.

Socrates/ And doesn't the same argument apply to what provokes laughter? If there are any jokes that you yourself would be ashamed to tell but that you very much enjoy hearing and don't detest as something evil in comic plays or in private, aren't you doing the same thing as in the case of what provokes pity? The part of you that wanted to tell the jokes and that was held back by your reason, for fear of being thought a buffoon, you then release, not realizing that, by making it strong in this way, you will be led into becoming a figure of fun where your own affairs are concerned.

Glaucon/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And in the case of sex, anger, and all the desires, pleasures, and pains that we say accompany all our actions, poetic imitation has the very same effect on us. It nurtures and waters them and establishes them as rulers in us when they ought to wither and be ruled, for that way we'll become better and happier rather than worse and more wretched.

Glaucon/ I can't disagree with you.

Socrates/ And so, Glaucon, when you happen to meet those who praise Homer and say that he's the poet who educated Greece, that it's worth taking up his works in order to learn how to manage and educate people, and that one should arrange one's whole life in accordance with his teachings, you should welcome these people and treat them

as friends, since they're as good as they're capable of being, and you should agree that Homer is the most poetic of the tragedians and the first among them. But you should also know that hymns to the gods and eulogies to good people are the only poetry we can admit into our city. If you admit the pleasure-giving Muse, whether in lyric or epic poetry, pleasure and pain will be kings in your city instead of law or the thing that everyone has always believed to be best, namely, reason.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ Then let this be our defense—now that we've returned to the topic of poetry—that, in view of its nature, we had reason to banish it from the city earlier, for our argument compelled us to do so. But in case we are charged with a certain harshness and lack of sophistication, let's also tell poetry that there is an ancient quarrel between it and philosophy, which is evidenced by such expressions as "the dog yelping and shrieking at its master," "great in the empty eloquence of fools," "the mob of wise men that has mastered Zeus," and "the subtle thinkers, beggars all." Nonetheless, if the poetry that aims at pleasure and imitation has any argument to bring forward that proves it ought to have a place in a well-governed city, we at least would be glad to admit it, for we are well aware of the charm it exercises. But, be that as it may, to betray what one believes to be the truth is impious. What about you, Glaucon, don't you feel the charm of the pleasure-giving Muse, especially when you study her through the eyes of Homer?

Glaucon/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Therefore, isn't it just that such poetry should return from exile when it has successfully defended itself, whether in lyric or any other meter?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then we'll allow its defenders, who aren't poets themselves but lovers of poetry, to speak in prose on its behalf and to show that it not only gives pleasure but is beneficial both to constitutions and to human life. Indeed, we'll listen to them graciously, for we'd certainly profit if poetry were shown to be not only pleasant but also beneficial.

Glaucon/ How could we fail to profit?

Socrates/ However, if such a defense isn't made, we'll behave like people who have fallen in love with someone but who force themselves to stay away from him, because they realize that their passion isn't beneficial. In the same way, because the love of this sort of poetry has been implanted in us by the upbringing we have received under our fine constitutions, we are well disposed to any proof that it is the best and truest thing. But if it isn't able to produce such a defense, then, whenever we listen to it, we'll repeat the argument we have just now put forward like an incantation so as to preserve ourselves from slipping back into that childish passion for poetry which the majority of people have. And we'll go on chanting that such poetry is not to be taken seriously or treated as a serious undertaking with some kind of hold on the truth, but that anyone who is anxious about the constitution within him must be careful when he hears it and must continue to believe what we have said about it.

Glaucon/ I completely agree.

Socrates/ Yes, for the struggle to be good rather than bad is important, Glaucon, much more important than people think. Therefore, we mustn't be tempted by honor, money, rule, or even poetry into neglecting justice and the rest of virtue.

Glaucon/ After what we've said, I agree with you, and so, I think, would anyone else.

Socrates/ And yet we haven't discussed the greatest rewards and prizes that have been proposed for virtue.

Glaucon/ They must be inconceivably great, if they're greater than those you've already mentioned.

Socrates/ Could anything really great come to pass in a short time? And isn't the time from childhood to old age short when compared to the whole of time?

Glaucon/ It's a mere nothing.

Socrates/ Well, do you think that an immortal thing should be seriously concerned with that short period rather than with the whole of time?

Glaucon/ I suppose not, but what exactly do you mean by this?

Socrates/ Haven't you realized that our soul is immortal and never destroyed? He looked at me with wonder and said:

Glaucon/ No, by god, I haven't. Are you really in a position to assert that?

Socrates/ I'd be wrong not to, and so would you, for it isn't difficult.

Glaucon/ It is for me, so I'd be glad to hear from you what's not difficult about it.

Socrates/ Listen, then.

Glaucon/ Just speak, and I will.

Socrates/ Do you talk about good and bad?

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you think about them the same way I do?

Glaucon/ What way is that?

Socrates/ The bad is what destroys and corrupts, and the good is what preserves and benefits.

Glaucon/ I do.

Socrates/ And do you say that there is a good and a bad for everything? For example, ophthalmia for the eyes, sickness for the whole body, blight for grain, rot for wood, rust for iron or bronze. In other words, is there, as I say, a natural badness and sickness for pretty well everything?

Glaucon/ There is.

Socrates/ And when one of these attaches itself to something, doesn't it make the thing in question bad, and in the end, doesn't it disintegrate it and destroy it wholly?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Therefore, the evil that is natural to each thing and the bad that is peculiar to it destroy it. However, if they don't destroy it, nothing else will, for the good would never destroy anything, nor would anything neither good nor bad.

Glaucon/ How could they?

Socrates/ Then, if we discover something that has an evil that makes it bad but isn't able to disintegrate and destroy it, can't we infer that it is naturally incapable of being destroyed?

Glaucon/ Probably so.

Socrates/ Well, what about the soul? Isn't there something that makes it bad?

Glaucon/ Certainly, all the things we were mentioning: Injustice, licentiousness, cowardice, and lack of learning.

Socrates/ Does any of these disintegrate and destroy the soul? Keep your wits about you, and let's not be deceived into thinking that, when an unjust and foolish person is caught, he has been destroyed by injustice, which is evil in a soul. Let's think about it this way instead: Just as the body

is worn out, destroyed, and brought to the point where it is a body no longer by disease, which is evil in a body, so all the things we mentioned just now reach the point at which they cease to be what they are through their own peculiar evil, which attaches itself to them and is present in them. Isn't that so?

Glaucon/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then look at the soul in the same way. Do injustice and the other vices that exist in a soul—by their very presence in it and by attaching themselves to it—corrupt it and make it waste away until, having brought it to the point of death, they separate it from the body?

Glaucon/ That's not at all what they do.

Socrates/ But surely it's unreasonable to suppose that a thing is destroyed by the badness proper to something else when it is not destroyed by its own?

Glaucon/ That is unreasonable.

Socrates/ Keep in mind, Glaucon, that we don't think that a body is destroyed by the badness of food, whether it is staleness, rottenness, or anything else. But if the badness of the food happens to implant in the body an evil proper to a body, we'll say that the body was destroyed by its own evil, namely, disease. But, since the body is one thing and food another, we'll never judge that the body is destroyed by the badness of food, unless it implants in it the body's own natural and peculiar evil.

Glaucon/ That's absolutely right.

Socrates/ By the same argument, if the body's evil doesn't cause an evil in the soul that is proper to the soul, we'll never judge that the soul, in the absence of its own peculiar evil, is destroyed by the evil of something else. We'd never accept that anything is destroyed by an evil proper to something else.

Glaucon/ That's also reasonable.

Socrates/ Then let's either refute our argument and show that we were wrong, or, as long as it remains unrefuted, let's never say that the soul is destroyed by a fever or any other disease or by killing either, for that matter, not even if the body is cut up into tiny pieces. We mustn't say that the soul is even close to being destroyed by these things until someone shows us that these conditions of the body make the soul more unjust and more impious. When something has the evil proper to something else in it, but its own peculiar evil is absent, we won't allow anyone to say that it is destroyed, no matter whether it is a soul or anything else whatever.

Glaucon/ And you may be sure that no one will ever prove that the souls of the dying are made more unjust by death.

Socrates/ But if anyone dares to come to grips with our argument, in order to avoid having to agree that our souls are immortal, and says that a dying man does become more vicious and unjust, we'll reply that, if what he says is true, then injustice must be as deadly to unjust people as a disease, and those who catch it must die of it because of its own deadly nature, with the worst cases dying quickly and the less serious dying more slowly. As things now stand, however, it isn't like that at all. Unjust people do indeed die of injustice, but at the hands of others who inflict the death penalty on them.

Glaucon/ By god, if injustice were actually fatal to those who contracted it, it wouldn't seem so terrible, for it would be an escape from their troubles. But I rather think that it's clearly the opposite, something that kills other people if it can, while, on top of making the unjust themselves lively, it even brings them out at night. Hence it's very far from being deadly to its possessors.

Socrates/ You're right, for if the soul's own evil and badness isn't enough to kill and destroy it, an evil appointed for the destruction of something else will hardly kill it. Indeed, it won't kill anything at all except the very thing it is appointed to destroy.

Glaucon/ "Hardly" is right, or so it seems.

Socrates/ Now, if the soul isn't destroyed by a single evil, whether its own or something else's, then clearly it must always be. And if it always is, it is immortal.

Glaucon/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ So be it. And if it is so, then you realize that there would always be the same souls, for they couldn't be made fewer if none is destroyed, and they couldn't be made more numerous either. If anything immortal is increased, you know that the increase would have to come from the mortal, and then everything would end up being immortal.

Glaucon/ That's true.

Socrates/ Then we mustn't think such a thing, for the argument doesn't allow it, nor must we think that the soul in its truest nature is full of multicolored variety and unlikeness or that it differs with itself.

Glaucon/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ It isn't easy for anything composed of many parts to be immortal if it isn't put together in the finest way, yet this is how the soul now appeared to us.

Glaucon/ It probably isn't easy.

Socrates/ Yet our recent argument and others as well compel us to believe that the soul is immortal. But to see the soul as it is in truth, we must not study it as it is while it is maimed by its association with the body and other evils—which is what we were doing earlier—but as it is in its pure state, that's how we should study the soul, thoroughly and

by means of logical reasoning. We'll then find that it is a much finer thing than we thought and that we can see justice and injustice as well as all the other things we've discussed far more clearly. What we've said about the soul is true of it as it appears at present. But the condition in which we've studied it is like that of the sea god Glaucus, whose primary nature can't easily be made out by those who catch glimpses of him. Some of the original parts have been broken off, others have been crushed, and his whole body has been maimed by the waves and by the shells, seaweeds, and stones that have attached themselves to him, so that he looks more like a wild animal than his natural self. The soul, too, is in a similar condition when we study it, beset by many evils. That, Glaucon, is why we have to look somewhere else in order to discover its true nature.

Glaucon/ To where?

Socrates/ To its philosophy, or love of wisdom. We must realize what it grasps and longs to have intercourse with, because it is akin to the divine and immortal and what always is, and we must realize what it would become if it followed this longing with its whole being, and if the resulting effort lifted it out of the sea in which it now dwells, and if the many stones and shells (those which have grown all over it in a wild, earthy, and stony profusion because it feasts at those so-called happy feastings on earth) were hammered off it. Then we'd see what its true nature is and be able to determine whether it has many parts or just one and whether or in what manner it is put together. But we've already given a decent account, I think, of what its condition is and what parts it has when it is immersed in human life.

Glaucon/ We certainly have.

Socrates/ And haven't we cleared away the various other objections to our argument without having to invoke the

rewards and reputations of justice, as you said Homer and Hesiod did? And haven't we found that justice itself is the best thing for the soul itself, and that the soul—whether it has the ring of Gyges or even it together with the cap of Hades—should do just things?

Glaucon/ We have. That's absolutely true.

Socrates/ Then can there now be any objection, Glaucon, if in addition we return to justice and the rest of virtue both the kind and quantity of wages that they obtain for the soul from human beings and gods, whether in this life or the next?

Glaucon/ None whatever.

Socrates/ Then will you give me back what you borrowed from me during the discussion?

Glaucon/ What are you referring to in particular?

Socrates/ I granted your request that a just person should seem unjust and an unjust one just, for you said that, even if it would be impossible for these things to remain hidden from both gods and humans, still, this had to be granted for the sake of argument, so that justice itself could be judged in relation to injustice itself. Don't you remember that?

Glaucon/ It would be wrong of me not to.

Socrates/ Well, then, since they've now been judged, I ask that the reputation justice in fact has among gods and humans be returned to it and that we agree that it does indeed have such a reputation and is entitled to carry off the prizes it gains for someone by making him seem just. It is already clear that it gives good things to anyone who is just and that it doesn't deceive those who really possess it.

Glaucon/ That's a fair request.

Socrates/ Then won't you first grant that it doesn't escape the notice of the gods at least as to which of the two is just and which isn't?

Glaucon/ We will.

Socrates/ Then if neither of them escapes the gods' notice, one would be loved by the gods and the other hated, as we agreed at the beginning.

Glaucon/ That's right.

Socrates/ And won't we also agree that everything that comes to someone who is loved by gods, insofar as it comes from the gods themselves, is the best possible, unless it is the inevitable punishment for some mistake he made in a former life?

Glaucon/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then we must suppose that the same is true of a just person who falls into poverty or disease or some other apparent evil, namely, that this will end well for him, either during his lifetime or afterwards, for the gods never neglect anyone who eagerly wishes to become just and who makes himself as much like a god as a human can by adopting a virtuous way of life.

Glaucon/ It makes sense that such a person not be neglected by anyone who is like him.

Socrates/ And mustn't we suppose that the opposite is true of an unjust person?

Glaucon/ Definitely.

Socrates/ Then these are some of the prizes that a just person, but not an unjust one, receives from the gods.

Glaucon/ That's certainly my opinion.

Socrates/ What about from human beings? What does a just person get from them? Or, if we're to tell the truth, isn't this what happens? Aren't clever but unjust people like

runners who run well for the first part of the course but not for the second? They leap away sharply at first, but they become ridiculous by the end and go off uncrowned, with their ears drooping on their shoulders like those of exhausted dogs, while true runners, on the other hand, get to the end, collect the prizes, and are crowned. And isn't it also generally true of just people that, towards the end of each course of action, association, or life, they enjoy a good reputation and collect the prizes from other human beings?

Glaucon/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then will you allow me to say all the things about them that you yourself said about unjust people? I'll say that it is just people who, when they're old enough, rule in their own cities (if they happen to want ruling office) and that it is they who marry whomever they want and give their children in marriage to whomever they want. Indeed, all the things that you said about unjust people I now say about just ones. As for unjust people, the majority of them, even if they escape detection when they're young, are caught by the end of the race and are ridiculed. And by the time they get old, they've become wretched, for they are insulted by foreigners and citizens, beaten with whips, and made to suffer those punishments, such as racking and burning, which you rightly described as crude. Imagine that I've said that they suffer all such things, and see whether you'll allow me to say it.

Glaucon/ Of course I will. What you say is right.

Socrates/ Then these are the prizes, wages, and gifts that a just person receives from gods and humans while he is alive and that are added to the good things that justice itself provides.

Glaucon/ Yes, and they're very fine and secure ones too.

Socrates/ Yet they're nothing in either number or size compared to those that await just and unjust people after death. And these things must also be heard, if both are to receive in full what they are owed by the argument.

Glaucon/ Then tell us about them, for there aren't many things that would be more pleasant to hear.

Socrates/ It isn't, however, a tale of Alcinous that I'll tell you but that of a brave Pamphylian man called Er, the son of Armenias, who once died in a war. When the rest of the dead were picked up ten days later, they were already putrefying, but when he was picked up, his corpse was still quite fresh. He was taken home, and preparations were made for his funeral. But on the twelfth day, when he was already laid on the funeral pyre, he revived and, having done so, told what he had seen in the world beyond. He said that, after his soul had left him, it travelled together with many others until they came to a marvelous place, where there were two adjacent openings in the earth, and opposite and above them two others in the heavens, and between them judges sat. These, having rendered their judgment, ordered the just to go upwards into the heavens through the door on the right, with signs of the judgment attached to their chests, and the unjust to travel downward through the opening on the left, with signs of all their deeds on their backs. When Er himself came forward, they told him that he was to be a messenger to human beings about the things that were there, and that he was to listen to and look at everything in the place. He said that he saw souls departing after judgment through one of the openings in the heavens and one in the earth, while through the other two souls were arriving. From the door in the earth souls came up covered with dust and dirt and from the door in the heavens souls came down pure. And the souls who were arriving all the time seemed to have been on long journeys, so that they

went gladly to the meadow, like a crowd going to a festival, and camped there. Those who knew each other exchanged greetings, and those who come up from the earth asked those who came down from the heavens about the things there and were in turn questioned by them about the things below. And so they told their stories to one another, the former weeping as they recalled all they had suffered and seen on their journey below the earth, which lasted a thousand years, while the latter, who had come from heaven, told about how well they had fared and about the inconceivably fine and beautiful sights they had seen. There was much to tell, Glaucon, and it took a long time, but the main point was this: For each in turn of the unjust things they had done and for each in turn of the people they had wronged, they paid the penalty ten times over, once in every century of their journey. Since a century is roughly the length of a human life, this means that they paid a tenfold penalty for each injustice. If, for example, some of them had caused many deaths by betraying cities or armies and reducing them to slavery or by participating in other wrongdoing, they had to suffer ten times the pain they had caused to each individual. But if they had done good deeds and had become just and pious, they were rewarded according to the same scale. He said some other things about the stillborn and those who had lived for only a short time, but they're not worth recounting. And he also spoke of even greater rewards or penalties for piety or impiety towards gods or parents and for murder with one's own hands.

For example, he said he was there when someone asked another where the great Ardiaeus was. (This Ardiaeus was said to have been tyrant in some city in Pamphylia a thousand years before and to have killed his aged father and older brother and committed many other impious deeds as

well.) And he said that the one who was asked responded: "He hasn't arrived here yet and never will, for this too was one of the terrible sights we saw. When we came near the opening on our way out, after all our sufferings were over, we suddenly saw him together with some others, pretty well all of whom were tyrants (although there were also some private individuals among them who had committed great crimes). They thought that they were ready to go up, but the opening wouldn't let them through, for it roared whenever one of these incurably wicked people or anyone else who hadn't paid a sufficient penalty tried to go up. And there were savage men, all fiery to look at, who were standing by, and when they heard the roar, they grabbed some of these criminals and led them away, but they bound the feet, hands, and head of Ardiaeus and the others, threw them down, and flayed them. Then they dragged them out of the way, lacerating them on thorn bushes, and telling every passer-by that they were to be thrown into Tartarus, and explaining why they were being treated in this way." And he said that of their many fears the greatest each one of them had was that the roar would be heard as he came up and that everyone was immensely relieved when silence greeted him. Such, then, were the penalties and punishments and the rewards corresponding to them.

Each group spent seven days in the meadow, and on the eighth they had to get up and go on a journey. On the fourth day of that journey, they came to a place where they could look down from above on a straight column of light that stretched over the whole of heaven and earth, more like a rainbow than anything else, but brighter and more pure. After another day, they came to the light itself, and there, in the middle of the light, they saw the extremities of its bonds stretching from the heavens, for the light binds the heavens like the cables girding a trireme and holds its entire

revolution together. From the extremities hangs the spindle of Necessity, by means of which all the revolutions are turned. Its stem and hook are of adamant, whereas in its whorl adamant is mixed with other kinds of material. The nature of the whorl was this: Its shape was like that of an ordinary whorl, but, from what Er said, we must understand its structure as follows. It was as if one big whorl had been made hollow by being thoroughly scooped out, with another smaller whorl closely fitted into it, like nested boxes, and there was a third whorl inside the second, and so on, making eight whorls altogether, lying inside one another, with their rims appearing as circles from above, while from the back they formed one continuous whorl around the spindle, which was driven through the center of the eighth. The first or outside whorl had the widest circular rim; that of the sixth was second in width; the fourth was third; the eighth was fourth; the seventh was fifth; the fifth was sixth; the third was seventh; and the second was eighth. The rim of the largest was spangled; that of the seventh was brightest; that of the eighth took its color from the seventh's shining on it; the second and fifth were about equal in brightness, more yellow than the others; the third was the whitest in color; the fourth was rather red; and the sixth was second in whiteness. The whole spindle turned at the same speed, but, as it turned, the inner spheres gently revolved in a direction opposite to that of the whole. Of these inner spheres, the eighth was the fastest; second came the seventh, sixth, and fifth, all at the same speed; it seemed to them that the fourth was third in its speed of revolution; the fourth, third; and the second, fifth. The spindle itself turned on the lap of Necessity. And up above on each of the rims of the circles stood a Siren, who accompanied its revolution, uttering a single sound, one single note. And the concord of the eight notes produced a single harmony. And there were three

other beings sitting at equal distances from one another, each on a throne. These were the Fates, the daughters of Necessity: Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos. They were dressed in white, with garlands on their heads, and they sang to the music of the Sirens. Lachesis sang of the past, Clotho of the present, and Atropos of the future. With her right hand, Clotho touched the outer circumference of the spindle and helped it turn, but left off doing so from time to time; Atropos did the same to the inner ones; and Lachesis helped both motions in turn, one with one hand and one with the other.

When the souls arrived at the light, they had to go to Lachesis right away. There a Speaker arranged them in order, took from the lap of Lachesis a number of lots and a number of models of lives, mounted a high pulpit, and spoke to them: "Here is the message of Lachesis, the maiden daughter of Necessity: "Ephemeral souls, this is the beginning of another cycle that will end in death. Your daemon or guardian spirit will not be assigned to you by lot; you will choose him. The one who has the first lot will be the first to choose a life to which he will then be bound by necessity. Virtue knows no master; each will possess it to a greater or less degree, depending on whether he values or disdains it. The responsibility lies with the one who makes the choice; the god has none.'" When he had said this, the Speaker threw the lots among all of them, and each—with the exception of Er, who wasn't allowed to choose—picked up the one that fell next to him. And the lot made it clear to the one who picked it up where in the order he would get to make his choice. After that, the models of lives were placed on the ground before them. There were far more of them than there were souls present, and they were of all kinds, for the lives of animals were there, as well as all kinds of human lives. There were tyrannies among them, some of which lasted throughout life, while others ended halfway through

in poverty, exile, and beggary. There were lives of famous men, some of whom were famous for the beauty of their appearance, others for their strength or athletic prowess, others still for their high birth and the virtue or excellence of their ancestors. And there were also lives of men who weren't famous for any of these things. And the same for lives of women. But the arrangement of the soul was not included in the model because the soul is inevitably altered by the different lives it chooses. But all the other things were there, mixed with each other and with wealth, poverty, sickness, health, and the states intermediate to them.

Now, it seems that it is here, Glaucon, that a human being faces the greatest danger of all. And because of this, each of us must neglect all other subjects and be most concerned to seek out and learn those that will enable him to distinguish the good life from the bad and always to make the best choice possible in every situation. He should think over all the things we have mentioned and how they jointly and severally determine what the virtuous life is like. That way he will know what the good and bad effects of beauty are when it is mixed with wealth, poverty, and a particular state of the soul. He will know the effects of high or low birth, private life or ruling office, physical strength or weakness, ease or difficulty in learning, and all the things that are either naturally part of the soul or are acquired, and he will know what they achieve when mixed with one another. And from all this he will be able, by considering the nature of the soul, to reason out which life is better and which worse and to choose accordingly, calling a life worse if it leads the soul to become more unjust, better if it leads the soul to become more just, and ignoring everything else: We have seen that this is the best way to choose, whether in life or death. Hence, we must go down to Hades holding with adamantine determination to the belief that this is so, lest we be dazzled

there by wealth and other such evils, rush into a tyranny or some other similar course of action, do irreparable evils, and suffer even worse ones. And we must always know how to choose the mean in such lives and how to avoid either of the extremes, as far as possible, both in this life and in all those beyond it. This is the way that a human being becomes happiest.

Then our messenger from the other world reported that the Speaker spoke as follows: "There is a satisfactory life rather than a bad one available even for the one who comes last, provided that he chooses it rationally and lives it seriously. Therefore, let not the first be careless in his choice nor the last discouraged."

He said that when the Speaker had told them this, the one who came up first chose the greatest tyranny. In his folly and greed he chose it without adequate examination and didn't notice that, among other evils, he was fated to eat his own children as a part of it. When he examined at leisure, the life he had chosen, however, he beat his breast and bemoaned his choice. And, ignoring the warning of the Speaker, he blamed chance, daemons, or guardian spirits, and everything else for these evils but himself. He was one of those who had come down from heaven, having lived his previous life under an orderly constitution, where he had participated in virtue through habit and without philosophy. Broadly speaking, indeed, most of those who were caught out in this way were souls who had come down from heaven and who were untrained in suffering as a result. The majority of those who had come up from the earth, on the other hand, having suffered themselves and seen others suffer, were in no rush to make their choices. Because of this and because of the chance of the lottery, there was an interchange of goods and evils for most of the souls. However, if someone pursues philosophy in a sound manner

when he comes to live here on earth and if the lottery doesn't make him one of the last to choose, then, given what Er has reported about the next world, it looks as though not only will he be happy here, but his journey from here to there and back again won't be along the rough underground path, but along the smooth heavenly one.

Er said that the way in which the souls chose their lives was a sight worth seeing, since it was pitiful, funny, and surprising to watch. For the most part, their choice depended upon the character of their former life. For example, he said that he saw the soul that had once belonged to Orpheus choosing a swan's life, because he hated the female sex because of his death at their hands, and so was unwilling to have a woman conceive and give birth to him. Er saw the soul of Thamyris choosing the life of a nightingale, a swan choosing to change over to a human life, and other musical animals doing the same thing. The twentieth soul chose the life of a lion. This was the soul of Ajax, son of Telamon. He avoided human life because he remembered the judgment about the armor. The next soul was that of Agamemnon, whose sufferings also had made him hate the human race, so he changed to the life of an eagle. Atalanta had been assigned a place near the middle, and when she saw great honors being given to a male athlete, she chose his life, unable to pass them by. After her, he saw the soul of Epeius, the son of Panopeus, taking on the nature of a craftswoman. And very close to last, he saw the soul of the ridiculous Thersites clothing itself as a monkey. Now, it chanced that the soul of Odysseus got to make its choice last of all, and since memory of its former sufferings had relieved its love of honor, it went around for a long time, looking for the life of a private individual who did his own work, and with difficulty it found one lying off somewhere neglected by the others. He chose it gladly and

said that he'd have made the same choice even if he'd been first. Still other souls changed from animals into human beings, or from one kind of animal into another, with unjust people changing into wild animals, and just people into tame ones, and all sorts of mixtures occurred.

After all the souls had chosen their lives, they went forward to Lachesis in the same order in which they had made their choices, and she assigned to each the daemon it had chosen as guardian of its life and fulfiller of its choice. This daemon first led the soul under the hand of Clotho as it turned the revolving spindle to confirm the fate that the lottery and its own choice had given it. After receiving her touch, he led the soul to the spinning of Atropos, to make what had been spun irreversible. Then, without turning around, they went from there under the throne of Necessity and, when all of them had passed through, they travelled to the Plain of Forgetfulness in burning, choking, terrible heat, for it was empty of trees and earthly vegetation. And there, beside the River of Unheeding, whose water no vessel can hold, they camped, for night was coming on. All of them had to drink a certain measure of this water, but those who weren't saved by reason drank more than that, and as each of them drank, he forgot everything and went to sleep. But around midnight there was a clap of thunder and an earthquake, and they were suddenly carried away from there, this way and that, up to their births, like shooting stars. Er himself was forbidden to drink from the water. All the same, he didn't know how he had come back to his body, except that waking up suddenly he saw himself lying on the pyre at dawn.

And so, Glaucon, his story wasn't lost but preserved, and it would save us, if we were persuaded by it, for we would then make a good crossing of the River of Forgetfulness, and our souls wouldn't be defiled. But if we are persuaded by me,

we'll believe that the soul is immortal and able to endure every evil and every good, and we'll always hold to the upward path, practicing justice with reason in every way. That way we'll be friends both to ourselves and to the gods while we remain here on earth and afterwards—like victors in the games who go around collecting their prizes—we'll receive our rewards. Hence, both in this life and on the thousand-year journey we've described, we'll do well and be happy.

Laws.

Translated by A. E. Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

An Athenian Guest, Clinias of Crete, and

Megillus of Lacedæmon.

Book 1.

Athenian Stranger/ To whom is the merit of instituting your laws ascribed, gentlemen? To a god, or to some man?

Clinias/ Why, to a god, sir, indubitably to a god—in our case to Zeus, in the case of Lacedaemon, to which our friend here belongs, I believe, according to their own story, to Apollo. That is so, is it not?

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ You mean that Minos, just as Homer relates, used to repair to a conference with his father every ninth year, and that his legislation for your Cretan cities was based on his father's oracles?

Clinias/ So our local story has it. It adds the further detail that Rhadamanthus, the brother of Minos—the name will, of course, be familiar to you—was conspicuous for his justice. Well, as we Cretans insist, it was his ancient administration of our judicial business which earned him this deserved reputation.

Athenian Stranger/ An honorable distinction indeed, and most appropriate to a son of Zeus. But as you and our friend Megillus have both been brought up under such venerable legal institutions, I trust you will not find it disagreeable to spend the time, as we walk this morning, in conversation on questions of politics and jurisprudence. The distance from Cnossus to the cave and chapel of Zeus is, I understand,

quite considerable, and there are presumably shady resting places, such as the sultry season demands, on the way, among the lofty trees, where it will be a comfort, at our age of life, to make frequent halts and entertain one another with discourse. Thus we may reach the end of our long journey without fatigue.

Clinias/ To be sure, sir, there are groves of prodigiously fine, tall cypresses farther on, as well as meadows, where we can take a rest.

Athenian Stranger/ I am glad to hear it.

Clinias/ No doubt you are, but we shall all be gladder still when we come to them. Well, let us make our start, and good luck go with us!

Athenian Stranger/ With all my heart! Come now, tell me, what is the purpose of your laws in prescribing your system of common meals and physical training, and your distinctive accouterments?

Clinias/ Why, in the case of my own countrymen, sir, I take the purpose to be very obvious. As you can both see for yourselves, Crete, as a whole, unlike Thessaly, has not a level surface. This is, of course, why the Thessalians rely by preference on cavalry, but we on rapid infantry movements, since with us the ground is uneven and better adapted for training in these maneuvers. On such a terrain a soldier must naturally be lightly accoutered, and not carry a load as he runs; consequently, bow and arrows are felt to be recommended by their light weight. These arrangements, then, have all been made with a military purpose, and it is warfare, if I am to speak my own conviction, which our lawgiver kept in view in all his dispositions. For instance, his reason for establishing the common meals was presumably that he saw that when the whole population are in the field, that very circumstance compels them to take their meals

together, through the campaign, for self-protection. He meant, I believe, to reprove the folly of mankind, who refuse to understand that they are all engaged in a continuous lifelong warfare against all cities whatsoever. Hence, if a force must take its meals together in wartime, for the sake of self-defense, and post relays of officers and men to act as its guards, the same thing should equally be done in time of peace. In fact, the peace of which most men talk—so he held—is no more than a name; in real fact, the normal attitude of a city to all other cities is one of undeclared warfare. By reflection on these lines you will discover that our Cretan legislator constructed the universal scheme of all our institutions, public and private, with a view to war, and transmitted his laws to us for observance in precisely the same spirit. It was his conviction that there is no benefit to be got from any other possessions or associations, where there is a failure to maintain supremacy in the field; all the advantages of the vanquished pass to the victors.

Athenian Stranger/ Your training, sir, would appear to have given you an admirable insight into the institutions of Crete. But you might be a little more definite on one point. As to your test of a well-constituted city, I understand you to be saying that such a city must be so equipped as to be victorious over its rivals in warfare. Am I right?

Clinias/ Most decidedly, and I fancy our friend here will be of the same mind, too.

Megillus/ Why, my good man, what other answer would you expect from any Lacedaemonian?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, possibly this is the right test in comparing cities with cities, but there may be a different test for the comparison of village with village?

Clinias/ Not at all.

Athenian Stranger/ The same test holds good?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, and when we compare one household in our village with another, and one man with one other man? The same test still holds?

Clinias/ The very same.

Athenian Stranger/ And the individual man? Must we think of him as related to himself as foeman to foeman, or what are we to say in this case?

Clinias/ Ah, my Athenian friend! I would rather not say Attic for I think you deserve to take your appellation by preference from the goddess. You have made the position all the more incontestable by this reduction of it to first principles. The more readily, then, can you satisfy yourself of the truth of what has just been said. Humanity is in a condition of public war of every man against every man, and private war of each man with himself.

Athenian Stranger/ And pray, how are we to understand that?

Clinias/ Why, here, sir, is the field in which a man may win the primal and subtlest victory, victory over self, and where defeat, defeat by self, is most discreditable as well as most ruinous. There lies the proof that everyone of us is in a state of internal warfare with himself.

Athenian Stranger/ Then suppose we invert the argument, thus. If each individual man is master of himself, or, alternatively, mastered by himself, may we, or may we not, say that a family, a village, a city, exhibit this same feature?

Clinias/ You mean that they may be masters of, or again mastered by, themselves?

Athenian Stranger/ Exactly.

Clinias/ Again a very proper question. The facts are beyond doubt, particularly in the case of cities. Any city where the better sort are victorious over the masses and inferior classes may properly be said to be mistress of herself and be rightly congratulated on the victory; where the reverse happens, we must speak in the opposite sense.

Athenian Stranger/ The question whether worse is ever really master of better is one we shall do well not to raise, since it calls for fuller consideration. Your present assertion, as I understand, comes to this. An unrighteous majority may sometimes make a combined effort to subdue by violence a righteous minority of their kinsmen and fellow citizens. When this attempt succeeds, the city may properly be spoken of as enslaved to herself, and called bad; when it fails, we call her good, and say that she is mistress of herself.

Clinias/ This language certainly sounds paradoxical, sir, but we cannot withhold our assent.

Athenian Stranger/ Now stay a moment, and consider a further point. There might be a great number of brothers, with the same father and mother, and it would not be remarkable that the majority of them should prove unrighteous and only a minority righteous?

Clinias/ Not in the least.

Athenian Stranger/ Nor would it be seemly for you and me to press too minutely the point that such a household or family can be said as a whole to be worsted by itself when its wicked members triumph, and to be its own mistress when they fail. The aim of our present inquiry into current language is to examine, not the propriety or impropriety of its phraseology, but the objective truth or falsehood of a theory of legislation.

Clinias/ Truly said, sir.

Megillus/ Yes, excellently put so far, as I agree.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, let us go on to a further point. These brothers of whom I have just spoken might conceivably have an adjudicator to decide between them?

Clinias/ To be sure they might.

Athenian Stranger/ Now which would be the better adjudicator? One who exterminated all the bad brothers and enjoined the better to govern themselves, or one who put the government into the hands of the good, but spared the lives of the worse and brought them to voluntary submission to this government? There might be still a third degree of merit in an adjudicator, if we could find one who would take in hand a family at variance with itself, reconcile its members for the future by his regulations, without the loss of a single life, and keep them on permanent amicable terms.

Clinias/ And this third sort would be far and away the best of adjudicators or lawgivers.

Athenian Stranger/ But, mark you, in all the regulations he gave them, he would be legislating with a view to the complete contrary of war.

Clinias/ That much is true enough.

Athenian Stranger/ Then what of the man who organizes a city? Is it with a view to external warfare he would order its life? Would he not much rather pay regard to the internal warfare which arises, from time to time, within the city, and is called, as you know, faction—a kind of war any man would desire never to see in his own city, or, if it broke out, to see appeased at once?

Clinias/ Obviously he would.

Athenian Stranger/ Now which of two courses would one prefer? That peace should be restored by the victory of one party or the other to the faction, and the destruction of its rival, or rather that friendship and amity should be

reestablished by a reconciliation, and the citizens compelled to bestow their attention on an external enemy?

Clinias/ Why, any man would prefer the latter issue, for his own city.

Athenian Stranger/ A lawgiver, no less than another?

Clinias/ Why, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And any legislator will have the best as the object of all his enactments?

Clinias/ Undeniably.

Athenian Stranger/ But the best is neither war nor faction—they are things we should pray to be spared from—but peace and mutual good will. And thus a victory of a city over itself turns out, it would seem, to be not so much a good as a necessary evil. It is as though one fancied that a diseased body which has been subjected to medical purgation were at its best in that condition, and ignored a body which has never stood in need of such treatment. So, if a man takes a similar view of the happiness of the city, or indeed, of the individual man—I mean, if external wars are the first and only object of his regard—he will never be a true statesman, nor will any man be a finished legislator, unless he legislates for war as a means to peace, rather than for peace as a means to war.

Clinias/ Your argument, sir, has the appearance of being sound; yet I am very much mistaken if the institutions of Lacedaemon, as well as those of my own country, have not the latter as their one serious end.

Athenian Stranger/ Very conceivably they have, but our present concern is to submit them to calm inquiry, rather than obstinate contention, as we are convinced that their authors have the same interests at heart as ourselves. We may begin, if you will kindly assist in the examination, by an appeal to the words of an enthusiast for warfare, Tyrtaeus,

an Athenian by birth, and a naturalized fellow citizen of our friend from Sparta. He says, you will remember, that he would ‘make no reckoning or count' of any man, no matter how vast his wealth, or what his advantages—and he makes a pretty full enumeration of such advantages—unless he proves himself at need a first-rate warrior. You are sure to have heard the verses, Clinias; as for Megillus, no doubt he has them at his fingers' ends.

Megillus/ Naturally.

Clinias/ We know the lines in this country, too; we got them from Sparta.

Athenian Stranger/ Well now, suppose we join in putting a question to our poet to some such effect as this. Tyrtaeus, you inspired poet, we are convinced of your wisdom and merit by the excellence of your eulogies of the eminent in warfare. So Clinias of Cnossus, myself, and our friend here believe ourselves to be decidedly of one mind with you already on the main point, but we should like to be quite certain that we are all speaking of the same persons. Tell us, then, do you agree with us in making a marked distinction between two forms of war, or not?

I fancy it would not require a poet of anything like the eminence of Tyrtaeus to give the true answer that there are two forms. There is what all mankind call faction, and it is, of course, the most dangerous kind of war, as we said a few minutes ago; the other, and much milder form, as I imagine we shall all agree, is that waged when we are at variance with external aliens.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then to which kind of warriors, or war, do your magnificent eulogies, and your corresponding censures, refer? Presumably to the external. At least, you speak in your verses of your intolerance of men who have

not the nerve to ‘face the carnage, close with the foe and strike him down.' So we might continue thus. Your special commendation, Tyrtaeus, is, we gather, meant for those who distinguish themselves in an external war against the stranger.

No doubt he would agree to admit this?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ But we affirm that good as such men are, those who prove themselves conspicuously best in the gravest kind of war are still better, and immensely better, and we, too, can cite a poet, Theogonies of Megara in Sicily, whose words are : ‘A loyal man, Cyrnus, is worth his weight in gold and silver in the hour of deadly feuds.' We assert, then, that this type of character proves himself, and proves himself in a deadlier warfare, a far better man than the other in the measure in which justice, self-command, and wisdom, combined together and seconded by valor, are better than mere valor by itself. For a man will never prove himself loyal and sound-hearted in times of faction unless he has all virtue, whereas there are plenty of hired combatants who are ready enough to take a firm stand and fight to the death in the kind of war of which Tyrtaeus has to speak, though most of them prove reckless, unjust, brutal, and superlatively imprudent, but for a very few rare exceptions. Now to what does our argument conclude? What do we mean to establish by urging it? Obviously that your Cretan legislator from the school of Zeus, or any other worth his salt, could have no other object in view in his legislation than the supreme virtue. This supreme virtue is what Theogonies speaks of as loyalty in peril, and we may call it complete righteousness. As for the quality specially commended by Tyrtaeus, it is noble enough, and nobly celebrated by the poet, but, to speak with precision, it comes only fourth in order and worth.

Clinias/ That, sir, is to rank our Cretan legislator very low.

Athenian Stranger/ No, not your legislator, my friend, but ourselves, if we dream that Lycurgus or Minos had warfare primarily in view in all his legislation for Lacedaemon or Crete.

Clinias/ But what, then, ought we to have said?

Athenian Stranger/ What, I take it, is true and ought to be said in an inquiry into the truth. Their legislation was framed in the interest of virtue as a whole, not of one fragment of it, and that the least considerable. They aimed at devising a classified code, though not on the lines of our present-day framers of such codes. Today each of them frames any additional paragraph he finds necessary—one a section on estates and their heiresses, another one on assault and battery, others, others of the same kind, in indefinite number. But we contend that the right procedure for the framer of a legislation is that with which we have just made a beginning. I unreservedly approve the intention of your own remarks about your national jurisprudence. It was quite right to begin with virtue, and explain that virtue was the aim your legislator had in view. But when you stated that the whole of his enactments regards only one fragment of it, and that the most inconsiderable, I thought you were misapprehending. But there is a further distinction I could wish you to observe in your own discourse and to expect in that of others. May I explain its nature?

Clinias/ With all my heart.

Athenian Stranger/ Sir—So I would have had you say—it is not without good cause that the laws of Crete have this exceptionally high repute with all Hellenes. They serve the right end, that of effecting the happiness of those who enjoy them. They, in fact, secure them all good things. But there

are two different kinds of good things, the merely human and the divine; the former are consequential on the latter. Hence a city which accepts the greater goods acquires the lesser along with them, but one which refuses them misses both. The lesser are those among which health holds the first place, comeliness the second, strength for the race and all other bodily exercises the third, while the fourth place belongs to a wealth which is not 'blind,' but clear-sighted, because attendant on wisdom. Of divine goods, the first and chiefest is this same wisdom, and next after it, sobriety of spirit; a third, resultant from the blending of both these with valor, is righteousness, and valor itself is fourth. All of these naturally rank before the former class, and, of course, a lawgiver must observe that order. Next, he should impress it on his citizens that all his other injunctions have a view to these ends, and that among the ends, the human look to the divine, and all the divine to their leader, wisdom.

He should superintend, by a right distribution of honor and dishonor, the matrimonial alliances among his citizens, and their subsequent behavior in the procreation of offspring, male and female, and rearing of it, from infancy right on to old age. He must make a careful and observant study of the pleasures, the pains, the desires, and all the vehement passions aroused in them by all these social relations, and distribute censure and praise among them rightly, in the actual text of his laws. So, again, with the passions of anger and fear, with the various troubles of soul engendered by misfortune, and the reactions from them in seasons of good fortune, and the emotions which are incidental to humanity in sickness, in war, in penury, and their opposites—in all such cases, he should explain and determine how far each human mood is becoming, and how far it is not.

Next, our legislator must watch over the methods by which his citizens acquire and expend their wealth, and have an eye to the presence or absence of justice in the various procedures by which they all contract or dissolve associations with one another, voluntary or involuntary, assigning marks of honor to those of them who conform to his laws, and imposing specific penalties on the disobedient. When he comes at last to the close of his whole constitution making, he must decide in what manner the funeral rites of each class of citizen should be celebrated, and what marks of respect should be assigned to them. When the lawmaker has completed his discovery he will set over the whole system a body of guardians endowed some with wisdom, some with true beliefs, to the end that intelligence may knit the whole into one, and keep it in subjection to sobriety and justice, not to wealth or self-seeking.

Those, gentlemen, are the lines on which I should have wished, and do still wish you to explain how all these merits are to be found in the laws ascribed to Zeus and the Pythian Apollo, and enacted by Minos and Lycurgus, and how they form a system, readily discernible by one familiar with law from scientific study, or even habit of life, though far from manifest to ordinary persons like myself.

Clinias/ Then what, sir, should be our next step?

Athenian Stranger/ I think there will need to be a fresh start of the examination, beginning, as before, with the practices by which courage is developed; then we will examine a second, and then a third form of virtue, if you are so minded. When once we have dealt with our first topic, we may try to take it as a model of procedure, and beguile our journey with further chat on the same lines. After we have treated of all virtue, we will try, with God's permission, to show that all the regulations we were just enumerating have it for their object.

Megillus/ Excellent. And suppose you begin by trying your criticism on our friend here, the admirer of Zeus.

Athenian Stranger/ On you and myself, no less than on him. We are all concerned in the argument. Come, then. We may say that your common meals and physical exercises were devised by your legislator with a view to war?

Megillus/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And thirdly, or fourthly? For in considering this and other virtues, it is possibly well to make such an enumeration of their parts, or whatever else they should be called, so long as a man's meaning is clear.

Megillus/ Well, thirdly, as I, or any other Lacedaemonian would say, he devised the chase.

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose we try to find a fourthly, or a fifthly, if we can.

Megillus/ Then I will venture on naming a fourthly, too, the endurance of bodily pain which finds so much scope among us Spartans in our boxing matches and our system of foraging raids, which regularly involve heavy whippings. Besides, we have what we call a crypteia, which is a wonderfully hard discipline in endurance, as well as the practices of going without shoes or bedding in the winter, and wandering all over the country, night and day, without attendants, performing one's menial offices for oneself. Further, again, our gymnopaediae involve rigid endurance, as the matches are fought in the heat of the summer, and we have a host of other similar tests—in fact, almost too many for particular enumeration.

Athenian Stranger/ You state your case well, my Lacedaemonian friend. But, pray, what are we to make of courage? Is it a conflict with fear and pain, just that and no more? Or does it also include conflict with longings and pleasures and their dangerous seductive blandishments,

which melt even the mettle of the would-be precisian like so much wax?

Megillus/ That, I believe, is the true account; it is a conflict with all of these.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, unless we have forgotten our earlier conversation, our friend from Cnossus spoke of cities, and men too, as defeated by themselves. Did you not?

Clinias/ To be sure, I did.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, shall we give the name bad now to the man who is defeated by pain, or to him who is defeated by pleasure as well?

Clinias/ I think it belongs more properly to one who is defeated by pleasure. And I imagine all of us are readier to say that one who is mastered by pleasure is shamefully self-defeated than to say it of one who succumbs to pain.

Athenian Stranger/ Then very surely our pair of legislators instructed by Zeus and Apollo cannot have canonized a lopsided courage, which can only stand its ground before a sinister enemy, but proves impotent against the dexterously and ingeniously seductive opponent? Surely they would have her face both?

Clinias/ Both, I am confident.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I must ask a second question. What practices have your two cities which teach a man the taste of pleasures without any evasion? Just as pains were not evaded—the man was thrust into the thick of them, but forced, or persuaded by marks of honor, to get the mastery of them. Where, I say, is the same regulation about pleasure to be found in your laws? I want to know what there is in your institutions to give the same person courage alike against pain and against pleasure, to make him victorious where he ought to be victorious, and secure him from defeat at the hands of his most intimate and mortal enemies.

Megillus/ Nay, sir, possibly I could not readily allege conspicuous illustrations, on a large scale, in the matter of pleasure, to match the numerous laws I was able to produce as a counterpoise to pain, though I might be more fortunate with minor details.

Clinias/ I, too, cannot produce an equally obvious illustration from our Cretan laws.

Athenian Stranger/ No, my friends, and it is no matter for surprise. But if any of us should be led, in his desire to discover what is true and best, into censure of some detail in the national laws of any of us, I trust we shall take such treatment from each other gently, without resentment.

Clinias/ Truly spoken, Athenian. We must do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Harshness would, in fact, hardly become our years, Clinias.

Clinias/ Indeed, it would not.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, how far the reproaches which are brought against the systems of Laconia and Crete may be deserved or undeserved is another matter; in any case, I am probably better qualified than either of you to report the criticisms which are generally current. If your laws are but reasonably good, as they are, we must reckon among the best of them the enactment that no young man shall raise the question which of them all are what they should be and which not, but that all should agree, without a dissonant voice, that they are all god-given and admirable, flatly refusing a hearing to anyone who disputes the point, while if an older man has any reflections to make, he must impart them to a magistrate of his own age, when none of the younger men are by.

Clinias/ Perfectly true, sir. Remote as today is from the times of our ancient legislator, I believe you have fairly divined his intentions and are exactly right.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, we have no younger men with us now, and for ourselves, our years give us the legislator's license to hold a private conversation on the subject without offense.

Clinias/ Just so. Accordingly we invite you to criticize our institutions without reserve. One is not insulted by being informed of something amiss, but rather gets an opportunity for amendment, if the information is taken in good part, without resentment.

Athenian Stranger/ Thank you. But my object for the present is not to criticize your laws, which we have not yet thoroughly examined, so much as to state a difficulty. You are the only communities, Greek or non-Greek, known to us whose lawgiver has enjoined you to leave the intensest pleasures and delights utterly untasted, though, in the matter of pains and fears which we have just been discussing, he held that one who is allowed to flinch from them on system from his boyhood, and then has to face fatigues and fears and pains which are not to be evaded, will flinch from those who have been disciplined in them, and be enslaved by them. Now, surely the legislator, to be consistent, should take the same view of pleasures. He should say to himself, if our citizens are to grow up from childhood without experience of the intensest pleasures, if they are to have no training in constancy and refusal to disgrace themselves when assailed by pleasures. susceptibility to pleasure will lead them to the same fate as those who succumb to their fears. They will fall slaves, in a different, but even more dishonorable fashion, to those who can resist the allurements of pleasure, and have the means of producing it at their disposal, though these may sometimes be utterly evil men. Thus, their souls will be half enslaved, half free, and they will not deserve to be called brave men, or free men, without qualification. I would have

you consider whether you find these remarks at all pertinent.

Clinias/ Pertinent enough, on such a first hearing. But it might show immaturity and folly to form confident conclusions on such weighty matters on the instant.

Athenian Stranger/ Then suppose we proceed to the next point of our program, my friends, and turn from courage to sobriety. Can we discover any point of superiority in these two systems over those of societies organized on no systematic principles, as we did in connection with war?

Megillus/ Not too easily. Still, our common meals and physical exercises were presumably well devised to promote both virtues.

Athenian Stranger/ Ah, my friends, how difficult it seems to ensure that the working of an institution shall be as unquestionable as its theory! Presumably it is with states as it is with human bodies—one cannot prescribe one definite treatment for one subject which involves no physically injurious consequences along with its beneficial effects. For example, these physical exercises and common meals you speak of, though in many ways beneficial to a city, provide dangerous openings for faction, as is shown by the cases of the Milesians, Boeotians, and Thurians. And, in particular, this practice is generally held to have corrupted the ancient and natural rule in the matter of sexual indulgence common to mankind with animals at large, and the blame for these corruptions may be charged, in the first instance, on your two cities and such others as are most devoted to physical exercises. Whether these matters are to be regarded as sport, or as earnest, we must not forget that this pleasure is held to have been granted by nature to male and female when conjoined for the work of procreation; the crime of male with male, or female with female, is an outrage on nature and a

capital surrender to lust of pleasure. And you know it is our universal accusation against the Cretans that they were the inventors of the tale of Ganymede; they were convinced, we say, that their legislation came from Zeus, so they went on to tell this story against him that they might, if you please, plead his example for their indulgence in this pleasure too. With the tale we have no further concern, but the pleasures and pains of communities and of private lives are as good as the whole subject of a study of jurisprudence. For pain and pleasure are, as it were, nature's twin fountainheads; whoso draws from the right fount, at due times, and in due measure, be it city, or person, or any living creature, is happy, but he that draws without science, and out of due season, has the completely contrary lot.

Megillus/ Sure, sir, this is finely said, and I would not deny that we are dumfounded for an answer to it. Yet, for myself, I hold that our Lacedaemonian lawgiver is right to command avoidance of pleasures. As to the law of Cnossus, its defense shall be made by our friend, if he will accept the task. In Sparta, to my mind, this matter of pleasure is ordered better than in any place on earth. That which, by its keen delightsomeness, most easily entangles men in outrage and all manner of follies is, by our law, banished entirely from our territory. Neither in our country districts, nor in towns which are controlled by Spartans, can you find drinking parties, with the strong incentives to various pleasures that attend them. There is not a man of us who would not forthwith lay the heaviest penalty on a tipsy reveler, if he fell in with him; the very festival of Dionysus would not serve as an excuse for the offender's discharge. I have seen such reveling before now in your Attica on the 'wagons,' and at Tarentum, a settlement of our own, I beheld the whole city in its cups at the feast of Dionysus, but there is no such practice among us.

Athenian Stranger/ Friend from Sparta, any recreation of this kind is commendable, when the power of resistance persists, though mere foolishness when it is relaxed. A countryman of my own might well defend himself by retorting on you the license of your Spartan women. To be sure, there is a rejoinder which is commonly held to be a sufficient vindication in all such cases at Tarentum, or in my own country, no less than in yours. A native will always meet the stranger's astonishment at an unfamiliar practice with the words, There is no call for surprise; this is our established custom in the matter, though yours may perhaps be different.

What you and I are now discussing is not the practice of mankind at large, but the merits or demerits of the legislators who create the customs. So we must take the whole subject of convivial drinking into fuller consideration; it is a practice of grave importance, and calls for the judgment of no mean legislator. The question is not that of the mere drinking of wine or its complete prohibition, but of the convivial drinking of it. Should we follow the fashion of Scythians and Persians—to say nothing of Carthaginians, Celts, Iberians, and Thracians, who are all of them warlike peoples—or that of your own countrymen? They, as you remind me, absolutely reject the practice, whereas the Scythians and Thracians, men and women alike, take their wine neat, and let it run down over their garments, and count this a laudable and glorious practice. The Persians, again, indulge freely in this, as in other luxurious habits which you Spartans prohibit, though with less disorder than the nations I have mentioned.

Megillus/ Yes, my dear sir, but do not forget that we make them all run when we have weapons in our hands.

Athenian Stranger/ Nay, sir, you must not urge that plea. A flight or pursuit has so often gone unrecorded, and will in

the future; this shows that we cannot regard victory or defeat in the field as more than a very dubious test of the laudability of a practice. For the matter of that, the more populous city may defeat the less populous and reduce it to subjection, as Syracuse has done with Locri, which, you know, has the reputation of enjoying the best laws to be found in that part of the world, or Athens with Ceos, and no doubt many similar instances could be produced. No, we must leave victories and defeats out of court for the present, and discuss the various practices on their own merits, in the hope of convincing ourselves that some are laudable and others the reverse. But first let me make an observation as to the right method of investigating the worth of such practices.

Megillus/ And what is it you would say?

Athenian Stranger/ When such a practice is under consideration, I hold that it is always highly improper to undertake to condemn or approve it out of hand, on the bare mention of its name. This is as though one who had heard wheat, for instance, commended as a wholesome article of diet should denounce it out of hand, without any inquiry into its effects, or the manner of its administration—I mean, how it is to be administered, and to whom, or with what accompaniments, in what form it is to be served, and to persons in what state of health. Well, that is exactly how I think we all argue our present question. As soon as we hear the mere word ‘drinking,' one party condemns the practice and another commends it, and both in a very odd fashion. Both sides rest their case on producing evidence to fact or character—the one thinking it decisive that its witnesses are so numerous, the other that we see the abstainers victorious in the field of battle—though there even the fact is open to dispute. Now if we are to go on to deal with established customs in general on these lines, I, for one, shall be left

unsatisfied. So I propose to deal with our immediate subject, drinking, by a different method—the right one, I believe—as an attempt to illustrate the proper procedure in treating such questions generally. For there are countless peoples ready to contest the issues at stake in these matters against your two cities.

Megillus/ Most certainly, if a right way of treating such problems is to be found, we must not refuse it a hearing.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us treat our question somewhat in this fashion. Suppose that someone should commend goat keeping, or the goat itself as a valuable animal, and another man, who had seen goats damaging lands under cultivation by grazing on them without a keeper, should denounce the brutes, or find fault with any creature he had seen thus under no control or bad control. Can we say that censure of anything coming from such a quarter would have the least validity?

Megillus/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ And what do you say to this? Is a man a useful commander at sea, so long as he only possesses the science of navigation, whether he happens to be seasick or not?

Megillus/ Certainly not, if he combines that disorder with his professional knowledge.

Athenian Stranger/ And what of the commander of an army in the field? Is he a competent commander, so long as he has military science, even if he is a coward and falls seasick in peril from the inebriation of terror?

Megillus/ A thoroughly useless officer, that! A commander for the veriest of women, not for men!

Athenian Stranger/ And what of him who commends or condemns any social activity, be it what it may, which naturally calls for a leader, and is beneficial under his

conduct, though he has never seen that activity rightly organized under such leadership, but only discharged with no leaders, or bad ones? Can we possibly imagine that there is any value in the censure or commendation of such concerted action by such observers?

Megillus/ How can we, on the assumption that they have never witnessed nor taken part in any such association, conducted as it should be?

Athenian Stranger/ Now, stay. I suppose we may reckon a drinking party and its members as one kind of social activity?

Megillus/ Surely, surely.

Athenian Stranger/ Then has anyone ever seen such a party conducted as it ought to be? Neither of you can hesitate to give the answer, 'never'—the whole thing is foreign and unfamiliar to you both. And for my own part, though I have been present at many, in different places, and what is more, may even say I have studied them all carefully, I have never seen nor heard of one rightly managed throughout; here and there a few minor details may not have been amiss, but, in the main, I have found universal wrong management.

Clinias/ You must explain your meaning, sir, rather more precisely. Our inexperience in these matters, as you were saying, is such that, even if we were present at such a gathering, we should very likely not distinguish proper management from improper at first sight.

Athenian Stranger/ No, possibly not. But do your utmost to follow my explanation. No doubt you understand as much as this, that in every assembly or concerted action for any purpose, there should always be someone in control of the parties?

Clinias/ Beyond a doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ And mark that we were lately saying that in a combat the commander must be a brave man.

Clinias/ So we were, to be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Now a brave man is less agitated by alarms than a coward.

Clinias/ True again.

Athenian Stranger/ And if we could contrive to place an army under a general who was utterly devoid of alarm and agitation, we should by all means do so, should we not?

Clinias/ Most decidedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But at the present moment we are contemplating a man who is to take command, not in the embattled meeting of foes with foes, but in the peaceful intercourse of friends with friends, for the promotion of common good feeling.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, as the kind of gathering we have in view is to be attended by drinking, it will not be free from excitement.

Clinias/ Of course not—very much the contrary, I should presume.

Athenian Stranger/ To begin with then, here, too, a commander is wanted.

Clinias/ Wanted, indeed—nowhere more.

Athenian Stranger/ And should we secure freedom from excitement in such a commander, if the thing is possible?

Clinias/ Decidedly.

Athenian Stranger/ And further. I presume, he should be a man of social tact. For his business is to conserve the existing friendly relations between the parties, as well as to ensure that they shall be still further augmented by the gathering.

Clinias/ True enough.

Athenian Stranger/ So the commander set to control a company of drinkers should be both sober and sagacious, not the reverse. If the drinkers are under the control of a young and indiscreet man who is drinking himself, he may think himself very fortunate if no grave disaster results.

Clinias/ Indeed, he may.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, if such parties were conducted among us under the most correct regulations attainable, an unfavorable critic who should attack the institution as such might perhaps be right in his disapproval, but when a man inveighs against a practice because he sees it mismanaged in every possible respect, he is obviously unaware, in the first place, that the practice in question is misconducted, and in the second, that any proceeding whatever will appear mischievous on the understanding that it is executed without a sober master or commander. Surely you can see that a tippling navigator, or commander of any kind, will wreck anything, vessel, or car, or army, or whatever it may be, for which he sets the course.

Clinias/ Your last remark, sir, is unquestionably true. But pray go on to explain what possible good this custom of drinking bouts would do us, if they were rightly conducted. Take the case of an army, such as we were just speaking of. If it gets the right kind of leadership, the result is a victory for the force—no inconsiderable good—and so with our other examples. But what appreciable benefit accrues to individuals, or to the city, from the proper surveillance of a wine party?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, and what appreciable benefit could we say accrues to the city from the proper surveillance of one boy, or one group of boys? If the question is to be put in that form, must we not reply that the city certainly gets

but a trifling advantage from the single case? But if the question is universally what considerable advantage the city derives from the education of the educated, the answer is easy. Education is the way to produce good men, and, once produced, such men will live nobly, and vanquish their enemies in the field into the bargain. So education brings victory in her train, though victory sometimes leads to loss of education, since victorious warfare often enough leads men to pride, and through pride they take the taint of other vices innumerable. Moreover, there has never been a Cadmean education, whereas Cadmean victories have been, and will be, only too common.

Clinias/ We may gather, then, that you regard time spent in companionship over the bottle as contributing much to education, when it is rightly so spent?

Athenian Stranger/ Most assuredly.

Clinias/ Then can you, in the next place, offer us proof that the statement is true?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, sir, as to truth, to be positive the thing is so, when there are so many to dispute it, must be left to a god. But if I am called on to give my personal opinion, I will state it frankly, since our present conversation has struck into the subject of law and politics.

Clinias/ That is just what we are attempting to do—to discover your own conviction on the matter now in dispute.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, to our task. You will have to make an effort to follow, and I to elucidate the argument, with such powers as I have. But first let me make one observation. The universal belief of Hellas is that whereas my own city delights in discourse and is copious in it, Lacedaemon is inclined to taciturnity, and Crete to versatility of mind rather than fluency of utterance. So I fear you may get the impression that I am expending too many

words on a minor matter, if I deliver myself of a long discourse on so inconsiderable a topic as drinking. But the truth is that a really sound theory on the point cannot be surely and adequately expounded apart from a true theory of music, nor that, again, apart from a theory of education at large, and these are subjects for protracted discussion. How would it be, then, I ask you, if we should drop them for the present, and divert the conversation to some other department of jurisprudence?

Megillus/ Sir, you may perhaps be unaware that my own family hold the position of proxeni for Athens. Now it may well be the universal experience of boys anywhere that when they are told they are proxeni for a city, an early kindness for that city promptly finds its way into the boys' hearts—we feel that it is a second fatherland, only next to our own. This is certainly what has happened in my own particular case. From the first, if Lacedaemon felt herself aggrieved by Athens, or obliged by her, the boys used to tell me, Megillus, your city has done the shabby—or the handsome—thing by us.

Well, by listening to these speeches and constantly replying in your defense against persons who brought reproaches against your city, I contracted a strong affection for her. To this day, I love the sound of your dialect, and am persuaded of the truth of the current saying that when an Athenian is a good man, he is exceptionally good. It is only at Athens that goodness is an unconstrained, spontaneous growth, a genuine ‘gift of God' in the full sense of the words. So, as far as I am concerned, you need feel no misgiving in discoursing at any length you please.

Clinias/ I, too, sir, have a statement to make which will relieve you from diffidence in speaking your full mind. You have presumably heard of Epimenides, an inspired person born in this city and connected with my own family, who

visited Athens ten years before the Persian Wars at the bidding of the oracle, and offered certain sacrifices enjoined by the god, besides telling the citizens, who were alarmed by the Persian preparations, that the enemy would not come within ten years, and when they did, would depart again with their purpose uneffected, after receiving more damage than they inflicted. That was when my family contracted their friendship with your countrymen, and my ancestors and myself have had a kindness for them ever since.

Athenian Stranger/ I take it, then, that there is full readiness to hear on your part. On mine, there is readiness enough of intention, but performance is none too easy; still I must do my endeavor. As the first step in the argument, then, let us define education and its effect, since we hold that the discussion on which we have adventured must follow that route to its destination, the wine god.

Clinias/ By all means, since that is your pleasure.

Athenian Stranger/ Good. Then I will attempt an account of what true education is; you must consider whether the account is acceptable.

Clinias/ Pray proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, I proceed at once to say that he who is to be good at anything as a man must practice that thing from early childhood, in play as well as in earnest, with all the attendant circumstances of the action. Thus, if a boy is to be a good farmer, or again, a good builder, he should play, in the one case at building toy houses, in the other at farming, and both should be provided by their tutors with miniature tools on the pattern of real ones. In particular, all necessary preliminary instruction should be acquired in this way. Thus, the carpenter should be taught by his play to use the rule and plumb line, and the soldier to sit a horse, and the like. We should seek to use games as a means of

directing children's tastes and inclinations toward the station they are themselves to fill when adult. So we may say, in fact, the sum and substance of education is the right training which effectually leads the soul of the child at play on to the love of the calling in which he will have to be perfect, after its kind, when he is a man. But, as I said, you must consider whether what has been said has your approval so far.

Clinias/ Indeed, it has.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us further guard against leaving our account of what education is too indeterminate. When we are to express approval or censure of a man's training, we correctly speak of one of ourselves as educated and another as uneducated—and the reference is sometimes to the business of a huckster or a supercargo—and of other such fellows of mighty fine education. But our present discourse is in place only on the lips of one who holds that education is none of these things, but rather that schooling from boyhood in goodness which inspires the recipient with passionate and ardent desire to become a perfect citizen, knowing both how to wield and how to submit to righteous rule. Our argument, I take it, would isolate this training from others and confine the name education exclusively to it; any training which has as its end wealth, or perhaps bodily strength, or some other accomplishment unattended by intelligence and righteousness, it counts vulgar, illiberal, and wholly unworthy to be called education. So we must not wrangle over a word, but abide by the proposition on which we have just agreed, that the rightly educated prove what we mean by good, and that no aspect of education is to be disparaged; it is the highest blessing bestowed on mankind, and it is the best of them on whom it is most fully bestowed. When it takes a false turn which permits of correction, we

should, one and all, devote the energy of a lifetime to its amendment.

Clinias/ True indeed. We admit the point.

Athenian Stranger/ We also agreed some time ago that those who can command themselves are good, and those who cannot, bad.

Clinias/ Precisely.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us once more consider rather more exactly just what our words mean. Perhaps you will allow me to make the point clearer, if I can, by a parable.

Clinias/ We are all attention.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, we may take it that any human being is one person?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ But one person who has within himself a pair of unwise and conflicting counselors, whose names are pleasure and pain?

Clinias/ The fact is as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ He has, besides, anticipations of the future, and these of two sorts. The common name for both sorts is expectation, the special name for anticipation of pain being fear, and for anticipation of its opposite, confidence (θάρρος (tharros)). And on the top of all, there is judgment, to discern which of these states is better or worse, and when judgment takes the form of a public decision of a city, it has the name of law.

Clinias/ I fear I hardly follow you, yet pray proceed with your statement as though I did.

Megillus/ I, too, find myself in the same condition.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us look at the whole matter in some such light as this. We may imagine that each of us living creatures is a puppet made by gods, possibly as a

plaything, or possibly with some more serious purpose. That, indeed, is more than we can tell, but one thing is certain. These interior states are, so to say, the cords, or strings, by which we are worked; they are opposed to one another, and pull us with opposite tensions in the direction of opposite actions, and therein lies the division of virtue from vice. In fact, so says our argument, a man must always yield to one of these tensions without resistance, but pull against all the other strings—must yield, that is, to that golden and hallowed drawing of judgment which goes by the name of the public law of the city. The others are hard and iron-like, it soft, as befits gold, whereas they resemble very various substances. So a man must always cooperate with the noble drawing of law, for judgment, though a noble thing, is as gentle and free from violence as noble, whence its drawing needs supporters, if the gold within us is to prevail over the other stuff. In this wise our moral fable of the human puppets will find its fulfillment. It will also become somewhat clearer, first, what is meant by self-conquest and self-defeat, and next that the individual's duty is to understand the true doctrine of these tensions and live in obedience to it, the city's to accept this doctrine from a god, or from the human discoverer just mentioned, and make it law for her converse with herself and other societies. This will lead us to a more exact articulation both of vice and of virtue, and the elucidation of the subject will presumably throw further light on education and institutions at large, and more particularly on this business of social drinking—a trifling matter, it might be thought, to waste such a long discussion on, and yet it may well prove to deserve the whole.

Clinias/ Very true. So let us treat it at whatever length our present business demands.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, tell me, suppose we ply our puppet with a drink, what effect are we producing on it?

Clinias/ Now why are you recurring to that? What is the purpose of the question?

Athenian Stranger/ I have not yet reached the why; what I want to know is generally how this puppet is affected by participating in this practice. Let me try to explain my meaning still more exactly. My question amounts to this. The drinking of wines makes our pleasures and pains, our tempers and passions more intense, does it not?

Clinias/ Much more intense.

Athenian Stranger/ And what of our perceptions, memories, beliefs, knowledge? Are they likewise intensified? Or do they desert a man altogether, if he is thoroughly soaked with drinking?

Clinias/ Why, utterly.

Athenian Stranger/ And so the man is brought back to the mental condition of his remote infancy?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Now that is the condition in which his self-command is at its lowest.

Clinias/ It is.

Athenian Stranger/ Such a man, we may say, is at his worst?

Clinias/ Decidedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus the phrase ‘second childhood' would seem to be as applicable to inebriation as to old age.

Clinias/ Admirably put, sir.

Athenian Stranger/ Now can there be an argument daring enough to suggest that we should try the taste of a practice such as this. and not avoid it with all our might?

Clinias/ It should seem there can—at least you say so, and only just now you offered to produce it.

Athenian Stranger/ An opposite reminder, and I repeat the offer now, since both of you have professed yourselves eager to give me a hearing.

Clinias/ Of course you must be heard. There is a reason, if there were no other, in the sheer incredibility of your paradox, that it can be right for a man to fling himself voluntarily into a state of sheer degradation.

Athenian Stranger/ Degradation of soul, that is?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, my good sir, and what of a bad habit of body—leanness, disfigurement, feebleness? Would it be a paradox that a man can voluntarily bring himself into those conditions?

Clinias/ Of course it would.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, sir, when men freely go to the physician for a course of medicaments, must we imagine they do not know they will very soon be, for days together, in such a state of body that, were it to be permanent, they would be sick of life? Again, when men resort to gymnasiums, or to heavy bodily exertions, we know their health suffers for the time being, do we not?

Clinias/ Yes, we know all that.

Athenian Stranger/ As also that they go of their own motion, for the sake of subsequent benefits?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ And surely we should take the same point of view about other habitual practices too?

Clinias/ I own we should.

Athenian Stranger/ And therefore also about spending time over the wine cup, if it is a view which can rightly be taken in this case?

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, if only wine drinking can be shown to lead to benefits comparable with those to be secured for the body, it certainly has the advantage over physical training in its initial stage; the second begins in pain, the other not so.

Clinias/ Quite true, but I shall be surprised if we can find any such benefit in the custom.

Athenian Stranger/ That, I take it, is just what we have at last to do our best to make clear. Tell me this. Can we not distinguish two kinds of fear?

Clinias/ And what may they be?

Athenian Stranger/ They are these. In the first place, we are afraid of evil, when we expect it to befall us.

Clinias/ We are.

Athenian Stranger/ But we are often also afraid for our reputation, when we apprehend we are getting a bad reputation from some unworthy act or speech; it is fear of this sort to which we, and I fancy the rest of the world too, give the name of shame.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, those are the two fears of which I was speaking, and the second kind opposes itself to our commonest and most passionate pleasures, as much as to pains and to fears other than itself.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Now does not a lawgiver, or any other man worth his salt, hold this sort of fear in the highest honor? He calls it modesty, and regards the kind of

confidence contrary to it, which he calls impudence, as universally one of the gravest evils in private or public life.

Clinias/ True again.

Athenian Stranger/ And, to say nothing of the many other great advantages this kind of fear secures for us, when you take one thing with another, nothing contributes more effectually to victory and preservation in war itself. In fact, victory has a double source, fearlessness of the enemy, and fear of disgrace in the eyes of one's friends.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ And consequently each of us needs to be at once free from fear and filled with fear, the reason for these contrasted moods being as we have stated.

Clinias/ Agreed.

Athenian Stranger/ And when we intend to make a man immune from various fears, we achieve our purpose by bringing him into contact with fear, under the direction of law.

Clinias/ So it would appear.

Athenian Stranger/ But now, suppose our aim is to make him rightly fearful. What then? Must we not ensure his victory in the conflict with his own lust for pleasures by pitting him against shamelessness and training him to face it? If a man can only attain mature courage by fighting the cowardice within himself and vanquishing it, whereas without experience and discipline in that contest, no man will ever be half the champion he might be, is it credible he should come to fullness of self-command unless he first fights a winning battle against the numerous pleasures and lusts which allure him to shamelessness and wrong, by the aid of precept, practice, and artifice, alike in his play and in his serious hours? Can he be spared the experience of all this?

Clinias/ The view, certainly, does not seem plausible.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, tell me, has any god bestowed on mankind a specific to induce fear—a drug whose effect is that the more a man permits himself to imbibe of it, the darker he fancies his fortunes at every draught, present and future alike grow increasingly alarming, and the climax is abject terror in the bravest, though when the subject has recovered from his stupor and shaken off the effects of the potion, he regularly becomes his own man again?

Clinias/ Nay, sir, where in all the world can we find a liquor like this?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, nowhere. But suppose one could have been found. Would the lawgiver have availed himself of it to develop courage? I mean, it would have been very much to the purpose to discuss it with him to some such effect as this. Pray, sir legislator—whether it is for Cretans or for any other society your legislation is intended—in the first place, would you be thankful for a touchstone of the courage or cowardice of your citizens?

Clinias/ And he would, no doubt, be sure to say yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, would you like the touchstone to be safe and applicable without serious risks, or the reverse?

Clinias/ There, again, he would be certain to prefer safety.

Athenian Stranger/ You would employ it to bring your citizens into such a state of fear and test them under its influence, thus constraining a man to become fearless, by encouragement, precept, and marks of recognition, as well as of disgrace for those who declined to be such as you could have them in all situations? He who shaped himself to this discipline well and manfully would be discharged from the test unscathed, but on him who shaped badly you would lay some penalty? Or would you simply refuse to employ the

liquor, supposing you had no fault to find with it on other grounds?

Clinias/ Why, of course he would employ it, my dear sir.

Athenian Stranger/ It would, at least, give us an infinitely readier and safer training than our present arrangements, whether for the individual, for small groups, or for groups of any desired numbers. A man would do pretty right to save endless trouble by providing himself with this single specific and training himself in privacy to face his fears, isolating himself, of course, from public view behind his regard for decorum until he had obtained a satisfactory result. And, again, he would do right, when confident that he was already adequately prepared by native endowment and preliminary practice, to prosecute his training in the company of fellow drinkers, and make public exhibition of the virtue which enables him to transcend and master the effects of the inevitable disturbances due to the potion, without once suffering a serious fall or deterioration, though he would leave off before he reached the final draught from fear of our universal human weakness before the liquor.

Clinias/ Why yes, sir, even such a man as you speak of would be wise to do that.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us resume our conversation with the legislator. Very good, we shall say to him, as for such a fear-inducing specific, providence has given us none, and we have invented none ourselves, for we need not take quacksalvers into account, but what about fearlessness, excessive confidence, improper confidence at the wrong moment? Is there a liquor which has these effects, or is there not?

Clinias/ He will, of course, say yes, and he will mean wine.

Athenian Stranger/ And are not its effects the very opposite of all we have just mentioned? When a man drinks it, its first immediate effect is to make him merrier than he was, and the more he takes, the more it fills him with optimistic fancies and imaginary capacity. In the very final phase the drinker is swollen with the conceit of his own wisdom to the pitch of complete license of speech and action, and utter fearlessness; there is nothing he will scruple to say, nothing he will scruple to do. I think this will be universally conceded.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let me remind you of something we said before. There are two qualities to be cultivated in our souls, supreme confidence, and its contrary, supreme fearfulness.

Clinias/ What you spoke of as modesty, I take it.

Athenian Stranger/ Well recollected. And seeing that the practice of courage and fearlessness has to be learned in the midst of alarms, it has to be considered whether the contrary quality does not demand the contrary conditions for its cultivation.

Clinias/ The presumption, certainly, is that it does.

Athenian Stranger/ It would seem, then, that the conditions in which we are naturally inclined to be more than usually confident or bold are the very conditions in which we must practice to be least audacious or unashamed, but rather apprehensive of ever presuming to say a shameful word, or submit to a shameful act, or even commit one.

Clinias/ So it seems.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, are not all the following conditions in which we are in the mood in question—anger, lust, pride, folly, greed, cowardice? We may add to the list

wealth, beauty, physical vigor, and whatever else drives us frantic with the intoxication of pleasure. And if we want an inexpensive and comparatively harmless pleasure to serve, in the first place, as a test of these conditions, and in the next, as a training for them, what can we find more suitable than the sportive touchstone of the wine cup, provided only that it is employed with a little precaution? For do but consider. Which is the more dangerous course with a sullen and untamed temper—the source of so many crimes—to test it by entering into a business agreement, with the risk of its failure, or by association in a bacchanalian celebration? Or to put the soul of a slave of sex to the test by entrusting him with our own daughters, sons, and wives, and discover his character at the risk to our nearest and dearest? One might allege endless such illustrations without exhausting the advantages of a sportive method of inquiry involving no serious painful cost. And there is certainly one part of the case which, I fancy, will not be disputed by Cretans, or any other body of men. The proposed test of one another is a reasonably good one, and has the advantage of others in point of inexpensiveness, security, and speediness.

Clinias/ That, at least, is beyond doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ Here, then, in the discovery of native disposition and character, we have something of incomparable service to the art whose business it is to cultivate them—that is, as I suppose we may say, to the art of the statesman.

Clinias/ Just so.

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Athenian Stranger/ Then the question which next arises in discussing these matters, as I think, is this. Rightly controlled fellowship over our cups affords a disclosure of our native disposition, but is this its sole recommendation? Or has it some further considerable and serious advantages? Yes or no? Yes, or so our argument should seem to suggest. But if we are to learn just what these advantages are, we must be on our guard against the snares it lays for us.

Clinias/ Say on, then.

Athenian Stranger/ I am fain, then, for my part, to recall once more our account of right education; 'tis this, or so I seem to divine, for which this institution, under proper management, affords a safeguard.

Clinias/ Truly a bold assertion!

Athenian Stranger/ And therefore what I would say is this. A child's first infant consciousness is that of pleasure and pain; this is the domain wherein the soul first acquires virtue or vice. For wisdom and assured true conviction, a man is fortunate if he acquires them even on the verge of old age, and, in every case, he that possesses them with all their attendant blessings has come to the full stature of man.

By education, then, I mean goodness in the form in which it is first acquired by a child. In fact, if pleasure and liking, pain and dislike, are formed in the soul on right lines before the age of understanding is reached, and when that age is attained, these feelings are in concord with understanding, thanks to early discipline in appropriate habits—this concord, regarded as a whole, is virtue. But if you consider the one factor in it, the rightly disciplined state of pleasures and pains whereby a man, from his first beginnings on, will abhor what he should abhor and relish what he should relish—if you isolate this factor and call it education, you

will be giving it its true name. At least, that is my own conviction.

Clinias/ Yes indeed, sir, we grant the truth of what you have just said, no less than of your former observations about education.

Athenian Stranger/ Good, but to proceed, education—this rightly disciplined state of pleasures and pains—is apt to be relaxed and spoiled in many ways in the course of a man's life. But the gods, in their compassion for the hardships incident to our human lot, have appointed the cycle of their festivals to provide relief from this fatigue, besides giving us the Muses, their leader Apollo, and Dionysus to share these festivals with us and keep them right, with all the spiritual sustenance these deities bring to the feast. Wherein we must see whether the argument whereon we are now harping is true to the facts of things or no. What that argument says is this. No young creature whatsoever, as we may fairly assert, can keep its body or its voice still; all are perpetually trying to make movements and noises. They leap and bound, they dance and frolic, as it were with glee, and again, they utter cries of all sorts. Now animals at large have no perception of the order or disorder in these motions, no sense of what we call rhythm or melody. But in our own case, the gods of whom we spoke as given us for companions in our revels have likewise given us the power to perceive and enjoy rhythm and melody. Through this sense they stir us to movements and become our choir leaders. They string us together on a thread of song and dance, and have named our choirs so after the delight (χαρά (khara)) they naturally afford. Now may we begin by taking this point as settled? May we assume that our earliest education comes through the Muses and Apollo, or not?

Clinias/ We may make that assumption.

Athenian Stranger/ So by an uneducated man we shall mean one who has no choric training, and by an educated man one whose choric training has been thorough?

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ And, mark you, the choric art as a whole embraces both dance and song.

Clinias/ No doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus it follows that a well-educated man can both sing well and dance well.

Clinias/ So it would seem.

Athenian Stranger/ Next let us observe what that statement comes to.

Clinias/ What statement precisely?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, we say the man sings well and dances well. But should we, or should we not, add the qualification, if he sings good songs and dances good dances?

Clinias/ Suppose we take in that qualification.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, suppose he judges the really good to be good and the bad bad, and acts accordingly. Shall we call a man who is in that case better educated in choric and musical art when he can be regularly counted upon for adequate physical and vocal rendering of what he apprehends to be good, though he feels no pleasure in the good, nor dislike of the bad, or rather when, though none too capable of correctness of vocal and physical execution, or of apprehension, he has correct feelings of pleasure and pain, is attracted by the good, and repelled by its opposite?

Clinias/ Sir, the advantage is vastly on the side of the education you are describing.

Athenian Stranger/ Then if the three of us understand what is good in song and dancing, we likewise know who has

been rightly educated and who is not so, whereas, if we do not know this, we shall be equally at a loss to decide whether there is any safeguard for education, and wherein it lies. Do I take you with me?

Clinias/ Entirely.

Athenian Stranger/ So we must follow up the trail by investigating the goodness of figure, melody, song, and dance. If we let the quarry escape us, all further discourse of right education—Hellenic or non-Hellenic—will be so much waste of breath.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, come now, pray what are we to speak of as goodness in a figure, or a melody? For instance, take a manly soul struggling with distress and a cowardly soul in the same or equal straits. Do we find they express themselves in similar postures and utterances?

Clinias/ Why, of course not, not even in similar complexions.

Athenian Stranger/ True, indeed, friend. But though there are figures and tunes in music, as its subject matter is rhythm and melody, and we may accordingly speak of a tune or a posture as rhythmical or melodious, we cannot properly use the metaphorical expression of the choir trainers, 'brilliantly colored,' of either. But coward and brave man have their characteristic postures and strains, and it is very proper to call those of brave men good, those of cowards bad. In fact, to spare ourselves a great deal of verbal repetition in our treatment of the whole subject, we may take it, once and for all, that universally all postures and melodies connected with goodness of soul or body—whether with such goodness itself or with some image of it—are good, and those connected with badness universally the reverse.

Clinias/ An excellent proposal, and you may treat it as understood that we have answered you to that effect.

Athenian Stranger/ And now to one further point. Does any choric performance give all men the like degree of enjoyment, or is the state of the case very different?

Clinias/ Very different? Utterly different.

Athenian Stranger/ Then what shall we say is likely to be the source of this confusion? Is it that the excellent is not the same thing for all alike? Or that it is in fact the same, but not believed to be so? For no one, I take it, would profess that the choric expressions of vice can in fact be more excellent than those of virtue, or that he personally enjoys the postures of turpitude, though other men may prefer the opposite Muse—though, to be sure, it is commonly said that the standard of rightness in music is its pleasure-giving effect. That, however, is an intolerable sentiment; in fact, 'tis a piece of flat blasphemy. The cause of our confusion is more probably that I am now to mention.

Clinias/ And what is that?

Athenian Stranger/ A choric exhibition is a mimic presentation of manners, with all variety of action and circumstance, enacted by performers who depend on characterization and impersonation. Hence, those who, from temperament, or habit, or both at once, find words, melodies, or other presentation of the choir, to their taste cannot but enjoy and applaud the performance, and further pronounce it good, whereas they who find it repugnant to temperament, taste, or training can neither enjoy nor applaud, and so call it bad. But where a man's native temperament is right, and his training wrong, or his training right and his natural temperament wrong, there enjoyment and approbation are at variance. The performance is, in fact, said to be pleasant, but bad; the man is ashamed to declare

his serious approval by executing such movements or singing such tunes before others whom he credits with judgment, but in his own heart he enjoys the performance.

Clinias/ Perfectly true.

Athenian Stranger/ Now do you think a man is in any way the worse for enjoying degrading postures or melodies, or any the better for getting his pleasure from the opposite quarter?

Clinias/ Presumably he is.

Athenian Stranger/ Only presumably? Is not his case inevitably the same as that of one who views the evil characters of bad companions in real life not with disgust, but with enjoyment, condemning their actions in a playful fashion, like one not awake to their vileness? In such a case it is, surely, inevitable that a man should grow like whatever he enjoys, whether good or bad, even though he may be ashamed to approve it. The result is absolutely inevitable—and what result could we call more momentous for good or evil?

Clinias/ None, as I believe.

Athenian Stranger/ Then is it conceivable that anywhere where there are, or may hereafter be, sound laws in force touching this educative-playful function of the Muses, men of poetic gifts should be free to take whatever in the way of rhythm, melody, or diction tickles the composer's fancy in the act of composition and teach it through the choirs to the boys and lads of a law-respecting society, leaving it to chance whether the result prove virtue or vice?

Clinias/ To be sure, that does not sound rational—decidedly not.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet this is precisely what they are actually left free to do, I may say, in every community with the exception of Egypt.

Clinias/ And in Egypt itself, now—pray how has the law regulated the matter there?

Athenian Stranger/ The mere report will surprise you. That nation, it would seem, long enough ago recognized the truth we are now affirming, that poses and melodies must be good, if they are to be habitually practiced by the youthful generation of citizens. So they drew up the inventory of all the standard types, and consecrated specimens of them in their temples. Painters and practitioners of other arts of design were forbidden to innovate on these models or entertain any but the traditional standards, and the prohibition still persists, both for these arts and for music in all its branches. If you inspect their paintings and reliefs on the spot, you will find that the work of ten thousand years ago—I mean the expression not loosely but in all precision—is neither better nor worse than that of today; both exhibit an identical artistry.

Clinias/ A most amazing state of things!

Athenian Stranger/ Or rather, one immensely to the credit of their legislators and statesmen. No doubt one could find grounds for censure in other Egyptian institutions, but in this matter of music, at least, it is a fact, and a thought-provoking fact, that it has actually proved possible, in such a sphere, to canonize melodies which exhibit an intrinsic rightness permanently by law. That must have been the doing of a god, or a godlike man—as, in fact, the local tradition is that the melodies which have been preserved for so many ages were the work of Isis. So, as I was saying before, if we can but detect the intrinsically right in such matters, in whatever degree, we should reduce them to law and system without misgiving, since the appeal to feeling which shows itself in the perpetual craving for novel musical sensation can, after all, do comparatively little to corrupt choric art, once it has been consecrated, by deriding it as

out of fashion. In Egypt, at any rate, its corrupting influence appears to have been nowise potent, but very much the reverse.

Clinias/ That seems to be the state of the case from your present account.

Athenian Stranger/ Then may we say boldly that the right way to employ music and the recreations of the choric art is on some such lines as these? When we believe things are going well with us, we feel delight, and, conversely, when we feel delight we believe things are well with us. You agree with me?

Clinias/ Surely, surely.

Athenian Stranger/ And, mark, when we are in that case—I mean, when we feel delight—we cannot keep still.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ And so our young folk are eager to dance and sing themselves, while, as for us elders, we think it the becoming thing to pass the time by looking on at them and enjoying their play and merriment. We miss the agility which is beginning to fail us at our years, and so we are glad to arrange competitions for performers who can reawaken the youthfulness in us by reminiscence.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So we can hardly deny that there is much in the current popular judgment about the providers of entertainments. I mean, the judgment that the palm for superior ingenuity should be awarded to the entertainer who gives us most pleasure and enjoyment. Since we are granted the liberty to play on such occasions, so it is argued, of course he who gives the keenest enjoyment to the greatest number is rightly held in the highest esteem, and, as I just put it, carries off the palm. That is the right thing to say, and the right way to act, too, if the occasion arises?

Clinias/ Yes, perhaps it is.

Athenian Stranger/ Still, my dear sir, let us avoid a hasty pronouncement on such a topic. It would be better to break the subject up into its details for consideration, in some such fashion as this. Suppose a man were to institute a competition without any further qualification, not specifying that it was to be an athletic or a musical contest, or a horse race. Imagine him to collect all his fellow citizens, offer a prize, and announce that anyone may enter as a competitor in simple pleasure giving—the prize to be awarded to the performer who entertains the spectators most. There are to be no restrictions as to the manner of the entertaining, so long as the man beats his competitors on that one score, and is voted the most pleasing. What should we expect to be the likely result of the announcement?

Clinias/ What have you in your mind?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, it is likely enough that one performer would produce a recitation of epic poetry, like a Homer, a second a chant to the lyre, a third a tragedy, and a fourth, perhaps, a comedy, and I should not be surprised if one of them actually thought his best chance of the prize was to exhibit a puppet show. But, now, can we say which of all these competitors, and the host of others who would enter, deserves the prize?

Clinias/ That is a singular question. How could anyone answer you, as though he could decide before he had listened and given a personal hearing to each of the different candidates?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, come now, would you like me to give the answer to this singular question for both of you?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Then here it is. If the tiny children are to decide, they will, no doubt, give it for the man with the puppet show.

Clinias/ Why, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ The bigger boys for the comedian; the cultivated women, youths, and perhaps the absolute majority, for the tragedy.

Clinias/ Yes, perhaps they would.

Athenian Stranger/ Whereas oldsters like ourselves would be likely to get most pleasure from a reciter who gave a fine rendering of the Iliad, or Odyssey, or a Hesiodic poem, and put him far and away first. Then, who would be the rightful winner? That is our next question, I presume?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Clearly you and I cannot avoid saying that rightful winners are those who are preferred by men of our own age. From our point of view that custom is far the best of existing arrangements in all societies everywhere.

Clinias/ And naturally so.

Athenian Stranger/ So I actually go myself with the current opinion so far as this. The standard by which music should be judged is the pleasure it gives—but not the pleasure given to any and every auditor. We may take it that the finest music is that which delights the best men, the properly educated, that, above all, which pleases the one man who is supreme in goodness and education. And the reason why we say judges in such matters need goodness is that they require to be equipped not only with wisdom, but particularly with courage. A judge who is truly a judge must not learn his verdict from the audience, letting himself be intimidated into it by the clamor of the multitude and his own incompetence, nor yet, out of cowardice and poltroonery, weakly pronounce a judgment which belies his

own convictions with the very lips with which he invoked the gods as he entered on his functions. To tell the plain truth, the judge takes his seat not to learn from the audience, but to teach them, and to set himself against performers who give an audience pleasure in wrong and improper ways. By the ancient and general Hellenic rule, there was none of the freedom of the present custom of Sicily and Italy, which leaves things to the majority of the audience and decides the victory by their votes, a practice which has corrupted the poets themselves—since their standard in composition is the debased taste of their judges, with the result that it is actually the audience who educates them—and equally corrupted the tastes of the audience. The repeated exhibition of characters better than their own ought to produce an improvement in their taste; as things are, the result is the direct contrary, and it is their own doing. Once more, then, what lesson is indicated by the conclusion of our present argument? Something, perhaps, to this effect.

Clinias/ To what effect?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, I believe the argument is bringing us back for the third or fourth time to our old position, that education is, in fact, the drawing and leading of children to the rule which has been pronounced right by the voice of the law, and approved as truly right by the concordant experience of the best and oldest men. That the child's soul, then, may not learn the habit of feeling pleasure and pain in ways contrary to the law and those who have listened to its bidding, but keep them company, taking pleasure and pain in the very same things as the aged—that, I hold, proves to be the real purpose of what we call our ‘songs.' They are really spells for souls, directed in all earnest to the production of the concord of which we have spoken, but as the souls of young folk cannot bear earnestness, they are spoken of as ‘play' and ‘song,' and practiced as such.

Just so, in the case of the physically invalid and infirm, the practitioner seeks to administer wholesome nutriment in palatable articles of meat and drink, but unwholesome in unpalatable, to accustom the patient to accept the one and reject the other, as he should. In the same fashion a true lawgiver likewise will persuade, or if persuasion fails, will compel, the man of poetic gifts to compose as he ought, to employ his noble and fine-filed phrases to represent by their rhythms the bearing, and by their melodies the strains, of men who are pure, valiant, and, in a word, good.

Clinias/ Great God, sir, do you imagine that is how poetry is actually produced in other cities? As far as my own observation goes, I know of no such practice as you recommend, except here at home, or in Lacedaemon; elsewhere I notice endless innovation in dancing and all branches of music generally, constant change, inspired not by the laws but by a sort of unregulated taste which is so far from being fixed and permanent, as is the case in Egypt by your account, that it never shows any constancy.

Athenian Stranger/ Well observed, Clinias. But if you imagined my remarks to refer to existing practice, the unfortunate impression is probably due to my failure to make my thought clear. I did, perhaps, say things which might give you that impression, but they simply explained what I would wish to see done in the matter of music. For the denunciation of error which is far advanced and without remedy, though sometimes unavoidable, is a decidedly unpleasant duty. But since we are at one about the principle, pray tell me, is it put into practice better among yourselves and our Spartan friends than among the Greeks at large?

Clinias/ Certainly it is.

Athenian Stranger/ And suppose the rest of us followed the same practice. May we say that this would be an improvement on the existing state of things?

Clinias/ An extraordinary improvement, I take it, if they would follow the example of Sparta and ourselves, and the precepts which you yourself have just given us.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, let us have an understanding on the issue before us. In both your communities the teaching conveyed by all education and music is to this effect, is it not? You constrain your poets to teach that a good man, since he is temperate and just, is a fortunate and happy man, no matter whether he be great and mighty or small and feeble, rich or poor. But if a man be unjust, even though he were 'richer than Midas or Cinyras,' he is a pitiable creature, and his life a miserable one. To borrow the words—and true words they are—of your own poet, 'I would neither name' a man, nor 'hold him in any account,' though he should practice or acquire all that is currently reputed good without justice, not though, being the man he is, 'he should close with the foe and strike him down.' If a man be unjust, I would not have him 'look the bloody carnage in the face unblenched,' or 'outstrip the north wind of Thrace,' nor enjoy any of the goods currently so reputed. For the things popularly called goods do not really deserve the name. The saying, you know, is that health is the greatest of all goods, beauty ranks second, and wealth third, and there are innumerable other goods, such as keen sight and hearing, and acute sensibility generally; it is good also to be an autocrat and gratify all one's passions, and the very crown of felicity would be that the possessor of all these advantages should forthwith become immune from death. But what you and I maintain is that though all these endowments are great goods to men of justice and religion, one and all of them, from health down, are great evils to the

unjust. To be more specific, sight, hearing, sensation, life itself, are superlatively evil, if one could persist forever without dying in the enjoyment of all these so-called goods unaccompanied by justice and virtue at large, though less evil if he who is in such case survive only for a short while. This is my teaching, and I conceive you will persuade, or constrain, your national poets to teach it too, and likewise to produce correspondent rhythms and scales for the education of your young people. Consider, now, I affirm with confidence that so-called evils are good for the unjust, though evil for the just, and so-called goods, though really good for a good man, evil for a bad one. So, as I was asking, are you and I in accord, or not?

Clinias/ Partly, I think, in accord, partly decidedly not so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then can the point on which I fail to convince you, by any chance, be this, that if a man enjoys lifelong health, wealth, and absolute power—and I will add, if you like, exceptional strength, and immunity from death, and exemption from all other so-called evils—so long as he but has injustice and arrogance within himself, such a man's life is miserable, not happy?

Clinias/ Exactly. That is the point.

Athenian Stranger/ Good. Then what should I say next? Granted that a man is brave, strong, handsome, rich, and can satisfy every passion of a lifetime, do you deny that, if he is an unjust and arrogant man, his life must inevitably be dishonorable? Or possibly you would go so far as to concede the dishonor.

Clinias/ Readily.

Athenian Stranger/ And inevitably evil, too? Would you allow that?

Clinias/ No. that is not to be so readily admitted.

Athenian Stranger/ And, further, unpleasant and inexpedient for himself?

Clinias/ How can we possibly carry concession to that pitch?

Athenian Stranger/ How? Apparently only by the intervention of a god to produce a concord as complete as our present discordance. For my part, dear Clinias, I find it even more certain that these truths are beyond question than that Crete is an island. Were I a legislator, I would do my best to constrain my poets and all my citizens to proclaim them. I would inflict a penalty little short of the capital on any inhabitant heard to maintain that there are wicked men who have a pleasant life, or that one course may be advantageous and profitable, but a different course more truly rightful—not to mention many other points on which I would try to persuade my citizens to use language very different from that current, apparently, among Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and, certainly, among mankind in general. Why, for the love of Zeus and Apollo, my worthy friends, imagine we could put the question to the very gods who were the authors of your own laws. Is the justest life also the most pleasant, or are there two different lives, one which is the most pleasant, and another which is the most just? Should they answer that there are two, we might probably go on to ask, if we knew how to put the right question, which should be called the happier men, those who live the more just life, or those who live the more pleasant. Should they say, those who live the more pleasant, the statement would come very oddly from them. Yet I could wish not to introduce the names of gods into such a matter, and should prefer to use those of fathers and legislators. We will, therefore, take my questions as having been addressed to such a father and lawgiver, and imagine him to reply that he who lives the pleasantest life is the most blessed of mankind.

Father, I should next remark, did you not mean me to have the happiest of lives? Yet you were never weary of enjoining me to lead the justest life. Thus the father or legislator, whichever he might be, who should decide in that sense, would, I fancy, appear strangely wanting in self-consistency. But should he take the other view that the justest life is happiest, any hearer, I conceive, would ask what good or blessing greater than pleasure that life has in it, that the law should commend it. What good, in fact, can come to the just man unattended by pleasure? Good fame, for example, and commendation from men and gods—are they good and honorable, but unpleasant? And is the reverse true of ill fame? Not a bit of it, respected legislator. Or again, neither to inflict wrong nor to suffer it—is that a course which, though good and honorable, is unpleasant, or its opposite pleasant, though dishonorable and evil?

Clinias/ Surely not.

Athenian Stranger/ And thus the theory which declines to separate the pleasant from the just, or the good from the honorable, if it has no other merits, is at least a persuasive to a just and religious life. Hence from the legislator's point of view any theory which denies these positions is highly disgraceful and dangerous, since no one, if he can help it, will let himself be persuaded into following a course not attended by a surplus of pleasure over pain. It is distance which causes confusion of vision in, I may say, all of us, and particularly in children, unless the lawgiver will effect a reversal of our judgments and dissipate our darkness, persuading us, as best he can, by institutions, eulogies, and arguments that right and wrong are like puzzle pictures, wrong-appearing, in the opposite perspective to right, pleasant when viewed from the standpoint of one who is himself unjust and evil, and right most unpleasant, but

everything the precise contrary, on both sides, from the point of view of the righteous.

Clinias/ So it would seem.

Athenian Stranger/ And which verdict, should we say, has the more valid claim to be true, that of the worse soul, or that of the better?

Clinias/ Certainly, I should presume, that of the better.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it is consequently certain that an unjust life is not merely more dishonorable and despicable, but actually more truly unpleasant than a just and religious.

Clinias/ So it should follow from our present argument, my friend.

Athenian Stranger/ And even had it not been so—as our present argument has shown that it is—could a legislator of even moderate merits, supposing him to have ventured on any fiction for the sake of its good effect on the young, have devised a more useful fiction than this, or one more potent to induce us all to practice all justice freely, and without compulsion?

Clinias/ Why, as to truth, sir, truth is a glorious thing and an enduring thing, but it seems no easy matter to convince men of it.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, and that most improbable fable of the man from Sidon—was it easy to convince anyone of that? Now there are many such tales.

Clinias/ Tales? Of what sort?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, they say teeth were once sown in the ground and armed men sprang up from them. And yet the example is striking proof for a lawgiver that the youthful mind will be persuaded of anything, if one will take the trouble to persuade it. Thus he need only tax his invention

to discover what conviction would be most beneficial to a city, and then contrive all manner of devices to ensure that the whole of such a community shall treat the topic in one single and selfsame lifelong tone, alike in song, in story, and in discourse. Still, if you incline to a different opinion, you are perfectly free to controvert my view.

Clinias/ Nay, neither of us, I conceive, feels equal to disputing the point.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it becomes my business to proceed to the next point. I maintain that all our choirs, of which there will be three, must enchant the souls of our children, while they are still young and tender, by reciting all the noble doctrines we have so far rehearsed or may hereafter rehearse, the sum and substance whereof may be worded thus. If we say that the gods account the pleasantest and the best life one and the same, our statement will be at once perfectly true, and more convincing to those whom we have to convince than if we spoke in any other tones.

Clinias/ The contention must be admitted.

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, then, it will be proper that the choir of boys, which will be sacred to the Muses, should make its entry first to sing publicly to this effect with all its might before the whole city. Next the choir of men under thirty should make its appearance, invoking the god of healing to bear witness to the truth of the doctrine uttered, and praying him of his grace to convince the young of it. And there must, of course, be still a third song from those who are between the ages of thirty and sixty. Men of more advanced age, who are naturally no longer equal to singing, will be left to tell stories about the same types of character in inspired accents.

Clinias/ And pray, sir, whom may you mean by this third choir? My friend and I do not understand what you would say of them any too clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet they are the very parties we have had in view in the greater part of our previous conversation.

Clinias/ We are as much in the dark as ever. Would you kindly make your explanation rather clearer.

Athenian Stranger/ You may recollect that we said, at the opening of our discussion, that all young creatures are naturally full of fire, and can keep neither their limbs nor their voices quiet. They are perpetually breaking into disorderly cries and jumps, but whereas no other animal develops a sense of order of either kind, mankind forms a solitary exception. Order in movement is called rhythm, order in articulation—the blending of acute with grave—pitch, and the name for the combination of the two is choric art. We further said that, in their pity for us, the gods have granted us companions and leaders of our choirs in Apollo and the Muses, to whom, you may remember, we added Dionysus as a third.

Clinias/ Why, of course we recollect this.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, we have already spoken of choirs of Apollo and of the Muses; so the remaining choir, the third, must be called that of Dionysus.

Clinias/ What! Pray explain yourself. A choir of old men sacred to Dionysus! That sounds very odd on a first hearing, if you seriously mean that men between thirty, or even fifty, and sixty are to form his chorus.

Athenian Stranger/ You are quite right. It does call for some argument, I take it, to show that such an arrangement would be a reasonable one.

Clinias/ To be sure it does.

Athenian Stranger/ We are in agreement, then, upon the results reached so far?

Clinias/ And what are they?

Athenian Stranger/ That the spell we have described must be recited without intermission by everyone, adult or child, free man or slave, man or woman; in fact the whole city must repeat it incessantly to itself in forms to which we must somehow contrive at all costs to give inexhaustible variety and subtlety, so that the performers' appetite for their own hymnody and enjoyment of it may persist unabated.

Clinias/ That is the result to be secured, as everyone must agree.

Athenian Stranger/ Now where must this worthiest element in our city—its combined years and wisdom will give it more authority than any other class, and the matter of its odes will be the noblest of all—do its singing, if it is to be most potent for good? Are we, in pure folly, to leave the body principally responsible for the noblest and most useful music without directions?

Clinias/ We certainly must not neglect it, if your argument is to be trusted.

Athenian Stranger/ What, then, would be the becoming arrangement? Something of this kind, perhaps?

Clinias/ Of what kind?

Athenian Stranger/ As a man gets into years, the reluctance to sing grows upon him. He feels less pleasure in the act, and, if it is forced on him, the older and more sober-minded he grows, the more bashful he feels about it. I am right, am I not?

Clinias/ Decidedly right.

Athenian Stranger/ And of course he will feel still more bashful about standing up and singing in a theater before an audience of all sorts. And besides, if men of such years and character were made, like competing choirs, to train their voices for the performance by a lowering regimen and abstinence from food, their singing would surely be a thoroughly disagreeable and humiliating task, and consequently their execution would be spiritless.

Clinias/ There is no disputing what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Then how shall we encourage them to sing with spirit? Might we not make a law to the following effect? In the first place, we shall absolutely prohibit the taste of wine to boys under eighteen. We shall tell them they must have too much concern for the passionate temperament of youth to feed the fire of body or soul with a further current of fire before they address themselves to the labors of life. In the next, while we permit a moderate use of wine to men under thirty, we shall absolutely forbid carousing and free potations. But when a man is verging on the forties, we shall tell him, after he has finished banqueting at the general table, to invoke the gods, and more particularly to ask the presence of Dionysus in that sacrament and pastime of advancing years—I mean the wine cup—which he bestowed on us for a comfortable medicine against the dryness of old age, that we might renew our youth, and our harsher mood be melted to softness by forgetfulness of our heaviness, as iron is melted in the furnace, and so made more tractable. To begin with, in that mood any man would be ready, would he not, to render his song—or, as we have so often called it, his spell—with more spirit and less bashfulness, not perhaps before a numerous audience of strangers, but in a smaller circle of personal friends?

Clinias/ Emphatically so.

Athenian Stranger/ As a means of inducing them to take their part in our proposed singing, then, the device is not so wholly out of place?

Clinias/ Out of place? By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ But what manner of strain should they utter? Of course it must be a music in keeping with their persons.

Clinias/ Why, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And what is the music which befits godlike men? Choric song?

Clinias/ Why, sir, personally we Spartans and our Cretan friends are quite incapable of any singing but that we learned when we were trained to sing in choirs.

Athenian Stranger/ I am not surprised at it; in plain fact, you have never risen to the noblest kind of song. Your cities are organized like armies, not like societies of town dwellers; you keep your young men in heads like so many colts at grass in one troop. None of you ever takes his own colt, draws him out of the general herd, for all his restiveness and fuming, and puts him in the charge of a special groom to be stroked and tamed and treated with all the attention required by a training which will make him no mere good soldier, but a man fit to administer a state and its townships—will make him, in fact, the type of man of whom we spoke at first as a better warrior than those of Tyrtaeus, because he will esteem valor, always and everywhere, the fourth, not the first, point of goodness in individuals and in society at large.

Clinias/ Somehow or other, sir, you are back again at your belittling of our legislators.

Athenian Stranger/ Nay, my dear sir, if I do so at all, it is of no set purpose, but please let us follow where our argument leads. If we can find a music more excellent than

that of choirs and public theaters, let us make the attempt to assign it to these men, who, as we are saying, are anxious to take their part in the noblest music, though bashful where the kind just mentioned is concerned.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, to begin with, must it not hold good of all things which have an attendant charm that their chief value lies either in this mere charm itself, in their rightness in some sense, or, finally, in their utility? To give an example, I mean that meat and drink, and articles of nutriment generally, are attended by a charm which we may call flavor; as to rightness and utility, it is precisely what we call the wholesomeness of the various viands which is also their true rightness.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, the act of learning is attended by a charm, a gusto, but it is the truth of what is learned which gives it its rightness and utility, its goodness and nobility.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ And what of the various arts of imitation which work by producing likenesses? If they are so far successful, I mean if they give rise to an attendant pleasure, charm, I suppose, would be just the right name for it?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Whereas the rightness of such products, speaking generally, depends not on their pleasantness, but on accurate correspondence in quality and magnitude?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus the only case in which it will be right to make pleasure our standard of judgment is that of a performance which provides us with neither utility, nor truth, nor resemblance, though, of course, it must do us no harm either, an activity practiced solely with a view to this concomitant charm, which is very properly called pleasure, unattended by any of the results just specified?

Clinias/ You refer only to harmless pleasure?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, and I also use the name play for it in cases where it does neither harm nor good worth taking into serious account.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then surely it follows from the argument that a man's feeling of pleasure, or his erroneous belief, is never a proper standard by which to judge of any representation, and I will add, any proportionality. Equal is never equal, nor symmetrical symmetrical, because someone believes it to be so, or because someone feels no pleasure; no, we should judge by the standard of truth, never, on any account, by any other.

Clinias/ Assuredly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we may say that all music is an art of producing likenesses or representations.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Consequently, when a man tells us that in music pleasure is the standard of judgment, we must refuse to accept his statement. It is not this type of music, if indeed there could be such a type, which we should make our serious object, but that other which retains its likeness to the model of the noble.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ And these citizens of ours, too, will naturally have to do the same. As they aim at the noblest kind of song, they will also have to aim not at a music which is pleasing, but at one which is right. In fact, we explained the rightness of a representation to lie in reproduction of the proportions and quality of the original.

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, it would be universally allowed of music that its productions are all of the nature of representation and portraiture. Composers, performers, audience, all of them would be in complete agreement so far?

Clinias/ Beyond doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ Hence it should seem that a man who is to make no mistake of judgment about a particular production must, in every case, understand what that production is. If he does not understand what it is, that is, what it is meant for, or of what it is in fact an image, it will be a long time before he will discern the rightness or wrongness in the artist's purpose.

Clinias/ A long time indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ And if a man does not understand this rightness, can he possibly be in a position to discuss the goodness or badness of the work? My question is not very clearly expressed, but it will perhaps become clearer if I put it thus.

Clinias/ How, pray?

Athenian Stranger/ There are, as you know, numerous likenesses which are apprehended by the eye.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now suppose that, in their case too, a man did not know what the various bodies represented were. Could he possibly judge of the rightness of the artist's

work? For example, could he tell whether it shows the members of the body in their true and natural numbers and real situations, so disposed relatively to one another as to reproduce the natural grouping—to say nothing of color or shape—or whether all this is confused in the representation? Could a man, think you, possibly decide the question, if he simply did not know what the creature depicted was?

Clinias/ Naturally he could not.

Athenian Stranger/ Now suppose we are aware that the figure the artist has drawn or modeled is that of a human being, and that he has reproduced all its members, with their colors and outlines. Does it follow that one who is alive to this need be competent to judge on the further point whether the work is beautiful, or falls short of beauty in some way?

Clinias/ Why, sir, at that rate, we should all, without exception, be connoisseurs of an animal's points.

Athenian Stranger/ Quite true. Then must not one who is to be an intelligent judge of any representation, whether in drawing, in music, or in any other branch of art, have three qualifications? He must understand, first, what the object reproduced is, next, how correctly, third and last, how well a given representation has been effected, in point of language, melody, or rhythm.

Clinias/ So it would appear.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we must not omit the full explanation of the difficulty of music. There is much more talk about musical imagery than about any other kind, and this is the very reason why such imagery demands more cautious scrutiny than any other. It is here that error is at once most dangerous, as it encourages morally bad dispositions, and most difficult to detect, because our poets are not altogether on the level of the Muses themselves. The

Muses, we may be assured, would never commit the grave mistake of setting masculine language to an effeminate scale, or tune, or wedding melody, or postures worthy of free men with rhythms only fit for slaves and bondsmen, or taking the pose of a free man and combining it with an air or words of inappropriate rhythm. Not to say that they would never make a pretended presentation of a single theme out of a medley of human voices, animal cries, noises of machinery, and other things. Whereas our mere human poets tend to be only too fond of provoking the contempt of those of us who, in the phrase of Orpheus, are 'ripe for delight,' by this kind of senseless and complicated confusion. In fact, not only do we see confusion of this kind, but our poets go still further. They divorce rhythm and figure from melody, by giving metrical form to bare discourse, and melody and rhythm from words, by their employment of cithara and flute without vocal accompaniment, though it is the hardest of tasks to discover what such wordless rhythm and tune signify, or what model worth considering they represent. Nay, we are driven to the conclusion that all this so popular employment of cithara or flute, not subordinated to the control of dance or song for the display of speed and virtuosity, and the reproduction of the cries of animals, is in the worst of bad taste; the use of either as an independent instrument is no better than unmusical legerdemain. So much for the theory of the thing. But, after all, the question for ourselves is what kind of music our citizens of thirty or more, and again our men of over fifty, are to practice, not what they are to avoid. And I think we may at once infer from what has been said as much as this. Those quinquagenarians whose business it will be to sing for us must at least have had an education better than that of a choir. They must, of course, be keenly sensitive to rhythms and melodies and able to judge of them. How, indeed, is a

man with little or no familiarity with the Dorian scale to judge of the rightness of the airs, or the rightness or wrongness of the rhythm to which the poet has set his air?

Clinias/ Plainly he can do nothing of the sort.

Athenian Stranger/ In fact, the general public are simply ridiculous in their belief that men are adequate judges of what is good or otherwise in melody and rhythm, if they have merely been drilled into singing to the flute and marching in step, though it never occurs to them that they do the acts without understanding anything about them. Whereas, of course, any tune is correct if it has the proper constituents, incorrect if it has unsuitable ones.

Clinias/ Undeniably.

Athenian Stranger/ But what now about a man who does not even know what constituents a piece has? As I was asking, will he be a judge of its correctness in any instance whatever?

Clinias/ Unquestionably not.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus it seems we are brought back again to our discovery that these singers of ours, whom we are urging and placing under a kind of voluntary coercion to sing, will need as much previous education as this. They will all need the ability to follow the steps of the rhythms and the notes of the airs, to qualify them to pass the scales and rhythms under review, select from them those proper to be rendered by men of their own years and character, and sing them as they should be sung, a performance which will both give the performers an immediate innocent pleasure and provide their juniors with a lesson in proper appreciation of sound character. If they are educated to this pitch they will have at their disposal a more careful education than either that which is applicable to the generality, or that of the poets themselves. For the poet it is not indispensable to be a judge

of our third point—whether his representation is a good one or not—though judgment of scale and rhythm certainly cannot be dispensed with, but the men we have in view will need all these qualifications to fit them to make the selection of the absolute best and the second best; otherwise none of them will effectually charm the young into virtue. The argument has now done its best to achieve its original purpose, to show that our defense of the 'choir of Dionysus' is a good one, and we have to consider its success. Of course, any such gathering inevitably grows noisy as the drinking goes further and further, as we began by assuming is bound to happen in cases like these.

Clinias/ Yes, inevitably.

Athenian Stranger/ In such a company everyone soars above his common level of lightsomeness and jollity, bubbles over with loquacity, pays no heed to the talk of his companions, but thinks himself fully entitled to give the law to himself and all the rest.

Clinias/ Assuredly.

Athenian Stranger/ As we were saying, then, in this state of affairs the souls of the drinkers grow softer as they are heated, like heated iron, and become more juvenile, and consequently more ductile in the hands of one who has the power and skill to train them and mold them, much as when they were still youthful, and the molding should now, as formerly, be the task of the good legislator. It is for him to lay down laws for the wine party effectual to induce our reveler, who is growing so sanguine and confident, so unduly relieved of his modesty, and so unwilling to observe order and alternation of silence with speech, drinking with music, to do the contrary of all this of his own accord—effectual also to confront this uncomely confidence, at its first entrance, with a righteous antagonist in that most comely, that divine,

fear which has received the name of modesty and the sense of shame.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And for wardens of these laws and fellow workers with them, we must set the unperturbed and sober as captains over the unsober, for without them the battle with drink is more hazardous than a battle against an enemy in the field without unperturbed commanders. Moreover, if a man cannot yield willing obedience to them and to Dionysus, his officers, that is, the citizens of over sixty, he must be put to as much disgrace as one who disobeys the officers of Ares, or to more.

Clinias/ Rightly said.

Athenian Stranger/ Then if wine and merriment were used in such fashion, would not the members of such a party be the better for it, and part, not as they do today, on terms of enmity, but with an increase of friendship, seeing their intercourse would have been regulated throughout by laws, and they would have followed the path marked out by the sober for the unsober?

Clinias/ True enough, if there could indeed be a party such as you describe.

Athenian Stranger/ Then pray let us have done with the old unqualified censure of the gift of Dionysus as an evil thing, not fit to be tolerated in a city. Indeed, one might be still more copious on the topic, though I feel some reluctance even to mention the principal benefit of the god's gift before the public, as the statement has been misunderstood and misjudged.

Clinias/ And what benefit is that?

Athenian Stranger/ There is a current of story and pious tradition to the effect that this god was bereft of his wits by his stepmother Hera, and that this is why he afflicts his

victims with Bacchic possession and all its frenzied dancing, by way of revenge—that that, and nothing else, was the motive for his gift of wine. For my own part I leave such stories to those who think it safe to tell them of deities, but of one thing I am certain. No creature whatsoever is born with that intelligence, or all that intelligence, which characterizes it in its maturity.

Hence, so long as a creature has not yet attained its proper level of native sense, it is quite mad, indulging in random cries, and, as soon as it has found its feet, in equally random leaps. And let me remind you that we pronounced these the source of both music and gymnastics.

Clinias/ Naturally we have not forgotten that.

Athenian Stranger/ You will recollect, too, how we said that in mankind this beginning has preluded to perception of rhythm and melody, and that the gods responsible for that development are Apollo, the Muses, and Dionysus?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ And as for wine in particular, the general story would seem to hold that it has been bestowed on men in vindictiveness, to drive us frantic, whereas our present version is that the gift was meant, on the contrary, as a medicine, to produce modesty of soul, and health and strength of body.

Clinias/ An admirable summary of the argument, sir.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we have finished our treatment of one half of the choric art. Shall we go on with further consideration of the other half, or should we perhaps dismiss the subject?

Clinias/ What are the halves you speak of? How do you distinguish the one from the other?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, the choric art as a whole we found to be the same thing as the whole of education, and

one half of the art, that which has to do with the voice, consists of rhythms and melodies.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ And the part which deals with bodily movement has rhythm in common with the movements of the voice, but posture and gesticulation are proper to it, just as melody, on the other side, is to vocal movement.

Clinias/ Precisely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now the training of the voice to goodness, continued till it reaches the soul, we named, in a sense, music.

Clinias/ And a very proper name for it, too.

Athenian Stranger/ As for the training of the body—we spoke of it as the dancing of creatures at play—when the process culminates in goodness of body, let us call scientific bodily discipline with that purpose gymnastics.

Clinias/ As we may very properly do.

Athenian Stranger/ As for music—that half of the choric art of which we have just professed to have given a complete review—our statement may be taken as still standing. How shall we proceed next? Shall we discuss the other branch, or what?

Clinias/ My dear sir, you are conversing with Cretans and Lacedaemonians. What possible answer, then, do you expect from either of us to that question, if we pass over gymnastics, now that we have disposed of music?

Athenian Stranger/ I take that remark as a pretty plain answer to my question; in fact, I recognize that though in form a question, it is actually what I have called it, an answer, and something more—an instruction to complete our treatment of gymnastics.

Clinias/ You take my meaning correctly, and I entreat you to comply with it.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, so I will, nor will it be particularly difficult, as you are both at home in the subject, having indeed made more experimental acquaintance with this art than with the former.

Clinias/ There you are very much in the right.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, this art similarly has its origin in the habitual leaping native to all living things, and in mankind, as we have said, the acquisition of a sense of rhythm has generated dancing. Since melody suggests and awakens consciousness of rhythm, the two in conjunction have given rise to the play of the choric dance.

Clinias/ Quite so.

Athenian Stranger/ One branch of the subject, as I have said, we have treated already, and will next do our best to deal with the other.

Clinias/ With all my heart.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, if you both approve, we may first give the final touch to our account of drinking.

Clinias/ And how do you propose to do this?

Athenian Stranger/ If a city is to practice the custom now under discussion in a serious spirit, in subjection to the control of law and rule, as a training in self-command, and permits a similar indulgence in other pleasures on the same principle, as a means to mastery of them, all without exception should be treated on the lines we have laid down. But if the practice is treated as mere play, and free license is to be given to any man to drink whenever he pleases, in what company he pleases, and when engaged on any undertaking he pleases, I could no longer vote for allowing any indulgence in the wine cup to such a city, or such a man. I would even go further than the practice of Crete and

Lacedaemon and propose an addition to the Carthaginian law which prohibits the very taste of this liquor to all soldiers in the field, and enforces water-drinking throughout the duration of a campaign. I would absolutely prohibit its taste in civic life to slaves of both sexes, to magistrates throughout the year of their office, and equally absolutely to captains of vessels and jurymen when on duty, and likewise to any member of an important council when about to attend its meetings. Further, I would prohibit its use during the day absolutely, except under the orders of a trainer or a physician, and at night also to any person of either sex contemplating the procreation of children, to pass over many other cases in which wine is not to be drunk by rational men with a sound law. Thus you see that by our argument no city would need many vineyards; agricultural production and bodily regimen in general would be matters for regulation, and viticulture in particular would be kept within very reasonable and narrow bounds. And this, gentlemen, if it has your approval, may be taken as the finale of my remarks on the subject of wine.

Clinias/ It is well said, indeed, and we fully concur.

Book 3.

Athenian Stranger/ Enough, then, on this matter. But what may we take to have been the first beginning of a state? I wonder whether the best and easiest way to treat the problem may not be this?

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ To start from the same point with which we regularly have to begin when we would study the double progressive development of a city in virtue and vice.

Clinias/ And that point is?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, the interminable length of time, I conceive, and the changes time brings with it.

Clinias/ Pray explain yourself.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, cities have existed and men have lived in civil society for a long time. Do you think you could possibly tell how long?

Clinias/ Not readily, to say the least of it.

Athenian Stranger/ But you admit at least that it must have been so for an immense and incredible time?

Clinias/ Oh yes, there is no doubt about that.

Athenian Stranger/ And you will surely grant that thousands and thousands of cities have come into being during this time, and no less a number have ceased to exist? Moreover, every form of constitution has repeatedly appeared in one or other of them. Sometimes a small city has grown larger, sometimes a large city smaller; a bad city has sometimes grown better, a good city sometimes worse.

Clinias/ Indubitably.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus we have, if possible, to discover the cause of these variations; there, I suspect, we may find the key to the primal origin of constitutions and their modification.

Clinias/ A happy thought, and we must all do our best endeavor—you to expound your thoughts on the subject, and my friend and myself to keep pace with you.

Athenian Stranger/ Then what view do you both take of the ancient legends? Have they any truth behind them?

Clinias/ Which legends might you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Those which tell of repeated destructions of mankind by floods, pestilences, and from various other causes, which leave only a handful of survivors.

Clinias/ Oh, that kind of story must be perfectly credible to any man.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well, let us suppose one of those various exterminations, that which was once effected by the Flood.

Clinias/ And what is the point you would have us observe about it?

Athenian Stranger/ That the few who then escaped the general destruction must all have been mountain shepherds, mere scanty embers of humanity left unextinguished among their high peaks.

Clinias/ Why, obviously.

Athenian Stranger/ And of course men like these were bound to be unfamiliar with the crafts at large and, above all, with the tricks of town dwellers for overreaching and outdistancing one another and the rest of their devices for mutual infliction of mischief.

Clinias/ The probabilities are certainly on that side.

Athenian Stranger/ Now may we assume that at such a time there is a total destruction of the cities situated in the lowlands and on the seacoast?

Clinias/ We may, no doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ And we may add that all implements are lost, and that any discoveries of value due to the science of statesmen or other specialists all vanish at such a time? For to be sure, my dear sir, if such inventions could persist permanently in their present excellence, how could there ever be a new discovery of anything?

Clinias/ As much as to say that we must take the men of those ages to have known nothing of these matters for untold tens of thousands of years. It is only some thousand or two thousand years since they were revealed, partly by Daedalus, partly by Orpheus, partly by Palamedes, music by Marsyas and Olympus, the lyre by Amphion, and various other discoveries by numerous other persons—a mere business, so to say, of yesterday and the day before.

Athenian Stranger/ It is delicate in you, Clinias, to omit your connection, who was in strict fact a man of yesterday.

Clinias/ You refer to Epimenides, I presume?

Athenian Stranger/ To no other. You know, my friend, his invention left them all in the lurch. True, Hesiod had long before had a glimmer of it in theory, but the practical achievement belonged to the other, by your Cretan story.

Clinias/ It did, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I suppose one may say that the state of mankind at the time of the calamity was this. There was frightful and widespread depopulation, but a vast territory of unoccupied land; most of the animals had perished, but there were a few herds of cattle, and perhaps a surviving stock of goats, and these provided those who grazed them with a sustenance which would be scanty enough in the first instance.

Clinias/ No doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ But as for a city, a constitution, a legislation—the themes of our present conversation—can we

imagine that, to put it broadly, the faintest recollection of them was preserved?

Clinias/ Why, surely not.

Athenian Stranger/ Now that is the condition which has given rise to the whole complex of our actual life, with its cities and constitutions, its sciences, its laws, its manifold moral evil and equally manifold moral goodness?

Clinias/ I do not quite follow you.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, my good sir, can we suppose that the men of that day, unacquainted as they were alike with the numerous blessings and the numerous curses of town life, would be mature either in moral virtue or in vice?

Clinias/ Well demanded. We appreciate your point.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus it is by progress of time and the multiplication of the species that life has come to be as we actually find it?

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ And that, I presume, not all at once, but little by little in the course of an immense period of time.

Clinias/ Nothing can be more likely.

Athenian Stranger/ Indeed, they were still haunted, I should presume, by a terror of coming down from the highlands to the plains.

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus, though the sight of another's face must have been welcome indeed in those days when men's numbers were so few, all conveyances for travel by land or water must have been pretty universally abolished, must they not, with the loss of the arts? So social intercourse, I conceive, was not easily feasible. For iron, copper, and metallic deposits in general had been so obliterated by the inundation that it was a problem to get

them clear again, and they had little opportunity of cutting timber. For what few tools might have survived among their mountains must soon have been used up and disappeared, and they would not be in a condition to replace them until the art of mining reappeared among them.

Clinias/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ And how many generations must we suppose to pass before that would happen?

Clinias/ A very considerable number, beyond all doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ Consequently, all arts which require iron, copper, and similar materials had then been lost for this period, or even longer.

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ And therefore both civil conflict and war had equally disappeared all through this period, for more reasons than one.

Clinias/ And what were those reasons?

Athenian Stranger/ For one thing, men's loneliness made them sociable and friendly; for another, there could be no quarreling over the means of subsistence. Except perhaps in some instances at the very first, they were not stinted for flocks and herds, the principal support of life in that age; in fact, there was no shortage of milk or meat, and besides, they could supply themselves with plenty of excellent viands by hunting. Again, they were quite well off for clothes, bedding, shelter, or vessels, culinary and other. Iron, as you know, is wholly superfluous for the arts of the potter and the weaver, and these two crafts have, by divine appointment, been empowered to supply all our wants, that our species may still be enabled to germinate and increase when it falls into such straits. Thus they were not extremely poor, for the reason I have assigned, and so were not set at variance by the stress of penury; rich they could never become in the

absence of gold and silver which was then their case. Now, a society in which neither riches nor poverty is a member regularly produces sterling characters, as it has no place for violence and wrong, nor yet for rivalry and envy. Thus they were good men, partly for this reason, and partly from their proverbial simplicity; they were so simple that when they heard things called fair or foul, they obediently took the statements for infallible truths. No one was sufficiently subtle to suspect deception, as men do today; what they were told about God or man they believed to be true, and lived by it. Thus they came to be just the kind of men you and I have been describing.

Clinias/ I agree with the statement, for one, and so does my friend here.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I take it we may say that the many generations of men who led such a life were bound, by comparison with the age before the Deluge or with our own, to be rude and ignorant in the various arts, particularly in those of warfare, as practiced today by land or water, and again within the city, under the names of litigation and party faction, with their manifold artful contrivances for the infliction of mutual injury and wrong by word and by deed; they were simpler and manlier, and by consequence more self-controlled and more righteous generally. The reason of this has already been explained.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now it must be understood that our purpose in the statement we have made, and all the inferences we have based on it, is simply to learn how laws came to be needed in those remote ages and who enacted them.

Clinias/ Yes, excellently put.

Athenian Stranger/ May we not perhaps say, then, that in that age men were in no need of a lawgiver, and that such a thing as a law was as yet unusual? In fact, those whose lives fall in that part of the cycle do not as yet so much as possess an alphabet, but regulate their lives by custom and what is called traditionary law.

Clinias/ That is at least the fair presumption.

Athenian Stranger/ Still, even this is already a form of polity.

Clinias/ But what form?

Athenian Stranger/ The form of polity in that age was, I believe, what is universally called dynasty, a form still to be found in many places among Greeks, as well as among non-Greeks. Homer, for one, apparently speaks of it as the mode of life of the Cyclopes, when he says, 'These have neither gatherings for council nor oracles of law, but they dwell in hollow caves on the crests of the high hills, and each one utters the law to his children and his wives, and they reck not one of another.'

Clinias/ This poet of yours seems indeed to have been quite a pretty fellow. I assure you I have perused other passages from him which are equally neat, though not many, as we Cretans are not much given to cultivating verse of alien origin.

Megillus/ Now in Sparta we do cultivate it, and regard Homer as the best composer of it, though the life he is always describing is decidedly Ionian rather than Laconian. He certainly seems to give full confirmation to your present theory where he ascribes the primitive manners of the characters in his story to their savage condition.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, to be sure he does, and we may take him as evidence to show that this type of polity is actually to be found at times.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ That is, they are found among such men as we are speaking of, who have been dispersed in single homesteads and families as a result of the distress caused by these disasters? In such societies do we not find that the oldest members rule, because their authority has come down to them from father or mother? The rest follow them, and form one flock, like so many birds, and are thus under patriarchal control, the most justifiable of all types of royalty.

Clinias/ Exactly so.

Athenian Stranger/ The next step is to come together in larger numbers, which will increase the size of the communities, and turn to agriculture. This will be at first practiced in the skirts of the hill country; dry fences of a kind will be contrived as walls for defense against savage beasts, and a new and larger single homestead thus erected for the community.

Clinias/ At least that is the probable succession of events.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, and is there not something else which is no less probable?

Clinias/ And what may that be?

Athenian Stranger/ As these larger homesteads are in process of growth from the smaller and most primitive, each of the smaller groups will bring along with it its patriarchal ruler and certain private customs of its own—private, I mean, because the groups are isolated from each other, and the several groups have been trained by their different progenitors and fosterers in different habits of conduct toward gods and fellow men, in more orderly habits where the ancestors have been more orderly, in more valiant where they have been valiant. Thus each group comes accordingly, as I say, into the larger settlement with special laws of its

own, and prepared to imprint its own preferences upon its children, and their children after them.

Clinias/ Why, inevitably so.

Athenian Stranger/ And of course each group unavoidably gives its approval to its own laws, and only in the second place to those of the others.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ And thus, to all appearances, we find ourselves insensibly embarked on the beginnings of legislation.

Clinias/ Yes, precisely so.

Athenian Stranger/ At least the next step is bound to be that the coalescing groups choose certain representatives who will, of course, review all the usages, publicly and plainly indicate those which most win their own approval to the chiefs and leaders of the various clans their kings as we may call them—and propose them for adoption. Hence these representatives will themselves get the name of legislators, and when they have appointed the chiefs as magistrates, and thus made the patriarchal groups into an aristocracy, or possibly a monarchy, they will direct affairs during this transformation of the polity.

Clinias/ To be sure, this may be presumed to be the next stage in the process.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us proceed to remark the rise of a third type of polity, under which polities and the societies which exhibit them alike manifest all varieties of form and fortunes.

Clinias/ And what type is that?

Athenian Stranger/ That which Homer, too, has commemorated as succeeding the second, when he says that the third form originated thus. 'He founded Dardania'—

those, I believe, are his words—'for holy Ilium had not yet been built in the plain, a city for mortal men, but they still dwelt on the slopes of many-fountained Ida.' The lines, like those which speak of the Cyclopes, are as true to nature as they are inspired. Poets, you know, singing as they do under the divine afflatus, are among the inspired and so, by the help of their Graces and Muses, often enough hit upon true historical fact.

Clinias/ I can fully believe it.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, let us carry the tale which has engaged our imagination some steps further. as it may very probably suggest some hints which will be much to our purpose. So the procedure will surely be proper?

Clinias/ Most proper.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, as I say, the foundation of Ilium was due to a descent from the heights to a wide and noble plain; it was built on a hill of low elevation watered by a number of rivers coming down from the higher ground of Ida.

Clinias/ So the story goes.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we must surely suppose that this happened many ages after the Deluge?

Clinias/ Many ages later, no doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ The founders, in fact, must have been singularly oblivious of the disaster we are now recalling, to build a city on such a site exposed to a number of rivers flowing from the mountains, with such confidence in hills of inconsiderable height.

Clinias/ Why, yes, that calamity must obviously have belonged to a very remote past.

Athenian Stranger/ There were also by that time. I conceive, a good many other city-communities, thanks to the multiplication of mankind.

Clinias/ Yes, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ It was they, you know, who assailed her, and probably enough by sea too, as all mankind had long ago forgotten their dread of the sea.

Clinias/ So it should seem.

Athenian Stranger/ And there was a delay of some ten years before the Achaeans succeeded in sacking Troy.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now during this period of ten years while Ilium was under investment, occurred the various domestic misfortunes of the different besiegers, occasioned by the insurrectionary movements of the younger generation. Moreover, when the warriors returned to their cities and families, the reception they met at the hands of these young men was neither honorable nor equitable, but attended with numerous instances of homicide, massacre, and expulsion. The expelled then returned again under a new name, calling themselves now not Achaeans, but Dorians, after Dorus, who reassembled the exiles of that time. As to the sequel of the story, it is told, and told fully, in your own Lacedaemonian tradition.

Megillus/ It is indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus we find ourselves, providentially as it were, brought back to the very point at which we were led into a digression at the outset of our discussion of law by our stumbling upon this topic of music and the wine cup, and we may now, so to say, close with the argument. For it has come round to the actual settlement of Lacedaemon a system you both declared sound—as also that of Crete which has closely related laws. And we have certainly gained this much vantage from our desultory argument, with its review of a variety of polities and foundations. We have inspected a first, a second, and a third

community succeeding one another in order of foundation through a vast period of time, and now at last we come, in the fourth place, to the foundation of a city—or you may prefer to say, a nation—which persists to this day as it was founded. If the whole discussion enables us to understand what has been commendable in such foundations, or the reverse, what types of laws lead to their preservation, where it is achieved, and what, in the opposite case, to their dissolution, and what kind of changes will contribute to the happiness of a community, why then, Megillus and Clinias, we must cover the ground again pretty much from the beginning, unless, indeed, you have some objections to urge against what has been already said.

Megillus/ Why, sir, if we could have the word of a god for it that on our second attempt to study this matter of legislation we are to hear discourse as good, yes, and as long, as that which has already passed, I would readily make our walk a long one and should think this day short enough, though, if I am rightly informed, it is the day of the summer solstice.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I presume we are to undertake the inquiry.

Megillus/ With all my heart.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, Megillus, let us place ourselves in imagination at the date at which Lacedaemon, Argos, and Messene, with all their domains, had come, to all intents, into the power of your ancestors. Their next step, as the story goes, was the resolution to divide their forces into three, and establish three cities, Argos, Messene, and Lacedaemon.

Megillus/ Precisely.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus Argos became the kingdom of Temenus, Messene of Cresphontes, Lacedaemon of Procles and Eurysthenes.

Megillus/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Whereupon the whole body took an oath to these sovereigns to support them against any attempt to subvert their monarchy.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And, in God's name, is a monarchy ever subverted, or, for the matter of that, has any government ever been overthrown, except by itself? That was our position when we fell a while ago into a discussion of the point, and can we have forgotten it now?

Megillus/ Oh, surely not.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we may assert the position even more confidently now, as we have met with historical facts which seem to lead to the same conclusion, and shall thus be dealing with realities and facts, not empty fiction. The historical facts, as we know, are these. Three reigning houses and the cities over which they reigned swore a mutual oath to one another, as required by the laws they had adopted as definitive of sovereignty and allegiance, the monarchs engaging that the continuance of the crown in the family should lead to no enlargement of prerogative, their subjects that, so long as they respected the compact, they would neither abolish the monarchies from within, nor submit to their subversion from without; the monarchs covenanted to support a populace, no less than a monarch, if its rights should be infringed, and the peoples, in like case, to support a monarch no less than a populace. Those, I believe, are the facts?

Megillus/ And so they are.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, have we not here provision made by the legislation of the three cities from the outset for a matter of prime importance to the established constitutions—whether the initiative was due to the monarchs or to others?

Megillus/ What matter do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean that in any case of infraction of the law of the constitution, there were always to be two cities leagued against the single defaulter.

Megillus/ Yes, manifestly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now I may remind you that a legislator is commonly expected to enact only such laws as a populace, or multitude, will accept of its own motion, which is much as though a trainer or physician were expected to make his treatment, or cure, of the body a pleasure to the recipient.

Megillus/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ Whereas in real fact one has often ground for thankfulness if one can secure bodily health and good condition at the cost of a moderate amount of pain.

Megillus/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ The statesmen of that period had moreover a second initial advantage which would greatly facilitate their legislative task.

Megillus/ And what was that?

Athenian Stranger/ They were not exposed, in their attempts to establish a certain equality of possessions, to the grave charge so persistently leveled, in connection with the passing of laws for other cities, at one who proposes change in the tenure of land, or a cancellation of debts, from his perception that equality can never be properly attained without these measures. When a legislator attempts a

change in these matters, everyone meets him with a cry of ‘no meddling with fundamentals,' and an imprecation on the author of redistribution of lands and repudiation of debts, sufficient to reduce any man to despair. Now the Dorians, you know, from their situation, had this further initial advantage, which relieved them of unpleasant recriminations. The land could be divided without controversy, and they had no burden of accumulated debts.

Megillus/ True enough.

Athenian Stranger/ Then what, I must ask you, can be the reason that their foundation and its legislation proved the failure it has been?

Megillus/ Why, in what respect has it failed, and why this censure of them?

Athenian Stranger/ Because in two of their three settlements there was a rapid degeneration of constitution and laws, only one of the three, your own city of Sparta, remaining unperverted.

Megillus/ Not precisely an easy question to answer.

Athenian Stranger/ All the same, there is the point we have now to envisage and discuss, if we are to relieve the distress of our journey by this sober old man's game of jurisprudence, as we called it at the beginning of our walk.

Megillus/ No doubt, and so we must do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ What laws, then, could be a fairer subject of inquiry than those by which these communities have been regulated? What greater and more illustrious cities are there, whose foundation we might take for our consideration?

Megillus/ If we dismiss them, it will be no easy matter to name any others.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, one thing is plain enough. The founders of that age meant their creation to be an adequate protection, not merely for Peloponnesus, but for the Greek world at large, if it should be wronged by an alien people, as it had already been wronged by the inhabitants of Ilium, when they provoked the expedition against Troy in their arrogant confidence in the power of the Assyrians of Nineveh. For the still-surviving prestige of that empire was considerable. The men of that age had then the same fear of that united dominion which we feel today of the Great King, as the second capture of Troy, a city which formed part of the Assyrian Empire, was a formidable grievance against them. It was to meet this situation that the militia of those days was organized as a single body, distributed over three cities under monarchs who were brothers, being all sons of Heracles, an excellent invention and disposition, superior, as was generally believed, to that of the force which had invaded Troy. For in the first place, commanders for commanders, the Heraclidae were thought better than the Pelopidae, and in the second, this army was held to have the advantage in valor of that which had assailed Troy, since it was composed of the victorious Dorians, but the other of the defeated Achaeans. Such, may we not say, were the dispositions of that time, and such was their purpose.

Megillus/ Why, surely.

Athenian Stranger/ So it was presumably expected that their work would prove stable and endure for ages, considering their past association in so many difficulties and dangers, and their subordination to three royal brothers of the same house—to say nothing of the fact that they had the sanction of many oracles, in particular of the Delphic Apollo.

Megillus/ That, to be sure, was the presumption.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet, as we see, these magnificent anticipations vanished speedily into air, except, as we were saying, in the case of the fraction in your territory of Laconia, and it, you know, has been in incessant warfare with the other two thirds to this day. Though had the original project been carried out, and a single confederacy formed, its military power would have been irresistible.

Megillus/ Yes, quite irresistible.

Athenian Stranger/ Then where was the source of the failure? Surely it is a question worth examining—what mischance may have been the undoing of so vast and admirable a formation.

Megillus/ Yes, surely. One who turned his attention from this case in another direction might look long enough for an example of the laws and institutions which preserve or destroy grandeur and greatness.

Athenian Stranger/ So here, I take it, we find ourselves happily launched on an inquiry of magnitude.

Megillus/ Very certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I would ask, my dear sir, whether we were not just now unconscious victims of a mistake universal to mankind. Men are perpetually fancying they have discovered some splendid creation which might have worked wonders if only someone had known the proper way—whatever it may be—to use it. Now it is just on this point I suspect you and I may be thinking falsely and unnaturally, like everyone else who has the same thought about anything.

Megillus/ Pray, what do you mean? What is the special point of your observation?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, my friend, I am actually amused by my own recent mood. As I pictured to myself the army of which we were talking, I thought, What a splendid

force, and what a wonderful acquisition it would have proved for the Greeks, if only, as I was saying, the proper use had been made of it at the time!

Megillus/ Well, and was not all you said, like our assent to it, the soundest of sense?

Athenian Stranger/ That may be, but what is in my mind is this. When anyone sees something big, strong, and powerful, he feels at once that if the owner of such a marvelous thing knew how to use it, he could effect wonders with it, and so achieve felicity.

Megillus/ Well, and that is equally true, is it not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let me beg you to consider the light in which a thing must be viewed to justify this eulogy. Take the case of the armament of which we are now speaking as a first example. If its creators had understood how to construct it properly, they would fairly have attained their aim—but how? I presume, if they had constituted it securely and assured its permanent continuance in being, with the consequences of freedom for themselves, sovereignty over any desired subjects, and, in a word, ability for themselves and their posterity to deal at their pleasure with all mankind, Greeks and non-Greeks alike. These are the grounds on which they might base their eulogy.

Megillus/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ And, again, when a man's notice is attracted to a great fortune, or preeminent family distinction, or the like, and he expresses the same commendation, he speaks from the same point of view; his thought is that the advantage will enable its possessor to gratify all his desires, or the most numerous and considerable of them?

Megillus/ So I should suppose.

Athenian Stranger/ So it follows that there is a certain desire, that indicated by our argument, which is universal in all men, as the argument itself asserts.

Megillus/ And that is?

Athenian Stranger/ That events shall fall out in accord with the bidding of a man's own soul, all of them, if possible, but if not, at least those which depend on human agency.

Megillus/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now if this is what all of us, from boyhood to age, are wishing all the time, it will necessarily also be our standing prayer.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And, again, I suppose, our petition for our dear ones will be that they may receive what they ask for themselves.

Megillus/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now a son, who is a boy, is dear to his father, a grown man.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And, mark you, there is much a boy prays to befall him, of which his father would beseech heaven that it may never fall out as the son prays.

Megillus/ You mean when the petitioner is thoughtless and still young?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, and what of the case when the father—old, or only too youthful as you please to consider him—has no sense of good and right, and prays from the heart in a passion akin to that conceived by Theseus against his unfortunate victim, Hippolytus, but the son has such a sense? Will the son, think you, second the father's prayer in such a case?

Megillus/ I see your point. You mean, I apprehend, that the object of a man's prayers and endeavors should not be that the universal course of events should conform to his own wishes, unless his wishes further conform to his sober judgment. It is the possession of intelligence that should be the mark of prayer and aspiration for the community and every individual of us alike.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, and I am particular to remind myself that it is this which a statesmanlike legislator should always have in view in framing his enactments—as I would also remind you, if we have not forgotten how our conversation began—that whereas you both agreed that a good legislator must devise all his institutions with an eye to war, I, for my part, urged that this is an injunction to legislate with a view to one single virtue out of four. He should keep them all in view, I said, but chiefly and in the first place that virtue which brings all the rest in its train, that is, judgment, intelligence, and right conviction attended by appropriate passionate desire. So our argument has come back again to the old point. I, its mouthpiece, say once more now what I said before, in jest or earnest, as you please to take it. I look on prayer, I say, as a dangerous instrument in the hands of the man without intelligence; it defeats his wishes. If you please to consider me in earnest, pray do so. I have every confidence that if you follow up the story we have just set before ourselves for consideration, you will directly discover that the cause of the ruin of the three kings and their whole design was no cowardice and no military ignorance on the part of commanders or commanded; what ruined them was their abundant vice of other kinds, and, above all, their folly in the supreme concerns of man. That this was the sequence of events on that occasion, is so still today in similar cases, and will be the same in the future—that is what, by your leave, I shall try to establish in the

fuller development of our argument, and friendship will lead me to make the point as clear to you as I possibly can.

Clinias/ Verbal applause, sir, might be in doubtful taste, but our conduct will show our emphatic approval. We shall follow your discourse with the keenest attention; that is the way in which a self-respecting man best shows approbation or the reverse.

Megillus/ Well said, Clinias—so we will.

Clinias/ Certainly, with God's permission. Pray proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, to follow up the thread of our argument, we say that what then destroyed that mighty power was the greatest folly, and that it inevitably produces the same results today. This being so, then, a legislator's aim must be to create all the wisdom he can in a community, and with all his might to eradicate unwisdom.

Clinias/ Yes, manifestly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now what type of folly may fairly be called the greatest I should certainly say that I am on the point of describing. but you must consider whether you agree with the observation.

Clinias/ What type do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ That of a man who hates, not loves, what his judgment pronounces to be noble or good, while he loves and enjoys what he judges vile and wicked. It is this dissonance between pleasure and pain and reasoned judgment that I call the worst folly, and also the greatest, since its seat is the commonalty of the soul, for pain and pleasure are in the soul what the populace or commonalty is in a community. Accordingly, when the soul sets itself at variance with knowledge, judgment, discourse, its natural sovereigns, you have what I describe as unwisdom, alike in a community where the commons rebel against magistrates and laws, and in one individual man when fair discourse is

present in the soul, but produces no effect, but rather the very contrary. These are the types of folly I would pronounce the gravest dissonances in community or individual citizen, not the follies of professionals—if you take my meaning.

Clinias/ Indeed we do, sir, and we grant your point.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us take it as definitely settled, and proclaim our conviction that no function of government may be entrusted to citizens who are foolish in this sense. They must be reprehended for their folly, though they were the most expert of calculators, and laboriously trained in all curious studies and everything that makes for nimbleness of mind, while those of the contrary sort should be styled wise, even though, as the proverb puts it, they can 'neither read nor swim,' and it is to them, as the men of sense, that our magistracies should be given. How, indeed, my friends, can there be the barest particle of wisdom where there is no concord? 'Tis a flat impossibility, whereas the fairest and greatest of consonances may very properly be called the greatest wisdom. In this wisdom he who lives by rule has his share, while he who is without it will invariably be found to be a waster of his substance and no savior of society but the very reverse, all because of his folly in this respect. Well, as I just said, let this stand as our recorded conviction.

Clinias/ By every means.

Athenian Stranger/ Now in a community, I take it, there must be those who govern and those who are governed?

Clinias/ Of course there must.

Athenian Stranger/ Very good. Now what recognized titles to government and obedience, and how many, do we find alike in large cities, in small, and in families? Is there not, for one, the claim of father and mother? Or speaking

generally, would it not be universally recognized that parents have a title to rule their offspring?

Clinias/ Most assuredly.

Athenian Stranger/ And next by consequence that the wellborn have a title to rule the worse-born, and third, by further consequence, that it is for elder men to rule and for younger to submit?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ And fourth, that it is for slaves to submit and for their owners to rule them?

Clinias/ Why, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And fifth, I conceive, for the stronger to rule, and for the weaker to submit?

Clinias/ Aye, there is a title which is not to be disputed.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, and one which is prevalent all through the animal kingdom—by nature's own appointment, as Pindar of Thebes has said. And sixth we may place the supreme claim of all which prescribes that it is for the ignorant to follow and for the wise men to take the lead and rule. And yet it is just this, this unforced rule of law over willing subjects, my all-accomplished Pindar, that I cannot pronounce unnatural. I should call it nature's own ordinance.

Clinias/ And you would be quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ Then there is a seventh kind of rule by the favor of heaven and fortune, as we say. We bring our men to a casting of lots, and call it the most equitable of arrangements that he who has the chance of the lot should rule, and he who misses it retire into the ranks of subjects.

Clinias/ True, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ You see, then, my legislator—so we might playfully address a man who sets lightheartedly about

the enactment of laws—how many titles there are in this matter of governing, and how conflicting they are. We have just discovered a whole fountainhead of dissensions; it is yours to provide the remedy for them. But suppose you begin by joining in our inquiry about the kings of Argos and Messene. How did they effect their own ruin and that of the Hellenic power which was so superb in their day? What offense did they commit against these principles? Was not their error that they forgot the solid truth of Hesiod's saying that ‘the half is often more than the whole'? He meant that when it is baneful to get the whole, but the half is sufficient, then the modestly sufficient, the better, is more than the disproportionate, the worse.

Clinias/ He was right, too.

Athenian Stranger/ Now when the ruin sets in, where does it regularly make its first appearance? In kings or in the common people? How say you?

Clinias/ Probability and common experience suggest that it is the malady of kings whose luxury leads to pomp.

Athenian Stranger/ Plainly, then, this infection of encroachment on the established laws began, in the old days, with the kings. They did not keep concord with one another, as they were pledged and sworn to do. It was this discord—in our judgment really supreme folly, for all its semblance of wisdom—which ruined the whole system by its shrill and tuneless dissonance.

Clinias/ Probably enough.

Athenian Stranger/ Well and good. Now what precaution should a legislator have taken at the time against the development of this symptom? God knows it is easy enough to give the answer now and takes no great wisdom to perceive it, but a prophet who could have foreseen it at the

time would have been a wiser man than ourselves, would he not?

Megillus/ And what answer may you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, Megillus, what should have been done then may be discovered and readily stated today if we will only look at what was done in your own society.

Megillus/ You must put it still more plainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, what is absolutely plain is just this.

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ If we disregard due proportion by giving anything what is too much for it, too much canvas to a boat, too much nutriment to a body, too much authority to a soul, the consequence is always shipwreck; rankness runs in the one case to disease, in the other to presumption, and its issue is crime. What is it we would say, you ask. Why, my friends, surely this. No soul of man, while young or accountable to no control, will ever be able to bear the burden of supreme social authority without taking the taint of the worst spiritual disease, folly, and so becoming estranged from its dearest intimates. When this happens, that soul very soon suffers ruin and the loss of all its powers. Hence it calls for a great legislator to forestall this danger by his insight into due proportion. The reasonable inference today, then, is that the danger was forestalled, but in very truth it seems there must have been—

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Some divinity in charge of you with prevision of the future, who gave you a double line of kings instead of a single, and so contracted their power within more proportionate limits. Even after this a human intelligence, with some divine assistance, observed that your rulers were still in their fever fit, and so blended the

temperate authority of age with the peremptory self-will of royal lineage by giving the eight-and-twenty elders an equal voice with the kings in affairs of moment. Then a third deliverer remarked that your governing body was still swelling with mettle and introduced the office of the ephorate, an office as good as filled by lot, as a curb. This is how the monarchy of your own Laconian state came to be a mixture of the right ingredients, and acquired due limitation, with the result that it was preserved itself, and has proved the means of our general preservation.

For had things been left to Temenus, Cresphontes, and the legislators of that age, whoever they may have been, not even the 'portion of Aristodemus' itself would have survived. In fact, they were mere amateurs in legislative work, or they could hardly have fancied an oath a guarantee of moderation in a youthful spirit succeeding to an authority which could be converted into autocracy, but God has shown us by the event how a government should have been constituted then and must be constituted now, if it is to have good prospects of permanence. That you and I should be able to understand this today, as I said before, is no proof of wisdom—it is always easy to see by the light of examples from the past—but had there been a man at the time with such foresight, and with the power to limit the sovereignties and make one of three, the excellent discoveries of that age would have been retained in their entirety, and contempt of our slender resources would never have launched a Persian, nor any other, armada against Hellas.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Indeed, Clinias, the repulse of those attacks was no credit to anyone. I do not mean, when I say this, that the victories of the time, on land and sea alike, were not honorable to the victors; what I mean by calling the history discreditable is this. Only one of those three states

took up arms for the defense of Hellas on the first assault; the other two were so badly corrupted that one of them even tried to hinder the efforts of Lacedaemon by vigorous hostilities against her, while the second, Argos, which had held the primacy in the old days of the first division of the Peloponnesus, sent no answer to the appeal for aid against the foreigner, and did nothing at all. And if a man were to tell the story of that war at length, it would amount to an unseemly indictment of Hellas. In fact, Hellas could not truly be said to have made any defense. Had not the combined resolution of Athens and Lacedaemon repelled the menace of enslavement, there would long ago have been a complete confusion of Hellenic stocks with one another, of barbarian with Hellenic and Hellenic with barbarian, like the wretched sporadic condition of the present dispersed and confused subjects of the Persian despotism.

This, Clinias and Megillus, is the charge I bring against the so-called statesmen and legislators of both past and present, and I bring it in the hope that examination into its causes will disclose the very different course which ought to have been taken. It was in this spirit that I said just now that after all it is wrong to establish over powerful or unmixed sovereignties, when we consider that a community should be at once free, sane, and at amity with itself, and that these are the ends a legislator must keep in view in his enactments. And I must ask you not to be surprised that we have already more than once proposed certain ends as those to which the legislator must look, and that our proposals have not always appeared to be identical. You must reflect that when we say he must look to sobriety, or again to wisdom, or to amity, these ends are not distinct but identical, and if we find ourselves using a further variety of expressions to the same effect, we must not be confused by that.

Clinias/ We shall do our best to keep it in mind as we review our discussions. For the present, you might explain your remarks about amity, wisdom, and liberty. What is it you were going to say a legislator should aim at?

Athenian Stranger/ Then let me have your attention. There are two matrices, as we may call them, of constitutions from which all others may truly be said to be derived; the proper name of the one is monarchy, of the other democracy. The first is seen in its perfection among the Persians, the second among my own countrymen. These are the strands, as I have said, of which all other constitutions, generally speaking, are woven. Very well, it is indispensably necessary that there should be both ingredients where there is to be the combination of liberty and amity with wisdom. This is what our argument means to enjoin when it urges that no community which has not those characters can be rightly administered.

Clinias/ Of course it cannot.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, one of the societies we have mentioned has shown exclusive and inordinate devotion to the principle of monarchy, the other to that of liberty, and thus neither has effected a proper balance between them, whereas yours of Laconia and Crete have succeeded better. There was a time when this was more or less true of Athens and Persia, but it is less true today. Shall we inquire into the causes of this or not?

Clinias/ By all means, if we mean to complete our investigations.

Athenian Stranger/ Then lend me your ears. While the Persians steered a middle course between subjection and liberty, in the time of Cyrus, they began by winning their own freedom and went on to make themselves masters of numerous peoples. As a government they gave these

subjects their share of liberty and placed them on equal terms with themselves; their soldiers thus grew attached to their commanders, and showed themselves forward in danger. Again, if a subject was a man of wisdom and a capable adviser, the king showed no jealousy of him, but permitted free speech and bestowed distinctions on such competent counselors, so that the gift of wisdom was freely placed at the disposal of the public service. Hence the combination of liberty with amity and generally diffused intelligence led, for the time, to all-round progress.

Clinias/ That certainly seems to have been much the course of the history.

Athenian Stranger/ Then what can have brought about the decay under Cambyses and the general recovery under Darius? Shall we hazard a guess at the reading of the riddle?

Clinias/ It would at least be a contribution to the study of our original problem.

Athenian Stranger/ Then my own present reading of Cyrus is this.

Though a good general and a true patriot, he had been wholly untouched by right education, and had never given a thought to the discipline of his household.

Clinias/ What are we to understand by that remark?

Athenian Stranger/ It should seem that he spent his life, from his youth, in perpetual campaigning, and left the training of his sons to the women, who treated them from their childhood as blessed creatures and born favorites of fortune endowed with every advantage. They would allow no one to cross such vastly superior beings in anything, forced everyone to commend all their sayings and doings, and so turned them out what you might expect.

Clinias/ A mighty fine training, by your account of it.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, the training one could look for when the children were left to the women of a royal harem, new to affluence and without a man to help them, thanks to perpetual preoccupation with the wars and their dangers.

Clinias/ That sounds reasonable, to be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ As for their father, he was busy winning for them flocks and herds and drove after drove of men and other creatures, but he forgot that the successors to whom he was to bequeath this wealth were getting no training in their ancestral Persian calling, an austere one—for the Persians, you know, were shepherds and sons of the barren hills—well fitted to turn out sturdy shepherds, equal to the endurance of exposure and wakefulness, and the hardships of a campaign too, when necessary. He shut his eyes to the way in which his sons had been imbued by women and eunuchs with an education—the Median—corrupted by what is called fortune, and so they proved what might have been anticipated from the neglect of correction in their training. At least, when the succession fell to them, at their father's death, they were swollen with pride and indiscipline. Cambyses, the elder, would brook no equal, and began by making away with his brother; then, what with strong drink and want of education, he went out of his own wits, and lost his throne at the hands of the Medes and the famous eunuch, who had conceived a contempt for his folly.

Clinias/ Certainly that is how the story runs, and it is presumably pretty true to the facts.

Athenian Stranger/ And then, we are told, the throne was recovered for the Persians by Darius and the Seven [chiefs].

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, let us follow up the train of thought suggested by our argument. Darius, you know, was no king's son, educated in pride and pomp. When he came

to a kingdom which he had won with the help of six companions, he divided it into seven departments, of which some faint traces are still surviving. He was satisfied to live under laws of his own devising which introduced a certain equality into the state; he promoted general amity and public spirit among the Persians by fixing, by his legislation, the tribute Cyrus had promised them and thus won the hearts of the common people by his liberality and munificence. Consequently his armies served with loyalty, and won him fresh territory as extensive as that left by Cyrus. But when Darius was gone, Xerxes, who had again received the pampering education of a prince of the blood! —Darius, Darius, so I think we may righteously protest, to think you should never have found out the fault in Cyrus, and should have trained your Xerxes in the same ways as he his Cambyses! —Xerxes, as I say, was a product of the same kind of education, and naturally the consequence was a career of the same sort. From his time to ours, speaking broadly, the Persians have never had a real Great King, who has been more than nominally such. And the cause of this, on my own theory, is not accidental; it is the evil life commonly led by the sons of autocrats and men of extraordinary wealth. Such a training will never, never lead to outstanding goodness in boy, or man, or graybeard. This, I maintain, is a consideration for legislators and equally for ourselves in our present discussion. And I would remark in fairness to you Lacedaemonians as creditable to your community that you assign no special distinction or special upbringing whatsoever to poor man or rich man, private citizen or prince of the royal house, beyond what your original source of inspiration revealed on divine authority. For assuredly special civic honors ought not to be assigned to exceptional wealth, any more than to speed of foot, beauty

of form, or strength of limb unaccompanied by goodness, or even to goodness which does not include temperance.

Megillus/ How is that remark to be understood, sir?

Athenian Stranger/ Courage, you will grant, is one part of goodness.

Megillus/ To be sure it is.

Athenian Stranger/ Good. Then listen to my argument and decide the point for yourself. Would you like a man of great courage who should also be intemperate and profligate as an inmate of your house, or a next-door neighbor?

Megillus/ Heaven forfend!

Athenian Stranger/ And what do you say to a man of professional skill, and wise in that sense of the word, but unjust?

Megillus/ I have nothing to say to him.

Athenian Stranger/ And justice, again, does not flourish where temperance is not.

Megillus/ No, how should it?

Athenian Stranger/ Neither does the sort of wisdom we were lately contemplating, that of the man whose pleasures and pains are accordant with and consequent on his right thinking.

Megillus/ No, decidedly not.

Athenian Stranger/ Besides, we have still a further point to consider for its bearing on the right or wrong distribution of various civic distinctions.

Megillus/ And what may it be?

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose temperance to exist in a man's soul all by itself, apart from any further goodness. Ought it, or ought it not, to be a rightful title to distinction?

Megillus/ That is more than I can say.

Athenian Stranger/ A most becoming answer. Had you said either yes or no, in either case you would have struck what I take to be a wrong note.

Megillus/ Then it is as well I replied as I did.

Athenian Stranger/ Just so. A mere adjunct to the true object of honorable distinction, or the reverse, calls for no discussion, and may well be passed over in silence.

Megillus/ By the adjunct in question, I take it you mean temperance.

Athenian Stranger/ I do. The truly sound procedure would be to assign the first place in honor to that other thing, be it what it may, which, combined with this adjunct, does us the chiefest service, and the second to that which serves us in the next degree. We have only to travel in the same fashion down the whole series for everything to receive its right place in the scale of distinctions.

Megillus/ I quite agree with you.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, surely it is one part of the legislator's business to construct this scale.

Megillus/ Most assuredly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, while leaving it to him to make the construction as a whole, and in all its particulars and details, shall we try to establish a threefold division, a distinct first, second, and third class, for ourselves, who are also, in a sort, amateurs of legislation?

Megillus/ With all my heart.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I say that it is clearly an imperative duty for a society, which is minded to survive and enjoy all the felicity men may, to award its marks of honor and dishonor in the right way. And the right way is to put the good qualities of the soul in the first and most honorable rank—its temperance always presupposed as a sine qua

non—advantages and good qualities of body in the second, and in the third, goods of estate, wealth, as we call them. Should any legislator or society transgress these limits by promoting wealth to honor, or giving anything of a lower class the distinctions of a higher, the act is an offense alike against religion and statesmanship. May we take this as our conviction?

Megillus/ Emphatically and absolutely, yes.

Athenian Stranger/ What led us into this lengthy discussion of the point was our examination of the Persian commonwealth. We find that they degenerated still further. The reason is that excessive curtailment of the liberty of the commons, and improper intensification of autocracy, made an end of their national feeling and public spirit. Since their disappearance, the concern of the authorities is no longer for their subjects, the commonalty, but for their own position; they give over loyal cities and peoples to fire and desolation whenever they think it of the slightest advantage to themselves, and consequently hate and are hated with savage and unrelenting animosity. On the other side, when they need the arms of the common people for their defense, they find no patriotism in them, no loyal readiness to hazard themselves in the field; in theory their forces are reckoned by countless thousands, but all these thousands are worthless for service. Hence they hire mercenaries and aliens, as though they had no troops of their own, and look to them for their salvation. Moreover they are forced to an exhibition of their folly, since their habitual conduct amounts to a proclamation that all that society esteems honorable and of good repute is a toy in comparison with gold and silver.

Megillus/ Exactly so.

Athenian Stranger/ And with this we may close our proof that the present maladministration of Persia is due to an excess of servitude and autocracy.

Megillus/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Next as to the state of Attica, we are similarly to show that unqualified and absolute freedom from all authority is a far worse thing than submission to a magistrate with limited powers. In the old days of the Persian assault on the Greeks—or perhaps I should say on the denizens of Europe at large—my countrymen enjoyed a venerable constitution with magistracies based on a fourfold system of social classes. Moreover conscience had a sovereignty among us which disposed us to willing subjection to the laws. Besides, the spectacle of the sheer magnitude of the military and naval armament threw us into helpless consternation, and led us to submit to laws and magistrates with a still stricter obedience. All these causes continued to intensify our loyalty to one another. Some ten years before the naval engagement at Salamis, Datis arrived at the head of the Persian armada, with express orders from Darius against the Athenians and Eretrians; he was to capture and deport them, and had been warned that his own life would be the price of failure. Well, Datis speedily effected the complete capture of the Eretrians by force of numbers, and thus originated the alarming report which reached us in Athens. It was said that not a man of the Eretrians escaped; in fact, the troops of Datis joined hands and so swept the whole territory of Eretria as with a net. True or false, whatever its source, this story appalled the Greeks, and more particularly the Athenians; they sent out appeals for help to every quarter, but were refused by all except the Lacedaemonians. Even they, whether under the pressure of their war with Messene, or from some other impediment—I am not acquainted with any statement on the point—even

they, from whatever cause, arrived a day too late for the Battle at Marathon.

After Marathon there were frequent reports of vast preparations, and repeated menaces reached us from the king, and in course of time it was learned that Darius was dead and had been succeeded by his son, who was persisting in the project with all the heat of youth. The Athenians conceived the whole undertaking to be directed against themselves in reprisal for Marathon. When they heard of the canalizing of Athos, the bridging of the Hellespont, and the numbers of the enemy's flotilla, they felt that there was no escape for them by land or by sea. No support could be looked for. They remembered how they had found no supporters or allies in peril before, when the first expedition sailed to deal with Eretria, and naturally supposed that on land events would take the same course again. On the other side, all hope of escape by sea was visibly precluded, since they had a fleet of a thousand vessels and more threatening them. There was just one chance of deliverance conceivable—faint and desperate, indeed, but still their only chance—when they looked at the past and observed how then, too, victory had appeared to emerge from the struggles of desperation. Supported by such hopes, they realized that their only refuge lay in their own right arm, and their gods. These causes combined to inspire them with loyalty to one another—the fear aroused by their present plight, and that other fear instilled by subjection to preexisting law, which they had learned by subjection to the existing laws—conscience, as we have called it more than once already. This, as we said, is the sovereign to whom we must submit if we are ever to become men of worth; ‘tis the dastards who are emancipate from that service and immune to that fear. Had they not been terrified at the time we are speaking of, they could never have rallied for the repulse of the invader

and the defense of temples, tombs, country, and all that is nearest and dearest, as in fact they did; we should have been pulverized at such a crisis and scattered severally to all the quarters of heaven.

Megillus/ The observation sir, is not only perfectly just, but most becoming to yourself and your countrymen.

Athenian Stranger/ No doubt, Megillus, and you, who have inherited the character of your ancestors, are the right person to hear the history of those times. But I would have you and Clinias consider the relevance of my narrative to our legislation. I give it, not for the sake of the story, but for the reasons I indicate. For do but mark. Seeing that our fate has, in a way, been the same as that of the Persians—though they reduced the commonalty to utter subjection, whereas we encouraged the multitude toward unqualified liberty—our foregoing conversation has been, in a way, very pertinent to the question what should be said next and how it should be said.

Megillus/ Good, but you must try to make the point of the remark a little plainer.

Athenian Stranger/ And so I will. Under our old laws, my friends, our commons were not masters; in a sense they were the willing servants of the laws.

Megillus/ Of what laws are you thinking in particular?

Athenian Stranger/ In the first instance, if our progress in extravagant liberty of living is to be traced from its origin, of the laws of music as it was in those days. Our music was then divided into several kinds and patterns. One kind of song, which went by the name of a hymn, consisted of prayers to the gods; there was a second and contrasting kind which might well have been called a lament; paeans were a third kind, and there was a fourth, the dithyramb, as it was called, dealing, if I am not mistaken, with the birth of

Dionysus. The actual word nome was used as the name of still another kind, though with the qualification citharoedic. Now these and other types were definitely fixed, and it was not permissible to misuse one kind of melody for another. The competence to take cognizance of these rules, to pass verdicts in accord with them, and, in case of need, to penalize their infraction was not left, as it is today, to the catcalls and discordant outcries of the crowd, nor yet to the clapping of applauders; the educated made it their rule to hear the performances through in silence, and for the boys, their attendants, and the rabble at large, there was the discipline of the official's rod to enforce order. Thus the bulk of the populace was content to submit to this strict control in such matters without venturing to pronounce judgment by its clamors.

Afterward, in course of time, an unmusical license set in with the appearance of poets who were men of native genius, but ignorant of what is right and legitimate in the realm of the Muses. Possessed by a frantic and unhallowed lust for pleasure, they contaminated laments with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs, actually imitated the strains of the flute on the harp, and created a universal confusion of forms. Thus their folly led them unintentionally to slander their profession by the assumption that in music there is no such thing as a right and a wrong, the right standard of judgment being the pleasure given to the hearer, be he high or low. By compositions of such a kind and discourse to the same effect, they naturally inspired the multitude with contempt of musical law, and a conceit of their own competence as judges. Thus our once silent audiences have found a voice, in the persuasion that they understand what is good and bad in art; the old ‘sovereignty of the best' in that sphere has given way to an evil ‘sovereignty of the audience.' If the consequence had been even a democracy, no great

harm would have been done, so long as the democracy was confined to art, and composed of free men. But, as things are with us, music has given occasion to a general conceit of universal knowledge and contempt for law, and liberty has followed in their train. Fear was cast out by confidence in supposed knowledge, and the loss of it gave birth to impudence. For to be unconcerned for the judgment of one's betters in the assurance which comes of a reckless excess of liberty is nothing in the world but reprehensible impudence.

Megillus/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So the next stage of the journey toward liberty will be refusal to submit to the magistrates, and on this will follow emancipation from the authority and correction of parents and elders; then, as the goal of the race is approached, comes the effort to escape obedience to the law, and, when that goal is all but reached, contempt for oaths, for the plighted word, and all religion. The spectacle of the Titanic nature of which our old legends speak is reenacted; man returns to the old condition of a hell of unending misery. Now, once more, why have we said all this? I think we should rein in our argument from time to time. We must not let it run away with us, as though it had no curb in its mouth, and so, as the proverb says, lose our seat in the saddle. No, as I was saying, we must be constantly asking ourselves why we have said what we have.

Megillus/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, I said it for its relevance to what had gone before.

Megillus/ And what was that?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, I said a legislator should have three aims in his enactments—the society for which he makes them must have freedom, must have amity with itself, must have understanding. That, I believe, was our position.

Megillus/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ This was why we took the examples of the most autocratic of communities and the freest, and are now asking ourselves in which of the two public life is what it should be. We found that when we had a certain due proportionality in either case, in the one of authority, in the other of liberty, there was a maximum of well-being in both societies, whereas when things were pushed to an extreme in either case, an extreme of subjection in the one, and of its opposite in the other, the consequences were unsatisfactory in both societies alike.

Megillus/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ It was for the same purpose that we reviewed the settlement of the Dorian invaders, the foundation of Dardanus in the foothills, and that of the city on the coast, and even the life of the first survivors of the Deluge. Our earlier conversations about music and drinking, and all that preceded them, were equally to the same end. The purport of the whole discourse has been to learn how a society is best administered and how a man will best conduct his personal life. But have we achieved any result? I would ask you both, Megillus and Clinias, what test we can propose to ourselves.

Clinias/ Why, sir, I believe I can find one. I fancy there has been something providential in the whole course of our argument; in fact, I find myself just now in a position in which it meets my needs well, and both your appearance and that of our friend Megillus are most opportune. So far from hiding my situation from you, I even count your presence a favorable omen. You must know that the largest part of Crete is undertaking the foundation of a colony, and has charged the Cnossians with the management of the business, which has been entrusted by the authorities of Cnossus to myself

and nine others. Our instructions are further to frame a legislation from such local Cretan laws as have our approval, or laws from other quarters; we are not to concern ourselves about their foreign origin, so long as we judge them superior. Suppose then we serve my turn and yours at once; let us use a selection from our results for the theoretical construction of a society, which we will imagine we are founding from the very start. The procedure will disclose the object of our search, and, at the same time, I may find our construction useful for the society that is to be.

Athenian Stranger/ No declaration of hostilities that, Clinias! If Megillus has no objections to offer, I, for one, promise compliance to the best of my ability.

Clinias/ Thank you.

Megillus/ And so do I for another.

Clinias/ My best thanks to both of you. Well, let us begin by trying to imagine the foundation of the city.

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Athenian Stranger/ Good, then, what must we suppose our state is to be? I do not mean that I am asking what its name is at present, or by what name it will have to be called hereafter. That might well come from the circumstances of the foundation or the locality, or the appellation of some river, or fountain, or local divinities might confer their own revered title on the city in its earliest days. What I am more concerned about in my question is this. Is the site maritime or inland?

Clinias/ Why, sir, the city of which I was just speaking is some eighty stadia, more or less, from the coast.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, and are there harbors on that side of it, or is it entirely without a harbor?

Clinias/ By no means, sir. The coast on that side is as well furnished with harbors as a coast can be.

Athenian Stranger/ Tut, tut! How distressing! And what about the surrounding territory? Does it yield produce of all sorts, or has it its deficiencies?

Clinias/ None to speak of.

Athenian Stranger/ Is there a neighboring city within easy distance?

Clinias/ Dear me, no. That is the very reason for the settlement. There was long ago an emigration from the district which has left this territory vacant for ages.

Athenian Stranger/ What about plainland, mountain, and forest? Pray, a how is it furnished in all these respects?

Clinias/ Much like the rest of Crete in general.

Athenian Stranger/ You mean it is rugged rather than level?

Clinias/ Decidedly so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then its case, from the point of view of the acquisition of goodness, is not desperate. Had it to be on the coast, well furnished with harbors and ill off for many of its necessaries, not productive of all, we should need a mighty protector and lawgivers who were more than men to prevent the development of much refined vice in consequence of such a situation. As it is, there is comfort in those eighty stadia. Even so, the site is nearer to the sea than it should be, all the more as you say it is well provided with a harbor. Still, we ought to be thankful for even so much. It is agreeable enough to have the sea at one's door in daily life, but, for all that, it is, in very truth, a briny and bitter neighbor. It fills a city with wholesale traffic and retail huckstering, breeds shifty and distrustful habits of soul, and so makes a society distrustful and unfriendly within itself as well as toward mankind at large. In view of this situation, there is further comfort, however, in the universal productiveness of our site. Clearly, since it is so rugged, it cannot at once produce everything and yield much of anything. Were that the case, there would be the opportunity for exportation on a large scale, and, once more, our city would abound with currency in gold and silver. Now, all things considered, nothing is a more serious impediment to the development of noble and righteous character in a society, as you may recollect that we have already said.

Clinias/ We well recollect the remark and agree with you now, as we did before, about its truth.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, as to a further point, how is our territory supplied with materials for shipbuilding?

Clinias/ It has neither fir nor pine to speak of, and not much in the way of cypress. As for the kinds of wood which, as you know, builders regularly require for the interior of boats, larch and plane, there is a little of them to be found.

Athenian Stranger/ That again is not a bad feature in the topography.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ It is just as well that a society should have a difficulty in copying the practice of its antagonists to its own undoing.

Clinias/ Now which of our results have you in view when you say that?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, my dear sir, I would have you watch my procedure in the light of our opening observations about the single object of your Cretan institutions. You both affirmed more precisely that this object is military, whereas I rejoined that it is right enough that goodness should be the object of such institutions, but could not quite concede that their aim should be some part of goodness short of the whole. It is now the turn of both of you to follow me in my proposals, taking care that I enjoin nothing which does not tend to goodness, or some part of goodness.

I take it as a postulate from the outset that a law is rightly enacted only when its aim is exclusively directed on that object of all others which is steadily and invariably attended by some worthy result, to the disregard of every other end whatsoever, be it wealth or anything else of the sort, divorced from the objects I have specified. And as for the pernicious imitation of an antagonist to which I referred. this is how it comes about in the case of a maritime population harassed by an enemy. Minos, for example—and I tell the story without any vindictive feeling against your countrymen, Clinias—Minos, in fact, once laid Attica under a cruel tribute, thanks to his strength at sea. His victims had as yet no men-of-war such as they have today, nor yet was their territory rich in timber suitable for the facile construction of a navy. So they could not imitate his seamen by turning

sailors themselves and promptly repelling the invader out of hand. Had the case been so, it would have been better for them to lose many times seven youths than to convert themselves from steady infantrymen into marines, with the marines' tricks of repeated descents followed by a helter-skelter retreat to the boats, their notion that there is nothing discreditable in shuffling out of dying at one's post when the enemy attacks, and their plausible and ready excuses for throwing down their arms and betaking themselves to 'flight without dishonor,' as it is called. Phrases like this are the normal consequences of employing men-at-arms on shipboard, and what they call for is not infinite commendation, but the very reverse. Men should never be trained to evil ways—least of all, the best element in the community. That the practice in question is ignoble might actually have been learned, I take it, from Homer, whose Odysseus upbraids Agamemnon for directing the ships to be drawn down to the water's edge when the Achaeans were hard pressed by the Trojans. What Odysseus says by way of remonstrance is this.

When thou biddest draw down the fair-benched ships to the sea while the battle and din encompass us, that the Trojans, fain as they are, may have their desire yet more fulfilled, and sheer destruction fall on ourselves. For when the ships are drawing seaward the Achaeans will not cleave to the battle, but look askance from it and flinch from the onset; then will counsel such as thou givest prove our bane.

Thus, you see, Homer was too well aware what a bad thing it is is for infantry in an engagement to be supported by a line of men-of-war. Why, lions would learn to run from deer if trained in habits like these. Not to add that states which owe their power to a navy also bestow the reward for their security on an inferior element of their forces. As they owe the security to the arts of the sea captain, the lieutenant, the

oarsman, and to a miscellaneous and not over-reputable crowd, there is no possibility of awarding honors aright to the various individuals. Yet where this is excluded, how can the state continue unimpaired?

Clinias/ It is hardly possible it should. And yet, sir, it was the sea fight at Salamis between Hellenes and non-Hellenes which was the salvation of Hellas—or so, at least, we say here in Crete.

Athenian Stranger/ To be sure that is what mankind at large say, Greeks or otherwise. But we—that is to say, Megillus here and myself—insist that the deliverance of Hellas was begun by one engagement on land, that at Marathon, and completed by another, that at Plataea. Moreover these victories made better men of the Hellenes, whereas the others did not, if such language is permissible about actions which contributed to the deliverance of those times. You see I am ready to throw you in the naval engagement at Artemisium along with the action at Salamis. The fact is, the object we are keeping in view in our present investigations into topography and legislation is the moral worth of a social system; we do not agree with the multitude that the most precious thing in life is bare preservation in existence. We hold, as I think we have said before, that it is better to become thoroughly good and to remain so as long as existence lasts.

Clinias/ Surely. surely.

Athenian Stranger/ Then the one and only point we have to consider is whether our treatment of settlements and legal enactments is following the same lines—the best for a society.

Clinias/ Indeed far the best.

Athenian Stranger/ Then tell me, in the next place, what is the population for which you are to construct a

settlement? Is it made up of volunteers from all parts of Crete—the masses in the various communities presumably having grown too great for the local food supply? For you are not, I take it, collecting applicants from Hellas at large, though I do observe that contingents from Argos, Aegina, and other Hellenic districts have settled in your country. But pray tell me from what quarter you expect the present host of citizens now to be dealt with.

Clinias/ They will most likely come from all over Crete. Of other Hellenes, Peloponnesians seem to have had the warmest welcome as settlers. In fact, it is true, as you were just saying, that we have emigrants from Argos among us, and among them the most distinguished of our societies of the present day, that of Gortyn; it is an offshoot from the well-known Gortyn in the Peloponnesus.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, it is not such an easy matter for a state to deal with a settlement when it is not formed, like a swarm of bees, by the emigration of a single stock from a single territory, with friendly feeling on both sides, under the stress of insufficient territory, or the pressure of some similar necessity. Sometimes, again, one section of a community may be driven to expatriate itself by the violence of party strife, and there has been the case of a whole society going into exile because it had been utterly crushed by an overwhelming attack. Now in one way the work of settlement and legislation is the easier in all these cases, but in another the harder. The unity of descent, speech, and institutions certainly promotes friendly feeling, since it involves the community in religious ceremonies and the like, but is not readily tolerant of novel laws or a constitution different from that of the homeland, while a group which has, perhaps, been driven into faction by the badness of the laws, yet still clings, from force of habit, to the very practices which had already led to its undoing, proves recalcitrant to the founder

and his legislation, and refuses obedience. On the other side, a stock due to a confluence of various elements may perhaps be more willing to submit to novel laws, but it is a difficult business, and takes a long time for it to 'breathe and blow in unison,' as the proverbial phrase has it of a pair of horses. No, in very truth to make a legislation or found a society is the perfect consummation of manly excellence.

Clinias/ No doubt, but you might explain the point of the remark a little more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, my dear man, I suspect my reiterated reflections about legislators will lead me to say something which is partly derogatory; still, if the remark is pertinent, no harm will be done. After all, why should I scruple at it; it is much what might be said about all human concerns.

Clinias/ What is it you have in your mind?

Athenian Stranger/ I was on the brink of saying that man never legislates at all; our legislation is always the work of chance and infinitely various circumstance. Constitutions are wrecked and laws revolutionized by the violence of war, or the helplessness of sheer destitution. Again, innovations are often forced on us by disease, in the case of the visitations of pestilence, or of protracted and recurrent periods of insalubrious weather. In view of such facts one might be moved to say, as I have just done, that no law is ever made by a man, and that human history is all an affair of chance. Still, the same thing may be said with apparent plausibility of seafaring, navigation, medicine, or strategy, and yet there is something else which may also be said with no less plausibility of them all.

Clinias/ And what is that?

Athenian Stranger/ That God is all, while chance and circumstance, under God, set the whole course of life for us,

and yet we must allow for the presence of a third and more amenable partner, skill. Thus I should count it no small advantage that the navigator's skill should cooperate with circumstance in a tempest, would not you?

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ Now the same thing will hold good for the other cases, and so we should make the same admission in the case of legislation. Granting the concurrence of the local conditions necessary for a fortunate settlement, such a community necessarily presupposes the appearance of a true legislator.

Clinias/ Beyond all doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus one who has the skill called for by any of the contingencies we have mentioned will also know well enough what form of fortune to pray for, that he may be dependent on nothing further besides his own skill.

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ And any of the other professionals we have mentioned could, no doubt, tell us, if we asked them, what it is they are praying for?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And presumably, then, a legislator could do so, too.

Clinias/ Presumably.

Athenian Stranger/ Come, then, legislator—let us so apostrophize him—what must we give you—I mean what social conditions—if their provision is to make you competent to model your society for the rest by your own efforts?

Clinias/ Now I wonder what is the right reply.

Athenian Stranger/ You understand we are speaking in the name of the legislator?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Then here is the answer. Give me a society, he will say, which is under an autocrat, but let that autocrat be young, of retentive memory, quick to learn, and temperamentally bold and high-souled. Also, if all these advantages are to be of any service, they must be further attended in the autocrat's soul by something we have already mentioned as an indispensable accompaniment of all the parts of goodness.

Clinias/ I think, Megillus, what our friend means by this accompaniment is temperance. Am I right, sir?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, Clinias, temperance in the popular sense of the word, not in that high and forced sense in which temperance might be said to be the same thing with wisdom. 'Tis a native surface quality which shows in mere children and animals that some of them have no self-restraint in the matter of pleasures, and others have—a quality, as we said, of no great account when divorced from the various other goods. You take me, no doubt?

Clinias/ Why, certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well, our autocrat must have that endowment as well as all those we have named, if the society is to achieve the constitution which will bring felicity into its life with maximum speed and success. I assure you there neither is, nor can be, any better and more rapid way to the settlement of the constitution.

Clinias/ Nay, sir, how or by what argument can a man possibly persuade himself of the truth of such a doctrine?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, surely, Clinias, it is easy enough to see how natural it is that it should be so.

Clinias/ What is the theory, once more? There is to be an autocrat, you say, and he must be young, temperate, quick to learn, retentive, bold, and high-souled?

Athenian Stranger/ And, you must add, fortunate—fortunate, that is, in the single point that there is a contemporary legislator of distinction with whom chance has brought him in contact. With that one coincidence, God has done his utmost toward his purpose of heaping blessings on a community. The next-best thing would be that there should be a pair of such potentates; it would be third best, and so on proportionately more difficult, the more of them there were, and vice versa.

Clinias/ The best state, as I understand you, might arise out of an autocracy, provided, that is, there were a consummate legislator and an autocrat of disciplined character, and the transition to it would be particularly easy and rapid in that case, less so from an oligarchy—is not that your meaning—and still less from a democracy?

Athenian Stranger/ By no means. The readiest starting point would be autocracy, the next-best, constitutional monarchy, the next-best again, democracy of a kind; oligarchy would come fourth, and only admits of such a development with great difficulty, for there the number of persons of influence is greatest. The occasion for it, mark you, is provided, according to us, when nature produces a real legislator who happens to share power of a kind with the most influential persons in society. Where, as in an autocracy, this latter element is numerically fewest but strongest, you have the normal occasion and opportunity for facile and speedy revolution.

Clinias/ What? This is more than we can follow.

Athenian Stranger/ Yet the point has been made, unless I am mistaken, more than once already. But perhaps you and your friend have never observed a society under an autocrat.

Clinias/ And I must say I have no particular desire to do so, either.

Athenian Stranger/ If you did, you would certainly remark the presence of the feature I first spoke of.

Clinias/ What feature?

Athenian Stranger/ An autocrat who desires to make a change in the tone of public life has no laborious or protracted task. He has only to take in his own person the first steps on the road—be it the path to virtue or to vice—into which he would guide the community. He must first set the copy of his own conduct, awarding credit and distinctions to one course, discredit to another, and disgracing the refractory in the various departments of conduct.

Clinias/ But why should you suppose that the rest of society will be so quick to follow the example of the wielder of this combined persuasion and coercion?

Athenian Stranger/ O my friends, never let yourselves be persuaded that there is any speedier or easier way to change the laws of a community than the personal guidance of those in authority; there is none today, and will be none hereafter. No, it is not there that we shall find the impossibility or difficulty; the true difficulty lies in the occurrence of something which has been uncommon enough in the whole course of history, but never happens without bringing a whole infinity of blessings to the society in which it occurs.

Clinias/ Now I wonder what this may be.

Athenian Stranger/ The awakening of a heaven-sent passion for ways of temperance and justice in persons of the highest station, monarchs, for example, or men of exceptionally outstanding wealth or family, or, it may be, in one who recalls the qualities of Nestor who is said to have towered above all his contemporaries even more by his

temperance than by his eloquence. That happened, we are told, in Trojan times, though it has never been known in our own. Be that as it may, if such a man there has been, or should be hereafter, or is now among us, how blessed is his own life, and how blessed they who hearken to the words which proceed from those virtuous lips! We may say the same of power in all its forms. When supreme power is combined in one person with wisdom and temperance, then, and on no other conditions conceivable, nature gives birth to the best of constitutions with the best of laws. So you may take these oracular remarks as a parable embodying the proof that though in one way it is hard for a society to get good laws, in another, if things only fall out as I say, it would be the quickest and easiest of all developments.

Clinias/ But why so?

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose we apply the parable to your city and try to model its laws in imagination, like elderly men playing a boys' game.

Clinias/ *En avant*, then, and a truce to all delays!

Athenian Stranger/ Of course we must invoke God's presence at our foundation. So may he hear us and come, gracious and debonair, to our help as we construct our city and its laws!

Clinias/ Amen to that!

Athenian Stranger/ And pray what type of constitution are we proposing to impose on our society?

Clinias/ But what do you mean by that question? You should put it a little more plainly. You mean, is it to be a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, or a monarchy? You surely cannot be thinking of an autocracy, or at least my friend and I can hardly credit it.

Athenian Stranger/ Come now, which of those names describes your own constitution? I wonder which of you will be the readier with his answer.

Megillus/ As I am the elder man, perhaps it would be fairer that I should speak first?

Clinias/ Yes, I think so.

Megillus/ Why, sir, when I consider our Lacedaemonian constitution, I really cannot tell you offhand which would be the proper name for it. It actually seems to have its resemblances to an autocracy—in fact, the power of our ephors is astonishingly autocratic—and yet at times I think it looks like the most democratic of all societies. Again, it would be sheer paradox to deny that it is an aristocracy, while yet again a feature of it is a life monarchy, asserted by all mankind, as well as ourselves, to be the very oldest of such institutions. When the question is put to me, like this, on a sudden, as I say, I really cannot tell definitely to which of these types of constitution it belongs.

Clinias/ I find myself in the same perplexity as you, Megillus. I am quite at a loss to identify our Cnossian constitution confidently with any of them.

Athenian Stranger/ That, my friends, is because you enjoy real constitutions, whereas the types we have specified are not constitutions, but settlements enslaved to the domination of some component section, each taking its designation from the dominant factor. But if a society must take its name from such a quarter, the proper course is to call it by the name of the god who is the master of rational men.

Clinias/ And what god is that?

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps we may need to employ parable a little longer, if I am to answer the question to your full satisfaction.

Clinias/ Oh, so that is the way we must proceed, is it?

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly. Why, long before the time of the societies whose foundation we have discussed, in the age of Cronus—so they say—there was a much earlier form of settled government, and a very happy one, which is reflected in the best of our present-day communities.

Clinias/ Then, I should say, we must very decidedly be told about it.

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly, in my own judgment, and that is the very reason why I have brought it into the argument.

Clinias/ Very properly, too, and, seeing how relevant it is, you will do right to tell the whole story.

Athenian Stranger/ I must do as you propose. Well, according to the received tradition, in that age of bliss, all life needs was provided in abundance and unsought, and the reason, we are told, was this. Cronus was of course aware that, as we have explained, no human being is competent to wield an irresponsible control over mankind without becoming swollen with pride and unrighteousness. Being alive to this he gave our communities as their kings and magistrates, not men but spirits, beings of diviner and superior kind, just as we still do the same with our flocks of sheep and herds of other domesticated animals. We do not set oxen to manage oxen, or goats to manage goats; we, their betters in kind, act as their masters ourselves. Well, the god, in his kindness to man, did the same; he set over us this superior race of spirits who took charge of us with no less ease to themselves than convenience to us, providing us with peace and mercy, sound law and unscanted justice, and endowing the families of mankind with internal concord and happiness. So the story teaches us today, and teaches us truly, that when a community is ruled not by God but by

man, its members have no refuge from evil and misery. We should do our utmost—this is the moral—to reproduce the life of the age of Cronus, and therefore should order our private households and our public societies alike in obedience to the immortal element within us, giving the name of law to the appointment of understanding. But when a single person, an oligarchy, or a democracy with a soul set on its pleasures and passions and lusting for its satisfaction—a soul that cannot contain itself, and is in the grip of unending and insatiate disease—when such a one tramples law under his feet and takes command of an individual or society, then, as I was just saying, all hope of deliverance is gone. That is my thesis, Clinias, and we have to consider whether it convinces us or not.

Clinias/ Convinces us? Of course it does.

Athenian Stranger/ Then are you acquainted with a theory that there are as many types of law as of constitution? And we have just seen how many types of constitution there are in the popular view. And pray believe me that the issue now at stake is no trifle, but of paramount moment. We are back again at the question of the standard of right and wrong. The standard of our laws, it is said, should be neither war nor a goodness as a whole. Whatever the existing constitution may be, the law should look to its interest, its permanent security against dissolution, and the best way to define real justice would be to say—

Clinias/ To say what?

Athenian Stranger/ That it is the interest of the sovereign.

Clinias/ You must explain yourself rather more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ And so I will. They say, you know, that the laws in a society are always enacted by the dominant section?

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, it is said, can you imagine that when the populace, or some other political party, or an autocrat, if you like, has got the upper hand, the victorious side will, of its own accord, enact laws with any principal aim but its own interest in the permanence of its authority?

Clinias/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ And if a man contravenes these enactments, their author will punish him for his violation of justice, meaning by justice these same enactments.

Clinias/ So I should apprehend.

Athenian Stranger/ These enactments, then, will in every case be justice, and for these reasons.

Clinias/ Yes, according to this account of the matter.

Athenian Stranger/ In fact, this is one of our former principles of sovereignty.

Clinias/ Principles? What principles?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, the claims to authority which we passed under review. We found parents claiming authority over their descendants, the older men over the younger, the wellborn over the baseborn, and you may remember that there were several other mutually incompatible claims. This was actually one of the list, and we remarked that Pindar treats the 'high hand of violence'—to use his own phrase—as natural justice.

Clinias/ Yes, that is certainly what we said before.

Athenian Stranger/ Now consider to which side we are to entrust our society. For here is a situation which has recurred over and over again in public life before now.

Clinias/ What situation is that?

Athenian Stranger/ After a contest for office, the victorious side engrosses the conduct of public affairs so completely to itself that no share whatsoever of office is left

to the vanquished, or even to their descendants; each party watches the other in jealous apprehension of insurrection, due to the attainment of office by someone with memories of past wrongs. Such societies, we are now, of course, contending, are no constitutional states, just as enactments, so far as they are not for the common interest of the whole community, are no true laws; men who are for a party, we say, are factionaries, not citizens, and their so-called rights are empty words. And our reason for saying it is that you and I have no intention of conferring an office in your society on anyone for his wealth, or his possession of some similar advantage, such as physical strength, stature, or family. It is, we hold, the man who is most perfect in obedience to established law, the man whose victory over his fellow citizens takes that form, to whom we should give the function of ministry to the gods, the highest post to him who stands first, the second to him who is next in the contest—the remaining posts being assigned similarly to the succeeding candidates in order. If I have just styled the so-called authorities ministers of the law, it is not for the sake of a novel phrase, but because I am persuaded that the preservation or ruin of a society depends on this more than on anything else. Where the law is overruled or obsolete, I see destruction hanging over the community; where it is sovereign over the authorities and they its humble servants, I discern the presence of salvation and every blessing heaven sends on a society.

Clinias/ Right, sir, right in God's name! You have the long sight of your years.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, yes, a man is always most shortsighted in such matters in youth, and most farsighted in age.

Clinias/ Yes, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, and our next step? May we not assume our settlers to be here in the country and under our eyes, and address the rest of our discourse to them in person?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ My friends! —this is what I would say to them—God, who, as the old saw has it, holds in his hands beginning, end, and middle of all that is, moves through the cycle of nature, straight to his end, and ever at his side walks right, the justicer of them that forsake God's law. He that would be happy follows close in her train with lowly and chastened mien, but whoso is lifted up with vanity—with pride of riches or rank or foolish conceit of youthful comeliness—and all on fire within with wantonness, as one that needs neither governor nor guide, but is fitted rather to be himself a guide to others—such a one is left alone, forsaken of God. In his abandonment he takes to him others like himself, and works general confusion by his frantic career. Now to some he seems to be some great one, but after no long while he makes no stinted amend to right by the sheer ruin of himself, his house, and his state. Now since these things are so, what must the man of judgment do or purpose, and what forbear?

Clinias/ So much is plain; every man must purpose to be of the company who follow after the god.

Athenian Stranger/ What line of conduct, then, is dear to God and a following of him? There is but one, and it is summed up in one ancient rule, the rule that 'like'—when it is a thing of due measure—'loves its like.' For things that have no measure can be loved neither by one another nor by those that have. Now it is God who is, for you and me, of a truth the 'measure of all things,' much more truly than, as they say, 'man.' So he who would be loved by such a being

must himself become such to the utmost of his might, and so, by this argument, he that is temperate among us is loved by God, for he is like God, whereas he that is not temperate is unlike God and at variance with him; so also it is with the unjust, and the same rule holds in all else. Now from this rule, I would have you note, follows another—of all rules, to my mind, the grandest and truest, which is this. For the good man 'tis most glorious and good and profitable to happiness of life, aye, and most excellently fit, to do sacrifice and be ever in communion with heaven through prayer and offerings and all manner of worship, but for the evil, entirely the contrary. For the evil man is impure of soul, where the other is pure, and from the polluted neither good men nor God may ever rightly accept a gift; thus all this toil taken with heaven is but labor thrown away for the impious, though ever seasonable in the pious.

Here, then, is the target at which we have to aim, but what shall we call the shafts which make straight for it, and the engine from which they are fired? Well, first, I say, the mark of godliness will be truly hit if the gods of the lower world are held in honor next to the Olympians, and the patron deities of the state, the even, the second best, and the left hand being consecrated to them, their superior counterparts to the powers which have just been named. After these gods a man of judgment will do worship to spirits, and after them to heroes, and I would give the next place to each man's images of his household gods, worshiped as the law directs.

And now we come to honor to be shown to parents while they are yet in life. Here religion demands the due discharge of this earliest and heaviest debt, the most sacred of all our obligations. It bids a man count all he has and owns at the service of those who gave him birth and breeding, to minister to their needs to his utmost ability, first with his substance, then with his body. and then with his mind, in repayment of

a loan of care and painful labor made so long ago on the security of his youth, and now to be made good to his elders in their age and sore necessity. Moreover, all his life through, a man should observe particular reverence of tongue toward his parents, for light and winged speech brings heavy doom; right has her appointed messenger, Nemesis, to keep watch over the matter. So one should yield to them when they feel anger, and discharge it, in word or deed, and understand that 'tis but natural in a father who thinks himself wronged by his son to be moved to uncommon anger. But when parents are once no more, the most modest burial is the best. A man should not exceed the customary pomps, nor yet come short of those wherewith his forefathers were wont to entomb their own sires; he should keep also to the same rule in paying the decent annual rites of tendance to the departed. Above all, he should honor the deceased at all times by keeping the memory of them green, while he expends on them what is proportionate to the means fortune permits him. If we act thus and frame our lives to this model, we shall, one and all, always reap the due reward from heaven and the higher powers, and our days, for the main of life, will be passed with bright hopes. As regards duties to children and kinsmen, friends and fellow citizens, as well as works of pious service to strangers, and our relations with them all, by discharge whereof, as the law enjoins, a man should adorn and illustrate his life—in all this the actual recital of the laws will, with heaven's consent, ensure our society bliss and well-being, in part by persuasion, and in part by enforced and legal correction of characters not amenable to persuasion.

There are other things, too, which should be said and must be said by a legislator like-minded with myself, and yet cannot be fittingly said in the form of a statute. As to these I would advise him, when he has finished the rest of his

discourse to the best of his power, to propound a sample to himself and those for whom he is to legislate before he enters on his actual enactments. In what form, then, is such matter best couched? To confine it all within the bounds of a single outline, as I might call it, is none too easy; still, we may be able to reach a definite result if we look at the matter in some such way as this.

Clinias/ And what result may that be?

Athenian Stranger/ I should wish the subjects to give a ready audience to persuasions to virtue, and plainly this is the effect at which our legislator will aim throughout his legislation.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, it struck me that what we have said might do some service—if our words have not been an appeal to utterly brutal souls—toward gaining a civil and friendly hearing. So, as I say, if it makes an auditor a little, even if ever so little, more friendly, and so readier to be instructed, we have every reason to be thankful. Men earnestly bent on becoming thoroughly good, and that with all speed, are not easily to be found, nor in large numbers, and Hesiod is commonly pronounced a wise man for his saying that 'the path to vice is smooth,' and, being so short, can be traveled without sweat, whereas 'before virtue the immortal gods have set sweat, and the road thither is long and uphill and rough at the outset, though when the summit is reached, the going is easy, for all its hardness.'

Clinias/ And a fine saying it is, too.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, no doubt. But I should like to propose to your common consideration the effect our foregoing argument has produced on myself.

Clinias/ Then let us hear it.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, let us address our remarks to the legislator, thus. Tell us one thing, legislator. If you knew what we ought to do and say, you would tell us what it is. Surely that is manifest?

Clinias/ Of course it is.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, but did we not hear you not so long ago pronouncing that a legislator must not permit poets to compose whatever they please? For they are not likely to know where they may contradict the law to the detriment of the society.

Clinias/ I must admit that it is the fact.

Athenian Stranger/ Then suppose we put the case for the poets to him. I wonder whether it might fairly be stated thus.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ As follows. 'Tis an old story, legislator, which we poets are always telling with the universal approval of the rest of the world, that when a poet takes his seat on the Muse's tripod, his judgment takes leave of him. He is like a fountain which gives free course to the rush of its waters, and since representation is of the essence of his art, must often contradict his own utterances in his presentations of contrasted characters, without knowing whether the truth is on the side of this speaker or of that. Now it is not the legislator's business in his law to make two such statements about one and the same topic; he has regularly to deliver himself of one pronouncement on one matter. Take, as an example, one of the very topics on which you have just delivered yourself. A funeral may be extravagant, it may be mean, it may be decently modest. You select one and only one of those types, the intermediate type, for universal imposition and unrestricted commendation. But, in my case, if my poem dealt with an opulent woman and her instructions for her own funeral, I should commend

extravagance, whereas a frugal poor man would be for parsimony, and a man of moderate estate and modest personality would have the same preference as yourself. But in your position it is not enough to use the word ‘moderate,' as you did just now; you must tell us what and how much is moderate, or else confess that your statement is not yet a law.

Clinias/ Truly said, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Then is our appointed lawmaker to set no such prefatory statement in front of his code? Is he just to tell us curtly what we are to do or not to do, add the threat of a penalty, and then turn to the next enactment, without one word of exhortation or advice to the recipients? Just as one type of physician treats us, when we call him in, in one way, and a second in another—but let us remind ourselves of the difference between the two methods, and then we shall have a request to make of our legislator, as children might beg their physician to give them the gentlest treatment. You would like an illustration? Well, there are physicians, and again there are physicians' assistants, whom we also speak of as physicians.

Clinias/ just so.

Athenian Stranger/ All bear the name, whether free men or slaves who gain their professional knowledge by watching their masters and obeying their directions in empirical fashion, not in the scientific way in which free men learn their art and teach it to their pupils. You agree that there are those two types of so-called physicians?

Clinias/ Certainly I do.

Athenian Stranger/ Now have you further observed that, as there are slaves as well as free men among the patients of our communities, the slaves, to speak generally, are treated by slaves, who pay them a hurried visit, or receive them in

dispensaries? A physician of this kind never gives a servant any account of his complaint, nor asks him for any; he gives him some empirical injunction with an air of finished knowledge, in the brusque fashion of a dictator, and then is off in hot haste to the next ailing servant—that is how he lightens his master's medical labors for him. The free practitioner, who, for the most part, attends free men, treats their diseases by going into things thoroughly from the beginning in a scientific way, and takes the patient and his family into his confidence. Thus he learns something from the sufferers, and at the same time instructs the invalid to the best of his powers. He does not give his prescriptions until he has won the patient's support, and when he has done so, he steadily aims at producing complete restoration to health by persuading the sufferer into compliance. Now which of the two methods is that of the better physician or director of bodily regimen? That which effects the same result by a twofold process or that which employs a single process, the worse of the two, and exasperates its subject?

Clinias/ Nay, sir, the double process is vastly superior.

Athenian Stranger/ Then would you like us to consider the two methods, the double and the single, in their application to legislation itself?

Clinias/ To be sure I should.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, I ask you, what will be the first law our legislator will enact? Is not his natural course to begin with an ordinance regulating the first stage in the creation of a society?

Clinias/ Why, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And the first stage in the creation of any society is surely conjugal conjunction and association?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably, then, if the legislation of any society is to be sound and right it must start with a marriage law.

Clinias/ I quite agree.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us state that law in the simple form first. It might run to some such effect as this. A man to marry when he has reached the age of thirty and before he comes to that of thirty-five; neglect to do so to be penalized by fine and loss of status; the fine to be of such and such an amount, and the loss of status to take such and such form.

That may be taken as the simple form of our law of marriage. Its double form we may word thus.

A man to marry when he has reached the age of thirty and before he comes to that of thirty – five, bethinking him that there is a sense in which mankind naturally partakes of immortality, a prize our nature makes desirable to all of us in its every form, for to win renown and not lie in our graves without a name is a desire of this. Thus the race of man is time's equal twin and companion, bound up with him in a union never to be broken, and the manner of their immortality is in this wise. By succession of generations the race abides one and the same, so partaking in immortality through procreation. Whence piety flatly forbids a man to deprive himself of the boon by his own act, as he willfully deprives himself who takes no thought of children and wife. So him who will obey the law we will hold scatheless, but as for him who disobeys and comes to five-and-thirty unwed, let him be yearly mulcted in such and such a sum, that he may not take his solitary state for a source of profit or ease, and let him have no part in the public honors paid from time to time by the younger folk to their elders.

You have heard this law set by the side of that, and are now in case to judge universally whether our laws, thus joining persuasion to menace, should be, at the very least, of double length, or should confine themselves to menace and so be of half the length.

Megillus/ To prefer the concise, sir, is ever our Laconian way; yet were I bidden to decide which of these statutes of yours I would rather see in force in our city, my vote would be for the more prolix. Indeed, my choice would be the same about any law whatsoever after this model, if both alternatives were possible. But we must not forget that our present proposals need the approval of our friend Clinias, too, since it is his city which is now proposing to adopt such laws as we may enact.

Clinias/ My thanks for your words, Megillus.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, to raise debate about a number of syllables more or less were, indeed, futile—it is quality, I take it, not length or brevity we should prize—'tis the matter of the one kind of law just mentioned that is of more than double excellence in use, by comparison with the other. As I said but now, our illustration of the two types of physicians was exactly apposite. Yet, in despite of us, none of our legislators would seem ever to have remarked that they rely wholly on one instrument in their work, whereas there are two available, so far as the mass's lack of education will permit, persuasion and compulsion. Authority is never tempered in their lawmaking with persuasion; they work by compulsion unalloyed. Aye, and by heaven, to my mind, there is yet a third requisite of a law which is universally disregarded in fact.

Clinias/ And pray what may it be?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, it has been providentially disclosed by our own conversation today. Since we began

our talk of law, daybreak has given place to noonday, and we have reached this delightful arbor, and all our conversation has been exclusively of laws. Yet I fancy we are only now beginning to talk laws; all we have said hitherto has been but preambles to laws. Now why do I say this? Because I would observe that discourse and vocal utterance of every kind have their preludes, their preliminaries, as I might say, preliminaries which furnish a useful methodical introduction to the coming performance. High-wrought and elaborate preludes are prefixed, for example, to the so-called ‘nomes' for the harp, and to musical compositions in general, whereas in the case of what we regard as the real ‘nomes,' the laws of the community, no one has ever uttered the name, nor constructed or published anything of the kind; it is taken for granted that such a thing does not exist. Yet our present conversation, I believe, suggests that it does. The deliverances which impressed me just now as laws of double length are not, I think, just precisely that; they contain two things at once, a law and the prelude to it. The dictatorial prescription in tones which we compared with the prescriptions of our unfree physician is unqualified law, while all that preceded—persuasive, as Megillus called it—is, in fact, such a persuasive, but has the rhetorical character of a preamble. For I find I framed the whole of this discourse, uttered by its speaker in the tones of persuasion, to prepare the auditor of the legislator's enactments to receive his prescription, that is to say, his law, in a spirit of friendliness and consequent docility, and for that very reason, it should, in my opinion, properly be called by no other name; it is not the text of the law but its preamble.

You will ask me, then, how I propose to follow up the observation. Thus. I would have a legislator take constant care to leave neither his code as a whole nor its various divisions unprovided with introductory preludes. This will

make as great a difference as in the two examples we were just considering.

Clinias/ I, too, would urge a legislator who understands his business to do the work in this fashion and no other.

Athenian Stranger/ I thoroughly agree with you, Clinias, as far as this. All laws have their preambles, and anyone who is beginning the work of legislation should prefix to each section the preamble appropriate to the whole subject. The pronouncement he is about to make is no trifle, and it will make a great difference whether it can be distinctly remembered or not. Yet we should be wrong if we insisted on the presence of a preamble alike for minor laws, as they are called, and major. In fact, one must not treat every song or every speech in that fashion.

It is true that there are appropriate preludes in all cases, but we are not to make invariable use of them; we must leave it to the individual speaker, or singer, or legislator to use his own judgment in each case.

Clinias/ I fully agree with you. But, pray, sir, let us waste no more time in delay. Let us go back to our argument and make a start, if you please, with what you said a while ago, though not as an avowed preamble. Let us begin it all over again, as they say in games, with a better 'second shot,' on the understanding that we are no longer constructing a casual argument, but a preamble—let us begin, I say, with the admission that we are making our preamble. As for the worship of the gods and the service of our progenitors, what has been already said is adequate enough, but we must try to pursue the theme further until you feel that our whole prelude is sufficiently complete. Then, and not before, you shall rehearse the actual statutes.

Athenian Stranger/ Good, then. Our preamble, as we are now agreed, has already dealt adequately with gods,

subordinate powers, and ancestors living and dead. As I understand you, you want me to throw some light on such parts of the subject as we have not yet touched.

Clinias/ Precisely.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, in the next place, it is proper and to their common highest interest that speaker and hearers should do their utmost to achieve their own education by meditation on their duties of effort and remission in all that concerns mind, body, and substance. Whence these, and no others, are doubtless the matters of which we must next speak and hear.

Clinias/ Very true.

Book 5.

Athenian Stranger/ Listen then, all ye who but now gave ear to our discourse of gods and well-beloved sires. Of all a man has—after his gods—the divinest thing, and the most truly his own, is his soul. Now things which pertain to any man are ever of two sorts, a superior and better sort to be sovereign, an inferior and worse to be subject. So a man should ever prefer those that are sovereign in honor before those that are subject. Therefore, when I bid men honor their own souls next to the gods, our sovereign lords, and the powers under them, the counsel I give is right. Yet not a man of us, I may say, honors his soul aright, though he dreams he does. Honor, I take it, is a thing divinely good, and can be conferred by nothing that is evil. He who deems he is advancing his soul by speech, gifts, or compliances, and all the while makes it no better than it was before, may dream that he shows it honor, but in truth does it none.

Barely, for example, has a man come to boyhood before he counts himself fit to pronounce on all things, honors his soul, as he fancies, by this flattery, and gives it ready license to act whatever it will. Now our present declaration is that by these courses he does it hurt, not honor, whereas we bid him honor it next to heaven. So again, when a man lays the blame for his several misdeeds and the greater and graver part of his mischances not on himself but on others, ever accounting himself clear of fault, by way of reverence—or so he fancies—for his soul, that is no honor done the soul—far from it—but hurt. Again, when he courts pleasures in defiance of the legislator's admonition and approval, he does his soul no honor, but rather dishonor, by thus defiling it with misery and remorse. Again, in a different way, when a man will not harden himself to endure commended hardships, fears, pains, sufferings, but makes submission, the surrender brings no honor, for all such courses bring

disgrace on the soul. Again, when a man counts it good to live at all costs, that also is dishonor to the soul; 'tis surrender to that within him which accounts the unseen world merely evil, whereas a man should make head against his fancy with cogent proof that he knows not even whether our chiefest good may not be in the gift of the gods of that land. Again, when a man prefers comeliness before goodness, this also is no other than real and utmost dishonor to the soul. For this estimate pronounces body more honorable than soul, and that most falsely. Nothing born of earth is more honorable than the heavenly, and he that conceits himself otherwise of the soul than this knows not the preciousness of this possession he despises. Again, when a man lusts after wealth basely won, or has no disrelish for the winning, he does no real honor to his soul by such offerings—far, far from it! He sells its goodly treasure for a parcel of coin, but all the gold on earth or under earth is no equal exchange for goodness.

To say all in one word, whosoever will not at all hazards keep himself from all the legislator lists in his count of things base and bad, and exercises himself with all his might in all that is in the contrary table of things good and lovely, knows not that by all such ways a man ever heaps foul dishonor and deformity on the divinest thing he has, his soul. In fact, none of us, or few, reckon with the sorest 'judgment'—as the phrase is—on evil-doing, which judgment is that a man grows like those who already are evil, and, as the likeness grows, avoids good men and good converse, and cuts himself off from them, but follows after the other sort and cleaves to them in intimate fellowship, and he who clings to such men cannot but do and have done to him what men of that sort naturally do and say. This state then is not judgment—for judgment is, like justice, a good—but vengeance, the painful consequence of iniquity. He that meets it and he that misses

it are alike unhappy, the one because he gets no healing for his disease, the other in that he is cut off for the salvation of many another. But honor, we hold, is, in sum, to follow after what is better, and for what is worse but may be amended, even to make it good as best may be.

There is nothing, then, of all a man owns so natively quick as the soul to shun the evil but follow on the trail of the chief good, win it, and spend the rest of a lifetime at home with it. Whence we have given the soul the second place in honor. The third, and so much must be plain to any vision, belongs to due honor to the body. But next it must be asked what various honors there are, which of them ring true, which are counterfeit, and here is a task for our legislator. He will suggest, I think, that they are these and the like. The body to be honored is not the comely, nor the strong, nor swift, no, nor the healthy, though so many might be of that mind—nor yet that of the contrary sort. The body which displays all these qualities in intermediate degree is by far the most sober, and soundest as well, for the one sort make men's souls vain and overbearing, the other tame and abject. 'Tis the same with ownership of wealth and property, and they must be rated by the same scale. Excess of all such things, as a rule, breeds public and private feuds and factions, defect, subjection.

Let no man covet wealth for his children's sake, that he may leave them in opulence; 'tis not for their own good nor for the state's. For the young an estate that tempts no sycophants and yet has no lack of things needful is of all others best and most consonant; it works general concord and concert and banishes pains from our lives. We should leave our children rich, not in gold but in reverence. Now we fancy we shall assure that inheritance if we rebuke the young when they forget their modesty, but in truth the thing is not to be done by giving the young such admonition as

they receive today when they are told that 'youth must respect all men.' A legislator of judgment will be more likely to charge older men to respect their juniors and, of all things, to take heed that no young man ever see or hear one of themselves doing act or speaking word of shame, since when the old forget their modesty, the young, too, cannot but be most graceless. Far the best way to educate our young men and ourselves along with them is not by admonition, but by lifelong visible practice of all to which a man would admonish others. If a man pays honor and respect to kindred and all fellowship of common blood in worship of the gods of the kin, he may reasonably expect the favor of the gods of birth for the propagation of his own children.

As to friends and comrades in the several affairs of life, a man will gain their good will if he counts their services to him greater and ampler than they do, but rates his own kindnesses to friend and companion lower than they themselves. In all that concerns city and fellow citizens, the best man, and the best by far, is he who would prize before an Olympian victory or any triumph in war or peace, the credit of victory in service to the laws of his home, as one who has all his life been their true servant above all men. Then, as regards the alien, we must remember that compacts have a peculiar sanctity; indeed, offenses by alien against alien, we may say, compared with sins against fellow citizens, more directly draw down the vengeance of God. For the alien, being without friends or kinsmen, has the greater claim on pity, human and divine. Whence he that is able to exact the vengeance is all the readier to come to his help, and none is so able as the god or spirit who protects the alien as minister of Zeus Xenios. What anxious care, then, should a man of any foresight take to come to the end of life's journey guiltless of offense toward aliens! Moreover, the gravest of offenses, whether against landsmen or aliens, is

always that done to a suppliant, for the god in whose name the suppliant made his appeal when he obtained a promise keeps jealous watch over the sufferer, and thus he will never suffer his wrongs unavenged.

We have now fairly reviewed a man's relations to parents, to himself, his possessions, his city, his friends, his kindred, to aliens and to countrymen, and must next in order consider what manner of man he must himself be to pass through life with full credit. We come to speak now, of the effects not of law, but of education through commendation and reproach in making men more amenable and well disposed toward the laws we are hereafter to enact.

Now of all things good, truth holds the first place among gods and men alike. For him who is to know felicity and happiness, my prayer is that he may be endowed with it from the first, that he may live all the longer a true man. For such a man is trusty, whereas he that loves voluntary deception is untrustworthy, and he that loves involuntary, a fool, and neither lot is to be envied. For, sure, the traitor or the fool is a man of no friends. Course of time discovers him and he prepares for himself utter loneliness in the trials of age at the end of his days, so living equally destitute of companions and children, whether they survive or not. Honor is due to him who himself does no wrong, but he that will not so much as suffer another to do it merits twofold and more than twofold honor; the first has the worth of one man, the second, who reveals the wrongdoing of others to the authorities, the worth of many. But he that further does his endeavor to second the authorities in their work of repression, he is the great and perfect citizen, and the palm of virtue shall be declared to be his. We must make this same grading in our recognition of temperance and judgment and all good qualities which a man imparts to others as well as enjoys in his own person. To him who communicates them

we should give the supreme degree of honor : he that cannot impart them, yet would fain do so, must be left in the second rank. As for him who engrosses good things to himself and will never, if he can help it, share them with a friend, we should censure his person, but with no depreciation of the quality on the possessor's account; rather we must do all we can to make it our own.

In this contest for virtue we will have all men competitors, but there must be no jealousies. For a man such as we would have him promotes a state, since he runs in the race himself without hampering others by evil reports, whereas the jealous man, who fancies slander of others the right means to his own advancement, strains less to reach real virtue himself, and causes his rivals to be discouraged by unmerited censure. Thus he cripples the whole society for the race for virtue, and does what lies in him to lower its good repute. High-spirited every man should be, but likewise gentle in eminent degree. For cruel and almost or wholly irreparable wrongs at the hands of others are only to be escaped in one way, by victorious encounter and repulse, and stern correction, and such action is impossible for the soul without generous passion. But as concerns the transgressions of those who commit wrong, but reparable wrong, we must first of all rest assured that no wrongdoer is so of deliberation. For no man will ever deliberately admit supreme evil, and least of all in his most precious possessions. But every man's most precious possession, as we said, is his soul; no man, then, we may be sure, will of set purpose receive the supreme evil into this most precious thing and live with it there all his life through. And yet, though a wrongdoer or a man in evil case is always a pitiable creature, it is with him whose disease is curable that there is scope for pity. With him one may curb and tame one's passion, and not scold like a vixen, but against the

unqualified and incorrigible offender, the utterly corrupt, we must give the rein to wrath. This is why we say it is meet for a good man to be high-spirited and gentle, as occasion requires.

But of all faults of soul the gravest is one which is inborn in most men, one which all excuse in themselves and none therefore attempts to avoid—that conveyed in the maxim that ‘everyone is naturally his own friend,' and that it is only right and proper that he should be so, whereas, in truth, this same violent attachment to self is the constant source of all manner of misdeeds in every one of us. The eye of love is blind where the beloved is concerned, and so a man proves a bad judge of right, good, honor, in the conceit that more regard is due to his personality than to the real fact, whereas a man who means to be great must care neither for self nor for its belongings, but for justice, whether exhibited in his own conduct, or rather in that of another. From this same fault springs also that universal conviction that one's own folly is wisdom, with its consequences that we fancy we know everything when we know as good as nothing, refuse to allow others to manage business we do not understand, and fall into inevitable errors in transacting it for ourselves. Every man, then, must shun extreme self-love and follow ever in the steps of his better, undeterred by any shame for his case.

There are also minor and often-formulated, but no less salutary, rules which must be kept in mind by repetition. For where waters, as we may say, are wasted by emission there must always be a balancing immission, and recall is the immission which makes waste of wisdom good. This is why there must be restraint of unseasonable laughter and tears and each of us must urge his fellow to consult decorum by utter concealment of all excess of joy or grief, whether the breeze of fortune is set fair, or, by a shift of circumstance, the fortunes of an enterprise are confronted by a mountain

of difficulty. It should be our constant hope that God, by the blessings he bestows, will lighten the troubles that come upon us, and change our present state for the better, while, with heaven's favor, the very reverse will always be true of our blessings. These are the hopes, and these and the like the meditations, in which each of us should live, sparing no pains, alike in work and in play, to bring them to his neighbor's confident recollection and to his own.

We have now dealt pretty completely with what divinity has to say of the institution which ought to be established, and the personal character to which all should aspire. On purely human considerations we have not touched, and yet we must; it is to men, not to gods, we are speaking. Nothing is so native to men as pleasure, pain, and desire; they are, so to say, the very wires or strings from which any mortal nature is inevitably and absolutely dependent. We have therefore to commend the noble life, not only as superior in comeliness of repute, but further as superior, if a man will but taste it and not decline it in the days of his youth, in that on which we are all set, lifelong predominance of pleasures over pains. That this will certainly be so, if only the tasting is done in the right way, will easily be made abundantly apparent. But what is the right way? This is what we must now learn from our argument to see. The following are the lines along which we must discover, by comparison of the relative pleasantness and painfulness of lives, whether one is naturally conformable to our constitution and another unconformable. We wish for pleasure; pain we neither choose nor wish for. A neutral state, though not desired as an alternative to pleasure, is desired as a relief from pain. Less of pain with more of pleasure is desired; less of pleasure with more of pain is not desired. As for an equal balance of both, we can give no certain reason for desiring it. And all these objects affect our several choices or leave them

unaffected, in virtue of their frequency, their magnitude, their intensity, their equality, and the conditions which are the opposites of these in their influence on desire. All this, then, being inevitably ordered so, a life which contains numerous, extensive, and intense feelings of both kinds is desired, if there is an excess of pleasures, not desired if the excess is on the other side. Again, a life where both kinds of feeling are few, inconsiderable, and of low intensity is not desired if the pains predominate, but is desired in the opposite case. As for a life in which the balance is even, we must stand to our earlier pronouncement; we desire it so far as it contains a predominance of what attracts us, and yet do not desire it so far as it is predominant in what repels. So we must regard our lives as confined within these limits and must consider what kind of life it is natural to desire. But if we ever speak of ourselves as desiring an object other than those aforesaid, the statement is due to ignorance and defective experience of actual lives.

What lives, then, are there, and how many, from which, on a review of the desirable and undesirable, a selection must be made and erected into a self-imposed law, if the choice of the course which is pleasant and attractive as well as virtuous and noble may lead to an existence of supreme human felicity? We shall, of course, name the life of temperance as one, and may count that of wisdom as another, that of courage as another, and that of health as another, thus making four in all, against which we may set four other types, the lives of folly, cowardice, profligacy, disease. Now the verdict of one acquainted with the facts will be that the life of temperance is uniformly gentle. The pains and pleasures it offers are alike unexciting, its desires and passions never furious, but mild, whereas that of profligacy is uniformly rash. The pains and pleasures it offers are alike violent, its intense desires and frantic passions maddening

in the extreme. But in the temperate life the pains are surpassed by the pleasures; in the profligate the pleasures are surpassed by the pains, in respect of magnitude, number, and condensation. Hence it follows naturally and inevitably that the former is the more pleasurable life, the latter the more painful, and a man who desires a pleasant life is no longer free to choose a career of profligacy. Nay, it is at once patent, if our present reasoning is sound, that the profligate must always be what he is against his own will. The reason why the great mass of men live without temperance is always either ignorance, or lack of self-control, or both at once. We must say the same thing of the lives of disease and of health; there are pleasures and pains in both, but pleasure predominates over pain in health, in disease pain over pleasure.

Now the object of our choice between lives is not to secure preponderance of pain; the life we have pronounced the pleasanter is one in which the preponderance is on the other side. The temperate life, then, we shall maintain exhibits both sorts of feeling in lesser number, smaller magnitude, and looser concentration than the profligate—the wise than the foolish, and the life of courage than that of cowardice. But since in each case the first-named has the superiority in pleasure over its rival, which has a superiority in pain, the life of courage is triumphant over that of cowardice, that of wisdom over that of folly, with the consequence that, lives for lives, the temperate, courageous, wise, and wholesome are pleasanter than the cowardly, foolish, licentious, and diseased, and, in sum, the life of bodily or mental excellence pleasanter than that of depravity—to say nothing of its further superiority on the score of comeliness, rightness, virtue, and fair fame—whence it results that such a life renders its possessor's existence absolutely and unreservedly happier than that of his rival.

Here our discourse by way of prelude to our legislation may come to its end. After the prelude, of course, must come the composition itself, or, as it would be truer to say, an outline of a civic code. Now just as in the case of a web or other piece of woven work, woof and warp cannot be fashioned of the same threads, but the material of the warp must be of superior quality—it must be tough, you know, and have a certain tenacity of character, whereas the woof may be softer and display a proper pliancy. Well, the illustration shows that there must be some similar distinction made between citizens who are to fill magistracies, and those who have been but lightly tested by education, this distinction being drawn appropriately to the various cases. For you must know that there are two things which go to the making of a constitution. The conferring of office on individuals is one; the other is the providing of the officials with a code of laws.

But before we come to any of these subjects, the following observations should be made. A man who takes in hand a herd of animals, a shepherd, neatherd, horse breeder, or the like, will never dream of trying to tend that herd without first submitting the group to the purgation proper to it. He will separate the sound animals from the sickly, the thoroughbreds from the mongrels, removing the latter to other herds, and exercising his tendance on the former, since he is well aware that, unless he thus purges his stock, he will have endless and fruitless trouble with bodies and minds already degenerate by nature or ill management, which will further communicate a taint to the sound and unimpaired in body and disposition in the various herds. With the lower animals this does not so much matter—they only call for mention by way of an illustration—but in the case of man it is of the first concern to the legislator to discover and explain the method of procedure appropriate to

various cases, in this matter of purgation as well as in all his other dealings with them. For instance, in the business of social purgation, the case stands thus. There are many ways of effecting a purgation, some of them milder, some sharper. Some—the sharpest and best of all—will be at the disposal of one who is at once autocrat and legislator, but a legislator who establishes a new society and new laws with less than autocratic power will be well satisfied if he can so much as reach his end of purgation by the mildest of methods. The best method of all, like the most potent medicines, is painful; it is that which effects correction by the combination of justice with vengeance, and carries its vengeance, in the last instance, to the point of death or exile, usually with the result of clearing society of its most dangerous members, great and incurable offenders. The milder method of purgation we may describe much as follows. Persons who, from want of the means of subsistence, show themselves ready to follow their leaders in an attack of the have-nots on the haves are treated by the legislator as a deep-seated disease in the body of the state, and, with all possible good feeling, sent abroad as a 'measure of relief,' to use the euphemistic phrase; the name given to the procedure is colonization. Now every legislator has to act more or less in this way at the outset, but our own situation, at the present juncture, is still less irksome; we need contrive neither a colonization, nor any other method of selecting our purgation. We have, so to say, a conflux into the reservoir of waters from many sources, some springs, some mountain becks, and need only take careful pains to secure maximum purity in the accumulating water by drawing off the supply from one quarter and diverting it into a different course in another. True, there is naturally some trouble and risk about any political undertaking; still, as we are concerned at the moment with theory, not with practical execution, we

may take our recruitment of citizens to have been completed, and its purity ensured to our wish. We shall, in fact, submit the bad among those who propose to come into our proposed state as members to the test of manifold exhortation and adequate time, and prevent their arrival; the good we shall welcome with all benevolence and complaisance.

Do not forget that we enjoy the same good fortune on which we congratulated the foundation of the Heraclidae, escape from cruel and dangerous controversy about confiscating of estates, cancellation of debts, and redistribution of property. In an old-established society, when legislation of this kind has become inevitable, innovation and refusal to innovate prove, in a way, alike impossible; room is left for little more than pious wishes and insensible and cautious modification by slow and gradual advances in the following direction. Among the innovators there should always be a section with extensive property in land and numerous debtors, who are not indisposed to share their advantages in a liberal spirit with the distressed by a remission of debts and redistribution of estates, thus evincing a certain regard for moderation, and showing their conviction that poverty consists not so much in the diminution of one's property as in the intensification of one's cupidity. This conviction is the surest of all sources of social security, a firm foundation for the subsequent erection of any political superstructure in keeping with such conditions. Where these initial conditions are unsound, a statesman's subsequent action will always be beset with difficulties. The danger, as I say, is one from which we are exempt; still, it is the better course to explain how we might have escaped it even without this exemption. Let us say, then, once for all, that escape must be sought in the combination of justice with freedom from avarice. There is no road to deliverance, broad or narrow, on other lines, and

we must take the principle as a buttress of our society. In fact, properties must be fixed by some system which excludes recriminations among their owners; otherwise, any man of any intelligence will refuse to go further, if he can help it, with a social system for a population among whom there are long-standing mutual jealousies. In persons who have, like ourselves at this moment, the providential opportunity to found a new society where there are as yet no internal hostilities, to introduce such hostilities by the distribution of land and houses would be a combination of sheer depravity with superhuman folly.

What, then, would be the right method of distribution? First we must fix the total number of the citizens at the suitable figure; next we must come to an agreement about their distribution, the number and size of the sections into which they should be subdivided; the land and houses should be partitioned among these sections as equally as may be. What would be a satisfactory total for the population is more than can be rightly said without consideration of the territory and the neighboring communities. The territory should be large enough for the adequate maintenance of a certain number of men of modest ambitions, and no larger; the population should be sufficient to defend themselves against wrongs from societies on their borders, and to assist their neighbors when wronged to some purpose. These points we will settle, practically and theoretically, by an inspection of the territory and its neighbors, but for the present our argument may proceed to the completion of our code of laws, in outline and as a general sketch.

Let us assume—to take a convenient number—that we have five thousand and forty landholders, who can be armed to fight for their holdings, and that the territory and houses are likewise divided among the same number, so that there will be one man to one holding. Let this total be divided first

by two, and then by three; in fact it will permit of division by four, five, and the successive integers up to ten. Of course anyone who is acting as a legislator must be at least familiar enough with figures to understand what number, or kind of number, will prove most useful in a given state. Accordingly we will select that which has the greatest number of immediately successive divisions. The whole integer series, of course, admits division by any number and with any quotient, while our five thousand and forty can be divided, for purposes of war, or to suit the engagements and combinations of peace, in the matter of taxes to be levied and public distributions to be made, into fifty-nine quotients and no more, ten of them, from unity onward, being successive.

These facts of number, then, must be thoroughly mastered at leisure by those whose business the law will make it to understand them—they will find them exactly as I have stated them—and they must be mentioned by the founder of a city, for the reason I shall now give. Whether a new foundation is to be created from the outset or an old one restored, in the matter of gods and their sanctuaries—what temples must be founded in a given community, and to what gods or spirits they should be dedicated—no man of sense will presume to disturb convictions inspired from Delphi, Dodona, the oracle of Ammon, or by old traditions of any kind of divine appearances or reported divine revelations, when those convictions have led to the establishment of sacrifice and ritual—whether original and indigenous, or borrowed from Etruria, Cyprus, or elsewhere—the consequent consecration by the tradition of oracles, statues, altars, and shrines, and the provision for each of these of its sacred precinct. A legislator should avoid the slightest interference with all such matters; he should assign every district its patron god, or spirit, or hero, as the case may be, and his first step in the subdivision of a territory should be

to assign to each of them his special precinct with all appertaining dues. His purpose in this will be that the convocations of the various sections at stated periods may provide opportunities for the satisfaction of their various needs, and that the festivities may give occasion for mutual friendliness, familiarity, and acquaintance. There is indeed no such boon for a society as this familiar knowledge of citizen by citizen. For where men have no light on each other's characters, but are in the dark on the subject, no one will ever reach the rank or office he deserves, or get the justice which is his proper due. Hence in every society it should always be the endeavor of every citizen, before anything else, to prove himself to all his neighbors no counterfeit, but a man of sterling sincerity, and not to be imposed on by any counterfeiting in others.

Our next move in this business of legislation must be—like the moving of a man on the draught-board from the 'sacred line'—so singular that it may well surprise you on a first hearing. Yet reflection and practical experience will make it clear that a society is likely to enjoy but a second-best constitution. Some of us may be dissatisfied with such a society from their unfamiliarity with the situation of a legislator who does not possess autocratic power, but the procedure of strict exactitude is to discriminate a best constitution, a second-best, and a third-best, and then to leave the choice between them to the party responsible for the foundation. Accordingly, I propose that we should adopt this method in our present proceedings. We will describe the best, second-best, and third-best constitutions, and leave the choice between them to Clinias in the present case, or to anyone else who may at any time come to the task of selection with a desire to incorporate what he values in his own native institutions to suit his own taste.

The first-best society, then, that with the best constitution and code of law, is one where the old saying is most universally true of the whole society. I mean the saying that ‘friends' property is indeed common property.' If there is now on earth, or ever should be, such a society—a community in womenfolk, in children, in all possessions whatsoever—if all means have been taken to eliminate everything we mean by the word ownership from life; if all possible means have been taken to make even what nature has made our own in some sense common property, I mean, if our eyes, ears, and hands seem to see, hear, act, in the common service; if, moreover, we all approve and condemn in perfect unison and derive pleasure and pain from the same sources—in a word, when the institutions of a society make it most utterly one, that is a criterion of their excellence than which no truer or better will ever be found. If there is anywhere such a city, with a number of gods, or sons of gods, for its inhabitants, they dwell there thus in all joyousness of life. Whence for the pattern of a constitution we should look to no other quarter, but cleave to this and strive to come as near it as may be in our state. That we have now in hand, were it once brought to the birth, would be in its fashion the nearest to immortality and the only one which takes the second place; of the third, under heaven's favor, we will treat hereafter. For the present, what, in any case, is this system we speak of, and how may it come to be what it is?

First, then, let them make a division of lands and houses among themselves, and not till the soil in common, for that were a project beyond their birth, breeding, and education. But let the division be made with some such thought as this, that he to whom a lot falls is yet bound to count his portion the common property of the whole society, and, since the territory is his fatherland, to tend it with care passing that

of son for mother, the more that the land is the divine mistress of her mortal children, and to think likewise of all the gods and spirits of the locality. That this temper may persist for all time to come, we must practice this further contrivance. The number of hearth fires established by our present division must remain forever unchanged, without increase or deviation whatsoever. Now the way to ensure this in any city will be as follows. Let him who has a lot assigned him ever leave after him one son, of his own preference, to be his heir in that household and successor in the worship of the gods of clan and in ministering to the family, living or already previously deceased. As for other children, when a man has more than the one, let him give the females in marriage as a law yet to be enjoined shall direct; the males let him distribute among citizens who have a lack of offspring, to be their sons, and that preferably by friendly agreement. If a man have no friendly connections, or if there be families too numerous in issue, female or male, as in the contrary case, when there is a paucity of issue due to childlessness, in all these cases the highest and most august of the magistracies we shall create must consider what should be done to meet the excess or defect, and contrive the best device they may to keep the number of households always at our five thousand and forty and no more. Now there are several such devices. There are shifts for checking propagation when its course is too facile, and, on the other side, there are ways of fostering and encouraging numerous births which affect the young by marks of honor and dishonor and admonition conveyed in warning speeches of their seniors, and these will do our business. Besides, in the final extremity, if all means fail us to keep the number of five thousand and forty households constant, if mated love should cause an excessive glut of population, and we find ourselves at a loss, we have ready to our hand the old

contrivance we have more than once spoken of—we can send out colonies of such persons as we deem convenient with love and friendship on both parts. Or in the contrary event, if our citizens are visited by a flood tide, as we may call it, of disease, or by destruction in battle, and so reduced far below the appointed number by untimely deaths, why, then, though we should never, if we can help it, foist in citizens whose education has been base, with necessity, as the proverb says, not even a god can cope.

Let us fancy, then, that we hear our present argument exhorting us in tones like these. Worthiest of men, see to it that you grow not slack in rendering the honor nature bids render to congruity and equality, identity and conformity, alike of number and of all that can produce fair and good effects. In especial you are herewith charged, first, to keep fixed throughout life the numbers prescribed you, and next to do no despite by mutual purchase and sale to the bulk and measure of substance assigned you at the first as your fitting portion; therein you will have against you the lot by which the division was made—and it is a god—and the lawgiver to boot. For first of all, our present law, with its warning that a man must take the lot, if so he pleases, on those terms or let it alone, contains this further enactment, that whereas the soil is consecrate to all gods, and whereas moreover priests of either sex shall offer prayers with sacrifice to that intent, once and twice and thrice, he who shall vend house or land assigned him, or purchase the same, shall suffer the fitting penalties for his act, written records inscribed on tables of cypress-wood being laid up in the temples as a memorial to times to come. Moreover, surveillance over the execution of this statute shall be made the charge of the magistracy which shall be deemed most keen-sighted, that contraventions of it, when they occur, may not go unremarked, but the offense at once against the

law and against God receive its chastisement. What a wealth of blessing the regulation now enjoined brings to any society which complies with it, if it be but conjoined with an organization to match, no evil man will ever know, but only, to speak with the old proverb, one who has made trial of it and is formed to ways of virtue. For such an organization leaves no great room for the making of fortunes; 'tis a consequence of it that none has either need or license to make them in any sordid calling—as even the sound of the reproach 'base mechanical' repels the man of free soul—and none will ever stoop to amass wealth by such devices.

With these injunctions goes also a further law by which no possession of gold or silver is permitted to any private man, but only a currency for the purpose of daily exchange, such as is hardly to be avoided by craftsmen or any whose business it is to pay wages in such a kind to wage earners, whether slaves or alien settlers; whence we shall lay it down that they must have an internal currency, of value at home but worthless abroad. As for a common Hellenic currency, to meet the needs of campaigns and foreign expeditions, such as embassies or other necessary missions of state on which a man may be dispatched, to serve these various purposes the state must possess current Hellenic money. If a private man should ever be forced to travel in foreign parts, let him get leave of the magistrates before he departs, and if on his return he have coin from any foreign quarter left, let him deposit it with the state, receiving the equivalent in local currency; if he be found to be secreting it, let it be confiscated to the treasury, and let any who is privy to the act and conceals it be liable equally with the importer to curse and reproach, and in addition to a fine of amount not less than the amount of foreign currency imported. Let there be no dowry whatsoever, given or received, in marrying or giving in marriage, no depositing of money with one who is

not trusted, and no lending on usury, the law permitting the borrower to withhold both interest and capital. That these practices are best for a society will be rightly discerned by the inquirer who considers them in the following light, with constant reference to their principle and intention. The intention of a sane statesman, mark you, is not what the many suppose. The good legislator, they would say, must intend the city for which he legislates in his wisdom to be as great as may be, and as wealthy, to possess mines of gold and silver, and to have a multitude of subjects by land and sea. They would further add that if he is a legislator of the right kind he must intend his city to be as good and as happy as possible. Now some of these objects are possibilities, others not so. Hence the state builder will intend the possible; the impossible he will neither make the object of a futile intention nor attempt it. In fact, speaking generally, happiness necessarily waits on goodness; so that combination he would intend. But to be at once exceedingly wealthy and good is impossible, if we mean by the wealthy those who are accounted so by the vulgar, that is, the exceptional few who own property of great pecuniary value—the very thing a bad man would be likely to own. Now since this is so, I can never concede to them that a rich man is truly happy unless he is also a good man, but that one who is exceptionally good should be exceptionally wealthy too is a mere impossibility. But why so, someone may ask. Why, I answer, because the profits of righteousness and iniquity together are more than double those from righteousness alone, while the expenditure of one who will spend neither honorably nor discreditably is less by half than that of one who is ready to lay out money honorably on honorable objects. Hence he who acts in the contrary fashion can never become wealthier than the man whose gains are double his own, and his expenditure but half his. Now of the two men,

the one is good; the other, when he is frugal, not bad—though on occasion he can be utterly bad too—but good, as I have just said, he never is. In fact, the man who will get by honest and dishonest means alike, and will spend neither righteously nor unrighteously, if he is only frugal to boot, grows wealthy, though the utterly bad man, being as a general rule a prodigal, is very poor, whereas a man who will spend on honorable objects and only make gains from honest sources, will not find it easy to become either remarkably wealthy or exceedingly poor. Thus our thesis that the immensely rich are not good men is sound, and if they are not good, neither are they happy.

The object our laws had in view was that our people should be supremely happy and devotedly attached to one another, but citizens will never be thus attached where there are many suits at law between them, and numerous wrongs committed, but where both are rarest and of least consequence. Our society, we pronounce, must have neither gold nor silver, nor yet much making of profits from mechanical crafts, or usury, or raising of sordid beasts, but only such as husbandry yields or permits, and of it only so much as will not force a man in his profit gathering to forget the ends for which possessions exist, that is to say, soul and body, which will never be of any account without bodily training and education at large. Wherefore we have said, and said more than once, that concern for possessions should take the lowest place in our esteem, for whereas the objects of universal interest to man are in all three, interest in possessions, rightly pursued, holds the third and lowest rank, the interest of the body is second, of the soul first. And so also with the polity now under consideration; if it prescribes its honors on these principles, its laws have been rightly made, but should any law there to be imposed be found to put health before sobriety in point of public esteem,

or wealth before health and sober-mindedness, it will stand detected as wrongly imposed. Hence a legislator should time and time again ask himself the plain questions, What is my intent? Do I hit the mark in this, or do I miss it? Thus perhaps, but in no other way whatsoever, will he finish his work of legislation and relieve others of the task.

Let him who has obtained a lot, then, as we say, hold it on the conditions here stated. It had indeed been well that all settlers should further enter our colony with equal means of every kind. But since this cannot be, but one arrival will bring more property and another less, there must be classes of unequal census, and that on many grounds, and in particular because of the equal opportunities our society affords, that so in election to office and assessment of payments to and receipts from the exchequer regard may be had to a man's due qualifications—not only of personal and ancestral virtue, or of bodily strength and comeliness, but of enjoyment of means or lack of them, honors and offices apportioned fairly by a rule of proportional, though unequal, distribution—and dissensions avoided. On these grounds we must arrange our citizens in four classes according to the amount of their property, a first, a second, a third, and a fourth—or they may be called by some other names—whether the members remain in the same class, or shift, as they pass from poverty to wealth, or wealth to poverty, each to the class appropriate to him.

As a further consequence of what has preceded I would enact another law of the following type. In a society which is to be immune from the most fatal of disorders which might more properly be called distraction than faction, there must be no place for penury in any section of the population, nor yet for opulence, as both breed either consequence. Accordingly the legislator must now specify the limit in either direction. So let the limit on the side of penury be the

value of an allotment; this must remain constant, and no magistrate, and no other person who is ambitious of a repute for goodness must connive, in any case, at its diminution. The legislator will take it as a measure, and permit the acquisition of twice, thrice, and as much as four times its value. If a man acquires further possessions, from treasure-trove, donation, or business, or by any other similar chance makes acquisitions in excess of this measure, he may retain his good name and escape all proceedings by consigning the surplus to the state and its gods. If there is any disobedience to this law, it shall be open to anyone who pleases to lay an information and claim half the property, the convicted offender also paying a fine to the same amount out of his own possessions; the other half shall go to the gods. The whole property of every citizen, other than his allotment, must previously be inscribed in a public record under the custody of magistrates appointed by law for the purpose with a view to making suits at law affecting any question of property capable of easy and most assured determination.

Next, the founder must see that his city is placed as nearly as possible at the center of the territory, after selecting a site possessed of the other favorable conditions for his purpose—it will not be difficult to discover or to state them. Then he must divide his city into twelve parts, but first he should establish and enclose a sanctuary of Hestia, Zeus, and Athena—which he will call the citadel—from which he will draw his twelve divisions of the city and its whole territory. Equality of the twelve regions should be secured by making those of good soil small and those of worse soil larger. He should then make a division into five thousand and forty allotments. Each of these, again, should be bisected and two half sections, a nearer and a remoter, paired together to form an allotment, one which is contiguous to the city with one on the border, one in the next

degree of proximity to the city with one next most nearly on the border, and so on in all cases. We should further practice in these half sections the already-mentioned contrivance relative to the poverty or excellence of the soil and effect an equalization by the greater or less size of the divisions. Of course, the legislator must also divide the population into twelve sections, constructing these sections so as to be as nearly as possible on an equality in respect of their other property, of the whole of which he will have made a careful record. Next he will be at pains to assign the twelve divisions to twelve gods, naming each section after the god to whom it has been allotted and consecrated, and calling it a tribe. Further, the twelve segments of the city must be made on the same lines as the division of the territory in general, and each citizen must have two houses, one nearer the center of the state and the other nearer the border. And this shall complete the business of settlement.

But here is a consideration on which we must be careful to reflect. All the arrangements we have just proposed are never likely to find just such conditions that the whole program will be completely executed. The conditions suppose a population with no disrelish for such social regulations, who will tolerate lifelong fixed limitation of property, restrictions such as those we have proposed on procreation, and deprivation of gold and other things which it is certain, from what has been said already, that the legislator will prohibit. They presuppose further the central position of the capital, and the distribution of the dwelling houses over the territory, as he has prescribed, almost as though he were telling his dreams or fashioning a city and its inhabitants out of waxwork. To be sure, the scheme does not sound amiss, but its author needs to give it his reconsideration to the following effect. So our legislator gives us once more the ensuing admonition.

Do not imagine, my friends, that I am less alive than yourselves to a certain truth in what you urge in your present discourse. But the fact is that I take it to be always the most equitable course in dealing with a plan for the future that he who exhibits the model on which an undertaking should be fashioned should abate nothing of perfect excellence and absolute truth, while one who finds it impossible to compass some point of this perfection should decline to put it into practice, and contrive the realization of the remaining possibility which approximates most nearly to what ought to be done and is most akin to it in character. But he should allow the legislator to perfect the delineation of his heart's desire; only when that has been done should he begin to discuss with him which of his legislative proposals are expedient and which involve difficulties. For self-consistency, you know, must be aimed at in everything, even by the artificer of the paltriest object, if he is to be of any account.

Our immediate concern, now that we have resolved on the division into twelve parts, must be precisely to see in what conspicuous fashion these twelve parts, admitting, as they do, such a multitude of further divisions, with the subsequent groups which arise from them, down to the five thousand and forty individuals—this will give us our brotherhoods, wards, and parishes, as well as our divisions of battle and columns of route, not to mention our currency and measures of capacity, dry and liquid and of weight—to see, I say, how all these details must be legally determined so as to fit in and harmonize with each other. There is a further fear we must dismiss, apprehension of a possible reputation for finicking pedantry if the law enacts that no utensil whatever in the possession of a citizen shall be of other than the standard size. The legislator must take it as a general principle that there is a universal usefulness in the

subdivisions and complications of numbers, whether these complications are exhibited in pure numbers, in lengths and depths, or again in musical notes and motions, whether of rectilinear ascent and descent or of revolution. All must be kept in view by the legislator in his injunction to all citizens, never, so far as they can help it, to rest short of this numerical standardization. For alike in domestic and public life and in all the arts and crafts there is no other single branch of education which has the same potent efficacy as the theory of numbers, but its greatest recommendation is that it rouses the naturally drowsy and dull, and makes him quick, retentive, and shrewd—a miraculous improvement of cultivation upon his native parts. So all these branches of study will be found fair and becoming, if only by further laws and institutions you expel illiberality and commercialism from the souls of those who are to pursue them thoroughly to their profit; otherwise you will be surprised to find that you have produced not a philosopher but a regular knave—an effect already produced, as we can see, in the case of Egyptians, Phoenicians, and many other races, by the illiberality of their other pursuits and of their opulence, whether the result may have been due to the defects of their legislator, to incidental misfortune, or possibly to some other natural circumstance of such a tendency.

In fact, Megillus and Clinias, there is a further consideration we must not ignore. Some localities have a more marked tendency than others to produce better or worse men, and we are not to legislate in the face of the facts. Some, I conceive, owe their propitious or ill-omened character to variations in winds and sunshine, others to their waters, and yet others to the products of the soil, which not only provide the body with better or worse sustenance, but equally affect the mind for good or bad. Most markedly conspicuous of all, again, will be localities which are the

homes of some supernatural influence, or the haunts of spirits who give a gracious or ungracious reception to successive bodies of settlers. A sagacious legislator will give these facts all consideration a man can, and do his best to adapt his legislation to them. So you, too, Clinias, must of course do the same. As the intending colonizer of a district you must give your first attention to such points.

Clinias/ Admirably said, sir. I must certainly do as you recommend.

Book 6.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, now, your next business, after all that has now been dealt with, will presumably be to constitute the magistracies in your society.

Clinias/ Why, of course it will.

Athenian Stranger/ There are really two branches of social organization implied here. First there are the creation of offices and the appointment of the persons who are to fill them, the determination of the proper number of such posts and the proper manner of appointing to them. Then, when this has been done, comes the assignment of the laws to the several offices, the decision which laws, how many, and of what type it is proper for each magistracy to administer. But before we make our election, we may pause a little while to lay down a principle of some relevance to the occasion.

Clinias/ And what may this principle be?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, it is this. Anyone may surely see that, while legislation is a great achievement, if a well-equipped state gives its excellent laws into the charge of unqualified officials, not merely does no good come of all their excellence, and not only does the state become a general laughingstock, but such societies are pretty sure to find their laws a source of the gravest detriment and mischief.

Clinias/ Yes, surely.

Athenian Stranger/ Why then, my friend, we must note the presence of this danger in the case of the society you are now contemplating, and its constitution. You see, no doubt, how necessary it is first that men who are to be rightly advanced to posts of power should, in every case, have been thoroughly put to the proof, themselves and their families, from earliest boyhood to the time of their election, and next that those who are to elect them should have been well

trained by a schooling in law-abiding habits for the work of selecting with right approval, and rejecting with proper disapprobation, candidates who deserve either fate. But in this case how can men who have but recently come together and are unfamiliar with one another, and devoid of education into the bargain, be expected to choose their magistrates in an irreproachable fashion?

Clinias/ Indeed, ‘tis hardly possible.

Athenian Stranger/ Still, when you are once in the ring, as they say, the time for excuses is past, and that is the case just now with you, and with me too. You with your nine colleagues, as I understand, have pledged yourselves to the Cretan people to throw your souls into the work of the foundation, and I, on my side, am pledged to help you with our present fanciful tale. And, to be sure, since I am telling a tale, I should not like to leave it without its head; it would look monstrous ugly if it roamed at large in that condition.

Clinias/ Very true, sir.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, and besides, I mean to do my best for you.

Clinias/ Then, with all my heart, let us do as we say.

Athenian Stranger/ So we will, with God's permission, if we can get the better of our years so far.

Clinias/ We may fairly count on God's permission.

Athenian Stranger/ To be sure we may. So with his help, let us make a further point.

Clinias/ What point is that?

Athenian Stranger/ What a spirited adventure our present experiment in founding a state will prove.

Clinias/ Of what are you thinking in that remark, and why in particular do you make it?

Athenian Stranger/ Of the lighthearted temerity with which we are legislating for the inexperienced in the hope that they will end by accepting our proposed enactments. Yet this much must be reasonably clear, Clinias, even to the not specially discerning, that no body of men will accept them readily from the first, but only if we could contrive to wait until those who have been given a taste of them in their boyhood, grown up under them, and become thoroughly at home with them come to play their part in choosing the whole body of public officials. But, mark you, this point once compassed, supposing there is any plan or device by which it can be truly secured, I believe a society so schooled would have an assured guarantee of survival well beyond that interval.

Clinias/ That sounds reasonable enough.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, let us consider whether some such measure as this would be sufficient for our purpose. What I maintain, Clinias, is that it is the duty of you Cnossians, before all other Cretans, not merely to treat the soil you are now settling with all religious care, but to give unflagging attention to the appointment of the original officials by the surest and best method possible. In general, this will be a comparatively light task, but it is indispensably necessary that we should begin by taking the utmost pains with the selection of curators of the laws.

Clinias/ Well, what measure or plan have we in contemplation for this?

Athenian Stranger/ I will tell you. Sons of Crete, I declare it the Cnossians' duty, in view of their leading position among your numerous cities, to join with the new arrivals in your settlement to elect a body of thirty-seven men in all from both sections, nineteen from the new arrivals and the rest from Cnossus itself. This body the Cnossians should

present to your city, including yourself as a citizen of the colony and one of the eighteen, either with their free consent or by a modest measure of compulsion.

Clinias/ But pray, sir, why have you not proposed a share in our citizenship for yourself and Megillus as well?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, Clinias, Athens is a proud state and so is Sparta, and both are far away, but you have every proper qualification, as have also your fellow founders. What has just been said about you is equally applicable to them. So much, then, for the most satisfactory procedure in our present circumstances. In course of time, if the constitution has survived, let the board be appointed by some such process as this. All shall have a voice in the election of these magistrates who bear arms in the cavalry or infantry and have served in the field as long as their age permitted. The election shall be held in the sanctuary regarded as most venerable by the state. Each voter shall deposit on the altar a tablet inscribed with the name of his nominee, his father, his tribe, and the ward to which he belongs, and subscribe his own name with the same particulars. Anyone who pleases shall be permitted to remove any voting tablet to the contents of which he has an objection and expose it in the market place within not less than thirty days. The names found to head the poll, to the number of three hundred, shall then be exhibited by the authorities to the view of the whole community, and every citizen shall again vote for any of them he pleases, the officials once more publishing the hundred names which stand first. On the third occasion anyone who pleases is to vote for any name he pleases of the hundred, passing between sacrificial victims; the seven-and-thirty who receive most votes shall be submitted to a scrutiny and appointed to the magistracy by the officials.

Who, then, Megillus and Clinias, are to institute all these regulations in our state about official posts and the scrutiny

for them? We can see, I suppose, that there must be such persons in a society which is just beginning to get under way, but who they can be before there are any magistrates is a problem. Have them we must, by hook or crook, and they must be no common fellows either, but men of the highest parts. For, as the adage runs, 'Well begun is half done,' and we all commend a fair beginning of anything, though the beginning is, in my own opinion, more than half the work, and a fair beginning has never yet been commended to its full merits.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then as we are agreed on the point we must not pass it over in silence without making clear to ourselves how it should be set about. Though, for my own part, I am ready with no more than one observation which is needful and salutary at this juncture.

Clinias/ And what is that?

Athenian Stranger/ That the city we are about to found has, as I may say, neither father nor mother, other than the society which is founding it. Not that I forget that plenty of such foundations have often enough been, and will hereafter be, at variance with their founders. But as things stand at present, it is as it is with a child; even if he is someday to have his differences with his parents, yet while the helplessness of childhood lasts, he is attached to them and they to him; he is always running to his family and finds his only allies among his own relatives. Now I say the same connection is to be found all ready to our purpose between the Cnossians and our new state—thanks to their care for it—and between it and Cnossus. So I maintain, as I have already maintained—a sound thought is not spoiled by repetition—that the Cnossians must join in taking charge of all this business. They should co-opt not less than a

hundred of the newly arrived colonists, selecting the most aged and best men they can, and there should be another hundred from Cnossus itself. These latter, as I say, must come to our new city and take their share in providing for the lawful appointment of officials and the scrutiny following on appointment. When this business has been done, the Cnossians should keep themselves to Cnossus, and the new state should be left to preserve itself and prosper by its own endeavors. To proceed, let those who belong to the thirty-seven, now and for all time to come, be taken to be appointed for the following purposes. They are to be curators in the first place of the laws, and in the next of the records in which every citizen has made his return to the officials of the amount of his property, with the exception of four minas for those of the highest assessment, three for the second, two for the third, and one for the lowest. If anyone is detected in possession of anything further in excess of the returns, let the whole of such sum be forfeited to the public, and let it further be open to anyone who will to pursue him on a charge that is neither creditable nor of comely name, but infamous for him who is convicted of contemning law for gain. Let him who will, that is, lay an indictment for infamous gain and prosecute the case before the curators in person. If the defendant lose the case, he shall have no share in the ‘common good,' and in any distribution from the public funds, he shall go without his part, except for his allotment; his conviction shall also be recorded, for his lifetime, in a place where it may be read by all who will. No curator shall hold office for more than twenty years, or be elected to his office at an age earlier than fifty; if he is sixty at the time of appointment he shall hold office no longer than ten years, and conformably to this rule, when a man's life is prolonged beyond seventy, he must in no case expect to hold office on this important board.

As to the curators of the laws, then, let us take it that they are charged with these three duties. Each fresh statute, as legislation proceeds, will lay on them such further duties as they should undertake beyond those now specified. For the present we may turn to the appointment of the rest of our officials in order. We must next, of course, choose generals of the forces, and their military assistants, as we may call them, hipparchs and phylarchs, as well as divisional commanders of the tribal infantry, whom we may very conveniently designate by that very title, taxiarchs; it is, in fact, the name commonly given them. As to these posts, there shall be a first nomination of generals, taken solely from among our citizens, by the curators of the laws, and a selection from the nominees by all who have borne arms at the proper age, or are actually bearing them on the occasion. Should anyone, however, judge a person whose name has not been included a better candidate than one of the nominees, he shall name his man, as well as the person in whose place he proposes him, take an oath to that effect, and put him forward as a rival candidate; whichever of the two shall be approved by show of hands shall then be placed on the select list. The three who receive most votes shall be appointed generals and controllers of military affairs, after passing the same scrutiny as the curators of laws. The generals so elected shall make their own preliminary nomination of taxiarchs to the number of twelve, one for each tribe; the procedure as to counter-nomination, voting, and final scrutiny shall be for taxiarchs the same as for generals. This assembly shall for the present—as neither council nor prytanes have been appointed—be convoked by the curators in the holiest and most spacious area available, the full-armed infantry and the cavalry occupying distinct stations, and all who rank after them in the forces forming a third group. Generals and hipparchs shall be chosen by a

vote of the whole body, taxiarchs by a vote of all the infantry, and their phylarchs by a vote of all the cavalry. The generals must appoint their own commanders of light-armed troops, archers, or other divisions of the forces. Thus it only remains to arrange for the appointment of hipparchs. Accordingly, the preliminary nomination in their case shall be made by the same authority which nominates in the case of generals, and the selection and counter-nomination shall proceed as in the case of generals. The cavalry shall give its vote in the presence of the infantry, and the two candidates who receive most votes shall be commanders in chief of the whole mounted force. There may be two challenges of the vote; if it is challenged a third time, those whose business it was to deal with the several returns shall put the issue to a vote among themselves.

There shall be a council of thirty dozen—three hundred and sixty will be a convenient number for our subdivisions—and this whole number shall be divided into four groups of ninety, ninety councilors being elected from each property class. First there shall be a vote compulsory upon all citizens for representatives of the highest property class, abstention being visited with a fine prescribed by law. When the voting is over, the names shall be duly recorded, and representatives of the second class voted for on the following day with the same procedure as before. On the third day representatives of the third class shall be chosen by a vote open to all citizens, but compulsory on those of the three first classes, the fourth and lowest class being exempt from fine in the case of abstention from the voting. On the fourth day representatives of this lowest fourth class shall be chosen by a vote of all, but there shall be no penalty for members of the third and fourth classes who may choose to abstain, whereas members of the second and first classes who decline to vote shall be fined, a member of the second

class thrice and a member of the first four times the amount of the previous fine. On the fifth day, the authorities shall exhibit the names already recorded to public view, and there shall be a selection from them in which every citizen shall once more vote, or else pay a fine to the original amount. A hundred and eighty names shall thus be selected from each class; half of them shall be taken by lot and submitted to their scrutiny, and these shall form the council for the year. Conducted in this way, the election will strike a mean between monarchy and democracy, as a constitutional system always should.

There can never be friendship between the slave and his owner, nor between the base and the noble when equal honors are bestowed on both; indeed, equal treatment of the unequal ends in inequality when not qualified by due proportion; it is these two conditions, in fact, which are the fertile sources of civil discord. It is an old saying, and as true as old, that equality gives birth to friendship; that maxim is most sound and admirable. But 'tis none too clear what sort of equality it is that has these effects, and the ambiguity makes havoc with us. There are, in fact, two equalities under one name, but, for the most part, with contrary results. The one equality, that of number, weight, and measure, any society and any legislator can readily secure in the award of distinctions, by simply regulating their distribution by the lot, but the true and best equality is hardly so patent to every vision. 'Tis the very award of Zeus. Limited as is its scope in human life, wherever it has scope, in public affairs or private, it works nothing but blessings. For it assigns more to the greater and less to the lesser, adapting its gifts to the real character of either. In this matter of honors, in particular, it deals proportionately with either party, ever awarding a greater share to those of greater worth, and to their opposites in trained goodness such share as is fit. For

we shall in truth find that this sheer justice is always also the statesmanlike policy. It is this, Clinias, at which we must aim, this equality on which we must fix our gaze, in the establishment of our nascent city. And if others would found other such societies, they should shape their legislation with a view to the same end—not to the interest of a handful of dictators or a single dictator, or the predominance of a populace, but always to justice, the justice we explained to be a true and real equality, meted out to various unequals. And yet, after all, a society as a whole will also have to apply these standards with some qualification, if it is to escape dissensions somewhere among its constituent parts. Equity and indulgence, you know, are always infractions of the strict rule of absolute and perfect justice—which is, in fact, the reason why we must introduce some use of the equality of the lot to avoid disaffection among the masses, though when men do so they should breathe a prayer to God and good luck to direct even the fall of the lot to the justest issue. So you see that while we cannot help availing ourselves of both sorts of equality, we should make the most sparing use we can of one of them, that which appeals to luck.

Such, my friends, must be the conduct of a society which means to survive, for the reasons we have given. Now, just as a ship at sea must have a perpetual watch set, day and night, so also a state, tossed, as it is, on the billows of interstate affairs and in peril of being trapped by plots of every sort. Magistrate must therefore follow magistrate in steady sequence from day to night and night to day, sentinel make over to and take over from sentinel in unbroken succession. No large body will ever be able to discharge these tasks with dispatch; no, we must perforce leave the most part of the councilors for most of the time to stay at home and administer their local business, appointing a twelfth part of them for each of the twelve months of the year to

serve as guardians who will give prompt audience to all corners, from abroad or from our citizens themselves, with reports to make or questions to put about matters in which it concerns a state to reply to other states or receive their replies to its own inquiries, and will, before all things, see to it in view of the frequent internal innovations of all kinds which so commonly occur, that, if possible, no such incidents arise, or, if they do, that the state may be quick to perceive and repair the mischief. For all these reasons the power of convoking and dissolving all meetings of the citizen body, ordinary and stated, or extraordinary and occasional, must lie with this presidential board. The twelfth part of the council, then, will take order for all these functions, and will be relieved of them for eleven months of the year, but a twelfth part of that body must be perpetually associated with our other officials in maintaining this watch over the state.

This, then, will be a reasonable way of ordering matters within the city. But what of the general superintendence and regulation of the territory at large? Now that our city and territory as wholes have both been divided into twelve sections, must we not designate superintendents of the city streets, of buildings, private and public, of harbors, of the market, of springs, and not least, of consecrated precincts, sanctuaries, and the like?

Clinias/ To be sure we must.

Athenian Stranger/ So we may say that there will have to be sacristans, priests, priestesses, for the sanctuaries. For streets and buildings and the maintenance of proper order in them, for human beings—to avoid infringement of rights—for lower animals—to secure decent civil conditions within the city walls and in the suburbs—we shall have to appoint officials of three kinds, of whom we may call those who are concerned with the matters just specified ‘city commissioners,' and those who have the control of the

market, ‘commissioners of the market.' As to priests of either sex for the sanctuaries, any whose dignity is hereditary must be left undisturbed, but if—as may well be the case in such matters in a first settlement—few or none are so provided, priests of either sex should be instituted, where they are not already instituted, to act as sacristans for the gods. In all these appointments we use should be made partly of election, partly of the lot; in each urban and rural district we must effect a friendly combination of the popular element with the nonpopular element in the way which will make for fullest concord. As far as priesthoods are concerned, then, we must allow God to effect his own good pleasure by just leaving appointments to the inspired decision of the lot, but every man on whom the lot may fall must be subjected to a scrutiny, first as to his freedom from blemishes and legitimate birth, next as to his provenance from houses pure of all pollution, and the cleanness of his own life, and likewise of those of his father and mother from blood-guiltiness and all such offenses against religion. Religious law universally should be fetched from Delphi, and this must be adhered to, official exponents of it being first appointed. Each priesthood should be tenable for a year and no longer; the man who is to celebrate worship in accord with our sacred law should be of the age of not less than sixty; the same regulations shall apply to priests of the other sex. As for the exponents, groups of four tribes are thrice to elect four persons, one from each of themselves; when they have held the scrutiny on the three who obtain most votes, they must send the nine to Delphi for the oracle to nominate one from each three—the rules for the scrutiny and age on appointment to be the same as for priests. The election to a vacancy shall be made by the group of four tribes in which the vacancy occurs. As concerns treasures of the sacred funds and precincts of the various sanctuaries and

controllers of their produce and rents, three persons shall be appointed from the highest property class for the largest sanctuaries, two for those of medium size, and one for the smallest—the procedure in their election and scrutiny to be the same as in that of the generals. Thus much, then, for the regulation of religion.

Nothing, if we can help it, shall be left unguarded. As for the city, guard shall be kept over it thus. It shall be the concern of generals, taxiarchs, hipparchs, phylarchs, and prytanes as well as of the commissioners of city and market, when once we have them duly elected and instituted. Watch shall be kept over all the rest of our territory in the following manner. As our territory as a whole has been divided into twelve nearly equal districts, one tribe shall be annually assigned by lot to each district and shall provide five 'rural commissioners and captains of the watch,' as we may style them; it shall be the business of each of the five to select from his own tribe twelve of the younger men, who must be twenty-five years of age or over, but not over thirty. The territorial districts shall be assigned to these groups in rotation by lot, each for a month of the year, to ensure personal experience and knowledge of the whole territory on the part of every member. These guards and their commanders shall hold their respective posts for a term of two years. From the position, or district, originally determined by the lot they shall be regularly conducted by the captains of the watch, at monthly intervals, to the next in order clock-wise, clockwise being deemed to be in the sense from west to east. On the expiry of the first year of service, to familiarize as many of the guards as possible, not merely with the state of the country at one single season of the year, but with the course of the seasons in all districts, they shall be conducted by the officers then in command through the successive districts in the reverse order—

counterclockwise—until the expiry of their second year. For the following year there must be a fresh election of rural commissioners and captains of watch, the five superintendents of twelves. Their functions while on duty in the various stations shall be these. First, they must provide for the most effectual blocking of the territory against an enemy by the construction of all necessary dikes and trenches, and the erection of fortifications as a check on any would-be despoilers of territory or cattle. For these purposes they may employ the draft animals and household servants of the various districts, who shall act as their instruments and be under their orders, though they should do their best to avoid requisitioning them in their own busy seasons. In a word, they are to do their utmost to make the whole country inaccessible to an enemy and easily accessible to friends, whether human beings, beasts of burden, or cattle; it shall be their charge to make all the roads as comfortable as possible, and to ensure that the flow of rain water from the highlands into the hollow valleys between the hills does good rather than harm to the countryside by regulating its discharge by dams and trenches, so that as the valleys receive or absorb the rainfall, they may supply all the lower-lying farms and localities with watercourses and springs, and furnish even the driest localities with an abundance of excellent water. Spring waters, whether rivers or fountains, they are to adorn and beautify by plantations and buildings; they shall secure a copious supply by collecting their streams in hewn watercourses. If there is any consecrated grove or precinct in the vicinity they shall enhance its charm by making conduits which convey their waters at all seasons into the very sanctuaries. In all such places our young men should construct exercising grounds for themselves and their seniors, furnished with warm baths for the service of the latter and supplied with plenty of dry seasoned fuel; here

they shall provide a friendly home for the treatment of invalids and persons worn with the labors of husbandry—a treatment much more profitable than a poorly qualified physician.

Work of this and similar kinds will be both useful and ornamental to a district and will also afford charming recreation. The serious duties of the office shall be as follows. Each group of sixty shall protect its district, not merely against enemies, but against professed friends. If a wrong is done to neighbor or fellow citizen by any person, bond or free, the case shall come for trial before the five commanders, who shall act alone in petty cases, and in more serious cases of complaint, where the sum involved is one not exceeding three minas, in concert with the twelves. No judge shall try a case, and no official shall discharge an office, without liability to an audit, except those who, like monarchs, pronounce a final decision. In the case of our rural commissioners in particular, if they oppress those who are under their care, by imposing unfair burdens, by attempts to requisition any of their farm stock without their consent, by reception of presents intended to purchase their good graces, or finally by unjust distributions, they shall be branded with public disgrace for their yielding to corruption; for all further wrong to the inhabitants of a district, where the value involved is one mina or less, they shall submit to a voluntary trial before the villagers and neighbors. If they decline to do so in any case of a major or even a minor charge, in the hope that their constant monthly migration to a fresh district will prove a sufficient defense against the prosecution, the complainant in such a case shall take proceedings in the public courts; if he gains the case, he shall exact a double penalty from the absconder who has declined to submit himself to a voluntary judgment. The daily course of life of the commanders and rural commission

during their two years of office shall be as follows. In the first place, there shall be in each district a public mess at which all shall take their meals together. If a man absent himself from mess for a single day, or sleep out of bounds for a single night, except at the command of his officers or from some sudden and absolute necessity, provided the five report the case and post him in the market place as a deserter from his watch, he shall suffer disgrace as a traitor to his duty to his country, and be subject to chastisement by stripes, for which there shall be no redress, at the hands of any who meet him and care to inflict it. Should one of the five commanders themselves act in the same way on his own authority, it shall be a matter for the attention of the whole sixty, and any of them who may observe the fact or be informed of it without taking action shall fall under the provisions of the same laws and be penalized more severely than the younger men; he shall be deemed disqualified for holding any post of authority over his juniors. The curators of the law shall exercise an exact inquisition into such cases, with a view to their complete prevention, or failing that to the imposition of a merited punishment. It must be strictly binding on all to believe that no man what-so-ever will prove a creditable master until he has first been a servant, and that less pride should be taken in successful ruling than in loyal service—service, in the first place, of the laws—since to serve them is to serve heaven—and after the laws, of a young man's honorably distinguished seniors. In the next place, a member of our rural police must have partaken through his two-years' service of the mean and meager daily rations. In fact, immediately after their selection, the twelves shall come together with their five commanders and resolve that, like the servants they are, they shall have no further servants, or slaves of their own, nor yet apply to farmers and villagers at large, and use their servants to minister to their own private

requirements, but only upon public employments. In other matters they shall make up their minds to a life of personal exertion in which they shall be their own employers and attendants. They shall further carry out a thorough exploration of the whole country under arms, both summer and winter, with a view to complete familiarity with its topography, as well as to its defense, since such universally diffused and exact acquaintance with their own country may be presumed to be as important a study as they can have. Hence they should practice coursing and other forms of hunting while they are in their prime, quite as much for this reason as for the combined pleasure and benefit which commonly attends such exercises. The men and their profession, then, may be known by any name one likes, scouts, or rural commission, or another, but the calling must be followed with might and main by any man who is minded to be a competent defender of his native city.

The next step in our selection of officials will be concerned with the appointment of commissioners for the market and the city. To our sixty rural commissioners will correspond three commissioners for the city. These shall divide the twelve urban districts into three regions, and, like the former board, have charge of the roads—the streets of the town itself, and the several highways leading from the country to the capital—as well as of the conformity of all the buildings erected with the legal regulations. In particular, they must take care that the water supply, which the rural police shall transmit and deliver to them in proper condition, shall reach the reservoirs in due plenty and purity, and so serve the ends of beauty no less than of utility. Hence they must be men at once of capacity and of leisure for public affairs. Accordingly, any citizen may propose for the office any name he pleases from the highest property class; when the names have been put to the vote and reduced to the six who receive

the most numerous suffrages, the officer charged with that function shall select three by lot; these, when they have passed their scrutiny, shall hold the office under the regulations made for them.

There shall next be a selection of five commissioners of the market, to be taken from the first and second property classes. The procedure in this case shall be in general the same as for the urban commissioners; of the ten who receive most votes, they shall take five by lot and, on their passing their scrutiny, proclaim them appointed. In every case, every elector shall cast his vote; any who declines shall, if his conduct is brought to the cognizance of the authorities, be fined fifty drachmas, and in addition be declared a bad citizen. Attendance at the assembly, or public convention, shall be open to any citizen, and compulsory on a member of the first or second property class, under a fine of ten drachmas if detected in absenting himself from these gatherings. For the third and fourth classes, there shall be no compulsion, and their members may escape the penalty, except in the case of a notification by authority that all are to attend for some urgent cause. The commissioners, then, shall superintend the orderly conduct of the market in conformity with legal regulations, and be charged with the prevention of injury to sanctuaries and fountains in its precincts; in the case of such injury they shall punish the offender, if a slave or an alien, by whipping or imprisonment. If the author of such disorders is a citizen, they shall be competent to fine the offender up to one hundred drachmas on their own sole authority or to double the sum when acting in conjunction with the urban commissioners. The urban commissioners shall have the same power of fine and chastisement in their own department; they may impose a fine of a mina on their own authority, or of two, when they act with the commissioners of the market.

It will next be in place to create authorities in music and physical training, in either case two sets, to have charge respectively of education and of competitions. By officers of education the law understands superintendents of gymnasiums and schools in charge of their seemly maintenance as well as of the education given and the connected supervision of attendances and accommodation for children of both sexes. By officers for competitions it understands judges of performers contending in both musical and athletic competitions, and of these there should, once more, be two sorts, the one for music and the other for athletics. In athletics it will be proper to have the same officials as judges of both men and horses, but in music to have one set of judges for solo performances—e.g., those of reciters, harpists, flutists, and the like—and a second and different set for choral singing. So we should, I take it, begin by selecting our authority for the play of our choirs of children, men, and maids as exhibited in the dance and the whole system of the musician's art. One such authority will be sufficient for them, who must be not under the age of forty years. One official of not less than thirty years of age will also be sufficient for the soloists, to enter the performers and pronounce a competent decision between competitors. The actual president or controller of the choirs should be appointed in the following way. All amateurs of such pursuits must attend the assembly on pain of a fine if they absent themselves—a matter which shall come under the jurisdiction of the curators of the laws—but attendance shall not be compulsory on others against their will. Then an elector must take the name he proposes from the list of experts, and the only point that shall count for inclusion or rejection at the scrutiny shall be the candidate's competence or, on the other side, incompetence in the subject. Of the ten candidates who head the poll, he who wins the lot shall, after

scrutiny, preside over the choirs for the year as the law requires. In precisely the same way the candidate who wins the lot shall preside for the year over competitors who have entered for the solos and concerted pieces, the winner of the lot thus submitting to the decision of the judges. Next we have to appoint from the third and second of our property classes directors of the athletic competitions for horses and human beings; it shall be compulsory on the first three classes to attend this election, but the meanest class shall not be penalized for their absence. The successful candidates shall be those who shall be taken by lot from twenty elected by a previous vote and must also be approved by the suffrage of the scrutinizing body. In appointing to or selection for any office whatsoever, if any names are rejected on scrutiny, others shall be substituted by the same methods and submitted to scrutiny by the same procedure.

There is still one office to he filled in the department under our consideration, that of the supervisor of education, male and female, as a whole. Accordingly, the law will require this post also to be held by a single official who must be a man of not less than fifty years, and the father of a legitimate family, preferably of both sexes, but failing that, of one or the other sex, and nominee and nominator alike must bear in mind that the post is far the most important of the highest offices in the state. For in all growing creatures alike—trees, beasts gentle or savage, humankind—the first sprouts and shootings, if but fair, are most potent to effect the happy consummation of goodness according to kind. Now man we call a gentle creature, but in truth, though he is wont to prove more godlike and gentle than any if he have but the right native endowments and the right schooling, let him be trained insufficiently or amiss, and he will show himself more savage than anything on the face of the earth. Wherefore the legislator must make the training of children

no secondary or subordinate task; since 'tis a first and primary need that their director shall be well chosen, he must do all that in him lies to appoint to the charge of their direction him who is in all points best of all the citizens. Accordingly, all officials, with the exception of the council and its committees, shall repair to the temple of Apollo, where each of them shall give his vote by secret ballot for one of the curators of the laws, whomsoever he judges fittest to control education. He that shall receive most votes shall pass a scrutiny before all hitherto-appointed officers other than the curators themselves and thereafter hold his post for five years; in the sixth, there shall be a fresh appointment to this charge by the same procedure. If a public official die before his term of office be expired, and there be still more than thirty days to run, a substitute shall be appointed in the same manner by the body already duly charged with the election. If an overseer of orphans decease, their resident relatives on both sides down to children of first cousins shall appoint a successor within ten days, or, in default, each such person shall incur a fine of one drachma per diem until the appointment of such guardian have been made. A society, as we know, will soon become no society at all, without duly appointed courts of justice. But a judge who may not make his voice heard, and, like an arbitrator, has no more to say in the preliminary proceedings than the contending parties, will in no case be a sufficient judge of disputed rights, and therefore a good court cannot well be either numerous or small and of poor capacity. It should be clear in every case what the contending claim of either party is, and time and slow and repeated preliminary inquiry conduce to this elucidation of the issues at stake. Hence the challenging parties should first appear before neighbors and friends who are best acquainted with the matters in dispute. If, when all is done, a man cannot get a satisfactory decision

from this body, he shall proceed to another court. If the two courts fail to settle the matter, the judgment of a third shall be final in the case.

In a certain sense the appointment of these courts is also an election of magistrates. In fact, any magistrate is bound also to be a judge in some questions, while a judge, though not actually a magistrate, becomes a magistrate, and one of considerable moment, for the day on which he finally decides a case. Thus we may include the judges among our magistrates and proceed to say who will be suited for the function, with what matters they shall deal, and what their number should be in various cases. The truest court, then, will be that which the various litigants appoint themselves for their own cases by an agreed choice. But for all other cases there shall be two tribunals, one when one private person complains of wrong received from another, and desires to bring him before a court for its decision between them, a second when a citizen believes the public wronged by some other and desires to support the state. And we must explain what and who their members are to be. First of all, we must institute a common court of justice for all private persons whose controversies reach the third hearing, and it shall be constituted thus. On the day before that on which a new year opens with the month following the summer solstice, all magistrates, whether their office be annual or of longer duration, shall assemble in the same temple; then, after an oath sworn in the name of the god, they shall set apart, as a choice offering, if I may say so, one judge from each board of magistrates, viz., the member they judge to have filled his magistracy best and to be likely to decide the cases of his fellow citizens best and most religiously for the ensuing year. When the selection has been made, there shall be a scrutiny by this electing body itself, and if any name be rejected, another shall be chosen in like manner; those who

pass this scrutiny shall act as judges for parties who have declined other jurisdiction, and their suffrages shall be open. Presence as eyewitnesses and auditors of these trials shall be compulsory on the members of council and other officials who appointed the judges, permissive to others who may wish to attend. A person who charges any judge with deliberate wrongful decision in a case shall go before the curators of the laws with his accusation; the judge convicted on such a count shall be liable to make good half the damage to the party who has incurred it; if the case be deemed to call for a graver penalty, the judges who deal with the suit shall specify the further punishment to be inflicted or fine to be paid to the public and the institutor of the prosecution. As to charges of crime against the public, it will be necessary, in the first place, to give the commonalty a voice in the hearing—when the state is wronged all are sufferers, and all would have a just grievance if deprived of a part in such decisions—but while the initial and final stages in such a case should be assigned to the populace, the investigation should take place before three of the highest magistrates, agreed upon by defendant and plaintiff; if the two cannot come to an agreement for themselves, the council shall revise the choice of each party.

As far as possible, too, all citizens should take their part in the private cases, since a man who has no share in the right to sit in judgment on others feels himself to be no real part of the community. Hence there must, of course, be courts for the several tribes with judges appointed by lot, as occasion arises, to give their verdicts uninfluenced by personal appeals, but the final determination in all such suits must be with this court which we claim to have constituted with the utmost freedom from corruptibility possible to human power for the service of those who can

reach no settlement either before their neighbors or in the tribal judicatures.

This matter of courts of justice, then—as I say, it is equally hard to give them the name of magistracies as to refuse it without qualification—has partly now been dealt with in what I may call its outlines, partly left unfinished. In fact, far the best place for a more exact regulation of judicial procedure and classification of actions at law will be found toward the end of our legislation. So we may tell the subject to wait till we come to the end of our work, but the method of appointment to other magistracies has received fairly full regulation. But a full and exact treatment of every single point of civil and political administration cannot be confidently given until our survey has covered the whole ground from start to finish in detail in the natural order. Still you will see that the stage it has now reached with these arrangements for the election of our officials forms a sufficient conclusion of preliminaries and starting point for legislation without further delay or hesitation.

Clinias/ Your treatment of the preliminaries, sir, has been wholly to my mind, and the way in which you have just linked up the beginning of what is still to come with the conclusion of what has gone before pleases me even better.

Athenian Stranger/ Then so far, we may say, our grave game for the aged has been finely played.

Clinias/ What you really mean to call fine, I fancy, is the hard work of active men.

Athenian Stranger/ Possibly, but ask yourself whether you agree with me on a further point.

Clinias/ What is it, and to what does it relate?

Athenian Stranger/ Why you know how the painter's brush never seems to have finished its work on a figure; it seems as though it could go on with endless embellishments

of coloring or relief—or whatever may be the professional name for the process—without ever reaching a point at which the picture admits no further enhancement of beauty or vivacity.

Clinias/ I think I have heard enough about such matters to follow your description, though I have no personal familiarity with these arts.

Athenian Stranger/ And no loss either! Still there is a point which we may use this chance reference to them to illustrate. Suppose it were an artist's intention to paint a figure of great beauty which should moreover be steadily enhanced, not deteriorated, by the lapse of years. You are aware that since the painter is not immortal, either he must leave behind him a successor capable of repairing any damage done to the figure by time, as well as of embellishing it by improving on defects due to the artist's imperfect craftsmanship, or his immense labor have very transitory results?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Well now, and the legislator, has he not a similar intention? He wants first of all to frame his laws with the closest approach to absolute perfection he can compass. Then, as time goes on and he puts his scheme to the test of practice, will any legislator, think you, be thoughtless enough to forget that they must be full of such lacunae which some successor will have to correct, to ensure that the constitution and system of the society he has founded may steadily improve, not deteriorate?

Clinias/ That is the presumable intention of every lawgiver. Of course it must be.

Athenian Stranger/ So if a man found some means of effecting this—found out a method of teaching another by example or precept how to understand, better or worse, the

way to conserve laws and improve them—he would never tire of explaining that method, I conceive, until he achieved success.

Clinias/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, must not I myself and both of you do the same thing now?

Clinias/ Do just what, do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Why since we are about to form a code of law and have appointed curators of it, and those young men by comparison with ourselves, whose sun is setting, we must, as I say, not merely legislate, but at the same time do all we can to make them also legislators as well as curators of law.

Clinias/ By all means, if only we are equal to it.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, we must at least make the attempt and do our best.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ So let this be our language to them. Friends and preservers of law, there will be a host of omissions in the different departments of our present legislation; that simply is not to be helped. Not but what we shall do all we can to sketch the outlines of the more considerable departments as well as of the whole system. But you will have to fill up this outline and must be told what your aim in doing so is to be. Megillus, Clinias, and myself have repeatedly stated it to one another, and are agreed that we stated it well, but we are anxious that you should be our sympathetic disciples, that your aim should be that which we one and all hold should be kept in mind by both curators and authors of law. Our unanimous pronouncement was, in sum, this, that whatever the way which promises to make a member of our citizen body—male or female, young or old—truly excellent in the virtues of soul proper to human

character, be they results of some occupation, some native disposition, some possession, or passion, or conviction, or course of study, that and no other shall be the end, as I say, toward which every nerve shall be strained so long as life endures, and that not a single soul shall be found to prefer aught which hampers these pursuits. In the last event, should there be no choice but to be driven from the state itself before she deigns to crouch under the servile yoke of rule by the base, or to leave her for exile, any such fate must be borne rather than the change to a polity which will breed baser men. This was our concurrent judgment before you. You, in your turn, are now to set both ends before you in your commendation or censure of our laws, to censure such as cannot serve the purpose, accept those that can with cordial good will, and make them the rule of your lives. All other pursuits, which lead to some different so-called good, you must dismiss.

We may open the legislation which is now to follow in some such way as this, with religion as our starting point. We must first return to our number of five thousand and forty and the various convenient subdivisions we find both in this total and in the constituent tribe, which was, you will remember, by assumption one twelfth of the whole, and is thus the exact product of one-and-twenty by twenty. Now our total number permits of division by twelve, and so likewise does that of the tribe; so each such division must be thought of as a sacred thing, a gift of heaven corresponding with the months of the year and the revolution of the universe. This, in fact, is why all communities are under the sway of an instinct which consecrates them, though some authorities perhaps have made a truer division than others, and been more fortunate in the result of the consecration. For our own part, our present point is that we were justified in our preference for

the number, five thousand and forty, as it is divisible by every integer from one to twelve with the exception of eleven, and that can be very readily put right, since one way of mending it is to set two hearths on one side. That the fact is so could be proved in a very few words if we had the leisure. So we may trust in our present task to the traditional belief in question and make this division. Each section will be called by the name of a god or a child of the gods and provided with altars and their furniture, where we shall convoke two sacrificial assemblies per month—twelve for the divisions into tribes, and twelve for the corresponding sections of the town itself. Their first purpose will be to ensure the divine favor and to promote religion, and their second, from our point of view, to encourage mutual intimate acquaintance and social intercourse of all kinds. For it is particularly necessary in view of the contraction of marriages and the connections to which they give rise to do away with our ignorance of the quarter from which a bride is taken, the bride herself, and the family she is entering; the utmost possible care should be taken to prevent any mistakes in such matters. To ensure that grave result, even the sports of our lads and lasses should take the form of dances of both sexes, which will incidentally give them the opportunity, within reason and at an age which affords a colorable justification, of seeing and being seen in undress, so far as sober modesty in all the parties will permit. The superintendence and control of all such matters should be in the hands of our directors of choirs, who should also, in conjunction with the curators of laws, legislate on any points we may omit in our regulations. As I said, in all such cases of multifarious minor details, it is inevitable that the legislator should make omissions for which those who have regular yearly experience of them should learn by practice to provide by regulations and annual amendments until a

sufficient rule for such observances and customs is felt to have been reached. So a moderate but a definite time to allow for the experiment to cover each and all of the details would be a ten-years' cycle of sacrifices and festal dances, within which the various magistracies—acting in concert with the original legislator, if he is still alive, or alone if he has deceased—may report omissions in their several departments to the curators of laws, and attempt amendments until the various regulations are felt to have been brought to perfection; they should then declare them incapable of modification and thereafter enforce them with the rest of the laws originally established by the legislator's imposition. On these statutes they must in no case make any willful innovation, but if they should ever judge themselves under the stress of absolute necessity, they are to consult the advice of all magistrates, the whole popular assembly, and all the oracles, and make such modifications as are approved by all these authorities, but no other changes whatever; the law will require that the noncontents shall always prevail.

Whensoever, then, a man of five-and-twenty or upward, on inspection made and submitted to, is satisfied that he has found in any quarter a congenial and suitable match for the common procreation of children, he shall in all cases marry before he comes to five-and-thirty. But let him first be informed of the right manner of seeking for the suitable and fitting, for, as Clinias says, each law must be introduced by its own preamble.

Clinias/ Thank you, sir, for the allusion. You have taken what I find to be a most appropriate occasion for its introduction.

Athenian Stranger/ You are most kind. This, then, is what we shall say

to the son of a worthy stock. My lad, the match to be made is that which will find favor with men of sense, and their counsel to you will be not to set your heart overmuch on avoidance of a poor match, or pursuit of a wealthy, but rather, when other things are equal, always to enter the bond with a preference for the humbler party. This will, in truth, be to the benefit of both society at large and the contracting houses, for balance and due proportion are out of all comparison more excellent than an unqualified extreme. And he who knows himself over hot of temper and overhasty to act in all he does should connect himself by preference with a quiet family, while he of the contrary bent should look for connections of the contrary kind. And we may lay down one sole rule for all matches. A man should 'court the tie' that is for the city's good, not that which most takes his own fancy. Yet there is a native instinct by which each of us is ever drawn to his own nearest like, and this brings inequalities of manner and moral temper into society at large, these lead by unfailing consequence in most states to effects which we would not have in ours. To make express and formal statutes, indeed, to such effect—to forbid the rich man to marry into a wealthy house, or the capable into a capable, to force the hasty-tempered to seek partners in matrimony among the phlegmatic and the placid among the hasty—would be ridiculous, and would, moreover, rouse general resentment. It is none too easy to see that a state should be like a well-compounded bowl where the wine when poured in is hot to madness, but when corrected by another and a soberer divinity and fairly mated furnishes us a healthful and modest draught. I say no man, or hardly any, has the wit to discern that it is even so with the blending of offspring. And this is why we are driven to let the matter alone in our law and do our endeavor to charm the individual man to set an inward equipoise among his offspring above

that equality of condition in wedlock that thirsts so insatiably after riches, and to direct him who is bent upon a wealthy match by reproaches without the compulsion of written enactment.

This, then—as well, of course, as what we said before—shall be our exhortation to wedlock and the duty of man to cleave to everlastingness by ever leaving children and children's children after him to serve God in his room. All this, and still more, might be said in a proper preamble on the obligation to matrimony. But should there be any who refuses willing obedience, but keeps himself apart and unfellowed in the city, and so comes to five-and-thirty unwedded, he shall pay a yearly fine of a hundred drachmas if he belong to the wealthiest class, of seventy if to the second, of sixty for the third, and thirty for the fourth, and this fine shall be dedicate to Hera. He that defaults in his yearly payment shall be indebted in ten times the amount. Payment shall be enforced by the treasurer of that goddess, who shall be liable himself to the debt in case of nonexaction, and all shall be bound to render account of such matters at the audits. This shall be the pecuniary penalty of refusal to marry. As to marks of honor from his juniors, the offender shall receive none, and no junior, if he can help it, shall show him any deference whatsoever. If he presume to chastise any of them, all shall come to the support and defense of the injured party, and any person present who fails in this shall be legally proclaimed both a dastard and a traitor.

With dowries we have already dealt, but may say once more that there is every reasonable presumption that the poor will reach old age when neither he that takes a wife nor he who gives her is straitened in means, for in our society all citizens are assured of the necessaries of life; moreover, there will be less of arrogance on the wife's side, and of mean sordid slavery to her moneybags on the husband's. So he

that obeys us will have one good deed to his score; he that disobeys, whether by accepting or by offering more than the worth of fifty drachmas toward the bride's appareling—or of one mina, or half as much again, or in the case of the wealthiest class, twice so much—shall be liable in an equal sum to the public exchequer, and the surplus offered or received shall be sacred to Hera and Zeus. Payment shall be enforced by the treasurers of these deities precisely as we directed its enforcement against celibates by the treasurers of Hera, or in case of nonenforcement, they shall discharge the fine from their own private purses.

The right of valid betrothal shall belong in the first instance to the father, failing him to the grandfather, in default of both to brothers on the father's side; if there are no such kinsmen, it shall pass in like manner to the kindred on the mother's side. Should a case of exceptional destitution arise, the nearest kinsmen, whoever they may be, shall have the right to act in conjunction with the guardians.

Concerning the ceremonies introductory to wedlock and any other holy rites it may be proper to fulfill before, during, or after the nuptials, the citizen should make inquiry of the exponents of religious law, and be satisfied that all is well and truly done if he follows their instructions.

In the matter of the marriage feast, the persons to be bidden to it should be not more than five male or female friends of either family, with the same number of kinsmen and connections of either, and in no case shall the expenditure be disproportionate to the means of the giver—one mina for a person of the wealthiest class, half that sum for one of the second, and thus in proportion as the means of the party diminish. Obedience to the law should receive commendation from all; the disobedient shall be punished by the curators of the laws as a boor with tastes untrained in the strains of the hymeneal Muses. As for drinking to

excess, ‘tis everywhere unseemly, except at a feast of the divine giver of the grape—and dangerous as well—above all, in one whose mind is seriously set on wedlock. Then, if ever, ‘tis meet for bride and bridegroom to be in their sober senses, seeing they are come to so grave a turning on life's road, and must take all care, moreover, that that which is at any moment begetting shall be the work of sober parents, for ‘tis quite unknown what night or day shall—under God—give it its being. Besides all this, the work of kind must never be left to bodies dissolved by revelry; the growing life must be fashioned with all due order, surely, firmly, in quiet. But a man in his cups does but sprawl and fumble all ways at once; his body is as crazy as his mind.

By consequence the drinker is an awkward, bungling sower of his seed, and ‘tis no wonder he commonly begets shambling, shifty creatures with souls as twisted as their bodies. Wherefore a man should the rather be wary all the year-long, and all his life through, and more particularly while he is procreating offspring, to forbear, so far as he may, from all action that prejudices health or is touched with wrong or violence—he cannot but imprint its color and impress on the souls and bodies of the unborn and become sire to a sorely degenerate brood—above all, to keep himself clear of such things all that day and night. For in all the affairs of man's life the first step holds the place of God himself and makes all the rest right, if but approached with proper reverence by all concerned.

He that has marriage in mind must think of one of the two homesteads on his own actual lot as a nest and nursery for his chicks, must leave father and mother and hold his nuptials there, and there keep house and home for himself and his children. For in all the kind affections of life the presence of some dash of unfulfilled longing rivets hearts and knits them in one, while unbroken companionship,

when there is none of this longing bred of absence, causes them to drift apart from utter satiety. This is why our young pair should leave mother, father, bride's kindred, to their old abodes, and live like settlers in a colony; they will pay visits to the old home and receive visits from it, beget children and bring them up, and thus hand the torch of life on from one generation to another and perpetuate that service of God which our laws demand.

Next for goods and chattels. Which of them should a man possess if proprietorship is to give him true satisfaction? The more part of such goods are as easy to name as to acquire, but there are difficulties of every kind about servants. Why is this? Because the things we say about them are partly false, partly true; our very language about slaves contradicts our experience of them and confirms it at once.

Megillus/ But pray how are we to take your words? As yet, sir, my friend and I are at a loss for your meaning.

Athenian Stranger/ And not to be wondered at, Megillus. The status of the Helots of Laconia—the controversy as to its merits or demerits—is probably the most puzzling problem of Hellenic life. There may be a similar, though less acute, controversy about the system of slavery under which the Mariandynians are held down at Heraclea, and the position of the serfs of Thessaly. When we take these instances and others like them into account, how shall we set about proprietorship in servants? The point on which I touched in the course of my argument, when you very naturally asked what I had in mind, is simply this. Of course, we are aware that we should all say a man should have the best and most trusty slaves who are to be had. Why, slaves have often enough before now shown themselves far better men in every way than brothers or sons; they have often been the preservation of their masters' persons, property, and whole

family. No doubt you know that such language about slaves is common.

Megillus/ So it is, to be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ And equally common the rival theory that slaves are rotten at heart, and no man of sense should ever put any trust in the whole tribe of them. Nay, the greatest genius among our poets, in speaking of Zeus, makes the explicit declaration that he fixed it certain that whatever day Makes man a slave, takes half his worth away.

So a man takes one or other side in the dispute for himself. Some distrust the whole class and make their servants threefold—nay, a hundredfold—slaves at heart by the scourge and the lash, as though they were dealing with so many wild beasts; others take the very opposite course.

Megillus/ Very true.

Clinias/ Well, then, sir, where there is such utter disagreement, how should we act about this territory of ours? How shall we deal with the right to own and to discipline slaves?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, Clinias, the human animal is a kittle beast, and so, clearly, is not likely to be, or become, readily amenable to the indispensable distinction between real slave and real free man and master, and so this form of property presents a difficulty. The facts of the common and repeated risings in Messenia and the experience of communities where there are great numbers of serfs all speaking the same dialect provide accumulated proof of the evils of the system—not to mention the multifarious depredations and adventures of the corsairs of Italy. When we face all this evidence we may well feel perplexed to know how to treat the whole problem. Indeed I see only two courses left open to us—the one that slaves who are to submit to their condition quietly should neither be all of one

stock, nor, as far as possible, of one speech, the other that we should treat them properly and show them consideration, for their own sake indeed, but still more for ours. And proper treatment of men in that position is to use no violence toward a servant, but to wrong him—if such a thing could be—with even more reluctance than an equal. For it is his dealings with those whom he can easily wrong which reveal a man's genuine unfeigned reverence for right and real abhorrence of wrong. Hence the man whose character and conduct are unsullied with wickedness and wrong in his relations with slaves is, beyond all others, sowing the seed for a harvest of goodness, and we may truthfully say the same of every master, or autocrat, or wielder of any kind of power in his relations with a weaker party. Not, of course, but what we should chastise our slaves when they deserve it, not spoil them by such mere admonition as we should use to free men. Our language to a servant should commonly be that of simple command, and there should be no familiar jesting with servants of either sex, though many masters show great unwisdom in this way in their behavior to their slaves, spoiling them in a fashion which makes life hard at once for the servant who is to obey, and the master who is to command him.

Clinias/ Very rightly said.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, now that we have done our best to provide the citizen with a sufficient number of servants qualified to assist him in his various tasks, I suppose our next step should be to produce a plan of our houses.

Clinias/ Yes, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ In fact, as our city is a new foundation, without any earlier habitations, it will have to give its attention to the whole subject of its architecture in all its details, not forgetting those of the temples and city

walls. This, Clinias, is a subject which properly comes before that of marriage, but as our whole construction is imaginary, the present will be an excellent opportunity to dispose of it. When our scheme takes actual shape, we shall, God willing, deal with domestic architecture first and make our marriage law the crown and completion of our work in this kind. For the present we shall attempt no more than a brief outline.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ The temples, then, should be built all-round the market square, and in fact round the whole city, on elevated sites, with a view at once to security and cleanliness. In their vicinity should be the offices of the magistrates and courts of law, where, as on holy ground, judgment will be received and given, partly because the business itself is so solemn, partly because these are the seats of awful deities, and among them courts of law where cases of murder and other crimes worthy of death may fitly be heard. As for walls, Megillus, I am of the same mind as your own Sparta. I would leave them to slumber peacefully in the earth without waking them, and here are my reasons. As the oft-quoted line of the poet happily words it, a city's walls should be of bronze and iron, not of stone, and we in particular shall cover ourselves with well-merited ridicule, after taking our young men in annual procession to the open country to block an enemy's path by ditches, entrenchments, and actual buildings of various kinds—all, if you please, with the notion of keeping the foe well outside our borders—if we shut ourselves in behind a wall. A wall is, in the first place, far from conducive to the health of town life and, what is more, commonly breeds of certain softness of soul in the townsmen; it invites inhabitants to seek shelter within it and leave the enemy unrepulsed, tempts them to neglect effecting their deliverance by unrelaxing nightly and daily watching, and to fancy they will find a way to real safety

by locking themselves in and going to sleep behind ramparts and bars as though they had been born to shirk toil, and did not know that the true ease must come from it, whereas dishonorable ease and sloth will bring forth toil and trouble, or I am much mistaken. No, if men must have a wall of sorts, they should construct their own dwellings from the outset in such a fashion that the whole town forms one unbroken wall, every dwelling house being rendered readily defensible by the uniformity and regularity with which all face the streets. Such a town, with its resemblance to one great house, would be no unpleasing spectacle, and the ease with which it could be guarded would give it an unqualified advantage over any other in point of security. The preservation of the original buildings will properly be, in the first instance, the business of the occupiers, while the urban commissioners will be charged with the task of superintendence, to the extent of compulsion by fines in the case of neglect, as well as of making general provision for sanitation within the city boundary, and of prohibiting all interference with the plan of the city by buildings or excavations on the part of private persons. They should also be responsible for the proper carrying-off of rain water and any other desirable regulations of housing within or without the city. For these and any other matters of detail which have been omitted in our law from inability to deal with them, the curators shall issue supplementary ordinances, in the light of their practical experience. And now that these buildings and those of the market place, the gymnasiums, schools, theaters, are all ready and waiting—the schools for their pupils, the theaters for their audiences—we may proceed, in the proper legislative order, to what follows upon matrimony.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, Clinias, let us suppose the marriage ceremonies over. On them will follow, before the

birth of children, an interval of not less than a year. How bride and bridegroom in a society which is to be so far above the common level should spend their time—for that is what I meant by 'what follows in the proper order'—is not the easiest of questions. We have had not a few such awkward problems already, but none so unpalatable to the great mass of mankind. Still, I suppose, Clinias, what we really believe to be right and true must be said at all costs.

Clinias/ Of course it must.

Athenian Stranger/ If a man proposes to give a society laws for the conduct of public and communal life, and yet imagines that law is superfluous when it comes to compulsion in private affairs, that it is improper to submit everything to regulation and that the individual should be left free to spend the day just as he pleases—if he leaves personal conduct exempt from legal control and yet flatters himself that his citizens will be ready to guide their communal and public action by law—he is seriously mistaken. Why do I say this? Because I am going to insist that our newly married men shall frequent the public tables neither more nor less than they did in the years before marriage. That institution aroused surprise when it made its first appearance in your countries, at the dictation, as I presume, of a war or some situation equally urgent for a small population in a desperate extremity, but when you have tried the experiment and been driven to avail yourselves of these public messes, the practice was pronounced to be highly conducive to security. That in fact is the way in which the public table became one of your institutions.

Clinias/ In all probability it is.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, here is the point. Though there were once persons who found the practice singular, and its

imposition dangerous, a legislator who should wish to enjoin it would have no such difficulty today. But it has a natural consequence, at present adopted nowhere, though its adoption offers every prospect of success, which all but drives a legislator to ‘card his wool into the fire,' as the saying is, and waste his labor in a host of other such ways, and this consequence is no light one either to propose or to put into effect.

Clinias/ And pray, sir, what is this point you are apparently so reluctant to explain?

Athenian Stranger/ To avoid long and useless discourse on the subject, let me have your attention. Wherever due order and law are found in the life of a society, their fruits are blessings, but neglect of regulation or misregulation more often than not undoes the work of sound regulation in other directions. And this is just where our present argument comes to a halt. In fact, my friends, your public table for men is an admirable institution, miraculously originated, as I was saying, by a truly providential necessity, but it is a grave error in your law that the position of women has been left unregulated, and that no vestige of this same institution of the common table is to be seen in their case. No, the very half of the race which is generally predisposed by its weakness to undue secrecy and craft—the female sex—has been left to its disorders by the mistaken concession of the legislator. Through negligence of the sex you have then allowed many things to get out of hand which might be far better ordered than they are if only they had come under the laws. Woman—left without chastening restraint—is not, as you might fancy, merely half the problem; nay, she is a two-fold and more than a twofold problem, in proportion as her native disposition is inferior to man's. Hence it would be better from the point of view of the good of the state, to submit this matter to revision and

correction and devise a set of institutions for both sexes alike. As things are, mankind are unhappily so far from such a consummation that it is impossible for a prudent man so much as to mention the proposal in other territories or societies, where the very existence of the public table as a recognized institution of society is unknown. So how is the actual attempt to compel women to take their meat and drink in public to escape derision? There is nothing about which a sex so accustomed to the life of the shady corner would make more difficulties; try to force a woman out into the daylight and she will offer a furious resistance far too powerful for the legislator. As I was saying, in other societies the sex will not so much as suffer the right rule to be named without a storm of outcries, though perhaps in our own they might. So if you desire our discussion of politics at large to attain its ends—so far as theory goes—I am ready to defend my proposal as sound and becoming, provided you would both like to hear my arguments; otherwise we may let the subject drop.

Clinias/ Sir, I assure you, we are both singularly in favor of hearing you.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, then, so you shall. But you must not be surprised if you find me going a fair way back for my starting point. You know we have plenty of time on our hands, and there is no pressing business to keep us from examining our subject, law, on all its sides.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ Good, then, let us revert to the position we began with. Any man, indeed, should be perfectly aware of one thing. Either the human race never had a beginning at all, any more than it will ever have an end, but always was and always will be, or else the time

which has elapsed since its beginning must have covered immeasurable ages.

Clinias/ No doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well, then, can we suppose there have not been, all over the world, all manner of risings and fallings of states, all kinds of institutions, orderly and disorderly, as well as every sort of taste in meat and drink, and multifarious climatic revolutions which presumably lead to many modifications of living organisms?

Clinias/ No, of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, we believe, do we not, that there was once a time when the vine made its first appearance, and that the same is true of the olive and the gifts of Demeter and the Virgin [Persephone], and that Triptolemus, or someone, was the instrument in the change? So we must suppose, must we not, that before the existence of these supplies, animals had recourse, as they have today, to feeding upon one another?

Clinias/ No doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ Besides, we remark the persistence of human sacrifice to this day in many quarters. while it is reported, on the other hand, of other peoples that they shrank from tasting even the flesh of oxen, and offered no animals in sacrifice; they honored their gods with cakes and meal soaked in honey and other such 'pure' sacrifices, but abstained from flesh, counting it criminal to eat it, or to pollute the altars of the gods with blood. Man's life in those days conformed to the rule known as Orphic, universal insistence on vegetarianism, and entire abstention from all that is animal.

Clinias/ 'Tis the widely current and highly credible tradition.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, I may of course be asked the question, What is your point in mentioning all this just now?

Clinias/ That, sir, is a well-founded apprehension.

Athenian Stranger/ And so, Clinias, I will try, if I can, to expound the thought to which these considerations give rise.

Clinias/ Pray proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ I observe that mankind are universally impelled by needs or desires, of three kinds, and that this impulsion results in virtue if men are well trained, in its contrary if they are ill-trained. Their needs are, in the first place, food and drink, from the hour of their birth. All creatures have the instinctive appetite for gratification in that kind and are furiously defiant of the voice which says that one has any duty except to sate one's craving for pleasures from that source, and to avoid all discomfort of any kind; our third and most imperious need and fiercest passion arises later, but most of all fires men to all manner of frenzies—I mean lust of procreation with its blaze of wanton appetite. These three unwholesome appetites, then, we must divert from the so-called pleasant toward the good; we must try to check them by the three supreme sanctions—fear, law, true discourse—not without the aid of the Muses and the gods of games, and so to quench their growth and onrush.

Thus we may make the procreation of children follow on our regulations of marriages, and on their procreation, their nurture, and education. As our discourse proceeds on these lines, our several laws may possibly reach their completion, as in the former instance when we had reached the subject of a common table—whether, after all, women should be admitted to share the institution, or it should be kept exclusively for men, we shall perhaps see more clearly when we view it at close quarters—we shall reduce the necessary

preliminaries, for which we have as yet given no regulations to order and shelter ourselves behind them. Thus, as I was just saying, we shall get a more precise view of these preliminaries themselves, besides being more likely to fit them with appropriate and becoming legislation.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us keep the points just referred to well before our memory, as we shall probably have to refer to them all.

Clinias/ But exactly what are the points you would have us remember?

Athenian Stranger/ Those which we made in our three clauses; we spoke, you may recollect, of meat, then of drink, and thirdly, of the excitements of sex.

Clinias/ Why, sir, I take it we shall be sure to remember what you are now impressing on us.

Athenian Stranger/ Well and good. So let us proceed to our regulations for the wedded pair, with the object of instructing them how and in what fashion they should set about procreation, or, if they should prove disobedient, appealing to the menace of law.

Clinias/ In what manner?

Athenian Stranger/ Bride and bridegroom should make it their purpose to present the city with the best and finest progeny they may. Now whenever you have human beings conjoined in any action, when the parties give their minds to themselves and what they are doing, the results of their work are every way fair and good, but entirely contrary if they have no mind or apply it not to their work. So let a bridegroom give his mind to his bride and his work of procreation—and the same with the bride—and most of all while children have not yet been born to them. The mother shall be under the surveillance of the women we have appointed—their number

to be more or fewer and the time of their election to be determined as the magistrates shall see fit to ordain—who shall assemble daily for not less than the third part of an hour at the temple of Ilithyia. At these assemblies each member shall report to the board any person, male or female, among the procreants, whom she sees to be paying regard to aught else than the injunctions imposed amid the sacrifices and rites of matrimony. This period of procreation and supervision of procreants shall last ten years and no longer, in cases of plentiful issue; if a pair are without progeny at the end of the period they shall, in consultation with their kinsmen and the official board of women, arrange terms of separation with a view to the interest of both parties. If there should be any dispute as to what is seemly or advantageous to either party, they shall choose ten of the curators of the laws, and be bound by this selection of arbitrators and their decisions. The ladies are to have entrance to the households of the young people, and are to stay them from their sinful folly, partly by admonition, partly by threats; if they fail they shall appear before the curators with their report, and the curators shall prevent the offense. If their action, too, proves unavailing, they shall bring the matter before the public, posting the offender's name with a sworn declaration of their ‘failure to reform the herein designated.' A man so a posted—except in the case of his successful prosecution of the authors of the notification before a court of law—shall be subject to the following disabilities. He shall be excluded from both weddings and birthday feasts, or, if he shows himself there, anyone who pleases may inflict a beating on him with impunity. The same law shall extend to the case of a female offender; if posted for similar disorders and unsuccessful in her action at law, she shall be excluded from the women's processions and honorable distinctions, and forbidden to attend

weddings and children's birthday parties. When they have once produced their children as the law requires, a man who has dealings in this kind with a woman not his wife, or a woman who has to do with a man not her husband, shall, if the other party be still among the procreants, incur the same penalties which have been prescribed for those who are still producing offspring. Outside this limit he or she that is continent in the matter shall be held in all esteem, he that is of the other sort in the contrary repute, or rather disrepute. While the more part show reasonable moderation in such things, the law will be silent on the topic, and leave it alone, but if there are disorders, regulations must be put in force as aforesaid, in accord with the laws but now prescribed.

A man's first year is the opening of his whole life; it should be registered with that title—'beginning of life'—in the shrines of the kindred. There must also be, for each boy or girl in every phratry, a further record on a whitened wall bearing the number of the magistrates after whom dates are reckoned; in the vicinity there must be a record of such members of the phratry as are alive at each date, the names of those who decease being expunged. For a girl the limiting age for marriage—the longest period specified—shall be from sixteen to twenty, and for a male from thirty to thirty-five. That for official appointments shall be forty for a woman, thirty for a man. For military service the term, in the case of a man, shall be from the age of twenty to that of sixty, for a woman—whatever military employments it may be thought right to impose on women—after she has borne her children, what it is possible and fit to enact in such cases, up to the age of fifty.

Book 7.

Athenian Stranger/ Now that we have our boys and girls born, the proper course will naturally be to deal with their nurture and education; this subject cannot possibly be passed over in silence, but our treatment will wear the guise rather of instruction and admonition than of legal enactment. The privacy of home life screens from the general observation many little incidents, too readily occasioned by a child's pains, pleasures, and passions, which are not in keeping with a legislator's recommendations, and tend to bring a medley of incongruities into the characters of our citizens. Now this is an evil for the public as a whole, for while the frequency and triviality of such faults make it both improper and undignified to penalize them by law, they are a real danger to such law as we do impose, since the habit of transgression is learned from repetition of these petty misdeeds. Hence, though we are at a loss to legislate on such points, silence about them is also impossible. But I must try to illuminate my meaning by the production of what I may call samples; at present my remarks must seem something of a riddle.

Clinias/ You are quite right there.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, now, I suppose we may take this much as truly said. The right system of nurture must be that which can be shown to produce the highest possible perfection and excellence of body and soul.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And perfection of the children's bodies, I conceive, means—to put it at the simplest—that they must grow straight from their earliest days.

Clinias/ Why, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And further, is it not a fact of observation that in all living things growth is most

conspicuous and rapid in its initial sproutings—so much so, indeed, that many have contended that the stature reached by a human being in its first five years is not doubled by the increment due to the following twenty?

Clinias/ Surely.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, when a body is subjected to vast augmentation of bulk without a counterbalancing abundance of appropriate forms of exercise, the consequences are disastrous in all sorts of ways. That, I think, is a known fact.

Clinias/ Indeed it is.

Athenian Stranger/ And so the period when the body is receiving its principal increment from nutrition is also the period when it demands the maximum of exercise.

Clinias/ What, sir? Are we actually to impose the maximum of exercise on infants and newborn babies?

Athenian Stranger/ Not precisely that. We must impose it at a still earlier stage while the child is being nursed in its mother's womb.

Clinias/ What, my dear sir! On the embryo? You cannot mean that!

Athenian Stranger/ Indeed I do, though I am not surprised you should be unaware of the proper regimen for the case. 'Tis a singular one, but I could wish to expound it for you.

Clinias/ By all means do so.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, the point would be more readily understood by my own countrymen, thanks to the undue devotion of some of them to sport. Among us, in fact, children, and some who are no longer children, too, are in the habit of rearing young birds for the purpose of cockfighting. Now they are very far from thinking the

performances in which they train these animals by pitting them against one another adequate discipline for such creatures. Over and above all this, everyone keeps birds somewhere on his person—the smaller ones in the hand, the bigger within his cloak, under the elbow—and takes walks of many furlongs, with an eye not to his own physique but to that of his beasties—a practice which at least indicates to the intelligent observer that all bodies are beneficially braced by every sort of shaking and stirring, whether due to their own movements, to the oscillations of a conveyance or a boat, the trot of a horse, or however the motion of the body may be caused. The frame is thus enabled to cope with its nutriment, solid or liquid, and presents a spectacle of health and beauty, to say nothing of robustness. Now in view of these facts, how, let me ask, shall we proceed to act? Would you have us raise a laugh by express statutes directing the pregnant mother to take constitutionals, to mold her infant, when she has borne it, like so much wax while it is still plastic, and to keep it swaddled for its first two years? And what of the nurse? Shall we compel her under legal penalties to be incessantly carrying her charges to the country, the public temples, the homes of their relatives, until they are strong enough to stand on their own feet, and ever later to persist in carrying a child about until it has completed its third year, for fear the limbs may be distorted in infancy if too much weight is thrown upon them? Shall we enact that our nurses must be the most robust we can get, and that there must be more than one for each infant, and crown our work by prescribing a penalty for the offender in case of neglect of any of these various directions? Surely not. It would be to lay ourselves open to more than enough of the consequences I have mentioned.

Clinias/ What consequences?

Athenian Stranger/ Why the ridicule we should be sure to incur. Not to add that our nurses will have the minds of women, and slave-women at that, and be none too ready to obey.

Clinias/ Then, pray, why have we thought it needful to give all these instructions?

Athenian Stranger/ I will tell you why. Because the minds of our masters and free citizens may probably be led by hearing them to recognize the truth that while the right regulation of the private households within a society is neglected, it is idle to expect the foundations of public law to be secure. A citizen who understands this will be likely to regard the directions we are now giving as so many laws for his own conduct, and, so regarding them, to be happy in his administration alike of his own household and of his city.

Clinias/ I believe there is much truth in what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Consequently, we are not to suppose that we have done with this sort of legislation until we have given a full account of the training of the infant's mind on the same lines as those with which we began our remarks about its body.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ We may take it then as the A B C of the matter in both cases that it is universally beneficial for infants, particularly very young infants, to have the process of bodily and mental nursing continued without intermission, all day and all night long. If it were only possible, it would be desirable for them to spend all their time, so to say, at sea, and as it is, we should come as near that ideal as we can with the newborn baby. We may learn the same lesson from the following facts. The truth and utility of our principles has been learned from experience by children's nurses, and the female healers of Corybantic

troubles. You know, when mothers want to put fractious babies to sleep, the remedy they exhibit is not stillness, but its very opposite, movement—they regularly rock the infants in their arms—and not silence, but a tune of some kind; in fact they, so to say, put a spell on their babies just as the priestess does on the distracted in the Dionysiac treatment, by this combination of the movements of dance and song.

Clinias/ And pray, sir, what explanation are we to give of these facts?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, the explanation is not far to seek.

Clinias/ But what is it?

Athenian Stranger/ Both disturbances are forms of fright, and fright is due to some morbid condition of soul. Hence, when such disorders are treated by rocking movement the external motion thus exhibited dominates the internal, which is the source of the fright or frenzy. By its domination it produces a mental sense of calm and relief from the preceding distressing agitation of the heart, and thus effects a welcome result in both cases, the induction of sleep in the one, in the other—that of patients who are made to dance to the flute in the ritual of the deities to whom sacrifice is done on these occasions—the substitution of sanity for their temporary state of distraction. This, though a brief and summary, is a plausible account of the matter.

Clinias/ Indeed, most plausible.

Athenian Stranger/ That these methods have such effects should lead us to recognize that a mind subjected from its early days to such frights will be all the more likely to contract a habit of fearfulness; now everyone will admit that this is tantamount to a training not in courage, but in timidity.

Clinias/ Surely.

Athenian Stranger/ Whereas it will be granted that the contrary course, that of mastering our frights and alarms as they arise, is a life-long discipline in courage.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Why then, here, we may say, is one important element in virtue of soul to which this exercising of infants by movement is contributory.

Clinias/ Yes, certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Furthermore. the encouragement of placidity of temper will play a prominent part in the development of moral excellence, and that of a fretful temper in that of vice.

Clinias/ Unquestionably.

Athenian Stranger/ So we must try to explain the way by which either may be induced in the newborn child at pleasure, so far as the means of effecting such results lie in our power.

Clinias/ To be sure we must.

Athenian Stranger/ Then—to state the conviction which I share—while spoiling of children makes their tempers fretful, peevish, and easily upset by mere trifles, the contrary treatment, the severe and unqualified tyranny which makes its victims spiritless, servile, and sullen, renders them unfit for the intercourse of domestic and civic life.

Clinias/ But pray how should the authority of the state be brought to bear on the nurture of creatures who as yet cannot understand human speech, and are wholly incapable of education.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, much in this fashion I believe. Newborn creatures, especially newborn human beings, have from the very first a way of screaming. and the human infant in particular is given not only to screaming but to tears.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So when the nurse would discover its desires she guesses from these indications what to offer it; if the child is quiet when something is offered it, she thinks she has found the right thing, but the wrong if it cries and screams. Thus, you see, the baby's likes and dislikes are disclosed by these ominous signals, its tears and screams; this holds good for a period of no less than three years, no inconsiderable part of one's life to be spent ill or well.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now a man of peevish and melancholy temper will be given to self-pity and commonly more prone to complaining than a good man should be. I take it you will both admit this?

Clinias/ I certainly shall.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, if we employ all our ingenuity to keep our growing child all through these three years from the experience of distress. alarms, and, so far as possible, pain itself, the growing soul is all this time being rendered more cheerful and gracious. Do you not think so?

Clinias/ Not a doubt of it, sir—above all, if we provide it with plenty of pleasures.

Athenian Stranger/ My dear sir! That is just where Clinias and I must part. The course you propose to us is the most mischievous we could possibly take, because the mischief is systematically introduced at the starting point of the process of growth. Let us see whether I am not right.

Clinias/ Pray unfold your meaning.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, I mean that the point now at issue between you and me is of no light consequence. So you must consider it too, Megillus, and help us to a decision. My own contention is that the right road in life is neither pursuit of pleasure nor yet unqualified avoidance of pain, but that

contentment with the intermediate condition to which I have just given the name of graciousness—a state which we all, on the strength of an oracular saying, plausibly assign to God himself. It is this habit of mind, I maintain, which must likewise be pursued by the man who would be like God; he must not fling himself headlong into the quest for pleasures, or forget that he, too, will have his share of pains, nor yet must we let him suffer such behavior in another, man or woman, old or young, and least of all, so far as he can help it, in the newly born, for that is the age at which it is most strictly true that character is made by habit. Why, if I did not apprehend I should be taken to be jesting, I would go still further. I would enjoin that special watch should be kept over our pregnant women during the year of their pregnancy to guard the expectant mother against the experience of frequent and violent pleasures—or pains either—and ensure her cultivation of a gracious, bright, and serene spirit.

Clinias/ You need not, sir, put it to Megillus which of us has more of the truth on his side. Frankly and freely I make the admission that all of us must avoid a life of untempered pain or pleasure, and steer a middle course in everything. Here is the proper answer to your very proper speech.

Athenian Stranger/ And an admirably true one, Clinias. Then let us, all three, turn our thoughts to a further point.

Clinias/ Which is?

Athenian Stranger/ That all we are now discussing is nothing other than what mankind at large call the unwritten law; it is the whole body of such regulations, and nothing else, to which they give the name, law of our forefathers. Further, we were quite right in the conviction borne in on us by our recent talk that such traditions should neither be designated laws nor left unformulated. They are the mortises of a constitution, the connecting links between all the

enactments already reduced to writing, and preserved by it, and those yet to be recorded, a true corpus of ancestral and primitive tradition which, rightly instituted and duly followed in practice, will serve as a sure shield for all the statutes hitherto committed to writing, while if they once swerve from the right bounds, it is as when a builder's supports give and subside under his edifice. The result is a general collapse of one part upon another, substructure and all that has been so admirably built upon it alike, when once the original supports have fallen. We must keep this in mind, Clinias, and do all we can to rivet your city together, while it is still in its inception, with no avoidable omission, major or minor, of anything that may be called law, custom, or usage; all are the rivets of society, and the one sort will not be permanent without the other. Thus we must not be surprised if the bulk of our legislation should be somewhat swelled by a torrent of numerous and—supposedly—petty traditional practices and customs.

Clinias/ To be sure you are right, and we will not forget the caution.

Athenian Stranger/ Then until the age of three has been reached by boy or girl, scrupulous and unperfunctory obedience to the instructions just given will be of the first advantage to our infantile charges. At the stage reached by the age of three, and the after ages of four, five, six, play will be necessary, and we must relax our coddling and inflict punishments—though not such as are degrading—as we were saying in the case of slaves that we should neither inflame the culprit by brutal punishments nor spoil a servant by leaving him uncorrected, so we must adopt the same course with the freeborn. And for their play, there are games which nature herself suggests at that age; children readily invent these for themselves when left in one another's company. All children of the specified age, that of three to

six, should first be collected at the local sanctuary—all the children of each village being thus assembled at the same place. Further, the nurses are to have an eye to the decorum or indecorum of their behavior; as for that of the nurses themselves and the whole group, it must be subjected, in each case, for the year to the control of one of the already-mentioned matrons to be assigned by the curators of the laws. These matrons are to be elected, one for each tribe, by the ladies charged with the supervision of marriages, and must be of the same age with them. It will be the official duty of a person so appointed to pay a daily visit to the sanctuary, and to chastise any offender—if a slave or alien of either sex, by the hand of some public menial, if a citizen who disputes the justice of the correction, she shall bring him before the court of the urban commissioners, but where there is no dispute, she shall punish even a citizen on her own authority. When the age of six has been passed by either sex, there shall henceforth be a separation of the sexes—boys now being made to associate with boys, and girls with girls—and it shall be time for both to turn to their lessons, the boys being sent to instructors in riding, archery, the management of the dart and sling—the girls may share in the instruction if they please—but, above all, in the use of spear and shield. To be sure, the prevalent notion about these matters rests on an all but universal misunderstanding.

Clinias/ What notion?

Athenian Stranger/ The belief that there is a real and natural difference in the serviceability of either hand for various actions, though, in fact, where the feet and lower limbs are concerned, there is no such difference in capacity to be detected; it is only the folly of nurses and mothers to which we owe it that we are all, so to say, lame of one hand. Nature, in fact, makes the members on both sides broadly correspondent; we have introduced the difference between

them for ourselves by our improper habits. No doubt in actions of no particular importance the practice is immaterial—as for example, that the player should hold his lyre in the left hand and his plectrum in the right, and the like—but to make these cases, without any necessity, precedents for others, is fairly foolish. This is illustrated by the practice of the Scythians, who do not confine the left hand to the drawing back of the bow and the right to the stringing of the arrow, but employ both alike for both purposes, and there are many other examples from the driving of chariots and other sources which may teach us how unnatural are the devices by which it is contrived to make a man's left weaker than his right. Now, as I said, this is no great matter when one is concerned with a plectrum of horn, or some similar implement, but it makes all the difference when one comes to deal with the iron implements of warfare, bows and arrows, javelins, and the rest, and most of all when spear and shield must be plied against shield and spear. And there is all the difference in the world between one who has learned his lesson, and one who has not, one who is well trained, and one who is not trained at all. A man who has practiced the pancratium, or boxing, or wrestling to perfection does not find himself incapable of fighting with his left; he does not halt or make ungainly lunges if his opponent drives him to shift his position and bring that side of his body into play. Well, I take it, it should similarly be expected as the proper thing, in swordplay and all other cases, that a man who has two sets of members for defense and attack should leave neither set unpracticed or untaught, so far as he can help it. Why, if a man should be born with the physique of a Geryon, or a Briareus, if you like, he ought to be able to throw a dart with every one of his hundred hands. All this must be the care of officers of both sexes, the women undertaking the superintendence of the games and meals,

the men being responsible for the instruction, so that all our boys and girls may grow up ambicrural and ambidextrous, their native endowments suffering no preventable distortion through acquired habit.

Their instruction may be said to fall, for practical purposes, under two heads, physical culture, which is concerned with the body, and music, which aims at mental excellence. Physical culture, again, has two branches, dancing and wrestling. One department of dancing is the presentation of works of poetical inspiration with the care for the preservation of dignity and decorum; the other, which aims at physical fitness, nobility, and beauty, ensures an appropriate flexure and tension in the actual bodily limbs and members, and endows them all with a grace of movement which is incidentally extended to every form of the dance and pervades all intimately. To come to wrestling, the devices introduced into their systems by Antaeus or Cercyon—or again into boxing by Epeus or Amycus—from mere idle vainglory, are useless in encounters in the field and unworthy of celebration. But anything which comes under ‘stand-up wrestling,' exercises in the disengaging of neck, arms, and ribs which can be practiced with spirit and gallant bearing to the benefit of strength and health, is serviceable for all occasions and may not be neglected. When we come to the appropriate place in our code we shall make it an injunction to our pupils and their prospective teachers alike that all such knowledge shall be generously imparted on the one side and gratefully received on the other. Nor again, must we neglect the presentation of appropriate choric action, the armored sports sacred in this island to the Curetes and at Lacedaemon to the heavenly twins. The virgin queen of my own country, too, I may remark, who delights in this choric pastime, deemed it wrong to disport herself with empty hands, and right to perform her dance in all the

splendor of full battle array. It will certainly be most proper that our boys and girls should copy these models in courting the favor of the goddess, both for their usefulness in war and for the embellishment of our festivals. Moreover, it will be obligatory on the boys, from the very first until they reach the age of liability to service in the field, to be equipped with arms and horses in every festal procession with which they honor a god; their litanies to gods and sons of gods shall always be accompanied by a march or dance, quick or slow. Besides, their matches and practices for matches must have the same objects and no others. Such competitions, in fact, are, in war and in peacetime, beneficial alike to the community and the individual household, whereas other physical exercises, playful or serious, are not for freeborn men.

I have now fairly described such a course of physical training as I said at first we should have to examine; the entire scheme is now before you. If either of you can propose a better, it is for you to lay it before us.

Clinias/ Nay, sir, if we reject these proposals, it will be hard to devise a better plan of physical training and athletic contests.

Athenian Stranger/ As for the subject which naturally comes next, the gifts of Apollo and the Muses, we thought at first that we had said all there is to be said, and had only the treatment of bodily training still left on our hands, but now it is plain both what must be said of it to everyone, and that these things should be said to them before anything else.

Clinias/ Aye, to be sure they should.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I will ask you to give me your attention. It is true you have done so once already; still, speaker and hearer alike are called on to show the greatest caution in dealing with a startling paradox, above all in the

present case. I feel some misgivings in advancing the thesis I shall lay before you; still, I will take heart as best I may not to flinch from it.

Clinias/ And what is your thesis, sir?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, as to this matter of children's games I maintain that our communities are sunk in a universal ignorance; it is not seen that they have a decisive influence on the permanence or impermanence of a legislation once enacted. Where there is prescription on this point, where it is ensured that the same children shall always play the same games in one and the same way, and get their pleasure from the same playthings, the regulations in more serious matters too are free to remain undisturbed, but where there is change and innovation in the former, incessant variation of all sorts and perpetual fluctuation in the children's tastes; where they have no fixed and settled standard of what is pretty or the reverse in their own bearing and movements, or in the pattern of their toys, where the inventor and introducer of an innovation in pattern, color, or the like is always held in particular esteem—how truly may we say society can suffer from no worse pest. Such a man is constantly changing the young folks' character behind your back; he teaches them to despise the old-fashioned and worship novelty. Once more I say, there can be no graver danger to any society than such language and such notions. Pray let me explain how serious this evil is.

Clinias/ You mean the evil of public dissatisfaction with the ancient fashions?

Athenian Stranger/ That and nothing else.

Clinias/ Why, we of all men are least likely to turn a deaf ear to that plea. We shall listen in the most friendly spirit.

Athenian Stranger/ So I should anticipate.

Clinias/ Speak on, then.

Athenian Stranger/ Come, then, let us rise above ourselves, as listeners or speakers, as we plead the case thus. Change—except when it is change from what is bad—is always, we shall find, highly perilous, whether it be change of seasons, of prevailing winds, of bodily regimen, of mental habit, or, in a word, change of anything whatever without exception, except in the case I have just mentioned, change from bad. Thus, if we consider our body and the way it can familiarize itself with any kind of food or drink or exertion—how, though they may upset it at first, in time their very use leads to the formation of flesh akin to themselves, and so the body is reconciled to its scheme of regimen, grows familiar and at home with it, and enjoys a life of pleasure and health; how, if it should be compelled to change again to some approved regimen, the man is at first upset by disorders and only recovers slowly as he once more becomes familiarized with his diet—why, we can but suppose the same thing takes place with men's understandings and souls. When men have been brought up under any system of laws and that system has, by some happy providence, persisted unchanged for long ages, so that no one remembers or has ever heard of a time when things were otherwise than as they are, the whole soul is filled with reverence and afraid to make any innovation on what was once established. A lawgiver, then, must contrive one device or another to secure this advantage for his community, and here is my own suggestion toward the discovery. They all suppose, as we were saying, that innovation in children's play is itself a piece of play and nothing more, not, as it is in fact, a source of most serious and grievous harm; hence they make no attempt to avert such changes, but compliantly fall in with them. They never reflect that these boys who introduce innovations into their games must inevitably grow to be men of a different stamp from the boys of an earlier time, that the change in

themselves leads to the quest for a different manner of life, and this to a craving for different institutions and laws, and thus none of them is apprehensive of the imminent consequence, of which we just spoke as the worst misfortune for a community. A change in other respects, in mere external forms, would, of course, do less mischief, but frequent modifications of moral approbation and disapprobation are of all changes the gravest and need to be most anxiously guarded against.

Clinias/ Yes, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, are we, or are we not, still of the same mind as before, when we said that rhythms and music generally are a reproduction expressing the moods of better and worse men?

Clinias/ Our conviction on the point remains exactly what it was.

Athenian Stranger/ Every means, then, shall we say, must be employed to keep our children from the desire to reproduce different models in dance or song, as well as to prevent a possible tempter from offering them the inducement of a variety of delights?

Clinias/ Perfectly true.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, can any of us find a better device for this purpose than that employed in Egypt?

Clinias/ And what is that?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, the plan is to consecrate all our dances and all our tunes. First, the festivals must be fixed by compiling an annual calendar to show what feasts are to be celebrated, at what dates, and in honor of what deities, sons of deities, or spirits, respectively. Next, certain authorities must determine what hymn is to be sung on the feast of each divinity, and by what dances the ceremony of the day is to be graced. When this has been determined, the

whole citizen body must do public sacrifice to the Destinies and the entire pantheon at large, and consecrate each hymn to its respective god or other patron by solemn libation. If any man tries to introduce hymn or dance into the worship of any deity in contravention of these canons, the priests of either sex, acting in conjunction with the curators of law, shall have the warrant both of religion and law in excluding him from the festival; if the excluded party declines to submit to this excommunication, he shall for life be liable to indictment for impiety at the instance of any who cares to institute proceedings.

Clinias/ And rightly so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, now we are upon this subject, we must be careful to act as becomes us.

Clinias/ What have you in mind?

Athenian Stranger/ When a young man—not to say an elderly man—has seen or heard something out of the common and quite unfamiliar, he will not be likely to rush on a solution of the puzzle all in a moment. He is more likely to stop short, as a man, traveling alone or in company, who has come to a crossroad and is none too sure of his way, will stop and question himself or his companions about his difficulty, and refuse to take a step farther until he has formed a pretty definite opinion whither the road is leading. Now that is exactly what we should do at this point. The point of jurisprudence which has now arisen is a singular one, and we are bound, of course, to investigate it thoroughly; men of our years must not lightly insist that we can offhand make a confident pronouncement about it.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So we will take our time over the question, and only decide it after searching investigation. Still, we do not wish the completion of the regulations which

belong to our legislation on the topic before us to be interrupted to no good purpose, and so we will go on with them to the end. Perhaps, indeed, by the kindness of providence, when the complete recital reaches its end, it will incidentally provide the answer to our present problem.

Clinias/ A good suggestion, sir. Let us act on it.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, let us, I say, take the paradox as granted. Our songs have become canons, as the men of earlier times seem to have given some such name to melodies for the harp—thus perhaps they too were not altogether strangers to the idea. Someone presumably divined the truth in his dreams, or possibly in a vision of waking life. In fine, let us assume a clause on the subject to the following effect. No man shall contravene the public standards of song, ritual, or choric performance of the young at large, whether by vocal utterance or by movement in the dance, any more than he would any other of our canons. Conformity shall be clear of the law; nonconformity shall be visited with penalties by curators of law and priests of either sex as before enjoined. May we now take this point as settled?

Clinias/ We may.

Athenian Stranger/ Then what sort of legal rules can a man lay down on such matters without exposing himself to sheer derision? Here is a further point it will be relevant to consider. Our safest course will be to begin by imagining a few typical cases, and as one such case I propose the following. Suppose sacrifice has been offered and the victims burned as law directs, when some worshiper—a son or a brother—in the immediate presence of the altar and the offering upon it, breaks out into downright blasphemy. The utterance, may we not say, will fill his father and the rest of

the group of kinsmen with dismay, forebodings, and gloomy apprehensions?

Clinias/ To be sure it will.

Athenian Stranger/ Now that is precisely what happens in pretty nearly all societies in our own world. A magistrate has just offered sacrifice in the name of the public when a choir, or rather a number of choirs, turn up, plant themselves not at a remote distance from the altar, but, often enough, in actual contact with it, and drown the solemn ceremony with sheer blasphemy, harrowing the feelings of their audience with their language, rhythms, and lugubrious strains, and the choir which is most successful in plunging the city which has just offered sacrifice into sudden tears is adjudged the victor. Surely our vote will be cast against such a practice. If there is really any need for our citizens to listen to such doleful strains on some day which stands accursed in the calendar, surely it would be more proper that a hired set of performers should be imported from abroad for the occasion to render them, like the hired minstrels who escort funerals with Carian music. The arrangement, I take it, would be equally in place in performances of the sort we are discussing, and I may add—to dismiss the topic as briefly as may be—that the appropriate costume for these dirges would not be garlands and cloth of gold, but the very opposite. The only question I want us to ask ourselves once more is whether we are satisfied that our first typical rule for hymnody should be—

Clinias/ Should be what?

Athenian Stranger/ That of auspiciousness of language. Indeed, may we lay it down that our hymnody must be wholly auspicious in every particular? Or perhaps I need not repeat the question, but may simply impose the rule.

Clinias/ Out of doubt, you may do so; the proposal is carried by a unanimous vote.

Athenian Stranger/ Then what shall our second regulation be? That there must always be a prayer to the gods to whom sacrifice is being done?

Clinias/ Obviously.

Athenian Stranger/ And a third, I take it, must be that our poets must understand that a prayer is a request made to a god, and should therefore be scrupulously careful not inadvertently to ask for a curse in mistake for a blessing. To offer such a petition, you know, would be a ridiculous proceeding.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we satisfied ourselves, I believe, a little while ago that wealth of silver or gold must have neither sanctuary nor abode in our city.

Clinias/ To be sure we did.

Athenian Stranger/ Now what principle, we may ask, did that statement illustrate? Was not the implication that poets are not quite the most competent judges of good and evil? Hence a poet who goes wrong in language or melody on this point—that of praying for the wrong thing—will of course lead our citizens to transgress our regulations in their prayers for things of supreme moment, though, as we just said, it would be hard to find a more serious error. Shall we then add another typical regulation about music to this effect?

Clinias/ But to what effect? We should be glad of a clearer statement.

Athenian Stranger/ No poet shall compose anything in contravention of the public standards of law and right, honor and good, nor shall he be at liberty to display any composition to any private citizen whatsoever until he has

first submitted it to the appointed censors of such matters and the curators of law, and obtained their approval. These censors we have to all intents appointed by our election of legislators for music and a superintendent of education. Well then—to repeat the question—shall this be taken as our third example of a typical regulation, or what do you say?

Clinias/ Why, of course it shall.

Athenian Stranger/ This matter once determined, the gods may be properly addressed in hymns and strains of mingled praise and petition; under them, spirits and heroes may similarly receive the prayers and praises appropriate to them.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And next, we may now proceed straightaway, without any occasion for scruples, to the following regulation. Such citizens as have brought to an end a life of honorable and arduous physical or mental achievements and obedience to law shall be deemed fitting recipients for our praises.

Clinias/ Why, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ As for those still living, it is perilous to award the honor of praises and hymns until the whole course of life has been crowned by a glorious end. All these distinctions shall be awarded alike to persons of either sex who have been illustrious for their goodness. The regulations for the songs and dances should be determined in the following way. The music of earlier times is rich in fine old poems, and similarly also in dances for the body, from which we shall be perfectly free to select whatever is appropriate and suitable for the society we are instituting. The selection should be made by appointing a number of triers of not less than fifty years of age; old poems pronounced satisfactory shall be accepted, while any that are judged to be defective,

or wholly unsuitable, shall in the one case be simply rejected, in the other, revised and corrected, with the aid of advice from experts in poetry and music. While we shall make full use of the poetical gifts of these experts, we shall not, except in a very few cases, trust to their tastes or preferences, but make ourselves interpreters of the legislator's intentions, and construct the whole scheme of dance, song, and choric activity in the closest conformity to their purport. Any unregulated pursuit of music is infinitely improved by being subjected to system, even without any addition of musical sweetmeats; delight is something which can be provided by all styles alike. If a man has from childhood to the age of sobriety and discretion been familiar with austere, classical music, he is repelled by the sound of the opposite kind and pronounces it unmanly; if brought up on music of the popular, cloying kind, he finds its opposite frigid and displeasing. Thus, as I was saying, neither type has any advantage or disadvantage over the other in respect of pleasing or displeasing, and there is the additional consideration that the one regularly makes those who are brought up on it better men, the other worse.

Clinias/ Perfectly true.

Athenian Stranger/ It will further be necessary to make a rough general distinction between two types of songs, those suited for females and those suited for males, and so we shall have to provide both with their appropriate scales and rhythms; it would be a dreadful thing that the whole tune or rhythm of a composition should be out of place, as it will be if our various songs are inappropriately treated in these respects. So we shall further have to legislate on these points, at any rate in general outline. Now it is perfectly possible to make the necessary regulations for both kinds of songs in both respects, but what music should be assigned to females is indicated by the actual natural distinction of

sex, which should therefore be our basis for discrimination. Accordingly, we shall pronounce the majestic and whatever tends to valor masculine, while it will be the tradition of our law and our theory alike that what makes rather for order and purity is peculiarly feminine. So much, then, for our regulations. We must next deal with the imparting of instruction in these subjects—how the teaching in the various departments is to be given, to whom, and at what times. The shipwright, you know, begins his work by laying down the keel of the vessel and indicating her outlines, and I feel myself to be doing the same thing in my attempt to present you with outlines of human lives answering to types of character. I am really laying the keels of the vessels by due consideration of the question by what means or manner of life we shall make our voyage over the sea of time to best purpose. To be sure, man's life is a business which does not deserve to be taken too seriously; yet we cannot help being in earnest with it, and there's the pity. Still, as we are here in this world, no doubt, for us the becoming thing is to show this earnestness in a suitable way. But I may probably be met—and very properly met—here by the question, What on earth do you mean?

Clinias/ You certainly may.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, I mean we should keep our seriousness for serious things, and not waste it on trifles, and that, while God is the real goal of all beneficent serious endeavor, man, as we said before, has been constructed as a toy for God, and this is, in fact, the finest thing about him. All of us, then, men and women alike, must fall in with our role and spend life in making our play as perfect as possible—to the complete inversion of current theory.

Clinias/ Inversion? In what way?

Athenian Stranger/ It is the current fancy that our serious work should be done for the sake of our play; thus it is held that war is serious work which ought to be well discharged for the sake of peace. But the truth is that in war we do not find, and we never shall find, either any real play or any real education worth the name, and these are the things I count supremely serious for such creatures as ourselves. Hence it is peace in which each of us should spend most of his life and spend it best. What, then, is our right course? We should pass our lives in the playing of games—certain games, that is, sacrifice, song, and dance—with the result of ability to gain heaven's grace, and to repel and vanquish an enemy when we have to fight him. What sort of song and dance will effect both results has partly been stated in outline. The path has, so to say, been cut for us, and we should walk in it, in assurance that the poet was right when he said;

Search, for some thoughts, thine own suggesting mind, And others, dictated by heavenly power, Shall rise spontaneous in the needful hour. For naught unprosperous shall thy ways attend, Born with good omens, and with heaven thy friend.

Our nurslings, too, must be of the poet's mind. They must believe that what we have said has been sufficient for its purpose, and that, for the rest, they will be visited by promptings, superhuman and divine, as to their sacrifices and dances, suggestions as to the several gods in whose honor, and the several times at which, they are to play their play, win heaven's favor for it, and so live out their lives as what they really are—puppets in the main, though with some touch of reality about them, too.

Megillus/ I must say, sir, you have but a poor estimate of our race.

Athenian Stranger/ Do not be amazed by that, Megillus. Bear with me. I had God before my mind's eye, and felt myself to be what I have just said. However, if you will have it so, man shall be something not so insignificant but more serious.

To proceed with our subject, we have already arranged for three public schools with attached training grounds within the city, and three training grounds and ample exercising grounds outside it for horses, suitably equipped for the use of the bow and other long-range weapons, where our young people may both learn and practice these accomplishments; or if adequate arrangements have not been already made they must be introduced into our theory and the corresponding code at this point. They shall all be adequately staffed with paid resident and salaried masters in the various subjects, who must be noncitizens, and must give a complete course of instruction alike in the arts of war and in that of music to the boys who attend their classes. A boy is not to attend if his father so desires, but otherwise to be exempted from this education. Education is, if possible, to be, as the phrase goes, compulsory for every mother's son, on the ground that the child is even more the property of the state than of his parents.

And, mind you, my law will apply in all respects to girls as much as to boys; the girls must be trained exactly like the boys. And in stating my doctrine I intend no reservation on any point of horsemanship or physical training, as appropriate for men but not for women. In fact, I give full credit to the tales I have heard of ancient times, and I actually know that at the present day there are untold thousands, one may fairly say, of women living round the Black Sea—Sarmatian women, they are called—on whom not horsemanship only but familiarity with bows and other weapons is enjoined no less than it is on their husbands,

and by whom it is equally cultivated. Besides, here is a consideration I would submit to you. If such results are feasible, then I say the present practice in our own part of the world is the merest folly; it is pure folly that men and women do not unite to follow the same pursuits with all their energies. In fact, almost every one of our cities on our present system, is, and finds itself to be, only the half of what it might be at the same cost in expenditure and trouble. And yet, what an amazing oversight in a legislator!

Clinias/ Why, so it would seem, sir, though a good many of our present proposals are at variance with our customary systems. However, your proposal to let the argument take its course, and not to decide on our verdict until it has reached its end, was most apposite—and in view of it, I feel self-condemned for my present observation. So pray go on with your exposition according to your own mind.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, Clinias, my mind, as I have already said, is that if the feasibility of our proposals had not been sufficiently established by actual facts, there might have been some ground for disputing the theory. As it is, an opponent who refuses our proposal a hearing must surely take a different line. Such tactics will not deter us from insisting on our principle that there must be the completest association of the female sex with the male in education as in everything else. In fact, we may treat the matter from some such standpoint as this. If women are not to take their part along with men in all the business of life, we are bound, are we not, to propose some different scheme for them?

Clinias/ To be sure we are.

Athenian Stranger/ And which of the various systems now recognized can we prefer to the comradeship we are just imposing on them? The system followed by the Thracians and many other peoples, that the women till the fields, look

after the flocks and herds, and perform menial offices, exactly like slaves? Or the practice universal in our own part of the world? You know what our own customs in this matter are. We ‘pack' all our belongings, as the phrase goes, ‘into one' house, and make over to our women the control of the store closet and the superintendence of the spinning and wool-work at large. Or should we perhaps vote for the via media, which you take, Megillus, in Laconia? Your women are expected in their girlhood to take their share in physical training and music. When they have grown up, they have no wool-work to occupy them, but you expect them to contrive a composite sort of life, one that calls for training and is far from being unworthy or frivolous, and to go halfway with the work of medicine chest, store chamber, and nursery, but to take no share in the business of war. The consequence is that if circumstances should ever force them to a fight for their city and their children, they would prove quite unequal to playing an expert's part with the bow, like Amazons, or any other missile weapon. They could not, could they, even copy our goddess by taking up spear and shield with the mien of doughty protectors of a harried motherland, and so strike an invader with alarm, if with nothing more, by their appearance in martial formation? As for the Sarmatian women, yours, while they lead the life they do, would never venture on imitating them at all; by comparison with women like yours, theirs would pass for men. Let him who will applaud your legislators in this matter. I can only speak as I think. A legislator should be thorough, not halfhearted; he must not, after making regulations for the male sex, leave the other to the enjoyment of an existence of uncontrolled luxury and expense, and so endow his society with a mere half of a thoroughly felicitous life in place of the whole.

Megillus/ What are we to do, Clinias? Must we suffer our visitor to run Sparta down in our hearing like this?

Clinias/ Indeed we must. We allowed him full liberty of speech, and so we must let him alone until our review of our legislation has fairly reached its completion.

Megillus/ I own you are right.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it is for me to proceed once more with my exposition.

Clinias/ Yes, certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ What, then, should life be like with men whose necessities have been moderately provided for, their trades and crafts put into other hands, their lands let out to villains who render from the produce such rent as is sufficient for sober livers—men, moreover, furnished with common dining halls, some for themselves, others near at hand for the members of their families, their daughters and their daughters' mothers, under presidents of either sex, whose appointed function is daily to dismiss the tables after review and inspection of the conduct of the company, and thereafter, libation first duly made by the president and the company to the gods to whom that night and day stand consecrate, so to betake themselves home to bed? When they have been so provided is there no necessary and wholly proper work left them to do? Is each man of them to pass his time fattening himself like a stalled ox? No, I say, it were neither right nor seemly nor yet possible that he who lives so should miss his proper destiny, that of an idle, sluggish, fattened beast—which is commonly to be the prey of some other beast, one worn to bitter leanness by risks and exertions. Now if we are going to look for an exact realization of our scheme, as we have styled it, it will perhaps never be found, so long as there are private wives, children, and houses, and each of us has his private belongings of all sorts. Still, if we can secure the second-best conditions,

which we are now describing, we shall indeed come off well enough.

But there is, I maintain, a work left for men who lead this life, and that none of the most trivial or meanest; righteous law has appointed them to the gravest work of all. The life of the aspirant to victory at Olympia or Pytho leaves no leisure for any other tasks whatever, and there is a double, or more than double, glut of occupation in the life we have rightly described as concerned with the practice of every virtue of body and mind. No other business can be allowed to come in as a by-end and hinder the provision of needful exercises and regimen for the body, nor of necessary studies and habitual discipline for the mind; the whole day and night is verily not long enough for one who is engaged on this sole work of getting the full and perfect benefit from these pursuits. Now, since this is so, every free citizen will need an ordered disposition of all his hours; he must begin with it at daybreak, and follow it without any intermission until the succeeding dawn and sunrise. A legislator, to be sure, will show lack of dignity if he stoops to a multitude of little trivial directions about household arrangements, and among them to the restrictions on sleep proper in a population which will have to keep perpetual and diligent watch over its whole city. In fact, that any citizen whatsoever should spend the whole of any night in unbroken sleep, and not let all his servants see him always awake and astir before anyone else in the house, must be unanimously pronounced a disgrace and an act unworthy of a free man, whether such a regulation should be regarded as law or as custom. In particular, that the mistress of a house should be called by her maids in the morning, and not get up first herself and wake them, and the whole building itself, if only that were possible, that is what every servant, man, woman, or boy, must cry shame on. Much of the business of public and household life should

certainly be done in the night hours saved from sleep by the state officials and by the masters and mistresses at home. Overmuch sleep, indeed, is naturally as unsuitable to us in body and mind as it is incongruous with business of all these kinds. In fact, a man asleep is of no more account than a corpse. He who sets most store on vital and mental activity keeps awake all the hours he can, only reserving for sleep what his health requires, and this is not much, when the habit has been well established. And public officials who are awake betimes by night are no less a source of fear to evildoers, whether enemies or citizens, and of awe and reverence in the righteous and virtuous than of benefit to themselves and their whole community.

So much, then, for night, and we may add to what we have said that to spend it in this fashion will further promote the spirit of courage in the souls of citizens of all sorts. With the return of day and dawn, the boys should betake themselves to school. And just as sheep, or any other creatures, cannot be allowed to live unshepherded, so neither must boys be left without the care of attendants, nor slaves without that of a master. Now of all wild young things a boy is the most difficult to handle. Just because he more than any other has a fount of intelligence in him which has not yet ‘run clear,' he is the craftiest, most mischievous, and unruliest of brutes. So the creature must be held in check, as we may say, by more than one bridle—in the first place, when once he is out of the mother's and nurse's hand, by attendants to care for his childish helplessness, and then, further, by all the masters who teach him anything, and, as befits a freeborn man, by the teaching he gets. But further chastisement, as befits a slave, shall be inflicted on the boy and his attendant and teacher as well, by any free person in whose presence he commits any of these faults. If such a person omits to inflict the due correction, he shall, in the

first place, be held to have disgraced himself most deeply. Also, the curator of law appointed to take control of boys shall take cognizance of the party who is present at an offense of the sort we are dealing with without imposing the necessary correction; this magistrate must be a man of keen vision, thoroughly devoted to his work of supervising the training of the boys, who will guide their native dispositions into right ways, always directing them to the good and lawful.

But, now, as to this minister himself, how is he to be sufficiently instructed by the lips of our law? For so far, its utterances have been neither clear nor full, but only partial, though where he is concerned, the law must make no omission it can help, but impart its whole doctrine to him, that he may so prove interpreter and foster father to others. Now we have dealt already with the choric art—song and dance, that is. We have said what types of these should be selected or corrected, and consecrated, but as for writings without meter, which of them may be put in the hands of your charges and on what terms, that, most worthy director of education, you have not been told. You have indeed been informed what their military lessons and exercises must be. But what must they know, first of letters, and next of the lyre and of ciphering, of which we said all must master what is needful for war, domestic business, or civil administration, as well as such knowledge of the courses of the heavenly bodies—sun, moon, planets—as is useful for these same ends, in so far as any city is bound to deal with the matter? What matter, you say? The grouping of days into monthly periods, and months into the year in such fashion that the seasons with their sacrifices and feasts may fit into the true natural order and receive their several proper celebrations, and the city be thus kept alive and alert, its gods enjoying their rightful honors and its men advancing in

intelligence of these matters. These, my friend are questions to which the legislator has as yet given you no full and sufficient answer. Give diligent heed, then, to what is now to be said.

Your instructions, we have said, are deficient, in the first place, as to reading and writing. Now what is the defect of which we complain? It is that you have so far not been told whether the lad who would be a decent citizen must attain to finished mastery of the study, or must leave it wholly alone, and the same is true of the lyre. Well, we tell you now that these studies must not be left alone. For reading and writing three years or so, from the age of ten, are a fair allowance of a boy's time, and if the handling of the lyre is begun at thirteen, the three following years are long enough to spend on it. No boy and no parent shall be permitted to extend or curtail this period from fondness or distaste for the subjects; to spend either more or less time upon them shall be an infraction of the law, and the disobedience shall be visited by exclusion from the school distinctions we shall shortly describe. But what more specifically is to be learned by the children and taught by their masters during these years? That is the very question to which you are first to hear our answer. They must, of course, carry their study of letters to the point of capacity to read and write, but perfection of rapid and accomplished execution should not be insisted on in cases where the natural progress within the prescribed term of years has been slower. As to the study of written compositions without musical accompaniment, whether written in meter or without rhythmical subdivisions—in fact, compositions in simple prose with no embellishments of rhythm or melody—difficult problems are raised by some of the works bequeathed to us by our numerous authors in this kind. How then will you deal with them, reverend curators of law? Or what would be the right injunction for the

legislator to lay upon you as to their treatment? I can conceive they will cause him no little perplexity.

Clinias/ Pray, sir, what is the difficulty, for it is plain you speak with a real sense of a personal difficulty?

Athenian Stranger/ I do, indeed, Clinias. You are right there. But you and your friend are my colleagues in this juristic discussion, and so I am bound to tell you frankly where I see difficulties and where I see none.

Clinias/ Well, and why do you mention the point just now? What is the feeling which leads you to do so?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, here it is. 'Tis no light matter to speak against so many thousands of voices.

Clinias/ But, bless me, do you imagine what we have already said about jurisprudence only contradicts popular opinion in a few trifles!

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, that is true enough. You tell me, I conceive, that though this legislative path of ours is repellent to so many—perhaps those who find it attractive may be as numerous, or if fewer, at least not inferior—you tell me, I say, to join this latter party and follow the path our present discussions have laid down for us with a stout courage and a good heart, not to flinch.

Clinias/ I do, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Then there shall be no flinching. Now mark my words. We have a great number of poets, in hexameter verse, in iambic trimeter, in a word in all the recognized meters, some grave and some gay. On them, so those many thousands of voices proclaim, young people who are being rightly educated should be fed, in them they should be steeped; their reading lessons must give them a wide acquaintance with their works and an extensive scholarship in them; whole poets must be learned by heart. There are others who compile anthologies of the poets and

make collections of whole passages, which they say must be committed to memory and learned by heart if our protégé's wide familiarity with literature and extensive learning is to make a good and wise man of him. What you are now calling on me to do is to tell those persons without any reserve where they are right and where they are wrong?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, what adequate verdict can I conceivably give about them all in a single sentence? Perhaps something like this—and it is a statement in which I suppose everyone will concur. In every poet there is much that is admirably said and also much that is not. But if so, this extensive learning, I must tell you, has its dangers for our young people.

Clinias/ Then how would you advise our curator of law?

Athenian Stranger/ Advise him? On what point?

Clinias/ On the choice of a standard by reference to which he will permit all the young folk to learn one piece and forbid their learning another. Tell us your mind without any diffidence.

Athenian Stranger/ There, my dear Clinias, I venture to think I am in a way fortunate.

Clinias/ Fortunate in what?

Athenian Stranger/ In not being altogether at a loss for a standard. As I look back on the discourse you and I have been holding ever since daybreak until this moment—and I really believe there has been some divine guiding about the matter—well, be that as it may, our converse has been, to my mind, just like a kind of poem. I dare say there is nothing surprising in my having felt this keen pleasure in reviewing this compact formation, as I may call it, of discourse of my own composition. The fact is that of all the many compositions I have met with or listened to, in verse or in

plain prose, I find it the most satisfactory and the most suitable for the ears of the young. So I really think I could not direct our curator of law and minister of education to a better standard, or bid him do better than instruct his schoolmasters to teach it to their pupils, and also if in his researches he should light upon connected and similar matter in the verse of our poets, in our prose literature, or even in the form of simple unwritten discourse of the same type as the present, by no means to neglect it, but get it put into writing. He should begin by making it compulsory on the teachers themselves to learn this material and appreciate it. Teachers who are dissatisfied with it he must not employ as colleagues; those who concur with his own appreciation he should employ, and to them he should entrust the young for their instruction and education. And with this what I have to say about reading and writing and the teachers of the subject may come to an end.

Clinias/ If one is to judge by reference to our professed intentions, sir, I believe we have kept the discussion on the lines originally laid down for it. Whether our whole attitude is the right one or not it might be harder to pronounce.

Athenian Stranger/ That, Clinias—to repeat what I have said more than once already—will presumably become clearer of itself when we have reached the end of our review of our legislation.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we may leave the teacher of letters, may we not, and direct our discourse to the instructor in the cithara?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, as for the teachers of that instrument, I fancy we shall be making a proper assignment of their functions as instructors, and more generally as

trainers, in that branch of education, if we call to mind our earlier pronouncements.

Clinias/ And, pray, what were they?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, I believe we said the sexagenarians of the ‘chorus of Dionysus' would need to be exceptionally sensitive to rhythmic and melodic structure to ensure their competence to distinguish a good musical imitation of a soul under the stress of its emotions from a bad—competence, that is, to distinguish the counterfeit presentments of a good soul from those of an evil, to reject the second but produce the first publicly in their hymnody, and thus to put a charm on the youthful mind, challenging one and all to join them in pursuit of virtue by means of these same imitations.

Clinias/ Truly said, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ That is the purpose, then, for which teacher and pupil must employ the notes of the lyre; they must do so to get the benefit of the emphasis given by its strings, and so must make their tones accordant with those of the voice. As for diversification and complication of the instrumental part—the strings giving out one tone and the composer of the melody another—and, in fact, for correspondence, within or without the octave, of lesser interval with greater, quicker note with longer, lower tones with higher, and equally for all sorts of complication of the rhythm by instrumental accompaniment, no such devices are to be employed with pupils who are to acquire the benefits of their musical studies in the brief space of three years. Such a clash of opposites makes learning a slow business, and it is imperative that our young people should learn their lessons with ease; the compulsory subjects we have imposed on them are neither few nor light, as the progress of our discourse will disclose in due time. All these

matters, then, are for our minister of education to supervise on the lines laid down. As for the actual tunes and words which the trainers of our choirs are to teach, and the character of them, that too has already been fully discussed. As you remember, we said they must be consecrated and assigned each to its appropriate festival to provide a society with a pleasure that is in very deed fortunate.

Clinias/ Here, again, what you say is true.

Athenian Stranger/ Aye, absolutely true. So our chosen director of music shall have the matter put under his care for supervision, and the blessings of fortune go with him! Our business shall be to add further specifications to what we have already said on the subject of the dance and the training of physique in general. We supplemented our treatment of music by adding directions for the teacher, and we will do the same for physical culture. Both the boys and the girls will, of course, have to dance and practice bodily exercises, will they not?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ So the convenient arrangement for these exercises will be that there should be dancing masters for boys and mistresses for girls.

Clinias/ I don't dispute it.

Athenian Stranger/ Then once more we must call in the busiest of our functionaries, the director of education. His supervision of music and physical training will keep his hands pretty full.

Clinias/ How then, at his advanced age, will he be equal to the supervision of such varied business?

Athenian Stranger/ Oh, easily enough. The law will permit him, as it has already done, to associate with himself in this work any citizens he may choose of either sex. He will know who are the right persons and have no wish to go

wrong in such matters, as he will have a prudent respect for his office and an understanding of its importance, and a lifelong conviction that so long as the young generation is, and continues to be, well brought up, our ship of state will have a fair voyage, while in the contrary case the consequences are better left unspoken, and we will leave them so in the case of a city which we are founding for the first time, from regard for the anxious observers of omens. On this subject, too—dancing and the motions of physical training in general—we ourselves have already said much. We are instituting gymnasiums and all kinds of military exercises—exercises in archery, the throwing of various sorts of missiles, light skirmishing, infantry fighting in its different departments, tactical maneuvers, field marches of all kinds, encampment, and any studies which go to form a cavalryman. In fact, there must be public teachers in all these branches, receiving a stipend from the state, and they must have for their scholars not merely boys and men, but the girls and women, who must get a knowledge of all this. While they are still in their girlhood they must practice dancing and fighting in armor thoroughly, and as women they must take their share in the maneuvering, Company drill, and grounding and shouldering of arms, for this reason if for no other. If circumstances should ever require our whole force to take the field en-masse outside the city, there will be a defense for the children and the city at large equal to its immediate purpose. On the other hand, if—and the possibility cannot be excluded—there should be a foreign invasion of a large and powerful force of Greeks or others, which might compel a pitched battle for the actual safety of the city, it would be a sad disgrace to the community if it had trained its women so ill that they had not even the courage of the hen bird, who will face the most dangerous beast in defense of her chicks at the risk of death or any

other peril—if they rushed straight to the temples, beset all the altars and shrines, and bespattered mankind with the opprobrium of being the most abject creature alive.

Clinias/ Why, no sir, such a performance would be no credit to any city in which it might occur—to say nothing of the mischief it would do.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we may impose the law that, up to the point indicated, our women are not to neglect the arts of war—they must be practiced by all citizens, male and female alike?

Clinias/ You have one supporter at any rate in me.

Athenian Stranger/ Now as to wrestling, we have dealt with it already, but we said nothing of what is to my mind the most important point, though one not easy to explain in the absence of an actual physical demonstration. So we will leave the decision of that issue until theory and practice combined have cleared up the whole subject and made it plain that the kind of wrestling we have in mind is far more closely connected with military combat than any other sort of movement, and also that it is to be cultivated with a view to this latter, not the latter with a view to it.

Clinias/ That last point is well taken.

Athenian Stranger/ So much, then, at present for what we have to say of the value of wrestling. As for other movement of the body as a whole—in the main it may properly be called dancing—we must bear in mind that it has two species, one reproducing motions of comely bodies with a dignified effect, the other those of uncomely bodies with a ludicrous, and that, further, the comic and the serious kinds have each two subspecies. One species of the serious sort represents the movements of the comely body and its valiant soul in battle and in the toils of enforced endurance, the other the bearing of the continent soul in a

state of prosperity and duly measured pleasure; an appropriate name for this latter would be the dance of peace. The war dance has a different character, and may properly be called the Pyrrhic; it depicts the motions of eluding blows and shots of every kind by various devices of swerving, yielding ground, leaping from the ground or crouching, as well as the contrary motions which lead to a posture of attack, and aim at the reproduction of the shooting of arrows, casting of darts, and dealing of all kinds of blows. In these dances the upright, well-braced posture which represents the good body and good mind, and in which the bodily members are in the main kept straight, is the kind of attitude we pronounce right, that which depicts their contrary, wrong. In the case of the dance of peace, the question to be raised in every case is whether the performer succeeds or fails in maintaining throughout his performance a graceful style of dancing in a way becoming to the law-abiding man. So we have, in the first place, to draw a distinction between questionable dances and those which are above question. What then is the distinction, and where should the line be drawn?

As for dances of bacchanals and their likes, which present what is called a ‘mimic' exhibition of persons in liquor, under the designations of nymphs, panes, sileni, or satyrs, and are performed as a part of certain rituals and initiations, it is hard to pronounce that whole style of dance either warlike or pacific, or to determine what possible a purpose it has. The most correct course, I think, will be to discriminate it alike from the dances of war and of peace, declare it unfit for a citizen, and leave it so on one side, returning once more to the war dance and peace dance as matters which unquestionably concern us. The nonmartial arts of worship of gods and their progeny in dances will all form a single genre expressive of a sense of well-being, and may be divided

into two branches, one expressive of escape from hard-ships and perils to good fortune, in which the pleasure conveyed is keener, and one of retention and augmentation of good already enjoyed, in which this pleasure is more sedate. Now, as we know, any man in such conditions executes movements of the body, more vigorous when his pleasure is more intense, less vigorous when it is less so. Again, the more sober the man and the more schooled to fortitude, the less violent these motions; the more fearful the man and the less disciplined in continence, the more violent and vehement these movements. But to speak generally, no man who is using his vocal organs, whether for song or for speech, can keep his body perfectly still. Hence it is from this representation of things spoken by means of posture and gesture that the whole art of the dance has been elaborated. And in all such cases, one man's motions keep time and tune with his utterance, another's do not. Hence, in fact, the well-merited praise which may be given to many of our traditional names for their excellence and truth to fact, one of which is that bestowed on the dances of prosperous men who preserve measure in their pleasures. We should give credit to the inventor, whoever he may have been, for the truth and musical taste of the names, and the philosophical insight shown by designating fine dancing as a whole emmeliae and proceeding to distinguish two kinds, each with its fitting and proper name—the war dance, or Pyrrhic, and the emmelia, or dance of peace. The legislator must deal with these matters in general outline, and the curator make them an object of study. His investigations should result in the combination of dancing with the rest of music, the assignment to each sacrificial feast of the appropriate measures, and the consecration of the whole arrangement in due course. Thenceforth there must be no innovation in anything which has to do either with dance or with song. No,

our citizens and their city must preserve their identity by a uniform life of unvarying pleasures, where all are as utterly alike as may be in all happiness and bliss.

This concludes our treatment of the employment of comely body and noble mind in choric performances such as we have said these displays should be. As for the play of uncomely body and mind and the artistes of ludicrous burlesque in diction, song, dance, and all the caricaturistic effects of the three, we cannot avoid taking notice of this and passing it under review. A man who means to form his judgment can no more understand earnest apart from burlesque than any other contrary apart from its contrary, but, on the other side, a man who means to have any part in goodness, were it never so little, cannot possibly produce both. The very reason why he must get to know such a thing is that he may never be betrayed by ignorance into doing or saying a ludicrous thing when it is out of place. We shall enjoin that such representations be left to slaves or hired aliens, and that they receive no serious consideration whatsoever. No free person, whether woman or man, shall be found taking lessons in them, and there must always be some novelty in a performance of the kind. The sportive entertainment to which the name comedy is universally given may be taken as disposed of on these lines by our law with its accompanying explanation.

For our tragic poets and their so-called serious compositions, we may conceive some of them to approach us with a question couched in these words or the like. May we pay your city and its territory a visit, sirs, or may we not? And may we bring our poetry along with us, or what decision have you reached on the point?

What would be the right answer to give to such men of genius?

Why this, I believe. Respected visitors, we are ourselves authors of a tragedy, and that the finest and best we know how to make. In fact, our whole polity has been constructed as a dramatization of a noble and perfect life; that is what we hold to be in truth the most real of tragedies. Thus you are poets, and we also are poets in the same style, rival artists and rival actors, and that in the finest of all dramas, one which indeed can be produced only by a code of true law—or at least that is our faith. So you must not expect that we shall lightheartedly permit you to pitch your booths in our market square with a troupe of actors whose melodious voices will drown our own, and let you deliver your public tirades before our boys and women and the populace at large—let you address them on the same issues as ourselves, not to the same effect, but commonly and for the most part to the very contrary. Why, we should be stark mad to do so, and so would the whole community, if you could find one which would let you do as you are now proposing, until its magistrates had decided whether your compositions are fit to be uttered and edifying to be heard by the public or not. Go to, then, ye scions of the softer Muses, first exhibit your minstrelsy to the magistrates for comparison with our own. Then, if your sentiments prove to be the same as ours, or even better, we will grant you a chorus, but if not, I fear, my friends, we never can.

Such, then, subject to your approval, shall be our legislation, and such our conjoined practice in the whole matter of the choric art and the instruction in it—slaves and their masters to receive separate treatment.

Clinias/ Well, of course, we approve—at any rate, for the moment.

Athenian Stranger/ Then there are, of course, three subjects for the freeborn still to study. Ciphering and arithmetic make one subject; mensuration, linear,

superficial, and solid, taken as one single study, forms a second; the third is the true relations of the planetary orbits to one another. The elaborate prosecution of all these studies into their minute details is not for the masses but for a select few—who these should be shall be indicated later as our argument draws to its conclusion, where the indication will be in place. For the multitude it will be proper to learn so much of the matter as is indispensable, and as it may truly be said to be a disgrace to the common man not to know, though it would be hard, or actually impossible, to pursue the research into minute detail. We simply cannot dispense with its character of necessity; in fact, it is this which the author of the proverb presumably had in view when he said that 'even God is never to be seen contending against necessity.' No doubt he meant the necessity which is divine, for if you understand the words of mere human necessities, like those to which men in general apply such sayings, they are far and away the silliest of speeches.

Clinias/ Yes, sir, but where in these studies do the other sort of necessities, the divine, come in?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, I presume they are those in neglect or sheer ignorance of which no being could possibly play the part of a god or superior spirit toward us, nor yet of a hero capable of serious supervision of humanity. How far would he be below the level of even inspired humanity who could not tell three from two, or even odd from even, in fact, could not so much as count, or could not even tell off night and day, or had no acquaintance with the orbits of moon, sun, and the rest of the planets! So the mere thought that all this information is not indispensable to anyone who means to know anything whatsoever of the noblest of all sciences is the idlest folly. What branches of them are to be studied, to what extent, and at what times, which must be taken in conjunction with another and which pursued by

itself, and how they are all to be blended into a whole—these are the questions which we must first settle correctly. We may then proceed under the guidance of these sciences to the study of all the rest. It is the natural order, and it has that necessity with which, as we say, no god contends or ever will contend.

Clinias/ Yes, sir, the views you have just expressed sound true and natural, as you expound them.

Athenian Stranger/ Indeed, they are so, Clinias, though it is difficult to legislate on the subject by anticipation as we are now doing. The more precise details of legislation, with your consent, we may postpone to another occasion.

Clinias/ You are apprehensive, I take it, sir, of the common unfamiliarity of our countrymen with such topics, but your concern is unwarranted. Pray do your best to state your views without any reservation on that score.

Athenian Stranger/ I certainly feel the apprehension you speak of, but am still more alarmed by students who have actually taken up these sciences, but taken them up in the wrong way. Complete unacquaintance with a subject is never a dangerous or formidable obstacle, nor is it the worst of evils; much graver harm is done by wide acquaintance with a subject and extensive learning in it, when they are conjoined with bad training.

Clinias/ Truly observed.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, I maintain that freeborn men should learn of these various subjects as much as in Egypt is taught to vast numbers of children along with their letters. To begin with, lessons have been devised there in ciphering for the veriest children which they can learn with a good deal of fun and amusement, problems about the distribution of a fixed total number of apples or garlands among larger and smaller groups, and the arranging of a

successive series of ‘byes' and ‘pairs' between boxers and wrestlers as the nature of such contests requires. More than this, the teachers have a game in which they distribute mixed sets of saucers of gold, silver, copper, and similar materials or, in other cases, whole sets of one material. In this way, they, as I was saying, incorporate the elementary application of arithmetic in the children's play, give the pupils a useful preparation for the dispositions, formations, and movements of military life as well as for domestic management, and make them more alert and more serviceable to themselves in every way. Then they go on to exercises in measurements of length, surface, and cubical content, by which they dispel the native and general, but ludicrous and shameful, ignorance of mankind about the whole subject.

Clinias/ And in what may this native ignorance consist?

Athenian Stranger/ My dear Clinias, when I was told, rather belatedly, of our condition in this matter, like you, I was utterly astounded. Such ignorance seemed to me more worthy of a stupid beast like the hog than of a human being, and I blushed not for myself alone, but for our whole Hellenic world.

Clinias/ But what was the reason for your blushes? Let us have your account of it, sir.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, so I will. Or rather I will make it plain by a question. Pray tell me one little thing. You know what is meant by line?

Clinias/ Of course I do.

Athenian Stranger/ And by surface?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And you know that they are two distinct things, and that volume is another and a third?

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now you hold, do you not, that all three are commensurable with one another?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ That is, that line is in its very nature measurable by line, surface by surface, and similarly with volume?

Clinias/ Most assuredly.

Athenian Stranger/ But suppose this cannot be said of some of them, neither with more assurance nor with less, but is true in some cases, but not in others, and you believe it true universally. What do you think of your state of mind on the matter?

Clinias/ That it is unsatisfactory, to be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ And what of the relations of line and surface to volume, or of line and surface to one another? Is it not the fact that we Hellenes all imagine they are commensurable in some way or other?

Clinias/ Why certainly that is the fact.

Athenian Stranger/ Then if this is another entire impossibility, though we Hellenes, as I said, all fancy it possible, are we not bound to blush for them all as we tell them, Worthy Hellenes, here is one of the things of which we said that ignorance is a disgrace and knowledge on a point so necessary, no great accomplishment?

Clinias/ We are, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ There are, besides, other closely related points which frequently give rise to errors akin to those just mentioned.

Clinias/ Such for example as?

Athenian Stranger/ The real relation of commensurability and incommensurability to one another. A man must be able to distinguish them on examination, or else must be a very

poor creature. We should frequently propound such problems to each other—a much more elegant pastime for the elderly than draughts—and give our passion for victory an outlet in amusements worthy of us.

Clinias/ I dare say, after all, the game of draughts and these studies are not so widely different.

Athenian Stranger/ Accordingly, Clinias, I hold that these are subjects which our young people must learn. Indeed there is neither danger nor difficulty in them, and if they are learned through the medium of play, they will do our city no harm, but rather good.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ Still, while we must clearly include them in our scheme, if our case for this proves to be made out, equally clearly we shall reject them if it is not made out.

Clinias/ Oh, plainly, plainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, for the present, sir, let them be set down among the requisite studies, to leave no gap in the body of our laws, but set down as detachable from the rest of our polity—like so many redeemable pledges—should they prove unacceptable to us who have deposited them, or you who have received them.

Clinias/ The terms of proposal are fair enough.

Athenian Stranger/ Next you must consider astronomy. Are we to adopt the recommendation that our young folk should study it, or are we not?

Clinias/ Well, say on.

Athenian Stranger/ Now here, mark you, I find a strange, indeed, a wholly intolerable paradox.

Clinias/ And of what kind?

Athenian Stranger/ It is currently said that it is wrong—indeed, positively blasphemous—to prosecute inquiry or

busy ourselves with the quest for explanation where the supreme God and the universe as a whole are concerned, though the very opposite should seem to be our right course.

Clinias/ What!

Athenian Stranger/ What I am trying to say, I know, is startling, and might be thought unbecoming in a man of our years, but the plain truth is that a man who-knows of a study which he believes sublime, true, beneficial to society, and perfectly acceptable to God, simply cannot refrain from calling attention to it.

Clinias/ Presumably not, but what astronomical study shall we find answering to this description?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, my friends, at this moment, all our Hellenic world, as I may fairly say, habitually charges high gods, sun and moon, falsely.

Clinias/ And what may this false charge be?

Athenian Stranger/ We say that they, and certain heavenly bodies associated with them, never keep to the same path, which is why we call them planets.

Clinias/ Egad, sir, and that is true enough. Why, in my own lifetime I myself have often seen the morning and evening stars and some others never keeping to the same track, but divagating in all directions. As for sun and moon, of course, I have seen them behave as we all know they regularly do behave.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, Megillus and Clinias, that is just the reason why I am now insisting that our citizens and their young people must learn enough of all the facts about the divinities of the sky to prevent blasphemy of them, and to ensure a reverent piety in the language of all our sacrifices and prayers.

Clinias/ That is right, provided, of course, that, in the first place, the knowledge of which you speak is possible. On that

assumption, if there are errors in our present language on such matters which study will correct, I, too, confess that a subject of such scope and quality must be taught. Do your best, then, with the demonstration that the facts are as you say, as we will do our best to follow your instruction.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, the lesson I have in mind, to be sure, is not an easy one—and yet it is not so hopelessly difficult either, and takes no very great time to learn, as this one fact is enough to prove. I was not a young man when I heard of the truth myself, and it was no long time ago, and yet I may possibly make it clear to both of you now at no great expense of time. Were the point a really hard one, a man of my age would never be able to explain it to men of yours.

Clinias/ Quite true. But pray what may this knowledge be—this doctrine, as you maintain, so surprising, yet so proper for the young to learn, and so unsuspected by us? You must try to explain so much of the subject with all possible clarity.

Athenian Stranger/ I will do my best. The fact is, my friends, that the belief that sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies are 'wandering stars' of any sort is not true. The very reverse is the truth—each of these bodies always revolves in the same orbit and in one orbit, not many, for all that it looks to be moving in several, and again the actually swiftest of them is wrongly believed to be the slowest and the slowest the swiftest. Well now, suppose these are the real facts, but we hold a discrepant view about them. If we had fancies of this kind about the competing horses or long-distance runners at Olympia, and so were to call the quickest runner slowest and the slowest quickest, and to compose triumphal odes in which we celebrated the vanquished as victor, why, I conceive our bestowal of our praises would neither be correct nor to the liking of the runners, who, after all, are

but men. But when we actually make the same mistake today about our deities, must we not think that an error which was risible in the other case and on the racecourse, is now, when transferred to this context, no laughing matter, and no very godly opinion either, since it means reiterated mendacity about divine beings?

Clinias/ Nothing can be truer—if the facts are really as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, if we can show that they are so, all these matters must be studied—within the limits we have proposed—if not, we must let them alone. May we take it that our agreement extends so far?

Clinias/ With all my heart.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we may say that our regulations for the studies to be included in our education are now complete. As to the chase, we should recur to the thought which has guided us in other cases of the same kind. It should seem that a legislator's task extends to something more than the mere imposing of a law and so dismissing a topic; there is something else he must do besides laying down the law, something which verges at once on admonition and on legislation, as our argument has led us to remark more than once already. A case in point is our treatment of the regimen of infants. As we say, we must not leave our demands unformulated, and yet when we formulate them it is perfect folly to imagine we are laying them down as law. So when the legal code, and the whole system of the constitution, have been reduced to written form, it is not a final encomium on the preeminently virtuous citizen to say that he is the good citizen who has shown himself the best servant of the laws and gives them the fullest obedience; there would be more finality in the statement that he is the best who has spent his life without

qualification in obedience to all the legislator has written, whether by way of enactment, of approbation, or of reprobation. This is the truest eulogy which can be bestowed on a citizen, and a real legislator should not confine himself to the composition of statutes; he should further entwine with the text of his laws an exposition of all he accounts laudable or the reverse, and the citizen of eminent goodness must feel himself no less bound by such directions than by those enforced with a legal sanction.

We may make our meaning plainer if we call the subject of our present remarks, so to say, in evidence. The chase, in fact, is a pursuit with very various departments, all currently comprehended under that single name. There are many ways of taking the denizens of the water, and again of fowling, and especially there are numerous devices for the capture of land animals. I mean not of brutes merely, but of the noteworthy hunting of men to be seen in warfare, as well as in the various forms under which that quarry is pursued in the way of kindness, some laudable and others the reverse; the kidnappings of brigands and forces in the field are also forms of the chase. Now the legislator framing his statutes of venery can neither omit to explain this, nor yet can he impose a set of legal regulations with directions for all cases and threatened penalties for their breach. What course is he, then, to take in such a case? He must—I mean the legislator must—commend some forms of the chase and condemn others, always with an eye on the exercises and sports of the younger man; the younger man, in his turn, must obey this advice. Neither hope of pleasure nor dread of hardship must interfere with his obedience, and he must treat the legislator's various commendations with still deeper respect and more dutiful compliance than his penalty-sanctioned ordinances.

These preliminary remarks may naturally be succeeded by judicious commendation and reprobation of diverse forms of the chase, commendation of such as tend to improve the young man's soul, reprobation of those which have the contrary tendency. So we will now, without more delay, direct our address to the young people, couching it in the language of pious wish.

Our prayer, beloved, is that you may never be smitten with the lust or passion for sea fishery, for angling or any taking of the creatures of the waters, or for the use of weels, by which the slothful hunter's work is done for him equally whether he wakes or sleeps. May you never be visited by hankerings for the pirate's trade—the chasing of men on the high seas—to make you cruel and lawless hunters! As for petty poaching in town or country, may the bare thought never so much as enter your minds! And may no young soul be haunted by the seductive itch for fowling—hardly a taste for the freeborn man! Thus we have left our athletes only the chase and taking of land creatures. One form of this, again, that practiced by parties who take it in turns to sleep—night trapping, as it is called—is for sluggards and deserves no commendation; the intervals of inaction fill as much time as the exercise, and the strength and violence of the quarry are overpowered not by the triumph of an energetic soul, but by nets and snares. Thus the only variety left free to all, and the best variety, is the chase of a four-footed quarry in reliance upon one's horse, one's dogs, and one's own limbs, where the hunters—those, that is, who cultivate godlike courage—all hunt in their own persons and achieve all their success by running, striking, and shooting.

The discourse we have just rehearsed may serve the end of general commendation and censure in the matter. The actual law may run to this effect. Such hunters are truly ‘sacred,' and none shall hinder them from following the game

with their hounds when and as they please. The night trapper who trusts to his nets and springs no one shall permit to pursue his game at any time or place. The fowler is not to be disturbed on uncultivated ground or in the mountains, but shall be turned off tilled fields or untilled consecrated demesnes by any who may find him there. The fisherman shall be free to take his fish anywhere save in harbors and consecrated rivers, marshes, or lakes, with the sole proviso that he may not foul the waters with stupefying juices.

And with this we may say our regulation of education is at last completed.

Clinias/ And well completed, too.

Book 8.

Athenian Stranger/ The next task awaiting us is, with the help of oracles from Delphi, to construct the calendar of festivals and give it the authority of law—to determine what sacrifices it will be 'to the welfare and profit' of the state to celebrate, and to what deities they should be offered. The question of their dates and their number will be, to some extent, one for our own decision.

Clinias/ That of their number will no doubt be so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let me deal with the question of number first. This shall be not less than three hundred and sixty-five, to ensure that sacrifice shall be done by at least one magistracy to some god or spirit on behalf of the state, its members, and their chattels without any interruption. Canonists, priests of both sexes, and prophets are to meet in committee with the curators of law and prescribe any details which the legislator has unavoidably omitted; the same committee shall further decide how the omissions aforesaid are to be supplied.

The provision of the actual law will be, in fact, that there shall be twelve festivals of the twelve gods after whom the different tribes are named, to be kept by the doing of monthly sacrifice to each of these deities, with the adjuncts of such choirs and contests, both musical and athletic, as are suitable to the character of the deity and the season of the festival, and the demarcation of celebrations for women from which men must be excluded from those in which this regulation is not necessary. Further, there must be no confusion between the cults of the gods of the underworld with their accessories and those of the celestial powers, as we should call them; the law will keep the two distinct, and put the former in the month sacred to Pluto, the twelfth of the year. True warriors must cherish no repugnance for such

a deity of death, but venerate him as the constant benefactor of mankind, for union of soul with body, as I would assure you in all earnest, is in no way better than dissolution.

Furthermore, an authority which is to make these arrangements to our satisfaction must be possessed with the convictions that the like of this society of ours is not to be found in the world for ample leisure and abundant provision of all necessaries, that its business, like that of an individual man, is to live well, and that the indispensable precondition of a happy life is that we commit no sin against ourselves and suffer no wrongs from others. Now there is no great difficulty about the first condition, but grave difficulty in compassing a power to protect oneself from suffering wrongs; 'tis, indeed, only to be fully got in one way, by becoming fully good. Now the case will be the same with a society—if it become good, its life will be one of peace, if evil, of warfare without and within. And since this is so, its members must train themselves for warfare, not in actual time of war, but during the life of peace. Hence the wise state will be under arms not less than one day in each month, and as many more as its magistrates may think good, without regard to stress of weather, cold or hot; men, women, children, will take the field, in one body when the magistrates so ordain, at other times in sections. They must also devise a round of noble sports, with their accompanying sacrifices, so as to provide festal combats which shall reproduce real warfare with all possible truth to life. On these occasions there should always be a distribution of prizes and rewards for merit, and the citizens should compose panegyrics and censures upon one another according to a man's performance in these contests and in life at large, the honor of the panegyric going to him who proves himself of perfect worth, and the censure to him who fails.

The composition of such verses shall not be for everyone. The author must, in the first place, have reached the age of not less than fifty; moreover he must not be one of those who have within them a sufficient vein of literature and music but have never achieved one noble and illustrious deed. But the verse of composers who are in their own persons men of worth, held in public honor as authors of noble deeds, may be sung, even though it have no real musical quality. The selection of composers shall be in the hands of the minister of education and his colleagues, the curators of law, who are to allow them this special privilege. Their music, and theirs only, shall be free and uncensored, whereas this liberty shall be granted to no one else, and no other citizen shall presume, without the curator's license, to sing an unauthorized air, were its notes more ravishing than those of Thamyras or Orpheus themselves, but only such verse as has been duly consecrated to the gods and such compositions by men of true worth as have been pronounced to convey laudation or reproof with due propriety. These directions as to maneuvers and freedom to compose uncensored verse are to be taken as applying equally to both sexes. The legislator must put the case to himself thus in his meditations. Go to, now, what manner of men am I training by the whole scheme of my institutions? Are they not men who are to be competitors in the most momentous of all contests, where they will find countless opponents pitted against them? 'Why, certainly,' will be the ready and the right answer.

Well then, suppose our training were meant for boxers, or pugilists, or athletes in some similar competition. Should we be for going straight into the actual contest without any previous daily combat with an opponent? Surely, were we boxers, for days together before the actual event we should be learning how to fight and working ourselves hard. We

should rehearse all the movements we expected to make in the actual match, when the time for it should come, and we should come as near as we could to the reality; we should fit our hands with practice gloves in place of match gloves, to make sure that we were getting the best training we could. If we were exceptionally put to it to find partners to practice with, would fear of the laughter of fools frighten us from hanging up an inanimate dummy to practice on? If we were actually without any opponent living or lifeless, and had no partners whatsoever, should we not have gone the length of quite literally sparring 'at our own shadows'? What other name could you give to the training in 'using one's mauleys'?

Clinias/ Why, sir, I can think of none but the name you have just employed.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well, then. And is the fighting force of our society to be worse prepared than such combatants as these when it ventures itself, as the occasion arises, in the gravest of all contests, in which the stake is the very existence of self, children, possessions, nay, of the whole community? Is this precious fear that our practice on one another may provoke some laughter to keep the legislator from his work? Should he not require drill on the small scale, not involving the use of heavy arms, to be performed, if possible, daily, directing all physical training, whether in combined groups or otherwise, to that end, and exercises of another kind, major and minor, to be held at least once a month, in which the citizens throughout our territories will contend with one another in the occupation of military positions and the laying of ambushes, and imitate all branches of warfare by very real fighting with gloves and missiles closely modeled on the genuine articles? These weapons should be comparatively dangerous, that the sport may not be wholly without its perils, but give occasion for alarms, and thus serve, in its way, to discriminate a man of

courage from a coward. Thus it will enable the legislator to train the whole community to lifelong efficient service in the real conflict, by a right apportionment of marks of distinction and discredit, and if a life should happen to be lost in this fashion, the homicide will be regarded as involuntary, and its author pronounced clear of the innocent blood, when he has undergone ritual cleansing as the law directs. The legislator's view will be that if a few men come to their end, others as good will be born to take their place, whereas, if fear of dangers comes to its end, if I may so express myself, he can find no touchstone of better and worse in situations of the kind, and this is a much graver misfortune for his society than the other.

Clinias/ My friend and I, sir, agree with you that this is what the law should enjoin and the whole community practice.

Athenian Stranger/ Now I wonder whether all of us understand the reason why such contests between opposing teams are nowhere to be found in our existing societies, except perhaps on the smallest scale. Should we lay the blame on the ignorance of the generality of mankind and their legislators?

Clinias/ Very likely we should.

Athenian Stranger/ My dear Clinias! Not in the least! The true causes are two, both very powerful.

Clinias/ And what are they?

Athenian Stranger/ One arises from the passion for wealth which leaves a man not a moment of leisure to attend to anything beyond his personal fortunes. So long as a citizen's whole soul is wrapped up in these, he cannot give a thought to anything but the day's takings. Any study or pursuit which tends to that result everyone sets himself eagerly to learn and practice; all others are laughed to scorn.

Here, then, we may say, is one reason in particular why society declines to take this or any other wholly admirable pursuit seriously, though everyone in it is ready enough, in his furious thirst for gold and silver, to stoop to any trade and any shift, honorable or dishonorable, which holds out a prospect of wealth, ready to scruple at no act whatsoever—innocent, sinful, or utterly shameful—so long as it promises to sate him, like some brute beast, with a perfect glut of eating, drinking, and sexual sport.

Clinias/ Too true.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, this, as I say, may be set down for one reason which tends to keep societies from efficient cultivation of noble activities, military and otherwise; it turns the naturally quiet and decent man into a tradesman, skipper, or mere menial, and makes the more adventurous, pirates, burglars, temple thieves, swashbucklers, and bullies, though often enough they are not so much vicious as unfortunate.

Clinias/ Unfortunate? Why so?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, what epithet but 'most unfortunate' can I find for men who are forced to go through the world with an incessant hunger gnawing at their own souls?

Clinias/ Well, that is one of your causes, sir, but what do you mean by the other?

Athenian Stranger/ Thank you for the reminder.

Clinias/ One cause, as I understand you, is this lifelong insatiate quest which leaves none of us an hour's leisure, and so keeps us all from practicing the arts of war as we should. Good, but let us hear something of the other reason.

Athenian Stranger/ I fancy you think my reason for being so slow to name it is that I cannot.

Clinias/ Not so, but what one must call your abhorrence of the character just described is leading you, as we think, into an invective irrelevant to our present argument.

Athenian Stranger/ I stand properly rebuked, gentlemen. You wish me, it appears, to proceed.

Clinias/ You have only to do so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I say the reason is to be found in those ‘no-constitutions' we have so often touched on already, democracy, oligarchy, autocracy. Not one of them is a true constitution; the proper name for all would rather be ‘party ascendancies.' In none do we find a willing sovereign with willing subjects; in all a willing sovereign is controlling reluctant subjects by violence of some sort. But a sovereign who goes in fear of his subject will never, if he can help it, permit that subject to become noble, wealthy, powerful, valiant, nor so much as a good fighting man. Here, then, we have the main sources of almost all mischief—certainly the main sources of the mischief we are treating of now. Both are avoided in the constitution we are now engaged in framing. It provides more ample leisure than any other; its citizens are free from one another's dictation. Our laws, I take it, are very unlikely to make them greedy of riches. Hence it is but natural and reasonable to believe that a society so constituted, and only such a society of all others, would have a place for the warrior's education described above, which is also his sport, as duly set forth in our discussion.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I suppose we may next make a general observation about all athletic contests. Those which provide a training for war should be encouraged and prizes instituted for success in them; those which do not may be dismissed. Which these are it will be better to make matter

for explicit statement and legislation from the very first. To begin with, I apprehend there should be such institution of prizes for fleetness of foot and rapidity of movement in general.

Clinias/ There should.

Athenian Stranger/ To be sure, bodily agility—quickness of hand as well as of foot—is a first-rate point in the soldier's equipment; fleetness of foot has its use in flight and pursuit, and readiness of hand in the close stand-up fighting which calls for so much stocky strength.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And again, neither yields its best service without the aid of weapons.

Clinias/ Naturally not.

Athenian Stranger/ So our herald will follow the existing custom and announce the furlong race as the first event of our sports. The competitor shall make his entry in full armor; we shall give no prize for an unarmed competitor. No, the order of entry will be first the runner for the furlong, in full equipment, second for the two furlongs, third for the chariot course, fourth for the long-distance; fifth there will be an entrant whom we shall call the hoplite, and set in the first place to run, in full armor of heavy weight, over a smooth course of sixty furlongs, to a temple of Ares and back, and his rival, an archer in complete archer's equipment, who must run against him over a course of a hundred furlongs, through hilly and varied ground, to a temple of Apollo and Artemis. In arranging the events, we shall wait for their return, and prizes will be given to the victors in each event.

Clinias/ A good arrangement.

Athenian Stranger/ Now let us make three classes in these athletic events, one for boys, one for lads, and one for

men. We will fix the length of the course for lads at two thirds, and that for boys at one half the length of the full course, whether they enter as hoplites or as archers. In the case of females, we shall have races of one and two furlongs, a chariot course, and a long-distance event, in which girls below the age of puberty must actually compete stripped, while girls who have passed thirteen and are still awaiting marriage—to ensue at latest at twenty and at earliest at eighteen—must be clad in the proper accouterment when they enter into these competitions. So much then for races for both males and females.

As for competitions of strength, in place of wrestling and the like, the 'heavy events' of current practice, we shall institute fights in armor, single combats, or combats between pairs, or contests between any number of combatants up to ten a side. In determining what points will disqualify for victory or count toward it, we shall follow the precedent set by existing authorities on wrestling in their rules for the proper conduct of that sport. We shall, in like manner, call in experts in fencing under arms and invite their help in regulating the faults which must be avoided, and hits which must be scored, to qualify for a victory in these contests, and the code which shall determine defeat. The same regulations shall equally apply to females under the age of marriage, for the element of boxing in the pancratium we shall substitute a general combat of peltasts in which the contest will be waged with bow and arrow and light target, darts, stones thrown by the hand, and slings, and in this case too we shall have to draw up the rules and award the prizes of victory to those who best fulfill the demands of our regulations.

We should naturally proceed now to make rules for the horse race. But in a district like Crete there will be no great use for horses and few horses to use; hence there will, of

course, be less interest in breeding them and matching them against one another. As for chariots, to be sure, there will be no one to keep them, and probably no one to cherish any particular aspirations in that direction; hence if we instituted anything so contrary to native custom as a chariot race, we should look like the fools we should in fact be. But if we offer prizes for races with ridden horses—young and half-grown colts as well as full-grown beasts—we shall be cultivating a form of the sport well in keeping with the nature of our territory. So the law will provide for competitive matches between these classes of sportsmen and no others, and appoint the phylarchs and hipparchs as public judges both of the course and of the competitors entering—who must be in their armor. Here, as in the case of the athletic sports, it would be a mistake for the law to institute contests for the unarmed. A Cretan, again, can do useful service as a mounted bowman or javelin man, and so we should further have matches between rivals in these lines for our amusement. As to women, it is really not worth our while to force them to take part in these competitions by legal enactments, but if their earlier training has led to the growth of such habits that they are physically equal, in their girlhood or later maidenhood, to take part without unwelcome results, they should be allowed to do so unreproved.

We have at last come to the end of this subject of athletic contests, and the teaching of physical culture, with all the work it entails both in the competitions and in the daily routine of school. We have similarly completed our main treatment of music. Rules for rhapsodes and their likes and for the competitions between choirs requisite at our festivals shall be drawn up later, when months, days, and years have first been assigned to the various gods and lesser objects of worship—e.g., regulations deciding whether these festivals

should be kept at intervals of two years, or of four, or in any other order we may be inspired to think of. On these occasions, further, we must expect that the musical competitions shall be held, each in its proper turn, as directed by the presidents of the sports, the minister of education, and the curators of law, who are to act in concert as a special committee for the purpose, and must make their own legislation for all choirs and dancers as to the dates at which competitions shall be held, the persons who may compete, and the company in which they may do so. The original legislator has explained more than once what the various compositions must be like, in words spoken or sung and in mingled melody, rhythm, and dance movement. His later successors must follow his lead in their regulations, assigning the several competitions to appropriate sacrifices at suitable times, and so providing our city with feasts for her observance. There is no difficulty in discovering how to reduce these details and others of the kind to a legitimate order, nor again will a different arrangement of them cause much benefit or detriment to society. But there is a matter of vast moment, as to which it is truly hard to inspire conviction. The task, indeed, is one for God himself, were it actually possible to receive orders from him. As things are, it will probably need a bold man, a man who puts plain speaking before everything, to declare his real belief about the true interest of state and citizens, and make the regulations the whole social system requires and demands in a corrupt age—a man who will oppose the passions at their strongest, and stand alone in his loyalty to the voice of truth without one creature on earth to second him.

Clinias/ Pray, sir, where may our argument be getting to now? As yet we do not see its drift.

Athenian Stranger/ I am not surprised you do not. But come! I must try to put the matter more plainly still. When

our conversation brought us to this theme of education, there rose before me a vision of young people of both sexes living in affectionate intimacy. As you may imagine, I was moved to uneasy apprehensions when I asked myself how one is to manage such a society—a society where the young of both sexes are in the pink of condition, exempt from the severe menial labor which does more than anything else to damp the fires of wantonness, and all make sacrifices, feasts, and choric song the concern of their lives. How, indeed, in such a society, are they to be kept free from the passions which bring such multitudes to their undoing, the passions from which wisdom, striving to convert itself into law, bids us abstain? To be sure, it would be nothing surprising that our regulations as already enacted should get the better of most of these passions. Our prohibition of excessive opulence, conducive as it is to temperance, is no trivial boon, and the whole course of the training is likewise under sound regulations of the same tendency. Besides, the magistrate's eye, drilled as it is to keep its object, and the young generation itself, constantly in view without a moment's diversion, provides a curb for most passions, so far as any device of men can.

But what of the passion of love in the young of either sex, or love of grown woman or man for the other? We know its untold effects in the life of private persons and whole societies, but what precautions should we take against it? Whence are you to cull the specific that shall protect all and sundry from its perils? There, Clinias, we have a difficulty indeed. In fact, Crete as a whole and Lacedaemon, which lend weighty and deserved support to a great deal of our proposed legislation where it is counter to common sentiment, are dead against us—I may say it between ourselves—in this business of sex. Were one to follow the guidance of nature and adopt the law of the old days before

Laius—I mean, to pronounce it wrong that male should have to do carnally with youthful male as with female—and to fetch his evidence from the life of the animals, pointing out that male does not touch male in this way because the action is unnatural, his contention would surely be a telling one, yet it would be quite at variance with the practice of your societies. Moreover, the very end we require the legislator to keep in constant view is ill suited with your practices.

You know the question we are repeatedly raising is what enactments foster goodness and what do not. Very well, then, suppose our present legislation pronounces this practice laudable, or free from discredit. How will it promote goodness? Will it lead to the growth of the temper of valor in the soul of the seduced? Or the growth of a temperate character in his seducer? That is surely more than any man can believe. Surely, the very opposite is the truth. Everyone must censure the unmanliness of the one party, who surrenders to his lusts because he is too weak to offer resistance, and reproach the other—the impersonator of the female—with his likeness to his model. Who in the world, then, will give legislative countenance to a practice of such a tendency? No one, I say, who has any notion of what a true law is. You ask how I prove my point? We shall have to examine the real nature of affection and its attendant desire and of love so called, if we are to think rightly of this matter. There are, in fact, two different things, as well as a third compounded of them both, covered here by one single name, and it is this which causes so much confusion and obscurity.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, we speak, you know, of the attachment between those who are alike in goodness, or between equals, and again of that between the indigent and

the rich, where the one party is the opposite of the other, and when either feeling is intense we call it love.

Clinias/ We do.

Athenian Stranger/ Now this attachment between opposites is fierce and furious, and we do not often find it reciprocated, whereas that founded on similarity is equable and permanently reciprocal. Where both factors are present at once, for one thing it is hard to perceive what the subject of this 'love' is really seeking, and for another, he is distracted and baffled by rival impulses, one inviting him to enjoy the charms of the object, the other forbidding the enjoyment. The man whose love is a physical passion, a hunger for another's charms, like that for ripe fruit, tells himself to take his fill and gives not a thought to his minion's state of soul. But he that treats carnal appetite as out of the question, that puts contemplation before passion, he whose desire is veritably that of soul for soul, looks on enjoyment of flesh by flesh as wanton shame; as one that reverences, aye and worships, chastity and manhood, greatness and wisdom, he will aspire to live with his love in constant purity on both parts. The sort of love in which both factors are involved is that we have now reckoned the third. Now since loves are of so many kinds, should the presence of all kinds be excluded from our midst by legal prohibition? Is it not obvious rather that we shall wish to find in our city the sort that has goodness for its object, the desire to make a youth as good as he can possibly be, but prohibit the other two, if only we can? Megillus, my friend, what would you have us say?

Megillus/ All you have even now said of this same matter, sir, is perfectly well.

Athenian Stranger/ I expected I should find you in accord with myself, friend, and it seems I was right. What your

Spartan law thinks about such matters is a question I need not raise; I need only welcome your assent to our doctrine. As for Clinias, I must do my best to charm him into acceptance of our view on some later occasion. But enough of your common concession. By all means let us return to our legislating.

Megillus/ Rightly proposed.

Athenian Stranger/ Well now, and about a device to make the establishment of our law secure? I have one actually ready to my hand, easy enough in one way, though in another of the utmost possible difficulty.

Megillus/ You mean to say?

Athenian Stranger/ Even today, as you know, lawless as most men are, they are very effectually deterred from cohabitation with the fair, and not against their own will either, but with their full and entire consent.

Megillus/ Of what cases are you thinking?

Athenian Stranger/ Of persons who have a fair sister or brother. The same law, though unwritten, proves a complete safeguard of son and daughter—so much so that no one lies with them, openly or covertly, or approaches them with any familiarities of that sort—nay the very wish for such congress never so much as enters the mind of the ordinary person.

Megillus/ True enough.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, you see how all such lusts are extinguished by a mere phrase.

Megillus/ Phrase? What phrase?

Athenian Stranger/ The saying that they are all unhallowed, abominations to God, deeds of black shame. The explanation must surely be that no one holds a different language about them. All of us, from our very cradles, are

constantly hearing the same report of them from all quarters; we hear it alike from the lips of the buffoon, and again delivered with all the so-called solemnity of tragedy, on those many occasions when the stage presents us with a Thyestes, an Oedipus, or a Macareus, some character who acts the stealthy paramour to a sister and freely sentences himself to death for his crime on discovery.

Megillus/ You are perfectly right on one point. Common fame is indeed a wonderfully potent force, provided only no single soul dares to entertain a sentiment contrary to the established usage.

Athenian Stranger/ So you see how right I was to say that if only the legislator has a mind to subjugate one of the passions which keep humanity in the hardest bondage, it is easy enough for him to find out the way to get a hold on it. He has merely to get the sanction of a common fame which is universal—embraces bond and free, women and children, and every section of society alike—and he will without more ado have secured the best of guarantees for his law.

Megillus/ No doubt, but, then, how a whole community is ever to be brought to this voluntary unanimity of language on such a point—

Athenian Stranger/ A pertinent rejoinder. That was exactly my own meaning when I said I knew of a device for establishing this law of restricting procreative intercourse to its natural function by abstention from congress with our own sex, with its deliberate murder of the race and its wasting of the seed of life on a stony and rocky soil, where it will never take root and bear its natural fruit, and equal abstention from any female field whence you would desire no harvest. Once suppose this law perpetual and effective—let it be, as it ought to be, no less effective in the remaining cases than it actually is against incest with parents—and the

result will be untold good. It is dictated, to begin with, by nature's own voice, leads to the suppression of the mad frenzy of sex, as well as marriage breach of all kinds, and all manner of excess in meats and drinks, and wins men to affection of their wedded wives. There are also numerous other blessings which will follow, if one can only compass the establishment of such a law. Yet should some young and lusty bystander of exuberant virility overhear us as we propose it, he might probably denounce our enactments as impracticable folly and make the air ring with his clamor. This was what led me to say, as I did, in so many words, that the device I knew for establishing such a law in perpetuity, though easy enough in one way, was most difficult in another. To see that the thing can be done, and how it can be done, is perfectly easy. As I say, if once the regulation receives adequate sanction, the minds of all will be subjugated and there will be a universal dread of the established law and conformity to it. But the fact is, things have come to such a pass today that no such result is thought possible, even in the case I have supposed. It is just as with the system of the common meal, a practice which it is thought beyond the bounds of possibility for a whole city to adopt throughout its daily life. The institution is proved as a fact to exist in your own societies, yet it is thought its extension to women would be outside the bounds of nature, even in them. It was in that sense, in view of this dead weight of incredulity, that I spoke of the great difficulty of establishing either practice as a permanent law.

Megillus/ And there was truth in what you said.

Athenian Stranger/ Still, would you like me to do what I can to urge an argument, and a telling one, to show that the proposal is feasible, not out of the range of human possibility?

Clinias/ Most certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then tell me, in which case would a man find it an easier task to abstain from sexual gratifications and obey orders on the matter readily, as a decent man should—if his physique were in good condition—in training, in fact—or if it were in poor form?

Clinias/ If he were in training, of course. Most decidedly so.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, we have all heard, have we not, how Iccus of Tarentum is said to have acted for the sake of distinction at Olympia and elsewhere? Such was his passion for victory, his pride in his calling, the combined fortitude and self-command of his character that, as the story goes, he never once came near a woman, or a boy either, all the time he was in training. And you know the same is said of Crison, Astylus, Diopompus, and not a few others. And, after all, Clinias, they had much worse-cultivated minds than the citizens for whom you and I are providing, and much more rebellious bodies.

Clinias/ You are perfectly right when you say that tradition asserts this emphatically as actual fact about these athletes.

Athenian Stranger/ Why then, they made no hardship of denying themselves this 'heaven of bliss,' as the vulgar account it, for the sake of winning a victory in the ring, or the racecourse, or the like. And are our pupils to fail in endurance for the sake of a far nobler victory—one whose supreme nobility we shall extol in their hearing, from their earliest years, by story, speech, and song—it is to be hoped with the of result of bringing them under the spell?

Clinias/ And what victory is that?

Athenian Stranger/ The conquest of their lusts. If they achieve it, we shall tell them, their life will be bliss; if they fail, the very reverse. And besides, are we to think the dread

of so utterly unhallowed a deed will be so wholly powerless to compass a mastery which has been attained before by other men, and worse men?

Clinias/ We can hardly suppose so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then if this is how we stand in the matter of this law—if it is the general viciousness which has brought us to a stand-still—I say it is the law's simple duty to go straight on its way and tell our citizens that it is not for them to behave worse than birds and many other creatures which flock together in large bodies. Until the age for procreation these creatures live in continence and unspotted virginity; when they have reached that age, they pair together, the male with the female and the female with the male their preference dictates, and they live thereafter in piety and justice, steadfastly true to their contract of first love. Surely you, we shall say, ought to be better than the beasts. But if, alas, they should be corrupted by the example of the great mass of other Greeks and of non-Greeks, as they learn from their eyes and ears how all-powerful so-called free love is among them all, and should so fail to win the victory, I would have our curators of law turn legislators and contrive a second law to meet their case.

Clinias/ And what law do you advise them to enact, if the one we are now proposing slips through their fingers?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, of course, Clinias, the next best to it.

Clinias/ And what is that?

Athenian Stranger/ There was a way of effectively checking the development of the full violence of these lusts, that of directing the rising current into some other physical channel by hard work. Now this result may be attained if sexual indulgence is attended by a sense of shame; this feeling will make indulgence infrequent, and the infrequency

of the indulgence will moderate the tyranny of the appetite. So it must be the ordinance of custom and unwritten usage that secrecy in such matters is a point of honor, and the discovery of the act, though not necessarily its mere commission, discreditable. The establishment of such a tradition would give us a second-best standard of honor and dishonor with its own inferior rightness; the morally corrupt class whom we speak of as 'slaves to their vices' would be circumvented and constrained to compliance with the law by no less than three influences.

Clinias/ And what are the three?

Athenian Stranger/ Fear of God, desire of honorable distinction, and the development of the passion for a beauty which is spiritual, not physical. It may be that my present proposals are no more than the aspirations of a pious imagination, though I assure you any society would find their realization a supreme blessing. However, by God's help, we might not impossibly enforce one or other of two rules for sexual love. One would be that no freeborn citizen should dare to touch any but his own wedded wife, and that there should be no sowing of unhallowed and bastard seed with concubines, and no sterile and unnatural intercourse with males. Failing this, we may suppress such relations with males utterly, and as for women, if a man should have to do with any—whether acquired by purchase or in any way whatsoever—save those who have entered the house with the sanction of heaven and holy matrimony, and his act become known to man or woman, we shall probably be pronounced to do well by enacting that he be deprived of the honors of a citizen, as one that proves himself an alien indeed. So whether this be taken as one single statute, or should rather be called two, let it stand as our law in the matter of sex and the whole business of love, our rule of right and wrong in all relations inspired by those passions.

Megillus/ Indeed sir, I for one shall welcome this law with all my heart. Clinias, of course, must declare his mind on the matter for himself.

Clinias/ And so I shall, Megillus, when I think I have fitting occasion. For the moment, however, suppose we permit our friend to proceed with his legislation.

Megillus/ Well and good.

Athenian Stranger/ Observe then. Our progress has now brought us to a point at which we may well take the public meals to have been instituted. As I say, there would be difficulties about this anywhere else, but in Crete no one is likely to recommend any other arrangement. But on what system they should be conducted, that of this country, that of Lacedaemon, or whether some third type of public meal would be better than either, is, I think, not a problem of great difficulty, nor does its solution promise any considerable advantage. In fact, I believe the arrangements we have already made quite sufficient.

The question which arises next in natural order is that of commissariat. What will be the appropriate sources of provisions? Of course, the sources from which societies in general can be provisioned are varied and numerous, twice as numerous, at least, as those open to our citizens, since a Greek population, as a rule, draws its food supply from land and sea alike, whereas ours is confined to the land. So far as the legislator is concerned, this makes his work lighter. The number of laws necessary for adequacy will be reduced not merely to one half, but within still narrower compass, and those which are required will also be fitter for freeborn men. The maker of our city's code is free to turn his back on the regulation of commerce, water-borne or land-borne, of retail trading, innkeeping, tolls and customs, mining operations, interest simple and compound, and a thousand

such details. His statutes will be made for husbandmen, graziers, beekeepers, custodians of such stock, and users of the implements connected with it. His principal task has already been achieved by his regulation of marriage, procreation and rearing of children, education, appointment of civic officials. He has now to turn his attention to regulations for those who raise the food supply or are concerned in its preparation.

We shall begin, then, with a number of statutes under the rubric, of Agriculture. At their head shall stand a law of the sacred landmark, and it shall run thus. No man shall move his neighbor's landmark, whether that neighbor be a fellow citizen, or the property lie on the border marches and the neighbor be thus an alien. The act must be held to be a literal ‘moving of the not-to-be-moved,' and every man must be readier to venture the shifting of the heaviest boulder that marks no boundary than to move the tiny stone, consecrate by oath to heaven, that marks off the land of a friend or a foe. For Zeus the god of common clanship is witness to one of these sanctities, Zeus protector of the stranger to the other, and when the wrath of these powers is awakened, deadliest hostilities ensue. He that is obedient to the law shall feel none of its penalties, but he that sets it at naught shall be guilty at more bars than one, first and foremost at the bar of heaven, and next at that of the law. None, I say, shall move a neighbor's boundary stone of his own free purpose; if they are so moved, he that will may lay an information before the husbandman, who shall bring the matter into court. If a man be cast in such a suit, he shall be held for one that seeks by stealth or violence to assail freehold, and the court shall assess the penalty the culprit shall suffer or the mulct he shall pay.

Further, little repeated torts between neighbors by their frequency engender a heavy burden of ill will and make

neighborhood a grievous and bitter hardship. Hence neighbor must take every care to do nothing exceptionable to neighbor, must keep himself strictly from all such acts, and above all from encroachment on a neighbor's lands, for whereas by no means every man can do his neighbor a service, to cause him hurt is easy enough, and any man can do it. He that disregards boundary marks and works soil that belongs to his neighbor shall make the damage good to him, and shall, moreover, by way of medicine for his churlish insolence, pay a further sum of double the amount of the damage to the sufferer. In all such cases the inspection, conviction, and assessment of penalties shall be in the hands of the rural commissioners—action being taken, as has already been said, in graver cases with the whole staff for the district, in the lighter with their commanders. If any man graze his cattle on a neighbor's land, they shall likewise decide the case and fix the penalty by ocular inspection of the damage done. If a man appropriate the bees of another's hive by humoring their tastes, and so beat down the swarm and make it his own, he shall pay for the damage done. If in making a bonfire he take no precaution for the timber of his neighbor's land, he shall pay such fine as the magistrates think good. And so, likewise, if in planting trees he should set them at an insufficient space from his neighbor's land. These matters have received competent treatment from many legislators, and we should adopt their regulations; we must not expect the great author of our social order to make statutes for all these numerous little matters with which any and every legislator can deal.

Thus, to take one instance, there are sound old laws extant concerning the farmer's water supplies. There is no need that they should be distilled in our discourse, but any who is minded to bring water to his steading may draw it from the public watercourses, so long as he does not tap

exposed springs owned by another private person, and may conduct it in any channel he pleases, provided he avoids houses, temples, and tombs, and causes no damage beyond the cutting of the channel itself. If certain districts are naturally arid from failure to retain rain water, and so there is a scarcity of the needful supply, the owner may dig on his own land down to the clay. If he should find no water at that depth, he shall be furnished by his neighbors with just so much as he needs for the drinking supply of his domestic staff; if the distress extends to the neighbors also, he shall procure an order for his ration of water from the rural commissioners, and receive that quantity daily by contribution from the neighbors. If a man causes damage to the occupant of the farm or dwelling house immediately above his own by impeding the outflow of rain water, or again to the occupant of a lower site by careless discharge of the efflux from a higher, with the consequence that the parties decline to oblige one another in the matter, either may obtain an order for the conduct of both from an urban commissioner, if the case arise within the town, or a rural commissioner, if it occur in a country district. A party who disregards such an order shall render himself liable to proceedings by his grudging and unaccommodating spirit, and on conviction shall pay the sufferer double the amount of damage caused as a penalty for his refusal to comply with the magistrate's directions.

As to the fruit harvest, there must be an accepted general understanding to some such effect as this. Two gifts are bestowed on us by the bounty of the goddess of harvest, one the 'ungarnered nursling of Dionysus,' the other destined for storage. So our law of fruits shall impose the following rules. If a man taste the common sort of fruit, whether grapes or figs, before Arcturus have brought round the season of vintage, whether on his own ground or on that of another,

he shall incur a fine in honor of Dionysus, of fifty drachmas for fruit culled in his own grounds, a mina for that taken from his neighbor's, two thirds of a mina for fruit gathered elsewhere. As for what we commonly call choice grapes or choice figs, if a man has a mind to harvest them and takes them from his own plants, he shall be free to gather them as and when he will, but if they are taken from another's plants without the owner's consent, he shall be fined for each such act conformably to the law which forbids him to 'take up what he did not lay down.' If it is actually a slave who touches such things without permission from the owner of the land, he shall receive a stripe for every grape of each cluster taken, or every fig taken from the tree. A resident alien who buys the choice produce may gather it at his pleasure. As for the alien on a temporary visit, who may desire to eat the fruit as he travels the roads, he and a single attendant may, if he so pleases, take the choice fruit without payment, as a gift of national hospitality, but the law must prohibit the foreigner from meddling with our common fruits and the like. If they are taken in ignorance by master or slave, the slave shall suffer a whipping; the free man shall be dismissed with a warning and an admonition only to touch such fruit as is unfit to be set apart for use as raisins, wine, or dried figs. As for pears, apples, pomegranates, and the like, it shall be no felony to filch them, but should any man under thirty years of age be taken in the act, he shall be punished by blows which must not draw blood, and a free man shall have no remedy at law against such blows. An alien shall be free to take his share of this produce, as of the grapes and figs. If they are taken by a citizen over the age of thirty, he may share in them on the same terms as the alien, provided he eat the fruit on the spot and carry none away, but disobedience to the law shall render him liable to disqualification from seeking distinctions, when the time

comes, if such conduct is brought to the notice of the acting judges.

Water, above all things, is exceptionally necessary for the growth of all garden produce, but is easily corrupted. It is not easy to affect the other contributory causes of the growth of products of the ground, the soil, the sunlight, the winds, by doctoring, diverting, or intercepting the supply, but water can be tampered with in all these ways, and the law must accordingly come to the rescue. So we shall meet the case by enacting as follows. If one man intentionally tamper with another's supply, whether of spring water or standing water, whether by way of drugging, of digging, or of abstraction, the injured party shall put the amount of the damage on record, and proceed at law before the urban commissioners. A party convicted of poisoning waters, shall, over and above the payment of the fine imposed, undertake the purification of the contaminated springs or reservoir in such fashion as the canon law may direct this purification to be performed in the individual case.

As to the bringing home of the fruits of the seasons, it shall be open to any man to fetch in his crop by the route he pleases, provided either that he cause no damage to another, or that the profit to himself is threefold of the damage to his neighbor. The determination in these cases shall lie with the magistrate, as generally in other cases where intentional damage is done to any man's person or property without his consent by a second party or a chattel of such party. Information shall be given to a magistrate and redress awarded for damage to the amount of three minas or under; when the claim is for a greater sum, the complainant shall carry the case before the public courts and seek redress of the injury from them. If any magistrate is judged to have shown injustice in an award of compensation, he shall be liable to forfeit double the amount to the aggrieved party; an

unfair decision about any charge may be brought before the public courts by either party to the suit. These countless minor formalities about methods of judicial procedure—the institution of a process, the issuing of a summons, the number of witnesses, whether two or some other number, required to its service, and the like—cannot be left without legal regulation, and yet are beneath the attention of an aged legislator. His younger imitators should prescribe them on the model of his antecedent and more important rules; they should make an experimental use of such rules where they are forced to employ them, until they are satisfied that they have a complete and adequate collection of them. Then, when the rules have been got into shape, and not before, they should treat them as final and live by them.

As to the arts and crafts, we should proceed as follows. In the first place, no native, and no servant of a native, is to practice a craft as his calling. A citizen has already a calling which will make full demands on him, in view of the constant practice and wide study it involves, in the preservation and enjoyment of the public social order—a task which permits of no relegation to the second place. But human capacity, we may fairly say, is never equal to the finished exercise of two callings or crafts. Nay more, none of us has the gift of following one craft himself while he superintends another's practice of a second. Hence we must from the start take this as a principle of our society. No one shall be smith and carpenter at once, and further, no one who is a carpenter shall be permitted to superintend others who are engaged in smith-work, to the neglect of his own craft, on the plea that as overseer of so many employees who are working for his profit, he naturally supervises them the more carefully because his revenue from their labors is so much greater than his income from his own trade. Each artisan in the society must have his single craft, and must earn his living

by that trade and no other. The urban commissioners must exert themselves to keep this law in force. If a native stray from the pursuit of goodness into some trade or craft, they shall correct him by reproach and degradation until he be brought back again into the straight course; if an alien follow two crafts, there shall be correction in the shape of imprisonment, fine, or expulsion from the city to constrain him to play one part, not several. Disputes about wages due to workmen or refusal of work done by them, and complaints of injustice done to them by others, or to others by them, shall be decided by the urban commissioners where the sum involved is not more than fifty drachmas; where it is greater, the public courts shall deal with the case as the law may direct.

No dues shall be paid in our city either on exports or on imports. There shall be no importation of frankincense or other such foreign perfumes for the purposes of religious ceremonial, nor yet of purple and other dyestuffs not produced in the country, nor of the materials of any other industry dependent on foreign importation and serving no necessary purpose. Further there shall be no exportation of any commodities which it is indispensable to retain at home. The jurisdiction and supervision in all these matters shall be with the twelve curators of law who stand at the head of the board when its five senior members are exempted.

As to weapons of war and military equipment of all kinds, if military purposes require the importation of any industry, vegetable, mineral substance, material for rope-making, or animal, the cavalry commanders and generals shall have the control of such importation and exportation, the state being both seller and buyer, and the proper and sufficient regulations for the proceeding being imposed by the curators of law. There shall be no retailing of these or any other

materials for profit anywhere within our territory or among our citizens.

When we come to supplies and the distribution of natural produce, a rule much like that followed in Crete will probably be found to serve our turn. All should divide the total produce of the soil into twelve parts, as it will in fact be divided in consumption. Each twelfth—that of the wheat and barley, for example, and all the produce of the seasons as well as all salable livestock in the various districts must, of course, be subject to the same law of division—should be subdivided into three proportional shares, one for the free citizens, another for their servants, while the third shall be for artisans and other noncitizens, whether permanent residents requiring the necessities of life or temporary visitors brought in by the business of the state or of private citizens, and the third part of all the necessaries of life shall be the only part which shall be forced into the market; there shall be no compulsion to sell any portion of the remaining two thirds. Now what will be the right way of making this division? For one thing, it must obviously be equal in one way, though not in another.

Clinias/ A word in explanation, please.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, you know, some of these products are bound to be inferior in strain and condition and others superior.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, in that respect none of the three subdivisions, neither that for the masters, nor that for the slaves, nor yet that of the aliens, shall have any advantage over the other; the distribution shall secure the same equality of similarity for all. Each citizen shall receive the two thirds and be authorized to distribute them among the slaves and free persons of his household in such quantity

and quality as he pleases. The residue shall be distributed by number and measure in the manner following. The distribution shall proceed upon a computation of the whole livestock which will have to be supported by the produce.

Next, we must provide our personnel with individual dwelling houses properly grouped, and the following disposition will be appropriate for the purpose. There should be twelve villages, each standing in the center of one of our twelve regional districts. Our first proceeding should be, in each of these villages, to set apart temples, with a market square, for the gods and superhuman beings under them, taking care that any local deities of the Magnesians, or sanctuaries of other powers of venerable memory which may be left, receive the same honors as in earlier ages. In each of the twelve regions we shall found shrines of Hestia, Zeus, Athena, and the god, whoever he may be, who is to be patron of the district. We should then begin by building dwellings on the highest ground, in the neighborhood of these temples, as the strongest lodging we can find for the garrison. The whole of the rest of our territory will be furnished with workmen, who will be divided into thirteen sections. One of these will be appointed to dwell in the capital—this section itself, in its turn, will be divided into twelve parts, like the capital itself, who will be distributed through all the suburbs—while we shall collect in the several villages the classes of hands whom farmers will find useful. The supervision of them all is to be in the hands of the chiefs of the rural commissioners, who shall decide what workers each district requires, and how many of them, and where they can live with least discomfort to themselves and most benefit to the farmers. The workmen in the capital shall, in like manner, be placed and remain under the supervision of the board of urban commissioners.

The details of the conduct of the market must, of course, rest with the commissioners of the market. After their vigilance to protect the temples in the market place from all violation, their second concern must be with the supervision of the human traffic, and in this charge they shall take careful note of decency and indecency of behavior, and inflict correction where it is called for. They are, first of all, to take note whether the sales of the articles which citizens are required to vend to aliens are in all cases conducted as the law commands. For each such article the law will be that on the first of the month the quantity which is to be sold to the aliens shall be produced by the agents—that is, aliens or slaves appointed by the citizens for this purpose—beginning with the monthly twelfth portion of corn, and an alien shall at this first market purchase corn and all that belongs to it for the whole month. On the tenth, the parties shall, respectively, conduct the sale and purchase of liquids sufficient for the full month. On the twentieth, there shall be a third sale, of such livestock as it meets the requirements of the parties to buy or sell, and also of such manufactured goods and articles as farmers have for sale, and foreigners can only acquire by purchase—for example, hides, wearing apparel, woven stuffs, felts. As to the retailing of those goods, of wheat or barley in the form of flour, or of any foodstuffs whatsoever, there shall be absolutely no selling to citizens or their slaves in this way, and no purchasing from them, though an alien, selling to artisans and their servants, in the market for foreigners, may drive a trade in wine and corn, a retail business, as it is commonly called. Butchers also may cut up carcasses and dispose of the joints to aliens, artisans, and artisans' servants. As for firewood, an alien shall be free, if he pleases, to buy it in bulk daily from the agents of the district, and may then retail it in such bulk and at such times as he pleases to other aliens.

As for all other goods or manufactured articles of which various parties may be in need, they shall be brought to the general market, each article to the proper quarter, and there offered for sale on the site appointed for traffic, and furnished with convenient stalls by the curators of law and the commissioners of market and city. The sale is to be by actual exchange of currency for goods and goods for currency, and neither party shall waive the receipt of a quid pro quo. A party who acts thus, by way of giving credit, shall put up with the consequences, whether he receives that for which he has bargained or not, as no action will lie in the case of such transactions. If the property bought or sold, in quantity or value, violate the law which fixes the limits of increase and decrease outside which both transactions are prohibited, the excess must be at once recorded in the court of curators, or the deficit canceled. The same rule shall apply to the inscription of the property of aliens.

Any foreigner who pleases may become a resident in the country on certain express conditions. It shall be understood that we offer a home to any alien who desires to take up his abode with us and is able to do so, but he must have a craft, and his residence must not be prolonged more than twenty years from the date of his registration. He shall pay no personal dues as an alien, however small, beyond good behavior, and no toll on the transactions of sale and purchase, and when the period of his stay has expired, he shall take his property with him on his departure. Should it be his good fortune, during this period, to have distinguished himself by some signal service to the state, and have hopes of satisfying the council and assembly of his claim to an official prorogation of his departure, or even to lifelong residence, he may appear and plead his case, and any claims of which he can convince the state shall receive full satisfaction. For the children of such aliens, provided

they possess a handicraft and have reached the age of fifteen, the period of residence shall be computed from their fifteenth year. When one of them who fulfills these conditions has completed his twenty years, he shall depart whither he pleases, or if he prefer to remain, he must obtain permission as already provided for. At a man's departure, the entries which previously stood against his name in the magistrates' register shall be canceled.

Book 9.

Athenian Stranger/ The next place in a digest of law will naturally fall to judicial processes arising from all the activities we have so far studied. What will inevitably be the matter of actions at law we have, indeed, already explained in a measure, viz., the affairs of the farm and the business connected therewith. But the main topic has not yet been broached; to handle it in its details—to say what punishment an offense must receive and before what court it must be brought—will be the next subject for our consideration.

Clinias/ And rightly so.

Athenian Stranger/ In a way, to be sure, it is to our shame to be framing any such legislation as we are now on the point of undertaking at all in such a society as we contemplate, one which, we hope, will have all advantages and enjoy all the right conditions for the practice of virtue. Why, the very assumption that a man will ever be born in such a society who will be stained by the graver turpitudes of other states, that we consequently need to anticipate the appearance of such characters by minatory legislation and enact statutes for their warning and punishment in the expectation that they will be found among us—the mere imagination, as I say, is, in a way, to our shame. But after all, we are not in the position of the legislators of earlier days, whose codes were framed for an age of heroes. They, if the current tales may be believed, were sons of gods and their laws were made for men of the same celestial ancestry; we are but men, and the law we are imposing is meant for slips of humanity. So we may well be pardoned for the apprehension that some 'hard shell' may be found among our citizens whose native stubbornness will be proof against all softening, and that such characters should yield no more to the mollifying

influence of our laws, effective as they are, than the tough bean to the heat of the fire. So for their ungracious sake I will begin with a law against temple robbery, should anyone commit so brazen a crime. It is not to be wished, and hardly to be imagined, that any rightly nurtured citizen should ever take the infection, but attempts in this way may not infrequently be made by servants, or by aliens and their slaves. For their benefit, in the first instance, though also from concern for our universal human frailty, I shall propound my statute against sacrilege and other such desperate, or well-nigh desperate, crimes generally. But I must first, on the principle we have already accepted, deliver myself of the briefest of preambles to this whole class of laws.

To him, then, who is driven by the voice of some unhappy passion that besets him by day and wakes him from his sleep at night, to go temple robbing, we may address some such words of reasoning and exhortation as these. Poor soul, this evil prompting which now moves you to go robbing temples comes neither from man nor from God; 'tis an infatuate obsession that is bred in men by crime done long ago and never expiated, and so runs its fatal course. You should strain every nerve to guard yourself from it. How you are to do so, you are now to be told. When thoughts of such things assail you, hasten to the rites that baffle the evil chance, hasten in supplication to the altars of the gods who give deliverance from curses, hasten to the company of your men of virtuous repute. Listen to them as they tell you, yes, and do your best to tell the story to yourself, how all are bound to revere the good and the right. From the company of the evil run, and look not once back. If such action bring relief from your malady, well and good; if not, think on the better way of death, and take your leave of life.

In such strains we shall couch our preludes for the behoof of such as purpose any of these accursed deeds whereby a

society is undone. The actual law shall be left without a voice for him who hearkens to us, but for him who will not listen it must follow up our prelude in ringing tones. Whosoever shall be taken in sacrilege, shall, if slave or alien, have his misfortune branded on hands and forehead, be scourged with such number of stripes as the court shall think proper, and be cast forth naked beyond the borders. For if he suffer that judgment, he may perchance be made a better man by his correction. For truly judgment by sentence of law is never inflicted for harm's sake. Its normal effect is one of two; it makes him that suffers it a better man, or, failing this, less of a wretch. If ever a citizen be detected in such an act, in gross and horrible crime against gods, parents, or society, the judge shall treat him as one whose case is already desperate, in view of the education and nurture he has enjoyed from a child and the depth of shame to which he is sunk. Whence his sentence shall be death, the lightest of ills for him, and he shall serve as an example for the profit of others, being buried in silence and beyond the borders. But children and family, if they forsake their father's ways, shall have an honorable name and good report, as those that have done well and manfully in leaving evil for good. It will not be proper that there should be any forfeiture of such men's estates in a society where patrimonies must remain forever unchanged and of undiminished number. And when a man has done a wrong which is judged to be met by a fine, he may meetly be made to pay such fine to the amount of whatever property may remain to him when his patrimony has been stocked, but no more. The curators shall ascertain the exact facts of each case from their register and report them to the court in due course of procedure, that no estate may go out of working for want of means. If a man's case be judged to call for a heavier fine than this, then if he have no friends who are ready to be bound for him and discharge

their part of his debt, his punishment shall take the form of long terms of prison, pillorying, and marks of degradation.

For no offense whatsoever shall any man be made a hopeless outlaw, not even though he have fled beyond our borders. Death, prison, stripes, ignominious postures of sitting or standing, or exposure at sanctuaries on the frontiers, fines, in cases where, as we have said, their payment is a proper sentence—these shall be our penalties. In a case of life and death the judges shall be curators of law acting together with the court selected for merit from the magistrates of the preceding year. It shall be the business of the junior curators to attend to the bringing in of the case, the issuing of citations and similar details, the observance of rules of procedure. We as legislators must prescribe the manner of taking the vote. The votes, then, shall be given openly, and before they are given the judges shall one and all, in order of seniority, take their seats in a compact body, facing prosecutor and defendant, and all citizens who have the necessary leisure shall be present and give attentive hearing to the pleadings in such cases.

The prosecutor shall state his case and the defendant reply to it, each in a single speech. When the speeches have been delivered, the senior judge shall first state his view of the case, discussing the statements of the parties in full and sufficient detail. When he has finished, the rest of the judges, each in his order, shall review any omissions or errors they find to complain of in the pleadings of either party, a judge who has no complaint to make leaving the right of speech to his neighbor. The written record of all statements pronounced to be relevant shall be confirmed by the seals of all the judges and deposited on the altar of Hestia. They shall meet again the next day at the same place to continue the review of the case, and once more affix their seals to the documents. When this has been done for a third

time, due weight being allowed to the evidence and witnesses, each judge shall give a solemn vote, swearing by the altar to pronounce just and true judgment to the best of his power, and this shall be the end of that trial.

To turn from cases of religion to cases of treason to the state, whosoever seeks to put law in chains and the state under the control of faction by subjecting them to the domination of persons, and further serves these ends and foments civil strife by revolutionary violence, must be counted the deadliest foe of the whole state, and he that, being in high office, though himself no party to such plottings, neglects to avenge his country on the plotter—whether it be that he detects them not, or that he detects them indeed, but is a craven at heart—such citizen must be held second only to the other in guilt. Any man of worth, however slight, must reveal the matter to the magistrate by bringing the plotter to trial for revolutionary and illegal violence. The judges in the case shall be the same as in those of sacrilege, and their whole procedure shall follow the same rule—death to be inflicted by a majority of their sentences. But once for all, in no case shall a father's disgrace or sentence descend to his children, save only when father, grandfather, great-grandfather have all, without break, incurred judgment of death. In that case the state shall deport them to their original native place with all their property beyond the whole stock of their patrimonial holding. Ten names shall be chosen by lot from the families of citizens who have more than one son over ten years of age, on the nomination of a father or grandfather on either side, and sent to Delphi. The nominee preferred by the god shall be constituted heir to the derelict house—let us pray, with brighter hopes!

Clinias/ An admirable proposal.

Athenian Stranger/ There is yet a third class to be covered by a single law prescribing the judges who shall sit upon them and the process of their trials—those who may be brought into court on the charge of traffic with the enemy. In like manner our proposed law concerning the retention of their children in the country or expulsion therefrom shall be the same for all three, the trafficker with the enemy, the temple breaker, the violent subverter of the state's laws. For the thief, again, there shall be one law, alike whether his theft be a great one or a small, and one legal penalty for all cases. For first he must pay twice the value of the thing stolen if convicted on such a charge, and if he have sufficient property besides his patrimonial holding to make the payment. If he have not, he shall lie in prison until the sum be either paid or remitted by the successful prosecutor. He that is convicted of theft from the public shall be released from durance on obtaining his grace from the state, or making payment of double the sum.

Clinias/ Pray, sir, how can we rule that it shall make no difference to a thief's case whether the stolen property be of great value or little, whether it be taken from a consecrated spot or an unconsecrated, or how the circumstances of a theft may differ in other respects? A lawgiver should surely adapt himself to the variety of these particulars by attaching widely different penalties to the several offenses.

Athenian Stranger/ A sound observation, Clinias. I fear I was letting myself drift when the collision with you woke me up. You remind me of the observation I made a while ago, that the business of legislation, if I may speak on the spur of the moment, has never yet been thoroughly worked out on right lines. But what, you may ask, do I mean by this? That was no unhappy simile by which we likened all existing legislation to the treatment of unfree patients by unfree physicians. You may be sure that were one of these empirical

practitioners of the healing art, so innocent of the theory of it, to discover a free physician conversing with his free patient, to hear him talking almost like a philosopher, tracing the disorder to its source, reviewing the whole system of human physiology, his merriment would be instantaneous and loud. His language would be no other than that which comes so pat from the lips of most of our so-styled physicians. This is not to treat the patient, fool, but to educate him—as though he wanted to be made a medical man, not to recover his health!

Clinias/ Well, and would not the speaker be in the right of it?

Athenian Stranger/ He might be so, if only he also understood that any man who treats of law in the style we are now adopting, means to educate his fellow citizens rather than to lay down the law to them. That, too, would be a pertinent remark, would it not?

Clinias/ It might be.

Athenian Stranger/ And how fortunate for us that our present position is what it is!

Clinias/ In what way fortunate?

Athenian Stranger/ Because we are under no obligation to lay down the law. We are free to pursue our own reflections on all points of political theory, to set ourselves to discover how to effect either the best possible result, or the indispensable minimum. In the case under discussion, for example, it is open to us, I take it, to ask either what would be the ideally best legislation, or what is indispensably requisite as a minimum, according to our preference. So we must make our option.

Clinias/ A singular pair of alternatives, sir. We should be in the position of the statesman driven by the stress of some dire necessity to produce his laws on the instant, because

tomorrow will be too late. Our case, please God, is more like that of stonemasons or some such workers at the beginning of their operations. We are free to collect our materials in the mass before we proceed to select those which will suit the future construction, and we can make the selection itself at our leisure. So we will take ourselves to be erecting our present edifice, not under pressure, but with undiminished leisure to lay up some of our material for future employment while we work the rest into our fabric. Thus we may rightly think of our body of law as composed partly of statutes actually imposed, partly of material for statutes.

Athenian Stranger/ At all events, Clinias, our digest of law will be the more scientific so. For here is a point I beg we may observe in connection with the legislator.

Clinias/ And what may it be?

Athenian Stranger/ Our societies, we may say, abound in literary works by various authors, and of this literature the productions of the legislator form part.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, are we to give serious attention to the compositions of others, poets and others who have left a written record of their counsels for the conduct of life, in prose or in verse, and none to the legislator's? Should not they have our first attention?

Clinias/ Decidedly.

Athenian Stranger/ And can we suppose that the legislator alone among authors is to give us no counsel about honor, good, or right, not to tell us what they are, and how they must be cultivated by one who would have a happy life?

Clinias/ Of course he must tell us.

Athenian Stranger/ Then if it is discreditable in Homer, or Tyrtaeus, or another poet, to have laid down bad precepts for the conduct of life in his verses, is the discredit less in

Lycurgus, or Solon, or any other author of a legislation? Surely a society's law-book should, in right and reason, prove, when we open it, far the best and finest work of its whole literature; other men's compositions should either conform to it, or, if they strike a different note, excite our contempt. How should we imagine the rightful position of a written law in a society? Should its statutes disclose the lineaments of wise and affectionate parents, or should they wear the semblance of an autocratic despot—issue a menacing order, post it on the walls, and so have done? Here, then, is the immediate question for us. Shall we try to take this line in uttering our thoughts on law, or, at least, make an earnest effort to do so, be its success as it may? And if there are hazards to be run on the road, shall we risk them? But may all be for the best—as it will be, God willing!

Clinias/ Well said, indeed. We must act as you propose.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we must, in the first place, go on with the investigation we had begun; we must look closely into our law of sacrilege, theft in general, and injuries as a class. We must not be discouraged to find that though some matters have been disposed of in the course of our still unfinished legislation, others still demand further consideration. We are still on our way to become legislators, but as yet have not reached the goal, as we may perhaps do in time. With your approval, then, we will discuss the points I have specified on the lines I suggest.

Clinias/ With all my heart.

Athenian Stranger/ Then here is the point where we must make an effort after clarity of vision in all discussion of the good and right. What amount of agreement and what amount of disagreement are actually to be found, among ourselves—who, you know, would own at least to an

aspiration to surpass the common herd—and again among the mass of mankind among themselves?

Clinias/ Of what disagreements between us are you thinking?

Athenian Stranger/ Let me try to explain. When we think of right in general, or of upright men, right deeds, right conduct, we are universally agreed in a way that they are one and all comely. Thus, however strongly a man should insist on the point that even upright men who may be physically ugly are perfectly comely, in respect of their eminent uprightness of character, his language would never be thought out of place.

Clinias/ And rightly not, surely.

Athenian Stranger/ No doubt. But I would have you observe that if all that is characterized by rightness is comely, this all must include what is done to us, no less than what we do.

Clinias/ And what then?

Athenian Stranger/ The right thing we do, just so far as it has its share of rightness, equally partakes of comeliness.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, if our language is to be kept clear of inconsistency, we must also admit that the thing done to us is comely just so far as it has its share of rightness.

Clinias/ True enough.

Athenian Stranger/ But if we grant that something may be done to us which is unseemly, though right, there will be a discord between the right and the comely; we shall have pronounced a right thing a shame.

Clinias/ But the point of your remark?

Athenian Stranger/ Quite a simple one. The laws we were just now laying down look like a proclamation of the direct contrary of our present doctrine.

Clinias/ Where does the discrepancy come in?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, you know, we laid it down that a temple robber or a man at war with an excellent law is rightly put to death. And we were on the point of enacting a host of similar rules when we were checked by the discovery that we have here the infliction of a host of severe penalties, and that these inflictions are at once supremely right and superlatively shameful. Thus we seem to assert first an absolute identity and subsequently an utter opposition between the right and the comely.

Clinias/ It looks dangerously like it.

Athenian Stranger/ And this is what brings the discordance and confusion into the popular employment of the epithets comely and right in such cases.

Clinias/ So it should seem, sir.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, Clinias, let us turn to ourselves. How far are we consistent in our language about the matter?

Clinias/ Consistent? Consistent with what?

Athenian Stranger/ I fancy I have already said in so many words—or if I have not, you may now take me as saying that—

Clinias/ That what?

Athenian Stranger/ That bad men universally are always bad against their own will. Now on that presupposition a further consequence inevitably follows.

Clinias/ And that consequence is?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, the doer of a wrong, you will grant, is a bad man, and a bad man is what he is against his

will. But it is mere nonsense to talk of the voluntary doing of an involuntary act. Ergo, he who declares the doing of a wrong involuntary must regard the doer of it as acting contrary to his own will, and I in particular am bound at this moment to accept the position. I grant, in fact, that those who commit wrongs always act against their own will. There may be those who are led by contentiousness or the desire to shine into saying that while there are involuntary wrongdoers, there are also many whose wrongdoing is voluntary, but for my part, I hold to the first statement and reject the second. Well then, I ask you, how am I to be consistent with my own avowals? Suppose you, Clinias and Megillus, put this question. The case being as you say, sir, how would you advise us about framing a code for our Magnesian state? Shall we make one or not? Make one, by all means, I answer. Then will it draw a distinction between involuntary wrongs and voluntary? Will it inflict heavier penalties for a voluntary transgression or wrong, and lighter for an involuntary? Or should they all be treated alike, on the ground that there is no such thing as a voluntary act of wrong?

Clinias/ Indeed, sir, you are very right. What are we to make of our statements?

Athenian Stranger/ Well demanded. Well, the first thing to be made of them is this.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ We shall remind ourselves of the truth of our recent remarks about the bewildering confusion and contradiction in our views of rights. Bearing this in mind, we shall go on to ask ourselves a further question. We have never extricated ourselves from our perplexity about this matter, we have never achieved any clear demarcation between these two types of wrongs, the voluntary and the

involuntary, which are recognized as distinct by every legislator who has ever existed in any society and regarded as distinct by all law. And is the formula we have just pronounced to dispose of the business by an ipse dixit, like some oracular response? Is it, so to say, to stifle opposition by decree, without one syllable of justification? Surely not. Before we come to the legislating we are bound to show that the cases are distinct and the difference between them other than supposed, to ensure that when we prescribe the penalty for an offense of either kind, everyone shall follow our reasoning and be capable of a more or less competent judgment on the appropriateness of the infliction.

Clinias/ Your audience is with you there, sir. Of two things, one—either we must deny the thesis that all wrongful acts are involuntary, or else, before we assert it, we must establish its soundness by making a distinction.

Athenian Stranger/ One of your alternatives, the denial of the thesis, I must absolutely decline to admit. Convinced as I am of its truth, to deny it would be unlawful and impious. But how do the two cases differ, if not as the involuntary and the voluntary? Of course we must try to find some other principle of distinction.

Clinias/ Assuredly, sir, we can think of no other possible course.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, I will try to do so. Consider. Citizens, of course, frequently cause mutual damage in their various associations and relations with one another, and the damage is often enough voluntary and also often enough involuntary.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we should not regard all these cases of causation of damage as wrongs, and so come to the conclusion that the wrong done in such acts may be of two

kinds, voluntary, or again involuntary—involuntary damage, as a form of damage, is as common and serious as voluntary. What you must consider is whether there is any truth or none at all in what I am next to say. What I maintain, Clinias and Megillus, is not that when one man causes hurt to another unintentionally and of no set purpose, he does him a wrong, but an involuntary wrong, and so I shall not propose to treat the act legally as an involuntary wrong—I shall not regard such causing of detriment, serious or trifling, as a wrong at all. Also, if my view carries the day, the author of a benefit will often be said to do a wrong, when that benefit is not rightfully conferred. Speaking generally, my friends, we cannot call it a right act without further qualification when one man gives another something, nor a wrong when he takes something from him. What the legislator has to ask himself is whether the agent of the beneficial or detrimental act is acting with a rightful spirit and in a rightful manner. There are thus two considerations he must keep in view, the wrong committed and the detriment occasioned. He must do all he can by his laws to make damage good, to recover the lost, rebuild the dilapidated, replace the slaughtered or wounded by the sound. He must aim throughout in his legislation at reconciling the minds of the authors and sufferers of the various forms of detriment by award of compensation, and converting their difference into friendship.

Clinias/ Admirable, so far.

Athenian Stranger/ And then as to wrongful detriment—or gain, either, in the case that a man should cause another to profit by a wrongful act—such things, as we know, are maladies of the soul, and we must cure them whenever they are curable. And the line our cure for wrong must follow, I say, is this.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ The line whereby law will both teach and constrain the man who has done a wrong, great or small, never again, if he can help it, to venture on repetition of the act, or to repeat it much more rarely—and he must make the damage good to boot. And so, if we can but bring a man to this—to hatred of iniquity, and love of right or even acquiescence in right—by acts we do or words we utter, through pleasure or through pain, through honor bestowed or disgrace inflicted, in a word, whatever the means we take, thus and only thus is the work of a perfect law effected. But should our legislator find one whose disease is past such cure, what will be his sentence or law for such a case? He will judge, I take it, that longer life is no boon to the sinner himself in such a case, and that his decease will bring a double blessing on his neighbors; it will be a lesson to them to keep them-selves from wrong, and will rid society of an evil man. These are the reasons for which a legislator is bound to ordain the chastisement of death for such desperate villainies, and for them alone.

Clinias/ All you have said seems, in its way, sound enough. But there is a point on which we should still be thankful for clearer explanations. How comes the distinction between wrong and detriment to be complicated in these cases with that between voluntary and involuntary?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, I must do what I can to give the explanation you require of me. I am sure that when you talk together about the soul there is one point assumed by speaker and listener alike, the presence in it of a native character—or, if you like, part—of passion, a contentious and combative element which frequently causes shipwreck by its headstrong violence.

Clinias/ Yes, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ You must observe further that we draw a distinction between passion and pleasure. The empire of pleasure, we say, is based on an opposite foundation; it regularly gets its will by a combination of seduction with cunning deception.

Clinias/ Assuredly.

Athenian Stranger/ And we should not be wrong if we spoke of ignorance as a third source of misconduct. Though you should note that the legislator will do well to make two kinds of it, ignorance pure and simple, which he will regard as a cause of venial offenses, and the more complicated condition in which a man's folly means that he is suffering not from ignorance alone, but also from a conceit of his own wisdom, and supposes himself to know all about matters of which he knows nothing whatsoever. When such ignorance is accompanied by exceptional capacity or power the lawgiver will regard the combination as a source of grave and monstrous crime; when it is conjoined with impotence, since the consequent misconduct is puerile or senile, he will treat it as an offense, indeed, and make laws against its perpetrator as an offender, but those laws will be the mildest and most indulgent of his whole code.

Clinias/ That is no more than sense and reason.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we all talk of one man as the master of his pleasures or his passion, of another as a slave to them, and this language describes real facts.

Clinias/ Most certainly it does.

Athenian Stranger/ But we have never heard it said that so-and-so is the master of his ignorance, or so-and-so a slave to it.

Clinias/ We certainly have not.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet we speak of all three as frequently impelling a man in one direction at the very time his own will is urging him in the opposite.

Clinias/ Aye, times out of mind.

Athenian Stranger/ Now at last I am in a position to explain precisely what I mean by right and wrong without any complications. Wrong is the name I give to the domination of the soul by passion, fear, pleasure or pain, envy or cupidity, alike in all cases, whether damage is the consequence or not. But where there is the conviction that a course is best—wherever a society or private individuals may take that best to lie—where that conviction prevails in the soul and governs a man's conduct, even if unfortunate consequences should arise, all that is done from such a principle, and all obedience of individuals to it, must be pronounced right and for the highest good of human life, though detriment thus caused is popularly taken to be involuntary wrong. Our business at present is not to contend about words, but, in the first place, to get a still surer mental grasp on the three classes of error which have already been indicated. One of these, you will remember, had a principal source of which we spoke as passion and fear.

Clinias/ Just So.

Athenian Stranger/ The second had its origin in pleasures and cupidities, and the third, which is of a very different kind, in the loss of sound anticipations and convictions about the good. Since the last has itself been subdivided into three, we get a total of five classes, as we may now observe, and for all five we have now to make distinct laws, under two principal heads.

Clinias/ And what are they?

Athenian Stranger/ Under one head fall all cases of deeds of open violence; under the other, those of dark and crafty

contrivance. There are also cases of acts in which both are employed, and it is, of course, these with which the law will deal most severely, if it is to have its proper effects.

Clinias/ Yes, to be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ So we may now revert to the point at which this digression began and continue our lawmaking. If I am not mistaken, we had already legislated against robbery of heaven and treasonable a traffic with the public enemy, and also against subversion of the established constitution by tampering with the laws. Now a man might conceivably commit an act of one of these kinds from insanity, or when so disordered by disease, so extremely aged, or of such tender years, as to be virtually insane. If one of these pleas can be established to the satisfaction of the court selected for the trial of the case, on the representations of the culprit or his advocate, and the verdict should be that the accused committed his transgression in such condition, he shall in any case pay full compensation to any party endamaged by his act, but the rest of the sentence shall be remitted, unless, indeed, he have taken a life and incurred the pollution of homicide. In that case, he shall remove to an abode in some other country, and remain there in exile for a full year; if he return before the legal term be expired, or set foot on any part of his native soil, the curators shall commit him to prison, and he shall not be released therefrom for two years.

As we have entered on the subject of homicide, we may attempt a complete statute dealing with all its forms. We will treat first of the case of unintentional violence. If a man unintentionally cause the death of a person with whom he is on friendly terms, in a competition or at the public sports, whether the death be immediate or result later from injuries received, or similarly if he cause such death in war or in some military exercise, whether unarmed practice or sham fight with armor, he shall, on accomplishing such

purifications as may be directed by a law for these cases received from Delphi, be esteemed clear of pollution. In the case of all medical practitioners, if the patient meet his end by an unintentional act of the physician, the law shall hold the physician clear. And if one man take the life of another by his own act but without intention, whether with his naked hands, with weapon or missile, by administration of meat or drink, by application of heat or cold, by deprivation of air, by his own physical agency alone or by that of other persons, in all cases the deed shall be held his personal act, and he shall pay the penalty herein under stated.

If the slain man be a slave, he shall consider that it is just as though one had made away with a slave of his own and indemnify the owner of the deceased for his loss, or shall, in default, be condemned in double the value of the deceased—the said value to be estimated by the court—and shall be put to purifications more burdensome and numerous than those enjoined on those who cause loss of life at the sports, authority to prescribe these rights being vested in the interpreters of religious law whom the oracle shall nominate. If the slain man be his own slave, he shall be clear on accomplishing the purifications required by law. If one have unintentionally slain a free man, he shall be cleansed with the same purifications as the slayer of a slave, but let him take heed not to despise the teaching of the venerable and primitive myth. It tells us how he that is done to death with violence, as one that has lived his days in all the pride of a free man, has his wrath kindled against the author of his death in the days while the deed is still fresh, how he is likewise filled with fear and horror by his bloody fate, how he is aghast to see his murderer haunting walks that were once familiar and his own, how in his own distraction of soul, he allies himself with the doer's own memories to bring all possible distraction upon him and all his works. Whence

it is truly but right that the homicide should avoid his victim's path through the round of a full year, and leave all homely spots of his native land clear of his presence, and if the deceased be an alien, he must likewise be forbidden the alien's native country for the same space of time. If a man comply with this law of his own motion, the next of kin to the deceased, who shall take note of his obedience, shall pardon his act, and will do no more than right to keep the peace with him. If a man disobey, if, in the first place, he venture to enter the sanctuaries with the stain of blood on his hands and do sacrifice there, or again, if he decline to expatriate himself for the full time appointed, the next of kin shall bring his action of homicide against the slayer, and if conviction follow, all the penalties shall be doubled. But if the next kinsman do not prosecute the case, though the blood now lies at his door, inasmuch as the dead man demands atonement for his death, any who will may proceed against him at law and drive him by legal sentence to five-years' banishment from his land. If an alien slay an alien resident in the state, he who will may prosecute the suit under the same law, and if the defendant be a resident settler, he shall go into exile for a year. If he be wholly an alien, whether the slain man were alien, resident alien, or citizen, he shall, after his purification, be excluded from the land to which these laws belong for the term of his natural life. If he return in violation of the law, the curators shall visit him with death, and shall deliver any effects he may possess to the next of kin of the sufferer. If the return be involuntary, he shall, if shipwrecked on our coasts, take up his quarters where the sea wets his feet and wait for a boat to remove him; if he be brought back by land by force majeure, the first official into whose hands he may come shall release him and send him over the border under safe conduct.

If one slay a free man by one's own act but the deed be done in passion, there are, first, two cases to be distinguished. It is an act of passion when a man is done away with on the impulse of the moment, by blows or the like, suddenly and without any previous purpose to kill, and remorse instantly follows on the act. It is also an act of passion when a man is roused by insult in words or dishonoring gestures, pursues his revenge, and ends by taking a life with purpose to slay and without subsequent remorse for the deed. I take it we cannot treat these as two distinct forms of homicide; both may fairly be said to be due to passion and to be partially voluntary, partially involuntary. Not but what each of them has a resemblance to one extreme. The man who nurses his passion and takes his revenge not at the moment and on the spot, but afterward and of set purpose, bears a resemblance to the deliberate manslayer. He who does not bottle up his wrath but expends it all at once, on the spot, without premeditation, is like the involuntary homicide; still we cannot say that even he is altogether an involuntary agent, though he is like one. Hence the difficulty of deciding whether homicides of passion should be treated in law as intentional or, in some sense, unintentional. However the best and soundest procedure is to class each sort with that which it resembles, discriminating the one from the other by the presence or absence of premeditation, and legally visiting the slaughter where there is premeditation as well as angry feeling with a severer, that which is committed on the spur of the moment and without purpose aforethought with a milder, sentence. That which is like the graver crime should receive the graver punishment, that which resembles the lighter, a lighter. Our own laws, then, will of course be on these lines.

Clinias/ Most assuredly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us return to our code and continue it thus. If a man slay a freeborn person by his own act, but the deed be done in angry passion and without purpose aforethought, his sentence shall be in all other respects the same as that proper for him who has slain without passion, but the offender shall be made to spend two years in exile, to learn to bridle his temper. He that slays in passion, but with the addition of premeditation, again, shall have the same sentence, in other respects, as the former, but three years of exile in the place of the other's two; as his passion was the more grievous, so the term of his punishment shall be the longer. The rule for their restoration from banishment shall be as follows—it is hard to lay it down in the law with precision, as there are cases in which the criminal reckoned by the law the more dangerous proves the more tractable, and the more tractable, as the law considers him, the more dangerous, the act of the latter being at times the more barbarous, that of the former the more humane, though in general the distinction already drawn holds good. The last word on these and similar matters must rest with the curators.

When the term of banishment, then, is expired in either case, the curators shall send twelve of their own number to the frontier to sit upon the case; the twelve must, during this interval, have subjected the exile's actions to still closer scrutiny, and they are to judge about giving the criminals their grace and receiving them home again—the parties to be finally bound by this official verdict. If an offender of either kind ever, after his restoration, give way to rage and repeat his crime, he shall go into exile never to be recalled, and if he return, shall meet the same end as the returned alien. The man who slays a slave in his passion shall, if the slave be his own, purify himself, if another man's, pay his owner twice what he has lost. If any homicide of any class,

in defiance of the law, shall pollute, by his presence still uncleansed, market place, public sports, or other hallowed assemblies, he that will may bring his action against both the kinsman who is executor for the deceased and the homicide, and compel exaction and payment of money and all else that is due twice over, and the sum so paid shall be awarded by law to the informer himself. If a slave slay his owner in his passion, the kinsmen of the deceased shall deal with the slayer as they please and be clean of guilt—only that in no case shall they spare his life. If a free man be killed in passion by a slave not his own, such slave shall be delivered by his owner to the kinsmen of the deceased, who shall be bound to put the slayer to death, but the manner of his death shall be in their own choice. If—for though unusual, the case does occur—father or mother take the life of son or daughter in passion, by stripes or other violence, the purificatory rites shall be as in other cases, and the period of exile shall be three full years. When the slayers have been received back, there shall be a divorce of wife from husband, husband from wife; procreation between them must cease; there must be no part in the family or its worship for one who has robbed it of a son and brother. He that impiously refuses to comply with this ordinance shall be open to an action for impiety at the suit of any who will charge him. If a man slay his wedded wife in passion, or a woman do the like by her husband, there shall be the same rites of purifying, and the term of banishment shall be three years. When the criminal returns, he shall be cut off from joining in worship with his children, or sitting at one table with them forever. If father or child disregard this law, once more it shall be open to him who will to bring them to trial for impiety. If brother or sister slay a brother or sister in passion, the purifications and term of exile shall be as ordained in the former case of parent and child—no man

shall share one board or join in one worship with the brother he has robbed of a brother, or the parents he has robbed of a child—and if the command is disobeyed, the disobedient shall be liable to answer to the aforesaid law of impiety, as is just and right.

If ever any man should harbor such unbridled passion against those that gave him being that he should presume in the frenzy of his fury to slay a parent, then, if the deceased, before his end, freely forgave the criminal his death, he shall be clear when he has accomplished the same purification imposed on the unintentional homicide and performed what else is prescribed for that case. But if such forgiveness be not given, the criminal in this sort shall lie in the danger of more laws than one. He shall lie open to heaviest judgment for violent outrage, and for impiety, and sacrilege to boot; he has done despite to the temple of a parent's soul, whence, were it possible a man should die more than once, it were perfect justice to put the parricide or matricide whose crime was done in passion to repeated deaths. In this sole case, when a man's life is in danger from his parents, no law will permit slaying, not even in self-defense—the slaying of the father or mother to whom his very being is due. The law's command will be that he must endure the worst rather than commit such a crime. How then can he, under the law, fitly receive any judgment but one? Let death, then, be the penalty prescribed for him who in passion takes the life of father or mother.

If brother slay brother in a faction fight or some like case, and the act be done in self-defense and the slain man the aggressor, he shall be clear of guilt, as though the slain had been an enemy in arms; the same shall hold in such case for slaying of citizen by citizen, or alien by alien. If citizen slay citizen, in self-defense, he shall likewise be clear, and so also slave who slays slave. But if the slave take the life of a free

man in his own defense, he shall fall under the same laws as the parricide. All we have said of the father's forgiveness of his own death shall hold also for all forgiveness of the act; if any party soever freely forgive any party soever his death, and treat it as undesigned, the law shall enjoin on the homicide performance of the prescribed purifications and one-year's absence from the country.

So much may serve for a reasonably full treatment of violent, unintentional, and passionate homicide. We are next to deal with the case of acts in this kind done with intent, in downright wickedness, and of deliberate design, at the dictation of overmastering pleasures, cupidities, and jealousies.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us once more begin with an attempt to enumerate their sources. First and foremost there is concupiscence with its domination over a soul stung to savagery by unsatisfied lusts. Now this is chiefly found concerned with that on which most men's longing is most permanently and sharply set—wealth, with the power wealth gets alike from native bias and pernicious wrong education to breed countless cravings for insatiate and unbounded possession of itself. And the source of this perverse education is the credit given to false praise of riches alike by Greek and non-Greek; they promote wealth to the first place among good things, whereas in truth it holds but the third, and thus they deprive not only themselves but their posterity. It were for the truest good and glory of all societies that the truth should be told of riches. They are for the service of the body, as the body itself for the service of the soul. Since, then, there are goods to which wealth is but a means, it must hold a third place, after goodness of body and soul. From this doctrine we should learn that the aim of him who would be happy must be not to get riches, but to

get such riches as rectitude and self-command will permit. That lesson learned, society will no longer see homicide calling for still further homicide in expiation, whereas, today, as we said at first, this greed of riches is one source, and the chief source, of the most aggravated charges of willful homicide. A second is the spirit of rivalry with its brood of jealousies, dangerous company that they are for the envious man himself in the first instance, and only less dangerous to the best of his fellow citizens. And a third cause of too many homicides may be found in craven and guilty terrors. There are acts of a man's present or past to which he would wish none but himself to be privy, and so the informer in such a case is removed by murder, if all other methods fail. All this shall be dealt with in our preludes. They will also state a truth firmly believed by many who have learned it from the lips of those who occupy themselves with these matters at the Mysteries, that vengeance is taken on such crimes beyond the grave, and when the sinner has returned to our own world once more, he must infallibly pay nature's penalty—must be done by as he did—and end the life he is now living by the like violence at another's hands. If our mere prelude move any to obedience and proper fear of such a judgment, for them the note of formal command need not be struck, but for the disobedient the statute shall run thus in writing. If a man take the life of a fellow tribesman by his own act, wrongfully, and of set purpose, he shall in the first place be excluded from every place of lawful assembly, and forbidden to pollute with his presence temples, markets, harbors, or other places of public resort whatsoever, and that nonetheless whether any man have given the slayer public notice of the ban or not—the law itself gives notice of it and proclaims it on behalf of the community at large, now and to all time.

If any man of the deceased's kin within the limits of cousinship, on either father's or mother's side, shall neglect his duty to institute proceedings, or to make proclamation of the excommunication first, on his own head be the pollution and—for the law's curse brings the evil omen with it—the wrath of heaven. Next, he shall be open to prosecution by any man who is minded to avenge the deceased. He that has a mind to avenge him shall fulfill with due care the washings and other observances the oracle may prescribe in such cases, and give formal notice of the excommunication; he shall then proceed to compel the culprit to submit to execution as required by the law. That this process should be attended by prayers and sacrifices to gods whose function is to preserve societies from homicides the legislator may declare without trouble to himself. What gods these should be and what manner of conducting such trials will best suit with religion shall be determined by the curators of law, in concert with canonists, seers, and the oracle, before they institute the trials. The court shall be the same to which we gave authority to decide in charges of sacrilege. The convicted offender shall be put to death, and shall not receive burial in the land of his victim—for that would add insult to impiety. If he flee the land and decline to submit to judgment, his banishment shall be everlasting. If any such exile set foot in the country of his victim, the first kinsman of the murdered man, or indeed the first fellow citizen, who may fall in with him, shall slay him, with the law's permission, or else put him in bonds and deliver him for execution to the magistrates presiding over the court in which the case was tried. He that enters the case for prosecution shall also at the same time demand security from the accused, who shall produce his sureties, men whom the court of judges constituted for these cases shall pronounce sufficient, three substantial sureties pledged to

surrender him for his trial. In the case of refusal or inability to find such surety, the court shall arrest the accused, keep him prisoner, and produce him at the trial.

If a man be not the actual assassin, but have purposed the death of another and brought him to his end by design and contrivance, and then continue to reside in the state a guilty man with the stain of homicide on his soul, the procedure in the trial of such charges shall be the same, only that security shall not be demanded, and that the convicted may find burial in his native soil; in all other respects this case shall be treated precisely like the other. The procedure shall be the same in cases both of homicide where both parties are aliens, or one party a citizen and the other an alien, or both parties slaves, and of plotting homicide, except as concerns giving of security; as to that point, the party who advances the charge of homicide shall at the same time demand security from the accused in such cases, exactly as it has been prescribed to be required from the assassin. If a slave cause the death of a free man with intent, either as the actual homicide or as the plotter of it, the common executioner shall conduct him toward the burial place of the victim and to a spot from which the tomb is visible, when he shall be scourged with as many stripes as the prosecutor shall enjoin, and, if he survive the infliction, be put to death. If a man slay a slave who has committed no crime, from apprehension that he may inform against his own shameful misdeeds, or some similar motive, he shall stand his trial for the homicide of such slave precisely as though the slain had been a citizen.

Should there arise cases for which it is a grim and repulsive task even to provide in a legislation, though impossible to ignore them, I mean cases of deliberate and purely wicked homicide by act or contrivance between kinsmen—they are mostly to be found in states where the

way of life or the system of training is corrupt; still such a thing may happen even in a land where we could least expect it—why, we can but repeat the doctrine we uttered but now, in the hope that it will by its appeal dispose a hearer the more readily to eschew of his own free choice this most abominable of all forms of homicide. That tale, or doctrine—call it what you please—comes to us on the authority of priests of ancient days, and it tells us expressly that there is a justice watching to avenge a kinsman's blood, and that the law followed by this justice is no other than that we even now stated; it is appointed that he who has dealt in such guilt shall infallibly be done by as he has done. If any man have slain his father, there shall come a time when he shall have to suffer the same violent end at the hands of a child; if his mother, his certain doom in later days is to be born himself a female creature and, in the end, to have his life taken by those whom he has borne. When pollution has been brought on the common blood, there is no other way of purification but this; the stain refuses to be effaced until the guilty soul have paid life for life, like for like, and this atonement lulled the wrath of the whole lineage to sleep.

Thus a man's hand should be stayed by dread of such vengeance from heaven, but should there be wretches so whelmed in misery that they of malice prepense rend father's, mother's, brother's, or child's soul from body, our human legislator's statute provides for their case as follows. The regulations for making proclamation of excommunication and taking of security shall be as appointed in the former cases. If a man be found guilty of such homicide, that is, of slaying any of the aforesaid, the officers of the court with the magistrates shall put him to death and cast him out naked, outside the city at an appointed place where three ways meet. There, all the magistrates, in the name of the state, shall take each man

his stone and cast it on the head of the corpse as in expiation for the state. The corpse shall then be carried to the frontier and cast out by legal sentence without sepulture.

But what of him who takes the life that is, as they say, nearest and dearest to himself? What should be his punishment? I mean the man whose violence frustrates the decree of destiny by self-slaughter though no sentence of the state has required this of him, no stress of cruel and inevitable calamity driven him to the act, and he has been involved in no desperate and intolerable disgrace, the man who thus gives unrighteous sentence against himself from mere poltroonery and unmanly cowardice. Well, in such a case, what further rites must be observed, in the way of purifications and ceremonies of burial, it is for heaven to say; the next of kin should consult the official canonists as well as the laws on the subject, and act according to their direction. But the graves of such as perish thus must, in the first place, be solitary; they must have no companions whatsoever in the tomb. Further, they must be buried ignominiously in waste and nameless spots on the boundaries between the twelve districts, and the tomb shall be marked by neither headstone nor name.

If a beast of draft or other animal cause homicide, except in the case when the deed is done by a beast competing in one of the public sports, the kinsman shall institute proceedings for homicide against the slayer. The case shall be heard by such and as many of the rural commissioners as the next of kin may appoint; on conviction, the beast shall be put to death and cast out beyond the frontier. If an inanimate thing cause the loss of a human life—an exception being made for lightning or other such visitation of God—any object which causes death by its falling upon a man or his falling against it shall be sat upon in judgment by the nearest neighbor, at the invitation of the next of kin, who

shall hereby acquit himself and the whole family of their obligation—on conviction the guilty object to be cast beyond the frontier, as was directed in the case of a beast.

But if a man have manifestly been murdered, and the murderer is unknown or cannot be discovered after careful inquiry, notice of prosecution shall be given as in other cases, but the prosecutor shall address the notification to ‘the author of the homicide,' and after establishing his right to prosecute shall give public warning in the market place to ‘the criminal slayer of so-and-so' to set no foot in the sanctuaries or any other place within the country of his victim, with the threat that if he makes an appearance and is recognized, he shall be put to death and cast out of the country of the victim unburied. This, then, shall form one chapter in our law—the statutes of homicide.

So much then on these matters. The cases wherein and conditions whereon a slayer shall rightly be held guiltless shall be these following. He that slays a thief entering the house by night with intent of robbery shall be guiltless; he that in his own defense slays a footpad shall be guiltless. He that offers hurtful violence to a free woman or boy may be slain without fear of the law by the object of his violent rape, or by father, brother, or son of such party; if a man take one in the act of enforcing his wedded wife and slay him, he shall be clear in the eye of the law. If a man slay in defense of a father's life—the father not being engaged in a criminal act—or in like defense of child, brother, or mother of his children, he shall be altogether clear.

Thus much then for the law of the living soul and that nurture and education which it must needs enjoy if it is to live, and without which it must die, and the vengeance to be taken for death by violence. The law of the nurture and training of the body has been stated, and it will next, I take it, be right to proceed to a kindred topic, to classify and

enumerate to the best of our ability the various intentional or unintentional violent assaults committed by man on man, and to prescribe the penalties properly to be attached to their several kinds.

Wounds and maims, then, will be placed next after manslaughter by the veriest dabbler in legislation. Thus, like homicides, wounds must be divided into the involuntary, wounds inflicted in passion, those inflicted in fear, those that are intentional and deliberate. Hence we should begin our treatment of all classes with a prefatory statement to the following effect. Mankind must either give themselves a law and regulate their lives by it, or live no better than the wildest of wild beasts, and that for the following reason. There is no man whose natural endowments will ensure that he shall both discern what is good for mankind as a community and invariably be both able and willing to put the good into practice when he has perceived it. It is hard, in the first place, to perceive that a true social science must be concerned with the community, not with the individual—common interest tending to cement society as private to disrupt it—and that it is to the advantage of community and individual at once that public well-being should be considered before private. Again, even one who had attained clear perception of this principle as a point of scientific theory, if subsequently placed in a position of irresponsible autocratic sovereignty, would never prove loyal to his conviction, or spend his life in the promotion of the public good of the state as the paramount object to which his own advantage must be secondary. His frail human nature will always tempt such a man to self-aggrandizement and self-seeking, will be bent beyond all reason on the avoidance of pain and pursuit of pleasure, and put both these ends before the claims of the right and the good; in this self-caused blindness it will end by sinking him and his community with

him in depths of ruin. I grant you readily that if ever, by God's mercy, a man were born with the capacity to attain to this perception, he would need no laws to govern him. No law or ordinance whatever has the right to sovereignty over true knowledge. 'Tis a sin that understanding should be any creature's subject or servant; its place is to be ruler of all, if only it is indeed, as it ought to be, genuine and free. But, as things are, such insight is nowhere to be met with, except in faint vestiges, and so we have to choose the second best, ordinance and law. Now they can consider most cases and provide for them, but not all, and this is why I have said what I have. You and I are about to fix the penalty or fine to be inflicted on him who wounds another or does him a hurt. Now it is, of course, a proper and obvious comment to make at this point, to say, Wounds? Yes, but wounds whom, and where and how and when? The different cases are countless and their circumstances are widely unlike. So it is equally impossible to leave everything to the discretion of the courts and to leave nothing. One issue, indeed, we cannot avoid leaving to their discretion in all cases, that of the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the alleged event. And it is quite impossible to the legislator to leave the courts no discretion at all on the further question of the amount of the fine or penalty to be imposed on the perpetrator of this sort of wrong, but deal with all cases himself, light or grave, by statute.

Clinias/ What line, then, are we to take up now?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, this. Something must be left to the discretion of the courts, but not everything; there are things which the law must itself regulate.

Clinias/ Then which are the points to be thus dealt with by statute, and which should be entrusted to a court's discretion?

Athenian Stranger/ The proper step to take next is to point out that in a state where the courts of law are poor-spirited and inarticulate, where their members keep their convictions to themselves and reach their verdict by a secret vote, where, worst of all, they do not even listen to the case in silence but make the walls ring with the voice of their applause or censure of the alternate speakers, like the audience at a play, the community finds itself in a difficult position. Where the courts are so constituted, to be sure, the legislator's hand is forced by an unfortunate but very real necessity; he is compelled to restrict the court's discretion to assess penalties to cases of the most insignificant kind and to do most of the work himself by express statute, if he has the misfortune to be legislator for such a society. But in a community where the constitution of the courts is thoroughly sound, and the persons who will have to exercise the judicial function have been properly trained and made to pass the most exacting tests, it will be entirely right and fitting that such courts should be allowed a wide discretion in assessing the fines or other penalties of offenders. So we may well be excused, in the present instance, if we do not impose on them by statute the numerous and important rules which may be discovered by the insight of judges with a training inferior to theirs for attaching to the particular offenses the penalty merited by the wrong committed and hurt inflicted. Indeed, as we believe the persons for whom we are making our statutes likely to prove particularly capable judges in such matters, we shall trust most of them to their discretion. Not that we were not perfectly right in the doctrine we have repeatedly stated and observed in practice in the preceding part of our own legislation. An outline of the law with samples of penalties should be set before the judges as a model to keep them from any infringement of the

bounds of right. I shall, in fact, act so again in the present case, and this brings me back to the work of lawmaking.

The statute of wounding, then, shall run thus. If anyone intend and purpose the death of a person with whom he is on friendly terms, such person not being one against whom the law arms his hand, and fail to kill, but inflict a wound, he who wounds with such intent deserves no mercy, and shall be made to stand his trial for homicide with as little scruple as though he had killed. But the law will show its reverence for his not too wholly unpropitious fortune and the tutelary power which has, in mercy to both wounder and wounded, preserved the one from a fatal hurt and the other from incurring a curse and a disaster; it will show its gratitude and submission to that power by sparing the criminal's life and dooming him to lifelong banishment to the nearest state, where he shall enjoy his revenues in full. He must make payment of whatever damage he have caused to the wounded, the amount being fixed by the court before which the case is tried, and this court shall be composed of the same persons as would have tried the homicide had death followed as a consequence of the wounds inflicted.

If a son wound his parents or a slave his master with the like intent, the penalty shall be death; so also if brother or sister wound brother or sister in like fashion, and be found guilty of wounding with intent, the penalty shall be death. If a wife wound her husband, or a husband his wife, with design to kill, they shall go into perpetual banishment. As for the estate, if there are sons or daughters who are still minors, it shall be in the hands of the guardians, who shall be charged with the care of the children as though they were orphans; if the family be of full age, there shall be no liability of the offspring to support the banished man, and the estate shall be their property. If the victim of the calamity be childless, the kinsmen of the exile within the degree of

second cousinship on both male and female sides shall meet to appoint an inheritor for the house in question—the five-thousand-and-fortieth of the state—in consultation with the curators and priests, and they shall do so with this thought before their minds. There is no house of the five thousand and forty that belongs so truly to its occupant or his whole kin as to the state, and that by every right of ownership. It is for the state, then, to keep its house in all purity and good fortune. When a house, then, is visited with such guilt and misfortune at once that the owner leaves no sons to succeed to it, but dies unwedded or wedded but childless, under conviction of willful homicide, or other sin against heaven or human society for which the pain of death stands expressly prescribed in the law, or again when a childless man is under doom of perpetual exile, the house itself shall first be purified and exorcised as the law directs. Next the household shall meet, as provided even now, along with the curators, to consider what house of all in the state is at once of the first repute for goodness, favored by fortune, and possessed of more children than one. From such a house they shall adopt one person as a son and successor to the father of the deceased and his line before him, naming him after one of the lineage for the omen's sake, and offering prayers that they may all find in him by this means a progenitor of issue, a preserver of the hearth, and a minister in things secular and sacred with fairer for tunes than his father. They shall then constitute him legal heir to the estate, while the criminal shall be left without name, children, or portion when such calamity overtakes him.

It should seem that boundary is not in all cases immediately adjacent to boundary; where there is a borderland, this interposing belt touches either region first and is common ground to both. In particular we have said that deeds of passion form such a borderland between the

unintentional and the intentional. Hence our law of wounding in anger shall run thus. On conviction, first the offender shall repay the damage done twofold, if the wound prove curable, fourfold for an incurable hurt. And if the wound, though curable, cause the injured man some grave and shameful disfigurement, the payment shall be threefold. In a case where the assailant causes detriment not only to the victim, but to the state as well, by incapacitating the wounded for national defense, he shall further, in addition to all other penalties, compensate the state for the loss. That is, in addition to his personal military service he shall also discharge that of the disabled and take his place in the ranks; failure to perform the task shall render him legally liable to prosecution at the instance of any man who pleases for evasion of military duty. The rate of compensation—whether it shall be twofold, threefold, or even fourfold—shall be determined by the court who found the verdict of guilty. If kinsman wound kinsman in the ways aforesaid, the parents and kinsfolk of both sexes and on both sides, within the degree of second cousins, shall meet, find a verdict, and commit the fixing of penalty to the natural parents of the parties. If their assessment be called in question, the male progenitors shall be authorized to make an assessment; if they fail to reach a decision for themselves, the matter shall be finally committed by them to the curators of law. In the case of such wounding of parents by their children, the judges shall be required to be persons of over sixty years of age who have children, not by adoption, but of their own begetting. On conviction, it shall be for the court to determine whether the offense shall be punished by death or some other sentence, more, or possibly slightly less, heavy. No kinsman of the culprit shall be a member of the court, even if he have attained the age required by law. If a slave wound a free man in anger, the owner of such slave shall

deliver him to the wounded man to be used at his pleasure; failing to deliver him, he shall himself make good the damage. If the defendant allege that the case is one of conspiracy between the slave and the wounded man, he must sustain his allegations. If he lose his suit, he shall pay the damage threefold; if he gain it, he shall have an action for kidnapping against the party who so conspired with the slave. He that wounds another without intent shall pay the simple damage—no legislator can be expected to prescribe rules to chance. The judges shall be as directed for the case of parents wounded by their children, and they shall fix the amount of compensation.

Assault and battery, in its various forms, is, like the cases of which we have treated, an offense of violence. Apropos of such conduct, it should never be forgotten by anyone, man, woman, or child, that seniority is held in highest consideration alike by gods and by men who intend a long and happy life. Hence the public assault of a younger man on his senior is a shameful spectacle and abominable in the eye of heaven. If the younger man is struck by the elder, the seemly course is ever that he should meekly give place to his anger, and thus lay up a capital of the same consideration for his own old age. Hence our rule shall run thus. All shall show their reverence for their seniors in act and speech. A man shall stay his hand from any that is twenty years older than himself, be it man or woman, as he would from his own father or mother; he must spare all who are of an age to have begotten or borne him, in duty to the gods of birth. He must likewise keep his hand from the alien, old-established resident, and recent arrival alike; neither in aggression nor in self-defense shall he ever permit himself to admonish one of that class by a blow. If the alien strike him a wanton and insolent blow and he think correction called for, he shall seize him and carry him before the court of the urban

commissioners, without striking him back, that he may be taught never more to presume to beat a native. The commissioners shall take the accused and examine into his case, but with all due regard for the god who watches over the alien. If the alien be judged to have struck the native wrongfully, they shall give him as many lashes of the scourge as he has himself struck blows, to break him of his abuse of his position; if to have done no wrong, they shall warn and censure the apprehender and so dismiss both parties. If a man be struck by another of his own age, or a senior but childless man by a junior, whether the parties be both old or both young, he shall defend himself with the arms nature has given him, his unweaponed naked fists. But if a man above forty years of age permit himself to fight another, whether he be assailant or attacked, he will meet no more than his desert if punished by being ill reputed as a ruffian and a boor. With him that is amenable to this counsel we shall have no difficulties; the refractory, who care nothing for our preamble shall find a law ready to meet their case to this effect. If a man strike one that is his senior by twenty years or more, first, any bystander who is neither of the same age as the combatants nor younger shall come between them, on pain of proclamation as a coward; if the bystander be of the same years as the party struck, or younger, he shall defend the attacked as he would his own brother, father, or still older kinsman. Furthermore, he that presumed to strike his senior, as already said, shall stand his trial for assault and battery and, if convicted, shall lie in prison for a full year at the least, or if the court propose a longer sentence, its determination of the period shall be binding. If a foreigner or resident alien strike one who is his senior by twenty or more years, the same legal provision for assistance from bystanders shall be in force, and he that is condemned on this count, if an alien and nonresident among

us, shall purge that offense by two years of imprisonment, if a resident, shall be imprisoned three years for his violation of our laws, unless the court award sentence of a longer term. Further a fine shall be laid in all such cases on a bystander who does not render the assistance required by the law, the amount to be one mina for members of the first property class, fifty drachmas for those of the second, thirty for those of the third, twenty for those of the fourth. The court, in such cases, shall be composed of the generals, infantry commanders, phylarchs, and hipparchs.

Laws, we may say, are made in part for the virtuous—to teach them what rule they should follow in their intercourse with one another, if they are to live in peace and good will—partly also for men who have shunned instruction, men whose stubborn tempers have yielded to none of those melting influences that might hold them back from utter debasement. It is to their account you must lay what I have now to utter, for them that a legislator will be driven to enact laws for which he could wish no need might ever arise. If any should ever presume to offer violent assault to father, mother, or one of their progenitors, should so far forget his fear of the wrath of heaven and the punishments of which men tell beyond the grave as to be led by his conceit of knowing where he is utterly ignorant, and his scorn of the venerable and universal tradition into that trespass—some last deterrent is wanted for his case. Now the last penalty is not death, and as for the pains said to be inflicted on such sinners in the world to come, though they are more extreme than any on earth and threaten in the tones of truth itself, they effect nothing for the deterrence of these criminal souls; were it otherwise, we should hear of no mishandlings of mothers or other cursed and presumptuous striking of progenitors. Hence we must make the chastisements for

such crime here in this present life, if we can, no less stern than those of the life to come.

Our next proclamation, then, shall be as follows. If a man, not being afflicted with insanity, presume to strike father, mother, or their parents, first, the bystanders shall come to their aid, as in cases already disposed of. The resident alien who intervenes thus shall be offered a seat in the front rank at the public sports; he who fails in this duty shall go into perpetual banishment from our soil. A nonresident alien affording such help shall receive public commendation, and who withholds it, public censure. A slave who affords it shall have his freedom; a slave who withholds it shall suffer a hundred lashes with the scourge, to be administered by the commissioners of the market, if the offense is committed in the market place—if committed in the city but elsewhere than in the market square, the correction to be inflicted by the urban commissioner in residence, if in some rural district by the commanders of the rural commission. Every bystander of native birth, child or woman or man, shall join in the rescue, crying out on the assailant as wretch and monster, and any that takes no part shall be held by the law under the curse of the god of kindred and family. If a man be convicted of assault on a parent, first he shall be perpetually relegated from the capital city to another region of the country and excluded from all holy places. If he do not observe the exclusion, the rural commission shall correct him with stripes, or in any way they please; if he returns he shall be condemned to death. If any free person eat, drink, or have any dealings whatever with the criminal, or

so much as take his hand on meeting him wittingly, he shall enter neither place of worship, market square, nor any part of the city what-so-ever, without first purifying himself, as one that has been infected by contact with an accursed horror, and if he disobey and pollute holy places and city by

infraction of the law, any magistrate informed of the fact and not proceeding against the guilty party shall have the fact charged against him as a point of first moment at his audit. If a slave strike a free man, alien or citizen, a bystander shall come to his aid or incur the specified fine, according to his status; the bystanders shall assist to bind the striker of the blow and shall deliver him to the injured party, who shall then lay him in fetters, scourge him with as many stripes as he pleases, provided no detriment to his master's interests ensue, and deliver him up to the master as his rightful owner. The words of the law shall run : If a slave strike a free man, except by order of a magistrate, the owner of such slave shall receive him in fetters from the aggrieved party, and shall not release him therefrom until such slave have satisfied the aggrieved that he deserves to be at large. These same rules of law shall hold good for cases of the same kind when both parties are women, or where either is a woman and the other a man.

Book 10.

Athenian Stranger/ Now that we have dealt with assault, we may enunciate a single and comprehensive principle of law in respect of cases of violence, to the following effect. No man shall lift the goods and chattels of others, nor yet make use of a neighbor's property without the owner's permission, since such conduct is the beginning whence all the aforesaid mischiefs, past, present, or future, derive by consequence. Now the gravest mischiefs of them all are the licenses and outrages of youth, and the affront is gravest when done to consecrated things, and most singularly grave again when the objects affronted are not only sacred but public, or partly public, as common to a tribe or some similar group. Second in order and in gravity are offenses against private shrines and private tombs, and third, impieties to parents other than the crimes already enumerated. A fourth form of outrage is the case when a man shows contempt for magistrates by lifting their goods or chattels, or using anything that is theirs without permission obtained, and a fifth branch will be such violation of the civil rights of the private citizen as calls for legal redress. Hence we must provide a law applicable to all these branches alike. Now as for actual sacrilege, open and forcible or secret, we have already said succinctly what the penalty for its commission should be. We are now to prescribe a punishment for all verbal or practical outrage offered to the gods by speech or act. But first our legislator must introduce his usual admonition, and it shall run to this effect. No man who believes in gods as the law would have him believe has ever yet of his own free will done unhallowed deed or let slip lawless discourse. If a man acts thus, 'tis from one of three causes. Either, as I say, he does not believe, or again, he believes that they are, but are regardless of mankind, or lastly, that they are lightly to be won over by the cajoling of offerings and prayers.

Clinias/ Then how are we to treat such men, or what should we say to them?

Athenian Stranger/ Nay, my dear sir, let us begin by giving a hearing to the mockeries in which, as I conceive, their scorn of us would find utterance.

Clinias/ And what form would this mockery take?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, their satire might well run to this effect. Gentlemen of Athens, Lacedaemon, and Cnossus, you are in the right of it. Some of us, in fact, recognize no gods whatsoever, and others gods such as you describe. So we make the same demand of you that you have yourselves made of the laws. Before you come to the severities of threats, it is for you to try persuasion—to convince us by sufficient proof that there really are gods, and that they are too good to be diverted from the path of justice by the attraction of gifts. As things are, that, and more to the same effect, is what we have heard from those who have the repute of being our first-rate poets, orators, prophets, and priests, and countless thousands of others, and this is why most of us follow the path not of refusing to do wrong, but of committing it and trying to patch it up. So we expect you, as legislators who make a profession of humanity rather than severity, to try persuasion on us in the first instance. Your case for the existence of gods may not be much better than that of the other side, but persuade us that it is better in the one point of truth, and you may perhaps make converts of us. So if you think our challenge a fair one, you must try to answer it.

Clinias/ Why, surely, sir, it looks easy enough to speak the truth in saying that gods exist.

Athenian Stranger/ And on what grounds?

Clinias/ Why, to begin with, think of the earth, and sun, and planets, and everything! And the wonderful and

beautiful order of the seasons with its distinctions of years and months! Besides, there is the fact that all mankind, Greeks and non-Greeks alike, believe in the existence of gods.

Athenian Stranger/ My dear friend, I have a fear—I will never call it an awe—of these evil men, a fear that they may despise us. You and our friend, in fact, do not understand the ground of their controversy with us. You imagine that what impels their souls to irreligion is incontinence of pleasures and lusts, and nothing more.

Clinias/ Why, sir, what further cause can there be in the case?

Athenian Stranger/ One of which your friend and you can be expected to know nothing. You fail to remark it because it does not touch your lives.

Clinias/ Now I wonder what it can be to which you allude.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, folly of a deadly sort that conceits itself to be the height of wisdom.

Clinias/ And what is that?

Athenian Stranger/ We have in my own community literary narratives—the excellence of your civic institutions, I am informed, prevents their appearance among you—which treat of the gods, some of them in verse, and others again in prose. The most ancient of these narratives relate that the primitive realities were the sky, and so forth. When the story has got a little way past this starting point it recounts the birth of the gods, and their subsequent conduct toward each other. Now whether in other respects the effect of these stories on those who hear them is good or the reverse is not lightly to be decided, in view of their antiquity, but as concerns their bearing on the tendance and reverence due to parents, I could certainly never commend them as salutary, nor as true at all. However, we may dismiss the

primitive stories without more ado; let them be told in any way heaven pleases. But the theories of our modern men of enlightenment must be held to account for the mischief they cause. Now the effect of their compositions is this. When you and I produce our evidence of the existence of gods, and allege this very point—the deity or divinity of sun and moon, planets and earth—the converts of these sages will reply that they are but earth and stones, incapable of minding human conduct, however plausibly we have coated them over with a varnish of sugared eloquence.

Clinias/ A dreadful theory this that you are talking of, sir, even if there were only one such. How much more dreadful our present age, when such doctrines are so rife.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, what answer have we, then? What course should we take? Must we look on ourselves as, so to say, indicted at the bar of the ungodly and defend our incriminated legislation from the charge that it has no right to assume the existence of gods? Or should we drop the subject and return to our lawmaking for fear our preamble may actually prove longer than the enactments to follow it? The discourse, to be sure, will run to considerable length, if we are first to furnish the undevoutly disposed with adequate proofs on the points which they said we were bound to treat, and so put the opponent in fear, only proceeding to the enactment of suitable regulations after we have thus created a disrelish for irreligion.

Clinias/ Well, sir, in the little while we have spent together we have repeatedly had occasion to remark that there is no reason to prefer brevity of speech, in our present business, to length—the proverbial ‘pursuer' is not on our traces—so we should make but a sorry and ludicrous show if we chose the shorter course rather than the best.

And ‘tis of the first importance to give our plea for the existence of gods, and good gods with a superhuman reverence for right, such persuasiveness as we can; such a preamble would, in fact, be the noblest and best defense for our whole legislation. Let us, then, show neither reluctance nor impatience, but unreservedly employ whatever gifts of persuasion we may possess in such matters on the task of adequate exposition to the utmost of our powers.

Athenian Stranger/ The earnestness and passion of your speech are, I feel, an invitation to prayer; they leave no further room for postponement of the argument. Come then, how shall we plead for the existence of gods dispassionately? To be sure, no man can help feeling some resentment and disgust with the parties who now, as in the past, impose the burden of the argument on us by their want of faith in the stories heard so often in earliest infancy, while still at the breast, from their mothers and nurses—stories, you may say, crooned over them, in sport and in earnest, like spells—and heard again in prayers offered over sacrifices, in conjunction with the spectacle which gives such intense delight to the eye and ear of children, as it is enacted at a sacrifice, the spectacle of our parents addressing their gods, with assured belief in their existence, in earnest prayer and supplication for themselves and their children. Then, again, at rising and setting of sun and moon, they have heard and seen the universal prostrations and devotions of mankind, Greeks and non-Greeks alike, in all the varied circumstances of evil fortune and good, with their implication that gods are no fictions, but the most certain of realities, and their being beyond the remotest shadow of a doubt. When we see all this evidence treated with contempt by the persons who are forcing us into our present argument, and that, as any man with a grain of intelligence will admit, without a single respectable reason, how, I ask,

is a man to find gentle language in which to combine reproof with instruction in the initial truth about the gods—that of their existence? Still, the task is to be faced. We can never permit one party among us to run mad from lust of pleasure, and the rest equally mad from fury against them. So our dispassionate preliminary admonition to minds thus depraved shall run to this effect—we will suppress our passion and use gentle language, imagining ourselves to be addressing a single person of the type.

My lad, you are still young, and as time advances it will lead you to a complete reversal of many of your present convictions. You should wait for the future, then, before you undertake to judge of the supreme issues, and the greatest of these, though you now count it so trivial, is that of thinking rightly about the gods and so living well, or the reverse. I may begin with a single word of significant warning which you will assuredly find to be no mistake, and it is this. You yourself and your friends are not the first nor the only persons to embrace this tenet as your doctrine about gods; nay, in every age there are sufferers from the malady, more or fewer. Hence I, who have had the acquaintance of many such, can assure you that no one who in early life has adopted this doctrine of the nonexistence of gods has ever persisted to old age constant to that conviction, though there have been cases—not many, certainly, but still some few—of persistence in the other two attitudes, the belief that there are gods but that they are indifferent to human conduct, and again, that, though not indifferent, they are lightly placated by sacrifice and prayers. If you will be ruled by me, then, you will wait for the fullness of clear and confident judgment on these matters to come to you, and inquire whether truth lies in one direction a or another, seeking for guidance in all quarters, and above all from the legislator. Meanwhile, beware of all impiety toward gods. For he who is framing the

law for you must make it his business, hereafter as well as now, to instruct you in the truth of this matter.

Clinias/ Admirably said, sir, so far as we have gone yet.

Athenian Stranger/ Just so, Megillus and Clinias, but we have unconsciously embroiled ourselves with a portentous theory.

Clinias/ And what theory may that be?

Athenian Stranger/ One which is widely held to be the last word of wisdom.

Clinias/ You must be still more explicit.

Athenian Stranger/ We are told, you know, that everything whatever which comes, has come, or will come into existence is a product either of nature, or of art, or of chance.

Clinias/ And rightly so told, are we not?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, there is, of course, a presumption that what wise men tell us is true. But suppose we follow up their traces, and ask ourselves what the real meaning of the spokesmen of that party may be.

Clinias/ With all my heart.

Athenian Stranger/ Evidently, so they say, all the grandest and fairest of things are products of nature and chance, and only the more insignificant of art. Art takes over the grand primary works from the hands of nature, already formed, and then models and fashions the more insignificant, and this is the very reason why we all call them artificial.

Clinias/ You mean to say?

Athenian Stranger/ Let me put it more plainly still. Fire and water, earth and air—so they say—all owe their being to nature and chance, none of them to art; they, in turn, are the agents, and the absolutely soulless agents, in the

production of the bodies of the next rank, the earth, sun, moon, and stars. They drifted casually, each in virtue of their several tendencies. As they came together in certain fitting and convenient dispositions—hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard, and so on in all the inevitable casual combinations which arise from blending of contraries—thus, and on this wise, they gave birth to the whole heavens and all their contents, and, in due course, to all animals and plants, when once all the seasons of the year had been produced from those same causes—not, so they say, by the agency of mind, or any god, or art, but, as I tell you, by nature and chance. Art, the subsequent late-born product of these causes, herself as perishable as her creators, has since given birth to certain toys with little real substance in them, simulacra as shadowy as the arts themselves, such as those which spring from painting, music, and the other fellow crafts. Or if there are arts which really produce anything of genuine worth, they are those which lend their aid to nature, like medicine, husbandry, gymnastics. Statesmanship in especial, they say, is a thing which has a little in common with nature, but is mainly a business of art; legislation, likewise, is altogether an affair not of nature, but of art, and its positions are unreal.

Clinias/ Unreal—but how so?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, my dear sir, to begin with, this party asserts that gods have no real and natural, but only an artificial being, in virtue of legal conventions, as they call them, and thus there are different gods for different places, conformably to the convention made by each group among themselves when they drew up their legislation. Then they actually declare that the really and naturally laudable is one thing and the conventionally laudable quite another, while as for right, there is absolutely no such thing as a real and natural right, that mankind are eternally disputing about

rights and altering them, and that every change thus made, once made, is from that moment valid, though it owes its being to artifice and legislation, not to anything you could call nature. All these views, my friends, come from men who impress the young as wise, prose writers and poets who profess that indefeasible right means whatever a man can carry with the high hand. Hence our epidemics of youthful irreligion—as though there were no gods such as the law enjoins us to believe in—and hence the factions created by those who seek, on such grounds, to attract men to the 'really and naturally right life,' that is, the life of real domination over others, not of conventional service to them.

Clinias/ What an awful creed you describe, sir! What a general corruption of the young people of whole cities and private households!

Athenian Stranger/ Too true, Clinias, too true. But how would you have the legislator act where such a situation is of long standing? Should he be content to stand up in public and threaten people all round that unless they confess the being of gods, and believe in their hearts that they are such as his law declares—and the case is the same with the laudable, the right, and everything of highest moment, and all that makes for virtue or vice—action must conform in all cases to the convictions prescribed by the text of the legislation—is he to threaten, I say, that those who will not lend a ready ear to the laws shall in some cases suffer death, in others be visited with bonds and whipping, in others with infamy, and in yet others with poverty and banishment, but to have no words of persuasion with which to work on his people, as he dictates their laws, and so, it may be, tame them?

Clinias/ Far from it, sir, far from it. If there are indeed persuasives, however weak, in such matters, no legislator who deserves the slightest consideration must ever faint. He

should strain every nerve, as they say, to plead in support of the old traditional belief of the being of gods and of all you have just recounted. In especial also, he should defend the claim of law itself and of art to be natural, or no less real than nature, seeing that they are products of mind by a sound argument which I take you to be now propounding and in which I concur.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, Clinias, here is zeal indeed! But pray, are not statements thus made to a multitude hard to support by argument, and do they not entail an interminable deal of it?

Clinias/ Well, sir, and what then? We bore with one another through all those long discourses of the wine cup and of music, and are we to show less patience now we are treating of gods and kindred themes? And, mark you, such argument will be a most valuable aid to intelligent legislation, because legal enactments, once put into writing, remain always on record, as though to challenge the question of all time to come. Hence we need feel no dismay if they should be difficult on a first hearing, since even the dull student may recur to them for reiterated scrutiny. Nor does their length, provided they are beneficial, make it less irrational than it is, in my opinion at least, impious for any man to refuse such discourse his heartiest support.

Megillus/ What Clinias says, sir, has my fullest approval.

Athenian Stranger/ And mine, too, Megillus, and we must do as he bids us. To be sure, if such theories had not been so widely broadcast, as we may fairly say, throughout all mankind, there would have been no need for arguments to defend the being of gods, but, as the case stands, they cannot be dispensed with. So with the highest laws in risk of perishing at the hands of wicked men, whose function can it be to come to the rescue before the legislator?

Megillus/ Why, no man's.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, Clinias—for you must be my partner in the argument—let me hear your opinion once more. Presumably one who reasons thus holds that fire and water, earth and air, are the most primitive origins of all things—nature being just the name he gives to them—but the soul is a later derivative from them. Or, more probably, it is no case of a presumption; his argument is an actual declaration to that effect.

Clinias/ Precisely.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, in God's name then, have we traced the unreason and error of all who have ever busied themselves with research into nature back to what we may call its source? Pray consider the point with careful attention to all their positions, as it will make a vast difference if we can show that those who have taken up with irreligious doctrines and set the tune for others to follow have actually argued their case ill and fallaciously. And I honestly believe this to be the fact.

Clinias/ Excellent, but you must try to explain where the fallacy lies.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I am afraid I shall have to treat of rather unfamiliar matters.

Clinias/ There is no need for your hesitation, sir. I see you apprehend you will be going outside the limits of legislation if we are to deal with such matters. But if that is the one and only way to accordance with the truth about gods, as now stated in our law, why, my good man, our argument must take it.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it seems I must propound my none too familiar thesis at once, and here it is. In the doctrine of which the soul of the ungodly is the product, the primal cause of all coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be is

pronounced to be not primal but secondary and derivative, the secondary primitive. Hence their error about the veritable being of gods.

Clinias/ I am still in the dark.

Athenian Stranger/ Soul, my friend, soul is that of whose nature and potency all but the few would seem to know nothing; in this general ignorance of it they know not in particular of its origin, how it is among the primal things, elder-born than all bodies and prime source of all their changes and transformations. But if this is indeed so, must not all that is akin to soul needs be of earlier birth than all that is proper to bodies, seeing that soul herself is older than body?

Clinias/ Why, necessarily.

Athenian Stranger/ And so judgment and foresight, wisdom, art and law, must be prior to hard and soft, heavy and light. Aye, and the grand primal works and deeds, for the very reason that they are primal, will prove to be those of art; those of nature, and nature herself—wrongly so called—will be secondary and derivative from art and mind.

Clinias/ Wrongly so called? Why wrongly?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, by nature they mean what was there to begin with, but if we can show that soul came first—that it was not fire, nor air, but soul which was there to begin with—it will be perfectly true to say that it is the existence of soul which is most eminently natural. Now this is the case if it can be proved that soul is more ancient than body, and not otherwise.

Clinias/ How true that is!

Athenian Stranger/ Then our next step must be to address ourselves to the proof of that point.

Clinias/ Yes, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Good. Then let us be on our guard against the extreme subtleties of the argument; we are elderly, and it a lusty stripling who may slip through our fingers by a feint—then we shall make ourselves a laughingstock, and be judged to have failed even of the little in our eagerness to reach after the greater. So reflect a moment. Suppose the three of us had to cross a river with a strong current, and I, being the youngest of the party and having a wide experience of such currents, were to say, I must first try the crossing by myself, leaving you in safety, to see whether the water is equally fordable for you, my elders, or not. If it proves so, afterward I must call to you and help you across it by my experience, but if it turns out to be out of the depth of men of your years, the risk will have been all mine. You would think this a reasonable suggestion. Well, it is even so with the waters of discourse which confront us now; the current is strong, and the passage perhaps too much for your strength. So to save you from being dizzied and staggered by the rush of questions you are unpracticed in answering, and the consequent unpleasantness of an undignified and unbecoming situation, I propose that I should act in this same fashion now. I will first put certain questions to myself while you listen in safety, and then once more give the answers to them myself. This plan will be followed throughout the argument until our discussion of the soul is completed, and its priority to body proved.

Clinias/ An admirable proposal, sir. Pray, act upon it.

Athenian Stranger/ To the work, then, and if we are ever to beseech God's help, let it be done now. Let us take it as understood that the gods have, of course, been invoked in all earnest to assist our proof of their own being, and plunge into the waters of the argument before us with the prayer as a sure guiding rope for our support. If put to the proof, then,

on such a subject, the safest course, I take it, is to meet the following questions with the following answers.

Sir—so someone may say—are all things at rest, and nothing in motion? Or is the truth the very reverse? Or are some things in motion, others at rest?

Of course, I shall reply, some are moving and others at rest.

And those which move are moving, just as those which are at rest are resting, in a space of some kind?

Of course.

And some of them, you will grant, do this in a single situation, others in more than one?

When you speak of moving in a single situation, I shall reply, you refer to things characterized by the immobility of their centers, as is the case with the revolution of so-called ‘sleeping' circles.

Yes.

And we observe, in the case of this revolution, that such a motion carries round the greatest and the smallest circle together, dividing itself proportionately to lesser and greater, and being itself proportionately less and greater. This, in fact, is what makes it a source of all sorts of marvels, since it supplies greater and smaller circles at once with velocities high or low answering to their sizes—an effect one might have imagined impossible.

Just so.

And by things which move in several situations I suppose you mean those which have a motion of translation and shift at every moment to a fresh place, sometimes having a single point of support, sometimes, in the case of rolling, more than one. In their various encounters one with another, collision with a stationary object disintegrates, while impact upon

other moving objects coming from an opposite quarter integrates them into new combinations which are betwixt and between the original components?

Yes, I grant the facts are as you state them.

And further, with integration goes augmentation in bulk, and reduction of bulk with disintegration—provided, that is, the preestablished constitution of the object persists. If it does not, both processes give rise to dissolution.

But the condition under which coming-to-be universally takes place—what is it?

Manifestly 'tis effected whenever its starting point has received increment and so come to its second stage, and from this to the next, and so by three steps acquired perceptibility to percipients. 'Tis ever by such change and transformation of motion that a thing comes to be; it is in veritable being so long as it persists. When it has changed to a different constitution, it is utterly destroyed. Perhaps, my friends, we have now classed and numbered all the types of motion—except, indeed, two.

Clinias/ And what are those two?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, the very pair, my good sir, with an eye to which our whole discussion is now in progress.

Clinias/ I must ask you to be plainer.

Athenian Stranger/ The discussion began with a view to soul, did it not?

Clinias/ To be sure, it did.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us take for one of our pair the motion which can regularly set other things in movement but not itself. As a second single type in the scheme of motions in general we will take that which can regularly set itself going as well as other things, alike in processes of

integration and disintegration, by way of augmentation and its opposite, or by coming into and perishing out of being.

Clinias/ And so we will.

Athenian Stranger/ We may proceed, then, to place the type which regularly moves some object other than itself, and is itself induced by such an object, ninth on our list. That which moves itself as well as other things—it finds its place in all doing and all being-done-to, and is veritably called transformation and motion of all that is—this we will reckon as tenth.

Clinias/ Yes, certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now of these ten motions which should we be most right to pronounce most powerful of all, and most superlatively effective?

Clinias/ Why, of course, we are bound to say that that which can move itself is infinitely most effective, and all the rest posterior to it.

Athenian Stranger/ Excellent. Then we should perhaps find one or two mistakes in what has just been said?

Clinias/ And what mistakes are they?

Athenian Stranger/ We were wrong, I think, in using that word tenth.

Clinias/ But why wrong?

Athenian Stranger/ It is demonstrably first in procedure, as in power, and the next in order is, as we hold, second, though we have just called it—oddly enough—ninth.

Clinias/ How am Ito understand you?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, thus. When we have one thing making a change in a second, the second, in turn, in a third, and so on—will there ever, in such a series, be a first source of change? Why, how can what is set moving by something other than itself ever be the first of the causes of alteration?

The thing is an impossibility. But when something which has set itself moving alters a second thing, this second thing still a third, and the motion is thus passed on in course to thousands and tens of thousands of things, will there be any starting point for the whole movement of all, other than the change in the movement which initiated itself?

Clinias/ Admirably put, and the position must be conceded.

Athenian Stranger/ Besides, let us put the point over again in this way, once more answering our own question. Suppose all things were to come together and stand still—as most of the party have the hardihood to affirm. Which of the movements we have specified must be the first to arise in things? Why, of course, that which can move itself; there can be no possible previous origination of change by anything else, since, by hypothesis, change was not previously existent in the system. Consequently, as the source of all motions whatsoever, the first to occur among bodies at rest and the first in rank in moving bodies, the motion which initiates itself we shall pronounce to be necessarily the earliest and mightiest of all changes, while that which is altered by something else and sets something else moving is secondary.

Clinias/ Unquestionably.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, now that the discussion has reached this point, we may answer a further question.

Clinias/ And what question is it?

Athenian Stranger/ When we see that this motion has shown itself in a thing composed of earth, water, or fire—separately or in combination—how should we describe the character resident in such a thing?

Clinias/ Am I right in supposing you to ask whether, when the thing moves itself, we speak of it as alive?

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly.

Clinias/ Alive? Of course it is alive.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well, and when we see soul in a thing, the case is the same, is it not? We must allow that the thing is alive.

Clinias/ Precisely.

Athenian Stranger/ In heaven's name, then, hold. You will grant, I presume, that there are three points to be noted about anything?

Clinias/ You mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean, for one, the reality of the thing, what it is, for another the definition of this reality, for another, its name. And thus you see there are two questions we can ask about everything which is.

Clinias/ And what are the two?

Athenian Stranger/ Sometimes a man propounds the bare name and demands the definition; sometimes, again, he propounds the definition by itself and asks for the corresponding name. In other words, we mean something to this effect, do we not?

Clinias/ To what effect?

Athenian Stranger/ There is, as you know, bisection in numbers, as in other things. Well, in the case of a number, the name of the thing is ‘even,' and the definition, ‘number divisible into two equal parts.'

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ That is the sort of case I have in mind. We are denoting the same thing, are we not, in either case, whether we are asked about the definition and reply with the name, or about the name, and reply with the definition? It is the same thing we describe indifferently by the name ‘even,' and the definition, ‘number divided into two equal parts'?

Clinias/ Identically the same.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, what is the definition of the thing for which soul is the name? Can we find any but the phrase we have just used, 'the motion which can set itself moving'?

Clinias/ You mean that the selfsame reality which has the name soul in the vocabulary of all of us has self-movement as its definition?

Athenian Stranger/ I do. But if this is indeed so, is there anything we can desiderate, anything further toward complete demonstration of the identity of soul with the primal becoming and movement of all that is, has been, or shall be, and of all their contraries, seeing it has disclosed itself as the universal cause of all change and motion?

Clinias/ No, indeed. Our proof that soul, since it is found to be the source of movement, is the first-born of all things is absolutely complete.

Athenian Stranger/ Then must not the motion which, wherever it arises, is induced by something else, but never confers the power of self-motion on anything, come second in the scale, or as low down as you please to put it, being, in fact, change in a truly soulless body?

Clinias/ Rightly argued.

Athenian Stranger/ Consequently it will be a right, decisive, true, and final statement to assert, as we did, that soul is prior to body, body secondary and derivative, soul governing in the real order of things, and body being subject to governance.

Clinias/ Indeed it would.

Athenian Stranger/ But we have not, I imagine, forgotten our earlier agreement that if soul could be proved older than body, the characters of soul must also be older than those of body.

Clinias/ Not in the least.

Athenian Stranger/ And so moods and habits of mind, wishes, calculations, and true judgments, purposes, and memories, will all be prior to physical lengths, breadths, and depths, in virtue of the priority of soul itself to body.

Clinias/ Inevitably so.

Athenian Stranger/ Hence we are driven, are we not, to agree in the consequence that soul is the cause of good and evil, fair and foul, right and wrong—in fact of all contraries, if we mean to assert it as the universal cause?

Clinias/ Certainly we are.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, if indwelling soul thus controls all things universally that move anywhere, are we not bound to say it controls heaven itself?

Clinias/ Yes, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And is this done by one single soul, or by more than one? I will give the answer for both of you. By more than one. At least we must assume not fewer than two, one beneficent, the other capable of the contrary effect.

Clinias/ Decidedly you are in the right of it.

Athenian Stranger/ So far, so good. Soul, then, by her own motions stirs all things in sky, earth, or sea—and the names of these motions are wish, reflection, foresight, counsel, judgment, true or false, pleasure, pain, hope, fear, hate, love—stirs them, I say, by these and what-ever other kindred, or primary, motions there may be. They, in turn, bring in their train secondary and corporeal movements, and so guide all things to increase and decrease, disgregation and integration, with their attendant characters of heat and cold, weight and lightness, hardness and softness, white and black, dry and sweet. By these and all her instruments, when wisdom is her helper, she conducts all things to the right and happy issue, whereas when she companies with

folly, the effect is entirely contrary. Shall we set it down that this is so, or have we still our doubts that it may be otherwise?

Clinias/ Nay, there is no doubt whatsoever.

Athenian Stranger/ Then which manner of soul, must we say, has control of heaven and earth and their whole circuit? That which is prudent and replete with goodness, or that which has neither virtue? Shall we, if you please, give the question this answer?

Clinias/ What answer?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, my friend, if the whole path and movement of heaven and all its contents are of like nature with the motion, revolution, and calculations of wisdom, and proceed after that kind, plainly we must say it is the supremely good soul that takes forethought for the universe and guides it along that path.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ But the evil, if the procedure is distraught and with-out order.

Clinias/ That is true, too.

Athenian Stranger/ Then of what nature, pray, is the movement of wisdom? There, my friends, we reach a question hard to be answered with due understanding. So it is only fair that I too should have a hand in your present reply.

Clinias/ A welcome proposal.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us beware of creating a darkness at noonday for ourselves by gazing, so to say, direct at the sun as we give our answer, as though we could hope to attain adequate vision and perception of wisdom with mortal eyes. It will be the safer course to turn our gaze on an image of the object of our quest.

Clinias/ You mean to say?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us take as that image the motion in our list of ten to which wisdom bears a resemblance. We will all recall it, as I join you in giving our answer.

Clinias/ An excellent proposal.

Athenian Stranger/ Then do we still remember this much of what we said, that we decided that some things are in motion and others at rest?

Clinias/ We do.

Athenian Stranger/ And that some of those in motion move in one place, others in more than one?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Of these two movements, that confined to one place must in every case be performed about a center, after the fashion of a well-turned cartwheel, and it is this which must surely have the closest affinity and resemblance that may be to the revolution of intelligence.

Clinias/ Your meaning is?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, of course, that if we say that intelligence and movement performed in one place are both like the revolutions of a well-made globe, in moving regularly and uniformly in one compass about one center, and in one sense, according to one single law and plan, we need have no fear of proving unskilled artists in imagery.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And again, motion which is never regular or uniform, never in the same compass, nor about the same center, or in one place, motion which has no order, plan, or law, will have kinship with folly of every kind.

Clinias/ Indeed it will.

Athenian Stranger/ Now there can be no further obstacle to positive assertion, since we have found that it is soul

which conducts the revolutions of all things, and are also bound to say that the soul by which the circle of the heavens is turned about with all foresight and order is either the supremely good, or its contrary—

Clinias/ Nay, sir, if what has gone before is true, it were blasphemy to ascribe the work to aught but a soul or souls—one or more than one—of absolute goodness.

Athenian Stranger/ You have followed the argument to good purpose indeed, Clinias, but I would have you follow it a step farther still.

Clinias/ And what is that step?

Athenian Stranger/ Take sun, and moon, and the other heavenly bodies. If the revolution of all is due to soul, so also is that of each singly, is it not?

Clinias/ Why, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus we may take one of them in particular as the subject of an argument we shall find no less applicable to all these celestial bodies.

Clinias/ And which of them shall we take?

Athenian Stranger/ The sun, whose body can be seen by any man, but his soul by no man, any more than that of any other creature's body is to be seen, during life or at the time of death. We have every reason to believe that it infolds us in a fashion utterly imperceptible to all bodily senses, and is only to be discerned by the understanding. So here is a relevant consideration which we must apprehend by an act of pure understanding and thought.

Clinias/ And what is it?

Athenian Stranger/ Since soul guides the sun on his course, we cannot well go wrong in saying that she must act in one of three ways.

Clinias/ And what are the three?

Athenian Stranger/ Either she dwells within this visible round body and conveys it hither and thither, as our soul carries us wherever we go, or, as some hold, she provides herself a body of her own, of fire, or it may be of air, and pushes body from without forcibly by body, or finally, she is herself naked of body, and does this work of guidance by some other most miraculous faculties of hers.

Clinias/ Yes, one of these ways is that by which soul transacts the whole business. So much is sure.

Athenian Stranger/ This soul, whether we take it to bring light to the world by driving the sun as its car, or from without, or in what way soever, each of us should esteem a god, should he not?

Clinias/ He should, if not sunk in the very depths of folly.

Athenian Stranger/ Of all the planets, of the moon, of years and months and all seasons, what other story shall we have to tell than just this same, that since soul, or souls, and those souls good with perfect goodness, have proved to be the causes of all, these souls we hold to be gods, whether they direct the universe by inhabiting bodies, like animated beings, or whatever the manner of their action? Will any man who shares this belief bear to hear it said that all things are not ‘full of gods'?

Clinias/ No man, sir, can be so much beside himself.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, my dear Megillus and Clinias, we may state our terms to him who has hitherto declined to acknowledge gods and dispose of him.

Clinias/ What terms shall we offer?

Athenian Stranger/ Either he must show us that we are wrong in pronouncing soul the primary source of all things, and in the further consequences we drew, or if unable to get the better of our reasoning, he must yield to us and live henceforth a believer in gods. Let us consider, then, whether

our defense of the being of gods against the unbeliever is now duly complete or defective.

Clinias/ Defective, sir? Anything but that.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, so far as concerns that party, let our discourse come to its end. We are now to admonish him who confesses the being of gods but denies that they take any heed of the affairs of men. Fair sir, we will say, as to your belief in gods, 'tis perhaps some kinship with the divine that draws you to your native stock in worship and acknowledgment. On the other side there are private and public fortunes of ill and wicked men—fortunes truly unblessed, but passionately, though tastelessly, extolled as blessed by the voice of public repute—and these draw you toward irreligion when you hear them wrongly harped upon in poetry and literature of all kinds. Or, it may be, you remark men who have come to the grave in fullness of days and left sons and sons' sons after them in high honors, and now you are dismayed when you find, from what you have heard from others or from your own personal observation of sundry deeds of impiety and horror in their histories, that some of the number have risen by these very crimes from obscurity to preeminence and a throne. The visible consequence of it all is that at such moments, while your kinship with the gods will not permit you to charge them with the responsibility for this, ill reasoning and inability to reproach the gods have together brought you to your present pass, your conviction that though they indeed exist, they despise and disregard humanity. So, that your present creed may lead you to no worse pitch of impiety, that the specter, as we may say, may happily be laid, as it approaches, by the power of argument, we must try to connect what now remains to be said with our original rejoinder to the complete atheist, and so have the benefit of that also.

You, Clinias—and you too, Megillus—must, as before, take the young man's place as respondent. And if the argument should chance to miscarry, I will once more take the task off your hands and put you across the waters.

Clinias/ A sound proposal. Act on it, then, and we, too, will do our best to carry out your suggestions.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, perhaps it would not be hard to establish as much as this, that the gods are more, not less, careful for small things than for great. The man was present, you know, at our recent discussion and was told that the gods, who are good with perfect goodness, have the universal charge of all things as their special and proper function.

Clinias/ He was most certainly told so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let them join us in asking what we mean by the goodness in virtue of which we confess the gods to be good. Come, now, prudence, may we say, and understanding belong to goodness, their opposites to badness?

Clinias/ We may.

Athenian Stranger/ And again that valor is part of goodness, cowardice of badness?

Clinias/ Assuredly.

Athenian Stranger/ And the latter qualities we shall call shameful, the former noble?

Clinias/ No doubt we must.

Athenian Stranger/ And all the baser qualities, we shall say, belong, if to anyone, to ourselves; gods have no part in them, great or small.

Clinias/ That, too, will be universally conceded.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, shall we set down negligence, indolence, petulance as goodness of soul? How say you?

Clinias/ Nay, how could we?

Athenian Stranger/ As its opposite, then?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Then their opposites will be referred to its opposite?

Clinias/ They will.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well, then. Anyone who is petulant, negligent, or indolent must be pronounced such a character as that the poet called ‘most like a stingless drone.'

Clinias/ And an excellent comparison it is.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it must never be said that God has such a character as this, a character God himself abhors, or if anyone ventures on such a speech, we must forbid him.

Clinias/ Indeed we must. How could we do otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ If one has the office of action and peculiar care of some charge, and his mind, though careful in great matters, is negligent in small, what ground could we find for commendation of such a one that would not ring false? We may look at the case thus. The conduct of him who behaves thus, be he god or man, may take either of two forms, may it not?

Clinias/ Either of what two forms?

Athenian Stranger/ Either he thinks neglect of little details makes no difference to the total result, or if it makes a difference which he disregards, he shows indolence or petulance. Can we, in fact, ascribe negligence to any other causes? For, of course, where concern for a whole is impossible, it is no negligence of the little or the great, in god or in ordinary mortal, to make no provision for that to which one's powers are not equal, and for which one is thus unable to provide.

Clinias/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well. Now for an answer to the interrogation of the three of us from the two parties who both confess the being of gods, but gods whom the one holds to be venal and the other negligent of little details. You both admit, to begin with, that the gods perceive, see, and hear everything, that nothing within the compass of sense or knowledge can fall outside their cognizance. That is your position, is it not?

Clinias/ It is.

Athenian Stranger/ And further that they can do all that is possible to be done by mortal or immortal?

Clinias/ Why, of course, they will concede that admission too.

Athenian Stranger/ Besides, all five of us have already agreed that they are good, and superlatively good.

Clinias/ Beyond all doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ Must we not then confess it a sheer impossibility that there should be any indolence or petulance in their conduct, so long as their character is such as we concede it to be. In ourselves, you know, want of courage gives birth to sloth, and sloth and petulance to indolence.

Clinias/ True, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ No god, then, can be negligent from sloth or indolence, for none, we may presume, has any lack of courage.

Clinias/ Rightly argued, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Then if they indeed neglect the trivial matters and minor details of the universe, we must conclude either that they do so with the knowledge that there is no

need whatsoever of attention to such points or—what other alternative is left but the contrary of knowledge?

Clinias/ None whatever.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, my dear good man, which view must we take you to hold? That they act in ignorance and neglect due to ignorance where attention ought to be shown, or that they are aware that attention is needed, and yet behave as the sorriest sort of men are said to do—men who know a better course than that they actually take, but leave it alone from some inferiority to pleasures or pains?

Clinias/ Out of the question altogether.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, is not human life a part of animated nature, and man himself moreover the most god-fearing of all living creatures?

Clinias/ Why, yes, to all appearances.

Athenian Stranger/ And surely we hold that all living creatures, like the world as a whole, are chattels of the gods?

Clinias/ To be sure we do.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Tis all one, then, whether a man counts such things small or great in the eyes of heaven; in neither case can it become our owners, provident and all-good as they are, to neglect them. For here is a still further point for our consideration.

Clinias/ And what may it be?

Athenian Stranger/ Whether there is not a natural opposition between perception and power in respect of their ease or difficulty.

Clinias/ In what way?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, that 'tis harder to see or hear the little than the great, whereas everyone finds it easier to move, wield, superintend the small and few than their contraries.

Clinias/ Emphatically so.

Athenian Stranger/ But suppose a physician who has the task of treating a whole body is willing and able to give his attention to the large masses but neglects the minor members and parts. Will his whole subject ever be in good condition?

Clinias/ No, never.

Athenian Stranger/ Nor yet will seamen, captains, householders, or again statesmen, as they are called, or persons with any other such functions make a success of the many or the great tasks apart from the few and the little. Why, even the hedger will tell you that the large stones will not lie well without the small.

Clinias/ Of course they will not.

Athenian Stranger/ We are never, then, to fancy God the inferior of human workmen. The better they are at their work, the more exactly and perfectly do they accomplish their proper tasks, small or great, in virtue of one and the same skill, and we must never suppose that God, who is at once supremely wise and both willing and able to provide, makes no provision for the small matters, which we have found it easier to care for, but only for the great, like some idle fellow or faint-heart who shirks his work from fear of exertion.

Clinias/ Nay, sir, let us never entertain such a belief about gods; the thought would be wholly impious and utterly false.

Athenian Stranger/ And now, I take it, we have had quite enough of controversy with him who is prone to charge the gods with negligence.

Clinias/ We have.

Athenian Stranger/ I mean so far as forcing him by argument to confess his error will go. Still something more, I believe, needs to be said by way of a charm for him.

Clinias/ And what shall it be, my friend?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, our discourse must persuade the young man that he who provides for the world has disposed all things with a view to the preservation and perfection of the whole, wherefore each several thing also, so far as may be, does and has done to it what is meet. And for each and all there are, in every case, governors appointed of all doing and being-done-to, down to the least detail, who have achieved perfection even to the minute particulars. Thine own being also, fond man, is one such fragment, and so, for all its littleness, all its striving is ever directed toward the whole, but thou hast forgotten in the business that the purpose of all that happens is what we have said, to win bliss for the life of the whole; it is not made for thee, but thou for it. For any physician or craftsman in any profession does all his work for the sake of some whole, but the part he fashions for the sake of the whole, to contribute to the general good, not the whole for the part's sake. And yet thou dost murmur because thou seest not how in thine own case what is best for the whole proves best also for thyself in virtue of our common origin. And seeing that a soul, in its successive conjunction first with one body and then with another, runs the whole gamut of change through its own action or that of some other soul, no labor is left for the mover of the pieces but this—to shift the character that is becoming better to a better place, and that which is growing worse to a worser, each according to its due, that each may meet with its proper doom.

Clinias/ Shift it—but how?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, I believe I can show you how universal superintendence may be easy enough for gods. In fact, if in his constant regard for the whole, an artificer were to mold everything by new transformations—fashioning fire, for example, into cold water—instead of producing variety from unity or unity from variety, by the time things had reached a first, second, or third generation the variations in the changing configuration would be infinitely numerous. But as it is, he who provides for the universe has an admirably light task.

Clinias/ Once more—your meaning?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean this. Since our king perceived that all our actions have soul in them and contain much virtue and likewise much vice, and that the complex of soul and body when once it has come to be, though not eternal, is, like the gods recognized by law, imperishable—for there would be no procreation of living creatures were either of the pair to be destroyed—and since he considered that 'tis ever the nature of such soul as is good to work blessing and of such as is evil to work harm—since he saw all this, I say, he contrived where to post each several item so as to provide most utterly, easily, and well for the triumph of virtue and rout of vice throughout the whole. Thus he has contrived to this universal end the seat or regions which must receive either type of soul as it is formed in their inhabitants, but the causes of the formation of either type he left free to our individual volitions. For as a man's desires tend, and as is the soul that conceives them, so and such, as a general rule, does every one of us come to be.

Clinias/ 'Tis a fair presumption.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus all things that have part in soul change, for the cause of change lies within themselves, and as they change they move in accord with the ordinance and

law of destiny. If their changes of character are unimportant and few, they are transferred over the surface of the soil; if they are more and in the direction of grave wickedness, they fall into the depths and the so-called underworld, the region known by the name of Hades and the like appellations, which fill the fancy of quick and departed alike with dreams of dismay. If a soul have drunk still deeper of vice or virtue, by reason of its own volition and the potent influence of past converse with others, when near contact with divine goodness has made it itself especially godlike, so surely is it removed to a special place of utter holiness, and translated to another and a better world, or, in the contrary case, transported to live in the opposite realm. This, my boy, or my lad, who deemest thyself forgotten by heaven, 'is the doom of the gods who dwell on Olympus' —that he that grows better shall make his way to the better souls and he that has grown worse to the worser, and so, in life, and throughout the series of deaths, do and have done to him what it is meet the like-minded should do to their likes. This doom of heaven be sure neither thyself nor any other that has fallen on ill ways shall ever claim to have escaped; 'tis that which the fashioners of doom have established before all others and that which should be shunned with utter dread. It will never leave thee forgotten. Though thou make thyself never so small and creep into the depths of earth, or exalt thyself and mount up to heaven, yet shalt thou pay them the due penalty, either while thou art still here among us, or after thy departure in Hades, or, it may be, by translation to some yet grimmer region. 'Twill be the same, thou must know, with them also whom thou hast seen raised from small beginnings to greatness by deeds of sacrilege or the like, and fancied to have passed from misery to blessedness, whence thou thoughtest their fortunes a mirror wherein to behold the utter carelessness of the gods,

knowing not how their contribution plays its part in the whole. Yet how, thou hardiest of men, canst thou doubt thy need of the knowledge? Nay, if a man has it not, he will never catch so much as a vestige of the truth, or be in case to say a word of life's happiness or disasters. If friend Clinias and the rest of our band of elders here assembled can convince thee of this much, that thou sayest of the gods thou knowest not what, why, 'tis well, and God's grace be thy aid! But if thou shouldst perchance need further argument, then listen, if thou hast any understanding, while we reason with our third antagonist. For that gods there are, and that they are concerned for mankind, has, I would maintain, been shown by no contemptible proofs. But that gods can be perverted by the receipt of gifts from the wicked, that again is what none must admit and we must dispute to the best of our power.

Clinias/ Well said. Let us do so.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, then. I ask you, in the name of these same gods, what can be the mode of the perversion, if indeed they are to be perverted? And what or what manner of beings must they be themselves? Governors, to be sure, they must be supposed to be, if they are to have effective control of the whole universe.

Clinias/ No doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ But what kind of governors are they like? Or what kind whom we can by any possibility compare rightly with them. as less with greater, are like them? Would drivers of contending teams, or captains of competing vessels, be a proper parallel? Or we might perhaps compare them with commanders of armies in the field, or they may even resemble physicians defending the body from the onslaughts of disease, or husbandmen anxiously apprehending recurrent seasons of danger for their crops, or

again overseers of flocks and herds. For since, as we have agreed among ourselves, the world is full of good things, but no less full of their contraries, and those that are amiss are the more numerous, the fight we have in mind is, we maintain, undying and calls for a wondrous watchfulness; gods and spirits are our allies in the warfare and we, moreover, the property of these gods and spirits. Wrong, arrogance, and folly are our undoing; righteousness, temperance, and wisdom, our salvation, and these have their home in the living might of the gods, though some faint trace of them is also plainly to be seen dwelling here within ourselves. Yet it should seem there are souls inhabiting our earth in possession of unrighteous spoil—bestial souls, these, beyond a doubt, who grovel before the souls of our guardians—watchdogs, shepherds, supreme masters of all, alike—and would fain persuade them by fawning speeches and witcheries of supplication—such is the tale told by the wicked—that it is lawful for them to encroach upon mankind without grievous consequence. But our contention, I take it, is that this vice I have just named of encroachment when found in bodies of flesh and blood is what is called disease, when found in seasons and whole years, pestilence, while in societies and politics it shows itself once more under the changed designation of iniquity.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ So the case of one who teaches that the gods are always indulgent to the unrighteous and the wrongdoer, if a share of the plunder is assigned them, comes inevitably to this. 'Tis as though the wolf should assign some small part of his spoil to the sheep dog, and the dog, pacified by the present, agree to the ravaging of the flock. That is the case of those who hold the gods to be venal, is it not?

Clinias/ It is indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, with which of our former list of guardians can a man compare the gods without absurdity? With seamen who are ‘turned from their course by “flow and fragrance” of wine''' and overturn vessel and crew?

Clinias/ Surely not.

Athenian Stranger/ And surely not with charioteers placed for the race but won over by a bribe to forfeit the victory to another team?

Clinias/ Nay, your comparison will be a shocking one if you say that.

Athenian Stranger/ And certainly not with commanders, physicians, or husbandmen, nor yet with herdsmen nor with sheep dogs on whom wolves have cast a spell?

Clinias/ Flat blasphemy! Quite impossible!

Athenian Stranger/ Now are not the gods, one and all, our chiefest guardians, and the interests they guard our chief interests?

Clinias/ Aye, and by far.

Athenian Stranger/ And shall we pronounce those who have the noblest of things to guard and are themselves supremely skillful in the task of guarding inferior to sheep dogs or average men, who will never betray the right for the sinful offer of a bribe from the unrighteous?

Clinias/ Assuredly not—the thought is not to be borne. Of all reprobates who are given to any form of ungodliness the defender of such a creed may well be most righteously condemned as the very worst and most ungodly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I presume we may say our three propositions, that there are gods, that they are mindful of us, that they are never to be seduced from the path of right, are sufficiently demonstrated.

Clinias/ Indeed you may, and my friend and I concur with your arguments.

Athenian Stranger/ Still I confess they have been delivered with some heat due to eagerness to triumph over these bad men. But the source of this zeal, my dear Clinias, was apprehension that if they get the better of the argument, the wicked may fancy themselves free to act as they will, seeing how many strange ideas they entertain about the gods. This is what prompted me to speak with more than common vigor. If I have done never so little to influence such men toward self-reprobation and attraction toward the opposite type of character, the prelude to our laws against impiety will have been spoken to good purpose.

Clinias/ Well, let us hope so, but if not, at least the cause will bring no discredit on a legislator.

Athenian Stranger/ So our preamble may properly be followed by a sentence which will express the sense of our laws, a general injunction to the ungodly to turn from their ways to those of godliness. For the disobedient our law against impiety may run as follows. If any man commit impiety of word or act, any person present shall defend the law by giving information to the magistrates, and the first magistratos under whose notice the matter comes shall bring the case before the court appointed to deal with such offenses as the law directs. Any official failing to take action on information received shall himself be liable to be proceeded against for impiety at the suit of anyone willing to vindicate the law. In the case of conviction, the court shall impose a particular penalty on the offender for each act of impiety. Imprisonment shall form part of the penalty in all cases. And whereas there are three prisons in the state, a common jail in the market place for the majority of cases, for safe custody of the persons of the commonalty, a second attached to the nocturnal council and known as the house

of correction, and a third in the heart of the country in the most solitary and wildest situation available, and called by some designation suggestive of punishment, and whereas also there are three causes of impiety, those we have already specified, and each such cause gives rise to two types of offense, there will be, in all, six classes of offenders against religion to be discriminated, who require different and dissimilar treatment. For though a man should be a complete unbeliever in the being of gods, if he have also a native uprightness of temper, he will detest evil men, his repugnance to wrong disinclines him to commit wrongful acts, he shuns the unrighteous and is drawn to the upright. But those in whom the conviction that the world has no place in it for gods is conjoined with incontinence of pleasure and pain and the possession of a vigorous memory and a keen intelligence share the malady of atheism with the other sort, but are sure to work more harm, where the former do less, in the way of mischief to their fellows. The first man may probably be free-spoken enough about gods, sacrifices, and oaths, and perhaps, if he does not meet with his deserts, his mockery may make converts of others. But the second, who holds the same creed as the other, but is what is popularly called a 'man of parts,' a fellow of plentiful subtlety and guile—that is the type which furnishes our swarms of diviners and fanatics for all kinds of imposture; on occasion also it produces dictators, demagogues, generals, contrivers of private Mysteries, and the arts and tricks of the so-called Sophist. Thus there are numerous types of these atheists, but two which legislation must take into account, the hypocritical, whose crimes deserve more than one death, or even two, and the others, who call for the combination of admonition with confinement. Similarly, the belief in divine indifference gives rise to two further types, and that in divine venality to another two.

These distinctions once recognized, the law shall direct the judge to commit those whose fault is due to folly apart from viciousness of temper or disposition to the house of correction for a term of not less than five years. Throughout this period they shall have no communication with any citizen except the members of the nocturnal council, who shall visit them with a view to admonition and their souls' salvation. When the term of confinement has expired, if the prisoner is deemed to have returned to his right mind, he shall dwell with the right-minded, but if not, and he be condemned a second time on the same charge, he shall suffer the penalty of death. As for those who add the character of a beast of prey to their atheism or belief in divine indifference or venality, those who in their contempt of mankind bewitch so many of the living by the pretense of evoking the dead and the promise of winning over the gods by the supposed sorceries of prayer, sacrifice, and incantations, and thus do their best for lucre to ruin individuals, whole families, and communities, the law shall direct the court to sentence a culprit convicted of belonging to this class to incarceration in the central prison, where no free citizen whatsoever shall have access to him, and where he shall receive from the turnkeys the strict rations prescribed by the curators of the laws. At death he shall be cast out beyond the borders without burial, and if any free citizen has a hand in his burial, he shall be liable to a prosecution for impiety at the suit of any who cares to take proceedings. But should he leave children fit to be citizens, the guardians of orphans shall provide for them also, no worse than for other orphans, from the date of the father's conviction.

Moreover we must frame a law applicable to all these offenders alike, and designed to alleviate the sin of most of them against religion in word or act—to say nothing of the

folly of the sinners—by the prohibition of illegal ceremonial. In fact the following law should be enacted for all cases without exception. No man shall possess a shrine in his private house; when a man feels himself moved to offer sacrifice, he shall go to the public temples for that purpose and deliver his offerings to the priests of either sex whose business it is to consecrate them. He may join with himself in the prayers any persons whose company he may desire. This regulation shall be adopted for the reasons following. The founding of a sanctuary or cult is no light task; to discharge it properly demands some serious thought. But it is the common way, especially with all women, with the sick universally, with persons in danger or any sort of distress, as on the other hand with those who have enjoyed a stroke of good fortune, to dedicate whatever comes to hand at the moment and vow sacrifices and endowments to gods, spirits, and sons of gods, as prompted by fears of portents beheld in waking life, or by dreams. Similarly, the recollection of endless visions and the quest of a specific for them commonly lead to a filling of every house and village with shrines and altars erected in clear spaces or wherever such persons are minded to place them. All these are grounds for conformity with the law now proposed, and there is the further ground that it serves as a check on the ungodly. It prevents them from fraud in this matter itself, from setting up shrines and altars in their own houses, under the delusion that they are winning the privy favor of heaven by offerings and prayers, thus indefinitely aggravating their criminality and bringing guilt before God on themselves and the better men who tolerate their conduct, until the whole community reaps the harvest of their impiety—as in a sense it deserves.

Our legislator, in any case, shall be clear before God, for his enactment shall run thus. No citizen to possess a shrine

in his private dwelling house; in the case of proved possession, or worship at any shrine other than the public, if the possessor, whether man or woman, have committed no serious act of impiety, he that discovers the fact shall proceed to lay an information before the curators of the law, who shall direct the private shrine to be removed to a public temple, and, in the case of disobedience, impose penalties until the removal is effected. Any person proved guilty of a sin against piety which is the crime of a grown man, not the trivial offense of a child, whether by dedicating a shrine on private ground or by doing sacrifice to any gods whatsoever in public, shall suffer death for doing sacrifice in a state of defilement. What offenses are or are not puerile shall be decided by the curators, who shall bring the offenders accordingly before the courts and inflict the penalty.

Book 11.

Athenian Stranger/ Our next need will, of course, be a proper regulation of our business transactions with each other. A simple general rule, I take it, might be expressed thus. I would have no one touch my property, if I can help it, or disturb it in the slightest way without some kind of consent on my part; if I am a man of sense, I must treat the property of others in the same way. We will take as a first instance treasure which someone, not being an ancestor of my own, has amassed as store for himself and his descendants. I must never pray to find such treasure. If I do find it, I must not meddle with it; I must breathe no word of it to diviners, as they are called, who are certain to recommend me to appropriate what has been committed to earth's keeping. If I appropriate it, the benefit to my fortunes will assuredly be more contracted than the expansion I shall gain in moral goodness and rectitude by leaving it alone. Purchase for purchase, I shall have made a better bargain in a better cause, if I choose to get rectitude for my soul rather than wealth for my pocket. The wise proverb which forbids moving what is better left alone has a wide range of application, and this is one of the cases to which it applies. Besides, one should give credence to the current tradition that such things are no blessing to a man's descendants. The man who is so careless for his posterity and deaf to the voice of the legislator that he takes up what neither he nor any of his fathers' fathers ever laid down, and that without the depositor's permission, in violation of one of the best of laws, that straightforward enactment of an illustrious man which runs, 'What thou hast not laid down, take not up'—the man, I repeat, who does despite to both these legislators and takes up what he has not himself laid down, and not on a petty scale either—often it is a vast heap of treasure—what shall be done to him?

What heaven will do to him, of course, is God's concern, but the first person to discover the fact shall report it, if the thing happen in the capital, to the urban commissioners, or if in the market square of the capital, to the commissioners of the market, or, if it occur out-side the capital, shall bring it to the notice of the rural commission and their heads. On receipt of the information, the state shall send a deputation to Delphi. Accordingly as the god shall pronounce about the property or the disturber of it, so the state shall act by the mandate of the oracle. If the informer be a free man, he shall be commended for his virtue, and censured as vicious if he neglects to give information; if a slave, he shall receive his well-earned freedom as a gift from the state, which shall pay his owner his price, but be punished with death if the information is withheld. It follows by consequence that we must have this same rule alike in small matters as in great. If a man leave his property behind him in any place, voluntarily or not, he that lights upon it must let it alone undisturbed; he must regard such things as placed under the protection of the spirit of the wayside, to whom they are deemed consecrate in law. Any person who appropriates such things and carries them home with him, in contravention of the law, shall, if a slave and the article of little value, receive a sound beating from any, not being under thirty years of age, who may fall in with him. If he be a free man, he shall be pronounced a churl unfit to consort with law-respecting men, and shall furthermore pay the owner of the goods he has disturbed their value ten times over. If a man charge another with being in possession of his property, great or small, and the man so charged admit possession of the object but dispute the ownership, the complainant shall, in the case of articles entered by legal requirement on the magistrates' register, summon the party in possession before the magistrates, to whom he shall

produce the article. If, upon such exhibition, such article is found to be recorded in the register as the property of either litigant, he shall be put in possession of it and so dismissed. If it prove to belong to a third party who is not in court, either party, on providing sufficient sureties, may remove it on behalf of the absent owner and in his right, for delivery to him. If the article in dispute be not recorded in the register, it shall be in the custody of three senior magistrates until the suit is decided. And if the thing so hypothecated be a beast, the loser in the suit shall pay the authorities the cost of its keep. The magistrates shall dispose of the case within three days.

Any man, provided he be sane, shall be at liberty to lay hands on his own slave for such purpose as he may please in the way of lawful business, and at liberty likewise to lay hands on the fugitive slave of any kinsman or friend, with a view to his safekeeping. If a man be thus seized as a slave and any person claim him as free and resist his detention, the captor shall let the man go, and the party opposing the detention shall provide three substantial sureties and stay the detention on these conditions aforesaid, and on no others. If capture is stayed otherwise than on these conditions, there shall be an action for assault, and the defendant, if convicted, shall pay the party whose right has been stayed twice the value of the article, as shown by the register. There shall be the like right of seizure of a freedman who pays no homage, or insufficient homage, to the authors of his freedom. Homage shall be deemed to mean that the freedman repair thrice in the month to the hearth of his emancipator and make proffer of all such services as are right and possible, and likewise that in the matter of marriage he act only with the approval of his former owner. It shall be illegal for the freedman to possess more wealth than the emancipator, and any surplus shall belong to the

master. A man thus receiving his freedom shall not prolong his residence beyond twenty years, but depart, like all aliens, with his estate in full, unless he can gain permission from the magistrates and the master who enlarged him. If the estate of a freedman or other alien come to exceed the census of the third class, he shall within thirty days from the day on which the excess first began, take up his property and depart, and in this case the authorities shall have no power to grant any extension of residence. Any person brought before the courts for noncompliance and convicted shall receive sentence of death, and his goods shall be forfeit to the state. Suits of this kind shall come before the court of a tribe, save when the counter-allegations of the parties have been previously disposed of before the neighbors, or before judges appointed by themselves.

If a man claim any other man's beast, or any other of his goods, as his own property, the party in possession shall return the article to the vendor, responsible and lawful donor, or person who otherwise made valid delivery of that article, where such person is a citizen or resident alien, within thirty days, or in the case where delivery was made by a foreigner, within a period of five months, of which months the midmost shall be that of the summer solstice. In all reciprocal exchange by means of sale and purchase, goods exchanged are to be delivered on the sites appointed in the market square for the various articles, and the price is to be received at the time; exchange shall not be permitted in any other locality, and there shall be neither selling nor buying on credit. If any citizen make any exchange whatever, for any return whatsoever, with another under other conditions or in a different locality, because he trusts the party with whom he is dealing, he must do so on the understanding that the law permits no action in respect of articles not vended under the conditions here specified. As

to subscriptions to clubs, anyone who pleases shall be free to raise them as between friends, but if a difference arise about a subscription, the parties must conduct their affairs with the understanding that the law will in no case grant an action on such grounds. If the vendor of an article receive a price of fifty drachmas or more, he shall be bound to remain in the territory for a space of ten days, and the purchaser shall be informed of the vendor's lodging with a view to the making of complaints such as are common in such cases, and satisfying the legal regulations about restitution. The legal requirements in question shall be as follows. In the case of the vending of a slave affected by phthisis, stone, strangury, or by the so-called 'holy distemper,' or other disorder of body or mind which readily escapes ordinary observation and is unamenable to treatment, if the sale were made to a physician or trainer, there shall be no right to return the article to the vendor; there shall likewise be none if the defect was truthfully mentioned at the time of sale. But where a professional man vends such an article to a layman, the purchaser shall have the right to return it within six months, except in the case of the 'holy distemper,' for which the period allowed for the return shall be one year. The case shall be brought before a body of physicians, to be nominated and selected by agreement between the parties, and a convicted vendor shall pay a sum double of the price at which he sold. If both parties be laymen, the regulations as to right of return and the trial of the issue shall be as in the former case, but the convicted vendor shall pay only the actual price received. If a man vend a slave who is a homicide, and both parties are aware of the fact, there shall be no right of return in respect of the transaction. If the purchaser be unaware, there shall be a right to return the purchase forthwith when the buyer shall discover the fact, and the case shall be heard before the five junior curators.

The vendor who is adjudged to have made such sale willingly shall purify the dwelling of the purchaser as the canonists' rules require, and shall repay the price threefold.

He that exchanges against coin other coin or any article whatsoever, animate or inanimate, shall be expected by the law in all cases to give genuine value and demand the same. But, as elsewhere in our code, let us make room for a preamble dealing with roguery of this sort at large. Everyone should understand that imposture, false pretenses, fraud, are all things of one kind, the kind which is unhappily credited in current popular parlance with being often enough an excellent thing if practiced at the proper juncture.' When and where this juncture occurs is left vague and indefinite, and thus the proverb works no little mischief to the believer and the rest of society. A legislator cannot be allowed to leave the point in this uncertainty. He should always draw definite boundary lines, wider or narrower, as we shall now proceed to do. No man shall practice any imposture or fraud of word or act with the name of a god on his lips, but one that would encounter God's reprobation, and such is he who swears lying oaths in contempt of heaven, and, in a lesser degree, he who lies to his superior. Now good men are the superiors of worse, the aged, speaking generally, of the youthful, and, by consequence, parents of their offspring, husbands, again, of their wives and children, magistrates of their subjects. Universal reverence is no more than the proper due of all who are in any of these positions of authority, and most of all the due of the authorities of the state, and it is of them we are now discoursing. A man who practices an imposition in the market is lying, cheating, and calling heaven to witness by his oaths in the face of all the laws and caveats of the commissioners of markets; he has no more respect for man than fear of God. Now undoubtedly it is a becoming habit to be careful of taking divine names in

vain, to show the same regard for them that most of us commonly and customarily show for ceremonial purity and cleanness in matters of worship, but if there should be any disobedience, here is our law. He that sells any article whatsoever in the market shall in no case put two prices on his wares. He shall ask one price, and if he do not get it, he will do right to take his goods away again, and shall not, that same day, set a higher or lower price on them. Also there shall be no proffering of wares offered for sale, or vouching for them by an oath. In case of breach of this statute, any citizen present, not being under thirty years of age, shall have the law's permission to chastise the swearer of such oath by blows; a citizen making light of the matter and disregarding this provision shall be liable to censure as a traitor to the law. The vendor of a spurious article, who cannot be persuaded by our present discourse, shall be exposed before the authorities by any person present with the knowledge requisite for his detection; such person, if a slave or resident alien, shall have the counterfeit article for his own use, if a citizen and neglecting to expose the cheat, shall be declared guilty of defrauding heaven; if he expose it, he shall publicly dedicate the article to the gods of the market. And the party found offering such wares for sale shall be deprived of the counterfeit goods, and shall moreover be scourged in the market square, and receive a stripe for each drachma of the price he set on his goods, proclamation being first made by a crier of the cause for the scourging. To counteract the impostures and knaveries of vendors, the commissioners of the market and curators shall inform themselves by inquiry from experts in different trades, and draw up rules of what the vendor may and may not do; these rules shall be engraved on a column to be erected in front of the offices of the commission of the market as regulations for the more precise direction of persons doing

business in the market. The functions of the urban commission have been described sufficiently already. If further regulations are thought needful, the commissioners shall consult with the curators of law and draft the necessary supplement; both the earlier and later rules for their official procedure shall be posted on a column in front of the offices of the commission.

The consideration of fraudulent practices and business leads directly to that of retail trade. We shall first deal with the subject as a whole in the way of reasoned counsel, and then propose legal regulation for it. Internal retail trade, when one considers its essential function, is not a mischievous thing, but much the reverse. Can a man be other than a benefactor if he effects the even and proportionate diffusion of anything in its own nature so disproportionately and unevenly diffused as commodities of all sorts? This, we should remind ourselves, is the very result achieved by a currency, and this, as we should recognize, the function assigned to the trader. Similarly, the wage earner, the tavern-keeper, and other callings, some more and some less reputable, all have the common function of meeting various demands with supply and distributing commodities more evenly. What, then, can be the reason why the calling is of no good credit or repute? What makes it generally unpopular? We must look into the question if we are to provide a partial remedy—a total cure would be beyond us—by our legislation. The thing is well worth doing, I fancy, and calls for no common abilities.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, Clinias my friend, 'tis but a small section of mankind, a few of exceptional natural parts disciplined by consummate training, who have the resolution to prove true to moderation when they find themselves in the full current of demands and desires. There

are not many of us who remain sober when we have the opportunity to grow wealthy, or prefer measure to abundance. The great multitude of men are of a completely contrary temper—what they desire they desire out of all measure—when they have the option of making a reasonable profit, they prefer to make an exorbitant one. This is why all classes of retailers, businessmen, tavern-keepers, are so unpopular and under so severe a social stigma. And yet, only suppose—an impossible supposition and heaven forbid it should be anything else! —but suppose the very best of men could be compelled—the fancy will sound ludicrous, I know, but I must give it utterance—suppose they could be compelled to take for a time to innkeeping, or retail trade, or some such calling, or suppose, for the matter of that, that some unavoidable destiny were to drive the best women into such professions. Then we should discover that all are humane and beneficent occupations. If they were only conducted on principles of strict integrity, we should respect them as we do the vocation of mother or nurse. But look at the actual facts! For purposes of commerce a man sets up his quarters in some solitary spot remote from everywhere; there he entertains the famished traveler and the refugee from tempests with welcome lodging, and provides them with calm in storm and cool shelter in heat. But what comes next? Where he might treat his customers as so many friends, and add a hospitable banquet to the entertainment, he behaves as though he were dealing with captive enemies who had fallen into his hands, and holds them to the hardest, most iniquitous, most abominable terms of ransom. These malpractices, and others like them, are to be found in all these callings, and it is they which have brought catering for the wants of the distressed into merited ill repute. This is the malady in them all for which law must find a specific. Now it is a sound old adage that it is hard to fight against

two enemies at once—even when they are enemies from opposite quarters. We see the truth of this in medicine and elsewhere. And in the battle we are at this moment waging against the evils of these professions we have two such enemies, penury and opulence. The one rots souls with luxury; the other, with its distresses, drives them into sheer insensibility to shame. What remedy, then, can be found for the disease in an intelligent society? Well, the remedy is, in the first place, that the numbers of those employed in trade be kept as low as possible, next, that such occupations be assigned to the sort of men whose corruption will do no great mischief to society; thirdly, some means must be found to prevent the characters of those actually engaged in these callings from readily taking the contagion of complete abandonment and baseness.

So our preface shall at once be followed by a law—and the blessing of providence go with it! —to this effect. In the Magnesian city which heaven is restoring from its decay, no one of all the five thousand and forty landowners who are our householders shall follow a trade, by his own will or against it, nor even engage in merchandise; neither shall he discharge menial services of any kind to a private employer who renders no like services to himself, save for services performed, without derogation to gentle blood, to father, mother, remoter ancestors, or to any man of gentle birth senior to himself. What services are thus consistent with gentle lineage and what are not can hardly be stated with precision in a law; the point shall be decided by those who have won distinction for abhorrence of the base and devotion to the gentle. If a citizen, on any pretext, engage in sordid trade, he shall be liable to an indictment for tainting the blood, to be preferred by any who will, and to come before a jury of men who have attained the first distinction for goodness; if found to have defiled the ancestral hearth by an

unworthy pursuit, he shall suffer a year's imprisonment as a lesson to avoid such conduct, or, for a repeated offense, two years' imprisonment. On each subsequent conviction the term inflicted for the last offense shall be regularly doubled. Now for a second law. A person proposing to follow a retail business shall always be a resident alien or a foreigner. And there shall be yet a third. To ensure that there shall be as much virtue, or at least, as little vice, as is possible among these associates in the life of our society, the curators must not be regarded merely as guardians of the class whom it is easy to protect from falling into crime or vice, the favorably born and properly educated and trained. Still more careful guard must be kept over those who have not these advantages, and follow callings which have a marked tendency to predispose to vice. So to effect this result for retail trade with its numerous branches and the many debasing employments it embraces—I mean those of them which we shall permit to subsist in our society because we have found their presence absolutely necessary—the curators will once more be required in this case to consult with the experts in all departments of trade, exactly as they have been enjoined to do in connection with the allied business of the prevention of fraud. They shall ascertain by consultation what scale of payment and expenditure will secure the trader a modest profit, and this scale of outlay and receipts shall be publicly displayed and enforced by the commissioners of the market and urban and rural commissioners in their respective spheres. Under such regulation we may expect our retail trade to produce general benefit for all classes with the minimum of harm to the class who follow it as their vocation.

In the case of failure to execute an admitted contract—save and except a contract to do what is prohibited by statute or by executive decree of the assembly, a contract

extorted by wrongful constraint, a contract unintentionally frustrated by unforeseen circumstances—there shall be an action for nonfulfillment of contract before the tribal courts, unless settlement can be previously reached before arbitrators or a court of the local neighbors. The class of artificers whose crafts have equipped us for the daily needs of life will be under the patronage of Hephaestus and Athena, while the other class who provide for our safety by a second group of crafts—those which subserve defense will have Ares and Athena as their patrons. There are as good grounds for this divine protection in the second case as in the other. All alike are engaged in continuous service of country and people—the one sort in taking charge of our struggles in the field, the other in producing implements and commodities for hire. Reverence for their divine progenitors will thus make it unseemly in such men to break their word about their work. If a craftsman, then, culpably fail to complete a task within the specified time, and thus forget the reverence due to the god from whom he gets his living, fancying, in his ignorance, that God is a mate who will make allowances, he shall, first, answer for it to the god, and, next, there shall be a law to suit the case. If a man break his word to the employer with whom he has contracted for any piece of work, he shall be indebted in the value of the work and shall execute it again gratis from the beginning within the time agreed on. The law will further give the same counsel to contractors for such performances as was given to vendors. The vendor was advised to take no advantage by asking too high a price, but to price his goods with all candor at their true worth, and the law gives the same injunction to the contractor, who, of course, as a craftsman is aware of the true value of his work. In a city of free men, then, the craftsman of all men may never use his expert knowledge, in itself an honest and straightforward thing, to take advantage

of the layman by the tricks of the trade, and persons wronged by such tricks must have a legal remedy. On the other side, if the party contracting with a workman fail to pay his wages strictly as stipulated in an agreement valid in law, this is to dishonor Zeus, our national defender, and Athena, who are both partners in our society, and to dissolve the supreme social bonds for the sake of petty profit, and there shall be a law to champion the heaven-ordained civic tie to this effect. If a man, having received delivery of work contracted for, do not pay the price within the stipulated time, the said price shall be recoverable from him twofold. If payment be not made within the year, whereas all other moneys out upon loan shall bear no interest, a defaulter in this kind shall pay an interest of one obol on the drachma for each month in arrears, actions under this head to be taken in the tribal courts.

As we have raised this topic of artificers, it is only right to say a passing word about the artificers of our preservation in war, generals and other military experts. In their case also—for they too, like the others, are craftsmen, though of a different sort—if any of them undertake work for the public, whether as a volunteer or under orders, and perform it well and truly, the law will never tire in commendation of the citizen who loyally pays him the soldier's wages—honors—but if the citizen receive delivery of the fine piece of military work and withhold the payment, the law shall censure him. We shall accordingly enact, and couple with our commendation of these heroes, the following law, which we address to the populace rather by way of counsel than by way of compulsion. The brave men who preserve our whole state by deeds of valor or military skill shall receive honors of the second class. Our supreme distinctions must be understood to have been assigned to those who stand first

of all in merit, those who have proved preeminent in reverence for the precepts of good legislators.

We have now, we may say, completed our regulation of the more important business relations of man with man, except for those which concern orphans and their supervision by their guardians. These are the spheres we are next driven to regulate as best we can. The foundations of the whole subject are laid by the desire of the dying to make a disposition of their estates and the accident of deaths without any such settlement, and the reason why I spoke of being ‘driven' to treat of it, Clinias, was that I saw the intricacies and difficulties involved. We certainly cannot leave such matters without all regulation. Were we to concede the unqualified validity of any testamentary disposition made at the end of life, irrespective of the testator's condition, men would often make disposals inconsistent in themselves and repugnant to law, or to the moral sense of the living, or of the testator himself at an earlier time of life. For in most of us, as you know, when in imminent expectation of death, the mental powers are in abeyance, broken, as I may say.

Clinias/ Yes, sir, and what of it?

Athenian Stranger/ A man at the point of death, Clinias, is not easy to handle; he is full of a notion which must give a legislator grave concern and perplexity.

Clinias/ How So, pray?

Athenian Stranger/ He wants to have his own way about everything, and so there is commonly a touch of passion in his language.

Clinias/ Language—what language?

Athenian Stranger/ Lord! he will say, I call it a shame if I am not to be perfectly free to give my own property to a man or not, exactly as I please, and not free to give more of it to

one man, less to another, according as I have found them treating me well or ill under the searching test of sickness, old age, and the other varied circumstances of life.

Clinias/ A perfectly proper thing to say, too, sir, don't you think so?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, Clinias, I think our legislators in the past have been too soft; their codes have been based on short views of human life and imperfect understanding of it.

Clinias/ But in what way?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, my dear sir, they were afraid of such complaints, and that is why they made the law which permits of the absolute disposition of property entirely as the testator pleases. You and I must pitch our reply to the dying in this society of yours in a more suitable key.

Friends, who have, in literal fact, only a day to live—this is what we shall tell them—in your present condition it is hard enough for you to know what is your own property; what is more, it is hard, as the inscription at Delphi says, to know what you are yourselves. So I, speaking as legislator, pronounce that neither your own persons nor the estate are your own; both belong to your whole line, past and future, and still more absolutely do both lineage and estate belong to the community. This is so surely so that I shall never, if I can help it, permit you, when shaken by age or infirmity, to be cajoled into evil testamentary dispositions by the insinuating arts of the flatterer. My law will be made with a general view to the best interests of society at large and your whole line, as I rightly hold the single person and his affairs of minor importance. Depart from us in peace and good will on the journey you are now to take, as all flesh must. What you leave behind you shall be our concern; we will take all the thought for it we may, and that with no partial care.

Such exhortations alike to living and dying shall form our preamble, Clinias. Our statute shall be to this effect. A person making written testamentary disposition of his effects, shall, if he have issue, first set down the name of such son as he judges proper to inherit. If he have another son whom he offers for adoption by a fellow citizen, he shall set his name down also. If there be still a son left, not already adopted as heir to any patrimony, who may expect in course of law to be sent to some overseas settlement, it shall be free to him to bequeath to such son such of his goods as he sees fit, other than his patrimonial estate and its complete plenishing. If there be more such sons than one, the father shall divide his possessions, other than his patrimony, among them in such proportions as he pleases. But if a son already possess a house, no portion of such goods shall be bequeathed to him, and the same shall hold in the case of a daughter; a daughter not contracted to a husband shall receive her share, but a daughter already so contracted shall receive none. If a son or daughter be found to have come into possession of an allotment of land subsequent to the date of the will, such party shall leave the bequest in the hands of the testator's heir. If the testator leave only female issue without male, he shall by will provide one daughter, selected at his pleasure, with a husband and himself with a son, and shall name such husband as his heir. If a man's son, naturally begotten or adopted, die in infancy before reaching the age of manhood, the testator shall further make provision for this contingency by naming a child to succeed such son with happier omens. If the party making his testament be absolutely childless, he may set aside one-tenth part of his acquired possessions for the purpose of legacies to any persons he pleases; all else shall be left to the adopted heir whom he shall make his son, in all integrity on the one part and gratitude on the other, with the law's

approval. Where the children require a guardian, if the deceased have stated in his will how many guardians he desires for his children and whom, and the parties named consent to act, the nomination of guardians in the will shall be final. If a man die wholly intestate, or without selecting such guardians, the lawful guardians shall be the nearest kinsmen on both sides, two from the father's side, two from the mother's, together with one personal friend of the deceased, the appointment to be made for an orphan in such case by the curators. The whole department of wardships and orphans shall be under the supervision of fifteen of the curators, the senior members of the board, who shall regularly divide themselves into groups of three, in order of seniority, one such group acting for one year and another for the next, until the five yearly periods are discharged; no avoidable breach shall be permitted in this rotation.

If a man die absolutely intestate but leaving children who need the care of a guardian, his children's distress shall share the benefit of these same laws. But if he meet his end by some incalculable accident and leave daughters behind him, he must make allowances for the legislator's disposal of his daughters' hands if it takes two points out of three into account, nearness in blood and protection of the patrimony. The third point—and this is what would have engaged a father's attention—the selection of the person out of the whole citizen body most congenial in character and disposition as a son for himself and bridegroom for his daughter, the legislator will pretermit as an impossible task. Here, then, is the best law we can devise for the case. If an intestate person leave daughters, a brother of the deceased on the father's side, or a brother on the mother's side having no patrimony of his own, shall take his daughter and inherit his patrimony. The same shall be the case if there be a brother's son but no brother, provided the parties are of

suitable age. If there be none of these, the rule shall hold for a sister's son. Father's brother shall be fourth in succession, his son fifth, father's sister's son sixth. In all cases where female issue is left, the family succession shall proceed in this regular order of proximity in blood through brothers and sisters and their offspring, males having the precedence over females in the same generation. The suitability or unsuitability of the match in point of years shall be determined by inspection, and the judge shall view the males stripped and the females stripped to the navel. If there be a failure of kin within the family, as far as brother's grandsons, and likewise grandsons of grandfather's sons, the maiden shall be free, with her guardians' assent, to make her choice among the citizens, the person so chosen, if he consent, becoming heir to the deceased and bridegroom to his daughter. Further, life is full of accidents, and it may well happen at times that an heir is still harder to find within the state. So if a maiden can find no husband on the spot, but have her eye on some party previously dispatched to a colony, whom she is minded to make her father's heir, that party, if a kinsman, shall come to the inheritance as the law appoints; if outside the family, provided there be no kinsmen within the state, consent of the daughter of the deceased and her guardians shall empower him to make the match and return home to take up the succession to the intestate person.

If a man decease intestate leaving no issue, male or female, in all other respects the law above stated shall apply to the case, but a female and male from the family shall mate, as we may express it, and be placed in the deserted homestead, the patrimony being legally assigned to them. The order of succession shall be : sister, brother's daughter, sister's daughter, father's sister, father's brother's daughter, father's sister's daughter. These shall be settled on their

kinsmen, in accord with the provisions of the foregoing statute, as consanguinity and religion demand. Of course we must not forget that such laws can prove burdensome; it is sometimes a hardship that they require a blood connection of the deceased to marry his kinswoman, but appear to overlook the numerous obstacles which will make any man reluctant to comply with the command and ready to face any consequence rather than obey, cases like those of bodily or mental disorder or deficiency in a party whom the law requires us to take as wife or husband. Hence it might be supposed that the legislator is indifferent to those considerations, but that would be a misconception. So you must take my remarks as a preamble delivered in the interests alike of the legislator and the parties for whom he legislates; they are meant to bespeak the indulgence of such parties for the legislator, if his concern for the public good hardly leaves him equally free to control the fortunes of private individuals, and a like indulgence for the recipients of his laws, if they sometimes, no less naturally, find themselves unable to execute orders laid on them in ignorance of the facts.

Clinias/ Then, let me ask you, sir, what would be the fairest way to act in such a situation?

Athenian Stranger/ In such a case, Clinias, we must appoint arbitrators between the law and the persons it commands.

Clinias/ Pray explain yourself.

Athenian Stranger/ Sometimes a nephew whose father is a wealthy man might make difficulties about marrying his uncle's daughter because he has high notions and aspires to a more splendid match. Sometimes, again, a man might be driven to disobey the law because what the legislator requires is disastrous, as when he would constrain you to

connect yourself with a house in which there is insanity, or other grievous bodily or mental affliction, such as renders life positively intolerable. So what I have to say on the subject shall be couched in the form of a law to this effect. If a party complain of being aggrieved by the laws now enacted, the law of testamentary dispositions or another, and in particular by the law of marriage, and emit a solemn declaration to the effect that the legislator, if now alive and present in person, would never have required the action—the taking or giving in marriage—of either party from whom it is now demanded, and if a relative or guardian make affirmation to the contrary, the law shall take the view that the legislator has bequeathed the fifteen curators to our orphans of both sexes as arbitrators and parents; litigants on these issues shall have recourse to them for the determination of their disputes, and shall act on their verdict as final. If the powers thus conferred on the curators be deemed too extensive by any party, he shall bring the curators before the court of selected judges and take its decision on the issue. If he lose his case, the legislator shall visit him with censure and disgrace, penalties heavier in the judgment of intelligence than the most grievous fine.

Our orphan children will thus experience a kind of second birth. How they should all be reared and trained after their first birth has already been explained. What we have to do after this second birth, a birth without a parent, is to discover the plan by which their unfortunate bereavement will entail least distress on the sufferers. First, then, to make laws for their conduct, in place of their fleshly begetters we appoint the curators, parents at least as good as they; moreover we especially charge three of them every year to care for them as their own, and we add a preamble on the upbringing of orphans apposite to these officers, as to all guardians. I believe, in fact, there was something really

opportune in all we said before of a power of taking an interest in human life retained by the souls of the departed after death. The tales which convey this moral may be lengthy, but they are true, and we ought to give our credence to general tradition on the subject, when we consider how abundant and how very venerable that tradition is, but particularly to legislators who lend their sanction to such beliefs—unless, indeed, we account them men of no judgment at all. If all this be truly so, there should be fear, first and foremost, of the gods in heaven, who behold the orphan in his loneliness, and next of the parted spirits whose native instinct is to keep especial watch over their own offspring—to show good will to him who respects them and ill to him who neglects—fear, in the third place, of the souls of men still alive, but of advanced years and high distinction. Where the laws of a state are good and its fortunes blessed, children's children delight to lavish affection on such men, their sight and hearing in such matters is quick, their good will is assured to him who walks uprightly in them, and their wrath hot against the despoiler of the defenseless orphan; they count him a solemn and sacred trust. Guardians and magistrates, if men of discretion, howsoever slight, should stand in awe of all these powers and bear themselves warily in all that concerns the orphan's upbringing and education; they should do them all the good they may in every way, even as though the benefit were bestowed on themselves and their own sons. So he that will give ear to the words of our preamble and keep himself from all spoiling of the orphan shall learn nothing of the legislator's naked wrath against these crimes, but he that will not hear, and wrongs fatherless or motherless, shall pay twofold the full compensation demanded of him who misconducts himself toward those whose parents are both in life.

As touching a general legislation for guardians of orphans, or magistrates who have charge of the guardians, had they no model already of an upbringing for the sons of the gently born in their upbringing of their own children and management of their own estates, or had they not moreover a sufficient law prescribed them for such matters, 'twould be no more than reason to propound a law of ward-ships with a special character of its own. and to make a distinction of the orphan's life from others by various special rules. As the case is, in our society the orphan's status is not very different in all these respects from that of the child under its father's care, though the two are commonly on such different levels in public estimation and in respect of the care bestowed. 'Tis, indeed, because of this very difference that our law has been so earnest with its exhortations and threats in its regulations concerning the orphan. We may add this further and most seasonable threat. The guardian of male or female infant, and the curator appointed to exercise surveillance of such guardian, shall show no less concern for the bereaved orphan than for his own children, and shall pay the same zealous attention to the estate of the ward under his care as to his own—or indeed more. This shall be the law, and the only law, under which guardianship of an orphan shall be exorcised. In the case of any contravention of this law, a guardian shall be fined by the magistrate; a defaulting magistrate shall be cited by the guardian before the court of the select judges, and fined twice the amount of his defalcations as assessed by the court. If the family, or any fellow citizen, charge a guardian with negligence or dishonesty, the case shall be brought before the same court; any defalcation proved shall be repaid fourfold, half the sum to go to the orphan child, and half to the successful prosecutor in the case. If an orphan who has attained his majority believe his guardian's administration

to have been faulty, it shall be open to him to institute proceedings in respect of the guardianship at any date within five years from the expiry of said guardianship. If a guardian be convicted, the court shall determine the penalty or fine; if a magistrate, and the injury to the orphan be found due to negligence, the court shall determine the sum payable to the ward. But if the verdict be one of malversation, the offender shall, in addition to payment of the fine, be removed from the office of curator, and the authorities shall provide country and state with a new curator in his stead.

Graver differences are found to arise between fathers and sons, sons and fathers, than ought to be possible. As a consequence, fathers are disposed to take the view that the legislator should empower them, if they see fit, to make public and legal notification through the crier that they will no longer hold a son as their son, and sons, on their part, to expect legal authorization to take proceedings in lunacy against a father discredited by years or disease. The cause of such variance is commonly to be found in utter unqualified badness of character; where the badness is on one side only, as where the son is an ill man but his father not so, or vice versa, such dissensions are not pushed to the point where they issue in disaster. Now in any society but ours a disinherited son would not necessarily lose his citizenship, but in the state for which these our laws are intended, a man whose father has cast him off has no option but to expatriate himself to some distant land, as we permit no addition whatsoever to our number of five thousand and forty households. Hence to be legally repudiated, a man must be disowned not merely by his father, but by the whole kindred. Thus our law will in such cases provide some such process as this. If, with just cause or without it, unhappy passion assail a man with the desire to cast out of his kin

the son of his own begetting and breeding, he shall have no license to do the act incontinently, without due form.

He shall first summon his own kin, as far as his cousins, and his son's kin by the mother's side in like manner, and lay his charges before them, in proof that expulsion from the kindred is no more than the accused's desert at the hands of all, and shall grant the son equal facilities of pleading that he deserves no such thing. If the father prevail and can carry the suffrage of more than one half of the kinsmen—those excepted who shall have no vote, the father, the mother, the defendant himself, and such other persons, male or female, as have not yet reached maturity—the father shall have leave to renounce his son, on these terms and conditions stated, and upon no others. If a citizen be minded to adopt one thus repudiated into his own house, there shall be no bar in law to the adoption—life commonly works frequent changes in a young man's temper—but if no one, within ten years, show desire to adopt the disowned son, the officers charged with the care of supernumerary children whom we destine for our settlement abroad shall take his case also under their charge, that he may duly receive his place there. If disease, age, sullen temper, or all together derange a man's mind with more than common violence, though the fact go undiscovered by all but those who share his daily life, so that he waste the family estate as one that is absolute lord of it, while his son knows not where to turn, and scruples to bring his action of lunacy, in such case, the law shall be that he must first have recourse to the eldest of the curators and tell them his father's case. They shall make diligent inquiry, and then counsel him whether the action shall be brought or no; if their counsel be to bring it, they shall, when the case comes on, serve the complainant both as witnesses and as advocates. The father who loses such action shall thereafter have no power to make any disposition of his goods in the

smallest particular, but shall be treated as a child for the rest of his life.

If man and wife be utterly estranged by their unhappy temper, the matter should in every case be referred to ten men—curators intermediate between the extremes in point of age—and ten women, of those who have charge of wedlock. If they are able to effect an accommodation, the arrangements thus made shall hold good, but if the storm rages too high within, they shall seek the best mate they can find for either party. The temper in these cases is like to be none too gentle, whence we try to match them with partners of more sedate and gentle mood. When the discordant parties have no children, or too few, an eye shall be had also in the new alliance to procreation; where there are already children in sufficient number, the end of the separation and new conjunction should be companionship in age and mutual care of one another. If a woman die leaving children male and female, our law shall counsel, but shall not compel, her husband to bring up the children he has and give them no stepmother; if there be no children, the husband shall be bound to marry again, until he have begotten children in number sufficient for the house and for the state. If the husband die leaving children in sufficient number, their mother shall remain in the household to bring them up. But if she be deemed unduly youthful to live without a man and keep her health, her kinsmen shall communicate with the women who have charge of wedlock and act as shall seem good to themselves and them. If there be a lack of children, that point also shall be considered; the lowest number which shall constitute a sufficiency in law shall be one boy and one girl.

When the parentage of issue is admitted and it is to be determined which parent the offspring shall follow, if a slave woman have had to do with slave, free man, or freedman,

the offspring shall, in every case, belong to her owner; if a free woman lie with a slave, the offspring shall be his owner's; if master have a child by his slave woman, or mistress by her slave, and the fact be notorious, the woman's child shall be sent, along with its father, by the women functionaries, the man's, with its mother, by the curators, to another land.

Neglect of parents is that to which neither god nor right-thinking man will ever counsel any. A man should have the wit to see how pat the preamble now to be delivered on divine worship is like to fit this theme of respect and disrespect of parents. All the world over the primitive rules of worship are twofold. Some of the gods of our worship are manifest to sight; there are others in whose likeness we set up images, believing that when we adore the lifeless image, we win the bountiful favor and grace of the living god for whom it stands. If, then, a man have a father or mother, or a parent of either, safe kept withindoors in the last frailty of age, he should remember that while there is such a figure to hallow his hearth at home, no image can be so potent for good, if only the owner give it the rightful worship he should.

Clinias/ Now what may you mean by this rightful worship?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, I will tell you. Indeed, my friends, ‘tis a theme well deserving our attention.

Clinias/ Say on, then.

Athenian Stranger/ Oedipus, so we commonly say, called down a curse on his sons when they showed him disrespect, and it is a familiar tale with us all, as you know, how fully heaven answered his prayer. And we have the stories of the cursing of Phoenix by his angry father Amyntor, and of Hippolytus by Theseus, with many another to the same effect—plain proof that heaven will listen to a parent's

prayers against his children. In fact, the curse of the parent on the offspring is more effectual than any other, and 'tis only right it should be so. If, then, 'tis the order of things that God is so exceeding quick to hear the prayer of father or mother when their children show them dishonor, let none conceit himself that when the parent receives his honors, rejoices and delights in them, and is moved to fervent prayer for blessings on the children—must we not think, I say, that heaven hears that prayer no less than the other, and dispenses the blessing? Were it not so, its blessings would not be fairly dispensed, a thought most unworthy of it.

Clinias/ Most unworthy indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ And so, as I have just said, we must believe that no image we can procure is more precious in heaven's eye than a father or forefather in the weakness of his age, or a mother in like case; when a man does them worship and honor, there is joy in heaven, or their prayers would not be heard. An ancestor's person is, in truth, an image of God more marvelous than any lifeless statue. These living images will always second our prayers for ourselves when we pay them worship, and pray in the opposite sense since when we show them dishonor, but the others can do neither the one thing nor the other. And so the man who bears himself as he ought to father, father's father, and the rest of his ancestors will find no other image so effectual to assure the favor of heaven as this which he has got.

Clinias/ Most admirably said.

Athenian Stranger/ And thus all right-thinking men treat a parent's prayer with fear and reverence; they know how time and again such petitions have been effectual. This being nature's appointment, a good man finds his aged progenitors treasure-trove to the last breath of their lives, and when they depart, the loss to their juniors is most heavy; to evil men

they are cause for real and deep alarm. Wherefore I would have all men listen to our present pleadings and show their parents all lawful honor. If there should be any whom ‘fame attaints' of deafness to a prelude to such strains, ‘twould be a fitting law against such men to decree as follows. If any person in our state be less mindful of his parents than he ought, not showing himself more careful to consider and comply with all their wishes, more than those of his sons and other posterity whatsoever and his own also, he that lies under such neglect may report it, in person or by deputy, to the three senior curators and three of the women who have charge of wedlock. They shall deal with the complaint, and chastise the criminal with stripes and imprisonment, if still young, that is, in the case of a man, not over thirty years; the penalty for a woman that offends shall be the same for a further ten years. If persons beyond these years still persistently neglect their parents, or, it may be treat them ill, they shall cite them before a court of one hundred and one citizens, the most ancient we have. In case of conviction the court shall determine the fine or other penalty, and shall not hold themselves debarred from the infliction of the utmost a man can be made to suffer or pay. If a person so ill-treated be unable to complain, any who shall become aware of the facts shall report them to the authorities, or else be deemed a craven, and lie open to action at any man's suit for the mischief. If the informer be a slave, he shall receive his freedom. If his owner be the party inflicting or suffering the injury, the magistrate shall pronounce him free; if another citizen, his price shall be paid to his owner from the public purse. The authorities shall take care that no wrong be done him in revenge for his information.

To come to injury inflicted by poisons, we have dealt at large with the cases where death results, but not, as yet, with lesser injuries arising from deliberate and intentional

administration of articles of meat or drink, or unguents. What gives us pause here is that mankind practice poisoning in two different ways. The form we have just expressly named is that in which the body is hurt by the action of some other body in normal ways. There is another form which works by art, magic, incantations, and spells, as they are called, and breeds in the minds of the projectors the belief that they possess such powers of doing harm, in those of the victims the conviction that the authors of their suffering can verily bewitch them. Now as to all such matters the true facts are hard to learn, nor, if one could learn them, would it be an easy task to convince another. And it would be labor lost to try to bring conviction to minds beset with such suspicions of each other, to tell them, if they should perchance see a manikin of wax set up in the doorway, or at the crossroads, or at the grave of a parent, to think nothing of such things, as nothing is known of them for certain. We shall therefore divide the law of poisons into two chapters, according to the mode in which the poisoner makes his attempt. But first we shall publish our request, desire, or counsel that no such attempt be made, that there be among us no working on the terrors of mankind—the most part of whom are as timorous as babes—and no constraint upon legislator or judge to find a remedy for these terrors. The would-be poisoner, we shall say, imprimis knows nothing of what he does, nothing, unless he be expert in medicine, of treatment of the body, nothing, unless he be prophet or diviner, of sorcery. The law of poisons, then, shall run to this effect. Any man administering a poison to another, or to persons employed by him, without fatal effect, or with effects fatal or otherwise to his cattle or bees, and convicted of the offense of poisoning shall, if a physician, suffer death, and if a layman, such penalty or fine as the court shall impose. And any found to have brought himself under suspicion of

doing a mischief by the practice of spells, charms, incantations, or other such sorceries whatsoever, shall, if prophet or diviner, have sentence of death; if the conviction be for sorcery without any help of prophetic art, he shall be dealt with as in the former case—the court, as before, shall determine his sentence or fine at its discretion.

In all cases of injury by theft or robbery with violence, the culprit shall pay compensation to the party injured, greater or less, according to the gravity of the mischief done, but in any case sufficient to cover completely the whole loss occasioned by his act; further, each such culprit shall pay a penalty imposed upon the offense by way of correction. The correction shall be lighter when the offender has been led astray by the folly of another to whose over persuasion he has yielded by reason of youth, or some other such cause, heavier when the crime is due to folly of his own, failure to resist pleasure or pain, or the pressure of desperate lust, envy, or rage. The purpose of the penalty is not to cancel the crime—what is once done can never be made undone—but to bring the criminal and all who witness his punishment in the future to complete renunciation of such criminality, or at least to recovery in great part from the dreadful state. For all these reasons, and since it has all these ends in view, the law must take careful aim at its mark; it must be exact in determining the magnitude of the correction imposed on the particular offense, and, above all, the amount of compensation to be paid. The judge must have the same task before him, and lend his services to the legislator, when the law leaves it to his discretion to fix a defendant's fine or sentence; the legislator, in this case, is like a draftsman who must design the outlines of cases which answer to the code. This is, in fact, Megillus and Clinias, what you and I are now to do to the fullest extent of our ability; we have to specify the penalties to be imposed on thefts and robberies of every

kind, so far as the gods and their sons permit us to legislate on the subject.

No lunatic shall be allowed to be at large in the community; the relatives of such persons shall keep them in safe custody at home by such methods as they can contrive, on penalty of fine. The fine for failure to control the lunatic, whether slave or free man, shall be for offenders of the highest property class one mina, for the second four fifths of that sum, for the third three fifths, for the fourth two fifths. Now there are many lunatics and their lunacy takes many different forms. In the case just mentioned it springs from disease, but there is another sort of lunatics who owe their madness to an unhappy native tendency to angry passion further strengthened by ill training, a kind of men whom any trifling dissension will provoke to clamorous and scurrilous reviling of each other, conduct always and totally out of place in a well-ordered society. We shall therefore have one single law of defamatory words to deal with all such men, and that law shall be this. No person shall use defamatory words of any other. A party to a dispute of any kind shall listen to his adversary's contention, and put his own before the adversary and the company present without scurrility of any sort. When disputants begin to invoke imprecations on one another and bandy foul names, like wrangling vixens, the first result is that such words, in themselves trifles light as air, yield a heavy harvest of deeds of spite and hatred. Passion is an ill-favored thing, and the speaker who does his wrath the favor to feast it on the poison it craves turns all the humanity education has fashioned within him into brutishness once more; persistence in his morose rancor makes him a wild beast, and that sorry return is all the return passion makes him for his favors. And besides, ‘tis the common way with all men in such encounters to be ever turning to the utterance of scoffs at the adversary, a practice

to which no man ever yet formed himself, save at the cost of losing all gravity of character or the better part of his dignity. For all these reasons no single scoffing word shall be uttered by any man in any temple or at any public sacrifice, nor yet at the public sports, nor in market place, court of justice, or any place of public resort. The offense shall be in every case punished by the official in charge, on pain of disqualification from all claims to distinction, as one that has no regard for the law and neglects to execute the legislator's injunctions. If a man indulge in such scurrilities elsewhere, whether he begin the reviling or retort it, any bystander, being an older man, shall uphold the law and drive out with blows him who humors his bad companion, temper, or else shall be subjected to the appointed fine. Now mark my point. When a man is entangled in a scolding match, he can say nothing without seeking to raise a laugh, and it is the resort to this trick at the prompting of angry passion which I denounce. But what follows? Are we lending our countenance to the comedians' efforts to raise a laugh against mankind, provided the object of their comedies is to attain their result, to turn the laugh against their fellow citizens, without such passion? Shall we draw the line between sport and earnest, permitting men to jest upon one another in sport and without anger, but absolutely forbidding all such jesting, as we have already done, where it is in downright earnest and charged with passion? That proviso must certainly not be withdrawn, but the law will proceed to specify the persons to whom permission shall or shall not be granted. No composer of comedy, iambic or lyric verse shall be permitted to hold any citizen up to laughter, by word or gesture, with passion or otherwise; in case of disobedience the presidents of the festival shall give orders for the offender's expulsion from the state's territory within the course of the day, on

pain of a fine of three minas to be paid to the deity in whose honor the festival is held.

The persons to whom permission has already been granted by an earlier arrangement to compose personal satire shall be free to satirize each other dispassionately and in jest, but not in earnest or with angry feeling. The actual drawing of the distinction shall be left to the minister in charge of the system of juvenile education. If he approve a piece, its composer shall have license to produce it in public; if he disapprove, the composer shall neither appear in it himself nor train any other person, slave or free, to perform it, on pain of being declared a bad citizen and a lawbreaker.

The true object of pity is not the man who is hungry or in some similar needy case, but the man who has sobriety of soul or some other virtue, or share in such virtue, and misfortunes to boot. Whence in a state where constitution and citizens alike are even middling good, it will be strange to find any such man, slave or free, so wholly neglected that he comes to utter beggary. Such men will be in no danger if the legislator enact the following statute. There shall be no begging in the state. If anyone attempt it and seek to scrape up a living by his incessant entreaties, he shall be expelled from the market place by the commissioners of the market and from the city by the urban commission, and escorted over the borders by the rural police, that our land may be entirely cleaned of such creatures.

If damage be done to a man's property of any kind by another's slave, male or female, such person not being himself contributory to the charge by awkwardness or other ill management, the owner of the party causing the damage shall either make compensation in full, or surrender the person of the culprit. If such owner allege that the charge is made by collusion between the parties causing the mischief and the party sustaining it, with intent to defraud him of his

slave, he shall take proceedings against the person alleging himself to have sustained damage. If he win the suit, he shall receive twice such price as the court may set upon the slave; if he lose it, he shall pay compensation for the damage and further surrender the slave. Likewise, if harm be done to a neighbor's property by draft animal, horse, dog, or other animal, the owner shall pay compensation for the damage.

If a man refuse to give evidence, he shall be served with a citation by the party desiring his testimony, on receipt whereof, he shall present himself at the trial of the case. If he have knowledge of the facts and is ready to depose to them, he shall then make his deposition; if he deny all knowledge, he shall profess his denial on oath by three gods, Zeus, Apollo, and Themis, and be dismissed from the case.

Any person cited in evidence and not answering to the citation shall be legally liable to action for damage. If a judge in the case be called up to give evidence, he shall do so and shall have no vote in the determination of such case. A free woman shall be qualified to give evidence and support a case, if she have attained the age of forty; if she have no husband, she shall further be qualified to initiate a process at law, but if she have a living husband, to give evidence only. A slave of either sex, or a child, shall be qualified to give evidence and support a case only in proceedings for homicide, and provided sufficient security is given that in case a demurrer is lodged against the deposition as false, the deponent will await his trial. A plaintiff or defendant making an allegation of perjury shall put in his demurrer to the whole or part of the testimony before the decision in the case is reached; the pleas of demurrer shall receive the seals of both parties to the suit and be in the custody of the officials for production at the hearing of the charge of perjury. A person twice convicted of bearing false witness shall be under no legal obligation to give evidence in the future; a

person convicted thrice shall be in future disqualified to bear witness. Any who shall have the front to do so after three convictions shall be summarily arrested upon information as to fact by the magistrates, who shall deliver him to a court, for sentence of death if convicted. Whenever depositions have been thus judicially condemned by a decision that the victory of the successful litigant was due to false evidence, if the condemnation affect half or more of such depositions, the suit so decided against a litigant shall be annulled, and the issue shall be raised and determined whether or not the suit was decided by these depositions; the result of the inquiry, either way, shall finally dispose of the original suit.

Life abounds in good things, but most of those good things are infested by polluting and defiling parasites. Justice, for example, is undeniably a boon to mankind; it has humanized the whole of life. And if justice is such a blessing, how can advocacy be other than a blessing too? Well, both blessings are brought into ill repute by a vice which cloaks itself under the specious name of an art. It begins by professing that there is a device for managing one's legal business—in fact that it is itself a device for managing such business of one's own and assisting another to manage his—and that this device will ensure victory equally whether the conduct at issue in the case, whatever it is, has been rightful or not. And it then adds that this art itself and the eloquence it teaches are to be had as a gift by anyone who will make a gift in money in return. Now this device—be it which it may, art or mere artless empirical knack—must not, if we can help it, strike root in our society. The legislator will call for obedient silence in the presence of right and departure to some other territory; to him who complies the law will have nothing more to say, but to the disobedient its language will be this. Any who shall fall under suspicion of

attempting to pervert the influence of justice upon the mind of a judge, of wrongfully multiplying suits at law, or wrongfully aiding others to such suits, shall be liable to prosecution by all who choose on the charge of perversion of justice or abetment of such perversion, as the case may be. The charge shall be tried before the court of select judges, and if it result in conviction, the court shall determine whether the defendant, in its judgment, acted from ambition, or from greed of lucre. If from the former, the court shall fix a space of time during which the guilty party shall have no right to enter a suit against any man, nor assist any man in a suit. If the offense be found due to greed of gain, the culprit shall, if an alien, be expelled from the country on pain of death in the case of return, and, if a citizen, suffer death for his insatiate love of lucre. Also a second conviction of commission of the same offense from the motive of ambition shall lead to sentence of death.

Book 12.

Athenian Stranger/ If an ambassador or envoy to a foreign state behave disloyally in his office, whether by falsification of the dispatch he is commissioned to deliver or by proved distortion of messages entrusted to him by such state, friendly or hostile, as ambassador or envoy, all such persons shall lie open to impeachment of the crime of sacrilege against the function and ordinances of Hermes and Zeus, and it shall be determined what sentence or fine shall follow conviction.

Larceny is a sordid thing and open robbery a flagitious. No son of Zeus has ever had dealings in either; neither fraud nor force is to their liking. So let none of us, if he offends in this sort, suffer himself to be gulled by the fictions of the poets and fabulists; let him never fancy his pilfering or robbing no deed of shame, but an act such as is done by the very gods themselves. That is a tale with neither truth nor semblance of truth about it, and he that transgresses so is no god, nor the son of any god at all. In these things 'tis the legislator's business to know better than all the poets together. So, if a man will obey our counsel, 'tis well with him—and may it ever be well! But if he will not, why, then he shall find a law up in arms against him, to this effect. For all theft of public property, great or small, there shall be one and the same judgment. For he that steals a little thing does his thieving with weaker hand but not with less lust, and he that takes up a greater, when he had not laid it down, is guilty of the whole law. This is why the law deems it fit that one offender should be visited with a lighter doom than the other—not that what he stole was a lesser thing, but because one may yet be recovered perchance, and the other is beyond cure. Whence, if a conviction for theft of the public property be gained in the courts against an alien or slave, seeing he may yet, in all likelihood, be recovered, the court shall decide

what sentence he must serve, or what fine he shall pay. A citizen, one trained as our citizens will be trained, found guilty of plundering or deforcing his native country, whether taken red-handed or no, shall suffer death as one beyond curing.

The organization of our forces is a thing calling in its nature for much advice and the framing of many rules, but the principal is this that no man, and no woman, be ever suffered to live without an officer set over them, and no soul of man to learn the trick of doing one single thing of its own sole motion, in play or in earnest, but, in peace as in war, ever to live with the commander in sight, to follow his leading, and take its motions from him to the least detail—to halt or advance, to drill, to bathe, to dine, to keep wakeful hours of nights as sentry or dispatch carrier, all at his bidding, in the stricken field itself neither to pursue nor to retire without the captain's signal, in a word, to teach one's soul the habit of never so much as thinking to do one single act apart from one's fellows, of making life, to the very uttermost, an unbroken consort, society, and community of all with all. A wiser and better rule than this man neither has discovered, nor ever will, nor a truer art of military salvation and victory. 'Tis this lesson of commanding our fellows and being commanded by them we should rehearse in the times of peace, from our very cradles. Anarchy—the absence of the commander—is what we should expel root and branch from the lives of all mankind, aye, and all beast-kind that is under man's dominion. In especial, all the choric dances our people are to learn must look to gallantry in the field; the same must be the end of all their training in easy and nimble movement, all their endurance of hunger and thirst, cold and heat, and lying hard. Above all, they must, to the same end, learn not to corrupt the native strength of the head and feet by swathing them in artificial coverings,

and so tampering with the growth and function of the head cover and footwear of nature's providing. For head and feet are the body's extremities, and due care of them affects the whole body most potently for good, neglect for ill; the foot is the whole body's servant of servants, the head the master member made by nature to contain all its principal organs of sense.

So much, then, for the praise of the warrior's life we would have a young man listen to in fancy—now for the relative laws. A man put on the roll or assigned to any arm of the forces shall perform his service. If a man absent himself from cowardice without a discharge from his commanders, he shall, on the return of the forces from the field, be impeached before the officers of the army for evasion of military duty, and the verdict shall be given by someone branch of the forces—infantry, cavalry, or other arm—in separate session. Thus an infantryman shall be brought before the infantry, a cavalryman before the cavalry, a member of some other force similarly before his comrades. A convicted person shall, imprimis, be disqualified for life for all competitions for distinction, and prohibited from laying an impeachment of the same kind against another, or speaking as accuser in such cases; the court shall, moreover, determine what further sentence or fine shall be inflicted. Next, when the charges of evasion of service have all been heard, the officers shall hold a second review of all arms, and the claims of all candidates for awards of distinction shall be settled before a body of their own mates; all evidence and commendatory testimonials proffered by candidates shall relate exclusively to the campaign just terminated, and to no previous service. The prize in each branch of the service shall be a wreath of olive; the winner shall dedicate this wreath in such temple of a god of war as he may prefer, as evidence for a future award of first, second, and third-rank distinctions for the

conduct of a whole life. A man going on service but returning prematurely before the commanders have withdrawn the forces shall be liable to impeachment for desertion before the same court in which cases of evasion are heard, and the penalties for conviction shall likewise be as in that case.

A person bringing a charge against another must, of course, be most scrupulously careful neither intentionally nor unintentionally to bring him to unmerited punishment. Justice is, indeed, as she has been called, the virgin daughter of conscience, and conscience and justice both are heart haters of the false charge. I say a man must keep himself from this and other offenses against justice, and in especial in the matter of loss of arms in war, a man must be tender of bringing unmerited judgment on the innocent, by mistaking an enforced loss for a shameful, and so making it a reproach. 'Tis truly no easy matter to draw the line of distinction between the two cases, and yet the law should do what it can to distinguish them. And so we will help ourselves out by recalling a legend. If Patroclus had come to himself in the tent when he had been carried there without his arms—and the thing, we know, has happened to thousands—while the gallant armor he had been wearing—by the poet's tale it came to Peleus with Thetis as a nuptial gift from the gods—was in Hector's hands, the baser sort of that day would have had their chance to taunt the brave son of Menoetius with casting away his arms. And then there are all the cases of those who have lost their arms by falls from heights, at sea, or when suddenly swept off their feet, under stress of weather, by a swirl of waters—or countless other excuses may be conjured with, to put a fair face on a suspicious misadventure. So we must do our best to discriminate the graver and uglier mischance from the lesser. There is a distinction, then, to be made when such epithets are used in reproach. It would not be fair in all cases

to call the man one who has flung his shield away, though he may be said to have lost his arms. A man who is stripped of his shield by a considerable exertion of force cannot be said to have flung it away with the same truth as one who drops it of his own act. There is all the difference in the world between the cases. So we shall give our law this wording. If a man surrounded by the enemy, and having arms in his hands, do not turn to try and defend himself but intentionally throw down his weapons, or cast them away, and thus choose to purchase a life of shame by his cowardice rather than fair and glorious death by his valor, there shall be judgment for the loss of arms thus flung away; in the other case above mentioned, the judge shall hold careful inquiry. Correction must always be meted to the bad—to make a better man of him—not to the unfortunate; on him it is wasted.

Now what shall we call a fitting punishment for the coward who throws away weapons so formidable for his defense? A human judge cannot, indeed, invert the transformation which is said to have been wrought on Caeneus of Thessaly; he, we are told, had been a woman, but a god changed him into a man. Were the reverse process, transformation from man to woman, possible, that, in a way, would be of all penalties the properest for the man who has flung his shield away. To come as near as we may to this in our treatment of the craven's pitiful clinging to his life, and that he may have no risks to take for the future, but prolong his life of infamy to the last minute possible, our law in these cases shall run thus. If a man be judicially convicted of the shameful casting away of his weapons of war, he shall not again be employed as a soldier nor assigned to any military post whatever by any general or other military officer. In case of disregard of this provision, the officer who so employs the coward shall be mulcted by the auditor of his official

accounts to the amount of one thousand drachmas, if he belong to the wealthiest class, five minas if to the second, three minas if to the third, or one, if to the fourth. And the convicted coward shall not only be discharged, as befits his unmanly spirit, from all the dangerous services that become a true man, but shall further pay a price, of a thousand drachmas if he come from the wealthiest class, five minas if from the second, three if from the third, or, if from the fourth class one, as in the previous clause.

Now as to auditors, what plan will be the proper one for us, whose magistrates have been appointed, some for a year and by the chance of the lot, some for years together and by selection from a leet? Who will be competent to put the crooked in such officers straight, if one of them should perchance act awry under the crushing weight of his office and his own inequality to its dignity? 'Twill indeed be no light task to find an officer of such supereminent merit to set over our officers themselves, and yet the attempt to discover auditors of such more-than-human quality must be made. For the matter, in fact, stands thus. A polity is like a ship or a living organism. The dissolution of the fabric hangs on a multitude of devices of one character under all their various forms, to which we give different names in the different cases, such as stays, girders, tendons of the sinews; one such, and not the least momentous, in the case of a polity, critical for its preservation or utter dissolution, is that now under our consideration. For if the censors who are to approve our magistrates are better men than themselves, and do their work with flawless and irreproachable justice, then there will be prosperity and true happiness for the whole of nation and society, but if aught is amiss with the auditing of our magistrates, then the bonds of right which hold all branches of our social fabric together in one will be loosened; every office will be dismembered from every other,

and all will no longer conspire in one effect; the state will no longer be one but many, will be filled with conflicting factions and, ere long, destroyed. So we must see to it that these auditors are, one and all, eminent in every sort of excellence. And so we shall contrive their creation in some such fashion as this. The whole body of citizens shall annually, after the day of the summer solstice, assemble in a precinct jointly dedicate to the sun and to Apollo for the purpose of presenting before the god three men, each citizen presenting the man of not less than fifty years of age whom he judges in all respects, himself excluded, the best. From those thus first elected they shall then select those for whom most votes have been cast, to the number of one half—if the total number be even; if it be odd, they shall omit the one name for which fewest votes have been given—so that half the names, as determined by the number of votes cast, are retained. If several names receive an equal number of votes, and the half thus becomes too large, they shall reduce it by excluding the youngest names and retaining the others. The voting shall then be repeated until only three names are left, with an unequal number of votes. If the votes cast for all three, or for two of them, be equal, they shall commit the issue to providence and good fortune, and decide it by lot. They shall then crown the first, second, and third competitors with olive; when this distinction has been awarded, public proclamation shall be made in this form. The state of the Magnesians, now providentially restored to its old prosperity, hereby presents its three most worthy citizens to the sun, and dedicates them, in accord with its ancient usage, as a choice offering of first fruits, to Apollo and the sun in common for so long as they shall give themselves to their work as judges.

Twelve such auditors shall be created in the first year, each to hold office until attaining the age of five-and-seventy;

thereafter three more shall be created annually. They shall divide the magistracies into twelve groups and scrutinize all by the application of every test to which a gentleman can be subjected. For their term of office they shall have their residence in the same precinct of Apollo and the sun in which their election was held. They shall individually, or in some cases conjointly, hold a scrutiny into the conduct of all outgoing officers of state, and declare by publication in writing in the market square what sentence or fine each official should incur in the judgment of the board of auditors. Any official claiming that their judgment upon him is unfair shall summon the auditors before the court of select judges, and if acquitted of their censures, may, if he so pleases, bring his action against the auditors themselves; if he lose his case, and the sentence previously pronounced against him by the auditors be that of death, it shall simply stand, as no more can be done to him, but any other sentence which can be doubled in the infliction shall be exacted twofold.

You must next be told what audit will be appointed for the auditors themselves, and how it will be conducted. While they are still alive, as men whom the whole community has pronounced worthy of its supreme distinction, they shall have the foremost seat at all festivals, and further, the heads of all delegations dispatched to inter-Hellenic sacrifices, religious gatherings, and other such international solemnities, shall always be taken from among them. They shall be the only citizens permitted to decorate themselves with the laurel wreath. They shall all hold priesthoods of Apollo and the sun, while the chief priesthood shall every year be enjoyed by the member of the college placed first at the election of that year, and the year shall be officially registered under his name, as a means of dating, so long as our society survives. When they decease, the lying-in-state,

the procession to the grave, and the grave itself shall be more distinguished than in the case of other citizens. All the draperies shall be white, and there shall be neither dirges nor lamentations, but the bier shall be surrounded by a choir of fifteen maidens and another of fifteen lads; these choirs shall alternately chant a eulogy on the priests in the form of a hymn, and this lyrical panegyric shall be kept up throughout the day. At dawn the next day the bier shall be conducted to the tomb, the actual escort being one hundred of the young men from the gymnasiums, to be selected at their pleasure by the deceased's kinsmen. At the head of the procession shall march the young bachelors, all appareled in their accouterments—the horsemen having their chargers, the infantry their arms, and the rest in the like array. The bier shall be immediately preceded by the boys, who will sing their national chant, and followed by the maidens, and such married women as are past the time of procreation. In the rear shall come priests and priestesses; even though they are debarred from accompanying other funerals, they may follow this, as one that imparts no defilement, if the Pythian prophetess will add her sanction to our proposal. The tomb shall be made in the form of an oblong underground vault of tufa, the most indestructible procurable, and provided with couches of stone set side by side. When the blessed dead has been laid to rest there, they shall cover the place with earth and plant a grove of trees round it, but leaving one end free, that the burial place may admit of extension at this end, where there will never be earth over the interred. And they shall hold an annual contest in music, athletic exercises, and horse racing in their honor. These, then, shall be the guerdons to be bestowed on those who have stood their audit and come out clear. But if any of them presume on his election and prove himself but too human after all by degeneration after his appointment,

the law shall ordain that he may be impeached by any who will, and the court before which the issue shall be tried shall be formed as follows. It shall be constituted of curators of law, surviving members of the board of auditors itself, the panel of select judges. The verbal form of the prosecutor's impeachment shall be : Such a one is unworthy of his distinctions and the office he holds. If the impeached be convicted, he shall forfeit his office, as well as the public burial and other honors granted to him, but if the prosecutor cannot obtain a fifth part of the votes, he shall pay a fine, if of the wealthiest class, of twelve minas, if of the second, of eight, if of the third, of six, if of the fourth, of two.

We may well admire one thing in Rhadamanthus' manner of deciding issues at law, as the tale describes it—his perception that the men of his day were so confident of the manifest existence of gods—as well they might be, according to the story, since most of them at that time, and Rhadamanthus among them, had gods for their parents. Apparently he held that a judge's work should not be entrusted to any mere man, but only to gods, and this is why he could decide the cases that came before him so simply and rapidly. He put the litigants in a case to their oath about their assertions, and so had his business speedily and surely dispatched. In these days of ours, when, as we have said, some men have no belief whatever in gods, others hold that they give themselves no concern about us, and the creed of the worst, who are the majority, is that if they pay the gods a trifle in the way of sacrifice and flattery, they will lend their help in vast frauds and deliver the sinner from all sorts of heavy penalties—in this present-day world, of course, the juristic methods of Rhadamanthus are no longer in place.

Men's beliefs about gods have changed, and so the law must be changed too. A thoughtful legislator should abolish the oath taken by either litigant in the institution of a private

action. The party instituting proceedings should state his charges in writing, but take no oath to their truth; similarly the defendant should deliver his denial of the charge to the magistrate in writing, without swearing to it. It is surely an awful thing, in a city where lawsuits are common, to know perfectly well that half or nearly half of the inhabitants are forsworn, and yet have no uneasiness about associating with each other at common meals and on other occasions of public and private intercourse.

Our law, then, will require an oath to be taken by a judge before delivering his sentence; it will command the citizen who gives his vote for the appointment of a public official to do so in all cases either upon oath, or by using a ballot fetched from a consecrated spot. Similarly, it will require an oath from judges of choirs or other musical performers, and presidents and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian sports, and persons in any similar position, where a false oath brings nothing men commonly regard as profit to the swearer. But wherever there is great and manifest profit, so esteemed, in denying the truth and standing to the denial on oath, the decision between the various contending parties must be reached by legal process requiring no oaths. And more generally, the presiding authorities of the court shall permit the litigant neither to court credence by swearing to his assertions, nor to support them by imprecations upon himself and his house, nor to indulge in degrading appeals for mercy or unmanly pathos; they shall see to it that he confines himself entirely to the statement of the rights he claims, in decent and reverent language, and gives a like decent hearing to his opponent. In case of breach of this rule, the presiding officers shall regard him as out of order, and recall him to relevance to the matter in hand. In a case between aliens, however, the parties shall be legally permitted to tender an oath to the opponent, or accept such

a tender from him, at their pleasure. Remember that they will not, as a rule, live to old age among us, or make themselves a nest where others of their own type will be bred up to be naturalized in our country. We shall decide how all such parties are to initiate private suits against each other on the same principle.

In cases of disobedience to the state on the part of a free citizen—I mean cases not grave enough to call for whipping, imprisonment, or death—neglect to present oneself at the meetings of a choir, or to take part in a procession, or some other ceremonial or act of public service, e.g., a sacrifice in peacetime, or the payment of a special levy in time of war—in all such cases, I say, the first requisite shall be that the loss be made good to the state, and the disobedient party shall be required to give a pledge to the officials empowered by the state's laws to demand it. If the disobedience continue after the pledge has been deposited, the articles so deposited shall be sold, and the proceeds confiscated to the state. If still further penalties be required, they shall be suitably imposed by the officers empowered to deal with the case in question, who shall cite the refractory parties before the courts, until they consent to obey orders.

A state which has no revenues except those it derives from its own soil, and no commerce, is bound to make up its mind what course it should take as regards foreign travel on the part of its citizens and admission of aliens to its own dominions. So a legislator has to open his treatment of the subject with counsels which he must make as persuasive as he can. Now free intercourse between different states has the tendency to produce all manner of admixture of characters, as the itch for innovation is caught by host from visitor or visitor from host. Now this may result in the most detrimental consequences to a society where public life is sound and controlled by right laws, though in most

communities, where the laws are far from what they should be, it makes no real difference that the inhabitants should welcome the foreign visitor and blend with him, or take a jaunt into another state themselves, as and when the fancy for travel takes hold of them, young or old. On the other side, to refuse all admission to the foreigner and permit the native no opportunity of foreign travel is, for one thing, not always possible, and, for another, may earn a state a reputation for barbarism and inhumanity with the rest of the world; its citizens will be thought to be adopting the ill-sounding policy of exclusion of aliens and developing a repulsive and intractable character. But reputation, for good or ill, with the outer world ought never to be undervalued. Mankind at large may come far short of the real possession of virtue, but they are by no means equally deficient in the power to judge of the vice or virtue of others; there is a wonderful sagacity among the wicked themselves by which the very wickedest of them are often enabled to discriminate better men from worse accurately enough in their thought and language. Hence it is sound advice to give to most societies if one counsels them to prize a good reputation with the wider world. The one absolutely right, supreme rule, in fact, is first to be genuinely good and then to pursue repute for goodness, never, if we mean to be perfect, mere reputation by itself. So it will be only proper for the state we are now founding in Crete, like others, to earn the highest and most illustrious reputation for virtue with all its neighbors, and we may have every reasonable hope that if our plan is carried out, ours will be one of the few well-governed states and countries that enjoy the beams of the sun and his fellow gods.

Our course in respect of travels in foreign parts and admission of aliens to our territory should therefore be as follows. First, no permission of foreign travel shall, in any

circumstances whatsoever, be granted to any person under the age of forty; further, such permission shall be granted to no person for his private occasions, but only to those traveling on business of state, envoys, embassies, and deputations to diverse ceremonies of religion. It will not be proper to reckon absences in war or field service among these occasions of state. As it will be our duty to send deputations to Apollo of Pytho and Zeus of Olympia, as well as to Nemea and the Isthmus, to take their part in the sacrifices and games with which these gods are honored, we must do our utmost to make these deputations as numerous, noble, and distinguished as we can; they must he composed of men who will make our city illustrious in the gatherings of religion and peace, and cover her with a glory to match her renown in the field; on their return they shall explain to their juniors how inferior are the ways of other nations to the institutions of their own land.

There are other commissioners who should, with the curators' license, be sent abroad. If we should have citizens desirous to investigate the affairs of other peoples with ampler leisure, no law shall stand in their way. A state unacquainted with mankind, bad and good, will never in its isolation attain an adequate level of civilization and maturity, nor will it succeed in preserving its own laws permanently, so long as its grasp of them depends on mere habituation without comprehension. Among the great mass of men there are always, in fact, some, though few, of a superhuman quality; they are to be found in states with defective laws no less than in states with good, and their society is priceless. An inhabitant of a well-governed state whose own character is proof against corruption should follow their trail over sea and land with a view to the confirmation of such practices in his own community as are sound and the amendment of any that are defective. Indeed

without observation and inquiry of this kind, or if it is ill conducted, no scheme of polity is perfectly stable.

Clinias/ Then how would you secure this pair of results?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, thus. This observer of whom we are speaking shall, in the first place, be a man of fifty or upward. Next, if our curators are to let him reach other lands as a sample of what they can produce, he must be of high repute, military and otherwise, and the period of his observations shall not be prolonged beyond his sixtieth year. He shall spend such part of these ten years as he pleases in his observations, and, on his return from them, shall report himself to the council entrusted with supervision of the laws. This shall be a body composed of younger and senior members, and shall be required to hold daily sessions from daybreak until after sunrise. It shall contain, first, the priests who have won distinctions of the first rank, next the ten senior acting curators, next the last elected minister of education and any retired holders of that office. Each of these shall not merely attend in person but associate with himself such younger person of the age of thirty to forty years as he deems best. The matter of the discourse held at their conferences shall always be the laws of their own community, with such relevant suggestions of moment as they may learn from other quarters, and, in especial, all branches of study they may judge to advance their inquiries by shedding light on points of law that would be left unduly dark and perplexed if these studies were neglected. The junior members shall give all diligence to pursue any such studies approved by their seniors, and if any of these assessors prove unworthy, the whole council shall reprimand him who invited his presence. Such of them as obtain a good repute shall be a target for the observation of the whole community; they shall be the object of its particular care and regard, and receive marks of honor or

more than common disgrace, according as they do themselves credit or fall below the general average in their conduct. Now the observer returned from his travels about the world is to present himself immediately before this council. If he have met with persons possessed of any information about legislation, education, or the management of children, or, as may also happen, have brought back personal reflections of his own, the results shall be laid before the whole council. If they judge him to have come back neither the worse nor the better, he shall still receive their commendations for his trouble and industry. If much better, he shall, while still living, be commended much more warmly, and at his death shall be honored with appropriate distinctions by the authority of the council. But should he appear to have come home corrupted by his travels, he shall not make his assumed 'wisdom' a pretext for conferences with young or old. If he will obey orders in this matter, he shall live out his life in privacy; if not, he shall have sentence of death—I mean, if a court convict him of meddling in any matter of education or legislation. If the magistrates neglect to bring such offender before the court, where cause for proceedings has been given, the fact shall be remembered to their discredit at the award of distinctions.

So much, then, of parties who shall have leave of foreign travel and the terms of their leave; we are next to consider the welcome to be given to a visitor from abroad. The foreign visitors of whom account must be taken are of four sorts. First, and everlastingly, a guest who will pay his incessant calls, for the most part, in the summer, like a bird of passage; most of his kind are, in fact, just like winged creatures in the way they come flying overseas, at the proper season, on their profitable business errands. He shall be admitted by officials appointed for his benefit, to our market

place, harbors, and certain public buildings erected near the city but outside its walls. The officials will take care to prevent the introduction of novelties by these guests, and will administer proper justice to them, but shall keep their intercourse with them within the strict bounds of necessity. The second sort are observers in the literal sense of the word; they come for the sights to be beheld by the eye and the musical displays to be enjoyed by the ear. Lodging shall be provided for all such visitants at the temples with a generous hospitality, and they shall receive the attention and solicitude of our priests and sacristans during a sojourn of reasonable length, but when they have seen and heard what they purposed, they must depart without harm done or received. In case of wrongs done or suffered by them, the matter shall be adjudicated upon by the priests, when the claim does not exceed fifty drachmas; where the sum claimed is higher, the case shall come before the commissioners of the market. A third sort, who must be entertained as guests of the state, are those who come from other countries on business of state. They shall be entertained by the generals and commanders of cavalry and infantry divisions, and by no other persons, and the business of their entertainment shall be confined to the particular commander in whose house such a guest receives lodging, acting in concert with the prytanes. In the case of a visitant of the fourth sort—the event will be indeed uncommon, but if we should be visited by a counterpart of our own observers from some other country—he must, in the first place, have attained the age of fifty at least, and further, his avowed object must be either to see for himself some excellent features superior to the beauties to be found in other societies, or to reveal something of the sort to another state. Such a visitor, then, shall need no bidding to-enter the doors of our men of 'wealth and wisdom,' being himself a

man of these same qualities. I mean, he may go to the house of the minister of education, confident of his fitness to be guest to such a host, or to that of some man who has won the award for virtue. He shall pass his time with some of these, imparting knowledge and acquiring it, and when he departs, it shall be as a friend from friends, with suitable parting presents and distinctions. These, I say, are the laws by which our citizens should manage all reception of foreign visitors, male or female, and dispatch of their own countrymen to foreign parts. They should show their reverence for Zeus, the stranger's patron, not make meats and sacrifices a device for repelling the alien, as we see the 'dusky brood of Nilus' doing today, or banish him by barbarian edicts.

Any person giving a security shall do so in explicit terms; he shall set down the whole transaction in a legal document, and in the presence of witnesses, to the number of three at the least, if the sum concerned be not more than a thousand drachmas, or five at the least if it be higher. Also the broker at a sale shall be security for a seller who has no sound title to the article sold, or cannot guarantee delivery, and an action shall lie against broker no less than against vendor.

A person proposing to search for stolen goods on another's premises shall first strip to his shirt and lay aside his belt, and shall also have made oath by the gods, as required by law, that he honestly expects to find his goods. The other party shall permit the search, which shall extend to sealed, as well as to unsealed, receptacles. If one party desire to make a search and the other refuse permission, the party so repelled shall lay an action, specifying the value of the missing goods, and the defendant shall, on conviction, pay twice the amount as specified. If the owner of the house be absent from home, the occupants shall permit the search of unsealed receptacles; sealed receptacles shall be

countersealed by the searcher and left for five days under such guard as he pleases. If the absence of the owner is further prolonged, the searcher shall call in the urban commissioners and prosecute his search; the sealed receptacles themselves shall be opened, but shall be afterward resealed as before in the presence of the household and the commissioners.

In cases of disputed title there shall be the following limits of time, beyond which a possessor's title shall no longer be liable to question. In this Cretan city there can be no such thing as a disputed title to a landed estate or a dwelling house. As to other property of which a man may be possessed, when the possessor of an article makes open use thereof in town, market square, and temples, no counterclaim being advanced, then, if another profess to be looking for the article during this period, while the possessor is plainly making no concealment thereof, if the possession on the one side and search on the other have continued for a year, after the expiry of such year no one shall have legal right to claim such article. If the article be in open use on a country estate, though not in town or market place, and no claimant appear with five years, no man's claim to such article shall thenceforth be entertained. If the article be in use withindoors, and in the town, the term of prescription shall be three years, or for an article thus held in undisclosed possession on a man's country estate, ten. If the article be in some other country, at whatever time it may be found, prescription shall be no bar to the claim of the finder.

If a man forcibly hinder the presence of a litigant or his witnesses in the courts, and the party thus hindered be a slave, his own or another's, the suit shall be declared null and void; if the party hindered be a free man, the offender shall further undergo a year's imprisonment, and shall be liable to action for kidnapping at the instance of any who

pleases. If a man forcibly prevent the presence of a rival competitor at any gymnastic, musical, or other contest, any who may please shall inform the presidents of the contest, and they shall set the intending competitor free to enter the contest. In a case where this is impossible, if the party hindering the appearance of a competitor prove victorious, the presidents shall award the prize to the competitor so hindered, and inscribe his name as victorious in such temples as he pleases; the party causing the hindrance shall be forbidden to commemorate such a contest by dedication or inscription, and shall be equally liable to an action for damage whether he be defeated in the competition or successful.

If a man knowingly receive stolen goods, he shall be liable to the same penalties as the thief; the sentence for reception of an exile shall be death.

All citizens shall regard a friend or enemy of the state as their own personal friend or enemy. Any person making peace or war with any parties independently of the commonwealth shall likewise incur the pain of death. If a section of the state make peace or war with any on its own account, the generals shall bring the authors of the measure before a court, and the penalty for conviction shall be death.

The servants of the nation are to render their services without any taking of presents, and there shall be no glossing of the practice, nor accepting of the principle that 'A present should be taken for a good deed, though not for an ill.' To form your judgment and then abide by it is no easy task, and 'tis a man's surest course to give loyal obedience to the law which commands, 'Do no service for a present.' The disobedient shall, if convicted, die without ceremony.

As concerns payment to the public treasury, every man must have his estate valued, and that for more reasons than

one, but the members of every tribe shall also furnish the rural commission with a written record of each year's produce that the exchequer may be free to choose at its pleasure, between the two methods of raising its revenue, as the authorities will consider annually whether they shall exact some fraction of the capital valuation or some part of the annual income, exclusive of the cost of the public table.

A modest man's gifts in the way of offerings to the gods should themselves be modest. Now the soil and the household hearthstone are sacred, in our universal conviction, to all gods that are. No man, then, shall reconsecrate what is dedicated already. In other societies you will find gold and silver in temples as well as in private houses, but they are possessions which breed ill will against their owner. Ivory, a body that soul has forsaken, is no clean offering; bronze and iron are tools of battle. But any man, at his pleasure, may dedicate in our public temples an image of wood, carved in one piece, or of stone similarly fashioned, or a piece of woven work, not exceeding what one woman can finish in a month. White is the color most proper for the gods, in tapestry as in other materials; dyes are not to be used except for military adornment. The most pious presents we can offer the gods are birds and figures on such scale that they can be finished by one artist in one day; our other offerings shall be on the model of these.

We have now spoken of the sections into which our whole city must be divided—their number and nature—and done what we may to prescribe laws for all its chief business transactions. It remains to constitute our judiciary. Our tribunal of first instance will consist of judges appointed by the concurrent choice of defendant and plaintiff; arbitrators would be a more appropriate name for them. The second court shall be formed from fellow villagers and tribesmen, each tribe being subdivided into twelve. If no decision can be

reached at the first stage, the litigants shall continue their contention before these judges, but the stake will be increased; the defendant, if worsted a second time, shall pay the award imposed in the original suit with an additional fifth. If he be ill content with his judges and desire to contest the case a third time, he shall take it before the select judges, and shall, if worsted once more, pay the original award with an additional half. A plaintiff who will not sit down with a defeat in the primary court but carries the case to the second shall, if successful, receive the additional fifth, but, if defeated, shall pay the same fraction of the sum under dispute. If the antagonists refuse to submit to the earlier judgments and take the case to the third court, the defeated party shall pay, if he be the defendant, the first award with an additional half, as already enacted, and if plaintiff, the half only.

For what concerns balloting for juries and filling vacancies on them, the provision of a staff for the different courts and the intervals at which sessions shall be held, the manner of taking the vote, the adjournment of the court, and other such necessary details of the administration of justice—as, for example, determination of the order in which suits shall be heard, the rules of compulsory answers to interrogatories and compulsory attendance in court, and the like generally—the matter has been dealt with already, but 'tis no ill deed to repeat a sound maxim or even to state it a third time. In a word, all such minor and simple details of legal procedure may be left by our aged legislator for his younger successors to fill in. Here, then, we have a fair model for the composition of courts to adjudge private disputes.

For tribunals in affairs of common and public concern and courts which are to subserve the magistrate in the exercise of his function, many communities already possess

decorous institutions derived from excellent authors and our curators must construct out of this material a scheme suited to the polity now in process of birth. They shall compare these institutions and amend them in the light of their personal experience until they judge them to be all sufficiently perfected; then only will they take the last step, stamp them as wholly immutable, and put them into practice for all time to come. For the silence and decorum of speech to be observed by the judges, and their contrary, as for our divergences from the various standards of right, good, honor in other societies, something has been said of this already, and we shall find more to say in the close. He that would show himself a righteously equal judge must keep these matters before his eyes; he must procure books on the subject, and must make them his study. There is, in truth, no study whatsoever so potent as this of law, if the law be what it should be, to make a better man of its student—else 'twould be for nothing that the law so stirs our worship and wonder bears a name so cognate with that of understanding. Furthermore, consider all other discourse, poesy with its eulogies and its satires, or utterances in prose, whether in literature or in the common converse of daily life, with their contentious disagreements and their too often unmeaning admissions. The one certain touchstone of all is the text of the legislator. The good judge will possess the text within his own breast as an antidote against other discourse, and thus he will be the state's preserver as well as his own. He will secure in the good the retention and increase of their rectitude, and in the evil, or those of them whose vicious principles admit remedy, will promote, so far as he can, conversion from folly, from profligacy, from cowardice, in a word, from all forms of wrong. As for those who are fatally attached to such principles, if our judges and their superiors prescribe death as the cure for a soul in that state, they will,

as has been more than once said already, deserve the praise of the community for their conduct.

When the suits of the year have been carried through to their final adjudication, the law as to execution of judgment shall be this. First, the magistrate delivering judgment shall make an assignment to the successful litigant of all the goods of the unsuccessful party, except such as he must necessarily be allowed to retain, and this shall be done, in every case, immediately upon the delivery of the verdict, through the crier of the court, in the presence of the judges. On the expiry of the month following that wherein a suit is tried, if no discharge have been obtained from the victorious litigant to the satisfaction of both parties, the magistrate before whom the suit was tried shall, at the instance of the victor, enforce delivery to him of the goods of the loser. If these prove insufficient to meet the obligation, and the deficiency amount to one drachma or upward, the loser shall be deprived of all right to institute a suit against any person whatsoever, until he have first discharged in full his debt to the victor, other parties retaining their full rights to institute proceedings against such debtor. Any person thus cast obstructing the action of the court which condemned him shall be brought by the magistrates so obstructed before the court of the curators, and any person convicted on such a charge shall suffer death as one that would undo our whole society and its law.

Now to proceed, when a man has been born into the world and brought up to manhood, has begotten his children and brought them up, has played his part duly in the transaction of affairs, offering compensation to any to whom he had done an injury and accepting such compensation from another, and has so come in due course to law-respecting old age, the natural close will be his decease. As to the deceased, then, whether male or female, full authority to prescribe the offices

of piety it will be proper to perform toward deities of the underworld or of our own shall be given to the interpreters of religious law. But there must be no grave or tomb, whether great or small, on any site capable of cultivation; they must fill up the places where our soil is naturally fitted only for this one purpose of receiving and concealing the bodies of the departed with least inconvenience to the living. Where earth, a true mother to us in the matter, is minded to yield sustenance for us, our living shall not be cheated of the benefit by any man, living or dead. The mound of earth shall not be made higher than can be done by five men within five days, and no stone shall be erected upon it larger than is needed to receive, at the outside, the customary four hexameter verses in commendation of the life of the deceased. The lying-in-state in the house shall, in the first place, be prolonged only for the time needed to distinguish between a swoon and a genuine death; the general rule will thus be that a man may properly be conveyed to the grave on the third day after his decease. And our faith in the legislator should extend particularly to his statements when he tells us that soul is utterly superior to body, and that what gives each one of us his being is nothing else but his soul, whereas the body is no more than a shadow which keeps us company. So 'tis well said of the deceased that the corpse is but a ghost; the real man—the undying thing called the soul—departs to give account to the gods of another world, even as we are taught by ancestral tradition—an account to which the good may look forward without misgiving, but the evil with grievous dismay. Whence, the legislator will add, we can do very little to help a man when he is once dead. The help should have been given by all connected with him while he was still alive, and it should have aided him to pass life, while it lasted, in all rectitude and purity, and at death to escape the vengeance of the

world to come on grave sin. Now since things stand thus with us, we should never waste our substance in the fancy that he who was so much to us is this bulk of flesh that is being committed to its grave, and not the real man—the son, or brother, or other lamented kinsman we fancy ourselves to be burying—who has left us, to continue and fulfill his own destiny; our duty, we must think, is rather to make the best of the case and to keep expenditure on what is, as it were, an altar of the dead about which no spirit hovers, within modest bounds, and the oracle which may best declare what modesty is is the voice of the legislator. Our law, then, shall be this. Modest expenditure shall mean an outlay upon the whole ceremonies of burial which must not exceed five minas for a person of the wealthiest class, three for one of the second, two for one of the third, one for one of the fourth.

It will be by no means the least of the many inevitable duties and cares of curators to give their life to the supervision of children, adults, and persons of all ages; in especial, at his death every man shall be put under the care of a particular curator to be called in as supervisor by the household of the deceased, to whose credit it shall count if the funeral ceremonies are conducted with propriety and moderation, and who shall be discredited by any impropriety. The lying-in-state and like matters shall be regulated by the custom in such things, but custom must bow to the legislation of the statesman in the points I shall now specify. To command or forbid tears to be shed over the departed would be unseemly, but it shall be forbidden to utter dirges over him, or to let the noise of the mourning be audible outside the house. We shall also prohibit the carrying of a corpse through the public streets and the raising of cries as the mourners traverse them, and the party must be beyond the city wall before daybreak. These are the regulations we shall impose in the matter. Compliance

therewith will secure a man from all penalty; disobedience shall be visited by one of the curators with a penalty to be approved by the whole body. Further rites of sepulture, as also the acts which involve loss of the right to sepulture—parricide, sacrilege, and others—have already been made matters of legislation, and we may accordingly say that our code is substantially completed. But the end of an enterprise is never reached by the mere performance of the act, acquisition of the possession, or establishment of the foundation; we must never take ourselves to have done all there was to do until we have provided a complete and permanent guarantee for the preservation of our work. Until then we should regard our whole achievement as unfinished.

Clinias/ Very true, sir. But I could wish for further light on the application of that last observation.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, look you, Clinias, there is good sense in many of our old household phrases, and not least in the designations men have given to the Fates.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ We are told that the first of them is called Lachesis, the second Clotho, and the third, she who, in fact, makes the result fast, Atropos, with an allusion to the—which makes the spinning irreversible. So likewise, the need of a state or constitution is not merely for provision for bodily health and preservation, but for the presence of loyalty to law in the soul, or rather for the abiding preservation of its law. And this, I believe, is the one thing still manifestly lacking to our own laws, some means of ensuring, so far as we can, this rightful irreversibility.

Clinias/ A serious deficiency, too, in any achievement, if it is really impossible to give it such a character.

Athenian Stranger/ Nay, the thing is certainly possible, as I can now see quite plainly.

Clinias/ Then we must on no account relinquish our work without performing this same service for our proposed code; you know it is always ridiculous to waste one's pains by building on insecurely laid foundations.

Athenian Stranger/ Well reminded. You will find me in accord with you there.

Clinias/ I am very glad to hear it. Well then, what, let me ask you, is to be this safeguard for our system and its laws? How do you propose to effect it?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, did we not say that our state must have a council which would be constituted in some such fashion as this? The ten senior acting curators of law and the whole body of persons who had won supreme distinction were to meet in council; further, any persons who had traveled into foreign parts to inquire into any capital invention for the preservation of law they might hear of, and had returned, were to be examined by this body and pronounced, on approval, worthy of association with it. Furthermore, each member was to bring with him one younger man, not being under the age of thirty, and present him to his colleagues, though not until he had personally judged him worthy of the honor by his parts and education. If the approval of the whole board were obtained, the young man was to be received as an associate; if not, his original nomination was to be kept a profound secret from everyone, and particularly from himself. The council was to hold its meetings before daybreak, the time, above all others when a man is always freest from all other business, private or public. I think this was much the substance of what we said.

Clinias/ You are right, it was.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I will go back to the subject of this council, and this is what I would affirm about it. If it is cast out, so to say, as a sheet anchor of state, furnished with

all its proper appurtenances, it will prove the safeguard of all our hopes.

Clinias/ And how so?

Athenian Stranger/ Ah, there is the critical point at which you and I have to do our uttermost to advise rightly.

Clinias/ Admirably said, but pray put the purpose into execution.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, Clinias, we have to discover what is the fitting protector for anything in all its various activities. In a living organism, for instance, it is, above everything else, the soul and head which are designed to this function.

Clinias/ Once more, how so?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, you know, it is the perfection of these two that guarantees the preservation of the whole creature.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ By the development of intelligence in the soul and vision and hearing in the head as the crowning endowment of each. To put it concisely, when intelligence is fused into a unity with these noblest of the senses, they constitute what we have every right to call a creature's salvation.

Clinias/ That certainly sounds like the truth.

Athenian Stranger/ It does indeed. But what in particular is the object envisaged by the blended intelligence and sense which is to be the salvation of a vessel in storm and calm? In this case of the ship, it is the fusion of the sharp senses of captain and crew alike with the captain's intelligence that preserves ship and ship's company together, is it not?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Well the point surely calls for no great number of illustrative examples. Take the case of a military expedition; we have to ask ourselves what must be the mark aimed at by its commanders—or again, by any medical service—if they are to aim at 'salvation,' as they ought to do. In the first case, I take it, the target is victory and superiority to the enemy, in that of the physicians and their staff, the preservation of bodily health?

Clinias/ Why, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, if a physician knew nothing of the nature of bodily health, as we have just called it, or a commander nothing of the nature of victory and the other results we mentioned, it would surely be clear that he had no understanding of his subject whatsoever.

Clinias/ Why, certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, to come to the case of a state, if a man plainly knows nothing of the mark a statesman must keep before his view, has he, for one thing, any right to the style of a magistrate, and will he, for another, have any capacity for the preservation of that of whose aim he is so utterly ignorant?

Clinias/ None whatsoever.

Athenian Stranger/ Why then, mark the inference. If our present disposition of our territory is to be completed, it must provide for the presence there of some body which understands, in the first place. the true nature of this mark of statesmanship, as we have called it, and next, the methods by which it may be attained, and the counsels—emanating principally from the laws themselves, secondarily from individual men—which make for or against it. If a state leave no room for such a body, we should not be surprised that a society so unintelligent and so imperceptive habitually

finds itself drifting at the mercy of circumstance in its various undertakings.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now where in our society, in which of its sections or institutions as so far prescribed, have we made any adequate provision for such a safeguard? Can we specify anything of the kind?

Clinias/ No indeed, sir, not with any certainty. But if I may hazard a guess, your observations seem to be pointing to the committee which, as you just said, will be expected to meet in the small hours.

Athenian Stranger/ You understand me perfectly, Clinias. That body, as our present observations prefigure, will, indeed, need to be equipped with all virtue. And the first point of such virtue will be that its aim must not wander from object to object; it must have a single mark always before its eye and make it the target of all its shafts.

Clinias/ Assuredly it must.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we have reached this point, we shall understand that there is nothing surprising in the fact that the laws of our various societies should be all at sea, seeing that the aims of the legislators in each of them are so conflicting. In general, we must not be surprised that the standard of rights with some men is the restriction of power to a certain group, no matter whether better or worse in reality than others, with others the acquisition of riches, no matter whether or not at the cost of enslavement, and yet others make 'liberty' the object of their passion. Others, again, combine two objects in their legislation and keep an eye on both together, liberty and empire over other societies, while the wisest of all, as they fancy themselves, pursue all these aims and others like them at once; they set no one

object of a particular devotion before them to which they might point as the proper aim of all other pursuits.

Clinias/ Surely then, sir, the position we took so long ago was the sound one. We said there was one end to be kept in view in all our own laws, and we were agreed, I believe, that the right name for the thing is virtue.

Athenian Stranger/ We were so.

Clinias/ And virtue, as I remember, we said has four parts.

Athenian Stranger/ Precisely.

Clinias/ But the chief of them all is understanding, and it should be the aim of the three other parts, as well as of everything else.

Athenian Stranger/ You follow my argument perfectly, Clinias; pray keep me company in the next step. As to this matter of the single aim, we have specified the mark on which the understanding of navigator, physician, military commander should direct its gaze and are now in the act of examining that of the statesman. If we like to personify his wisdom, we may address it with these words. In the name of all that is wonderful, what is it you have in view? What is your one aim? The physician's wisdom can give us a definite answer. You, the wisest of all the wise, by your own account, have you no answer?

Now Megillus and Clinias, can you, between you, act as his spokesmen? Can you give me a definition stating what you take this object to be, like the definitions I have so often given you as spokesman for other parties?

Clinias/ Nay sir, there we are at a loss.

Athenian Stranger/ Now what is it that we must be so anxious to discern, in itself as in its various manifestations?

Clinias/ I should like some illustration of what you mean by manifestations.

Athenian Stranger/ As an illustration, then, take our language about the four types of virtue. If there are four of them, obviously we must hold that each type by itself is one.

Clinias/ Obviously.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet we give one name to all of them. In fact, we speak of courage as virtue, of wisdom as virtue, and similarly with the other two, and this implies that they are not really several things, but just this one thing—virtue.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now it is easy enough to point out where these two, or the others, differ and why they have received two distinct names; it is not so light a matter to show why we have given both of them, and the rest, the one common name, virtue.

Clinias/ Now what is your point?

Athenian Stranger/ One which I can explain readily enough. Suppose we divide the parts of questioner and respondent between us.

Clinias/ Again, I must ask you to explain yourself.

Athenian Stranger/ Ask me the question why we first call both things by the one name virtue, and then speak of them as two—courage and wisdom. I will give you the reason. One of them, courage, is concerned with fears, and so is to be found in the brutes and in the behavior of mere infants. In fact, a soul may attain to courage by mere native temperament independently of discourse of reason, but without such discourse no soul ever comes by understanding or wisdom; none has ever done so, and none ever will—the cases are utterly different.

Clinias/ That is true enough.

Athenian Stranger/ Very good. My statement has told you where the things differ and why they are two; it is now your turn to tell me in what respects they are one and the same. Remember that you will also have to explain in what way the four things can be one thing, and that when you have given your explanation you are once more to ask me in what way they are four. And there will be still a further point to investigate. If a man is to have competent knowledge of anything whatsoever which has not only a name but a definition, is it enough that he should know its bare name, but be unaware of its definition? Is not any such ignorance in a man of any account disgraceful, when the matter at issue is one of paramount importance and dignity?

Clinias/ So I should presume.

Athenian Stranger/ In the eye of an author or custodian of law, a man who believes in his own preeminence in virtue and has won the prize for the very qualities of which we are treating, can there be anything of greater importance than these qualities themselves, valor, purity, justice, wisdom?

Clinias/ There surely cannot.

Athenian Stranger/ Then where these are the issues at stake, is it to be believed of our interpreters, our teachers, our legislators, the very men who have the rest of us in their keeping—can it be believed, I say, when it comes to the provision for one who needs to learn and know, or to be corrected and rebuked for his faults, that a man such as we have in mind will not show himself preeminent as a teacher of the characteristic quality of virtue and vice and generally as an instructor? Can we suppose that some poet or pretended 'educator of youth' who has come to our city will get the credit of superiority to one who has won the palm of a perfect virtue? In a state like this, where there are no

custodians competent in act as in thought from their competent acquaintance with virtue—is it surprising, I ask you, if a state left so unguarded has the fortunes of too many of our states of today?

Clinias/ Why no, I suppose not.

Athenian Stranger/ What follows? Shall we act, as we are now proposing, or how? Shall we equip our guardians with a more finished mastery in the theory and practice of virtue than the mass of their neighbors? How else is our own city to resemble an intelligent man's head with its sense organs in its possession of such a defense within itself?

Clinias/ Pray, sir, how are we to understand the comparison? In what does the likeness consist?

Athenian Stranger/ Why manifestly the city at large is the trunk of the body. The younger guardians—we selected them for their superior parts, for the quickness of all their faculties—are stationed, so to say, at its summit, their vision ranges over the whole compass of the state, they commit what they perceive in their watch to memory, and serve their elders as scouts in every branch of affairs. Those senior men—we may compare them with the understanding for their special wisdom in so many momentous matters—sit in council, where they avail themselves of the services and suggestions of their juniors, and thus, by their united action, the two parties are, between them, the real salvation of the whole state. Is this to be our project, or are we to find some other arrangement for ourselves? Are we to leave all our citizens on one level of training and education, with no more sedulously trained class among them?

Clinias/ My dear sir! We cannot possibly take such a course.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we shall have to proceed to an education of a more exacting kind than we have so far contemplated.

Clinias/ I dare say we shall.

Athenian Stranger/ And that on which we have just touched may perhaps prove to be the very one we need?

Clinias/ Indeed it may.

Athenian Stranger/ I believe we said that a consummate craftsman or guardian in any sphere will need the ability not merely to fix his regard on the many, but to advance to the recognition of the one and the organization of all other detail in the light of that recognition?

Clinias/ Yes, and it was the truth.

Athenian Stranger/ Now whose vision and view of his object can be more intimate than his who has learned to look from the dissimilar many to the one form?

Clinias/ You may be right.

Athenian Stranger/ Not 'may be,' bless you! There is no surer path for a man's steps, and can be none.

Clinias/ Well, sir, I admit it on your assurance; so we may let the argument take that course.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it looks as though the guardians of our god-given constitution too must be constrained, first and foremost, to see exactly what is the identity permeating all the four, the unity to be found, as we hold, alike in courage, in purity, in rectitude, in wisdom, and entitling them all to be called by the one name, virtue. This, my friends, if you please, is what we must now close upon with a firm and unyielding grip, until we are content with our account of the real character of the mark on which our gaze shall be fixed, whether it prove to be a unit or a whole, or both at once, or what you please. If we let this slip through

our fingers, can we suppose we shall ever be fully equipped for a virtue of which we cannot tell whether it is many things, or four, or one? No, if we are to follow our own advice, we must find some other way of securing this result in our society. But of course we must consider whether we should leave the whole subject alone.

Clinias/ Nay, sir, in the name of the god of strangers, you cannot let such a matter drop; we find your remarks full of truth. But how is the thing to be compassed?

Athenian Stranger/ Ah, that is a question we are not yet ready to ask. We must first be sure we are agreed whether or not the thing must be done.

Clinias/ Indeed it must, if only it can be done.

Athenian Stranger/ Then what say you to this? Do we take this same view when it comes to the fine, or to the good? Will our guardians have merely to know that each of them is many, or must they know further how and in what way each is a unit?

Clinias/ Why, we seem fairly driven to hold that they will actually have to understand their unity.

Athenian Stranger/ And suppose they can perceive this, but are unable to give any articulate demonstration of it?

Clinias/ Out of the question! A condition only fit for a slave!

Athenian Stranger/ Well, once more, must we say the same of all matters of moment? Men who are to be real guardians of the law will need a real knowledge of them all; they must be able to expound this knowledge in their speech and to conform to it in their practice, to discern the true intrinsic demarcations of good and evil?

Clinias/ Indubitably.

Athenian Stranger/ Now among these matters of high import is not the subject of divinity which we treated so earnestly preeminent? 'Tis of supreme moment for us, is it not, to know with all the certainty permitted to man that there are gods, and with what evident might they are invested? In the great mass of our citizens we may tolerate mere conformity to the tradition embodied in the laws, but we shall do well to deny all access to the body of our guardians. to any man who has not made it his serious business to master every proof there is of the being of gods. And by denial of access I mean that no man who is not divinely gifted or has not labored at divinity shall ever be chosen for a curator, nor ever be numbered among those who win the distinction for virtue.

Clinias/ As you say, it will be only right that the slothful or incompetent in such matters should be hopelessly excluded from high distinction.

Athenian Stranger/ May we say, then, that we know of two motives—those we have already rehearsed—of credibility in divinity?

Clinias/ And what are these two?

Athenian Stranger/ One of them is our theory of the soul, our doctrine that it is more ancient and more divine than anything that draws perennial being from a motion that once had a beginning, the other our doctrine of the orderliness in the movements of the planets and other bodies swayed by the mind that has set this whole frame of things in comely array. No man who has once turned a careful and practiced gaze on this spectacle has ever been so ungodly at heart that its effect has not been the very reverse of that currently expected. 'Tis the common belief that men who busy themselves with such themes are made infidels by their astronomy and its sister sciences, with their disclosure of a

realm where events happen by stringent necessity, not by the purpose of a will bent on the achievement of good.

Clinias/ And what is the true state of the matter?

Athenian Stranger/ As I told you, the situation has been precisely reversed since the days when observers of these bodies conceived them to be without souls. Even then, they awakened wonder, and aroused in the breasts of close students the suspicion, which has now been converted into an accepted doctrine, that were they without souls, and by consequence without intelligence, they would never have conformed to such precise computations; even in those days there were persons bold enough to hazard the actual assertion that it is mind to which the heavens owe all their ordered array. And yet these same thinkers went astray about the soul; they took it to be junior to body, not senior, and their error, as I may say, wrecked the whole scheme, or, to speak more accurately, wrecked themselves. For on a shortsighted view, the whole moving contents of the heavens seemed to them a parcel of stones, earth, and other soulless bodies, though they furnish the sources of the world order! It was this that involved the thinkers of those days in so many charges of infidelity and so much unpopularity, and further inspired poets to denounce students of philosophy by comparing them with dogs baying the moon, and to talk a world of folly besides, but, as I told you, today the position has been reversed.

Clinias/ In what way?

Athenian Stranger/ No son of man will ever come to a settled fear of God until he has grasped the two truths we are now affirming, the soul's dateless anteriority to all things generable, her immortality and sovereignty over the world of bodies, and moreover that presence among the heavenly bodies of a mind of all things of which we have spoken so

often already. He must also possess the requisite preliminary sciences, perceive the links which connect them with music, and apply his knowledge meetly to his moral and legal behavior; also he must be able to give a reasoned account of all that admits thereof. He that adds not these endowments to his possession of the popular virtues will never be a sufficient magistrate of a whole community, but only a magistrate's underling. Thus the time has now come, Megillus and Clinias, when we must ask ourselves whether we shall add one more statute to all hitherto rehearsed, a law instituting the nocturnal council of magistrates, duly furnished with the whole education we have described, as the state's custodian and preserver. How shall we act, think you?

Clinias/ How, my dear friend, can we do other than make the addition, if we have the power, in however low degree?

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us indeed, one and all, throw our powers into so worthy an undertaking. This at least is a task in which you will find me eager to help—and I may possibly discover other cooperators besides myself—from my copious experience of such matters and meditation upon them.

Clinias/ Out of all question, sir, we must take the road along which God himself is so plainly guiding us. But what is our right way to set about it? That is what our present conference has to discover.

Athenian Stranger/ As to laws on such a point, Megillus and Clinias, it is impossible to lay them down now, before the institution has been framed—it will be time to define its statutory powers when it exists —all that can be done at present toward fashioning such a body, if the work is to be done rightly, is instruction by repeated conferences.

Clinias/ How so? What is the meaning of that remark?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, we must obviously begin by compiling a list of persons qualified for the post of guardian in respect of age, intellectual ability, character, and habits. When we come to the next point, that of the subjects to be studied, it is no easy matter to invent them ourselves, nor yet to go to school to some other inventor. Further, it would be futile to give regulations either for the length of time to be given to the single subjects or for the order in which they shall be taken up; the student himself will not discover which of his studies is relevant until scientific knowledge of the subject has found a settlement in his soul. Thus you see that while it would be wrong to call these various subjects incapable of description, it is very right to call them incapable of prescription, for prescription can throw no light on their contents.

Clinias/ Why, sir, if the case stands so, what, I ask you, are we to do?

Athenian Stranger/ As the phrase goes, my friends, we have a 'fair field and no favor'; if we are ready, as they say, to stake the whole future of our polity on a throw of triple six or triple ace, why, so we must, and I, for one, will take my share in the risk. My part shall be the statement and exposition of my own convictions about the scheme of education and training which our conversation has thus started for the second time. But the hazard we run, mind you, is no slight one; there are not many others to be compared with it. I would advise you, Clinias, in particular, to lay the matter deeply to heart. For you the alternatives are to construct this state of Magnesia—or whatever name God will have it called after—on right lines and cover yourself with glory, or to incur the abiding reputation of a daring not to be equaled in all future ages. But if we can once create this admirable council, then, my good friends and colleagues, we must deliver the state into its keeping, and

there will be hardly one modern legislator to disagree with us. The dream on which we touched a while ago in our talk, when we painted our picture of the partnership of the mind and the head, will have found its fulfillment in real and working fact, if and when we have seen our men scrupulously selected, duly educated, settled at the end of the process in the nation's central fortress and established there as guardians whose likes we have never seen in our whole lives for perfection as protectors.

Megillus/ My dear Clinias, after all that has now been said, we shall either have to abandon the foundation of your city or else to be deaf to our friend's excuses, and try every entreaty and inducement to secure him as a cooperator in the foundation.

Clinias/ Very true, Megillus. I will do as you wish, and you must assist me.

Megillus/ Count upon me.

Laws.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

An Athenian Stranger. Cleinias, *a Cretan*.

Megillus, a Lacedaemonian.

Book 1.

Athenian Stranger/ Tell me, Strangers, is a God or some man supposed to be the author of your laws?

Clinias/ A God, Stranger; in very truth a God: among us Cretans he is said to have been Zeus, but in Lacedaemon, whence our friend here comes, I believe they would say that Apollo is their lawgiver: would they not, Megillus?

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And do you, Cleinias, believe, as Homer tells, that every ninth year Minos went to converse with his Olympian sire, and was inspired by him to make laws for your cities?

Clinias/ Yes, that is our tradition; and there was Rhadamanthus, a brother of his, with whose name you are familiar; he is reputed to have been the justest of men, and we Cretans are of opinion that he earned this reputation from his righteous administration of justice when he was alive.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, and a noble reputation it was, worthy of a son of Zeus. As you and Megillus have been trained in these institutions, I dare say that you will not be unwilling to give an account of your government and laws; on our way we can pass the time pleasantly in talking about them, for I am told that the distance from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus is considerable; and doubtless there are

shady places under the lofty trees, which will protect us from this scorching sun. Being no longer young, we may often stop to rest beneath them, and get over the whole journey without difficulty, beguiling the time by conversation.

Clinias/ Yes, Stranger, and if we proceed onward we shall come to groves of cypresses, which are of rare height and beauty, and there are green meadows, in which we may repose and converse.

Athenian Stranger/ Very good.

Clinias/ Very good, indeed; and still better when we see them; let us move on cheerily.

Athenian Stranger/ I am willing. —And first, I want to know why the law has ordained that you shall have common meals and gymnastic exercises, and wear arms.

Clinias/ I think, Stranger, that the aim of our institutions is easily intelligible to anyone. Look at the character of our country: Crete is not like Thessaly, a large plain; and for this reason they have horsemen in Thessaly, and we have runners—the inequality of the ground in our country is more adapted to locomotion on foot; but then, if you have runners you must have light arms, —no one can carry a heavy weight when running, and bows and arrows are convenient because they are light. Now all these regulations have been made with a view to war, and the legislator appears to me to have looked to this in all his arrangements: —the common meals, if I am not mistaken, were instituted by him for a similar reason, because he saw that while they are in the field the citizens are by the nature of the case compelled to take their meals together for the sake of mutual protection. He seems to me to have thought the world foolish in not understanding that all men are always at war with one another; and if in war there ought to be common meals and certain persons regularly appointed under others to protect an army, they

should be continued in peace. For what men in general term peace would be said by him to be only a name; in reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other, not indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting. And if you look closely, you will find that this was the intention of the Cretan legislator; all institutions, private as well as public, were arranged by him with a view to war; in giving them he was under the impression that no possessions or institutions are of any value to him who is defeated in battle; for all the good things of the conquered pass into the hands of the conquerors.

Athenian Stranger/ You appear to me, Stranger, to have been thoroughly trained in the Cretan institutions, and to be well informed about them; will you tell me a little more explicitly what is the principle of government which you would lay down? You seem to imagine that a well-governed state ought to be so ordered as to conquer all other states in war: am I right in supposing this to be your meaning?

Clinias/ Certainly; and our Lacedaemonian friend, if I am not mistaken, will agree with me.

Megillus/ Why, my good friend, how could any Lacedaemonian say anything else?

Athenian Stranger/ And is what you say applicable only to states, or also to villages?

Clinias/ To both alike.

Athenian Stranger/ The case is the same?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And in the village will there be the same war of family against family, and of individual against individual?

Clinias/ The same.

Athenian Stranger/ And should each man conceive himself to be his own enemy: —what shall we say?

Clinias/ O Athenian Stranger, —inhabitant of Attica I will not call you, for you seem to deserve rather to be named after the goddess herself, because you go back to first principles, —you have thrown a light upon the argument, and will now be better able to understand what I was just saying, —that all men are publicly one another's enemies, and each man privately his own.(

Athenian Stranger/ My good sir, what do you mean?)—

Clinias/ … Moreover, there is a victory and defeat, —the first and best of victories, the lowest and worst of defeats, —which each man gains or sustains at the hands, not of another, but of himself; this shows that there is a war against ourselves going on within every one of us.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us now reverse the order of the argument: Seeing that every individual is either his own superior or his own inferior, may we say that there is the same principle in the house, the village, and the state?

Clinias/ You mean that in each of them there is a principle of superiority or inferiority to self?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes.

Clinias/ You are quite right in asking the question, for there certainly is such a principle, and above all in states; and the state in which the better citizens win a victory over the mob and over the inferior classes may be truly said to be better than itself, and may be justly praised, where such a victory is gained, or censured in the opposite case.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether the better is ever really conquered by the worse, is a question which requires more discussion, and may be therefore left for the present. But I now quite understand your meaning when you say that citizens who are of the same race and live in the same cities

may unjustly conspire, and having the superiority in numbers may overcome and enslave the few just; and when they prevail, the state may be truly called its own inferior and therefore bad; and when they are defeated, its own superior and therefore good.

Clinias/ Your remark, Stranger, is a paradox, and yet we cannot possibly deny it.

Athenian Stranger/ Here is another case for consideration; —in a family there may be several brothers, who are the offspring of a single pair; very possibly the majority of them may be unjust, and the just may be in a minority.

Clinias/ Very possibly.

Athenian Stranger/ And you and I ought not to raise a question of words as to whether this family and household are rightly said to be superior when they conquer, and inferior when they are conquered; for we are not now considering what may or may not be the proper or customary way of speaking, but we are considering the natural principles of right and wrong in laws.

Clinias/ What you say, Stranger, is most true.

Megillus/ Quite excellent, in my opinion, as far as we have gone.

Athenian Stranger/ Again; might there not be a judge over these brethren, of whom we were speaking?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, which would be the better judge, —one who destroyed the bad and appointed the good to govern themselves; or one who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and made them voluntarily submit? Or third, I suppose, in the scale of excellence might be placed a judge, who, finding the family distracted, not only did not destroy anyone, but reconciled them to one another for ever

after, and gave them laws which they mutually observed, and was able to keep them friends.

Clinias/ The last would be by far the best sort of judge and legislator.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet the aim of all the laws which he gave would be the reverse of war.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And will he who constitutes the state and orders the life of man have in view external war, or that kind of intestine war called civil, which no one, if he could prevent, would like to have occurring in his own state; and when occurring, everyone would wish to be quit of as soon as possible?

Clinias/ He would have the latter chiefly in view.

Athenian Stranger/ And would he prefer that this civil war should be terminated by the destruction of one of the parties, and by the victory of the other, or that peace and friendship should be re-established, and that, being reconciled, they should give their attention to foreign enemies?

Clinias/ Everyone would desire the latter in the case of his own state.

Athenian Stranger/ And would not that also he the desire of the legislator?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And would not everyone always make laws for the sake of the best?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ But war, whether external or civil, is not the best, and the need of either is to be deprecated; but peace with one another, and good will, are best. Nor is the victory of the state over itself to be regarded as a really good

thing, but as a necessity; a man might as well say that the body was in the best state when sick and purged by medicine, forgetting that there is also a state of the body which needs no purge. And in like manner no one can be a true statesman, whether he aims at the happiness of the individual or state, who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace.

Clinias/ I suppose that there is truth, Stranger, in that remark of yours; and yet I am greatly mistaken if war is not the entire aim and object of our own institutions, and also of the Lacedaemonian.

Athenian Stranger/ I dare say; but there is no reason why we should rudely quarrel with one another about your legislators, instead of gently questioning them, seeing that both we and they are equally in earnest. Please follow me and the argument closely: —And first I will put forward Tyrtaeus, an Athenian by birth, but also a Spartan citizen, who of all men was most eager about war: Well, he says;

'I sing not, I care not, about any man.

even if he were the richest of men, and possessed every good (and then he gives a whole list of them), if he be not at all times a brave warrior.' I imagine that you, too, must have heard his poems; our Lacedaemonian friend has probably heard more than enough of them.

Megillus/ Very true.

Clinias/ And they have found their way from Lacedaemon to Crete.

Athenian Stranger/ Come now and let us all join in asking this question of Tyrtaeus: O most divine poet, we will say to him, the excellent praise which you have bestowed on those who excel in war sufficiently proves that you are wise and good, and I and Megillus and Cleinias of Cnosus do, as I

believe, entirely agree with you. But we should like to be quite sure that we are speaking of the same men; tell us, then, do you agree with us in thinking that there are two kinds of war; or what would you say? A far inferior man to Tyrtaeus would have no difficulty in replying quite truly, that war is of two kinds, —one which is universally called civil war, and is, as we were just now saying, of all wars the worst; the other, as we should all admit, in which we fall out with other nations who are of a different race, is a far milder form of warfare.

Clinias/ Certainly, far milder.

Well, now, when you praise and blame war in this high-flown strain, whom are you praising or blaming, and to which kind of war are you referring? I suppose that you must mean foreign war, if I am to judge from expressions of yours in which you say that you abominate those

> 'Who refuse to look upon fields of blood, and will not draw near and strike at their enemies.'

And we shall naturally go on to say to him, —You, Tyrtaeus, as it seems, praise those who distinguish themselves in external and foreign war; and he must admit this.

Clinias/ Evidently.

Athenian Stranger/ They are good; but we say that there are still better men whose virtue is displayed in the greatest of all battles. And we too have a poet whom we summon as a witness, Theognis, citizen of Megara in Sicily; —

> 'Cyrnus,' he says, 'he who is faithful in a civil broil is worth his weight in gold and silver.'

And such an one is far better, as we affirm, than the other in a more difficult kind of war, much in the same degree as justice and temperance and wisdom, when united with courage, are better than courage only; for a man cannot be faithful and good in civil strife without having all virtue. But

in the war of which Tyrtaeus speaks, many a mercenary soldier will take his stand and be ready to die at his post, and yet they are generally and almost without exception insolent, unjust, violent men, and the most senseless of human beings. You will ask what the conclusion is, and what I am seeking to prove: I maintain that the divine legislator of Crete, like any other who is worthy of consideration, will always and above all things in making laws have regard to the greatest virtue; which, according to Theognis, is loyalty in the hour of danger, and may be truly called perfect justice. Whereas, that virtue which Tyrtaeus highly praises is well enough, and was praised by the poet at the right time, yet in place and dignity may be said to be only fourth-rate.

Clinias/ Stranger, we are degrading our inspired lawgiver to a rank which is far beneath him.

Athenian Stranger/ Nay, I think that we degrade not him but ourselves, if we imagine that Lycurgus and Minos laid down laws both in Lacedaemon and Crete mainly with a view to war.

Clinias/ What ought we to say then?

Athenian Stranger/ What truth and what justice require of us, if I am not mistaken, when speaking in behalf of 'divine excellence; —that the legislator when making his laws had in view not a part only, and this the lowest part of virtue, but all virtue, and that he devised classes of laws answering to the kinds of virtue; not in the way in which modern inventors of laws make the classes, for they only investigate and offer laws whenever a want is felt, and one man has a class of laws about allotments and heiresses, another about assaults; others about ten thousand other such matters. But we maintain that the right way of examining into laws is to proceed as we have now done, and I admired the spirit of

your exposition; for you were quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this was the aim of the giver of the law, but I thought that you went wrong when you added that all his legislation had a view only to a part, and the least part of virtue, and this called forth my subsequent remarks. Will you allow me then to explain how I should have liked to have heard you expound the matter?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ You ought to have said, Stranger, — The Cretan laws are with reason famous among the Hellenes; for they fulfill the object of laws, which is to make those who use them happy; and they confer every sort of good. Now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there are divine goods, and the human hang upon the divine; and the state which attains the greater, at the same time acquires the less, or, not having the greater, has neither. Of the lesser goods the first is health, the second beauty, the third strength, including swiftness in running and bodily agility generally, and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god [Pluto], but one who is keen of sight, if only he has wisdom for his companion. For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods, and next follows temperance; and from the union of these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage. All these naturally take precedence of the other goods, and this is the order in which the legislator must place them, and after them he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances on the citizens with a view to these, the human looking to the divine, and the divine looking to their leader mind. Some of his ordinances will relate to contracts of marriage which they make one with another, and then to the procreation and education of children, both male and female; the duty of the lawgiver will be to take charge of his citizens, in youth and age, and at every time of life, and to give them punishments and

rewards; and in reference to all their intercourse with one another, he ought to consider their pains and pleasures and desires, and the vehemence of all their passions; he should keep a watch over them, and blame and praise them rightly by the mouth of the laws themselves. Also with regard to anger and terror, and the other perturbations of the soul, which arise out of misfortune, and the deliverances from them which prosperity brings, and the experiences which come to men in diseases, or in war, or poverty, or the opposite of these; in all these states he should determine and teach what is the good and evil of the condition of each. In the next place, the legislator has to be careful how the citizens make their money and in what way they spend it, and to have an eye to their mutual contracts and dissolutions of contracts, whether voluntary or involuntary: he should see how they order all this, and consider where justice as well as injustice is found or is wanting in their several dealings with one another; and honor those who obey the law, and impose fixed penalties on those who disobey, until the round of civil life is ended, and the time has come for the consideration of the proper funeral rites and honors of the dead. And the lawgiver reviewing his work, will appoint guardians to preside over these things, —some who walk by intelligence, others by true opinion only, and then mind will bind together all his ordinances and show them to be in harmony with temperance and justice, and not with wealth or ambition. This is the spirit, Stranger, in which I was and am desirous that you should pursue the subject. And I want to know the nature of all these things, and how they are arranged in the laws of Zeus, as they are termed, and in those of the Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus gave; and how the order of them is discovered to his eyes, who has experience in laws gained either by study or habit, although

they are far from being self-evident to the rest of mankind like ourselves.

Clinias/ How shall we proceed, Stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ I think that we must begin again as before, and first consider the habit of courage; and then we will go on and discuss another and then another form of virtue, if you please.

In this way we shall have a model of the whole; and with these and similar discourses we will beguile the way. And when we have gone through all the virtues, we will show, by the grace of God, that the institutions of which I was speaking look to virtue.

Megillus/ Very good; and suppose that you first criticize this praiser of Zeus and the laws of Crete.

Athenian Stranger/ I will try to criticize you and myself, as well as him, for the argument is a common concern. Tell me, —were not first the syssitia, and secondly the gymnasia, invented by your legislator with a view to war?

Megillus/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And what comes third, and what fourth? For that, I think, is the sort of enumeration which ought to be made of the remaining parts of virtue, no matter whether you call them parts or what their name is, provided the meaning is clear.

Megillus/ Then I, or any other Lacedaemonian, would reply that hunting is third in order.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us see if we can discover what comes fourth and fifth.

Megillus/ I think that I can get as far as the fourth head, which is the frequent endurance of pain, exhibited among us Spartans in certain hand-to-hand fights; also in stealing with the prospect of getting a good beating; there is, too, the

so-called Crypteia, or secret service, in which wonderful endurance is shown, —our people wander over the whole country by day and by night, and even in winter have not a shoe to their foot, and are without beds to lie upon, and have to attend upon themselves. Marvelous, too, is the endurance which our citizens show in their naked exercises, contending against the violent summer heat; and there are many similar practices, to speak of which in detail would be endless.

Athenian Stranger/ Excellent, O Lacedaemonian stranger. But how ought we to define courage? Is it to be regarded only as a combat against fears and pains, or also against desires and pleasures, and against flatteries; which exercise such a tremendous power, that they make the hearts even of respectable citizens to melt like wax?

Megillus/ I should say the latter.

Athenian Stranger/ In what preceded, as you will remember, our Cnosian friend was speaking of a man or a city being inferior to themselves: —Were you not, Cleinias?

Clinias/ I was.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, which is in the truest sense inferior, the man who is overcome by pleasure or by pain?

Clinias/ I should say the man who is overcome by pleasure; for all men deem him to be inferior in a more disgraceful sense, than the other who is overcome by pain.

Athenian Stranger/ But surely the lawgivers of Crete and Lacedaemon have not legislated for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet attacks which come from the left, but impotent against the insidious flatteries which come from the right?

Clinias/ Able to meet both, I should say.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let me once more ask, what institutions have you in either of your states which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them any more than

they avoid pains; but which set a person in the midst of them, and compel or induce him by the prospect of reward to get the better of them? Where is an ordinance about pleasure similar to that about pain to be found in your laws? Tell me what there is of this nature among you: —What is there which makes your citizen equally brave against pleasure and pain, conquering what they ought to conquer, and superior to the enemies who are most dangerous and nearest home?

Megillus/ I was able to tell you, Stranger, many laws which were directed against pain; but I do not know that I can point out any great or obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure; there are some lesser provisions, however, which I might mention.

Clinias/ Neither can I show anything of that sort which is at all equally prominent in the Cretan laws.

Athenian Stranger/ No wonder, my dear friends; and if, as is very likely, in our search after the true and good, one of us may have to censure the laws of the others, we must not be offended, but take kindly what another says.

Clinias/ You are quite right, Athenian Stranger, and we will do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ At our time of life, Cleinias, there should be no feeling of irritation.

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Athenian Stranger/ I will not at present determine whether he who censures the Cretan or Lacedaemonian polities is right or wrong. But I believe that I can tell better than either of you what the many say about them. For assuming that you have reasonably good laws, one of the best of them will be the law forbidding any young men to enquire which of them are right or wrong; but with one mouth and one voice they must all agree that the laws are

all good, for they came from God; and anyone who says the contrary is not to be listened to. But an old man who remarks any defect in your laws may communicate his observation to a ruler or to an equal in years when no young man is present.

Clinias/ Exactly so, Stranger; and like a diviner, although not there at the time, you seem to me quite to have hit the meaning of the legislator, and to say what is most true.

Athenian Stranger/ As there are no young men present, and the legislator has given old men free license, there will be no impropriety in our discussing these very matters now that we are alone.

Clinias/ True. And therefore you may be as free as you like in your censure of our laws, for there is no discredit in knowing what is wrong; he who receives what is said in a generous and friendly spirit will be all the better for it.

Athenian Stranger/ Very good; however, I am not going to say anything against your laws until to the best of my ability I have examined them, but I am going to raise doubts about them. For you are the only people known to us, whether Greek or barbarian, whom the legislator commanded to eschew all great pleasures and amusements and never to touch them; whereas in the matter of pains or fears which we have just been discussing, he thought that they who from infancy had always avoided pains and fears and sorrows, when they were compelled to face them would run away from those who were hardened in them, and would become their subjects. Now the legislator ought to have considered that this was equally true of pleasure; he should have said to himself, that if our citizens are from their youth upward unacquainted with the greatest pleasures, and unused to endure amid the temptations of pleasure, and are not disciplined to refrain from all things evil, the sweet feeling of

pleasure will overcome them just as fear would overcome the former class; and in another, and even a worse manner, they will be the slaves of those who are able to endure amid pleasures, and have had the opportunity of enjoying them, they being often the worst of mankind. One half of their souls will be a slave, the other half free; and they will not be Worthy to be called in the true sense men and freemen. Tell me whether you assent to my words?

Clinias/ On first hearing, what you say appears to be the truth; but to be hasty in coming to a conclusion about such important matters would be very childish and simple.

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose, Cleinias and Megillus, that we consider the virtue which follows next of those which we intended to discuss (for after courage comes temperance), what institutions shall we find relating to temperance, either in Crete or Lacedaemon, which, like your military institutions, differ from those of any ordinary state.

Megillus/ That is not an easy question to answer; still I should say that the common meals and gymnastic exercises have been excellently devised for the promotion both of temperance and courage.

Athenian Stranger/ There seems to be a difficulty, Stranger, with regard to states, in making words and facts coincide so that there can be no dispute about them. As in the human body, the regimen which does good in one way does harm in another; and we can hardly say that anyone course of treatment is adapted to a particular constitution. Now the gymnasia and common meals do a great deal of good, and yet they are a source of evil in civil troubles; as is shown in the case of the Milesian, and Boeotian, and Thurian youth, among whom these institutions seem always to have had a tendency to degrade the ancient and natural custom of love below the level, not only of man, but of the

beasts. The charge may be fairly brought against your cities above all others, and is true also of most other states which especially cultivate gymnastics. Whether such matters are to be regarded jestingly or seriously, I think that the pleasure is to be deemed natural which arises out of the intercourse between men and women; but that the intercourse of men with men, or of women with women, is contrary to nature, and that the bold attempt was originally due to unbridled lust. The Cretans are always accused of having invented the story of Ganymede and Zeus because they wanted to justify themselves in the enjoyment of unnatural pleasures by the practice of the god whom they believe to have been their lawgiver. Leaving the story, we may observe that any speculation about laws turns almost entirely on pleasure and pain, both in states and in individuals: these are two fountains which nature lets flow, and he who draws from them where and when, and as much as he ought, is happy; and this holds of men and animals—of individuals as well as states; and he who indulges in them ignorantly and at the wrong time, is the reverse of happy.

Megillus/ I admit, Stranger, that your words are well spoken, and I hardly know what to say in answer to you; but still I think that the Spartan lawgiver was quite right in forbidding pleasure. Of the Cretan laws, I shall leave the defense to my Cnosian friend. But the laws of Sparta, in as far as they relate to pleasure, appear to me to be the best in the world; for that which leads mankind in general into the wildest pleasure and license, and every other folly, the law has clean driven out; and neither in the country nor in towns which are under the control of Sparta, will you find revelries and the many incitements of every kind of pleasure which accompany them; and anyone who meets a drunken and disorderly person, will immediately have him most severely punished, and will not let him off on any pretense, not even

at the time of a Dionysiac festival; although I have remarked that this may happen at your performances 'on the cart' as they are called; and among our Tarentine colonists I have seen the whole city drunk at a Dionysiac festival; but nothing of the sort happens among us.

Athenian Stranger/ O Lacedaemonian Stranger, these festivities are praiseworthy where there is a spirit of endurance, but are very senseless when they are under no regulations. In order to retaliate, an Athenian has only to point out the license which exists among your women. To all such accusations, whether they are brought against the Tarentines, or us, or you, there is one answer which exonerates the practice in question from impropriety. When a stranger expresses wonder at the singularity of what he sees, any inhabitant will naturally answer him: —Wonder not, O stranger; this is our custom, and you may very likely have some other custom about the same things. Now we are speaking, my friends, not about men in general, but about the merits and defects of the lawgivers themselves. Let us then discourse a little more at length about intoxication, which is a very important subject, and will seriously task the discrimination of the legislator. I am not speaking of drinking, or not drinking, wine at all, but of intoxication. Are we to follow the custom of the Scythians, and Persians, and Carthaginians, and Celts, and Iberians, and Thracians, who are all warlike nations, or that of your countrymen, for they, as you say, altogether abstain? But the Scythians and Thracians, both men and women, drink unmixed wine, which they pour on their garments, and this they think a happy and glorious institution. The Persians, again, are much given to other practices of luxury which you reject, but they have more moderation in them than the Thracians and Scythians.

Megillus/ O best of men, we have only to take arms into our hands, and we send all these nations flying before us.

Athenian Stranger/ Nay, my good friend, do not say that; there have been, as there always will be, flights and pursuits of which no account can be given, and therefore we cannot say that victory or defeat in battle affords more than a doubtful proof of the goodness or badness of institutions. For when the greater states conquer and enslave the lesser, as the Syracusans have done the Locrians, who appear to be the best-governed people in their part of the world, or as the Athenians have done the Ceans (and there are ten thousand other instances of the same sort of thing), all this is not to the point; let us endeavor rather to form a conclusion about each institution in itself and say nothing, at present, of victories and defeats. Let us only say that such and such a custom is honorable, and another not. And first permit me to tell you how good and bad are to be estimated in reference to these very matters.

Megillus/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ All those who are ready at a moment's notice to praise or censure any practice which is matter of discussion, seem to me to proceed in a wrong way. Let me give you an illustration of what I mean: —You may suppose a person to be praising wheat as a good kind of food, whereupon another person instantly blames wheat, without ever enquiring into its effect or use, or in what way, or to whom, or with what, or in what state and how, wheat is to be given. And that is just what we are doing in this discussion. At the very mention of the word intoxication, one side is ready with their praises and the other with their censures; which is absurd.

For either side adduce their witnesses and approvers, and some of us think that we speak with authority because we

have many witnesses; and others because they see those who abstain conquering in battle, and this again is disputed by us. Now I cannot say that I shall be satisfied, if we go on discussing each of the remaining laws in the same way. And about this very point of intoxication I should like to speak in another way, which I hold to be the right one; for if number is to be the criterion, are there not myriads upon myriads of nations ready to dispute the point with you, who are only two cities?

Megillus/ I shall gladly welcome any method of enquiry which is right.

Athenian Stranger/ Let me put the matter thus: — Suppose a person to praise the keeping of goats, and the creatures themselves as capital things to have, and then someone who had seen goats feeding without a goatherd in cultivated spots, and doing mischief, were to censure a goat or any other animal who has no keeper, or a bad keeper, would there be any sense or justice in such censure?

Megillus/ Certainly not.

Athenian Stranger/ Does a captain require only to have nautical knowledge in order to be a good captain, whether he is sea-sick or not? What do you say?

Megillus/ I say that he is not a good captain if, although he have nautical skill, he is liable to sea-sickness.

Athenian Stranger/ And what would you say of the commander of an army? Will he be able to command merely because he has military skill if he be a coward, who, when danger comes, is sick and drunk with fear?

Megillus/ Impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ And what if besides being a coward he has no skill?

Megillus/ He is a miserable fellow, not fit to be a commander of men, but only of old women.

Athenian Stranger/ And what would you say of someone who blames or praises any sort of meeting which is intended by nature to have a ruler, and is well enough when under his presidency? The critic, however, has never seen the society meeting together at an orderly feast under the control of a president, but always without a ruler or with a bad one: —when observers of this class praise or blame such meetings, are we to suppose that what they say is of any value?

Megillus/ Certainly not, if they have never seen or been present at such a meeting when rightly ordered.

Athenian Stranger/ Reflect; may not banqueters and banquets be said to constitute a kind of meeting?

Megillus/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And did anyone ever see this sort of convivial meeting rightly ordered? Of course you two will answer that you have never seen them at all, because they are not customary or lawful in your country; but I have come across many of them in many different places, and moreover I have made enquiries about them wherever I went, as I may say, and never did I see or hear of anything of the kind which was carried on altogether rightly; in some few particulars they might be right, but in general they were utterly wrong.

Clinias/ What do you mean, Stranger, by this remark? Explain. For we, as you say, from our inexperience in such matters, might very likely not know, even if they came in our way, what was right or wrong in such societies.

Athenian Stranger/ Likely enough; then let me try to be your instructor: You would acknowledge, would you not, that in all gatherings of mankind, of whatever sort, there ought to be a leader?

Clinias/ Certainly I should.

Athenian Stranger/ And we were saying just now, that when men are at war the leader ought to be a brave man?

Clinias/ We were.

Athenian Stranger/ The brave man is less likely than the coward to be disturbed by fears?

Clinias/ That again is true.

Athenian Stranger/ And if there were a possibility of having a general of an army who was absolutely fearless and imperturbable, should we not by all means appoint him?

Clinias/ Assuredly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, however, we are speaking not of a general who is to command an army, when foe meets foe in time of war, but of one who is to regulate meetings of another sort, when friend meets friend in time of peace.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And that sort of meeting, if attended with drunkenness, is apt to be unquiet.

Clinias/ Certainly; the reverse of quiet.

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, then, the revelers as well as the soldiers will require a ruler?

Clinias/ To be sure; no men more so.

Athenian Stranger/ And we ought, if possible, to provide them with a quiet ruler?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And he should be a man who understands society; for his duty is to preserve the friendly feelings which exist among the company at the time, and to increase them for the future by his use of the occasion.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Must we not appoint a sober man and a wise to be our master of the revels? For if the ruler of

drinkers be himself young and drunken, and not over-wise, only by some special good fortune will he be saved from doing some great evil.

Clinias/ It will be by a singular good fortune that he is saved.

Athenian Stranger/ Now suppose such associations to be framed in the best way possible in states, and that someone blames the very fact of their existence—he may very likely be right. But if he blames a practice which he only sees very much mismanaged, he shows in the first place that he is not aware of the mismanagement, and also not aware that everything done in this way will turn out to be wrong, because done without the superintendence of a sober ruler. Do you not see that a drunken pilot or a drunken ruler of any sort will ruin ship, chariot, army—anything, in short, of which he has the direction?

Clinias/ The last remark is very true, Stranger; and I see quite clearly the advantage of an army having a good leader—he will give victory in war to his followers, which is a very great advantage; and so of other things. But I do not see any similar advantage which either individuals or states gain from the good management of a feast; and I want you to tell me what great good will be effected, supposing that this drinking ordinance is duly established.

Athenian Stranger/ If you mean to ask what great good accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth, or of a single chorus, —when the question is put in that form, we cannot deny that the good is not very great in any particular instance. But if you ask what is the good of education in general, the answer is easy—that education makes good men, and that good men act nobly, and conquer their enemies in battle, because they are good. Education certainly gives victory, although victory sometimes produces

forgetfulness of education; for many have grown insolent from victory in war, and this insolence has engendered in them innumerable evils; and many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors; but education is never suicidal.

Clinias/ You seem to imply, my friend, that convivial meetings, when rightly ordered, are an important element of education.

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly I do.

Clinias/ And can you show that what you have been saying is true?

Athenian Stranger/ To be absolutely sure of the truth of matters concerning which there are many opinions, is an attribute of the Gods not given to man, Stranger; but I shall be very happy to tell you what I think, especially as we are now proposing to enter on a discussion concerning laws and constitutions.

Clinias/ Your opinion, Stranger, about the questions which are now being raised, is precisely what we want to hear.

Athenian Stranger/ Very good; I will try to find a way of explaining my meaning, and you shall try to have the gift of understanding me. But first let me make an apology. The Athenian citizen is reputed among all the Hellenes to be a great talker, whereas Sparta is renowned for brevity, and the Cretans have more wit than words. Now I am afraid of appearing to elicit a very long discourse out of very small materials. For drinking indeed may appear to be a slight matter, and yet is one which cannot be rightly ordered according to nature, without correct principles of music; these are necessary to any clear or satisfactory treatment of the subject, and music again runs up into education generally, and there is much to be said about all this. What

would you say then to leaving these matters for the present, and passing on to some other question of law?

Megillus/ O Athenian Stranger, let me tell you what perhaps you do not know, that our family is the proxenus of your state. I imagine that from their earliest youth all boys, when they are told that they are the proxeni of a particular state, feel kindly towards their second country; and this has certainly been my own feeling. I can well remember from the days of my boyhood, how, when any Lacedaemonians praised or blamed the Athenians, they used to say to me, — 'See, Megillus, how ill or how well' as the case might be, 'has your state treated us;' and having always had to fight your battles against detractors when I heard you assailed, I became warmly attached to you. And I always like to hear the Athenian tongue spoken; the common saying is quite true, that a good Athenian is more than ordinarily good, for he is the only man who is freely and genuinely good by the divine inspiration of his own nature, and is not manufactured. Therefore be assured that I shall like to hear you say whatever you have to say.

Clinias/ Yes, Stranger; and when you have heard me speak, say boldly what is in your thoughts. Let me remind you of a tie which unites you to Crete. You must have heard here the story of the prophet Epimenides, who was of my family, and came to Athens ten years before the Persian war, in accordance with the response of the Oracle, and offered certain sacrifices which the God commanded. The Athenians were at that time in dread of the Persian invasion; and he said that for ten years they would not come, and that when they came, they would go away again without accomplishing any of their objects, and would suffer more evil than they inflicted. At that time my forefathers formed ties of hospitality with you; thus ancient is the friendship which I and my parents have had for you.

Athenian Stranger/ You seem to be quite ready to listen; and I am also ready to perform as much as I can of an almost impossible task, which I will nevertheless attempt. At the outset of the discussion, let me define the nature and power of education; for this is the way by which our argument must travel onwards to the God Dionysus.

Clinias/ Let us proceed, if you please.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, if I tell you what are my notions of education, will you consider whether they satisfy you?

Clinias/ Let us hear.

Athenian Stranger/ According to my view, anyone who would be good at anything must practice that thing from his youth upwards, both in sport and earnest, in its several branches: for example, he who is to be a good builder, should play at building children's houses; he who is to be a good husbandman, at tilling the ground; and those who have the care of their, education should provide them when young with mimic tools. They should learn beforehand the knowledge which they will afterwards require for their art. For example, the future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in play; and the future warrior should learn riding, or some other exercise, for amusement, and the teacher should endeavor to direct the children's inclinations and pleasures, by the help of amusements, to their final aim in life. The most important part of education is right training in the nursery. The soul of the child in his play should be guided to the love of that sort of excellence in which when he grows up to manhood he will have to be perfected. Do you agree with me thus far?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or ill-defined. At present, when we

speak in terms of praise or blame about the bringing-up of each person, we call one man educated and another uneducated, although the uneducated man may be sometimes very well educated for the calling of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship, and the like. For we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is the only education which, upon our view, deserves the name; that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be called education at all. But let us not quarrel with one another about a word, provided that the proposition which has just been granted hold good: to wit, that those who are rightly educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take a wrong direction, is capable of reformation. And this work of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives.

Clinias/ Very true; and we entirely agree with you.

Athenian Stranger/ And we agreed before that they are good men who are able to rule themselves, and bad men who are not.

Clinias/ You are quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ Let me now proceed, if I can, to clear up the subject a little further by an illustration which I will offer you.

Clinias/ Proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we not consider each of ourselves to be one?

Clinias/ We do.

Athenian Stranger/ And each one of us has in his bosom two counselors, both foolish and also antagonistic; of which we call the one pleasure, and the other pain.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ Also there are opinions about the future, which have the general name of expectations; and the specific name of fear, when the expectation is of pain; and of hope, when of pleasure; and further, there is reflection about the good or evil of them, and this, when embodied in a decree by the State, is called Law.

Clinias/ I am hardly able to follow you; proceed, however, as if I were.

Megillus/ I am in the like case.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us look at the matter thus: May we not conceive each of us living beings to be a puppet of the Gods, either their plaything only, or created with a purpose—which of the two we cannot certainly know? But we do know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to opposite actions; and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice. According to the argument there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go, but to pull with it against all the rest; and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the State; there are others which are hard and of iron, but this one is soft because golden; and there are several other kinds. Now we ought always to co-operate with the lead of the best, which is law. For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles. And thus the moral of the tale about our being puppets will not have been lost, and the

meaning of the expression 'superior or inferior to a man's self' will become clearer; and the individual, attaining to right reason in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, should live according to its rule; while the city, receiving the same from some god or from one who has knowledge of these things, should embody it in a law, to be her guide in her dealings with herself and with other states. In this way virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us. And when they have become clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner become clearer; and in particular that question of convivial entertainment, which may seem, perhaps, to have been a very trifling matter, and to have taken a great many more words than were necessary.

Clinias/ Perhaps, however, the theme may turn out not to be unworthy of the length of discourse.

Athenian Stranger/ Very good; let us proceed with any enquiry which really bears on our present object.

Clinias/ Proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink, —what will be the effect on him?

Clinias/ Having what in view do you ask that question?

Athenian Stranger/ Nothing as yet; but I ask generally, when the puppet is brought to the drink, what sort of result is likely to follow.

I will endeavor to explain my meaning more clearly: what I am now asking is this—Does the drinking of wine heighten and increase pleasures and pains, and passions and loves?

Clinias/ Very greatly.

Athenian Stranger/ And are perception and memory, and opinion and prudence, heightened and increased? Do not these qualities entirely desert a man if he becomes saturated with drink?

Clinias/ Yes, they entirely desert him.

Athenian Stranger/ Does he not return to the state of soul in which he was when a young child?

Clinias/ He does.

Athenian Stranger/ Then at that time he will have the least control over himself?

Clinias/ The least.

Athenian Stranger/ And will he not be in a most wretched plight?

Clinias/ Most wretched.

Athenian Stranger/ Then not only an old man but also a drunkard becomes a second time a child?

Clinias/ Well said, Stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Is there any argument which will prove to us that we ought to encourage the taste for drinking instead of doing all we can to avoid it?

Clinias/ I suppose that there is; you, at any rate, were just now saying that you were ready to maintain such a doctrine.

Athenian Stranger/ True, I was; and I am ready still, seeing that you have both declared that you are anxious to hear me.

Clinias/ To be sure we are, if only for the strangeness of the paradox, which asserts that a man ought of his own accord to plunge into utter degradation.

Athenian Stranger/ Are you speaking of the soul?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And what would you say about the body, my friend?

Are you not surprised at anyone of his own accord bringing upon himself deformity, leanness, ugliness, decrepitude?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Yet when a man goes of his own accord to a doctor's shop, and takes medicine, is he not quite aware that soon, and for many days afterwards, he will be in a state of body which he would die rather than accept as the permanent condition of his life? Are not those who train in gymnasia, at first beginning reduced to a state of weakness?

Clinias/ Yes, all that is well known.

Athenian Stranger/ Also that they go of their own accord for the sake of the subsequent benefit?

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ And we may conceive this to be true in the same way of other practices?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And the same view may be taken of the pastime of drinking wine, if we are right in supposing that the same good effect follows?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ If such convivialities should turn out to have any advantage equal in importance to that of gymnastic, they are in their very nature to be preferred to mere bodily exercise, inasmuch as they have no accompaniment of pain.

Clinias/ True; but I hardly think that we shall be able to discover any such benefits to be derived from them.

Athenian Stranger/ That is just what we must endeavor to show. And let me ask you a question: —Do we not distinguish two kinds of fear, which are very different?

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ There is the fear of expected evil.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And there is the fear of an evil reputation; we are afraid of being thought evil, because we do or say some dishonorable thing, which fear we and all men term shame.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ These are the two fears, as I called them; one of which is the opposite of pain and other fears, and the opposite also of the greatest and most numerous sort of pleasures.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And does not the legislator and everyone who is good for anything, hold this fear in the greatest honor? This is what he terms reverence, and the confidence which is the reverse of this he terms insolence; and the latter he always deems to be a very great evil both to individuals and to states.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Does not this kind of fear preserve us in many important ways? What is there which so surely gives victory and safety in war? For there are two things which give victory—confidence before enemies, and fear of disgrace before friends.

Clinias/ There are.

Athenian Stranger/ Then each of us should be fearless and also fearful; and why we should be either has now been determined.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And when we want to make anyone fearless, we and the law bring him face to face with many fears.

Clinias/ Clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ And when we want to make him rightly fearful, must we not introduce him to shameless pleasures, and train him to take up arms against them, and to overcome them? Or does this principle apply to courage only, and must he who would be perfect in velour fight against and overcome his own natural character, —since if he be unpracticed and inexperienced in such conflicts, he will not be half the man which he might have been, —and are we to suppose, that with temperance it is otherwise, and that he who has never fought with the shameless and unrighteous temptations of his pleasures and lusts, and conquered them, in earnest and in play, by word, deed, and act, will still be perfectly temperate?

Clinias/ A most unlikely supposition.

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose that some God had given a fear-potion to men, and that the more a man drank of this the more he regarded himself at every draught as a child of misfortune, and that he feared everything happening or about to happen to him; and that at last the most courageous of men utterly lost his presence of mind for a time, and only came to himself again when he had slept off the influence of the draught.

Clinias/ But has such a draught, Stranger, ever really been known among men?

Athenian Stranger/ No; but, if there had been, might not such a draught have been of use to the legislator as a test of courage? Might we not go and say to him, 'O legislator, whether you are legislating for the Cretan, or for any other state, would you not like to have a touchstone of the courage and cowardice of your citizens? '

Clinias/ 'I should' will be the answer of everyone.

Athenian Stranger/ ‘And you would rather have a touchstone in which there is no risk and no great danger than the reverse?

Clinias/ In that proposition everyone may safely agree.

Athenian Stranger/ ‘And in order to make use of the draught, you would lead them amid these imaginary terrors, and prove them, when the affection of fear was working upon them, and compel them to be fearless, exhorting and admonishing them; and also honoring them, but dishonoring anyone who will not be persuaded by you to be in all respects such as you command him; and if he underwent the trial well and manfully, you would let him go unscathed; but if ill, you would inflict a punishment upon him? Or would you abstain from using the potion altogether, although you have no reason for abstaining?’

Clinias/ He would be certain, Stranger, to use the potion.

Athenian Stranger/ This would be a mode of testing and training which would be wonderfully easy in comparison with those now in use, and might be applied to a single person, or to a few, or indeed to any number; and he would do well who provided himself with the potion only, rather than with any number of other things, whether he preferred to be by himself in solitude, and there contend with his fears, because he was ashamed to be seen by the eye of man until he was perfect; or trusting to the force of his own nature and habits, and believing that he had been already disciplined sufficiently, he did not hesitate to train himself in company with any number of others, and display his power in conquering the irresistible change effected by the draught—his virtue being such, that he never in any instance fell into any great unseemliness, but was always himself, and left off before he arrived at the last cup, fearing that he, like all other men, might be overcome by the potion.

Clinias/ Yes, Stranger, in that last case, too, he might equally show his self-control.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us return to the lawgiver, and say to him: —'Well, lawgiver, there is certainly no such fear-potion which man has either received from the Gods or himself discovered; for witchcraft has no place at our board. But is there any potion which might serve as a test of over-boldness and excessive and indiscreet boasting?'

Clinias/ I suppose that he will say, Yes, —meaning that wine is such a potion.

Athenian Stranger/ Is not the effect of this quite the opposite of the effect of the other? When a man drinks wine he begins to be better pleased with himself, and the more he drinks the more he is filled full of brave hopes, and conceit of his power, and at last the string of his tongue is loosened, and fancying himself wise, he is brimming over with lawlessness, and has no more fear or respect, and is ready to do or say anything.

Clinias/ I think that everyone will admit the truth of your description.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, let us remember, as we were saying, that there are two things which should be cultivated in the soul: first, the greatest courage; secondly, the greatest fear—

Clinias/ Which you said to be characteristic of reverence, if I am not mistaken.

Athenian Stranger/ Thank you for reminding me. But now, as the habit of courage and fearlessness is to be trained amid fears, let us consider whether the opposite quality is not also to be trained among opposites.

Clinias/ That is probably the case.

Athenian Stranger/ There are times and seasons at which we are by nature more than commonly valiant and bold; now we ought to train ourselves on these occasions to be as free from impudence and shamelessness as possible, and to be afraid to say or suffer or do anything that is base.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Are not the moments in which we are apt to be bold and shameless such as these? —when we are under the influence of anger, love, pride, ignorance, avarice, cowardice? or when wealth, beauty, strength, and all the intoxicating workings of pleasure madden us? What is better adapted than the festive use of wine, in the first place to test, and in the second place to train the character of a man, if care be taken in the use of it? What is there cheaper, or more innocent? For do but consider which is the greater risk: —Would you rather test a man of a morose and savage nature, which is the source of ten thousand acts of injustice, by making bargains with him at a risk to yourself, or by having him as a companion at the festival of Dionysus? Or would you, if you wanted to apply a touchstone to a man who is prone to love, entrust your wife, or your sons, or daughters to him, periling your dearest interests in order to have a view of the condition of his soul? I might mention numberless cases, in which the advantage would be manifest of getting to know a character in sport, and without paying dearly for experience. And I do not believe that either a Cretan, or any other man, will doubt that such a test is a fair test, and safer, cheaper, and speedier than any other.

Clinias/ That is certainly true.

Athenian Stranger/ And this knowledge of the natures and habits of men's souls will be of the greatest use in that art which has the management of them; and that art, if I am not mistaken, is politics.

Clinias/ Exactly so.

Book 2.

Athenian Stranger/ And now we have to consider whether the insight into human nature is the only benefit derived from well-ordered potations, or whether there are not other advantages great and much to be desired. The argument seems to imply that there are. But how and in what way these are to be attained, will have to be considered attentively, or we may be entangled in error.

Clinias/ Proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ Let me once more recall our doctrine of right education; which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of convivial intercourse.

Clinias/ You talk rather grandly.

Athenian Stranger/ Pleasure and pain I maintain to be the first perceptions of children, and I say that they are the forms under which virtue and vice are originally present to them. As to wisdom and true and fixed opinions, happy is the man who acquires them, even when declining in years; and we may say that he who possesses them, and the blessings which are contained in them, is a perfect man. Now I mean by education that training which is given by suitable habits to the first instincts of virtue in children; —when pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred, are rightly implanted in souls not yet capable of understanding the nature of them, and who find them, after they have attained reason, to be in harmony with her. This harmony of the soul, taken as a whole, is virtue; but the particular training in respect of pleasure and pain, which leads you always to hate what you ought to hate, and love what you ought to love from the beginning of life to the end, may be separated off; and, in my view, will be rightly called education.

Clinias/ I think, Stranger, that you are quite right in all that you have said and are saying about education.

Athenian Stranger/ I am glad to hear that you agree with me; for, indeed, the discipline of pleasure and pain which, when rightly ordered, is a principle of education, has been often relaxed and corrupted in human life. And the Gods, pitying the toils which our race is born to undergo, have appointed holy festivals, wherein men alternate rest with labor; and have given them the Muses and Apollo, the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, to be companions in their revels, that they may improve their education by taking part in the festivals of the Gods, and with their help. I should like to know whether a common saying is in our opinion true to nature or not. For men say that the young of all creatures cannot be quiet in their bodies or in their voices; they are always wanting to move and cry out; some leaping and skipping, and overflowing with sportiveness and delight at something, others uttering all sorts of cries. But, whereas the animals have no perception of order or disorder in their movements, that is, of rhythm or harmony, as they are called, to us, the Gods, who, as we say, have been appointed to be our companions in the dance, have given the pleasurable sense of harmony and rhythm; and so they stir us into life, and we follow them, joining hands together in dances and songs; and these they call choruses, which is a term naturally expressive of cheerfulness. Shall we begin, then, with the acknowledgment that education is first given through Apollo and the Muses? What do you say?

Clinias/ I assent.

Athenian Stranger/ And the uneducated is he who has not been trained in the chorus, and the educated is he who has been well trained?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And the chorus is made up of two parts, dance and song?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Then he who is well educated will be able to sing and dance well?

Clinias/ I suppose that he will.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us see; what are we saying?

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ He sings well and dances well; now must we add that he sings what is good and dances what is good?

Clinias/ Let us make the addition.

Athenian Stranger/ We will suppose that he knows the good to be good, and the bad to be bad, and makes use of them accordingly: which now is the better trained in dancing and music—he who is able to move his body and to use his voice in what is understood to be the right manner, but has no delight in good or hatred of evil; or he who is incorrect in gesture and voice, but is right in his sense of pleasure and pain, and welcomes what is good, and is offended at what is evil?

Clinias/ There is a great difference, Stranger, in the two kinds of education.

Athenian Stranger/ If we three know what is good in song and dance, then we truly know also who is educated and who is uneducated; but if not, then we certainly shall not know wherein lies the safeguard of education, and whether there is any or not.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us follow the scent like hounds, and go in pursuit of beauty of figure, and melody, and song, and dance; if these escape us, there will be no use in talking about true education, whether Hellenic or barbarian.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And what is beauty of figure, or beautiful melody? When a manly soul is in trouble, and when a cowardly soul is in similar case, are they likely to use the same figures and gestures, or to give utterance to the same sounds?

Clinias/ How can they, when the very colors of their faces differ?

Athenian Stranger/ Good, my friend; I may observe, however, in passing, that in music there certainly are figures and there are melodies: and music is concerned with harmony and rhythm, so that you may speak of a melody or figure having good rhythm or good harmony—the term is correct enough; but to speak metaphorically of a melody or figure having a 'good color' as the masters of choruses do, is not allowable, although you can speak of the melodies or figures of the brave and the coward, praising the one and censuring the other. And not to be tedious, let us say that the figures and melodies which are expressive of virtue of soul or body, or of images of virtue, are without exception good, and those which are expressive of vice are the reverse of good.

Clinias/ Your suggestion is excellent; and let us answer that these things are so.

Athenian Stranger/ Once more, are all of us equally delighted with every sort of dance?

Clinias/ Far otherwise.

Athenian Stranger/ What, then, leads us astray? Are beautiful things not the same to us all, or are they the same in themselves, but not in our opinion of them? For no one will admit that forms of vice in the dance are more beautiful than forms of virtue, or that he himself delights in the forms of vice, and others in a muse of another character. And yet most persons say, that the excellence of music is to give

pleasure to our souls. But this is intolerable and blasphemous; there is, however, a much more plausible account of the delusion.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ The adaptation of art to the characters of men. Choric movements are imitations of manners occurring in various actions, fortunes, dispositions, —each particular is imitated, and those to whom the words, or songs, or dances are suited, either by nature or habit or both, cannot help feeling pleasure in them and applauding them, and calling them beautiful. But those whose natures, or ways, or habits are unsuited to them, cannot delight in them or applaud them, and they call them base. There are others, again, whose natures are right and their habits wrong, or whose habits are right and their natures wrong, and they praise one thing, but are pleased at another. For they say that all these imitations are pleasant, but not good. And in the presence of those whom they think wise, they are ashamed of dancing and singing in the baser manner, or of deliberately lending any countenance to such proceedings; and yet, they have a secret pleasure in them.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And is any harm done to the lover of vicious dances or songs, or any good done to the approver of the opposite sort of pleasure?

Clinias/ I think that there is.

Athenian Stranger/ 'I think' is not the word, but I would say, rather, 'I am certain.' For must they not have the same effect as when a man associates with bad characters, whom he likes and approves rather than dislikes, and only censures playfully because he has a suspicion of his own badness? In that case, he who takes pleasure in them will surely become like those in whom he takes pleasure, even

though he be ashamed to praise them. And what greater good or evil can any destiny ever make us undergo?

Clinias/ I know of none.

Athenian Stranger/ Then in a city which has good laws, or in future ages is to have them, bearing in mind the instruction and amusement which are given by music, can we suppose that the poets are to be allowed to teach in the dance anything which they themselves like, in the way of rhythm, or melody, or words, to the young children of any well-conditioned parents?

Is the poet to train his choruses as he pleases, without reference to virtue or vice?

Clinias/ That is surely quite unreasonable, and is not to be thought of.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet he may do this in almost any state with the exception of Egypt.

Clinias/ And what are the laws about music and dancing in Egypt?

Athenian Stranger/ You will wonder when I tell you: Long ago they appear to have recognized the very principle of which we are now speaking—that their young citizens must be habituated to forms and strains of virtue. These they fixed, and exhibited the patterns of them in their temples; and no painter or artist is allowed to innovate upon them, or to leave the traditional forms and invent new ones. To this day, no alteration is allowed either in these arts, or in music at all. And you will find that their works of art are painted or molded in the same forms which they had ten thousand years ago; —this is literally true and no exaggeration, —their ancient paintings and sculptures are not a whit better or worse than the work of to-day, but are made with just the same skill.

Clinias/ How extraordinary!

Athenian Stranger/ I should rather say, How statesmanlike, how worthy of a legislator! I know that other things in Egypt are not so well. But what I am telling you about music is true and deserving of consideration, because showing that a lawgiver may institute melodies which have a natural truth and correctness without any fear of failure. To do this, however, must be the work of God, or of a divine person; in Egypt they have a tradition that their ancient chants which have been preserved for so many ages are the composition of the Goddess Isis. And therefore, as I was saying, if a person can only find in any way the natural melodies, he may confidently embody them in a fixed and legal form. For the love of novelty which arises out of pleasure in the new and weariness of the old, has not strength enough to corrupt the consecrated song and dance, under the plea that they have become antiquated. At any rate, they are far from being corrupted in Egypt.

Clinias/ Your arguments seem to prove your point.

Athenian Stranger/ May we not confidently say that the true use of music and of choral festivities is as follows: We rejoice when we think that we prosper, and again we think that we prosper when we rejoice?

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ And when rejoicing in our good fortune, we are unable to be still?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Our young men break forth into dancing and singing, and we who are their elders deem that we are fulfilling our part in life when we look on at them. Having lost our agility, we delight in their sports and merry-making, because we love to think of our former selves; and gladly institute contests for those who are able to awaken in us the memory of our youth.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it altogether unmeaning to say, as the common people do about festivals, that he should be adjudged the wisest of men, and the winner of the palm, who gives us the greatest amount of pleasure and mirth? For on such occasions, and when mirth is the order of the day, ought not he to be honored most, and, as I was saying, bear the palm, who gives most mirth to the greatest number? Now is this a true way of speaking or of acting?

Clinias/ Possibly.

Athenian Stranger/ But, my dear friend, let us distinguish between different cases, and not be hasty in forming a judgment: One way of considering the question will be to imagine a festival at which there are entertainments of all sorts, including gymnastic, musical, and equestrian contests: the citizens are assembled; prizes are offered, and proclamation is made that anyone who likes may enter the lists, and that he is to bear the palm who gives the most pleasure to the spectators—there is to be no regulation about the manner how; but he who is most successful in giving pleasure is to be crowned victor, and deemed to be the pleasantest of the candidates: What is likely to be the result of such a proclamation?

Clinias/ In what respect?

Athenian Stranger/ There would be various exhibitions: one man, like Homer, will exhibit a rhapsody, another a performance on the lute; one will have a tragedy, and another a comedy. Nor would there be anything astonishing in someone imagining that he could gain the prize by exhibiting a puppet-show. Suppose these competitors to meet, and not these only, but innumerable others as well—can you tell me who ought to be the victor?

Clinias/ I do not see how anyone can answer you, or pretend to know, unless he has heard with his own ears the several competitors; the question is absurd.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, if neither of you can answer, shall I answer this question which you deem so absurd?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ If very small children are to determine the question, they will decide for the puppet-show.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ The older children will be advocates of comedy; educated women, and young men, and people in general, will favor tragedy.

Clinias/ Very likely.

Athenian Stranger/ And I believe that we old men would have the greatest pleasure in hearing a rhapsodist recite well the Iliad and Odyssey, or one of the Hesiodic poems, and would award the victory to him. But, who would really be the victor? —that is the question.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Clearly you and I will have to declare that those whom we old men adjudge victors ought to win; for our ways are far and away better than any which at present exist anywhere in the world.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus far I too should agree with the many, that the excellence of music is to be measured by pleasure. But the pleasure must not be that of chance persons; the fairest music is that which delights the best and best educated, and especially that which delights the one man who is pre-eminent in virtue and education. And therefore the judges must be men of character, for they will

require both wisdom and courage; the true judge must not draw his inspiration from the theatre, nor ought he to be unnerved by the clamor of the many and his own incapacity; nor again, knowing the truth, ought he through cowardice and unmanliness carelessly to deliver a lying judgment, with the very same lips which have just appealed to the Gods before he judged. He is sitting not as the disciple of the theatre, but, in his proper place, as their instructor, and he ought to be the enemy of all pandering to the pleasure of the spectators. The ancient and common custom of Hellas, which still prevails in Italy and Sicily, did certainly leave the judgment to the body of spectators, who determined the victor by show of hands. But this custom has been the destruction of the poets; for they are now in the habit of composing with a view to please the bad taste of their judges, and the result is that the spectators instruct themselves; — and also it has been the ruin of the theatre; they ought to be having characters put before them better than their own, and so receiving a higher pleasure, but now by their own act the opposite result follows. What inference is to be drawn from all this? Shall I tell you?

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ The inference at which we arrive for the third or fourth time is, that education is the constraining and directing of youth towards that right reason, which the law affirms, and which the experience of the eldest and best has agreed to be truly right. In order, then, that the soul of the child may not be habituated to feel joy and sorrow in a manner at variance with the law, and those who obey the law, but may rather follow the law and rejoice and sorrow at the same things as the aged—in order, I say, to produce this effect, chants appear to have been invented, which really enchant, and are designed to implant that harmony of which we speak. And, because the mind of the child is incapable of

enduring serious training, they are called plays and songs, and are performed in play; just as when men are sick and ailing in their bodies, their attendants give them wholesome diet in pleasant meats and drinks, but unwholesome diet in disagree- able things, in order that they may learn, as they ought, to like the one, and to dislike the other. And similarly the true legislator will persuade, and, if he cannot persuade, will compel the poet to express, as he ought, by fair and noble words, in his rhythms, the figures, and in his melodies, the music of temperate and brave and in every way good men.

Clinias/ But do you really imagine, Stranger, that this is the way in which poets generally compose in States at the present day? As far as I can observe, except among us and among the Lacedaemonians, there are no regulations like those of which you speak; in other places novelties are always being introduced in dancing and in music, generally not under the authority of any law, but at the instigation of lawless pleasures; and these pleasures are so far from being the same, as you describe the Egyptian to be, or having the same principles, that they are never the same.

Athenian Stranger/ Most true, Cleinias; and I daresay that I may have expressed myself obscurely, and so led you to imagine that I was speaking of some really existing state of things, whereas I was only saying what regulations I would like to have about music; and hence there occurred a misapprehension on your part. For when evils are far gone and irremediable, the task of censuring them is never pleasant, although at times necessary. But as we do not really differ, will you let me ask you whether you consider such institutions to be more prevalent among the Cretans and Lacedaemonians than among the other Hellenes?

Clinias/ Certainly they are.

Athenian Stranger/ And if they were extended to the other Hellenes, would it be an improvement on the present state of things?

Clinias/ A very great improvement, if the customs which prevail among them were such as prevail among us and the Lacedaemonians, and such as you were just now saying ought to prevail.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us see whether we understand one another: —Are not the principles of education and music which prevail among you as follows: you compel your poets to say that the good man, if he be temperate and just, is fortunate and happy; and this whether he be great and strong or small and weak, and whether he be rich or poor; and, on the other hand, if he have a wealth passing that of Cinyras or Midas, and be unjust, he is wretched and lives in misery? As the poet says, and with truth: I sing not, I care not about him who accomplishes all noble things, not having justice; let him who draws near and stretches out his hand against his enemies be a just man.' But if he be unjust, I would not have him 'look calmly upon bloody death' nor 'surpass in swiftness the Thracian Boreas;' and let no other thing that is called good ever be his. For the goods of which the many speak are not really good: first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth third; and then innumerable others, as for example to have a keen eye or a quick ear, and in general to have all the senses perfect; or, again, to be a tyrant and do as you like; and the final consummation of happiness is to have acquired all these things, and when you have acquired them to become at once immortal. But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all these things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all, including even health, the greatest of evils. For in truth, to have sight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all without justice and virtue, even

though a man be rich in all the so-called goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; but not so great, if the bad man lives only a very short time. These are the truths which, if I am not mistaken, you will persuade or compel your poets to utter with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, and in these they must train up your youth. Am I not right? For I plainly declare that evils as they are termed are goods to the unjust, and only evils to the just, and that goods are truly good to the good, but evil to the evil. Let me ask again, Are you and I agreed about this?

Clinias/ I think that we partly agree and partly do not.

Athenian Stranger/ When a man has health and wealth and a tyranny which lasts, and when he is pre-eminent in strength and courage, and has the gift of immortality, and none of the so-called evils which counter-balance these goods, but only the injustice and insolence of his own nature—of such an one you are, I suspect, unwilling to believe that he is miserable rather than happy.

Clinias/ That is quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ Once more: Suppose that he be valiant and strong, and handsome and rich, and does throughout his whole life whatever he likes, still, if he be unrighteous and insolent, would not both of you agree that he will of necessity live basely? You will surely grant so much?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And an evil life too?

Clinias/ I am not equally disposed to grant that.

Athenian Stranger/ Will he not live painfully and to his own disadvantage?

Clinias/ How can I possibly say so?

Athenian Stranger/ How! Then may Heaven make us to be of one mind, for now we are of two. To me, dear Cleinias, the truth of what I am saying is as plain as the fact that Crete is an island. And, if I were a lawgiver, I would try to make the poets and all the citizens speak in this strain; and I would inflict the heaviest penalties on anyone in all the land who should dare to say that there are bad men who lead pleasant lives, or that the profitable and gainful is one thing, and the just another; and there are many other matters about which I should make my citizens speak in a manner different from the Cretans and Lacedaemonians of this age, and I may say, indeed, from the world in general. For tell me, my good friends, by Zeus and Apollo tell me, if I were to ask these same Gods who were your legislators, —Is not the most just life also the pleasantest? or are there two lives, one of which is the justest and the other the pleasantest? —and they were to reply that there are two; and thereupon I proceeded to ask, (that would be the right way of pursuing the enquiry), Which are the happier—those who lead the justest, or those who lead the pleasantest life? and they replied, Those who lead the pleasantest—that would be a very strange answer, which I should not like to put into the mouth of the Gods. The words will come with more propriety from the lips of fathers and legislators, and therefore I will repeat my former questions to one of them, and suppose him to say again that he who leads the pleasantest life is the happiest. And to that I rejoin: —O my father, did you not wish me to live as happily as possible? And yet you also never ceased telling me that I should live as justly as possible. Now, here the giver of the rule, whether he be legislator or father, will be in a dilemma, and will in vain endeavor to be consistent with himself. But if he were to declare that the justest life is also the happiest, everyone hearing him would enquire, if I am not mistaken, what is

that good and noble principle in life which the law approves, and which is superior to pleasure. For what good can the just man have which is separated from pleasure? Shall we say that glory and fame, coming from Gods and men, though good and noble, are nevertheless unpleasant, and infamy pleasant? Certainly not, sweet legislator. Or shall we say that the not-doing of wrong and there being no wrong done is good and honorable, although there is no pleasure in it, and that the doing wrong is pleasant, but evil and base?

Clinias/ Impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ The view which identifies the pleasant and the just and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and religious tendency. And the opposite view is most at variance with the designs of the legislator, and is, in his opinion, infamous; for no one, if he can help, will be persuaded to do that which gives him more pain than pleasure. But as distant prospects are apt to make us dizzy, especially in childhood, the legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the truth; he will persuade the citizens, in some way or other, by customs and praises and words, that just and unjust are shadows only, and that injustice, which seems opposed to justice, when contemplated by the unjust and evil man appears pleasant and the just most unpleasant; but that from the just man's point of view, the very opposite is the appearance of both of them.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And which may be supposed to be the truer judgment—that of the inferior or of the better soul?

Clinias/ Surely, that of the better soul.

Athenian Stranger/ Then the unjust life must not only be more base and depraved, but also more unpleasant than the just and holy life?

Clinias/ That seems to be implied in the present argument.

Athenian Stranger/ And even supposing this were otherwise, and not as the argument has proven, still the lawgiver, who is worth anything, if he ever ventures to tell a lie to the young for their good, could not invent a more useful lie than this, or one which will have a better effect in making them do what is right, not on compulsion but voluntarily.

Clinias/ Truth, Stranger, is a noble thing and a lasting, but a thing of which men are hard to be persuaded.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet the story of the Sidonian Cadmus, which is so improbable, has been readily believed, and also innumerable other tales.

Clinias/ What is that story?

Athenian Stranger/ The story of armed men springing up after the sowing of teeth, which the legislator may take as a proof that he can persuade the minds of the young of anything; so that he has only to reflect and find out what belief will be of the greatest public advantage, and then use all his efforts to make the whole community utter one and the same word in their songs and tales and discourses all their life long. But if you do not agree with me, there is no reason why you should not argue on the other side.

Clinias/ I do not see that any argument can fairly be raised by either of us against what you are now saying.

Athenian Stranger/ The next suggestion which I have to offer is, that all our three choruses shall sing to the young and tender souls of children, reciting in their strains all the noble thoughts of which we have already spoken, or are about to speak; and the sum of them shall be, that the life which is by the Gods deemed to be the happiest is also the best; —we shall affirm this to be a most certain truth; and the minds of our young disciples will be more likely to receive

these words of ours than any others which we might address to them.

Clinias/ I assent to what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ First will enter in their natural order the sacred choir composed of children, which is to sing lustily the heaven-taught lay to the whole city. Next will follow the choir of young men under the age of thirty, who will call upon the God Paean to testify to the truth of their words, and will pray him to be gracious to the youth and to turn their hearts. Thirdly, the choir of elder men, who are from thirty to sixty years of age, will also sing. There remain those who are too old to sing, and they will tell stories, illustrating the same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle.

Clinias/ Who are those who compose the third choir, Stranger? for I do not clearly understand what you mean to say about them.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet almost all that I have been saying has been said with a view to them.

Clinias/ Will you try to be a little plainer?

Athenian Stranger/ I was speaking at the commencement of our discourse, as you will remember, of the fiery nature of young creatures: I said that they were unable to keep quiet either in limb or voice, and that they called out and jumped about in a disorderly manner; and that no other animal attained to any perception of order, but man only. Now the order of motion is called rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which high and low are duly mingled, is called harmony; and both together are termed choric song. And I said that the Gods had pity on us, and gave us Apollo and the Muses to be our playfellows and leaders in the dance; and Dionysus, as I dare say that you will remember, was the third.

Clinias/ I quite remember.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus far I have spoken of the chorus of Apollo and the Muses, and I have still to speak of the remaining chorus, which is that of Dionysus.

Clinias/ How is that arranged? There is something strange, at any rate on first hearing, in a Dionysiac chorus of old men, if you really mean that those who are above thirty, and may be fifty, or from fifty to sixty years of age, are to dance in his honor.

Athenian Stranger/ Very true; and therefore it must be shown that there is good reason for the proposal.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Are we agreed thus far?

Clinias/ About what?

Athenian Stranger/ That every man and boy, slave and free, both sexes, and the whole city, should never cease charming themselves with the strains of which we have spoken; and that there should be every sort of change and variation of them in order to take away the effect of sameness, so that the singers may always receive pleasure from their hymns, and may never weary of them?

Clinias/ Everyone will agree.

Athenian Stranger/ Where, then, will that best part of our city which, by reason of age and intelligence, has the greatest influence, sing these fairest of strains, which are to do so much good? Shall we be so foolish as to let them off who would give us the most beautiful and also the most useful of songs?

Clinias/ But, says the argument, we cannot let them off.

Athenian Stranger/ Then how can we carry out our purpose with decorum? Will this be the way?

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ When a man is advancing in years, he is afraid and reluctant to sing; —he has no pleasure in his own performances; and if compulsion is used, he will be more and more ashamed, the older and more discreet he grows; —is not this true?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, and will he not be yet more ashamed if he has to stand up and sing in the theatre to a mixed audience? —and if moreover when he is required to do so, like the other choirs who contend for prizes, and have been trained under a singing master, he is pinched and hungry, he will certainly have a feeling of shame and discomfort which will make him very unwilling to exhibit.

Clinias/ No doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ How, then, shall we reassure him, and get him to sing? Shall we begin by enacting that boys shall not taste wine at all until they are eighteen years of age; we will tell them that fire must not be poured upon fire, whether in the body or in the soul, until they begin to go to work—this is a Laws II. precaution which has to be taken against the excitableness of Athenian, youth; —afterwards they may taste wine in moderation up to the age of thirty, but while a man is young he should abstain altogether from intoxication and from excess of wine; when, at length, he has reached forty years, after dinner at a public mess, he may invite not only the other Gods, but Dionysus above all, to the mystery and festivity of the elder men, making use of the wine which he has given men to lighten the sourness of old age; that in age we may renew our youth, and forget our sorrows; and also in order that the nature of the soul, like iron melted in the fire, may become softer and so more impressible. In the first place, will not anyone who is thus mellowed be more ready and less ashamed to sing, —I do not

say before a large audience, but before a moderate company; nor yet among strangers, but among his familiars, and, as we have often said, to chant, and to enchant?

Clinias/ He will be far more ready.

Athenian Stranger/ There will be no impropriety in our using such a method of persuading them to join with us in song.

Clinias/ None at all.

Athenian Stranger/ And what strain will they sing, and what muse will they hymn? The strain should clearly be one suitable to them.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And what strain is suitable for heroes? Shall they sing a choric strain?

Clinias/ Truly, Stranger, we of Crete and Lacedaemon know no strain other than that which we have learnt and been accustomed to sing in our chorus.

Athenian Stranger/ I dare say; for you have never acquired the knowledge of the most beautiful kind of song, in your military way of life, which is modeled after the camp, and is not like that of dwellers in cities; and you have your young men herding and feeding together like young colts. No one takes his own individual colt and drags him away from his fellows against his will, raging and foaming, and gives him a groom to attend to him alone, and trains and rubs him down privately, and gives him the qualities in education which will make him not only a good soldier, but also a governor of a state and of cities. Such an one, as we said at first, would be a greater warrior than he of whom Tyrtaeus sings; and he would honor courage everywhere, but always as the fourth, and not as the first part of virtue, either in individuals or states.

Clinias/ Once more, Stranger, I must complain that you depreciate our lawgivers.

Athenian Stranger/ Not intentionally, if at all, my good friend; but whither the argument leads, thither let us follow; for if there be indeed some strain of song more beautiful than that of the choruses or the public theatres, I should like to impart it to those who, as we say, are ashamed of these, and want to have the best.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ When things have an accompanying charm, either the best thing in them is this very charm, or there is some rightness or utility possessed by them; —for example, I should say that eating and drinking, and the use of food in general, have an accompanying charm which we call pleasure; but that this rightness and utility is just the healthfulness of the things served up to us, which is their true rightness.

Clinias/ Just so.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus, too, I should say that learning has a certain accompanying charm which is the pleasure; but that the right and the profitable, the good and the noble, are qualities which the truth gives to it.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ And so in the imitative arts, —if they succeed in making likenesses, and are accompanied by pleasure, may not their works be said to have a charm?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ But equal proportions, whether of quality or quantity, and not pleasure, speaking generally, would give them truth or rightness.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Then that only can be rightly judged by the standard of pleasure, which makes or furnishes no utility or truth or likeness, nor on the other hand is productive of any hurtful quality, but exists solely for the sake of the accompanying charm; and the term 'pleasure' is most appropriately applied to it when these other qualities are absent.

Clinias/ You are speaking of harmless pleasure, are you not?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; and this I term amusement, when doing neither harm nor good in any degree worth speaking of.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, if such be our principles, we must assert that imitation is not to be judged of by pleasure and false opinion; and this is true of all equality, for the equal is not equal or the symmetrical symmetrical, because somebody thinks or likes something, but they are to be judged of by the standard of truth, and by no other whatever.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we not regard all music as representative and imitative?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, when anyone says that music is to be judged of by pleasure, his doctrine cannot be admitted; and if there be any music of which pleasure is the criterion, such music is not to be sought out or deemed to have any real excellence, but only that other kind of music which is an imitation of the good.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And those who seek for the best kind of song and music ought not to seek for that which is

pleasant, but for that which is true; and the truth of imitation consists, as we were saying, in rendering the thing imitated according to quantity and quality.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And everyone will admit that musical compositions are all imitative and representative. Will not poets and spectators and actors all agree in this?

Clinias/ They will.

Athenian Stranger/ Surely then he who would judge correctly must know what each composition is; for if he does not know what is the character and meaning of the piece, and what it represents, he will never discern whether the intention is true or false.

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Athenian Stranger/ And will he who does not know what is true be able to distinguish what is good and bad? My statement is not very clear; but perhaps you will understand me better if I put the matter in another way.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ There are ten thousand likenesses of objects of sight?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And can he who does not know what the exact object is which is imitated, ever know whether the resemblance is truthfully executed? I mean, for example, whether a statue has the proportions of a body, and the true situation of the parts; what those proportions are, and how the parts fit into one another in due order; also their colors and conformations, or whether this is all confused in the execution: do you think that anyone can know about this, who does not know what the animal is which has been imitated?

Clinias/ Impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ But even if we know that the thing pictured or sculptured is a man, who has received at the hand of the artist all his proper parts and colors and shapes, must we not also know whether the work is beautiful or in any respect deficient in beauty?

Clinias/ If this were not required, Stranger, we should all of us be judges of beauty.

Athenian Stranger/ Very true; and may we not say that in everything imitated, whether in drawing, music, or any other art, he who is to be a competent judge must possess three things; —he must know, in the first place, of what the imitation is; secondly, he must know that it is true; and thirdly, that it has been well executed in words and melodies and rhythms?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us not faint in discussing the peculiar difficulty of music. Music is more celebrated than any other kind of imitation, and therefore requires the greatest care of them all. For if a man makes a mistake here, he may do himself the greatest injury by welcoming evil dispositions, and the mistake may be very difficult to discern, because the poets are artists very inferior in character to the Muses themselves, who would never fall into the monstrous error of assigning to the words of men the gestures and songs of women; nor after combining the melodies with the gestures of freemen would they add on the rhythms of slaves and men of the baser sort; nor, beginning with the rhythms and gestures of freemen, would they assign to them a melody or words which are of an opposite character; nor would they mix up the voices and sounds of animals and of men and instruments, and every other sort of noise, as if they were all one. But human poets are fond

of introducing this sort of inconsistent mixture, and so make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who, as Orpheus says, 'are ripe for true pleasure.' The experienced see all this confusion, and yet the poets go on and make still further havoc by separating the rhythm and the figure of the dance from the melody, setting bare words to meter, and also separating the melody and the rhythm from the words, using the lyre or the flute alone. For when there are no words, it is very difficult to recognize the meaning of the harmony and rhythm, or to see that any worthy object is imitated by them. And we must acknowledge that all this sort of thing, which aims only at swiftness and smoothness and a brutish noise, and uses the flute and the lyre not as the mere accompaniments of the dance and song, is exceedingly coarse and tasteless. The use of either instrument, when unaccompanied, leads to every sort of irregularity and trickery. This is all rational enough. But we are considering not how our choristers, who are from thirty to fifty years of age, and may be over fifty, are not to use the Muses, but how they are to judges, like use them. And the considerations which we have urged seem to show in what way these fifty years' old choristers who are to sing, may be expected to be better trained. For they need to have a quick perception and knowledge of harmonies and rhythms; otherwise, how can they ever know whether a melody would be rightly sung to the Dorian mode, or to the rhythm which the poet has assigned to it?

Clinias/ Clearly they cannot.

Athenian Stranger/ The many are ridiculous in imagining that they know what is in proper harmony and rhythm, and what is not, when they can only be made to sing and step in rhythm by force; it never occurs to them that they are ignorant of what they are doing. Now every melody is right

when it has suitable harmony and rhythm, and wrong when unsuitable.

Clinias/ That is most certain.

Athenian Stranger/ But can a man who does not know a thing, as we were saying, know that the thing is right?

Clinias/ Impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ Then now, as would appear, we are making the discovery that our newly-appointed choristers, whom we hereby invite and, although they are their own masters, compel to sing, must be educated to such an extent as to be able to follow the steps of the rhythm and the notes of the song, that they may know the harmonies and rhythms, and be able to select what are suitable for men of their age and character to sing; and may sing them, and have innocent pleasure from their own performance, and also lead younger men to welcome with dutiful delight good dispositions. Having such training, they will attain a more accurate knowledge than falls to the lot of the common people, or even of the poets themselves. For the poet need not know the third point, viz. whether the imitation is good or not, though he can hardly help knowing the laws of melody and rhythm. But the aged chorus must know all the three, that they may choose the best, and that which is nearest to the best; for otherwise they will never be able to charm the souls of young men in the way of virtue. And now the original design of the argument which was intended to bring eloquent aid to the Chorus of Dionysus, has been accomplished to the best of our ability, and let us see whether we were right: —I should imagine that a drinking assembly is likely to become more and more tumultuous as the drinking goes on: this, as we were saying at first, will certainly be the case.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Every man has a more than natural elevation; his heart is glad within him, and he will say anything and will be restrained by nobody at such a time; he fancies that he is able to rule over himself and all mankind.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ Were we not saying that on such occasions the souls of the drinkers become like iron heated in the fire, and grow softer and younger, and are easily molded by him who knows how to educate and fashion them, just as when they were young, and that this fashioner of them is the same who prescribed for them in the days of their youth, viz. the good legislator; and that he ought to enact laws of the banquet, which, when a man is confident, bold, and impudent, and unwilling to wait his turn and have his share of silence and speech, and drinking and music, will change his character into the opposite—such laws as will infuse into him a just and noble fear, which will take up arms at the approach of insolence, being that divine fear which we have called reverence and shame?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And the guardians of these laws and fellow-workers with them are the calm and sober generals of the drinkers; and without their help there is greater difficulty in fighting against drink than in fighting against enemies when the commander of an army is not himself calm; and he who is unwilling to obey them and the commanders of Dionysiac feasts who are more than sixty years of age, shall suffer a disgrace as great as he who disobeys military leaders, or even greater.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ If, then, drinking and amusement were regulated in this way, would not the companions of our revels be improved? they would part better friends than they

were, and not, as now, enemies. Their whole intercourse would be regulated by law and observant of it, and the sober would be the leaders of the drunken.

Clinias/ I think so too, if drinking were regulated as you propose.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us not then simply censure the gift of Dionysus as bad and unfit to be received into the State. For wine has many excellences, and one pre-eminent one, about which there is a difficulty in speaking to the many, from a fear of their misconceiving and misunderstanding what is said.

Clinias/ To what do you refer?

Athenian Stranger/ There is a tradition or story, which has somehow crept about the world, that Dionysus was robbed of his wits by his stepmother Herè, and that out of revenge he inspires Bacchic furies and dancing madnesses in others; for which reason he gave men wine. Such traditions concerning the Gods I leave to those who think that they may be safely uttered; I only know that no animal at birth is mature or perfect in intelligence; and in the intermediate period, in which he has not yet acquired his own proper sense, he rages and roars without rhyme or reason; and when he has once got on his legs he jumps about without rhyme or reason; and this, as you will remember, has been already said by us to be the origin of music and gymnastic.

Clinias/ To be sure, I remember.

Athenian Stranger/ And did we not say that the sense of harmony and rhythm sprang from this beginning among men, and that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus were the Gods whom we had to thank for them?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ The other story implied that wine was given man out of revenge, and in order to make him mad; but our present doctrine, on the contrary, is, that wine was given him as a balm, and in order to implant modesty in the soul, and health and strength in the body.

Clinias/ That, Stranger, is precisely what was said.

Athenian Stranger/ Then half the subject may now be considered to have been discussed; shall we proceed to the consideration of the other half?

Clinias/ What is the other half, and how do you divide the subject?

Athenian Stranger/ The whole choral art is also in our view the whole of education; and of this art, rhythms and harmonies form the part which has to do with the voice.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ The movement of the body has rhythm in common with the movement of the voice, but gesture is peculiar to it, whereas song is simply the movement of the voice.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ And the sound of the voice which reaches and educates the soul, we have ventured to term music.

Clinias/ We were right.

Athenian Stranger/ And the movement of the body, when regarded as an amusement, we termed dancing; but when extended and pursued with a view to the excellence of the body, this scientific training may be called gymnastic.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ Music, which was one half of the choral art, may be said to have been completely discussed.

Shall we proceed to the other half or not? What would you like?

Clinias/ My good friend, when you are talking with a Cretan and Lacedaemonian, and we have discussed music and not gymnastic, what answer are either of us likely to make to such an enquiry?

Athenian Stranger/ An answer is contained in your question; and I understand and accept what you say not only as an answer, but also as a command to proceed with gymnastic.

Clinias/ You quite understand me; do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ I will; and there will not be any difficulty in speaking intelligibly to you about a subject with which both of you are far more familiar than with music.

Clinias/ There will not.

Athenian Stranger/ Is not the origin of gymnastics, too, to be sought in the tendency to rapid motion which exists in all animals; man, as we were saying, having attained the sense of rhythm, created and invented dancing; and melody arousing and awakening rhythm, both united formed the choral art?

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And one part of this subject has been already discussed by us, and there still remains another to be discussed?

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ I have first a final word to add to my discourse about drink, if you will allow me to do so.

Clinias/ What more have you to say?

Athenian Stranger/ I should say that if a city seriously means to adopt the practice of drinking under due regulation and with a view to the enforcement of temperance, and in

like manner, and on the same principle, will allow of other pleasures, designing to gain the victory over them—in this way all of them may be used. But if the State makes drinking an amusement only, and whoever likes may drink whenever he likes, and with whom he likes, and add to this any other indulgences, I shall never agree or allow that this city or this man should practice drinking. I would go farther than the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and am disposed rather to the law of the Carthaginians, that no one while he is on a campaign should be allowed to taste wine at all, but that he should drink water during all that time, and that in the city no slave, male or female, should ever drink wine; and that no magistrates should drink during their year of office, nor should pilots of vessels or judges while on duty taste wine at all, nor anyone who is going to hold a consultation about any matter of importance; nor in the day-time at all, unless in consequence of exercise or as medicine; nor again at night, when anyone, either man or woman, is minded to get children. There are numberless other cases also in which those who have good sense and good laws ought not to drink wine, so that if what I say is true, no city will need many vineyards. Their husbandry and their way of life in general will follow an appointed order, and their cultivation of the vine will be the most limited and the least common of their employments. And this, Stranger, shall be the crown of my discourse about wine, if you agree.

Clinias/ Excellent: we agree.

Book 3.

Athenian Stranger/ Enough of this. And what, then, is to be regarded as the origin of government? Will not a man be able to judge of it best from a point of view in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good or evil?

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean that he might watch them from the point of view of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite ages.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?

Clinias/ Hardly.

Athenian Stranger/ But you are sure that it must be vast and incalculable?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And have not thousands and thousands of cities come into being during this period and as many perished? And has not each of them had every form of government many times over, now growing larger, now smaller, and again improving or declining?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us endeavor to ascertain the cause of these changes; for that will probably explain the first origin and development of forms of government.

Clinias/ Very good. You shall endeavor to impart your thoughts to us, and we will make an effort to understand you.

Athenian Stranger/ Do you believe that there is any truth in ancient traditions?

Clinias/ What traditions?

Athenian Stranger/ The traditions about the many destructions of mankind which have been occasioned by deluges and pestilences, and in many other ways, and of the survival of a remnant?

Clinias/ Everyone is disposed to believe them.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us consider one of them, that which was caused by the famous deluge.

Clinias/ What are we to observe about it?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean to say that those who then escaped would only be hill shepherds, —small sparks of the human race preserved on the tops of mountains.

Clinias/ Clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ Such survivors would necessarily be unacquainted with the arts and the various devices which are suggested to the dwellers in cities by interest or ambition, and with all the wrongs which they contrive against one another.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us suppose, then, that the cities in the plain and on the sea-coast were utterly destroyed at that time.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Would not all implements have then perished and every other excellent invention of political or any other sort of wisdom have utterly disappeared?

Clinias/ Why, yes, my friend; and if things had always continued as they are at present ordered, how could any discovery have ever been made even in the least particular? For it is evident that the arts were unknown during ten thousand times ten thousand years. And no more than a thousand or two thousand years have elapsed since the

discoveries of Daedalus, Orpheus and Palamedes, —since Marsyas and Olympus invented music, and Amphion the lyre, —not to speak of numberless other inventions which are but of yesterday.

Athenian Stranger/ Have you forgotten, Cleinias, the name of a friend who is really of yesterday?

Clinias/ I suppose that you mean Epimenides.

Athenian Stranger/ The same, my friend; he does indeed far overleap the heads of all mankind by his invention; for he carried out in practice, as you declare, what of old Hesiod only preached.

Clinias/ Yes, according to our tradition.

Athenian Stranger/ After the great destruction, may we not suppose that the state of man was something of this sort: —In the beginning of things there was a fearful illimitable desert and a vast expanse of land; a herd or two of oxen would be the only survivors of the animal world; and there might be a few goats, these too hardly enough to maintain the shepherds who tended them?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And of cities or governments or legislation, about which we are now talking, do you suppose that they could have any recollection at all?

Clinias/ None whatever.

Athenian Stranger/ And out of this state of things has there not sprung all that we now are and have: cities and governments, and arts and laws, and a great deal of vice and a great deal of virtue?

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Why, my good friend, how can we possibly suppose that those who knew nothing of all the

good and evil of cities could have attained their full development, whether of virtue or of vice?

Clinias/ I understand your meaning, and you are quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ But, as time advanced and the race multiplied, the world came to be what the world is.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Doubtless the change was not made all in a moment, but little by little, during a very long period of time.

Clinias/ A highly probable supposition.

Athenian Stranger/ At first, they would have a natural fear ringing in their ears which would prevent their descending from the heights into the plain.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ The fewness of the survivors at that time would have made them all the more desirous of seeing one another; but then the means of travelling either by land or sea had been almost entirely lost, as I may say, with the loss of the arts, and there was great difficulty in getting at one another; for iron and brass and all metals were jumbled together and had disappeared in the chaos; nor was there any possibility of extracting ore from them; and they had scarcely any means of felling timber. Even if you suppose that some implements might have been preserved in the mountains, they must quickly have worn out and vanished, and there would be no more of them until the art of metallurgy had again revived.

Clinias/ There could not have been.

Athenian Stranger/ In how many generations would this be attained?

Clinias/ Clearly, not for many generations.

Athenian Stranger/ During this period, and for some time afterwards, all the arts which require iron and brass and the like would disappear.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Faction and war would also have died out in those days, and for many reasons.

Clinias/ How would that be?

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, the desolation of these primitive men would create in them a feeling of affection and goodwill towards one another; and, secondly, they would have no occasion to quarrel about their subsistence, for they would have pasture in abundance, except just at first, and in some particular cases; and from their pasture-land they would obtain the greater part of their food in a primitive age, having plenty of milk and flesh; moreover they would procure other food by the chase, not to be despised either in quantity or quality. They would also have abundance of clothing, and bedding, and dwellings, and utensils either capable of standing on the fire or not; for the plastic and weaving arts do not require any use of iron: and God has given these two arts to man in order to provide him with all such things, that, when reduced to the last extremity, the human race may still grow and increase. Hence in those days mankind were not very poor; nor was poverty a cause of difference among them; and rich they could not have been, having neither gold nor silver: —such at that time was their condition. And the community which has neither poverty nor riches will always have the noblest principles; in it there is no insolence or injustice, nor, again, are there any contentions or envyings. And therefore they were good, and also because they were what is called simple-minded; and when they were told about good and evil, they in their simplicity believed what they heard to be very truth

and practiced it. No one had the wit to suspect another of a falsehood, as men do now; but what they heard about Gods and men they believed to be true, and lived accordingly; and therefore they were in all respects such as we have described them.

Clinias/ That quite accords with my views, and with those of my friend here.

Athenian Stranger/ Would not many generations living on in a simple manner, although ruder, perhaps, and more ignorant of the arts generally, and in particular of those of land or naval warfare, and likewise of other arts, termed in cities legal practices and party conflicts, and including all conceivable ways of hurting one another in word and deed; —although inferior to those who lived before the deluge, or to the men of our day in these respects, would they not, I say, be simpler and more manly, and also more temperate and altogether more just? The reason has been already explained.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ I should wish you to understand that what has preceded and what is about to follow, has been, and will be said, with the intention of explaining what need the men of that time had of laws, and who was their lawgiver.

Clinias/ And thus far what you have said has been very well said.

Athenian Stranger/ They could hardly have wanted lawgivers as yet; nothing of that sort was likely to have existed in their days, for they had no letters at this early period; they lived by habit and the customs of their ancestors, as they are called.

Clinias/ Probably.

Athenian Stranger/ But there was already existing a form of government which, if I am not mistaken, is generally

termed a lordship, and this still remains in many places, both among Hellenes and barbarians, and is the government which is declared by Homer to have prevailed among the Cyclopes: —

> 'They have neither councils nor judgments, but they dwell in hollow caves on the tops of high mountains, and everyone gives law to his wife and children, and they do not busy themselves about one another.'

Clinias/ That seems to be a charming poet of yours; I have read some other verses of his, which are very clever; but I do not know much of him, for foreign poets are very little read among the Cretans.

Megillus/ But they are in Lacedaemon, and he appears to be the prince of them all; the manner of life, however, which he describes is not Spartan, but rather Ionian, and he seems quite to confirm what you are saying, when he traces up the ancient state of mankind by the help of tradition to barbarism.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, he does confirm it; and we may accept his witness to the fact that such forms of government sometimes arise.

Clinias/ We may.

Athenian Stranger/ And were not such states composed of men who had been dispersed in single habitations and families by the poverty which attended the devastations; and did not the eldest then rule among them, because with them government originated in the authority of a father and a mother, whom, like a flock of birds, they followed, forming one troop under the patriarchal rule and sovereignty of their parents, which of all sovereignties is the most just?

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ After this they came together in greater numbers, and increased the size of their cities, and

betook themselves to husbandry, first of all at the foot of the mountains, and made enclosures of loose walls and works of defense, in order to keep off wild beasts; thus creating a single large and common habitation.

Clinias/ Yes; at least we may suppose so.

Athenian Stranger/ There is another thing which would probably happen.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ When these larger habitations grew up out of the lesser original ones, each of the lesser ones would survive in the larger; every family would be under the rule of the eldest, and, owing to their separation from one another, would have peculiar customs in things divine and human, which they would have received from their several parents who had educated them; and these customs would incline them to order, when the parents had the element of order in their nature, and to courage, when they had the element of courage. And they would naturally stamp upon their children, and upon their children's children, their own likings; and, as we are saying, they would find their way into the larger society, having already their own peculiar laws.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And every man surely likes his own laws best, and the laws of others not so well.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Then now we seem to have stumbled upon the beginnings of legislation.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ The next step will be that these persons who have met together, will select some arbiters, who will review the laws of all of them, and will publicly present such as they approve to the chiefs who lead the

tribes, and who are in a manner their kings, allowing them to choose those which they think best. These persons will themselves be called legislators, and will appoint the magistrates, framing some sort of aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, out of the dynasties or lordships, and in this altered state of the government they will live.

Clinias/ Yes, that would be the natural order of things.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, now let us speak of a third form of government, in which all other forms and conditions of polities and cities concur.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ The form which in fact Homer indicates as following the second. This third form arose when, as he says, Dardanus founded Dardania: —

> 'For not as yet had the holy Ilium been built on the plain to be a city of speaking men; but they were still dwelling at the foot of many-fountained Ida.'

For indeed, in these verses, and in what he said of the Cyclopes, he speaks the words of God and nature; for poets are a divine race, and often in their strains, by the aid of the Muses and the Graces, they attain truth.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Then now let us proceed with the rest of our tale, which will probably be found to illustrate in some degree our proposed design: —Shall we do so?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Ilium was built, when they had descended from the mountain, in a large and fair plain, on a sort of low hill, watered by many rivers descending from Ida.

Clinias/ Such is the tradition.

Athenian Stranger/ And we must suppose this event to have taken place many ages after the deluge?

Clinias/ Yes; many ages must have elapsed.

Athenian Stranger/ A marvelous forgetfulness of the former destruction would appear to have come over them, when they placed their town right under numerous streams flowing from the heights, trusting for their security to not very high hills, either.

Clinias/ There must have been a long interval, clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ And, as population increased, many other cities would begin to be inhabited.

Clinias/ Doubtless.

Athenian Stranger/ Those cities made war against Troy—by sea as well as land—for at that time men were ceasing to be afraid of the sea.

Clinias/ Clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ The Achaeans remained ten years, and overthrew Troy.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And during the ten years in which the Achaeans were besieging Ilium, the homes of the besiegers were falling into an evil plight. Their youth revolted; and when the soldiers returned to their own cities and families, they did not receive them properly, and as they ought to have done, and numerous deaths, murders, exiles, were the consequence. The exiles came again, under a new name, no longer Achaeans, but Dorians, —a name which they derived from Dorieus; for it was he who gathered them together. The rest of the story is told by you Lacedaemonians as part of the history of Sparta.

Megillus/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus, after digressing from the original subject of laws into music and drinking-bouts, the argument has, providentially, come back to the same point,

and presents to us another handle. For we have reached the settlement of Lacedaemon; which, as you truly say, is in laws and in institutions the sister of Crete. And we are all the better for the digression, because we have gone through various governments and settlements, and have been present at the foundation of a first, second, and third state, succeeding one another in infinite time. And now there appears on the horizon a fourth state or nation which was once in process of settlement and has continued settled to this day. If, out of all this, we are able to discern what is well or ill settled, and what laws are the salvation and what are the destruction of cities, and what changes would make a state happy, O Megillus and Cleinias, we may now begin again, unless we have some fault to find with the previous discussion.

Megillus/ If some God, Stranger, would promise us that our new enquiry about legislation would be as good and full as the present, I would go a great way to hear such another, and would think that a day as long as this—and we are now approaching the longest day of the year—was too short for the discussion.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I suppose that we must consider this subject?

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us place ourselves in thought at the moment when Lacedaemon and Argos and Messene and the rest of the Peloponnesus were all in complete subjection, Megillus, to your ancestors; for afterwards, as the legend informs us, they divided their army into three portions, and settled three cities, Argos, Messene, Lacedaemon.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene, Procles and Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ To these kings all the men of that day made oath that they would assist them, if anyone subverted their kingdom.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ But can a kingship be destroyed, or was any other form of government ever destroyed, by any but the rulers themselves? No indeed, by Zeus. Have we already forgotten what was said a little while ago?

Megillus/ No.

Athenian Stranger/ And may we not now further confirm what was then mentioned? For we have come upon facts which have brought us back again to the same principle; so that, in resuming the discussion, we shall not be enquiring about an empty theory, but about events which actually happened. The case was as follows: —Three royal heroes made oath to three cities which were under a kingly government, and the cities to the kings, that both rulers and subjects should govern and be governed according to the laws which were common to all of them: the rulers promised that as time and the race went forward they would not make their rule more arbitrary; and the subjects said that, if the rulers observed these conditions, they would never subvert or permit others to subvert those kingdoms; the kings were to assist kings and peoples when injured, and the peoples were to assist peoples and kings in like manner. Is not this the fact?

Megillus/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And the three states to whom these laws were given, whether their kings or any others were the

authors of them, had therefore the greatest security for the maintenance of their constitutions?

Megillus/ What security?

Athenian Stranger/ That the other two states were always to come to the rescue against a rebellious third.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Many persons say that legislators ought to impose such laws as the mass of the people will be ready to receive; but this is just as if one were to command gymnastic masters or physicians to treat or cure their pupils or patients in an agreeable manner.

Megillus/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ Whereas the physician may often be too happy if he can restore health, and make the body whole, without any very great infliction of pain.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ There was also another advantage possessed by the men of that day, which greatly lightened the task of passing laws.

Megillus/ What advantage?

Athenian Stranger/ The legislators of that day, when they equalized property, escaped the great accusation which generally arises in legislation, if a person attempts to disturb the possession of land, or to abolish debts, because he sees that without this reform there can never be any real equality. Now, in general, when the legislator attempts to make a new settlement of such matters, everyone meets him with the cry, that 'he is not to disturb vested interests'—declaring with imprecations that he is introducing agrarian laws and cancelling of debts, until a man is at his wits' end; whereas no one could quarrel with the Dorians for distributing the

land, —there was nothing to hinder them; and as for debts, they had none which were considerable or of old standing.

Megillus/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ But then, my good friends, why did the settlement and legislation of their country turn out so badly?

Megillus/ How do you mean; and why do you blame them?

Athenian Stranger/ There were three kingdoms, and of these, two quickly corrupted their original constitution and laws, and the only one which remained was the Spartan.

Megillus/ The question which you ask is not easily answered.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet must be answered when we are enquiring about laws, this being our old man's sober game of play, whereby we beguile the way, as I was saying when we first set out on our journey.

Megillus/ Certainly; and we must find out why this was.

Athenian Stranger/ What laws are more worthy of our attention than those which have regulated such cities? or what settlements of states are greater or more famous?

Megillus/ I know of none.

Athenian Stranger/ Can we doubt that your ancestors intended these institutions not only for the protection of Peloponnesus, but of all the Hellenes, in case they were attacked by the barbarian? For the inhabitants of the region about Ilium, when they provoked by their insolence the Trojan war, relied upon the power of the Assyrians and the Empire of Ninus, which still existed and had a great prestige; the people of those days fearing the united Assyrian Empire just as we now fear the Great King. And the second capture of Troy was a serious offence against them, because Troy

was a portion of the Assyrian Empire. To meet the danger the single army was distributed between three cities by the royal brothers, sons of Heracles, —a fair device, as it seemed, and a far better arrangement than the expedition against Troy. For, firstly, the people of that day had, as they thought, in the Heraclidae better leaders than the Pelopidae; in the next place, they considered that their army was superior in valor to that which went against Troy; for, although the latter conquered the Trojans, they were themselves conquered by the Heraclidae—Achaeans by Dorians. May we not suppose that this was the intention with which the men of those days framed the constitutions of their states?

Megillus/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ And would not men who had shared with one another many dangers, and were governed by a single race of royal brothers, and had taken the advice of oracles, and in particular of the Delphian Apollo, be likely to think that such states would be firmly and lastingly established?

Megillus/ Of course they would.

Athenian Stranger/ Yet these institutions, of which such great expectations were entertained, seem to have all rapidly vanished away; with the exception, as I was saying, of that small part of them which existed in your land. And this third part has never to this day ceased warring against the two others; whereas, if the original idea had been carried out, and they had agreed to be one, their power would have been invincible in war.

Megillus/ No doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ But what was the ruin of this glorious confederacy? Here is a subject well worthy of consideration.

Megillus/ Certainly, no one will ever find more striking instances of laws or governments being the salvation or

destruction of great and noble interests, than are here presented to his view.

Athenian Stranger/ Then now we seem to have happily arrived at a real and important question.

Megillus/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Did you never remark, sage friend, that all men, and we ourselves at this moment, often fancy that they see some beautiful thing which might have effected wonders if anyone had only known how to make a right use of it in some way; and yet this mode of looking at things may turn out after all to be a mistake, and not according to nature, either in our own case or in any other?

Megillus/ To what are you referring, and what do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I was thinking of my own admiration of the aforesaid Heracleid expedition, which was so noble, and might have had such wonderful results for the Hellenes, if only rightly used; and I was just laughing at myself.

Megillus/ But were you not right and wise in speaking as you did, and we in assenting to you?

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps; and yet I cannot help observing that anyone who sees anything great or powerful, immediately has the feeling that—'If the owner only knew how to use his great and noble possession, how happy would he be, and what great results would he achieve!'

Megillus/ And would he not be justified?

Athenian Stranger/ Reflect; in what point of view does this sort of praise appear just: First, in reference to the question in hand: —If the then commanders had known how to arrange their army properly, how would they have attained success? Would not this have been the way? They would have bound them all firmly together and preserved them forever, giving them freedom and dominion at

pleasure, combined with the power of doing in the whole world, Hellenic and barbarian, whatever they and their descendants desired. What other aim would they have had?

Megillus/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose anyone were in the same way to express his admiration at the sight of great wealth or family honor, or the like, he would praise them under the idea that through them he would attain either all or the greater and chief part of what he desires.

Megillus/ He would.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, now, and does not the argument show that there is one common desire of all mankind?

Megillus/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ The desire which a man has, that all things, if possible, —at any rate, things human, —may come to pass in accordance with his soul's desire.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And having this desire always, and at every time of life, in youth, in manhood, in age, he cannot help always praying for the fulfillment of it.

Megillus/ No doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ And we join in the prayers of our friends, and ask for them what they ask for themselves.

Megillus/ We do.

Athenian Stranger/ Dear is the son to the father—the younger to the elder.

Megillus/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet the son often prays to obtain things which the father prays that he may not obtain.

Megillus/ When the-son is young and foolish, you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; or when the father, in the dotage of age or the heat of youth, having no sense of right and justice, prays with fervor, under the influence of feelings akin to those of Theseus when he cursed the unfortunate Hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having a sense of right and justice, will join in his father's prayers?

Megillus/ I understand you to mean that a man should not desire or be in a hurry to have all things according to his wish, for his wish may be at variance with his reason. But every state and every individual ought to pray and strive for wisdom.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; and I remember, and you will remember, what I said at first, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a view to wisdom; while you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought to order all with a view to war. And to this I replied that there were four virtues, but that upon your view one of them only was the aim of legislation; whereas you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that which comes first, and is the leader of all the rest—I mean wisdom and mind and opinion, having affection and desire in their train. And now the argument returns to the same point, and I say once more, in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, that the prayer of a fool is full of danger, being likely to end in the opposite of what he desires. And if you would rather receive my words in earnest, I am willing that you should; and you will find, I suspect, as I have said already, that not cowardice was the cause of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their whole design, nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of the rulers or of their subjects; but their misfortunes were due to their general degeneracy, and especially to their ignorance of the most important human affairs. That was then, and is still, and always will be the case, as I will endeavor, if you will

allow me, to make out and demonstrate as well as I am able to you who are my friends, in the course of the argument.

Clinias/ Pray go on, Stranger; —compliments are troublesome, but we will show, not in word but in deed, how greatly we prize your words, for we will give them our best attention; and that is the way in which a freeman best shows his approval or disapproval.

Megillus/ Excellent, Cleinias; let us do as you say.

Clinias/ By all means, if Heaven wills. Go on.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, proceeding in the same train of thought, I say that the greatest ignorance was the ruin of the Dorian power, and that now, as then, ignorance is ruin. And if this be true, the legislator must endeavor to implant wisdom in states, and banish ignorance to the utmost of his power.

Clinias/ That is evident.

Athenian Stranger/ Then now consider what is really the greatest ignorance. I should like to know whether you and Megillus would agree with me in what I am about to say; for my opinion is——

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he nevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves and embraces that which he knows to be unrighteous and evil. This disagreement between the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my opinion, the worst ignorance; and also the greatest, because affecting the great mass of the human soul; for the principle which feels pleasure and pain in the individual is like the mass or populace in a state. And when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, which are her natural lords, that I call folly, just as in the state, when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers and the laws; or,

again, in the individual, when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and yet do no good, but rather the reverse of good. All these cases I term the worst ignorance, whether in individuals or in states. You will understand, Stranger, that I am speaking of something which is very different from the ignorance of handicraftsmen.

Clinias/ Yes, my friend, we understand and agree.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us, then, in the first place declare and affirm that the citizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind of authority entrusted to him: he must be stigmatized as ignorant, even though he be versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts of accomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity; and the opposite are to be called wise, even although, in the words of the proverb, they know neither how to read nor how to swim; and to them, as to men of sense, authority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how can there be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony? There is none; but the noblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom; and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason; whereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and the very opposite of a savior of the state: he is utterly ignorant of political wisdom. Let this, then, as I was saying, be laid down by us.

Clinias/ Let it be so laid down.

Athenian Stranger/ I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And what are the principles on which men rule and obey in cities, whether great or small; and similarly in families? What are they, and how many in number? Is there not one claim of authority which is always

just, —that of fathers and mothers and in general of progenitors to rule over their offspring?

Clinias/ There is.

Athenian Stranger/ Next follows the principle that the noble should rule over the ignoble; and, thirdly, that the elder should rule and the younger obey?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ And, fourthly, that slaves should be ruled, and their masters rule?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Fifthly, if I am not mistaken, comes the principle that the stronger shall rule, and the weaker be ruled?

Clinias/ That is a rule not to be disobeyed.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, and a rule which prevails very widely among all creatures, and is according to nature, as the Theban poet Pindar once said; and the sixth principle, and the greatest of all, is, that the wise should lead and command, and the ignorant follow and obey; and yet, O thou most wise Pindar, as I should reply to him, this surely is not contrary to nature, but according to nature, being the rule of law over willing subjects, and not a rule of compulsion.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ There is a seventh kind of rule which is awarded by lot, and is dear to the Gods and a token of good fortune: he on whom the lot falls is a ruler, and he who fails in obtaining the lot goes away and is the subject; and this we affirm to be quite just.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Then now' as we say playfully to any of those who lightly undertake the making of laws, 'you see, legislator, the principles of government, how many they are,

and that they are naturally opposed to each other. There we have discovered a fountain-head of seditions, to which you must attend. And, first, we will ask you to consider with us, how and in what respect the kings of Argos and Messene violated these our maxims, and ruined themselves and the great and famous Hellenic power of the olden time. Was it because they did not know how wisely Hesiod spoke when he said that the half is often more than the whole? His meaning was, that when to take the whole would be dangerous, and to take the half would be the safe and moderate course, then the moderate or better was more than the immoderate or worse.'

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And may we suppose this immoderate spirit to be more fatal when found among kings than when among peoples?

Clinias/ The probability is that ignorance will be a disorder especially prevalent among kings, because they lead a proud and luxurious life.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it not palpable that the chief aim of the kings of that time was to get the better of the established laws, and that they were not in harmony with the principles which they had agreed to observe by word and oath? This want of harmony may have had the appearance of wisdom, but was really, as we assert, the greatest ignorance, and utterly overthrew the whole empire by dissonance and harsh discord.

Clinias/ Very likely.

Athenian Stranger/ Good; and what measures ought the legislator to have then taken in order to avert this calamity? Truly there is no great wisdom in knowing, and no great difficulty in telling, after the evil has happened; but to have

foreseen the remedy at the time would have taken a much wiser head than ours.

Megillus/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Anyone who looks at what has occurred with you Lacedaemonians, Megillus, may easily know and may easily say what ought to have been done at that time.

Megillus/ Speak a little more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ Nothing can be clearer than the observation which I am about to make.

Megillus/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ That if anyone gives too great a power to anything, too large a sail to a vessel, too much food to the body, too much authority to the mind, and does not observe the mean, everything is overthrown, and, in the wantonness of excess, runs in the one case to disorders, and in the other to injustice, which is the child of excess. I mean to say, my dear friends, that there is no soul of man, young and irresponsible, who will be able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power—no one who will not, under such circumstances, become filled with folly, that worst of diseases, and be hated by his nearest and dearest friends: when this happens his kingdom is undermined, and all his power vanishes from him. And great legislators who know the mean should take heed of the danger. As far as we can guess at this distance of time, what happened was as follows: —

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ A God, who watched over Sparta, seeing into the future, gave you two families of kings instead of one; and thus brought you more within the limits of moderation. In the next place, some human wisdom mingled with divine power, observing that the constitution of your

government was still feverish and excited, tempered your inborn strength and pride of birth with the moderation which comes of age, making the power of your twenty-eight elders equal with that of the kings in the most important matters. But your third savior, perceiving that your government was still swelling and foaming, and desirous to impose a curb upon it, instituted the Ephors, whose power he made to resemble that of magistrates elected by lot; and by this arrangement the kingly office, being compounded of the right elements and duly moderated, was preserved, and was the means of preserving all the rest. Since, if there had been only the original legislators, Temenus, Cresphontes, and their contemporaries, as far as they were concerned not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been preserved; for they had no proper experience in legislation, or they would surely not have imagined that oaths would moderate a youthful spirit invested with a power which might be converted into a tyranny. Now that God has instructed us what sort of government would have been or will be lasting, there is no wisdom, as I have already said, in judging after the event; there is no difficulty in learning from an example which has already occurred. But if anyone could have foreseen all this at the time, and had been able to moderate the government of the three kingdoms and unite them into one, he might have saved all the excellent institutions which were then conceived; and no Persian or any other armament would have dared to attack us, or would have regarded Hellas as a power to be despised.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ There was small credit to us, Cleinias, in defeating them; and the discredit was, not that the conquerors did not win glorious victories both by land and sea, but what, in my opinion, brought discredit was, first of all, the circumstance that of the three cities one only

fought on behalf of Hellas, and the two others were so utterly good for nothing that the one was waging a mighty war against Lacedaemon, and was thus preventing her from rendering assistance, while the city of Argos, which had the precedence at the time of the distribution, when asked to aid in repelling the barbarian, would not answer to the call, or give aid. Many things might be told about Hellas in connection with that war which are far from honorable; nor, indeed, can we rightly say that Hellas repelled the invader; for the truth is, that unless the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, acting in concert, had warded off the impending yoke, all the tribes of Hellas would have been fused in a chaos of Hellenes mingling with one another, of barbarians mingling with Hellenes, and Hellenes with barbarians; just as nations who are now subject to the Persian power, owing to unnatural separations and combinations of them, are dispersed and scattered, and live miserably. These, Cleinias and Megillus, are the reproaches which we have to make against statesmen and legislators, as they are called, past and present, if we would analyze the causes of their failure, and find out what else might have been done. We said, for instance, just now, that there ought to be no great and unmixed powers; and this was under the idea that a state ought to be free and wise and harmonious, and that a legislator ought to legislate with a view to this end. Nor is there any reason to be surprised at our continually proposing aims for the legislator which appear not to be always the same; but we should consider when we say that temperance is to be the aim, or wisdom is to be the aim, or friendship is to be the aim, that all these aims are really the same; and if so a variety in the modes of expression ought not to disturb us.

Clinias/ Let us resume the argument in that spirit. And now, speaking of friendship and wisdom and freedom, I wish

that you would tell me at what, in your opinion, the legislator should aim.

Athenian Stranger/ Hear me, then: there are two mother forms of states from which the rest may be truly said to be derived; and one of them may be called monarchy and the other democracy: the Persians have the highest form of the one, and we of the other; almost all the rest, as I was saying, are variations of these. Now, if you are to have liberty and the combination of friendship with wisdom, you must have both these forms of government in a measure; the argument emphatically declares that no city can be well governed which is not made up of both.

Clinias/ Impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ Neither the one, if it be exclusively and excessively attached to monarchy, nor the other, if it be similarly attached to freedom, observes moderation; but your states, the Laconian and Cretan, have more of it; and the same was the case with the Athenians and Persians of old time, but now they have less. Shall I tell you why?

Clinias/ By all means, if it will tend to elucidate our subject.

Athenian Stranger/ Hear, then: —There was a time when the Persians had more of the state which is a mean between slavery and freedom. In the reign of Cyrus they were freemen and also lords of many others: the rulers gave a share of freedom to the subjects, and being treated as equals, the soldiers were on better terms with their generals, and showed themselves more ready in the hour of danger. And if there was any wise man among them, who was able to give good counsel, he imparted his wisdom to the public; for the king was not jealous, but allowed him full liberty of speech, and gave honor to those who could advise him in any matter. And the nation waxed in all respects, because there was

freedom and friendship and communion of mind among them.

Clinias/ That certainly appears to have been the case.

Athenian Stranger/ How, then, was this advantage lost under Cambyses, and again recovered under Darius? Shall I try to divine?

Clinias/ The enquiry, no doubt, has a bearing upon our subject.

Athenian Stranger/ I imagine that Cyrus, though a great and patriotic general, had never given his mind to education, and never attended to the order of his household.

Clinias/ What makes you say so?

Athenian Stranger/ I think that from his youth upwards he was a soldier, and entrusted the education of his children to the women; and they brought them up from their childhood as the favorites of fortune, who were blessed already, and needed no more blessings. They thought that they were happy enough, and that no one should be allowed to oppose them in any way, and they compelled everyone to praise all that they said or did. This was how they brought them up.

Clinias/ A splendid education truly!

Athenian Stranger/ Such an one as women were likely to give them, and especially princesses who had recently grown rich, and in the absence of the men, too, who were occupied in wars and dangers, and had no time to look after them.

Clinias/ What would you expect?

Athenian Stranger/ Their father had possessions of cattle and sheep, and many herds of men and other animals; but he did not consider that those to whom he was about to make them over were not trained in his own calling, which was Persian; for the Persians are shepherds—sons of a

rugged land, which is a stern mother, and well fitted to produce a sturdy race able to live in the open air and go without sleep, and also to fight, if fighting is required. He did not observe that his sons were trained differently; through the so-called blessing of being royal they were educated in the Median fashion by women and eunuchs, which led to their becoming such as people do become when they are brought up unreproved. And so, after the death of Cyrus, his sons, in the fullness of luxury and license, took the kingdom, and first one slew the other because he could not endure a rival; and, afterwards, the slayer himself, mad with wine and brutality, lost his kingdom through the Medes and the Eunuch, as they called him, who despised the folly of Cambyses.

Clinias/ So runs the tale, and such probably were the facts.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; and the tradition says, that the empire came back to the Persians, through Darius and the seven chiefs.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us note the rest of the story. Observe, that Darius was not the son of a king, and had not received a luxurious education. When he came to the throne, being one of the seven, he divided the country into seven portions, and of this arrangement there are some shadowy traces still remaining; he made laws upon the principle of introducing universal equality in the order of the state, and he embodied in his laws the settlement of the tribute which Cyrus promised, —thus creating a feeling of friendship and community among all the Persians, and attaching the people to him with money and gifts. Hence his armies cheerfully acquired for him countries as large as those which Cyrus had left behind him. Darius was succeeded by. his son

Xerxes; and he again was brought up in the royal and luxurious fashion. Might we not most justly say: 'O Darius, how came you to bring up Xerxes in the same way in which Cyrus brought up Cambyses, and not to see his fatal mistake?' For Xerxes, being the creation of the same education, met with much the same fortune as Cambyses; and from that time until now there has never been a really great king among the Persians, although they are all called Great. And their degeneracy is not to be attributed to chance, as I maintain; the reason is rather the evil life which is generally led by the sons of very rich and royal persons; for never will boy or man, young or old, excel in virtue, who has been thus educated. And this, I say, is what the legislator has to consider, and what at the present moment has to be considered by us. Justly may you, O Lacedaemonians, be praised, in that you do not give special honor or a special education to wealth rather than to poverty, or to a royal rather than to a private station, where the divine and inspired lawgiver has not originally commanded them to be given. For no man ought to have pre-eminent honor in a state because he surpasses others in wealth, any more than because he is swift of foot or fair or strong, unless he have some virtue in him; nor even if he have virtue, unless he have this particular virtue of temperance.

Megillus/ What do you mean, Stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ I suppose that courage is a part of virtue?

Megillus/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, now hear and judge for yourself: —Would you like to have for a fellow-lodger or neighbor a very courageous man, who had no control over himself?

Megillus/ Heaven forbid!

Athenian Stranger/ Or an artist, who was clever in his profession, but a rogue?

Megillus/ Certainly not.

Athenian Stranger/ And surely justice does not grow apart from temperance?

Megillus/ Impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ Any more than our pattern wise man, whom we exhibited as having his pleasures and pains in accordance with and corresponding to true reason, can be intemperate?

Megillus/ No.

Athenian Stranger/ There is a further consideration relating to the due and undue award of honors in states.

Megillus/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ I should like to know whether temperance without the other virtues, existing alone in the soul of man, is rightly to be praised or blamed?

Megillus/ I cannot tell.

Athenian Stranger/ And that is the best answer; for whichever alternative you had chosen, I think that you would have gone wrong.

Megillus/ I am fortunate.

Athenian Stranger/ Very good; a quality, which is a mere appendage of things which can be praised or blamed, does not deserve an expression of opinion, but is best passed over in silence.

Megillus/ You are speaking of temperance?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; but of the other virtues, that which having this appendage is also most beneficial, will be most deserving of honor, and next that which is beneficial in

the next degree; and so each of them will be rightly honored according to a regular order.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And ought not the legislator to determine these classes?

Megillus/ Certainly he should.

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose that we leave to him the arrangement of details. But the general division of laws according to their importance into a first and second and third class, we who are lovers of law may make ourselves.

Megillus/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ We maintain, then, that a State which would be safe and happy, as far as the nature of man allows, must and ought to distribute honor and dishonor in the right way. And the right way is to place the goods of the soul first and highest in the scale, always assuming temperance to be the condition of them; and to assign the second place to the goods of the body; and the third place to money and property. And if any legislator or state departs from this rule by giving money the place of honor, or in any way preferring that which is really last, may we not say, that he or the state is doing an unholy and unpatriotic thing?

Megillus/ Yes; let that be plainly declared.

Athenian Stranger/ The consideration of the Persian governments led us thus far to enlarge. We remarked that the Persians grew worse and worse. And we affirm the reason of this to have been, that they too much diminished the freedom of the people, and introduced too much of despotism, and so destroyed friendship and community of feeling. And when there is an end of these, no longer do the governors govern on behalf of their subjects or of the people, but on behalf of themselves; and if they think that they can gain ever so small an advantage for themselves, they

devastate cities, and send fire and desolation among friendly races. And as they hate ruthlessly and horribly, so are they hated; and when they want the people to fight for them, they find no community of feeling or willingness to risk their lives on their behalf; their untold myriads are useless to them on the field of battle, and they think that their salvation depends on the employment of mercenaries and strangers whom they hire, as if they were in want of more men. And they cannot help being stupid, since they proclaim by their actions that the ordinary distinctions of right and wrong which are made in a state are a trifle, when compared with gold and silver.

Megillus/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ And now enough of the Persians, and their present mal-administration of their government, which is owing to the excess of slavery and despotism among them.

Megillus/ Good.

Athenian Stranger/ Next, we must pass in review the government of Attica in like manner, and from this show that entire freedom and the absence of all superior authority is not by any means so good as government by others when properly limited, which was our ancient Athenian constitution at the time when the Persians made their attack on Hellas, or, speaking more correctly, on the whole continent of Europe. There were four classes, arranged according to a property census, and reverence was our queen and mistress, and made us willing to live in obedience to the laws which then prevailed. Also the vastness of the Persian armament, both by sea and on land, caused a helpless terror, which made us more and more the servants of our rulers and of the laws; and for all these reasons an exceeding harmony prevailed among us. About ten years before the naval engagement at Salamis, Datis came, leading

a Persian host by command of Darius, which was expressly directed against the Athenians and Eretrians, having orders to carry them away captive; and these orders he was to execute under pain of death. Now Datis and his myriads soon became complete masters of Eretria, and he sent a fearful report to Athens that no Eretrian had escaped him; for the soldiers of Datis had joined hands and netted the whole of Eretria. And this report, whether well or ill founded, was terrible to all the Hellenes, and above all to the Athenians, and they dispatched embassies in all directions, but no one was willing to come to their relief, with the exception of the Lacedaemonians; and they, either because they were detained by the Messenian war, which was then going on, or for some other reason of which we are not told, came a day too late for the battle of Marathon. After a while, the news arrived of mighty preparations being made, and innumerable threats came from the king. Then, as time went on, a rumor reached us that Darius had died, and that his son, who was young and hot-headed, had come to the throne and was persisting in his design. The Athenians were under the impression that the whole expedition was directed against them, in consequence of the battle of Marathon; and hearing of the bridge over the Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the host of ships, considering that there was no salvation for them either by land or by sea, for there was no one to help them, and remembering that in the first expedition, when the Persians destroyed Eretria, no one came to their help, or would risk the danger of an alliance with them, they thought that this would happen again, at least on land; nor, when they looked to the sea, could they descry any hope of salvation; for they were attacked by a thousand vessels and more. One chance of safety remained, slight indeed and desperate, but their only one. They saw that on the former occasion they had gained a seemingly

impossible victory, and borne up by this hope, they found that their only refuge was in themselves and in the Gods. All these things created in them the spirit of friendship; there was the fear of the moment, and there was that higher fear, which they had acquired by obedience to their ancient laws, and which I have several times in the preceding discourse called reverence, of which the good man ought to be a willing servant, and of which the coward is independent and fearless. If this fear had not possessed them, they would never have met the enemy, or defended their temples and sepulchers and their country, and everything that was near and dear to them, as they did; but little by little they would have been all scattered and dispersed.

Megillus/ Your words, Athenian, are quite true, and worthy of yourself and of your country.

Athenian Stranger/ They are true, Megillus; and to you, who have inherited the virtues of your ancestors, I may properly speak of the actions of that day. And I would wish you and Cleinias to consider whether my words have not also a bearing on legislation; for I am not discoursing only for the pleasure of talking, but for the argument's sake. Please to remark that the experience both of ourselves and the Persians was, in a certain sense, the same; for as they led their people into utter servitude, so we too led ours into all freedom. And now, how shall we proceed? for I would like you to observe that our previous arguments have a good deal to say for themselves.

Megillus/ True; but I wish that you would give us a fuller explanation.

Athenian Stranger/ I will. Under the ancient laws, my friends, the people was not as now the master, but rather the willing servant of the laws.

Megillus/ What laws do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, let us speak of the laws about music, —that is to say, such music as then existed, —in order that we may trace the growth of the excess of freedom from the beginning. Now music was early divided among us into certain kinds and manners. One sort consisted of prayers to the Gods, which were called hymns; and there was another and opposite sort called lamentations, and another termed paeans, and another, celebrating the birth of Dionysus, called, I believe, 'dithyrambs' And they used the actual word 'laws' or νόμοι, for another kind of song; and to this they added the term 'citharoedic.' All these and others were duly distinguished, nor were the performers allowed to confuse one style of music with another. And the authority which determined and gave judgment, and punished the disobedient, was not expressed in a hiss, nor in the most unmusical shouts of the multitude, as in our days, nor in applause and clapping of hands. But the directors of public instruction insisted that the spectators should listen in silence to the end; and boys and their tutors, and the multitude in general, were kept quiet by a hint from a stick. Such was the good order which the multitude were willing to observe; they would never have dared to give judgment by noisy cries. And then, as time went on, the poets themselves introduced the reign of vulgar and lawless innovation. They were men of genius, but they had no perception of what is just and lawful in music; raging like Bacchanals and possessed with inordinate delights—mingling lamentations with hymns, and paeans with dithyrambs; imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre, and making one general confusion; ignorantly affirming that music has no truth, and, whether good or bad, can only be judged of rightly by the pleasure of the hearer. And by composing such licentious works, and adding to them words as licentious, they have inspired the multitude with

lawlessness and boldness, and made them fancy that they can judge for themselves about melody and song. And in this way the theatres from being mute have become vocal, as though they had understanding of good and bad in music and poetry; and instead of an aristocracy, an evil sort of theatrocracy has grown up. For if the democracy which judged had only consisted of educated persons, no fatal harm would have been done; but in music there first arose the universal conceit of omniscience and general lawlessness; —freedom came following afterwards, and men, fancying that they knew what they did not know, had no longer any fear, and the absence of fear begets shamelessness. For what is this shamelessness, which is so evil a thing, but the insolent refusal to regard the opinion of the better by reason of an over-daring sort of liberty?

Megillus/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Consequent upon this freedom comes the other freedom, of disobedience to rulers; and then the attempt to escape the control and exhortation of father, mother, elders, and when near the end, the control of the laws also; and at the very end there is the contempt of oaths and pledges, and no regard at all for the Gods, —herein they exhibit and imitate the old so-called Titanic nature, and come to the same point as the Titans when they rebelled against God, leading a life of endless evils. But why have I said all this? I ask, because the argument ought to be pulled up from time to time, and not be allowed to run away, but held with bit and bridle, and then we shall not, as the proverb says, fall off our ass. Let us then once more ask the question, To what end has all this been said?

Megillus/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ This, then, has been said for the sake——

Megillus/ Of what?

Athenian Stranger/ We were maintaining that the lawgiver ought to have three things in view: first, that the city for which he legislates should be free; and secondly, be at unity with herself; and thirdly, should have understanding; —these were our principles, were they not?

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ With a view to this we selected two kinds of government, the one the most despotic, and the other the most free; and now we are considering which of them is the right form: we took a mean in both cases, of despotism in the one, and of liberty in the other, and we saw that in a mean they attained their perfection; but that when they were carried to the extreme of either, slavery or license, neither party were the gainers.

Megillus/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And that was our reason for considering the settlement of the Dorian army, and of the city built by Dardanus at the foot of the mountains, and the removal of cities to the seashore, and of our mention of the first men, who were the survivors of the deluge. And all that was previously said about music and drinking, and what preceded, was said with the view of seeing how a state might be best administered, and how an individual might best order his own life. And now, Megillus and Cleinias, how can we put to the proof the value of our words?

Clinias/ Stranger, I think that I see how a proof of their value may be obtained. This discussion of ours appears to me to have been singularly fortunate, and just what I at this moment want; most auspiciously have you and my friend Megillus come in my way. For I will tell you what has happened to me; and I regard the coincidence as a sort of omen. The greater part of Crete is going to send out a colony,

and they have entrusted the management of the affair to the Cnosians; and the Cnosian government to me and nine others. And they desire us to give them any laws which we please, whether taken from the Cretan model or. from any other; and they do not mind about their being foreign if they are better. Grant me then this favor, which will also be a gain to yourselves: —Let us make a selection from what has been said, and then let us imagine a State of which we will suppose ourselves to be the original founders. Thus we shall proceed with our enquiry, and, at the same time, I may have the use of the framework which you are constructing, for the city which is in contemplation.

Athenian Stranger/ Good news, Cleinias; if Megillus has no objection, you may be sure that I will do all in my power to please you.

Clinias/ Thank you.

Megillus/ And so will I.

Clinias/ Excellent; and now let us begin to frame the State.

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Athenian Stranger/ And now, what will this city be? I do not mean to ask what is or will hereafter be the name of the place; that may be determined by the accident of locality or of the original settlement, —a river or fountain, or some local deity may give the sanction of a name to the newly-founded city; but I do want to know what the situation is, whether maritime or inland.

Clinias/ I should imagine, Stranger, that the city of which we are speaking is about eighty stadia distant from the sea.

Athenian Stranger/ And are there harbors on the seaboard?

Clinias/ Excellent harbors, Stranger; there could not be better.

Athenian Stranger/ Alas! what a prospect! And is the surrounding country productive, or in need of importations?

Clinias/ Hardly in need of anything.

Athenian Stranger/ And is there any neighboring State?

Clinias/ None whatever, and that is the reason for selecting the place; in days of old, there was a migration of the inhabitants, and the region has been deserted from time immemorial.

Athenian Stranger/ And has the place a fair proportion of hill, and plain, and wood?

Clinias/ Like the rest of Crete in that.

Athenian Stranger/ You mean to say that there is more rock than plain?

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then there is some hope that your citizens may be virtuous: had you been on the sea, and well provided with harbors, and an importing rather than a producing country, some mighty savior would have been

needed, and lawgivers more than mortal, if you were ever to have a chance of preserving your state from degeneracy and discordance of manners. But there is comfort in the eighty stadia; although the sea is too near, especially if, as you say, the harbors are so good. Still we may be content. The sea is pleasant enough as a daily companion, but has indeed also a bitter and brackish quality; filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and begetting in the souls of men uncertain and unfaithful ways—making the state unfriendly and unfaithful both to her own citizens, and also to other nations. There is a consolation, therefore, in the country producing all things at home; and yet, owing to the ruggedness of the soil, not providing anything in great abundance. Had there been abundance, there might have been a great export trade, and a great return of gold and silver; which, as we may safely affirm, has the most fatal results on a State whose aim is the attainment of just and noble sentiments: this was said by us, if you remember, in the previous discussion.

Clinias/ I remember, and am of opinion that we both were and are in the right.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, but let me ask, how is the country supplied with timber for ship-building?

Clinias/ There is no fir of any consequence, nor pine, and not much cypress; and you will find very little stone-pine or plane-wood, which shipwrights always require for the interior of ships.

Athenian Stranger/ These are also natural advantages.

Clinias/ Why so?

Athenian Stranger/ Because no city ought to be easily able to imitate its enemies in what is mischievous.

Clinias/ How does that bear upon any of the matters of which we have been speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ Remember, my good friend, what I said at first about the Cretan laws, that they looked to one thing only, and this, as you both agreed, was war; and I replied that such laws, in so far as they tended to promote virtue, were good; but in that they regarded a part only, and not the whole of virtue, I disapproved of them. And now I hope that you in your turn will follow and watch me if I legislate with a view to anything but virtue, or with a view to a part of virtue only. For I consider that the true lawgiver, like an archer, aims only at that on which some eternal beauty is always attending, and dismisses everything else, whether wealth or any other benefit, when separated from virtue. I was saying that the imitation of enemies was a bad thing; and I was thinking of a case in which a maritime people are harassed by enemies, as the Athenians were by Minos (I do not speak from any desire to recall past grievances); but he, as we know, was a great naval potentate, who compelled the inhabitants of Attica to pay him a cruel tribute; and in those days they had no ships of war as they now have, nor was the country filled with ship-timber, and therefore they could not readily build them. Hence they could not learn how to imitate their enemy at sea, and in this way, becoming sailors themselves, directly repel their enemies. Better for them to have lost many times over the seven youths, than that heavy-armed and stationary troops should have been turned into sailors, and accustomed to be often leaping on shore, and again to come running back to their ships; or should have fancied that there was no disgrace in not awaiting the attack of an enemy and dying boldly; and that there were good reasons, and plenty of them, for a man throwing away his arms, and betaking himself to flight, —which is not dishonorable, as people say, at certain times. This is the language of naval warfare, and is anything but worthy of extraordinary praise. For we

should not teach bad habits, least of all to the best part of the citizens. You may learn the evil of such a practice from Homer, by whom Odysseus is introduced, rebuking Agamemnon, because he desires to draw down the ships to the sea at a time when the Achaeans are hard pressed by the Trojans, —he gets angry with him, and says: —

> 'Who, at a time when the battle is in full cry, biddest to drag the well-benched ships into the sea, that the prayers of the Trojans may be accomplished yet more, and high ruin fall upon us. For the Achaeans will not maintain the battle, when the ships are drawn into the sea, but they will look behind and will cease from strife; in that the counsel which you give will prove injurious.'

You see that he quite knew triremes on the sea, in the neighborhood of fighting men, to be an evil; —lions might be trained in that way to fly from a herd of deer. Moreover, naval powers which owe their safety to ships, do not give honor to that sort of warlike excellence which is most deserving of it. For he who owes his safety to the pilot and the captain, and the oarsman, and all sorts of rather inferior persons, cannot rightly give honor to whom honor is due. But how can a state be in a right condition which cannot justly award honor?

Clinias/ It is hardly possible, I admit; and yet, Stranger, we Cretans are in the habit of saying that the battle of Salamis was the salvation of Hellas.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, yes; and that is an opinion which is widely spread both among Hellenes and barbarians. But Megillus and I say rather, that the battle of Marathon was the beginning, and the battle of Plataea the completion, of the great deliverance, and that these battles by land made the Hellenes better; whereas the sea-fights of Salamis and Artemisium—for I may as well put them both together—made them no better, if I may say so without offence about

the battles which helped to save us. And in estimating the goodness of a state, we regard both the situation of the country and the order of the laws, considering that the mere preservation and continuance of life is not the most honorable thing for men, as the vulgar think, but the continuance of the best life, while we live; and that again, if I am not mistaken, is a remark which has been made already.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we have only to ask, whether we are taking the course which we acknowledge to be the best for the settlement and legislation of states.

Clinias/ The best by far.

Athenian Stranger/ And now let me proceed to another question: Who are to be the colonists? May anyone come out of all Crete; and is the idea that the population in the several states is too numerous for the means of subsistence? For I suppose that you are not going to send out a general invitation to any Hellene who likes to come. And yet I observe that to your country settlers have come from Argos and Aegina and other parts of Hellas. Tell me, then, whence do you draw your recruits in the present enterprise?

Clinias/ They will come from all Crete; and of other Hellenes, Peloponnesians will be most acceptable. For, as you truly observe, there are Cretans of Argive descent; and the race of Cretans which has the highest character at the present day is the Gortynian, and this has come from Gortys in the Peloponnesus.

Athenian Stranger/ Cities find colonization in some respects easier if the colonists are one race, which like a swarm of bees is sent out from a single county either when friends leave friends, owing to some pressure of population or other similar necessity, or when a portion of a state is

driven by factions to emigrate. And there have been whole cities which have taken flight when utterly conquered by a superior power in war. This, however, which is in one way an advantage to the colonist or legislator, in another point of view creates a difficulty. There is an element of friendship in the community of race, and language, and laws, and in common temples and rites of worship; but colonies which are of this homogeneous sort are apt to kick against any laws or any form of constitution differing from that which they had at home; and although the badness of their own laws may have been the cause of the factions which prevailed among them, yet from the force of habit they would fain preserve the very customs which were their ruin, and the leader of the colony, who is their legislator, finds them troublesome and rebellious. On the other hand, the conflux of several populations might be more disposed to listen to new laws; but then, to make them combine and pull together, as they say of horses, is a most difficult task, and the work of years. And yet there is nothing which tends more to the improvement of mankind than legislation and colonization.

Clinias/ No doubt; but I should like to know why you say so.

Athenian Stranger/ My good friend, I am afraid that the course of my speculations is leading me to say something depreciatory of legislators; but if the word be to the purpose, there can be no harm. And yet, why am I disquieted, for I believe that the same principle applies equally to all human things?

Clinias/ To what are you referring?

Athenian Stranger/ I was going to say that man never legislates, but accidents of all sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways. The violence of war and the hard necessity

of poverty are constantly overturning governments and changing laws. And the power of disease has often caused innovations in the state, when there have been pestilences, or when there has been a succession of bad seasons continuing during many years. Anyone who sees all this, naturally rushes to the conclusion of which I was speaking, that no mortal legislates in anything, but that in human affairs chance is almost everything. And this may be said of the arts of the sailor, and the pilot, and the physician, and the general, and may seem to be well said; and yet there is another thing which may be said with equal truth of all of them.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ That God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him in the government of human affairs. There is, however, a third and less extreme view, that art should be there also; for I should say that in a storm there must surely be a great advantage in having the aid of the pilot's art. You would agree?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And does not a like principle apply to legislation as well as to other things: even supposing all the conditions to be favorable which are needed for the happiness of the state, yet the true legislator must from time to time appear on the scene?

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ In each case the artist would be able to pray rightly for certain conditions, and if these were granted by fortune, he would then only require to exercise his art?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And all the other artists just now mentioned, if they were bidden to offer up each their special prayer, would do so?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And the legislator would do likewise?

Clinias/ I believe that he would.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Come, legislator we will say to him; 'what are the conditions which you require in a state before you can organize it?' How ought he to answer this question? Shall I give his answer?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ He will say—'Give me a state which is governed by a tyrant, and let the tyrant be young and have a good memory; let him be quick at learning, and of a courageous and noble nature; let him have that quality which, as I said before, is the inseparable companion of all the other parts of virtue, if there is to be any good in them.'

Clinias/ I suppose, Megillus, that this companion virtue of which the Stranger speaks, must be temperance?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense; not that which in the forced and exaggerated language of some philosophers is called prudence, but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, of whom some live continently and others incontinently, but when isolated, was, as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods. I think that you must understand my meaning.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then our tyrant must have this as well as the other qualities, if the state is to acquire in the best manner and in the shortest time the form of government which is most conducive to happiness; for there neither is

nor ever will be a better or speedier way of establishing a polity than by a tyranny.

Clinias/ By what possible arguments, Stranger, can any man persuade himself of such a monstrous doctrine?

Athenian Stranger/ There is surely no difficulty in seeing, Cleinias, what is in accordance with the order of nature?

Clinias/ You would assume, as you say, a tyrant who was young, temperate, quick at learning, having a good memory, courageous, of a noble nature?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; and you must add fortunate; and his good fortune must be that he is the contemporary of a great legislator, and that some happy chance brings them together. When this has been accomplished, God has done all that He ever does for a state which He desires to be eminently prosperous; He has done second best for a state in which there are two such rulers, and third best for a state in which there are three. The difficulty increases with the increase, and diminishes with the diminution of the number.

Clinias/ You mean to say; I suppose, that the best government is produced from a tyranny, and originates in a good lawgiver and an orderly tyrant, and that the change from such a tyranny into a perfect form of government takes place most easily; less easily when from an oligarchy; and, in the third degree, from a democracy: is not that your meaning?

Athenian Stranger/ Not so; I mean rather to say that the change is best made out of a tyranny; and secondly, out of a monarchy; and thirdly, out of some sort of democracy: fourth, in the capacity for improvement, comes oligarchy, which has the greatest difficulty in admitting of such a change, because the government is in the hands of a number of potentates. I am supposing that the legislator is by nature of the true sort, and that his strength is united with that of

the chief men of the state; and when the ruling element is numerically small, and at the same time very strong, as in a tyranny, there the change is likely to be easiest and most rapid.

Clinias/ How? I do not understand.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet I have repeated what I am saying a good many times; but I suppose that you have never seen a city which is under a tyranny?

Clinias/ No, and I cannot say that I have any great desire to see one.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet, where there is a tyranny, you might certainly see that of which I am now speaking.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean that you might see how, without trouble and in no very long period of time, the tyrant, if he wishes, can change the manners of a state: he has only to go in the direction of virtue or of vice, whichever he prefers, he himself indicating by his example the lines of conduct, praising and rewarding some actions and reproving others, and degrading those who disobey.

Clinias/ But how can we imagine that the citizens in general will at once follow the example set to them; and how can he have this power both of persuading and of compelling them?

Athenian Stranger/ Let no one, my friends, persuade us that there is any quicker and easier way in which states change their laws than when the rulers lead: such changes never have, nor ever will, come to pass in any other way. The real impossibility or difficulty is of another sort, and is rarely surmounted in the course of ages; but when once it is surmounted, ten thousand or rather all blessings follow.

Clinias/ Of what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ The difficulty is to find the divine love of temperate and just institutions existing in any powerful forms of government, whether in a monarchy or oligarchy of wealth or of birth. You might as well hope to reproduce the character of Nestor, who is said to have excelled all men in the power of speech, and yet more in his temperance. This, however, according to the tradition, was in the times of Troy; in our own days there is nothing of the sort; but if such an one either has or ever shall come into being, or is now among us, blessed is he and blessed are they who hear the wise words that flow from his lips. And this may be said of power in general: When the supreme power in man coincides with the greatest wisdom and temperance, then the best laws and the best constitution come into being; but in no other way. And let what I have been saying be regarded as a kind of sacred legend or oracle, and let this be our proof that, in one point of view, there may be a difficulty for a city to have good laws, but that there is another point of view in which nothing can be easier or sooner effected, granting our supposition.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us try to amuse ourselves, old boys as we are, by molding in words the laws which are suitable to your state.

Clinias/ Let us proceed without delay.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us invoke God at the settlement of our state; may He hear and be propitious to us, and come and set in order the State and the laws!

Clinias/ May He come!

Athenian Stranger/ But what form of polity are we going to give the city?

Clinias/ Tell us what you mean a little more clearly. Do you mean some form of democracy, or oligarchy, or

aristocracy, or monarchy? For we cannot suppose that you would include tyranny.

Athenian Stranger/ Which of you will first tell me to which of these classes his own government is to be referred?

Megillus/ Ought I to answer first, since I am the elder?

Clinias/ Perhaps you should.

Megillus/ And yet, Stranger, I perceive that I cannot say, without more thought, what I should call the government of Lacedaemon, for it seems to me to be like a tyranny, —the power of our Ephors is marvelously tyrannical; and sometimes it appears to me to be of all cities the most democratical; and who can reasonably deny that it is an aristocracy? We have also a monarchy which is held for life, and is said by all mankind, and not by ourselves only, to be the most ancient of all monarchies; and, therefore, when asked on a sudden, I cannot precisely say which form of government the Spartan is.

Clinias/ I am in the same difficulty, Megillus; for I do not feel confident that the polity of Cnosus is any of these.

Athenian Stranger/ The reason is, my excellent friends, that you really have polities, but the states of which we were just now speaking are merely aggregations of men dwelling in cities who are the subjects and servants of a part of their own state, and each of them is named after the dominant power; they are not polities at all. But if states are to be named after their rulers, the true state ought to be called by the name of the God who rules over wise men.

Clinias/ And who is this God?

Athenian Stranger/ May I still make use of fable to some extent, in the hope that I may be better able to answer your question: shall I?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ In the primeval world, and a long while before the cities came into being whose settlements we have described, there is said to have been in the time of Cronos a blessed rule and life, of which the best-ordered of existing states is a copy.

Clinias/ It will be very necessary to hear about that.

Athenian Stranger/ I quite agree with you; and therefore I have introduced the subject.

Clinias/ Most appropriately; and since the tale is to the point, you will do well in giving us the whole story.

Athenian Stranger/ I will do as you suggest. There is a tradition of the happy life of mankind in days when all things were spontaneous and abundant. And of this the reason is said to have been as follows: —Cronos knew what we ourselves were declaring, that no human nature invested with supreme power is able to order human affairs and not overflow with insolence and wrong. Which reflection led him to appoint not men but demigods, who are of a higher and more divine race, to be the kings and rulers of our cities; he did as we do with flocks of sheep and other tame animals. For we do not appoint oxen to be the lords of oxen, or goats of goats; but we ourselves are a superior race, and rule over them. In like manner God, in His love of mankind, placed over us the demons, who are a superior race, and they with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care of us and giving us peace and reverence and order and justice never failing, made the tribes of men happy and united. And this tradition, which is true, declares that cities of which some mortal man and not God is the ruler, have no escape from evils and toils. Still we must do all that we can to imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of Cronos, and, as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, to that we must hearken, both in private and

public life, and regulate our cities and houses according to law, meaning by the very term Maw,' the distribution of mind. But if either a single person or an oligarchy or a democracy has a soul eager after pleasures and desires—wanting to be filled with them, yet retaining none of them, and perpetually afflicted with an endless and insatiable disorder; and this evil spirit, having first trampled the laws under foot, becomes the master either of a state or of an individual, —then, as I was saying, salvation is hopeless. And now, Cleinias, we have to consider whether you will or will not accept this tale of mine.

Clinias/ Certainly we will.

Athenian Stranger/ You are aware, —are you not? —that there are often said to be as many forms of laws as there are of governments, and of the latter we have already mentioned all those which are commonly recognized. Now you must regard this as a matter of first-rate importance. For what is to be the standard of just and unjust, is once more the point at issue. Men say that the law ought not to regard either military virtue, or virtue in general, but only the interests and power and preservation of the established form of government; this is thought by them to be the best way of expressing the natural definition of justice.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ Justice is said by them to be the interest of the stronger.

Clinias/ Speak plainer.

Athenian Stranger/ I will: —'Surely' they say, 'the governing power makes whatever laws have authority in any state'?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Well' they would add, 'and do you suppose that tyranny or democracy, or any other conquering

power, does not make the continuance of the power which is possessed by them the first or principal object of their laws'?

Clinias/ How can they have any other?

Athenian Stranger/ 'And whoever transgresses these laws is punished as an evil-doer by the legislator, who calls the laws just'?

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ 'This, then, is always the mode and fashion in which justice exists'

Clinias/ Certainly, if they are correct in their view.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, yes, this is one of those false principles of government to which we were referring.

Clinias/ Which do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Those which we were examining when we spoke of who ought to govern whom. Did we not arrive at the conclusion that parents ought to govern their children, and the elder the younger, and the noble the ignoble? And there were many other principles, if you remember, and they were not always consistent. One principle was this very principle of might, and we said that Pindar considered violence natural and justified it.

Clinias/ Yes; I remember.

Athenian Stranger/ Consider, then, to whom our state is to be entrusted. For there is a thing which has occurred times without number in states——

Clinias/ What thing?

Athenian Stranger/ That when there has been a contest for power, those who gain the upper hand so entirely monopolize the government, as to refuse all share to the defeated party and their descendants—they live watching one another, the ruling class being in perpetual fear that someone who has a recollection of former wrongs will come

into power and rise up against them. Now, according to our view, such governments are not polities at all, nor are laws right which are passed for the good of particular classes and not for the good of the whole state. States which have such laws are not polities but parties, and their notions of justice are simply unmeaning. I say this, because I am going to assert that we must not entrust the government in your state to anyone because he is rich, or because he possesses any other advantage, such as strength, or stature, or again birth: but he who is most obedient to the laws of the state, he shall win the palm; and to him who is victorious in the first degree shall be given the highest office and chief ministry of the gods; and the second to him who bears the second palm; and on a similar principle shall all the other offices be assigned to those who come next in order. And when I call the rulers servants or ministers of the law, I give them this name not for the sake of novelty, but because I certainly believe that upon such service or ministry depends the well- or ill-being of the state. For that state in which the law is subject and has no authority, I perceive to be on the highway to ruin; but I see that the state in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of the law, has salvation, and every blessing which the Gods can confer.

Clinias/ Truly, Stranger, you see with the keen vision of age.

Athenian Stranger/ Why, yes; every man when he is young has that sort of vision dullest, and when he is old keenest.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And now, what is to be the next step? May we not suppose the colonists to have arrived, and proceed to make our speech to them?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Friends' we say to them, —'God, as the old tradition declares, holding in His hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, travels according to His nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of His end. Justice always accompanies Him, and is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law. To justice, he who would be happy holds fast, and follows in her company with all humility and order; but he who is lifted up with pride, or elated by wealth or rank, or beauty, who is young and foolish, and has a soul hot happy with insolence, and thinks that he has no need of any guide or ruler, but is able himself to be the guide of others, he, I say, is left deserted of God; and being thus deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and dances about, throwing all things into confusion, and many think that he is a great man, but in a short time he pays a penalty which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed, and his family and city with him. Wherefore, seeing that human things are thus ordered, what should a wise man do or think, or not do or think'?

Clinias/ Every man ought to make up his mind that he will be one of the followers of God; there can be no doubt of that.

Athenian Stranger/ Then what life is agreeable to God, and becoming in His followers? One only, expressed once for all in the old saying that 'like agrees with like, with measure measure,' but things which have no measure agree neither with themselves nor with the things which have. Now God ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man, as men commonly say: the words are far more true of Him. And he who would be dear to God must, as far as is possible, be like Him and such as He is. Wherefore the temperate man is the friend of God, for he is like Him; and the intemperate man is unlike Him, and different from Him, and unjust. And

the same applies to other things; and this is the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all sayings, —that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the Gods, and hold converse with them by means of prayers and offerings and every kind of service, is the noblest and best of all things, and also the most conducive to a happy life, and very fit and meet. But with the bad man, the opposite of this is true: for the bad man has an impure soul, whereas the good is pure; and from one who is polluted, neither a good man nor God can without impropriety receive gifts. Wherefore the unholy do only waste their much service upon the Gods, but when offered by any holy man, such service is most acceptable to them. This is the mark at which we ought to aim. But what weapons shall we use, and how shall we direct them? In the first place, we affirm that next after the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the State, honor should be given to the Gods below; they should receive everything in even numbers, and of the second choice, and ill omen, while the odd numbers, and the first choice, and the things of lucky omen, are given to the Gods above, by him who would rightly hit the mark of piety. Next to these Gods, a wise man will do service to the demons or spirits, and then to the heroes, and after them will follow the private and ancestral Gods, who are worshipped as the law prescribes in the places which are sacred to them. Next comes the honor of living parents, to whom, as is meet, we have to pay the first and greatest and oldest of all debts, considering that all which a man has belongs to those who gave him birth and brought him up, and that he must do all that he can to minister to them, first, in his property, secondly, in his person, and thirdly, in his soul, in return for the endless care and travail which they bestowed upon him of old, in the days of his infancy, and which he is now to pay back to them when they are old and in the extremity of their need. And all his life long he ought

never to utter, or to have uttered, an unbecoming word to them; for of light and fleeting words the penalty is most severe; Nemesis, the messenger of justice, is appointed to watch over all such matters. When they are angry and want to satisfy their feelings in word or deed, he should give way to them; for a father who thinks that he has been wronged by his son may be reasonably expected to be very angry. At their death, the most moderate funeral is best, neither exceeding the customary expense, nor yet falling short of the honor which has been usually shown by the former generation to their parents. And let a man not forget to pay the yearly tribute of respect to the dead, honoring them chiefly by omitting nothing that conduces to a perpetual remembrance of them, and giving a reasonable portion of his fortune to the dead. Doing this, and living after this manner, we shall receive our reward from the Gods and those who are above us [i.e. the demons]; and we shall spend our days for the most part in good hope. And how a man ought to order what relates to his descendants and his kindred and friends and fellow-citizens, and the rites of hospitality taught by Heaven, and the intercourse which arises out of all these duties, with a view to the embellishment and orderly regulation of his own life—these things, I say, the laws, as we proceed with them, will accomplish, partly persuading, and partly when natures do not yield to the persuasion of custom, chastising them by might and right, and will thus render our state, if the Gods co-operate with us, prosperous and happy. But of what has to be said, and must be said by the legislator who is of my way of thinking, and yet, if said in the form of law, would be out of place—of this I think that he may give a sample for the instruction of himself and of those for whom he is legislating; and then when, as far as he is able, he has gone through all the preliminaries, he may proceed to the work of legislation. Now, what will be the form

of such prefaces? There may be a difficulty in including or describing them all under a single form, but I think that we may get some notion of them if we can guarantee one thing.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ I should wish the citizens to be as readily persuaded to virtue as possible; this will surely be the aim of the legislator in all his laws.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ The proposal appears to me to be of some value; and I think that a person will listen with more gentleness and good-will to the precepts addressed to him by the legislator, when his soul is not altogether unprepared to receive them. Even a little done in the way of conciliation gains his ear, and is always worth having. For there is no great inclination or readiness on the part of mankind to be made as good, or as quickly good, as possible. The case of the many proves the wisdom of Hesiod, who says that the road to wickedness is smooth and can be travelled without perspiring, because it is so very short: —

> 'But before virtue the immortal Gods have placed the sweat of labor, and long and steep is the way thither, and rugged at first; but when you have reached the top, although difficult before, it is then easy.'

Clinias/ Yes; and he certainly speaks well.

Athenian Stranger/ Very true: and now let me tell you the effect which the preceding discourse has had upon me.

Clinias/ Proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose that we have a little conversation with the legislator, and say to him—'O, legislator, speak; if you know what we ought to say and do, you can surely tell'

Clinias/ Of course he can.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Did we not hear you just now saying, that the legislator ought not to allow the poets to do what they liked? For that they would not know in which of their words they went against the laws, to the hurt of the state.'

Clinias/ That is true.

Athenian Stranger/ May we not fairly make answer to him on behalf of the poets?

Clinias/ What answer shall we make to him?

Athenian Stranger/ That the poet, according to the tradition which has ever prevailed among us, and is accepted of all men, when he sits down on the tripod of the muse, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he allows to flow out freely whatever comes in, and his art being imitative, he is often compelled to represent men of opposite dispositions, and thus to contradict himself; neither can he tell whether there is more truth in one thing that he has said than in another. But this is not the case in a law; the legislator must give not two rules about the same thing, but one only. Take an example from what you have just been saying. Of three kinds of funerals, there is one which is too extravagant, another is too niggardly, the third in a mean; and you choose and approve and order the last without qualification. But if I had an extremely rich wife, and she bade me bury her and describe her burial in a poem, I should praise the extravagant sort; and a poor miserly man, who had not much money to spend, would approve of the niggardly; and the man of moderate means, who was himself moderate, would praise a moderate funeral. Now you in the capacity of legislator must not barely say 'a moderate funeral,' but you must define what moderation is, and how much; unless you are definite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a language that can become law.

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Athenian Stranger/ And is our legislator to have no preface to his laws, but to say at once Do this, avoid that—and then holding the penalty in terrorem, to go on to another law; offering never a word of advice or exhortation to those for whom he is legislating, after the manner of some doctors? For of doctors, as I may remind you, some have a gentler, others a ruder method of cure; and as children ask the doctor to be gentle with them, so we will ask the legislator to cure our disorders with the gentlest remedies. What I mean to say is, that besides doctors there are doctors' servants, who are also styled doctors.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And whether they are slaves or freemen makes no difference; they acquire their knowledge of medicine by obeying and observing their masters; empirically and not according to the natural way of learning, as the manner of freemen is, who have learned scientifically themselves the art which they impart scientifically to their pupils. You are aware that there are these two classes of doctors?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ And did you ever observe that there are two classes of patients in states, slaves and freemen; and the slave doctors run about and cure the slaves, or wait for them in the dispensaries—practitioners of this sort never talk to their patients individually, or let them talk about their own individual complaints? The slave-doctor prescribes what mere experience suggests, as if he had exact knowledge; and when he has given his orders, like a tyrant, he rushes off with equal assurance to some other servant who is ill; and so he relieves the master of the house of the care of his invalid slaves. But the other doctor, who is a freeman, attends and practices upon freemen; and he

carries his enquiries far back, and goes into the nature of the disorder; he enters into discourse with the patient and with his friends, and is at once getting information from the sick man, and also instructing him as far as he is able, and he will not prescribe for him until he has first convinced him; at last, when he has brought the patient more and more under his persuasive influences and set him on the road to health, he attempts to effect a cure. Now which is the better way of proceeding in a physician and in a trainer? Is he the better who accomplishes his ends in a double way, or he who works in one way, and that the ruder and inferior?

Clinias/ I should say, Stranger, that the double way is far better.

Athenian Stranger/ Should you like to see an example of the double and single method in legislation?

Clinias/ Certainly I should.

Athenian Stranger/ What will be our first law? Will not the legislator, observing the order of nature, begin by making regulations for states about births?

Clinias/ He will.

Athenian Stranger/ In all states the birth of children goes back to the connection of marriage?

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And, according to the true order, the laws relating to marriage should be those which are first determined in every state?

Clinias/ Quite so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let me first give the law of marriage in a simple form; it may run as follows: —A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, or, if he does not, he shall pay such and such a fine, or shall suffer the loss of such and such privileges. This would be the

simple law about marriage. The double law would run thus: —A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, considering that in a manner the human race naturally partakes of immortality, which every man is by nature inclined to desire to the utmost; for the desire of every man that he may become famous, and not lie in the grave without a name, is only the love of continuance. Now mankind are coeval with all time, and are ever following, and will ever follow, the course of time; and so they are immortal, because they leave children's children behind them, and partake of immortality in the unity of generation. And for a man voluntarily to deprive himself of this gift, as he deliberately does who will not have a wife or children, is impiety. He who obeys the law shall be free, and shall pay no fine; but he who is disobedient, and does not marry, when he has arrived at the age of thirty-five, shall pay a yearly fine of a certain amount, in order that he may not imagine his celibacy to bring ease and profit to him; and he shall not share in the honors which the young men in the state give to the aged. Comparing now the two forms of the law, you will be able to arrive at a judgment about any other laws—whether they should be double in length even when shortest, because they have to persuade as well as threaten, or whether they shall only threaten and be of half the length.

Megillus/ The shorter form, Stranger, would be more in accordance with Lacedaemonian custom; although, for my own part, if anyone were to ask me which I myself prefer in the state, I should certainly determine in favor of the longer; and I would have every law made after the same pattern, if I had to choose. But I think that Cleinias is the person to be consulted, for his is the state which is going to use these laws.

Clinias/ Thank you, Megillus.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether, in the abstract, words are to be many or few, is a very foolish question; the best form, and not the shortest, is to be approved; nor is length at all to be regarded. Of the two forms of law which have been recited, the one is not only twice as good in practical usefulness as the other, but the case is like that of the two kinds of doctors, which I was just now mentioning. And yet legislators never appear to have considered that they have two instruments which they might use in legislation—persuasion and force; for in dealing with the rude and uneducated multitude, they use the one only as far as they can; they do not mingle persuasion with coercion, but employ force pure and simple. Moreover, there is a third point, sweet friends, which ought to be, and never is, regarded in our existing laws.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ A point arising out of our previous discussion, which comes into my mind in some mysterious way. All this time, from early dawn until noon, have we been talking about laws in this charming retreat: now we are going to promulgate our laws, and what has preceded was only the prelude of them. Why do I mention this? For this reason: —Because all discourses and vocal exercises have preludes and overtures, which are a sort of artistic beginnings intended to help the strain which is to be performed; lyric measures and music of every other kind have preludes framed with wonderful care. But of the truer and higher strain of law and politics, no one has ever yet uttered any prelude, or composed or published any, as though there was no such thing in nature. Whereas our present discussion seems to me to imply that there is; —these double laws, of which we were speaking, are not exactly double, but they are in two parts, the law and the prelude of the law. The arbitrary command, which was

compared to the commands of doctors, whom we described as of the meaner sort, was the law pure and simple; and that which preceded, and was described by our friend here as being hortatory only, was, although in fact, an exhortation, likewise analogous to the preamble of a discourse. For I imagine that all this language of conciliation, which the legislator has been uttering in the preface of the law, was intended to create good-will in the person whom he addressed, in order that, by reason of this goodwill, he might more intelligently receive his command, that is to say, the law. And therefore, in my way of speaking, this is more rightly described as the preamble than as the matter of the law. And I must further proceed to observe, that to all his laws, and to each separately, the legislator should prefix a preamble; he should remember how great will be the difference between them, according as they have, or have not, such preambles, as in the case already given.

Clinias/ The lawgiver, if he asks my opinion, will certainly legislate in the form which you advise.

Athenian Stranger/ I think that you are quite right, Cleinias, in affirming that all laws have preambles, and that throughout the whole of this work of legislation every single law should have a suitable preamble at the beginning; for that which is to follow is most important, and it makes all the difference whether we clearly remember the preambles or not. Yet we should be wrong in requiring that all laws, small and great alike, should have preambles of the same kind, any more than all songs or speeches; although they may be natural to all, they are not always necessary, and whether they are to be employed or not has in each case to be left to the judgment of the speaker or the musician, or, in the present instance, of the lawgiver.

Clinias/ That I think is most true. And now, Stranger, without delay, let us return to the argument, and, as people

say in play, make a second and better beginning, if you please, with the principles which we have been laying down, which we never thought of regarding as a preamble before, but of which we may now make a preamble, and not merely consider them to be chance topics of discourse. Let us acknowledge, then, that we have a preamble. About the honor of the Gods and the respect of parents, enough has been already said; and we may proceed to the topics which follow next in order, until the preamble is deemed by you to be complete; and after that you shall go through the laws themselves.

Athenian Stranger/ I understand you to mean that we have made a sufficient preamble about Gods and demigods, and about parents living or dead; and now you would have us bring the rest of the subject into the light of day?

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ After this, as is meet and for the interest of us all, I the speaker, and you the listeners, will try to estimate all that relates to the souls and bodies and properties of the citizens, as regards both their occupations and amusements, and thus arrive, as far as in us lies, at the nature of education. These then are the topics which follow next in order.

Clinias/ Very good.

Book 5.

Athenian Stranger/ Listen, all ye who have just now heard the laws about Gods, and about our dear forefathers: —Of all the things which a man has, next to the Gods, his soul is the most divine and most truly his own. Now in every man there are two parts: the better and superior, which rules, and the worse and inferior, which serves; and the ruling part of him is always to be preferred to the subject. Wherefore I am right in bidding everyone next to the Gods, who are our masters, and those who in order follow them [i.e. the demons], to honor his own soul, which everyone seems to honor, but no one honors as he ought; for honor is a divine good, and no evil thing is honorable; and he who thinks that he can honor the soul by word or gift, or any sort of compliance, without making her in any way better, seems to honor her, but honors her not at all. For example, every man, from his very boyhood, fancies that he is able to know everything, and thinks that he honors his soul by praising her, and he is very ready to let her do whatever she may like. But I mean to say that in acting thus he injures his soul, and is far from honoring her; whereas, in our opinion, he ought to honor her as second only to the Gods. Again, when a man thinks that others are to be blamed, and not himself, for the errors which he has committed from time to time, and the many and great evils which befell him in consequence, and is always fancying himself to be exempt and innocent, he is under the idea that he is honoring his soul; whereas the very reverse is the fact, for he is really injuring her. And when, disregarding the word and approval of the legislator, he indulges in pleasure, then again he is far from honoring her; he only dishonors her, and fills her full of evil and remorse; or when he does not endure to the end the labors and fears and sorrows and pains which the legislator approves, but gives way before them, then, by yielding, he

does not honor the soul, but by all such conduct he makes her to be dishonorable; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good, does he honor her, but yet once more he dishonors her; for the soul having a notion that the world below is all evil, he yields to her, and does not resist and teach or convince her that, for aught she knows, the world of the Gods below, instead of being evil, may be the greatest of all goods. Again, when anyone prefers beauty to virtue, what is this but the real and utter dishonor of the soul? For such a preference implies that the body is more honorable than the soul; and this is false, for there is nothing of earthly birth which is more honorable than the heavenly, and he who thinks otherwise of the soul has no idea how greatly he undervalues this wonderful possession; nor, again, when a person is willing, or not unwilling, to acquire dishonest gains, does he then honor his soul with gifts—far otherwise; he sells her glory and honor for a small piece of gold; but alt the gold which is under or upon the earth is not enough to give in exchange for virtue. In a word, I may say that he who does not estimate the base and evil, the good and noble, according to the standard of the legislator, and abstain in every possible way from the one and practice the other to the utmost of his power, does not know that in all these respects he is most foully and disgracefully abusing his soul, which is the divinest part of man; for no one, as I may say, ever considers that which is declared to be the greatest penalty of evil-doing—namely, to grow into the likeness of bad men, and growing like them to fly from the conversation of the good, and be cut off from them, and cleave to and follow after the company of the bad. And he who is joined to them must do and suffer what such men by nature do and say to one another, —a suffering which is not justice but retribution; for justice and the just are noble, whereas retribution is the suffering which waits upon in justice; and whether a man

escape or endure this, he is miserable, —in the former case, because he is not cured; while in the latter, he perishes in order that the rest of mankind may be saved.

Speaking generally, our glory is to follow the better and improve the inferior, which is susceptible of improvement, as far as this is possible. And of all human possessions, the soul is by nature most inclined to avoid the evil, and track out and find the chief good; which when a man has found, he should take up his abode with it during the remainder of his life. Wherefore the soul also is second [or next to God] in honor; and third, as everyone will perceive, comes the honor of the body in natural order. Having determined this, we have next to consider that there is a natural honor of the body, and that of honors some are true and some are counterfeit. To decide which are which is the business of the legislator; and he, I suspect, would intimate that they are as follows: —Honor is not to be given to the fair body, or to the strong or the swift or the tall, or to the healthy body (although many may think otherwise), any more than to their opposites; but the mean states of all these habits are by far the safest and most moderate; for the one extreme makes the soul braggart and insolent, and the other, illiberal and base; and money, and property, and distinction all go to the same tune. The excess of any of these things is apt to be a source of hatreds and divisions among states and individuals; and the defect of them is commonly a cause of slavery. And, therefore, I would not have anyone fond of heaping up riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no use, either to them or to the state. The condition of youth which is free from flattery, and at the same time not in need of the necessaries of life, is the best and most harmonious of all, being in accord and agreement with our nature, and making life to be most entirely free from

sorrow. Let parents, then, bequeath to their children not a heap of riches, but the spirit of reverence. We, indeed, fancy that they will inherit reverence from us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present style of admonition, which only tells them that the young ought always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather exhort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take heed that no young man sees or hears one of themselves doing or saying anything disgraceful; for where old men have no shame, there young men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way of training the young is to train yourself at the same time; not to admonish them, but to be always carrying out your own admonitions in practice. He who honors his kindred, and reveres those who share in the same Gods and are of the same blood and family, may fairly expect that the Gods who preside over generation will be propitious to him, and will quicken his seed. And he who deems the services which his friends and acquaintances do for him, greater and more important than they themselves deem them, and his own favors to them less than theirs to him, will have their good-will in the intercourse of life. And surely in his relations to the state and his fellow-citizens, he is by far the best, who rather than the Olympic or any other victory of peace or war, desires to win the palm of obedience to the laws of his country, and who, of all mankind, is the person reputed to have obeyed them best through life. In his relations to strangers, a man should consider that a contract is a most holy thing, and that all concerns and wrongs of strangers are more directly dependent on the protection of God, than wrongs done to citizens; for the stranger, having no kindred and friends, is more to be pitied by Gods and men. Wherefore, also, he who is most able to avenge him is most zealous in his cause; and he who is most able is the genius

and the god of the stranger, who follow in the train of Zeus, the god of strangers. And for this reason, he who has a spark of caution in him, will do his best to pass through life without sinning against the stranger. And of offences committed, whether against strangers or fellow-countrymen, that against suppliants is the greatest. For the God who witnessed to the agreement made with the suppliant, becomes in a special manner the guardian of the sufferer; and he will certainly not suffer unavenged.

Thus we have fairly described the manner in which a man is to act about his parents, and himself, and his own affairs; and in relation to the state, and his friends, and kindred, both in what concerns his own countrymen, and in what concerns the stranger. We will now consider what manner of man he must be who would best pass through life in respect of those other things which are not matters of law, but of praise and blame only; in which praise and blame educate a man, and make him more tractable and amenable to the laws which are about to be imposed.

Truth is the beginning of every good thing, both to Gods and men; and he who would be blessed and happy, should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither condition is enviable, for the untrustworthy and ignorant has no friend, and as time advances he becomes known, and lays up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age when life is on the wane: so that, whether his children or friends are alive or not, he is equally solitary. —Worthy of honor is he who does no injustice, and of more than twofold honor, if he not only does no injustice himself, but hinders others from doing any; the first may count as one man, the second is worth many men, because he informs the rulers of the

injustice of others. And yet more highly to be esteemed is he who cooperates with the rulers in correcting the citizens as far as he can—he shall be proclaimed the great and perfect citizen, and bear away the palm of virtue. The same praise may be given about temperance and wisdom, and all other goods which may be imparted to others, as well as acquired by a man for himself; he who imparts them shall be honored as the man of men, and he who is willing, yet is not able, may be allowed the second place; but he who is jealous and will not, if he can help, allow others to partake in a friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame: the good, however, which he has, is not to be undervalued by us because it is possessed by him, but must be acquired by us also to the utmost of our power. Let every man, then, freely strive for the prize of virtue, and let there be no envy. For the unenvious nature increases the greatness of states—he himself contends in the race, blasting the fair fame of no man; but the envious, who thinks that he ought to get the better by defaming others, is less energetic himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his rivals to despair by his unjust slanders of them. And so he makes the whole city to enter the arena untrained in the practice of virtue, and diminishes her glory as far as in him lies. Now every man should be valiant, but he should also be gentle. From the cruel, or hardly curable, or altogether incurable acts of injustice done to him by others, a man can only escape by fighting and defending himself and conquering, and by never ceasing to punish them; and no man who is not of a noble spirit is able to accomplish this. As to the actions of those who do evil, but whose evil is curable, in the first place, let us remember that the unjust man is not unjust of his own free will. For no man of his own free will would choose to possess the greatest of evils, and least of all in the most honorable part of himself. And the soul, as we said, is of a

truth deemed by all men the most honorable. In the soul, then, which is the most honorable part of him, no one, if he could help, would admit, or allow to continue the greatest of evils. The unrighteous and vicious are always to be pitied in any case; and one can afford to forgive as well as pity him who is curable, and refrain and calm one's anger, not getting into a passion, like a woman, and nursing ill-feeling. But upon him who is incapable of reformation and wholly evil, the vials of our wrath should be poured out; wherefore I say that good men ought, when occasion demands, to be both gentle and passionate.

Of all evils the greatest is one which in the souls of most men is innate, and which a man is always excusing in himself and never correcting; I mean, what is expressed in the saying that 'Every man by nature is and ought to be his own friend.' Whereas the excessive love of self is in reality the source to each man of all offences; for the lover is blinded about the beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the just, the good, and the honorable, and thinks that he ought always to prefer himself to the truth. But he who would be a great man ought to regard, not himself or his interests, but what is just, whether the just act be his own or that of another. Through a similar error men are induced to fancy that their own ignorance is wisdom, and thus we who may be truly said to know nothing, think that we know all things; and because we will not let others act for us in what we do not know, we are compelled to act amiss ourselves. Wherefore let every man avoid excess of self-love, and condescend to follow a better man than himself, not allowing any false shame to stand in the way. There are also minor precepts which are often repeated, and are quite as useful; a man should recollect them and remind himself of them. For when a stream is flowing out, there should be water flowing in too; and recollection flows in while wisdom is departing.

Therefore I say that a man should refrain from excess either of laughter or tears, and should exhort his neighbor to do the same; he should veil his immoderate sorrow or joy, and seek to behave with propriety, whether the genius of his good fortune remains with him, or whether at the crisis of his fate, when he seems to be mounting high and steep places, the Gods oppose him in some of his enterprises. Still he may ever hope, in the case of good men, that whatever afflictions are to befall them in the future God will lessen, and that present evils He will change for the better; and as to the goods which are the opposite of these evils, he will not doubt that they will be added to them, and that they will be fortunate. Such should be men's hopes, and such should be the exhortations with which they admonish one another, never losing an opportunity, but on every occasion distinctly reminding themselves and others of all these things, both in jest and earnest.

Enough has now been said of divine matters, both as touching the practices which men ought to follow, and as to the sort of persons who they ought severally to be. But of human things we have not as yet spoken, and we must; for, to men we are discoursing and not to Gods. Pleasures and pains and desires are a part of human nature, and on them every mortal being must of necessity hang and depend with the most eager interest. And therefore we must praise the noblest life, not only as the fairest in appearance, but as being one which, if a man will only taste, and not, while still in his youth, desert for another, he will find to surpass also in the very thing which we all of us desire, —I mean in having a greater amount of pleasure and less of pain during the whole of life. And this will be plain, if a man has a true taste of them, as will be quickly and clearly seen. But what is a true taste? That we have to learn from the argument, —the point being what is according to nature, and what is not

according to nature. One life must be compared with another, the more pleasurable with the more painful, after this manner: —We desire to have pleasure, but we neither desire nor choose pain; and the neutral state we are ready to take in exchange, not for pleasure but for pain; and we also wish for less pain and greater pleasure, but less pleasure and greater pain we do not wish for; and an equal balance of either we cannot venture to assert that we should desire. And all these differ or do not differ severally in number and magnitude and intensity and equality, and in the opposites of these when regarded as objects of choice, in relation to desire. And such being the necessary order of things, we wish for that life in which there are many great and intense elements of pleasure and pain, and in which the pleasures are in excess, and do not wish for that in which the opposites exceed; nor, again, do we wish for that in which the elements of either are small and few and feeble, and the pains exceed. And when, as I said before, there is a balance of pleasure and pain in life, this is to be regarded by us as the balanced life; while other lives are preferred by us because they exceed in what we like, or are rejected by us because they exceed in what we dislike. All the lives of men may be regarded by us as bound up in these, and we must also consider what sort of lives we by nature desire. And if we wish for any others, I say that we desire them only through some ignorance and inexperience of the lives which actually exist.

Now, what lives are they, and how many in which, having searched out and beheld the objects of will and desire and their opposites, and making of them a law, choosing, I say, the dear and the pleasant and the best and noblest, a man may live in the happiest way possible? Let us say that the temperate life is one kind of life, and the rational another, the courageous another, and the healthful another; and to

these four let us oppose four other lives, —the foolish, the cowardly, the intemperate, the diseased. He who knows the temperate life will describe it as in all things gentle, having gentle pains and gentle pleasures, and placid desires and loves not insane; whereas the intemperate life is impetuous in all things, and has violent pains and pleasures, and vehement and stinging desires, and loves utterly insane; and in the temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains, but in the intemperate life the pains exceed the pleasures in greatness and number and frequency. Hence one of the two lives is naturally and necessarily more pleasant and the other more painful, and he who would live pleasantly cannot possibly choose to live intemperately. And if this is true, the inference clearly is that no man is voluntarily intemperate; but that the whole multitude of men lack temperance in their lives, either from ignorance, or from want of self-control, or both. And the same holds of the diseased and healthy life; they both have pleasures and pains, but in health the pleasure exceeds the pain, and in sickness the pain exceeds the pleasure. Now our intention in choosing the lives is not that the painful should exceed, but the life in which pain is exceeded by pleasure we have determined to be the more pleasant life. And we should say that the temperate life has the elements both of pleasure and pain fewer and smaller and less frequent than the intemperate, and the wise life than the foolish life, and the life of courage than the life of cowardice; one of each pair exceeding in pleasure and the other in pain, the courageous surpassing the cowardly, and the wise exceeding the foolish. And so the one class of lives exceeds the other class in pleasure; the temperate and courageous and wise and healthy exceed the cowardly and foolish and intemperate and diseased lives; and generally speaking, that which has any virtue, whether of body or soul, is pleasanter than the vicious life, and far superior in

beauty and rectitude and excellence and reputation, and causes him who lives accordingly to be infinitely happier than the opposite.

Enough of the preamble; and now the laws should follow; or, to speak more correctly, an outline of them. As, then, in the case of a web or any other tissue, the warp and the woof cannot be made of the same materials, but the warp is necessarily superior as being stronger, and having a certain character of firmness, whereas the woof is softer and has a proper degree of elasticity; —in a similar manner those who are to hold great offices in states, should be distinguished truly in each case from those who have been but slenderly proven by education. Let us suppose that there are two parts in the constitution of a state—one the creation of offices, the other the laws which are assigned to them to administer.

But, before all this, comes the following consideration: —The shepherd or herdsman, or breeder of horses or the like, when he has received his animals will not begin to train them until he has first purified them in a manner which befits a community of animals; he will divide the healthy and unhealthy, and the good breed and the bad breed, and will send away the unhealthy and badly bred to other herds, and tend the rest, reflecting that his labors will be vain and have no effect, either on the souls or bodies of those whom nature and ill nurture have corrupted, and that they will involve in destruction the pure and healthy nature and being of every other animal, if he should neglect to purify them. Now the case of other animals is not so important—they are only worth introducing for the sake of illustration; but what relates to man is of the highest importance; and the legislator should make enquiries, and indicate what is proper for each one in the way of purification and of any other procedure. Take, for example, the purification of a city—there are many kinds of purification, some easier and

others more difficult; and some of them, and the best and most difficult of them, the legislator, if he be also a despot, may be able to effect; but the legislator, who, not being a despot, sets up a new government and laws, even if he attempt the mildest of purgations, may think himself happy if he can complete his work. The best kind of purification is painful, like similar cures in medicine, involving righteous punishment and inflicting death or exile in the last resort. For in this way we commonly dispose of great sinners who are incurable, and are the greatest injury of the whole state. But the milder form of purification is as follows: —when men who have nothing, and are in want of food, show a disposition to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the rich—these, who are the natural plague of the state, are sent away by the legislator in a friendly spirit as far as he is able; and this dismissal of them is euphemistically termed a colony. And every legislator should contrive to do this at once. Our present case, however, is peculiar. For there is no need to devise any colony or purifying separation under the circumstances in which we are placed. But as, when many streams flow together from many sources, whether springs or mountain torrents, into a single lake, we ought to attend and take care that the confluent waters should be perfectly clear, and in order to effect this, should pump and draw off and divert impurities, so in every political arrangement there may be trouble and danger. But, seeing that we are now only discoursing and not acting, let our selection be supposed to be completed, and the desired purity attained. Touching evil men, who want to join and be citizens of our state, after we have tested them by every sort of persuasion and for a sufficient time, we will prevent them from coming; but the good we will to the utmost of our ability receive as friends with open arms.

Another piece of good fortune must not be forgotten, which, as we were saying, the Heraclid colony had, and which is also ours, —that we have escaped division of land and the abolition of debts; for these are always a source of dangerous contention, and a city which is driven by necessity to legislate upon such matters can neither allow the old ways to continue, nor yet venture to alter them. We must have recourse to prayers, so to speak, and hope that a slight change may be cautiously effected in a length of time. And such a change can be accomplished by those who have abundance of land, and having also many debtors, are willing, in a kindly spirit, to share with those who are in want, sometimes remitting and sometimes giving, holding fast in a path of moderation, and deeming poverty to be the increase of a man's desires and not the diminution of his property. For this is the great beginning of salvation to a state, and upon this lasting basis may be erected afterwards whatever political order is suitable under the circumstances; but if the change be based upon an unsound principle, the future administration of the country will be full of difficulties. That is a danger which, as I am saying, is escaped by us, and yet we had better say how, if we had not escaped, we might have escaped; and we may venture now to assert that no other way of escape, whether narrow or broad, can be devised but freedom from avarice and a sense of justice—upon this rock our city shall be built; for there ought to be no disputes among citizens about property. If there are quarrels of long standing among them, no legislator of any degree of sense will proceed a step in the arrangement of the state until they are settled. But that they to whom God has given, as He has to us, to be the founders of a new state as yet free from enmity—that they should create themselves enmities by their mode of distributing lands and houses, would be superhuman folly and wickedness.

How then can we rightly order the distribution of the land? In the first place, the number of the citizens has to be determined, and also the number and size of the divisions into which they will have to be formed; and the land and the houses will then have to be apportioned by us as fairly as we can. The number of citizens can only be estimated satisfactorily in relation to the territory and the neighboring states. The territory must be sufficient to maintain a certain number of inhabitants in a moderate way of life—more than this is not required; and the number of citizens should be sufficient to defend themselves against the injustice of their neighbors, and also to give them the power of rendering efficient aid to their neighbors when they are wronged. After having taken a survey of theirs and their neighbors' territory, we will determine the limits of them in fact as well as in theory. And now, let us proceed to legislate with a view to perfecting the form and outline of our state. The number of our citizens shall be 5040—this will be a convenient number; and these shall be owners of the land and protectors of the allotment. The houses and the land will be divided in the same way, so that every man may correspond to a lot. Let the whole number be first divided into two parts, and then into three; and the number is further capable of being divided into four or five parts, or any number of parts up to ten. Every legislator ought to know so much arithmetic as to be able to tell what number is most likely to be useful to all cities; and we are going to take that number which contains the greatest and most regular and unbroken series of divisions. The whole of number has every possible division, and the number 5040 can be divided by exactly fifty-nine divisors, and ten of these proceed without interval from one to ten: this will furnish numbers for war and peace, and for all contracts and dealings, including taxes and divisions of the land. These properties of number should be ascertained

at leisure by those who are bound by law to know them; for they are true, and should be proclaimed at the foundation of the city, with a view to use. Whether the legislator is establishing a new state or restoring an old and decayed one, in respect of Gods and temples, —the temples which are to be built in each city, and the Gods or demi-gods after whom they are to be called, —if he be a man of sense, he will make no change in anything which the oracle of Delphi, or Dodona, or the God Ammon, or any ancient tradition has sanctioned in whatever manner, whether by apparitions or reputed inspiration of Heaven, in obedience to which mankind have established sacrifices in connection with mystic rites, either originating on the spot, or derived from Tyrrhenia or Cyprus or some other place, and on the strength of which traditions they have consecrated oracles and images, and altars and temples, and portioned out a sacred domain for each of them. The least part of all these ought not to be disturbed by the legislator; but he should assign to the several districts some God, or demi-god, or hero, and, in the distribution of the soil, should give to these first their chosen domain and all things fitting, that the inhabitants of the several districts may meet at fixed times, and that they may readily supply their various wants, and entertain one another with sacrifices, and become friends and acquaintances; for there is no greater good in a state than that the citizens should be known to one another. When not light but darkness and ignorance of each other's characters prevails among them, no one will receive the honor of which he is deserving, or the power or the justice to which he is fairly entitled: wherefore, in every state, above all things, every man should take heed that he have no deceit in him, but that he be always true and simple; and that no deceitful person take any advantage of him.

The next move in our pastime of legislation, like the withdrawal of the stone from the holy line in the game of draughts, being an unusual one, will probably excite wonder when mentioned for the first time. And yet, if a man will only reflect and weigh the matter with care, he will see that our city is ordered in a manner which, if not the best, is the second best. Perhaps also someone may not approve this form, because he thinks that such a constitution is ill adapted to a legislator who has not despotic power. The truth is, that there are three forms of government, the best, the second and the third best, which we may just mention, and then leave the selection to the ruler of the settlement. Following this method in the present instance, let us speak of the states which are respectively first, second, and third in excellence, and then we will leave the choice to Cleinias now, or to anyone else who may hereafter have to make a similar choice among constitutions, and may desire to give to his state some feature which is congenial to him and which he approves in his own country.

The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that 'Friends have all things in common.' Whether there is anywhere now, or will ever be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same occasions, and whatever laws there are unite the city to the utmost, —whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state which will be truer or better or more exalted in virtue. Whether such a state is governed by Gods or sons of Gods,

one, or more than one, happy are the men who, living after this manner, dwell there; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and to seek with all our might for one which is like this. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality and the only one which takes the second place; and after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second.

Let the citizens at once distribute their land and houses, and not till the land in common, since a community of goods goes beyond their proposed origin, and nurture, and education. But in making the distribution, let the several possessors feel that their particular lots also belong to the whole city; and seeing that the earth is their parent, let them tend her more carefully than children do their mother. For she is a goddess and their queen, and they are her mortal subjects. Such also are the feelings which they ought to entertain to the Gods and demi-gods of the country. And in order that the distribution may always remain, they ought to consider further that the present number of families should be always retained, and neither increased nor diminished. This may be secured for the whole city in the following manner: —Let the possessor of a lot leave the one of his children who is his best beloved, and one only, to be the heir of his dwelling, and his successor in the duty of ministering to the Gods, the state and the family, as well the living members of it as those who are departed when he comes into the inheritance; but of his other children, if he have more than one, he shall give the females in marriage according to the law to be hereafter enacted, and the males he shall distribute as sons to those citizens who have no children, and are disposed to receive them; or if there should be none such, and particular individuals have too many

children, male or female, or too few, as in the case of barrenness—in all these cases let the highest and most honorable magistracy created by us judge and determine what is to be done with the redundant or deficient, and devise a means that the number of 5040 houses shall always remain the same. There are many ways of regulating numbers; for they in whom generation is affluent may be made to refrain, and, on the other hand, special care may be taken to increase the number of births by rewards and stigmas, or we may meet the evil by the elder men giving advice and administering rebuke to the younger—in this way the object may be attained. And if after all there be very great difficulty about the equal preservation of the 5040 houses, and there be an excess of citizens, owing to the too great love of those who live together, and we are at our wits' end, there is still the old device often mentioned by us of sending out a colony, which will part friends with us; and be composed of suitable persons. If, on the other hand, there come a wave bearing a deluge of disease, or a plague of war, and the inhabitants become much fewer than the appointed number by reason of bereavement, we ought not to introduce citizens of spurious birth and education, if this can be avoided; but even God is said not to be able to fight against necessity.

Wherefore let us suppose this 'high argument' of ours to address us in the following terms: —Best of men, cease not to honor according to nature similarity and equality and sameness and agreement, as regards number and every good and noble quality. And, above all, observe the aforesaid number 5040 throughout life; in the second place, do not disparage the small and modest proportions of the inheritances which you received in the distribution, by buying and selling them to one another. For then neither will the God who gave you the lot be your friend, nor will the legislator; and indeed the law declares to the disobedient

that these are the terms upon which he may or may not take the lot. In the first place, the earth as he is informed is sacred to the Gods; and in the next place, priests and priestesses will offer up prayers over a first, and second, and even a third sacrifice, that he who buys or sells the houses or lands which he has received, may suffer the punishment which he deserves; and these their prayers they shall write down in the temples, on tablets of cypress-wood, for the instruction of posterity. Moreover they will set a watch over all these things, that they may be observed; —the magistracy which has the sharpest eyes shall keep watch that any infringement of these commands may be discovered and punished as offences both against the law and the God. How great is the benefit of such an ordinance to all those cities, which obey and are administered accordingly, no bad man can ever know, as the old proverb says; but only a man of experience and good habits. For in such an order of things there will not be much opportunity for making money; no man either ought, or indeed will be allowed, to exercise any ignoble occupation, of which the vulgarity is a matter of reproach to a freeman, and should never want to acquire riches by any such means.

Further, the law enjoins that no private man shall be allowed to possess gold and silver, but only coin for daily use, which is almost necessary in dealing with artisans, and for payment of hirelings, whether slaves or immigrants, by all those persons who require the use of them. Wherefore our citizens, as we say, should have a coin passing current among themselves, but not accepted among the rest of mankind; with a view, however, to expeditions and journeys to other lands, —for embassies, or for any other occasion which may arise of sending out a herald, the state must also possess a common Hellenic currency. If a private person is ever obliged to go abroad, let him have the consent of the

magistrates and go; and if when he returns he has any foreign money remaining, let him give the surplus back to the treasury, and receive a corresponding sum in the local currency. And if he is discovered to appropriate it, let it be confiscated, and let him who knows and does not inform be subject to curse and dishonor equally with him who brought the money, and also to a fine not less in amount than the foreign money which has been brought back. In marrying and giving in marriage, no one shall give or receive any dowry at all; and no one shall deposit money with another whom he does not trust as a friend, nor shall he lend money upon interest; and the borrower should be under no obligation to repay either capital or interest. That these principles are best, anyone may see who compares them with the first principle and intention of a state. The intention, as we affirm, of a reasonable statesman, is not what the many declare to be the object of a good legislator, namely, that the state for the true interests of which he is advising should be as great and as rich as possible, and should possess gold and silver, and have the greatest empire by sea and land; — this they imagine to be the real object of legislation, at the same time adding, inconsistently, that the true legislator desires to have the city the best and happiest possible. But they do not see that some of these things are possible, and some of them are impossible; and he who orders the state will desire what is possible, and will not indulge in vain wishes or attempts to accomplish that which is impossible. The citizen must indeed be happy and good, and the legislator will seek to make him so; but very rich and very good at the same time he cannot be, not, at least, in the sense in which the many speak of riches. For they mean by 'the rich' the few who have the most valuable possessions, although the owner of them may quite well be a rogue. And if this is true, I can never assent to the doctrine that the rich

man will be happy—he must be good as well as rich. And good in a high degree, and rich in a high degree at the same time, he cannot be. Someone will ask, why not? And we shall answer, —Because acquisitions which come from sources which are just and unjust indifferently, are more than double those which come from just sources only; and the sums which are expended neither honorably nor disgracefully, are only half as great as those which are expended honorably and on honorable purposes. Thus, if the one acquires double and spends half, the other who is in the opposite case and is a good man cannot possibly be wealthier than he. The first—I am speaking of the saver and not of the spender—is not always bad; he may indeed in some cases be utterly bad, but, as I was saying, a good man he never is. For he who receives money unjustly as well as justly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, will be a rich man if he be also thrifty. On the other hand, the utterly bad is in general profligate, and therefore very poor; while he who spends on noble objects, and acquires wealth by just means only, can hardly be remarkable for riches, any more than he can be very poor. Our statement, then, is true, that the very rich are not good, and, if they are not good, they are not happy. But the intention of our laws was, that the citizens should be as happy as may be, and as friendly as possible to one another. And men who are always at law with one another, and amongst whom there are many wrongs done, can never be friends to one another, but only those among whom crimes and lawsuits are few and slight. Therefore we say that gold and silver ought not to be allowed in the city, nor much of the vulgar sort of trade which is carried on by lending money, or rearing the meaner kinds of livestock; but only the produce of agriculture, and only so much of this as will not compel us in pursuing it to neglect that for the sake of which riches exist, —I mean, soul and body, which

without gymnastics, and without education, will never be worth anything; and therefore, as we have said not once but many times, the care of riches should have the last place in our thoughts. For there are in all three things about which every man has an interest; and the interest about money, when rightly regarded, is the third and lowest of them: midway comes the interest of the body; and, first of all, that of the soul; and the state which we are describing will have been rightly constituted if it ordains honors according to this scale. But if, in any of the laws which have been ordained, health has been preferred to temperance, or wealth to health and temperate habits, that law must clearly be wrong. Wherefore, also, the legislator ought often to impress upon himself the question—'What do I want?' and 'Do I attain my aim, or do I miss the mark?' In this way, and in this way only, he may acquit himself and free others from the work of legislation.

Let the allottee then hold his lot upon the conditions which we have mentioned.

It would be well that every man should come to the colony having all things equal; but seeing that this is not possible, and one man will have greater possessions than another, for many reasons and in particular in order to preserve equality in special crises of the state, qualifications of property must be unequal, in order that offices and contributions and distributions may be proportioned to the value of each person's wealth, and not solely to the virtue of his ancestors or himself, nor yet to the strength and beauty of his person, but also to the measure of his wealth or poverty; and so by a law of inequality, which will be in proportion to his wealth, he will receive honors and offices as equally as possible, and there will be no quarrels and disputes. To which end there should be four different standards appointed according to the amount of property: there should be a first and a second

and a third and a fourth class, in which the citizens will be placed, and they will be called by these or similar names: they may continue in the same rank, or pass into another in any individual case, on becoming richer from being poorer, or poorer from being richer. The form of law which I should propose as the natural sequel would be as follows: —In a state which is desirous of being saved from the greatest of all plagues—not faction, but rather distraction—there should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty, nor, again, excess of wealth, for both are productive of both these evils. Now the legislator should determine what is to be the limit of poverty or wealth. Let the limit of poverty be the value of the lot; this ought to be preserved, and no ruler, nor anyone else who aspires after a reputation for virtue, will allow the lot to be impaired in any case. This the legislator gives as a measure, and he will permit a man to acquire double or triple, or as much as four times the amount of this. But if a person have yet greater riches, whether he has found them, or they have been given to him, or he has made them in business, or has acquired by any stroke of fortune that which is in excess of the measure, if he give back the surplus to the state, and to the Gods who are the patrons of the state, he shall suffer no penalty or loss of reputation; but if he disobeys this our law, anyone who likes may inform against him and receive half the value of the excess, and the delinquent shall pay a sum equal to the excess out of his own property, and the other half of the excess shall belong to the Gods. And let every possession of every man, with the exception of the lot, be publicly registered before the magistrates whom the law appoints, so that all suits about money may be easy and quite simple.

The next thing to be noted is; that the city should be placed as nearly as possible in the center of the country; we should choose a place which possesses what is suitable for

a city, and this may easily be imagined and described. Then we will divide the city into twelve portions, first founding temples to Hestia, to Zeus and to Athene, in a spot which we will call the Acropolis, and surround with a circular wall, making the division of the entire city and country radiate from this point. The twelve portions shall be equalized by the provision that those which are of good land shall be smaller, while those of inferior quality shall be larger. The number of the lots shall be 5040, and each of them shall be divided into two, and every allotment shall be composed of two such sections; one of land near the city, the other of land which is at a distance. This arrangement shall be carried out in the following manner: The section which is near the city shall be added to that which is on the borders, and form one lot, and the portion which is next nearest shall be added to the portion which is next farthest; and so of the rest. Moreover, in the two sections of the lots the same principle of equalization of the soil ought to be maintained; the badness and goodness shall be compensated by more and less. And the legislator shall divide the citizens into twelve parts, and arrange the rest of their property, as far as possible, so as to form twelve equal parts; and there shall be a registration of all. After this they shall assign twelve lots to twelve Gods, and call them by their names, and dedicate to each God their several portions, and call the tribes after them. And they shall distribute the twelve divisions of the city in the same way in which they divided the country; and every man shall have two habitations, one in the center of the country, and the other at the extremity. Enough of the manner of settlement.

Now we ought by all means to consider that there can never be such a happy concurrence of circumstances as we have described; neither can all things coincide as they are wanted. Men who will not take offence at such a mode of

living together, and will endure all their life long to have their property fixed at a moderate limit, and to beget children in accordance with our ordinances, and will allow themselves to be deprived of gold and other things which the legislator, as is evident from these enactments, will certainly forbid them; and will endure, further, the situation of the land with the city in the middle and dwellings round about; —all this is as if the legislator were telling his dreams, or making a city and citizens of wax. There is truth in these objections, and therefore everyone should take to heart what I am going to say. Once more, then, the legislator shall appear and address us: —'O my friends,' he will say to us, 'do not suppose me ignorant that there is a certain degree of truth in your words; but I am of opinion that, in matters which are not present but future, he who exhibits a pattern of that at which he aims, should in nothing fall short of the fairest and truest; and that if he finds any part of this work impossible of execution he should avoid and not execute it, but he should contrive to carry out that which is nearest and most akin to it; you must allow the legislator to perfect his design, and when it is perfected, you should join with him in considering what part of his legislation is expedient and what will arouse opposition; for surely the artist who is to be deemed worthy of any regard at all, ought always to make his work self-consistent.'

Having determined that there is to be a distribution into twelve parts, let us now see in what way this may be accomplished. There is no difficulty in perceiving that the twelve parts admit of the greatest number of divisions of that which they include, or in seeing the other numbers which are consequent upon them, and are produced out of them up to 5040; wherefore the law ought to order phratries and demes and villages, and also military ranks and movements, as well as coins and measures, dry and liquid, and weights,

so as to be commensurable and agreeable to one another. Nor should we fear the appearance of minuteness, if the law commands that all the vessels which a man possesses should have a common measure, when we consider generally that the divisions and variations of numbers have a use in respect of all the variations of which they are susceptible, both in themselves and as measures of height and depth, and in all sounds, and in motions, as well those which proceed in a straight direction, upwards or downwards, as in those which go round and round. The legislator is to consider all these things and to bid the citizens, as far as possible, not to lose sight of numerical order; for no single instrument of youthful education has such mighty power, both as regards domestic economy and politics, and in the arts, as the study of arithmetic. Above all, arithmetic stirs up him who is by nature sleepy and dull, and makes him quick to learn, retentive, shrewd, and aided by art divine he makes progress quite beyond his natural powers. All such things, if only the legislator, by other laws and institutions, can banish meanness and covetousness from the souls of men, so that they can use them properly and to their own good, will be excellent and suitable instruments of education. But if he cannot, he will unintentionally create in them, instead of wisdom, the habit of craft, which evil tendency may be observed in the Egyptians and Phoenicians, and many other races, through the general vulgarity of their pursuits and acquisitions, whether some unworthy legislator of theirs has been the cause, or some impediment of chance or nature. For we must not fail to observe, O Megillus and Cleinias, that there is a difference in places, and that some beget better men and others worse; and we must legislate accordingly. Some places are subject to strange and fatal influences by reason of diverse winds and violent heats, some by reason of waters;

or, again, from the character of the food given by the earth, which not only affects the bodies of men for good or evil, but produces similar results in their souls. And in all such qualities those spots excel in which there is a divine inspiration, and in which the demigods have their appointed lots, and are propitious, not adverse, to the settlers in them. To all these matters the legislator, if he have any sense in him, will attend as far as man can, and frame his laws accordingly. And this is what you, Cleinias, must do, and to matters of this kind you must turn your mind since you are going to colonize a new country.

Clinias/ Your words, Athenian Stranger, are excellent, and I will do as you say.

Book 6.

Athenian Stranger/ And now having made an end of the preliminaries we will proceed to the appointment of magistracies.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ In the ordering of a state there are two parts: first, the number of the magistracies, and the mode of establishing them; and, secondly, when they have been established, laws again will have to be provided for each of them, suitable in nature and number. But before electing the magistrates let us stop a little and say a word in season about the election of them.

Clinias/ What have you got to say?

Athenian Stranger/ This is what I have to say; —everyone can see, that although the work of legislation is a most important matter, yet if a well-ordered city superadd to good laws unsuitable offices, not only will there be no use in having the good laws, —not only will they be ridiculous and useless, but the greatest political injury and evil will accrue from them.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Then now, my friend, let us observe what will happen in the constitution of our intended state. In the first place, you will acknowledge that those who are duly appointed to magisterial power, and their families, should severally have given satisfactory proof of what they are, from youth upward until the time of election; in the next place, those who are to elect should have been trained in habits of law, and be well educated, that they may have a right judgment, and may be able to select or reject men whom they approve or disapprove, as they are worthy of either. But how can we imagine that those who are brought together for the first time, and are strangers to one another,

and also uneducated, will avoid making mistakes in the choice of magistrates?

Clinias/ Impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ The matter is serious, and excuses will not serve the turn. I will tell you, then, what you and I will have to do, since you, as you tell me, with nine others, have offered to settle the new state on behalf of the people of Crete, and I am to help you by the invention of the present romance. I certainly should not like to leave the tale wandering all over the world without a head; —a headless monster is such a hideous thing.

Clinias/ Excellent, Stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; and I will be as good as my word.

Clinias/ Let us by all means do as you propose.

Athenian Stranger/ That we will, by the grace of God, if old age will only permit us.

Clinias/ But God will be gracious.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; and under His guidance let us consider a further point.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us remember what a courageously mad and daring creation this our city is.

Clinias/ What had you in your mind when you said that?

Athenian Stranger/ I had in my mind the free and easy manner in which we are ordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive our laws. Now a man need not be very wise, Cleinias, in order to see that no one can easily receive laws at their first imposition. But if we could anyhow wait until those who have been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the public elections of the state; I say, if this could be accomplished, and rightly

accomplished by any way or contrivance, —then, I think that there would be very little danger, at the end of the time, of a state thus trained not being permanent.

Clinias/ A reasonable supposition.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us consider if we can find any way out of the difficulty; for I maintain, Cleinias, that the Cnosians, above all the other Cretans, should not be satisfied with barely discharging their duty to the colony, but they ought to take the utmost pains to establish the offices which are first created by them in the best and surest manner. Above all, this applies to the selection of the guardians of the law, who must be chosen first of all, and with the greatest care; the others are of less importance.

Clinias/ What method can we devise of electing them?

Athenian Stranger/ This will be the method: —Sons of the Cretans, I shall say to them, inasmuch as the Cnosians have precedence over the other states, they should, in common with those who join this settlement, choose a body of thirty-seven in all, nineteen of them being taken from the settlers, and the remainder from the citizens of Cnosus. Of these latter the Cnosians shall make a present to your colony, and you yourself shall be one of the eighteen, and shall become a citizen of the new state; and if you and they cannot be persuaded to go, the Cnosians may fairly use a little violence in order to make you.

Clinias/ But why, Stranger, do not you and Megillus take a part in our new city?

Athenian Stranger/ O, Cleinias, Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are both a long way off. But you and likewise the other colonists are conveniently situated as you describe. I have been speaking of the way in which the new citizens may be best managed under present circumstances; but in after-ages, if the city continues to exist, let the election

be on this wise. All who are horse or foot soldiers, or have seen military service at the proper ages when they were severally fitted for it, shall share in the election of magistrates; and the election shall be held in whatever temple the state deems most venerable, and everyone shall carry his vote to the altar of the God, writing down on a tablet the name of the person for whom he votes, and his father's 'name, and his tribe, and ward; and at the side he shall write his own name in like manner. Anyone who pleases may take away any tablet which he does not think properly filled up, and exhibit it in the Agora for a period of not less than thirty days. The tablets which are judged to be first, to the number of 300, shall be shown by the magistrates to the whole city, and the citizens shall in like manner select from these the candidates whom they prefer; and this second selection, to the number of 100, shall be again exhibited to the citizens; in the third, let anyone who pleases select whom he pleases out of the 100, walking through the parts of victims, and let them choose for magistrates and proclaim the seven-and-thirty who have the greatest number of votes. But who, Cleinias and Megillus, will order for us in the colony all this matter of the magistrates, and the scrutinies of them? If we reflect, we shall see that cities which are in process of construction like ours must have some such persons, who cannot possibly be elected before there are any magistrates; and yet they must be elected in some way, and they are not to be inferior men, but the best possible. For as the proverb says, 'a good beginning is half the business;' and 'to have begun well' is praised by all, and in my opinion is a great deal more than half the business, and has never been praised by anyone enough.

Clinias/ That is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us recognize the difficulty, and make clear to our own minds how the beginning is to be

accomplished. There is only one proposal which I have to offer, and that is one which, under our circumstances, is both necessary and expedient.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ I maintain that this colony of ours has a father and mother, who are no other than the colonizing state. Well I know that many colonies have been, and will be, at enmity with their parents. But in early days the child, as in a family, loves and is beloved; even if there come a time later when the tie is broken, still, while he is in want of education, he naturally loves his parents and is beloved by them, and flies to his relatives for protection, and finds in them his only natural allies in time of need; and this parental feeling already exists in the Cnosians, as is shown by their care of the new city; and there is a similar feeling on the part of the young city towards Cnosus. And I repeat what I was saying—for there is no harm in repeating a good thing—that the Cnosians should take a common interest in all these matters, and choose, as far as they can, the eldest and best of the colonists, to the number of not less than a hundred; and let there be another hundred of the Cnosians themselves. These, I say, on their arrival, should have a joint care that the magistrates should be appointed according to law, and that when they are appointed they should undergo a scrutiny. When this has been effected, the Cnosians shall return home, and the new city do the best she can for her own preservation and happiness. I would have the seven-and-thirty now, and in all future time, chosen to fulfill the following duties: —Let them, in the first place, be the guardians of the law; and, secondly, of the registers in which each one registers before the magistrate the amount of his property, excepting four minae which are allowed to citizens of the first class, three allowed to the second, two to the third, and a single mina to the fourth. And if anyone,

despising the laws for the sake of gain, be found to possess anything more which has not been registered, let all that he has in excess be confiscated, and let him be liable to a suit which shall be the reverse of honorable or fortunate. And let anyone who will, indict him on the charge of loving base gains, and proceed against him before the guardians of the law. And if he be cast, let him lose his share of the public possessions, and when there is any public distribution, let him have nothing but his original lot; and let him be written down a condemned man as long as he lives, in some place in which anyone who pleases can read about his offences. The guardian of the law shall not hold office longer than twenty years, and shall not be less than fifty years of age when he is elected; or if he is elected when he is sixty years of age, he shall hold office for ten years only; and upon the same principle, he must not imagine that he will be permitted to hold such an important office as that of guardian of the laws after he is seventy years of age, if he live so long.

These are the three first ordinances about the guardians of the law; as the work of legislation progresses, each law in turn will assign to them their further duties. And now we may proceed in order to speak of the election of other officers; for generals have to be elected, and these again must have their ministers, commanders, and colonels of horse, and commanders of brigades of foot, who would be more rightly called by their popular name of brigadiers. The guardians of the law shall propose as generals men who are natives of the city, and a selection from the candidates proposed shall be made by those who are or have been of the age for military service. And if one who is not proposed is thought by somebody to be better than one who is, let him name whom he prefers in the place of whom, and make oath that he is better, and propose him; and whichever of them is

approved by vote shall be admitted to the final selection; and the three who have the greatest number of votes shall be appointed generals, and superintendents of military affairs, after previously undergoing a scrutiny, like the guardians of the law. And let the generals thus elected propose twelve brigadiers, one for each tribe; and there shall be a right of counter-proposal as in the case of the generals, and the voting and decision shall take place in the same way. Until the prytanes and council are elected, the guardians of the law shall convene the assembly in some holy spot which is suitable to the purpose, placing the hoplites by themselves, and the cavalry by themselves, and in a third division all the rest of the army. All are to vote for the generals [and for the colonels of horse], but the brigadiers are to be voted for only by those who carry shields [i.e. the hoplites]. Let the body of cavalry choose phylarchs for the generals; but captains of light troops, or archers, or any other division of the army, shall be appointed by the generals for themselves. There only remains the appointment of officers of cavalry: these shall be proposed by the same persons who proposed the generals, and the election and the counter-proposal of other candidates shall be arranged in the same way as in the case of the generals, and let the cavalry vote and the infantry look on at the election; the two who have the greatest number of votes shall be the leaders of all the horse. Disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice; but if the dispute be raised a third time, the officers who preside at the several elections shall decide.

The council shall consist of 30 × 12 members, —360 will be a convenient number for sub-division. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety counselors for each class. First, all the citizens shall select candidates from the first class; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined. When the

candidates have been selected, someone shall mark them down; this shall be the business of the first day. And on the following day, candidates shall be selected from the second class in the same manner and under the same conditions as on the previous day; and on the third day a selection shall be made from the third class, at which everyone may if he likes vote, and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote; but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day candidates shall be selected from the fourth and smallest class; they shall be selected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished; —he who is of the second class shall pay a fine of triple the amount which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple. On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, for all the citizens to see, and every man shall choose out of them, under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one-half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny: —These are to form the council for the year.

The mode of election which has been described is in a mean between monarchy and democracy, and such a mean the state ought always to observe; for servants and masters never can be friends, nor good and bad, merely because they are declared to have equal privileges. For to unequals equals become unequal, if they are not harmonized by measure; and both by reason of equality, and by reason of inequality, cities are filled with seditions. The old saying, that 'equality makes friendship' is happy and also true; but there is obscurity and confusion as to what sort of equality is meant. For there are two equalities which are called by the same

name, but are in reality in many ways almost the opposite of one another; one of them may be introduced without difficulty, by any state or any legislator in the distribution of honors: this is the rule of measure, weight, and number, which regulates and apportions them. But there is another equality, of a better and higher kind, which is not so easily recognized. This is the judgment of Zeus; among men it avails but little; that little, however, is the source of the greatest good to individuals and states. For it gives to the greater more, and to the inferior less and in proportion to the nature of each; and, above all, greater honor always to the greater virtue, and to the less less; and to either in proportion to their respective measure of virtue and education. And this is justice, and is ever the true principle of states, at which we ought to aim, and according to this rule order the new city which is now being founded, and any other city which may be hereafter founded. To this the legislator should look, —not to the interests of tyrants one or more, or to the power of the people, but to justice always; which, as I was saying, is the distribution of natural equality among unequals in each case. But there are times at which every state is compelled to use the words, 'just' 'equal' in a secondary sense, in the hope of escaping in some degree from factions. For equity and indulgence are infractions of the perfect and strict rule of justice. And this is the reason why we are obliged to use the equality of the lot, in order to avoid the discontent of the people; and so we invoke God and fortune in our prayers, and beg that they themselves will direct the lot with a view to supreme justice. And therefore, although we are compelled to use both equalities, we should use that into which the element of chance enters as seldom as possible.

Thus, O my friends, and for the reasons given, should a state act which would endure and be saved. But as a ship

sailing on the sea has to be watched night and day, in like manner a city also is sailing on a sea of politics, and is liable to all sorts of insidious assaults; and therefore from morning to night, and from night to morning, rulers must join hands with rulers, and watchers with watchers, receiving and giving up their trust in a perpetual succession. Now a multitude can never fulfill a duty of this sort with anything like energy. Moreover, the greater number of the senators will have to be left during the greater part of the year to order their concerns at their own homes. They will therefore have to be arranged in twelve portions, answering to the twelve months, and furnish guardians of the state, each portion for a single month. Their business is to be at hand and receive any foreigner or citizen who comes to them, whether to give information, or to put one of those questions, to which, when asked by other cities, a city should give an answer, and to which, if she ask them herself, she should receive an answer; or again, when there is a likelihood of internal commotions, which are always liable to happen in some form or other, they will, if they can, prevent their occurring; or if they have already occurred, will lose no time in making them known to the city, and healing the evil. Wherefore, also, this which is the presiding body of the state ought always to have the control of their assemblies, and of the dissolutions of them, ordinary as well as extraordinary. All this is to be ordered by the twelfth part of the council, which is always to keep watch together with the other officers of the state during one portion of the year, and to rest during the remaining eleven portions.

Thus will the city be fairly ordered. And now, who is to have the superintendence of the country, and what shall be the arrangement? Seeing that the whole city and the entire country have been both of them divided into twelve portions, ought there not to be appointed superintendents of the

streets of the city, and of the houses, and buildings, and harbors, and the agora, and fountains, and sacred domains, and temples, and the like?

Clinias/ To be sure there ought.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us assume, then, that there ought to be servants of the temples, and priests and priestesses. There must also be superintendents of roads and buildings, who will have a care of men, that they may do no harm, and also of beasts, both within the enclosure and in the suburbs. Three kinds of officers will thus have to be appointed, in order that the city may be suitably provided according to her needs. Those who have the care of the city shall be called wardens of the city; and those who have the care of the agora shall be called wardens of the agora; and those who have the care of the temples shall be called priests. Those who hold hereditary offices as priests or priestesses, shall not be disturbed; but if there be few or none such, as is probable at the foundation of a new city, priests and priestesses shall be appointed to be servants of the Gods who have no servants. Some of our officers shall be elected, and others appointed by lot, those who are of the people and those who are not of the people mingling in a friendly manner in every place and city, that the state may be as far as possible of one mind. The officers of the temples shall be appointed by lot; in this way their election will be committed to God, that He may do what is agreeable to Him. And he who obtains a lot shall undergo a scrutiny, first, as to whether he is sound of body and of legitimate birth; and in the second place, in order to show that he is of a perfectly pure family, not stained with homicide or any similar impiety in his own person, and also that his father and mother have led a similar unstained life. Now the laws about all divine things should be brought from Delphi, and interpreters appointed, under whose direction they should be used. The tenure of the priesthood should

always be for a year and no longer; and he who will duly execute the sacred office, according to the laws of religion, must be not less than sixty years of age, —the laws shall be the same about priestesses. As for the interpreters, they shall be appointed thus: —let the twelve tribes be distributed into groups of four, and let each group select four, one out of each tribe within the group, three times; and let the three who have the greatest number of votes [out of the twelve appointed by each group], after undergoing a scrutiny, nine in all, be sent to Delphi, in order that the God may return one out of each triad; their age shall be the same as that of the priests, and the scrutiny of them shall be conducted in the same manner; let them be interpreters for life, and when anyone dies let the four tribes select another from the tribe of the deceased. Moreover, besides priests and interpreters, there must be treasurers, who will take charge of the property of the several temples, and of the sacred domains, and shall have authority over the produce and the letting of them; and three of them shall be chosen from the highest classes for the greater temples, and two for the lesser, and one for the least of all; the manner of their election and the scrutiny of them shall be the same as that of the generals. This shall be the order of the temples.

Let everything have a guard as far as possible. Let the defense of the city be committed to the generals, and taxiarchs, and hipparchs, and phylarchs, and prytanes, and the wardens of the city, and of the agora, when the election of them has been completed. The defense of the country shall be provided for as follows: —The entire land has been already distributed into twelve as nearly as possible equal parts, and let the tribe allotted to a division provide annually for it five wardens of the country and commanders of the watch; and let each body of five have the power of selecting twelve others out of the youth of their own tribe, —these

shall be not less than twenty-five years of age, and not more than thirty. And let there be allotted to them severally every month the various districts, in order that they may all acquire knowledge and experience of the whole country. The term of service for commanders and for watchers shall continue during two years. After having had their stations allotted to them, they will go from place to place in regular order, making their round from left to right as their commanders direct them; (when I speak of going to the right, I mean that they are to go to the east). And at the commencement of the second year, in order that as many as possible of the guards may not only get a knowledge of the country at anyone season of the year, but may also have experience of the manner in which different places are affected at different seasons of the year, their then commanders shall lead them again towards the left, from place to place in succession, until they have completed the second year. In the third year other wardens of the country shall be chosen and commanders of the watch, five for each division, who are to be the superintendents of the bands of twelve. While on service at each station, their attention shall be directed to the following points: —In the first place, they shall see that the country is well protected against enemies; they shall trench and dig wherever this is required, and, as far as they can, they shall by fortifications keep off the evil-disposed, in order to prevent them from doing any harm to the country or the property; they shall use the beasts of burden and the laborers whom they find on the spot: these will be their instruments whom they will super-intend, taking them, as far as possible, at the times when they are not engaged in their regular business. They shall make every part of the country inaccessible to enemies, and as accessible as possible to friends; there shall be ways for man and beasts of burden and for cattle, and they shall take care

to have them always as smooth as they can; and shall provide against the rains doing harm instead of good to the land, when they come down from the mountains into the hollow dells; and shall keep in the overflow by the help of works and ditches, in order that the valleys, receiving and drinking up the rain from heaven, and providing fountains and streams in the fields and regions which lie underneath, may furnish even to the dry places plenty of good water. The fountains of water, whether of rivers or of springs, shall be ornamented with plantations and buildings for beauty; and let them bring together the streams in subterraneous channels, and make all things plenteous; and if there be a sacred grove or dedicated precinct in the neighborhood, they shall conduct the water to the actual temples of the Gods, and so beautify them at all seasons of the year. Everywhere in such places the youth shall make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths for the aged, placing by them abundance of dry wood, for the benefit of those laboring under disease—there the weary frame of the rustic, worn with toil, will receive a kindly welcome, far better than he would at the hands of a not over-wise doctor.

The building of these and the like works will be useful and ornamental; they will provide a pleasing amusement, but they will be a serious employment too; for the sixty wardens will have to guard their several divisions, not only with a view to enemies, but also with an eye to professing friends. When a quarrel arises among neighbors or citizens, and anyone whether slave or freeman wrongs another, let the five wardens decide small matters on their own authority; but where the charge against another relates to greater matters, the seventeen composed of the fives and twelves, shall determine any charges which one man brings against another, not involving more than three minae. Every judge and magistrate shall be liable to give an account of his

conduct in office, except those who, like kings, have the final decision. Moreover, as regards the aforesaid wardens of the country, if they do any wrong to those of whom they have the care, whether by imposing upon them unequal tasks, or by taking the produce of the soil or implements of husbandry without their consent; also if they receive anything in the way of a bribe, or decide suits unjustly, or if they yield to the influences of flattery, let them be publicly dishonored; and in regard to any other wrong which they do to the inhabitants of the country, if the question be of a mina, let them submit to the decision of the villagers in the neighborhood; but in suits of greater amount, or in the case of lesser if they refuse to submit, trusting that their monthly removal into another part of the country will enable them to escape—in such cases the injured party may bring his suit in the common court, and if he obtain a verdict he may exact from the defendant, who refused to submit, a double penalty.

The wardens and the overseers of the country, while on their two years' service, shall have common meals at their several stations, and shall all live together; and he who is absent from the common meal, or sleeps out, if only for one day or night, unless by order of his commanders, or by reason of absolute necessity, if the five denounce him and inscribe his name in the agora as not having kept his guard, let him be deemed to have betrayed the city, as far as lay in his power, and let him be disgraced and beaten with impunity by anyone who meets him and is willing to punish him. If any of the commanders is guilty of such an irregularity, the whole company of sixty shall see to it, and he who is cognizant of the offence, and does not bring the offender to trial, shall be amenable to the same laws as the younger offender himself, and shall pay a heavier fine, and be incapable of ever commanding the young. The guardians

of the law are to be careful inspectors of these matters, and shall either prevent or punish offenders. Every man should remember the universal rule, that he who is not a good servant will not be a good master; a man should pride himself more upon serving well than upon commanding well: first upon serving the laws, which is also the service of the Gods; in the second place, upon having served ancient and honorable men in the days of his youth. Furthermore, during the two years in which anyone is a warden of the country, his daily food ought to be of a simple and humble kind. When the twelve have been chosen, let them and the five meet together, and determine that they will be their own servants, and, like servants, will not have other slaves and servants for their own use, neither will they use those of the villagers and husbandmen for their private advantage, but for the public service only; and in general they should make up their minds to live independently by themselves, servants of each other and of themselves. Further, at all seasons of the year, summer and winter alike, let them be under arms and survey minutely the whole country; thus they will at once keep guard, and at the same time acquire a perfect knowledge of every locality. There can be no more important kind of information than the exact knowledge of a man's own country; and for this as well as for more general reasons of pleasure and advantage, hunting with dogs and other kinds of sports should be pursued by the young. The service to whom this is committed may be called the secret police or wardens of the country; the name does not much signify, but everyone who has the safety of the state at heart will use his utmost diligence in this service.

After the wardens of the country, we have to speak of the election of wardens of the agora and of the city. The wardens of the country were sixty in number, and the wardens of the city will be three, and will divide the twelve parts of the city

into three; like the former, they shall have care of the ways, and of the different high roads which lead out of the country into the city, and of the buildings, that they may be all made according to law; —also of the waters, which the guardians of the supply preserve and convey to them, care being taken that they may reach the fountains pure and abundant, and be both an ornament and a benefit to the city. These also should be men of influence, and at leisure to take care of the public interest. Let every man propose as warden of the city anyone whom he likes out of the highest class, and when the vote has been given on them, them, and the number is reduced to the six who have the greatest number of votes, let the electing officers choose by lot three out of the six, and when they have undergone a scrutiny let them hold office according to the laws laid down for them.

Next, let the wardens of the agora be elected in like manner, out of the first and second class, five in number: ten are to be first elected, and out of the ten five are to be chosen by lot, as in the election of the wardens of the city: —these when they have undergone a scrutiny are to be declared magistrates. Everyone shall vote for everyone, and he who will not vote, if he be informed against before the magistrates, shall be fined fifty drachmae, and shall also be deemed a bad citizen. Let anyone who likes go to the assembly and to the general council; it shall be compulsory to go on citizens of the first and second class, and they shall pay a fine of ten drachmae if they be found not answering to their names at the assembly. But the third and fourth class shall be under no compulsion, and shall be let off without a fine, unless the magistrates have commanded all to be present, in consequence of some urgent necessity. The wardens of the agora shall observe the order appointed by law for the agora, and shall have the charge of the temples and fountains which are in the agora; and they shall see that

no one injures anything, and punish him who does, with stripes and bonds, if he be a slave or stranger; but if he be a citizen who misbehaves in this way, they shall have the power themselves of inflicting a fine upon him to the amount of a hundred drachmae, or with the consent of the wardens of the city up to double that amount. And let the wardens of the city have a similar power of imposing punishments and fines in their own department; and let them impose fines by their own authority, up to a mina, or up to two minae with the consent of the wardens of the agora.

In the next place, it will be proper to appoint directors of music and gymnastic, two kinds of each—of the one kind the business will be education, of the other, the superintendence of contests. In speaking of education, the law means to speak of those who have the care of order and instruction in gymnasia and schools, and of the going to school, and of school buildings for boys and girls; and in speaking of contests, the law refers to the judges of gymnastics and of music; these again are divided into two classes, the one having to do with music, the other with gymnastics; and the same who judge of the gymnastic contests of men, shall judge of horses; but in music there shall be one set of judges of solo singing, and of imitation—I mean of rhapsodists, players on the harp, the flute and the like, and another who shall judge of choral song. First of all, we must choose directors for the choruses of boys, and men, and maidens, whom they shall follow in the amusement of the dance, and for our other musical arrangements; —one director will be enough for the choruses, and he should be not less than forty years of age. One director will also be enough to introduce the solo singers, and to give judgment on the competitors, and he ought not to be less than thirty years of age. The director and manager of the choruses shall be elected after the following manner: —Let any persons who

commonly take an interest in such matters go to the meeting, and be fined if they do not go (the guardians of the law shall judge of their fault), but those who have no interest shall not be compelled. The elector shall propose as director someone who understands music, and he in the scrutiny may be challenged on the one part by those who say he has no skill, and defended on the other hand by those who say that he has. Ten are to be elected by vote, and he of the ten who is chosen by lot shall undergo a scrutiny, and lead the choruses for a year according to law. And in like manner the competitor who wins the lot shall be leader of the solo and concert music for that year; and he who is thus elected shall deliver the award to the judges. In the next place, we have to choose judges in the contests of horses and of men; these shall be selected from the third and also from the second class of citizens, and the three first classes shall be compelled to go to the election, but the lowest may stay away with impunity; and let there be three elected by lot out of the twenty who have been chosen previously, and they must also have the vote and approval of the examiners. But if anyone is rejected in the scrutiny at any ballot or decision, others shall be chosen in the same manner, and undergo a similar scrutiny.

There remains the minister of the education of youth, male and female; he too will rule according to law; one such minister will be sufficient, and he must be fifty years old, and have children lawfully begotten, both boys and girls by preference, at any rate, one or the other. He who is elected, and he who is the elector, should consider that of all the great offices of state this is the greatest; for the first shoot of any plant, if it makes a good start towards the attainment of its natural excellence, has the greatest effect on its maturity; and this is not only true of plants, but of animals wild and tame, and also of men. Man, as we say, is a tame or civilized

animal; nevertheless, he requires proper instruction and a fortunate nature, and then of all animals he becomes the most divine and most civilized; but if he be insufficiently or ill-educated he is the most savage of earthly creatures. Wherefore the legislator ought not to allow the education of children to become a secondary or accidental matter. In the first place, he who would be rightly provident about them, should begin by taking care that he is elected, who of all the citizens is in every way best; him the legislator shall do his utmost to appoint guardian and superintendent. To this end all the magistrates, with the exception of the council and prytanes, shall go to the temple of Apollo, and elect by ballot him of the guardians of the law whom they severally think will be the best superintendent of education. And he who has the greatest number of votes, after he has undergone a scrutiny at the hands of all the magistrates who have been his electors, with the exception of the guardians of the law, —shall hold office for five years; and in the sixth year let another be chosen in like manner to fill his office.

If anyone dies while he is holding a public office, and more than thirty days before his term of office expires, let those whose business it is elect another to the office in the same manner as before. And if anyone who is entrusted with orphans dies, let the relations both on the father's and mother's side, who are residing at home, including cousins, appoint another guardian within ten days, or be fined a drachma a day for neglect to do so.

A city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a city; and again, if a judge is silent and says no more in preliminary proceedings than the litigants, as is the case in arbitrations, he will never be able to decide justly; wherefore a multitude of judges will not easily judge well, nor a few if they are bad. The point in dispute between the parties should be made clear; and time, and deliberation, and

repeated examination, greatly tend to clear up doubts. For this reason, he who goes to law with another, should go first of all to his neighbors and friends who know best the questions at issue. And if he be unable to obtain from them a satisfactory decision, let him have recourse to another court; and if the two courts cannot settle the matter, let a third put an end to the suit.

Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice of magistrates, for every magistrate must also be a judge of some things; and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, yet in certain respects is a very important magistrate on the day on which he is determining a suit. Regarding then the judges also as magistrates, let us say who are fit to be judges, and of what they are to be judges, and how many of them are to judge in each suit. Let that be the supreme tribunal which the litigants appoint in common for themselves, choosing certain persons by agreement. And let there be two other tribunals: one for private causes, when a citizen accuses another of wronging him and wishes to get a decision; the other for public causes, in which some citizen is of opinion that the public has been wronged by an individual, and is willing to vindicate the common interests. And we must not forget to mention how the judges are to be qualified, and who they are to be. In the first place, let there be a tribunal open to all private persons who are trying causes one against another for the third time, and let this be composed as follows: —All the officers of state, as well annual as those holding office for a longer period, when the new year is about to commence, in the month following after the summer solstice, on the last day but one of the year, shall meet in some temple, and calling God to witness, shall dedicate one judge from every magistracy to be their first-fruits, choosing in each office him who seems to them to be the best, and whom they deem likely to decide

the causes of his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and holiest manner. And when the election is completed, a scrutiny shall be held in the presence of the electors themselves, and if anyone be rejected another shall be chosen in the same manner. Those who have undergone the scrutiny shall judge the causes of those who have declined the inferior courts, and shall give their vote openly. The councilors and other magistrates who have elected them shall be required to be hearers and spectators of the causes; and anyone else may be present who pleases. If one man charges another with having intentionally decided wrong, let him go to the guardians of the law and lay his accusation before them, and he who is found guilty in such a case shall pay damages to the injured party equal to half the injury; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater penalty, the judges shall determine what additional punishment he shall suffer, and how much more he ought to pay to the public treasury, and to the party who brought the suit.

In the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought to participate, for when anyone wrongs the state all are wronged, and may reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the decision. Such causes ought to originate with the people, and they ought also to have the final decision of them, but the trial of them shall take place before three of the highest magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and the defendant shall agree; and if they are not able to come to an agreement themselves, the council shall choose one of the two proposed. And in private suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have a share; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, is apt to imagine that he has no share in the state at all. And for this reason there shall be a court of law in every tribe, and the judges shall be chosen by lot; —they shall give their decisions at once, and shall be inaccessible to entreaties. The final judgment shall

rest with that court which, as we maintain, has been established in the most incorruptible form of which human things admit: this shall be the court established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of neighbors or of the tribes.

Thus much of the courts of law, which, as I was saying, cannot be precisely defined either as being or not being offices; a superficial sketch has been given of them, in which some things have been told and others omitted. For the right place of an exact statement of the laws respecting suits, under their several heads, will be at the end of the body of legislation; —let us then expect them at the end. Hitherto our legislation has been chiefly occupied with the appointment of offices. Perfect unity and exactness, extending to the whole and every particular of political administration, cannot be attained to the full, until the discussion shall have a beginning, middle, and end, and is complete in every part.

At present we have reached the election of magistrates, and this may be regarded as a sufficient termination of what has preceded. And now there need no longer be any delay or hesitation in beginning the work of legislation.

Clinias/ I like what you have said, Stranger; and I particularly like your manner of tacking on the beginning of your new discourse to the end of the former one.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus far, then, the old men's rational pastime has gone off well.

Clinias/ You mean, I suppose, their serious and noble pursuit?

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps; but I should like to know whether you and I are agreed about a certain thing.

Clinias/ About what thing?

Athenian Stranger/ You know the endless labor which painters expend upon their pictures—they are always putting in or taking out colors, or whatever be the term which artists employ; they seem as if they would never cease touching up their works, which are always being made brighter and more beautiful.

Clinias/ I know something of these matters from report, although I have never had any great acquaintance with the art.

Athenian Stranger/ No matter; we may make use of the illustration notwithstanding: —Suppose that someone had a mind to paint a figure in the most beautiful manner, in the hope that his work instead of losing would always improve as time went on—do you not see that being a mortal, unless he leaves someone to succeed him who will correct the flaws which time may introduce, and be able to add what is left imperfect through the defect of the artist, and who will further brighten up and improve the picture, all his great labor will last but a short time?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And is not the aim of the legislator similar? First, he desires that his laws should be written down with all possible exactness; in the second place, as time goes on and he has made an actual trial of his decrees, will he not find omissions? Do you imagine that there ever was a legislator so foolish as not to know that many things are necessarily omitted, which someone coming after him must correct, if the constitution and the order of government is not to deteriorate, but to improve in the state which he has established?

Clinias/ Assuredly, that is the sort of thing which everyone would desire.

Athenian Stranger/ And if anyone possesses any means of accomplishing this by word or deed, or has any way great or small by which he can teach a person to understand how he can maintain and amend the laws, he should finish what he has to say, and not leave the work incomplete.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ And is not this what you and I have to do at the present moment?

Clinias/ What have we to do?

Athenian Stranger/ As we are about to legislate and have chosen our guardians of the law, and are ourselves in the evening of life, and they as compared with us are young men, we ought not only to legislate for them, but to endeavor to make them not only guardians of the law but legislators themselves, as far as this is possible.

Clinias/ Certainly; if we can.

Athenian Stranger/ At any rate, we must do our best.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ We will say to them, —O friends and saviors of our laws, in laying down any law, there are many particulars which we shall omit, and this cannot be helped; at the same time, we will do our utmost to describe what is important, and will give an outline which you shall fill up. And I will explain on what principle you are to act. Megillus and Cleinias and I have often spoken to one another touching these matters, and we are of opinion that we have spoken well. And we hope that you will be of the same mind with us, and become our disciples, and keep in view the things which in our united opinion the legislator and guardian of the law ought to keep in view. There was one main point about which we were agreed—that a man's whole energies throughout life should be devoted to the acquisition of the virtue proper to a man, whether this was to be gained

by study, or habit, or some mode of acquisition, or desire, or opinion, or knowledge—and this applies equally to men and women, old and young—the aim of all should always be such as I have described; anything which may be an impediment, the good man ought to show that he utterly disregards. And if at last necessity plainly compels him to be an outlaw from his native land, rather than bow his neck to the yoke of slavery and be ruled by inferiors, and he has to fly, an exile he must be and endure all such trials, rather than accept another form of government, which is likely to make men worse. These are our original principles; and do you now, fixing your eyes upon the standard of what a man and a citizen ought or ought not to be, praise and blame the laws—blame those which have not this power of making the citizen better, but embrace those which have; and with gladness receive and live in them; bidding a long farewell to other institutions which aim at goods, as they are termed, of a different kind.

Let us proceed to another class of laws, beginning with their foundation in religion. And we must first return to the number 5040—the entire number had, and has, a great many convenient divisions, and the number of the tribes which was a twelfth part of the whole, being correctly formed by 21 × 20 [5040 ÷ (21 × 20), i.e. 5040 ÷ 420 = 12], also has them.

And not only is the whole number divisible by twelve, but also the number of each tribe is divisible by twelve. Now every portion should be regarded by us as a sacred gift of Heaven, corresponding to the months and to the revolution of the universe. Every city has a guiding and sacred principle given by nature, but in some the division or distribution has been more right than in others, and has been more sacred and fortunate. In our opinion, nothing can be more right than the selection of the number 5040, which may be divided

by all numbers from one to twelve with the single exception of eleven, and that admits of a very easy correction; for if, turning to the dividend (5040), we deduct two families, the defect in the division is cured. And the truth of this may be easily proved when we have leisure. But for the present, trusting to the mere assertion of this principle, let us divide the state; and assigning to each portion some God or son of a God, let us give them altars and sacred rites, and at the altars let us hold assemblies for sacrifice twice in the month—twelve assemblies for the tribes, and twelve for the city, according to their divisions; the first in honor of the Gods and divine things, and the second to promote friendship and 'better acquaintance' as the phrase is, and every sort of good fellowship with one another. For people must be acquainted with those into whose families and whom they marry and with those to whom they give in marriage; in such matters, as far as possible, a man should deem it all important to avoid a mistake, and with this serious purpose let games be instituted in which youths and maidens shall dance together, seeing one another and being seen naked, at a proper age, and on a suitable occasion, not transgressing the rules of modesty.

The directors of choruses will be the superintendents and regulators of these games, and they, together with the guardians of the law, will legislate in any matters which we have omitted; for, as we said, where there are numerous and minute details, the legislator must leave out something. And the annual officers who have experience, and know what is wanted, must make arrangements and improvements year by year, until such enactments and provisions are sufficiently determined. A ten years' experience of sacrifices and dances, if extending to all particulars, will be quite sufficient; and if the legislator be alive they shall communicate with him, but if he be dead then the several

officers shall refer the omissions which come under their notice to the guardians of the law, and correct them, until all is perfect; and from that time there shall be no more change, and they shall establish and use the new laws with the others which the legislator originally gave them, and of which they are never, if they can help, to change aught; or, if some necessity overtakes them, the magistrates must be called into counsel, and the whole people, and they must go to all the oracles of the Gods; and if they are all agreed, in that case they may make the change, but if they are not agreed, by no manner of means, and anyone who dissents shall prevail, as the law ordains.

Whenever anyone over twenty-five years of age, having seen and been seen by others, believes himself to have found a marriage connection which is to his mind, and suitable for the procreation of children, let him marry if he be still under the age of five-and-thirty years; but let him first hear how he ought to seek after what is suitable and appropriate. For, as Cleinias says, every law should have a suitable prelude.

Clinias/ You recollect at the right moment, Stranger, and do not miss the opportunity which the argument affords of saying a word in season.

Athenian Stranger/ I thank you. We will say to him who is born of good parents, —O my son, you ought to make such a marriage as wise men would approve. Now they would advise you neither to avoid a poor marriage, nor specially to desire a rich one; but if other things are equal, always to honor inferiors, and with them to form connections; —this will be for the benefit of the city and of the families which are united; for the equable and symmetrical tends infinitely more to virtue than the unmixed. And he who is conscious of being too headstrong, and carried away more than is fitting in all his actions, ought to desire to become the relation of orderly parents; and he who is of the opposite

temper ought to seek the opposite alliance. Let there be one word concerning all marriages: —Every man shall follow, not after the marriage which is most pleasing to himself, but after that which is most beneficial to the state. For somehow everyone is by nature prone to that which is likest to himself, and in this way the whole city becomes unequal in property and in disposition; and hence there arise in most states the very results which we least desire to happen. Now, to add to the law an express provision, not only that the rich man shall not marry into the rich family, nor the powerful into the family of the powerful, but that the slower natures shall be compelled to enter into marriage with the quicker, and the quicker with the slower, may awaken anger as well as laughter in the minds of many; for there is a difficulty in perceiving that the city ought to be well mingled like a cup, in which the maddening wine is hot and fiery, but when chastened by a soberer God, receives a fair associate and becomes an excellent and temperate drink. Yet in marriage no one is able to see that the same result occurs. Wherefore also the law must let alone such matters, but we should try to charm the spirits of men into believing the equability of their children's disposition to be of more importance than equality in excessive fortune when they marry; and him who is too desirous of making a rich marriage we should endeavor to turn aside by reproaches, not, however, by any compulsion of written law.

Let this then be our exhortation concerning marriage, and let us remember what was said before—that a man should cling to immortality, and leave behind him children's children to be the servants of God in his place for ever. All this and much more may be truly said by way of prelude about the duty of marriage. But if a man will not listen, and remains unsocial and alien among his fellow-citizens, and is still unmarried at thirty-five years of age, let him pay a yearly

fine; —he who is of the highest class shall pay a fine of a hundred drachmae, and he who is of the second class a fine of seventy drachmae; the third class shall pay sixty drachmae, and the fourth thirty drachmae, and let the money be sacred to Herè; he who does not pay the fine annually shall owe ten times the sum, which the treasurer of the goddess shall exact; and if he fails in doing so, let him be answerable and give an account of the money at his audit. He who refuses to marry shall be thus punished in money, and also be deprived of all honor which the younger show to the elder; let no young man voluntarily obey him, and, if he attempt to punish anyone, let everyone come to the rescue and defend the injured person, and he who is present and does not come to the rescue, shall be pronounced by the law to be a coward and a bad citizen. Of the marriage portion I have already spoken; and again I say for the instruction of poor men that he who neither gives nor receives a dowry on account of poverty, has a compensation; for the citizens of our state are provided with the necessaries of life, and wives will be less likely to be insolent, and husbands to be mean and subservient to them on account of property. And he who obeys this law will do a noble action; but he who will not obey, and gives or receives more than fifty drachmae as the price of the marriage garments if he be of the lowest, or more than a mina, or a mina-and-a-half, if he be of the third or second classes, or two minae if he be of the highest class, shall owe to the public treasury a similar sum, and that which is given or received shall be sacred to Herè and Zeus; and let the treasurers of these Gods exact the money, as was said before about the unmarried—that the treasurers of Herè were to exact the money, or pay the fine themselves.

The betrothal by a father shall be valid in the first degree, that by a grandfather in the second degree, and in the third degree, betrothal by brothers who have the same father; but

if there are none of these alive, the betrothal by a mother shall be valid in like manner; in cases of unexampled fatality, the next of kin and the guardians shall have authority. What are to be the rites before marriages, or any other sacred acts, relating either to future, present, or past marriages, shall be referred to the interpreters; and he who follows their advice maybe satisfied. Touching the marriage festival, they shall assemble not more than five male and five female friends of both families, and a like number of members of the family of either sex, and no man shall spend more than his means will allow; he who is of the richest class may spend a mina, —he who is of the second, half a mina, and in the same proportion as the census of each decreases: all men shall praise him who is obedient to the law; but he who is disobedient shall be punished by the guardians of the law as a man wanting in true taste, and uninstructed in the laws of bridal song. Drunkenness is always improper, except at the festivals of the God who gave wine; and peculiarly dangerous, when a man is engaged in the business of marriage; at such a crisis of their lives a bride and bridegroom ought to have all their wits about them—they ought to take care that their offspring may be born of reasonable beings; for on what day or night Heaven will give them increase, who can say? Moreover, they ought not to be begetting children when their bodies are dissipated by intoxication, but their offspring should be compact and solid, quiet and compounded properly; whereas the drunkard is all abroad in all his actions, and is beside himself both in body and soul. Wherefore, also, the drunken man is bad and unsteady in sowing the seed of increase, and is likely to beget offspring who will be unstable and untrustworthy, and cannot be expected to walk straight either in body or mind. Hence during the whole year and all his life long, and especially while he is begetting children, he ought to take care and not intentionally do what is injurious

to health, or what involves insolence and wrong; for he cannot help leaving the impression of himself on the souls and bodies of his offspring, and he begets children in every way inferior. And especially on the day and night of marriage should a man abstain from such things. For the beginning, which is also a God dwelling in man, preserves all things, if it meet with proper respect from each individual. He who marries is further to consider, that one of the two houses in the lot is the nest and nursery of his young, and there he is to marry and make a home for himself and bring up his children, going away from his father and mother. For in friendships there must be some degree of desire, in order to cement and bind together diversities of character; but excessive intercourse not having the desire which is created by time, insensibly dissolves friendships from a feeling of satiety; wherefore a man and his wife shall leave to his and her father and mother their own dwelling-places, and themselves go as to a colony and dwell there, and visit and be visited by their parents; and they shall beget and bring up children, handing on the torch of life from one generation to another, and worshipping the Gods according to law forever.

In the next place, we have to consider what sort of property will be most convenient. There is no difficulty either in understanding or acquiring most kinds of property, but there is great difficulty in what relates to slaves. And the reason is, that we speak about them in a way which is right and which is not right; for what we say about our slaves is consistent and also inconsistent with our practice about them.

Megillus/ I do not understand, Stranger, what you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ I am not surprised, Megillus, for the state of the Helots among the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most controverted and disputed

about, some approving and some condemning it; there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the Heracleots, who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae. Looking at these and the like examples, what ought we to do concerning property in slaves? I made a remark, in passing, which naturally elicited a question about my meaning from you. It was this: —We know that all would agree that we should have the best and most attached slaves whom we can get. For many a man has found his slaves better in every way than brethren or sons, and many times they have saved the lives and property of their masters and their whole house—such tales are well known.

Megillus/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ But may we not also say that the soul of the slave is utterly corrupt, and that no man of sense ought to trust them? And the wisest of our poets, speaking of Zeus, says:

> 'Far-seeing Zeus takes away half the understanding of men whom the day of slavery subdues.'

Different persons have got these two different notions of slaves in their minds—some of them utterly distrust their servants, and, as if they were wild beasts, chastise them with goads and whips, and make their souls three times, or rather many times, as slavish as they were before; —and others do just the opposite.

Megillus/ True.

Clinias/ Then what are we to do in our own country, Stranger, seeing that there are such differences in the treatment of slaves by their owners?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, Cleinias, there can be no doubt that man is a troublesome animal, and therefore he is not very manageable, nor likely to become so, when you attempt

to introduce the necessary division of slave, and freeman, and master.

Clinias/ That is obvious.

Athenian Stranger/ He is a troublesome piece of goods, as has been often shown by the frequent revolts of the Messenians, and the great mischiefs which happen in states having many slaves who speak the same language, and the numerous robberies and lawless life of the Italian banditti, as they are called. A man who considers all this is fairly at a loss. Two remedies alone remain to us, —not to have the slaves of the same country, nor if possible, speaking the same language; in this way they will more easily be held in subjection: secondly, we should tend them carefully, not only out of regard to them, but yet more out of respect to ourselves. And the right treatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if possible, even more justice than to those who are our equals; for he who naturally and genuinely reverences justice, and hates injustice, is discovered in his dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily be unjust. And he who in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety and injustice, will best sow the seeds of virtue in them; and this may be truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of every other having authority in relation to his inferiors. Slaves ought to be punished as they deserve, and not admonished as if they were freemen, which will only make them conceited. The language used to a servant ought always to be that of a command, and we ought not to jest with them, whether they are males or females—this is a foolish way which many people have of setting up their slaves, and making the life of servitude more disagreeable both for them and for their masters.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Now that each of the citizens is provided, as far as possible, with a sufficient number of suitable slaves who can help him in what he has to do, we may next proceed to describe their dwellings.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ The city being new and hitherto uninhabited, care ought to be taken of all the buildings, and the manner of building each of them, and also of the temples and walls. These, Cleinias, were matters which properly came before the marriages; —but, as we are only talking, there is no objection to changing the order. If, however, our plan of legislation is ever to take effect, then the house shall precede the marriage if God so will, and afterwards we will come to the regulations about marriage; but at present we are only describing these matters in a general outline.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ The temples are to be placed all-round the agora, and the whole city built on the heights in a circle, for the sake of defense and for the sake of purity. Near the temples are to be placed buildings for the magistrates and the courts of law; in these plaintiff and defendant will receive their due, and the places will be regarded as most holy, partly because they have to do with holy things, and partly because they are the dwelling-places of holy Gods: and in them will be held the courts in which cases of homicide and other trials of capital offences may fitly take place. As to the walls, Megillus, I agree with Sparta in thinking that they should be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not attempt to disinter them; there is a poetical saying, which is finely expressed, that 'walls ought to be of steel and iron, and not of earth;' besides, how ridiculous of us to be sending out our young men annually into the country to dig and to trench, and to keep off the

enemy by fortifications, under the idea that they are not to be allowed to set foot in our territory, and then, that we should surround ourselves with a wall, which, in the first place, is by no means conducive to the health of cities, and is also apt to produce a certain effeminacy in the minds of the inhabitants, inviting men to run thither instead of repelling their enemies, and leading them to imagine that their safety is due not to their keeping guard day and night, but that when they are protected by walls and gates, then they may sleep in safety; as if they were not meant to labor, and did not know that true repose comes from labor, and that disgraceful indolence and a careless temper of mind is only the renewal of trouble. But if men must have walls, the private houses ought to be so arranged from the first that the whole city may be one wall, having all the houses capable of defense by reason of their uniformity and equality towards the streets. The form of the city being that of a single dwelling will have an agreeable aspect, and being easily guarded will be infinitely better for security. Until the original building is completed, these should be the principal objects of the inhabitants; and the wardens of the city should superintend the work, and should impose a fine on him who is negligent; and in all that relates to the city they should have a care of cleanliness, and not allow a private person to encroach upon any public property either by buildings or excavations. Further, they ought to take care that the rains from heaven flow off easily, and of any other matters which may have to be administered either within or without the city. The guardians of the law shall pass any further enactments which their experience may show to be necessary, and supply any other points in which the law may be deficient. And now that these matters, and the buildings about the agora, and the gymnasia, and places of instruction, and theatres, are all ready and waiting for scholars and

spectators, let us proceed to the subjects which follow marriage in the order of legislation.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Assuming that marriages exist already, Cleinias, the mode of life during the year after marriage, before children are born, will follow next in order. In what way bride and bridegroom ought to live in a city which is to be superior to other cities, is a matter not at all easy for us to determine. There have been many difficulties already, but this will be the greatest of them, and the most disagreeable to the many. Still I cannot but say what appears to me to be right and true, Cleinias.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ He who imagines that he can give laws for the public conduct of states, while he leaves the private life of citizens wholly to take care of itself; who thinks that individuals may pass the day as they please, and that there is no necessity of order in all things; he, I say, who gives up the control of their private lives, and supposes that they will conform to law in their common and public life, is making a great mistake. Why have I made this remark? Why, because I am going to enact that the bridegrooms should live at the common tables, just as they did before marriage. This was a singularity when first enacted by the legislator in your parts of the world, Megillus and Cleinias, as I should suppose, on the occasion of some war or other similar danger, which caused the passing of the law, and which would be likely to occur in thinly-peopled places, and in times of pressure. But when men had once tried and been accustomed to a common table, experience showed that the institution greatly conduced to security; and in some such manner the custom of having common tables arose among you.

Clinias/ Likely enough.

Athenian Stranger/ I said that there may have been singularity and danger in imposing such a custom at first, but that now there is not the same difficulty. There is, however, another institution which is the natural sequel to this, and would be excellent, if it existed anywhere, but at present it does not. The institution of which I am about to speak is not easily described or executed; and would be like the legislator 'combing wool into the fire' as people say, or performing any other impossible and useless feat.

Clinias/ What is the cause, Stranger, of this extreme hesitation?

Athenian Stranger/ You shall hear without any fruitless loss of time. That which has law and order in a state is the cause of every good, but that which is disordered or ill-ordered is often the ruin of that which is well-ordered; and at this point the argument is now waiting. For with you, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables of men are, as I said, a heaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. They have no similar institution of public tables in the light of day, and just that part of the human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weakness—I mean the female sex—has been left without regulation by the legislator, which is a great mistake. And, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might have been far better, if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter, but in proportion as woman's nature is inferior to that of men in capacity for virtue, in that degree the consequence of such neglect is more than twice as important. The careful consideration of this matter, and the arranging and ordering on a common principle of all our

institutions relating both to men and women, greatly conduces to the happiness of the state. But at present, such is the unfortunate condition of mankind, that no man of sense will even venture to speak of common tables in places and cities in which they have never been established at all; and how can anyone avoid being utterly ridiculous, who attempts to compel women to show in public how much they eat and drink? There is nothing at which the sex is more likely to take offence. For women are accustomed to creep into dark places, and when dragged out into the light they will exert their utmost powers of resistance, and be far too much for the legislator. And therefore, as I said before, in most places they will not endure to have the truth spoken without raising a tremendous outcry, but in this state perhaps they may. And if we may assume that our whole discussion about the state has not been mere idle talk, I should like to prove to you, if you will consent to listen, that this institution is good and proper; but if you had rather not, I will refrain.

Clinias/ There is nothing which we should both of us like better, Stranger, than to hear what you have to say.

Athenian Stranger/ Very good; and you must not be surprised if I go back a little, for we have plenty of leisure, and there is nothing to prevent us from considering in every point of view the subject of law.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us return once more to what we were saying at first. Every man should understand that the human race either had no beginning at all, and will never have an end, but always will be and has been; or that it began an immense while ago.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, and have there not been constitutions and destructions of states, and all sorts of pursuits both orderly and disorderly, and diverse desires of meats and drinks always, and in all the world, and all sorts of changes of the seasons in which animals may be expected to have undergone innumerable transformations of themselves?

Clinias/ No doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ And may we not suppose that vines appeared, which had previously no existence, and also olives, and the gifts of Demeter and her daughter, of which one Triptolemus was the minister, and that, before these existed, animals took to devouring each other as they do still?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, the practice of men sacrificing one another still exists among many nations; while, on the other hand, we hear of other human beings who did not even venture to taste the flesh of a cow and had no animal sacrifices, but only cakes and fruits dipped in honey, and similar pure offerings, but no flesh of animals; from these they abstained under the idea that they ought not to eat them, and might not stain the altars of the Gods with blood. For in those days men are said to have lived a sort of Orphic life, having the use of all lifeless things, but abstaining from all living things.

Clinias/ Such has been the constant tradition, and is very likely true.

Athenian Stranger/ Someone might say to us, What is the drift of all this?

Clinias/ A very pertinent question, Stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ And therefore I will endeavor, Cleinias, if I can, to draw the natural inference.

Clinias/ Proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ I see that among men all things depend upon three wants and desires, of which the end is virtue, if they are rightly led by them, or the opposite if wrongly. Now these are eating and drinking, which begin at birth—every animal has a natural desire for them, and is violently excited, and rebels against him who says that he must not satisfy all his pleasures and appetites, and get rid of all the corresponding pains—and the third and greatest and sharpest want and desire breaks out last, and is the fire of sexual lust, which kindles in men every species of wantonness and madness. And these three disorders we must endeavor to master by the three great principles of fear and law and right reason; turning them away from that which is called pleasantest to the best, using the Muses and the Gods who preside over contests to extinguish their increase and influx.

But to return: —After marriage let us speak of the birth of children, and after their birth of their nurture and education. In the course of discussion the several laws will be perfected, and we shall at last arrive at the common tables. Whether such associations are to be confined to men, or extended to women also, we shall see better when we approach and take a nearer view of them; and we may then determine what previous institutions are required and will have to precede them. As I said before, we shall see them more in detail, and shall be better able to lay down the laws which are proper or suited to them.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us keep in mind the words which have now been spoken; for hereafter there may be need of them.

Clinias/ What do you bid us keep in mind?

Athenian Stranger/ That which we comprehended under the three words—first, eating, secondly, drinking, thirdly, the excitement of love.

Clinias/ We shall be sure to remember, Stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Very good. Then let us now proceed to marriage, and teach persons in what way they shall beget children, threatening them, if they disobey, with the terrors of the law.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ The bride and bridegroom should consider that they are to produce for the state the best and fairest specimens of children which they can. Now all men who are associated in any action always succeed when they attend and give their mind to what they are doing, but when they do not give their mind or have no mind, they fail; wherefore let the bridegroom give his mind to the bride and to the begetting of children, and the bride in like manner give her mind to the bridegroom, and particularly at the time when their children are not yet born. And let the women whom we have chosen be the overseers of such matters, and let them in whatever number, large or small, and at whatever time the magistrates may command, assemble every day in the temple of Eileithyia during a third part of the day, and being there assembled, let them inform one another of anyone whom they see, whether man or woman, of those who are begetting children, disregarding the ordinances given at the time when the nuptial sacrifices and ceremonies were performed. Let the begetting of children and the supervision of those who are begetting them continue ten years and no longer, during the time when marriage is fruitful. But if any continue without children up to this time, let them take counsel with their kindred and with the women holding the office of overseer and be divorced for their

mutual benefit. If, however, any dispute arises about what is proper and for the interest of either party, they shall choose ten of the guardians of the law and abide by their permission and appointment. The women who preside over these matters shall enter into the houses of the young, and partly by admonitions and partly by threats make them give over their folly and error: if they persist, let the women go and tell the guardians of the law, and the guardians shall prevent them. But if they too cannot prevent them, they shall bring the matter before the people; and let them write up their names and make oath that they cannot reform such and such an one; and let him who is thus written up, if he cannot in a court of law convict those who have inscribed his name, be deprived of the privileges of a citizen in the following respects: —let him not go to weddings nor to the thanksgivings after the birth of children; and if he go, let anyone who pleases strike him with impunity; and let the same regulations hold about women: let not a woman be allowed to appear abroad, or receive honor, or go to nuptial and birthday festivals, if she in like manner be written up as acting disorderly and cannot obtain a verdict. And if, when they themselves have done begetting children according to the law, a man or woman have connection with another man or woman who are still begetting children, let the same penalties be inflicted upon them as upon those who are still having a family; and when the time for procreation has passed let the man or woman who refrains in such matters be held in esteem, and let those who do not refrain be held in the contrary of esteem—that is to say, disesteem. Now, if the greater part of mankind behave modestly, the enactments of law may be left to slumber; but, if they are disorderly, the enactments having been passed, let them be carried into execution. To every man the first year is the beginning of life, and the time of birth ought to be written

down in the temples of their fathers as the beginning of existence to every child, whether boy or girl. Let every phratria have inscribed on a whited wall the names of the successive archons by whom the years are reckoned. And near to them let the living members of the phratria be inscribed, and when they depart life let them be erased. The limit of marriageable ages for a woman shall be from sixteen to twenty years at the longest, —for a man, from thirty to thirty-five years; and let a woman hold office at forty, and a man at thirty years. Let a man go out to war from twenty to sixty years, and for a woman, if there appear any need to make use of her in military service, let the time of service be after she shall have brought forth children up to fifty years of age; and let regard be had to what is possible and suitable to each.

Book 7.

Athenian Stranger/ And now, assuming children of both sexes to have been born, it will be proper for us to consider, in the next place, their nurture and education; this cannot be left altogether unnoticed, and yet may be thought a subject fitted rather for precept and admonition than for law. In private life there are many little things, not always apparent, arising out of the pleasures and pains and desires of individuals, which run counter to the intention of the legislator, and make the characters of the citizens various and dissimilar: —this is an evil in states; for by reason of their smallness and frequent occurrence, there would be an unseemliness and want of propriety in making them penal by law; and if made penal, they are the destruction of the written law because mankind get the habit of frequently transgressing the law in small matters. The result is that you cannot legislate about them, and still less can you be silent. I speak somewhat darkly, but I shall endeavor also to bring my wares into the light of day, for I acknowledge that at present there is a want of clearness in what I am saying.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Am I not right in maintaining that a good education is that which tends most to the improvement of mind and body?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ And nothing can be plainer than that the fairest bodies are those which grow up from infancy in the best and straightest manner?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And do we not further observe that the first shoot of every living thing is by far the greatest and fullest? Many will even contend that a man at twenty-five does not reach twice the height which he attained at five.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, and is not rapid growth without proper and abundant exercise the source of endless evils in the body?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And the body should have the most exercise when it receives most nourishment?

Clinias/ But, Stranger, are we to impose this great amount of exercise upon newly-born infants?

Athenian Stranger/ Nay, rather on the bodies of infants still unborn.

Clinias/ What do you mean, my good sir? In the process of gestation?

Athenian Stranger/ Exactly. I am not at all surprised that you have never heard of this very peculiar sort of gymnastic applied to such little creatures, which, although strange, I will endeavor to explain to you.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ The practice is more easy for us to understand than for you, by reason of certain amusements which are carried to excess by us at Athens. Not only boys, but often older persons, are in the habit of keeping quails and cocks, which they train to fight one another. And they are far from thinking that the contests in which they stir them up to fight with one another are sufficient exercise; for, in addition to this, they carry them about tucked beneath their armpits, holding the smaller birds in their hands, the larger under their arms, and go for a walk of a great many miles for the sake of health, that is to say, not their own health, but the health of the birds; whereby they prove to any intelligent person, that all bodies are benefited by shakings and movements, when they are moved without weariness, whether the motion proceeds from themselves, or

is caused by a swing, or at sea, or on horseback, or by other bodies in whatever way moving, and that thus gaining the mastery over food and drink, they are able to impart beauty and health and strength. But admitting all this, what follows? Shall we make a ridiculous law that the pregnant woman shall walk about and fashion the embryo within as we fashion wax before it hardens, and after birth swathe the infant for two years? Suppose that we compel nurses, under penalty of a legal fine, to be always carrying the children somewhere or other, either to the temples, or into the country, or to their relations' houses, until they are well able to stand, and to take care that their limbs are not distorted by leaning on them when they are too young, —they should continue to carry them until the infant has completed its third year; the nurses should be strong, and there should be more than one of them. Shall these be our rules, and shall we impose a penalty for the neglect of them? No, no; the penalty of which we were speaking will fall upon our own heads more than enough.

Clinias/ What penalty?

Athenian Stranger/ Ridicule, and the difficulty of getting the feminine and servant-like dispositions of the nurses to comply.

Clinias/ Then why was there any need to speak of the matter at all?

Athenian Stranger/ The reason is, that masters and freemen in states, when they hear of it, are very likely to arrive at a true conviction that without due regulation of private life in cities, stability in the laying down of laws is hardly to be expected; and he who makes this reflection may himself adopt the laws just now mentioned, and, adopting them, may order his house and state well and be happy.

Clinias/ Likely enough.

Athenian Stranger/ And therefore let us proceed with our legislation until we have determined the exercises which are suited to the souls of young children, in the same manner in which we have begun to go through the rules relating to their bodies.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us assume, then, as a first principle in relation both to the body and soul of very young creatures, that nursing and moving about by day and night is good for them all, and that the younger they are, the more they will need it; infants should live, if that were possible, as if they were always rocking at sea. This is the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion—rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music.

Clinias/ Well, Stranger, and what is the reason of this?

Athenian Stranger/ The reason is obvious.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear, which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when someone applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent internal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending the children to sleep, and making the Bacchantes, although they remain awake, to dance to the pipe with the help of the Gods to whom they

offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their frenzy. And, to express what I mean in a word, there is a good deal to be said in favor of this treatment.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But if fear has such a power we ought to infer from these facts, that every soul which from youth upward has been familiar with fears, will be made more liable to fear, and everyone will allow that this is the way to form a habit of cowardice and not of courage.

Clinias/ No doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ And, on the other hand, the habit of overcoming, from our youth upwards, the fears and terrors which beset us, may be said to be an exercise of courage.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And we may say that the use of exercise and motion in the earliest years of life greatly contributes to create a part of virtue in the soul.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ Further, a cheerful temper, or the reverse, may be regarded as having much to do with high spirit on the one hand, or with cowardice on the other.

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Then now we must endeavor to show how and to what extent we may, if we please, without difficulty implant either character in the young.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ There is a common opinion, that luxury makes the disposition of youth discontented and irascible and vehemently excited by trifles; that on the other hand excessive and savage servitude makes men mean and

abject, and haters of their kind, and therefore makes them undesirable associates.

Clinias/ But how must the state educate those who do not as yet understand the language of the country, and are therefore incapable of appreciating any sort of instruction?

Athenian Stranger/ I will tell you how: —Every animal that is born is wont to utter some cry, and this is especially the case with man, and he is also affected with the inclination to weep more than any other animal.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ Do not nurses, when they want to know what an infant desires, judge by these signs? —when anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but, when he weeps and cries out, then he is not pleased. For tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate. Now the time which is thus spent is no less than three years, and is a very considerable portion of life to be passed ill or well.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Does not the discontented and ungracious nature appear to you to be full of lamentations and sorrows more than a good man ought to be?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, but if during these three years every possible care were taken that our nursling should have as little of sorrow and fear, and in general of pain as was possible, might we not expect in early childhood to make his soul more gentle and cheerful?

Clinias/ To be sure, Stranger, —more especially if we could procure him a variety of pleasures.

Athenian Stranger/ There I can no longer agree, Cleinias: you amaze me. To bring him up in such a way would be his utter ruin; for the beginning is always the most critical part of education. Let us see whether I am right.

Clinias/ Proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ The point about which you and I differ is of great importance, and I hope that you, Megillus, will help to decide between us. For I maintain that the true life should neither seek for pleasures, nor, on the other hand, entirely avoid pains, but should embrace the middle state, which I just spoke of as gentle and benign, and is a state which we by some divine presage and inspiration rightly ascribe to God. Now, I say, he among men, too, who would be divine ought to pursue after this mean habit—he should not rush headlong into pleasures, for he will not be free from pains; nor should we allow anyone, young or old, male or female, to be thus given any more than ourselves, and least of all the newly-born infant, for in infancy more than at any other time the character is engrained by habit. Nay, more, if I were not afraid of appearing to be ridiculous, I would say that a woman during her year of pregnancy should of all women be most carefully tended, and kept from violent or excessive pleasures and pains, and should at that time cultivate gentleness and benevolence and kindness.

Clinias/ You need not ask Megillus, Stranger, which of us has most truly spoken; for I myself agree that all men ought to avoid the life of unmingled pain or pleasure, and pursue always a middle course. And having spoken well, may I add that you have been well answered?

Athenian Stranger/ Very good, Cleinias; and now let us all three consider a further point.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ That all the matters which we are now describing are commonly called by the general name of unwritten customs, and what are termed the laws of our ancestors are all of similar nature. And the reflection which lately arose in our minds, that we can neither call these things laws, nor yet leave them unmentioned, is justified; for they are the bonds of the whole state, and come in between the written laws which are or are hereafter to be laid down; they are just ancestral customs of great antiquity, which, if they are rightly ordered and made habitual, shield and preserve the previously existing written law; but if they depart from right and fall into disorder, then they are like the props of builders which slip away out of their place and cause a universal ruin—one part drags another down, and the fair superstructure falls because the old foundations are undermined. Reflecting upon this, Cleinias, you ought to bind together the new state in every possible way, omitting nothing, whether great or small, of what are called laws or manners or pursuits, for by these means a city is bound together, and all these things are only lasting when they depend upon one another; and, therefore, we must not wonder if we find that many apparently trifling customs or usages come pouring in and lengthening out our laws.

Clinias/ Very true: we are disposed to agree with you.

Athenian Stranger/ Up to the age of three years, whether of boy or girl, if a person strictly carries out our previous regulations and makes them a principal aim, he will do much for the advantage of the young creatures. But at three, four, five, and even six years the childish nature will require sports; now is the time to get rid of self-will in him, punishing him, but not so as to disgrace him. We were saying about slaves, that we ought neither to add insult to punishment so as to anger them, nor yet to leave them unpunished lest they become self-willed; and a like rule is to be observed in the

case of the free-born. Children at that age have certain natural modes of amusement which they find out for themselves when they meet. And all the children who are between the ages of three and six ought to meet at the temples of the villages, the several families of a village uniting on one spot. The nurses are to see that the children behave properly and orderly, —they themselves and all their companies are to be under the control of twelve matrons, one for each company, who are annually selected to inspect them from the women previously mentioned, [i.e. the women who have authority over marriage], whom the guardians of the law appoint. These matrons shall be chosen by the women who have authority over marriage, one out of each tribe; all are to be of the same age; and let each of them, as soon as she is appointed, hold office and go to the temples every day, punishing all offenders, male or female, who are slaves or strangers, by the help of some of the public slaves; but if any citizen disputes the punishment, let her bring him before the wardens of the city; or, if there be no dispute, let her punish him herself. After the age of six years the time has arrived for the separation of the sexes, —let boys live with boys, and girls in like manner with girls. Now they must begin to learn—the boys going to teachers of horsemanship and the use of the bow, the javelin, and sling, and the girls too, if they do not object, at any rate until they know how to manage these weapons, and especially how to handle heavy arms; for I may note, that the practice which now prevails is almost universally misunderstood.

Clinias/ In what respect?

Athenian Stranger/ In that the right and left hand are supposed to be by nature differently suited for our various uses of them; whereas no difference is found in the use of the feet and the lower limbs; but in the use of the hands we are, as it were, maimed by the folly of nurses and mothers;

for although our several limbs are by nature balanced, we create a difference in them by bad habit. In some cases this is of no consequence, as, for example, when we hold the lyre in the left hand, and the plectrum in the right, but it is downright folly to make the same distinction in other cases. The custom of the Scythians proves our error; for they not only hold the bow from them with the left hand and draw the arrow to them with their right, but use either hand for both purposes. And there are many similar examples in charioteering and other things, from which we may learn that those who make the left side weaker than the right act contrary to nature. In the case of the plectrum, which is of horn only, and similar instruments, as I was saying, it is of no consequence, but makes a great difference, and may be of very great importance to the warrior who has to use iron weapons, bows and javelins, and the like; above all, when in heavy armor, he has to fight against heavy armor. And there is a very great difference between one who has learnt and one who has not, and between one who has been trained in gymnastic exercises and one who has not been. For as he who is perfectly skilled in the Pancratium or boxing or wrestling, is not unable to fight from his left side, and does not limp and draggle in confusion when his opponent makes him change his position, so in heavy-armed fighting, and in all other things, if I am not mistaken, the like holds—he who has these double powers of attack and defense ought not in any case to leave them either unused or untrained, if he can help; and if a person had the nature of Geryon or Briareus he ought to be able with his hundred hands to throw a hundred darts. Now, the magistrates, male and female, should see to all these things, the women superintending the nursing and amusements of the children, and the men superintending their education, that all of them, boys and

girls alike, may be sound hand and foot, and may not, if they can help, spoil the gifts of nature by bad habits.

Education has two branches, —one of gymnastic, which is concerned with the body, and the other of music, which is designed for the improvement of the soul. And gymnastic has also two branches—dancing and wrestling; and one sort of dancing imitates musical recitation, and aims at preserving dignity and freedom, the other aims at producing health, agility, and beauty in the limbs and parts of the body, giving the proper flexion and extension to each of them, a harmonious motion being diffused everywhere, and forming a suitable accompaniment to the dance. As regards wrestling, the tricks which Antaeus and Cercyon devised in their systems out of a vain spirit of competition, or the tricks of boxing which Epeius or Amycus invented, are useless and unsuitable for war, and do not deserve to have much said about them; but the art of wrestling erect and keeping free the neck and hands and sides, working with energy and constancy, with a composed strength, and for the sake of health—these are always useful, and are not to be neglected, but to be enjoined alike on masters and scholars, when we reach that part of legislation; and we will desire the one to give their instructions freely, and the others to receive them thankfully. Nor, again, must we omit suitable imitations of war in our choruses; here in Crete you have the armed dances of the Curetes, and the Lacedaemonians have those of the Dioscuri. And our virgin lady, delighting in the amusement of the dance, thought it not fit to amuse herself with empty hands; she must be clothed in a complete suit of armor, and in this attire go through the dance; and youths and maidens should in every respect imitate her, esteeming highly the favor of the Goddess, both with a view to the necessities of war, and to festive occasions: it will be right also for the boys, until such time as they go out to war, to

make processions and supplications to all the Gods in goodly array, armed and on horseback, in dances and marches, fast or slow, offering up prayers to the Gods and to the sons of Gods; and also engaging in contests and preludes of contests, if at all, with these objects. For these sorts of exercises, and no others, are useful both in peace and war, and are beneficial alike to states and to private houses. But other labors and sports and exercises of the body are unworthy of freemen, O Megillus and Cleinias.

I have now completely described the kind of gymnastic which I said at first ought to be described; if you know of any better, will you communicate your thoughts?

Clinias/ It is not easy, Stranger, to put aside these principles of gymnastic and wrestling and to enunciate better ones.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we must say what has yet to be said about the gifts of the Muses and of Apollo: before, we fancied that we had said all, and that gymnastic alone remained; but now we see clearly what points have been omitted, and should be first proclaimed; of these, then, let us proceed to speak.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Let me tell you once more—although you have heard me say the same before—that caution must be always exercised, both by the speaker and by the hearer, about anything that is very singular and unusual. For my tale is one which many a man would be afraid to tell, and yet I have a confidence which makes me go on.

Clinias/ What have you to say, Stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ I say that in states generally no one has observed that the plays of childhood have a great deal to do with the permanence or want of permanence in legislation. For when plays are ordered with a view to

children having the same plays, and amusing themselves after the same manner, and finding delight in the same playthings, the more solemn institutions of the state are allowed to remain undisturbed. Whereas if sports are disturbed, and innovations are made in them, and they constantly change, and the young never speak of their having the same likings, or the same established notions of good and bad taste, either in the bearing of their bodies or in their dress, but he who devises something new and out of the way in figures and colors and the like is held in special honor, we may truly say that no greater evil can happen in a state; for he who changes the sports is secretly changing the manners of the young, and making the old to be dishonored among them and the new to be honored. And I affirm that there is nothing which is a greater injury to all states than saying or thinking thus. Will you hear me tell how great I deem the evil to be?

Clinias/ You mean the evil of blaming antiquity in states?

Athenian Stranger/ Exactly.

Clinias/ If you are speaking of that, you will find in us hearers who are disposed to receive what you say not unfavorably but most favorably.

Athenian Stranger/ I should expect so.

Clinias/ Proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, let us give all the greater heed to one another's words. The argument affirms that any change whatever except from evil is the most dangerous of all things; this is true in the case of the seasons and of the winds, in the management of our bodies and the habits of our minds—true of all things except, as I said before, of the bad. He who looks at the constitution of individuals accustomed to eat any sort of meat, or drink any drink, or to do any work which they can get, may see that they are at

first disordered by them, but afterwards, as time goes on, their bodies grow adapted to them, and they learn to know and like variety, and have good health and enjoyment of life; and if ever afterwards they are confined again to a superior diet, at first they are troubled with disorders, and with difficulty become habituated to their new food. A similar principle we may imagine to hold good about the minds of men and the natures of their souls. For when they have been brought up in certain laws, which by some Divine Providence have remained unchanged during long ages, so that no one has any memory or tradition of their ever having been otherwise than they are, then everyone is afraid and ashamed to change that which is established. The legislator must somehow find a way of implanting this reverence for antiquity, and I would propose the following way: —People are apt to fancy, as I was saying before, that when the plays of children are altered they are merely plays, not seeing that the most serious and detrimental consequences arise out of the change; and they readily comply with the child's wishes instead of deterring him, not considering that these children who make innovations in their games, when they grow up to be men, will be different from the last generation of children, and, being different, will desire a different sort of life, and under the influence of this desire will want other institutions and laws; and no one of them reflects that there will follow what I just now called the greatest of evils to states. Changes in bodily fashions are no such serious evils, but frequent changes in the praise and censure of manners are the greatest of evils, and require the utmost prevision.

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ And now do we still hold to our former assertion, that rhythms and music in general are imitations of good and evil characters in men? What say you?

Clinias/ That is the only doctrine which we can admit.

Athenian Stranger/ Must we not, then, try in every possible way to prevent our youth from even desiring to imitate new modes either in dance or song? nor must anyone be allowed to offer them varieties of pleasures.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Can any of us imagine a better mode of effecting this object than that of the Egyptians?

Clinias/ What is their method?

Athenian Stranger/ To consecrate every sort of dance or melody. First we should ordain festivals, —calculating for the year what they ought to be, and at what time, and in honor of what Gods, sons of Gods, and heroes they ought to be celebrated; and, in the next place, what hymns ought to be sung at the several sacrifices, and with what dances the particular festival is to be honored. This has to be arranged at first by certain persons, and, when arranged, the whole assembly of the citizens are to offer sacrifices and libations to the Fates and all the other Gods, and to consecrate the several odes to Gods and heroes: and if anyone offers any other hymns or dances to anyone of the Gods, the priests and priestesses, acting in concert with the guardians of the law, shall, with the sanction of religion and the law, exclude him, and he who is excluded, if he do not submit, shall be liable all his life long to have a suit of impiety brought against him by anyone who likes.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ In the consideration of this subject, let us remember what is due to ourselves.

Clinias/ To what are you referring?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean that any young man, and much more any old one, when he sees or hears anything strange or unaccustomed, does not at once run to embrace the paradox, but he stands considering, like a person who is

at a place where three paths meet, and does not very well know his way—he may be alone or he may be walking with others, and he will say to himself and them, 'Which is the way?' and will not move forward until he is satisfied that he is going right. And this is what we must do in the present instance: —A strange discussion on the subject of law has arisen, which requires the utmost consideration, and we should not at our age be too ready to speak about such great matters, or be confident that we can say anything certain all in a moment.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we will allow time for reflection, and decide when we have given the subject sufficient consideration. But that we may not be hindered from completing the natural arrangement of our laws, let us proceed to the conclusion of them in due order; for very possibly, if God will, the exposition of them, when completed; may throw light on our present perplexity.

Clinias/ Excellent, Stranger; let us do as you propose.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then affirm the paradox that strains of music are our laws (νόμοι) and this latter being the name which the ancients gave to lyric songs, they probably would not have very much objected to our proposed application of the word. Someone, either asleep or awake, must have had a dreamy suspicion of their nature. And let our decree be as follows: —No one in singing or dancing shall offend against public and consecrated models, and the general fashion among the youth, any more than he would offend against any other law. And he who observes this law shall be blameless; but he who is disobedient, as I was saying, shall be punished by the guardians of the laws, and by the priests and priestesses. Suppose that we imagine this to be our law.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Can anyone who makes such laws escape ridicule? Let us see. I think that our only safety will be in first framing certain models for composers. One of these models shall be as follows: —If when a sacrifice is going on, and the victims are being burnt according to law, —if, I say, anyone who may be a son or brother, standing by another at the altar and over the victims, horribly blasphemes, will not his words inspire despondency and evil omens and forebodings in the mind of his father and of his other kinsmen?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And this is just what takes place in almost all our cities. A magistrate offers a public sacrifice, and there come in not one but many choruses, who take up a position a little way from the altar, and from time to time pour forth all sorts of horrible blasphemies on the sacred rites, exciting the souls of the audience with words and rhythms and melodies most sorrowful to hear; and he who at the moment when the city is offering sacrifice makes the citizens weep most, carries away the palm of victory. Now, ought we not to forbid such strains as these? And if ever our citizens must hear such lamentations, then on some unblest and inauspicious day let there be choruses of foreign and hired minstrels, like those hirelings who accompany the departed at funerals with barbarous Carian chants. That is the sort of thing which will be appropriate if we have such strains at all; and let the apparel of the singers be, not circlets and ornaments of gold, but the reverse. Enough of all this. I will simply ask once more whether we shall lay down as one of our principles of song——

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That we should avoid every word of evil omen; let that kind of song which is of good omen be heard everywhere and always in our state. I need hardly ask again, but shall assume that you agree with me.

Clinias/ By all means; that law is approved by the suffrages of us all.

Athenian Stranger/ But what shall be our next musical law or type? Ought not prayers to be offered up to the Gods when we sacrifice?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And our third law, if I am not mistaken, will be to the effect that our poets, understanding prayers to be requests which we make to the Gods, will take especial heed that they do not by mistake ask for evil instead of good. To make such a prayer would surely be too ridiculous.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Were we not a little while ago quite convinced that no silver or golden Plutus should dwell in our state?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ And what has it been the object of our argument to show? Did we not imply that the poets are not always quite capable of knowing what is good or evil? And if one of them utters a mistaken prayer in song or words, he will make our citizens pray for the opposite of what is good in matters of the highest import; than which, as I was saying, there can be few greater mistakes. Shall we then propose as one of our laws and models relating to the Muses——

Clinias/ What? —will you explain the law more precisely?

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we make a law that the poet shall compose nothing contrary to the ideas of the lawful, or

just, or beautiful, or good, which are allowed in the state? nor shall he be permitted to communicate his compositions to any private individuals, until he shall have shown them to the appointed judges and the guardians of the law, and they are satisfied with them. As to the persons whom we appoint to be our legislators about music and as to the director of education, these have been already indicated. Once more then, as I have asked more than once, shall this be our third law, and type, and model—What do you say?

Clinias/ Let it be so, by all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it will be proper to have hymns and praises of the Gods, intermingled with prayers; and after the Gods prayers and praises should be offered in like manner to demigods and heroes, suitable to their several characters.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ In the next place there will be no objection to a law, that citizens who are departed and have done good and energetic deeds, either with their souls or with their bodies, and have been obedient to the laws, should receive eulogies; this will be very fitting.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ But to honor with hymns and panegyrics those who are still alive is not safe; a man should run his course, and make a fair ending, and then we will praise him; and let praise be given equally to women as well as men who have been distinguished in virtue. The order of songs and dances shall be as follows: —There are many ancient musical compositions and dances which are excellent, and from these the newly-founded city may freely select what is proper and suitable; and they shall choose judges of not less than fifty years of age, who shall make the selection, and any of the old poems which they deem

sufficient they shall include; any that are deficient or altogether unsuitable, they shall either utterly throw aside, or examine and amend, taking into their counsel poets and musicians, and making use of their poetical genius; but explaining to them the wishes of the legislator in order that they may regulate dancing, music, and all choral strains, according to the mind of the judges; and not allowing them to indulge, except in some few matters, their individual pleasures and fancies. Now the irregular strain of music is always made ten thousand times better by attaining to law and order, and rejecting the honeyed Muse—not however that we mean wholly to exclude pleasure, which is the characteristic of all music. And if a man be brought up from childhood to the age of discretion and maturity in the use of the orderly and severe music, when he hears the opposite he detests it, and calls it illiberal; but if trained in the sweet and vulgar music, he deems the severer kind cold and displeasing. So that, as I was saying before, while he who hears them gains no more pleasure from the one than from the other, the one has the advantage of making those who are trained in it better men, whereas the other makes them worse.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, we must distinguish and determine on some general principle what songs are suitable to women, and what to men, and must assign to them their proper melodies and rhythms. It is shocking for a whole harmony to be inharmonical, or for a rhythm to be unrhythmical, and this: will happen when the melody is inappropriate to them. And therefore the legislator must assign to these also their forms. Now both sexes have melodies and rhythms which of necessity belong to them; and those of women are clearly enough indicated by their natural difference. The grand, and that which tends to

courage, may be fairly called manly; but that which inclines to moderation and temperance, may be declared both in law and in ordinary speech to be the I more womanly quality. This, then, will be the general order of them.

Let us now speak of the manner of teaching and imparting them, and the persons to whom, and the time when, they are severally to be imparted. As the shipwright first lays down the lines of the keel, and thus, as it were, draws the ship in outline, so do I seek to distinguish the patterns of life, and lay down their keels according to the nature of different men's souls; seeking truly to consider by what means, and in what ways, we may go through the voyage of life best. Now human affairs are hardly worth considering in earnest, and yet we must be in earnest about them, —a sad necessity constrains us. And having got thus far, there will be a fitness in our completing the matter, if we can only find some suitable method of doing so. But what do I mean? Someone may ask this very question, and quite rightly, too.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ I say that about serious matters a man should be serious, and about a matter which is not serious he should not be serious; and that God is the natural and worthy object of our most serious and blessed endeavors, for man, as I said before, is made to be the plaything of God, and this, truly considered, is the best of him; wherefore also every man and woman should walk seriously, and pass life in the noblest of pastimes, and be of another mind from what they are at present.

Clinias/ In what respect?

Athenian Stranger/ At present they think that their serious pursuits should be for the sake of their sports, for they deem war a serious pursuit, which must be managed well for the sake of peace; but the truth is, that there neither

is, nor has been, nor ever will be, either amusement or instruction in any degree worth speaking of in war, which is nevertheless deemed by us to be the most serious of our pursuits. And therefore, as we say, every one of us should live the life of peace as long and as well as he can. And what is the right way of living? Are we to live in sports always? If so, in what kind of sports? We ought to live sacrificing, and singing, and dancing, and then a man will be able to propitiate the Gods, and to defend himself against his enemies and conquer them in battle. The type of song or dance by which he will propitiate them has been described, and the paths along which he is to proceed have been cut for him. He will go forward in the spirit of the poet: —

> 'Telemachus, some things thou wilt thyself find in thy heart, but other things God will suggest; for I deem that thou wast not born or brought up without the will of the Gods.'

And this ought to be the view of our alumni; they ought to think that what has been said is enough for them, and that any other things their Genius and God will suggest to them —he will tell them to whom, and when, and to what Gods severally they are to sacrifice and perform dances, and how they may propitiate the deities, and live according to the appointment of nature; being for the most part puppets, but having some little share of reality.

Megillus/ You have a low opinion of mankind, Stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Nay, Megillus, be not amazed, but forgive me: —I was comparing them with the Gods; and under that feeling I spoke. Let us grant, if you wish, that the human race is not to be despised, but is worthy of some consideration.

Next follow the buildings for gymnasia and schools open to all; these are to be in three places in the midst of the city; and outside the city and in the surrounding country, also in

three places, there shall be schools for horse exercise, and large grounds arranged with a view to archery and the throwing of missiles, at which young men may learn and practice. Of these mention has already been made; and if the mention be not sufficiently explicit, let us speak further of them and embody them in laws. In these several schools let there be dwellings for teachers, who shall be brought from foreign parts by pay, and let them teach those who attend the schools the art of war and the art of music, and the children shall come not only if their parents please, but if they do not please; there shall be compulsory education, as the saying is, of all and sundry, as far as this is possible; and the pupils shall be regarded as belonging to the state rather than to their parents. My law would apply to females as well as males; they shall both go through the same exercises. I assert without fear of contradiction that gymnastic and horsemanship are as suitable to women as to men. Of the truth of this I am persuaded from ancient tradition, and at the present day there are said to be countless myriads of women in the neighborhood of the Black Sea, called Sauromatides, who not only ride on horseback like men, but have enjoined upon them the use of bows and other weapons equally with the men. And I further affirm, that if these things are possible, nothing can be more absurd than the practice which prevails in our own country, of men and women not following the same pursuits with all their strength and with one mind, for thus the state, instead of being a whole, is reduced to a half, but has the same imposts to pay and the same toils to undergo; and what can be a greater mistake for any legislator to make than this?

Clinias/ Very true; yet much of what has been asserted by us, Stranger, is contrary to the custom of states; still, in saying that the discourse should be allowed to proceed, and

that when the discussion is completed, we should choose what seems best, you spoke very properly, and I now feel compunction for what I have said. Tell me, then, what you would next wish to say.

Athenian Stranger/ I should wish to say, Cleinias, as I said before, that if the possibility of these things were not sufficiently proven in fact, then there might be an objection to the argument, but the fact being as I have said, he who rejects the law must find some other ground of objection; and, failing this, our exhortation will still hold good, nor will anyone deny that women ought to share as far as possible in education and in other ways with men. For consider; —if women do not share in their whole life with men, then they must have some other order of life.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And what arrangement of life to be found anywhere is preferable to this community which we are now assigning to them? Shall we prefer that which is adopted by the Thracians and many other races who use their women to till the ground and to be shepherds of their herds and flocks, and to minister to them like slaves? —Or shall we do as we and people in our part of the world do—getting together, as the phrase is, all our goods and chattels into one dwelling, we entrust them to our women, who are the stewards of them, and who also preside over the shuttles and the whole art of spinning? Or shall we take a middle course, as in Lacedaemon, Megillus—letting the girls share in gymnastic and music, while the grown-up women, no longer employed in spinning wool, are hard at work weaving the web of life, which will be no cheap or mean employment, and in the duty of serving and taking care of the household and bringing up children, in which they will observe a sort of mean, not participating in the toils of war; and if there were any necessity that they should fight for their city and

families, unlike the Amazons, they would be unable to take part in archery or any other skilled use of missiles, nor could they, after the example of the Goddess, carry shield or spear, or stand up nobly for their country when it was being destroyed, and strike terror into their enemies, if only because they were seen in regular order? Living as they do, they would never dare at all to imitate the Sauromatides, who, when compared with ordinary women, would appear to be like men. Let him who will, praise your legislators, but I must say what I think. The legislator ought to be whole and perfect, and not half a man only; he ought not to let the female sex live softly and waste money and have no order of life, while he takes the utmost care of the male sex, and leaves half of life only blest with happiness, when he might have made the whole state happy.

Megillus/ What shall we do, Cleinias? Shall we allow a stranger to run down Sparta in this fashion?

Clinias/ Yes; for as we have given him liberty of speech we must let him go on until we have perfected the work of legislation.

Megillus/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then now I may proceed?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ What will be the manner of life among men who may be supposed to have their food and clothing provided for them in moderation, and who have entrusted the practice of the arts to others, and whose husbandry committed to slaves paying a part of the produce, brings them a return sufficient for men living temperately; who, moreover, have common tables in which the men are placed apart, and near them are the common tables of their families, of their daughters and mothers, which day by day, the officers, male and female, are to inspect—they shall see

to the behavior of the company, and so dismiss them; after which the presiding magistrate and his attendants shall honor with libations those Gods to whom that day and night are dedicated, and then go home? To men whose lives are thus ordered, is there no work remaining to be done which is necessary and fitting, but shall each one of them live fattening like a beast? Such a life is neither just nor honorable, nor can he who lives it fail of meeting his due; and the due reward of the idle fatted beast is that he should be torn in pieces by some other valiant beast whose fatness is worn down by brave deeds and toil. These regulations, if we duly consider them, will never be exactly carried into execution under present circumstances, nor as long as women and children and houses and all other things are the private property of individuals; but if we can attain the second-best form of polity, we shall be very well off. And to men living under this second polity there remains a work to be accomplished which is far from being small or insignificant, but is the greatest of all works, and ordained by the appointment of righteous law. For the life which may be truly said to be concerned with the virtue of body and soul is twice, or more than twice, as full of toil and trouble as the pursuit after Pythian and Olympic victories, which debars a man from every employment of life. For there ought to be no bye-work interfering with the greater work of providing the necessary exercise and nourishment for the body, and instruction and education for the soul. Night and day are not long enough for the accomplishment of their perfection and consummation; and therefore to this end all freemen ought to arrange the way in which they will spend their time during the whole course of the day, from morning till evening and from evening till the morning of the next sunrise. There may seem to be some impropriety in the legislator determining minutely the numberless details of

the management of the house, including such particulars as the duty of wakefulness in those who are to be perpetual watchmen of the whole city; for that any citizen should continue during the whole of any night in sleep, instead of being seen by all his servants, always the first to awake and get up—this, whether the regulation is to be called a law or only a practice, should be deemed base and unworthy of a freeman; also that the mistress of the house should be awakened by her handmaidens instead of herself first awakening them, is what the slaves, male and female, and the serving-boys, and, if that were possible, everybody and everything in the house should regard as base. If they rise early, they may all of them do much of their public and of their household business, as magistrates in the city, and masters and mistresses in their private houses, before the sun is up. Much sleep is not required by nature, either for our souls or bodies, or for the actions which they perform. For no one who is asleep is good for anything, any more than if he were dead; but he of us who has the most regard for life and reason keeps awake as long as he can, reserving only so much time for sleep as is expedient for health; and much sleep is not required, if the habit of moderation be once rightly formed. Magistrates in states who keep awake at night are terrible to the bad, whether enemies or citizens, and are honored and reverenced by the just and temperate, and are useful to themselves and to the whole state.

A night which is passed in such a manner, in addition to all the above-mentioned advantages, infuses a sort of courage into the minds of the citizens. When the day breaks, the time has arrived for youth to go to their schoolmasters. Now neither sheep nor any other animals can live without a shepherd, nor can children be left without tutors, or slaves without masters. And of all animals the boy is the most unmanageable, inasmuch as he has the fountain of reason

in him not yet regulated; he is the most insidious, sharp-witted, and insubordinate of animals. Wherefore he must be bound with many bridles; in the first place, when he gets away from mothers and nurses, he must be under the management of tutors on account of his childishness and foolishness; then, again, being a freeman, he must be controlled by teachers, no matter what they teach, and by studies; but he is also a slave, and in that regard any freeman who comes in his way may punish him and his tutor and his instructor, if any of them does anything wrong; and he who comes across him and does not inflict upon him the punishment which he deserves, shall incur the greatest disgrace; and let the guardian of the law, who is the director of education, see to him who coming in the way of the offences which we have mentioned, does not chastise them when he ought, or chastises them in a way which he ought not; let him keep a sharp look-out, and take especial care of the training of our children, directing their natures, and always turning them to good according to the law.

But how can our law sufficiently train the director of education himself; for as yet all has been imperfect, and nothing has been said either clear or satisfactory? Now, as far as possible, the law ought to leave nothing to him, but to explain everything, that he may be an interpreter and tutor to others. About dances and music and choral strains, I have already spoken both as to the character of the selection of them, and the manner in which they are to be amended and consecrated. But we have not as yet spoken, O illustrious guardian of education, of the manner in which your pupils are to use those strains which are written in prose, although you have been informed what martial strains they are to learn and practice; what relates in the first place to the learning of letters, and secondly, to the lyre, and also to calculation, which, as we were saying, is needful for them all

to learn, and any other things which are required with a view to war and the management of house and city, and, looking to the same object, what is useful in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies—the stars and sun and moon, and the various regulations about these matters which are necessary for the whole state—I am speaking of the arrangements of days in periods of months, and of months in years, which are to be observed, in order that seasons and sacrifices and festivals may have their regular and natural order, and keep the city alive and awake, the Gods receiving the honors due to them, and men having a better understanding about them: all these things, O my friend, have not yet been sufficiently declared to you by the legislator. Attend, then, to what I am now going to say: —We were telling you, in the first place, that you were not sufficiently informed about letters, and the objection was to this effect, —that you were never told whether he who was meant to be a respectable citizen should apply himself in detail to that sort of learning, or not apply himself at all; and the same remark holds good of the study of the lyre. But now we say that he ought to attend to them. A fair time for a boy of ten years old to spend in letters is three years; the age of thirteen is the proper time for him to begin to handle the lyre, and he may continue at this for another three years, neither more nor less, and whether his father or himself like or dislike the study, he is not to be allowed to spend more or less time in learning music than the law allows. And let him who disobeys the law be deprived of those youthful honors of which we shall hereafter speak. Hear, however, first of all, what the young ought to learn in the early years of life, and what their instructors ought to teach them. They ought to be occupied with their letters until they are able to read and write; but the acquisition of perfect beauty or quickness in writing, if nature has not stimulated them to acquire these

accomplishments in the given number of years, they should let alone. And as to the learning of compositions committed to writing which are not set to the lyre, whether metrical or without rhythmical divisions, compositions in prose, as they are termed, having no rhythm or harmony—seeing how dangerous are the writings handed down to us by many writers of this class—what will you do with them, O most excellent guardians of the law? or how can the lawgiver rightly direct you about them? I believe that he will be in great difficulty.

Clinias/ What troubles you, Stranger? and why are you so perplexed in your mind?

Athenian Stranger/ You naturally ask, Cleinias, and to you and Megillus, who are my partners in the work of legislation, I must state the more difficult as well as the easier parts of the task.

Clinias/ To what do you refer in this instance?

Athenian Stranger/ I will tell you. There is a difficulty in opposing many myriads of mouths.

Clinias/ Well, and have we not already opposed the popular voice in many important enactments?

Athenian Stranger/ That is quite true; and you mean to imply that the road which we are taking may be disagreeable to some but is agreeable to as many others, or if not to as many, at any rate to persons not inferior to the others, and in company with them you bid me, at whatever risk, to proceed along the path of legislation which has opened out of our present discourse, and to be of good cheer, and not to faint.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And I do not faint; I say, indeed, that we have a great many poets writing in hexameter, trimeter, and all sorts of measures—some who are serious, others who

aim only at raising a laugh—and all mankind declare that the youth who are rightly educated should be brought up in them and saturated with them; some insist that they should be constantly hearing them read aloud, and always learning them, so as to get by heart entire poets; while others select choice passages and long speeches, and make compendiums of them, saying that these ought to be committed to memory, if a man is to be made good and wise by experience and learning of many things. And you want me now to tell them plainly in what they are right and in what they are wrong.

Clinias/ Yes, I do.

Athenian Stranger/ But how can I in one word rightly comprehend all of them? I am of opinion, and, if I am not mistaken, there is a general agreement, that every one of these poets has said many things well and many things the reverse of well; and if this be true, then I do affirm that much learning is dangerous to youth.

Clinias/ How would you advise the guardian of the law to act?

Athenian Stranger/ In what respect?

Clinias/ I mean to what pattern should he look as his guide in permitting the young to learn some things and forbidding them to learn others. Do not shrink from answering.

Athenian Stranger/ My good Cleinias, I rather think that I am fortunate.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ I think that I am not wholly in want of a pattern, for when I consider the words which we have spoken from early dawn until now, and which, as I believe, have been inspired by Heaven, they appear to me to be quite like a poem. When I reflected upon all these words of ours, I naturally felt pleasure, for of all the discourses which I have

ever learnt or heard, either in poetry or prose, this seemed to me to be the justest, and most suitable for young men to hear; I cannot imagine any better pattern than this which the guardian of the law who is also the director of education can have. He cannot do better than advise the teachers to teach the young these words and any which are of a like nature, if he should happen to find them, either in poetry or prose, or if he come across unwritten discourses akin to ours, he should certainly preserve them, and commit them to writing. And, first of all, he shall constrain the teachers themselves to learn and approve them, and any of them who will not, shall not be employed by him, but those whom he finds agreeing in his judgment, he shall make use of and shall commit to them the instruction and education of youth. And here and on this wise let my fanciful tale about letters and teachers of letters come to an end.

Clinias/ I do not think, Stranger, that we have wandered out of the proposed limits of the argument; but whether we are right or not in our whole conception, I cannot be very certain.

Athenian Stranger/ The truth, Cleinias, may be expected to become clearer when, as we have often said, we arrive at the end of the whole discussion about laws.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And now that we have done with the teacher of letters, the teacher of the lyre has to receive orders from us.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ I think that we have only to recollect our previous discussions, and we shall be able to give suitable regulations touching all this part of instruction and education to the teachers of the lyre.

Clinias/ To what do you refer?

Athenian Stranger/ We were saying, if I remember rightly, that the sixty years old choristers of Dionysus were to be specially quick in their perceptions of rhythm and musical composition, that they might be able to distinguish good and bad imitation, that is to say, the imitation of the good or bad soul when under the influence of passion, rejecting the one and displaying the other in hymns and songs, charming the souls of youth, and inviting them to follow and attain virtue by the way of imitation.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And with this view the teacher and the learner ought to use the sounds of the lyre, because its notes are pure, the player who teaches and his pupil rendering note for note in unison; but complexity, and variation of notes, when the strings give one sound and the poet or composer of the melody gives another, —also when they make concords and harmonies in which lesser and greater intervals, slow and quick, or high and low notes, are combined, —or, again, when they make complex variations of rhythms, which they adapt to the notes of the lyre, —all that sort of thing is not suited to those who have to acquire a speedy and useful knowledge of music in three years; for opposite principles are confusing, and create a difficulty in learning, and our young men should learn quickly, and their mere necessary acquirements are not few or trifling, as will be shown in due course. Let the director of education attend to the principles concerning music which we are laying down. As to the songs and words themselves which the masters of choruses are to teach and the character of them, they have been already described by us, and are the same which, when consecrated and adapted to the different festivals, we said were to benefit cities by affording them an innocent amusement.

Clinias/ That, again, is true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let him who has been elected a director of music receive these rules from us as containing the very truth; and may he prosper in his office! Let us now proceed to lay down other rules in addition to the preceding about dancing and gymnastic exercise in general. Having said what remained to be said about the teaching of music, let us speak in like manner about gymnastic. For boys and girls ought to learn to dance and practice gymnastic exercises—ought they not?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Then the boys ought to have dancing masters, and the girls dancing mistresses to exercise them.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Then once more let us summon him who has the chief concern in the business, the superintendent of youth [i.e. the director of education]; he will have plenty to do, if he is to have the charge of music and gymnastic.

Clinias/ But how will an old man be able to attend to such great charges?

Athenian Stranger/ O my friend, there will be no difficulty, for the law has already given and will give him permission to select as his assistants in this charge any citizens, male or female, whom he desires; and he will know whom he ought to choose, and will be anxious not to make a mistake, from a due sense of responsibility, and from a consciousness of the importance of his office, and also because he will consider that if young men have been and are well brought up, then all things go swimmingly, but if not, it is not meet to say, nor do we say, what will follow, lest the regarders of omens should take alarm about our infant state. Many things have been said by us about dancing and about gymnastic movements in general; for we include

under gymnastics all military exercises, such as archery, and all hurling of weapons, and the use of the light shield, and all fighting with heavy arms, and military evolutions, and movements of armies, and encampings, and all that relates to horsemanship. Of all these things there ought to be public teachers, receiving pay from the state, and their pupils should be the men and boys in the state, and also the girls and women, who are to know all these things. While they are yet girls they should have practiced dancing in arms and the whole art of fighting—when grown-up women, they should apply themselves to evolutions and tactics, and the mode of grounding and taking up arms; if for no other reason, yet in case the whole military force should have to leave the city and carry on operations of war outside, that those who will have to guard the young and the rest of the city may be equal to the task; and, on the other hand, when enemies, whether barbarian or Hellenic, come from without with mighty force and make a violent assault upon them, and thus compel them to fight for the possession of the city, which is far from being an impossibility, great would be the disgrace to the state, if the women had been so miserably trained that they could not fight for their young, as birds will, against any creature however strong, and die or undergo any danger, but must instantly rush to the temples and crowd at the altars and shrines, and bring upon human nature the reproach, that of all animals man is the most cowardly!

Clinias/ Such a want of education, Stranger, is certainly an unseemly thing to happen in a state, as well as a great misfortune.

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose that we carry our law to the extent of saying that women ought not to neglect military matters, but that all citizens, male and female alike, shall attend to them?

Clinias/ I quite agree.

Athenian Stranger/ Of wrestling we have spoken in part, but of what I should call the most important part we have not spoken, and cannot easily speak without showing at the same time by gesture as well as in word what we mean; when word and action combine, and not till then, we shall explain clearly what has been said, pointing out that of all movements wrestling is most akin to the military art, and is to be pursued for the sake of this, and not this for the sake of wrestling.

Clinias/ Excellent.

Athenian Stranger/ Enough of wrestling; we will now proceed to speak of other movements of the body. Such motion may be in general called dancing, and is of two kinds: one of nobler figures, imitating the honorable, the other of the more ignoble figures, imitating the mean; and of both these there are two further subdivisions. Of the serious, one kind is of those engaged in war and vehement action, and is the exercise of a noble person and a manly heart; the other exhibits a temperate soul in the enjoyment of prosperity and modest pleasures, and may be truly called and is the dance of peace. The warrior dance is different from the peaceful one, and may be rightly termed Pyrrhic; this imitates the modes of avoiding blows and missiles by dropping or giving way, or springing aside, or rising up or falling down; also the opposite postures which are those of action, as, for example, the imitation of archery and the hurling of javelins, and of all sorts of blows. And when the imitation is of brave bodies and souls, and the action is direct and muscular, giving for the most part a straight movement to the limbs of the body—that, I say, is the true sort; but the opposite is not right. In the dance of peace what we have to consider is whether a man bears himself naturally and gracefully, and after the manner of men who duly conform to the law. But before

proceeding I must distinguish the dancing about which there is any doubt, from that about which there is no doubt. Which is the doubtful kind, and how are the two to be distinguished? There are dances of the Bacchic sort, both those in which, as they say, they imitate drunken men, and which are named after the Nymphs, and Pan, and Silenuses, and Satyrs; and also those in which purifications are made or mysteries celebrated, —all this sort of dancing cannot be rightly defined as having either a peaceful or a warlike character, or indeed as having any meaning whatever, and may, I think, be most truly described as distinct from the warlike dance, and distinct from the peaceful, and not suited for a city at all. There let it lie; and so leaving it to lie, we will proceed to the dances of war and peace, for with these we are undoubtedly concerned. Now the unwarlike muse, which honors in dance the Gods and the sons of the Gods, is entirely associated with the consciousness of prosperity; this class maybe subdivided into two lesser classes, of which one is expressive of an escape from some labor or danger into good, and has greater pleasures, the other expressive of preservation and increase of former good, in which the pleasure is less exciting; —in all these cases, every man when the pleasure is greater, moves his body more, and less when the pleasure is less; and, again, if he be more orderly and has learned courage from discipline he moves less, but if he be a coward, and has no training or self-control, he makes greater and more violent movements, and in general when he is speaking or singing he is not altogether able to keep his body still; and so out of the imitation of words in gestures the whole art of dancing has arisen. And in these various kinds of imitation one man moves in an orderly, another in a disorderly manner; and as the ancients may be observed to have given many names which are according to nature and deserving of praise, so there is an excellent one

which they have given to the dances of men who in their times of prosperity are moderate in their pleasures—the giver of names, whoever he was, assigned to them a very true, and poetical, and rational name, when he called them Emmeleiai, or dances of order, thus establishing two kinds of dances of the nobler sort, the dance of war which he called the Pyrrhic, and the dance of peace which he called Emmeleia, or the dance of order; giving to each their appropriate and becoming name. These things the legislator should indicate in general outline, and the guardian of the law should enquire into them and search them out, combining dancing with music, and assigning to the several sacrificial feasts that which is suitable to them; and when he has consecrated all of them in due order, he shall for the future change nothing, whether of dance or song. Thenceforward the city and the citizens shall continue to have the same pleasures, themselves being as far as possible alike, and shall live well and happily.

I have described the dances which are appropriate to noble bodies and generous souls. But it is necessary also to consider and know uncomely persons and thoughts, and those which are intended to produce laughter in comedy, and have a comic character in respect of style, song, and dance, and of the imitations which these afford. For serious things cannot be understood without laughable things, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to have intelligence of either; but he cannot carry out both in action, if he is to have any degree of virtue. And for this very reason he should learn them both, in order that he may not in ignorance do or say anything which is ridiculous and out of place—he should command slaves and hired strangers to imitate such things, but he should never take any serious interest in them himself, nor should any freeman or freewoman be discovered taking pains to learn them; and

there should always be some element of novelty in the imitation. Let these then be laid down, both in law and in our discourse, as the regulations of laughable amusements which are generally called comedy. And, if any of the serious poets, as they are termed, who write tragedy, come to us and say—'O strangers, may we go to your city and country or may we not, and shall we bring with us our poetry—what is your will about these matters?'—how shall we answer the divine men? I think that our answer should be as follows: — Best of strangers, we will say to them, we also according to our ability are tragic poets, and our tragedy is the best and noblest; for our whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy. You are poets and we are poets, both makers of the same strains, rivals and antagonists in the noblest of dramas, which true law can alone perfect, as our hope is. Do not then suppose that we shall all in a moment allow you to erect your stage in the agora, or introduce the fair voices of your actors, speaking above our own, and permit you to harangue our women and children, and the common people, about our institutions, in language other than our own, and very often the opposite of our own. For a state would be mad which gave you this license, until the magistrates had determined whether your poetry might be recited, and was fit for publication or not. Wherefore, O ye sons and scions of the softer Muses, first of all show your songs to the magistrates, and let them compare them with our own, and if they are the same or better we will give you a chorus; but if not, then, my friends, we cannot. Let these, then, be the customs ordained by law about all dances and the teaching of them, and let matters relating to slaves be separated from those relating to masters, if you do not object.

Clinias/ We can have no hesitation in assenting when you put the matter thus.

Athenian Stranger/ There still remain three studies suitable for freemen. Arithmetic is one of them; the measurement of length, surface, and depth is the second; and the third has to do with the revolutions of the stars in relation to one another. Not everyone has need to toil through all these things in a strictly scientific manner, but only a few, and who they are to be we will hereafter indicate at the end, which will be the proper place; not to know what is necessary for mankind in general, and what is the truth, is disgraceful to everyone: and yet to enter into these matters minutely is neither easy, nor at all possible for everyone; but there is something in them which is necessary and cannot be set aside, and probably he who made the proverb about God originally had this in view when he said, that 'not even God himself can fight against necessity;'—he meant, if I am not mistaken, divine necessity; for as to the human necessities of which the many speak, when they talk in this manner, nothing can be more ridiculous than such an application of the words.

Clinias/ And what necessities of knowledge are there, Stranger, which are divine and not human?

Athenian Stranger/ I conceive them to be those of which he who has no use nor any knowledge at all cannot be a God, or demi-god, or hero to mankind, or able to take any serious thought or charge of them. And very unlike a divine man would he be, who is unable to count one, two, three, or to distinguish odd and even numbers, or is unable to count at all, or reckon night and day, and who is totally unacquainted with the revolution of the sun and moon, and the other stars. There would be great folly in supposing that all these are not necessary parts of knowledge to him who intends to know anything about the highest kinds of knowledge; but which these are, and how many there are of them, and when they are to be learned, and what is to be learned together and

what apart, and the whole correlation of them, must be rightly apprehended first; and these leading the way we may proceed to the other parts of knowledge. For so necessity grounded in nature constrains us, against which we say that no God contends, or ever will contend.

Clinias/ I think, Stranger, that what you have now said is very true and agreeable to nature.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, Cleinias, that is so. But it is difficult for the legislator to begin with these studies; at a more convenient time we will make regulations for them.

Clinias/ You seem, Stranger, to be afraid of our habitual ignorance of the subject: there is no reason why that should prevent you from speaking out.

Athenian Stranger/ I certainly am afraid of the difficulties to which you allude, but I am still more afraid of those who apply themselves to this sort of knowledge, and apply themselves badly. For entire ignorance is not so terrible or extreme an evil, and is far from being the greatest of all; too much cleverness and too much learning, accompanied with an ill bringing up, are far more fatal.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ All freemen I conceive, should learn as much of these branches of knowledge as every child in Egypt is taught when he learns the alphabet. In that country arithmetical games have been invented for the use of mere children, which they learn as a pleasure and amusement. They have to distribute apples and garlands, using the same number sometimes for a larger and sometimes for a lesser number of persons; and they arrange pugilists and wrestlers as they pair together by lot or remain over, and show how their turns come in natural order. Another mode of amusing them is to distribute vessels, sometimes of gold, brass, silver, and the like, intermixed with one another, sometimes

of one metal only; as I was saying they adapt to their amusement the numbers in common use, and in this way make more intelligible to their pupils the arrangements and movements of armies and expeditions, and in the management of a household they make people more useful to themselves, and more wide awake; and again in measurements of things which have length, and breadth, and depth, they free us from that natural ignorance of all these things which is so ludicrous and disgraceful.

Clinias/ What kind of ignorance do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ O my dear Cleinias, I, like yourself, have late in life heard with amazement of our ignorance in these matters; to me we appear to be more like pigs than men, and I am quite ashamed, not only of myself, but of all Hellenes.

Clinias/ About what? Say, Stranger, what you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ I will; or rather I will show you my meaning by a question, and do you please to answer me: You know, I suppose, what length is?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And what breadth is?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ And you know that these are two distinct things, and that there is a third thing called depth?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And do not all these seem to you to be commensurable with themselves?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ That is to say, length is naturally commensurable with length, and breadth with breadth, and depth in like manner with depth?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But if some things are commensurable and others wholly incommensurable, and you think that all things are commensurable, what is your position in regard to them?

Clinias/ Clearly, far from good.

Athenian Stranger/ Concerning length and breadth when compared with depth, or breadth and length when compared with one another, are not all the Hellenes agreed that these are commensurable with one another in some way?

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ But if they are absolutely incommensurable, and yet all of us regard them as commensurable, have we not reason to be ashamed of our compatriots; and might we not say to them: —O ye best of Hellenes, is not this one of the things of which we were saying that not to know them is disgraceful, and of which to have a bare knowledge only is no great distinction?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And there are other things akin to these, in which there spring up other errors of the same family.

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ The natures of commensurable and incommensurable quantities in their relation to one another. A man who is good for anything ought to be able, when he thinks, to distinguish them; and different persons should compete with one another in asking questions, which will be a far better and more graceful way of passing their time than the old man's game of draughts.

Clinias/ I dare say; and these pastimes are not so very unlike a game of draughts.

Athenian Stranger/ And these, as I maintain, Cleinias, are the studies which our youth ought to learn, for they are innocent and not difficult; the learning of them will be an amusement, and they will benefit the state. If anyone is of another mind, let him say what he has to say.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then if these studies are such as we maintain, we will include them; if not, they shall be excluded.

Clinias/ Assuredly: but may we not now, Stranger, prescribe these studies as necessary, and so fill up the lacunae of our laws?

Athenian Stranger/ They shall be regarded as pledges which may be hereafter redeemed and removed from our state, if they do not please either us who give them, or you who accept them.

Clinias/ A fair condition.

Athenian Stranger/ Next let us see whether we are or are not willing that the study of astronomy shall be proposed for our youth.

Clinias/ Proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ Here occurs a strange phenomenon, which certainly cannot in any point of view be tolerated.

Clinias/ To what are you referring?

Athenian Stranger/ Men say that we ought not to enquire into the supreme God and the nature of the universe, nor busy ourselves in searching out the causes of things, and that such enquiries are impious; whereas the very opposite is the truth.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps what I am saying may seem paradoxical, and at variance with the usual language of age.

But when anyone has any good and true notion which is for the advantage of the state and in every way acceptable to God, he cannot abstain from expressing it.

Clinias/ Your words are reasonable enough; but shall we find any good or true notion about the stars?

Athenian Stranger/ My good friends, at this hour all of us Hellenes tell lies, if I may use such an expression, about those great Gods, the Sun and the Moon.

Clinias/ Lies of what nature?

Athenian Stranger/ We say that they and divers other stars do not keep the same path, and we call them planets or wanderers.

Clinias/ Very true, Stranger; and in the course of my life I have often myself seen the morning star and the evening star and divers others not moving in their accustomed course, but wandering out of their path in all manner of ways, and I have seen the sun and moon doing what we all know that they do.

Athenian Stranger/ Just so, Megillus and Cleinias; and I maintain that our citizens and our youth ought to learn about the nature of the Gods in heaven, so far as to be able to offer sacrifices and pray to them in pious language, and not to blaspheme about them.

Clinias/ There you are right, if such a knowledge be only attainable; and if we are wrong in our mode of speaking now, and can be better instructed and learn to use better language, then I quite agree with you that such a degree of knowledge as will enable us to speak rightly should be acquired by us. And now do you try to explain to us your whole meaning, and we, on our part, will endeavor to understand you.

Athenian Stranger/ There is some difficulty in understanding my meaning, but not a very great one, nor

will any great length of time be required. And of this I am myself a proof; for I did not know these things long ago, nor in the days of my youth, and yet I can explain them to you in a brief space of time; whereas if they had been difficult I could certainly never have explained them all, old as I am, to old men like yourselves.

Clinias/ True; but what is this study which you describe as wonderful and fitting for youth to learn, but of which we are ignorant? Try and explain the nature of it to us as clearly as you can.

Athenian Stranger/ I will. For, O my good friends, that other doctrine about the wandering of the sun and the moon and the other stars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth. Each of them moves in the same path—not in many paths, but in one only, which is circular, and the varieties are only apparent. Nor are we right in supposing that the swiftest of them is the slowest, nor conversely, that the slowest is the quickest. And if what I say is true, only just imagine that we had a similar notion about horses running at Olympia, or about men who ran in the long course, and that we addressed the swiftest as the slowest and the slowest as the swiftest, and sang the praises of the vanquished as though he were the victor, —in that case our praises would not be true, nor very agreeable to the runners, though they be but men; and now, to commit the same error about the Gods which would have been ludicrous and erroneous in the case of men, —is not that ludicrous and erroneous?

Clinias/ Worse than ludicrous, I should say.

Athenian Stranger/ At all events, the Gods cannot like us to be spreading a false report of them.

Clinias/ Most true, if such is the fact.

Athenian Stranger/ And if we can show that such is really the fact, then all these matters ought to be learned so far as is necessary for the avoidance of impiety; but if we cannot, they may be let alone, and let this be our decision.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Enough of laws relating to education and learning. But hunting and similar pursuits in like manner claim our attention. For the legislator appears to have a duty imposed upon him which goes beyond mere legislation. There is something over and above law which lies in a region between admonition and law, and has several times occurred to us in the course of discussion; for example, in the education of very young children there were things, as we maintain, which are not to be defined, and to regard them as matters of positive law is a great absurdity. Now, our laws and the whole constitution of our state having been thus delineated, the praise of the virtuous citizen is not complete when he is described as the person who serves the laws best and obeys them most, but the higher form of praise is that which describes him as the good citizen who passes through life undefiled and is obedient to the words of the legislator, both when he is giving laws and when he assigns praise and blame. This is the truest word that can be spoken in praise of a citizen; and the true legislator ought not only to write his laws, but also to interweave with them all such things as seem to him honorable and dishonorable. And the perfect citizen ought to seek to strengthen these no less than the principles of law which are sanctioned by punishments. I will adduce an example which will clear up my meaning, and will be a sort of witness to my words. Hunting is of wide extent, and has a name under which many things are included, for there is a hunting of creatures in the water, and of creatures in the air, and there is a great deal of hunting of land animals of all kinds, and not of wild beasts

only. The hunting after man is also worthy of consideration; there is the hunting after him in war, and there is often a hunting after him in the way of friendship, which is praised and also blamed; and there is thieving, and the hunting which is practiced by robbers, and that of armies against armies. Now the legislator, in laying down laws about hunting, can neither abstain from noting these things, nor can he make threatening ordinances which will assign rules and penalties about all of them. What is he to do? He will have to praise and blame hunting with a view to the exercise and pursuits of youth. And, on the other hand, the young man must listen obediently; neither pleasure nor pain should hinder him, and he should regard as his standard of action the praises and injunctions of the legislator rather than the punishments which he imposes by law. This being premised, there will follow next in order moderate praise and censure of hunting; the praise being assigned to that kind which will make the souls of young men better, and the censure to that which has the opposite effect. And now let us address young men in the form of a prayer for their welfare: O friends, we will say to them, may no desire or love of hunting in the sea, or of angling or of catching the creatures in the waters, ever take possession of you, either when you are awake or when you are asleep, by hook or with weels, which latter is a very lazy contrivance; and let not any desire of catching men and of piracy by sea enter into your souls and make you cruel and lawless hunters. And as to the desire of thieving in town or country, may it never enter into your most passing thoughts; nor let the insidious fancy of catching birds, which is hardly worthy of freemen, come into the head of any youth. There remains therefore for our athletes only the hunting and catching of land animals, of which the one sort is called hunting by night, in which the hunters sleep in turn and are lazy; this is not to be

commended any more than that which has intervals of rest, in which the wild strength of beasts is subdued by nets and snares, and not by the victory of a laborious spirit. Thus, only the best kind of hunting is allowed at all—that of quadrupeds, which is carried on with horses and dogs and men's own persons, and they get the victory over the animals by running them down and striking them and hurling at them, those who have a care of godlike manhood taking them with their own hands. The praise and blame which is assigned to all these things has now been declared; and let the law be as follows: —Let no one hinder these who verily are sacred hunters from following the chase wherever and whithersoever they will; but the hunter by night, who trusts to his nets and gins, shall not be allowed to hunt anywhere. The fowler in the mountains and waste places shall be permitted, but on cultivated ground and on consecrated wilds he shall not be permitted; and anyone who meets him may stop him. As to the hunter in waters, he may hunt anywhere except in harbors or sacred streams or marshes or pools, provided only that he do not pollute the water with poisonous juices. And now we may say that all our enactments about education are complete.

Clinias/ Very good.

Book 8.

Athenian Stranger/ Next, with the help of the Delphian oracle, we have to institute festivals and make laws about them, and to determine what sacrifices will be for the good of the city, and to what Gods they shall be offered; but when they shall be offered, and how often, may be partly regulated by us.

Clinias/ The number—yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we will first determine the number; and let the whole number be 365—one for every day, —so that one magistrate at least will sacrifice daily to some God or demigod on behalf of the city, and the citizens, and their possessions. And the interpreters, and priests, and priestesses, and prophets shall meet, and, in company with the guardians of the law, ordain those things which the legislator of necessity omits; and I may remark that they are the very persons who ought to take note of what is omitted. The law will say that there are twelve feasts dedicated to the twelve Gods, after whom the several tribes are named; and that to each of them they shall sacrifice every month, and appoint choruses, and musical and gymnastic contests, assigning them so as to suit the Gods and seasons of the year. And they shall have festivals for women, distinguishing those which ought to be separated from the men's festivals, and those which ought not. Further, they shall not confuse the infernal deities and their rites with the Gods who are termed heavenly and their rites, but shall separate them, giving to Pluto his own in the twelfth month, which is sacred to him, according to the law. To such a deity warlike men should entertain no aversion, but they should honor him as being always the best friend of man. For the connection of soul and body is no way better than the dissolution of them, as I am ready to maintain quite seriously. Moreover, those

who would regulate these matters rightly should consider, that our city among existing cities has no fellow, either in respect of leisure or command of the necessaries of life, and that like an individual she ought to live happily. And those who would live happily should in the first place do no wrong to one another, and ought not themselves to be wronged by others; to attain the first is not difficult, but there is great difficulty in acquiring the power of not being wronged. No man can be perfectly secure against wrong, unless he has become perfectly good; and cities are like individuals in this, for a city if good has a life of peace, but if evil, a life of war within and without. Wherefore the citizens ought to practice war—not in time of war, but rather while they are at peace. And every city which has any sense, should take the field at least for one day in every month, and for more if the magistrates think fit, having no regard to winter cold or summer heat; and they should go out en-masse, including their wives and their children, when the magistrates determine to lead forth the whole people, or in separate portions when summoned by them; and they should always provide that there should be games and sacrificial feasts, and they should have tournaments, imitating in as lively a manner as they can real battles. And they should distribute prizes of victory and velour to the competitors, passing censures and encomiums on one another according to the characters which they bear in the contests and in their whole life, honoring him who seems to be the best, and blaming him who is the opposite. And let poets celebrate the victors, —not however every poet, but only one who in the first place is not less than fifty years of age; nor should he be one who, although he may have musical and poetical gifts, has never in his life done any noble or illustrious action; but those who are themselves good and also honorable in the state, creators of noble actions—let their

poems be sung, even though they be not very musical. And let the judgment of them rest with the instructor of youth and the other guardians of the laws, who shall give them this privilege, and they alone shall be free to sing; but the rest of the world shall not have this liberty. Nor shall anyone dare to sing a song which has not been approved by the judgment of the guardians of the laws, not even if his strain be sweeter than the songs of Thamyras and Orpheus; but only such poems as have been judged sacred and dedicated to the Gods, and such as are the works of good men, in which praise or blame has been awarded and which have been deemed to fulfill their design fairly.

The regulations about war, and about liberty of speech in poetry, ought to apply equally to men and women. The legislator may be supposed to argue the question in his own mind: —Who are my citizens for whom I have set in order the city? Are they not competitors in the greatest of all contests, and have they not innumerable rivals? To be sure, will be the natural reply. Well, but if we were training boxers, or pancratiasts, or any other sort of athletes, would they never meet until the hour of contest arrived; and should we do nothing to prepare ourselves previously by daily practice? Surely, if we were boxers, we should have been learning to fight for many days before, and exercising ourselves in imitating all those blows and wards which we were intending to use in the hour of conflict; and in order that we might come as near to reality as possible, instead of cestuses we should put on boxing-gloves, that the blows and the wards might be practiced by us to the utmost of our power. And if there were a lack of competitors, the ridicule of fools would not deter us from hanging up a lifeless image and practicing at that. Or if we had no adversary at all, animate or inanimate, should we not venture in the dearth of

antagonists to spar by ourselves? In what other manner could we ever study the art of self-defense?

Clinias/ The way which you mention, Stranger, would be the only way.

Athenian Stranger/ And shall the warriors of our city, who are destined when occasion calls to enter the greatest of all contests, and to fight for their lives, and their children, and their property, and the whole city, be worse prepared than boxers? And will the legislator, because he is afraid that their practicing with one another may appear to some ridiculous, abstain from commanding them to go out and fight; will he not ordain that soldiers shall perform lesser exercises without arms every day, making dancing and all gymnastic tend to this end; and also will he not require that they shall practice some gymnastic exercises, greater as well as lesser, as often as every month; and that they shall have contests one with another in every part of the country, seizing upon posts and lying in ambush, and imitating in every respect the reality of war; fighting with boxing-gloves and hurling javelins, and using weapons somewhat dangerous, and as nearly as possible like the true ones, in order that the sport may not be altogether without fear, but may have terrors and to a certain degree show the man who has and who has not courage; and that the honor and dishonor which are assigned to them respectively, may prepare the whole city for the true conflict of life? If anyone dies in these mimic contests, the homicide is involuntary, and we will make the slayer, when he has been purified according to law, to be pure of blood, considering that if a few men should die, others as good as they will be born; but that if fear is dead, then the citizens will never find a test of superior and inferior natures, which is a far greater evil to the state than the loss of a few.

Clinias/ We are quite agreed, Stranger, that we should legislate about such things, and that the whole state should practice them.

Athenian Stranger/ And what is the reason that dances and contests of this sort hardly ever exist in states, at least not to any extent worth speaking of? Is this due to the ignorance of mankind and their legislators?

Clinias/ Perhaps.

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly not, sweet Cleinias; there are two causes, which are quite enough to account for the deficiency.

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ One cause is the love of wealth, which wholly absorbs men, and never for a moment allows them to think of anything but their own private possessions; on this the soul of every citizen hangs suspended, and can attend to nothing but his daily gain; mankind are ready to learn any branch of knowledge, and to follow any pursuit which tends to this end, and they laugh at every other: —that is one reason why a city will not be in earnest about such contests or any other good and honorable pursuit. But from an insatiable love of gold and silver, every man will stoop to any art or contrivance, seemly or unseemly, in the hope of becoming rich; and will make no objection to performing any action, holy, or unholy and utterly base, if only like a beast he have the power of eating and drinking all kinds of things, and procuring for himself in every sort of way the gratification of his lusts.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Let this, then, be deemed one of the causes which prevent states from pursuing in an efficient manner the art of war, or any other noble aim, but makes the orderly and temperate part of mankind into merchants,

and captains of ships, and servants, and converts the valiant sort into thieves and burglars, and robbers of temples, and violent, tyrannical persons; many of whom are not without ability, but they are unfortunate.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Must not they be truly unfortunate whose souls are compelled to pass through life always hungering?

Clinias/ Then that is one cause, Stranger; but you spoke of another.

Athenian Stranger/ Thank you for reminding me.

Clinias/ The insatiable lifelong love of wealth, as you were saying, is one cause which absorbs mankind, and prevents them from rightly practicing the arts of war: —Granted; and now tell me, what is the other?

Athenian Stranger/ Do you imagine that I delay because I am in a perplexity?

Clinias/ No; but we think that you are too severe upon the money-loving temper, of which you seem in the present discussion to have a peculiar dislike.

Athenian Stranger/ That is a very fair rebuke, Cleinias; and I will now proceed to the second cause.

Clinias/ Proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ I say that governments are a cause—democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, concerning which I have often spoken in the previous discourse; or rather governments they are not, for none of them exercises a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects; but they may be truly called states of discord, in which while the government is voluntary, the subjects always obey against their will, and have to be coerced; and the ruler fears the subject, and will not, if he can help, allow him to become either noble, or rich,

or strong, or valiant, or warlike at all. These two are the chief causes of almost all evils, and of the evils of which I have been speaking they are notably the causes. But our state has escaped both of them; for her citizens have the greatest leisure, and they are not subject to one another, and will, I think, be made by these laws the reverse of lovers of money. Such a constitution may be reasonably supposed to be the only one existing which will accept the education which we have described, and the martial pastimes which have been perfected according to our idea.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Then next we must remember, about all gymnastic contests, that only the warlike sort of them are to be practiced and to have prizes of victory; and those which are not military are to be given up. The military sort had better be completely described and established by law; and first, let us speak of running and swiftness.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly the most military of all qualities is general activity of body, whether of foot or hand. For escaping or for capturing an enemy, quickness of foot is required; but hand-to-hand conflict and combat need vigor and strength.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Neither of them can attain their greatest efficiency without arms.

Clinias/ How can they?

Athenian Stranger/ Then our herald, in accordance with the prevailing practice, will first summon the runner; —he will appear armed, for to an unarmed competitor we will not give a prize. And he shall enter first who is to run the single course bearing arms; next, he who is to run the double course; third, he who is to run the horse-course; and

fourthly, he who is to run the long course; the fifth whom we start, shall be the first sent forth in heavy armor, and shall run a course of sixty stadia to some temple of Ares—and we will send forth another, whom we will style the more heavily armed, to run over smoother ground. There remains the archer; and he shall run in the full equipments of an archer a distance of 100 stadia over mountains, and across every sort of country, to a temple of Apollo and Artemis; this shall be the order of the contest, and we will wait for them until they return, and will give a prize to the conqueror in each.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us suppose that there are three kinds of contests, —one of boys, another of beardless youths, and a third of men. For the youths we will fix the length of the contest at two-thirds, and for the boys at half of the entire course, whether they contend as archers or as heavy-armed. Touching the women, let the girls who are not grown up compete naked in the stadium and the double course, and the horse-course and the long course, and let them run on the race-ground itself; those who are thirteen years of age and upwards until their marriage shall continue to share in contests if they are not more than twenty, and shall be compelled to run up to eighteen; and they shall descend into the arena in suitable dresses. Let these be the regulations about contests in running both for men and women.

Respecting contests of strength, instead of wrestling and similar contests of the heavier sort, we will institute conflicts in armor of one against one, and two against two, and so on up to ten against ten. As to what a man ought not to suffer or do, and to what extent, in order to gain the victory—as in wrestling, the masters of the art have laid down what is fair and what is not fair, so in fighting in armor—we ought to call in skillful persons, who shall judge for us and be our

assessors in the work of legislation; they shall say who deserves to be victor in combats of this sort, and what he is not to do or have done to him, and in like manner what rule determines who is defeated; and let these ordinances apply to women until they are married as well as to men. The pancration shall have a counterpart in a combat of the light-armed; they shall contend with bows and with light shields and with javelins and in the throwing of stones by slings and by hand: and laws shall be made about it, and rewards and prizes given to him who best fulfils the ordinances of the law.

Next in order we shall have to legislate about the horse contests. Now we do not need many horses, for they cannot be of much use in a country like Crete, and hence we naturally do not take great pains about the rearing of them or about horse races. There is no one who keeps a chariot among us, and any rivalry in such matters would be altogether out of place; there would be no sense nor any shadow of sense in instituting contests which are not after the manner of our country. And therefore we give our prizes for single horses, —for colts who have not yet cast their teeth, and for those who are intermediate, and for the full-grown horses themselves; and thus our equestrian games will accord with the nature of the country. Let them have conflict and rivalry in these matters in accordance with the law, and let the colonels and generals of horse decide together about all courses and about the armed competitors in them. But we have nothing to say to the unarmed either in gymnastic exercises or in these contests. On the other hand, the Cretan bowman or javelin-man who fights in armor on horseback is useful, and therefore we may as well place a competition of this sort among our amusements. Women are not to be forced to compete by laws and ordinances; but if from previous training they have acquired

the habit and are strong enough and like to take part, let them do so, girls as well as boys, and no blame to them.

Thus the competition in gymnastic and the mode of learning it have been described; and we have spoken also of the toils of the contest, and of daily exercises under the superintendence of masters. Likewise, what relates to music has been, for the most part, completed. But as to rhapsodes and the like, and the contests of choruses which are to perform at feasts, all this shall be arranged when the months and days and years have been appointed for Gods and demi-gods, whether every third year, or again every fifth year, or in whatever way or manner the Gods may put into men's minds the distribution and order of them. At the same time, we may expect that the musical contests will be celebrated in their turn by the command of the judges and the director of education and the guardians of the law meeting together for this purpose, and themselves becoming legislators of the times and nature and conditions of the choral contests and of dancing in general. What they ought severally to be in language and song, and in the admixture of harmony with rhythm and the dance, has been often declared by the original legislator; and his successors ought to follow him, making the games and sacrifices duly to correspond at fitting times, and appointing public festivals. It is not difficult to determine how these and the like matters may have a regular order; nor, again, will the alteration of them do any great good or harm to the state. There is, however, another matter of great importance and difficulty, concerning which God should legislate, if there were any possibility of obtaining from Him an ordinance about it. But seeing that divine aid is not to be had, there appears to be a need of some bold man who specially honors plainness of speech, and will say outright what he thinks best for the city and citizens, — ordaining what is good and convenient for the whole state

amid the corruptions of human souls, opposing the mightiest lusts, and having no man his helper but himself standing alone and following reason only.

Clinias/ What is this, Stranger, that you are saying? For we do not as yet understand your meaning.

Athenian Stranger/ Very likely; I will endeavor to explain myself more clearly. When I came to the subject of education, I beheld young men and maidens holding friendly intercourse with one another. And there naturally arose in my mind a sort of apprehension—I could not help thinking how one is to deal with a city in which youths and maidens are well nurtured, and have nothing to do, and are not undergoing the excessive and servile toils which extinguish wantonness, and whose only cares during their whole life are sacrifices and festivals and dances. How, in such a state as this, will they abstain from desires which thrust many a man and woman into perdition; and from which reason, assuming the functions of law, commands them to abstain? The ordinances already made may possibly get the better of most of these desires; the prohibition of excessive wealth is a very considerable gain in the direction of temperance, and the whole education of our youth imposes a law of moderation on them; moreover, the eye of the rulers is required always to watch over the young, and never to lose sight of them; and these provisions do, as far as human means can effect anything, exercise a regulating influence upon the desires in general. But how can we take precautions against the unnatural loves of either sex, from which innumerable evils have come upon individuals and cities? How shall we devise a remedy and way of escape out of so great a danger? Truly, Cleinias, here is a difficulty. In many ways Crete and Lacedaemon furnish a great help to those who make peculiar laws; but in the matter of love, as we are alone, I must confess that they are quite against us.

For if anyone following nature should lay down the law which existed before the days of Laius, and denounce these lusts as contrary to nature, adducing the animals as a proof that such unions were monstrous, he might prove his point, but he would be wholly at variance with the custom of your states. Further, they are repugnant to a principle which we say that a legislator should always observe; for we are always enquiring which of our enactments tends to virtue and which not. And suppose we grant that these loves are accounted by law to be honorable, or at least not disgraceful, in what degree will they contribute to virtue? Will such passions implant in the soul of him who is seduced the habit of courage, or in the soul of the seducer the principle of temperance? Who will ever believe this? —or rather, who will not blame the effeminacy of him who yields to pleasures and is unable to hold out against them? Will not all men censure as womanly him who imitates the woman? And who would ever think of establishing such a practice by law? Certainly no one who had in his mind the image of true law. How can we prove that what I am saying is true? He who would rightly consider these matters must see the nature of friendship and desire, and of these so-called loves, for they are of two kinds, and out of the two arises a third kind, having the same name; and this similarity of name causes all the difficulty and obscurity.

Clinias/ How is that?

Athenian Stranger/ Dear is the like in virtue to the like, and the equal to the equal; dear also, though unlike, is he who has abundance to him who is in want. And when either of these friendships becomes excessive, we term the excess love.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ The friendship which arises from contraries is horrible and coarse, and has often no tie of communion; but that which arises from likeness is gentle, and has a tie of communion which lasts through life. As to the mixed sort which is made up of them both, there is, first of all, a difficulty in determining what he who is possessed by this third love desires; moreover, he is drawn different ways, and is in doubt between the two principles; the one exhorting him to enjoy the beauty of youth, and the other forbidding him. For the one is a lover of the body, and hungers after beauty, like ripe fruit, and would fain satisfy himself without any regard to the character of the beloved; the other holds the desire of the body to be a secondary matter, and looking rather than loving and with his soul desiring the soul of the other in a becoming manner, regards the satisfaction of the bodily love as wantonness; he reverences and respects temperance and courage and magnanimity and wisdom, and wishes to live chastely with the chaste object of his affection. Now the sort of love which is made up of the other two is that which we have described as the third. Seeing then that there are these three sorts of love, ought the law to prohibit and forbid them all to exist among us? Is it not rather clear that we should wish to have in the state the love which is of virtue and which desires the beloved youth to be the best possible; and the other two, if possible, we should hinder? What do you say, friend Megillus?

Megillus/ I think, Stranger, that you are perfectly right in what you have been now saying.

Athenian Stranger/ I knew well, my friend, that I should obtain your assent, which I accept, and therefore have no need to analyze your custom any further. Cleinias shall be prevailed upon to give me his assent at some other time. Enough of this; and now let us proceed to the laws.

Megillus/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Upon reflection I see a way of imposing the law, which, in one respect, is easy, but, in another, is of the utmost difficulty.

Megillus/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ We are all aware that most men, in spite of their lawless natures, are very strictly and precisely restrained from intercourse with the fair, and this is not at all against their will, but entirely with their will.

Megillus/ When do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ When anyone has a brother or sister who is fair; and about a son or daughter the same unwritten law holds, and is a most perfect safeguard, so that no open or secret connection ever takes place between them. Nor does the thought of such a thing ever enter at all into the minds of most of them.

Megillus/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Does not a little word extinguish all pleasures of that sort?

Megillus/ What word?

Athenian Stranger/ The declaration that they are unholy, hated of God, and most infamous; and is not the reason of this that no one has ever said the opposite, but everyone from his earliest childhood has heard men speaking in the same manner about them always and everywhere, whether in comedy or in the graver language of tragedy? When the poet introduces on the stage a Thyestes or an Oedipus, or a Macareus having secret intercourse with his sister, he represents him, when found out, ready to kill himself as the penalty of his sin.

Megillus/ You are very right in saying that tradition, if no breath of opposition ever assails it, has a marvelous power.

Athenian Stranger/ Am I not also right in saying that the legislator who wants to master any of the passions which master man may easily know how to subdue them? He will consecrate the tradition of their evil character among all, slaves and freemen, women and children, throughout the city: —that will be the surest foundation of the law which he can make.

Megillus/ Yes; but will he ever succeed in making all mankind use the same language about them?

Athenian Stranger/ A good objection; but was I not just now saying that I had a way to make men use natural love and abstain from) unnatural, not intentionally destroying the seeds of human increase, or sowing them in stony places, in which they will take no root; and that I would command them to abstain too from any female field of increase in which that which is sown is not likely to grow? Now if a law to this effect could only be made perpetual, and gain an authority such as already prevents intercourse of parents and children—such a law, extending to other sensual desires, and conquering them, would be the source of ten thousand blessings. For, in the first place, moderation is the appointment of nature, and deters men from all frenzy and madness of love, and from all adulteries and immoderate use of meats and drinks, and makes them good friends to their own wives. And innumerable other benefits would result if such a law could only be enforced. I can imagine some lusty youth who is standing by, and who, on hearing this enactment, declares in scurrilous terms that we are making foolish and impossible laws, and fills the world with his outcry. And therefore I said that I knew a way of enacting and perpetuating such a law, which was very easy in one respect, but in another most difficult. There is no difficulty in seeing that such a law is possible, and in what way; for, as I was saying, the ordinance once consecrated

would master the soul of every man, and terrify him into obedience. But matters have now come to such a pass that even then the desired result seems as if it could not be attained, just as the continuance of an entire state in the practice of common meals is also deemed impossible. And although this latter is partly disproven by the fact of their existence among you, still even in your cities the common meals of women would be regarded as unnatural and impossible. I was thinking of the rebelliousness of the human heart when I said that the permanent establishment of these things is very difficult.

Megillus/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall I try and find some sort of persuasive argument which will prove to you that such enactments are possible, and not beyond human nature?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Is a man more likely to abstain from the pleasures of love and to do what he is bidden about them, when his body is in a good condition, or when he is in an ill condition, and out of training?

Clinias/ He will be far more temperate when he is in training.

Athenian Stranger/ And have we not heard of Iccus of Tarentum, who, with a view to the Olympic and other contests, in his zeal for his art, and also because he was of a manly and temperate disposition, never had any connection with a woman or a youth during the whole time of his training? And the same is said of Crison and Astylus and Diopompus and many others; and yet, Cleinias, they were far worse educated in their minds than your and my citizens, and in their bodies far more lusty.

Clinias/ No doubt this fact has been often affirmed positively by the ancients of these athletes.

Athenian Stranger/ And had they the courage to abstain from what is ordinarily deemed a pleasure for the sake of a victory in wrestling, running, and the like; and shall our young men be incapable of a similar endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory, which is the noblest of all, as from their youth upwards we will tell them, charming them, as we hope, into the belief of this by tales and sayings and songs?

Clinias/ Of what victory are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ Of the victory over pleasure, which if they win, they will live happily; or if they are conquered, the reverse of happily. And, further, may we not suppose that the fear of impiety will enable them to master that which other inferior people have mastered?

Clinias/ I dare say.

Athenian Stranger/ And since we have reached this point in our legislation, and have fallen into a difficulty by reason of the vices of mankind, I affirm that our ordinance should simply run in the following terms: Our citizens ought not to fall below the nature of birds and beasts in general, who are born in great multitudes, and yet remain until the age for procreation virgin and unmarried, but when they have reached the proper time of life are coupled, male and female, and lovingly pair together, and live the rest of their lives in holiness and innocence, abiding firmly in their original compact: —surely, we will say to them, you should be better than the animals. But if they are corrupted by the other Hellenes and the common practice of barbarians, and they see with their eyes and hear with their ears of the so-called free love everywhere prevailing among them, and they themselves are not able to get the better of the temptation, the guardians of the law, exercising the functions of lawgivers, shall devise a second law against them.

Clinias/ And what law would you advise them to pass if this one failed?

Athenian Stranger/ Clearly, Cleinias, the one which would naturally follow.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ Our citizens should not allow pleasures to strengthen with indulgence, but should by toil divert the aliment and exuberance of them into other parts of the body; and this will happen if no immodesty be allowed in the practice of love. Then they will be ashamed of frequent intercourse, and they will find pleasure, if seldom enjoyed, to be a less imperious mistress. They should not be found out doing anything of the sort. Concealment shall be honorable, and sanctioned by custom and made law by unwritten prescription; on the other hand, to be detected shall be esteemed dishonorable, but not, to abstain wholly. In this way there will be a second legal standard of honorable and dishonorable, involving a second notion of right. Three principles will comprehend all those corrupt natures whom we call inferior to themselves, and who form but one class, and will compel them not to transgress.

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ The principle of piety, the love of honor, and the desire of beauty, not in the body but in the soul. These are, perhaps, romantic aspirations; but they are the noblest of aspirations, if they could only be realized in all states, and, God willing, in the matter of love we may be able to enforce one of two things—either that no one shall venture to touch any person of the freeborn or noble class except his wedded wife, or sow the unconsecrated and bastard seed among harlots, or in barren and unnatural lusts; or at least we may abolish altogether the connection of men with men; and as to women, if any man has to do

with any but those who come into his house duly married by sacred rites, whether they be bought or acquired in any other way, and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be right in enacting that he be deprived of civic honors and privileges, and be deemed to be, as he truly is, a stranger. Let this law, then, whether it is one, or ought rather to be called two, be laid down respecting love in general, and the intercourse of the sexes which arises out of the desires, whether rightly or wrongly indulged.

Megillus/ I, for my part, Stranger, would gladly receive this law. Cleinias shall speak for himself, and tell you what is his opinion.

Clinias/ I will, Megillus, when an opportunity offers; at present, I think that we had better allow the Stranger to proceed with his laws.

Megillus/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ We had got about as far as the establishment of the common tables, which in most places would be difficult, but in Crete no one would think of introducing any other custom. There might arise a question about the manner of them—whether they shall be such as they are here in Crete, or such as they are in Lacedaemon, —or is there a third kind which may be better than either of them? The answer to this question might be easily discovered, but the discovery would do no great good, for at present they are very well ordered.

Leaving the common tables, we may therefore proceed to the means of providing food. Now, in cities the means of life are gained in many ways and from divers sources, and in general from two sources, whereas our city has only one. For most of the Hellenes obtain their food from sea and land, but our citizens from land only. And this makes the task of the legislator less difficult—half as many laws will be enough,

and much less than half; and they will be of a kind better suited to free men. For he has nothing to do with laws about ship-owners and merchants and retailers and innkeepers and tax collectors and mines and money-lending and compound interest and innumerable other things—bidding good-bye to these, he gives laws to husbandmen and shepherds and bee-keepers, and to the guardians and superintendents of their implements; and he has already legislated for greater matters, as for example, respecting marriage and the procreation and nurture of children, and for education, and the establishment of offices—and now he must direct his laws to those who provide food and labor in preparing it.

Let us first of all, then, have a class of laws which shall be called the laws of husbandmen. And let the first of them be the law of Zeus, the god of boundaries. Let no one shift the boundary line either of a fellow-citizen who is a neighbor, or, if he dwells at the extremity of the land, of any stranger who is conterminous with him, considering that this is truly 'to move the immovable,' and everyone should be more willing to move the largest rock which is not a landmark, than the least stone which is the sworn mark of friendship and hatred between neighbors; for Zeus, the god of kindred, is the witness of the citizen, and Zeus, the god of strangers, of the stranger, and when aroused, terrible are the wars which they stir up. He who obeys the law will never know the fatal consequences of disobedience, but he who despises the law shall be liable to a double penalty, the first coming from the Gods, and the second from the law. For let no one willfully remove the boundaries of his neighbor's land, and if anyone does, let him who will inform the landowners, and let them bring him into court, and if he be convicted of re-dividing the land by stealth or by force, let the court determine what he ought to suffer or pay. In the next place,

many small injuries done by neighbors to one another, through their multiplication, may cause a weight of enmity, and make neighborhood a very disagreeable and bitter thing. Wherefore a man ought to be very careful of committing any offence against his neighbor, and especially of encroaching on his neighbor's land; for any man may easily do harm, but not every man can do good to another. He who encroaches on his neighbor's land, and transgresses his boundaries, shall make good the damage, and, to cure him of his impudence and also of his meanness, he shall pay a double penalty to the injured party. Of these and the like matters the wardens of the country shall take cognizance, and be the judges of them and assessors of the damage; in the more important cases, as has been already said, the whole number of them belonging to anyone of the twelve divisions shall decide, and in the lesser cases the commanders: or, again, if anyone pastures his cattle on his neighbor's land, they shall see the injury, and adjudge the penalty. And if anyone, by decoying the bees, gets possession of another's swarms, and draws them to himself by making noises, he shall pay the damage; or if anyone sets fire to his own wood and takes no care of his neighbor's property, he shall be fined at the discretion of the magistrates. And if in planting he does not leave a fair distance between his own and his neighbor's land, he shall be punished, in accordance with the enactments of many lawgivers, which we may use, not deeming it necessary that the great legislator of our state should determine all the trifles which might be decided by anybody; for example, husbandmen have had of old excellent laws about waters, and there is no reason why we should propose to divert their course: He who likes may draw water from the fountain-head of the common stream on to his own land, if he do not cut off the spring which clearly belongs to some other owner; and he may take the water in

any direction which he pleases, except through a house or temple or sepulcher, but he must be careful to do no harm beyond the channel. And if there be in any place a natural dryness of the earth, which keeps in the rain from heaven, and causes a deficiency in the supply of water, let him dig down on his own land as far as the clay, and if at this depth he finds no water, let him obtain water from his neighbors, as much as is required for his servants' drinking, and if his neighbors, too, are limited in their supply, let him have a fixed measure, which shall be determined by the wardens of the country. This he shall receive each day, and on these terms have a share of his neighbors' water. If there be heavy rain, and one of those on the lower ground injures some tiller of the upper ground, or someone who has a common wall, by refusing to give them an outlet for water; or, again, if someone living on the higher ground recklessly lets off the water on his lower neighbor, and they cannot come to terms with one another, let him who will call in a warden of the city, if he be in the city, or if he be in the country, a warden of the country, and let him obtain a decision determining what each of them is to do. And he who will not abide by the decision shall suffer for his malignant and morose temper, and pay a fine to the injured party, equivalent to double the value of the injury, because he was unwilling to submit to the magistrates.

Now the participation of fruits shall be ordered on this wise. The goddess of Autumn has two gracious gifts: one, the joy of Dionysus which is not treasured up; the other, which nature intends to be stored. Let this be the law, then, concerning the fruits of autumn: He who tastes the common or storing fruits of autumn, whether grapes or figs, before the season of vintage which coincides with Arcturus, either on his own land or on that of others, —let him pay fifty drachmae, which shall be sacred to Dionysus, if he pluck

them from his own land; and if from his neighbor's land, a mina, and if from any others', two-thirds of a mina. And he who would gather the 'choice' grapes or the 'choice' figs, as they are now termed, if he take them off his own land, let him pluck them how and when he likes; but if he take them from the ground of others without their leave, let him in that case be always punished in accordance with the law which ordains that he should not move what he has not laid down. And if a slave touches any fruit of this sort, without the consent of the owner of the land, he shall be beaten with as many blows as there are grapes on the bunch, or figs on the fig-tree. Let a metic purchase the 'choice' autumnal fruit, and then, if he pleases, he may gather it; but if a stranger is passing along the road, and desires to eat, let him take of the 'choice' grape for himself and a single follower without payment, as a tribute of hospitality. The law however forbids strangers from sharing in the sort which is not used for eating; and if anyone, whether he be master or slave, takes of them in ignorance, let the slave be beaten, and the freeman dismissed with admonitions, and instructed to take of the other autumnal fruits which are unfit for making raisins and wine, or for laying by as dried figs. As to pears, and apples, and pomegranates, and similar fruits, there shall be no disgrace in taking them secretly; but he who is caught, if he be of less than thirty years of age, shall be struck and beaten off, but not wounded; and no freeman shall have any right of satisfaction for such blows. Of these fruits the stranger may partake, just as he may of the fruits of autumn. And if an elder, who is more than thirty years of age, eat of them on the spot, let him, like the stranger, be allowed to partake of all such fruits, but he must carry away nothing. If, however, he will not obey the law, let him run the risk of failing in the competition of virtue, in case anyone takes notice of his actions before the judges at the time.

Water is the greatest element of nutrition in gardens, but is easily polluted. You cannot poison the soil, or the sun, or the air, which are the other elements of nutrition in plants, or divert them, or steal them; but all these things may very likely happen in regard to water, which must therefore be protected by law. And let this be the law: —If anyone intentionally pollutes the water of another, whether the water of a spring, or collected in reservoirs, either by poisonous substances, or by digging, or by theft, let the injured party bring the cause before the wardens of the city, and claim in writing the value of the loss; if the accused be found guilty of injuring the water by deleterious substances, let him not only pay damages, but purify the stream or the cistern which contains the water, in such manner as the laws of the interpreters order the purification to be made by the offender in each case.

With respect to the gathering in of the fruits of the soil, let a man, if he pleases, carry his own fruits through any place in which he either does no harm to anyone, or himself gains three times as much as his neighbor loses. Now of these things the magistrates should be cognizant, as of all other things in which a man intentionally does injury to another or to the property of another, by fraud or force, in the use which he makes of his own property. All these matters a man should lay before the magistrates, and receive damages, supposing the injury to be not more than three minae; or if he have a charge against another which involves a larger amount, let him bring his suit into the public courts and have the evil-doer punished. But if any of the magistrates appear to adjudge the penalties which he imposes in an unjust spirit, let him be liable to pay double to the injured party. Anyone may bring the offences of magistrates, in any particular case, before the public courts. There are innumerable little matters relating to the modes of

punishment, and applications for suits, and summonses and the witnesses to summonses—for example, whether two witnesses should be required for a summons, or how many—and all such details, which cannot be omitted in legislation, but are beneath the wisdom of an aged legislator. These lesser matters, as they indeed are in comparison with the greater ones, let a younger generation regulate by law, after the patterns which have preceded, and according to their own experience of the usefulness and necessity of such laws; and when they are duly regulated let there be no alteration, but let the citizens live in the observance of them.

Now of artisans, let the regulations be as follows: —In the first place, let no citizen or servant of a citizen be occupied in handicraft arts; for he who is to secure and preserve the public order of the state, has an art which requires much study and many kinds of knowledge, and does not admit of being made a secondary occupation; and hardly any human being is capable of pursuing two professions or two arts rightly, or of practicing one art himself, and superintending someone else who is practicing another. Let this, then, be our first principle in the state: —No one who is a smith shall also be a carpenter, and if he be a carpenter, he shall not superintend the smith's art rather than his own, under the pretext that in superintending many servants who are working for him, he is likely to superintend them better, because more revenue will accrue to him from them than from his own art; but let every man in the state have one art, and get his living by that. Let the wardens of the city labor to maintain this law, and if any citizen incline to any other art rather than the study of virtue, let them punish him with disgrace and infamy, until they bring him back into his own right course; and if any stranger profess two arts, let them chastise him with bonds and money penalties, and

expulsion from the state, until they compel him to be one only and not many.

But as touching payments for hire, and contracts of work, or in case anyone does wrong to any of the citizens, or they do wrong to any other, up to fifty drachmae, let the wardens of the city decide the case; but if a greater amount be involved, then let the public courts decide according to law. Let no one pay any duty either on the importation or exportation of goods; and as to frankincense and similar perfumes, used in the service of the Gods, which come from abroad, and purple and other dyes which are not produced in the country, or the materials of any art which have to be imported, and which are not necessary—no one should import them; nor, again, should anyone export anything which is wanted in the country. Of all these things let there be inspectors and superintendents, taken from the guardians of the law; and they shall be the twelve next in order to the five seniors. Concerning arms, and all implements which are required for military purposes, if there be need of introducing any art, or plant, or metal, or chains of any kind, or animals for use in war, let the commanders of the horse and the generals have authority over their importation and exportation; the city shall send them out and also receive them, and the guardians of the law shall make fit and proper laws about them. But let there be no retail trade for the sake of moneymaking, either in these or any other articles, in the city or country at all.

With respect to food and the distribution of the produce of the country, the right and proper way seems to be nearly that which is the custom of Crete; for all should be required to distribute the fruits of the soil into twelve parts, and in this way consume them. Let the twelfth portion of each (as for instance of wheat and barley, to which the rest of the fruits of the earth shall be added, as well as the animals

which are for sale in each of the twelve divisions) be divided in due proportion into three parts; one part for freemen, another for their servants, and a third for craftsmen and in general for strangers, whether sojourners who may be dwelling in the city, and like other men must live, or those who come on some business which they have with the state, or with some individual. Let only this third part of all necessaries be required to be sold; out of the other two-thirds no one shall be compelled to sell. And how will they be best distributed? In the first place, we see clearly that the distribution will be of equals in one point of view, and in another point of view of unequals.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean that the earth of necessity produces and nourishes the various articles of food, sometimes better and sometimes worse.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Such being the case, let no one of the three portions be greater than either of the other two; — neither that which is assigned to masters or to slaves, nor again that of the stranger; but let the distribution to all be equal and alike, and let every citizen take his two portions and distribute them among slaves and freemen, he having power to determine the quantity and quality. And what remains he shall distribute by measure and number among the animals who have to be sustained from the earth, taking the whole number of them.

In the second place, our citizens should have separate houses duly ordered; and this will be the order proper for men like them. There shall be twelve hamlets, one in the middle of each twelfth portion, and in each hamlet they shall first set apart a market-place, and the temples of the Gods, and of their attendant demi-gods; and if there be any local

deities of the Magnetes, or holy seats of other ancient deities, whose memory has been preserved, to these let them pay their ancient honors. But Hestia, and Zeus, and Athene will have temples everywhere together with the God who presides in each of the twelve districts. And the first erection of houses shall be around these temples, where the ground is highest, in order to provide the safest and most defensible place of retreat for the guards. All the rest of the country they shall settle in the following manner: —They shall make thirteen divisions of the craftsmen; one of them they shall establish in the city, and this, again, they shall subdivide into twelve lesser divisions, among the twelve districts of the city, and the remainder shall be distributed in the country round about; and in each village they shall settle various classes of craftsmen, with a view to the convenience of the husbandmen. And the chief officers of the wardens of the country shall superintend all these matters, and see how many of them, and which class of them, each place requires; and fix them where they are likely to be least troublesome, and most useful to the husbandman. And the wardens of the city shall see to similar matters in the city.

Now the wardens of the agora ought to see to the details of the agora. Their first care, after the temples which are in the agora have been seen to, should be to prevent anyone from doing any wrong in dealings between man and man; in the second place, as being inspectors of temperance and violence, they should chastise him who requires chastisement. Touching articles of sale, they should first see whether the articles which the citizens are under regulations to sell to strangers are sold to them, as the law ordains. And let the law be as follows: —On the first day of the month, the persons in charge, whoever they are, whether strangers or slaves, who have the charge on behalf of the citizens, shall produce to the strangers the portion which falls to them, in

the first place, a twelfth portion of the corn; —the stranger shall purchase corn for the whole month, and other cereals, on the first market day; and on the tenth day of the month the one party shall sell, and the other buy, liquids sufficient to last during the whole month; and on the twenty-third day there shall be a sale of animals by those who are willing to sell to the people who want to buy, and of implements and other things which husbandmen sell, (such as skins and all kinds of clothing, either woven or made of felt and other goods of the same sort), and which strangers are compelled to buy and purchase of others. As to the retail trade in these things, whether of barley or wheat set apart for meal and flour, or any other kind of food, no one shall sell them to citizens or their slaves, nor shall anyone buy of a citizen; but let the stranger sell them in the market of strangers, to artisans and their slaves, making an exchange of wine and food, which is commonly called retail trade. And butchers shall offer for sale parts of dismembered animals to the strangers, and artisans, and their servants. Let any stranger who likes buy fuel from day to day wholesale, from those who have the care of it in the country, and let him sell to the strangers as much as he pleases and when he pleases. As to other goods and implements which are likely to be wanted, they shall sell them in the common market, at any place which the guardians of the law and the wardens of the market and city, choosing according to their judgment, shall determine; at such places they shall exchange money for goods, and goods for money, neither party giving credit to the other; and he who gives credit must be satisfied, whether he obtain his money or not, for in such exchanges he will not be protected by law. But whenever property has been bought or sold, greater in quantity or value than is allowed by the law, which has determined within what limits a man may increase and diminish his possessions, let the excess

be registered in the books of the guardians of the law; or in case of diminution, let there be an erasure made. And let the same rule be observed about the registration of the property of the metics. Anyone who likes may come and be a metic on certain conditions; a foreigner, if he likes, and is able to settle, may dwell in the land, but he must practice an art, and not abide more than twenty years from the time at which he has registered himself; and he shall pay no sojourner's tax, however small, except good conduct, nor any other tax for buying and selling. But when the twenty years have expired, he shall take his property with him and depart. And if in the course of these years he should chance to distinguish himself by any considerable benefit which he confers on the state, and he thinks that he can persuade the council and assembly, either to grant him delay in leaving the country, or to allow him to remain for the whole of his life, let him go and persuade the city, and whatever they assent to at his instance shall take effect. For the children of the metics, being artisans, and of fifteen years of age, let the time of their sojourn commence after their fifteenth year; and let them remain for twenty years, and then go where they like; but any of them who wishes to remain, may do so, if he can persuade the council and assembly. And if he depart, let him erase all the entries which have been made by him in the register kept by the magistrates.

Book 9.

Athenian Stranger/ Next to all the matters which have preceded in the natural order of legislation will come suits of law. Of suits those which relate to agriculture have been already described, but the more important have not been described. Having mentioned them severally under their usual names, we will proceed to say what punishments are to be inflicted for each offence, and who are to be the judges of them.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ There is a sense of disgrace in legislating, as we are about to do, for all the details of crime in a state which, as 'we say, is to be well regulated and will be perfectly adapted to the practice of virtue. To assume that in such a state there will arise someone who will be guilty of crimes as heinous as any which are ever perpetrated in other states, and that we must legislate for him by anticipation, and threaten and make laws against him if he should arise, in order to deter him, and punish his acts, under the idea that he will arise—this, as I was saying, is in a manner disgraceful. Yet seeing that we are not like the ancient legislators, who gave laws to heroes and sons of gods, being, according to the popular belief, themselves the offspring of the gods, and legislating for others, who were also the children of divine parents, but that we are only men who are legislating for the sons of men, there is no uncharitableness in apprehending that some one of our citizens may be like a seed which has touched the ox's horn, having a heart so hard that it cannot be softened any more than those seeds can be softened by fire. Among our citizens there may be those who cannot be subdued by all the strength of the laws; and for their sake, though an ungracious task, I will proclaim my first law about the robbing of temples, in case

anyone should dare to commit such a crime. I do not expect or imagine that any well-brought-up citizen will ever take the infection, but their servants, and strangers, and strangers' servants may be guilty of many impieties. And with a view to them especially, and yet not without a provident eye to the weakness of human nature generally, I will proclaim the law about robbers of temples and similar incurable, or almost incurable, criminals. Having already agreed that such enactments ought always to have a short prelude, we may speak to the criminal, whom some tormenting desire by night and by day tempts to go and rob a temple, the fewest possible words of admonition and exhortation: —O sir, we will say to him, the impulse which moves you to rob temples is not an ordinary human malady, nor yet a visitation of heaven, but a madness which is begotten in a man from ancient and unexpiated crimes of his race, an ever-recurring curse; —against this you must guard with all your might, and how you are to guard we will explain to you. When any such thought comes into your mind, go and perform expiations, go as a suppliant to the temples of the Gods who avert evils, go to the society of those who are called good men among you; hear them tell and yourself try to repeat after them, that every man should honor the noble and the just. Fly from the company of the wicked—fly and turn not back; and if your disorder is lightened by these remedies, well and good, but if not, then acknowledge death to be nobler than life, and depart hence.

Such are the preludes which we sing to all who have thoughts of unholy and treasonable actions, and to him who hearkens to them the law has nothing to say. But to him who is disobedient when the prelude is over, cry with a loud voice—He who is taken in the act of robbing temples, if he be a slave or stranger, shall have his evil deed engraven on his face and hands, and shall be beaten with as many stripes

as may seem good to the judges, and be cast naked beyond the borders of the land. And if he suffers this punishment he will probably return to his right mind and be improved; for no penalty which the law inflicts is designed for evil, but always makes him who suffers either better or not so much worse as he would have been. But if any citizen be found guilty of any great or unmentionable wrong, either in relation to the gods, or his parents, or the state, let the judge deem him to be incurable, remembering that after receiving such an excellent education and training from youth upward, he has not abstained from the greatest of crimes. His punishment shall be death, which to him will be the least of evils; and his example will benefit others, if he perish ingloriously, and be cast beyond the borders of the land. But let his children and family, if they avoid the ways of their father, have glory, and let honorable mention be made of them, as having nobly and manfully escaped out of evil into good. None of them should have their goods confiscated to the state, for the lots of the citizens ought always to continue the same and equal.

Touching the exaction of penalties, when a man appears to have done anything which deserves a fine, he shall pay the fine, if he have anything in excess of the lot which is assigned to him; but more than that he shall not pay. And to secure exactness, let the guardians of the law refer to the registers, and inform the judges of the precise truth, in order that none of the lots may go uncultivated for want of money. But if anyone seems to deserve a greater penalty, let him undergo a long and public imprisonment and be dishonored, unless some of his friends are willing to be surety for him, and liberate him by assisting him to pay the fine. No criminal shall go unpunished, not even for a single offence, nor if he have fled the country; but let the penalty be according to his deserts, —death, or bonds, or blows, or degrading places of

sitting or standing, or removal to some temple on the borders of the land; or let him pay fines, as we said before. In cases of death, let the judges be the guardians of the law, and a court selected by merit from the last year's magistrates. But how the causes are to be brought into court, how the summonses are to be served, and the like, these things may be left to the younger generation of legislators to determine; the manner of voting we must determine ourselves.

Let the vote be given openly; but before they come to the vote let the judges sit in order of seniority over against plaintiff and defendant, and let all the citizens who can spare time hear and take a serious interest in listening to such causes. First of all the plaintiff shall make one speech, and then the defendant shall make another; and after the speeches have been made the eldest judge shall begin to examine the parties, and proceed to make an adequate enquiry into what has been said; and after the oldest has spoken, the rest shall proceed in order to examine either party as to what he finds defective in the evidence, whether of statement or omission; and he who has nothing to ask shall hand over the examination to another. And on so much of what has been said as is to the purpose all the judges shall set their seals, and place the writings on the altar of Hestia.

On the next day they shall meet again, and in like manner put their questions and go through the cause, and again set their seals upon the evidence; and when they have three times done this, and have had witnesses and evidence enough, they shall each of them give a holy vote, after promising by Hestia that they will decide justly and truly to the utmost of their power; and so they shall put an end to the suit.

Next, after what relates to the Gods, follows what relates to the dissolution of the state: —Whoever by promoting a

man to power enslaves the laws, and subjects the city to factions, using violence and stirring up sedition contrary to law, him we will deem the greatest enemy of the whole state.

But he who takes no part in such proceedings, and, being one of the chief magistrates of the state, has no knowledge of the treason, or, having knowledge of it, by reason of cowardice does not interfere on behalf of his country, such an one we must consider nearly as bad. Every man who is worth anything will inform the magistrates, and bring the conspirator to trial for making a violent and illegal attempt to change the government. The judges of such cases shall be the same as of the robbers of temples; and let the whole proceeding be carried on in the same way, and the vote of the majority condemn to death. But let there be a general rule, that the disgrace and punishment of the father is not to be visited on the children, except in the case of someone whose father, grandfather, and great-grandfather have successively undergone the penalty of death. Such persons the city shall send away with all their possessions to the city and country of their ancestors, retaining only and wholly their appointed lot. And out of the citizens who have more than one son of not less than ten years of age, they shall select ten whom their father or grandfather by the mother's or father's side shall appoint, and let them send to Delphi the names of those who are selected, and him whom the God chooses they shall establish as heir of the house which has failed; and may he have better fortune than his predecessors!

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Once more let there be a third general law respecting the judges who are to give judgment, and the manner of conducting suits against those who are tried on an accusation of treason; and as concerning the remaining or departure of their descendants, —there shall be one law

for all three, for the traitor, and the robber of temples, and the subverter by violence of the laws of the state. For a thief, whether he steal much or little, let there be one law, and one punishment for all alike: in the first place, let him pay double the amount of the theft if he be convicted, and if he have so much over and above the allotment; —if he have not, he shall be bound until he pay the penalty, or persuade him who has obtained the sentence against him to forgive him. But if a person be convicted of a theft against the state, then if he can persuade the city, or if he will pay back twice the amount of the theft, he shall be set free from his bonds.

Clinias/ What makes you say, Stranger, that a theft is all one, whether the thief may have taken much or little, and either from sacred or secular places—and these are not the only differences in thefts seeing, then, that they are of many kinds, ought not the legislator to adapt himself to them, and impose upon them entirely different penalties?

Athenian Stranger/ Excellent. I was running on too fast, Cleinias, and you impinged upon me, and brought me to my senses, reminding me of what, indeed, had occurred to my mind already, that legislation was never yet rightly worked out, as I may say in passing. —Do you remember the image in which I likened the men for whom laws are now made to slaves who are doctored by slaves? For of this you may be very sure, that if one of those empirical physicians, who practice medicine without science, were to come upon the gentleman physician talking to his gentleman patient, and using the language almost of philosophy, beginning at the beginning of the disease and discoursing about the whole nature of the body, he would burst into a hearty laugh—he would say what most of those who are called doctors always have at their tongue's end: —Foolish fellow, he would say, you are not healing the sick man, but you are educating him; and he does not want to be made a doctor, but to get well.

Clinias/ And would he not be right?

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps he would; and he might remark upon us, that he who discourses about laws, as we are now doing, is giving the citizens education and not laws; that would be rather a telling observation.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ But we are fortunate.

Clinias/ In what way?

Athenian Stranger/ Inasmuch as we are not compelled to give laws, but we may take into consideration every form of government, and ascertain what is best and what is most needful, and how they may both be carried into execution; and we may also, if we please, at this very moment choose what is best, or, if we prefer, what is most necessary—which shall we do?

Clinias/ There is something ridiculous, Stranger, in our proposing such an alternative, as if we were legislators, simply bound under some great necessity which cannot be deferred to the morrow. But we, as I may by the grace of Heaven affirm, like gatherers of stones or beginners of some composite work, may gather a heap of materials, and out of this, at our leisure, select what is suitable for our projected construction. Let us then suppose ourselves to be at leisure, not of necessity building, but rather like men who are partly providing materials, and partly putting them together. And we may truly say that some of our laws, like stones, are already fixed in their places, and others lie at hand.

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly, in that case, Cleinias, our view of law will be more in accordance with nature. For there is another matter affecting legislators, which I must earnestly entreat you to consider.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ There are many writings to be found in cities, and among them there are discourses composed by legislators as well as by other persons.

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we give heed rather to the writings of those others, —poets and the like, who either in meter or out of meter have recorded their advice about the conduct of life, and not to the writings of legislators? or shall we give heed to them above all?

Clinias/ Yes; to them far above all others.

Athenian Stranger/ And ought the legislator alone among writers to withhold his opinion about the beautiful, the good, and the just, and not to teach what they are, and how they are to be pursued by those who intend to be happy?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Athenian Stranger/ And is it disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and other poets to lay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and the pursuits of men, but not so disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon and others who were legislators as well as writers? Is it not true that of all the writings to be found in cities, those which relate to laws, when you unfold and read them, ought to be by far the noblest and the best? and should not other writings either agree with them, or if they disagree, be deemed ridiculous? We should consider whether the laws of states ought not to have the character of loving and wise parents, rather than of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten, and, after writing their decrees on walls, go their ways; and whether, in discoursing of laws, we should not take the gentler view of them which may or may not be attainable, —at any rate, we will show our readiness to entertain such a view, and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the result. And may the result be good, and if God be gracious, it will be good!

Clinias/ Excellent; let us do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, what relates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of thefts, and offences in general; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course of legislation, we have enacted some things, and have not made up our minds about some others; for as yet we are not legislators, but we may soon be. Let us, if you please, consider these matters.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Concerning all things honorable and just, let us then endeavor to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves, and how far we are inconsistent, and how far the many, from whom at any rate we should profess a desire to differ, agree and disagree among themselves.

Clinias/ What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?

Athenian Stranger/ I will endeavor to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are all agreed that justice, and just men and things and actions, are all fair, and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any inconsistency in this.

Clinias/ They would be quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps; but let us consider further, that if all things which are just are fair and honorable, in the term 'all' we must include just sufferings which are the correlatives of just actions.

Clinias/ And what is the inference?

Athenian Stranger/ The inference is, that a just action in partaking of the just partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honorable.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle be admitted to be in the same degree fair and honorable, if the argument is consistently carried out?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonorable, and the term 'dishonorable' is applied to justice, will not the just and the honorable disagree?

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ A thing not difficult to understand; the laws which have been already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to what we are saying.

Clinias/ To what?

Athenian Stranger/ We had enacted, if I am not mistaken, that the robber of temples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put to death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of a similar nature. But we stopped short, because we saw that these sufferings are infinite in number and degree, and that they are, at once, the most just and also the most dishonorable of all sufferings. And if this be true, are not the just and the honorable at one time all the same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?

Clinias/ Such appears to be the case.

Athenian Stranger/ In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language of the many rend asunder the honorable and just.

Clinias/ Very true, Stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Then now, Cleinias, let us see how far we ourselves are consistent about these matters.

Clinias/ Consistent in what?

Athenian Stranger/ I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the discussion, but if I did not, let me now state——

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That all bad men are always involuntarily bad; and from this I must proceed to draw a further inference.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his will. Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily is a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily. I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily, and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against their will, and yet that many do injustice willingly, I do not agree with him. But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if you, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me, —Well, Stranger, if all this be as you say, how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes—shall we legislate or not—what do you advise? Certainly we will, I should reply. Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary? or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime?

Clinias/ Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these objections?

Athenian Stranger/ That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us——

Clinias/ Do what?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us remember what has been well said by us already, that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and contradictory. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever, two kinds of actions have been distinguished—the one, voluntary, the other, involuntary; and they have legislated about them accordingly. But shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and get away without giving any explanation or verification of itself? How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation? Impossible. Before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two, and what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty upon either, everyone may understand our proposal, and be able in some way to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly inflicted.

Clinias/ I agree with you, Stranger; for one of two things is certain: either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or we must show the meaning and truth of this statement.

Athenian Stranger/ Of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable—not to speak what I believe to be the truth would be to me unlawful and unholy. But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary, I must endeavor to find some other distinction between them.

Clinias/ Very true, Stranger; there cannot be two opinions among us upon that point.

Athenian Stranger/ Reflect, then; there are hurts of various kinds done by the citizens to one another in the intercourse of life, affording plentiful examples both of the voluntary and involuntary.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ I would not have anyone suppose that all these hurts are injuries, and that these injuries are of two kinds, —one, voluntary, and the other, involuntary; for the involuntary hurts of all men are quite as many and as great as the voluntary. And please to consider whether I am right or quite wrong in what I am going to say; for I deny, Cleinias and Megillus, that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury involuntarily, nor should I legislate about such an act under the idea that I am legislating for an involuntary injury. But I should rather say that such a hurt, whether great or small, is not an injury at all; and, on the other hand, if I am right, when a benefit is wrongly conferred, the author of the benefit may often be said to injure. For I maintain, O my friends, that the mere giving or taking away of anything is not to be described either as just or unjust; but the legislator has to consider whether mankind do good or harm to one another out of a just principle and intention. On the distinction between injustice and hurt he must fix his eye; and when there is hurt, he must, as far as he can, make the hurt good by law, and save that which is ruined, and raise up that which is fallen, and make that which is dead or wounded whole. And when compensation has been given for injustice, the law must always seek to win over the doers and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of enmity to those of friendship.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Then as to unjust hurts (and gains also, supposing the injustice to bring gain), of these we may heal as many as are capable of being healed, regarding them as diseases of the soul; and the cure of injustice will take the following direction.

Clinias/ What direction?

Athenian Stranger/ When anyone commits any injustice, small or great, the law will admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like again, or never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; and he must in addition pay for the hurt. Whether the end is to be attained by word or action, with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking away privileges, by means of fines or gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall proceed to make a man hate injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the just, —this is quite the noblest work of law. But if the legislator sees anyone who is incurable, for him he will appoint a law and a penalty. He knows quite well that to such men themselves there is no profit in the continuance of their lives, and that they would do a double good to the rest of mankind if they would take their departure, inasmuch as they would be an example to other men not to offend, and they would relieve the city of bad citizens. In such cases, and in such cases only, the legislator ought to inflict death as the punishment of offences.

Clinias/ What you have said appears to me to be very reasonable, but will you favor me by stating a little more clearly the difference between hurt and injustice, and the various complications of the voluntary and involuntary which enter into them?

Athenian Stranger/ I will endeavor to do as you wish: —Concerning the soul, thus much would be generally said and allowed, that one element in her nature is passion, which may be described either as a state or a part of her, and is hard to be striven against and contended with, and by irrational force overturns many things.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And pleasure is not the same with passion, but has an opposite power, working her will by persuasion and by the force of deceit in all things.

Clinias/ Quite true. ‘

Athenian Stranger/ A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of crimes. Ignorance, however, may be conveniently divided by the legislator into two sorts: there is simple ignorance, which is the source of lighter offences, and double ignorance, which is accompanied by a conceit of wisdom; and he who is under the influence of the latter fancies that he knows all about matters of which he knows nothing. This second kind of ignorance, when possessed of power and strength, will be held by the legislator to be the source of great and monstrous crimes, but when attended with weakness, will only result in the errors of children and old men; and these he will treat as errors, and will make laws accordingly for those who commit them, which will be the mildest and most merciful of all laws.

Clinias/ You are perfectly right.

Athenian Stranger/ We all of us remark of one man that he is superior to pleasure and passion, and of another that he is inferior to them; and this is true ‘.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But no one was ever yet heard to say that one of us is superior and another inferior to ignorance.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ We are speaking of motives which incite men to the fulfillment of their will; although an individual may be often drawn by them in opposite directions at the same time.

Clinias/ Yes, often.

Athenian Stranger/ And now I can define to you clearly, and without ambiguity, what I mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of them: —When anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires, tyrannize over the soul, whether they do any harm or not, —I call all

this injustice. But when the opinion of the best, in whatever part of human nature states or individuals may suppose that to dwell, has dominion in the soul and orders the life of every man, even if it be sometimes mistaken, yet what is done in accordance therewith, and the principle in individuals which obeys this rule, and is best for the whole life of man, is to be called just; although the hurt done by mistake is thought by many to be involuntary injustice. Leaving the question of names, about which we are not going to quarrel, and having already delineated three sources of error, we may begin by recalling them somewhat more vividly to our memory: —One of them was of the painful sort, which we denominate anger and fear.

Clinias/ Quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ There was a second consisting of pleasures and desires, and a third of hopes, which aimed at true opinion about the best. The latter being subdivided into three, we now get five sources of actions, and for these five we will make laws of two kinds.

Clinias/ What are the two kinds?

Athenian Stranger/ There is one kind of actions done by violence and in the light of day, and another kind of actions which are done in darkness and with secret deceit, or sometimes both with violence and deceit; the laws concerning these last ought to have a character of severity.

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ And now let us return from this digression and complete the work of legislation. Laws have been already enacted by us concerning the robbers of the Gods, and concerning traitors, and also concerning those who corrupt the laws for the purpose of subverting the government. A man may very likely commit some of these crimes, either in a state of madness or when affected by

disease, or under the influence of extreme old age, or in a fit of childish wantonness, himself no better than a child. And if this be made evident to the judges elected to try the cause, on the appeal of the criminal or his advocate, and he be judged to have been in this state when he committed the offence, he shall simply pay for the hurt which he may have done to another; but he shall be exempt from other penalties, unless he have slain someone, and have on his hands the stain of blood. And in that case he shall go to another land and country, and there dwell for a year; and if he return before the expiration of the time which the law appoints, or even set his foot at all on his native land, he shall be bound by the guardians of the law in the public prison for two years, and then go free.

Having begun to speak of homicide, let us endeavor to lay down laws concerning every different kind of homicide; and, first of all, concerning violent and involuntary homicides. If anyone in an athletic contest, and at the public games, involuntarily kills a friend, and he dies either at the time or afterwards of the blows which he has received; or if the like misfortune happens to anyone in war, or military exercises, or mimic contests of which the magistrates enjoin the practice, whether with or without arms, when he has been purified according to the law brought from Delphi relating to these matters, he shall be innocent. And so in the case of physicians: if their patient dies against their will, they shall be held guiltless by the law. And if one slay another with his own hand, but unintentionally, whether he be unarmed or have some instrument or dart in his hand; or if he kill him by administering food or drink, or by the application of fire or cold, or by suffocating him, whether he do the deed by his own hand, or by the agency of others, he shall be deemed the agent, and shall suffer one of the following penalties: — If he kill the slave of another in the belief that he is his own,

he shall bear the master of the dead man harmless from loss, or shall pay a penalty of twice the value of the dead man, which the judges shall assess; but purifications must be used greater and more numerous than for those who committed homicide at the games; —what they are to be, the interpreters whom the God appoints shall be authorized to declare. And if a man kills his own slave, when he has been purified according to law, he shall be quit of the homicide. And if a man kills a freeman unintentionally, he shall undergo the same purification as he did who killed the slave. But let him not forget also a tale of olden time, which is to this effect: —He who has suffered a violent end, when newly dead, if he has had the soul of a freeman in life, is angry with the author of his death; and being himself full of fear and panic by reason of his violent end, when he sees his murderer walking about in his own accustomed haunts, he is stricken with terror and becomes disordered, and this disorder of his, aided by the guilty recollection of the other, is communicated by him with overwhelming force to the murderer and his deeds. Wherefore also the murderer must go out of the way of his victim for the entire period of a year, and not himself be found in any spot which was familiar to him throughout the country. And if the dead man be a stranger, the homicide shall be kept from the country of the stranger during a like period. If anyone voluntarily obeys this law, the next of kin to the deceased, seeing all that has happened, shall take pity on him, and make peace with him, and show him all gentleness. But if anyone is disobedient, and either ventures to go to any of the temples and sacrifice unpurified, or will not continue in exile during the appointed time, the next of kin to the deceased shall proceed against him for murder; and if he be convicted, every part of his punishment shall be doubled. And if the next of kin do not proceed against the perpetrator of the crime, then the

pollution shall be deemed to fall upon his own head; —the murdered man will fix the guilt upon his kinsman, and he who has a mind to proceed against him may compel him to be absent from his country during five years, according to law. If a stranger unintentionally kill a stranger who is dwelling in the city, he who likes shall prosecute the cause according to the same rules. If he be a metic, let him be absent for a year, or if he be an entire stranger, in addition to the purification, whether he have slain a stranger, or a metic, or a citizen, he shall be banished for life from the country which is in possession of our laws. And if he return contrary to law, let the guardians of the law punish him with death; and let them hand over his property, if he have any, to him who is next of kin to the sufferer. And if he be wrecked, and driven on the coast against his will, he shall take up his abode on the seashore, wetting his feet in the sea, and watching for an opportunity of sailing; but if he be brought by land, and is not his own master, let the magistrate whom he first comes across in the city, release him and send him unharmed over the border.

If anyone slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done in passion, in the case of such actions we must begin by making a distinction. For a deed is done from passion either when men suddenly, and without intention to kill, cause the death of another by blows and the like on a momentary impulse, and are sorry for the deed immediately afterwards; or again, when after having been insulted in deed or word, men pursue revenge, and kill a person intentionally, and are not sorry for the act. And, therefore, we must assume that these homicides are of two kinds, both of them arising from passion, which may be justly said to be in a mean between the voluntary and involuntary; at the same time, they are neither of them anything more than a likeness or shadow of either. He who treasures up his anger,

and avenges himself, not immediately and at the moment, but with insidious design, and after an interval, is like the voluntary; but he who does not treasure up his anger, and takes vengeance on the instant, and without malice prepense, approaches to the involuntary; and yet even he is not altogether involuntary, but is only the image or shadow of the involuntary; wherefore about homicides committed in hot blood, there is a difficulty in determining whether in legislating we shall reckon them as voluntary or as partly involuntary. The best and truest view is to regard them respectively as likenesses only of the voluntary and involuntary, and to distinguish them accordingly as they are done with or without premeditation. And we should make the penalties heavier for those who commit homicide with angry premeditation, and lighter for those who do not premeditate, but smite upon the instant; for that which is like a greater evil should be punished more severely, and that which is like a less evil should be punished less severely: this shall be the rule of our laws.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us proceed: —If anyone slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done in a moment of anger, and without premeditation, let the offender suffer in other respects as the involuntary homicide would have suffered, and also undergo an exile of two years, that he may learn to school his passions. But he who slays another from passion, yet with premeditation, shall in other respects suffer as the former; and to this shall be added an exile of three instead of two years, —his punishment is to be longer because his passion is greater. The manner of their return shall be on this wise: (and here the law has difficulty in determining exactly; for in some cases the murderer who is judged by the law to be the worse may really be the less cruel, and he who is judged the less cruel may be really the

worse, and may have executed the murder in a more savage manner, whereas the other may have been gentler. But in general the degrees of guilt will be such as we have described them. Of all these things the guardians of the law must take cognizance): —When a homicide of either kind has completed his term of exile, the guardians shall send twelve judges to the borders of the land; these during the interval shall have informed themselves of the actions of the criminals, and they shall judge respecting their pardon and reception; and the homicides shall abide by their judgment. But if after they have returned home, anyone of them in a moment of anger repeats the deed, let him be an exile, and return no more; or if he returns, let him suffer as the stranger was to suffer in a similar case. He who kills his own slave shall undergo a purification, but if he kills the slave of another in anger, he shall pay twice the amount of the loss to his owner. And if any homicide is disobedient to the law, and without purification pollutes the agora, or the games, or the temples, he who pleases may bring to trial the next of kin to the dead man for permitting him, and the murderer with him, and may compel the one to exact and the other to suffer a double amount of fines and purifications; and the accuser shall himself receive the fine in accordance with the law. If a slave in a fit of passion kills his master, the kindred of the deceased man may do with the murderer (provided only they do not spare his life) whatever they please, and they will be pure; or if he kills a freeman, who is not his master, the owner shall give up the slave to the relatives of the deceased, and they shall be under an obligation to put him to death, but this may be done in any manner which they please. And if (which is a rare occurrence, but does sometimes happen) a father or a mother in a moment of passion slays a son or daughter by blows, or some other violence, the slayer shall undergo the same purification as

in other cases, and be exiled during three years; but when the exile returns the wife shall separate from the husband, and the husband from the wife, and they shall never afterwards beget children together, or live under the same roof, or partake of the same sacred rites with those whom they have deprived of a child or of a brother. And he who is impious and disobedient in such a case shall be brought to trial for impiety by anyone who pleases. If in a fit of anger a husband kills his wedded wife, or the wife her husband, the slayer shall undergo the same purification, and the term of exile shall be three years. And when he who has committed any such crime returns, let him have no communication in sacred rites with his children, neither let him sit at the same table with them, and the father or son who disobeys shall be liable to be brought to trial for impiety by anyone who pleases. If a brother or a sister in a fit of passion kills a brother or a sister, they shall undergo purification and exile, as was the case with parents who killed their offspring: they shall not come under the same roof, or share in the sacred rites of those whom they have deprived of their brethren, or of their children. And he who is disobedient shall be justly liable to the law concerning impiety, which relates to these matters. If anyone is so violent in his passion against his parents, that in the madness of his anger he dares to kill one of them, if the murdered person before dying freely forgives the murderer, let him undergo the purification which is assigned to those who have been guilty of involuntary homicide, and do as they do, and he shall be pure. But if he be not acquitted, the perpetrator of such a deed shall be amenable to many laws; —he shall be amenable to the extreme punishments for assault, and impiety, and robbing of temples, for he has robbed his parent of life; and if a man could be slain more than once, most justly would he who in a fit of passion has slain father or mother, undergo many

deaths. How can he, whom, alone of all men, even in defense of his life, and when about to suffer death at the hands of his parents, no law will allow to kill his father or his mother who are the authors of his being, and whom the legislator will command to endure any extremity rather than do this—how can he, I say, lawfully receive any other punishment? Let death then be the appointed punishment of him who in a fit of passion slays his father or his mother. But if brother kills brother in a civil broil, or under other like circumstances, if the other has begun, and he only defends himself, let him be free from guilt, as he would be if he had slain an enemy; and the same rule will apply if a citizen kill a citizen, or a stranger a stranger. Or if a stranger kill a citizen or a citizen a stranger in self-defense, let him be free from guilt in like manner; and so in the case of a slave who has killed a slave; but if a slave have killed a freeman in self-defense, let him be subject to the same law as he who has killed a father; and let the law about the remission of penalties in the case of parricide apply equally to every other remission. Whenever any sufferer of his own accord remits the guilt of homicide to another, under the idea that his act was involuntary, let the perpetrator of the deed undergo a purification and remain in exile for a year, according to law.

Enough has been said of murders violent and involuntary and committed in passion: we have now to speak of voluntary crimes done with injustice of every kind and with premeditation, through the influence of pleasures, and desires, and jealousies.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us first speak, as far as we are able, of their various kinds. The greatest cause of them is lust, which gets the mastery of the soul maddened by desire; and this is most commonly found to exist where the passion reigns which is strongest and most prevalent among the

mass of mankind: I mean where the power of wealth breeds endless desires of never-to-be-satisfied acquisition, originating in natural disposition, and a miserable want of education. Of this want of education, the false praise of wealth which is bruited about both among Hellenes and barbarians is the cause; they deem that to be the first of goods which in reality is only the third. And in this way they wrong both posterity and themselves, for nothing can be nobler and better than that the truth about wealth should be spoken in all states—namely, that riches are for the sake of the body, as the body is for the sake of the soul. They are good, and wealth is intended by nature to be for the sake of them, and is therefore inferior to them both, and third in order of excellence. This argument teaches us that he who would be happy ought not to seek to be rich, or rather he should seek to be rich justly and temperately, and then there would be no murders in states requiring to be purged away by other murders. But now, as I said at first, avarice is the chiefest cause and source of the worst trials for voluntary homicide.

A second cause is ambition: this creates jealousies, which are troublesome companions, above all to the jealous man himself, and in a less degree to the chiefs of the state. And a third cause is cowardly and unjust fear, which has been the occasion of many murders. When a man is doing or has done something which he desires that no one should know him to be doing or to have done, he will take the life of those who are likely to inform of such things, if he have no other means of getting rid of them. Let this be said as a prelude concerning crimes of violence in general; and I must not omit to mention a tradition which is firmly believed by many, and has been received by them from those who are learned in the mysteries: they say that such deeds will be punished in the world below, and also that when the perpetrators return to

this world they will pay the natural penalty which is due to the sufferer, and end their lives in like manner by the hand of another. If he who is about to commit murder believes this, and is made by the mere prelude to dread such a penalty, there is no need to proceed with the proclamation of the law. But if he will not listen, let the following law be declared and registered against him: —Whoever shall wrongfully and of design slay with his own hand any of his kinsmen, shall in the first place be deprived of legal privileges; and he shall not pollute the temples, or the agora, or the harbors, or any other place of meeting, whether he is forbidden of men or not; for the law, which represents the whole state, forbids him, and always is and will be in the attitude of forbidding him. And if a cousin or nearer relative of the deceased, whether on the male or female side, does not prosecute the homicide when he ought, and have him proclaimed an outlaw, he shall in the first place be involved in the pollution, and incur the hatred of the Gods, even as the curse of the law stirs up the voices of men against him; and in the second place he shall be liable to be prosecuted by anyone who is willing to inflict retribution on behalf of the dead. And he who would avenge a murder shall observe all the precautionary ceremonies of lavation, and any others which the God commands in cases of this kind. Let him have proclamation made, and then go forth and compel the perpetrator to suffer the execution of justice according to the law. Now the legislator may easily show that these things must be accomplished by prayers and sacrifices to certain Gods, who are concerned with the prevention of murders in states. But who these Gods are, and what should be the true manner of instituting such trials with due regard to religion, the guardians of the law, aided by the interpreters, and the prophets, and the God, shall determine, and when they have determined let them carry on the prosecution at law. The

cause shall have the same judges who are appointed to decide in the case of those who plunder temples. Let him who is convicted be punished with death, and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered man, for this would be shameless as well as impious. But if he fly and will not stand his trial, let him fly forever; or, if he set foot anywhere on any part of the murdered man's country, let any relation of the deceased, or any other citizen who may first happen to meet with him, kill him with impunity, or bind and deliver him to those among the judges of the case who are magistrates, that they may put him to death. And let the prosecutor demand surety of him whom he prosecutes; three sureties sufficient in the opinion of the magistrates who try the cause shall be provided by him, and they shall undertake to produce him at the trial. But if he be unwilling or unable to provide sureties, then the magistrates shall take him and keep him in bonds, and produce him at the day of trial.

If a man do not commit a murder with his own hand, but contrives the death of another, and is the author of the deed in intention and design, and he continues to dwell in the city, having his soul not pure of the guilt of murder, let him be tried in the same way, except in what relates to the sureties; and also, if he be found guilty, his body after execution may have burial in his native land, but in all other respects his case shall be as the former; and whether a stranger shall kill a citizen, or a citizen a stranger, or a slave a slave, there shall be no difference as touching murder by one's own hand or by contrivance, except in the matter of sureties; and these, as has been said, shall be required of the actual murderer only, and he who brings the accusation shall bind them over at the time. If a slave be convicted of slaying a freeman voluntarily, either by his own hand or by contrivance, let the public executioner take him in the direction of the sepulcher, to a place whence he can see the

tomb of the dead man, and inflict upon him as many stripes as the person who caught him orders, and if he survive, let him put him to death. And if anyone kills a slave who has done no wrong, because he is afraid that he may inform of some base and evil deeds of his own, or for any similar reason, in such a case let him pay the penalty of murder, as he would have done if he had slain a citizen. There are things about which it is terrible and unpleasant to legislate, but impossible not to legislate. If, for example, there should be murders of kinsmen, either perpetrated by the hands of kinsmen, or by their contrivance, voluntary and purely malicious, which most often happen in ill-regulated and ill-educated states, and may perhaps occur even in a country where a man would not expect to find them, we must repeat once more the tale which we narrated a little while ago, in the hope that he who hears us will be the more disposed to abstain voluntarily on these grounds from murders which are utterly abominable. For the myth, or saying, or whatever we ought to call it, has been plainly set forth by priests of old; they have pronounced that the justice which guards and avenges the blood of kindred, follows the law of retaliation, and ordains that he who has done any murderous act should of necessity suffer that which he has done. He who has slain a father shall himself be slain at some time or other by his children, —if a mother, he shall of necessity take a woman's nature, and lose his life at the hands of his offspring in after ages; for where the blood of a family has been polluted there is no other purification, nor can the pollution be washed out until the homicidal soul which did the deed has given life for life, and has propitiated and laid to sleep the wrath of the whole family. These are the retributions of Heaven, and by such punishments men should be deterred. But if they are not deterred, and anyone should be incited by some fatality to deprive his father, or mother, or brethren, or children, of

life voluntarily and of purpose, for him the earthly lawgiver legislates as follows: —There shall be the same proclamations about outlawry, and there shall be the same sureties which have been enacted in the former cases. But in his case, if he be convicted, the servants of the judges and the magistrates shall slay him at an appointed place without the city where three ways meet, and there expose his body naked, and each of the magistrates on behalf of the whole city shall take a stone and cast it upon the head of the dead man, and so deliver the city from pollution; after that, they shall bear him to the borders of the land, and cast him forth unburied, according to law. And what shall he suffer who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own best friend? I mean the suicide, who deprives himself by violence of his appointed share of life, not because the law of the state requires him, nor yet under the compulsion of some painful and inevitable misfortune which has come upon him, nor because he has had to suffer from irremediable and intolerable shame, but who from sloth or want of manliness imposes upon himself an unjust penalty.

For him, what ceremonies there are to be of purification and burial God knows, and about these the next of kin should enquire of the interpreters and of the laws thereto relating, and do according to their injunctions. They who meet their death in this way shall be buried alone, and none shall be laid by their side; they shall be buried ingloriously in the borders of the twelve portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated and nameless, and no column or inscription shall mark the place of their interment. And if a beast of burden or other animal cause the death of anyone, except in the case of anything of that kind happening to a competitor in the public contests, the kinsmen of the deceased shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and the wardens of the country, such, and so many as the kinsmen

appoint, shall try the cause, and let the beast when condemned be slain by them, and let them cast it beyond the borders. And if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the Gods, —whether a man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him, or by his falling upon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbor to be a judge, and thereby acquit himself and the whole family of guilt. And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border, as has been said about the animals.

If a man is found dead, and his murderer be unknown, and after a diligent search cannot be detected, there shall be the same proclamation as in the previous cases, and the same interdict on the murderer; and having proceeded against him, they shall proclaim in the agora by a herald, that he who has slain such and such a person, and has been convicted of murder, shall not set his foot in the temples, nor at all in the country of the murdered man, and if he appears and is discovered, he shall die, and be cast forth unburied beyond the border. Let this one law then be laid down by us about murder; and let cases of this sort be so regarded.

And now let us say in what cases and under what circumstances the murderer is rightly free from guilt: —If a man catch a thief coming into his house by night to steal, and he take and kill him, or if he slay a footpad in self-defense, he shall be guiltless. And anyone who does violence to a free woman or a youth, shall be slain with impunity by the injured person, or by his or her father or brothers or sons. If a man find his wife suffering violence, he may kill the violator, and be guiltless in the eye of the law; or if a person kill another in warding off death from his father or mother or children or brethren or wife who are doing no wrong, he shall assuredly be guiltless.

Thus much as to the nurture and education of the living soul of man, having which, he can, and without which, if he unfortunately be without them, he cannot live; and also concerning the punishments which are to be inflicted for violent deaths, let thus much be enacted. Of the nurture and education of the body we have spoken before, and next in order we have to speak of deeds of violence, voluntary and involuntary, which men do to one another; these we will now distinguish, as far as we are able, according to their nature and number, and determine what will be the suitable penalties of each, and so assign to them their proper place in the series of our enactments. The poorest legislator will have no difficulty in determining that wounds and mutilations arising out of wounds should follow next in order after deaths. Let wounds be divided as homicides were divided—into those which are involuntary, and which are given in passion or from fear, and those inflicted voluntarily and with premeditation. Concerning all this, we must make some such proclamation as the following: —Mankind must have laws, and conform to them, or their life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast. And the reason of this is that no man's nature is able to know what is best for human society; or knowing, always able and willing to do what is best. In the first place, there is a difficulty in apprehending that the true art of politics is concerned, not with private but with public good (for public good binds together states, but private only distracts them); and that both the public and private good as well of individuals as of states is greater when the state and not the individual is first considered. In the second place, although a person knows in the abstract that this is true, yet if he be possessed of absolute and irresponsible power, he will never remain firm in his principles or persist in regarding the public good as primary in the state, and the private good as secondary. Human

nature will be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and better; and so working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and the whole city. For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but rather the lord of all. I speak of mind, true and free, and in harmony with nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at least not much; and therefore we must choose law and order, which are second best. These look at things as they" exist for the most part only, and are unable to survey the whole of them. And therefore I have spoken as I have.

And now we will determine what penalty he ought to pay or suffer who has hurt or wounded another. Anyone may easily imagine the questions which have to be asked in all such cases: —What did he wound, or whom, or how, or when? for there are innumerable particulars of this sort which greatly vary from one another. And to allow courts of law to determine all these things, or not to determine any of them, is alike impossible. There is one particular which they must determine in all cases—the question of fact. And then, again, that the legislator should not permit them to determine what punishment is to be inflicted in any of these cases, but should himself decide about all of them, small or great, is next to impossible.

Clinias/ Then what is to be the inference?

Athenian Stranger/ The inference is, that some things should be left to courts of law; others the legislator must decide for himself.

Clinias/ And what ought the legislator to decide, and what ought he to leave to the courts of law?

Athenian Stranger/ I may reply, that in a state in which the courts are bad and mute, because the judges conceal their opinions and decide causes clandestinely; or what is worse, when they are disorderly and noisy, as in a theatre, clapping or hooting in turn this or that orator—I say that then there is a very serious evil, which affects the whole state. Unfortunate is the necessity of having to legislate for such courts, but where the necessity exists, the legislator should only allow them to ordain the penalties for the smallest offences; if the state for which he is legislating be of this character, he must take most matters into his own hands and speak distinctly. But when a state has good courts, and the judges are well trained and scrupulously tested, the determination of the penalties or punishments which shall be inflicted on the guilty may fairly and with advantage be left to them. And we are not to be blamed for not legislating concerning all that large class of matters which judges far worse educated than ours would be able to determine, assigning to each offence what is due both to the perpetrator and to the sufferer. We believe those for whom we are legislating to be best able to judge, and therefore to them the greater part may be left. At the same time, as I have often said, we should exhibit to the judges, as we have done, the outline and form of the punishments to be inflicted, and then they will not transgress the just rule. That was an excellent practice, which we observed before, and which now that we are resuming the work of legislation, may with advantage be repeated by us.

Let the enactment about wounding be in the following terms: —If anyone has a purpose and intention to slay another who is not his enemy, and whom the law does not permit him to slay, and he wounds him, but is unable to kill

him, he who had the intent and has wounded him is not to be pitied—he deserves no consideration, but should be regarded as a murderer and be tried for murder. Still having respect to the fortune which has in a manner favored him, and to the providence which in pity to him and to the wounded man saved the one from a fatal blow, and the other from an accursed fate and calamity—as a thank-offering to this deity, and in order not to oppose his will—in such a case the law will remit the punishment of death, and only compel the offender to emigrate to a neighboring city for the rest of his life, where he shall remain in the enjoyment of all his possessions. But if he have injured the wounded man, he shall make such compensation for the injury as the court deciding the cause shall assess, and the same judges shall decide who would have decided if the man had died of his wounds. And if a child intentionally wound his parents, or a servant his master, death shall be the penalty. And if a brother or a sister intentionally wound a brother or a sister, and is found guilty, death shall be the penalty. And if a husband wound a wife, or a wife a husband, with intent to kill, let him or her undergo perpetual exile; if they have sons or daughters who are still young, the guardians shall take care of their property, and have charge of the children as orphans. If their sons are grown up, they shall be under no obligation to support the exiled parent, but they shall possess the property themselves. And if he who meets with such a misfortune has no children, the kindred of the exiled man to the degree of sons of cousins, both on the male and female side, shall meet together, and after taking counsel with the guardians of the law and the priests, shall appoint a 5040th citizen to be the heir of the house, considering and reasoning that no house of all the 5040 belongs to the inhabitant or to the whole family, but is the public and private property of the state. Now the state should seek to

have its houses as holy and happy as possible. And if anyone of the houses be unfortunate, and stained with impiety, and the owner leave no posterity, but dies unmarried, or married and childless, having suffered death as the penalty of murder or some other crime committed against the Gods or against his fellow-citizens, of which death is the penalty distinctly laid down in the law; or if any of the citizens be in perpetual exile, and also childless, that house shall first of all be purified and undergo expiation according to law; and then let the kinsmen of the house, as we were just now saying, and the guardians of the law, meet and consider what family there is in the state which is of the highest repute for virtue and also for good fortune, in which there are a number of sons; from that family let them take one and introduce him to the father and forefathers of the dead man as their son, and, for the sake of the omen, let him be called so, that he may be the continuer of their family, the keeper of their hearth, and the minister of their sacred rites with better fortune than his father had; and when they have made this supplication, they shall make him heir according to law, and the offending person they shall leave nameless and childless and portionless when calamities such as these overtake him.

Now the boundaries of some things do not touch one another, but there is a borderland which comes in between, preventing them from touching. And we were saying that actions done from passion are of this nature, and come in between the voluntary and involuntary. If a person be convicted of having inflicted wounds in a passion, in the first place he shall pay twice the amount of the injury, if the wound be curable, or, if incurable, four times the amount of the injury; or if the wound be curable, and at the same time cause great and notable disgrace to the wounded person, he shall pay fourfold. And whenever anyone in wounding

another injures not only the sufferer, but also the city, and makes him incapable of defending his country against the enemy, he, besides the other penalties, shall pay a penalty for the loss which the state has incurred. And the penalty shall be, that in addition to his own times of service, he shall serve on behalf of the disabled person, and shall take his place in war; or, if he refuse, he shall be liable to be convicted by law of refusal to serve. The compensation for the injury, whether to be twofold or threefold or fourfold, shall be fixed by the judges who convict him. And if, in like manner, a brother wounds a brother, the parents and kindred of either sex, including the children of cousins, whether on the male or female side, shall meet, and when they have judged the cause, they shall entrust the assessment of damages to the parents, as is natural; and if the estimate be disputed, then the kinsmen on the male side shall make the estimate, or if they cannot, they shall commit the matter to the guardians of the law. And when similar charges of wounding are brought by children against their parents, those who are more than sixty years of age, having children of their own, not adopted, shall be required to decide; and if anyone is convicted, they shall determine whether he or she ought to die, or suffer some other punishment either greater than death, or, at any rate, not much less. A kinsman of the offender shall not be allowed to judge the cause, not even if he be of the age which is prescribed by the law. If a slave in a fit of anger wound a freeman, the owner of the slave shall give him up to the wounded man, who may do as he pleases with him, and if he do not give him up he shall himself make good the injury. And if anyone says that the slave and the wounded man are conspiring together, let him argue the point, and if he is cast, he shall pay for the wrong three times over, but if he gains his case, the freeman who conspired with the slave shall be liable to an action for kidnapping. And

if anyone unintentionally wounds another he shall simply pay for the harm, for no legislator is able to control chance. In such a case the judges shall be the same as those who are appointed in the case of children suing their parents; and they shall estimate the amount of the injury.

All the preceding injuries and every kind of assault are deeds of violence; and every man, woman, or child ought to consider that the elder has the precedence of the younger in honor, both among the Gods and also among men who would live in security and happiness. Wherefore it is a foul thing and hateful to the Gods to see an elder man assaulted by a younger in the city; and it is reasonable that a young man when struck by an elder should lightly endure his anger, laying up in store for himself a like honor when he is old.

Let this be the law: —Everyone shall reverence his elder in word and deed; he shall respect anyone who is twenty years older than himself, whether male or female, regarding him or her as his father or mother; and he shall abstain from laying hands on anyone who is of an age to have been his father or his mother, out of reverence to the Gods who preside over birth; similarly he shall keep his hands from a stranger, whether he be an old inhabitant or newly arrived; he shall not venture to correct such an one by blows, either as the aggressor or in self-defense. If he thinks that some stranger has struck him out of wantonness or insolence, and ought to be punished, he shall take him to the wardens of the city, but let him not strike him, that the stranger may be kept far away from the possibility of lifting up his hand against a citizen, and let the wardens of the city take the offender and examine him, not forgetting their duty to the God of Strangers, and in case the stranger appears to have struck the citizen unjustly, let them inflict upon him as many blows with the scourge as he has himself inflicted, and

quell his presumption. But if he be innocent, they shall threaten and rebuke the man who arrested him, and let them both go. If a person strikes another of the same age or somewhat older than himself, who has no children, whether he be an old man who strikes an old man or a young man who strikes a young man, let the person struck defend himself in the natural way without a weapon and with his hands only. He who, being more than forty years of age, dares to fight with another, whether he be the aggressor or in self-defense, shall be regarded as rude and ill-mannered and slavish; —this will be a disgraceful punishment, and therefore suitable to him. The obedient nature will readily yield to such exhortations, but the disobedient, who heeds not the prelude, shall have the law ready for him: —If any man smite another who is older than himself, either by twenty or by more years, in the first place, he who is at hand, not being younger than the combatants, nor their equal in age, shall separate them, or be disgraced according to law; but if he be the equal in age of the person who is struck or younger, he shall defend the person injured as he would a brother or father or still older relative. Further, let him who dares to smite an elder be tried for assault, as I have said, and if he be found guilty, let him be imprisoned for a period of not less than a year, or if the judges approve of a longer period, their decision shall be final. But if a stranger or metic smite one who is older by twenty years or more, the same law shall hold about the bystanders assisting, and he who is found guilty in such a suit, if he be a stranger but not resident, shall be imprisoned during a period of two years; and a metic who disobeys the laws shall be imprisoned for three years, unless the court assign him a longer term. And let him who was present in any of these cases and did not assist according to law be punished, if he be of the highest class, by paying a fine of a mina; or if he be of the second

class, of fifty drachmas; or if of the third class, by a fine of thirty drachmas; or if he be of the fourth class, by a fine of twenty drachmas; and the generals and taxiarchs and phylarchs and hipparchs shall form the court in such cases.

Laws are partly framed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct them how they may live on friendly terms with one another, and partly for the sake of those who refuse to be instructed, whose spirit cannot be subdued, or softened, or hindered from plunging into evil. These are the persons who cause the word to be spoken which I am about to utter; for them the legislator legislates of necessity, and in the hope that there may be no need of his laws. He who shall dare to lay violent hands upon his father or mother, or any still older relative, having no fear either of the wrath of the Gods above, or of the punishments that are spoken of in the world below, but transgresses in contempt of ancient and universal traditions as though he were too wise to believe in them, requires some extreme measure of prevention. Now death is not the worst that can happen to men; far worse are the punishments which are said to pursue them in the world below. But although they are most true tales, they work on such souls no prevention; for if they had any effect there would be no slayers of mothers, or impious hands lifted up against parents; and therefore the punishments of this world which are inflicted during life ought not in such cases to fall short, if possible, of the terrors of the world below. Let our enactment then be as follows: —If a man dare to strike his father or his mother, or their fathers or mothers, he being at the time of sound mind, then let anyone who is at hand come to the rescue as has been already said, and the metic or stranger who comes to the rescue shall be called to the first place in the games; but if he do not come he shall suffer the punishment of perpetual exile. He who is not a metic, if he comes to the rescue, shall have praise, and if he do not come,

blame. And if a slave come to the rescue, let him be made free, but if he do not come to the rescue, let him receive 100 strokes of the whip, by order of the wardens of the agora, if the occurrence take place in the agora; or if somewhere in the city beyond the limits of the agora, any warden of the city who is in residence shall punish him; or if in the country, then the commanders of the wardens of the country. If those who are near at the time be inhabitants of the same place, whether they be youths, or men, or women, let them come to the rescue and denounce him as the impious one; and he who does not come to the rescue shall fall under the curse of Zeus, the God of kindred and of ancestors, according to law. And if anyone is found guilty of assaulting a parent, let him in the first place be forever banished from the city into the country, and let him abstain from the temples; and if he do not abstain, the wardens of the country shall punish him with blows, or in any way which they please, and if he return he shall be put to death. And if any freeman eat or drink, or have any other sort of intercourse with him, or only meeting him have voluntarily touched him, he shall not enter into any temple, nor into the agora, nor into the city, until he is purified; for he should consider that he has become tainted by a curse. And if he disobeys the law, and pollutes the city and the temples contrary to law, and one of the magistrates sees him and does not indict him, when he gives in his account this omission shall be a most serious charge.

If a slave strike a freeman, whether a stranger or a citizen, let anyone who is present come to the rescue, or pay the penalty already mentioned; and let the bystanders bind him, and deliver him up to the injured person, and he receiving him shall put him in chains, and inflict on him as many stripes as he pleases; but having punished him he must surrender him to his master according to law, and not

deprive him of his property. Let the law be as follows: —The slave who strikes a freeman, not at the command of the magistrates, his owner shall receive bound from the man whom he has stricken, and not release him until the slave has persuaded the man whom he has stricken that he ought to be released. And let there be the same laws about women in relation to women, and about men and women in relation to one another.

Book 10.

Athenian Stranger/ And now having spoken of assaults, let us sum up all acts of violence under a single law, which shall be as follows: —No one shall take or carry away any of his neighbor's goods, neither shall he use anything which is his neighbor's without the consent of the owner; for these are the offences which are and have been, and will ever be, the source of all the aforesaid evils. The greatest of them are excesses and insolences of youth, and are offences against the greatest when they are done against religion; and especially great when in violation of public and holy rites, or of the partly-common rites in which tribes and phratries share; and in the second degree great when they are committed against private rites and sepulchers, and in the third degree (not to repeat the acts formerly mentioned), when insults are offered to parents; the fourth kind of violence is when anyone, regardless of the authority of the rulers, takes or carries away or makes use of anything which belongs to them, not having their consent; and the fifth kind is when the violation of the civil rights of an individual demands reparation. There should be a common law embracing all these cases. For we have already said in general terms what shall be the punishment of sacrilege, whether fraudulent or violent, and now we have to determine what is to be the punishment of those who speak or act insolently toward the Gods. But first we must give them an admonition which may be in the following terms: —No one who in obedience to the laws believed that there were Gods, ever intentionally did any unholy act, or uttered any unlawful word; but he who did must have supposed one of three things, —either that they did not exist, —which is the first possibility, or secondly, that, if they did, they took no care of man, or thirdly, that they were easily appeased and turned aside from their purpose by sacrifices and prayers.

Clinias/ What shall we say or do to these persons?

Athenian Stranger/ My good friend, let us first hear the jests which I suspect that they in their superiority will utter against us.

Clinias/ What jests?

Athenian Stranger/ They will make some irreverent speech of this sort: —'O inhabitants of Athens, and Sparta, and Cnosus' they will reply, 'in that you speak truly; for some of us deny the very existence of the Gods, while others, as you say, are of opinion that they do not care about us; and others that they are turned from their course by gifts. Now we have a right to claim, as you yourself allowed, in the matter of laws, that before you are hard upon us and threaten us, you should argue with us and convince us—you should first attempt to teach and persuade us that there are Gods by reasonable evidences, and also that they are too good to be unrighteous, or to be propitiated, or turned from their course by gifts. For when we hear such things said of them by those who are esteemed to be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and priests, and by innumerable others, the thoughts of most of us are not set upon abstaining from unrighteous acts, but upon doing them and atoning for them. When lawgivers profess that they are gentle and not stern, we think that they should first of all use persuasion to us, and show us the existence of Gods, if not in a better manner than other men, at any rate in a truer; and who knows but that we shall hearken to you? If then our request is a fair one, please to accept our challenge'

Clinias/ But is there any difficulty in proving the existence of the Gods?

Athenian Stranger/ How would you prove it?

Clinias/ How? In the first place, the earth and the sun, and the stars and the universe, and the fair order of the

seasons, and the division of them into years and months, furnish proofs of their existence; and also there is the fact that all Hellenes and barbarians believe in them.

Athenian Stranger/ I fear, my sweet friend, though I will not say that I much regard, the contempt with which the profane will be likely to assail us. For you do not understand the nature of their complaint, and you fancy that they rush into impiety only from a love of sensual pleasure.

Clinias/ Why, Stranger, what other reason is there?

Athenian Stranger/ One which you who live in a different atmosphere would never guess.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ A very grievous sort of ignorance which is imagined to be the greatest wisdom.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ At Athens there are tales preserved in writing which the virtue of your state, as I am informed, refuses to admit. They speak of the Gods in prose as well as verse, and the oldest of them tell of the origin of the heavens and of the world, and not far from the beginning of their story they proceed to narrate the birth of the Gods, and how after they were born they behaved to one another. Whether these stories have in other ways a good or a bad influence, I should not like to be severe upon them, because they are ancient; but, looking at them with reference to the duties of children to their parents, I cannot praise them, or think that they are useful, or at all true. Of the words of the ancients I have nothing more to say; and I should wish to say of them only what is pleasing to the Gods. But as to our younger generation and their wisdom, I cannot let them off when they do mischief. For do but mark the effect of their words: when you and I argue for the existence of the Gods, and produce the sun, moon, stars, and earth, claiming for them a divine

being, if we would listen to the aforesaid philosophers we should say that they are earth and stones only, which can have no care at all of human affairs, and that all religion is a cooking up of words and a make-believe.

Clinias/ One such teacher, O Stranger, would be bad enough, and you imply that there are many of them, which is worse.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then; what shall we say or do? —Shall we assume that someone is accusing us among unholy men, who are trying to escape from the effect of our legislation; and that they say of us—How dreadful that you should legislate on the supposition that there are Gods! Shall we make a defense of ourselves? or shall we leave them and return to our laws, lest the prelude should become longer than the law? For the discourse will certainly extend to great length, if we are to treat the impiously disposed as they desire, partly demonstrating to them at some length the things of which they demand an explanation, partly making them afraid or dissatisfied, and then proceed to the requisite enactments.

Clinias/ Yes, Stranger; but then how often have we repeated already that on the present occasion there is no reason why brevity should be preferred to length; for who is 'at our heels?'—as the saying goes, and it would be paltry and ridiculous to prefer the shorter to the better. It is a matter of no small consequence, in some way or other to prove that there are Gods, and that they are good, and regard justice more than men do. The demonstration of this would be the best and noblest prelude of all our laws. And therefore, without impatience, and without hurry, let us unreservedly consider the whole matter, summoning up all the power of persuasion which we possess.

Athenian Stranger/ Seeing you thus in earnest, I would fain offer up a prayer that I may succeed: —but I must proceed at once. Who can be calm when he is called upon to prove the existence of the Gods? Who can avoid hating and abhorring the men who are and have been the cause of this argument; I speak of those who will not believe the tales which they have heard as babes and sucklings from their mothers and nurses, repeated by them both in jest and earnest, like charms, who have also heard them in the sacrificial prayers, and seen sights accompanying them, —sights and sounds delightful to children, —and their parents during the sacrifices showing an intense earnestness on behalf of their children and of themselves, and with eager interest talking to the Gods, and beseeching them, as though they were firmly convinced of their existence; who likewise see and hear the prostrations and invocations which are made by Hellenes and barbarians at the rising and setting of the sun and moon, in all the vicissitudes of life, not as if they thought that there were no Gods, but as if there could be no doubt of their existence, and no suspicion of their non-existence; when men, knowing all these things, despise them on no real grounds, as would be admitted by all who have any particle of intelligence, and when they force us to say what we are now saying, how can anyone in gentle terms remonstrate with the like of them, when he has to begin by proving to them the very existence of the Gods? Yet the attempt must be made; for it would be unseemly that one half of mankind should go mad in their lust of pleasure, and the other half in their indignation at such persons. Our address to these lost and perverted natures should not be spoken in passion; let us suppose ourselves to select some one of them, and gently reason with him, smothering our anger: —O my son, we will say to him, you are young, and the advance of time will make you reverse many of the

opinions which you now hold. Wait awhile, and do not attempt to judge at present of the highest things; and that is the highest of which you now think nothing—to know the Gods rightly and to live accordingly. And in the first place let me indicate to you one point which is of great importance, and about which I cannot be deceived: —You and your friends are not the first who have held this opinion about the Gods. There have always been persons more or less numerous who have had the same disorder. I have known many of them, and can tell you, that no one who had taken up in youth this opinion, that the Gods do not exist, ever continued in the same until he was old; the two other notions certainly do continue in some cases, but not in many; the notion, I mean, that the Gods exist, but take no heed of human things, and the other notion that they do take heed of them, but are easily propitiated with sacrifices and prayers. As to the opinion about the Gods which may someday become clear to you, I advise you to wait and consider if it be true or not; ask of others, and above all of the legislator. In the meantime take care that you do not offend against the Gods. For the duty of the legislator is and always will be to teach you the truth of these matters.

Clinias/ Our address, Stranger, thus far, is excellent.

Athenian Stranger/ Quite true, Megillus and Cleinias, but I am afraid that we have unconsciously lighted on a strange doctrine.

Clinias/ What doctrine do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ The wisest of all doctrines, in the opinion of many.

Clinias/ I wish that you would speak plainer.

Athenian Stranger/ The doctrine that all things do become, have become, and will become, some by nature, some by art, and some by chance.

Clinias/ Is not that true?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, philosophers are probably right; at any rate we may as well follow in their track, and examine what is the meaning of them and their disciples.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ They say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of nature and of chance, the lesser of art, which, receiving from nature the greater and primeval creations, molds and fashions all those lesser works which are generally termed artificial.

Clinias/ How is that?

Athenian Stranger/ I will explain my meaning still more clearly. They say that fire and water, and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order, —earth, and sun, and moon, and stars, —they have been created by means of these absolutely inanimate existences. The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them—of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only. Art sprang up afterwards and out of these, mortal and of mortal birth, and produced in play certain images and very partial imitations of the truth, having an affinity to one another, such as music and painting create and their companion arts. And there are other arts which have a serious purpose, and these co-operate with nature, such, for example, as medicine, and

husbandry, and gymnastic. And they say that politics co-operate with nature, but in a less degree, and have more of art; also that legislation is entirely a work of art, and is based on assumptions which are not true.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, my dear friend, these people would say that the Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honorable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made. —These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might, and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions, these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others, and not in legal subjection to them.

Clinias/ What a dreadful picture, Stranger, have you given, and how great is the injury which is thus inflicted on young men to the ruin both of states and families!

Athenian Stranger/ True, Cleinias; but then what should the lawgiver do when this evil is of long standing? should he only rise up in the state and threaten all mankind, proclaiming that if they will not say and think that the Gods are such as the law ordains (and this may be extended generally to the honorable, the just, and to all the highest

things, and to all that relates to virtue and vice), and if they will not make their actions conform to the copy which the law gives them, then he who refuses to obey the law shall die, or suffer stripes and bonds, or privation of citizenship, or in some cases be punished by loss of property and exile? Should he not rather, when he is making laws for men, at the same time infuse the spirit of persuasion into his words, and mitigate the severity of them as far as he can?

Clinias/ Why, Stranger, if such persuasion be at all possible, then a legislator who has anything in him ought never to weary of persuading men; he ought to leave nothing unsaid in support of the ancient opinion that there are Gods, and of all those other truths which you were just now mentioning; he ought to support the law and also art, and acknowledge that both alike exist by nature, and no less than nature, if they are the creations of mind in accordance with right reason, as you appear to me to maintain, and I am disposed to agree with you in thinking.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, my enthusiastic Cleinias; but are not these things when spoken to a multitude hard to be understood, not to mention that they take up a dismal length of time?

Clinias/ Why, Stranger, shall we, whose patience failed not when drinking or music were the themes of discourse, weary now of discoursing about the Gods, and about divine things? And the greatest help to rational legislation is that the laws when once written down are always at rest; they can be put to the test at any future time, and therefore, if on first hearing they seem difficult, there is no reason for apprehension about them, because any man however dull can stood, go over them and consider them again and again; nor if they are tedious but useful, is there any reason or religion, as it seems to me, in any man refusing to maintain the principles of them to the utmost of his power.

Megillus/ Stranger, I like what Cleinias is saying.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, Megillus, and we should do as he proposes; for if impious discourses were not scattered, as I may say, throughout the world, there would have been no need for any vindication of the existence of the Gods—but seeing that they are spread far and wide, such arguments are needed; and who should come to the rescue of the greatest laws, when they are being undermined by bad men, but the legislator himself?

Megillus/ There is no more proper champion of them.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, tell me, Cleinias, —for I must ask you to be my partner, —does not he who talks in this way conceive fire and water and earth and air to be the first elements of all philosophers things? these he calls nature, and out of these he supposes the soul to be formed afterwards; and this is not a mere conjecture of ours about his meaning, but is what he really means.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, by Heaven, we have discovered the source of this vain opinion of all those physical investigators; and I would have you examine their arguments with the utmost care, for their impiety is a very serious matter; they not only make a bad and mistaken use of argument, but they lead away the minds of others: that is my opinion of them.

Clinias/ You are right; but I should like to know how this happens.

Athenian Stranger/ I fear that the argument may seem singular.

Clinias/ Do not hesitate, Stranger; I see that you are afraid of such a discussion carrying you beyond the limits of legislation. But if there be no other way of showing our

agreement in the belief that there are Gods, of whom the law is said now to approve, let us take this way, my good sir.

Athenian Stranger/ Then I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument of those who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions; they affirm that which is the first cause of the generation and destruction of all things, to be not first, but last, and that which is last to be first, and hence they have fallen into error about the true nature of the Gods.

Clinias/ Still I do not understand you.

Athenian Stranger/ Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of the nature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to her origin: they do not know that she is among the first of things, and before all bodies, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions. And if this is true, and if the soul is older than the body, must not the things which are of the soul's kindred be of necessity prior to those which appertain to the body?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then thought and attention and mind and art and law will be prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light; and the great and primitive works and actions will be works of art; they will be the first, and after them will come nature and works of nature, which however is a wrong term for men to apply to them; these will follow, and will be under the government of art and mind.

Clinias/ But why is the word 'nature' wrong?

Athenian Stranger/ Because those who use the term mean to say that nature is the first creative power; but if the soul turn out to be the primeval element, and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to exist by nature; and this would be true if you

proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise.

Clinias/ You are quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we, then, take this as the next point to which our attention should be directed?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us be on our guard lest this most deceptive argument with its youthful looks, beguiling us old men, give us the slip and make a laughing-stock of us. Who knows but we may be aiming at the greater, and fail of attaining the lesser? Suppose that we three have to pass a rapid river, and I, being the youngest of the three and experienced in rivers, take upon me the duty of making the attempt first by myself; leaving you in safety on the bank, I am to examine whether the river is passable by older men like yourselves, and if such appears to be the case then I shall invite you to follow, and my experience will help to convey you across; but if the river is impassable by you, then there will have been no danger to anybody but myself, — would not that seem to be a very fair proposal? I mean to say that the argument in prospect is likely to be too much for you, out of your depth and beyond your strength, and I should be afraid that the stream of my questions might create in you who are not in the habit of answering, giddiness and confusion of mind, and hence a feeling of unpleasantness and unsuitableness might arise. I think therefore that I had better first ask the questions and then answer them myself while you listen in safety; in that way I can carry on the argument until I have completed the proof that the soul is prior to the body.

Clinias/ Excellent, Stranger, and I hope that you will do as you propose.

Athenian Stranger/ Come, then, and if ever we are to call upon the Gods' let us call upon them now in all seriousness to come to the demonstration of their own existence. And so holding fast to the rope we will venture upon the depths of the argument. When questions of this sort are asked of me, my safest answer would appear to be as follows: —Someone says to me, 'O Stranger, are all things at rest and nothing in motion, or is the exact opposite of this true, or are some things in motion and others at rest?'—To this I shall reply that some things are in motion and others at rest. 'And do not things which move move in a place, and are not the things which are at rest at rest in a place?' Certainly. 'And some move or rest in one place and some in more places than one?' You mean to say, we shall rejoin, that those things which rest at the center move in one place, just as the circumference goes round of globes which are said to be at rest? 'Yes' And we observe that, in the revolution, the motion which carries round the larger and the lesser circle at the same time is proportionally distributed to greater and smaller, and is greater and smaller in a certain proportion. Here is a wonder which might be thought an impossibility, that the same motion should impart swiftness and slowness in due proportion to larger and lesser circles. 'Very true' And when you speak of bodies moving in many places, you seem to me to mean those which move from one place to another, and sometimes have one center of motion and sometimes more than one because they turn upon their axis; and whenever they meet anything, if it be stationary, they are divided by it; but if they get in the midst between bodies which are approaching and moving towards the same spot from opposite directions, they unite with them. 'I admit the truth of what you are saying' Also when they unite they grow, and when they are divided they waste away, —that is, supposing the constitution of each to remain, or if that fails,

then there is a second reason of their dissolution. ‘And when are all things created and how?’ Clearly, they are created when the first principle receives increase and attains to the second dimension, and from this arrives at the one which is neighbor to this, and after reaching the third becomes perceptible to sense. Everything which is thus changing and moving is in process of generation; only when at rest has it real existence, but when passing into another state it is destroyed utterly. Have we not mentioned all motions that there are, and comprehended them under their kinds and numbered them with the exception, my friends, of two?

Clinias/ Which are they?

Athenian Stranger/ Just the two, with which our present enquiry is concerned.

Clinias/ Speak plainer.

Athenian Stranger/ I suppose that our enquiry has reference to the soul?

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us assume that there is a motion able to move other things, but not to move itself; —that is one kind; and there is another kind which can move itself as well as other things, working in composition and decomposition, by increase and diminution and generation and destruction, —that is also one of the many kinds of motion.

Clinias/ Granted.

Athenian Stranger/ And we will assume that which moves other, and is changed by other, to be the ninth, and that which changes itself and others, and is co-incident with every action and every passion, and is the true principle of change and motion in all that is, —that we shall be inclined to call the tenth.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as being the mightiest and most efficient?

Clinias/ I must say that the motion which is able to move itself is ten thousand times superior to all the others.

Athenian Stranger/ Very good; but may I make one or two corrections in what I have been saying?

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ When I spoke of the tenth sort of motion, that was not quite correct.

Clinias/ What was the error?

Athenian Stranger/ According to the true order, the tenth was really the first in generation and power; then follows the second, which was strangely enough termed the ninth by us.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean this: when one thing changes another, and that another, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving principle?

Clinias/ Very true, and I quite agree.

Athenian Stranger/ Or, to put the question in another way, making answer to ourselves: —If, as most of these philosophers have the audacity to affirm, all things were at rest in one mass, which of the above-mentioned principles of motion would first spring up among them?

Clinias/ Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them arising out of any external cause; the change must first take place in themselves.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we must say that self-motion being the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ At this stage of the argument let us put a question.

Clinias/ What question?

Athenian Stranger/ If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound—how should we describe it?

Clinias/ You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving power life?

Athenian Stranger/ I do.

Clinias/ Certainly we should.

Athenian Stranger/ And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same—must we not admit that this is life?

Clinias/ We must.

Athenian Stranger/ And now, I beseech you, reflect; —you would admit that we have a threefold knowledge of things?

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean that we know the essence, and that we know the definition of the essence, and the name, —these are the three; and there are two questions which may be raised about anything.

Clinias/ How two?

Athenian Stranger/ Sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition; or he may give the definition and ask the name. I may illustrate what I mean in this way.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ Number like some other things is capable of being divided into equal parts; when thus divided, number is named ‘even’ and the definition of the name ‘even’ is ‘number divisible into two equal parts’?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ I mean, that when we are asked about the definition and give the name, or when we are asked about the name and give the definition—in either case, whether we give name or definition, we speak of the same thing, calling ‘even’ the number which is divided into two equal parts.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ And what is the definition of that which is named ‘soul’? Can we conceive of any other than that which has been already given—the motion which can move itself?

Clinias/ You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things?

Clinias/ Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things.

Athenian Stranger/ And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an

inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower number which you may prefer?

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler?

Clinias/ Nothing can be more true.

Athenian Stranger/ Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, and true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul is prior to the body.

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ In the next place, must we not of necessity admit that the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honorable, just and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things?

Clinias/ We must.

Athenian Stranger/ And as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move, however moving, must we not say that she orders also the heavens?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ One soul or more? More than one—I will answer for you; at any rate, we must not suppose that there are less than two—one the author of good, and the other of evil.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, very true; the soul then directs all things in heaven, and earth, and sea by her movements, and these are described by the terms—will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, love, and other primary motions akin to these; which again receive the secondary motions of corporeal substances, and guide all things to growth and decay, to composition and decomposition, and to the qualities which accompany them, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those other qualities which the soul uses, herself a goddess, when truly receiving the divine mind she disciplines all things rightly to their happiness; but when she is the companion of folly, she does the very contrary of all this. Shall we assume so much, or do we still entertain doubts?

Clinias/ There is no room at all for doubt.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we say then that it is the soul which controls heaven and earth, and the whole world? — that it is a principle of wisdom and virtue, or a principle which has neither wisdom nor virtue? Suppose that we make answer as follows: —

Clinias/ How would you answer?

Athenian Stranger/ If, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of heaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ But if the world moves wildly and irregularly, then the evil soul guides it.

Clinias/ True again.

Athenian Stranger/ Of what nature is the movement of mind? —To this question it is not easy to give an intelligent answer; and therefore I ought to assist you in framing one.

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let us not answer as if we would look straight at the sun, making ourselves darkness at midday, —I mean as if we were under the impression that we could see with mortal eyes, or know adequately the nature of mind; —it will be safer to look at the image only.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us select of the ten motions the one which mind chiefly resembles; this I will bring to your recollection, and will then make the answer on behalf of us all.

Clinias/ That will be excellent.

Athenian Stranger/ You will surely remember our saying that all things were either at rest or in motion?

Clinias/ I do.

Athenian Stranger/ And that of things in motion some were moving in one place, and others in more than one?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Of these two kinds of motion, that which moves in one place must move about a center like globes made in a lathe, and is most entirely akin and similar to the circular movement of mind.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ In saying that both mind and the motion which is in one place move in the same and like manner, in and about the same, and in relation to the same, and according to one proportion and order, and are like the motion of a globe, we invented a fair image, which does no discredit to our ingenuity.

Clinias/ It does us great credit.

Athenian Stranger/ And the motion of the other sort which is not after the same manner, nor in the same, nor about the same, nor in relation to the same, nor in one place, nor in order, nor according to any rule or proportion, may be said to be akin to senselessness and folly?

Clinias/ That is most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, after what has been said, there is no difficulty in distinctly stating, that since soul carries all things round, either the best soul or the contrary must of necessity carry round and order and arrange the revolution of the heaven.

Clinias/ And judging from what has been said, Stranger, there would be impiety in asserting that any but the most perfect soul or souls carries round the heavens.

Athenian Stranger/ You have understood my meaning right well, Cleinias, and now let me ask you another question.

Clinias/ What are you going to ask?

Athenian Stranger/ If the soul carries round the sun and moon, and the other stars, does she not carry round each individual of them?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then of one of them let us speak, and the same argument will apply to all.

Clinias/ Which will you take?

Athenian Stranger/ Everyone sees the body of the sun, but no one sees his soul, nor the soul of any other body living or dead; and yet there is great reason to believe that this nature, unperceived by any of our senses, is circumfused around them all, but is perceived by mind; and therefore by

mind and reflection only let us apprehend the following point.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ If the soul carries round the sun, we shall not be far wrong in supposing one of three alternatives.

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ Either the soul which moves the sun this way and that, resides within the circular and visible body, like the soul which carries us about every way; or the soul provides herself with an external body of fire or air, as some affirm, and violently propels body by body; or thirdly, she is without such a body, but guides the sun by some extraordinary and wonderful power.

Clinias/ Yes, certainly; the soul can only order all things in one of these three ways.

Athenian Stranger/ And this soul of the sun, which is therefore better than the sun, whether taking the sun about in a chariot to give light to men, or acting from without, or in whatever way, ought by every man to be deemed a God.

Clinias/ Yes, by every man who has the least particle of sense.

Athenian Stranger/ And of the stars too, and of the moon, and of the years and months and seasons, must we not say in like manner, that since a soul or souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of them, those souls are Gods, whether they are living beings and reside in bodies, and in this way order the whole heaven, or whatever be the place and mode of their existence; —and will anyone who admits all this venture to deny that all things are full of Gods?

Clinias/ No one, Stranger, would be such a madman.

Athenian Stranger/ And now, Megillus and Cleinias, let us offer terms to him who has hitherto denied the existence of the Gods, and leave him.

Clinias/ What terms?

Athenian Stranger/ Either he shall teach us that we were wrong in saying that the soul is the original of all things, and arguing accordingly; or, if he be not able to say anything better, then he must yield to us and live for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are Gods. —Let us see, then, whether we have said enough or not enough to those who deny that there are Gods.

Clinias/ Certainly, —quite enough, Stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Then to them we will say no more. And now we are to address him who, believing that there are Gods, believes also that they take no heed of human affairs: To him we say, —O thou best of men, in believing that there are Gods you are led by some affinity to them, which attracts you towards your kindred and makes you honor and believe in them. But the fortunes of evil and unrighteous men in private as well as public life, which, though not really happy, are wrongly counted happy in the judgment of men, and are celebrated both by poets and prose writers—these draw you aside from your natural piety. Perhaps you have seen impious men growing old and leaving their children's children in high offices, and their prosperity shakes your faith—you have known or heard or been yourself an eyewitness of many monstrous impieties, and have beheld men by such criminal means from small beginnings attaining to sovereignty and the pinnacle of greatness; and considering all these things you do not like to accuse the Gods of them, because they are your relatives; and so from some want of reasoning power, and also from an unwillingness to find fault with them, you have come to

believe that they exist indeed, but have no thought or care of human things. Now, that your present evil opinion may not grow to still greater impiety, and that we may if possible use arguments which may conjure away the evil before it arrives, we will add another argument to that originally addressed to him who utterly denied the existence of the Gods. And do you, Megillus and Cleinias, answer for the young man as you did before; and if any impediment comes in our way, I will take the word out of your mouths, and carry you over the river as I did just now.

Clinias/ Very good; do as you say, and we will help you as well as we can.

Athenian Stranger/ There will probably be no difficulty in proving to him that the Gods care about the small as well as about the great. For he was present and heard what was said, that they are perfectly good, and that the care of all things is most entirely natural to them.

Clinias/ No doubt he heard that.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us consider together in the next place what we mean by this virtue which we ascribe to them. Surely we should say that to be temperate and to possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; and courage is a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And the one is honorable, and the other dishonorable?

Clinias/ To be sure.

Athenian Stranger/ And the one, like other meaner things, is a human quality, but the Gods have no part in anything of the sort?

Clinias/ That again is what everybody will admit.

Athenian Stranger/ But do we imagine carelessness and idleness and luxury to be virtues? What do you think?

Clinias/ Decidedly not.

Athenian Stranger/ They rank under the opposite class?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And their opposites, therefore, would fall under the opposite class?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ But are we to suppose that one who possesses all these good qualities will be luxurious and heedless and idle, like those whom the poet compares to stingless drones?

Clinias/ And the comparison is a most just one.

Athenian Stranger/ Surely God must not be supposed to have a nature which He Himself hates? —he who dares to say this sort of thing must not be tolerated for a moment.

Clinias/ Of course not. How could He have?

Athenian Stranger/ Should we not on any principle be entirely mistaken in praising anyone who has some special business entrusted to him, if he have a mind which takes care of great matters and no care of small ones? Reflect; he who acts in this way, whether he be God or man, must act from one of two principles.

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ Either he must think that the neglect of the small matters is of no consequence to the whole, or if he knows that they are of consequence, and he neglects them, his neglect must be attributed to carelessness and indolence. Is there any other way in which his neglect can be explained? For surely, when it is impossible for him to take care of all, he is not negligent if he fails to attend to

these things great or small, which a God or some inferior being might be wanting in strength or capacity to manage?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, then, let us examine the offenders, who both alike confess that there are Gods, but with a difference, —the one saying that they may be appeased, and the other that they have no care of small matters: there are three of us and two of them, and we will say to them, —In the first place, you both acknowledge that the Gods hear and see and know all things, and that nothing can escape them which is matter of sense and knowledge: —do you admit this?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And do you admit also that they have all power which mortals and immortals can have?

Clinias/ They will, of course, admit this also.

Athenian Stranger/ And surely we three and they two—five in all—have acknowledged that they are good and perfect?

Clinias/ Assuredly.

Athenian Stranger/ But, if they are such as we conceive them to be, can we possibly suppose that they ever act in the spirit of carelessness and indolence? For in us inactivity is the child of cowardice, and carelessness of inactivity and indolence.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then not from inactivity and carelessness is any God ever negligent; for there is no cowardice in them.

Clinias/ That is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then the alternative which remains is, that if the Gods neglect the lighter and lesser concerns of

the universe, they neglect them because they know that they ought not to care about such matters—what other alternative is there but the opposite of their knowing?

Clinias/ There is none.

Athenian Stranger/ And, O most excellent and best of men, do I understand you to mean that they are careless because they are ignorant, and do not know that they ought to take care, or that they know, and yet like the meanest sort of men, knowing the better, choose the worse because they are overcome by pleasures and pains?

Clinias/ Impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ Do not all human things partake of the nature of soul? And is not man the most religious of all animals?

Clinias/ That is not to be denied.

Athenian Stranger/ And we acknowledge that all mortal creatures are the property of the Gods, to whom also the whole of heaven belongs?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And, therefore, whether a person says that these things are to the Gods great or small—in either case it would not be natural for the Gods who own us, and who are the most careful and the best of owners, to neglect us. —There is also a further consideration.

Clinias/ What is it? ‘

Athenian Stranger/ Sensation and power are in an inverse ratio to each other in respect to their ease and difficulty.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean that there is greater difficulty in seeing and hearing the small than the great, but more

facility in moving and controlling and taking care of small and unimportant things than of their opposites.

Clinias/ Far more.

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose the case of a physician who is willing and able to cure some living thing as a whole, — how will the whole fare at his hands if he takes care only of the greater and neglects the parts which are lesser?

Clinias/ Decidedly not well.

Athenian Stranger/ No better would be the result with pilots or generals, or householders or statesmen, or any other such class, if they neglected the small and regarded only the great; —as the builders say, the larger stones do not lie well without the lesser.

Clinias/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us not, then, deem God inferior to human workmen, who, in proportion to their skill, finish and perfect their works, small as well as great, by one and the same art; or that God, the wisest of beings, who is both willing and able to take care, is like a lazy good-for-nothing, or a coward, who turns his back upon labor and gives no thought to smaller and easier matters, but to the greater only.

Clinias/ Never, Stranger, let us admit a supposition about the Gods which is both impious and false.

Athenian Stranger/ I think that we have now argued enough with him who delights to accuse the Gods of neglect.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ He has been forced to acknowledge that he is in error, but he still seems to me to need some words of consolation.

Clinias/ What consolation will you offer him?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us say to the youth: —The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the excellence and preservation of the whole, and each part, as far as may be, has an action and passion appropriate to it. Over these, down to the least fraction of them, ministers have been appointed to preside, who have wrought out their perfection with infinitesimal exactness. And one of these portions of the universe is thine own, unhappy man, which, however little, contributes to the whole; and you do not seem to be aware that this and every other creation is for the sake of the whole, and in order that the life of the whole may be blessed; and that you are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you. For every physician and every skilled artist does all things for the sake of the whole, directing his effort towards the common good, executing the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part. And you are annoyed because you are ignorant how what is best for you happens to you and to the universe, as far as the laws of the common creation admit. Now, as the soul combining first with one body and then with another undergoes all sorts of changes, either of herself, or through the influence of another soul, all that remains to the player of the game is that he should shift the pieces; sending the better nature to the better place, and the worse to the worse, and so assigning to them their proper portion.

Clinias/ In what way do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ In a way which may be supposed to make the care of all things easy to the Gods. If anyone were to form or fashion all things without any regard to the whole, —if, for example, he formed a living element of water out of fire, instead of forming many things out of one or one out of many in regular order attaining to a first or second or third

birth, the transmutation would have been infinite; but now the ruler of the world has a wonderfully easy task.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ I will explain: —When the king saw that our actions had life, and that there was much virtue in them and much vice, and that the soul and body, although not, like the Gods of popular opinion, eternal, yet having once come into existence, were indestructible (for if either of them had been destroyed, there would have been no generation of living beings); and when he observed that the good of the soul was ever by nature designed to profit men, and the evil to harm them—he, seeing all this, contrived so to place each of the parts that their position might in the easiest and best manner procure the victory of good and the defeat of evil in the whole. And he contrived a general plan by which a thing of a certain nature found a certain seat and room. But the formation The of qualities he left to the wills of individuals. For every one of us is made pretty much what he is by the bent of his desires and the nature of his soul.

Clinias/ Yes, that is probably true. themselves.

Athenian Stranger/ Then all things which have a soul change, and possess in themselves a principle of change, and in changing move according to law and to the order of destiny: natures which have undergone a lesser change move less and on the earth's surface, but those which have suffered more change and have become more criminal sink into the abyss, that is to say, into Hades and other places in the world below, of which the very names terrify men, and which they picture to themselves as in a dream, both while alive and when released from the body. And whenever the soul receives more of good or evil from her own energy and the strong influence of others—when she has communion with divine virtue and becomes divine, she is carried into

another and better place, which is perfect in holiness; but when she has communion with evil, then she also changes the place of her life.

'This is the justice of the Gods who inhabit Olympus'

O youth or young man, who fancy that you are neglected by the Gods, know that if you become worse you shall go to the worse souls, or if better to the better, and in every succession of life and death you will do and suffer what like may fitly suffer at the hands of like. This is the justice of heaven, which neither you nor any other unfortunate will ever glory in escaping, and which the ordaining powers have specially ordained; take good heed thereof, for it will be sure to take heed of you. If you say: —I am small and will creep into the depths of the earth, or I am high and will fly up to heaven, you are not so small or so high but that you shall pay the fitting penalty, either here or in the world below or in some still more savage place whither you shall be conveyed. This is also the explanation of the fate of those whom you saw, who had done unholy and evil deeds, and from small beginnings had grown great, and you fancied that from being miserable they had become happy; and in their actions, as in a mirror, you seemed to see the universal neglect of the Gods, not knowing how they make all things work together and contribute to the great whole. And thinkest thou, bold man, that thou needest not to know this? —he who knows it not can never form any true idea of the happiness or unhappiness of life or hold any rational discourse respecting either.

If Cleinias and this our reverend company succeed in proving to you that you know not what you say of the Gods, then will God help you; but should you desire to hear more, listen' to what we say to the third opponent, if you have any understanding whatsoever. For I think that we have sufficiently proved the existence of the Gods, and that they

care for men: —The other notion that they are appeased by the wicked, and take gifts, is what we must not concede to anyone, and what every man should disprove to the utmost of his power.

Clinias/ Very good; let us do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, by the Gods themselves I conjure you to tell me, —if they are to be propitiated, how are they to be propitiated? Who are they, and what is their nature? Must they not be at least rulers who have to order unceasingly the whole heaven?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And to what earthly rulers can they be compared, or who to them? How in the less can we find an image of the greater? Are they charioteers of contending pairs of steeds, or pilots of vessels? Perhaps they might be compared to the generals of armies, or they might be likened to physicians providing against the diseases which make war upon the body, or to husbandmen observing anxiously the effects of the seasons on the growth of plants; or perhaps to shepherds of flocks. For as we acknowledge the world to be full of many goods and also of evils, and of more evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us, which requires marvelous watchfulness; and in that conflict the Gods and demigods are our allies, and we are their property. Injustice and insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and justice and temperance and wisdom are our salvation; and the place of these latter is in the life of the Gods, although some vestige of them may occasionally be discerned among mankind. But upon this earth we know that there dwell souls possessing an unjust spirit, who may be compared to brute animals, which fawn upon their keepers, whether dogs or shepherds, or the best and most perfect masters; for they in like manner, as the voices of the

wicked declare, prevail by flattery and prayers and incantations, and are allowed to make their gains with impunity. And this sin, which is termed dishonesty, is an evil of the same kind as what is termed disease in living bodies or pestilence in years or seasons of the year, and in cities and governments has another name, which is injustice.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ What else can he say who declares that the Gods are always lenient to the doers of unjust acts, if they divide the spoil with them? As if wolves were to toss a portion of their prey to the dogs, and they, mollified by the gift, suffered them to tear the flocks. Must not he who maintains that the Gods can be propitiated argue thus?

Clinias/ Precisely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And to which of the above-mentioned classes of guardians would any man compare the Gods without absurdity? Will he say that they are like pilots, who are themselves turned away from their duty by 'libations of wine and the savor of fat' and at last overturn both ship and sailors?

Clinias/ Assuredly not.

Athenian Stranger/ And surely they are not like charioteers who are bribed to give up the victory to other chariots?

Clinias/ That would be a fearful image of the Gods.

Athenian Stranger/ Nor are they like generals, or physicians, or husbandmen, or shepherds; and no one would compare them to dogs who have been silenced by wolves.

Clinias/ A thing not to be spoken of.

Athenian Stranger/ And are not all the Gods the chiefest of all guardians, and do they not guard our highest interests?

Clinias/ Yes; the chiefest.

Athenian Stranger/ And shall we say that those who guard our noblest interests, and are the best of guardians, are inferior in virtue to dogs, and to men even of moderate excellence, who would never betray justice for the sake of gifts which unjust men impiously offer them?

Clinias/ Certainly not; nor is such a notion to be endured, and he who holds this opinion may be fairly singled out and characterized as of all impious men the wickedest and most impious.

Athenian Stranger/ Then are the three assertions—that the Gods exist, and that they take care of men, and that they can never be persuaded to do injustice, now sufficiently demonstrated? May we say that they are?

Clinias/ You have our entire assent to your words.

Athenian Stranger/ I have spoken with vehemence because I am zealous against evil men; and I will tell you, dear Cleinias, why I am so. I would not have the wicked think that, having the superiority in argument, they may do as they please and act according to their various imaginations about the Gods; and this zeal has led me to speak too vehemently; but if we have at all succeeded in persuading the men to hate themselves and love their opposites, the prelude of our laws about impiety will not have been spoken in vain.

Clinias/ So let us hope; and even if we have failed, the style of our argument will not discredit the lawgiver.

Athenian Stranger/ After the prelude shall follow a discourse, which will be the interpreter of the law; this shall proclaim to all impious persons that they must depart from

their ways and go over to the pious. And to those who disobey, let the law about impiety be as follows: —If a man is guilty of any impiety in word or deed, anyone who happens to be present shall give information to the magistrates, in aid of the law; and let the magistrates who first receive the information bring him before the appointed court according to the law; and if a magistrate, after receiving information, refuses to act, he shall be tried for impiety at the instance of anyone who is willing to vindicate the laws; and if anyone be cast, the court shall estimate the punishment of each act of impiety; and let all such criminals be imprisoned. There shall be three prisons in the state: the first of them is to be the common prison in the neighborhood of the agora for the safe-keeping of the generality of offenders; another is to be in the neighborhood of the nocturnal council, and is to be called the 'House of Reformation'; another, to be situated in some wild and desolate region in the center of the country, shall be called by some name expressive of retribution. Now, men fall into impiety from three causes, which have been already mentioned, and from each of these causes arise two sorts of impiety, in all six, which are worth distinguishing, and should not all have the same punishment. For he who does not believe in the Gods, and yet has a righteous nature, hates the wicked and dislikes and refuses to do injustice, and avoids unrighteous men, and loves the righteous. But they who besides believing that the world is devoid of Gods are intemperate, and have at the same time good memories and quick wits, are worse; although both of them are unbelievers, much less injury is done by the one than by the other. The one may talk loosely about the Gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and perhaps by laughing at other men he may make them like himself, if he be not punished. But the other who holds the same opinions and is called a clever man, is full of stratagem and deceit—men of this class deal

in prophecy and jugglery of all kinds, and out of their ranks sometimes come tyrants and demagogues and generals and hierophants of private mysteries and the Sophists, as they are termed, with their ingenious devices. There are many kinds of unbelievers, but two only for whom legislation is required; one the hypocritical sort, whose crime is deserving of death many times over, while the other needs only bonds and admonition. In like manner also the notion that the Gods take no thought of men produces two other sorts of crimes, and the notion that they may be propitiated produces two more. Assuming these divisions, let those who have been made what they are only from want of understanding, and not from malice or an evil nature, be placed by the judge in the House of Reformation, and ordered to suffer imprisonment during a period of not less than five years. And in the meantime let them have no intercourse with the other citizens, except with members of the nocturnal council, and with them let them converse with a view to the improvement of their soul's health. And when the time of their imprisonment has expired, if any of them be of sound mind let him be restored to sane company, but if not, and if he be condemned a second time, let him be punished with death. As to that class of monstrous natures who not only believe that there are no Gods, or that they are negligent, or to be propitiated, but in contempt of mankind conjure the souls of the living and say that they can conjure the dead and promise to charm the Gods with sacrifices and prayers, and will utterly overthrow individuals and whole houses and states for the sake of money—let him who is guilty of any of these things be condemned by the court to be bound according to law in the prison which is in the center of the land, and let no freeman ever approach him, but let him receive the rations of food appointed by the guardians of the law from the hands of the public slaves; and

when he is dead let him be cast beyond the borders unburied, and if any freeman assist in burying him, let him pay the penalty of impiety to anyone who is willing to bring a suit against him. But if he leaves behind him children who are fit to be citizens, let the guardians of orphans take care of them, just as they would of any other orphans, from the day on which their father is convicted.

In all these cases there should be one law, which will make men in general less liable to transgress in word or deed, and less foolish, because they will not be allowed to practice religious rites contrary to law. And let this be the simple form of the law: —No man shall have sacred rites in a private house. When he would sacrifice, let him go to the temples and hand over his offerings to the priests and priestesses, who see to the sanctity of such things, and let him pray himself, and let anyone who pleases join with him in prayer. The reason of this is as follows: —Gods and temples are not easily instituted, and to establish them rightly is the work of a mighty intellect. And women especially, and men too, when they are sick or in danger, or in any sort of difficulty, or again on their receiving any good fortune, have a way of consecrating the occasion, vowing sacrifices, and promising shrines to Gods, demigods, and sons of Gods; and when they are awakened by terrible apparitions and dreams or remember visions, they find in altars and temples the remedies of them, and will fill every house and village with them, placing them in the open air, or wherever they may have had such visions; and with a view to all these cases we should obey the law. The law has also regard to the impious, and would not have them fancy that by the secret performance of these actions—by raising temples and by building altars in private houses, they can propitiate the God secretly with sacrifices and prayers, while they are really multiplying their crimes infinitely, bringing

guilt from heaven upon themselves, and also upon those who permit them, and who are better men than they are; and the consequence is that the whole state reaps the fruit of their impiety, which, in a certain sense, is deserved. Assuredly God will not blame the legislator, who will enact the following law: —No one shall possess shrines of the Gods in private houses, and he who is found to possess them, and perform any sacred rites not publicly authorized, —supposing the offender to be some man or woman who is not guilty of any other great and impious crime, —shall be informed against by him who is acquainted with the fact, which shall be announced by him to the guardians of the law; and let them issue orders that he or she shall carry away their private rites to the public temples, and if they do not persuade them, let them inflict a penalty on them until they comply. And if a person be proven guilty of impiety, not merely from childish levity, but such as grown-up men may be guilty of, whether he have sacrificed publicly or privately to any Gods, let him be punished with death, for his sacrifice is impure. Whether the deed has been done in earnest, or only from childish levity, let the guardians of the law determine, before they bring the matter into court and prosecute the offender for impiety.

Book 11.

Athenian Stranger/ In the next place, dealings between man and man require to be suitably regulated. The principle of them is very simple: —Thou shalt not, if thou canst help, touch that which is mine, or remove the least thing which belongs to me without my consent; and may I be of a sound mind, and do to others as I would that they should do to me. First, let us speak of treasure-trove: —May I never pray the Gods to find the hidden treasure, which another has laid up for himself and his family, he not being one of my ancestors, nor lift, if I should find, such a treasure. And may I never have any dealings with those who are called diviners, and who in any way or manner counsel me to take up the deposit entrusted to the earth, for I should not gain so much in the increase of my possessions, if I take up the prize, as I should grow in justice and virtue of soul, if I abstain; and this will be a better possession to me than the other in a better part of myself; for the possession of justice in the soul is preferable to the possession of wealth. And of many things it is well said, —'Move not the immovables' and this may be regarded as one of them. And we shall do well to believe the common tradition which says, that such deeds prevent a man from having a family. Now as to him who is careless about having children and regardless of the legislator, taking up that which neither he deposited, nor any ancestor of his, without the consent of the depositor, violating the simplest and noblest of laws which was the enactment of no mean man: —'Take not up that which was not laid down by thee'— of him, I say, who despises these two legislators, and takes up, not some small matter which he has not deposited, but perhaps a great heap of treasure, what he ought to suffer at the hands of the Gods, God only knows; but I would have the first person who sees him go and tell the wardens of the city, if the occurrence has taken place in the city, or if the

occurrence has taken place in the agora he shall tell the wardens of the agora, or if in the country he shall tell the wardens of the country and their commanders. When information has been received the city shall send to Delphi, and, whatever the God answers about the money and the remover of the money, that the city shall do in obedience to the oracle; the informer, if he be a freeman, shall have the honor of doing rightly, and he who informs not, the dishonor of doing wrongly; and if he be a slave who gives information, let him be freed, as he ought to be, by the state, which shall give his master the price of him; but if he do not inform he shall be punished with death. Next in order shall follow a similar law, which shall apply equally to matters great and small: —If a man happens to leave behind him some part of his property, whether intentionally or unintentionally, let him who may come upon the left property suffer it to remain, reflecting that such things are under the protection of the Goddess of ways, and are dedicated to her by the law. But if anyone defies the law, and takes the property home with him, let him, if the thing is of little worth, and the man who takes it a slave, be beaten with many stripes by him who meets him, being a person of not less than thirty years of age. Or if he be a freeman, in addition to being thought a mean person and a despiser of the laws, let him pay ten times the value of the treasure which he has moved to the leaver. And if someone accuses another of having anything which belongs to him, whether little or much, and the other admits that he has this thing, but denies that the property in dispute belongs to the other, if the property be registered with the magistrates according to law, the claimant shall summon the possessor, who shall bring it before the magistrates; and when it is brought into court, if it be registered in the public registers, to which of the litigants it belonged, let him take it and go his way. Or if the property

be registered as belonging to someone who is not present, whoever will offer sufficient surety on behalf of the absent person that he will give it up to him, shall take it away as the representative of the other. But if the property which is deposited be not registered with the magistrates, let it remain until the time of trial with three of the eldest of the magistrates; and if it be an animal which is deposited, then he who loses the suit shall pay the magistrates for its keep, and they shall determine the cause within three days.

Anyone who is of sound mind may arrest his own slave, and do with him whatever he will of such things as are lawful; and he may arrest the runaway slave of any of his friends or kindred with a view to his safe-keeping. And if anyone takes away him who is being carried off as a slave, intending to liberate him, he who is carrying him off shall let him go; but he who takes him away shall give three sufficient sureties; and if he give them, and not without giving them, he may take him away, but if he take him away after any other manner he shall be deemed guilty of violence, and being convicted shall pay as a penalty double the amount of the damages claimed to him who has been deprived of the slave. Any man may also carry off a freedman, if he do not pay respect or sufficient respect to him who freed him. Now the respect shall be, that the freedman go three times in the month to the hearth of the person who freed him, and offer to do whatever he ought, so far as he can; and he shall agree to make such a marriage as his former master approves. He shall not be permitted to have more property than he who gave him liberty, and what more he has shall belong to his master. The freedman shall not remain in the state more than twenty years, but like other foreigners shall go away, taking his entire property with him, unless he has the consent of the magistrates and of his former master to remain. If a freedman or any other stranger has a property

greater than the census of the third class, at the expiration of thirty days from the day on which this comes to pass, he shall take that which is his and go his way, and in this case he shall not be allowed to remain any longer by the magistrates. And if anyone disobeys this regulation, and is brought into court and convicted, he shall be punished with death, and his property shall be confiscated. Suits about these matters shall take place before the tribes, unless the plaintiff and defendant have got rid of the accusation either before their neighbors or before judges chosen by them. If a man lay claim to any animal or anything else which he declares to be his, let the possessor refer to the seller or to some honest and trustworthy person, who has given, or in some legitimate way made over the property to him; if he be a citizen or a metic, sojourning in the city, within thirty days, or, if the property have been delivered to him by a stranger, within five months, of which the middle month shall include the summer solstice. When goods are exchanged by selling and buying, a man shall deliver them, and receive the price of them, at a fixed place in the agora, and have done with the matter; but he shall not buy or sell anywhere else, nor give credit. And if in any other manner or in any other place there be an exchange of one thing for another, and the seller give credit to the man who buys from him, he must do this on the understanding that the law gives no protection in cases of things sold not in accordance with these regulations. Again, as to contributions, any man who likes may go about collecting contributions as a friend among friends, but if any difference arises about the collection, he is to act on the understanding that the law gives no protection in such cases.

He who sells anything above the value of fifty drachmas shall be required to remain in the city for ten days, and the purchaser shall be informed of the house of the seller, with

a view to the sort of charges which are apt to arise in such cases, and the restitutions which the law allows. And let legal restitution be on this wise: —If a man sells a slave who is in a consumption, or who has the disease of the stone, or of strangury, or epilepsy, or some other tedious and incurable disorder of body or mind, which is not discernible to the ordinary man, if the purchaser be a physician or trainer, he shall have no right of restitution; nor shall there be any right of restitution if the seller has told the truth beforehand to the buyer. But if a skilled person sells to another who is not skilled, let the buyer appeal for restitution within six months, except in the case of epilepsy, and then the appeal may be made within a year. The cause shall be determined by such physicians as the parties may agree to choose; and the defendant, if he lose the suit, shall pay double the price at which he sold. If a private person sell to another private person, he shall have the right of restitution, and the decision shall be given as before, but the defendant, if he be cast, shall only pay back the price of the slave. If a person sells a homicide to another, and they both know of the fact, let there be no restitution in such a case, but if he do not know of the fact, there shall be a right of restitution, whenever the buyer makes the discovery; and the decision shall rest with the five youngest guardians of the law, and if the decision be that the seller was cognizant of the fact, he shall purify the house of the purchaser, according to the law of the interpreters, and shall pay back three times the purchase-money.

If a man exchanges either money for money, or anything whatever for anything else, either with or without life, let him give and receive them genuine and unadulterated, in accordance with the law. And let us have a prelude about all this sort of roguery, like the preludes of our other laws. Every man should regard adulteration as of one and the same class

with falsehood and deceit, concerning which the many are too fond of saying that at proper times and places the practice may often be right. But they leave the occasion, and the when, and the where, undefined and unsettled, and from this want of definiteness in their language they do a great deal of harm to themselves and to others. Now a legislator ought not to leave the matter undetermined; he ought to prescribe some limit, either greater or less. Let this be the rule prescribed: —No one shall call the Gods to witness, when he says or does anything false or deceitful or dishonest, unless he would be the most hateful of mankind to them. And he is most hateful to them who takes a false oath, and pays no heed to the Gods; and in the next degree, he who tells a falsehood in the presence of his superiors. Now better men are the superiors of worse men, and in general elders are the superiors of the young; wherefore also parents are the superiors of their offspring, and men of women and children, and rulers of their subjects; for all men ought to reverence anyone who is in any position of authority, and especially those who are in state offices. And this is the reason why I have spoken of these matters. For everyone who is guilty of adulteration in the agora tells a falsehood, and deceives, and when he invokes the Gods, according to the customs and cautions of the wardens of the agora, he does but swear without any respect for God or man. Certainly, it is an excellent rule not lightly to defile the names of the Gods, after the fashion of men in general, who care little about piety and purity in their religious actions. But if a man will not conform to this rule, let the law be as follows: —He who sells anything in the agora shall not ask two prices for that which he sells, but he shall ask one price, and if he do not obtain this, he shall take away his goods; and on that day he shall not value them either at more or less; and there shall be no praising of any goods, or oath

taken about them. If a person disobeys this command, any citizen who is present, not being less than thirty years of age, may with impunity chastise and beat the swearer, but if instead of obeying the laws he takes no heed, he shall be liable to the charge of having betrayed them. If a man sells any adulterated goods and will not obey these regulations, he who knows and can prove the fact, and does prove it in the presence of the magistrates, if he be a slave or a metic, shall have the adulterated goods; but if he be a citizen, and do not pursue the charge, he shall be called a rogue, and deemed to have robbed the Gods of the agora; or if he proves the charge, he shall dedicate the goods to the Gods of the agora. He who is proved to have sold any adulterated goods, in addition to losing the goods themselves, shall be beaten with stripes, —a stripe for a drachma, according to the price of the goods; and the herald shall proclaim in the agora the offence for which he is going to be beaten. The wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law shall obtain information from experienced persons about the rogueries and adulterations of the sellers, and shall write up what the seller ought and ought not to do in each case; and let them inscribe their laws on a column in front of the court of the wardens of the agora, that they may be clear instructors of those who have business in the agora. Enough has been said in what has preceded about the wardens of the city, and if anything seems to be wanting, let them communicate with the guardians of the law, and write down the omission, and place on a column in the court of the wardens of the city the primary and secondary regulations which are laid down for them about their office.

After the practices of adulteration naturally follow the practices of retail trade. Concerning these, we will first of all give a word of counsel and reason, and the law shall come afterwards. Retail trade in a city is not by nature intended

to do any harm, but quite the contrary; for is not he a benefactor who reduces the inequalities and incommensurabilities of goods to equality and common measure? And this is what the power of money accomplishes, and the merchant may be said to be appointed for this purpose. The hireling and the tavern-keeper, and many other occupations, some of them more and others less seemly—all alike have this object; —they seek to satisfy our needs and equalize our possessions. Let us then endeavor to see what has brought retail trade into ill-odor, and wherein lies the dishonor and unseemliness of it, in order that if not entirely, we may yet partially, cure the evil by legislation. To effect this is no easy matter, and requires a great deal of virtue.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Dear Cleinias, the class of men is small—they must have been rarely gifted by nature, and trained by education, —who, when assailed by wants and desires, are able to hold out and observe moderation, and when they might make a great deal of money are sober in their wishes, and prefer a moderate to a large gain. But the mass of mankind are the very opposite: their desires are unbounded, and when they might gain in moderation they prefer gains without limit; wherefore all that relates to retail trade, and merchandise, and the keeping of taverns, is denounced and numbered among dishonorable things. For if what I trust may never be and will not be, we were to compel, if I may venture to say a ridiculous thing, the best men everywhere to keep taverns for a time, or carry on retail trade, or do anything of that sort; or if, in consequence of some fate or necessity, the best women were compelled to follow similar callings, then we should know how agreeable and pleasant all these things are; and if all such occupations were managed on incorrupt principles, they would be

honored as we honor a mother or a nurse. But now that a man goes to desert places and builds houses which can only be reached by long journeys, for the sake of retail trade, and receives strangers who are in need at the welcome resting-place, and gives them peace and calm when they are tossed by the storm, or cool shade in the heat; and then instead of behaving to them as friends, and showing the duties of hospitality to his guests, treats them as enemies and captives who are at his mercy, and will not release them until they have paid the most unjust, abominable, and extortionate ransom, —these are the sort of practices, and foul evils they are, which cast a reproach upon the succor of adversity. And the legislator ought always to be devising a remedy for evils of this nature. There is an ancient saying, which is also a true one—'To fight against two opponents is a difficult thing' as is seen in diseases and in many other cases. And in this case also the war is against two enemies—wealth and poverty; one of whom corrupts the soul of man with luxury, while the other drives him by pain into utter shamelessness. What remedy can a city of sense find against this disease? In the first place, they must have as few retail traders as possible; and in the second place, they must assign the occupation to that class of men whose corruption will be the least injury to the state; and in the third place, they must devise some way whereby the followers of these occupations themselves will not readily fall into habits of unbridled shamelessness and meanness.

After this preface let our law run as follows, and may fortune favor us: —No landowner among the Magnetes, whose city the God is restoring and resettling—no one, that is, of the 5040 families, shall become a retail trader either voluntarily or involuntarily; neither shall he be a merchant, or do any service for private persons unless they equally serve him, except for his father or his mother, and their

fathers and mothers; and in general for his elders who are freemen, and whom he serves as a freeman. Now it is difficult to determine accurately the things which are worthy or unworthy of a freeman, but let those who have obtained the prize of virtue give judgment about them in accordance with their feelings of right and wrong. He who in any way shares in the illiberality of retail trades may be indicted for dishonoring his race by anyone who likes, before those who have been judged to be the first in virtue; and if he appear to throw dirt upon his father's house by an unworthy occupation, let him be imprisoned for a year and abstain from that sort of thing; and if he repeat the offence, for two years; and every time that he is convicted let the length of his imprisonment be doubled. This shall be the second law: —He who engages in retail trade must be either a metic or a stranger. And a third law shall be: —In order that the retail trader who dwells in our city may be as good or as little bad as possible, the guardians of the law shall remember that they are not only guardians of those who may be easily watched and prevented from becoming lawless or bad, because they are well-born and bred; but still more should they have a watch over those who are of another sort, and follow pursuits which have a very strong tendency to make men bad. And, therefore, in respect of the multifarious occupations of retail trade, that is to say, in respect of such of them as are allowed to remain, because they seem to be quite necessary in a state, —about these the guardians of the law should meet and take counsel with those who have experience of the several kinds of retail trade, as we before commanded concerning adulteration (which is a matter akin to this), and when they meet they shall consider what amount of receipts, after deducting expenses, will produce a moderate gain to the retail trades, and they shall fix in writing and strictly maintain what they find to be the right

percentage of profit; this shall be seen to by the wardens of the agora, and by the wardens of the city, and by the wardens of the country. And so retail trade will benefit everyone, and do the least possible injury to those in the state who practice it.

When a man makes an agreement which he does not fulfill, unless the agreement be of a nature which the law or a vote of the assembly does not allow, or which he has made under the influence of some unjust compulsion, or which he is prevented from fulfilling against his will by some unexpected chance, the other party may go to law with him in the courts of the tribes, for not having completed his agreement, if the parties are not able previously to come to terms before arbiters or before their neighbors. The class of craftsmen who have furnished human life with the arts is dedicated to Hephaestus and Athene; and there is a class of craftsmen who preserve the works of all craftsmen by arts of defense, the votaries of Ares and Athene, to which divinities they too are rightly dedicated. All these continue through life serving the country and the people; some of them are leaders in battle; others make for hire implements and works, and they ought not to deceive in such matters, out of respect to the Gods who are their ancestors. If any craftsman through indolence omit to execute his work in a given time, not reverencing the God who gives him the means of life, but considering, foolish fellow, that he is his own God and will let him off easily, in the first place, he shall suffer at the hands of the God, and in the second place, the law shall follow in a similar spirit. He shall owe to him who contracted with him the price of the works which he has failed in performing, and he shall begin again and execute them gratis in the given time. When a man undertakes a work, the law gives him the same advice which was given to the seller, that he should not attempt to raise the price, but simply ask

the value; this the law enjoins also on the contractor; for the craftsman assuredly knows the value of his work. Wherefore, in free states the man of art ought not to attempt to impose upon private individuals by the help of his art, which is by nature a true thing; and he who is wronged in a matter of this sort, shall have a right of action against the party who has wronged him. And if anyone lets out work to a craftsman, and does not pay him duly according to the lawful agreement, disregarding Zeus the guardian of the city and Athene, who are the partners of the state, and overthrows the foundations of society for the sake of a little gain, in his case let the law and the Gods maintain the common bonds of the state. And let him who, having already received the work in exchange, does not pay the price in the time agreed, pay double the price; and if a year has elapsed, although interest is not to be taken on loans, yet for every drachma which he owes to the contractor let him pay a monthly interest of an obol. Suits about these matters are to be decided by the courts of the tribes; and by the way, since we have mentioned craftsmen at all, we must not forget that other craft of war, in which generals and tacticians are the craftsmen, who undertake voluntarily or involuntarily the work of our safety, as other craftsmen undertake other public works; —if they execute their work well the law will never tire of praising him who gives them those honors which are the just rewards of the soldier; but if anyone, having already received the benefit of any noble service in war, does not make the due return of honor, the law will blame him. Let this then be the law, having an ingredient of praise, not compelling but advising the great body of the citizens to honor the brave men who are the saviors of the whole state, whether by their courage or by their military skill; —they should honor them, I say, in the second place; for the first and highest tribute of respect is to be given to

those who are able above other men to honor the words of good legislators.

The greater part of the dealings between man and man have been now regulated by us with the exception of those that relate to orphans and the supervision of orphans by their guardians. These follow next in order, and must be regulated in some way. But to arrive at them we must begin with the testamentary wishes of the dying and the case of those who may have happened to die intestate. When I said, Cleinias, that we must regulate them, I had in my mind the difficulty and perplexity in which all such matters are involved. You cannot leave them unregulated, for individuals would make regulations at variance with one another, and repugnant to the laws and habits of the living and to their own previous habits, if a person were simply allowed to make any will which he pleased, and this were to take effect in whatever state he may have been at the end of his life; for most of us lose our senses in a manner, and feel crushed when we think that we are about to die.

Clinias/ What do you mean, Stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ O Cleinias, a man when he is about to die is an intractable creature, and is apt to use language which causes a great deal of anxiety and trouble to the legislator.

Clinias/ In what way?

Athenian Stranger/ He wants to have the entire control of all his property, and will use angry words.

Clinias/ Such as what?

Athenian Stranger/ O ye Gods, he will say, how monstrous that I am not allowed to give, or not to give, my own to whom I will—less to him who has been bad to me, and more to him who has been good to me, and whose

badness and goodness have been tested by me in time of sickness or in old age and in every other sort of fortune!

Clinias/ Well, Stranger, and may he not very fairly say so?

Athenian Stranger/ In my opinion, Cleinias, the ancient legislators were too good-natured, and made laws without sufficient observation or consideration of human things.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean, my friend, that they were afraid of the testator's reproaches, and so they passed a law to the effect that a man should be allowed to dispose of his property in all respects as he liked; but you and I, if I am not mistaken, will have something better to say to our departing citizens.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ O my friends, we will say to them, hard is it for you, who are creatures of a day, to know what is yours, —hard too, as the Delphic oracle says, to know yourselves at this hour. Now I, as the legislator, regard you and your possessions, not as belonging to yourselves, but as belonging to your whole family, both past and future, and yet more do I regard both family and possessions as belonging to the state; wherefore, if someone steals upon you with flattery, when you are tossed on the sea of disease or old age, and persuades you to dispose of your property in a way that is not for the best, I will not, if I can help, allow this; but I will legislate with a view to the whole, considering what is best both for the state and for the family, esteeming as I ought the feelings of an individual at a lower rate; and I hope that you will depart in peace and kindness towards us, as you are going the way of all mankind; and we will impartially take care of all your concerns, not neglecting any of them, if we can possibly help. Let this be our prelude and

consolation to the living and dying, Cleinias, and let the law be as follows: —He who makes a disposition in a testament, if he be the father of a family, shall first of all inscribe as his heir anyone of his sons whom he may think fit; and if he gives any of his children to be adopted by another citizen, let the adoption be inscribed. And if he has a son remaining over and above who has not been adopted upon any lot, and who may be expected to be sent out to a colony according to law, to him his father may give as much as he pleases of the rest of his property, with the exception of the paternal lot and the fixtures on the lot. And if there are other sons, let him distribute among them what there is more than the lot in such portions as he pleases. And if one of the sons has already a house of his own, he shall not give him of the money, nor shall he give money to a daughter who has been betrothed, but if she is not betrothed he may give her money. And if any of the sons or daughters shall be found to have another lot of land in the country, which has accrued after the testament has been made, they shall leave the lot which they have inherited to the heir of the man who has made the will. If the testator has no sons, but only daughters, let him choose the husband of anyone of his daughters whom he pleases, and leave and inscribe him as his son and heir. And if a man have lost his son, when he was a child, and before he could be reckoned among grown-up men, whether his own or an adopted son, let the testator make mention of the circumstance and inscribe whom he will to be his second son in hope of better fortune. If the testator has no children at all, he may select and give to anyone whom he pleases the tenth part of the property which he has acquired; but let him not be blamed if he gives all the rest to his adopted son, and makes a friend of him according to the law. If the sons of a man require guardians, and the father when he dies leaves a will appointing guardians, those who have been named by

him, whoever they are and whatever their number be, if they are able and willing to take charge of the children, shall be recognized according to the provisions of the will. But if he dies and has made no will, or a will in which he has appointed no guardians, then the next of kin, two on the father's and two on the mother's side, and one of the friends of the deceased, shall have the authority of guardians, whom the guardians of the law shall appoint when the orphans require guardians. And the fifteen eldest guardians of the law shall have the whole care and charge of the orphans, divided into threes according to seniority, —a body of three for one year, and then another body of three for the next year, until the cycle of the five periods is complete; and this, as far as possible, is to continue always. If a man dies, having made no will at all, and leaves sons who require the care of guardians, they shall share in the protection which is afforded by these laws. And if a man dying by some unexpected fate leaves daughters behind him, let him pardon the legislator if when he gives them in marriage, he have a regard only to two out of three conditions, —nearness of kin and the preservation of the lot, and omits the third condition, which a father would naturally consider, for he would choose out of all the citizens a son for himself, and a husband for his daughter, with a view to his character and disposition—the father, I say, shall forgive the legislator if he disregards this, which to him is an impossible consideration. Let the law about these matters where practicable be as follows: —If a man dies without making a will, and leaves behind him daughters, let his brother, being the son of the same father or of the same mother, having no lot, marry the daughter and have the lot of the dead man. And if he have no brother, but only a brothers son, in like manner let them marry, if they be of a suitable age; and if there be not even a brother's son, but only the son of a sister, let them do

likewise, and so in the fourth degree, if there be only the testator's father's brother, or in the fifth degree, his father's brother's son, or in a sixth degree, the child of his father's sister. Let kindred be always reckoned in this way: if a person leaves daughters the relationship shall proceed upwards through brothers and sisters, and brothers' and sisters' children, and first the males shall come, and after them the females in the same family. The judge shall consider and determine the suitableness or unsuitableness of age in marriage; he shall make an inspection of the males naked, and of the women naked down to the navel. And if there be a lack of kinsmen in a family extending to grandchildren of a brother, or to the grandchildren of a grandfather's children, the maiden may choose with the consent of her guardians anyone of the citizens who is willing and whom she wills, and he shall be the heir of the dead man, and the husband of his daughter. Circumstances vary, and there may sometimes be a still greater lack of relations within the limits of the state; and if any maiden has no kindred living in the city, and there is someone who has been sent out to a colony, and she is disposed to make him the heir of her father's possessions, if he be indeed of her kindred, let him proceed to take the lot according to the regulation of the law; but if he be not of her kindred, she having no kinsmen within the city, and he be chosen by the daughter of the dead man, and empowered to marry by the guardians, let him return home and take the lot of him who died intestate. And if a man has no children, either male or female, and dies without making a will, let the previous law in general hold; and let a man and a woman go forth from the family and share the deserted house, and let the lot belong absolutely to them; and let the heiress in the first degree be a sister, and in a second degree a daughter of a brother, and in the third, a daughter of a sister, in the fourth

degree the sister of a father, and in the fifth degree the daughter of a father's brother, and in a sixth degree of a father's sister; and these shall dwell with their male kinsmen, according to the degree of relationship and right, as we enacted before. Now we must not conceal from ourselves that such laws are apt to be oppressive and that there may sometimes be a hardship in the lawgiver commanding the kinsman of the dead man to marry his relation; he maybe thought not to have considered the innumerable hindrances which may arise among men in the execution of such ordinances; for there may be cases in which the parties refuse to obey, and are ready to do anything rather than marry, when there is some bodily or mental malady or defect among those who are bidden to marry or be married. Persons may fancy that the legislator never thought of this, but they are mistaken; wherefore let us make a common prelude on behalf of the lawgiver and of his subjects, the law begging the latter to forgive the legislator, in that he, having to take care of the common weal, cannot order at the same time the various circumstances of individuals, and begging him to pardon them if naturally they are sometimes unable to fulfill the act which he in his ignorance imposes upon them.

Clinias/ And how, Stranger, can we act most fairly under the circumstances?

Athenian Stranger/ There must be arbiters chosen to deal with such laws and the subjects of them.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean to say, that a case may occur in which the nephew, having a rich father, will be unwilling to marry the daughter of his uncle; he will have a feeling of pride, and he will wish to look higher. And there are cases in which the legislator will be imposing upon him the greatest

calamity, and he will be compelled to disobey the law, if he is required, for example, to take a wife who is mad, or has some other terrible malady of soul or body, such as makes life intolerable to the sufferer. Then let what we are saying concerning these cases be embodied in a law: —If anyone finds fault with the established laws respecting testaments, both as to other matters and especially in what relates to marriage, and asserts that the legislator, if he were alive and present, would not compel him to obey, —that is to say, would not compel those who are by our law required to marry or be given in marriage, to do either, —and some kinsman or guardian dispute this, the reply is that the legislator left fifteen of the guardians of the law to be arbiters and fathers of orphans, male or female, and to them let the disputants have recourse, and by their aid determine any matters of the kind, admitting their decision to be final. But if anyone thinks that too great power is thus given to the guardians of the law, let him bring his adversaries into the court of the select judges, and there have the points in dispute determined. And he who loses the cause shall have censure and blame from the legislator, which, by a man of sense, is felt to be a penalty far heavier than a great loss of money. Thus will orphan children have a second birth. After their first birth we spoke of their nurture and education, and after their second birth, when they have lost their parents, we ought to take measures that the misfortune of orphanhood may be as little sad to them as possible. In the first place, we say that the guardians of the law are lawgivers and fathers to them, not inferior to their natural fathers. Moreover, they shall take charge of them year by year as of their own kindred; and we have given both to them and to the children's own guardians a suitable admonition concerning the nurture of orphans. And we seem to have spoken opportunely in our former discourse, when we said

that the souls of the dead have the power after death of taking an interest in human affairs, about which there are many tales and traditions, long indeed, but true; and seeing that they are so many and so ancient, we must believe them, and we must also believe the lawgivers, who tell us that these things are true, if they are not to be regarded as utter fools. But if these things are really so, in the first place men should have a fear of the Gods above, who regard the loneliness of the orphans; and in the second place of the souls of the departed, who by nature incline to take an especial care of their own children, and are friendly to those who honor, and unfriendly to those who dishonor them. Men should also fear the souls of the living who are aged and high in honor; wherever a city is well ordered and prosperous, their descendants cherish them, and so live happily; old persons are quick to see and hear all that relates to them, and are propitious to those who are just in the fulfillment of such duties, and they punish those who wrong the orphan and the desolate, considering that they are the greatest and most sacred of trusts. To all which matters the guardian and magistrate ought to apply his mind, if he has any, and take heed of the nurture and education of the orphans, seeking in every possible way to do them good, for he is making a contribution to his own good and that of his children. He who obeys the tale which precedes the law, and does no wrong to an orphan, will never experience the wrath of the legislator. But he who is disobedient, and wrongs anyone who is bereft of father or mother, shall pay twice the penalty which he would have paid if he had wronged one whose parents had been alive. As touching other legislation concerning guardians in their relation to orphans, or concerning magistrates and their superintendence of the guardians, if they did not possess examples of the manner in which children of freemen should be brought up in the

bringing up of their own children, and of the care of their property in the care of their own, or if they had not just laws fairly stated about these very things, —there would have been reason in making laws for them, under the idea that they were a peculiar class, and we might distinguish and make separate rules for the life of those who are orphans and of those who are not orphans.

But as the case stands, the condition of orphans with us is not different from the case of those who have a father, though in regard to honor and dishonor, and the attention given to them, the two are not usually placed upon a level. Wherefore, touching the legislation about orphans, the law speaks in serious accents, both of persuasion and threatening, and such a threat as the following will be by no means out of place: —He who is the guardian of an orphan of either sex, and he among the guardians of the law to whom the superintendence of this guardian has been assigned, shall love the unfortunate orphan as though he were his own child, and he shall be as careful and diligent in the management of his possessions as he would be if they were his own, or even more careful and diligent. Let everyone who has the care of an orphan observe this law. But anyone who acts contrary to the law on these matters, if he be a guardian of the child, may be fined by a magistrate, or, if he be himself a magistrate, the guardian may bring him before the court of select judges, and punish him, if convicted, by exacting a fine of double the amount of that inflicted by the court. And if a guardian appears to the relations of the orphan, or to any other citizen, to act negligently or dishonestly, let them bring him before the same court, and whatever damages are given against him, let him pay fourfold, and let half belong to the orphan and half to him who procured the conviction. If any orphan arrives at years of discretion, and thinks that he has been ill-used by his

guardians, let him within five years of the expiration of the guardianship be allowed to bring them to trial; and if any of them be convicted, the court shall determine what he shall pay or suffer. And if a magistrate shall appear to have wronged the orphan by neglect, and he be convicted, let the court determine what he shall suffer or pay to the orphan, and if there be dishonesty in addition to neglect, besides paying the fine, let him be deposed from his office of guardian of the law, and let the state appoint another guardian of the law for the city and for the country in his room.

Greater differences than there ought to be sometimes arise between fathers and sons, on the part either of fathers who will be of opinion that the legislator should enact that they may, if they wish, lawfully renounce their son by the proclamation of a herald in the face of the world, or of sons who think that they should be allowed to indict their fathers on the charge of imbecility when they are disabled by disease or old age. These things only happen, as a matter of fact, where the natures of men are utterly bad; for where only half is bad, as, for example, if the father be not bad, but the son be bad, or conversely, no great calamity is the result of such an amount of hatred as this. In another state, a son disowned by his father would not of necessity cease to be a citizen, but in our state, of which these are to be the laws, the disinherited must necessarily emigrate into another country, for no addition can be made even of a single family to the 5040 households; and, therefore, he who deserves to suffer these things must be renounced not only by his father, who is 'a single person, but by the whole family, and what is done in these cases must be regulated by some such law as the following: —He who in the sad disorder of his soul has a mind, justly or unjustly, to expel from his family a son whom he has begotten and brought up, shall not lightly or at once

execute his purpose; but first of all he shall collect together his own kinsmen, extending to cousins, and in like manner his son's kinsmen by the mother's side, and in their presence he shall accuse his son, setting forth that he deserves at the hands of them all to be dismissed from the family; and the son shall be allowed to address them in a similar manner, and show that he does not deserve to suffer any of these things. And if the father persuades them, and obtains the suffrages of more than half of his kindred, exclusive of the father and mother and the offender himself—I say, if he obtains more than half the suffrages of all the other grown-up members of the family, of both sexes, the father shall be permitted to put away his son, but not otherwise. And if any other citizen is willing to adopt the son who is put away, no law' shall hinder him; for the characters of young men are subject to many changes in the course of their lives. And if he has been put away, and in a period of ten years no one is willing to adopt him, let those who have the care of the superabundant population which is sent out into colonies, see to him, in order that he may be suitably provided for in the colony. And if disease or age or harshness of temper, or all these together, makes a man to be more out of his mind than the rest of the world are, —but this is not observable, except to those who live with him, —and he, being master of his property, is the ruin of the house, and his son doubts and hesitates about indicting his father for insanity, let the law in that case ordain that he shall first of all go to the eldest guardians of the law and tell them of his father's misfortune, and they shall duly look into the matter, and take counsel as to whether he shall indict him or not. And if they advise him to proceed, they shall be both his witnesses and his advocates; and if the father is cast, he shall henceforth be incapable of ordering the least particular of his life; let him be as a child dwelling in the house for the

remainder of his days. And if a man and his wife have an unfortunate incompatibility of temper, ten of the guardians of the law, who are impartial, and ten of the women who regulate marriages, shall look to the matter, and if they are able to reconcile them they shall be formally reconciled; but if their souls are too much tossed with passion, they shall endeavor to find other partners. Now they are not likely to have very gentle tempers; and, therefore, we must endeavor to associate with them deeper and softer natures. Those who have no children, or only a few, at the time of their separation, should choose their new partners with a view to the procreation of children; but those who have a sufficient number of children should separate and marry again in order that they may have someone to grow old with and that the pair may take care of one another in age. If a woman dies, leaving children, male or female, the law will advise rather than compel the husband to bring up the children without introducing into the house a stepmother. But if he have no children, then he shall be compelled to marry until he has begotten a sufficient number of sons to his family and to the state. And if a man dies leaving a sufficient number of children, the mother of his children shall remain with them and bring them up. But if she appears to be too young to live virtuously without a husband, let her relations communicate with the women who superintend marriage, and let both together do what they think best in these matters; if there is a lack of children, let the choice be made with a view to having them; two children, one of either sex, shall be deemed sufficient in the eye of the law. When a child is admitted to be the offspring of certain parents and is acknowledged by them, but there is need of a decision as to which parent the child is to follow, —in case a female slave have intercourse with a male slave, or with a freeman or freedman, the offspring shall always belong to the master of

the female slave. Again, if a free woman have intercourse with a male slave, the offspring shall belong to the master of the slave; but if a child be born either of a slave by her master, or of his mistress by a slave—and this be proven—the offspring of the woman and its father shall be sent away by the women who superintend marriage into another country, and the guardians of the law shall send away the offspring of the man and its mother.

Neither God, nor a man who has understanding, will ever advise anyone to neglect his parents. To a discourse concerning the honor and dishonor of parents, a prelude such as the following, about the service of the Gods, will be a suitable introduction: —There are ancient customs about the Gods which are universal, and they are of two kinds: some of the Gods we see with our eyes and we honor them, of others we honor the images, raising statues of them which we adore; and though they are lifeless, yet we imagine that the living Gods have a good will and gratitude to us on this account. Now, if a man has a father or mother, or their fathers or mothers treasured up in his house stricken in years, let him consider that no statue can be more potent to grant his requests than they are, who are sitting at his hearth, if only he knows how to show true service to them.

Clinias/ And what do you call the true mode of service?

Athenian Stranger/ I will tell you, O my friend, for such things are worth listening to.

Clinias/ Proceed.

Athenian Stranger/ Oedipus, as tradition says, when dishonored by his sons, invoked on them curses which everyone declares to have been heard and ratified by the Gods, and Amyntor in his wrath invoked curses on his son Phoenix, and Theseus upon Hippolytus, and innumerable others have also called down wrath upon their children,

whence it is clear that the Gods listen to the imprecations of parents; for the curses of parents are, as they ought to be, mighty against their children as no others are. And shall we suppose that the prayers of a father or mother who is specially dishonored by his or her children, are heard by the Gods in accordance with nature; and that if a parent is honored by them, and in the gladness of his heart earnestly entreats the Gods in his prayers to do them good, he is not equally heard, and that they do not minister to his request? If not, they would be very unjust ministers of good, and that we affirm to be contrary to their nature.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ May we not think, as I was saying just now, that we can possess no image which is more honored by the Gods, than that of a father or grandfather, or of a mother stricken in years? whom when a man honors, the heart of the God rejoices, and he is ready to answer their prayers. And, truly, the figure of an ancestor is a wonderful thing, far higher than that of a lifeless image. For the living, when they are honored by us, join in our prayers, and when they are dishonored, they utter imprecations against us; but lifeless objects do neither. And therefore, if a man makes a right use of his father and grandfather and other aged relations, he will have images which above all others will win him the favor of the Gods.

Clinias/ Excellent.

Athenian Stranger/ Every man of any understanding fears and respects the prayers of parents, knowing well that many times and to many persons they have been accomplished. Now these things being thus ordered by nature, good men think it a blessing from heaven if their parents live to old age and reach the utmost limit of human life, or if taken away before their time they are deeply

regretted by them; but to bad men parents are always a cause of terror. Wherefore let every man honor with every sort of lawful honor his own parents, agreeably to what has now been said. But if this prelude be an unmeaning sound in the ears of anyone, let the law follow, which may be rightly imposed in these terms: —If anyone in this city be not sufficiently careful of his parents, and do not regard and gratify in every respect their wishes more than those of his sons and of his other offspring or of himself, —let him who experiences this sort of treatment either come himself, or send someone to inform the three eldest guardians of the law, and three of the women who have the care of marriages; and let them look to the matter and punish youthful evil-doers with stripes and bonds if they are under thirty years of age, that is to say, if they be men, or if they be women, let them undergo the same punishment up to forty years of age. But if, when they are still more advanced in years, they continue the same neglect of their parents, and do any hurt to any of them, let them be brought before a court in which every single one of the eldest citizens shall be the judges, and if the offender be convicted, let the court determine what he ought to pay or suffer, and any penalty may be imposed on him which a man can pay or suffer. If the person who has been wronged be unable to inform the magistrates, let any freeman who hears of his case inform, and if he do not, he shall be deemed base, and shall be liable to have a suit for damage brought against him by anyone who likes. And if a slave inform, he shall receive freedom; and if he be the slave of the injurer or injured party, he shall be set free by the magistrates, or if he belong to any other citizen, the public shall pay a price on his behalf to the owner; and let the magistrates take heed that no one wrongs him out of revenge, because he has given information.

Cases in which one man injures another by poisons, and which prove fatal, have been already discussed; but about other cases in which a person intentionally and of malice harms another with meats, or drinks, or ointments, nothing has as yet been determined. For there are two kinds of poisons used among men, which cannot clearly be distinguished. There is the kind just now explicitly mentioned, which injures bodies by the use of other bodies according to a natural law; there is also another kind which persuades the more daring class that they can do injury by sorceries, and incantations, and magic knots, as they are termed, and makes others believe that they above all persons are injured by the powers of the magician. Now it is not easy to know the nature of all these things; nor if a man do know can he readily persuade others to believe him. And when men are disturbed in their minds at the sight of waxen images fixed either at their doors, or in a place where three ways meet, or on the sepulchers of parents, there is no use in trying to persuade them that they should despise all such things because they have no certain knowledge about them. But we must have a law in two parts, concerning poisoning, in whichever of the two ways the attempt is made, and we must entreat, and exhort, and advise men not to have recourse to such practices, by which they scare the multitude out of their wits, as if they were children, compelling the legislator and the judge to heal the fears which the sorcerer arouses, and to tell them in the first place, that he who attempts to poison or enchant others knows not what he is doing, either as regards the body (unless he has a knowledge of medicine), or as regards his enchantments (unless he happens to be a prophet or diviner). Let the law, then, run as follows about poisoning or witchcraft: —He who employs poison to do any injury, not fatal, to a man himself, or to his servants, or any injury,

whether fatal or not, to his cattle or his bees, if he be a physician, and be convicted of poisoning, shall be punished with death; or if he be a private person, the court shall determine what he is to pay or suffer. But he who seems to be the sort of man who injures others by magic knots, or enchantments, or incantations, or any of the like practices, if he be a prophet or diviner, let him die; and if, not being a prophet, he be convicted of witchcraft, as in the previous case, let the court fix what he ought to pay or suffer.

When a man does another any injury by theft or violence, for the greater injury let him pay greater damages to the injured man, and less for the smaller injury; but in all cases, whatever the injury may have been, as much as will compensate the loss. And besides the compensation of the wrong, let a man pay a further penalty for the chastisement of his offence: he who has done the wrong instigated by the folly of another, through the lightheartedness of youth or the like, shall pay a lighter penalty; but he who has injured another through his own folly, when overcome by pleasure or pain, in cowardly fear, or lust, or envy, or implacable anger, shall endure a heavier punishment. Not that he is punished because he did wrong, for that which is done can never be undone, but in order that in future times, he, and those who see him corrected, may utterly hate injustice, or at any rate abate much of their evil-doing. Having an eye to all these things, the law, like a good archer, should aim at the right measure of punishment, and in all cases at the deserved punishment. In the attainment of this the judge shall be a fellow-worker with the legislator, whenever the law leaves to him to determine what the offender shall suffer or pay; and the legislator, like a painter, shall give a rough sketch of the cases in which the law is to be applied. This is what we must do, Megillus and Cleinias, in the best and fairest manner that we can, saying what the punishments

are to be of all actions of theft and violence, and giving laws of such a kind as the Gods and sons of Gods would have us give.

If a man is mad he shall not be at large in the city, but his relations shall keep him at home in any way which they can; or if not, let them pay a penalty, —he who is of the highest class shall pay a penalty of one hundred drachmas, whether he be a slave or a freeman whom he neglects; and he of the second class shall pay four-fifths of a mina; and he of the third class three-fifths; and he of the fourth class two-fifths. Now there are many sorts of madness, some arising out of disease, which we have already mentioned; and there are other kinds, which originate in an evil and passionate temperament, and are increased by bad education; out of a slight quarrel this class of madmen will often raise a storm of abuse against one another, and nothing of that sort ought to be allowed to occur in a well-ordered state. Let this, then, be the law about abuse, which shall relate to all cases: —No one shall speak evil of another; and when a man disputes with another he shall teach and learn of the disputant and the company, but he shall abstain from evil-speaking; for out of the imprecations which men utter against one another, and the feminine habit of casting aspersions on one another, and using foul names, out of words light as air, in very deed the greatest enmities and hatreds spring up. For the speaker gratifies his anger, which is an ungracious element of his nature; and nursing up his wrath by the entertainment of evil thoughts, and exacerbating that part of his soul which was formerly civilized by education, he lives in a state of savageness and moroseness, and pays a bitter penalty for his anger. And in such cases almost all men take to saying something ridiculous about their opponent, and there is no man who is in the habit of laughing at another who does not miss virtue and earnestness altogether, or lose

the better half of greatness. Wherefore let no one utter any taunting word at a temple, or at the public sacrifices, or at the games, or in the agora, or in a court of justice, or in any public assembly. And let the magistrate who presides on these occasions chastise an offender, and he shall be blameless; but if he fails in doing so, he shall not claim the prize of virtue; for he is one who heeds not the laws, and does not do what the legislator commands. And if in any other place anyone indulges in these sort of revilings, whether he has begun the quarrel or is only retaliating, let any elder who is present support the law, and control with blows those who indulge in passion, which is another great evil; and if he do not, let him be liable to pay the appointed penalty. And we say now, that he who deals in reproaches against others cannot reproach them without attempting to ridicule them; and this, when done in a moment of anger, is what we make matter of reproach against him. But then, do we admit into our state the comic writers who are so fond of making mankind ridiculous, if they attempt in a good-natured manner to turn the laugh against our citizens? or do we draw the distinction of jest and earnest, and allow a man to make use of ridicule in jest and without anger about anything or person; though as we were saying, not if he be angry and have a set purpose? We forbid earnest—that is unalterably fixed; but we have still to say who are to be sanctioned or not to be sanctioned by the law in the employment of innocent humor. A comic poet, or maker of iambic or satirical lyric verse, shall not be permitted to ridicule any of the citizens, either by word or likeness, either in anger or without anger. And if anyone is disobedient, the judges shall either at once expel him from the country, or he shall pay a fine of three minae, which shall be dedicated to the God who presides over the contests. Those only who have received permission shall be allowed to write verses at one

another, but they shall be without anger and in jest; in anger and in serious earnest they shall not be allowed. The decision of this matter shall be left to the superintendent of the general education of the young, and whatever he may license, the writer shall be allowed to produce, and whatever he rejects let not the poet himself exhibit, or ever teach anybody else, slave or freeman, under the penalty of being dishonored, and held disobedient to the laws.

Now he is not to be pitied who is hungry, or who suffers any bodily pain, but he who is temperate, or has some other virtue, or part of a virtue, and at the same time suffers from misfortune; it would be an extraordinary thing if such an one, whether slave or freeman, were utterly forsaken and fell into the extremes of poverty in any tolerably well-ordered city or government. Wherefore the legislator may safely make a law applicable to such cases in the following terms: —Let there be no beggars in our state; and if anybody begs, seeking to pick up a livelihood by unavailing prayers, let the wardens of the agora turn him out of the agora, and the wardens of the city out of the city, and the wardens of the country send him out of any other parts of the land across the border, in order that the land may be cleared of this sort of animal.

If a slave of either sex injure anything, which is not his or her own, through inexperience, or some improper practice, and the person who suffers damage be not himself in part to blame, the master of the slave who has done the harm shall either make full satisfaction, or give up the slave who has done the injury. But if the master argue that the charge has arisen by collusion between the injured party and the injurer, with the view of obtaining the slave, let him sue the person, who says that he has been injured, for malpractices. And if he gain a conviction, let him receive double the value which the court fixes as the price of the slave; and if he lose

his suit, let him make amends for the injury, and give up the slave. And if a beast of burden, or horse, or dog, or any other animal, injure the property of a neighbor, the owner shall in like manner pay for the injury.

If any man refuses to be a witness, he who wants him shall summon him, and he who is summoned shall come to the trial; and if he knows and is willing to bear witness, let him bear witness, but if he says he does not know let him swear by the three divinities Zeus, and Apollo, and Themis, that he does not, and have no more to do with the cause. And he who is summoned to give witness and does not answer to his summoner, shall be liable for the harm which ensues according to law. And if a person calls up as a witness anyone who is acting as a judge, let him give his witness, but he shall not afterwards vote in the cause. A free woman may give her witness and plead, if she be more than forty years of age, and may bring an action if she have no husband; but if her husband be alive she shall only be allowed to bear witness. A slave of either sex and a child shall be allowed to give evidence and to plead, but only in cases of murder; and they must produce sufficient sureties that they will certainly remain until the trial, in case they should be charged with false witness. And either of the parties in a cause may bring an accusation of perjury against witnesses, touching their evidence in whole or in part, if he asserts that such evidence has been given; but the accusation must be brought previous to the final decision of the cause. The magistrates shall preserve the accusations of false witness, and have them kept under the seal of both parties, and produce them on the day when the trial for false witness takes place. If a man be twice convicted of false witness, he shall not be required, and if thrice, he shall not be allowed to bear witness; and if he dare to witness after he has been convicted three times, let anyone who pleases

inform against him to the magistrates, and let the magistrates hand him over to the court, and if he be convicted he shall be punished with death. And in any case in which the evidence is rightly found to be false, and yet to have given the victory to him who wins the suit, and more than half the witnesses are condemned, the decision which was gained by these means shall be rescinded, and there shall be a discussion and a decision as to whether the suit was determined by that false evidence or not; and in whichever way the decision may be given, the previous suit shall be determined accordingly.

There are many noble things in human life, but to most of them attach evils which are fated to corrupt and spoil them. Is not justice noble, which has been the civilizer of humanity? How then can the advocate of justice be other than noble? And yet upon this profession which is presented to us under the fair name of art has come an evil reputation. In the first place, we are told that by ingenious pleas and the help of an advocate the law enables a man to win a particular cause, whether just or unjust; and that both the art, and the power of speech which is thereby imparted, are at the service of him who is willing to pay for them. Now in our state this so-called art, whether really an art or only an experience and practice destitute of any art, ought if possible never to come into existence, or if existing among us should listen to the request of the legislator and go away into another land, and not speak contrary to justice. If the offenders obey we say no more; but for those who disobey, the voice of the law is as follows: —If anyone thinks that he will pervert the power of justice in the minds of the judges, and unseasonably litigate or advocate, let anyone who likes indict him for malpractices of law and dishonest advocacy, and let him be judged in the court of select judges; and if he be convicted, let the court determine whether he may be supposed to act from a love of

money or from contentiousness. And if he is supposed to act from contentiousness, the court shall fix a time during which he shall not be allowed to institute or plead a cause; and if he is supposed to act as he does from love of money, in case he be a stranger, he shall leave the country, and never return under penalty of death; but if he be a citizen, he shall die, because he is a lover of money, in whatever manner gained; and equally, if he be judged to have acted more than once from contentiousness, he shall die.

Book 12.

Athenian Stranger/ If a herald or an ambassador carry a false message from our city to any other, or bring back a false message from the city to which he is sent, or be proved to have brought back, whether from friends or enemies, in his capacity of herald or ambassador, what they have never said, let him be indicted for having violated, contrary to the law, the commands and duties imposed upon him by Hermes and Zeus, and let there be a penalty fixed, which he shall suffer or pay if he be convicted.

Theft is a mean, and robbery a shameless thing; and none of the sons of Zeus delight in fraud and violence, or ever practiced either. Wherefore let no one be deluded by poets or mythologers into a mistaken belief of such things, nor let him suppose, when he thieves or is guilty of violence, that he is doing nothing base, but only what the Gods themselves do. For such tales are untrue and improbable; and he who steals or robs contrary to the law, is never either a God or the son of a God; of this the legislator ought to be better informed than all the poets put together. Happy is he and may he be forever happy, who is persuaded and listens to our words; but he who disobeys shall have to contend against the following law: —If a man steal anything belonging to the public, whether that which he steals be much or little, he shall have the same punishment. For he who steals a little steals with the same wish as he who steals much, but with less power, and he who takes up a greater amount, not having deposited it, is wholly unjust. Wherefore the law is not disposed to inflict a less penalty on the one than on the other because his theft is less, but on the ground that the thief may possibly be in one case still curable, and may in another case be incurable. If anyone convict in a court of law a stranger or a slave of a theft of public property, let the court determine what punishment he shall suffer, or

what penalty he shall pay, bearing in mind that he is probably not incurable. But the citizen who has been brought up as our citizens will have been, if he be found guilty of robbing his country by fraud or violence, whether he be caught in the act or not, shall be punished with death; for he is incurable.

Now for expeditions of war much consideration and many laws are required; the great principle of all is that no one of either sex should be without a commander; nor should the mind of anyone be accustomed to do anything, either in jest or earnest, of his own motion, but in war and in peace he should look to and follow his leader, even in the least things being under his guidance; for example, he should stand or move, or exercise, or wash, or take his meals, or get up in the night to keep guard and deliver messages when he is bidden; and in the hour of danger he should not pursue and not retreat except by order of his superior; and in a word, not teach the soul or accustom her to know or understand how to do anything apart from others. Of all soldiers the life should be always and in all things as far as possible in common and together; there neither is nor ever will be a higher, or better, or more scientific principle than this for the attainment of salvation and victory in war. And we ought in time of peace from youth upwards to practice this habit of commanding others, and of being commanded by others; anarchy should have no place in the life of man or of the beasts who are subject to man. I may add that all dances ought to be performed with a view to military excellence; and agility and ease should be cultivated for the same object, and also endurance of the want of meats and drinks, and of winter cold and summer heat, and of hard couches; and, above all, care should be taken not to destroy the peculiar qualities of the head and the feet by surrounding them with extraneous coverings, and so hindering their natural growth

of hair and soles. For these are the extremities, and of all the parts of the body, whether they are preserved or not is of the greatest consequence; the one is the servant of the whole body, and the other the master, in whom all the ruling senses are by nature set. Let the young man imagine that he hears in what has preceded the praises of the military life; the law shall be as follows: —He shall serve in war who is on the roll or appointed to some special service, and if anyone is absent from cowardice, and without the leave of the generals, he shall be indicted before the military commanders for failure of service when the army comes home; and the soldiers shall be his judges; the heavy-armed, and the cavalry, and the other arms of the service shall form separate courts; and they shall bring the heavy-armed before the heavy-armed, and the horsemen before the horsemen, and the others in like manner before their peers; and he who is found guilty shall never be allowed to compete for any prize of velour, or indict another for not serving on an expedition, or be an accuser at all in any military matters. Moreover, the court shall further determine what punishment he shall suffer, or what penalty he shall pay. When the suits for failure of service are completed, the leaders of the several kinds of troops shall again hold an assembly, and they shall adjudge the prizes of velour; and he who likes shall give judgment in his own branch of the service, saying nothing about any former expedition, nor producing any proof or witnesses to confirm his statement, but speaking only of the present occasion. The crown of victory shall be an olive wreath which the victor shall offer up at the temple of any war-god whom he likes, adding an inscription for a testimony to last during life, that such an one has received the first, the second, or the third prize. If anyone goes on an expedition, and returns home before the appointed time, when the generals have not withdrawn the

army, he shall be indicted for desertion before the same persons who took cognizance of failure of service, and if he be found guilty, the same punishment shall be inflicted on him. Now every man who is engaged in any suit ought to be very careful of bringing false witness against anyone, either intentionally or unintentionally, if he can help; for justice is truly said to be an honorable maiden, and falsehood is naturally repugnant to honor and justice. A witness ought to be very careful not to sin against justice, as for example in what relates to the throwing away of arms—he must distinguish the throwing them away when necessary, and not make that a reproach, or bring an action against some innocent person on that account. To make the distinction may be difficult; but still the law must attempt to define the different kinds in some way. Let me endeavor to explain my meaning by an ancient tale: —If Patroclus had been brought to the tent still alive but without his arms (and this has happened to innumerable persons), the original arms, which the poet says were presented to Peleus by the Gods as a nuptial gift when he married Thetis, remaining in the hands of Hector, then the base spirits of that day might have reproached the son of Menoetius with having cast away his arms. Again, there is the case of those who have been thrown down precipices and lost their arms; and of those who at sea, and in stormy places, have been suddenly overwhelmed by floods of water; and there are numberless things of this kind which one might adduce by way of extenuation, and with the view of justifying a misfortune which is easily misrepresented. We must, therefore, endeavor to divide to the best of our power the greater and more serious evil from the lesser. And a distinction may be drawn in the use of terms of reproach. A man does not always deserve to be called the thrower away of his shield; he may be only the loser of his arms. For there is a great or rather absolute

difference between him who is deprived of his arms by a sufficient force, and him who voluntarily lets his shield go. Let the law then be as follows: —If a person having arms is overtaken by the enemy and does not turn round and defend himself, but lets them go voluntarily or throws them away, choosing a base life and a swift escape rather than a courageous and noble and blessed death—in such a case of the throwing away of arms let justice be done, but the judge need take no note of the case just now mentioned; for the bad man ought always to be punished, in the hope that he may be improved, but not the unfortunate, for there is no advantage in that. And what shall be the punishment suited to him who has thrown away his weapons of defense? Tradition says that Caeneus, the Thessalian, was changed by a God from a woman into a man; but the converse miracle cannot now be wrought, or no punishment would be more proper than that the man who throws away his shield should be changed into a woman. This however is impossible, and therefore let us make a law as nearly like this as we can—that he who loves his life too well shall be in no danger for the remainder of his days, but shall live forever under the stigma of cowardice. And let the law be in the following terms: —When a man is found guilty of disgracefully throwing away his arms in war, no general or military officer shall allow him to serve as a soldier, or give him any place at all in the ranks of soldiers; and the officer who gives the coward any place, shall suffer a penalty which the public examiner shall exact of him; and if he be of the highest class, he shall pay a thousand drachmae; or if he be of the second class, five minae; or if he be of the third, three minae; or if he be of the fourth class, one mina. And he who is found guilty of cowardice, shall not only be dismissed from manly dangers, which is a disgrace appropriate to his nature, but he shall pay a thousand drachmae, if he be of the highest

class, and five minae if he be of the second class, and three if he be of the third class, and a mina, like the preceding, if he be of the fourth class.

What regulations will be proper about examiners, seeing that some of our magistrates are elected by lot, and for a year, and some for a longer time and from selected persons? Of such magistrates, who will be a sufficient censor or examiner, if any of them, weighed down by the pressure of office or his own inability to support the dignity of his office, be guilty of any crooked practice? It is by no means easy to find a magistrate who excels other magistrates in virtue, but still we must endeavor to discover some censor or examiner who is more than man. For the truth is, that there are many elements of dissolution in a state, as there are also in a ship, or in an animal; they all have their cords, and girders, and sinews, —one nature diffused in many places, and called by many names; and the office of examiner is a most important element in the preservation and dissolution of states. For if the examiners are better than the magistrates, and their duty is fulfilled justly and without blame, then the whole state and country flourishes and is happy; but if the examination of the magistrates is carried on in a wrong way, then, by the relaxation of that justice which is the uniting principle of all constitutions, every power in the state is rent asunder from every other; they no longer incline in the same direction, but fill the city with faction, and make many cities out of one, and soon bring all to destruction. Wherefore the examiners ought to be admirable in every sort of virtue. Let us invent a mode of creating them, which shall be as follows: —Every year, after the summer solstice, the whole city shall meet in the common precincts of Helios and Apollo, and shall present to the God three men out of their own number in the manner following: —Each citizen shall select, not himself, but some other citizen whom he deems in every way the best,

and who is not less than fifty years of age. And out of the selected persons who have the greatest number of votes, they shall make a further selection until they reduce them to one-half, if they are an even number; but if they are not an even number, they shall subtract the one who has the smallest number of votes, and make them an even number, and then leave the half which have the greater number of votes. And if two persons have an equal number of votes, and thus increase the number beyond one-half, they shall withdraw the younger of the two and do away the excess; and then including all the rest they shall again vote, until there are left three having an unequal number of votes. But if all the three, or two out of the three, have equal votes, let them commit the election to good fate and fortune, and separate off by lot the first, and the second, and the third; these they shall crown with an olive wreath and give them the prize of excellence, at the same time proclaiming to all the world that the city of the Magnetes, by the providence of the Gods, is again preserved, and presents to the Sun and to Apollo her three best men as first-fruits, to be a common offering to them, according to the ancient law, as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. And these shall appoint in their first year twelve examiners, to continue until each has completed seventy-five years, to whom three shall afterwards be added yearly; and let these divide all the magistracies into twelve parts, and prove the holders of them by every sort of test to which a freeman may be subjected; and let them live while they hold office in the precinct of Helios and Apollo, in which they were chosen, and let each one form a judgment of some things individually, and of others in company with his colleagues; and let him place a writing in the agora about each magistracy, and what the magistrate ought to suffer or pay, according to the decision of the examiners. And if a magistrate does not admit that he

has been justly judged, let him bring the examiners before the select judges, and if he be acquitted by their decision, let him, if he will, accuse the examiners themselves; if, however, he be convicted, and have been condemned to death by the examiners, let him die (and of course he can only die once): —but any other penalties which admit of being doubled let him suffer twice over.

And now let us pass under review the examiners themselves; what will their examination be, and how conducted? During the life of these men, whom the whole state counts worthy of the rewards of virtue, they shall have the first seat at all public assemblies, and at all Hellenic sacrifices and sacred missions, and other public and holy ceremonies in which they share. The chiefs of each sacred mission shall be selected from them, and they only of all the citizens shall be adorned with a crown of laurel; they shall all be priests of Apollo and Helios; and one of them, who is judged first of the priests created in that year, shall be high priest; and they shall write up his name in each year to be a measure of time as long as the city lasts; and after their death they shall be laid out and carried to the grave and entombed in a manner different from the other citizens. They shall be decked in a robe all of white, and there shall be no crying or lamentation over them; but a chorus of fifteen maidens, and another of boys, shall stand around the bier on either side, hymning the praises of the departed priests in alternate responses, declaring their blessedness in song all day long; and at dawn a hundred of the youths who practice gymnastic exercises, and whom the relations of the departed shall choose, shall carry the bier to the sepulcher, the young men marching first, dressed in the garb of warriors, —the cavalry with their horses, the heavy-armed with their arms, and the others in like manner. And boys near the bier and in front of it shall sing their national hymn,

and maidens shall follow behind, and with them the women who have passed the age of child-bearing; next, although they are interdicted from other burials, let priests and priestesses follow, unless the Pythian oracle forbid them; for this burial is free from pollution. The place of burial shall be an oblong vaulted chamber underground, constructed of tufa, which will last forever, having stone couches placed side by side. And here they will lay the blessed person, and cover the sepulcher with a circular mound of earth and plant a grove of trees around on every side but one; and on that side the sepulcher shall be allowed to extend forever, and a new mound will not be required. Every year they shall have contests in music and gymnastics, and in horsemanship, in honor of the dead. These are the honors which shall be given to those who at the examination are found blameless; but if any of them, trusting to the scrutiny being over, should, after the judgment has been given, manifest the wickedness of human nature, let the law ordain that he who pleases shall indict him, and let the cause be tried in the following manner. In the first place, the court shall be composed of the guardians of the law, and to them the surviving examiners shall be added, as well as the court of select judges; and let the pursuer lay his indictment in this form—he shall say that so-and-so is unworthy of the prize of virtue and of his office; and if the defendant be convicted let him be deprived of his office, and of the burial, and of the other honors given him. But if the prosecutor do not obtain the fifth part of the votes, let him, if he be of the first class, pay twelve minae, and eight if he be of the second class, and six if he be of the third class, and two minae if he be of the fourth class.

The so-called decision of Rhadamanthus is worthy of all admiration. He knew that the men of his own time believed and had no doubt that there were Gods, which was a

reasonable belief in those days, because most men were the sons of Gods, and according to tradition he was one himself. He appears to have thought that he ought to commit judgment to no man, but to the Gods only, and in this way suits were simply and speedily decided by him. For he made the two parties take an oath respecting the points in dispute, and so got rid of the matter speedily and safely. But now that a certain portion of mankind do not believe at all in the existence of the Gods, and others imagine that they have no care of us, and the opinion of most men, and of the worst men, is that in return for a small sacrifice and a few flattering words they will be their accomplices in purloining large sums and save them from many terrible punishments, the way of Rhadamanthus is no longer suited to the needs of justice; for as the opinions of men about the Gods are changed, the laws should also be changed; —in the granting of suits a rational legislation ought to do away with the oaths of the parties on either side—he who obtains leave to bring an action should write down the charges, but should not add an oath; and the defendant in like manner should give his denial to the magistrates in writing, and not swear; for it is a dreadful thing to know, when many lawsuits are going on in a state, that almost half the people who meet one another quite unconcernedly at the public meals and in other companies and relations of private life are perjured. Let the law, then, be as follows : —A judge who is about to give judgment shall take an oath, and he who is choosing magistrates for the state shall either vote on oath or with a voting tablet which he brings from a temple; so too the judge of dances and of all music, and the superintendents and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian contests, and any matters in which, as far as men can judge, there is nothing to be gained by a false oath; but all cases in which a denial confirmed by an oath clearly results in a great advantage to

the taker of the oath, shall be decided without the oath of the parties to the suit, and the presiding judges shall not permit either of them to use an oath for the sake of persuading, nor to call down curses on himself and his race, nor to use unseemly supplications or womanish laments. But they shall ever be teaching and learning what is just in auspicious words; and he who does otherwise shall be supposed to speak beside the point, and the judges shall again bring him back to the question at issue. On the other hand, strangers in their dealings with strangers shall as at present have power to give and receive oaths, for they will not often grow old in the city or leave a fry of young ones like themselves to be the sons and heirs of the land.

As to the initiation of private suits, let the manner of deciding causes between all citizens be the same as in cases in which any freeman is disobedient to the state in minor matters, of which the penalty is not stripes, imprisonment, or death. But as regards attendance at choruses or processions or other shows, and as regards public services, whether the celebration of sacrifice in peace, or the payment of contributions in war—in all these cases, first comes the necessity of providing a remedy for the loss; and by those who will not obey, there shall be security given to the officers whom the city and the law empower to exact the sum due; and if they forfeit their security, let the goods which they have pledged be sold and the money given to the city; but if they ought to pay a larger sum, the several magistrates shall impose upon the disobedient a suitable penalty, and bring them before the court, until they are willing to do what they are ordered.

Now a state which makes money from the cultivation of the soil only, and has no foreign trade, must consider what it will do about the emigration of its own people to other countries, and the reception of strangers from elsewhere.

About these matters the legislator has to consider, and he will begin by trying to persuade men as far as he can. The intercourse of cities with one another is apt to create a confusion of manners; strangers are always suggesting novelties to strangers. When states are well governed by good laws the mixture causes the greatest possible injury; but seeing that most cities are the reverse of well-ordered, the confusion which arises in them from the reception of strangers, and from the citizens themselves rushing off into other cities, when anyone either young or old desires to travel anywhere abroad at whatever time, is of no consequence. On the other hand, the refusal of states to receive others, and for their own citizens never to go to other places, is an utter impossibility, and to the rest of the world is likely to appear ruthless and uncivilized; it is a practice adopted by people who use harsh words, such as xenelasia or banishment of strangers, and who have harsh and morose ways, as men think. And to be thought or not to be thought well of by the rest of the world is no light matter; for the many are not so far wrong in their judgment of who are bad and who are good, as they are removed from the nature of virtue in themselves. Even bad men have a divine instinct which guesses rightly, and very many who are utterly depraved form correct notions and judgments of the differences between the good and bad. And the generality of cities are quite right in exhorting us to value a good reputation in the world, for there is no truth greater and more important than this—that he who is really good (I am speaking of the man who would be perfect) seeks for reputation with, but not without, the reality of goodness. And our Cretan colony ought also to acquire the fairest and noblest reputation for virtue from other men; and there is every reason to expect that, if the reality answers to the idea, she will be one of the few well-ordered cities which the sun

and the other Gods behold. Wherefore, in the matter of journeys to other countries and the reception of strangers, we enact as follows: —In the first place, let no one be allowed to go anywhere at all into a foreign country who is less than forty years of age; and no one shall go in a private capacity, but only in some public one, as a herald, or on an embassy, or on a sacred mission. Going abroad on an expedition or in war is not to be included among travels of the class authorized by the state. To Apollo at Delphi and to Zeus at Olympia and to Nemea and to the Isthmus, citizens should be sent to take part in the sacrifices and games there dedicated to the Gods; and they should send as many as possible, and the best and fairest that can be found, and they will make the city renowned at holy meetings in time of peace, procuring a glory which shall be the converse of that which is gained in war; and when they come home they shall teach the young that the institutions of other states are inferior to their own. And they shall send spectators of another sort, if they have the consent of the guardians, being such citizens as desire to look a little more at leisure at the doings of other men; and these no law shall hinder. For a city which has no experience of good and bad men or intercourse with them, can never be thoroughly and perfectly civilized, nor, again, can the citizens of a city properly observe the laws by habit only, and without an intelligent understanding of them. And there always are in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities. These are they whom the citizens of a well-ordered city should be ever seeking out, going forth over sea and over land to find him who is incorruptible—that he may establish more firmly institutions in his own state which are good already, and amend what is deficient; for without this examination and enquiry a city will never

continue perfect any more than if the examination is ill-conducted.

Clinias/ How can we have an examination and also a good one?

Athenian Stranger/ In this way: —In the first place, our spectator shall be of not less than fifty years of age; he must be a man of reputation, especially in war, if he is to exhibit to other cities a model of the guardians of the law, but when he is more than sixty years of age he shall no longer continue in his office of spectator. And when he has carried on his inspection during as many out of the ten years of his office as he pleases, on his return home let him go to the assembly of those who review the laws. This shall be a mixed body of young and old men, who shall be required to meet daily between the hour of dawn and the rising of the sun. They shall consist, in the first place, of the priests who have obtained the rewards of virtue; and, in the second place, of guardians of the law, the ten eldest being chosen; the general superintendent of education shall also be a member, as well the last appointed as those who have been released from the office; and each of them shall take with him as his companion a young man, whomsoever he chooses, between the ages of thirty and forty. These shall be always holding conversation and discourse about the laws of their own city or about any specially good ones which they may hear to be existing elsewhere; also about kinds of knowledge which may appear to be of use and will throw light upon the examination, or of which the want will make the subject of laws dark and uncertain to them. Any knowledge of this sort which the elders approve, the younger men shall learn with all diligence; and if anyone of those who have been invited appear to be unworthy, the whole assembly shall blame him who invited him. The rest of the city shall watch over those among the young men who distinguish themselves, having

an eye upon them, and especially honoring them if they succeed, but dishonoring them above the rest if they turn out to be inferior. This is the assembly to which he who has visited the institutions of other men, on his return home shall straightway go, and if he have discovered anyone who has anything to say about the enactment of laws or education or nurture, or if he have himself made any observations, let him communicate his discoveries to the whole assembly. And if he be seen to have come home neither better nor worse, let him be praised at any rate for his enthusiasm; and if he be much better, let him be praised so much the more; and not only while he lives but after his death let the assembly honor him with fitting honors. But if on his return home he appear to have been corrupted, pretending to be wise when he is not, let him hold no communication with anyone, whether young or old; and if he will hearken to the rulers, then he shall be permitted to live as a private individual; but if he will not, let him die, if he be convicted in a court of law of interfering about education and the laws. And if he deserve to be indicted, and none of the magistrates indict him, let that be counted as a disgrace to them when the rewards of virtue are decided.

Let such be the character of the person who goes abroad, and let him go abroad under these conditions. In the next place, the stranger who comes from abroad should be received in a friendly spirit. Now there are four kinds of strangers, of whom we must make some mention—the first is he who comes and stays throughout the summer; this class are like birds of passage, taking wing in pursuit of commerce, and flying over the sea to other cities, while the season lasts; he shall be received in market-places and harbors and public buildings, near the city but outside, by those magistrates who are appointed to superintend these matters; and they shall take care that a stranger, whoever

he be, duly receives justice; but he shall not be allowed to make any innovation. They shall hold the intercourse with him which is necessary, and this shall be as little as possible. The second kind is just a spectator who comes to see with his eyes and hear with his ears the festivals of the Muses; such ought to have entertainment provided them at the temples by hospitable persons, and the priests and ministers of the temples should see and attend to them. But they should not remain more than a reasonable time; let them see and hear that for the sake of which they came, and then go away, neither having suffered nor done any harm. The priests shall be their judges, if any of them receive or do any wrong up to the sum of fifty drachmae, but if any greater charge be brought, in such cases the suit shall come before the wardens of the agora. The third kind of stranger is he who comes on some public business from another land, and is to be received with public honors. He is to be received only by the generals and commanders of horse and foot, and the host by whom he is entertained, in conjunction with the Prytanes, shall have the sole charge of what concerns him. There is a fourth class of persons answering to our spectators, who come from another land to look at ours. In the first place, such visits will be rare, and the visitor should be at least fifty years of age; he may possibly be wanting to see something that is rich and rare in other states, or himself to show something in like manner to another city. Let such an one, then, go unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich, being one of them himself: let him go, for example, to the house of the superintendent of education, confident that he is a fitting guest of such a host, or let him go to the house of some of those who have gained the prize of virtue and hold discourse with them, both learning from them, and also teaching them; and when he has seen and heard all, he shall depart, as a friend taking leave of friends, and be honored

by them with gifts and suitable tributes of respect. These are the customs, according to which our city should receive all strangers of either sex who come from other countries, and should send forth her own citizens, showing respect to Zeus, the God of hospitality, not forbidding strangers at meals and sacrifices, as is the manner which prevails among the children of the Nile, nor driving them away by savage proclamations. When a man becomes surety, let him give the security in a distinct form, acknowledging the whole transaction in a written document, and in the presence of not less than three witnesses if the sum be under a thousand drachmae, and of not less than five witnesses if the sum be above a thousand drachmae. The agent of a dishonest or untrustworthy seller shall himself be responsible; both the agent and the principal shall be equally liable. If a person wishes to find anything in the house of another, he shall enter naked, or wearing only a short tunic and without a girdle, having first taken an oath by the customary Gods that he expects to find it there; he shall then make his search, and the other shall throw open his house and allow him to search things both sealed and unsealed. And if a person will not allow the searcher to make his search, he who is prevented shall go to law with him, estimating the value of the goods after which he is searching, and if the other be convicted he shall pay twice the value of the article. If the master be absent from home, the dwellers in the house shall let him search the unsealed property, and on the sealed property the searcher shall set another seal, and shall appoint anyone whom he likes to guard them during five days; and if the master of the house be absent during a longer time, he shall take with him the wardens of the city, and so make his search, opening the sealed property as well as the unsealed, and then, together with the members of the family and the wardens of the city, he shall seal them up

again as they were before. There shall be a limit of time in the case of disputed things, and he who has had possession of them during a certain time shall no longer be liable to be disturbed. As to houses and lands there can be no dispute in this state of ours; but if a man has any other possessions which he has used and openly shown in the city and in the agora and in the temples, and no one has put in a claim to them, and someone says that he was looking for them during this time, and the possessor is proved to have made no concealment, if they have continued for a year, the one having the goods and the other looking for them, the claim of the seeker shall not be allowed after the expiration of the year; or if he does not use or show the lost property in the market or in the city, but only in the country, and no one offers himself as the owner during five years, at the expiration of the five years the claim shall be barred forever after; or if he uses them in the city but within the house, then the appointed time of claiming the goods shall be three years, or ten years if he has them in the country in private. And if he has them in another land, there shall be no limit of time or prescription, but whenever the owner finds them he may claim them.

If anyone prevents another by force from being present at a trial, whether a principal party or his witnesses; if the person prevented be a slave, whether his own or belonging to another, the suit shall be incomplete and invalid; but if he who is prevented be a freeman, besides the suit being incomplete, the other who has prevented him shall be imprisoned for a year, and shall be prosecuted for kidnapping by anyone who pleases. And if anyone hinders by force a rival competitor in gymnastic or music, or any other sort of contest, from being present at the contest, let him who has a mind inform the presiding judges, and they shall liberate him who is desirous of competing; and if they

are not able, and he who hinders the other from competing wins the prize, then they shall give the prize of victory to him who is prevented, and inscribe him as the conqueror in any temples which he pleases; and he who hinders the other shall not be permitted to make any offering or inscription having reference to that contest, and in any case he shall be liable for damages, whether he be defeated or whether he conquer.

If anyone knowingly receives anything which has been stolen, he shall undergo the same punishment as the thief, and if a man receives an exile he shall be punished with death. Every man should regard the friend and enemy of the state as his own friend and enemy; and if anyone makes peace or war with another on his own account, and without the authority of the state, he, like the receiver of the exile, shall undergo the penalty of death. And if any fraction of the city declare war or peace against any, the generals shall indict the authors of this proceeding, and if they are convicted death shall be the penalty. Those who serve their country ought to serve without receiving gifts, and there ought to be no excusing or approving the saying, 'Men should receive gifts as the reward of good, but not of evil deeds'; for to know which we are doing, and to stand fast by our knowledge, is no easy matter. The safest course is to obey the law which says, 'Do no service for a bribe' and let him who disobeys, if he be convicted, simply die. With a view to taxation, for various reasons, every man ought to have had his property valued: and the tribesmen should likewise bring a register of the yearly produce to the wardens of the country, that in this way there may be two valuations; and the public officers may use annually whichever on consideration they deem the best, whether they prefer to take a certain portion of the whole value, or of the annual

revenue, after subtracting what is paid to the common tables.

Touching offerings to the Gods, a moderate man should observe moderation in what he offers. Now the land and the hearth of the house of all men is sacred to all Gods; wherefore let no man dedicate them a second time to the Gods. Gold and silver, whether possessed by private persons or in temples, are in other cities provocative of envy, and ivory, the product of a dead body, is not a proper offering; brass and iron, again, are instruments of war; but of wood let a man bring what offering he likes, provided it be a single block, and in like manner of stone, to the public temples; of woven work let him not offer more than one woman can execute in a month. White is a color suitable to the Gods, especially in woven works, but dyes should only be used for the adornments of war. The most divine of gifts are birds and images, and they should be such as one painter can execute in a single day. And let all other offerings follow a similar rule.

Now that the whole city has been divided into parts of which the nature and number have been described, and laws have been given about all the most important contracts as far as this was possible, the next thing will be to have justice done. The first of the courts shall consist of elected judges, who shall be chosen by the plaintiff and the defendant in common: these shall be called arbiters rather than judges. And in the second court there shall be judges of the villages and tribes corresponding to the twelvefold division of the land, and before these the litigants shall go to contend for greater damages, if the suit be not decided before the first judges; the defendant, if he be defeated the second time, shall pay a fifth more than the damages mentioned in the indictment; and if he find fault with his judges and would try a third time, let him carry the suit before the select

judges, and if he be again defeated, let him pay the whole of the damages and half as much again. And the plaintiff, if when defeated before the first judges he persist in going on to the second, shall if he wins receive in addition to the damages a fifth part more, and if defeated he shall pay a like sum; but if he is not satisfied with the previous decision, and will insist on proceeding to a third court, then if he win he shall receive from the defendant the amount of the damages and, as I said before, half as much again, and the plaintiff, if he lose, shall pay half of the damages claimed. Now the assignment by lot of judges to courts and the completion of the number of them, and the appointment of servants to the different magistrates, and the times at which the several causes should be heard, and the votings and delays, and all the things that necessarily concern suits, and the order of causes, and the time in which answers have to be put in and parties are to appear—of these and other things akin to these we have indeed already spoken, but there is no harm in repeating what is right twice or thrice: —All lesser and easier matters which the elder legislator has omitted may be supplied by the younger one. Private courts will be sufficiently regulated in this way, and the public and state courts, and those which the magistrates must use in the administration of their several offices, exist in many other states. Many very respectable institutions of this sort have been framed by good men, and from them the guardians of the law may by reflection derive what is necessary for the order of our new state, considering and correcting them, and bringing them to the test of experience, until every detail appears to be satisfactorily determined; and then putting the final seal upon them, and making them irreversible, they shall use them forever afterwards. As to what relates to the silence of judges and the abstinence from words of evil omen and the reverse, and the different notions of the just and

good and honorable which exist in our own as compared with other states, they have been partly mentioned already, and another part of them will be mentioned hereafter as we draw near the end. To all these matters he who would be an equal judge shall justly look, and he shall possess writings about them that he may learn them. For of all kinds of knowledge the knowledge of good laws has the greatest power of improving the learner; otherwise there would be no meaning in the divine and admirable law possessing a name akin to mind (νοῦς, νόμος). And of all other words, such as the praises and censures of individuals which occur in poetry and also in prose, whether written down or uttered in daily conversation, whether men dispute about them in the spirit of contention or weakly assent to them, as is often the case—of all these the one sure test is the writings of the legislator, which the righteous judge ought to have in his mind as the antidote of all other words, and thus make himself and the city stand upright, procuring for the good the continuance and increase of justice, and for the bad, on the other hand, a conversion from ignorance and intemperance, and in general from all unrighteousness, as far as their evil minds can be healed, but to those whose web of life is in reality finished, giving death, which is the only remedy for souls in their condition, as I may say truly again and again. And such judges and chiefs of judges will be worthy of receiving praise from the whole city.

When the suits of the year are completed the following laws shall regulate their execution: —In the first place, the judge shall assign to the party who wins the suit the whole property of him who loses, with the exception of mere necessaries, and the assignment shall be made through the herald immediately after each decision in the hearing of the judges; and when the month arrives following the month in which the courts are sitting, (unless the gainer of the suit

has been previously satisfied,) the court shall follow up the case, and hand over to the winner the goods of the loser; but if they find that he has not the means of paying, and the sum deficient is not less than a drachma, the insolvent person shall not have any right of going to law with any other man until he have satisfied the debt of the winning party; but other persons shall still have the right of bringing suits against him. And if anyone after he is condemned refuses to acknowledge the authority which condemned him, let the magistrates who are thus deprived of their authority bring him before the court of the guardians of the law, and if he be cast, let him be punished with death, as a subverter of the whole state and of the laws.

Thus a man is born and brought up, and after this manner he begets and brings up his own children, and has his share of dealings with other men, and suffers if he has done wrong to anyone, and receives satisfaction if he has been wronged, and so at length in due time he grows old under the protection of the laws, and his end comes in the order of nature. Concerning the dead of either sex, the religious ceremonies which may fittingly be performed, whether appertaining to the Gods of the under-world or of this, shall be decided by the interpreters with absolute authority. Their sepulchers are not to be in places which are fit for cultivation, and there shall be no monuments in such spots, either large or small, but they shall occupy that part of the country which is naturally adapted for receiving and concealing the bodies of the dead with as little hurt as possible to the living. No man, living or dead, shall deprive the living of the sustenance which the earth, their foster-parent, is naturally inclined to provide for them. And let not the mound be piled higher than would be the work of five men completed in five days; nor shall the stone which is placed over the spot be larger than would be sufficient to

receive the praises of the dead included in four heroic lines. Nor shall the laying out of the dead in the house continue for a longer time than is sufficient to distinguish between him who is in a trance only and him who is really dead, and speaking generally, the third day after death will be a fair time for carrying out the body to the sepulcher. Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and that even in life what makes each one of us to be what we are is only the soul; and that the body follows us about in the likeness of each of us, and therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are quite rightly said to be our shades or images; for the true and immortal being of each one of us which is called the soul goes on her way to other Gods, before them to give an account—which is an inspiring hope to the good, but very terrible to the bad, as the laws of our fathers tell us; and they also say that not much can be done in the way of helping a man after he is dead. But the living—he should be helped by all his kindred, that while in life he may be the holiest and justest of men, and after death may have no great sins to be punished in the world below. If this be true, a man ought not to waste his substance under the idea that all this lifeless mass of flesh which is in process of burial is connected with him; he should consider that the son, or brother, or the beloved one, whoever he may be, whom he thinks he is laying in the earth, has gone away to complete and fulfill his own destiny, and that his duty is rightly to order the present, and to spend moderately on the lifeless altar of the Gods below. But the legislator does not intend moderation to be taken in the sense of meanness. Let the law, then, be as follows: —The expenditure on the entire funeral of him who is of the highest class, shall not exceed five minae; and for him who is of the second class, three minae, and for him who is of the third class, two minae, and

for him who is of the fourth class, one mina, will be a fair limit of expense. The guardians of the law ought to take especial care of the different ages of life, whether childhood, or manhood, or any other age. And at the end of all, let there be someone guardian of the law presiding, who shall be chosen by the friends of the deceased to superintend, and let it be glory to him to manage with fairness and moderation what relates to the dead, and a discredit to him if they are not well managed. Let the laying out and other ceremonies be in accordance with custom, but to the statesman who adopts custom as his law we must give way in certain particulars. It would be monstrous for example that he should command any man to weep or abstain from weeping over the dead; but he may forbid cries of lamentation, and not allow the voice of the mourner to be heard outside the house; also, he may forbid the bringing of the dead body into the open streets, or the processions of mourners in the streets, and may require that before daybreak they should be outside the city. Let these, then, be our laws relating to such matters, and let him who obeys be free from penalty; but he who disobeys even a single guardian of the law shall be punished by them all with a fitting penalty. Other modes of burial, or again the denial of burial, which is to be refused in the case of robbers of temples and parricides and the like, have been devised and are embodied in the preceding laws, so that now our work of legislation is pretty nearly at an end; but in all cases the end does not consist in doing something or acquiring something or establishing something, —the end will be attained and finally accomplished, when we have provided for the perfect and lasting continuance of our institutions; until then our creation is incomplete.

Clinias/ That is very good, Stranger; but I wish you would tell me more clearly what you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ O Cleinias, many things of old time were well said and sung; and the saying about the Fates was one of them.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ The saying that Lachesis or the giver of the lots is the first of them, and that Clotho or the spinster is the second of them, and that Atropos or the unchanging one is the third of them; and that she is the preserver of the things which we have spoken, and which have been compared in a figure to things woven by fire, they both (i.e. Atropos and the fire) producing the quality of unchangeableness. I am speaking of the things which in a state and government give not only health and salvation to the body, but law, or rather preservation of the law, in the soul; and, if I am not mistaken, this seems to be still wanting in our laws: we have still to see how we can implant in them this irreversible nature.

Clinias/ It will be no small matter if we can only discover how such a nature can be implanted in anything.

Athenian Stranger/ But it certainly can be; so much I clearly see.

Clinias/ Then let us not think of desisting until we have imparted this quality to our laws; for it is ridiculous, after a great deal of labor has been spent, to place a thing at last on an insecure foundation.

Megillus/ I approve of your suggestion, and am quite of the same mind with you.

Clinias/ Very good: And now what, according to you, is to be the salvation of our government and of our laws, and how is it to be effected?

Athenian Stranger/ Were we not saying that there must be in our city a council which was to be of this sort: —The ten oldest guardians of the law, and all those who have

obtained prizes of virtue, were to meet in the same assembly, and the council was also to include those who had visited foreign countries in the hope of hearing something that might be of use in the preservation of the laws, and who, having come safely home, and having been tested in these same matters, had proved themselves to be worthy to take part in the assembly; —each of the members was to select some young man of not less than thirty years of age, he himself judging in the first instance whether the young man was worthy by nature and education, and then suggesting him to the others, and if he seemed to them also to be worthy they were to adopt him; but if not, the decision at which they arrived was to be kept a secret from the citizens at large, and, more especially, from the rejected candidate. The meeting of the council was to be held early in the morning, when everybody was most at leisure from all other business, whether public or private—was not something of this sort said by us before?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, returning to the council, I would say further, that if we let it down to be the anchor of the state, our city, having everything which is suitable to her, will preserve all that we wish to preserve.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Now is the time for me to speak the truth in all earnestness.

Clinias/ Well said, and I hope that you will fulfill your intention.

Athenian Stranger/ Know, Cleinias, that everything, in all that it does, has a natural savior, as of an animal the soul and the head are the chief saviors.

Clinias/ Once more, what do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ The well-being of those two is obviously the preservation of every living thing.

Clinias/ How is that?

Athenian Stranger/ The soul, besides other things, contains mind, and the head, besides other things, contains sight and hearing and the mind, mingling with the noblest of the senses, and becoming one with them, may be truly called the salvation of all.

Clinias/ Yes, quite so.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, indeed; but with what is that intellect concerned which, mingling with the senses, is the salvation of ships in storms as well as in fair weather? In a ship, when the pilot and the sailors unite their perceptions with the piloting mind, do they not save both themselves and their craft?

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ We do not want many illustrations about such matters: —What aim would the general of an army, or what aim would a physician propose to himself, if he were seeking to attain salvation?

Clinias/ Very good.

Athenian Stranger/ Does not the general aim at victory and superiority in war, and do not the physician and his assistants aim at producing health in the body?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And a physician who is ignorant about the body, that is to say, who knows not that which we just now called health, or a general who knows not victory, or any others who are ignorant of the particulars of the arts which we mentioned, cannot be said to have understanding about any of these matters.

Clinias/ They cannot.

Athenian Stranger/ And what would you say of the state? If a person proves to be ignorant of the aim to which the statesman should look, ought he, in the first place, to be called a ruler at all; and further, will he ever be able to preserve that of which he does not even know the aim?

Clinias/ Impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ And therefore, if our settlement of the country is to be perfect, we ought to have some institution, which, as I was saying, will tell what is the aim of the state, and will inform us how we are to attain this, and what law or what man will advise us to that end. Any state which has no such institution is likely to be devoid of mind and sense, and in all her actions will proceed by mere chance.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ In which, then, of the parts or institutions of the state is any such guardian power to be found? Can we say?

Clinias/ I am not quite certain, Stranger; but I have a suspicion that you are referring to the assembly which you just now said was to meet at night.

Athenian Stranger/ You understand me perfectly, Cleinias; and we must assume, as the argument implies, that this council possesses all virtue; and the beginning of virtue is not to make mistakes by guessing many things, but to look steadily at one thing, and on this to fix all our aims.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states going astray—the reason is that their legislators have such different aims; nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule of justice, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state, whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be rich, not caring whether they are the slaves of

other men or not. The tendency of others, again, is towards freedom; and some legislate with a view to two things at once, —they want to be at the same time free and the lords of other states; but the wisest men, as they deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims, and there is no one of them which they exclusively honor, and to which they would have all things look.

Clinias/ Then, Stranger, our former assertion will hold, for we were saying that laws generally should look to one thing only; and this, as we admitted, was rightly said to be virtue.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes.

Clinias/ And we said that virtue was of four kinds?

Athenian Stranger/ Quite true.

Clinias/ And that mind was the leader of the four, and that to her the three other virtues and all other things ought to have regard?

Athenian Stranger/ You follow me capitally, Cleinias, and I would ask you to follow me to the end, for we have already said that the mind of the pilot, the mind of the physician and of the general look to that one thing to which they ought to look; and now we may turn to mind political, of which, as of a human creature, we will ask a question: —O wonderful being, and to what are you looking? The physician is able to tell his single aim in life, but you, the superior, as you declare yourself to be, of all intelligent beings, when you are asked are not able to tell. Can you, Megillus, and you, Cleinias, say distinctly what is the aim of mind political, in return for the many explanations of things which I have given you?

Clinias/ We cannot, Stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see where it is to be found?

Clinias/ For example, where?

Athenian Stranger/ For example, we were saying that there are four kinds of virtue, and as there are four of them, each of them must be one.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And further, all four of them we call one; for we say that courage is virtue, and that prudence is virtue, and the same of the two others, as if they were in reality not many but one, that is, virtue.

Clinias/ Quite so.

Athenian Stranger/ There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ from one another, and have received two names, and so of the rest. But there is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and the rest of them by the single name of virtue.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. Let us distribute the subject into questions and answers.

Clinias/ Once more, what do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Ask me what is that one thing which I call virtue, and then again speak of as two, one part being courage and the other wisdom. I will tell you how that occurs: —One of them has to do with fear; in this the beasts also participate, and quite young children, —I mean courage; for a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason. But without reason there never has been, or is, or will be a wise and understanding soul; it is of a different nature.

Clinias/ That is true.

Athenian Stranger/ I have now told you in what way the two are different, and do you in return tell me in what way

they are one and the same. Suppose that I ask you in what way the four are one, and when you have answered me, you will have a right to ask of me in return in what way they are four; and then let us proceed to enquire whether in the case of things which have a name and also a definition to them, true knowledge consists in knowing the name only and not the definition. Can he who is good for anything be ignorant of all this without discredit where great and glorious truths are concerned?

Clinias/ I suppose not.

Athenian Stranger/ And is there anything greater to the legislator and the guardian of the law, and to him who thinks that he excels all other men in virtue, and has won the palm of excellence, than these very qualities of which we are now speaking, —courage, temperance, wisdom, justice?

Clinias/ How can there be anything greater?

Athenian Stranger/ And ought not the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers, the guardians of the other citizens, to excel the rest of mankind, and perfectly to show him who desires to learn and know or whose evil actions require to be punished and reproved, what is the nature of virtue and vice? Or shall some poet who has found his way into the city, or some chance person who pretends to be an instructor of youth, show himself to be better than him who has won the prize for every virtue? And can we wonder that when the guardians are not adequate in speech or action, and have no adequate knowledge of virtue, the city being unguarded should experience the common fate of cities in our day?

Clinias/ Wonder! no.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, must we do as we said? Or can we give our guardians a more precise knowledge of virtue in speech and action than the many have? or is there any way in which our city can be made to resemble the head

and senses of rational beings because possessing such a guardian power?

Clinias/ What, Stranger, is the drift of your comparison?

Athenian Stranger/ Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are not the younger guardians, who are chosen for their natural gifts, placed in the head of the state, having their souls all full of eyes, with which they look about the whole city? They keep watch and hand over their perceptions to the memory, and inform the elders of all that happens in the city; and those whom we compared to the mind, because they have many wise thoughts—that is to say, the old men—take counsel, and making use of the younger men as their ministers, and advising with them, —in this way both together truly preserve the whole state: —Shall this or some other be the order of our state? Are all our citizens to be equal in acquirements, or shall there be special persons among them who have received a more careful training and education?

Clinias/ That they should be equal, my good sir, is impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we ought to proceed to some more exact training than any which has preceded.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And must not that of which we are in need be the one to which we were just now alluding?

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Did we not say that the workman or guardian, if he be perfect in every respect, ought not only to be able to see the many aims, but he should press onward to the one? this he should know, and knowing, order all things with a view to it.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And can anyone have a more exact way of considering or contemplating anything, than the being able to look at one idea gathered from many different things?

Clinias/ Perhaps not.

Athenian Stranger/ Not 'Perhaps not' but 'Certainly not' my good sir, is the right answer. There never has been a truer method than this discovered by any man.

Clinias/ I bow to your authority, Stranger; let us proceed in the way which you propose.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, as would appear, we must compel the guardians of our divine state to perceive, in the first place, what that principle is which is the same in all the four—the same, as we affirm, in courage and in temperance, and in justice and in prudence, and which, being one, we call as we ought, by the single name of virtue. To this, my friends, we will, if you please, hold fast, and not let go until we have sufficiently explained what that is to which we are to look, whether to be regarded as one, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way. Are we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we cannot tell whether virtue is many, or four, or one? Certainly, if we take counsel among ourselves, we shall in some way contrive that this principle has a place amongst us; but if you have made up your mind that we should let the matter alone, we will.

Clinias/ We must not, Stranger, by the God of strangers I swear that we must not, for in our opinion you speak most truly; but we should like to know how you will accomplish your purpose.

Athenian Stranger/ Wait a little before you ask; and let us, first of all, be quite agreed with one another that the purpose has to be accomplished.

Clinias/ Certainly, it ought to be, if it can be.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, and about the good and the honorable, are we to take the same view? Are our guardians only to know that each of them is many, or also how and in what way they are one?

Clinias/ They must consider also in what sense they are one.

Athenian Stranger/ And are they to consider only, and to be unable to set forth what they think?

Clinias/ Certainly not; that would be the state of a slave.

Athenian Stranger/ And may not the same be said of all good things—that the true guardians of the laws ought to know the truth about them, and to be able to interpret them in words, and carry them out in action, judging of what is and of what is not well, according to nature?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Is not the knowledge of the Gods which we have set forth with so much zeal one of the noblest sorts of knowledge; —to know that they are, and know how great is their power, as far as in man lies? We do indeed excuse the mass of the citizens, who only follow the voice of the laws, but we refuse to admit as guardians any who do not labor to obtain every possible evidence that there is respecting the Gods; our city is forbidden and not allowed to choose as a guardian of the law, or to place in the select order of virtue, him who is not an inspired man, and has not labored at these things.

Clinias/ It is certainly just, as you say, that he who is indolent about such matters or incapable should be rejected, and that things honorable should be put away from him.

Athenian Stranger/ Are we assured that there are two things which lead men to believe in the Gods, as we have already stated?

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ One is the argument about the soul, which has been already mentioned—that it is the eldest and most divine of all things, to which motion attaining generation gives perpetual existence; the other was an argument from the order of the motion of the stars, and of all things under the dominion of the mind which ordered the universe. If a man look upon the world not lightly or ignorantly, there was never anyone so godless who did not experience an effect opposite to that which the many imagine. For they think that those who handle these matters by the help of astronomy, and the accompanying arts of demonstration, may become godless, because they see, as far as they can see, things happening by necessity, and not by an intelligent will accomplishing good.

Clinias/ But what is the fact?

Athenian Stranger/ Just the opposite, as I said, of the opinion which once prevailed among men, that the sun and stars are without soul. Even in those days men wondered about them, and that which is now ascertained was then conjectured by some who had a more exact knowledge of them—that if they had been things without soul, and had no mind, they could never have moved with numerical exactness so wonderful; and even at that time some ventured to hazard the conjecture that mind was the orderer of the universe. But these same persons again mistaking the nature of the soul, which they conceived to be younger and not older than the body, once more overturned the world, or rather, I should say, themselves; for the bodies which they saw moving in heaven all appeared to be full of stones, and earth, and many other lifeless substances, and to these they assigned the causes of all things. Such studies gave rise to much atheism and perplexity, and the poets took occasion to be abusive, —comparing the philosophers to she-dogs

uttering vain howlings, and talking other nonsense of the same sort. But now, as I said, the case is reversed.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ No man can be a true worshipper of the Gods who does not know these two principles—that the soul is the eldest of all things which are born, and is immortal and rules over all bodies; moreover, as I have now said several times, he who has not contemplated the mind of nature which is said to exist in the stars, and gone through the previous training, and seen the connection of music with these things, and harmonized them all with laws and institutions, is not able to give a reason of such things as have a reason. And he who is unable to acquire this in addition to the ordinary virtues of a citizen, can hardly be a good ruler of a whole state; but he should be the subordinate of other rulers. Wherefore, Cleinias and Megillus, let us consider whether we may not add to all the other laws which we have discussed this further one, —that the nocturnal assembly of the magistrates, which has also shared in the whole scheme of education proposed by us, shall be a guard set according to law for the salvation of the state. Shall we propose this?

Clinias/ Certainly, my good friend, we will if the thing is in any degree possible.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us make a common effort to gain such an object; for I too will gladly share in the attempt. Of these matters I have had much experience, and have often considered them, and I dare say that I shall be able to find others who will also help.

Clinias/ I agree, Stranger, that we should proceed along the road in which God is guiding us; and how we can proceed rightly has now to be investigated and explained.

Athenian Stranger/ O Megillus and Cleinias, about these matters we cannot legislate further until the council is constituted; when that is done, then we will determine what authority they shall have of their own; but the explanation of how this is all to be ordered would only be given rightly in a long discourse.

Clinias/ What do you mean, and what new thing is this?

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, a list would have to be made out of those who by their ages and studies and dispositions and habits are well fitted for the duty of a guardian. In the next place, it will not be easy for them to discover themselves what they ought to learn, or become the disciple of one who has already made the discovery. Furthermore, to write down the times at which, and during which, they ought to receive the several kinds of instruction, would be a vain thing; for the learners themselves do not know what is learned to advantage until the knowledge which is the result of learning has found a place in the soul of each. And so these details, although they could not be truly said to be secret, might be said to be incapable of being stated beforehand, because when stated they would have no meaning.

Clinias/ What then are we to do, Stranger, under these circumstances?

Athenian Stranger/ As the proverb says, the answer is no secret, but open to all of us: —We must risk the whole on the chance of throwing, as they say, thrice six or thrice ace, and I am willing to share with you the danger by stating and explaining to you my views about education and nurture, which is the question coming to the surface again. The danger is not a slight or ordinary one, and I would advise you, Cleinias, in particular, to see to the matter; for if you order rightly the city of the Magnetes, or whatever name God

may give it, you will obtain the greatest glory; or at any rate you will be thought the most courageous of men in the estimation of posterity. Dear companions, if this our divine assembly can only be established, to them we will hand over the city; none of the present company of legislators, as I may call them, would hesitate about that. And the state will be perfected and become a waking reality, which a little while ago we attempted to create as a dream and in idea only, mingling together reason and mind in one image, in the hope that our citizens might be duly mingled and rightly educated; and being educated, and dwelling in the citadel of the land, might become perfect guardians, such as we have never seen in all our previous life, by reason of the saving virtue which is in them.

Megillus/ Dear Cleinias, after all that has been said, either we must detain the Stranger, and by supplications and in all manner of ways make him share in the foundation of the city, or we must give up the undertaking.

Clinias/ Very true, Megillus; and you must join with me in detaining him.

Megillus/ I will.

The Laws.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

An Athenian Guest, Clinias of Crete, and

Megillus of Lacedæmon.

Book 1

Athenian Stranger/ Has a god, or some man, obtained from you, O guests, the fame of being the cause of the laying down of laws?

Clinias/ A god, O guest, a god, to say what is most just; with us indeed, Zeus; but amongst the Lacedæmonians, from whose country is this person here, I think, they mention Apollo. Is it not so?

Megillus/ It is.

Athenian Stranger/ Say you then, according to Homer, that Minos did constantly on the ninth year go to a conference with his father, and according to the oracular responses given by him, lay down the laws found in your states?

Clinias/ It is so said by us; and, likewise, that his brother Rhadamanthus—for you have heard the name—was the most just of men. Now we Cretans would say that he obtained this praise from his distributing at that time things pertaining to justice in an upright manner.

Athenian Stranger/ And honorable is the renown, and very becoming to the son of Zeus. But since both you and this person here have been brought up in legal institutions of this kind, I expect it will not be unpleasant for us at present to have a dissertation, by speaking and hearing respecting a form of government and laws, and at the same

time to be taking a walk. Now the way from Cnossus to the cavern and temple of Zeus is, as we hear, altogether sufficient, and the resting-places along the road are, as is proper, during the present sultry weather, shady amongst lofty trees; and it will be suited to our age to rest in them frequently, and by relieving each other during the conversation, to go in this way through the whole walk with ease.

Clinias/ There are indeed, O guest, to a person as he goes on, in the groves cypress-trees of wondrous height and beauty, and meadows, in which while we rest, we may discourse.

Athenian Stranger/ Speak you correctly?

Clinias/ Entirely so; and we shall say so more, on seeing them. But let us go with a good fortune.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. But tell me, why has the law ordained for your joint-feasts gymnastic exercises and the handling of arms?

Clinias/ I conceive, O guest, that it is easy even for everyone to apprehend these customs of ours. For you see that the nature of the whole country of Crete is not a plain, like that of Thessaly. On this account, they make use of horses more; but we of running. Now as this irregular ground is more adapted to the exercise of foot-races, it is necessary for a person in such a case to have light arms, and not to run holding what has a weight. Now the lightness of bows and arrows seems to be fitted for this. All these therefore have been adopted by us in war; and all this has the legislator, as it appears to me, looking to this point, ordained; especially since he nearly seems to have instituted the joint feasts, through perceiving how all persons, when engaged in war, are then compelled by the thing itself, for the sake of their own defense, to feast at that time together.

In truth, he appears to me to have condemned the multitude of stupidity, for their not learning that there is constantly through life a war to all with all states. Now if during the time of war it was necessary to feast in common for the sake of defense, and for certain persons, both rulers and ruled, to be drawn up as their defenders, this should be done in the time of peace likewise. For that, which most men call peace, is only a name; but in reality there is a war, not proclaimed by a herald, according to nature, to all against all states. For by thus considering, you will almost discover, that the Cretan legislator has, looking to war, ordained for us all institutions both public and private, and ordered us to guard the laws in such a manner, as if nothing else were useful, either of possessions or pursuits, unless one became victorious in war, and all the goods of the vanquished became the property of the victors.

Athenian Stranger/ You appear to me, O guest, to have been well practiced in seeing through the laws of Crete. But tell me still more clearly this. For by the definition you have laid down of a well-regulated state, you seem to me to say that one ought to administer it, so arranged in order, as to be victorious over the rest of states in war. Is it not so?

Clinias/ Just so; and I think it will seem so to this person here.

Megillus/ For how can any Lacedæmonians whatever, O thou divine man, answer otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Whether, then, is this right in the case of states towards states, but otherwise in the case of one village towards another?

Clinias/ By no means otherwise.

Athenian Stranger/ But it is the same?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, is it the same in the case of one family towards another family, and in the case of one man towards another?

Clinias/ The same.

Athenian Stranger/ But in the case of a person towards himself, shall we consider him in that of an enemy towards an enemy? Or, how shall we say?

Clinias/ O Athenian guest, —for I am not willing to call you Attic, because you appear to me rather to deserve to be called after the name of the goddess Minerva, —you have, by correctly carrying back the reasoning to its principle, made it clearer; so that you will more easily discover that it has just now been rightly said, that all persons are enemies to all, both publicly and privately, and each individual to himself.

Athenian Stranger/ How hast thou, O wonderful man, said this?

Clinias/ And these, too, O guest; it is the first and best of all victories for a man to conquer himself; but to be vanquished by himself is of all things the most shameful and vile. For these words signify that there is a war in each of us against ourselves.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then turn back our discourse. For, since each of us is one better and another worse than himself, shall we say that a family, and a village, and a state, have this same thing in them, or not?

Clinias/ Do you mean that one is better than itself in some things, and the other worse?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes.

Clinias/ Concerning this too you have rightly inquired. For a thing of this kind occurs very and much, not the least in states. For, in the case of those, in which the better conquer the multitude and the worse, such a city would be

correctly said to be better than itself, and be most justly praised for such a victory. But the contrary where the contrary occurs.

Athenian Stranger/ Now the question, whether the worse is at any time more excellent than the better, let us lay aside; for it would be a long discussion; but for the present I understand what is asserted by you; that sometimes citizens of the same family and of the same city, being unjust and numerous, will, by coming together, forcibly attack the just, fewer in number, and enslave them; and that, when they conquer, the city may be justly said to be inferior to itself, and at the same time depraved; but, when they are conquered, better than itself, and good.

Clinias/ What is now said, guest, is very strange; but yet it is most necessary to confess it.

Athenian Stranger/ Hold then, and let us again consider this. Many brothers may surely be born from one man and from one woman. Nor is it at all wonderful that the greater part of them should be unjust, and the lesser just.

Clinias/ It is not.

Athenian Stranger/ Nor will it be proper for me and you to investigate this, that, when the base vanquish, both the family and every kind of relationship may be called inferior to themselves, but better than themselves, when the base are vanquished. For we do not investigate these things at present for the sake of some elegance or inelegance in words, according to the discourse of many, but for the sake of discovering what is a natural rectitude and error in the case of laws.

Clinias/ You speak most truly, O guest.

Megillus/ To me too so much appears to be well said.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us look into this likewise. Can anyone become a judge of the brothers just spoken of?

Clinias/ Doubtless.

Athenian Stranger/ Which then will be the better judge? He, who cuts off such of them as are bad, and orders the good to govern themselves? or he, who causes the good to govern, but suffers the bad to live, being willing to be governed? But let us mention a third judge, if such there be, with respect to virtue; who, receiving a single clan at difference with itself, will not destroy any person; but, after having reconciled the parties, will lay down for them laws relating to each other, and be able so to guard them, that they may be on friendly terms.

Clinias/ Such a judge and legislator would be the better by far.

Athenian Stranger/ And he would frame laws for them, looking to a purpose contrary to war.

Clinias/ This indeed is true.

Athenian Stranger/ But what is he, who brings a state together? Would he, by looking to external war, better put in order its life than by looking to the wars produced constantly within itself, which is called sedition? which everyone would particularly wish not to occur in his own state; and when it has occurred, to be released from it as quickly as possible?

Clinias/ By looking, it is evident, to this the latter.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether would anyone choose that peace should result from sedition, through one party being destroyed, and the other victorious, or that, by peace and friendship resulting from a reconciliation, they should necessarily direct their attention to external wars?

Clinias/ Everyone would rather wish it to happen to his own state in this way than in that.

Athenian Stranger/ Would not a legislator too in a similar manner?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Would not everyone lay down all laws for the sake of that which is best?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But neither war nor sedition is the best of things, —for to be in want of these is a thing to be prayed for—but peace with, and kindly feelings towards, each other. Moreover, for a state to vanquish itself, is not, it seems, one of the best, but of necessary things; just as if anyone should think a body in sickness would, when meeting with medicinal cleansing, be then doing the best, but should pay no attention to the body, which needed the cleansing not at all. Should anyone in like manner have his thoughts directed to the happiness of a state or an individual, he will never become correctly a statesman, while looking only and primarily to external war; nor will he be an accurate legislator, unless he lays down laws respecting war for the sake of peace, rather than laws respecting peace, for the sake of war.

Clinias/ This reasoning, O guest, appears somehow to have been stated correctly. But still, I wonder whether the institutions existing with us, and still more those relating to Lacedæmon, have not given rise to all care for the sake of those things.

Athenian Stranger/ This may perhaps be the case. We ought not, however, to contest the matter at present in a harsh manner; but quietly to ask questions, as both we and they have especially an interest in things of this kind. Do ye then keep pace with my discourse. In the first place, we will place before you Tyrtæus—who was by birth an Athenian, but afterwards a fellow-citizen with these persons here; and who has the most of all men been engaged on these points—where he says, “I would not bear in recollection the man, nor

hold him in any account, not though he were the most wealthy of men, and possessed many good things,"—and he enumerates nearly all, —"who is not always the best in the affairs of war." For you have surely heard of his poetry. For this person here is, I think, saturated with them.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Clinias/ And they have reached us likewise, having been brought from Lacedæmon.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, let us interrogate in common this poet somehow in this fashion. Thou, most divine poet, Tyrtæus, —for you appear to us to be wise and good, because you have celebrated excellently well those, who excel in war, —and as myself, and this person here, and Clinias the Cnossian, happen, as we seem, to agree very much with you in this particular, —we wish to know clearly, whether we are speaking about the same men or not, —do tell us, whether you too think, as we do, that there are two kinds of war? Or how say you? To this I think that a man, much inferior to Tyrtæus, would say the truth, that there are two kinds; one, which we now call sedition, which is the most grievous of all wars, as we just now asserted; but the other kind of war, which we employ in our differences with those out of the state, and of a different tribe, we will lay down, as being milder than the other.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Come now, inform us what men, and for what kind of war, have you so transcendently praised some and blamed others. For you appear to have praised those engaged in a foreign war. For you have said in your poems thus—that you by no means endure those;

> Who dare not upon gory slaughter look,
> Nor with the hand, close standing, clutch the foe.

Hence, as an inference, we should say that you, Tyrtæus, are praising, it seems, those, who have been eminently conspicuous in a foreign and external war. Surely he would say this and confess it.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But we, although these are good, assert that those are far better, who are conspicuously the best in the greatest war. We have too the poet Theognis as a witness, a citizen of Megara in Sicily, who say;

> The man, who, when the strife of party's high,
> Is faithful, is in gold and silver worth
> His weight.

Now, such a one we say is in a more difficult war altogether superior to the other, by nearly as much as justice, temperance, and prudence, when coming to the same point, are superior to fortitude by itself alone. For no one can be found faithful and sound in seditions, without the whole of virtue. But, as Tyrtæus says, there are a great number of mercenaries who fight standing firmly with their legs apart, and die willingly in battle—among whom are the most bold, and unjust, and insulting, and nearly the most thoughtless of all men except some very few. But to what does this story tend? And what did he wish to render clear, when he said this? It was evidently this above all; that both he, who laid down laws here from Zeus, and everyone else, from whom there is even a little advantage, will lay down his laws, while always looking for the most part to nothing else than the greatest virtue. But it is, as Theognis says, a faithfulness in things of dread, which a person may denominate perfect justice; but that, which Tyrtæus has praised so highly, is indeed beautiful, and opportunely celebrated by the poet, yet it may most rightly be called the fourth in number and in the power of being in honor.

Clinias/ Shall we, O guest, throw our legislator away amongst the remote legislators?

Athenian Stranger/ Not him indeed, most excellent man, but ourselves, should we imagine, that both Lycurgus and Minos laid down their laws in Lacedæmon and here, looking especially to war.

Clinias/ What then, and how ought we to say?

Athenian Stranger/ As truth and justice, I think, require those to speak, who discourse about a divine republic. Not looking to some part of virtue, and that the most trifling, but to the whole of virtue, he laid down, and according to their species to seek the laws, not what those seek who place species before those now—for that, of which each person is in want, does he laying aside seek; one, the laws about inheritances; another, those about sole heiresses; another, those about an assault; and others, about ten thousand other matters of a similar kind. But we assert that the inquiry about laws is the business of those, who properly inquire, as we have just now begun to do. And I am in every way delighted with your attempt to give an explanation on the subject of laws. For it is right to begin from virtue, by asserting that for its sake a person has laid down laws. But when you said that the legislator had laid down all laws with reference to a part of virtue, and this too the least, you did not appear to me to speak correctly any longer; and on this account did I speak all this subsequent speech. Do you, then, wish me to say in what manner I am still willing for you to speak in detail, and myself to hear.

Clinias/ Entirely so, O guest.

Athenian Stranger/ It is proper to assert that the laws of the Cretans are not vainly held in very great esteem by all the Greeks. For they are in a correct state by their making those, who use them, happy; for they impart every good. Now

there are two kinds of good; one human, and the other divine; and the former hangs upon the divine; and if any state receives the greater, it possesses likewise the lesser; but if not, it is deprived of both. But the lesser are those, of which health is the leader, beauty the second in order, and strength for running, and all other movements of the body, the third; but the fourth is, Plutus, wealth, not blind indeed, but seeing acutely, if it follows prudence. Now that which is the first good and the leader of the divine, is prudence; but the second after intellect, is a temperate habit of the soul; from these two mixed up with fortitude, the third in order will be justice; and the fourth, fortitude. Now all these are naturally arranged before those, and so must they be arranged by the lawgiver; and after these he must enjoin upon the citizens the other ordinances that look to these. But of these the human look to the divine, and all the divine to their leader intellect. And he ought to have a care respecting marriages contracted by each other, and after these in the procreation and education of children, such as are male and female, and likewise of those still young, and of those advancing in years to old age, and to hold correctly in honor and dishonor; directing, in all the intercourse of these persons, his attention to their pains, and pleasures, and desires, and eagerness in all matters of love; and acting as a guard over them to blame and praise correctly through the laws themselves. In the case of anger and fear, and what perturbations soever in the soul arise through misfortune, and whatever escapes from them exist in prosperity; and whatever sufferings happen to men through disease, or wars, or poverty, or the contraries to these, in all such occasions he must teach and define what is beautiful, or not, in the arrangement of each. And after this, it is necessary for the legislator to watch over the property and expenditure of the citizens, in whatever way it may take place, and the

unions with and separations from each other in all persons acting with their free will or without it; and to have an eye to what is just or not, and in what things it exists or is wanting, and to distribute honors to those who obey the laws, but to inflict upon those, who do not obey, punishments ordained by law; until, having reached the end of all polity, he shall perceive in what manner it is meet for the burial of the dead to take place, and what honors to pay to them. And after perceiving, he who has laid down the laws shall place over them all, as guardians, some persons on account of their prudence, and some who have gone through a truthful reputation; so that intellect, binding all these together, may exhibit them as following temperance and justice, and not riches or ambition. In this manner, O guests, I did wish, and still do wish now, that you would explain how all these particulars exist in the laws said to be from Zeus, and in those of the Pythian Apollo, which both Minos and Lycurgus laid down; and how, after they have assumed a certain order, they become evident to a person skilled in the business of law, either through art or certain customs; while to us, the rest of mankind, they are by no means apparent.

Clinias/ How then, O guest, ought we to speak of what comes after these?

Athenian Stranger/ It appears to me that we ought to go through again from the beginning, as we have begun in part, in the first place, the pursuits of fortitude; and afterwards we will go through another species of virtue, and again another, if you are willing; and that we may go through the first subject, we will endeavor, by laying down a pattern, and conversing about the others in this way, to make for ourselves a beguilement of the road; and afterwards we will show, if god is willing, that the things relating to the whole of virtue look thitherward.

Clinias/ You speak well. Endeavor then, in the first place, to sift for us this praiser of Zeus.

Athenian Stranger/ I will endeavor likewise to sift both you and myself. For the discourse is common. Speak therefore. Shall we say that the joint-feasts and gymnastic exercises were invented by the lawgiver for the purposes of war?

Megillus/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And that a third or fourth thing was invented? For perhaps it is necessary for a person thus to make an enumeration respecting those of the rest of virtue, whether it is right to call them of parts, or anything whatever, only showing clearly what he means.

Megillus/ The third thing, as I and any Lacedæmonian whatever likewise would say, he discovered was hunting. And a fourth, and even a fifth, thing let us try, if we can, to mention. I then would endeavor to mention the fourth thing, namely, that which takes place to a great extent with us, in the endurance of pain, which occurs constantly in fighting with hands against each other, and in certain snatchings in the midst of many blows. There is, moreover, what is called a concealment, wonderfully laborious as regards endurance of pain; and the being in winter without shoes and without a bed, and waiting without servants upon themselves, while wandering night and day through the whole country. Still further, in the exercises of naked persons, there is a severe endurance amongst us when contending with the violence of intense heat; and there are very many other things of this kind, in detailing which a person would nearly never cease.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak well, O Lacedæmonians guest. But come, whether shall we put down fortitude as a contest merely with fears and pains? or with desires likewise and pleasures, and certain vehement fawnings of flattery,

which soften the minds of those, who deem themselves objects of worship, and mold them like wax?

Megillus/ I think thus, that it is a contest with all these.

Athenian Stranger/ If then we call to mind the previous discourse, this person here said, that both a state is inferior in some things to itself, and a man to himself. Was it not so, Cnossian guest?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, whether shall we call him the inferior, who is subdued by pain, or him rather, who is subdued by pleasure?

Clinias/ Him, it appears to me, who is subdued by pleasure. And surely we all much rather say that he, who is vanquished by pleasures, is disgracefully inferior to himself, than he, who is vanquished by pains.

Athenian Stranger/ Surely the legislator through Zeus and he through Apollo did not lay down by law that fortitude is lame, and able to march against things only on its left hand, but unable to do so against elegancies and flatteries on its right hand? or is it able to march against both?

Clinias/ Against both, I think.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us, then, mention again what those pursuits are, in both of your states, which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them in the same manner, as they do not avoid pain, but bring persons into the midst of them, pleasures, and induce them, partly by force, and partly by honors, to vanquish them. Now where is the same thing ordained in your laws respecting pleasures as respecting pains? Let it be stated, what is that, which in your case causes the same persons to be similarly brave, both with respect to pain and pleasures, while they are victorious over those things, in which they ought to be victorious, and

to be by no means inferior to enemies the nearest to them and the most difficult to contend with.

Megillus/ In the same manner, O guest, as I had the power to mention many laws opposed to pains, I should not thus perhaps possess the means of speaking about pleasures according to their great and conspicuous parts; but according to their small I might perhaps have the means.

Clinias/ Nor should I be able myself to do anything of this kind clearly in the case of the laws of Crete.

Athenian Stranger/ This, O ye best of guests, is by no means wonderful. But should anyone of us, who is desirous of seeing what is true, and at the same time the best, find fault with anything in the laws of our respective countries, let us receive the words from each other not harshly, but with mildness.

Clinias/ You speak well, O Athenian guest; and we must obey you.

Athenian Stranger/ For no other conduct than this would become men of our age.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether then a person finds fault rightly or not with the Laconian and Cretan polity, is another question. But perhaps I can better tell what is said by the multitude than either of you can. For although the laws are regulated even moderately well, yet there would be with you one law the most beautiful, not to permit any youth to inquire which laws are well or ill established, but to ordain all to proclaim, with one voice, and with one mouth, that they are all beautifully laid down, since the gods were the parties who gave them; and that, if anyone says otherwise, persons should not endure to hearken to him: and that if any old man has any thoughts respecting them, he shall

place his reasons before a ruler and his equals in age, but not in the presence of a young man.

Clinias/ You speak most properly, O guest: and, like a seer, although you were absent from the then thoughts of the party who laid them down, yet you appear to me to have made a conjecture reasonably correct, and to have spoken what is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ There is then a freedom now from the presence of young men; but we, on account of our old age, are permitted by the lawgiver to speak about the laws among ourselves, without doing any wrong.

Clinias/ Such is the case. Do not then be remiss at all in reproving our laws. For it is not dishonorable to know aught of what is not beautiful; but by this means it happens that a remedy exists to a party receiving what is said with not an envious feeling, but with a good will.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak correctly. I shall not however speak in reprehension of the laws before diligently considering them to the utmost of my power; or rather, I shall speak doubtingly. For upon you alone of all the Greeks and Barbarians, of whom we hear, the legislator has enjoined to abstain from the greatest pleasures and sports, and not to taste them; but on the question of pains and fears, which we have lately discussed, he was of opinion, that if anyone should avoid them thoroughly from his infancy, he would, when he came to endure necessary labors, and fears, and pains, avoid those, who are exercised in them, and would become their slave. The same lawgiver ought, I think, to have thought the same respecting pleasures, and to have said to himself that, if the citizens shall from childhood be inexperienced in the greatest pleasures, and be unpracticed in bearing up against pleasures, so as not to be compelled to do anything base for

the sake of the sweetness arising from pleasure, they would suffer the same as those, who are vanquished by fear, and become the slaves in a different and still baser manner to those, who are able to bear up against pleasures, and are the masters of what relate to pleasures, although they are sometimes the worst of men; and they would have their soul partly a slave, and partly free, and be unworthy to be called wholly brave and free. Consider therefore whether aught of what has been now said appears to you to be according to reason.

Clinias/ It appears so to us somehow, on the speech being spoken. But immediately and readily to be confident about questions of such moment would be the act rather of young and senseless persons.

Athenian Stranger/ But if, O Clinias and Lacedæmonians guest, we discuss someone point of those, which we proposed—for after fortitude let us speak of temperance—what difference shall we find between these polities and those, which are laid down at random, as the things relating to war just now?

Megillus/ It is nearly not easy. But it seems that the joint-feasts and gymnastic exercises have been well invented for both.

Athenian Stranger/ It appears then, O guest, to be a difficult thing for what is incontestable on the question of polities to exist in deed as well as in word. For it seems almost that, as in the case of bodies, it is not possible to order anyone regimen for anyone body, because the very same thing would be seen to do an injury to some of our bodies, and a benefit to others, so too in a state; since these gymnastic exercises and joint-feasts are on many other grounds now beneficial to states, but in seditions are hurtful. This do the children of the Milesians and Bœotians

and Thurians make evident. And in truth this very institution, legalized of old, appears to have perverted the natural pleasures of Venus, not only in the case of men, but of beasts. And of such things a person may accuse your cities the first, and such others, as have chiefly adopted gymnastic exercises. And whether one ought to consider things of this kind in a jocose or serious manner, still we must consider that, to the male and female sex, proceeding to a participation in production, the pleasure arising from the act seems to have been imparted according to nature; but, that the copulation of males with males, or of females with females, is contrary to nature; and that the daring attempt of those who first did so, arose from the non-mastery over pleasure. We all of us indeed bring an accusation against the Cretans, as having invented the story respecting the fable of Ganymede. For, since their laws are believed by them to have been from Zeus, they have put together this fable against Zeus, in order that they may enjoy this pleasure, by following forsooth the example of the god. But let us bid farewell to the fable; but of those, who direct their attention to laws, nearly the whole consideration is with regard to pleasure and pain, in the case of states and the morals of individuals. For these two fountains are permitted to flow by nature; from which he who draws at what place and at what time and what quantity he ought, is happy; and so is a state, and an individual, and every animal: but he, who draws unskillfully and at an improper time, will live in a manner the contrary to that person.

Megillus/ This, O guest, is surely said beautifully. Nevertheless a want of speech does not lay hold of me as to what I ought to say against it. Still to me at least it seems correct that the Lacedæmonians lawgiver exhorted persons to fly from pleasures. But with respect to the Cnossian laws, this person here will, if he pleases, assist us. But those at

Sparta relating to pleasures seem to me to be laid down most beautifully of all. For that, by which men chiefly fall into the greatest pleasures and insulting conduct and all kinds of folly, the law casts out from the whole of our country; nor would you see in the fields or in the cities, over which there is to the Spartans a care, banquets or such things as attend upon them, and excite, according to their power, every kind of gratification. Nor is there one, who, meeting with a person reveling from intoxication, would not immediately inflict on him the greatest punishment; nor would he let the party go free, pleading as an excuse a Dionysiac festival, as I once saw was the case with your people when riding in carts; and at Tarentum, amongst our colonists, I have seen the whole city intoxicated during the Dionysiac festival; but with us there is nothing of the kind.

Athenian Stranger/ O Lacedæmonian guest, all such things are to be praised, where there are certain endurances of pain; but, where there is a remission of the latter, the former are rather of a stupid kind. For someone, defending our institutions, would very quickly lay hold of you by showing the free manners of your women. Now in all these cases, occurring at Tarentum, and with us, and with you, one answer appears to free them, so that they are not in a bad state, but in a correct one. For everyone may answer and say to a stranger, expressing wonder on his beholding what is unusual in his own country—Wonder not, O guest. This law exists amongst us; but with you perhaps there is upon the same points a different one. At present however our discourse is not, O friends, about different men, but about the vice and virtue of the lawgivers themselves. But let us speak more fully about all kind of intoxication. For it is not a thing of a trifling nature; nor to know it thoroughly is it the province of an inferior lawgiver. I am not speaking about drinking wine or not, in general, but about

intoxication itself, whether it is to be adopted, as the Scythians and Persians use it, and still more the Carthaginians, and Celts, and Iberians, and Thracians, all of whom are warlike nations; or, as you use it; for you, as you say, abstain from it entirely. But the Scythians and Thracians use it entirely unmixed with water, both women and men, and pour it on their garments, and imagine they are engaged in a beautiful and blessed occupation. But the Persians make much use of other luxuries, which you reject, yet, O thou best of men, in a more orderly manner than these.

Megillus/ All these, however, we pursue when we take arms into our hands.

Athenian Stranger/ Do not, thou best of men, say this. For many flights and pursuings have been, and will be, without a proof; on which account, we cannot at any time give a clear definition, but rather a doubtful one, about occupations honorable or not, when we speak of victory and defeat in battle; especially since the greater states, when fighting, overcome and enslave the lesser; as the Syracusans did the Locrians, who were thought to be regulated by the best laws of all those around that district; and as the Athenians did the Ceans; and we could find numberless other instances of a similar kind. But let us endeavor by speaking to persuade ourselves of each pursuit taken by itself; and let us for the present put out of the account victories and defeats, and let us state how a pursuit of this kind is honorable, but of that kind not honorable. But first hear from me, how we ought to consider what is useful or not as regards those very things.

Megillus/ How then say you?

Athenian Stranger/ All those, who in talking lay hold upon any pursuit and propose to praise or blame it

immediately it is enunciated, appear to me to act by no means according to reason; but to do just the same, as if, while one person is praising wheat as good, another should immediately blame it, without having heard either its operation or utility, and in what manner, and for what, and with what and how it has itself, and to persons how having themselves, it is useful. The very same thing do we seem to do now in the case of our discourses. For after merely hearing about drunkenness, some of us immediately blame, and others praise it, and very absurdly too; for making use of witnesses and those who praise, we each of us praise, and some of us think we say something decisive, because we adduce many witnesses; but others, because we see that those, who do not make use of it wine, are victorious when fighting. But this too has been considered doubtful by us. If then we go through in this manner each of the other laws, it will not be to me at least according to sound sense. But I am desirous of speaking in the manner, which it seems we ought, by endeavoring, if I can, about this very matter drunkenness, to point out the right road for us in all such cases; since ten thousands upon ten thousands of nations are in doubt upon these points, and would contend in a discourse with your two states.

Megillus/ If indeed we possess any correct method of inquiry touching these matters, we must not shrink from hearing it.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then consider somehow in this way. Come now, should one person praise the rearing of goats, and the animal itself, as a beautiful possession, but some other person blame it, from having seen goats feeding apart from the goatherd, in cultivated grounds, and doing mischief, and from seeing that every kind of cattle is either without a ruler, or under bad rulers, should thus find fault,

should we hold that the blame of such a person has blamed anything whatever soundly?

Megillus/ How should we?

Athenian Stranger/ But is a commander in ships, who possesses merely nautical skill, useful, should he be troubled with sickness or not? or how shall we say?

Megillus/ By no means useful; should he have in addition to his skill the suffering you mention.

Athenian Stranger/ And what is the commander of armies? Is he competent to command, if he possesses the science of war, although he may be timid in danger, and be sick with the drunkenness of fear.

Megillus/ How can he?

Athenian Stranger/ But what if he does not possess the art, and is timid?

Megillus/ You are speaking of a person, who is in every respect vile, and by no means a ruler of men, but of some very women.

Athenian Stranger/ But what say you of him, who praises or blames a community, over which is naturally a ruler, and which with him the ruler is useful? But he, who has never seen it in communion with a ruler over itself, but always without a ruler, or in communion with bad rulers, can we imagine that such inspectors of such communities will blame or praise anything usefully?

Megillus/ How can those, who have never seen or been connected with anyone of such-like communities rightly constituted?

Athenian Stranger/ Attend then. Out of many communities, shall we not lay down, that fellow-drinkers and fellow-drinkings are a certain single association?

Megillus/ Yes, very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Has anyone then ever seen this existing in a proper manner? Now it is easy for you to answer, that no one has ever seen it at any time; for it is neither according to your country nor laws. But I have met with many, and in many places; and moreover I have diligently inquired, as I may say, about all; and I have seen or heard of scarcely one whole community existing correctly. And though there are a few and small portions, yet the whole together, so to say, are for the most part in error.

Clinias/ How say you, guest, this? Speak still more clearly. For we, as you say, through our inexperience in such matters, would perhaps, even when meeting with them, not immediately know what in them is right or not.

Athenian Stranger/ You say what is reasonable; but, while I am speaking, do you endeavor to learn. Do you then acknowledge, that, in all associations and communions of any doings whatever, it is proper everywhere for each to have a commander?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But we have just now said, that the commander of persons fighting ought to be brave.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Now the brave man is less disturbed by fears than cowards are.

Clinias/ And this too is so.

Athenian Stranger/ If there were any plan of placing a general over an army, who was not at all timid, nor confused, should we not have done so by all means?

Clinias/ Most certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But we are now speaking not of a person about to command an army amongst associations of

men, the foes of foes during a war, but of friends, sharing during a peace in the kind feelings of friends.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ But an association of this kind, if it is attended with drunkenness, will not be without confusion. Is it not so?

Clinias/ How should it be without? Nay, I imagine quite the contrary.

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place then they have a need of a ruler.

Clinias/ How not, as for anything else?

Athenian Stranger/ Must one then furnish a ruler, if possible, not confused?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And he ought, it seems, to be thoughtful with respect to associations. For he is the guardian of existing friendship, and has the care of it still becoming greater, through the previous association.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ It is proper, therefore, to place over the drunken a sober and wise ruler, and not the contrary. For, if the ruler of the drunken is himself drunk, young, and not wise, he must have great good luck indeed, if he does not perpetrate some mighty mischief.

Clinias/ Very great indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Should then anyone blame such associations, when existing as correctly as possible in states, while he is finding fault with the thing itself, he will perhaps properly blame it. But if a person blames a pursuit through seeing it erring as much as it can, it is evident, in the first place, that he is ignorant that this existed not correctly; and, in the next place, that everything will in this manner appear

improper, when it is done apart from a sober master and ruler. Or, do you not understand, that when a pilot, and each ruler of each thing, is drunk, he will overturn everything, whether ships, or chariots, or an army, or whatever else is ruled by him?

Clinias/ You have said, O guest, this at least what is altogether true. But tell me moreover what good would it do us, should this regulation respecting drinking be correct? just as what we lately stated, that should an army meet with a correct leading, there would be victory in war, a no small good to those who followed; and so as regards the rest. But what great advantage will accrue either to individuals or states from a drinking association being placed properly under an instructor?

Athenian Stranger/ What great advantage can we say would arise to a state from one boy, or one chorus, being properly instructed? Or shall we not say, when asked this question, that the state derives very little advantage from the education of one person? But if you inquire universally about the education of youth, how does it profit greatly the state, it is not difficult to say, that persons well educated will become good men; and becoming such will act in other respects in an honorable manner; and still further, that they will conquer their enemies in battle. Discipline therefore brings with it even victory; but victory sometimes produces a want of instruction. For many become more insolent through victory in war, and through their insolence are replete with a thousand other ills. Now discipline indeed has never at any time been Cadmeian; but there have been, and will be, many victories of this kind among men.

Clinias/ You seem to say, friend, that the passing the time in common over wine, if it be done properly, tends in a great part to instruction.

Athenian Stranger/ How not?

Clinias/ Shall you after this be able to state that, what has been just now asserted, is true?

Athenian Stranger/ To assert positively for truth, O guest, that such is the case, while many persons are in doubt, is the province of a god; but, if it be requisite to state what seems to me, there will be no grudging; since we have rushed onwards to make for ourselves a discourse about laws and a polity.

Clinias/ Let us then endeavor to learn what is your opinion upon these doubtful points.

Athenian Stranger/ It is proper to do so; and that you for the purpose of learning, and myself for that of teaching, should endeavor by some means to lengthen out our discourse. But first of all, hear from me some such thing as this.

All the Greeks consider this city of ours as fond of talking and of many words; but that Lacedæmon and Crete practice, the former a brevity in speech, but the latter, an abundance in thought rather than in words. But I am considering lest I shall give you an idea of my speaking much about a trifling matter, while cleansing a very long speech about drunkenness. But the rectification of it according to nature would not be able, without musical rectitude, to take off in discourses either clear or sufficient; and on the other hand, music would not be able without the whole of education. Now all this is the work of very many words. Consider then, what we are to do, if we leave these things for the present, and pass on to some other discourse about laws.

Megillus/ Perhaps you do not know, Athenian guest, that our family hearth is the public guest of your city. Perhaps then into all the boys of each of us the public guests, when they hear that they are the public guests of some city, a

certain kind feeling enters immediately from their youth towards that city, as being a second country after their own. And this very same thing has now taken place with myself. For immediately on hearing the boys, when the Lacedæmonians were blaming or praising the Athenians for something—How your city, Megillus, say they, has done to us not well or well—on hearing this, and contending against these assertions, in your behalf, I have ever had every kind feeling towards those, who are bringing the city into blame. And now, indeed, both your voice is grateful to me; and that too which is said by many, that such of the Athenians, as are good, are so pre-eminently, appears to be most truly asserted. For they alone, without necessity, by their very nature, and from a divine allotment, are truly and not feignedly good. Therefore on my account at least you may, my friend, boldly say whatever is agreeable to you.

Clinias/ And in truth after hearing and receiving, O guest, a word from myself, do you with confidence speak what you please. For you have perhaps heard, that Epimenides was held here a divine man, who was of our family, and ten years prior to the Persian war came to your city, according to the oracle of the god, and performed certain sacrifices, which the god had enjoined; and he told, moreover, the Athenians, who were terrified at the expedition of the Persians, that they would not come for ten years; and that, when they did come, they would depart without having done a single thing they expected, and suffer greater evils than they inflicted. At that time our ancestors were hospitably received by yours; and hence both myself and my parents have a kind feeling towards you.

Athenian Stranger/ You therefore, as it seems, are prepared to hear; and I too am prepared as regards my will, but not very easy as regards my power. I must however make the attempt. In the first place then, as preparatory to our

discourse, let us define what education is, and what power it possesses. For we say that through this must proceed the discourse taken for the present in hand by us, until it arrives at the deity.

Clinias/ Let us altogether do this, since it is agreeable to you.

Athenian Stranger/ While then I am saying what it is proper to assert that education is, do you consider whether what is asserted is agreeable to you.

Clinias/ Say on.

Athenian Stranger/ I say then and assert that he, who is about to be a good man in anything whatever, ought immediately from childhood to practice, when engaged in playful and serious pursuits, the very thing suited to each particular of the object in view. Thus he, who is about to be a good farmer or house-builder, ought, the latter to play at building children's houses; the former, on the other hand, at tilling the ground; and he, who brings up each of them should provide for each small instruments, the imitations of the true ones; and moreover, they should learn previously what is necessary to learn previously. For instance, a workman, to measure or use a rule; and he, who is to be a warrior, should in sport ride on horseback, or do something else of a similar kind; and the master of the children should endeavor by sports to turn the pleasures and desires of the children thither, where, when they arrive, it is proper for them to have an end. We say then, that the very head of instruction is a right bringing up, which will lead as much as possible the soul of him, who sports, to the love of that which it will be requisite for him, when he has become a complete man, to lay down as a part of the virtue of the thing. See then whether, up to this point, what has been asserted does, as I said, please you.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let not then that, which we assert instruction is, be undefined. For now, when we blame or praise the bringing up of each person, we say that one has been educated, but another uneducated; although the men have sometimes been very well educated for retail trades, and those of ship-owners, and for the profits from some other things of this kind. For of those, who, it seems, consider such things to be education, there would be now no account; but that we say is the education from childhood towards virtue, which causes a person to feel a desire of, and a love for, becoming a perfect citizen, and to know how to govern and to be governed with justice. Such a bringing up this discourse would, as it seems to me, define, and be willing to call it the only education; but that, which tends to the acquisition of wealth, or to any bodily strength, or any other cleverness, apart from intellect and justice, is a handicraft trade and illiberal, and not worthy to be called education at all. Let us not then contend with them about a name; but let the assertion, which has been assented to just now, remain, that those, who are properly educated, become nearly all of them good. And it is by no means meet to hold education in dishonor; since when it is present to the best men, it is the first of things the most beautiful. And if at any time a person goes astray, and it is possible for him to set himself right, this must ever be done by everyone according to his ability, through the whole of life.

Clinias/ Right; and we agree with what you are saying.

Athenian Stranger/ And we formerly agreed, that those are good, who are able to govern themselves, but those bad, who are not.

Clinias/ You speak most correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then resume in a still clearer way the very point we were speaking of; and do you receive me through some resemblance, if perchance I am able to render clear to you a thing of this kind.

Clinias/ Only speak.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we not consider each of us ourselves as one?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ But that each has in himself two counselors, opposite and thoughtless, which we denominate pleasure and pain?

Clinias/ Such is the case.

Athenian Stranger/ And in addition to both these, there is the opinion about things to be, to which is given the common name of expectation; but individually the expectation, prior to pain, is fear; but that, which is prior to its contrary, is confidence. But in the case of all these there is a reasoning process, as to which of them is better or worse; which, when it becomes the common determination of the city, is denominated law.

Clinias/ I scarcely follow you. However, say on, what comes after, as if I were following you.

Megillus/ And the very same state of suffering is to myself likewise.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then think upon these matters in this manner. Let us consider that each of us is a kind of animal, the wonder of the gods, and put together, either as their plaything, or through some serious act; for on this point we are ignorant; but this we do know, that these passions are inherent in our nature, and that they pull us, like nerves or ropes, and being themselves contrary, draw us to contrary actions, where virtue and vice are situated apart from each other. For reason says, that each ought always to

follow one of the pullings, and, never abandoning it, draw in a contrary direction by the other nerves; and that this is the golden and sacred leading of the reasoning power, which is called the common law of the state; but that the other pullings are hard, and iron-like; but that this is soft, as being golden, and moreover it is uniform, but that the rest are like every variety of forms. It is necessary for us then to assist always the most beautiful leading, belonging to the law. For inasmuch as the power of reasoning is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, its leading has need of assistants, in order that the golden race in us may vanquish the rest of the races. And thus the story of virtue relating to our being a wonder, will be preserved; and the expression, to be superior or inferior to oneself, will in a certain manner become more clear, as to what it means; and that both a state and a private individual ought, the latter, after receiving in himself the true reason respecting those pullings, to live conformable to it; but that a state, after receiving reason from some of the gods, or from the very person who knew these particulars, ought to lay down reason as a law, and to have an intercourse with itself and the rest of states. Thus vice and virtue would be more clearly disjointed; and this taking place rather conspicuously, both education and the rest of pursuits would be perhaps more apparent, and especially that relating to the passing the time in drinking, about which it might appear despicable to discourse any further.

Clinias/ But perhaps it would appear to be not unworthy of a long discourse.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak well; and let us go through whatever is worthy of the present mental exercise.

Clinias/ Say on.

Athenian Stranger/ If to this wonder we bring drunkenness, what thing shall we make of him?

Clinias/ Looking to what do you ask this?

Athenian Stranger/ To nothing particular. But if this the wonder-thing should be combined with that, drunkenness, what would happen to be the result? But I will endeavor to explain more clearly what I mean. For I am asking some such thing as this. Does the drinking of wine cause pleasure, and pain, and anger, and love, to be more violently on the stretch?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Does it on the other hand cause the senses, and memory, and opinion, and prudence, to be in like manner more vehement? or do these entirely leave him, who may have become saturated with drunkenness.

Clinias/ They leave him entirely.

Athenian Stranger/ Does he not return then to the same point, as regards the habit of the soul, which he had when he was a boy?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ At that time then he would have the least control over himself.

Clinias/ The least.

Athenian Stranger/ Is not then such a one, we say, the most wretched?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Not the old man then, as it appears, is alone twice a child, but the man likewise who is drunk.

Clinias/ You speak, guest, in the best manner.

Athenian Stranger/ Is there any reason, which should endeavor to persuade us, that we ought to have a taste of

this pursuit, and not avoid it, as far as possible, with all our might.

Clinias/ It appears there is; at least you just now said you was prepared to show it.

Athenian Stranger/ You have correctly reminded me; and I am now prepared, since you have both said that you are willing to hear me with alacrity.

Clinias/ How should we not hear you, if on no other account, yet for the sake of the wonderful and the absurd, if it is meet for a man at any time to voluntarily throw himself into every kind of depravity?

Athenian Stranger/ Are you speaking of the soul?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ But what say we of the deformity, the leanness, and ugliness, and imbecility of the body? should we wonder, my friend, if at any time someone should voluntarily arrive at a thing of that kind?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ What then, do we think that those, who go to medical shops for the sake of drinking drugs, are ignorant that, for a short time afterwards, and for many days they will have the body in such a state, that, if they were about to endure to the end, they would not accept of life? or, do we not know that those, who go to places of exercise and labor, do for the time being become weak?

Clinias/ All this we know.

Athenian Stranger/ And that they willingly go for the sake of the subsequent benefit?

Clinias/ You speak most beautifully.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it not, then, requisite to think of the rest of pursuits in the same manner?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ In the same manner, then, we ought to think about the occupation of drinking wine, if it is lawful to think correctly upon this amongst those.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ If it should appear to us to possess any utility, not inferior to the occupation relating to the body, it is superior at the very outset to bodily exercise, in that, the latter is attended with pain, but the former, not.

Clinias/ You speak correctly. But I should wonder, if we are able to perceive any such thing in it.

Athenian Stranger/ This, then, as it seems, I must now endeavor to explain to you. And tell me—Are we able to perceive two kinds of fear, nearly opposite?

Clinias/ Of what kinds?

Athenian Stranger/ Such as these. We surely are in fear when we expect that ills will arise.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And we are often in fear of opinion, thinking we shall be considered bad characters, by doing or saying something not good; which fear, I think, both we and all others call shame.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ These then are the two fears I spoke of; one of which is contrary to pain, and the rest of other fears; and contrary likewise to the most in number and the greatest in kind of pleasures.

Clinias/ You speak most correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Does not then a legislator, and everyone, from whom there is derived even a little, reverence this fear with the greatest honor? and calling it shame, does he not denominate the contrary to this, boldness and

shamelessness? and has he not held it to be the greatest evil to all, both in a public and private view?

Clinias/ You speak correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ This fear then preserves us in many other and great matters; and not a single thing, taken by itself, works out so greatly both victory and safety in war. For there are two things which work out victory, confidence on the part of foes, and the fear of shame on the ground of cowardice amongst friends.

Clinias/ It is so.

Athenian Stranger/ It is necessary therefore for each of us to be fearless and fearful. But on what account, either the one or the other, we have defined.

Clinias/ Completely so.

Athenian Stranger/ When we wish to render anyone fearless, in combination with law, we make him such by leading him to the fear of many terrible things.

Clinias/ So we appear to do.

Athenian Stranger/ But what, when we endeavor to render anyone fearful in combination with justice, must we not cause him to overcome those, who are arrayed with, and previously exercised in, shamelessness, by his having contended with his own lusts; and by contending with and overcoming his usual mode of living, he must needs become perfect in fortitude; but whosoever is unexperienced and unexercised in contests of this kind, he will not become even the half of himself as regards virtue. But how will anyone be perfectly temperate, who has not fought with, and overcome by reason, and labor, and art, in sport and in earnest, many pleasures and lusts, that urge him to act with shamelessness and injustice, but who is impassive with respect to all such things.

Clinias/ It is by no means probable that he can.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, is there a god, who has given any medicine for fear to man, so that by how much the more desirous is anyone of drinking it, by so much the more from every draught he thinks himself unhappy, dreads everything present and to come, and at last, although the bravest of men, proceeds to every kind of fear; and yet, after having slept, and being released from the effect of the potion, will always become the same man again.

Clinias/ And what potion of this kind, shall we say, O guest, exists amongst men?

Athenian Stranger/ None. Yet if such a potion had been from any quarter, it would, be assured of that, have been useful; and we should have been able to converse with him much in such a manner as this respecting it. Come, say, thou legislator, whether you have laid down laws for the Cretans, or any other people whatever, are you in the first place willing to be able to receive a touchstone of the citizens, as regards fortitude and timidity?

Clinias/ It is plain that everyone would say he was.

Athenian Stranger/ What, with security, and without great danger, or the contrary?

Clinias/ And this too everyone will acknowledge, with security.

Athenian Stranger/ Would you make use of this drinking by leading them to fears and trying them during their sufferings, so as to compel one person to become fearless, by exhorting, and advising, and honoring him; but disgracing another, who would not be persuaded by you to become in all things such as you enjoin him; and would you dismiss him unscathed, who had exercised himself in a proper and manly manner, but impose a punishment upon him, who had exercised himself badly? or would you not use the potion at all, having no other fault to find with it?

Clinias/ Why should one not use it, O guest?

Athenian Stranger/ There would be, friend, an exercise contrary to those at present, and wonderful for its facility, as regards one individual and a few and as many as a person would wish. And whether anyone, being alone in solitude, should place the idea of disgrace before his eyes, and thinking that he ought not to be seen, before he is in a good condition, should thus exercise himself against fear, and prepare merely a potion in preference to ten thousand other acts, he would do something proper; or whether someone trusting to himself to be properly prepared by nature and careful practice, should not hesitate in the company of many fellow-drinkers to show his power, in the necessary difference of the drinking, by being superior to others and being his own master, so as neither to stumble in one great matter through unseemliness, nor to be changed in manner through virtue, but should depart, before he reached the last drinking, fearing the defeat which all men suffer through drinking.

Clinias/ Certainly. For such a one, by thus acting, would conduct himself with temperance.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us thus then say again to the legislator this. Be it so, lawgiver, that neither has a god given nearly to mankind such a medicine for fear, nor have we devised one ourselves—for I say nothing of sorcerers at a banquet—but is there a potion for fearlessness and for excessive confidence, and doing unseasonably what is not meet? Or how say we?

Clinias/ There is, he will perhaps say, meaning wine.

Athenian Stranger/ Has this a property contrary to that which was just now spoken of? Does it make a man drinking it, to be in the first place immediately more cheerful than before; and by how much the more he tastes it, by so much

the more to be filled with good hopes and an opinion of his own power; and at last is such a person filled, as if he were wise, with all freedom of speech and of behavior and of all fearlessness, so as to say anything whatever without hesitation, and do so likewise?

Clinias/ Everyone, I think, will agree to this.

Megillus/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then recollect this, that we said that two things in our souls ought to be cultivated; one, that we may be as confident as possible; the other, the very contrary, that we may be as fearful as possible?

Clinias/ These, I think, you said belonged to shame.

Athenian Stranger/ You very properly remind me. But since it is meet to practice fortitude and fearlessness in fears, let us consider whether the contrary ought to be cultivated in the case of things contrary.

Clinias/ It is at least probable.

Athenian Stranger/ In those things, which when we suffer, we are naturally remarkably confident and audacious, it will be proper, as it seems, to meditate, how we may become the least possible shameless and full of boldness, but fearful with respect to daring on each occasion to speak, or suffer, or do anything base whatever.

Clinias/ It seems so.

Athenian Stranger/ Are not then these the things, in which we are such, namely anger, love, insolence, ignorance, the love of gain, cowardice, and these too, riches, beauty, strength, and all such things as make a person, drunk with pleasure, to be mad? Now to the making in the first place an easy and harmless experiment in all these, and afterwards to the meditating upon them, with the exception of the touch-stone furnished by wine and sport, what pleasure more in measure, can we mention should it exist in any

degree with caution? For, let us consider. Of a disposition morose and savage, from which ten thousand acts of injustice arise, is it more dangerous for a person, when going for the purpose of contracts, to make a trial, and so run a risk respecting them, or when present at the shows of Dionysus? or to a disposition, yielding to venery, to apply a touchstone, by entrusting to it one's own daughters, and sons, and wives, and thus by running a risk in things the most dear, to see the moral condition of the soul? and by mentioning ten thousand things, a person would not accomplish, by how much excels the contemplating in sport, and without a fixed purpose, and without a reward, bringing damage. And this very thing, we think, that on these points at least, neither the Cretans nor other persons would doubt of this being a reasonable experiment of each other, and of its superiority, as compared with other touchstones, on the ground of its slightness, and security, and dispatch.

Clinias/ This at least is true.

Athenian Stranger/ This, then, will be one of the most useful things, to know the nature and habit of souls by that art, whose business it is to cure them. Now this, I think, is the business of the statesman's art. Is it not?

Clinias/ It is entirely so.

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Athenian Stranger/ After this, it appears, that point must be considered respecting them, whether this alone has a good, namely, to see how we possess our natures, or whether some greatness of advantage likewise, that deserves much care, is inherent in the proper use of wine-parties. What then do we assert? It is inherent, as our reasoning seems desirous to point out. But when, and how, let us hear by giving our attention, lest peradventure we are shackled by it.

Clinias/ Speak then.

Athenian Stranger/ I am desirous therefore of again recalling to memory what we stated a correct education to be. For its preservation, as I now conjecture, consists in this employment being properly directed.

Clinias/ You speak largely.

Athenian Stranger/ I say then, that the first puerile perception of children is pleasure and pain; and that these two exist in those, to whose soul vice and virtue are present for the first time. But as to reflection and opinions true and firm, that man is happy to whom they are present even to old age. And that man is perfect, who possesses these and all the goods in them. Now I call the virtue, which is first present to children, education; but should pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred be correctly produced in the soul of those not yet able to understand a reason; but of those, who have understood reason, should they agree with the reason, to have been correctly accustomed by fitting customs. This very consent is the whole of virtue; but its proper nurture is relating to pleasures and pains, so as to hate what it ought to hate, immediately from the beginning to the end, and to love what it ought to love, after having cut off this very thing by reason, and calling it education, you would according to my mind rightly call it.

Clinias/ Both formerly, O guest, and likewise now it seems to have been correctly spoken by you on the subject of education.

Athenian Stranger/ Correctly indeed. For of these pleasures and pains, after having been rightly brought up by existing education, the greater part is relaxed and corrupted by men during life; but the gods, pitying the naturally laborious race of man, have ordained for it, as remissions from labor, the returns of feast-days in honor of the gods, and have given the Muses, and Apollo, the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, as fellow-feasters, in order that they may correct the nurture that has taken place in the feasts with the gods. It is meet then to see whether the account is hymned by us truly according to nature, or how? For it says that the whole, so to speak, of youth is unable to keep quiet in its body and voice, but is ever seeking to be moved and to speak, at one time leaping and skipping, as if dancing with joy and full of fun, at another uttering all kinds of sounds; and that the rest of animals have no perception of either order or disorder in their movements, to which is given the name of rhythm and harmony; but that the gods, whom we have said were given to us as fellow-choristers, have given to us the perception likewise of what is in rhythm and in harmony in combination with pleasure, by which they excite us and lead the dance, uniting us with each other by means of songs and dances, and given the name of dance from the inherent name of pleasure. Shall we then in the first place receive this? Shall we lay down that the first education was through the Muses and Apollo? or how?

Clinias/ Thus.

Athenian Stranger/ He therefore, who is uneducated, will be with us one, who has not joined a choir; but him, who has been educated, we must lay down as one, who has sufficiently engaged in a choir.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But a choir, as a whole, is dancing and singing.

Clinias/ It is necessarily so.

Athenian Stranger/ He then, who is properly educated, would be able to sing and dance well.

Clinias/ It seems so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us see then what has been now asserted.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ A person, we have said, sings well and dances well. Whether shall we add that he does so, if he sings what is beautiful and dances what is beautiful, or not?

Clinias/ Let us add it.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, should a person consider things beautiful, as beautiful, and things base, as base, and use them as such, will such a one be better educated for us, with respect to dancing and music, who may be sufficiently able to minister to the body and voice what is considered beautiful, but yet does not rejoice in things beautiful, nor hate such as are void of beauty? Or he, who, though he is not altogether able to act or think rightly, with respect to his voice and body, yet acts rightly with respect to pleasure and pain, embracing such things as are beautiful, and feeling a disgust at such as are not beautiful?

Clinias/ You are speaking, guest, of a great difference of education.

Athenian Stranger/ If, then, we three know what is beautiful in singing and dancing, we likewise know correctly the person educated or not educated: but, if we are ignorant of this, we shall not be able to know if there is, and where, a guard of education. Is it not this?

Clinias/ It is thus.

Athenian Stranger/ We must then in the next place, like dogs on the; track, seek out what is beautiful in form, and melody, and singing, and dancing. But if these shall escape us and get away, our discourse about proper education, whether Grecian or Barbarian, will hereafter be in vain.

Clinias/ Truly so.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. What forms then, or melody, is it proper to call the beautiful? Shall we say that the form and the voice of a brave and a timid soul, held fast by the same and equal labors, are similar?

Clinias/ How similar, since neither are their colors?

Athenian Stranger/ Well said, my friend. But in music there are both forms and melody, since music is conversant with rhythm and harmony; so that it is possible for a person, making use of a resemblance, as the chorus-teachers do, to speak correctly of a melody or form as being in good rhythm or in good harmony, but not as being of a good color. Now of a timid, and of a brave man, there is a certain form or melody; and one has the power to call those properties of brave men, beautiful, but of timid, ugly. And that there may not be to us a great prolixity respecting these matters, let all the beautiful forms and melodies connected with the soul or body be all abstractedly the property of virtue, either of itself or of some image of it; but of vice on the other hand, all that is of a contrary kind.

Clinias/ You correctly make a call upon me; and let it be decided, for the present, that such is the state of the case.

Athenian Stranger/ But let us consider still further this; whether all of us are similarly delighted with all dancing, or it wants much of such being the case?

Clinias/ It wants it entirely.

Athenian Stranger/ What then shall we say is that, which has caused us to err? Is it because the same things are not beautiful to all of us? Or that some are, but do not appear to be the same? For surely no one will say that the choric movements of vice are more beautiful than those of virtue; or that he is delighted himself with the forms of depravity, but others with music, the contrary to this. And yet the majority assert, that the correctness of music consists in the power which imparts pleasure to the soul. But this is not to be endured, nor is it holy to speak so at all. But this more probably causes us to err.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Since the things relating to choric movements are the imitations of manners, that take place in all kinds of actions, and fortunes, and morals, and imitations, each going through. For those then, to whom is suited what is said, or sung, or danced, according to nature or custom, or both, it is necessary to rejoice in and praise those acts, and to call them beautiful; but for those, to whom they are contrary to nature, or manners, or custom, it is possible neither to rejoice in nor praise them, but to call them base. And they, to whom the things of nature happen to be right, but the things of custom the contrary, or the things of custom right, but the things of nature the contrary, address their praises contrary to pleasures. For they say that each of these is pleasant, but wrong; and in the presence of others, whom they consider to be intellectual, they are ashamed for such movements to take place in their body, and ashamed to sing, as if making a display with seriousness of things beautiful; but by themselves they are delighted with them.

Clinias/ You speak most correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Does something then bring any injury to him, who is delighted with the forms or melodies of depravity? or an advantage on the other hand to those, who are pleased with the contraries to these?

Clinias/ It is probable.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it probable, or is it necessary also, for the same thing to take place, as when anyone, associating with the depraved habits of depraved men, does not hate, but rejoices in and admits them; and yet blames his own depravity in the way of fun, as if he were in a dream. Surely at that time it is necessary for the party rejoicing to be assimilated to the things in which he rejoices, even though he is ashamed to praise them. And yet what greater good, or evil, can we say, would of every necessity happen to us than a thing of this kind?

Clinias/ I think, none.

Athenian Stranger/ But where laws are beautifully established, or will be at some future period of time, can we think that the instruction touching the Muses and amusement, will be in the power of poets, so that, whatever delights a poet in composition, or what is connected with rhythm, or melody, or verse, he can, by teaching it to the children of the well-regulated, and to young men formed into choirs, work out whatever may happen with respect to virtue and depravity?

Clinias/ This has no particle of reason; for how could it?

Athenian Stranger/ But, now it is in their power to do so in all states, so to say, except in Egypt.

Clinias/ But how say you that a thing of this kind has been established by law in Egypt?

Athenian Stranger/ It is wonderful even to hear. For, as it seems, this doctrine, of which we are now speaking, has been known of old amongst them, that young men in cities

should be accustomed to occupy themselves with beautiful forms and beautiful melodies. And after regulating these, as to what they are, and of what kind they may be, they exhibit them in their temples; and except these it is not lawful either for painters or others, who work out forms, and whatever else there may be, to introduce any novelty, or even to think of any other than those of the country; nor is it lawful at present to do this, either in these particulars or in the whole of music; and you will, by observing, discover, that what have been painted and sculptured there ten thousand years ago, —and I say ten thousand, not as a word, but a fact, — are neither more beautiful, nor more ugly, than those turned out of hand at the present day, but are worked off according to the same art.

Clinias/ You say what is wonderful.

Athenian Stranger/ It is, however, a matter relating pre-eminently to law and politics. But you would find other things there of a trifling kind. But this respecting music is true, and worthy of consideration, that it was possible for a law-giver upon these points to lay down firmly and with confidence melodies, possessing correctness naturally. But this would be the work of a deity, or of some divine person; as they say there, that the melodies, which have been preserved for such a length of time, are the production of Isis. So that, as I said, if anyone is able to understand their correctness ever so little, he ought with confidence to reduce them to law and order. Since the search after pleasure and pain does, through the seeking perpetually to make use of new music, possess scarcely no great power towards corrupting the consecrated dancing, by finding fault with its antiquity. The dancing there at least it does not seem to have been able to corrupt, but the contrary has been entirely the case.

Clinias/ It appears from what has been just now stated, that it would be so.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we not then confidently assert that there is in music and sport together with dancing a correct use in some such manner as this? We are glad, when we think we are doing well; and, when we are glad, think on the other hand we are doing well? Is it not so?

Clinias/ It is so.

Athenian Stranger/ And at such a time in our gladness we are unable to keep quiet.

Clinias/ It is so.

Athenian Stranger/ Are not then the young, amongst us ready to dance? and do not we, their elders, think we conduct ourselves properly in looking upon them, while we take a delight in their sports and revelry, since elasticity fails us at our time of life, which regretting and loving we thus establish games for those, who are able in the highest degree to carry us by the aid of memory to our youth.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we then think that the majority give really in vain the account now told of those who celebrate festivals, that it is meet to consider him the wisest, and to decide that he is the victor, who causes us to be delighted and to rejoice in the greatest degree? For since we are permitted to play at this period, it is surely meet, for him, who causes the most in number to be glad in the highest degree, to be honored the most; and, as I just now said, to bear off the prize of victory. Is not this rightly said? and would it not be rightly done, if it took place in this way?

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Athenian Stranger/ But, O blessed man, let us not hastily decide upon a matter of this kind; but, dividing it into parts, let us consider it in some such manner as this. If anyone

should at any time simply establish a certain game—but without defining whether it is gymnastic, or musical, or equestrian—and, collecting together all those in the city, should make a proclamation, after laying down the prizes of victory, for anyone who wished to come and enter the contest for pleasure alone, and that he, who should delight the spectators the most, without receiving any order as to the manner of contending, and be victorious in effecting this very thing in the greatest degree possible, and should be adjudged to be the most agreeable of all the competitors, what do we think would result from this proclamation?

Clinias/ Of what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ It is surely likely that one would exhibit, like Homer, a rhapsody, another guitar-playing; one a tragedy, and some again a comedy. Nor would it be wonderful, if someone, by exhibiting things of wonder, should think that he is especially the victor. Now when these and other competitors without number come together, can we say which of them would justly be the victor?

Clinias/ You ask an absurd question. For who can answer you on this point, as if he were cognizant of it, before hearing and being himself a hearer of each of the champions?

Athenian Stranger/ What then, are you willing for me to reply to this absurd question?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Now if very little children were to decide, they would decide that he who had exhibited the things of wonder, was the victor over the others. Is it not so?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But if greater boys were to decide, they would decide in favor of the party exhibiting comedies; but the women, who are better educated, and the young

men, and perhaps nearly the whole multitude, would decide in favor of the party exhibiting a tragedy.

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Athenian Stranger/ But perhaps we old men would hear with the greatest delight the rhapsodist, when stringing together in a beautiful manner the Iliad and Odyssey, or some of the works of Hesiod, and say that he was very far the victor. Who then would be rightly the victor? This must be stated after these.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ It is evident that it is necessary for me and you to say that those are properly the victors, who are judged so by persons of our age; for habit seems to us to be by far the best of things at present which are in all states and everywhere.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ I grant then thus much to the many, that music ought to be judged of by pleasure, yet not by that of any person one meets with, —but that that is nearly the most beautiful music, which delights the best of men, and such as are sufficiently educated; but especially, that which delights one person, who excels in virtue and education. On this account we say that the judges of these things stand in need of virtue; because they ought to be partakers of the rest of prudence and fortitude. For a true judge ought not to learn how to judge from a theatre, being stupefied by the clamors of the multitude, and by his own ignorance; nor on the other hand, while knowing something, ought he through unmanliness and cowardice to give from the same mouth, with which when about to judge, he called upon the gods, a decision containing a falsehood, with an easy disposition. For a judge does not sit as the disciple, but, as is just, the teacher rather of the spectators, and as about to oppose

himself to those, who do not afford pleasure fitly and properly to the spectators. For by the old law of Greece, it was permitted to do, what the law of Sicily and Italy permits at present; which by leaving to the mass of spectators to decide, by the holding up of hands, upon the victor, has corrupted the poets themselves; for they write according to the depraved pleasure of their judges; so that the spectators instruct themselves; and it has corrupted likewise the pleasures of the theatre. For while it is meet that the spectators should, by always hearing of manners better than their own, have a superior pleasure, it happens now that they do quite the contrary. What then do the matters discussed in the present discourse intend to point out? Consider whether it is this.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ The reasoning appears to me, after making a third or fourth revolution, to come to the same point—that education is the drawing and leading of youth to that, which is called by the law right reason, and which has been decreed by the most reasonable and oldest men through their experience to be really correct. In order then that the soul of a youth may be accustomed not to feel joy or sorrow in things contrary to the law, and to those that are recommended by law, but follow in joy and in sorrow after the same things as those which an old man does, for the sake of this, the compositions which we call odes, and which are truly incantations for the soul, are said to have been produced, having been carefully adapted to that kind of symphony, of which we are speaking; but on account of the soul of children not being able to bear a serious pursuit, sports and other odes are said to be played on the pipe and executed. Just as in the case of persons who are sick and have their bodies in a weak state, they, who have the care of them, endeavor to bring useful food in pleasant meats and

drinks; but that, which is annoying, in such as are bitter, in order that they may receive kindly the one, and be accustomed to reject rightly the other. In the same way a correct lawgiver will by words fairly spoken and to be praised, persuade, or, not persuading, compel, the poet to represent correctly the attributes of men, temperate, and brave, and good in every way, by composing his forms in rhythm, and his melodies in harmony.

Clinias/ Do persons, by Zeus, seem to you, O guest, to act thus at present in other states? For, as far as I hear, what you are now speaking of I do not know to be done except by us and the Lacedæmonians; but there are certain novelties ever taking place in dancing, and all the rest of music, and changes not through law, but some inordinate pleasures, which are very far from being the same, and in the same manner, as you have said occur in Egypt, but never belong to the same.

Athenian Stranger/ Most excellent, O Clinias! But if I have appeared to you, as you say, to speak of these things as existing at present, I should not wonder, if I have done this through my not clearly stating my meaning. But as to what I mean as taking place with respect to music, perhaps I have spoken of it in such a way as to seem to you to speak of it. For to abuse things which are incurable, and far advanced in error, is by no means agreeable, although it is necessary sometimes. But since the same things appear good to you likewise, come, tell me, do such kind of things exist amongst you and these here, more than amongst the other Greeks?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But if they thus existed amongst others likewise, should we say that they would thus be better than they now are?

Clinias/ By far better, if they subsisted, as they do amongst these here and with us, and as you just now said they ought to subsist.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, say, should we agree for the present, are the things mentioned by you in every kind of education and music these? Do you compel poets to assert that a good man, if he is temperate and just, is fortunate and happy, and if he is a big man and strong, and if little and weak, and if rich or not? and that, although he is richer than both Cinyras and Midas, but unjust, he is miserable, and lives in sorrow, and, as the poet says, if he says rightly, "I would not mention nor place in account as a man" him, who does not perform all that is called beautiful with justice, and possess it likewise. For being such a one he will stand near and grapple with the foe; but he, who is unjust, will neither dare to look upon gory slaughter, nor will he vanquish in running the Thracian Boreas, nor will there ever be to him any other of the things called good. For what are called good by the many, are not rightly called so. For it is said that health is the best thing; beauty the next; strength the third; and riches the fourth; and numberless other things are called good. Thus, to see and hear acutely, and to possess with a clear perception all that is connected with the senses; and further, to do like a tyrant whatever you wish; and, what is said to be the completion of all happiness, to become, after possessing all these, as quickly as possible, immortal. But you and I surely say that all these are the best possessions for just and holy men; but for the unjust, all the worst, beginning from health. For to be well, to see, hear, and possess the other senses, and, in short, to live, is the greatest evil, when a man is immortal through the whole of time, and possesses all that is called good, except justice and all virtue; but it is a less evil, should such a person survive for the shortest time. In this manner, I think, you will

persuade, and, as I said, compel the poets with you to speak; and moreover, that persons who follow them should, by giving out rhythms and harmonies, thus educate your young men? Is it not so? Look, then. For I clearly assert, that the things that are called evil, are good to the unjust, but to the just, are evil; but that things good are to the good truly good, but evil to the wicked. In what then, I asked, do you and I agree, or how?

Clinias/ We appear to agree in some things, but not in others.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it then in the case of a person possessing health, and wealth, and despotic power completely, and, I add further, superior strength and bravery, together with immortality, and to whom there is none else of the things called evil, but who has only injustice and insolence in his own person, that I do not perhaps persuade you that the person so living is not only not fortunate, but that he is clearly wretched?

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. What then ought we to say after this? For if he is brave, and strong, and beautiful, and rich, and does through the whole of life whatever he wishes, does it not necessarily appear to you, that if he is unjust and insolent, he will live in a shameful manner?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, and wickedly too?

Clinias/ This does not seem equally.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, would he not do so unpleasantly, and not conducing to his own interest?

Clinias/ How can we admit this too?

Athenian Stranger/ How? If, as it seems, some god, my friends, should grant us to agree, as we now nearly dissent

from each other. For these things appear to me as necessary, as it is not even for Crete, friend Clinias, to be clearly an island. And if I were a legislator, I would endeavor to compel both the poets and all persons in the state to speak in this manner; and I would impose nearly the greatest of punishments, should anyone in the land assert that there are certain wicked men, who lead a pleasant life; or that some things are more advantageous and lucrative, but others more just. And I would persuade my citizens to assert many other things, contrary to what are now advanced, it seems, by the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, and, differing from the rest of mankind. For come, by Zeus and Apollo, say ye best of men, if we asked the very gods, who laid down laws for us, whether the most just is the most pleasant life, or whether there are some two lives, of which one is the most pleasant, and the other the most just? and if they should say there are two, we should perhaps ask them again, if we inquired properly, —Whom ought we to call the most happy, those, who lead the most just life, or those, who lead the most pleasant one? Now, should they say those, who lead the most pleasant life, their answer would be absurd. But I am desirous that an expression of this kind should not be said of the gods, but of fathers and lawgivers rather. Let then the question previously put be asked of a father and a lawgiver, and let him say that he, who lives the most pleasant life, is the most happy. After this, I would say thus—Have you not, father, wished me to live most happily? And yet you have never ceased exhorting me to live most justly. He, then, who lays down in this manner, whether he is a legislator or a father, would, I think, appear absurd, and unable to speak consistently with himself. But if he should, on the other hand, proclaim that the most just life is the most happy, everyone, perchance, who hears him, would, I think, inquire—What is it, which the law praises in that life

as good and beautiful, and better than pleasure? For what good, separate from pleasure, can there be to a just man? Come, tell me, —Is renown and praise from both men and gods a thing good and beautiful, but at the same time unpleasant? and infamy the contrary? We shall say—By no means, O thou dear lawgiver. But neither to do anyone an injury, nor to be injured by anyone, is it unpleasant, but at the same time good and beautiful? And are the other things pleasant, but shameful and base?

Clinias/ How can they be?

Athenian Stranger/ The reason, then, which does not separate the pleasant and the just, and the good and the beautiful, is persuasive, if towards nothing else, yet at least towards the wish to live a holy and a just life; so that the language of the lawgiver will be most disgraceful and opposed to itself should one deny that these things are so. For no one will voluntarily wish to be persuaded to do that, on which joy does not follow more than sorrow. But that which is seen from a distance produces upon all, so to say, and, especially upon boys, a haziness. But the lawgiver, by dispersing the mist, will establish for us an opinion the contrary to this; and he will persuade the citizens, somehow or other, by customs, and praises, and arguments, that things just and unjust are both painted with shadow-lines; that things unjust, appearing contrariwise to that of the just, being viewed by the unjust and depraved man himself, pleasant; but things just, most unpleasant; but by the just man, all the contrary to everyone as regards both.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ But which shall we say is the more decisive truth of judgment? is it that of the worse soul, or the better?

Clinias/ Necessarily the better.

Athenian Stranger/ It is necessary then that an unjust life should not only be more base and depraved, but, in truth, more unpleasant than a just and holy life.

Clinias/ It appears nearly so, my friends, according to the present reasoning.

Athenian Stranger/ Would then a legislator, from whom there is even a little benefit, although the fact were not so, as the reasoning has detected it to be, dare, if there were anything else, to tell an untruth to young persons for their good? knowing that he never would have told a falsehood more advantageous than this, and more able to cause them to do all just things, not by force, but willingly.

Clinias/ Truth is indeed, O guest, a beautiful thing, and stable. It does not however appear an easy thing to persuade.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. And yet that fabulous tale of the Sidonian, although improbable, has been easy to persuade, and numberless others likewise.

Clinias/ What fable?

Athenian Stranger/ That, teeth having been sown at one time, armed men were produced from them. Now this is a great example to a lawgiver, that he will persuade the souls of young men to whatever a person may attempt to persuade; so that he ought by considering to find out nothing else, than by persuading to what he may work out the greatest good to a state; and for this to discover every contrivance, after what manner the whole of such fellow-dwellers may speak as much as possible one and the same thing on these points, continually through the whole of life, in odes, and fables, and rational discourses. So I think. But if it appears to you to be otherwise than in this way, there will be no grudging about contesting these points in our discourse.

Clinias/ It does not appear to me that either of us can contest them.

Athenian Stranger/ It shall then be my business to speak after this. For I assert, that it is necessary for the choirs, being three, to bring all together an enchantment upon the still young and tender souls of boys, and to say all the other beautiful things we have discussed, and shall still discuss. And let this be the sum of them. By saying that the same life has been pronounced by the gods to be the most pleasant, and the best, we shall, at the same time, speak with the greatest truth, and more persuade those, whom we ought to persuade, than if we assert anything else.

Clinias/ We must agree to what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place then, the boy-choir of the Muses would most correctly enter the first, about to sing in public subjects of this kind, with all earnestness, and for the whole city. And let the second be the choir of men up to thirty years old calling upon the god Pæan, as a witness in behalf of the truth of what is said, and praying him to be, together with Persuasion, propitious to the youth. And it is necessary for the third to sing, consisting of those who are above thirty, and up to sixty years old; but those after that period—for they are no longer able to endure singing—are left as the tellers of stories relating to the same habits through a divine oracle.

Clinias/ Who do you mean, guest, by these third choirs? for I do not clearly understand what you mean to say about them.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet these are nearly the parties, for whose sake most of the above assertions were made.

Clinias/ We do not yet understand. But endeavor to speak still more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ We said, if we remember, at the beginning of our discourse, that the nature of all young persons was fiery, and unable to keep quiet either in body or

voice, but that it was always speaking without order, and leaping; and that of the rest of animals not one had a sense of order in both of these things, but that the nature of man alone possessed it; and that rhythm was the name given to the order of motion, but to that of the voice, when the acute and the grave are mingled together, the name of harmony was addressed; and that both together are called a choir. We said too that the gods in pity have given us Apollo and the Muses as our associates in, and leaders of, the choir; and we mentioned, if we recollect, Dionysus as the third.

Clinias/ How do we not remember?

Athenian Stranger/ Now the choir of Apollo and the Muses have been mentioned; and it is necessary for the third and remaining choir of Bacchus to be spoken of.

Clinias/ How so? Say on. For to a person hearing on a sudden a choir of old men in honor of Dionysus it would seem very absurd, if persons, who have been born above thirty and fifty and up to sixty years old, were to join in the dance for that god.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak most truly. But I think there is need of a reason on these points, to show how this, taking place thus, may take place rationally.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Are then the previous points agreed upon?

Clinias/ Respecting what?

Athenian Stranger/ That every man and boy, freeman and slave, female and male, and the whole city itself, should never cease singing for the whole city what we have gone through, yet changed perpetually in some manner, and exhibiting altogether a variety, so that there may be to the singers no satiety of hymns and pleasure.

Clinias/ How should it be not agreed that this ought to be done?

Athenian Stranger/ Where then will the best part of the city, and which by its age together with intellect is the most persuasive of those in the state, effect the greatest good by singing the most beautiful subjects? or shall we thus thoughtlessly omit that, which would be the chief object of songs, the most beautiful and the most useful?

Clinias/ But it is impossible to omit it, as has been just now said.

Athenian Stranger/ How then would it be proper to do this? Consider, if it is in this way.

Clinias/ In what way?

Athenian Stranger/ Everyone on becoming rather old, is full of hesitation with respect to songs, and is less delighted in doing this; and when a necessity arises, is the more ashamed by how much the older and more modest he is. Is it not so?

Clinias/ It is so.

Athenian Stranger/ He will therefore be still more ashamed to stand up and sing in the theatre, and amongst persons of all kinds; and this too, if like the choirs that, contending for victory, are compelled, after practicing their voices, to sing lean and fasting, such persons should, by singing altogether in a manner unpleasant to themselves and with feelings of shame, perform without readiness their part.

Clinias/ You speak of what is most necessary to happen.

Athenian Stranger/ How then shall we soothe them into being ready for singing? Shall we not lay down a law, in the first place, that boys shall not taste wine at all, until they are eighteen years old? thus teaching them, that it is not proper to bring by a funnel fire to fire, into the body and soul,

before they attempt to proceed to labors, and exercising a caution about the mad-like habit of young persons; but afterwards to taste indeed wine in moderation, until they are thirty years old; but that a young man is by all means to keep himself from intoxication and much wine; but on reaching forty years, to indulge freely in convivial meetings, and to call upon the other gods, and especially to invite Dionysus to the mystic rites and sports of old men, in which he kindly bestowed wine upon man as a remedy against the austerity of old age, so that through this we might grow young again, and that, by a forgetfulness of heart-sinking, the habit of the soul might become from a harder state more soft, just as iron becomes, when it is placed in the fire, and molded thus more readily. In the first place then, will not each person, who is thus affected, be willing with more readiness and with less shame, not indeed amongst many, but a moderate number, nor amongst strangers, but familiar friends, to sing, and, as we have often said, to join in a song?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ To lead them then to join with us in singing, this method will not be altogether unseemly.

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ But what voice, and what music, will these men pour forth? Or is it not evident that it must needs be someone becoming to them?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Now what will be becoming to divine men? Will it not be that of choirs?

Clinias/ We indeed, O guest, and these here, would not be able to sing any other song, than what we have learnt in the choirs, and have been accustomed to sing.

Athenian Stranger/ And reasonably so. For you have not in reality hit upon the most beautiful singing. For you have

the polity of an army, but not of those dwelling in cities; and you keep your young men collected together in pastures, like colts, and feeding in herds. And not one of you has taken to himself his own offspring, and dragging from his fellow-feeders one that is very wild and very unmanageable, placed over him a groom, or privately educates him by rubbing him down and rendering him gentle, and giving all that is suited to the bringing up of a boy; from whence he would become not only a good soldier, but able to administer a state and cities, and one who, as we said at the beginning, would be more warlike than the soldiers of Tyrtæus, and would honor always and everywhere the possession of fortitude, as being the fourth, and not the first part of virtue, for the benefit of individuals and the whole state.

Clinias/ I do not know, guest, why you are thus again holding cheap our lawgivers.

Athenian Stranger/ I do so, if so I do, by not giving, my good man, my mind to that point. But by what road the discourse may carry us, by that, if you are willing, we will go. For if we possess music more beautiful than that of the choirs and in the public theatres, let us endeavor to impart it to such as we said were ashamed of that music, and to seek that, which is the most beautiful, to share with them.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, then, it is meet for this to be present to all things, which a certain agreeableness follows, that there be either this the agreeableness itself alone an object of the most serious attention, or a certain rectitude, or, in the third place, utility. For instance, I say, that agreeableness follows food and drink, and every kind of aliment, and this agreeableness we should call pleasure; but if it contributes to health, we denominate it rectitude and utility.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And that learning too does as agreeableness follow, namely, the pleasure, but that it is the truth which perfects the rectitude and utility, and the well and the beautifully.

Clinias/ It is so.

Athenian Stranger/ But what, in the working out of things similar, should such arts as are productive of resemblances effect this, namely, for pleasure to result from them, would it not be most just to call it, should it by following be produced, an agreeableness?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But the equality rather of the so great, and of the such kind, would, to speak universally, effect the rectitude of such things.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ Hence that alone can be rightly judged of by pleasure, which works out and affords neither a certain utility, or truth, or similitude; nor, on the other hand, a hurt; but which subsists for the sake of that very thing alone, namely, agreeableness, which follows the other things, and which a person may most beautifully denominate pleasure, when none of those follow it.

Clinias/ Are you speaking of innoxious pleasure alone?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; and I say that this very same agreeableness is sport, when it does neither an injury or a benefit worthy of serious consideration or mention.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we not then assert, from what has been now said, that all imitations, and moreover all equality, ought to be judged of the least by pleasure and false opinion? For equality would not be equality, or symmetry

symmetry wholly, although it appears so to someone, or someone is not delighted with it; but they are so from truth, the most of all things, but from anything else the least.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we not therefore say, that all music is productive of resemblances and is imitative?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ When therefore anyone asserts that music is to be judged of by pleasure, we must receive such an assertion the least of all, and seek in the least degree such music, as a serious thing, if, perchance, it exists anywhere; but that music rather which possesses a resemblance to the imitation of the beautiful.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ By those then, who are inquiring after the most beautiful singing and music, there ought, as it seems, to be sought not that which is pleasant, but that which is right. For the rectitude of imitation, as we said, was then, when the thing imitated is exhibited, as great and such as it is.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And surely everyone will allow this with respect to music, that all its poetry is an imitation and resemblance. And this will not all poets and auditors and players allow?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ It is meet then, as it seems, for a person to know in the case of each poem, what it is, if he is about not to err in that point. For he who does not know its being, what it means, and of what it is the resemblance, will scarcely understand the rectitude or erroneousness of its intention.

Clinias/ Scarcely indeed; how not?

Athenian Stranger/ But would he, who does not know, ever be able to decide upon what is well or ill done? But I am not speaking very clearly; and perhaps it will be thus said more clearly.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ There are surely numberless resemblances, as regards the sight.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, if anyone in these cases does not know what each of the imitated bodies is, would he ever know whether it is worked out correctly? I speak of some such thing as this, for instance, whether it has the joints of the body, and the positions of each of the parts of the body, and how many are the joints, and of what kind, when placed near to what kind, have the parts received their fitting arrangement, and moreover their colors and shapes; or whether all these are worked out in a confused manner. Do you think that anyone can at all know these particulars, who does not know what is the animal imitated?

Clinias/ How should he?

Athenian Stranger/ But what, if anyone knows that the thing painted, or modeled is a man, and that it has received all its parts, colors, and shapes from art, is it not necessary for a person knowing these facts, to know readily that too, whether it is beautiful, or whether it is in any respect wanting in beauty?

Clinias/ We should all of us, so to say, O guest, have known the beautiful points in animals.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak with perfect propriety. Is it not then necessary for a person who is about to be an intelligent judge, to possess these three things, as regards every representation both in painting and music and

everywhere? In the first place, to know what the thing is; then that it is rightly; and then thirdly, that whatever it be of representations, it is worked out well in words and melodies and rhythms?

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then be not faint-hearted in speaking of music in what point it is difficult. For since it has been bruited beyond the other representations, it requires of all representations the greatest caution. For a person erring in this, will be injured in the greatest degree by receiving kindly depraved manners; and it is most difficult to perceive them, through poets being inferior to the Muses themselves. For these would never err so much as, in composing the words of men, to give the figure and melody of women; and on the other hand in putting together the melody and gestures of freemen, to fit them for the rhythms of slaves and the not free; or, in taking as a subject the rhythms and gestures of a freeman, to assign a melody or words contrary to the rhythms. Moreover, they would never place together the voices of beasts and men, and instruments, and every kind of noise, as imitating one certain thing. But human poets, interweaving things of this kind very much, and mixing them together irrationally, would produce a laugh amongst men, such, as Orpheus says, “Have obtained by lot the season of delight.” For the poets perceive all these things mingled together; and moreover they tear away rhythm and figures apart from melody, putting naked words into measures, and, on the other hand, melody and rhythm without words, and employing the playing the harp and the hautboy nakedly; from which it is very difficult to know what rhythm and harmony mean without words, and to which of the imitations, worthy of mention, they are similar. But it is necessary to understand that everything of this kind is full

of rusticity, as much as it loves swiftness and not stumbling, and the voice of wild beasts, so as to make use of playing on the hautboy and the harp, except for dancing and singing. But to use either of those instruments unaccompanied with words, would be wholly a non-musical education, and a wonder-exciting act. In this way such assertions have a reason. And we are considering not only that persons of thirty years old, and those even beyond fifty, ought to make use of the Muses, but in what they ought. This then, for such reasons, does the discourse seem to me to point out to us respecting the music of choirs, that those who are fifty years old, and for whom it is suited to sing, ought to be better instructed than the others. For they must necessarily possess a proper sensation and knowledge of rhythms and harmonies. Or how shall anyone know the rectitude of melodies, and for what the Doric harmony is proper or improper, and of rhythm, which the poet has united to it, whether it is right, or not?

Clinias/ It is evident he cannot by any means.

Athenian Stranger/ But the numerous common people are ridiculous in thinking that they sufficiently know what is well harmonized, and in proper rhythm, and what is not so; such at least as have been compelled to sing and walk in rhythm. But as they do each of these things ignorantly, they do not reason upon them. Now every melody, when it has what is fitting, is in a proper state; but when it has what is not fitting, it is in an erring one.

Clinias/ Most necessarily so.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, will the person, not knowing what it possesses, know, as we have said, how it is in a proper state in any way and at any time?

Clinias/ What plan is there for so doing?

Athenian Stranger/ This then, as it appears, we have now again discovered, that those singers, whom we are now calling upon, and, after a fashion, compel to sing voluntarily, ought from necessity to be disciplined thus far, as to be able each of them to follow the progressions of the rhythms, and the chords of the melodies, in order that, by perceiving the harmonies and the rhythms, they may be able to choose such as are fit to be sung by persons of such an age, and of such a kind, and who may sing thus, and by singing may themselves be immediately innocently delighted, and become the leaders to an adoption of good manners, suited to younger persons; and being educated to this point, they would take into their hands a share of that more accurate discipline, which has reference to the multitude, and is conversant about poets themselves. For, it is by no means necessary for a composer to know the third point, whether the imitation is beautiful or not. But it is nearly necessary to know that which relates to harmony and rhythm; but for those the elders to know all the three, for the sake of choosing the most beautiful, and the second, or else never to become a sufficient enchanter of young persons towards the acquisition of virtue. And thus, what our discourse intended at the beginning, namely to exhibit a well-spoken support in favor of the choir of Bacchus, it has spoken to the best of our power. But let us consider whether this has taken place in this manner. For such an assembly does of necessity ever happen to become tumultuous through the drinking going forward to a higher point, as we supposed at the beginning of our discourse it would necessarily do, as regards those of the present time.

Clinias/ It is necessary it should.

Athenian Stranger/ And everyone becoming lighter than himself is elevated and joyous, and is filled with a freedom of speech, and with the not-listening at such a time to his

neighbor, but considers himself sufficient to have a command over himself and the rest.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Did we not say, that, when this takes place, the souls of the drinkers, becoming warmed, are rendered, like iron, more soft and juvenile? so that they are easily led by a person able and knowing how to instruct and mold them, as when they were young, and that this molder is the same as he, who was then said to be a good lawgiver, from whom there ought to be laws for convivial drinking, competent to restrain the person who had become full of confidence and bold and more impudent than is proper, and unwilling to endure a regulation, and the turn for silence and talking and drinking and music; and so to instruct him, that he is willing to do everything the contrary to those acts; and laws also competent to send, together with justice, a fear the most honorable, which is to fight against a confidence not honorable, whilst it is advancing; which divine fear we have denominated modesty and shame.

Clinias/ It is so.

Athenian Stranger/ And we said that there are guardians and fellow-fabricators of these laws, the cool and sober leaders of those not sober; without whom it is more difficult to fight against drunkenness than against enemies without cool leaders; and that the person unable to be willing to obey these and the leaders of Dionysus, upwards of sixty years old, suffers an equal or even a greater disgrace than the person, who disobeys the leaders of Mars.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ If then there were such drunkenness and such sport, such fellow-drinkers, by being benefited and friends more than before, would not be separated from each other, nor enemies as at present; but having formed their

whole association according to law, they would follow, whenever the sober should come and lead the not sober.

Clinias/ Certainly; if the sport were such as you now speak of.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then not blame that part of the gift of Bacchus simply, that it is an evil, and not worthy to be received into a state. For one might go on and say much more still, since it is the greatest blessing which he gives. There is a fear of speaking before the many, through men improperly taking it up, and knowing it when spoken.

Clinias/ What is that good?

Athenian Stranger/ A certain tale and rumor is somehow floating secretly, that this god had the intellect of his mind scattered by his step-mother Hera; on which account he did, to avenge himself, introduce the Bacchic rites, and the whole of the mad choir; from whence he gave for this purpose likewise wine. But things of this kind I leave for those to say, who think they can assert them with safety respecting the gods. But thus much I know, that every animal is not born with such and so much intelligence as is suited to it, when perfectly grown; but that, during the time in which it has not yet obtained its proper intelligence, every animal is mad, and cries out in no order; and when anyone slays it rapidly, it again leaps without order. But let us recollect that we said these were the principles of the musical and gymnastic arts.

Clinias/ We recollect it. How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And did we not say too, that this principle imparted to us men the sense of rhythm and harmony, and that Apollo, the Muses, and Dionysus were the causes of gods?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And wine too, it seems, the account of the others says, was given as a punishment for men, in

order that we might become mad. But what has been now stated by us shows, on the contrary, that it was given as a medicine, for the sake of the soul acquiring shame, and the body health and strength.

Clinias/ You have brought, very beautifully, O guest, the story to our recollection.

Athenian Stranger/ And now let the half of the subject respecting the choir be held to be gone through. Shall we go through the other half, how it seems to be, or omit it?

Clinias/ What parts are you speaking of; and how do you divide each of them?

Athenian Stranger/ The whole of the choir was with us the whole of education. But of this one part consists in rhythms and harmonies according to the voice.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But the other, according to the movement of the body, had a rhythm in common with the movement of the voice, but a figure peculiar to itself; but there in the former part melody is the movement of the voice.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ The things then pertaining to the voice, and extending as far as the soul, for the discipline of virtue, we have, I know not after what manner, denominated music.

Clinias/ They were rightly called so.

Athenian Stranger/ But the things pertaining to the body, which we called a dancing of those in sport, if such a movement should extend as far as the virtue of the body, we denominated the artistic leading of it to a thing of this kind, the gymnastic art.

Clinias/ Most rightly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let then that portion of the musical art, which we have just now said we have gone through, as the half of dancing, and has been brought to an end, be held to have been spoken of. But of the other half shall we speak? Or, in what manner and by what road must we proceed?

Clinias/ O thou most excellent man, who art conversing with Cretans and Lacedæmonians, say, since we have gone through the subject relating to the musical art, but are deficient in that relating to the gymnastic, what do you think either of us ought to reply to this question?

Athenian Stranger/ I would say that you have by putting this question nearly answered it clearly; and I understand that this, although a question, is for the present, as I have said, both an answer, and moreover a command to go through the points relating to the gymnastic art.

Clinias/ You understand me excellently well; and now act in this way.

Athenian Stranger/ And act I must; for it is not very difficult to speak about things known to both of you; for in this very art you have a greater share of skill than in that of music.

Clinias/ You speak nearly the truth.

Athenian Stranger/ Is not then the principle of this very sport, that every animal is naturally accustomed to leap? But man, as we have said, receiving a sense of rhythm, has begotten and brought forth dancing; but melody, putting him in mind of, and exciting, rhythm, these two have, by their connection with each other, brought forth dancing and sport.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ One portion of this, we say, we have already gone through; but the other we will endeavor to go through in order.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then first put a Colophon finish to the use of drunkenness, if it seems good to you likewise.

Clinias/ Of what kind of person, and whom are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ If any state shall make use of the pursuit lately mentioned, as being a serious thing, by law and with order, employing it as an exercise in behalf of temperance, and shall not keep itself from the rest of pleasures, in like manner, and for the same reason, by devising a plan for the sake of subduing them, after this manner it may use all these. But if it uses them as a sport, and it shall be lawful for anyone to drink, both when he pleases, and with whom he pleases, in combination with any other pursuit whatever, I would not give my vote in this way, that it is meet for that state, or that individual to make use at any time of drunkenness; but I would give it much more to the law of the Carthaginians than to the custom of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, namely, that no one, when in camp, is to taste of that drink, but to exist upon water during all that period; and that in the city neither a male or female slave should ever taste it, nor magistrates during the year of their office, nor pilots, nor judges, engaged in business, should taste wine at all; nor anyone, who goes to any council to deliberate upon any matter of moment, neither in the day-time at all, unless for the sake of bodily exercise or disease; nor at night, when any man, or even a woman, are thinking of begetting children. And many other cases a person might mention, in which wine ought not to be drunk by those, who possess a mind and correct laws; so that, according to this reasoning, there is to no state any need of many vineyards, but other kinds of field-works should be ordained, and the whole of diet: but those relating to wine should be nearly of

all the most moderate in kind and the least in number. And let this, if it seems good to you, O guests, be held to be said as the Colophon to the discourse relating to wine.

Clinias/ It is beautifully said, and it does seem good to us.

Book 3.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus much then on this point. But shall we say what was the commencement of civil government? Would not anyone see it from hence in the easiest and best manner?

Clinias/ From whence?

Athenian Stranger/ From whence he might behold the progress of states marching continually to virtue and to vice.

Clinias/ From whence do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ I conceive, from a length and infinity of time, and from the mutations in it.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ Come tell me, do you seem to have ever conceived what a length of time has elapsed, since cities and men have been formed into polities?

Clinias/ This is by no means easy.

Athenian Stranger/ It would however be something endless, and impossible to be told.

Clinias/ Yes, this very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Have not myriads upon myriads of states existed during this period? and, through the same ratio of the length of time have there not been destroyed no fewer in number? and have they not everywhere been often under every kind of polity? and at one time become greater from less, and at another less from greater, and worse from better, and better from worse?

Clinias/ It is necessary.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then lay hold, if we can, of the cause of this change; for perhaps it would show us the first birth of polities, and their altered state.

Clinias/ You speak well. It is then necessary for you to be ready to show, what you are thinking about them, and for us to follow.

Athenian Stranger/ Do the stories of old appear to you to possess any truth?

Clinias/ Of what kind?

Athenian Stranger/ That there have been frequent destructions of the human race through deluges and diseases and many other events, in which some small family of mankind was left.

Clinias/ Everything of this kind must be very probable to everyone.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, let us consider one of these destructions out of many, namely that which took place through a deluge.

Clinias/ Considering what about it?

Athenian Stranger/ That those, who then escaped the destruction, were nearly some hill-shepherds, preserved on the tops of mountains, like some slight fire-preserving embers of the human race.

Clinias/ It is evidently so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now such as these must surely of necessity have been ignorant of the rest of the arts and contrivance of those in cities towards each other, with respect to cupidity and a love of quarrel, and whatever other deeds of ill they had in their thoughts against each other.

Clinias/ It is likely.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us suppose then that the inhabited cities, which were in the plains and on the sea-coast, were at that time entirely destroyed.

Clinias/ Let us suppose it.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we not say then, that all instruments were destroyed, and that, if anything connected with art, either in politics or any other wisdom, had been carefully discovered, all such were lost at that period?

Clinias/ For how, O most excellent man, if these things had remained through the whole time, as they are placed in order at present, could anything new whatever have been invented by anyone whatever? Because ten thousand times ten thousand years lay hid from persons then. But there have been a thousand or twice as many years, since some things have been made known by Dædalus, others by Orpheus, and others by Palamedes; while those relating to music have become so by Marsyas and Olympus, and, as regards the lyre, by Amphion; and very many other things by others, so to say, but yesterday and the day before.

Athenian Stranger/ Know you not, Clinias, that you have omitted your friend, who was really of yesterday?

Clinias/ Do you mean Epimenides?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, him. For he has leaped far over all amongst you in his contrivance, which Hesiod had formerly, my friend, divined in word, but he has in reality accomplished, as ye assert.

Clinias/ We do assert it.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then assert, that, when that destruction took place, human affairs had then a solitude infinitely terrible; that there was a very great part of the earth ungrudged; and that the other animals having perished, there were some herds of oxen, and a race of goats, if perchance it happened to have survived, and these too rare to live for those feeding then at the commencement.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But of a state, and polity, and legislation, to which our conversation has now turned, do we think there was any, so to say, any recollection at all?

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ From those people then so situated all the present things did not arise, namely, cities and polities and arts and laws and much of vice and much of virtue.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ Think we, O wonderful man, that the persons of that time, who were inexperienced in many beautiful things relating to cities, and many too of a contrary kind, had become perfect as regards either virtue or vice?

Clinias/ You speak well, and we understand what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ As time then went on, and our race multiplied, all things advanced to all their present state.

Clinias/ Most right.

Athenian Stranger/ But, as is probable, not suddenly, but by little, during some very long period.

Clinias/ And this too is very likely.

Athenian Stranger/ For there was a fear, I think, tingling in all, of coming down from their high ground to the plain.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Did they not with delight behold each other, through the fewness in things about that time? For the means of going to each other at that period by land or sea, were nearly all, so to say, lost together with the arts; hence it was not, I think, very possible for them to mingle with each other. For iron and brass and all metals had disappeared confused together; so that there was every want of means for them to be purified, and they had a scarcity of

means in felling timber. For if any instrument had by chance been preserved in the mountains, these had by rapidly wearing away disappeared; and no others were about to be made, before the art of metallurgy had returned again to man.

Clinias/ How could it?

Athenian Stranger/ But in how many generations afterwards think we did this take place?

Clinias/ It is evident, in a great many.

Athenian Stranger/ Would not then the arts that require iron and brass, and all things of that kind, have disappeared for the same and even a longer time at that period?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Dissension then together with war was at that time dead everywhere.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, they loved and had a friendly feeling towards each other, on account of their solitude; and then their food was not an object of contention; for of pastures there was no scarcity—except perhaps to some at the beginning—on which they lived for the most part at that time; for they were not at all in want of milk and flesh; and besides, by hunting they obtained food, neither indifferent in kind nor little in quantity. Moreover, they had plenty of clothing, and beds, and dwellings, and utensils, for fire or not. For the earth-molding and weaving arts did not require iron at all. And a god gave to man these arts to procure all those things, in order that, when at any time they might fall into a difficulty of this kind, the race of man might have a shooting up and an improvement. Through some such means persons at that time were not very poor, nor had they, compelled by poverty, any differences with each other. But neither would they ever have become rich, being without

silver and gold, which was then present in them. Now in any association, where neither riches nor poverty dwell, in this manners nearly the most just will exist. For neither insolence nor injustice, neither emulation nor envy, are produced there. Through these causes, and their so-called simplicity, they were good. For whatever they heard to be beautiful or base, they thought, through being of simple manners, it was said so most truly, and were persuaded. For no one, through his wisdom, knew to suspect an untruth, as at present; but, conceiving all that was said about gods and men to be true, they lived in this manner; and hence they were altogether such, as we have just now described them.

Clinias/ Both to me and to this person here such seems to be the case.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we then not assert, that many generations, both of those prior to the deluge and of those at present living in this manner, are likely to be less skillful and less learned as regards the other arts, and those too of war, such as exist at present by land and sea; and such, as in the case of a city being called only there law-trials and seditions, contrive both by words and deeds every plan for doing evil and injustice towards each other? but that they were more simple and brave, and at the same time more temperate, and in every respect more just? Now of these things we have already detailed the cause.

Clinias/ You speak correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let then this be held to have been said by us; and let all that still follows upon this be said for the sake of understanding what need of laws there was to persons of that period, and who was their lawgiver.

Clinias/ You have spoken well.

Athenian Stranger/ Were they then neither in want of legislators, nor was there wont to be any matter of such a

kind at that time? For surely to those existing at that portion of the period there were not writings, but they lived following the customs and the spoken laws of their ancestors.

Clinias/ It is probable. But the manner of their polity do you know well what it was?

Athenian Stranger/ This.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ All appear to me to call the polity subsisting at that period, a dynasty, which even now exists in many places, both amongst the Greeks and Barbarians. And even Homer speaks somewhere of it as taking place in the administration of the Cyclopes, saying;

> "Meetings, that counsel bring, to them are not,
> Nor legal judges. On the high hill-tops
> They dwell, or in the hollow cave; and each
> To wife and children gives the law, nor care
> Aught have they of each other."

Clinias/ This poet of yours appears to have been a graceful one; for we have gone through some other pieces of his, very clever, but not many of them; for we Cretans do not make a very great use of foreign poems.

Megillus/ But we do on the other hand make use of them. And he seems to excel poets of this kind; although he does not describe everywhere a Laconic, but rather an Ionic, life. At present indeed he appears to testify fairly to your language, mythologically referring the ancient state of mankind to a savage life.

Athenian Stranger/ So he does testify; and let us receive him, as pointing out that polities of this kind did once upon a time exist.

Clinias/ Well said.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it not then from those, who were dispersed by single families and races through the want arising from those destructions, amongst whom the oldest bears sway on account of the authority having come from the father and mother, that following them, as birds do, persons will form one herd, and under their fathers' laws be governed by kingly rule, which is the most just of all?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And after this, more of them come together to a common spot, and form larger cities; and betaking themselves to agriculture, first at the foot of hills they make certain enclosures of thorns, as defensive walls against wild beasts, and thus establish one common and large dwelling.

Clinias/ It is probable that this occurs.

Athenian Stranger/ But is not this also probable?

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That, while these larger dwellings are increasing from the less and original ones, each of the small would remain, having, according to the race, the oldest person as its ruler, and, through living separate from each other, its own peculiar customs, and different from different parents and bringers-up, and which have been accustomed to be, as regards the gods and themselves, the more modest in the case of the more modest, and more manly in that of the more manly; and thus according to reason, each one, after stamping his own edicts on his children and children's children, would come, as we said, to the greater community, bringing their own peculiar laws.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Moreover it is surely necessary for each to be pleased with their own laws first, and afterwards with those of the others.

Clinias/ It is so.

Athenian Stranger/ We appear then to be unconsciously walking, as it were, in the commencement of legislation.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ After this then, it is necessary for those, who thus come together to choose some among themselves in common, who, after inspecting the laws of all, shall lay open such of them as they most approve of in common before the rulers and leaders of the wards, as before kings, and enable them to make a choice; and these would be called legislators; and after appointing their magistrates and making out of the dynasties an aristocratical or kingly government, they would dwell in such a change of polity.

Clinias/ This would in this way take place in due order.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then speak of a third form of polity as occurring, in which all the forms and accidents of polities and at the same time of cities happen to exist together.

Clinias/ Of what kind is this?

Athenian Stranger/ That, which Homer likewise has pointed out, as having taken the third place after the second.

> "He built Dardania; for Ilion holy
> Was in the plain, not yet a city made
> For voice-dividing men; but still they dwelt
> Below Mount Ida with its many rills.

For he pronounces these verses, and those which he said respecting the Cyclopes, as having been spoken somehow divinely and naturally. For the race of poets being divine does enthusiastically handle the hymnings on many events which have truly happened, in conjunction with some of the Graces and Muses.

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then now proceed onwards, a fable having just now come upon us; for, perhaps, it will make some sign respecting our wishes. Is it not proper?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ We say then that Ilion was colonized down from elevated places to a large and beautiful plain, upon a hill not very lofty, and having many rivers which rush from Mount Ida.

Clinias/ So they say.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we not think that this occurred at some long time after the deluge?

Clinias/ How not a long time?

Athenian Stranger/ A dreadful oblivion then it seems has taken place of the destruction just mentioned, since they thus placed a city under rivers many and flowing from high ground, and put their trust in hills not very high.

Clinias/ It is then quite evident that they were distant some considerable time from that event.

Athenian Stranger/ And many other cities, I think, were at that time inhabited as mankind multiplied.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And these perchance fought against it; and perhaps by sea, all of them now fearlessly using the sea.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ But the Achæans, after remaining ten years, overthrew Troy.

Megillus/ Entirely.

Athenian Stranger/ During then that period of ten years, in which Troy was besieged, the affairs of the besiegers happened to each of them to turn out very ill at home through the seditions of the young men, who received the

commanders, when returning to their cities and homes, neither in a becoming nor just manner, but so that deaths and murders and very many banishments occurred to those, who, after being exiled, returned with a change of name, and were called Doriens instead of Achæans, through Dorieus being the person who collected together the exiles of that period. And hence you Lacedæmonians turn all these things into a fable, and go through them.

Megillus/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ To the same point from whence, while discoursing at the commencement about laws, we turned aside through falling upon music and drunkenness, we have now arrived again, as it were, through some god; and our discourse gives us, as it were, a handle. For it has come to the colonization of Lacedæmon, which you said was properly governed by laws fraternal to those in Crete. For the present then we obtain something additional to this extent from the wandering of our discourse, while passing through certain polities and colonizations. For we behold a first, a second, and a third city connected with each other, as we think, by their colonizations during a boundless length of time. But now this fourth city, or, if you please, nation, presents itself to us, which was formerly colonized, and is so now. From all which, if we are able to understand what has been colonized well or not, and what laws of theirs preserve, what is preserved, and what corrupt, what is corrupted, and what being changed for what will render, Megillus and Clinias, a state happy, we shall think that enough has been done. But all these matters must be discussed by us, as if from the beginning, unless we have any fault to find with what has been said.

Megillus/ If, O guest, a god had promised us that, if we put our hands a second time to the inquiry respecting legislation, we should hear discourses neither worse nor

fewer than those already spoken, I would go a long road, and the present day would appear to me to be short, although it is nearly that of the god, when he is turning from the summer to the winter solstice.

Athenian Stranger/ It is meet then, as it seems, to consider these matters.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then be present in thought at that time, when Lacedæmon, and Argos, and Messéné, and the places which with them were, Megillus, under the power of your ancestors. For then, it is said, according to the story, that after having divided their army into three parts, they colonized three cities, Argos, Messéné, and Lacedæmon.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And Temenus became king of Argos, and Cresphontes of Messéné, but Procles and Eurysthenes of Lacedæmon.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Now, all of those then present swore to assist them, if anyone should destroy their kingly rule.

Megillus/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Now say, by Zeus, is kingly rule destroyed, or has any government whatever been destroyed by other parties than by themselves? Or after having just now a little before met with these words, did we suppose so, but have now forgotten it?

Megillus/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, we will more confirm this kind of assertion. For meeting with deeds, as it seems, which have occurred, we have arrived at the same discourse; so that we shall not seek the same discourse respecting a vain thing, but one that has occurred and possesses truth. Now

this has occurred. Three kingdoms have made an oath with three cities under a kingly government, each with each other, according to the laws which they had laid down, about governing and being governed in common, that one party the rulers should not make for itself a government of violence, as time and race progressed, and the other, the ruled, that, while the rulers observed these conditions, they would not at any time themselves destroy the kingly rule, nor permit others to destroy it, but that the kings would defend both kings and the people when injured, and the people, both kings and the people. Was it not so?

Megillus/ It was so.

Athenian Stranger/ Was not then that, which is of the greatest moment in the establishments of polities, present to these three cities, regulated by law, whether the kings laid down the laws, or some other person?

Megillus/ What was this?

Athenian Stranger/ That two cities should always assist against the one, which happened to be disobedient to the laws laid down.

Megillus/ It is evident.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet this do the many order the lawgivers, that they are to lay down such laws as the wards and the masses will willingly receive; just as if anyone should order the exercise-masters, or physicians, to take care of, and cure, the bodies under their direction in an agreeable manner.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ It is however often a desirable thing, should anyone with no great pain be able to render bodies of a good habit and in health.

Megillus/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ This too, which is not a small matter towards making easy the laying down of laws, was present to those of that period.

Megillus/ What was that?

Athenian Stranger/ There was not to the lawgivers, while preparing an equality of property, the greatest blame, and which exists in many other cities regulated by laws, when anyone endeavors to disturb the possession of land, or to wipe out debts, through perceiving that equality can never sufficiently exist without such measures. For to the lawgiver, who endeavors to disturb anything of this kind, everyone on meeting cries out, Do not move things to be not moved; and utters curses upon him, who introduces the distributions of land, and the cutting off debts, so that every man is thrown into a difficulty. But to the Dorians even this happened successfully and without any finding fault, that both the land was divided without causing disputes, and the debts were not large and of long standing.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ How then, ye best of men, did the colonization and legislation turn out so badly to them?

Megillus/ How do you mean? and for what do you blame them?

Athenian Stranger/ That when three administrations had been established, two parts of them quickly corrupted their polity and laws, and one alone, belonging to your city, remained.

Megillus/ You ask a question not very easy to answer.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet it is requisite for us, while considering now and examining into laws, and playing a game suited to old men temperately, to go through the journey without annoyance, as we stated, when we began to enter upon it.

Megillus/ How not? and we must do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ What inquiry can we make to ourselves relating to laws in general, more beautiful than respecting those individually which have adorned cities of this kind? or shall we make an inquiry about any cities and colonizations more illustrious and larger than these?

Megillus/ It is not easy to speak of others in preference to these.

Athenian Stranger/ It is then nearly evident, that the persons of that period conceived this arrangement would be an assistance sufficient not only for the Peloponnesus, but for all the Greeks, if any of the Barbarians should do it any injury; just as those, who dwelt then about Ilion, were, when trusting to the power of the Assyrians, as it existed in the time of Ninus, emboldened to excite war against Troy. For the showy appearance of its government, still preserved, was by no means small. And as we at present fear the great king, so the people then feared the combination of power standing together. For the taking of Troy a second time became a great accusation against them; because the Trojan power was a portion of that the Assyrian government. On all these accounts then, the unity of the arrangement of the army at that time, divided into three states, under the brother kings, the offspring of Hercules, appeared surely to be beautifully planned and put into order, and superior to that which went against Troy. For, first, they conceived that the descendants of Hercules were better commanders than those sprung from Pelops; and, next, that this army far surpassed in velour that which came against Troy; for that these were the victors, but those vanquished by these, the Achæans by the Doriens. Do we not then conceive, that the persons of that period made their arrangements with this very view?

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it not probable then, that they thought their affairs would be in a firm state, and endure for some lengthened period, through their having shared in many dangers and labors, and in being orderly governed by one race of brother kings; and in addition to this, through having made use of many other prophets, and the Delphic Apollo likewise?

Megillus/ How is it not probable?

Athenian Stranger/ But all these expectations so great flew away, as it seems, at that time quickly, except, as we just now said, a small part around your region; and this has never ceased warring against the two other parts, even to the present day. Since the policy then existing would, by agreeing for one object, have possessed a power in war not to be overturned.

Megillus/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ How then, and why was it dissolved? Is it not worthwhile to consider, what accident destroyed a constitution of such a standing, and of such a kind?

Megillus/ Scarcely would anyone, looking elsewhere, behold either laws or other polities, conservative of doings beautiful and great, or on the contrary destructive of them, if he neglects these.

Athenian Stranger/ It seems, then, we have by some good fortune come upon a sufficient consideration of this question.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Do not, then, all persons, thou wondrous man, and we too at the present moment, unconsciously fancy perpetually that they see some beautiful thing existing, and which would effect wonders, if a person knew how to use it properly. But now we should ourselves, perhaps, neither think correctly about it, nor

according to nature; and moreover all men err respecting all the other things about which they think in a similar manner.

Megillus/ What do you mean? and about what especially shall we say this speech has been spoken?

Athenian Stranger/ My good man, I have been just now laughing at myself. For upon looking to that very expedition about which we have been conversing, it appeared to me to be very beautiful, and that a wonderful possession would have fallen accidentally to the Greeks, if, as I said, anyone had at that time made a proper use of it.

Megillus/ Did you not say all correctly and with a fixed mind; and did not we properly praise them?

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps so. But I think that everyone, who beholds anything great, and having much power and strength, has immediately this feeling, that if he knew as its possessor how to use it, being of such a kind, and such an age, he would do many and wonderful things, and be happy.

Megillus/ Is not this correct? or how say you?

Athenian Stranger/ Consider now, by looking to what does he, who gives this praise to each thing, speak correctly. Now first, as regards what has been said just now, how would the persons of that period, even if they had known how to draw up an army properly, have, by a complete marshalling, met with the opportunity somehow? Would it not have been, had they put it together securely, and preserved it forever, so that they might be free themselves, and rule over others whom they pleased, and do in short, both themselves and their descendants amongst all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, whatever they desired? Would they not for the sake of these things have felt a desire?

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Has not he too, who, on seeing great wealth, or superior honors arising from a family, or anything

else of this kind, would have said the very same thing, said so, looking to this, as if through this there would come to him all he desires, or the greater part of them, and such as are the most worthy of mention?

Megillus/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ But there is certainly one common desire to all men, which is signified by our present discourse.

Megillus/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ That the things which do take place, should take place at the command of his own soul, all for the most part, but, if not all, at least human affairs.

Megillus/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Since then all of us when children, and men, and grown old, perpetually wish a thing of this kind, we should of necessity pray for that very thing to the end of life.

Megillus/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And we would pray for our friends that which they do for themselves.

Megillus/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Now a son, being a boy, is a friend of his father, being a man.

Megillus/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And yet many of the things which the boy prays may happen to himself, the father would pray the gods that they may not happen according to the prayers of his son.

Megillus/ When, you mean, the son prays, being thoughtless and still young.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; and when the father, being old, or with very youthful feelings, shall, although he knows nothing of what is honorable and just, offer up a prayer with

great fervor in the midst of sufferings, akin to those that happened to Theseus, in the case of the unfortunate Hippolytus, when dying, will the boy, think you, who does know, join in prayer with his father?

Megillus/ I understand what you mean. For you appear to me to assert, that a person ought not to pray, nor be urgent for all things to follow his wishes, but for wishes rather to follow his prudence; and that both a state and each of us ought to pray for and hasten to this, how to possess intellect.

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly. And, moreover, that the statesman and lawgiver ought always to lay down the ordinances of your recollection, what, if we remember, was said, at the commencement, that it was your advice, that a good lawgiver ought to lay down all laws for the sake of war; but it was mine, that this would enjoin him to make laws for one virtue out of four existing; that he ought to look to every virtue, but especially the first, which is the leader of the whole of virtue, and that is prudence, and intellect and opinion together, with love and desire attendant on them. But our discourse has now returned again to the same point; and I now say again, what I then said in jest, if you please, or in earnest, that I assert then, that it is dangerous for a person not possessing intellect to pray; but that it is better for the contrary to his wishes to happen to him. If you are willing to suppose that I am in earnest, suppose it. For I now fully expect to find you following the reasoning we produced a little before, that timidity was not the cause of the destruction of kings, and of the whole of their policy; nor was it because the rulers and they, whom it was meet to be ruled, did not know what relates to war; but they were destroyed by all the remaining depravity, and especially by their ignorance respecting the greatest of human affairs. That these things thus happened at that time, and must so

happen now, if they happen anywhere, and will hereafter happen not otherwise, I will endeavor, if you wish it, to find out, by proceeding according to a discourse in due order, and to show, as far as I can, to you, who are my friends.

Clinias/ To praise you, guest, in words, would be rather offensive; but we shall mightily praise you in deed. For we shall cheerfully follow what is said, by which acts he, who praises as a free-man or not, is most apparent.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak most excellently, Clinias; and let us do as you say.

Clinias/ These things will be so, if god pleases. Only speak.

Athenian Stranger/ We say then, proceeding along the still remaining road of our discourse, that the greatest ignorance destroyed that power at that time, and that it is naturally able to do the same thing now. So that, if this be the case, the lawgiver must endeavor, as far as he can, to infuse prudence into states, and destroy to the utmost thoughtlessness.

Clinias/ It is evident.

Athenian Stranger/ What then may be justly called the greatest ignorance? Consider whether you agree with me in what I am going to say. For I lay it down to be such as this.

Clinias/ Of what kind?

Athenian Stranger/ When anyone does not love, but hates that, which seems to him to be beautiful, or good; but loves and embraces that, which appears to him to be base and unjust, I assert that this discordance, respecting pain and pleasure, with opinion founded on reason, is the extreme of ignorance; and it is the greatest, because it belongs to the mass of the soul. For that part of the soul, which feels pain and pleasure, is what the common people and the mass are in a city. When, therefore, it is opposed to science, or

opinions, or reason, the natural rulers, I call this ignorance; and it is the same as that of a city, when the multitude will not obey the rulers and the laws; and likewise in the case of one man, when although beautiful reasons reside in his soul, yet they do not produce any good effect, but everything the contrary. All these kinds of ignorance I would lay down as the most inordinate, in the case of a state and each individual citizen, but not as applied to handicraftsmen, if, guests, you understand what I mean.

Clinias/ We do understand you, friend, and assent to what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Let this then be laid down as determined upon, and said, that to citizens, who are after this manner ignorant, nothing connected with government is to be committed, but they are to be reproached as ignorant, even though they are very skillful in argument, and have labored at all that is elegant in language, and whatever relates to a quickness of intellect; but that those, who possess qualities contrary to these, are to be called wise, although they should, according to the saying, know neither their letters, nor how to swim, and that power is to be given to them as being prudent persons. For how, friends, can the smallest form of prudence subsist without symphony? It is not possible. But the most beautiful and greatest of symphonies may be most justly called the greatest wisdom; of which he participates, who lives according to reason; but he, who is deficient, is a family-destroyer, and in no respect a savior as regards the city, but, quite the contrary, he will appear to be always ignorant on these points. Let this then, as I just now said, be laid down, as having been spoken of in this manner.

Clinias/ Let it be laid down.

Athenian Stranger/ But it is surely necessary for rulers and ruled to exist in states.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. But of what kind, and how many, are the axioms respecting the ruling and being ruled in the case of great and small states, and similarly in that of families? Is there not one relating to a father and mother? and universally would it not be a correct axiom everywhere that parents should rule over their offspring?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ And the next to this, that men of high birth should rule over those of low birth? and the third, that the more aged should rule, and the younger be ruled?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And the fourth, that slaves should be ruled, and their owners rule?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And the fifth, I think, that the better person should rule, and the worse be ruled?

Clinias/ You speak of a ruling very necessary indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ And one that exists the most in all animals, and is "according to nature," as the Theban Pindar says. But the greatest axiom, as it seems, would be the sixth, which commands the ignorant to follow, but the prudent to lead and rule. And yet, O thou most wise Pindar, I should almost say, that this at least is not contrary to nature, but according to it, for the rule of law to be over willing subjects, and not by an act of violence.

Clinias/ You speak most correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then in speaking of the seventh rule, as being god-loved and fortunate, bring it to a lot-drawing, and say, that he, on whom the lot falls, is most

justly the ruler, but he the ruled, who goes away, after being unsuccessful in the lot.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ We will say then, playing with some one of those who go on with facility to the laying down of laws—Dost thou, O lawgiver, see how many axioms there are relating to rulers, and how they are naturally contrary to each other? For now we have discovered a certain fountain of seditions, to which it is necessary for you to attend. First, consider with us, by erring how and in what point, contrary to these axioms, did the kings of Argos and Messéné destroy themselves, and the power of the Greeks, which at that time was wonderful. Was it not through their not knowing that Hesiod had said most truly, that "the half is often more than the whole?" For, when to receive the whole brings a damage, but in the half is moderation, he held in that case the moderate to be more than the immoderate, as being better than the worse.

Clinias/ Most correctly so.

Athenian Stranger/ But whether think we that this, when it occurs, destroys on each occasion what relates to kings before what exists amongst the people?

Clinias/ It is probable that this is mostly the disease of kings, who live proudly in luxury.

Athenian Stranger/ Is not this evident then, in the first place, that the kings of that time had a power above the established laws? and as to what they had praised both by word and an oath, they did not accord with themselves. But discordance, as we have said, being the greatest ignorance, although appearing to be wisdom, has destroyed all those things through error and a sad want of education.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. But why was it meet for the lawgiver then laying down laws to be cautious about the generation of this disease? Is it, by the gods, at the present time, no wisdom to know this, and not difficult to speak of it? but that, if it had been possible to foresee it then, the person, who foresaw it, would have been wiser than we are?

Megillus/ What kind of thing are you speaking of?

Athenian Stranger/ For a person looking, O Megillus, to what has occurred with you, it is easy to know, and, knowing, to state what ought to have occurred then.

Megillus/ Speak yet more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ Some such thing as this then will be most clear.

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ If anyone gives a power too great to things rather small, by disregarding moderation, —as, for instance, sails to ships, food to bodies, and dominion to dispositions—all things are overturned; for some, by being full of insolence, run into disorders, and others to injustice, the offspring of insolence. What then are we saying? Is it not, my friends, of this kind? that there exists not the nature of a mortal soul, which will be able, when young and not under supervision, to bear the greatest rule amongst men, so as, when filled as to its thinking faculty with folly, which is the greatest disease, not to suffer a hate from his nearest friends; which, when it takes place, is wont to corrupt quickly, and to cause all its power to disappear. To be cautious on this point, through knowing moderation, is the province of great lawgivers. Hence what took place at that time, it is now easy to perceive. It appears to have been this.

Megillus/ Of what kind?

Athenian Stranger/ Some god, I think, is taking care of you; who, through foreseeing future events, and planting for

you the twofold generation of kings descended from one, has contracted you rather to a moderate state; and after this a certain human nature, mixed up with a certain divine power, did, perceiving your government to be still in an inflamed state, mingle the temperate power of old age with the self-willed strength of noble birth, and made equal with the power of the kings the vote of twenty-eight old men in matters of the greatest moment. But your third savior, perceiving your government swelling with desire and passion, placed upon it the power of the Ephori, as a bit, and led it near the power which is chosen by lot. And by this arrangement the kingly power with you, being mingled with such things as were proper, and possessing moderation, was both preserved itself, and became the cause of preservation to others. For under the rule of Temenus and Cresphontes, and the lawgivers of that time, if indeed they were lawgivers, not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been saved. For they were not then sufficiently skilled in legislation; for, had they been so, they never would have thought to moderate by oaths a youthful spirit, when receiving a power from which it was possible for a tyranny to arise. But now the deity has shown what kind of government it was and is necessary to be, that is about to continue the longest. But that these things should be known by us, as I said before, now that they have happened, is no feat of wisdom. For from a model already existing, it is not difficult to see. But if anyone had then foreseen these things, and had been able to render governments moderate, and to form one out of three, he would have preserved all the beautiful conceptions of that time, and neither the Persian expedition, nor any other, would have come against Greece, through despising us as being of little account.

Clinias/ You speak the truth.

Athenian Stranger/ Hence, Clinias, they defended themselves shamefully. Now by shamefully I mean, not that the persons of that time did not conquer by sea and land, and gain honorable victories; but what I call shameful at that time, I say is this. In the first place, that, out of those three states, only one fought in defense of Greece, but the other two were so miserably corrupted, that one of them Messéné prevented Lacedæmon from assisting her, Greece, by warring against it with all its strength; but the other, which had the first share at that period in the distribution, that about Argos, did, when called upon to repel the Barbarian, neither give ear nor assistance. But by detailing many things that occurred then relating to that war, a person might bring a charge against Greece by no means of a pleasant kind; nor would he, who should say that Greece defended herself, speak correctly; since, unless the policy in common of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had warded off the slavery coming against them, there would have been mixed together nearly all the races of Greeks with each other, and Barbarians with Greeks, and Greeks with Barbarians; just as those, over whom the Persians are now the tyrants, are, after being carried away separately or together, and scattered abroad, made to settle down in a miserable state. This, Clinias and Megillus, is what we have to urge against the men of old, called politicians and legislators, and likewise those of the present day, in order that, by seeking out the causes, we may discover what else besides these ought to have been done, as we say for the present, that it is not meet to lay down great or unmixed powers of rule, through considering this, that it is requisite for a state to be free and intellectual, and a friend to itself, and that a legislator ought looking to these points, to lay down laws. And let us not wonder if, after proposing other things, we have frequently said that the legislator ought to look to

these, while laying down laws, and that what have been proposed do not appear to us to be the same. But it is proper to infer that, when we say the legislator ought to look to temperance, or prudence, or friendship, our design is not different, but the same; and let not many other expressions of that kind, should they occur, disturb you.

Clinias/ We will endeavor to do so by recurring to your reasoning. But for the present explain, what you mean by saying with respect to friendship, and liberty, and prudence, that a legislator ought to aim at those objects.

Athenian Stranger/ Hear then now. There are, as it were, two mothers of polities, from which he, who says that all the rest are produced, will speak correctly. Now one of these it is right to call a monarchy, but the other a democracy; and to say that the race of the Persians possess the extreme of the one; but we of the other. Now nearly all the rest are, as I have said, variously formed from these. It is proper then, and necessary for a state to participate in both these, if there is to be freedom and friendship in conjunction with prudence. Now this our discourse intends to enjoin, by saying that a city is unable to be beautifully governed, while it is destitute of these properties.

Clinias/ For how can it?

Athenian Stranger/ When therefore the one embraces monarchy alone, but the other liberty more than is proper, neither of them possess what is moderate in these. Your cities however in Laconia and Crete possess it more than others; and so too did the Athenians and Persians formerly, but now less so. Shall we go through the causes of this, or not?

Clinias/ By all means, if we wish to bring to an end what we have proposed for ourselves.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us hear then. The Persians under Cyrus possessed more of moderation in slavery and freedom. At first they were free, but afterwards the masters of many others. For by sharing as rulers their freedom with the ruled, and leading them to an equality, the soldiers became greater friends with their commanders, and conducted themselves with alacrity in dangers. And if anyone among them was intelligent and competent to give advice, as the king was not envious, and granted a liberty of speech, and honored those, who were able to advise anything, he brought into the midst of all the common power of intellect; and at that time everything exhibited an improvement, through liberty, and friendship, and a communion of intellect.

Clinias/ It appears somehow that what has been stated did so occur.

Athenian Stranger/ How then was that government almost destroyed under Cambyses, and again restored under Darius? Are you willing for us, while thinking, to make use, as it were, of divination.

Clinias/ This at least brings our inquiry to the point, whither we have been hastening.

Athenian Stranger/ Respecting Cyrus, then, I thus divine; that in other respects he was a good general, and a lover of his country, but that he had not laid hold at all of a correct education, nor applied his mind to the regulation of his household.

Clinias/ How shall we say a thing of this kind?

Athenian Stranger/ He appears from his youth to have passed his life in the army, and to have committed to women the bringing up of his boys. Now these brought them up as persons fortunate immediately from their childhood, and born blessed, and indigent of nothing of these. Hence they forbade anyone to oppose them in any respect, as being

sufficiently fortunate; and compelling everyone to praise what was said or done by them, they brought them up being some such.

Clinias/ You have detailed, as it seems, a beautiful education.

Athenian Stranger/ At least a feminine one, the women princesses having become recently rich, and bringing up the boys, during a scarcity of men, through the men not having leisure to do so in consequence of wars and many dangers.

Clinias/ So goes the story.

Athenian Stranger/ But their father possessed cattle and sheep and many herds of men, and of many other animals; but he was ignorant that those, to whom he was to hand down all these things, were not instructed in his country's trade, which was a rough one, as the Persians were shepherds, the children of a rugged land, and competent to render the shepherds very strong, and able to live out of doors, and to be without sleep, and, if required, to become soldiers. But he disregarded the corruption of education by the so-called happiness of Media, and by his sons being instructed by women and eunuchs; from whence they became such as it was likely for those to become, who are brought up in luxury unreproved. Upon the death of Cyrus his sons came into the possession of power, and being full of luxury and without reproof, at first one of them slew the other, through brooking ill an equality; and subsequently the survivor Cambyses becoming mad through drinking and a want of education, lost his power through the Medes and the then called Eunuch, who viewed with contempt his silly conduct.

Clinias/ These things also are reported, and it seems they somehow happened nearly in this manner.

Athenian Stranger/ And it is said moreover that the power came again to the Persians through Darius and the seven.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then take a view, following out the reasoning. For Darius was not the son of a king, nor brought up in a luxurious manner. But coming to power, and receiving it, he divided it, himself the seventh sharer, into seven portions, of which there are at present left some small dream-like remnants, and he thought proper to live, laying down laws and introducing a kind of equality common to all; and he bound under law the tribute, which Cyrus had promised the Persians, and infusing into all the Persians a feeling of interest, he attached to himself the masses in Persia, by money and gifts. His armies therefore did with a good will add countries to his power not less in number than what Cyrus had left. After Darius came Xerxes, who was again brought up with a royal and luxurious education. But it may be most just to say perhaps, "O Darius, thou hast not learned the evil conduct of Cyrus, but hast brought up Xerxes in the same manners, as Cyrus did Cambyses. He therefore, as being a child of the same education, has brought to pass what is very near to the sufferings of Cambyses; and from that time scarcely a single Persian king has become truly great except in name. Now the cause of this was not fortune, but, according to my reasoning, the vicious life, which the sons of those, who were remarkably rich and tyrannical, for the most part lived. "For neither boy, nor man, nor old person, will ever become superior in virtue from such an education." And these are the matters which we say should be considered by a legislator, and by us likewise at present. But it is just, O Lacedæmonians, to give this praise to your state, that you never distribute any superior honor or food to poverty or wealth, or to a private station or a kingly one, which the oracle from some god has

not at the first prophetically enjoined. For it is not proper in a state, to distribute to anyone superior honors, because he is superior in wealth; nor because he is swift-footed, or handsome, or robust, without some virtue, and not in the case of a virtue even, from which temperance is excluded.

Megillus/ How, guest, say you this?

Athenian Stranger/ Fortitude is surely one part of virtue.

Megillus/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Judge then yourself, after hearing my reasoning, whether you would admit any fellow-dweller or neighbor to be very brave, when not temperate, but profligate?

Megillus/ Speak good words.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, that an artist is wise in things of his art, but unjust?

Megillus/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ But justice could not be produced without temperance.

Megillus/ How could it?

Athenian Stranger/ Nor could he, whom we just now laid down to be wise, as possessing pleasures and pains, in harmony with, and following right reason.

Megillus/ Certainly not.

Athenian Stranger/ But let us still consider this too, touching the bestowing of honors in states, of what kind do they take place properly or not on each occasion.

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Whether temperance, if it be alone in a soul without all the rest of virtue, can justly be a thing either of honor or dishonor?

Megillus/ I know not what to say.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak with moderation. For had you said either the one or the other, about which I asked the question, you would have appeared to me at least to have spoken beside the measure.

Megillus/ It would then have turned out well.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. The addition then relating to honors and dishonors will be worthy not of a discourse, but rather of some irrational silence.

Megillus/ You appear to me to mean temperance.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes. But that which benefits us the most of the others, would, in addition to its being honored the most, be honored the most justly; and that which is second in benefit would be second in honor; and thus each thing obtaining, according to the reasoning in succession, its honors in due order, would obtain them justly.

Megillus/ Such is the case.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, shall we not say that it is the business of the legislator to distribute these?

Megillus/ And very much So.

Athenian Stranger/ Are you then willing for us to allow him to distribute all things, both pertaining to each work, and to trifling particulars? But with respect to making a triple division, let us endeavor, since we also are somehow desirous of laws, to divide the greatest, second, and third, apart from each other.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ We say then that a state ought, as it seems, if it is about to be preserved happy to the utmost of human power, necessarily to distribute honors and dishonors in a proper manner. Now to do so properly, it is for the good things pertaining to the soul, to be laid down as the most honorable and the first in rank, temperance at the

same time being present to it the soul; and as the second in rank, the things beautiful and good pertaining to the body; and as the third in rank, the things pertaining to property and riches. But if any legislator or state proceeds beyond these, by leading either riches to honors, or by placing by means of honors in the foremost rank any of the things in the rear, he will do a deed neither holy nor statesman-like. Is this to be held as said, or how?

Megillus/ Let it be held as said clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ The inquiry into the Persian polity has caused us to speak to a greater length on these points. And we find that they became much worse still; and we say the reason was, that through their taking away too much of liberty from the people, and introducing a despotic power more than was proper, they destroyed the feeling of friendship and of a common interest in the city; and that, when this is destroyed, the deliberations of the rulers are not engaged in behalf of the governed and the people, but for their own power; and should they think that something more, even if it were little, would accrue to themselves, they would, by destroying with fire cities overturned, and by treating friendly nations in an hostile and unpitying manner, at once hate and be hated. But when they come to the people during a time of need to fight for them, they find in them no such communion of interest, that anyone is willing with alacrity to run a risk and to fight; and though they possess myriads, not to be defined in a calculation, yet they are all useless for war; and, as if in want of men, they hire some, and think they will be saved by mercenary and foreign troops; and added to this, they are compelled to act the part of simpletons, proclaiming by their acts, that the things constantly called honorable or beautiful in a state are a trifle as compared with silver and gold.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let then the subject of the affairs of the Persians, which are now administered not correctly through excessive slavery and despotism, have an end.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But after this it is proper for us to go through in a similar manner the polity of Attica, that it may appear how perfect liberty even, exempt from all rule, is not a little worse than that, which has a moderation in rule under others. For at the time, when the Persian invasion took place against the Greeks, and perhaps against almost all the inhabitants of Europe, our polity had been of long standing; and we had some four institutions framed with reference to a property-census; and a certain modesty too at that time was a despot, through which we were then willing to live in subjection to the laws. In addition to this, the magnitude of the expedition, extending over land and sea, brought on a fear not to be overcome, and caused us to endure a still greater submission to the rulers and the laws. And on all these accounts a violent friendship came upon us towards ourselves. For nearly ten years before the naval battle at Salamis, Datis had arrived, leading the Persian expedition of Darius, who had sent him distinctly against the Athenians and Eretrians, to reduce them to slavery, and to carry them off; and proclaiming death to him, if he did not do so. And Datis did in a very short time with his many myriads and by main force subdue them entirely; and he sent a certain dreadful report to our city, that not one of the Eretrians had escaped him; for that the soldiers of Datis had by joining hands to hands got, as into a net, the whole of Eretria. This report, whether arriving true or in any way whatever, struck with terror the other Greeks, and the Athenians likewise; and on their sending ambassadors everywhere, no one was willing to assist them, except the Lacedæmonians; and even they, through the war then raging

against Messéné, or whether something else, as alleged, prevented them, —for we know not, —arrived one day later than the battle that took place at Marathon. After this, mighty preparations and innumerable threats are said to have come from the king. But as time went on, Darius was reported to have died, and his son, young and violent, to have received from him the government, and by no means to have desisted from his father's undertaking. Now the Athenians were of opinion, that the whole of this preparation was against themselves, on account of what had occurred at Marathon; and hearing of Athos being dug through, and of the shores of the Hellespont being united, and of the great number of the vessels, they thought there was no safety for themselves by land or sea; for that none would assist them; as they recollected that, even when the Persians had come before, and had done thoroughly for the Eretrians, not one had given them assistance then, or had run a risk by fighting with them; and they expected the same thing would then take place, at least by land; and on the other hand, by sea they saw a want of all means of safety, since more than a thousand ships were being brought against them. They thought, however, upon a single source of safety, slender indeed and dubious, yet the only one, through their looking to what had previously occurred, how even then victory had appeared to spring out of difficulties, as they were fighting. Carried along upon this hope, they found their refuge rested in themselves alone and in the gods. All these things then engendered in them a friendship with each other, both the fear which was then present, and that which had been produced by the laws before, and which they had felt, when they were submitting to their former laws; a fear which we have frequently in the preceding discourse called modesty; to which we have said all must be subservient, who are about to become good men; and of which he who is the slave

is free and fearless; whom had not this fear seized, he would never have quickly come and defended himself and aided the sacred places, and tombs, and country, and all the rest of household ties, and friends, as he did aid at that time; but each of us would at that period have been routed in small parties, and scattered one hither and another thither.

Megillus/ And very much so, guest; and correctly have you spoken, and in a manner becoming both to yourself and country.

Athenian Stranger/ Such is the case, Megillus. For it is just to mention to you, what happened at that time, as being a sharer in the nature of your parents. But do you and Clinias consider, whether we say what is suited to legislation. For I do not go through these matters for the sake of telling a story, but for the sake of what I am saying. For look ye. Since the same circumstance has in a certain manner happened to us, that did to the Persians, while they were leading the people to every kind of slavery, but we, on the contrary, turning the masses to every kind of freedom, how and what shall we say henceforth? The reasons that have previously occurred to us, have in a certain manner been detailed correctly.

Megillus/ You speak well. But endeavor to point out to us still more clearly what has been said just now.

Athenian Stranger/ This shall be. The people was not, my friends, according to the laws of old, the master of any, but did after a certain manner obey willingly the laws.

Megillus/ Of what laws are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ Those relating in the first place to music as then existing—in order that we may detail from the beginning the great progress made in a life of freedom. For music was then divided by us according to certain kinds and figures of itself; and prayers to the gods was a kind of ode,

and they were called by the name of hymns; and the contrary to this was another kind of ode, and a person would have called it lamentations for the most part; and another was Pæans, and another the birth of Dionysus, called, I think, a Dithyramb: and they have called laws by this very name, as being another ode; and they have given the additional name of "harp music." After these and some others had been ordained, it was not lawful to use one kind for another. But the authority to know any of these, and, after knowing, at the same time to judge of them, and to fine the person not obedient, was not the whistle nor certain uneducated noises of the multitude, as at present, nor yet the clatterings that express praise, but it was decreed that persons, who were conversant with education, should themselves hear to the end in silence; but for boys, and boy-leaders, and the numerous vulgar, there was the admonition by a rod putting them in order. These things having been thus ordained, the multitude of citizens were willing to be ruled, and not to dare to judge in a tumultuous manner. After this, as time went on, the poets themselves became the leaders of this uneducated lawlessness; being naturally indeed poetical, but ignorant with respect to what is just and lawful in music, they were acting like Bacchants, and possessed with joy more than was becoming, and were mingling lamentations with hymns, and Pæans with dithyrambs, and imitated with harp music the music of the hautboy, and by bringing together all things to all they involuntarily, through their ignorance, asserted falsely that music did not possess any correctness whatever; but that it might be judged of most correctly by the pleasure of the party gratified, whether he were a better person or a worse. Composing, therefore, works of this kind, and adding to them words of this kind, they infused into the multitude a lawlessness with respect to music, and a daring of their being competent to judge.

Hence theatres, from being silent, came to be noisy, as if capable of understanding what is beautiful or not in music; and instead of an aristocracy in it, a certain depraved theatrocracy was produced. For if only a democracy of free men had existed, nothing very dreadful would have taken place; but now from music there began an opinion with us respecting the wisdom of all men in all things, and a lawlessness, and after these did a licentiousness follow. For men became fearless, as if endued with knowledge; and this absence of fear generated shamelessness. For through boldness to feel no fear of the opinion of a better person, is almost a depraved shamelessness, resulting from a certain liberty that has dared too much.

Megillus/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ And consequent upon this liberty, there would arise that of being unwilling to submit to rulers; and following this, to fly from the submission to, and admonition of, a father and mother and elders, and to the being near the point of seeking to be not subject to laws; and having arrived at that point, to think nothing at all of oaths and faith and the gods; by exhibiting and imitating the ancient Titanic nature, as it is called, so that, by again arriving at those same things, they led a life of difficulty, and never ceased from ills. On what account then has this been said by us? It appears that I at least ought to pull up a discourse, like a horse, on each occasion, and not, by having its mouth without a bridle, to be carried away forcibly, and, according to the proverb, fall from the discourse, as from an ass. But I again ask what was just now said. On what account has this been mentioned?

Megillus/ Correctly so.

Athenian Stranger/ This then has been said on account of those?

Megillus/ Whom?

Athenian Stranger/ We have said that a legislator ought in laying down laws to aim at three things, how the state may, by being legislated for, become free, and friendly to itself, and possess a mind. These were the objects. Is it not so?

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ For the sake of this we selected two kinds of government, one most despotic, and the other most free; and we were considering which of these is rightly administered. But on laying hold of each of them, as regards a certain moderation, on the part of some to be despots, and of others to be free, we saw that then in moderation prosperity resulted to them in an eminent degree, but that when each party was proceeding to the extreme, the one, of slavery, and the other, of the contrary, no benefit had accrued to either these or those.

Megillus/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ And moreover, for the sake of these things, we looked into both the Doric army, and the country under the Dardan mountains, and the settlement by the sea, and first those persons who remained after the deluge; and moreover we had a previous conversation about music and drunkenness, and on subjects still prior to these. For all this has been mentioned, for the sake of seeing, how a state may be best administered, and how everyone may individually best pass through life. Now, if we have done anything of importance, what proof of error can be brought, Megillus and Clinias, against us?

Clinias/ I seem to myself, O guest, to have something in my mind. For it appears that the subjects of all the discourse, we have gone through, have arisen through some good fortune. For I have come almost in want of them at the

present moment; and both you and Megillus here are by some opportune accident present. For I will not conceal from you what has just now occurred to me, but I will make it a kind of omen. For the greatest part of Crete is attempting at present to establish a certain colony, and orders the Cnossians to take the care of the matter; but the city of the Cnossians imposes it upon me and nine others; and at the same time orders us to lay down laws taken from this place, if any are pleasing to us, and, if there are any, from elsewhere, making no account of their foreign character, should they appear to be better. Let us then grant this favor to myself and you. After making a selection out of what has been said, let us in our discourse form a state, and colonize it, as if from its commencement; and there will be to us at the same time an inquiry into what we are in search of, and at the same time I may perhaps make use of this formation for the city that is to be.

Athenian Stranger/ You are not, O guest, proclaiming a war. And, unless there is some opposition on the part of Megillus, conceive that everything on my side will be to the best of my power according to your mind.

Clinias/ You speak well.

Megillus/ And on my side likewise.

Clinias/ You both have spoken most beautifully. Let us then endeavor, in the first place, to form in our discourse a state.

Book 4.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, what kind of state must we imagine it is to be? I mean that I am not asking what is its name now, nor what it will be necessary to call it in after-time; for this perhaps its colonization, or some spot, or the surname of some river or fountain, or of the gods of the place, may give their own appellation to the new state; but this is rather what I wish to ask concerning it, whether it is near the sea, or inland?

Clinias/ The state, of which we are now speaking, is, O guest, distant from the sea nearly eighty stadia.

Athenian Stranger/ Are there any harbors along it, or is it entirely harborless?

Clinias/ It has, as far as is possible, very good harbors, O guest.

Athenian Stranger/ Ho! ho! What say you? But is the country about it likewise all-prolific, or is it wanting in some things?

Clinias/ It is nearly in want of nothing.

Athenian Stranger/ Will there be any neighboring state near to it?

Clinias/ Not very; on which account it is colonized. For an expulsion of the inhabitants having taken place of old in that spot, caused the country to be desolate for an immense space of time.

Athenian Stranger/ But with respect to plains, and mountains, and woods, how has it obtained by lot a portion of each?

Clinias/ It is wholly similar to the rest of Crete.

Athenian Stranger/ Would you say it is more rough than plain?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ It is not therefore incurably unfit for the acquisition of virtue. For, if it were near the sea, and had good harbors, but not all-productive, but wanting in many things, it would require for itself some powerful preserver, and certain divine lawgivers, unless being such naturally, it had been about to acquire many various and depraved manners. But now it has some consolation from its distance of eighty stadia. It is situated indeed nearer the sea than is becoming, by nearly as much that it has, as you state, good harbors. There is however this desirable circumstance. For a sea, being near to a country, brings something pleasant each day, although it is in reality a very brackish and bitter neighbor. For filling it through retail-trading with foreign commerce and money-making, it begets in the disposition a moral conduct tost backwards and forwards, and not to be trusted, and renders the state faithless and unfriendly to itself and to other nations likewise. It possesses however against these evils a consolation in being all-productive; since if it were rugged, it is evident that it would not be very productive and all-productive at the same time. For possessing this advantage, by possessing a great export-trade, it would in return be filled with gold and silver coin in abundance; than which a greater evil cannot, so to say, exist, comparing one thing with another, in a state, as regards the possession of manners generous and just, as we stated, if we remember, in our previous discourse.

Clinias/ We do recollect; and we concede that we were then and we are now speaking correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ But how is the country situated as regards timber for ship-building?

Clinias/ There is not any fir worth mentioning, or pine, and not much cypress; and a person would find little of larch, or plane-trees, which it is necessary for shipwrights to make use of for the inner parts of vessels.

Athenian Stranger/ And this too would not be ill for the nature of the country.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Because it is good for a city to be unable to imitate easily its enemies in mischievous imitations.

Clinias/ To which of the subjects that have been mentioned have you, after looking, said what you are now stating?

Athenian Stranger/ Do thou, O excellent man, watch me, looking to what was said at the beginning, the question about the Cretan laws, how they looked to one thing. And you two asserted that this very thing was what regards war; but I, taking you up, said, that when such laws, being laid down, looked to virtue, it was well; but when only to a part, but not to the whole almost of virtue, I did not entirely agree. Do you then still again watch my present legislation, while following me, if perchance I lay down any law not tending to virtue, or to a part of virtue. For I make it a fundamental position, that he alone lays down a law correctly, who, like an archer, ever aims at that, on which alone some of those things that are ever beautiful follow close, but who leaves all the rest, whether it be wealth or anything else of that kind, which happens to exist without those before mentioned. And I said on one side, that the imitation of enemies would be then mischievous, when anyone residing near the sea is annoyed by enemies, as for instance—for I will relate it to you, although not wishing to remind you of a past annoyance—when Minos imposed the payment of a tribute upon the inhabitants of Attica, through his having acquired a great power by sea. But the Athenians did not at that period possess, as they do now, ships of war, nor a country abounding in wood, suited for ship-building, so as to exhibit

with facility a naval power. Hence they could not, through nautical imitation, become immediately sailors themselves at that time, and defend themselves against their enemies. And it would have been for their advantage to have lost many times seven young men, before suffering what happened to them. For, instead of being foot-soldiers, with heavy arms, and remaining firm, they were accustomed, on becoming sailors, frequently to leap with a run into and upon the vessels, and to come back again quickly; and to think they were doing nothing disgraceful in not daring to die, by waiting for the attacks of the enemy advancing; and there were pretexts plausible and ready to those throwing away their arms, and making, as they said, not disgraceful flights; for language of this kind is wont to arise from naval heavy-armed troops—language by no means worthy of unbounded praise, but very much the contrary. For it is never proper to accustom persons to mischievous habits, and this too the best part of the citizens. And it is surely possible to understand this from Homer, that such conduct is not honorable. For with him Ulysses abuses Agamemnon for exhorting the Greeks, at that time pressed down by the Trojans in fight, to draw down their ships to the sea, and he Ulysses is harsh against him Agamemnon, and says;

> Thou bid'st, while e'en of war, still standing round,
> The clamor's heard, our well-bench'd ships to drag
> Seaward, that, what the Trojans oft have wish'd,
> Their prayers may be accomplish'd, and 'gainst us
> The scale from on high Death turn. But ne'er will Greeks
> Hold to the fight, while ships to sea are drawn;
> But frighten'd look, and from the fray retreat.
> Such hurt will bring the counsel thou dost preach.

He too knew then that three-banked galleys standing near were an evil to heavy-armed soldiers while fighting at sea.

For even lions would, by adopting similar conduct, be accustomed to fly from stags. Moreover the states, when power and safety depend upon a navy, do not bestow honors on the most beautiful of warlike concerns. For an account of the pilot's art, and the rower's art, and that which is connected with persons of various kinds and of no great worth, no one could bestow upon each individual honors in a proper manner. And yet how can a polity deprived of this exist correctly?

Clinias/ It is nearly impossible. But yet, O guest, we Cretans say that the naval battle, which took place at Salamis, of the Greeks against the Barbarians, has preserved Greece.

Athenian Stranger/ And indeed many both of the Greeks and Barbarians assert the same thing. But we, my friend, both I and Megillus here, say, that the battle of foot-soldiers at Marathon and Platæa did one of them begin, and the other complete, the safety of the Greeks; and some made the Greeks better, but some not better, so to say of the battles that conjointly saved us at that time; for to the naval battle at Salamis I will add the one at Artemisium. But now, looking to the virtue of a polity, let us consider the nature of the region, and the order of the laws; not thinking, as the many do, that to be preserved and to exist is alone to mankind the most honorable of all things, but to become the best, and to continue to be so, for as long a period as they may live. But this, I think, has been stated by us in the former part of our discourse.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then consider this alone, whether we are proceeding in the same path as being the best for states, touching their settlement and legislation.

Clinias/ Let us do so very much.

Athenian Stranger/ Tell me, then, what is next in order to this, what are the people, who are to be the colonists; whether anyone may go, who is willing from the whole of Crete, since the masses have become in the cities more numerous than according to the quantity of food to-be got from the land? For you surely do not bring together whoever of the Greeks is willing to go. And yet I see that some persons from Argos, and Ægina, and other parts of Greece, have settled themselves in the country amongst you. But for the present, tell me, from whence do you say there will be an army of citizens?

Clinias/ It seems it will be from the whole of Crete; and of the rest of the Greeks it appears that the colonizers will receive persons from Peloponnesus, as fellow-settlers for the most part. For, what you were saying just now, you said truly, that there are some from Argos, and the race, which has the highest character here at present, is that of Gortyna, because it happens to have settled there from Gortyna in the Peloponnesus.

Athenian Stranger/ The establishment of a colony would not take place in states with equal facility, when one family, like a swarm of bees, going from one country settles down, friends from friends, after having been, as it were, besieged by a certain want of space, or compelled by some other sufferings of a similar kind. For it sometimes happens that a part of a city is forcibly driven out by seditions and compelled to migrate as strangers to some other spot; and sometimes a whole city has exiled itself, after being thoroughly vanquished in war. In all these cases then it is easy for one to be colonized and governed by laws, but difficult for another. For when a colony is of one race, and has the same language, and the same laws, it possesses a kind of friendship, as being a partaker in the same holy rites, and everything else of a similar kind, nor does it easily

endure other laws, and a polity foreign to what it had at home. And sometimes a colony, having revolted through the badness of its laws, and through custom still seeking to adopt the very same habits as those, by which it was previously corrupted, becomes refractory and disobedient to its colonizer and legislator. But on the other hand a colony, composed of all kinds of people flowing together to the same point, will perhaps be more willingly obedient to certain new laws; but to conspire together, and, like a pair of horses to froth together, as the saying is, individually to the same point, is the work of a long time and very difficult. Nevertheless legislation and the colonization of states is a thing the most effective of all for virtue in man.

Clinias/ It is probable; but tell me more clearly, looking to what have you said this?

Athenian Stranger/ I appear to myself, good sir, while praising and speculating about legislators, to be about to say something unimportant. But if we shall say aught opportunely, it would be no matter. And yet why do I feel a difficulty? for nearly all human affairs appear to exist in this manner.

Clinias/ Of what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ I was about to say, that no man is ever a legislator; but that fortune and all kinds of accidents, happening in all kinds of ways, are our legislators. For either a war by violence has overturned polities and changed laws, or the want of s means arising from severe poverty. Many innovations too diseases compel men to make, through pestilences falling upon them, and unfavorable seasons during many years. He then, who foresees all this, will be eager to exclaim, as I just now did, that no mortal was ever a legislator, but that nearly all human affairs are accidents; and that it is possible for him, who asserts all this respecting

navigation, and the arts of the pilot, and physician, and general, to appear to speak correctly. But on the other hand, it is equally possible for the person to appear to speak correctly on these points, who says this.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That a god, and, together with a god, fortune and opportunity govern all human affairs; but that it is necessary to admit that art, a somewhat milder power, follows them. For on the occasion of a storm I should consider it a thing of great moment for the pilot's art to take a part, or not. Or how say you?

Clinias/ Thus.

Athenian Stranger/ Will not the same reasoning apply similarly in the case of other things? And we must attribute the very same principle to legislation; that, other things concurring which ought to happen to a country, if it is about to live happily, it is requisite for a legislator, who adheres to truth, to fall on each occasion upon a state of such a kind.

Clinias/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Would not he then, who possesses an art for each of the above-mentioned occasions, be justly able to pray for something to be present with him through fortune, should he be wanting only in art?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And all the rest just now mentioned would, if commanded to tell their prayers, say so. Is it not so?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And a legislator likewise would, I think, do the same.

Clinias/ So I think.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, Legislator, and say—for let us address him—a city possessing what, and being in what state, shall we give you, and you take and hold, so that you may administer sufficiently, from the things remaining, the city? What is it possible to assert rightly after this? Shall we not say surely something belonging to the legislator? For it is meet.

Clinias/ It is.

Athenian Stranger/ This. Give me a city governed by a tyrant, he will say; and let the tyrant be a young man, of a good memory, and docile, and brave, and naturally of a magnificent disposition; and let that, which, we said before, ought to follow all the parts of virtue, now accompany the soul of the tyrant, if there is about to be any benefit from the presence of the other qualities.

Clinias/ Our guest, Megillus, appears to me to say that temperance should follow the other virtues. Is it not so?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, temperance, Clinias, in its popular sense, and not that, which anyone in solemn phrase would call prudence, and compel it to be temperance; but that feeling which, inherent in boys and savage animals, bursts into flower on the instant, so that some are incontinent with respect to pleasures, but others continent; and which we said, when it exists apart from the many things called good, is not worth mention. For you understand what I am saying?

Clinias/ Perfectly.

Athenian Stranger/ This nature, then, let our tyrant possess in addition to those mentioned above, if the city is about to have a polity in the quickest and best manner possible, and on the receiving of which it may live the most happily. For, there neither is, nor will there ever be, the establishment of a polity more rapid or better than this.

Clinias/ But how, O guest, and by what argument would anyone, who asserts this, persuade himself that he is speaking correctly?

Athenian Stranger/ It is easy, Clinias, to understand how this is so naturally.

Clinias/ How say you? Do you assert, if the tyrant is a young man, temperate, docile, of a good memory, brave, and magnificent?

Athenian Stranger/ Add too fortunate in nothing else, except in that during his time a legislator is existing worthy of praise, and that a certain fortune leads the two to the same point. For, on this taking place, there is brought to pass by a god nearly everything which is done, when he wishes any state to be eminently prosperous; and in the second degree, when two rulers are of such a kind; and in the third degree, when three; and in a similar proportion more difficult, as the rulers are more numerous; but, the contrary, by how much the contrary happens.

Clinias/ You assert, as it seems, that the best state would result from a tyranny, in conjunction with a superior legislator and a well-regulated tyrant; and that it would most easily and rapidly change into that from such a kind as this; and that the second in degree is from an oligarchy; and the third in degree, from a democracy. Is it not so?

Athenian Stranger/ By no means. But the first is produced from a tyranny; the second, from a regal polity; the third, from a certain democracy; but with respect to the fourth, an oligarchy would be able to receive a generation of this kind with the utmost difficulty. For in it there are the greatest number of the powerful. Now we say, that these things then take place, when a legislator is naturally true, and when there exists in him a strength in common with those, who possess the greatest influence in the state. But

where this exists the fewest in number, but at the same time the most strong, as in the case of a tyranny, in this way and then there is wont to take place a rapidity and easiness in the change.

Clinias/ How? For we do not understand.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet I think this has been said by us, not once, but often. But perhaps you never saw a state under a tyrant.

Clinias/ Nor am I desirous of such a spectacle.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet you may see it in the one just now spoken of.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That the tyrant, who wishes to change the habits of a state, has no need either of great labor, or any very long time for the accomplishment of his purpose. For it is necessary that he should proceed the first in whatever road he wishes, either to turn the citizens to the pursuit of virtue, or the contrary, and mark out the course by acting himself the first, and praising and honoring some things, but bringing a blame upon others, and disgracing the party that is disobedient in each of these doings.

Clinias/ And how can we imagine that the other citizens will quickly follow him, who has obtained such persuasion, and at the same time force?

Athenian Stranger/ Let no one persuade us, friends, that a state has ever changed its laws more quickly and easily by any other way than the leading of its rulers, or that this happens now by any other means, or will happen ever again. For that indeed is neither impossible for us, nor would it be done with difficulty. But this is the thing difficult to be done, and has rarely taken place in a long time; although, when it does happen, it produces in the state, in which it is found, ten thousand, or rather every good thing.

Clinias/ Of what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ When a divine love of temperate and just pursuits is inherent in certain mighty powers, whether they rule according to a monarchy, or a marked superiority in wealth or family, or should anyone bring back the nature of Nestor, who they say excelled all men in the power of speaking, and still more in temperance. But this, as they say, took place in the times of Troy, but in ours not at all. If then such a man existed formerly, or shall exist, or is at present amongst us, he lives in a blessed state, and blessed too are those, who hear the words proceeding from his temperate mouth. Of a similar kind is the reasoning respecting all power, that, when the greatest power of a man falls to the same point with the acting prudently and temperately, then the production of the best polity and of such kind of laws takes place, but otherwise it will never be. Let this then be held to be spoken oracularly, as if it were a story detailed, and to have been shown, that in one way it is difficult for a state to have good laws, and in another, that, if what we have said should take place, it would have them in a manner the quickest and the easiest by far.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us now endeavor, by adapting our laws to your state, to mold it, as old men do boys, by our discourse.

Clinias/ Let us go this road, and no longer delay.

Athenian Stranger/ But let us call upon a god for the preparation of the state. And may he hear, and hearing come to us, in a propitious and kind manner, to adorn, in conjunction with us, the state and laws!

Clinias/ May he come!

Athenian Stranger/ But what kind of polity have we in our mind to enjoin upon the state?

Clinias/ Inform me still more clearly what you wish to say; for instance, whether it is a certain democracy, or oligarchy, or aristocracy, or a regal government. For you would not surely speak of a tyranny, as we should imagine.

Athenian Stranger/ Come, then, which of you is willing to answer first, by stating what is the polity at home?

Megillus/ Is it not more just for myself, who am the elder, to speak first?

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Megillus/ When I consider, guest, the polity of Lacedæmon, I am unable to tell you what I ought to call it thus. For it appears to me to be similar to a tyranny. For the power of the Ephori in it is wonderfully tyrannical. And yet it sometimes appears to me to be the most similar of all states to a democracy. But, on the other hand, not to say that it is an aristocracy, is perfectly absurd. There is in it likewise the office of a king for life, which is said, both by all men, and by us too, to be the most ancient of all. On being then asked thus suddenly, I cannot, as I have said, by a definition, tell you which of these polities it is.

Clinias/ I too, Megillus, appear to be affected in the same manner as yourself. For I am quite at a loss as to which of these I should firmly assert the polity in Cnossus to be.

Athenian Stranger/ For you, most excellent men, do really participate in polities. But those, which we now name such, are not polities, but settlements of cities, ruled over, and a slave to some portions of each other, and each is denominated from the power of the ruler. But if it were meet for a city to be called after this manner, it ought to be called by the name of the god, who is the ruler of those that possess truly a mind.

Clinias/ Who is this god?

Athenian Stranger/ Must we then still to a small extent make use of a fable, if we are about to explain in a careful manner what has been just now asked? Is it not meet to do so in this way?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ A long time antecedent to that of the cities, whose settlement we have before gone through, there is said to have existed in the time of Saturn a certain government of, and dwelling in, them extremely happy, and of which that, which is now administered the best, exhibits an imitation.

Megillus/ It would as it seems be very requisite to hear about it.

Athenian Stranger/ It appears so to me; and hence I have brought the subject amongst us during our conversation.

Megillus/ And you have done so most correctly; and you will act very correctly too in bringing to an end the fable in due order as far as it is suitable.

Athenian Stranger/ I must do as you say. We have received then a report of the happy life of the persons living of that period, how it possessed all things without stint and produced spontaneously. Of this state of things the cause is said to have been something of this kind. Saturn, well knowing, as we have already detailed, that no human nature, when administering with absolute power the affairs of man, is so sufficient, as not to be filled with insolence and injustice, did, from reflecting upon this, place over our cities, as kings and rulers, not men, but Dæmons of a more divine and excellent race; just as we now do, by placing some men over flocks of sheep and such herds of cattle as are tame. For we do not make oxen rulers of oxen, nor goats of goats; but we ourselves rule over them, as being of a better race than them. The same thing does the god, who being a lover

of mankind has placed over us the race of Dæmons, as being better than us; which through the great inactivity on their part, and great too on ours, has taken care of us, and by imparting to us peace and modesty and good legislation and abundance of justice, rendered the human race exempt from sedition, and happy. And now this our discourse, employing the language of truth, asserts, that of such states as not a god but some mortal governs, there is to them no escape from evils and labors; but it conceives that we ought, by every contrivance, to imitate the life, said to have been under Saturn; and, as far as immortality is in us, by being obedient to it, to administer both publicly and privately our houses and cities, calling law the distribution of mind. For should one man, or an oligarchy, or even democracy, possess a soul eager after pleasures and desires, and requiring to be filled with these, and retaining nothing, but connected closely with an evil not to be finished, and a disease not to be filled, and should such a person rule over either a city or an individual, and trample upon the laws, there would be, as we just now said, no contrivance for security. It is necessary then to consider, Clinias, whether we shall be persuaded by this account or not.

Clinias/ It is surely necessary to be persuaded.

Athenian Stranger/ You understand then, that some say there are as many species of laws as of polities; but of polities we have already gone through as many as the multitude say there are. Do not then think that our present doubt is about a matter of no moment, but about one of the greatest. For that, to which the just and the unjust ought to look, has come again to us as a matter of doubt. For persons say that the laws ought not to look either to war or to the whole of virtue, but to see what may be beneficial to a polity whatever it may be, so that it may always rule, and never be dissolved;

and they say that the natural definition of the just is laid down most beautifully thus.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ That what belongs to the superior is beneficial.

Clinias/ Speak still more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus do I speak. On every occasion the superior power, they say, lays down the laws in a state. Is it not so?

Clinias/ You speak the truth.

Athenian Stranger/ Think you then, say they, that ever at any time will a mob after being victorious, or any other polity, or even a tyrant, lay down willingly laws for any other purpose at first, than for what is conducive to the continuance of its own power?

Clinias/ How should it?

Athenian Stranger/ Whoever transgresses what is thus laid down, him will the lawgiver, who calls such laws by the name of just, punish as a person acting unjustly.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ In this way then, and in this wise, and by this manner, will what is just exist.

Clinias/ So at least this reasoning says.

Athenian Stranger/ For this is one of those prerogatives relating to government.

Clinias/ What are those?

Athenian Stranger/ Those, which we were then considering as to what ought to govern what. And it appeared that it was proper for parents to rule over their progeny, and the older over the younger, and the well-born over the ignobly born. And there were many other things, if we remember, and some an obstacle to others; and among

them there was this one; for we said somehow that Pindar conceived it to be according to nature for the most violent to take the lead, to use his own words.

Clinias/ This was indeed said formerly.

Athenian Stranger/ But consider to what persons our state is to be committed. For a thing of this kind has taken place ten thousand times in certain states.

Clinias/ Of what kind?

Athenian Stranger/ When power has been fought for, the conquerors are wont to take the affairs of the state so strongly into their own hands, as to give no share of the government to the conquered, or to their descendants, and they live watching each other, lest anyone should get into power and cause an insurrection, through remembering the ills which had taken place. At present we surely say that those are neither polities, nor upright laws, which are not laid down for the sake of the whole state in common; and those, which so exist for the sake of some alone, we call seditions, but not polities; and that the things which they call just, are called so in vain. Now this has been asserted by us on this account, because we will give your state no one as a magistrate, because he is rich, or possesses anything of this kind, such as strength, or size, or family; but whoever is most obedient to the laws laid down, and gains this victory in the state, to him we assert must be given the ministerial office, that relates to the gods, the greatest to the first; the second to him, who gains the second prize; and so, according to a certain ratio, to those coming in a certain order must each of the things after these be assigned. But those, that are called rulers, I have now denominated the ministers of the laws, not for the sake of introducing any innovation in names; but I think there will be to a state a safety from this more than from anything else, and the contrary from a

contrary. For I see destruction is at hand to that state, in which the law is ruled over, and is powerless. But in the state, where the law is the absolute ruler over the rulers, and the rulers are slaves of the law, I behold safety and all other good things, such as the gods have bestowed upon states.

Clinias/ Truly so, by Zeus, O guest! For according to your age you perceive acutely.

Megillus/ For every man, when young, sees, himself by himself, matters of this kind very dully; but most acutely, when old.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ But what after this? Shall we not suppose settlers as having arrived and being present? and must we not finish the portion next in order of our discourse for them?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then address them. O ye men, God, as the old saw says, having in himself the beginning, and end, and middle of all things, does, proceeding in a circle, according to nature, bring things to an end by a straight road; and him does Justice ever follow, the punisher of those, who are deserters from the divine law; and close upon her attends in a humble and orderly manner he, who would be happy; but he, who is lifted up by high-boasting, exalting himself through his riches, or honors, or the fine form of his body, and having from his youthfulness and thoughtlessness his soul inflamed with insolence, as one who is in no need of either a ruler or a leader, but competent to lead even others, is left, deserted by the deity; and being thus left, and falling in with others of a similar kind, he leaps about, when he throws all things into confusion together; and to many indeed he appears to be somebody; but in no long time afterwards suffers a punishment, which justice

would not blame, and causes himself and family and city to be utterly destroyed. With regard then to these matters thus disposed in order, what must a prudent man do, or think, and what must he not?

Clinias/ This at least is plain, that every man ought to think how he may be one of those, who are to follow the deity.

Athenian Stranger/ What manner of acting then is dear to and attendant upon the deity? There is one, which possesses one reason of old, that the similar will be friendly to the similar, when it is moderate; but that the immoderate are neither friendly to each other nor to the moderate. Now the deity will be especially the measure to us of all things, and much more than, as persons say, a man. He then, who is to become friendly to a nature of this kind, must necessarily become such to the utmost of his power. And, according to this reasoning, our temperate man is dear to the deity, for he is similar to him. But the intemperate man is dissimilar, and at variance with the deity, and unjust; and the rest of instances are by the same reasoning affected in this way. Let us then consider that language of this kind is to follow these premises, language I think the most beautiful, and the most true of all, namely, that for a good man to sacrifice to, and be conversant ever with, the gods, by means of prayers, and offerings, and every kind of attention to the gods, is a conduct the most beautiful, and best, and most conducive to a happy life, and moreover pre-eminently becoming; but to the wicked man the contraries of these naturally happen. For the wicked man is unpurified in his soul, but the contrary one is pure; and to receive gifts from a defiled person is not at all correct for either a good man or a god. To the unholy then there is much labor in vain respecting the gods; but it is the most seasonable to all holy men. Such then is the mark at which we ought to aim. Whither then can be most correctly carried, what are called

the arrows of a person, and what is the shooting out by thought, as it were by arrows? We assert, in the first place, that he, who gives after the Olympian gods, and those who preside over the city, as honors to the terrestrial gods, the things of an even number, and secondary, and on the left hand, will in the most proper manner reach the mark of piety; but to the gods above these, things of an odd number, and those that signify the opposite to what have been just now mentioned. And after these gods a prudent person will celebrate the holy rites of Dæmons, and after them of Heroes. And after them follow the statues of the household gods, held holy according to law; and after them are the honors paid to living parents; since it is just for a person, who owes the first and the greatest of debts, to pay those that are of the longest standing; and to think, that the things he has acquired and holds belong all to those, who begot him and brought him up, for supplying what is required for their service to the utmost of his power, beginning from his substance; and, in the second place, from his body; and, thirdly, from his soul, by paying off the debts due for their care of him, and in favor of those, who gave the pangs of labor as a loan to the young; and by returning what has been due a long time to those who in old age are greatly in want. It is requisite likewise through the whole of life for a person to hold and to have held pre-eminently a kind language towards his parents; because there is for light and winged words a punishment most heavy; for Nemesis, the messenger of Justice, has been appointed an inspector over all persons in matters of this kind. It is necessary then to yield to them when in anger, and gratifying their feelings, whether they so conduct themselves by words or deeds, as not being ignorant that a father would very reasonably be exceedingly angry with his son, if he conceived he had been injured by him. But, on the death of parents, the funeral

which is the most moderate is the best; and let not its size exceed what is customary, nor be deficient in those things, which the forefathers made for their parents; and on the other hand, let persons pay yearly to such, as have now reached their end, the attention that brings a decoration to the tomb; and by omitting nothing, that contributes to a perpetual remembrance, by this especially is there ever an honor, and likewise by a person contributing for the dead a moderate expense, such as is allowed by fortune. By acting thus, and living thus, we shall each of us on each occasion carry off what is due to us both from the gods and such as are superior to us, and we shall pass the greatest part of our lives in a good hope. But why the person who is doing perfectly what relates to his offspring, and kindred, and friends, and fellow-citizens, and what relates to the rites of hospitality laid down by the gods, and the intercourse arising from all these matters, ought to make his life a shining ornament according to law, the very course of the laws will show forth; which, by persuading some of our habits and punishing by violence and justice others, that do not yield to persuasion, renders our state blessed and happy. But what it is meet and necessary for a legislator, who thinks as I do, to say, but which when spoken are unfitted to the form of a law, respecting these it appears to me that a person would, by bringing forward a pattern both before himself and those, for whom he is about to give laws, and by going through all that remains to the utmost of his ability, make after this a beginning in the laying down of laws.

Clinias/ Let then such things be laid in some form especially.

Athenian Stranger/ But it is not a very easy thing to embrace them, as it were in some one form, and to speak of them; but let us in this way take some method, if perchance

we may be able to establish anything of a firm kind respecting them.

Clinias/ Say what method.

Athenian Stranger/ I should wish them to be very obedient as regards, virtue; and it is evident that the legislator will endeavor to accomplish this through the whole of his legislation.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ What then has been now said appears to me to effect something of moment towards a person listening with a greater mildness and a kinder feeling to what the words recommend, provided they do not come in contact with a disposition altogether savage; so that should what the words say render the person, who has become if not very much, yet a little more kindly disposed, more docile, we must be quite content. For there is no great facility nor an abundance of those, who feel a desire to become the best to the greatest degree and in the shortest time; and the many point out Hesiod as a wise person for asserting that the road to wickedness is smooth, and offers itself to be passed through without sweat, as being very short; but says he;

> "Th' immortal gods have before virtue placed
> The sweat of labor, and the road is long
> And steep, that to it leads. At first 'tis rough;
> But when you reach the top, 'tis easy all,
> Although it was all difficult before."

Clinias/ And he appears to be like a person who speaks well.

Athenian Stranger/ Entirely so. But what the discourse has done, as it has been going on, I wish to place in the midst of you.

Clinias/ Place it then.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then say to the legislator, while addressing these words to him—Tell us, Legislator, is it not evident that, if you knew what we ought to do and say, you would have said it?

Clinias/ It is necessarily so.

Athenian Stranger/ Did we not hear you saying a little before, that a legislator ought not to suffer poets to say what they please? For they would not know, that by saying what is contrary to the laws, they would injure the state.

Clinias/ You speak truly.

Athenian Stranger/ If then we should speak in this manner to him in behalf of the poets, would what has been said be in moderation?

Clinias/ In what manner?

Athenian Stranger/ In this. There is an old story, O legislator, which is constantly told by ourselves, and seems correct to all the rest, that a poet, when he sits on the tripod of the Muse, is then not in his right senses, but, like a fountain, readily permits what comes to it to flow out: and as his art is an imitation, he is often compelled, when representing persons placed in situations contrary to each other, to contradict himself frequently, and does not know whether of what is told these or the others are true. But it is not possible for a legislator to act in this manner in the case of a law, namely to say two different things about one thing; but he must always make one assertion about one thing. And do you so consider it from what has been said just now. For in the case of a funeral, one being excessive, and another deficient, and a third moderate, you, having chosen one of these, the moderate, order it, and simply praise it. But if my wife were pre-eminently rich, and should order me to bury her, I would celebrate in a poem her magnificent sepulcher; but on the other hand, a parsimonious and poor man would

praise a deficient one; but he who possesses moderate means, and is moderate himself in mind, would praise a moderate one. But you must not talk, as you did just now, when speaking of the moderate; but you must tell us what the moderate is, and of what quantity it is; or do not imagine that a discourse of this kind is a law.

Clinias/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether then will he, who is placed by us over the laws, say nothing of this kind at the beginning of his laws, but immediately state what it is meet to do, and what not, and, having threatened a fine, turn himself to another law, and add nothing of exhortation and persuasion to those, for whom the laws are laid down? But as in the case of physicians, one is accustomed on each occasion to attend in this way, and another in that, let us call to mind the method of either, in order that we may beg the legislator, as children do a physician, to cure them in the mildest manner. But what are we saying? There are, surely, we say, some persons physicians, and others the ministers of physicians; and these too we somehow call physicians.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And this too, whether they are free-men, or slaves, and possess the art through the injunctions of their masters, both according to theory and experience, but not by nature, just like free-men, who have both learnt the art in this way themselves, and are teaching it to their children? Would you put down these as two kinds of the so-called physicians?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Do you then not perceive that when there are both slaves and free-men sick in cities, the slaves do for the most part go round and cure the slaves, or remain in the medical shops; and that not one of such physicians

either give or receive any reason respecting each of the diseases of each of the slaves, but, as if knowing accurately from experience, orders, as if he were a self-willed tyrant, what seems good to him; and then goes away, bounding off from one sick domestic to another; and by this means affords a facility to his master of attending to other patients? But the freeborn physician, for the most part, attends to and reflects upon the diseases of the freeborn; and, by exploring them from the beginning, and according to nature, and communing with both the patient himself and his friends, does, at the same time, learn something himself from the sick, and at the same time teach him, as far as he can, something, and does not order him anything until he has persuaded him of its propriety; and then, after rendering the patient gentle by persuasion, endeavors to finish the business by bringing him back to health. Which of these is the better physician? he who cures in this way or in that? and which is the better exerciser? he who exercises in this way or that? he, who effects his single power in a twofold manner, or he, who works it out in one way, and in the worse and the more rustic of the two?

Clinias/ The twofold, O guest, is surely the superior.

Athenian Stranger/ Are you willing then for us to look into this twofold and simple method, as it exists in legislation?

Clinias/ How am I not willing?

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, by the gods, and state what law will the legislator first lay down? Will he not, according to nature, regulate by his ordinances first the commencement of generation relating to states?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Is not the connection by and communion of marriages the commencement of generation in all cities?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ The laws then of marriage being first laid down correctly, seem to be laid down for correct conduct in every state.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then first speak of the simple law, which would perhaps exist somehow in this way; that a man is to marry when he is from thirty to thirty-five years old; but if he does not, that he should be fined both in money and with the loss of political privileges; in money to this or that amount, and in disfranchisement of this or that kind. Let this then be the simple law respecting marriages; but this the twofold; that a man is to marry from thirty to thirty-five years old, considering that the human race has in some measure partaken naturally of immortality, of which everyone has naturally every desire. For to become famous, and not to lie when dead without a name, is the desire of a person of this kind. The human race then is a thing connected with all time, and follows and will follow it to the end, becoming in this manner immortal through that, which is ever the same and one, partaking by generation of immortality, in consequence of its leaving children's children. Now for a man to deprive himself willingly of this, is by no means holy; and he intentionally deprives himself of this, who has no care for children and a wife. He, therefore, who obeys this law would depart without a fine. But let him, on the other hand, who does not obey it, and does not marry when he is thirty-five years of age, be fined yearly so and so, in order that his solitary life may not seem to bring him gain and an easy state; nor let him share in those honors, which the younger in the state pay on every occasion to the elder. It is then in the power of a person, who hears this law compared with that, to form an idea of each particular law, whether it ought to become in this way double, and the

longest in length through its mingling threats with persuasions; or by employing threats alone, it ought to become simple in length.

Megillus/ It is the Laconic practice, O guest, to prefer ever the shorter method. But should anyone order me to become a judge of such enactments, which of the two I would wish to be written and laid down for a state, I would prefer the longer; and as regards every law according to this model, if two such were proposed, I should make the same choice. It is, however, requisite that the present legislation should be agreeable to Clinias; for his is the state, which is now thinking of making use of laws of this kind.

Clinias/ Well have you spoken, Megillus.

Athenian Stranger/ To take any account of enactments either prolix or brief is very silly. For we must honor, I conceive, the best, but not the shortest, nor look to their length. But, in the laws which we have just now spoken of, one differs from the other not by the double alone as regards the value of their use; but that, which was said just now, respecting the twofold kind of physicians, was most properly adduced. To this point however no legislator seems at any time to have given a thought, that, when it is possible to make use of two things in legislation, persuasion and force, they employ the other alone, as far as is possible, against the masses unexperienced in education. For they legislate, not mingling a fight with force, but employing unmingled violence alone. But I, O blessed men, perceive that a third thing likewise ought to exist with regard to laws, but which does not exist at present.

Clinias/ Of what kind are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ Of something, which has arisen, through a certain god-send, out of the matters we have just now discussed. For from the time when we began to speak

about laws in the morning, mid-day has now arrived; and we have been in this very beautiful retreat discoursing upon no other topic than laws. But we seem to me to be just now beginning to speak about laws; and that all before has been a prelude to laws. Now why have I mentioned this? It is because I wished to say, that in all discourses, and whatever else partake of a vocal sound, there are both preludes and, as it were, movements backwards and forwards, that possess some artificial handling, useful to that which is about to be gone through. And, indeed, of the laws, as they are called, of guitar-songs and of every kind of music, preludes are laid down composed with wondrous care. But of laws really so, which we say are political, no one has ever at any time made any mention of their preludes, nor, as being a composer, has he brought it to light, as if it did not naturally exist. But our present discussion, as it seems to me, indicates that it does exist; and the laws, which were just now mentioned as twofold, have seemed to be not surely thus twofold simply, but there have seemed to be some two things, law and a prelude to a law; but the tyrannical injunction, which was spoken of as being similar to the orders of slave-physicians, has appeared to be an unmingled law; but that, which was spoken of prior to this, and called persuasive by this person here, seemed to be in reality persuasive, but to have the power of a prelude, relating to discourses. For in order that the person, to whom the legislator addresses his law, may receive kindly, and, through his kindness, with more docility, the injunction, which is the law, on this account the whole of this discourse has appeared to me to have been spoken; which the speaker has spoken persuading. Hence, according to my reasoning, this very thing would be properly called a prelude to a law, but not a discussion of it. What then, after saying this, should I wish to be stated subsequently? It is this; that the

legislator ought ever prior to all laws to make them not without a share of preludes; and as regards each law, in so far as they differ from themselves, as much as the two just now mentioned have differed.

Clinias/ For my part, I would never exhort a man, skilled in these things, to lay down laws in any other manner.

Athenian Stranger/ You appear therefore to me, O Clinias, to speak correctly, so far that there is a prelude to all laws; and that it is requisite for a person commencing the business of legislation, to prefer to every discourse a preface, that is natural to each. For that, which is to be said after this, is not a thing of little moment, nor is it a trifling difference, whether they are stated clearly or not clearly. However, if we should enjoin upon legislators to make a prelude equally about what are called great and small laws, we should not speak correctly. For this is not to be done either in every song or in every discourse; since, though it naturally belongs to all, yet it is not to be used for all; and a thing of this kind is to be allowed to the orator, the lyric singer, and the legislator.

Clinias/ You appear to me to speak most true. But let us make a no further exercise of delay, but return to the question, and begin, if it is agreeable to you, from those points, which you did, as a person not preluding, speak of at that time. Again then, as persons say, when playing, since second things are better, let us turn up and back from the beginning, as finishing a prelude, and not an accidental discourse, as just now. Let us take then their commencement acknowledging that we are preluding. And what has been just now stated, respecting the honors to be paid to the gods, and the attention due to ancestors, is sufficient. But let us endeavor to speak about what is next in order, until it shall appear to you that the whole prelude

has been spoken of sufficiently. And after this you will go through detailing the laws themselves.

Athenian Stranger/ About the gods, then, and those that come after them, and parents, both when living and dead, we made sufficiently then a prelude, as we call it now; but the portion that still remains of this kind of a subject, you appear to exhort me to lead forth into the light.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And after these matters, how it is necessary for persons to keep their souls, and bodies, and substance with reference to serious pursuits and remissions of labor, and fitting too for both the speaker and the hearers to ruminate in common, and to become, to the utmost of their power, successful in attaining instruction. These very matters then must in reality be spoken of and heard by us after those.

Clinias/ You speak most correctly.

Book 5.

Athenian Stranger/ Let everyone then hear, who has already heard what we have said respecting the gods, and our dear progenitors. For a man's soul is, after the gods, the most divine of all his possessions, as being most his own. Now the whole of a man's possessions are altogether twofold. The more powerful and the better are the lords, but the weaker and worse, the slaves. Of those then that are his the lord must always be held in honor before the slaves. Hence after the gods, who are lords, and those that follow next to them, I properly exhort a person to honor his own soul by speaking of it as the second in rank. But not one, so to say, honors his soul properly, although he appears to do so. For honor is somehow a divine good; but of things that are evil not one is honorable. He then, who fancies that he shall enlarge his soul by certain discourses or gifts or certain yieldings, and yet does not make it better from being worse, appears indeed to honor it, but by no means does so. For instance, every boy on becoming a man thinks himself competent to know all things, and that he honors his soul by praising it, and he freely permits it to do whatever it pleases. But we now say that he, who acts so, injures and does not honor his soul. And yet it is necessary, as we have said, to honor it in the second rank after the gods. Nor, when a man does not consider himself, but others, as the cause of his own errors and of ills the most in number and magnitude, and ever exempts himself as free from blame, is he honoring his own soul, as he forsooth fancies; for he is far from doing so; since he injures it; nor when contrary to reason, and the praise of the legislator, he indulges in pleasures, does he honor it all; but he dishonors it, by filling it with vice and repentance. Nor yet when, on the contrary, he does not thoroughly labor by bearing up against exertions that receive praise, and against fears and pains, but sinks

under them; for by sinking he then dishonors it; for he causes it to be in dishonor by doing all these acts. Nor does he honor it, when he thinks that to live is altogether a good: for then too he dishonors it. For while his soul imagines that everything in Hades is evil, he yields, nor does he strive against it by teaching and convincing it that it does not know whether, on the contrary, that, what relates to the gods there is not the greatest of all good to us. Nor yet, when anyone honors beauty before virtue, is this any other thing than truly and wholly a dishonor to the soul. For such an assertion falsely proclaims that the body is more honorable than the soul. For nothing born of earth is more honorable than what is in Olympus; and he, who thinks otherwise of the soul, is ignorant that he is careless of this wonderful possession. Nor when a person, who desires to possess wealth not honorably, or when possessing unjustly, does not bear it ill, does he then honor his soul with gifts? He fails of it entirely. For he sells what is honorable and at the same time beautiful in his soul for a little gold; for all the gold both on the earth and under the earth is of no value against virtue. And, to speak comprehensively, he, who is neither willing by every contrivance to abstain from such things, as the legislator numbers up and ranks amongst the disgraceful and bad, nor, on the other hand, to pursue to the utmost of his power the good and the honorable, does not perceive that, in all these cases, he treats his soul, which is a thing the most divine, with the greatest dishonor, and in the most unseemly manner. For not one, so to say, considers what is the greatest of the so-called punishment for evil conduct. Now the greatest is in the becoming similar to bad men; and by becoming similar, to avoid good men and good discourses, and to be cut off from them, but to be glued to the bad, while pursuing according to their intercourse; and sticking close to such persons, he must of necessity do and

suffer what such persons naturally do and say to each other. Such a state then is not one of justice, for the beautiful is just and justice, but of punishment, the attendant on a state of injustice, with which both he, who does meet, and he, who does not meet, are miserable; the one in not being cured; the other in being destroyed, in order that many may be saved. But to us it is an honor, to speak generally, to follow the better and to make the worse, still capable of becoming better, the best possible.

There is not then a possession belonging to a man more naturally fitted, than the soul, to flying from evil, and to tracking out and taking what is of all things the best; nor, when it has taken it, to associate with it for the rest of life. Hence it has been ranked second in honor; but the third—everyone will understand this at least—is the honor, according to nature, of the body. It is however requisite to consider these honors, which of them are genuine, and which with a false stamp. Now this is the business of a legislator. And he appears to me to point out that they are these and some such as these; that the body is honorable, not when it possesses beauty, or strength, or swiftness, or size, or health—although this would seem so to many—nor even when it possesses the contraries to these. But those things which, being in the middle, touch upon the whole of this possessing, are by far the most moderate and safe. For the former cause the soul to be puffed up and confident, but the latter humble and servile. And similarly situated is the possession of money and means, according to the same measure of valuation. For an excess in the bulk of all these things produces enmity and revolts, both in states and amongst individuals; but a deficiency produces slavery for the most part. Let not then anyone be desirous of riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them very wealthy; for this is better neither for them nor the state.

For the substance of the young is not the prey of flatterers; and if it is not in want of the necessaries of life, it is the most harmonious and the best of all. For by its harmony and fitness in all things it renders our life free from pain. It is meet then to leave to children abundance of modesty, not of gold. And we think we shall accomplish this by reproving impudent young men, when they act shamelessly. This, however, is not effected by the exhortation given at present to young men; which persons give by saying that it is meet to be modest in everything; but a prudent legislator will rather advise old men to feel a shame before the young; and above all things to take care, that no young person, at any time, either sees or hears them doing or saying anything base; since where old men are shameless, there too must young men of necessity be the most impudent; for the most excellent education both of the young and of themselves is, not in giving advice, but in being seen to do through the whole of life, what a person would say, while giving advice to another. But he who honors and venerates his relationship and the whole communion of family gods, that possess the nature of the same blood, will have, according to reason, the gods who preside over births favorably disposed towards him for the procreation of children. And moreover, he will obtain the kind feeling of friends and associates in the intercourse of life, by considering their attentions to himself as of a greater and more respectful kind than they do; but his own favors to them less than his friends and associates do themselves. As regards, however, the state and fellow-citizens, he is by far the best, who prefers before the contests at Olympia and all in war and peace, to be victorious in the glory of being the servant of the laws at home, as having been subservient to them in a manner the most beautiful of all men through the whole of life. We must consider too the laws of intercourse with strangers to be matters of the most holy

kind. For nearly all the delinquencies of strangers towards strangers depend more upon an avenging deity than do those in the case of fellow-citizens. For a stranger being destitute of companions and kindred, is an object of greater pity both to men and gods. He therefore, who is more able to take vengeance, is more ready to assist. Now the Dæmon of each person, and the god of hospitality, are as the attendants upon Zeus, who presides over strangers, powerful in the greatest degree. It is then a matter of much caution for a person, to whom there is even a little portion of forethought, to proceed on to the end of life, without having committed any error with regard to strangers. But, of all the crimes done by strangers and denizens, the greatest is that which takes place in the case of each towards suppliants. For the god, with whom the suppliant happens to have met, as a witness to agreements made with a suppliant, becomes himself pre-eminently the guardian of the sufferer. So that no one, who injures suppliants, will go unpunished.

Thus then have we nearly gone through the modes of intercourse relating to parents, and to a person himself, and the things belonging to him, and those relating to the state, and friends, and kinsmen, and strangers, and natives. But as to what follows how a person by being what can best pass through life, it is meet to detail, not what a law, but what praise and blame may, by teaching individuals, render them more obedient to the rein, and more kindly disposed to the laws about to be established. These then are the matters we must subsequently speak of. Now truth is the leader of every good both to gods and men; of which he, who is about to be blessed and fortunate, should participate immediately from the beginning, in order that for the greatest length of time he may live a person of truth. For he is trust-worthy; but he is not trustworthy, by whom a voluntary falsehood is loved; while he, by whom an involuntary one is so, is a senseless

person; of which states neither is an object of envy. For he, who is not trustworthy and untaught, is unloved; and as time progresses towards morose old age, he becomes known, and at the end of life has prepared for himself a solitude complete; so that, whether his associates and children are alive or not, his life becomes nearly equally an orphanhood. He however who does no injury is held in honor; but he, who does not suffer the unjust to act unjustly, deserves more than double the honor of the former person. For the former has a value equal to one man; but the latter to many others, by pointing out to the rulers the injustice of the rest. But let him, who unites with the rulers in inflicting punishments to the utmost of his power, be proclaimed the great man in a state, and the complete victor, if ever one was, in virtue. The very same praise it is meet to proclaim of temperance and prudence; and the person, who possesses other goods, that have a power not only for him to possess them himself, but to share them with others, it is meet to honor, as being at the tip-top of excellence; but him, who is unable, although willing, to put aside in the second rank; and to blame indeed the man who is envious and unwilling through friendship to be a sharer of any of his good things with anyone; but not to hold a jot the more in dishonor his possession on account of the possessor, but to acquire it with all one's might. Let then everyone contend with us for virtue unstintingly. For such a person advances a state by striving himself, and not cutting down others through calumny. But the envious man, while he thinks to become the superior by detracting from others, tends less himself to true virtue, and makes his competitors disheartened through their being blamed unjustly; and by these means causing the whole state to be untrained for the contests of virtue, he renders it, as far as he can, of less account as regards its renown. It is proper, moreover, for every man to possess a spirit, and yet to be as mild as

possible. For it is not possible to avoid the unjust acts of others, which are harsh and difficult to be cured, or entirely incurable, otherwise than by fighting and conquering, after defending oneself, and by remitting nothing, when in the act of punishing. Now to do this every soul is unable, without possessing a noble spirit.

With respect to the acts of those, who do an injury that admits of a cure, it is requisite to know, in the first place, that no unjust man is voluntarily unjust. For no one would at any time willingly possess any of the greatest evils, and least of all in the case of the most honored belonging to himself. Now the soul, as we have said, is in truth a thing the most honored by all. No one, therefore, would at any time voluntarily receive the greatest evil in the thing most honored, and live through the whole of life possessing it. But the unjust man and he who has what are evils, is in every respect an object of pity. It is proper, however, to pity him, who has an evil that is curable, and to restrain and soften down one's anger, and not, like a woman with an excess of passion, to continue embittered against him. But it is meet to let loose one's anger against a person incontinently sinful, and past all exhortation depraved. On which account we have said that the good man ought to be conspicuous for possessing a spirit, and yet to be on each occasion mild.

But of all evils the greatest is implanted in the souls of the major part of mankind; for which, while each one is giving himself a pardon, he devises no plan for avoiding it. And this is what people say; that every man is naturally a friend to himself, and that it is well for a thing of this kind to be necessarily so. But, in truth, the cause of all his mistakes arises to each man, upon each occasion, through the violent love of self. For the lover is blinded with respect to the object loved. So that he judges improperly of things just, and good, and beautiful, through thinking that he

ought always to honor what belongs to himself in preference to truth. For it is necessary that he, who is to be a great man, should love neither himself, nor the things belonging to himself, but what is just, whether it happens to be done by himself or by another person rather. From this very same mistake it has come to pass in all cases that his ignorance appears to a person to be a wisdom peculiarly his own. Hence, although we know, so to say, nothing, we fancy we know everything; but, by not permitting others to do that, of which we ourselves are ignorant, we are compelled to make mistakes through doing it ourselves. On this account every man ought to avoid the vehement love of himself, and ever to follow one better than himself, without placing, in a matter of this kind, a feeling of shame in the foreground. But what are of less importance than these, and mentioned frequently, and not less useful than these, it is proper for a person to remind himself of and to state. For, as something is always flowing away from us, it is necessary for something on the contrary to be flowing to us. Now recollection is the influx of thoughts, which had left us. On which account it is meet to abstain from ill-timed laughter, and tears; and for every man to announce to every man that he must endeavor, by concealing all excessive joy and all excessive sorrow, to preserve a decent bearing, each person, while his Dæmon is standing steadily, going on successfully or unsuccessfully to places on high and steep, while Dæmons are opposing with certain disturbances; and that it is meet ever to hope that the deity will, when troubles fall upon the good state, which he has given, make them less instead of greater, and cause a change from the present state to a better one; and with respect to good things the contraries of these, that they will always be present to them with good fortune. In these hopes it is meet for everyone to live, and in the recollection of all these things to be sparing on no point, but ever amidst

serious and sportive occupations to remind another and himself clearly.

Now then there have been mentioned nearly all, as far as divine things are concerned, respecting the pursuits, to which everyone ought to attend, and respecting each individual himself, of what kind he ought to be; but matters relating to man have not been at present spoken of. But it is necessary to speak of them: for we are conversing with men, and not with gods. Now pleasures, and pains, and desires, are naturally in the highest degree human; on which it is necessary for the whole mortal animal to hang, as it were, and to be suspended with the greatest earnestness. It is requisite then to praise the most beautiful life, not only because by its form it is superior, as regards fair renown; but because, if anyone is willing to taste of it, and not, as being young, to become a deserter from it, it excels in that too, of which we all are in search, I mean the possessing more of joy and less of sorrow through the whole of life. That this will be clearly the case, if anyone tastes of it correctly, will readily and vehemently appear. Now what is this correctness? This it is requisite to ascertain from the reasoning, and to consider whether it is produced according to nature in this way, or in another, contrary to nature. It is requisite therefore to consider in this manner one life, as compared with another, if it be more pleasant and more painful. We wish for pleasure to be present with us; but we neither choose nor wish for pain. But what is neither the one or the other we do not wish for in the place of pleasure; but we do wish for it to be exchanged in the place of pain. We wish too for less pain with more pleasure; but we do not wish for less pleasure with greater pain. But we can show clearly that we do not wish to possess each of these, equal in the place of equals. All these differ in multitude and magnitude and intensity and equality, and in whatever things are the

contrary to all these, with respect to wishing; but with respect to the choice of each, they do not differ. Since then these things have been thus arranged by necessity, we wish for that life, in which the many and great and intense of each kind exist, but in which pleasures exceed; but we do not wish for that life, in which the contraries to these exist. And on the other hand, the life in which things few and little and quiet exist, but in which pains exceed, we do not wish for; but we wish for that life in which the contraries to these exist. And again, the life, in which the balance is equal, as we said before, it is meet to consider as an equal-balanced life; since we wish for the life, which exceeds in what is agreeable to us; but we do not wish for that which exceeds in what is disagreeable. Now it is necessary to consider all our lives as naturally bound up in these; and it is necessary to consider what kind of lives we naturally wish for. And if we say, that we wish for anything except these, we say so through an ignorance of, and inexperience in, lives as they exist.

What then and of what kind are the lives, respecting which it is necessary for a person to know something, while forecasting what is to be wished for and is voluntary, and what is to be not wished for and is involuntary; and, after prescribing a law to himself, to choose what is agreeable and pleasant and the best and the most beautiful, and to lead a life as far as possible, the most happy for man? Let us then call one life temperate, another prudent, another brave, and rank one as healthy; and four others, the contraries to these four, by the name of the imprudent, the cowardly, the intemperate, and the diseased. He, then, who knows the temperate, will lay it down as mild in all things, and exhibiting quiet pains, and quiet pleasures, and placid desires, and loves not insane; but the intemperate as being impetuous in all things, and exhibiting vehement pains, and

vehement pleasures, and desires on the stretch and goaded on, and loves the maddest possible; and that in a temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains; but in an intemperate one the pains exceed the pleasures in magnitude and multitude and intensity. Hence, the one of these lives happens of necessity to be according to nature more pleasant to us, but the other more painful; and it is no longer in the power of him, who wishes to live pleasantly, to live voluntarily in an intemperate manner; but it is evident, if what has been said is correct, that every licentious person is of necessity so unwillingly. For the whole mass of mankind live in the want of temperance, either through the want of teaching, or through incontinence, or through both. The same things are to be considered respecting a diseased and healthy life, that they possess pleasures and pains, but that the pleasures exceed the pains in health, but the pains the pleasures in illness. Our wish however in the choice of lives is not that pain may exceed, but, where it is exceeded, that life we have decided to be the more pleasant. Now the temperate man, we would say, possesses in both respects things fewer, and less, and slighter than the intemperate, and the prudent than the imprudent, and the man of bravery than the one of timidity, each exceeding each on the score of pleasures; but on that of pains, the former exceeding the latter, the brave man has the victory over the timid, and in that of the prudent the imprudent; so that of the lives, the more pleasant are the temperate, and the brave, and the prudent, and the healthy, than the timid, and imprudent, and intemperate, and the diseased; and in short, the life which is connected with virtue, pertaining either to the body or the soul, is more pleasant than the life which is connected with depravity, and is superior even to superfluity in the other points, such as beauty and rectitude and virtue and fair renown; so that it causes the person, who possesses it,

to live more happily in every respect and totally, than he who possesses the contrary life.

Let then the prelude of the laws, having been here spoken of, have an end of the speeches. But after the prelude it is necessary somehow for the strain to follow; or rather, in good truth, to write down the laws of a polity. As then it is not possible, in the case of a web, or any other tissue whatever, to work up the weft and the warp from the same materials, but there must needs be a difference as regard their quality in the production of the warp, by being some of it strong and assuming a firmness through the spindle, and another part of it softer and making use of a just easiness; from whence it is meet that those, who are about to hold great offices in the state, should be judged of separately in this way, and those too, who have been tested in a trifling education, on each occasion according to reason. For there are two kinds of polities, one relating to the appointment of offices to each individual, and the other relating to the laws assigned to the offices. But before all it is requisite to consider things of this kind. A shepherd, and a herdsman, and a breeder of horses, and whatever else there are of this kind of occupations, will, after receiving the whole herd, never attempt to attend to them otherwise than by first applying a purification suited to their individual living together; and having by a selection separated the healthy and diseased, and the well-bred and ill-bred, he will send away one part to some other herds, but attend upon the other part, thoroughly perceiving that his labor would be in vain and non-effective as regards both the body and soul, which after nature and improper aliment had corrupted, they moreover destroy the race of healthy and unmixed habits and bodies in each of the flocks, unless a person purifies what is present in them. The attention, however, which is paid to other animals is indeed less, and is alone worthy to be brought forward for the sake of an

example. But the affairs of men need the greatest attention on the part of the legislator, to investigate and detail what is suited to each individual, as regards purification and all other actions. For instance, that which relates to the purification of a state should be in this way. Of many existing purifications, some are rather easy, but others more difficult; and he who is both a tyrant and a legislator may be able to use such purifications as are difficult and the best. But the legislator, who without being a tyrant lays down a new polity and laws, would, if he were able to purify with the mildest of purifications, do a thing of this kind contentedly. The best purification is however painful; just as are the remedies of some such kind, which leading for justice to punishment with avenging, put death or exile as the finish to punishment. For it is wont to free the city from those, who have erred the greatest, and who, as being incurable, are the greatest hurt to the state. But with us there is a milder purification of this kind. For upon these, who, having nothing themselves, do, through the want of food, exhibit themselves as prepared to follow their leaders in an attack upon the property of persons, who possess something, upon such, as being naturally a disease in the state, it imposes a removal, under the name, by way of good omen, of a colony, and sends them away in the kindest possible manner. This then should somehow be done at the very commencement by everyone legislating. To us however what is still more strange than this has now happened relating to these. For there is no need to devise either a colony or any selection for a purification; but as if the waters, partly from fountains and partly from mountain torrents, were flowing together into one lake, it is necessary for persons to be on the watch, that, partly by pumping out, and partly by drawing off into channels, and partly by diverting its course, the water flowing together may be the most clear. But labor and

danger, as it appears, are to be found in every political establishment. However, since what is now done exists in discourse, and not in action, let our selection be held to be completed, and the purification to have taken place according to our notions. For having by every kind of persuasion and for a sufficient length of time tried by a test those amongst evil men, who were endeavoring to enter our city in order to administer it, let us prevent them from reaching it, and let us introduce the good, rendering them well-disposed and propitious to the utmost of our power.

Let not, however, the good fortune, which has happened, lie hid from us, that, as we said that the colony of the Heraclidae was fortunate, because it escaped the dreadful and dangerous strife respecting the division of land and the abolition of debts, in which strife it is impossible for a state, compelled to be regulated by law, to leave any of its ancient institutions undisturbed, nor on the other hand is it possible to disturb them after a certain manner successfully, the same thing appears nearly to have happened to us; and there is left merely, so to say, a prayer, and a trifling change to those making a slight alteration cautiously and slowly in a great length of time; which alteration should take place by those persons innovating, who have an abundance of land, and have likewise many debtors, and are willing through a kind consideration to share with those in want, partly by giving up debts and partly by distributing property, and by holding to moderation, and by thinking that poverty does not consist in a diminution of property, but in an insatiable desire to acquire more. For this is the greatest beginning of safety to a state; and upon this, as upon a stable foundation, it is possible to build up whatever political arrangement anyone would raise up, befitting a constitution of this kind. But when the change is of an unsound kind, no political movement will afterwards take place easily in a state. From

this, as we have said, we fly. It would however have been more correct to have said in what way, if we have not fled from it, we might have made for ourselves the flight. Let it then be said how that through not being fond of money together with justice; but there is no other escape, either broad or narrow, of such a plan. Let this then be laid down by us as a prop of a state. For it is necessary that the citizens should somehow raise up for themselves their property without reproach from each other; or, that they should not be willing to proceed previously to the before of the rest of the constitution, who have accusations of old standing against each other, and to whom there is even a small share of intellect. But for those persons, to whom a god has given, as it has to us at present, to settle a new state, and for no enmities to exist against each other, to become themselves the cause of enmities to each other through the division of the land and dwellings, would be a not-human want of education, united to every kind of wickedness.

What then would be the method of a correct distribution? In the first place, it is requisite to fix the same quantity of the number, how great it ought to be. After this it must be agreed respecting the distribution to the citizens, into how many and what kind of parts it is to be made by them for the mass of people. And for this purpose the land and dwellings must be distributed as equally as possible. Now a sufficient quantity of the mass of people cannot be correctly stated otherwise than with reference to the land and cities of neighboring nations. As regards the land, how much of it is sufficient to feed how many temperate persons—for of more there is no need—but as regards the number, how many would be able to defend themselves not altogether without resources against bordering tribes acting unjustly, and to assist their neighbors when injured. Having then viewed these points, we will define both by deed and word the land

and neighbors. But now, for the sake of a sketch and outline, that the thing itself may be accomplished, let the discourse proceed to our laying down the laws.

Let the land-owners and those that defend the distribution of the land, be, for the sake of a fitting number, five thousand and forty; and let, in like manner, the land and the dwellings be distributed into the same portions, so that the man and his portion may accord in distribution. And in the first place, let there be of the whole number two parts distributed, and afterwards three of the same; for it is by nature divisible into four and five, and so in succession as far as ten. Thus much ought every person, who is legislating, to understand respecting number, what it is, and what kind will be the most useful to all states. Let us then say it is that, which possesses in itself the greatest quantity of divisions and most in orderly succession. For the whole number does not obtain by lot all kinds of divisions for all things. But the number five thousand and forty, in matters relating to war and whatever in peace have to do with conventions and communions, and relating to revenue and distributions, cannot be cut into more than sixty parts wanting one; but there are continuous divisions of it from one up to ten.

These things however it is meet for those to take in hand; firmly at leisure, on whom the law enjoins to take them; for they cannot exist otherwise than in this manner. But it is requisite for them to be mentioned to a person settling a state for the sake of this; that no one, whether he is making a polity new from the beginning, or patching up an ancient one that has been corrupted, will, if he has any mind, attempt to disturb, with respect to the gods or sacred rites, and whatever else ought to be established in the state for each of the gods or dæmons, by whatever name they may be called, whatever has come from Delphi or Dodona or

Ammon, or what certain old accounts have somehow persuaded persons on hearing them, when, through visions having occurred or an inspiration from gods having been declared, parties have, through being persuaded, established sacrifices mixed up with mystic ceremonies, emanating either from their own country, or being exotic from Tyrrhenia, or Cyprus, or any other place whatever; and from these ancient accounts and oracles they consecrated statues, and altars, and temples, and made for each of the deities a sacred grove. Of all these not even the least must the legislator disturb; but he must assign to each of the portions a god, a Dæmon, or some hero. And in the division of the land, he must give up, selected for the first in rank, the groves and all that is fitting, so that the assemblies of each of the portions, taking place at stated times, may furnish resources against their wants, and during the sacrifices kindly entertain, and become familiar with, and recognize, each other. For there is no greater good to a state than for persons to be the acquaintances of each other. Since where there is no light to each other in the manners of each other, but a darkness, there no one will properly meet with the honor due to his worth, nor with offices, nor even with the justice which is fitting. It is meet then for every man in all states to be earnest in this matter, compared as one with one, that he never appear to anyone to be of a base stamp, but always artless and true, and that no other person of that kind deceive him. But the next movement, as in the case of the pebble-game, from the sacred spot would, as being unusual, cause, in the case of legislation, the person who hears of it for the first time perhaps to wonder. To him however who has reasoned upon, and tried it, it will appear that the state is in a second way settled for the best. Perhaps however someone will not receive the movement, through its not being customary with a tyrannic legislator. It will

however be most correct to speak of the best polity, and of the second and third, and then to leave the choice to each person, who is the lord in the co-settlement. Let us act then even now according to this very method, by speaking of a polity the first, and the second, and the third in worth; and let us leave the choice to Clinias at present, and to anyone else who may be willing to come to the selection of such polities, and to assign, according to his own method, that which is agreeable to him with respect to his own country.

Now the first state and polity and the best laws are there, where the old saying may be most in vogue through the whole state; for it said that, amongst friends all things are really in common. This saying, whether it now is or ever will be practiced, that women are in common, and children in common, and all possessions in common, has taken away by every means everywhere and entirely from life what is called private property; and it has planned that things even naturally private, as far as possible, become by some means in common; such as the eyes, the ears, and the hands, in seeming to see, and hear, and work, in common; and that, again, all men taken singly praise and blame as much as possible the same things, rejoicing in, and pained by, the same things; and hence no one has ever laid down or will lay down a definition more correct and better than this, that of such laws as cause a state to be as much as possible one, there is the superiority on the ground of virtue. Such a state will ours be, whether gods or the children of gods, more in number than one, dwell there, and with delight save and regulate those living in that manner. Hence it is proper to reflect upon the pattern of a polity in no other way; but, sticking to this, to seek that, which is as much as possible of such a kind. But that, which we have now taken in hand, would, if it existed at all, be the nearest to immortality; and if it is not in the first rank, it will be at least one in the

second. After this we will, god willing, go through the polity, which is the third in order. But now let us speak of this polity, what it is, and how it may be produced.

In the first place, let them distribute the land and houses. But let them not cultivate the ground in common; since a thing of this kind is spoken of as greater than is suited to their present birth, nurture, and education. Let them however distribute land and houses with somehow such an intention as this, that each on obtaining his allotment ought to consider it as being common to the whole state; and, as this country is their paternal land, they ought to attend to it in a greater degree than children do their mother, in that, being a goddess, she is the sovereign mistress of mortals. The same conceptions they ought to have of the gods of the place, and likewise of dæmons. But that these things may exist in this manner through all time, on this too they must thoroughly reflect. As many hearths as are distributed by us at present, so many must there be always, and neither more nor less. Now a thing of this kind will be firmly established through every state in this way. Let the person, who has obtained his allotment, leave ever the child, who is most dear to him, the only heir of his household, and his successor, and the attendant upon the gods and family and state, and of those still living, and of such as their end has already reached up to the then period. But with respect to the other children, they, to whom there are more than one, must give their daughters in marriage according to a law to be laid down; but distribute their male children as sons to those, who have no family, as an act of kindness conferred; but if there be a lack of kindness, or if more females are born than some males, or the contrary, when they are fewer, through barrenness taking place, let the magistrate, whom we shall lay down as the greatest and most honorable, consider what is proper to be done with the superabundance and deficiency

of children, and devise a method by which five thousand and forty households alone may exist always. Now there are many methods. For there are checks to procreation when it is overflowing; and, on the contrary, care and an attention to the number of births do, by means of honors, and disqualifications, and the advice of elders to young persons, meet the difficulty, and are able to effect what we are speaking of by admonitory discourses. Moreover, should at last every difficulty arise about the inequality of the five thousand and forty households, and an excessive influx of citizens take place through the kind feelings of those, who dwell together, and we come to want, there remains the old contrivance, which we have often mentioned, of friendly colonies being sent out from friends, whithersoever it may appear to be suitable. But if, on the contrary, there should at any time come a wave bringing an inundation, or a destruction arising from plagues or wars, and the people become, through a state of orphanhood, much less than the prescribed number, we must not willingly introduce citizens educated in a not legitimate discipline; but to use force against necessity it is said not even a god has the power.

This then let us assert our present discourse advises, by saying—O ye best of all men, do not relax in honoring similitude and equality and the same and what is generally acknowledged according to nature and according to number and all the power of things beautiful and good. And now guard, in the first place, through the whole of life the above-mentioned number; next, do not hold in dishonor the height and magnitude of the property, which ye first distributed, as being moderate, by buying from, and selling to, each other. For neither the distributing lot, being a god, is an ally, nor the legislator. For now the law, in the first place, enjoins upon the disobedient, by proclaiming beforehand, that upon these conditions any person, who is willing, may cast lots or

not; and that, since the land, being sacred, belongs first to all the gods, and next, to the priests and priestesses, who pray at the first sacrifices, and the second, and even to the third, both the buyer and seller of tenements and farms, which they have obtained by lot, are to suffer what is befitting upon such transactions; and having written memoranda on cypress tablets, they shall place them in temples written for the time hereafter; and in addition to this they shall invest the guardianship of these, in order that they may be, in that magistrate, who seems to see the most acutely, in order that the matters fraudulently introduced may not lie hid from them, but that they may punish the person disobedient at the same time to the law and to the god. For how great a good will what is now enjoined be to all states that are persuaded, when they adopt the following arrangement, according to the old proverb, no person being wicked will know, but being experienced and reasonable in his habits he will. For in such an arrangement there exists not much of money-making; and there is attendant upon it the being neither necessary nor lawful for anyone to make money by any illiberal kind of money-making—inasmuch as the so-called operative art is reproached as subverting liberal habits—nor to think it right to scrape money together at all by such means.

In addition to this a law still follows all these, that no private person be permitted to possess any gold or silver; but that there be a coin for the sake of daily exchange, which it is almost necessary for handicrafts to change, and for all, who have a need of such things, to pay the wages due to hired persons, be they slaves or domestic servants. On which account we say that they must possess coin, which is of value amongst themselves, but of no worth amongst the rest of mankind. For the sake of war indeed and of going abroad to other countries—for instance in the case of

embassies, or some other business of a herald, compulsory on the state—should it be requisite to send out the common coin of Greece, it will be necessary on each occasion for the state to possess it. But if there be any necessity for a private person to go abroad, let him, after obtaining leave of the magistrate, go abroad; but the foreign coin, which on his return home he has brought from any place, still remaining, let him put down for the state, and take up that of the country at the rate of exchange. And if anyone is detected in making the foreign money his own, such money shall become public property; and let him, who knows the fact, but does not divulge it, be subject to a curse and reproach together with the party bringing it in, and to a fine in addition, not less than the amount of the foreign money so brought in.

And be it enacted, that a person who is going to marry, or is giving a daughter in marriage, is neither to give or receive a marriage portion at all of any kind whatsoever, nor to deposit money with a person, whom one does not trust, nor to lend money upon interest, since it will be lawful for the borrower to repay neither interest nor principal. Now that these pursuits are the best for a state to pursue, a person would decide correctly by considering them in this way, and referring them ever to their origin and intention. Now the intention of the statesman, who has a mind, we say, is not that, which the many would say, that a good legislator ought to wish, how the state, for which he is with correct thoughts legislating, may be the greatest and the wealthiest possible, and possess gold and silver money, and rule over as many as possible by sea and land; and they would add, that the person legislating correctly ought to wish the state to be the best and the happiest possible. Now of these things some can take place, but others cannot. The possible then the arranging party would wish; but the impossible he would

not; nor would he make even an attempt at wishes that are vain. For it is almost necessary for them to be at the same time happy and good. This then he would wish. But it is impossible for persons to be very rich and good, such at least as the many reckon rich. For they reckon rich those, who amongst a few persons have possessions valued at the greatest quantity of coin, which even a bad man may possess. Now if such be the case, I will never agree with them that the rich man, if not a good one, can be truly happy; but that it is impossible for the person pre-eminently good, to be pre-eminently rich. What then? someone would perhaps say. Because, we would say, the possession of what is obtained both justly and unjustly, is more than double of that which is obtained justly alone; and that the expenditure, which is wont to be made neither honorably nor disgracefully, is doubly less than that which is honorable, and is wont to be made for honorable objects. He, therefore, who acts in a contrary manner, will never be richer than him, who has double the means and half the expenditure. Now of these, the one is a good person, but the other not a bad one, since he is merely parsimonious; sometimes, indeed, he is altogether bad; but, as we have just now said, is never good. For he, who receives both justly and unjustly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, is indeed rich, because he is parsimonious; but he who is altogether bad, as being for the most part luxurious, is very poor. And he, who spends upon honorable objects and acquires only justly, will never at any time become preeminently rich, nor yet very poor; so that our assertion is right, that the very rich are not good men; and, if they are not good, they are not happy.

With us, however, the laying down of laws looks to that point, that the citizens may become the most happy and in the highest degree friends to each other. But the citizens will never be friends, where there are many lawsuits with each

other and much injustice; but most so where the least and fewest are found. We have said too, that there ought to be neither gold nor silver in the state; nor, again, much moneymaking through handicraft trades and usury, or ugly cattle, but what agriculture gives and bears, and of these too such as will not compel a person by making money to neglect those things, for the sake of which riches are produced. Now these are the soul and body; which, without gymnastics and the rest of discipline, would never be worth mentioning. Hence we have said more than once, that we must put the attention to money in the last place of honor. For, since all, about which every man is seriously engaged, are three, the last and third is correctly the attention paid to riches, but the middle is that relating to the mind; but that relating to the soul the first. And, indeed, the polity, which we have just now been going through, has been correctly laid down by laws, if it ordains honors in this manner. But if anyone of the laws which are ordained in it shall seem to put health in the place of honor in the state before temperance, or wealth before health and temperance, it will appear to be not properly laid down. A legislator, therefore, ought often to point out to himself this. "What do I intend?" and, "If this happens, or I fail in my aim," what then? And thus perhaps he would get himself out of legislation, and liberate likewise the rest, but never a single person by any other means. Let then the person, who has obtained by lot his portion, keep it on the conditions we have detailed.

It were a beautiful thing for each person to come to the colony possessing the rest of things also equally. But as this is not possible, and one will come possessing more means, and another less, it is requisite, for the sake of many things, and of the opportunities in the state, for the sake of equality, that the value of property should be unequal, in order that magistracies, and contributions, and distributions, may

exist to each according to the value of his worth; and that, not according to his own virtue alone, and that of his ancestors, nor yet according to the strength or beauty of his body, but according to the using of wealth and poverty they may receive as equally as possible, by what is unequal, but commensurable, and not differ. For the sake of these things it is requisite that there should be four valuations in the size of property; and that these should be called first, second, third, and fourth, or by some other appellation; and that, when they remain in the same valuation, and when becoming richer from being poor, and poor from being rich, each may pass to the valuation suited to themselves. This scheme of law I would lay down as following after these.

We say then that in a state, which is to have no part in the greatest of diseases, which would be more correctly called dissension or sedition, there should exist neither severe poverty amongst some of the citizens nor great wealth: for both these produce both. It is therefore requisite for a legislator to say at present what is the bound of each. Let then the limit of poverty be the valuation of the lot, which ought to remain, and which no magistrate will ever overlook its becoming less to anyone, nor anyone of the rest of those who in the same way love honor on the score of virtue. Now the legislator, having laid down that limit as a measure, will permit a person to possess the double, triple, and even to the quadruple of it. But, if anyone possesses more than these, whether by finding them, or their being given, or by money-making, or by acquiring through any other such like fortune, by giving up what is above the measure to the state and to the gods, who guard the city, he will be in good repute and without damage. But if any disobeys this law, anyone may inform against him on condition of receiving half the property, and the delinquent shall pay another portion to the same amount, and the half shall go to the gods. And let the

whole property of all, except the allotment, be written down openly before the magistrates, who are the guardians, in order that such of the suits upon all points as relate to money may be easy and extremely clear.

After this it is meet in the first place to build the city as much as possible in the middle of the country, after selecting a spot from those at hand, which possesses what is suited for a city, which it is not difficult to imagine and detail. After this, to divide it into twelve parts; and placing first the temple of Hestia, Vesta, and Zeus, and Athéné, to call it the Acropolis, and to throw round it a circular enclosure, and from it to cut the city and all the country into twelve parts. But the twelve parts ought to be equalized by the portions of the prolific land being small, but those of the unprolific large, and the allotments to be five thousand and forty. And again it is meet to cut each of these into two; and to unite two sections into one allotment, each having a share of what is near to, and what is remote from, the city, the near portion being added to that one farthest off, making one allotment; and that, which is the second from the city, to be added to that, which is the second from the extremity; and so on with all the rest. And it is meet to contrive in the twofold divisions, that what has just now been said respecting the badness and goodness of the land, be equalized by the greater and less quantity at the distribution; and to divide the males likewise into twelve parts; and for a person to arrange the whole of the rest of property into twelve parts equal, as much as is possible, a description being made of all particulars. After this, to assign the twelve allotments to the twelve gods, and to call them after their names, and to consecrate to each the portion obtained by lot, and to call it a Phylé; and again to divide the twelve sections of the city in the same manner as they divided the rest of the country; and that each should possess two habitations, one near the center and the other

near the extremity; and thus let the method of settlement have an end. But it is requisite for us to consider by all means a matter of this kind, that all the points, which have just now been stated, will never concur on such like occasions, so that all should happen to take place according to reason; and that men will exist, who would not feel annoyed at such a method of living together, but would endure to have property fixed by law and moderate through the whole of life; and the procreation of children to be such as we have mentioned; and to be deprived of silver and gold, and other things, which the legislator is clearly, from what has been said, about to forbid; and endure further the equalization of the land and the dwelling in a city placed in the center, as we have mentioned above. Of all which matters a person has been speaking almost as if they were dreams, and molding a state and citizens, as it were, of wax. Subjects however of this kind have been in a certain manner not badly spoken of. But it is requisite to take up again against himself things of this kind. For the legislator would say again to us this—"Do not think, my friends, that what has been now asserted in these speeches has lain hid from me, and that a person has gone through in some manner the truth. But I think this will be most just in each of those things about to be, that he, who exhibits a pattern, according to which the thing attempted ought to be done, should omit nothing of what is most beautiful and true; but that he, to whom it is impossible for anything of this kind to happen, should decline executing that very thing; but that of those which remain, and is nearest to it, and most closely connected naturally with what it is fitting to do, he should devise a plan how this very thing may take place; but permit the legislator to put a finish to his intention; and this being done, then to consider in common with him, which of the matters that have been mentioned are conducive, and which

adverse to legislation. For it surely behooves the artist in a matter the most trifling to make by all means his work consistent with itself, if it is to be worthy of mention. But now after the decree relating to the division into twelve parts, we must be ready to look into this too, namely, to show in what manner the twelve parts have the greatest possible number of divisions of the things within them, and what are consequent upon these, and produced from them, up to the five thousand and forty; and from whence they have clans, and wards, and villages, and, in addition, the drawing up and leading out of troops in war, and moreover coins, and measures dry and liquid, and weights; all these it is requisite for the law to regulate in measure and in harmony with each other. In addition to these we ought not to feel a fear even on that ground, lest there should be what is considered an attention to trifles, should anyone regulate all the chattels which persons are to possess, nor permit any of them to be immoderate, and consider by a reason common to all, that the distributions and variations of the numbers are useful for all things, even such as are various themselves in themselves, and such as are so in length and depth, or in sounds and motions, both those that proceed in a straight direction upwards and downwards, and those that move in a circle. For it behooves the legislator, looking to all these points, to enjoin all the citizens not to swerve from this arrangement, to the utmost of their power. For no one branch of learning suited to children possesses such a mighty power as regards domestic economy, and state polities, and all arts, as the study of numbers; and, what is the greatest of all, excites even the sleepy person and naturally untaught, and renders him docile, and with a good memory, and clever, while making a progress, by a divine art, beyond his own nature. All these, if a person shall have taken away by other laws and pursuits illiberality and a love

of money from the minds of those, who are about to possess them sufficiently and profitably, would become a course of instruction honorable and befitting; but if not, a person would unconsciously, instead of wisdom, produce the so-called cleverness, such as it is in our power to see the Egyptians and Phoenicians, and many other nations produce, through the illiberality of their other pursuits and possessions; either because some indifferent legislator of theirs has caused such results, or a severe misfortune has fallen upon them, or some other nature of this kind. For let not this, Megillus and Clinias, lie hid from us respecting places, that some differ from others in producing men better or worse; in opposition to which we must not lay down laws. For through all kinds of winds and violent heat, some persons are of an alien disposition, and with feelings of hostility; others through the water; but others through that food from the earth, which not only imparts to bodies properties better and worse, but which is no less able to infuse all things of this kind into their soul. But of all the places in a country those excel the most, in which there is a certain divine inspiration, and allotments for dæmons, who are either always propitious to the inhabitants, or the contrary; for whom the legislator, who has a mind, would, after reflecting, as much as it is possible for man to reflect upon all things of this kind, endeavor to lay down laws; which must be done by you, Clinias; for to matters of this kind must he turn himself, who is about to colonize a country.

Clinias/ Very beautifully, Athenian guest! do you speak; and so must it be done by me.

Book 6.

Athenian Stranger/ But, after all that has now been said, there will be almost the appointment of magistrates in your state.

Clinias/ Such is the case.

Athenian Stranger/ Respecting the proper arrangement of a polity, these two kind of things happen to exist. First, the appointment of offices, and of persons about to rule, how many they ought to be, and in what manner appointed. Next, with respect to the laws that are to be imposed upon each office, what, and how many, and of what kind it will be fitting to impose upon each. But, previous to choosing them, let us stop a little, and give some account fitting to be detailed respecting them.

Clinias/ What account is this?

Athenian Stranger/ This. Something of this kind is surely evident to all, that, since the work of legislation is a matter of moment, by placing a state well furnished with laws well laid down under not suitable magistrates, not only would there be a very great laugh at the laws well laid down to no purpose, but there would arise nearly the greatest mischief and bane to states from them.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then consider this, as happening to you, my friend, touching the present polity and state. For you see that it is necessary in the first place for those, who are proceeding in a straight road to the powers of magistrates, to have given, both themselves and their respective families from childhood to the period of their election, a sufficient test. Next for those, who are about to make the choice, to have been brought up and well taught in legal habits, so as to be able to judge correctly of those worthy of either fate, and to receive, or to reject them with

disgust. But how can those, who have recently met together for this purpose, and are unacquainted with each other, and moreover uninstructed, be ever able to choose magistrates in a blameless manner?

Clinias/ They nearly never can.

Athenian Stranger/ But a contest, as they say, does not readily admit of excuses. This then must now be accomplished both by you and me; since you have with readiness undertaken to settle a colony for a clan of the Cretans, and are, as you say, the tenth commissioner; and I have promised to assist you, according to our present story-telling. I will not therefore willingly leave this discourse without a head. For should it meet us, while wandering in this state, it would appear to be deformed.

Clinias/ You have spoken, guest, very well.

Athenian Stranger/ Not spoken merely, but so I will do to the utmost of my power.

Clinias/ Let us do by all means, as we have said.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so, if god be willing; and so far at least let us be victors over old age.

Clinias/ And it is likely that he will be willing.

Athenian Stranger/ It is reasonable. Following him therefore, let us understand this.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ In how manly and hazardous a manner will our state have been at present settled.

Clinias/ Looking to what and whither especially have you thus spoken at present?

Athenian Stranger/ How easily and fearlessly have we laid down laws for persons unskilled, in what way they may receive what has been just laid down. Thus much, at least, is evident, Clinias, nearly to everyone, although not very

wise, that no one will easily admit these laws at first. But if we wait for the time when those, who in their boyhood had tasted of, and been sufficiently brought up in, the laws, and accustomed to them, shall have taken a common part in them with the whole city in the election of magistrates, on such an event happening as we are speaking of, if this should take place in a certain manner and skill, I conceive there would be a great security that a state would remain even after the then existing period educated in this way.

Clinias/ This carries reason with it.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then look to this, whether we can furnish any means sufficient for this end. For I assert, Clinias, that the Cnossians ought, in a manner superior to the other Cretans, not merely to go through a formal rite respecting the country which is now being colonized, but to be strenuously careful that the first magistrates may stand in the most secure and best manner possible. With respect to others, it is a shorter work; but it will be most necessary for us to choose the guardians of the laws with every care.

Clinias/ What road then and method can we discover for this?

Athenian Stranger/ This. I assert then, ye sons of Cretans, that the Cnossians, since they take the lead of the majority of cities, ought to choose in common with those who are going to this joint settlement, from themselves, and them, thirty-seven men in all; nineteen from the settlers, but the rest from Cnossus itself; and let the Cnossians give up these to your state, and for yourself to be a member of this colony and one of the eighteen men; and this, either by employing persuasion or moderate force.

Clinias/ But why do not you, O guest, and Megillus, share with us in this polity?

Athenian Stranger/ Athens, O Clinias, has a high opinion of herself, and so too has Sparta, and each have their dwellings far off. But to you and the other settlers there is a care on all points, the same as what we were just now saying respecting you. Let it then be held to have been stated how these things may, from what is at present in our power, take place in the most likely manner. But as time progresses, and the form of polity continues, let the choice of them the magistrates be something in this way. In the election of magistrates let all take a share who bear arms, either as horse-soldiers or foot-soldiers, and who have taken a part in war according to their respective ability in age; and let the election take place in whatever temple the state holds in the highest veneration; and let each person bring to the altar of the god a small tablet, on which he has written the name of his father, and parish, and ward where he is a liveryman; and let him write thus his own name in the same manner. But let it be lawful for anyone to take away the tablet, which appears to him to be not properly written, and to place it in the Agora, there to remain for not less than thirty days. Of the tablets let the magistrates exhibit to the view of the whole city up to three hundred, that have been judged to be amongst the first; and from these in a similar manner let the city vote whomsoever each person pleases; and let the magistrates exhibit again to all one hundred of those selected out of them a second time; and out of the hundred let anyone vote a third time for whom he pleases, going through cuttings. But the thirty-seven, who may have the greatest number of votes, let some persons deciding declare to be the magistrates. Who then, Clinias and Megillus, shall appoint all these things for us in the state, respecting magistrates and the testing of them? Do we not perceive, that in states, so united from the first, there must be some; but who they would be, it is not the province of all

magistrates? It is however necessary that there should be some, and these too men of not an inferior kind, but as much as possible at the very summit. For the beginning, according to the proverb, is the half of the whole; and all men praise a good commencement. But this, as it seems to me, is more than the half; nor has anyone sufficiently praised it, when it has taken place correctly.

Clinias/ You speak most correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then, since we know it, not pass it by untold, by making nothing clear to ourselves as to the manner in which it exists. For my part I have it not in my power to say but one word necessary for, and conducive to, the present purpose.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ I assert that to this state, which we are about to settle, there is not, as it were, a father and mother except the city which colonizes it. Nor am I ignorant that oftentimes some differences have arisen, and will arise, between colonies and their parent countries. At present then, as a child, although it is about to be at variance with its parents, through its present want of instruction, loves and is beloved by them, and is constantly flying to its relations, finds allies in them alone, which I assert has now taken place readily to the Cnossians through their care for the new city, and to the new city through their care for the Cnossians. I repeat then, as I have just now said, —for what is well said it does no harm to say twice—that the Cnossians ought to have a care over all these particulars in common, by selecting from those, who are departing for the colony, the oldest and best possible, not less than one hundred, and let there be another hundred from the Cnossians themselves. I say too, that these should, on coming to the new city, be careful how the magistrates are appointed

according to the laws, and after being appointed undergo a scrutiny. And on this taking place, let the Cnossians dwell in Cnossus; and let the new city endeavor to preserve itself and become prosperous. Let then those numbered amongst the thirty-seven men be held to have been chosen both now and for all time to come for these purposes. First, let them be guardians of the laws; next, of those writings in which everyone shall write down for the magistrates the amount of his property, except the person who has the greatest valuation of four minæ, and the second of three, and the third of two minæ; but the fourth of one minæ. But if anyone shall be shown to possess anything else beyond what has been written down, let all this become public property; and, besides this, let him undergo a punishment, through anyone bringing him to trial, neither honorable nor with a good name, but disgraceful, should he be convicted of despising the laws through the love of gain. Let then anyone indict him for being addicted to a disgraceful love of gain, and follow up the charge by a trial before the guardians of the laws. And if the defendant is condemned to pay a fine, let him have no share in the public property; and when any distribution takes place in the state, let him be without a share, except as regards his first allotment; and let him be written down, where anyone who wishes may read it, as a person condemned, as long as he lives. Let not the guardian of the laws be in office more than twenty years; and let him not be inducted into his office, if he is less than fifty years of age. But if he is sixty years old when he is inducted into it, let him hold it for ten years; and according to this ratio let it be, that he, who has passed beyond seventy years, shall not imagine that he holds an office of such importance amongst those who are holding it.

Let then these three ordinances be considered to have been stated, touching the guardians of the laws. But as the

laws progress, each one may enjoin upon these men, what matters they ought to attend to, in addition to what have been detailed already.

And now we will speak in order about the election of other magistrates. For after this it is necessary to elect Generals, and such as minister to them in war, such as the Hipparchs and the Phylarchs, and those who drill the foot-soldiers of the Phylé, to whom would be very fitting the name of Taxiarchs, as the common people call them. Of these let the guardians of the laws propose for Generals from this very state itself; and from those so proposed let all, who have taken a part in war at their proper age, or are in the act of doing so on each occasion, make the selection. But if it shall appear to anyone that some one of those, who have not been proposed, is superior to some of those, who have been proposed, let him name the person, whom he proposes, in the place of someone, and, taking an oath touching this very matter, let him bring forward the other party; and whichever shall be voted by a show of hands, let him be decreed as belonging to the selection. And let the three, who have the greatest number of votes for them to be Generals and to have the care of the war department, undergo a scrutiny, as the guardians of the law underwent. And let the twelve elected Generals propose twelve Taxiarchs for themselves, for each tribe one; and let there be a preference nomination, as occurred in the case of the Generals, done in the same manner, respecting the Taxiarchs, and a second show of hands and a decision. And let the guardians of the laws, after they have brought together an assembly at a place the most holy and most convenient, cause to sit, before the Prytanes and Council have been chosen, the heavy-armed apart, and apart too the cavalry, and the third in order after these the whole of those employed in war. And let all hold up their hands for the Generals and Hipparchs; but for the

Taxiarchs those who carry shields; but let all the cavalry choose for itself Phylarchs; but let the Generals appoint for themselves the officers over the light-armed soldiers, or archers, and the rest of those employed in war. There still remains for us the appointment of the Hipparchs. These then let those propose, who proposed the Generals; and let the election and the preference nomination take place, as it occurred in the case of the Generals. And let the cavalry hold up their hands for them in the presence of the infantry looking upon them; and let the two, who have the greatest show of hands, be the commanders of all the cavalry; and let the disputes about the show of hands take place up to twice; but if anyone doubts about them a third time, let those determine the votes, whose province it is to fix the measure of voting.

The Council shall consist of thirty dozen; for three hundred and sixty would be suited to the distributions; and by dividing that number into four parts, each ninety, from each portion of the census ninety councilors would give their vote. And in the first place let all those of the largest valuation give their vote; or the person who disobeys the law will be fined according to the fine decreed, and when they shall have been carried in, let a person put a mark against them. On the following day let those of the second class give their vote, as on the former day; and on the third day let anyone of the third class bring his vote. In the case of those belonging to these three classes, let it be compulsory to give a vote; but let the fourth and smallest class be dismissed exempt from fine, should anyone belonging to it be unwilling to give a vote. On the fourth day let all belonging to the fourth and smallest class give their votes; but let him, who belonging to the third and fourth class, is unwilling to give a vote be exempt from a fine. But let him, who, belonging to the second and first class, does not give a vote, be fined; he,

who belongs to the second rank, be fined the triple of the first fine; and he, who belongs to the first, quadruple. On the fifth day let the rulers bring out for all the citizens to see the names that have a mark against them; and let every man of them give a vote or be fined with the first fine. And after selecting one hundred and eighty out of each class, let them, after choosing by ballot one half of them, make a scrutiny of them, and these shall form the council for one year.

The election taking place in this manner, would be a medium between a monarchy and a democracy; which medium a polity ought always to preserve. For slaves and masters can never become friends, nor the depraved and worthy, when proclaimed with equal honors. For through things, that are unequal, those that are equal will become unequal, unless they partake of moderation; for, through both of those inequalities polities are filled with seditions. For the old saw, being true, that equality produces friendship, has been asserted very correctly and carefully. But through its not being very evident what the equality is, which is able to effect this, it throws us into great trouble. For, as there are two equalities, of the same name, but in reality nearly contrary to each other on many points, every state and every legislator is competent to introduce one of these in the case of honors by regulating, as regards the distribution by means of the ballot, the equality consisting in measure, weight, and number; but it is not easy for everyone to perceive the most true and the best equality. For it is the decision of Zeus; and it furnishes but little at all times to men; although as much as it does furnish to states or private persons, it works out every good. For it distributes more to the greater, and less to the smaller, imparting to each what is moderate according to its nature. Moreover it distributes greater honors to those who are even greater in virtue, but to those who have less of virtue and education it

distributes less honors, as being suited to each according to reason. For this surely is justice itself even in politics, at which we ought at present to grasp, and, looking to this equality, Clinias, to settle our now rising state. And should anyone settle any other state, he ought to give laws, with his mind turned to this point, and not to a few tyrants, or one, or to any power of the people, but always to justice itself. And this is what has just now been stated, namely, the distributing what is according to nature, equal to unequals. It is necessary however for every state to make use of these two equalities in name, if it is about not to have a share in seditions in any degree. For the easy and lenient temper of what is perfect and accurate contrary to justice the correct is improperly broken down when it takes place. Hence it is perhaps necessary to make use in addition of the equality by ballot, on account of the moroseness of the multitude; and afterwards to invite by prayers a god and good fortune to direct the ballot to what is most just. In this manner then it is necessary to use both the equalities; but the one which is in need of good fortune on the very fewest occasions.

These things, and in this way, and for these reasons, it is necessary, friends, for that state to do, which is about to be preserved. But since both a ship, while sailing on the sea, requires constantly a watch both night and day, and in like manner a state dwells, while driven along by the storm of other states, and running the risk of being caught by all kinds of plots, it is requisite through the day to night, and from night to day, for the rulers to join with rulers, and watchers with watchers, and to succeed each other constantly, and never to cease handing over their power. But the multitude is not able to do any of these things quickly. And it is necessary to permit the majority of the counselors to remain for the greatest part of their time properly managing their own private affairs; but that a twelfth part of

them should distribute themselves over the twelve months, so as to furnish a watch, one part for one month, and to be in readiness for anything in the case of anyone coming from anywhere else, or from the city itself for any purpose, whether a person should be desirous of telling or hearing aught respecting what it is fitting for one state to give an answer to other states, or by putting questions to others to receive replies; and moreover for the sake of those innovations of all kinds which are wont to happen perpetually, in order especially that they may not occur; or, if they have occurred, that the consequences may be cured as quickly as possible, after the state shall have become acquainted with them. Hence that portion, which presides over the state, ought to be the master of public meetings and their dissolutions, which take place both according to law and on a sudden. All these matters it should be for the twelfth part of the council to arrange, who are to be at rest for eleven parts of the year. But this part of the Council ought always to keep these watchings over the state in common with the other magistrates.

Such then being the state of affairs as regards the state, they may be put into order with moderation. But what care, and what order, will there be in all the rest of the country? Must there not, since all the city, and the whole country, is distributed into twelve parts, be shown to be Commissioners of the roads, and dwellings, and buildings, and harbors, and of the market-place, and fountains, and moreover of sacred groves, and temples, and all other things of this kind belonging to the state?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us say then, that there ought to be persons to cleanse the temples, and priests and priestesses; and that it is meet to choose three kinds of officers over roads and buildings, and the ornaments

belonging to things of this kind, and over human beings that they may do no injury, and over the rest of wild beasts, in the very encircling enclosure and suburb of the city, in order that everything may take place befitting cities; and that as regards the duty just now stated, it is meet to call them City-Stewards, but as regards the market, Market-Stewards, and as regards the temples, Priests. But let us not disturb those, with whom, as priests or priestesses, the sacred office is hereditary. But if, as is likely to happen to those first settled, nothing has been laid down respecting holy things of this kind in favor of anybody or only a few, one must appoint priests and priestesses to be the cleansers of the temples of the gods. But of all these things some are to be in their appointment by election, and some by lot, through those that are and are not Wardsmen mingling in a friendly manner with each other in every district and town, in order that they may be as much as possible of one mind. To commit then what relates to sacred rites to the god himself, let it be an act of gratification to him, and to allow divine fortune to settle by lot. But the party who has happened to obtain the lot, it is meet to subject to a scrutiny first, whether he is of a sound body and lawfully begotten; next of a family as pure as possible, and unpolluted himself by blood and all crimes of such a kind against the gods, and whether his father and mother have lived in a similar manner. And it is meet to bring from Delphi the laws relating to all divine things, and, after appointing interpreters for them, to make use of them. And let the priestly office be for a year, and not longer; and let the person be not less than sixty years of age, who is, according to holy laws, to attend for us sufficiently to divine matters. And let there be the same laws relating to priestesses. And let the thrice four tribes bring to the vote thrice four interpreters, each one from themselves; and after scrutinizing the three who have the greatest number of

votes, it is meet to send the other nine to Delphi, for the god to designate by an oracle one out of each triad; and let the scrutiny relating to these, and their age, be as in the case of the priests, and let these be interpreters for life; and let the four wards elect in the place of him, who may have left life, another from the ward where there is a deficiency. It is meet too to choose Stewards for the sacred money in each of the temples, with full powers over the sacred groves and their produce, and the leasing of the property, and three for the largest temples out of those with the largest estates; but two for the smaller temples, and one for the most moderate; and let the choice and scrutiny of these be in the same manner as the election of the Generals was made. And let what relates to sacred things take place in this way.

But let nothing be as far as possible without a guard. Let the guards of the city be in this way, through the Generals, and Taxiarchs, and Hipparchs, and Phylarchs, and the Prytanes, and moreover the City-Stewards and Market-Stewards, attending to their respective duties, after they have been chosen and appointed sufficiently; but the whole of the rest of the country it is meet to guard in this way. The whole country has been divided by us into twelve parts as nearly as possible equal. Let then, one Phylé ward, after being allotted to each portion, furnish for the year five, as it were, Rural-Stewards and Phylarchs. And let it be for these to choose, each of the five, out of their own Phylé, twelve from the young men not less than five-and-twenty years of age, and not more than thirty. To these let there be allotted portions of the country during a month, each for each, so that all of them may have a practical knowledge of every part of the country. But let the government and guardianship continue to the guards and governors for two years; and let those, who first obtain by lot their respective portions, the guard-officers lead out, changing the places of the country

constantly, by going to the place next in order towards the right in a circle, and let the right be that which is in the east. But as the year comes round, in the second year, in order that the greatest portion of the guards may become acquainted with the country, not only during one season of the year, but that as many as possible may know thoroughly, in addition to the country, at the same time what occurs relating to each spot in the country at each season, let the then officers lead them out again to the left, constantly changing the place, until they go through the second year. In the third year, it is meet to choose other Rural-Stewards and guard officers as the five curators of the twelve young men; and in their occupations attention should be given of some such kind as this to each place. First that the country may be as much as possible well-fortified against the enemy, by trenching and digging out wherever it is requisite, and with buildings restraining, as far as they can, those endeavoring to injure in any way the country and its possessions; and by making use of animals under the yoke, and the servants in each place, for these purposes, doing through them, standing over them, selecting as much as possible their own employment in their own works, to render every place difficult for the enemy to pass, but as easy as possible for friends, and animals under the yoke and cattle; and by taking care of the roads that they may be in the most quiet state, and of the waters from Zeus, that they may not injure the country, but benefit it rather, when descending from high grounds into hollow places in the mountains, and by restraining the outlets of the waters with buildings and ditches, such hollows may, by receiving and drinking up the waters from Zeus, produce streams and fountains for the fields below them and for all places. and thus cause the most dry places to possess water plentiful and good. And let them, by ornamenting the water from fountains, whether it is a

river or its source, with plantations and buildings, render it more beautiful, and bringing all the streams together make them abundant by means of mine-like tunnels and surface-irrigations, according to each season, if perchance there may have been a grove or sacred precinct about those very streams dedicated to a deity, and by sending which to those spots they may adorn the holy places of the gods. By all means too in spots of this kind it is necessary for youths to fit up places for naked exercises for themselves, and old men's baths, and making them warm for the aged, by placing wood dry and dry for the benefit of those laboring under diseases, and receiving kindly bodies worn down by rustic labors, and a habit of body much better than that of a medical practitioner not very skillful.

All these things then, and of this kind, would be to such places an ornament and use, in conjunction with sport by no means unpleasant. But let the serious attention relating to these things be this. —Let the sixty defend, each their own place, not only on account of enemies, but for the sake of those, who call themselves friends. But if anyone, whether he is a slave or a free-man, injure his neighbor, or any other citizen, let those five rulers act as judges in the case of the party asserting that he has been injured, with respect to trifling matters; but where one person brings a charge against another on greater matters, let the seventeen, together with the twelve, on questions up to three minæ. No judge or magistrate ought to be exempt from giving an account of his conduct as judge or magistrate, except such as, like kings, put the finish to suits. Moreover as regards the Rural-Stewards if they behave insolently to those, of whom they are the guardians, by enjoining unequal tasks, or by attempting to seize and carry off anything from those, employed in agriculture, not having previously persuaded them to give it up; and if they receive aught from those, who

offer it to curry favor; or if they give their decisions unjustly, through yielding to adulation; let them bear off as their reward the reproach of the whole state. But for the other wrongs, which they may do to those in their district, let them voluntarily undergo a fine, as far as one mina, imposed by the villagers and neighbors. But for greater or smaller injuries, on each occasion, if they are not willing to pay, through their trusting to being removed monthly to another place, and thus escaping, although pursued by law, in such cases the injured party is to have the chance of a trial at common law; and if he obtains a verdict, let him demand of the defendant to pay a double fine, and having been unwilling, to undergo punishment willingly.

And let the rulers and the Rural-Stewards have their dietary for the space of two years in some such manner as this. First let there be in the different places a common table, at which they must all make a common table. And let the person, who is absent from table, and sleeps out for one day or night, without orders from the rulers, or some every necessity falling upon him, if the five inform against him, and, after writing the indictment, place it in the market-place, to the effect that he has broken through his guardianship, let him bear the disgrace of having on his part betrayed the constitution, and be chastised with stripes by anyone, who meets him, and is willing to do so with impunity. And if anyone of the rulers themselves is doing anything of this kind himself, it is necessary for all the sixty to direct their care to such a person; and let him who perceives or hears of it, but does not bring him to trial, be amenable to the same laws as the party offending; and let him be punished with a greater fine than the young men, and be held dishonored with respect to all the rule over young men.

Of these doings likewise let the guardians of the laws be the inspectors, in order that either they may not take place at all, or, taking place, meet with condign punishment. Now it is meet for every man to bear in mind touching all men, that he, who has never been a servant, will never be a master worthy of praise; and it is requisite to pride oneself rather upon acting properly the slave, than on acting properly the master, first towards the laws, since this is being a servant to the gods; next towards elders and the young persons who have lived with honor. After this it is meet for the person, who has been one of the Rural-Stewards, to taste during these two years daily food of a humble and poor kind. For, after the twelve magistrates shall have been enrolled, let them come together with the five and take counsel, that, like domestics, they will not have other persons to be domestics and slaves to them, nor will they from the household of other farmers and villagers use their attendants for their own concerns, but only so far as relates to the public at large; but in other matters let them consider that they are to live, dependent themselves on themselves, and ministering to, and ministered by, themselves; and in addition to this, searching through the whole country, summer and winter, in arms, for the sake of guarding and knowing thoroughly all places, that successively present themselves. For it appears that for all to know accurately their own country is a piece of learning inferior to none. For the sake of which it behooves a person at the period of youth to attend to hunting by dogs and to other kinds of catching wild beasts, no less than for the sake of any other pleasure and profit at the same time, which results through these means to all. These very pursuits then let every man to the utmost of his power readily pursue, whether a person delights to call them concealments, or rural stewardships, or by any other name, if they are about to preserve sufficiently their own state.

After this there follows the subject relating to the election of those acting as rulers, both Market-Stewards, and City-Stewards. Upon the Rural-Stewards, sixty in number, there should follow three City-Stewards, dividing the twelve parts of the city into three; and in imitation of those the Rural Stewards they should have the care of the path-ways, and of the city, and the public roads, that respectively stretch from the country to the city, and of the buildings likewise, so that all of them are made according to law; and moreover of the streams of water, which those, who watch them, send to them and deliver, after being attended to, in order that they may pass on to the fountains, sufficient in quantity and clear, and adorn at once and benefit the city. These too ought to be persons of influence, and at leisure to pay attention to public affairs. On this account let every man propose as a City-Steward whomsoever he wishes out of those with the largest property. And when all have had hands held up for them, and those are reduced to six, to whom the most votes have been given, let those, who are to have this charge, select by ballot the three, and after they have undergone a scrutiny, let them be in office according to the laws laid down for them. Next in order after these it is meet to choose Market-Stewards, five in number, out of those with the valuation of the second and first class; but in other respects let their election be in the same manner as for the City-Stewards. For it is meet that ten out of all the rest, having had hands held up for them, should ballot for the five, and declare them, after undergoing a scrutiny, to be the persons in power. And let everyone hold up his hand for ten in all. But let him, who is unwilling to vote, if informed against before the rulers, be fined fifty drachms, in addition to his being held to be a bad man. And let anyone who wishes go to the public assembly and common meeting; and let it be compulsory on him, who belongs to the second and first

class of property, to be fined ten drachms, if he is not present and mustered at the conventions; but it shall not be compulsory on the third and fourth class of property; but let such a person be dismissed without a fine, unless the rulers give an order for all to be present in consequence of some urgent necessity.

And it is meet for the Market-Stewards to preserve the orderly arrangement enjoined by the laws relating to the market-place; and to take care of the temples and fountains in the market-place, so that no one injures them; and to punish the party so injuring with stripes and bonds, if a slave and a stranger; but if a native acts in a disorderly manner with respect to things of this kind, let them be authorized, after a trial, to fix a fine up to one hundred drachms in money, but to fine up to the double of this sum the offending party, if they are sitting in judgment in common with the City-Stewards. Let there be the same power to fine and punish allowed to the City-Stewards in their own department, so as to fine offenders up to a mina themselves, but the double of this sum in conjunction with the Market-Stewards.

After this it will be proper for the leaders in Music and Gymnastics to be established, two kinds of each; some of them for the sake of instruction, and others for the sake of contesting. Now in the case of instruction, the law relating to Gymnasia and schools means to speak of those, who have the care of orderly arrangement and instruction to boot, and of the attention paid to such matters, and of the frequenting and staying at schools on the part of young persons, both male and female: but in the case of contesting, it means to speak of those who assign the prizes to competitors in Gymnastics and Music; and these two are two-fold; one employed on Music, and the other on Gymnastics. Now in the contests of men and horses, it would be proper for the

same persons to assign the prizes; but in those of Music, for some to do so in the case of solo-singing and the imitative art, such as the rhapsodists, and all of this kind; but others over chorus-singing and players on the harp and hautboy. First then with regard to the amusement of the choirs of boys and men, and girls exercised in dancing, and in the whole order of music, it is surely requisite to elect their leaders. Now one leader, not less than forty years old, will surely suffice for these. One too not less than thirty years old will suffice for solo-singing, and to be the introducer of, and to give a judgment sufficiently upon, the competitors. Now the leader and regulator of the choir it is requisite to choose in some such manner as this. Let those, who have a friendly feeling towards such matters, go to the meeting, subject to a fine if they do not go, and of this let the guardians of the law be the judges; but upon the rest, if they are not willing, let there be nothing compulsory. And let the person, who makes the nomination, select one out of those who are skillful; and in the scrutiny let there be only this one charge and denial, on the part of some, that the person, who has obtained the lot, is unskilled, but on the part of others, that he is skilled; and let the person who, out of ten previously voted for, has obtained singly the lot, be, after undergoing a scrutiny, the leader of the choirs according to the law for one year. In the same manner as these, let him who, out of those that come to a trial, in this way obtains the lot, be the leader for that year of the solo-singing, and concert-singing, after giving, as the party so obtaining the lot, to the judges the power to decide. After this it is necessary to choose from the persons belonging to the third and even second class of property, the assigners of prizes in the contest relating to the exercises of horses and men. Now to the election let it be compulsory upon the three classes to go, but let the smallest class be dismissed without a fine; and let there be three who obtain

the lot, twenty having previously had hands held up for them, but three of the twenty obtaining the lot, whom the vote of the examiners shall approve of. But if anyone is rejected through any balloting or decision whatever of a magistrate, let another be chosen in his stead, and the scrutiny take place in the same manner respecting him.

There remains now the ruler relating to what has been mentioned by us before, namely, the party to take care of the whole instruction of females and males. Let the person who is to rule over these be, according to the laws, not less than fifty years old, and the father of children lawfully begotten, males and females especially, but if not, of either sex. And let both him, who selects, and him, who is selected, consider that this office is by far the greatest of the chief offices in the state. For the first budding of every plant, when it runs in a beautiful manner to the excellence of its nature, is the most powerful to put a suitable finish of other plants, and of animals tame and wild and men. Now man we say is a tame animal; and when he meets with proper instruction and a fortunate nature, is wont to become an animal the most divine and tame; but when he is not sufficiently or not properly brought up, he is the most savage of all the animals, which the earth produces. On which account the legislator ought not to suffer the bringing up of children to be a secondary thing, or as a by-work. But it is necessary to begin from the first step, by the person, who is about to have the care of them, being selected, who is the best in all respects of those in the state; and by the legislator ordering that person to be by all possible means set over and to take care of them. Let all the magistrates, therefore, except the Counselors and Prytanes, go to the temple of Apollo and give, unknown to the guardians of the laws, their votes for him, whom each conceives would rule the best amongst those conversant with education. And let him, for whom the most

votes come together, after he has been scrutinized by the other magistrates, who, with the exception of the guardians of the laws, have chosen him, enter upon his office for five years; but in the sixth year, let another be chosen to the office in a similar manner.

But if any ruler dies while employed in a public situation before the term of office shall have expired, wanting more than thirty days, let those, to whom this duty belongs, appoint another in the same manner to the office. And if anyone, who is a guardian to orphans, dies, let the relations on both the father's and mother's side, as far as the cousins, who may at that time be in the country, appoint another within ten days, or let each be fined a drachm a day, until they shall have appointed the guardian for the children.

Now every state will surely become no state, in which courts of justice are not properly established; and on the other hand a voiceless judge, and who, in the preliminary proceedings, does not speak more than the litigants, as in the case of arbitrators, will never be sufficient for the purpose of deciding justly. On this account, it is not easy, when there are either many or few indifferent characters, to have a fair trial. But it is necessary for the matter in dispute to be clearly stated by each party; and time too and the sifting slowly and frequently a question conduce to the rendering a doubtful point clear. On this account it is meet for those, who complain of each other, to betake themselves first to their neighbors and friends, and those the most conversant with the subject of dispute. But if a party is unable to obtain a satisfactory decision from them, let him go to another tribunal; but if those two cannot bring about a reconciliation, let the third put an end to the suit. In a certain respect, indeed, the establishment of courts of justice depends on the choice of magistrates; for every magistrate is necessarily a judge of certain things; but every

judge is not a magistrate, although, in a certain respect, during the day in which he is deciding a suit, he is no mean a magistrate. Considering, then, the judges likewise as magistrates, let us state which of them would be proper, and of what matters they are to be the judges, and how many for each suit. Let then that tribunal be of the highest authority, which each show forth, themselves to themselves, after having chosen certain persons in common. But as regards the rest, let there be two tribunals; one, when a private person accusing another private person of doing him a wrong, shall bring him to trial, and be willing for the suit to be decided; the other, when anyone conceives that the public has been injured by some of the citizens, and is willing to aid the community at large. Let us state then of what kind are the judges, and who.

In the first place then, let a tribunal common to all, who are contending for the third time, as private persons with each other, exist in this manner. All the magistrates that are in office for a year, and those for a longer period, ought, when the new year is about to commence in the month that succeeds the summer solstice, to come on the day, before that very day of the month, together to one temple, and, swearing by the god, to take, as it were, for the initiatory rite of every office, one judge, who shall be deemed to be the best in each office, and appear likely to decide in the best and most holy manner lawsuits amongst his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year. When the judges are chosen, let a scrutiny take place by the very persons who have chosen them; and if anyone is rejected, let them choose another in the same manner; but let the persons approved of act as judges in the case of those, who have fled from the other courts of justice, and let them give their vote openly. The Counselors, however, and the other officials, who chose them, must of necessity be the hearers and spectators of

these decisions; and other persons too, whoever wish it. But if anyone accuses any person of having willingly decided a suit unjustly, let him go and make the accusation before the guardians of the law; and let the party found guilty undergo a punishment of this kind, namely, to pay half of the damage done to the injured party; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater fine, let those, who tried the suit, fix what additional punishment he ought to suffer in person, or to pay either to the public treasury, or to the person who has suffered the injury. But with respect to public accusations, it is necessary in the first place for the multitude to participate in the decision. For all are injured, when anyone does wrong to the state; and hence the multitude would justly take it ill, if they had no share in such decisions; but both the beginning and the end of such a suit it is requisite to refer to the people; but the inquiry into it, to the three greatest magistrates, whom both the defendant and plaintiff agree in acknowledging; but if they are unable to participate in such agreement themselves, let the Council decide upon the choice of each of them. It is meet moreover for all to have a share as far as they can in private suits. For he, who has no share in the power of acting as a judge with others, conceives that he has in no respect a share in the state. On this account then it is necessary for the courts of justice to be according to the wards, and for the judges to give on the instant, uncorrupted by entreaties, their decision by ballot; and that of all such matters that tribunal is to give the final decision, which we say is established, as far as is possible by human power, the most incorruptible in the case of those, who are unable to come to terms either through their neighbors or the tribunals belonging to the wards.

Now in truth, respecting courts of justice, of which we said that a person speaking could not easily assert indubitably that they are offices of rule or not, this

description, painted, as it were, in outline, has asserted some things, and nearly left out others. For the exact laying down and at the same time the division of laws relating to suits will take place by far the most correctly at the end of legislation. Let it then be told to those subjects to wait for us. For the appointments relating to other magistrates have taken up nearly the greatest part of legislation. But the totality and exactness relating to one and all of the subjects connected with a state, and the whole of a state administration, cannot become clear, until the digression shall arrive at the end, after having embraced from the beginning portions of itself, the second and the middle and all. At present, however, as far as the choosing of magistrates has taken place, this would be a sufficient finish to what has been previously mentioned; while the commencement of the laying down of laws is requiring no longer a putting off and doubts.

Clinias/ Having spoken, O guest, what has gone before entirely to my mind, you have now said this, still more agreeably than those, by uniting the beginning with the end, touching both what has been, and is to be, said.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus far then will the game of prudent old men have been played by us in a becoming manner.

Clinias/ Beautiful is the serious pursuit of men, which you appear to show forth.

Athenian Stranger/ It is probable. But let us reflect whether this appears to you as it does to me.

Clinias/ What kind of thing? and about what?

Athenian Stranger/ You know that, as in painting to the life, the business appears never to have an end as regards each animal, but that by coloring, and discoloring, or by whatever name the sons of painters call a thing of this kind,

it seems that it never would cease giving afresh touch, so that what has been painted receives an increase towards becoming more beautiful and more clear.

Clinias/ I almost understand, by hearing, what you mean, although I am by no means conversant with this kind of art.

Athenian Stranger/ This will be no detriment to you. But let us employ the expression, which has occurred to us respecting the art, to this purpose, so that, if anyone had an idea of painting a most beautiful animal, and to keep it for not a worse state, but a better one, as time was continually progressing, do you not perceive that, through his being a mortal, unless he left behind him a successor to set it to rights, should it make any slip through time, and who would be able to add what, through his own weakness in the art, had been omitted, and by giving a brilliancy cause it to improve, all his great labor would last but a short time?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, does not this appear to you to be the intention of the legislator? First, to write down his laws as accurately as possible, or sufficiently so? In the next place, do you think that in the course of time, and after making an actual trial of what has been decreed, any legislator has been so insane, as not to know that many things of this kind must necessarily be left out, which it is requisite for some successor to set to rights, in order that the polity and arrangement may by no means become worse, but always better and more adorned, as regards the state settled by him?

Clinias/ It is likely—how not? —that every legislator whatever intends a thing of this kind.

Athenian Stranger/ If then any legislator possesses any plan for this, in deed and in word, namely, by what method

he could teach another, whether a greater person or less, to have his wits upon this point, how it is requisite to preserve laws and to set them to rights, he would never be tired of telling a thing of this kind, until he reached the end.

Clinias/ How should he?

Athenian Stranger/ Ought not this then to be done both by you and me at present?

Clinias/ Of what kind of thing are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ Since we are about to establish laws, and guardians of the laws have been chosen by us, but we are ourselves at the sunset of life, and the guardians are young men as compared with us, it is, as we have said, necessary for us at the same time to lay down laws, and to endeavor likewise to make these very young men, as much as possible, both legislators and guardians of the laws.

Clinias/ How not? since we are able to do so sufficiently.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then make the attempt, and be eager to do so.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us say to them—O friends, the preservers of the laws, we shall leave very many things relating to matters, the laws of which we have laid down; for it must needs be so; nevertheless we will not omit matters of not small moment, nor the whole as far as we can, undescribed, as it were, by some sketch; and what is so sketched, it will be requisite for you to fill up. But it is meet for you to hear by looking to what point you will accomplish a thing of this kind.

For Megillus, and myself, and Clinias have spoken upon these matters with each other not seldom, and we agree that it has been spoken correctly. And we are desirous for you to be at the same time indulgent to us, and to become our disciples, looking to those points, to which we have agreed

among ourselves that a guardian of the laws and a legislator ought to look. Now this agreement has one head, namely, how a man may become good by possessing that virtue of the soul, which is suited to his nature, either from a certain study, or some habit, or from some kind of possession or desire or opinion, or from some kind of learning, whether the nature of those dwelling together is male or female, youthful or aged, in order that there may be, through the whole of life, every serious exertion directed to that very same object, of which we are now speaking; but of all the rest, that are an impediment to these, there will appear not one person holding a single thing in greater honor; but that he will at length even die for a state, rather than be willing to support the yoke of slavery, should there appear a necessity for it to be overthrown, and to be under the rule of worse men, or to quit it a not-state by flight; since everything of this kind is to be endured by those who are suffering, before they take in exchange that polity, which naturally makes men worse. On these points we have previously agreed; and do you now, looking to both of these, praise and blame the laws; blaming such as are not able to effect these objects; but, embracing and receiving with a kind feeling such as are able, do live ye in them; but to other pursuits, and many of those called good, it is meet for you to bid a farewell.

Let this then be to us the beginning of the subsequent laws, commencing from things holy. For we ought in the first place to resume the number five thousand and forty, because it had and has now convenient distributions, both the whole number, and that which was assigned to the wards; which we laid down as the twelfth part of the whole, being exactly four hundred and twenty. And as the whole number has twelve divisions, so also has that of the wards. Now it is meet to consider each division as a sacred gift of a deity, through its following both the order of the months and

the revolutions of the universe. Hence that which is inherent leads every state, making them holy. Some persons indeed have perhaps made a more correct distribution than others, and with better fortune have dedicated the distribution to the gods. But we now assert, that the number five thousand and forty has been chosen most correctly, as it has all divisions as far as twelve, beginning from one, except that by eleven; and this has the slightest correction. For it becomes whole, if two hearths are distributed to the other parts. Now that these things are true, a tale not very long would show at leisure. Believing then for the present in the present tradition and story, let us distribute this number; and dedicating to a god, or a son of gods, each portion, and giving the altars, and the things pertaining to them, let us institute monthly two meetings relating to sacrifices, twelve according to the division of the wards, and twelve to that of the city; the first, for the sake of the favor of the gods, and of things pertaining to the gods; the second, for the sake of our relationship and acquaintanceship with each other, and for the sake of every kind, as we should say, of intercourse. For as regards the communion in, and mixture of, marriages, it is necessary to take away the ignorance as to the parties from whom a person leads home a wife, and what woman he is giving in marriage and to whom, deeming it of every importance that there should be in matters of this kind as far as is possible no mistake at all. For the sake then of a serious object of this kind it is necessary for youths and maidens to make for themselves sports by dancing together, and at the same time seeing and being seen by each other, rationally, and at an age that has a fair pretext, being both often naked as far as a prudent feeling of modesty exists in each party. Of all these let the rulers of the choirs be the guardians and arrangers and the legislators likewise, together with the guardians of the laws, by ordaining what

we may have left out. But it is necessary, as we have said, that, as regards all such matters, the legislator should leave out all that are small and numerous; but that those, who become in succession during the year experienced by learning from their use, be arranged and being corrected move yearly, until there shall appear to have been made a sufficient limit to such legal enactments and pursuits. Now the space of ten years will, when applied to all and each, be at the same time moderate and sufficient for an experience in sacrifices and choirs, a legislator, who had arranged, living in common, but coming to his end, let each of the magistrates themselves, bringing before the guardians of the laws, what is omitted in their own office, be corrected, until each thing shall appear to have attained the end of having been done properly. And then, after laying them down as immovable, let them use them in conjunction with the other laws, which the legislator, who laid them down, ordained at the beginning; of which it is becoming for them to change voluntarily not a single thing at any time. But should perchance any necessity seem to lay hold of them, it is requisite for all the magistrates and all the people to consult together, and to go to all the oracles of the gods; and should all these accord, then to disturb the laws, but by no means otherwise; but let the person, who prevents a change, ever be, according to law, the superior.

Whenever then at whatever period a person amongst those of five-and-twenty years old believes that he has, after seeing and being seen by others, found someone to his mind and fitted for a communion in, and procreation of, children, let him marry when he is within thirty-five years of age; but how it is requisite to seek the becoming and fitting, let him first hear. For it is meet, as Clinias says, to lay down before each law a prelude relating to it.

Clinias/ You have very properly reminded us, guest; and you have seized upon the opportunity of a discourse, that appears to me to be extremely well-timed.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak well. Let us then say to a person born of good parents—It is meet, O boy, to contract those marriages, which appear correct amongst thinking men; who would advise you neither to avoid a marriage with poor persons, nor to pursue pre-eminently one with the rich; but, if all the other things are equal, to always honor the inferior, and to enter into a communion with it. For this would be advantageous both to the city and the hearths which come together. For the equable and commensurate infinitely surpass the immoderate with respect to virtue. He therefore, who is conscious of being rather headstrong, and carried away more than is fitting towards all kinds of actions, ought to be eager to become the relation of parents of orderly manners: but he, who is naturally of a contrary disposition, ought to proceed to an alliance of a contrary kind. And in every case, let there be one story respecting marriage. For it is meet that each person should be a suitor in a marriage that is beneficial to the state, and not what is the most pleasant to himself. For all are naturally carried to that, which is the most like to themselves; from whence the whole state becomes in an anomalous position as regards wealth and manners; through which those things, that we do not wish to happen to ourselves, happen especially to the majority of states. Now in our system to order by law that the rich are not to marry with the rich, or the party, who has much power, not to do so with another such, but to compel the quicker in their habits to go by a community of marriage to the more slow, and the slower to the quicker, would, in addition to its being ridiculous, excite a feeling of anger with the many. For it is easy to understand that a city ought not to be mixed like a cup, in which the maddened wine, when

poured forth, effervesces; but one that, being corrected by another and a sober deity, does, after receiving a beautiful commingling, produce a good and moderate drink. But not one, so to say, is able to clearly see this taking place in the mingling of the sexes with respect to children. On this account it is necessary to leave alone things of this kind in a law; and to endeavor by charms to persuade each person to set a greater value upon the equality in their children, themselves to themselves, than in the equality of marriages, insatiable of wealth, and by reproaches to turn aside him, who makes riches the object of his pursuit in marriage, but not to compel him by a written law.

Let these then be the exhortations respecting marriages, and those too, which have been mentioned previous to these, that it is requisite to hold fast to ever-producing nature, by leaving behind children of children, and to deliver them over continually as servants of god in the place of ourselves. All this then, and still more, a person may say respecting marriages, how they ought to take place, and may make use of a prelude correctly. But if anyone cannot be persuaded willingly, but keeps himself in the city estranged and without connection, and remains unmarried for five and thirty years, let him be fined every year, if he possesses property of the largest class, one hundred drachms; if of the second, seventy; if of the third, sixty; but if of the fourth, thirty; and let the fine be sacred to Hera. And let him, who does not pay every year, be made a debtor tenfold; and let the Steward of the goddess exact the fine; and if he does not exact it, let him be the debtor. And let every Steward in the passing of his accounts give a statement relating to debts of this kind. Let him then, who is unwilling to marry, be thus punished as regards money; and of all honor from juniors let him be deprived: nor let any young man voluntarily obey him in anything; and, if he attempts to chastise anyone, let anyone

assist and defend the injured person; and let him, who when present does not assist, be pronounced by the law to be both a cowardly and a bad citizen. Concerning the marriage portion we have spoken before; and let it be said again, that equal things are in return for equal things, by neither the poor receiving nor bestowing through want of money to grow old. For the necessaries of life exist to all of those in this state; and to wives, there will be less of insolence, and to the men who marry for money, less of humble and illiberal slavery. And he who is obedient to this law will perform one of the things that are beautiful. But let him, who is not obedient, and either gives or receives more than the worth of fifty drachms for the sake of a garment, pay one mina, or three half-minæ, or two minæ; but let him who has the largest property, pay another such sum to the public treasury; and let whatever has been given or received be held as sacred to Hera and Zeus, and let the Stewards of those deities exact the fine, just as was stated in the case of those who did not marry, that the Stewards of Hera were on each occasion to exact the fine, or each of them to pay it themselves. With respect to the power of betrothal, let the first be in the father, the second in the grandfather, and the third in that of brothers by the same father. But if there be none of these, let the right rest afterwards in a similar manner on the mother's side; but should an unusual misfortune occur, let the nearest of kin have the power together with the guardians. But whatever are the rites before marriage or any other sacred act, relating to things future, present, or past, and fitting to be done, it is requisite to inquire of the interpreters, and for each person to consider that, by obeying them, everything will take place in moderation in his behalf. With respect to nuptial feasts, it is meet to invite together not more than five male and five female friends; and as many of both sexes of kindred and

familiars; and let the expense be not more than is according to anyone's substance; a mina to him of the largest property; to another, the half of that sum; and so to another in succession, according as the value of his property decreases. And it is requisite for all to praise the person who obeys the law; but let the guardians of the law punish the disobedient, as being a person unskilled in what is becoming, and uneducated in the laws relating to marriage songs. To drink, however, to intoxication, is never at any place becoming, except in the festivals of the god who is the giver of wine; nor is it safe for a person seriously occupied about a marriage; at which it is becoming for the bride and bridegroom to be particularly prudent, as making no small change in their life, and at the same time, that the offspring may always be produced as much as possible from prudent parents. For it is nearly uncertain what kind of night or day will in conjunction with a deity produce. And moreover it is meet for the work of procreation to take place, not when bodies are relaxed by drinking, but for what is born to stand together compact, not wandering and quiet in fate. But he, who is filled with wine, is carried along everywhere, and carries others along, maddened both in body and soul. Hence he, who is drunk, is at the same time beside himself, and bad to sow seed; so that it is probable he would beget offspring anomalous, and not trustworthy, and with a habit of body and mind not straightforward. Hence, it is requisite through the whole year, and life more, but mostly during the time of procreation, to be careful, and not to do willingly such things as produce disease, or such as are close upon conduct riotous or unjust. For it must needs be, that what is squeezed out into the souls and bodies of what is being born, should be molded into a form, and produce things in every respect inferior. But preeminently is it requisite to abstain from what is related to such things on that day and

night. For the principle and deity seated in man preserves all things, if it obtains the honor, suited to it, from those, who make use of it. And it is requisite for the bridegroom to consider that one of the two dwellings assigned by lot is for the procreation and bringing up of, as it were, fledglings; and that, separated from his father and mother, he is to make his marriage there, and have it as his own residence and the nurture-place of his children. For where in friendships there exists a feeling of desire, it glues together and binds all habits; but where intercourse becomes satiated, and has no retaining power, it causes the desire, that existed for a time for each other, to glide away through excess of repletion. On which account it is meet for husbands to give up to mother, and father, and the relations of the wife their own dwellings, as if they were departing for a colony, and to live observing at the same time and observed, while begetting and rearing children, and handing in succession from some to others life, like a torch, and ever paying, according to law, worship to the gods.

We must consider after this by having what possessions would a person keep his substance in the most careful order. The majority indeed it is not difficult to imagine or possess; but in the case of domestic servants there is a difficulty on every side. Now the reason for this we can assign in a certain manner not correctly, and again in a certain manner correctly; for we consider what is said respecting slaves to be contrary, and yet according to, the use of them.

Megillus/ How can we say this? For we do not, O guest, understand at all what you are asserting at present.

Athenian Stranger/ And very reasonably so, Megillus. For the Helot state amongst the Lacedæmonians would give rise to the greatest doubt and contention to nearly all the Greeks, to some as being well introduced, but to others, not; but a less contention would the enslaving of the Marianduni by

the Heracleotes furnish, and the clan of the Penestæ under the dominion of the Thessalians. Looking to which and everything of that kind, what ought we to do with respect to the possession of servants? a subject, that I happened to pass by in my discourse, when I was speaking; and as you have very properly asked me, what I meant, I say it is this. We know, that we should all assert, that it is requisite to possess slaves of the kindest and best dispositions. For many slaves, by conducting themselves with respect to all virtue better towards some persons than brothers and sons, have preserved their masters, and their possessions and the whole of their dwellings; for we surely know that these things have been said of slaves.

Megillus/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And is not the contrary likewise said, that, as there is nothing healthy in the soul of a slave, it behooves a person, who possesses any intellect, never to trust at all to that race. The wisest too of poets has given this opinion, when speaking of Zeus, he says;

> "Half of their minds wide-seeing Jove has ta'en
> From men, whose doom has slavery's day brought on."

Since then each person has got such notions in his mind, some place no confidence at all in the race of slaves, but with goads and whips, not thrice alone, but often, cause the souls of their domestics, as if they had the nature of wild beasts, to become slavish; but others on the other hand do what is quite the contrary.

Megillus/ How not?

Clinias/ How then must we act, since persons thus differ, in the case of our land, touching the possession, and at the same time the punishment of slaves.

Athenian Stranger/ How, Clinias, is it not evident that, since man is an animal ill-tempered, he is by no means

willing to be easily got under hand for the purpose of a compulsory definition, namely, to define in reality a slave, a free-man, and a master?

Clinias/ So indeed he appears to be a thing difficult to have and hold.

Athenian Stranger/ True. For it has been often proved by facts in the case of the frequent revolts of the Messenians, that have been wont to occur, and of the cities of those, who possess many servants, speaking one language, how many mischiefs happen; and further still, by the doings and sufferings of all kinds of the thieves, called "Prædones," who exist round Italy. By looking to all of which a person would doubt what he ought to do in all matters of this kind. Two methods then alone are left, namely, for those, who are to act rather easily as slaves, to be not of the same country with each other, and, as much as possible, not of the same language; but to bring them up correctly, and to hold them in honor, not only for their sakes, but much more for the sake of themselves. Now the proper education of such persons is in not behaving insolently towards domestics, but in acting less unjustly towards them, if possible, than towards one's equals. For he is quite clearly a person reverencing justice naturally and not fictitiously, who truly hates what is unjust as regards those human beings, amongst whom it is easy for him to do a wrong. He then, who is with respect to the habits and doings of slaves undefiled by an unjust and unholy manner, will be the most competent to sow what is suited for the springing up of virtue. The very same thing one may correctly assert, when speaking at the same time of a despot and a tyrant, and of any person exercising authority of any kind over a party weaker than himself. It is however necessary to punish slaves, and not to make them conceited by admonishing them, as if they were free-men; and the address to a slave

ought to be entirely or nearly a command; nor should persons ever in any respect jest with them, whether males or females—acts which many persons do very foolishly towards their slaves—and by making them conceited, render it more difficult during life for their slaves to be governed, and for themselves to govern.

Clinias/ You speak correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ When then a person has become furnished with domestics to the best of his power, as regards their number and fitness to assist in each employment, is it not requisite after this to describe the dwellings?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And of the entire, so to say, house-building, it appears we ought, as regards a new city and one never before inhabited, to have a care, in what manner each, as respects the temples and walls, ought to be. The buildings ought indeed, Clinias, to precede the marriages. But now, since it exists only in word, it is all very well for matters to stand as they do at present. When however it shall exist in reality, we will, if god wills, make these the walls before the marriages, and then put those things, that are requisite, to a finish after all matters of this kind. But at present let us go through in a few words some model merely.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ The temples, then, it is necessary to build around all the market-place, and about the whole city in a circle upon elevated spots, for the sake of defense and purity. And hard by them the dwellings of the rulers, and the courts of justice; in which, as being most holy, they shall inflict and undergo punishments; partly, as being about holy matters, and partly, the seats established of such kind of gods; and in these courts of justice, in which there shall be fitting suits relating to murders and whatever crimes are

worthy of death. With respect to the walls, Megillus, I would agree with Sparta, to let them lie sleeping on the earth, and not raise them up on this account. For well is hymned that poetical saying respecting them, that “walls ought to be of brass and iron, rather than made of earth.” But our plan, in addition to this, of sending young men every year into the country to dig out the earth and make trenches, and by means of buildings to keep off the enemy, as if forsooth not suffering them to put their foot on the boundaries of the land, would justly pay the forfeit of very great ridicule. For we throw round a wall, which in the first place by no means contributes to the health of the citizens; and moreover it is wont to produce a cowardly habit in the souls of the inhabitants, by inviting them to fly to it, and not to repel the enemy, nor to find their safety in some persons in the city ever guarding it both night and day, but to fancy that, while they are hedged in with walls and gates and asleep, they will in reality possess the means of safety, as if they were born not to labor, nor knew that an easy life is the result of labor; but that, as I conceive, from a disgraceful inactivity and easy temper labors naturally result again. But if there is any need to men of walls, it must needs be that the buildings of private dwellings be so laid down from the commencement, that the whole city may be one wall through the equality and similarity of all the dwellings, possessing, as regards the roads, a good fortified position; and by the city having thus the form of one house, it would be not unpleasant to look upon; and it would be in every respect pre-eminently adapted to the ease of its guards, and the safety of the garrison. To these points it should be particularly incumbent on those, who are to dwell in it, to direct their care, until those at the commencement are built up, and that the City-Stewards should look to it, and compel the party, who pays no attention, by imposing a fine; and they ought to have a

care with respect to the purity of everything in the city; and that no private person seizes upon any public property, either by buildings or diggings; and moreover it is requisite to take care that the waters from Zeus i.e. rain water may run off easily; and that every part, both within and without the city, may be fit for dwelling in. And let the guardians of the laws, knowing all this by experience, lay down additional laws on all these points, and on such others as the law may from its want of power have omitted. But since both these matters and the buildings about the marketplace, and the particulars relating to the gymnasia, have been gone through, and the schools, that have been prepared, and the theatres too, are waiting for scholars and spectators, let us now proceed to what is consequent upon marriages, and keep close to the business of legislation next in order.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Let then marriages be considered, Clinias, by us to exist. But the mode of living prior to child-getting should subsist for not less than a year after this; but in what manner it is requisite for a bride and bridegroom to live in a city, which is about to be pre-eminent above the majority of Cities—a point which is close upon what has been mentioned already—is a thing not the most easy of all to state. But though not a few of what have gone before are of such a kind, this will be still more difficult than all of those for the many to take in. Nevertheless, Clinias, that which appears to be right and true must be mentioned.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ He then, who thinks to promulgate laws for states, as to what manner citizens should live and perform their public and common duties, but of their private concerns such as necessity does not bind down ought to be let loose, and that there should be a license for each person

to live as they please each day, and no need for everything to take place by an order, and thinks that by leaving private matters not regulated by law, persons will be willing, as regards public and common concerns, to live according to law, he does not think correctly. Now on what account has this been asserted? On this; that we shall lay down that the bridegrooms ought neither pre-eminently more or less, than during the time previous to marriage, to have their living at the common tables. Now this was a wonderful thing when it took place at first in your country through some war, as it seems, or some other circumstance possessing the same power, establishing it legally over you, when hampered during a paucity of people by a great want of means. But after you had tasted these common tables, and been compelled by necessity to make use of them, the law was deemed to conduce very greatly to your preservation; and in some such manner as this, the employment of common tables was established amongst you.

Clinias/ So it appears.

Athenian Stranger/ What I mentioned as being at that time a thing wonderful and fearful for some to enjoin, it would not be now equally difficult for the person enjoining it to establish by law. But that which follows this, namely, that the thing naturally existing would exist in a proper manner, but not existing at all at present, it would want but little to cause the legislator, as the saying of persons in jest is, to card wool for the fire, and to do by laboring in vain an infinity of things of this kind, it is not easy to mention, nor, after mentioning, to accomplish.

Clinias/ What is this, guest, which you appear, although attempting to mention, so vehemently to shrink from?

Athenian Stranger/ You shall hear, in order that there may be no longer needlessly a waste of time about it. For

everything, that in a state partakes of order and law, produces every good; but of things that are without order, or ordered badly, the majority loosens some of the well-ordered, and destroys others: which has just now happened touching the matter under discussion. For in the case of your countrymen, Clinias and Megillus, the common tables relating to the men have been instituted in both a beautiful, and, as I have said, wonderful manner, from a certain divine necessity; but those relating to the women have been by no means correctly left unregulated by law; nor has the arrangement of their common tables been brought to light. But though the female sex is really rather more given to secrecy and stealth, on account of its weakness, than we men are, yet it is not properly dismissed, as being difficult to regulate in consequence of the legislator conceding this point. For, through this being neglected, many things have in your state glided by, which would have been far better than they at present are, had they met with laws. For the want of regulations relating to women, is not, as it would seem, when disregarded, merely the half of human concerns; but, by how much the nature of women is worse than that of men, as regards virtue, by so much does it differ in being more than the double as regards vice. This therefore to take up again and to correct, and to arrange all pursuits in common for women and men, is better for the happiness of the state. But at present mankind is so led on in a manner by no means fortunate for this purpose, that it is the part of a person with mind not even to mention it in some other places and states, where it has been voted that common tables shall not exist at all in a city. How then shall anyone without being laughed at attempt in reality to compel women to make their consumption of meat and drink a conspicuous spectacle? For there is nothing which that sex would with more difficulty endure than this. For being accustomed to

live in retirement and obscurity it will, when brought by force into the light, make every possible resistance, and greatly overpower the legislator. This sex then, as I have said, would not elsewhere endure a reason urged even correctly, without making every kind of outcry; but in this state perhaps they would. If then it is agreeable to you, for the sake of conversation, that our reasoning, as regards every kind of polity, should not be imperfect, I am desirous of telling you, how good and becoming a thing this is; if, as I said, it seems good to you to hear; but if not, to leave it alone.

Clinias/ But, O guest, it does seem by all means wonderfully good for us to hear.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then hear it. But do not wonder, if I appear to you to make an attempt from some source far back. For we are now in the enjoyment of leisure, and there is nothing pressing us so as to prevent our seeing on every side and in every way what relate to the laws.

Clinias/ You have spoken correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then return to what was stated at first. For it is proper for every person to correctly understand so much as this, that the generation of men either never had any beginning at all, nor ever will have an end, but always was and always will be, or that the length of time from which its beginning took place, is so measureless, that even Time would not know it.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ What then, do we not think that there have been the establishment and subversion of cities, and all sorts of pursuits relating to order and disorder, and the use of drink and food, and the desires of all kinds of those, mad in the affairs of love, and through all the earth, and all varieties in the alterations of seasons, in which it is likely that animals have undergone very many changes?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Do we believe that vines appeared somehow, not having existed previously; and in a similar manner olives, and the gifts of Demeter and her virgin daughter; and that a certain Triptolemus was the minister of such powers; and do we not think that during the time, in which these did not exist, animals turned to devouring each other, as they do now?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But we see the custom remaining even now in many places of men sacrificing each other; and we hear, on the contrary, that in others we did not dare to taste the flesh even of oxen, and that the sacrifices to the gods were not animals, but cakes moistened with honey, and fruits, and other innocent offerings of a similar kind; and that we entirely abstained from flesh, as it was unholy to eat it, and to defile the altars of the gods with blood; and that there existed, what is called the Orphic life amongst persons of that period, keeping fast to all things without life, but abstaining on the contrary from all that had life.

Clinias/ What you say is greatly bruited abroad, and is very easy to be believed.

Athenian Stranger/ But for what purpose, someone may say, has all this been mentioned now?

Clinias/ You very correctly understand, O guest, the matter.

Athenian Stranger/ I shall endeavor therefore, Clinias, to state, if I can, what follows in order upon this.

Clinias/ Speak then.

Athenian Stranger/ I perceive that all things in the case of man hang from a threefold want and desire; through which virtue results to them, if they are properly led, but the contrary, if improperly. These are, immediately on being

born, eating and drinking, for which every animal having an innate love, is full of a mad feeling, and a disinclination to hearken to him, who says that one must do something else than, by satisfying the pleasures and desires connected with such things, to be ever freeing oneself from all pain. But a third, and the greatest want, and a desire the most acute, comes rushing on the last, and causes men to be the most inflamed with all kinds of madness, I mean that which is on fire with the very great sexual passion for propagating the species. These three diseases it is meet to turn from what is called the most pleasant to the best, and to endeavor to keep them down by the three greatest bonds, fear, and law, and truthful reasoning; and by making use moreover of the Muses, and the gods who preside over contests, to extinguish their increase and influx. But after marriages let us place the procreation of children, and after procreation their nurture and instruction. And by our discourse proceeding in this manner, each law will perhaps advance onwards to our doctrine of common tables; when, after arriving at communities of this kind, we shall perhaps see better by approaching nearer to them, whether they ought to exist of women likewise, or of men alone; and by putting into order the institutions antecedent to these, which are at present not laid down by law, we will consider them previously; and, as has been just now said, we shall see them more accurately, and lay down laws more suited to them and becoming.

Clinias/ You speak most correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then keep in recollection what has been just now said; for perhaps we shall have a need of it hereafter.

Clinias/ What do you bid us remember?

Athenian Stranger/ That which we defined by three words. For we surely spoke about eating, and secondly, drinking, and thirdly, a kind of madness in the matters of love.

Clinias/ We will by all means, O guest, recollect, what you now bid us to do.

Athenian Stranger/ It is well. Let us proceed then to the affairs of marriage, and teach the parties how and in what manner they ought to get children; and, if we cannot persuade them, we will threaten them with certain laws.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ It is requisite for the bride and bridegroom to consider, that they are about to exhibit to the state children, the most beautiful and the best in their power. Now all persons, who share in any work, when they give their minds to themselves and the work, produce the whole beautiful and good; but the contrary, when they do not give their minds, or do not possess any. Let the bridegroom then give his mind both to the bride and to child-getting; and in the same way let the bride give her mind to the bridegroom preeminently at the time when children have not yet been born to them. And let the women, whom we have chosen, be the overseers of these matters, whether many or few, just as the rulers may order, as many and at what time they please; and let them assemble every day in the temple of Eileithuia, and continue there for the third part of an hour; where they shall, on being assembled, tell, if they have seen any man or woman, of those connected with child-getting, looking to anything else than to what are ordained to be done during the sacrifices and sacred ceremonies pertaining to marriage. Let the procreation of children, and the supervision of those connected with child-getting above mentioned, continue for ten years, but not for a longer time,

when there is a fecundity in generation. But should some continue unprolific for this space of time, let them, after having consulted with their kindred, and the women that are in power, be divorced for the benefit of each party. If however any dispute arises respecting what is proper and beneficial to each, let them select ten of the guardians of the law, and abide by what they shall impose and ordain. And let these women, entering into the houses of the young folks, partly by admonitions and partly by threats, cause them to cease from their error and ignorance. But if they are unable to do so, let them go and speak to the guardians of the law; and let these restrain the parties. If they too are unable to effect anything, let them bring the matter before the public assembly, after having put up in writing the names of the parties, and made an affidavit that they are unable to make this or that person better. And let him, who is indicted, unless he can obtain a verdict in a court of law against the parties so putting up in writing his name, be disgraced on these points; namely, let him not go to weddings, nor to the rites solemnized for children; and should he go, let anyone who wishes scourge him with stripes with impunity. And let there be the same enactments in the case of a woman. For let her not share in female out-goings and honors, and the visits made at weddings, and at the birth-rites of children, if she be indicted as acting disorderly, and does not obtain a verdict. But when they are begetting children according to law, if any man has a connection with another woman for such a purpose, or a woman with another man, while such other parties are getting children, let the same fines be imposed upon them, as have been mentioned in the case of those still getting them. After this let the man and woman, who act temperately with respect to such points, be altogether in good repute, but those who act contrariwise be held in a contrary light, or dishonored rather. And if the

majority act with moderation in matters of this kind, let such points lie in silence without being established by law; but if they act disorderly, let enactments be laid down in this way, and punishment enacted according to the laws then laid down. The first year is the beginning of the whole of life to everyone; which ought to be written in the temples of their fathers, as the beginning of life, both to a boy and girl. In every Phratria too, let the number of the rulers that are numbered for a year, be written on a whitened wall, and near to them the names of those still living in the Phratria be always written; but blot out those who have departed from life. Let the limits of a marriageable age for a female be from sixteen to twenty years of age—and let this be the longest definite time—but for a man from thirty to thirty-five; and let the time for any public office be, in the case of a woman, forty years of age; but in that of a man, thirty; but with respect to war, for a man from twenty to sixty years; but for a woman, should it appear necessary to employ her for warlike purposes, and after she shall have brought forth children, up to fifty years of age, enjoining what is possible and becoming for each.

Book 7.

Athenian Stranger/ Children then, both male and female, having been begotten, it will be most correct to speak next about their nurture and education; which it is perfectly impossible to be not mentioned; and being mentioned it will appear to us to be rather like a kind of teaching and admonition than laws. For the numerous and trifling and not conspicuous matters, which happen to all privately, and in each family, since they easily take place through the pain, and pleasure, and desire of the respective individuals, will render, contrary to the advice of the legislator, the habits of the citizens all-various, and not similar to each other. Now this is an evil to states. For on account of their insignificance and frequency, to make them subject to a fine would be at the same time unbecoming and unseemly. But it destroys even the laws already laid down in writing, if persons are accustomed to act contrary to law in things insignificant and numerous; so that it is difficult to lay down laws concerning them, and yet impossible to be silent. But what I mean to say, I must endeavor to show clearly by bringing, as it were, samples to the light; for there seems to be on what is now said in some respect a darkness.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ Has not then this been rightly said, that a nurture perfectly correct ought to show itself able to render both bodies and souls the most beautiful and best?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Now the most beautiful bodies I conceive, to speak in the most simple style, ought, while boys are still young, to grow up in the most upright manner.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, do we not understand this, that the first shooting forth of every animal is produced

the greatest and most abundant by far; so that it has given rise to a dispute amongst many, whether the length of human bodies does or does not become by increase from the age of five years doubled in the remaining twenty-five?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, when a great increase flows on without much and commensurate exercise, do we not know that it produces ten thousand maladies in bodies?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ There is need then of most exercise, when most nutriment is introduced into bodies.

Clinias/ What then, O guest, shall we enjoin upon the recently born, and the youngest, the greatest exertions?

Athenian Stranger/ By no means; but to those still prior, who are being nourished in the wombs of their mothers.

Clinias/ How say you, thou best of men? Are you speaking of those in a state of being conceived?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes. But it is not at all wonderful for you to be ignorant of the exercise of such as these; which, although it seems absurd, I am willing to render clear to you.

Clinias/ By all means do so.

Athenian Stranger/ For us indeed a thing of this kind is more easy to understand through some persons playing there sports more than is needful. For with us not only children, but some older men, bring up the young of birds, and exercise such kinds of wild animals in fighting with each other, and they are far from thinking that the labors are moderate, in which by exercising they stir them up. For in addition to this, each taking under their arms the smaller in their hands, and the larger under their arms within, they walk about, going many stadia, and this, not for the sake of the good state of their own bodies, but for that of the birds.

And thus much they signify to the person capable of learning, that all bodies are benefited by shakings and motion, when moved without weariness, of all that are moved by themselves, or by swings, or carried on the sea, or on horseback, or borne along in any manner soever by other bodies; and through these getting the mastery over food and drink, they are able to impart to us health, and beauty, and the rest of strength.

Since then such is the case, what shall we say we ought to do after this? Are you willing for us to say with a laugh, that we are laying down laws for the pregnant woman to walk about, and to mold the infant as a thing of wax, while it is yet flexible, and to put it in swathing-clothes until it is two years old; and that we are moreover compelling the nurses by legal fines to carry the children either into the fields, or to the temples, or their acquaintance, until they are sufficiently able to stand alone; and then that they should be careful, lest by the limbs becoming distorted, while forcibly resting on them, being still young, to undergo the additional labor of carrying the infant, until it had completed its third year; and that the nurses ought to be as strong as possible; and, in addition, that unless these things take place to each child, we are to enact a fine upon those who do not act so? or is this far from being the case? For that, which has just now been mentioned, would happen to us without stint.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ To pay the debt of abundant laughter, through the womanlike and servile manners of the nurses being unwilling to obey us.

Clinias/ But on what account then did we say that this ought to be stated?

Athenian Stranger/ On this. A person, on hearing of the habits of masters and free persons in states, would perhaps come to the correct conception, that, without a proper administration of private concerns taking place in states, one would think there would be vainly any stability in the laying down of laws; and so thinking, he would make use of the laws just now mentioned; and using them correctly, he would by his administration render both his own household and the city happy.

Clinias/ You have spoken very reasonably.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then not desist from the legislation of this kind, until we have given out the pursuits relating likewise to the souls of very young children in the same manner as we began to go through the subject, when the accounts were stated relating to the body.

Clinias/ Perfectly right.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then receive this as an element with respect to both the circumstances, the body and soul, of the very young, that the nursing and motion, taking place as much as possible all the night and day, are profitable to all, and not the least to the youngest; so that, if it were possible, they may live as if always sailing on the sea. But now, since this is impossible, it is requisite to act as near as possible to this with respect to the newly born nurslings of children. And what ought to be done one may conjecture from this, that both the nurses of infants, and those who are initiated in the remedies relating to the Corybantes, have adopted this from experience, and know it to be useful. For, when mothers are desirous to put to sleep their children, who sleep with difficulty, they do not bring to them a state of quietness, but, on the contrary, of motion, by shaking them ever in their arms; nor yet that of silence, but that of singing to them; and they artlessly soothe their children, as

it were, by the sound of a pipe, and, as the remedies of the mad Bacchants are employed, by making use, at the same time, of the movements in music and the dance.

Clinias/ What then, O guest, is especially the cause of this?

Athenian Stranger/ It is not very difficult to know.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Both these passions result from fear; and there are certain terrors through a depraved habit of the soul. When therefore anyone brings from without an agitation to passions of this kind, that which is from without overcomes the dreadful and insane motion within; and after overcoming, it seems to have produced a calm in the soul, and a quietness in the leaping, which had been troublesome as regards the heart of each; and thus, what is altogether agreeable, it causes some to obtain by lot sleep; but others, who are awake, and dancing and soothed by the pipe under the influence of the divinities, to whom each may be supplicating and sacrificing, it causes to possess habits of sound sense in the place of a maddened state. Now this, to speak in brief, has in this way a certain probable reason.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now if these things possess thus any such power, it is requisite to consider this point as connected with them, that every soul, which has been familiar with fear from youth, would be more accustomed to be conversant with fears. But this everyone will surely say is an exercise of timidity, and not of fortitude.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But the contrary pursuit we should say is that of fortitude, in the overcoming, even from youth, what falls upon us in the shape of fears and terrors.

Clinias/ Correctly so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us say then, that this one thing, the all-perfect gymnastic exercise of children in motion, greatly contributes to a part of virtue in the soul.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And moreover, that a disposition, morose or not, in the soul would become and be called respectively no little part of cowardice or bravery.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ In what manner then is to be implanted which of these we may wish in the newly born? We must endeavor to state how and to what extent a person may have an easy road in these matters.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ I will mention then the fixed opinion with us, that luxury renders the manners of youth morose and irascible, and vehemently agitated by things of a trifling nature; but that an excessive and rustic servitude causes them to be contrary to this, abject and illiberal, and man-haters, and unfitting associates.

Clinias/ But how will the whole state be able to bring up those, who have as yet no perception of language, and are unable to have any taste for the rest of instruction?

Athenian Stranger/ Somehow in this way. Every animal, as soon as it is born, is wont to utter some sound with a loud cry, and not the least the human species; and more than the rest of animals it is affected in addition to its crying with the shedding of tears.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now nurses, looking to what infants are desirous of, make a conjecture by their presenting to them something. For they think they correctly offer that, on which being presented the children are silent; but

incorrectly that, at which it sheds tears and cries out. For in the case of children tears and cries are the indications of what they love and hate, and are signs by no means lucky. Now this period is not less than three years, a not small portion of life to pass through badly or not badly.

Clinias/ You speak correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Does not a person who is morose, and by no means good-tempered, appear to you to be for the most part given to lamentation and full of moanings more than is fitting for the good to be?

Clinias/ It appears so to me.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, if a person were to endeavor, by bringing together every method, during those three years, that the nursling may be affected as little as possible with sorrow and fears and with every pains in our power, do we not think that we should render then the soul of the nursling more cheerful and kind?

Clinias/ It is evident, O guest; and most of all, should anyone supply it with many pleasures.

Athenian Stranger/ In this I cannot, O wondrous man, follow Clinias. For with us such conduct would be a destruction the greatest of all. For it occurs perpetually at the commencement of nurture. But let us see whether we are asserting anything.

Clinias/ State what you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ That our discourse is at present about a not trifling matter. Do you then, Megillus, look to it, and decide between us. For my assertion is, that an upright life ought neither to pursue pleasures, nor entirely to avoid pain, but to embrace the medium between them, which I have just now denominated a favorable temper; a disposition, of which, according to some voice of an oracle, we correctly speak as belonging to a deity. This habit, I

assert, that he amongst us ought to pursue, who would be divine; nor let him go wholly headlong to pleasures; for in this case he would not be free from pain; nor let him permit any other person, old or young, male or female, to suffer the same thing with us, and, as far as he is able, the newly born the least of all. For all the manners are, through custom, implanted in all the most powerfully at that period. And further still, if I were not about to appear to be jesting, I would say, that one ought to attend to women, who are carrying anything in the womb, the most of all during that very year, so that the person pregnant may neither enjoy pleasures numerous and violent, nor, on the other hand, feel pains, but live through that period, preserving a line of conduct benignant, and good-tempered, and mild.

Clinias/ There was no need, O guest, of your asking Megillus, which of us spoke in the more proper manner; for I agree with you, that all persons ought to avoid a life of unmingled pleasure and pain, and that they should always pursue a certain middle course. You have, therefore, both spoken and heard in a proper manner.

Athenian Stranger/ Very properly so, Clinias. But, in addition to these points, let us all three consider this likewise.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That all these matters, which we are now going through, are by the many called unwritten laws; and that those, which they call the laws of the country, are no other than of such a kind; and further still, that the discourse, which has just now flowed upon us, how that we ought not either to call them laws, or to permit them to be unmentioned, has been spoken correctly. For these are the bonds of all polity, existing in a middle state between all laws that have been, and are, and will be hereafter, laid down in

writing; and being, as it were, altogether the laws of a country, and ancient in every respect, and which, when laid down correctly and have become a custom, have invested the written laws with every kind of security; but should they advance improperly beyond what is right, they cause, like supports placed by carpenters in the buildings of houses, and gliding away from the center, everything to fall together to the same point, and to lie, some under others, both themselves and what has been subsequently built upon them, after the old portions have secretly given way. Reflecting upon which, it is necessary for us, O Clinias, to bind together your city new on all sides, and to the utmost of our power to omit nothing great or small which a person may call laws, or manners, or pursuits; for by all things of this kind a state is bound together; but none of these can be stable without each other; so that one need not wonder, if many and at the same time trifling things, appearing to us to be enactments, or even customs, should, when flowing to the same point, cause the laws to become of a greater length.

Clinias/ Both you speak properly yourself, and we too shall reflect in this manner.

Athenian Stranger/ If then, in the case of a boy and girl of three years old, anyone should bring these matters accurately to an end, and make use of what has been said in not a careless manner, they will be of no small advantage to those recently brought up. But there will be a need of sports for the habits of the soul at three, and four, and five, and even six years of age. But we must already remove them from luxury, by chastising them, not in an ignominious manner, but, as we said on the subject of slaves, by chastising not with insults so as to encourage an angry feeling in them, when so chastised, nor a feeling for licentiousness by suffering them to go unpunished, we must do the same in the case of the free-born. Now the sports of

persons of that age are self-produced; and which, when they come together, they almost invent themselves. All children then of this kind ought to come together at the temples distributed through the villages, from three to six years of age, each of those belonging to the same village to the same spot in common; and let the nurses take cognizance of their orderly behavior and licentiousness; but of the nurses themselves and their whole pack, let one of the twelve women be appointed to each to regulate for the space of a year, of those of the before-mentioned, whom the guardians of the law may have ordained. And let the women, who have full powers over the care of marriages, choose them, one out of each ward, and of the same age with themselves; and let her, who is appointed, perform her office, by going each day to the temple, and ever punishing the person who does wrong, a male and female slave, and a stranger, male or female, herself, or by means of certain domestics of the state; and let her take a citizen, when disputing about his punishment, before the City-Stewards for trial; but let her punish herself, even a citizen, when there is no dispute. After six years of age, let each sex be separated; and let boys pass their time with boys, and girls in like manner with each other; and it is meet for each to be turned to learning, the males from the teachers of horsemanship, and archery, and the hurling of darts, and the using of slings, and the females too, if they consent so far as to learn especially what relates to the use of arms. But what is at present established on matters of this kind, is unknown to nearly all.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ That what relates to the right and the left hand differs naturally, with respect to their use in the several actions pertaining to the hands; especially since there appears in what relates to the feet and the lower limbs no difference as regards labor. But in the case of hands we

each of us become, as it were, lame, through the folly and ignorance of our nurses and mothers. For while the nature of our limbs on each side is nearly balanced, we have ourselves, by not using them correctly, made them, through habit, different. In such employments as where there is no great difference, it is of no consequence, whether a person makes use of a lyre with his left hand and of the plectrum with his right, and whatever else is of a similar kind. But to make use of these examples in other cases, where there is no need of using it, is nearly a folly. This fact has the law of the Scythians pointed out, where a person does not push from him the bow with his left hand merely, and draw to himself the arrow with his right merely, but he makes use of either similarly for both purposes. And there are very many other examples of this kind in charioteering and other things. From which one may learn, that those, who make the left hand weaker than the right, act contrary to nature. This, as I have said, is of no great moment in the case of plectra made of horn, and such like instruments; but in war, when it is necessary to use weapons of iron, and bows, and spears, and each of these, it matters much; but it is of the greatest moment by far, when it is necessary to use shields against shields. There is too a great difference between a person learning and one not learning, and between one, who exercises himself, and one, who is not exercised. For as he, who is perfectly exercised in the pancratium, or in boxing, or wrestling, is incapable of combating with his left-hand limbs, and becomes lame, and drags himself along in a superfluous manner, when anyone, causing him to change his position, compels him to exert himself on the other side, so the same thing, I conceive, one must expect in the case of shields, and in all the rest of weapons, that it behooves him, who possesses doubly the arms by which he can defend himself and attack others, not to suffer, to the utmost of his

power, either of these to remain idle, and without skill; but if anyone were born, possessing the nature of Geryon or Briareus, he ought to be able with their hundred hands to hurl a hundred darts. Of all these matters it is meet for the care to be under the female and male rulers; the former being superintendents over the sports and nurture of the children, but the latter over their education, in order that all the boys and girls by having the perfect use of their feet and their hands may do, to the best of their power, no injury to their natures by their habits.

But a twofold education, so to say, it will happen to make use of; one, of gymnastics, relating to the body; the other, of music, for the sake of a good state of the soul. Again, those of the gymnastics are twofold; one dancing and the other wrestling. And of dancing one kind imitates the diction of the Muse, preserving the gorgeous at the same time with the liberal; but another kind is for the sake of a good habit of body, and lightness, and the beauty of its limbs and parts, their own harmonious motion being imparted to each, according to what is becoming in their bending and extending, and, at the same time, scattered through and following upon every kind of dancing sufficiently. The wrestling, however, which Antæus or Cercyon placed among their arts, for the sake of useless contention, or the boxing, which Epeius or Amycus did likewise, do not deserve to be graced by a discourse, as being of no use in the fellowship of war. But what relates to a stand-up wrestling, and the untwisting of the neck, and the hands, and the sides, when the labor is accompanied with a spirit for contention and a well-framed arrangement of body, for the sake of strength and health, these, as they are useful in every way, are not to be omitted; but we must enjoin upon disciples and masters at the same time, that when we come to that point of our laws, the latter are to impart with a good will all information

of this kind, and the former to receive it with thanks. Nor must we omit such imitations in dances as are fit to be imitated; as regards this place, the armed sports of the Curetes; and, as regards Lacedæmon, those of the Dioscuri. Our virgin too and mistress Athéné being delighted with the amusement of the dance, does not think fit to sport with empty hands; but, being adorned with a complete suit of armor, goes in this manner through the dance; which acts it will be proper for the boys and girls to imitate, and to do honor to the kindness of the goddess shown during the needs of war, and in behalf of festive days. It will likewise be proper for the boys forthwith, and for as long a time as they shall not have gone out to war, to make to all the gods processions and pomps, with the adornment of arms and horses, and to perform their supplications to the gods and the sons of the gods, swifter and slower, with dances and marches; and to enter into contests, and preludes of contests, if for any purpose, for no other than these. For these, both in peace and war, are useful for a polity and private households. But the rest of labors, and sports, and pursuits relating to the body are not, Megillus and Clinias, suited to free-men. And thus the gymnastic, which I said in our former discourse ought to be gone through, I have almost gone through at the present moment, and the subject is finished. But if you have anything better than this, lay it down as a common topic and speak upon it.

Clinias/ It is not easy, O guest, to put these on one side, and to have anything better to say about gymnastics and contests.

Athenian Stranger/ With regard then to the gifts of the Muses and Apollo, which is the sequel to the preceding, we formerly thought that, as having said all correctly about them, we should have to leave only the subject relating to gymnastics; but now it is evident that there is something

which should be first mentioned before all. Let us then speak of it in order.

Clinias/ It must by all means be spoken of.

Athenian Stranger/ Hear me then, although you have heard previously. Nevertheless it is requisite for both the speaker and hearer to be cautious as to what is very strange and unusual; and now too, although I am going to tell a tale not to be spoken without fear, I will nevertheless take courage, and not stand aloof.

Clinias/ What mean you, O guest, by this?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean that in all states it is a thing unknown to all, that the family of games is of the greatest power in the laying down of laws, as to whether what are laid down will remain or not. For if it is so ordered, that the same persons shall always use the same sports, and according to the same, and in a similar manner, and be delighted with the same playthings, it permits the institutions laid down with seriousness to remain quiet. But when the sports are disturbed, and innovations made in them, and they are affected constantly by changes, the young never speaking of the same things as being dear to them, and neither in the bearing of their own bodies, nor in the rest of their dresses, the becoming and the unbecoming are laid down as acknowledged by them, and when the person, who is ever making some innovation, and introducing something different from what is customary, as regards shape and color, and everything of that kind, is pre-eminently held in honor, we should, by saying that no greater bane could happen to a state than by such a thing, speak most correctly; for he is secretly changing the morals of the young, and causing what is old to be dishonored, and what is novel to be held in honor. Than this, both an assertion and a fixed

opinion, I assert again, there is not a greater bane to all states. Hear, then, how great an evil do I say it is.

Clinias/ Do you mean the circumstance, that what is old in states is found fault with?

Athenian Stranger/ Entirely so.

Clinias/ You will then have in us no ordinary auditors, with respect to this very discourse, but the best disposed possible.

Athenian Stranger/ It is likely.

Clinias/ Only speak then.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, let us hear it more attentively than we usually do, and thus speak to each other. For we shall discover that a change in all things, except the bad, causes us to stumble the most, in the case of all seasons, and winds, and in the diet of bodies, and in the manners of souls, and not merely, so to say, in some, but not in others, but in what I have just now said, in things bad. So that anyone will see, if he looks to bodies, how, being accustomed to all kinds of food and all kinds of drink and labors, they do, although they are at first disturbed by them, in time generate from those very substances flesh, kindred to such substances, and by becoming friendly and accustomed to, and acquainted with, all that diet, they exist in the best way as regards pleasure and health. But if at any time a person is compelled by necessity to change any part of the approved diet, he is at first disturbed by diseases, and with difficulty is set on his legs again, after acquiring again a familiarity with his food. The same thing, it is meet to think, takes place as regards the ideas of men, and the nature of their souls. For every soul has a reverence for the laws in which it may have been brought up, and which have, by a certain divine good fortune, remained undisturbed through time so long and much, that no one either recollects

or has ever heard of their having been otherwise than they are at present, and it fears to disturb any of those then existing. The legislator then ought to devise from some quarter a plan as to the manner in which this may take place in a state. In this way then do I discover it. All men, as I have said before, consider the sports of youth, when they are disturbed, to be in reality sports, and not that the greatest seriousness and mischief arise out of them; so that they do not avert the change, but comply with and yield to it; nor do they consider this, that the children, who engage in these new sports, must necessarily become men different from those who were children in the former period; and that, becoming different, they will seek a different life; and so seeking will be desirous of other pursuits and laws; and no one fears that, after this, there will come upon states what has been just now called the greatest evil. But other changes would effect lesser evils; such at least as relate to fashions would suffer a thing of this kind. But whatever alterations occur frequently with respect to praise and blame, touching the question of manners, these would, I think, be the greatest of all, and require the most caution.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ What then, do we still believe in our former assertion, in which we stated that the matters relating to rhythm and every kind of music are imitations of the manners of men better and worse? Or how?

Clinias/ Our fixed opinion would be in no respect otherwise than this.

Athenian Stranger/ We assert then, that we must contrive every kind of plan in order that the children in our state may not hanker after other imitations in dancing and singing, nor anyone persuade them to an innovation by introducing pleasures of various kinds.

Clinias/ You speak most correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Has then anyone of us any art better for this purpose than that of the Egyptians?

Clinias/ What art do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Of making holy every kind of dancing and melody, by ordaining, in the first place, festivals, after calculating for the year, what ought to take place, and at what time, and in honor of what gods respectively, and the sons of gods, and dæmons; and after this, what ode ought to be hymned at each sacrifice of the gods, and with what dances to honor the then sacrifice: which when they are ordained, it is meet to ordain some other things, so that all the citizens may in common make sacrifices and libations to the Fates, and to all the other deities, and consecrate their several odes to the gods severally, and to the others. But if any person introduces in honor of any god other hymns and dances besides those which are instituted by law, let the priests and priestesses, together with the guardians of the laws, restrain him in a holy manner, and according to law; and let him, who is restrained, if he is not willingly restrained, suffer the punishment of his impiety through the whole of life from anyone who is willing to inflict it.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ But since we are now engaged on this subject, let us be affected in a manner befitting us.

Clinias/ About what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ Every young person, not merely the old, on seeing or hearing anything out of the way, and by no means customary, would not immediately run thus and concede what is the doubtful point respecting them, but he would stand still; and, as if being where three roads meet, and not knowing very well the road, whether he happened to be travelling alone, or in company with others, he would

inquire of himself and the others, and not proceed before he had settled the question in his mind, as to whither the road would lead him. And we must act in a similar manner at present. For a strange conversation having now fallen upon us on the subject of laws, we ought necessarily to make every inquiry; and, being of such an age, to speak not readily on matters of such moment, insisting with vehemence, that we have it in our power to say something clearly on the instant.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ We will, therefore, give the subject time, and decide then firmly upon it, when we shall have considered it sufficiently. But in order that we may not be prevented from going through in vain the arrangement consequent upon the laws, let us proceed to the end of them. For, perhaps, if god wills, this very digression will obtain wholly its completion, and point out sufficiently what is at present a matter of doubt.

Clinias/ You speak most excellently, O guest, and we will do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Let then, we say, this strange thing be decreed, that odes exist for us as laws, and just as the ancients gave such a name, as it seems, formerly with respect to playing on the harp; so that, perhaps, not even they would have entirely dissented from what is said by us at present; and someone has surely, as if either in a night dream or with his eyes open in the day, imagined and prophesied this. Let this then be the decree respecting it. Let no one utter any song besides the public and sacred songs, or move in any dance, contrary to the whole dancing of the young men, any more than he would act contrary to any other law: and let him, who is such, be dismissed without a fine; but let, as was said just now, the guardians of the laws, and the priests and priestesses, chastise him, who does not

obey. Let then this be held to be laid down by us in our discourse.

Clinias/ Let it be laid down.

Athenian Stranger/ But in what manner can anyone, so laying them down as laws, not be altogether a laughing-stock? Let us still consider something of this kind respecting them. It is the safest course to mold for them, as it were, certain impressions in our discourse. Now I assert that one of the impressions is something of this kind. The sacrifice having taken place and the victims burnt according to law, if some person, a son, we say, or a brother, should as a private person stand by the altars and sacred rites, and blaspheme with every kind of blasphemy, should we not say that he gave vent to a want of thought, and imposed an evil omen and prophecy both against his father and the rest of his kindred?

Clinias/ How not.

Athenian Stranger/ Now this is occurring in the places with us, the states, so to say, nearly all by a little. For when any magistrate shall have performed any sacrifice publicly, after this there comes not one choir, but a multitude of choirs; and standing not far from the altars, but sometimes close to them, they pour forth every kind of blasphemy against things sacred, putting on the stretch the souls of the hearers with words, and rhythms, and the most doleful harmonies; and he who causes the city, after it has made the sacrifice, to weep the most on the instant, carries off the victory. Do we not reject by our votes this law? And if at any time it is requisite for the citizens to hear sorrows of this kind, it should be, not when the days are clear of any stain, but of an inauspicious kind rather; and then it is proper for some dancers and singers to be hired from abroad, just as those, who are hired at funerals, send forward the dead with

some Carian strain. A thing of this kind would properly take place about such odes as these. Moreover a robe will be proper for funeral odes, and not crowns, or golden ornaments, but everything the contrary, that I may be freed as quickly as possible from speaking on these matters. But thus much do I ask of you again, whether of the impressions relating to odes it is agreeable to you for this first one to be laid down?

Clinias/ Of what kind.

Athenian Stranger/ As a good omen; and moreover, let the genus of the ode be everywhere, and in every respect, a good omen to us. Or shall I not ask you at all, but lay it down thus?

Clinias/ Lay it down by all means; for by all votes this law is the victor.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, after this good omen, shall be the second law of music? Will it not be for prayers to be offered to the gods, to whom we on each occasion sacrifice?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But the third law, I think, will be, that it behooves poets, when they know that prayers are requests from men to the gods, ever to direct their mind very carefully to this point, that they may not unconsciously ask for what is an evil, as if it were a good. For the condition of a prayer of this kind taking place, would, I think, be ridiculous.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Were we not a little while ago convinced, that a Plutus, neither of silver nor of gold, ought to dwell in a state, as if settled there?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Of what then shall we say that this discourse has been spoken as the pattern? Is it not of this, that not every race of poets is competent to know thoroughly things good and evil? Some poet then surely, having composed either in prose or verse, on a mistaken subject, so that our citizens make their prayers not correct respecting matters of the greatest moment, will not do all with impunity, especially since, as we have already said, we shall not find many mistakes greater than this. Let us then lay down this as one of the laws and forms respecting the Muse.

Clinias/ What one? Speak to us more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ That a poet shall not compose anything, either beautiful or good, contrary to what is lawful and just in the state; nor shall he be permitted to show what he has composed to any private person, before it shall have been shown to the judges and guardians of the law, appointed for this purpose, and approved of by them. Now they have been almost marked out, whom we have chosen as the lawgivers relating to music, and the guardian likewise of education. What then, as I have often asked, shall this be laid down as a law, and a type, and a third impression? Or how seems it?

Clinias/ Let it be laid down; how not?

Athenian Stranger/ After these there should be sung hymns to, and praises of, the gods accompanied with prayers; and after the gods in like manner, there should be prayers with praises to the dæmons and heroes, and suited to all of them.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And after these there should take place this law without any stint. Such of the citizens as may have come to the end of life, after having performed works honorable and laborious relating to the body and soul, and

have been obedient to the laws, it shall be fitting for these to meet with praises.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But to honor those still living with praises and hymns, it is not safe, before a person after having run through the whole of life, shall stand still at an honorable end. Let all these be common to men and women, who have been conspicuously virtuous. But it is necessary for odes and dancings to be established in this manner. There are many ancient and beautiful poems of old writers relating to music, and similarly to dancing for bodies. Against choosing out of these what is becoming and suited to an established polity, there is no objection. Of these let the persons selected as examiners, being not less than fifty years old, make a selection. And let them select whatever of the ancient poems appears to be all-sufficient; but whatever is defective, or altogether unsuitable, let it be rejected entirely; or let them take poets and musicians, and employing their powers of poetry, adapt it to a new rhythm after it is corrected; but let them not give way to pleasure or desire, except in some few cases; but, interpreting the intention of the legislator, establish dancing and singing, and every dancing according to their own good sense. For every occupation relating to music, which adopts order, is infinitely better than that without order, even when the pleasant in music is not added. Now the pleasant is common to all music. For that music, with which a person has lived from childhood to a staid and intelligent age, he considers to be pleasant, inasmuch as it is temperate and in order. But on hearing a contrary kind, he dislikes it, and calls it illiberal. But if he has been brought up in that, which is pleasant and common, he says that the contrary to this is frigid and unpleasant. So that, as I just now said, what relates to the pleasant or the unpleasant does not exist

about either as a superabundance, but from a superfluity the one makes those, who have been brought up in it on each occasion better, the other worse.

Clinias/ You have spoken well.

Athenian Stranger/ Further still, it will be meet to separate the songs suited to females and males, by defining them under a certain type, and necessary moreover to adapt them to harmonies and rhythms. For it is a shocking thing for the whole of harmony to be a discord, or rhythm to be out of tune, and thus to attribute to melodies nothing adapted to each of them. It is necessary then to lay down by a law the figures of these. And it is necessary to attribute both constrained to both, but those of the females, by the difference of the nature of each, by this it is meet to mark out clearly. Now that which is gorgeous and verges to fortitude, must be called manly; but that which more inclines to the ornamental and the moderate, must be handed down, both in law and in discourse, as more feminine. This, then, is the order. After this, let the teaching and handing down of them be detailed, as to the manner how, and the persons by whom, and the time when it is requisite to perform them. And as a shipwright, when he lays down the keel timbers, as the commencement of the ship-building, draws the form of vessels, I appear to myself to do the same thing, by endeavoring to distinguish the figures of lives according to the manners of souls, and in reality to lay down their keel-timbers, and very properly to consider by what device, and after what manner, we may live together and be carried the best during this voyage of life. Human affairs, indeed, are not worthy of great attention; yet it is necessary to attend to them. This indeed is not a fortunate circumstance. But since we are here, if we can somehow accomplish this in a fitting manner, it will perhaps be within

our measure. But what am I saying? This very point perhaps someone would take up, and rightly so.

Clinias/ And very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ I say then, that to a serious thing we ought to pay a serious attention, but to a not serious one none at all; and that the deity is naturally worthy of every blessed attention, but that man, as I said before, has been devised as the plaything of a deity, and this is truly his best attribute. It is necessary then for every man and woman to pursue this mode, and, by engaging in the most beautiful sports, to pass thus through life with thoughts the reverse of what they think at present.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ At present indeed they think that serious pursuits ought to exist for the sake of sports. For they consider that they ought to well dispose the serious pursuits relating to war for the sake of peace. But in war there never has been naturally either sport or instruction worthy of mention, nor is there, nor will there be. But this we say is a thing to us the most serious, that everyone ought to pass through life for the most part and the best in peace. What then is the proper manner, in which a person may pass through life in sport? and what are the sports for a person to engage in, while sacrificing and singing and dancing, so as to be able to render the gods propitious to him, and to repel foes, and to be the victor in battle? Now by what singing and dancing a person may accomplish both these things, a portion of the type has been detailed, and the paths, as it were, have been cut, in which the person is to proceed, who thinks that the poet has well said;

> "Some things, Telemachus, thon wilt thyself
> Find in thy heart; but others will a god
> Suggest; for I do not conceive thou hast

Been born or brought; up 'gainst the will of gods."

The same ought our nurslings likewise to bear in mind, and to consider that some things have been stated sufficiently, but that others a Dæmon and a deity will suggest to them respecting sacrifices and dances in honor of what divinities and at what time they will by playing, each for each, render them propitious, and live themselves according to the manner of their nature, while they are for the most part things to stare at, yet partake in certain small particles of truth.

Megillus/ You are vilifying, O guest, in every respect the human race.

Athenian Stranger/ Do not wonder, Megillus, but pardon me. For, looking to the deity, and being affected somewhat, I have said what I have just now said. But let our race be not a vile thing, if it so please you, but worthy of some serious attention.

With regard to the subject next in order after these, mention has been made of public schools, situate in a tripartite manner in the middle of the city; but out of and around the city the exercising grounds for horses have been assigned in a tripartite manner, and ample places put into order for the sake of the young men, learning and practicing themselves in archery and other hurlings of missiles. But if they were not then spoken of sufficiently, let them now be mentioned in our discourse together with the laws.

In all these cases let masters in each art be induced by wages to reside as strangers, and to teach everyone, who frequents their school, the learning that relates to war, and likewise to music; not only the youth, who comes to school, because his father wishes it, but him too who, because his father does not wish, neglects his education, but, as the saying is, every man and boy must by compulsion be

instructed as well as they can, since they belong rather to the state than their parents. The very same things my law would mention relating to females, as it does to males. For it is meet to exercise equally the females likewise. And I should fear to say respecting this subject of horsemanship and gymnastics, that they are becoming indeed to men, but not to women. For by hearing stories of the olden time have I been persuaded. And even at present, I know that there are, so to say, countless myriads of women about Pontus, whom they call Sauromatides, on whom there has been enjoined an exercise in common with, and perhaps equal to, that of men not only upon horses, but in bows likewise, and in the rest of arms. But I have, moreover, a reason for this, of some such kind as this. I say then, that if it is possible for these things to happen in this manner, of all things is that, which now takes place in our countries, the most silly, in the men not pursuing all together, and with all their might, and with one mind, the same pursuits as the women. For thus the whole state is and becomes but the half, instead of being the double, from the same expense and labor. And wonderful would this very error be to any legislator.

Clinias/ It seems so. Very much however of what has been asserted by us at present is, O guest, contrary to customary polities.

Athenian Stranger/ But I have said that it is meet to permit us to go through the discourse properly, and, when we have gone through it, to select thus what seems the best.

Clinias/ You have spoken very elegantly, and caused me to reproach myself for what I just now said. Speak therefore on this point whatever is agreeable to yourself.

Athenian Stranger/ This very thing is agreeable to me, Clinias, what I said above, that, if these matters are not sufficiently proved by deeds, that they can take place, it

would be possible perhaps to gainsay them by words. But now something else must be sought for by him, who does not admit this law at all; but our exhortation will not in this case be extinguished, so that we should say that the female sex ought not to partake as much as possible in education and other studies in common with the male sex. For it is required that we think on these points in some such way as this. Say then, if women do not share in common with men in the whole of life, is it not necessary for some other arrangement to be assigned to them?

Clinias/ It is necessary.

Athenian Stranger/ What arrangement then among those, which are exhibited at present, shall we assign them in preference to this very partnership, which we are assigning to them? Is it that, in which the Thracians and many other nations employ their women, to cultivate the ground, and to tend cattle and sheep, and to minister to them in no way different from slaves? Or, as we do ourselves, and all around that place? for what happens at present with us, is in this way. For having brought together into one dwelling, according to the saying, all our chattels, we hand over to the women the power to act as stewards, and to rule over the shuttles and all kinds of working in wool. Or shall we, Megillus, speak of a medium between these, adopted in Laconia? so that the virgins should live, partaking in gymnastic exercises and music, but the married women be unemployed in wool-work, but, weaving a kind of active life and in no respect mean or worthless, arrive at some middle point in the duties of attendants and stewards and bringers up of children; but not to take a part in warlike concerns, so as not to fight, even should a necessity arise from any accident to do so, in behalf of their city and children, nor be able with skill to take a part in the use of bows, like certain Amazons, or in any other kind of dart-hurling; nor yet,

seizing the spear and shield, to imitate the goddess, and standing up nobly for their country, while it is laid waste, strike terror at least, if able to do nothing more, into the foe, when they are seen drawn up in a kind of array. And yet living even in this manner, they would not dare to imitate at all the Sauromatides, who would appear, as compared with them, to be men. Let then the person, who is willing to praise your legislators on these points, praise them; but my opinion will not be given otherwise. For a legislator ought be a perfect and not a half one, who permits the female sex to indulge in luxury and waste by making use of an unregulated living, and who, by taking a complete care of the male sex, leaves to the state nearly the half instead of the double of a happy life.

Megillus/ What shall we do, Clinias? Shall we permit our guest thus to run down our Sparta?

Clinias/ Certainly. For, since a liberty of speech has been given to him, we must permit him, until we shall in every way have gone through the laws sufficiently.

Megillus/ You speak correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it not then nearly my business to endeavor to unfold what follows upon this?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ What then will be the mode of life amongst men, for whom what is necessary may be procured in moderation, and the affairs of art handed over to others, and agriculture committed to slaves, who are to pay the first-fruits of the earth, sufficient for persons who live in a moderate manner; and common meals adopted, the men being placed apart, but their household kept near them, and the female children likewise, and their mothers; and where all these common meals are regulated by male and female governors, so that, after having inspected them daily, and

seen the behavior of those taking the common meals, they may on each occasion dismiss them; and after this, that the governor and the rest, after making libations to the gods, to whom that day or night is dedicated, may go home thus in this manner. By persons under such regulations no work that is necessary, and in every way fitting, is left undone. But must each of them live after the manner of cattle, and grow fat? This, we say, is neither just nor honorable; nor is it possible for a man, who lives in this manner, not to fail in what is fitting. But it is fitting for an animal idle and grown fat through indolence to be almost torn to pieces by another animal amongst those greatly worn down by fortitude and labors to boot. If then we investigate these matters with sufficient accuracy, as we are doing now, they will perhaps never take place, as long as women, and children, and dwellings remain private property, and everything else is made such by each of us. But those things, which have just now been mentioned as secondary to these, if they take place at all, would take place in a very moderate manner. We say then that to those, who live thus, there is left a work, neither the least nor vilest, but the greatest of all ordained by a just law. For while the life of him, who is eager for victory in the Pythian or Olympian games, supplies a want of leisure for all other business, that life is filled with a double, or more than a double want of leisure, which has chosen most correctly the care of the body and soul altogether relating to virtue, for there ought to be nothing in the shape of a by-work as an impediment to the other works suited to the body, as regards the emolument from labors and bringing up, nor in the case of the soul, from education and habits. Indeed the whole of the night and day is scarcely sufficient for a person, who is doing this very thing, to extract from them what is perfect, or even something sufficient. Since then such is naturally the case, there ought to be to all free-

men an order in the employment of all time, beginning almost from the morning until the other, ever continually both morning and sunrise. A lawgiver would indeed appear to be ill-conditioned, who speaks of many and frequent and trifling matters relating to the management of an household, and the other things and whatever about sleeplessness it is becoming for those, who are about to watch completely over the state carefully. For that any citizen whatever should pass the whole of any night whatever in sleep, and not be seen by all his domestics, as being awake and getting up the first, this ought to be considered by all a disgraceful act, and not that of a free-man, whether it is meet to call it a law or a fashion. So too for a mistress to be called up by any servants, and not for herself to first call up them, it is meet for the male and female slaves and house-lad to speak of amongst themselves, and, if it were possible, the whole household together, as a disgraceful thing. It is meet then for all to get up by night, and to perform their many parts in the business of the state and household; the rulers, as regards the city, and the mistresses and masters in their own families. For much sleep is not naturally suited to our bodies or souls, or to the actions relating to them. For he, who is asleep, is not of any more worth at all than he, who is not alive. But whoever amongst us is careful to live well, and to be the most wise, keeps awake for the greatest part of his time, reserving only what is necessary for his health. But it is not much going well to a habit. Now magistrates, who are awake by night in states, are a terror to evil-doers, whether enemies or citizens, but are admired and honored by the just and the wise, and a benefit both to themselves and to the whole state.

The night, when passed through in this manner, supplies, in addition to all the above-mentioned advantages, a certain fortitude to the souls of each of those who are in the state.

But on the return of day and the early dawn, it is requisite for the boys to turn their steps to their teachers. For neither sheep nor anything else ought to live without a shepherd, nor boys without some boy-leaders, nor slaves without masters. Now a boy is of all wild beasts the most difficult to manage. For by how much the more he has the fountain of prudence not yet fitted up, he becomes crafty and keen, and the most insolent of wild beasts. On this account it is necessary to bind him, as it were, with many chains; first by boy-leaders, as soon as he is freed from his nurse and mother, on account of his childishness and infantine state; and still again by those who teach him anything whatever, and by instructions as a free-born youth; but as being a slave, let it be lawful for any free-born man to punish the child, boy-instructor, and master, whenever anyone of these commits any sin. But if anyone, who happens to be present, does not punish the offenders according to justice, let him in the first place be subject to the greatest reproach; and let that one of the guardians of the law, who has been chosen to preside over the boys, look to the party who was present at the deeds of which we have spoken, and did not chastise the offenders when it was fit to chastise them, or did not chastise them in a proper manner; and looking with a keen eye, and pre-eminently regarding the bringing up of the boys, let him regulate their dispositions, by ever turning them to what is good according to the laws. But how shall our law itself sufficiently instruct that very person? For this it has not at present stated at all in a clear and sufficient manner, but only in some things, and some not. It is however necessary, to the utmost of our power to leave nothing for him to do; but to explain the whole reason, in order that he may be to others both an interpreter and a bringer up. Now something has been already said about a choir, and melodies, and dancing, and possessing what type they are

to be selected, and corrected, and made holy. But as regards what is written out of meter, we have not stated of what kind and in what manner it is meet for the boys brought up under thee, thou best guardian of the boys, to handle them. And yet you understand by our discourse what subjects relating to war it is meet for them to learn and to practice; but what relates to letters first and secondly to the lyre, and about calculations, of which we said there is a need, and whatever it is requisite for each to learn relating to war, and house-regulation; and the administration, as respects the state, and relating to the very same things still useful of those in the revolutions of divine things, and respecting the stars, and sun, and moon, whatever it is necessary to regulate about these things in every state. But of what things am I speaking? Of the order of days according to the revolutions of months, and of months according to each year, in order that seasons, and sacrifices, and festivals, receiving each what is suited to them, by being celebrated according to nature, may render the city alive and awake, and pay to the gods the honors due, and cause men to be more intelligent respecting them—all these matters, my friend, have been thus sufficiently discussed for you by the legislator. Direct therefore your mind to what is about to be said after this. Now we have said that you do not sufficiently understand what is the first thing respecting letters, while we were finding some fault with the conversation on this point, that it has not been as yet clearly stated to you, whether he, who is about to become a moderate citizen, should betake himself to an accuracy in learning, or not betake himself at all. And so too in the case of the lyre. We say then that he ought to betake himself. For learning to read and write three years would do for a boy ten years old. But to those, who are thirteen, three years for handling the lyre would be a moderate time. Nor let it be lawful for a father to permit, or

his son of his own act to make his application to these studies more or less, and for more or less years than these whether desirous to learn or hating it. And let him, who disobeys the law, be deprived of those youthful honors, which are to be mentioned shortly afterwards. But hear this first, what the youths ought to learn during this period, and what the masters to teach. They ought to labor at letters until they are able to write and read. But let us leave those unregarded, whom nature has not urged on to become, with respect to quickness and beauty, proficients within the years enjoined. But in the case of the lyreless learning of poets preserved in writings, some in meter, and others without metrical divisions, which are called merely compositions in prose destitute of rhythm and harmony, there have been left to us unsafe writings by some such men, the majority of which, ye best of all guardians of the laws, how will ye make any use? Or how would a lawgiver, ordering you to use them, correctly order? I expect he would be much at a loss.

Clinias/ What is this, guest, which you seem to say, as regards yourself, as being in reality at a loss.

Athenian Stranger/ You have taken me up correctly, Clinias. But before you, who are associates with me on the subject of laws, it is necessary for me to state what seems to be an easy matter, and what does not.

Clinias/ What then, do you now say, and what has been your state, with respect to these matters?

Athenian Stranger/ I will tell you. For it is by no means easy to speak what is opposed to many myriads of mouths.

Clinias/ But what, does it not seem to you that the few and trifling matters, previously mentioned by us relating to laws, are somewhat opposed to the multitude?

Athenian Stranger/ You have spoken this with the greatest truth. For, as it seems to me, you are exhorting me

to proceed confidently in this road, although it is arduous and odious to many, and to advance through the path of laws, which our present discourse has laid open, without omitting any particular, when perhaps a journey of this kind will be pleasing to others not fewer in number, and, if fewer, not worse.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ I am not then remiss. I assert indeed, that there are very many writers of poetry amongst us, in hexameters and trimeters, and all the so-called measures, some having aimed at seriousness, others at fun; in whose writings very many myriads assert that we ought to bring up such of the youths as are properly instructed, and to render them full even to satiety, by making them to be frequent hearers at the reading of them, and very learned in them, through having got whole poets by heart. But others say that, selecting the heads from all, and bringing to the same point entire sentences, they ought to learn them well by committing them to memory, if anyone among us is about to be a good man and wise through much experience and much learning. Do you, then, exhort me with a freedom of speech to show to them what they say correctly or not?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ By saying what then upon all these points shall I in one word say what is sufficient? I think it nearly something of this kind, in which everyone would agree with me, that each of those the poets have said many things beautifully, and many the reverse. And if this be the case, I assert, that much learning is bringing danger to youth.

Clinias/ How then, and what would you advise the guardian of the law to do?

Athenian Stranger/ Of what are you speaking?

Clinias/ By looking to the pattern of what thing would he permit all the youths to learn one subject and forbid them another? Speak, and do not shrink from speaking.

Athenian Stranger/ My good Clinias, I seem almost in a certain manner to have been fortunate.

Clinias/ About what?

Athenian Stranger/ In not being entirely in want of a pattern. For now, after looking to the discourse, which we have gone through, from the morning up to the present moment, not without the inspiration of some god, as we appear to myself, I fancy, by Zeus, that something has been said by a person in his senses altogether similar to a kind of poetry. Nor has perhaps any wonderful event fallen upon me, in being delighted with looking upon our own discourse, as being collected together. For of the very many discourses in poems, or spoken thus in prose, which I have learnt and heard, they have appeared to me to be the most moderate of all, and the most fit for youths to hear. Hence I conceive I could not have to mention to a guardian of the laws and an instructor a pattern better than this, or to exhort the masters to teach boys these subjects, and what are next and similar to these, whether a person happens to be going through the compositions of poets, or what has been written in prose, or spoken thus nakedly, without being written, as being the brothers of these discourses, so as not to neglect them in any way, but to write them down; and in the first place to compel the teachers themselves to learn and praise them; and not to employ as co-workers the teachers, to whom they are not acceptable; but that such as a person may find giving their votes for praise, let him make use of these, and hand over to them the youths to teach and to instruct. Here then and thus let my tale be brought to an end, after having been told as regards the teachers of letters and letters likewise.

Clinias/ As regards the argument, stranger, we do not appear to myself at least to have wandered from the subject proposed. But whether we are right upon the whole or not, it is perhaps difficult to assert positively.

Athenian Stranger/ But this, Clinias, will then become more clear, as is reasonable, when, as we have often said, we arrive at the end of this digression respecting the laws.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ After the grammar-master is not the harp-master to be spoken of?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ I fancy that, if we recollect our previous discourse, we assigned to the harp-masters what was suited to the teaching and the whole of education in things of such a kind.

Clinias/ Of what kind of things are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ We said, I think, that the Dionysiacal singers of sixty years of age ought to have pre-eminently a fine perception of rhythms, and the compositions of harmonies, in order that someone, through knowing well the imitation by melodies, when it is well or ill done, at what time an affection how violent soever may happen to the soul, may thus, by being able to select the resemblances of the good soul and those of the contrary one, reject the latter, but bring forward the former, and hymn to and enchant the souls of the young, and invite each of them, while following him on account of the imitations, to be led on to the possession of virtue.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ For the sake then of these matters, it is requisite for both the harper and his pupil to use the sounds of the lyre, for the sake of the clearness of the chords, by bringing out sounds in accordance with sounds. But as

regards the difference and variety of the sounds of the lyre—the chords producing some melodies, and the poet who composes the strain others—and moreover others by their making the thick and the thin, the swift and the slow, the sharp and the flat, agree with or opposed to each other respectively, and by adapting similarly all the varieties of rhythms to the sounds of the lyre, it is not lawful to bring all such things as these before those, who are about to extract quickly in three years what is useful in music. For contraries, confusing each other, produce a difficulty in learning. But it is requisite that the young should be as quick as possible to learn. For the subjects of education enjoined upon them are of necessity not trifling or few. However, our discourse, as it proceeds, will, together with time, point them out. To such matters relating to music, let the teacher thus attend. But the melodies and words, of what kind and what it is meet for the choir-masters to teach, have been all previously discussed; and we have said that, by being consecrated and adapted each to festivals, they ought to be of service to the state, by contributing to a pleasure of a happy kind.

Clinias/ And this too have you discussed with truth.

Athenian Stranger/ Most truly indeed. And let him, who is chosen the ruler as regards music, receive these rules from us, and let him attend to them with a kind fortune. But let us deliver them relating to dancing and the whole of the gymnastics pertaining to the body, in addition to what has been stated previously; and as we have delivered the instruction, that remained respecting music, let us act in a similar manner with regard to gymnastics. For it is meet for boys and girls to learn to dance and to practice gymnastics likewise. Is it not?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now for the boys dancing-masters, but for the girls dancing-mistresses, would be the better fitted for going through the occupation.

Clinias/ Be it so.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, let us call the man, who has the most to do, the curator of youth; and who, since he attends to the subjects relating to music and gymnastics, will not have much leisure.

Clinias/ How then is it possible for a person, advanced in years, to attend to so many things?

Athenian Stranger/ Easily, my friend. For the law has allowed and will allow him to take to himself as his associates in such an employment, whomever of the male and female citizens he pleases; and he will know whom he ought to take; and he will be desirous not to do wrong in these matters while prudently knowing and reverencing the importance of his office, and being conversant with the reasoning that, when youths have been and are properly brought up, everything will sail on prosperously over the sea of life; but if not, it is not fit to state, nor do we state what will follow through our venerating the great lovers of prophets in a new city.

Much then has been said by us on the subjects relating to dancing and all the movements of gymnastics. For under gymnastics we place all the exercises relating to war in archery and every kind of hurling, and the use of the small shield, and all the fighting with the large shield, and the tactics of sallying out, and all the marching of armies, and their conduct in camps, and whatever relates to cavalry regulations. For all these subjects there ought to be teachers in common, obtaining their pay from the state, and having both men and boys as their pupils, and girls and women skilled in all these matters—those who are still virgins

practicing every kind of dancing, and fighting in armor, but the women laying hold of the science of sallying out, and of laying down and taking up arms, if for nothing else, at least for this, that should there be a necessity at any time for those, who had been guarding the children and the rest of the city, to leave the town with their whole force, and to march to a distance from it, the women may be sufficient for so much as this. Or, on the contrary, should it happen, what is not at all denied to be possible, that enemies from without fall upon it with some mighty power and force, whether Greeks or Barbarians, and furnish the necessity for a battle to take place for the state itself, it would surely be a great fault in a polity for the women to have been brought up in so shameful a manner, as not to fight, as even birds do in behalf of their offspring with the strongest of wild animals, nor to be willing to die, and to expose themselves to every danger; but straightway to hurry to sacred places, and to fill all the altars and temples, and to bring down upon the race of women the bad repute of being the most cowardly of all animals.

Clinias/ By Zeus, O guest, this would be by no means seemly, independent of the cowardice, in any state, where it might take place.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then lay down the law so far as this at least, that warlike concerns ought not to be neglected by women, but that all the citizens, both male and female, ought to attend to them.

Clinias/ I agree with you.

Athenian Stranger/ With respect to wrestling, then, we have said something; but that which is, as I should say, the greatest thing, we have not spoken of; nor is it easy to speak of it, without pointing it out with the body, as well as by word of mouth. This then we will determine, when our language,

following out acts, shall indicate something clear about the other points of which we have spoken; and that such a wrestling is in reality of all motions allied the nearest to a personal encounter in battle; and, moreover, that it is requisite to attend to this for the sake of that, but not that for the sake of this.

Clinias/ Beautifully indeed do you say this.

Athenian Stranger/ Let then thus much be held to have been said up to the present moment on the subject of wrestling. But with respect to the other motions of the whole body, the greatest part of which a person would, by calling it a certain dancing, call it correctly, it is proper to consider as of two kinds; one imitating the solemn in the more beautiful bodies, but the other the depraved in baser bodies. And again, of the depraved there are two species, and two of the serious. Of the serious motion one kind exists, when bodies of beauty and a soul of bravery become implicated in war and violent exertions: but the other, when a temperate soul being mixed up with a prosperous state and moderate pleasures. Now he who calls a dancing of this kind pacific, calls it according to its nature. But the warlike, on the other hand, which is entirely different from the pacific, a person would correctly call Pyrrhic; which imitates the careful guarding against all blows and hurlings by leanings away, and by every kind of yielding and leapings on high, together with a lowering of the body; and the contrary to these, which are borne along to active gestures in the shooting of arrows, and the hurling of javelins, and which attempt to imitate the infliction of all kinds of blows. But that which is erect and braced up in these, when an imitation takes place of good bodies and souls, becoming straightforward for the most part of the limbs of the body, receiving a thing of this kind as right, but the contrary as not right. In this way, on the other hand, we must look upon the pacific dancing of each,

whether a person lays hold or not of the beautiful dancing, and conducts himself in a becoming manner in the dances of men, acting according to law. It is necessary, then, to separate first the dancing about which there is a doubt from that about which there is not a doubt. Now what is this? And how must we separate them? Such then as is Bacchic, and belongs to those that follow the Bacchants, whom some persons, calling by the name of Nymphs, Pans, Silenuses, and Satyrs, say that they imitate, and, drunk with wine, perform purifications and certain mystic rites, the whole of this kind of dancing it is not easy to define, as being neither pacific, nor adapted to war, or to say what it means. But it seems to me that it is nearly the most correct to define it in this way, by placing the warlike dancing apart, and apart too the pacific, and to assert that this kind of dancing is not adapted to a civil life. Leaving it, therefore, to lie down lying there, let us return to the warlike and pacific dancing, as being indubitably ours. Now the kind of the unwarlike Muse, and that which honors the gods and the sons of the gods by dancing, will become altogether one kind, when it takes place in the reputation of doing well. And we could make of this a twofold division; the one, possessing greater pleasures, after we have escaped from certain labors there and dangers to what is good; but the other, when there is a preservation and increase of former good things, possessing pleasures milder than them; since in matters of this kind, everyone is affected with greater movements in the body, when the pleasures are greater, but with less, when they are less; and he, who is more orderly, and more exercised in fortitude, exhibits less changes of movement; but he, who is timid, and unexercised in temperance, the more vehement; and generally everyone, who emits a sound, whether in singing or in speaking, is not entirely able to exhibit tranquility in his body. Hence an imitation of what has been

said, taking place by gestures has produced the whole of the art of dancing. In all these occasions, one person amongst us moves elegantly, but another inelegantly. Now it is fitting for him, who reflects, to praise many others of the old names, as being assigned correctly, and according to nature; and to one of them, relating to the dancings of those who are doing well, and are moderate in their pleasures, how correctly and at the same time musically did he, whoever he was, give a name. For assigning to them taken all together a name according to reason, he called it Emmeleia, and established two kinds of beautiful dancings, one warlike, called Pyrrhic, the other pacific, called Emmeleia, assigning to each a becoming and fitting appellation. These matters it behooves the lawgiver to explain by types, but the guardian of the laws to seek out; and having sought out, to combine dancing with the rest of music, and to distribute at all festivals that which is suited to each of the sacrifices; and having thus made them all holy in their order, hereafter to disturb nothing connected with dancing or singing. For it is requisite that the same city and the same citizens should pass their time as far as possible equally in the same pleasures, and live really well and happily.

The matters then relating to the dancings of beautiful bodies and souls, of what kind it has been said they ought to be, have been gone through. But it is necessary to look into and know those relating to disagreeable bodies and thoughts, and of those that are directed to the comicalities of laughter, as regards the language, and the song, and the dance, and the imitations of all these, done in a comical way. For it is not possible to learn serious things without the laughable, nor the converse of anything without its contrary, if a person is about to be intellectual; but to do both it would be not possible, if a person is on the other hand about to have even a little share of virtue. But it is meet to learn them

for the sake of this very thing, namely, the not doing or saying at any time through ignorance what is ridiculous, when there is no need of it; but it is proper to order slaves and hired strangers to imitate things of this kind; but for no serious study of them to exist at any time, or for any free person, either woman or man, to be seen learning them, but for some novelty of imitations about them to always appear. Thus then let whatever are the sports pertaining to laughter, which we all call comedy, be laid down both by our language and law. But should any of the serious poets, who, they say, are occupied on tragedies, come to us and ask—Shall we, O strangers, come to your city and country, or not, and bring our poetry and act it? or how is it decreed for you to do in matters of this kind? what answer to this should we correctly give to these divine men? This to myself indeed it seems good to say—O most excellent of strangers, we are ourselves, to the utmost of our power, poets of a tragedy the most beautiful and best. For the whole of our polity consists in an imitation of a life the most beautiful and best, which we say is in reality the truest tragedy. You, therefore, are poets, and we too are poets of the same kind, being your opponents in art, and antagonists in the most beautiful drama, which true law alone has naturally completed, as is the hope in us. But do not think that we shall so easily suffer you to fix your scenes in our place of meeting, and, introducing players with beautiful voices, and who talk louder than we do, to speak in public before our children and wives and all the masses not the same things as we do about pursuits, but for the most part even the most contrary. For we should be ourselves nearly quite mad, and the whole state too, should it permit you to do what has been just now mentioned, before the magistrates shall have decided whether you have composed what is to be spoken and fit to be brought forward or not. Now then, ye children, offspring of the tender Muses,

we will, after first showing your odes by the side of ours to the rulers grant you a Chorus; if what has been said by you shall appear to be the same as, or better than that by us, but if not, we shall never, friends, be able to do so. Let then these be the customs, ordained by laws, relating to all kind of dancing and the teaching of them, that separate are the affairs of slaves, and separate those of masters, if so it seems good to you.

Clinias/ How does not this seem good, at least for the present?

Athenian Stranger/ Three things however still remain for the free-born to learn; one is computation, and what relates to numbers; but that, which measures, length, breadth, and depth, is a second one; and the third that, which measures the orbits of the stars, and how they naturally march with relation to each other. On all these it is not requisite for the many to labor to a nicety, but only some few; of whom, as we advance, we will speak towards the end of our discussion. For so it will be becoming. But such as are necessary for the masses, it has been very correctly said even by boys, that it is shameful for the many not to know. However it is neither easy nor altogether possible to search into all things accurately; but whatever is necessary among them, it is not possible to throw aside. And it seems that he, who first spoke proverbially of the deity, that not even a god will ever at any time be seen contending against necessity, said so looking to this, namely, such necessities as, I conceive, are at least divine; since, if he said so of human necessities, to which the multitude look when, speaking in this manner, it would be the most stupid by far of all their speeches.

Clinias/ What then are those necessities for instruction, O guest, which are not such, but divine?

Athenian Stranger/ I think they are those, which he, who does not practice, nor in any respect learn, will never become either a god, a Dæmon, or a hero among men, competent to undertake the care seriously of mankind. And he would want much of being a divine man, who is unable to tell either one, or two, or three, or, in short, even and odd, or in any respect to knowhow to number, or to reckon nights and days, and is unskilled in the revolutions of the moon, the sun, and the other stars. There is then much folly in the notion that all this education is not necessary for him, who is about to know the most beautiful subjects of instruction. But of what kind is each of these, and how many they are, and when they are to be learnt, and what with some, and what apart from others, and the whole combination of them, these are the subjects, which a person ought to learn the first; and, with this instruction as the guide, to go on to the rest. For thus a necessity has overtaken him naturally, with which we say no divinity contests at present, or ever will contest.

Clinias/ What has been asserted at present, O guest, seems to have been somehow truly asserted, and you speak according to nature.

Athenian Stranger/ Such is the case, Clinias. But it is difficult for a person, who has previously arranged thus for himself, to lay down laws in this manner. But if it seems good to you, we will lay down laws for ourselves in a more accurate manner at some other time.

Clinias/ You seem to us, guest, to fear our habit of ignorance on matters of this kind. You do not, however, justly fear. Endeavor then to speak, concealing nothing on this account.

Athenian Stranger/ I fear the very things you are now speaking of; but I fear much more those, who have indeed laid hold of these points of education, but have laid hold of

them improperly. For an ignorance of all things is by no means a dreadful thing nor slippery, nor yet the greatest evil; but much skill and great learning united to an improper education, is a calamity much greater than these.

Clinias/ You speak the truth.

Athenian Stranger/ It is necessary then to say that the free-born ought to learn of each of these subjects so much as the great mass of boys in Ægypt learn together with their letters. For, in the first place, the rules relating to reckoning have been so artlessly devised for children, that they learn it in sport, and with pleasure; for there are distributions of certain apples and chaplets, the same numbers being adapted to more and at the same time to fewer: and in the case of pugilists and wrestlers, the assessorships and co-allotments in turn and in successive order, and how they exist naturally; and, moreover, when playing, they mix phials of gold, and copper, and silver, and other things of this kind, and some distribute them whole, adapting, as I said before, to their sports the use of necessary numbers; and thus they benefit those, who are learning to draw up and lead out armies, and to arrange encampments, and to regulate a household, and cause in short the men to be more useful themselves to themselves, and awake; and after this in the case of measurements, relating to length, breadth, and depth, since they say that there is naturally inherent in all men a certain ridiculous and disgraceful ignorance on all these points, they liberate them from this.

Clinias/ What and what kind of ignorance do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ My dear Clinias, I too, having altogether late in life heard how we are affected on these points, have felt a wonder; and it seems to me, that it is the situation not of human beings, but rather of certain swine-

like animals; and I have been ashamed not only of myself, but of all the Greeks.

Clinias/ About what? Tell us, guest, what you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ I will tell you; or, rather, I will point it out to you by asking a question. And do you give me a short answer. You surely know what length is?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And what breadth is?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And that there are these two things, and that a third of these is depth?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Does it not, then, seem to you, that all these may be measured by each other?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ I mean length by length, and breadth by breadth; and that depth is naturally capable of being measured similarly?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ But, if some of these can do this neither violently nor quietly, but some can, and others not, and yet you imagine that all can, how do you conceive yourself to be situated with respect to these?

Clinias/ Badly, it is evident.

Athenian Stranger/ But again, as regards length and breadth against depth, or length and breadth against each other, do not all of us the Greeks think, touching these questions, thus, that they can be measured against each other in some way?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But if this be at no time and by no means possible, and yet all the Greeks, as I have said, think it is possible, is it not fit, that, being ashamed of them all, we should thus address them, —O ye best of Greeks, this is one of the things, which we said it was base not to know. But is it not altogether beautiful to know things necessary to be known?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And in addition to these, there are other things allied to them, in which many errors, the sisters of those errors, are produced in us.

Clinias/ What are these?

Athenian Stranger/ Those relating to quantities that are commensurable and not commensurable, by what nature they exist. For it is necessary that he, who reflects upon them, should distinguish them, or be altogether a person of no mark; and it is meet by throwing out problems to each other, and, being engaged in an amusement more agreeable than the pebble-game of old men, to have a love for contention in a pursuit worthy of all attention.

Clinias/ Perhaps so. At least it seems that the pebble-game and this education are very different from each other.

Athenian Stranger/ These subjects then I assert, Clinias, the youths ought to learn. For they are neither hurtful nor difficult; and when they are learnt, combined with sport, they will do a benefit, but never a hurt, to our state. But, if anyone says otherwise, let us hear him.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ If then these things appear to be so, it is evident that we shall decide in their favor; but appearing to be not so, they will be decided against.

Clinias/ Evidently so. How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let then these be laid down as belonging to necessary instructions, in order that what relates to the laws may not be done by us in vain.

Clinias/ Let them be laid down.

Athenian Stranger/ For they are as it were pledges from the rest of the polity, which may be dissolved, if they should in no respect receive kindly us, who propose them, or you, who establish them.

Clinias/ The condition you propose is just.

Athenian Stranger/ After these then look to the instruction relating to the stars, whether this being chosen for youth pleases us, or the contrary.

Clinias/ Only speak.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet there is respecting them a subject of great marvel, and to be endured at no time and by no means.

Clinias/ What is this?

Athenian Stranger/ We say that we ought not to search after the greatest god, and the whole order of the world, nor to be busy in explaining the causes of things; for it is not holy. It seems indeed, that, if the very contrary took place, it would take place correctly.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ What is stated is a paradox, and someone may think it is not suited to old men; but when anyone conceives that instruction is something beautiful, and true, and advantageous to a city, and likewise in every respect acceptable to the deity, by no manner of means is it possible not to mention it.

Clinias/ You say what is reasonable. But shall we find an instruction of this kind in the case of the stars?

Athenian Stranger/ All we Greeks, so to say, tell, O ye good men, a falsehood respecting those mighty divinities the Sun and Moon.

Clinias/ Of what kind is the falsehood?

Athenian Stranger/ We say that they never proceed in the same path, and that there are some other stars with them, to which we give the name of planets.

Clinias/ By Zeus, you are saying, guest, the truth. For in the course of my life, I have often seen myself the morning and the evening star, and certain other stars, never proceeding along in the same track, but wandering entirely. And we all know that the Sun and Moon are perpetually doing so.

Athenian Stranger/ These then are the things, Megillus and Clinias, which I assert our citizens and youths ought to learn respecting the gods in heaven, so far as this about all these, matters, so far for the sake of not blaspheming them, but of offering sacrifices ever with good-omened words, and piously in prayers approaching them.

Clinias/ This indeed is right, if, first, it is possible to learn that, of which you are speaking; and next, if we are not at present speaking properly about them, yet after learning, we shall speak so of them. Thus much do I go along with you; and that a thing of this kind must be learnt. Do you, then, endeavor to explain entirely that these things are so, and we will together follow you as your disciples.

Athenian Stranger/ It is not easy to learn what I am saying, nor is it on the other hand altogether difficult, nor is it a matter of a very long time. And the proof is, that, although I myself have heard these things, neither recently nor formerly, I am able to render them manifest in a little time. And yet had they been difficult, I, who am in years,

would not have been able to explain them to you, who are in years.

Clinias/ You say what is true. But what is the instruction, which you call marvelous; but which you say it is fitting for the youths to learn, and yet we are ignorant of? Endeavor to speak about it, at least to this extent, with the utmost perspicuity.

Athenian Stranger/ I must endeavor. The notion then, thou best of men, respecting the Sun and Moon and the other stars, that they are planets, is not correct; but the very contrary is the case. For each of them perpetually traverses the same path, being not many, but one, in a circle; but they appear to traverse many. And that, which is the most swift of them, is not rightly thought to be the slowest, and contrariwise the contrary. Now if such is the case naturally, but we do not think so, if we had such notions respecting the horses, that run at Olympia, or of men contesting in the long course, and we called the swiftest the slowest, and the slowest the swiftest, and, passing our encomiums, celebrated the vanquished as the victor, I think we should not attach our praises properly, nor in a manner agreeable to the racers, being men. But now, when we err in the very same manner respecting the gods, do we not think that, what, when it took place there, would be then ridiculous and incorrect, takes place here at present not well in the case of the gods.

Clinias/ Ridiculous, I am aware, entirely.

Athenian Stranger/ It is not then an act acceptable to the divinity, when we hymn to the gods what is false.

Clinias/ Most true; if such is the case.

Athenian Stranger/ If then we can show that such is the case, all these subjects are up to this point to be learnt; but,

if we cannot show it, we must dismiss them; and let this be thus laid down.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ It is then proper to say now, that the legal institutions relating to the instruction of childhood, have reached their end. And it is requisite to reflect in a similar manner upon hunting and everything else of this kind. For it appears that the office of a lawgiver is not merely that of laying down laws; but that he ought to make use of what is a mean between admonition and laws; an idea that has often occurred to us during our discussion; for instance, when we were speaking about the bringing up of the very young. For we said there were things not to be mentioned; and that, speaking of them, as laws laid down, we thought the notion to be full of folly; but laws having been written in this way, and the whole of a polity laid down, the praise of a citizen pre-eminent in virtue is not then perfect, when anyone says that he, who ministers the best to the laws, and obeys them the most, is the good man; but this would be said more perfectly, that he is so, who leads a life without stain, through being obedient to the writings of the party, who lays down the laws and distributes praise and blame. This is the most correct language for the praise of a citizen; and the legislator in reality ought not only to write down his laws, but in addition to the laws to write down, interwoven with them, what seems to him to be beautiful and not beautiful; and the tip-top citizen should establish firmly these no less than what are bound down by fines imposed by the law. And we adduce as a witness the subject of our present discussion; for it will show more clearly what we mean. For hunting is a thing of wide extent, comprehended at present under nearly one name. For there is much hunting of aquatic animals; much of those that fly; and still more of those on land, not only of wild beasts, but that which

it is fit to consider as the hunting of men, I mean in war, and much too is the hunting in the way of friendship, of which one part brings praise, the other blame. The thefts too of robbers and armies are huntings. The legislator, therefore, who establishes laws about hunting, can neither leave these unnoticed, nor, by imposing regulations and fines on all, lay down laws of a menacing kind. What then is to be done in cases of this kind? On the one hand, the legislator ought to praise and blame the business of hunting, relating to the labors and pursuits of youth; and on the other hand, the young man ought to hear and obey, and neither pleasure nor labor ought to prevent him from doing so; but let him honor what is mentioned with praise, rather than what has been laid down by law, and are accompanied with threats, united to fines relating to each, and perform what is enjoined. This being premised, the praise and blame of hunting will follow in a becoming manner. For that, which makes the souls of young men better, belongs to the person praising, but to the party blaming that, which effects the contrary. Let us then speak of what follows in order, addressing the young men by a prayer—O friends, never may any desire or love of fishing by sea, or of fishing with a hook, seize you; nor, generally, of laboring to catch any aquatic animals with an osier net, either when you are awake or asleep! May no desire ever come upon you to catch men at sea, nor to rob them, which would make you cruel and lawless hunters! And never may it come into your farthest thoughts to commit thefts in the country and city; nor let a desire, full of cleverness, but not a very liberal one, come upon any young person to catch birds. The hunting then and catching of land animals alone remains for our athletes; of which, one kind, performed by those sleeping ever in turn, and called nocturnal, belongs to sluggish men, and is not worthy of praise; nor yet the other of those awake, which, enjoying a remission from labor, does

by nets and snares, and not by the victory of a soul fond of labor, get the savage strength of wild beasts into its power. That hunting then of quadrupeds alone remains as the best of all, performed with horses and dogs, and by the bodies of the parties themselves; over all of which animals they get the mastery by running them down, and inflicting blows, and hurling darts, the parties themselves, to whom there is any care of possessing a godlike bravery, being engaged with their own hands in the hunt. Of all these matters then in the shape of praise or blame, let this discourse have been spoken; and let this be the law. Let no one hinder these truly sacred hunters from hunting, wherever they please. But no one shall ever suffer any person at any place to engage in nocturnal hunting with dogs and ropes. And let him not prevent fowling in uncultivated places and in mountains; but anyone who may be present shall forbid it in cultivated and sacred holy places, and a person catching fish, except in ports or sacred rivers, and marshes or pools; but in other places let it be lawful for him to catch them, provided he does not use a mixture of juices. Now, therefore, it is proper to say, that the legal institutions respecting education have arrived at their end.

Clinias/ You may well say so.

Book 8.

Athenian Stranger/ Close upon these it is for us to regulate and lay down by law, in conjunction with the Delphic oracles, festivals, and what are to be the sacrifices and the divinities, to whom it will be better and more advisable for the state to sacrifice, and at what time, and how many in number. Of these matters, I think it will be perhaps nearly our business to lay down some by law.

Clinias/ Perhaps so, as regards the number.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then speak first as regards the number. For let there be of three hundred and sixty-five nothing wanting; so that some one of the magistrates may always sacrifice to some god or Dæmon in behalf of the city, and the people, and their property. And let the holy interpreters, and the priests, and the priestesses, and the prophets, being assembled together, with the guardians of the laws, ordain what it was necessary for the legislator to omit. For it is requisite that these should take notice of things omitted. For the law will say that there are twelve festivals to the twelve gods, from whom each tribe has its name, and that persons are to make to each of these monthly sacrifices, and dances, and musical contests, and to assign the gymnastic exercises, in a manner befitting both to the gods themselves, and the several seasons; and to distribute the female festivals likewise, such as ought to be separated from the men, and such as ought not. Moreover, the festivals of the gods below, and such as are to be called celestial, and what is attendant on these, must not be mixed together, but must be separated in the twelfth month, sacred to Pluto, by persons paying rites according to law: nor must persons feel, like enemies, an ill will towards that god, but they must honor him, as being even the best to the race of men. For the communion between soul and body is not better than the

separation, as I affirm, speaking seriously. Besides, it is requisite for those, who are about to distinguish these sufficiently, to have this notion, that this our city is such, as no one will find another like it, of those at present, as regards the leisurely employment of time, and the power over things necessary for existence. But it ought, like a single individual, to live well. Now to those living well, it is necessary for this to be present the first, namely, that persons should neither injure others, 'nor be injured by others. Now of these, the former is not very difficult; but it is very difficult to possess the power of not being injured; nor is it possible to perfectly acquire it otherwise than by becoming perfectly good. The same thing also takes place in a city, to which, when it is good, there is a life of peace; but of war from without and within, when it is wicked. And as this is the case nearly everywhere, each must exercise themselves in war, not during a war, but during a life of peace. It is necessary then for a city, endued with intellect, to exercise itself in war, for not less than one day in each month, but for more as it may seem fit to the rulers, without taking thought of cold or heat, both the men, and the women and the boys, in order that all may be prepared, when it shall somehow seem good to the rulers to lead forth the people in a mass, and sometimes in portions. And it is meet to devise some beautiful sports, together with sacrifices, that certain festival-battles may take place, imitating as distinctly as possible the battles in war; and it is meet to distribute rewards of victory and velour to each of these, and to make encomiums upon, and abuse of, each other, according as each may conduct himself in the contests, and through the whole of life, by decking the party, who has been thought to be the best, and dispraising him, who has not. But, in the first place, let not everyone be a poet on such subjects, but let him be a person not less than fifty years of age; nor, in the next place, such of those, as

possess poetry and music sufficiently in themselves, but have never done any honorable and conspicuous act, but such as are good men themselves and held in honor by the state, and have been the doers of honorable deeds. And let the compositions of such persons be sung, even although they may not be naturally musical. But let the decision on these matters be with the instructor of youth, and the other guardians of the laws; and let them assign, as an honor to them alone, a freedom of speech in songs; but to the others let there not be this liberty; nor let anyone dare to sing a song, which has not been approved of by the guardians of the laws, who are to decide, not even if it be sweeter than the hymns of Thamyris and Orpheus; but such sacred poems as have, after being decided upon, been dedicated to the gods; and such as, being the poems of worthy men, scattering blame or praise on certain parties, have been adjudged to do a thing of this kind with moderation.

The same things, I assert, ought to take place similarly, both among men and women, respecting war, and the liberty of speech in poetry. But it is meet for the legislator to bring the question before himself, and to cast about it with this discourse—Come, what citizens shall I, after having nourished the whole state properly, bring up? Ought they not to be the combatants in the greatest contests, to whom there are ten thousand antagonists? Entirely so, someone speaking with propriety may say. What then, if we had brought up boxers or combatants in boxing and wrestling united, or persons contending in any other contests of this kind, should we have met them in the contest itself, not having ourselves fought with anyone at a former time? Or, if we were pugilists, should we not have learned to fight many days previous to the contest, and labored hard in imitating all such things as we should be about to adopt at that period, when we were contending for victory? And should we not,

with the view of coming the nearest possible to what is similar, have put on boxing-gloves instead of the cestus, in order that the blows and the avoidance of blows might be practiced as sufficiently as possible? And should there have happened to be a deficiency of fellow-combatants, should we not, through dreading the laughter of the senseless, have dared to hang up an inanimate image, and practice ourselves against it? And if we were in want both of animate and inanimate adversaries, should we not have ventured, in some desert spot, to fight even with a shadow against ourselves? Or, for what else would anyone say that this practice in moving the hand took place?

Clinias/ For nearly nothing else, O guest, than the very one you have just now mentioned.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, will the warlike portion of the city dare on each occasion to go to the greatest of contests, worse prepared than combatants of this kind, when it is about to fight for life, and for children, and property, and the whole of the state. And will not then the legislator, fearful lest these gymnastic exercises with each other should appear to some persons ridiculous, lay down a law, and ordain that persons are to act the soldier each day in a little way without arms, and cause the dances, and the whole of gymnastic exercise, to tend together to this point? and will he not likewise ordain that some of the gymnastic exercises for instance, either greater or less, are to last for not less than a month; and that persons are to enter into contests with each other through the whole country in seizing upon places, and making ambuscades, and by imitating the whole of war in reality, to fight with boxing-gloves, and to make use of darts somewhat dangerous, and as near as possible to the hurling of real ones; in order that the sport may not be altogether without a fear from each other, but cause some terror, and thus, after a manner,

show who is the man of mettle, and who is not; and by distributing correctly honors to some, and disgrace to others, he may render the whole state through its whole life useful for a real contest. And moreover, should anyone happen to die in these contests, that, as the death was involuntary, he may lay down that the homicide shall, after being purified according to law, be pure in hand; reflecting that when not many men die, others will be born again not inferior; but when fear, as it were, dies, in all these cases he will no longer be able to discover a test of the better and the worse; which is, in no small degree, a greater evil to a state than the other.

Clinias/ We will agree with you, O guest, that he ought to lay down matters of this kind by law, and direct the attention of the whole state to them.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we then all of us know the reason, why in cities at present no such dancing and contest exist, scarcely at any time or in any manner, except to a very small extent? Shall we say that this happens through the ignorance of the masses, and of those who have laid down laws for them?

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Athenian Stranger/ By no means, O blessed Clinias. But it is proper to say that there are two causes of this, and very sufficient too.

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ One is, that, through the love of wealth making the whole of time to be without any leisure for the care of other things except private property, on which the soul of every citizen is hanging, it can have no care for other things but of daily pecuniary gain; and whatever learning or pursuit leads to this, everyone individually is most ready to learn and to practice, but he laughs down all

the rest. It is proper therefore to mention this as one reason, why a state is unwilling to engage seriously in this or any other honorable and excellent pursuit; but through an insatiable desire of silver and gold is willing for every man to undergo every art and artifice, both the more beautiful and the more base, if he is about to become wealthy, and to engage in a line of conduct holy and unholy, and thoroughly disgraceful, and to feel no annoyance, if only he possesses the power, like a wild beast, to eat all kinds of things, and drink likewise, and to obtain all satiety in all forms of venereal enjoyments.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ Let this then be put down as one reason, which I assign, as preventing states from practicing anything else that is honorable or what relates to war sufficiently; but by causing the naturally well-ordered to become merchants, and ship-owners, and servile ministers, and the brave to be robbers, and house-breakers, and guilty of sacrilege, and fond of war, and tyrannical, it destroys, and greatly so sometimes, those who were well-disposed but unfortunate.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ Why should I not call those in every respect unfortunate, to whom there is a necessity by feeling hungry through the whole of life and neglecting their own soul to be perpetually engaged in a contest?

Clinias/ This, then, is one reason. But what do you assign, O guest, as the second?

Athenian Stranger/ You have very properly reminded me.

Clinias/ This insatiable search after wealth that makes each person to be without leisure, is, as you say, one impediment to each practicing what relates to war. Be it so. But tell us the second.

Athenian Stranger/ Do I seem to have not spoken, but to have wasted time through a want of readiness?

Clinias/ You do not. But you seem to us to reprobate, as through hatred, a custom of this kind more than is becoming, in the language which has just now fallen from you.

Athenian Stranger/ You find fault with me, guests, most correctly; and you shall hear, as is reasonable, what is after this.

Clinias/ Only speak.

Athenian Stranger/ I say, then, that the not-polities, of which we have often spoken in our previous conversation, namely, a democracy, an oligarchy, and a tyranny, are the causes of this. For in these there is not a single polity; but all may most justly be called states of sedition. For not one willingly rules over the willing, but willingly over the unwilling, and this always with some compulsion. And as the governor fears the governed, he never at any time willingly permits a person to be handsome, or wealthy, or strong, or brave, or altogether warlike. These two then are nearly pre-eminently the causes of all things, but of these they are really the pre-eminent. But the polity for which we are now giving laws, avoids both these. For it leads a life of the greatest leisure; and the people are free from each other, and will, I think, become from these laws the lovers of money the least. So that such an establishment of a polity would alone of all existing at present, probably and according to reason receive at the same time the instruction that has been gone through, and the warlike sport, which has been perfected correctly at least by description.

Clinias/ Correctly said.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it not then next in order to these for us to have a recollection of all gymnastic contests, so that

we may attend to such of them as appertain to war, and lay down the rewards of victory, but to bid farewell to such, as do not appertain. But what they are, it is better for them to be detailed from the beginning, and to establish by law. And, first, must we not lay down what appertains to running and swiftness?

Clinias/ We must lay them down.

Athenian Stranger/ Now the quickness of the body is altogether of all things the most appertaining to war; one kind connected with the feet, and the other with the hands; that of the feet being required for running away and overtaking, but of the hands the fight in close conflict and the standing up together requiring strength and vigor.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But neither of them without heavy arms possesses the greatest utility.

Clinias/ For how should they?

Athenian Stranger/ The crier, then, shall first invite the runner in the stadium, as he does now at the games. And the runner will enter, having a shield; for we do not put, down rewards for the light-armed soldier. He, who is about to contend by running in the stadium, will enter the first with his arms; but the second, he who is to run the doubled course; the third, he who is to run the horse course; the fourth, moreover, he who is to run the long course; and the fifth, whom we shall start the first with his arms on, is to run a distance of sixty stadia to a certain temple of Mars; and again calling by name another heavier armed to contend in a shorter and smoother road; and again, another who is an archer, and having all the dress of an archer, to run a hundred stadia while engaged in the contest, through mountains and all kinds of country, to a temple of Apollo and Artemis; and after establishing the contest, we will wait

for them, until they arrive, and we will then bestow upon each victor the prize.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then consider these contests as of three kinds; one of boys, another of beardless youths, and a third of men. And for the beardless youths we will lay down two thirds of the whole course; but for boys the halves of these, when contending with archers and armed men. With respect to females, for girls not yet arrived at puberty and undressed, we will establish the stadium, and diaulum, and horse-course, and the long course, for them to contend in the course itself, but to those, who are thirteen years of age, the communion remaining until marriage, for a period not longer than twenty years, nor less than eighteen. And clothed with a fitting dress let them descend to the contest in these courses.

And thus much concerning the contests of men and women in running. With regard to trials of strength, in the place of wrestling, and such things, we will establish what are now considered heavy contests, namely, the fighting in heavy armor, by one contending with one, and two with two, and up to ten with ten. But what and to what extent it is requisite for a person not to suffer, or to do, to gain the victory, just as recently in the case of wrestling, the parties conversant with that exercise have laid down laws, relating to what is the work of a person wrestling well, or not; so it is requisite to invite parties skilled in fighting with arms, and to request them to lay down laws, as to who is justly the victor in contests of this kind, and what regulation shall determine likewise the defeated party. And let the same laws be laid down respecting the females up to the time of marriage. And it is requisite for us to oppose to the contest in boxing and wrestling united the whole of the art of the light-shield soldier, where parties contend with bows, and

light shields, and short spears, and in the hurling of stones from the hand and from slings; and to lay down laws on these matters, and to distribute legal honors and victories to the party conducting himself the best on these points. After this it would be in the order of events for laws to be laid down respecting equestrian contests. There is not, indeed, much need of horses, nor many of them, at least in Crete; so that of necessity there is less attention given to the rearing of horses, and the contests with them. For not one of you is in any respect the rearer of a chariot, and there would be no ambition founded on reason to anyone on this point: so that for us to establish competitors in a pursuit, which does not belong to the country, would be for us to have no mind, and to seem not to possess it. But by proposing rewards for single horse contests, and for colts, that have not shed their first teeth, and for those that are between full-grown horses and colts, and to those that are full-grown, we should introduce an equestrian amusement, suited to the nature of the country. Let then there be on these points, according to law, a contest and a love of contests, and let there be granted to the Phylarchs and Hipparchs a decision in common respecting all the courses themselves and those, who descend into them as competitors with their arms on. But by establishing contests either in gymnastic exercises or for those without arms here, we shall not correctly lay down the law. But as an archer on horseback, or a javelin-hurler, a Cretan is not useless, so that there will be for the sake of sport a strife and contest in these points. But it is not fit to force females by laws relating to these matters and by ordinances touching a sharing in common. But if from their previous education, proceeding to a habit, their nature admits of it, and there is no reluctance in boys and virgins to take a share, it is proper to permit them and not to blame.

Here then has there now completely come to an end the plan for contending and the learning of gymnastics on such points, as we labor in contests, and such as we learn under masters day by day. And of music, moreover, the greater part has been gone through in like manner, and the matters relating to the Rhapsodists, and those that follow after them, and whatever contests of choirs necessarily occur at festivals, and will be orderly arranged in the months, and on the days, and in the years, assigned to the gods and those with them, whether they are distributed into triennial periods, or quinquennial, or in whatever way or manner the gods have given an idea respecting their arrangement. At that period too it is meet to expect that the contests of music will take place, when ordered by the prize-distributers and the instructor of the youths, and the guardians of the laws; who, on meeting together at a common spot, touching those very matters, shall become themselves the lawgivers, as to the time when, and the persons who, and with whom, they shall make the contests relating to all choirs and dancing. But of what kind each of these ought to be, both with respect to the language, and songs, and harmonies mingled with rhythms and dancing, has been often said by the first legislator; according to which the second legislators ought, by following in their steps, to distribute the contests in a manner befitting the several sacrifices at proper periods, and to permit the city to enjoy its festivals. With respect to these and other such like points, it is not difficult to know what kind of a lawful arrangement they should obtain by lot; nor would the placing them here and there bring any great gain or loss to the state. But what is of no small consequence, and difficult to effect by persuasion, would be the work especially of a god; if indeed it is possible for the regulation to exist from him; but now there seems almost to be the need of some bold man to do honor pre-eminently to the liberty of

speech, and to state what seems to be the best for a city and citizens, by enjoining upon souls, that have become corrupt, what is becoming and consequent upon the whole polity, and by speaking in opposition to the greatest desires, and this without having a human being as an ally, but solely following reason alone.

Clinias/ Of what reason are you now speaking, guest? for we do not understand you.

Athenian Stranger/ Very likely. But I will endeavor to speak to you in a yet clearer manner. For when I arrived in the discourse at education, I perceived the lads and lasses associating with each other in a friendly manner. And it came, as was natural, upon me to be alarmed, when I considered how a person would use a state of that kind, where young men and women are delicately brought up, and unoccupied in those violent and vulgar labors, which very greatly extinguish rudeness, and where sacrifices, and festivals, and choirs are a care to all through the whole of life. By what means then in such a state will they abstain from those desires, which hurl many men and many women into the worst state, from which should reason order them to abstain, a law is attempting to become. Indeed it is not wonderful, if the laws previously ordained obtained a mastery over the majority of desires. For the not permitting a person to be excessively wealthy, is a no trifling advantage towards being temperate; and the whole of education has adopted laws in moderation for objects of this kind. Added to this, the eye of the rulers is compelled not to look elsewhere, but to regard even the young. These then, such at least as relate to man, possess moderation, as compared with the rest of desires. But against the unnatural love for boys and girls, and for women as if they were men, and for men as if they were women, whence innumerable evils arise both to men individually and to whole cities, how can anyone

be on their guard? and by cutting what remedy for each of these will a person discover an escape from such a danger? This is by no means easy, Clinias. For in other things not a few the whole of Crete and Lacedæmon will properly contribute no small assistance to us, while laying down laws alien to the manners of the majority; but in matters of love—since we are alone, I say it, they are entirely opposed to us. For, if anyone, following nature, should lay down the law, which was prior to the time of Laïus, and assert it was proper not to have an intercourse with men and boys, as if they were females, and bring forward as a witness the nature of wild beasts, and show that for such purposes the male does not touch the male, through its being unnatural, perhaps he would make use of a probable reason; but he would by no means accord with your cities. Moreover he would not agree with them in that point, which we have said the legislator ought always to observe. For we ever seek in the laws laid down what contributes to virtue or not. Come then say, should we agree that this may be at present laid down legally as something beautiful, or at least as not base, what part of it would aid us in the road to virtue? Whether, when it takes place, will the habit of fortitude be produced in the soul of him, who is persuaded? or a kind of a temperate form in the soul of him who persuades? Or would no one be persuaded on these points? but rather in every way the contrary of this. Will everyone blame the soft disposition of him, who yields to pleasures, and is incapable of self-control? But will not everyone blame on the other hand the likeness of the image in him, who proceeds to an imitation of the female sex? What man then will lay down as a law such a thing as this? Scarcely not one, who has true law in his mind. How then do we say that this is true? It is necessary for a person to see the nature of friendship and desire at the same time, and of the so-called loves, if he would reflect upon these matters

correctly. For they are two, and there is another and a third kind arising from both, and which, comprehended under one name, produces every doubt and darkness.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ We surely call a friend one, who is like to like and equal to equal, as regards virtue. And on the other hand, a friendly thing that, which is in want of what has become wealthy, although it is the contrary in sex. But when each of these friendships becomes vehement, we call it love.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ The friendship, then, which arises from contraries is horrible and coarse, and does not often possess anything in common; but that which arises from similars is mild and common to both parties through life. But as regards that, which is mixed up with these, it is not, in the first place, easy to learn thoroughly what the person, who possesses this third love, would wish to happen to himself; and, in the next place, being drawn by both to a contrary point, he is in a state of doubt; the one exhorting him to enjoy the prime of youth, and the other forbidding him. For he, who is a lover of the body and hungers after its beauty, as if it were a ripe grape, exhorts himself to be filled with it, and pays no honor to the moral feeling in the soul of his beloved. But he, who holds the desire of the body as a thing of secondary importance, and looks rather than loves with his soul, is wont, after feeling a desire for the soul in a becoming manner, to consider the satiety relating to the body as an insult; but, reverencing, at the same time, and worshiping temperance, and fortitude, and what is highly becoming, and prudence, he would wish to live ever chastely with the object of his love. But the love, which is mixed up with both these, is the love, which we have just now detailed

as the third. Since then there are these so many in number, ought the law to forbid all of them, and prevent them from subsisting in us? or, is it not manifest that we should wish for the love, which is of virtue, and which is desirous of a young person becoming the best possible, to exist in the state? and, if it were possible, that we would prevent the other two? Or how shall we say, friend Megillus?

Megillus/ You have spoken, guest, on these very matters in a manner perfectly beautiful.

Athenian Stranger/ I was likely, as I conjectured, friend, to meet with your accordance in sentiment. And there is no need for me to examine what your law intends on points of this kind, but for me to receive your agreement with my reasoning. But after this, I will again endeavor to persuade Clinias by a kind of enchantment to be of our opinion. Let then, what has been conceded by you to me, be dismissed, and let us now go through entirely the laws.

Megillus/ You speak most correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ For laying down law itself I possess a certain art, which at present is partly easy, and partly in every respect the most difficult possible.

Megillus/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ We know even at present very many men, who, although they act contrary to law, yet are restrained properly and carefully from an intercourse with beautiful persons, not unwillingly, but as much as possible willingly.

Megillus/ When, say you?

Athenian Stranger/ When anyone has a beautiful brother or sister; and in the case of a son or daughter, the same law, although unwritten, defends as sufficiently as possible a person from sleeping with them either openly or in secret, or in any other way from embracing and touching them. Nor

does even the desire of this intercourse come at all upon the masses.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Does not then a small word extinguish all such pleasures?

Megillus/ What word do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ The assertion that these acts are by no means holy, but hateful to the gods, and of all base acts the most base. And is not this the cause, that no one even speaks of them in other terms? but that each of us immediately from our birth hear persons speaking of these acts at all times and in all places, both in fun and oftentimes in all the so-called seriousness of tragedy, when persons introduce Thyesteses, or some Œdipuses or Macareuses, who have had secretly a connection with their sisters, but on being detected have readily inflicted death as the punishment of their wickedness upon themselves?

Megillus/ You have spoken most truly so far as this, that fame has some wonderful power, since no one attempts even to breathe in any other manner contrary to law.

Athenian Stranger/ That, therefore, which we just now said was right, that for a legislator, desirous of bringing under subjection some one of those passions, which pre-eminently get the mastery of men, it is easy to know in what manner he should take this in hand. For by making this evil report a holy thing amongst all the slaves and free-born and children and women, and the whole city, he will in the same manner thus work out the greatest stability relating to this law.

Megillus/ Entirely so. But consider how it will be possible to make all persons willingly speak in this manner.

Athenian Stranger/ You have taken me up correctly. For this is what was stated by myself, that I possess an art,

relating to this law, of making use of an intercourse according to nature for the procreation of children, by persons abstaining from a connection with males, and not designedly destroying the race of man, nor sowing upon rocks and stones that, which, even if it takes root, will never obtain its naturally productive power; and by abstaining from every female field, in which what is sown is unwilling to germinate. This law then, by becoming perpetual and in power at the same time, as it is now in power in the case of the intercourse amongst parents, would, if it prevailed in other connections justly, produce benefits innumerable. For, in the first place, it is laid down according to nature. And, next, it causes persons to restrain from the fury and madness of love, from all adulteries, and all the immoderate use of meats and drinks, and to be familiar with and friendly to their wives; and many other benefits would arise if anyone could be the master of this law. But, perhaps, some violent and young man, who is brim-full of seed, would, on hearing this law laid down, immediately abuse us for framing laws foolish and impracticable, and would fill every place with his vociferations. It was then through looking to this, that I said I possessed a certain art, in part the easiest of all, and in part the most difficult, for perpetuating this very law, when laid down. For it is very easy to understand that this is possible, and in what way it is so. For we have said that, when this legal institution shall have been sufficiently made holy, it will bring under subjection every soul, and cause them through fear to be entirely obedient to the laws laid down. But matters at present have come to such a pass, that it appears it never can take place; just as the practice of common meals is believed to be a thing impossible for a whole state to practice through its whole life and to exist; and though it has been proved by the fact, that it does take place amongst you, yet as regards the female sex, it does not

seem even in your states to have the nature of being able to exist for ever. Hence through the strength of this unbelief, I said it was very difficult for both of these to remain according to law.

Megillus/ And you were right in saying so.

Athenian Stranger/ Since then it is not above the power of man, but it may indeed take place, are you willing that I should endeavor to tell a tale bordering on credibility?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Will then a person abstain more easily from venery and be willing to do, what is enjoined, respecting it, in a moderate manner, when he has his body in a good condition, and not like an ordinary person, or when in a bad one?

Clinias/ By much the most, when it is not like an ordinary person.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we then not know by hearsay of Iccus of Tarentium, how, for the sake of his contests at Olympia and the rest, he did, from his love of contest and his art and his possessing in his soul fortitude combined with temperance, never, as the story goes, touch any woman or a boy during the whole period of his practice. And the same account is told of Crysson, and Astylus, and Diopompus, and very many others; although they were much worse educated as to their souls than my fellow-citizens and yours too, Clinias, and had their bodies swelling much more with carnal desires.

Clinias/ In this you speak the truth that, what has been stated by persons of old respecting those athletes, did really take place.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, did they for the sake of victory in wrestling, and in running, and such like things, dare to abstain from that, which is called happiness by the

masses? and shall our youth be unable to have a mastery over themselves, for the sake of a far more excellent victory? which we tell them from their very childhood is the most beautiful, and in fables in prose, and by singing in verse, charm them, as is natural.

Clinias/ What victory?

Athenian Stranger/ The victory over pleasure; so that by being masters of themselves they live happily; but by being mastered, the very reverse. In addition to this, will not the dread of its being at no time and by no means a holy act give them the power to be the masters over those things, which others, worse than them, have mastered?

Clinias/ It is probable.

Athenian Stranger/ Since then we have arrived thus far on the subject of this law, but have fallen into a difficulty through the wickedness of the many, I assert with confidence, that our legal institution ought to march on without disguise, and to say on these points, that our citizens ought not to be worse than birds, and many other wild animals; who, produced in large herds, live without intercourse, and pure, and chaste, up to the time of procreation; but when they arrive at that period, the male for its gratification pairing with the female, and the female with the male, they live for the remainder of their time in a holy and just manner, firmly abiding in the first compacts of friendship. It is requisite then for them to be better than wild beasts. If however they are corrupted by the other Greeks, and the greatest number of the Barbarians, and on seeing what is called the unregulated Aphrodite, and on hearing that it has the greatest power, are thus unable to have a mastery over it, there will be a need for the guardians of the laws to become legislators, and to devise for them a second law.

Clinias/ What law would you advise to be laid down for them, if the one now laid down escapes them?

Athenian Stranger/ Evidently, Clinias, that which follows upon this.

Clinias/ What law do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ That they should especially cause the strength of pleasures to be not exercised, by turning, by means of labors, to other parts of the body the course of their overflow and feeding. And this will take place, if in the use of venereal pleasures there is no shamelessness. For they, who, through shame, make a rare use of a thing of this kind, will have their mistress of less power, by using it seldom. Let it then be held by custom and an unwritten law, that to do any of these lawful things secretly, is honorable; but not secretly, is disgraceful; but not to do it, not at all; thus this would lie in our law as being disgraceful on the other hand, and honorable secondly possessing a second rectitude. And thus one genus, comprehending three genera, would compel those, who are corrupted in their nature, and whom we have spoken of as being inferior to themselves, not to act contrary to the law.

Clinias/ What are these?

Athenian Stranger/ The god-worshipping genus, and the honor-loving, and that which is produced from the desire not of beauties in the body but of those really existing in the manners of the soul. And these matters perhaps, now detailed by us, are like prayers in a fable; but they will be by far the best, should they perchance exist in all states. Perhaps, too, if a god pleases, we may compel one of two things to take place in matters of love; either that no one shall dare to touch any free and well-born woman, besides his married wife, or sow the seed, for which there has been no sacrificial rite, and which is illegitimate, amongst harlots,

nor that, which is barren, amongst males, contrary to nature; or we will take away entirely the intercourse of males; but with respect to females, if anyone has an intercourse with anyone, except those who come to his house, together with the gods, and sacred marriages, whether such women are bought, or acquired by any other means, and he does not lie hid from all men and women, to such a person we should, if we caused him by law to be disfranchised of the privileges in the state, perhaps appear to have acted by law correctly, as being one who is truly like a foreigner. Let this law, whether it is one, or we ought to call them two, be laid down respecting all venereal and amatory matters, which, through having an intercourse with each other from desires of such a kind, we transact both in a proper and improper manner.

Megillus/ Even now, O guest, I would vehemently accept this law from you; but let Clinias here tell us himself, what he thinks on these points.

Clinias/ So shall it be, Megillus, when it appears to me that a fitting opportunity presents itself; but, for the present, permit our guest to proceed forward in the matter of his laws.

Megillus/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ But having proceeded so far, we are almost at the establishment of common meals, which we said would with difficulty exist elsewhere; but in Crete no one else would suppose that it ought to be adopted. But after what manner? whether as here, or as at Lacedæmon? or is there a third kind of common meals beside these, which would be better than both? This it seems to me it is not difficult to discover; and when discovered, to work out not a great good. For what has been now prepared is in an elegant condition.

Following upon these is the preparation for livelihood, in what manner it ought to follow them. Now a livelihood in other states would be of various kinds and many, and especially from the double sources of what there would be to these. For what relates to food is obtained by most of the Greeks from the earth and sea; but by these from the earth alone. This therefore will present a more easy task for the legislator. For not only will half the laws be moderate, but much fewer, and still befitting free-men. For the legislator of this state is freed for the most part from matters relating to ship-owners, and foreign merchants, and retail dealers, and inn-keepers, and tax-collectors, and miners, and money-lenders, and usurers at compound interest, and ten thousand other things of this kind, and bids them all go hang; but he will lay down laws for the tillers of land, and shepherds, and the breeders of bees, and the guardianship and the superintendents of the operations connected with such matters, after having laid down laws on subjects of the greatest moment relating to marriages, and the procreation and the bringing up of children, and still further, their education, and the establishment of magistracies in the state. But at present it is necessary for the legislator to turn himself to the laws, relating to feeding and to those, who labor for it. Let the laws then, called Agricultural, be first laid down. And let this be mentioned as the first law relating to Zeus, who presides over boundaries. Let no one remove the landmarks, either of a fellow-citizen, who is a friend, or of a neighbor, while possessing himself at the extremities he is a neighbor to another stranger, thinking that this is truly "To remove what is not to be removed." But let everyone be desirous to attempt to remove the greatest other except a boundary stone rather than a small stone, which is the boundary of friendship and hatred sworn before the gods. For Zeus, who presides over a kindred-clan, is the witness

of the one, and he who presides over hospitality, of the other; which deities are excited together with the most hateful wars. Now he, who is obedient to the law, will have no perception of the ills, that come from it: but let him, who despises it, be exposed to a double punishment, one, and the first, from the gods, but the second, under the law. For let no one voluntarily remove the landmark of his neighbor; and against him, who does remove them, let anyone, who is willing, inform the landowners; and let them bring him into court; and if anyone has to pay damages on the charge of his having made privately and by force the land to be without a division, respecting the party so having to pay, let the court fix the penalty, as to what he is to suffer in person or in purse after being defeated. After this, many and small injuries from neighbors do, through their frequency, beget a great weight of enmity, and cause a neighborhood to be disagreeable and excessively bitter. Hence it is requisite for a neighbor to take every care not to cause any differences with his neighbor; and to be particularly cautious in other matters, and especially as regards the cultivation of grounds, which they have a mutual right to till. For to do an injury is by no means difficult, but is in the power of every man; but to do a benefit is not in the power of everyone. Let him then, who, stepping over his own boundary, secretly tills his neighbor's land, pay for the mischief done; and, on account of his shameless and sordid conduct, pay another sum, the double of the mischief to the injured party. Of these and all such like matters let the Land-Stewards take cognizance, and act as judges and fix the fine; and over the greater suits, as it has been stated before, let the whole order of the twelfth part preside; but of the lesser, the chiefs of the guardians of these. And if anyone pastures his flocks over his neighbors' grounds, let those who witness the injury, decide upon it and fix the fine. And if a person appropriates

to himself the swarms of bees belonging to another, by following the pleasure of the bees, and making a noise, by beating them down thus makes them his own, let him pay for the injury done. And if anyone sets fire to his own wood, and takes no thought of his neighbor's, let him be fined according to the damage decided on by the rulers. And if in planting he does not leave a proper distance from his neighbor's land, let him pay, as has been stated even by many legislators sufficiently; of whose laws it is meet to make use, and not to think that the greater regulator of a state is to lay down laws for all matters, both great and small, and such as belong to a casual legislator. Since relating even to water laws of the olden time, and those beautiful too, have been laid for the tillers of the ground, which it is not proper for us to use like water-channels in our discourse. But let him, who will, lead water to his own ground, commencing from common streams, and not cutting off the sources, evidently belonging to a private person; and let him lead it where he likes, except through dwellings, or certain sacred places or tombs, and doing no damage, except what arises from leading aside the water. But if the natural dryness of the ground in certain places should be incapable of retaining the waters from Zeus, and there is a deficiency in necessary drink, let a person dig in his own ground, until he comes to the clay. But if in this depth he does not meet with water, let him draw from his neighbors as much drink as is necessary for each of his domestics. But if there should be a scarcity amongst his neighbors also, let him, after receiving an order from the Land-Stewards, take to himself the regulation-allowance each day, and thus have a share in the water of his neighbor. But if there be water from Zeus, and one of those on the lower ground does an injury to a farmer on the upper, or to the party dwelling near him, by not allowing an outlet to the water; or, on the contrary, if the

party above carelessly permits the waters to run down, and does an injury to a party below; and the two parties are for this unwilling to communicate with each other on these matters, let the party, who wishes it, bring in a City-Steward in the city, and in the country a Land-Steward, and let him regulate himself what each ought to do; and let him, who does not abide by the regulation, undergo a punishment for his envious and at the same time morose temper, and let him, the verdict being against him, pay to the injured party the double of his loss, through not being willing to obey the person in office.

It is meet likewise for all to have a communion in some such way as this of the fruits of autumn. The goddess herself has a twofold gift of grace for us; one a Dionysal instruction, not to be treasured up; the other, which is naturally suited for laying by. Let then this law be ordained respecting the fruits of autumn. Whoever tastes the rustic fruit, be it grapes or figs, before the season for gathering them, which falls in with the rising of Arcturus, either in his own or the grounds of others, pay fifty drachms sacred to Dionysus, if he has plucked them from his own land; but if from his neighbor's, a mina; but if from that of others, two-thirds of a mina. But let him who wishes to gather the grape now called "well-born," or grapes called "well-born," if he takes them from his own ground, pluck them how and when he likes; but if from another's, let him, if he has not persuaded the owner, be fined in that way ever following out the law, that a person is not to remove what he has not put down. But if a slave, not having persuaded the owner of the ground, gathers any fruit of this kind, let him be scourged with stripes equal in number to each grape on a bunch and fig on the tree. Let a foreign settler, who has bought the "well-born" autumnal fruit, eat them if he pleases; but if a stranger sojourning in the land, as he passes along the road, either alone or with

one follower, desires to taste the autumnal fruit, let him taste the "well-born" fruit, receiving it as the gift of a host; but the law prohibits even a person of such a kind from sharing in the fruit called rustic. If anyone ignorantly tastes these, either himself or a slave, let a person punish the slave with stripes, but send away the free person after admonishing and teaching him that he may taste other autumnal fruits unfit for laying by, but that those, belonging to raisins and wine and dry figs, are unfit for him to have. With respect to pears, and apples, and pomegranates, and all such fruits, let it not be held a disgraceful act to gather them secretly. But if a person under thirty years of age is detected gathering them, let him be struck and repelled, but without wounds, but let there be no infliction of such like blows upon a free-man. And let it likewise be lawful for a stranger to be a partaker of these, as of the autumnal fruits. But if any older person tastes of them, eating them on the spot, and secretly taking away none, let him partake of all such as a stranger does; but if he is not obedient to the law, let him run the risk of being no competitor for virtue, should anyone at that time give information of such matters to the then judges.

Water for gardens is pre-eminently the most nutritive of all things, but it is easily rendered corrupt. For it is not easy to corrupt either the earth, or the sun, or the air, which together with water are the nourishers of what springs up from the soil, either by drugs, or turnings aside, or thefts; but all such things as these can take place in the case of the nature of water; and hence it requires the assistance of law. Let this then be the law respecting it. If anyone willingly corrupts the water of another by drugs, or diggings, or thefts, whether such water be from a spring or collected in a tank, let the party injured have a trial before the City-Stewards, and write down the estimated amount of the injury. And if

anyone be found guilty of having corrupted it by any drugs, let him, in addition to the fine, cleanse the spring or the tank of water in the way that the laws of the holy interpreters shall point out, how the cleansing ought to be done on each occasion, and by each person.

With respect to the conveyance of all fruits in season, let it be lawful for any, who wishes, to carry home his own property through every place, wherever he shall do no damage to anyone, or gain an advantage himself three times as much as the damage done to his neighbor. But of these questions let the magistrates take cognizance, and of all other injuries that one person willfully commits by violence or secretly against another person unwillingly, either himself or his property, by means of the property of the former. And let the party injured lay all matters of this kind before the rulers, and receive compensation for the injury up to three minæ; but if the complaint of one person against another be of a higher amount, let him bring his suit before the common courts of justice, and let him have satisfaction against the party, who has done the injury. But if any magistrate shall be found to decide upon the damage with an unjust sentence, let him be considered as a debtor to the injured person for twice the loss sustained. And let anyone, who wishes it, bring the unjust conduct of the magistrate before the common tribunals in each case of complaint. But as there are ten thousand trifling things of law, according to which punishments ought to be inflicted, respecting the distribution of trials by lot, and the citations, and the persons citing, whether the citation ought to be made before two, or how many, and whatever else is of such a kind, these are not to be left unregulated by law, nor yet are they worthy of an aged legislator. Let young men, therefore, lay down the laws relating to these, by looking to the enactments of their predecessors, and modeling trifling matters after great, and

by becoming experienced in the necessary use of them, till everything shall appear to be sufficiently laid down. And then rendering them immovable, let them live and use them as possessing a power in moderation.

With respect to the other handicraft trades, it is requisite to act in this manner. In the first place, let no person of the country be one of those, who labor at handicraft trades, nor yet the domestic of a person of the country. For a citizen, who is to preserve and hold the arrangements of the state, common to all, is engaged in an art requiring much practice, and, at the same time, much learning, nor is he able to attend to the pursuit as a by-work. Now to labor accurately in two pursuits, or two arts, scarcely not a single nature of man is sufficient. Nor is the same person sufficient to exercise one art, and to superintend another person, exercising another. This therefore ought first of all to take place in a state. Let no coppersmith be at the same time a carpenter; nor let a carpenter attend more to others, who are coppersmiths, than to his own art, making as a pretext, that while he is attending to many servants, who are working for him, he very reasonably attends more to them, for the sake of greater gain accruing from thence to himself than from his own art; but let every artist in the state exercise one art alone, and from that obtain his living. This law let the City-Stewards with all exertion preserve; and let them punish with disgrace and infamy any person of the country, if he inclines to any art more than to the attention to virtue, until they bring him to his own proper course. But if any stranger applies himself to two arts, let them, by punishing him with bonds, and fines, and expulsions from the city, compel him to be one person instead of being many. With respect to the wages of workmen, and the destruction of their works, and should any other person injure them, or they anyone else, let the City-Stewards pass a judgment as far as to fifty

drachms; but beyond this, let the common tribunals decide according to law.

And let no person in the state pay any duty on exports and imports. But with respect to frankincense, and other foreign aromatics, for the gods, and purple, and other dyed colors, which this country does not produce, or with respect to any other art, requiring foreign articles to be imported, let no one introduce any of these without some necessity; nor, on the other hand, export anything which it is necessary to remain in the country. On all these matters let the twelve guardians of the laws, five of the elder being excepted, take the cognizance and have the care. With respect to arms and all warlike instruments, if there should be a necessity for importing any foreign art, relating to plants, or metals, or chains, or any animals, on account of their use of such a kind, let the Hipparchs and the Generals have full powers over the import and export of such articles, the state giving at the same and receiving; but the guardians of the laws shall lay down, respecting these matters, laws becoming and sufficient. And let there be no higgling for the sake of money-making, either by this person or anyone else, either in the whole country or city, or in any part.

With respect to food and the distribution of the produce of the country, the correctness of the method near to that laid down by the law in Crete, would seem, if adopted, to be adopted with reason. For it is meet that all should distribute into twelve parts the whole produce of the land, in which way also it is to be consumed. Let every twelfth part, for example, of wheat and barley, of which let all the rest of fruits be the followers, that are to be divided, and all the animals in each, that are to be sold, be divided into three parts, according to a certain proportion; one being for free-men, another for their domestics, and the third for handicraftsmen and strangers generally, and such as are residing with the

foreign settlers, in want of necessary sustenance, or are constantly arriving during the exigencies of the state, or any individual. Of all the necessaries of life, let this third part so distributed be alone vendible from necessity; but of the two others let nothing be necessarily sold. How then would these be distributed most correctly? In the first place, it is evident that we should distribute them partly equally, and partly unequally.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ It must needs be, that the land produces and brings up each of these things worse or better.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ In such a way then as this, as there are three parts, let no part have more, when distributed, either that for masters or slaves, nor, on the other hand, that for strangers; but let the distribution give the equality of similitude, the same to all. And let each citizen, on receiving his two parts, have the power to distribute both to slaves and free-men, as much of his share, and of what kind, as he pleases. But the greater quantity of these it is meet to be distributed by measure and number, in this way, by a person taking the number of all the animals to which there ought to be food from the earth and distributing it. After this it is meet for habitations to be separately assigned them in an orderly regulated manner. Now the following regulation is suited to matters of this kind. There ought to be twelve hamlets, one in the middle of each twelfth part; and in each hamlet, to be selected first a marketplace, and temples for the gods and the dæmons, who follow the gods; and whether these are some local heroes amongst the Magnetes, or the holy seat of other ancients, whose memory has been preserved, to these let persons pay the honors due to ancient men, and found everywhere temples to Vesta, and Zeus, and

Athéné, and to him who may be the leader of the others, that belong to each twelfth part. And first it is meet for the buildings to be about these temples, where the ground is the highest, as receptacles the best protected possible for the garrison; but to prepare all the rest of the country, by distributing it into thirteen parts for the handicraftsmen; and to cause one portion of these to settle in the city, by distributing this portion amongst the twelve parts of the whole city; but to have the other persons distributed out of the city, and in a circle about it; and every hamlet to cause the race of handicraftsmen to settle together, that are useful to the agriculturists; and of all these let the Land-Stewards have the care, and of how many and of what kind each place may require; and of the spots in which the handicraftsmen may dwell, and be the least annoyance, and the greatest benefit to the agriculturists; but of those in the city, let the City-Stewards in like manner have the care. But to the City-Stewards each of the matters relating to the market-place must be a care. For after their inspection of the sacred things, let their attention be given to the matters of the market-place, lest anyone does wrong in what relates to the needs of man; their second work would be to punish, as being the inspectors of temperance and insolence, the person requiring punishment; but such of the vendible articles, as the citizens are under regulations to sell, they must first look into, in behalf of the strangers, whether each article is according to the law. And let the law be this. On the new day of each month, let the superintendents bring out a portion of what is to be sold to the foreigners; namely, a first twelfth part of the corn; and let the foreigner buy corn, and such things as pertain to corn, on the first market for the whole month. But on the twelfth day of the month, let some make a selling, and others a buying of liquid articles, sufficient for the whole of the month. And on the twenty-

third day of the month, let there be a sale of such animals as are to be sold by each party, or bought by those in want of them, and the sale of such chattels and goods as suit the agriculturists, such as of skins, and all kind of clothing, either woven or felt-like, or other things of such a kind; but it is necessary for foreigners to acquire them by purchasing from others; but the retail dealing in these articles either barley or wheat, distributed in the form of meal, or any other food in general, for citizens and their slaves, let no one sell or buy from any person of this kind. But in the markets for foreigners, let a foreigner sell to the handicraftsmen, and their slaves, exchanging the sold articles for wine and food, which the majority call a retail trading; and let the cooks expose for sale portions of animals cut into pieces to foreigners and handicraftsmen and their domestics. Let too a foreigner buy daily the whole of the materials for burning in a mass, from the superintendents of farms, and sell it again to other foreigners for as much as he pleases, and when he pleases. But of all other goods and chattels, as much as there is a need of them to each person, let the foreigners sell any part at the common market, after bringing them to a place Appointed for each occasion, where they shall wait, having made a conjecture about fitting situations, until the guardians of the laws, and the Stewards of the market, with the City-Stewards, shall have marked out the limits of the sale-stands. In these places let a person exchange money for goods, and goods for money, one party not giving up to another the article of barter without an equivalent. But if a person does give it up in confidence, whether he recovers its value or not, let him rest contented; as there is no action relating to contracts of this kind. But the article sold and bought, by how much the more it is, or at a greater price than according to the law, which has stated through how much its being increased and decreased it is

meet to do neither of these acts; let the greater be written up before the guardians of the laws, and the contrary expunged. Let the same take place respecting the foreign settlers with regard to the registering of their property.

And let anyone, who wishes, come to the emigration on certain conditions, as there is a location for any foreigner, who has the wish and the power to emigrate, if he belongs to any craft; and if there is to him sojourning not more than twenty years from his enrolling himself, and paying no foreign settler's tax, ever so small, except that of living temperately, nor any other hawker's license for the sake of buying and selling. But when the time twenty years shall have expired, let him take away his property and depart. But if during these years it should happen to him to become a person of note through some sufficient acts of kindness done to the state, and he trusts he can persuade the Council and Assembly by making a request that a delay may take place in his quitting the country absolutely, or that he may stay there for the whole of life, let him go and persuade the city; and whatever he may persuade, let it be accomplished for him. But in the case of the sons of foreign settlers, who are handicraftsmen and fifteen years of age, let the period of their settlement commence after their fifteenth year; and after these let a person remain twenty years, and then depart whither he pleases; but if he wishes to remain let him remain after having persuaded the government on the same grounds. But let the person, who is leaving, go and expunge for himself the registrations, which have been written previously about him before the rulers.

Book 9.

Athenian Stranger/ After these there would be law-suits, consequent upon all the preceding doings, according to the natural arrangement of laws. Now of the doings whatsoever, respecting which it is requisite for law-suits to take place, some have been mentioned, namely, those relating to agriculture, and what follow upon them; but some of the greatest moment have not been mentioned at all; and each having been mentioned stated singly what recompense it ought to receive, and what judges to meet with, these are to be stated after those in order.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ It were, however, after a manner disgraceful to lay down all the laws, that we are now about to do, in such a kind of state as we assert will be well regulated, and meet with everything leading directly to the pursuit of virtue. Forever to think that in such a state a man can be born, who will participate in the depravity of the others, the greatest, so that it is necessary to lay down laws by anticipation, and to put out threats, should such a character arise, and for the sake of averting these, when they do arise, to lay down against them laws of punishment, as if they would arise, this, as I said, were after a manner disgraceful. But since we do not, as the ancient legislators did, give laws to heroes the sons of gods, as the story now goes, and they who were born from gods, gave laws to themselves and others, born themselves from such beings, but we do at present legislate as men for the seed of men, there is no dread of doing wrong in fearing that some of our citizens should be, as it were horn-struck, and become naturally so hard, as not to be liquefied, and, as those kinds of pulse are in the case of fire, so these persons should in the case of laws, although ever so strong, become not

wasted. In favor of whom I will state what is no favor, first a law relating to sacrilege, should anyone dare to commit it. Now we would neither wish, nor is it to be very much feared, that any citizen amongst those, who have been properly brought up, will ever labor very greatly under this disease; but their domestics and strangers, and the slaves of strangers, would attempt many things of this kind. For the sake of whom especially, and at the same time being cautious of all the weakness of human nature, I shall mention the law relating to sacrilege, and all the other matters of that kind, as are to be cured, or not to be cured at all. The prelude, however, to these matters ought, according to what has been formerly agreed upon, to be as short as possible. Someone then would, conversing and at the same time admonishing, address him, whom an evil desire calls aside by day and excites by night, and leads him to plunder temples, in these words: —O wonderful man, no ill, either human or divine, stirs up that—which is now urging you to proceed to an act of sacrilege, but a certain madness, begotten in men from crimes of old date, and not yet cleansed, and which is carried round in the form of something to be expiated; and against which you ought, with all your might, to be on your guard. Learn, then, what this caution is. When any such idea comes upon you, betake yourself to expiatory rites; betake yourself, as a suppliant, to the temples of the gods who avert evils; and betake yourself to the society of men, who are called good, and partly hear, and partly endeavor yourself to say, that every man ought to honor what is beautiful and just. But fly, without turning back, from the society of the wicked. And if, while you are so doing, the disease becomes somewhat lighter, it is well; but if not, consider that death is more honorable than life, and free yourself from it.

Since, then, we have sung these preludes to those, who turn their thoughts to all such things as are unholy and destructive to the state, it is meet for the law to be silent in the case of him who obeys: but to him, who does not obey, to sing, after the prelude, loudly—He, who is detected in the act of sacrilege, if he is either a slave or a stranger, shall have the circumstance marked in his face and hands; and after being scourged with as many stripes as the judges shall think proper, he shall be cast out naked beyond the boundaries of the country. For, perhaps, after suffering this punishment, he will, by being brought to his senses, become a better man. For punishment, taking place according to law, is not inflicted as an evil, but it nearly effects one of two things; for it makes him who suffers the punishment, either better or less depraved. If however any citizen shall appear to have done anything of this kind, in the shape of a crime, considered one of the heinous and not to be mentioned, relating to the gods, or parents, or the state, the judge shall consider such a person to be incurable, from reflecting that though he had met with an education and a bringing up of so excellent a kind, he had not kept himself from the greatest wickedness. Now to such a person death is the least of evils. But he will by his example benefit the rest, when he is held in dishonor, and is made to disappear, and is cast out beyond the boundaries of the country. But to his children and race, if they avoid their father's habits, let there be glory and words of honor, inasmuch as they have well and bravely fled from evil to good. It will not, however, be becoming for the property of such person to be confiscated to the state, in which the same and equal allotments ought to remain forever. But when anyone shall be voted to have committed crimes worthy of a loss of property, let him pay from his possession the fines, if there be any overplus beyond his allotment properly furnished; and to this extent let him be

fined, but not beyond. And let the guardians of the laws, looking into these matters accurately from the registers, ever give a clear statement to the judges, in order that no one may be idle, with regard to his allotment, through the want of means. But should anyone be voted to be worthy of a greater fine, and none of his friends be willing to be his surety, and, by paying jointly the fine, to procure his liberty, punish him with bonds for a length of time, and in public, and with some kind of ill-treatment; and let no one for any offence be at any time without a punishment, not even if he is driven over the boundaries; but it is meet for the punishment to be either death, or bonds, or stripes, or certain formless sittings or standings, or by-standings at temples, at the extreme parts of the country, or, as we before stated, the payment of money; and for the trial to take place in this way. Let then the guardians of the laws be the judges of death; and let the tribunal consist of the last year's magistrates, selected for their excellence. But as regards the bringing before the court an accusation and the citing the witnesses, and such like matters, and how they ought to take place, this must be the care of the junior legislators, but ours to lay down the law for regulating the manner of giving votes. Now let the vote be given openly; but, prior to this, let the judge be seated before the face of the accuser and defendant, in order, as near as possible, according to old age; and let all the citizens too, who are at leisure, diligently attend as the hearers of such causes; and let the accuser speak first one speech, and afterwards the defendant; and after these speeches, let the senior judge commence by his own inquiry and proceed to a sufficient examination of what has been stated; and, after the elder judge, all the rest in order ought to go through whatever a person is still desirous of being stated, or regrets to have been not stated by each party. But let him, who desires or regrets nothing, give up

his right of inquiry to another. But of the matters mentioned, whatever may seem to be to the purpose, let persons affix a seal to the writings, and, after putting the marks of all the judges, place the document in the temple of Vesta; and again on the morrow, after coming together to the same place, let them inquire into and go through the suit, and again affix marks to what has been stated; and when they shall have done this thrice, after having sufficiently sifted the proofs and testimony, let each judge, carrying in his hand a sacred pebble, undertake before Vesta, to decide, as far as he can, justly and truly, and thus put an end to a suit of this kind.

After the offences relating to the gods, let us speak of those, that relate to the dissolution of a polity. Now he, who brings a person into power and makes the laws slaves, and puts the state under the control of factious societies, and effects all this by force, and excites sedition, acts contrary to the law. Such a person it is meet to consider as the greatest enemy of all to the whole state. And it is meet to hold him as the second in wickedness, who, although not taking any part in any of these acts, yet while he has a share in the greatest offices of the state, either lies hid from the knowledge of these matters, or not lying hid does through cowardice not act the part of an avenger on behalf of his country. But let everyone, who is of the smallest utility, lay an information before the magistrates, and bring to trial the person who is plotting for a violent and at the same time an illegal change in the form of government. And let the judges for these be those in the cases of sacrilege; and let the whole process be conducted for the former in a similar manner as for the latter; and let the vote, which is the superior in number, bring with it death. And in one word, let not the disgrace and punishment of the father follow upon any of the children, unless the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather of anyone have in succession paid the penalty of death; and let

the children keep their own property, except so much as belongs completely to the regulated allotment, and let the state send them away to their ancient paternal land and state. But as to those citizens, who shall happen to have more children than one, and these not less than ten years of age, let ten of them cast lots, whom the father or grandfather on the father's or mother's side shall mark out; and let the names of those who have obtained the lot be sent to Delphi; and whomsoever the god fixes upon, it is meet to appoint with a better fortune as the heir of the family of those who have left their home.

Clinias/ And properly so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let there be still a one-third law in common, respecting the judges who ought to judge for them, and the mode of the suits, in the case of those, against whom a person shall lay a charge of treason, and bring them before a court of justice. In like manner, let there be in the case of their children this one law on all points touching their remaining in, or departing from, their country, as regards the three, a traitor, and him who commits sacrilege, and him who by violence destroys the laws of the state. Against a thief too, whether he steals a thing great or small, let there be one law, and one punishment, after a trial in all cases. For if anyone is cast in a trial of this kind, and he has other property, beyond his allotment, sufficient to pay, he must in the first place pay double of what has been stolen; but if he has not, let him be put into bonds, until he either pays, or persuades the party, who has a verdict against him, to forego his claim. But if anyone is cast in a trial relating to a public theft, let him be freed from bonds, after he has either persuaded the state, or paid the double of the property stolen.

Clinias/ How say we, guest, that there is no difference in the case of a thief, who purloins a thing small or great, and

from places sacred or not sacred; and in such other cases, as present a dissimilitude in the whole of thieving, which, as being various, the legislator ought to follow up by assigning punishments not similar at all?

Athenian Stranger/ You have, Clinias, in the best manner, nearly beaten me off, while I have been as it were carried along; and after stirring me up, you have reminded me, although I had previously thought of it myself, that the matters relating to the laying down of laws have never at any time been by any means properly worked out, as it has fallen out to speak of them at present.

Clinias/ But how again say we this?

Athenian Stranger/ We did not make use of an incorrect image, when we compared all those, who were now regulated by laws, to slaves under the care of slave-physicians. For it is meet to know a thing of this kind correctly, that if at any time one of those physicians, who handle the medical art from practice alone without theory, should come upon a free-born physician, discoursing with a free-born patient, and making use of theories bordering upon philosophy, and touching upon the disorder from its very commencement, and going back to the subject relating to the whole nature of bodies, he would quickly and greatly laugh, and speak no other language than is ready on such subjects to be addressed to the majority of the so-called physicians. For he would say—O stupid fellow, you are not curing the sick man, but you are almost giving him a lesson, as if he wanted to become a physician, and not to be in health.

Clinias/ And would he not speak properly in speaking so?

Athenian Stranger/ And would not the same person deservedly object against us, that whoever discusses laws, as we do now, gives the citizens lessons, but not laws?

Clinias/ And would he not seem to say this too correctly?

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps so. But at present a fortunate circumstance has occurred to us.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ That there is no necessity for us to lay down laws; but that, entering voluntarily upon an inquiry into all kinds of polity, we are endeavoring to perceive in what manner the best one and the most necessary may take place. And now, as it seems, it is permitted us, if we please, to consider what is the best, or, if we had rather, what is the most necessary on the question of laws. Let us choose, then, whichever it seems is best.

Clinias/ We propose, O guest, a ridiculous choice, and we should become really similar to those legislators, who are compelled by some great necessity to give laws immediately, as being not permitted to defer it till the morrow. But it is lawful for us to speak with god's will, just as it is for masons, or those, who commence any other putting together of materials, to bring together for ourselves dispersedly, things out of which we may select what is suited to the combination which is to be, and to collect them at leisure. Let us then suppose ourselves to be for the present house-builders, not from necessity, but those, who at leisure put aside for their use some things, and put together others, so that we may have to say correctly, that some portions of the laws have been laid down, but others laid aside.

Athenian Stranger/ For thus, Clinias, our survey of the laws will be more natural. But, by the gods, let us consider some such thing as this, relating to legislators.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ There are writings and written discourses in cities by many other persons, and writings likewise and discourses by the legislator.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Whether then shall we direct our attention to the compositions of the rest of poets, and of such as in prose and in verse, have put together their advice relating to life, to be remembered by their having written them down, and by no means apply ourselves to the writings of legislators? Or to the latter most of all?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ But surely it is not necessary for the legislator alone of those who write to give counsel about things beautiful, and good, and just, while teaching what they are, and how they ought to be studied by those, who are about to be happy.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But is it more disgraceful for Homer, and Tyrtæus, and the rest of poets, to have laid down in their writings what is incorrect, relating to life and its pursuits, and less so for Lycurgus, Solon, and such as, being legislators, have composed writings? Or is this correct, that of all writings in cities those relating to laws ought to appear, when unfolded, the most beautiful and best; but that those of the rest, either following after them, or at discordance with them, are to be laughed down?

Clinias/ Let us think in this way.

Athenian Stranger/ And that with regard to the writing down of laws, it ought to take place in states, that the writings seem to be of persons, who, in the garb of a father or mother, have feelings of love, and possess a mind, and not, like a tyrant and despot, commanding and threatening, and after writing decrees on walls, to depart. Let us consider then, even now, whether we should, after thinking upon laws, endeavor to speak in this manner, whether we are able or not. Let us gird up ourselves for it, exhibiting at least an alacrity, and proceeding along this road, let us, if we must

suffer aught, endure it. And may the attempt be fortunate; and fortunate, if god pleases, it will be in this way.

Clinias/ You have spoken well. And let us do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place then, let us accurately consider, as we have attempted to do, respecting those who commit sacrilege, and about every kind of theft, and injuries of all kinds. And let us not take it ill, if we lay down some, during our legislating, and deliberate about others. For we are becoming to be legislators, but are not yet so, although perhaps we soon shall be. But if it seems good to you, to consider about what I have said, let us, as I have said, consider.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ With regard to all things that are beautiful and just, let us endeavor to look in some such way as this, how we may for the present agree with, and how differ from ourselves; who would say that we desire, if nothing else, to differ from the majority, and the majority too on the other hand with themselves.

Clinias/ Of what kind of disagreement among ourselves are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ I will endeavor to state. On the question of justice generally, and of just men, and of things, and of actions, we all of us in a manner agree, that all these are beautiful; so that if anyone should strenuously affirm that just men are, through their most just habit, all-beautiful, although they should happen to be ugly in body, scarcely a single person would, by speaking thus, be thought to speak improperly. Is not this true?

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Athenian Stranger/ But let us see that, if all things that border upon justice are beautiful, the sufferings of all of us are nearly equal to our doings.

Clinias/ What then?

Athenian Stranger/ Whatever action is just, so far as it partakes of what is just, it nearly partakes of the beautiful likewise.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Whatever suffering then partakes of what is just, it would so far, by being confessed to be beautiful, exhibit a reasoning not discordant.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But if we should agree that a suffering is just, but not beautiful, the just and the beautiful would be discordant through things that are just being said to be the least beautiful.

Clinias/ How have you said this?

Athenian Stranger/ It is not difficult to understand. For the laws which have been laid down a little before, would seem to proclaim what is perfectly the contrary to our present assertions.

Clinias/ To what assertions?

Athenian Stranger/ We surely laid it down, that he, who committed sacrilege, would justly die, and he too, who is hostile to well-established laws; and, as we were about to lay down many other laws of this kind, we stopped short, on perceiving that these sufferings were infinite in multitude and magnitude; and that they were of all sufferings the most just, and of all the least beautiful. Will not then things just and beautiful appear in this manner at one time to be the same, and at another to be the most opposite?

Clinias/ There is a danger of it.

Athenian Stranger/ By the multitude, then, things beautiful and just, which are so discordant on these kind of points, are addressed as things separate.

Clinias/ It appears so, guest.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then, Clinias, view again our notions, as to how the accordance exists on these very points.

Clinias/ Of what accordance, and with what, are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ I think I have clearly stated in the previous discourse; but if not before, suppose me saying it now.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That all wicked persons are in all things wicked involuntarily; and that as this is the case, it is necessary for this inference to follow in order.

Clinias/ What inference do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ That the unjust man is wicked; and that the wicked man is such involuntarily. Now there is no reason for a voluntary act to be ever done in an involuntary manner. He therefore, whoever acts unjustly, will appear to act so in an involuntary manner to him, who considers injustice to be an involuntary act. And this too must now be acknowledged by me. For I have agreed, that all men act unjustly involuntarily; and though some one, for the sake of contention or ambition, may say, that unjust men are involuntarily unjust, but yet many act unjustly voluntarily, the other is my assertion, and not this. In what way then should I agree with my own assertions, should ye, Clinias and Megillus, thus interrogate me—If these things are so, what would you, O guest, advise us respecting the legislation for the city of the Magnesians? To legislate for them, or not? How not? I shall say. Will you then separate injuries into the involuntary and voluntary? And shall we assign greater punishments for voluntary offences and injuries, and less

for the contrary? Or equal for all, since injuries are not voluntary at all?

Clinias/ You speak properly, O guest. But how shall we make use of what has now been said?

Athenian Stranger/ You have inquired correctly. Let us in the first place use them for this.

Clinias/ For what?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us call to mind that we stated correctly, that there is a great confusion and dissonance amongst ourselves respecting things just. Laying hold then of this, let us ask ourselves again what shall we say. Since we have neither found a way clearly out of the doubt relating to these matters, nor defined how those things differ from each other, which in all states, and by all legislators, that have ever existed, are laid down as forming two kinds of injuries, one voluntary, and the other involuntary, are they to be legally established in this way likewise? and shall the language, which has been expressed by us, as if it had been spoken by some god, be dismissed, after having said only thus much, and without assigning any reason, that it has spoken correctly; shall it in some manner lay down a counter-law? This may not be. But it is somehow necessary, before we lay down laws, to show these two things as existing, and having another difference between them, in order that when anyone assigns a punishment for either, everyone may follow what is said, and be able to judge, whether it is established in a becoming manner, or not.

Clinias/ You appear to us, O guest, to speak well. For it is necessary to do one of two things, either to say that all unjust actions are not involuntary, or to show, by first defining, that this has been stated correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Of these two things one I can by no means endure that it takes place, I mean the denying that

the person, who thinks so, has the truth on his side; for this would be neither according to law nor holy. But in what manner these are two, if they do not differ by the involuntary and voluntary, but by something else perchance, I must endeavor by some means to show.

Clinias/ By all means, O guest: for it is not possible for us to understand this at least otherwise.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. Come then, say, does not, as it seems, much damage take place amongst citizens in their communications and intercourse with each other, and yet the voluntary and the involuntary abound in these transactions?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let not however anyone imagine, after laying down that all damage is an injury, that in this way the injuries exist in them of a double kind, partly voluntary, and partly involuntary. For the involuntary damage done by all men is neither in number, nor in magnitude, less than the voluntary. But consider whether I am saying anything, when I say what I am about to say, or nothing at all. For I do not say, Clinias and Megillus, that if someone hurts another, not willingly, but unwillingly, he does an injury to a person unwilling to be injured. And in this way I will lay down the law, by making legally this an involuntary injury; nor will I consider a damage of this kind as an injury at all, whether it be of a greater or less magnitude. And we shall frequently say that through assistance taking place not correctly, he, who is the cause of the assistance, does an injury, at least if my opinion is the better. For, my friends, if anyone gives one anything, or, on the contrary, takes it away, it is not meet to call such an action thus simply just or unjust; but whether a person does to another in anything a benefit or harm, while making use

of a correct habit, and a just manner, to this ought the legislator to look; and direct his attention to these two things, injustice and detriment; and by making, what has been damaged, uninjured as much as is possible, by the law, and by restoring, what has been lost, and raising up again, what has fallen by means of anyone, and making, what has been wounded, whole, and, what has been killed, expiated with money, let him ever endeavor to convert, in the case of the doers and sufferers, by means of his laws, each of the injuries from a state of variance to that of friendship.

Clinias/ This at least is well said.

Athenian Stranger/ Unjust damages therefore and gains, if anyone can by injuring a person cause to be a gain to himself, he ought to cure, such at least as are to be cured, as being diseases in the soul; but the question of the cure of injustice it is meet to say inclines in this way.

Clinias/ In what?

Athenian Stranger/ That what injury soever a person may do, be it great or little, the law may instruct, and altogether compel him, either not to dare again at any time to do such an act voluntarily, or far less frequently, in consequence of the punishment for the injury. This should anyone accomplish, either by works or words, or by pleasure or pains, or by honors or dishonors, and by fines of money or gifts, or altogether by any means whatever, so that a person may hate injustice, and love, or at least not hate, the nature of justice, this is the very business of laws the most beautiful. But, upon the persons, whom the legislator perceives to be incurable on these points, he shall impose a punishment and law, knowing that to all such as these it is better even for themselves not to live any longer, and that they will doubly benefit the rest, when freed from life, by being an example to others to do no wrong, and by causing

the state to be devoid of bad men. In this way there is a necessity for the legislator to assign death, as the punisher of delinquencies of this kind, but by no means otherwise.

Clinias/ This appears to have been spoken by you with great moderation; but we would hear still more gladly this spoken, namely, the difference between injustice and detriment, and how the question of what is voluntary and involuntary is in these cases variously represented.

Athenian Stranger/ I must endeavor therefore to do and say as you request me. For it is evident that, respecting the soul, you say to, and hear from, each other thus much, that one property of nature resides in it, whether as an accident or part, namely, anger, a thing naturally hard to contest with and to overcome, and which overturns many things by its irrational violence.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And we speak moreover of pleasure as not being the same as anger; and we say that it possesses, from a contrary influence, a power through persuasion, united to a violent deception, to do whatever the will pleases.

Clinias/ And very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ He too who says that ignorance is a third cause of crimes, will not state a falsehood. Now the legislator, who makes a twofold division, would act the better by considering one kind as simple, and the cause of light offences; but the other twofold, when anyone is in a state of non-instruction, not only by being afflicted with ignorance, but by an opinion of wisdom, as if he knew perfectly what he does not know at all; and laying down things of this kind, when followed by power and strength, as the causes of crimes mighty and unmusical; but when followed by imbecility, as are the crimes of children and old men, he will consider them all as crimes, and will ordain laws against

those who commit them; laws, however, the mildest of all, and near to the greatest pardon.

Clinias/ You speak what is reasonable.

Athenian Stranger/ Now nearly all of us say, that one of us is superior to pleasure and anger, and another inferior. And such is the case.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But we have never heard even, that one of us is superior to ignorance, and another inferior.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ But we say that all these allure to their will a person, who is frequently drawn at the same time to things opposite.

Clinias/ Very often indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Now I will define to you clearly the just and the unjust, of which I was speaking, with no variety of coloring. For I denominate injustice to be wholly the tyranny over the soul through anger, and fear, and pleasure, and pain, and envy, and desires, whether it does, or does not, harm anyone. But the opinion of what is the best, by whatever way a state or any individuals may think it will exist, should it the opinion, by having a power in the soul, arrange in order the whole man, even though it stumbles in some matter, we must say that, what is done in this way, is just entirely, and that too which is under a rule of this kind of each, and of men through the whole of life best; but that a damage of this kind is thought by the multitude to be an involuntary injustice. However, our discourse at present is not a harsh contest about names. But since there have been pointed out three kinds of delinquencies, let us, in the first place, still more diligently recall them to our memory. Of pain then, which we denominate anger and fear, there is one kind.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But of pleasure and desires there is a second kind; another the third, of hopes, and a desire of true opinion about that which is the best. Now by this third being divided into two parts, five kinds will be produced, as we have just now stated, for which we must lay down five laws, differing from each other in two genera.

Clinias/ What are these?

Athenian Stranger/ One, when a deed is done constantly with violence and accordant actions; and the other, when it takes place secretly in darkness and with a fraud; but sometimes the act is done with both of these, against which there will be laws the most severe, if they possess their proper character.

Clinias/ This is reasonable.

Athenian Stranger/ But let us after this proceed to the point, from which we have digressed, and finish the laying down of laws. Now the subjects laid down by us were respecting those, who rob the gods, and are traitors to their country, and who corrupt the laws for the purpose of dissolving the existing polity. Of these someone may perhaps commit an act, when mad, or affected with a disease, or a very great age, or childishness, differing not at all from things of this kind. Of which acts should any become manifest to the judges selected on each occasion, either by the party himself informing, or a person making an excuse in behalf of the perpetrator, and he be decreed, when in this state, to have acted contrary to the law, let him pay simply for the damage, whatever he may have done; and let him be exempt from other punishments, unless by having killed anyone his hands are not clean from murder; for in this case let him depart to another country, and dwell there in exile during a year; but if he returns before the time prescribed

by the law, or puts his foot on the whole of his native land, let him be imprisoned by the guardians of the laws for two years in the public jail, and then released from bonds.

Since then we have begun with murder, let us endeavor to lay down laws completely for every kind of it. And, in the first place, let us speak of that done with violence and involuntarily. If then anyone in a contest, and at the public games, shall involuntarily kill a friend, either on the instant, or sometime after from the blows inflicted; or, in like manner, during a war, or in warlike exercises, of which the rulers have enjoined the practice, with naked bodies, or with any weapons, in imitation of warlike doings, let him be purified according to the law brought from Delphi touching these matters, and let him be held to be pure. And in the case of physicians, should any person, when attended upon by them, die, without their willing it, let everyone be held to be pure by the law. But if anyone with his own hand unwillingly slays another, whether with his own naked body, or with an instrument or dart, or by administering drink or food, or by the hurling of fire, or a tempest, or the privation of breath, whether he does this with his own body, or through the means of other bodies, let him be considered altogether a slayer with his own hand, and suffer punishments such as these. If he kills the slave of another, thinking that he had done for his own, let him either cause the master of the dead slave to be without loss or hurt, or be fined double the value of such slave; and let the judges make an inquiry into the value, and let the homicide make use of greater and more purifications than those, who kill a person in gymnastic exercises; and in such cases let the holy interpreters, whom the god ordains, decide without an appeal. But if anyone kills his own slave, let him, after undergoing a purification, be released according to law from the stain of murder. But if anyone kills involuntarily a free-

born person, let him be purified with the same purifications as him, who has killed a slave. And let him not dishonor some of so-called old stories of the ancients. For it is said, that a person, who had lived with the feelings of a free-man, having been violently put to death, was, when recently dead, angry with his murderer; and being filled with fear and terror likewise through his violent suffering, and beholding the person, who slew him, passing the time in his own seats, familiar haunts, terrified him, and, being disturbed himself, disturbed with all his might the murderer and his doings, by having Memory as an ally. On this account, it is requisite for the doer to withdraw himself from the sufferer through all the seasons of the year, and to cause a void in all his own places through the whole of his native land. But if the party deceased is a stranger, let the homicide be debarred the country of the stranger for the same period. And if anyone willingly obeys this law, let him, who is the nearest relative of the deceased, be the examiner into all that has taken place and grant a pardon; and by keeping quiet, he would be altogether moderate towards him. But if a person does not obey, and, in the first place, being still unpurified, dares to go to the temples, and to sacrifice; and, further, is not willing to be an exile, and to complete the stated time; let the nearest relative of the deceased prosecute the murderer on a charge of blood, and let his punishment be doubled when found guilty. But if the nearest relative shall not prosecute for the act of suffering, let anyone, since the pollution has come round to the relative, through the sufferer turning on himself the suffering, prosecute the relative and compel him by law to be absent from his country for five years. But if a stranger involuntarily kills a stranger amongst those in the city, let whosoever is willing prosecute him on the same laws; but if a foreign settler kills a stranger, let him be exiled for one year; but if he be altogether a stranger, in addition to

the purification, let him, if he shall have killed a stranger, or a foreign settler, or a citizen, be banished for his whole life from the country which has the supreme power over these laws, and if he returns contrary to the law, let the guardians of the laws punish him with death; and if he has any property, let them give it to the nearest relative of the deceased. But if he returns involuntarily by sea, and has been cast out on the coast by a storm, let him fix a tent on the shore, so that his feet may touch the water, and watch for an opportunity of sailing; but, if he is brought on land forcibly by anyone, let the magistrate, who of those in the city first meets him, release him and send him safe from harm to the country over the borders. But if anyone with his own hand kills a free-man, and what is done is done through passion, it is meet, in the first place, to make a twofold distinction in a thing of this kind. For a thing is done in a passion by those who, on a sudden, and without intending to kill, destroy by blows, or such other means, a person, on the instant that an impulse arises, and when repentance is close upon the deed; and a deed is done in a passion by those too, who, having been befouled by words or deeds of dishonor, pursue with revenge and subsequently kill a person, intending to murder, and for the deed there is no repentance. We must therefore, as it seems, put down two kinds of murder, and both of them as arising nearly from passion, and they may be said most justly to be between the voluntary and the involuntary. Each, however, is only a likeness. For, he who stores up his anger, and does not immediately and suddenly, but with malice prepense after a time revenge himself, is like to the voluntary; but he, who, without storing up his anger, does on the instant immediately gratify his passion, without premeditation, is like to the involuntary. He is not, however, altogether involuntary, but the likeness of the involuntary. On this

account, the murders committed in anger are difficult to define, whether one ought to lay down laws for them, as being voluntary, or some of them involuntary. The best and the truest method therefore is to put both down as likenesses; and to divide them apart from each other, by their being done with malice prepense and without premeditation; and to lay down by law severer punishments for those, who kill in anger, and with malice prepense; but milder for those without premeditation and on the sudden. For that, which is like a greater evil, should be punished more severely; but that, which is like a less one, less severely. Let it then be thus established by our laws.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then return again to the subject and say, that if anyone with his own hand kills a free-man, but if the deed, when done, took place without premeditation, in a moment of anger, let him in other respects suffer, as it is proper for the party to suffer, who has killed a person, not in a passion; but let him of necessity be an exile for two years, and thus punish his passion. But he, who in a passion, but with malice prepense, commits a murder, let him suffer in other respects as the former does; but let him be an exile for three years, as the other is for two, and be punished for the greatness of his passion by a longer time. And let this be held universally respecting these matters. It is difficult however to give laws on such matters with accuracy. For sometimes of these two murders, the one, which is held by the law to be the more atrocious, is the milder; and that, which is the milder, would be the more atrocious, according as the murder is committed in a more savage or a more gentle manner. But for the most part the deeds take place according to what has been mentioned already. Of all these matters, therefore, it is meet for the guardians of the laws to have the cognizance; and, when the

period of the exile shall have expired to each offender, to send twelve judges to the borders of the country, so that after having examined still more clearly the conduct of the exiles during that period, they may be the judges of the pity to be shown and of their reception; and let the exiles acquiesce in the decisions of such magistrates. And if, after having returned from exile, anyone of them shall, overcome by passion, commit again the very same offence, let him be exiled and never return again; and if he returns, he shall suffer in the same way as a stranger for returning from exile. And let him, who kills his own slave, undergo a purification. But if, in a passion, he kills the slave of another, let him pay to the master double the value of the loss. But whoever of all the homicides does not obey the law, but, while he is uncleansed, defiles by his presence the place of public meeting, and of contests, and other sacred places, whoever is willing may bring to trial the relative of the deceased, who has neglected his duty, and the murderer likewise, and compel him to pay a double fine, and to do some of the other doings; and let the accusing party carry off the payment according to the law. If a slave kills his master in a passion, let the kindred of the deceased use the murderer in whatever manner they please, and be clean of the acts, so long as they do not by any means preserve the life of the slave. But if a slave kills not his own master, but some other free-man, in a passion, let the owners give up the slave to the relatives of the deceased, and let them of necessity put him to death in whatever manner they please. If a father or a mother in a passion kills their son or daughter by blows, or any other violent manner—events that happen but rarely—let them be purified after the same manner as other homicides, and be exiled for three years; and on their return from exile, let the husband be divorced from the wife, and the wife from the husband, and let them never afterwards beget children

together, nor be a fellow-dweller with those, whom they have deprived of a child or brother, nor have a share with them in sacred rites. But he, who has acted impiously in these matters, and does not obey the laws, let him be brought to trial for impiety by anyone who is willing. If a husband kills his wife in a passion, or a wife does the same thing in a similar manner to her husband, they shall undergo the same purifications, and complete an exile for three years; and let not the party, who has so acted, on his return, have a share with their children in sacred rites, nor ever eat at the same table with them. And let the father or the child, who disobeys the law, be brought to trial for impiety by anyone who is willing. If a brother kills either a brother or a sister, or a sister kills a brother or a sister in a passion, let the matters, relating to purifications and exiles, be stated as necessary to take place in the same manner, as have been stated in the case of parents and children; and on their return from exile, let not anyone be a fellow-dweller or a sharer in sacred rites with those, whom a person has deprived, brothers of brothers, and fathers of children. And if anyone disobeys the law, he would rightly with justice be amenable to the before-mentioned law, relating to impiety on these points. But should anyone in the case of his parents be so powerless over his passion, as in the madness of anger to dare to murder one of his parents, if the deceased shall, before he expired, have voluntarily absolved the perpetrator of the murder, let him be purified as they are, who commit murder involuntarily, and performing the other things that they do, let him be considered as pure; but if the deceased shall not have absolved him, let the party who has done a deed of this kind be amenable to many laws. For he will be amenable to the extreme punishments for an assault, and, in like manner, for impiety and for the robbery of what is holy, because he has robbed his parent of his life; so that, if it

were possible for the same man to die oftentimes, it would be most just for a person, who had in a passion committed an act of parricide or matricide, to meet with many deaths. For in the case of him, whom no law will permit, even when defending himself and about to be made an end of by his parents, to destroy his father or mother, who have brought his nature to the light, and whom the legislator shall order to endure all things rather than do a deed of this kind, how would it be fitting for such a person to meet with punishment legally in any other way? Let death then be laid down as the punishment for him, who in a passion kills either his father or mother. But if a brother shall in his own defense, during a fight occurring in a sedition or in any other similar manner, kill a brother, while warding off the party, who first had recourse to his hands, let him be held clear in the same manner, as he who kills an enemy; and similarly, if a citizen kills a citizen, or a stranger a stranger; and if a citizen in defending himself kills a stranger, or a stranger a citizen, let him in the same way be held to be clear; and similarly if a slave kills a slave. But if a slave, in his own defense, kills a free-man, let him be amenable to the same laws as him, who kills his father. And what has been stated it respecting the absolution from murder by a father, let the very same thing take place respecting every absolution in matters of this kind; that if any person of his own accord gives an absolution to anyone for such an act, let the purifications take place for the perpetrator, as if the murder had been involuntary, and let one year be the term of absence from the country according to law. And thus let the matters relating to murders, done with violence and involuntarily and in a passion, be held to have been detailed in moderation. But as regards those relating to such as are voluntary and perpetrated with every kind of injustice, respecting these and what are done with malice prepense,

through yielding to pleasure and desires and envy, it is to be spoken of subsequently.

Clinias/ You speak correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then again speak to the utmost of our power in the first place upon these points, how many they are. Now the greatest is desire, having a mastery over a soul rendered savage by regrets. And this exists for the most part there, where there happens to be the greatest and most vehement wish for wealth on the part of the many, and a power that is producing an infinite love for the possession of property insatiable and boundless, by means of a natural disposition and a wretched want of education, of which the cause is that wealth is praised improperly by report amongst both the Greeks and Barbarians. For by placing as the first of good things that, which is the third, they do by this opinion injure both those after them and themselves. For that the truth respecting wealth be told in all states is of all things the most beautiful and the best; namely, that it exists for the sake of the body, but the body for the sake of the soul. Of the good things then existing, for the sake of which wealth naturally exists, it would be the third after the virtue of the body and soul. This reasoning then will be to us a teacher, that it is not meet for him, who would be happy, to seek to be wealthy by any means, but to be wealthy in a just and temperate manner. For thus murders, which require to be purified by murders, would not take place in cities. But now, as we stated at the beginning of the discussion, this is one and the greatest thing, which causes the greatest punishments of voluntary murder. The second is the habit of an ambitious soul, producing envy, a fellow-dweller the most disagreeable to him who possesses it, and secondly, to the best of those in the state. But the third is a cowardly and unjust fear, which has caused many murders, when acts are being done or have been done by a person, which he does

not wish to be conscious to himself of their taking place, or of having taken place. They therefore take off by death the informers of such acts, if they cannot do it by any other means. About all these matters then let this be held to be said as a prelude; and in addition to this, the story, which many of those engaged seriously in the Mysteries have heard touching these subjects, and strongly believe, that of such persons there is in Hades a punishment; and that it is necessary for them to come back hither to suffer punishment according to nature, namely, of suffering from another what a person had done himself, and with such a fate to finish his then life. For him therefore, who from this prelude is persuaded, and fears altogether such a punishment, there is no need to hymn a law on this point, but for him, who is not persuaded, let this law be expressed in writing.

Whosoever shall designedly and unjustly kill with his own hand anyone soever of his tribes-men, let him, in the first place, be debarred from legal rights, nor let him pollute the temples, or the place of public meeting, or the ports, or any other general assembly, whether any person forbids the perpetrator or not. For the law forbids him; and it is ever seen and will be seen forbidding him in behalf of the whole state. But the relative of the deceased as far as a cousin, on the male or female side, who does not, when requisite, prosecute, or forbid him to be debarred from those things, shall first of all take upon himself the pollution, and the hatred of the gods, as the imprecation by the law provokes the report; and secondly, let him be amenable to any, who is willing to avenge the dead; and let him, who is willing, avenge, after performing everything respecting the observation of washings for such occasions, and of such other acts as the deity has enjoined as legal in cases of this kind; and after making the proclamation let him go and

compel the perpetrator to suffer the vengeance of justice according to law. But that these things ought to take place through certain prayers and sacrifices to certain deities, who have a care of such matters, so that murders may not take place in cities, it is easy for a legislator to show. But who are the deities, and what would be the manner of introducing such suits most correctly as regards the divine power, let the guardians of the laws, together with the holy interpreters, and the prophets, and the god, lay down by law, and introduce these suits. But let the judges of these matters be the same as those, to whom has been given the power of deciding upon sacrilege. Let him too, who is convicted, pay the penalty of death, and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered person, on account of his shameless conduct, in addition to the act of impiety. But if he goes away, being unwilling to stand a trial, let him suffer a perpetual exile. And if anyone of these sets his foot upon the land of the murdered party, let whatever relation or even citizen, who first meets him, kill him with impunity, or, placing him in bonds, hand him over to the magistrates, who decide upon the suit, to put him to death. But let him, who urges the suit, require bail at the same time from him, against whom he is urging it; and let the latter produce three persons, whom the magistrate appointed for such matters shall decide to be in sufficient credit, who shall engage to produce the accused at the trial; but if the latter either will not or cannot get bail, let the magistrate take and put him in prison, and produce him at the trial of the suit. If a person shall not with his own hand perpetrate, but suggest to another, a murder, and by his willing and plotting cause the murder to take place, and dwell in a city, having been the instigator of, and not pure in his soul from, the murder, let there be to him in the same manner, with the exception of the bail, a trial and verdict on these matters; and, if

convicted, let it be lawful for him to have the family burial-place; but let other things take place in the same manner to him, as to the party previously mentioned; and let the same things take place in the case of strangers towards strangers, and citizens and strangers towards each other, and of slaves towards slaves, with respect to a murder done by a person's own hand and instigation, with the exception of the bail; but this let the murderers with their own hands be required to procure, as has been stated; and let the party who brings forward the suit, require bail of them likewise. But if a slave voluntarily murders a free-man, whether with his own hand or through a plotting, and there is a verdict against him, let the public executioner lead him to the tomb of the deceased, or to a place, where he may see the tomb, and after scourging him with as many stripes as the plaintiff shall order, put the murderer, if he survives the whipping, to death. But if anyone kills a slave, who has done no wrong, through the fear of his disclosing deeds disgraceful and wicked, or for any similar reason, let him, as if he underwent the punishment of murder for having killed a citizen, undergo similarly and with the same forms a punishment on account of the slave, who had thus perished.

But if cases occur, for which it is a thing of dread and by no means agreeable to legislate, and impossible on the other hand not to legislate, relating to the murder of relations by a person's own hand or plotting, and done willingly and wickedly in every way—which take place for the most part in states badly administered and nurtured, and which will somehow take place in a country where no one would expect it—it is requisite to mention again, what has been stated a little before, should perchance someone, on hearing us, be enabled more willingly on this account to abstain from murders the most unholy in every way. For a fable, or a story, or whatever else it is meet to call it, has been clearly

told by priests of old, that Justice, the avenger and inspector of kindred blood, makes use of the law, which we have just now mentioned; and has ordained that he, who has done any such act, shall necessarily suffer what he has done; so that if anyone has ever murdered his father, he has at some time suffered the very same fate by the daring and violence of his own children; and if he has murdered his mother, he has in after times become necessarily a partaker in a feminine nature, and having become so, has departed from life at the hands of his offspring. For of a common blood defiled there is no other cleansing, nor is the pollution wont to be washed out, before the life, that has done wrong, shall pay like blood for like blood, and appease and put to sleep the anger of all the kindred. It is requisite then for a person to be restrained on these points, through the fear of such punishments from the gods. But if so wretched a calamity should lay hold of anyone, as that he should dare designedly and willingly to separate the soul of his father or mother, or brethren or children, from the body, the law of the mortal lawgiver legislates respecting matters of this kind in this way, that there is to be a proclamation respecting a debarring from all rights, and the same bail, as mentioned above; and if anyone is convicted of a murder of this kind, for having killed anyone of those, let the ministers of the judges and the magistrates put him to death, and cast him out of the city naked to an appointed place, where three roads meet; and let all the magistrates, in behalf of the whole state, carry each a stone and hurl it at the head of the dead body, and thus make an expiation for the whole state; and afterwards carry the corpse to the boundaries of the country, and cast it out there unburied, according to law. But what ought he to suffer, who murders his nearest and so-called dearest friend? I mean, he who kills himself, and by violence deprives himself of his share of fate, being compelled neither by a verdict of the city

ordering it, nor by a very painful and unavoidable misfortune falling upon him, nor by sharing in a thing of shame, without a resource, and not to be lived through, and who by his indolence and the cowardice of unmanliness imposes upon himself an unjust punishment. To such a person a god knows what ought to take place on other points, and relating to purification and burial; about which it is necessary for the nearest relatives to inquire of the holy interpreters, and at the same time the laws relating to them, and to do according to the orders given by them; but let the tombs of those, who have perished thus, be in the first place by themselves, and with no one buried in them; next, let them be in the twelve boundaries of the divisions, which are uncultivated and without a name; and bury them without honor, nor mark their tombs with any pillars or names. But if a beast of burden or any other animal shall kill any person, except such as may do so in some public contest, let the relations prosecute the causer of the death: and let the Land-Stewards, upon whom and how many the relative shall impose the task, decide upon the matter; and let them destroy the condemned animal, and cast it beyond the borders. If any lifeless thing deprives a man of life, except lightning, or any other such-like bolt sent from a god, but of all the rest that kill a person, by either the person falling upon it, or it falling upon the person, let the nearest of kin appoint the nearest neighbor to be a judge for him, and let him make an expiation both for himself and the whole of his kindred; but drive the thing condemned beyond the borders of the country, as has been stated in the case of the living kind. If anyone is found dead, and the murderer is not known, and is not to be discovered by parties searching not carelessly, let there be proclamations, as in other cases; and let the heir-at-law make a proclamation against the perpetrator of the murder, and state in the Market-place that

the person, who has murdered so and so, is not, as being guilty of murder, to set his foot upon any sacred place, or in the whole of the country of the party suffering, as he shall die, should he be found and known, and shall be cast out unburied, beyond the country of the sufferer. Let this one law then be laid down by us as decisive on the subject of murder. And thus be it said up to this point about matters of this kind.

But for killing whom, and on what conditions, a person would be properly pure, let this be laid down. If anyone catches a thief, entering his house by night, for the purpose of stealing his property, and kills him, let him be pure. In like manner, let him be pure, who kills a cloak-stripper in his own defense. And if anyone commits a rape upon a free-born woman or a boy, let him be put to death with impunity, either by the party treated with insult and violence, or by the father, or brothers, or sons of the party. And if a man comes upon his wedded wife, while being ravished, and kills the party using violence, let him be pure by the law. And if anyone, while assisting his father, when doing nothing unlawful and unholy, or his mother, or children, or brothers, or joint-parent of his children, shall kill a person, let him be in every respect pure.

Let these then be the laws laid down relating to the nurture and education of a living soul, with which if it meets it may live; but not meeting, the reverse; and relating also to violent deaths, what punishments there ought to be for them. Mention too has been made of the nurture and education of bodies; and what is close upon those subjects, namely, actions done with violence by persons to each other, both voluntary and involuntary, we must define according to our power, what they are, and how many, and meeting with what punishment they would each of them possess what is suited to them. For these, it appears, would be properly laid

down as laws after those. Now the person of the least mark amongst those, who have turned themselves to law, would rank wounds, and mutilations from wounds, as secondary to murders. Wounds then are to be divided in the same manner as murders have been divided. For some are involuntary, others done in a passion, some through fear; but such as take place from design are called voluntary. Now about all such something of this kind must be premised; that it is necessary to lay down laws for mankind, and for them to live according to law, or for them to differ not at all from animals the most savage in every respect. And the cause of this is, that the disposition of not a single man is naturally sufficient to know what is conducive to a polity amongst men; and, when it does know, to be always able to do and wish what is the best. For first it is difficult to know that not private but public interests must necessarily be the object of the true science of polities—for a common interest binds states, but a private one tears them asunder—and that it conduces to both public and private interests, when the public are well established rather than when the private are so. Secondly, that, although a person should obtain sufficiently from art the knowledge that such things are so naturally, yet should he after this possess power in the state, without being brought to book, and hold it in his own hands entirely, he would never be able to remain in this opinion, and continue to live, while nourishing the public interest in a state as the leading one, and the private as following the public; but his mortal nature will ever urge him on to the wish to possess more, and to his own individual well-doing. For through irrationally avoiding pain, and pursuing pleasure, it will set both of these before what is more just and excellent; and, by producing a darkness in itself, it will at length fill both itself and the whole state with every ill. Since should any man, born with a divine destiny, be

naturally competent to comprehend this, he would require no laws for the government of himself. For there is no law or order superior to science; nor is it lawful for intellect to be the minister, and the slave of anything, but the ruler of all, if it is thus true and really free by nature. But now it is not so; for it does not exist anywhere and in any manner, except to a small extent. On this account then we must choose the second in rank, namely, order and law; which the one for the most part sees and beholds, but the other is entirely unable. Thus much then has been stated for the sake of these matters; and let us now ordain what he ought to suffer in person, or pay in purse, who wounds or otherwise injures another. For it is easy for everyone upon every point to take up correctly of a party having wounded what thing, or what person, or in what manner, or whether are you speaking; for there are numberless things of this kind and very different from each other. It is therefore impossible to commit to courts of justice, to decide upon all these matters, or not one. For it is necessary to commit in the case of all to decide upon this one point, whether each of these acts have taken place or not; but on the other hand not at all to commit to them, to decide upon this point, what the party, who has done any of these injuries, ought to be fined in purse, and suffer in person; and yet for the law-giver himself to lay down laws upon all questions, small and great, is nearly impossible.

Clinias/ What then is the inference consequent upon this?

Athenian Stranger/ It is this; that some matters should be committed to courts of justice, and others not, but be left to the legislator himself.

Clinias/ What then are the matters, which are to be laid down by law, and what those to be committed to courts of justice?

Athenian Stranger/ After the preceding, it would be the most correct to say this; that, in a state, where the courts of justice are depraved and dumb, and concealing their opinions pass sentence in private; and, what is still more dreadful than this, when, not in silence, but full of noise, as in a theatre, they praise and blame with an uproar each of the orators in turn; then is a grievous calamity wont indeed to occur to the whole state. It is not then a fortunate circumstance for a person to be laid hold of by some necessity to legislate for courts of justice of this kind; nevertheless, when he is laid hold of by a necessity, he must commit to them to order fines only relating to matters of the slightest kind, but he must himself distinctly lay down those relating to the most numerous, if he would ever legislate correctly for such a kind of polity. But in a state, where courts of justice are established as correctly as possible, and those, who are about to judge, are brought up well and undergo a scrutiny with all accuracy, there it is right and it will be well to commit to such judges to decide upon most points relating to those who are found guilty, as to what they are to suffer in person, or to pay in purse. Against us then there will be no cause of complaint for our not laying down laws relating to matters the greatest and most numerous, into which judges, who have been educated in the meanest manner, would be able to look, and to adapt to each offence a punishment suited to the suffering and act. But since we are of opinion, that those, for whom we are laying down laws, will be not the least clever of judges in such matters, we must commit to their decision the greatest number of cases. However, as we have often said and done during the previous laying down of the laws, that by giving an outline and types of punishments, we have presented to judges patterns for their never going beyond the line of justice; and, as this was then correctly done, so must we now do likewise the very

same thing, while returning again to the laws. Let then the outline of the laws relating to wounds be thus laid down. If anyone, having both the intention and wish to kill a friend, except it be those whom the law ordains, shall wound, but is unable to kill him, towards the party with such intentions, so inflicting a wound, it is not meet to feel a pity nor to pay a regard to him, otherwise than by compelling him to undergo the punishment of murder, as if he had actually killed his friend; and, by doing reverence to his Fortune, not bad in every respect, and his Dæmon likewise, who, pitying both him and the wounded party, became to both an averter of evil—to one, in the wound not being incurable, and to the other, in the accident and calamity being exposed to a curse—it is meet to give thanks to this Dæmon; and, by not opposing him, to take away the punishment of death from the party inflicting the wound, but for a removal to take place to him during life to a neighboring state, enjoying there his property; but if he has inflicted any loss upon the wounded person, let him pay for the loss; and let the court of justice, that tried the cause, fix the sum; and let those, who would have decided about the murder, had the party died from the blow of the wound, be the judges.

If a child designedly wounds his parent, or a slave his master, the punishment shall be death. And if a brother wounds in like manner a brother or sister, or a sister a sister or brother, and there is a verdict of wounding by design, let the punishment be death. But if a woman wounds her husband with the design of killing him, or in like manner a husband his wife, let each undergo a perpetual exile; and, if their sons or daughters are at that time but children, let guardians manage their property, and take care of the children, as being orphans; but if they are adults, let it not be a compulsory act for the exiled parent to be supported by their offspring, but let there be a permission to take

possession of the estate. But whosoever happens to be childless, when falling into calamities of this kind, let his kindred, as far as cousins, both on the male and female side, come together, and appoint for this family, being one of the five thousand and forty in the state, an heir, after consulting with the guardians of the laws and considering the matter in this manner and reasoning, that no house out of the five thousand and forty is the property of its inhabitant, or of all his kindred, but of the state, considered in a public and private view, and that it is requisite for the state to possess its own houses, as holy and as happy as is possible. When therefore any house has become at the same time unhappy and unholy, so that its possessor has left no children in it, and being in youth and married has died childless, through his having been convicted of voluntary murder, or some other crime against the gods or his fellow-citizens—the punishment for which has been distinctly laid down by the law to be death—or if a person is in perpetual exile, being without male children, let it be necessary in the first place to purify this house and make use of expiatory sacrifices according to law; and next, let the kindred coming together, as we have said just now, examine together with the guardians of the laws, what family there is in the state in the greatest repute for virtue, and fortunate at the same time, and in which the children are rather numerous; from which let them put one upon the father of the deceased and his progenitors, as their adopted son, and let them call him, for the sake of a good omen, by the name of the father, and pray that he may become for them a parent and hearth-preserver and minister of rites holy and sacred, with better fortune than his predecessor; and after praying in this manner, let them appoint him the heir according to law, and suffer the sinner to lie nameless, and childless, and shareless, whenever such a calamity shall have seized upon him.

There is not, as it seems, in all existing things a boundary close in contact with a boundary; but in things to which there is a boundary, that in the middle being previously thrown to either of the boundaries, would become between both. Moreover, we have said that what takes place in a passion is something between what arc voluntary and involuntary. If then a person is found guilty of wounds existing, taken place in a passion, in the first place let him pay double the amount of the damage, if the wound is curable; but four-fold in the case of those incurable. But if it be curable indeed, and yet brings upon the wounded party a feeling of considerable shame and disgrace, let the party pay fourfold. But when a person in wounding another, injures not only the sufferer, but the state likewise, by rendering him unable to assist his country against its enemies, he must, in addition to other fines, pay for the damage done to the state. For besides his own period of service abroad, let him go through that of the disabled party, and execute the orders relating to war at home in the place of the other; or not doing so, let him be brought to trial by anyone whatever, according to law, for neglect of military duty. And let the judges, who have given their votes against him, fix the equivalent for the damage, whether it is to be twofold, or threefold, or fourfold. If one relative by blood wounds another in the same manner, let the parents and kindred, as far as the cousins on the male and female side, come together, and decide to deliver the offender to his parents to fix the fine according to nature. But if the fixing of the fine be a matter of doubt, let the kindred on the male side fix the fine definitely. And if they are unable to decide, let them at length commit it to the guardians of the laws. And of such kind of wounds as are inflicted by children on their parents the judges must be of necessity above sixty years old, and whose children are not adopted but truly their

own. And if a person is found guilty, let them fix the punishment, whether such a person must die or suffer something else greater, or not much less; but let none of the relatives of the doer act as judge, not even if he be of the age which the law has ordained. But if a slave wounds any free-man in anger, let his owner give up the slave to the wounded person, to use him as he pleases; but if the owner does not give him up, he himself shall remedy the wrong. And if anyone brings an accusation touching what has happened, as being a plan arising from an arrangement between the slave and the wounded party, let him contest the matter; and if he does not get a verdict, let him pay the damage threefold; but if he does, let him hold the party planning as amenable together with the slave under the statute of slavery. But let him, who involuntarily wounds another, pay a simple fine; for no legislator is competent to be the ruler over accident; and let the judges be those, who were mentioned in the case of children wounding their parents, and let them fix a fine for the damage.

All the aforesaid sufferings come under the class of violent; and violent too is every kind of assault and disfigurement. It is necessary therefore for every man and every woman in matters of this kind always to bear in mind that, what is older is honored in no small degree beyond what is younger, both amongst gods and such persons as are about to be in a state of safety and happiness. To see therefore an assault made upon an elderly person by a younger is in a state a thing shameful and hateful to the deity; and it seems reasonable for every young man, when struck by an old one, to refrain with a light heart his anger, and to lay up for himself such a kind of honor for his old age. Thus then let it be. Let everyone reverence both in deed and word a person older than himself; and let him, deeming a person, who is his superior by twenty years of age, whether

male or female, as a father or mother, act reverently towards them, and let him keep his hands from every period of life, that would be able to beget or bring forth himself, for the sake of the gods who preside over births. In like manner let him keep his hands from a stranger, whether a resident of old, or a new comer. For neither as the aggressor nor in self-defense let him dare to punish by blows such a person. But should he conceive that a stranger ought, through acting wantonly and rudely, to be punished, let him lay hold of the party and bring him before the office of the City-Stewards; but let him abstain from beating him, in order that he may be far from daring to strike a fellow-citizen. And let the City-Stewards, reverencing ever the god of hospitality, receive the stranger and sift the matter; and let them, should the stranger appear to have struck unjustly the inhabitant of the country, cause the stranger to cease from his foreign and bold behavior, by inflicting as many blows as he may himself have struck. But if he has acted not unjustly, let them after threatening and reproaching the party, who had brought him, dismiss them both. If one person strikes another of the same age with himself, or who is a little older, but without children, or if an old man strikes an old man, or one youth another, let a person defend himself according to nature, without a weapon, with naked hands. But if anyone more than forty years old dares to fight with another, either as the aggressor, or in self-defense, let him be called rude, and ill-mannered, and slave-like, and meeting with this disgraceful punishment, he will have what is becoming to him. And if anyone is obedient to these admonitions, he will be led easily by the rein; but let him, who is disobedient, and heeds not a prelude, receive with readiness the following law. If anyone strikes another, who is older than himself by twenty years or more, in the first place, let him, who happens to be present, if he is neither of an equal age, nor younger than

the combatants, prevent them; or if he does not prevent them, let him be considered a bad man according to law. But if he is of the same age with, or younger than, the person struck, let him defend the injured party, as if he were his brother or father, or a person still more remote; and further still, let him, who has dared to strike his senior, undergo the punishment for an assault and disfigurement, as stated; and if he is found guilty, let him be put into prison for not less than a year; and if the judges fix the fine for a longer period, let the time so fixed be considered as positive. If a stranger or a settler strikes his senior by twenty years or more, let the same law have the same power, with respect to the assistance of those who are present. And let him, who is defeated in a suit of this kind, if he is a stranger, and not a settler, undergo this very punishment, by being in bonds for two years. But if he is a settler, and disobedient to the laws, let him be in bonds for three years, unless the court of justice shall fix upon him a punishment for a longer period. And let whoever happens to be present on any of these occasions, and does not give assistance according to law, be fined, the person of the largest estate, a mina, of the second class, fifty drachms, of the third, thirty, and of the fourth, twenty; and let the court of justice for such matters consist of the Generals and Taxiarchs, and Phylarchs and Hipparchs.

With respect to the laws, some, as it seems, are in behalf of worthy men, for the sake of their instruction, as to what manner they may associate with each other on friendly terms; others for the sake of those, who fly from instruction through their being of an unmanageable nature and not to be softened, so that they proceed to every kind of vice. These are the persons, who would have caused the discourses to be spoken, that are about to be; for whom in truth the legislator would of necessity lay down his laws, while wishing

that there may never be a need of using them. Whoever then dares to touch his father or mother or their progenitors still, and to violently maltreat them, neither fearing the anger of the gods above nor the so-called vengeance of those below the earth, but, as one who, thinking he knows what he does not know at all, despises the men of old, and what has been asserted by all, and acts contrary to the law, for such a person there is a need of some extreme turning aside. Now death is not the extreme; but the pains inflicted on such persons in Hades are still more amongst the extreme than this; and though they tell the greatest truths, they effect nothing in the way of turning aside in the case of such souls as these. For otherwise there would not have been persons to strike their mothers, nor the unholy daring of blows inflicted upon other parents. It is requisite then, that the punishments here for crimes of this kind, should be as much as possible in no respect inferior to those in Hades. Let then what follows be stated in this way. Whoever shall dare to strike his father or mother, or their fathers or mothers, unless he is seized with madness, let, in the first place, anyone, who is present, as mentioned before, give assistance; but if it be a settler or stranger, who assists, let him be called to the principal seat at the public games; but, not assisting, let him suffer a perpetual exile from the country. But let him, who is not a settler, if he assists, receive praise; but if he does not assist, blame. And if a slave assists, let him be made free; but if he does not assist, let him receive a hundred stripes with a whip. And if this occurs in the market-place, let him be whipt by the Market-Stewards; but if out of the marketplace in the city, let anyone of the City-Stewards, who is resident, inflict the punishment; but if in the rural parts of the country, let the chiefs of the Land-Stewards do so. If any denizen happens to be present when parents are struck by their child, whether such

denizen be a boy, or a man, or a woman, let him assist, and call the striker an impious wretch; and let him, who does not assist, be implicated in the curse sworn in the name of Zeus Homognius, and Patroius, according to law. And if anyone is convicted on the charge of assaulting and disfiguring his parents, let him, in the first place, suffer a perpetual exile from the city to some other country; and next, let him keep himself from all sacred rites; but if he will not so keep himself, let the Land-Stewards punish him with blows, and entirely as they please. And if he returns from exile, let him be punished with death. And if any free-man shall eat or drink with such a person, or have any other communication of such a kind with him, or only touch him voluntarily, should he happen to meet him anywhere, let the party neither enter a temple, nor a place of public meeting, nor, in short, the city, until he is purified; conceiving that he has had a communication with a calamity of an impious kind. But if, disobedient to the law, he shall contrary to the law defile the sacred places, and the city, let the magistrate, who, cognizant of this, does not institute a suit against such a person, be held amenable to the greatest accusation for this very matter. If a slave strikes a free-man, whether a stranger or citizen, let anyone present give assistance, or pay the fine above-mentioned, according to the value of his estate; and let those who are present succor the party struck, and having bound the striker, deliver him to the injured party; and he, on receiving him, shall put him into the stocks, and give him as many stripes with a whip as he pleases, without doing an injury to the slave's owner, to whom let him deliver up the slave, to be his possession according to law. And let the law be this. Whatever slave strikes a free-man, without the order of the magistrates, let his owner, on receiving him bound from the party struck, not release him from bonds, until the slave shall have persuaded the party struck that he

deserves to be released and to live. And let the same laws be for women, with respect to each other, on all matters of this kind; and for women with respect to men, and men to women.

Book 10.

Athenian Stranger/ After assaults, let a law of some such kind as this be stated relating to acts of violence, one for all; that no one shall carry or take away anything belonging to another, or use his neighbor's property, if he has not induced the possessor to permit it. For from a thing of this kind all the above-mentioned evils have depended, and do and will depend. But of the remaining evils, the greatest are the lasciviousness and insolence of young men; to the greatest extent, when they are directed against sacred things; and they are particularly great in the case of public and holy matters, or in those of the common portions of tribes-men, or any other persons who have a communion in things of that kind. The second in order and heinousness, are those directed against the sacred concerns of individuals and sepulchers. The third, when, apart from the acts previously detailed, a person behaves insolently towards parents. The fourth kind of insolence is, when anyone, despising the magistrates, carries off, or drives away, or makes use of anything belonging to them, without having persuaded them to suffer it. The fifth consists in unjustly calling to account the political conduct of any citizen. For each of these there must be assigned a law in common. For in the case of sacrilege, it has been stated summarily what a person ought to suffer, if it takes place with violence and secrecy. But with regard to what a person does by word or deed insolently towards the gods, let me now detail, after laying down an exhortation, what he ought to suffer. Let it then be this. No one, who believes that there are gods, conformably to laws, has ever at any time voluntarily done an impious act, or spoken a word contrary to the laws; but he, who does or says an impious deed or word against the gods, suffers one of these three things; either he does not think, what I have stated; or, secondly, that, although they

exist, they take no care of mankind; or, thirdly, that they are easily appeased by sacrifices, and drawn aside by prayers.

Clinias/ What then shall we do, and what shall we say to them?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us, my good man, first hear, what I prophesy they will jocosely say in contempt of us.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps they will say with a banter—O guests from Athens, and Lacedæmon, and Cnossus, you speak the truth. For some of us think the gods are no gods at all; others, that they take no care of us; and others, that they are drawn aside by prayers, as you have described them. We deem it then proper, as you have deemed it with respect to the laws, that, before you threaten us severely, you should endeavor to persuade and teach us that there are gods, by stating sufficient arguments, and that they are beings too good to be drawn aside, contrary to what is just, by any gifts. For now, after hearing this, and other things of such a kind, from those said to be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and priests, and ten thousand times ten thousand others, the majority of us do not turn to the acting unjustly, but, after acting so, we endeavor to get a salve. But on the part of legislators, who profess themselves to be not savage, but mild, we think it reasonable for them to make use of persuasion in our case, by stating, with regard to the gods, if not in a manner much superior to the rest, yet superior at least as regards the truth, that they do exist. And then perhaps we may be persuaded by you. Endeavor then, if we say what is fair, to speak on the points, to which we invite you.

Clinias/ Does it not seem then easy, O guest, to say with truth, that there are gods?

Athenian Stranger/ How?

Clinias/ In the first place, the Earth and Sun, and all the Stars, and the arrangements so beautiful of the Seasons, divided into months and years, prove this; and moreover, that all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, believe that there are gods.

Athenian Stranger/ I feel a fear, O blessed man—for I will never say that I feel shame, lest depraved persons hold you in contempt. For you are not acquainted with the cause of their difference in opinion; but you imagine that their souls are impelled to an impious life, by a want of mastery alone over pleasures and desires.

Clinias/ But what other cause can there be, O guest, besides this?

Athenian Stranger/ That, which you would know nearly not at all, through living out of their way, and which would lie hid from you.

Clinias/ Of what are you speaking at present?

Athenian Stranger/ A certain ignorance of a very grievous nature is appearing to be the greatest prudence.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ There are certain stories put into writing amongst us, which, as I understand, are, through the virtue of your polity, not amongst you, some in a kind of verse, and others out of it, which speak of the gods. The most ancient assert, that the first nature was that of Uranus and the other gods; and proceeding they detail, not far from the beginning, the birth of the gods, and how after being born they had intercourse with each other. Upon those, who hear the accounts, whether they are well or not upon any other ground, it is not easy to cast a censure, as they are of the olden time; but as regards the attention and honor to be paid to parents, I would never praise them, nor say that they are beneficial, nor that they have been correctly told at all. Let

then, what relates to the writings of the ancients, be dismissed and bidden farewell, and let them be spoken of, as may be pleasing to the gods. But let the poetry of the young and wise be blamed as the cause of evil; for the language of such persons effects this. For when you and I, detailing the proofs, that there are gods, bring forward those very things, the Sun and Moon, and Stars, and the Earth, as being gods and of a god-like nature, they, who have been persuaded by these wise men, would say that they are earth and stones, and incapable of paying any regard to human affairs; and that such ideas are cleverly wrapped round in a paste of words to render them plausible.

Clinias/ You have spoken, guest, a speech, grave indeed, even if only one had said so; but now, since there happen to be very many who say so, it will be still more grave.

Athenian Stranger/ What then shall we say, and what ought we to do? Shall we apologize, as if some person were accusing us before impious men, who fly from the subjects relating to legislation, and assert that we are acting in a shocking manner by legislating as if there were gods? Or shall we bid farewell to these, and return again to the laws, in order that this our preface to the laws may not become rather prolix? For the discourse will, if stretched out, become by no means short, if we sufficiently prove only moderately by reasons to men, eager to act impiously, some of the points, on which they say we ought to speak; and if we lead them to feel a fear upon others; and if, after having caused them to be disgusted on others, we lay down laws after this on matters that are becoming.

Clinias/ But, O guest, we have often, for so short a time at least, said this very thing, that for the present it is not meet to prefer brevity to prolixity. For nobody, according to the saying, is pursuing us in haste. And it would be ridiculous, and at the same time paltry, for us to be seen

preferring the shorter to the best. And it is a thing of no little moment, for our reasons possess somehow a power to prove that there are gods, that they are good, and that they honor justice pre-eminently more than men. For this will be nearly the most beautiful and excellent preface to all our laws. Let us then, without feeling any disgust, or being urged on, exhibit, as far as we can, sufficiently whatever power we possess in the way of persuasion, and lay aside no part of such kind of reasonings.

Athenian Stranger/ The speech just now spoken by you appears to me to invite a prayer, since you put yourself on the stretch with alacrity, nor is it fitting to delay any longer to discourse.

But come, tell us how can anyone speak without a feeling of anger on the question that there are gods? For there is a necessity for us to bear ill with and to hate those, who have been and are now the cause of the discussion, in not being persuaded by the tales, which they have heard even from young children, and when they were fed with milk from their nurses and mothers, and which were spoken, as it were, in epodes, both in sport and in earnest, and together with sacrifices hearing them in prayers, and seeing the sights that follow them, which a young person sees and hears with the greatest delight, when they take place; while their parents are making a sacrifice with the greatest earnestness, and occupied in it in behalf of themselves and them; and addressing in prayers and supplications the gods, as really existing, both at the rising of the Sun and Moon, and at their setting; and when they hear and see the rollings on the ground and acts of adoration of Greeks and Barbarians of all kinds, under the influence of all kinds of adversity and prosperity, not as if the gods were not existing, but as if existing in reality, and giving not even a handle for the suspicion that the gods do not exist—they who despise all

these facts, and from not a single sufficient reason, as all would say, who possess even a little intellect, compel us to speak as we do at present, how can anyone in mild language admonish, and at the same time teach them, in the first place, that the gods do exist? Let us however dare the attempt. For it is not meet that some of us should be mad through a violent hankering after pleasure, and others through being angry with such characters as these. Let then our address to persons thus depraved in their intellect be of this kind and passionless, and let us speak mildly after extinguishing our anger, as if conversing with one of such persons—My child, you are young. But time, as it advances, will cause you to change in many points the opinions you now hold, and to give them to the opposite side. Wait then until that period, so as to become a judge of matters of the greatest moment. Now that is of the greatest moment, which you at present deem to be of no consequence, namely, to have correct ideas on the subject of the gods, and to live well or not. If then I first point out to you a thing of this kind, as being one of great moment, I shall not appear to tell a falsehood. Not you alone nor your friends are the first, who have held this opinion respecting the gods; but there have been always a greater or less number laboring under this very disease. I will therefore tell you this, as I have come in contact with many of them, that not one of them, after adopting this opinion from their youth respecting the gods, that they do not exist, has continued to old age remaining in it. Two circumstances have however remained as regards the gods, not indeed to many, but to some; one is, that the gods exist indeed, but take no care of human affairs; and the other after this, that they do indeed take care, but are easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers. If then you will be persuaded by me, you will, turning over with all your might this doctrine, which has ever been clear to you, wait and

consider whether it be thus or otherwise, by inquiring of other persons, and the legislator in particular. But during that period do not dare to act impiously towards the gods. For he, who lays down laws for you, must endeavor, both now and hereafter, to teach you on these points in what state they are.

Clinias/ What has been said thus far, is, O guest, most beautiful.

Athenian Stranger/ Entirely so, Megillus and Clinias; but we have unconsciously fallen upon a wonderful assertion.

Clinias/ Of what kind are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ That, which is thought by many to be the wisest of all assertions.

Clinias/ Speak yet clearer.

Athenian Stranger/ Some persons surely say, that all things, which are and have been and will be, exist, some from nature, others from art, and others from chance.

Clinias/ And do they not say well?

Athenian Stranger/ It is reasonable, indeed, for wise men to speak correctly. Let us then follow those from that point, and consider what they happen to be thinking of.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ It seems, say they, that nature and chance effect the greatest and most beautiful things, but art the lesser; which, receiving from nature the generation of great and primary works, molds and fabricates all the smaller works, which all of us call artificial.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ I will speak still clearer in this way. They say that fire and water and earth and air exist from nature and chance, and not one of them from art; and that the bodies, next after these, of the Earth, and the Sun, and

the Moon, and the Stars, are generated through them, being entirely without a soul; and that, each being borne along by the chance, which is a portion of the power of each, to the spot where they fall together, fit together in some congenial manner, the hot with the cold, the dry with the moist, and the soft with the hard; and that all things, which by the mixture of contraries, according to chance, have been commingled through necessity, have in this way and under such circumstances really generated the whole of heaven and all that are in heaven, and animals and plants together, all the seasons having been produced from them; and not, say they, through intellect, nor any god, or art, but, as we have stated, by nature and chance; and that art, mortal itself, being subsequently produced from these, themselves mortal, generated afterwards some kind of instruction, not partaking very much of truth, but certain images allied to themselves, such as painting produces, and music, and whatever arts are fellow-workers: and that if any of the arts produce anything of a serious nature, they are such as communicate their own power with that of nature, such as the art of medicine, and of agriculture, and of gymnastics; and, moreover, the statesman's art communicates in some small part with nature, but very much with art; and thus the whole of legislation is not from nature, but art; of which the positions are not true.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ The gods, O blessed man, these persons say, in the first place, exist from art, not nature, but from certain laws; and that these are different amongst different people, according as each have agreed to have laws laid down for each. And, moreover, that things beautiful by nature are of one kind, those by law of another; and that things just do not exist by nature at all, but that persons continue to dispute amongst themselves about them, and

are perpetually changing them; and that, what they change and when, possess then a fixed authority, emanating from art and laws, but not from any certain nature. All these, my friends, are amongst young men the doctrines of the wise, both private persons and poets, who assert that to be the most just, by which a person obtains a victory through violence. From whence both impiety comes upon young men—since gods are not such as the law enjoins us we ought to think there are—and seditions too arise on this account, while persons are drawing towards the life, which is correct according to nature, which is in truth that a person lives, the master over others, and not the slave of others according to law.

Clinias/ What an account have you, O guest, gone through, and what a mischief detailed to young men, both publicly in cities, and in their private homes!

Athenian Stranger/ You speak truly, Clinias. What then think you a legislator ought to do, when states have been of old in this condition. Ought he merely to stand up in the city and threaten all, that unless they assert, and are thoroughly satisfied in their own minds, that there are gods, such as the law says there are, they shall suffer punishment. And with respect to things beautiful and just, and everything of the greatest moment, and whatever tends to virtue and vice, that it is meet for them to think and act in the way the legislator leads by his writings; and that, whoever does not exhibit himself obedient to the laws, one of them ought to die, another to be punished with stripes and bonds, and another with disfranchisement, and others with poverty and exile; and that while he is laying down laws for men, he is to have no persuasion over them, so that by fitting them to reasonings, he may, as far as he can, render them mild.

Clinias/ By no means, O guest. But should any persuasion, though small, happen to exist relating to

matters of this kind, it behooves a legislator, who is of the least worth, to be never faint-hearted, but to utter, as the saying is, every cry, and to become an helper to the old legal saw, that there are gods, and such other things as you have discussed; and moreover, to aid both nature itself and art, by showing that they two exist by nature, or not less than nature, since they are the progeny of intellect, according to correct reasoning, which you seem to me to have stated, and as I now believe.

Athenian Stranger/ O thou most eager-minded Clinias, what, are not the matters thus spoken before the multitude difficult to follow up by arguments, and do they not possess a prolixity spoken with a clamorous voice?

Clinias/ But what, O guest, have we on the subject of drunkenness and music waited, while we were speaking at such a length, and shall we not wait while speaking on the subject of the gods, and such like matters? Moreover there will be the greatest assistance to the legislation, which is united to intelligence, because the ordinances relating to the laws being put into writing, will, as being about to afford a disproof, for all time remain perfectly quiet. So that we ought not to be alarmed, even if those things are at the commencement harsh to hear, which it will be in the power of a person, who is slow to learn, by frequently recurring to them, to look into; nor even, if they are prolix, yet useful, do they on this account possess no consideration; nor does it seem to me to be a holy thing for every person not to assist these assertions to the utmost of his power.

Megillus/ Clinias appears to me, O guest, to speak most excellently.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, very much so; and we must do as he says. For if assertions of this kind were not scattered, so to say? amongst all men, there would be no need of

arguments to prove that there are gods. But now this is necessary. To whom then does it pertain, more than to the legislator, to give assistance to the greatest laws, when corrupted by wicked men?

Clinias/ To no one.

Athenian Stranger/ But do you, Clinias, tell me again—for it behooves you to take part in the conversation—does not he, who mentions these things, namely, fire and water and earth and air, appear almost to consider them as the first of all things, and to call them nature, and to say that soul is a production subsequent to them? Does it seem that he not only appears to think so, but in reality signifies to us so much by his assertions?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Have we not then, by Zeus, discovered, as it were, some source of the stupid opinion of those men, who have ever touched upon inquiries relating to nature? Look into and examine the whole subject. For it is a matter of no small moment, if those, who meddle themselves with impious assertions, and are the leaders to others, are seen to employ arguments not correctly, but erroneously. Such to myself at present appears to be the case.

Clinias/ You speak well; but endeavor to show why so.

Athenian Stranger/ It seems then I must employ rather unusual arguments.

Clinias/ You must not, guest, hesitate. For I understand that you conceive you will travel out of legislation, if we handle reasonings of this kind. But if it is not possible to agree in any other way than this with what has been according to law just now stated, as being correct, on the subject of the gods, let us, O wonderful man, speak even in this way.

Athenian Stranger/ I will detail then some such reasoning as this, which, as it seems, is nearly not usual. The discourses, which have worked upon the soul of the impious, have shown that, what is the first cause of the generation and corruption of all things, was not produced the first, but subsequently, and that the subsequent was prior: from whence they have erred respecting the real existence of the gods.

Clinias/ I do not yet understand.

Athenian Stranger/ Almost all men, my friend, appear to have been nearly ignorant what the soul happens to be, and what power it possesses, with respect to other things belonging to it, and its generation besides—how that it is amongst the first of substances and before all, and that more than anything else it rules over the change and altered arrangement of bodies. And if this be the case, is it not necessary for things allied to soul to have been produced prior to those pertaining to body, through soul itself being more ancient than body?

Clinias/ It is necessary.

Athenian Stranger/ Now opinion, and care, and intellect, and art, and law, would be prior to things hard and soft, and heavy and light. And moreover the great and first works and doings of art would be amongst the first things; but those produced by nature, and nature herself, which they do not correctly call by that name, would be posterior to, and ruled by art and intellect.

Clinias/ How not correctly?

Athenian Stranger/ Because they are willing to say that nature is the generation relating to the first; and they place bodies amongst the first. But if soul shall appear to be first, and not fire or air, soul would be said with almost the greatest correctness to have been produced amongst the

first; and these will be pre-eminently by nature in this state, should anyone show that soul is more ancient than body; but otherwise not.

Clinias/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we then, after this, proceed to this very point?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But let us by all means guard against a deceitful reason, lest perchance, being of a youthful look, it persuades us old men improperly, and after escaping, makes us a laughing-stock; and lest we appear, after throwing ourselves upon greater things, to miss even the little. Consider then, if it were requisite for us three to pass a river, running with a strong current, and I, happening to be the youngest of us, and acquainted with many rivers, should say, —It is proper for myself to make an experiment the first, and, leaving you in safety, to ascertain whether it is fordable by you, older than myself, or how it is; and, on its appearing to be in that state, I were then to call upon you, and by my experience cause you to pass it together with myself; but if not fordable by you, for the danger to fall upon myself—I should appear to speak with moderation. So now, the future reasoning is of rather a violent kind, and perhaps nearly impassable, at least by your strength. Lest then it should cause in you a dizziness and giddiness, by being carried round, and put questions to you unaccustomed to give answers, and afterwards beget in you an unseemly and unbecoming conduct, it appears to me that I ought, in the present case, to do thus to myself, namely to interrogate myself, first, while you are hearing in safety, and after this to give the answer myself, and thus to go through the whole of the reasoning, until, as regards the soul, it is finished, and shows that soul exists prior to body.

Clinias/ You seem to us, guest, to speak most excellently; and do then as you are saying.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, if at any time we ought to call upon gods, let this be done so now; and let them be called on with all earnestness to the demonstration of their existence. And laying hold, as by some secure rope, let us mount up to the present reasoning. Now it appears to me that, when I am examined upon these points, I shall answer most securely after this fashion, to questions of this kind. When a person says—O guest, do all things stand still, and is nothing moved; or does quite the contrary to this take place? Or, are some things moved, but others remain fixed? To this I shall reply—Some things are moved, but others remain fixed. Do not then the things, which stand still, stand in a certain place; and are not the things, which are moved, moved in a certain place? How not? And some things would surely do so in one spot, but others in more than one. Are you speaking, we shall say, of the things, which, obtaining the power of such as stand in the middle, are moved in one spot, just as the circumference of tops, which are said to stand still, revolves? I do. And we understand that, in this circumference, the motion, which carries round the largest and the smallest circle, distributes itself proportionally in small and large circles, and is proportionally less and more. Hence it becomes the fountain of all wonderful things, proceeding with slowness and swiftness, that coincide with large and small circles, in a manner that one would expect to be an impossible occurrence. You speak most true. But by things that are moved in many places, you appear to me to mean such as are carried along by a movement, and pass from one place to another. And sometimes it is when they obtain the going of someone center, and sometimes more, by being rolled around, and meeting on each occasion with each, they are cut through by those that stand still; but

being in the middle and between things of this kind, they are mingled with each other, meeting from an opposite direction, and carried along to one point. I mean that these things are, as you say. And, moreover, the things that are mingled together, are increased; but when separated, waste away, when the existing condition of each remains; but when it does not remain, both are destroyed. But the generation of all things takes place, when what event occurs? It is evident that, when the commencement, after receiving an increase, arrives at the state of a second transition, and proceeding from this to that which is near, as far as three, it possesses sense in things sentient. Everything therefore is generated by this change and transition, and it exists in reality when it remains; but when it is changed into another condition, it becomes entirely destroyed. Have we not then detailed, O friends, the whole of motion in its species and numbers, except two?

Clinias/ Of what kind are those?

Athenian Stranger/ They are nearly those, my good man, for the sake of which has been the whole of our present inquiry.

Clinias/ Speak more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ It was surely for the sake of soul.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let then one motion be that, which is able to move other things, but is ever unable to move itself; and let the other be that, which is ever able to move both itself and other things, by a commingling and a separation, and by increase and the contrary, and by generation and corruption; and let this motion be different from all the other motions.

Clinias/ Be it so.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we not then place that motion as the ninth, which always moves another, and is moved by another; but the motion, which moves both itself and others, and which is adapted to all doings and sufferings, and which is truly denominated the change and motion of all things, shall we not call this almost the tenth?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But which of the ten motions shall we most correctly select as the most powerful of all, and pre-eminently effective?

Clinias/ It is necessary to say, that the motion, which is able to move itself, is superior ten thousand-fold, and that all the rest come after this.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak well. Must we not then alter one or even two of our present assertions, as having been made not correctly?

Clinias/ Of what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ That, which was stated respecting the tenth, was not correctly stated.

Clinias/ In what way?

Athenian Stranger/ According to reason, it is the first in generation and strength; but we hold, as second to this, that which comes after it, the tenth, although it has been just now absurdly called the ninth.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ Thus. When one thing moves another, and something else always moves the former, will there ever be amongst such things anything which first moves?

Clinias/ How can that, which is moved by another, ever be the first of things that cause an alteration?

Athenian Stranger/ It is certainly impossible. But when a thing, by moving itself, alters another thing, and this latter some other thing, and thousand things upon ten thousand become moved thus, will there be any other commencement of all the motion than the change of that, which moves itself?

Clinias/ You speak most beautifully; and on these points we must agree.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us speak still further in this way, and give an answer to ourselves. If all things that are produced should somehow stand still together, as the majority of such persons dare to assert they do, which of the above-mentioned motions must necessarily exist the first?

Clinias/ That surely which moves itself. For things will never change by a fall under another, when there has not existed previously a change by a fall in themselves.

Athenian Stranger/ We will say then that the commencement of all motions, and which first exists in things standing still and moved, is that, which moves itself; and that this is necessarily the most ancient and the most powerful change of all: but that the second is that, which is altered by another thing, and moves other things.

Clinias/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Since then we are at that point of our reasoning, let us likewise give an answer to this.

Clinias/ To what?

Athenian Stranger/ If perchance we should see this first motion taking place in a body formed of earth, or water, or fire-like, whether separate or mixed, what circumstance should we say was inherent in a thing of this kind?

Clinias/ Do you ask me, whether, when a thing moves itself, we should say it is alive?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes.

Clinias/ That it is alive. How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But what, when we see soul inherent in anything, must we admit that it lives through anything else than this?

Clinias/ Through nothing else.

Athenian Stranger/ Hold then, by Zeus. Would you not be willing to understand three things with respect to each thing?

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ One, the existence; and one, the definition of the existence; and one, its name; and that there are likewise two questions respecting everything that exists?

Clinias/ How two?

Athenian Stranger/ Sometimes each of us, when the name itself is proposed, inquires the definition; and sometimes, when the definition itself is proposed, we inquire on the other hand the name. Are you then willing for us to speak again of a thing of this kind at present?

Clinias/ Of what kind?

Athenian Stranger/ There is surely a twofold distinction in other things, and in numeration. Thus, for instance, in numeration, “even” is a name; but the definition is, a number divided into two equal parts.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ I mean some such thing as this. Do we not speak of the same thing in each way, when, on being asked the name, we give the definition, or, being asked the definition, we give the name? and when we call by the name of “even” a thing really the same, but by a definition divide a number as into two equal parts?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But what is the definition of that thing, to which there is the name of soul? Have we any other than what has been just now mentioned, I mean, the motion which is able to move itself?

Clinias/ Do you mean, that the thing, which moves itself, is the definition of that existence, which we all call by the name of soul?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, I do. But if this be the case, do we not still regret that it has not been shown sufficiently, that soul is the same with the first generation and motion of things which are, and have been, and will be, and, on the other hand, of all the contraries to these; since it has appeared to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?

Clinias/ No. For soul has been sufficiently shown to be the most ancient of all things, and the commencement of motion.

Athenian Stranger/ Will not then the motion, which exists in another through another, but which never causes a thing to be moved in itself, be the second in order? and ought it not to be placed after the former motion, by whatever interval of numbers anyone may choose to reckon, since it is the change by a truly soulless body?

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ Rightly then, and decisively, and most truly, and most completely, should we have said that soul was generated prior to body, and that body is posterior and secondary, as being according to nature ruled over by the ruling soul.

Clinias/ With the greatest truth indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ We surely remember, however, that we agreed on a previous occasion that, if soul should appear

to be more ancient than body, the things pertaining to soul would also be more ancient than those pertaining to body?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now conduct, and manners, and wishes, and reasonings, and true opinions, and attention, and memory, would have been generated prior to the length, and breadth, and depth, and strength of bodies, if soul be prior to body.

Clinias/ It is necessary.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it not then necessary after this to acknowledge, that soul is the cause of things good and evil, and of honorable and base, and of just and unjust, and of all contraries, if we lay it down as the cause of all things?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Is it not also necessary to assert, that soul, which administers and dwells in all things that are moved in every way, administers likewise the heavens?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ One soul, or many? Many; for I will answer for you. Let us not then lay down less than two, one the beneficent, and the other able to effect things of a contrary kind.

Clinias/ You speak very correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. Soul then leads everything in heaven, and on earth, and in the sea, by its movements; the names of which are, to will, to consider, to take care of, to consult, to form opinions true and false, to be in a state of joy, sorrow, confidence, fear, hate, love, together with all such primary movements as are allied to these, and which, receiving those of bodies that are secondary efficients, lead all things to increase and decay, and to rarefaction and condensation, and to things consequent upon these, such

as heat, cold, gravity, lightness, the hard and the soft, the white and the black, the sour and sweet, and the bitter, and all that Soul makes use of, when, being a goddess herself, she ever takes as an ally Mind, a god, and disciplines all things correctly and happily; but when with Not-Mind, it works out everything the contrary. Shall we lay down that such is the case? or do we still doubt whether the case is different?

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether then shall we say, that the genus of soul has a power over heaven and earth, and the whole circuit, as being intellectual and full of virtue, or as possessing neither of these qualities? Are you willing then for us to answer these questions thus?

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ If, let us say, O wonderful man, the whole path of heaven, and at the same time the progressive movement of all it contains, possess a nature similar to the motion and circulation and reasonings of Mind, and proceed in a manner allied to them, it is evident that we must say that the most excellent soul takes care of the whole world, and leads it along a path of that very kind.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ But if it proceeds in a mad and disordered manner, that the evil soul leads it.

Clinias/ And this too is correct.

Athenian Stranger/ What nature then does the motion of Mind possess? To this question indeed it is difficult, friends, to answer prudently. It is therefore just that I should for the present anticipate you in the answer.

Clinias/ You say well.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then not look, as it were, opposite to the sun, and, bringing upon ourselves night in mid-day, answer the question, as if we could ever sufficiently see and know Mind with mortal eyes: but one may see it more securely by looking to the image of the object of the question.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ From among those ten motions let us take one as an image, to which Mind is similar, which bearing in remembrance, I will in common with you give a reply.

Clinias/ You would speak most beautifully.

Athenian Stranger/ We remember, at present, so much at least of what was said formerly, that some of all things we laid down were moved, and others remained at rest.

Clinias/ We do.

Athenian Stranger/ But of things, which are moved, some were moved in one place, but others borne along in many.

Clinias/ They are so.

Athenian Stranger/ Of these motions, it is necessary for that, which is borne along in one place, to be moved round a certain middle point, in imitation of circles fashioned by a wheel, and that it is in every respect as much as possible allied and similar to the circular movement of Mind.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ In saying that both Mind and the movement borne along in one place, are moved according to the same, and in a similar manner, and in the same, and round the same, and towards the same, according to one reason, and one order, similar to the movements of a sphere made round by a turner, we should not appear to be at all indifferent workmen for beautiful similes in a speech.

Clinias/ You speak most correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ The motion, then, which is not borne along in a similar manner, nor according to the same, nor in the same, nor round the same, nor towards the same, neither in arrangement, nor in order, nor in one certain reason, will be allied to all Not-Mind.

Clinias/ It will so most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ It will then be now no longer difficult to assert distinctly, that since it is soul, which leads all things in a circular manner, we mast of necessity assert, that the best soul, or the contrary, leads round, and takes care of, and arranges the circular movement of heaven.

Clinias/ From what has been now stated, it is not, O guest, holy to say otherwise than that either one soul, possessing every virtue, or more souls, lead those things round.

Athenian Stranger/ You have listened, Clinias, to the reasons in the best manner; but listen still further to this.

Clinias/ To what?

Athenian Stranger/ If a soul leads round the Sun, and Moon, and the other Stars, does it not do so to each singly.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then direct our arguments to one luminary, that they may appear to suit all the stars.

Clinias/ Which one?

Athenian Stranger/ Everyone sees the body of the Sun, but not one its soul; nor the soul even of the body of any other animal, either living or dead; but there is a great hope that this genus of things, which is naturally altogether not perceptible by all the senses of the body, would be thoroughly perceptible by the Mind alone. Let us then take something of this kind in our thoughts respecting it.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ If soul leads the Sun, we shall perhaps not miss the mark by asserting that it does so in nearly one of these three methods.

Clinias/ What methods?

Athenian Stranger/ That either, residing within this apparent circular body, it entirely carries along a thing of that kind, just as the soul within us carries us around everywhere; or that, by supplying somehow from without a body of fire or air, as the doctrine is of some persons, it violently impels body with body; or thirdly, that being itself destitute of body, yet possessing certain other powers pre-eminently wonderful, it leads the way.

Clinias/ Yes, this is necessary, that a soul, by doing some one of these things, should lead through all.

Athenian Stranger/ And this too is surely better, for every man to consider this very soul as a god, which, keeping together the Sun, as a well-reined car, brings a dancing light to all the universe, whether derived from without, or in whatever manner, or by whatever road. Or how shall we say?

Clinias/ Yes, for every man surely, who has not arrived at the extremity of silliness.

Athenian Stranger/ But with respect to all the stars, and the moon, and years, and months, and all the seasons, shall we give any other account than this, that, since a soul, or souls, good in every virtue, are seen to be the causes of all these things, we will call them gods, whether they exist in bodies, as being animals, and put in order the whole of heaven, by whatever road or in whatever manner they do so? nor is there the person, who, assenting to this, would endure to say that all things are not full of gods.

Clinias/ There is not, O guest, a person so insane.

Athenian Stranger/ After assigning then limits to him, who at the former period conceived that gods do not exist, let us, Clinias and Megillus, free ourselves from this person.

Clinias/ What limits?

Athenian Stranger/ Either that he is to teach us we do not speak rightly, in laying down that soul is the first generation of all things, and such other points as follow upon this; or, if he is unable to assert anything better than we do, that he is to be persuaded by us, and live for the remainder of his life in the notion that gods do exist. Let us then see whether we have spoken sufficiently to those, who do not conceive that gods exist, or insufficiently.

Clinias/ Insufficiently, O guest, the least of all.

Athenian Stranger/ For these then let this be the end of our discourse. And let us thus soothe him, who conceives that gods exist indeed, but take no care of human affairs. Let us then say, O thou best of men, since you think there are gods, perhaps a certain divine relationship leads you to honor what is cognate, and to think it does exist; but the good fortune of evil and unjust men, both in private and public life, who, although not truly happy, yet are deemed to be very much so in common opinion, and are improperly hymned by the Muses, and in all kinds of compositions to boot, leads you not very sensibly to impiety. Or perhaps, on seeing that impious old men, after arriving at their end, have left behind them grandchildren in the greatest honors, you are disturbed for the present in all these matters; or learning by hearsay, or perhaps being altogether an eye-witness, you have met with many and dreadful impieties, that have occurred to some, who through such very acts have arrived from small means at despotic power and the greatest state. On account of all such events, you would then evidently be unwilling to blame the gods as the causes of such things,

through your relationship with them; but at the same time being led by a want of reason, and unable to feel an ill-will towards the gods, you have arrived at your present state, so as to think that they do indeed exist, but that they despise and neglect the affairs of men. In order then that your present opinion may not draw you in the direction of impiety to greater suffering, but that we may be able, as it were, to send it away, while advancing like a disease, by reasonings, let us endeavor to unite the reasoning next in order, with that, which we went through from the beginning, against the party, who held that gods did not exist at all, and to make use of it for the present. And do you, Megillus and Clinias, in succession, answer for the young man, as you did before; and if in our reasonings anything difficult occurs, I will, as I did just now, take hold of you and cause you to pass the river.

Clinias/ You speak correctly. And do you act in this manner, and we will, to the best of our power, do as you say.

Megillus/ But, perhaps, it would not be difficult to prove this at least, that the gods are no less attentive to small things than to such as are pre-eminent in greatness. For I surely heard and was present during what was just now aid, that they are good and possess every virtue, and have a care peculiarly their own of all things.

Clinias/ And I too heard it very distinctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then after this search out in common thus, by speaking of what virtue of theirs do we acknowledge that they are good. Come then, to be temperate, we say, and to possess a mind, belongs to virtue, but their contraries to vice.

Clinias/ We say so.

Athenian Stranger/ And that fortitude belongs to virtue, and cowardice to vice.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And shall we say that some of these are base, and others honorable?

Clinias/ Of necessity.

Athenian Stranger/ And shall we say that of such things those, that are vile, if vile they are, belong to us; but that to gods there is no share in aught that is great or small amongst things of this kind?

Clinias/ And this too everyone would acknowledge.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, shall we place carelessness, and idleness, and luxuriousness, as belonging to the virtue of soul? Or how do you say?

Clinias/ How can we?

Athenian Stranger/ But belonging to the contrary?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ The contraries therefore to these belong to that which is contrary.

Clinias/ To that which is contrary.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, would a person luxurious, and careless, and idle, whom the poet says is most like the bees without a sting, be wholly of such a kind amongst us?

Clinias/ Having spoken most correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ It must not then be said, that a god has a habit of such a kind that he himself hates it; nor must we overlook it, when a person attempts to say so much.

Clinias/ By no means. For how could it be said?

Athenian Stranger/ But of him, to whom it belongs pre-eminently to do, and to take care of, anything, does the mind take care of great things, but neglect small? And shall we not do wrong entirely in the case of a person by praising such an assertion? But let us view the matter in this way. Does

not he, who acts so, whether a god or a man, so act according to two kinds of acting?

Clinias/ What two?

Athenian Stranger/ We will tell you. Either because he thinks it of no consequence to the whole, when the small are neglected; or, if it is of consequence, he does through indolence and luxuriousness knowingly disregard them. Or does negligence take place in any other way? For surely, when it is impossible to take care of all things, there will not then be a neglect of things small, or great, in the case of the party not taking care of what either a god may be wanting in power or some trifling person unable to take care.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Now then let those two, who, although they both confess that there are gods, yet one says they are easy to be turned aside, and the other that they neglect matters of small moment, give an answer to us three. Do ye both assert, first that the gods know, and see, and hear all things, and that nothing of what there is a perception or knowledge can lie hid from them? Do ye say that such is the case? Or how?

Clinias/ That it is such.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, that they are able to do all things over which there is a power to mortals and immortals?

Clinias/ How will they not agree that such too is the case?

Athenian Stranger/ We five then have agreed that the gods are good and the best.

Clinias/ Entirely.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it not, then, impossible to confess that they do at all anything whatever through indolence and luxuriousness, since they are such as we confess they are?

For with us inactivity is the offspring of cowardice, but indolence of inactivity and luxuriousness.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now of gods not one is negligent through inactivity and indolence; for in cowardice surely they have no share.

Clinias/ You speak most correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ It remains then that, if they neglect things of little moment and size of those in the universe, they would do so either through their knowing that there is no need of taking care of things of this kind; or—what remains but to think the contrary?

Clinias/ Nothing.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether then, O thou most excellent and best of men, shall we put you down, as saying that the gods are ignorant, and through their ignorance neglect, when they ought to take care; or that, knowing what is proper, they do just as the weakest of mankind are said to do, when they know there are other things better to be done than what they are really doing, they do not do them through some failure, arising from pleasure or pain.

Clinias/ But how could there be ignorance?

Athenian Stranger/ Do not human affairs partake of a nature endued with soul? and at the same time is not man of all animals the most pious towards the gods?

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we assert that all mortal animals are the property of gods, to whom belongs the whole of heaven.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let then anyone say that these things are to the gods either small or great, it matters not; for on

neither ground would it be fitting for our owners, who are the most careful and the best, to neglect us. For let us, in addition to these points, consider still further this.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Respecting sensation and power, are they not naturally contrary to each other, with reference to easiness and difficulty?

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ To see and hear small things is more difficult than large. But on the other hand, to carry, and to rule over, and to take care of, small and few things, is for everyone more easy than in the case of their contraries.

Clinias/ Yes, more easy.

Athenian Stranger/ But when the whole of a thing is enjoined upon a physician, both willing and able to cure, will the whole itself ever be in a good state, while he is taking care of great matters, but neglecting parts that are small?

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ Nor will things many and large, apart from the few and small, be in a good state in the case of pilots, or army-leaders, or housekeepers, nor, on the other hand, of some statesmen, or any other person of such a kind. For masons say, that great stones do not lie well without small ones.

Clinias/ For how is it possible?

Athenian Stranger/ We will not then think it right for a god at least to be even more vile than mortal artificers; who, the better they are, by so much the more do they from one art bring out accurately and perfectly the works small and great, pertaining to their own trade; but that a god, who is most wise, and both willing and able to take care of things, does of things which, being small, it is easy to take care of,

take no care at all, like a person inactive or timid, or listless through labor, but only of things that are large.

Clinias/ Let us by no means, O guest, receive this notion, respecting the gods; for we should form a conception neither holy nor true.

Athenian Stranger/ We seem then, to myself, to have conversed in a very moderate manner with him who loves to find fault with the carelessness on the part of the gods.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ By forcing him through our reasoning to confess that he does not speak correctly. He seems however to myself to be still in want of enchantments by certain words.

Clinias/ Of what kind, my good man?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us persuade the young man by our reasonings, that by him, who takes care of the universe, with a view to the safety and excellence of the whole, everything has been arranged, each part of which, as far as possible, suffers and acts what is suited to it; and that over each of these parts rulers have been appointed with reference to even the smallest portion of action and passion, having worked out an end to the ultimate distribution; of which parts, even thy portion, O miserable man, is one, and although it is very small, it is continually stretching its view to the whole. But this very thing has lain hid from you, that all generation is for the sake of the whole, in order that the existence of the universe may be happy in its life, and not for the sake of you; but that you exist for the sake of the universe. For every physician, and every skillful handicraftsman, works out all things for the sake of the whole, stretching his view to that which is the best, taken in common; and he fashions a part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of a part. But you take it ill,

through not knowing that what is best with respect to yourself, happens both to the universe and yourself, according to the power of a common generation. But since a soul, connected at one time with one body and at another with another, undergoes all kinds of changes through itself, or through some other soul, nothing else remains for the player at pebbles than to place the habit, which has become better, into a better place, but the worse into a worse, according to the proper condition of each, in order that they may obtain their fitting allotment.

Clinias/ In what way do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I appear to myself to be speaking in that way, by which an inactivity on the part of the gods in taking care of all things would seem to have a reason. For if anyone, always looking to the whole, were to mold all things by changing their forms—for instance, water with a soul from fire, and either many things from one or one from many—participating in a first, or second, or even a third generation, the things relating to an altered arrangement would be infinite in number. But now there is a wonderful easiness to the party taking a care of the universe.

Clinias/ How again, say you?

Athenian Stranger/ Thus. After our king had seen all his actions, possessing a soul, and much of virtue existing in them, and much of vice, and both soul and body being a thing indestructible, but not eternal, like the gods, existing according to law, for there never would have been a generation of living beings, if either of these soul or body had been destroyed, —and that the thing which, as being a good in the soul, has been thought to be always naturally disposed to be of service, but that the thing which, as being an evil in it, has been thought to do mischief, —all this, when the king beheld, he planned, where each of the parts should

be situated, and cause virtue to gain the victory in the universe, and vice to suffer a defeat, in the easiest and best manner. He planned therefore generally this, how a thing, being generated of what kind, what seat it ever ought to share in, and in what place reside; but he left to the will of each of us the causes of generation of this or that. For wherever a person has a desire, and of what kind he may be as to his soul, there nearly on each occasion, and such becomes each of us, for the most part.

Clinias/ It is likely.

Athenian Stranger/ Everything then, that has a share of soul, is changed, and possesses in itself the cause of the change; but, when changed, it is borne along according to the order and law of fate. And of the manners such as being changed are less and less wicked, proceed along the superficies of the region; but those that are more changed and are more unjust, fall into a depth, and into the so-called places below, which persons, designating by the name of Hades, and what are close upon these appellations, greatly fear, and dream of, when living and freed from their bodies; but the soul when it partakes more of vice than of virtue through its will and intercourse becoming strong, when mixing with divine virtue, it becomes pre-eminently such, and it is changed to a pre-eminent place entirely holy, after being carried to some other better place; but when the contrary, it transfers its life to the contrary.

> This is the judgment of the gods, who hold
> Olympus—

O thou boy and youth, who thinkest that thou art neglected by the gods; for that the person, who has become more wicked, departs to the more wicked souls; but he, who has become better, to the better, both in life, and in all deaths, to suffer and do what is fitting for the like to do to the like.

But neither must you or anyone else pray, after becoming fortunate, to be superior to this judgment of the gods. For this judgment, pre-eminent above all, did those, who ordained, ordain, and it is meet to regard it carefully in every way. For you will never be neglected by it, not though you were so small, as to sink into the depths of the earth, nor so lofty, as to fly up to heaven; but you will suffer from them the fitting punishment, whether you abide here, or depart to Hades, or are carried to a place still more wild than those. And my language will be the same to you, as it was respecting those persons, whom you have seen becoming great after being small, and whom, after committing unholy acts, or doing something of that kind, you thought had become happy after being miserable. And then you conceived that you beheld in their doings, as in a mirror, the disregard of all things on the part of the gods, nor did you know in what way they pay up the full amount of their contribution to everyone; and to know that, think you, O most courageous of all men, is a thing of no consequence? which he who is ignorant of, will neither see a type of life, nor be able to contribute a discourse about it on the subject of happiness or an unhappy fortune. If then Clinias here, and the whole of this old assembly, are able to persuade you that you do not know what you are saying about the gods, a god himself will kindly give you his aid; but if you are still in want of a further reason, hear us, if you possess any mind whatever, while we are speaking to the third party. For that there are gods, and that they take care of men, I would say has been not altogether badly shown by us. But that the gods can be turned aside by receiving gifts from those who act unjustly, must not be conceded to anyone; but on the other hand, disproved by every means in our power.

Clinias/ You speak most beautifully; and let us do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Come, then, by the gods themselves, say if forsooth they are turned aside in what manner are they so moved; and who and what kind of beings are they? Now it is surely necessary for those to be rulers, who regulate continually the whole of heaven.

Clinias/ It is so.

Athenian Stranger/ But to what rulers are they like? or what rulers are like to them amongst such as it is in our power to meet with, while likening the less to the greater? Would such be either the rein-holders, while two-yoked cars are contending in the course, or the pilots of ships? Perhaps however they may be likened to certain leaders of armies. Or it would be possible to liken them to physicians, who have a prudent care respecting the war of diseases about bodies; or to husbandmen, who, in fear for the generation of plants, wait for the usual period of bad seasons; or to the superintendents of herds. For, since we have agreed amongst ourselves that heaven is full of many good things, and that there are some of the opposite kind, but the majority is of those that are not, we assert that a war of this kind is immortal, and requires a wonderful watching. The gods however, and at the same time dæmons, fight on our side; for we are the property both of gods and dæmons. But injustice and insolence together with imprudence corrupt us; whereas justice and temperance, united to prudence, which dwell in the soul-endued powers of the gods, preserve us. Now that some little portion of such properties resides in us, one may clearly see even in this way. Certain souls residing on the earth, and possessing an unjust disposition, it is plain, have a savage feeling towards the souls of their guardians, whether dogs, or shepherds, or in every respect the highest of all rulers. And falling upon these, they persuade them by flattering words, and some prayer-like enchantments—as say the reports of the wicked—that it is

lawful for them to possess a superfluity of power amongst men, and not to suffer anything. Now this superfluity, what is now denominated a sin, we surely say is called, in the case of fleshly bodies, a disease; in that of the seasons of the year, a pestilence; and in that of cities and polities, by giving again to this very word a change, injustice.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Such a reasoning as this it is, therefore, necessary for him to state, who asserts that the gods always pardon men unjust and acting unjustly, should anyone offer a part of his unjust gains, just as wolves give a small portion of their plunder to dogs, who, being softened down by gifts, allow them to seize upon the sheep. Is not this the assertion of those who say that the gods are easily turned aside?

Clinias/ It is this.

Athenian Stranger/ To which then of the aforesaid guardians would any man by likening the gods not become a laughing-stock? Is it to pilots, who turned aside;

By wine-libations and the scent of fat.

destroy both the ships and the sailors?

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ Nor yet to charioteers, who, when drawn up in order for contest, are induced by a bribe to give up the victory to the other two-yoked cars.

Clinias/ For in speaking such a speech you would speak of a dreadful likeness.

Athenian Stranger/ Nor yet to army-leaders, nor to physicians, nor to husbandmen, nor to shepherds, nor to certain dogs softened down by wolves.

Clinias/ Speak good words. For how could a person, by so likening them, not be a laughing-stock?

Athenian Stranger/ But are not all the gods the greatest of all guardians, and over the greatest affairs?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we then say that those, who watch over the most beautiful things, and over themselves pre-eminently, with a guard as respects virtue, are worse than dogs, and men of a moderate kind, who would never betray justice for the sake of bribes given in an unholy manner from unjust men?

Clinias/ By no means—such an assertion is not to be borne; and of those, who are engaged in every kind of impiety, he who lays hold of this opinion runs the risk surely of being most justly adjudged to be of all impious persons the worst and most impious.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us say, then, that the three subjects proposed, namely, that the gods exist and have a care of all things, and that they are not to be drawn aside by entreaties contrary to what is just, have been demonstrated sufficiently.

Clinias/ How not? and we give our votes together in favor of these reasonings.

Athenian Stranger/ The arguments have however been somehow stated with greater vehemence through the love of contention in bad men. But, friend Clinias, this love of contention has been indulged in on this account, that wicked persons may not imagine that, by being the masters in words, they have a license to do what they please, according to what and of what magnitude and of what kind they conceive of the gods. There has then arisen a readiness on this account, to speak in rather a novel manner. But if we have done even a little of moment towards persuading somehow the three men to hate themselves and to love

manners quite the reverse, the prelude to the laws relating to impiety will have been spoken by us to a good purpose.

Clinias/ There is a hope at least; but should the event be not so, this kind of discourse will bring no blame upon the lawgiver.

Athenian Stranger/ After the prelude, then, such a discourse as is the interpreter of the laws, would follow correctly, proclaiming to all impious persons, that they must stand apart from their depraved manners, and betake themselves to such as are pious. But against those, who are not persuaded, let this be the law relating to impiety. If anyone is impious in word or deed, let anyone who happens to be present repel him by giving information to the magistrates; and let the magistrate, who first hears of it, bring, according to law, the party before the court of justice appointed for such matters. But if any magistrate, on hearing of it, does not act so, let him be accused of impiety by anyone, who is willing to be the avenger on behalf of the laws. And if anyone is convicted, let the court of justice fix a fine against each person for each act of impiety. And let a prison in the case of all be assigned, since there are three prisons in the city; one in common for the generality of crimes committed about the Market-place, for the sake of safety to the majority of persons; another by the spot, where meetings take place at night, and which has the name of the House of Correction; and another in the middle of the country, where the locality is most solitary and wild, and having as an appellation of punishment some ill name. There being respecting impiety three causes which we have gone through; and since from each of such-like causes two are produced, there will be six kinds of crimes against the gods; which, as being worthy of a distinction, require neither an equal nor a similar punishment. For to him, who may think that gods do not exist at all, there may be a naturally just

habit of mind; and such become the haters of the wicked; and through their bearing ill with injustice, they do not give themselves up to committing actions of that kind, and they avoid the unjust, and love the just. But upon whom, in addition to their opinion that all things are destitute of the gods, there falls a want of self-control in pleasures and pains, and to whom there is present a strong memory and a quickness in learning, the notion that gods do not exist, would be one circumstance common to both; but in the mischief done to the rest of mankind, one effects less of evil, the other more; for the one would in word be full of a freedom of speech on the subject of the gods, and about sacrifices and oaths, and, laughing at the others, he would perhaps render the rest like himself, should he not meet with punishment. But the other, who thinks as the former does, is called by the vulgar clever, but is full of fraud and stratagem; from whom many diviners are produced, and such as are excited with respect to every kind of witchcraft; and sometimes, too, from them are produced tyrants, and mob-orators, and army-leaders; and those, who plot against private mysteries, and with the plans of men called sophists. Of these indeed there are many species. But two of them are worthy of legislation; one of which the ironic errs in a way to deserve not one or two deaths, but more; but the other requires admonition and bonds. In like manner the notion that the gods are careless produces two errors; and that they are easily turned aside, another two. Of these persons, so placed apart, such as have become so through folly, without a vicious frowardness and manners, let the judge appointed by law, put into the House of Correction, for not less than five years; and during that time, let no one of the citizens converse with them, except those, who participating in the assembly by night, associate for the purpose of admonition and the safety of the soul. And when the period of their

imprisonment expires, if anyone amongst them appears to be modestly behaved, let him dwell together with the modest; but if not, and he is again convicted on such a suit, let him pay the penalty of death. But such as, in addition to their believing that gods do not exist, or that they are careless, or easily turned aside, become brute-like, and despising mankind, allure the souls of many while living, and pretend they can allure too the souls of the dead, and promise they can persuade the gods, as bewitching them with sacrifices, and prayers, and incantations, and who endeavor by these means to destroy utterly individuals and whole families and cities, for the sake of their property; amongst these whoever shall be deemed to be convicted, let the court of justice determine that he is to be imprisoned according to law in the prison of the midland district; and let no free-man be ever allowed to visit him; but let the food, appointed for him by the guardians of the laws, be brought to him by servants; and, when he dies, let him be cast out, beyond the boundaries of the country, unburied; and if any free-men shall together bury him, let the party undergo the punishment for impiety through any person who is willing to obtain by lot a trial. If he leaves behind him children, sufficient for the state, let the guardians of orphans take care of these likewise, as being orphans not less than the others, from the day, on which their father was convicted.

But it is meet for a common law to be established in all these cases, such as shall cause the masses to behave less improperly towards the gods, both in word and deed, and may render them moreover less devoid of intellect, through not permitting them to attend to sacred matters in a manner contrary to law. Now let this law be laid down simply for all together. Let no one practice sacred rites in a private dwelling. But when it enters into the mind of anyone to sacrifice, let him go to the public buildings, and there

sacrifice; and let him place his offerings in the hands of the priests and priestesses, to whom the holy ritual is a care; and let him pray, both himself and whoever else may wish to join with him in prayer. And let this take place on this account. It is not easy to build temples and place statues of the gods; but to do such things correctly, is the work of some mighty intellect. But it is a custom with all women especially, and all men in sickness, or in danger, or in want, and, on the contrary, when they receive an abundance of anything, ever to consecrate that which is at hand, and to vow sacrifices, and to promise statues to the gods, and to dæmons, and to the sons of the gods; when they are awakened by frightful apparitions, and in dreams bring up the recollection of many visions likewise; against all of which things they endeavor to make for each of themselves remedies, by filling all the streets and all the villages with altars and chapels, and fixing them in purified places, and wherever a person has met with such events. On account of all which things it is meet to act according to the law now mentioned, and on account moreover of the impious; in order that they may not, after acting fraudulently by such doings, put up altars in their private dwellings; and, thinking to render the gods propitious by sacrifices and prayers in secret, increase injustice unlimitedly, and give rise to accusations on the part of the gods against them and those, who permitted them to do so, although the latter were themselves the best of all; and thus the whole city meet justly, after a certain manner, with mischief through the impious. The god, however, shall not blame the lawgiver. For let the law be laid down that no one is to have holy places in private houses; and the party, who is discovered as having other places and performing orgies, except such as are public, let the person, who is cognizant of it, denounce to the guardians of the laws; and let them, if a man or a woman

has it, not having committed any great or impious crime, order the parties to carry their private sacred affairs to the public places; and not persuading, let them punish with a fine, until they are carried. But, if anyone shall be conspicuously committing. not the impious deed of unholy boys, but of men, whether by sacrificing to the gods in private or in public temples, let him be condemned to death, as one who has sacrificed, not being pure; and let the guardians of the laws, after deciding, whether there is any impiety or not, on the part of the children, bring it before a court of justice, and thus put in their case a finish to the trial for impiety.

Book 11.

Athenian Stranger/ After these, the compacts with each other would require from us a suitable regulation. Now a thing of this kind at least is surely simple. Let no one touch, as far as possible, my property, nor disturb the least thing of mine, without previously persuading me; and may I, possessing a well-disposed mind, act in the same manner with respect to the property of others. Let us then, in the first place, speak about such a treasure, as a person not descended from my parents, has placed as a thing to be kept both for himself and those belonging to him, and which may I never pray to the gods to find, nor, on finding, to disturb; nor on the other hand to communicate with those called diviners, who in some sort advise me to take up the deposit put into the ground. For I should never be so much benefited by the possession of property, should I take it up, as I should increase in the virtue of the soul and in justice by not taking it to myself, and by acquiring one possession instead of another, a better in a better, and preferring justice in the soul to wealth, to hold it as a property in preference. For on many occasions it is well said—"Do not disturb what ought not to be disturbed—" and it may be said on this too, as being one of them. It is likewise meet to be persuaded by the stories told relating to these matters, that things of this kind do not contribute to the procreation of children. Now he, who is careless of children, and disregards the enactment of the lawgiver, and takes up that, which neither he nor his grandfather had deposited, such a one destroys the most beautiful and simple law, which has been laid down by a man, ignoble by no means, which says, "Thou shalt not take away that, which thou hast not deposited." What then he ought to suffer at the hands of the gods, who, disregarding these two lawgivers, takes up a trifling thing, which he did not deposit himself, but is sometimes a mighty treasure, the

god knows; but let us declare what he ought to suffer from men. Let him, who first sees the offender give information, if such an event happens in the city, to the City-Stewards; if in the marketplace of the city, to the Market-Stewards; and, if in any other part of the country, point him out to the Rural-Stewards and to their chiefs; and when the parties have been pointed out, let the city send to Delphi; and whatever the god gives as an oracle respecting the money and the person who has removed it, let the city perform, and be the minister to the oracle; and if the informer is a free-man, let him have a reputation for virtue; but, not informing, for wickedness; but if he is a slave, let him for informing be made, and justly so, free by the city, paying the value to his owner; but not revealing it, let him be punished with death. This enactment there would in due order follow this same law relating to matters great and small, so as to follow. If a man leaves any property of his own willingly or unwillingly, let him, who may happen to meet with it, suffer it to remain, conceiving that the Dæmon, who presides over roads, watches over things of this kind, that are dedicated to the deity by the law. When anyone shall be disobedient to the enactment, and, contrary to it, take up and carry home anything of little worth, let him, if a slave, receive many stripes from anyone not less than thirty years of age, who may happen to meet him. But, if he is a free-man, let him in addition to his being considered ungentleman-like and out of the pale of the law, pay as a fine to the party, who left it, ten-fold the value of what he took up. When anyone accuses another of detaining his property, whether it be much or little, and the party who detains it acknowledges that he has it, but denies that it is the other's property, if there be a written statement relating to the property laid before the magistrates according to law, let the plaintiff call the detaining party before the magistrate, and let the latter place

the property in court; and the matter being rendered clear, if the property mentioned in the written statement shall appear to belong to either of the contending parties, let him have it and depart. But if it belongs to some of those, who are not present, whichever party shall in favor of the absent owner produce trust-worthy bail, that he will deliver it up to him, let the party so producing the bail take the property away, according to the right of taking away in the absent party. But if the property in dispute be not stated in writing before the magistrates, let it lie under the charge of the three oldest magistrates until the trial; and if the property under security be a thing requiring food, let the party defeated in the suit respecting it, pay the magistrates for its keep; and let the magistrates decide the question within three days.

Athenian Stranger/ Let anyone who wishes, provided he is in his senses, take his own slave and treat him as he pleases, in whatever way it is holy, and let him on behalf of a relation or friend, for their security, lead the slave to punishment who has revolted. But if anyone takes away another person, as if the latter were a slave led away, on the ground of giving him freedom, let the party so leading let the other go; and let the person taking away, on producing three trust-worthy bail, take away on these conditions, but otherwise not. And if a person takes away contrary to these conditions, let him be amenable to the laws relating to acts of violence; and on being cast, pay to the party, who has taken away, double of the damage which has been stated in the pleadings. And let a person lead to punishment his freed-man, if he does not attend to those, who have made him free, at all or not sufficiently. Now the attention is in the freed-man going thrice in the month to the hearth of the party, who had made him free, and engaging to do whatever is requisite of acts just and in his power; and as regards marriage, to do whatever seems good to his lord. And let it

not be lawful for him to possess more wealth than the person who made him free; and let the overplus belong to his lord. And let a freed-man remain not longer than twenty years, but like the rest of strangers depart, taking his whole property with him, unless he can persuade the magistrates and the party who made him free. And if the property of a freed person, or of any other stranger, is more than that of the census, the third in magnitude, let him within thirty days from that on which this occurs take his property and depart; nor let there be granted to him by the magistrates a request for a further stay. And if anyone disobeys them, let him be brought before a court of justice, and after being convicted, let him be punished with death, and his wealth become public property. And let the suits in these cases be amongst the suits relating to parishes, unless the parties are previously freed from the accusations against each other in the presence of neighbors or chosen judges. And if anyone lays his hand upon an animal or anything else whatever, as being his own property, let him who has possession of it bring the claimant to the party who sold or gave it, being trust-worthy, and having the right to do so, or who handed it over in any manner with authority, in the case of a citizen, or a settler in the city, within thirty days, but in the case of a transfer by a stranger, within five months, the middle of which is the month in which the summer sun turns to the winter. And whatever articles one person exchanges with another by sale or purchase, let them thus make the exchange, by one party giving and the other receiving on the instant the value in the place appointed for each kind of articles in the market-place, and nowhere else; and let no one engage in the purchase or sale of an article on credit. But if anyone person barters with another anything whatever for anything whatever in any other manner or in any other place, by trusting the party, who is making the

exchange, let a person act in this way towards him, as no action will lie according to law, respecting articles, that have not been purchased according to what is here detailed. With respect to joint contributions, let any who is willing ask a contribution as a friend amongst friends; but if any difference arises respecting the payment of the contribution, let the parties act thus, as there will be no action against anyone on such matters. Whoever sells an article and receives for it a price of not less than fifty drachms, let him remain of necessity ten days in the city; and let the buyer know the residence of the seller, for the sake of the complaints which usually take place on such matters, and the return of the articles according to law. Now let the return or not, according to law, be in this way. If a person sells a slave laboring under a consumption, or the stone, or a strangury, or the disease called sacred, or any other malady not apparent to the many, of long standing and incurable, whether of the body or mind, if the sale be to a physician or a master of gymnastics, there is to be no return; nor yet, when the seller tells beforehand the whole truth to anyone; but if a handicraftsman sells to a person not in trade an article of such a kind, let the buyer return the article, except in the case of a slave affected with the sacred disease, within six months; but in the case of the disease, let it be lawful to make the return within a year; and let the matter be decided before some physicians, whom the parties may bring forward and select in common, and let the party defeated pay double the value for which the party sold it. But if a party not in trade sells to another not in trade, let the return and decision take place in the manner mentioned above; and let the party defeated pay simply the value. If anyone knowingly sells to another knowingly a slave, who has killed any person, let him have no return in the case of a purchase of this kind; but to a person not knowing, let there be a return then, when

any buyer becomes aware of it; and let the decision rest with the five youngest guardians of the laws; and if it is decided that the seller was cognizant of the fact, let a person purify the residence of the buyer according to the law of the sacred interpreters, and let the seller pay the purchaser triple the sum.

Let him who exchanges either money for money, or anything whatever for things of life or not of life, give and receive everything unadulterated, following out the law. Let us however receive a prelude, as in the case of other laws, so likewise with respect to the whole of this wrong. It is meet for every man to consider adulteration, and lying, and fraud, as forming one genus; to which it is usual for the multitude to apply the saying, although speaking improperly, that when such a conduct is adopted opportunely, on each occasion, it often turns out well. But as they leave the occasion, and the where, and the when, in an unregulated and undefined state, they do by this assertion much injury to themselves and to others. But it is not fitting for the legislator to leave this undefined; but he ought always to state clearly the greater and lesser limits. Let them be determined now. Let no one who is not about to be the most odious to the gods, perpetrate, either by word or deed, a falsehood, or fraud, or adulteration in anything, when calling to witness the race of the gods. Now such is in the first place he, who while swearing false oaths, thinks nothing of the gods; and secondly he, who speaks falsely before those who are better than himself. Now the better are superior to the bad, both the elder, to speak in general terms, than the younger, and parents better than their offspring, and men than women and children, and governors than the governed; all of whom it is becoming for all to reverence in every other government, and especially in political offices, for the sake of which the present conversation has come upon us. For

every one of those in the market-place, who by adulterating anything perpetrates a falsehood and a fraud, and calling upon the gods takes an oath, according to the regulations and precautions of the Market-Stewards, is a person who has no regard for men nor reverence for the gods. It is indeed a beautiful institution not to defile the names of the gods, while a person is taking it easily, as the majority of us do on each occasion as regards the greater part of a pure and holy conduct in what relates to the gods. If then a person is not persuaded by these reasonings, let this be the law. Let the seller of anything in the market-place never mention two prices of what he is selling; but after mentioning a simple one, if he does not meet with it, let him take the article back again, and justly so, nor value it for that day at a greater or less sum. Let puffing and oaths be absent in the case of everything sold. And if a person is disobedient to these enactments, let any citizen, not less than thirty years of age, who happens to be present, punish the party swearing, and strike him with impunity; and if he neglects to do so, and is himself disobedient to the law, let him be amenable to blame for his betrayal of the laws. And let him, who falls in with those who know the seller of an adulterated article, and unable to obey the present reasonings, if he is able himself to detect the party, expose the fraud before the magistrates, and if he is a slave or a settler, let him carry off the adulterated article. But let the citizen, who does not expose the fraud, be proclaimed a bad man, as one who defrauds the gods: but if he exposes it, let him offer up the adulterated article to the gods, who preside over the market-place. And let him, who has been discovered selling anything of this kind, in addition to his being deprived of the adulterated article, be scourged with as many lashes from a whip as there are drachms in the sum at which he valued the article, by the hands of the crier, proclaiming in the market-place

the reason of his being about to be whipped. And let the Market-Stewards and the guardians of the laws, after hearing from those who are skilled in each of the adulterations and evil practices of the sellers, write out what the seller ought and ought not to do; and let them, after writing down the laws that are to afford clear information to those engaged in business about the marketplace, put them upon a pillar before the court belonging to the Market-Stewards. But the particulars relating to the City-Stewards have been sufficiently detailed above. Should it however appear that anything more is wanting, let them communicate with the guardians of the laws, and writing down what seems to be wanting, let them place on a pillar at the court belonging to the City-Stewards, the first and second regulations, as laid down by their authority.

To the business of adulteration there follows on its heel those of the huckster's trade. But about the whole of this let us first give advice according to reason, and afterwards a law respecting it. For the whole of huckstering in a city does not exist for the sake of doing an injury, at least naturally, but the reverse. For how is not everyone a benefactor, who causes the existence of property of any kind soever, that is out of measure and unequably diffused, to become so equably in measure? This it is meet for us to acknowledge, and to work out the power of money; and it is necessary to say that the merchant is ordained for this; and the person who is hired, and the tavern-keeper, and other trades, that are some, more genteel, and some, less, have all this power, to show assistance to all in need, and to cause an equality in property. But let us see why this seems to be neither honorable nor becoming, and why it happens to lead to calumny, in order that, although we may not cure the whole by a law, yet we may at least a part.

Clinias/ This, as it seems, is no trifling matter, and requires no little virtue.

Athenian Stranger/ How say you, friend Clinias? A race of men small and naturally few, and brought up with a superior education, are, when they fall into want and a desire for certain things, able to bear up with moderation; and when they have it in their power to acquire great wealth, behave soberly, and prefer that, which borders on moderation, to excess. But the mass of mankind conduct themselves in a manner perfectly the reverse of this; for they desire without measure; and when they have it in their power to obtain a moderate gain, they prefer to have a gain that never satisfies. Hence all the races of men engaged in trades retail and wholesale, and as tavern-keepers, have been calumniated and subject to disgraceful reproaches. For should anyone—which never may it happen, nor ever will—compel—what it is ridiculous indeed to say, yet said it shall be—the best of men in every way to keep a tavern for a certain time, or to be a huckster, or to do anything of this kind, or even women the most holy through some necessity of fate, to take part in an employment of such a kind, we should know that each of these is honest and laudable, and that if they occurred uncorrupted according to reason, all such acts would be honored, as belonging to the character of a mother and a nurse. But now, since someone has for the sake of a retail trade established dwellings in solitary places, and, having in every direction a length of road, receives in much-desired resting-places those unable to proceed, or affords a warm and quiet spot to those driven by the violence of severe weather, and a cool one in hot; and afterwards having them received as friends, does not give them symbols of friendship subsequent to their reception, but, as if they were enemies taken in war and in their power, lets them go for a ransom very great, and unjust, and not to

be cleansed—these actions and such as these, having been disgracefully committed by all persons of this kind, have correctly furnished a ground of calumny against the assistance given to distress. Against these the lawgiver ought therefore to prepare a remedy. For the saying of old is correct, that against two opposite things it is hard to fight, as in the case of diseases and many other things. But at present the contest is against these two things, poverty and wealth; the latter of which corrupts the soul of man through luxury, while the former turns itself through pain to shamelessness of every kind. What protection, then, will there be against this disease in a state endued with intellect? In the first place, let it make use, to the utmost of its power, of the fewest in number of the race of hucksters; next, we enjoin such trades upon some of those persons, from whose corruption there would be not a great mischief to the state; and thirdly, to discover a plan in the case of those, who take a part in these occupations, how their morals may not happen to become freely partakers in impudence and in feelings unfitted for free-men. Let then, after what has now been stated, a law of this kind take place, with a good fortune relating to these matters. Of the Magnesians, whom a god is again raising up and settling into a colony, let no one amongst such as have a share in the land, and possess hearths amounting to five thousand and forty, either willingly or unwillingly become a retail or wholesale dealer, nor hold any situation whatever under individuals, who are not upon an equality with himself, except under a father or mother, and those who are still higher up in birth than these, and all who are older than himself, and live like free-men in a free manner. It is not however easy to legislate for what is gentleman-like or ungentlemanly. Let however a distinction be made by those, who have obtained the prize of excellence, by their hatred and reception of these doings

respectively. Let then anyone, who is willing, indict, on the charge of disgracing his family, the person, who takes a part in any trickery of an ungentlemanly huckstering; and if he shall appear to have defiled his paternal hearth by any unworthy employment, let him, after being in bonds for a year, abstain from such employment; and if he does so again, for two years; and on each conviction let him not cease doubling the previous period. A second law ordains, moreover, that a person must be a settler or a stranger, who is to follow a retail trade. And a third one ordains this the third, in order that the best character, or one the least improper, may be a fellow-dweller in the city, that it is requisite for the guardians of the law to consider that they are the guardians not only of those, whom it is easy to guard against, when acting contrary to the law, and becoming wicked—such, I mean, as are well born and have been well brought up—but that they ought to guard still more against persons, who are not of such a kind, and who follow pursuits, that possess a powerful incentive to their becoming bad. Such then are the circumstances relating to retail trade, which is extensive, and embraces many occupations. Respecting then such of these, as may be left, through their being thought to be, from a great necessity, requisite in a state, it behooves the guardians of the laws to come again together with those skilled in retail trades, as we before enjoined in the case of adulteration, an occupation allied to this; and, after coming together, to see what receipts and outlay produce a moderate profit to the retail dealer; and after writing down the outlay and receipts, to lay down the result, and, to watch over it, in some matters the Market-Stewards, in others the City-Stewards, and in others the Rural-Stewards. And thus will retail trading be of service in some points on nearly every occasion, and be of the least disservice to those, who make use of it in states.

Whatever compact a person acknowledges to have made, if he does not act according to the acknowledgment, except in cases where laws or a decree prevent him, or where he has made the acknowledgment through being compelled by some unjust necessity, or if he is prevented unwillingly by an unexpected accident, let an action lie against him in the legal suits relating to the tribes, for an acknowledgment not completed in other respects, unless the parties are able to come to a reconciliation previously, in the presence of arbitrators or neighbors. The race of artificers is sacred to Hephaestus and Athéné, who jointly fit up our life by their arts; while, on the other hand, they, who preserve the works of artificers by other arts of a defensive kind, are sacred to Ares and Athéné. And justly too is this race sacred to those gods; for all these are through life attending to the country and people; some by presiding over the contests of war; others by bringing to an effect the production by hire of instruments and works; to whom it would not be a becoming act to tell a falsehood about these matters, while reverencing the gods, their progenitors. If then any operative shall, through improper conduct, not complete his work by the stated time, and, paying no reverence to the god, who is the giver of life, conceive, seeing nothing with his mind's eye, that a god, as being of his own kindred, will pardon him, such a one will, in the first place, suffer punishment from the god himself; and secondly, let a law be laid down conformably to this; and let him be bound to pay the value of the work, of which he has defrauded by a falsehood the party, who gave it out; and let him complete it again from the commencement within the stated time gratuitously. And as the law has advised the seller not to make an attempt on the purchaser by valuing an article at more than its worth, but in all simplicity at its worth—for the operative knows the value—so does it advise in the case of a person undertaking

a job, and gives the same order. In cities, therefore, of free-men, it is not meet for the operative himself to make an attempt upon unskilled individuals by his own skill in an art, which is a thing naturally clear and devoid of falsehood; but it is meet for an action to lie on this ground in behalf of the person injured against the party doing the wrong. If then anyone, after giving out work to an operative, does not pay him his wages, according to the agreement legally drawn up, but by dishonoring Zeus, the guardian of the city, and Athéné, both sharing in the polity, and, by being in love with a little gain, shall loosen great societies, let there be a law to assist, conjointly with the gods, the binding together of the state. For let him, who, after he has bargained for work and got hold of it, does not pay the wages at the time agreed upon, be sued for double the amount. And if a year has elapsed, while all the other monies are without interest, which a person confers as a loan, let him put down the interest at the rate of an obolus, for a drachm monthly, and let the cause be tried in the courts of justice belonging to the tribes. As, however, we have made mention incidentally of those, who in war are the workers of safety, and of army-leaders, and such as are artists in these matters, it is only just to say that we have been reminded of operatives altogether, as in the case of these being again, like those, as it were other operatives. If then anyone even of these undertakes a public work, either voluntarily or from a command, and executes it beautifully, and the law justly pays him in honors, which are the wages of men skilled in war, such a law one will never be tired of praising; but he will blame it, if it does not pay, after it has bargained for and got hold of any work of those works that are beautiful in war. Let then this law mingled with praise be laid down by us respecting these matters, in the form of advice, and not of compulsion, to the mass of the citizens, namely, to pay

secondary honors to brave men, who are the saviors of the whole state, whether by their velour, or by stratagems in war; for let the greatest guerdon be given to those the first, who have been able to honor pre-eminently the writings of good legislators.

The greatest of compacts, that men have with each other, except such as relate to orphans, and the guardians of orphans, have been laid down by us in due order, in nearly the best manner. It is necessary however, after what has been now detailed, to arrange these matters at least in some manner. Now of all these is the desire of those about to die respecting their will, and the circumstances of those who have made no will. I have said it is necessary, Clinias, from looking at the harsh and difficult temper of such persons; nor is it possible to leave the point unarranged. For each party would, previous to his being about to make his will, introduce many clauses at variance with each other, and contrary to the laws, and the manners of the living, and their progenitors, if one gave a power for a will to be effective, simply in the manner, that a person may have made it in whatever state he might be towards the end of life. For most of us, when we think we are about to die, are in a certain manner silly in mind, and broken down in spirit.

Clinias/ How say you this, O guest?

Athenian Stranger/ A man, Clinias, when about to die, is morose, and full of language very terrible to legislators, and difficult to treat with.

Clinias/ In what way?

Athenian Stranger/ Seeking to be the master of all things, he is wont to speak with anger.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ It is a shocking thing, O ye gods, says he, if I am not permitted to give my property to whomsoever

I please, and not to one person more, and to another less, amongst such as have evidently behaved ill or well towards me, after they have been tested sufficiently, some during my disorders, and others during my old age, and in other circumstances of various kinds.

Clinias/ Does he then, O guest, not appear to you to speak correctly?

Athenian Stranger/ The lawgivers of old appear to me, Clinias, to have been cowards, and to have legislated, while they were looking to and thinking upon a trifling portion of human affairs.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ Terrified at this language of the dying man, they laid down this law, that it should be lawful for anyone to dispose of his property without exception entirely as he pleased. But I and you will answer those in your state about to die, in a more careful manner.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ O friends, we will say, who exist really but for a day, it is a difficult thing for you to know your own affairs, and yourselves to boot, as the writing of the Pythian priestess says at present. I, therefore, as being a legislator, lay down that neither yourselves are your own property, nor this substance of yours, but that they belong to the whole of your family, both past and to come; and further still, that both the whole of your family and substance belong to the state; and this being the case, should anyone by flattery insinuate himself into your favor, either during a disorder or when you are tost about by old age, and persuade you to dispose of your property by will in not the best manner, I shall not willingly agree to it; but looking to all that is the best both for the whole state, and your family, I will lay down laws by justly putting to a less account that which belongs

to each individual. May you, therefore, be mild and well-disposed towards us, and proceed in the path, in which you are now, according to man's nature, journeying; while of the rest of your concerns it will be for us to be the guardians, by taking, to the utmost of our power, a care of everything, and not of merely some, but not of others. Let this then, Clinias, be the consolation for the dead, and for the living this the prelude of the law; but this the law itself.

Let him, who makes a will, disposing of his property, if he is a father of children, appoint first whichever of his sons he thinks proper to be his heir, but of his other children whichever he gives to another person to adopt, let this too be written down. And if any of his sons survive him, after having been adopted, but not with any heir-property, and of whom there is an expectation that he will be sent to a colony according to law, let the father be permitted to give him from his other property what he pleases, except the paternal allotment, and all the chattels belonging to it. And if there are more children, let their father distribute in shares the remainder of the allotment in whatever manner he pleases. But whichever of the sons possesses a house, let him not leave to such a one any money. To a daughter, in like manner, to whom a man has been affianced, that he may be about to be her husband, let him not give a share; but to her, who is not betrothed, let him give a share. And if any allotment in the country shall be found to be in the hands of any of the sons or daughters, after the will has been made, let it be left for the heir of the party who has made the will. And if the testator has no sons, but daughters, let him write down what man he would wish as the husband for any of his daughters, and as the son-in-law for himself. And if the son of anyone, whether natural or adopted, happens to die before he could be enrolled amongst men, let the testator mention this circumstance in the will, and signify whom he wishes to

be his son in his stead with better fortune. And if anyone without children makes a will, let him select the tenth part of his property, beyond the allotment, and give it to whom he pleases; but all the rest let him give without blame to his adopted son, and make for himself, according to law, a son kindly disposed. And in the case of a person whose children require guardians, if, after having made his will, he dies, and has mentioned as guardian for his children parties of the number and kind he wishes, and who are willing and agree to act as guardians, let the selection of the guardians be according to what has been written down in full force. But if a person dies intestate, if there is anything deficient in the selection of the guardians, let the next of kin, two on the father's side, and two on the mother's, and one from among the friends of the deceased, have power to act as guardians; and these let the guardians of the law appoint as guardians to any orphan, who is in want of them. And of the whole care of orphans, let fifteen of the guardians of the laws, who are the oldest, have the charge ever according to seniority; and having divided themselves into threes, let three act in one year, and in another year three others, until the five periods are accomplished in a circle; and let no one fail in this duty to the best of his power. But should anyone die without having made a will at all, and leave children that require a guardian, let the indigent state of the children share in the same laws. And should anyone, meeting with an unexpected misfortune, leave behind him daughters, let him pardon the legislator if, looking to two things out of three, namely, proximity of race, and the preservation of the allotment, he makes provision for the giving the daughters in marriage; but the third point, to which the father would have attended, namely, by looking to habits and manners, to select from all the citizens a fitting son for himself and a husband for his daughter, he omits, through the consideration of it being an

impossibility. Let then this law be laid down relating to matters of this kind. If anyone, dying intestate, leaves behind him daughters, let the brother or! the father's or mother's side, if he is without an allotment, take the daughter and the allotment of the deceased. But if there is not a brother, let a brother's son do so in like manner, if the cousins are of a sufficient age. And if there is not one of these left, let the son of the father's sister act in the same way, and let the fourth after these be the father's brother; the fifth, the son of this brother; and the sixth, the son of the father's sister; and in like manner let the race be continued perpetually by consanguinity, if a person leaves behind daughters, proceeding through brothers and cousins, first the males, and afterwards the females, in one family. And let the judge on reflection determine the fitness or unfitness of the time of marriage, by looking at the males naked, and at the females naked, as far as the navel. And if there is a want of kindred to families, as far as the sons of brothers, and as far too as the children of grandfathers, whomsoever of the other citizens, being willing, the girl shall of her own free-will select, with the consent of her guardians, let that person become the heir of the deceased, and the husband of his daughter. Further still, there might be a great want of many things, and a still greater of persons of this kind, at some time in this very state. Should then a female, being in want of nuptials, see anyone going from hence to a colony, and it is in her mind for that person to be the heir of her father's property, provided he is a relation, let him enter upon the allotment according to the arrangement of the laws. But if he is out of the family, those in the city being out of relationship, let him have the power, through the selection of the guardians and of the daughter of the deceased, to marry her, and returning home, to take the allotment of the intestate. And if anyone, who has no male or female children

at all, dies intestate, let other matters hold good respecting such a person, according to the aforesaid law; but let a female and a male go, as joint-sharers, from his family to the dwelling, on each occasion deserted; and to them let the allotment belong as owners; and let a sister enter first; a brother's daughter, second; a sister's offspring, third; a sister of the father, fourth; a daughter of the father's brother, fifth; and a daughter of the father's sister, sixth. Let these females live together with those males according to affinity and lawfulness, as we have previously laid down by law. Nor let the weighty nature of laws of this kind lie hid from us, that sometimes it harshly ordains the relation of a deceased person to marry a relation. For he who introduces a law of this kind, does not appear to consider that ten thousand impediments arise, so as to render a person unwilling to comply with mandates of this kind; and that there are those, who would suffer anything whatever, when diseases and maimings in body or mind come upon some of those ordained by law to marry, or be married. The legislator then will perhaps seem, not correctly so, to some, to pay no regard to these matters. Let this then be stated, as if it were a prelude in common, both for the lawgiver, and the party to whom laws are given; which requests those under laws to grant a pardon to the legislator, because, while he is taking care of public concerns, he cannot at the same time regulate the circumstances that occur to each individual likewise; and, on the other hand, the legislator to grant a pardon to those under laws; since they are sometimes unable, and reasonably so, to perform the commandments of the legislator, which, ignorant of private circumstances, he has ordained.

Clinias/ By doing what then, O guest, will a person be the most in measure in such a case?

Athenian Stranger/ It is necessary, Clinias, to choose arbitrators between laws of this kind, and for those governed by them.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ Sometimes the son of a rich father would not be willing to marry the daughter of his uncle, through being given to luxury and keeping his thoughts upon a greater connection; and sometimes too, while the legislator is enjoining the greatest calamity, he would be compelled by necessity to disobey the law, which forces him to accept an alliance with a mad woman, or other terrible calamities of body or soul, and by possessing them, to live a life not to be endured. Let then this law, which has been just now spoken of, be laid down by us. If any persons find fault with the laws laid down relating to wills and anything else whatever, and marriages to boot, by saying that if the legislator himself were present and living, he would never compel a person to act thus, nor would those compelled to marry, or to be married, do either; or should any of the family or any guardian assert, that as the lawgiver had left the fifteen of the guardians of the laws to appear as arbitrators and parents to male and female orphans, to these let those go, who are contesting about any of such like matters, and by them be adjudged, and bring to an end their decrees as being decisive. But should it seem to anyone that too great a power has been given to the guardians of the law, let him carry the matter to the tribunal of selected jurymen, and decide the question about contested points; and upon him, who is defeated by the legislator, let blame and reproach lie, a fine in the eyes of him, who possesses a mind, more heavy than a mass of money.

And now there would be, as it were, a second birth to orphans. After the first the nurture and education for each have been spoken of. But after the second, rendered desolate

by the want of fathers, it is meet to devise by what means the misfortune of their orphanhood may excite the least possible pity for their misfortune in the case of those who have become orphans. First then, we assert that we assign by law to them the guardians of the laws to be not worse parents, in the place of those who begat them; and we ordain moreover, that for each year they take a care of them, as if they were their own. And such is the prelude we have given with care to them and the guardians, relating to the bringing up of orphans. For we appear to have detailed at some fitting time in the previous discourse, how that the souls of the dead possess a certain power, by which they attend to human affairs. On this point indeed the reasons are true, but long, through the going round about. It is necessary likewise to believe in the other traditions relating to matters of this kind, which are so numerous and very old; and to believe too in those who legislate, unless they seem to be altogether insane, that such is the case. If then such is naturally the case, let persons fear in the first place the gods above, who have a perception of the desolate state of orphans; next, the souls of the dead, to whom in the course of nature it belongs to have a care of their own offspring, and to be kind to those who do them honor, but hostile towards those who treat them with dishonor; and further still, the souls of those who are living, but in old age, and in the greatest honors; for to whom there is a state under good laws and prosperous, their children's children live a pleasant life, through paying them a proper attention. For all those acutely hear and acutely see everything relating to these matters, and are kind to those who act justly to these persons, but excessively angry, on the other hand, with those, who behave insolently towards orphans and the destitute; since they deem such a state to be a deposit the greatest and the most sacred. To all of which points it is meet

for the guardian and magistrate, who possesses the smallest degree of intellect, to direct his attention, and by bestowing his care upon the bringing up and education of orphans, to pay, as it were, a contribution for the benefit of himself and children, and to confer wholly a kindness to the whole of his power. He then, who is persuaded by this story before the law, and does not behave insolently towards an orphan, will never know distinctly the anger of the legislator about matters of this kind. But let him, who is unpersuaded and does an act of injustice to one deprived of father and mother, suffer a punishment entirely the double of what he would have done from acting evilly to a party whose parents are both alive.

With regard to the remaining portion of legislation applicable to guardians, in the case of orphans, and to magistrates touching their supervision of guardians, if they had not themselves a pattern for bringing up free children, in bringing up their own, and taking care of their own property, and laws relating to these very matters stated in moderation, there would have been some reason to lay down certain laws for guardians, as differing very much individually from others, and causing to vary by individual pursuits the life of orphans from that of those who are not so. But now, with respect to everything of this kind, the care of orphans does not with us differ much from paternal care; but it is unwilling to be equalized in honor, and dishonor, and in attentiveness. Hence as regards this very point the law has, by consoling and threatening, attended to the legislation relating to orphans; and further still, a threat of this kind would be very seasonable. Let him, who is the guardian of a female or a male, and him, who is appointed by the guardians of the law to watch over the guardian, love, not less than his own children, the party who has a share in the misfortune of an orphan; nor let him pay less attention

to the property of the party brought up than to his own, but better than according to the forethought shown to his own. Let then everyone act as a guardian while having this one law relating to orphans. But if anyone acts otherwise and contrary to this law in affairs of this kind, let the magistrate fine the guardian. And let the guardian bring the magistrate, who has acted contrary to the law, before the tribunal of select jurymen, and punish him if convicted with a fine, that shall have seemed good to the tribunal, two-fold. And if the guardian shall appear to the kindred of the orphans, or to any other of the citizens, to act negligently or viciously, let such party bring him before the same tribunal; and in whatever sum he shall be cast, let him pay the quadruple, and let one half belong to the child, and the other to the party who brought the charge forward. When an orphan arrives at puberty, if he thinks that he has been badly treated by his guardian, let him be allowed to obtain by lot a trial relating to guardianship up to five years from the close of the guardianship; and if any guardian is found guilty, let the court of justice fix what he is to suffer in person, or pay in purse; and if any magistrate shall appear to have injured an orphan through negligence, let the court of justice fix what he is to pay the child; and if through injustice, in addition to the fine, let him be removed from the office of a guardian of the law; and let the common power of the state appoint another in his place for the country and the city.

Greater differences take place between fathers and sons and between sons and fathers, than is proper; in which fathers will think that the legislator ought to permit them to renounce, if one wishes it, a son by the public crier, and to say he is no longer his own according to law; and sons, on the other hand, that they ought to be allowed to indict their fathers on the charge of silliness, when they are disgracefully in that state through disease or old age. Now these things

are wont to take place, when the morals of men are perfectly corrupt. For on the half only of these evils taking place, as in the case of a wicked parent and child, or the contrary, calamities, which are the progeny of such a mighty hatred, have no existence. Indeed, in any other polity, a son disowned by his father would not necessarily become cityless; but in a state, where these are the laws, it is a matter of necessity for the fatherless to settle himself in some other place; since it is not possible for a single one to be added to the five thousand and forty households. On this account it is necessary that the son, who shall suffer this justly at the hands of one person, his father, should be renounced by his whole race. It is meet then, in relation to matters of this kind, to act according to some such law as this. For him, upon whom a feeling by no means fortunate has come, whether justly or not, in his desire to release the party, whom he has begotten and brought up, from a relationship to himself, let it not be lawful to do so upon slight grounds, nor on the instant; but let him first bring together his own relations up to cousins, and in like manner those of his son on the mother's side; and let him accuse his son before them, and show that he deserves on all accounts to be expelled from the family; and let him allow his son to give reasons of equal weight to prove that he does not deserve to suffer anything of that kind; and if the father can persuade them, and get to vote on his side more than half of all the relations, except the father, mother, and the son himself, and of the rest such as are complete women and men, in this way and under these regulations let it be lawful for the father to renounce his son; but otherwise not; and if any of the citizens is willing to adopt as his son the party so renounced, let no law prevent him from so adopting him. For the habits of youth naturally undergo many changes continually in life. But if during ten years no one wishes to

adopt the renounced party as a son, let the curators of the superabundant population that is fit for a colony, look to these likewise, in order that they may have a share in the same colony in a proper manner. But if disease, or old age, or harshness of manners, or all these together, more than anything else, cause a person to be pre-eminently beyond the majority out of his mind, and this is concealed from everyone, except those who live with him, and, as being the master of his property, he brings his family to ruin, but his son hesitates and fears to bring a charge of silliness, let a law be first laid down in this case, that the son is to go to the oldest guardians of the law, and inform them of his father's calamity; and let them, when they have seen him sufficiently, take counsel together, whether the suit is to be entered upon or not; and if they together advise a suit, let them be both witnesses and parties in the cause. And if the father is condemned, let him for the remainder of his time be without the power of disposing by will of even the smallest portion of his property, but dwell at home for the rest of his life, like a child.

If a husband and wife cannot, through the misfortune of their tempers, agree with each other, it will be requisite for ten men, from amongst the guardians of the laws, as mediators, and similarly ten women, who are the curators of marriages, to have the care of matters of this kind; and if they are able to reconcile the parties, let their decision be valid. But if their minds swell rather violently, like waves, let them seek, to the best of their power, such persons as will reside with either party; and as it is likely that such persons are not tempered by gentle manners, it is meet to endeavor to fit to them social habits and manners of greater weight and mildness, and that such as, being without children, or having but a few, disagree, should, even for the sake of children, make for themselves a joint-dwelling. But it is meet

for such as, when there is a sufficient number of children, to make for themselves a separation and an union, for the sake of a joint old age, and a care for each other. If a woman dies, and leaves behind her male and female children, let the law laid down advise, but not compel, the husband to bring up the children, and not bring upon them a stepmother; but if there are no children, let him of necessity marry, until he has begotten children, sufficient both for his household and the state. But if the husband dies, and leaves behind him a sufficient number of children, let the mother of the children remain a widow, and bring them up. But if she seems to be younger than is fitting for a person to live in a state of health without a husband, let her kindred, communicating with the women who take care of marriages, do what seems good to themselves and the women touching matters of this kind; and if they are in want of children, even for the sake of children; and let an exact sufficiency of children be considered, according to law, a male and a female. When it is agreed that an offspring is the progeny of the adopters, but there is a need of a decision, as to which of the parents the child ought to follow, if a female slave shall have had connection with a slave, or with a freeborn person, or with a freed-man, let the offspring be the property of the master of the female slave; and if a free-born woman shall have had intercourse with a slave, let the offspring belong to the master of the slave. If a slave becomes pregnant by her master, or a mistress by her slave, and this becomes apparent, let the women send the offspring of the woman, together with the father, into another country; but let the guardians of the law send away the offspring of the man together with its mother.

To have a neglect of parents neither a god nor a man, who has any mind, would ever advise anyone. And it is necessary to consider that a prelude of this kind would be relating to

the ministering to the gods, having been properly regulated touching the honors and dishonors shown to parents. Now laws have been of old laid down relating to the gods amongst all men in a two-fold manner. For seeing clearly some of the gods, we honor them; but of others we place statues as resemblances; which while we are honoring, although not endued with life, we do not vainly imagine that the gods, who are endued with life, feel a great goodwill on this account, and gratitude towards us. Let not then anyone, whose father or mother, or the fathers or mothers of these, lie in his house, like a deposit, worn down with old age, ever conceive that while he has such a possession at his hearth and in his house, there will be ever a statue more powerful, if only the possessor ministers to it in a proper manner.

Clinias/ What is the propriety which you say exists?

Athenian Stranger/ I will tell you. For things of this kind, friends, it is fit to hear.

Clinias/ Only mention it.

Athenian Stranger/ We say that Œdipus, having been dishonored by his children, imprecated upon them what everyone celebrates in hymns, as having come to pass and being heard by the gods. Amyntor too is said to have cursed in anger his son Phœnix, and Theseus too Hippolytus, and innumerable other fathers innumerable other sons. From which it has become manifest that the gods hearken to parents when praying against their children. For a parent is to his children, as no one else is to other persons, when imprecating a curse, most justly pernicious. Nor let anyone imagine, that for a deity to be hearkening to the prayers of a father and mother, when dishonored pre-eminently by their children, is according to nature; for when a parent is held in honor, and has become very joyous, and on this account is earnest in prayer and is calling upon the gods for good things

to his children, shall we not imagine that they equally hear and grant us their requests? For otherwise they would not be just distributors of what is good—an act, which we say becomes the gods the least of all.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us think then, as we observed a little before, that we could not possess a statue more honored by the gods, than that of our father and grandfather, worn down by old age, and of mothers and grandmothers, possessing the same want of power; which when anyone honors, the god is glad; for otherwise he would not hear them. For the statues of our progenitors still living are wonderfully superior to those without life. For those, which are animated, do, when ministered to by us, pray for us on each occasion; but the very contrary when they are held by us in dishonor. But the inanimate do neither of these. So that he, who behaves properly to his father and grandfather, and all persons of this kind, would possess the most powerful of all statues, as regards his portion of life beloved by the gods.

Clinias/ You speak most beautifully.

Athenian Stranger/ Everyone therefore, who has any mind, fears and honors the prayers of his parents, as knowing that they have come to pass to many persons and at many times. Since then this is the ordinance of nature to good men, their aged progenitors will be a god-send, when living to the extremity of life, and young persons, when they depart, be a source of great regret; but to the bad, on the contrary, very terrible. Let then everyone, persuaded by these reasonings, honor his parents with all lawful honors. But if the voice of preludes like these lays hold of any deaf person, for such would this law be properly laid down. If anyone in this state takes a less care of his parents than is

fitting, and does not pay them in all matters more attention than he does his sons, and all his offspring and himself, and is not fulfilling their wishes, let the party suffering in this way lay an information, either himself or by sending someone to three of the oldest guardians of the law, and likewise to three of the women, who have the care of marriages; and let these attend to the matter, and punish the offenders, if young men, with stripes and bonds, if they happen to be up to thirty years of age; and let women be punished with the same punishment, up to ten years more. But if they are beyond these years, and do not stand aloof from the same neglect of parents, but maltreat them in some way, let persons bring them before a court of justice, to one and each of the citizens, who may be the oldest of all; and if a person is cast, let the tribunal fix what he is to pay in purse or suffer in person, and consider nothing of what a person can suffer in person or pay in purse as a thing not to be told. And if anyone, who has been maltreated, is unable to tell the tale, let him, who has heard from free persons, lay an information before the rulers, or let him be considered a bad man, and brought to trial by anyone who is willing, for a mischief done. And if a slave gives information, let him be made free; and if he is the slave, either of the maltreating or maltreated parties, let him be made free by the magistrate; but if he is the slave of any other citizen, let the public treasury put down his value for his master; and let it be a care to the magistrates, that no one, in revenging himself, does an injury to a person of this kind for giving the information.

With respect to the cases, where one person does a mischief to another by means of poisons, such as are deadly have been already spoken of; but as regards other mischiefs, if any does an injury willingly and with malice prepense, by drink, or meat, or ointments, of these nothing has been

stated as yet. For two kinds of poisonings according to the race of man stop the statement. For the poisoning, of which we were just now clearly speaking, is doing an injury to bodies by bodies according to nature; but the other is that, which, by sorceries and incantations and the so-called bindings, persuades those, who dare to injure them, that they are able to do something of this kind; and others, that they are injured more than anything by those, who are able to act the sorcerer. Now these matters, and all relating to things of this kind, it is neither easy to know how they exist in nature, nor, if anyone did know, to persuade others. But upon the minds of men, who look with suspicion on each other in things of this kind, it is not worthwhile to endeavor to make an attack, if perchance they see representations molded in wax, either on the house-door, or where three cross-roads meet, or on the tombs of their parents, and to exhort those, who have no clear notions about them, to hold all things of that kind cheap. Dividing then the law relating to poisonings into two parts, according as a person may attempt to use poisons in one way or the other, let us first beg, and exhort, and advise persons, that they ought not to attempt to do a thing of this kind, nor to terrify the masses of mankind, frightened like children; nor, on the other hand, to compel the legislator and judge to cure mankind of such fears; since, in the first place, he who attempts to make use of poison, if he does not know what he is doing, both as regards the body, if he happens not to be skilled in medical science, and as regards on the other hand sorceries, unless he happens to be a diviner, or an interpreter of miracles. Let this law then be stated in words respecting poisons. He, who employs poison, not for deadly injury to a person himself, or to the folks belonging to that man, but for an injury of another kind, or deadly to cattle and hives of bees, if he happens to be a physician, and is condemned for poisoning

let him be punished with death; but if he is unskilled in medicine, let the tribunal fix what he must suffer in person or pay in purse. But if anyone by bindings-down, or allurements, or certain incantations, or any of such like poisonings whatever, appears to be like a person doing an injury, if he is a diviner, or an interpreter of miracles, let him be put to death. But if anyone is accused of poisoning, without being a diviner, let the same thing take place to him likewise. For respecting him, let the tribunal fix what it seems good to them he ought to suffer in person or pay in purse. Whatever injury one person does to another by fraud or force, if it be a great one, let him pay a greater fine; but a smaller one, if it be small; and in all cases let a party pay as much as he may on each occasion have done an injury, until he shall have remedied the mischief done. In each case of wrong-doing, let each person pay the penalty that follows it, for the sake of bringing him to his senses; and let one, who in thoughtlessness has done wrong, and by making use of a persuasion foreign to his nature, through his youth or some such thing, pay a lighter fine, but another one a heavier, through his own thoughtlessness, or his non-mastery over pleasure and pain, from the fears of cowardice, or certain desires, or envyings, or angers, that have become difficult to cure; and let him suffer a punishment, not for having done wrong—for what has been born, ne'er will be unborn—but for the sake of this, that in aftertime both the culprit and those, who see him under the sentence of the law, may either hate injustice entirely, or that a great portion of a calamity of this kind may cease. For the sake of all which, it is meet for the laws to look to all these matters, nor, like a bad archer, to take aim, for the sake of the magnitude of the punishment in each case, and the proper desert viewed as a whole. The same ought the judge to do, and to be the minister to the legislator, whenever a law puts upon him to

fix what the party tried ought to suffer in person or pay in purse; and, like a painter, he ought to sketch out the acts, in conformity with the description of them; which must be done at present by us, Megillus and Clinias, in the most beautiful and best manner; and we must state what fines, as they are called, are to take place for all acts done by fraud and violence, in order that the gods, and the sons of gods, may permit us to lay down laws.

If anyone is insane, let him not be seen openly in the city, but let the relations of each person watch over them at home, in the best manner they know of; or let them pay a fine, he with property of the largest valuation a hundred drachms, if he is negligent in the case of a person, whether a slave or a free-man; he of the next valuation, four out of five parts of a mina; he of the third, three parts of a mina; and he of the fourth, four parts. Many indeed are mad in various ways. Some, of whom we have just spoken, through disease; others, through the vicious nature and nurture to boot of passion; for being excited by a trifling enmity, they send forth a loud voice and speak blasphemously against each other. But nothing of this kind ought to take place at any time, or by any means, in a state under good laws. Let then there be this one law relating to all on the subject of evil-speaking. Let no one speak evil of another. But when one person has in some discourses a dispute with another, let him give to and receive instruction, from the person disputing, and those who are present, and abstain entirely from evil-speaking. For from uttering prayers and curses against each other, and bringing through disgraceful names the language of women upon each other, in the first place from words, which are a light thing, hatred and grievous enmities are produced in deed. For by gratifying anger, a thing most unlovely, the speaker gorges passion with an evil feast, and just as much as he was once rendered mild by

education, to such an extent does he again make his soul savage, and, living in moroseness, becomes like a wild-beast, and receives from passion a bitter delight. And under these feelings all are frequently wont to go out of the way to utter something ridiculous about their opponents; to which there is no one who accustoms himself, but who fails in a seriousness of manner, partially or entirely, or destroys of high-mindedness many a part. On this account therefore, let no one ever speak any word of this kind in a temple, or at public sacrifices, or at public games, or in the market-place, or a court of justice, or at any common meeting. But let the magistrate, who is the president at such places, punish without damage to himself the individual so speaking; or never let him enter the lists for the prizes of good conduct, as being one who pays no attention to the laws, nor performs what is enjoined by the legislator. And if anyone in other places begins abuse or uses it in self-defense, and does not keep himself from language of this kind, let any more elderly person, who meets him, in defense of the law restrain with blows those, who act kindly towards anger, another ill; or let them be held amenable to the fine ordained. We say too at present, that he, who is entangled with abuse, is not able to make use of it without seeking to say what raises a laugh; and this is what we abuse ourselves, when it takes place through anger. But what then? Shall we admit the propensity of comic writers to say what raises a laugh against persons, if without any feeling of anger they attempt in their comedies to say anything of this kind against the citizens? Or shall we make a twofold division into the playful and not? and that it may be lawful for anyone in fun to say what is laughable, if without anger, about anyone; but that it be not lawful for anyone, as we said before, when on the stretch and with any angry feeling? This then must by no means be put off; but let us lay down by a law for whom it

may be lawful, or not. Let it then be not lawful for any composer of comedies, or of any iambics or melodies of the Muses, either by words or caricatures, to make any citizen a butt in comedy, either in anger or without anger. And if anyone disobeys this law, let the umpires at the contests expel him utterly from the country on the very same day, or be fined three minæ, sacred to the god to whom the contest belongs. But let it be lawful for the others, to whom it has been stated above that there is a permission, to do so to each other without anger and in sport; but let it not be allowed in seriousness and in anger. And let the inquiry into this matter be committed to him, who has the care of the whole education of the young. And whatever he shall select, let it be lawful for the composer to bring it before the public; but whatever he rejects, let not the author show it to anyone, nor let him be found to have taught it to any other person, either a slave or free-man; or let him be considered as a vicious character, and disobedient to the laws.

But he is a person deserving of pity, not when he is hungry or suffers a thing of this kind, but when temperate, or possessing some other virtue, or a part of it, he has in addition a certain calamity. Hence it would be a thing of wonder, should a person, who is such, be so entirely neglected, as to arrive at extreme poverty, whether a slave or a free-man, in a polity and a city which is regulated even moderately. On this account it would be safe for the legislator to lay down for such persons a law of this kind. Let there be no beggar in the state. But if anyone attempts to do a thing of this kind, by collecting food by prayers which cannot be satisfied, let the Market-Stewards expel him from the market-place, and the City-Stewards from the city, and the Rural-Stewards send him from the rest of the country, over the land on the borders, in order that the land may become altogether pure from an animal of such a kind.

If a male or a female slave injures the property of persons ever so little, the injured party himself not being a joint-cause, through inexperience or any other event of an intemperate kind, let the owner of the party, who has done the mischief, either remedy the mischief in not a deficient manner, or hand over the injuring party himself. But if the owner of the slave brings an accusation by saying that the charge has been made by the common trick of the parties injuring and injured, with the view of depriving him of his slave, let him bring against the person, who pretends to have been injured, an action for fraudulent practices; and if the party is convicted, let him receive double the value of the slave, at which the tribunal may have fixed it; but if he is himself defeated, let him remedy the mischief and give up the slave. And if a beast of burden, or a horse, or a dog, or any other animal, injures the property of neighbors, let the owner of the animal in like manner pay for the mischief done.

If a person is unwilling to be a witness, let the party, who wants him, cite him; and after being cited, let him meet the party at the trial; and if he knows the facts, and is willing to give evidence, let him give it. But if he says that he knows nothing, let him swear by the three deities, Zeus, Apollo, and Themis, that he knows nothing, and be dismissed from the trial; and let him, who, when cited to give evidence, does not attend, be held amenable for the mischief according to law. If anyone cause a juryman to stand up as a witness, let him not, while giving evidence, give his vote upon the case. Let a free woman be allowed to bear witness, and appear as counsel, if she is more than forty years of age, and to obtain by lot a trial, if she is unmarried; but if her husband is living, let her be allowed to be a witness only. Let a male and female slave, and a boy, be allowed to be a witness in the case of murder, and to act as counsel, if they can produce trust-

worthy bail that they will remain up to the trial, should they be accused of bearing false witness. Let either of the litigants bring a charge against the whole or part of the evidence, if he asserts that some have borne false witness before the trial is decided; and let the magistrates preserve in writing the accusations put under the seal of both, and bring them forward for the purpose of deciding upon the false testimony. If anyone shall be twice convicted of having borne false witness, let the law no longer compel him to bear witness again; but if thrice, let him not be allowed ever to bear witness again. And if he dares, after having been caught thrice, to bear witness, let anyone who is willing, inform against him before a magistrate; and let the magistrate deliver him to a tribunal, and if he is convicted, let him be punished with death. Of whomsoever, that have seemed to have borne false witness in a cause, and by so doing to have gained the suit for the plaintiff, the evidence shall be detected, if more than half of such testimony is condemned, let the verdict obtained by such evidence be set aside, and let there be a question of doubt, and a trial, whether the cause had been decided or not by such evidence; and according as the decision may be on either side, let the final result of the previous trials be determined by this decision.

While however there are many things of beauty in the life of man, to the majority of them there stick, as it were naturally, evil fates, which stain and defile them. And yet, as there is justice amongst men, how is not that beautiful, which renders all human affairs mild? And this being beautiful, how would it not be beautiful in us to take the side of a party in a cause? But on these notions being of such a kind a certain maliciousness brings a calumny, by putting forward art under an honorable name, which says forsooth that the first thing is a certain stratagem in causes, and that it is able to gain a victory by litigating, and taking a part in

causes, whether what may have been done respecting each suit is just or not; and that of this art, and of the speeches resulting from it, there is a gift, if a person will give money in return. This therefore, whether it is an art, or an artless skill and practice, it is particularly necessary that it should not exist in our state; but, as the legislator requests the people to be persuaded by him, and not to say what is contrary to justice, be sent about its business to some other country. To those then, who are persuaded, silence is sufficient; but for the unpersuaded let this be the voice of the law. If anyone is thought to be endeavoring to turn the power of justice, which is in the souls of the judges, to a contrary direction, and out of season to toss back and fro a matter of this kind, or to side with it, let anyone who is willing, indict him for the perversion of a suit, or siding with a wrong one; and let the trial come on in the court for select jurymen; and if he is convicted, let the court decide whether he seems to have done a deed of this kind through a love of money or contention; and if through a love of contention, let the court decide for what length of time such a person is not to obtain by lot a suit, or to side in a suit with anyone; but if through avarice, let him, if he is a stranger, depart from the city, and never return to it again, or be punished with death; but let a citizen be put to death for his love of money, which has been honored by him in every way; but if a person is convicted of having done so twice through a love of contention, let him be put to death.

Book 12.

Athenian Stranger/ If an ambassador or a herald by telling falsehoods performs improperly an embassy from one state to another, or when sent does not report the embassy on which he is sent, as it is in reality; or again, on the other hand, is clearly bringing back not correctly from enemies or friends what he has heard as an ambassador or herald, let indictments be drawn up against these persons, for having, contrary to law, acted With impiety towards the messages and mandates of Hermes and Zeus; and let there be a fine as to what he is to suffer in person or pay in purse.

The stealing of money is an ungentleman-like act, but seizing by violence is a shameless one. But of the sons of Zeus not one has ever carried on either of those pursuits by fraud or force with impunity. Let no one therefore, acting improperly, be deceived and persuaded at all by poets or certain mythologists, and think that, if he makes use of fraud or force, he does nothing disgraceful, but only what the gods themselves are doing. For this is neither true nor becoming. But whoever does a thing of this kind contrary to law, is neither a god, nor a son of the gods. But this it is fitting for the legislator rather than all poets to know. He therefore, who is persuaded by our discourse, is happy, and may he be happy through the whole of time; but let him, who is unpersuaded, be restrained subsequently by some such law as this. If anyone steals what is public property, whether great or small, he has need of the same punishment; for he who steals a trifle, steals with the same desire, but with less power. But he, who removes anything of greater value, and does not put it down again, is wholly unjust. The law however deems it just to punish the one with a less punishment than the other, not on account of the greatness of the theft, but through one of them being perhaps curable, but the other incurable. If anyone convicts before a tribunal

a slave or a stranger of stealing any public property, let sentence be passed on him as to what he ought to suffer in person, or what fine he ought to pay, as if he were, from what is likely, curable; but if a citizen, who has been brought up, as he will have been brought up, is caught committing a theft upon, or doing violence to, his country, whether taken in the fact or not, it is meet to punish him with death, as being nearly incurable.

For the sake of foreign expeditions much consultation and many laws are properly instituted. The greatest of all things, however, is for no one, either male or female, to be at any time without a ruler, nor the soul of anyone, either seriously engaged or in sport, to be ever accustomed to do anything alone itself by itself; but that in all time of war and in all of peace, to look perpetually to a ruler, and, following him, to live and be governed by him in the smallest things; as for instance, to stand, when he commands, and to march and to engage in gymnastics, and to wash himself, and to take food, and to get up at night, to mount guard and to convey orders; and in the midst even of dangers, neither to pursue nor to give way to anyone, without the orders of the rulers; and in one word, to teach the soul by habit to do nothing apart from the rest, nor to think of, or know it at all; but that the life of all men should, as much as possible, be in all things collected into one, and in common. For nothing is, or will ever be, superior to, and better, and more full of art than this, for the purposes of safety and victory in war. And in peace, too, men must from their childhood be practiced in ruling over others, and being ruled by others; but anarchy must be expelled from the whole life of all men, and of wild beasts under man. All dancings moreover it is meet to celebrate with a view to the best modes of warfare, and to practice a complete facility in using the body and arms for the sake of the same objects, and an endurance in food and

drink, and of cold weather and the contrary, and a hard bed, and, what is the greatest of all, the not destroying the powers of the head and feet through the covering of strange clothing, and by relaxing the generation and growth of our natural caps and shoes. For these extremities, when preserved, possess the greatest power of the whole body; but the contrary, when in a contrary state; and one the feet is the most subservient to the whole body; but the other the head has the greatest power, through possessing naturally all its dominant senses. And this praise of a warlike life, it is meet, it seems to me, for young men to hear; but the laws are these. Let the party serve in a campaign, who is on the list, or has been ordered through a certain quota. But if anyone through cowardice deserts his post, without a dismissal from the army-leaders, let an indictment for desertion lie before the war-officers, when they return from camp; and let those, who have served, try each of the parties, the heavy-armed foot and the cavalry severally, and all the other arms of the service each of the parties in a similar manner; and let the heavy-armed bring the defaulters before the heavy-armed, and the cavalry before the cavalry, and each of the other arms in like manner to those of their comrades. If anyone is convicted, let it be not in his power to be a candidate for the whole prize of good conduct; or to indict another party for not serving in a campaign, or to be an accuser on these matters; and besides this, let a court of justice decide what he is to suffer in person or pay in purse. After this, when the trials for desertions have been decided, let the commanders of each arm of the service form an assembly; and let the party, who wishes it, have amongst his own clans a trial relating to the prizes for good conduct; but let him not produce any testimony touching a former war, nor the confirmation of his assertions by witnesses, but only of the campaign, which had taken place at that time; and let

the crown of victory to each be that of a bough; and let this person, after writing out an inscription, hang it up in the temple of whatever war-god he likes, as a witness through the whole of life, of the decision relating to the prize of good conduct; and so of the second and third prizes likewise. But if anyone goes out during a campaign, but returns home before his time, without the commanding officers having sent him away, let there be indictments against such persons for leaving the ranks before the same parties as those in the case of non-service; and against the parties convicted, let punishments be imposed, such as have been laid down before. Now it is requisite for every man, when bringing every kind of law-suit against a person, to have a fear of bringing a false punishment, either willingly or unwillingly, to the best of his power. For Justice is said to be a modest virgin, and is said to be so really. Now Falsehood is naturally an object of blame to Modesty and Justice. Respecting other matters then it is requisite to take care not to err against Justice; but pre-eminently so, in the case of throwing away arms in war; lest perchance a person by making a mistake about the throwing away of arms from a necessity, places such acts on the score of a reproach, and brings lawsuits unjustly against a person not deserving them. Indeed it is by no means easy to define one or the other of these points. It is necessary however for the law to endeavor to define somehow in part. Employing then a fable, let us say, that had Patroclus been carried to his tent without arms, and was still alive, as has befallen numberless persons, and those former arms, which, as the poet says, were given as a wedding present to Peleus by the gods on his marriage with Thetis, had Hector possessed, would it have been lawful for such bad men, as were at that time, to reproach the son of Menœtius, for throwing away his arms? Still further, could such persons be reproached, who, by

being thrown down from precipices, have lost their arms, or have fallen into the sea during storms, or in level places, when a great flow of water has suddenly received them—and numberless things of this kind one might chaunt, when consoling persons, and beautifying an act bad in itself, and easy to be abused? It is necessary, however, to the utmost of our power, to divide the greater and the most grievous evil from the contrary. Now in abuse, the very abundance of such appellations possess nearly a certain division. For a person would not be justly called in all cases a thrower away of a shield, but the loser of them. For he, who is deprived of his arms by a reasonable display of force, and he, who throws them willingly away, would not be equally a thrower away of a shield; but there is a difference wholly and entirely. Let then this be held as spoken by a law. If anyone, being overtaken by the enemy, and having arms, does not turn round and defend himself, but voluntarily drops them, or throws them away, catching at a base life, united to a soulless cowardice, rather than at an honorable death, united to manliness, against such a loss of arms thrown away, let there be justice done; but let the judge neglect to consider the loss mentioned above. For it is requisite always to punish the coward, in order that he may become better; but not the unfortunate. For in this there is no advantage. But what punishment will be suited to him, who gives up such a power of defensive weapons to a contrary purpose? For it is not possible to do, in the case of a man, the contrary to what they say a god did, by changing Cæneus of Thessaly from a woman into the nature of a man. For to the man, who throws away his shield, the sex would, after a manner, be the most becoming of all, which is the contrary to that sex, which, by the being changed from a man into a woman, would become a punishment to such a person. But now, what is the nearest to these, in order that a person, for the

sake of a love of life, may through the remainder of life run no risk, but live as long as possible, as being a coward and coupled to reproaches, for such let this be the law. The man, who is convicted of having disgracefully thrown away his weapons of war, let neither the general of an army, nor any other military officer, ever employ as a soldier, nor put him into the ranks at all; otherwise let the party, who is the auditor of his accounts and doings, set him to rights thus. If the person who has put the coward into the ranks, belongs to the highest property-census, let him pay a thousand drachms; if to the second, five minæ; if to the third, three; and if to the fourth, one mina. And let him, who has been convicted of throwing away his arms, pay, in addition to his being excluded from manly dangers, through his own individual nature, a thousand drachms, if he belongs to the highest census; and five minæ, if to the second; three, if to the third; and one mina, in like manner as the preceding, if to the fourth.

With respect to the auditing of accounts, what would be for us the fitting discourse, when some of the magistrates are chosen by the chance of a lot for a year, and others for many years and from a selection? For of such accounts who will be a sufficient Auditor? For should anyone of the persons in office say or do anything not straightforward, when bent down by the weight of his duties, or by the want of power, with respect to the dignity of his office, it would be by no means easy to find a ruler, superior to other rulers in virtue; still we must endeavor to discover some god-like Auditors. For the case is this. There are many occasions for dissolving a polity, as of a ship, or any animal; of which while we say there are blocks, and under-joinings, and fibers, and ropes, we call the nature one, yet dispersed in many parts by many names. But this is an occasion by no means the smallest, for the preservation of a polity and its dissolution

and falling away. For if those, who audit the accounts of the magistrates, are better than the magistrates, and this takes place with justice not to be blamed, and in a blameless manner, the whole country and state thus flourishes and is happy. But if that, which relates to the audit of the magistrates, takes place in a different manner, then the justice, which binds together all political affairs into one, being dissolved, the whole government is torn apart, one portion from another, and no longer inclining to the same point, they cause the city from being one to become many, and, filling it with sedition, destroy it quickly. On this account then it is requisite for the Auditors to be objects of admiration for their virtue. Let us then devise by some method that their production shall be of this kind. Let the whole city come together each year, after the turn of the sun from the summer to the winter, to a sacred grove, common to the Sun and Apollo, with the view of exhibiting to the god three men, which each person shall judge to be the best of all except himself, and not less than fifty years of age; and of those voted in preference by the greatest number of persons, let them make a selection up to the half, if they are an even number; but if they are odd, let them take away the one, who had the fewest votes, and leave the half, and make a decision by the number of votes; but if to some the votes are equal, and they make the half number more, let them take away the surplus, after rejecting on account of the youth; but selecting the others, let them give their votes again, until three with unequal votes are obtained. But if for all or for two the votes are equal, then, committing the affair to good fate and fortune, let them select the victor by a lot, and let them crown him, and the second, and the third, with a bough; and after giving the prizes for excellence, let a crier proclaim to all, that the city of the Magnesians having again obtained safety from a god, shows before the Sun three of

her best men, and offers them up, according to the old law, as a common first-fruit to Apollo and the Sun, for as long a time as they follow their judgment. Let these in the first year mark out twelve Auditors and do so until each has reached his seventy-fifth year; and afterwards, let three be always added every year. Let these, dividing the magisterial offices into twelve parts, freely examine them, by making use of all kinds of touchstones; and let them reside, as long as they are Auditors, in the grove sacred to the Sun and Apollo, in which they were elected. And let each, judging of some matters privately, and of others in common with each other, exhibit the rulers before the state; and putting, what they have written respecting each office in the market-place, let it be stated what the parties are to suffer in person or pay in purse according to the decision of the Auditors. And whichever of the magistrates shall not admit that he has been judged of With justice, let him bring the Auditors to the select jurymen; and if he escapes from the Auditors' decision, let him, if he will, bring a charge against the Auditors themselves; and if he is convicted, let him, if the punishment fixed by the Auditors against anyone is death, simply die, as necessity requires; but of the other fines, of which it is possible to pay the double, let him pay the double.

It is now meet to hear what the honors of these Auditors are to be, and after what manner. Let the first seats in all public meetings be given to those, who, while they live, are deemed by the whole state worthy of the prizes for good conduct; and further, in the case of sacrifices, and holy embassies amongst the Greeks in common, and of holy rites, in which there is a communion on other grounds, let them send from amongst these the chiefs of each holy embassy; and let these alone of those in the state be adorned with a crown of laurel; and let all of them be priests of Apollo and the Sun; and let one be the high priest for the year, who is

adjudged to have been the first amongst the priests in that year; and write up his name every year, in order that it may become the measure of the period of time, as long as the city is inhabited. And when they die, let the laying out of the corpse, and the carrying it out, and their graves, be different from those of the other citizens; and let everyone wear his whole robe white, and let no one be without weeping and lamentation; and let there be also one choir of fifteen girls, and another of as many boys, and let each stand round the bier, and sing in turn praises on the priests, as it were a set hymn, and celebrate their happy state in an ode the whole day long; and on the morning following, let a hundred young men, amongst those engaged in gymnastic exercises, and whom the relations of the deceased shall have selected, carry the bier to the sepulcher. And first, let the unmarried young men precede the bier, each having put on a warrior's dress, the horsemen with their horses, and the heavy-armed foot-soldiers with their shields, and the rest after a similar manner; and let the boys around the bier go before and sing the national hymn, and let the girls follow behind, and such of the women as happen to be freed from child-bearing; and after them let the priests and priestesses follow, as to a pure tomb, although they are repelled from other tombs, if at least the Pythian priestess gives her vote so and on this side; and let the place of deposit for them be built under the earth, a long vault composed of stones very valuable, and without old age to the best of their power, and having couches, made of stones, lying by each other; where having placed the man, who has become blessed, and raising a mound in a circle, they shall plant a grove of trees around, except at one limb, in order that the burial-place may have an enlargement, such that there may be no deficiency in a mound for those to be placed there in all time; and they shall make yearly contests in music and gymnastics and horsemanship. Such

are the honors to be paid to those, who have escaped the reversal of their auditorship. But if anyone of these, confiding too much in his having been tried, should exhibit a depraved human nature, by becoming depraved after his trial, let the law ordain that anyone, who is willing, may indict him; and let the trial take place at a tribunal, in some such manner as this. First let the guardians of the laws belong to this tribunal. Next of these very persons the living; and moreover let the tribunal be composed of the select jurymen. And let him, who lays the indictment, put on the record against the party, whom he is indicting, the charge, averring that this or that person is unworthy of the prize for good conduct and of his office. And if the defendant is cast, let him be deprived of his office, and sepulcher, and the other honors granted to him; but if the accuser does not obtain a fifth part of the votes, let him pay, if his property is of the highest valuation, twelve minæ; eight, if of the second; if of the third, six; and if of the fourth, two.

Respecting the so-called decision of Rhadamanthus, in judicial matters, it is indeed worthy of admiration. For he saw that the men of that time distinctly believed that there were gods, and reasonably so; because at that time the majority were the descendants of gods, of whom he was himself one, at least as the story goes. He appears, therefore, to have thought that he ought to commit nothing to any man as a judge, but to gods; from whence causes were decided by him simply and quickly. For by tendering an oath to the disputants upon each matter in dispute, he was freed from them with rapidity and safety. But since at present, as we have stated, some portion of mankind think that the gods do not exist at all; and others conceive that they take no care of us; while the opinion of the greatest and worst part is, that, by receiving trifling sacrifices and abundance of flattery, they will conjointly deprive persons of considerable property, and

free them from harm on many occasions, the art of Rhadamanthus in lawsuits would no longer be suited to men of the present time. For since the opinions of men respecting the gods have undergone a change, it is necessary for laws to be changed likewise. In the allotment of causes therefore, it is meet for those who, possessing a mind, lay down laws, to take away the oaths of either of the opposing parties, and for the party, who has obtained by lot a trial against anyone, to write down the accusations, but to swear no oath; and for the defendant in like manner to write down his denial, and to hand it over to the rulers without an oath. For it is surely a terrible thing to know well that, while many lawsuits are occurring in the state, almost one half of the parties have perjured themselves, by having been easily mixed up with each other at joint-feasts and through other intercourse and private joint-producings of each one. Let it therefore be laid down as a law that he, who is about to act the juryman, shall take an oath as a juryman; and that he, who appoints for the commonweal the magistrates by oaths, or by the bringing of votes, must bring them from sacred places and do something of this kind; and on the other hand, that the judge of choirs and all kinds of music, and the presidents over, and the umpires at, the gymnastic and equestrian contests, and in all matters which, according to the opinion of men, do not bring a gain to the party forswearing himself, shall take an oath; but in those, that seem to be plainly a great profit to the party, who makes a denial or takes an oath, let all, who bring a charge against each other, be judged by lawsuits without any oaths. And generally in a lawsuit let not the presidents permit a person while speaking to take an oath, for the sake of making his assertion credible, or to imprecate curses on himself and race, or to employ unseemly entreaties or the piteous tones of a woman, but let the party proceed ever with good words in teaching and

learning what is just; and if not, let the magistrate, as if the party were speaking out of the record, bring him back to the arguments that may happen to be relating to the business in hand. But let it be in the power of a stranger when litigating with a stranger, as at present, to receive from, if they are willing, and to tender to, each other oaths. For they will not grow old, nor by hatching young ones in the state, will they furnish the power to others for the most part of such a brood to become the masters of the country.

In the same manner let there be a decision respecting the allotment of lawsuits against each other in all cases, where a free-man is not obedient to the state in matters, deserving neither stripes, nor bonds, nor death. But as regards the nonattendance at dancings, or processions, or other public acts of a showy kind, or sharing in public duties, such as take place for the sake of a sacrifice in peace, or a contribution in war, in all these let the first necessity be a remedy for the damage done; but from such, as are disobedient, let a security be demanded by those, on whom the state and the law together enjoin to demand it; and of such, as are inattentive to the matter, let there be a sale of the security, and let money got from the sale belong to the state. But if they are in need of a greater fine, let each of the magistrates, after imposing a fitting fine on the disobedient, bring the parties before a court of justice, until they are willing to do what they are ordered.

It is necessary moreover to consult about what it is meet to do for a state, which does not make money, except by what arises from the land, and does not import anything, touching the going abroad of its own people out of the country, and the reception of foreigners from other parts. On these points the legislator ought to give advice by first persuading to the utmost of his power. The intermixture indeed of states with states naturally causes a mixture of all kinds of manners,

through strangers making with strangers innovations with each other; which thing would bring an injury the greatest of all to those, who have a good polity through good laws. But, to the greater number of states, as being by no means under good laws, it makes no difference for the citizens to be contaminated by receiving foreigners, and for the citizens to revel in other states, when a person is desirous of going abroad in any way or at any time, whether he is young, or rather advanced in years. But, on the other hand, for these never to receive others, and never themselves to travel elsewhere, is not at all suitable; and it would appear to be a behavior rustic and rude to the rest of mankind, who would make use of harsh names, such as the so-called stranger-expellings, and manners self-willed and morose, as they would seem to be. Now to appear to be good, or not good, to others, it is meet never to consider a thing of small importance. For the multitude do not, as far as they happen to fail in the substance of virtue, fail so far in their judgment of others, who are vicious and useless, but there is even in the bad a something divine and felicitous in hitting the mark, so that very many even of the very bad distinguish very well, both by their words and thoughts, the better sort of men and the worse. And hence the exhortation to many states is correct, to set some value on the good opinion of the multitude. For it is a thing the most correct and of the greatest consequence for a man truly good to hunt in this way after a life of fair repute; for without it, he will by no means become the perfect man. And truly becoming would it be for the city, settled in Crete, to render itself in the opinion of the rest of mankind the most beautiful and best. And there is every hope in all likelihood, should it conduct itself according to reason, that in a little time the Sun and the other gods will see it amongst the states and countries, that are well-governed. In this way then it is meet to act, with

regard to travelling into other countries and places, and the reception of foreigners. In the first place, let it not be lawful for a person less than forty years of age to go abroad at any time, or in any manner; and further still, for no person on a private account, but on a public one, let it be lawful for heralds or ambassadors, or certain holy inspectors to go abroad. But to be absent from the country during a war or a campaign, does not deserve to be called a going abroad, nor to be a part of such political doings. It is likewise requisite to send persons to the Pythian Apollo, and the Olympian Zeus, and likewise to Nemea and the Isthmus, to take a share in the sacrifices and contests sacred to those gods; and to send the most numerous, and such as are the most beautiful and the best in their power, who may cause the state to appear of fair repute in holy and peaceful meetings, by exhibiting its apparatus for renown as the counter-part of what is requisite for war. And when they return home, they will teach the young, that the legal institutions of the rest of mankind relating to political affairs, are second to their own. But on other grounds it is not meet to send out holy inspectors; but some such as these, after obtaining permission of the guardians of the laws, should any of the citizens be desirous to look at the affairs of the rest of mankind, let no law restrain. For a state, while unacquainted with good and wicked men, cannot by being unsociable be sufficiently mild and perfect. Nor again, can it preserve its laws without taking them into consideration, but not only by morals. For amongst the multitude there are always some, not many, godlike men, every way worthy of being associated with, and who are produced in no respect the more in well-governed states than in those that are not so; in whose footsteps it is ever meet for him, who dwells in well-regulated states, to proceed, when on going out by sea or by land, he is seeking the party, who may be uncorrupted,

so as to make some of the legal institutions, that have been laid down correctly, more firm, and to correct others, where there is any deficiency. For without such an inspection and search, a state will never continue perfect; not even if they inspect it badly.

Clinias/ How, therefore, can both of these take place?

Athenian Stranger/ Thus. First let an inspector of this kind be not more than fifty years of age; and further, let him be of good repute for other matters and for war, if he is about to lay before other cities a specimen of the guardians of the laws. But when he is more than sixty years of age, let him no longer be an inspector. And having made an inspection for as many years of the ten as he likes, let him return home and go to the assembly of those who inspect the laws. And let this assembly be composed of old persons and young; and let it be held of necessity every day, from day-break until the sun rises; and let it be composed first of those priests, who have received the prizes for good conduct; next, ten of the guardians of the laws, who happen to be the seniors; and further still, the guardian of the whole education, both the new one, and those who have been released from the office. And let each of these go not alone, but with a young man from thirty to forty years of age, having taken as an ally the person agreeable to himself; and let there be a conference amongst them, and a conversation upon the laws of their own state, and on such matters as they shall have heard of, superior at all in any other quarter; and about objects of learning to boot, such as may seem to be of use in this inquiry, and which, to those, who have learnt, will be more clear to be understood; but to those, who have not learnt, the points relating to laws would seem to be rather dark. And whatever the elders may select from these, let the younger learn with all attention; and if anyone of those, who have been invited, seems to be an unworthy person, let the whole

meeting blame the party who invited him. But let the whole state watch over those of the young men, who are in good repute, looking at them, and observing them pre-eminently; and let them hold in honor those, who are in the right way, but in dishonor more than the rest, if they turn out worse than the majority. To this meeting let him, who has inspected the legal institutions amongst the rest of mankind, go immediately on his arrival; and if he has discovered any persons possessing any rumor about the laying down of any laws, or of education or bringing up, let him mention it, or if he has himself thought upon any matters, let him communicate it to the whole assembly. But if he appears to have returned in no respect either worse or better, let him be praised at least for his very great readiness to go; but if he returns much better, let him while living be greatly honored, and when dead, let all the power of the parties in the assembly honor him with befitting honors. But if he appears to have returned corrupted, although he pretends to be wise, let him associate with no one, either young or old. And if he is obedient to the magistrates, let him live in private; but if not, let him be put to death, at least if he be convicted in a court of justice of being a busy-body on the subject of education and the laws. But if none of the rulers bring him before a court of justice, when he deserves it, let a reproach be laid up against the rulers at the time of their undergoing a trial for the rewards for good conduct. Let him then, who goes abroad, go abroad in this manner, and being such a person. But after him it is meet to receive kindly the person, who comes from abroad. Now there are four kinds of foreigners of whom we ought to make mention. The first is he, who comes ever in the summer, and continues for the most part in his visits like birds of passage; and of these the majority flying, as it were, cleverly over the sea in the spring of the year, wend their way to other cities, for the sake of

making money as merchants; which persons it is meet for the magistrates, appointed for such purposes, to receive in the market-places, and ports, and public buildings outside the city, at the city; taking care that none of such foreigners make any innovation; and distributing correctly to them the claims of justice, and having an intercourse with them for what is necessary, but as little as possible. The second kind is he, who is in reality an inspector with his eyes, and receives with his ears such sights, as are presented by the Muses. For every such person it is meet that lodgings should be fitted up near the temples by the kindness of people towards strangers; and it is meet for the priests and the sweepers of the temples to take care that, after they have staid a moderate time, and have seen and heard all, for the sake of which they came, they take their departure, uninjured by doing or suffering anything; and let the priests be their judges, should anyone of them do an injury to anyone, or anyone else do an injury to anyone of them, to within fifty drachms. But if there be a greater charge laid against them, it is requisite that the trial in such cases be before the Market-Stewards. The third kind of foreigner it is meet to receive in a public manner, when he arrives from another country on some public business. Him let the Generals, and the Hipparchs, and the Taxiarchs alone receive; and let the care of such person rest with that one of the Prytanes, with whom alone any person, received as a stranger, takes up his abode. The fourth, should he come at any time, is a rarity; but if he should come, the counterpart of the Inspectors from us, let him, first, be not less than fifty years of age; besides this, let him think it right to see something beautiful, and superior in its beauty to the things in other cities, or to show something of the same kind to another city. Let then every such person come unbidden to the doors of the wealthy and wise, as being himself another

of such a kind. And let him go to the house of the party, who is the guardian of the whole of education, trusting that the reception of a stranger by one of those, who have gained a victory for virtue, will be sufficient for a stranger of such a kind; and after being with some of these, and teaching in part, and learning in part, let him go away honored, as a friend should be by friends, with gifts and becoming honors. According to these laws it is meet to receive all strangers, both male and female, from another country, and to send out our own people, doing honor to Zeus, who presides over hospitality, nor to make an expulsion of foreigners by eatings and sacrifices, as the nurslings of the Nile do at present, nor yet by savage proclamations.

Let a person, who makes himself a guarantee, make it in an explicit manner, by acknowledging the whole transaction in writing, before not less than three witnesses, where the guarantee is for a sum under a thousand drachms; but, if above a thousand, before not less than five. Let the broker of a person, who sells anything not justly, or is not trustworthy, be a guarantee; and let the broker, like the seller, be amenable to a lawsuit.

If a person wishes to search for his property in the possession of another party, let him, having previously sworn by the gods who preside over laws, that he expects to find the property, search for it, either naked, or wearing a small cloak and ungirded; and let the other permit him to search the house, and the portions sealed up or unsealed. But if anyone does not allow the search to the party desiring it, let the party, who is prevented, bring an action, after setting a value upon the property sought; and, if the person is convicted, let him pay for twice the loss of the property valued. If the master of the house happens to be abroad, let those that inhabit it permit the search of such portions as are unsealed, and let the searcher place his own seal by

those already sealed, and appoint any person he pleases as a guard for five days. But if the master is absent for a longer time, let the other party take the City-Stewards along with him, and search it thus, by breaking the seals, and, together with the relations and City-Stewards, seal them again in the same manner as before.

Of property in dispute it is meet to define the time, during which, if a person has held it, it will not be lawful to dispute it any longer. Of farms and dwellings indeed there will be in this way no dispute. But of other property, whatever a person may have had in his possession, if he appears to have used it in the city, and market-place, and at sacred rites, openly for a whole year, and no one has made a claim upon it, and he says he has been seeking an owner during that time, but that the party has concealed himself and never appeared—if a person has thus held possession of anything for a year, and he continues to be the seeker, let it be lawful for no person to lay claim to property of this kind, after a year has gone by. But if a person uses it neither in the city nor in the market-place, but in the fields openly, and no one offers himself during five years as the owner, let it not be lawful for anyone, after the five years have elapsed, to lay claim to it for the remainder of time. But if anyone uses it at home in the city, let the period of laying claim be for three years; but if he uses it not openly in the country, for ten years; but if in another land, whenever the owner shall find it anywhere, let there be no definite period in all time for laying claim to it.

If anyone by violence prevents another from being present at a trial, whether the party himself, or his witnesses, or his slave, or that of another person, let the cause be unfinished and undecisive; but if the party prevented is a free-man, in addition to the cause being unfinished, let the party preventing be in bonds for a year, and let him be amenable

to a trial for making him a slave at the suit of anyone, who wishes. And if anyone by violence prevents an antagonist in a gymnastic or musical or any other contest from being present, let anyone, who is willing, inform the prize-distributors; and let them send to the contest a free-man, who is willing to contend; but if they are unable to do so, let them, should he, who has prevented a party from contending, be the victor, assign the reward of victory to the party prevented, and write him down as the victor in whatever temples he pleases; but to the party preventing let it not be lawful for any offering or inscription of such a contest to exist; and let him be amenable to a trial for doing an injury, whether he is defeated in the contest, or is the victor.

If anyone receives stolen property knowingly, let him undergo the same punishment as the thief. Let death, too, be the punishment of him, who harbors an exile. For let everyone consider the same person a friend and enemy, as the state does. If anyone makes privately a peace with, or a war against, certain persons, without the public sharing in it, let death be the punishment for such a one. But if any part of the state makes a peace with, or a war against, any persons for its own benefit for itself, let the Generals bring the authors of this affair before a court of justice; and let death be the punishment of the party convicted. For they, who serve their country in any way, ought to do so without gifts. And let there be no pretext or argument held out, that for good deeds we ought to receive gifts, but not for bad. For it is not easy either to know, or knowing to restrain oneself patiently, when this knowledge is obtained. It is, therefore, the safest plan to obey the law—“Do not serve for gifts”—and let him who does not obey, simply die, when found guilty at a trial.

With regard to the contribution of money to the public, it is meet for the state of each person to be valued, for many reasons; and for the parishioners to put down in writing before the Rural-Stewards the yearly produce, in order that, as there are two contributions, the public may, after deliberating every year, make use of whichever it pleases, whether it be a part of the whole valuation, or of the income arising each year, exclusive of the sums paid for the joint-feasts.

It is meet likewise for a man of moderate means to make moderate offerings to the gods. Now the Earth is the holy hearth of the whole domicile of all the gods. Let no one then consecrate the same thing a second time to the gods. But gold and silver in other states, both privately and in temples, is an invidious possession. And ivory, as belonging to a body, that has departed from life, is not a pure offering to the gods. And iron and brass are the instruments of war. Let, then, anyone offer up whatever he pleases, of wood, and of one kind of wood, and, in a similar manner, of stone at the public temples; and let the woven portion be not more than one month's work for one woman; and the colors becoming to a god, both in other things and those woven, should be white; and offer nothing dyed, except for warlike ornaments. But the most godlike gifts are birds and pictures, such as a painter could finish in a single day. And let all the other offerings be imitations after this fashion.

Since then the portions of the whole state have been detailed, as to what number and of what kind they ought to be, and the laws have been mentioned relating to compacts of the greatest moment, it would be requisite that, as to what remains, the lawsuits relating to all matters should be mentioned. In the first place, there should be in the courts of justice selected judges, whom the defendant and plaintiff may choose in common, having the more becoming name of

arbitrators, than of judges. Secondly, let those of the same village and parish divided according to a twelfth part be the judges, before whom let those go to contest about greater damages, who shall not have had the cause decided before the first judges; and let the defendant, if he is defeated a second time, pay the fifth part of the damages in the indictment. But if anyone brings an accusation against the judges, and wishes to contest the matter a third time, let him carry the cause before the select judges; and if he is again defeated, let him pay the whole of the damages, and the half of it besides. But if the plaintiff, after being defeated before the first judges, will not be quiet, but goes to the second, let him, if he is the victor, receive the fifth part; but if defeated, pay the same portion. And if the parties go to the third tribunal, not satisfied with the former trials, let the defendant, if defeated, pay as has been stated, the whole of the damages, and the half to boot, but let the plaintiff pay the half only of the damages. With respect to the allotments of the tribunals, and their fillings up, and the appointments of persons to minister to the magistrates, and the times at which each of these ought to take place, and the matters relating to votes, and puttings off, and all that of such a kind necessarily takes place in lawsuits, and the obtaining by lot former and latter trials and the necessities of answers, and of coming into court and all together that are the nearest of kin to these, we have spoken of even before; but what is right is beautiful twice and thrice. All such legal matters then, as are of a trifling kind, it is requisite for a young legislator to fill up after an older one has passed them by. The tribunals relating to private suits, would, when existing in this way, have a sufficient measure. But those, that are public and common, and which it is meet for the magistrates to make use of, so as to administer affairs suited to each office, are in many states the not unseemly legislation nor few of

reasonable persons; from whence it is requisite for the guardians of the laws to furnish what is suited to the polity now being in a state of birth, by reasoning together, and correcting themselves and testing by experience, until each of the points shall appear to be laid down sufficiently; and then by putting a finish, to place a seal on what is to be thus irremovable, and to use them for the whole of life. But what relates to the silence and the good-omened language of the judges and the contrary, and what in other states cause the mind of the many to change improperly about things just, good, and honorable, these have been mentioned in part; but a part will be still mentioned towards the end. To all of which it is requisite for him, who is about to be an impartial judge according to justice, to look, and possessing them in writing to learn respecting all. For of all objects of learning the matters laid down relating to laws have the greatest power to make the learner better; which event, if the laws are laid down correctly, would take place well; or vainly would the law, considered by us divine and wonderful, possess a name having an affinity with intellect. And moreover of the rest of discourses whatever are detailed in poems, as the praise or blame of some persons, or whatever in prose, whether in writings, or in all the rest of daily meetings, and are disputed about through a love of contention, and through concessions sometimes very foolish—of all these the writings of the legislator would be the clearest touchstone; which it behooves a good juryman to possess in himself, the remedies, as it were, against the poison of other discourses; and by putting himself and the state in a straight course, to furnish to the good an abiding and an increase in justice; but to the bad a change, to the best of his power, from ignorance and intemperance, and timidity, and in one word, from all injustice; to such at least of the bad as have opinions that can be cured; but to such as have their opinions really

woven by fate, the jurymen and leaders of the jurymen would be deserving of praise from the whole state, by assigning, what would be frequently said justly, death as the cure for minds so disposed. After the lawsuits, that occur yearly, have been decided upon, and come to an end, it is necessary for carrying out the proceedings after the verdict, that these laws should hold good. Let the magistrate, who tried the cause, hand over to the victor all the monies of the defeated party, except what is required for necessaries, immediately after each verdict has been proclaimed by the crier and in the hearing of the jury. And when a month, next upon those, when lawsuits are tried, shall have arrived, unless a party has willingly sent the victor willingly away, let the magistrate, who tried the cause, follow the victor, and deliver to him the property of the party in his debt. But if he has not the wherewithal, and there is a deficiency not less than a drachm, let him have no lawsuit against any other person, until he has paid to the full the whole of what is due to the victor; but to others let there be lawsuits decisively. And if anyone when condemned unjustly takes anything from the condemning magistrate, let the parties unjustly despoiled bring him before the tribunal of the guardians of the laws; and if he is cast in this suit, let him be punished with death, as one who is destroying the whole state and the laws.

To a man after this, who has been born and brought up, and has begotten children and brought them up, and has been mixed up with contracts in a moderate manner, and has made restitution, if he has done anyone an injury, and on the other hand received when injured what is just in law, and in turn has grown old, his end would take place according to nature.

With respect then to the dead, whether a person be male or female, let the interpreters of the gods have full powers to detail the laws of the gods under the earth, and of those here

relating to things divine and what it is proper to be done. But let the receptacles be in such spots as are not cultivated at all; nor let the monument be either great or small; but such spots, as being useless, possess a nature fitted for that alone, and which easily receive and conceal the bodies of the dead in the least painful manner to the living, these it is meet to fill up. For whatever the earth, being a mother, naturally wishes to bear as food for man, of this let no one alive or dead deprive any of us still living. And heap up no mound higher than what would be the completed work of five men in five days. And make not the upright tomb-stones greater than what may contain the praises of the deceased in not more than four heroic verses. And let the laying out of the corpse within the house, be for not a shorter or longer time than to show that the person is in a death-like trance, or really dead. But the carrying out to the tomb would, as human affairs are, be for a moderate period on the third day nearly. It is meet likewise to be persuaded by the legislator on other points, namely, when he says that soul is altogether superior to body; and that there is nothing, but the soul, which causes each of us to be in this life the very thing we are; and that the body, like an image, follows each of us; and that, when we are dead, the bodies of the deceased are beautifully said to be image-like forms; and that each of us, being in reality immortal, but called by the name of soul, depart to other gods, to render an account, as the law of our country asserts, full of confidence to the good, but very fearful to the bad; and that to this last one there is no great assistance when dead. For it behooved all the relatives to aid the living man, so that he might have lived, when living, most just and holy, and when dead, have been punished for his wicked sins, during the life after this. Since then such is the case, there is no need to ruin a family by acting in a luxurious manner, through thinking that the mass of flesh,

which is buried, belongs to him; but not that his son, who lies dead, or brother, or whomsoever he regrets the most, and conceives he is burying, has departed, after bringing to an end and fulfilling his fate; and that he ought to do the best with present events, by expending a moderate sum upon, as it were, the lifeless altar of those in the earth. Now the legislature would divine what this moderate expense would be in not the most unseemly manner. Let this then be the law. By him in the highest census of property let there be expended not more than five minæ on the whole funeral; by him of the second class, three minæ; and two, by him of the third; and let one mina be the measure of expense to him of the fourth. And it is necessary for the guardians of the laws to do many other things, and to take care of many things, and especially of this, that they may live attending to boys and men, and persons of every age. And moreover, at the end of the life of all, let one of the guardians of the laws, whom the relations of the deceased shall take as a superintendent, act as president, to whom let whatever takes place in a proper and moderate manner be an honor; but what in not a proper manner, a disgrace. And let the laying out, and carrying out, and all the rest relating to such matters, take place according to this law. But things of this kind it is meet to give up to the legislator, who lays down a political law. It would be a thing unseemly to order, or not, persons to weep for the dead; but it is necessary to forbid them to lament loudly, and to send the voice like that of a messenger out of the house, and to bring forth the corpse into the open part of the roads, and to talk while going along the paths, and to go out of the city before day. Let such laws then be thus laid down on these points; and let him, who is obedient, be exempt from punishment; but let him, who disobeys one of the guardians of the laws, be punished by a punishment that appears fit to all in common. What other

burials, or non-burials, in the case of persons guilty of parricide and sacrilege, and all acts of such a kind, take place of the dead, these have been spoken of in our previous discourse and laid down by law; so that our legislation would now have nearly arrived at the end. But the end is not in having on each occasion done of nearly all matters something, nor in possessing and in settling, but in having discovered a preservation for what has been produced, and in thinking that all, which ought to have been done, has been then done completely; but previously, that the whole is incomplete.

Clinias/ You speak well, O guest. But tell me still more clearly, for what purpose has been said, what has just now been said?

Athenian Stranger/ Much, Clinias, of former sayings have been hymned beautifully, and nearly not the least so are the appellations of the Fates.

Clinias/ What are these?

Athenian Stranger/ In Lachesis being the first, Clotho the second, and Atropos the third, the savior of what has been asserted, things assimilated by that of those woven by fire, of working out a power not to be turned aside; which in a city and polity ought not only to furnish health and safety to bodies, but a good state of law in souls, or rather the preservation of laws. But it appears to me that this is yet wanting to laws, how it is needful for a power to exist in them to be according to nature not turned.

Clinias/ You speak of no small affair, if it is possible to find how a thing of this kind may exist in every possession.

Athenian Stranger/ But this is possible, as it appears to me, in every respect at present.

Clinias/ Let us then by all means not separate until we have supplied this very thing to the laws already mentioned.

For it is ridiculous to labor at anything in vain, and not to lay down something stable.

Megillus/ You correctly exhort me: and you will find me to be such another person.

Clinias/ You speak indeed well. What then, say you, would this preservation be, and after what fashion for our polity and laws?

Athenian Stranger/ Have we not said that an assembly ought to be held in our city of this kind—That ten of the oldest guardians of the laws and those, who have received the prizes for good conduct, ought ever to be gathered together at the same spot with them? and further, that those, who had gone abroad to make a search, if perchance it has happened to them to hear of anything opportune for guarding the laws, ought, on arriving safe at home, to be voted, after having been tested by these very doings, worthy to become partakers of the assembly? and in addition to this, that each ought to take as an ally one of the young men, not less than thirty years of age, and that he himself, after deciding that the young man was a worthy character both by nature and nurture, should introduce him to the others; and, if it should seem good to the others, that he should take him as an ally; but if not, that the judgment, which may have taken place, should be kept secret from the rest, and especially the party rejected; and that the assembly ought to beat day-break, when there is leisure for the most part to everyone from all other business, both public and private? Something of this kind was stated by us in the preceding discourse.

Clinias/ It was.

Athenian Stranger/ Resuming then the subject relating to this very assembly, I would say something of this kind. I assert then that if anyone throws out this, as an anchor for

the whole city, that it has in itself everything requisite to preserve all we wish.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ On what comes after this an opportunity will occur for our speaking correctly, and to omit nothing of our readiness to act.

Clinias/ You speak exceedingly well; and do as you intend.

Athenian Stranger/ It is meet therefore, Clinias, to understand that with respect to everything there is a savior suited to each kind of work; as in an animal, the soul and the head are naturally the greatest.

Clinias/ How again say you?

Athenian Stranger/ The power of these two, doubtless, affords safety to the whole animal.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ In soul there is, besides other things, intellect implanted; and in the head, besides other things, sight and hearing. And, in short, intellect being mingled with the most beautiful senses, and becoming one, it would justly be called the preservation of each.

Clinias/ It appears so at least.

Athenian Stranger/ So indeed it appears. But would not intellect, when conversant about something, and mingled with the senses, become the safety of vessels, both in storms and fair weather? Do not, in the case of a ship, the pilot and the sailors, by mingling their senses with the intellect of the pilot, preserve both themselves and what relates to the ship?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But there is no need of many examples relating to things of this kind; but let us consider, as in the case of armies, and diseases, after laying down

what mark would both generals and all the ministering of physicians direct their aim for the sake of preservation.

Clinias/ Very right.

Athenian Stranger/ Does not the former aim at victory, and the power over the enemy? and the latter of physicians and their assistants, at a preparation for the health of the body?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ But if the physician is ignorant of that relating to the body, which we now call health, or the general of that relating to victory, or of the other things we have mentioned, would either appear to possess intellect relating to any of these matters?

Clinias/ How could they?

Athenian Stranger/ But what with respect to a city? If anyone is ignorant of the mark, at which a statesman ought to look, could he in the first place be justly denominated a ruler? And in the next, would he be able to preserve that, of the scope of which he knows nothing at all?

Clinias/ How could he?

Athenian Stranger/ It is necessary therefore now, as it seems, if the settlement of this our country is to have an end, that there should be something in it, that knows, in the first place, what we call the mark, whatever that may happen to be in a statesman's view; next, after what manner it is requisite to partake of it; and which of the laws first, and, afterwards, who among men, will properly or improperly consult with a view to it. But if there shall be any state devoid of a thing of this kind, it will not be wonderful, if, by being mindless and senseless, it should on each occasion perform in each of its doings whatever presents itself by chance.

Clinias/ You speak the truth.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, in what part of our state, or pursuits, is there any sufficient guard whatever prepared of such a kind? Have it we in our power to tell?

Clinias/ Not I indeed, guest, clearly. But, if I must make a guess, this discourse seems to me to tend to that assembly, which you said ought to come together at night.

Athenian Stranger/ You have rightly understood me, Clinias; and, as the present reasoning indicates, this assembly ought to possess every virtue; the beginning of which is not to be wandering, by guessing at many things, but by looking to one thing, always to direct every thought, like arrows, to this.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then we shall learn that it is not a wonderful thing for the legal institutions of cities to wander; because the system of laws in each city looks, one to one thing, and another to another. And for the most part it is no wonder that to some the limit is that of what is just, in order that certain persons, whether they happen to be better or worse, may have dominion over the state; to others, that they may be wealthy, whether they are slaves of certain persons, or not; the attention of others again is urged on to a life forsooth of liberty; but others are regulated by laws, like two united, looking to both, that they may be free themselves, and the lords of other states. But the wisest, as they think themselves, look to these, and to all such points as these together, and not to anyone singly, as they are unable to mention anyone thing held in pre-eminent honor, to which it is needful for them to direct the rest.

Clinias/ Would not then, O guest, our assertion formerly laid down be right; for we said that the whole of our laws ought always to look to one point; and we conceded that this might be called very correctly virtue.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes.

Clinias/ And we laid down surely that virtue is fourfold.

Athenian Stranger/ Entirely so.

Clinias/ And that of all these, intellect was the leader, to which all other things, and three of the virtues, ought to look.

Athenian Stranger/ You have followed me in a most beautiful manner, Clinias; and follow me too in what remains. For we have said, that the intellect of the pilot, and of the physician, and of the general, looks to that one point, to which it ought to look; but examining the intellect of the statesman, we are at that point now; and interrogating it, as if it were a person, we will say—O wonderful creature, to what point are you looking? What is that one thing, of which the intellect of the physician can speak in a clear manner? but of which you, who are forsooth superior, as you would say, to all clever persons, will not have it in your power to speak? Or can you, Megillus and Clinias, define and speak for him, and tell me what it is, as I have defined to you in behalf of many other matters?

Clinias/ By no means, guest.

Athenian Stranger/ But what, ought we not to be desirous of knowing well what it is, and in what it is?

Clinias/ In what, for example, do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ For example, when we said that there are four species of virtue, it is evidently necessary to say that each is one, since they are four.

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ And yet we call all these one. For we say that fortitude is a virtue, and that prudence is a virtue, and the two others likewise, as if this virtue was not in reality many things, but only one.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ So far, then, as these two differ from each other, and have received two names, and the other two likewise, there is no difficulty in speaking of them; but so far as we apply to both one name of virtue, and to the others likewise, it is not easy to speak of them.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ It is not difficult to explain what I mean. For let us distribute among ourselves the business of interrogating and answering.

Clinias/ How again are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ Ask me why, when speaking of virtue as one thing, we have given this appellation to two things, one of which is fortitude, and the other prudence? for I will tell you the reason. Because one of these is conversant with fear, from whence both wild beasts participate in fortitude, and so do the habits of children very young. For the soul may be brave without reason and from nature; but on the other hand, without reason it never has been prudent and possessed of intellect, nor is it so now, nor will it ever be, since this is a different thing.

Clinias/ You speak truly.

Athenian Stranger/ In what way then these are different and two, you have received from me through the reasoning; but in what way they are one and the same, do you on the other hand tell me. But bear in mind that you are going to tell me in what way, being four, they are one; and require of me to tell, after you have shown that they are one, in what way they are again four. And after this, let us consider whether for him, who would know sufficiently respecting anything whatever, to which there is both a name and a definition, it is meet to know only the name, but to be ignorant of the definition; or whether it is disgraceful for him,

who knows something of what excels in magnitude and beauty, to be ignorant of all such matters as these.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ But is there anything of greater consequence for a legislator and a guardian of the laws, and for him, who is thought to excel all others in virtue, and who has received the rewards of victory in these very points, than fortitude, temperance, justice, and prudence?

Clinias/ How can there be?

Athenian Stranger/ On these points then ought not holy interpreters, and teachers, and legislators, and the guardians of others, to speak to him, who requests to know and to perceive, or who requests to be punished and reproved when erring, by teaching him what power virtue and vice possess, and by showing that they themselves excel the rest in every respect? Or must some poet come to the city, or an instructor of youth, and assert that he is seen to be better than him, who has been the victor in every virtue? And then will it appear wonderful in a state like this, where both in word and deed the guardians would be incompetent through their not having correctly a knowledge of virtue, that such a state, by being without a guard, should suffer what the majority of existing states suffer?

Clinias/ Not at all wonderful, as it seems.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, must we do what we just now said? Or how must we make the guardians more exact with respect to virtue, in deed and word, than the masses? Or after what manner will our state be assimilated to the head and senses of the prudent, through possessing in itself a guard of this kind?

Clinias/ How then, O guest, and after what manner, shall we speak, assimilating it to a thing of this kind?

Athenian Stranger/ It is evident that, while the state itself is the resemblance" of a cavity, the young of the guards, who are selected, as it were, for the top of the head, as being of the best disposition, and possess a quickness of perception in their whole soul, survey the whole state in a circle; and, while guarding it, they deliver up the senses to memory, and become the announcers to the elders of everything in the state; and that these the elders, being assimilated to intellect, through considering pre-eminently many matters and those worthy of regard, enter into consultations, and employ the young, as agents, in their joint deliberations; and thus both truly preserve the whole state in common. Whether then shall we say that they are to be established in this manner, or how otherwise? Or that they all possess all things equally, and that some of them have been brought up and educated in not the most exact manner?

Clinias/ But this, O wonderful man, is impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then proceed to a more accurate education than the former.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Would not that, which we almost touched just now, happen to be the very one, of which we have a want?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Did we not say then, that of each trade the tip-top handicraftsman and guardian ought to be able not only to look to the majority of things, but to hasten onwards to one thing, and to know it, and, after knowing it by looking at it, to arrange everything in order?

Clinias/ Correctly so.

Athenian Stranger/ Would there be then to any person whatever a speculation or a sight more accurate, respecting

anything whatever, than to be able to look to one form out of many and dissimilar?

Clinias/ Perhaps not.

Athenian Stranger/ Not perhaps, but in reality, O thou godlike man, there is not any method more clear than this to anyone.

Clinias/ Trusting to you, O guest, I admit it; and in this way let us proceed in our discourse.

Athenian Stranger/ We must compel, then, as it seems, even the guardians of our divine polity to see accurately, in the first place, what happens amongst all the four virtues to be the same; and which, being one thing in fortitude, and temperance, and prudence, and justice, we assert would be properly called by one name, virtue. This, my friends, if we are willing, let us for the present, as it were squeezing violently, not let go, before we state sufficiently what it is that we must look at, whether as one thing, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way it exists naturally. Or, if this escapes us, think we that we shall ever sufficiently possess the things relating to virtue, of which we shall be unable to say, whether it is many things, or four, or one thing? If, then, we follow ourselves as fellow-counselors, we shall by some means devise a plan for this to take place in our state. But if it seems good to you to dismiss the subject altogether, it is necessary to dismiss it.

Clinias/ By the god, who presides over hospitality, we must, O guest, dismiss a subject of this kind the least of all, since you appear to us to speak correctly. But how can anyone devise this plan?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us not at present speak of the how we can devise it; but let us first establish firmly by agreement amongst ourselves, whether it is requisite or not.

Clinias/ It is doubtless requisite, if possible.

Athenian Stranger/ But what, with respect to the beautiful and the good, do we think the same on this point? Must our guardians know only that each of these is many? Or that it is one, and how it is so?

Clinias/ It seems almost necessary for them to understand how each of these is one.

Athenian Stranger/ But what, ought they to understand, but be unable to show by arguments what they understand?

Clinias/ How so? For you are speaking of a certain habit belonging to a slave.

Athenian Stranger/ But what, with respect to all serious pursuits, is there the same reasoning, that it behooves those, who are to be really guardians of the laws, to know really the matters relating to the truth, and to be competent to interpret them in a discourse, and follow them out in deeds, deciding upon the things that exist beautifully according to nature, or do not exist?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ Is not then one of the most beautiful things that relating to the gods, which we went through with seriousness, how that they exist, and of how great a power they seem to be the lords; and that man, as far as he can, ought to know this; and, that we ought to pardon the greatest number of those in the state, if they will only follow the voice of the laws; but that we ought not to commit to persons a share in the guardianship, who have not labored to acquire every faith in the existence of the gods; and that there should be this one object of care, namely, never to choose anyone for a guardian of the laws, who is not a divine man, and has not labored for them, nor permit him to become one of those selected for his virtue.

Clinias/ It is just then, as you say, for him, who is inactive on matters of this kind, or unable to give a reply, to be at a distance from honorable affairs.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we then not know, that there are two things relating to the gods, which lead to a belief in what we have gone through in our previous discourse?

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ One is that, which we asserted respecting the soul, that it is the oldest and most divine of all things, of which a motion, by receiving the generation, imparts an ever-flowing existence; and one too is that, concerning the movement, how orderly it is, of the stars and such other things with which mind has, by its power over them, adorned the universe. For he, who views these matters in neither a mean manner nor like a common individual, has never been an atheistical person, so as not to be affected in a manner the contrary to what would be expected by the many. For they imagine that those, who take in hand subjects of this kind through astronomy and other necessary arts in conjunction with it, become atheists from having seen that it is possible for things to exist by necessity and not from the intellect of a divine plan relating to good things to be brought to pass.

Clinias/ How then would it exist?

Athenian Stranger/ All things, as I have said, are in a contrary state now to what they were, when those, who thought upon them, conceived them to be without soul. A feeling of wonder crept even then upon the mind respecting them; and what is now really determined upon, was suspected then by such as touched upon accuracy, how that things without soul would never have made use of reasonings wonderful for their accuracy, had they not possessed intellect. And some indeed dared to hazard this

very doctrine even at that period, by saying that it was Mind, which put into order everything in heaven. But the same persons erred again about the nature of the soul, by not knowing that it is older than body; but conceiving it to be younger, they did, so to say, overturn all things, and themselves much more. For all things, that were before their eyes, while carried along the heavens, appeared to them to be full of stones and earth, and many other soulless bodies, that furnished reasons for the existence of the whole world. These doctrines it was that caused much of atheism and disgust to flit about amongst such persons. Moreover revilings have come from the poets, so that, while likening philosophers to dogs that make use of vain howlings, they said, on the other hand, other senseless things. But now, as I have said, all the contrary takes place.

Clinias/ How could this be?

Athenian Stranger/ It is not possible for any mortal man ever to become firmly pious, who does not receive these two things, that the soul is the oldest of all things, which share in generation and is immortal; and that it rules over all bodies. And in addition to this, what has been said very often, who shall receive the mind said of beings in the stars, and the necessary learning before these subjects, and after beholding the communion in these according to the Muse, shall make use of it in a manner fitting to the pursuits of morals and legal institutions; and shall be able to give a reason for such things as admit of a reason, and do not. Now he, who is not able to acquire these in addition to public virtues, will scarcely ever become a competent ruler over a whole state; but he would be a minister to other rulers. It is then, Clinias and Megillus, requisite to see in addition to all the laws already detailed, which we have gone through, whether we can bring this nocturnal meeting of the rulers to be a guard, according to law, for the sake of preservation,

after becoming a sharer in the education, such as we have gone through. Or how shall we act?

Clinias/ But how, O thou best of men, should we not bring it, if perchance we are able, even for a little?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then enter altogether into a contest for a thing of this kind at least. For I will readily be your helper in this; and in addition to myself perhaps, through my skill in things of this kind, and my thinking upon them very frequently, I shall find others likewise.

Clinias/ Let us, O guest, proceed in this path, rather than any other, in which even a god is almost leading us. But what is the method, which, if it took place, would take place correctly, this let us now speak of and seek out.

Athenian Stranger/ Laws about things of this kind, Megillus and Clinias, it is not possible to lay down, until the whole state is orderly arranged; for then one can lay down, over what it is meet for them to have an authority. But the furnishing such things at present would be, if it were done correctly, an act of instruction combined with much intercourse.

Clinias/ How so? Why do we say that this is mentioned again?

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, a list should be drawn out of those, who would be fitted for the nature of a guard by the power of their time of life, and instruction, and by their morals and manners. But after this, it is neither easy to find oneself, what one ought to learn, nor to become the disciple of another, who has found it out. In addition to this, it is a vain thing to state in writing the times which and in which it is requisite to obtain each particular. For not even to the learners themselves would it be manifest, what is learnt opportunely, before the science of the instruction is generated in the soul of each. Hence, all, that relates to these

matters, being spoken of, would not be said to be properly secrets; but they might be said to be not previously spoken, through nothing of what has been spoken indicating what has been previously spoken.

Clinias/ Since then this is the case, what, O guest, must we do?

Athenian Stranger/ According to the proverb, friends, it appears we are lying in a common and middle ground. And if we are willing to run a risk respecting the whole polity, we must do all things, by throwing, as they say, either thrice six, or thrice ace. I will, however, undergo the danger with you in stating and explaining, what appears to me respecting the education and nurture, which has been agitated in our conversations. The hazard is, indeed, neither small, nor similar to any others. But I exhort you, Clinias, to have a care of this. For you will obtain the greatest renown by establishing correctly the city of the Magnesians, or after what other event a god shall give it a name; or you will at least not escape the seeming to be the bravest of all born afterwards. If then this divine assembly shall be established by us, O friends and companions, the city must be delivered to its care; nor will there be any dispute amongst anyone, so to say, of the legislators at present respecting these institutions; but there will be completed almost a day-dream in a matter, which we touched upon in our discourse a little before as a night dream, when we mingled together a certain image of the agreement of the head with intellect; if indeed these men are accurately mingled together by us, and properly instructed, and when instructed, reside in the acropolis of the country, and become guardians, such as we have never seen in our previous life, as regards the power of preservation.

Megillus/ O friend Clinias, from all that has been now said by us, we must either give up the city, as regards its

settlement, or not dismiss this our guest, but by entreaties and all kinds of devices make him a partner with us in settling the city.

Clinias/ You speak with the greatest truth, Megillus; and both myself will act thus, and do you also co-operate.

Megillus/ I will co-operate.

Laws.

Translated by Thomas L. Pangle.

[or On Lawgiving]

Persons of the Dialog

An Athenian Stranger, Kleinias, Megillus.

Book I.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it a god or some human being, strangers, who is given the credit for laying down your laws?

Clinias/ A god, stranger, a god—to say what is at any rate the most just thing. Among us Zeus, and among the Lacedaimonians, from whence this man here comes, I think they declare that it's Apollo. Isn't that so?

Megillus/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Don't you people follow Homer, and say that Minos got together with his father every ninth year and was guided by his oracles in establishing the laws for your cities?

Clinias/ So it is said among us. And also that his brother Rhadamanthus, at least—you've both heard the name—became very just. We Cretans, at any rate, would assert that he won this praise because he regulated judicial affairs correctly in those times.

Athenian Stranger/ His fame is splendid at least, and very appropriate for a son of Zeus. But since you and this man here were reared in such conventions and habits, I expect it would not be unpleasant for you to pass the present time discussing the political regime and laws, talking and listening as we go on our way. The road from Knossos to the cave and temple of Zeus is altogether long enough, as we hear, and there are resting places along the way, appropriate

for this stifling heat; there are shady spots under tall trees, where it would be fitting for men of our age to pause often. Encouraging one another with speeches, we would thus complete the whole journey in ease.

Clinias/ And as one goes along this route, stranger, there are groves with cypresses of amazing height and beauty, and meadows in which we could rest and pass the time.

Athenian Stranger/ What you say is correct.

Clinias/ Yes indeed. And when we see them we'll assert it even more emphatically. But let's proceed, accompanied by good fortune.

Athenian Stranger/ So be it. Tell me this, now. For what reason has your law ordained the common meals, and also the gymnastic training and the weapons you employ?

Clinias/ I think, stranger, that it's easy for anyone to understand our ways. As you can both see, the nature of the entire Cretan countryside is not flat like the Thessalian, and hence, while they use horses more, we depend on running. The unevenness of the terrain here is more fitted to the practice of running on foot. In such country light arms, not heavy arms, are necessary if one is to be able to run, and the lightness of bows and arrows seems to harmonize with this. So all these practices of ours exist with a view to war, and to me at least it appears that our lawgiver had this in view in everything he did. Thus with the common meals: it's very likely he set them up after seeing that all men, when on a military campaign, are compelled by the business to eat together during this time in order to keep up their guard. I believe he condemned the mindlessness of the many, who do not realize that for everyone throughout the whole of life an endless war exists against all cities. And if, when a state of war exists, defense requires common meals and orderly relays of rulers and ruled among the guards, then this same

thing should be-done in peacetime. For what most humans call peace he held to be only a name; in fact, for everyone there always exists by nature an undeclared war among all cities. If you look at it this way, you are pretty sure to find that the lawgiver of the Cretans established all our customs, public Sand private, with a view to war, and that he handed down the laws to be guarded according to these principles. For according to him nothing is really beneficial, neither possessions nor customs, unless one triumphs in war. For then all the good things of the defeated belong to the victors.

Athenian Stranger/ You appear to me, stranger, to have had a fine gymnastic training in understanding the legal customs of the Cretans. But explain this to me more clearly: the definition you seem to me to have given for a well-governed city is that it must be ordered in such a way as to defeat the other cities in war. Isn't that so?

Clinias/ By all means. And I think that's how it seems to this man here.

Megillus/ How else would any Lacedaimonian answer, you divine man?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, is it the case that this definition is correct for cities, in relation to cities, but that another would be correct for a neighborhood, in relation to another neighborhood?

Clinias/ In no way.

Athenian Stranger/ The same applies?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? For a household in relation to another household in the neighborhood, and for one man in relation to another man, the same still?

Clinias/ The same.

Athenian Stranger/ For a person in relation to himself, should the relationship be understood to be one of enemy to enemy? Or how then should we speak of this?

Clinias/ O Athenian stranger—I would rather not address you as merely "Attic," for you seem to me worthy of being called rather by the name of the goddess—you have correctly followed the argument up to its source and have thus made it clearer, so that you will the more easily discover that we were correct just now in saying that all are enemies of all in public, and in private each is an enemy of himself.

Athenian Stranger/ What are you saying, you amazing man?

Clinias/ Why, right here, stranger, is the first and best of all victories, the victory of oneself over oneself; and being defeated by oneself is the most shameful and at the same time the worst of all defeats. These things indicate that there is a war going on in us, ourselves against ourselves.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's turn the argument back in the reverse direction. Given that each one of us is superior to himself or inferior to himself, should we also assert that a house and a neighborhood and a city all have this same thing within them? Or should we not assert it?

Clinias/ You mean that one is superior to itself and another inferior?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes.

Clinias/ You're correct in asking this. Now such a situation certainly does exist, and not least in cities. For in those where the better men are victors over the majority, and the worse, the city would correctly be said to be superior to itself, and would very justly be praised for such a victory. But the opposite would hold where the opposite things happen.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's set aside the question whether the worse can ever somehow be superior to the better (that would require a longer discussion). Here is how I now understand what you are saying: sometimes citizens of a common stock and of the same city become unjust and numerous, and combine to enslave by force the just who are less numerous. When they do prove superior, the city itself would correctly be said to be inferior to itself and at the same time bad; but where they prove inferior, stronger and good.

Clinias/ What is now being said is very odd, stranger; yet it is very necessary to agree to it.

Athenian Stranger/ Just a moment—let's also consider this once again: where there were many brothers, the sons of one man and one woman, it wouldn't be at all surprising if more of them turned out unjust and fewer of them just.

Clinias/ No, it wouldn't.

Athenian Stranger/ Now it wouldn't be fitting for me and the two of you to go hunting after whether the whole household or family should itself be called "inferior to itself" when the wicked are victorious, and "superior" when they are inferior; we aren't now investigating the speech employed by the many with a view to the question of the seemliness or unseemliness of words, but rather with a view to laws, seeking whatever in them constitutes correctness and faultiness according to nature.

Clinias/ What you say is very true, stranger.

Megillus/ I agree that what you've said so far, at least, is certainly fine.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let's look at this: presumably there would be some judge for these brothers just mentioned?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Which would be better: the one who destroyed the wicked among them and set the better to ruling themselves, or the one who made the worthy men rule and allowed the worse to live while making them willing to be ruled? But I suppose we should also mention the judge who is third in respect to virtue—if there should ever be such a judge—one capable of taking over a single divided family and destroying no one, but rather reconciling them by laying down laws for them for the rest of time and thus securing their friendship for one another.

Clinias/ Such a judge and lawgiver would be better by far.

Athenian Stranger/ And surely he would be enacting laws for them with a view not to war but to its opposite.

Clinias/ That is true.

Athenian Stranger/ Now what about someone who brings harmony to the city? Would he order its way of life with a view more to external war or more to that internal war called "civil war," which occurs from time to time and which everyone would wish never to come to pass in his city and, if it does, would wish to end as soon as possible?

Clinias/ Clearly, with a view to this latter.

Athenian Stranger/ Which of these sets of circumstances would someone prefer: civil peace brought about by the destruction of some and the victory of others, or friendship as well as peace brought about through reconciliation—supposing it were necessary to pay attention to external enemies?

Clinias/ Everyone would prefer the latter rather than the former for his own city.

Athenian Stranger/ Then wouldn't the lawgiver also?

Clinias/ How could he not?

Athenian Stranger/ And doesn't everyone set up all his lawful customs for the sake-of what is best?

Clinias/ How could he not?

Athenian Stranger/ The best, however, is neither war nor civil war—the necessity for these things is to be regretted—but rather peace and at the same time goodwill towards one another. Moreover, it is likely that even that victory of the city over itself belonged not to the best things but to the necessary things. To think otherwise is as if someone held that a sick body, after it had received a medical purgation, were in the best active condition, and never turned his mind to a body which had no need of such remedies at all. Likewise, with regard to the happiness of a city or of a private person, anyone who thought this way would never become a correct statesman, if he looked first and only to external wars, and would never become a lawgiver in the strict sense, if he didn't legislate the things of war for the sake of peace rather than the things of peace for the sake of what pertains to war.

Clinias/ This argument appears somehow to be stated correctly, stranger; but I would be amazed if our customs and those of Lacedaimon were not directed, in all seriousness, to what pertains to war.

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps so. Still, we should not fight harshly with one another, but should rather make a calm inquiry about the present matters, since we, as well as they, are very serious about these things. So follow the argument along with me. Let us appeal to Tyrtaeus, who was by birth an Athenian but who became a naturalized citizen of this fellow's people, and who was the most serious of human beings about these matters. He says: "I would not memorialize nor set down in speech a man," even if someone were the wealthiest of human beings, he declares, even if he

possessed many good things (and then he mentions just about all of them), unless that man always were best in war. Presumably you too have heard these poetic lines; and this fellow, I believe, is surfeited with them.

Megillus/ Yes, indeed.

Clinias/ They've been brought to us from Lacedaimon.

Athenian Stranger/ Come now, let's question this poet in common, roughly as follows: "Tyrtaeus, most divine poet! You seem to us to be wise and also good, because you have praised in so distinguished a manner those who are distinguished in war. Now I, and this fellow here, and this other fellow, Kleinias the Knossian, happen to be very much in agreement with you regarding this matter, we believe. But we want to know clearly whether we are referring to the same men or not. So tell us: do you clearly hold, as we do, that there are two forms of war? Or what?" To these things I think even a much less respectable figure than Tyrtaeus would respond with the truth, namely that these are two, one of which we all call civil war—the harshest of all wars, as we just now declared. The other I believe we would all set down as the kind that is waged against outsiders and members of other tribes, and this is much milder than the former.

Clinias/ How could it not be?

Athenian Stranger/ "Well, then, which sort of men in which sort of war were you praising when you gave such strong praise to some and such blame to others? That waged against outsiders, it appears. For you have said in your verses, at any rate, that you cannot at all abide men who do not dare;

> ... to look on bloody death,
> And staying near assail the foe."

So after these things we would say, "It appears, Tyrtaeus, that you praise especially those who become conspicuous in

foreign and external war." Presumably he would affirm that this is so, and would agree?

Clinias/ But of course.

But we, at any rate, would assert that while these men are good, better by far are those who reveal themselves to be best in the greatest war. And we have a poet as witness—Theognis, a citizen of Sicilian Megara, who declares:

> Cyrnus, in harsh civil strife a trustworthy
> Man is equal in value to gold and silver.

This man in the harsher war, we assert, is altogether better than that other man, in almost the same degree as justice and moderation and prudence, existing in a man along with courage, are better than courage itself alone. For a man would never become trustworthy and sound in the midst of civil wars if he didn't have the whole of virtue. There are very many mercenaries who are willing to take a stand and fight to the death in the war Tyrtaeus mentions, and most of them are rash, unjust, insolent, and very imprudent, with only a very few who are not.

Where has this argument, of ours wound up now, and what does it want to make clear when it says these things? Isn't it obvious that it wanted to show us that above all others the lawgiver of this place, who came from Zeus, as well as any other lawgiver worth much of anything, will never set down laws with a view to anything but the greatest virtue? And this is, as Theognis asserts, trustworthiness in the midst of dangers—that quality which someone would call perfect justice. As for what Tyrtaeus praised especially, it is something noble, and the poet has adorned it in a fitting way; yet one would speak most correctly if one said it was fourth in number and in claim to honor.

Clinias/ Stranger, we are consigning our lawgiver to a pretty low rank among lawgivers!

Athenian Stranger/ No, it's ourselves that we're consigning to a low rank, O best of men, when we show that we think Lycurgus and Minos arranged all the customs at Lacedaimon and here chiefly with a view to war!

Clinias/ But what should we have been saying?

Athenian Stranger/ What is true, I think and just, since we were carrying on a dialogue on behalf of a divine man. We should have said that he had in view not just some part of virtue—and that the lowest—but that he looked to the whole of virtue, and that in seeking his laws he arranged them in forms that are different from the forms used by those who now seek to put forward laws. Nowadays, each seeks merely to add on that form which he needs. So one concerns himself with inheritances and heiresses, another with assaults, and others with myriad other such things. But we assert that the search for laws belongs to those who seek well, as we have now begun to do. For I wholly admire the way you started out interpreting the laws; it is correct to begin from virtue and say that he laid down the laws for the sake of this. But when you claimed that he legislated by referring everything to a part of virtue—and that the smallest—I was sure you were no longer correct, and that is why all this last part of the argument has been put forward now. How then would I have liked to hear you proceeding in your talk? Do you want me to show you?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ "O stranger," it should have been said, "not in vain are the laws of Crete in especially high repute among all the Greeks. They are correct laws, laws that make those who use them happy. For they provide all the good things. Now the good things are two fold, some human, some divine. The former depend on the divine goods, and if a city receives the greater it will also acquire the lesser.

If not, it will lack both. Health leads the lesser goods; in the second place is beauty; third is strength, both in running and in all the other motions of the body; and fourth is Wealth—not blind but sharp-sighted, insofar as it follows prudence. Prudence, in turn, is first and leader among the divine goods. Second after intelligence comes a moderate disposition of the soul, and from these two mixed with courage comes justice, in third place. Courage is fourth. All of these last goods are by nature placed prior in rank to the first, and this is the rank they should be placed in by the legislator.

After these things, the citizens should be told that the other orders are given to them with a view to these goods, of which the human look to the divine and the divine all look to the leader, intelligence. It is necessary to care for the citizens by apportioning honor and dishonor correctly among them, in their marriage associations, and then later in the birth and rearing of the children, male and female, while they are young and also as they get older, until they reach old' age. In all their mingling with one another one must keep a guard, watching their pains and pleasures, their desires and the ardors of all their erotic longings, blaming and praising correctly by means of the laws themselves. Moreover, in fits of anger, in fears, in "the disturbances that come over souls in bad fortune and the release from such things that comes with good fortune, in the experiences brought by diseases and wars and poverty, and the experiences brought upon human beings by the opposite circumstances—in all such situations what is noble and what, is ignoble in each case must be taught and defined.

After these matters necessity demands that the lawgiver guard the citizens' acquisitions and expenditures, in whatever way these take place, and also that he watch over

the formation and dissolution of their associations with one another for all these purposes, both voluntary and involuntary, keeping an eye on how they behave towards one another in each of; these sorts of activity, and observing which sorts are just and which are lacking in justice. For those citizens who obey the: laws he should ordain honor, and for those who disobey he should ordain penalties. When he comes to what is the end of the whole political regime, he should consider how each of those who has died should be buried and what honors should be allocated to them.

Looking back over all these things, the one who frames the; laws will set up guards—some grounded in prudence, others in true opinion—so that intelligence will knit together all: these things and may declare that they follow moderation and. justice but not wealth or love of honor."

Thus, O strangers, I at least would have wished and still do wish that you would speak: explaining how all this is to be found in the laws that are said to be from Zeus and the Pythian Apollo, the laws laid down by Minos and Lycurgus. And then I would like to be shown why it is that their order is so clear to anyone with experience in laws, either because of technical skill or because of certain habits, while it remains quite unapparent to the rest of us.

Clinias/ What should be said after these things, stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ In my opinion, it's necessary to start over again from the beginning, commencing just as we did, by first discussing the practices that contribute to courage and then proceeding through another and then yet another form of virtue—if you wish to do so. As soon as we've been through the first, we will try to use it as a pattern for the others and thus have a comforting discussion about them as we go along our route. Later, if god is willing, we'll show how what we just went through is aimed at virtue as a whole.

Clinias/ What you're saying is fine. How about trying first to test our praiser of Zeus here?

Athenian Stranger/ I will, but I'll also try to test you and me as well. For the discussion is common to us all. So both of you tell me now: didn't we assert that the common meals and the gymnastics were devised by the legislator with a view to war?

Megillus/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And what would come third, and fourth? For one probably ought to count in this way as regards the things that constitute the rest of virtue too (whether one calls them "parts" or speaks of them by themselves, so long as it's clear what one means to say).

Megillus/ Thirdly, I and any Lacedaimonian would say, he devised hunting.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's try to give a fourth, or a fifth if we can.

Megillus/ In the fourth place I at least would try to put the great attention that we pay to endurance of suffering, in the fistfights we hold with one another and in certain practices of theft we have, which always involve many blows. Then too., there is a practice called the "secret service," which is amazingly full of the sort of toils that instill endurance; they go barefoot and sleep without blankets in winter, and they have to take care of themselves without any servants as they wander by night as well as by day through the whole territory. And then there is the festival of naked games, where we undergo terrible suffering, combating the stifling heat of summer. There are many other such practices—so many that one would almost never stop if he tried to enumerate them all.

Athenian Stranger/ You've spoken well indeed, Lacedaimonian stranger. But look, as to courage, how shall

we define it? Shall we leave it at saying that it's a combat against fears and pains only, or also against longings and pleasures, and certain terrible cajoling flatteries that can turn to wax the spiritedness even of those who think themselves solemn?

Megillus/ I agree; it fights against all these.

Athenian Stranger/ If we recall the earlier arguments, this fellow here said that a certain sort of city is inferior to itself, and also a certain sort of man; isn't that so, Knossian stranger?

Clinias/ It certainly is.

Athenian Stranger/ Are we now saying that the man inferior to pains is bad, or do we mean the man inferior to pleasures also?

Clinias/ More the one inferior to pleasures, in my opinion at least. Presumably we all mean the one overcome by pleasures rather than the one overcome by pains when we refer to one who is blamably inferior to himself.

Athenian Stranger/ Surely the lawgiver of Zeus or of the Pythian hasn't instituted a crippled courage, able to resist only on the left side but unable to resist on the right, the side of cunning and flattery? Isn't his resistant on both sides?

Clinias/ On both, I at least would maintain.

Athenian Stranger/ All right then, let's go back and say what these practices are in both your cities that constrain men to taste pleasures and not flee them—just as they were constrained not to flee pains, but were dragged right into the midst of them and, by the use of force and by persuasion through honors, were made to conquer them. Where in the laws is this same thing set up with regard to pleasures? Let it be said what this practice of yours is that makes the same men equally courageous before sufferings and pleasures,

triumphing over what they should and in no way proving inferior to their own nearest and harshest enemies.

Megillus/ Although I was able to list for you many laws ordained with a view to sufferings, stranger, I couldn't with equal ease produce major and conspicuous examples with regard to pleasures. I would probably have no trouble in finding some minor examples.

Clinias/ Nor could I myself, in regard to the Cretan laws, show this as clearly as I could the other.

Athenian Stranger/ Best of strangers, this is not surprising. But if one of us should blame some feature in the laws belonging to each of the others, being led to this out of a wish to see what is true and, at the same time, what is best, let's accept such behavior from one another not in a harsh way, but gently.

Clinias/ What you've said is correct, Athenian stranger, and it should be heeded.

Athenian Stranger/ For of course, Kleinias, that kind of thing wouldn't be fitting for men of our age.

Clinias/ Indeed it wouldn't.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether or not someone can correctly blame the Laconian and the Cretan regime is another question. But I am probably in a better position than either of you to tell what things are said by the many. Because, given that what pertains to your laws has been put together in a measured way, one of the finest is the law that does not allow any of the young to inquire which laws are finely made and which are not, but that commands all to say in harmony, with one voice from one mouth, that all the laws are finely made by gods; if someone says otherwise, there is to be no heed paid to him at all. And yet if some old man has been thinking over something in your laws, he is to make

such arguments before a magistrate and someone his own age, with no young person present.

Clinias/ Most correctly spoken, stranger, and like a diviner! Even though you're far away in time from the thought of him who laid down these strictures, I think you've fairly hit upon it. What you say is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, there are no youngsters around us now; and on account of our old age the lawgiver allows us a dispensation—carrying on a conversation about these matters alone "by ourselves, we'll be doing nothing wrong, will we?

Clinias/ That's so, and don't hold yourself back from laying blame on our laws. It's not dishonorable simply to find out about something that is ignoble; in fact, if the one who hears is not resentful, but well disposed, the outcome may be a remedy of the ill.

Athenian Stranger/ Nobly spoken. What I have to say will not really be a blame of the laws—-not, at least, until I am on firm ground after inquiring as closely as I can—but will be rather an expression of perplexity. For you are the only peoples of whom we know, among Greeks as well as barbarians, whose lawgiver has given orders to keep away from and not taste the greatest sorts of pleasure and play; while as to pains and fears, as we just remarked, he held that if someone flees them, from childhood until the end of life, the result will be that when he gets into unavoidable toils and fears and pains, he will flee before those who have had gymnastic training in such things and will be enslaved by them. I think the same legislator should have thought the same thing about pleasures. He should have said to himself, "If our citizens grow up from youth lacking experience in the greatest pleasures, if they aren't practiced in enduring pleasures and in never being compelled to do anything

shameful, their softness of spirit before pleasures will lead them to suffer the same thing as those who are overcome by fears. They will be enslaved in another and more shameful fashion to those who are capable of enduring pleasures, who know about pleasures, and who are sometimes human beings vicious in every way. They'll have souls that are part slave and., part free, and will not be worthy of being called courageous and free men without qualification." Consider now whether you think any of this that's just been said is to the point.

Clinias/ Offhand, the argument seems to us, at least, to make sense. But to be quickly and easily persuaded about matters of such gravity might well betoken youth and mindlessness.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, Kleinias, and Lacedaimonian stranger, suppose we turn to the next matter, we proposed to deal with. Let's discuss moderation after courage. What will we find in these regimes that is different from what is, in regimes arranged at random, parallel to the features we just discovered pertaining to war?

Megillus/ It's not too easy to say, but it's- likely that the common meals and the gymnastics have been devised so as to be fine for both.

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely indeed, strangers, that it is difficult for regimes to become as uncontroversial in deed as they are in speech. It's the same as with bodies: it's almost impossible to prescribe one exercise for anyone body that would not appear in some respects harmful as well as in some respects beneficial to our bodies. So it is with these gymnastics and common meals: in many other ways they now benefit cities, but in the event of civil strife they are harmful (as is shown by the examples of the Miletian, Boeotian, and Thurian boys). What's more, there is an

ancient law concerning sexual pleasures not only of humans but of beasts, a law laid down even in nature, which this practice seems to have corrupted. For these offenses your cities might be the first to be accused by someone, along with other cities that zealously pursue gymnastics. However such things are to be considered, in a playful or a serious mood, it should be understood that the pleasure is given according to nature, it seems, when the female unites with the nature of males for procreation. Males coming together with males, and females with females, seems against nature; and the daring of those who first did it seems to have arisen from a lack of self-restraint with regard to pleasure. But the fact is, we all accuse the, Cretans of being the originators of the myth of Ganymede: since their laws were believed to have come from Zeus, they added this myth about Zeus so that they could be following the god as they continued to reap the enjoyments of this pleasure. About the myth no more need be said; but about human beings who inquire into laws almost their entire inquiry concerns pleasures and pains, in cities and in private dispositions. These two. springs flow forth by nature, and he who draws from the right one, at the right time, and in the right amount, is happy; the same holds for a city and for a private individual and for every animate thing. But he who does so without knowledge and at the wrong time lives a life that is just the opposite.

Megillus/ What's been said, stranger, is in some ways fine, and we have trouble finding words in response to these things, but to me at least, the lawgiver in Lacedaimon seems to have done what's correct when he ordered fleeing from pleasures. As for the laws in Knossos, this fellow here, if he wishes, will take the field in their support. But the ways of Sparta with regard to pleasures are in my opinion the finest to be found among humankind. For our law proscribed from the entire country that practice which leads humans to fall

into the greatest pleasures and the greatest sorts of insolence and total mindlessness. Never would you see in fields or towns under Spartan supervision any drinking parties or any of the stuff that goes with them, which has such power to incite men to every sort of pleasure. There isn't a one of us who wouldn't immediately inflict the gravest punishment when he encountered one of those drunken revelers, and the Dionysia wouldn't afford an excuse that would protect him, if he were doing the sorts of things I saw them do in the carts once among your people. Why, in Tarentum among our colonists I witnessed the whole city drunk at a Dionysia! That kind of thing just doesn't exist among us.

Athenian Stranger/ O Lacedaimonian stranger, all such things are praiseworthy, where there is endurance; where that is loosened, they do become pretty stupid. Perhaps someone from our side might defend himself by taking you up, and pointing to the looseness of your women. But whether in Tarentum or among my people or among yours, there is one response that seems to acquit all such things of evil and make them correct. To a stranger amazed at seeing what he is not used to seeing among his own people, everyone answers this way: "Don't be amazed, stranger. This is the law among us—among your people perhaps there is a different law pertaining to these same things." Yet our present discussion is not about the rest of mankind, my dear sirs, but about the vice and virtue of the lawgivers themselves. So let's speak at greater length about the whole subject of intoxication. It is not a practice of minor significance, and to understand it is not the part of any paltry lawgiver. I'm speaking now, not about the drinking or nondrinking of wine in general, but about getting drunk, and whether it should be employed as the Scythians and Persians do, and also the Carthaginians, the Celts, the

Iberians, and the Thracians- (all these being warlike races), or whether it should be employed as you do. You people, as you say, wholly abstain from it, while the Scythians and Thracians drink wine completely undiluted, women as well as men, and pour it over their cloaks, believing that they're engaging in a fine and happy practice. The Persians also use it a great deal, along with other luxuries you abstain from, but they preserve more orderliness than those others.

Megillus/ But, O best of men, we do put all these peoples, to flight when we take up our arms.

Athenian Stranger/ Best of men, don't talk that way. Many routs and pursuits have occurred, and will occur again, without a clear cause. So we should always set down victory or defeat in battle not as a clear but as a controversial criterion for whether practices are noble or not. The fact is, bigger cities defeat smaller ones in battle: the Syracusans enslave the Locrians, who seem the best-governed of the people in that area; the Athenians enslave the Ceians; and we could find ten thousand other such examples. So with regard to each practice we discuss, let's now leave aside the talk about victories and defeats and try to persuade ourselves with arguments, showing how one sort of thing is noble and how another sort is not noble. But first hear me out as I explain how one should inquire into what is advantageous and what is not in these matters.

Megillus/ How do you say it should be done?

Athenian Stranger/ It seems to me that all those who take up a practice for discussion and propose to blame or praise it as soon as it's mentioned proceed in a manner that is not at all proper. They do the same as someone who, when he hears another strongly praising a kind of cheese as a good food, immediately blames it, without learning either its effect or the way it is administered—in what manner, by whom,

along with what, in what condition, and to persons in what condition. This is the very thing, it seems to me, we're now doing in our arguments. Having heard only this much about the subject of drunkenness, some of us are immediately blaming it and others are praising it—both absurdly. On both sides we present our praise by using witnesses and praisers: one side claims that what they say is decisive because they bring forward so many, while the other side replies that their claim is decisive because we see that those who don't use the practice are victorious in battle. And then this has become a subject of controversy between us. I really don't think it makes sense for us to go through each of the other legal customs this way. Instead, I am willing to go through this very custom, drunkenness, in another way, which to me appears the required way. In so doing I will try, if I can, to demonstrate what is the correct method for our inquiry into all such things. For thousands upon thousands of nations would disagree with your two cities and fight with them in speech over these things.

Megillus/ Well, if in fact we have some correct method of inquiry into such things, there should be no hesitation to hear about it.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's carry out the inquiry, then, in roughly the following way: come, suppose someone were to praise the raising of goats, and the animal itself as. a fine possession. Suppose someone else, who had seen goats grazing without a goatherd and doing damage to cultivated fields, were to denounce the animal and blame, in the same way, every animal he had ever seen without a ruler or with bad rulers over it. Would we consider such a man's denunciation—whatever he might denounce—to be sound?

Megillus/ How could we?

Athenian Stranger/ Do we suppose someone is a worthy ruler in ships if he possesses only the knowledge of navigation, regardless of whether he is subject to seasickness or not? Or what would we say?

Megillus/ Not at all, if in addition to possessing the art, he suffers from the defect you mention.

Athenian Stranger/ And what of a ruler over an army? Is it sufficient qualification that he possess the knowledge of war even if he's cowardly in the midst of dangers, even if he's seasick with the drunkenness of terror?

Megillus/ How could it be?

Athenian Stranger/ And what if in addition to being a coward he lacked the art?

Megillus/ Now you're speaking of someone who is a complete wretch—a ruler of certain womanish women but not at all of men.

Athenian Stranger/ Take any community for which there is by nature a ruler, and which is beneficial when that ruler is present: what would we say about someone who praised it or blamed it without ever having seen it operating in a correct communal way under its ruler, but had always seen such social intercourse without a ruler or under bad rulers? Do we believe onlookers like these will ever have any worthwhile praise or blame for such communities?

Megillus/ How could they, when they've never seen or taken part in a correct version of any of the communities? —

Athenian Stranger/ Hold on a moment. Should we set down drinking parties and drinking gatherings as one sort of social intercourse, among the many sorts of communities?

Megillus/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, has anyone ever yet seen one of these proceed correctly? For you two it's easy to reply, "Never

yet at all," because among you this practice is neither customary nor legal; but I have encountered many drinking parties in many places, and what's more I have studied all of them, so to speak. I have hardly seen or heard of a single one being run correctly in its entirety—if a few small aspects of some were correct, the vast majority were, so to speak, entirely faulty.

Clinias/ What do you mean by that, stranger? Speak still more clearly. For, as you've said, we lack experience of such gatherings, and if we happened upon them we probably wouldn't know straight off what was correct or not in the way they were proceeding.

Athenian Stranger/ That's likely. Try to learn from my explanation. You do understand, don't you, that in every gathering, in every community formed for any kind of action, there is always a correct ruler in each case?

Clinias/ How could there not be?

Athenian Stranger/ And we said just now that for fighting men a courageous ruler is needed.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now a courageous man is less disturbed by fears than are cowardly men.

Clinias/ That, too, is so.

Athenian Stranger/ So if there had been some device for putting a general who wasn't at all fearful or disturbed at the head of an army, shouldn't we have exerted every effort to do so?

Clinias/ Most certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ At the moment, though, we're speaking not of a ruler of an army in gatherings of men who are fighting enemies in war, but rather of friends communing with friends in peace and with goodwill.

Clinias/ That's correct.

Athenian Stranger/ And such intercourse, if accompanied by drunkenness, is not without disturbance, is it?

Clinias/ How could it be? Entirely the opposite, I think!

Athenian Stranger/ First, then, these also need a ruler.

Clinias/ How could they not? More than in any other action!

Athenian Stranger/ Should a ruler be provided who is undisturbed, if possible?

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And it's likely that he should be someone who is prudent in regard to social intercourse, at any rate. For he becomes both the guardian of their present friendship and the one who sees to it that the friendship will increase through the intercourse they will have.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So shouldn't a sober and wise ruler be set over the drunkards, and not the opposite? For if the ruler of drunken men were a young drunk who wasn't wise, he'd need a lot of good fortune to avoid doing some great evil.

Clinias/ A lot indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Now if someone were to blame this kind of intercourse even in cities where it proceeds in the most correct way possible—if he objected to the activity itself—he might perhaps be correct in his blame. But if someone reviles the practice when he has only seen it proceeding under the most mistaken conditions, he shows first that he doesn't know that this is an example of an incorrect version, and then in addition shows that he is ignorant of the fact that any activity proceeding thus—without a sober despot and ruler—appears wicked. Or don't

you agree that a drunken pilot, and indeed any drunken ruler of anything, will upset all—whether ship, or chariot, or army, or whatever might be governed by him?

Clinias/ What you've said here, stranger, is in every respect true. But tell us this next: suppose this custom regarding drinking were to proceed correctly—what good would it then do us? Just as, to refer back to what we said a moment ago, if an army were led correctly, then victory in war would accrue to the followers (and that's no small benefit), and so on with the rest; so from a correctly instructed drinking party what great thing accrues to private individuals or to the city?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, from one child or one chorus correctly instructed, what great thing would we claim accrues to the city? If we were asked the question in this way, wouldn't we reply as follows? "From one, only a little good comes to the city, but if you ask about the education in general of all who are educated, what great benefit it gives the city, the answer is not difficult: those who are well educated become good men, and becoming such, they act nobly in other respects, as well as in winning victories when they fight their enemies. Education brings victory, although victory sometimes brings a loss of education; for many have grown more insolent because of victories in war, and through their insolence have been filled with ten thousand other vices. And education has never become 'Cadmean,' although many such victories have happened and will happen again to human beings."

Clinias/ You seem to us to be saying, friend, that spending time drinking together is a great contribution to education, if it is done correctly!

Athenian Stranger/ Why not?

Clinias/ Well, could you explain next how what's just been said is true?

Athenian Stranger/ Stranger, to be sure of the truth in these matters, when so many disagree, would belong to a god. But I don't begrudge giving my own view, if that's what's required, since we have now embarked on the discussion of laws and a regime.

Clinias/ That is precisely what we should try to understand, your view on these now-disputed matters.

Athenian Stranger/ All right then, that's what we must do: you two must strive somehow or other to understand the argument and I must strive somehow or other to make it clear. First, however, hear me out on this: all the Greeks regard our city as one that loves to talk and that talks a great deal; but as for Lacedaimon and Crete, the former is considered to be pithy in speech and the latter to be clever rather than talkative. Now I'm anxious not to give you the opinion that I'm long-winded about small matters, as I go ahead to elaborate what is a very lengthy argument about the small activity of getting drunk. Because it would never be possible to regulate this according to nature without giving a clear and sufficient account of what is correct in music; and it would never be possible to give an account of music without going into the whole subject matter of education. All this means very long speeches. So consider what we should do. How would it be if we leave off the discussion of these things for now and turn to a different discussion about laws?

Megillus/ Athenian stranger, you probably are not aware of the fact that our hearth happens to be the consulate for your city. And in all us children who hear that we are the "consuls" for some city there probably sinks in, from the time we are young, a friendly disposition towards that city, as if

it were a second fatherland after one's own city. Now this is just what has happened to me. For whenever the Lacedaimonians were blaming or praising the Athenians for something, I would immediately hear the children crying, "That's your city, Megillus, that's dealing with us ignobly or nobly." Hearing these things, and always fighting over them on your behalf against those who blamed your city, I became entirely well disposed; even now your dialect is a friendly sound to me, and I believe that what is said by many is very true, namely, that those Athenians who are good are good in a different way. They alone are good by their own nature without compulsion, by a divine dispensation: they are truly, and not artificially, good. So with regard to me at any rate, you should take heart and talk as long as you like.

Clinias/ Once you've heard and accepted what I too have to say, stranger, you may surely take heart and talk as much as you wish. As you may have heard, Epimenides, that divine man, was born around here and is, as a matter of fact, related to my family. In obedience to a god's oracle he journeyed to you people ten years before the Persian Wars and made some sacrifices that had been demanded by the god. He told the Athenians, who were at that time living in dread of a Persian expedition, that "the Persians won't come for another ten years and when they do come, they'll go away having accomplished nothing of what they hoped, and having suffered more evil than they've inflicted." At that time, then, our ancestors formed a bond with yours, and from that day to this, I and my family have felt well disposed towards your people.

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely, then, that you're ready to take your part and listen. I'm willing to take my part, but it's not a part that's very easy to carry out. Still, it must be tried. First, for the purposes of the argument, let's define education—saying what it is and what power it has. That's

the way we assert the argument we have now taken in hand should go, until it arrives at the god.

Clinias/ By all means let's do just that, if it pleases you.

Athenian Stranger/ Now as I say what one ought to assert education is, you think over whether what is said is acceptable.

Clinias/ Say on.

Athenian Stranger/ I will, and what I assert is this: whatever a man intends to become good at, this he must practice from childhood; whether he's playing or being serious, he should spend his time with each of the things that pertain to the activity. Thus, in the case of someone intending to become a good farmer or a good house-builder of some sort, the house-builder should play at games that educate in house-building, and the farmer similarly, and the person who raises each child should provide each with miniature tools that are imitations of the true ones. Moreover, the child should learn any knowledge that is a necessary preliminary: a carpenter, for example, should learn to measure and gauge things, and a soldier should play at horseback riding or some other such things. The attempt should be made to use the games to direct the pleasures and desires of children toward those activities in which they must become perfect. The core of education, we say, is a correct nurture, one which, as much as possible, draws the soul of the child at play toward an erotic attachment' to what he must do when he becomes a man who is perfect as regards the virtue of his occupation.

Now, as I said, see if what has been said up to this point is acceptable to us.

Clinias/ Why shouldn't it be?

Athenian Stranger/ Because what we mean by education is not yet defined! When we at present blame or praise the

upbringing of different persons, we say that one of us is "educated" and another is "uneducated," sometimes applying the latter characterization to human beings who are very well educated in trade or merchant shipping or some other such things. So it's appropriate that in our present discussion we do not consider these sorts of training to be education; we mean rather the education from childhood in virtue, that makes one desire and love to become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled with justice. It is this upbringing alone, it appears to me, that this discussion would wish to isolate and to proclaim as education. As for an upbringing that aims at money, or some sort of strength, or some other sort of wisdom without intelligence and justice, the argument proclaims it to be vulgar, illiberal, and wholly unworthy to be called education. But let's not get into a dispute with each other over the name. Let's simply hold fast to the argument now being agreed to by us, the argument that states: "Those who are correctly educated usually become good, and nowhere should education be dishonored, as it is first among the noblest things for the best men. If it ever goes astray, and if it is possible to set it right, everyone ought always to do so as much as he can, throughout the whole of life."

Clinias/ That is correct, and we agree with what you're saying.

Athenian Stranger/ Now long ago, at least, we agreed that the good are those able to rule themselves, and the bad are those who cannot.

Clinias/ What you say is very correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's consider again in a clearer way what we mean by that. Allow me to clarify it for you, if I can, by means of an image.

Clinias/ Just speak on.

Athenian Stranger/ May we then assume that each of us is one person?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ But possessing within himself two opposed and imprudent counselors, which we call pleasure and pain?

Clinias/ That is so.

Athenian Stranger/ Connected to these two there are opinions about the future, common to both of which there is the name "expectation," but each of which also has its own peculiar name: "fear" is the expectation of pain, and "boldness" the expectation of the opposite. Over all these there is calculation as to which of them is better and which worse—and when this calculation becomes the common opinion of the city, it is called law.

Clinias/ I follow this only with great difficulty; but say what comes next as if I were following.

Megillus/ I'm experiencing similar difficulties.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's think about these things in this way: let's consider each of us living beings to be a divine puppet, put together either for their play or for some serious purpose—which, we don't know. What we do know is that these passions work within us like tendons or cords, drawing us and pulling against one another in opposite directions toward opposing deeds, struggling in the region where virtue and vice lie separated from one another. Now the argument asserts that each person should always follow one of the cords, never letting go of it and pulling with it against the others; this cord is the golden and sacred pull of calculation, and is called the common law of the city; the other cords are hard and iron, while this one is soft, inasmuch as it is golden; the others resemble a multitude of different forms. It is necessary always to assist this most

noble pull of law because calculation, while noble, is gentle rather than violent, and its pull is in need of helpers if the race of gold is to be victorious for us over the other races.

Thus, the myth of virtue, the myth about us being puppets, would be saved, and what was intended by the notion of being superior to oneself or inferior would be somewhat clearer. Moreover, as regards a city and a private individual, it'll be clearer that the latter should acquire within himself true reasoning about these cords and live according to it, while a city should take over a reasoning either from one of the gods or from this knower of these things, and then set up the reasoning as the law for itself and for its relations with other cities. Thus, certainly, vice and virtue would be more clearly distinguished for us. With this distinction sharpened, education and other practices will perhaps be clarified, and the practice of spending time drinking together, which might be considered too trivial to be worth so many words, may well appear not unworthy of such lengthy speech.

Clinias/ You speak well; let's complete whatever may be demanded by our present pastime.

Athenian Stranger/ Then tell me: if we introduce drunkenness into this puppet what effect shall we produce?

Clinias/ What do you have in view in asking this?

Athenian Stranger/ Nothing in particular as yet, but just what happens, in general, when the two come together. But I'll try to explain what I want more clearly. What I'm asking is this: doesn't the drinking of wine make pleasures, pains, the spirited emotions, and the erotic emotions, more intense?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ What about sensations, memories, opinions, and prudent thoughts? Do they become more

intense in the same way? Or don't they abandon anyone who becomes thoroughly soused?

Clinias/ Yes, they completely abandon him.

Athenian Stranger/ So he arrives at a disposition of the soul that is the same as the one he had when he was a young child?

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ At such a time he would be least the master of himself.

Clinias/ Least.

Don't we assert that such a man is most wicked?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely, then, that it's not only the old man who becomes a child for a second time, but also the man who is drunk.

Clinias/ Very well put, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Is there really any argument that will try to persuade us that we must taste such a practice and not flee from it with all the strength we have?

Clinias/ It's likely that there is. You, at any rate, assert that there is, and were ready just now to state it.

Athenian Stranger/ What you two remember is true. And I am indeed ready, now that you two have asserted that you would listen in a spirit of eagerness.

Clinias/ How could we not listen—if for no other reason than the wonder, the strangeness, of the notion that a human being should ever voluntarily cast himself into a state of complete degradation.

Athenian Stranger/ … of soul, you mean? Or don't you?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, what about badness in the body, comrade: would we be amazed if someone ever voluntarily got into a state that was emaciated, ugly, and weak?

Clinias/ How could we not be?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, but what about those who go voluntarily to a dispensary to drink medicine: do we think they are ignorant of the fact that a little while later and for many days thereafter they may be in a bodily state such that if they had to live thus until the end of their lives they would refuse to go on living? And don't we know that those who go to gymnasiums for exercise become exhausted right afterwards?

Clinias/ We know all this.

Athenian Stranger/ And that it's for the subsequent benefit that they go voluntarily?

Clinias/ That's a very noble way of putting it.

Athenian Stranger/ Shouldn't one think about other practices in the same way?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then this is the way one should think about the pastime of drinking wine—if it can correctly be thought of as among these other practices.

Clinias/ Why not?

Athenian Stranger/ Now if it's evident that this practice procures for us a benefit no less than that which accrues to the body, it will gain the victory over the bodily practices at the outset, because they involve suffering while this doesn't.

Clinias/ What you say is correct, but I would be amazed if we were able to discover such a thing in it.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it's likely that this is what we must now try to explain. Tell me this: can we distinguish in our minds two forms of fear that are nearly opposite?

Clinias/ Which?

Athenian Stranger/ These: on the one hand we presumably fear evils, when we expect them to come to pass.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And on the other hand we often fear opinion, when we think we will be considered evil if we say or do something that is not noble. This is the sort of fear that we at least, and I believe everyone, calls "shame."

Clinias/ What else?

Athenian Stranger/ These are the two fears I spoke of. The latter opposes sufferings and other fears, but also opposes the most frequent and greatest pleasures.

Clinias/ What you say is very correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Now won't the lawgiver, and indeed anyone worth much of anything, revere with the greatest honors this sort of fear, calling it "awe" and the boldness opposed to it "lack of awe"? Won't he consider lack of awe to be the greatest evil for everyone both in private and in public life?

Clinias/ You speak correctly.

Athenian Stranger/ Doesn't this fear save us from many great evils, and in particular doesn't it play a greater role than anything else in procuring for us victory and safety in war? For there are two things that procure victory, boldness with enemies and with friends fear of shame on account of vileness.

Clinias/ That is so.

Athenian Stranger/ Each of us then must be at the same time fearless and fearful: in respect to what, in each case, we have just indicated.

Clinias/ Indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, when we wish to make each man immune to many fears, we accomplish this by dragging him into the midst of fear in a manner that is consistent with the law.

Clinias/ It appears that we do.

Athenian Stranger/ What about when we try to make him fearful, in a manner that is consistent with justice? Shouldn't we throw him against shamelessness, and by thus giving him gymnastic training in combating it, make him a victorious fighter against his own pleasures? A man becomes perfect in courage by fighting against and conquering the cowardice within him; surely no man who lacks experience and gymnastic training in these struggles would ever attain half his potential in virtue. Can a man then become perfect in moderation if he has not fought triumphantly against the many pleasures and desires that try to seduce him into shamelessness and injustice, using the help of speech, deed, and art, in games and in serious pursuits? Can he remain inexperienced in all such things?

Clinias/ That wouldn't make sense.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, now, is there a fear drug, handed down to human beings by some god, which has the effect that the more one is willing to drink, the more unfortunate one conceives oneself to be with each drink, fearing for oneself everything in the present and in the future, until finally the most courageous human being experiences total terror, and yet when he has slept it off and the drink has been sloughed off he becomes himself again each time?

Clinias/ What drink of this sort could we claim human beings possess, stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ There is none. But if one had appeared from somewhere, could the lawgiver have used it in any way to promote courage? We might well carry on a dialogue with him about it as follows: "Come, lawgiver—whether you are the lawgiver for the Cretans or whoever—would you like to be able, first, to test the citizens for courage and cowardice?"

Clinias/ Obviously, every one of them would say he would.

Athenian Stranger/ "Well then, would you prefer a test that was safe, without great risks, or the opposite?"

Clinias/ All would also agree on a test that was safe.

Athenian Stranger/ "And would you use it to drag them into fears and test them in their sufferings, so as to force them to become fearless—encouraging, exhorting, and honoring them, but dishonoring anyone who refused to obey you and become in every respect the type of person you ordered him to be? The man who had performed well and courageously in this gymnastic you would dismiss without penalty, wouldn't you? And the man who did badly you would penalize? Or would you refuse to use the drug at all, even though you had no other objection to it?"

Clinias/ But why wouldn't he use it, stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ At any rate, friend, compared to our present gymnastics this gymnastic would certainly be amazingly easy—for one person, for a few, or for as many as one might want to apply it to on each occasion. Then too, if someone went off alone to a deserted place, excusing himself out of a sense of shame at being seen before he was in what he considered good condition, and engaged in gymnastic exercise against fear by merely drinking, instead of

performing tens of thousands of other activities, he would be acting in a correct manner. On the other hand, a man would act just as correctly if, trusting in himself on account of the fine preparation given by nature and by training, he did not hesitate to perform such gymnastic exercise in the company of many fellow drinkers, making a display of his capacity to outstrip and overcome the power of the necessary transformation effected by the drink. Thus would he show that because of his virtue he was not made to fall into a single major disgraceful act nor to act like a different person, but that he could go away before taking that last drink, because he was afraid of the weakness all human beings have in the face of the drink.

Clinias/ Yes. For he too would be moderate, stranger—the man who acted in this way.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's speak to the lawgiver again: "Well, lawgiver, it's likely that no god has bestowed such a fear drug on human beings, and we have not devised one for ourselves—I'm not including magicians in the banquet. But what about a drink that induces fearlessness, boldness that is too great, at the wrong time, and toward the wrong things—does one exist or how shall we say?"

Clinias/ "One does," he assert, naming wine.

Athenian Stranger/ Isn't it just the opposite of the one now mentioned? Doesn't it first make a human being who drinks it immediately more cheerful than he was before, and to the degree to which he tastes more, doesn't he become more puffed up with good hopes and an opinion of his own power? Then, finally, doesn't he wind up being filled with complete license of speech, believing himself wise; isn't he filled with freedom and total fearlessness, so that he doesn't hesitate to say or even to do anything? Everyone would agree with us on this description, I think.

Clinias/ How could they not?

Athenian Stranger/ Let's recollect how we asserted that there are two things in our souls that need to be cultivated: on the one hand that we be as bold as possible, and on the other hand the opposite, that we be as fearful as possible.

Clinias/ Which you said belonged to awe, we suppose.

Athenian Stranger/ You two remember in a fine way. But given that courage and fearlessness in the midst of fears should be practiced, one should consider whether the opposite quality in the midst of the opposite things should also be cultivated.

Clinias/ That seems likely, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it's likely that those experiences in which we are naturally inclined to be especially rash and bold are the ones in which we should practice becoming as little filled with shamelessness and boldness as possible, and instead be afraid to say or suffer or do anything shameful on each occasion.

Clinias/ That's likely.

Athenian Stranger/ Aren't all the experiences where we're like that these: spirited anger, erotic desire, insolence, lack of learning, love of gain, cowardice, and, in addition, wealth, beauty, strength, and everything which drives a person out of his wits with the intoxication of pleasure? Now is there anyone of these that is as inexpensive or comparatively harmless, first for testing and then for practicing, than the test and play associated with wine? What pleasure can we say is more measured, if indulged in with any kind of care? Let's just consider it. To test a harsh and savage soul from which tens of thousands of injustices come, is it safer to run the risks involved in making contracts or to get together with it at the festival sights of Dionysus? Or take the example of a soul dominated by sexual desires: is it safer to test it by

turning over one's own daughters, sons, and wives, and risk those who are dearest, in order to see the soul's disposition? One could give ten thousand such examples without ever showing fully how different the method is which observes people through play, and involves no other payoff or penalty. Indeed, in this respect we believe that neither the Cretans nor any other human beings would disagree that this is a decent way of testing one another—one which in cheapness, safety, and speed differs from the other tests.

Clinias/ That, at least, is true.

Athenian Stranger/ This then—the knowledge of the natures and the habits of souls—is one of the things that is of the greatest use for the art whose business it is to care for souls. And we assert (I think) that that art is politics. Or what?

Clinias/ It certainly is.

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Athenian Stranger/ In the next place, what probably ought to be investigated is whether the insight into our natures is the only good to be derived from correctly managed wine parties, or whether there is not a great benefit, worthy of much serious consideration. What do we say, then? The argument seems to want to indicate that there is such a great benefit. Let's listen to hear in what sense and how, doing so with attentive minds, lest the argument ensnare us.

Clinias/ Say on.

Athenian Stranger/ I have a desire to recollect again what we say correct education is, in our view. Because it's now my guess that a safeguard for this education is to be found in this institution, when it's nobly directed.

Clinias/ That's a big claim you make!

Athenian Stranger/ Well, I say that the first infantile sensation in children is the sensation of pleasure and pain, and that it is in these that virtue and vice first come into being in the soul; as for prudence, and true opinions that are firmly held, he is a fortunate person to whom it comes even in old age. He who does possess them, and all the good things that go with them, is a perfect human being. Education, I say, is the virtue that first comes into being in children. Pleasure and liking, pain and hatred, become correctly arranged in the souls of those who are not yet able to reason, and then, when the souls do become capable of reasoning, these passions can in consonance with reason affirm that they have been correctly habituated in the appropriate habits. This consonance in its entirety is virtue; that part of virtue which consists in being correctly trained as regards pleasures and pains so as to hate what one should hate from the very beginning until the end, and also

to love what one should love—if you separate this off in speech and assert that this is education, you will, in my view, be making a correct assertion.;

Clinias/ Stranger, what you said earlier about education and what you have said now both seem correct to us.

Athenian Stranger/ Fine. Now, this education which consists in correctly trained pleasures and pains tends to slacken in human beings, and in the course of a lifetime becomes corrupted to a great extent. So, taking pity on this suffering that is natural to the human race, the gods have ordained the change of holidays as times of rest from labor. They have given as fellow celebrants the Muses, with their leader Apollo, and Dionysus—in order that these divinities might set humans right again. Thus men are sustained by their holidays in the company of gods.

It is necessary to see whether or not the things the argument is singing to us now are true according to nature. The argument asserts that every young thing, so to speak, is incapable of remaining calm in body or in voice, but always seeks to move and cry: young things leap and jump as if they were dancing with pleasure and playing together, and emit all sorts of cries. The other animals, the argument goes, lack perception of orders and disorders in motions (the orders which have received the names of "rhythm" and "harmony"); we, in contrast, have been given the aforementioned gods as fellow-dancers, and they have given us the pleasant perception of rhythm and harmony. Using this they move us, and lead us in choruses, joining us together with songs and dances; and that is why they bestowed the name "choruses"—from the "joy" [charā] which is natural to these activities.

First, then, do we accept this? Do we proclaim that the first education comes through the Muses and Apollo, or what?

Clinias/ So be it.

Athenian Stranger/ So the uneducated man will in our view be the one untrained in choral performances, and the educated ought to be set down as the one sufficiently trained in choral performances?

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now a chorus is the combination of dance and song taken together as a whole.

Clinias/ Necessarily.

Athenian Stranger/ He who is finely educated will be able then to sing and dance in a fine way.

Clinias/ That's likely.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's see exactly what it is that has just been said.

Clinias/ Which part of what was just said?

Athenian Stranger/ "He sings in a fine way," we declared, "and he dances in a fine way": should we add, "if he also sings fine songs and dances fine dances." or not?

Clinias/ We should add that.

Athenian Stranger/ What about someone who regards as fine the things that are fine and regards as ugly the things that are ugly, and uses them this way? Which version of such a man shall we hold to be better educated in the choral art and in music: the one who is able to give adequate devotion with his body and voice to what is understood to be fine each time, while neither delighting in the fine things nor hating the ignoble; or the one who is not fully able to express correctly with voice and body what he understands, yet feels

pleasure and pain correctly—welcoming what is fine and being disgusted by what is ignoble?

Clinias/ You're speaking of a vast difference as regards education, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Then, if we three know what is fine in song and dance, we will also know who has been correctly educated and who is uneducated. But if we don't know the former we will never be able to know if, and where, a safeguard exists for education. Isn't this so?

Clinias/ Yes, that's so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then the next thing for us to do is to track down, like dogs sniffing out prey, what is fine in posture, tune, song, and dance. If these elude us and get away, our discussion that should come after—about correct education, whether Greek or barbarian—would be in vain.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, what should we declare constitutes beauty in posture or tune? Consider this: if a courageous and then a cowardly soul undergo identical and equal sufferings, do the same postures and utterances result?

Clinias/ How could they, when not even the pallor or color is the same?

Athenian Stranger/ What you say is fine, comrade. It should be noted, though, that music includes postures and tunes, since music involves rhythm and harmony; now one can speak of "good rhythm" and "good harmony." but one cannot correctly apply to either tune or posture and image "good color"—as the chorus teachers, speaking in images, do. On the other hand, with regard to the posture or tune of the coward and the courageous man, it is correct to call what pertains to courageous men "fine," and what pertains to cowards "ugly." To avoid our getting involved in a very

lengthy discussion of all these things, let's simply let all the postures and tunes that belong to virtue of the soul or of the body (whether they belong to virtue itself or to an image of it) be beautiful, and those belonging to vice be entirely the opposite.

Clinias/ Your proposal is a correct one, and for now let us respond by saying that's the way things are.

Athenian Stranger/ Here's another question: do we all feel a similar joy in every choral performance, or is this far from being the case?

Clinias/ It's not at all the case.

Athenian Stranger/ What shall we say is the reason for our wavering? Shall we say that the beautiful things are not the same for all of us? Or that they are the same but don't seem to be the same? Surely no one will say, at least, that choral performances of vice are ever more beautiful than those of virtue, nor again that he himself delights in the postures appropriate to depravity, while the rest like an opposite Muse. Most people do say, at least, that the criterion for correct music is its power to provide pleasure to the souls. But that is not acceptable, nor is it at all pious to utter such a thing.

The source of our wavering is in all likelihood rather the following—

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Choral performances are imitations of characters, in all sorts of action and fortune, and each brings to bear both his habitual dispositions and his capacity to imitate. Now those whose character is in accord with what is said and sung and in any way performed—because of nature or habit or both—are necessarily delighted by the things, and led to praise them and pronounce them fine. Those, on the other hand, who find that the things go

against nature, character, or a certain habituation, are unable to delight in them or to praise them, and must necessarily pronounce them ugly. Then there are some whose nature is correct but whose habituation is opposed, and others whose habituation is correct but whose nature is opposed, and these make pronouncements of praise that are opposed to their feelings of pleasure. They call each performance pleasant, but wicked; in the presence of others whom they think prudent, they are ashamed to move their bodies in such ways and ashamed to sing, because they will show that they treat them as fine things, and take them seriously. Nevertheless, they do delight in them when they're all by themselves.

Clinias/ What you say is very correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Isn't a person who delights in wicked postures or songs harmed in some way, and aren't those who take pleasure in the opposite things benefited in some way?

Clinias/ That's likely, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it only a matter of likelihood or is it not a necessity that such a person be in the same position as one who comes into contact with the wicked habits of evil human beings and doesn't hate them, but instead accepts them with delight—blaming them only in a playful way, on those occasions when he sees as in a dream their vileness? Surely it is necessary that one who takes delight in things becomes then similar to the things he takes delight in, even when he is ashamed to praise them; and what greater good or evil could we declare there is for us than such completely necessary assimilation?

Clinias/ I believe there is none greater.

Athenian Stranger/ Where there are or will someday be fine laws laid down regarding the education and play which concerns the Muses, do we suppose that poets will be

allowed to teach the children of those who live under good laws, and the young men in the choruses, whatever the poet himself finds pleasing in the rhythm or tune or words of poetry, so that he makes them similar to whatever he happens to be as regards virtue or wickedness?

Clinias/ That at least wouldn't make sense. How could it?

Athenian Stranger/ Yet this is just what can be done nowadays, at any rate, in all cities, so to speak, except Egypt.

Clinias/ What sort of legislation on this matter do you claim they have in Egypt?

Athenian Stranger/ It's astounding to hear. Long ago, as is likely, this argument which we are now enunciating was known to them—the argument which says that it's necessary for the young in the cities to practice fine postures and fine songs. They made a list of these, indicating which they were and what kind they were, and published it in their temples. Painters and others who! represented postures and that sort of thing were not allowed to make innovations or think up things different from the ancestral. And they are still not allowed to—not in these things or in music altogether. If you look into this you will find that for ten thousand years—not "so to speak" but really ten thousand years—the paintings and sculptures have been in no way; more beautiful or more ugly than those that are being made, with the very same skill, by their craftsmen now.

Clinias/ What you say is astounding!

Athenian Stranger/ An extreme in the lawgiving and political art. There are other features in their law that you would find pretty poor. But this much about the music is true and worthy of thought: it was possible to be firm about such things, and mandate in law songs which are by nature correct. This would have to be the work of a god or someone divine—even as they claim there that the songs which have

been preserved for this long time were the poetry of Isis. So, as I said, if someone could grasp in any way what is correct in these things, he ought boldly to order it in law. The search, dictated by pleasure and pain, for a music that is continually new brands the sanctified chorus "old-fashioned"; but this will not have a very corrupting effect on a chorus that has been made sacred. In that land, at any rate, it has probably had no corrupting power; entirely the contrary.

Clinias/ So it appears from what you say now.

Athenian Stranger/ So won't we take heart and elaborate the correct use of music and the correct play associated with the choric art, in something like the following way? Don't we feel delight when we think we are doing well? Isn't this so?

Clinias/ Yes, that is so.

Athenian Stranger/ And when we are in such a mood, a mood of delight, we aren't able to remain still?

Clinias/ Such is the case.

Athenian Stranger/ Isn't it also the case that while our young men are ready by themselves to perform in the chorus, we elders hold that it is fitting for us to look on at their performance, delighting in their play and festivity? Isn't it because we are now no longer very lively, and yet miss and welcome liveliness, that we establish contests for those who can as much as possible restore us, through memory, to youthfulness?

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then do we think that the account the many give about celebrators of holidays is completely vacuous, when they say that the person who as much as possible gives us joy and delight is the one who should be considered wisest and judged victorious? For since we give ourselves over to play on such occasions, the one who makes

the most people enjoy themselves the most should be the one who is most honored and, as I just now said, given the victory prizes. Isn't this correctly spoken, and wouldn't things be done correctly, if they were done in this way?

Clinias/ Maybe.

Athenian Stranger/ But let's not judge such a thing quickly, blessed one. Instead, let's analyze it part by part and consider it in something like the following way: suppose someone once set up a contest simply—without specifying whether it was for gymnastic or for music or for horseback riding. Suppose he gathered together everyone in the city and proclaimed a victory prize, open to anyone who wanted to compete regarding pleasure alone, the prize to go to that person who had pleased the spectators the most. No restrictions on the means; the winner to be simply he who had done this the most and who was judged to be the most pleasant of all the contestants. What do we think would ever result from this proclamation?

Clinias/ In which respect do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, I suppose it's likely that one, like Homer, would present a rhapsody, and another a recital on the kithara, and another a tragedy, and another, again, a comedy; and it wouldn't be surprising if someone thought he could best win by presenting puppets. If performers such as these came forward and tens of thousands of others as well, can we say which justly wins?

Clinias/ Your question is strange. Who could ever answer you as if he knew, before he had heard and had himself been part of the audience for each contestant?

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Do you want me to give the two of you the strange reply?

Clinias/ Why not?

Athenian Stranger/ If the very little children are the judges they'll choose the man who presents puppets. Isn't that so?

Clinias/ How could they not?

Athenian Stranger/ If the bigger boys, the one who presents the comedies. Tragedy will be the choice of the educated among the women, the younger men, and probably almost the majority of the whole.

Clinias/ Most probably.

Athenian Stranger/ But the rhapsode, who gave a beautiful recital of the Iliad or the Odyssey or something from Hesiod, would probably please us old men listeners most and be proclaimed the winner by far. Now who would have correctly been winner? That's the next question, isn't it?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Clearly, for me at least and the two of you, it's necessary to declare that the ones chosen by men of our age are the ones who are the correct winners. For our kind of habituation seems to be the best by far of the sorts of habituation nowadays found in all the cities and everywhere.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ For my part I go along with the many to this extent, at least, that music must be judged by pleasure, but not by the pleasure of any chance listeners. Almost the finest Muse is she who pleases the best men and the adequately educated men, and especially finest is she who pleases the one man who is distinguished in virtue and education.

The reason why we assert that the judges of these matters should have virtue is that they must partake of the rest of prudence and especially of courage. The true judge should

not learn from the audience how to judge, swept away by the noise of the many and his own lack of education. Nor, again, I should lack of manliness and cowardice make him contradict what he knows, and pronounce a soft-spirited judgment, lying through the very same lips that just finished swearing an oath to gods. If justice prevails, it's not as a student but as a teacher that the judge will sit before the audience, and he will oppose himself to those who provide the spectators with pleasure in a way that is not appropriate or correct. That's the way it used to be, under the ancient Greek law—just the opposite of what the law commands today in Sicily and Italy. There it has given way to the majority of the spectators, and decides the winner by a show of hands. Thus it has corrupted the poets themselves, who now create with- a view to the lowly pleasure of the judges; as a result, the spectators educate the poets! In addition, it has corrupted the pleasures of the theater itself: an audience should be continually hearing about characters better than their own, and hence continually experiencing better pleasure; but now they make it so that entirely the opposite takes place among them.

What is it that the things now gone through again in the argument wish to indicate to us? Consider if it's the following—

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ It seems to me that the argument has come around again for the third or fourth time to the same thing, namely, that education is the drawing and pulling of children toward the argument that is said to be correct by the law and is also believed, on account of experience, to be really correct by those who are most decent and oldest. So, to prevent the child's soul from becoming habituated to feeling delight and pain in a way opposed to the law and to those who are persuaded by the law, to make the child's soul

follow and feel the same joys and pains as an old man, the things we call songs, but which are really incantations for souls, have now come into being. These have as their serious goal the consonance we are speaking about. But since the souls of the young cannot sustain seriousness, these incantations are called "games" and "songs," and I are treated as such. It's just like when people are sick and their bodies are weak; those in charge try to give them the needed nourishment mixed with other pleasant tasting foods and drinks, and offer them the bad things mixed with unpleasant stuff, so that they will welcome one and become correctly habituated in hating the other. This is the same thing the correct lawgiver will persuade—or, if he cannot persuade, compel—the poet to do in his beautiful and praiseworthy phrases: to create poetry correctly by depicting in rhythms and harmonies the postures and songs of moderate, courageous, and wholly good men.

Clinias/ In the name of Zeus, stranger! Do they seem to you to create poetry this way nowadays, in other cities? As far as I observe, I know of no place except among us and the Lacedaimonians where things are done as you now say. There is continual innovation in dances and in all the rest of music, and the changes are not ordained by the laws but by certain disorderly pleasures, which, far from remaining the same and being concerned with the same things (as in the Egyptian system you have interpreted) never stay the same.

Athenian Stranger/ Excellent, Kleinias! If I seemed to you to say that the things you refer to exist now, I wouldn't be surprised if I did so by not expressing clearly what I was thinking. What I was describing was what I wish would come to pass in regard to music, but perhaps I did speak in such a way as to seem to you to say that this is the way things are. For it is not at all pleasant to rail at incurable practices

and errors that are far developed, though sometimes it is necessary.

But come, since you also are in agreement with these standards: are you claiming that they are followed among your people and among his people more than among the rest of the Greeks?

Clinias/ Why not?

Athenian Stranger/ And what if the rest were to adopt them? Would we then claim things were in a finer condition than they are now?

Clinias/ Presumably it would be a big change if things were done as they are among his people and my people, and also as you just now said things should be done.

Athenian Stranger/ Look, let's come to an agreement regarding the matters under discussion now. Among your peoples, in all education and music is anything said other than the following? You compel the poets to say that the good man, being moderate and just, is happy and blessed, whether he be great and strong or small and weak, whether he be rich or not. Even if someone is richer "than Cinyras or Midas," if he is unjust, he is a wretch and lives a life of misery. And "I would not memorialize," declares your poet—if, that is, he speaks correctly—"nor set down in speech a man" who without justice performed and acquired all the things said to be noble; not even if such a man were to "stand near and assail the enemy"; if he were unjust, I would not want such a man to remain bold after "seeing bloody death," or win a victory in running against "the Northwind of Thrace," or ever to obtain any of the things said to be good. For the things said to be good by the many are not correctly so described. It is said that the best thing is health, and second is beauty, and third is wealth—and then there are said to be ten thousand other goods: sharp sight, hearing,

and good perception of all the objects of the senses; and then, by becoming a tyrant, to do whatever one desires; and finally the perfection of complete blessedness, which is to possess all these things and then to become immortal, as quickly as possible. But you two and I, presumably, speak as follows: we say that these things, beginning with health, are all very good when possessed by just and pious men, but all very bad when possessed by unjust men. To see, to hear, to perceive, and, in general, to live as an immortal for the whole of time, while possessing all the things said to be good except for justice and the whole of virtue, is the greatest of evil. The evil gets less as the time such a man continues to live gets shorter.

Now you two are going to persuade and compel your poets to say just the things I've been saying, I suppose; in addition, they must furnish rhythms and harmonies that go along with this, and thus educate your young. Or isn't this so? See what you think. To speak plainly, I say that the things said to be "bad" are good for unjust men and bad for just men, while the good things are really good for good men but bad for bad men.

Well, I ask again, are we in consonance, I and you two, or what?

Clinias/ Well, in some respects we appear to me, at least, to be, but in other respects not at all.

Athenian Stranger/ Given a man who possesses in a lasting way health, wealth, and tyrannical power—and for you two, I add exceptional strength and courage along with immortality—but who has nothing else of the things said to be bad, and who has within himself only injustice and insolence—given a man who lives such an existence, perhaps I don't persuade you when I say he is unhappy and indeed manifestly miserable?

Clinias/ That is very true, you don't.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, what should we say after this? Doesn't it seem to you two that a man who is courageous, strong, beautiful, and rich, and who does whatever he might desire throughout his whole life will, if he should also be unjust and insolent, necessarily live in a shameful way? This perhaps you would agree to, that he would live in a shameful way, at any rate?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Also in a bad way?

Clinias/ No, there is no longer the same agreement.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? That he would live also in an unpleasant way and in a way that was not to his benefit?

Clinias/ Now how could we agree to these things in addition?

Athenian Stranger/ How? It would be likely, my friends, if some god were to give us consonance—for now, at any rate, we sing pretty much at variance with one another. For to me, dear Kleinias, these things appear more necessary than the proposition that Crete is manifestly an island; and if I were a legislator I would try to compel the poets and everyone in the city to speak in this way: I would lay down almost the gravest penalty for anyone in the territory who should say that there are some human beings who were once wicked but live in a pleasant way, or who said that some things are profitable and gainful while others are more just. I would persuade my citizens to say things that are different from the things that are now said, it appears, by Cretans and Lacedaimonians—and by the rest of mankind too, doubtless.

Come now, best of men, in the name of Zeus and Apollo! Suppose we could question these very gods who were your lawgivers and ask: "Then is the most just way of life the most

pleasant? Or are there two ways of life, of which the most pleasant happens to be one, and the most just another?" If they were to declare that there are two, we would probably ask them again, if we were questioning correctly: "Then which men must be called the happier—those who live the most just life or those who live the most pleasant?" If they were to reply, "those who live the most pleasant," their answer would be a strange one.

But I don't want such a thing to be put by me in the mouth of the gods; rather, in the mouths of fathers and lawgivers. Let the questions I asked just now be asked of a father and lawgiver, and let him say that the one who lives the most pleasant life is most blessed. Then, after these things I at least would declare: "O father, didn't you want me to live as happily as possible? Yet you never ceased bidding me to live always as justly as possible." Now the lawgiver or father who laid things down in this way would appear strange, I think, and unable to speak in consonance with himself. And if, on the other hand, he had proclaimed the most just life to be the happiest, I think everyone who heard him would ask whatever this was that the law was praising, what good and noble thing, superior to pleasure, was possessed by this life. For what indeed would be this good, separate from pleasure, that accrues to the just man?

Come now, is fame, and the praise that comes from human beings and gods, something good and noble, but unpleasant? Is ignominy the opposite? "Far from it, dear lawgiver," we will declare. But is it unpleasant, though good or noble, neither to do someone injustice nor to be done an injustice by someone? Are the opposites pleasant, though shameful and bad?

Clinias/ How could they be?

Athenian Stranger/ So then the argument which does not split the pleasant from the just, and the good from the noble, is (if nothing else) persuasive in making some willing to live the pious and just life. And this means that for a lawgiver, at least, the most shameful and most opposed of arguments is the one that fails to declare that these things are so. For no one would voluntarily be willing to be persuaded to do that which does not bring him more joy than pain.

Looking at things from a distance produces a dizzying obscurity in everyone, so to speak, and especially in children; but our lawgiver will do the opposite to opinion by taking away the obscurity, and will somehow or other persuade, with habits and praises and arguments, that the just and unjust things are shadow-figures. From the perspective of the unjust and evil man himself, the unjust things appear pleasant, the opposite of the way they appear to the just man, while the just things appear very unpleasant. But from the perspective of the just everything appears entirely the opposite.

Clinias/ So it appears.

Athenian Stranger/ Which shall we claim is the better authority for judging the truth: that of the worse soul or that of the better?

Clinias/ Necessarily, I suppose, that of the better.

Athenian Stranger/ Necessarily then, the unjust way of life is not only more shameful and more wicked, but is also truly more unpleasant than the just and pious way of life.

Clinias/ That's pretty much the way it is according to the argument being presented now, at any rate, my friends.

Athenian Stranger/ Even if what the argument has now established were not the case, could a lawgiver of any worth ever tell a lie more profitable than this (if, that is, he ever has the daring to lie to the young for the sake of a good cause),

or more effective in making everybody do all the just things willingly, and not out of compulsion?

Clinias/ Truth is a noble and a lasting thing, stranger; but it is likely that it's not easy to persuade people of it.

Athenian Stranger/ So be it. Now didn't it prove easy to persuade people of that myth told by the Sidonian, though it was incredible, and doesn't the same hold for tens of thousands of other myths?

Clinias/ What myths?

Athenian Stranger/ About the teeth that were once sown in the ground, from which grew heavily-armed men. Indeed, this myth is a great example for the lawgiver of how it is possible to persuade the souls of the young of just about anything, if one tries. It follows from this that the lawgiver should seek only the convictions which would do the greatest good for the city, and he should discover every device of any sort that will tend to make the whole community speak about these things with one and the same voice, as much as possible, at every moment throughout the whole of life, in songs and myths and arguments.

Now if anyone thinks things are otherwise, let him not hesitate to carry on the controversy through argument.

Clinias/ It seems to me that with regard to what you've now said, at least, neither of us would ever be able to dispute you.

Athenian Stranger/ What follows after this, then, would belong to me. So I assert that the choruses, three in number, must all sing incantations for the tender young souls of the children, repeating to them all the noble things we have been saying and will say later on, the sum of which is this: when we claim that the gods say that the most pleasant life and the best life are the same, we will be saying what is most

true, and also persuading those who must be persuaded, more effectively than if we spoke in some other way.

Clinias/ What you say must be agreed to.

Athenian Stranger/ First, it would be most correct for the children's chorus dedicated to the Muses to lead off, singing such things in complete seriousness before the whole city. Second should come the chorus for those up to thirty years of age, invoking Paean as witness to the truth of what is said and praying that he be gracious and make the young believers. Then it is necessary that a third group sing, the men between the ages of thirty and sixty; the ones who come after these, since they aren't able anymore to bear the toil of singing, should use their divinely inspired voices to present mythical speeches about the same kinds of characters.

Clinias/ Who do you say is to make up this third chorus, stranger? We didn't follow very clearly what you intended to explain about them.

Athenian Stranger/ Yet most of the arguments that have been uttered up until now have been pretty much for the sake of these men!

Clinias/ We haven't understood; try to explain more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ We said, if we remember, at the beginning of our discussion, that the nature of all young things is fiery, and unable to remain calm either, in body or in voice, but is always crying and leaping in a disorderly way. We said that none of the other animals attains perception of order in either of these, but that human nature alone has this. The name for order in movement is "rhythm," and for order in voice, the mixture of sharp and deep, the name is "harmony"; the two things together are called "a chorus." The gods, we asserted, have taken pity on us and given us

as fellow members or leaders of our choruses Apollo and the Muses; then, if we remember, we spoke of a third, Dionysus.

Clinias/ How could we not remember?

Athenian Stranger/ Now the chorus of Apollo, and that of the Muses have been described; the third and last, the chorus of Dionysus, must necessarily be described.

Clinias/ What? Explain. For it sounds very strange, at first hearing, a Dionysian chorus of elders—if, that is, men over thirty or even fifty, men as old as sixty, are to dance in his honor.

Athenian Stranger/ What you say is certainly very true. This does require an argument, I think, showing how this would be reasonable.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ So then, are we in agreement on what went before?

Clinias/ In what respect?

Athenian Stranger/ That every man and child, free and slave, female and male—indeed, the whole city—must never cease singing, as an incantation to itself, these things we've described, which must in one way or another be continually changing, presenting variety in every way, so that the singers will take unsatiated pleasure in their hymns.

Clinias/ How could it not be agreed that this is how things must be done?

Athenian Stranger/ Where would our best part of the city—the part that is most persuasive of those in the city because of its age and also its prudence—do its singing of the most beautiful things, so as to effect the most good things? Or will we foolishly neglect this part which would wield authority over the most beautiful and beneficial songs?

Clinias/ But it's impossible to neglect them, at least according to what's being said now.

Athenian Stranger/ So what would be fitting for this part? See if it's the following—

Clinias/ Which?

Athenian Stranger/ Everyone as he gets more elderly is presumably full of reluctance to sing songs; he gets less delight from doing this and would become rather ashamed if compelled to do it. The more elderly and more moderate he becomes, the more this increases. Isn't that so?

Clinias/ That is so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then he would be still more ashamed to sing at the theater, standing up before all sorts of human beings. Especially if such men were compelled to sing under the same conditions as the choruses that train their voices for competitions, lean and without having eaten, they would presumably do so entirely without pleasure, ashamed, and without any eagerness' of spirit.

Clinias/ What you say would be inevitable.

Athenian Stranger/ How then will we encourage them so as to make their spirits eager to sing the songs? Won't we legislate as follows? First, children until the age. of eighteen are not to taste wine at all. We will teach that one shouldn't pour fire into the fire that is already in the body and the soul until they've taken up their tasks, and that they must be on their guard against the madness that is habitual in youth. After this, up until the age of thirty it will be permitted to taste wine with due measure; but drunkenness and copious wine drinking will be totally forbidden to the young man. As a man approaches forty he is to share in the enjoyment of the common meals, invoking the presence of the other gods, and especially Dionysus, at this mystery-rite and play of older men, which he has bestowed on human beings as a

drug that heals the austerity of old age. Its effect is that we are rejuvenated, and the soul, by forgetting its despondency of spirit, has its disposition turned from harder to softer, so that it becomes more malleable, like iron when it is plunged into fire.

First, then, if each man were so disposed, wouldn't he become more eager in spirit and less ashamed to sing and (as we've often put it) to chant incantations—not before many, but only before a measured number; and not in the presence of strangers, but only among his own intimates?

Clinias/ Very much so!

Athenian Stranger/ So this method wouldn't be entirely unseemly as a device for inducing them to partake of our singing.

Clinias/ Not at all.

Athenian Stranger/ In what sort of voice will the men sing? Or isn't it obvious that they must have some Muse that is fitting for them?

Clinias/ What else?

Athenian Stranger/ So which would be fitting for divine men? Would it be that of the choruses?

Clinias/ My people at any rate, stranger, and this fellow's as well, wouldn't be able to sing any song other than the ones we learned to sing when we were habituated in the choruses.

Athenian Stranger/ Of course not. For you have really never attained to the most beautiful song. Your regime is that of an armed camp and not of men settled in cities. You keep your young in a flock, like a bunch of colts grazing in a herd. None of you takes his own youngster apart, drawing him, all wild and complaining, away from his fellow grazers. None of you gives him a private groom and educates him by currying and soothing him, giving him all that is appropriate

for child rearing. If you did, he would become not only a good soldier but someone capable of managing a city and towns, someone who, as we said at the beginning, was more of a warrior than those warriors in Tyrtaeus. He would always and everywhere honor the possession of courage as the fourth, not the first, part of virtue, for private individuals and the whole city.

Clinias/ Somehow or other, stranger, you are once again belittling our lawgivers.

Athenian Stranger/ No! —but if I am, I'm not doing so intentionally, my good man. Let's follow wherever the argument carries us, if you will.

Now if we possess a Muse that is more beautiful than that of the choruses and that in the common theaters, let's try to give her to these men whom we assert are ashamed of that one and seek to share in this" one that is most beautiful.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ First, then, isn't it the case that in all things which are accompanied by some charm, the most important or serious feature is either this charm itself, alone, pr a certain correctness, or, third, the benefit? I mean, for example, that food, drink, and nourishment in general are accompanied by a charm, which we would call pleasure. As for the correctness and the benefit, the healthiness which we say is in each meal is also the most correct aspect.

Clinias/ Yes indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Then again, accompanying the experience of learning there is something of charm, the pleasure; but the correctness and the benefit, the goodness and the beauty, come from its truth.

Clinias/ That is so.

Athenian Stranger/ What about the image-making arts which produce resemblances? Isn't it the case that when

these arts produce this, the accompanying pleasure in them—if there is pleasure—-would be very justly pronounced “charm”?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably the correctness in such things is, generally speaking, produced primarily by equality in quantity and quality, not by pleasure.

Clinias/ Nobly put.

Athenian Stranger/ So then pleasure would be a correct criterion only for something which wasn’t produced to provide some benefit, or truth, or similarity, nor of course harm,, but was produced only for the sake of what accompanies these, the charm. And when it is accompanied by none of the other things, it would be very noble for someone to call the charm “pleasure.”

Clinias/ You are speaking now of harmless pleasure only.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, and this is what I call “play”—when something doesn’t do any harm or any benefit worthy of serious consideration.

Clinias/ What you are saying is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, wouldn’t we assert that it follows from the things that have just been said that pleasure and untrue opinion are the least appropriate criteria for judging any imitation—or, for that matter, any equality? Surely it’s not just because of somebody’s opinion, or because somebody doesn’t feel charmed, that the equal would be equal or the proportionate wholly proportionate; wouldn’t it be because of the truth, most of all, and least of all anything else?

Athenian Stranger/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now don’t we assert that all music, at least, is imagery and imitation?

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ So the argument that is least acceptable is when someone asserts that music should be judged by pleasure. If there should exist somewhere such a music, it should be sought as the least serious; what should be sought as serious is music that contains a resemblance to the imitation of the beautiful.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And these who seek the most beautiful song and Muse should seek, it is likely, not she who is pleasant, but she who is correct. For correctness of imitation, we have asserted, exists when there is complete reproduction both in quantity and quality of the thing imitated.

Clinias/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ And in the case of music everyone would agree to this at least, that all its creation is imitation and image-making; wouldn't everybody—poets, audience, actors—agree to this at least?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it's likely that in the case of each creation one must know what it is, in order to avoid making mistakes about it. If one doesn't know the being—what is intended and what the image is really of—one will scarcely know whether it is correct ' in its intention or mistaken.

Clinias/ Scarcely. How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ He who does not know what is done correctly would never be able to know what is done well or badly, would he? But I have not put this very clearly. Perhaps it would be clearer if put this way—

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ There are of course myriad images which are visible to our eye.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, if someone doesn't know what each of the bodies of the things imitated is? Would he ever know what is correctly executed in them? What I mean is something like this: doesn't he have to know whether the imitation captures the number and the arrangement of each of the parts, how many there are and how they fit next to one another in the appropriate order, and also the colors and shapes, or whether all these things have been put together in a confused way? Do you think someone can ever know these things if he is completely ignorant of what the living thing is that has been imitated?

Clinias/ How could he?

Athenian Stranger/ What if we were to know that the thing that has Been painted or sculpted is a human being, and that all his own parts, colors, and shapes have been captured by the art? Does it follow necessarily that whoever knows about these things also readily knows whether the work is beautiful or just where it is deficient in beauty?

Clinias/ That would mean, stranger, that all of us, so to speak, know what is beautiful in any paintings of living things.

Athenian Stranger/ What you say is very correct. Isn't it the case, then, that with regard to each image, in painting and in music and in all the rest, the person who is going to be a prudent judge must have three kinds of knowledge? He must know first what the thing is, and then know how correctly, and then—the third thing—how well, any of the images of it in words, tunes, and rhythms are produced.

Clinias/ That's likely, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we mustn't fail to indicate the way in which music presents a difficulty. Since people sing on about music more than about the other sorts of images, music requires the most careful treatment of all the images. For if someone makes a mistake in regard to music, he becomes well disposed toward wicked characters and he suffers the greatest harm. Yet it is very difficult to perceive that one has made a mistake, because the poets are so inferior, as poets, to the Muses themselves. The latter would never make a mistake like setting a man's words to a woman's color and tune, or like harmonizing the tune and postures of free men with the rhythms of slaves and men who are not free, or, again, giving to free rhythms and postures they've constructed a tune or speech that contradicts the rhythms.) Nor, again, would they mix together the sounds of beasts, humans, instruments, and every sort of noise, pretending to imitate some one thing. But the human poets do indeed weave and jumble together such things, creating a senseless mishmash such as would be laughable to the humans who, in the words of Orpheus, "are at the age when pleasure blooms." for they see that all these are jumbled concoctions, and moreover, that the poets are guilty of separating rhythm and postures from melodies—that they write bare words in meter without any accompaniment, and create melody and rhythm without words, to be played on kithara or aulos all alone, and thus make it very difficult to know what is intended and which of the worthwhile imitations are being imitated by this rhythm and harmony presented without words. But all those creations which depend on speed, dexterity, and beast-like cries, which lead to the employment of aulos or kithara without dance and song, must be considered completely uncouth. The use of aulos or kithara all alone must be regarded as unmusical virtuosity.

Enough said about such things. Our task, after all, is to consider what use our thirty-year-olds and men over fifty should make of the Muses, not what use they should not make. Now from what has been said our argument seems to me to be indicating the following: those fifty-year-olds for whom the singing is appropriate must have an education superior to that given by the chorus Muse. For they must necessarily be sensitive themselves to and knowledgeable about rhythms and harmoniae. Otherwise how will any of them know what is correct in melodies—whether a given melody is or is not suitable for the Dorian and whether or not the poet has set the melody to a correct rhythm?

Clinias/ Obviously, they won't know at all.

Athenian Stranger/ It's laughable that the great mob considers itself capable of knowing what is good harmony and good rhythm, and what is not, as many of them as have been drilled to sing to an aulos and dance in rhythm; they don't realize that they practice these things without understanding each of them. The fact remains, every melody when accompanied by the appropriate things is presumably correct, and when accompanied by inappropriate things erroneous.

Clinias/ Most necessarily.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Will someone who doesn't know this ever know what we're speaking of—that is, whether the melody has been performed correctly?

Clinias/ How could he possibly?

Athenian Stranger/ Once again now, it seems, we have discovered that our singers, whom we have now invited and in a way compelled to sing willingly, must, almost of necessity, be educated to this point: each of them must be able to follow the steps of the rhythms and the notes of the melodies, so that by keeping an eye on the harmoniae and

rhythms, they may choose what is appropriate, what is fitting for men of their age and condition to sing; then they will sing in this way what is chosen, and by singing, they will themselves enjoy harmless pleasures at the moment and will lead the younger men to take the proper enjoyment in worthy characters.

Now in becoming educated to this extent, they would handle an education which is more exacting than both the education of the majority and the education of the poets themselves. For there is no necessity that a poet know the third thing—that is, whether the imitation is noble or ignoble; but it is almost a necessity that the poet know about the harmonia and rhythm. The former, however, must know all three things, in order to choose which music is most noble as well as which is second. Otherwise the young will never hear an adequate incantation on behalf of virtue.

The argument has done its best to present what it wished to demonstrate in the beginning, namely, that it is noble to speak out in favor of the Dionysian chorus; let us consider then whether this is the case.

Presumably, such a meeting will always become, of necessity, more boisterous as more drinking goes on—from the beginning we laid this down as a necessary hypothesis regarding the things that are taking place now.

Clinias/ Necessarily.

Athenian Stranger/ Everyone becomes lighter than he really is, rejoices, becomes filled with license of speech, and fails to listen to his neighbors; each considers himself capable of ruling the others as well as himself.

Clinias/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Didn't we assert that when these things come to pass, the souls of the drinkers, like some iron, become fiery, softened, and youthful, so that they can

easily be led—as they were when they were young—by someone who possesses the ability and the knowledge required to educate and mold souls? Didn't we say that the one who did the molding is the same as he who molded them earlier, the good lawgiver, whose laws must be fellow drinkers at the banquet? They must be able to make whoever becomes sanguine, bold, and more shameless than he should be, whoever refuses to take his orderly turn in being silent and in speaking, in drinking and in music, willing to act just the opposite. When ignoble boldness appears, these laws will be able to send in as a combatant the noblest sort of fear accompanied by justice, the divine fear to which we gave the name "awe" and "shame."

Clinias/ So we did.

Athenian Stranger/ And as guardians of these laws, and fellow craftsmen, we will appoint steady and sober men as generals to command those who are unsober. Without them, it would be more dangerous to fight against the effects of drunkenness than it is to fight against enemies in war when one's commanders are unsteady. Anyone who is incapable of willing obedience to these and to the Dionysian leaders (who will be men over sixty years of age) will bear shame equal to or surpassing that of the man who is disobedient to Ares's commanders.

Clinias/ Correctly spoken.

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose, then, such drunkenness, and such play, were to be instituted; suppose the fellow drinkers were to carry on all their intercourse in accordance with the laws, obeying whenever the sober men gave orders to the unsober: wouldn't those who drank together benefit? Instead of becoming enemies as happens now, wouldn't they part from one another closer friends than they had been before?

Clinias/ Correct—if, that is, it were to take place as you now say.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us not then simply blame any more the gift of Dionysus, as if it were evil and unacceptable in a city. Indeed, someone might say still more -on its behalf, but one must be wary of speaking in the presence of the many about the greatest good it brings; human beings misinterpret it, and don't understand what is said.

Clinias/ What are you referring to?

Athenian Stranger/ There is an argument and oracle spread about somehow, telling how this god had his soul deprived of its wits through the agency of his stepmother Hera. In revenge, it is said, he inflicts Bacchic frenzies with all their mad choruses; and this is the cause of the gift of wine. I'll leave it to those who think it's safe to say such things about gods to say them; but this much I do know: every living being, to the degree to which it is appropriate for it to possess intelligence when fully developed, to this same degree it lacks intelligence when it first is born. During the time in which it lacks the prudence that is proper to it, every being is completely mad and cries out in a disorderly way; as soon as it can stand by itself, it jumps in a disorderly way. Let us recollect that we asserted that these motions and cries were the source of music and gymnastic.

Clinias/ We remember; how could we not?

Athenian Stranger/ We also asserted that this source gave us humans the perception of rhythm and harmony, and that Apollo, the Muses, and Dionysus are the gods responsible?

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ The argument put forward by the others seems to claim that wine was given to human beings out of revenge and was intended to drive us mad; the

argument we are putting forth, in contrast, claims that it is a medicine given with just the opposite intention—to put awe in the soul and health as well as strength in the body.

Clinias/ You have recalled the argument in a very fine way, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ And half of the discussion about the choral art has been completed. Shall we complete the other half in whatever way may seem well, or shall we skip it?

Clinias/ What are you talking about, and how are you making this division?

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably the choral art as a whole is for us the same as education as a whole, and -the vocal aspect of this is rhythms and harmoniae.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Now the aspect that pertains to bodily movement has rhythm, which is shared by the movement of the voice, and posture, which is peculiar to it alone; while peculiar to the movement of the voice is melody.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ The vocal aspect, reaching to the soul, we regarded as education in virtue and we named it—how I don't know—"music." And correctly so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now with regard to the bodily aspect, which we referred to as "dance" in the case of persons at play, if this sort of movement becomes effective in instilling the virtue of the body we would give the name "gymnastic" to the art of training involved in the process.

Clinias/ That is very correct.

Athenian Stranger/ With regard to music, we said a moment ago—and let it be said again now—that almost half of the choral art has been gone through and completed; shall we talk about the other half, or what shall we do, and how?

Clinias/ Best of men, you are carrying on a dialogue with Cretans and Lacedaimonians, and we have gone through music but have omitted to speak of gymnastic: now how do you think either of us is going to answer you this question?

Athenian Stranger/ I at least would assert that you have with your question given a pretty clear answer; I understand your present question to be an answer, as I say, and in fact a command to complete the discussion of gymnastic.

Clinias/ You have understood very well: so do it.

Athenian Stranger/ It must be done; of course, it's not very difficult to talk to you about what you both know. You have much more experience in this art than you had in the other.

Clinias/ What you say is pretty much true.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, the source of this play is once again the fact that every living being is by nature accustomed to jumping, and that humankind, as we asserted, obtained a perception of rhythm and thus engendered and gave birth to dance. When song recalled and awakened rhythm, the two in common gave birth to the chorus and to play.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Now the one, as we said, we've already gone over; next we will try to go through the other.

Clinias/ Yes indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ First, though, if it's all right with you two, let's put the capstone on our discussion of the use of drunkenness.

Clinias/ What capstone and what sort do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ If a city will consider the practice that has now been discussed as something serious, and will make use of it, in conformity with laws and order, for the

sake of moderation, and will not refrain from other pleasures but will arrange them with a view to mastering them according to the same argument, then all these things should be employed, in this manner.

On the other hand, if this is treated as something playful, if anyone who wishes will be allowed to drink whenever he wishes, with whomever he wishes, along with all sorts of other similar practices, I would not vote for the use of drunkenness at any time by this city or this man. Indeed, I would go beyond the Cretan and the Lacedaimonian usage, and advocate the Carthaginian law which forbids anyone to taste this drink while out on campaign and requires that only water be drunk for all that time. I would add to that law, and forbid drinking within the city too, among female and male slaves, and among magistrates during the year in which they serve; pilots and judges would not be allowed to taste wine at all while they were performing their services, and the same would apply to anyone who was about to give advice in an important council meeting. Moreover, no one would be allowed to drink at all during the day except for purposes of physical training or illness, nor at night would any man or woman who was intending to create children. And someone might list many other circumstances in which those who possess intelligence and a correct law should not drink wine.

So according to this argument no city would need many vines, and while the other farm products and the diet as a whole would be regulated, the wine production would be almost the most measured and modest of all. Let this, strangers, if you agree, be our capstone to the argument about wine.

Clinias/ Beautifully spoken, and we agree.

Book 3.

Athenian Stranger/ So then that's how these things should be done. But what shall we assert was the original source of the political regime? Wouldn't one see it in the easiest and finest way by looking from this viewpoint ...?

Clinias/ From which?

Athenian Stranger/ From the same viewpoint one should always choose in order to see the progression of cities as they change towards virtue and at the same time towards vice.

Clinias/ What viewpoint are you speaking of?

Athenian Stranger/ I suppose I mean one that embraces an infinite length of time and the changes during that time.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Come, do you think you could ever conceive how long a time there have been cities, and human beings engaged in politics?

Clinias/ It's not at all easy, at least.

Athenian Stranger/ You do see, though, that it would be an immense and immeasurable time?

Clinias/ Yes, that at least, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Don't we suppose that tens upon tens of thousands of cities have come into being during that time, and that just as many, in the same proportions, have been destroyed? And hasn't each place been governed often by every kind of regime? And haven't they at one time gotten bigger from being smaller, and then smaller from being bigger, and haven't they gone from better to worse and from worse to better?

Clinias/ Necessarily.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us grasp, if we can, the cause of this change. For this might perhaps show us the first origin and transformation of political regimes.

Clinias/ You speak well, and we should proceed with eager spirits—you to show what you think about these things, and we to follow.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, do both of you believe that there's some truth in the ancient sayings?

Clinias/ Which sayings?

Athenian Stranger/ The ones that tell of many disasters—floods and plagues and many other things—which have destroyed human beings and left only a tiny remnant of the human race.

Clinias/ This sort of thing seems entirely credible to everyone.

Athenian Stranger/ Come, of the many disasters let's focus our minds on one that occurred once on account of a flood.

Clinias/ What shall we think about in regard to it?

Athenian Stranger/ How those who then escaped the destruction would almost all be mountain herdsmen—little sparks of the human race saved on the peaks somewhere.

Clinias/ Clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably men such as these, at least, necessarily lack experience in the arts, and especially in the contrivances that city dwellers use against one another, motivated by the desire to have more, the love of victory, and all the other mischief they think up against each other.

Clinias/ That's likely, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we assume that the cities settled in the plains and along the sea were utterly destroyed at that time?

Clinias/ So we shall assume.

Athenian Stranger/ Won't we assert that all tools were destroyed, and that if some serious and important part of an art—whether politics or some other sort of wisdom—had been discovered, all these things would have perished at that time? For otherwise, best of men, if these things had remained through all time as thoroughly ordered as they are today, how could anything new ever have been discovered?

Clinias/ In other words, for tens upon tens of thousands of years these things were unknown to the men at that time, and only within the past one or two thousand years have they been brought to light, some by Daedalus, others by Orpheus, and others by Palamedes; the things that pertain to music by Marsyas and Olympos, the things that pertain to the lyre by Amphion; and very many other arts by other men—just yesterday or the day before, so to speak.

Athenian Stranger/ Is there any reason, Kleinias, why you omitted your friend, who really was around only yesterday?

Clinias/ You don't mean Epimenides?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, him. He far surpassed all others among your people in inventiveness, my friend; what Hesiod had divined in speech long ago, he actually brought to completion in deed—as you people claim.

Clinias/ So we claim.

Athenian Stranger/ So what shall we say human affairs were like after the destruction? Wasn't there a vast and frightening desolation, but a great mass of abundant land? Won't we say the other animals were destroyed, while the cattle, and the remnant of the stock of goats that might have happened to remain somewhere, barely supported the life of the herdsmen at the beginning?

Clinias/ How else could it have been?

Athenian Stranger/ With regard to the city and the political regime and law-giving—the subjects with which our discussion is now concerned—do we suppose that there was, so to speak, any memory at all?

Clinias/ None at all.

Athenian Stranger/ So from those men, in that situation, have developed all the things we possess now: cities and political regimes and arts and laws, and much wickedness—but much virtue as well.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Do we suppose, you amazing man, that men at that time—inexperienced in the many beautiful things that go with urban life, and inexperienced in the opposite sorts of things as well—ever became either perfectly virtuous or perfectly vicious?

Clinias/ You've stated it beautifully, and we understand what you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ Then as time went on, and as our race multiplied, everything arrived at the state it's in now?

Clinias/ That's very correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Not straightaway though, it's likely, but rather little by little over a very long period of time.

Clinias/ This seems most appropriate.

Athenian Stranger/ For I suppose that the fear of descending from the heights into the valleys was ringing in everyone's ears.

Clinias/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Weren't they; glad whenever they saw each other, because there were so few of them during that time, although the means of transportation by land and by sea were almost all destroyed, so to speak, along with the arts? I don't think, therefore, that it was very easy to mix

with one another. For iron and copper and all metals had disappeared under the mud, and they were at a complete loss as to how to extract such things; as a result they had very little cut timber. If some tool had survived somewhere up in the mountains, it was soon worn out with use and disappeared, and there weren't others to replace it until the art of metals had appeared among human beings.

Clinias/ How could there have been?

Athenian Stranger/ And how many generations later do we suppose this happened?

Clinias/ Very many, obviously.

Athenian Stranger/ Doesn't it follow that the arts which depend on iron and copper and all such things would have disappeared for an equal or even longer time?

Clinias/ How could they not?

Athenian Stranger/ For a variety of reasons, then, civil war and war were destroyed during that time.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ First because they were delighted with one another and full of goodwill on account of the desolation. Then again, food was not something they fought over. At that time most lived from herding, and there was no lack of pasture land—except perhaps for some people at the start. So they didn't lack milk and meat. Besides, by hunting they provided themselves with food that was neither poor in quality nor scanty in amount. They were well off in cloaks, bedding, houses, and equipment for use over the fires and also for tasks that don't call for fire. For not one of the molding and weaving arts requires iron; and a god has given these two arts to provide all these things for human beings, so that whenever the human race finds itself in such straits it may be able to grow and progress. Hence they weren't terribly poor, and weren't compelled by poverty to differ with

one another. On the other hand, since they lacked gold and silver they didn't ever become rich, either—and such was their situation then. Now the most well-bred dispositions usually spring up in a home when neither wealth nor poverty dwell there. For neither insolence nor injustice, nor again jealousies and ill will, come into being there.

They were good on account of these things and also because of what is called naive simplicity. For whenever they heard something was noble or something was shameful, in their simplicity they considered what had been said to be the very truth, and believed it. No one had the wisdom, as they do nowadays, to know how to be on the lookout for lies. They believed that what they heard about gods as well as about human beings was true, and lived according to these things. That is why they were in every way as we have just described them.

Clinias/ To me at least, and to him too, it seems this is the way things were.

Athenian Stranger/ Shouldn't we go on to say that the many generations who passed their lives this way were less practiced and less knowledgeable in the arts generally than those who lived before the flood or those who live now, and especially as regards the arts of war? They didn't know all the present-day arts of war on land or on sea, or in a city all by itself, which are called lawsuits and civil wars, and in which every sort of contrivance of words and deeds is devised in order to do mutual mischief and injustice. So, for the reason we already have explained, shouldn't we say that they were simpler and more courageous and also more moderate and in every way more just?

Clinias/ What you say is correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Now what we've been saying, and all that is still to follow from it, has been said as a means to our

coming to understand what need the men of that time had for laws, and who was lawgiver for them.

Clinias/ You've stated it in a fine way.

Athenian Stranger/ Isn't it the case, though, that they didn't yet need lawgivers, and that such a thing wasn't yet likely to occur in those times? For writing doesn't yet exist among those born in that part of the cycle, and their lives are guided by habits and by what are called ancestral laws.

Clinias/ That's likely, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ But even this is already a kind of political regime.

Clinias/ Which kind?

Athenian Stranger/ I think everyone calls the regime of that epoch "dynasty," and even now it still exists in many places, among Greeks as well as barbarians. This is presumably the regime Homer speaks of in connection with the household of the Cyclopes, when he says;

> Among these people are neither deliberative assemblies nor clan-rules,
>
> But they dwell, on crests of lofty mountains
>
> In hollow caves, and each gives the rule to
>
> His own children and wives, and they don't trouble themselves about one another.

Clinias/ This poet of yours seems to have been quite charming. We've gone through other verses of his and found them very urbane. But we're not familiar with much of what he says because we Cretans don't make much use of foreign poetry.

Megillus/ We, however, do; and he is probably the chief of such poets, although he portrays in each case a way of life that is not Laconian but rather sort of Ionian. He certainly seems to be a good witness now to your argument, since

through his. myth he attributes their ancient ways to savagery.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, he is a witness, so let's take his word for it that such regimes do sometimes arise.

Clinias/ Fine.

Athenian Stranger/ Aren't they found among those who have been scattered in single households or clans in the confusion caused by the destructive disasters? The eldest rules with an authority handed down from the father and mother, whom the others follow, like birds forming one flock. Thus aren't they ruled by paternal laws and by a monarchy that is the most just of all monarchies?

Clinias/ Most certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ After this, larger numbers come together in bigger communities, making cities. Those who live in the foothills are the first to turn to farming; and they create one common, large dwelling by erecting defensive walls of stone around themselves, on account of wild beasts.

Clinias/ It seems likely, at any rate, that it happened this way.

Athenian Stranger/ Then what? Isn't the following likely…?

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ As these dwellings are growing bigger out of the smaller original ones, each of the small family groups arrives clan by clan, possessing both its own eldest who rules, and its own particular customs because it has lived apart. The variety of their different customs pertaining to the gods and to themselves derives from the variety in their parents and in those who reared them; the rather orderly have rather orderly customs and the manly have rather manly customs. Since they each thus imprint their own conceptions on their own children and on their

children's children, they come, as we say, to the larger common dwelling bringing their own particular laws.

Clinias/ Of course, how could they not?

Athenian Stranger/ Moreover, presumably the laws of each are necessarily pleasing to them, while the others' are less so.

Clinias/ So it is.

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely that we've stumbled unawares, as it were, upon the origin of legislation.

Clinias/ Indeed it is.

Athenian Stranger/ Surely, after this, those who have come together are compelled to choose certain men common to them who look over the customs of all the clans and, having picked out the ones they find especially agreeable for the community, display them clearly and present them for the approval of the leaders and chiefs, the monarchs as it were, of the populace. The men who do this will be called lawgivers; but although they have appointed the ruling officials, thus fashioning a sort of aristocracy or even monarchy out of the dynasties, during the period when the regime is undergoing the transformation they themselves will rule.

Clinias/ Things would turn out just this way, though step by step.

Athenian Stranger/ Now let's say that yet a third pattern of regime emerges, in which all forms and experiences of political regimes and of cities come together.

Clinias/ Which is this?

Athenian Stranger/ The one that comes after the second, as Homer reveals when he says the third emerged in this way: "… and he founded Dardania," he asserts somewhere;

since sacred Ilium had not yet been

> Founded on the plain, a city of human beings endowed with speech,
> But instead they still dwelled among the foothills of Ida with the many springs.

When he speaks these words, and those others that he spoke about the Cyclopes, he speaks somehow according to god, as well as according to nature. For the race of poets is divine, and becomes inspired when it sings: each time, singing in the company of certain Graces and Muses, they hit upon many things that truly happened.

Clinias/ They surely do.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's proceed still further into this myth which has now come upon us, since it may reveal something about the object of our inquiry. Shouldn't we?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Ilium was settled, we assert, when they left the heights for the wide and beautiful plain and settled on a low hill with many rivers that rushed down from Ida.

Clinias/ So they say, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ Don't we suppose that this came to pass many ages after the flood?

Clinias/ It had to be many ages.

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely that they were possessed by an amazing degree of forgetfulness regarding the disaster just now discussed, when they thus set up a city close to a lot of rivers flowing down from the heights, putting their trust in some hills that were not very high.

Clinias/ This makes it completely clear that they were separated by a great interval of time from such suffering.

Athenian Stranger/ I suppose that already, at that time, there were many other cities being settled down below, since human beings were multiplying.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And presumably these others undertook a military expedition against this one, and probably came by sea, since now everyone was making use of the sea without fear.

Clinias/ So it appears.

Athenian Stranger/ After remaining about ten years, presumably, the Achaeans sacked Troy.

Clinias/ They certainly did.

Athenian Stranger/ And so during this time, a ten-year period, while Ilium was being besieged many evils befell each of the besiegers at home, through the revolts of the young men. When the soldiers returned to their cities and homes they were not nobly received by these, nor with justice, but instead in such a way as to produce many deaths and slaughters and exiles. The ones who were driven into exile came back again though, having changed their name from Achaeans to Dorians because Dorieus was the one who gathered the exiles together at that time. And surely it is you, O Lacedaimonians, who tell the myth and complete the account of all the things that happened after this.

Megillus/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ We have come now once again, as if according to a god, to the point at the beginning of our dialogue about laws where we digressed and fell into the topics of music and drunken carousals. The argument is, as it were, letting us get a good hold on it again, for it has arrived at the very settling of Lacedaimon, which you both were asserting to have been correctly settled (along with Crete, as if by codes of law that were brothers). Now we've gained this much by the meanderings of the argument, by going through certain regimes and settlements: we have seen the first, the second, and the third city, settled one after the

other, as we believe, over immense stretches of time. And here this fourth city—or nation, if you wish—comes before us, having been settled in an earlier time and now being settled once again. If from all of this we are able to learn what has and has not been nobly settled, which laws preserve the things that are preserved and which destroy the things that are destroyed, and what sort of changes would make a city happy, then, Megillus and Kleinias, we ought to discuss all these things again, from the beginning as it were—unless we have some objection to what has been said so far.

Megillus/ If, stranger, some god would promise us that if we make a second attempt at an investigation into lawgiving we will hear arguments no worse and no shorter than what were said just now, I at least would be willing to have a long walk, and for me this day would seem to become short—even though we are close to the day when the god turns from summer toward winter.

Athenian Stranger/ So it's likely that these things must be investigated.

Megillus/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's put ourselves in thought back into that time when not only Lacedaimon but also Argos and Messene and their dependencies were sufficiently under the control of your ancestors, Megillus. According to what is said in myth at least, they decided next to divide the army into three parts and found three cities—Argos, Messene and Lacedaimon.

Megillus/ Indeed they did.

Athenian Stranger/ Temenos became king of Argos, Kresphontes of Messene, and Procles and Eurusthenes of Lacedaimon.

Megillus/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And everyone at that time swore that they would come to their aid if anyone subverted their monarchies.

Megillus/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ In the name of Zeus! Is a monarchy dissolved, or has any rule ever been dissolved, by anybody other than the rulers themselves? Or have we now forgotten that we established this just a little while ago now, in the speeches we chanced to make?

Megillus/ How could we?

Athenian Stranger/ Then we shall now have made such a thesis even firmer. For it's likely that the deeds we've chanced upon lead us to the same argument, so we won't be investigating the same argument on the basis of some empty figment, but on the basis of something that really happened and possesses truth.

What happened was this: the three kings and the three cities that were to be governed monarchically all swore mutual oaths, in accordance with the common laws they set up for ruling and being ruled. The former swore not to make their rule harsher as time went on and the line continued, while the latter swore that if the rulers kept their oaths, they in return would never dissolve the monarchies or allow others to try to do so. They also promised that the kings would help the other kings or the populaces if they were treated unjustly, and that the populaces would help the other populaces or kings if they were treated unjustly. Isn't that the way it was?

Megillus/ That's the way it was.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, whether the kings or certain others did the legislating, wasn't this a very great advantage in the three regime-establishments that were legislated in the three cities ...?

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ The fact that there were always two cities ready to take the field against anyone of the cities that disobeyed the established laws.

Megillus/ Clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ Of course, the many command their lawgivers to establish such laws as the populaces and the majorities will accept voluntarily, just as if someone were to command gymnasts or doctors to do what is pleasant as they care for and cure the bodies they care for.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Yet in fact it is often the case that one must be contented if someone can make bodies strong and healthy with only modest pain.

Megillus/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ At that time, they were provided with yet this other advantage that had no small role in making the laying down of the laws easy.

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ When the lawgivers were arranging for them some sort of equality in property they were not subjected to that very great reproach raised in many other cities during the time of the establishment of laws, whenever someone seeks to change land tenure and dissolve debts because he sees that otherwise a sufficient degree of equality will never be possible. When a lawgiver tries to change any of such things, everyone raises against him the cry, “Do not move the immovable!” and curses him for introducing redivision of the land and dissolution of debts, and thus putting every man at his wit’s end. But for the Dorians there was this further advantage, that the process went along in a fine way and was free from blame, because they could divide

up the land without disputes and, in addition, there were no large, ancient debts.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ So then how, you two best of men, did the settlement and legislation ever turn out so badly for them?

Megillus/ What do you mean, and what do you blame in them?

Athenian Stranger/ The fact that of the three existing dwelling places, two of them swiftly corrupted their regime and laws, while only one held fast—your city.

Megillus/ That's not a very easy question you're asking.

Athenian Stranger/ But this is what we must now investigate and inquire into, playing at this moderate old man's game concerning laws, and proceeding on our way without discomfort, as we asserted we would do when we began our walk.

Megillus/ Why not? It must be done as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ And what more beautiful inquiry into laws could we make than an inquiry into the laws which have brought order to these cities? Could we inquire into the settlement of cities more famous and greater than these?

Megillus/ You wouldn't easily find substitutes for these!

Athenian Stranger/ Now it's pretty clear that at that time they at least intended their arrangement to be a sufficient defense not only of the Peloponnese but of all the Greeks, in case any of the barbarians might do them injustice, as happened when the people who once lived in the area around Ilium relied on the support of the Assyrian Empire of Ninos and rashly stirred up the Trojan War. For what was left of the grandeur of that empire was not insignificant: just as we nowadays fear the Great King, so they at that time trembled

at that combined system; and in fact, since Troy was a part of that empire, its second capture was a grave charge against them. In the face of all this, the unified arrangement whereby the army was then divided up into three cities seemed to be a fine discovery on the part of the brother kings, the sons of Heracles, and a mode of organization superior to that of the expedition against Troy. For in the first place, the sons of Heracles were considered to be better rulers than the descendants of Pelops; then again, this army of theirs was considered to be superior in virtue to the army that went against Troy. After all, these bore the victory, and the others were defeated by them: the Achaeans were defeated by the Dorians. Don't we suppose that the men of those days organized themselves this way and with this intention?

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Isn't it also likely that they supposed these things would remain stable, and last a long time, since they had shared together many toils and risks, and had been organized by brother kings belonging to a single family? Moreover, hadn't they employed many diviners, including the Delphic Apollo?

Megillus/ That is indeed likely.

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely, however, that these great expectations flew away soon after—except, as we just said, what pertained to the small part in your area, and even that part has never to this day ceased fighting with the other two parts. For if the original intention had been carried through, and unified consonance had been established, it would have possessed an irresistible power in war.

Megillus/ How could it not have?

Athenian Stranger/ So how and in what way was it destroyed? Isn't it worthwhile to investigate what sort of

chance it was that ever destroyed so great a system of this kind?

Megillus/ If one were to disregard this investigation, one would seek in vain to see other laws or regimes that preserve or, on the contrary, utterly destroy the fine and great matters.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it looks as though we have somehow been fortunate enough to come across an adequate investigation.

Megillus/ It surely does.

Athenian Stranger/ But look here, you amazing man, haven't we now fallen into the same error that affects all us human beings? We are always supposing, whenever we see some fine object, that it would achieve amazing things if only someone knew the way to put it to a fine use. But maybe we aren't yet thinking about this particular matter correctly, or according to nature—and maybe this is true of everything that everyone thinks of in this way.

Megillus/ What are you talking about? What are we to declare you're referring to when you make this argument?

Athenian Stranger/ My good man, I just had a laugh at my own expense. For when I gazed at this armed force we're discussing, it appeared to me to be a wholly fine and amazing possession that had fallen to the Greeks—if, as I said, someone had used it in a fine way at that time.

Megillus/ And wasn't all that you said—and we praised—spoken well and sensibly?

Athenian Stranger/ Maybe. I do think that everyone who sees something big, with a lot of power and strength, immediately feels that if only the possessor knew how to use a thing of such quality and magnitude, he would perform many amazing deeds and thus become happy.

Megillus/ Well isn't that correct? Or what do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ Consider for a moment what a person has in view in each case when he correctly gives this sort of praise to something. Consider first the very case under discussion. If those who arranged affairs in those days had known how to order the army properly, what would they have done to make the best of their opportunity? Wouldn't they have kept the army firmly together and preserved it for the rest of time, in order to maintain their own freedom while they ruled over anyone else they wished, and in order to enable themselves and their descendants to do whatever they wanted with the whole human race, Greeks as well as barbarians? Wouldn't it be on account of these things that men gave them praise?

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Furthermore, isn't it the case that when someone speaks this way after having seen great wealth, or an especially honorable family, or any such thing, he does so with a view to the fact that through this thing one might gain all, or most—and the worthiest part—of what one desires?

Megillus/ That's likely, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, do all human beings have one desire in common, the one revealed by the present argument—as the argument itself claims?

Megillus/ Which desire?

Athenian Stranger/ To have things happen in accordance with the commands of one's own soul—preferably all things, but if not that, then at least the human things.

Megillus/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Then since all of us wish such a thing always, when we're children, when we're men, and when we're elderly, wouldn't it necessarily follow that we pray for this throughout?

Megillus/ How could it not?

Athenian Stranger/ And presumably we would also join with our friends, at any rate, in praying that they might have the things they wish for themselves.

Megillus/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ A son is a friend of a father though one is a child and the other is a man.

Megillus/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Yet many of the things a child prays he will get, a father would pray the gods never to allow in accordance with the son's prayers.

Megillus/ You mean when the son who prays lacks intelligence and is still young?

Athenian Stranger/ And also when the father, either because he is an old man or all-too-much a youth, knows nothing of what is noble and just, and, experiencing passions akin to those of Theseus against Hippolytus (who died so unfortunately), prays with a vehement spirit, do you suppose that the son—the son who knows—will ever join in the father's prayers?

Megillus/ I understand what you mean. You mean, I think, that one shouldn't pray or be eager to have everything follow his own wish, but rather to have his wish follow his prudence. This is what a city and each one of us should pray and strive for—to possess intelligence.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, and also that the man who is a statesman-lawgiver must always look to this in setting up the orderings of the laws; and I'm reminded here, and I'd like to recollect for you two as well, what was said at the beginning of the discussion, if you remember: you two maintained that the good lawgiver should lay down all his enactments for the sake of war; I on the other hand maintained that this would constitute an exhortation to set

up laws for the sake of only one virtue out of four, whereas what should be done was to look to the whole of virtue, and especially at the first part, the leader of all virtue, which would be prudence, and intelligence, and opinion—with eros and desire following upon these. The argument has arrived again at the same place, and I, the speaker, now say again what I said back then—playfully, if you wish, or seriously, but this is what I assert: it is dangerous for one who lacks intelligence to pray, and the opposite of what he wishes comes to pass. If you want to take me seriously here, you may.

I do certainly expect that you two will now find, if you follow the argument we set forth a little earlier, that the cause of the destruction of the kings and of the whole plan was not cowardice, nor a lack of knowledge of war on the part of the rulers or those for whom it was fitting to be ruled. The corruption was caused by all the rest of vice, and especially ignorance regarding the greatest of human affairs. That this is how things happened then, and still can happen now in similar circumstances, and will happen again in times to come, I will try my best—since we're friends—to discover and show you, if you're willing, by proceeding along the course of the argument.

Clinias/ It would be rather tasteless for us to praise you in speech, stranger, but we will enthusiastically praise you in deed. We will follow what is said with attentive spirits, and it's in this way that a free man makes clear what he finds praiseworthy and what he does not.

Megillus/ Excellent, Kleinias! Let's do as you say.

Clinias/ So be it, if god is willing. Go ahead and speak.

Athenian Stranger/ We are now asserting, as we follow the rest of the path of the argument, that the greatest sort of ignorance is what destroyed that earlier power and that it is

natural for it to do the same in the present as well. If this is so, then the lawgiver at least should try to instill as much prudence as possible in the cities and to drive out lack of intelligence as much as possible.

Clinias/ Clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ What then would justly be called the greatest sort of ignorance? See if you both agree with what is going to be said. I now set it down to be something like the following—

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ When someone doesn't like, but rather hates, what in his opinion is noble or good, and likes and welcomes what in his opinion is wicked and unjust. This dissonance between pleasure and pain on the one hand, and the opinion that is according to reason on the other, I assert to be the ultimate and greatest ignorance, because it belongs to the major part of the soul. In the soul, you see, the part that feels pain and pleasure is like the populace and the majority in the city. So when the soul opposes knowledge, or opinions, or reason—the natural rulers—this I call lack of intelligence: in a city, when the majority refuses to obey the rulers and the laws, and in one man, when the noble arguments in the soul achieve nothing, but indeed go contrary to these things. All these, I at any rate, would set down as the sorts of ignorance that are most discordant, both in the city and in each one of the citizens, and not the sorts of ignorance belonging to craftsmen—if you understand what I mean, strangers.

Clinias/ We understand, friend, and we agree with the things you're saying.

Athenian Stranger/ This, then, can be set down as something resolved and declared: nothing that pertains to ruling is to be given to citizens who are ignorant in the above

respects; and they are to be blamed for their ignorance, even if they are shrewd at calculating and have been trained in all the elegant niceties whose natural effect is to make the soul agile. It is just the opposite sort who are to be proclaimed wise—even if, as in the proverb, they "know neither how to read nor swim"—and the ruling offices are to be handed over to them on the grounds that they are the prudent ones. For without consonance, my friends, how can prudence—even in its smallest form—come about? It isn't possible. But the finest and greatest of consonances would most justly be called the greatest wisdom, and whoever partakes of this evidently lives according to reason, while he who doesn't partake of it evidently brings ruin to his home and is in no way a savior of his city, but is instead just the opposite, as a result of his ignorance in these matters. So, as we just said, let these things stand as the declaration in this matter.

Clinias/ Let them stand indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Now I suppose there must necessarily be rulers and ruled in cities.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, which and how many are the worthy titles to rule and to be ruled, in large and small cities and in households as well? Wouldn't one be that of the father and mother, and in general, wouldn't it be everywhere correct for parents to have title to rule over their descendants?

Clinias/ Emphatically so.

Athenian Stranger/ And, following upon this, for the well born to rule over those who are not well born. Thirdly, following these, the elderly ought to rule and the younger ought to be ruled.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Fourthly, then, that slaves be ruled and masters rule.

Clinias/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Fifth at any rate, I think, that the stronger rule and the weaker be ruled.

Clinias/ Now you've mentioned a kind of rule that is compellingly necessary.

Athenian Stranger/ And the one most widely spread among all living things, and according to nature, as the Theban Pindar once asserted. But it's likely that the greatest title would be the sixth, the one bidding the ignorant to follow and the prudent to lead and rule. Indeed it is this title, O most wise Pindar, that I at least would hardly assert is against nature, but rather according to nature: the natural rule exercised by the law over willing subjects, without violence.

Clinias/ What you say is very correct.

Athenian Stranger/ "Dear to the gods" at any rate, and "lucky," is what we call the seventh sort of rule—where we bring forward someone for a drawing of lots and assert that it is very just for the one who draws a winning lot to rule and for the one who draws a losing lot to give way and be ruled.

Clinias/ What you say is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ "Do you see then," we would say, "O lawgiver," (joking with one of those who undertakes lightly the task of laying down laws) "how many worthy titles to rule there are, and that they are by nature opposed to one another? Here, indeed, we have discovered a source of civil strife, which you must treat.

"But first investigate with us how and why the kings of Argos and Messene managed to go wrong in respect to these matters, and destroy both themselves and the power of the Greeks, which was so amazing at that time. Didn't their

mistake consist in the fact that they were ignorant of what Hesiod has stated very correctly—that 'the half is often more than the whole'? When it is harmful to take the whole, but the half is a measured amount, then the measured amount should be considered more than the amount that is unmeasured—for the one is better and the other is worse."

Clinias/ That is very correct, at least.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we suppose that this occurs and causes corruption each time among the kings first, or the populaces?

Clinias/ It's likely that most of the time this is a disease of kings who live in an arrogant manner because of luxury.

Athenian Stranger/ Then isn't it clear that it was the kings of that time who were first seized by this—the desire to have more than the established laws allowed—and that they weren't in consonance with themselves as regards what they praised in speech and in their oath? The dissonance—which we have asserted to be the greatest ignorance but which seems to be wisdom—corrupted everything, through discord and a shrill lack of music.

Clinias/ That's likely, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ All right then: what should the legislator have set up at that time in order to forestall the emergence of this affliction? In the name of the gods! It doesn't take any wisdom to understand now, does it, nor is it difficult to say; but if it had been possible to foresee it back then, the foreseer would have been wiser than we are, wouldn't he?

Megillus/ What are you referring to?

Athenian Stranger/ By looking at what has happened to your people, Megillus, it is now possible to know and, knowing, easy to say what should have happened back in that time.

Megillus/ Speak still more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ The clearest way of putting it would be about as follows—

Megillus/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ If someone goes against due measure and gives more power to those who are inferior—whether it involves giving sails to ships or food to bodies or ruling offices to souls—he will presumably overturn everything; filled with insolence, some things will run to sickness, others to the injustice that is born from insolence. So what then is our point? Isn't it something like this? There does not exist, dear sirs, a mortal soul whose nature, so long as it is still young and irresponsible, will ever bear the greatest sort of rule among human beings. The result is always that its thought becomes filled with the greatest sickness, namely lack of intelligence, and hence comes to be hated by its closest friends; and this, when it occurs, swiftly destroys it and obliterates all its power. Knowing how to preserve due measure in this respect is the sign of great lawgivers. So a very well measured guess to make now is that such a thing did occur in those days. It seems likely that there was—

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ —that there was some god taking care of you, who foresaw the future, and by bringing about the birth of twin kings from a single line made things more measured for you.

Then after this some human nature, having been mixed with some divine power, saw that your system of rule was still feverish and proceeded to mix the moderate power of old age with the willful strength of family lineage: the council of the twenty-eight old men was given, in the greatest matters, a vote equal to the power of the kings.

Your third savior, seeing that your system of rule was still swollen and irritated with spiritedness, put a sort of bridle on it through the power of the Ephors, and drew near to the power based on a lottery.

So according to this account your monarchy, having become a mixture of the proper things and having attained due measure, preserved itself and was the cause of the preservation of the rest. If it had been left to Temenos and Kresphontes and the lawgivers of that time—whoever those lawgivers might have been—even the portion of Aristodemus wouldn't have been saved. For they were not sufficiently experienced in lawgiving; otherwise they would hardly ever have thought they could keep a young soul within measured bounds by means of oaths, once the soul had obtained a rule which might become tyrannical. Now, however, the god has shown what had to be done and what should still be done to bring about an especially stable rule. And as I said at the beginning, it isn't any mark of wisdom for us to figure out these things now, because it isn't difficult to see them by looking at the model that has emerged; but if someone had foreseen these things then, and had been able to arrange the ruling offices in due measure—creating one out of three—he would have saved all the fine plans of that time, and there would never have been an expedition by the Persians or by anybody else against Greece, caused by their looking down on us as people who count for little.

Clinias/ What you say is true.

Athenian Stranger/ Anyway, it was shameful the way they repulsed them, Kleinias. When I say it was shameful I don't mean to deny that the men of that time were victorious and won noble victories on land and sea; what I assert was shameful at that time was the following: first, that of these cities, being three in number, only one defended Greece, while the other two were so far gone in corruption that one

of them prevented Lacedaimon from assisting in the defense—fighting against her with might and main—and the other, the one in Argos (which had the primacy, in those days of the original division), refused to pay heed or help defend when called upon to repulse the barbarian. There are many things that went on during the war at that time that would be the occasion for someone's making unseemly accusations against Greece. And if one were to say that Greece defended itself, he would not be speaking correctly; had not the common resolution of the Athenians and the Lacedaimonians warded off the approaching slavery, the Greek races would by this time probably be all mixed together, and there would be barbarians among Greeks and Greeks among barbarians, like the peoples the Persians now tyrannize over, who live scattered in a miserable fashion after having been dispersed and herded together.

These are the things, Kleinias and Megillus, for which we can blame the so-called statesmen and lawgivers of old—and also the ones now. And the reason we engage in such blame is to investigate the causes and to find out what should have been done differently. As we said with regard to the present case, they shouldn't have legislated great ruling offices, or unmixed authority; they should have considered something like the following: that a city should be free and prudent and a friend to itself, and that the lawgiver should give his laws with a view to these things.

By the way, let's not be surprised to find that we have often before laid down goals which we've asserted the lawgiver should look to when he lays down his laws, but that the goals don't appear to be the same for us each time. One should reason as follows: when we asserted one should look toward moderation, or toward prudence, or friendship, these goals are not different but the same. Even if many other words of this sort crop up, let's not let it disturb us.

Clinias/ We'll make an attempt to proceed in this way when we go back over the arguments. But for now, tell us what you intended to say—just what is it the lawgiver should aim at with regard to friendship and prudence and freedom?

Athenian Stranger/ Listen, then. There are, as it were, two mothers of regimes. It would be correct for someone to say that the others spring from these, and correct to call one monarchy and the other democracy, and to say that the Persian type is the full development of the former, while my people's country is the full development of the latter. Almost all other regimes, as I said, are woven from these. Both of them should and must necessarily be present if there is to be freedom and friendship, together with prudence: this is what the argument wishes to set before us when it says that no city will ever have a fine political life if it lacks a share in either of these.

Clinias/ Of course not, how could it?

Athenian Stranger/ Now one of these two nations delighted exclusively and more than was necessary in monarchy, the other in freedom, and neither possessed due measure in these matters. Your regimes, on the other hand—the Laconian and the Cretan—have more measure. The Athenians and Persians of old were also once somewhat well measured, but now are less so. Let's go through the causes, shall we?

Clinias/ By all means, if, at any rate, we're going to complete the task we laid but.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's listen then: the Persians under Cyrus, possessing the proper amount of slavery and freedom, began by becoming free and then became despots over many others. For the rulers shared their freedom with the ruled and drew toward equality; as a result the soldiers felt more friendly toward their generals and faced danger

with eager spirits. Moreover, if someone among them was prudent and capable of giving counsel, the king wasn't jealous but allowed freedom of speech and honored those capable of giving counsel; hence, a man was willing to share his capacity, in their midst, as something common. Everything prospered for them in those days because of freedom and friendship and a common sharing in intelligence.

Clinias/ It's likely, at any rate, that things happened somewhat in the way they've been described.

Athenian Stranger/ How then was this ever destroyed under Cambyses and then almost saved again under Darius? Do you want us to figure it out, as if we were using divination?

Clinias/ That at least would help us in the investigation we've embarked upon.

Athenian Stranger/ Now I divine that Cyrus, though in other respects a good general and a friend to his city, failed completely to grasp what is a correct education, and didn't direct his mind at all to household management.

Clinias/ What makes us assert such a thing?

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely that he spent his whole life, from youth on, preoccupied with military matters, and turned his children over, to the women to be brought up. They brought the children up as though they were happy from the time they were babies, and blessed from the moment they were born, lacking nothing. The women allowed no one to oppose them in anything, on the grounds that they were endowed with happiness, and compelled everyone else to praise whatever the children said or did: that was the sort of children they raised.

Clinias/ It sounds lovely, this upbringing you've described!

Athenian Stranger/ A feminine upbringing—the children were brought up by royal, newly-rich women, and in the absence of the men, who were unable to find leisure because of wars and many other dangers.

Clinias/ That stands to reason.

Athenian Stranger/ Their father, meanwhile, kept acquiring flocks and herds, including many droves of men along with many other animals, on their behalf; but he didn't know that they to whom he was going to give all this were not being educated in their father's art, which was Persian (for the Persians are shepherds because of the rough country from which they originate). This art is a tough one, sufficient to make men very strong herdsmen, capable of living outdoors, able to keep watch without sleep, and ready to serve as soldiers whenever they have to. Anyway, he failed to see that women and eunuchs had given his sons an education which had been corrupted by the so-called happiness of the Medes, and the sons turned out as one would expect, after having been brought up without any restraint. When his children took over from Cyrus after his death, they were bursting with luxury and lack of restraint. First one killed the other because he couldn't bear to share equally; after this the one who remained, maddened by drunkenness and lack of education, had his rule destroyed by the Medes and by the fellow they, at that time, called "the Eunuch," who had nothing but contempt for the silliness of Cambyses.

Clinias/ These things are said to have happened, anyway, and it is likely that they happened more or less this way.

Athenian Stranger/ And presumably it is said that the rule passed back into the hands of the Persians because of Darius and the Seven.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's observe as we follow the argument. For Darius was not the son of a king, and was not brought up under a luxurious education. He came into the rule and seized it as the seventh member of a group, and divided it into seven parts (traces of this division still remain now). He saw fit to govern by establishing laws, through which he introduced a sort of general equality and regulated by law the tribute promised to the Persians by Cyrus; thus he brought about friendship and a sense of community among all the Persians, and won over the Persian populace with money and gifts. That's why his army was well disposed to him and gave him additional territories, no less than those left by Cyrus. But then after Darius Xerxes was once again educated in a royal and luxurious education: "O Darius!" it's perhaps very just to say, "you have failed to learn from the vice of Cyrus and have brought up Xerxes in the same habits as Cyrus did Cambyses!" Anyway, as he was an offspring of the same sorts of education, so he wound up suffering just about the same things as Cambyses. And since that time there has arisen among the Persians hardly a single truly "great" king, except in name. The cause of this is not chance, my argument goes, but rather the evil life led for the most part by children of exceptionally rich and tyrannical men. No child or man or old man will ever become outstanding in virtue if he has been brought up in such a way. And these, we assert, are matters a lawgiver ought to look into, and that we ought to look into right now.

As for your city, Lacedaimonians, it is just to give it this at least: in the distribution of honor, and training, you draw no distinctions between poverty and wealth, private individual and king—except for distinctions laid down by the divine oracle given you by some god at the beginning. And as far as the~-city is concerned at least, there shouldn't be preeminent honors bestowed on someone because he is

especially rich—: any more than if he is swift or beautiful or strong—unless he has some virtue. And not if he has virtue, unless it includes; moderation.

Megillus/ How do you mean this, stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably courage is one part of virtue?

Megillus/ How could it not be?

Athenian Stranger/ You yourself be the judge, after you've heard the argument: would you be willing to have as a member of your household or as a neighbor someone who was very courageous, but was lacking in restraint, rather than moderate?

Megillus/ Hush!

Athenian Stranger/ What about an artisan, wise in these matters but unjust?

Megillus/ In no way!

Athenian Stranger/ What is just, at least, does not by nature grow apart from moderation.

Megillus/ How could it?

Athenian Stranger/ Nor does the man we've just now set down as wise, the one who possesses pleasures and pains that are in consonance with and follow the correct reasonings.

Megillus/ No indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we should also consider the following with regard to the question of which honors are correctly or incorrectly bestowed on each occasion in the city.

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose moderation exists alone in some soul, without any of the rest of virtue: would it be just to honor it or dishonor it?

Megillus/ I Can't say.

Athenian Stranger/ What you have said, at least, is measured. For if you had given either of the answers I suggested, you would have seemed, to me at least, to be speaking out of tune.

Megillus/ So the answer turned out to be fine.

Athenian Stranger/ Indeed. After all, an adjunct to the things that qualify for honors or dishonors would be worthy not of talk, but of some silent sign.

Megillus/ You appear to me to be speaking of moderation.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes. As for the rest, the most correct way to apportion honors is to honor preeminently the thing which, when combined with this adjunct, gives us the greatest benefit, then to honor second the thing which gives the second-greatest benefit. If the rest were honored in succession according to this principle, then each would get its correct share.

Megillus/ That's so.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Won't we assert again that this apportionment is the lawgiver's responsibility?

Megillus/ Emphatically.

Athenian Stranger/ Do you want us to leave it to him to apportion everything for every deed in detail, and shall we try to make a threefold distinction—distinguishing the greatest things, and the second, and the third? For we ourselves are somehow desirous of laws.

Megillus/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ We say, then, that the likelihood is that if a city is to be preserved and is to become happy within the limits of human power, it must necessarily apportion honors and dishonors correctly. The correct apportionment is one which honors most the good things pertaining to the

soul (provided it has moderation), second, the beautiful and good things pertaining to the body, and third, the things said to accrue from property and money. If some lawgiver or city steps outside this ranking either by promoting money to a position of honor or by raising one of the lesser things to a more honorable status, he will do a deed that is neither pious nor statesmanlike. Shall these things be declared by us, or what?

Megillus/ Let this be declared by all means, and clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ We've been led to speak about these things at greater length because of the investigation into the regime of the Persians. We find that they got worse year by year, and we claim the cause is this: by going too far in depriving the populace of freedom, and by bringing in more despotism than is appropriate, they destroyed the friendship and community within the city. Once this is corrupted, the policy of the rulers is no longer made for the sake of the ruled and the populace, but instead for the sake of their own rule; if they suppose just a little more will accrue to themselves each time, the rulers are willing to overturn cities and overturn and destroy with fire friendly nations, and as a result, they give and receive bitter, pitiless hatred. When they come to need the assistance of their populaces to fight in their defense, they discover that there no longer exists a community with a spirit eager to run risks and fight. They have countless myriads of subjects in number, but all of them are useless in war; so they have to hire helpers as if they lacked human subjects: they think they can then protect themselves by relying on mercenaries and foreign human beings. In addition to these things, they're compelled to become so stupid as to proclaim by their deeds that the things regularly said to be honorable and noble in the city are worthless each time compared to gold and silver.

Megillus/ That is certainly so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let this be the end of the discussion of what pertains to the Persians, and of how their affairs are at present incorrectly managed because of an excess of slavery and despotism.

Megillus/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Next we should go through the discussion of what pertains to the Attic regime in the same way, showing how total freedom from all rule is to no small extent inferior to a measured degree of rule by others.

For at that time, when the Persian expedition came against the Greeks, and probably against all the settlements of Europe, there was an ancient regime with certain rulers based on a division into four classes. In it was a certain despotic mistress—Awe—on account of whom we were willing to live as slaves of the laws that then existed. In addition, the magnitude of the invading force, on land and sea, struck us with a helpless feeling of fear: this made us even more the slaves of the rulers and the laws, and all these things created a very strong sense of friendship among us.

For you see, almost ten years before the naval battle of Salamis, Datis came, bringing a Persian expedition, sent by Darius expressly against the Athenians and Eretrians with orders to bring them back enslaved, and under the threat of death if he failed in this. In a brief space of time Datis with his myriad hordes completely subdued the Eretrians by force and then sent a frightening message to our city, to the effect that not a single Eretrian had escaped him: Datis's soldiers had actually joined hands to form a dragnet around the whole of Eretria. This report, whether true or not, and wherever it came from, terrified all the Greeks and especially the Athenians. But when they sent embassies everywhere for help, no one was willing to come except the Lacedaimonians. However, they were held up by a war they were waging at

that time with Messene and maybe by some other impediment (we don't know what was alleged) and arrived one day too late for the battle of Marathon.

After that, reports came in of vast preparations and myriad threats on the part of the king. As time went on, it was reported that Darius had died but that a robust young son of his had taken over the rule and was in no way abating the assault preparations. The Athenians supposed that all these preparations were aimed at them on account of what had happened at Marathon. When they heard that a canal was being dug across the peninsula at Athos and that the Hellespont was being bridged, and how many ships there were, they came to believe that there was no way of saving themselves, by land or by sea. For they expected no one would help them—remembering how on the earlier occasion, when Eretria had fallen, no one had come to help or had dared to fight on their side. They expected the same thing to happen this time, on land at least; on the sea they felt they were completely at a loss because more than a thousand ships were coming against them. They figured out one means of survival. It was a slender and desperate recourse, but the only one available. Besides, they looked back at what had happened before, when victory had appeared to come when they were fighting in a situation that was desperate. Embarking on this hope they found their refuge in themselves alone, and in the gods.

So all these things instilled in them a friendship for one another: fear, both that which came at the time and that which sprang from the laws they already had—the fear which they possessed as a result of their enslavement to those previous laws, which we have often in the arguments before called "awe," and which we claimed those who are going to be good must be enslaved to. The coward is free from this and is fearless in respect to it. But if our populace had

not at that time been seized by this sort of fear, they would never have banded together as they then did to defend themselves, nor would they have defended the temples, the graves, the fatherland, and their relatives, as well as their friends. Instead, each of us would have been scattered from the rest at that time and little by little dispersed here and there.

Megillus/ You have spoken altogether correctly, stranger, and in a manner befitting both you and your fatherland.

Athenian Stranger/ That is so, Megillus. And it's just to speak about what happened in that time with you, surely, who share the nature of your forefathers.

But consider now, you and Kleinias, if what we're speaking of is pertinent to lawgiving. After all, that's why I'm going through all this, I'm not doing it for the sake of the myths. See how this sounds to you: my people have in a way suffered the same thing the Persians suffered—they by leading their populace into complete slavery and we by leading the majority in the opposite direction, into complete freedom. Given this, the arguments we laid down earlier are in a way fine for showing us what we should say here and how we should say it.

Megillus/ You speak well: but try to give us a clearer indication of what is being said now.

Athenian Stranger/ All right. Under the ancient laws, my friends, our populace was not sovereign over certain matters but was rather voluntarily enslaved, in a certain sense, to the laws.

Megillus/ Which laws are you speaking of?

Athenian Stranger/ First those regulating the music of that time—if we are to start from the origin of the excessive development of the free way of life. Our music in those days was divided according to its own forms and postures. There

was a form of song comprising prayers sung to the gods, called “hymns”; opposite to this was another form of song which someone might well call “dirges.” “Paeans” were another. Then there was yet another called the “dithyramb,” which was about the birth of Dionysus, I believe. They gave the name “laws” [nomoi] to another form of song—this sort was for the kithara, they used also to say. Once these, and certain others, had been arranged, it was not allowed to misuse one form of song for another. The authority that knew about these things and used its knowledge to judge them, penalizing anyone who disobeyed, was not, as is the case today, whistling, nor the majority, with its unmusical shouts, nor the clapping that bestows praise. Instead it was accepted practice for the educated to listen in silence until the end, while the children and their attendants and the general mob were kept in order by the threat of a beating.

So the majority of the citizens were willing to be ruled in an orderly fashion in these respects, and did not dare to render judgment by their noise. But later, with the passage of time, the poets became rulers and held sway over unmusical lawlessness. Although by nature poetic, the poets were ignorant about what is just and lawful for the Muse. In a sort of Bacchic frenzy, more overwhelmed by pleasure than they should have been, they jumbled together dirges with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs; they used kithara sounds to imitate the sounds of the aulos—they confounded everything. In their mindlessness they involuntarily falsified music itself when they asserted that there was no such thing as correct music, and that it was quite correct to judge music by the standard of the pleasure it gives to whoever enjoys it, whether he be better or worse. By creating works of this kind, and then by adding these sorts of arguments, they instilled in the many a lawlessness as regards music, and made them dare to suppose that they were adequate judges.

The outcome was that the theaters have become noisy instead of quiet, claiming to understand what is beautiful in the Muses and what is not; and in place of an aristocracy in music, a wretched theatocracy has emerged.

If only there had emerged a democracy of free men, in music, what has happened wouldn't be so terrible. But as it was, the opinion that everyone is wise in everything, together with lawlessness, originated in our music, and freedom followed. People became fearless, as if they were knowers, and the absence of fear engendered shamelessness. For to be so bold as not to fear the opinion of someone who is better, this is almost the same as vile shamelessness, and springs from an excessively brazen freedom.

Megillus/ What you say is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Next after this freedom would come the sort that involves the loss of the willingness to be enslaved to the rulers; following upon this is the rejection of the enslavement to and guidance by one's father and mother and elders; the next to the last stage involves seeking not to have to obey laws; after this comes the ultimate freedom when they cease to give any more thought to oaths and pledges and everything pertaining to the gods, but instead display and imitate what is called the ancient Titanic nature—arriving back again at those same conditions, and introducing a harsh epoch in which there is never a cessation of evils.

Why, again, have these things been said by us? In my view at least, it's clearly necessary to pull up the argument like a horse, every now and then, and not allow oneself to be carried along by force as if the argument had no bridle in its mouth. To avoid the proverbial fall from the ass, one needs to insist on the question just asked—for the sake of what have these things been said?

Megillus/ Fine question.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, they have been said for the sake of the earlier things.

Megillus/ Which?

Athenian Stranger/ We said that the lawgiver must in laying down his laws aim at three things, namely that the city for which he legislates be free, that it be a friend to itself, and that it possess intelligence. Those were the goals—weren't they?

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ For the sake of these things we chose the most despotic regime and the freest, and are now investigating which of these is correctly governed. We have seen that when either—the despotic or the free—was limited within measure, affairs went outstandingly well; but when either marched on to its extreme—the one to slavery and the other to the opposite—there was no advantage in either case.

Megillus/ What you say is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ It was also for the sake of these things that we looked at the establishment of the Dorian armed camp, the hill dwellings of Dardanos and the establishment on the sea, the first people, who were the survivors of the catastrophe, the arguments about music and drunkenness that emerged earlier than these, and the things that came even before that. All these things have been discussed for the sake of understanding hew a city might best be established sometime, and how, in private, someone might best lead his own life.

But what sort of a test in conversation might we ever set for ourselves in speech, Megillus and Kleinias, to reveal whether we have been making something that is useful?

Clinias/ I, stranger, think that I can conceive one. It's likely that some stroke of luck has brought before us the

subjects of all these arguments we've gone through, for I at any rate have now come almost to the point of needing them, and you, and also Megillus here, have come along at an opportune time. For I won't hide from you two my present situation but will treat this as a good omen. The greater part of Crete, you see, is attempting to found a certain colony and has put the Knossians in charge of the affair. The city of the Knossians has in turn delegated it to me and nine others. We have been commissioned to establish the same laws as the ones there, if we find some satisfactory; but if we discover some laws from elsewhere that appear to be better, we are not to hesitate about their being foreign. So now let's do ourselves—me and you two as well—this favor: making a selection from the things that have been said, let's construct a city in speech, just as if we were founding it from the very beginning. That way there will be an examination of the subject we are inquiring into, while at the same time I may perhaps make use of this construction, in the city that is going to exist.

Athenian Stranger/ You're not declaring war, at any rate, Kleinias! Unless it would be somehow irksome to Megillus, you may consider that I for my part will do all in my power to accommodate your intention.

Clinias/ Well spoken!

Megillus/ For my part, I'll do the same.

Clinias/ The two of you have spoken very nobly! So let's try now, first in speech, to found the city.

Book 4.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, what must one think the city is going to be? In saying this, I'm not asking what name it has at present or what it will be necessary to call it in time to come, because that will probably depend on the circumstances of its settlement, or on the locale—a name taken from some river or spring, or from one of the local gods. One of these will give its august name to the new city. What I mean to ask about it now is rather this: whether it will be on the sea or inland.

Clinias/ The city we're now discussing, stranger, is roughly eighty stades from the sea.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Does it have harbors along the near coast, or is it entirely without harbors?

Clinias/ It has the best possible harbor there, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Alas, what are you saying! But what about the land around it? Is it productive in all respects or lacking in some things?

Clinias/ It lacks practically nothing.

Athenian Stranger/ And will there be any nearby neighbor city?

Clinias/ None at all, that's why it's being settled. For an ancient migration from the place has left the land deserted for an incalculably long time.

Athenian Stranger/ What about plains and mountains and forests? What portion of each do we have?

Clinias/ It resembles the nature, as a whole, of the rest of Crete.

Athenian Stranger/ You'd say the land is quite rough rather than quite flat.

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it would not be incurable, at least, as regards the acquisition of virtue. For if it was to be right on the sea, with a good harbor, and not productive in all respects but lacking many things, why, with such a nature it would have required some great savior, and some lawgivers who were divine, to prevent it from coming to have many diverse and low habits. As it is, there is comfort in the eighty stades. It is indeed nearer to the sea than it should be, the more so since you declare it has good harbors, but this has to be made the best of. For although a land's proximity to the sea affords daily pleasure, the sea really is a "briny and bitter neighbor." It infects a place with commerce and the money-making that comes with retail trade, and engenders shifty and untrustworthy dispositions in souls; it thereby takes away the trust and friendship a city feels for itself and for the rest of humanity. In this regard there's comfort in the fact that the city will be productive in every way, while the roughness of the terrain obviously prevents it from being both productive of great quantities and, at the same time, fertile in all respects. If it were, that would mean large exports and a resulting infection of silver and gold money. And on balance there is nothing that does more harm, so to speak, to a city's acquisition of well-born and just dispositions—as we asserted, if you remember, in our earlier discussions.

Clinias/ But we do remember, and we agree that we spoke correctly then, as well as now.

Athenian Stranger/ Next, then: how is the land in our place as regards timber for shipbuilding?

Clinias/ There's no fir worth mentioning, nor pine, and not much cypress. One wouldn't find much pitch pine and plane, either—the trees shipbuilders must always use for the inner parts of ships.

Athenian Stranger/ These natural features would also not be bad for the land.

Clinias/ How's that?

Athenian Stranger/ It's good that a city cannot easily imitate its enemies when it comes to wicked imitations.

Clinias/ Which of the things mentioned do you have in view, in saying what you've said?

Athenian Stranger/ Be on your guard with me, you demonic man! Keep in view what was said back at the beginning, about how the Cretan laws looked to one goal. You two said this goal was what pertains to war. I then interrupted, saying it was fine that such legal institutions looked somehow to virtue, but that I could not at all go along with them when they looked only to a part and not to almost the whole. Now you two in your turn, as you follow the present legislation, must guard against my legislating something that doesn't aim at virtue, or that aims at a part of virtue. For I assert that the only law correctly laid down is this: one which, just like an archer, aims each time at what alone is constantly accompanied by something noble, one which leaves all the rest aside, even if there is a chance of producing some wealth and some other such things by ignoring the things just mentioned.

Now the evil imitation of enemies I was referring to is the sort that occurs when someone dwells near the sea and is vexed by enemies—as in the days when (I say this not intending to remind you of ills) Minos imposed a certain harsh tribute on the inhabitants of Attica. He wielded great power on the sea, while they did not possess ships, as they do now, for war, nor a territory well stocked with shipbuilding timber that allows for the easy creation of naval power. As a result they were not able, through nautical imitation, to become seafarers immediately and defend

themselves, at that time, against their enemies. For it would have been in their interest to have had many times seven youths destroyed, if by doing so they could have remained steady, heavily-armed infantrymen instead of adopting the habits of marines. Marines are quick to jump forward, then to retreat at a run back into their ships; they see nothing shameful in not daring to stand and die in the face of attacking enemies. Excuses are readily made for them, and they're quite prepared to throw away their weapons and flee, in certain routs they claim are not shameful! Such are the sentiments armed marines are apt to express—and these sentiments merit not myriad and frequent praises, but just the opposite. There should never be habituation in wicked ways, especially among the best part of the citizenry.

This at least could presumably be gathered from Homer, too (that is, that such a practice isn't noble). For his Odysseus reviles Agamemnon on the occasion when the Achaeans are being hard pressed in battle by the Trojans and he has ordered the ships to be dragged down to the sea. Taking him to task, Odysseus says;

> …you who bid us, while war and shouting still rages 'round,
> Draw our well-benched ships down to the sea, so that yet more
> The prayers of the Trojans may be fulfilled—even
> though they have long wished for this—
> And we be overtaken by utter destruction. For the Achaeans will not
> Maintain the war once the ships are drawn seaward;
> They'll be always looking behind, and will draw off from the battle.
> That will be the evident outcome of the counsel you're proclaiming!

So that man also knew these things and realized that it's bad to support the combat of heavy infantry with triremes at sea. By using customs of this sort one would habituate lions to flee deer!

Besides, cities that rest their power on their navies, after being saved, don't give honors to the noblest of their warriors, since the deliverance is brought about by the art of the pilot and the boatswain and the rower—in fact, by all sorts of human beings who aren't very serious—and one wouldn't be able to apportion honors correctly to each. Yet how would a regime become correct if it lacked this?

Clinias/ It's almost impossible. But look, stranger: we Cretans at least assert that it was the naval battle of the Greeks against the barbarians at Salamis that saved Greece.

Athenian Stranger/ The many, both Greek and barbarian, do indeed say these things. But we, my friend, myself and Megillus here, assert that it was the land battles at Marathon and Plataea: the former began the deliverance of the Greeks and the latter completed it. Moreover, we assert that these battles made the Greeks better, while those other battles made them no better—if it's all right for us to speak in such a way about the battles that contributed to our salvation in those days. For I would add the sea battle of Artemisium to your mention of that' at Salamis.

But anyway, in our consideration of the nature of the land and the order of the laws, we're looking now to the virtue of the regime. We do not hold, as the many do, that preservation and mere existence are what is most honorable for human beings; what is most honorable is for them to become as excellent as possible and to remain so for as long a time as they may exist. This too, I think, was said already, in our earlier discussions.

Clinias/ Why, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let's consider this alone: whether or not we are continuing to proceed along the path that is best as regards the establishing of, and legislating for, cities.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Now tell about what comes next after these things. Who are the people who will be your colonists? Will they be made up of anyone who wishes to come from all of Crete, because a sort of overflow mob, outstripping the earth's food supply, has come into being in each city? I'm assuming you people aren't collecting every Greek, at any rate, who wants to come (although I notice that you already have some colonists in your territory from Argos and Aegina and elsewhere in Greece). But come, tell us where you claim this armed camp of citizens will now come from.

Clinias/ It's likely that they'll come from all over Crete; as for the rest of Greece, it's clear to me that fellow colonists from the Peloponnese will be especially welcome. For what you just now said, about the people from Argos, is true: they make up the most famous of the tribes here now, the Gortynian. You see, they happen to be colonists from the Peloponnesian Gortyn.

Athenian Stranger/ Colonization wouldn't be as easy a thing for cities when it doesn't take place in the manner of bee-swarms, where one tribe from one land undertakes the new settlement, a friend coming from friends, because it was hemmed in by a shortage of land or compelled by other such sufferings. There is also the occasion when a part of a city may be compelled to move to some foreign place because of civil strife. There have even been times when a whole city went into exile, completely overpowered by an irresistible attack. In all these situations it is in one sense easier to settle and lay down laws, but in another sense more difficult.

The tribal unity, the similarity of language and of laws, since they imply a sharing of the sacred things and all such matters, create a certain friendship; but then again, they do not easily accept laws and regimes different from their own. Sometimes, even when they have suffered from civil strife as a result of the wickedness of their laws they still prefer, out of habit, to live with the same habitual customs that corrupted them before. So they give trouble to the founder and lawgiver and become disobedient. In contrast, the tribe that has been collected from all over would probably be more willing to obey certain new laws; but for it to breathe together and grow to be constantly united—like a team of horses, as they say—would require much time and trouble.

Yes, it is really the case that lawgiving and the founding of cities is the most perfect of all tests of manly virtue.

Clinias/ That's likely; but explain more clearly what you have in view in saying this.

Athenian Stranger/ My good man, when I go back over and consider lawgivers again, I'll probably say something belittling about them. Still, if we say something that is opportune, it shouldn't cause trouble. And after all, why should I ever be upset about it? It's likely that almost-all the human things are in a similar condition.

Clinias/ What are you talking about?

Athenian Stranger/ I was about to say that no human being ever legislates anything, but that chances and accidents of every sort, occurring in all kinds of ways, legislate everything for us. Either it's some war that violently overturns regimes and transforms laws, or it's the baffling impasse of harsh poverty that does it. Diseases, too, make many innovations necessary, when epidemics occur or bad weather comes and frequently lasts many years. If he looked ahead to all these things, someone might be eager to say

what I just said—that no mortal ever legislates anything, but that almost all human affairs are matters of chance. With regard to the sailing art, the pilot's art, the art of medicine, and the art of the general it seems good to say all this; but it seems equally good to speak about these same affairs in the following way.

Clinias/ In what way?

Athenian Stranger/ To the effect that in all things god—and together with god, chance and opportunity—pilots all the human things. One must, indeed, concede that these are accompanied by yet a third thing, a gentler thing: art. For I at least would declare that the pilot's art is a great advantage when it comes to cooperating with the opportune moment in the midst of a gale. Isn't that so?

Clinias/ That is so.

Athenian Stranger/ So the same argument would hold in the same way for the other cases, and in particular this very thing must be granted in the case of lawgiving. Along with the rest of the good luck a land needs to have befall it if it would ever dwell in happiness, there must always happen along, for such a city, a lawgiver who possesses the truth.

Clinias/ What you say is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Now in each of the cases mentioned the one who possesses the art would presumably be able to pray in the correct way for that which, being available to him through chance, would make nothing lacking except the art?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ All the others who were mentioned just now, if asked to pronounce their prayer, would speak up. Isn't that so?

Clinias/ Sure—why not?

Athenian Stranger/ And the lawgiver would do the same, I think.

Clinias/ I think so.

Athenian Stranger/ "Come, then, lawgiver!" let's say to him, "what city shall we give you and in what condition, so as to enable you to take it and proceed henceforth by yourself to arrange the city satisfactorily?" So what is the correct thing to say next after this? Shall we explain, on behalf of the lawgiver? Or what?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Here it is: "Give me a tyrannized city," he will declare, "and let the tyrant be young, possessed of an able memory, a good learner, courageous, and magnificent by nature. And what we earlier said must accompany all the parts of virtue must now attend the tyrannized soul, if its other qualities are to prove beneficial."

Clinias/ It seems to me that the stranger is referring to moderation, Megillus, when he speaks of the necessary accompaniment. Isn't that so?

Athenian Stranger/ The popular sort, that is, Kleinias—not the sort one would speak of in a solemn way, compelling prudence to be moderation, but rather the sort that blooms naturally, from the beginning, in children and beasts, and by which some lack self-restraint with regard to pleasures while others possess self-restraint. We asserted that when this quality is separated from the many other things said to be good it is not worthy of mention. You get what I'm saying, I suppose.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ So our tyrant should possess this nature in addition to those other natural qualities, if the city is to gain, in the shortest possible time and in the best possible manner, the political regime whose possession will

make it most happy. For there is not now nor would there ever be a speedier and better process of founding a regime.

Clinias/ How, and by what argument, stranger, could someone say this and persuade himself that what he is saying is correct?

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably, Kleinias, it is easy to think this at least, that such a thing is according to nature.

Clinias/ What are you saying? If there were to be a tyrant, you claim, who was young, moderate, a good learner, with an able memory, courageous, and magnificent?

Athenian Stranger/ Add "with good luck"—not in other respects, but in this: that in his epoch there should arise a praiseworthy lawgiver, and that some chance should bring the two of them together. For if this should happen, then the god has done almost all the things that he does when he wants some city to fare especially well. Second is the situation where two such rulers arise; then comes the third situation, and so on in proportion, the situation becoming progressively more difficult the more there are, and the opposite as it moves in the opposite direction.

Clinias/ You're asserting, it appears, that the best city emerges out of tyranny, with an eminent lawgiver and an orderly tyrant, and that the city would be transformed most easily and most swiftly from such a situation; second would be a transformation from oligarchy—is that what you mean?—and third from democracy.

Athenian Stranger/ No, not at all; in first place would be the transformation from tyranny, second would be from a monarchic regime, and third would be from some sort of democracy. Oligarchy would be in fourth place, since it would with the greatest difficulty allow such a thing to come into being, because it has the largest number of all-powerful rulers.

We say that these things come to pass when there comes into being by nature a true lawgiver, who coincidentally shares some of the strength of those who are the most powerful in the city. If this should occur where the powerful are the smallest in number, but the strongest, as in tyranny, then the change is apt to take place there swiftly and easily.

Clinias/ How? The fact is, we don't understand.

Athenian Stranger/ Yet we've said it, at least, not once but many times now, I think! But you two have probably never witnessed a city being tyrannized.

Clinias/ Nor am I, at least, desirous of witnessing it!

Athenian Stranger/ But you'd see in it what's been spoken of now.

Clinias/ Namely?

Athenian Stranger/ You'd see that if a tyrant wishes to change a city's habitual ways, he doesn't need to exert great efforts or spend an enormous amount of time. What he has to do is first proceed himself, along the route he'd like the citizens to turn toward, whether it be toward the practices of virtue or the opposite. He need only first trace out a model in his own conduct of all that is to be done, praising and honoring some things while assigning blame to others, and casting dishonor on anyone who disobeys in each of the activities.

Clinias/ And why do we suppose that the other citizens will swiftly follow someone who has adopted such a combination of persuasion and violence?

Athenian Stranger/ Let no one persuade us, friends, that there will ever be a quicker or easier way for a city to change its laws than through the hegemony of all-powerful rulers. This is the case now and it will always be so. And for us this is not impossible or even difficult to bring about. What is difficult is the following, which seldom comes to pass even

in a great span of time, but which, when it does happen in a city, brings to that city myriads of all that is good.

Clinias/ What are you talking about?

Athenian Stranger/ The possibility that a divine erotic passion for moderate and just practices should arise in some of the great and all-powerful rulers—whether they derive their power from monarchy, or from outstanding superiority in wealth or birth, or from the fact that someday one of them possesses the nature of Nestor, who they claim surpassed all human beings in moderation to an even greater degree than he surpassed them in the power of speaking. This man lived in the time of Troy, as they claim, though never among us; but if such a man has ever existed, or will exist someday, or is now among us, then he himself lives a blessed life, and blessed are those who join in paying heed to the words that flow from his moderate mouth.

The very same argument applies to every sort of power: when the greatest power coincides in a human being with prudence and moderation, then occurs the natural genesis of the best regime, and laws to match; but otherwise it will never come to pass.

Let these remarks be like a myth pronounced in oracular fashion, revealing, on the one hand, that it would be difficult for a city with good laws to come into being, but, on the other hand, that if what we discussed did occur, such a city's origin would be the quickest and by far the easiest of all.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ Let's try to harmonize this with your city, and like elderly children, let's try to fashion the laws in speech.

Clinias/ Yes, let's get on with it and not delay anymore.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us invoke a god in the setting up of the city. Let him hear us, and having heard, let him

graciously and propitiously come to us and take part with us in the ordering of the city and the laws.

Clinias/ Let him come indeed!

Athenian Stranger/ Now what sort of regime do we have in mind to arrange for the city?

Clinias/ Just what do you mean by this question? State it yet more clearly: do you mean what sort of democracy, or oligarchy, or aristocracy, or monarchy? Surely you wouldn't be referring to tyranny—at any rate, we would assume not.

Athenian Stranger/ Come now: which of you two is more willing to answer first, by saying which of these fits his own regime?

Megillus/ Since I am the elder, wouldn't it be more just for me to speak first?

Clinias/ Perhaps.

Megillus/ Well, if I reflect on it, stranger, I can't explain to you which of these names ought to be given to the regime in Lacedaimon. It seems to me that the regime does resemble tyranny—for the institution of the Ephors in it is surprisingly tyrannical; but then again, it sometimes appears to me that ours, of all cities, resembles most closely a democracy. Yet it would be altogether strange if I were not to assert that it was an aristocracy. Then too, there is a monarchy in it with a king for life: in fact, this is the most ancient of all monarchies, according to what is said by all human beings, including us. So when I'm now asked to reply on the spur of the moment I really can't, as I said, separate it off and say which of these regimes it is.

Clinias/ I find myself undergoing the same difficulty as you, Megillus. For I am altogether at a loss to say definitely which of these characterizes the regime in Knossos.

Athenian Stranger/ That's because you two really belong to regimes, best of men. The other things we just named,

they aren't regimes, but city administrations where the city is under the sway of despots, with some parts enslaved to other parts of itself. Each takes its name from the authority that is the despot. If one ought to name the city in this way, then one must use the name of the god who truly rules as despot over those who possess intellect.

Clinias/ Who is this god?

Athenian Stranger/ Should a little more use be made of myth, if it will allow us somehow to clarify, in a harmonious way, the answer to the present question?

Clinias/ Is that, then, the Way one has to proceed?

Athenian Stranger/ By all means. Now long before the cities whose formation we described earlier, there is said to have come into being a certain very happy rule and arrangement under Kronos. The best of arrangements at the present time is in fact an imitation of this.

Clinias/ Then it seems one certainly ought to hear about it.

Athenian Stranger/ So it appears to me at least; that's why I introduced it into the midst of the discussion.

Clinias/ And you acted in a most correct way. So you'd be quite correct in going on to complete the rest of the myth, if in fact it's relevant.

Athenian Stranger/ One must do as you two say. Now we have received an oracular report of the blessed way of life of those who lived in that time, how it had everything without stint and spontaneously. And the cause of these things is said to have been something like the following: Kronos understood that, as we have explained, human nature is not at all capable of regulating the human things, when it possesses autocratic authority over everything, without becoming swollen with insolence and injustice. So, reflecting on these things, he set up at that time kings and rulers

within our cities—not human beings, but demons, members of a more divine and better species. He did just what we do now with sheep and the other tame herd animals. We don't make cattle themselves rulers of cattle, or goats rulers of goats; instead, we exercise despotic dominion over them, because our species is better than theirs. The same was done by the god, who was a friend of humanity: he set over us the better species of demons, who supervised us in a way that provided much ease both for them and for us. They provided peace and awe and good laws and justice without stint. Thus they made it so that the races of men were without civil strife, and happy.

What this present argument is saying, making use of the truth, is that there can be no rest from evils and toils for those cities in which some mortal rules rather than a god. The argument thinks that we should imitate by every device the way of life that is said to have existed under Kronos; in public life and in private life—in the arrangement of our households and our cities—we should obey whatever within us partakes of immortality, giving the name "law" to the distribution ordained by intelligence. But if there is one human being, or some oligarchy, or a democracy, whose soul is directed to pleasures and desires, and needs to be filled with these, and retains nothing, but is sick with endless and insatiable evil—if such a one rules a city or some private individual, trampling underfoot the laws, there is, as we just now said, no device of salvation.

We must think over this argument, Kleinias, and decide whether we will obey it, or just how we will behave.

Clinias/ Presumably it is necessary to obey it.

Athenian Stranger/ Do you understand, now, that some assert there are as many forms of laws as there are regimes, and that the forms of regimes spoken of by the many are

those we have just enumerated? And do not suppose that this present disagreement is about something paltry: it concerns something very great. For once again we are involved in the dispute over the aim of the just and the unjust. They are claiming that laws ought not look to war or to virtue as a whole, but ought to look to what is in the interest of the established regime, to whatever will allow that regime to rule forever and avoid dissolution. They claim that the finest way to formulate the definition of justice that is according to nature is this—

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ That it is the interest of the stronger.

Clinias/ Speak still more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ It is as follows: "Presumably," they assert, "it is the strong authority who lays down the laws on each occasion in the city. Isn't that so?"

Clinias/ What you say is true.

Athenian Stranger/ "Well do you think," they assert, "that when the populace is victorious, or some other regime, or even a tyrant, that it will voluntarily set up laws aimed primarily at something, other than what is in the interest of the maintenance of its own rule?"

Clinias/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ And if someone violates these things that are set down, won't the one who established them punish this person as someone who does injustice, naming the things set down "the just things"?

Clinias/ That's indeed likely.

Athenian Stranger/ So these things would at every moment, thus and in this manner, be what is just.

Clinias/ So this argument asserts, at any rate.

Athenian Stranger/ For this is one of those worthy titles to rule.

Clinias/ What titles?

Athenian Stranger/ The ones we investigated earlier, to see who should rule over whom. It emerged that parents should rule over offspring, that the younger should be ruled by the elder, that the well born should rule over those not well born; and then there were several others, if we remember, and they were obstacles to one another. One of them was this very thing. We asserted, I suppose, that "according to nature" Pindar "pushes through and makes just what is most violent," as he asserts.

Clinias/ Yes, these were the things that were said then.

Athenian Stranger/ Consider, then, to which men our city is to be turned over. For this sort of thing has already happened tens of thousands of times in some cities.

Clinias/ What sort of thing?

Athenian Stranger/ The ruling offices become matters for battle, and those who are victorious take over the city's affairs to such an extent that they refuse to share any of the rule with those who lost out—with either them or their descendants—and the two sides live keeping watch on one another lest someone ever get into office who might remember the old wrongs and start a revolt. These we presumably declare now not to be regimes, nor do we declare any laws correct that are not laid down for the sake of what is common to the whole city. Where the laws exist for the sake of some, we declare the inhabitants to be "partisans" rather than citizens, and declare that when they assert their ordinances to be the just things they have spoken in vain.

We have said these things because of the following: we will not apportion the offices in your city on the basis of someone's wealth or any such possession, be it physical

strength or size or descent. Whoever is most obedient to the established laws and wins this victory in the city must, we assert, be given the service dedicated to the gods: the greatest service to the one who is first, the second-greatest to the one who is ranked second in mastery,, and so on in the same proportion for each rank of service after these.

I have now applied the term "servants of the laws" to the men usually said to be rulers, not for the sake of an innovation in names but because I hold that it is this above all that determines whether the city survives or undergoes the opposite. Where the law is itself ruled over and lacks sovereign authority, I see destruction at hand for such a place. But where it is despot over the rulers and the rulers are slaves of the law, there I foresee safety and all the good things which the gods have given to cities.

Clinias/ Yes by Zeus, stranger! For you see with the sharpness of age!

Athenian Stranger/ That is because every young human being sees such things indistinctly, when he looks by himself, but when old sees them with great sharpness.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So what's next after these matters? Shouldn't we assume that the colonists have arrived and are present, and that the rest of the argument ought to be completed before them?

Clinias/ Why not?

Athenian Stranger/ "Sirs," let us address them, "the god, just as the ancient saying has it, holding the beginning and the end and the middle of all the beings, completes his straight course by revolving, according to nature. Following him always is Justice, avenger of those who forsake the divine law. He who is going to become happy follows Her, in humility and orderliness. But anyone who is puffed up with

boastfulness, or who feels exalted because of riches or honors or good bodily form accompanied by youth and mindlessness, anyone whose soul burns with insolence and hence regards himself as needing neither ruler nor any leader but rather considers himself capable of leading others, is left behind, abandoned by the god. Once left behind, he takes up with others like himself and leaps around overturning everything; to many, he seems to be somebody, but after no long while he undergoes the blameless vengeance of Justice, bringing complete ruin to himself and his household and city as well.

"Now if things are ordered in this way, what should and should not the prudent man do and think about in regard to them?"

Clinias/ Well, this at least is clear: every man must think about how he may become one of the followers of the god.

Athenian Stranger/ "What then is the activity that is dear to and follows god? There is one, and it is expressed in a single ancient saying: 'like is dear to like, if it is measured'; things that lack measure are dear neither to one another nor to things that possess measure. For us, the god would be the measure of all things in the highest degree, and far more so than some 'human being,' as they assert. He who is to become dear to such a being must necessarily do all in his power to become like him; and according to this argument the moderate man among us is dear to god, because similar, while the man who is not moderate is dissimilar and different and unjust—and the other things follow thus, according to the same argument.

"Let us understand that from these observations there follows a principle of the following sort (the noblest and truest of all principles, I believe): for the good man it is very noble, very good, and most efficacious for a happy life, as

well as preeminently fitting, if he sacrifices to and always communes with the gods—through prayers, votive offerings, and every sort of service to the gods. But for the bad man just the opposite of these things holds by nature. For the wicked man is impure in his soul, while his opposite is pure, and it is never correct for either a good man or a god to receive gifts from someone who is polluted. The great effort spent by the impious on the gods is therefore spent in vain—though such effort is very opportune for all the pious.

"This, then; is the target at which we must aim. What is the most correct way to characterize the missiles one should shoot and their trajectory? First, we assert, one would most correctly hit the target of pious reverence if one honored the gods of the underworld after the Olympians and the gods who possess the city, assigning to them the even-numbered, the second place, and the left side. The higher things—the odd-numbered and the other opposites—should be assigned to those just now mentioned. After these gods, the prudent man at least would worship the demons, and then next after these, the heroes. Following close upon them would be the private shrines of ancestral gods, worshipped as the law directs, and then after these the honors that are due to living parents. For it is just that one in debt pay back his first and greatest debts, the eldest of all his obligations, and that he consider all his acquisitions and possessions as belonging to those who engendered and nourished him; he should strive with all his power to devote these things to their service—starting with property, then secondly the things of the body, and thirdly the things of the soul. Thus he will pay back the ancient loans that were bestowed on the young—the cares and laborious pains suffered—and will be returning help to the ancient ones when they especially need it, in their old age. Beyond all this, it is essential that one maintain throughout life a tone of special respect in one's speech to

parents, because there is a very heavy penalty for flippant or winged words. Nemesis, the messenger of Justice, has been set to keep watch over everyone in this regard. So when parents become enraged it is necessary to bear with them and appease their spiritedness, whether they vent it in words or in deeds; one must keep in mind that it is very likely that a father feel an especially spirited anger at a son who he believes is doing him an injustice. And when parents die, the most moderate burial ceremony is the most beautiful, one not more elaborate than is customary and yet not falling short of those which the forefathers held for their parents. The yearly ritual services in honor of those who have reached their end should preserve a similar orderliness. One should reverence them especially by never ceasing to remember them and by continuing to allot to those who have passed away a well-measured portion of the wealth fortune bestows.

"If we do these things and live according to these precepts, each of us will on each occasion reap what we deserve from the gods and from those who are stronger than we are, and we will pass most of life in good hopes."

As for what pertains to offspring, relatives, friends, and citizens, as well as whatever services the gods require toward strangers, and how one is to commune with all these, the sequence of the laws themselves will show how one adorns and lawfully orders his own life by fulfilling his duties. Sometimes the law will persuade, and sometimes—when dispositions are recalcitrant—it will persuade by punishing, with violence and justice. Thus, if the gods are willing, the laws will succeed in making our city blessed and happy.

There are also some things which a lawgiver who thinks as I do should and must necessarily say, but which cannot be presented harmoniously in the shape of law; it seems to me that the lawgiver should present an example of these things for himself and for those he will give laws to. After he

has done this, and has proceeded through everything else to the best of his ability, he should begin to establish the laws.

Clinias/ What shape should such things preferably take?

Athenian Stranger/ It is not too easy to embrace them by speaking of a single model, as it were; but let's conceive of them in something like the following way and see if we can get a firm grasp on them.

Clinias/ Say what sort of way you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ I would wish that the people would be as persuadable as possible with regard to virtue; and it's clear that the lawgiver will also strive to achieve this, in every facet of his legislation.

Clinias/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Now it seemed to me that the things that were just said, if they took hold of a soul that was not entirely savage, would contribute something to making the hearer listen in a more tame and agreeable mood to the advice. So even if these words have no great effect, but only a small one, still, insofar as they make the one who listens to what was said more agreeable and a better learner, that is in every way desirable. For there is no great plenty or abundance of persons who are eager in spirit to become as good as possible in the shortest possible time; indeed, the many show that Hesiod is wise when he says that the road to vice is smooth to travel and without sweat, since it is very short, but "before virtue," he asserts, the immortal gods have put sweat;

> And a path to it that is long and steep,
> And rough at first. When you arrive at the top,
> Then it's easy to endure; but the ascent is hard.

Clinias/ He sounds like someone who speaks nobly, at any rate.

Athenian Stranger/ He certainly does. Now I want to set directly before you two the effect produced on me by the preceding speech.

Clinias/ Do so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's engage then in the following dialogue with the lawgiver: "Tell us, O lawgiver: If in fact you knew what we should do and say, isn't it obvious that you would state it?"

Clinias/ Necessarily.

Athenian Stranger/ "Well, didn't we hear you saying just a little while ago that a lawgiver should not allow the poets to create whatever they like? For they would not know what in any of their speeches was opposed to the laws and hence harmful to the city."

Clinias/ What you say is indeed true.

Athenian Stranger/ Now if we were to reply to him on behalf of the poets, would the following remarks be well measured?

Clinias/ Which?

Athenian Stranger/ The following. "There is an ancient myth, O lawgiver, which we ourselves always repeat and which is also the accepted opinion of all the others, to the effect that the poet, when seated on the tripod of the Muses, is not at that time in possession of his senses, but is like some spring that readily lets flow whatever comes up from within. Since his art consists of imitation, he is compelled to contradict himself often, by creating human beings who are opposed to one another; and he doesn't know if either of the diverse things said is true. For the lawgiver, however, it isn't possible to create this in a law—to make two speeches about one subject—but he must always exhibit one speech about one subject. Take a look at something from the speeches you pronounced just now. Burial ceremonies can be either overly

elaborate, or skimpy, or of measured size. You chose one of these, the medium size, and enjoined and praised this one without any qualifications. But as for me, if in my poetry some especially wealthy woman were to give orders for her funeral, I'd praise the overly elaborate funeral; or again, if some thrifty and poor man were involved, he'd praise the skimpy funeral; if he were someone possessing a measured amount of property, and were himself a person of measure, he'd praise the same funeral as you. Now, in your case it isn't sufficient to leave it at what you just now said, about a well-measured size; one must tell what and how much constitutes well measured. Until that is done you shouldn't think that such a speech has become a law."

Clinias/ What you say is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So, then, is the one who is to have charge of our laws going to pronounce no such preface at the beginning of the laws? Is he just going to explain straightaway what must and must not be done, add the threat of a penalty, and turn to another law, without adding a single encouragement or bit of persuasion to his legislative edicts? There is one sort of doctor who used to proceed in this way, and another sort who used to proceed in the other way each time he took care of us. Let's recollect each of those different modes of procedure, so that we may beseech the lawgiver the same way children beseech a doctor, asking him to care for them in the most gentle way. Now just what sort of thing are we referring to? Presumably we assert that there are certain persons who are doctors; and then, that there are in addition doctor's servants, whom we also, I suppose, call "doctors."

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether they be free men or slaves, they acquire the art by following their masters' command, by

observing, and by experience, but not by following nature, as the free doctors do, who have themselves learned in this way and who teach their disciples in this way. Would you set these down as the two species of what are called doctors?

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Then you also understand that sick people in the cities, slaves? and free, are treated differently. The slaves are for the most | part treated by slaves, who either go on rounds or remain at! the dispensaries. None of these latter doctors gives or receives any account of each malady afflicting each domestic slave. Instead, he gives him orders on the basis of the opinions he has derived from experience. Claiming to know with precision, he gives his commands just like a headstrong tyrant and hurries off to some other sick domestic slave. In this way he relieves his master of the trouble of caring for the sick.

The free doctor mostly cares for and looks after the maladies of free men. He investigates these from their beginning and according to nature, communing with the patient himself and his friends, and he both learns something himself from the invalids and, as much as he can, teaches the one who is sick. He doesn't give orders until he has in some sense persuaded; when he has on each occasion tamed the sick person with persuasion, he attempts to succeed in leading him back to health.

Which of the two procedures is better, whether for a doctor who is curing or for a gymnast who is exercising people? Should the practitioner execute his single power in a split way or in only one way, employing only the worse and more savage of the two?

Clinias/ The double method would presumably make a great difference, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Do you want us to observe this double method, and then the simple, in the very acts of lawgiving?

Clinias/ How could I not want to!

Athenian Stranger/ Come, then, in the name of the gods, what would be the first law the lawgiver would lay down? Won't he proceed according to nature, and with his regulations bring order to what is the first cause of childbirth in cities?

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Isn't intercourse and partnership between married spouses the original cause of childbirths in all cities?

Clinias/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Then it's likely that in every city it's fine, with a view to what is correct, if the marriage laws are the first laid down.

Clinias/ In every way, surely.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's pronounce first the simple version, which would perhaps be something like this:

Everyone is to marry after he reaches the age of thirty and before the age of thirty-five. If not, there is to be a penalty of fines and dishonor, the fines to be of such-and-such an amount, the dishonor to be of such-and-such a character.

Let something like that be the simple formula regarding marriage. Here's the double formula:

Everyone is to marry after he reaches the age of thirty and before he reaches thirty-five, bearing in mind that there is a sense in which the human species has by a certain nature a share in immortality, and that it is the nature of everyone to desire immortality in every way. For the desire to become famous and not to lie nameless after one has died is a desire

for such a thing. Thus the species of human beings has something in its nature that is bound together with all of time, which it accompanies and will always accompany to the end. In this way the species is immortal; by leaving behind the children of children and remaining one and the same for always, it partakes of immortality by means of coming-into-being. For anyone voluntarily to deprive himself of this is never pious, and whoever does not care for children and a wife does so intentionally deprive himself.

Now let him who obeys the law depart without penalty; but he who disobeys, he who at the age of thirty-five does not marry, is to pay a fine of such-and-such an amount every year—so that he won't be of the opinion that the bachelor's life is a source of gain and ease for him—and further let him be excluded from the honors the younger men in the city pay to their own elders on each occasion.

After listening to this law next to the other it's possible to decide in every single case whether they should become at the very least double in length by embodying persuasion as well as threats, or whether by employing threats alone they should remain simple in length.

Megillus/ The Laconic way, stranger, is to give more honor always to the shorter. Yet if someone were to ask me to be the judge who decides which of these writings I would want used in the written statutes of my city, I would choose the lengthier; in fact, in the case of every law I would make this same choice—if, as in this example, both possibilities were present. Of course, presumably the present legislation must also be satisfying to Kleinias here. After all, the city that is thinking of using such laws is his.

Clinias/ You've spoken nobly, at any rate, Megillus.

Athenian Stranger/ It's extremely simple-minded to argue over whether writings should be long or short; for what

should be honored, I think, are the best writings, not the shortest or the lengthy. Besides, in the laws just mentioned, not only does the one version differ by double the amount of practical virtue, but, as was said just a moment ago, the comparison with the dual species of doctors is a very correct comparison.

In this regard, it's likely that none of the lawgivers has ever reflected on the fact that it is possible to use two means of giving laws, persuasion and violence (insofar as the uneducated condition of the mob permits). They have used only the latter; failing to mix compulsion with persuasion in their lawgiving, they have employed unmitigated violence alone. But I, O blessed ones, see the need for yet a third way of handling laws, one not at all in use nowadays.

Clinias/ What are you referring to?

Athenian Stranger/ Something which has emerged, by the aid of some god, out of the very things about which we're now carrying on a dialogue! We began to discuss laws about dawn, and it has become high noon and we've paused in this altogether lovely resting place. In all this time we've been having a dialogue about nothing except laws. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we have only just begun to enunciate laws, and that everything said before consisted of our preludes to laws.

Why have I said these things? What I wish to say is this: all speeches, and whatever pertains to the voice, are preceded by preludes—almost like warming-up exercises—which artfully attempt to promote what is to come. It is the case, I suppose, that of the songs sung to the kithara, the so-called "laws" or nomoi, like all music, are preceded by preludes composed with amazing seriousness. Yet with regard to things that are really "laws," the laws we assert to be political, no one has ever either uttered a prelude or

become a composer and brought one to light—just as if it were a thing that did not exist in nature. But the way we've been spending our time has shown us, it seems to me, that such a thing really does exist; and the laws which were talked of as double seemed to me just now to be not simply double but rather composed of two different parts, a law and a prelude to the law. What was called a tyrannical command, and likened to the image of the commands of the doctors we said were unfree, seemed to be unmixed law; what was spoken of before this, and was said to be persuasive on behalf of this, really did seem to be persuasion, but seemed to have the power that a prelude has in speeches. For it became clear to me that this whole speech, which the speaker gives in order to persuade, is delivered with just this end in view: so that he who receives the law uttered by the legislator might receive the command—that is, the law—in a frame of mind more favorably disposed and therefore more apt to learn something. That's why, according to my argument at least, this would correctly be called a "prelude" rather than an "argument" of the law.

Having said these things, what would I wish myself to say next? Just this: the lawgiver must always provide that all the laws, and each of them, will not lack preludes, so that the laws will differ from themselves to as great a degree as the two that were spoken of just now differed from one another.

Clinias/ For my part at least, I think that we should bid the one who knows about these things to legislate in no other way.

Athenian Stranger/ To me what you say seems fine to this extent, Kleinias—insofar as you say that all laws have preludes, and that at the beginning of every legislation as well as at the beginning of every speech one should pronounce the prelude which is by nature appropriate to each. For what is going to be said after this is of no small

significance, and it makes no small difference whether or not the things are remembered clearly or unclearly. Yet if we should ordain that every one of the aforementioned laws, great or small, is to have a prelude, we would not be speaking correctly. Such a thing isn't necessary in the case of every song and every speech: even though there does exist by nature a prelude for all of them, it ought not be employed in all cases. In this regard one must leave a certain latitude to the particular orator, singer, or legislator in each case.

Clinias/ What you say seems very true to me. But look, stranger, let's not use up any more time in delay; let's retrace the steps of our discussion and begin, if it's all right with you, with the things you said a little while ago when you were not pronouncing a prelude. Let's repeat, with a second and better start, as they declare in playing games, but this time with the intention of completing a prelude and not just any chance sort of speech, as we were doing; let's take it as agreed that the beginning of them was a prelude. As regards honoring the gods and caring for ancestors, the things said just now are sufficient. Let's try to say what comes next, until the whole prelude seems to you to be sufficiently set forth. Then after this you will go ahead with the pronouncement of the laws themselves.

Athenian Stranger/ So we are now saying that earlier we pronounced a sufficient prelude as regards the gods, those who come after the gods, and the living and dead ancestors. And you appear to me to be asking now that I bring to light, as it were, whatever has been left unsaid.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, next after such things it is fitting and very much in the common interest for the speaker and the listeners to deal with how they should be serious and how they should relax as regards their own souls, their

bodies, and their property; by pondering these matters, they'll attain education—insofar as they are able. These, then, are for us the very matters that really should be spoken of and hearkened to next, after those others.

Clinias/ What you say is very correct.

Book 5.

Athenian Stranger/ "Listen, then, each of you who has heard what was said just now about the gods and the cherished forefathers.

"Of all the things that belong to one, the most divine—after the gods—is the soul, the thing that is most one's own. It is the case with everybody that all one's possessions fall into two classes. The superior and better sort are masterful, while the inferior and worse are slavish. Hence one's masterful possessions should always be honored above one's slave possessions. So I speak correctly when I urge that one honor one's soul second after the gods, who are masters, and those who follow after the gods. There is no one among us, so to speak, who assigns honor correctly, though we are of the opinion that we do. For honor is presumably a divine good, and cannot be bestowed through what is bad: he who thinks that he is making his soul greater with words or gifts or certain indulgences, yet fails to change its condition from worse to better, seems to honor it, but in fact is not doing so at all.

"Every boy who has barely become an adult human being right away considers himself capable of understanding everything, thinks that he honors his soul by praising it, and with an eager spirit encourages it to do whatever it might wish; whereas, according to what is now being said, this sort of behavior harms rather than honors it. And yet, we assert, it should be honored second after the gods. And when a human being refuses to consider himself responsible on each occasion for his errors and most of his gravest evils, but assigns responsibility to others and always excuses himself, he is seeming to accord honor to his soul while falling far short of doing as he should. For he is doing harm. And when he delights in pleasures contrary to the advice and

praise given by the lawgiver, then he does not honor it at all and instead dishonors it by filling it with evils and remorse. And when, in the opposite situation, he fails to endure firmly the hardships, fears, pains, and sufferings that are praised, and instead gives in to them, then he does not honor it, by giving in. Through all such actions he brings dishonor upon it. And when he considers survival to be always good, then too does he dishonor rather than honor it. For in this case he has given in and allowed the soul to go on supposing that everything done in Hades is bad; he has failed to struggle as he should, teaching and attempting to refute it in order to show that one doesn't know whether things aren't just the opposite—it may be that among the gods below are to be found the things that are by nature the greatest goods of all for us. And when someone honors beauty more than virtue, this constitutes nothing other than a real and thorough dishonoring of the soul. For this argument falsely claims that the body is more honorable than the soul. Yet nothing earth-born is more honorable than the Olympians, and he who has a different opinion when it comes to the soul fails to comprehend what a marvelous possession he is neglecting. And when someone has an erotic passion for ignoble gain, or fails to be troubled when he makes such gain, he then honors his own soul by giving it gifts—entirely missing the point. For he is selling what is honorable and beautiful in it for a small bit of gold; whereas all the gold on earth or beneath the earth is not equal in value to virtue.

"In short, with regard to the things the lawgiver enumerates and sets down as shameful and bad, and the opposite, good and noble, whoever is unwilling to use every means to avoid the former and employ all his capacities in the practice of the latter—every such human being—is ignorant of the fact that in all these matters he is treating his soul, a most divine thing, in a most dishonorable and

unseemly way. No one, so to speak, takes into account the gravest of the so-called 'judicial penalties' for wrongdoing: what is gravest is to become similar to men who are wicked, and, in becoming similar, to avoid good men and be cut off from good conversation, and instead to attach oneself to the bad by seeking intercourse with them. He who grows similar in nature to such people must necessarily do and suffer what such men by their natures do and say to one another. To suffer in this way is not, indeed, a 'judicial penalty,' since what is just—including penalty—is noble. It is retribution, a suffering that is a consequence of injustice. Both he who undergoes this and he who escapes it are miserable: one because he does not get cured, the other because he is destroyed in order that many others may be saved. To speak generally, 'honor' means for us following the better things and, in the case of the worse things that allow for improvement, bringing them as close as possible to the same end. And hence no human possession is more naturally well-suited than the soul for fleeing the bad or for tracking down and capturing what is best of all, and, after capturing it, dwelling in common with it for the rest of one's life. That's why it was assigned the second rank of honor.

"The third rank of honor belongs by nature to the body (everyone would understand this at least). Here too it is necessary to look into the various sorts of honor to see which are true and how many are false, and this is the responsibility of the lawgiver. It appears to me that he would announce and distinguish them as follows: the honorable body is not the one that is beautiful, or strong, or swift, or large, or even healthy—though many would believe this, indeed, to be rather honorable—nor, of course, a body that has the opposite characteristics. Instead, those attributes which occupy the middle ground, in between all these, are the most moderate and steady by far. For the former

extremes make souls boastful and rash, while the latter make them humble and unfree.

"The same holds true for the possession of money and property; honor should be bestowed on this according to the same scheme. Excesses of each of these create enmities and civil strife both in cities and in private life, while deficiencies lead, for the most part, to slavery.

"And let no one be a lover of money for the sake of his children, so that he may leave them as wealthy as possible: this is better neither for them nor for the city. A portion that will not attract flatterers around the young but will avoid neediness is the most musical and the best of all; for this brings us consonance, and through harmony makes life painless in all respects. Children should be left an abundance of awe rather than gold. Now we think that we bestow this legacy on the young by rebuking them whenever they behave shamelessly. Yet this is not the result produced if the young are exhorted the way they are nowadays, when they are urged to be ashamed before everyone. The prudent lawgiver would instead urge the elderly to be ashamed before the young, and to take care above all lest any young person ever see or hear them doing or saying anything shameful; for where the old are lacking in a sense of shame, there the young necessarily lack modest awe. What really makes a difference in education—not only of the young but of ourselves—is not so much the precepts one gives others, as the way one exemplifies the precepts one would give to another, in one's conduct throughout life.

"If a man honors and reverences family ties and his entire natural blood-community that shares in the family gods, he may expect the gods who watch over births to be proportionately well disposed towards his own begetting of children.

“Moreover, as for friends and comrades, one will make them favorably disposed in the interminglings of life if one thinks more highly than they do of the worth and importance of their services to oneself, and assigns to one’s own favors to friends a lesser value than that assigned by the friends and comrades themselves.

“With regard to the city and its citizens, the best person by far is the one who prefers, above any Olympic victories or any victories in contests of war or peace, the victorious reputation of having served his own laws—a reputation as the one who throughout his life served the laws more nobly than any other human being.

“Again, as regards strangers, one must consider contracts made with them to be the most hallowed. For almost all the wrongs committed among strangers or against strangers are linked more closely to an avenging god than are the wrongs committed among citizens. This is because the stranger, being bereft of comrades and relatives, evokes more pity on the part of both human beings and gods; therefore he who has the power to avenge him has a spirit that is more eager to come to his aid. And especially powerful, in each case, are the demon and the god of strangers, who follow Zeus, god of strangers. Thus anyone with even a little foresight will take great care to complete his life’s journey without having done any wrong to strangers. The gravest of these wrongs done to strangers, and native inhabitants as well, is in every case that done to suppliants; for the god who bore witness to the agreement the suppliant happened to obtain becomes a special guardian of the one who suffers, so that whatever he happens to suffer never goes unavenged.”

We have now just about covered the relations with parents, with oneself, and with what belongs to one, as well as with the city, friends, and family, and also strangers and the natives; what should come next after this is an

explanation of; what sort of person one should be oneself if one is to lead the: most noble sort of life. In turning to these next matters we must speak not of law, but rather of how praise and blame can educate each of them so that they become more obedient and well-disposed to the laws that are going to be laid down.

”Truth is the leader of all good things for gods, and of all things for human beings. Whoever is to become blessed and happy should partake of it from the very beginning, so that he may live as a truthful man for as long a time as possible. Such a man is trustworthy. The untrustworthy man is one who finds the voluntary lie congenial; he who finds the involuntary lie congenial is without intelligence. Neither of these is enviable, because every man who is untrustworthy, certainly, and ignorant, is also friendless. As time goes on such a man is discovered, and in the hard time of old age, near the end of life, he makes himself completely deserted, so that whether his comrades and children are living or not he lives almost as if he were an orphan.

”He who does not do injustice is indeed honorable; but he who does not allow unjust men to work their injustice is more [than twice as honorable. The former has a value of one, but the latter, by reporting the injustice of the others to the magistrates, is equal in value to many others. Yet the great man in the city, the man who is to be proclaimed perfect and the bearer of victory in virtue, is the one who does what he can to assist the magistrates in inflicting punishment.

“This same praise should of course be bestowed on moderation and prudence, and on any other good possessions which can be given to others as well as possessed by oneself. The one who does the giving should be honored most highly; in the second rank should be put the one who is willing to give, but unable; as for the one who

begrudges certain good things and does not, out of friendship, voluntarily share them in common with anyone, he should be blamed—though the possession itself should not be dishonored on account of the possessor, and one should still strive to acquire it, as much as one can.

"Let all of us be lovers of victory when it comes to virtue, but without envy. The man of this sort—always competing himself but never thwarting others with slander—makes cities great. But the envious man, who fancies he must gain superiority by slandering the others, both lessens his own efforts to attain true virtue and makes his competitors dispirited by getting them unjustly blamed. Thus he makes the whole city a flaccid competitor in the contest for virtue and does what he can to diminish its fame.

"Every real man should be of the spirited type, but yet also as gentle as possible. For there is no way to avoid those injustices done by others that are both dangerous and difficult, or even impossible, to cure, except to fight and defend oneself victoriously, in no way easing up on punishment. This, every soul is unable to do, if it lacks a high-born spiritedness. On the other hand, in regard to the curable injustices men commit, one must first understand that no unjust man is ever voluntarily unjust. For no one anywhere would ever voluntarily acquire any of the greatest evils—least of all when the evil afflicts his most honored possessions. Now the soul, as we asserted, is truly the most honorable thing for everyone; therefore no one would ever voluntarily take the greatest evil into his most honorable possession and keep it for the rest of his life. So the unjust man, like the man who possesses bad things, is pitiable in every way, and it is permissible to pity such a man when his illness is curable; in this case one can become gentle, by restraining one's spiritedness and not keeping up that bitter, woman's raging. But against the purely evil, perverted man

who cannot be corrected, one must let one's anger have free rein. This is why we declare that it is fitting for the good man to be of the spirited type and also gentle, as each occasion arises.

"The greatest of all evils for the mass of human beings is something which grows naturally in the soul, and everyone, by excusing it in himself, fails to devise any way to escape it. This is shown by the way people talk, when they say that every human being is by nature a friend to himself and that it is correct that he should be so. The truth is that the excessive friendship for oneself is the cause of all of each man's wrongdoings on every occasion. Everyone who cares for something is blind when it comes to the thing cared for, and hence is a poor judge of what is just and good and noble, because he believes he should always honor his own more than the truth. Yet a man who is to attain greatness must be devoted not to himself or to what belongs to him, but to what is just—whether it happens to be done by himself or by someone else. This same failing is the source of everyone's supposing that his lack of learning is wisdom. As a result, we think we know everything when in fact we know, so to speak, nothing: and when we refuse to turn over to others what we don't know how to do, we necessarily go wrong, by trying to do them ourselves. So every human being should flee excessive self-love, and should instead always pursue someone who is better than himself, without putting any feeling of shame in the way.

""There are some matters that are often talked about which are smaller, but no less useful, than these things; each person should repeat them to himself and keep recollecting them. For just as where there is a constant flow outward, there must be the opposite, constant replenishment, so recollection is' the inflow that replenishes the supply of prudence. Thus excessive laughter or weeping

should be restrained, and every man should remind everyone else to that effect. On the whole, one should try to keep all great joy or great pain hidden under a seemly veil, whether each person's demon remains in good condition or whether in some enterprises chance brings high, steep slopes for the demons to climb. With regard to the troubles that fall upon men, they should hope that for good men at least the god will always diminish them, and change their present lot for the better, by means of the gifts he bestows; with regard to the good things, they should hope that, with the help of good luck, the opposite sort of change will always take place for them. It's in these hopes that each should live and with recollections of all such admonitions, never flagging, but always recollecting them clearly, for another and for oneself, playfully and seriously."

Now thus far, what has been said describing the practices that are to be followed and the sort of person each should be himself, concerns mainly the divine things; we have not yet discussed the human things, though we must—for we are carrying on a dialogue with human beings, not gods.

"By nature, the human consists above all in pleasures and pains and desires. To these every mortal animal is, as it were, inextricably attached and bound in the most serious ways. The noblest life should be praised not only because it is superior as regards the splendor of its reputation, but also because, if someone is willing to taste it and not become a fugitive from it because of his youth, it will prove superior in respect to that which we all seek—namely, having more delight and less pain throughout the whole of one's life. That this will be clear, if one tastes in the correct way, will be very obvious. But what is 'the correct way'? This is what must now be investigated, under the guidance of the argument: one way of life must be compared with another, the more pleasant with the more painful, to see whether the life grows

for us according to nature or whether it grows otherwise, against nature.

"Now we want pleasure for ourselves, while we neither choose nor want pain; we don't want what is neither pleasant nor painful instead of what is pleasant, but we do want it in exchange for pain; we want less pain with more pleasure but we don't want less pleasure with more pain; where the pleasant things and the painful things are equal in each of two situations, we could not say clearly which situation we choose. As each choice is exercised, all these do or do not make a difference to him who is wishing, depending on their number, size, intensity, and equality, or the opposites. This being the way these things are necessarily ordered, in the case of a life that has many great and intense pleasures and pains, we want the life in which the pleasures predominate and don't want the life in which the opposite predominate. Again, in the case of a life that has a few small and calm pleasures and pains, we don't wish the life in which the painful things predominate but we do wish the life in which the opposite predominate. Further, the life whose intensity is balanced we have to understand in the same way: we wish the balanced life that has more of the things we like, but if it has more of the things we find repugnant, we do not wish it.-One must understand that all ways of life open to us are naturally limited by this range of alternatives, and on this basis one must decide which ways of life we wish for by nature. If we claim we wish something beyond these alternatives, we are speaking from a certain ignorance and lack of experience of what the ways of life really are.

"So then what and how many are the ways of life among which one must distinguish the Wished-for and voluntary from the unwished and involuntary—looking to a law that one gives to oneself, and choosing what is dear and also pleasant and best and most noble, and thus living as blessed

a life as is humanly possible? One of these lives, let us say, is the moderate life; one is the prudent; and one is the courageous; in addition, let us set down the healthy life as one. Opposed to these, being four, are four others—the imprudent, the cowardly, the unrestrained, and the sickly. Now he who knows will set down the life of moderation as a life that is mild in every way, ¦with gentle pains and gentle pleasures, a life characterized by desires that are mild and loves that are not mad. The unrestrained life he will set down as intense in every way, with strong pains and strong pleasures, a life characterized by desires that are vehement and frenzied, and loves that are as mad as possible. In the moderate life, he will say, the pleasures predominate over the griefs, while in the unrestrained life the pains are greater and more numerous and more frequent than the pleasures. From this it falls out, necessarily and according to nature, that the one life is more pleasant for us and the other more painful; and he at least who wants to live pleasantly will no longer, voluntarily at any rate, permit himself to live in an unrestrained way. Indeed, it is now obvious—if what is being said now is correct—that every unrestrained man must necessarily be living this way involuntarily. The whole mob of humanity lives with a lack of moderation because of their ignorance or their lack of self-mastery or a combination of both. One must understand the sickly and healthy ways of life in the very same way. Both have their pleasures and pains, but in a healthy life the pleasures predominate over the pains, while sick men have more pains than pleasures. In choosing among ways of life we do not wish that the painful should predominate, and the life where pain is subordinate is the life we have judged to be more pleasant. Now in comparing the moderate life with the unrestrained, the prudent with the imprudent, and even the life of courage with that of cowardice, we would assert that in the former

lives both pleasures and pains are fewer, smaller, and rarer, and the one life surpasses the other in pleasures, while the latter lives surpass the others in pain. The courageous man defeats the coward, the prudent man defeats the imprudent, and so their lives are more pleasant than the lives of the others: the moderate, courageous, prudent, and healthy lives compared to the cowardly, imprudent, unrestrained, and sickly. In sum, we would assert that the life that possesses virtue, of body or also of soul, is more pleasant than the life possessing vice, and that in the other respects—beauty, correctness, virtue, and fame—it is far superior to the life of vice. Thus it makes the one who possesses it live more happily than his opposite, in every way and on the whole."

Let the speeches that constitute the prelude to the laws come to an end here. After the "prelude" it is presumably necessary that a "law" follow—or rather, in truth, the outline of the laws of a political regime. Now just as in some web or any other woven article the woof and the warp can't be made of the same materials, and the warp must necessarily be different in regard to virtue (for it should be strong, with a certain firmness in its ways, while the other should be softer, with a certain just, yielding quality), so with respect to those who are to fill the ruling offices in cities one must in each case discriminate, in some reasonable way, between them and the others who have been tested and hardened by only a small education. For a political regime has two fundamental parts: on the one hand, the appointment of men to fill each ruling office, and on the other hand, the laws that are given to the ruling offices.

But before all these matters, it is necessary to think through such matters as the following. With regard to every herd, one who takes up the task of a shepherd or cowherd or horse breeder or any other such things will never attempt

to care for his charges otherwise than by first instituting the purge appropriate to each group. Picking out the healthy from those who are not, and the well born from those not well born, he will send the latter away to other herds and direct his care to the former. He understands that his labor would be vain and endless, as regards both the body and the souls, if someone didn't carry out a purification by the appropriate means. For in the case of each animal he owns, the souls that have been ruined by nature and by a corrupt upbringing will ruin the stock that has healthy and undefiled habits and bodies. With the other animals it is a less serious matter, and deserves mention in the argument only to serve as an example; but in the case of human beings it is a task of the greatest seriousness for the lawgiver to discover and give an account of what is appropriate for each group, as regards the purge and all other activities. So, without further ado, the account of the purges of the city would go as follows. There are many sorts of purification, some gentler and some harsher. If the same man were a tyrant as well as a lawgiver he could employ the purges that are harsh and best; if a lawgiver who lacks tyranny is setting up a new regime with laws, he should be glad if he can purify using even the gentlest of purges. The best method is painful, like medicines of this kind, since it involves punishing with justice and retribution, and completes the retribution by means of death and exile. That is how the greatest offenders, those who are incurable and who represent the greatest harm to the city, are usually gotten rid of. But our method of purification is one of the gentler—something like this: those who, because they lack food, show themselves ready to follow men who lead the have-nots in an attack on the property of the haves will be looked upon as a disease growing within the city; they will be sent away in as gentle a manner as possible, in an expulsion that bears the

euphemistic name "colonization." Every lawgiver must somehow or other accomplish this at the beginning, but for us now the problem happens to be rather unusual. There isn't any need to devise a colonizing expedition or some purgative selection at present; instead, just as in the case of a single reservoir formed by the flowing together of many springs and mountain torrents, we are compelled to turn our minds to insuring that the water flowing in will be as pure as possible, partly by drawing off some and partly by diverting some in side-channels. But it's likely that toil and danger are present in every political project. Since things are being done now in speech but not in deed, let's assume that our selection has been carried out and that the purification has happened according to our manner of thinking. By thorough testing—with every sort of persuasion over a sufficient period of time—we will discover those who are bad among the people trying to become citizens of the present city and prevent them from entering; to those who are good we will extend as gentle and as gracious an invitation as we can.

Let us not, by the way, overlook the good fortune that has befallen us, the same luck that we said befell the colony founded by the descendants of Heracles: they avoided the terrible, dangerous strife occasioned by redivision of land, cancelling of debts, and redistribution. When a city with ancient roots is compelled to legislate about this, it finds that it cannot leave things as they are, unchanged, nor is it able to change them in any way; the only thing left, so to speak, is prayer, and small, careful transformation that gradually produces a small result over a long period of time. For this to happen there must be a continual supply of reformers from among those who possess an abundance of land and many debtors. These reformers must be willing, out of a sense of fairness, to share in some way what they have with

any of their debtors who are in distress, forgiving some of the debts and parceling out some of their land. Thus they bring about a kind of measure and show that they believe poverty consists not in a lessening of one's property but in an increase of one's avarice. This is the most important source of a city's preservation, and provides a sort of sturdy foundation upon which someone can later build whatever political order befits such an arrangement. But if this foundation is rotten, political activity would always encounter difficulties in the city. This danger, as we assert, we're avoiding; nevertheless, it is more correct to discuss it, at any rate, and show how we might find a way out if we were not escaping it. It's been said that what would be needed is an absence of the money-loving that goes with justice: there is no other way of escape, broad or narrow, besides this device. So let this stand now as a kind of buttress for our city. Somehow or other things must be arranged so that they don't have disputes over their property, because those who have even a little intelligence won't voluntarily go ahead with the rest of the arrangements as long as ancient property disputes remain unsettled among themselves. But for men in a situation like ours now, where a god has given a new city to found, and where there are as yet no hatreds against one another; no human ignorance, even if combined with complete evil, would lead men to set up a division of land and houses that would introduce these hatreds among themselves.

What then would be the method of a correct distribution? First the numerical mass has to be decided—how many of them there ought to be. After that there must be agreement on the distribution of the citizens—how many divisions there should be, and how big they should be. Among these divisions the land and houses should be distributed as equally as possible. Now the only correct way to determine

the adequate size of the population is by consideration of the land and the neighboring cities. The land should be large enough to support a certain number of people living moderately, and no more. This number should be large enough to enable them both to defend themselves, if they suffer an injustice from their neighbors, and to be in a position to give at least some aid to their neighbors if someone else does them an injustice. When we have looked over the territory and the neighbors we will decide on these things in deed as well as in speech. At the moment, for the sake of giving a sketch in outline, let the argument proceed to the giving of the laws, so that it can be completed.

As a suitable number, let there be five thousand forty landholders and defenders of the distribution; and let there be the same division of the land and the households, each man paired with an allotment. First let the whole number be divided by two, and then the same number by three—for its nature is to be divisible also by four, and five, and so on up to ten. Any man who is a lawgiver must understand at least this much about numbers: which number and what kind of number would be the most useful for all cities. Let's choose the number that has the most numerous and most nearly consecutive divisors within itself. The entire number series is divisible by every number for every purpose. Five thousand forty has no more than sixty, minus one, divisors, including all the numbers from one to ten, consecutively. And these divisions are useful in war and in peace—in all contracts and associations, in revenue-gathering, and in disbursements. These matters must be studied at leisure and firmly understood by those who are given this duty by the law; at any rate, this is the way it is, and the person who is going to set up a city should proclaim these things with a view to the following. The same applies whether someone is making a new city from the beginning or refounding an old

city that has become corrupted: as regards gods and temples—which things are to be constructed in the city for each of them, and which gods or demons they are to be named after—no one of intelligence will try to change what has been laid down by Delphi or Dodona or Ammon, or what has been ordained by the ancient sayings, however they may have become manifest—whether they issue from apparitions or from an inspiration said to come from gods. Through such advice men have established sacrifices, mixed with mystery-rites, some of which have local origins and some of which are borrowed from Etruria, or Cyprus, or somewhere else. Such sayings have led them to sanctify oracles, statues, alters, and shrines, and to lay out sanctuaries for each of these things. Now a lawgiver should not change any of these things in the least. He should give to each group a god or demon or some hero, and before he makes any other land distribution he should set aside choice places for sanctuaries and everything that goes with them. In this way, when the various parts of the population gather together at the regularly established intervals, they'll be amply supplied with whatever they need; they'll become more friendly to one another, at the sacrifices, will feel they belong together, and will get to know one another. There is no greater good for a city than that its inhabitants be well known to one another; for where men's characters are obscured from one another by the dark instead of being visible in the light, no one ever obtains in a correct way the honor he deserves, either in terms of office or justice. Above everything else, every man in every city must strive to avoid deceit on every occasion and to appear always in simple fashion, as he truly is—and, at the same time, to prevent any other such man from deceiving him.

The next move in the process of establishing laws is analogous to the move made by someone playing draughts,

who abandons his "sacred line," and because it's unexpected, it may seem amazing to the hearer at first. Nevertheless, anyone who uses his reason and experience will recognize that a second-best city is to be constructed. Perhaps someone would not accept this because he is unfamiliar with a lawgiver who is not a tyrant. But the most correct procedure is to state what the best regime is, and the second and the third, and after stating this to give the choice among them to whoever is to be in charge of the founding in each case. Let us, too, follow this procedure now: let's state what regime is first as regards virtue, what is second, and what is third. Then let's give the choice to Kleinias, in the present circumstances, and to anyone else who might be willing, at any time, to proceed to choose among such things—taking over from his own fatherland whatever his particular character leads him to cherish in it.

That city and that regime are first, and the laws are best, where the old proverb holds as much as possible throughout the whole city: it is said that the things of friends really are common. If this situation exists somewhere now, or if it should ever exist someday—if women are common, and children are common, and every sort of property is common; if every device has been employed to exclude all of what is called the "private" from all aspects of life; if, insofar as possible, a way has been devised to make common somehow the things that are by nature private, such as the eyes and the ears and the hands, so that they seem to see and hear and act in common; if, again, everyone praises and blames in unison, as much as possible delighting in the same things and feeling pain at the same things, if with all their might they delight in laws that aim at making the city come as close as possible to unity—then no one will ever set down a more correct or better definition than this of what constitutes the extreme as regards virtue. Such a city is inhabited,

presumably, by gods or children of gods (more than one), and they dwell in gladness, leading such a life. Therefore one should not look elsewhere for the model, at any rate, of a political regime, but should hold on to this and seek with all one's might the regime that comes as close as possible to such a regime. If the regime we've been dealing with now came into being, it would be, in a way, the nearest to immortality and second in point of unity. The third we will elaborate next after these, if the god is willing.

Now then what do we say this regime is and how do we say it comes to be such? First, let them divide up the land and the households, and not farm in common, since such a thing would be too demanding for the birth, nurture, and education that have now been specified. However, the division of lands is to be understood in something like the following way: each shareholder must consider his share to be at the same time the common property of the whole city, and must cherish his land, as a part of the fatherland, more than children cherish their mother; he must consider the land as a goddess who is mistress of mortals. And he should have the same under- standing of the native gods and demons.

In order that these arrangements remain fixed for all the rest of time, the following must also be understood: the number of hearths we establish now is never to be altered, never to become greater or smaller. To maintain this arrangement firmly through the whole city, let each allotment holder always leave behind only one heir to his household from among his children. The child who is especially dear to him shall become his successor in ministering to the gods of the family and of the city, looking after both the living gods and those who may have reached their end by that time. As for the other children, in families where there are more than one, the females should be given

in marriage according to the law that will be ordained, and the males should be distributed as sons to those citizens who lack sons. Personal likes and dislikes should be followed as closely as possible. If there are some who can find no one who pleases them, or if a surplus of females or males occurs, or on the contrary a deficiency because of a lack of childbirths, there will be a magistracy which we will designate—the greatest and most honored, in fact—which should, after looking into all these things, devise means of assisting those who have too many offspring and those who are lacking, so as to maintain the five thousand forty households always intact insofar as is possible. There are many devices, including ways of preventing birth in those who conceive too many offspring, and, on the contrary, various ways of encouraging and stimulating a greater number of conceptions. The use of honors and dishonors, as well as the encouraging words of elders addressed to young people, can accomplish what we're talking about. Finally, if we're at a complete loss as to how to deal with the inequalities among the five thousand forty; households, if we have an overflow of citizens because of the warmth of feeling among those who live together in house-holds, and can't devise any other way out, there is presumably the old device we've often spoken of: the dispatch of colonists from among those who seem suitable—colonists who will depart as friends leaving friends. If, on the other hand, the opposite dilemma ever occurs, if a flood-wave of disease washes over them, or destructive wars, and through bereavements their number becomes much smaller than the number ordained, then, though they should never voluntarily admit citizens educated in a bastard education, against necessity it is said that even a god is unable to use force.

Let us next assert that our present argument itself is speaking and giving counsel in the following way: "O you

best of all men, never cease to follow nature in honoring similarity and equality and sameness and what has been agreed upon—in number and in every sort of capacity that pertains to noble and good practices. First, guard throughout your whole lives the number that has been stated just now. Moreover, do not! dishonor the well-measured height and magnitude of property that you were allotted at the beginning, by buying and selling it among yourselves. If you do, neither the Lot itself—which made the distribution, and is a god—nor the lawgiver will remain allied with you." He who disobeys this injunction will find first the law set against him, having warned him that he himself chose either to accept the allotment on these conditions or not; that he accepted it, in the first place, on the condition that Earth is sacred to all the gods, and, in addition, that he saw priests and priestesses praying at the first, the second, and the third sacrifices. The law will go on to warn that whoever sells or buys an allotted house or land will suffer penalties appropriate to these circumstances which have been enumerated: to wit, they will engrave the story of the offender on 'cypress tablets stored in temples, there to be read and remembered for the rest of time. They will give responsibility for guarding and executing these provisions to that one of the magistrates who is believed to see the sharpest, so that the transgressions on any occasion will never escape their notice and they will be able to punish anyone who disobeys the law and the god.

The amount of good that the system now being laid down will do for all the cities that follow it (given, in addition, the appropriate arrangements) is, as the ancient proverb has it, forever unknown to the evil man and knowable only by him who has become experienced and decent through habituation. For under such a system great money-making is impossible, and the consequence is that there should not

and cannot be anyone who makes money in any way from illiberal pursuits. No one need seek in any way to accumulate money from the sort of occupation that receives the contemptible epithet “gross vulgarity” and that can distort the character of a free man.

There is another law that is closely linked to all these matters: no one is to be allowed to possess any gold or silver in > any private capacity. There is a need for currency in daily exchange—the money that can scarcely be avoided when dealing with craftsmen, and that is required by all who pay hired help—slaves and foreigners—their wages. For these purposes, we assert that they should possess a kind of coin that carries value among themselves but is valueless among other human beings. The city itself, however, must necessarily possess some money of the sort that is common to the Greeks, for use by army expeditions and by travelers who go abroad among other human beings—ambassadors, for instance, and any other necessary messengers whom the city must send out. For the sake of these things, the city must, on each occasion, possess Greek money. If a private individual is ever compelled to go abroad, let him go, if the magistrates allow it, but if he has any extra foreign money on his return home, let him deposit it with the city and receive back an amount of native currency equal in value. If anyone is caught keeping the illicit currency on his own, let the money be confiscated for the public, and let anyone else who knew of it, but failed to inform, share equally in the curse and blame and additional fine, which is to be an amount not less than the foreign currency that was brought back.

When someone marries or gives away a daughter in marriage, there is to be no dowry whatsoever given or received; moreover, no one should give money to someone he can’t trust, and no money should be lent at interest. Anyone

who has received a loan will be permitted to refuse to pay it back, both interest and principal.

That these are the best practices for a city to follow will be seen by anyone who looks into the matter correctly, always referring back and judging according to the first principle and intention. The intention of the intelligent statesman, we assert, is not that which the many would assert a good legislator should have. They claim he should intend to make the city for which he is benevolently legislating very big and as rich as possible, possessing gold and silver, and ruling over as many people as possible, on land and sea. And they would add that he who legislates correctly, at any rate, should also wish the city to be the best and happiest possible. But of these things some can be achieved and others cannot. The one who orders things should aim at what is possible, and not waste his wishes or his efforts on what is in vain. Now it is almost a necessity that those who become happy also become good—and this he should wish for—but it is impossible that those who become very rich become also good, at least if by "rich" is meant the same thing the many mean. They mean those few human beings who possess the property that is worth the most money—the sort of possessions even some wicked man might have. If this is so, I at least would never agree with them that a rich man becomes truly happy, if he is not also good. But it is impossible for someone to be both unusually good and unusually rich.

"But why?" someone might perhaps ask.

"Because," we would reply, "the gain derived from both just and unjust means is more than twice that derived from just means alone; and he who is willing to spend money neither nobly nor shamefully spends less than half as much as they who are noble and are willing to spend money on noble objects. They who get twice as much and spend twice

as little will never be exceeded in wealth by the one who does the opposite. Now of these men, one is good; the other is not bad so long as he is a miser, but utterly bad otherwise, and never good—as was said just now. The man who makes money both justly and unjustly and who spends it neither justly nor unjustly is rich—so long as he's a miser; but the utterly bad man, since he's mostly not a saver, is very poor. The man who spends on noble things and makes money only from just enterprises would never easily become either unusually rich or very poor. Thus our argument is correct: the very rich are not good, and if they're not good then they're not happy."

The hypothesis that underlies our laws aims at making the people as happy and as friendly to one another as possible. Now citizens don't ever become friends where they have many lawsuits among themselves, and where there are many injustices, but rather where such affairs are as minor and rare as possible. Indeed, we say there should be no gold and silver in the city, nor again big profits made through vulgar occupations, or usury, or other sorts of shameful breeding. There; should be just the things that farming gives and yields, and ¦ only as much of that as will not compel one because of moneymaking to neglect those things which money is by nature intended to serve—namely, the soul and the body (and even these, when they lack gymnastics and the rest of education, would never become worthy of mention). That, indeed, is why we have said more than once that the pursuit of money ranks last in the scale of honor. Of the total of three things that every human being is serious about, the serious and correct caring for money ranks last and third, for the body somewhere in the middle, and for the soul first. And in the case of the regime we are now elaborating, the legislation has been correct if honors are assigned according to this scale. But if one of the laws that

will be laid down in the future there should show greater honor to health than to moderation, in the city, or should honor wealth above health and being moderate, it will reveal that it has not been correctly formulated. This, then, is what the lawgiver must repeatedly ask himself: "What is it that I want?" and, "Am I obtaining this or am I straying from the goal?" If he does this he may perhaps get through with his legislation, and relieve others of the task as well—but there is not a single other way that he ever will.

Now the main who receives one of the land allotments is to keep it, we declare, on the conditions that we've described. It would surely have been a fine thing if each one could have entered the colony possessing an equal amount of everything else as well; but since that is impossible, and one will arrive with more money and another with less, it follows that for many reasons, and for the sake of equality of opportunities in the city, there must be unequal classes, so that when it comes to offices, revenues, and distributions, the honor that is due to each person will depend not only on the virtue of his ancestors and himself, and the strength and handsomeness of bodies, but also on the way one uses money or poverty. Quarrels will be avoided because honors and offices will be distributed as equally as possible on the basis of proportional inequality. For these reasons, four classes should be created, according to the amount of property: a First, a Second, a Third, and a Fourth—or they may be known by some other names, both when individuals stay in the same class and when they pass over each other into the appropriate class, by becoming richer from being poor or by becoming poor from being rich.

Following upon these things, I at least would set down a law whose outline is as follows. We assert that if (as we presume) the city must avoid the greatest illness, which has been more correctly termed "civil war" than "faction," then

neither harsh poverty nor wealth should exist among any of the citizens. For both these conditions breed both civil war and faction. It follows, therefore, that the lawgiver must announce a limit for; both conditions. So let the limit of poverty be the value of the ¦ allotment, which must be maintained, and which no magistrate, and none of the others who desires to be honored for! virtue, should ever allow to be diminished in the case of anyone. Taking this as the measure, the lawgiver will allow citizens to acquire twice again, and three times again, and up to four times again this amount. But if anyone acquires more than four times this amount—by finding something or by being given something, or by money-making, or some other such stroke of luck—let him dedicate the surplus to the city and to the gods who possess the city. Thus he would attain a good name and avoid all penalty. If, however, someone disobeys this law, then anyone who wishes can denounce him and take half the surplus, while the guilty party will pay an equal amount from his own property, and give the other half to the gods. Everything that anyone possesses apart from the original allotment must be clearly recorded in books kept by guardian-officials whom the law will designate, so that all lawsuits over property may proceed easily and with matters made very dear.

After this the first' thing to be done is to build the city as close to the center of the territory as possible, having chosen a spot which has also those other advantages for the city that can without difficulty be understood and enumerated. Then after these things there should be a division into twelve parts. First a sanctuary should be set up to Hestia, Zeus, and Athena, called the "acropolis," and surrounded with a circular wall. From there the twelve parts should radiate, dividing the city itself as well as the whole territory. The twelve parts should be equal, in the sense that the ones

where the earth is good should be smaller and the ones where it is worse larger. There should be a division into five thousand forty allotments, but each of these should be divided in two, and the two parts put together to constitute an allotment, one part nearer and one part farther away. The part closest to the city should be paired with the part closest to the borders to make one allotment, and the second-closest to the city paired with the second-closest to the borders, and so on with all the rest. They should mingle the sterility and virtue of the soil in these double plots, using the device just mentioned: by assigning plots of larger and smaller size, the shares should be made equal. The men should also be distributed into twelve parts, in such a manner as to make the twelve parts as equal as possible with respect to the rest of their property—all having been duly recorded. And then, after this, they should give the twelve parts to the twelve gods as allotments, naming and sanctifying each after the god to whom it has been allotted, and calling the part a "tribe." The twelve parts of the city are to be divided just as the rest of the country was. Each individual is to have two houses, one near the center and the other near the border. Thus the settlement will be completed.

Yet we must by all means keep in mind something like the following: the things that have just been described may never all coincide with such opportune circumstances as would allow all of them to come to pass exactly the way the argument has indicated. There may not be found men who will live together in such a fashion without complaint, who will tolerate the stated and fixed limits on money throughout their whole lives, and the childbirth policies we've ordained for each person, or who will live deprived of gold and the other things the lawgiver must clearly proscribe according to what's been said now. They may not accept a territory and city such as he's described, with dwellings located at the

center and all around; in fact, he's been talking in every respect almost as if he were telling dreams, or as if he were molding a city and citizens from wax. In one way it wasn't bad to talk that way, but he has to remind himself of things such as the following. Once again, then, the lawgiver expresses to us the following:

"Friends, you shouldn't suppose that in the course of this discussion I have overlooked the fact that what has just been said is in a way true. But I think that when future courses of action are being considered, the most just thing to do in each case is this: he who presents the model of what should be attempted should depart in no way from what is most noble and most true; but, when some aspect of these things turns out to be impossible for a fellow, he should steer away and not do it. Instead, he should contrive to bring about whatever is the closest to this from among the things that remain, and by nature the most akin from among the things that are appropriate to do. He should allow the lawgiver to complete things according to his wish; then, when that is done, he should investigate in common with him to see which part of what he has described is expedient and which part of the legislation he has described is too difficult. For a craftsman of even the meanest thing, who's going to be worth anything, must be everywhere consistent in his activity, I suppose."

Now, after the division into twelve parts has become accepted opinion, one should with an eager spirit look to see in what way each of the twelve parts (which will contain within themselves very many possible subdivisions) may be clearly subdivided, and then how those subdivisions may be further subdivided in successive stages until a division into five thousand forty parts is reached. In this way clans and districts and villages will be created, as well as military units and marching arrangements, and also currency units, dry

and liquid measures, and weights: all of these should be so ordained by law as to be convertible and consonant with one another. In addition, the fear of appearing to speak in a petty way should not frighten one from ordering that all the tools they possess be of standard sizes; the general principle one should hold to is that the divisions and variations of numbers are useful for everything—both the variations that exist within numbers themselves and also those that exist in plane and solid figures, in sounds, and in motions (both straight up-and-down and circular revolution). With a view to all these things, the law-giver must order all the citizens to do all in their power to avoid abandoning this sort of coherence. For in household management, and in the political regime, and in all the arts, there is no single part of education that has as much power as the study of numbers. Most important of all, it awakens him who is by nature sleepy and unlearned, giving him ease of learning, memory, and sharpness, and thus making him surpass his own nature by a divine art. All these branches of education would be fine and fitting then—so long as one employs other laws and practices to take illiberality and the love of money away from the souls of those who are going to be competent in, and benefit from, the studies. Otherwise, before one knows it, one will have created a capacity for what is called mischief-making rather than wisdom, similar to what can now be seen among the Egyptians, the Phoenicians, and many other nations, who are formed by a lack of freedom in their other practices and possessions—either because they had a miserable lawgiver who gave them such ways, or because harsh luck befell them, or because of some other such natural thing.

For, Megillus and Kleinias, we mustn't overlook the fact that some places differ from one another in their tendency to breed better and worse human beings, and such factors

shouldn't be defied when one makes laws. All sorts of winds and different exposures to the sun can presumably make places unfavorable or favorable, as can the local waters, and the type of plants in the earth. The latter can provide better or worse nourishment not only for the bodies but also for the souls—to no less degree and in all the similar respects. But of all these places, those territories which would differ the most would be those that have some divine presence in the winds and are under the care of demons, and hence receive those who come to settle each time either graciously or in the opposite way. An intelligent lawgiver, at least, will inquire about these places as closely as a human being can in such matters, in order to try to formulate laws that are appropriate. That's what you must do as well, Kleinias: when you're about to settle the territory, you must first turn your attention to such matters.

Clinias/ What you say is in every way fine, Athenian stranger, and that's what I must do.

Book 6.

Athenian Stranger/ At this point—after, that is, all the things that have just been discussed—almost your next task would be the establishment of offices for the city.

Clinias/ Yes, that is surely so.

Athenian Stranger/ There happen to be these two fundamental parts to the ordering of a political regime: first, there's the establishment of ruling offices and officeholders, including the decision as to how many there should be and how they should be selected; then, the laws must be given to each of the offices, and this, again, includes the decision as to what kind of laws there'll be, how many, and which ones would be fitting for each office.

But let's pause a bit before we make the choice, because there's something pertinent that we should say about it.

Clinias/ What's that?

Athenian Stranger/ The following. Presumably it's clear to everyone that although the giving of laws is a grand deed, still, even where a city is well equipped; if the magistrates established to look after the well-formulated laws were unfit, then not only would the laws no longer be well founded, and the situation most ridiculous, but those very laws would be likely to bring the greatest harm and ruin to cities.

Clinias/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, let's recognize this very possibility in the case of your present regime and city, my friend. For you see that, in the first place, if the powers of office are to go to the correct persons, they and their families must each have been given a sufficient test—from the time they were children until the time they are selected. Then again, those who are to do the selecting should be reared in lawful habits, and well educated in the capacity of distinguishing correctly between the candidates, accepting

or rejecting them as they deserve. Now how could people who are newly gotten together, and unknown to one another, and also uneducated, ever be able to make a blame-less selection of officials?

Clinias/ It's unlikely that they ever could.

Athenian Stranger/ Nevertheless, a contest, as they claim, doesn't tolerate excuses at all; you, and I too, must now accomplish this task. For, as you've asserted just now, the ten of you have made a promise to the Cretan nation that you will, with a firm spirit, carry out a founding; and I have promised to help you, with the mythic discourse we're now involved in. And surely when I'm telling a myth I wouldn't voluntarily leave it unfinished. Because if it wandered around like that, without a head, it would appear shapeless!

Clinias/ You've made your point very well, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Not only have I made it, but I'll act on it, as far as I'm able.

Clinias/ Let's by all means do as we say.

Athenian Stranger/ So be it, if the god is willing and if we can overcome old age sufficiently.

Clinias/ Well, it's likely that he's willing.

Athenian Stranger/ That is likely. Following him, let's start with this observation.

Clinias/ Which?

Athenian Stranger/ Observe how much courage and willingness to take risks will be needed, to found our city in the present circumstances.

Clinias/ Why? What exactly do you have in view in making this remark now?

Athenian Stranger/ The fact that we are confidently legislating for men who lack experience, without any fears as to how they'll ever accept the laws that are now being laid

down. After all, Kleinias, this much at least is obvious to almost everyone, even to someone who isn't very wise: they won't easily, at any rate, accept any of them at the beginning. What is needed is for us to survive, somehow, for a long enough time so that the children who have grown up tasting the laws from an early age, having been reared under them and having become sufficiently accustomed to them, have taken part in the selection of magistrates for the whole city. If in some way, by some device, what we're now describing could come to pass correctly, I at least think that the city that had been given such a childhood training would, after this period of time, remain very stable.

Clinias/ That's a reasonable supposition, certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's see now if we couldn't devise some adequate way of dealing with this problem, along the following lines:

For I assert, Kleinias, that the Knossians must, more than any of the other Cretans, not only remove any obstacles to the profanation of the territory that is being settled, but also strain with all their might to insure that the first rulers are the safest and best possible. The other magistrates present a less difficult task, but it is very necessary that your first Guardians of the Laws be chosen with total seriousness.

Clinias/ So what procedure and plan can we find for this task?

Athenian Stranger/ The following:

"I assert, O children of the Cretans, that the Knossians must, because they take precedence of age among the many cities, join with those who are arriving at this settlement in selecting, from among themselves and those, a total of thirty-seven men, nineteen of whom are to be chosen from the colonists and the rest from Knossos itself."

The Knossians should give these men to your city, and should make you yourself a citizen of this colony and one of the eighteen—either by persuading you or compelling you, with a measured amount of force.

Clinias/ And why then don't you and Megillus take part in our regime, stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ Kleinias, Athens thinks big—as does Sparta. And both are far away, while for you it is convenient, in every way. The same holds for the other founders, to whom what was just now said about you also applies.

Let this be the description of the most equitable solution, given our present conditions; after a certain time has passed, if the regime lasts, let the method of selecting them be some such thing as the following:

Eligibility to share in the selection of the magistrates is to be extended to all who possess heavy weapons, cavalry or infantry, as well as to those who have taken part in war as long as the capacity of their age allowed. The selection is to be carried out in the temple which the city considers most honorable. Each is to carry to the altar of the god a little tablet on which he has written the name of the candidate, his father's name, his tribe's name, and the name of the district where the candidate resides. Adjacent, each is to write his own name in the same way. Then, during a period of not less than thirty days, anyone who wishes may remove and set out in the marketplace any of the written tablets that doesn't please him. From the tablets that have thus been judged suitable, the magistrates are to take the first three hundred and display them for the whole city to see; from these the city is to select again, in the same way, each carrying up whomever he prefers. After this second round they are to display to everybody again the one hundred preferred names. In the third round, anyone who wishes

should carry up his preference from among the hundred, by walking between the parts of a sacrificial animal. The thirty-seven who receive the most votes, after being scrutinized, are to be appointed to office.

Now who is there, Kleinias and Megillus, who will set up all these things concerning the offices and their scrutinies in our city? Don't we recognize that there must necessarily be such persons in cities that are being thus yoked together for the first time? And yet who would it be, before there are any magistrates? In one way or another, they must be there, and they can't be men of little capacity, but of the highest possible. For as the proverbs have it, "the beginning is half the whole deed," and we all praise a noble beginning, at least, on every occasion; in fact, in my view, the beginning is more than half, and no one has bestowed enough praise on the beginning that is noble.

Clinias/ What you say is very correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's not, then, knowingly pass by the problem without discussion, leaving completely unclarified the manner in which we ourselves will deal with it. Now I for my part can see no way of dealing with it at all, except to make one statement that in the present situation is both necessary and useful.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ I assert that this city we are about to found has no "father" or "mother" except the very city that is doing the founding. I say this without ignoring the fact that many colonies have had and will have differences, sometimes frequent, with those who colonized them. But at present it is just like a child: even if someday in the future a difference arises with its parents, in the present, at least, while it lacks education, it cherishes and is cherished by the parents, and always flees to its own people to find those who

alone are allies by necessity. These are the ties that I assert will now readily bind the Knossians to the young city (because they care for it) and the young city to Knossos. So I repeat what I said just a moment ago (it doesn't hurt to repeat the noble, at least, a second time): the Knossians should share in supervising all these things, by choosing not less than one hundred men from those who have arrived at the colony, selecting the oldest and the best men they can. Then there should be another one hundred from the Knossians themselves. These are the men I assert should go to the new city and together see to it that the magistrates are installed according to the laws, and, after being installed, scrutinized. Once these things are accomplished, the Knossians should go dwell in Knossos and the young city should try by itself to find its own safety and good fortune.

The thirty-seven who are elected, now and in all the rest of time, are to be chosen by us to do the following: first they are to stand as guards over the laws; then in addition, they are to be the guards of the written records in which each individual has written down for the rulers the amount of his property (except each person of the highest class may omit up to four minas, the second class three minas, the third class two! minas, and the fourth class a mina). If it becomes evident that someone possesses something other than this and what has been written, then the whole such amount is to be turned over to the public; in addition, anyone who wishes may bring a judicial action against the culprit, and if he is convicted of holding the laws in contempt for the sake of gain, the judicial procedure shall be neither noble nor illustrious, but shameful. So let anyone who wishes accuse him of shameful gain and take him to trial before the Guardians of the Laws. If the defendant loses, he is to have no share in common property, and whenever some division is made by the city, he is to go without a share—save for his

original allotment. Moreover, as long as he lives his guilt is to be written down where anyone who; wishes may read about it.

Let a Guardian of the Laws rule for no more than twenty years, and let the minimum age for election be fifty years. If a man is sixty when elected, let him rule only ten years, and so on, according to this principle; if someone lives beyond seventy he is not to think that he can remain among these magistrates, ruling in such a high office.

Let these then be stated as the three duties of the Guardians of the Laws. As the laws unfold further, each law will enlarge upon the responsibilities that have now been assigned to these men.

At this point we may move on to discuss the selection of the other magistrates. Next after these, the Generals should be chosen, as well as those who are like assistants to them during wartime—Cavalry Commanders, Tribe Commanders, and those officers who supervise the marching order of the infantry tribes, whom it would be fitting to call by the very same name the many apply to them, "Rank Commanders."

Of these, as regards the Generals, let the Guardians of the Laws make up a list of nominees drawn from this city itself, and from these nominees let all who took a share in war when they were of the proper age, or who are now ready to do so, choose. (If someone thinks there is someone who hasn't been nominated who is better than someone who was nominated, let him name his nominee and the one he thinks should be replaced, and, swearing an oath, let him nominate the rival candidate. Then let whichever of the two wins in a vote by show of hands be placed on the election list.) The three who win the most votes by show of hands are to be made Generals and supervisors of the affairs of war—after having undergone the same scrutiny as the Guardians of the

Laws. Let the elected Generals nominate their own twelve Rank Commanders, a Rank Commander for each tribe, and let there be the same procedure for counter-proposals in the case of the Rank Commanders as there was for the Generals, the same vote by show of hands, and the same scrutiny.

For the present, since Presidents and Council are not yet selected, it will be the Guardians of the Laws who will call together this public meeting, convening it in a place that is as sacred and spacious as possible, and separating off the heavily-armed infantry, the cavalry, and, in a third section next to these, the whole auxiliary military force. Let everyone participate in the show of hands by which the Generals and the Cavalry Commanders are elected, but let those who bear shields elect the Rank Commanders, while the entire cavalry should choose the subordinate Tribe Commanders. The leaders of the lightly-armed troops, or archers, or any other auxiliaries, the Generals should themselves appoint.

We have remaining the appointment of the Cavalry Commanders. Let these be nominated by the same people who nominated the Generals, and let the election and the procedure for counter-proposals also be the same as it was for the Generals, but the cavalry should elect by show of hands while the infantry look on, and the two who receive the most votes by show of hands should become leaders of all the cavalry.

Two recounts after disputed votes by show of hands are allowed; if somebody challenges the count on the third showing of hands the decision will rest with those who are responsible for making the count of hands on each occasion.

The Council is to number thirty twelves, for three hundred sixty would be an appropriate number for the subdivisions. By dividing the number into four parts of ninety each, there will be ninety councilmen elected from

each of the classes. The first vote will be for men from the highest class, and all are to be compelled to vote: he who doesn't obey must pay the appointed fine. When the voting is completed, the names voted for are to be recorded. Then, on the next day, they are to vote for men from the second class according to the same procedures as on the day before. On the third day anyone who wishes may vote for men from the third class; while the upper three classes are to be compelled to vote, anyone who belongs to the fourth and lowest class and doesn't wish to vote is to be let off free of any fine. On the fourth day everyone is to vote for men from the fourth and lowest class, but there is to be no fine for anyone from the third or fourth class who doesn't wish to vote, while anyone belonging to the second and first classes who fails to vote must pay a fine. In the case of someone from the second class, it will be triple the first fine and, in the case of someone from the first class, quadruple. On the fifth day the magistrates will display the recorded names for all the citizens to see, and every man must vote on this list or pay the first fine. One hundred eighty are to be elected from each class; half of these are then to be chosen by lot, and, after being scrutinized, these are to be the Councilmen for the year.

This selection procedure would strike a mean between a monarchic and a democratic regime, which is the mean the regime should always aim for. For slaves and masters would never become friends, nor would lowly types and serious gentlemen, if they were both held equal when it comes to honors. Both these situations fill regimes with civil strife; equal rewards would become unequal if they were distributed to men who are unequal, unless the distribution struck a proper measure. The ancient pronouncement is true, that "equality produces friendship": the saying is both very correct and graceful. But just whatever is the equality

that has this effect? Because this is not very clear, we get into a lot of trouble!

For there are two equalities, the same in name, but in many respects almost diametrically opposed in deed. Every city and every lawgiver is competent to assign honors according to the other sort—the equality that consists in measure and weight and number—and by the use of the lot applies it in distributions. But it's not so easy for everyone to discern the truest and best equality. For it is the judgment that belongs to Zeus, and it assists human beings only to a small degree, on each occasion; still, every bit of assistance it does give to cities or private individuals brings all the good things. By distributing more to what is greater and smaller amounts to what is lesser, it gives due measure to each according to their nature: this includes greater honors always to those who are greater as regards virtue, and what is fitting—in due proportion—to those who are just the opposite as regards virtue and education. Presumably this is just what constitutes for us political justice. It is for this that we should now strive, and to this equality that we should now look, Kleinias, to found the city that is now growing. The same holds in the case of another city someone might found sometime: it is to this that one should look while giving laws, not to the tyranny of a few, or of one, or some rule by the populace, but always to justice. And this is what has just been described—the natural equality given on each occasion to unequal men.

Nonetheless, necessity compels every city to blur sometimes the distinction between these two, if it is to avoid partaking of civil war in some of its parts. For equity and forgiveness, whenever they are applied, are always enfeeblements of the perfection and exactness that belong to strict justice. Because of the discontent of the many they are compelled to make use of the equality of the lot, but when

they do, they should pray both to the god and to good luck to correct the lot in the direction of what is most just. Thus, of necessity, both equalities ought to be employed, though the type that depends on chance as rarely as possible. A city that is going to last is compelled, for these reasons, to do things this way, my friends.

Now just as a ship sailing at sea must have a watch at all times both day and night, so a city, driven by the waves of other cities and dwelling in danger of being taken over by all sorts of conspiracies, needs magistrates who rule in uninterrupted succession through the day until nightfall and through the night until daybreak, guards who always pass the watch on to guards without a break. It can never be the business of a large number to keep a sharp watch in this way; most of the time all but a few of the Councilmen must of necessity be allowed to stay at their own private business and attend to their own domestic affairs. But by dividing the Council into twelve parts corresponding to the twelve months, each single part can stand guard for one month, always ready to meet with someone coming from abroad or from within the city itself, who wants to give information or make inquiries about the replies it is fitting for a city to make other cities and about the answers it is fitting for it to receive when it asks others. They will also be ready to contend at any time with the innovations that are constantly wont to occur in cities everywhere: if possible they'll forestall them, but if they can't, they will at least see to it that the city knows about them as soon as possible, and can cure the sickness. That is why this presiding part of the city must always have the authority to convoke and dissolve the public meetings—both those that meet regularly according to the laws and those the city needs on sudden notice. Each twelfth part of the Council is to have charge of ordering all these things, and is to be at rest during eleven

parts of the year; at all times this part of the Council is to share with the other officials in maintaining this guard over these matters throughout the city.

Thus the things of the city would be arranged in due measure; but what supervision and what order is there to be in all the rest of the territory? Now that the whole city and the whole land have been divided into twelve parts, shouldn't some supervisors be appointed for the streets of the city itself, the houses, the buildings, the harbors, the marketplaces, and the fountains—as well as the sanctuaries, temples, and all such things?

Clinias/ How else?

Athenian Stranger/ For the temples, let's say that there should be Temple Custodians as well as Priests and Priestesses. For the roads and buildings, and the maintenance of order around such places—to prevent the humans from committing injustices and to make the rest of the beasts behave, in the city itself and in the suburbs, in a manner that befits cities—three forms of officials must be selected: one, that will be called "City Regulators," to take care of the things just mentioned; another, the "Market Regulators," to keep order in the markets; then, if there are Priests and Priestesses who hold hereditary priesthoods, they shouldn't be changed, but if, as is likely in such matters with people who are being settled together for the first time, there are none or only a few set up, then Priests and Priestesses should be established to be the Temple Custodians for the gods who do not already have some.

Of all these officials, some should be elected and others chosen by lot, and for the sake of friendship we should mix individuals who belong to the populace with those who are not of the populace in each land and city, so that the place would be as much as possible of the same mind.

What pertains to the Priests should be turned over to the god himself so that what pleases him comes to pass: their choice should be given to the divine chance of the lottery, with the proviso that he who obtains the lot each time is to be scrutinized to make sure first that he is sound and of legitimate birth, and then that he comes from households that are as nearly unpolluted as possible—that he and his father and mother have lived without any pollution from homicide or any of the other crimes that offend in such ways against the divine. They should get their laws regulating all the divine things from Delphi, and establish Interpreters of them who will explain how to use them. Each Priesthood should be held for one year and no longer, and no one who is less than sixty years of age should be considered qualified to administer the divine things for us, in accordance with the sacred laws. Let these same legal customs apply to the Priestesses.

For the Interpreters: thrice the four tribes are to elect four, each of whom is to come from among themselves; the three who receive the most votes are to be scrutinized; then the nine are to be sent to Delphi, where one is to be chosen from each triad. The scrutiny and the age limit are to be the same in their case as for the Priests. These Interpreters are to serve for life, and when one passes away a replacement will be elected by the four tribes to whom the vacancy belongs.

The Treasurers in charge of the sacred funds in each of the temples, as well as of the sanctuaries and their harvests and revenues, are to be elected from the highest property class—three for the largest temples, two for the smaller, and one for the most elegant little ones. The election and scrutiny of these officials are to be the same as they were for the Generals. So let these be the arrangements for the sacred things.

To the extent of our power, nothing is to be unguarded. There are these guards for the city: the supervisory Generals, the Rank Commanders, the Cavalry Commanders, the Tribe Commanders, and the Presidents, as well as the City Regulators and the Market Regulators (once we have them adequately elected and installed). All the rest of the land should be guarded in the following ways:

Since our entire territory has been divided into twelve sections that are as close to being equal as they can be, let one tribe be assigned by lot to each section for the period of a year. The tribe is to supply five men who will be like Field Regulators or Officers of the Guard, and each [of the] five is to choose from their tribe twelve young men not less than twenty-five nor more than thirty years of age. These contingents should be given by lot the parts of the land, one part to each month, so that all will become experienced and knowledgeable about the whole country. The term of the office and guard duty will be two years for both guards and officers. Starting from the parts they are allotted first—the districts of the land, that is—the Officers of the Guard should always lead them each month to the next district on the right in a circle (on the right meaning toward the dawn). When one year's circuit has been completed and they are to begin the second year, in order to make as many of the guards as possible experienced with the land during more than one season of the year, in order that as many as possible not only know the land but also what goes on in each area in each season, the leaders should then lead them back around, always changing to the district on the left, until they have completed the second year. In the third year other Field Regulators or Officers of the Guard should be chosen, sets of five to supervise the sets of twelve.

During their periods of service they are to look after each district in something like the following way. First, to make

the land as well defended as possible against enemies, they'll dig ditches wherever they're needed, and trenches, and do all they can with fortifications to check those who would try in any way to do harm to the land and property. They can employ the beasts of burden and domestic servants in each district in these tasks, using the former and supervising the latter, though insofar as they can, they should requisition them when they are not being used in their domestic tasks. They should make every place difficult of access for enemies but as easily accessible as possible for friends—for humans, and for beasts of burden and herds as well—by taking care that each of the roads be kept as smooth as possible. To prevent the water Zeus sends from doing evil to the land, and instead to make it beneficial, as it flows down from the heights into the hollow-like gulleys in the mountains, they can prevent the runoff with fortifications and ditches, thus containing and absorbing the water from Zeus, and thereby providing streams and springs for the lower fields and all the other areas. Thus they'll furnish the driest areas with plenty of water and good water. They should adorn the watering holes in a more becoming way, whether they be rivers or springs, with shrubbery and buildings, and by collecting the streams in pipes make sure there is an abundant supply; and if any sacred grove or sanctuary is located nearby they should adorn it with water in every season, introducing streams into the very temples of the gods. Everywhere in such places the young men should maintain gymnasia for themselves and for the old men as well, providing hot baths for the old and maintaining an abundant supply of seasoned, dry wood; thus they should give a cheerful welcome to those worn out with sicknesses and those whose bodies are weary from the farmer's toils. Surely this does more good than a welcome from some doctor who isn't very wise. These and all such activities would bring adornment

and benefit to the areas while providing a kind of play that is not at all lacking in grace.

Their serious business in these matters is to be the following. Each group of sixty is to guard its district not only against enemies but also against those who profess to be friends. If a slave or a free man does an injustice to a neighbor or any of the rest of the citizens, they should be judges for the man who claims to have been done the injustice. For small matters the five officers themselves should sit in judgment; for greater matters (up to three minas in damages claimed by one man against another), they should sit together with the twelve, and the seventeen should be judges.

But no judge or magistrate shall sit in judgment and perform his ruling functions without being subject to an audit; the only exceptions are those quasi-regal judges of last appeal. In particular, if these Field Regulators are in some way insolent in their treatment of those they supervise—if they levy unequal assessments, if they try to take and carry something from the farms without getting permission, if they accept something given as a bribe, if they assign unjust penalties—then, for being susceptible to flatterers, they are to be held in ill repute throughout the entire city, and for the other sorts of injustice they commit against those in the district, if the damage claimed is one mina or less, they should voluntarily submit to be tried by a jury of the villagers and neighbors; if the damages claimed for the injustices on any occasion are more, or if, where the damages are less, the accused are unwilling to submit (because they trust they'll flee prosecution by means of the monthly rotation that always takes them out of a district), then the party done the injustice is to bring charges concerning these matters in the common courts: if he wins,

let him exact double from the one who fled and was unwilling to undergo retribution voluntarily.

During their two years' service the Officers and Field Regulators will live in some such way as follows. First, there will be common meals in each of the districts, where all must dine together. If anyone is absent from a common meal on any day, or if anyone spends a night sleeping somewhere else, without being ordered to do so by the Officers or compelled by some dire necessity that befalls him, and if the five decide to take notice of this lapse and post his name in writing in the marketplace as a deserter from the guard, then he is to be held in ill repute, as one who betrayed his share in the regime. Moreover, let anyone Whom he encounters and who wishes punish him with blows, without retribution. If someone among the Officers themselves does such a thing, he must come under the purview of all sixty; if one of these perceives and learns of such delinquency but fails to prosecute, let him be punished under the same laws that apply to the young—only more. He is to lose all eligibility to serve in any office that pertains to the young. The Guardians of the Laws are to keep a precise watch over these matters, to prevent his obtaining such office, or, if he should obtain one, to see to it that he gets the punishment he deserves.

Indeed, every real man must understand that no human being would ever-become a praiseworthy master unless he has been a slave, and that one should be more attentive to the' adornment that comes from a noble enslavement than that which comes from a noble rule. The first enslavement is to the laws (for this is really an enslavement to the gods), and the next is that of the young to their elders at all times, and also to those who have lived honorable lives.

In the next place, someone who has served his two years among the Field Regulators should have developed a taste for a daily ration of humble and uncooked food. For once the

sets of twelve have been chosen and put together with the sets of five, they must resolve that since they themselves are like domestic servants they will not have their own domestic servants and slaves; they won't use the servants belonging to the other farmers and villagers for private tasks, but only for public tasks. When it comes to the rest, they must resolve that they are going to live by their own efforts and as their own servants. In addition, they are to scout over the whole country with their heavy weapons, summer and winter, so as constantly to guard and get to know all the districts. It's likely that no learning they pursue is more important than that which gives all of them accurate knowledge of their own country. It's for this reason, as much as for the rest of the pleasure and benefit such activities bring to everyone, that a young man should go in for hunting with hounds and the rest of hunting. Now these men—they and their functions—can be called the Secret Service, or the Field Regulators, or whatever one likes: whatever it's called, this is the service that every real man, everyone who's going to defend his city adequately, should serve in, with, an eager spirit and to the best of his ability.

Next in order in our selection of rulers was to be the selection of the Market Regulators and City Regulators. Following the sixty Field Regulators would be three City Regulators, who will divide the twelve parts of the city three ways. Imitating those others, they should attend to the city roads and to the thoroughfares coming into the city at each point from the country, as well as to the buildings, watching to see that all are constructed and maintained according to law. They should also attend to the water, seeing to it that the well-tended waters sent in and turned over to them by the Guards are conducted in sufficient amounts and in a pure condition to the fountains, so as to adorn and benefit the city.

These too should have the capacity and the leisure to look after the common things. That is why, for City Regulator, every man may nominate anyone he wishes from the highest class: then they are to vote by a show of hands and determine the six who have the most votes. Those who are responsible for drawings should select three of the six by lot; when these three have passed the scrutiny they are to rule according to the laws that have been assigned to them.

Next after these come the Market Regulators, five of whom are to be chosen from the second and first classes; in other respects the election procedure is to be the same as it was for the City Regulators. When the nominees are reduced to ten by voting with a show of hands, five are to be chosen by lot; when these have passed the scrutiny they are to be proclaimed magistrates.

Everyone must participate in the vote by show of hands, and this applies to every office. Anyone unwilling to do so, if he is reported to the magistrates, should be fined fifty; drachmas—besides getting the reputation of being a bad fellow. Anyone who wishes may attend the assembly and the public meetings, but it should be compulsory for the second and first classes. If any of them is absent from the meetings he is to be fined ten drachmas. Attendance will not be compulsory for the third and fourth classes; unless some necessity should compel the magistrates to announce that all must attend, a member of these classes who is absent will incur no penalty.

As for the Market Regulators, they are to keep order in the marketplace as the laws direct and look after the temples and fountains in the vicinity of the marketplace, seeing to it that no one does any injustice. They are to punish anyone committing injustice—with blows and bondage if he is a slave or stranger, while if it is one of the native inhabitants who is disorderly concerning such things, they should

themselves wield the judging authority where the monetary fine involved is one hundred drachmas or less; for fines up to an amount twice this much, they should pass judgment and penalize the unjust offender together with the City Regulators. Let the City Regulators employ the same penalties and punishments in their own official jurisdiction: where the fine is one mina or less, let them inflict the penalty themselves, and where it is up to twice this amount, let them act together with the Market Regulators.

After this it would be fitting to establish magistrates for music and gymnastics. There should be two sets of each kind of official: some for education and some for contests. By "education" the law means to say those officials charged with looking after the gymnasia and schools, supervising their orderliness and the education given in them, and also the attendance and housing of the male and female youths. By "contests" the law means those who award prizes to athletes in gymnastic events and concerning music. These should again be divided into two sets: some for music and others for contests. In contests the same men can be judges, whether the competition be among human beings or horses. But in music it would be fitting that those who award prizes to solo singing and imitation—such as rhapsodes, kitharists, aulists, and all such—should be different from those who award prizes to choral singing.

First, I suppose, magistrates should be chosen to judge the play of the choruses of children, men, and young women, which consists of dances and the whole ordered arrangement that is music. One magistrate is enough for these things; he should be not less than forty years of age. And one magistrate not less than thirty years of age will suffice for solo singing: he will perform the function of Director and will judge adequately among the competitors. The magistrate who presides over and arranges the choruses

should be selected in some such manner as the following. Those who are devoted to such pursuits should go to a public meeting. If they don't go, they are to be penalized: the Guardians of the Laws will be judges of this. The rest will not be required to attend this meeting if they do not wish to. The elector should nominate from among those who have experience, and in the scrutiny, the one issue about which there should be favorable and unfavorable statements is whether the one who has won the draw lacks or possesses experience. Of the ten who receive the most votes by show of hands, one is to be selected by lot, and after being scrutinized, is to rule for a year over the choruses, according to law. With the same procedures, and in the same way as these, let one who wins the draw rule for that year over those who enter competitions in solo singing and singing to aulos accompaniment, after handing over to the other judges the decision as to the fitness for office of he who wins the draw.

Next, those who award the prizes at gymnastic contests of horses and human beings should be chosen from the third and second classes. The top three classes are to be required to participate in the election, but the lowest class may absent itself without penalty. Let three be chosen by lot from twenty who have been selected by a show of hands, and let the three out of twenty who win the draw be installed after having received a ratifying vote from those who conduct the scrutiny.

If anyone fails to pass the scrutiny in any appointment to, or examination for office, let others be selected instead, by repeating the same procedures and the same scrutiny.

There remains, for the affairs we mentioned, another office—that of Supervisor of Education in general for females and males. Let there be for these one official under the laws, a man not less than fifty years of age, who is a father of legitimate children—of sons and daughters both, if possible,

but if not, of either. He who is judged preeminent, and the person who so judges him, must bear in mind that this office is by far the greatest of the highest offices in the city. For in everything that grows the initial sprouting, if nobly directed, has a sovereign influence in bringing about the perfection in virtue that befits the thing's own nature. This holds for the other growing things, and for animals—tame, wild, and human. The human being, we assert, is tame; nevertheless, though when it happens upon a correct education and lucky nature, it is wont to become the most divine and tamest animal, still, when its upbringing is inadequate or ignoble, it is the most savage of the things that the earth makes grow. This is why the lawgiver must not allow the upbringing of children to become something secondary or incidental, and since the one who is going to supervise them should begin by being chosen in a fine way, the lawgiver should do all he possibly can to insure that he provides them with a supervisor to direct them who is the best person in the city, in every respect. So all magistrates except the Council and the Presidents are to go to the temple of Apollo, there to vote by secret ballot for that man among the Guardians of the Laws who each believes would most nobly rule over educational affairs. Whoever receives the most votes is to be scrutinized by the other magistrates who elected him, with the exception of the Guardians of the Laws. He is to rule for five years, and at the sixth year another is to be chosen for this office in the same way.

If someone who rules in a public office should die with more than thirty days remaining in his term of office, another should be appointed to the office, according to the same procedures and by the individuals to whom this responsibility is appropriate. And if someone who is a guardian of orphans should die, the appropriate individuals who happen to be at home (the relatives on both the father's

and the mother's sides extending as far as the children of first cousins) must appoint another within ten days, or pay a fine of one drachma a day each until they have appointed a guardian for the children.

Now doubtless every city would cease to exist as a city if it were not to have duly established courts of justice. Moreover, if our judge couldn't speak, if he could say no more than what is said by the opposing parties at a preliminary inquiry, as in arbitration proceedings, he would never make an adequate judgment about what is just. For this reason it isn't easy for many, or even a few, if they lack capacity, to judge well. The dispute must always be made clear on each side, and time is required, as well as slow and frequent questioning, in the interest of illuminating the dispute. To achieve this the litigants should go first before their neighbors, who are their friends and are as familiar as possible with the disputed actions. If someone fails to get an adequate judgment from these, let him go on to another court. Then there will be a third court, which must terminate the judicial contest if the other two courts could not settle it.

In a way, the establishment of courts is a selection of ruling officers. For every ruling officer is necessarily a judge of some affairs, and, though a judge is not a ruler, on the day when he makes his decision and concludes a judicial trial, a judge is in some sense a ruler—and no very petty one, at that. Treating judges as if they were rulers, then, let's say who would be fitting judges, what affairs they should judge, and how many of them should preside at each sort of hearing.

The court which the litigants put together themselves, by choosing judges together, should be most authoritative. The other courts should be resorted to for two reasons: either because a private individual accuses a private individual of doing him some injustice, and takes him to court wishing to

get a judgment, or because someone wishes to defend the community when he thinks one of the citizens has done an injustice to the public. And it must be said how many and who the judges should be.

So first we should have a common court for all those private parties who are going through the third round of their disputes with one another. It should be constituted in something like the following way. On the day before the new year begins, with the new moon which follows the summer solstice, all officials whose term lasts a year, and those whose term lasts longer, should get together in one temple. After swearing an oath to the god they should, as it were, dedicate to him one judge chosen from each category of official—in each magistracy, the one who seems the best and who gives promise of rendering the best and most pious verdicts to his fellow citizens in the coming year. Those who have been elected should undergo scrutiny at the hands of the electors themselves; if any of them fails to pass scrutiny, another should replace him according to the same procedures. Those who pass the scrutiny will sit in judgment over all who have fled from the other courts, rendering their vote openly. The Councilmen as well as the other magistrates, who elected these judges, should be compelled to attend and witness the proceedings of this court, along with anyone else who wishes to attend. If someone accuses one of the judges of having voluntarily rendered an unjust verdict, he should go and lay his accusation before the Guardians of the Laws. Anyone convicted of rendering such a verdict must pay to the individual who was hurt half the damages suffered; if the convicted judge seems to merit a stiffer penalty, the judges in the case should decide what additional penalty he should suffer or pay to the community and to the one who brought him to trial.

In regard to crimes against the public, it is necessary, first, that the majority have a share in the decision. For when someone does an injustice to the city everyone suffers the injustice, and they would justly be vexed if they had no share in such trials. Still, while the beginning of such a trial and its final conclusion ought to be in the hands of the populace, the investigation should be the responsibility of three of the highest magistrates, chosen with the consent of the accused and the accuser. If they are unable to agree, then the Council should decide between their respective candidates.

Even in private suits it is necessary that everyone take part as much as possible. For anyone who does not share in the right of judging considers himself not at all a sharer in the city itself. That is why there should also be tribal courts, with judges selected by lot and as each occasion arises, and not judging corruptly in response to special pleading. But the final sentence in all such affairs belongs to the court which we claim has been so devised as to be as uncorruptible as human power, at least, can make it. It is to this court that appeal must be made by those who have been unable to reconcile their differences in the neighborhood courts or the tribal courts.

Now with regard to our courts—which, we assert, cannot easily be discussed either as ruling offices or as not, without difficulties arising—a sort of exterior outline has been presented, with certain things pretty much left out. For it would be most correct if the precise establishment and delineation of the laws concerning judicial matters were presented at length near the end of the lawgiving. Let these subjects, then, be asked to wait for us at the end. Most of the legislation concerning the installation of the other ruling offices has, on the other hand, been just about completed. Of course, the complete and precise account of each and every arrangement of the city and of the political art in

general cannot be made clear until the exposition has proceeded from the beginning, to the second things, then to the middle, and thus through every part of itself until it arrives at the conclusion. But the point now reached, the selection of the magistrates, would be an adequate conclusion to what has preceded, and the laying down of the laws can begin without any further hesitations or delays.

Clinias/ The things you've said up until now have been entirely agreeable to me, stranger; but what you've just said—linking the beginning of what is going to be said with the end of what's been said—is still more pleasing than those things.

Athenian Stranger/ Then our prudent game of the elderly would have been played in noble fashion thus far.

Clinias/ It's likely that what you're setting forth is a noble and serious pursuit for real men.

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely, at least. But let's see if the following appears to you as it appears to me.

Athenian Stranger/ What do you mean, and whom does it concern?

Athenian Stranger/ You know how the painter's activity, for example, never seems to finish working on each of the figures, but keeps touching up or highlighting—or whatever it is painters' disciples call such activity? It seems never to cease its adorning, and hence never to reach a point where there can be no further improvement of the paintings as regards beauty and clarity.

Clinias/ I too know pretty well these things you're talking about, by hearsay—for I am not at all practiced, at least, in such an art.

Athenian Stranger/ That's no hindrance for you. We'll still make use of this allusion to it that's cropped up in our discussion now, in something like the following way:

suppose someone once took it into his head to paint the most beautiful figure possible, one that would never get worse but would always improve as time went by. Don't you see that since he's mortal, he'll have to leave behind a successor, able to make it right if the painting suffers some decay at the hands of time, as well as to make future touch-ups that improve on deficiencies left by his own artistic weaknesses? Otherwise, won't his very great labor last but a brief time?

Clinias/ That's true.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, don't you think the lawgiver has such a purpose? He first writes his laws with as nearly adequate a precision as he can muster. Then, with the passage of time, as his opinions are tried out in deed, do you suppose there's any lawgiver who is so imprudent as to be ignorant of the fact that he must necessarily have left very many such things that require being set right by some follower, if the regime and order of the city he has founded are always to become in no way worse but instead better?

Clinias/ It's likely—how could it be otherwise? —that everyone wants such a thing.

Athenian Stranger/ So if someone had some device indicating the way in which, by deed or by words, he might teach another to understand, more or less, how he ought to guard and set right the laws, would he ever give up explaining such a thing before he had achieved his end?

Clinias/ How could he?

Athenian Stranger/ So now, in the present circumstances, is this what I and you two should do?

Clinias/ Just what do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ We are about to give laws, but certain Guardians of the Laws have been chosen for us; since we are in the twilight of life, while they are young, relative to us, we shouldn't only give laws ourselves—as we claim—but should

at the same time try our best to make these same men lawgivers as well as Guardians of the Laws.

Clinias/ Why not? —if, that is, we are up to it.

Athenian Stranger/ But it ought at least to be attempted, and with an eager spirit.

Clinias/ Indeed, why shouldn't it?

Athenian Stranger/ Then let's speak to them:

"Dear Saviors of the laws, we will leave out many things as regards each of the matters for which we have established laws. This is inevitable. Still, in all but the small points, at least, and on the whole, we will do all we can not to leave the outline sketch, as it were, unfinished. Your task will be to help fill in the outline. You must hear now where you should look when you carry out this task. Megillus here, and I and Kleinias, have said the same things to one another not infrequently, and we are in agreement that they are nobly spoken. We want your agreement and your attention as our pupils, so that you will look to the things we have agreed together should be looked to by a Guardian of the Laws and a giver of the laws.

"In brief, this was the substance of the agreement: in whatever way a member of the community, whether his nature be male or female, young or old, might ever become a good man, possessing the virtue of soul that befits a human being—whether this be as a result of some practice, or some habituation, or some possession, or desire, or opinion, or certain things learned at some time—toward this, which we are describing, every serious effort will be made throughout the whole of life; no one of any sort is to be seen giving precedence in honor to any of the other things that are impediments, not even, finally, to the city, if it appears necessary that the alternative to its destruction is either willingly tolerating the slavish yoke of being ruled by worse

men or departing from the city in exile. All such things must be borne, and suffered, rather than allowing the regime to be changed into one whose nature is to make human beings worse.

'These are the things we agreed to in our previous discussions, and now you must look to both these goals of ours as you pass our laws in review. You should blame those that aren't capable of effecting these goals, but those that are capable, you should welcome and, gladly adopting them, live under them. As for other pursuits that aim at other things among those that are said to be good, you must proclaim good-bye to them."

Now the beginning of our laws that come after these things should be as follows, starting with the sacred things: first we should consider again the number five thousand forty and the many convenient divisions it had and has, both as a whole and within its tribal subdivisions—each of which we set down as a twelfth part of the whole, and each of which is by nature exactly twenty taken twenty-one times. Our number as a whole has twelve divisions, and the number contained in each tribe also has twelve. Each part must be understood as a sacred entity, a gift of the god, corresponding to the months and to the revolution of the whole. That is why every city is naturally led to sanctify these divisions, though some people probably have made a more correct distribution and have been more fortunate in making the division divine than others have. We for our part now assert that the most correct number to choose is five thousand forty, which has as its divisors all the numbers from one to twelve—except for eleven, and for this there is a very minor remedy: one way the number becomes whole again is if two hearths are set aside. To show how these things truly are would not require a long tale, if one had leisure. But for now let's take the present oracle and

argument on trust, and proceed to make this division, solemnly assigning a god or the child of gods to each part, along with altars and the appropriate accoutrements. Let's make sacrificial processions to two of these altars each month, twelve for the divisions within the tribe and twelve for the divisions of the city. We should do this first for the sake of pleasing the gods and the things connected with the gods, and second, we would assert, for the sake of our own kinship and familiarity with one another, and for the sake of every sort of intercourse.

For indeed, with regard to the community and commingling of those who are married, it is necessary to dispel the ignorance concerning the bride's people, the bride herself, and the people to whom they are giving her. Everything possible must be done, to the best of one's ability, to prevent any mistakes at all being made in such affairs. To achieve such a serious goal, play must be devised that consists of choral dancing by the boys and girls, where they can see and be seen, in a reasonable way and at an occasion that offers suitable pretexts. Both sexes should be naked, within the limits a moderate sense of shame sets for each. The supervisors and regulators of all these matters ought to be those who rule over and give laws to the choruses; in cooperation with the Guardians of the Laws they can arrange whatever we have left out.

For it's inevitable, as we've said, that in the case of all such matters the lawgiver will leave out the small and numerous details; and those who constantly gain experience in them, learning from yearly practice, must make yearly arrangements and corrective changes until what seems to be a satisfactory definition of such customs and practices has been reached. Ten years of sacrificing and dances would be a measured and sufficient period of time to assign for gaining experience in each and every aspect. If the lawgiver is still

alive, they can share the task in common with him, but if he has died, each of the magistrates should bring to the attention of the Guardians of the Laws whatever omissions need correcting within their own jurisdictional spheres, and continue to do so until each feature seems to be perfected in noble fashion; then the. customs are to be made unchangeable, and adhered to along with the rest of the laws the lawgiver laid down for them at the beginning. They are never voluntarily to change a single one of them. But if some necessity should ever seem to overtake them, they must consult with all the magistrates and the whole populace and all the oracles of the gods. If all these are in consonant agreement, then the change can be made, but otherwise never in any way. If there is any opposition, the law will be that it always prevails.

So when anyone anywhere has passed twenty-five years of age, has observed and been observed by others, and trusts that he has found someone who pleases him and is appropriate for sharing and procreating children, let him marry. And everyone is to do so by the age of thirty-five. First, however, let him hearken to an account of how he should seek what is fitting and harmonious. For it is necessary, as Kleinias asserts, to preface each law with its own prelude.

Clinias/ You've reminded us in a very splendid way, stranger, by choosing what seems to me to be an opportune and especially well-measured moment in the argument.

Athenian Stranger/ Well spoken. "My lad" (let's address someone who has grown from good parents), "one should make a marriage of the kind that is held in good repute by prudent men, who would counsel you not to avoid someone of poor parents nor to pursue especially someone of rich parents, but, other things being equal, always to give precedence in honor to the less highly placed of your

prospective partners. For this would be in the interest of the city, and also of the hearths that are being united; for the even-keeled and the commensurable are distinguished ten thousand-fold from the unrestrained when it comes to virtue. A man who knows himself to be too impatient and hasty in all his affairs should be eager to become related by marriage to orderly parents, and one whose natural disposition is the opposite should proceed to ally himself with the opposite sort of in-laws. In general, let there be one myth regarding marriage: in each marriage what must be wooed is not what is most pleasant for oneself, but what is in the interest of the city. It is according to nature that everyone always be somehow attracted to what is most similar to himself, and because of this the city as a whole becomes uneven as regards wealth and the dispositions of characters. The consequences of this, which we wish to avoid for ourselves, are very prevalent in most cities."

To enact by law, through discourse, that a rich man is not to marry from the rich, and a man capable of doing many things is not to marry someone similar to himself—and to compel those of hasty dispositions to join in marriage with those who are more phlegmatic, and the more phlegmatic with the hasty—besides being laughable, would stir up the spiritedness of many. For it's not easily understood that a city should be mixed, just like the drinker's bowl: the wine, when poured in, is throbbing with madness, but under the chastening of another, sober god, it forms a noble partnership that creates a good and measured drink. No one, so to speak, can perceive that this also holds for the commingling that produces children. That is why it is necessary to leave such things out of the law, and instead try to use enchanting song to persuade them that each should value more the similarity of their children than the equality in marriage which is insatiable for money. One must

also use blame to dissuade anyone who is seriously bent on getting money through marriage; but one shouldn't apply force through written law.

So let these be the things said to encourage marriage, in addition to what was said a while ago, to the effect that one must partake of the eternal coming-into-being of nature by always leaving behind children of children, whom one leaves as one's successors in serving the god. So someone would say all these things and yet more about marriage, about how it is necessary to marry, if one were giving a prelude in the correct way.

If,, despite this, someone voluntarily disobeys, estranging himself and not sharing in the city, but persisting in an unmarried state at the age of thirty-five, let him pay a penalty each year: one hundred drachmas if he belongs to the class with most property, seventy if to the second, sixty if to the third, and thirty if to the fourth. Let this be sacred to Hera. Anyone who fails to make the yearly payment will have to pay ten times the penalty. It will be up to the Treasurer of the goddess to collect the fine; if he fails to do so he himself will incur the obligation to pay it, and everyone must give an accounting of such things at the audits. As far as money goes, then, these are the penalties everyone unwilling to marry must pay; in addition, let him be excluded from every honor paid by those who are younger, and let none of the young voluntarily pay him any heed. If he raises his hand to punish someone, everyone should come to the aid of and defend the one who is being treated unjustly, and if any bystander fails to come to his aid, let the law call him a coward and also a bad citizen.

The subject of dowries has already been discussed, but let it be repeated that there is no reason why the poor should reach old age having been unable, because of a lack of money, to take a wife or give away a daughter. For in this

city everyone is to possess the necessities. Thus there would be less insolence on the part of wives and less humble and illiberal slavery because of money on the part of husbands.

He who obeys will have done one of the noble things. He who disobeys and gives or receives for the trousseau an amount worth more than fifty drachmas, or one mina, or one and one-half minas, or two minas for someone in the class possessing the most property, must pay to the public an amount equal to whatever excess he spent, and the sum given or received is to be consecrated to Hera and Zeus. The treasurers of these two gods are to take care of things in this case just as the treasurers of Hera were said to take care of things each time in the case of those who don't marry, and if they fail to do so, each of them is to pay the fine out of their own funds.

The authority to make the marriage pledge should belong first to the father, second to the grandfather, and third to brothers sprung from the same father. If one of these is not available, then the authority should pass to the same line of relatives on the mother's side. If some unusual mischance should intervene, then the authority should pass to the nearest relatives in each case, together with the guardians.

In regard to rites preliminary to marriage, or any other such sacred ceremonies that are appropriate to celebrate before, during, and after the marriage, a person should make inquiries with the Interpreters and, by obeying whatever they say, everyone may believe that he has done everything in a well-measured way.

As for the marriage feasts, no more than five male and five female friends should be invited on each side, and a similar number from each family and household. The expenditure should in no case be more than the property will bear—a mina for the class with the most money, half that much for

the next, and so on, in proportion, as the property of each class is less. He who obeys the law should be praised by everyone, but he who disobeys should be punished by the Guardians of the Laws as one who lacks experience in things beautiful and who is uneducated in the laws of the Muses of marriage.

Drinking to the point of drunkenness presumably befits no other occasion except the festivals of the god who has given wine, nor is such behavior safe, above all for someone who takes getting married seriously. Prudence is. especially fitting in this time for the bride and groom, who are making no small transformation in their lives, and, at the same time, it's needed for the sake of the child to be engendered, to insure that it is conceived by parents who are as much as possible in possession of their senses at all times. For it's quite hard to tell just what night or day, with the god's help, the child will be conceived. Moreover, children shouldn't be made in bodies saturated with drunkenness. What is growing in the mother should be compact, well attached, and calm, but someone who's been drinking carries himself and is carried every which way, raging with frenzy in body and soul; as a result, a drunk is a clumsy and bad sower of seed, and is likely to beget at such a time offspring who are irregular, untrustworthy, and not at all straight in character or body. That's why one should strive throughout the whole year and all one's life, but especially at the time when one is engendering children, to be careful and to avoid doing anything that voluntarily brings on sickness or involves insolence or injustice. Otherwise, one will necessarily stamp these effects on the souls and bodies of the embryos, and create children who are in every way inferior. One must especially avoid such things that day and night. For the beginning, which among human beings is established as

god, is the savior of all things—if She receives the proper honor from each of those who make use of Her.

Considering the other of the two allotted households as a sort of nest where the young will be born and raised, the bridegroom must separate from his father and mother and go there to make the marriage and a new home and nursery for himself and the children. For in the case of endearing attachments, a certain amount of longing cements and binds together all the dispositions, while excessive intercourse, without the longing that time produces, makes people drift apart through satiety. On this account they should leave mother and father and the wife's family in their own homes and, like colonists who have gone abroad, see them only on visits or when receiving them as visitors at home, where they are bearing and raising children, as if passing the lamp of life on from one generation to the next, always devoted to the lawful gods.

After this comes the question of property: what sort would one possess if one's belongings were to be most harmonious? There are many things that are not difficult either to understand or to acquire; but with regard to domestic servants there is every sort of harsh difficulty. The cause of this is the fact that we speak of them in ways that are somehow incorrect and yet in a certain manner correct. For our speech about slaves sometimes contradicts the ways we use them, while at other times our speech is consistent with the ways we use them.

Clinias/ What's this again that we're saying? We certainly do not understand, stranger, what things you're pointing out now.

Athenian Stranger/ That's surely not surprising, Megillus. For among almost all the Greeks the Helot system of the Lacedaimonians provokes the most perplexity and

strife—some holding that it is good, others that it is not good. There would be less strife about the enslavement of the Mariandynoi to the Heracleans, or again about the serf nation of the Thessalians. But considering these and all such systems, what ought we to do about the possession of domestic servants? You quite reasonably asked whatever I meant to indicate by the remark I happened to make as I proceeded through the argument, and it was this: presumably we're aware that we all would say that one should own slaves who are as well-disposed and good as possible. Indeed, there have been many slaves superior in every virtue to their owner's brothers and sons, slaves who have saved their masters' lives, their property, and their entire households. These things, we presumably know, are said about slaves.

Megillus/ Doubtless.

Athenian Stranger/ But also the opposite—how no slave's soul is healthy, how no one who has intelligence should ever trust any of their race? In fact, our wisest of the poets has made the following pronouncement, referring to Zeus: "half of one's intelligence," he declares;

> far-seeing Zeus takes away
> From men, whom the day of slavery seizes.

Everyone chooses between these ways of thinking. Some decide they will trust no one who belongs to the race of domestic servants, and, treating them as if they had the nature of wild animals, they use goads and whips to reduce the souls of domestic servants to a threefold and much more than threefold state of slavery. Others, again, do entirely the opposite of these things.

Megillus/ Doubtless.

Clinias/ So then given these different policies, what should we do in our land about possession and punishment of slaves, stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ What, indeed, Kleinias? It's obvious that the human animal is a difficult possession; for it is stiff-necked, and evidently not willing at all to be or become easily managed in terms of the inevitable distinction in deed between slave, freeman, and master. It has often been demonstrated in deed how many evils result—by the regular and frequent revolts of the Messenians, by the cities which possess many domestic servants who speak one language, and also by the robberies and other ills suffered at the hands of the so-called Peridinoi around Italy. Looking at all this, one would find oneself at a loss as to what should be done about all such things. The fact is, there are only two devices that remain: those will more easily serve as slaves who aren't compatriots and whose languages are as discordant as possible; and one should train slaves correctly by treating them with dignity—not only for their sakes but even more for our own. The training of people in such a condition avoids a certain sort of insolence, and does domestic servants even less injustice, if that is possible, than is done to equals. For a man shows clearly that he reverences justice naturally, and not artificially, and that he really hates injustice, when he does so in his dealings with human beings whom he might easily treat unjustly; he who in his disposition and actions toward slaves remains undefiled by what is impious or unjust, would be a man who is fully capable of sowing the natural seed of virtue. The same thing can be said, and correctly said, about a master and a tyrant, and about one who exercises any sort of absolute rule over someone weaker than himself. Of course, it is necessary to punish slaves, in a just way, and not spoil them by mere chiding, as if they were free men. And in speaking to a domestic servant one

should almost always use a straightforward command; one should never joke with domestic servants in any way, whether they be females or males, and the many who are very thoughtlessly fond of this playfulness with slaves spoil them—thereby making life more difficult both for those who are ruled and for themselves who do the ruling.

Clinias/ What you say is correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Now when every effort has been made to provide a mass of domestic servants adequately trained in every way to assist in action, shouldn't what comes next, in speech, be the housing plans?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely that in the new and hitherto uninhabited city there must be supervision of the way in which everything, so to speak, is constructed—including the temples and walls. These things come before marriage, Kleinias; but since now the thing is coming into being in speech, it's quite all right if it proceeds in this order, for now. When it comes into being in deed we can put these things prior to marriage, if the god is willing, and can at last complete the latter business after all the architectural details. For now let's just go through a brief sketch of them.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ The temples should be constructed all around the marketplace and in a circle around the city, on the highest ground—for the sake of both defense and cleanliness. Near them should be buildings for the magistrates and for the courts. Thus cases will be accepted and judgments dispensed on the most sacred soil, reflecting not only the questions of piety involved in the cases but also the fact that the buildings belong to such gods. In the same buildings will be housed those courts in which it would be

fitting to hear homicide trials and all charges of injustice involving the death penalty.

As for walls, Megillus, for my part I would go along with Sparta, and leave the walls sleeping in the earth, and not set them up. The reasons are these. It's a fine poetic argument that people sing about them, to the effect that walls should be made of bronze and iron rather than earth. What is more, our plan would justly incur much ridicule—the plan to send the young out into the countryside in yearly relays, making trenches and ditches and certain buildings to thwart enemies, as if they weren't going to let them cross the borders—if we were still to put up a wall, when a wall is, first, not at all beneficial to cities from the point of view of health, and, in addition, usually instills a certain habit of softness in the souls of those who dwell within it. The wall tempts men to flee within it instead of standing against the enemies, and makes them think they needn't always keep up a guard, night and day, in order thus to obtain safety, but can have the means for real security by going to sleep fenced in behind walls and gates. They think they were born not to toil, not knowing that ease really comes as the result of toils. And the fact is, I believe, that toils naturally reappear as a result of shameful ease and softness of spirit.

But, if some wall is necessary for humans, then it ought to be created by constructing the private homes at the beginning so as to form the whole city into one wall, with the evenness and uniformity of all the houses as they face the street providing good defense. In presenting the appearance of one house it would not be unpleasant to look at, and would on the whole make a difference in every way as regards the ease of guarding and providing security.

It would be fitting that the responsibility for maintaining the buildings in accordance with the original plan lie mainly with the inhabitants, but the City Regulators ought to

exercise supervision, using penalties to compel anyone who becomes careless. They should see to it that everything in the city is kept clean, and should insure that no private individual encroaches in any way on what belongs to the city when constructing buildings or ditches. These same officials should see to it that there is good drainage for the water that comes from Zeus, and should oversee any construction pertaining to the water that would be fitting within the city or outside. The Guardians of the Laws should take cognizance of all these matters and make additional laws as needs arise—and the same goes for anything else the law might, in its perplexity, omit.

Now that these buildings, the buildings of the marketplace, the buildings of the gymnasia, and all the school buildings, stand ready for those who will frequent them, now that the theater stands ready for the spectators, let's proceed to the matters that come after marriage, following the order of lawgiving.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's suppose then that our marriages have been made, Kleinias. After this, a length of time of not less than a year would elapse before children were born. What way of life the groom and the bride ought to pursue during this time, in a city which will differ so greatly from the many, is the subject that comes next after the things just now discussed. But it is not exactly the easiest thing to say. In fact, although there have been more than a few things of this kind already, this is even less acceptable to the majority than all of them. Nevertheless, whatever seems correct and true should be spoken in its entirety, Kleinias.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Whoever intends to promulgate laws for cities, and regulate how men should act in regard to public and common actions, but supposes he need not apply a degree of compulsion to the private things, supposing that each can live his daily life as he wishes, that it's not necessary for everything to be ordered—whoever leaves the private things unregulated by law and believes the people will be willing to live with the common and public things regulated by the laws—is incorrect in his thinking.

Why have these things been said? For the following reason: we are going to assert that our grooms must participate in the common meals no differently, and no less, than in the time before marriage. This institution aroused amazement at the beginning when it was first introduced in your territories—when some war, as is likely, or some other affair of equal power legislated it because of the great difficulty created by a scarcity of human beings—but once you had tasted and had been compelled to use the common meals, the custom seemed to you to make a great contribution to security. In some such way the practice of common meals was instituted among you.

Clinias/ That's likely, at any rate.

Athenian Stranger/ What I said about it, that this practice was once an amazing, and for some a frightening, thing to institute, would no longer hold in the same way now, or present the same difficulty for the one undertaking to legislate it. But there is another practice that follows from this one, and which would be correct according to nature if it came into being. Because it exists nowhere now, the lawgiver effects little and finds himself in the situation they tell of in the joke: he cards his wool into a fire and engages in ten thousand other such fruitless efforts. Yet the practice is not an easy thing to talk about nor, having been discussed, to carry into execution.

Clinias/ What is this, stranger, that makes you seem to hesitate so, as you try to explain it?

Athenian Stranger/ You shall hear, to prevent a great deal of discussion being wasted on it. Everything that partakes of order and law in the city has entirely good effects, while most things that lack order or are badly ordered weaken the other things that are well ordered. This principle applies directly to the subject under discussion. For among your peoples, Kleinias and Megillus, the common meals for men were established in a fine and, as I said, amazing way by some divine necessity; but women's affairs were in an altogether incorrect way left without legislative regulation, and the practice of common meals for them never saw the light. That race of us humans that is by nature more secretive and cunning because of its weakness—the female—was incorrectly left in disorder by the legislator's failure to be firm. On account of this neglect there are many things that have gotten out of hand among you that would have fared better than they do now, if they had happened to be regulated by laws. When one overlooks the disorderliness of women's affairs, what is affected is not only, as one might suppose, a half; in fact, to the degree that our female nature is inferior to that of the males as regards virtue, by so much would the harm approach being more than double. So, if this were revised and corrected, if it were ordained that every practice is to be shared in common by women as well as men, it would be better for the happiness of the city.

As things stand, the human race has so failed to be fortunate in this respect that in other places and cities, where common meals are not at all officially accepted customs in the city, it's not possible for someone of intelligence even to mention it. How then, without being laughed at, will someone attempt in deed to force women to take their food and drink in the open, where they can be

clearly seen? There is nothing that would be harder for this race of women to bear, for it is habituated in a retired, indoor way of life; it'll use every means to resist being dragged by force into the light, and will prove much superior to the legislator. Thus, anywhere else, as I said, they wouldn't tolerate the utterance of the correct argument without much screaming, but perhaps they would here. If it doesn't seem unlucky for the discussion of the whole regime to unfold—for the sake of the argument, anyway—I am willing to state how this practice is both good and fitting, if you two agree to listen. But if not, let's just let it go.

Clinias/ But stranger, the two of us are amazingly and in every way agreeable to hearing about it, at any rate!

Athenian Stranger/ Let's indeed hear it. But don't be amazed if I seem to you to undertake the subject by going way back. After all, we're enjoying leisure, and there's nothing pressing that prevents us from making a complete inquiry into every aspect of the laws.

Clinias/ What you've said is correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's go back again to the first things that were discussed. Every man ought to have a good understanding of this much at least: either the coming into being of humans had no beginning at all and will never have an end, but existed always and will exist always, in every respect, or an immeasurable time would have elapsed since the beginning, when it came into being.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Don't we think that every part of the earth, in every sort of way, has had foundings and destructions of cities, every kind of practice orderly arid disorderly, and every sort of desire for food, both liquid and solid? And don't we think that there have been climatic

revolutions of all types, in which it is likely that the animals underwent very many transformations?

Clinias/ How could this not be so?

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Presumably we believe that the vines appeared at a certain time, when they had not existed before? Doesn't the same hold for olive trees, and the gifts of Demeter and Kore? Wasn't a certain Triptolemus the one who brought such things? During the time when these things didn't exist, don't we think that animals used one another for food, as they do now?

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ In fact, we see that even now the practice of human beings sacrificing one another still persists among many peoples. And we hear just the opposite about other peoples: how there was once a time when we did not dare to taste cattle, and sacrificed to the gods no animals, but instead gruel and fruits soaked in honey and other such hallowed sacrifices. They abstained from flesh on the grounds that it wasn't pious to eat it or to pollute the altars of the gods with blood. Those of us who existed then had ways of life that were what is called "Orphic": we partook of everything that lacked soul but abstained from the opposite, from everything possessed of soul.

Clinias/ What you've described is certainly what people say, and can be trusted.

Athenian Stranger/ "But," someone would ask, "with a view to what, have all these things been said by you now?"

Clinias/ You are correct in supposing that, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ And now then, if I can, I'll try to explain what follows after these things, Kleinias.

Clinias/ Say on.

Athenian Stranger/ I observe that for human beings everything depends on a threefold need or desire, and that if they are guided correctly by these, virtue results, while if they are guided badly, the opposite. Of these, the need for food and the need for drink are present as soon as they're born. In all this regard, every animal has a natural erotic longing, is full of frenzy, and refuses to listen if someone says it ought to do anything except satisfy the pleasures and desires connected with all these things, and always avoid for itself all the pain connected with them. Our third and greatest need or erotic longing is that which urges most sharply and comes latest, the one which makes human beings burn with complete madness: that most insolent flame involved in the engendering of offspring. What is needed is to turn the three illnesses toward what is best and away from what is said to be most pleasant, attempting to restrain them with the three greatest checks—fear, law, and true reason. These must be reinforced, of course, by the Muses and the gods of contests, in order to quench the growth and spread of the illnesses.

Let's put the procreation of children after the subject of marriages, and, after procreation, upbringing and education. Perhaps if the discussion proceeded thus, each of our laws that pertain to the common meals would be completed later on, so that when we arrive at such occasions of fellowship and partake of them, we will be in a position to look closely and perhaps see whether they should be common to women too, or should be only for men. The preliminaries to these common meals still remain unlegislated for now, but later we will bring them into order and set them up. At that time, as was just said, we will see them more distinctly, and would lay down the laws that are appropriate and fitting for them.

Clinias/ What you say is very correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's guard in our memories the things that have been said just now; for perhaps we'll have need of all of them sometime.

Clinias/ Which in particular do you bid us to remember?

Athenian Stranger/ The things we distinguished by three terms. We spoke of food, did we not, and second of drink, and third of a certain fluttering excitement of sex.

Clinias/ We will doubtless remember all the things you now bid us to, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Fine. Let's proceed then to the newlyweds and teach them how and in what way they should procreate the children; if we can't persuade them, then we'll threaten them by means of certain laws.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ The bride, and the groom as well, must think about how they may do all they can to provide the city with the noblest and best children possible. All human beings who take a common share in any action perform everything nobly and well if they reflect intelligently upon themselves and upon the deed itself; but if they don't apply their intelligence to it, or if they lack intelligence, they do just the opposite. So the groom should reflect intelligently on the bride and the making of children, and the bride should do likewise—especially during the time when they don't yet have children. To supervise them, there are to be the women we have chosen, whose number, greater or less, and time of appointment will be left to the rulers to fix; each day they will meet together for up to a third of an hour at the temple of Eileithuia, and at their meetings they'll bring to one another's attention any man or woman among those engaged in the procreation of children whom someone has observed preoccupied with something other than what was

enjoined upon them at the marriage sacrifices and the sacred rites.

If the flow of conception is strong, let the parents procreate children and keep a watch over themselves for ten years, but no longer. If some remain childless after this period of time, let them be divorced, after consulting with their families and the women magistrates about the terms that would be for the benefit of both parties. If some quarrel arises over what terms would be fitting and beneficial to both, they should choose ten of the Guardians of the Laws to whom they should turn the matter over, and abide by their ruling.

The women should go into the houses of the young people, and by exhortations and threats prevent them from doing anything wrong or foolish. If they are unable to do so, let them go and make a report to the Guardians of the Laws, who will proceed to prevent them. But if they also can't do it, let them report it to the public at large, by putting the matter in writing and swearing an oath to the effect that they have been unable to reform so-and-so. He who is written up, and fails to get a judgment against his accusers, must suffer dishonor in the following ways: he is not to attend weddings or the thanksgiving rites after a child has been born, and if he should attend them, let anyone who wishes punish him with blows and suffer no retaliation. Let the same customs apply to the wife: if her disorderliness leads to her being written up and she fails to get a court judgment, she is not to participate in the processions and honors of the women, nor attend weddings and the celebrations at the time of the birth of children.

When they have finished procreating children according to the laws, if someone has relations of this sort with another woman, or if a wife has them with another man, and if the other persons involved are still at the child-procreating age,

they must suffer the same penalties that have been described for those who are still procreating children. But thereafter, the man or woman who behaves moderately in all such respects should be accorded an entirely good reputation; he who behaves in the opposite fashion should be honored in the opposite way—or rather dishonored. If most people live well-measured lives in such respects, let the subject be passed over in silence, without legislation; but if they get disorderly, let legislation be put into effect in this way, according to laws that'll be laid down at that time.

The first year is the beginning of each person's whole life, and each boy and girl should have it written down in the ancestral temples: "his or her life began on…" Written next to this, on the whitewashed wall for every clan, should be the number of the rulers, who are numbered according to the years. Nearby, the names of those in each clan who are alive at any given time should be written; the names of those who depart from life should be erased.

A girl should marry between the ages of sixteen and twenty, to state the longest time period, and a boy between thirty and thirty-five. A woman can enter office at forty, a man at thirty. A man is subject to service in war from the age of-twenty until the age of sixty; in whatever military services it seems women should be employed, each will be ordered to do what is possible and fitting for her, after she has borne children and until she is fifty years old.

Book 7.

Athenian Stranger/ Now that the male and female children have been born, presumably the most correct procedure would be for us to turn next to a discussion of their upbringing and education. To avoid speaking about this is completely impossible; yet it would appear to us more reasonable to utter a kind of instruction and admonition rather than laws. For there are many little things, not visible to everyone, that take place in private and in the home, which, because of each person's pain, pleasure, and desire, go against the advice of the lawgiver, and would easily make the dispositions of the citizens diverse and dissimilar. This is bad for cities. For while the pettiness and frequency of these practices render it unfitting and unseemly to make laws imposing penalties, it nevertheless corrupts even the written laws to have human beings become accustomed to act against the law in petty, frequent ways. The result is that there's perplexity as to what to legislate about these things, and yet it's impossible to remain silent.

But I should try to clarify what it is I'm saying by sort of bringing to light examples; so far what's been said is pretty dark.

Clinias/ What you say is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably it was correct to say that an upbringing that is correct in every way must manifest the power to make bodies and souls the most beautiful and the best possible.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And if they are to have the most beautiful bodies I suppose the simplest requirement, at least, is that the children grow with the straightest possible posture from youngest infancy.

Clinias/ Most certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Isn't this our understanding, that the first sprouting of every animal involves by far the greatest and most substantial growth, so that many people would strongly contend that humans,, at least, fail to attain, in the twenty years after the age of five, a size that is double the size attained in the first five years?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Aren't we aware that a great deal of growth, occurring without much well-measured exercise, produces myriad evils in the bodies?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Therefore it's when bodies are getting the most nourishment that they need the most exercise.

Clinias/ What's that, stranger? Are we going to assign the most exercise to the newborn and youngest?

Athenian Stranger/ Not at all, but to those even younger, those being nourished inside their mothers!

Clinias/ Best of men, what are you talking about? You mean the fetuses?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes. It's not surprising that you two are ignorant of the gymnastic art pertaining to that time of life; and although it's something strange, I'd like to explain it to you.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ My people can understand this sort of thing better because among us some play games more than they should. Some of us—and not only boys but certain elderly men as well—raise young birds for battles against one another. Those who raise beasts for such purposes are far from thinking that the creatures get sufficient exercise when they are stimulated to struggle with one another in gymnastic competition. In addition to these exercises, they

each take their birds under their cloaks, smaller birds in the hands and bigger ones under the arm, and proceed to walk very many stades—not for the well-being of their own bodies, but for that of these young creatures. By such a practice they show, to anyone capable of understanding, that all bodies benefit from the invigorating stir produced by all sorts of shaking and motions, whether the bodies be moved by themselves, or in litters, or on the sea, or by being carried on horses or on any other body. These motions allow the bodies to digest the foods and drinks that nourish them, and make them capable of providing us with health, beauty, and the other sorts of strength.

If these things are so, what would we claim we ought to do next? Do you wish us to go ahead despite the laughter and set forth laws to the effect that a pregnant woman must go for walks, and that when the child is born she must mold it like wax so long as it remains moist, wrapping it in swaddling clothes until it is two years old? Shall we compel nurses, by legal penalties, to somehow carry the children about continually, to the fields, or the temples, or to relatives, until the babies have become capable of standing, and even then to be very careful lest the children, being still young, should distort their limbs by somehow putting too much weight on them? Shall we command the nurses to keep carrying the children until they've reached the age of three? Ought the nurses to be as strong as possible, and ought there be more than one? And shall we set down a written penalty accompanying each of these laws, applicable to those who fail to carry them out?

Or would this be far off the mark? After all, it would produce a very great deal of what was just mentioned.

Clinias/ What's that?

Athenian Stranger/ The great laughter we'd incur, in addition to the unwillingness to obey on the part of the nurses' womanly as well as slavish dispositions.

Clinias/ But then why have we claimed that these principles ought to be announced?

Athenian Stranger/ The reason is this: the dispositions of the masters and free men in the cities may perhaps listen, and if so, they would come to the correct understanding that unless private homes within cities are correctly regulated it is vain for someone to suppose the common things will stand on a firm legal footing. Once someone understood these things, he would adopt for himself the laws mentioned just now, and, by using them to make his own home and city well run, would become happy.

Clinias/ What you've said is very likely.

Athenian Stranger/ For this reason, we shouldn't leave such legislation until we've described which pursuits are appropriate to the souls of the very young children, proceeding in the very same way as when we began to go through the myths that were told about the bodies.

Clinias/ That is altogether correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's take this as a sort of fundamental principle that applies to both body and soul: in the very young, nursing and motion should be as continuous as possible, the whole night and day, because it is beneficial for all, and not least for the very youngest, to dwell—if it were possible—as if they were always on a ship at sea. As it is, what is needed in the case of newborn nursling creatures is to approach as close as one can to achieving this state.

Evidence for this principle is found in the facts that it has been adopted, and is known to be useful from experience, by the women who nurse little ones and by the women who perform the mystery-rite cures of the Corybantes. For

presumably when mothers want to lull their restless children to sleep they don't provide stillness but just the opposite, motion; they rock them constantly in their arms, and not with silence but with some melody. It's exactly as if they were charming the children with aulos-playing, even as is done for the maddened Bacchic revelers, to whom they administer this same cure, which consists of the motion that is dance and music.

Clinias/ What are we to suppose is the principal cause of these things, stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ It's not very hard to understand.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ In both cases the passion being experienced is presumably terror, and the terror is due to some poor habit of the soul. When someone brings a rocking motion from the outside to such passions, the motion brought from without overpowers the fear and the mad motion within, and, having overpowered it, makes a calm stillness appear in the soul that replaces the harsh fluttering of the heart in each case. This has wholly desirable effects. In the one case it makes them go to sleep; in the other case, with the help of the gods to whom each sacrifices and from whom each receives good omens, the process incites to dancing, and influences the dancers through the aulos music: it thereby replaces our mad dispositions with prudent habits. For a brief discussion, at least, these remarks convey an account that is plausible.

Clinias/ Indeed they do.

Athenian Stranger/ If, then, these procedures do thus have some such power, one is also led, by the example of these people, to understand the following: every soul that dwells with terror from the time of childhood would be especially likely to become accustomed to feeling fear; and

presumably everyone would assert that this is practice in cowardice rather than courage.

Clinias/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ And we would assert that the opposite, the practice in courage from earliest youth onward, consists in triumphing over the terrors and fears that come upon us.

Clinias/ Correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Then with regard to this one part of the virtue of the soul, let us assert that the use of the gymnastic of motions among the little children is of great assistance to us.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Moreover, the absence or presence of ill-humor in the soul is no small factor in determining whether stoutness of soul or weakness of soul would result.

Clinias/ How could it not be?

Athenian Stranger/ Then in what way might we have naturally implanted in the newborn, at the outset, either of these dispositions we might want? We ought to try to explain how and to what extent someone would successfully handle this.

Clinias/ How could we not do so?

Athenian Stranger/ I say that this is the dogma accepted among us: luxury makes the dispositions of the young ill humored, irascible, and easily moved by minor matters, while the opposite—extreme, savage enslavement—by making them humble, illiberal, and misanthropic, renders them unsuited for living with others.

Clinias/ How then ought the city as a whole bring up those who cannot yet speak or partake of the rest of education?

Athenian Stranger/ Roughly as follows. Presumably every newborn animal customarily gives forth cries from the moment it's born, and this applies not least to humankind. Indeed, it is more given to tears as well as cries than the others.

Clinias/ That is certainly so.

Athenian Stranger/ In fact, nurses judge by these very signs when they bring things and thus see what it desires; when they see it falls silent when something is brought, they think they've done fine in bringing the thing, and when instead it weeps and cries they think what they've done isn't fine. Babies make manifest what they love and hate through their tears and cries—a way of communicating that is not at all fortunate. And yet this goes on for at least three years' time (no small portion of life to spend in a condition that is either bad or not bad).

Clinias/ What you say is correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Doesn't it seem to you two that the man who is ill humored and not at all gracious is more glum and, for the most part, more filled with complaints than a good man ought to be?

Clinias/ It seems that way to me, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? If someone were to apply every device in an attempt to make the three year period for our nursling contain the least possible of suffering and fears and every sort of pain, don't we suppose that he would give the soul of the one brought up this way a better spirit, and make it more gracious?

Clinias/ Clearly; and it would be especially the case, stranger, if someone should provide many pleasures for it.

Athenian Stranger/ In this I would no longer go along with Kleinias, you amazing man! That kind of behavior is for us the greatest of all corruptions. For it starts each time at the

very beginning of the upbringing. But let's see if what we're saying holds up.

Clinias/ Say what you're asserting.

Athenian Stranger/ Our argument now is not about a matter of small importance; so you too, Megillus, must consider this and help us judge. My argument asserts that the correct way of life should neither pursue pleasures nor entirely flee pains. Instead, it enjoys the middle course, for which I just now used the name "gracious." Guided by some saying of an oracle, this is how we all characterize precisely the situation of god. And I assert that this is the habit that should be pursued by anyone of us who is to be divine: one should not allow oneself to pursue pleasures headlong, thinking one can in this way avoid the experience of pain, nor allow anyone else among us—old or young, male or female—to suffer this. Least of all the newborn, if one can help it, for that is the age when, through habituation, the most decisive growth in the entire character occurs for everyone. Moreover, I at least would assert (if I could avoid the appearance of joking) that of all women the most special attention should be paid to those who are carrying children inside their stomachs, during that year, so as to prevent the pregnant woman's having many or violent pleasures—or pains—and to provide that she lives through the period honoring what is gracious, even, and gentle.

Clinias/ You don't have to ask Megillus which of us has spoken more correctly, stranger: I myself grant you that everybody should avoid a life of unrestrained pain and pleasure, and should always cut it somewhere in the middle. So now both what you have said and what you have heard are noble.

Athenian Stranger/ Both are indeed very correct, Clinias. But let us, being three, turn our thoughts next, after these things, to the following.

Clinias/ To what?

Athenian Stranger/ To the fact that all these things we're now going through are what the many call "unwritten customs." Indeed, what they name "ancestral laws" are nothing other than all such things as these. What is more, the argument that has been poured over us now, to the effect that one shouldn't ordain these in law, and yet also shouldn't leave them unmentioned, has been nobly put. For these are the bonds of every regime, linking all the things established in writing, and laid down, with the things that will be set forth in the future, exactly like ancestral and in every way ancient customs; if nobly established and made habitual, they provide a cloak of complete safety for the later written laws, but when they perversely stray from the noble they are like props of the walls of houses which buckle in the middle and cause the whole edifice to fall, one part under another, the parts that were later constructed in a fine way collapsing after the props themselves, the ancient things, have collapsed. Keeping these things in mind, Kleinias, we must bind your new city together in every way, neglecting, so far as is in our power, neither the great nor small aspects of what are called "laws," "habits," or "practices." For a city is bound together by all such things, and in the absence of either of them the other ceases to be stable. So it should not be surprising to find that the laws are made lengthier by an overflow of customs or even habits that seem numerous and minor to us.

Clinias/ But what you're saying is correct, and we will keep it in mind.

Athenian Stranger/ With regard, then, to the first three years of life (whether for a boy or a girl), if someone would carry out these things punctiliously, and not treat what's been said as peripheral, the benefit that would accrue to the young who are being raised would not be inconsiderable.

As for three-year-olds, and four-year-olds, and five-year-olds, and even six-year-olds, the character of their souls would require games, while punishment must be employed to detach them from luxury. The punishment should not be dishonorable, but should resemble the sort we just said was to be used on the slaves; they should punish in a way which is not insolent and hence does not instill anger in those who are punished, yet which doesn't permit luxury by leaving them unpunished. This same approach should be used on those who are free. The games for children of this age spring up naturally, mostly discovered by the children themselves when they get together. And all the children of this age, three to six, should gather together in the district temples, the children of each district coming together in the same common place. The nurses should keep watch over the orderliness or lack of restraint of those who are still at this age, while supervision over the nurses themselves and over the whole herd should be the responsibility of one of the previously selected twelve women: the Guardians of the Laws should assign a woman to each herd, to keep order for a period of a year. The selection of these women is to be the responsibility of the women who are in charge of overseeing marriages, who will select one woman, of the same age as themselves, from each tribe. The one who is selected should pay an official visit to the temple each day and punish anyone she finds acting unjustly on each occasion. She can use some of the servants belonging to the city to punish, on her own authority, male or female slaves and male or female strangers, but if the accused is a citizen, and disputes the

punishment, she must take him to court before the City Regulators. If he doesn't dispute her claim, let her punish even the citizen on her own authority.

The sexes should be separated after they reach the age of six—boys spending their time with boys, and, similarly, the virgins spending their time with one another. Both should turn to studies, the males going to teachers of horseback riding, archery, javelin throwing, and the sling. Females too, if somehow they will agree, should at least know about these things—and especially about the use of heavy arms. For almost everyone fails to recognize the prejudice that prevails about such matters at the present time.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ I refer to the belief that nature makes our right and left sides differ with respect to the way they are used in each of the actions done by our hands, whereas with respect to chores done by the feet and the lower limbs no difference is apparent. On account of the mindlessness of our nurses and mothers we have each become like cripples as regards our hands. For by nature the limbs on both sides are almost equally balanced; we have made them differ through habituation, by not using them correctly. In some activities where it doesn't make much difference—such as in playing the lyre, where the instrument is held in the left hand and the plectrum in the right, and in other such activities—no harm is done. But to use these activities as models for other activities, where such usage isn't necessary, is practically mindless. The Scythians have a convention that makes this evident: instead of holding the bow in the left hand and pulling the arrow back only with the right, they use either hand to the same extent for both. There are very many other such models—in chariot driving and other activities—from which one could learn that those who contrive to make the left weaker than the right do so

against nature. As we said, when this affects plectrums made of horn and other such tools, it doesn't make a big difference; but in war, when one must employ tools made of iron, it does make a big difference, not only as regards bows and javelins, but especially when heavy arms must be used against heavy arms. At that point, there is a very great difference between one who has learned and one who hasn't, and between one who has been trained in gymnastic and one who hasn't been trained in gymnastic. Just as someone perfectly trained for the pankration, or for boxing, or for wrestling, is never unable to fight with his left side, and thus is not a cripple or a clumsy bumbler whenever someone, by switching over, compels him to fight on that side; in the very same way, I think, one should correctly expect that for fighting in heavy armor and all the rest, whoever possesses two limbs with which to defend himself and attack others should do all he can not to allow either to be idle or untrained. And if someone should grow up with the nature of even a Geryon or a Briareus, he ought to be able to throw a hundred javelins with his hundred hands. All these things should be supervised by the female rulers and the male rulers—the former keeping a watch over the games and the nurses, the latter over the studies—so that all the boys and all the girls will have feet and hands that are ambidextrous, and so that insofar as possible they won't harm their natures through habits.

It would presumably be useful if the studies were twofold, so to speak: the gymnastic would be those that pertain to the body, and the musical would be for the sake of stoutness of soul. The gymnastic, in turn, would be divided in two, into dancing and wrestling. One kind of dancing involves their imitating the speech of the Muse, while preserving a magnificent and free demeanor; the other kind, which is for the sake of health, agility and beauty, involves the proper

bending and stretching of the limbs and parts of the body, and produces rhythmic motion in each of them as they adequately extend and retract themselves in every sort of dance.

As for the sort of wrestling techniques Antaeus or Cercyon developed in their arts, out of their useless love of victories, or the boxing techniques developed by Epeius or Amycus, since they're useless in the encounters of war, they're not worthy of being adorned by a discussion. But the things that fall under straight wrestling, including releases for the necks, hands, and sides, when practiced with a love of victory, when one is tough and graceful, and for the sake of strength and health, should not be neglected, since they are useful in every way. When we get to that stage in the laws we should, however, require the teachers to give all such lessons gently and the students to take them with a good grace.

Nor should one neglect whatever is appropriate in choral imitations, such as the armed games of the Kuretes that are held in this area, or those of the Dioscuri in Lacedaimon. And presumably our virgin mistress, who delights in the play of the chorus, doesn't think it proper to dance with empty hands; so she decks herself out with a complete set of armor and performs the entire dance that way. These are the sorts of things that would be entirely fitting for the boys and also the girls to imitate, as they honor the graciousness of the goddess, for the sake of their use both in war and in festivals. Presumably, it would be required that from the very beginning of their lives, and throughout all the time that passes until they go to war, the children always be arrayed with weapons and accompanied by horses as they make processions and ceremonial marches in honor of each of the gods. Thus with quick and slower steps, in the dances and

processions, they will make their supplications to the gods and the children of the gods.

It is for no other ends—if for any—that contests and preparatory contests ought to be waged. For these are useful in peace and war, in the political regime and in private households; but the other sorts of playful and serious bodily exercises are not for free men, Megillus and Kleinias.

I have now given a pretty full elaboration of the gymnastic art that I said, in the first parts of the conversation, had to be elaborated: this is it, complete in every way. But if you two have something better than this to suggest, speak up, and set it before us in common.

Clinias/ It isn't easy, stranger, to set aside these things and proceed to tell of other things that are better than these as regards both the gymnastic art and contests.

Athenian Stranger/ What follows next in order, then, is a discussion of the gifts of the Muses and Apollo. Earlier, indeed, we thought we had discussed all this, and had left only what pertains to the gymnastic art. Now, however, it is clear what things were omitted and that those things should be the first things one tells everyone. So let's proceed to discuss these very matters next in order.

Clinias/ This ought to be discussed, by all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Listen to me, then; even though you've listened before, still, care must be taken now too, as something very strange and uncustomary is spoken and heard. For I'm going to present an argument that is somewhat frightening to utter; yet by becoming bold, somehow, I will not flinch.

Clinias/ What is this, stranger, that you're talking about?

Athenian Stranger/ I assert that in all the cities, everyone is unaware that the character of the games played is decisive for the establishment of the laws, since it determines

whether or not the established laws will persist. Where this is arranged, and provides that the same persons always play at the same things, with the same things, and in the same way, and have their spirits gladdened by the same toys, there the serious customs are also allowed to remain undisturbed; but where the games change, and are always infected with innovation and other sorts of transformations, where the young never call the same things dear, where good form and bad form—in the postures of their own bodies or in other things they use—are not always agreed upon, where instead they honor especially the man who continually innovates with something new and carries in shapes and colors and all such things that are different from the usual, we would be speaking in an entirely correct way if we were to assert this of such a man: there is no greater ruin than this that can come to a city. For, escaping notice, this man transforms the characters of the young, and makes them dishonor what is ancient and honor what is new. Of this man and his talk and dogma I say once again: there is no greater punishment for all cities. Hear how much evil I assert this is.

Clinias/ Are you referring now to the blame laid on the ancient things in the cities?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, indeed.

Clinias/ Well, then, you'd find that we're by no means inattentive listeners to this part of your speech; nay, we'll be as receptive as we can.

Athenian Stranger/ That's to be expected.

Clinias/ So just say on.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, let us surpass ourselves both in listening to the argument and enunciating it to one another.

Change, we shall find, is much the most dangerous thing in everything except what is bad—-in all the seasons, in the

winds, in bodily habits, and in the characters of souls. It isn't the case that change is, so to speak, safe in some things and dangerous in others, except, as I just now said, in bad things.

Thus, if one were to look at bodies, one would see how they become accustomed to all foods and all drinks and exercises, even if at first they are upset by them; one would see how, with the passage of time, they grow, out of these very materials, flesh that is akin to these things, and come to like, be accustomed to and familiar with, a whole regimen—thriving on it in the best way from the point of view of both pleasure and health; one would see that if someone is ever compelled to change back to one of the reputable diets, he is at first upset-with sickness, but then once again with difficulty recovers, by regaining a habituation in the food. Now one must hold that this very same thing applies to the thoughts of human beings and the natures of their souls. If they're brought up under laws which by some divine good fortune have remained unchanged for a great length of time, if they neither remember nor have heard that things were ever otherwise than they are at present, then the entire soul reverences and fears changing any of the things that are already laid down. Somehow or other the lawgiver must think up a device by which this situation will prevail in the city. The following is what I at least have discovered: as we said before, everyone thinks that very great and serious harm can't follow from changes in the games of the young, on the grounds that these are really just games. As a result, they don't prevent such changes but give in to and follow them, not taking into account the fact that these boys who practice innovations in their games must necessarily grow up to be men who are different from those the earlier children grew into; being different, they seek a different way of life, and in seeking it they desire different practices and

laws; from this it follows that none of them fears the arrival of what was now said to be the greatest evil for cities; There are, indeed, other changes—those affecting outward appearance—that would do less damage; but whatever brings about frequent change in the praise and blame accorded to dispositions is the greatest of all changes, I believe, and would require the most attentive watching.

Clinias/ How could it not?

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Do we trust the earlier arguments, where we said that things pertaining to rhythms and music as a whole are imitations of the characters of better and worse human beings? Or what?

Clinias/ Among us at least there would be no change in opinion whatsoever.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we assert, then, that every sort of contrivance should be contrived to prevent our boys from desiring to partake of other imitations, in dances or songs, and to prevent anyone from using all sorts of pleasures to persuade them?

Clinias/ What you say is very correct.

Athenian Stranger/ With regard to these matters, does any of us have an art better than that of the Egyptians?

Clinias/ What things are you referring to?

Athenian Stranger/ The sanctification of all dance and all songs. First comes the arranging of the holidays in a yearly calendar, showing what they are, when they occur, and to whom among the gods, the gods' children, or the demons they should be dedicated. After this, certain persons should first arrange which song is appropriately sung at each of the sacrifices to the gods, and which choruses should celebrate the sacrifice on each occasion; then all the citizens in common, by making sacrifices to the Fates and all the rest of the gods, and by pouring out libations, should sanctify

each of the songs ordained for each of the gods and the others.

If anyone dedicates to one of the gods other hymns, or presents choruses, contrary to these, the Priests and Priestesses together with the Guardians of the Laws will be acting piously and lawfully if they exclude that person. If the one excluded refuses, voluntarily, to abide by the exclusion, he will for the rest of his life be subject to indictment for impiety by anyone who wishes to bring the charge.

Clinias/ Correctly spoken.

Athenian Stranger/ Now that we've entered into this discussion, let's undergo what is fitting for men like us.

Clinias/ What are you talking about?

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably every young man, not to speak of an elderly man, when he sees or hears something strange and utterly unaccustomed, would never, I suppose, rush to agree right away with whatever is puzzling in such things; instead he'd stand there, like someone confronted with the triple fork at a crossroads and not knowing the road very well. Whether he were alone or should happen to be travelling with others, he'd ask himself or the others about what is puzzling, and wouldn't hurry on before he'd somehow placed on firm ground the inquiry into which way the path leads. The same should certainly be done by us at the present juncture: it is necessary, presumably, to make a complete inquiry into the strange argument about laws that has now cropped up. At our age, and about such matters, we shouldn't make a facile claim to be able to say something clear at a moment's notice.

Clinias/ What you say is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So we'll devote some time to this, and when we've investigated it sufficiently, we'll then put it on firm ground. But in order to avoid the possibility that we

might be uselessly prevented from completing the sequence of regulations that goes with the laws we have before us now, let's proceed to the end of them. And maybe, if the god would be willing, the way itself as a whole, taken to its end, would reveal sufficiently the answer to what now is puzzling.

Clinias/ An excellent suggestion, stranger—let's do as you've said.

Athenian Stranger/ So, we assert, this strange dogma has been accepted: our songs have become "laws." This is in agreement with the name the ancients, as is likely, somehow gave to songs accompanied by the kithara, and so they probably wouldn't have disagreed entirely with what's being said now: someone prophesied it vaguely in a dream, either while asleep or while in a state of waking vision. At any rate, this is to be the dogma about it: let no one voice anything or make any dance movement contrary to the public and sacred songs, or the whole choral exercise of the young, any more than he would go against any of the other "laws." He who goes along may depart unpunished. He who disobeys will be punished, as was just now said, by the Guardians of the Laws, the Priestesses, and the Priests. Shall these things be laid down in speech by us now?

Clinias/ Let them be laid down.

Athenian Stranger/ Now in what way would someone legislating these things avoid becoming totally ridiculous? Let's consider something like the following additional point in regard to these matters: the safest thing to do is first to shape some molds for them in speech. I say one of the molds is something like this: suppose a sacrifice is taking place and the sacred meats are being burned as the law dictates, and let's say someone in a private capacity, a son or a brother, while standing near the altars and sacred things, breaks out in a total blasphemy. Wouldn't we assert that his utterance

would fill his father and his other kinsmen with despondency, and a sense of bad omen and prophetic warning of evil?

Clinias/ How could it not?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, in our part of the world this happens in almost every city, so to speak. For whenever some official carries out some sacrifice in public, a chorus comes along afterwards—in fact not just one, but a mass of choruses—and standing not far from the altars, indeed sometimes right beside the altars, pours total blasphemy on the sacred things! They use words, rhythms, and very mournful harmoniae to get the souls of the hearers all worked up, and whoever can straightaway make the city that is engaged in sacrificing weep the most is the fellow who wins the victory prize! Won't we vote down this "law"? If it is sometimes necessary for the citizen to hear such wailings, on certain impure and ill-omened days, then there should rather be certain choruses of singers who come, hired from abroad, of the sort that are paid to walk before funeral processions, inspired by some Carian Muse. Presumably such would be the fitting occasion for songs of that kind. And presumably it wouldn't be fitting for the garb that goes with the funeral songs to be crowns or golden ornaments, but entirely the opposite—so as to leave off discussing these matters as quickly as I possibly can.

With regard to such a thing, I ask us ourselves once again: should we lay down this first instance as one satisfactory mold for songs?

Clinias/ Which?

Athenian Stranger/ Auspicious speech. Shouldn't our species of song be wholly auspicious in speech, on every occasion? Or shall I not ask, but shall I just ordain it this way?

Clinias/ Ordain it by all means; for this law wins by unanimous vote.

Athenian Stranger/ What would be the second law of music after auspicious speech? Is it not that there are to be prayers to the gods to whom we are sacrificing on each occasion?

Clinias/ What else, except this?

Athenian Stranger/ The third law, I believe, should be that the poets must realize that prayers are requests to the gods, and they must apply their intelligence to the utmost in order to avoid ever mistakenly requesting evil in place of good. For the situation becomes laughable indeed, I think, when such a prayer is made.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now weren't we convinced a little earlier by the argument that neither the Silver nor the Golden Pluto was to have an established dwelling place in the city?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ What, then, shall we claim this argument illustrates? Isn't it this, that the race of poets is not entirely capable of understanding well what things are good and what things are not? Presumably, if some poet creates, through words or melody, a work that is erroneous in this, respect—if he creates prayers that are incorrect—he will make the citizens pray in a way opposed to what we ordain, in respect to the greatest matters. And as we said, we won't find many mistakes that are graver than this. So shall we set this down as one of the laws and outlines concerning the Muse?

Clinias/ Set down what? Tell us more clearly what you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ The poet is to create nothing that differs from the city's conventional and just version of the beautiful or good things; he may show none of his creations to any of the nonexperts before he has shown them to the judges appointed in these matters as well as to the Guardians of the Laws, and met with their approval. (We've practically selected these judges already, since we've chosen both those who are to legislate in musical affairs and the one who is to be Supervisor of Education.) What then? I ask again what I've often asked: shall we ordain this as the third law, outline, and mold? Or how does it seem?

Clinias/ Let it be ordained—why should it not be?

Athenian Stranger/ Next, after these things at any rate, it would be quite correct to sing to the gods hymns and encomia mixed with prayers. After the gods would come, in the same way, prayers, with encomia, to the demons and the heroes, whatever is fitting to every one of these.

Clinias/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Now after these things, at any rate, this law could immediately follow, without hesitation: it would be fitting for any citizens who have reached life's end, who have performed noble and laborious deeds with either their bodies or their souls, and who have been obedient to the laws, to obtain encomia.

Clinias/ How else?

Athenian Stranger/ But it isn't safe to honor through encomia and hymns those still living (before a person has run through the entire course of his life and arrived at a noble end). Among us let all these matters be applied to men and women in common, to all those of either sex who become conspicuous for their goodness.

The songs and dances should be ordained thus. From the ancients have come many ancient and beautiful creations in

music, and also for the bodies, dances of the same quality. There should be no hesitation to pick out from these what is fitting and harmonious for the political regime that is being set up. To make the choice among these, examiners should be selected who are not younger than fifty years of age. They should decide what seems adequate among the ancient creations and what is either deficient or wholly unsuitable. In the latter case they should cast it entirely away, while in the former case they should take it up again and rework it, seeking the aid of the poetic and musical men. They should use the poetic powers of these men, but they shouldn't be guided by their pleasures and desires, except in the case of a few of them; instead, by interpreting the intentions of the lawgiver, they should put together dance and song and choral performance as a whole in a way that comes as close as possible to the intentions in his mind. Every disorderly pursuit involving the Muse becomes better ten thousand-fold when it attains order, even if it doesn't partake of the sweet Muse. Pleasure, after all, is common to all the Muses. If someone passes the time from childhood until the age of adulthood and prudence hearing a 'moderate and orderly Muse, then every time he hears the opposite he will hate Her and proclaim Her to be lacking in freedom; but if he's brought up with the common and sweet Muse, he'll assert the opposite to this is cold and unpleasant. So, as was just now said, from the point of view of pleasure or lack of pleasure, at least, neither side gets more; the big difference lies in the fact that one makes those brought up with Her better while the other always makes them worse.

Clinias/ You've spoken beautifully.

Athenian Stranger/ In addition, it would presumably be necessary to distinguish, in an outline, the songs fitting for females from those fitting for males, and it's necessary to harmonize them with the harmoniae and rhythms. For it's

terrible to sing something discordant with the harmonia as a whole, or to use a meter that's unsuitable to the rhythm, by failing to assign to the songs what is appropriate in each of these respects. So it's necessary to legislate at least the outlines of these matters. Now both kinds of song must be assigned certain necessary accompaniments; and since what belongs to females is determined by the very way they differ in nature, one must make use of this difference in order to make clear the difference in the songs. Magnificence, then, and whatever inclines to courage, ought to be declared to be masculine looking; whatever leans rather toward the orderly and the moderate should be proclaimed, in legal convention and in speech, as belonging more to the feminine. This will be the arrangement.

What needs to be discussed next after this is the teaching and handing down of these very things—in what way, to whom, and when each of the subjects should be practiced.

It's evident to me that what I'm doing here myself is much the same as what a shipwright does in beginning to build ships, when he sketches the shape of ships in outline by laying down the keels. I'm trying to distinguish the outline of ways of life as they accord with characteristics of souls, and thus really "laying down their keels"—investigating, in the correct way, what device we should use and what characteristics we should at any time incorporate if we are going to be carried through this voyage of existence on the best way of life. Of course, the affairs of human beings are not worthy of great seriousness; yet it is necessary to be serious about them. And this is not a fortunate thing. But since we're here, if somehow we would carry out the business in some appropriate way it would perhaps be a well-measured thing for us to do. But whatever am I saying? Someone would perhaps be correct to take me up in this very way.

Clinias/ Indeed!

Athenian Stranger/ I assert that what is serious should be treated seriously, and what is not serious should not, and that by nature god is worthy of a complete, blessed seriousness, but that what is human, as we said earlier, has been devised as a certain plaything of god, and that this is really the best thing about it. Every man and woman should spend life in this way, playing the noblest possible games, and thinking about them in a way that is the opposite of the way they're now thought about.

Clinias/ How's that?

Athenian Stranger/ Nowadays, presumably, they suppose the serious things are for the sake of the playful things: for it is held that the affairs pertaining to war, being serious matters, should be run well for the sake of peace. But the fact is that in war there is not and will not be by nature either play or, again, an education that is at any time worthy of our discussion; yet this is what we assert is for us, at least, the most serious thing. Each person should spend the greatest and best part of his life in peace. What then is the correct way? One should live out one's days playing at certain games—sacrificing, singing, and dancing—with the result that one can make the gods propitious to oneself and can defend oneself against enemies and be victorious over them in battle. The sort of things one should sing and dance in order to accomplish both these things have been described in outlines, and the trails, as it were, have been blazed along which one should go, expecting that the poet speaks well when he says:

> Telemachus, some things you yourself will think of in your own thoughts,
>
> And some things a demon will suggest; for I do not think

> That you were born and raised against the will of the gods.

This is the way our nurslings should consider things: they should believe that what's been said has been adequately spoken, but that the demon and god will suggest things to them regarding sacrifices and choral performances, thus indicating those whom they should offer games and propitiate, and when they should play each game for each, so as to live out their lives in accordance with the way of nature, being puppets, for the most part, but sharing in small portions of truth.

Megillus/ Stranger, you are belittling our human race in every respect!

Athenian Stranger/ Don't be amazed, Megillus, but forgive me! For I was looking away toward the god and speaking under the influence of that experience, when I said what I did just now. So let our race be something that is not lowly then, if that is what you cherish, but worthy of a certain seriousness.

With regard to what follows these things, it has already been said that buildings for gymnastics and for common instruction should be located at three places in the center of the city, and that outside, at three places again around the city, there should be gymnasia and open spaces arranged for horses as well as for archery and the other long-range weapons, where the young can learn and practice. If these things weren't described adequately before, let them be described now, in speech and also in laws. In all these buildings there should dwell teachers of each subject, strangers persuaded by pay to teach those who attend all the things they should learn, with a view to war and with a view to music. And it will not be left up to the father's wish to decide who shall attend and whose education shall be neglected, but rather, as the saying goes, "every man and

child insofar as he is able" must of necessity become educated, on the grounds that they belong more to the city than to those who generated them. Indeed, my law would say all the very same things about females that it says about males, including that females should be trained on an equal basis. I would speak without being at all afraid of the argument that horseback riding and gymnastics are fitting for men but not fitting for women. For I am persuaded by the ancient myths I've heard, and at this very moment, so to speak, I know there are countless myriads of women around the Black Sea—the women called Sarmatians—who are enjoined to handle not only horses, but the bow and the other weapons as well, in equality with the men, and who practice them equally. Besides this, I make some such calculation as the following, in regard to these matters: I assert that if, indeed, it is possible for these things to turn out this way, then the way they're now arranged in our lands—where it's not the case that all the men with their entire strength, and united in spirit, practice the same things as the women—is the most mindless of all. For this way, almost every city is just about half of what it might be, when with the same expenditures and efforts it could double itself. And this would be an amazing mistake on the part of the lawgiver.

Clinias/ That's likely, anyway. Still, there are very many aspects of what we're now saying, stranger, that run counter to what is usual in political regimes.

But you spoke very reasonably when you said that the argument should be allowed to unfold, and that once it had unfolded well, one should then choose what one approved. As a matter of fact, what you said makes me rebuke myself now, for the things I just said. So say next after these things whatever you find pleasing.

Athenian Stranger/ What would please me, at least, Kleinias, is the following (something I've said before): if the possibility of what we're discussing hadn't been sufficiently demonstrated by deeds, one might perhaps say something against the argument, but now, presumably, he who cannot in any way accept this law will have to seek some other way of opposing it. He won't extinguish our insistence that one should say that our female race must, as much as possible, have a common share in education and in the other things along with the race of males. For that's about the way one should think about these matters. Look, if women don't share their entire lives in common with men, won't it be necessary to have some different regimen for them?

Clinias/ That will indeed be necessary.

Athenian Stranger/ So which of the regimens now in evidence would we set up, instead of this common regimen we are now establishing for them? Would it be that of the Thracians and many other tribes, who use their women to farm, tend cattle, herd sheep, and to serve no differently than slaves? Or our own practice and that of everyone in our area? For nowadays, among us, these things are done as follows: "bringing all our goods together in some one house," as the saying goes, we give to the women the responsibility of acting as stewards, setting them to rule over the shuttles and everything having to do with spinning. Or shall we, Megillus, prescribe the practice that is midway between these, the Laconic? Should the girls live partaking of gymnastics and music, while the women, without having to work at spinning, weave a rather laborious way of life that is neither mean nor cheap, and arrives at a middle ground between taking care of people, acting as steward again, and bringing up the children? But then they'd take no part in the things of war, so even if someday some chance should compel them to fight for their city and their children, they

wouldn't be able to shoot arrows, like certain Amazons, nor ever be capable of partaking in the artful use of any other missile, nor be able to take up shield and spear in imitation of the goddess, and thus nobly oppose the sack of their own fatherland—being able to strike fear at least, if nothing more, in the enemy, by being seen in some battle order. Living this way of life, they wouldn't at all dare to imitate the Sarmatians, whose women would appear to be men in comparison with them.

With regard to these things, let whoever wishes to do so praise your lawgivers. For my part, I can only stand by what's been said: a lawgiver must be complete, and not half a lawgiver; to let the female live in luxury, spend money, and follow disorderly pursuits, while supervising the male, is to leave the city with only about half of a completely happy life instead of double that.

Megillus/ What are we going to do, Kleinias? Are we going to let the stranger run down Sparta in front of us this way?

Clinias/ Yes. Freedom of speech has been granted him, and we have to let him go on until we've gone through the laws in a way that is entirely sufficient.

Megillus/ What you say is correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Then probably I may try to explain the things that come next after these?

Clinias/ Why not?

Athenian Stranger/ What then would be the way of life of human beings for whom the necessities were taken care of in due measure, for whom matters pertaining to the arts were handed over to others, and whose farms, assigned to slaves, provided sufficient produce from the things of the land to allow human beings to live in an orderly way? Suppose there were separate common meals arranged for the men, and nearby common meals for the members of their

families, including female children and their mothers; at all of these common tables there would be male and female rulers assigned to dismiss each of them, having observed and watched over the conduct of the common meals each day; then, after the ruler and the others had poured a libation to whichever gods the particular night and day might happen to be consecrated, they would thus make their way home. To lives ordered in this way, is there no necessary and wholly appropriate activity left, but is each of them to live out his life getting fattened up, like a cow? It isn't just, we assert, nor noble, nor is it possible for one who lives that way to avoid the appropriate fortune: for it's appropriate that an idle, soft-spirited, and fattened animal usually is ravaged by one of those other animals who have been worn very hard with courage and labors.

Of course, these things we're now seeking probably wouldn't ever be realized with adequate precision so long as women and children and homes are private, and all such things are arranged privately by each of us. But if the second-best arrangements after those would come into being for us as they've now been described, things would achieve due measure.

And for men who lived this way the activity that would be left is neither the smallest nor the humblest, we assert, but is in fact the greatest of all the tasks that can be assigned by a just law. For just as the life of a man who aims at victory in the Pythian or Olympian games wholly lacks leisure for all the other activities, so doubly or much more than doubly lacking in leisure is the life that's most correctly called a "life"—that of a man who is devoted to cultivating his body in all respects and his soul as regards virtue. Not even a small part of any of the other activities should be allowed to pose an obstacle to his giving the body its appropriate exercises and food, and the soul teachings and habits; the

whole night and day are scarcely sufficient time for the man who's doing this to get the complete and adequate benefit from these things.

Given that this is the way things are by nature, it follows that there should be a schedule regulating how all the freemen spend all their time, beginning almost at dawn and extending to the next dawn and rising of the sun. Of course, there are many little and frequent details regarding the management of a household that it would be unseemly for a lawgiver to speak of—including the provisions for curtailing sleep at night that would be needed by men who intend to keep a complete and accurate guard over the whole city. If any of the citizens spends the whole of any night slumbering, and fails to show himself always the first to be up and around, before any of his domestic servants, his behavior must be regarded by everyone as shameful and unworthy of a free man, whether such a provision be called a law or a practice. Indeed, if the mistress of a house is awakened by some of her maids and fails to get up first herself and wake the others, it should be talked of as something shameful among the slaves—male, female, and children—and, if somehow it were possible, by the whole house itself in its entirety. Moreover, everyone should be up during the night performing a good part of the business of politics as well as of the households—the magistrates acting in the city and the masters and mistresses in the private homes. A great deal of sleep does not by nature harmonize with our bodies or souls, or with the activities pertaining to all these things. For while a person sleeps he is worth nothing—no more than one who isn't living. But whoever among us cares for living and thinking to a special degree stays up the longest time, reserving only so much time as is useful for his health, and that isn't much, once a fine habit has been established. Again, where the magistrates are awake at night in cities

they strike more fear in the wicked, both enemies and citizens, and are more prized and honored by the just and moderate men because they are beneficial both to themselves and to the city "as a whole. Now a night spent in such a way would, in addition to everything else that's been said, instill a certain courage in the souls of each of those in the cities.

As for the day, when dawn arrives and people are up, the children should presumably be turned over to their teachers; but just as sheep and every other herd animal shouldn't live without a herder, so children shouldn't live without certain tutors, nor slaves without masters. And the child is the hardest to handle of all beasts, because insofar as it has within it, to a high degree, a not yet disciplined source of thought, it becomes treacherous, sharp, and the most insolent of beasts. That's why it's necessary to fetter it with many sorts of bridles, as it were: at first, when it has just been separated from its nurses and mothers, one needs to use tutors for its playfulness and childishness; later one needs to use teachers and subject matters of all sorts, as befits a free man. But it's as befits a slave that the boy himself, and his tutor and his teacher should be punished, if any of them does wrong, by any of the free men who happen along. If someone should happen upon such wrongdoing and fail to give it a just punishment, let him first bear the greatest sort of blame, and then let the Guardian of the Laws who has been chosen to fill the office of the children watch this fellow, who happened upon what we're describing, but failed to punish one who needed punishment or carried out the punishment in an improper way. This same magistrate of ours should keep a sharp watch and exercise an especially careful supervision over the upbringing of the children, so as to keep their natures on a

straight path, by always turning them toward what is good according to the laws.

Yet how would this man himself be educated adequately by our law? Up to this point it has mentioned some things, and omitted others, but has said nothing yet that is clear or sufficient. As nearly as possible, it should omit nothing that concerns this magistrate; the whole argument should be interpreted for him, so that he can become the interpreter and protector of the others.

"Now while chorus matters—the songs and dancing, and which kinds should be chosen, corrected, and consecrated—have been discussed, we haven't talked about the writings that are not in meter, showing what sort they should be and how they should be handled by those whom you are bringing up, O best Supervisor of Children. You do of course have an account of what they should learn and practice for war, but you lack an account as regards first, the written things; second, the lyre; and then, arithmetical calculations—about which we declared everyone must grasp as much as is necessary for war, household management, and the management of the city. Moreover, they should learn whatever is useful, for these same purposes, of what pertains to the revolutions of the divine things, the stars and the sun and the moon: they should learn about the arrangements every city needs to make in respect to these things. But just what are we referring to? What we mean is the ordering of the days into the revolutions of the months, and the months in each year, so that each of the seasons, sacrifices, and festivals will receive its due for itself according to the sequence of nature, will keep the city alive and awake, will render honors to the gods, and will make the humans more prudent in these matters. All these things, my friend, have not yet been explained to you sufficiently by the

lawgiver; so turn your mind to what is going to be said next after these things.

"We just said that, in the first place, you don't have a sufficient explanation of the written things. Now just what were we finding fault with when we said this? The following: it hasn't yet been explained to you whether someone who's going to become a well-measured citizen should pursue the subject to the point of precision or whether he should not pursue it at all. The same goes for the lyre. So at this point we do indeed assert that these subjects should be pursued. In the case of the written things, for about three years, commencing at the age of ten; in the case of lyre-playing, another three years, commencing at thirteen, would be a due measure of time. Neither for the father nor for the child himself, whether he be a lover of learning or a hater, will it be permissible to prolong or shorten, with more or less time, this lawful period of study. Anyone who disobeys will be excluded from the educational honors that will be mentioned a little later. What the children are to learn in these years, and what the teachers are to teach, you must first learn yourself. They should practice the written things until they are able to write and read; but it isn't required that some, whom nature doesn't urge during the appointed years, develop a precise capacity for speed and beauty. As regards lessons in poets' writings that are not accompanied by the lyre,, some of which are in meter and some of which are without rhythmical parts (writings that follow speech alone, and lack rhythm and harmony), there are harmful writings left among us by some of the many human beings who have composed such things. So what are you going to do about them, you best of all Guardians of Laws? Or rather, what, indeed, would be the correct regulations for the legislator to give you to use? I expect he's going to be very much at a loss."

Clinias/ What is this, stranger, that you're evidently speaking with yourself about in real perplexity?

Athenian Stranger/ You're correct in your surmise, Kleinias; and since you two are sharers in the laws, it's necessary to indicate when the path appears clear and when not.

Clinias/ What, then? What are you referring to in the present subjects, and what is it you're experiencing?

Athenian Stranger/ I'll tell you: it is not at all easy to take the path of speaking against what has been said often, by myriads of mouths.

Clinias/ Come now, you think what we've said before about laws is opposed to what the many say in a small way, or in a few matters?

Athenian Stranger/ This at least that you say is very true. You're urging me, I think, since the very path that is hateful to the many is cherished by others who are perhaps no fewer—or, if fewer, not inferior at least—you're urging me to go ahead in the company of these latter, to risk and dare the path of legislation now opened up by the present arguments, and not to hang back.

Clinias/ What else?

Athenian Stranger/ All right, I won't hang back. I say, then, that we have very many poets, composing verses in hexameters, trimeters, and all the other meters that are spoken about, some of whom aim at what is serious and others at what is laughable; now tens of thousands of people often assert that the young who are educated correctly must be brought up and steeped in these poets, that they should learn whole poets by heart, and gain vast experience of hearing, and much learning, through their readings. Others, again, make a collection of excerpts from all the poets, including some complete poems, and assert that the

collection must be learned by heart and stored in the memory, if any of our students is to become good and wise through much experience and much learning. Now isn't it the case that you're urging on me a freedom of speech that will permit me to show these people which part of what they say is fine and which is not?

Clinias/ What else but that?

Athenian Stranger/ What could I ever say in brief that would characterize all these men adequately? I think something like the following will about suffice: everyone would agree with me that each of these men has uttered many things in a noble fashion, but also many things in the opposite fashion. If that is so, then I assert that there is a danger in imbuing the children with much learning.

Clinias/ Then how and what would you recommend to the Guardian of the Laws?

Athenian Stranger/ About what, do you mean?

Clinias/ About what model he should look to, at any time, to decide what he would allow all the young to learn and what he would prevent them from learning. Speak up; don't hesitate to say it.

Athenian Stranger/ Good Kleinias, in a way I may well have been rather lucky.

Clinias/ In what respect?

Athenian Stranger/ Inasmuch as I'm not altogether at a loss for a model. As I looked now to the speeches we've been going through since dawn until the present—and it appears to me that we have not been speaking without some inspiration from gods—they seemed to me to have been spoken in a way that resembles in every respect a kind of poetry. It's probably not surprising for me to have had such a feeling, to have been very pleased at the sight of my own speeches, brought together, as it were; for compared to most

of the speeches that I have learned or heard, in poems, or poured out in prose like what's been said, these appeared to me to be both the most well-measured, at any rate, of all, and especially appropriate for the young to hear. I don't think I would have a better model than this to describe for the Guardian of the Laws and Educator, or anything that would be better for him to bid the teachers to teach the children, other than these things and things that are connected to them and similar. He should work through the poems of poets, as well as prose writings and things that are simply recited without being written down, and if, as can be presumed, he comes across speeches that are the brothers of these, he should on no account let them pass by but should write them down. Then, in the first place, he should compel the teachers themselves to learn and to praise these writings; if there are any teachers who find the writings unpleasing, he should not employ them as his assistants, but should instead use those who vote with him in their praise. It is to these men that he should give the young, to be taught and educated.

Here and in this way let there be a conclusion to this myth of mine, that has told about instructors in the written things, and also about writings.

Clinias/ We don't appear, to me at least, to have gone outside the bounds of the speeches proposed by the fundamental hypothesis, stranger; yet perhaps it is difficult to be sure whether or not our discussion is correct as a whole.

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely, Kleinias, that this at least will itself be more evident when, as we've often said, we've arrived at the end of the whole discourse on laws.

Clinias/ That is correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, after the grammarian shouldn't we address the kitharist?

Clinias/ Why not?

Athenian Stranger/ It seems to me that we should recollect the earlier arguments, as we allocate to the kitharists what is appropriate as regards their teaching and the education as a whole in such matters.

Clinias/ You're referring to the arguments about what things?

Athenian Stranger/ We asserted, I believe, that the sixty-year-old Dionysian singers had to become especially perceptive about rhythms and the schemes of the harmoniae, in order that there would be someone who could pick out, as regards the imitation in songs that makes the soul feel passions (whether the imitation be well done or badly done), the resemblances to the good and the resemblances to the opposite; the one he was to cast away, while the other he was to produce in their midst, singing to and enchanting the souls of the young and calling upon each of them to join in pursuing the acquisition of virtue, by means of the imitations.

Clinias/ What you say is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ These, then, are the ends for which the kitharist and the person being educated should use the sounds of the lyre, because of the clarity of its strings: they should present notes that are like the notes sung by voices. But as for heterophony or variety in the lyre, with the strings emitting a tune different from that of the composer of the melody, either by presenting a consonance of notes close together in contrast to notes sting further apart, or by swift tempo in contrast to slow, or by sharp notes in contrast to flat, or as for using the sounds of the lyre to present all sorts of similar variations in rhythm—all such things will be

inappropriate for those who are supposed to grasp quickly, in three years, what is useful in music. Things that contradict one another are disturbing, and produce difficulty in learning. But the young need to be as good at learning as possible, since they have before them necessary subjects of study that are neither minor nor few in number (and what these are the argument will show as it proceeds, with the passage of time). So that is the way our Educator should supervise these things concerning music.

As for the songs themselves and the words, which sort and which of them the chorus teachers should teach, that has all been elaborated by us before: we declared that the songs had to be sanctified, and each harmonized with the festivals, so as to benefit the cities by providing lucky pleasure.

Clinias/ Here again what you've explained is true.

Athenian Stranger/ It's indeed very true. Let the magistrate who is elected to be concerned with the Muse take these things from us and supervise them with the help of kindly luck; for our part, let us give additional guidance, beyond the things said before, as regards dancing and the whole gymnastic that has to do with the body. Just as we supplied what was left in regard to the teaching of music, so let us do the same for gymnastic. For surely the boys and girls must learn to dance, and to exercise in the nude. Isn't that so?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ With a view to their exercising, it would not be too unsuitable if the boys had male dancing teachers and the girls female.

Clinias/ Let it be arranged this way.

Athenian Stranger/ Once again let's call upon the man who'll have the most business to take care of, the Supervisor

of the Children, who, with his supervision of the things pertaining to both music and gymnastics, won't have much leisure.

Clinias/ How will a rather old man like that be able to supervise so many things?

Athenian Stranger/ Easily, my friend. The law has given and will give to him the power to take as his assistants in this supervision any men or women citizens he chooses. He'll know whom to choose, and he won't want to go astray in the choice, because he'll feel a prudent awe for, and understand, the greatness of the office; he'll keep in mind the calculation that when the young have been, and are being, brought up well, all sails correctly for us, but if not—well, it's not worthwhile describing the consequences, and we won't do it here in the presence of this novel city, out of our reverent respect for those who are especially attached to prophecy.

Now we've already said a great deal about these matters as well, about dances and the whole of gymnastic motion. For we're setting up gymnasia and all the bodily exercises for war—for archery, for every sort of throwing, for skirmishing with the sling, for the whole of heavily-armed fighting, for tactical maneuvers, for all the movements of armies, including pitching camps, and for whatever one should learn that pertains to horseback riding. There should be common teachers for all these things, hired for pay by the city, and the boys and men in the city must become pupils of these subjects, while the girls and women must become knowers of all these subjects. So long as they're still girls, they should practice all the dancing and fighting that goes with heavy armor; when they get to be women, they should have grasped maneuvers, battle orders, and how to put down and take up weapons. They should do this if for no other reason than for the sake of being fit to do this much at least: to take the responsibility of guarding the children and

the rest of the city if the whole mass of the army with all its power should ever have to leave the city and fight outside. Or then again the opposite could happen (something that no one can swear is impossible): some enemies from abroad, whether barbarians or Greeks, might fall upon them with enormous strength and violence, compelling them to make a fight for the city itself. It would presumably show much evil in the political regime if the women had been so shamefully reared that they didn't do as the birds do (who are willing to run every risk, and even to die, fighting on behalf of their babies against even the strongest beasts), but instead rushed immediately to the temples and crowded around all the altars and inner shrines, bringing down on the race of humans the reputation of being by nature the most cowardly of all the beasts.

Clinias/ By Zeus, stranger, wherever this should happen in a city it would not look good at all, apart from the harm that would be done!

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, won't we establish this as a law, that the women must not neglect the business of war, to this extent, at least, and that it must be a concern of all male citizens and female citizens?

Clinias/ I, at least, go along with this.

Athenian Stranger/ With regard to wrestling we've talked about some things, but what I would declare the most important part we have not discussed, nor is it easy to do so without using bodily demonstrations to accompany one's explanation in speech. So let's pronounce our judgment on this later on, when speech can accompany deed and make clear other things that have been said, and especially that the wrestling we have in mind is really, of all motions, the most akin by far to fighting in war and that the former is to

be practiced for the sake of the latter, and the latter is not to be learned for the sake of the former.

Clinias/ In this respect, at least, you speak nobly.

Athenian Stranger/ So let this much be said by us for now about the power of the wrestling school.

As for the rest of the motion of the body as a whole, one would be speaking correctly if one called the greatest part of this a kind of "dance." It should be held to comprise two forms: one is the imitation of noble bodies in solemn movement, the other is the imitation of shameful bodies in low movement. Then again there are two forms of the low sort and two other forms of the serious sort. One of the serious forms is the imitation of noble bodies entangled in violent exertions during war, where the soul is manly; the other is the imitation where the soul is moderate, in prosperous settings and well-measured pleasures. If someone called such a dance "The Peaceful" he would speak according to nature. The warlike of these, whose essence is different from the peaceful, one would correctly call "The Pyrrhic." It consists in imitating, on the one hand, movements that evade all kinds of blows and missiles—'by dodging, giving way completely, jumping up, humble crouching—and then again striving to imitate the opposites to these, aggressive postures involved in striking with missiles—arrows and javelins—and with all sorts of blows. In dances of this kind, when imitation of good bodies and souls takes place, correctness and vigor are achieved for the most part by keeping the limbs of the bodies straight; such a posture is correct, and the opposite sorts of postures are not considered right.

With regard to the Peaceful dance, one should in each case observe the following—whether in the choral dances a person succeeds in correctly keeping to the noble dance, in

a manner that befits men of good conventions, or whether he does not succeed in doing so according to nature. Now first it is necessary to separate off the controversial dancing from the uncontroversial. What then is this, and how should it be separated off from the other? Whatever dances are Bacchic, and everything that goes with these—the dances in which, as they claim, they imitate as drunks the so-called "Nymphs," "Pans," "Silenuses," and "Satyrs," and thereby celebrate certain purifications and mystery-rites—this entire class of dance is not easily defined either as peaceful or as warlike, or indeed as to just what it intends at any time. To me it seems that just about the most correct way to define it is this: it must be distinguished from the warlike, and distinguished from the peaceful, and one must say that this class of dancing is not political. Let it be, lying in that region, while we return now to the warlike and peaceful dances, since there is no controversy as to whether they are our business.

With regard, then, to what belongs to the unwarlike Muse who is manifested in the dances where men honor the gods and the children of the gods, one whole kind of dance would be that which portrays an opinion of prosperity. This in its turn we would subdivide: one sort, involving more pleasures, would represent people fleeing from certain toils and risks, into good things; the other sort would represent the preservation and augmentation of the aforementioned good things, involving pleasures gentler than those of the others. In such circumstances every human being presumably moves his body more when the pleasures are greater, and less when they are lesser; moreover, the human being who is more orderly and who has a better gymnastic training in courage moves his body less, while the coward and the one who lacks gymnastic training in moderation presents greater and more violent changes in his motion. In general, no one

who is using his voice—whether in songs or in speeches—can remain very calm in his body. That is why, as the imitation through gestures of what is being said came into being, it gave rise to the whole art of dancing. With regard to all these gestures, one of us moves harmoniously, while another moves in ways that are not in harmony. Now we should understand that many of the ancient names are well assigned and according to nature, and therefore deserve our praise: one of these is the name given to the dances of men in prosperity who are themselves handling pleasures in a well-measured way. Whoever it was at that time who named the dances, he spoke correctly, musically, and reasonably, when he gave them all the name "Harmonies," and established two forms of noble dances—the warlike or "Pyrrhic" and the peaceful or "Harmony." In each case he assigned a name that is fitting and harmonious. The lawgiver should go through these dances in outline, while the Guardian of the Laws should seek them out, and, once he has discovered them, should put the dances together with the rest of the music and distribute them among all the holidays, assigning what is suitable to each of the sacrifices. When he has thus sanctified all these things in an ordered arrangement, he should no longer make any change in what pertains to either dance or song. Thus the same city, with citizens that are as similar to one another as possible. should experience the same pleasures, and live well and happily.

This brings to a conclusion the discussion of how beautiful bodies and well-born souls behave in the choral performances that have been prescribed; but it is necessary to look at and get to know what pertains to shameful bodies and thoughts, as well as those who turn themselves to laughter-provoking comedies—through speech and song, dance, and the comic imitations all these contain. For

someone who is going to become prudent can't learn the serious things without learning the laughable, or, for that matter, anything without its opposite. Yet one can't create in both ways if one is to partake of even a small portion of virtue, and indeed one should learn about the ridiculous things just for this reason—so that he may never do or say, through ignorance, anything that is ridiculous, if he doesn't have to. The imitation of such things should be assigned to slaves and to strangers who work for hire. There should never be any seriousness whatsoever about these things, nor should any free person, woman or man, be observed learning these things; in fact, these imitations should always manifest something new. Let the play that provokes laughter, the play we all call "comedy," be thus ordained in law and in argument.

As for what they call the "serious" poets, our tragic poets, suppose some of them should at some time come to us and ask something like this: "Strangers, shall we frequent your city and territory or not? And shall we carry and bring along our poetry, or what have you decided to do about such matters?" What kind of a reply regarding these matters would we correctly give to the divine men? For my part, I think it should be as follows: "Best of strangers," we should say, "we ourselves are poets, who have to the best of our ability created a tragedy that is the most beautiful and the best; at any rate, our whole political regime is constructed as the imitation of the most beautiful and best way of life, which we at least assert to be really the truest tragedy. Now you are poets, and we too are poets of the same things; we are your rivals as artists and performers of the most beautiful drama, which true law alone can by nature bring to perfection—as we hope. So don't suppose that we'll ever easily, at any rate, allow you to come among us, set up your stage in the marketplace, and introduce actors whose

beautiful voices speak louder than ours. Don't suppose we'll easily let you make public speeches to the children and the women and the whole mob, speaking of the same pursuits that we speak of, but saying things that are in great part the most opposite to what we say. For we'd be almost completely mad—we and every city, if it allowed you to do what's just been described, before its rulers had passed a judgment on whether or not the words and practices you had created were to be spoken in its midst or not. Now then, you children descended from the soft Muses, we will first display to the rulers your songs alongside ours; if the things said by you are evidently the same, at least, or better, we will give you a chorus. But if not, friends, we could never do it."

Let these be the lawfully ordained customs as regards the entire choral art and the learning connected with it, the things appropriate for the slaves being kept separate from the things appropriate for the masters—if this is acceptable.

Clinias/ At this point, at any rate, how could it not be acceptable?

Athenian Stranger/ For the freemen there are in addition three subjects to be learned. One subject is calculation and what pertains to numbers; second is measurement of length, surface, and volume, considered as one subject; third is the way the stars revolve, in their natural relation to one another as they move. The many need not labor at all these things to the point of precise accuracy; that will be required of a certain few (who they are we will explain when we get to the end, for that would be fitting). But as for the majority, though it's shameful for the many not to know as many of these things as are in a sense very correctly called "necessary," it isn't easy, in fact it isn't at all possible, for everyone to pursue these studies to the point of precise accuracy. Of course, the necessity that inheres in these subjects can't be dispensed with, and it's likely that whoever

first formulated the proverb about god was looking to these when he said that "even a god is never seen to fight against necessity"—meaning, I believe, whatever necessities are divine. But as applied to human necessities, which the many look to when they utter such a thing, this is by far the most naive of all sayings.

Clinias/ What are the necessities in these subjects, stranger, that are not of this sort, but are instead divine?

Athenian Stranger/ In my opinion, they are those which one cannot avoid acting according to and knowing something about if one would ever become, among human beings, a god or a demon or a hero capable of exercising serious supervision over humans. A human being, at any rate, would fall far short of becoming divine if he couldn't learn about one and two and three and in general the even and odd things, or if he didn't know anything about counting, or if he couldn't number the nights and the days, and lacked familiarity with the orbits of the moon and the sun and the other stars. It is a great stupidity to think that all these aren't necessary subjects of learning for anyone who is going to know almost any of the noblest subjects of learning. What parts of each of these should be learned, and how much, and when, and which should be learned in conjunction with which, and which apart from the others, and in general the way of mixing them all—these are things that should first be grasped correctly, before going on to learn the other subjects to which these subjects lead. For thus has it been established according to natural necessity, which we assert none of the gods fights against now, nor will ever fight against.

Clinias/ It's likely at least, stranger, that what's just now been said has been said correctly somehow, and that what you say is in accordance with nature.

Athenian Stranger/ That is indeed the case, Kleinias—though it is difficult to legislate about these matters in this way beforehand; if it is all right with you, let's legislate in a more precise way at some other time.

Clinias/ You seem to us, stranger, to be frightened off by our habitual lack of familiarity with such things. But you are incorrect in this fear; try to speak up, and hide nothing on this account.

Athenian Stranger/ I do indeed fear what you're now describing, though I fear even more those who have had some contact with these studies but in a bad way. After all, extreme lack of experience in everything is not at all a terrible thing, nor is it the greatest evil; a far greater penalty is incurred by much experience, and much learning, acquired under a bad course of study.

Clinias/ What you say is true.

Athenian Stranger/ So one should declare that the free men must learn, in each of these subjects, as much as the whole mob of children in Egypt learns along with their reading lessons. In the first place, as regards calculations, lessons have been invented even for little children that involve them in play and pleasure as they learn: distributions of certain fruits and garlands so that the same numbers harmonize with more and with less, or distributions of boxers and wrestlers into byes and pairs, in turn and in sequence according to the natural order. Also, in play, they mix together flat bowls of gold, bronze, silver, and other such materials, and then divide them into wholes in various ways. Thus, as I said, by harmonizing the play with the use of numerical necessities they help their students in the ordering of army camps, in marches, and in military campaigns, as well as in their households, and in general make them both more useful to themselves and more

alert human beings. Then after these things they go on to measurements in length and surface and volume, dispelling a certain ridiculous and shameful ignorance which exists by nature in all human beings, as regards all these subjects.

Clinias/ What sort of ignorance is this you're referring to?

Athenian Stranger/ Kleinias my friend, when I myself heard about this at a rather late date, I too was utterly amazed to find what our situation is, in respect to these matters; it seemed to me it was one that belonged not to humanity but to the offspring of certain pigs. I was ashamed not only for myself but for all the Greeks.

Clinias/ About what? Say what it is you're claiming, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ I'm doing so. Or rather I'll show by questioning you. Answer me a small question: presumably you know about length?

Clinias/ How not?

Athenian Stranger/ What then? About surface?

Clinias/ In every way.

Athenian Stranger/ And that these are two things, and that there is a third thing besides these, namely volume?

Clinias/ How could there not be?

Athenian Stranger/ Now don't all these seem to you to be commensurable with one another?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Length, I believe, seems commensurable with length, and surface with surface, and volume, in the same way, seems by nature capable of commensurability.

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ But if some are not capable of it at all—neither "very much so" nor even a little bit—and some

are commensurable and some are not, while you hold that all are, what do you think of your situation in respect to these things?

Clinias/ It's clear that it's wretched.

Athenian Stranger/ And what then? What about length and surface in relation to volume, or surface and length in relation to one another? Don't all we Greeks think about these things this way, as though they are somehow or other commensurable one with another?

Clinias/ Completely.

Athenian Stranger/ But if, again, they are not at all, in any way, and yet, as I said, all we Greeks think they are, wouldn't it be proper to feel ashamed of us all, and say to us "O best of the Greeks, isn't this one of those things which we declared it shameful not to know, although knowing such necessities is not very noble?"

Clinias/ How could it not be?

Athenian Stranger/ And there are, in addition, other matters akin to these, which again involve us in many errors that are the brothers of those errors.

Clinias/ Which matters?

Athenian Stranger/ The relations commensurables and incommensurables have to one another because of a certain nature. For it is necessary to investigate and get to know the difference between these, if one is not to be utterly wretched. By constantly proposing problems of this kind to one another, they should pass their time in a manner much more graceful for old men than playing at draughts, and thus indulge their love of victory in leisure pursuits that are worthy of them.

Clinias/ Perhaps. It is likely, anyway, that draughts and these subjects of learning are not very widely separated from one another.

Athenian Stranger/ For my part, Kleinias, I assert that the young should learn these things. For they aren't harmful or difficult, and if they're learned during play they'll bring benefit, while in no way harming our city. But if someone says otherwise, he should be heard.

Clinias/ How else?

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, if these activities evidently proceed thus, it's clear that we'll judge them acceptable; but if it should appear that they don't proceed in this way, they'll be judged unacceptable.

Clinias/ Clearly, how else?

Athenian Stranger/ So now, stranger, shall these things be laid down as belonging to the required subjects of study, so that there won't be gaps in our laws? Let them be laid down like deposits, outside the rest of the political regime, redeemable in case either we, the depositors, or you, the holders, find the pledge in no way welcome.

Clinias/ You are describing a just deposit.

Athenian Stranger/ Next after these things see if what the young are to learn about the stars suits us, as it's stated, or the opposite.

Clinias/ Just state it.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, there's something very amazing involved in these things, something that's simply intolerable in every way.

Clinias/ What's that?

Athenian Stranger/ With regard to the greatest god, and the cosmos as a whole, we assert that one should not conduct investigations nor busy oneself with trying to discover the causes—for it is not pious to do so. Yet it's likely that if entirely the opposite of this took place it would be correct.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ The thing being said is paradoxical, and one may think it unfitting for older men. But when someone thinks there's a subject of learning that is noble, true, beneficial to the city, and dear in every way to the god, it is in no way possible for him to refrain from telling about it.

Clinias/ What you say is likely; but what subject of this sort will we find in what pertains to the stars?

Athenian Stranger/ Good sirs, all of us Greeks, so to speak, nowadays tell a falsehood about the great gods, Sun and also Moon.

Clinias/ What falsehood?

Athenian Stranger/ We claim they never keep to the same path, and we say there are other stars that also don't, which we name "wanderers."

Clinias/ By Zeus, stranger! This is true, what you say! For in my lifetime I myself have often seen the Morning Star and the Evening Star, and certain others, never going along the same course, but wandering all over the place; and I suppose we all know that the sun and the moon do these things all the time.

Athenian Stranger/ These are the things, Megillus and Kleinias, I now assert that our citizens and our young people, at least, ought to learn about the heavenly gods; they should learn enough about all of these things so that they won't utter blasphemies about them, but will always speak of them auspiciously, while sacrificing or engaged in reverent prayer.

Clinias/ That is correct—if, that is, it is first possible to learn about what you refer to. If so, and if we now say something about them that is incorrect, and through learning will speak correctly, then I too agree that to this

extent, at least, this kind of thing should be learned. These things being so, you try to explain fully what you mean, and we'll try to learn by following you.

Athenian Stranger/ But it isn't easy to learn what I'm speaking of. On the other hand, it isn't totally difficult, nor does it require a great deal of time. The proof is that I, who heard about this when I was no longer young—in fact not so long ago—could make it clear to you two without taking up much time. If the subject were a difficult one, I would never be able, at my age, to make it clear to men of your age.

Clinias/ What you say is true. But what do you claim this subject matter is, that you say is amazing, and appropriate for the young to learn, but that we are ignorant of? Try to explain this much about it, at least, as clearly as possible.

Athenian Stranger/ It ought to be attempted. Best of men, that dogma is incorrect which holds that the moon, the sun, and other stars sometimes wander. The case is entirely the opposite to this: each of them always moves in the same circular path, which is one and not many—though each appears to move in many. Moreover, the swiftest of them is incorrectly opined to be the slowest, and vice versa. If this is the way these things are by nature, but our opinion holds things to be otherwise—well, if in the races of horses or long-distance runners at Olympia we considered things in this way, announcing the fastest as the slowest and the slowest as the fastest, and creating encomia in which we sang of the defeated as though he were victor, I think we would be singing encomia that were both incorrect and not pleasing to the runners, who would be human. But now, when it's the gods that we're making the same mistakes about, don't we suppose that what was laughable and incorrect in the earlier case will be not at all laughable in the present case, and as applied to these—for surely it is not at all pleasing to the

gods for us to be singing hymns about gods that contain a false report?

Clinias/ That is very true, if indeed this is the way these things are.

Athenian Stranger/ So if we do demonstrate that this is the way these things are, then all such things should be learned, to this extent at least, but if the demonstration fails, these things ought to be left alone? Shall we agree in this way about these matters?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ At this point one should declare that the legal customs regarding the subjects of learning that pertain to education have reached their end. But about hunting and all things of that sort one should think in the very same way. For there is a risk that the task of the legislator involves yet more than just the laying down of laws and thus being finished, and that there is something else in addition to laws, something that by nature lies in the middle between admonition and laws. We have come across this often in our discussions, as in those concerning the rearing of very young children. We assert that these things shouldn't be left unmentioned, but that to suppose, in speaking about them, that they are being laid down as laws would be great folly. Indeed, even when the laws and the whole political regime have been thus written down, the praise accorded to the citizen distinguished as regards virtue is not complete when someone declares that he serves the laws best and is especially obedient to them, and that this constitutes a good man. A more perfect sort of praise is that which speaks of a man who has passed his life in unbroken obedience to those writings in which the lawgiver legislates, praises, and blames. This is the speech that is most correct as regards praise of a citizen. And what is really required of a lawgiver

is that he write not only laws, but, in addition to laws, things interwoven with the laws, writings that reveal what seems noble and ignoble to him. The highest citizen is limited by these things no less than by the things sanctioned by legal penalties. We would make clearer what we mean if we brought forward as a sort of witness the present subject matter.

For hunting is a very widely extended activity even though it is now comprehended, for the most part, in a single name. There is much hunting of things in water, and much of winged things, and very much of beasts who move on their feet, which includes not only wild beasts but also a hunting of human beings which is worth reflection. One sort occurs in warfare, but there is also a great deal of hunting—sometimes praiseworthy, sometimes blamable—that occurs through friendship. The assaults of robbers and of armies against armies are hunts. Now the lawgiver who is laying down the laws about hunting can't avoid clarifying these things, and yet he can't establish threatening legal customs that give orders and penalties to every sort of hunting. So what should be done about such matters? The one party, the lawgiver, ought to praise and blame what pertains to hunting with a view to the exercises and practices of the young; the other party, the young man, should obey what he hears, without allowing himself to be deflected either by pleasure or by toil. At the same time, he should honor more, and carry out more fully, the orders uttered in praises than either the threats accompanied by penalties or the things legislated.

Having said these things as a preliminary, what would come next is a measured praise and blame as regards hunting; there should be praise for the sort that makes the souls of the young better and blame for the opposite sorts.

So let's say what comes next in order, addressing the young through prayer:

"O friends, may you never be seized by a desire or an erotic love for hunting on the sea, for angling, or in general for hunting of the animals that dwell in water, or for those basket-traps that perform the toil of a lazy hunt, whether the hunters are awake or asleep! May there never come over you a longing for the catching of humans by sea, and piracy, and may you never thus be made cruel and lawless hunters! May it never enter your minds in the least to engage in theft, in the countryside or in the city! May a seductive, erotic love of bird-hunting, which is hardly a liberal pursuit, never come over any of the young!

"What is left for our athletes is only the hunting and catching of animals that move on their feet. One branch of this, practiced by men who take turns sleeping, is called night-hunting; it belongs to idle men and is not worthy of praise. The same holds for the sort of hunting that provides periods of rest from toils because the hunters depend on nets and snares, instead of on the victory of a soul that likes struggle, to handle the fierce strength of the wild beasts. What alone remains and is best for everyone is the hunting of four-footed prey that employs horses, dogs, and the bodies of the hunters themselves. In this type the hunters use running, blows, and missiles thrown by their own hands to prevail Over all their prey, and this is the type that should be practiced by whoever cultivates the courage that is divine."

Let the speech just uttered constitute the praise and blame pertaining to all these things; the law is as follows:

No one is to prevent these hunters, who are really sacred, from hunting with dogs whenever and however they please, but no one is ever to allow the night-hunter, who trusts in

nets and traps, to hunt anywhere. The bird-hunter is not to be hindered on land that is not in use or on mountainsides, but anyone who happens along should put a stop to it on cultivated or sacred land. The water-hunter is not to be hindered, except in harbors, sacred streams, ponds, and reservoirs. Elsewhere he is permitted to hunt, so long as he doesn't muddy the waters with juices.

So now at this point one should declare that all the legal customs that pertain to education have reached their end.

Clinias/ And nobly would you say it.

Book 8.

Athenian Stranger/ Following on these things, the festivals need to be arranged and legislated. Delphic oracles will help indicate which sacrifices, to which of the gods, it would be better and more agreeable for the city to perform; but as for when they should take place, and what their number should be, that legislation is probably up to us—at least in the case of some of the festivals.

Clinias/ Probably as regards the number.

Athenian Stranger/ The number, then, is what we should speak of first. Let there be three hundred sixty-five without any omissions, so that there will always be at least one magistrate performing a sacrifice to some god or demon, on behalf of the city, the people, and their possessions. The Interpreters, Priests and Priestesses, and Diviners should get together with the appointed Guardians of the Laws to arrange whatever the lawgiver is forced to leave incomplete in regard to these matters. These same persons are the ones who must determine just what he has left incomplete. The law itself will proclaim twelve festivals for the twelve gods, each of whom has a tribe named after him. They'll make sacred monthly sacrifices to each of these, along with choruses, musical contests, and gymnastic contests, distributing them in a way that befits both the gods themselves and each of the seasons. They'll also distribute women's festivals, both those that are appropriately celebrated apart from the men and those that are not. Furthermore, what pertains to the underworld gods should not be mixed with what pertains to the gods whom we ought to call "heavenly" or with what belongs to them; these underworld rites they should keep separate and assign, according to law, to Pluto's month, the twelfth month. Nor should warlike human beings abhor such a god; they should

rather honor him as being always the best for the human race, because, I would seriously affirm, for soul and body, community is not superior to dissolution.

In addition to these things, those who are going to make adequate distinctions in these affairs should keep in mind some such things as the following: one wouldn't find, nowadays, another city the equal of ours in its provision of leisure time or of the necessities, but it is nonetheless necessary for this city, just as for a single human being, to live well. Now those who live happily must first avoid doing injustice to others and suffering injustice themselves at the hands of others. Of these two, the former is not very difficult, but what is very difficult is acquiring the power that prevents being done injustice—this cannot be completely achieved unless one becomes completely good. This very same thing applies to a city: if it becomes good it lives a life of peace, but it lives a life of external and internal war if it is evil. Since this is just about the way things are, no one should wait until wartime to exercise the gymnastic of war, but all should do so while living at peace. So any city that possesses intelligence should engage in army maneuvers not less than one day every month, and even more if the rulers think it advisable. They should exercise paying no heed to cold or hot weather—themselves and their women and children as well—whenever the rulers think it fitting to lead the whole populace out; then at other times they'll be led out in sections. They should always be devising noble games to accompany the sacrifices, so that there'll be certain festival battles that imitate as clearly as possible the battles of war. On every such occasion prizes should be distributed for victory or prowess, and they should compose for one another poems of praise and blame that reflect what sort of person each is becoming both in the contests and in life as a whole, adorning the one who seems to be best and blaming the one

who does not. And the poet who composes such things shouldn't be just anyone. First of all, he must be at least fifty years of age; then again, he can't be one of those who possess poetry and the Muse within themselves in an adequate way, but have never performed a noble and conspicuous deed. What should be sung are the poems of those who are good and honored in the city, those who are artists of noble deeds, even if their compositions are not by nature musical. The selection of these men will belong to the Educator and the other Guardians of the Laws. They will give to these men the prize of being the only ones who may have freedom of speech in musical compositions, while all the others will lack this privilege. Let no one dare to sing a Muse judged unseemly by the Guardians of the Laws, not even if She is sweeter than the hymns of Thamyrus or Orpheus; instead, let them sing the poems that have been judged sound and consecrated to the gods, as well as the songs of blame or praise composed by good men who are judged to have spoken in a well-measured way. As regards both the military and the freedom of speech in poetry, I say that the same regulations should apply equally to women and to men.

Now there are some other considerations the lawgiver ought to alert himself to, by reasoning with himself: "Come now, what sort of people am I rearing by putting together this entire city? Aren't they athletes in the greatest of contests, in which they are confronted with tens of thousands of competitors?"—"Certainly," someone who spoke correctly would reply. —"What then? If we had been rearing boxers, or pancratiasts, or athletes in some other of such contests, would we have entered the competition without having spent the time before in daily fighting practice against someone? If we were boxers, at any rate, wouldn't we for very many days before the contest have been learning to fight and practicing, imitating all those things we

intended to use later on when we fought for victory, and coming as close as we could to resemblance, putting on padded gloves instead of thongs in order to do what we could to practice in an adequate way the striking and eluding of blows? And if we ran short of gymnastic sparring partners would we fear the laughter of mindless people, and not dare to hang up a dummy lacking any soul, and carry out our gymnastic against that? And if we then ran short of both all the opponents with souls and opponents without souls, in the absence of gymnastic partners wouldn't we dare to literally shadowbox against ourselves? Or what else would someone ever call the sort of practice where one just gesticulates?"

Clinias/ Probably nothing other than what you've just said, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Will the fighting force of our city dare to enter the greatest of contests, each time, with a preparation inferior to that of the contests just mentioned? Is this the way it would enter the contest where what is at stake is the soul, children, property, and the whole city? Will their lawgiver, because he fears that the way they carry on these gymnastic exercises with one another might appear ridiculous to some, fail to legislate military exercises of a minor sort, without heavy arms, for nearly every day? Will he fail to aim at this in setting up choruses and the whole gymnastic art? Won't he order that certain major gymnastic exercises with heavy arms be held no less than once a month, where they must struggle with one another over every point of the territory, competing to capture "positions and set ambushes? Won't he have them imitate the whole art of war so that they are actually "fighting with padded practice gloves," using missiles that come as near as possible to true ones, though with less risky weapons? That way, the play they engage in with one another will not be

altogether lacking in fear, and through the fear it will in a certain way make apparent who has a stout soul and who does not; as a result, couldn't he correctly assign honors to the former and dishonor to the latter, thereby equipping the whole city to be serviceable in the true contest it must wage throughout life? And moreover, if someone should die as a result of these exercises, wouldn't the murder be considered involuntary, and wouldn't the lawgiver decree that the killer's hands are clean once he's undergone the lawful purification, figuring that not many human beings will die this way, and that others no worse will grow to take their place, but that if fear should, as it were, die, then he could not find another way of testing, in all such exercises, who is better and who is worse, and that for the city this would be a much greater evil?

Clinias/ We at least would go along in declaring, stranger, that such things should be legislated and practiced by the whole city.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we all know the reason why in cities nowadays such choral activity and contests are almost in no way practiced, except perhaps to a very small degree? Shall we assert that the situation is due to the ignorance of the many and of those who give them their laws?

Clinias/ Probably.

Athenian Stranger/ Not at all, O blessed Kleinias! One should assert there are two quite sufficient causes of these things.

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ One is the erotic love of wealth, that prevents a person from having leisure to look after anything except his private possessions; hanging on these, the entire soul of every citizen would never be capable of caring for anything other than daily gain. Whatever learning or

practice conduces to this, everyone in private is most eager to learn or pursue—but the rest he laughs at. This single thing, then, is one reason that should be stated to explain why a city is unwilling to undertake in a serious way this or any other noble and good activity, but, on account of an insatiable greed for gold and silver, every man is willing to put up with every art and contrivance, whether it be more noble or more unseemly, if it will make him wealthy, and is willing to perform without disgust any action, whether pious, or impious, or utterly shameful, if only it gives him, like a beast, the power to eat and drink all sorts of things and provides him with total gratification of every sexual lust.

Clinias/ That is correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Let this, then—which I'm stating—be set down as one cause that prevents cities from practicing everything else noble and in particular the adequate preparations for war; it turns those; human beings who are orderly by nature into merchants, commercial ship traders, and complete servants, and makes those who are courageous into pirates, housebreakers, temple; robbers, warriors, and tyrannical types—and sometimes they: aren't deficient in nature, but-only in luck.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ How could I not speak of them as totally unlucky—those, at any rate, who are compelled to live out their lives with their; own souls always hungry?

Clinias/ So this is one—now what do you say the second cause is, stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ It's fine of you to remind me.

Clinias/ This is one, you're saying—a lifelong, insatiable quest that leaves each man without leisure, and becomes an obstacle to each man's noble preparation for war. So be it. Now say what the second cause is.

Athenian Stranger/ Do I give the impression that I'm failing to speak and taking up time because I'm at a loss?

Clinias/ No, but you do give us the impression that you're so filled with hatred that you chastise this sort of disposition more than is required by the present argument.

Athenian Stranger/ You have rebuked me in a very fine way, strangers. And it's likely that you would like to hear what comes next.

Clinias/ So speak!

Athenian Stranger/ I at least affirm that the causes are the nonregimes which I've often mentioned in the earlier arguments—democracy and oligarchy and tyranny. None of these is a regime, but all would most correctly be termed "factions." For none of them constitutes a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects, but instead a voluntary rule, always with some violence, over involuntary subjects. Since he is afraid, the one ruling will never voluntarily allow the one ruled to become noble, or wealthy, or strong, or courageous, or in any way warlike. These, then, are the two principal causes of nearly everything, and certainly of the things just mentioned. Now the present regime, which we are legislating, has escaped both of the causes we've described. For it presumably dwells in the greatest leisure, and they are free as regards one another, and because of these laws they would be the least likely, I think, to become lovers of money. So it's likely and reasonable that the establishing of such a regime would, alone of all existing regimes, allow for the warrior education and play that has been elaborated, once the elaboration has been correctly completed in speech.

Clinias/ Nobly spoken.

Athenian Stranger/ Following on these things, shouldn't it be borne in mind, in regard to all the gymnastic contests, that any which are for the sake of war are to be practiced

and to have victory prizes, but any which are not are to be passed over? But it would be better if their character were described and legislated from the beginning. First of all, shouldn't one set up the contests in running and in speed generally?

Clinias/ Yes, that's what should be set up.

Athenian Stranger/ Surely the most important thing for war is total bodily keenness, one part of which pertains to the feet and the other to the hands. Keenness of the feet allows one to flee and to effect captures, while the other is for the dose, stand-up fighting that requires sturdiness and strength.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Neither is of very great use, however, without weapons.

Clinias/ How could it be?

Athenian Stranger/ First, then, our herald will call the stade runner to the contests, just as is done nowadays, but the runner will come forth fully armed: we won't establish prizes for an unarmed contestant. So first will come the contestant who runs the stade with heavy weapons, second the double-stade runner, third the horse-length runner, fourth the long-distance runner, and fifth will be a race in which the first, armed, runner is called "heavily-armed" because of the weight of arms he carries, and whom we'll require to run a length of sixty stades over more level ground to some temple of Ares and back, while his competitor, an archer fully equipped in archer's gear, is required to run one hundred stades over hills and all sorts of ground to some temple of Apollo and Artemis, and then back. Having set up the contest we'll await their return and then give the victory prizes to each of the winners.

Clinias/ Correctly spoken.

Athenian Stranger/ We should think of these contests as divided into three categories, one for children, one for the beardless boys, and one for the men. For the beardless boys we should set races of two-thirds length and for the children races of half-length, whether they contend as archers or in full armor. As for the women, girls who have not reached puberty should compete naked in the stade, double-stade, horse-length, and long-distance run, within the racing stadium itself; unmarried girls over thirteen should continue to take part at least until they are eighteen, but not after they have reached twenty, and they should come down to compete in these races clothed in suitable garments. Let these be the arrangements for races, for men and women.

With regard to contests of strength, instead of the wrestling matches and all those other sorts of difficult contests held nowadays, there'll be combat in heavy armor—one against one, and two against two, and so on up to ten against ten competing with one another. What it is one needs to avoid or to inflict in order to win, and how much of this one must succeed in doing, is something that should be determined just as is done now in wrestling, where those who are involved in wrestling have themselves established laws regulating what action belongs to fine wrestling and what to wrestling that isn't fine: in the same way, those who are the top fighters in heavy armor should be called in and asked to help lay down laws determining who is justly the victor in these battles and what it is such a victor should avoid or inflict, and similarly what rules decide who is defeated. The same things should be legislated for the females who are not yet married.

The fighting part of the pankration should be replaced by the whole art of lightly-armed combat, with bows and arrows, light shields, javelins, and stones thrown by hand or by slings. There should be laws regulating these competitors

also, distributing prizes and victories to the one who most nobly fulfills the conventions.

Next in order after these things would come legislation about contests with horses. But we don't have much use for horses in any great number, inasmuch as we're in Crete, so it's inevitable that there's not much serious attention paid either to their rearing or to contests for them. No one at all maintains a chariot among us, nor would there be any appreciable love of honor connected with these matters, so that to set up contests of this sort, not native to the land, would both seem and be mindless. But if we were to establish prizes for single horsemen—riding on colts who have not yet shed their foal teeth, horses whose age is between full-grown horses and such colts, and full-grown horses—we would be establishing a sport for horses that is suitable to the nature of the land. So let there be lawful contests and competitions for victory among such riders, and let the Tribe Commanders and Cavalry Commanders share in judging both all the races themselves and the dismounting armed competitors. We would legislate incorrectly if we were to establish contests for those without weapons either in gymnastics or in the present case; and since the mounted Cretan archer or javelin thrower is not without value, let there be strife and contests, for the sake of play, in these categories too. It isn't worth the trouble to compel females, by laws and commands, to take a common share in these contests, but if from a habitual disposition developed in the earlier games their nature permits such activity and does not take it ill, then girls and virgins should be allowed to participate without incurring blame.

Now at this point contests, and the learning of the gymnastic art—both what pertains to contests and what we must work at each day in school—are subjects that have been entirely completed. Most of the subject of music has

also been similarly completed, although the arrangements for rhapsodes, their retinue, and the necessary choral contests during the festivals will be made after the months and days and years have been assigned to the gods and those who accompany the gods; at that point it can be determined whether the festivals are to be held every third year or every fifth year, or how and in what way they are to be distributed, in accordance with the indications the gods may give of their preferences as to the order. On the same occasions it is to be expected that the musical contests will be held, each in turn. They will have been arranged by the Regulators of the Games, the Educator of the Young, and the Guardians of the Laws, who will have met together and become themselves legislators in these matters. They will decide, with respect to all choruses and choral contests, when they are to be held, who is to perform, and who is to accompany the performers. The first lawgiver has often explained what ought to be established for each contest as regards the words, the songs, and the harmoniae mixed with rhythms and dances; the lawgivers who come second should follow these guidelines as they take up the task, arranging, at appropriate times, contests that befit each sacrifice, and thus giving the city its festivals to celebrate.

It isn't difficult to know how these and other such matters should be put in lawful order, and if they are altered here and there the city would neither gain much nor suffer much of a penalty. But there are other matters which make no small difference, about which it is difficult to be persuasive, and which are in fact the task of the god, if it were somehow possible to get the orders themselves from him; as things stand now, what is required, in all probability, is some daring human being, who by giving unusual honor to outspokenness will say what in his opinion is best for the city and the citizens. Speaking before an audience of corrupt

souls, he will order what is fitting and becoming to the whole political regime; opposing the greatest desires, and having no human ally, all alone he will follow reason alone.

Clinias/ Just what argument is it again that we're now pronouncing, stranger? For we don't yet understand.

Athenian Stranger/ That's not surprising; I'll try to explain it to you yet more clearly. When I arrived, in the course of the argument, at education, I saw young men and young women mixing together affectionately. As might be expected, a fear came over me as I reflected on the problem of how someone will manage a city like this, in which young men and women are well reared, and released from the severe and illiberal tasks that do the most to quench wantonness; and where sacrifices, festivals, and choruses are the preoccupations of everyone throughout their whole lives. How, in this city, will they ever avoid the desires that frequently cast many down into the depths, the desires that reason, striving to become law, orders them to avoid? It won't be surprising if the legal customs ordained earlier should predominate over the mass of desires: the fact that it's impossible to get terrifically rich is. no small benefit to moderation; the education as a whole has well-measured laws that promote such things; and in addition, there is the trained eye of the rulers which never looks elsewhere but is always watching things, including the young themselves, so as to limit the other desires as much, at least, as is humanly possible. But with regard to the erotic love of and for children—both male and female—and the erotic love of women for men and of men for women, whence tens of thousands of things have happened to human beings in private and to whole cities, how could one take proper precautions? And what sort of medicine will one apply, in each of these cases, so as to find an escape from the danger? It is in no way easy, Kleinias. For although in quite a few

other matters Crete as a whole and Lacedaimon have been decent enough to give us considerable aid as we establish laws that differ from the ways of many, in regard to erotic things—speaking now among ourselves—they are totally opposed to us. If someone were to follow nature and lay down the law that prevailed before Laius, if he were to say that it was correct to avoid, with males and youths, sexual relations like those one has with females, bringing as a witness the nature of the beasts and demonstrating that males don't touch males with a view to such things because it is not according to nature to do so, his argument would probably be unpersuasive, and not at all in consonance with your cities.

But in addition, these practices do not agree with what we assert should always be the object of the lawgiver's care. For we are always seeking which establishments are conducive to virtue and which are not. Come, suppose we were to agree that the present legislation says this sort of activity is noble or at least in no way shameful, to what extent would this help us promote virtue? Will a courageous disposition be nourished in the soul of the seduced, or will the offspring of the idea of a moderate man be nourished in the soul of the seducer? Or isn't it the case that nobody would ever be seduced by such claims, but rather everyone expects just the opposite, blaming the softness of the one who gives in to the pleasures and is incapable of mastering them, and reproving the resemblance in image presented by the one who undertakes the imitation of the female? What human being will ever legislate such a practice as this? Hardly anyone, at least if he has true law in his mind. But how then do we affirm that this is true? If someone is going to think these things through in a correct manner, he must necessarily examine the nature of friendship, of desire, and of what are called "the erotic desires." For there are two

entities here, and from their combination comes yet a third form, but because they are all given just one name, total confusion and obscurity is created.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, presumably we use the term "friend" to characterize the relationship between similars in point of virtue, and also the relationship between equals; then again, the term "friend" also characterizes the needy in its relationship to the wealthy, where they are opposite in kind. And when either of these becomes vehement, we name it "erotic love."

Clinias/ That is correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Now the friendship between opposites is terrible and savage, and is seldom mutual among us, while the friendship between those who are similar is gentle and mutual throughout life. As for the friendship that is a mixture of these, it is in the first place not easy to learn what the one who has this third erotic attraction might ever want to obtain for himself. Moreover, because he's drawn in opposite directions by the two loves, he finds himself at a loss, with one bidding him to pick the bloom of youth and the other telling him not to. For the man who loves the body, hungering for the bloom as for ripe fruit, bids himself take his fill without honoring the disposition of soul of the beloved. The other sort of lover holds the desire for the body to be secondary; looking at it rather than loving it, with his soul he really desires the soul of the other and considers the gratification of body by body to be wantonness. He holds in awe and reverence what is moderate, courageous, magnificent, and prudent, and would wish to remain always chaste with a beloved who is chaste. This love mixed from these two is the one we characterized a moment ago as the "third."

Since this is how many categories there are, should the law exclude all of them and prevent them from arising among us, or isn't it obvious that we would want to have in our city the type which belongs to virtue and desires that the youth become as excellent as possible, while we would forbid the other two, if we could? What shall we say, Megillus, my friend?

Megillus/ What you have said now about these particular matters is in every way fine, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ It looks like—as I guessed—I've obtained your harmonious assent, dear friend. I don't need to inquire what the law among your people thinks about such things—it's sufficient to accept your agreement to the argument. Later on I'll come back to these same matters and try to use incantations to persuade Kleinias. For now let's let it stand that you've both granted assent to me, and so proceed through all the laws.

Megillus/ Very correctly spoken.

Athenian Stranger/ In order to establish this law, I have now a certain art, which will be in one respect easy to employ but in another respect extremely difficult in every way.

Megillus/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably, we know that even at the present time most human beings, however lawless they may be, nevertheless punctiliously refrain from intercourse with beautiful persons, and do so not involuntarily, but with the greatest possible willingness.

Megillus/ When do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ When the beautiful person is one's brother or sister. Moreover, with regard to a son or daughter, the same unwritten law guards in a very effective way, as it were, against touching them—by open or secret sleeping together, or by any other sort of embracing. In fact, among

the many there isn't the slightest desire for this sort of intercourse.

Megillus/ What you're saying is true.

Athenian Stranger/ And isn't it just a little phrase that quenches all such pleasures?

Megillus/ What phrase are you referring to?

Athenian Stranger/ The phrase that declares these things are not at all pious, but are hateful to the gods and the most shameful of shameful things. Isn't the cause the fact that no one ever says anything else, but from the moment of birth each of us hears people saying these things, always and everywhere? In jokes and in every serious tragedy isn't it frequently said, and when they bring on Thyestes-figures or certain Oedipuses, or certain Macareuses, who secretly have intercourse with their sisters, isn't it seen that they promptly inflict upon themselves the just punishment of death for their crime?

Megillus/ You are quite correct to this extent: when no one ever even tries to breathe against the law in any way, then the pronouncement has an amazing power.

Athenian Stranger/ So what was said a moment ago is correct: when a lawgiver wishes to enslave a certain desire which especially enslaves human beings, it's easy to know, at least, how he should handle it. By having everyone—slaves, free men, children, women, the whole city in agreement together—hold this pronouncement to be something sacred, he will have succeeded in making this law very firm.

Megillus/ That's certainly so. But now how it will ever be possible to arrange things so that everyone is willing to say such a thing—

Athenian Stranger/ —It's fine of you to take me up this way. For this was the very thing I said, that in regard to this

law I had an art that would promote the natural use of sexual intercourse for. the production of children—by abstaining on the one hand from intercourse with males, the deliberate killing of the human race, as well as from the wasting of sperm on rocks or stones where it will never take root and generate a natural offspring, and on the other hand by abstaining from any female field in which you wouldn't wish your sperm to grow. If this law becomes permanent and holds sway (if it were justly victorious in the other cases, as it is now in regard to intercourse on the part of parents), tens of thousands of good things would result. For in the first place, it is laid down according to nature; then too, it will prevent erotic frenzy and madness, as well as all adulteries, and all excessive drinking and eating, and will make men familiar with and dear to their own wives. Indeed, there are very many other good things that would come to pass, if someone had enough control to pass this law. But if there were standing here some vehement young man full of a lot of sperm who had been listening to the laying down of the law, he would probably revile us for setting up mindless and impossible customs, and would fill the air with his clamor. It was with a view to such that I made my pronouncement, about a certain art I possessed, in one respect the easiest of all things to apply and in another respect the most difficult, which would promote the permanent establishment of this law. It's very easy to understand that it's possible and in what way: we assert that if this custom is sufficiently sanctified, it will enslave every soul and instill it with a fear that will insure its total obedience to the established laws. But a point has now been reached where it doesn't seem that this law would take hold even under those conditions. The same sort of thing occurs in the case of the practice of common meals—it's not believed that an entire city can live practicing this throughout its life. Yet the disbelief was

refuted by the deed, by the fact that it actually came to pass among your people—although with regard to women it still doesn't seem natural to your cities. It's because of this, because of the strength such disbelief possesses, that I have described both these practices as things that are very difficult to make permanent in the law.

Megillus/ What you say is correct, at any rate.

Athenian Stranger/ But do you want me to try to present to you two a somewhat persuasive argument to the effect that it is not beyond human ability, but is in fact possible?

Clinias/ Sure, why not?

Athenian Stranger/ Would someone more easily refrain from sexual things, and be more willing to follow in a measured way the relevant ordinance, if his body were in good shape and not lacking in training, or if it were in poor shape?

Clinias/ Much more easily, I suppose, if he's not lacking in training.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, don't we know by hearsay about Iccus of Tarentum, because he competed in the Olympian and other contests? He was so filled with love of victory, and possessed in his soul such art, and such courage mixed with moderation, that he never touched a woman—or a boy, for that matter—during the entire time of his intensive training. So the account goes. The same account is presumably given of Crison, and Astylus, and Diopompus, and very many others. And their souls were much less well educated than the citizens that belong to me and you, Kleinias, while their bodies were much more full blooded.

Clinias/ It's true, as you say, that the ancient stories confidently report these things as really having happened with regard to these athletes.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Those fellows, for the sake of victory in wrestling and running and that sort of thing, had the heart to refrain from an activity that the many say is happy; now will our children be unable to restrain themselves for the sake of a much nobler victory, whose great beauty we will have, it is likely, enchanted them with from the time they were babies, using spellbinding myths, speeches, and songs?

Clinias/ Which victory?

Athenian Stranger/ The victory over pleasures. If they master pleasures they will live happily, but if they're defeated by them they'll experience entirely the opposite. And besides, can't we expect that their fear that the thing is in no way pious will give us the capacity to master what people inferior to these have shown the capacity to master?

Clinias/ That's likely, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ Since we've come to such a pass with regard to this custom, having fallen into perplexity because of the depravity of the many, I assert that the only thing left for our custom to do is to plunge on, saying that our citizens must not be inferior to the birds and many of the other beasts, who are born amid great flocks and live celibate, pure, and chaste, until the time of child-rearing; then when they arrive at this age they pair off, male with female according to preference, and female with male, and live out the rest of their lives in pious and just fashion, remaining steadfast to the first agreements of friendship. Now surely they ought to be superior to the beasts, at least! But, if they become corrupted by the other Greeks and most of the barbarians, by seeing among themselves and hearing about the very great power of the so-called "disorderly Aphrodite," and so are incapable of mastering it, then the Guardians of

the Laws, becoming lawgivers, will have to devise for them a second law.

Clinias/ What law would you advise them to establish, if the one being laid down now escapes them?

Athenian Stranger/ Obviously the one that comes right after this one would be the second law, Kleinias.

Clinias/ Which do you refer to?

Athenian Stranger/ The strength of the pleasures should, as much as possible, be deprived of gymnastic exercise by using other exercises to turn its flow and growth elsewhere in the body. This would be the case if the indulgence in sexual things never occurred without a sense of awe. For if shame made their indulgence rare, the infrequency would weaken the sway over them Of this mistress. So let it be the custom laid down in habit and unwritten law, that among them it is noble to engage in these activities if one escapes notice, but shameful if one doesn't escape notice—though they are not to abstain entirely. Thus our law would come to possess a second-rank standard of the shameful and the noble, a second-rank correctness, and those whose natures have been corrupted—whom we proclaim to be "weaker than themselves"—being one tribe, would be surrounded and forcibly prevented from disobeying the law by three tribes.

Clinias/ Which are these?

Athenian Stranger/ Reverence for the gods, and also love of honor, and being desirous not of bodies but of the beautiful characteristics of souls. These things that have now been said, perhaps as if in a myth, are prayers; if they should come to pass they would bring about by far the best effects in all cities. But maybe, if a god would be willing, we could enforce one of two ordinances regarding erotic matters:

Either no one is to dare to touch any well-born and free person except the woman who is his wife, and no one is to sow unhallowed, bastard sperm in concubines or go against nature and sow sterile seed in males; or we should abolish erotic activity between males altogether, and in the case of women, if anyone should have sexual intercourse with a woman other than those who enter his house with the sanction of the gods and the sacred marriage ceremonies, whether they be purchased or secured in any other way, and fails to escape the notice of all men and women, we would probably seem to be legislating correctly if we legislated that he should be barred from all honors in the city on the grounds that he is really a stranger.

Let this law, whether it ought to be called one law or two, be laid down concerning sexual matters and all the erotic things: it regulates our mingling with one another caused by such desires, both when we act correctly and when we act incorrectly.

Megillus/ Stranger, I would readily accept this law from you, but Kleinias ought to express for himself what he thinks of these matters.

Clinias/ That will be done, Megillus, when I think an opportune time has arrived. For now, let's allow the stranger to go ahead still further with the laws.

Megillus/ Correctly spoken.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, if we go ahead we find that we're now just about at the point where the common meals have been set up. We assert that elsewhere this would create difficulty, but that in Crete nobody would suppose there ought to be any other arrangement. As to the way they are to be organized—whether as they are here or as they are in Lacedaimon, or whether there is yet some third form of common meals better than both of these two—I don't think

it's a very difficult matter to figure out, and no great advantage is to be had by figuring it out: they're well-arranged now.

Following upon these things is the arranging of the means of livelihood, and the way in which these meals are to be supplied. In other cities there would be many kinds of food from many sources, and they would have at least twice the resources of these people, since most Greeks get what pertains to nourishment from both the land and the sea, while these people get it from the land alone. For the lawgiver this makes things easier. They'll need only half as many laws, or even far less than half, and the laws are more fitting for free human beings. The lawgiver for this city can just say good-bye to most of what pertains to ship-owning, wholesale trading, retail merchandising, innkeeping, customs duties, mining, loans, compound interest, and tens of thousands of other such things, and proceed to give laws regulating farmers, herdsmen, beekeepers, and those who guard such things and take care of the tools. The most important things have already been taken care of in legislation—marriage, the generation and rearing of children, and then also education and the institution of ruling officers in the city. Now he is compelled to turn to the legislation concerning food and those who work to provide it.

In the first place, there should be laws named "The Farming Laws." The first, belonging to Zeus the god of boundaries, should run as follows:

No one is to move the boundary markers of the earth, neither when they belong to a neighbor who is one of his fellow-citizens nor when he possesses a boundary at the edge, adjoining another foreigner; one should hold that the saying about moving the immovable truly applies to this. Everyone should prefer to try to move an enormous rock that is not a boundary marker rather than move a little stone that

marks the boundary—protected by an oath to the gods—between friendly and enemy land. In the former case, Zeus the god of tribal kinship is the witness, while in the latter case it is Zeus the god of strangers; when either is aroused, most hateful wars follow.

He who obeys the law would not experience the evils that attend it, but he who shows contempt for the law would become liable to two penalties—one, and the first, from the gods and the second from the law:

Let no one voluntarily move the boundary markers of his neighbors' land. If someone should move them, let anyone who wishes report him to the farmers involved, and they shall take him to court. If someone is convicted of such an offense, it will be up to the court to estimate what the loser should suffer or pay, as one convicted of attempting to redistribute the land in secret and by force.

Next after this are the many petty injuries neighbors do to one another which, because of repetition, instill immense hatred and bring about a harsh and very bitter relationship among neighbors. On this account every care must be taken by a neighbor to refrain from doing anything inimical to his neighbor, in other respects and especially as regards any encroachment; for it's not difficult but is in fact in the power of any human being to do harm, while it's by no means everyone who can do a benefit.

Anyone who oversteps boundaries and encroaches on a neighbor must pay for the damages and, in order to be cured of lack of awe and illiberality, must pay the injured party an additional amount equal to twice the damages. Field Regulators are to take cognizance of these and all such things and are to act as judges and assessors; in the case of graver offenses, as was said earlier, the entire twelfth part is to preside, while in the case of lesser offenses just the

Commanders. If anyone lets his cattle graze on someone else's land, they are to inspect the damage and then arrive at a judgment and assessment. If anyone appropriates someone else's bee swarms, working on the pleasure bees take in certain noises and thus getting them to like him, he is to pay for the damages. If someone while burning wood is negligent of his neighbor's wood, he is to pay whatever penalty the magistrates think appropriate. If someone plants trees but fails to leave between them and his neighbor's land an adequate gap, such as has been adequately stated by many lawgivers—whose laws one ought to make use of, and not demand that the great orderer of the city legislate about everything, including all the numerous petty affairs that can be handled by any run-of-the-mill lawgiver.

For instance, with regard to the water supply for farms, there are some ancient and fine laws laid down that aren't worthy of irrigating the discussion; but still, anyone who wishes to draw water to his land may go ahead and do so, starting from the common streams; he must not tap the above ground springs of any private individual, but he can lead the water along any course he wants so long as he avoids houses, certain temples, and memorial markers, and does no damage except the actual digging of the channel. If there are some naturally dry districts where Zeus's water just runs off the land in streams and the necessary drinking water is lacking, one should dig down in his own land until he reaches clay earth, and if at that level he still fails to strike any water, he is to obtain from his neighbors the necessary drinking water for each member of his household. If the neighbors have only just enough for themselves, the Field Regulators should fix a ration of the water and he must go and get this each day, thus sharing water with his neighbors. When Zeus's water comes pouring down, if someone who lives below another or shares a boundary line

with him does damage by not allowing excess water to flow off the farm of the one above, or if the opposite happens, if the one above is careless about the runoff and does damage to the one below, and on account of this they aren't willing to come to some common agreement between themselves about these matters, anybody who wishes can call in a City Regulator (in the city) or a Field Regulator (in the country); he is to arrange what each of the parties ought to do. If someone fails to abide by the arrangement, he is indictable for having an envious and ill-humored soul; if convicted he must pay double the damages to the injured party for not having been willing to obey the magistrates.

The Harvest should be shared by all in some such way as the following. This goddess in Her graciousness has given us two gifts, the plaything of Dionysus which is not stored, and the fruit which by nature is put away and kept. So this is the law that should be ordained regarding the Harvest:

Whoever tastes of field fruits, grapes or figs, before the vintage season that coincides with the rising of Arcturus—whether it be from his own lands or from that of others—must, if he plucked the fruit from his own fields, pay fifty drachmas sacred to Dionysus; if from the neighbors', a mina; if from others' two-thirds of a mina.

Whoever wishes to harvest what are now called "well-born" grapes or what are named "well-born" figs may do so in whatever way he wishes and whenever he wants, if he takes them from his own crop; but if he harvests without permission from other persons' he must always fall under the penalty of the law that says "one shouldn't move what one didn't set down." If a slave touches any such things without getting the permission of the master of the lands, he is to be whipped with a number of strokes equal to the grapes in the bunch or the figs in the fig tree. A resident alien who has purchased it may harvest the well-born fruit if he

wishes. If a stranger who is visiting should desire some fruit to eat as he goes along the roads he may without penalty pick the well-born fruit if he wishes, enough for himself and for one attendant, and thus receive the hospitality accorded to strangers; but the law should prevent us from sharing the so-called "field" fruits and the like with strangers. If someone out of ignorance, or his slave, should pick this fruit, the slave is to be punished with blows and the free man is to be sent away after having been advised and instructed to pick the other fruit which is not suitable for storing, to make raisins for wine and dried figs.

With regard to pears, apples, pomegranates, and all such, there should be no shame if one takes them in stealth, but if someone under thirty is caught at it he is to be driven off by being struck, though without any wounding, and it will not be permissible for a free man to seek any judicial redress for such blows. A stranger may partake of such fruits just as he could partake of the harvest. If an elderly man picks such fruits to eat on the spot, and doesn't carry any away, he should be allowed in all such things the same share the stranger has; but if he disobeys this law, he will risk losing the right to be a competitor in the contest for virtue, if on a later occasion someone recollects such conduct on his part and at that time brings it to the attention of the judges.

Water is the most nourishing of all the things that contribute to gardening, but it is easily polluted. In the case of the earth, sun, and winds, which together with water nourish the things that grow up from the earth, it isn't easy to do harm by means of poisons or diversions or thefts—but the nature of water is such that all these things are possible. Therefore it needs the help of a law, which should run as follows:

If anyone should voluntarily pollute someone else's water, whether it be a spring or a cistern, using poisons or

excavations or thefts, let the injured party file charges with the City Regulators, including a written estimate of damages; if someone should be convicted of doing such damage through the use of poisons, he must not only pay the penalty but also purify the water in the springs or reservoir, according to whatever rites of purification are prescribed, for each occasion and each person, by the Interpreters' laws.

As regards the bringing home of all the harvest fruits: Anyone who wishes may bring home what belongs to him by any route whatsoever, provided that he penalizes no one else in any way, or that he himself profits in an amount that is three times that of the penalty inflicted on the neighbor. The magistrates are to be the assessors bf these matters, and of all other cases where someone voluntarily uses his own property to harm—violently or stealthily—the person or property of another who is unwilling that the harm be done. In all such cases the injured party should show the damage to the magistrates and receive reparation, so long as the harm done amounts to three minas or less. But if someone accuses someone else of having done greater damage, he should take the case to the common courts and there exact judicial retribution from the unjust party. If one of the magistrates is thought to have rendered an assessment of penalty with unjust purpose, he is to be held liable for double the damages to the party he harmed. Anyone who wishes may bring the injustices of the magistrates, in the case of each particular complaint, before the common courts.

There are tens of thousands of these petty legal customs that regulate the imposing of retributions, and that pertain to written complaints, judicial summonses, the witnesses to a summons (whether there should be two, or how many there should be) and all such things. They can't be left

unlegislated, and yet aren't worth the trouble of a legislator who is old; so the young men should take care of these aspects of the legislation, imitating what their predecessors have already laid down in law and patterning the petty matters after the great. They should profit from the experience they gain in the cases where it's necessary to use such arrangements, until they arrive at a point where all the details seem to have been satisfactorily laid down; then they should make the customs unchangeable, and live using these procedures that have attained the proper measure.

The rest of the craftsmen should be regulated as follows: First, no native inhabitant, nor any domestic servant of a man who is a native, is to labor at the craftsmen's arts. For the man who is a citizen possesses already a sufficient art, requiring much practice and many branches of learning: preserving and holding the common order of the city, which must not be a part-time pursuit. There's almost no human nature that is capable of laboring with precision at two pursuits or two arts, or even of practicing one adequately himself while overseeing someone else who is practicing another. This, then, is the first rule that should prevail in the city:

No one is to be a metal worker and at the same time a carpenter, nor again is a carpenter to supervise others who are working in metal instead of his own art, advancing the excuse that if he supervised many domestic servant artisans working for him, he could reasonably be expected to oversee them better, in order to get a bigger income than he would get from just his own art. Each single individual in the city is to have one art and make his living from that. The City Regulators must labor to maintain this law, and if one of the native inhabitants inclines to some art instead of cultivating virtue, they are to punish him with blame and dishonors until they have succeeded in putting him back on his own

straight track. If a stranger practices two arts, they are to punish him with bondage, monetary penalties, and expulsions from the city and thus force him to be only one person and not many.

With regard to their pay, and refusals to take delivery of their work, and injustices done to them by another or done by them to another, the City Regulators are to judge in cases involving fifty drachmas or less, and the common courts are to have legal jurisdiction where the amount is more than this.

No one is to pay any duty on either exported or imported goods in the city. No one is to import frankincense or any other such foreign incenses that pertain to the gods, nor purple dye or any other dyeing ingredients that aren't produced in this country, nor substances from foreign lands that are needed for an unnecessary purpose in any other art. On the other hand, no one is to export anything in the country that needs to remain.

All these matters are to be under the cognizance and supervision of the twelve Guardians of the Laws who are next eldest after the five eldest are subtracted.

With regard to heavy arms and all the implements of war, if for such a purpose the importation of some art, or plant, or metal object, or binding material, or certain animals, becomes necessary, the Cavalry Commanders and Generals are to be in charge of the import and export of these things. The city itself should carry on such giving and taking, and these things will be regulated by fitting and adequate laws laid down by the Guardians of the Laws. But retail trade for the sake of money in this or any other merchandise will never be allowed in any part of the entire territory or city.

As regards the food supply and the distribution of the country's produce, it's likely that a method close to that of the Cretan law would possess some correctness:

Everybody must make a division of all the country's produce into twelve parts, according to the order in which it is to be consumed. Each of the twelve parts, such as of wheat and barley (and all the other harvests should be distributed following the same procedure, as well as all the animals which may be for sale in each district), is to be divided proportionally into three parts, one of which is for the free men and one of which is for their domestic servants. The third share is to go to the artisans and the strangers in general: some of them will be in need of necessary foodstuffs because they are living here together as resident aliens, and others will be visiting because of some need a city or a private individual has. Once all the necessities have been divided, they will be required to sell only this third part, and no one is to be compelled to sell any of the two parts.

But just what would be the most correct way to make these divisions? In the first place, it's obvious that our division is in one sense equal but in another sense unequal.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably it's necessary that for each of these things that grow and are nourished from the earth, some turn out worse, and some better.

Clinias/ How could this not be the case?

Athenian Stranger/ In this respect, then, none of the three parts ought to be greater, neither what is distributed to the masters and the slaves nor again what goes to the strangers; the distribution should assign to everyone the same—an equality in similarity. Each citizen, taking his two parts, is to be in charge of the distribution to slaves and free persons, and is to distribute as much and of whatever sort

he sees fit. Any surplus should be distributed according to a measure and number arrived at in the following way: taking the number of all the animals that must be fed from the land, they are to make the distribution on this basis.

After this there must be the arrangement of their separate houses. The appropriate ordering of such houses is as follows: There ought to be twelve villages, each one located in the middle of one of the twelve districts. In each village there should first be a site for the temples and marketplace belonging to the gods, and to the demons who follow after the gods. If there are any local Magnesian deities, or shrines of some other ancients who have been preserved in memory, they should pay them the honors that were paid by humans in ancient times; but temples should be set up everywhere to Hestia, Zeus, and Athena, and to whichever of the other gods is the primary patron of each twelfth part. First, there should be buildings around these temples, on the highest ground, thus providing the guards with the best-defended barricades possible. Then all the rest of the land should be furnished with craftsmen, who are to be divided into thirteen groups. One of these groups will be settled in the city; it will in turn be divided into twelve parts, one for every section of the city, and will be settled in a circle outside. And in each village the farmers are to have the appropriate kinds of craftsmen living next to them. The Commanders of the Field Regulators are to be the supervisors of all these matters, deciding how many and what sort each place needs, and where they should be settled so as to be the least painful and the most beneficial to the farmers. Similarly, in the city the magistracy of the City Regulators is to take in hand and supervise these matters.

The Market Regulators presumably have the job of looking after each of the things that pertains to the market. Besides watching to see that no one does any injustice to the

temples around the marketplace, they should, in the second place, watch over the human affairs, keeping an eye out for moderation and insolence, and punishing anyone who needs punishment. With regard to commodities, they must first see that each of the articles city dwellers are supposed to sell to strangers is sold according to law. Let there be one law:

On the first day of every month the portion that is to be sold to strangers should be brought forth by the selling agents (either strangers or slaves, who will act for the city dwellers). The first commodity is the twelfth-part of grain. Each stranger should at the first market buy the grain that he will need for the whole month, along with whatever else goes with grain. Then on the tenth day of the month the one party should sell, and the other buy, enough liquid goods to last the whole month. The third market, for livestock, should take place on the twentieth of each month. At that time there should be whatever selling and buying of animals is necessary for each, as well as the sale on behalf of the farmers of any equipment or other goods the strangers must acquire by purchase from others (such as animal skins and all sorts of clothing, woven goods, wool felt, and some other such things).

But as regards retail trade in any of these things, including barley, wheat turned into flour, and every other sort of food, no one is ever supposed to sell to or buy from the city dwellers or their slaves; it should be in the strangers' marketplaces that a stranger does his selling to craftsmen and their slaves, and performs those dealings in wine and grain that are termed "retail trade" by most people. Once animals have been slaughtered and cut up, the butchers should distribute them to strangers and craftsmen, or their domestic servants. And any stranger who wants to, can on any day buy any sort of firewood in bulk from agents out in

the country, and then sell it himself to other strangers—in whatever amount and whenever he wishes.

All the other sorts of goods and equipment each needs should be brought to the common marketplace and sold in a location for each, where the Guardians of the Laws and the Market Regulators, along with the City Regulators, should mark out appropriate boundaries for stalls for the goods to be bought. In these allotted spaces they should exchange money for goods and goods for money, not allowing each other to get anything without gaining something in return. He who gives something on trust must be content whether or not he receives the thing, since there'll no longer be a just cause of action in such transactions.

If what's purchased or sold creates an excess or a deficiency contrary to the law that has said there must not be an increase or a decrease beyond a certain sum, then, in the former case, the excess should be recorded with the Guardians of the Laws and, in the opposite case, the shortfall should be cancelled. The same ordinances concerning registration of property apply to resident aliens.

Anyone who wishes may become a resident alien upon the following explicit conditions:

There is a place for strangers to live in, and anyone who is willing and able can settle there; he must possess an art; he can prolong his visit no longer than twenty years after the time of his enrollment; he will pay no resident alien tax, not even a small one, except for the requirement that he be moderate; he will pay no other tax on any purchases or sales. When the time has elapsed, he is to take his property and depart. But if in these years he has attained noteworthiness because of some sufficiently good deed done for the city, and he trusts he can persuade the Council and the Assembly to respond to his •request by granting a sovereign delay of his

departure, or even permission to stay for life, he should go ahead and make his case to the city, and whatever he succeeds in persuading it to agree to, should be fully carried out. The resident aliens'

children, if they are craftsmen and have attained the age of fifteen, should begin the period of their residency when they reach the age of fifteen. Each may remain twenty years on these conditions and then must depart for wherever he likes. If one of them wishes to remain he can do so if he persuades as has just been described. He who departs should go after having erased the written records which he previously wrote down and left with the magistrates.

Book 9.

Athenian Stranger/ The judicial penalties that are consequent to all the earlier activities would come next after these things, according to the nature of the ordering of the laws. Some of the matters that require judicial actions have been discussed—those that pertain to farming and whichever follow them—but with regard to the greatest matters there has been as yet no discussion, showing in each single case what retribution should be attached and who the judges should be at the time. These are the things that should be stated next, after those others.

Clinias/ Correct.

Athenian Stranger/ It is indeed in a certain way shameful even to legislate all the things we are now about to lay down, in a city such as this, which we claim will be well administered and correctly equipped in every way for the practice of virtue. Even to assume that in such a city someone may grow up who shares in the wickedness of the greatest other places, so that it's necessary to have legislation that anticipates and threatens such a man, if he comes into being—to lay down laws to deter these men and punish them when they do arise, as if they are going to arise—is, as I said, in a certain way shameful. But we aren't in the same position as were the ancient lawgivers who gave their laws to heroes, the children of gods (as the present account has it, they were themselves sprung from gods and legislated for others who had such an origin); we're humans, and legislating now for the seed of humans. Therefore, there is no blame incurred by our fearing lest one of our citizens become, as it were, "home-struck"—so tough by nature that he wouldn't melt. Just as those seeds are unmelted by fire, so these men are unmelted by strong laws.

Thanks to these men I would first state an unpleasing law about temple robberies, in case someone should dare to do this. We wouldn't wish, and there isn't any great expectation, that one of the correctly brought up citizens will ever contract this disease, but their domestic servants, as well as the strangers and the slaves of strangers, would try many such things. Especially on account of them, but also as a precaution against the general weakness of human nature, I will pronounce the law about temple robberies and all other such things that are difficult to cure or incurable. According to the argument agreed on earlier, preludes (the briefest possible) should preface all these laws. Someone would say the following, by way of a dialogue and an encouragement to that man who is urged during the day and awakened at night by an evil desire to despoil something of the sacred things:

"You amazing man, the evil that now moves and turns you to temple robbery is neither human nor divine, but a certain, gadfly that grows naturally in human beings as a result of ancient and unexpiated injustices. It is an accursed thing that revolves around, which one must take precaution against with all one's strength. Learn now what the precaution is: When any of such opinions seize upon you, go partake of exorcisms; go as a suppliant to the temples of the gods who ward off evil; go and frequent the company of the men said to be good among you; hear, and try yourself to say, that every man must honor the noble and the just things. Flee, without turning back, the company of bad men. If by your doing these things the disease abates somewhat, well and good; but if not, look to death as something nobler, and depart from life."

These are the preludes we sing to those who are considering all these deeds that are impious and destructive of the city. For him who obeys, the law should be left silent;

but for him who disobeys, it sings in a loud voice, after the prelude:

"Whoever is caught robbing a temple, if a slave or a stranger, is to have the misfortune written on his face and hands and, after having been whipped as much as the judges decide, is to be thrown naked out beyond the borders of the country."

Perhaps by paying this penalty he would become better, by becoming moderate. For no judicial punishment that takes place according to law aims at what is bad, but for the most part accomplishes one of two other aims: it makes the one who receives the judicial punishment either better or less wicked.

If some citizen is ever detected doing such a thing, committing one of the grave and unspeakable injustices against gods or parents or city, the judge should think of this man as already incurable, considering that even though he happened to get such an education and upbringing from childhood, he didn't refrain from the gravest evils. The judicial penalty for this man is to be death, the least of evils, and by which he'll present an example that will benefit the others, once he's disappeared, without fame, beyond the borders of the country. But let his children and family, if they avoid the paternal disposition, receive fame and be spoken of with honor, as persons who well and courageously fled from evil to good. It wouldn't be fitting, for the regime in which the allotments are to remain always the same and equal, if the property of any such men were forfeited to the public. So when someone seems to commit an injustice that merits a monetary penalty, let him pay as much as he has in excess of an equipped allotment—let him pay so much, but no more. The Guardians of the Laws are to inspect the written records to get precise figures in this regard, and are to announce them clearly to the judges on each occasion, so

that none of the allotments ever becomes idle because of a lack of funds. If someone seems to merit a greater penalty, and if some of his friends aren't willing to pledge security for him and give him his freedom by helping to pay, he is to be punished with conspicuous, lengthy imprisonment and with certain humiliations. But no one is ever to be completely dishonored for a single fault, not even if he is in exile beyond the borders. Let the punishments be death, or prison, or beating, or sitting or standing in certain disgraceful ways, or standing at temples on the frontiers of the country, or money paid in the way we earlier said this judicial penalty should be paid.

For a capital offense, the judges are to be the Guardians of the Laws and the court composed of those magistrates from the previous year who were selected because they were best. The younger lawgivers should attend to the indictments, summonses, and such matters in these cases, and how they should take place; but it's our task to legislate about the voting. Let the vote be taken openly, but before this let our judges sit down in a row right next to one another, in order of age, directly facing the accuser and the defendant, and let all the citizens, as many as are at leisure, stand as serious listeners to such trials. First one speech is to be spoken by the accuser, and then a second speech by the defendant. After these speeches, the oldest should begin his judging, making an adequate inquiry into the things that have been said; after the eldest, they should all one by one go through whatever someone finds wanting in some way in what was said or not said by either of the litigants. He who finds nothing wanting should turn the judging over to another. Whatever seems to them to be to the point in what was said should be ratified, by affixing the written signatures of all the judges, and deposited on the altar of Hestia. The next day they should assemble again in the same place, to

go through a judicial inquiry into the case in the same way and to affix signatures again to the things said. When they've done this a third time, and have paid sufficient heed to the evidence and witnesses, each should give a sacred vote, swearing before Hestia to judge what is just and true to the best of his ability, and thus such a trial should be brought to its end.

After matters pertaining to gods come matters pertaining to the dissolution of the regime. Whoever enslaves the laws by bringing them under the rule of human beings, whoever makes the city subject to a faction, and does all this through violence and the stirring up of civil strife against the law, this man must be regarded as the greatest enemy of all to the whole city. And he who doesn't take part in any such things, but, holding one of the highest offices in the city, lets these things escape his notice—or, not because they escape his notice, but because of cowardice, fails to wreak retribution on behalf of his own fatherland—such a citizen must be held to be second in evil. Every man who's capable of even a little good should inform the magistrates by bringing any plotter to trial, on a charge of violent and also illegal overthrow of the regime. The judges for these men are to be those who judge temple robbers, and the whole trial for these men is to proceed just as it did for the latter. The victory by a majority of votes shall bring death.

To put it in one word, the blame and retribution exacted from a father is to fall on none of the children, except in the case of someone whose father, grandfather, and grandfather's father have one after the other been condemned to death. These the city is to send away to their ancient fatherland and city, along with their property, except for what is part of the fully equipped allotment. Then, of the sons of citizens who have more than one son not less than ten years of age, ten are to be chosen by lot from among

those nominated by their father or their grandfather on their father's or mother's side. The names of those who draw lots shall be sent to Delphi, and the one whom the god selects shall be set up, with better luck, in the household of those who departed.

Clinias/ Fine.

Athenian Stranger/ Let the law concerning which judges are to preside and the procedure of the trials be common to yet a third case, that of the man whom someone brings to trial on a charge of treason. Likewise, as to whether the offspring are to remain or to leave the fatherland, let this one law regulate these matters in the three cases of the traitor, the temple robber, and the man who destroys the laws of the city through violence.

As to stealing, whether someone steals something great or something small, again let there be one law and one judicial retribution in all cases. First, double the value of the item stolen should be paid as a fine, if someone is convicted of such an offense and possesses enough other property, over and above the allotment, to pay; but if not, let him be imprisoned until he does pay or persuades the successful prosecutor. If someone is convicted of stealing from the public, if he persuades the city or pays double the value of the theft, let him be let out of prison.

Clinias/ How comes it, stranger, that we're saying it makes no difference to the thief whether he's convicted of stealing something great or something small, whether from sacred or profane places, or whatever other respects in which a theft can be entirely dissimilar? For crimes that are thus various, is the lawgiver in no way to follow with penalties of a similar variety?

Athenian Stranger/ Excellent, Kleinias! As I was being all but borne along you've collided with me and woken me up,

reminding me of what I was thinking about earlier—namely, that what pertains to the laying down of laws has never been worked out correctly in any way, as in fact can be said on the basis of what has cropped up now. What, again, do we mean by this? We didn't make a bad image, when we compared all those living under legislation that exists now, to slaves being doctored by slaves. For it's necessary to know well some such thing as the following: if one of those doctors who practices medicine on the basis of experiences rather than reason should ever encounter a free doctor carrying on a dialogue with a free man who was sick—using arguments that come close to philosophizing, grasping the disease from its source, and going back up to the whole nature of bodies—he would swiftly burst out laughing and would say nothing other than what is always said about such things by most of the so-called doctors. For he would declare, "Idiot! You're not doctoring the sick man, you're practically educating him, as if what he needed were to become a doctor, rather than healthy!"

Clinias/ Well, wouldn't he be speaking correctly when he said such things?

Athenian Stranger/ Maybe—if, at any rate, he went on to reflect that this man who goes through laws in the way we're doing now, is educating the citizens but not legislating. Would he not appear to be saying this too in the right way?

Clinias/ Perhaps.

Athenian Stranger/ The present situation is fortunate for us.

Clinias/ In what way?

Athenian Stranger/ In that there is no necessity to legislate, but just that we ourselves, by becoming engaged in an inquiry about the whole regime, try to discern in what way the best and also the most necessary would each come

into being. Indeed, it's likely that we can now, if we wish, inquire into what is best, or, if we wish, into what is most necessary, as regards the laws. So let's choose which it seems we'll do.

Clinias/ We're proposing a ridiculous choice, stranger, and we'd become exactly the same as lawgivers constrained by some great necessity to legislate immediately, because tomorrow it'll no longer be possible. But the fact is that for us—if god is in accord with what I say—it's possible, just as it is for masons or those beginning some other construction, to accumulate indiscriminately the materials from which we'll select what's to be used in the structure that is about to come into being, and indeed to make the selection at leisure. So let's assume that we are now house-builders who aren't working under constraint, but are in a leisurely way still accumulating some things and incorporating others. Thus it is correct to speak of some things pertaining to the laws as being established, and others as being accumulated.

Athenian Stranger/ That way, Kleinias, our synoptic review of the laws would be more in accordance with nature, at any rate. So then let's look—in the name of the gods! —at some such thing as the following, pertaining to legislators.

Clinias/ What's that?

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably there exist in the cities writings and written arguments of many others, and also the writings and arguments of the lawgiver.

Clinias/ How could there not?

Athenian Stranger/ Should we turn our minds to the writings of the others, of poets and of those who without meter or with meter have left a written record of their advice about life, but not pay attention to those of the lawgivers? Or should we pay attention to the latter most of all?

Clinias/ The latter, by far!

Athenian Stranger/ But is the lawgiver alone, among the writers, not supposed to give advice about the noble, good, and just things, teaching what sorts of things they are and how they must be practiced by those who are going to become happy?

Clinias/ How could that be?

Athenian Stranger/ But is it then more shameful for Homer, and Tyrtaeus, and the other poets to make bad written pronouncements about life and practices, and less so for Lycurgus, and Solon, and whoever has become a lawgiver and written down things? Or isn't it correct, at any rate, that of all the writings in the cities, the things written about the laws appear, when opened up, by far the noblest and best, and that the writings of the others either follow those or, if they speak in dissonance, be laughed at? How do we conceive writing about laws in the cities should be: should the writings appear in the shapes of a father and mother, caring dearly and possessing intelligence, or, like a tyrant and despot, should they command and threaten, post writings on the walls and go away? Let's consider now, ourselves, whether we're going to try to speak with this conception concerning laws—evincing an eager spirit at least, whether or not we have the capacity. And if by going this route we have to suffer something, let's suffer it! May it be a good thing, and, if god is willing, so it shall be.

Clinias/ You've spoken nobly, and let's do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ First then, there must be a precise inquiry, such as we have undertaken, into what pertains to temple robbers, and stealing in general, and all injustices; and we mustn't take it ill if in the midst of giving laws, we've established some things and are inquiring further into others. For we're becoming lawgivers but we aren't yet lawgivers, though probably we may be. If it seems as though

we should inquire into the things I've mentioned, and in the way I've mentioned, let's carry out the inquiry.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Then with regard to the noble things and all the just things, let's try to see something like the following: to what extent we now agree, and to what extent we disagree with ourselves—we who would claim to be eager in spirit, if nothing else, to differ from most people—and then again to what extent the many agree and disagree among themselves.

Clinias/ What differences of ours do you have in mind when you say this?

Athenian Stranger/ I shall try to explain. With respect to justice as a whole and just human beings, deeds, and actions, we all somehow agree that all these are noble; so if someone would maintain that just human beings, even if they happen to be ugly in their bodies, were nevertheless entirely beautiful people in respect to their very just disposition considered by itself, in almost no case would the one who speaks thus seem to speak off key.

Clinias/ Isn't that correct?

Athenian Stranger/ Maybe. But let's observe how, if all things are noble which partake of justice, then the "all" includes the things we undergo, almost as much as the things we do.

Clinias/ So what then?

Athenian Stranger/ In the case of an action that is just, it partakes of the noble to about the extent to which it shares in the just.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Then in the case of something one undergoes that shares in the just, to agree that it becomes

noble, to the same extent, would not be to present a dissonant speech?

Clinias/ That is true.

Athenian Stranger/ But if, at any rate, we agree that something one undergoes is just, but shameful, the just and the noble will be in dissonance since the just things will be said to be most shameful.

Clinias/ What do you mean by this?

Athenian Stranger/ Nothing difficult to understand. For the laws established by us a little earlier would seem to pronounce things totally opposed to the things now being said.

Clinias/ To what things?

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably we established that the temple robber should die—justly—and the same for the enemy of well-made laws; and when we were about to establish very many such legal customs we stopped, seeing that these sufferings were limitless in number and severity, and that while they were the most just of all sufferings, they were also the most shameful. So don't the just things and the noble things appear to us at one time to be all the same, and then at another time very opposed?

Clinias/ I'm afraid so.

Athenian Stranger/ It's with regard to such things that the many proclaim, without consonance, that the noble things and the just things are separate.

Clinias/ So it appears anyway, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's look again, Kleinias, to see how we have a harmony about these same matters.

Clinias/ What harmony, and in what respect?

Athenian Stranger/ In the earlier discussions I believe I said expressly somehow, or if I didn't earlier, set me down now as saying …

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That the bad are all bad involuntarily in every respect. Since this is so, it is presumably necessary that the next argument follows upon this.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ That the unjust man is presumably bad, but the bad man is involuntarily so. Now it never makes sense that the voluntary is done involuntarily. Hence the man who does injustice appears involuntarily unjust to the one who sets down injustice as something involuntary. This is what I must agree to now. For I agree that everyone does injustice involuntarily. And if someone, out of love of victory or love of honor, asserts that the unjust are indeed involuntarily so, but that many voluntarily do injustice, my argument, at any rate, remains the former and not the latter. So then in what way would I, at least, speak in consonance with my own arguments? Suppose, Kleinias and Megillus, you were to ask me:

"If these things are so, stranger, what advice do you have for us concerning the legislation for the city of the Magnesians? Should we legislate or not?"

"Why not?" I'll declare.

"Are you going to distinguish for them the involuntary from the voluntary injustices, and will we establish greater penalties for the voluntary faults and injustices, and lesser for: the former? Or equal penalties for all, on the grounds that there aren't any voluntary injustices at all?"

Clinias/ Correctly spoken, stranger. What use, indeed, shall we make of these things that are now being said?

Athenian Stranger/ A noble question. First, let's use them for the following.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Let's recollect that just now we made a noble remark to the effect that concerning the just things we were in a very great deal of confusion and disharmony. Seizing upon this, let's question ourselves again: "Well, we haven't found our way clear of the difficulty in these matters, nor defined what the difference is between these things, which in all the cities, by all the legislators who have ever existed, have been held to be two forms of injustices, voluntary and involuntary, and have been so legislated. Is the argument now being uttered by us going to say only this much and depart, as if it were being spoken by a god, giving no argument as to why it has spoken correctly, and just legislating in defiance of the difficulty in some way?"—that's impossible. Before legislating, it's necessary to make clear somehow that these things are two, and what the other difference is, so that whenever someone imposes the judicial penalty on either of them, everyone may follow the things that are being said and may be able to judge, somehow or other, what is fittingly laid down and what is not.

Clinias/ You appear to us to be speaking in a noble way, stranger. For we ought to do one of two things—either refrain from saying that injustices are all involuntary, or make clear how this is the correct thing to say, by first making a distinction.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, of these two alternatives presumably one is wholly unacceptable to me—refraining from saying it, when I believe it to be the truth. For that would be neither according to legal custom nor pious. But in what way are they two, if they don't differ from one another by being involuntary and voluntary? Somehow or other then,

one must try to make it clear on the basis of some other distinction.

Clinias/ There's simply no other way we can think about this, at least, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ So it shall be. Come, then: it's likely that many injuries are done by the citizens to one another in their associations and minglings, and that these involve an abundance of the voluntary, as well as the involuntary.

Clinias/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Let not someone set down all the injuries as injustices, thus supposing that the injustices in them become, in this way, double—some voluntary and some involuntary. For of all injuries, the involuntary are not less in number or severity than the voluntary. But consider whether I'm saying anything in saying what I'm about to say, or whether I'm saying nothing at all: for I at least do not assert, Kleinias and Megillus, that if someone injures somebody in some way, not intending to do so, but involuntarily, that he does injustice involuntarily. And I won't legislate in this fashion, legislating to the effect that this is an involuntary injustice; I'll set such an injury down as being not an injustice at all, whether it be greater or smaller. Indeed, if my view, at least, is victorious, we'll often assert that when a benefit comes to pass that is not correct, the one responsible for the benefit is committing an injustice. Generally speaking, friends, if someone gives something to somebody, or, on the contrary, takes something away, such a thing shouldn't thus be called simply just or unjust, but what the lawgiver should observe is whether someone employs a just disposition and character in doing some benefit or injury to somebody. The lawgiver should look to these two things, injustice and injury; he should do what he can through the laws to redress

the injury—by preserving what may be destroyed, setting upright again what has fallen, and making sound what has been killed or wounded—and once compensations have made atonement for each of the injuries, he should always try through the laws to create friendship in place of discord between the doers and sufferers.

Clinias/ In doing these things, at least, he'd be acting nobly.

Athenian Stranger/ On the other hand, in the case of unjust injuries, and gains as well—when someone makes somebody gain by doing him an injustice—as many of these as are curable, being regarded as diseases in the soul, should be cured. And it should be declared that our cure for injustice proceeds in the following direction.

Clinias/ In which?

Athenian Stranger/ Toward making it so that whatever injustice, great or small, someone might commit, the law will teach and compel him in every way either never again to dare voluntarily to do such a thing or to do it very much less; this is in addition to paying compensation for the injury. To accomplish these things by deeds or words—with pleasures or pains, by honors or dishonors, even by monetary penalties or gifts, and in general by whatever procedure someone may use to bring about hatred of injustice and desire, or lack of hatred, for the nature of the just—it is this that is the task of the noblest laws. But what about the one whom the lawgiver perceives to be incurable in these respects: what judicial penalty and law will he lay down 'for these people? Because he knows, presumably, that in the case of all such men it isn't better for them if they go on living, and that by departing life they would confer a double benefit on the others (becoming examples to the others of why not to do injustice, and emptying the city of bad men),

the lawgiver must necessarily assign to such men the punishment of death for their faults, though this must not be done in any other case.

Clinias/ It's likely that the things you're saying are in some way very well measured, but nevertheless we'd be more pleased to hear these things put still more clearly, indicating how it is that the difference between injustice and injury has gotten mixed up with the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary in these matters.

Athenian Stranger/ One must try to do and say what you ask. Now it's clear that you say and hear from one another at least this much about the soul: that one thing in its nature, either a passion or a part, is spiritedness—a possession that is by nature quarrelsome and pugnacious, overturning many things with uncalculating violence.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And pleasure, we proclaim, is not the same as spiritedness, but, we assert, holds absolute rule through a strength opposite to it: through persuasion and forceful trickery she does whatever her intention wishes.

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Someone wouldn't speak falsely if he said that ignorance is the third cause of faults. It would be better for the lawgiver however, to divide this in two, holding the simple version of it to be responsible for light faults. The double version occurs when someone lacks understanding because he partakes not only of ignorance but also of the opinion that he is wise, and believes he knows completely things about which he knows nothing; if this is accompanied by strength and force, the lawgiver sets such things down as the causes of great and unmusical faults, while if this is accompanied by weakness, leading to the faults of children and the elderly, he'll set such things down as faults indeed,

and will establish laws, as for those who are at fault, but the laws will be the gentlest, at any rate, of all and the most forgiving.

Clinias/ What you say is reasonable.

Athenian Stranger/ Now with regard to pleasure and spiritedness, we almost all say that one of us is "stronger," while another is "weaker"; and this is the way it is.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But with regard to ignorance, at least, we've never heard that one of us is "stronger," while another is "weaker."

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ And we assert that all these things, at least, often turn each man in directions opposite to that toward which his intention at the same time draws him.

Clinias/ Very often indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Now at this point I would clearly define for you what I say is the just and the unjust, without complication. The tyranny in the soul of spiritedness, fear, pleasure, pain, feelings of envy, and desires, whether it does some injury or not, I proclaim to be in every way injustice. When, on the other hand, the opinion about what is best (however a city or certain private individuals may believe this will be) holds sway in souls and brings order to every man, then, even if it is in some way mistaken, what is done through this, and the part of each man that becomes obedient to such a rule, must be declared to be entirely just and best for the whole of human life—even though many are of the opinion that such injury constitutes involuntary injustice. We aren't now involved in a quarrelsome argument about names, but since the three forms of faults have been made clear, these ought first to be still more firmly fixed in

the memory. So, then, one of our forms is that of pain, which we name “spiritedness” and “fear.”

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ A second, again, is that of pleasure and desires; third and distinct is the striving for expectations and true opinion concerning what is best. When this last is divided into three by being cut twice, there come to be five forms, as we now assert, and for these five forms there should be laws established that differ from one another, and that are of two kinds.

Clinias/ What are these?

Athenian Stranger/ One concerns what is done through violence and open deeds on each occasion, the other concerns what takes place secretly, with darkness and trickery; then sometimes what is done combines both of these, and the laws dealing with this case would be the harshest, if it is to receive its appropriate share.

Clinias/ That makes sense.

Athenian Stranger/ After these things let’s go back to the point from which we digressed to get here, and complete the laying down of the laws. I believe we had set down what pertains to those who plunder the gods and what pertains to traitors, and also what pertains to those who corrupt the laws with a view to the dissolution of the existing regime. Now someone might perhaps do one of these things while insane, or while so afflicted with diseases or extreme old age or while still such a child as to be no different from such men. If, on the plea of the doer or of the doer’s advocate, it should become evident to the judges chosen for the occasion that one of these circumstances obtains, and he should be judged to have broken the law while in such a condition, let him pay to the full exact compensation for the injury he has done someone, but let him be released from the other

judicial sentences, unless he has killed someone and has hands that are not unpolluted by murder. In the latter case, he is to go away into another country and place, and dwell away from home for a year; if he comes back prior to the time which the law has ordained, or sets foot at all in his own country, he is to be incarcerated in the public prison by the Guardians of the Laws for two years, and then released from prison.

Let's not hesitate to proceed just as we began, and lay down laws that cover completely every form of murder. Let's speak first about violent, involuntary murders.

If someone in a contest and in the public games has involuntarily killed somebody dear to him, whether it happens immediately or at a later time as a result of the blows, or if this happens during war or during the preparation for war—when they practice the javelin without using body armor, or imitate the activity of war with certain heavy arms—let him be free from pollution once he has been purified according to the law brought from Delphi for these purposes.

In the case of all doctors, if the person being cared for by them should die against their intention, they are to be held unpolluted according to law.

If with his own hands, but involuntarily, one man should kill another, whether it be with his own unarmed body, or with an instrument, or missile, or by giving some drink or food, or by applying fire or cold, or by deprivation of air—whether he acts with his own body or through other bodies—in all cases let it be as if by his own hands, and let him pay something like the following judicial penalties. If he should kill a slave, he must render the master of the dead slave free of injury and penalty by reckoning what it would cost him to be deprived of a slave of his own, or else sustain a judicial

penalty equal to twice the value of the deceased—the value to be assessed by the judges. He is to employ purifications that are greater and more numerous than those employed by persons who kill during the games, and the Interpreters whom the god selects are to be sovereign in these matters. If it's his own slave, he is to be released under law from the murder once he's undergone purification. If someone should involuntarily kill a free man, let him purify himself by the same purifications as in the case of one who kills a slave, and let him not underestimate a certain old saying of the ancient myths. It is said that he who dies a violent death after having lived with the outlook of a free man feels, when freshly dead, spirited rage against the perpetrator. Filled with fear and horror on account of his violent experience, and seeing his own murderer going about in his own accustomed haunts, he feels horror; being himself disturbed, he does all he can, having Memory as an ally, to disturb the perpetrator and his doings. That is why the perpetrator must go away from the sufferer during all the seasons of a year, and desert all his accustomed places throughout the entire fatherland. And if the one who has died should be a stranger, the perpetrator must also keep away from the stranger's country for the same amount of time. If someone voluntarily obeys this law, the nearest of kin to the one who has died, who is the one who watches to see that all these things have come to pass, should be forgiving—and it would be entirely well measured for him to have peaceful dealings with the man. But if someone is disobedient—if, first, he dares to frequent the sacred places and sacrifice while being unpurified, and then if he isn't willing to go away as a stranger and fulfill the stated time period, the nearest of kin to-the one who has died should prosecute the killer for murder, and all the retributions are to be doubled for the man who is convicted. And if the

nearest kinsman doesn't prosecute for what has been suffered, it shall be as if the curse has gone on to him because he who has suffered makes supplication in the name of what he has suffered; anyone who wishes should prosecute this man and compel him under law to stay away from his own fatherland for five years. If a stranger involuntarily kills one of the strangers who are in the city, let anyone who wishes prosecute under the same laws: if he's a resident alien, let him go away for a year; if he's a total stranger, in addition to the purification, whether he's killed a stranger or a resident alien or a member of the city, he must spend all the rest of his life away from the country that is sovereign over these laws. If he comes back illegally, the Guardians of the Laws are to penalize him with death, and, if he has some property, are to give it to the nearest of kin of the one who suffered. If he comes back involuntarily, if he's shipwrecked at sea near the country, he must camp where his feet will be moistened by the sea and watch for a sailing opportunity; if certain persons violently drag him in by land, the first of the city's magistrates who happens along should release him and give him safe-conduct across the border.

If someone kills a free man with his own hands, but the deed was done out of spirited anger, it is necessary first to distinguish between two versions of such an act. For sometimes it is done out of spirited anger by those who act on a sudden impulse, who all at once and without intending to kill beforehand destroy someone with blows or some such thing, and feel regret immediately after the deed is done. On the other hand, killing is also done out of spirited anger by those who have been insulted by words or dishonorable deeds, who seek retribution, and who later kill someone, intending to kill and feeling no regret once the deed is done. So it's likely that they should be set down as two sorts of murder, both pretty much done out of spiritedness, and it

would be most just to say that they are somewhere in the middle between the voluntary and the involuntary. Nevertheless, each of them is an image of one of the other two: he who guards his spiritedness and doesn't immediately get retribution at the moment, but does so at a later time after deliberating, resembles the voluntary; he who doesn't hoard his rages and immediately employs them at the moment, without prior deliberation, is similar to the involuntary—though this man again is not wholly involuntary, but an image of the involuntary. That's why it's difficult to define murders done out of spiritedness, to decide whether one ought to legislate for them as voluntary or as in a sense involuntary. The best and most truthful thing to do is to set them both down as images, and make a division between them on the grounds of the presence or absence of prior deliberation: one should legislate harsher retributions for those who kill with prior deliberation and in anger, and gentler for those who kill without prior deliberation and all of a sudden. For one should assign greater retribution to the image of the greater evil, and less to that of the lesser. And that's the way our laws should do.

Clinias/ In every respect.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's go back again, then, and say:

If, then, someone kills a free man with his own hands, and the deed was done out of a certain anger, without prior deliberation, let the killer suffer the other things that were assigned the one who kills without spirited anger, but let him also be compelled to spend two years in exile, restraining his own spiritedness. He who kills out of spirited anger, but with prior deliberation, is to suffer in other respects the same again as the former, except that he is to spend three years in exile instead of the two years for the other. Thus he'll pay a greater retribution of time because of his greater spiritedness. The return from exile in these cases

should be as follows. (This is difficult to legislate with precision. For there would be times when the one the law defines as the harsher of the two is rather gentle, and when the "gentler" is rather harsh, having committed a more savage act of murder, or when the former would have committed a gentler. But the procedure will for the most part follow what is now being said.) The Guardians of the Laws ought to take cognizance of all these things, and when the time of exile in either case has elapsed, they should send twelve of their number out to the borders of the country as judges: during this time they should have carried out a more minute investigation of the actions of the exiles, and should be judges as regards forgiving them and allowing them to come back. The exiles must abide by the verdicts of such magistrates. In either of the two cases, if, after his return, the exile ever again commits the same act because he is overcome by anger, he must go into exile and never return; if he should return, let him suffer the same thing as the stranger who returns. If it's a slave that someone has killed, and it's his own, he is to undergo rites of purification; if it's someone else's slave that he's killed out of spirited anger, he is to pay twice the value of the injury to the owner.

If any of all those who kill should disobey the law and defile the marketplace, the athletic games, and the other sacred places by frequenting them while unpurified, anyone who wishes may prosecute the dead man's kinsman who is permitting this, and the killer, compelling them to exact and pay double the money and the other actions, and taking the fine for himself according to the law.

If some slave should kill his own master out of spirited anger, the kinsmen of the dead man are to do whatever they wish to the killer and remain unpolluted, so long as under no circumstances they let him continue to live in any sense. If some other slave should kill a free man out of spirited

anger, his masters are to hand the slave over to the kinsmen of the dead man, and they must necessarily kill the perpetrator, in whatever manner they wish. If a father or mother should out of. spirited anger kill a son or daughter, with blows or in some violent fashion—something that does occur, though rarely—they are to undergo the same rites of purification as the others and go into banishment for three years; when the killers return, the wife is to separate from the husband, and the husband from the wife, and they are never again to share in creating children, nor is the perpetrator ever to become part of the hearth or a sharer in the sacred things with those whom he has deprived of a son or brother. He who is impious about these matters and disobeys is to be subject to prosecution for impiety by anyone who wishes. If some man out of rage should kill some woman who is his wife, or if a woman should do this same thing in the same way to her husband, let them undergo the same purification rites and complete three years in banishment. When he who has done such a thing returns, he is not to share in the sacred things with his children, and is never to become part of the same dining table. If the parent or the progeny disobeys, here again he is to become subject to prosecution for impiety by anyone who wishes. If a brother should kill a brother or sister out of spirited anger, or if a sister should kill a brother or sister, let it be said that these must undergo the purification rites and banishment in the same way as was said for parents and offspring: let him never become part of the hearth or a sharer in the sacred things with those whose brothers he has deprived of brothers and whose children he has deprived of parents. If someone should disobey, he would correctly and with justice become subject to prosecution under the law' that has been described regarding impiety in these matters. If someone becomes so unrestrained in his spirited anger towards his

parents that he dares, in an insanity of rage, to kill one of his parents, then, if the one who has died voluntarily absolved the perpetrator of murder before he died, the perpetrator is to undergo purification of the same sort as those who carry out an involuntary murder. Once he has done whatever other things those do, he is to be free of pollution. But if he was not absolved, the one who has done such a thing is to be liable to many laws. For he would become liable to the most severe judicial penalties for assault, and, likewise, impiety and temple robbing (for having plundered the soul of his parent). So if, indeed, it were possible for the same man to die often, the parricide or matricide, who committed this deed out of spirited anger, would very justly undergo many deaths. In this case alone (where a man is about to be killed by his parents), no law will permit killing to defend oneself against death; with regard to father or mother, the ones who brought one's nature into the light, the law will legislate that one must endure, suffering everything rather than doing such a deed. So how would it be fitting for this man to receive a judicial penalty under the law in any other way? Let the punishment be death for him who kills his father or mother out of spirited anger.

Should a brother kill a brother in a battle that takes place during civil strife or in some such fashion, defending himself with his hands against the other who started it, let him be unpolluted just as if he had killed an enemy. The same holds for a citizen who kills a citizen, or a stranger who kills a stranger. If a member of the city should kill a stranger in self-defense, or a stranger a member of the city, he is to be unpolluted in the same way. The same holds for a slave who kills a slave. But if a slave should kill a free man in self-defense, he is to be liable to the same laws as the man who kills his father. Let what was said about being absolved of

murder by the father apply in the same way to every absolution in such cases: if anyone voluntarily absolves somebody of this, let it be as if the murder was involuntary, let there be purification rites for the perpetrator, and let the law impose one year of exile.

Now what pertains to murders that involve violence and the involuntary, and that occur because of spiritedness, has been discussed with due measure. Next after these matters we should discuss what pertains to those that are voluntary and totally unjust, as well as the plotting involved—which spring from weakness in the face of pleasures, desires, and envies.

Clinias/ Correctly spoken.

Athenian Stranger/ First let's again do our best to say how many such things there would be. The greatest is desire, that dominates a soul driven wild by longings. This occurs especially where there is the yearning that is most frequent and strongest among the many: because of the wickedness due to nature and lack of education, money has the power to engender tens of thousands of erotic desires for its insatiable and limitless acquisition. The cause of the lack of education is the wicked praise of wealth that is spread abroad by both the Greeks and barbarians. For by judging it to be first among the goods when in fact it is third, they ruin their posterity as well as themselves. The noblest and best thing of all for every city is that the truth be told about wealth, namely, that it is for the sake of the body, and the body is for the sake of the soul. Since, therefore, there are goods for the sake of which wealth by nature exists, it would come third after virtue of the body and of the soul. Thus this argument would become a teacher, showing that he who is to be happy shouldn't seek to be wealthy, but to be wealthy justly and moderately; and then there wouldn't occur in cities murders that require murders to purge them. But now,

as we said when we began to discuss these things, this is one, and the greatest, thing that brings about the most severe judicial penalties for voluntary murder. The second is the habit of the honor-loving soul. This breeds envies, which are harsh companions, especially for the one who possesses the envy, but secondly for the best among those in the city. The third cause is the cowardly and unjust fears that stir up many murders, in a situation where someone is doing or has done something that he wants no one to become or to have become knowledgeable about. They remove those who would inform about these things by killing them, when they can do so in no other way.

Let these things that have been said be the preludes for all these cases, and in addition the argument many earnestly believe because they've heard it from those who are seriously involved in the mystery-rites concerning such matters, to the effect that vengeance is exacted for such things in Hades, and that when they return back here again they must necessarily pay the just penalty according to nature, which is that of suffering whatever he himself inflicted on the victim and having his life brought to an end this time by the same fate at another's hands. For him who believes and is wholly fearful of such a penalty, because of the prelude itself, it isn't necessary to sing the law in addition to this; but for him who doesn't believe let the following law be stated in writing:

He who with forethought, unjustly, and with his own hands kills any of his fellow tribesmen must, in the first place, stay away from the places conventionally proscribed: he must not pollute the temples, or the marketplace, or the harbors, or any other common place of meeting, whether or not one of the human beings has pronounced this prohibition to the perpetrator. For the law prohibits it, and is always seen prohibiting it, and will always be seen prohibiting it, on behalf of the whole city. And anyone related

to the deceased as closely as a cousin, on either the male or female side, who fails to prosecute as he ought, or fails to proclaim to the perpetrator his banishment, would, in the first place, have the pollution and the enmity of the gods fall on himself—for the enmity of the law urges, the omen on. Then, in the second place, he is to be liable to prosecution by anyone who is willing to seek retribution on behalf of the deceased. He who is willing to seek retribution should carry out everything, in the way of attention to rites of lustration for these matters and whatever other things the god prescribes for these conventional proceedings, and, after proclaiming the warning, should proceed to compel the perpetrator to submit to the lawful execution of the judicial penalty.

That these things should be accompanied by certain prayers and sacrifices, to certain gods who make such matters their concern, so that murders won't occur in cities, would be easy for the lawgiver to show. But which are the gods, and what manner of initiating such trials would be most correct with a view to the divine, are matters that will be legislated by the Guardians of the Laws, together with the Interpreters, the Diviners, and the god, and thus they shall initiate these trials.

The judges in these trials are to be the same as were said to have sovereign judgment over those who plunder the temples. He who is convicted is to be given the death penalty, and he is not to be buried in the country of the one who suffered, in order to show he is not forgiven, as well as with a view to the impiety. If he flees and isn't willing to stand trial, let him remain in perpetual flight. If one of these people should set foot in the country of the man who was murdered, the first member of the deceased's household or the first citizen who comes across him, should kill him with impunity, or bind him and hand him over to be killed by the

magistrates who judged the trial. He who is prosecuting should at once demand guarantees from the one he's prosecuting, and the latter should present guarantors who are judged substantial by the judicial magistracy in charge of these matters—he should present three substantial guarantors, who guarantee his presence at the trial. If someone is either unwilling or unable to do so, the magistracy is to take him, guard him in bonds, and present him for judgment at the trial. If someone didn't kill with his own hands, but planned death for another, and after having killed by the planning and plotting is dwelling in the city as one responsible for the murder, and impure in his soul, let the same judicial proceedings be followed in these cases, except for the guarantee. If the man is convicted, he is to be allowed his own tomb, but in other aspects the same things are to happen to him as were described for the previous case. These same things are to apply to strangers in relation to strangers, and to city dwellers and strangers in relation to one another, and again to slaves in relation to slaves, whether the murder be by one's own hands or by plotting—except for the guarantee. As regards this, those who kill with their own hands must give guarantees, as was said, but he who makes the public accusation of murder should in these cases at the same time demand guarantees. If a slave should voluntarily kill a free man and be convicted at a trial, whether it be with his own hands or by planning, the common executioner of the city should take him near the memorial marker of the deceased, to a spot from where he can see the tomb, and whip him as many times as the one prosecuting prescribes; if the murderer is still alive after the beating, he is to put him to death. If someone should kill a slave who was doing no injustice, out of fear lest he inform about his shameful and wicked deeds, or for some other such reason, then, just as he would have submitted to

judicial proceedings for murder if he had killed a citizen, so let him submit to the same things for the death of such a slave.

If there should come to pass cases about which it is terrible and is no way pleasing even to legislate, but which it is impossible not to legislate for—voluntary and wholly unjust murders of kinsmen, that take place either by one's own hands or through plotting, and which occur for the most part in cities with bad organization and rearing, but which presumably would also occur in some way in a country where someone wouldn't ever expect them—the account that was uttered a little while ago should be restated again, in case someone who hears us might become better able, on account of such things, to refrain voluntarily from murders that are in every way the most impious. For indeed the myth, or argument, or whatever it ought to be called, has been stated clearly, as it has come down from ancient priests:

It is to the effect that watchful Justice, the avenger of the blood of kinsmen, uses the law mentioned just now, and ordains for the perpetrator of such a deed that he must necessarily suffer the very same things he has perpetrated. If someone -ever kills his father, he must endure to suffer violently this same thing at the hands of his children at some time; if he should kill his mother, it is necessary that he himself be born partaking of female nature, and having become such, must at a later time depart life at the hands of the offspring. For there is no other purification for the shared polluted blood, nor is the pollution willing to be washed away, until the soul that perpetrated the deed pays for murder with murder, like for like, and thus, by appeasing, lays to rest the spiritedness of the entire family.

These things should restrain someone who fears such retributions from the gods; but if some should be overtaken by such a miserable condition that they dare voluntarily,

with forethought, to take the soul from the body of father, mother, brothers, or children, the law of the mortal lawgiver will legislate about such persons as follows:

The warnings about staying away from places customarily proscribed, and the guarantees, are to be the same as those stated for the earlier cases. If someone is convicted of such a murder, of having killed one of these, the magistrates who are servants of the judges shall kill him; then they are to throw him down naked at a specified crossroads outside the city and all the magistrates, on behalf of the whole city, are each to bring a stone and throw it at the head of the corpse, to remove the impiety from the whole city. After this they are to carry him to the borders of the country and cast him out unburied, according to law.

But what of one who kills the person that is most of all his own, and is said to be dearest to him—what should he suffer? I'm speaking of one who kills himself, violently robbing his Fate-allotted share, when he isn't ordered to do so by the city's judicial decree, nor compelled by some terribly painful and inescapable bad luck that's befallen him, and hasn't been allotted some baffling shame that he can't live with, but out of lack of effort and unmanly cowardice inflicts an unjust judicial penalty upon himself.

In other respects the god knows what the legal conventions of purifications and burials ought to be in this case, and the nearest of kin should inquire about them with the Interpreters and also with the laws concerning these matters, and then act as these prescribe. But the tombs for those destroyed in this way should, in the first place, be off by themselves without a single companion tomb; then they should be buried without any fame, in uncultivated and nameless boundary regions of the twelve districts, without tablets or name markers indicating the tombs.

If a beast of burden or any other living thing should murder someone, except in the case where it does such a thing when competing for the prizes established in a public contest, the kinsmen should prosecute the killer for murder, and the judges are to be whichever and as many of the Field Regulators as the next of kin shall ordain. The convicted party they should kill and cast out beyond the borders of the country. If some soulless thing should take away the soul from a human being, except in cases where it's a lightning bolt or some such missile coming from a god, but in the case of any of the other things that may kill someone through his falling upon it or its falling upon him—the next of kin should appoint the closest neighbor to be judge, and thus remove the impious impurity from himself and the whole family. The convicted party they should cast beyond the borders, just as was stated in the case of the class of living things.

If someone has evidently died, and the killer remains uncertain and undetected even after they seek him in a way that is not careless, there should be the same warnings as in the other cases, but proclaimed "for the perpetrator of the murder." After the prosecution is successful; they should announce in the marketplace to the killer of so-and-so, who has been convicted of murder, that he is not to set foot in the temples nor in the whole country of the one who has suffered, because, if he should be detected and known, he will be killed and thrown unburied outside the country of the one who has suffered.

Let this then be our one law that stands sovereign in regard to murder, and what's been said until this point is what covers such things. But the cases and circumstances in which the killer would correctly be unpolluted are to be as follows:

If at night he should catch and kill a thief entering his house to steal goods, let him be unpolluted. If he should kill

while defending himself against a highwayman, let him be 'unpolluted. If someone should use violence for sexual purposes against a free woman or boy, he may be killed with impunity by the violently outraged party, or the father, or the brothers or sons. If a man should come upon his wedded wife being violently attacked, let him be unpolluted under the law if he kills the violent attacker. If someone should kill somebody while defending his father from death, when his father is doing nothing impious—or his mother, his children, his brothers, or his fellow procreator of children—let him be entirely unpolluted.

Let this be the legislation concerning the living soul's nurture and education—whose presence makes life livable for it and whose absence does the opposite—and concerning the retributions that should follow violent deaths. What concerns the nurture and education of the bodies has also been discussed. Following on these things, one ought to define as well as one can the acts of violence they do to one another involuntarily and voluntarily, showing what they are, how many they are, and what retribution would be appropriate for each to obtain. It's likely that these are the things that it would be correct to legislate next.

Even the lowliest of those who turn to arranging laws would treat wounds and maimings that arise from wounds second after deaths. Now wounds should be distinguished just as murders were distinguished, into those that are involuntary, those that occur because of spirited anger, those that occur because of fear, and those that occur voluntarily out of forethought.

Something like the following preliminary statement should be made about all such cases, to the effect that it's necessary for human beings to establish laws for themselves and live according to laws, or they differ in no way from the beasts that are the most savage in every way. The cause of

these things is this, that there is no one among human beings whose nature grows so as to become adequate both to know what is in the interest of human beings as regards a political regime and, knowing this, to be able and willing always to do what is best. For, in the first place, it is difficult to know that the true political art must care not for the private but the common—for the common binds cities together, while the private tears them apart—and that it is in the interest of both the common and the private that the common, rather than the private, be established nobly. Secondly, even if someone should advance sufficiently in the art to know that this is the way these things are by nature, and after this should rule the city without being audited, and as an autocrat, he would never be able to adhere to this conviction and spend his life giving priority to nourishing what is common in the city, while nourishing the private as following after the common; mortal nature will always urge him toward getting more than his share and toward private business, irrationally fleeing pain and pursuing pleasure, and putting both of these before what is more just and better. Creating a darkness within itself, it will completely fill both itself and the whole city with everything bad. Of course, if ever some human being who was born adequate in nature, with a divine dispensation, were able to attain these things, he wouldn't need any laws ruling over him. For no law or order is stronger than knowledge, nor is it right for intelligence to be subordinate, or a slave, to anyone, but it should be ruler over everything, if indeed it is true and really free according to nature. But now, in fact, it is so nowhere or in any way, except to a small extent. That is why one must choose what comes second, order and law—which see and look to most things, but are incapable of seeing everything.

These things have been said for the sake of what follows: we are now going to ordain what someone who wounds or

does injury to someone else other than himself ought to suffer or pay.

Of course, it's available to anyone, in regard to anything, to interrupt and correctly ask, "What sort of wounding, inflicted on whom, or how, or when, are you talking about? For each of these has ten thousand varieties, which are very different from one another." Now it's impossible either to turn all of these things, or none of them, over to the judicial courts for judgment. There is indeed one thing, that applies to every case, that must necessarily be turned over to them to judge: whether each of these things happened or not. Then again, to turn over nothing about what penalty should be paid by the one who has been unjust in one of these respects, or what he ought to suffer, and to legislate about everything, small and great, oneself, is almost impossible.

Clinias/ So what is to be said after this?

Athenian Stranger/ This: that some things ought to be turned over to the judicial courts and some things shouldn't be turned over, but one should legislate them oneself.

Clinias/ What then ought to be legislated and what things ought to be given to the judicial courts to judge?

Athenian Stranger/ After these things, it would be most correct to say the following things: in a city in which the judicial courts are wretched and inarticulate, keep hidden their opinions, deliver their judgments in secret, and, what is more terrible than this, when they aren't silent but are full of noise just like a theater, judging each of the orators in turn with shouts of praise and blame, then the whole city is wont to undergo a harsh experience. To be led by some necessity to legislate for such judicial courts is not a lucky thing, but nevertheless, if led by necessity, one ought to turn over to them the authority to fix the penalties in the smallest possible matters, and one should legislate most matters

expressly oneself—if someone should ever legislate for such a regime. But in a city in which the judicial courts were set up correctly, insofar as possible, and where those who are going to judge have been well brought up, and tested with complete precision, there it would be correct, good, and noble to turn over to such judges the judgment of most things pertaining to what those who are convicted ought to suffer or pay. In the present situation, we'll incur no blame if we don't legislate for them concerning the greatest and most frequent matters, in regard to which even rather wretchedly educated judges would be able to discern and assign to each fault the value of what is suffered and done. Since we believe those we're legislating for are not the most poorly fitted to become judges of such matters, most ought to be turned over to them. Nonetheless, what we've often said and done in legislating the earlier laws—describing an outline and sketches of retributions, to give examples to the judges of how always to avoid going beyond the bounds of justice—was very correct at that time, and indeed this same thing should be done now, as we return once again to the laws. Our writing about wounding should go as follows:

If someone should in his thought intend to kill somebody dear—except in cases where the law directs him to do so—but only wounds, and is unable to kill, the one who has wounded with this thought in mind is unworthy of pity; he is not to be forgiven any more than if he had killed, and is to be compelled to submit to a judicial trial for murder. Yet out of reverence for his not entirely bad luck, and for the demon, who from pity for him and the person wounded prevented the wound from becoming incurable for the latter, and warded off the accursed luck and outcome for the former—to show gratitude to this demon and not oppose it—the one who did the wounding is to be spared death, and is to be removed to some neighboring city to spend his life,

continuing to reap the benefits of all his property. But as for the injury done, if he has done some injury to the person wounded, he must pay the one injured, the value to be set by the judicial court which judged the trial—and the judges are to be those who would have judged the murder case if the man had died from the blow that inflicted the wound. If a child should thus wound his parents from forethought, or a slave his master, death is to be the penalty. And if a brother should thus wound a brother or sister, or a sister a brother or sister, and he be convicted of wounding from forethought, death is to be the penalty. If a wife should wound her own husband with the intention of killing, or a husband his own wife, the person is to go into perpetual exile. If they should have sons or daughters who are still children, the guardians are to take care of the property and look after the children as if they were orphans. If they're grown men, it shall not be necessary for the offspring to take care of the exile, and they are to acquire the property. In the case where someone who has no children falls into such straits, the family relations of the exile as far removed as the children of cousins on both sides, men and women, are to meet together arid, in consultation with the Guardians of the Laws and the Priests, are to appoint a lot holder for this five thousand fortieth household in the city. They should think about this in a way and in terms of an argument that is something like the following: none of the five thousand forty households is the property of the occupier or of his entire family so much as it is the property of the city, in both a public and a private sense. And it is necessary for the city, at least, that the households it owns be as pious and as lucky as they can possibly be. So whenever one of the households is rendered unlucky and at the same time impious, with the result that the owner leaves in it no children, dying a bachelor, or a married man without children, who has been convicted of

voluntary murder or of some other fault pertaining to gods or citizens for which death is the penalty expressly stated in the law, or when someone without grown male children has gone into perpetual exile, the house must first be purified and cleansed of this, according to the law. Then, as we said just now, the relatives should meet together with the Guardians of the Laws to look for the family that has the best reputation of those in the city for both virtue and also good luck, and in which there are several children. They should take one from that family and give him to the father and family forebears of the man who has died, as their son, and should name him after them for the sake of the omen; praying that he will become a begetter of children for them, a guardian of the hearth, and a minister of the profane and sacred things with better luck than his father, they should appoint him lot holder according to law, and let the man who was at fault lie nameless and without children or estate, when such disasters overtake a man.

It is likely that not all the beings have a boundary that is contiguous with the boundary of another, but for those in which there is an area between the boundaries, this would lie in the middle of both, stretching in between the boundaries and encountering each of them. And indeed, what takes place out of spiritedness we asserted to be just such a thing, between the involuntary and the voluntary. Let the same hold for wounds that occur because of rage.

If someone is convicted, he is in the first place to pay twice the value of the injury, if the wound turns out to be curable; for incurable wounds he is to pay four times the value. If it's curable, but casts some great shame and disgrace on the wounded party, he is to pay triple the value. And insofar as someone who wounds somebody injures not only the one who suffers but also the city, by rendering the victim incapable of helping the fatherland against enemies, in this

case he is to pay for the injury to the city along with the other penalties. For in addition to his own military services he is to serve for the one who is incapacitated, and carry out the military duties on behalf of that man; or if he fails to do these things let him be subject under the law to prosecution, by anyone who wishes, for failing to perform his military service. The value of the injury, whether double, triple, or quadruple is to be paid, should be determined by the judges who voted on the conviction. If one member of a family should wound another member of the same family, in the same way as this person just discussed, the family and kin as distant as children of cousins on the women's and men's sides, both women and men, should meet together and, after arriving at a judgment, hand over to the natural parents the estimation of the injury. If the estimation is in dispute, those on the male side are to have sovereign authority to make the estimation; if they are unable to do so, they must finally turn the matter over to the Guardians of the Laws. The judges for those offspring who inflict such wounds on their parents must necessarily be men over sixty years of age who have children—not created by adoption, but truly. If someone is convicted, they must decide if such a person ought to die, or suffer something else greater than this or something not much less. None of the perpetrator's family are to serve as judges, not even if one should have lived as long a time as the law has stated. If some slave should wound a free man out of rage, the owner should hand the slave over to the person wounded, to use as he wishes. If he should fail to hand him over, he himself is to cure the injury. If someone accuses the slave and the wounded party of having agreed to contrive what happened, he should dispute the case: if he should fail to win, let him pay three times the value of the injury, but if he should win he shall hold the one who artfully colluded with the slave liable for kidnapping.

He who involuntarily wounds another should pay simply for the injury—for no lawgiver is sufficient to rule over chance—and the judges are to be those who were said to judge in cases of offspring who wound their parents: let them estimate the value of the injury.

All the sufferings we've discussed so far are violent, and the whole class of assault is also violent. So every man, child, and woman ought always to think about such things in the following way:

The elder is to no small degree more venerable than the younger, in the eyes of gods and of human beings who are going to be saved and become happy. It is therefore shameful, and hateful to the gods, to see in the city an assault by a younger man on an elder. And it's reasonable for every young man who is beaten by an old man to endure his rage with a soft spirit, thereby laying up for himself in old age this same honor. So let it be as follows. Every one of us is to evince awe, in deed and word, toward one elder than himself. Whoever exceeds us by twenty years in age, male or female, should be considered as a father or a mother, and care must be taken accordingly: one must always abstain from the entire generation that is capable of having begotten or borne one, for the sake of the gods who preside over childbirth. One should abstain in the same way from a stranger, whether he's lived here from old or is newly arrived. One shouldn't at all dare to chastise such a person with blows, whether one initiates the attack or is defending against it. If someone thinks a stranger should be punished for having licentiously and brazenly struck him, he should seize him and take him before the magistracy of the City Regulators, but should abstain from beating him, so that he will be far from daring ever to strike a native inhabitant. The City Regulators should take him and judge him, paying due regard to the god of strangers; if the stranger then should

seem to have struck a native inhabitant unjustly, they are to give the stranger as many blows with the whip as he himself struck, and thus put a stop to the brazenness of strangers. But if he hasn't done an injustice, they are to threaten and blame the one who brought him before them, and dismiss both. If a man of a certain age should strike a man of the same age, or a man more advanced in age than himself but childless—an old man against an old man, or a young man against a young man—let the man defend himself according to nature, without a weapon and using his bare hands. But if a man over forty years of age should dare to fight, whether he initiates it or is on the defensive, he is to be spoken of as boorish, illiberal, and slavish, and it would be fitting if he incurred a degrading judicial penalty.

If someone should become obedient to such admonitions, he would be a docile man. But he who obeys poorly and thinks nothing of the prelude would have a law such as the following waiting for him:

If someone should strike somebody elder than himself by twenty years or more, then, in the first place, the one who comes upon this, if he isn't of the same age or younger than the combatants, must try to separate them or else be a bad man according to law. If he is of the same age or yet younger than the man being beaten, he must defend him as if the one being done the injustice were a brother or a father or a more senior relative. Then, in addition, the one who, as was said, dared to strike an elder must submit to a trial for assault, and if he should be convicted in the trial is to be imprisoned for not less than a year. If in the judges' estimation the time should be longer, let the time the court decides be authoritatively binding. If a stranger or one of the resident aliens should strike someone elder than himself by twenty years or more, the same law concerning help from bystanders is to have the same power. He that loses such a

trial, if he's a stranger and not a resident, must pay the judicial penalty of spending two years in prison; if he's a resident alien and has disobeyed the laws he must spend three years in prison—unless in the court's estimation the judicial penalty for him should be a longer period of time. He who was a bystander in any of these cases and failed to give help according to the law must pay a penalty: if he's a member of the highest class, a mina, if of the second, fifty drachmas, if of the third, thirty, and twenty if of the fourth. The judicial court for such cases is to be constituted by the Generals, Rank Commanders, Tribe Commanders, and Cavalry Commanders.

The laws, it is likely, come into being partly for the sake of the worthy human beings, in order to teach them the way in which they might mingle with one another and dwell in friendship, and partly for the sake of those who have shunned education, who employ a certain tough nature and have been in no way softened so as to avoid proceeding to everything bad. It is these who have brought about the words that are going to be uttered. On their account the lawgiver would legislate the laws, from necessity, wishing that the need for them would never arise. For whoever will dare at any time to touch in some violent assault his father or mother, or yet their progenitors, terrified neither by the wrath of the gods above nor by the retributions said to be beneath the earth, but holding in contempt the ancient sayings repeated by everyone, as if he knew things he doesn't know at all, and breaking the law—this man requires some ultimate deterrent. Now death is not the ultimate, and the toils said to await these people in Hades, though they're closer than this to being ultimates, and though they speak very truly, do not succeed as a deterrence for such souls. If they did, there would never be assaults on mothers or daring, impious, attacks on the other progenitors. It is

necessary, then, that the punishments here for such things, inflicted on these men while they are living, be no less than those in Hades, insofar as possible. Let what is said after this be as follows:

If someone should dare to strike his father or mother, or their fathers or mothers, and should do so while not afflicted with madness, then, in the first place, one who happens along should help just as in the earlier cases. If a stranger who's a resident alien helps, he is to be invited to take a front seat at the contests, while if he hasn't helped, he is to be exiled perpetually from the country; he who is not a resident alien should receive praise if he helps, and blame if he doesn't help. A slave who has helped is to become a free man, while if he hasn't helped, he is to be beaten a hundred strokes with the whip—by the Market Regulators, if the incident occurred in the marketplace. If it occurred outside the marketplace but in the city, the resident City Regulator will inflict the punishment, while if it occurred somewhere in the fields of the country, it will be inflicted by the Officers of the Field Regulators. If the person who happens along should be some native inhabitant, whether it be child or man or even a woman, everyone must come to the defense, crying out against the impious one. He who fails to come to the defense must according to law bear the curse of Zeus who watches over kinship and fatherhood. If someone should be convicted in a judicial trial for assault on his parents, he must in the first place be perpetually exiled from the city, into the rest of the country, and must avoid all sacred places. If he doesn't avoid them, the Field Regulators are to punish him with blows and entirely as they wish, while if he comes back from exile, he is to be penalized with death. And if someone among the free men should eat with such a man, or drink with him, or partake in common with him in some other such community, or even if he should only touch him

in greeting, voluntarily, when encountering him somewhere, he is not to go into any temple, nor into the marketplace, nor into the city as a whole, until he has been purified, believing that he has partaken of accursed luck. But if in disobedience to the law he should illegally pollute the temples and the city, and any of the magistrates should be aware of the fact and doesn't bring to trial such a man, then in the audits this is to be one of the gravest accusations against the magistrate.

If, again, a slave should strike a free man, whether he be a stranger or a member of the city, the bystander is to help or pay a fine according to his class, as has been stated. Those who happen along, together with the one beaten, should tie up the culprit and hand him over to the one who has been done the injustice. The latter shall take him, bind him in fetters, and whip him as much as he wishes, so long as he does no injury to the master, to whom he shall turn him over to be kept according to law. The law should be: Whoever, being a slave, should strike a free man when the magistrates haven't commanded it, should be taken in bonds by his owner from the person beaten, and shouldn't be released until the slave persuades the one who was beaten that he is worthy of living released. The same legal customs are to apply to women in all such relations with one another, and to women in relation to men, and men in relation to women.

Book 10.

Athenian Stranger/ After assaults, let a single legal custom such as the following be pronounced concerning acts of violence in general: no one is to carry or drive away anything belonging to others, or use anything belonging to a neighbor, if he hasn't persuaded the owner. For such behavior has been, is, and will be a source of all the evils that have been mentioned.

Of the evils that are left, the gravest are the unrestrained and insolent things done by the young. These offend the worst when they offend the sacred things, and are especially grave when they offend things that are public as well as hallowed—or are common to a part (being shared by members of a tribe or some other such groups). Second and second-worst is when they offend private sacred things and tombs. Third is when someone is insolent against his parents, apart from the cases discussed earlier. A fourth kind of insolence is when someone, heedless of the rulers, drives or carries away or uses something belonging to them without persuading them. A fifth would be insolence against the political right of each of the citizens, of a sort that calls for judicial penalty. A law should be given to all these in common.

As to temple robbery, what ought to be suffered, whether the robbery takes place violently or by stealth, has been stated in summary fashion. But as regards the ways by which someone may in speech and in deed be insolent toward the gods either by speaking or by acting, what must be suffered should be stated after the exhortation has been laid down. Let the latter be the following:

No one who believes in gods according to the laws has ever voluntarily done an impious deed or let slip an illegal utterance unless he is suffering one of three things: either

this, which I just said, he doesn't believe; or, second, he believes they exist but that they do not think about human beings; or, third, he believes they are easily persuaded if they are brought sacrifices and prayers.

Clinias/ So what should we do or even say to them?

Athenian Stranger/ My good man, let us first hearken to what I divine they say in a joking way, out of contempt for us.

Clinias/ What's that?

Athenian Stranger/ These are the things they would probably say, in a jocular speech:

"O Athenian stranger, and Lacedaimonian, and Knossian, the things you say are true. For some of us don't believe in the gods at all, and others believe them to be as you say. Now we demand, just as you demanded in regard to the laws, that before you direct harsh threats at us, you try to persuade and teach that there are gods, adducing adequate evidence, and that they are too good to be turned aside and beguiled from what is just by certain gifts. For as it is now, since we hear these and other such things from those who are said to be best among the poets, orators, diviners, and priests, as well as from myriads upon myriads of others, most of us don't turn to refraining from doing unjust things, but rather try to make healing amends after we've done them. From lawgivers who are claiming to be not savage but gentle, we demand that persuasion be used on us first. And perhaps we would be persuaded by you, even if you didn't speak much better than the others about the existence of the gods, so long as you spoke better as regards the truth. But do try, if we're saying something well measured, to say what we're asking for."

Clinias/ Well, doesn't it seem easy, stranger, to say that the gods exist and to be speaking the truth?

Athenian Stranger/ How?

Clinias/ First, there's the earth, the sun, the stars, and all things, and this beautiful orderliness of the seasons, divided into years and months. Then there's the fact that all Greeks and barbarians believe the gods exist.

Athenian Stranger/ I am afraid, at least, my blessed man—for I would never say that I am in awe—lest the wicked will somehow be contemptuous of us. For you don't know about what is responsible for our difference with them, but believe that it's only because of a lack of self-restraint in the face of pleasures and desires that their souls are urged on to an impious life.

Clinias/ But what in addition to these things would be responsible, stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ Something you would hardly know of because you live entirely out of it, and which would escape your notice.

Clinias/ What is this you're now explaining?

Athenian Stranger/ A certain very harsh lack of learning, that seems to be the greatest prudence.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Among us there are accounts found in writings, which aren't among you because of the virtue of the regime, as I understand. These are discussions about the gods, some with certain meters and others without meters. The most ancient discuss how the first nature of heaven and the other things came into being, and then, proceeding on to a point not much after the beginning, they go through how the gods came into being and how they mingled with one another once they had come into being. It's not easy to pass judgment, in the case of writings so ancient, as to whether they have some other sort of noble or ignoble effect on the hearers, but as regards services and honors

toward parents, I at least would never speak of them in praise, either as beneficial or as spoken entirely in accordance with reality. What pertains to the ancients should be left alone and bid good-bye, and spoken of in whatever way is pleasing to the gods; but what pertains to our new and wise men must be accused, insofar as it is responsible for bad things. Now the following is what is done by the arguments of such men: when I and you adduce evidence that the gods exist, bringing forward these very things—sun and moon and stars and earth—as being gods and divine things, those who are convinced by these wise men would say that these things are earth and stones, and incapable of thinking anything about human affairs, however well decked-out they may somehow be, with arguments that make them plausible.

Clinias/ You happen to have uttered an argument that is indeed difficult, stranger, even if it were alone and single; but now when there are very many arguments, it is still more difficult.

Athenian Stranger/ So what then? What do we say? What must we do? Will we pronounce a defense as if someone were accusing us before impious human beings, who say to those defending themselves in regard to the legislation that we are doing terrible things when we legislate that gods exist? Or shall we let it go, bidding good-bye and turning back again to the laws, lest our prelude become longer than the laws? For the argument once unfolded would not be short, if we would use arguments of due measure and demonstrate to those desiring to be impious the things they indicated had to be discussed, and if we would convert him to fear, and then, having created a sense of repugnance, would legislate whatever was fitting after these things.

Clinias/ But stranger, we've often—considering the short time anyway—said this very thing, that in the present

circumstances there's no need to honor brevity of speech over length. For there's no one, as the saying goes, in pressing pursuit of us. Indeed, to show that we choose the shorter in preference to the best would be ridiculous and petty. Moreover, it makes no small difference, if somehow or other there is some persuasiveness in our arguments that the gods exist and are good, honoring justice differently from human beings. For this would be just about our noblest and best prelude on behalf of all the laws. So without feeling repugnance or being in a hurry, mustering whatever capability we have for making such arguments persuasive, let's go through the arguments in as adequate a way as we can, holding back nothing.

Athenian Stranger/ Prayer is what it seems to me your present speech is calling for, so zealous are you, and eager in spirit! There's no room for further delay in speaking. Come then, how would someone speak without spirited anger about the gods, and that they do exist? For it's inevitable that we be harshly disposed toward, and hate, those who have been and are now responsible for our getting involved in these arguments: they refuse to believe the myths which they heard from their nurses and mothers since the time they were still young children being nourished on milk, hearing them spoken as if in incantations, playfully and seriously. And they heard them in prayers that go with sacrifices, and saw them accompanied by spectacles, executed during the sacrifices, that are most pleasant for the young man, at least, to see and hear. They saw their own parents evincing the greatest seriousness, on behalf of themselves and them, as they carried on a dialogue in prayers and supplications with gods who were assumed to exist in the highest degree. At the rising of the sun and moon, and at their settings, they heard of and saw Greeks and all the barbarians, in every sort of disaster and in

prosperity, kneeling and prostrating themselves—not as if those things didn't exist, but as if they existed to the highest degree and gave no hint that they are not gods. Those who now compel us to say what we're saying are people who have contempt for all these things, and not on account of a single adequate argument—as would be affirmed by those who possess even a small amount of intelligence; how could someone use gentle arguments to admonish, and at the same time to teach, these people about gods, and first that they exist? Yet it must be dared. For it shouldn't be that both are maddened at the same time, at least—some of us by gluttony for pleasure, and others by spirited anger at such men. Let some such preliminary speech as the following proceed, without spiritedness, for those who are thus corrupted in their thinking, and let's speak gently, quenching spiritedness, as if we were carrying on a dialogue with one such man:

"Lad, you are young, and the passage of time will make you alter many of the opinions you now hold, and exchange them for their opposites. So wait until then to judge the greatest things—and the greatest thing, which you now consider nothing, is thinking correctly about the gods and thus living nobly or not. If I first reminded you of one great thing about them, I would never be asserting a falsehood, and it is to the following effect: neither you alone nor your friends are the first and foremost to have this opinion about gods, but there always arise people, sometimes more, sometimes less, who have this illness. And having encountered many of them, I would declare to you the following: no one has ever adopted from his youth this opinion about the gods, that they don't exist, and continued until old age remaining in this frame of mind.

"The other two states of mind do remain (not for many people, but they do remain for some)—that the gods exist,

but think nothing of human things, and the one after this, that they do think about them, but are easily persuaded by sacrifices and prayers. If you should be persuaded by me, you'll wait until you have a doctrine about these matters that has become as clear as it can be, and meanwhile you'll investigate whether things are thus or are otherwise, and will inquire from others, and especially from the lawgiver. During this time you would not dare to do anything impious concerning the gods. The one who establishes the laws for you should try, now and in the future, to teach how these very things are."

Clinias/ What's been said until now at least, stranger, is very fine with us.

Athenian Stranger/ In every way, Megillus and Kleinias. But without our realizing it, we've fallen into an amazing argument!

Clinias/ Which one do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ The one that in the opinion of many is the wisest of all arguments.

Clinias/ Explain yet more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably, certain people say that all affairs come into being, have come into being, and will come into being, by nature, by art, and through chance.

Clinias/ Isn't that finely expressed?

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely, at any rate, that men who are presumably wise speak correctly. Let's follow them, anyway, and investigate whatever it is that those people over there happen to think.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely, they assert, that the greatest of them, and the finest, are produced by nature and chance, and the smaller by art, which, taking from nature

the genesis of the greatest and first deeds, molds and constructs all the smaller things which we all call artificial.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I'll express it still more clearly, as follows. Fire, water, earth, and air are all by nature and by chance, they claim, and none of these is by art; and the bodies that come after these—of the earth, sun, moon, and stars—came into being through these, which are beings completely without soul. They are each carried about by the chance of the power each has; when they fall together with things that somehow harmonize with what is proper to them—hot things with cold things, or dry things in relation to wet things, and soft things in relation to hard things, and all things that are mixed together, by the mixing of opposites according to chance, that arises out of necessity—then in this way and according to these means, the whole heaven and all things in heaven, and also the animals and all the plants have come into being, once all the seasons had come into being out of these things: not through intelligence they claim, nor through some god, nor through art, but, as we're saying, by nature and chance. Art is later, coming into being later from these; being itself mortal and from mortals, it later has brought into being certain playthings that don't partake much of truth, but are certain images that are akin to one another—such as the things brought into being by painting and music and whatever arts are fellow workers with these. But some of the arts do bring into being something serious, and these are the ones that have their power in common with nature—such as, again, medicine and farming and gymnastics. And indeed, as for the political art, they claim that there is a small portion of it that is in partnership with nature, but that most of it is by art; and thus the whole of legislation, whose assumptions are not true, is not by nature but by art.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ The gods, blessed one, are what these people first assert to exist by art—not by nature but by certain legal conventions, and these differ from one place to another, depending on how each group agreed among themselves when they laid down their laws. They claim that the noble things by nature are different from those by convention, and that the just things are not at all by nature, but that men are continually disputing with one another and are always changing these things, and whatever changes they've made at a given time are each at that time authoritative, having come into being by art and by the legal conventions, but not, surely, by any nature.

All these things, friends, are put forward by men considered wise by young people, private men who write in prose and poets, who explain that what is most just is whatever allows someone to triumph by force. This is the source of the impieties the young people contract, to the effect that the gods are not such as the law commands they must be conceived; by means of these things civil strife is instigated, by those who draw people toward the way of life that is correct according to nature—which is, in truth, to live dominating the rest and not to be a slave to others according to legal convention.

Clinias/ What an argument you've gone through, stranger! And what ruin for young people, in the public life of cities and in private homes!

Athenian Stranger/ What you say is indeed true, Kleinias. So what do you think the lawgiver ought to do, seeing how these men have been preparing in this way for a long time? Is he merely to stand up in the city and threaten all the human beings, that if they don't affirm that the gods exist and don't conform their thoughts to the opinion that they

are such as the law affirms—and about noble things and just things and all the greatest matters, the same speech, and about whatever aims at virtue and vice, that it is necessary to act in these respects while thinking in the way the lawgiver has instructed in writing—is he to say that whoever does not show himself obedient to the laws must in one case die, and in another case be punished with blows and prison, and in another case with dishonors, or, in other cases, with poverty and exile? Is he to present no persuasion for the human beings, mixed in with his speeches as he gives them laws, so as to make them as tame as he can?

Clinias/ Not at all, stranger! If there happens to be even some small bit of persuasion as regards such matters, the lawgiver of even slight merit should in no way grow faint, but should lend his whole voice, as they say, in assistance to the ancient law's argument to the effect that there are gods, and the rest that you just now went through; indeed, he should take the field on behalf of law itself and art, showing that they are by nature, or by something not inferior to nature, if they are offspring of intelligence—according to the correct argument, which you appear to me to be pronouncing, and on the basis of which I put my trust in you now.

Athenian Stranger/ O most eager-spirited Kleinias! What now? Isn't it difficult to follow arguments of this kind spoken before crowds, and, in addition, aren't they of enormous length?

Clinias/ What, stranger? About drunkenness and music we put up with ourselves talking at such length, and we're not going to put up with it when it comes to gods and such matters? Besides, at least for legislation that is to proceed with prudence, it is presumably a very great help when the prescriptions pertaining to the laws are set down in writing and are entirely stable, because they provide for all time an opportunity for questioning; as a result, if they're difficult to

listen to at the beginning, there's no need to fear, so long as the slow learner can go and examine them often. Even if they're lengthy, if the arguments are beneficial, it doesn't appear to me, at least, to be at all reasonable or pious for any man to fail, on this account, to help these arguments as best he can.

Megillus/ What Kleinias says seems excellent to me, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ And certainly, Megillus, one ought to do as he says. Of course, if such arguments weren't spread about among the whole of humanity, so to speak, there'd be no need for arguments in defense of the gods' existence. But now they're necessary. When the greatest laws are being undermined by bad human beings, who is a more appropriate defender than the lawgiver?

Megillus/ Nobody is.

Athenian Stranger/ But now you tell me again, Kleinias (for you must share in the arguments): the one saying these things ventures to hold that fire, water, earth, and air are the first of all things, and ventures to name these very things "nature," and to say that soul is something that comes later, out of these things. But it's likely that he doesn't "venture," but really makes these things manifest to us in his argument.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, in the name of Zeus! Haven't we discovered something like a source of the mindless opinion of those human beings who have at any time engaged in investigations into nature? Consider and investigate the whole argument. For it would make no small difference if those who handle impious arguments, and initiate others into them, were evidently using the

arguments not well, but erroneously. And such seems to me to be the case.

Clinias/ Well spoken, but try to explain how this is.

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely that rather unfamiliar arguments are going to have to be handled now.

Clinias/ There shouldn't be hesitation, stranger. For I understand that you think it's necessary to go outside the realm of legislation, if we are to handle such arguments. But if there is no other way whatsoever, except this, by which there can be consonant agreement that what are now called gods by legal convention are correctly so called, then this is the way the discussion must proceed, you amazing man!

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely, then, that at this point I may present something like the following rather unfamiliar argument. The arguments which have shaped the soul of the impious have asserted that what is in fact the first cause of the coming into being and passing away of all things is not first, but has come into being later, and that what in fact comes later comes earlier. That is why they have fallen into error concerning the real existence of gods.

Clinias/ I don't yet understand.

Athenian Stranger/ It is soul, comrade, that almost all of them have dared to misunderstand: what sort of thing it happens to be, what power it has, and, among other things about it, how it comes into being—how it is among the first things, how it comes into being before all bodies, and how it is, more than anything, the ruling cause of their change and of all their reordering. And if these things are so, isn't it necessarily the case that the things akin to soul would come into being before the things belonging to body, since it is elder than body?

Clinias/ Necessarily.

Athenian Stranger/ Opinion, then, and supervision, intelligence, art, and law would be prior to hard things, soft things, heavy things, and light things. And, indeed, the great and first deeds and actions would be those of art, since they're among the first things, while the things that are by nature, and nature, which they incorrectly name in this way, would be later and would have as their ruling causes art and intelligence.

Clinias/ How do you mean "incorrectly"?

Athenian Stranger/ Nature, they mean to say, is the coming into being connected with the first things. But if soul is going to appear first, and not fire or air, and it's soul that has come into being among the first things, it would be most correct, almost, to say that it is especially by nature. These things are so if someone should demonstrate that soul is a being elder than body, but otherwise not at all.

Clinias/ What you say is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So, after these things, shall we address ourselves to this very task?

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us be on our guard against an argument that is wily in every way, lest with its youthful vigor it cajole us, who are elderly, and get away, making us laughable, and seem like people who reached for great things but failed to obtain even the smaller. Consider therefore: suppose it was necessary for us, being three, to cross a very swift flowing river, and I, happening to be the youngest of us and experienced in many currents, said that I ought to try it first by myself, leaving you in safety and investigating whether it is fordable for more elderly men such as you, or just how it is. If it appeared to be, I would then call to you and help you across with my experience, while if it were unfordable for you, the risk would be mine. I would have

seemed to speak in a well-measured way. Now the argument coming up is rather swift and perhaps almost unfordable for your strength. Lest it create in you a dizziness and whirling, sweep you away by asking unfamiliar questions, and engender an unpleasant unsightliness and unseemliness, it seems to me that I ought now to proceed thus: first I should question myself, while you listen in safety, and then after this I again should answer myself, and go through the entire argument this way, until what pertains to soul is completed and it has been demonstrated that soul is prior to body.

Clinias/ You seem to us, stranger, to have spoken in an excellent way. Do as you suggest.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, if ever we should invoke the aid of a god, it's now that this should happen—at the demonstration of their own existence let their aid be invoked in all seriousness—and holding on as if to some safe cable, let's set forth into the present argument.

If I am examined about such matters through some such questions as the following, it appears to me to be safest to answer as follows. When someone should ask, "O stranger, do all things stand still then, and is there nothing in motion? Or is the case entirely the opposite to this? Or are some of the things in motion, and some remaining still?"—"Some things are presumably in motion," I will declare, "and some things remain still."—"And then isn't it in a certain place that the standing things stand and the things in motion move?"—"How could it be otherwise?"—"And some, at least, would presumably do this in one location, but some in many."—"Are you speaking of those that obtain the power of things that stand still in the middle," we will declare, "and thus move in one place, just as the circumference turns in circles that are said to stand still?"—"Yes."—"And we learn, at any rate, that in this rotation such motion carries the largest and smallest circles around together, distributing itself

proportionally to the small and the large, being less and more according to proportion. That is how it has become a source of all wonders, conveying the large and small circle at the same time, at slow and fast speeds that are in agreement, an effect that someone would expect to be impossible."—"What you say is very true."—"And in speaking of things that move in many locations, at least, you appear to me to refer to whatever moves in a course by which it always changes to another place: sometimes they possess one axis of support, and sometimes more, because they roll. Each time they encounter each other, if they encounter things that stand still> they are split, and if they encounter the others, coming from opposite directions, they coalesce and become one, in the middle and in between such things."—"Now I do say that these things are this way, as you are saying."—"And when things coalesce there is growth, while when they are separated, then there is decay, so long as the established character of each thing lasts; if it doesn't last, both processes are destructive. Now the coming into being of all things takes place when what experience occurs? Clearly, when the original cause, obtaining growth, proceeds to the second transformation, and from this to the next, and, when it arrives at the third, it allows of perception by perceivers. By this transformation and change everything comes into being. And it is really in being, so long as it lasts, but when it is transformed into another character, it is completely destroyed."

So then haven't we enumerated in forms all motions, except, friends, for two?

Clinias/ Which two?

Athenian Stranger/ Those two, my good man, for the sake of which just about our entire investigation is now taking place.

Clinias/ Speak more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably it was for the sake of soul?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let there be a motion that is capable of moving others, but incapable of moving itself, and that is always one; and let there be another, that is always capable of moving itself as well as others, in coalescences and separations, growths and the opposite, generations and destructions—another one motion among all the motions.

Clinias/ Let it be so.

Athenian Stranger/ So then the one that always moves another and is transformed by another we will set down as the ninth, and the one that moves itself as well as others, in harmony with all actions and all experiences, and which is called the real transformation and motion of all the beings, this we will call just about the tenth.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Which of our roughly ten motions would we most correctly judge to be the strongest of all and especially active?

Clinias/ Presumably it's necessary to declare that the one capable of moving itself differs ten thousand-fold, and that all the others are later.

Athenian Stranger/ Well spoken. So then shouldn't one or even two of our statements just now that were incorrect, be changed?

Clinias/ Which do you claim are so?

Athenian Stranger/ What was said about the tenth was pretty incorrect.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ It is first, in generation and in strength, according to reason. And the one we have after this is second to this, though it was just said, strangely, to be ninth.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ The following. When we always have one thing transforming another, and this another, will one of such transformations ever be first? How will that which is set in motion by another ever be first of the things that are altered? It's impossible. But when there's something that, having moved itself, alters another, and that other another, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of things moved come into being, what will be a ruling cause of all their motion other than the transformation of what has moved itself?

Clinias/ What you've said is very fine, and there ought to be agreement to these things.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us go on to speak in the following way, and again answer ourselves. If somehow all the things that have come into being should stand still, as most of those men dare to say, which then of the motions mentioned would necessarily come into being first among them? Doubtless, the motion that moves itself. For it would never be changed by another before it, there being no prior change among them. Therefore we will assert that the motion which moves itself, since it is the ruling cause of all motions, as well as the first to have come into being among things standing still and the first to exist among things moving, is necessarily the eldest and the strongest transformation of all, while the motion that is altered by another and moves others is second.

Clinias/ What you say is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Now that we're at this point in the argument, let's answer the following.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ If we should see that this had come into being somewhere, in something composed of earth, or of water, or in something having the form of fire—whether separated or mixed—what then will we ever claim is the condition of such a thing?

Clinias/ Would you be asking me if we'll speak of it as alive, when it moves itself?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes.

Clinias/ Alive. How could it not be?

Athenian Stranger/ What then? When we see soul in certain things, do we say anything other than this same thing? Shouldn't it be agreed that they're alive?

Clinias/ Nothing else.

Athenian Stranger/ Hold it, in the name of Zeus! Wouldn't you be willing to think about each thing in three ways?

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ One is the being, one is the definition of the being, and one is the name. And indeed there are two questions about every being.

Clinias/ How two?

Athenian Stranger/ Each of us sometimes presents the name itself and seeks the definition, and sometimes, again, presents the definition itself and asks for the name. So do we mean, then, something like the following here?

Clinias/ Which?

Athenian Stranger/ There is presumably a division into two in other things and also in number. The name for this in number is "even," and the definition is, "a number divisible into two equal parts."

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ It's such a thing that I'm explaining. Aren't we speaking of the same thing in either case, whether we are asked about the definition, and give the name, or asked about the name, and give the definition? By the name, "even," and by the definition "number divisible in two," aren't we speaking of the same being?

Clinias/ In every way.

Athenian Stranger/ Now what is the definition of this thing to which the name "soul" is given? Do we have another besides what was just now said, "the motion capable of moving itself"?

Clinias/ Do you claim that the definition, "to move itself," belongs to the same being as that to which we all give the name "soul"?

Athenian Stranger/ That's what I claim, at least. And if this is so, are we yet lacking an adequate demonstration that soul is the same being as that which is the first generation and motion of the things that exist, that have come into being, and that will be, and of all the opposites to these, since it has come to sight as the cause of all transformation and motion in all things?

Clinias/ No, but it has been very adequately demonstrated that soul is the eldest of all things, having come into being as the ruling cause of motion.

Athenian Stranger/ And isn't the motion that comes into being in one thing on account of another, but that never allows anything to move itself in itself, second—or as many numbers down as someone would wish to count, being really a transformation of soulless body?

Clinias/ Correctly spoken.

Athenian Stranger/ So then we would have spoken correctly, authoritatively, very truly, and most perfectly,

when we said that for us soul has come into being prior to body, and that body is second and later, being ruled, while soul rules, according to nature.

Clinias/ That is indeed very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we of course remember what we agreed to earlier, that if soul should be evidently elder than body, then the things pertaining to soul would be elder than the things pertaining to the body.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Temperaments, then, and dispositions, wishes, calculations, true opinions, supervisions, and memories would have come into being prior to lengths of bodies, widths, depths, and strength—if, indeed, soul came into being prior to body.

Clinias/ Necessarily.

Athenian Stranger/ Well now, after this, isn't it necessary to agree that soul is the cause of things good and bad, noble and shameful, just and unjust, and of all the opposites, if indeed we are going to set it down as the cause of all things?

Clinias/ How could it not be?

Athenian Stranger/ Isn't it also necessary to assert that since soul manages and resides in all things that are in motion everywhere, it also manages heaven?

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ One or several? Several; I will answer for both of you. Presumably we should assume no less than two, anyway—one that does good, and another capable of doing the opposite.

Clinias/ What you've said is surely correct.

Athenian Stranger/ So be it. Soul then drives all things in heaven, on earth, and in the sea through its motions—which are named wishing, investigating, supervising,

deliberating, opining correctly and falsely, rejoicing, being pained, being bold, being fearful, hating, and desiring—and through all the motions that are akin to these or primary; these take over the secondary motions of bodies and drive all things to growth and decay, separation and coalescence, and to what follows these—heat, cold, heaviness, lightness, hard and soft, light and dark, bitter and sweet; soul makes use of all these and, every time it takes as a helper Intelligence—god, in the correct sense, for the gods—it guides all things toward what is correct and happy, while when it associates with lack of intelligence it produces in all things just the opposite to these. Are we to set down these things as being so, or are we still in doubt lest it is somehow otherwise?

Clinias/ Not at all.

Athenian Stranger/ Then which kind of soul are we to assert has become master of heaven and earth and of the whole orbit? The one full of prudence and virtue, or the one that possesses neither? Do you wish us to answer these questions as follows?

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ If, you amazing man (we should declare), the entire path and motion of heaven and of all the beings in it has the same nature as the motion, revolution, and calculations of Intelligence, and proceeds in a kindred way, then it is clear that one ought to affirm that the best soul supervises the entire cosmos and drives it along such a path as that.

Clinias/ Correctly spoken.

Athenian Stranger/ But the bad soul, if they move in a mad and disordered way.

Clinias/ These things are also correct.

Athenian Stranger/ So what nature does the motion of Intelligence possess, then? Now this, friends, is a question that's difficult to answer while speaking in a prudent way. That's why it's just, at this point, for you to take me as a helper in answering.

Clinias/ Well spoken.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's not make our reply by looking straight on, and thereby, as if we were looking at the sun, create night at midday—because we supposed Intelligence were ever visible and adequately knowable by mortal eyes. One can see in more safety by looking at an image of what is being asked about.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Let's take as the image that one among those ten motions which Intelligence resembles. Recollecting it for you, I'll make our common reply.

Clinias/ You would say what is most beautiful.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we still remember this much, at least, of what was said earlier: we set it down that of all things, some are in motion and some at rest?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And again, of the things in motion, some move in one place, and some in several.

Clinias/ That is so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now of these two motions, the one that moves always in one place must necessarily move around some center, being an imitation of circular things turned on a lathe, and it must in every way have the greatest possible kinship and resemblance to the revolution of Intelligence.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Surely, if we said that moving according to what is the same, in the same way, in the same place, around the same things, toward the same things, and according to one proportion and order characterized both Intelligence and the motion that moves in one place—speaking of them as images of the motions of a sphere turned on a lathe—we'd never appear to be poor craftsmen of beautiful images in speech.

Clinias/ What you say is very correct.

Athenian Stranger/ On the other hand, wouldn't the motion that never moves the same, nor according to what is the same, nor in the same place, nor around the same things, nor toward the same things, nor in one place, nor in regularity, or order, or some proportion, be akin to complete lack of Intelligence?

Clinias/ It would, most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, indeed, it's no longer difficult to say explicitly that, since soul is what drives everything around for us, it ought to be affirmed that the revolution of heaven is necessarily driven around under the supervision and ordering of either the best soul or the opposite.

Clinias/ But stranger, from what has now been said at any rate, it isn't pious to say anything other than that the soul—whether it be one or several—that has every virtue drives things around!

Athenian Stranger/ Kleinias, you've attended to the arguments in a very fine way. But attend also to this.

Clinias/ To what?

Athenian Stranger/ If indeed sun and moon and the other stars are all driven around by soul, isn't each one of them?

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's take the case of one and make the arguments, which will then seem, to us, to apply harmoniously to all the stars.

Clinias/ Which one?

Athenian Stranger/ In the case of the sun, every human being sees the body, but no one the soul. And the same holds for the soul of any other living body, either while it's alive or when it's dying. It is very likely, rather, that this entire class of things grows by nature all around us, imperceivable through any of the bodily senses, but intelligible through intelligence alone. Let us, indeed, use intelligence and thought to grasp something of the following sort concerning it.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ If soul does drive the sun around, we will hardly be wide of the mark if we say it does this in one of three ways.

Clinias/ Which ways?

Athenian Stranger/ Either it resides within this spherical-appearing body and conducts it, being such, everywhere, just as our soul carries us around everywhere; or it provides itself with some outside body of fire or some kind of air, as the account of some people has it, and pushes the body with bodily force; or, third, being itself without body, it possesses certain other exceedingly amazing powers, and exercises guidance.

Clinias/ Yes: this is necessary, that soul drives all things by doing some one, at least, of these things.

Athenian Stranger/ Now hold it right there. This soul, whether it carries light to all of us by being in the chariot of the sun, or by acting from the outside, or however and in whatever way it does it, ought to be held to be a god by every man. Or how should it be?

Clinias/ Yes—at least, I suppose, by every man who hasn't arrived at the ultimate in lack of intelligence!

Athenian Stranger/ And with regard to all the stars, and the moon, the years, months, and all the seasons, what other account will we give except this same one, to the effect that since soul or souls are evidently the causes of all these things, and souls good with respect to every virtue, we will declare that they are gods—whether they order the entire heaven by existing within bodies, as living beings, or in whatever way and however they do it? Is there anyone who will agree to these things and maintain that all things are not full of gods?

Clinias/ There is no one so bereft of sense, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let's state terms to the one who didn't believe in gods earlier, Megillus and Kleinias, and be done with him.

Clinias/ What terms?

Athenian Stranger/ Either to teach us how we aren't speaking correctly when we set down soul as the primal generation of all things, and whatever else we said followed from this, or, if he's not able to speak better than us, to believe us and live believing in gods for the rest of his life. So let's see whether what we've said to those who don't believe in gods—showing that there are gods—is sufficient at this point, or whether it is lacking.

Clinias/ It is the least lacking of all, stranger!

Athenian Stranger/ Then let our arguments with these people be concluded. But the one who does believe the gods exist, and that they don't think about human affairs, must be persuaded.

"Best of men," let us declare, "the fact that you believe in gods probably indicates some kinship with the divine that draws you to what is of a like nature, to honor and believe

in its existence. But the private and public fortunes of bad and unjust human beings, not happy in truth, but very happy according to mistaken opinions, draw you toward impiety by the way in which they're sung about through incorrect Muses and in all sorts of accounts. Or perhaps you see human beings approaching the end of old age, leaving behind children of children in the highest honors, and you are now disturbed when you see in all these cases—either by hearing of it or by seeing it all yourself—that there are some who have partaken of many terrible impieties and by means of these very things have risen from low positions to tyrannies and the highest stations. Then, on account of all such things, since you are obviously unwilling, because of kinship, to blame the gods as being responsible for such things, you are drawn by ill reasoning and an incapacity to hold the gods in contempt to the condition you have now come to: it is your opinion that they exist, but that they despise and don't care about human affairs. In order, therefore, to prevent your present belief from impelling you toward an even graver condition of impiety, let's try, if somehow we can possibly exorcise it by arguments when it approaches, to connect the next argument to the one we went through from the beginning against the person who didn't believe in gods at all, making use of the latter in the present circumstances." But you, Kleinias and Megillus, take the part of the young man in answering, just as you did in the previous arguments; if something troubling comes up in the arguments, I'll take over from you two and ford the river as I did just now.

Clinias/ What you say is correct. You do these things, in this way, and we'll do our best to do what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ But there'd probably be no difficulty in demonstrating to this fellow, at least, that the gods supervise the small matters not less, but more, than the

especially big matters. For presumably he heard and was present at the things that were said just now, to the effect that since they are good, at least, with respect to every virtue, they possess, as very proper to them, the supervisory care of all things.

Clinias/ He certainly heard.

Athenian Stranger/ After this let them join in examining what virtue of the gods was referred to when we agreed they were good. Come, do we assert that being moderate and possessing Intelligence belong to virtue, and the opposites to vice?

Clinias/ We do assert that.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? That courage belongs to virtue, and cowardice to vice?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ And will we assert that some of these are shameful, and some noble?

Clinias/ Necessarily.

Athenian Stranger/ And will we say that whichever of those qualities are low befit us, if anyone, but that the gods partake neither in the great nor the small aspects of such things?

Clinias/ Everyone would agree that these things too are so.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Will we set down carelessness, idleness, and luxury as belonging to the soul's virtue, or what do you say?

Clinias/ How could we?

Athenian Stranger/ But as belonging to the opposite?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Then the opposites to these as belonging to the opposite?

Clinias/ The opposite.

Athenian Stranger/ So what then? Wouldn't everyone who is luxurious, without care, and idle become for us such as the poet explains: "resembling especially stingless drones"?

Clinias/ And he speaks very correctly, at least.

Athenian Stranger/ Then the god, at least, shouldn't be said to have such a disposition, which he, at least, himself hates; and he who tries to say such a thing is not to be tolerated.

Clinias/ Indeed not. How could he be?

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose it belongs to someone to act and exercise special supervision over something, and his intelligence supervises the great things but neglects the small: according to what argument would we in praising such a one not err in every way? Let's consider it as follows: doesn't the action of one who acts in such a way, whether god or human, take one of two forms?

Clinias/ Which two are we speaking of?

Athenian Stranger/ Either he neglects the small things, thinking it makes no difference to the whole, or he neglects them out of softness of spirit and luxury—if it does make a difference. Or is there some other way that neglect comes about? For surely when it's impossible, at any rate, to supervise all things, then it won't be neglect of small or great matters, in the case of that god or low person who fails to supervise things because he lacks the power and is incapable of supervising them.

Clinias/ How could it be?

Athenian Stranger/ At this point let the two of them reply to the three of us (they both agree that gods exist, and the other of them says they're appeasable, while this one says they're careless of the small things): "In the first place, do

you both claim that the gods know, see, and hear all things, and that nothing of which there are perceptions and knowledge can escape their notice?" Is this the way these things are said to be, or how?

Clinias/ Thus.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Are they, again, capable of all those things that mortals and immortals are capable of?

Clinias/ How will they not agree that these things too are so?

Athenian Stranger/ And we, being five, have agreed that they are good, at least, and even the best.

Clinias/ Emphatically.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, since they are, at any rate, such as we agree, isn't it impossible to agree that they do anything at all out of softness of spirit and luxuriousness? For in us, at any rate, idleness is an offspring of cowardice, and softness of spirit of idleness and luxury.

Clinias/ What you say is very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then no one among the gods is careless because of idleness or softness of spirit; for surely he doesn't share in cowardice.

Clinias/ What you say is very correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Then what is left—if indeed they do neglect the small and few things pertaining to the whole—is either that they would do this because they know it's not at all necessary to supervise any of such things, or, ... what else, except the opposite of knowledge?

Clinias/ Nothing else.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, most excellent and best of men, are we to set you down as saying they are ignorant, and neglect what ought to be supervised because of

ignorance, or that they know what is necessary, and, like the lowest of human beings are said to do, they know it is better to act otherwise than the way they're acting, but they don't do so on account of certain weaknesses in the face of pleasures or pains?

Clinias/ How could that be?

Athenian Stranger/ Don't human affairs, at any rate, partake of the nature of what has soul, and isn't the human being the most god-revering of all living things?

Clinias/ That's likely, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ Surely we assert that all mortal, living things are possessions of gods, to whom the whole heaven belongs.

Clinias/ How could this not be so?

Athenian Stranger/ So at this point someone may assert that these are either—small or great—to the gods: because in neither case would it be appropriate for our owners to neglect us, since they're the most careful supervisors, at any rate, as well as the best. For let's just consider the following, in addition to these matters.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Take what pertains to perception and power: are the two not by nature opposite to one another as regards ease and difficulty?

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably it's more difficult to see and hear the small things than the big, while it's easier for everyone to carry, master, and supervise the small and few things rather than their opposites.

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ If some whole is given to a doctor to care for, and he wishes and is able to supervise the big parts,

but neglects the small, will the whole ever turn out in a fine way for him?

Clinias/ Not at all.

Athenian Stranger/ Nor for pilots or generals or household managers, nor even certain statesmen, nor for any other such person: the many or great things won't turn out in this way without the few and small. For the stonemasons claim that the big stones don't lie well without little stones.

Clinias/ How could they?

Athenian Stranger/ Let's never judge the god, at least, to be less than mortal craftsmen, who, the better they may be, just so much the more exactly and perfectly do they use one art to carry out both the small and large aspects of the work that is appropriate to them—nor that the god, being very wise, and willing and able to exercise supervision, won't in any way supervise the things that are easily supervised, being small, but just the big things, like some idle or cowardly fellow whose spirit becomes soft in toils.

Clinias/ Let's by no means accept- such an opinion about gods, stranger; for we would be thinking a thought that is in no way pious or true.

Athenian Stranger/ We seem to me at this point to have carried on a very well-measured dialogue with the one who is fond of accusing the gods of neglect.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And it was done by forcing him, through arguments, to agree that he wasn't speaking correctly; but it seems to me that there are still needed, in addition, some mythic incantations.

Clinias/ Which, my good man?

Athenian Stranger/ Let's persuade the young man, through arguments, that "He who supervises everything has put all things together with a view to the safety and virtue of the whole and each part suffers and does what befits it, insofar as it can. Rulers have been set up over the suffering and activity of each of these at any time, down to the smallest aspect, and they have achieved perfection to the last detail. And one of these is your part, stubborn one, and it constantly strives and looks toward the whole, even though it is entirely small; but it has escaped your notice, in this very regard, that all generation comes into being for the sake of this: that a happy existence might characterize the life of the whole—it hasn't come into being for your sake, but you for the sake of it. For every doctor and every artful craftsman does everything for the sake of a whole, creating a part which strives for what is best in common, for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part. But you complain, ignorant of how what is best in your case for the whole turns out to be best for you as well, by the power of the common generation. Now since soul is always put together with body, sometimes with one, sometimes with another, and undergoes all sorts of transformations caused by itself or by another soul, no other task is left for the draughts player except that of transferring the disposition that has become better to a better place, and the worse to the worse place, according to what befits each of them, so that it obtains the appropriate fate."

Clinias/ In what way do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ In the way that would make sense of the gods having the greatest ease of supervision over all the things—this is what it seems to me I'm explaining. For if someone would mold and change the shape of all things without always looking to the whole, and had something like cold water coming out of fire, instead of many things from

one or from many, one, after the first or second or third generation there would be a limitless number of changes in the rearranged cosmos. But now it is amazingly easy for the one who supervises the whole.

Clinias/ How do you mean this again?

Athenian Stranger/ As follows. "Since, indeed, our King saw that all actions are involved with souls, and that there is much virtue in them, though much vice, and that soul with body, once it has come into being, is indestructible but not eternal—just like the gods who exist according to legal convention—(for if either of these two had been destroyed there would never have been generation of living things), and since he understood that whatever is good in soul is always beneficial by nature, while the bad is harmful; since he saw all these things, he presumably contrived the situation of each part so that in the whole, virtue would very much triumph, and vice meet defeat, in the easiest and best way. For the sake of the whole he has, in fact, contrived it so that when a certain sort of thing comes into being it must always take a certain place, and then dwell in certain regions. And he has assigned to the wishes of each of us the responsibility for what sort of person comes into being: the way one desires and what one is in one's soul just about determines each time, the type and character every one of us, for the most part, becomes."

Clinias/ That is likely, at any rate.

Athenian Stranger/ "So all things that partake of soul are transformed, possessing within themselves the cause of the transformation, and, undergoing transformation, are moved according to the order and law of destiny: for smaller and lesser transformations of dispositions there is lateral regional movement; when the transformations are greater and more unjust, there is a fall into the depths and the

places said to be below, to which in their fear people give the name 'Hades' and others connected to this, both while they're alive and dreaming, and when they've become separated from their bodies. But when a soul's own wishing and familiarity with others have become strong, and as a result it obtains a large share of vice or virtue—then, when by mingling with a divine virtue it comes to be such in an exceptional degree, it undergoes an especially great transformation in locale and is borne along a hallowed path to some other, better place; and when the opposite things occur, it transfers its own life to the opposite sorts of places. 'This, indeed, is the justice of the gods who hold Olympus,' O lad and young man who suppose yourself neglected by the gods: he who becomes more vicious is transported among the more vicious souls, while he who becomes better is transported among the better, and in life and in every death suffers and does the things that are appropriate for similars to do to similars. Neither you nor anyone else who has become unfortunate will ever boast of having eluded this justice of the gods. Those who ordained it have ordained it to be preeminent among all justices, and one ought to be careful in every way as regards it. For you will never be neglected by it—not if you should be small enough to sink into the depths of the earth, not if you should become high enough to fly up into heaven—but you will pay them the appropriate retribution, either while remaining here, or after having been transported to Hades, or after having been moved to some place still fiercer than these. You'll find that the same account would hold for those you observe having risen from pettiness to greatness through acts of impiety or some such thing, whom you supposed to have become happy, from being miserable, and in whose actions, as in mirrors, you believed you had seen the carelessness of all the gods—not knowing how their contribution ever assists

the whole. But how can you suppose, O most courageous of all men, that it isn't necessary to know this? If someone doesn't know it, he would never see an outline, nor become capable of contributing an account, of life, as regards happiness and an unhappy fortune.

"Now if Kleinias here and our entire Council of Elders persuade you of these things, that you don't know what you're saying about gods, god himself would aid you nobly; but if you should be still in need of some argument, hearken to us as we speak to the third party—if you have any intelligence."

For that gods exist, and exercise supervision over human beings, I at least would claim has been demonstrated by us, in a not altogether paltry fashion. But that gods can be appeased by the unjust, if they get gifts, is something one ought not go along with, and that ought also to be refuted by every means in one's power.

Clinias/ What you've said is very fine, and let's do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, in the name of the gods themselves! In what way would they become appeasable by us, if they were to become so? And what, or what sort, would they be? Presumably they must necessarily be rulers, since they manage the entire heaven perpetually.

Clinias/ That is so.

Athenian Stranger/ But then to which of the rulers are they similar? Or which are similar to them from among those we can compare to them, lesser to greater? Would it be certain drivers of competing teams, or pilots of ships? But perhaps they might be compared to certain rulers of armies; it might even be that they are like doctors taking care of a war against diseases in bodies, or farmers fearfully awaiting seasons that are usually difficult for the generation of plants,

or those set over flocks. For since we've agreed among ourselves that heaven is full of many good things, and also of the opposite, and that there are more of the latter, we assert that there is an immortal battle of this kind going on, requiring an amazing guard, and that the gods; and demons are our allies, while we in turn are the property of the gods and demons. Injustice and insolence, together with lack of prudence, destroy us, while what saves us are justice and moderation, together with prudence—qualities which dwell in the soul-imbued powers of the gods, but a small portion of which someone would also discern clearly dwelling here in us. Now there dwell on earth certain souls which have acquired unjust gain and are obviously beastly in form; they fawn upon the souls of the guards—the dogs, shepherds, or those who are in every way the highest masters—persuading them, with speeches of flattery or through certain prayerful incantations, of what the claims of the bad men assert, that it is possible for them to get more than their share among human beings and suffer no harshness. But we presumably assert that the fault just now named, getting more than one's share, is the thing called "disease" in the flesh of bodies, "plague" in seasons and years, and, in cities and regimes, having had its name refashioned, is injustice.

Clinias/ That is altogether the case.

Athenian Stranger/ This, indeed, is the argument that must necessarily be made by the one who says the gods always forgive unjust human beings and those who act unjustly, so long as one distributes to them a share of the unjust gains: it's just as if wolves were to distribute to the dogs small portions of what they've pillaged, and the latter, rendered gentle by the gifts, were to go along with the pillaging of the flocks. Isn't this the argument of those who claim the gods are appeasable?

Clinias/ This is it indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ To which of those mentioned before could any human being whatsoever compare the gods as guards who are similar, and avoid becoming ridiculous? Could it be pilots, who are "turned aside by the libation and aroma" of wine, and overturn ship and sailors?

Clinias/ In no way.

Athenian Stranger/ But surely not drivers lined up together for competition, persuaded by a gift to betray the victory to the other teams.

Clinias/ You would describe a terrible image in uttering this speech!

Athenian Stranger/ And not generals, surely, nor doctors, nor farmers, nor herdsmen, nor yet certain dogs softened by wolves.

Clinias/ Hush! How could they be?

Athenian Stranger/ But isn't it our view that all the gods are the greatest of all guards, and of the greatest thing?

Clinias/ By far.

Athenian Stranger/ Are we going to assert that those who guard the noblest affairs, and are themselves preeminent in the virtue of guarding, are inferior to dogs and ordinary human beings, who would never betray what is just in return for gifts bestowed impiously by unjust men?

Clinias/ Not at all; this speech is intolerable, and of those involved in every sort of impiety, every man who maintains this opinion risks being very justly judged the worst and most impious of all the impious.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we not assert, then, that the three propositions—that the gods exist, exercise supervisory care, and are in every way not to be appeased in a manner contrary to what is just—have been sufficiently demonstrated?

Clinias/ How could we not? We vote, at least, in accordance with these arguments.

Athenian Stranger/ Yet they were spoken, at any rate, rather vehemently somehow, on account of a fondness for victory over bad human beings. The reason, dear Kleinias, why they were animated by a fondness for victory was a concern lest the bad should believe that if they ever were stronger in arguments, they could act in the ways they wish, according to the sorts of notions they have about gods. It's on account of these things that an eagerness of spirit has prompted us to speak with youthful vigor; but if we've made some brief contribution to persuading the men in some sense to hate themselves, and to desire somehow the opposite dispositions, the prelude to the laws about impiety would have been spoken by us in a noble way.

Clinias/ But there is hope; and if not, the character of the argument will at least not discredit the lawgiver.

Athenian Stranger/ After the prelude it would be correct for us to have a speech that is like an interpreter of the laws, proclaiming to all the impious that they should change their ways into pious ones. For those who don't obey, let the law concerning impiety be as follows:

If someone should be impious in words or deeds, the one who comes across such behavior is to help defend by reporting the occurrence to the magistrates, and the first magistrates that learn of it are to bring the accused before the judicial court designated to judge these matters according to the laws. If some magistracy hears of such a thing and should fail to do this, it shall become liable to prosecution for impiety by anyone who wishes to seek retribution on behalf of the laws. If someone should be convicted, the court is to impose one penalty for each one of

those who are impious. Imprisonment is to be imposed in every case.

And there will be three prisons in the city: one around the marketplace, the common jail for most prisoners, and the place where the bodies of the many are secured; one around the meeting place of the councilmen who meet at night, named the "Moderation-Tank"; and one, again, in the middle of the country, in some spot that is deserted and as wild as possible, having for its name some term of retribution. Moreover, since the matters involving impiety have three causes, which we've gone through, and each of such causes gives rise to two kinds, there would be six kinds of faults worth distinguishing, concerning the divine things, which do not call for equal or similar judicial penalties. For a naturally just disposition may come to characterize the man who doesn't believe-the gods exist at all; such people do come to hate bad men, and out of disgust at injustice won't submit to doing such actions; they flee the human beings who aren't just and seek the just. But there are those who, in addition to the opinion that all things are bereft of gods, may be afflicted by lack of restraint as regards pleasures and pains, and may also possess strong memories and sharp capacities to learn. The disbelief in gods would be a disease that inheres in both, but as regards the ruin of other human beings, the one would do less, the other more, harm. For the former would be full of frankness in his speech about gods, as well as about sacrifices and oaths, and by his ridicule of the rest would perhaps make others like himself, if he didn't get a judicial penalty; the latter, on the other hand, while having the same opinion as the other, has what is called a "good nature," and is full of guile and trickery. From this type come many diviners and men equipped in all of magic, and sometimes tyrants, demagogues, and generals, and those who plot by means of private mystery-rites, and the

contrivances of those called “sophists.” There would be many forms of these things, but just two that are worthy of establishing laws about: one, the ironic, commits faults that deserve not one nor two deaths; the other needs admonishment and imprisonment. In the same way, the belief that the gods are careless breeds two, and the belief that they can be appeased, another two.

Of these which have been distinguished in this way, the ones who have come to be such because of lack of intelligence, without evil anger or disposition, the judge is to place, according to law, in the Moderation-Tank for no less than five years. During this time no one else among the citizens is to have intercourse with them except those who share in the Nocturnal Council, who are to associate with them for the purposes of admonishment and the salvation of the soul. When the time of their imprisonment is up, if someone among them should seem to be moderate, he is to dwell among the moderate, but if not, and he should be convicted at such a trial again, let him be punished with death.

Then there are those who, in addition to not believing in the gods, or believing them to be careless, or appeasable, become like beasts: they hold human beings in contempt and entice the souls of many of the living while pretending to entice the souls of the dead; they promise to persuade gods by charming them with sacrifices, prayers, and incantations; thus, for the sake of money, they try utterly to destroy private individuals and whole households and cities. He who should appear convicted of being one of these, the court is to imprison according to law, in the jail that lies in the middle of the country, and no free man is ever to go to visit him; the Guardians of the Laws are to arrange for them to get their food from the domestic slaves. When he dies he is to be cast out beyond the borders unburied. And if some

free man should take part in burying him, he is to be put on trial for impiety by whoever wishes. If the convict should leave behind children who are adequate to become members of the city, the supervisors of orphans are to supervise these as if they were orphans, treating them in no way as inferior to the rest, from the day when their father is convicted in the trial.

There should be a law that applies in common to all these people, that would make many of them commit fewer offenses in deed or in word concerning the gods, and that would in fact render them less unintelligent, by making it impermissible to traffic in divine matters contrary to law. Let the following law deal with all of them in compendious fashion:

Not a single person is to possess shrines in private dwellings. When someone is minded to sacrifice, he is to go and sacrifice at the public shrines, and hand the sacrificial offerings over to the priests and priestesses, whose responsibility it is to purify these things.

Let he himself and whomever he wants to accompany him join in the prayers. These arrangements are to be made for some such reasons as the following. It isn't easy to establish temples and gods, but to do such a thing correctly requires a certain amount of deep thought. It's a habit of all women especially, and indeed of people who are sick in any way, or in danger, or at a loss, however someone may be at a loss—and also in the opposite circumstances, when they prosper in some way—to sanctify whatever happens to be around at the time, to vow sacrifices, and to promise to establish shrines to gods, demons, and children of gods. Moreover, having been stirred awake by the fears they experience in apparitions and dreams, and, in the same way, recalling many visions, they make remedies against each of them by filling every house and every district with altars and temples,

establishing them in places free of pollution and wherever someone happened to have such experiences. On account of all these things, one should act according to the law now being pronounced. In addition to these considerations, one should do so because of the impious, to prevent them from committing fraud in these matters by setting up shrines and altars in private homes, supposing they can in secret make the gods propitious through sacrifices and prayers. They thus foster a limitless growth in injustice, bringing down on themselves and on those who tolerate them (and who are better than them) accusations on the part of the gods, and thus involving the whole city—justly, in a way—in the results of their impieties. The lawgiver, however, will not incur the god's blame, for this law is to hold:

There is to be no possession of shrines to the gods in private homes. If someone is found possessing shrines and worshipping in rituals other than the public ones, and if the man or woman possessing them has committed none of the great and impious sorts of injustice, the one who discovers this is to report it to the Guardians of the Laws; they are to command that the private sacred things be carried away to the public shrines, and those who disobey are to be penalized until they are carried away. But if someone should be detected having committed an impiety that is not of the childish sort but of the sort that characterizes impious grown men, either by establishing private shrines, or by sacrificing at the public shrines belonging to any of the gods whatsoever, let the penalty be death, on the grounds that he sacrificed while being polluted. The Guardians of the Laws are to judge whether it be childish or not, and, introducing the accused into the judicial court accordingly, are to carry out the judicial penalty for impiety in these cases.

Book 11.

Athenian Stranger/ Next after these matters, our business transactions with one another would require an appropriate ordering. Presumably a compendious statement, at any rate, would go like this: insofar as possible, one should refrain from touching my goods, and should not move them even the shortest distance, if he has in no way persuaded me at all. And should do likewise, according to the same principles, with things belonging to the others, if I possess a prudent intelligence.

Among such things, let us first discuss treasure which someone has laid in a hoard for himself and his people, in the case where he was not among my forefathers. I should never pray to the gods that I may find it; nor, if I do find it, should I move it; nor, again, should I take counsel about it with the so-called diviners, who in one way or another will advise me to take what was deposited in the earth. Because I would never benefit as much in money by taking the property as I would increase in substance as regards virtue of the soul and what is just by not taking it, I would thereby have acquired a better possession than that possession, and in a better part of me, by honoring the acquisition of justice in the soul before that of wealth in property. Indeed, the saying "do not move the immovable" applies well to many things, and one should speak of this as one of those things. One ought to believe the myths spoken about these matters, to the effect that such behavior does not promote the generation of children. But what of he who may become indifferent to children and, heedless of the one who established the law, takes up what neither he himself nor, again, some father of his fathers set down, without persuading the person who did set it down? He thereby corrupts the noblest of laws—a most compendious act of legislation, by a man who was in no way ill born, who said,

“what you didn’t set down, don’t take up.” What ought the man suffer, who holds in contempt these two lawgivers, and takes up what he himself did not put down, when it isn’t something small, but is sometimes a very great mass of treasure?

What he is to suffer at the hands of the gods, is known to the god. But he who is first to detect such a thing is to report it: if it should occur in the city, to the City Regulators; if somewhere in the marketplace of the city, to the Market Regulators; if somewhere in the rest of the country, he is to reveal it to the Field Regulators and their Officers. Once such things have been revealed, the city is to send to Delphi: whatever the god should ordain concerning the money and the person who moved it, this the city, in service to the divinations, shall do on behalf of the god. If the one who has informed should be a free man, he is to acquire a reputation for virtue, but if he has failed to inform, for vice; if he should be a slave, it would be correct for the city to make him free for having informed, and to give his price to his master; but if he failed to inform, he is to be punished with death.

Following after this in order would come the same thing concerning small as well as great matters, so that this legal custom would follow:

If someone should voluntarily or involuntarily leave something that belongs to him somewhere, he who comes across it must leave it lying, believing that the demoness of the roads guards such things, as made sacred to the goddess by law. If, contrary to these injunctions, someone should disobey by taking it up and carrying it home, then, if he’s a slave and the object is something of small value, he is to be whipped many times by anyone who happens along who is not less than thirty years of age. But if he’s a free man, besides being held to be illiberal, and one who doesn’t share in laws, he must pay ten times the value of the object moved

to the person who left it. If someone accuses somebody of having some amount of his goods, great or small, in his possession, and the accused agrees that he has it, but not that it belongs to the other; then, if the property be registered with the magistrates according to law, he should summon the possessor before the magistracy and the possessor must produce it. Once the object has been brought to light, if it should appear as registered in the written lists under either of the disputants, he is to have it and go away. But if it should appear under someone else (among those who aren't present), whichever of the two should present a worthy guarantor is to carry it away on behalf of the absent party, to hand it over to him in accordance with his right to take it away. And if the disputed object should not be -registered with the magistrates, it is to lie, until the trial, with the three eldest among the magistrates; if the pledged object be a beast, the one who is defeated in the trial concerning it shall pay the magistrates for its upkeep. The judicial decision is to be rendered by the magistrates within three days.

He who wishes, if he be of sound mind, may seize his own slave and do to him what he wants, so long as it is within the limits of what is pious. He may also seize a runaway, to keep him safe, on behalf of another who is a relative or friend. But if someone should try to remove into freedom someone being taken as a slave, the one who's taking him must give him up, while the one trying to remove him must provide three worthy guarantors, and effect the removal on these conditions, but otherwise not. If someone should effect removal contrary to these conditions, he is to be liable for violent assault, and if convicted must pay to the party injured by the removal double the damages.;

A freed man may be seized if he doesn't pay the freed man's homages or does so insufficiently. The homage is to consist in the freed man's attending the hearth of the man

who freed him three times a month, offering to do whatever he ought that is just and of which he is capable, and his marrying in a way that may meet with the approval of his former master. Moreover, he will not be permitted to become more wealthy than the man who freed him, and whatever he has in excess is to go to the master. The man who has been released is not to remain more than twenty years, but, just like the other strangers, is to go away, taking all his property, unless he should persuade the magistrates and the one who freed him. If a freed man or one of the other strangers should come to have property in an amount greater than that of the third class, he must depart, taking his property, within thirty days of the day on which this comes to pass—and there is to be no request to stay put to the magistrates in this case. If someone should be brought into court and convicted of having disobeyed these injunctions, he is to be punished with death and his goods are to go to the public. The trials of these matters are to take place in the tribal courts, if they don't resolve the accusations against one another earlier, before neighbors and chosen judges.

If someone lays hold of anybody's animal as his own, or of any other of his goods, the one who possesses it should return it to the warrantor or to the deliverer (if he's solvent and can be sued), or to the person who conveyed it in some other authoritative way; if it was a citizen or resident alien in the city, he's to do so within thirty days, while if it was a foreign delivery he's to do so within five months, of which the middle month shall be that in which the sun turns from summer toward winter.

Whatever one man may exchange with another by way of some purchase or sale is to be exchanged by making delivery at the location assigned to each commodity in the marketplace and receiving value on the spot, but nowhere

else, and no one is to make a sale or purchase on credit. If one person should exchange with another in another way or in any other places whatsoever, trusting the one he's exchanging with, he is to do these things on the understanding that there are no lawful judicial suits for things that are not sold under the conditions now being stated. As regards club contributions, he who wishes may make collections as a friend from friends; but it should be done on the understanding that if some difference should arise concerning the collection, there are to be no suits of any kind for anyone concerning these matters. Whoever has sold something and received a price of not less than fifty drachmas is to remain in the city for a necessary period of ten days, and the buyer is to know the house of the seller, on account of the accusations that regularly arise in such matters and for the sake of lawful returns.

Lawful return and refusal is to be as follows. If someone should sell a slave-captive who is sick with phthisis, or stones, or strangury, or the so-called "sacred disease," or some other long-lasting and hard-to-cure disease of the body or mind that is unapparent to the many, then, if the sale is to a doctor or gymnast, there is to be no right of return in such a case for this ~ man, nor if someone made the sale to somebody after having told them the truth. But if someone who's a craftsman should make some such sale to a layman, the buyer may make a return within six months, except in the case of the "sacred" disease, and for this he may make the return within a year. The judicial decision is to rest with three doctors chosen in common by the parties. He who is convicted in the trial shall pay twice the price for which he sold. If some layman sells to a layman, there is to be right of return and judgment just as in the cases mentioned before, but he who is convicted shall pay simply the selling price. If someone should knowingly sell a manslayer to someone who

also knows it, there is to be no right of return for the purchase of such a slave; but if it's to someone who doesn't know about it, there's to be a right of return whenever one of the buyers finds out. The judgment is to rest with the five youngest Guardians of the Laws, and if it should be decided that the seller acted knowingly, he shall purify the households of the buyer according to the law of the Interpreters and pay triple the price to the buyer.

He who exchanges currency for currency, or for anything else whatsoever, living or nonliving, must give and receive everything in an unadulterated state, in accordance with the law. But just as in the case of the other laws, let us receive a prelude concerning this vice as a whole:

Every man must understand that adulteration, lying, and deception constitute a single class, about which the many (speaking badly) are accustomed to make the pronouncement that such a thing may often be correct if it occurs each time at an opportune moment; but by leaving unregulated and undefined the where and when of the opportune moment, they inflict many penalties on themselves and others through this saying. The lawgiver, however, isn't allowed to leave this undefined, but must always clarify what the boundaries are, great or small. So let this now be defined: No one who is not going to become most hateful to the gods shall commit in word or deed any lie, deception, or adulteration of something, when this kind of thing is done by invoking gods; and such a man is the one who in swearing false oaths thinks nothing of the gods, or, in the second place, who lies in the face of those superior to him. Now the better are superior to the worse, and the elder, generally speaking, to the young, and therefore parents are superior to offspring, men to women and children, and rulers to the ruled. It would be fitting for everyone to feel awe before all of these superiors, in the case of every other sort

of rule and especially in the case of political offices, which occasion our present discourse. For everyone who adulterates something of the things in the marketplace lies and deceives, and, calling upon the gods, adds an oath in the face of the Market Regulators' laws and cautions—thereby evincing neither awe before human beings nor pious reverence before gods. Certainly it is in every way a fine practice not lightly to take the gods' names in vain, or to behave each time as most of us do in most matters concerning purity and what is hallowed in respect to the gods. But if someone would not obey, the law will be as follows:

The seller of anything whatsoever in the marketplace may never mention two prices for the things he may be selling, but must utter the price simply, and if he doesn't obtain this, he would act correctly if he took the item away again; and he may not set a greater or lesser price on this day. There is to be no praise supported by an oath concerning anything that is sold. If someone should disobey these injunctions, any city dweller who happens along and is not less than thirty years of age should inflict punishment on the one who swears by beating him, with impunity; but if he doesn't pay attention, and disobeys, he is to be liable to be blamed for betraying the laws. In the case of the man who sells some adulterated article and is unable to obey the present pronouncements, anyone who happens along who is among those knowledgeable and capable of proving it, and who does prove it in front of the magistrates, may, if he's a slave or a resident alien, take the adulterated article; if he's a citizen, and fails to prove it, he's to be proclaimed an evil man who robs the gods, but if he does prove it he's to dedicate the article to the gods who possess the marketplace. He who is detected selling such a thing, besides being deprived of the adulterated article, is to be beaten with a whip as many

blows as the number of drachmas he asked as the price of the article for sale, after the herald has proclaimed in the marketplace the reasons why he is about to be beaten.

As regards the adulterations and evildoings of sellers, the Market Regulators and the Guardians of the Laws, inquiring from those who have experience in each matter, should write down what a seller ought and ought not to do, and shall post 'the written laws on a tablet in front of the Market Regulators' office, so that there'll be clear guidelines for those involved in the use of the marketplace. What pertains to the City Regulators has been sufficiently discussed at earlier points; but if something additional should seem required, they should consult the Guardians of the Laws, write down what seems to be left out, and post on a tablet at the City Regulators' office the first and second sets of legal customs pertaining to their magistracy.

Following on the heels of the practices of adulteration come the practices of retail trade. Let's first give advice and argument about this entire matter, and establish a law for it later.

Now all retail trade has come into being in the city not for the sake of injury—at least according to nature—but for entirely the opposite end. For how should everyone not be a doer of good deeds, who creates evenness and symmetry in the distribution of any sorts of goods that are asymmetrical and uneven in distribution? And this, we ought to declare, is achieved through the power of money; and we ought also to say that this is the task assigned to the merchant. The hireling, the innkeeper, and the rest, some of whom become more seemly, some less seemly, are all able to bring this about, to provide help for all the needs, and evenness in the distribution of property. So let us see what then has ever made this seem to be neither noble nor seemly, and what

has brought it into discredit, so that we may remedy by law, if not the whole, then at least parts of it.

It's likely that the task is not a paltry one, and requires no small virtue.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Dear Kleinias, it's a small class of human beings, few by nature and brought up with the highest upbringing, that is able to hold fast to what is measured when the need and desire for certain things comes over it, and which, when it can get a lot of money, is sober and chooses what is measured in preference to what is large. The bulk of human beings are entirely the opposite to these men: when in want, they want without measure, and when it's possible for them to gain measured amounts, they choose to gain insatiably. That is why every kind of retail trade, and wholesale trade, and innkeeping, has come to be discredited and held in shameful blame. Yet if someone—as should never take place nor ever will—were to compel (now it's laughable to utter this, but nevertheless it's going to be uttered) the best men everywhere to become innkeepers for a certain period of time, or to carry on retail trade, or do one of such things, or were even to compel the women, out of some necessity of fate, to partake of such a way of life, we would know how friendly and desirable each of these things is; and, if it were to be practiced according to an uncorrupted principle, all such activities would be honored in the guise of a mother and nurse. But now, when someone has established houses for the sake of retail trade in deserted spots having lengthy roads in every direction, and receives, with welcome resting places, those who have come to be at a loss, providing calm tranquility to those driven by the violence of savage storms, and refreshment in stifling heat, he doesn't proceed after this to follow up his welcome as he would if he were receiving comrades, and give friendly guest-

gifts, but instead, as if they were enemy prisoners who had fallen into his hands, he releases them on payment of very large, unjust, and impure ransoms! It is these and similar faults that have in all such cases correctly discredited the provision of assistance to those at a loss. So the lawgiver must always contrive medicine for these things. Now it has been correctly said of old that "against two from opposite quarters it is difficult to fight," in the case of diseases and many other things; and indeed the present battle about and around these matters is against two, poverty and wealth, one of which corrupts the soul of human beings through luxury, and the other of which urges it to shamelessness through pains. What aid would there be then for this disease, in a city that possessed intelligence? The first' is to make use of the class of retail traders as little as one can; then, human beings ought to be assigned to retail trade whose corruption would least affront the city; in the third place, a device should be found to prevent the dispositions of soul in those who partake of these practices from easily becoming unrestrainedly shameless and illiberal.

After the things that have now been said, let us, with good fortune, have some such law as the following for these matters: Among the Magnesians, whom the god is restoring and settling again, no one of those who hold a share of land among the five thousand forty hearths is ever voluntarily or involuntarily to become a retail trader, or a wholesale trader, or render any menial service whatsoever to private persons who do not return to him an equal service—except for his father and mother, and family members of a still earlier generation, and all those who are elder than he, who are free and whom he serves in a liberal way. It's not easy to legislate exactly what is liberal and what is illiberal, but let it be judged by those who have obtained recognition for excellence in hating the latter and embracing the former. He who

should by some art partake of illiberal retail trade is to be indicted for shaming his family by anyone who wishes, before those who have been judged first in virtue, and if he should seem to be sullying his own ancestral hearth by an unworthy practice, let him be imprisoned for a year and thus desist from such a thing; if it happens again, for two years, and each time he's caught he's not to cease doubling the length of time of the earlier imprisonment.

Now the second law: He who is going to engage in retail trade must be a resident alien or a stranger.

In the third place, the third law: In order that such a fellow resident in the city may be for us the best possible, or the least bad possible, the Guardians of the Laws are to understand that they are not only guards of those whom, because they have been well educated by birth and upbringing, it is easy for them to guard against becoming lawless and bad, but also that they should guard even more those who are not such, but are engaged in practices that have a certain strong influence in prompting men to become bad.

With this end in view, the Guardians of the Laws ought; again to meet concerning these matters with those who have experience in each branch of retail trade, just as we earlier ordered them to do in the case of adulteration, which is a practice akin to this; with respect to those aspects of retail trade (which is extensive, and includes many practices of the sort just alluded to) which have seemed to be highly necessary in the city and have been allowed to remain, they should meet and see what receipt and expense balance at any time makes a well-measured gain for the retail merchant. The receipt and expense balance arrived at is to be posted in writing and guarded by the Market Regulators, City Regulators, and Field Regulators. In this way, what pertains to retail trade would be pretty beneficial to each

person, and would do pretty much the smallest injury to those in the city who make use of it.

As regards cases in which someone agrees to cooperate in doing something and fails to act according to what he agreed, except when laws or a decree stands in the way, or where he was forced by unjust compulsion to agree, or where he's involuntarily prevented by unforeseen chance, trials for unfulfilled agreements in the other situations are to be held in the tribal courts, if the parties weren't able to resolve their differences earlier in the courts of the arbitrators or neighbors.

Sacred to Hephaistos and Athena is the class of craftsmen, who have furnished our life with arts, and sacred to Ares and Athena are those who preserve the deeds of the craftsmen through other, defensive, arts; and it is just that this class too, be sacred to these gods. Indeed, all these men continually take care of the country and the populace—the latter by ruling over the contests of war, the former by bringing into being tools and works for pay. In regard to such matters, because of their awe for the gods who are their progenitors, it wouldn't be fitting for them to lie. So if someone who is a craftsman should, because of vice, fail to complete work within the specified time, and should lack a sense of awe before the god who gives him his livelihood (believing that his own god is forgiving), and should not look at the matter with his intelligence, he must first pay a judicial penalty to the god and, in the second place, a law shall await him:

He is to owe the price of the works about which he lied to the person giving the commission and produce them again from the beginning, within the stated time, for free.

And to him who undertakes work the law is a counselor, giving the same advice it gave to the one who sells: not to try

to take advantage by setting a greater price, but to set just simply what it is worth. This same advice the law enjoins upon him who undertakes work; for the craftsman, at any rate, knows the worth. In cities of freemen the craftsman himself ought never to use his art (which is by nature an activity that is above board and not dishonest) to try to take artful advantage of laymen, and the one who has been done an injustice in these matters may bring a lawsuit against him who does the injustice. If, on the other hand, someone who has given a commission to a craftsman should fail to pay him the correct amount according to the lawful agreement, thus dishonoring Zeus, the Protector of the City, and Athena, who share in the regime, and out of desire for a small gain loosens great ties of community, the law together with the gods must come to the defense of the bond that holds the city together:

He who has received work in advance and fails to give pay within the agreed time period must pay double. If a year has elapsed, although all other monies that someone may contribute as a loan are to be without interest, this man must pay one obol on the drachma per month; and the trials for these matters shall take place in the tribal courts.

Because we reminded ourselves of craftsmen in general, it is just to speak in passing about the craftsman of security through war—the generals and whoever are artful in these matters. These are like the former, but a different sort of craftsmen; and the law will never tire of praising him who gives just honors, which are the pay for men of war, if one of these should perform nobly a public work he has undertaken either voluntarily or in following orders. But if he has received, in advance, work that is part of the noble works of war, and should fail to give payment, it will blame him. So let this law be laid down, intermingled for us with the praise that concerns these matters, and counseling,

rather than forcing, the bulk of the citizens to honor in the second rank those good men who are saviors of the whole city, either by acts of courage or by warlike contrivances. For the greatest prize should be given to those who rank first, those who are preeminently capable of doing honor to the writings of the good lawgivers.

We have just about arranged the most important business transactions human beings have with one another, except for what pertains to orphans and the supervision of orphans by their guardians; and, after what has now been discussed, it is necessary that these matters be arranged, somehow or other. The ruling beginnings in all matters of this kind are the desires on the part of those who are about to die to effect a distribution by will, and the chance accidents that leave some without having made any wills at all. And I said it was "necessary," 'Kleinias, with a view to the trouble and difficulty that characterize these things. It's impossible to leave this unregulated; for everyone would set up many instructions that are in discord with one another as well as contrary to the laws, to the dispositions of the living, and even to their own prior dispositions in the time before they were about to make the will, if someone gives permission for that will to be unqualifiedly authoritative which someone may set up, no matter what condition he's in, as he approaches the end of life. The fact is, most of us are in some sense mindless and weak at the time when we believe we're about to die.

Clinias/ What do you mean by this, stranger?

Athenian Stranger/ A human being who is about to die is difficult, Kleinias, and full of a speech that is for lawgivers very frightening and hard to handle.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Seeking to have authority over everything, he usually speaks with anger.

Clinias/ Saying what?

Athenian Stranger/ "Gods! It is indeed a terrible thing," he declares, "if I'm not at all allowed to give my own belongings to whomever I wish or not, and more to one, less to another, of those who have proved miserable or good to me, having been adequately tested in periods of sickness and, in the case of some, in old age and all sorts of other twists of fortune!"

Clinias/ Well, stranger, don't they seem to you to speak in a fine way?

Athenian Stranger/ To me at least, Kleinias, those who became lawgivers of old seem to have been soft, and to have looked at and thought about a small range of human affairs when they made laws.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Fearing this speech, my good sir, they made a law that allowed a man to distribute his belongings by will simply and entirely as he might wish; but I and you will reply more suitably, somehow, to those in your city who are about to die.

"Friends," we will declare, "and really, creatures of a day, it is difficult for you at the present time to know your own property and, what is more, to know yourselves, as even the Pythian writing explains. I at any rate, being the lawgiver, ordain that neither yourselves nor this property belong to you, but that they belong rather to your entire family, both past and future, and that to an even higher degree the entire family, as well as the property, belong to the city. Since this is the way things are, I will never voluntarily go along if someone imposes upon you through flattery when you're sick or tottering with old age, and persuades you to make a

will contrary to what is for the best; instead, I will legislate with a view to what is best for the entire city and family, and, with a view to all this, will justly assign a lower rank to what belongs to each individual. But you, being gracious and well disposed toward us, proceed along the way which you're now going, according to human nature; we'll take care of the rest of your belongings, looking after them to the very best of our powers—not looking after some but not others." Let these be the encouragements and preludes for the living, Kleinias, as well as for the dying; the law shall be the following:

He who writes a will distributing his belongings, and is a father of children, must in the first place indicate in writing which of his sons he has decided is worthy to become the allotment holder, and with regard to the other children, if he should be giving one to someone else to take and adopt, he must indicate this too in writing; if there should be in addition some son of his who hasn't been adopted as heir to any allotment, and who it is hoped will be sent away to some colony according to law, the father may give this one as much of the rest of his property as he may wish, except for the ancestral allotment and the entire equipment of the allotment; if there should be more sons, the father may distribute the surplus over and above the allotment in any proportion he may wish. If one of the sons should have a house, he is not to distribute property to him, and the same for a daughter—if she should be betrothed to a man, he is not to distribute to her, but if that is not the case, he may distribute to her. If it should appear later, after the will has been made, that one of his sons or daughters owns a native allotment, the latter should leave what he received to the one who is heir to the allotment of him who made the will. If the man making the will should leave no males, but females, he is to leave as his son the husband of whichever daughter he wishes, indicating in writing the allotment heir. If the born

or adopted son should have died while still a child, before he could take his place among the men, in this unfortunate circumstance also, the man writing the will should indicate in writing which of his children should come second, with better fortune. If someone who is entirely without children should write his will, he may pick out one-tenth of his property over and above the allotment, if he should wish to give it to someone, and give it away. All the rest he is to hand over to the adopted heir, whom he must adopt as his son according to law—he being blameless and the son gracious.

In the case of a man whose children need guardians, if he should die having indicated guardians in his written will, if those whom he wished and as many as he wished will agree voluntarily to serve as guardians for the children, the authoritative choice of the guardians is to proceed according to these written instructions. But if someone should die either without any will at all, or having omitted a choice of guardians, then the authoritative guardians shall be the nearest of kin on the father's and the mother's sides, two from the father's and two from the mother's, and one from the friends of the deceased: these the Guardians of the Laws shall appoint for the orphan in need. Guardianship in general and the orphans shall always be supervised by the fifteen eldest among all the Guardians of the Laws, who shall divide themselves into threes according to seniority: three are to serve for a year, and then another three for another year, until the five orbits make a circle. And this is never to cease insofar as possible. In the case of a man who dies having made no will at all, and who leaves children in need of a guardian, his children's need shall share in these same laws. If someone should meet with an unforeseen chance and leave females, he is to forgive the one laying down the law if the latter looks to just two of the three concerns he would have had, as he arranges the giving away in marriage

of the daughters: the closeness of kinship and the preservation of the allotment. The third, which the father would have considered—looking to see who among all the citizens would in dispositions and ways be appropriate as his son as well as his daughter's groom, this shall be left aside because of the impossibility of carrying out the investigation. The following law should stand, as the best that can be done in such situations:

If a man who hasn't made a will should leave daughters after he has died, a brother from the same father, or from the same mother and without an allotment, is to have the daughter and the allotment of the deceased. If there should be no brother, but the son of a brother, the same shall hold for him, if the spouses are of an age with one another. And if there should be not one of these, but the son of a sister, the same shall hold. Fourth shall be a brother of the deceased's father; fifth, a son of this latter; sixth, a son of the father's sister. Thus let the family always proceed according to degree of kinship, if someone should leave female children: ascending through brothers and the children of brothers, males coming before females in anyone generation. The symmetry or lack of symmetry in the time of marriage for these shall be determined by an inspecting judge, who is to see the males naked and the females naked to the navel. If the family lacks relatives as far as grandsons of brothers, and children of a grandfather as well, then whomever of the other citizens the child may choose in consultation with her guardians, she and he acting voluntarily, is to become heir to the deceased's allotment and groom for his daughter. Still, many things require many resources, and times occur when there would be a lack of enough such men in the city itself. So if someone who is at a loss for men on the spot should see somebody who has emigrated to a colony whom it would please her to have

become heir to her father's allotment, then, if he should be kin, let him proceed to the inheritance of the allotment according to the arrangement in the law; if he should be outside the family, and there's no one in the city who is part of her family, then in accordance with the choice of the guardians and the child of the deceased, he shall be authorized to come home, marry, and receive the allotment of the man who failed to make a will.

In the case of a man without any male or female children at all who should die without having made a will, what pertains to such a man in other respects should be governed by the aforementioned law, but a female as well as a male from the family shall proceed as mates to the deserted house each time, and the allotment shall become legitimately theirs—a sister first, a brother's daughter second, third, the offspring of a sister, fourth, the sister of the father, fifth, the child of the father's brother, and sixth would be the child of the father's sister. These females are to dwell together with the males, according to consanguinity and justice, in the way we have legislated earlier.

Let's not overlook the oppressiveness of such laws, the harshness sometimes involved in their ordering the next of kin of the deceased to marry his kinswoman, and their apparent failure to consider the tens of thousands of impediments that come into being among human beings and make one unwilling to obey such commands, and indeed make them ready to suffer anything whatsoever rather than obey, when diseases or maimings of the bodies or the mind arise in some of those they are commanded to marry or be married to. It might seem to some people that the lawgiver gives no thought to these things, but that impression would be incorrect. So let there be something spoken on behalf of the lawgiver and on behalf of the man to whom the law is given, almost as a common prelude, requesting those who

are given the orders to forgive the lawgiver, because in his supervision of the common things he would never be able at the same time to manage the private calamities of each man, and on the other hand requesting forgiveness for those to whom the legislation is given, because it's likely that sometimes they are unable to carry out fully the orders of the lawgiver, which he issued in ignorance.

Clinias/ What, stranger, would be the most well measured thing for someone to do in regard to such matters?

Athenian Stranger/ It's necessary to choose arbitrators, Kleinias, for such laws and for the persons who are the objects of the legislation.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Sometimes a nephew whose father is wealthy would not voluntarily be willing to accept the daughter of his uncle, because he luxuriates, and has his mind set on a grander marriage; but sometimes one would be compelled to disobey the law because what the lawgiver commands involves a very great calamity—compelling them to take spouses who are mad or afflicted with some other terrible calamities of body or soul, which render life unlivable for the one who acquires them. So our present statement about these matters shall be established in law as follows:

If some people should complain about the established laws in regard to a will, either with respect to any other aspects whatsoever or, with respect to marriages, to the effect that if the lawgiver himself were present and alive, he would never have compelled those who are now being compelled, to marry or to be married, to do either, while, on the other hand, someone in the family or some guardian asserts that he would have, it must be declared that the lawgiver has left the fifteen Guardians of the Laws as

arbitrators and fathers for the male and female orphans. Those who are in dispute about some such matter must appeal to these for a decision, and carry out their opinions as authoritative. But if it should seem to someone that this is a great power to confer on the Guardians of the Laws, he is to take them before the court of select judges and obtain a decision about the matters in dispute. The losing party is to incur the blame and censure of the lawgiver—a more oppressive penalty than a large sum of money, for him who possesses intelligence.

Now for orphan children there should be, as it were, a certain second birth. The upbringing and education for each of them after the first have been described; after the second, which has taken place through the loss of fathers, some way must be devised whereby the fortune of orphanhood for those who have become orphans will involve the least possible pity for their calamity. In the first place, legislation gives them Guardians of the Laws as fathers, instead of, and not inferior to, those who begot them; and indeed we assign them to the orphans each year, to supervise them as if they were their own, having presented a prelude about the upbringing of orphans that is attuned to these men as well as to the guardians:

For opportune indeed, it appears to me, was our elaboration of the earlier speeches, to the effect that the souls of the dead have a certain power after they have died, by which they look after the affairs of human beings. These things are true, though the accounts concerning them are lengthy; one ought to trust the other pronouncements concerning such things, since they are so numerous and so very ancient, but also trust those who legislate that these things are so—if, that is, they don't appear wholly senseless. And if, in this way, these things are according to nature, then they ought to fear first the gods above, who perceive the

bereavement of the orphans, then the souls of those who have passed away, for whom it is natural to care especially for their own offspring and to be well disposed toward those who honor them and ill disposed toward those who dishonor them, and then the souls of the living, who are in old age and held in the highest honors. Where a city is happy under good laws, their grandchildren live, loving them fondly and with pleasure; and they hear sharply and see sharply what pertains to these matters, and are well disposed toward those who are just in regard to them, but are very indignant, on the other hand, toward those who are insolent to orphans and the bereaved, holding this to be the greatest and most sacred deposit. To all these the guardian and the magistrate ought to turn his mind—if he should have any—and take care with the upbringing and education of orphans: as if he were doing a favor to himself and his own, he should do them all the good he possibly can, in every way.

He, then, who obeys the myth that precedes the law, and does nothing insolent to an orphan, will not know definitely the lawgiver's anger in such matters; but he who disobeys, and does an injustice to someone bereft of father or mother, shall pay double the total damages paid by someone who has been bad to a child with both parents living.

As to the other legislation for guardians, concerning orphans, and for magistrates, concerning the supervision of the guardians, if they didn't have examples of the upbringing of free children through bringing up their own and supervising their own properties, and moreover if laws pertaining to these very matters hadn't been discussed in due measure, it would make some sense to lay down certain guardians' laws, as being very different in their own way, and as differentiating, by means of their peculiar practices, the life of the orphans from the life of the non-orphans. But now, in regard to all such matters, the status of our orphans

doesn't call for anything that's very different from a father's duty, although the task is prone to be not at all equal in honors and dishonors, or supervisory responsibilities. That, indeed, is why the law has been serious in its exhortations and threats concerning this subject—the legislation concerning orphans. Yet some such threat as the following would be very timely:

Whoever should be the guardian of a female or male, and whoever among the Guardians of the Laws should stand guard over and supervise a guardian, shall prize the one whose fortune it is to be an orphan no less than his own children, and supervise the goods of the ward no worse than his own, or, indeed, better than his own, with a spirited zeal. Everyone is to serve as guardian keeping this single law regarding orphans.

But if someone should act otherwise in such matters, contrary to this law, the magistrate shall punish the guardian, or the guardian shall bring the magistrate before the court of the select judges, and exact a fine that is twice the damages estimated by the court. And if a guardian should seem to the kinsmen or to any of the other citizens to be careless or to be doing evil, they are to take him before the same court; whatever injury he should be convicted of, he is to pay four times this amount, half of which is to go to the child and half to the person who successfully prosecuted. At the time when one of the orphans comes of age, if he believes he has been treated badly by his guardian, he may bring a judicial action concerning the guardianship within five years after the guardianship has ended. If one of the guardians should be convicted, the court is to estimate what he ought to suffer or pay; if it should be one of the magistrates, if it seems he's done the evil to the orphan on account of carelessness, the court is to estimate what he ought to pay to the child, but if it seems on account of

injustice, then in addition to the fine he is to be removed from the magistracy of the Guardians of the Laws, and the common authority of the city is to appoint another Guardian of the Laws in this man's place, for the land and the city.

To a greater degree than they should, quarrels occur, on the part of fathers toward their own children, and children toward their parents, in which the fathers would hold that the legislator ought to legislate permission for them, if they wish, to have a herald proclaim in front of everyone that they henceforth disown the son according to law; and in which sons, on the other hand, hold that they should be given permission to indict their fathers for derangement when they are in a shameful condition on account of diseases or old age. These are prone to arise out of the dispositions of human beings who are really altogether bad, since if just half are bad—as where the father isn't the bad one, but the son, or the opposite—calamities that are the offspring of such a degree of enmity don't occur. Now in another political regime, a child who was proclaimed disowned would not necessarily be without a city; but in this one, for which these laws will hold, a person who lacks a father must necessarily go and dwell in another land. For there is not to be a single addition to the five thousand forty households. That is why he who is to undergo these things in a trial should be disowned not just by one father, but by the entire family. And in such affairs it is necessary to proceed according to something like the following law:

He who, justly or not, is urged by a spirited anger that is in no way fortunate, to desire to remove from his own family the person he begot and brought up, is not to be allowed to do this in a paltry or hasty fashion. Rather, first he is to call together his own kinsmen as distant as cousins, and the same kinsmen of the son on the mother's side, and is to present his accusation before them, teaching how the son

deserves to be proclaimed by all of them expelled from the family; and he is to give the son equal time to speak and show why he doesn't deserve to suffer any of these things. If the father should persuade and obtain the votes of more than half of all the kinsmen—excluding the father, mother, and defendant from the voting, but including the rest of the adult women and men—then in this way and according to these procedures it-shall be permissible for a father to proclaim his son disowned, but in no other way. If one of the citizens should wish to adopt as his son the man proclaimed disowned, no law is to prevent his doing so—for the dispositions of the young naturally undergo many transformations during the lifetime of each—but if after ten years no one should have desired to adopt as his son the man proclaimed disowned, the supervisors of the excess offspring who are to be sent to a colony are to take charge of these also, so that they may take a suitable share in the same colonization.

If some disease, or old age, or harshness of character, or all of these together, should unhinge someone's mind to a greater degree than is the case with the many, and it should escape the notice of the others—except those who live with him—and he should be destroying his household under the sovereign authority he has over what belongs to him, and the son should be at a loss and should shrink from bringing a written indictment for derangement, the law in his case shall be that first he is to go and explain his father's calamity to those who are eldest among the Guardians of the Laws; after they've looked into the matter adequately, they are to advise whether or not he should bring the written indictment, and if they do advise it, they are to become witnesses and fellow plaintiffs for the one who brings the indictment. The man who is convicted shall for the rest of his life lack sovereign authority to dispose of his belongings

in even the smallest detail, and is to be supervised for the rest of his life like a child.

If a husband and a wife should be in no way in agreement, because of their unfortunate characters, ten middle-aged men among the Guardians of the Laws should constantly supervise them, along with ten of the women who are concerned with marriages and are of a similar age. If they should be able to effect a reconciliation, these arrangements are to be authoritative; but if the souls seethe all the more with passion, then they should do their best to seek partners who will be suitable for each of the parties. It's likely that such persons are not possessed of gentle dispositions; they should try to harmonize these with mates of more phlegmatic and gentle dispositions of character. And where those without children or with just a few children should have a falling-out, the domestic union should be made for the sake of children. Where it's those who have enough children, then the separation and the joining should be made for the sake of growing old together and caring for one another.

If a woman should die leaving female and male children, the established law would counsel, but not compel, one to bring up the children without introducing a stepmother; but if there aren't children, one must necessarily marry, until one begets enough children for the household and the city. If a man should die leaving enough children, the mother of the children should stay there and bring them up. But if she should seem to be younger than she ought to be for healthy living without a man, the relatives should communicate with the women who supervise marriages and do what seems appropriate to themselves and to those women in such cases. If there should be a lack of children, they should act for the sake of children as well; and a barely sufficient number of children by law shall be a male and a female.

When it is agreed who the creators of an offspring are, but a judgment is needed as to which the offspring should follow, then, if a slave woman should mate with a slave, or free man, or freed man, the offspring is to belong entirely to the master of the slave woman, but if some free woman should have intercourse with a slave, the offspring is to belong to the master of the slave. And if the offspring should be from a man's own slave, or a woman's own slave, and this should become evident, the women shall send the offspring of the woman, together with its father, to another land, and the Guardians of the Laws shall do likewise with the offspring of the man, together with she who bore it.

No god or human being who possesses intelligence would ever advise anyone to neglect their parents; and one should have the prudence to see that it is correct to apply a prelude of the following sort, concerning the solicitude due the gods, to the honors and dishonors rendered to parents:

The ancient laws established among all men concerning the gods are twofold. Some of the gods we see clearly and honor; for others we set up images as objects of worship, which delight us even though they are without souls, and on account of which we believe those gods, having souls, feel great goodwill and gratitude. Now no one who has a father and mother, or the fathers or mothers of these, lying as treasures in the house and weakened by old age, should ever think that a statue will be more authoritative than such a shrine established on the hearth of the home—if, indeed, the possessor cares for it in the correct way.

Clinias/ What do you explain to be the correct way?

Athenian Stranger/ I will say. For such things are surely worth hearing, friends.

Clinias/ Just say on.

Athenian Stranger/ Oedipus, we assert, when he was dishonored, invoked upon his children those things which, according to what everyone sings, were fulfilled and heeded by the gods; and Amyntor in his spirited anger brought a curse upon his own child Phoenix, as did Theseus upon Hippolytus, and myriad others upon myriad others; from which it became clear that the gods pay heed to the curses of parents against children. For a parental curse against offspring is as no other curse against others, and it is most just that it be so. So let no one believe that a god by nature pays heed to the prayers of an especially dishonored father or mother toward children, but to one who is honored and has become exceedingly glad, and on account of such things generously beseeches the gods with prayers for good things for his children—will we believe that they don't listen with equal attentiveness, and thus distribute things to us? Why, in that case they would never be just in the distribution of goods, which is something we claim is least fitting for gods to be.

Clinias/ Very much so!

Athenian Stranger/ So then let us understand, as we said a little earlier, that we could not possess any statue more honorable in the eyes of the gods than a father or forefather in their old age, or mothers having the like capacity, and when one takes delight in them with honors, the god rejoices. For otherwise he would not pay heed to them. Surely, the shrine that is our ancestors' is marvelous to us, and preeminent over that of soulless figures. The former, which have souls, pray for us whenever they're cared for by us, and do the opposite when they're dishonored, whereas the latter do neither; as a result, if someone were to treat his father and forefather and all such persons correctly, he would possess the most- efficacious of all statues for securing a destiny befriended by gods.

Clinias/ You've spoken in a most noble way.

Athenian Stranger/ Everyone who has intelligence fears and honors prayers of parents, knowing that they have often been fulfilled for many people. Since this is the way these things are arranged by nature, for good men old progenitors are a godsend while they live, up to the very last moments of their life, and if they depart while still young, they're especially missed; but for bad men they are a source of great fear. So let everyone, believing these words, honor his own parents with all lawful honors. But if word should have it that someone is deaf to such preludes, to these men the following law would correctly apply: If someone in this city should be more neglectful of his parents than he ought to be, and, heedless of them, should fail to fulfill their wishes in every respect more than those of his sons, all his offspring, and himself, let the one who is suffering such treatment report it—either in person or by sending someone—to the three eldest Guardians of the Laws and to three also of the women who supervise marriages. They are to look after this, and punish with blows and imprisonment those committing injustice who are still young (that is, in the case of the men, those who are under thirty, but in the case of the women, they are to use the same punishments on those who are up to ten years older). And if, when they are past these ages, they should not desist from the same sorts of neglect toward parents, but in some cases should do evil to them, they are to take them before a court composed of the one hundred and one eldest among all the citizens. If someone should be convicted, let the court determine what he ought to suffer or pay, ruling out nothing which a human being is capable of suffering or paying. If someone should be unable to report that he is being treated badly, anyone among the free men who learns of it should report it to the magistrates, or be an evil man and subject to prosecution for the injury by anyone

who wishes. If a slave should report it, he is to become free: if he's the slave of one of those doing or suffering the evil, the magistracy shall let him go, while if he belongs to some other citizen, the public shall pay his price on his behalf to the owner. The magistrates are to see to it that no one does an injustice to such a man as retribution for his informing.

With regard to the ways in which one person harms another with poisons, the fatal cases have been discussed fully, but none of the other injuries which someone voluntarily and with forethought effects, either through drinks, or foods, or unguents, have yet been fully discussed. The discussion is arrested by the fact that poisons are twofold, in accordance with the character of the human race. The kind we expressly mentioned just now works its evil on bodies by bodies, according to nature. But another kind uses certain sorceries, incantations, and so-called "binding spells" to persuade those who dare to injure people that they can do such a thing, and others that they are injured worst of all by these men who can practice magic. Now it isn't easy to know how these and all such things are by nature at any time, nor, if one should know, is it easy to persuade others; it's not worth trying to persuade the souls of human beings who are suspicious of one another in regard to such things that, if they should ever see molded waxen images at doorways, or at places where three roads meet, or at the images of their own parents, they must pay little attention' to all such things, and to urge them to do so because they lack a clear opinion about them. But, dividing in two the law concerning poisoning, according to whichever of the ways someone might try to poison, one ought first to beseech, exhort, and advise them that they should not try to do such a thing, nor frighten the many among human beings who are as terrified as children, nor, again, to compel the: lawgiver and the judge to cure human beings of such fears; since, in

the first place, he who tries to poison doesn't know what he might do—in regard to the bodies, if he doesn't happen to be a doctor and hence a knower, and in regard to sorceries, if he doesn't happen to be a diviner or wizard. So let reason present the following law about poisoning:

A man who poisons someone so as to cause injury that is not mortal either to the man himself or to his human beings, or so as to cause a mortal or other injury to his livestock or beehives, if he should happen to be a doctor, and should be convicted in a trial for poisoning, is to be punished with death; but if he should be a layman, the court is to assess in his case what he ought to suffer or pay. If he should seem to be the same as one who injures by using binding spells, or charms, or certain incantations, or any such poisons, and is a diviner or wizard, he is to die; but if someone should be convicted of the poisoning without possessing the art of divining, the same thing is to happen to this man: for in the case of this man too, the court is to assess what they think he ought to suffer or pay.

With regard to the ways in which one person may harm another by theft or violence, if the harm be greater, he is to pay a greater indemnity to the one harmed, and if it be lesser, he is to pay a smaller penalty, but above all the person is to pay each time an amount sufficient to cure the injury. In addition, each must pay the judicial penalty attached to each evil deed for the sake of instilling moderation: he who has done evil because of another's lack of intelligence—giving way to persuasion on account of his youthfulness or some other such thing—shall pay a lighter penalty; he who has done evil because of his own lack of intelligence, on account of lack of self-restraint in the face of pleasures or pains—in cowardly fears, or certain desires, or feelings of envy, or spirited angers that are hard to cure—shall pay a heavier. He shall pay the judicial penalty not for

the sake of the evildoing—for what has been done will never be undone—but so that he and those who see him suffering justice will in future time either hate the injustice altogether, or refrain in large part from such a calamity. For the sake of all these things, and with a view to all such considerations, the laws should aim, just like an archer who is not bad, at the greatness and above all at the worthiness of the punishment for each of the offenses. And the judge must assist the lawgiver in performing this same task, whenever some law assigns to him the estimation of what the man judged guilty should suffer or pay; while the latter, like a painter, must sketch in outline deeds which follow what has been written. That, Megillus and Kleinias, is just what we ought to do now, in the noblest and best manner possible. The proper sorts of penalties for all thefts and acts of violence ought to be described, insofar as the gods and the sons of the gods allow us to legislate.

If someone should be mad, he is not to appear openly in the city. The relatives in each case are to guard the persons in their homes, using any method they know of, or they must pay a penalty: a man of the highest class one hundred drachmas, whether it be a slave or a free man that he's failing to look after; a man of the second class four-fifths of a mina; a third-class man three-fifths; and two-fifths in the case of a fourth-class man. Now many men are mad, in many ways. There are those whom we're now discussing, where it's on account of diseases, but there are some who are such because both the nature and the nurture of their spiritedness have become bad: in a minor dispute they give vent to loud-voiced, wicked slanders against one another, and no such behavior is in any way or on any occasion fitting in a city with good laws. So let the following be the single law that applies to all abusive talk:

No one is to abuse anyone in speech. He who is disputing with another in certain discussions is to teach and learn and wholly abstain from abusing the disputant and the bystanders. For from words (a light affair at first), from imprecating and cursing one another, and bringing down on each other the shameful epithets of women's cries, there arises, in deed, hatred and most weighty enmities. The one who speaks is gracious to a graceless thing—spiritedness—and gorges his anger with wicked feasts; making the part of his soul that was at one time tamed by education savage again he becomes a beast through living in ill humor, and receives as a gift in return the bitterness of his spiritedness. Moreover, it is often usual, somehow, for everyone in such situations to switch to uttering something that ridicules the opponent; and no one ever becomes accustomed to this behavior without either straying in some degree from a serious disposition, or destroying in large part his high-mindedness. That is why no one is ever to utter any such thing at all in a temple, or at publicly funded sacrifices, or again in the contests, or in the marketplace, or in a court, or in any common assembly. The magistrate in charge of each of these is to carry out the punishment, or else never desire to win a victory for excellence—on the ground that he neither cares for the laws nor does the things commanded by the lawgiver. And if in other places someone doesn't abstain from such words—whether he initiates the reviling or defends himself with it—any elder man who happens along is to defend the law by driving away with blows those who are kindly disposed toward spirited anger, that evil comrade, or else must undergo the prescribed penalty.

We are now saying that it is impossible for a man entangled in reviling to avoid trying to say something that evokes laughter, and we are reviling this practice, when it involves spirited anger. But what then? Do we accept the

spirited eagerness of the comedians to say what is laughable about human beings, when they speak in such a way, trying to make comedies about our citizens, without spirited anger? Should we divide it in two, into what is playful and what is not, and allow someone to speak playfully in ridicule of another, without spirited anger, but allow no one to do so seriously and, as we said, with spirited anger? This must in no way be given up, but we should legislate who may do so, and who may not.

A poet of comedy, or of some iambic lampoon, or a melody of the Muses, may not in any way make a comedy about any citizen, through speech or image, whether with spirited anger or without spirited anger. If someone should disobey, those who preside over the contests must drive him completely out of the country on the very day, or else pay a penalty of three minas sacred to the god whose contest it is. Those, however, who were earlier said to have permission to do this concerning someone, may do so to one another, without spirited anger and in play, but may not do so in seriousness or in spirited anger. The judgment as to this distinction shall be left to the Supervisor of Education as a whole for the young; what this man judges approved, the poet may present in public, but what he judges disapproved, the poet may not himself show to anyone nor ever be seen teaching to any other, slave or free, without being held to be a bad man and one disobedient to the laws.

What is pitiable is not the man who is hungry, or suffering some such thing, but rather the man who is moderate, or has some virtue or some part of virtue, yet in addition to these has some calamity; so it would be amazing if someone like this, whether slave or free, were totally uncared for, and as a result arrived at a condition of utter beggary, in a regime and city that is even moderately well managed. That is why it is safe for the lawgiver to establish some such law as the

following for such cases: -

No one is to become a beggar in our city, and if someone should try to do such a thing, to earn his living through endless prayers, the Market Regulators are to drive him from the marketplace, the magistracy of the City Regulators is to drive him from the city, and the Field Regulators are to send him out of the rest of the country and across the border, so that the country may become completely purged of such a creature.

If a male or female slave should injure anything that belongs I to someone else, and the one injured does not himself share the responsibility, on account of inexperience or some other imprudent usage, the master of the one who did the injury must either cure the injury, omitting nothing, or hand over the one who did the injury. But if the master brings a counterclaim, alleging that the claim has arisen as a result of the common craft of injurer and injured, with the aim of robbing the slave, let him prosecute the man claiming to have been injured, on a charge of conspiracy. If he should win, let him exact twice the value of the slave, which the court is to estimate; but if he should lose, let him both cure the injury and hand over the slave. And if a beast of burden, or a horse, or a dog, or some other animal, should do some harm to the belongings of a neighbor, let the injury be recompensed ac- cording to the same principles.

If someone should voluntarily refuse to testify, the man who needs him is to issue a summons, and the man summoned is to appear at the trial. If he should have knowledge and be willing to testify, let him testify; but if he should claim not to have knowledge, let him depart from the trial after having sworn in the name of the three gods Zeus, Apollo, and Themis that he doesn't have knowledge. He who has been summoned to testify and fails to appear with the

man who issued the summons is to be lawfully liable for the injury. If someone calls up as witness somebody who is a judge, the latter is not to vote on the case in which he has testified. It is permissible for a free woman to testify and support a pleading, if she should be over forty years of age, and to bring a judicial action, if she should be without a husband. If the husband is living she may only testify. A female or male slave and a child are to be permitted to testify and support a pleading only in a murder case, provided they furnish a worthy guarantee that they will remain until the trial, if their testimony should be denounced as false. And either of the parties may denounce the testimony as a whole or in part, provided he makes the assertion that they have testified falsely before the case has been decided. The magistrates shall guard the denunciations once they've been sealed by both parties, and present them at the trial for false testimonies. If someone should be convicted of false testimony twice, no law shall any longer compel this man to testify, and if he should be convicted three times, this man is no longer to be permitted to testify. If he should dare to testify after having been convicted a third time, let anyone who wishes expose him to the magistracy, and let the magistracy hand him over to the court; if he should be convicted, let him be punished with death. In the case of those whose testimony is condemned at the trial, and who seem to have testified falsely and brought about the victory for the party that won, if over half the testimony of such persons should be condemned, the case that was won by these testimonies is to be annulled, and there shall be a dispute and trial as to whether the case was decided on these testimonies or not; the final outcome of the earlier trials shall depend on which way this is decided.

There are many noble things in the life of human beings, but most of them are, as it were, naturally subject to defects

which pollute and defile them. And indeed, is even justice, which has tamed all the human things, somehow not noble for human beings? But if this is noble, how would judicial advocacy not be noble for us? These things, being such, are discredited by a certain vice pretending to the noble name of art. It claims, first, that there is for judicial proceedings a certain contrivance—itself—which can carry on judicial cases and support the pleading of another, and can bring about victory, whether the things done in each judicial case be just or not; and it claims that the gift of this very art, and of the speeches that result from the art, is to be had if one gives money in return. Now this, whether it is an art or a certain experience and practice without art, certainly ought not to grow in our city. The lawgiver requests that one obey, and not utter what is opposed to justice, but go away to another country; to those who obey, the law is silent, but to those who disobey, this is the voice of the law:

If someone should seem to try to reverse the power of the just things in the souls of the judges, and to bring many suits or support the suits of others, when they aren't called for, he is to be prosecuted for evil, judicial procedure or evil judicial advocacy by anyone who wishes, and tried in the court of select judges. If he's convicted, the court is to decide whether he seems to do such a thing out of fondness for money or fondness for victory: if out of fondness for victory, the court shall determine in his case how long a time such a man ought not to undertake a suit against anyone or support anyone else's suit; but if it's out of fondness for money, in the case of a stranger he's to depart from the country and never come again, or be punished with death, while in the case of a member of the city he's to die, because of having honored in every way the fondness for money. And if someone should be judged to have done such a thing twice out of fondness for victory, he is to die.

Book 12.

Athenian Stranger/ If someone acting in the capacity of ambassador or herald should convey a false message from the city to some city, or, when he is sent, should fail to convey the matters he was sent to convey, or if it should become evident that in his capacity as ambassador or herald he has not brought back correctly what was sent from the enemies or even from friends, these actions should be prosecuted as illegal acts of impiety against messages and commandments of Hermes and Zeus; and if he's convicted an assessment should be made of what he ought to suffer or pay.

Theft of money is illiberal, and rapacity is shameless. None of the sons of Zeus has practiced either of these, through delighting in guile or violence. So let no one be deceived and persuaded about such matters by poets, or in some other way by some discordant tellers of myths, and think that when he steals or uses violence he does nothing shameful, but just what is done by the gods themselves. For that is neither true nor likely: whoever should do such a thing against the law is never a god or the child of gods, and it is more fitting for the lawgiver to know about these things than it is for all the poets. He, therefore, who is persuaded by our argument has good fortune, and would have good fortune for all time; but he who doesn't believe must, after these remarks, enter into combat with some such law as the following:

If someone should steal some public thing, he must undergo the same judicial penalty, whether it be great or small. For he who steals something small has stolen under the influence of the same erotic passion, but with less power, while he who moves a greater thing that he didn't set down is unjust to the full extent. So the law would not decide to

assign a lesser judicial punishment to either of them on account of the size of the theft, but only because one of them is perhaps still curable and the other incurable. In fact, if someone should convict in court a stranger or a slave of stealing something public, the judgment as to what the person ought to suffer, or what penalty he ought to pay, should be made on the grounds that it's likely that he's curable. But if a member of the city, brought up in the way he will have been brought up, should be convicted of pillaging or doing violence to the fatherland (whether he's caught in the act or not), he's to be punished with death, on the grounds that he's practically incurable.

Military organization appropriately calls for much consultation and many laws, but the most important thing is that no one, male or female, should ever be without a ruler, and that no one's soul should acquire the habit of doing something on its own and alone, either seriously or in play; at all times, in war and in peace, it should live constantly looking to and following the ruler, governed by that man in even the briefest matters—such as standing when someone gives the order, and walking and exercising in the nude and washing and eating and getting up at night to guard and carry messages, and in dangers, not pursuing someone or retiring before another without an indication from the rulers. In a word, one should teach one's soul by habits not to know, and not to know how to carry out, any action at all apart from the others; as much as possible everyone should in every respect live always in a group, together, and in common—for there is not nor will there ever be anything stronger, better, and more artful than this for producing security and victory in war. This ought to be practiced during peacetime, from earliest childhood: ruling the rest and being ruled by others. And anarchy ought to be removed from the entire life of all human beings and of all

beasts that are subject to human beings. Indeed, all choral dances are to be danced with a view to feats of excellence in war, and good temper as a whole and fortitude are to be practiced for the sake of the same things, as is endurance with regard to foods, drinks, cold and the opposite, and hard beds; most important, they are not to corrupt the capacity of the head and feet by wrapping them with alien coverings, thus destroying the birth and growth of their own felt and shoes. For if these extremities are preserved they maintain a very great capacity in the body as a whole, while they do the opposite if the opposite occurs; the one is the most ministerial part for the entire body, and the other is the most magisterial, since by nature it possesses all the sovereign perceptions of the body. This is the praise that it was necessary for a young man to seem to be listening to concerning the military life, and the following are the laws:

He who is selected, or is commanded to take his turn, must serve in the military. But if someone out of a certain cowardice and without the Generals' permission should fail to do so, there are to be prosecutions before the war officers for failing to perform military service, when they come back from the military camp. The judges shall be each class of soldiers sitting separately—heavily-armed infantry, cavalry, and each of the other military classes in the same way. Heavily-armed infantrymen are to be brought before heavily-armed infantry, cavalrymen before cavalry, and the others, in the same way, before their own kind. If someone should be convicted, he shall never be a competitor for a prize in excellence as a whole, and shall never prosecute another for failing to perform military service, or be an accuser in these matters; in addition to these things, the court is also to estimate what he ought to suffer or pay. After this, when the trials for failing to perform military service have been decided, the officers are to call an assembly for each class

again, and he who wishes shall be judged concerning the prizes for excellence, in their own tribes. The evidence he presents, and the confirmation from the speeches of witnesses, is not to be from an earlier war, but just from the expedition they've been on at that time. The crown of victory for each class shall be of olive branches, and this is to be hung up, with an inscription, in the temples of whichever gods of war the person may wish, as a witness during his entire life to the judgment concerning the prizes for excellence, or the second or third prizes. If someone should go on military service but return home prior to the time when the officers send him back, these men are to be prosecuted for deserting the ranks before the same persons as those who preside over cases of failure to perform military service; for those who are convicted, there are to be the same retributions as were exacted earlier.

Of course, every man who prosecutes a man on any charge must fear lest he bring about a false retribution, either voluntarily or involuntarily (insofar as is within his power). For Justice is said, and has been said really, to be the virgin daughter of Awe, and falsehood is naturally hated by Awe and Justice. So everyone must be careful about mistaking justice in other matters, and especially in the case of the throwing away of arms during war, lest one make an erroneous judgment about the occasions when it's necessary to throw them away, blaming these occasions as if they were shameful, and bringing unworthy judicial charges against a man who doesn't deserve them. Now it's not at all easy to define either of these situations, yet nevertheless the law must try somehow or other to distinguish them from each other. Let's discuss it while making use of myth: if Patroclus had been carried to the tent without his weapons and had recovered, as has happened to tens of thousands while Hector was in possession of those arms which the poet

claims had been given by the gods to Peleus as a dowry in his marriage with Thetis, it would have been possible for whoever was base among the men of that time to blame the son of Menoetios for throwing away his arms. And then there are those who have lost their weapons by being thrown down cliffs, or at sea, or when a sudden flood of water hits them in the toils of storms; indeed, there would be ten thousand such cases one might sing about in a comforting way, and thereby portray as noble an easily misrepresented evil. One must do what one can to separate the greater and more disgusting evil from the opposite. Now the application of these names in the course of blaming virtually contains a certain distinction; for it wouldn't be just to use the name "shield-hurler" in all cases, but rather "arms-thrower." The one who is deprived of his arms by a reasonable degree of violence wouldn't be a "shield-hurler" in the same way as the one who voluntarily drops them: presumably they differ altogether, and in every way. So let it be put as follows in the law:

If someone overtaken by enemies possesses arms, and doesn't turn to make a defense, but voluntarily drops them or hurls them away, striving to win a shameful life with cowardice rather than a noble and happy death with courage, then for such a throwing away of arms there is to be judicial punishment for the arms hurled away; but the judge is not to be careless in investigating the case described previously. Because it is always necessary to punish the bad man, so that he may become better, but not the unlucky man—for no more is to be gained. What then would be the appropriate penalty for the man who gave up such a power of defensive arms in the opposite way? It isn't possible for a human being to do the opposite of what they claim was once done by a god, who transformed Caeneus the Thessalian from a woman's to a man's nature; but if the opposite change

to that one, the transformation from man into woman, were the retribution for the man who is a shield-hurler, it would be in a way the most fitting of all. As it is, to come as near as possible to this, because of his love of his soul, and so that he may not run risks for the rest of his life, but may live for the maximum length of time in ill repute, let the following law apply to these men:

A man who should be convicted in a trial for shamefully throwing away his weapons of war is never to be used as a male soldier or assigned to any post whatsoever by any General or any other of the war officers. Otherwise, the Auditor shall condemn the officer at his audit, and if the one who gave the bad man an assignment should be of the highest class, he must pay a thousand drachmas, if of the second, five minas, if of the third, three minas, and if of the fourth, a mina. The one who was convicted in the trial, in addition to giving up manly risks, as befits his nature, must also pay a recompense: a thousand drachmas if he should be of the highest class, five minas if of the second, three if of the third, and likewise a mina, just as in the case of those discussed before, if he's of the fourth class.

What account would it be fitting for us to give concerning the audits of magistrates, some of whom obtain office by the fortune of the lot for a period of a year, and some of whom obtain office for several years and come from a previously selected group? Who would be an adequate Auditor of such men, in case one of them should do something that is somehow crooked, because he's been bent by the weight and on account of his own lack of capacity in regard to what the office requires? It's not at all easy to find a ruler over rulers who is superior in virtue, but nevertheless an attempt must be made to find some divine Auditors. For this is the way it is: in the case of a regime, just as in the case of a ship or some animal, opportunities for dissolution are afforded by

many things—stays, undergirdings, and the tendons of the sinews—which, being of one nature, are dispersed all around, and which we call by many names. And this provides one such opportunity, and not the smallest, for the preservation or the dwelling in dissolution of a regime. For if the ones who audit the magistrates are better than them, and evince this by applying a blameless justice in a blameless way, the entire country and city flourish and are happy. But if what pertains to the audits of the magistrates turns out otherwise, then the justice that binds all the political activities into one is dissolved, and in this way every office is split apart from the others: rather than assenting to the same thing they make the one city many, fill it with factions, and swiftly destroy it. That is why the Auditors must be in every way amazing men in regard to the whole of virtue. Let us contrive, then, to bring them into being in some such way as the following:

Each year, after the sun has turned from summer to winter, the entire city must assemble in the precinct common to the Sun and Apollo, to present to the god three men from among them. Each of them is to propose a man not less than fifty years of age whom he considers to be the best in every way (leaving aside himself). They are to pick out the half of the nominees who receive the most votes—if, that is, their number is even; if it's odd, they're to delete the one who received the least votes, and leave half of them after rejecting the others according to the plurality of votes. If some should be equal in votes and make the half larger, they are to delete the surplus by rejecting those who are younger. They are to judge among the rest by voting again, until three are left with an unequal number of votes. But if either all or two of these should have an equal number of votes, they are to turn the matter over to good destiny and fortune, and use the lot to choose the victor, the second, and the third, whom

they are to crown with olive branches. Giving the prizes for excellence to all of them, they are to proclaim that the city of the Magnesians, again finding security under god, presents to the Sun her three best men, and dedicates them as a common first-offering to Apollo, according to the ancient law, and the Sun, for as long a time as they pursue their task of judging. In the first year they are to elect twelve such Auditors, until each has attained the age of seventy-five, and afterward three are to be added each year. These are to divide all the offices into twelve parts and examine them by means of every test appropriate for free men. They are to dwell, for as long a time as they should conduct audits, in the precinct of Apollo and the Sun in which they were selected. When they've judged those who rule the city, some of whom each will judge in private and some of whom they'll judge in common with one another, they are to announce by written proclamations in the marketplace what must be suffered or paid by each magistracy, according to the sentence of the Auditors. Any of the magistracies that should not agree that it has been judged justly must take the Auditors before the select judges; if someone should win an acquittal from the Auditors' sentence, he is to bring an accusation against the Auditors themselves, if he wishes. But if he should be convicted, then if the Auditors have assessed the death penalty, he is to die and no more, necessarily; but in the case of the other assessments, which it's possible to pay double, he's to pay double.

One must also hear what the audits of these men themselves will be, and how they will come about. While they're alive, these men whom the entire city has judged worthy of prizes for excellence shall occupy the front seats at every festival. Moreover, from them are to be sent out the officers in charge of each mission to observe the common sacrifices, spectacles, and other sacred ceremonies shared

in common with the Greeks. These men, alone of those in the city, are to be adorned with a crown of laurel. All are to be priests of Apollo and the Sun, but the one who is judged to be first among those selected each year is to be the ruling priest that year, and the name of this man is to be inscribed each year, so that he might become the measure of the year's number as long as the city should last. When they die, they are to have laying-outs, funeral processions, and groves that are distinguished from those of the rest of the citizens: all the clothing is to be white, and it is to take place without dirges and lamentations, and instead a chorus of fifteen girls and another of males are each to stand around the bier and sing in turn praise, in the form of a poetic hymn, to the priests—glorifying their happiness in song for an entire day. At dawn the next day, the bier itself is to be carried to the burial by a hundred of the young men from the gymnasia, chosen by the deceased's relatives. First in the procession are to be the unmarried youths, each clothed in his military garb—cavalry with their horses, heavily-armed infantry with their heavy armor, and the rest similarly—and around the bier itself are to come, in front, boys singing the anthem of the fatherland, and following behind, girls and any of the women who may happen to have passed the age of child-bearing; after these, priests and priestesses are to follow, on the grounds that the tomb is unpolluted—even though they avoid the tombs of the rest—if, that is, the Pythian should vote thus and in this way. Their grave is to be constructed underground, in the shape of an oblong crypt made of stones that are porous and as lasting as possible, and it is to have stone couches lying next to one another; when they've laid him who has become blessed there, and heaped up dirt around in a circle, they'll plant a grove of trees around, except at one extremity, so that the tomb may for the rest of time increase in this direction, where dirt will be needed to

cover those placed there. Each year they'll dedicate to them a contest in music, in gymnastics, and in horsemanship. These are the prizes for the men who have passed their audits.

But if one of these men, trusting to the judgment passed upon him, should display his human nature by becoming bad after the judgment, let the law command anyone who wishes to prosecute him; and let the contest in court take place in something like the following way:

Let this court be composed, first, of the Guardians of the Laws, and then of the living Auditors, and, in addition to these, the court of select judges; and let the prosecutor write an indictment, concerning the man he's prosecuting, saying that so-and-so is unworthy of the prizes for excellence and of the office. If the defendant should be convicted, he's to be deprived of the office, and the tomb, and the rest of the honors assigned to him; but if the prosecutor should fail to obtain a fifth of the votes, he is to pay a fine—a man of the highest class twelve minas, eight for a man of the second, a man of the third six, and of the fourth two.

Rhadamanthus is worthy of admiration as regards the way he is said to have judged judicial proceedings, because he saw -that the human beings of that time believed that there were evidently gods—as was reasonable, since the many at that time, of whom he was one, were sprung from gods, according to report at least. Indeed, it's likely that he thought he shouldn't turn the business over to any human judge but rather to the gods, from whom he obtained simple and swift judgments. For by administering an oath to the disputants about each of the matters in dispute he settled things swiftly and safely. But now a certain part of humanity, we claim, doesn't believe in gods at all, while others think they don't pay attention to us, and the opinion of most—the worst—is that if the gods receive small

sacrifices and flatteries they'll aid in robbing great amounts of money, and release them from many sorts of great penalties: as a result, Rhadamanthus's art would no longer be fitting for the trials of present day human beings. So since the opinions of human beings about gods have changed, it's necessary that the laws change too. For in judicial trials of complaints, laws that are laid down with intelligence must remove the oaths from each of the contending parties, and he that brings some judicial action against someone should write the charges but not swear an oath, while the defendant, in the same way, should write the denial and hand it over to the magistrates without an oath. For presumably it's a terrible thing, since there are many judicial actions in a city, to know for sure that close to half the parties have sworn falsely and yet carry on easy intercourse with one another at common meals, at the other meetings, and at the private gatherings of each.

Let the law be, then, that a judge is to swear an oath when he's about to give judgment, and that he who appoints the common magistrates is to do such a thing each time, by voting with oaths or by carrying the votes from sacred places, and again that the same sort of thing is to be done by the judge of choruses and of every musical event, and by the supervisors and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian contests, and of all contests in which swearing falsely doesn't produce gain—according to the opinion of humanity. But in any contests where a great gain seems evidently to accrue to him who denies strongly and with an oath, in these all the persons bringing charges against one another are to be judged by trials without oaths. And in general, those who preside at a trial are not to allow someone to speak with oaths, for the sake of persuasiveness, or to curse himself and his family, or to use unseemly supplication or womanly wailings, but a person is always to state fully what is just,

teaching and learning with auspicious speech; otherwise, as if the speaker had digressed from the speech, the magistrates are to bring him back to a speech that constantly refers to the business at hand. As for a stranger in his relations with strangers, they are to receive and give authoritative oaths to one another, if they should wish, just as is done now—for they won't grow old or, as a rule, make nests of young in the city, and leave others like themselves who have the right to dwell in the country—and in judicial trials of complaints against one another the judging shall proceed in the same way, for all of them.

With regard to the ways in which some free man is disobedient to the city, not in matters deserving of blows, imprisonment, or death, but with respect to certain attendances at choral performances, or at processions, or at certain other such common ceremonies or public services—such as are involved in sacrifices during peacetime or contributions for war—with respect to all such instances, what is necessary first is the healing of the damage. For those who fail to obey there must be a security deposit left with the men whom the city, and also the law, may appoint to exact pledges. Those who then disobey are to have their deposits sold, and the money is to go to the city. If a greater penalty is needed, the magistrates in each case shall impose the fitting penalties on the disobedient and bring them into court, until they are willing to do what has been ordered.

A city that isn't going to make money except for the money that comes from the land, and that isn't going to engage in commerce, must have deliberated about what it ought to do concerning both trips abroad, away from the country, on the part of its own people, and the reception of strangers from elsewhere. So the lawgiver should give advice about these matters, first by being as persuasive as he can:

By nature the intermingling of cities with cities mixes dispositions in every way, as strangers produce innovations in one another. For the cities that are well governed by means of correct laws this would bring the greatest of all injuries. But for most cities, since they're not at all well regulated by laws, it makes no difference if they mingle by receiving strangers among themselves or go gallivanting off to other cities, whenever someone might desire a trip abroad, anywhere and at any time, whether he be young or more elderly. Yet then again, not to receive others, or go abroad elsewhere themselves, is at once not entirely possible and in addition, would appear savage and hard to the other human beings, to whom they would seem to be adopting the harsh words of what are called "the expulsions of strangers," as well as stubborn and harsh manners. But one ought never to belittle the reputation one has among others for being good or not. For the many happen not to be as deficient in their judgment of who among the rest are wicked and good, as they are deficient in the essence of virtue; there is a certain divine shrewdness even in bad men, such that very many even of those who are especially bad can distinguish well, in their speeches and opinions, the better human beings and the worse. That is why the exhortation to give preeminence in honor to one's good reputation among the many is a noble exhortation for the many cities. But the most correct and greatest thing, at least for the man who is to be perfect, is to be truly good and thus to hunt for a life of good repute, but otherwise not to do so at all; and indeed, it would be fitting for the city being founded in Crete to obtain from the other human beings the noblest and best reputation possible, with respect to virtue. And there is every reasonable hope that if it should come into being according to plan, the Sun and the other gods will look upon it and a few others as being among the cities and countries with good

laws. So in regard to travel abroad into other lands and places, and the reception of strangers, it is necessary to do as follows:

First, it shall not be permissible for a man younger than forty to go abroad anywhere in any way; moreover, no one is to go abroad in a private capacity, but heralds, ambassadors, and certain observation missions may do so in a public capacity. Military expeditions abroad in wartime aren't worth including among these political trips. There should be persons sent to the Pythian Apollo, the Olympian Zeus, to Nemea, and to the Isthmus, to take part in the sacrifices and contests dedicated to these gods; and they should do what they can to send the most numerous, beautiful, and best men possible, who will give the city a good reputation in the sacred and peaceful gatherings, and provide a supply of reputation that is the counterpart to what is gained in war. When they return home they will teach the young that the legal customs, pertaining to the regimes, of the others are in second place. There are also certain other observation missions they ought, with the permission of the Guardians of the Laws, to send out, such as the following. If certain citizens desire to observe the affairs of the other human beings at greater leisure, no law is to prevent them. For a city without experience of bad as well as good human beings would never be able, because of its isolation, to be sufficiently tame and perfect; nor, again, would it be able to guard its laws, unless it accepts them by knowledge and not solely by habits. The fact is, there are always among the many certain divine human beings—not many—whose intercourse is altogether worthwhile, and who do not by nature grow any more frequently in cities with good laws than in cities without. These the inhabitant of cities with good laws, if he's uncorruptible, must always seek and track down, by going out over sea and land, in order to place

on a firmer footing those legal customs that are nobly laid down, and correct others, if they are lacking something. For without this observation and search a city will never remain perfect—nor will it do so if they should carry out the observational mission badly.

Clinias/ How then would both these things be accomplished?

Athenian Stranger/ As follows. First, our observer of this kind must be more than fifty years of age; then he should have become one of those with a good reputation in other respects and in war, if the Guardians of the Laws are to allow him to go to other cities as an exemplar. After he gets to be over sixty years of age he is no longer to go on observational missions. When he's spent as many of the ten years as he may wish observing, and has arrived back home, he's to go to the council of those who keep watch over the laws.

This council is to be composed of a mixture of young and elderly men, and shall be compelled to meet each day, from dawn until the sun has risen. It shall be composed, first, of the priests who have obtained the prizes for excellence, and then of the ten Guardians of the Laws who are eldest at any time, and then there will be the Supervisor of Education as a whole—the new one and those who have stepped down from this office. Each of these is not to attend alone, but with a young man between the ages of thirty and forty, having chosen the man who pleases him. The intercourse and speeches of these men are always to be about laws and their own city, and anything they may have learned elsewhere that is different and pertains to such matters, as well as whatever branches of learning might seem to contribute to this inquiry by making things clearer for the learners, while, for those who don't learn these, things pertaining to laws appear darker and unclear. Among these, the matters the older men judge approvingly, the younger are to learn with

complete seriousness, and if one of those invited should seem to be unworthy, the whole council is to blame the man who did the inviting. But those who are of good repute among these young men the rest of the city shall guard, watching over and taking care of them in a special way, honoring them when they do what is correct but dishonoring them more than the others, if they should turn out worse than the many.

It is to this council, then, that the man who has been observing the legal customs among the rest of humanity is to go immediately after he has arrived, and if he's found some persons capable of explaining some utterance concerning the laying down of laws, or education, or upbringing, or if he himself should return having thought some things up, let him share this with the entire council. If he should seem to have returned no whit worse or better, let him be praised for the sake of his great eagerness of spirit, at any rate; but if he should seem much better, let him receive much more praise while he lives, and when he has died let him be honored with appropriate honors by the power of those in the council. If, however, he should seem to come back corrupted, he is not to associate with any young or elder man, making a claim to be wise. If he should obey the magistrates, he may live, as a private man, but if not, he is to die—if, that is, he should be convicted in court for being a busybody in some way concerning the education and the laws. And if he should deserve to be brought into court but none of the magistrates brings him, blame is to accrue to the magistrates on the occasion of the judging concerning prizes for excellence.

The man who goes abroad should go abroad in this way and be this sort of person; next, after this man has been dealt with, a friendly reception must be provided for the man who visits from abroad. There are four strangers whom it is

necessary to discuss. The first, and perpetual, visitor mostly completes his visits in summer, like the migratory birds; the bulk of these simply carry on their traffic across the sea for the sake of money, flying as if they had wings, to other cities in the summer of the year. The magistrates assigned to these fellows must receive the man at the marketplaces, harbors, and public buildings outside the city but near the city, keeping guard lest any of such strangers introduce some innovation, and apportioning judicial matters to them in the correct way—having dealings with them as is necessary, but as little as possible.

The second is a real observer, with his eyes—and also with his ears, when it comes to the spectacles of the Muses. For every such person there must be lodgings prepared near the temples, with marks of humane hospitality, and the priests and temple custodians must look after and care for such persons until they have stayed a measured time; then, having seen and heard what they came for, they are to depart, having done and suffered no injury. And the priests are to be judges for them, if someone should do an injustice to one of them or if one of these should do an injustice to someone else of less than fifty drachmas' worth; but if some greater charge should be made concerning them, the trials for such persons must be held before the Market Regulators.

The third stranger, who arrives on some public business from another country, must be received publicly. He ought to be received only by Generals, Cavalry Commanders, and Rank Commanders, and such persons should be taken care of only by that man with whom one of them might be lodged and entertained as a guest, in conjunction with the Presidents.

The fourth, if ever one should arrive, is rare; but if ever someone should come who is the counterpart, from another country, of our observers, he must first be no less than fifty

years of age, and in addition to this must ask either to see something beautiful which is different from the beautiful things in the other cities, or to reveal some such thing to another city. Now every such man may go uninvited to the doors of the rich and wise, he being another such himself. Indeed, let him go to the house of the Supervisor of Education as a whole, trusting that he is a suitable guest for such a host, or to the house of one of those who has won the victory in virtue; when he has kept company with some of these, teaching and learning, let him depart as a friend leaving friends, honored with gifts and fitting honors.

These are the laws that should regulate the reception of all male and female strangers from another country and their sending out of their own—honoring Zeus the god of strangers, and not using meats and sacrifices as a way of expelling strangers (as the nurslings of the Nile do now), nor savage proclamations.

Any security that someone may pledge is to be pledged explicitly, with the entire affair agreed upon in writing and in the presence of not less than three witnesses, if the amount is under a thousand drachmas, and not less than five if it's over a thousand. The previous seller is to stand as security for any seller who is not suable or is not at all solvent, and is to be liable to be sued to the same degree as the seller.

If someone should wish to conduct a search on anyone's premises, he is to conduct the search naked except for an ungirded undershirt, and after having sworn an oath to the conventional gods that he does indeed expect he will find the thing. And this other shall hand over the household, the things that have been sealed as well as the unsealed things, to be searched. If someone should fail to give leave to somebody who wishes to search, the one who's prevented is to go to court after having assessed the value of the thing

he's looking for; if there should be a conviction, double the assessed value is to be paid in damages. If a master should happen to be away from home, the inhabitants of the house must allow the unsealed things to be searched, but the sealed things the searcher is to counterseal and put under the guard of whomever he may wish, for five days. If the master should be away a longer time, he is to call in the City Regulators and thus conduct the search, opening the sealed things as well and then sealing them again in the same way in the presence of the household members and the City Regulators.

The following is to be the time limit for disputed claims, after which it shall no longer be possible to dispute the possessor's claim: There is to be no dispute as regards lands and houses in this country; as regards the other things which someone may possess, if someone should openly make use of a thing in the city and in the marketplace and temples, and no one seizes it, but then somebody claims they've been looking for it during this time, while the man clearly wasn't hiding it—if they spend a year this way, with the one in possession of something, and the other searching, then after the passage of a year no one is to be permitted to seize such a possession. If someone should make use of a thing not in the city or the marketplace, but in the fields, openly, and someone doesn't confront him within five years, then when the five years have expired this person is no longer to be permitted to seize such a thing. If someone should make use of something in the houses in the city, the time limit is to be three years; if he should possess it in the fields in a way that isn't evident, ten years; if in another country, there is to be no time limit on the seizure, however long a time before it may be discovered somewhere.

If someone should forcibly prevent somebody from appearing at a trial, whether it be the party or the witnesses,

then, if it's a slave—his own or someone else's—the trial is to be nullified and invalid; if it's a free man, in addition to the nullification the one who does this is to be imprisoned for a year and liable to prosecution for kidnapping by anyone who wishes. And if someone should forcibly prevent a rival competitor from appearing at some contest in gymnastic, in music, or in something else, anyone who wishes should report it to those who preside at the contest, and they shall allow the one who is willing to compete to enter the contest freely. If they're unable to do so, and the one who did the preventing should win the contest, they're to give the victory prizes to the man who was prevented, and inscribe his name as the victor in whatever temples he may wish; for the man who did the preventing there is never to be any votive offering or inscription concerning such a contest, and he is to be liable for the damages, whether he is defeated or is victorious in the contest.

If someone should knowingly receive anything stolen, he is to be liable to the same judicial penalty as the thief. The penalty for harboring a fugitive is to be death.

Everyone is to consider the same person a friend or enemy as the city does, and if someone should make peace or war with certain parties in private, apart from the community; the penalty is to be death in this case too. If some part of the city should by itself make peace or war with certain parties, the Generals are to bring those responsible for this action into court, and the judicial penalty for someone who is convicted shall be death.

Those who do some service to the fatherland ought to do the service without gifts, and it is no excuse, nor is it a praiseworthy saying, to aver that "for good deeds gifts should be received, but not for petty deeds." Now it isn't easy to know and, having knowledge, to be firm; the safest course is

to pay heed and obey the law, and do no service for gifts. He who disobeys is simply to die, if he's convicted in a trial.

As regards communal money revenues, each man's property is to be evaluated (for many purposes), and in addition the tribes are to report the yearly harvest in writing to the Field Regulators; this way, the public treasury may deliberate and decide each year to use whichever of the two existing modes of revenue it might wish to use—either a portion of the whole assessed evaluation, or of the current annual income, apart from the contributions to the common meals.

As regards votive offerings to the gods, the well-measured man ought to bestow well-measured votive offerings. Now the earth and the household hearth are held sacred to all the gods by everyone. So no one should consecrate them a second time as sacred to the gods. In other cities, in private and in the temples, gold and silver are possessions that arouse envy; yet ivory, being from a body that has lost its soul, is not a pure votive offering, while iron and bronze are tools of war. Let a person dedicate any wooden thing made of one piece that he may wish, and likewise anything of stone for the common temples, or something woven that doesn't entail more than a month's work for one woman. The color white would befit gods, in something woven as well as in other things, and dyes are not to be added except in the case of the adornments for war. But the most divine gifts are birds, and figures that a single artist might complete in one day. The other votive offerings are to imitate such things.

When there has been a thorough discussion of the parts of the entire city—how many and what they should be—and the laws concerning all the greatest business transactions have been discussed as best they can be, what ought to remain is judicial procedure. The first of the judicial courts would be those of the chosen judges, whom the defendant

and the prosecutor should choose in common, and for whom the name "arbitrators" is more fitting than "judges." The second would be those composed of villagers and tribesmen, divided into twelve parts, before whom they should contest the case if they haven't arrived at a judgment before the first judges—but with a greater penalty at stake. The defendant, if he should lose the second time, must pay another fifth part of the value of the written judicial penalty. If someone should complain of the judges and wish a third contest, he is to take the case before the select judges; if he should lose again, he must pay one and a half the assessed penalty. Where the prosecutor is dissatisfied after losing before the first judges and goes before the second, he shall take away another fifth part, if he wins; but if he's defeated he must pay the same portion of the judicial penalty. If they should go to the third court and not abide by the earlier trials, and the defendant is defeated, he is to pay one and a half times the penalty, as was said, while the prosecutor is to pay half the assessed penalty.

The drawing of lots for and the filling of the courts, the appointments of assistants for each of the offices, the times at which each of these things ought to be done, what pertains to the recording of votes and adjournments, and all such necessary details concerning judicial actions—earlier and later written complaints, requirements for answers and attendance, and everything akin to these things—have been discussed by us earlier, but it is noble to repeat what is correct, at least, twice or even thrice. Yet an elderly lawgiver may leave out all the legal customs that are minor and easily discovered, and the young lawgiver should fill them in. Indeed, the private courts would attain due measure if they were instituted in something like that way. But as for the public and common courts, and whatever courts magistrates must use in order to manage the tasks appropriate to each

of the magistracies, there exist in many cities a number of pieces of legislation by decent men, which are not unseemly, from which the Guardians of the Laws ought to select what is fitting and equip the regime that is now being brought forth. They should consider these pieces of legislation, correct them, and test them by experience, until each of them should seem adequately established; then they should set them up as final, seal them as simply unchangeable, and employ them for the whole of the city's life. Whatever pertains to the silence and auspicious speech of the judges, and the opposite, and whatever matters differ from the many just, good, and noble things in the other cities, have in part been discussed and will in part be discussed later, near the end. He who is going to be a judge who is even handed, in accordance with justice, must look to all such things and learn the writings about them that he has acquired. For of all branches of learning, those which have the most sovereign influence in making the learner become better are the ones that pertain to the laws—if, that is, they should be correctly set up; and they would be, or else our divine and marvelous law [nomos] would in vain possess a name akin to intelligence [nous]. Moreover, as regards the other speeches, whatever praise or blame about certain men is uttered in poems, and whatever is uttered in prose—whether in writings or in all the other kinds of daily intercourse (where they dispute, out of fondness for victory, and agree, sometimes in very empty ways)—of all these, the clear test would be the writings of the lawgiver. These latter writings the good judge must have acquired within himself, as antidotes to the other speeches, and must use to correct both himself and the city: making the just things abide and grow in the good men, and effecting the greatest transformation he can in the bad men, away from lack of learning, lack of restraint, cowardice, and all injustice

generally—that is, for whoever among the bad men seem to have curable opinions. As to those whose opinions have really been fixed by fate, if to souls thus disposed they assigned death as the cure (a remark that it would be just to make often), such judges and leaders of judges would become worthy of the entire city's praise.

When the judicial trials for a year have proceeded to a conclusion, the following laws ought to govern the execution of the verdicts:

First, immediately after the vote in each case has been announced by the herald, with the judges listening, the judicial magistracy shall assign to the victor all the goods of the convicted party, except for the goods that must necessarily be retained. When the month after the months during which trials are held has elapsed, if someone hasn't voluntarily received a voluntary discharge from the victor, the magistracy that has tried the case shall, in accordance with the request of the victor, hand over the goods of the convicted party. If the goods should be insufficient, and there should be lacking no less than a drachma, this man is not to be able to undertake any judicial action against anyone else until he has paid in full everything owed to the victor. But judicial actions undertaken, by others against this man are to have authoritative force. If someone who has been judicially condemned should obstruct the magistracy that did the condemning, those who have been unjustly obstructed should bring the man before the court of the Guardians of the Laws, and if someone should be convicted in such a trial he is to be punished with death, on the grounds that he was subverting the whole city and the laws.

After this, for a man who has been born and brought up, and has begotten and brought up children, and has mingled in business transactions with due measure—paying judicial penalties if he has done someone an injustice and receiving

the same from another—for a man who has aged according to destiny in the company of the laws, the end would come, according to nature. Now as regards those who have died, whether it be a male or a female, the legal customs concerning the divine things that belong to the gods beneath the earth and here—concerning whatever rites are appropriately celebrated—are to be authoritatively explained by the Interpreters. Graves, however, are not to be located on any land that is cultivable, whether the monument be great or small, but only where the nature of the land is suitable for this alone: to receive and hide, in a way that is the most painless to the living, the bodies of those who have died—these are the areas that should be filled. But with respect to those areas which Mother Earth by nature intends to produce food for human beings, no one either living or dead is to deprive those among us who are living of them. And they shall not heap up a mound higher than what can be completed by the work of five men in five days; nor shall they make stone markers larger than are required to contain at most four heroic lines of encomia on the life of the deceased. As for the laying out, first, it is not to be for a longer time than that which shows whether a man has fallen into a death-like swoon or has really died, and in dealing with human beings, the third day would be just about a well-measured time to carry the body out to the monument. One should be persuaded by the lawgiver in other respects, and also when he says that soul is altogether different from body; that in life itself, what constitutes each of us is nothing other than the soul, the body following each of us as a semblance; and that it is a noble saying that the bodies of the corpses are images of the dead, while the being that is really each of us—named "the immortal soul"—goes off to other gods to give an account, as the ancestral law says. To the good man this is heartening, but to the bad man very frightening.

Furthermore, there is no great help available for the man who has died. All his relatives should have helped him while he was alive, so that he might have lived as justly and piously as possible while he was alive, and might have died without incurring retribution for evil faults, in the life after this one. Since this is the way things are, one ought never to squander one's substance, in the belief that this lump of flesh being buried especially belongs to one; instead, one should believe that that son or brother, or whoever it is one misses and strongly believes one has buried, has gone away to complete and fulfill his own destiny, and that one should make the best of the present circumstances, spending a measured amount, as if one were spending money on a soulless altar of the infernal ones. And it wouldn't be very unseemly if the lawgiver were to divine what is a measured amount. So let this be the law:

The expenditures would be measured if not more than five minas were spent on the whole funeral by a man of the highest class, three minas by a man of the second, two by a man of the third, and a mina by a man of the fourth.

The Guardians of the Laws must necessarily do many other things and supervise many matters, but not the least of these is that they should live supervising children and men and every age; and moreover at the end of everyone's life supervision should be exercised by someone Guardian of the Laws, whom the household of the deceased should take on as an overseer: let it be a noble thing to his credit if what pertains to the deceased proceeds nobly and with due measure, but a shameful thing if it proceeds ignobly. The laying out and the rest shall proceed in accordance with the convention concerning such matters, but something like the following measures must be conceded to the statesman-legislator:

To command that there be crying for the deceased, or that there not be, is unseemly, but the singing of dirges and the raising of the voice outside the house are forbidden. Carrying the corpse in the open on the roads is to be prevented, as is crying aloud while it proceeds along the roads, and the procession is to be outside the city before daybreak. These are to be the legal customs in regard to such matters, and he who obeys shall avoid penalty, but he who disobeys one of the Guardians of the Laws shall be punished by all, with a penalty that is approved by all in common. Whatever other actions take place concerning the dead, whether they have tombs or are without tombs (as in the case of parricides and temple robbers and all such), have been discussed earlier and set down in laws, so that our legislation would be just about at an end.

But in every case, the end each time is not quite the doing of something, nor the acquiring and settling; it's rather when one has discovered a perfect and permanent safeguard for what has been begotten that one should believe that whatever needs to be done has been done, and prior to that one must believe the whole is unfinished.

Clinias/ Nobly spoken, stranger. But explain more clearly what was aimed at in what was just now said.

Athenian Stranger/ Kleinias, many of the earlier things were sung beautifully, and it's likely that this applies not least to the designations given to the Fates.

Athenian Stranger/ Which designations?

Athenian Stranger/ That "Lachesis" is the first, "Clotho" the second, and "Atropos" the third savior of things fated, being likened to a woman who uses the third twist to give spun threads their capacity of irreversibility. And indeed, for a city and for citizens provision must be made in these respects not only for the health and safeguarding of the

bodies, but also for a state of good lawfulness in the souls, or rather, for a safeguard of the laws. To me it seems evident that this is still lacking in our laws—the way in which the capacity of irreversibility ought naturally to be implanted in them.

Clinias/ You're not speaking of a minor matter, if it proves impossible to discover how everything would acquire some such thing.

Athenian Stranger/ But to me at least it appears altogether possible, from everything present.

Clinias/ Then let's in no way desist, until we've provided this very thing for the laws that have been discussed. For it's ridiculous to have labored in vain, by building on a foundation that's not at all firm!

Athenian Stranger/ What you urge is correct, and you'll find me to be another who's similarly disposed.

Clinias/ Nobly spoken. So then what, do you claim, would be the safeguard for our regime and laws, and how would it operate?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, didn't we say that in our city there should be some such council as the following? The ten Guardians of the Laws who are the eldest at any time, and, together with these, all those who have won prizes for virtue, are to meet together in the same place. Moreover, those who have gone abroad seeking to hear something, somewhere, that would perhaps be pertinent to the guarding of the laws, when they've returned home safe, are to be considered worthy attendants at the council, after they've been tested by those same men. In addition to these, each man is to select one of the young men not less than thirty years of age, after having first judged him to be worthy in nature and in upbringing, and is to introduce the young man thus selected to the others; if the candidate should meet with the approval

of the others as well, he is to select him, but if not, the judgment that has taken place is to be kept secret from the rest, and especially from the man who was judged unacceptable. And the meeting should be at dawn, when everyone would have the most leisure from the rest of their private and common activities. Presumably some such thing was discussed by us in the earlier discussions?

Clinias/ Indeed it was.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, going back again to this council, I would say something like the following: I assert that if someone were to cast this like an anchor for the entire city, and it were equipped with everything that befits it, it would save all the things we wish for.

Clinias/ But how?

Athenian Stranger/ The moment is ripe for us to explain correctly what comes after this, without any abatement of spirited zeal.

Clinias/ Very nobly spoken: do as you think.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, in the case of everything, Kleinias, it is necessary to understand what is its appropriate savior in each of its activities—just as, in an animal, it is the soul and the head that are by nature such, to the greatest degree at least.

Clinias/ How do you mean, again?

Athenian Stranger/ Doubtless the virtue of these two provides every animal with safety?

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ By the presence of intelligence in the soul, in addition to the other things, and by the presence of sight and hearing in the head, in addition to the other things. In short, when intelligence is mixed with the noblest senses

and has become one, it would most justly be called the salvation of each.

Clinias/ That's likely, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ That's likely, indeed. But what sort of intelligence, when mixed with senses, would become the salvation of ships in storms, at least, and in fair weather? Isn't it the case on a ship that the pilot and the sailors mix the senses with the intelligence of the piloting art to save themselves and what pertains to the ship?

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ There's no need for many examples of such things. But let's consider, in the case of armies, for instance, what goal generals—and the whole ministerial art of medicine as well—would set up, if they were to aim in the correct way at salvation. In the former case, wouldn't it be victory and superiority over enemies, and in the case of doctors and their assistants wouldn't it be the provision of health for the body?

Clinias/ What else?

Athenian Stranger/ Now would a doctor be ignorant about what pertains to body, which we just now said was health, or would a general 'be ignorant of victory, or any of the other matters we've gone through, and still appear to have intelligence about some of these things?

Clinias/ How could he?

Athenian Stranger/ Then what about a city? If someone should be evidently ignorant of the goal at which the statesman should aim, would he, in the first place, be justly called a ruler, and then, would he be' able to save this thing—whose goal he didn't know at all?

Clinias/ How could he?

Athenian Stranger/ Then it's likely that in the present case, if our founding of the country is to have an end, there must be something in it that knows, in the first place, this goal we're speaking of (whatever our political goal might happen to be), and then in what way it ought to attain this, and who—first among the laws themselves, and then among human beings—gives it advice in a noble or ignoble way. But if some city is devoid of such a thing, it won't be surprising if, lacking intelligence and senses, it acts haphazardly each time in each of its actions.

Clinias/ What you say is true.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then in which of the parts or practices of our city is there ever such a guard adequately prepared in any way? Can we explain?

Clinias/ Surely not in a clear way, at least, stranger. But if it's necessary to guess, this argument seems to me to be leading toward the council which you just now said had to get together at night

Athenian Stranger/ You've caught on in a very fine way, Kleinias, and it is indeed necessary, as the argument that is with us now indicates, for this council to possess every virtue, the ruling principle of which is not to wander and have many aims, but to look to one aim, and always shoot all things, like shafts, at this.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Now of course well understand that there's nothing surprising in the fact that the legal customs of the cities wander, since different parts of the legislated codes in each city look to different aims. And in most cases there's nothing surprising in the fact that for some, the definition of the just things is what allows some to rule in the city, whether they happen to be better or worse, while for others it's what allows them to become wealthy, whether

they're slaves of certain people or not, and that others are set in motion by the spirited zeal for the free way of life. Others, again, have a twofold legislation that looks to both—that they may be free and may also be despots over other cities; then the wisest, as they suppose, look to these and all such aims, but not to anyone, being unable to give an account of anything that is honored preeminently and toward which their other affairs should look.

Clinias/ So then wouldn't our principle, at any rate, have been set down in the correct way a long while ago, stranger? For we declared that everything pertaining to our laws ought always to be looking to one thing, and this, we presumably agreed, was very correctly said to be virtue.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes.

Clinias/ And virtue, now, we presumably set down as being four.

Athenian Stranger/ Indeed so.

Clinias/ And intelligence, now, as being the leader of all these, to which, indeed, everything else as well as the three of these ought to look.

Athenian Stranger/ You follow in a very fine way, Kleinias. Now follow the rest. For we said that intelligence in the piloting art, in the medical art, and in the art of generalship, looks to that one thing toward which it ought, and we're now examining here the intelligence that's in the political art; and let's ask just as if it were a human being, in which case we'd say: "Amazing one! Where do you aim? Whatever is that one thing, which intelligence in the case of the medical art can explain clearly, but which you, being indeed distinguished, as you claim, among all the prudent ones, are unable to describe?"—Or you, at least, Megillus and Kleinias, can you two articulate and explain for me, on

its behalf, whatever you claim this thing is, just as I gave definitions on behalf of many others for you?

Clinias/ Not at all, stranger.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Can you say that it's necessary to be zealous in spirit to know the thing itself and the things it's in?

Clinias/ Such as which things do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Such as when we claimed that there had come to be four forms of virtue: obviously, it's necessary to claim that each of them is one, since they're four.

Clinias/ But of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet we call all these one. For we claim that courage is virtue, and prudence is virtue, and also the two others, as if they're really not many but only this one, virtue.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now it's not difficult to say how it is that these two (and the others) differ from each other, and take two names; but how it is that we give to both the same name, virtue, and also give it to the others, this is no longer easy.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ There's no difficulty in clarifying what I'm saying. Let's just divide between ourselves the questioning and answering.

Clinias/ What is it, again, that you're explaining?

Athenian Stranger/ Ask me why, when we assert both to be the one, virtue, we then refer to them again as two, as courage and as prudence. For I'll tell you the reason: it's because the one—courage—is concerned with fear, and even the beasts share in it, as do the dispositions, at least, of the very young children. For soul becomes courageous without

reason and by nature, but, on the other hand, without reason soul never has, does not, and never will become prudent and possessed of intelligence—for that is a different entity.

Clinias/ What you're saying is true.

Athenian Stranger/ Now you've received from me a reasoned account of how they're different and two; you give back to me in return how they're one and the same. And consider that you are going to tell how they're one when they're four, and then ask me—once you've demonstrated how they're one—to tell again how they're four. Moreover, after this let's investigate whether, for one who knows adequately any of the things for which there is both a name and a definition, it's sufficient to know only the name, and to be ignorant of the definition, or whether, for one who is anything, it isn't shameful to be ignorant of all such points in regard to things which are distinguished by their greatness and nobility.

Clinias/ That is likely, at any rate.

Athenian Stranger/ Now for a lawgiver and a Guardian of the Laws, and one who thinks he is distinguished from everyone in virtue, and who has received victory prizes in these very things, is there anything that is more important than these very matters about which we are now talking—courage, moderation, prudence, and justice?

Clinias/ How could there be?

Athenian Stranger/ Now in regard to these matters, are the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers, the guardians of the others—is the one who deals with the man who needs to know and understand, or with the man who needs to be punished and reproved, when he has committed a fault, not to be superior to the others in teaching and making entirely clear what power vice and virtue have? Is some poet who

comes into the city, or somebody who claims to be an educator of the young, to appear better than the man who has won the victory in every virtue? In such a city, where there would be neither in word nor in deed adequate guardians, who had adequate knowledge about virtue, would it be surprising if this city, lacking a guardian, were to suffer what many of the present day cities suffer?

Clinias/ Not at all, it's likely.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Should we create what we're now talking about, or what? Should the guardians be prepared so as to be more precisely accurate than the many, in deed and word, concerning virtue? Or in what way will our city be made similar to the head and senses of prudent men, by possessing within itself some such guard?

Clinias/ But how, and in what way, stranger, can we compare it to such a man when we speak of it?

Athenian Stranger/ Obviously, the city itself is the trunk, and the young among the guardians, who have been chosen as the ones who have the best natures, and who are the sharpest in every part of the soul, are, as it were, at the very top; they survey the whole city in a circle, and as they keep watch they hand over perceptions to the memories, and report everything in the city to the elders; the old men, who are an image of intelligence because they are distinguished by their prudent thinking about many matters worthy of discussion, deliberate, using the young as assistants in their collective deliberation. Thus both of them in common really save the whole city. Shall we say that this is the way we ought to arrange things, or some other way? Are we to have them all the same and not have some who are brought up and educated with greater precision?

Clinias/ But that's impossible, you amazing man!

Athenian Stranger/ Then it's necessary to proceed to some more precise education than before.

Clinias/ Probably.

Athenian Stranger/ Wouldn't that which we just now almost touched on happen to be the one which we need?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Didn't we say that the man who was at any rate the top craftsman and guardian in each thing must be able not only to look to the many, but also to pursue and know the one, and, knowing it, to order everything with a synoptic view to that?

Clinias/ Correctly spoken.

Athenian Stranger/ Is there any way in which there would be a more precise vision and seeing of anything than that which is the capacity to look to one idea from the many and dissimilar things?

Clinias/ Perhaps.

Athenian Stranger/ Not perhaps, but really, you demonic man! There is not a clearer way to proceed than this for any human being.

Clinias/ Trusting in you, stranger, I do indeed agree, and let's proceed in this way in our discussion.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it's necessary to compel, as is likely, even the guardians of our divine regime to see with precision, first, whatever is the same in all the four: what it is that we assert is one in courage, moderation, justice, and prudence, and is justly called by one name, virtue. This, friends—if we wish—let's not let up on now, but let's bear down hard on it, as it were, until we may express in an adequate way whatever it is that ought to be looked to—whether it be one, or a whole, or both of these, or however it is by nature. Or do we suppose that if this eludes us, we'll

ever be in a satisfactory situation as regards virtue, when we won't be able to explain whether it's many, or four, or one? No. In that case (if, at any rate, we would obey our own advice), we will contrive some other way by which this will come into being in our city. If, however, it seems that the topic should be completely abandoned, then it must be abandoned.

Clinias/ By the god of strangers, stranger! Surely such a topic ought least to be abandoned, since what you're saying seems to us to be very correct. But now how would someone contrive this?

Athenian Stranger/ Let's not discuss yet how we might contrive it. First let's make sure, by agreeing among ourselves, if it's necessary or not.

Clinias/ But surely it's necessary—if, that is, it's possible.

Athenian Stranger/ But what then? Do we think this same thing in regard to the beautiful and the good? Should our guardians know only that each of these is many, or also how and in what sense it is one?

Clinias/ It's pretty likely that they must necessarily understand how it's one.

Athenian Stranger/ But what? Must they understand it, while being unable to give a demonstration of it through argument?

Clinias/ What? Now you're describing some habit that befits a slave!

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Is this not our argument concerning all the serious things, that those who are really to be the Guardians of the Laws must really know what pertains to the truth about them, and must be capable of interpreting it in speech and following it in deed, judging by the standard of nature what things come into being in a noble fashion and what things do not?

Clinias/ How could they be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Now isn't one of the noblest things that which pertains to the gods (which, we, indeed, went through in a serious way)—to know, insofar as human power is capable of knowing these matters, that they exist, and how much power they are evidently masters of, and to make allowance for most of those in the city who only go along with what the laws proclaim; but, in the case of those who belong to the guardianship, refusing to admit anyone unless he has labored to grasp every proof that exists concerning gods? And isn't the import of this refusal to be that a man is never to be chosen as one of the Guardians of the Laws, nor again as one of those judged approvingly in regard to virtue, unless he is divine and has labored over these things?

Clinias/ It's just, at any rate, that—as you say—the man who is idle or lacks capacity in such matters is to be kept widely separated from the noble men.

Athenian Stranger/ Now don't we know that there are two things that lead to belief concerning the gods, which we went through in the discussions earlier?

Clinias/ Which two?

Athenian Stranger/ One is what we said about the soul, how it is the eldest and most divine of all the things which are provided with ever-flowing existence by a motion that receives its coming-into-being. And one is the point about the orderly motion of stars and of the other things which intelligence is master of, having arranged the whole in an order. For no human being who has looked at these things in a way that is not low or amateurish has ever been by nature so atheistic that he has not experienced the opposite of what the many expect. For they think that those who busy themselves with such matters, through astronomy and the other arts that necessarily go with it, become atheists,

having seen that, as much as possible, actions come into being by necessities and not by the thoughts of an ¦ intention concerned with fulfillments of good things.

Clinias/ But then how would it be?

Athenian Stranger/ As I said, the situation now is entirely the opposite of what it was when those who think about such things thought they were without soul. Even at that time a sense of wonder crept -in about them, and those who studied them with precision suspected what is now really believed: that if the beings were without soul, they would never have used on them wonderful calculations of such precision—if the beings didn't possess intelligence. Indeed, there were some even then who dared to hazard this very claim, saying that it was intelligence that had ordered all of the things in heaven. But these same men erred again about the nature of soul, and how it is elder than bodies; by thinking that it was younger, they overturned everything again, so to speak, and themselves especially. For everything that moves in heaven and that appears to the eyes appeared to them to be full of stones and earth and many other soulless bodies, which provided the causes of the entire cosmos. These were the things which at that time caused many varieties of atheism and other disgusting views to infect such men; and indeed the poets took to reviling, and compared those who philosophize to dogs using vain howlings, and said other mindless things. But now, as was said, the situation is entirely the opposite.

Clinias/ How's that?

Athenian Stranger/ No mortal human being can ever become firmly pious towards gods unless he has grasped these two things that are now being mentioned: that soul is the eldest of all the things that have partaken of coming into being, and is immortal, and rules all bodies; and, in addition

to these things, he should grasp that which has now been discussed often—that intelligence of the beings, which has been said to be in the stars—as well as the subjects of learning that necessarily precede these matters. He should see what is common to these things and the things that concern the Muse, and should apply this understanding, in a harmonious way, to the practices and customs that pertain to the habitual dispositions; and he should be able to give the reason for as many of these as have a reason. He who is incapable of acquiring these attributes in addition to the popular virtues would almost never become an adequate ruler of the city as a whole, but would be an assistant for the other rulers.

So now at this point, Kleinias and Megillus, it must be seen whether we shall add this to all the laws mentioned, which we've gone through: that the Nocturnal Council of Rulers, which will have shared an education such as we've discussed, is lawfully to become a guard, for the sake of security. Or what shall we do?

Clinias/ But best of men, how will we not add this, if we can do so to even a small extent?

Athenian Stranger/ And let's all strive, at any rate, for such a thing. In this, at least, even I would with an eager spirit become your helper, making use of my very extensive experience and inquiry concerning such matters. And I will perhaps find others besides myself.

Clinias/ But stranger, we must above all proceed in this direction, in which the god is virtually leading us! And what we should do now is discuss and look for the way in which this might correctly come into being for us.

Athenian Stranger/ It's not possible at this stage to legislate laws about such men, Megillus and Kleinias, until the council has been arranged in order—and then they

themselves should have the sovereign authority to legislate what is necessary. But the present preparation for such things would take place through teaching and much intercourse, if it were to proceed correctly.

Clinias/ How so? What is this, again, that we must claim has been said?

Athenian Stranger/ Doubtless there should first be a list compiled of those who fit the nature of the guardianship in age, capacity for learning, and characteristic dispositions and habits. But after this, it isn't easy either to discover what things should be learned, or to become the student of someone else who has made the discovery. Then in addition to these things there is the question of the times—at what times and for how much time each subject should be taken up; it is vain to discuss these matters in writings, for it wouldn't be clear to the learners themselves whether the subject were being learned at the right time, until knowledge of the subject had, presumably, come into being within the soul of each. Thus, while it would be incorrect to speak of all that pertains to these matters as indescribable secrets, they are incapable of being described beforehand because describing them beforehand would clarify nothing of what is being discussed.

Clinias/ If this is the way things are, stranger, what then ought to be done?

Athenian Stranger/ It's likely, friends, that as the saying goes, "it lies in common and in the middle" for us, and if we're willing to risk the entire regime and throw either three sixes, as they say, or three aces, then that's what must be done; and I'll share the risk with you, by explaining and giving an account of my opinions, at least, concerning the education and upbringing that have now again become the topic of the discussion. The risk would indeed not be small,

nor even comparable to certain others. And I call on you, Kleinias, to take charge of this. For with respect to the city of the Magnesians—or after whomever else the god has it named—it is you who will achieve the greatest fame by setting it up correctly, or who will never avoid the reputation of being the most courageous, at least, in comparison to all later successors. Now if, indeed, this divine council should come into being for us, dear comrades, the city ought to be handed over to it; of the present day lawgivers, none, so to speak, have any quarrel with this. And what we touched on in speech a little while ago as a dream, when we somehow mixed together a certain image of a community of head and intelligence, will really be almost a perfected waking vision—if, that is, our men have been mixed with precision, fittingly educated, and, once educated, dwell in the country's acropolis as perfected guardians whose like, with regard to the virtue of safeguarding, we have not seen come into being in our lives previously.

Megillus/ Dear Kleinias, from all that has now been said by us, either the city's founding must be abandoned, or this stranger here must not be allowed to go, and by entreaties and every contrivance he must be made to share in the city's founding.

Clinias/ What you say is very true, Megillus, and I will do just these things, and you must help.

Megillus/ I'll help.

The Laws.

Book 1.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.
An Athenian Guest,
Clinias the Cretan, and
Megillus the Lacedæmonian.

Athenian Stranger/ Do YOU think, O guests, that a God, or some man, was the cause of the establishment of laws?

Clinias/ A God, O guest, a God, as it is most just to assert: with us, indeed, Zeus; but, with the Lacedæmonians (whence originated this our guest), I think, Apollo dictated the laws. Is it not so?

Megillus/ It is.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether, therefore, do you speak according to Homer, viz. that Minos every year, for the space of nine years, went to converse, with his father, and established laws for your cities, according to his conceptions?

Clinias/ It is so said by us: and, likewise, that his brother Rhadamanthus (you have heard the name) was most just. We Cretans, therefore, say that he obtained this praise, from his distributing, at that time, things pertaining to justice in a proper manner.

Athenian Stranger/ His renown is indeed beautiful, and highly becoming the son of Zeus. But since both you and this other have been educated in legal institutions of this kind, I persuade myself, it will not be unpleasant to us to speak and hear about the establishment of cities and laws, at the same time that we are proceeding on our journey. But

the way from Cnossus to the cavern and temple of Zeus is, as we have heard, sufficiently long; and the resting-places along the road are, as it is proper they should be during the present hot weather, shady, from their position under lofty trees. It will likewise be suitable to our age, to rest in them frequently; and thus, by the allurements of discourse, render the whole of our journey easy.

Clinias/ Indeed, O guest, in the course of our journey, we shall meet in the groves with cypress trees of an admirable height and beauty, and meadows in which while we rest we may discourse.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak rightly.

Clinias/ Entirely so. We shall however speak with more confidence when we become spectators of these. But let us now proceed on our journey with good fortune.

Athenian Stranger/ Let it be so. But inform me, why the law instituted for you public feasts, gymnastic exercises, and the custom of using arms.

Clinias/ I think, O guest, that these particulars respecting us may be apprehended with perfect ease. For you see that the nature of the whole region of Crete is not plain, like that of Thessaly. On this account, with them, horses are more used, and, with us, courses on foot. For this, irregularity of the ground is more adapted to the exercise of pedestrian races. Hence, for this purpose, it is necessary that the arms should be lighter, that they may not hinder the race by their weight. But lightness of bows and arrows seems to be adapted to this purpose. All these particulars, therefore, are subservient to our use in war; and the legislator, as it appears to me, looking to this, established everything. For he seems to have instituted public banquets, in consequence of perceiving that all men, when they engaged in war, were compelled by the thing

itself, for the sake of their own defense, to feast at that time together. But he appears to me to be charged with folly by the multitude, in consequence of their not having learnt that cities are perpetually at war with each other. But if during the time of war it is necessary to feast together for the sake of defense, and that certain governors and men governed should be the armed defenders of them, this also should be done in the time of peace. For that which most men call peace, is only a name; but, in reality, war is perpetually proclaimed according to nature, by all cities; against all. And thus considering, you will nearly find that the Cretan legislator established for us all the laws, both public and private, as if looking to war; and ordered them to defend these laws in such a manner as if nothing else was useful, either of possessions or studies, unless a man became victorious in war; and as considering that all the goods of the vanquished become the property of the victors.

Athenian Stranger/ You appear to me, O guest, to be well exercised for the purpose of explaining the Cretan laws. But explain this yet more clearly to me. For you seem to me to say that a city is then well established when it is so constituted as to be able to vanquish other cities in war. Is it not so?

Clinias/ It is perfectly so; and I think that this our other guest will be of the same opinion.

Megillus/ How can a Lacedæmonian. O divine man, answer otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Whether, therefore, is this right from cities towards cities, but not from one village towards another?

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it therefore the same?

Clinias/ It is.

Athenian Stranger/ But what then? Is it likewise the same from one house to another in the same village, and from one man to another?

Clinias/ The same.

Athenian Stranger/ But what shall we say of one man towards himself? Shall we consider the relation as that of an enemy to an enemy? Or, how shall we say?

Clinias/ O Athenian guest! for I am not willing to call you Attic, because you appear to me rather to deserve to be called by the surname of the Goddess Minerva. For, rightly reducing the discourse to its principle, you render it more clear; and, by this mean, are able to find with facility that which has now been rightly asserted, —I mean, that all men are enemies to all, both publicly and privately, and likewise, that each individual is an enemy to himself.

Athenian Stranger/ How do you say, O wonderful man?

Clinias/ This, O guest; that for a man to vanquish himself is the first and best of all victories, but to be vanquished by himself is a thing the most shameful and vile. For these things signify that there is war in each of us against ourselves.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, therefore, let us resume the discourse. For, since each of us is either better or worse than himself, whether shall we say that a house, a village, and a city, have this same thing in them, or not?

Clinias/ Do you mean that one is better, and the other worse than itself?

Athenian Stranger/ I do.

Clinias/ Concerning this also you have rightly inquired. For this does not less happen to cities, but in the highest degree. For, in those in which the better vanquish the multitude and the worse, such a city is with propriety said to be better than itself, and may with the greatest justice be

praised for such a victory. But the contrary must be the case with a contrary city.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether, therefore, here, the worse is at any time more excellent than the better, must be left uninvestigated; (For it would require a prolix discussion;) but I understand what is at present asserted by you, thus: That sometimes citizens who are allied to each other, and of the same city, being unjust and numerous, will forcibly attack the just, being fewer in number, that they may subject them to slavery; and that, when they conquer, the city may be justly said to be inferior to itself, and at the same time depraved, but, when they are conquered, better than itself, and good.

Clinias/ What is now said, O guest, is wonderful in the extreme; but, at the same time, thus to confess is most necessary.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, let us again consider this. Many brothers may be born from one father, and from one mother. Nor is it at all wonderful that the greater part of them should be unjust, and the lesser just.

Clinias/ It is not wonderful.

Athenian Stranger/ Nor will it be proper for me and you to investigate this, that when the base vanquish, both the house and every kind of alliance may be called inferior to themselves, but better than themselves when the base are vanquished. For we do not investigate these things at present for the sake of an elegant or inelegant arrangement of words, according to the manner of many, but for the sake of discovering what is natural rectitude and error concerning laws.

Clinias/ You speak most truly, O guest.

Megillus/ It appears to me, too, that what has hitherto been said is beautiful.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us besides consider this: Can anyone become a judge of such brothers as we have just spoken of?

Clinias/ Doubtless.

Athenian Stranger/ Which therefore will be the better judge? he who cuts off those that are unworthy, and orders the worthy to govern themselves? or he who causes the worthy to govern, but suffers the unworthy to live, when they are willing to be governed? But we will say that a third is a judge with respect to virtue, if such a one can be found, who, receiving one discordant alliance, will not destroy anyone, but, reconciling the disagreeing parties, will establish for them laws by which they may be enabled to preserve friendship towards each other.

Clinias/ Such a judge and legislator will be by far the best.

Athenian Stranger/ And he will frame laws for them, by acting in a manner contrary to looking at war.

Clinias/ This indeed is true.

Athenian Stranger/ But what—Whether does he who aptly constitutes a city look to external war, and by this mean principally adorn the lives of the citizens, or to the war produced within the city, which is called sedition, which everyone would particularly wish not to arise in his city; and that, when, it arises, the city may be liberated from it with the utmost celerity?

Clinias/ It is evident that he would look to the latter.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether would anyone choose that peace should be the result of sedition, in consequence of one part of the citizens being destroyed, and the other part being victorious, or rather that peace and friendship should be the consequence of reconciliation, and thus the mind of the citizens be necessarily directed to external wars?

Clinias/ Everyone would rather wish that the latter should happen to his city, than the former.

Athenian Stranger/ Would not a legislator in a similar manner?

Clinias/ He would.

Athenian Stranger/ Does not everyone establish all laws for the sake of that which is best?

Clinias/ How should he not?

Athenian Stranger/ But neither war nor sedition is the best of things (for to be in want of these is execrable), but mutual peace and benevolence. Nor is that victory by which a city vanquishes itself, one of the best of things, but it ranks among things necessary. But to think that the best state of a city consists in fighting and conquering, is just as if anyone should think that a wearied body, when undergoing medicinal purification, then acted in the best manner, but should pay no attention to a body which was not at all indigent of medical assistance. And if anyone thinks in a similar manner, either of the felicity of a city or of a private man, he will never become a politician, while he thus alone and primarily looks to external war; nor will he be an accurate legislator, unless he establishes laws respecting war for the sake of peace, rather than laws respecting peace for the sake of war.

Clinias/ These things, O guest, appear in a certain respect to be rightly said. But I should wonder to find anyone contending that our laws, and likewise those of the Lacedæmonians, were not with all possible attention framed for the sake of war.

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps this is the case. We ought not, however, to investigate the present affair in a contentious but in a quiet manner; the greatest diligence being employed, both by us and them, about things of this

kind. Attend therefore to my discourse. In the first place, we shall adduce Tyrtaeus, who was by birth an Athenian, but afterwards a citizen of Lacedæmonia, and who most of all men applied himself to these particulars: “I shall not then (says he) consider that man as worthy of being mentioned, or of any consequence, though he should be the most wealthy of all men, and should possess abundance of goods (and he enumerates almost all goods), who does not always conduct himself in the most excellent manner in warlike affairs.” These poems perhaps you also have heard. For this other associate of ours is, I think, satiated with them.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Clinias/ And these also have reached us, being brought from Lacedæmonia.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us, therefore, in common interrogate this poet thus: O most divine poet, Tyrtæus! for you appear to us to be wise and good, because you have in the highest degree celebrated those who in the highest degree excel in war. I, therefore, and this Clinias the Cnossian, appear very much to agree with you in this particular. But we wish clearly to know, whether or not we speak about the same men. Inform us, therefore, whether you also as well as we are clearly of opinion, that there are two kinds of war? Or how do you say? For I think that a man much worse than Tyrtæus would answer that there are two kinds; one, which we all denominate sedition, and which we consider as the most grievous of all wars; but the other kind, I think, is that which we all consider as milder than the former, and which we employ against those who do not belong to the city, and who are of a different tribe.

Clinias/ How is it possible he should answer otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ Inform us, therefore, who were the men, and what the kind of war, in which you have so

transcendently praised some, and blamed others. For you appear to have praised those that fought in external wars. Thus, you say in your poems, that you can by no means endure those who are not hardy enough to behold bloody slaughter, and to aspire after fierce battle, hand to hand. From this, O Tyrtæus, we should infer, that you praise those who have been eminently illustrious in waging external war. Shall we say that Tyrtæus would grant this?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But we, since these are good, shall assert that those are far better who evidently excel in the greatest war. We have too the poet Theognis a witness in our favor, who was a citizen of the Megarensians in Sicily.

For he says:

> Who faithful in insane sedition keeps,
> With silver and with ruddy gold may vie.

We say, therefore, that such a one will conduct himself in the most difficult war in a manner nearly as much superior to the other, as justice, temperance, and prudence, when conjoined with fortitude, are superior to fortitude alone. For no one can be found faithful and found in seditions, without the whole of virtue. But, as Tyrtæus says, there are a great number of mercenaries who fight intrepidly and die willingly in battle, most of whom are ferocious, injurious, reproachful, and, with a very few exceptions, are the most stupid of all men. But to what does all this tend? And what did he perspicuously intend to signify by these assertions? It is evidently this, that both he who framed laws here from Zeus, and every other legislator who profits cities in the smallest degree, establishes laws by always looking as much as possible to the greatest virtue. But it is, as Theognis says, confidence in dire events, which may be denominated perfect justice. But that which Tyrtæus so highly praises is indeed

beautiful, and opportunely celebrated by the poet; yet it may most rightly he said to be honorable, the fourth in number, and in power.

Clinias/ Shall we, therefore, O guest, rank our legislator among remote legislators?

Athenian Stranger/ Not him indeed, most excellent man, but ourselves, since we are of opinion, that both Lycurgus and Minos established all the laws in Lacedæmon, and here, in consequence of especially directing their attention to war.

Clinias/ In what manner then ought we to speak?

Athenian Stranger/ As truth and justice, I think, require those should speak who discourse about a divine republic; for such ought not to be considered, as looking to a certain part of virtue, and that the most abject, but as regarding the whole of virtue, and inquiring after laws, according to the species of virtue; —not, indeed, investigating those species which many at present propose; for, at present, everyone proposes to inquire after that which he is principally in want of. Thus, one inquires about an inheritance, another about women who are left the only heirs, another about an injury, and others about ten thousand things of a similar kind. But we say that inquiries about laws rank among good inquiries, when they are such as we have just now begun. And, indeed, I in every respect approve of the manner in which you have entered on the discussion of laws. For you are certainly right in beginning from virtue, and asserting that for its sake laws are framed. But you do not appear to me to be right in saying, that the legislator framed all his laws by regarding a part of virtue, and this the least; and this has been the cause of all that was afterwards said by me. Are you, however, willing I should tell you in what manner I wish you to distinguish in this affair?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ It is proper, O guest, to assert that the laws of the Cretans are not rashly approved by all men, and particularly by all the Greeks. For they are rightly framed, since they render those who use them happy; and this because they impart every good. But there are two kinds of goods, one human, and the other divine; and the former is suspended from the latter. And if any city receives the greater goods, it also possesses the lesser; but if not, it is deprived of both. But the lesser goods are those of which health is the leader, beauty the second in order, and strength for the course, and all the other motions pertaining to the body, the third. But riches rank in the fourth place, which are not blind, but perceive acutely, if they follow prudence. However, that which is the first leader of all divine goods is prudence. That which ranks in the second place after intellect is a temperate habit of the soul. From these mingled with fortitude, the third in order will be justice. And the fourth will be fortitude. All which are to be placed, according to nature before those human goods. A legislator, therefore, ought to follow this order, and should command the citizens to look to these divine goods in all their actions. But, of these, human should be referred to divine goods, and all divine goods to their leader intellect. After these things he ought to pay attention to the marriages of the citizens, and to the procreation and education of children, both male and female, and likewise to the young, and those who are advancing to old-age. Such too, among these, as behave well, he should honor as they deserve, but should reprobate in all the conversations of these, their pains, pleasures, and desires. He should likewise consider, and act as a guardian over, the studies of all lovers; and, through the laws, praise such as are worthy, and blame the contraries to these. With respect to anger and fear, too, he will show what in each of these is laudable, and what to be avoided; likewise what

perturbations are produced in the soul through misfortune, and what the means by which these are avoided in prosperity. Lastly, he will show what passions men are subject to, through disease, war, poverty, or the contraries to these; and in all such things he will teach and desire what is beautiful, or otherwise, in the disposition of each. After this, it is necessary that the legislator should pay attention to the possessions and expenses of the citizens, so as to know how they are conducted, together with societies, and their dissolutions, whether voluntarily or involuntarily instituted; where justice is found among these, and where it is wanting; that by these means he may distribute honors to those that obey the laws, and punish those who cannot be persuaded to obey them. In the last place, having instituted everything as far as to the end of every polity, it is necessary he should establish the manner in which the monuments of the dead should be raised, and what honors are to be paid to them. The legislator, having established all these particulars, should place over them guardians, some of whom conduct public affairs according to prudence, but others according to true opinion; so that intellect, binding all these together, may evince that the city follows temperance and justice, and not riches or ambition. After this manner, O guests, I have wished, and am now desirous, you would explain how all these particulars are to be found in those laws which are called the laws of Zeus, in those of Pythian Apollo, and in those which Minos and Lycurgus established; and how, being assumed in a certain order, they may become evident to one who is skilled in the legislative science, either by art or from certain customs, though to us they are by no means apparent.

Clinias/ How then, O guest, ought we to discuss what follows?

Athenian Stranger/ It appears to me that we ought to commence our discussion from the beginning (as we began to do); considering in the first place the pursuits of fortitude, and afterwards discussing another and another species of virtue, if you are willing: and that we may discuss the first object of our inquiry, we will endeavor to establish a paradigm, and refer to it the other particulars, that by mutual converse of this kind we may beguile the tediousness of the way. But afterwards we will consider the pursuits of the whole of virtue, and evince that our present discussion, if divinity is willing, looks thitherward.

Clinias/ You speak well. Endeavor therefore, in the first place, to judge for us respecting this praiser of Zeus.

Athenian Stranger/ I will endeavor to do this, both for you and myself. For the discourse is common.

Clinias/ Speak therefore.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we say that common banquets and gymnastic exercises were invented by the legislator, for the purposes of war?

Clinias/ They were.

Athenian Stranger/ And is this the case with a third or fourth thing? For, perhaps, it is proper thus to enumerate in the things pertaining to another virtue, whether it is right to call them parts, or anything else, for the sake of perspicuity.

Megillus/ I, therefore, as well as every Lacedæmonian, should say that hunting was invented as the third thing. But we should endeavor, if possible, to discover the fourth or fifth thing. I therefore shall endeavor to evince that the fourth thing consists in the endurance of pain. For we are much exercised in this, in fighting with each other with our hands, and in certain violent seizures, each of these being attended with a multitude of wounds. Besides this we have an exercise, which is called a certain concealment, which is

wonderfully laborious, and is undertaken for the purpose of strengthening our endurance. Besides, in winter, without shoes, without any covering to our body, and without servants, waiting indeed on ourselves, we wander both night and day through every region. Further still: in the exercises of naked young men, severe endurances take place among us, when we contend with the strength of suffocating heat; and there are many other things of this kind among us, which it would not be easy to enumerate.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak well, O Lacedæmonian guest. But whether or not shall we place fortitude as simply confirming in a contest alone with fears and pains? or, shall we say that it likewise consists in opposing desires and pleasures, and certain vehement flatteries, which soften the minds of those who are considered as venerable persons, and besides this render them like wax?

Megillus/ I think it likewise consists in opposing all these.

Athenian Stranger/ If, therefore, we call to mind what was advanced above, this our other guest said, that some city was inferior to itself, and some man to himself. Was it not so, O Cnossian guest?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, then, which ought we to call the inferior, —he who is subdued by pain, or he who is subdued by pleasure?

Clinias/ It appears to me, he who is subdued by pleasure. And, in every respect, we should rather say that he who is vanquished by pleasures is disgracefully inferior to himself, and, prior to this, to him who is vanquished by pains.

Athenian Stranger/ Did therefore the legislators of Zeus and Apollo establish by law fortitude as lame, and consider it as alone able to oppose things on its left hand, but

incapable of resisting elegancies and flatteries on its right hand? or, did they consider it as able to oppose both?

Clinias/ Both, I think.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us, therefore, again relate what those pursuits are, in both your cities, which taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them, in the same manner as they do not avoid pain, but bring them into the midst, and cause the citizens to vanquish them, partly by force, and partly by the allurements of honor. But, inform me where the same thing is ordained in your laws respecting pleasures, as respecting pains; and what that is which renders you similarly brave both with respect to pain and pleasures; which renders you victorious over those things which you ought to vanquish, and by no means suffers you to be inferior to your neighboring and most grievous enemies?

Megillus/ I cannot, O guest, so easily adduce a multitude of laws opposite to pleasures, as I can a multitude opposite to pains. Nor perhaps is it easy to speak of pleasures according to great and apparent parts, but only according to such as are small.

Clinias/ Nor am I able in a similar manner to render the same apparent in the Cretan laws.

Athenian Stranger/ This, O best of guests, is by no means wonderful. If anyone, therefore, who is desirous of perceiving that which is true and at the same time most excellent, should find something to reprehend in the laws of our respective countries, we should behave towards each other with mildness, and not with severity.

Clinias/ You speak well, O Athenian guest; and therefore we ought to follow your advice.

Athenian Stranger/ Indeed, Clinias, a conduct of this kind becomes men of your age.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ The next question, therefore, will be, whether or not the Laconian and Cretan polity is reprehensible. Perhaps, indeed, I can better relate what is said by the multitude on this occasion, than either of you. As to your laws, though they should be but of a moderate degree of excellence, yet you certainly have one most beautiful law, which forbids any youth from inquiring whether the laws are well or ill established, but orders them all to accord, with one voice, and with one mouth, that they are all beautifully constituted, as if they had been established by the Gods; and that, if any young man asserts the contrary, no one shall by any means listen to his discourse: but that an old man, if he has anything to urge against them, shall relate his objections to the rulers, and his equals in age, yet not in the presence of any young man.

Clinias/ You speak most properly, O guest: and though at the time this law was established you was absent from the thought of the founder, yet you appear to me to conjecture his intention sufficiently, as if you were a prophet, and to speak the truth in the most eminent degree.

Athenian Stranger/ At present, therefore, let us be free from young men, but we, on account of our old-age, are permitted by the legislator to speak about the laws among ourselves, without committing any offence.

Clinias/ We are so. Do not spare, therefore, but freely reprove our laws. For it is not dishonorable to know if anything is not beautifully established; but, by this mean, a remedy is applied, when what is asserted is received with a benevolent, and not an envious mind.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak well. I shall not, however, reprehend the laws till I have diligently considered them to the utmost of my ability; or rather, I shall proceed in this

affair by doubting. For you alone, of all the Greeks and Barbarians with whom we are acquainted, the legislator has ordered to abstain from the greatest pleasures and sports, and not to taste them. But with respect to pains and fears, which we have lately discussed, he was of opinion, that if anyone avoided them from his infancy, when he came to endure necessary pains, fears, and labors, he would avoid those who are exercised in them, and would become their slave. This legislator ought, in my opinion, to have thought the same respecting pleasures, and to have said to himself: If the citizens should from childhood be unexperienced in the greatest pleasures, and never be taught how to sustain the attacks of pleasure, or informed that they should never be compelled to do anything base for the sake of the sweetness with which pleasure is attended, they would be induced to act in the same manner as those who are vanquished by fear, and would become servile in a different and yet baser manner than those who are able to endure the assaults of pleasure, but yet procure pleasures for themselves, and are sometimes the worst of men. The soul of such, likewise, is partly a slave, and partly free; and they do not deserve to be called simply brave, and free. Consider, therefore, whether anything that has been now said appears to you to be proper.

Clinias/ It does. But immediately and readily to assent to things of such great importance would be the province of young men, or rather of stupid men.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we then, O Clinias and Lacedæmonian guest, after this, discuss what we at first proposed; (for after fortitude we shall speak of temperance,) I mean, what difference there is between these polities and those which are governed by chance, in the same manner as we have now spoken about war?

Megillus/ This is not very easy to accomplish.

Clinias/ Yet it appears that the common banquets, and gymnastic exercises, were beautifully invented by both polities.

Athenian Stranger/ It appears, O guests, to be a difficult undertaking to introduce, in reality as well as in discourse, the indubitable, respecting polities. For it seems that, as in bodies it is not possible to accommodate anyone pursuit to anyone body, because the same thing is seen to injure some and benefit others, the like takes place in cities. For gymnastic exercises, public banquets, and a multitude of other things, at one time are beneficial to cities, but in seditions they are hurtful. The truth of this is evinced by the Milesians, Bœotians, and Thurians. But this ancient, legal, and natural pursuit appears to have perverted the venereal pleasures, not only of men, but of beasts. And your cities may be first accused of this, and such others as have particularly applied themselves to gymnastic exercises. And whether things of this kind ought to be considered jocosely, or seriously, still we must be convinced that, when the male and female unite for the purpose of producing offspring, the pleasure attending such a conjunction appears to be imparted according to nature; but, that the conjunction of males with males, or of females with females, is contrary to nature. We must likewise assert, that he who first dared to act in this manner was induced by the incontinence of pleasure. We all of us, indeed, blame the fable of the Cretans about Ganymede, as discoursing about these particulars. For, as they believe that their laws were given by Zeus, they have devised this fable against Zeus, that they may give themselves up to this pleasure, following the example of the God. But let us bid farewell to the fable. Again, with respect to those who make the laws the subject of their speculation, almost all their attention should be directed to pleasures and pains, both in the manners of cities and of individuals. For

these two fountains are permitted to flow by nature; of which, he who draws whence, when, and as much as he ought, is happy; and this is equally true of a city, an individual, and of every animal: but he who draws unscientifically, and at an improper time, will, on the contrary, live unhappy.

Megillus/ These things, O guest, are so beautifully said, as to render us incapable of urging anything against them. But, at the same time, the Lacedæmonian legislator appears to me to have very properly forbidden the avoiding of pleasure. But this our other guest can, if he pleases, assist us with respect to the Cnossian laws. For it appears to me that the institutions in Sparta about pleasures are the most beautiful of all institutions; since that through which men principally fall into the greatest pleasures, the most injurious conduct, and every kind of folly, our law exterminates from the whole of our country, nor will you see in the fields, nor in any of the Spartan cities, banquets, nor such other particulars attendant on these, as excite, according to their power, every kind of pleasure. Nor is there anyone who, happening, to meet with a person wanton through intoxication, would not immediately inflict on him the greatest punishment. Nor would the pretext of celebrating the festival of Bacchus absolve him from chastisement, as I once saw was the case with your people in carriages. And in Tarentum, with those of our colony, I have seen all the city intoxicated during the Bacchic festival. With us, however, there is nothing of the kind.

Athenian Stranger/ O Lacedæmonian guest, all such things as these are laudable where they are attended with certain endurances; but, where they are permitted, they are of a most slothful nature. For someone, defending, our institutions, would very readily reprove you by showing the licentiousness of your women. But one answer appears to

liberate all such particulars, in Tarentum, with us, and with you, from not being base, but upright. For everyone who answers may say to an admiring stranger on his beholding things unusual in his own country: Wonder not, O guest, that this law is established among us, but with you a different law, perhaps about the same things. At present, however, O friends, our discourse is not about different men, but about the vice and virtue of the legislators. But let us speak more fully about all intoxication. For it is not a thing of a trifling nature; nor is the knowledge of it the province of a depraved legislator. I do not mean to inquire, whether wine ought to be drunk or not, but about intoxication itself, — whether it is to be used, as the Scythians and Persians use it, and besides these the Carthaginians, Celtæ, Iberians, and Thracians, who all of them are warlike nations; or, as it is used by you; for you (as you say) entirely abstain from it. But the Scythians and Thracians use it unmingled with water, women as well as men, and pour it on their garments, thinking that thus they are engaged in a beautiful and blessed pursuit. But the Persians are very much given to other luxuries, which you reject; yet, O best of men, they are more orderly in these than the Scythians and Thracians.

Megillus/ All these, however, we shall put to flight, when we take up arms.

Athenian Stranger/ O best of men, do not speak in this manner. For many flights and pursuings have taken place, and will take place, of which it is impossible to form any conjecture; on which account, we cannot at any time give an evident definition, but are involved in doubts about beautiful and base pursuits, when we speak of victory and flight in war; especially since the greater vanquish in battle, and enslave the lesser cities. Thus, the Locrians were vanquished and enslaved by the Syracusans, who appear to have possessed the best laws of all the neighboring nations; and

the Cei by the Athenians; and innumerable instances of the same kind may be found. Neglecting, therefore, the consideration of victory and being vanquished, we will endeavor to speak and persuade ourselves about every pursuit; and to show how this thing is beautiful, and that is not so. But, first of all, hear me, how we ought to consider what is good or bad in things of this kind.

Megillus/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ All those who introduce any dispute in their discourse, and immediately propose to praise or blame it, appear to me to act by no means in a proper manner, but to do just the same as if, anyone praising a piece of bread as good, another should immediately discommend it, without either understanding its operation or utility, and, without knowing after what manner, by whom, and with whom it was prepared, and the past and present habit of the bodies to whom it ought to be offered. But we appear to act in the very same manner, at present, in our discourses. For, upon only hearing intoxication mentioned, some of us immediately blamed, and others praised it; and this very absurdly. For, employing witnesses and those who praise, we likewise praised; and some of us thought that we advanced something seasonable, because we adduced a multitude of witnesses; but others, because those who make no use of wine conquer in battle. This, however, is to us ambiguous. If then we proceed in this manner in the discussion of other particulars pertaining to laws, we shall not in my opinion proceed rationally. But adducing intoxication as an instance, I will endeavor to the utmost of my ability to point out a right method for us, about all such subjects of inquiry; since innumerable nations, who are doubtful about these particulars, will verbally contend with your two cities.

Megillus/ We must not through sluggishness refuse to hear, whether we possess any right consideration about these affairs.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us, therefore, thus consider. If anyone should praise the employment of nurturing goats, and the possession of that species of animals, as a beautiful thing, but another should blame it, in consequence of seeing that goats are fed in cultivated places without a shepherd, and that every kind of cattle is either without a shepherd, or is under the direction of bad shepherds; should we consider the accusation of such a one as sane, or not?

Megillus/ How is it possible we could?

Athenian Stranger/ But, whether will a pilot be useful in a ship, if he alone possesses the nautical science, whether he is troubled with sea sickness or not? or how shall we say?

Megillus/ This passion which you speak of is not in any respect connected with the nautical art.

Athenian Stranger/ But what shall we say of the general of an army? Is he to be considered as sufficient to the purposes of commanding, if he possesses the warlike science, though, being timid in dangers, yet through intoxication he should loath fear?

Megillus/ How can he?

Athenian Stranger/ But what shall we say, if he does not possess art, and is timid?

Megillus/ You speak of one in every respect depraved, and who is by no means a ruler of men, but of some extremely weak women.

Athenian Stranger/ But he who praises or blames a community, which is naturally capable of being governed, and which with a proper governor is a useful a society, but, at the same time, has either never seen it well governed, or

has always beheld it without governors, can he with propriety ever praise or blame such a community?

Megillus/ How is it possible he can, who has never beheld a society well governed?

Athenian Stranger/ Attend then: Do we not consider guests and banquets as one certain association out of many communities?

Megillus/ We do in the highest degree.

Athenian Stranger/ Has no one, therefore, ever beheld this subsisting in a proper manner? But it is easy for you to answer, that this has never in any respect been beheld (for this is neither according to the manner of your country nor your laws). But I have met with many, and in many places, and have diligently inquired, as I may say, about all of them. And, indeed, I have scarcely seen or heard of one whole community that has been established in a proper manner; but I have seen that this has been the case with certain few and small parts, while many have, as I may say, been entirely faulty.

Clinias/ How do you say, O guest? Speak still more perspicuously. For we, as you say, being unskilled in such things, and perhaps not having met with them, cannot immediately know what in them is right or wrong.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak probably: but, while I speak, endeavor to learn. Do you then acknowledge, that, in all associations and communions of actions whatever, it is proper for each to have a governor?

Clinias/ How is it possible I should not?

Athenian Stranger/ But we have already said, that the governor of warlike affairs ought to be brave.

Clinias/ We have.

Athenian Stranger/ But the brave will be less disturbed by fear than the timid man.

Clinias/ And this also will be the case.

Athenian Stranger/ If any method could be devised by which a general of an army might be rendered neither timid, nor subject to perturbation, should we not accomplish this by all possible means?

Clinias/ In the greatest degree.

Athenian Stranger/ But now we do not speak of an army which is governed in the inimical associations of inimical men, in war, but of the benevolence of friends communicating with each other in peace.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ But an association of this kind, if it is attended with intoxication, will not be without perturbation. Or, do you think it will?

Clinias/ How should it be without?

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, therefore, these have need of a governor.

Clinias/ Most of all.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether, therefore, is it proper to choose for them, if possible, a governor who is free from perturbation?

Clinias/ How can it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ And, indeed, as it appears, he ought to be prudent with respect to association. For he should be the guardian of their friendship, and should take care that it may be increased through this their association.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ It is proper, therefore, to place over the intoxicated a sober and wise governor, and not the contrary. For, if the governor of the intoxicated is himself

intoxicated, young, and not wise, he must be abundantly fortunate if he does not accomplish some mighty evil.

Clinias/ Abundantly indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ If, therefore, anyone should blame drinking associations, though they should be as well instituted as possible in cities, while he accuses the thing itself, he will perhaps very properly blame them. But if he should blame all drinking associations, merely because he had seen one defective; in the first place, it is evident he is ignorant that this was not well instituted; and, in the next place, everything after this manner will appear base, although the master and governor should be sober. Or, do you not perceive, that when the pilot is intoxicated, or any other governor, he will subvert everything, whether it is a ship, or a chariot, or an army, or anything else that is governed by him?

Clinias/ You speak, O guest, in every respect, true. But inform me what advantage can be derived from drinking associations when they are well conducted. As that which we just now asserted, that an army well commanded would procure victory in war, which is no small good: and in the same manner we must judge of other things. But what great advantage will accrue either to individuals, or cities, from drinking associations being properly instituted?

Athenian Stranger/ What great advantage can a city derive from one boy, or one company being properly educated? or shall we not reply to him who asks this question, that the city derives but very little advantage from the education of an individual, or a company? But, if you inquire universally about the education of youth, of what great advantage it is to a city, it is not difficult to reply, that, when boys are well educated, they will become good men; and that, in consequence of becoming good men, they will

both act in other respects in a beautiful manner, and will vanquish their enemies in battle. Discipline, therefore, will give victory, but victory sometimes produces ignorance. For many becoming insolent through victory in war are filled, in consequence of their insolence, with a thousand other evils. And discipline indeed has never at any time been Cadmeian; but there have been, and will be, many victories of this kind among men.

Clinias/ You seem to say, O friend, that associations for the purpose of drinking wine form a great part of discipline, if they are properly conducted.

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly.

Clinias/ Will you after this be able to prove that your assertion is true?

Athenian Stranger/ To contend, O guest, that these things are true, since many doubt about them, is alone the province of divinity; but, if it be requisite to assert what appears to me, I think no one will be envious, since our intention, at present, is to discourse about laws and a polity.

Clinias/ We will therefore endeavor to learn what is your opinion with respect to these ambiguities.

Athenian Stranger/ It is proper to do so; and, besides this, that you should endeavor to learn, and I to teach, and that this should be the whole business of our discourse. But, first of all, hear what follows. All the Greeks consider this city of ours as philological, and abounding in words. But with respect to Lacedæmon and Crete, the former is considered as sparing of words, but the latter, as more remarkable for abundance of sagacity than abundance of words. But I am afraid I shall appear to you to speak much about a small affair, —I mean intoxication. An emendation of it, indeed, according to nature cannot be accomplished with perspicuity, without musical rectitude, nor be sufficiently

handled in discourse. But music cannot be discussed without the whole of erudition. And all this requires a multitude of words. Consider, therefore, what we shall do: whether we shall omit these things at present, and pass on to some other question about laws.

Megillus/ Perhaps you do not know, O Athenian guest, that our family is the public guest of your city. Perhaps, therefore, a certain benevolence will immediately enter into the minds of all boys towards a city, when they hear that they are the public guests of that city; and they will consider it as another native country, which ranks in the second place after their own. And this is the case with myself at present. For I have heard the Lacedæmonian youth, as often as they praised or blamed anything belonging to the Athenians, say, Your city, O Megillus, has been the cause of this evil, or that good. But, on hearing this, I have fought against those who blamed your city, in consequence of possessing all possible benevolence towards it. And now, indeed, your voice is grateful to me; and that which is said by many, that such of the Athenians as are good are so in a remarkable degree, appears to be most truly asserted. For they alone, without necessity, spontaneously, and from a divine allotment, are truly and not fictitiously good. Therefore, for my sake, my friend, you may boldly say whatever you please.

Clinias/ And hearing and receiving, O guest, what I have to advance, you may confidently speak what you please. For you have perhaps heard, that Epimenides was a divine man, who was of our family, and who ten years prior to the Persian war came to your city through the admonition of an oracle, and performed certain sacrifices which the God had enjoined. And besides this, he told the Athenians, who were terrified at the Persian expedition, that the Persians would not come for the space of ten years; and that, when they came, they would depart without accomplishing anything

which they hoped to accomplish, and would suffer greater evils than they caused. At that time our ancestors hospitably received yours; and, in consequence of this, both myself and our parents are benevolently disposed towards you.

Athenian Stranger/ You therefore, as it appears, are prepared to hear; but I am indeed prepared so far as relates to my will, but not altogether with respect to my ability. I shall however endeavor to gratify your request. In the first place then, as preparatory to our discourse, let us desire what discipline is, and what power it possesses. For we say that through this the discourse proposed by us at present must proceed, until it arrives at divinity.

Clinias/ We ought entirely to act in this manner, if agreeable to you.

Athenian Stranger/ While, therefore, I assert what it is proper to say discipline is, do you consider whether my assertion accords with your opinion.

Clinias/ You may begin when you please.

Athenian Stranger/ I say, then, that those who are hereafter to become great men ought from their very childhood to meditate both in sport, and when acting seriously, things accommodated to the objects of their pursuit. Thus, if anyone is to become a good husbandman or architect, he ought from childhood, even in play, either to till the ground, or build certain puerile houses. And he who is entrusted with the education of both these should provide each of them with small instruments, which are imitations of the true ones. And besides this, he should learn such disciplines as are necessary to be previously learned. Thus, a workman should learn how to measure, or use a rule. He who is destined to be a warrior should in sport ride on horse-back, or do something else of a similar kind. And the master of the children should endeavor, by sports, to turn the

pleasures and desires of the children thither, where when arrived, it is proper they should receive their consummation. But we say that the head or summit of discipline is a right education, which especially leads the soul of him who sports to a love of that which it will be requisite for him to do when he has arrived at manhood, and has acquired perfection in the virtue of his art. Consider therefore, now, whether (as I said) what has been thus far asserted pleases you.

Clinias/ How is it possible it should not?

Athenian Stranger/ Neither, therefore, should that which we have said discipline is, be left indefinite. For now, when we blame or praise the education of particular persons, we say that such a one is endued with discipline, but another is undisciplined, although he may possess the greatest skill in cooking, or navigation, and other things of this kind. For we do not, as it appears, consider these to be discipline, but that which causes a citizen from his childhood to desire and love virtue, and through which acquiring perfection, he may know how to govern and be governed with justice. This is what our discourse defines to be education; from which it appears, that this alone ought to be called discipline, according to our sentiments; but that the education which tends to the acquisition of wealth, or bodily strength, or any other particular wisdom, without intellect and justice, is mechanical and illiberal, and does not in any respect deserve to be called, discipline. We shall not, however, contend about a word. But let what we have just now assented to remain, that those who are properly disciplined become nearly all of them good. So that it is by no means proper to despise discipline, because it is present to the most excellent men, the first of all beautiful things. And if at any time one properly disciplined should depart from right conduct, he is capable of being put in the right way; and this he may always accomplish according to his ability, through the whole of life.

Clinias/ Right: and we assent to what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ But we formerly granted, that those are good who are capable of governing themselves, but those bad, who do not possess this ability.

Clinias/ You speak most rightly.

Athenian Stranger/ We will therefore resume this assertion, that what we say may become more clear. And receive me through an image, if in any respect I may be able to manifest to you a thing of this kind.

Clinias/ Only speak.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we not consider each of us as one?

Clinias/ We do.

Athenian Stranger/ But that we contain in ourselves two counselors, contrary to each other, and foolish, which we denominate pleasure and pain?

Clinias/ This also we admit.

Athenian Stranger/ With these are connected the opinions of things future, the common name of which is hope. But, properly speaking, the hope prior to pain is fear, but that which is prior to its contrary is confidence. But in all these there is a reasoning process, determining which of them is better or worse; and which, when it becomes the common dogma of the city, is denominated law.

Clinias/ I can scarcely follow you. However, proceed with what remains, as if I were able to follow you.

Megillus/ I likewise am affected in the same manner.

Athenian Stranger/ But we should thus think about these things. We should consider that each of us is reckoned a prodigy by divine animals, whether we were produced as their sport, or as the result of a serious operation: for of this we are ignorant. This however we know, that these passions are inherent in our nature like nerves or ropes, that they

draw contrary to each other, being themselves contrary, and that they draw us to contrary actions, where virtue and vice are situated apart from each other. For reason says, that we ought always to follow one of the drawings, and should never abandon it, but through this draw in a contrary direction to the other nerves; and that this is the golden and sacred guidance of the reasoning energy, which is called the common law of the city. It adds, that the other drawings are hard, and of an iron nature; but that this is soft, as being golden. That it is besides uniform, but that the others are similar to all-various forms. It is necessary, therefore, that we should always follow the most beautiful guidance of law. For, since the energy of reasoning is beautiful and gentle, but not violent, servants have need of its guidance, that the golden race, in us may vanquish the genera of a different kind. And thus the fable, since we are beings of a wonderful nature, will be preservative of virtue; and we shall be able to understand more clearly how anyone may be said to be superior and inferior to himself: and both cities and individuals, apprehending the true reason respecting these drawings, ought to live conformable to it. We shall likewise be convinced that a city, whether it receives reason from some one of the Gods, or from him who knows these particulars, will establish it as law, and employ it in its own transactions, and in its transactions with other cities. For thus vice and virtue will appear to us more clearly distinct; and this distinction becoming more conspicuous, both discipline and other studies will perhaps be rendered more apparent. This will likewise be the case with respect to the custom of drinking societies, about which it might appear despicable to discourse any further.

Clinias/, Perhaps it will appear not to be unworthy of a long discourse.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak well. We will therefore endeavor to relate what appears to be praise-worthy in a custom of this kind.

Clinias/ Speak then.

Athenian Stranger/ If to this wonderful thing we should add intoxication, what sort of a thing shall we fashion him?

Clinias/ What thing do you look to in asking this question?

Athenian Stranger/ To nothing particular. But if this prodigy or wonderful thing should become connected with intoxication, what would happen to be the result? But I will endeavor to explain more clearly what I mean. For this is what I ask: Does the drinking of wine more vehemently excite pleasure, pain, anger, and love?

Clinias/ It does very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Does it in a similar manner render the senses, memory, opinion, and prudence, more vehement? or does it entirely extinguish these, when anyone has drunk of it to intoxication?

Clinias/ It entirely extinguishes these.

Athenian Stranger/ Such a one, therefore, returns to that habit of soul which he possessed when he was a boy.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Hence such a one has at that time the least possible command of himself.

Clinias/ The least.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we, therefore, call such a one most depraved?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Not only then, as it appears, does an old man become twice a boy, but this is likewise the case with a man when intoxicated.

Clinias/ You speak, O guest, in a most excellent manner.

Athenian Stranger/ Is there any reason which can persuade us that we ought to taste this liquor, and not to the utmost of our power avoid it?

Clinias/, It appears that there is; and you just now said you was prepared to show it.

Athenian Stranger/ You have very properly reminded me; and I am now prepared, since you have both said that you are willing to hear me with alacrity.

Clinias/ How is it possible we should not hear you, if on no other account, yet for the sake of the wonderful and the absurd which it contains, if it is necessary that a man should at any time voluntarily hurl himself into every kind of depravity?

Athenian Stranger/ Do you speak of the soul?

Clinias/ I do.

Athenian Stranger/ But what? Shall we wonder, my friend, if at any time someone should voluntarily arrive at depravity of body, —I mean leanness, deformity, and imbecility?

Clinias/ How is it possible we should not?

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we, therefore, think that those who go to a dispensary for the sake of obtaining medicines, are ignorant that, in a short-time after they have taken the medicines, their body will for many days be so affected, that, if they were to remain in that condition to the end of life, they would not wish to live? or, Do we not know that those who undergo gymnastic exercises and labors are immediately rendered weak?

Clinias/ All this we know.

Athenian Stranger/ And that they willingly tend to these things, for the sake of consequent utility?

Clinias/ Most beautifully said.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it not, therefore, necessary to think after, the same manner about other pursuits?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ In the same manner, therefore, we ought to think about the employment of drinking wine, if it is admitted that this among other employments may be considered in a proper light.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ If it should, therefore, appear to us to possess any utility, which is not inferior to corporeal exercise, —in the first place, it will vanquish this, because corporeal exercise is attended with pain, but the employment of drinking wine is without pain.

Clinias/ You speak very properly. But I should wonder if we were able to perceive any such thing in it.

Athenian Stranger/ This, therefore, as it appears, I must now endeavor to explain to you. Tell me then, are we able to understand two species of fear, which are nearly contrary to each other?

Clinias/ Of what kind are they?

Athenian Stranger/ They are such as these. We are afraid of things evil, when we expect they will arrive.

Clinias/ We are.

Athenian Stranger/ And we are often afraid of opinion, thinking we shall be considered by others as depraved characters, when we do or say anything which is not becoming; which fear, I think, both we and all others denominate shame.

Clinias/ Doubtless.

Athenian Stranger/ These are the two fears I spoke of, —one of which is contrary to pain, and other fears, and is also contrary to the greater part and the greatest of pleasures.

Clinias/ You speak most rightly.

Athenian Stranger/ Will not therefore a legislator, and everyone who is in the least degree useful, reverence this fear with the greatest honor, and call it shame, —but denominate confidence the contrary to this, impudence, and consider it as the greatest evil that can befall men, both in public and private?

Clinias/ You speak rightly.

Athenian Stranger/ This fear, therefore, will preserve us in many other and great concerns, and nothing will so much procure for us victory and safety in war, one being opposed to one, as this. For there are two things which procure victory, confidence of the enemy, and the dread of friends with respect to base infamy.

Clinias/ It is so.

Athenian Stranger/ It is necessary, therefore, that each of us should become intrepid, and, at the same time, timid. But we shall show, by division, on what account we ought to become each of these.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ When we wish to render anyone intrepid, we shall accomplish this by leading him, according to law, to the dread of many terrible things.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ But, what, —when we endeavor to render anyone justly terrified, ought we not, by exercising him in impudence, to cause him to be victorious in contending with pleasures? Or, by contending with and vanquishing his usual mode of living, ought he not thus to

obtain perfection in fortitude? And will not he who is unexperienced and unexercised in contests of this kind remain, as to one half of himself, destitute of virtue? But how can anyone be perfectly temperate, who has not contended with and vanquished, by reason, labor and art, in sport and in earned, many pleasures and desires, which urge him to act impudently and unjustly; but who is impassive with respect to all such things?

Clinias/ It is by no means probable that he can.

Athenian Stranger/ But what, —has divinity given men any medicine of fear, so that by how much more desirous anyone is of drinking it, by so much the more unhappy will he think himself from every draught; so that he will dread everything, both present and future, and will at length, though he should be the bravest of men, be filled with every kind of dread; and, after having slept, and being freed from the potion, will again every day be equally terrified?

Clinias/ And what potion of this kind, shall we say, O guest, is found among men?

Athenian Stranger/ None. Yet if such a potion should be found, would it be useful to the legislator with respect to fortitude, so that we might thus speak to him respecting it: O legislator, whether you have given laws to the Cretans, or to any other nation, are you willing to make trial of your citizens with respect to fortitude and timidity?

Clinias/ He would doubtless say, that he was willing.

Athenian Stranger/ But what, —are you willing to do this with safety, and without great danger; or the contrary?

Clinias/ Everyone must acknowledge, he would wish to do this with security.

Athenian Stranger/ Would you use this potion, leading them to terrors, and accusing them during their perturbation, so as to compel them to become intrepid, by

exhortations and honors; disgracing him who will not be persuaded to become in all things such a one as you wish; and dismissing him with impunity who exercises himself in a proper and valiant manner, but punishing him who acts otherwise? or, Would you by no means use this potion, though you could find nothing else in it to accuse?

Clinias/ Why should he not use it, O guest?

Athenian Stranger/ An exercise, therefore, O friend, different from those at present, will possess a wonderful facility, both with respect to one person and a few, and as many as you shall always wish to be exercised. And whether anyone, being alone in solitude, should place ignominy before his eyes, thinking that he ought not to be seen till he has made sufficient advances in virtue, and should thus exercise himself against fear, preparing this potion alone, in preference to ten thousand other things, he would do something proper: or whether someone, consisting in his own nature, and being properly prepared by meditation, should not refuse to exercise himself with many drinking associates, and should evince, in the necessary consumption of the liquor, a power so transcendent and strong, as neither greatly to err through impudence, nor to be changed through virtue, but towards the end of the liquor should depart without being intoxicated, fearing any human potion the least of all things; —in this case, he would do something well.

Clinias/ Certainly. For such a, one, by thus acting, would conduct himself with temperance and modesty.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, let us thus address the legislator: Neither, O legislator, has any God given to mankind such a medicine, nor have we devised such a one: (for I do not consider witches at a banquet) but whether or not, is there a potion capable of producing intrepidity,

together with vehement and unseasonable confidence? Or how shall we say?

Clinias/ There is, and he would say that it is wine.

Athenian Stranger/ But this produces contrary effects to the potion of which we have just now spoken. For, when a man drinks of it, it makes him at first immediately more cheerful than he was before; and by how much more he drinks of it, by so much more is he filled with good hope, and an opinion of his own power; till at length, as if he were a wise man, he becomes replete with all possible freedom of speech and behavior, and intrepidly both says and does whatever he pleases.

Clinias/ I think everyone will admit this.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But do we recollect that we said there were two things in our souls which ought to be cultivated; — the one, that we may possess confidence in the highest degree; but the other, which is the very contrary, that we may be afraid in the highest degree?

Clinias/ I think you said this of shame.

Athenian Stranger/ You very properly remember. But since it is necessary that fortitude and intrepidity in fear should be the subjects of meditation, let us consider whether it will be proper that the contrary should be cultivated in the contrary to fear.

Clinias/ It is probable.

Athenian Stranger/ In those things, therefore, in which, naturally suffering, we are remarkably confident and audacious, in these it will be proper, as it appears, to meditate how we may become in the least degree impudent and audacious, but timid with respect to daring to speak, or suffer, or do anything base.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ Are not all these, therefore, the things in which we are thus affected, viz. anger, love, petulance, ignorance, the love of gain, and timidity; and besides these, riches, beauty, strength, and all such things as, intoxicating men through pleasure, render them delirious? In order to make an easy and innocent trial of all these, and afterwards meditate upon them, what pleasure have we more convenient than that which explores the disposition of men by means of wine, when it is attended with prudent caution? For, let us consider: whether ought we to make trial of a morose and rustic soul, from which a thousand injuries germinate, in his contracts with others, or from his being present at the shows of Bacchus, or from his soul being vanquished in venereal affairs, so as to behold the manners of his soul when his sons, daughter, and wife, are exposed to danger? In short, among ten thousand things, you will not find anything in which in jest, and without any danger, you can so well contemplate the disposition of anyone, as by wine. We ought, therefore, to think that neither the Cretans, nor any other nation, would ever doubt but that this trial of the disposition of each other is convenient, and above all others safe and easy.

Clinias/ You speak truly.

Athenian Stranger/ This, then, will be one of the most useful things, to know the natures and habits of souls by that art whose province it is to procure a remedy for these. But this, as I think, is the province of the politic art. Or is it not?

Clinias/ It is entirely so.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

Book 2.

Athenian Stranger/ After this, as it appears, we should consider respecting these particulars, whether this alone is beneficial, to contemplate after what manner we possess certain natures, or whether also some great advantage which deserves much attention is inherent in the proper use of drinking wine in conjunction with others. What then shall we say? Our discourse would seem to insinuate that it is inherent. But when, and after what manner, let us attentively hear, lest we should be impeded in our inquiry by this affair.

Clinias/ Speak then.

Athenian Stranger/ I am desirous, therefore, of again recalling to our memory our definition of proper discipline. For the safety of this, as I conjecture at present, consists in the employment we are now speaking of, when well conducted.

Clinias/ You speak largely.

Athenian Stranger/ I say then, that the first puerile sense of boys is pleasure and pain; and that these are first inherent in the soul, in which vice and virtue subsist. But he is happy who in old-age acquires the firm possession of prudence and true opinions. And that man is perfect who possesses these, and all the goods they contain. But I call discipline that virtue which first accedes to boys. When pleasure, love, pain, and hatred, are properly produced in the soul, before it is able to receive these attended with reason; if, when they are attended with reason, they accord with it in consequence of being properly accustomed by well adapted manners, then this content is the whole of virtue. But the proper nurture of the soul, with respect to pleasure and pain, so as that it may hate what it ought to hate, immediately from the beginning to the end, and love what it ought to love, —this, if it is

considered separately, and is denominated discipline, will, according to my opinion, be properly denominated.

Clinias/ What you have said, O guest, formerly and at present, about discipline, appears to be well said.

Athenian Stranger/ It is well, therefore. For these pleasures and pains, which when; properly nurtured are disciplines, are often loosened and corrupted by men in the business of life. But the Gods, commiserating the naturally laborious race of men, ordained for them remissions of labors, and gave them the vicissitudes of festivals in honor of the Gods, together with the Muses, Apollo the leader of the Muses, and Bacchus, as their associates in these celebrations; that in these festivals they might rectify the education of youth, in conjunction with the Gods. Consider, therefore, whether it is proper to say, that our discourse at present is celebrated as true according to nature, or how shall we say? But it asserts, in short, that every youth is incapable of being at rest, either in body or voice, but that he always seeks to be moved and to speak; sometimes exulting and leaping, dancing and sporting as it were with pleasure, but at other times uttering sounds with every kind of voice. Other animals, indeed, have no sensation either of order or disorder in motions, which order is denominated rhythm and harmony; but those Gods whom we call associates in the choir have bestowed upon us a rhythmical and harmonic sense, which might agitate us with pleasure, by connecting us with each other through singing and dancing. But the word choir was denominated from joy, as its natural name. In the first place, however, it is necessary to ask, whether we admit that discipline first subsists through the Muses and Apollo? or how shall we say?

Clinias/ That it does.

Athenian Stranger/ He, therefore, who is void of discipline, is with us one who has never joined a choir; but he who is disciplined is to be considered as one who has sufficiently engaged in a choir.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But the whole of a choir consists in dancing and singing.

Clinias/ It is necessary it should.

Athenian Stranger/ He, therefore, who is properly disciplined will be able to sing and dance in a becoming manner.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ But let us consider what it is that we have now asserted.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ We have spoken of singing and dancing in a becoming manner. But whether or not is it proper to add, that things beautiful ought to be the subjects of singing and dancing?

Clinias/ This ought to be added.

Athenian Stranger/ But what, —will he who considers things beautiful, as beautiful, and things base, as base, and who uses them as such, —will such a one be better disciplined for us, with respect to the choir and music, than he who is sufficiently able to become subservient to that which he considers as beautiful in body and voice, but yet does not rejoice in things beautiful, nor hate such as are void of beauty? Or he, who, though he is not altogether able to act or think rightly, with respect to his voice and body, yet acts rightly with respect to pleasure and pain; embracing such things as are beautiful, and hating such as are base?

Clinias/ You speak, O guest, of a mighty difference of discipline.

Athenian Stranger/ If, therefore, we three possess a knowledge of the beautiful in singing and dancing, we also know when anyone is properly or improperly disciplined: but, if we are ignorant of this, we shall not be able to know what is the defense of discipline, and where it is to be found. Is not this the case?

Clinias/ It is.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us, therefore, in the next place, like dogs on the scent, investigate beautiful figure, melody, singing and dancing. For, if these elude our pursuit, our discourse about proper discipline, whether Grecian or Barbarian, will be in vain.

Clinias/ It will.

Athenian Stranger/ What figure, therefore, or melody, is it proper to call beautiful? Shall we say, that in the same and equal labors the figures and voices of a brave and timid soul are similar?

Clinias/ How can they, since neither are their colors similar?

Athenian Stranger/ Well observed, my companion. But in music there are both figures and melody, since music is conversant with rhythm and harmony. So that melody or figure may possess proper rhythm or harmony, but not a proper color, that we may speak in the assimilative way, as the matters of the choir are accustomed to assimilate. But there is a certain figure or melody of a timid, and of a brave man; and it will be proper to call these things in brave men, beautiful, but in the timid, base. And that we may not be prolix about these particulars, all the figures and melodies which simply adhere to the virtue of the soul or body, or to

a certain image of it, are beautiful; but the contrary must be asserted with respect to the vice of the soul or body.

Clinias/ You are right; and we judge that these particulars subsist in this manner.

Athenian Stranger/ But we must still further consider, whether all of us are similarly delighted with all choirs, or whether this is far from being the case?

Clinias/ It is far from being the case.

Athenian Stranger/ What then shall we say is the cause of our error? Is it because not the same things are beautiful to all? Or shall we say that they are the same things, but do not appear to be the same? For no one will say that a vicious is better than a virtuous choir; or that he is delighted with depraved figures, but others with a muse contrary to this. Though, indeed, most men assert, that the rectitude of music consists in a power which imparts pleasure to the soul. This, however, is neither to be endured, nor is it holy by any means to make such an assertion. But this is more probably the cause of our error.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Since the particulars respecting choirs are imitations of manners and of actions which take place in all-various fortunes and habits, those by whom the imitations of manners, whether expressed by discourse, or melody, or dancing, are approved, either from nature or custom, or from both, must, necessarily rejoice in and praise these, and denominate them beautiful. But those to whom they appear contrary to nature, or manners, or custom, can neither rejoice in nor praise them, but must necessarily denominate them base. And those, again, to whom these particulars happen right by nature, but the contrary from custom; or right from custom, but the contrary from nature; —these will denominate things contrary to pleasures,

laudable. For they will assert that each of these is pleasant, but at the same time base. Hence, before others, whom they consider as intelligent persons, they will be ashamed that their body should be moved after that manner, and will blush to sing, and to call such things beautiful, or deserving serious attention; but, by themselves, they will be delighted with them.

Clinias/ You speak with the utmost rectitude.

Athenian Stranger/ Does he then suffer any injury who is delighted with base figures or melodies; or do they receive any advantage who are pleased with the contraries to these?

Clinias/ It is probable.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it only probable, or also necessary, that the same thing should happen as takes place when anyone, being conversant with the depraved habits of depraved men, does not hate, but rejoices in and admits them; and yet blames them in jest, having a dreaming perception of his own depravity? For, in this case, it is necessary that he should be assimilated to the things in which he rejoices, although he should be ashamed to praise them. But what greater good, or evil, shall we say, can possibly happen to us than a thing of this kind?

Clinias/ I think, none.

Athenian Stranger/ But where laws are beautifully established, or will be in some future period of time, can we think it will be lawful for poets, in discipline and sport respecting the Muses, to teach in their poetical compositions whatever delights them, by rhythm, or melody, or verse, and to form in choirs the boys and young men of well instituted polities, either to virtue or vice?

Clinias/ It is contrary to reason to suppose this would be allowed.

Megillus/ For how is it possible it should be?

Athenian Stranger/ But, in short, it is lawful to act in this manner at present in all cities, except Egypt.

Clinias/ But how do you say a thing of this kind is established by law in Egypt?

Athenian Stranger/ It is wonderful to hear. For, as it appears, they formerly knew what we have now said, that young men in cities should be accustomed to beautiful figures and beautiful melodies; and it is one of their institutions to exhibit in their temples what these are, and what the qualities which they possess; and besides these, it is not lawful, either for painters or other artificers of figures, to introduce any that are new, or even to think of any other than those belonging to their country: nor is it lawful at present to do this, either in these particulars or in the whole of music. If you observe, therefore, you will find that paintings and sculptures there, which were executed ten thousand years ago, as if they were not of such great antiquity, are neither more beautiful, nor more deformed, than paintings or carvings of the present day, but are fashioned by just the same art.

Clinias/ You speak of a wonderful circumstance.

Athenian Stranger/ It is, however, a circumstance pertaining to law and politics in a transcendent degree. You will likewise find other things there of a trifling nature. But this respecting music is true, and deserves attention, because the legislator could firmly give laws about things of this kind, and with confidence introduce such melodies as possessed a natural rectitude. But this must be the work of a God, or of some divine person. Just as they say there, that their melodies, which have been preserved for such a length of time, are the poems of Isis. So that, as I said, if anyone is able to apprehend the rectitude of them, he ought to have the courage to reduce them to law and order. For the search

of pleasure and pain, which is always directed to the use of new music, perhaps possesses no great power of corrupting the consecrated choir by an accusation of its antiquity. It appears, therefore, that the choir of the Egyptians was by no means capable of being corrupted, but that the contrary was entirely the case.

Clinias/ From what you have now said, it appears that it must be so.

Athenian Stranger/ May we not, therefore, confidently say, that a choir is after a certain manner properly connected with sports and music; and, that we rejoice as often as we think that we do well, and, when we rejoice, think we do well? Is it not so?

Clinias/ It is.

Athenian Stranger/ But, rejoicing in a thing of this kind, we are incapable of being at rest.

Clinias/ We are so.

Athenian Stranger/ Are not, therefore, those among us that are young men prompt to dance? And do not we who are old men think that we conduct ourselves in a becoming manner in beholding these, while we rejoice in their sports, and in their celebration of sacred festivals, since lightness of body fails us at our time of life, —through the desire of which, we thus establish games for those who are able in the highest degree to excite in us the memory of our juvenile period?

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we therefore consider that which is said by many of those who celebrate sacred festivals, as said in vain, that it is proper to reckon him most wise, and to judge that he will conquer who causes us to be delighted and to rejoice in the greatest degree? For it is proper, since we permit sport in things of this kind, that we

should particularly honor him who causes the greatest number and in the greatest degree to rejoice; and, as I just now said, that we should pronounce him victor. Is this, therefore, rightly said, and will a conduct of this kind be right?

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Athenian Stranger/ But, O blessed man, we should not hastily judge a thing of this kind, but, dividing it into parts, consider after this manner: If anyone should at any time simply establish a certain game, but without defining whether it is gymnastic, or equestrian, or musical; and, collecting together all the inhabitants of the city, should proclaim, that he was going to establish a contest for the sake of pleasure alone, in which (without expressing the mode of contest) rewards would be assigned for him who gave the spectators the greatest delight, and that for this he would be considered as victor, and as the best of all those engaged in the contest, —what do we think would be the consequence of this proclamation?

Clinias/ Of what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ It is proper that one should exhibit, like Homer, a rhapsody, another the modulation of the harp, another tragedy, and another comedy. Nor will it be wonderful, if someone, by exhibiting prodigies, should think that he is especially victorious. But, these and an innumerable multitude of other champions assembling together, can we say which of them is justly the victor?

Clinias/ You ask an absurd thing. For, who can give you an answer to this question, unless he has himself been an auditor of each of the champions?

Athenian Stranger/ Are you therefore willing that I myself should reply to this absurd question?

Clinias/ How is it possible I should not?

Athenian Stranger/ If, therefore, very little children were to judge in this affair, they would give the palm of victory to him who exhibited prodigies: or would they not?

Clinias/ How should they do otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ The greater boys, however, would give the preference to those that exhibited comedies; but such women as are better educated than others, young men, and perhaps almost the whole multitude, would prefer the tragedians.

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Athenian Stranger/ But perhaps we old men should hear with the most pleasure the rhapsodist when properly handling the Iliad and Odyssey, or some of the works of Hesiod, and should by far proclaim him the victor of all the others. Ought we not, therefore, after this to show who is properly the victor in these contests?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ It is evident that both I and you ought necessarily to confess, that he will be properly the victor whom those of our age judge to be so: for the skill which we derive from age appears to be everywhere by far the best of all political concerns.

Clinias/ Doubtless.

Athenian Stranger/ I therefore grant thus much to the multitude, that music ought to be judged by pleasure, yet not by the pleasure it imparts to every man, —but that, nearly, that is the most beautiful muse which delights the best of men, and such as are sufficiently disciplined; but especially when it delights a man who excels in virtue and discipline. On this account we say that judges of these things require virtue, because they ought to participate of prudence and fortitude. For a true judge ought not to learn how to judge from another, and thus become as it were

stupefied by the clamors of the multitude, and his own ignorance. But he ought to possess fortitude, because, though he should be endued with knowledge, he ought not, through sloth and timidity, to give an unjust decision from the same mouth with which when about to judge he invoked the Gods. For a judge does not sit as a disciple, but rather, as it is just he should, as a master of the spectators, and as one who is averse to things which do not afford the spectators a fit and proper pleasure. For it was allowed by the ancient and Grecian law, as by that of Sicily and Italy at present, that the multitude of spectators should decide who was victor, by holding up their hands: but this corrupted the poets themselves, who wrote according to the depraved pleasure of vulgar judges; so that the spectators both disciplined themselves and the poets. It likewise corrupted the pleasures of the theatre. For, as it is here proper that the spectators should always hear of manners better than their own, and thus obtain a more excellent pleasure, the very contrary to this takes place at present. What then does the present discourse wish to signify? Consider whether it is this.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ My discourse appears to me to have thrice or four times revolved to the same thing, that discipline is the drawing and leading of youth to that which is called by the law, right reason, and which the most worthy and ancient men have found by experience to be truly right. That the soul of a youth, therefore, may be accustomed by law, and by those who are persuaded by law, not to rejoice in things contrary, but to be delighted or afflicted with the same things as an old man; for the sake of this, those poetical compositions called odes, and which are truly epodes, or incantations to the soul, are composed at present, and which hastily tend to that kind of symphony of which

we are speaking. But since the souls of boys are incapable of engaging in serious pursuits, sports and odes were instituted by the legislator. Just as, in curing diseased and imbecile bodies, physicians endeavor to introduce useful food in pleasant meats and drinks, but noxious food in such as are bitter, that they may be rightly accustomed to embrace the one, and hate the other. A proper legislator will persuade the poet to do the same in beautiful and laudable words; and will compel him, if he cannot be persuaded, that when he produces figures of temperate, brave, and, in short, of all good men, in rhythms, and melodies in harmonies, he shall produce them properly.

Clinias/ By Zeus, O guest, does it appear to you that this is done at present in other cities? For I do not know of any city in which what you speak of takes place, except ours, and that of the Lacedæmonians. But in other cities there are always some new regulations about dancing, and the rest of the music; and this not from any mutation in the laws, but from certain inordinate pleasures, which are very far from remaining perpetually the same, like those Egyptian regulations which you related, but continually vary.

Athenian Stranger/ Most excellent, O Clinias! But if I have appeared to you, as you say, to assert these things as existing at present, I shall not wonder that I have done this in consequence of not clearly unfolding my meaning. But having spoken about certain particulars, which I wished to take place, respecting music, I perhaps appeared to you to speak as if they actually existed at present. For, to blame a thing which is incurable, and which is very far advanced in error, is by no means pleasant, though sometimes necessary. But, as we are thus far agreed, will you not say that these things subsist among us, and those, more than among the other Greeks?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But if they should also take place among others, would they not be better conducted than at present?

Clinias/ By far better, if they subsisted as you just now said they ought to subsist, and as they subsist among those and with us.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we then agree at present, that the things asserted by you, in every kind of discipline and music, are these: that poets should be compelled to assert that a good man, being temperate and just, is happy and blessed, whether he is large and robust, small and weak, rich or poor; but that an unjust man is miserable, and passes his days in sorrow, though he should be richer than Cinyras or Midas? A poet, therefore, if he speaks rightly, will say to us: I shall never mention nor consider him as a man, who does not perform with justice, and possess everything which is denominated beautiful in conduct. Such a one too, being just, will desire to contend with his enemies in close engagement. But he who is unjust will neither dare to behold bloody slaughter, nor to vanquish, running, the Thracian Boreas, nor will he acquire any of those things which are denominated good. For the things which are called by the many good, are not rightly denominated. For it is said that health is the best thing; beauty the next; strength the third; and riches the fourth. And an innumerable multitude of other things are called good. Thus, to see and hear acutely, and to possess in a proper manner all such things as belong to the senses; likewise to do in a tyrannical manner whatever you please, appears to be good. And besides this, it is considered as the end of all blessedness to become in the most rapid manner immortal, while possessing all these. But you and I say that all these are the best of possessions to just and holy men, but that to unjust men they are the worst of all things, beginning the enumeration from health. For to

be well, to see, hear, and possess the other senses, and, in short, to live, is the greatest evil, though a man should be immortal through the whole of time, and possess everything that is called good, if all these are not attended with justice and every virtue. But it is a less evil to live in this manner for the shortest time. I think that your poets should speak in this manner, and that you should persuade and compel them to do so, and to instruct the youth, through rhythms and harmonies, consequent to these assertions. Do you perceive this? For I clearly assert, that the things which are called evil are good to the unjust, but evil to the just; but that things good are truly good to the good, but evil to the wicked. Do, therefore, you and I agree in what is said, or not?

Clinias/ We appear partly to agree, and partly not.

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps I have not persuaded you that he is not happy, but clearly wretched, who alone possesses in himself injustice and insolence, though he should be healthy and rich, and a tyrant to the end of life; and, besides all these, should be endued with uncommon strength of body, in conjunction with immortality, and should never experience any of those things which are called evils.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so then. But what ought we to say after this? If he is valiant, and strong, and beautiful, and rich, and accomplishes through the whole of life whatever he desires, —will he not necessarily appear to you, if he is unjust and insolent, to live in a shameful manner?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Will he not also appear to you to live badly?

Clinias/ This will not in a similar manner appear to me.

Athenian Stranger/ But will you not admit that he must live unpleasantly, and in a manner contrary to his interest?

Clinias/ How can I admit this?

Athenian Stranger/ How? If a God, my friends, should cause us to agree in sentiment, as we now nearly dissent from each other. For these things appear to me so necessary, that Crete, O friend Clinias, does not more clearly appear to be an island. And if I were a legislator, I would endeavor to compel the poets, and all the other inhabitants of the city, to speak in this manner: and I would ordain, that nearly the greatest of all punishments should be inflicted on him who should assert, in the country to which he belonged, that there are certain men of a base character who lead a pleasant life; or that some things are advantageous and lucrative, but others more just. And I would persuade my citizens to assert many other things, contrary to what are now advanced by the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, as it appears, and, indeed, by the rest of mankind. For, by Zeus and Apollo, O best of men! if we should ask those Gods who gave us laws, whether the most just is the most pleasant life, or whether there are two certain lives, one of which is most pleasant, and the other most just: —if, in answer to our inquiry, they should say there are two lives, we might, perhaps, again ask them (if we inquire properly) which we ought to call most happy; those who lead the most just, or those who lead the most pleasant life. If they should say, those who lead the most pleasant life, their answer would be absurd. But I am desirous that a thing of this kind should not be said by the Gods, but rather by our fathers and legislators. I shall therefore put the same question to my father and legislator, and I shall suppose him to reply, that he who lives the most pleasant life is the most blessed. After this, I shall thus interrogate him: O father, do you not wish me to live most happily? But you never cease exhorting me

to live most justly. He, therefore, who acts in this manner, whether he is a legislator or a father, acts I think absurdly, and speaks inconsistently. But if he should evince that the most just life is the most blessed, everyone who hears him may, I think, inquire what it is which the law praises in that life as good and beautiful, and better than pleasure. For, what good separate from pleasure can be present to the just man? Can it be said that renown and praise, both from men and Gods, are good and beautiful, but at the same time unpleasant? and that the contrary is true with respect to infamy? We shall say, By no means, O legislator. But is neither to do an injury, nor to suffer one, unpleasant indeed, but at the same time good, or beautiful? And are other things pleasant, but shameful and base?

Clinias/ How can they?

Athenian Stranger/ The reason, therefore, which neither separates the pleasant and the just, nor the good and the beautiful, is persuasive, if to nothing else, yet at least to the wish to live a holy and just life. So that the discourse of the legislator will be most shameful and discordant, if he denies that these things are so. For no one will voluntarily wish to be persuaded to do that which is not attended with more joy than sorrow. But that which is beheld afar off affects everyone, as I may say, and even boys, with a dark vertigo. The legislator, therefore, dispersing the darkness, shall establish for us an opinion the contrary to this; and shall persuade the citizens, by custom, and praise, and arguments, that both things just and unjust are involved in shade; and that things unjust, which appear contrary to the just, being surveyed by the unjust and depraved man, seem to be pleasant, but things just, most unpleasant: but when they are surveyed by the just man, they appear to be entirely the contrary.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ But which of these decisions, shall we say, is most true? Whether is it that of the worse, or of the better soul?

Clinias/ Necessarily, that of the better soul.

Athenian Stranger/ It is necessary, therefore, that an unjust life should not only be more base and depraved, but, in reality, more unpleasant, than a just and holy life.

Clinias/ It appears so, my friend, according to the present reasoning.

Athenian Stranger/ A legislator, therefore, who is in the least degree useful, though what we have now asserted should not subsist in this manner, —yet, as there is not anything else which can be more advantageous to youth, he will venture to assert it, though false, for their good; because he will thus be enabled to lead them to act justly, not by force, but willingly.

Clinias/ Truth, indeed, O guest, is beautiful and stable: but it does not appear easy to persuade.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. But that fable of the Sidonian, though improbable, yet easily persuades, as well as an innumerable multitude of others.

Clinias/ What fable?

Athenian Stranger/ That, teeth being once sown, armed men were produced from them. For this may serve as a great example to a legislator, that anyone may persuade the souls of young men to whatever he pleases. So that he ought, by considering, to find out nothing else than by what means he may confer, through persuasion, the greatest good on the city; and should, by every possible contrivance, discover after what manner the whole of such an association may always speak one and the same thing about these particulars, through the whole of life, in odes, fables, and

discourses. But if it appears to you to be otherwise, no discord will arise from this difference in opinion.

Clinias/ It does not appear to me that either of us can doubt about these particulars.

Athenian Stranger/ I will, therefore, continue my discourse. I say then, that it is necessary to insinuate, as by enchantment, all the choirs, which are three, into the young and tender souls of boys, together with all such other beautiful things as we have spoken of, and which yet remain for us to discuss. But the principal thing among them is this: that if the life which is pronounced by the Gods to be the most pleasant, and the best, appears to be the same with that which we have described, we shall have spoken most truly, and shall more persuade those whom we ought to persuade, than if we had asserted anything else.

Clinias/ What you say must be granted.

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, therefore, the puerile choir of Muses should enter, being about to sing things of this kind, with all possible earnestness to the whole city. In the second place, that choir which consists of men thirty years old shall invoke the God Pæan as a witness of the truth of what is said, and shall beseech him, together with the divinity Persuasion, to be propitious to the youth. But it is necessary that there should be a third choir, consisting of those who are between thirty and sixty years old. But the mythologists about the same odes, who are more advanced in years than these, as they will no longer be able to sing to the harp, ought agreeably to a divine oracle to be dismissed.

Clinias/ Who do you mean, O guest, by these third choirs? for I do not clearly understand what you wish to say about them.

Athenian Stranger/ These are nearly those for whose sake most of the above assertions were made.

Clinias/ We do not yet understand: Endeavor therefore to speak yet clearer.

Athenian Stranger/ We said, if I remember, in the beginning of this discourse, that the nature of every youth was so ardent, that it could not be at rest either in body or voice, but that it was always speaking and leaping without order; and that no other animal possessed a sense of the order of both these, but that this was alone the province of the nature of man. We likewise said, that rhythm was the name given to the order of motion, but harmony to that of the voice, when the sharp and the flat are mingled together; and that both together are denominated a choir. We still further asserted, that the Gods, commiserating our nature, gave us Apollo and the Muses as our associates in and leaders of the choir; and Bacchus (if we recollect) as the third.

Clinias/ How is it possible we should not remember?

Athenian Stranger/ We have therefore spoken concerning the choir of Apollo and the Muses: and hence it is necessary that we should speak respecting the third and remaining choir, or that of Bacchus.

Clinias/ Inform me how you mean: for a Bacchic choir of old men appears, on the first hearing, to be very absurd; if those who form this choir exceed thirty, so as to be from fifty to sixty years old.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak most truly. But I think reason is requisite, that it may appear how this may be opportunely accomplished.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we therefore agree in what has been previously said?

Clinias/ Respecting what?

Athenian Stranger/ That every man and boy, those who are free, and those who are slaves, the male and the female, and in short the whole city, should sing these things to the whole city without ceasing, according to all the varieties of harmony, so as that those who sing the hymns may experience an insatiable pleasure.

Clinias/ How is it possible not to acknowledge that these things ought to be so?

Athenian Stranger/ But by what means will the best part of the city, and which is most capable of persuading by age, in conjunction with prudence, be able, by singing the most beautiful things, to be the cause of the greatest good? or shall we foolishly omit that which will be the most principal thing in the most beautiful and most useful odes?

Clinias/ In consequence of what has been just now said, it is impossible to omit it.

Athenian Stranger/ How then will it be accomplished in a becoming manner? Consider, if in this way.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ Everyone who is more advanced in age, being full of sluggishness with respect to odes, will be less delighted with these; and by how much the older and more modest he is, by so much the more will he necessarily be ashamed to sing. Will it not be so?

Clinias/ It will.

Athenian Stranger/ He will therefore be still more ashamed to sing, standing upright m the theatres, before an all-various multitude of men; especially if the choir, like those that contend for victory when exercising their voice, should be compelled to sing though lean and falling; for, thus circumstanced, they will not sing without molestation and shame, and, when they do, it will be without alacrity.

Clinias/, You speak of things most necessary.

Athenian Stranger/ How then shall we render them disposed to engage in odes with alacrity? Shall we not ordain by law, in the first place, that boys shall not by any means taste wine till they are eighteen years old? For we ought to teach them, that it is not proper to deduce like a river, fire to fire, into the body and soul, before they begin to engage in manly labors; but that we should dread the furious habit of youth. In the next place, we should inform them that wine is to be moderately used till they are thirty years old, and that young men should by all means avoid intoxication and abundance of wine. But when they have attained the fortieth year, then they may be allowed to attend feasts, to invoke the other Gods, and beseech Bacchus to be present at the mystic ceremonies and sports of the old men; for this divinity bestowed wine upon men as a remedy against the austerity of old-age, that through this we might acquire a second youth, forget sorrow, and render the manners of our soul softer, —just as iron is softened by the action of fire. In the first place, therefore, will not everyone who is thus affected, be willing, with more alacrity and less shame, not indeed in a great but in a moderate multitude, nor among strangers, but his familiars, to sing, and, as we have often said, to enchant?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ This mode then will not be altogether improper to induce them to join with us in singing.

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ But with what voice, and with what muse, will these men sing? or is it not evident that it will be with such a one as is adapted to them?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But which will be adapted to divine men? Will it not be that of choirs?

Clinias/ We indeed, O guest, and these, are not able to sing anything else than that which we have learnt in the choirs, having been accustomed thus to sing.

Athenian Stranger/ It is reasonable it should be so. For you have not in reality been partakers of the most beautiful singing; and this because your government is rather military than civil. Hence your young men are like a compact multitude of colts feeding together in herds. And no one of your people, taking to himself his own offspring, commits him as it were to a groom, that his fierceness may be tamed, and that he may be gently and mildly educated, and from whom he may receive everything proper to the discipline of youth; whence he may not only become a good soldier, but an able governor of a city, and one who, in the beginning we said, would be more warlike than the soldiers of Tyrtæus, and would always and everywhere, both in private and public, honor the possession of fortitude, as ranking in the fourth, and not in the first place among the virtues.

Clinias/ I do not know, O guest of ours, for what reason you again degrade our legislators.

Athenian Stranger/ It is not my intention, excellent man, to do so, if I do it; but where reason leads, there, if you are willing, we will direct our course. For if we possess a muse more beautiful than that of the choirs, and the common theatres, we will endeavor to impart this to such as we said were ashamed of that muse, and endeavored to participate of one more beautiful.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, then, it is proper that this should be present to all whom a certain grace follows, that either the grace itself alone should be the most

approved, or a certain rectitude, or, in the third place, advantage. Thus, for example, a grace follows food and drink, and every kind of aliment, and this grace we call pleasure: but if it contributes to health, we denominate it rectitude and utility.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus, too, a grace follows discipline, which is also called pleasure; and the truth resulting from discipline is denominated rectitude and advantage, the beneficial and the becoming.

Clinias/ It is so.

Athenian Stranger/ But what? In the artificial production of similitudes, when pleasure is the result of such productions, may not such pleasure be most justly denominated a grace?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But, in short, the equality of such things, rather than pleasure, renders them such and so great.

Clinias/ It is well said.

Athenian Stranger/ Hence that alone can be rightly judged by pleasure, which neither affords a certain advantage, nor truth, nor similitude; nor yet again is the cause of any injury, but which alone subsists for the sake of that grace which follows other things, and which may be most beautifully denominated pleasure, when none of these attend it.

Clinias/ Do you alone speak of innoxious pleasure?

Athenian Stranger/ I do; I say that this is sport, when it is neither the cause of anything detrimental or advantageous, which deserves serious consideration.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we not then assert, from what has been now said, that it fit all imitations should be judged in the least degree by pleasure and false opinion, and in like manner, all equality? For it does not follow, that because this thing appears to someone to be equal, or someone is delighted with that, that therefore this thing is equal, or that possesses symmetry; but it is so from truth, the most of all things.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we not therefore say, that all music is assimilative and imitative?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ In the smallest degree, therefore, when anyone says that music is to be judged by pleasure, is such an assertion to be admitted, and in the smallest degree is such a music to be inquired after as a serious thing, if it is anywhere to be found; but that music alone is to be explored which possesses similitude by its imitation of the beautiful.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Those, therefore, that inquire after the most beautiful singing, and the most beautiful muse, ought, as it appears, to explore not that which is pleasant in each of these, but that which is right. For the rectitude of imitation, as we have said, consists in expressing the magnitude and quality of that which it represents, such as they are.

Clinias/ How should it not be so?

Athenian Stranger/ But everyone will acknowledge this with respect to music, that all poems are an assimilation and imitation of it. Or, do you think that all poets, auditors, and players, will not assent to this?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ But it is proper, as it appears, to know respecting every poem, what kind of a thing it is, if anyone wishes not to err in deciding upon it. For he who does not know what the essence of it means, nor of what it is the image, will never understand the rectitude or erroneousness of its intention.

Clinias/ It is impossible he should.

Athenian Stranger/ But can he who does not know the rectitude of a performance ever be able to know whether it is well or ill accomplished? I do not indeed speak in a manner perfectly clear; but, perhaps, I shall thus speak with more perspicuity.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ There are ten thousand similitudes which have reference to the sight.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? If anyone is ignorant what each of the imitated bodies is, can he ever know whether it is properly represented? as, for instance, whether the representation possesses the joints and respective members of the body, their portions, number, and quality, such as they ought to be, and besides all these, the proper colors and figures; or, on the contrary, whether all these are exhibited in a disordered manner. Do you think that anyone can at all know these particulars who is unacquainted with the animal which is imitated?

Clinias/ How should he?

Athenian Stranger/ But if anyone knows that it is a man who is painted, or otherwise represented, and that he has received all his parts, colors and figures, from art, would it be necessary that he who knows this should likewise readily know whether the representation is beautiful, or whether it is in any respect defective in beauty?

Clinias/ We should all of us, O guest, as I may say, know the beautiful parts of animals.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak with perfect propriety. Is it not therefore necessary, that a prudent judge should possess these three things about every image, both in painting and music? In the first place, that he should know what the thing is; in the second place, that it possesses rectitude; and, in the third place, that the image is properly executed in words, melodies, and rhythms?

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ We should not, therefore, omit to speak concerning the difficulty which is in music. For, since it is more celebrated than other images, it requires more caution than the rest. For he who errs in this will be injured in the greatest degree, since he will thus conciliate to himself depraved manners. But it is most difficult to be known, because poets are more depraved than the Muses. For these are incapable of erring to so great a degree as, in fashioning the words of men, to give the figure and melody of women; or, in composing the melody and figures of those who are free, to harmonize together the rhythms of slaves and the free-born; or, in exhibiting rhythms and liberal figures, to assign a melody or discourse contrary to the rhythms. Besides this, they will never place together the voices of beads, and men, and instruments, and every kind of noise, as imitating one certain thing. But human poets combine things of this kind together in the greatest degree, and irrationally mingle them with each other, exciting such men by these means to laugh, who, as Orpheus says, “are allotted the elegance of delight.” For they perceive all these particulars mingled together: and, besides this, the poets dilacerate rhythm and figures separate from melody, arranging naked words in measure; producing melody and rhythm without words; and employing the naked sound of

the harp and the pipe. Among which particulars, it is very difficult to know the intention of the rhythm and harmony which subsist without words, and to which of the imitations deserving to be mentioned they are similar. But it is necessary to consider everything of this kind as replete with rusticity; as immoderately loving swiftness without falling, and the voice of wild beasts, and on this account using the melody of the harp and the pipe for other purposes than dancing and singing. But to use either of these instruments unaccompanied with words, is full of all unskillfulness and legerdemain. But the reason of this is as follows: We do not consider that we ought not to employ our Muses when we are fifty, or thirty, years old, but we ought to find out when it is proper. Our discourse, however, appears to me, from what has been said, to signify thus much concerning the muse belonging to choirs, that it is necessary those who are fifty years old should be better instructed than others in the particulars belonging to singing. For they must necessarily possess a proper sensation and knowledge of rhythms and harmonies. Or how can they know the rectitude of melodies; to what the Doric harmony is proper or improper; and whether the rhythm which the poet has united to it is right, or not?

Clinias/ It is evident that they cannot by any means.

Athenian Stranger/ But the numerous vulgar are ridiculous in thinking that they sufficiently know what is well harmonized, and possesses proper rhythm, and what is not so: for these have been compelled to sing and walk in rhythm. But in consequence of doing each of these ignorantly, they would not syllogize as follows: Every melody, when it possesses things which accord, subsists in a proper manner; but when it does not possess things which accord, it is defective.

Clinias/ Most necessarily so.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Can he who does not understand what it possesses, and what its definition is, know, as we have said, how it properly subsists at any time in anyone?

Clinias/ How is it possible he should?

Athenian Stranger/ This then, as it appears, we have now discovered, that those singers which we have now called upon, and have after a manner compelled to sing voluntarily, ought from necessity to be disciplined thus far, as to be able each of them to follow the progressions of the rhythms, and the chords of the melodies, that, perceiving the harmonies and the rhythms, they may choose such as are fit to be sung by so many, and by such particular persons; and, thus singing, may themselves immediately be innocently delighted, and thus induce young men to embrace worthy manners. But, being thus far instructed, they will participate of a more accurate discipline than that which is directed to the multitude, and to poets themselves. For, in the third place, it is by no means necessary that a poet should know whether the imitation is beautiful or not; but it is nearly necessary that he should know this of harmony and rhythm. But all the three ought to be known for the sake of choosing the most beautiful, and the second; for otherwise they will never become a sufficient enchantment to youth to the acquisition of virtue. And thus, that which our discourse intended in the beginning, viz. that it might afford proper assistance to the choir of Bacchus, has been accomplished by us to the utmost of our ability. But let us consider whether this should be accomplished in this manner. For such an assembly must necessarily be tumultuous, in consequence of the compotation proceeding to a greater degree, which we supposed in the beginning of our discourse must necessarily happen to drinking associations of the present day.

Clinias/ It is necessary it should.

Athenian Stranger/ But everyone becoming lighter than himself will be elevated and delighted; will be filled with freedom of speech; and in this condition will not hear him who is near him, but will consider himself sufficient both to govern himself and others.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Have we not said, that, when these things take place, the souls of the drinkers, being rendered fervid, will become more soft and juvenile, like iron heated in the fire? so that they may be easily led, as when they were young, by those who are able and know how to instruct and fashion them: but that he who is able to fashion them is the same as he who was then said to be a good legislator, by whose laws respecting compotation he may be restrained who is confident and audacious, and more impudent than is proper, and who is unwilling to endure order with respect to silence, discourse, drinking, and the muse; and may be willing to act in a contrary manner in every respect; sending out against advancing and base confidence, the most beautiful opposing fear, in conjunction with justice; which divine fear we have denominated shame and modesty.

Clinias/ It is so.

Athenian Stranger/ But the guardians and fabricators of these laws ought, as leaders of those that are not sober, to be themselves free from perturbation and ebriety; without which it is more difficult to fight against intoxication than to contend with enemies without unterrified leaders. But he who is unwilling to be persuaded by these, and by the leaders of Bacchus who are more than sixty years old, sustains an equal, and indeed a greater disgrace than he who is unpersuaded by the leaders of Mars.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ If such ebriety and such sport were adopted, would not such drinking associates derive great utility from thence, and be more conjoined in friendship than before, and not be enemies as at present? Would not likewise the whole of their association be according to law, in consequence of the sober being the leaders of the intoxicated?

Clinias/ Certainly, if the ebriety was conducted in the manner you now speak of.

Athenian Stranger/ We ought not, therefore, to blame the gift of Bacchus simply, as if it were evil, and not worthy to be received into the city. For much more might yet be said to this purpose; though I should be fearful to disclose to the multitude the greatest good which this divinity imparts, because men when they hear it will not receive and understand it as they ought.

Clinias/ What is that good?

Athenian Stranger/ A certain narration and rumor has devolved to us, that this God was once disordered in his mind by his mother Hera, and that on this account he introduced the Bacchic rites, and the whole of the insane choir, that he might take vengeance on the Goddess. It is further reported, that for this purpose he bestowed wine upon mankind. But I leave things of this kind to be said by those who think that they can assert them with safety respecting the Gods. Thus much, however, I know, that no animal is born with such, and so much, intelligence as is proper to it, when it acquires a perfection of intellect. But every animal, during the time in which it has not yet obtained its proper prudence, rages and vociferates in a disordered manner; and when anyone slays it rapidly, it again leaps without order. But we may recollect that we said these were the principles of music and gymnastic.

Clinias/ We do recollect.

Athenian Stranger/ Did we not also say, that this principle imparted to us the sense of rhythm and harmony? and that Apollo, the Muses, and Bacchus, were the causes of these?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But wine, according to the assertions of some, was given to men as a punishment, that they might be rendered, through it, insane. Agreeably, however, to what has now been asserted by us, it is on the contrary a medicine; and was imparted that the soul might acquire shame, but the body health and strength.

Clinias/ You have very beautifully, O guest, reminded us of what has been said.

Athenian Stranger/ But now the half of the particulars pertaining to the choir is complete. Shall we finish or omit the remaining part?

Clinias/ What parts do you speak of; and how do you divide each of them?

Athenian Stranger/ According to us, the whole of the choir is the whole of discipline. But, of this, one part consists in vocal rhythms and harmonies.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But the other in the motion of the body, which has rhythm in common with the motion of the voice, but figure peculiar to itself: but, in the former part, melody is the motion of the voice.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ I know not, therefore, after what manner we have denominated things pertaining to the voice, which extend as far as to the soul, and contribute to the discipline of virtue, music.

Clinias/ They were rightly called so.

Athenian Stranger/ But things pertaining to the body, which we have called dancing in sport, if such a motion should extend as far as to the virtue of the body, we should denominate the artificial leading of it to this purpose, gymnastic.

Clinias/ Most right.

Athenian Stranger/ But we appear to have spoken sufficiently of that part of music, which we have said is the half of the choir. Shall we, therefore, speak of the remaining half, or how shall we do?

Clinias/ O most excellent man, who art discoursing with Cretans and Lacedæmonians, as you have spoken sufficiently about music, but gymnastic remains yet to be discussed, what do you think each of us ought to reply to your interrogation?

Athenian Stranger/ I shall say that you have perspicuously answered by your question. For I understand that your present interrogation is, as I have said, an answer, and, besides this, a mandate to discuss the particulars about gymnastic.

Clinias/ You apprehend my meaning excellently well; and therefore discuss these particulars.

Athenian Stranger/ We shall do so: For it is not very difficult to speak about things known to both of you. And besides, you are far more skilled in this art than in that of music.

Clinias/ You nearly speak the truth.

Athenian Stranger/ Is not, therefore, the principle of this sport, every animal being naturally accustomed to leap? But man, as we have said, receiving a sense of rhythm, generated and brought forth dancing. And melody, recalling to mind,

and exciting rhythm, these two, communicating with each other brought forth the choir, and sport.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ One part of this we have said we have already discussed, and that we should in the next place endeavor to discuss the remaining part.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ We will, therefore, first of all bring to a conclusion the choir of intoxication, if it is agreeable to you.

Clinias/ Of what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ If any city should use drinking associations as a serious concern, with law and order, and as an exercise to the acquisition of temperance, and should not at the same time avoid other pleasures, but in a similar manner should engage in them for the sake of subduing them, after this manner it may be allowed to use all these. But if it uses drinking associations as sport, and gives permission to anyone to drink when he pleases, and with whom he pleases, and to engage in any other pursuit without restraint, I should not be of this opinion, that this city, or any individual in it, ought, at any time, to make use of intoxication. But I should much prefer the law of the Carthaginians to the custom of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians. For their law forbids anyone belonging to the camp to taste of wine, but orders water to be drunk during all this period. I likewise would not permit it to be drunk in the city by either male or female slaves; nor by magistrates during the year of their office; nor by pilots, nor judges, when engaged in their respective employments; nor, in short, by anyone when deliberating about things of importance. Again, I would not permit it to be drunk by anyone in the daytime, unless for the sake of bodily exercise

or disease; nor by a man and woman at night, when they intend to beget children. And many other circumstances might be adduced, in which those who possess a sound mind, and conform to good laws, will abstain from wine. So that, according to this reasoning, no city has occasion for a multitude of vineyards. But other concerns of agriculture, and everything respecting diet, should be orderly disposed: and wine should be nearly used in the most moderate and least degree of all things. And this, if it is agreeable to you, O guests, shall be the conclusion of my discourse respecting wine.

Clinias/ Beautifully said; and it is agreeable to us it should be so.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

Book 3.

Athenian Stranger/ And thus much concerning these particulars. But man we say that civil government had a certain beginning? And may not anyone behold it hence with ease, and in the most beautiful manner?

Clinias/ Whence?

Athenian Stranger/ Whence anyone may behold the progress of cities to virtue, and at the same time to vice.

Clinias/ Whence do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ I think, indeed, from a length and infinity of time, and from the mutations in it.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ Do you appear to have ever understood what a multitude of time has elapsed since cities and the politic institutions of men commenced?

Clinias/ This is by no means easy to understand.

Athenian Stranger/ It is indeed infinite, and impossible to be expressed.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Will not myriads upon myriads of cities have subsisted in this time? and, in consequence of the same temporal infinity, have not as many been destroyed? and will they not everywhere have been governed according to every kind of polity; and at one time pass from the lesser to the greater, and at another from the greater to the lesser; and have become worse from the better, and better from the worse?

Clinias/ It is necessary.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us therefore assign, if we are able, the cause of this mutation: for perhaps it may exhibit to us the first generation and mutation of polities.

Clinias/ You speak well. It is therefore necessary that you should readily unfold what you conceive to be the truth concerning them, and that we should at the same time follow you.

Athenian Stranger/ Do ancient discourses then appear to you to possess any truth?

Clinias/ Of what kind?

Athenian Stranger/ That there have been many destructions of the human race, through deluges, diseases, and many other things, in which a very small part of mankind was left.

Clinias/ Everything of this kind must be very probable to everyone.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then consider one of these destructions out of many, —I mean that which was caused by a deluge.

Clinias/ What ought we to think about this?

Athenian Stranger/ That those who then escaped the destruction were nearly mountain shepherds, a few dormant sparks of the human race, preserved on the summits of mountains.

Clinias/ Evidently so.

Athenian Stranger/ But such as these must necessarily have been ignorant of other arts, and of those artifices in cities of men towards each other, with a view to prerogative and contention, and other base ends.

Clinias/ It is likely.

Athenian Stranger/ But we shall also suppose that the cities which were situated in plains, and those bordering on the sea, entirely perished at that time.

Clinias/ We will suppose so.

Athenian Stranger/ We must assert, therefore, that all instruments were destroyed at that time, together with every invention pertaining to art, politic discipline, or any other certain wisdom.

Clinias/ For how, O most excellent man, if these particulars remained through the whole of time in the same perfection as at present, could anything new have ever been invented? It is because an innumerable multitude of years was unknown to the inventors. But one or two thousand years have elapsed since some things were invented by Dædalus, others by Orpheus, and others by Palamedes. The particulars indeed respecting music were discovered by and Olympus; but those relating to the lyre by Amphion. And a multitude of other things were, as I may say, invented by others but yesterday.

Athenian Stranger/ Do you not perceive, O Clinias, that you have omitted to mention the friend who was yesterday present?

Clinias/ Do you mean Epimenides?

Athenian Stranger/ I do. For he far excelled all among you in inventions; and, as you say, brought to perfection in reality what Hesiod had formerly divined in his writings.

Clinias/ We do say so.

Athenian Stranger/ We must assert, therefore, that when that devaluation by a deluge took place, human affairs were in a state of infinite and dreadful solitude; that a prodigious part of the earth was unprolific; and other animals having perished, some herds of oxen, and a few goats, which were rarely found, supplied those men with food that escaped the devastation.

Clinias/ Doubtless.

Athenian Stranger/ But are we of opinion that there was then any memory of a city, politic discipline, and legislation, which is the subject of our present discourse?

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ From these people, therefore, thus circumstanced, all the particulars which exist at present derived their subsistence; viz. cities and polities, arts and laws, many vices and many virtues.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ Can we be of opinion, O wonderful man, that as those who then existed were ignorant of many beautiful things pertaining to citizens, and many of a contrary nature, they could ever become perfect either in virtue or vice?

Clinias/ You speak well; and I understand what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ In consequence, therefore, of the progression of time, and the increase of the human race, all things advanced to the condition of all things at present.

Clinias/ Most right.

Athenian Stranger/ But this was probably not effected suddenly, and in a short, but in a very extended period of time.

Clinias/ It is very proper it should be so.

Athenian Stranger/ For I think that fear would prevent all the inhabitants from descending from their elevated abodes to the plains.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Would not likewise those who lived at that time be delighted in beholding each other, on account of their paucity? And would they not have nearly lost, as I may say, all the artificial means of passing over to each other, either by land or sea? I do not therefore think it would

be very possible for them to mingle with each other. For Iron and brass and all metals would have perished, confused together; so that it would be impossible to separate and bring them into light. Hence trees would be but rarely cut down. For, if any instrument should happen to be left on the mountains, these rapidly wearing away would vanish; and no other could be made, till the metallic art should again be discovered by men.

Clinias/ How indeed could it?

Athenian Stranger/ But in how many generations afterwards do we think this would take place?

Clinias/ It is evident, in a great many.

Athenian Stranger/ The arts therefore which are employed about iron and brass, and all such things, must at the same time be involved in darkness, and indeed in a still greater degree.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Sedition, therefore, together with war, must at that time be everywhere extirpated.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, they will be benevolent towards and love each other, on account of their solitude. In the next place, food will not be the cause of war to them: for pastures will be rare; a few only perhaps remaining from the first, in which the inhabitants of that time will for the most part live. For they will not by any means be in want of milk and animal food. Further still, hunting will supply them with food, neither of a bad kind nor in a small quantity. They will likewise possess abundance of clothing, beds and habitations, together with apparatus pertaining to fire, and such as has no occasion for fire. The plastic too and weaving arts will not be indigent of iron. But divinity imparted all these together with these

arts to men, that, if at any time they should fall into so great a calamity, they might be able to propagate the human race. On this account, at that time they were not very poor, nor were they compelled by poverty to quarrel with each other. But neither could they ever become rich, because they were without silver and gold. But in any association where neither riches nor poverty take up their abode, in this the most just manners will nearly be found. For neither insolence nor injustice, neither emulation nor envy, can subsist in such a society. From these causes, and through their innocence which we have spoken of, they were good. For, whenever they heard that anything was beautiful or base, they thought, in consequence of their innocence, that it was most truly said to be so, and were persuaded. For no one was suspected of lying, through his wisdom, as is the case at present; but, believing all that was asserted about Gods and men to be true, they lived conformably to what they heard; on which account they were altogether such as we a little before represented them to be.

Clinias/ These things appear both to me and this other to be so.

Athenian Stranger/ We say moreover, that many generations living in this manner, both of those prior to the deluge and of those at present, they must be less skillful and less learned both in warlike and other arts, which at present are exercised by land and sea; likewise in judicial affairs and seditions, which men have devised both in words and works, with every possible subtlety of contrivance, in order to injure and act unjustly towards each other. That besides this they must be more innocent, brave, and at the same time modest, and in every respect more just. But of these things we have already assigned the cause.

Clinias/ You speak with rectitude.

Athenian Stranger/ These things, therefore, have been asserted by us; and we shall speak of everything consequent to these particulars, for the sake of understanding what occasion they had at that time for laws, and who was their legislator.

Clinias/ You have spoken well.

Athenian Stranger/ Were they, therefore, neither indigent of laws, nor was any such thing adopted at that time? For men of that period were unacquainted with letters, but lived following the manners and laws, as they were called, of their ancestors.

Clinias/ It is probable.

Athenian Stranger/ But the manner of their polity was this.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ All of that period appear to me to have called a polity, a dynasty, which even at present subsists in many places, both among the Greeks and Barbarians. And Homer says that it was adopted in the habitation of the Cyclops; for he thus speaks:

> "By these no statutes and no rights are known,
> No council held, no monarch fills the throne;
> But high on hills or airy cliffs they dwell,
> Or sleep in caves whose entrance leads to hell.
> Each rules his race, his neighbor not his care,
> Heedless of others, to his own severe."

Clinias/ Homer appears to you to have been an elegant poet. We have also met with other pieces, though not many, of his composing, extremely elegant. For we Cretans do not very much make use of foreign poems.

Megillus/ We however do make use of them. And Homer appears to me to excel poets of this kind, though he does not describe a Laconic, but rather throughout his poems an

Ionic life. At present, indeed, he appears to give a good testimony to your discourse, mythologically referring the ancient condition of mankind to rusticity.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ For he testifies the truth of our assertion: and we shall therefore admit him as one who indicates that polities of this kind once subsisted.

Clinias/ It is well said.

Athenian Stranger/ Were not polities of this kind formed from families and kindred dispersed through the want arising from these devaluations, —polities, in which the oldest person rules over the rest, on account of their origin being derived from father and mother; and who following these like birds produce one herd, are obedient to paternal mandates, and are governed in a kingdom, the most just of all?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But after this, more of them collecting together into one body, they will form larger cities: and first of all betaking themselves to agriculture, at the roots of mountains they will make certain enclosures from hedges, as defensive walls against the attacks of wild beasts, and thus produce one common and mighty habitation.

Clinias/ It is probable that this would be the case.

Athenian Stranger/ But is not this also probable?

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That since these more increased habitations are composed from such as are lesser and first, each of the small ones should be present, having at the same time its most ancient governor, according to alliance, together with its own proper manners; and this on account of their living separate from each other, and having had

different parents and preceptors by whom they have been accustomed to reverence the Gods, and attend to themselves, the more modest by the more modest, the braver by the more brave, and so in all the rest, according as each has fashioned their sons and grandsons, who, as we have said, will bring with them to this greater habitation the peculiar laws under which they have lived.

Clinias/ How is it possible this should not be probable?

Athenian Stranger/ It is likewise necessary that everyone should be pleased with his own laws in the first place, and with those of others in the second place.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But we appear to be ignorant that we are entering as it were on the beginning of legislation.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ After these things, therefore, it is necessary that those who thus assemble together should choose among themselves in common some who know the legal institutions of all of them, and that they should openly show such of these as they most approve of, to the common rulers and guides of the people as to kings, who themselves approving these institutions will be called legislators. But, having appointed their rulers, they will form in this mutation of their polity a certain aristocracy, composed from dynasties, or a certain kingdom.

Clinias/ This will doubtless afterwards be the case.

Athenian Stranger/ In the next place, therefore, let us speak of a third form of polity, in which all the forms and passions of polities, and at the same time of cities, happen to be found.

Clinias/ Of what kind is this? That which Homer signifies, asserting that the third was thus produced after the second:

"Dardania's walls he rais'd; for Ilion then

(The city since of many-languag'd men)
Was not. The natives were content to till
The shady foot of Ida's fount-full hill."

These verses, and those above, about the Cyclops, are in a certain respect divinely written, and are conformable to nature. For the poetic genus is divine, being agitated with sacred fury, celebrating many things which have happened according to truth, and handling each of them with certain graces and Muses.

Clinias/ And this very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ We will therefore now proceed to consider the preceding fable: for, perhaps, something of our intention may be signified by it. Will it not be proper to do so?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ We say then that Troy was built from elevated places, in a large and beautiful plain, upon a hill not very lofty, and having many rivers which rush from mount Ida.

Clinias/ So it is said.

Athenian Stranger/ Must not we think that this happened a long time after the deluge?

Clinias/ How could it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ A dreadful oblivion, therefore, of the devaluation we are now speaking of, must, as it appears, have been then present with them, as they thus built their city under many rivers, and which descended from lofty places, and were not afraid to trust themselves to hills of no great altitude.

Clinias/ It is perfectly evident, therefore, that they existed a long time after this devaluation.

Athenian Stranger/ And I am of opinion that many other cities were at that time inhabited, in consequence of the increase of mankind.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And these indeed fought against Troy; and perhaps by sea, all of them now intrepidly using that element.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ But the Achaians, who warred on Troy, subverted it in the tenth year.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ In this time, therefore, or the space of ten years, in which Troy was besieged, many evils happened to the besiegers through the seditions of the young men, who received the commanders, when returning to their cities and houses, neither in a becoming nor just manner, but so that many were slain, and many were exiled. Those that were exiled, however, returned, changing their names, and being called Doriens instead of Achaians, through one Dorieus, who at that time collected together the exiles. And hence you Lacedæmonians mythologize about, and thoroughly discuss, all these particulars.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Hence, as, while discoursing about laws in the beginning of this conversation, we made a digression to music and intoxication, so now we are led to the same thing as it were by divinity; and our discourse presents us as it were with a handle for this purpose. For it has brought us to that politic discipline which you said was properly instituted both in Lacedæmon and Crete, as by fraternal laws. But now we obtain this prerogative from the wandering of our discourse, that, while we pass through certain polities and habitations, we behold a first, second,

and third city, following each other, according to our opinion, in immense extensions of a certain time. But now this fourth city, or if you please nation, presents itself to us, which was once inhabited, and is so at present; from all which, if we are able to understand what is beautiful or the contrary, respecting its being inhabited, and what laws of the inhabitants preserve what is preserved, or corrupt what is corrupted among them, and what change of political institutions renders the city happy, we shall think, O Megillus and Clinias, that we have done enough. But all these particulars must be discussed by us from the beginning, unless we call to account what has been said.

Megillus/ If, O guest, any God will promise us that, if we enter a second time on the business of legislation, we shall hear neither worse nor fewer things than what have now been said, I would make a long journey, and the present day would appear to me to be short, though the God is now turning from the summer to the winter solstice.

Athenian Stranger/ It is proper, as it appears, to consider these things.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then be present in thought at that time when Lacedæmon, and Argos, and Messene, and the cities which were in alliance with them, were, O Megillus, in subjection to your ancestors. For then, as it is said in the fable, they thought proper, having triply divided their army, to inhabit three cities, Argos, Messene, and Lacedaemon.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And Temenus, indeed, was made king of Argos, but Cresphontes of Messene, and Eurysthenes in conjunction with Patrocles of Lacedæmon.

Clinias/ They were so.

Athenian Stranger/ But all these took an oath that they would give assistance, if anyone should destroy any of these dominions.

Megillus/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But inform me, by Zeus, whether their kingdom or government was ever destroyed by anyone; or whether it was not subverted by others, but by themselves? or shall we say, that a little before, when we entered on this discourse, we thought it was so, but have now forgotten it?

Megillus/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, therefore, we shall be more able to establish a thing of this kind; for we are led to the same conclusion, as it appears, by the history of past transactions; so that we do not pursue in our discourse any vain thing, but that which has happened and is true. But the following particulars have taken place: Three kingdoms, and three cities, having a kingly government, mutually swore, respecting the laws which they had established about governing and being governed, that kings should not reign by violence as time and race continued to advance, and that the people, while the kings observed their oath, should not at any time destroy the kingdoms, nor endeavor that they might be subverted by others; but that kings should defend both kings and the people when injured, and the people, both kings and the people. Was it not so?

Megillus/ It was.

Athenian Stranger/ That therefore which is of the greatest importance in the establishments of polities was present with the legislators in these three cities, whether the kings themselves gave laws, or any other persons.

Megillus/ What was this?

Athenian Stranger/ That two cities should always rise up against one which would not be persuaded to obey the established laws.

Megillus/ It is evident.

Athenian Stranger/ This also many advise legislators, that they should establish such laws as the people and the multitude will willingly admit; which is just as if someone should advise the masters of gymnastic exercises, or physicians, to take care of and cure the bodies under their direction in an agreeable manner.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ It is, however, often a desirable circumstance, when with no great degree of pain anyone is able to procure for bodies a good habit and health.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ This also was at that time present with them, and contributed in no small degree to the facility of establishing laws.

Megillus/ What was that?

Athenian Stranger/ The legislators had not to procure an equality of possessions, which causes the greatest of all accusations, and which takes place in other cities established by laws, when anyone endeavors to disturb the possession of land, or to dissolve what is due; perceiving that equality can never sufficiently subsist unless these things take place. For against him who endeavors to disturb everything of this kind, all men exclaim, that he must not move things which are immoveable. Imprecations likewise are uttered against him who introduces divisions of land, and the cancelling of debts; so that every man is involved in difficulty on this account. This, however, was not the case with the Doriens. For land was distributed to them, without

envy or controversy; and they had no large and ancient debts.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ How therefore came it to pass, O most excellent men, that their settlement in houses and legislation came to be so bad?

Megillus/ How do you mean? and of what is it you accuse them?

Athenian Stranger/ That three house-establishments taking place, two of them swiftly corrupted the polity and the laws, and one alone, which was your city, remained.

Megillus/ You ask a question which it is not very easy to answer.

Athenian Stranger/ But it is proper that, considering and exploring this at present, concerning laws, with aged and prudent sport, we should accomplish the journey we have undertaken without molestation.

Megillus/ We ought certainly to do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Can we therefore speculate concerning laws in a more beautiful manner, than by considering the laws which adorned cities of this kind? or can we think of any cities and habitations more illustrious and larger than these?

Megillus/ It is not easy to speak of others that are preferable to these.

Athenian Stranger/ It is nearly evident, therefore, that, thus prepared, they would not only be able sufficiently to defend Peloponnesus, but all Greece, if it should be injured by any of the Barbarians; in the same manner as those that dwelt about Ilion, who, trusting to the power of the Assyrians descended from Ninus, dared to excite war against Troy. For the form of that government, which was still preserved, was

by no means despicable. And as we at present fear a mighty king, in like maimer all at that time feared that collected coordination of people. For the destruction of Troy a second time raised a great accusation against them; because the Trojan power was a portion of the Assyrian government. Against all these, therefore, the army at that time was divided into three cities, under the brother kings, the offspring of Hercules, and appeared to be beautifully regulated, and far more so than that which came against Troy. For, in the first place, they were of opinion that the commanders who descended from Hercules were better than those that derived their origin from Pelops; and in the next place, that this army far surpassed in virtue that which came against Troy. For these conquered, but those were vanquished by these, the Achaians by the Doriens. Ought we not thus to think, and that at that time they prepared themselves for battle with this intention?

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ It is probable, therefore, that they would consider this their constitution to be firmly established, and that it would endure for a long time, in consequence of their mutually undergoing many dangers and labors, and being under the orderly government of one race, their kings being brothers. And besides this, it is further probable that they used many prophets, and among these the Delphic Apollo.

Megillus/ It is highly probable.

Athenian Stranger/ But these particulars, which appear to be thus great, glided away, as it seems, at that time rapidly, except, as we just now said, a small part situated about the place of your abode; and this part has not ever ceased warring on the two other parts even to the present day. For, if the several parts of the constitution at that time

had unanimously conspired to one end, they would have possessed an irresistible power in war.

Megillus/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ How, therefore, and on what account, was it dissolved? Does it not deserve to be considered what fortune subverted a constitution so great, and of such a kind?

Megillus/ Indeed, he who considers anything else will not be able to understand either other laws or polities, which preserve beautiful and great concerns, or on the contrary destroy them, if he neglects these things.

Athenian Stranger/ It seems, therefore, that we have been fortunately led to this consideration, which is so well adapted to our purpose.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Are not, therefore, all men ignorant, and at present we ourselves, while each of us thinks that he beholds a certain beautiful thing, and which will produce admirable effects, when anyone is not ignorant how it should be properly used? But we ourselves, perhaps, neither think rightly about this, nor according to nature. And shall we not say, that all men err respecting all other things about which they think in a similar manner?

Megillus/ How do you say? And about what especially are you now speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ O, good man, I now laugh at myself. For, looking to that army about which we have been speaking, it appeared to me to be very beautiful, and that a wonderful possession would fall to the lot of the Greeks, as I have said, if anyone should at that time have used it in a proper manner.

Megillus/ Did you not say all these things well and prudently; and, did not we properly praise them?

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps so. But I think that everyone who perceives anything great, and which is endued with much power and strength, will be immediately convinced, that if he knows it to be used by its possessor, being such and so great, its possessor will be happy through accomplishing many and admirable things.

Megillus/ Is not this therefore right? or, how do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ Consider now to what he looks, who, in praising everything of this kind, speaks rightly. And in the first place concerning that of which we are now speaking, how will those commanders of that time, who knew properly how to marshal an army, fortunately make use of occasion? Will it not be from their establishing it in safety, and preserving it perpetually, so that they themselves may be free, and that they may rule over others whom they please? And, in short, that both they and their progeny may obtain from all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, whatever they desire? Will they not desire it for the sake of these things?

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ He, therefore, who beholding either great wealth, or the illustrious honors of a family, or anything else of this kind, says the very same things, will he not say so looking to this, as if through this kind he should obtain all that he desires, or the greater part, and such as are of the most consequence?

Megillus/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ But there is one common desire of all men, which is signified by our present discourse.

Megillus/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ That all things should especially happen according to everyone's mandate; but, if not all, at least human affairs.

Megillus/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Since, therefore, all of us perpetually wish a thing of this kind, both when we are adults and advanced in years, we necessarily pray for this to the end of life.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But we also pray that our friends may obtain the same things as ourselves.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But the son is a friend to the father, viz. the boy to the man.

Megillus/ How can it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ But many of those things which the boy prays may happen to himself, the father will beseech the Gods to grant that they may not happen according to the prayers of his son.

Megillus/ Do you say that this will be the case when he who prays is foolish, and while he is yet a youth?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes; and when he is a father, either very old or very young, while he knows nothing of things beautiful and just, but, being affected like Theseus to the unfortunate Hippolytus, when dying, will pray with great alacrity. But if the son knows what is beautiful and just at the same time, does it appear to you that he will join in prayer with the father?

Megillus/ I understand what you say. For you appear to me to assert, that we ought not to pray, nor endeavor that all things may be conformable to our wish, but that our will rather may be obedient to our prudence; and that both cities and each of us ought to pray for, and endeavor to obtain, the possession of intellect.

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly. And that the politician who is a legislator ought always to establish legal orders, looking

to this, as I remember to have said before, and as I now remind you. For, in the beginning of this conversation, you gave it as your opinion, that a good legislator ought to establish all laws for the sake of war; but I said that this was to exhort him to compose laws according to one virtue only, when, at the same time, there are four virtues; and that he ought to look to every virtue, but especially towards the first, which is the leader of them all, and which is prudence, intellect and opinion, with love and desire attendant on these. But our discourse returns again to the same thing; and what I then said, I now again say, either if you please jesting or seriously—I assert then, that it is dangerous to pray without the possession of intellect, but that in this case it is better the contrary to what we ask should come to pass. If you are of opinion that these things are asserted by me seriously, consider them to be so. For I now entirely expect to find you consenting to what we a little before advanced, that timidity was not the cause of the destruction of kings, and of the whole of that constitution, nor yet the ignorance in warlike concerns of the governors and governed, but the whole of depravity, and especially ignorance about the greatest of human affairs. That these things thus happened at that time, and must so happen now, if they anywhere subsist, and that in following times they will no otherwise happen, I will endeavor, if you please, to discover, taking reason for our guide, and unfold it to you as friends to the utmost of my ability.

Clinias/ To praise you, O guest, in words, would be troublesome, but we shall vehemently praise you in the thing itself. For we shall cheerfully follow you in what you have to say, and in so doing a liberal and true encomiast is particularly apparent.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak most excellently, O Clinias! and we shall do as you say.

Clinias/ These things will be so, if God pleases. Only speak.

Athenian Stranger/ We say then, proceeding according to the remaining road of our discourse, that the greatest ignorance destroyed that power at that time, and that at present the same thing is naturally capable of effecting this. So that, if this be the case, the legislator ought to endeavor as far as he is able to impart prudence to cities, and exterminate in the highest degree ignorance.

Clinias/ It is evident.

Athenian Stranger/ What then may be justly called the greatest ignorance? Consider whether you agree with me in what I am going to say. For I establish it to be such as this.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ When anyone does not love, but hates that which appears to him to be beautiful, or good; but loves and embraces that which appears to him to be base and unjust. I assert that this dissonance of pain and pleasure, with rational opinion, is extreme ignorance. But it is the greatest, because it belongs to the multitude of the soul. For that part of the soul which is conversant with pain and pleasure corresponds to the common people and the multitude in a city. When, therefore, the soul opposes sciences or opinions, or reason, all which naturally govern, this I call ignorance: and it then takes place in a city when the multitude will not be persuaded by the rulers and the laws. The same thing happens to one man, when though beautiful reasons reside in his soul, yet he does not at all act conformably, but does everything contrary to them. I should establish all these most inordinate ignorances as belonging to a city, and to every citizen, but not as belonging to the artificers, if, O guest, you understand what I say.

Clinias/ We understand you, my friend, and assent to what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Let this then be thus fixed, that to citizens who are after this manner ignorant, nothing pertaining to government is to be committed, but that they are to be reproached as ignorant, though they should be very skillful in argument, and possess everything pertaining to the elegance and celerity of the soul. On the other hand, that those who are affected in a contrary manner are to be called wise, though, as it is said, they should neither know their letters, nor how to swim, and dominion should be given to these as to prudent persons. For how, O friends, can the least form of prudence subsist without consent?

Clinias/ It cannot.

Athenian Stranger/ But the most beautiful and greatest of mutual agreements may be most justly called the greatest wisdom; of which he participates who lives according so reason. But he who is void of this, who destroys his own house, and is in no respect a savior to the city, but everything of a contrary nature, —such a one appears to be ignorant with respect to these particulars. These things, therefore, as I just now said, must subsist in this manner.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But ought there not, necessarily, to be in cities governors and the governed?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. But of what kind, and how many, are the axioms respecting governing and being governed in great and small cities, and in a similar manner in families? Is not this one of them, that father and mother, and universally a begetter should rule over the thing begotten? Will not this be everywhere a right axiom?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ But the next in order is this, that the ingenious should rule over the ignoble. The third, that the more aged ought to govern, and the younger to be governed.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But the fourth will be, that slaves should be governed, and masters govern.

Clinias/ How can it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ The fifth will be, I think, that the better character should rule over the worse.

Clinias/ You speak of a dominion which is extremely necessary.

Athenian Stranger/ And of a dominion, which for the most part subsists in all animals, and is according to nature, as the Theban Pindar says. But the greatest axiom, as it appears, will be the sixth, which orders the unscientific to follow, but the prudent to lead and govern. And this government, O most wise Pindar, I should nearly say was not contrary but according to the nature of law, subsisting spontaneously and not by violence.

Clinias/ You speak most rightly.

Athenian Stranger/ The seventh government we shall produce to a certain allotment, speaking of a thing grateful to divinity, and subsisting with good fortune. And we shall say it is most just, that he who is chosen by lot should govern, but that he who is rejected should be governed.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ We shall say then jocosely to some one of those who proceed with great facility to the establishment of laws, Do you see, O legislator, how many axioms there are respecting governors, and how they are naturally contrary to each other? For now we have discovered a certain fountain of seditions, which it is

necessary you should cure. But, in the first place, consider with us how, and in what respect, the kings of Argos and Messene, acting contrary to these axioms, destroyed the power of the Greeks, which at that time was wonderful. Was it not because they were ignorant of that which is most rightly said by Hesiod, That the half is often more than the whole? That is to say, when the possession of the whole is noxious, but that of the half is moderate: for, in this case, he considered the moderate as more than the immoderate, as being better than the worse.

Clinias/ Most right.

Athenian Stranger/ But will this, when happening to kings, destroy each of them, prior to its happening to the people?

Clinias/ It is probable that this is mostly the disease of kings, who live proudly through luxuries.

Athenian Stranger/ It is evident, therefore, in the first place, that the kings at that time arrogated to themselves authority over the established laws, and that their actions did not accord with what they had celebrated both in discourse and by an oath. But dissonance, as we have said, being the greatest ignorance, though appearing to be wisdom, subverted all those particulars through confusion and bitter unskillfulness.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so then. But why is it necessary that the legislator of that time should be fearful respecting the generation of this passion? Shall we say, by the Gods, that to know this is a thing of no great wisdom, and that it is not difficult to assert; but that, if anyone at that time had foreseen it, he would have been more wise than we are?

Megillus/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ We may now, O Megillus, understand that which was formerly transacted by you, and, in consequence of knowing this, easily relate what ought then to have been accomplished.

Megillus/ Speak yet more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ This then will be most clear.

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ If anyone gives a greater power to lesser things, so as to neglect mediocrity, —as, for instance, sails to ships, food to bodies, and dominion to souls, —he would subvert all things. For, becoming insolent, some of these would rush to diseases, and others to injustice, the offspring of insolence. What then do we mean to say? It is this, my friends, that the nature of a mortal soul is such, that no one of these can, when young and unrestrained, bear the greatest dominion without having its dianoëtic power filled with folly, which is the greatest disease; and that, besides this, it will hate its nearest friends; which circumstance, when happening, will swiftly destroy it, and obscure the whole of its power. To be afraid of this, in consequence of knowing the moderate, is the province of great legislators. Hence, that which it is easy to see was at that time transacted appears to be this.

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Some God, as it seems, took care of you; who, foreseeing future events, planted for you a two-fold generation of kings, from one, and by this mean more contracted you to the moderate. And further still, after this a certain human nature, mingling with a certain divine power, and perceiving the effervescence of your government, conjoined the prudent power of old-age with the proud strength of noble birth, equaling the decision of men eighty years old, in affairs of the greatest concern, with the power

of kings. But your third savior, perceiving your distended and raging government, hurled upon it, as a bridle, the power of the Ephori, and led it near the power which is determined by lot. Hence, your kingdom being mingled from such things as are proper, and possessing measure, was both preserved itself, and became the cause of safety to others. For the faction of Aristodemus had never taken place under the government of Temenus and Cresphontes, and other legislators of that time; for they were not then sufficiently skilled in legislation. For, had they been so, they never would have thought that a juvenile soul, when receiving a dominion from which it might be possible to become a tyrant, should be kept within the bounds of moderation by oaths. But now a God has shown you what kind of government is necessary; and such a one ought especially to subsist. But that these things should be known by us, (as I said before) now they have been accomplished, is not a thing replete with wisdom. For it is not difficult to see from a paradigm a thing which has been transacted. But if anyone could then have foreseen these particulars, and had been able to moderate the governments, and to form one from the three, he would have preserved all the beautiful conceptions of that time, and neither the Persian fleet, nor any other which has been despised by us as of no account, would have sailed with hostile intentions into Greece.

Clinias/ You speak the truth.

Athenian Stranger/ Hence, O Clinias, they made a shameful resistance. I say shameful, not because those who at that time vanquished by sea and land did not conquer in a becoming manner, but what I call shameful at that time is this; in the first place, because one of those three cities only fought in defense of Greece, but the other two were so basely corrupted, that one of them hindered Lacedæmon from assisting Greece, by warring against it with all its strength;

and the other obtaining the chief authority in those times, respecting distribution, or about Argos, would neither hear, nor give any assistance when called upon to repel the Barbarian. But many things might be adduced relative to the transactions of those times, about that war, by which the conduct of the two cities towards Greece might be accused as shameful. For those who assert that they defended Greece do not speak rightly; since, unless the common opinion of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had resisted the approaching slavery, all things would nearly have been mingled together, the race of Greeks with Greeks, the Barbarians with Greeks, and the Greeks with Barbarians; just as at present, in consequence of the Persians tyrannizing, Greece being separated in a disorderly manner is badly inhabited. These are the things, O Clinias and Megillus, which we have to urge against ancient politicians and legislators, and likewise those of the present day, that, exploring the causes of these, we may discover what else ought to be done. Such as is that which we now assert, that it is not proper to establish great nor unmingled governments; considering this, that a city ought to be free and prudent, and a friend to itself; and that a legislator ought to give laws looking to these particulars. But we must not wonder, if we often propose other things, and assert that the legislator ought to regard these in giving laws, though they are not the same with what we have previously delivered. But it is proper to infer, that when we say the legislator ought to look to temperance, or prudence, or friendship, our design is not different, but the same: and you must not be disturbed on finding us using many other words of this kind.

Clinias/ We shall endeavor to do so by repeating your discourse. But now inform us what you meant by saying that

a legislator ought to look to friendship, liberty, and prudence.

Athenian Stranger/ You shall now hear. There are as it were two mothers of polities, from which he who says that others are produced will speak rightly. It is necessary to call one of these a monarchy, but the other a democracy. The race of the Persians possesses the summit of the one, but that of the other is possessed by us. But all other forms of polities are nearly, as I have said, variously composed from these. It is proper, therefore, and necessary, that a city should participate of both these, if it is to be free, and friendly in conjunction with prudence. But this our discourse wishes to ordain, when it says, that a city can never be beautifully governed while it is destitute of these.

Clinias/ For how can it?

Athenian Stranger/ When, therefore, the one embraces monarchy, but the other liberty, more than is proper, neither will preserve the mediocrity of these. Your cities however, Laconia and Crete, possess it more than others. And this was the case with the Athenians and Persians formerly, but now they possess less of this mediocrity. But shall we discuss the causes of this, or not?

Clinias/ Entirely so, if we wish to accomplish our proposed design.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us hear therefore. The Persians under the reign of Cyrus, possessing more of the mediocrity of slavery and freedom, were in the first place themselves free; and in the next place they were the lords of many others. For the governors imparted liberty to the governed, and by leading them to equality the soldiers had a greater friendship for the commanders, and conducted themselves with alacrity in dangers. And if anyone among them was prudent, and able to give advice, as the king was not

envious, but permitted liberty of speech, and honored those who were able to advise, he openly exhibited the common power of prudence. And at that time he gave them all things, through liberty, friendship, and a communion of intellect.

Clinias/ It appears that the particulars which you have now mentioned thus subsisted at that time.

Athenian Stranger/ How then came that government to be almost destroyed under the reign of Cambyses, and again nearly restored under that of Darius? Are you willing that we should speak as if we used divination?

Clinias/ Certainly; for this will contribute to our design.

Athenian Stranger/ Respecting Cyrus, therefore, I thus divine; that in other particulars he was a good commander, and a lover of his country, but that he did not at all apply himself to right discipline, nor attend to œconomy.

Clinias/ But why must we say so?

Athenian Stranger/ He appears from his youth to have passed his life in the army, and to have committed the education of his sons to women. But these educated them as persons happy and blessed from their childhood, and as indigent of nothing. Hence, as being sufficiently happy, they forbade anyone to oppose them in any respect, and compelled everyone to praise all their words and actions. After this manner were they educated by certain women.

Clinias/ You speak, as it seems, of a fine education.

Athenian Stranger/ Of a feminine one indeed, introduced by royal women, who became suddenly rich; and which took place during a scarcity of men, who through wars, and a multitude of dangers, had not leisure to attend to the education of youth.

Clinias/ It is probable that this was the case.

Athenian Stranger/ But the father of these children possessed cattle and sheep, and herds of men, and of many other animals; but he was ignorant that those to whom he was to leave all these, were not instructed in their paternal or Persian art (the Persians being shepherds, the offspring of a rough country, and the methods being hard by which they rendered the shepherds very strong, able to pass the night out of doors, to be vigilant, and to fight if there was occasion). But he suffered women and Median eunuchs to educate his sons, who corrupted discipline through what is called felicity. Hence they came to be such as it is likely those must be who are educated without reproof. The sons, therefore, on the death of Cyrus taking possession of the government, and being full of luxury and unacquainted with reproof, in the first place, one slew the other in consequence of indignantly bearing equality: and in the next place, Cambyses, raging through intoxication and ignorance, destroyed the kingdom through the Medes, and a certain person who was then called the eunuch, and who despised his folly.

Clinias/ These things also are reported; and it appears that they nearly happened in this manner.

Athenian Stranger/ And it is likewise said, that the government came again to the Persians through Darius and seven others.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But let us behold, following the order of discourse. For Darius was neither the son of a king, nor educated in a luxurious manner. But coming to the government, and receiving it as the seventh, he divided it into seven parts, of which at present some small dreams remain. He likewise was of opinion that men should live under laws which contribute to a certain common equality;

and made that distribution legitimate, which Cyrus had promised the Persians; thus imparting friendship and communion to all the Persians, and alluring the vulgar among them by money and gifts. Being thus beloved by his soldiers, he subdued regions not less in number than Cyrus had left. After Darius, Xerxes reigned, who was again educated in a royal and luxurious manner. But, O Darius! we may, perhaps, most justly say you was not warned by the evil conduct of Cyrus, but educated Xerxes in the same manners in which Cyrus educated Cambyses. He, therefore, as being the offspring of the same discipline, acted in a manner similar to Cambyses. And, indeed, from this time scarcely any of the Persian kings were truly great, except in name. But the cause of this, according to my reasoning, was not fortune, but a vicious life, which the sons of those who were remarkably rich and tyrannical for the most part lived. For neither boy, nor man, nor old man, can ever become illustrious in virtue from such an education. And these are the things which we say should be considered by a legislator, and by us at present. But it is just, O Lacedæmonians, to confer this praise upon your city, that you never distribute any remarkable honor or nutriment to either a poor or rich man, to a king or a private person, which the oracle of some God has not from the first ordered you to distribute. For it is not proper that he who excels in riches, or swiftness, or beauty, or strength, without the possession of some virtue, should obtain the highest honors in a city; nor even if he possesses some virtue, if it is not attended with temperance.

Clinias/ What do you mean by asserting this, O guest?

Athenian Stranger/ Is not fortitude one part of virtue?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Do you, therefore, judge, on hearing what I shall advance. Would you be pleased with any

domestic or neighbor who was excessively brave, yet not temperate, but the contrary?

Clinias/ Predict better things of me.

Athenian Stranger/ But what? Would you be pleased with one who was an artist, and wise in things of this kind, but at the same time unjust?

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ But justice is never produced without temperance.

Clinias/ How can it be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ But neither did he who was just now considered by us as wise, because he possessed pleasures and pains, according with and following right reason, become so without temperance.

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Athenian Stranger/ But, further still, we should also consider this, that we may behold how honors are properly or improperly distributed in cities.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Whether temperance, if it subsists alone in the soul without every other virtue, can with justice become either honorable or dishonorable?

Clinias/ I know not what to answer.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak modestly. And I think you would reply, that in this case it would subsist inharmoniously.

Clinias/ You have very properly answered for me.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so then. But the addition which we made use of, of honorable and dishonorable, did not deserve a reply, but ought rather to have been passed over in irrational silence.

Clinias/ You appear to me to speak concerning temperance.

Athenian Stranger/ I do. But that which is of more advantage to us than other things, if it is especially honored with an addition, it will be most rightly honored; that which is second in utility, when honored in a secondary manner; and thus everything will be properly honored when it receives consequent honors in the order of succession.

Clinias/ This will be the case.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Shall we not say that it is the province of the legislator to distribute these?

Clinias/ And very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Are you willing that we should invest him with the power of distributing all things, both pertaining to every work, and to trifling particulars? And shall we not endeavor to give a triple division, since we also are in a certain respect desirous of laws; dividing things greatest, second, and third, apart from each other?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ We say then that a city, in order that it may be preserved, and may be happy to the utmost of human power, ought necessarily to distribute honors and dishonors in a proper manner.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ Proper distribution, therefore, is this, to establish the goods pertaining to the soul, as the most excellent and first in rank, temperance at the same time being present with the soul: but as second in rank, things beautiful and good pertaining to the body; and in the third place, things pertaining to possessions and riches. If any legislator or city proceeds without these, and either causes riches to be honored, or through honors renders something which is posterior, prior, they will act neither in a holy nor

in a political manner. Shall these things be said by us, or how?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ A consideration of the Persian polity caused us to speak more copiously about these particulars. But we found that they became still worse; and we say that this was owing to their depriving the people of liberty in an immoderate degree. Likewise, by introducing the despotic more than was proper, they destroyed friendship and society in the city. But, these being corrupted, the deliberation of the rulers is not directed to the governed and the people, but to the advantage of their own government. Indeed, for the sake of a trifling benefit which might accrue to themselves, cities have been entirely subverted, and friendly nations destroyed by fire. Hence, hating in an hostile manner, and without pity, they are also hated. And when there is occasion for the people to fight for them, and they assemble for this purpose, they do not find in them a general consent to undergo danger, and fight with alacrity. But though they possess myriads, and indeed innumerable subjects, yet they are all useless for the purposes of war. Hence, as if they were in want of men, they procure some for hire; and thus think they shall be safe under the protection of mercenary and foreign soldiers. Besides all this, they are compelled to be unlearned, asserting seriously, that whatever is called honorable or beautiful in the city is a mere trifle when compared to silver and gold.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But we have spoken sufficiently concerning the affairs of the Persians, which do not subsist in a proper manner, through excessive slavery and despotism.

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But, after this, it is proper in a similar manner to discuss the Attic polity, that it may appear how perfect liberty, exempt from all government, is in no small degree worse than that which is moderately in subjection to others. For at that time in which the Persians invaded Greece, and perhaps nearly all Europe, our polity was ancient, and we had certain governments composed of four divisions. A certain shame, too, at that time was a despot, through which we were then desirous to live in subjection to the laws. Besides this, the magnitude of that military force, which spread itself over the land and sea, produced an immense fear, and caused us to be in still greater subjection to the governors and laws then existing. And from these causes the highest degree of friendship subsisted between us. For nearly ten years before the naval battle in Salamis, Datis, being sent by Darius, led a Persian army against the Athenians and Eretrienses in order to reduce them to slavery; Darius at the same time threatening him with death unless he enslaved these nations. Datis, therefore, in a very short time entirely subdued them with an innumerable multitude of forces; and a certain dreadful rumor reached our city, that not one of the Eretrienses had escaped, but that the soldiers of Datis had bound the hands of the Eretrienses together, and plundered all their city. This rumor, whether true or not, terrified both the other Greeks, and also the Athenians, who in consequence of this sending ambassadors to every part of Greece for the purpose of procuring assistance, no one aided them except the Lacedæmonians. And even they, indeed, whether they were hindered by being engaged in a war at that time against Messene, or by some other circumstance (for we are unacquainted with the true reason), did not come till one day after the battle at Marathon. After this, mighty preparations and innumerable threats of the king are said

to have taken place. In the meantime Darius is said to have died, who was succeeded in the government by his son, at that time extremely young, and who in no respect abandoned his father's undertaking. But the Athenians were of opinion, that the whole of his preparation would be directed against them, on account of the battle at Marathon. And hearing that mount Athos was dug through, the Hellespont joined, and a great multitude of ships collected, they thought that there was no safety for them by land or by sea. For they were unwilling to confide in the assistance of anyone, recollecting that, when on the first invasion of the Persians the Eretrienses were vanquished, no one gave them assistance, or exposed themselves to danger by fighting in their defense. But it appeared to them that the same thing would then take place by land. And again, when they looked to the sea, they saw that all safety was excluded there, since more than a thousand ships were coming against them. They perceived, therefore, only one mean of safety, and that was slender and dubious. For, looking back upon former transactions, and considering how they had fought without any prospect of success, —being borne along by this hope, they found their only refuge was in themselves and the Gods. This, therefore, united all of them in friendship with each other. I mean the fear which was then present, together with that which before this the laws had produced in those that were obedient to them. This in our former discourse we have frequently called shame, and to which we have said all those must be subservient who desire to become worthy characters. For he who is a slave to this is free and intrepid. Unless this fear, therefore, had been then present, they would never, collecting themselves together, have defended their temples, their tombs, and their country, together with their other familiars and friends, as at that time they

defended them, but we should have been widely separated from each other.

Megillus/ And very much so, O guest. You likewise speak very properly, and in a manner becoming both yourself and your country.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so, O Megillus! For it is just to discourse with you about the particulars which happened at that time, because you retain the nature of your parents. But do you and Clinias consider whether we say anything accommodated to legislation. For I do not discuss these things for the sake of fables: but behold on what account I speak. For, in a certain respect, the same thing happens to us which happened to the Persians: for they led the people to every kind of slavery; but we, on the contrary, invite the multitude to every kind of freedom. But how and what we shall speak respecting this affair, our former discourses after a manner beautifully demonstrate.

Megillus/ You speak well. But endeavor to signify to us in a still clearer manner what you have now said.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. The people, O friends, with us, according to ancient laws, were not the lords of anything, but after a manner they were voluntarily subservient to the laws.

Megillus/ What laws do you speak of?

Athenian Stranger/ Those which were then established about music, that we may show from the beginning how liberty came to be bestowed in an extreme degree. For then music was divided by us into certain species and figures; and one species of the ode consisted in prayers to the Gods, which are called by the name of hymns. But another species of the ode, contrary to this, may be said especially to consist in lamentations. Again, another species consists in pæons: another celebrates the generation of Bacchus, and is, I

think, called dithyrambos: and another species is denominated laws pertaining to the harp. These, and some others, being established, it was not lawful to use one species of melody instead of another. But the authority of knowing these, and, at the same time, judging respecting them, and condemning them when improper, was not inverted in the pipe, nor in the ignorant clamors of the multitude, as at present, nor yet in those who express their applause by clapping their hands, —but in men illustrious for their erudition, and who were permitted to hear to the end in silence. But boys, pedagogues, and the numerous vulgar, were admonished to behave orderly by a rod. These things being established in so orderly a manner, the multitude of citizens willingly submitted to be governed, and did not dare to judge in a tumultuous manner. But after this, in the course of time, the poets themselves became the leaders of this unlawful privation of the muse. These, indeed, naturally possessed the poetic genius, but were unskilled to a degree of folly in what is just and lawful respecting music. They likewise celebrated the orgies of Bacchus, and pursued pleasure more than was becoming. Besides this, they mingled lamentations with hymns, and pæons with dithyrambic compositions. They imitated with harps the sound of the pipe, and mingled all things with all, involuntarily deceiving through their ignorance of music. For they asserted that it did not possess any rectitude whatever; but that anyone, whether he was a worthy or a worthless man, might judge with the greatest rectitude from the pleasure which it produced in the hearer. Composing, therefore, poems of this kind, and thus speaking publicly, they caused the multitude to act in an unlawful and daring manner with respect to music, by persuading them that they were sufficient judges of harmony. Hence theatres, from being silent, came to be noisy, as if capable of hearing what

in the Muses was beautiful, or the contrary: and thus, instead of an aristocracy, a certain depraved theatrical dominion was produced. For, if only a democracy of free men had subsisted, nothing very dire would have taken place: but now, through music, an opinion came to us of the wisdom of all men in all things, and a transgression of law in conjunction with liberty followed. For they became intrepid, as if endued with knowledge; and this privation of fear produced impudence. For when the opinion of a more excellent person, through confidence, is not dreaded, this is nearly base impudence, and is produced from a certain liberty vehemently daring.

Megillus/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ An unwillingness to become subservient to governors is the consequence of this liberty: and this is attended with a desertion of the service and admonitions of father, mother, and elders. After this follows, as now being near the consummation of the whole, disobedience to the laws. When arrived at this extremity, oaths and faith, and the cultivation of the divinities, are neglected. Hence they exhibit and imitate that ancient Titanic nature, which is celebrated by poets; and again returning to the manners of that period, they lead a life involved in difficulties, and find no end to their evils. But on what account have these things been said by us? It appears to me that discourse, like a horse, should be restrained on every side, lest, having its mouth unbridled, and rushing onward, we should at length, according to the proverb, fall from an ass. It is proper therefore to ask, on what account these things have been said.

Megillus/ It is so.

Athenian Stranger/ On what account, therefore, have we asserted these things?

Megillus/ On what account?

Athenian Stranger/ We have said that a legislator ought to give laws regarding three things; that the city which receives his laws be free, friendly to itself, and endued with intellect. Was not this what we said?

Megillus/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ For the sake of these things we adduced two species of government, one most despotic, and the other most free; and we have considered which of these was rightly administered. But, receiving a certain mediocrity in each, in the one of despotism, and in the other of liberty, we have seen that a prosperous condition of affairs will by these means be produced; but that the contrary will be the case when each is carried to an extreme, the one of slavery, and the other of liberty.

Megillus/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ But, for the sake of these things, we considered the nature of the Doric army, the roots of the Dardan mountains, and the maritime habitation. We likewise considered, on the same account, those first men who escaped the devastation of the deluge; and discoursed about music and intoxication, and things yet prior to these. For all these particulars have been discussed, for the purpose of perceiving how a city may be inhabited in the best manner, and how every private individual in it may lead the most excellent life. But if by all this we have accomplished anything of consequence, what can be said against us, O Megillus and Clinias?

Clinias/ I seem to myself, O guest, to perceive something. For it appears that we have fortunately discussed all these particulars. For I nearly am at present in want of them; and both you and Megillus here have very opportunely met with me. For I will not conceal from you that which has now

happened to me, but I will make it serve as an omen. The greatest part of Crete, then, endeavors at present to establish a certain colony, and commits the management of it to the Cnossians. But the city of the Cnossians appoints me and nine others to manage this affair; and at the same time orders us to establish those laws which please us Cretans, and which may be collected from other nations. And if those of other nations shall appear to be better than our own, it enjoins us not to reject them because they are foreign. We shall now, therefore, bestow this favor both upon ourselves and you. For, making a selection out of what has been said, we shall establish a city in our discourse, and consider it from the first time of its being inhabited. For thus a consideration of the object of our inquiry will take place, and which at the same time may be useful to me in the establishment of my future city.

Athenian Stranger/ You do not announce war, O guest. Unless, therefore, it should not be agreeable to Megillus, be persuaded that I shall give you every assistance in my power.

Clinias/ You speak well.

Megillus/ You may likewise depend on my assistance.

Athenian Stranger/ You both speak in the most becoming manner. Let us therefore endeavor, in the first place, to build a city in discourse.

THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

Book 4.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, what kind of a city is it proper to think this should be? I do not now ask about its present or future name (for this, perhaps, may be owing to its colonization, or some particular place; or, perhaps, the surname of some river or fountain, or of the Gods there resident, may have given a denomination to the new city by its celebrity); but this is rather what I wish to ask concerning it, whether it is situated near the sea, or on the main land?

Clinias/ The city, of which we are now speaking, O guest, is distant from the sea about eighty stadia.

Athenian Stranger/ Are there any ports near it, or is it entirely without a port?

Clinias/ It is furnished with ports, O guest, in the greatest possible degree.

Athenian Stranger/ Strange! What do you say? But is this region likewise all-prolific, or is it indigent of some things?

Clinias/ It is nearly indigent of nothing.

Athenian Stranger/ Is any city situated near it?

Clinias/ Not very much so; on which account it became colonized. For, an ancient expulsion of the inhabitants having taken place in this city, the country was rendered desolate for an immense space of time.

Athenian Stranger/ But how is it circumstanced with respect to plains, mountain, and woods?

Clinias/ It is similar to the whole of the rest of Crete.

Athenian Stranger/ Do you mean to say that it is more rough than plain?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ It is not therefore incurably unfit for the acquisition of virtue. For, if it was situated near the sea, and abounded with ports, but was not all-prolific, but

indigent of many things, it would require for itself some mighty savior, and certain divine legislators, that it might be preserved from many various and depraved manners to which it would be naturally disposed. But now its distance of eighty stadia becomes its consolation. It is indeed situated nearer the sea than is becoming, on which account it abounds as you say with ports; but, at the same time, this is a desirable circumstance. For the vicinity of the sea to this region renders it every day pleasant, though this proximity is in reality extremely salt and bitter. For, filling it with the desire of gain, through merchandize, it produces in the souls of the inhabitants craft and unfaithfulness; and thus renders the city both unfaithful and unfriendly to itself, and in a similar manner to other nations. As a consolation, however, under these disadvantages, it possesses an all-prolific soil; but, being rough, it is evident that it will not be abundantly, though it is all-prolific. For, if this were the case, in consequence of great exportation, it would again possess gold and silver coin in abundance; a greater evil than which cannot, as I may say, exist, if one thing is compared with another, nor can anything in a city be more adverse to the possession of generous and just manners, as, if we recollect, we said before.

Clinias/ We do recollect; and we allow that what was then and is now said is right.

Athenian Stranger/ But what? Does this region possess materials proper for building ships?

Clinias/ It has not any fir-trees which deserve to be mentioned, nor yet any pines. It likewise has not many cypress trees; and very few plane- or pitch-producing trees are to be found in it, which shipwrights necessarily use in constructing the interior parts of ships.

Athenian Stranger/ In this respect likewise the nature of the country is not badly disposed.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Because it is good for a city to be incapable of easily imitating its enemies in base imitations.

Clinias/ On account of which of the things that have been advanced do you speak in this manner?

Athenian Stranger/ Observe me, O divine man! I am looking to that which was asserted in the beginning about the Cretan laws, which you said regarded one particular, viz. war; but I said that such laws, because they were established with a view to virtue, were well established; but because they regarded only a part, and not the whole of virtue, I did not altogether approve of them. Do you therefore observe me in the present business of legislation, and consider whether I legally establish anything tending to virtue, or to any part of virtue. For it is with me a fundamental position, that he only establishes laws in a proper manner, who, like an archer, always directs his attention thither where alone something of the beautiful in conduct will always follow, but who leaves all other things, whether riches or anything else of this kind, when they subsist without beautiful manners. But I call the imitation of enemies then vicious, when anyone residing near the sea is injured by enemies, as in the following instance. For I will relate a circumstance to you, though not with any intention of calling to mind a past injury. Minos, in consequence of possessing great power by sea, imposed a heavy tribute on the Attic region. But the Athenians at that time had not ships of war as at present; nor did their country abound in wood well adapted for building ships. Hence they could not, through nautical imitation, becoming themselves sailors, immediately at that time defend themselves against their

enemies. And they would have done better if they had often lost seven young men, instead of suffering that which happened to them. For, instead of fighting on land, and in a legal manner, in consequence of becoming sailors they were accustomed to leap running in close array into the ships, and again rapidly to abandon them; and appeared to themselves to act in no respect base, in not daring to die, and wait for the attacks of the enemy. But they had a plausible pretext at hand, asserting that, by throwing away their arms, they could not be accused of shameful flight. They say, that language of this kind came to be adopted in consequence of naval engagements; language by no means worthy of infinite praise, but the contrary. For it is never proper to be accustomed to base manners, and especially for the best part of the citizens. But it appears from Homer, that a conduct of this kind is not beautiful. For Ulysses reproves Agamemnon for exhorting the Greeks, who at that time were engaged in fight against the Trojans, to draw their ships to the sea. But Ulysses thus reproves him:

> "Is this a general's voice, that calls to flight
> While war hangs doubtful, while his soldiers fight?
> What more could Troy? What yet their fate denies
> Thou giv'st the foe: all Greece becomes their prize.
> No more the troops (our hoisted sails in view,
> Themselves abandon'd) shall the fight pursue;
> But thy ships flying, with despair shall see,
> And owe destruction to a prince like thee."

Homer therefore knew that three-banked galleys prepared for flight were bad in naval engagements. For lions, by using manners of this kind, might be accustomed to fly from stags. Besides this, the naval powers of cities do not together with safety bestow honors on the most beautiful of warlike concerns. For, in consequence of naval affairs subsisting through piloting, the government of fifty men, and rowing,

men of all-various descriptions and of no great worth being employed for these purposes, no one can bestow honors upon individuals in a proper manner. Though deprived of this, how can a polity be in a good condition?

Clinias/ It is nearly impossible. But, O guest, we Cretans say that the naval battle at Salamis of the Greeks against the Barbarians preserved Greece.

Athenian Stranger/ And, indeed, many both of the Greeks and Barbarians assert the same thing. But we, my friend, viz. I and Megillus here, say, that the pedestrians battle at Marathon and Platææ was the one the beginning, and the other the end, of safety to the Greeks. And, in short, that we may speak of the battles which at that time preserved us, some of them were advantageous, but others not so, to the Greeks. For to the battle at Salamis I add that at Artemisium. But now, looking to the virtue of a polity, let us consider the nature of the region, and the order of the laws; not thinking, with the vulgar, that to be preserved, and to exist, is alone to mankind the most honorable of all things, but to become and continue to be the most excellent characters during the whole period of their existence. And this I think has been said by us in the former part of our discourse.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ We will therefore alone consider this, if we are in that path which is best for a city, respecting habitations, and the establishment of laws.

Clinias/ And we are very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Inform me, therefore, as that which is consequent to these things. who the people are that are to inhabit your colony; whether such as are willing from every part of Crete, so as that a great multitude will be collected from its several cities; or whether they are such as are

chosen for the purpose of cultivating the land? For you do not collect such of the Greeks as are willing; though I see that some of you from Argos, and Ægina, and other parts of Greece, inhabit this region. But inform me at present whence you will derive this army of citizens.

Clinias/ I think it will be procured from the whole of Crete. And it appears to me that those from Peloponnesus will be received for inhabitants, in preference to the other Greeks. For, what you said just now you said truly: I mean, that these are from Argos: for the race which is most celebrated here at present is Gortynic, because it migrated hither from the Peloponnesian Gortyna.

Athenian Stranger/ This establishment of a colony, therefore, is not similarly easy to cities, since it does not take place after the manner of a swarm of bees, one race of friends proceeding from one region, and from friends, in order to form a settlement, being as it were besieged by a certain narrowness of land, or forced by other inconveniences of a similar nature. But it sometimes happens that a part of a city, being violently urged by seditions, is compelled to settle in some other place. And sometimes a whole city is, forced to fly, in consequence of being vanquished in war. It is, therefore, partly easy for these to be colonized, and governed by laws, and partly difficult. For, when a colony is of one race, speaking the same language, and obeying the same laws, it is united by a certain friendship, and has a communion of priests, and everything else of a similar kind; but it will not easily endure different laws, and a polity foreign to its own. But such a colony, having been forced to sedition through the badness of its laws, and still desiring through custom those pristine manners by which it was corrupted, becomes, in consequence of this, refractory and disobedient to its colonizer and legislator. But when a colony is composed of all-various tribes, it will perhaps be more

willingly obedient to certain new laws; but to conspire together, and, like horses under one yoke, to blow as it is said the same blast, requires a long time, and is extremely difficult. But legislation and the establishment of cities are the most perfect of all things with respect to the virtue of men.

Clinias/ It is probable; but inform me in a yet clearer manner why you asserted this.

Athenian Stranger/ O good man, I appear to myself, while praising and speculating about legislators, to have said something vile. But, if we have spoken opportunely, there will be no difficulty in the affair. Though, indeed, why should I be disturbed? for nearly all human affairs appear to subsist in this manner.

Clinias/ Of what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ I was about to say, that no man ever at any time established laws, but that fortunes and all-various events, taking place in an all-various manner, gave us all our laws. For either war by its violence has subverted polities and changed laws, or the anxiety of severe poverty. Diseases also have caused many innovations; and these have often been produced through pestilences, and unseasonable times enduring for many years. He who considers all these things will think it fit to exclaim, as I just now did, that no mortal ever established any laws, but that all human affairs are nearly governed by fortune. But he who asserts all this respecting navigation, piloting, medicine, and military command, will appear to speak well. This also may be properly asserted respecting these things.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That divinity, and, together with divinity, fortune and opportunity, govern all human affairs. But a third of a milder nature must be admitted, —I mean,

that art ought to follow these. For I am of opinion, that it would make a great difference, during a storm, whether you possessed the pilot's art, or not. Or how do you say?

Clinias/ That it would.

Athenian Stranger/ Will not the same consequence ensue in other things? But, indeed, we must attribute the same thing to legislation; that, other things concurring which are requisite to the living happily in a country, a legislator endued with truth ought not to be wanting to such a city.

Clinias/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Ought not, therefore, he who possesses art in each of the above-mentioned particulars, to pray that something may be properly present with him through fortune, that he may not wholly trust to art?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And would not all the rest that we have just now mentioned speak in this manner, if anyone should call upon them to disclose their prayer?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ And I think that a legislator also will do the same.

Clinias/ So I think.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, legislator (for we will now address him), What, and after what manner, shall we give you a city, so that from the things which are left in it you may be able sufficiently to govern the city? What will he rightly assert after this? Shall we not say, that the legislator will thus speak?

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ Thus. Give me a city governed by a tyrant, he will say. But let the tyrant be a young man, of a good memory, docile, brave, and naturally magnificent. And

let that which, we said before, ought to follow all the parts of virtue, take place in the soul of the tyrant, in order that some advantage may be derived from other things being present.

Clinias/ Our guest, O Megillus, appears to me to say that temperance should follow the other virtues. Is it not so?

Athenian Stranger/ I speak, O Clinias, of popular temperance, and not of that which anyone extolling would call prudence; but I mean that temperance which immediately and naturally blossoms forth in boys and savage animals, so that some are incontinent with respect to pleasures, but others continent. And this temperance, when subsisting separate from the multitude of things which are called good, I do not consider as worthy to be mentioned. Do you understand me?

Clinias/ Perfectly.

Athenian Stranger/ This nature, therefore, our tyrant must possess in addition to the other natures we have mentioned, if the city is to receive a polity, through which it may live most happily in the swiftest and best manner possible. For no disposition of a polity can ever be more rapid or more excellent than this.

Clinias/ But how, O guest, and by what arguments, may anyone who asserts this persuade himself that he speaks properly?

Athenian Stranger/ It is easy to understand, O Clinias, that this is naturally so.

Clinias/ How do you say? Do you not mean to assert, if the tyrant is a young man, temperate, docile, of a good memory, brave, magnificent, and fortunate?

Athenian Stranger/ Add nothing else, except that he proves to be a legislator worthy of praise, and that a certain fortune leads him to this. For, this taking place, everything will nearly be accomplished by a divine nature, which it

brings to pass when it is willing that any city should be eminently prosperous. But this will happen in the second degree, when two such characters are the governors: in the third degree, when three: and the difficulty of a prosperous government will be increased in proportion to the number of such governors. But, on the contrary, the facility will be increased in proportion to the paucity of such governors.

Clinias/ You appear to assert that the best city is produced from a tyranny, in conjunction with a most excellent legislator and a modest tyrant; and that it is easily and rapidly changed into the former from the latter: that the best city in the second degree is produced from an oligarchy; and in the third degree, from a democracy. Or how do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ Not this, by any means. But that the first is produced from a tyranny; the second, from a royal polity; the third, from a certain democracy; and in the fourth place, an oligarchy will be able to receive a generation of this kind with the utmost difficulty. For, in this mode of government, the powerful are very numerous. But we say that these things will then take place, when a true legislator, and who is naturally such, shall be found; and when a certain strength shall happen to him in common with those in the city, who are able to accomplish that which is of the greatest consequence. But where the governors are the fewest in number, and at the same time the most strong, as in a tyranny, there this mutation is accustomed to take place in a rapid and easy manner.

Clinias/ How do you mean? For I do not understand you.

Athenian Stranger/ And yet I think you have heard this, not once, but often. But perhaps you never saw a city under the dominion of a tyrant.

Clinias/ Nor am I desirous of such a spectacle.

Athenian Stranger/ But you may see that in it which we have just now spoken of.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That a tyrant who wishes to change the manners of a city has no occasion either of great labor, or a long time, for the accomplishment of his purpose. For, if he wishes to exhort the citizens to the study of virtue, it is necessary that he should be the first who proceeds in the road leading to it; but if to the contrary, he should first set them the example. For he ought to express all things in himself by acting; praising and honoring some things, but blaming others, and disgracing those who in their several actions are disobedient to his commands.

Clinias/ How is it possible not to be of opinion that the other citizens will rapidly follow him who is endued with such persuasion and force?

Athenian Stranger/ No one will be able to persuade us, O friends, that a city will change its laws swiftly and easily by anything else than the command of its governors. For this does not happen at present by any other means, nor ever will. Indeed, this is neither difficult for us, nor impossible to be accomplished. But another thing is difficult to be accomplished, and rarely takes place in a long time; though, when it happens, it produces in the city in which it is found ten thousand advantages, and, indeed, every good.

Clinias/ Of what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ When a divine love of temperate and just pursuits is inherent in certain mighty authorities, whether they govern according to a monarchy, according to transcendency in wealth, or nobility of race. Or when anyone restores the nature of Nestor, who is said to have excelled all men in strength of speaking, and still more in the temperance of his life. This man, therefore, they say, was

born in the Trojan times, but by no means in ours. If, then, such a man either formerly was, or will be, or at present subsists among us, he must himself live in a blessed manner, and those must be blessed who hear the words proceeding from his temperate mouth. In a similar manner we must reason respecting all power; as that, when the greatest power in a man falls into the same with acting prudently and temperately, then the generation of the best polity and the best laws is produced, but never otherwise. These things, therefore, which are spoken as if they were a certain fable, have been uttered in an oracular manner: and it has been shown, that it is partly difficult for a city to have good laws; and that partly, if what we have spoken of should take place, it would happen the most rapidly of all things, and in the shortest time.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us therefore now endeavor, adapting these things to your city, like old men to boys, to fashion laws in discourse.

Clinias/ Let us endeavor to do this, and no longer delay.

Athenian Stranger/ But let us invoke Divinity in constituting the city. And may he hear, and hearing be present with us, in a propitious and benevolent manner, adorning, in conjunction with us, the city and the laws!

Clinias/ May he, therefore, come!

Athenian Stranger/ But what kind of polity have we in our mind to impart to the city?

Clinias/ Inform me yet more clearly what you wish to say; whether it is a certain democracy, or oligarchy, or aristocracy, or a royal government. For we do not think that you will speak of a tyranny.

Athenian Stranger/ Come, then, which of you is willing first to answer me, and declare which of these is the government of his country?

Megillus/ Is it more just that I, who am the elder, should speak first?

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Megillus/ When I consider then, O guest, the polity in Lacedæmon, I cannot tell you what it ought to be called; for it appears to me to be similar to a tyranny. For the power of the ephori in it is wonderfully tyrannical. Though sometimes it appears to me to be the most similar of all cities to a democracy. But yet, again, not to say that it is an aristocracy is perfectly absurd. There is also a kingdom for life in it, and which is said to be the most ancient of all kingdoms, both by all men and by us. I therefore, being thus suddenly asked, cannot, as I have said, definitely inform you which of these polities it is.

Clinias/ I too, O Megillus, appear to be affected in the same manner as yourself. For I am perfectly doubtful which of these I should call the polity in Cnossus.

Athenian Stranger/ For you, O most excellent men, truly participate of polities; but those which are now so called are not polities, but habitations of cities, in which one part is subject to the dominion of another, and each is denominated from the power of the despot. But if a city ought to be denominated after this manner, it is fit that it should be called by the name of a divinity, who is the true ruler of those that are endued with intellect.

Clinias/ But who is this God?

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we then for a little while make use of a fable, in order that we may unfold in a becoming manner the object of our inquiry? Will it not be proper to do so?

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ A long time then prior to those habitations of cities which we have before discussed, a certain government and habitation is said to have subsisted under Saturn; a government extremely happy, and of which the present aristocracies are an imitation.

Megillus/ It is proper, as it appears, to attend to this vehemently.

Athenian Stranger/ It appears so to me; and on this account I have introduced it into our discourse.

Megillus/ It is well done: and you will act very properly by proceeding with the fable as far as is necessary to your design.

Athenian Stranger/ I shall do as you say. We learn, then, from the report of the blessed life of the inhabitants of that time, that they possessed all things in abundance, and spontaneously produced; of which the following is said to be the cause: Saturn, well knowing (as we have already observed) that no human nature, when endued with absolute dominion, is so sufficient to itself as not to be filled with insolence and injustice, in consequence of understanding this, placed over our cities, as kings and governors, not men, but dæmons of a more divine and excellent kind; just as we do at present with flocks of sheep and herds of tame cattle. For we do not make oxen governors of oxen, nor goats of goats; but we ourselves rule over them, as being of a better race. In a similar manner this God, who is a lover of mankind, placed over us the race of dæmons, as being more excellent than our species. But these taking care of our concerns, with great facility both to themselves and us, imparted to us peace and shame, liberty and abundance of justice, and rendered the human race exempt from sedition, and happy. This our present discourse, therefore,

employing truth, asserts, that such cities as are not governed by a divinity, but by some mortal, will never be exempt from evils and labors: but it is of opinion that we ought, by all possible means, to imitate the life which is said to have been under Saturn; and that, being obedient to as much of immortality as is inherent in our nature, we should govern both publicly and privately our houses and cities, calling law the distribution of intellect. For, if one man, or a certain oligarchy, or democracy, possessing a soul aspiring after pleasures and desires, and requiring to be filled with these, but not being able to retain them, should be tormented with an insatiable vicious disease; —such a one, when governing either a city or an individual, would trample on the laws; and, as we just now said, under such a dominion there could be no possibility of obtaining safety. But it is necessary to consider, O Clinias, whether we ought to be persuaded by this discourse, or not.

Clinias/ It is necessary that we should be persuaded.

Athenian Stranger/ You understand, therefore, that they say there are as many species of laws as of polities. But we have already related how many species of polities there are said to be by the multitude. Nor should you think that our present inquiry is about something vile, but that it is about a thing of the greatest moment. For, to what the just and the unjust ought to look, again becomes to us a thing of an ambiguous nature. For they say that the laws ought not to look either to war, or to the whole of virtue, but rather to that which is advantageous to the subsistence of a polity, so that it may always govern, and never be dissolved: and they say that the definition of the just will thus be naturally beautiful.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ Because it is advantageous to that which is more excellent.

Clinias/ Speak yet more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ That which has dominion, say they, always establishes the law, in a city. Is not this what they say?

Clinias/ You speak truly.

Athenian Stranger/ Do you think, therefore, say they, that ever at any time, whether the people are victorious, or any other polity, or a tyranny, he who establishes the laws will voluntarily establish them, looking to anything else in the first place than his own advantage, viz. the stability of his dominion?

Clinias/ For how should he?

Athenian Stranger/ He, therefore, who transgresses these laws when established, will be punished by the legislator (who will denominate his laws just) as acting unjustly.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ This, therefore, will always be the case, and in this manner the just will subsist.

Clinias/ According to this doctrine it will be so.

Athenian Stranger/ For this is one of those iniquities which take place about government.

Clinias/ What iniquities?

Athenian Stranger/ It is one of those which we then considered when we discoursed about governors and the governed. And we then said, that parents ought to rule over their progeny, the older over the younger, the noble over the ignoble; and other things, in short, some of which, if you remember, were a hindrance to others, among which this was one. We likewise mentioned that Pindar said, it was both

according to nature and just that the most powerful should lead.

Clinias/ These things, indeed, were then said.

Athenian Stranger/ But consider to what persons our city ought to be committed. For a circumstance of this kind takes place ten thousand times in certain cities.

Clinias/ Of what kind?

Athenian Stranger/ When a contest about dominion happens, those who are victorious so vehemently usurp the affairs of the city, as not to communicate any part of the government to the vanquished, nor to their progeny; always being careful left anyone of these, if invested with authority, should cause an insurrection, through a remembrance of the evils which he had formerly suffered. At present, we doubtless say, those are neither polities, nor upright laws, which are not established in common for the sake of the whole city. But those who establish these for the sake of any parts of the city, we denominate seditious, but not citizens; and we say that the things which they call just are called so by them in vain. But these things are asserted by us on this account, because we shall not give your city any magistrate who is rich, or who possesses anything else of this kind, such as strength or magnitude, or illustrious birth; but we shall give it one who will be most obedient to the legislator, and who will surpass all in the city in this respect. We likewise say that the greatest attention to the worship of the Gods must be attributed to the first in power; the second degree of attention to him who is second in authority; and that everything consequent to this must be distributed in an orderly manner. But those that are called governors I have now denominated servants to the laws, not for the sake of innovation with respect to names, but because I think that the city will obtain safety from this more than from anything;

and that by neglecting it the contrary will take place. For I see that destruction hangs over that city in which law does not govern the magistrates, but magistrates the law. But in that city in which the law possesses absolute dominion over the governors, and the governors are slaves to the law, I behold safety, and such other goods as the Gods impart to cities.

Clinias/ By Zeus, it is so, O guest! For, through your age, you perceive acutely.

Megillus/ For every man, while he is young, perceives these things obtusely; but, when old, most acutely.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ But what is next to be done? Ought we not after this to consider the inhabitants of our city as having arrived, and being present, and to finish the remaining part of our discourse to them?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us, therefore, thus address them: Divinity, O men, according to an ancient saying, containing in himself the beginning, end, and middle of all things, bounds by a circular progression that which is direct according to nature. But justice always follows him, the punisher of those who desert the divine law, and which will be followed in a humble and composed manner by him who intends to be happy in future. But he who is elevated by arrogance, either because he excels in riches or honors, or in the form of his body, having his soul inflamed with insolence in addition to his youthfulness and privation of intellect, as one who is not in want either of a governor or a leader, but is himself sufficiently able to lead others, —such a one is left destitute of divinity. But being thus left destitute, and meeting with others similar to himself, he exults, at the same time causing a general confusion. And to many,

indeed, he appears to be a person of consequence; but in no long time afterwards, suffering an unblameable punishment from justice, he entirely subverts himself, his house, and his country. Since these things, therefore, are thus disposed, what ought a prudent man to do, or to think, and from what ought he to abstain, both in action and thought?

Clinias/ It is evident, that every man ought to think how he may be of the number of those who follow divinity.

Athenian Stranger/ What action, therefore, is friendly to and attendant on divinity? One indeed, and which possesses an ancient reason, is this, that the similar will be friendly to the similar which is moderate; but that the immoderate are neither friendly to each other nor to the moderate. But divinity, indeed, is in the most eminent degree the measure to us of all things, and much more, as it is said, than any man. He, therefore, who becomes friendly to a nature of this kind must necessarily become such to the utmost of his power. But, according to this reasoning, every temperate man is a friend to divinity, for he is similar to him. But the intemperate man is dissimilar, different, and unjust; and other things from the same reasoning will take place in a similar manner. But we should understand that which is consequent to these things, and which in my opinion is *the most beautiful*, and THE MOST TRUE of all assertions, that for a good man to sacrifice to and be conversant with the gods, is of all things the most beautiful, the best, and the most useful to the possession of a happy life; and that, besides this, it is in the highest degree becoming; but the contraries of these things naturally happen to the vicious man. For the vicious man is unpurified in his soul, but the contrary character is pure. But to receive gifts from one who is defiled, can never become either a good man or a God. In vain, therefore, do the unholy bellow much labor about the Gods; but such labor is most opportune to all holy men. Such then

is the scope which we ought to regard. What therefore shall we say the arrows are, and what the impulse by which they will be most properly directed? In the first place we must say, that he who after the Olympian Gods, and those who preside over the city, honors the terrestrial Gods, by attributing to them things even, secondary, and on the left hand, will in the most proper manner reach the mark of piety. But to the Gods superior to these he will attribute things according to the odd number, and dissonant to the particulars we have just now mentioned. But after these Gods a wise man will celebrate the orgies of dæmons, and after these of heroes. In the next place, statues must follow of the household Gods, which must be severally sacrificed to according to law. After these things, such honors as are lawful must be paid to living parents. For to these the first, greatest, and most ancient of all debts are to be paid. For everyone ought to think, that the whole of his possessions belongs to those by whom he was begotten and educated, and that he ought to supply their wants from these to the utmost of his power; beginning in the first place from his external possessions; in the second place, supplying them from those of his body; and, in the third place, from those of his soul: imparting all these, in order to discharge the debt which he owes his parents for the care they have bestowed upon him, and the pangs of labor which his mother formerly endured on his account. He must support them too in old-age, when they want assistance in the highest degree. It is likewise requisite through the whole of life to speak of our parents in the most honorable manner, because there is a most heavy punishment for light and winged words. For Nemesis, the angel of justice, is the inspector of all men in things of this kind. It is necessary, therefore, to be submissive to them when they are angry and full of rage, whether their anger shows itself in words or in deeds, as not

being ignorant that a father may very properly be angry with his son, when he thinks that he has been injured by him. But, on the death of parents, the most decent and beautiful monuments are to be raised to them; not exceeding the usual magnitude, nor yet less than those which our ancestors erected for their parents. Every year, too, attention ought to be paid to the decoration of their tombs. They ought likewise to be continually remembered and reverenced—and this with a moderate expense, adapted to the condition of our fortune. By always acting, therefore, and living in this manner, we shall each of us be rewarded according to our deserts, both by the Gods and those natures superior to our own, and shall pass the greatest part of our life in good hope. But the course of the laws themselves will show in what manner we ought to behave towards our offspring, relations, friends, fellow-citizens, and strangers, so as to conduct ourselves piously towards all these, and render our life pleasant, and adorned according to law; and this it will accomplish, partly by persuading, and partly by punishing through violence and justice, such manners as will not submit to persuasion; and thus, through the favoring will of the Gods, will render our city blessed and happy. But what a legislator whose conceptions are the same as mine ought necessarily to say of these things, but which cannot be adapted to the form of law, it appears to me an example should be presented, both to the legislator and those to whom he gives laws; and that, having discussed what remains to the utmost of our ability, we should after this commence the thesis of laws. Such things, indeed, cannot be easily comprehended in one description, so as to explain the manner in which they subsist; but we may thus be able to assert something stable respecting them.

Clinias/ Inform me how.

Athenian Stranger/ I should wish them to be obedient to virtue: and it is evident that the legislator should endeavor to accomplish this in the whole of legislation.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ What has been said, therefore, appears to me to contribute something to that end; so that, if the soul of the hearer is not perfectly savage, it will attend with greater mildness and benevolence: hence, though we should not accomplish any great but a small matter, by rendering the hearer more benevolent, and by this means more docile, we ought to be perfectly satisfied. For facility is rare, nor is there an abundance of those who endeavor to become the most worthy characters in the greatest degree, and in the shortest time. But many proclaim Hesiod to be wise for asserting that the road to vice was smooth, and easy to be passed through, as being very short: "but (says he) the immortal Gods have placed sweat before virtue, and the road which leads to it is long and arduous, and, at first, rough; but, when we arrive at the summit, the path which before was difficult becomes easy."

Clinias/ And it appears to be well said.

Athenian Stranger/ Entirely so. But I am willing to explain to you the intention of my discourse.

Clinias/ Explain it then.

Athenian Stranger/ We will thus therefore direct our discourse to the legislator. Inform us, O legislator, whether, if you knew what we ought to do and say, you would not say so?

Clinias/ He necessarily would.

Athenian Stranger/ Did we not a little before hear you saying, that a legislator ought not to suffer poets to say just what they pleased? For they are ignorant that, when they assert anything contrary to the laws, it will injure the city.

Clinias/ You speak truly.

Athenian Stranger/ But if we should thus speak to him respecting the poets, shall we have spoken moderately?

Clinias/ On what account do you ask this question?

Athenian Stranger/ There is an ancient saying, O legislator, which is common among us, and is confirmed by all other nations, that a poet, when he sits on the tripod of the muse, is not in his right senses, but, like a fountain, readily pours forth the influx which he has received: and that, his art being imitative, he is often compelled, when representing men that are contrary to each other, to contradict himself; and does not know whether these things, or those, are true. But a legislator must not act in this manner in law, viz. he must not assert two different things about one thing, but always make one assertion about one thing. And you may perceive the truth of this from what you have just now said. For, since of sepulchers some exceed, others are deficient, and others are moderate, you, having chosen the last of these, have ordered them to be adopted, and have simply praised them. But I, if my wife was remarkably rich, and should order me to bury her, I would celebrate in a poem her magnificent sepulcher: but a parsimonious and poor man would praise a tomb which was, in some respect or other, deficient; and he who is moderately rich would praise a moderate sepulcher. But it is not proper that you should only speak of the moderate as you did just now, but that you should inform us what the moderate is, and how far it extends; for otherwise you will not as yet understand that a discourse of this kind is a law.

Clinias/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether, therefore, will he who presides for us over the laws order nothing of this kind in the beginning of the laws, but immediately inform us what

ought to be done, and what not, and, having appointed a fine, will turn himself to the establishing of another law, adding nothing of exhortation and persuasion to the promulgators of the laws? Just as different physicians cure in a different manner. But we will recall to our mind the methods which they employ; that, as boys entreat the physician to cure them in the gentlest manner, so we may implore the legislator to cure us by the mildest means. That I may explain, however, what I mean—we say that some are physicians, and others the servants of physicians; and these last we likewise call, in a certain respect, physicians. Do we not?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And do we call them so, whether they are free, or servants, who, through the orders of their masters, have acquired the art of medicine, both according to theory and experience, but are not naturally physicians like those who are free, who have both learnt the art from themselves, and instructed their children in it? Or do you consider these as forming two kinds of physicians?

Clinias/ Why should I not?

Athenian Stranger/ Do you, therefore, understand, that when in a city both servants and those who are free are sick, servants are for the most part cured by servants, who visit the multitude of the sick, and are diligently employed in the dispensatories; and this without either assigning or receiving any reason respecting the several diseases of the servants, but what they have found by experience to be efficacious they tyrannically prescribe for their patients, as if they possessed accurate knowledge; and thus, in an arrogant manner, hurry from one diseased servant to another; by this mean facilitating their master's attention to the sick? But the free-born physician, for the most part,

heals and considers the diseases of those who are free-born; and this, by exploring the disease from the beginning, and proceeding according to nature; conversing both with the sick man and his friends, and, at the same time, learning something himself from the sick, and teaching him something, so as not to order him to do anything till he has persuaded him of its propriety. But after this he always endeavors, in conjunction with persuasion, to lead him in a gentle manner to health. Which of these appears to be the better physician and exerciser, he who in this manner heals and exercises, or he who in that? He who accomplishes one power in a two-fold manner, or he who accomplishes it in one way, and this the worse and more rustic of the two?

Clinias/ The two-fold method, O guest, is by far the more excellent.

Athenian Stranger/ Are you willing, therefore, that we should consider this two-fold and simple method as taking place in the establishment of laws?

Clinias/ How is it possible I should not be willing?

Athenian Stranger/ Inform me then, by the Gods, what the first law will be which the legislator will establish. Will he not first of all adorn by his mandates the principle of the generation of cities?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But are not the mutual mixture and communion of marriages the principle of generation to all cities?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Nuptial laws, therefore, being first of all established, they will appear to be well established with respect to the rectitude of every city.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ We will, therefore, first of all speak of the simple law, which, perhaps, will subsist in the following manner. Everyone should marry from thirty to thirty-five years of age; but he who did not should be fined both with money and disgrace; with money to a certain amount, and with disgrace of this or that particular kind. Let this then be the simple law respecting marriages; but let the following be the two-fold law. Everyone should marry from thirty to thirty-five, considering, at the same time, that the human race participates from a certain nature of immortality, of which everyone is naturally desirous in the extreme. For the endeavor of mankind not to remain after death without a name is a desire of this kind. The human race, therefore, is something connate with the whole of time, following and being conjoined with it to the end, becoming immortal by leaving children of children, and participating of immortality through being one and the same by generation. For a man willingly to deprive himself of this, is by no means holy. But he intentionally deprives himself of this who neglects children and wife. He, therefore, who is persuaded by this law shall be liberated from the punishment of a fine. But he who is not obedient to it, and who is not married when he is thirty-five years of age, shall be fined every year a certain sum of money, that his solitary life may not appear to be profitable and pleasant to him; and that he may not partake of those honors which the younger in a city pay to the elder. These laws being compared with each other, it will be possible to judge of every particular law, whether it ought to be double, and of the smallest extension, on account of mingling threats with persuasions; or whether, alone employing threats, it should become simple in length.

Megillus/ Agreeably to the Laconic mode, O guest, the shorter ought always to be preferred. But if anyone should order me to become a judge of these writings, I should, if it

were left to my choice, adopt the longer law for a city. And according to this paradigm, if these two laws were proposed, I should choose the same respecting every law. It is, however, proper that the laws which we have now instituted should be approved by Clinias; for the city belongs to him for whose use these laws have been conceived by us.

Clinias/ You speak well, O Megillus.

Athenian Stranger/ To pay great attention, therefore, either to prolixity or brevity of writing is foolish in the extreme. For I think that the best writings, and not the longest or the shortest, are to be preferred. But, in the laws which we have just now spoken of, the one is not by the double alone more conducive to virtue than the other; but that which we said respecting the two-fold kind of physicians was most properly adduced. This, however, no legislator appears at any time to have considered. For, as it is possible to use two things in the establishment of laws, viz. persuasion and force, they alone employ one of these in managing the crowd who are void of erudition. For they do not mingle persuasion with force, but alone employ unmingled violence. But I, O blessed man, perceive that a third thing also should take place respecting laws, but which is not at present adopted.

Clinias/ Of what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ Of something arising, through a certain divinity, out of things which we have now discussed. For we began to speak about laws in the morning, and it is now noon; and, reposing in this all-beautiful retreat, we have discoursed of nothing else than laws. And we appear to me to have entered just now on the business of legislation; but all that has been said before by us was nothing more than a preface to laws. But to what purpose do we say this? It is because I wish to say, that of all discourses, and other things

which participate of sound, that is the preface, and, as it were, prelude, which possesses any artificial argumentation, and is useful to the intended discussion. And, indeed, of the laws, as they are called, of the ode belonging to the harp, and of every muse, prefaces precede which are wonderfully elaborate. But of true laws, which we say are political, no one has ever at any time led forth into light a preface either spoken or written; as if there were not naturally any such thing. But our present conversation appears to me to signify that there is one. The laws, however, which we just now called two-fold, are not simply so; but the law, and the preface of the law, are a certain two. However, that which we assimilated to a tyrannic mandate, and to the mandates of servile physicians, is mere, or unmingled, law. But that which was said prior to this, and was called persuasive, was in reality persuasive, but, with respect to discourse, had the power of a preface. For, that the mandate of the legislator, which is law, might be received more benignantly, and, through this, in a more docile manner, the whole of that discourse, which was calculated to persuade, was introduced by me. Hence, according to my decision, that discourse is a preface, and cannot properly be called a discussion of law. But, after this, what is it I am desirous should be said by me? It is this: that a legislator ought to introduce prefaces prior to all laws, and prior to each particular law, so far as they differ from each other, in the same respect as the two which we have just now mentioned.

Clinias/ For my part, I should never exhort a man skilled in these things to establish laws in any other manner.

Athenian Stranger/ You appear, therefore, to me, O Clinias, to speak well, so far as you say there should be a preface to all laws; and that, on commencing the business of legislation, it is requisite to prefer to every discourse an exordium naturally accommodated to the several laws. For

that which is to be said after this is not a thing of small importance, nor is the difference trifling, whether such things are commemorated in a clear, or in an obscure, manner. If, therefore, we should order legislators to preface in a similar manner about great and small laws, we should not act properly. For this is not to be done either in every song or in every discourse; because, though it may naturally belong to all, yet it is not useful to all. A thing of this kind, however, is to be allowed the rhetorician, the singer, and the legislator.

Clinias/ You appear to me to speak most true. But let us make no longer delay, but return to our proposed discourse, and begin, if it is agreeable to you, from those things which, not as prefacing, were asserted by you above. Again, therefore, as those that are engaged in sports say, let us revolve better things from a second beginning, as finishing a preface, and not a casual discourse, as was the case just now. Let us begin, then, acknowledging that we preface. And the particulars, indeed, respecting the honor of the Gods, and reverence of our ancestors, have been sufficiently discussed. Let us, therefore, endeavor to speak about what follows, till it shall appear to you that our preface is complete. And after this you may enter on the business of laws.

Athenian Stranger/ About the Gods, therefore, and the attendants on the Gods, together with parents both when living and dead, we then sufficiently prefaced, as we now say. With respect to what remains, you appear to me to order that it should be led forth into light.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But, after these things, it is proper to discourse in common about our souls, bodies, and possessions, together with serious pursuits and remissions

of labor, in such a manner that both the speaker and the hearers may, to the utmost of their power, be partakers of discipline. After what has been said, therefore, these things are to be truly spoken and heard by us.

Clinias/ You speak with the utmost rectitude.

THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.

Book 5.

Athenian Stranger/ Let everyone then hear who has already heard what we have said respecting the Gods, and our dear progenitors. For, after the Gods, a man's soul is the most divine of all his possessions, as being his most intimate property. But a man's possessions are in every respect two-fold. And the more excellent, and the better, possess dominion, but the inferior, and worse, are subject to command. The former, therefore, are always to be honored before the latter. Hence, I properly exhort every man, when I say that he ought to honor his own soul in the second place, after our lords, the Gods, and their attendants. But, in short, no one honors his soul properly, though he appears to do so. For honor is, in a certain respect, a divine good: but nothing evil is honorable. He, therefore, who thinks that he enlarges his soul by certain discourses or gifts, when, at the same time, he does not render it better than it was before, appears indeed to honor it, but by no means does so. For every man, from his very childhood, thinks himself sufficient to know all things, and that he honors his soul by praising it, and by freely permitting it to do whatever it pleases. But we now say that he who acts in this manner injures, and does not honor, his soul. And yet it is necessary, as we have said, that it should be honored in the second place after the Gods. Nor does he honor it who does not consider himself as the cause of his own errors, and of his numerous and mighty vices, but says the blame upon others, and is always careful to exonerate himself. Such a one appears, indeed, to honor it, though this is far from being the case: for he injures it. Nor does he in any respect honor his soul who gratifies himself with pleasures contrary to reason, and the praise of the legislator: for he dishonors it, by filling it with vice and repentance. Nor yet does a man honor his soul, when he does not strenuously endure labors that are praised, fear

and pain, but sinks under them: for by doing all these things he dishonors his soul. Nor, again, does he honor his soul, who thinks that to live is a thing in every respect good: for by such a conception he dishonors it. For he assents to him who thinks that everything in Hades pertaining to the soul is bad; nor does he oppose and teach him, that he is ignorant whether, on the contrary, the things about the Gods that dwell there are not the greatest of all goods. Nor yet, when anyone honors a certain corporeal beauty before virtue, is it at all different from truly and entirely dishonoring the soul. For such a one falsely asserts, that the body is more honorable than the soul. For nothing earth-born is more honorable than things Olympian. But he who entertains an opinion different from this, respecting the soul, is ignorant that he neglects this admirable possession. Nor, again, does he adorn his soul with gifts, who desires to possess riches in an unbecoming manner, or who is not grieved when he possesses them unjustly; but such a one entirely fails of accomplishing this. For he gives up that which is honorable, and at the same time beautiful, in his soul, for the sake of a little gold; when at the same time all the gold, which is both upon and under the earth, is in no respect of equal worth with virtue. In short, he who is not willing, by all possible means, to abstain from such things as the legislator ranks among the base and vicious, and to pursue to the utmost of his power such things as he places among the good and beautiful, does not perceive that, in all these things, he renders his soul, which is a most divine possession, in the highest degree dishonorable and base. For, in short, no one considers what is the greatest punishment of evil conduct; which is the becoming similar to vicious men. But he who becomes similar to them avoids good men and good assertions, separates himself from the good, becomes agglutinated to the vicious, and earnestly desires their

conversation. But, in consequence of intimately associating with these, he must necessarily do and suffer such things as they naturally do and say to each other. Such a passion, therefore, is not justice (for the just and justice are beautiful), but punishment; this being a passion attendant on injustice, of which both he who is a partaker, and he who does not partake, are miserable: —the one, because he is not cured; but the other, because, while many are saved, he perishes. But, that I may sum up the whole, our honor consists in following things of a more excellent nature, and in rendering such things as are worse, but yet are capable of being made better, as good as possible. No possession, therefore, belonging to a man is more naturally adapted to fly from evil, and to investigate and choose that which is the best of all things, than soul; nor, when it has chosen, to associate with it in common for the remainder of life. On this account, it must be honored in the second degree. But everyone will understand, that the third honor according to nature is that of the body. It is however requisite to contemplate these honors, and to consider which of them are true, and which adulterated. And this is the business of a legislator. But he appears to me to announce, what, and what kind of honors these are; as, that the body is honorable, not when it is beautiful, or strong, or swift, nor yet when it is large or healthy, (though under these circumstances it appears to be so to many,) nor when it has the contraries of these. But those things which, being in the middle, touch upon the whole of this habit, are by far more moderate and base. For the former render the soul arrogant and confident, but the latter humble and servile. The like takes place with respect to the possession of riches and property of every kind. For the possession of each of these, in a transcendent degree, produces hatred and sedition, both among cities and individuals. But slavery is for the

most part the consequence of a deficiency of these. No one, therefore, should apply himself to the acquisition of wealth for the sake of his children, that he may leave them rich in the extreme: for this will neither be better for them, nor for the city. For the property of young men, which is neither attended with adulation, nor indigent of things necessary, is the most harmonious, and the best of all. For, symphonizing and harmonizing with us in all things, it renders our life free from pain. It is proper, therefore, to leave children, not abundance of gold, but of modesty. But we think that we shall accomplish this by reproving impudent young men. This, however, is not to be accomplished by exhorting young men in the manner adopted at present, —I mean, by telling them that they ought to be modest in everything; but a prudent legislator will rather advise old men to behave modesty before youth, and above all things to take care that no young man, at any time, either sees or hears them doing or saying anything base. For, where old men are void of shame, there young men must necessarily be most impudent; since the most excellent discipline, both of young and old, consists, not in admonishing, but in acting through the whole of life agreeably to the admonitions of others. But he who honors and venerates the whole of his kindred, who participate of the same blood, and the same household Gods, will deservedly find those Gods propitious to him in the procreation of children. And besides this, he will obtain the benevolence of his friends and associates through life, who considers the attention which they pay him greater and more venerable than they do, but his own kindness towards them less than they do. But he will by far behave in the best manner, both towards his country and fellow citizens, who prefers the glory of being subservient to the laws of his country, to conquest in the Olympian games, and to all warlike and peaceful contests; and who is subservient to

them in the most becoming manner through the whole of life. The associations, too, with strangers should be considered as things most holy. For nearly all the crimes of strangers towards strangers are more noticed by avenging Deity than those of citizens towards each other. For, a stranger being destitute both of companions and kindred is an object of greater commiseration both to men and Gods. He, therefore, who is more capable of taking vengeance is more readily disposed to give assistance. But the hospitable dæmon and divinity of everyone, being the attendants of hospitable Zeus, are capable of taking vengeance in the most eminent degree. Everyone, therefore, who is endued with the least portion of consideration, should be very fearful through the whole of life of acting in an inhospitable manner. But, of all crimes which are committed both towards strangers and natives, those are the greatest which are committed towards suppliants. For the Divinity with whom the suppliant forms a covenant, becomes eminently the guardian of him in his affliction. So that no one who injures suppliants will go unpunished. And thus far we have nearly discussed the duties of children towards their parents, of a man towards himself, and the things belonging to himself; likewise of his duty towards his country, friends, kindred, strangers, and fellow citizens. It now follows that we show what qualities a man ought to possess so as that he may pass through life in the most becoming manner; and so that, not law, but praise and blame, instructing everyone, they may by these means be rendered more benevolent and obedient to those who are about to establish laws. And these are the things which after this must be subjects of our discourse. But truth is the leader of every good both to Gods and men: of which he who in futurity will be blessed and happy, must participate from the beginning, that for the greatest part of time he may pass through life in truth. For such a one is faithful. But he is

unfaithful who is a friend to voluntary falsehood. And he who is a friend to involuntary falsehood is deprived of intellect: neither of which is an object of emulation. For he who is unfaithful and void of discipline is unfriendly. And in progress of time, his character being known, near the end of life there is prepared for him the grievous solitude of old-age. So that, whether his associates and children live or not, he nearly leads, in either case, an orphan life. Indeed, he is honorable who acts in no respect unjustly: but he who does not suffer the unjust to act unjustly, deserves more than double the honor of the former character. For the former is of equal worth with one man, but the latter, with many men; since he announces to the governors the injustice of others. But he who punishes injustice, in conjunction with the governors, to the utmost of his power, such a one will be proclaimed a great and perfect man in the city; for he will be victorious in virtue. It is proper also to give the same praise to temperance and prudence. And he who possesses other goods, and is not only able to possess them himself, but to impart them to others, is to be honored as one who has attained the summit of excellence. But he who is not able to accomplish this, and yet is willing, is to be ranked in the second place: and the envious man, and he who will not impart any good for the sake of friendship, are to be blamed. We ought not, however, to dishonor the possession on account of the possessor, but should endeavor to obtain it with all our might. Everyone too should contend with us for virtue, without envy. For every character of this kind enlarges cities, in consequence of striving himself, and not impeding others through calumny. But the envious man, while he thinks to surpass others by detraction, tends less himself to true virtue, and renders those who mutually tend to it despondent, by blaming them unjustly. Hence, depriving the city of strenuous exertions in the acquisition

of virtue, he, at the same time, lessens its renown. It is proper, besides, that a man should be ardent in everything, and particularly that he should be mild. For it is impossible to avoid the unjust actions of others, which are either difficult to be cured, or are entirely incurable by any other means than contest, defense, victory, and by suffering no remission in punishment. But it is impossible for any soul to accomplish this without generous ardor.

With respect to such unjust actions as are curable, it is requisite to know, in the first place, that no unjust man is voluntarily unjust. For no one would, at any time, willingly possess any of the greatest evils, and much less in those things respecting himself which are most honorable. But soul, as we have said, is in reality in all things the most honorable. No one, therefore, would at any time voluntarily receive the greatest evil in that which is most honorable, and live through the whole of life possessing it. But the unjust man, and he who is vicious, are in every respect miserable. It is proper, however, to pity him who is capable of being cured, and to restrain our anger against him, lest, by an effeminate effervescence of anger, we should exhibit all the bitterness of wrath. But it is requisite to employ anger against those who are incontinently and incurably bad. Hence, we have said that every good man ought to be ardent, and at the same time mild. But an evil, which is the greatest of all evils, is implanted in the souls of many men, which (everyone pardoning himself) they do not devise any means of avoiding. And this is what is usually said, that every man is naturally a friend to himself, and that it is proper a thing of this kind ought to be. But, in reality, a vehement love of self is to every man the cause of all his errors. For he who loves is blind with respect to the object of his love. So that he who thinks he ought always to be honored in preference to truth, judges of things just, good, and beautiful, in a

depraved manner. For it is proper that he who is destined to be a great man should neither love himself, nor the things pertaining to himself, but that he should love just actions, whether they are accomplished by himself or by another. In consequence of this error, every man's ignorance appears to himself to be wisdom. Hence, in short, though we do not know anything, we are of opinion that we know all things. But, not permitting others to do that of which we ourselves are ignorant, we are compelled to err from their conduct. On this account every man ought to avoid the vehement love of himself, and to follow one better than himself, without paying any attention to shame. There are also certain lesser things, which are often said, and which, as they are not less useful than what has been already asserted. it is proper, recollecting ourselves, to mention. For, as if something was always flowing away from us, it is necessary that, on the contrary, there should be a perpetual influx of something. But recollection is an influx of prudence which had deserted us. It is proper, therefore, to restrain unbecoming laughter, and that every man should announce to every man the propriety of concealing all joy and sorrow, and of keeping the body in a becoming habit, whether the dæmon of anyone establishes him in felicity, or whether his fortune is such that he is obliged, with dæmons opposing him, to engage in actions of an elevated and arduous nature. But it is proper always to hope for those things which divinity imparts to the good; and when we are oppressed with heavy labors, we should hope that Divinity will diminish their weight, and change the present condition of our circumstances into one more favorable; and with respect to good things, the contraries of these, that they will always be present with us, with good fortune. With these hopes everyone ought to live, and with the recollection of all these things; not with a parsimonious recollection, but always, both seriously and in

sport, perspicuously reminding each other and ourselves of these particulars. And now we have nearly said all that is proper respecting those divine duties which everyone ought to perform, but we have not yet spoken concerning human duties. It is, however, necessary so to do: for we speak to men, and not to Gods. But pleasures, pains, and desires, are naturally in the highest degree human, from which it is necessary that the whole mortal animal should, with the greatest earnestness, be suspended. And it is requisite to praise the most becoming life, not only because in its form it excels in glory, but because, if anyone is willing to taste of it, and not when a youth to fly from it, he will also excel in that which we all are in search of, I mean the possession of more joy than sorrow through the whole of life. That this will clearly be the case, if anyone tastes of it in a proper manner, will readily and vehemently be apparent; but how this may be accomplished, and whether it is inherent in us naturally, or contrary to nature, it is requisite now to consider. We ought, however, to consider one life compared with another, the more pleasant and the more calamitous, in this manner. We wish that pleasure may be present with us, but we neither choose nor wish for pain. And we never wish for a middle condition instead of pleasure, but we desire it in preference to pain. We also wish for less pain with more pleasure, but we do not desire less pleasure with greater pain. But we can clearly show that we are unwilling to possess each of these in an equal manner. All these both differ and at the same time do not differ in multitude and magnitude, in intensity, equality, and such things as are contrary to all these, with respect to the choice of each. And as these particulars are thus circumstanced, we wish for that life in which many of both these greatly and vehemently subsist, but in which pleasures transcend; but we do not desire that life in which the contraries to these are inherent.

Nor, again, do we wish for that life in which a few of these, of a trifling and solitary nature, subsist, and in which afflictive circumstances transcend; but we desire that life in which the contraries to these are found. However, as we have said before, we ought to consider that life as subsisting in an equilibrium, in which these possess equal power. For we desire the life which surpasses in the things with which we are pleased; and we are unwilling to possess that which exceeds in the contraries to these. But it is necessary to consider all our lives as naturally bound in these; and besides this, what the things are which we naturally desire. If, therefore, we should say that we wish for anything besides these, we must say that it is through an ignorance and unskillfulness in lives. What then, and of what kind are those lives, in preferring which it is necessary that he who perceives what is the object of desire, and voluntary, and what are the contraries to these, should prescribe a law to himself, that thus having chosen that which is friendly, pleasant, the best, and the most beautiful, he may lead the most blessed life possible to man? We call then one life temperate, another prudent, another brave; and we rank in the fourth place a healthy life. We likewise establish four other lives contrary to these, viz. the imprudent, the timid, the intemperate, and the diseased. He, therefore, who knows what a temperate life is, will assert that it is mild in all things, and that it imparts quiet pains, quiet pleasures, placid desires, and loves not insane; but that an intemperate life is impetuous in all things, so that it imparts vehement pains, vehement pleasures, strenuous and furious desires, and the most insane loves. But in a temperate life the pleasures surpass the pains, and in an intemperate life the pleasures are surpassed by the pains, in magnitude, multitude, and density. Hence the one of these lives is necessarily more pleasant to us, according to nature, but the

other is more painful. And nature does not permit him, who wishes to live pleasantly, to live voluntarily in an intemperate manner. But it is evident, if what we have now asserted is right, that every intemperate man is necessarily unwillingly so. For the vulgar everywhere live indigent of temperance, either through the privation of discipline, or through incontinence, or through both. The same things are to be considered respecting a diseased and healthy life: as, that they possess pleasures and pains, but that the pleasures surpass the pains in a healthy life, but the pains the pleasures in diseases. Our will, however, in the choice of lives, does not consent that pain may transcend pleasure; but we judge the life in which it is surpassed to be more pleasant. And we say that the temperate man possesses in every respect things fewer, less, and more attenuated than the intemperate, the prudent than the imprudent, the brave than the timid; and that the one surpasses in pleasures, but the other in pains; so that the brave man surpasses the timid in pleasures, and the prudent the imprudent. And, in short, the life which participates of virtue, either pertaining to the body or the soul, is more pleasant than the life which participates of depravity; and besides this, it transcends other lives in beauty and rectitude, in virtue and glory; so that he who possesses it lives more happily than he who possesses the contrary life, in every respect, and totally. Here then let the preface to laws end.

But, after the preface, it is necessary that law should follow; or rather, according to truth, the laws of a polity are to be written. As, therefore, things which are woven are not all woven from the same threads, but there is a difference in the quality of the threads, for some are more firm and strong, but others softer and of a more yielding nature; in like manner it is necessary to judge of those that have great dominion in cities, and those that act only in everything from

trifling discipline. There are, however, two forms of a polity: the one, the establishment of governors; the other, that which gives laws to the governors themselves. But prior to all these things it is necessary to consider as follows: When a shepherd and herdsman, one who takes care of horses, and others of this kind, engage in their respective offices, they never attempt to take an care of them till they have first administered a purification adapted to each of them. And, besides this, choosing out the healthy and the sick, the noble and the ignoble, they send the former to other herds, but take care of the latter; considering that otherwise their labor would be vain about those bodies and souls which a depraved nature and aliment have corrupted; since, without separating in each of these herds the healthy and diseased manners and bodies from each other, they would perish by contagion. The attention, however, which is paid to other animals is indeed less, and is alone worthy to be mentioned for the sake of an example. But the legislator ought to pay the greatest attention to men, and should investigate and assert that which is accommodated to everyone, both respecting purification and all other actions. For that which concerns the purification of a city should subsist as follows: As there are many purifications, some of them are easy, but others difficult; and he who is both a tyrant and a legislator may be able to use such purifications as are difficult, and such as are the best. But the legislator who establishes anew polity and laws without the assistance of a tyrant, may rejoice, if he is able to purify with the mildest of purifications. The best purification is however painful; just as those medicines which unite justice with punishment, produce at length in the offending party either exile or death. For it is customary to free the city from those men who have perpetrated the greatest crimes, when they are found to be incurable, and have in the greatest degree injured the city;

but with us the following is a milder purification. For those that through want of food readily offer themselves to certain leaders, in order to assault those that are not in want, these, as being naturally the disease of a city, should be benignantly sent away, under the honorable appellation of a colony. Every legislator, therefore, should do this in the beginning of his legislation. But more difficult things than these happen to us at present. For it is not necessary to devise at present either a colony or any select purification: but as if there was a conflux of water, partly from fountains and partly from torrents, into one lake, it is necessary to observe how the confluent water will be most pure; partly by drawing, partly by deducing it into another channel, and partly by diverting its course. But labor and danger, as it appears, are to be found in every political establishment. However, since we are now engaged in discourse, and not in action, our selection is accomplished, and purification takes place according to our desire. For, having by every kind of persuasion, and for a sufficient length of time, examined those evil men who endeavor to enter our city in order to govern it, we shall forbid their entrance. But we shall admit the good, rendering them benevolent and propitious to the utmost of our power. The felicity, however, which has happened to us ought not to be concealed. For, as we say that the colony of the Heraclidæ was happy, because it escaped the dire and dangerous strife respecting the division of land and the discharge of debts, about which a city of the ancients being compelled to give laws, it did not permit anything to be immoveable, nor yet after a manner was it possible for anything to be moved; in like manner, the same thing appears nearly to have happened to us. But, in short, prayer alone remains, and a trifling mutation cautiously and slowly made in a great length of time; so that, in these mutations, the citizens, together with many debtors, will

possess abundance of land, with which they will give assistance to many, humanely imparting their land to the indigent, and contenting themselves with moderate possessions. They will likewise consider poverty as consisting, not in a diminution of property, but in an insatiable desire of acquiring more. For this is the greatest beginning of safety to a city; and upon this, as a stable foundation, every politic ornament, which is accommodated to an establishment of this kind, may be raised. But when this mutation is debile, no political action will afterwards be easily accomplished by the city. This, indeed, as we have said, we should avoid; but, at the same time, it may more properly be said, that, if we do not avoid it, we should show by what means this flight may be accomplished. We say then, that it is to be accomplished by cultivating justice, and banishing the desire of gain: but, besides this, there is no other, either broad or narrow, passage for flight. Let this then be established by us as a prop of the city. For it is necessary that the possessions which the citizens prepare for themselves should be blameless; or, that those should desist from advancing any further in the acquisition of property, who have an ancient enmity towards each other, and who participate but a small degree of intellect. But those to whom Divinity imparts, as it does to us at present, the establishment of a new city, in which the inhabitants have no enmity towards each other, —if through the distribution of land and habitations hatred should arise among them, — in this case it will not be human ignorance, but ignorance accompanied with every vice. What then will be the mode of proper distribution? In the first place, the quantity of the number ought to be determined. In the next place, it should be agreed into how many and what kind of parts the distribution to the citizens should be made. In the third place, the land and habitations should be distributed

equally, in the most eminent degree. But the quantity of the multitude cannot otherwise be properly assigned than by paying attention to the land and cities of the neighboring inhabitants. And the land, indeed, should be as much as is sufficient to afford nutriment for so many moderate men; but of more than this there is no occasion. But the number of these moderate persons should be sufficient to defend themselves against the incursions of their unjust neighbors, and likewise to give assistance to their neighbors when injured. Having then considered these things, we may be able to desire both actually and verbally the land and the neighboring inhabitants. But now, for the sake of a scheme and description, that the thing itself may be accomplished, our discourse proceeds to legislation. The number of the husbandmen, and those that defend the distribution of the land, should be five thousand and forty, this being a number adapted for the purpose. In like manner the land and the habitation should be distributed into the same parts, so that the man and his portion of land may accord in distribution. And in the first place, indeed, the whole number should be divided into two parts, and afterwards into three. It is likewise naturally capable of a division into four, five, and so in succession as far as to ten. Thus much, indeed, ought to be understood by every legislator respecting numbers; I mean, that he should understand what, and what kind of number will be most useful to all cities. But we say that that number is best adapted for this purpose, which possesses in itself many distributions, and these orderly disposed. For every number is not allotted sections into all things. But the number five thousand and forty, both for the purposes of war and peace, for all conventions and communions, for tributes and distributions, cannot be cut into more than one of sixty parts; but you may continue the division of it from one as far as to ten. These things, however, ought to be more

firmly considered at leisure, by those to whom they are committed by the law; for they cannot subsist otherwise than in this manner. But it is necessary that they should be mentioned to the founder of a city, for the sake of what follows. For, whether anyone establishes a new city from the beginning, or whether he restores an ancient one that has perished, —if he is endued with intellect, he will not attempt to make any alterations in anything which ought to, be performed respecting the Gods, their temples, and their sacred concerns, or the names of certain Gods or dæmons, which ought to be given to temples; whether these ceremonies are derived from Delphi, or Dodona, or Ammon, or from certain ancient discourses, by which some persons have been persuaded; or whether they have been the result of divine visions and inspiration. For, in consequence of being persuaded of their truth, the ancients established sacrifices mixed with mystic ceremonies; whether these originated from the natives themselves, or whether they are of Tyrrhene, or Cyprian, or of any other origin. But, from these ancient discourses and rumors, they consecrated statues, altars and temples, and placed each in a sacred grove. 'In all these the legislator should not make the smallest innovation; but should attribute to each of the parts, a God, a dæmon, or a certain hero. And in the distribution of the land, he should in the first place select a portion for illustrious groves and other sacred purposes, so that the inhabitants of each of the parts, assembling at slated times, may with facility prepare themselves for their respective employments, so as during the sacrifices to associate benevolently with and recognize each other. For *nothing is more advantageous to a city than for the citizens to be known to each other*; *since*, *where each has no light in the manners of each*, *but darkness*, *there neither honors nor governors are properly appointed*, *nor can anyone obtain*, *in*

a becoming manner; *the justice which is due to him*. But every man, one towards one, ought earnestly to endeavor in all cities, that he may never appear insincere to anyone, but may be always artless and true, and that, being such, no other person may deceive him. But the throw which follows this, in the establishment of laws, like that of chess-men, according to the proverb, from a temple, since it is unusual, may perhaps cause him who hears it at first to wonder. But to him who has reasoned upon, and tried it, it will appear that the city will thus, in the second place, be inhabited in the best manner. Someone, however, perhaps, will not approve of this city, because it does not employ a tyrannic legislator. It will, indeed, be most proper to speak of the best polity, and likewise of a second and third, and then leave it to everyone's option to choose that which pleases him the most. We therefore shall act in this manner; and, after we have spoken of a polity which is first, of one which is second, and of another which is the third in virtue, we shall leave it to the option of Clinias, and any other who may be present at the selection of these, to attribute to his country whichever of them he pleases. The first city and polity, therefore, and the best laws, subsist there where through the whole city that ancient proverb takes place in the most eminent degree, that all things are common among friends. This then must be asserted, whether it now is or ever was adopted, that women, children, and all possessions should be common; and that private property should by all possible means be exterminated from life. Things too which are private by nature should everywhere, as much as possible, become common; such as the eyes, the ears, and the hands. For seeing, hearing, and acting, should be employed for common advantage. In like manner, all men should praise and blame the same things, rejoice in and be afflicted with the same circumstances, and as much as possible adopt

such laws as will unite the city in the most eminent degree. No one can establish any bound of virtue more transcendently proper than this. The inhabitants of such a city, whether they are Gods or sons of the Gods, by living together in this manner, will lead a joyful life. On this account it is not proper to consider any other paradigm of a polity, but, inspecting this, we ought to explore such a one to the utmost of our power. But this, which is the subject of our present discussion, if it should subsist, would most nearly approach to immortality. And if it does not rank in the first, it certainly will in the second place. However, if Divinity is willing, we will after this discuss the polity, which is the third in order. Let us now then consider the nature of this polity, and how it may be established. In the first place, land and houses should be distributed to them, and they should not be suffered to cultivate the ground in common; since a thing of this kind is greater than their generation, nutrition, and education will admit. Land, however, and houses, should be distributed to them with this intention, that each may consider the portion allotted him, as common to the whole city. But, this region being their country, they ought to reverence it in a greater degree than children their mother; for, being a goddess, she is the sovereign mistress of mortals. The same should be our conceptions of the indigenous Gods and dæmons. But that these things may subsist in this manner, through the whole time, the following particulars are to be considered: As many Vestal hearths as are distributed to us at present, so many ought always to be distributed, and neither more nor fewer in number. But a thing of this kind will be firmly established in every city, if everyone always leaves that child to whom he is most attached, the only heir of his allotted portion, his successor, and cultivator of the Gods, of his race, his country, of the living, and the dead. But those who have

more children than one should for this purpose portion the females according to the established law; but commit the males to the care of those citizens that have no children of their own, and this in a very benevolent manner. However, if benevolence is wanting, or each of the citizens has a numerous progeny of male or female children, or on the contrary but a few children, owing to the barrenness of the women, then that greatest and most honorable governor whom we have established, must consider what is proper to be done in either of these cases, and, whether there is an abundance or a defect of children, must devise some method by which five thousand and forty habitations alone may always remain. But there are many methods by which this may be accomplished. For procreation may be restrained, which is the cause of this abundance; and, on the contrary, by diligent attention, an increase of offspring may be obtained, when it is requisite. For what we are speaking of may be accomplished by honor and disgrace, and by the admonitory discourses of the old to the young. Lastly, every defect arises from the number of five thousand and forty houses not being preserved. But, if our city should have a superabundance of citizens, through the familiarity of those that dwell together, and by this means it should be oppressed with poverty, that ancient device must be adopted which we have often mentioned, that a friendly colony should be sent from friends; for it appears that this will be advantageous to the city. But if, on the contrary, at any time an inundation of diseases, or the ravages of war, should reduce the citizens to a less than the established number, such citizens as have been educated in an adulterated manner are not to be voluntarily admitted to supply the place of those that are wanting. But it is said that even Divinity is not able to force necessity. We should say, therefore, that our present discourse speaks in an

exhortatory manner as follows: O best of all men, who honor according to nature similitude and equality, sameness, and general consent, never relax in honoring these, both according to the number, and all the power of things beautiful and good. And, in the first place, preserve through the whole of life the above-mentioned number. In the next place, do not despise the moderate elevation and magnitude of the possessions which were first distributed to you, by buying and selling with each other. For, if you act in this manner, neither Divinity, the distributor of your allotted portion, nor the legislator will be your associate in war. For now the law announces in the first place, that he who is willing to receive the allotted portion shall receive it, but that he who is unwilling shall be deprived of it: and this, because in the first place the land is sacred to all the Gods; and in the next place, because the priests and priestesses pray during the first, second, and third sacrifices, that both the buyers and sellers of allotted houses and lands may be properly disposed in such transactions. But they should write on cypress monuments in temples, for the benefit of posterity. And besides this, for the purpose of preserving; these, they should commit them to the care of that magistrate who appears to have the most acute vision, that those may be detected who act fraudulently, and that he who is disobedient both to law and divinity may be punished. But, according to the proverb, no vicious man will ever understand how much all cities will be benefited by acting in the manner we have prescribed, but he only who is skillful and of equitable manners. In this city there is no ardent pursuit of gain; nor is it lawful for anyone to apply himself to the acquisition of illiberal wealth, because the disgraceful mechanic art, as it is called, which is employed for this purpose, subverts liberal manners. Riches, therefore, are not to be accumulated by any such, means. Besides this,

another law follows all these, which forbids any private person the possession of either silver or gold. But because there is daily occasion for money for the sake of commutation, which is nearly necessary to artificers, and to all those that have similar wants, in order to pay the wages of mercenaries, servants, and husbandmen—for the sake of these things we permit the use of money in the city, but order it to be such as may be honored by our citizens, but despised by other men. For the sake of war, indeed, and travelling to other countries, as when ambassadors are sent to foreign nations, or for some other necessary purpose, the city should possess a quantity of the common coin of Greece. But when any necessity obliges a private person to leave the city, having begged permission of the magistrates, he shall be suffered to depart; but the foreign coin, which he possesses on his return, he shall change for that of his own country. And if anyone is detected converting the money of another city to his own private use, such money shall become public property. He who has been an eye witness of such conduct, but has not divulged it, shall be disgraced, and pay the same fine as he who endeavored to enrich himself with foreign coin. Besides, no one shall be permitted to give or receive a marriage portion, nor to deposit money with a man who cannot be trusted, nor to put money out to use. And it shall be lawful for him with whom money is deposited at interest, to pay neither interest nor principal. That a conduct of this kind is best for a city, will be rightly judged by him who always refers these particulars to the intention of the legislator. But we say that the intention of a politician who is endued with intellect, is not that which the multitude say is the intention of a good legislator, —I mean, that the city may be greater and richer than others, and that it may for the most part have dominion over the land and sea. To which they add, that he who establishes laws

properly, ought to wish that the city may be the best, and the most happy. But of these, some are capable of taking place, but others not. The legislator, therefore, will wish that the possible, but he will not wish that the impossible, may take place. For in the latter case his wish would be vain; neither, therefore, would he attempt it. For it is nearly necessary that they should be happy, and at the same time worthy. This then will be the object of his wish. But it is impossible that they should be rich in the extreme, and at the same time good; I mean rich in the vulgar acceptation of the word. For the vulgar call those rich, who being few in number possess a great quantity of money, which even a bad man may possess. If this be the case, I should never grant them, that a rich man, who is not at the same time worthy, can be truly happy. But I assert that it is impossible a man can be at the same time eminently good, and eminently rich. Someone, however, may perhaps say, Why not? Because we say, The possession which is obtained both from just and unjust conduct is more than double of that which is alone justly obtained; and that the expenses which are neither becoming nor base are doubly less than those which are becoming, and which are performed in a becoming manner. He, therefore, who acts in a contrary manner will never be richer than him who acquires more than double, and spends less than half. But of these, the one is worthy, but the other not worthy, because he is parsimonious. Sometimes, indeed, this latter character is perfectly vicious; but, as we have just now said, is never good. For he who receives both justly and unjustly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, is indeed rich, because he is parsimonious: but he who is perfectly vicious, as being for the most part prodigal, is extremely poor. And he who spends in a becoming manner, and alone acquires justly, will never at any time become remarkably rich, nor yet excessively poor; so that our assertion is right,

that very rich are not good men. But, if they are not good, they are not happy. With us, however, the establishment of laws looks to this, that the citizens may become most happy, and in the highest degree friends to each other. But the citizens will never be friends where there is much judicial controversy and unjust transactions with each other, but where the least of these is found. We have said too, that there ought to be neither gold nor silver in the city, nor yet an anxious pursuit of gain through mechanical arts and usury, or base cattle, but that wealth should be acquired from such things as agriculture imparts and affords; yet in such a manner, as that it may not compel the citizens to neglect: those things for the sake of which riches are desired: but these are the soul and body, which without gymnastic and the other disciplines will never be of any worth. On this account, we have said more than once, that an attention to money ought to be honored in the last place. For, since all the concerns in which every man is seriously engaged are three, an attention to riches properly ranks in the last and third place: but the concerns of the body possess the middle; and those of the soul the first place. And, indeed, the polity which we are now considering will be governed by proper laws, if it distributes honors in this manner. But if anyone of the laws which are established in it shall appear to prefer the health of the body to temperance, or riches to both health and temperance, it will appear to be improperly established. A legislator, therefore, ought often to signify his intention to the people in this manner: I am desirous that this particular thing should take place, which if it does, my intentions will succeed; but if it does not, they will be rendered frustrate. And thus, perhaps, he might both liberate himself and others from the burthen of legislation; but never by any other means. He, therefore, who receives an allotted portion should possess it on the conditions we

have mentioned. But this will take place in a becoming manner, when each person who becomes an inhabitant of the colony possesses everything else equally. Since, however, this is not possible, but one coming to settle in it will possess more money, and another less, it is requisite, for the sake of many advantages, and of equality in the city, that property should be unequally possessed: that, in consequence of each receiving magistracies, tributes, and distributions, according to the honor annexed to each, and not according to his own virtue only, and that of his ancestors, nor yet according to the strength or beauty of his body, but receiving these equalized as much as possible, viz. unequally, but commensurably distributed, they may not disagree with each other. For the sake of these things, it is requisite that there should be four divisions in magnitude of possessions; and that these should be called first, second, third, and fourth divisions, or should receive some other appellations; so that, both when they remain in possession of the same property, and when they become most rich from being poor, or poor from being rich, each may pass to the possession of property accommodated to each. For this purpose, I shall lay down the following scheme of law: We say, that in a city which in future is to be void of that greatest disease, which may be more properly called discord, or sedition, none of the citizens should either be extremely poor, or extremely rich: for both these produce both. It is therefore now requisite that a legislator should say what is the bound of each. Let, then, the bound of poverty be the honor of the allotted distribution, which ought to be stable, and which no magistrate, nor anyone who loves honor for the sake of virtue, will ever suffer to become less to anyone. The legislator, establishing the measure of these distributions, will permit the double, triple, and quadruple of this to be possessed. But, if anyone possesses more than

these, whether they are found, or bestowed, or procured by mechanical arts, or possessed by any other such like fortune, —if he imparts what remains to the city, and to the Gods, the guardians of the city, he will act in a blameless and laudable manner. But he who accuses one that is not obedient to this law shall obtain the half of his possessions; and, at the same time, the half of the accuser's property shall be dedicated to the Gods. An account too shall be openly given, in writing, of all such property as surpasses the allotted portion, to the magistrates who are appointed guardians by law, that all the judgments respecting riches maybe easy and extremely clear. In the next place, the city ought to be built as much as possible in the middle of the country, and in a place possessing other things accommodated to the city, which it is not difficult to understand and relate. After this, it should be divided into twelve parts, the temple of Vesta, Zeus, and Minerva, being first of all raised under the appellation of the Acropolis, or tower of the city. This temple should be circularly enclosed; and from this enclosure, the city and all the region should be divided into twelve parts. But the twelve parts ought to be equalized in such a manner, that the portion of the prolific land may be small, but that of the unprolific great: and the allotted portions should be five thousand and forty. Again, each of these should receive a two-fold division. The two divisions, likewise, should be associated allotments, and each should participate of the near and remote distributions, viz. the division near the city should communicate with that which is situated in its extremity; that which is at the second distance from the city, with that which is the second from its extremity; and after this manner with all the rest. It should likewise be so contrived in the two-fold divisions of which we are now speaking, respecting the fecundity and barrenness of the region, that there should be an equality of distribution

in multitude and paucity. It is likewise necessary that the streets should be divided into twelve parts, and, indeed, every other possession, equality being preserved in the greatest degree, and a description made of every particular. After this, the twelve allotments should be attributed to the twelve Gods; each allotted portion being denominated after, and consecrated to, its presiding deity, and called a tribe. The twelve sections too of the city ought to be divided in the same manner as the rest of the region, viz. so that each section shall have two habitations, one near the middle, and the other near the extremity. And thus much respecting the habitations. This, however, we ought by all means to consider, that all the particulars which we have just now spoken of will never so opportunely concur as they have happened to do in our discourse; and that the inhabitants will not be indignant at living together in this manner, but will be satisfied with their allotted and moderate portion of wealth through the whole of life. The procreation too of children will take place with each in the manner we have mentioned: and they will be deprived of silver and gold, and other things, which it is evident, from what has been said, the legislator will forbid. Besides this, the habitations will be circularly enclosed in the middle of the city and the region, as we have mentioned above. All which particulars have nearly been asserted by us as dreams: and we have fashioned, as it were, from wax a certain city and citizens. But these particulars in a certain respect have not been badly asserted. It is now proper, therefore, to attend to the legislator, addressing us in the following manner: —You must not consider me, O friends, as ignorant that what has been now said has been after a manner truly asserted. But I think it will be most just in each of the following particulars, that he who exhibits a paradigm, according to whose similitude that which he wishes to accomplish should be

formed, ought not to omit anything which is most beautiful and true. And he to whom it is impossible something of these should happen, should desist from attempting to accomplish this; but he should devise some means by which he may produce that which is most proximate and allied to these; and should permit the legislator to bring his wish to an end. This being done, he should consider, in common with him, which of the above-mentioned particulars contributes, and which is adverse, to legislation. For even an artificer of the most trifling thing ought everywhere to produce a work in con sent with itself, if he wishes to obtain praise for its execution. But now, after the distribution of the twelve parts, we should consider, that since these twelve parts contain in themselves many distributions, and things consequent to, and produced from, these, as far as to five thousand and forty; whence they possess tribes, and towns, and streets, warlike orders and discipline, money, dry and wet measures, and weights; —all these the law should establish commensurate and according with each other. Besides this, we ought not to fear lest we should be thought to bestow too much attention on things of a trifling nature, when we order that no one shall possess furniture of any kind which is destitute of the proper measure, and consider the divisions and varieties of the numbers as useful to all things; to such particulars as are various in themselves, and such as receive a variety in length and depth, or in sounds and motions, whether the motions are upwards and downwards, in a right line, or circular. For the legislator, looking to all these, should enjoin all the citizens to preserve this order to the utmost of their power. For no one discipline belonging to youth possesses, such a mighty power, in œconomies, polities, and all arts, as the study of numbers. And that which is greatest of all is, that this discipline excites even the sleepy, and those that are naturally rustic, and renders

them docile, of a good memory, and sagacious; benefiting them, by a divine art, beyond what their own nature is able to accomplish. All which things, when they are possessed sufficiently and usefully, illiberality and avarice being extirpated from the mind of their possessor, become beautiful and properly adapted studies: but, when these are not extirpated, instead of wisdom they secretly produce that which is called craft; as we see at present is the case with the Egyptians, Phœnicians, and many other nations, through the illiberality of their pursuits and possessions; whether things of this kind were occasioned by a depraved legislator, or by adverse fortune, or by any other similar nature. For, O Megillus and Clinias, this ought not to be concealed from us, that there is a great difference in places, with respect to producing men of a more or less excellent character; and that laws should be established accommodated to such places. For some places, through all-various winds and storms, are inhabited with difficulty; others through water; others through nutriment from the earth, which not only imparts to bodies food of a more and less excellent nature, but is no less able to accomplish this, with respect to souls. But those places in a country possess the greatest difference, in which there are a certain divine inspiration, and allotments of dæmons who are either always propitious to the inhabitants, or the contrary. Which things the legislator, who is endued with intellect, considering as much as it is possible for man to speculate things of this kind, will thus endeavor to establish laws. And this must be done by you, O Clinias! for, before you cause the city to be inhabited, you must direct your attention to these particulars.

Clinias/ But, O Athenian guest! you speak in an all-beautiful manner: and, therefore, this must be done by me.

THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

Book 6.

Athenian Stranger/ After all that has now been said, the next thing that remains for you to do will be the establishment of magistrates in the city.

Clinias/ It will so.

Athenian Stranger/ These two species are found to subsist respecting the ornament of a polity. In the first place, the establishment of magistrates, how many there ought to be, and in what manner they ought to be appointed. In the next place with respect to the laws, which are to be given to the several magistrates, what, how many, and what kind will be accommodated to each. But, previous to choosing the magistrates, let us mention some particulars pertaining to the election of them.

Clinias/ What particulars are these?

Athenian Stranger/ These. It must be perfectly evident that, since legislation is a great work, he who does not appoint proper magistrates in a well-regulated city, though the laws are well established, will find no advantage derived from them, but abundance of ridicule; and such a one will be the mean of oppressing the city with the most weighty injuries and calamities.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ We will therefore consider this, as now happening to you, O friend, respecting this polity and city. For you see it is necessary, that those who undertake in a proper manner the office of magistrates should from their youth have been sufficiently tried, as likewise their race, till the time of election. In the next place, that those who are to choose the magistrates should be educated in legitimate manners, so that they may be able to judge in a proper manner, who should be admitted, and who rejected. But with respect to those that have recently met together, as

they are unacquainted with each other, and, besides this, are void of erudition, how can they ever be able to choose magistrates in a blameless manner?

Clinias/ They nearly never will be able.

Athenian Stranger/ But the contest, as they say, does not easily admit of excuses. This then must now be accomplished both by you and me; since you have willingly undertaken the office of establishing a city for the Cretans, and are, as you say, the tenth in this employment; and I have promised to assist you in the present fabulous narration. I shall not therefore willingly leave this discourse without a head. For, wandering everywhere in this condition, it would appear deformed.

Clinias/ You have spoken most excellently, O guest.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us, therefore, accomplish this to the utmost of our power.

Clinias/ Let us, indeed, do by all means as we have said.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so, if Divinity is willing, that in this respect we may vanquish old-age.

Clinias/ But it is reasonable to suppose that he is willing.

Athenian Stranger/ It is reasonable. Following him, therefore, let us attend to this.

Clinias/ To what?

Athenian Stranger/ In how bold, and at the same time dangerous, a manner our city will at present be established.

Clinias/ To what circumstance adverting do you thus speak?

Athenian Stranger/ To the easy and intrepid manner in which we have given laws to unskillful men, and have ordered them to receive such laws. Thus much, indeed, O Clinias, is nearly perfectly evident, even to one who is not very wise, that no one will easily admit these laws at first.

But if we wait so long till boys tasting of, and being sufficiently disciplined in, the laws, and accustomed to them, are able to give their votes in conjunction with the whole city, and this by a certain manner and device is properly accomplished, I then should think that a city so disciplined would remain after the present time abundantly secure.

Clinias/, It is reasonable to suppose this will be the case.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us consider, therefore, whether we can afford assistance sufficient for this purpose. For I say, O Clinias, that the Cnossians, far more than the other Cretans, ought not only to make an expiation about the region which you have now caused to be inhabited, but should be strenuously careful that the first magistrates may be appointed as much as possible in the most secure and best manner. In appointing others, indeed, there will be less labor; but it will be most necessary that the guardians of the laws should be chosen with the utmost attention.

Clinias/ What method then shall we adopt in order to accomplish this?

Athenian Stranger/ The following. I say, O sons of Crete, that the Cnossians, since they are the most ancient of many cities, ought to choose in common from themselves, and those that settle with them in the same habitation, thirty-seven men in all; nineteen indeed of these from the inhabitants, but the rest from Cnossus itself. The Cnossians should give these to your city, and should cause you to be a citizen of this colony, and one of the eighteen men; and this, either by employing persuasion or moderate force.

Clinias/ But what? Will not you, O guest, and Megillus, partake with us of this polity?

Athenian Stranger/ The Athenians, O Clinias, are men of lofty thought, and so also are the Spartans, and each dwell

at a great distance. But, both by you and the other inhabitants, everything will be elegantly possessed, conformably to what you have just now said. However, in the course of time, and the polity remaining, the magistrates should be chosen in the following manner: All such as are capable of bearing arms, whether horsemen or footmen, and when age has given them sufficient strength to engage in war, all these should give their vote; and the election should be made in that temple which is considered by the city as the most honorable. But everyone, from whatever part of the country he may come, should place the name which he derived from his father, and that of his tribe and nation, written on a small table on the altar of the God. He should likewise, in a similar manner, write on it his own name. But it shall be lawful for everyone to take away that table which does not appear to him to be properly written, and place it in the forum, where it shall remain for not less than thirty days. After this, the magistrates shall expose to the view of the whole city three hundred approved tables; and in a similar manner the city shall approve out of these whichever it pleases. In the second place, they shall again show to everyone a hundred chosen out of these: and, in the third place, everyone shall name out of the hundred men that person whom he most approves. But the thirty-seven men shall declare those to be the magistrates who are chosen by the greatest number of votes. Who, therefore, O Clinias and Megillus, will establish all these things for us in the city, respecting magistrates, and the examination of them? Do we, therefore, understand, that in cities so constituted from the first, there ought to be such persons, but that they will never be found among those that are chosen for magistrates? It is however necessary that these should not be men of a depraved character, but of the most exalted virtue. For the beginning, according to the proverb, is the

half of the whole work; and all men praise him who begins a thing well. But, as it appears to me, the beginning is more than the half, and that no one has sufficiently praised it when properly accomplished.

Clinias/ You speak most properly.

Athenian Stranger/ Since, therefore, we know this, we should not pass over it in silence, and leave it involved in obscurity. Indeed, at present, I have nothing to say respecting it, except this one necessary and advantageous thing.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ I say, that no one is the father or mother of this city which we are about to establish, except the city which gives it inhabitants. Nor am I ignorant that there often has been, and will be, strife between colonies and their parent countries. At present, therefore, as a child, who, though he sometimes opposes his parents, yet, through his indigence of education, loves and is beloved by them, and, always flying to his own, finds in them alone protection; in like manner, I say, the Cnossians will be readily disposed to give assistance to the new city, and the new city to the Cnossians. I repeat then what I have just now said (for there is no harm in twice saying that which is well said), that the Cnossians ought carefully to attend to all these particulars, and choose no fewer than a hundred of the oldest and best men out of the colony, and another hundred from the Cnossians themselves. I say too, that these coming to the new city should be careful that the magistrates are established according to the laws, and that they are approved of when established. When these things are accomplished, the Cnossians should return to Cnossus, but the new city should endeavor to preserve and render itself prosperous. But the thirty-seven men, whom we have

chosen, should both at present and in futurity attend to the following particulars: In the first place, they should establish guardians of the laws; and, in the next place, of those writings in which everyone must give an account to the magistrates of the multitude of his possessions. The greatest estate should be that of four minæ; the second, of three; and the third of two minæ; but the fourth should consist of one mina but if anyone shall be found to possess more than he has given an account of in writing, all such overplus shall become public property; and, besides this, it shall be lawful for anyone to accuse him as acting in neither a becoming nor legal manner, when he is found to despise the laws, through the love of gain. He likewise who is desirous of accusing such a one shall accuse him to the guardians of the laws, under the appellation of one addicted to base gain. And he who happens to be condemned shall not partake of the public property; but, when any distribution is made in the city, he shall possess nothing but his first allotment. It shall likewise be signified in writing, that such a one is condemned as long as he lives; and the writing shall be placed where anyone who is willing may read it. The guardian of the laws shall not govern more than twenty years, and shall not hold this office if he is less than fifty years of age. But, if he is sixty years old when he enters on this employment, he shall only govern for ten years. It shall likewise be established, that he who has lived more than seventy years shall not hold an office of such great importance. These three mandates, therefore, are to be attended to, respecting the guardians of the laws. But, as the laws advance, anyone may order these men what they ought to attend to, in addition to what we have already said.

Let us now, therefore, speak about the election of other magistrates. For, after these, it is necessary that the commanders in chief of the army should be chosen, and

such as are ministrant to these in war, as, for instance, the matters of the horse, the military tribunes, and those who orderly arrange the foot; and who may very properly be called, as they are in common, governors of tribes. The guardians of the laws, therefore, should draw out of the city the commanders of all these, and should approve all such as, being of a proper age, either have been, or now are, engaged in war. But if it shall appear that anyone of those who are not drawn out is better than some one of those that are, it shall be lawful to choose the former in preference to the latter, on condition that this preference is confirmed by an oath; and the choice, when he is named, shall be determined by the greater number of votes. Three amongst these, who are found to have the most votes, shall be chosen as the commanders of the army, and as those that are to take care of warlike concerns, just in the same manner as the guardians of the laws were chosen. These shall appoint twelve præfects of the military orders, and assign one to each tribe. It shall likewise be here lawful to prefer one who is not nominated, to one who is, in the same manner as was observed respecting the election of the commanders in chief. But this assembly, before the præfects are deliberately chosen, shall be held by the guardians of the laws in a place the most holy and best adapted for the purpose. Here the foot and the horse shall be seated separate from each other; and in the third place, after these, the rest of those who are employed in warlike concerns. And everyone, indeed, shall give his vote in the choice of commanders in chief and masters of the horse. The præfects of the bands shall be chosen by those alone that carry shields, but the commanders of tribes by all the horse. The commanders in chief shall choose for themselves the light-armed soldiers, the archers, and the rest of this kind. In the next place there remains for us the establishment of the masters of the horse.

These, therefore, must be appointed by those who appoint the commanders in chief; and the election must be conducted in a similar manner. But the horse shall give their vote, the foot being placed opposite to them; and those two that have the most votes shall be the commanders of all the horse. Disputes about votes shall be allowed to take place twice; but, if anyone doubts about them a third time, the votes shall be determined by those whose province it is to six the measure of voting. The council shall consist of thirty twelves; for the number three hundred and sixty will be found accommodated to the distributions. And it is capable of being distributed into four parts by ninety, so that ninety counselors may be obtained from each of the divisions of land. And in the first place all the counselors will necessarily be obtained from the largest possessions; and he who is unwilling to be chosen shall be fined; and after information has been given respecting him, he shall be noted. On the following day the same method shall be adopted with possessions of the second rank. And on the third day, whoever is willing shall be obtained from possessions of the third order. This mode with respect to three orders of possessions is necessary; but the fourth and smallest possession should be exempt from fine, if anyone whose property is of this order is unwilling to act as a counselor. On the fourth day all shall be obtained from the fourth and smallest order of possessions; but he who is unwilling to be chosen from third and fourth possessions shall be exempt from fine. But he who refuses from possessions of the second and first order shall be fined, so as that he who belongs to the second rank shall undergo a fine triple of the first fine, and he who belongs to the first quadruple. On the fifth day the magistrates shall exhibit to the view of all the citizens the names of the counselors. Every man belonging to these shall act as a counselor; or, if anyone refuses to act in that

capacity, he shall be fined the first fine. But the half of those that are elected out of all the possessions, viz. one hundred and eighty, shall be chosen by lot as counselors for a year. The election, therefore, subsisting in this manner, will be a medium between a monarchical and democratic polity, which medium a polity ought always to preserve. For slaves and despots can never become friends, nor the depraved and worthy, when they are equally honored. For, by unequal things, such as are equal will become unequal, unless they partake of measure; because, through both these, polities are filled with seditions. That ancient saying, indeed, being true, that equality produces friendship, is asserted with the greatest propriety and elegance. But, as it is not very evident what the equality is which is able to accomplish this, we are on this account vehemently disturbed. For, as there are two equalities which have the same appellation, but are in reality nearly contrary to each other in many respects, every city and every legislator may sufficiently employ one of these in the distribution of honors by lot, viz. the equality consisting in measure, weight, and number; but it is not easy for everyone to perceive the most true and the best equality. For it is the judgment of Zeus, and but little of it is at all times employed by men; though as much of it as is employed either by cities or private persons produces every good. For it distributes more to the greater, and things smaller to the less; imparting to each that which is moderate according to the nature of each. It likewise always attributes greater honors to those who are greater in virtue, but less to such as are less in virtue and discipline; and imparts to each the becoming according to reason. For this is, doubtless, always with us the politically just itself; which we ought at present to aspire after, and, looking to this equality, O Clinias, establish our now rising city. Whoever, likewise, establishes any other city ought to give laws with his eye directed to this,

and not to a few tyrants, or to one, or to any strength of the people, but always to the just itself. And this is what has just now been said by us, viz. a distribution of the equal, according to nature, to unequal particulars. But it is, indeed, necessary, that every city should make use of these two equalities, which are similar in denomination, if it wishes to continue entirely free from sedition. For the equitable and the lenient judgment of the perfect and accurate, when it takes place contrary to upright judgment, is broken. On this account it is, perhaps, necessary to use election by lot, for the sake of avoiding the moroseness of the multitude, and to invoke on this occasion divinity and good fortune, and beseech them to direct the lot to that which is most just in this manner, then, it is necessary to use both the equalities; but that equality which is indigent of fortune ought to be used on very few occasions these things, O friends, must be accomplished by the city which is to be established on a sure, foundation. But as a ship, while sailing on the sea, requires a perpetual guard both night and day; in like manner a city, while situated in the tempest of other cities, subject to all-various stratagems, and in danger of captivity, is continually indigent of protection. Hence, the magistrates and guardians of a city ought mutually to succeed each other from night to day, and from day to night, so as that this interchange of office may never cease. But the multitude is not able to accomplish any of these things with celerity. It is, however, necessary that the multitude of the counselors should be permitted to employ the greatest part of their time in properly managing their own private affairs; but that a twelfth part of them, a distribution being made into twelve months, should succeed each other, one by one, in the office of guardians. These should readily attend to everyone, whether coming from the city or elsewhere, whether he wishes to give any information, or to ask respecting those

particulars about which a city ought either to ask or answer other cities, or receive answers from them. And this, for the sake of those all-various innovations which are always accustomed to happen; so as to prevent them, as much as possible, from not happening; and that, when they do happen, the city may perceive them with the utmost celerity, and apply a remedy. This ought always to be accomplished by an assembly of the governors of the city, together with a dissolution of the difficulties which suddenly happen to the city and the laws. All these particulars must be under the direction of the twelfth part of the council, who are to cease from their office eleven parts of the year. But this part of the council ought always to defend the city in common with the other magistrates. And the particulars, indeed, respecting the city, when subsisting in this manner, will be orderly disposed. But what care, and what order, must there be of all the rest of the region? Will it not be necessary, since all the city, and the whole region, is distributed into twelve parts, that there should be inspectors of the roads, habitations, edifices, ports, forum, fountains, sacred groves, and temples, and other things of this kind belonging to the city?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ We must say, then, that there ought to be purifiers of the temples, and priests and priestesses. But that three species of magistrates ought to be chosen for the purpose of taking care of the roads and buildings, and the ornaments belonging to things of this kind, and of preventing men from being injured by each other, or by wild beasts; and that, both within the walls and in the suburbs of the city, everything may be conducted in a proper manner. And those that take care of the above-mentioned particulars should be called ædiles; but those that attend to the ornament of the forum, præfects of the market; and those

that take care of the ornament of the temples, priests. But the priesthood which is paternal, whether sustained by men or women, is by no means to be moved. If nothing of this kind happens to none, or but to a few, which is likely to be the case with the inhabitants of a new city, then priests, priestesses, and the purifiers of temples are to be appointed. But all these things are to be instituted partly by election, and partly by lot. In every region too, and city, the common people, and those that are not common, should mingle in a friendly manner with each other, that they may be concordant in the highest degree. The particulars, therefore, pertaining to the priests are to be committed to the care of Divinity, that, as it pleases him, so the lot may be referred to a divine fortune. But he who is allotted the priesthood ought always to be examined, and proved to be in the first place a man of integrity, and legitimately begotten; in the next place one from a pure habitation, and who is free from slaughter, and all crimes of this kind against divine natures, and whose father and mother have lived with similar purity. The laws too relative to divine concerns ought to be procured from Delphi; and, interpreters of them being appointed, these should be used. But the priesthood should not be of longer continuance than a year; nor should he be less than sixty years of age who is to attend to divine concerns for us, sufficiently, according to sacred laws. The same things are to be established respecting priestesses. The four tribes should appoint thrice four interpreters; three being taken from each tribe: and three being approved, that are chosen by the greatest number of votes, the other nine must be sent to Delphi, that one may be chosen out of each triad. But the examination and approbation of these, and their age, must be such as that of the priests which was mentioned above. These should be established as interpreters for life; and, on the decease of anyone of them, the four tribes to which he

belonged must choose another in his place. There ought likewise to be, in each of the temples, dispensators of the sacred money, who should possess absolute authority over the sacred groves, and their fruits, and over things let out to hire: and three should be chosen for the greatest temples out of the three largest possessions; but two for the smaller temples, and one for such as are the most elegant. The choice, too, and examination of these should be made in the same manner as in the election of the leaders of the army. And such are the particulars which should take place respecting sacred concerns. But the utmost care should be taken that nothing is left without a guard. The guards of the city, too, should be these: the commanders in chief of the army, the præfects of the military orders, the masters of the horse, the governors of tribes, the dispensators, the inspectors of roads and buildings, and the magistrates who preside over the markets, when all these are properly chosen. The rest of the region should be defended as follows: —The whole region was divided by us, as much as possible, into twelve parts. But one tribe being allotted to each division, it should choose every year five, as it were, inspectors of the lands, and governors of tribes. Each of these should choose out of his own tribe twelve young men, not less than five and twenty years of age, and not more than thirty. Each of these should be allotted each part of the region for the space of a month, that all of them may be skillful and knowing in every part of the region. But the guardians and governors should defend and govern the city for the space of two years. And when first they are allotted their respective divisions, they should change their places every month, and the governors of the guard should lead them to the places next in order, and to the right hand parts in a circular progression. But I mean by the right hand parts, those which are towards the east. Afterwards, in the second

year, they should change to the left hand parts, that they may not only be skilled in the nature of the country for one part of the year, but may know, for the most part, what happens in every season, to every part of the country. In the third year, five other inspectors of the land, and governors of the guard, should be chosen, as curators of the twelve young men. But the following care should be bestowed in the several occupations in each place. First, that the region may be, in the highest degree, well-fortified against the incursions of the enemy; trenches being dug where they are requisite, and buildings raised for the purpose of restraining those who may endeavor to injure the country and its possessions. Animals subject to the yoke, and the servants belonging to each place, should be employed for this purpose, when they are not engaged in their usual respective employments; those that preside over these disposing every part of the country in such a manner, that it may be difficult of access to the enemy, but easy to friends, animals subject: to the yoke, and cattle. They should likewise take care that the waters from Zeus do not injure the country, but that they may rather be useful to it, when descending from lofty mountains into hollow valleys; and this by restraining their course in edifices and ditches; so that, being received and imbibed by these places, they may produce streams and fountains for all the subject lands and places, and may thus render the most dry parts of the country moist, and abounding with water. They should likewise adorn fountains and rivers with trees and edifices; and, conducting streams through metal pipes, should cause them to be distributed in great abundance. In like manner, they should send these streams into thickets and sacred groves, as an ornament to the temples of the Gods. But everywhere, in things of this kind, young men ought to procure gymnastic exercises, both for themselves and the aged, preparing senile hot baths, and

placing dry wood in abundance; that an easy remedy may by these means be obtained for the diseased, and the bodies of husbandmen, when wearied with labor, may be refreshed; which remedy is, indeed, far better than any which can be adopted by a physician who is not very skillful in his art. These things, therefore, and everything of this kind, should be introduced into these places, as both ornamental and useful, in conjunction with sport by no means unpleasant. But let the attention which is to be paid to things of this kind be as follows: —Sixty men should each of them defend their own place, not only on account of enemies, but for the sake of those who call themselves friends. And if anyone, whether he is a servant or free, injures his neighbor, or any other citizen, if the offence is small, he shall be judged by those five governors, but if great, by seventeen men, together with the twelve, and shall be fined as far as to three minæ. But no judge or magistrate ought to be exempt from giving an account of his conduct when called upon, except such as like kings bring things to a conclusion. Besides this, the præfects of the land, if they behave insolently towards the subjects of their care, by enjoining them unequal tasks, or taking anything by force from the husbandmen, or if they receive anything which is given through flattery, or distribute justice unjustly, in consequence of yielding to adulation; —in any of these cases they shall be disgraced by the whole city. But for other injuries which they may commit in their office, they shall voluntarily be fined by the inhabitants of the same village, and by their neighbors, as far as to one mina. If, however, they are unwilling, either for greater or smaller injuries, to pay the proper fine, in consequence of believing that, during their transitions from place to place every month, they shall escape punishment, —in this case, they shall be sentenced by a common judgment to pay the injured person the double of his loss.

But both the governors and the præfects of the land shall live for the space of two years in the following manner. In the first place, the convivial associations in the different places shall be in common. But he who is absent from these for one day or night, without orders from the governors, and without being compelled by any necessity, —if the five men condemn him, and write in the forum that he has abandoned his guard, he shall be disgraced, as betraying his part of the polity. He shall likewise be chastised with stripes by anyone who may meet him; and whoever is willing to punish him shall do it with impunity. All the sixty men, likewise, should carefully observe whether anyone of the governors acts in this manner: and he who perceives or hears that anyone of these does so, but yet does not accuse him, shall be subject to the same punishment as the offending governor; and, being more severely punished by the young men, shall be despised by all their magistrates. The guardians of the laws too should diligently attend to all these particulars, either that they may not take place, or that, when they do, the offenders may be properly punished. But every man ought to think respecting all men, that he who has never been a servant will never be a master worthy of praise. So that he who has acted in a becoming manner as a servant, ought to glory in his conduct more than he who has properly exercised the authority of a master: —in the first place, as having been properly subservient to the laws, which is the same as being a servant to the Gods; and in the next place, to old men who have conducted themselves in an honorable manner towards youth. After this, the præfects of the lands should, during the space of these two years, live on humble and poor food. For, when the twelve magistrates think proper to assemble together with the five, they should not join with themselves the other servants and slaves, nor employ husbandmen, and the inhabitants of the same

village, for their own private concerns, but alone for public utility. In other particulars, they may attend to their own advantage. Besides this, they should explore every part of the region in summer and winter, armed, for the sake of perpetually defending and becoming acquainted with every place. For it appears, that for all men to have an accurate knowledge of every place is a discipline inferior to no study. And for the sake of this, young men ought to apply themselves to hunting with dogs, and the capture of wild beasts, no less than for the sake of any other pleasure or advantage which is derived from pursuits of this kind. Every man too should, to the utmost of his power, apply himself to that study, which may either be called concealments, or inspection of the lands, or by any other name at pleasure, if he is desirous that the city should be sufficiently secure.

After this, it follows that we should speak concerning the election of the governors of the markets, and the præfects of cities. Three præfects of cities, therefore, should follow the governors of markets, who are to be sixty in number; and should preside over the twelve parts of the city according to a triple distribution, in imitation of those twelve parts. These should inspect the roads about the city, and the public ways which lead from the country to the city: likewise the buildings, taking care that all of them are raised according to law; and the streams of water which are sent by the guardians into the city, that they may be deduced into pure fountains, and such as are sufficient for use, and may become both an ornament and advantage to the city. These too ought to be such as are capable, when at leisure, of employing their attention on public affairs. On this account, every man should nominate from the largest estate him whom he wishes to be a præfect of the city. And out of six that have the most votes, three shall obtain this office by lot. Lastly, when they have been examined and approved, they

shall discharge the duties of their office according to the laws which are prescribed to them. After this, the governors of markets shall be chosen, five in number, from possessions of the second and first order; and they shall be elected in the same manner as the præfects of the city. For out of ten that have the most votes, five shall be chosen by lot, and, when they are approved, shall be declared to be governors. But every individual shall give his vote. And he who is unwilling to vote, if he is brought before the magistrates, shall be fined fifty drachms, and shall, besides this, be considered as a bad man. Likewise, everyone shall be permitted to enter into the assembly and common convention; and all those shall be compelled to do this whose possessions are of the first and second order. And he who is absent from these shall be fined ten drachms. But those whose possessions are of the third and fourth order shall not be compelled to be present at the common convention. Hence, if anyone is absent from these, he shall not be fined, unless the governors shall find it necessary to order all the citizens to assemble. But the office of the governors of markets consists in preserving the forum in that order which is established by law; and in taking care of the temples and fountains about the forum, and that no one acts unjustly with respect to them: likewise in punishing him who acts unjustly, with stripes and bonds if he is a slave and a stranger; but if it is a native who acts in a disorderly manner, with respect to things of this kind, he shall be condemned by these governors to a fine of one hundred drachms: but they shall not be allowed to condemn him to a greater fine, as far as to the double of this, unless the governors of the city are present on the occasion. The governors of the city too should adopt the same mode of fining and punishing in their department; fining offenders as far as to a mina by their own authority, but the double of this in conjunction with the governors of markets. After this

it will be proper that the governors of music and gymnastic should be established, so as that there may be a two-fold order of each of these; some of them being appointed for the sake of discipline, and others for the sake of exercise. And the law is desirous of asserting with respect to those who preside over discipline, that they should be careful of the ornament pertaining to exercises and doctrines, erudition, and the attention requisite to things of this kind; and likewise of the conduct of males and females, both at home and abroad. Those who reward the athlete should have the care of gymnastic exercises and music And these should be two-fold; one kind being employed about music, and the other about gymnastic exercise. The same persons should preside over the agonistic exercises of both men and horses. But, with respect to music, some should preside over the monody, and the imitative art, viz. over the rhapsodists, harpers, pipers, and all of this kind, but others over the singing of the choir. And in the first place, with respect to the sport of the choir, where men, boys, and girls are exercised in the dance, and in the whole order of music, the governors of this ought to be properly chosen. But one governor will be sufficient for these, who is not less than forty years of age. One also will be sufficient for the monody, who is not less than thirty years old, and who must perform the office, of an introducer, and be able to judge sufficiently the merits of the contending parties. But the governor and moderator of the choir ought to be chosen in the following manner: Those who are attached to things of this kind should go to the assembly, and, if they did not go, should be fined: and the guardians of the law should be the judges in this case. No one, however, should compel others to join this assembly if they are not willing. The candidates should be chosen from among skillful persons; and the skillfulness or unskillfulness of the candidate should be the only thing

attended to in his examination. But he who, out of ten that have the most votes, is approved of on being examined, shall, according to law, preside for one year over the choir. The election and approbation respecting the monody, and the melody of the pipe, should be accomplished in a similar manner; and he who is finally chosen should preside over these for a year; his election at the same time being confirmed by the judges. After these things, it is proper that the dispensators of rewards to the gymnastic exercises, both of horses and men, should be chosen in the following manner from possessions of the third and second order. Three estates should be compelled to the election of these, but the smallest estate should be exempt from fine; and three being selected out of twenty that have the most votes, are after examination to be chosen as dispensators. But if anyone happens to be rejected, according to any election by lot, and judgment of the magistrate, another shall be chosen in his place, and the examination of him performed in a similar manner. There now remains the governor, who is to take care of the whole of the above-mentioned discipline, both of males and females. Let there then be but one governor of this kind established by law. Let him be not less than fifty years of age; one who is the father of lawful children of both sexes, but, if not of both, at least of one sex. But both he who chooses and he who is chosen ought to think that this magistrate is by far the greatest of the chief magistrates in the city. For the first blossom of every plant, when it tends in a becoming manner to the virtue of its nature, possesses the highest power of arriving at its proper end; and this is true, both with respect to other plants, and to tame and savage animals. But we say that man is a tame animal; who, when he partakes of proper discipline, in conjunction with a prosperous nature, is wont to become a most divine and mild animal: but when he is not sufficiently

or not properly educated, he is the most savage of all the animals which the earth produces. On this account the legislator ought not to suffer the education of youth to be a secondary thing, or to be attended to in a careless manner. But, in the first place, he who is desirous of bestowing a proper attention upon youth, ought to choose out of the citizens him who is the most excellent in all things, and establish him as one who is to educate children with the utmost attention and care. All the magistrates, therefore, except the counselors and præfects, coming into the temple of Apollo (the guardians of the laws privately receiving the votes), shall each of them choose him whom they consider as calculated to educate youth in the best manner. And he who has most votes, after he has been approved of by the magistrates that choose him (the guardians of the laws being excepted), shall act in this capacity for five years. And in the sixth year another shall be chosen to succeed him in a similar manner. But if any public magistrate dies before he has governed more than thirty days, another shall be similarly chosen by those to whom this province belongs. And, when anyone who is the guardian of orphans dies, the kindred of both father and mother, as far as to cousins, who may at that time be present, shall appoint another within the space of ten days, or each shall be fined every day a drachma till they have appointed another guardian. But every city will become a privation of a city, in which courts of justice are not properly established; and a mute judge, and who in his interrogation, does not speak more than the litigants, will never be sufficient to us for the purpose of deciding justly. On this account, neither can judges when they are many judge well, nor when they are few and of a depraved character, But it is proper that the object of inquiry should be clearly enunciated by both parties. Time however, delay, and frequent interrogation contribute to the

resolution of doubts. On this account litigants ought first of all to betake themselves to their neighbors and friends, and discuss with them the subject of their complaints. But, if they are not able to determine their cause sufficiently by the assistance of these, they should go to another court of justice. And, if they cannot be reconciled by the two former, a third shall bring the affair to a conclusion. In a certain respect, indeed, the establishments of courts of justice are the elections of magistrates; for every magistrate is necessarily a judge of certain things. But every judge is not a magistrate; though, in a certain respect, a judge on the day in which he acts as a judge, is no contemptible magistrate. Considering, therefore, the judges as magistrates, let us show which of them will be adapted to our purpose, of what things they are to be judges, and how many for every particular. Let then the most principal court of justice be that which they exhibit among themselves, when they choose certain judges by common consent. But let there be two criteria of the rest: the one, when, any private person accusing another of acting unjustly, and leading him to justice, he is willing that he should be judged; the other, when anyone thinks that the public minister has been injured by some one of the citizens, and is willing to assist the community at large. Let us say then who are the judges, and what kind of men they ought to be. In the first place, there should be a common court of justice for all those that contend the third time with each other; and this should subsist in the following manner: All the magistrates, as well those that govern for a year as those that govern for a longer time, ought to assemble into one temple, on the day before the first day of that month in which after the summer solstice the new year begins. Here taking an oath, and making a first-fruit offering as it were, out of every order of magistrates, they should choose one judge, who appears

likely to be the best in every magistracy, and to judge the citizens on the following year in the best and most holy manner. When the judges are chosen, the examination and approbation should be made by those that chose them. And if anyone is rejected, another shall be chosen in a similar manner. But the persons approved shall judge those that fled from other courts of justice, and give their decision openly. The counselors, however, and the other magistrates that chose these, must necessarily be hearers and spectators of these decisions. With respect to men of another description, anyone of these who is willing may be present. But, if any person accuses anyone of these judges, as voluntarily judging unjustly, he shall accuse him before the guardians of the law; and he who is condemned in consequence of such accusation shall pay the half of the fine to the injured party. But if he shall appear to deserve a greater fine, the judges by whom he is condemned shall determine what he ought to suffer, or to restore, either to the community, or to the person who has suffered the injury. With respect to public accusations, it is necessary in the first place that the multitude should participate of the decision. For, when anyone acts unjustly towards a city, all the citizens are injured; and hence the multitude will justly be indignant, when they are excluded from such judgments. The beginning likewise and end of such a decision ought to be referred to the people, but the examination of the particulars in which the litigants accord, to the three greatest magistrates. But if they cannot agree, the council itself shall judge the election of each of them. It is requisite likewise that all men should participate to the utmost of their power of private judgments. For he who is deprived of the power of judging with others must: be considered as in no respect participating of the city. On this account courts of justice must necessarily subsist in the tribes, and the

judges should immediately give sentence by lot, uncorrupted by entreaties. And, finally, that court of justice should judge of all these particulars which we have said should be established incorrupt to the utmost of human power, for the purpose of determining those disputes which can neither be decided by neighbors nor by the courts of justice belonging to the tribes. And thus, concerning courts of justice, which we say can neither easily be indubitably called magistrates, nor yet denied to be such, this description, which is as it were externally induced, has asserted some things, and nearly left others undiscussed. For, towards the end of legislation, the accurate position, and at the same time division of judicial laws, will be by far most properly discussed. We shall, therefore, till then defer the consideration of these. But the establishment of other magistrates has nearly taken up the greatest part of legislation. The accurate, however, respecting all civil and politic administrations will not become perspicuous, till the discussion, receiving from the beginning things secondary, middle, and all its parts, has arrived at the end. For at present, indeed, proceeding as far as to the election of magistrates, it becomes a sufficient end of what has been previously delivered, so that the beginning of the position of laws is no longer indigent of sluggishness and delay.

Clinias/ All that you have asserted above is entirely, O guest, agreeable to my sentiments; but your discourse will be still more pleasing to me, when you have conjoined the beginning of what is now to be said, with the end of what has been already asserted.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus far then we have played in a becoming manner the game of prudent old men.

Clinias/ You appear to have evinced a beautiful pursuit of men.

Athenian Stranger/ It is probable. But do we understand whether this appears to you as it does to me?

Clinias/ What do you allude to?

Athenian Stranger/ Do you know that the art of painting has no boundary with respect to the several animals, but never ceases adorning, either by inumbrating or deumbrating, or by whatever name a thing of this kind may be called by painters, that the picture may continually become more beautiful and conspicuous?

Clinias/ I scarcely understand what you say, since I am by no means conversant with this art.

Athenian Stranger/ This will be no detriment to you. But we will employ this similitude which fortune has presented to us. If then someone should design to paint a most beautiful animal, and which might not become worse but better by length of time, do you not perceive that in consequence of such a one being a mortal, unless he leaves behind him a successor who may prevent the damages which the picture might sustain from time, by frequently retouching the piece, or who may supply what was omitted by the artist, through the imbecility of his art, and thus daily render the picture more splendid, the labored piece will last but a short time?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Does not this appear to you to be the wish of the legislator? In the first place, that laws may be written for him as accurate as possible? In the next place, can you think that in the course of time, and after having made an actual trial of the thing, any legislator can be so insane as not to know that many things must necessarily be left, which will require amendment from some successor; that a polity may by no means become worse, but always better and more adorned?

Clinias/ It is probable. For how is it possible he should not wish a thing of this kind?

Athenian Stranger/ If then any legislator possesses any method by which both in words and in reality he can teach another, whether he is a man of greater or of less consequence, how laws ought to be preserved and corrected, he will not cease speaking about a thing of this kind till he has accomplished his purpose.

Clinias/ For how is it possible he should?

Athenian Stranger/ Ought not this, therefore, to be done, both by you and me, at present?

Clinias/ Of what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ As we are about to establish laws of which we have chosen the guardians, but we ourselves are in the decline of life, and the guardians are with respect to us young men, it will, as we have said, be necessary that at same time we should both establish laws, and endeavor to make these very men, as much as possible, both legislators and guardians of the laws.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly, since we are sufficient for the purpose.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then cheerfully endeavor to effect this.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ We will, therefore, thus address them: O friends, saviors of the laws, we have necessarily left many things unfinished, respecting the several particulars of which we have established laws, and which are not indeed inconsiderable; and we have endeavored to the utmost of our power not to leave the whole unexplained by a certain circumscription. This deficiency it is your business to supply. But it is proper you should hear where you ought to look in order to accomplish a thing of this kind. For Megillus,

I, and Clinias, have often said the same things to each other, and we are agreed among ourselves that we have spoken in a becoming manner. We are likewise desirous that you should both be favorable to our undertaking, and become our disciples; at the same time looking to those things which, we have agreed among ourselves, a guardian of the laws and a legislator ought to make the objects of his consideration. But this agreement, which has one head or summit, is this: That we should endeavor to find the means by which a man may become a worthy character, possessing that virtue of the soul which is accommodated to his nature, either from a certain study, or certain manners, or from some kind of possession or desire, or opinion; or, lastly, from certain disciplines; and this, whether the nature of the inhabitant of our city is male or female, youthful or aged. Likewise, that everyone, through the whole of life, should tend with all possible earnestness to this of which we are now speaking; neglecting at the same time everything which may become an impediment to this acquisition. Besides this, too, he should be disposed to die for his country if it is necessary, rather than either to see it entirely subverted, and becoming subject to the yoke of bondage, governed by bad men, or desert it by flight. For everything of this kind is to be endured rather than the polity should be changed, which men of a worse character are naturally disposed to effect. These things have been already mutually assented to by us, and do you now, looking to both these, praise and blame the laws; blaming such as are not able to accomplish these particulars, but, embracing and receiving in a benevolent manner such as are, live in them. But it is proper that you should bid farewell to other studies which tend to other things that are called good. Let this, then, be the beginning to us of the subsequent laws, commencing from sacred concerns. For we ought in the first place to resume

the number five thousand and forty, because it had, and now has, convenient distributions, both the whole number, and that which was assigned to the tribes; which we established as the twelfth part of the whole, this producing with the greatest rectitude the number four hundred and twenty. And as the whole number has twelve distributions, so also that of the tribes. But it is proper to consider each division as a sacred gift of divinity, as following both the order of months and the period of the universe. On this account, that which is connate should lead every city, rendering them sacred. Some, indeed, are perhaps more properly distributed than others, and more prosperously dedicate their distributions to the Gods. But we now say, that the number five thousand and forty is most properly chosen, as that which has all distributions as far as to twelve, beginning from one, except that into eleven parts. This, however, has the easiest remedy. For it will be restored to health, if two houses are distributed to the other part. But that these things are true, may be evinced with facility when at leisure. Believing, therefore, in the present conception and discourse, let us distribute this number; and ascribing a God, or a son of the Gods, to each part, likewise dedicating altars, and things pertaining to these, let us make two conventions for the purpose of sacrificing every month; accommodating twelve to the distribution of the tribes, and twelve to the division of the city. But all this should be done, in the first place, for the sake of the Gods, and things pertaining to the Gods; in the second place, for the sake of our familiarity with, and knowledge of, each other; and likewise for the sake of every kind of association. For it is necessary, in the communion and mixture of marriages, that ignorance should be taken away, so as that everyone may know with whom he is connected, and that all deception in things of this kind may, as much as possible, be taken away. For the sake of this,

therefore, it is necessary that sports should be instituted, boys and girls together forming a choir, mutually beholding and being beheld by each other, being properly paired, as to their age, and having as much of their bodies naked as modesty will permit. All these should be taken care of, and properly ornamented by the governors of choirs, and likewise by the legislators, in conjunction with the guardians of the laws, that they may supply what we have left deficient. But it is necessary, as we have said, respecting all such things as are small and numerous, that some particulars should be omitted by the legislator, in which the magistrates becoming every year skillful, and being admonished by experience, they may be able every year to supply what is deficient; till it shall appear that these discussions and legal institutes have obtained a sufficient bound. The space of ten years, therefore, will be a length of time both moderate and sufficient for obtaining an experience in sacrifices and choirs, and every other particular. But in order to accomplish this, he who supplies these deficiencies should live in common with the legislator: and on his death, the several magistrates having informed the guardians of the laws of his decease, must supply his place in correcting what is amiss, till everything shall appear to have attained the consummation of excellence. When this period arrives, having given stability to these institutes, they are to be used in conjunction with other laws which the legislator has ordained from the beginning; respecting which, nothing should ever be voluntarily changed. But if any necessity shall, at any time, appear to urge a mutation, all the magistrates, ought to consult together on this occasion, all the people should be assembled, and all the oracles of the Gods explored. If all these accord, then a change in the laws may be made, but by no means unless this is the case; but that which impedes, shall always obtain dominion according

to law. Whenever, therefore, anyone who has arrived at five and twenty years of age, beholding and being beheld by others, believes that he has found one of his own disposition, and adapted for the communion and procreation of children, he shall marry within thirty-five years of age. But, in the first place, let him hear how the becoming and adapted are to be investigated. For it is requisite, as Clinias says, prior to the laws, to give a preface accommodated to each.

Clinias/ You very properly remind us, O guest; and your discourse appears to me to be both seasonable and highly fitting.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak well. Let us, therefore, speak as follows: O young man, born of good parents, it is proper to contract those marriages which appear honorable to prudent men. But these exhort neither to avoid marriage with the poor, nor to pursue with avidity marriage with the rich, but, cæteris paribus, always honoring the inferior, to enter into communion with it. For, both to the city and the families which are united, this will be advantageous. For the equable and commensurate infinitely surpasses the immoderate with respect to virtue. He, therefore, who in all his actions is more rash and hasty than is becoming, should desire that the daughter of parents of more composed manners may be united to him in marriage: but he who is naturally of a contrary disposition should enter into alliance with a contrary character. And in every marriage this one thing should be observed, that everyone should enter into such a matrimonial connection as is advantageous to the city, and not such a one as is most pleasant to himself. For everyone always naturally tends to that which is most similar to himself; whence the whole city becomes anomalous both in wealth and manners, when it partakes in the highest degree of those things which we are unwilling should happen to ourselves. If, then, in our discourse we

should order by law that the rich should not marry with the rich, nor the powerful with the powerful, but should compel those whose manners are more hasty to marry those whose manners are more slow, and the more slow to marry with the more hasty, we should not only appear ridiculous to, but excite the anger of, the multitude. For it is not easy to understand that a city ought to be like a cup, in which the mad wine, when first poured forth, effervesces; but, being corrected by another deity, who is a sober God, and thus obtaining a beautiful conjunction, it becomes a good and moderate drink. But no one, as I may say, is able to see this taking place in the formation of children by the mingling of the sexes. On this account, therefore, we should not compel the citizens to things of this kind by law, but endeavor to charm them into the persuasion, that they ought to prefer equability in the natural disposition of their children to the equality of the most opulent alliance; and that we ought to deter, by disgrace, him who makes riches the object of his pursuit in marriage, and not compel him to a contrary mode of conduct by a written law. Let these, then, be the exhortations respecting marriages, together with what we have previously asserted, —I mean, that we ought to aspire after perpetuity of nature, by always leaving behind us children of children, as servants of divinity, instead of ourselves. All these particulars, therefore, and still more than these, someone may with propriety preface, respecting the manner in which marriages ought to be concluded. But he who cannot willingly be persuaded to act in this manner, but lives in the city alienated, without connection, and unmarried, for five and thirty years, such a one shall be fined every year. And if he possesses the largest estate, he shall be fined one hundred drachms; if that which is second in order, seventy; if that which is third, sixty; and if that which is fourth in order, thirty drachms. Let all these fines be

sacred to Hera. And let him who does not pay his fine every year be made a debtor of ten times that sum. Let this money too be exacted by the dispensator of the Goddess; which unless he exacts, he himself shall be the debtor. He, therefore, who is unwilling to marry, shall be thus punished with respect to a fine; but with respect to honor as follows: In the first place, let him be deprived of all honor from his juniors, nor let any young man voluntarily obey him in anything. In the next place, if he should attempt to chastise anyone, everyone shall be permitted to assist and defend the injured person. And he who does not in this case give assistance, shall be considered by the law as a timid and vicious citizen. Concerning the marriage portion we have spoken before, and we again say, that equal things are to be given for equal things, since neither he who receives, nor he who bestows, will grow old in the want of money. For in this city everyone is supplied with necessaries. Besides, women will be less insolent, and men will have less of humble and illiberal slavery, through riches. And he who is obedient to this law will accomplish one among the number of things beautiful; but he who is disobedient to it, and either gives or receives more than the worth of fifty drachms for the sake of a garment, shall either pay one mina, or three half minæ, or two minæ, according to the magnitude of his possessions. He who possesses the largest estate shall pay another such sum to the public treasury: and whatever is given or received shall be sacred to Hera and Zeus. But the exactors of this money should be the dispensators of these divinities, just as we said, when we spoke of those that refused to marry, that their fine should be exacted by the dispensators of Hera, who, if they, neglected to exact it, should pay it themselves. With respect to suretyship, the first man be that of a father, the second, that of a grandfather, and the third, that of brothers by the same father. If no one of these survives, the

suretyship shall, in a similar manner, be equally valid on the mother's side. But if, through an unusual fortune, none of these should survive, the authority in this affair must always be vested in the nearest kindred, in conjunction with the guardians. If anything preparatory to initiation, or other sacred operation, shall be found necessary for things future, present, or past, pertaining to marriage, it will be proper to interrogate the interpreters of sacred concerns; and each person, being persuaded by these, should think that he has accomplished everything sufficiently. With respect to nuptial feasts, not more than five male and five female friends should be invited; and as many of both sexes of kindred and familiars. But the expenses on this occasion should not exceed the possessions. He, therefore, who has the largest estate shall spend one mina, another half a mina, and so on in succession, according to everyone's respective property. And he who is obedient to the law in this respect ought to be praised by all men; but he who is disobedient shall be chastised by the guardians of the laws, as one who is ignorant of the becoming, and unskilled in the laws respecting the spousal Muses. To drink, however, to intoxication, is never at any time becoming, nor safe, except in the festivals of that God who is the giver of wine. Neither, therefore, is it proper that this should take place at the nuptial feast, when the bride and bridegroom ought particularly to be in a sound state of mind, as having changed the former condition of their life in no small degree; and in order, at the same time, that offspring may always be produced as much as possible from prudent parents. For it is nearly immanifest what night or day may generate offspring in conjunction with divinity. Children, therefore, ought not to be begotten when the body is in a relaxed and diffluent state through ebriety, but when it is compact, stable, and quiet. But he who is filled with wine hurries and

is hurried away everywhere, being agitated with insane fury both in body and soul. Hence, he who is intoxicated, as being delirious, must disseminate in a vicious manner. So that it is probable such a one will beget offspring anomalous, unfaithful, and void of rectitude, both in their manners and corporeal frame. Hence, it is requisite to guard against intoxication, both through the whole year, and through the whole of life, but especially at the time of procreation, and neither to do such things as spontaneously introduce disease, nor such as participate of insolence or injustice. For, these being necessarily impressed in the souls and bodies of the offspring in a fetal state, the impressions become worse than their originals. But especially on the wedding day and night it is requisite to abstain from all such things. For the principle and divinity established in men preserves all things, when he is allotted that honor which is accommodated to his nature by the respective individuals by whom he is employed. But it is proper that the bridegroom should consider one of the two houses assigned by lot as set apart for the procreation and education of children; and that he should celebrate his nuptials in that house, and reside there with his children separate from his father and mother. For, where there is a certain desire in friendship, it agglutinates and binds together all the manners; but where association is attended with satiety, and has not any desire through time, it causes a mutual separation through transcendency of repletion. Hence, leaving his parents and kindred, the bridegroom should depart as it were to a colony, observing, and being at the same time observed by, them; procreating and educating children; transmitting to others, like a lamp, the life which he received from others, and always honoring the Gods according to law. In the next place, it is requisite to consider which among the number of possessions is the most elegant. With respect to many of

these, therefore, it is neither difficult to understand nor to possess them; but with respect to servants the difficulty is extreme. But we may assign the cause of this in a certain respect properly, and in a certain respect not properly. For our assertions concerning slaves are contrary to, and yet conformable to, use.

Megillus/ How do you mean? For we do not, O guest, understand what you assert at present.

Athenian Stranger/ And it is very reasonable, O Megillus, to suppose you do not. For that servitude of the Lacedæmonians which is called Hilotia is nearly the source of the greatest doubt and contention to all Greece; because it appears to some to be well instituted, and to others not. But the slavery of the Heraclidæ is a subject of less contention than that of the Mariandyni. And besides this, the nation of the Thessalians is servile. However, looking to these, and all such particulars as these, what ought we to do respecting the possession of servants? As the subject, therefore, is so ambiguous, you very properly asked me what I meant. But my meaning is this: —We know that we all say that it is requisite to possess slaves of the most benevolent and best dispositions. For many slaves, conducting themselves in every respect with more virtue towards certain persons than brothers and sons, have preserved their masters, together with their possessions and the whole of their habitations. We know that these things are said of certain slaves.

Megillus/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ The contrary to this, likewise, is asserted, viz. that nothing in the soul of a slave is in a healthy condition, and that the race of slaves is not to be believed in any particular. The wisest of the poets too seems to be of this opinion, when he says respecting Zeus:

"Jove fixed it certain, that whatever day
Makes man a slave takes half his mind away."

In consequence of these different conceptions, some place no confidence in slaves, but with spurs and whips, as if they had to manage wild beasts, not thrice but often, enslave the souls of their servants; but others act entirely contrary to these.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly. Since, then, the opinions respecting slaves are so different, how shall we act in our region as to the possession and correction of them?

Athenian Stranger/ It appears to me, O Clinias, since man is an animal difficult to be managed, and one that by no means patiently endures that the necessary distinction between a slave and one who is free and a master should be made in reality, —that on this account he is a difficult possession. The truth of this is actually evinced in the frequent rebellions of the Messenians, and by the mighty evils which happen to those cities that possess many servants of the same language; and further still, by the all-various thefts which are committed by pirates about Italy. All which particulars, when they are considered, may render it doubtful what ought to be done in things of this kind. Two methods, therefore, alone remain to be adopted, namely, that those who are to act with ease in the capacity of slaves should not be of the same country, and that as much as possible they should be discordant with each other. And in the second place, that they should be properly educated, not only for their own sakes, but much more for the sake of their masters. But the proper education of these consists in not behaving insolently, but in acting less unjustly towards them, if possible, than towards our equals. For he is perfectly manifest who, reverences justice naturally and not fictitiously, and who truly hates to act unjustly towards those men whom he might easily injure. He, therefore, who

is never defiled by acting in an unjust and unholy manner, with respect to the manners and actions of slaves, will be most sufficient to sow the seeds of virtue. The same thing may with rectitude be asserted of a despot, and a tyrant, and of all authority, when exercised by the more powerful over the more imbecile. But slaves ought justly to be always punished, and not to be made effeminate by admonishing them like those that are free. Everything too that is said to a slave should nearly be a command, nor should they ever in any respect be jested with, whether they are of the male or of the female sex. Many, however, very foolishly jest with their slaves; and, thus making them effeminate, render it more difficult to their slaves to be governed, and to themselves to govern.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ After this manner, therefore, servants may be acquired as much as possible sufficient both in multitude and aptitude to assist in the necessary employments of life. But, after this, it is requisite to describe the habitations.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ In a new city, therefore, and which had never before been inhabited, edifices are in the first place to be attended to, and particularly the temples and walls of the city. The buildings too of the city, O Clinias, ought to precede the marriages. But, now since the city is raised in discourse, we may very properly admit these particulars to subsist in the manner we have delivered them. When, indeed, the city is raised in reality, we shall attend to the buildings prior to the marriages, if divinity is willing, and afterwards accomplish everything pertaining to matrimonial connections. We shall now, therefore, in a cursory manner, discuss these particulars.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ The temples, therefore, ought to be built round all the forum, and the city should be built in a circle, in elevated places, for the sake of defense and purity. The houses of the governors and judges should be situated near the temples; and in these, as most holy places, sentence should be given and received; partly, as about holy concerns, and partly because the temples of the judicial Gods are there situated. Courts of judgment too should be built in this place, in which proper sentence shall be passed on murder and other crimes which deserve death. With respect to the walls, O Megillus, I agree with the Spartans, that they should be permitted to lie sleeping on the earth, and not be raised. For that poetical assertion respecting them is deservedly praised, that walls ought to be of brass and iron, rather than of earth. With us, indeed, the custom of sending young men every year into the fields to dig trenches and raise buildings, for the purpose of restraining the incursions of the enemy, may justly be considered as extremely ridiculous. We likewise enclose our city with walls, which in the first place by no means contributes to the health of the citizens; and, in the next place, it usually produces an effeminate disposition in the souls of the inhabitants. For it incites them to fly within these for shelter, and not repel the enemy; and leads them to think that the safety of the city does not consist in guarding it perpetually both night and day, but that, sleeping under the protection of walls and gates, they shall be truly safe; as if they were born for sloth, and not to labor. They are, indeed, ignorant that ease is truly produced from labor; and, as it appears to me, labor is again the natural result of base ease. But, if there is any occasion of walls for men, the houses of individuals should be so raised from the first, that the whole city, by its equality and similitude, may be one wall, and that

all the houses may have a sufficiently secure passage to the different roads of the city. And in this case, indeed, the city, having the form of one house, will be no unpleasant spectacle, and will be in every respect adapted to the ease of its guards and the safety of the whole. The citizens who are to inhabit this region should be particularly careful that these things are constructed in this manner from the first. They should also take care that ædiles are provided, compelling them to be chosen, and punish with fines those that neglect this office. Attention too should be paid to the purity of everything in the city; and that no private person occupies any public property, either by building or digging. They should likewise take care that the waters from Zeus may be imparted with facility to the inhabitants; and that every part, both within and without the city, may be fit to be inhabited. But all these particulars the guardians of the law, becoming skilled in by experience, must legally establish, together with such others as the law omits, through its incapacity of providing for all things. But since these things, the buildings about the forum, the particulars respecting gymnasia, theatres, and all that pertains to discipline, are instituted, let us now proceed to marriages, as following next in the business of legislation.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Marriages, therefore, O Clinias, must be instituted for us in the manner we have described above. But, after this, the mode of living which should be adopted prior to the procreation of children must not continue a less time than a year. However, it is by no means easy to say, after what manner a bride and bridegroom ought to live in a city which transcends the multitude of cities. But, as many things that have been already advanced are difficult, this will appear to the vulgar still more difficult to determine.

Nevertheless, O Clinias, that which appears to be right and true must be asserted.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ He, therefore, who is of opinion that things public and common only, in a city, should be established by law, but does not think it requisite that the necessary concerns of private persons should be attended to, but that they should be permitted to live as they please; and that it is not necessary everything should subsist in an orderly manner; but that, private affairs being neglected by the law, men should only live legally in public and common concerns; —he who thinks in this manner does not think rightly. But on what account are these things asserted by us? On this: Because we say that the bridegrooms in our city ought to live at public tables, at other times no less than prior to their nuptials. And, indeed, when first eating in public was instituted by you, Lacedæmonians, it appeared a wonderful thing; being legally established, in consequence of a certain war, or something else endued with the same power, and which the paucity of men rendered necessary. But this mode of eating in public having been adopted by necessity, when it was found to contribute greatly to the safety of the city it was established by law.

Clinias/ It appears that this was the case.

Athenian Stranger/ As I said, therefore, this was at first a thing of a wonderful nature, and dreadful to enjoin; but, at present, the legal establishment of it would not be attended with the like difficulty. But that which follows this is both arduous to relate and accomplish. It is a thing which is naturally capable of taking place in a proper manner, but which by no means subsists at present, and in establishing which the legislator would appear like jugglers to pluck fire, and to accomplish ten thousand other impossible things.

Clinias/ What is this, O guest, which you appear to be so vehemently afraid of mentioning?

Athenian Stranger/ You shall hear, that I may not any longer needlessly detain you. For everything in the city that participates of order and law produces every good. But such things as are deprived of order, or are badly disposed, dissolve the multitude of those things which are orderly disposed. And this happens with respect to the subject of our present discussion. For, O Clinias and Megillus, the public banquets of the men are instituted for you in a beautiful, and, as I said, wonderful manner, from a certain divine necessity; but those of the women are by no means properly left unestablished by law, and not led forth into light. For the female sex is another kind of men, more occult and fraudulent than we are, through the imbecility of its nature. But the legislator did not act rightly in omitting it, on account of the difficulty of managing it in an orderly manner. For, this being neglected, many things in your city will be dissolved, which would subsist far better than at present if it was regulated by law. For the particulars relative to women are not only the half (as they may appear to be) of human concerns, if they are left in a disordered manner; but, by how much the feminine is worse than the masculine nature with respect to virtue, by so much it surpasses in multitude the double. This, therefore, must be resumed and corrected; and all employments and studies should be established as common, both to men and women, as that which will more contribute to the felicity of the city. But at present mankind are so unhappily circumstanced in this respect, that no prudent man would even mention a thing of this kind, in other places where eating in common is by no mean's approved. How then can anyone attempt, without rendering himself ridiculous, to force women to eat and drink openly? For there is not anything which the sex would

more difficultly endure than this. For, being accustomed to live timorously, and obscurely, when forced into light they will make every possible resistance, and greatly overpower the legislator. Women, therefore, as I have said, will not elsewhere endure even the most rational discourse, without extreme vociferation; but here perhaps they will. If then it is agreeable to you, for the sake of conversation, lest our discourse about every kind of polity should be incomplete, I am desirous of informing you, how good and becoming a thing this is, —if, as I said, it is agreeable to you to hear it: —if not, I shall dismiss it.

Clinias/ But, O guest, we are wonderfully desirous of hearing it.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us then hear it. But you must not wonder if I appear to you to derive what I shall say from an elevated source. For we are now at leisure, and there is nothing to prevent us from considering everything, pertaining to laws.

Clinias/ Rightly said.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, therefore, we will recur to what was first asserted by us. For it is highly proper that every man should know, that the generation of men either never had any beginning, nor ever will have an end, but always was and always will be; or that, if it had a beginning, the length of time from its commencement is immense.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Should not we think that there have been all-various establishments and subversions of cities, studies and employments of every kind, some attended with and others without order, and all-various desires of food and drink, in every part of the earth; likewise all-various revolutions of seasons, in which animals have undergone a prodigious number of mutations?

Clinias/ It is reasonable to think so.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Shall we believe that vines at a certain period rose into existence, and in a similar manner olives, and the gifts of Ceres and Proserpine; and that a certain Triptolemus supplied things of this kind? And shall we not think that during the time in which these had no existence animals devoured each other, as at present?

Clinias/ We ought doubtless to think so.

Athenian Stranger/ But we see at present that men sacrifice each other in many places; and we hear, on the contrary, that there was a time when we did not dare to taste the flesh of oxen, and when we did not sacrifice animals to the Gods, but cakes, and fruits moistened with honey, and other pure offerings of a similar kind: but we entirely abstained from flesh; considering it as neither holy to feed on it, nor to defile the altars of the Gods with blood. But we then lived an Orphic life, feeding on all inanimate substances, but on the contrary abstaining from all animals.

Clinias/ These things, as you say, are everywhere reported, and persuade belief.

Athenian Stranger/ But someone may say, What is the meaning of all this?

Clinias/ You very properly conjecture what is likely to be the case, O guest.

Athenian Stranger/ I shall endeavor, therefore, if I am able, O Clinias, to unfold what is consequent to this.

Clinias/ Speak then.

Athenian Stranger/ I behold all things suspended to men, from a triple indigence and desire, through which virtue is produced if they are properly conducted, but the contrary if they are improperly burdened. These are, from the very period of their birth, meat and drink, of which every animal having an innate love, it is full of fury, and refuses to listen

to him who says that something else is to be done besides replenishing the pleasures and desires, with which all such things as these are conversant, and perpetually avoiding every kind of pain. But a third, and this the greatest indigence, and the most acute desire, afterwards excites us, producing in mankind the most fiery furies. This is the desire of propagating the species, which burns with unbounded insolence. These three diseases should be turned from that which is called most pleasant, to that which is best, by three the greatest of all things; viz. fear, law, and true reason; at the same time employing the Muses, and the agonistic Gods, in order to extinguish this influx and increase. But after marriages we should place the procreation of children, and, after this, education and discipline. For, our discourse proceeding in this manner, the law will perhaps at length lead us to public banquets, when we have arrived at associations of this kind; and then perhaps we shall see more clearly than before, whether this mode of eating in public ought to be adopted by women alone, or by men, together with the particulars preceding this mode, and which are not yet legally established. These things, as I just now said, we shall then behold more accurately, and establish respecting them more becoming and convenient laws.

Clinias/ You speak with the greatest rectitude.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us, therefore, preserve in our memory what we have just now said: for perhaps we shall have occasion for it hereafter.

Clinias/ What are the things which you exhort us to remember?

Athenian Stranger/ Those which we defined by three words; viz. meat, drink, and the astonishment about venereal concerns.

Clinias/ We shall by all means, O guest, be careful to remember these things.

Athenian Stranger/ It is well. But let us proceed to matrimonial concerns, and instruct the bride and bridegroom in what manner children ought to be procreated; and if we cannot persuade them to comply with our instructions, we will threaten them with certain laws.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ It is proper that the bride and bridegroom should consider, that children are to be exhibited to the city, as much as possible, the most beautiful and the best. But all men who produce anything in common, when they attend both to themselves and the work, produce the whole beautiful and good: but when they do not attend, or are not endued with intellect, the contrary takes place. The bridegroom, however, should attend both to the bride and to the procreation of children: and in a similar manner the bride should attend to the bridegroom, especially at that time when children are not yet begotten by them. Certain women chosen by us shall be inspectors of this particular, whether many or few, just as it may seem fit to the governors. These shall assemble every day in the temple of Lucina, and continue there for the third part of an hour. Here they shall inform each other, if they have seen any married man or woman looking to anything else than what the sacrifices and sacred ceremonies pertaining to marriage order to be done. Let the procreation of children and the inspection of the women above mentioned continue for ten years, but not for a longer time, when there is an easy flux of generation. But if some continue unprolific for this space of time, after having consulted with their kindred, and the women that superintend them, they shall be divorced in such a manner as is advantageous to both. However, if any altercation ensues respecting what is proper and

advantageous to each, ten guardians of the law, chosen by the contending parties, shall take cognizance of and determine the affair. After this, the inspecting women shall enter into the houses of the young men, and, partly by admonitions and partly by threats, liberate them from their error and ignorance. But if they are unable to accomplish this, they shall speak to the guardians of the law, who shall then take the affair into consideration. If they too are incapable of applying a remedy, they shall make the people acquainted with the case; at the same time giving in the offenders names in writing, and affirming by an oath that they are unable to render them better. But let him whose name is committed to writing be disgraced, unless he can confute his accusers in the court of judgment. If he is unable to do this, he shall neither engage in a matrimonial connection, nor in the procreation of children. And in case he attempts it, anyone that pleases shall punish him with impunity. The same laws too must be established respecting women. For such shall not participate of female egressions and honors, and shall not be permitted to go to weddings, and labors, if they are in a similar manner condemned in a court of justice. But when children are begotten according to law, if anyone has connection with another man's wife or a woman with any man but her husband, while children are begotten by them, let them be punished in the manner mentioned above when they did not beget children. In the next place, let the married men and women that live temperately with respect to all such things as these, be honored, but those that live in a contrary manner be disgraced. And if the greater part of the citizens conduct themselves with moderation in things of this kind, let these particulars be passed over in silence, without being established by law. But if the conduct of the greater part is disordered in things of this kind, let them be legally

established, and a judgment made of such conduct according to the established laws. The first year is the beginning of the whole of life to everyone. This ought to be written in paternal temples, as the beginning of life, both to boys and girls. In every tribe, too, the number of the governors that are reckoned by years should be written on a white wall. Next to these, the names of those that are living in the tribe should always be written; and on their decease their names should be blotted out. The boundary of marriage for girls should be from sixteen to twenty years of age; and this should be the longest definite time: but for boys, from thirty to thirty-five. The time for acting in the capacity of magistrates should be limited: for women, to forty years of age; but for men, to thirty. With respect to war, men should engage in it from twenty to sixty years of age; but women, when it shall appear necessary to employ them for warlike purposes, and after they have brought forth children, to the fiftieth year of their age: at the same time being mindful to prescribe the possible and the becoming to each.

THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

Book 7.

Athenian Stranger/ Children, therefore, both male and female, being begotten, we shall act with the greatest propriety in speaking in the next place about their education and discipline; for to pass this over in silence is perfectly impossible. However, when it is discussed, it will appear to us to be rather similar to a certain doctrine and admonition than to laws. For the numerous small and unapparent circumstances which happen privately, and in every house, since they easily take place through the pain, pleasure and desire of the respective individuals, contrary to the intention of the legislator, render the manners of the citizens all-various, and not similar to each other. But this is an evil to cities. For, on account of their smallness and frequency, to punish them by a legal fine would be unbecoming, and at the same time unseemly. It would likewise be the means of destroying written laws, in consequence of men being accustomed to act contrary to law in things small and numerous. So that it is difficult indeed to establish laws concerning them, and impossible to pass them over in silence. But I will endeavor to render what I say manifest, leading forth an example, as it were, into light; for what is said at present seems to be involved in obscurity.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ That a proper education, therefore, appears to be capable of rendering both souls and bodies most beautiful and excellent, has been rightly asserted by us.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But I think that the most beautiful bodies are simply those which immediately from infancy grow in the most proper manner.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But what? Do we not understand this, that the first blossom of every animal is by far the greatest and most abundant; so that it is the source of contention to many, that human bodies at twenty do not receive twice the increase in length which they had at five years of age?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? When there is an influx of abundant increase without many and moderate labors, do we not know that it produces ten thousand maladies in bodies?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Many labors, therefore, are then necessary, when abundant nutriment is introduced into bodies.

Clinias/ What do you say, O guest? Shall we order those who are but just born, and the youngest, to undergo the greatest labors?

Athenian Stranger/ By no means: but still prior to these, those that are nourished in their mother's womb.

Clinias/ How do you say, O best of men? Do you really speak of those that are yet carried in the womb of their mother?

Athenian Stranger/ I do. But it is not at all wonderful that you should be ignorant of the exercise of such as these; which, though it appears to be absurd, I am willing to unfold to you.

Clinias/ By all means, do so.

Athenian Stranger/ By us, indeed, a thing of this kind can be more readily comprehended, because children there engage in certain sports more than is proper. For, with us, not only children, but certain old men, nourish the young of

birds, and exercise them in fighting with each other; but they are far from thinking that the labors, in which by exercising they excite them, are moderate. For, besides this, taking each of them by the wing, they walk many stadia with the lesser young in their hands, and the larger under their arms; and this, not for the sake of the good habit of their own bodies, but for that of the birds. And by this, indeed, they signify thus much to him who is capable of understanding what is said, that all bodies are benefited by motion and agitation when not continued to weariness, whether these are produced from themselves, or by carriages, or by the sea, or horses, or by whatever other means bodies are moved. Hence, through these vanquishing the nutriment of food and drink, they are able to impart to us health, beauty, and strength. This being the case, what shall we say we ought to do in the next place? Are you willing that we should say, laughing, while we are establishing laws, that the pregnant woman should take the exercise of walking, and, after she is delivered, fashion the infant like wax, while he is moist, and during the space of two years bind him with rollers? Likewise, that we should compel the nurses, by legal fines, to carry the children either into the fields, or to the temples, or their acquaintance, till they are sufficiently able to stand alone? And that then they should be careful lest their legs become distorted through the violence of resting on them; and, for this purpose, should carry them in their arms till they are three years old? That the nurses, likewise, ought to be as strong as possible; and that there should be more than one for each child? And, lastly, that a punishment shall be ordained by a written law for neglect in each of these particulars? Or shall this by no means be the case? For that which we just now mentioned will happen to us in great abundance.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ We shall expose ourselves to abundant laughter, because the effeminate and servile manners of the nurses will be unwilling to obey us.

Clinias/ For whose sake, therefore, shall we say these things ought to be asserted?

Athenian Stranger/ For the sake of the manners of the masters and free persons in the city, who, perhaps, when they hear these things, will rightly conceive, that unless private affairs are properly conducted in cities, it is in vain to expect that such as are common can have any stability by the promulgation of laws; and who, in consequence of such a conception, will use as laws what we have just now advanced. And further still, by a proper use of these assertions they will govern both their families and the city in such a manner as to render them happy.

Clinias/ What you say is very likely to be the case.

Athenian Stranger/ We should not, therefore, desist from a legislation of this kind: till we have delivered the particulars of those studies which pertain to the souls of very young children, and thus bring our discourse to a conclusion ii the same manner as when we spoke concerning their bodies.

Clinias/ Perfectly right.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us receive this, therefore, as an element with respect to both the body and soul of very young children, that nutrition and motion, when applied every night and day, are profitable to all juvenile bodies and souls, but especially to the most youthful; so that, if it were possible, they should be in such a condition as if they were always sailing on the sea. But as this is impossible, it is requisite to approach as near to this as we are able in our treatment of infants. Indeed, that we ought to do so, may be conjectured from this, that both the nurses of infants, and

those who are initiated in the remedies of the Corybantes, know experimentally that it is useful. For, when mothers are desirous that their children who sleep with difficulty may sleep soundly, they do not attempt to accomplish this by quiet, but, on the contrary, by gently moving them in their arms; nor yet by silence, but by singing to them. And, in short, they charm their children by the melody of their voice, as if by that of a pipe; just in the same manner as the remedies of mad Bacchanalians employ this choir, and, at the same time, Muse of motion.

Clinias/ What then, O guest, is especially the cause of this to us?

Athenian Stranger/ It is not very difficult to know.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Both these passions consist in fear: and they are certain terrors arising from a depraved habit of the soul. When, therefore, anyone externally causes an agitation in passions of this kind, the exterior vanquishes the interior dreadful and insane motion: but, being vanquished, a tranquil quiet takes place in the soul, and the leaping of the heart, which was troublesome to endure, subsides. And thus it entirely causes some to receive the benefit of sleep; but it recalls others, who are awake, from insane to prudent habits, by dancing and the melody of the pipe, in conjunction with those divinities to whom suppliants sacrifice. And these things, in short, possess a certain probable reason.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But if these things possess such a power, this ought to be understood concerning them, that every soul that has been familiar with fear from infancy will have been more accustomed to endurance. Everyone,

however, will acknowledge that this is an exercise of timidity, and not of fortitude.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But, on the contrary, we should say that he is exercised in fortitude who, from his infancy, has made it his study to vanquish all the fears and terrors which befall us.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ We may say, therefore, that this one thing greatly contributes to a part of the virtue of the soul, viz. the all-perfect gymnastic exercise of children in motions.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And besides this, a placid or morose disposition becomes no small part of goodness or depravity of soul.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But we should endeavor to relate to the utmost of our ability, after what manner we should wish that each of these may be implanted in infants.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ This, then, is a dogma with us, that luxury renders the manners of youth morose, irascible, and vehemently agitated by things of a trifling nature; but that, on the contrary, excessive and rustic servitude causes them to be abject, illiberal, haters of mankind, and unfit for society.

Clinias/ But how will the whole city be able to educate infants, who are incapable of understanding what is said to them, and who cannot taste of any discipline whatever?

Athenian Stranger/ Thus. Every animal, as soon as it is born, is accustomed to utter certain sounds with a loud

voice: and this is particularly the case with the human species, which to vociferation adds weeping.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Nurses, therefore, being desirous to know what infants are in want of, conjecture this by the things which they offer to them. For that which causes them to be silent they consider as offered to them in a becoming manner, but that as improperly offered at which they cry and make a noise. For, in children, vociferation and tears are indications by no means fortunate of the things which they love and hate. But the time in which this takes place is not less than the space of three years, which is no small portion of life to pass through well or ill.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ Does not a child at that period appear to you to be morose, and by no means kind, and for the most part full of lamentation and tears, more than becomes one that is good?

Clinias/ It appears so to me.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? If someone should endeavor, by all possible means, that during this period of three years the child may in as small a degree as possible be affected with sorrow, fear, and pain, should we not think that by this means his soul would be rendered more cheerful and kind?

Clinias/ It is evident it would, O guest, and especially if the child should be supplied with many pleasures.

Athenian Stranger/ This I cannot grant you, O wonderful Clinias. For with us an action of this kind would be the most pernicious of all things. But let us see whether we may assert a certain thing.

Clinias/ Inform us what it is.

Athenian Stranger/ Our discourse, at present, is about a thing of no small importance. Do you, O Megillus, attend and decide for us. For my discourse asserts that an upright life ought neither to pursue pleasures, nor entirely avoid pain, but should embrace the medium between these, which we just now denominated benignity; and which, from a certain oracular rumor, we all of us aptly call the habit of divinity. We say too, that he who is desirous of becoming a divine man ought to pursue this habit, so that he may neither be wholly hurried away to pleasures in a rash manner (for in this case he would not be free from pain), nor yet suffer any other to act in this manner, whether he is an old or a young man, of the male or female sex. But he will least of all suffer this to be the case with infants. For all the manners then, through custom, inhere in everyone in the most firm and powerful manner. And further still, if it were not that I should appear to jest, I should say that pregnant women ought more than other women so to be managed, that during the year of their pregnancy they may neither be engaged in certain numerous and insane pleasures, nor be agitated by pain, but lead a benignant, benevolent, and mild life.

Clinias/ There was no occasion for you, O guest, to ask Megillus, which of us spoke in the more proper manner; for I agree with you, that all men ought to fly from a life of unmingled pleasure and pain, and that they should always pursue a certain middle condition. You have, therefore, both spoken and heard in a becoming manner.

Athenian Stranger/ With very great rectitude, therefore, O Clinias. But, besides these things, let us all three consider this.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That all these particulars which are now discussed by us are called by many unwritten laws, and

that those which are denominated the laws of a country are no other than all these. And further still, that what we just now said, that these particulars ought neither to be called laws, nor yet suffered to be passed over in silence, was beautifully asserted. For these are the bonds of every polity, subsisting between all laws that are as yet and will be hereafter written, and being as it were altogether the laws of a country, and such as are in every respect ancient. These, when established in a becoming manner, and rendered familiar, will invest the written laws with every kind of safety. But when they are established in an unbecoming manner, confusion will be the consequence: just as in edifices, when the pillars by which they are supported are taken away, the whole falls to the ground, some things lie under others, and those parts of the structure which were beautifully raised on the pillars become a heap of ruins, through the falling of their supporters. In consequence of considering this, O Clinias. it is proper that you should bind your city on all sides, as being a new city, and that to the utmost of your power you should not omit anything either greater small, which may be called laws, or manners, or studies: for by all these a city is bound together; but no one of these can be stable without the rest. So that it is not proper to wonder, if, in consequence of many and at the same time small things appearing to us to be legal, or this being the case with a conflux of customs, the laws should become more extended.

Clinias/ You speak properly; and we shall think in this manner.

Athenian Stranger/ If anyone, therefore, accurately accomplishes these things, in both male and female children of three years old, and does not negligently make use of what has been said, he will procure no small advantage to such as are recently educated. But these things will be accommodated to the disposition of children of three, four,

five, and six years of age. Luxury too should be removed from them; and they should be chastised, but not in an ignominious manner. But, as we said respecting slaves, that they should neither be chastised with insolence, as this would excite them to anger, nor yet be suffered to go unpunished, as this would render them delicate; the same mode of conduct should be observed towards those that are free. Sports, however, are to children certain spontaneous things, which when they engage in, they nearly of themselves invent. All children then of this age should assemble in the temples of the respective districts, from three to six years of age; the nurses of these still keeping a watchful eye over their orderly behavior and incontinence. But one out of each of the twelve women should be placed over the nurses, and the whole herd, for the space of a year; and her province must consist in taking care that everything prescribed by the guardians of the law is executed in an orderly manner. These should be chosen by the women that preside over marriages; one out of each tribe, and of the same age with themselves. She who is established in this office should go every day to a temple, and always punish the person that acts unjustly, viz. a male and female slave and a stranger of either sex, herself, by means of certain servants of the city; but a citizen, when she is doubtful respecting his punishment, must be taken by her to the ædiles to receive his sentence. But when the punishment which a citizen deserves is not dubious, she herself shall inflict it. After children are six years of age, the males should be separated from the females; boys should associate with boys, and girls in a similar manner with each other. It is likewise proper that the attention of each should be directed to disciplines; the males being sent to the masters of equestrian exercises, of bows, darts, and slings; likewise the females, if discipline of this kind is allowed them; and especially that they may become

acquainted with the use of arms. But now almost all men are ignorant how things of this kind are circumstanced.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ That things on the right hand seem to differ naturally from those on the left, with respect to the several actions of the hands. For the feet, and the inferior parts of the body, do not appear to possess any difference with respect to labor. But in the hands we each of us become as it were lame, through the ignorance of our nurses and mothers. For each of the members naturally possesses nearly equal power; but they not properly using them, through custom we make a difference between them. For, indeed, in certain employments there is no great difference in the use of the hands. Thus, using the lyre with the left hand, and the plectrum with the right, is a thing of no consequence; and so in other things of a similar nature. But not to use these examples in other particulars is nearly folly. The law of the Scythians, indeed, evinces the truth of these observations. For they not only hold the bow in their left hand, and the arrow in the right, but similarly employ both hands for both these. And there are many other examples of this kind in charioteers and others. From all which we may learn, that those who render the left hand more imbecile than the right act contrary to nature. This, as I have said, is a thing of no great consequence in horned plectra, and such-like instruments; but in battle, where it is necessary to use iron, bows, and spears, it is of great consequence. But it is by far of the greatest importance when it is requisite to use arms against arms. There is, indeed, a great difference between one that learns and one that does not learn, and between him who is exercised and him who is not exercised. For, as he who is perfectly exercised in the pancratium, or in boxing, or wrestling, is not incapable of fighting from his left-hand parts, but becomes lame and confused in his

motions when anyone, causing him to change his position, compels him to exercise himself from his right-hand parts; —the same thing, in my opinion, ought to appear proper in arms, and in everything else. For he who possesses a two-fold power, viz. of defending himself, and vanquishing others, ought not to suffer, to the utmost of his power, either of these to remain indolent and without skill. And if anyone had the nature of Geryon or Briareus, since in this case he would be capable of using a hundred hands, he ought with all these hands to hurl a hundred darts. All these particulars ought to be under the direction of the male and female governors; the female governors inspecting the sports and nutriment of the children, but the male their disciplines, that, all the boys and girls having the perfect use of both their feet and both their hands, they may as much as possible in no respect injure nature by custom. But it will happen that two-fold disciplines must be used; gymnastic, for particulars pertaining to the body; and music, for such as pertain to the good condition of the soul. Again, however, gymnastic is two-fold; dancing and wrestling. And of dancing, one kind imitates the diction of the muse, preserving the magnificent in conjunction with the liberal; but another kind, for the sake of the good habit, lightness, and beauty of the parts and members of the body, aptly bends and stretches each, imparting to them rhythmical motion, disseminating, and at the same time following the whole order of dancing. With respect to wrestling, that which Antæus or Cercyon adopted among their arts, for the sake of useless contention, or the boxing employed by Epeus or Amycus, since they are of no use in battle, they do not deserve to be mentioned. But the particulars respecting proper wrestling, by clinging round the neck, or with the hands, or round the sides, when desire of victory and a good habit of body are applied for the sake of strength and health,

—these, as they are useful to every purpose, are not to be omitted; but both masters and disciples are to be enjoined, that, when we establish the laws respecting these, all such particulars may be benevolently imparted to the one, and gratefully received by the other. Nor must such imitations in choirs as are fit to be imitated be omitted; in this place, indeed, the armed sports of the Curetes; but, in Lacedæmon, of the Dioscuri. Our virgin too and mistress Minerva, being delighted with the sport of the choir, does not think it fit to play with empty hands; but, being perfectly adorned with complete armor, she in this manner completes the dance. It will be proper that all the boys and girls should imitate the goddess in this respect, honoring her benevolence, in the necessity of war, and for the sake of festivals. It will likewise be proper that boys, immediately before they go to battle, should supplicate and make sacred processions in honor of all the Gods, being at the same time adorned with arms and horses, and performing their supplications to the Gods and the sons of the Gods, sometimes swifter, and sometimes slower in dancing, and as they proceed to battle. Contests too, and preludes of contests, should be used, for no other purpose than for the sake of these things. For these, both in peace and war, are useful to a city and to private families. But other labors, sports, and exercises respecting the body are not, O Megillus and Clinias, liberal. And thus that gymnastic, which I said in our former discourse ought to be discussed, is nearly now absolved. But, if you have anything better than this, speak, and do not withhold it.

Clinias/ It is not easy, O guest, omitting these, to have anything better to say about gymnastic and contest.

Athenian Stranger/ It follows, therefore, that we should speak about the gifts of the Muses and Apollo, which we formerly thought we had so sufficiently discussed, that the particulars about gymnastic alone remained; but now it is

evident that there is something respecting these which should be mentioned before everything else. Of this, therefore, we will in the next place speak.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Hear me, therefore; for you have heard me in what has been already discussed. But at the same time it is requisite that both the speaker and hearer should be cautious in mentioning that which is vehemently wonderful and unusual. This also should be the case at present. For I am now going to assert something which cannot be mentioned without fear; but at the same time, assuming courage, I shall not desist.

Clinias/ What is this, O guest?

Athenian Stranger/ I say, that all cities are ignorant that the liability or mutation of sports is the principal thing respecting the promulgation of laws. For when it is so ordered, that the same persons always use, and are delighted with, the same sports, according to the same, and in a similar manner, legal institutions are then permitted to remain established in quiet. But when sports are changed, and innovations made in them, so that young men are perpetually engaged in new sports, both in the figures of their bodies and other apparatus; continually form a different opinion of the becoming and unbecoming in these particulars; and in the highest degree honor the inventors of new figures, colors, and everything else of this kind; —when this is the case, we say, and say with the greatest rectitude, that a greater mischief cannot befall the city. For it secretly changes the manners of the youthful part of the inhabitants, and causes them to despise that which is ancient, and honor that which is new. But I again say, that there is not anything more detrimental to all cities than this assertion and dogma. Hear, however, what a mighty evil I say it is.

Clinias/ Do you speak of blaming ancient institutions in cities?

Athenian Stranger/ Entirely so.

Clinias/ You shall not, therefore, find us depraved auditors of this discourse, but as much as possible most benevolent.

Athenian Stranger/ It is reasonable to suppose that you will be so.

Clinias/ Only speak, therefore.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, let us hear this with greater attention, and thus speak among ourselves. We find then, that mutation in all things, except such as are evil, is in the highest degree pernicious at all times in the diet of bodies, in the manners of souls, and, in short, in everything except, as I just now said, in things evil. So that, if anyone directs his attention to bodies, and considers them as accustomed to certain kinds of food, drink, and labors, he will find that at first they are disturbed by them, but afterwards by the long continued use of these acquire flesh, become friendly, accustomed, and familiar to all this diet, and are disposed in the best manner with respect to health and pleasure. He will likewise find, that if at any time they are forced to change any part of their approved diet, at first they are disturbed by disease, and do not recover their health till they are accustomed to the new food. The same thing must be considered as taking place in the thoughts of men, and the natures of souls. For every soul reverences and fears to make any change in the laws in which it has been educated, when by a certain divine good fortune those laws have remained for a long time unmoved, so that no one either recollects or has ever heard that they subsisted otherwise than at present. The legislator, therefore, ought to devise some method by which this may be accomplished in

the city. But I have discovered the following, method: All men, as I have said before, consider the sports of youth when changed, as nothing more than mere sports, and are far from thinking that they are of the greatest consequence. Hence, they do not resist this mutation, but comply with it. Nor do they consider, that the children who engage in these new sports necessarily become different men from what they would have been if their old sports had remained; but, becoming different, that they will pursue a different life, and thus be accustomed to different studies and laws. Hence, no one fears that what I just now called the greatest evil will by these means happen to cities. Mutations, therefore, respecting figures are less noxious. But frequent innovations in praising and blaming manners are, in my opinion, the greatest of all evils, and the most to be dreaded.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Shall we believe in our former discourse, in which we said that the particulars respecting rhythm, and every kind of music, were imitations of the manners of better and worse men? Or how shall we say?

Clinias/ Our opinion is in no respect different from this.

Athenian Stranger/ We say, therefore, that we should endeavor, by every possible contrivance, that neither children in our city may desire other imitations in dancing and singing, nor anyone may persuade them to this innovation by introducing all-various pleasures.

Clinias/ You speak with the utmost rectitude.

Athenian Stranger/ Has anyone then of us any art better calculated for this purpose than that of the Egyptians?

Clinias/ What art are you speaking of?

Athenian Stranger/ That every kind of dancing and melody should be consecrated; instituting, in the first place,

festivals at certain times of the year, in honor of the several Gods, the sons of Gods, and dæmons; and after this, the sacrifices to the different divinities, together with the ode and choirs with which the sacrifices are to be honored. After these things are established, all the citizens in common should sacrifice to the Fates, and to all the other Gods, and dedicate their several odes to each of the Gods and their attendants. But if anyone introduces other hymns and choirs in honor of the Gods than those which are instituted by law, the priests and priestesses, together with the guardians of the laws, shall, in a holy and legitimate manner, repulse him in his undertaking. And he who is repulsed, if he is not willingly restrained, shall suffer the punishment of his impiety through the whole of life, from anyone who is willing to inflict it.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ But since we are arrived thus far in our discourse, we should be affected in a becoming manner.

Clinias/ About what are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ All men, not only the old but the young, when they see or hear anything unusual, do not immediately assent to that which is dubious respecting it, directly, as it were, running to embrace it; but, standing still, as if situated in a place where three roads meet, and not very much seeing the right way, inquire, and do not proceed any further till they have a firm assurance respecting the road they should take. We too should act in a similar manner at present. For, as we have now fallen upon an unusual and wonderful discourse respecting laws, we ought necessarily to make every possible inquiry, and not readily decide, being such men as we are, on things of such great importance, or attempt to assert anything immediately, as if the subject was perfectly clear.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ We will, therefore, give the subject time, and then firmly decide upon it, when it has been sufficiently considered by us. But lest we should in vain leave the order consequent to laws unfinished, let us proceed to the end of them. For, perhaps, if divinity is willing, and this discussion obtains its completion, what is at present dubious may become sufficiently clear.

Clinias/ You speak most excellently, O guest, and we shall do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ We say, then, that this wonderful thing must be granted, —I mean, that odes must be established for us by law; just as the ancients, as it appears, proclaimed respecting singing to the harp. So that they, perhaps, did not entirely dissent from what is said by us at present; but in a dream, as it were, or roused to a vigilant state, they either dreamt or prophesied this. Let this then be the decree respecting it: —No one man dare to sing anything besides the public and sacred songs, or make any alteration in the whole choir of the young men, or utter anything contrary to the other laws. And he who complies with this decree shall be liberated from fine; but he who does not comply, as we said just now, shall be punished by the guardians of the laws, and by the priests and priestesses. Let these things, therefore be now established for us in discourse.

Clinias/ Let them be established.

Athenian Stranger/ But after what manner can anyone so establish them by law as that he may not appear perfectly ridiculous? It appears to me that it will be the safest way to fashion them first of all in our discourse like certain images. I say, then, that one of the images is as follows: The sacrifice being performed, and the victims burnt according to law, if

some private person, a son for instance, or a brother, should approach the altars and sacred rites blaspheming with every kind of blaspheme, should we not say that he uttered a sorrowful and bad omen and prophecy, both to his father and the rest of his kindred?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ This, therefore, in short, must nearly take place in all our cities. For, when any magistrate performs any sacrifice in common, not one choir, but a multitude of choirs assemble on the occasion; and standing not far from the altars, but sometimes close to them, they utter every kind of blasphemy respecting the sacred concerns, exciting the souls of the hearers with words, rhythms, and the most lamentable harmonies: and he who causes the city to weep most abundantly immediately after the sacrifice is finished, bears away the palm of victory. Shall we not abrogate this law? And if, at any time, it is necessary that the citizens should hear lamentations of this kind, it should not be on certain sacred, but rather on inauspicious days: and then it will be proper that rather certain foreign choirs, conducted by hire, should sing on this occasion, as is the case at funerals, where those who are hired for the purpose walk before the dead with a certain *Caric Muse*. A thing of this kind may very properly be adopted about such odes as these. A long robe too will be proper for funeral odes, and not crowns or golden ornaments. But, in short, everything of a nature contrary to these should be employed on this occasion, that I may dismiss all further discourse about these particulars with the utmost celerity, I again, therefore, ask if it is agreeable to you, that this first image should be established for odes?

Clinias/ What kind of image?

Athenian Stranger/ A good omen. And, indeed, the genus of the ode should everywhere, and in every respect, be employed in prognosticating well. Or shall I not at all ask your opinion, but thus establish it?

Clinias/ By all means, establish it: for this law will vanquish by the unanimous votes of all men.

Athenian Stranger/ What then, after good omination, will be the second law of music? Will it not be, that prayers should be offered to the respective Gods to whom we sacrifice?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But the third law, I think, will be, that since poets know that prayers are petitions addressed to the Gods, they ought to be careful in the highest degree, lest they should ignorantly request what is evil, as if it were good. For I think the condition of him who prays in this manner would be ridiculous.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Did we not a little before agree, that neither silver nor gold ought to be considered as riches in our city?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Of what then shall we say this discourse is the paradigm? Is it not of this, that not every genus of poets is sufficient to know, in the highest degree, things good and evil? If, therefore, any poet, either in prose or verse, shall compose for us improper prayers, he shall be made by the citizens to pray for the contrary to what he asked in his prayers, in things of the greatest importance: though, as we have already said, we shall not find many offences greater than this. But we shall establish this as one of the laws and forms respecting the Muse.

Clinias/ Which? Speak to us more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ That a poet shall not compose anything, either beautiful or good, different from the legal and just institutions of the city. Nor shall he be permitted to show what he has composed to any private person, before the judges and guardians of the law, appointed for this purpose, have seen and approved it. But it has nearly been shown by us, who those are whom we have chosen to preside over music and discipline. Shall I then, as usual, ask whether this law, formula, and third image, is to be established for us? Or how does it appear to you?

Clinias/ That it should be established, undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ After these things, it will be most proper that hymns, and encomiums of the Gods, should be sung mingled with prayers; and after the Gods, in a similar manner, that proper prayers, with encomiums, should be offered to dæmons and heroes.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But, after this law, the following will take place without envy. It will be proper that those citizens who have accomplished beautiful and laborious works, pertaining either to bodies or souls, and who have been obedient to the laws, should after their decease be celebrated.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But to honor those who are yet alive, with encomiums and hymns, and before, having completely run the race of life, they have arrived at a beautiful end, is not safe. Let all these particulars be established for us, common both to men and women that have been illustriously good. But it will be proper that odes and dancings should be established in the following manner: — There are many ancient and beautiful poems about music, and in a similar manner about dancing. Out of these to

choose that which is becoming and adapted to an established polity, cannot, be the means of exciting envy. The electors of these shall not be less than fifty years old. These shall choose that poem out of the ancient poems which appears to be sufficient for the purpose. But that which is inefficient, or altogether unfit, they shall either entirely reject, or commit to poets and musicians to be properly corrected, employing for this purpose their poetical abilities. They shall not apply to these for the gratification of desire, or for pleasures, except in a very few cases; but, the will of the legislator being made known, all dancing, every ode, and every choir, shall be instituted according to their determination. For every employment about a Muse, which is conducted in an orderly manner, though a sweet Muse is not added, is ten thousand times better than every disorderly pursuit of a Muse. The pleasant, however, is common to all the Muses. For every one considers that to be pleasant with which he has been conversant from infancy to mature age. And if he has been familiar with a prudent and orderly Muse, when he hears one of a contrary character, he hates, and calls it illiberal. But he who has been educated in familiarity with a common and sweet Muse, calls the contrary to this frigid and unpleasant. So that, as I just now said, neither the pleasant nor the unpleasant has any peculiar privilege. But the case is different with respect to emolument and detriment: for the one renders those who are educated in it better, and the other worse.

Clinias/ It is well said.

Athenian Stranger/ Further still, it will be proper to separate the songs which are adapted to the women from those which are adapted to the men, defining them by a certain formula, and accommodating them to harmonies and rhythms. For to be dissonant from the whole of harmony, or foreign from rhythm, attributing to melodies

nothing adapted to each of these, is a dire circumstance. It is necessary, therefore, that the figures of these should be established by law, and both be properly attributed to both. But that which is accommodated either to men or women ought to be rendered manifest from the difference of the nature of each. That which is magnificent, therefore, and verges to fortitude, must be called virile: but that which more inclines to the ornamental and the moderate must be delivered, both in law and in discourse, as of a more feminine nature. This, then, is the order. In the next place, let us declare after what manner, by whom, and when, each of these are to be accomplished. But as a ship-wright, when he lays down that which is the principle in the construction of a ship, describes the form of the keel; in like manner, I appear to myself to do the same thing. For, while I endeavor to distinguish the figures of lives according to the manners of souls, I in reality lay down the keels of them, and very properly consider by what device, and after what manner, we may transport in the best manner life over this sea of life. Human affairs, indeed, are not worthy of great attention; yet it is necessary that they should be attended to. But this is not an unfortunate circumstance. Since, however, we are here, if we can in a certain respect accomplish this in a convenient manner, it will, perhaps, be sufficient for us. But someone may, perhaps, very properly inquire what it is that I now say.

Clinias/ Someone may.

Athenian Stranger/ I say, then, that a thing of a serious nature ought to be seriously studied, but that this ought by no means to be the case with that which is not of a serious nature. And that divinity, indeed, is naturally worthy of every blessed study, but that man, as I said before, was fashioned to be a certain sport of divinity. This, indeed, is truly the most excellent thing which he possesses. It is

necessary, therefore, that every man and woman, pursuing this mode, and engaging in the most beautiful sports, should thus pass through life, thinking, in a manner, entirely contrary to what they do at present.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ Now, indeed, they think that serious pursuits ought to subsist for the sake of sports. For they consider that warlike concerns, which are things of a serious nature, ought to be well disposed for the sake of peace. But neither does sport naturally belong to war, nor was there ever any discipline in it which deserves to be mentioned, nor is there at present, nor will be. But we say that this is a thing of a most serious nature, —I mean, that everyone ought to pass through life, for the most part, and in the most excellent manner, in peace. What the proper manner, therefore, is of sporting through life, and what the sports are which should be employed in sacrifices, in singing and dancing, so that the Gods may be rendered propitious, and enemies, opposed and vanquished in battle; likewise, by what songs and dances both these may be accomplished; —of all these particulars we have delivered the formulæ, and, as it were, cut the paths in which we should proceed. The poet too appears to speak well when he says: "You will conceive, O Telemachus, some things from yourself, but others the dæmon will suggest to you. For I do not think that you were born and nourished with unfavorable Gods." Such too ought to be the conceptions of our pupils. For they should think that what we have already said has been sufficiently said; and that the dæmon and divinity will suggest other things to them respecting sacrifices and choirs, viz. what divinities they ought to render propitious in their sports, and when; at the same time living in a natural manner, and being themselves, for the most part, prodigies, but participating certain small portions of truth.

Megillus/ You vilify, O guest, in every respect the human race.

Athenian Stranger/ You should not wonder at this, O Megillus, but pardon me. For, looking to divinity, and being affected with the view, I have said that which I just now said. But let our race not be anything despicable (if it is agreeable to you), but worthy serious attention. After these things the public buildings for gymnastic exercises and disciplines have been spoken of, and placed in a tripartite manner in the middle of the city. The gymnasia too of the horses have, in a similar manner, been assigned a tripartite distribution in the suburbs of the city, together with ample places adorned for the sake of the young men, that in these they may exercise themselves with the bow and arrow, and in other jaculations; and may be properly disciplined and attended to. If, therefore, we did not then sufficiently speak about these particulars, let us now discourse about them in conjunction with the laws.

Of all these, then, foreign matters should be hired, who residing in these ample places may teach everyone that shall come to be instructed, the warlike and musical disciplines; not only instructing those whom their parents wish to be taught, and rejecting others, but, as it is said, teaching every man and boy to the utmost of their power, as being those who from necessity discipline the city rather than children. My law too asserts the same things about females as about males; and says, that the former ought to be equally exercised with the latter. Nor shall I be afraid to say, that both the gymnastic and equestrian disciplines are adapted to women as well as to men. For I am persuaded of this through hearing ancient fables. But, in short, even at present, I know that there are innumerable myriads of women about Pontus, called Sauromantides, who are ordered equally to use, and equally to be exercised in,

horses, bows, and other arms, in common with the men. But besides this I reason in the following manner about these particulars: I say, if it is possible that these things may subsist in this manner, the custom of our country, which excludes women from engaging with all their strength in the same pursuits as men, is the most foolish of all customs. For thus every city is nearly rendered half instead of double, from the same effects and labors. Though, indeed, this is a wonderful error of the legislator.

Clinias/ So it appears. Yet, O guest, many of the things asserted by us at present are contrary to the custom of a polity.

Athenian Stranger/ But we ought to permit the subject of our discourse to be well discussed; and, when discussed, it is requisite to select that which appears to be best.

Clinias/ You have spoken very elegantly, and you have made me reprove myself for what I just now said. Speak, therefore, after this, whatever is agreeable to yourself.

Athenian Stranger/ That is agreeable to me, O Clinias, which I said above; that, if it should appear these things could not be sufficiently accomplished, they may perhaps be contradicted in discourse. But now, if someone is by no means disposed to admit this law, he ought to inquire after something else. Nevertheless our exhortation will not cease to assert that women ought in the highest degree, in our city, to participate in common with the men of discipline and other particulars. For in a certain respect it is requisite to think as follows on this subject. Admit that women are not to participate in common with men, in everything pertaining to life, will it not be necessary that another order should be assigned to them?

Clinias/ It will be necessary.

Athenian Stranger/ What other order then among those which exist at present, shall we assign them in preference to that of our communion? Shall we adopt that of the Thracians and many other nations, who use women for the purposes of agriculture, and in the place of herdsmen and shepherds, in the very same manner as they use their slaves? Or shall we adopt the custom of our country, and that of all our neighboring cities? For, with us, all possessions, as they are called, are collected together into one habitation, and the care of provisions, shuttles, and everything pertaining to the manufacture of wool, is committed to women. Or shall we, O Megillus, choose a medium between these, the Laconic mode? so that virgins shall engage in gymnastic exercises and music; but women, during the time of peace, shall take care of the manufacture of wool, at the same time leading an active, but by no means a depraved and abject life? And further still, shall they bestow a certain kind of middle attention to the care of provisions and the education of children, but shall not engage in war; so that, if it should be necessary at any time to defend the city and their children, they may neither be able to use bows like certain Amazons, nor be skilled in any other kind of jaculation, nor yet to imitate the Goddess with spear and shield, and make a generous resistance for their besieged country, so as to be able, when beheld in a certain order, at least to terrify the enemy, if they can accomplish nothing greater than this? But, if they live in this manner, they will by no means dare to imitate the Sauromantides, who will appear to these women to be men. Let him, therefore, who is willing to praise your legislators for these things, praise them: but my opinion respecting them will never alter. For a legislator ought to be a perfect and not a half character, who suffers the female sex to be lost in luxury, and to use improper diet, but takes consummate care of the male sex, and thus nearly

leaves for the city the half instead of the double of a happy life.

Megillus/ What shall we do, O Clinias? Shall we suffer our guest thus to censure the Spartans?

Clinias/ Certainly. For, since liberty of speech is given to him, he must be suffered to go on, till laws have in every respect been sufficiently discussed.

Megillus/ You speak very properly.

Athenian Stranger/ It is, therefore, nearly my province to endeavor to discuss what is subsequent to this.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ What then will be the mode of life by which necessaries may be moderately procured for men? so that arts may be left to others, but agriculture committed to slaves, who may procure the first fruits of the earth, so as to be sufficient for men that live in a moderate manner; likewise, that eating in common may be adopted, the men being placed apart, and their domestics situated near them; also the female offspring, together with their mothers. Further still, that male and female governors may be placed over these public banquets, so as to dissolve them every day, and inspect the behavior of all those that eat in common; and who may return home after the governor and the rest have made libations to those Gods to whom that day or night is dedicated. To men governed in this orderly manner, will no necessary work, and which is in every respect adapted to them, be left? But is it necessary that each of them should live after the manner of cattle, paying attention to nothing but growing fat? This therefore, we say, is neither just nor beautiful: nor is it possible that a man who lives in this manner can obtain that which is adapted to his nature. But to a sluggish animal, and which grows fat through indolence, it belongs to be torn in pieces by another animal who is

vehemently exercised by fortitude and labors. If, therefore, we investigate these things with the accuracy which we employ at present, we shall perhaps find that they will never take place as long as women and children, private houses, and everything else of this kind, are made to be private property. But those particulars which are secondary to these, and have just now been mentioned by us, if they take place, should be established in a very moderate manner. We say then that a work remains for those that live in this manner, which is neither the smallest nor the most vile, but the greatest of all things which are ordained by a just law. For, as he who aspires after victory, in the Pythian or Olympian games, neglects every other pursuit, so his soul is filled with a double, or more than a double employment, who devotes himself in the most proper manner to the virtue of the soul and body. For no other employment ought to become an impediment to a proper attention to the body, and to the disciplines and manners of the soul. But, indeed, every night and every day are scarcely sufficient for him who does this, to accomplish his end in a perfect and sufficient manner. Since these things, therefore, naturally subsist in this manner, the whole time of employment ought to be always orderly assigned to liberal men, in a continued succession, from one rising of the sun to another. The legislator, indeed, will appear ungraceful, who says many and trifling things about domestic government, and among these about the necessity of nocturnal vigilance, in order that the whole city may be continually defended with accuracy. For it ought to be considered as base, and not liberal, by all men, for any citizen to pass the whole night in sleep, and not to be always the first that is roused and seen by all his domestics; whether it is proper to call a thing of this kind a law or an institute. Besides this, it ought to be reckoned base by female slaves, for the mistress to be roused

by them, instead of being herself the first to rouse the rest, viz. both male and female slaves, her children, and in short, if possible, the whole house. All free persons, therefore, rising by night, should perform the many necessary political and œconomic duties of their stations; the governors, those pertaining to the city, and masters and mistresses, those pertaining to their families. For much sleep is neither naturally adapted to bodies nor to souls, nor to the actions of these. For he who is asleep is of no more worth than that which is destitute of life; but, whoever among us is careful in the highest degree that he may live and be wise, will be vigilant for the greatest part of his time, sleeping no longer than is necessary to the preservation of health. But much of this will not be requisite for him who is familiar with good habits. Magistrates, indeed, who are vigilant by night in cities, are a terror to evil men, whether they are enemies or citizens, but are admired and honored by the just and the wise; and are both useful to themselves and the whole city. The night being passed through in this manner, besides all the above mentioned advantages, produces likewise a certain fortitude in the souls of the citizens. On the dawn of day it will be proper that boys should go to their masters. For neither cattle nor anything else should live without a shepherd; nor boys without certain teachers, nor slaves without masters: but a boy is the most difficult to manage of all wild beasts. For, in consequence of the fountain of prudence in him not being yet perfect, he becomes insidious and vehement, and the most insolent of wild beasts. On this account it is necessary to bind him with a multitude of chains: and as soon as he is freed from his nurse and mother, he should be committed to the care of pedagogues, on account of his childishness and infancy, and afterwards to preceptors, that, as a free-born animal, he may be instructed in proper disciplines. But if the boy is born a

slave, let it be lawful for any free-born man to punish the child, pedagogue, and preceptor, whenever he detects them acting improperly. But whoever is present on this occasion, and does not justly punish the offenders, shall in the first place be subject to the greatest reproach; and, in the next place, he who was chosen by the guardians of the law to preside over boys, shall take notice whether he whom we have mentioned does not chastise these offenders, when it is fit they should be chastised, or does not chastise them in a proper manner. For he must be an acute inspector, and one who diligently attends to the education of boys, and regulates their natures, always converting them to that which is legally good. But in what manner will the law furnish us with sufficient instruction in this particular? For this has not yet been delivered either clearly or sufficiently, but only in a partial manner. It is however necessary, that to the utmost of our power nothing should be left incomplete, but that everything should be unfolded, that our discourse may be to others both an interpreter and a nourisher. We have, therefore, already spoken concerning the form of a choir of singing and dancing, which among these are to be chosen, corrected, and dedicated to divinity. But we have not yet spoken concerning prose compositions, which of these, and in what manner, O most excellent superintendent of boys, they are to be delivered to those under your tuition. Though you have in our discourse the particulars which they ought to learn and study, respecting war. For the things, my friend, pertaining to letters have in the first place been sufficiently discussed by the legislator. In the next place, those pertaining to the lyre, and such as are of a memorable nature, which we said it was necessary to mention, together with warlike and œconomical concerns. After this, the legislator discussed those particulars respecting the periods of divine bodies, viz. of the stars, the sun, and the moon,

which ought to be established by every city. But of what particulars are we speaking? I answer, Of the order of days with respect to the periods of months, and of months with respect to years, that seasons, sacrifices, and festivals, receiving that which is accommodated to them, and being disposed in a natural order, may render the city alive and vigilant, attributing proper honors to the Gods, and causing men to be more wise about the worship of divinity. These things, O friend, have thus been efficiently discussed for you by the legislator. Attend, therefore, to what follows: We say that all has not been said about letters that might be said, because it has not yet been determined whether he who is to become a moderate citizen ought to possess an accurate knowledge of discipline, or by no means apply to it. In a similar manner, too, respecting the lyre. Boys, therefore, of ten years of age should apply to letters for nearly the space of three years. And those who are thirteen years old should bestow in like manner three years on the study of the lyre. Nor shall it be lawful for a father to keep his children to these studies for a shorter or longer space of time, nor for a child to apply to them, whether he is a lover or a hater of discipline. But he who is not obedient to the law in this respect, let him be deprived of those youthful honors which we shall shortly mention. However, in the first place, hear what masters ought to teach, and youth to learn, during this period. They should labor at letters till they are able to read and write. But we should not be at all concerned that those who are not naturally quick make neither rapid nor beautiful advances in allotted portions of time. With respect to those monuments of the poets destitute of the lyre, which are partly written in measure, and are partly without the sections of rhythm, O ye best of all guardians of the laws, what use will ye permit to be made of those writings, which, being destitute of rhythm and harmony, are deceitful

compositions, and are left us by certain men of this description? It appears to me, that the legislator himself will very much doubt what is to be done in this case.

Clinias/ What is this, O guest, which you appear to say, doubting with yourself?

Athenian Stranger/ Your question is very pertinent, O Clinias. But to you, who speculate in common with me respecting laws, it is necessary that I should speak both that which appears certain, and that which appears dubious.

Clinias/ What, therefore, do you now say respecting these? And what is it that moves you to speak in this manner?

Athenian Stranger/ I will tell you. For it is by no means easy to speak contrary to what has been often said by ten thousand mouths.

Clinias/ But what? Does it appear to you that the few and inconsiderable particulars which have been above mentioned by you respecting laws, are contrary to the sentiments of the multitude?

Athenian Stranger/ You have spoken this with the greatest truth. For, as it appears to me, you exhort me to proceed confidently in this road, though it is arduous and odious to many, and advance through the path of laws which our present discourse has unfolded, without omitting any particular. And, perhaps, a journey of this kind will be pleasing to no less a multitude of a different description; but, if to a less, it will not be a worse multitude.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ I shall not therefore desist. I say, indeed, that we have many poets who have written in hexameter, and many who have written in trimeter verse; among which the intention of some has been serious in these compositions, but of others jocose. An innumerable

multitude too of such as are skilled in these writings have often said, that children who are properly educated must be abundantly nourished with those poetical compositions by often hearing them read; and, in short, must be made learned by committing all the poets to memory. But others say, that a selection should be made of the principal things in all the poets, and that certain entire sentences collected for this purpose should be committed to memory, if anyone among us is desirous of becoming a wise and good man through much experience and skill in a multitude of particulars. Do you, therefore, now order me to explain what is beautifully said, and what not, among these assertions?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall I, in one word, therefore say what I think sufficient about all these? I am of opinion, indeed, that everyone will allow me to say that many things are beautifully asserted by the poets, and many things quite the contrary. But, if this be the case, I say that polymathy is dangerous to youth.

Clinias/ How then, and what would you advise the guardian of the law to do?

Athenian Stranger/ Of what are you speaking?

Clinias/ Of the paradigm, by looking to which the guardian of the laws may permit some things to be learnt by all boys, and may forbid others. Speak, and do not be remiss in answering this question.

Athenian Stranger/ O good Clinias, I appear in a certain respect to be fortunate.

Clinias/ About what?

Athenian Stranger/ Because I am not entirely destitute of a paradigm. For, now, looking to the particulars which we have discussed from the rising of the sun to the present hour, but not in my opinion without divine inspiration, it

appears to me that they are similar to a certain poesy. Nor perhaps is it wonderful that I should be very much delighted, on beholding our assertions collected as it were together in one. For, of all those above-mentioned numerous sentences which I have learnt and heard, those which we have collected in the present discourse appear to me to be the most moderate, and most fit to be heard by youth. So that I think I cannot propose a better paradigm to the guardian of the laws, and to the preceptor of youth, than this, that they should exhort the matters to teach boys these things, together with such particulars as are consequent and similar to these, whether they are written in prose or verse, or are simply asserted without being written, but are conformable to these laws, and are, therefore, by no means to be neglected, but committed to writing. And, in the first place, the teachers themselves should be compelled to learn and praise these assertions: but those teachers must not act in the capacity of teachers by whom they are not approved. And, finally, boys must be committed to the care of those preceptors by whom these assertions are approved and praised. And thus much concerning letters, and the matters of letters.

Clinias/ We do not appear to me, O guest, to have wandered from the design of our discourse: but whether or not we are right upon the whole, is perhaps difficult to determine.

Athenian Stranger/ But this, O Clinias, will become more apparent (as it is proper it should) when, as we have often said, we arrive at the end of this discussion of laws.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ Should we not, after having discussed the particulars about letters, speak concerning the master of the harp?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ If we call to mind what has been already said by us, we assigned to the masters of the harp the province of imparting discipline and every kind of instruction about things of this sort.

Clinias/ Of what kind of things are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ We said, I think, that the Dionysiacal singers of sixty years of age ought to become remarkably acute in their perception of rhythms, and the compositions of harmonies; so that, in those melodies which imitate the passions of the soul, they may be able to distinguish good from bad imitations, —rejecting the latter, but singing to and enchanting the souls of youth with the former, and thus inciting them through imitations to the possession of virtue.

Clinias/ You speak most truly.

Athenian Stranger/ It is requisite, therefore, for the sake of these things, that both the harper and his pupil should use the sounds of the lyre, and likewise for the sake of the distinction of the chords; rendering sounds consonant to sounds. But it shall not be lawful to exhibit to those who, through the quickness of their apprehension, would in three years, experience the utility of music, the different sounds, and variety of the lyre; the chords themselves producing certain melodies, and others being produced by the poet who composes the melody, so as to connect the dense with the rare, the swift with the slow, the acute with the grave, and the consonant with the dissonant, and in a similar manner harmonizing to the sounds of the lyre all the varieties of rhythms. For contraries when confused with each other are difficult to be learnt. But it is proper that youth should be taught with the greatest possible facility. For the necessary disciplines which they must acquire are neither small nor few. However, our discourse as it advances in conjunction

with time will show what these are. And such are the particulars respecting music, which must be attended to by the master of youth. But the particulars respecting those melodies and words which ought to be taught by the masters of choirs, we have already discussed. These we said ought to be consecrated in festivals, in an accommodated manner, so as that they may be advantageous to the city, in conjunction with prosperous pleasure.

Clinias/ These things too have been delivered by you, conformable to truth.

Athenian Stranger/ He, therefore, who is chosen as governor respecting the Muse, must attend to these particulars in conjunction with benevolent fortune. But, as we have delivered what remained to be discussed respecting music, we shall do the same respecting dancing, and the whole of gymnastic pertaining to the body. For it is necessary that both boys and girls should learn to dance, and to be exercised. Is it not?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Dancing-masters therefore must be chosen for boys, and dancing-mistresses for girls, that they may not be unaptly exercised in this art.

Clinias/ Be it so.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, we call that man who engages in a variety of employments, the curator of youth, and who, since he attends to both music and gymnastic, cannot have much leisure.

Clinias/ How is it possible that, being advanced in years, he can attend to so many things?

Athenian Stranger/ Easily, my friend. For the law has permitted, and will permit him to choose, as his associates in these employments, such men and women among the citizens as he pleases. But he knows who ought to be

chosen, and will desire to choose worthy associates, as prudently knowing and reverencing the magnitude of government, and being well convinced that all our affairs will sail prosperously over the sea of life when youth are properly educated. But, when this is not the case, the consequence neither deserves to be mentioned, nor shall we mention it, as in the highest degree venerating the lovers of prophets in a new city. Much, therefore, has been said by us respecting dancing and all gymnastic motions. For we consider as gymnastic, all corporeal exercises in war, such as that of the bow, and every kind of hurling, likewise with the shield, and all the battles with arms; together with tactic evolutions, the conducting of armies, the positions of camps, and such particulars as pertain to equestrian disciplines. For it is proper that there should be common teachers of all these, procured by hire for this purpose by the city, and that both boys and girls, men and women, should be their disciples, that they may be skilled in all these particulars. And girls indeed should apply themselves to every kind of dancing and fighting in armor; but women to military evolutions, and the taking up and laying down of arms, if on no other account, yet that, if at any time there should be occasion for all the men leaving the city to march to battle, the women may be able sufficiently to defend the children and the rest of the city. Or, on the contrary, that they may take up arms for the city, if it should be attacked by foreign enemies, with a certain mighty strength and violence, whether they are Greeks or Barbarians; this being an event that may easily happen. For it is certainly a great fault in a polity, to educate women in so shameful a manner as to be inferior even to birds, who fight for their offspring with the strongest of savage animals, are willing to die, and expose themselves to every danger in their defense. But women, according to the present mode of education, in time of danger immediately

run to sacred places, and fill all the altars and temples, and thus give rise to an opinion that man is naturally the most timid of all animals.

Clinias/ By Zeus, O guest, this is both disgraceful and detrimental to a city.

Athenian Stranger/ We will, therefore, establish this as a law, that women shall not neglect warlike concerns, but that all the citizens, both male and female, shall pay attention to them.

Clinias/ I agree with you that it should be so.

Athenian Stranger/ With respect to wrestling, therefore, we have said some things, but we have not discussed that which I should call the greatest thing, nor is it easy to discuss it without uniting gesticulation to the discussion. This, therefore, we shall then determine when our discourse, following things, indicates something clear about other particulars of which we have spoken, and shows that such a wrestling is, in reality, of all motions most allied to contention in battle: and, besides this, that such wrestling ought to be studied for the sake of war, but not war for such wrestling.

Clinias/ This assertion of yours is beautiful.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus much, therefore, may suffice at present concerning wrestling. But with respect to every other motion of the body, the greatest part of which may be properly denominated a certain dancing, it must be divided into two species; one of which imitates that which is venerable in more beautiful bodies, but the other, that which is depraved in baser bodies. And again, of each of these there are two species. For, of the worthy motion, one kind takes place when beautiful bodies and brave souls are entangled in war and violent labors: but the other, in the prosperous condition of the temperate soul in moderate pleasures. And

he who calls a dancing of this kind pacific, denominates it according to nature. But of these, the dancing in battle, which is different from the pacific, may be properly called Pyrrhic; which imitates the avoiding of all blows and hurlings by declinations, every kind of yielding, leaping on high, and dropping on the ground; and likewise attempts to imitate the motions contrary to these, tending to efficacious figures, in the hurling of bows and spears, and in all kinds of blows. But the rectitude and proper tone both of good bodies and souls takes place for the most part when an imitation is employed which is advantageous to the members of the body. This, therefore, should be admitted as proper, but the contrary to this, as improper. This also should be considered in the pacific dancing of everyone, viz. whether, engaging in beautiful dancing, according to nature, he conducts himself in the choirs in a manner conformable to those who are subservient to good laws. In the first place, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the ambiguous from the unambiguous dancing. What then is this, and how is each to be distinguished? The ambiguous dancing is Bacchic, and belongs to those that follow the Bacchuses, viz. the Nymphs, Pans, Silenuses, and Satyrs, who, as they say, imitate those that are intoxicated with wine, and perform purifying and certain mystic ceremonies. The whole of this kind of dancing cannot easily be defined, either as pacific, or adapted to war; nor, in short, is it easy to say what is the intention of it. But it appears to me that it may with the greatest rectitude be distinguished as follows: We must place the military dancing separate from that which is pacific, and assert that this kind of dancing is not adapted to war. Leaving it, therefore, thus situated, let us return to the military and pacific dancing, which may be praised as indubitably ours. But that kind of the pacific Muse which subsists in an opinion of a prosperous condition, and which

honors the Gods and the sons of the Gods, in dancing, may receive a two-fold division. For one kind is adopted when we have escaped certain labors and dangers, and have obtained good; and this contains greater pleasures. But the other kind subsists when the goods which we before possessed continue to be base, and become increased; in which case the pleasures are of a milder nature. But in things of this kind every man, with respect to the motions of the body, is moved in a greater degree when the pleasures are greater, but in a less degree when they are less. And he who is more modest, and more exercised in fortitude, is moved in a less degree. But he who is timid, and unexercised in temperance, sustains greater and more vehement mutations of motion. And, in short, everyone that emits a sound, whether in singing or in speaking, is not entirely able to accomplish this with a quiet body. On this account the imitations of words by figures of the body produced the whole of the art of dancing. Some of us, therefore, in all these move elegantly, but others inelegantly. And as many of the ancient names ought to be praised by us as posited well, and according to nature; in like manner, it is proper to believe that he, whoever he was, rightly and musically denominated the dancings of prosperous men, who conduct themselves moderately with respect to pleasures; and that, assigning all of them a name according to reason, he denominated them modulations. Likewise, that he established two kinds of beautiful dancing; calling the military dancing Pyrrhic, and the pacific modulation, giving to each a becoming and adapted name. These things, indeed, the legislator ought to explain by representations: but the guardian of the laws ought to investigate dancing; when he has discovered it, unite it with the rest of music; and in all festivals distribute that which is adapted to each of the sacrifices; so consecrating everything in order, that no innovation may be

made either in dancing or singing, but that, both the city and citizens persevering as much as possible after the same manner in the same pleasures, they may live well and happily. And thus we have determined what the particulars respecting the choirs of beautiful bodies and generous souls ought to be. But it is necessary to contemplate and know the motions of base bodies and thoughts, and those motions which are conversant with the defamations of laughter, in words, singing, dancing, and the reviling imitations of all these. For it is not possible that serious things can be learnt without such as are ridiculous, or contraries without all contraries, if anyone is desirous of becoming prudent. But it is impossible to do both, if we wish to participate even a small portion of virtue. These things, however, ought to be learnt, lest through ignorance we should either do or say something ridiculous, which is at all times unbecoming. Servants, therefore, and hired strangers, should be appointed to imitate things of this kind: but no free person should ever study, or be seen learning them, neither woman nor man; but some novelty of imitation about them should always present itself to the view. And thus let the sports pertaining to laughter, which we all denominate comedy, be established both in discourse and law. But if any of the tragic poets, who, as they say, write about things of a serious nature, should thus interrogate us: —O guests, will you allow us, or not, to come to your city and region, and present you with our poesy? or how are you determined to act about things of this kind? what answer, then, shall we give to these divine men about these particulars? For it appears to me that we should reply as follows: O most excellent of strangers, we ourselves are, to the utmost of our power, poets of the most beautiful and best tragedy. For the whole of our polity is an imitation of the most beautiful and most excellent life, which we say is, in reality, the most true

tragedy. You, therefore, are poets, and we also are poets of the same description, being your competitors and antagonists in the most beautiful drama, which, as we hope, true law alone is naturally capable of effecting. But do not think that we shall easily suffer you to fix your scenes in the market-place, and, introducing players of elegant utterance, who speak louder than we do, to discourse to our children, wives, and the vulgar, about things for the most part different from those which they have heard from us. For we ourselves, and the whole city, would be nearly perfectly insane, if we should permit you to do what we have just now mentioned, before the magistrates have seen what you have composed, and have judged whether it is fit or not to be spoken before the people. Now, therefore, O boys, offspring of soft Muses, we shall, in the first place, show your odes, together with ours, to the governors; and if the things said by you shall appear to be the same, or better than those which are said by us, we will give the choir to you: but if this should not be the case, we shall never, O friends, be able to give you the choir. Let these particulars, therefore, be instituted by law respecting every choir, together with the discipline and manners of choirs, those pertaining to slaves being separated from those pertaining to masters, if it is agreeable to you.

Clinias/ How is it possible it should not be so?

Athenian Stranger/ Three disciplines, however, still remain for the free-born. One of these is computation, and the particulars respecting numbers. But the second is that which measures length, breadth, and depth. And the third is that which contemplates the circuit of the stars, and the order in which they are naturally formed to move with relation to each other. With respect to all these particulars, it is not proper that the multitude should labor in obtaining an accurate knowledge of them, but a certain few, of whom

we shall speak when we arrive at the end of our discussion. But it is shameful for the multitude not to know such particulars among these as are necessary, and which, in a certain respect, are asserted with the greatest rectitude. However, it is neither easy, nor altogether possible, to investigate all things accurately: but whatever is necessary among them must not be rejected. Indeed, it appears that he who first spoke proverbially respecting divinity, looking to these things, said, that God was never at any time seen contending with necessity; which I think must be understood of such necessities as are divine. For, if this was asserted of human necessities, to which the multitude looking speak in this manner, it would be by far the most stupid of all assertions.

Clinias/ What are those necessities of disciplines, O guest, which are not human, but divine?

Athenian Stranger/ It appears to me that they are those, which he who does not practice, nor in any respect learn, will never become either a God, a dæmon, or a hero among men, so as to be able to be a consummately diligent curator of mankind. But he will be very far from becoming a divine man who is neither able to know one, nor two, nor three, nor, in short, the even and the odd, nor in any respect knows how to number, nor is capable of numbering night and day, but is unskilled in the revolutions of the moon, the sun, and the other stars. He, therefore, who is of opinion that all these are disciplines not necessary for one who is about to know the most beautiful disciplines, will think in a very stupid manner. But what the nature is of each of these, how many they are, and when they are to be learnt; likewise, what that is which is to be learnt with some other, and what without others, together with all the mixture of these, —these are the things which ought in the first place to be learnt; and, with these disciplines as leaders, a transition is to be made to

other things. For, thus necessity subsists naturally, which we say no divinity opposes at present, nor ever will oppose.

Clinias/ What you assert at present, O guest, appears to be truly asserted, and according to nature.

Athenian Stranger/ So it is, O Clinias: but it is difficult to establish laws respecting these things, when previously disposed in this manner. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, we will establish laws concerning them in a more accurate manner at some other time.

Clinias/ You appear to me, O guest, to be afraid of our ignorance in things of this kind; and, indeed, not improperly. However, endeavor to speak, and do not conceal anything on this account.

Athenian Stranger/ I fear, indeed, what you now say: but I am much more afraid of those who have, indeed, touched upon these disciplines, but in a depraved manner. For, the being ignorant of all things is by no means a circumstance vehemently dire, nor yet the greatest evil; but much skill and great erudition, when improperly employed, are much more pernicious.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Free-born men, therefore, ought to learn those things which a great multitude of boys in Egypt learn, together with their letters. For, in the first place, with the Egyptians the art of reckoning is so inartificially devised for children, that they learn it in sport, and with pleasure. For a distribution is made of apples and crowns to many, and at the same time to a few, the same numbers being adapted for the purpose. The fitting together, too, of the pugilists and wrestlers, and the alternate and consequent order of their conjunction, are determined by numbers. Likewise, when they play, mingling together vessels of gold, brass, and silver, and other things of this kind, or

distributing them separate, they adapt, as I said before, to their sports the use of necessary numbers; and thus render their pupils fit to conduct armies, to fix camps, and become good œconomists; and, in short, to be more useful and vigilant than other men. In the next place, since a certain ridiculous and base ignorance respecting the measures of length, breadth, and depth, is naturally inherent in all men, they take care to liberate them from this.

Clinias/ Of what kind of ignorance are you now speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ O friend Clinias! I formerly heard, but after a long time began to wonder at, the manner in which we are affected about these things; and it appears to me, that it is not human, but rather the passion of certain swine and cattle. I therefore not only blush for myself, but for all the Greeks.

Clinias/ About what? Inform us, O guest, what it is you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ I will tell you. Or, rather, I will point it out to you interrogating. And do you answer me a trifling question. Do you know what length is?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ And what breadth is?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And do you know that these are two things, and that the third of these is depth?

Clinias/ How is it possible that I should not?

Athenian Stranger/ Does it not, therefore, appear to you that all these may be measured by each other?

Clinias/ It does.

Athenian Stranger/ I mean length by length, and breadth by breadth; and that, in a similar manner, depth is naturally capable of being measured by depth.

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ But, if some among these can neither do this vehemently, nor remissly, but some are able, and others not, and yet you think it can be effected by all, in what manner are you circumstanced with respect to these?

Clinias/ Badly, it is evident.

Athenian Stranger/ But again, do not all the Greeks, after a manner, think that length, breadth, and depth, can be mutually measured by each other?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But if this is by no means possible, and yet all the Greeks, as I have said, think that it is possible, is it not fit, that, being ashamed of all them, we should thus address them: O best of the Greeks, this is one of the things which we said it was base not to know; but is it not in every respect beautiful to know things necessary to be known?

Clinias/ How is it possible it should be otherwise?

Athenian Stranger/ And further still, there are other things allied to these, in which many errors are produced in us, the sisters of the above-mentioned errors.

Clinias/ What are these?

Athenian Stranger/ The reason why some things are commensurate and others incommensurate with each other. For it is necessary that these things should be known, or that he should be in every respect depraved who is ignorant of them. In these things, therefore, we should always be mutually engaged. For this aged game will be much more pleasant, and more worthy of a free-born man, than that of chess.

Clinias/ Perhaps so. It appears, therefore, that the game of chess, and these disciplines, are very different from each other.

Athenian Stranger/ These things, then, I say, O Clinias, ought to be learnt by youth. For they are neither noxious nor difficult: and when they are learnt in conjunction with sport, they will be advantageous, but never detrimental to the city. But, if anyone says otherwise, let us hear him.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ If, then, it should appear that these things are so, it is evident that we should embrace them; but if it should appear that they are not so, that we should reject them.

Clinias/ Evidently so. Ought not, therefore, O guest, these to be now established by us as necessary disciplines, that the particulars pertaining to laws may not be discussed by us in vain?

Athenian Stranger/ Let them, indeed, be established, but as pledges from another polity, which may be dissolved if they should in no respect please us who establish them, or you for whom they are established.

Clinias/ The condition you propose is just. But, consider after this the discipline of the stars, whether this being chosen for youth pleases us, or the contrary.

Clinias/ Only speak.

Athenian Stranger/ A great prodigy takes place in these, and which can by no means be endured.

Clinias/ What is this?

Athenian Stranger/ We say that the greatest God, and the whole world, ought not to be investigated, and that the causes of things ought not to be diligently and anxiously

explored; because a conduct of this kind is not holy. It appears, however, that the very contrary to this is proper.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ What I have said is a paradox, and someone may think it is not adapted to old men: but when anyone is of opinion that a discipline is beautiful, true, and advantageous to a city, and likewise in every respect friendly to divinity, it is perfectly impossible he should not mention it.

Clinias/ You speak probably. But shall we find a thing of this kind about the discipline of the stars?

Athenian Stranger/ O good man, all we Greeks, as I may say, conceive falsely of those mighty divinities the sun and moon.

Clinias/ Of what kind of falsehood are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ We say that the sun and moon never move in the same path, and that this is likewise the case with certain other stars which move together with these, and therefore we denominate them planets.

Clinias/ By Zeus, O guest, what you say is true. For, in the course of my life, I have often seen the morning and the evening star, and certain other stars, by no means moving in the same track, but entirely wandering. But we all know that the sun and moon perpetually wander.

Athenian Stranger/ These are the things, therefore, O Megillus and Clinias, which we say our citizens and boys ought to learn respecting the celestial Gods, so far as this, that they may not blaspheme in speaking of them, but may celebrate them in a proper manner, by piously sacrificing and praying to their divinities.

Clinias/ This indeed is right, if in the first place it is possible to learn that which you speak of; and in the next place, if we should not at present speak properly about these

particulars, yet we shall when we are instructed in them. This being admitted, I grant that a thing of this kind should be thus far learnt. Do you, therefore, endeavor to evince that these things are so, and we will follow you as your disciples.

Athenian Stranger/ It is not easy to learn what I say, nor is it again in every respect difficult, nor does it require a great length of time. As a proof of this, I myself have heard these things, neither recently nor formerly, and yet I am able to render them manifest in a short time; though, if they were difficult, I who am aged should not be able to explain them to you, who are likewise aged.

Clinias/ True. But what is this discipline which you call admirable, which you say it is fit youth should learn, but we are ignorant of? endeavor to speak about it with the utmost perspicuity.

Athenian Stranger/ I will endeavor. The dogma then, O best of men, respecting the sun and moon and the other stars, that they have at any time wandered, is not right; but the very contrary of this is true. For each of them perpetually passes through, in a circle, one and the same path, and not many paths; though they appear to pass through many. But that which is swiftest in them is not rightly conceived to be slowest, nor contrarily the contrary. And these things, indeed, naturally subsist in this manner; but we are of opinion that they subsist otherwise. If then, beholding in the Olympic games the course of horses or of men that run the longest race, we should call the swiftest the slowest, and the slowest the swiftest, and, making our encomiums, should celebrate the vanquished as the victor, I do not think that we should adapt our encomiums properly, nor in a manner agreeable to the racers. But now, when we err in the same manner respecting the Gods, shall we not think that, as such a conduct in the instance just alleged is ridiculous and not right, this is likewise true in the present case?

Clinias/ It is ridiculous indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ We are not, therefore, acceptable to divinity, when in hymning the Gods we celebrate them falsely.

Clinias/ Most true, if these things are so.

Athenian Stranger/ If, therefore, we can show that they are so, all these particulars as far as to this are to be learnt; but, if we cannot show it, they must be dismissed. Let these things then be thus determined.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ It is proper, therefore, now to say, that the legal institutions respecting the disciplines of erudition have obtained their consummation. But it is requisite to conceive in a similar manner respecting hunting, and everything else of this kind. For it appears that the office of a legislator is something more than that of merely establishing laws, and that he ought to make use of that medium which naturally subsists between admonition and the laws, and which has often occurred to us in the course of our discussion, and especially when we spoke, concerning the education of children. For we said there were many things pertaining to this which could not be established by law, and that it was folly to attempt it: but laws being thus written, and the whole of a polity established, that is not the perfect praise of a citizen excelling in virtue, which says that he submits to the laws in the best manner, and is persuaded by them in the highest degree; but the praise is more perfect which asserts that he is one who leads a pure life, in consequence of being obedient to the writings of the legislator, in which he establishes, praises, and blames laws. For this is the most proper praise of a citizen. And the legislator, in reality, ought not only to write laws, but should subjoin to them what appears to him to be beautiful and not

beautiful. The citizen too, that has arrived at the summit of virtue, should no less observe these, than those particulars which are punishable by the laws. But we will adduce for this purpose, as a witness, the subject of our present discussion; for it will render our intention more manifest. For hunting is a thing of a great extent, and which is now nearly comprehended in one name. For there is much hunting of aquatic, much of aerial, and still more of terrestrial animals, not only of wild beasts but of men; and, of this last, one kind respects war, and another friendship; and the one is laudable, but the other blamable. The thefts too of robbers and camps are huntings. The legislator, therefore, who establishes laws about hunting, can neither leave these unnoticed, nor impose fines and menacing laws on each, in a certain order. What then is to be done respecting things of this kind? The legislator ought to praise and blame what is laudable and blamable in hunting, with a view to the labors and studies of youth. And young men, when they hear, should be obedient, to him, and should not suffer either pleasure or labor to prevent them from acting contrary to the directions of the legislator. But they should rather honor what is said and enjoined with praise, than what is established with threats and fines. These things being premised, the praise and blame of hunting will follow in a becoming manner. For that hunting is to be praised which improves the souls of young men, but that which has a contrary tendency is to be blamed. Let us therefore discuss what follows, calling as follows upon young men through prayer: O friends, may never any desire or love of marine fishing, or of fishing with a hook, seize you; nor, in short, of laboring to catch any aquatic animals with a bow not, either by day or by night! May you likewise be void of all inclination to piracy, by which you would become unjust and atrocious hunters of men on the sea! And may you never in the least

desire to commit theft in the region and city to which you belong, or to hunt birds, which, though a fascinating, is not a very liberal pursuit! The hunting, therefore, of pedestrian animals alone remains for our athletæ. But, of this, that kind which is performed by sleeping in turns, and is called nocturnal, as it belongs to sluggish men, is not worthy of praise. Nor yet that which during a remission of labors vanquishes the fierce strength of wild beasts by nets and snares, and not by patient endurance. That hunting, therefore, of wild beasts alone remains as the best of all, which is accomplished by horses, dogs, and corporeal strength and skill. For those that are anxious to obtain divine fortitude will vanquish savage animals by hunting them in the course, and with wounds, darts, and their own hands. And thus much may suffice respecting the praise and blame of all these particulars. However, let the law be this: No one shall impede these truly sacred hunters from hunting wherever they please. But no one shall suffer any person to engage in nocturnal hunting with nets and dogs. Fowling shall be permitted in uncultivated places and in mountains; but anyone who may happen to be present shall forbid it in cultivated and sacred places. A fisherman shall not be suffered to hunt, either in ports or sacred rivers, marshes, or pools; but in other places he may be permitted to hunt so long as he does not use a mixture of juices. Now, therefore, it is proper to say, that the legal institutions respecting discipline have obtained their completion.

Clinias/ You speak well.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.

Book 8.

Athenian Stranger/ It now follows that we should legally establish festivals, in conjunction with the Delphic oracles, and show what are the sacrifices, and who the divinities to whom it will be better for the city to sacrifice. But when and what number of sacrifices should be performed, it is perhaps nearly our business to establish by law.

Clinias/ Perhaps so, as to the number.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us therefore first speak as to the number. I should establish then three hundred and sixty-five; so that some one of the magistrates may always sacrifice to some God or dæmon for the city, and for their possessions. But, the interpreters being assembled together with the priests, priestesses, prophets, and guardians of the laws, all these shall ordain such particulars as were necessarily omitted by the legislator. For it is requisite that these should take notice of things omitted. For the law indeed says that there should be twelve festivals to the twelve Gods, from whom each tribe is denominated, and that the citizens should perform sacred rites to each of these monthly, together with choirs, musical contests, and gymnastic exercises, in such a manner as is properly adapted both to the Gods themselves and the several seasons. Female festivals too must be orderly disposed in such a manner, that it may appear which should be celebrated with, and which without men. Further still, the festivals of the terrestrial, and such as are denominated celestial Gods, together with the attendants on these, must not be mingled with each other, but must be separated in the twelfth month, which is sacred to Pluto, that they may be legitimately celebrated. For a God of this kind must not be indignantly treated, but honored by warlike men, as always being the best of divinities to the race of men. For the

communion between, is not better than the solution of soul and body, as I affirm, speaking seriously. Besides, it is requisite that those who intend to distinguish these things sufficiently, should think that this our city is such with respect to vacation of time, and the possession of things necessary, as no other city is found to beat present. But it is requisite that it should live well in the same manner as an individual of the human species. To those however that live happily, this must necessarily be present the first of all things, —I mean, that they neither injure others, nor are injured by others. But, of these, the former is not very difficult; but the latter is difficult in the extreme, and cannot be perfectly acquired otherwise than by becoming perfectly good. The same thing also takes place in a city. For, when it is good, its life is pacific; but, when depraved, it is infested with external and internal war. But, this being nearly the case, cities should not exercise themselves in war during the time of war, but in a life of peace. It is necessary, therefore, that a city endued with intellect should every month exercise itself in war, for not less than the space of one day, but more frequently as it may seem fit to the magistrates, and this without fearing either heat or cold; and that the magistrates, together with women and boys, should be exercised in it, that every inhabitant of the city may be prepared when it shall appear to the governors proper to lead forth all the people. For this purpose, too, certain beautiful games are to be devised, together with sacrifices, that certain festive battles may take place, perspicuously imitating in the highest degree the contentions of war. It is likewise necessary that the rewards of velour should be distributed to each of these; and that the victors should be praised, and the vanquished blamed, in a degree corresponding to the manner in which they have conducted themselves in the contests, and through the whole of life. However, let not

everyone be a poet of things of this kind. But in the first place let him be a poet who is not less than fifty years of age; and in the next place who not only sufficiently possesses the poetic muse, but who has accomplished something beautiful and illustrious. The poems, therefore, of good and honorable men in the city, and who have performed illustrious actions, should be sung; though they may not be naturally musical. But let the judgment of these be given to the instructors of youth, and to the other guardians of the laws. These shall attribute this honor to worthy men, that they alone shall be allowed freedom of speech in the Muses; but they shall not grant this liberty to others. No one, therefore, shall dare to sing a Muse which is not approved by the guardians of the laws, though it should be sweeter than the hymns of Thamyris and Orpheus: but such sacred poems shall be sung as have been examined and approved, and are dedicated to the Gods; together with the poems of worthy men, in which certain persons are praised or blamed, and which are judged to do this with moderation. The same things ought in a similar manner to take place, both among men and women, respecting war, and poetic liberty of speech. But it is requisite that the legislator should thus reason with himself: In properly arranging the whole city, what citizens shall I educate? Ought they not to be the athletæ of the greatest contests, who have ten thousand antagonists? Entirely, someone speaking with propriety may say. But what? If we should educate pugilists, or pancratiasts, or others of this kind, shall we lead them forth to the contest before they have contended with anyone? Or, if we were pugilists, should we not have learned to fight, and labored in it, many days prior to the contest, imitating all such particulars as we should adopt in a real contest when we contend for victory? And should we not, as approaching in the nearest manner possible to a similitude of real

contention, instead of thongs, gird ourselves with the cestus, that we may be able sufficiently both to give wounds and with premeditation avoid them? And if it should happen that there are none with whom we can contend, should we not, without dreading the laughter of the foolish, dare to suspend an inanimate image, and exercise ourselves against it? And if we were in want both of animate and inanimate adversaries, should we not venture to contend even with our own shadows? Or, would anyone say that this particular motion of the hand was devised for any other purpose?

Clinias/ For nearly no other purpose, O guest, than that which you have just now mentioned.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Will the warlike part of the city dare to engage in the greatest of contests, worse prepared than combatants of this kind? I mean, when they are to fight for life for their children, possessions, and the whole of the city. Will not, therefore, the legislator be afraid lest these mutual gymnastic exercises should appear to certain persons ridiculous? And will he not establish by law, that military concerns should be engaged in every day in an inferior degree, without arms, exciting to this purpose the choirs, and the whole of gymnastic exercise? Will he not likewise order, that both greater and lesser gymnastic exercises should be performed every month at least, that each may contend in taking possession of places, or acting on the defensive in every part of the city; truly imitating everything pertaining to war, and fighting with balls and with darts, which approach as near as possible to true and dangerous darts? And this, that the sportive contests of the citizens with each other may not be entirely destitute of fear, but may excite terror, and thus, after a manner, evince who is magnanimous, and who is not? For, thus he may be able in a proper manner to honor some, and disgrace others, and render the whole city through the whole of life useful for true

contention. But, if anyone should happen to die in these contests through involuntary slaughter, let it be established that the homicide, when he has made an expiation according to law, shall be considered in future as pure. For the legislator ought to think that, in the place of a few who may happen to die, others again will succeed not worse than the slain: but that fear becoming, as it were, extinct in all these, he will no longer be able to distinguish the better from the worse; which is, in no small degree, a greater evil to the city than the involuntary destruction of a few individuals.

Clinias/ We agree with you, O guest, that these things ought to be legally established, and attended to by all the city.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we, therefore, all of us know the reason, why in cities at present there is scarcely any such choir and contest, or, at least, in a very small degree? Shall we say that this happens through the ignorance of the multitude and of the legislators?

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Athenian Stranger/ By no means, O blessed Clinias! But it is proper to say that there are two causes of this, and those very sufficient.

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ One is, that, through the love of riches everything else being at all times neglected, the soul of every citizen is incapable of applying to anything but the daily accumulation of wealth. Hence everyone with the greatest alacrity learns and exercises himself in that discipline or study which leads to this, but ridicules other things. It is proper therefore to say, that this is one reason why citizens are unwilling to engage seriously in this, or any other beautiful and excellent pursuit; but, through an insatiable desire of silver and gold, every man willingly

embraces every art and artifice, both the more beautiful and the more base, that he may become rich, acts both in a holy and unholy manner, and is not indignant at any kind of conduct, however base, by which he may be able like a wild beast to eat and drink abundantly, and enjoy venereal pleasures to satiety.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ This, therefore, I assign as one reason why cities are prevented from being sufficiently exercised in anything else beautiful, and in warlike particulars: but those that are naturally modest have their attention directed to merchandize, navigation, and servile offices; and those that are naturally brave, to theft, house-breaking, sacrilege, warlike stratagems, and tyranny. These indeed are naturally well disposed, but become unfortunate through this pernicious custom.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ Why should I not call those in every respect unfortunate, who are compelled by hunger through the whole of life to torment their own soul?

Clinias/ This, therefore, is one reason. But what do you assign, O guest, as the second reason?

Athenian Stranger/ You have very properly admonished me.

Clinias/ One reason, as you say, is the insatiable desire of riches, in the accumulation of which all men are so busily engaged, that they have not leisure to attend in a proper manner to warlike concerns. Let it be so. But inform us what is the second reason.

Athenian Stranger/ Do I appear to you to have dwelt too long upon the first reason, through an incapacity of assigning the second?

Clinias/ You do not. But you appear to us to reprobate through hatred a custom of this kind more than is becoming.

Athenian Stranger/ You accuse me, O guests, in a most proper manner. You shall therefore hear what is consequent to this.

Clinias/ Only speak.

Athenian Stranger/ I say, therefore, that those polities which we have often mentioned in the preceding part of our discourse are the causes of this, viz. a democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny. For no one of these is a polity, but all of them may with the greatest rectitude be called seditions; because in these the willing never rule over the willing, but over the unwilling, and this always with a certain violence. And as in these the governor fears the governed, he never at any time suffers men to become voluntarily good, rich, strong, brave, or altogether warlike. These two reasons are nearly the causes of all things in cities, but particularly of those which we have enumerated. But the polity to which we are now giving laws avoids both these. For it possesses the greatest leisure; its inhabitants are free, and I think will from these laws be lovers of money in the smallest degree. So that it seems probable, and may reasonably be concluded, that such an establishment of a polity alone of all that exist at present can bring to perfection that warlike discipline, and warlike sport, which we have already rightly discussed.

Clinias/ It is well said.

Athenian Stranger/ Does it not follow, therefore, that we should now speak concerning all gymnastic contests; so that such of them as are conducive to war may be studied, and the rewards of victory assigned them; but such as are not, may be dismissed? But it is better to relate from the beginning what these are, and establish them by law. And,

in the first place, should we not establish the particulars pertaining to the course, and to swiftness?

Clinias/ We should establish them.

Athenian Stranger/ The celerity of the body, therefore, is universally the most warlike of all things; one kind being of the feet, and the other of the hands; that of the feet consisting in flying and pursuing; but that of the hands being indigent of strength and vigor in fighting and wrestling.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But neither of them without arms possesses the greatest utility.

Clinias/ For how should they?

Athenian Stranger/ The crier, therefore, must first announce to us the race of the stadium in the contests, as at present: but he who runs the stadium must enter armed. For we do not place rewards for one that contends unarmed. In the first place, therefore, he that runs the stadium must enter armed. In the second place, he that runs the two-fold course, viz. from the barriers to the goal, and from the goal to the barriers. In the third place, the equestrian racer. In the fourth place, he who runs twenty-four stadia. And, in the fifth place, he who is lighter armed, whom we shall order to run for the space of sixty stadia to a certain temple of Mars. Afterwards we shall enjoin another, who is heavier armed, to run a shorter and smoother space of ground. And again, another who is an archer, and has all the apparatus belonging to archery, shall, contending, proceed through mountains and all-various places, for a hundred stadia, to the temple of Apollo and Diana. Having established the contest, therefore, we must wait for these till they arrive, and bestow on the several victors the rewards of victory.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ These contests we must conceive to have a tripartite division: one of boys; another of beardless youths; and a third of men. And for the beardless youths we shall establish two out of three parts of the course: but for boys the halves of these, who shall contend with archers and armed men. With respect to females, for naked girls not yet fit for marriage, we shall establish the stadium, the two-fold course, the equestrian course, and the long course, or that of four and twenty stadia. But those that are thirteen years of age shall not, prior to their marriage, contend in the course longer than their twentieth, nor shorter than the eighteenth year of their age. At the same time care must be taken that their clothing is adapted for the purpose. And thus much concerning the contests of men and women in the course. As to the particulars respecting strength, instead of wrestling, and such things as are adopted at present, such as are more difficult must be instituted. And one should contend with one, two with two, and so on, as far as to ten with ten. But the things which the victor ought neither to suffer nor do, and the number of these, must be legally established by those that are skilled in the contests of arms; in the same manner as, in wrestling, those that preside over this exercise determine what is beautifully performed in wrestling, or the contrary. Let the same things too be legally established respecting women till they are married. But it is requisite that the whole of the peltastic should be opposed to the pancratian contest; and that those who engage in this contest should use bows, half-mooned shields, darts, and the hurling of stones both from the hand and slings. Laws too shall be established respecting these particulars, by which the rewards of victory shall be given to those that behave well in these contests. After these things, it is requisite we should establish laws respecting equestrian contests. But we have not much occasion for horses in Crete;

so that the Cretans must necessarily pay less attention to the rearing of horses, and contests with them. For no one of you is in any respect a curator of chariots, or ambitious of acquiring renown through them. So that it would be foolish to establish contests of this kind. We must, however, establish an equestrian sport with single horses, with colts that have not yet shed their teeth, with those that are situated between these, and with those that have attained the perfection of their nature, according to the condition of the country. Let, therefore, contention and desire of victory with these be according to law; and let a common judgment of all these contests, and of those that contend with arms, be attributed to the governors of tribes, and the masters of horses. But it will not be proper to give laws to the unarmed, neither in gymnastic exercises nor in these contests. However, he who hurls an arrow or a dart on horse-back is not useless for Crete. So that let there be strife and contention with these for the sake of sport. But it is not fit to force women by law to engage in this contest. However, if nature is not averse to girls or virgins contending in this manner, in consequence of their former disciplines and habits, it may be admitted. And thus much may suffice for gymnastic contest and discipline, whether it is such as takes place in contests, or such as we daily engage in under proper masters. We have likewise, in a similar manner, discussed the greater part of music. But the particulars respecting rhapsodists, and those that follow these, together with those contests of choirs which must necessarily take place in festivals, days, months and years being assigned to the Gods and their attendants, —how all these are to be disposed, and whether they are to be instituted for three or for five years, must be referred to the conceptions imparted by the Gods respecting their order. Then also it is proper that the contests of music should alternately take place, according

as the athletæ, the instructor of youth, and the guardians of the laws, assembling together for this purpose, shall determine. For these shall order when, and with whom, the several contests in all dancing and singing assemblies shall take place. But of what kind each of these ought to be, both with respect to the odes and harmonies mingled with rhythms and dancing, has been often said by the first legislator; conformably to which, succeeding legislators should establish contests in such a manner that they may be properly adapted to the several sacrifices and stated times; and should ordain sacred festivals for the city. With respect to these, therefore, and other such particulars, it is not difficult to know what legitimate order they should be allotted; nor would the transferring of them be greatly advantageous or detrimental to the city. There are, however, some particulars of no small consequence, which it is so difficult to establish, that divinity alone is equal to the talk; but now they require some bold man who, honoring in the highest degree liberty of speech, will declare what appears to be best for a city and citizens, and will establish it in such a manner, as to introduce into the corrupted souls of the citizens that which is becoming and consequent to the whole polity. He will, likewise, assert things contrary to their most ardent desires; and this without any human assistance, and singly following reason alone.

Clinias/ What is it you now say, O guest? for I do not understand you.

Athenian Stranger/ It is likely. But I will endeavor to speak to you in a yet clearer manner. For, when my discourse led me to discipline, I saw the youth of both sexes associating in a benevolent manner with each other. But I was alarmed, as it was reasonable to suppose I should, when I considered who would use a city in which young men and women are delicately educated, and never engage in those

vehement and sordid labors which in the highest degree extinguish petulance, but through the whole of life are at leisure for sacrifices, festivals, and choirs. How, therefore, in this city will they abstain from those desires which hurl many of both sexes into the extremity of danger, so that those things may be forbidden by law which reason orders us to abstain from? Indeed, it is not wonderful if the laws which were above established vanquish a multitude of desires. For the law which forbids the possession of riches in an immoderate degree, contributes not a little to the acquisition of temperance: and the whole of discipline possesses laws accommodated to this purpose. And, besides this, the eye of the governors is compelled not to look elsewhere, but always to observe youth. These things, therefore, possess measure with respect to such other desires as are human. But the unnatural connection with boys and girls, with women as if they were men, and with men as if they were women, whence innumerable evils arise both to individuals of the human species and to whole cities, how can anyone prevent? And what medicine can be found by which the danger in each of these may be avoided? This is by no means easy, O Clinias. For, in other things, and these not a few, all Crete and Lacedæmon will afford us no small assistance in establishing laws foreign from the manners of the multitude; but, with respect to amatory affairs, they will entirely oppose us. For, if anyone, following nature, should establish the law which existed prior to the times of Laius, and should assert it was proper not to have connection with men and boys as if they were females, adducing as a witness the nature of wild beasts, and showing that, among these, males are not connected with males, because this is unnatural, perhaps he would use a probable reason, but he would by no means accord with our cities. In addition to this, likewise, he would not agree with

them in that particular which we have said ought always to be observed by a legislator. For he ought always to observe among legal institutions, what contributes to virtue, and what does not contribute. Thus, for instance, he should consider whether what we have just now asserted would, when legally established, be beautiful, or at least not base, and how far it would contribute to the acquisition of virtue. Whether, when it takes place, it will produce the habit of fortitude in the soul of him who is persuaded, or a species of temperance in the soul of him who persuades? Or shall we say that no one will be persuaded of these things, but rather of everything contrary to them? For everyone will blame the effeminacy of him who yields to pleasures, and is incapable of endurance. But will not everyone reprobate the similitude of the image in him who imitates the female sex? What man, therefore, will legally establish such a thing as this? Scarcely no one who has true law in his mind. How, therefore, do we say it is true, that the nature of friendship, desire, and the love which we have spoken of, must be necessarily beheld by him who would properly consider these things? For, since they are two, and there is another third species arising from both, and which is comprehended in one name, the greatest doubt and darkness are produced.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ We call a friend one who is similar to the similar according to virtue, and equal to the equal. We likewise denominate him a friend who is indigent of a rich man, though he is contrary to him in genus. But, when each of these friendships becomes vehement, we call it love.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ The friendship, therefore, which arises from contraries is dire and rustic, and is not often mutual: but that which arises from similars is mild and

mutual through life. But as to that which is mixed from these, in the first place, it is not easy to learn what his wish may be who possesses this third love: and, in the next place, being drawn by both to that which is contrary, he himself is doubtful what he should do; the one exhorting him to use the flower of his age, and the other dissuading him from it. For, he who is a lover of body, and hungers after its flower, as if it were ripe fruit, endeavors to be satiated with it, and confers no honor on the manners of the soul of his beloved. But he who possesses a careless desire of body, and rather beholds than loves it with his soul, such an one, since he is a lover of soul in a becoming manner, considers the satiety of body, with respect to body, as disgraceful; but, reverencing and cultivating temperance, fortitude, magnificence, and prudence, he always wishes to live chastely with a chaste lover. But the love which is mixed from both these is the love which we just now discussed, as ranking in the third place. Since, therefore, there are three kinds of love, ought the law to forbid all of them, and prevent them from subsisting in us? Or, is it not manifest we should be willing that the love which is of virtue, and which desires that youth may arrive at the summit of excellence, should subsist in the city; but that, if possible, we should expel the other two? Or how shall we say, O friend Megillus?

Megillus/ You have spoken, O guest, about these particulars in a manner perfectly beautiful.

Athenian Stranger/ I was right in my conjecture, O friend, that you would accord with me in sentiment. But it is not proper that I should inquire what your law conceives about things of this kind, but that I should receive what you admit; and, after this, that I should endeavor to persuade Clinias to be of our opinion. Let, however, that which you have granted me be admitted, and let us now diligently discuss the laws.

Megillus/ You speak with the utmost rectitude.

Athenian Stranger/ I possess an art at present relative to the establishment of this law, which is partly easy, and partly in every respect difficult.

Megillus/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ We know even at present many men, who, though they act illegally, yet in a becoming manner and diligently abstain from a connection with beautiful persons, and this not involuntarily, but for the most part willingly.

Megillus/ When does this take place?

Athenian Stranger/ When anyone has a beautiful brother or sister. The same law too, though unwritten, sufficiently defends a son or a daughter, and prevents their parents from having any connection with them, either openly or secretly. Indeed, it prevents the vulgar from even desiring a connection of this kind.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ A small word, therefore, extinguishes all such pleasures.

Megillus/ What word is that?

Athenian Stranger/ That which says these things are by no means holy, but that they are odious to divinity, and the most base of all base things. But does not this take place, because the contrary to this is never asserted, but each of us from our childhood hears the same things said both jocosely and seriously; and often in tragedies, when a Thyestes or Œdipus is introduced, or a certain Macareus, who being secretly connected with their sisters, but detected, immediately suffered death, as the punishment of their offence?

Megillus/ This is said with the greatest rectitude. For rumor possesses a certain wonderful power; since no one attempts even to breathe in a manner contrary to law.

Athenian Stranger/ That which we just now said, therefore, was right; that it was easy for a legislator, who wished to enslave some one of those desires which in a remarkable degree enslave men, to know in what manner this must be accomplished. For, if this rumor becomes consecrated among slaves and the free-born, men and women, and the whole city, it will cause this law to be most firm and stable.

Megillus/ Entirely so. But how can it be brought to pass that all men shall willingly speak in this manner?

Athenian Stranger/ Your question is a very proper one. For this is what I said, that I had an art relative to this law, by which men might be induced to use copulation according to nature, and in order to produce offspring. Let them, therefore, abstain from connection with males, and not designedly cut off the race of men, nor disseminate in rocks and stones, where the prolific nature of that which is sown can never take root. Let them, likewise, abstain from every feminine field in which the seed is unwilling to germinate. This law, if it was established, and possessed the same authority in other things as in the connection of parents, would produce innumerable benefits. For, in the first place, it would be established according to nature. And, in the next place, it would restrain men from amatory fury and madness, from all adulteries, and the immoderate use of meats and drinks. It would likewise cause men to be familiar and friendly with their wives; and many other benefits would arise if this law was diligently observed by everyone. But, perhaps, some very young man, and who is full of seed, on hearing that this law is to be established, will immediately revile us, as framing laws which are foolish, and impossible to be observed, and will fill every place with his vociferations. It was in consequence of looking to this, that I said I possessed a certain art, which was partly easy and partly

difficult, by which this law might be firmly established. For it is easy to understand that this is possible, and in what manner it is possible. For we have said that, when this legal institution is sufficiently consecrated, it will subdue every soul, and entirely cause them, through fear, to be obedient to the established laws. But at present it appears to be impossible that it should ever take place: just as the institution of eating in common is considered as a thing impossible to be perpetually observed by a whole city; yet it is adopted by you, though it appears impossible to persuade women to this, nor does it seem to be naturally adapted to your cities. Hence, through the strength of this belief, I said that both these could not without great difficulty be legally established.

Megillus/ And you was right in saying so.

Athenian Stranger/ Are you, therefore, willing that I should endeavor to mention to you a thing endued with a certain persuasive power, and which is not beyond human ability to accomplish?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly, we are willing.

Athenian Stranger/ Will, therefore, anyone more easily abstain from venereal concerns, and be willing to observe in a moderate manner, and not like the vulgar, the order imposed on him, when his body is in a good condition, or when it is badly affected?

Clinias/ Doubtless, when his body is in a good condition.

Athenian Stranger/ Have we not, therefore, heard of the Tarentine Iccus, who, for the sake of Olympic and other contests which he applied himself to, through a desire of victory and art, and in conjunction with temperance and fortitude, never had any connection either with a woman or boy during the whole time of his exercise? The same thing too is reported of Crysson, Astyllus, Diopompus, and many

others; though their souls were much worse disciplined than those of your and my fellow citizens, O Clinias, and their bodies much more luxurious.

Clinias/ You give a true account of what the ancients say respecting the conduct of these athletæ.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Could they for the sake of victory in wrestling, in the course, and such like things, have the courage to abstain from that affair which is called blessed by the multitude; and shall our youth be incapable of a similar continence, for the sake of a far more excellent victory, which we sing to them from their very childhood, as a thing most beautiful, in fables, in prose and in verse, and charm them into a persuasion of this, as it is fit we should?

Clinias/ What victory are you speaking of?

Athenian Stranger/ Of the victory over pleasure, —that, being continent in this, they may live happily: for, if they are vanquished by pleasure, the very contrary will take place. Besides this, will not the dread led: it should be a thing by no means holy, enable them to subdue those things which others worse than themselves subdue?

Clinias/ It is probable it will.

Athenian Stranger/ Since, therefore, we have arrived thus far about this law, and have fallen into doubt through the depravity of many, we now say with confidence, that our citizens ought not to be worse than birds, and many wild beats: for many herds of these live a single, pure, and incorrupt life till the time of procreating offspring; and when they arrive at this age, the male benevolently uniting with the female, and the female with the male, they live for the remainder of their time in a holy and just manner, firmly abiding in the first compacts of friendship. But it is requisite that our citizens should be better than wild beasts. If, therefore, they are corrupted by other Greeks, and the

greater part of Barbarians, and are incapable of restraining themselves when they see and hear that the Venus which is called inordinate is capable of accomplishing in them that which is greatest, —in this case, it is requisite that the guardians of the laws, becoming legislators, should devise for them a second law.

Clinias/ What law would you advise should be established for them, if they reject the present?

Athenian Stranger/ Evidently that which follows this, O Clinias.

Clinias/ What law do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ That they should especially cause the strength of pleasures to be unexercised, altering the course of its infusion and aliment through labors of the body. But this will take place if the use of venereal pleasures is not attended with impudence. For, these being more rarely used through shame, the mistress of them will possess a more imbecile dominion. Custom, therefore, and an unwritten law, should privately persuade them to act in this manner, and dissuade them from a contrary mode of conduct as base. For thus, in the second place, we shall preserve the becoming; and one race of men comprehending three genera, will compel those of a depraved nature, and who, we have confessed, are their inferiors, not to act in an illegal manner.

Clinias/ What three genera are these?

Athenian Stranger/ Those that venerate divinity, the lovers of honor, and those that do not desire corporeal beauty, but are lovers of the beautiful manners of the soul. And these things, perhaps, which are now asserted by us, are like prayers in a fable. But they will by far subsist in the most excellent manner, if they should be adopted by all cities. Perhaps, too, if divinity pleases, we may by force accomplish one of the two in amatory affairs: either that no

one shall dare to touch any free and well-born woman besides his wife, or have any connection with concubines, or disseminate contrary to nature in the barren soil of males: or else we must entirely take away connection with males; and if anyone has connection with other women than those which came to his house in conjunction with the Gods, and sacred marriages, whether such women are bought, or acquired by any other means, —such an one, unless he is concealed from all men and women, may perhaps with propriety be deprived by law of all the honors in the city, as being one who is truly a foreigner. This law, whether it is proper to call it simple or two-fold, should be established respecting all venereal and amatory concerns, which are transacted by us with each other through such-like desires, and this both in a proper and improper manner.

Megillus/ I very much approve, O guest, of this law; but let Clinias here inform us what is his opinion respecting these things.

Clinias/ I shall do so, O Megillus, when it appears to me that a proper opportunity presents itself for this purpose: but let us now permit our guest to proceed forward in his discussion of laws.

Megillus/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ But we have now proceeded so far, that we are nearly arrived at the establishment of eating in common; which in other places we have said it is difficult to establish, but no one will suppose but that it ought to be adopted in Crete. After what manner, however, must it be established? Shall we say as here, or as in Lacedæmon? or is there a third mode better than both these? It appears to me to be difficult to discover this third mode, and that when found it will not be productive of any great good. For what we have now instituted appears to have been accomplished

in an elegant manner. After this, it follows that we should speak respecting the apparatus of food, and show in what manner it should be procured for our citizens. Food then in other cities is all-various, and procured from many places, but especially from two places. For food is obtained for the greatest part of the Greeks from the earth and sea; but to our citizens from the earth alone. This, therefore, will be easy for the legislator. For much less than half of the laws will be sufficient; and these will be more adapted to free-born men. For the legislator of this city will have nothing to do with naval and mercantile affairs, or with inn-keepers, publicans, victualling-houses, miners, borrowing money, usury, and ten thousand other things of this kind. But he will only have to give laws to husbandmen, shepherds, the curators of bees, and the guardians and superintendents of things of this kind: and his principal business as a legislator will consist in attending to marriages, the procreation, education, and discipline of children, and the establishment of magistrates in the city. It is, therefore, now necessary that we should direct our attention to nutriment, and to those who by their own labor procure it. Let the laws, therefore, called georgic be first established. And let this be the first law of Zeus Terminalis: No one shall move the boundaries of land, neither that of a neighboring fellow-citizen, nor of a neighboring stranger, if he should possess the extremities of the land; but he should consider that the saying, 'This is to move things immoveable', is true. And everyone should rather wish to move a mighty rock, than a boundary, or small stone, which terminates friendship and hatred by an oath. For Omophylus Zeus is a witness of the one, and Hospitable Zeus of the other; and these divinities are roused in conjunction with the most hostile battles. He, too, who is obedient to the law shall be free from condemnation: but he who despises it shall be obnoxious to a two-fold punishment;

one, and that the first, from the Gods; but the second from the law. For the law says that no one shall voluntarily move the boundaries of his neighbor's land. But of him who does move them, anyone that is willing may inform the husbandmen, who shall lead him to the court of judgment. Here he shall be condemned by the judges to make restitution, as one who distributes land privately and by force, and shall be otherwise punished in such manner as the judges shall determine. But, in the next place, many and small injuries of neighbors, when often taking place, produce great enmities, and render vicinity difficult and vehemently bitter. On this account a neighbor ought to be extremely cautious of injuring his neighbor, both in other things, and in everything pertaining to agriculture. For to do an injury is by no means difficult, but is in the power of every man; but to profit is not in the power of everyone. But he who, passing beyond his own boundaries, cultivates his neighbor's land, shall make a restitution, and, suffering the punishment of his impudence and illiberality, shall pay the injured person the double of his loss. Of all such like particulars, husbandmen should be the judges and censors. And of such as are greater, as I have said before, the whole order of the twelfth part; but of the lesser, those that preside over the guardians of these. And if anyone distributes cattle, the husbandmen, considering the injury, shall judge and condemn accordingly. Likewise, if anyone usurps a swarm of bees belonging to another, alluring the bees by the sound of brass, and thus rendering them familiar to him, he shall make a restitution to the injured person. And if anyone sets fire to certain materials, without paying any attention to his neighbor's property, he shall pay that fine which the magistrates think fit to impose. In like manner, he who in planting does not leave the measure of his neighbor's land, shall be punished in such a manner as would be said to be

sufficient by many legislators; whose laws we ought to use, and not think that the many and trifling particulars which are instituted by any casual legislator are to be adopted by a greater moderator of a city. For ancient and beautiful laws respecting water are established for husbandmen, which yet do not deserve to be recited. But he who wishes to deduce water to his own place, should so deduce it from common fountains as not to cut off the apparent fountain of any private person. He may likewise be permitted to conduct the water where he pleases, except through houses, or certain temples, or sepulchers, at the same time being cautious not to do any damage, except what may arise from the derivation of the stream. But if the natural dryness of the ground in certain places should be incapable of retaining the waters from Zeus, and there should be a defect of necessary drink, anyone may dig in his own ground till he comes to chalky earth. And if in this depth he meets with no water, he may draw as much from his neighbors as his necessities require. But if there should be a scarcity of water with his neighbors, the quantity that should be daily used must be determined by the præfects of the land. However, if the waters from Zeus abound, and those that inhabit or cultivate the lower places restrain the flux of the water, so as to injure those in the higher grounds; or, on the contrary, if the inhabitants of the higher places, inconsiderately permitting the waters to flow, injure the inhabitants of the lower grounds, and disagreement arises between the two respecting this particular, —then, in the city, the city surveyor, but, in the country, he who presides over the land, shall order what each ought to do in this case. But he who is not obedient to this order shall suffer the punishment of his envy and moroseness, and shall give the injured person the double of his loss. A participation of the fruits of autumn should be made by all men as follows: —The God of autumn imparts

to us two gracious gifts; one Dionysiacal, which does not require to be concealed; but another, to which concealment is natural. Let this law then be established respecting autumnal fruits. Whoever tastes of the rustic fruit of grapes, or of figs, before the time of vintage, which concurs with a returns, shall be fined fifty drachms sacred to Bacchus, if he has gathered these fruits from his own land; but if from that of his neighbor's, a mina; and if from other lands, two parts of a mina. Grapes and figs, which we denominate generous, may be gathered by anyone, after what manner and when he pleases, if they are his own; but not when they belong to another, unless he obtains leave of the possessor; and this in conformity to the law which says that no one shall move that which he has not deposited, and that he who does so shall be fined. But if a slave, not complying with the orders of his master, gathers fruits of this kind, he shall receive as many lashes with a whip as the number of the grapes and figs which he gathered. When a native has bought any generous autumnal fruits, he may eat them if he pleases; but if a stranger as he passes along desires to eat these autumnal fruits, whether he is alone or with one companion, he may eat them as hospitable property: but the law forbids strangers from eating those fruits which are called rustic. If anyone ignorantly gathers these, or if they are gathered by a slave, the slave shall be punished with stripes; but the free person shall be dismissed with an admonition that he may gather other autumnal fruits, but that those from which raisins, wine, and dry figs are made, are not fit to be gathered. with respect to pears, apples, pomegranates, and all such fruits, let it not be considered as base to gather them secretly. But if anyone who is less than thirty years of age is detected gathering them, let him be chastised, but without wounds; and let not the free-born man suffer any punishment for inflicting this chastisement. Let it likewise

be lawful for a stranger to partake of these fruits in the same manner as of generous autumnal fruits. If any person more advanced in years tastes of these, but does not take them away, let him, in the same manner as a stranger, be permitted to partake of all these: but if he is not obedient to the law, let him be considered as one who does not contend for virtue; —if anyone gives information of this to the judges of these particulars. Again, water is the most nutritive of everything pertaining to gardens, but it is easily corrupted. For neither the earth, the sun, nor the air, which together with water nourish things germinating from the earth, can be easily corrupted either by medicaments, turnings aside, or thefts: but all such things as these are able to take place respecting the nature of water; and on this account it requires the assistance of law. Let this, then, be the law respecting it: If anyone voluntarily corrupts water belonging to another person by medicaments, or ditches, or thefts, whether such water is fontal or collected, he shall be taken before these ædiles; and, if convicted, he shall be punished adequately to his offence. With respect to the conveyance of all seasonable fruit, let it be lawful for anyone who is willing, to carry his own fruit anywhere, so long as he does not injure anyone, or so long as a gain arises to himself triple of the damage which his neighbor has sustained. Let the magistrates be the inspectors of these things, and of all such injuries as are either committed by violence or secretly, against a person himself, or his property. Let all such particulars be said before the magistrates, if the injury does not exceed three minæ; but if it does, let the case be brought before the common courts of justice, and let him who has committed the injury be punished. But if any magistrate shall be found to condemn an accused person unjustly, let him be considered as a debtor to the injured person of twice the loss which he sustained. And, in short, let the unjust

conduct of the magistrates be brought before the common courts of justice by any person that is willing. But as there are ten thousand small legal institutions, according to which punishments ought to be inflicted respecting the allotments of justice, citations, and the persons cited, whether the citation ought to be made between two, or between many; — all such particulars as these must not be left destitute of law, nor yet do they seem worthy to be noticed by an aged legislator. Let young men, therefore, give laws respecting these, imitating prior legal institutions, understanding small things from such as are great, and becoming experienced in the necessary use of them till everything shall appear to be sufficiently established. After this, causing these institutions to be immovable, let them be used as such.

With respect to other artificers, it is requisite to act as follows: In the first place, let no citizen labor about artificial works, nor yet a servant of any citizen. For a citizen who preserves the common ornament of the city, is engaged in an art which requires long continued exercise, and, at the same time, many disciplines, and the possession of it is not to be obtained by indolent application. But to labor accurately in two studies, or two arts, nearly surpasses the ability of human nature. Nor can anyone sufficiently exercise one art, and at the same time direct his attention to one who exercises another. This, therefore, ought first of all to take place in the city, that no one shall at the same time be a coppersmith and a builder; and that a builder shall not attend more to the coppersmith's, than to his own, art, under a pretext that, because he has many servants who work for him, he very properly bestows more attention upon them, that greater gain may thence accrue to him from his own art: but every artist in the city shall exercise one art only, and from this derive his support. This law the ædiles should particularly attend to; and should punish with

disgrace and infamy anyone who inclines a citizen to a certain art more than to the study of virtue, till they have converted the citizen to his right course. But, if any stranger is found to apply himself to two arts, he shall be punished with bonds, fines, and expulsions from the city, and shall be compelled to exercise one art alone. With respect to the wages of workmen, and the destruction of works, and the injuries which workmen may either suffer or commit, the ædiles shall judge of these as far as to fifty drachms. Offences which merit a greater fine than this, shall be judged according to law in the common courts of justice. There shall, likewise, be no revenue in the city arising from the exportation and importation of goods. But, with respect to frankincense, and other foreign aromatics, from which fumigations are made to the Gods, together with purple, and other dyed colors, which are not produced in this region, or any other article of foreign importation, let no one introduce any of these, nor yet again export anything which the region necessarily requires. All these particulars must be attended to, and taken care of, by the twelve guardians of the laws, five of the elder being excepted. With respect to arms, and all warlike instruments, if there should be a necessity of any foreign art, whether relative to plants, or metals, or bonds, or animals which are subservient to war, the care of the importation and exportation of these must be committed to the masters of the horse, and the generals of the army; but the guardians of the law must establish respecting these becoming and sufficient laws. No victualling-houses shall be suffered, either in the city or in any part of the region for the sake of accumulating wealth. But it appears that the mode established by the law of the Cretans of distributing the food which is the produce of the country, is a proper one: for a general distribution into twelve parts is made of the whole produce of the land, which also is consumed. Every twelfth

part of barley, wheat, all autumnal fruits, and vendible animals, should be triply divided according to proportion; one part being given to free-born persons, another to the servants of these, and a third part to artificers and strangers, whether such strangers have taken up their residence in the city through the want of necessary sustenance, or for the sake of any advantage to the city, or any individual in it. This third part, therefore, of all necessaries, should be alone vendible from necessity; but nothing belonging to the two other parts should be necessarily sold. How, therefore, are these to be distributed in the most proper manner? In the first place, it is evident that we should distribute them partly equally, and partly unequally.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ It is necessary that every land should produce and nourish things better or worse than each of these.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ As, therefore, there are three parts, let no more be distributed either to masters or slaves, or strangers, but let the distribution be made to all, according to the same equality of similitude. But let each citizen since he receives two parts, have the power of distributing both to slaves and free-born persons, as much, and such things, as he pleases. It is however proper that a greater quantity than these should be distributed in measure and number, and that a distribution should be made after an account is taken of all the animals which derive their nourishment from the earth. After this, it is necessary that habitations should be separately assigned them in an orderly manner. But the following order will be adapted to things of this kind. There ought to be twelve streets in the middle, and one in each of the twelve parts; and in each street a forum, and temples of

the Gods, and of dæmons the attendants of the Gods, should be raised; and whether there are statues of certain inhabitants of Magnesia, or of other ancients whose memory is preserved, to these the honors of ancient men should be paid. The temples of Vesta, Zeus, Minerva, and of him who is the leader of each of the other divinities that preside over the twelve parts, should be everywhere established. But first of all buildings should be raised about these temples in the highest place, as well defended receptacles for the guards: but the rest of the region should be distributed for the artificers into thirteen parts. And one part of these shall reside in the city, this part being distributed into the twelve parts of the whole city; but another part shall be circularly distributed about the environs of the city. In every street artificers shall reside that are adapted to the purposes of husbandmen. The governors of the husbandmen, too, shall take care of all these particulars, and of such things as each place may require; and shall provide such places as will be most advantageous to the husbandmen. The ædiles in like manner shall take care of the artificers in the city. Things pertaining to the forum ought likewise to be taken care of by the præfects of the markets. After attention to sacred things, they should be careful, in the first place, that no one acts unjustly in buying or selling; and, in the next place, they should punish everyone that deserves punishment, as being the inspectors of modesty and insolence. With respect to things vendible, they should, in the first place, consider, whether the citizens sell to foreigners in a manner conformable to law. But let the law be this: On the first day of the month, those that take care of foreigners shall exhibit a part of what is to be sold; viz. in the first place a twelfth part of the corn: and foreigners during the space of the whole month shall buy corn, and such things as pertain to corn, in the first market. But on the twelfth day of the month, the

selling and buying of moist articles shall take place through the whole of the month. And on the twenty-third day of the month, let such animals be sold as may be wanted, together with such articles as husbandmen require, viz. skins and garments of every kind, whether knit or woven. But it is necessary that strangers should buy the possessions of others. However, let there be no buying or selling of wheat or barley, distributed into barley-meal, or of any other aliment, either among the citizens or their slaves. In the markets of the strangers, a stranger may sell and exchange to artificers and their slaves, wine and food, and in like manner distributed flesh, which is generally called cauponation. A stranger, too, may be permitted to buy every day the whole materials of fire, from the inspectors of places, and sell it again to other strangers, for as much as he pleases, and when he pleases. Let every other useful article be sold in the common forum, in such places as the guardians of the laws, and præfects of the markets, together with the ædiles, shall appoint. Here let money be exchanged for things, and things for money; no one committing the exchange to another, but performing it by himself. However, if anyone thinks proper to commit it to another, whether restitution is made to him or not, he must be contented, because no notice is taken in the courts of justice of such contracts. But if that which is bought or sold, has been bought or sold at a greater or less price than the law fixes upon vendible commodities, the quantity by which it exceeds the just price shall be taken an account of in writing by the guardians of the laws, and the contrary shall be expunged. Let the same things be enjoined respecting the registering of the property possessed by the inhabitants of the city. Let it likewise be lawful for anyone to migrate to our city on certain conditions, viz. so that he is skilled in, and exercises, some art, and does not continue more than twenty years from the

day of his being registered; during which time he shall not be forced to pay any tribute for buying and selling, nor be under any restraint, except that of conducting himself temperately. But when the twenty years are expired, he shall receive his own property and depart. However, if it should so happen during this time, that the city should be greatly benefitted by him, and he is desirous of continuing longer, or of settling for life in the city, let his request be complied with, if agreeable to the inhabitants of the city. With respect to the sons of the emigrants that are artists and fifteen years of age, let the time of their continuance in the city commence from their fifteenth year, so that they may stay, if they please, twenty years after this period, or longer if agreeable to the inhabitants. But if they choose to leave the city, they may depart after their registers, which were committed to the care of the magistrates, are obliterated.

THE END OF THE EIGHTH BOOK.

Book 9.

Athenian Stranger/ As judicial affairs are consequent to all the preceding particulars, the discussion of them at present will be agreeable to the natural order of laws. But we have partly shown what the particulars are respecting which judgments ought to take place, viz. respecting agriculture and the like; though we have not as yet distinctly spoken of the greatest judgments, and shown what punishments they ought to inflict, and who should be the judges. It therefore follows that we should now speak of these.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ But it is after a manner base that the city which we say will be properly inhabited, and furnished with everything adapted to the study of virtue, should observe all such laws as we are now about to establish. For to suppose that, in such a city, a man capable of the greatest iniquity will be born, so that it will be necessary to give laws by anticipation, and enjoin threats, if such a character should arise, and this for the sake of preventing the greatest enormities, and that when they are committed, they may be legally punished, —to suppose this will, as I have said, be in a certain respect base. But since we do not, like the ancient legislators, give laws to heroes the sons of the Gods, these legislators at the same time being themselves descended from the Gods, but being ourselves men, we at present give laws to those that are born from the seed of men; —since this is the case, we may justly be afraid lest anyone of our citizens should be so naturally intractable and untamed, as not to be liquefied; just as leguminous substances, when blasted by thunder, cannot be subdued by fire. The first law, therefore, which we shall establish, though it is not agreeable to us to do so, is respecting sacrilege, if anyone shall dare to commit it. Indeed, we neither wish, nor do we

very much fear, that a citizen, when properly educated, will ever labor under this disease. But the servants of these, strangers, and the slaves of strangers, will attempt many things of this kind; for the sake of which especially, and at the same time fearing for all the imbecility of human nature, I shall speak about the law of sacrilege, and all other such particulars as are either difficult to be cured or entirely incurable. The preface, however, to these particulars, according to what has been formerly assented to, ought to be as short as possible. Someone, therefore, may thus address him who is excited by a vicious desire both day and night to plunder temples, mingling at the same time admonitions with his speech: O wonderful man, neither a human nor a divine evil moves and excites you now to sacrilege, but a certain execrable fury, arising in men from ancient and unpurified offences, which you ought to dread with all your might. Learn, then, what this dread is. When any such opinion attacks you, betake yourself to expiations, betake yourself, in a suppliant manner, to the temples of those Gods that avert evils from mankind; and betake yourself to an association with good men. Among these partly hear, and endeavor yourself to say, that every man ought to honor things beautiful and just. But fly without turning back from an association with the vicious. And if, in consequence of your acting in this manner, the disease ceases, you have done well; but if not, considering that in this case it is better to die, liberate yourself from life. Since, therefore, we have sung these exordia to those whose thoughts lead them to deeds impious and destructive to the city, it is proper to dismiss him in silence who is obedient to the law: but to him who will not be persuaded, it is necessary, after the preface, to sing in a higher strain. He, then, who is detected in the act of sacrilege, if he is either a slave or a stranger, shall have his calamity written in his face

and hands, and after he has received as many lashes with a whip as the judges shall think proper, he shall be driven naked beyond the borders of the region. For, perhaps, being brought to his right mind by this punishment, he will become a better man. For no punishment subsisting according to law is inflicted with an evil intention. But one of two things is nearly always effected: for he who suffers punishment either becomes better or less depraved. If, however, a citizen shall at any time appear to have perpetrated anything of this kind, or some mighty and arcane crime towards the Gods, or his parents, or his country, the judge shall pronounce such an one to be incurable, in consequence of considering, that though he has been well nourished and disciplined from his childhood, yet he has not abstained from the greatest vices. But death to such a man is the least of evils. Such an one, therefore, that others may be benefited by his example, being stigmatized with infamy, and expelled beyond the boundaries of the region, shall there be put to death. But let his children and race be honored and praised, if they avoid his manners, as those that bravely fly from evil to good. It will not, however, be proper that the riches of any such person should become public property, in a polity in which the same and equal allotments ought to be perpetually preserved. But when anyone perpetrates such things as are to be punished with a fine, he shall be fined as much as he possesses above his allotted portion, but the lot itself shall remain entire. The guardians of the laws, however, considering this affair accurately from written accounts, should always give a clear statement of it to the judges, that no one may be deprived of his allotments through want of money. If anyone should appear to deserve a greater fine, and no one of his friends is willing to be bound for him, and procure his liberty, such an one shall be punished with

lasting and apparent bonds, and with certain reproaches. But let no one offence ever by any means pass unpunished, nor any fugitive; but let him either be punished with death, or bonds, or stripes, or certain squalid seats, or with standing, or being exhibited in temples at the extremity of the region, or by fines, in the manner we have before mentioned. Let the guardians of the laws too be established the judges of death; and let the best among them be chosen for this purpose, who in the preceding year had acted in the capacity of magistrates. But the citations and accusations of these, and such like particulars, together with the manner in which they ought to take place, should be attended to by junior legislators. The manner, however, in which suffrages ought to be conducted, it is our business to determine. Let them, therefore, be given openly. But, prior to this, let the judge sit before the accuser and defendant, and as near to them as possible, in a grave and dignified manner. Let all the citizens too that are at leisure, diligently attend as the hearers of such causes. And, in the first place, let the accuser speak, and afterwards the defendant. After this, let the senior judge diligently and sufficiently examine what was said: and, after the elder judge, all the other judges in order ought to consider what is worthy of discussion in the speeches of the accuser and defendant. But he who does not think there is anything worthy of discussion in either of the speeches, should refer the investigation of it to another. And, lastly, such things as shall appear to be well said, being committed to writing, and signed by all the judges, shall be placed in the temple of Vesta. And again, assembling the next day into the same place, they shall in a similar manner examine and judge, and put their signatures to what shall appear to have been well said. When this has been thrice accomplished, and the proofs and witnesses have been sufficiently examined, each judge bearing in his hand a

sacred pebble, and swearing before Vesta that he has judged to the utmost of his ability justly and truly, a judgment of this kind shall be thus brought to a conclusion.

After crimes respecting the Gods, it is requisite to speak of those which pertain to the dissolution of a polity. He, therefore, who subjects government to the power of a man, enslaves the laws, makes the city subservient to factious societies, and, accomplishing all this by force, excites illegal seditions. It is proper to consider a character of this kind as the greatest of all enemies to the whole city. But he who, though he is not the author of anything of this kind, yet possesses the greatest authority in the city, but takes no notice of these conspiracies, or if he does notice them, through timidity, suffers his injured country to be unrevenged, —a citizen of this kind ought to be considered as the second in wickedness. Every man who is of the smallest utility in a city should inform the judges of these particulars, and bring him to judgment who endeavors by stratagem to produce a violent and illegal mutation of the polity. But let the same judges give sentence in these cases as decided in sacrilege; and let the whole process be conducted in a similar manner. Let the suffrage too which vanquishes in multitude, be the sentence of death. And, in short, let not the disgrace and punishment of the father attend the children, unless the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, of someone in succession, have deserved death. These, with their possessions, except as much as pertains to the lot, shall be sent to their ancient paternal city. But as to those citizens who shall happen to have more children than one, and these not less than ten years of age, ten out of their number must be chosen by lot, which the father, or a paternal paternal or maternal grandfather, shall approve; and after they are chosen, their names must be sent to Delphi. Then, with a better fortune, the possessions

and habitation assigned by lot shall be restored to him whom the Delphic God approves.

Clinias/ And very properly so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let there be yet a third common law, respecting judges, and the mode of judgment, against those that are accused of treason. In a similar manner let there be one law respecting the abiding of children in, and their egression from, their country; just as we instituted one respecting the betrayer of his country, the man who commits sacrilege, and he who by violence destroys the laws of the city. With respect to theft too, whether in great or small matters, let one law, and one punishment, be ordained for every kind of theft. For, when anyone is condemned for thieving, if his own possessions, besides his allotted portion, are sufficient, he shall make a two-fold restitution: and if he does not, he shall be fettered till he has either paid the appointed sum, or persuaded him to whom he is indebted to excuse him from paying it. But if anyone is convicted of public theft, he shall then be freed from his bonds, when he has either persuaded the city, or made a two-fold restitution.

Clinias/ How is it that we say, O guest, there is no difference whether the theft is small or great, and whether it is from sacred or not sacred places, and such other dissimilitudes as subsist about the whole of thieving? For, since thefts are various, the legislator ought to attend to their varieties, and not inflict similar punishments on dissimilar offences.

Athenian Stranger/ You most excellently repulse me, O Clinias, who am, as it were, hurrying along, and you likewise recall into my memory what I have formerly thought, that the particulars respecting the establishment of laws have never been by any means properly determined.

Clinias/ But how, again, do we say this?

Athenian Stranger/ We did not adopt a bad image when we said, that all those of the present day that submitted to laws were similar to those slaves who are cured by slaves. For it is well to know this, that if at any time one of those physicians who meddle with the medical art from experience alone, without reason, should meet with a free-born physician discoursing with a free-born patient, and very nearly philosophizing, by investigating in a rational manner the beginning of his disease, and afterwards discoursing about all the nature of bodies, he would readily and vehemently laugh, and would address the free-born physician in language not at all different from what is generally used towards most physicians. For he would say to him, O stupid fellow, you do not cure the sick man, but you discipline him as if he wanted to become a physician, and not to be well.

Clinias/ And would he not speak properly by speaking in this manner?

Athenian Stranger/ And may it not also be very properly objected against us, that whoever discusses laws in the manner we do at present, disciplines the citizens, but does not give them laws?

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Athenian Stranger/ But at present a fortunate circumstance happens to us.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ That there is no necessity for us to establish laws, but that, entering voluntarily on the business of legislation, we have endeavored to perceive in every polity what is best and most necessary, and after what manner it might take place. And now, as it seems, it is permitted us if we please to consider what is best, or, if we had rather, what

is most necessary, respecting laws. We may choose, therefore, whichever is most agreeable to us.

Clinias/ We propose, O guest, a ridiculous choice, and we manifestly become similar to those legislators who are compelled by a certain mighty necessity to give laws immediately, and are not permitted to defer this till tomorrow. But it is lawful for us to speak through divine assistance, just as it is permitted those who gather stones, or any other materials of a building, to collect abundantly, and at leisure, such things as are adapted to the future building. Like builders, therefore, who do not raise structures from necessity, but at leisure, let us lay down some things, and join together others, so that it may be rightly said that some things pertaining to the laws are placed as foundations, and that other particulars are raised on them as foundations.

Athenian Stranger/ For thus indeed, O Clinias, our synopsis of laws will be more natural. But, by the Gods, let us consider this respecting legislators.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That there are writings and written discourses in cities respecting a variety of particulars, and that there are writings and discourses of the legislator.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether, therefore, shall we direct our attention to the writings of poets and others; writings which, whether in verse or in prose, are composed respecting the mode of conduct in life; but by no means apply ourselves to the writings of legislators? Or shall we direct our attention to these beyond all others?

Clinias/ To these far beyond others.

Athenian Stranger/ But will it not be necessary that the legislator should only consult writings respecting things

beautiful, good, and just, and that he should teach what is the nature of these, and how they should be studied by those that intend to be happy?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But it is shameful that Homer, Tyrtæus, and other poets, should have written more beautifully respecting life and the studies of men than Lycurgus, Solon, and other legislators. Or, is it not proper that writings, respecting laws should be by far the most beautiful and best of all writings in a city: but that other writings should be consonant to these; or, if they are discordant, that they should be treated with ridicule? We ought, therefore, to conceive, that laws should be so written for cities that the legislator in composing them shall appear to have assumed the person of a father and mother, and the writings themselves ought to be full of benevolence and prudence, and not like those of a tyrant and despot, commanding, threatening, and written on walls. Let us consider, therefore, whether we should endeavor to speak in this manner respecting laws, whether we are able or not. Let us, however, attempt it with alacrity, and, proceeding in this way, patiently endure whatever difficulties we may have to encounter. And may our journey be prosperous! which it will be if Divinity pleases.

Clinias/ You speak well. Let us, therefore, do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, then, let us accurately consider, as we began to do, respecting sacrilege, every kind of theft, and all injuries. And let us not be indignant if, while delivering laws in an intermediate manner, we establish some things, and deliberate about others. For we are becoming to be legislators, but are not yet, though, perhaps, we soon shall be. But if it is agreeable

to you, as I have said, to consider respecting the particulars I have mentioned, let us consider them.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ However, respecting all beautiful and just things, we should endeavor to consider this, in what manner we now accord, or dissent from ourselves: for we acknowledge that we desire, though we may not be able, to excel most others.

Clinias/ What kind of disagreements among ourselves do you speak of?

Athenian Stranger/ I will endeavor to inform you. With respect to justice entirely, just men, things, and actions, we all of us, in a manner, agree that all these are beautiful. So that, if anyone should strenuously affirm that just men, through the habit of justice, are all-beautiful, though they should be deformed in body, there is scarcely anyone who by thus speaking would be considered as speaking in a disorderly manner. Is not this true?

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Athenian Stranger/ But let us see whether all such things as partake of justice are beautiful: for all our passions are nearly equal to our actions.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Whatever action is just, so far as it participates of the just, so far also it nearly participates of the beautiful.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ If a passion, therefore, which participates of the just, is acknowledged by us to be beautiful on this account, our discourse by such an assertion would not be rendered dissonant.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ But if we should agree that a passion is just, but at the same time base, the just and the beautiful would be dissonant, in consequence of asserting that just things are most base.

Clinias/ How is this?

Athenian Stranger/ It is not at all difficult to understand. For the laws which a little before have been established by us, appear to announce things perfectly contrary to the present assertions.

Clinias/ After what manner?

Athenian Stranger/ We established it as just, that he who committed sacrilege should die; and likewise the enemy of well-established laws; and, as we were about to establish many other laws of this kind, we desisted on perceiving that these were passions infinite both in multitude and magnitude: and that they were the most just, but at the same time the most base, of all the passions. Do not things just and beautiful after this manner appear at one time to be the same, and at another to be most contrary?

Clinias/ They do appear so.

Athenian Stranger/ By the multitude, therefore, things beautiful and just, which are so dissonant with each other, are denominated things separate.

Clinias/ It appears so, O guest.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us therefore again, O Clinias, see how we accord with ourselves respecting these things.

Clinias/ What concord and what particulars are you speaking of?

Athenian Stranger/ I think it has clearly been shown by me in the foregoing discourse.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ However, if it has not been already shown by me, yet consider me as now speaking about it.

Clinias/ After what manner?

Athenian Stranger/ That all vicious men are in all things involuntarily vicious; and that, if this is the case, this also must necessarily follow.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That the unjust is a vicious man; and that the vicious man is involuntarily such. But the voluntary can by no means be done in an involuntary manner. He, therefore, who acts unjustly, will appear to act so in an involuntary manner to him who considers injustice as a thing involuntary. This also too is now acknowledged by me. For I have agreed, that all men act unjustly involuntarily, though some one, for the sake of contention or ambition, may say that unjust men are involuntarily unjust, but yet many act unjustly voluntarily. This, however, is not my assertion. After what manner, then, shall I accord with my own assertions, if anyone, O Clinias and Megillus, should thus interrogate me? If these things are so, O guest, what would you advise us respecting the city of the Magnesians? Shall we give laws to them, or not? I say, undoubtedly. Do you distinguish injuries then by the voluntary and involuntary? And do you ordain greater punishments for voluntary offences and injuries, than for such as are involuntary? Or do you punish all offences equally, as considering that no injuries are voluntarily committed?

Clinias/ You speak properly, O guest. But what use shall we make of what has now been said?

Athenian Stranger/ You interrogate well. In the first place, then, we shall use what has been said for the following purpose.

Clinias/ What purpose?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us call to mind that it was well said by us above, that there is great confusion and dissonance among us respecting things just. Resuming this, therefore, we again ask ourselves whether, since we have neither solved the doubt about these things, nor defined what is their difference, though in all cities, by all legislators that have ever existed, voluntary and involuntary injuries are considered as forming two species of injuries, and laws are established conformable to this opinion, —whether, therefore, since this is the case, ought we to dismiss what we have now advanced, after we have asserted that it is, as it were, divinely said, without offering any arguments to show the rectitude of such assertions? Certainly not. But it is in a manner necessary, that before we establish laws we should evince that these two things have a subsistence, and what is the difference between them; that, when anyone establishes a punishment for either, everyone may understand, and be able to judge, whether it is established in a becoming manner, or not.

Clinias/ You appear to us, O guest, to speak well. For it is fit we should do one of two things, viz. either not say that all unjust actions are involuntary, or first of all evince by defining that this is properly asserted.

Athenian Stranger/ One of these two things, therefore, I can by no means endure, I mean the denying that I think it is so, (for this would neither be legal nor holy). But after what manner these are two, if they by no means differ with respect to voluntary and involuntary, but with respect to something else, we should endeavor to evince.

Clinias/ By all means, O guest: for we cannot otherwise understand the nature of these.

Athenian Stranger/ Let it be so. Do not, therefore, many damages take place among citizens in their communications

and associations with each other, in which the voluntary and involuntary abound?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether, therefore, does anyone, considering all damages as injuries, think, in consequence of this, that they are attended with two-fold injuries, one kind being voluntary, and the other involuntary? For the involuntary damages of all men are neither in number, nor magnitude, less than the voluntary. But consider whether I say anything to the purpose, or not. For, do I not say, O Clinias and Megillus, that when someone unwillingly hurts another, he acts unjustly, but involuntarily injures one who is unwilling to be injured? And do I legally establish this as an involuntary injury? Indeed I do not at all consider a damage of this kind as an injury, whether it is of a greater or less magnitude. But we often say that he who assists another in an improper manner acts unjustly, if his assistance is not victorious. For, my friends, it is not proper, neither if anyone imparts anything, nor if, on the contrary, he takes anything away, to call such an action simply just or unjust: but the legislator should consider whether he who benefits, or is the cause of detriment to another, is endued with worthy manners, and employed those manners justly. And he should look to these two things, viz. injustice, and detriment. He should likewise, as much as possible, legally indemnify the person that has sustained a damage, restore what has been lost, raise what has fallen, and repair the ravages of death and wounds. Lastly, he should always endeavor that the discords arising from damages may, by means of the laws, terminate in friendship.

Clinias/ These things are well said.

Athenian Stranger/ Unjust damages, therefore, and emoluments, if anyone happens to derive emolument from

injuring another, ought to be cured, if they are such as are capable of being cured, as diseases inherent in the soul. But it is requisite to say, that the cure of injustice verges to this.

Clinias/ To what?

Athenian Stranger/ That the law may discipline everyone who does an injury, whether it be great or small, and may entirely compel him, either that he shall never afterwards dare to do the like voluntarily, or by far less frequently, through the dread of the consequent punishment. In whatever manner anyone may accomplish this, whether by works or words, pleasure or pain, honor or infamy, fines or gifts, so as that men may either love, or at least not hate, the nature of justice, but may hate injustice, —this is the business of the most beautiful laws. But those whom the legislator perceives to be incurable with respect to these particulars, he should punish in the extreme, as knowing that death is better than life to all such as these; and that when they are liberated from life they will doubly benefit others. For they will serve as a warning to others not to act unjustly, and the city, by their death, will be freed from bad men. On this account *it will be necessary for the legislator to punish* INCURABLE *offences with death, but* BY NO MEANS *on any other account.*

Clinias/ These things appear to have been spoken by you in a very sufficient manner; but we should gladly hear you relating still more clearly the difference between injustice and detriment.

Athenian Stranger/ I shall endeavor, therefore, to do and say as you request me. For it is evident that you have both said to, and heard from, each other thus much respecting the soul, that anger naturally residing in it, whether as a certain passion, or a certain part, and being contentious and invincible, subverts many things through irrational violence.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Besides this, too, we do not call pleasure the same as anger, but we say that it possesses dominion from a contrary power, and that it persuades us, with a violent deception, to do whatever it pleases.

Clinias/ And very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ He, likewise, who says that ignorance is the third cause of crimes will not be deceived. But he will be a better legislator who gives this a two-fold division: considering one kind as simple, and the cause of light offences; but the other two-fold, when anyone is void of discipline, not only from being detained by ignorance, but by an opinion of wisdom, so as to think that he has a perfect knowledge about things of which he is entirely ignorant. Things of this kind, therefore, when followed by power and strength, are to be established as the causes of mighty and rustic crimes; but when followed by imbecility, as in this case they become the crimes of children and old men, they are to be considered as crimes, and laws are to be established for those that commit them; but, at the same time, they should be reckoned the mildest of all crimes, and as deserving the most abundant indulgence.

Clinias/ You speak reasonably.

Athenian Stranger/ We nearly, therefore, all of us speak of pleasure and anger, as things to which some of us are superior, and by which others of us are vanquished: and this is truly the case.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But we never have at any time heard that one of us is superior to ignorance, and another vanquished by it.

Clinias/ Most true.

Athenian Stranger/ But we say that all these allure us to their will, and often, at the same time, draw us to things contrary.

Clinias/ Often, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ But I will now explain to you clearly what I call the just and the unjust, without any variety of distinction. For I entirely denominate injustice to be the tyranny of anger, fear, pleasure, and pain, envy and desire in the soul, whether such a tyrant injures anyone, or not. But the opinion of that which is best, whether it is the conception of cities, or of certain private individuals, if, possessing dominion in the soul, it adorns the whole man, though it may in a certain respect lead him into error, —this I denominate justice, and call everything which is performed from this opinion, just. And I further add, that the whole life of those who are obedient to a principle of this kind will be most excellent. But a damage of this nature is considered by the multitude as involuntary injustice. However, our business at present is not a contention about names. But since we have evinced that there are three species of crimes, let us, in the first place, still more diligently recall these into our memory. Of pain, therefore, which we denominate anger and fear, there is one species for us.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But of pleasure and desires there is a second species; a third of hopes and a desire of true opinion about that which is best. This third species being divided into two parts, five species will be produced, for which laws are to be established, differing from each other in two genera.

Clinias/ What are these?

Athenian Stranger/ The one, everything which is performed through violent and according actions; the other,

which takes place with darkness and deception in a secret manner. And sometimes actions are attended with both these; which, if they are treated in a proper manner, ought to be restrained by the severest laws.

Clinias/ It is just: they should.

Athenian Stranger/ But let us now return whence we have digressed, and finish the establishment of laws. The particulars then which we proposed to discuss were respecting sacrilege, betrayers of their country, and those who corrupted the laws, by dissolving the polity governed by those laws. Someone may perhaps commit one or other of these through insanity, disease, excessive old-age, or youthfulness, which last does not in any respect differ from the other causes which we have enumerated. If it shall appear that anyone thus affected has perpetrated one of these crimes, when the judges are chosen, and the crime is divulged, either by the guilty person or the inspector of the deed, he shall be judged to have acted contrary to law; and he shall be entirely fined a simple fine for the injury which he has committed. But let him be exempt from other punishments, unless, having committed man-slaughter, his hands are not pure from murder: for, in this case, departing to another country, he shall be exiled for a year. If he returns before the time prescribed by the law, or shall be detected within the borders of the country, he shall be imprisoned for two years in the public jail by the guardians of the laws, but liberated from his bonds after this period. However, as we began with murder, let us endeavor to establish laws consummately for every species of it. And, in the first place, let us speak concerning violent and involuntary homicide. If anyone, therefore, in a contest, and public gymnastic exercises, shall involuntarily slay his friend, whether his death happens immediately, or sometime after, from the wounds which he has received; or, if a man kills his friend

in battle in a similar manner, or in warlike exercises instituted by the magistrates, whether with naked bodies, or with certain arms in imitation of warlike exercises, —in all these cases let him be purified according to the law about these particulars received from Delphi. But let all physicians who, in endeavoring to cure, have unwillingly been the death of anyone, be considered as pure according to law. If anyone with his own hand unwillingly slays another, whether with his own naked body, or with an instrument or dart, or from administering drink or food, or by the hurling of fire, or tempest, or the privation of breath, whether he does this with his own body, or through the means of other bodies, let him be entirely considered as one that slays with his own hand, and suffer the following punishments: If he kills a slave belonging to another person, thinking that it is his own, he shall indemnify the master of the dead slave, or be fined the double of the worth of such slave: but his worth shall be determined by the judges. The homicide, too, in this case shall use greater and more numerous purifications than those who commit murder in gymnastic exercises; and the proper interpreters of these things shall be those whom the Delphic God approves. But if anyone kills his own slave, when he is purified according to law, let him be liberated from murder. If anyone involuntarily slays a free-born person, let him be purified with the same purifications as he who cuts off a slave. And let him not despise one of the ancient sayings. For it is said, that a free-born person who is violently put to death, will soon after his death be angry with his murderer; and being filled with fear and terror through his violent dissolution, and perceiving the person that slew him living after his usual manner, he will terrify, and, being disturbed himself, disturb with all his might his murderer and his actions, memory at the same time contributing to oppose him. On this account, it is requisite

that a homicide should be exiled from every part of his country for a whole year. But, if it is a stranger who is slain, the homicide shall be expelled from the country of the stranger for the same length of time. And if anyone is willingly obedient to this law, he who is the nearest relation of the deceased, and who was an inspector of all the particulars relative to the murder, shall pardon the homicide; with whom if he is entirely reconciled, it will be perfectly sufficient. But with respect to him who is not obedient to this law, and who, in the first place, being unpurified, dares to go to the temples of the Gods, and sacrifice; and, in the next place, is unwilling to be exiled for the above-mentioned time, such a one the nearest relative of the deceased shall accuse to the judges, and he shall suffer double the punishments which are due to the crime. If the nearest relative of the deceased does not call him to an account, the defilement, as it were, revolving on such a one, or, in other words, the slain person directing his anger towards him, he shall be accused by anyone that pleases, and shall be compelled by law to leave his country for five years. But if a stranger involuntarily slays a stranger in the city, whoever is willing shall accuse him by the same laws. If an inhabitant slays a stranger, he shall be exiled for one year. And, universally, if a stranger slays a stranger, who is an inhabitant and a citizen, besides his purification he shall be banished for the whole of his life from the country in which laws of this kind have dominion. And if he returns illegally, the guardians of the laws shall punish him with death; and his property, if he has any, shall be given to the nearest relation of the deceased. However, if anyone involuntarily returns before the limited time, being driven on the coast by a storm at sea, in this case, let him fix a tent on the shore, so that his feet may touch the water, and watch for a fit opportunity of sailing. But, if he should be forcibly

brought into the city by anyone, let him be liberated by the first magistrate he may meet with, and sent back with safety into exile. Again, if anyone with his own hand shall slay a free-born person, being incited by anger to the deed, a thing of this kind ought, in the first place, to receive a two-fold distinction. For he commits murder through anger, who suddenly and unintentionally kills a man by blows, or any other such like means, so that immediately after the impulse penitence follows the deed. And he likewise murders another in anger, who having been previously defamed by ignominious words or deeds, and, endeavoring to be avenged, afterwards voluntarily slays the person by whom he has been injured, and is not penitent for the deed. Murder, therefore, as it appears, must receive a two-fold distribution; and both of them nearly are produced by anger. But they may most justly be said to subsist between the voluntary and the involuntary. In reality, indeed, they are but images of the voluntary and involuntary. For, he who retains his anger, and does not immediately and suddenly, but with stratagem, at some distance of time, avenge himself, is similar to one who murders voluntarily. But he who does not conceal his anger, but immediately follows its impulse without premeditation, is similar to one who murders involuntarily. However, he is not altogether involuntary, but an image of one that acts involuntarily. On this account, it is difficult to determine respecting murders committed through anger, whether they should be established by law as voluntary or involuntary actions. The best and the truest method, therefore, that can be adopted is, to consider both these kinds of murder as images, and to divide them apart from each other, so as to class the one under premeditated, and the other under unpremeditated actions. Severer punishments, therefore, are to be ordained for those that commit murder through anger, with

premeditation; but milder punishments for those that murder without deliberation, and suddenly, For, that which is similar to a greater evil should receive a greater punishment, but that which is similar to a lesser evil, a lesser punishment. Let it, therefore, be thus established by our laws.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ But again returning to the subject we say, that if anyone with his own hand slays a free-born person, but was incited to the deed by a certain anger, without premeditation, in other respects let him suffer the same punishment as it is proper he should suffer who kills a man without anger; but let him, from necessity, be exiled for two years, as a punishment for his anger. But he who commits murder through anger, but with deliberation, shall be punished in other respects in the same manner as the former character; but he shall be banished for three years instead of two, that his anger, which is greater, may be punished for a longer time. And let this be the universal establishment respecting these particulars. For it is difficult to give laws about such things with accuracy. For, sometimes, murder of this kind, which is considered by the law as of a more atrocious, will prove to be of a milder, nature; and sometimes that which is of a milder, will be considered as of a more atrocious, nature; according as the murder is committed in a more savage or a more gentle manner. But, for the most part they will happen agreeably to the above-mentioned mode. Of all these particulars, therefore, the guardians of the laws should be inspectors. When the time of the banishment of these offenders is expired, the guardians of the laws must send twelve judges to the boundaries of the region, for the purpose of considering, in a still clearer manner, the actions of the exiles during this time; and that they may determine in a

proper manner respecting their modesty and reception. But the exiles shall acquiesce in the judgment of these magistrates. And if again, on returning from banishment, anyone of these, being impelled by anger, shall commit the same offence, he shall be perpetually banished: and if he returns from his exile, he shall be punished in the same manner as a stranger for returning from exile. Let him who kills his slave purify himself. But if he kills the slave of another person in anger, let him pay to the master of the slave double the worth of his loss. If any homicide is not obedient to the laws respecting murder, but, while he is unpurified, defiles by his presence the forum, gymnasia, and other sacred places, —whoever is willing may bring before a court of judgment both the homicide, and the relation of the deceased who has neglected to avenge the dead, and compel him to pay a double fine, and suffer in other respects a double punishment. And let the offending party consider the fine as legal. If a slave kills his master in anger, the kindred of the deceased shall be allowed to slay the homicide in whatever manner they please, and shall be pure from murder, so long as they do not by any means preserve the life of the slave. But if a slave does not kill his own master, but some other free-born person, in anger, he shall be given up by his master to the kindred of the deceased, who shall, from necessity, put him to death in whatever manner they please. If a father or mother shall in anger slay a son or daughter, by blows, or any other violent manner (a thing which will happen, though but rarely), let them be purified after the same manner as other homicides, and be exiled for three years. And after they return from exile, the husband shall be divorced from the wife, and the wife from the husband: and they shall never afterwards beget children together, nor shall either of these dwell together with him whose son or brother either of them slew, nor communicate

with him in sacred rites. But he who is impious with respect to these things, and does not obey these laws, shall be obnoxious to the charge of impiety by anyone that is willing. If a man slays his wife, or a wife her husband, in anger, they shall be purified in a similar manner with other homicides, and shall be exiled for three years. But, on returning from exile, let not either of them be permitted to join with their children in sacred rites, nor ever eat at the same table with them. And, if either the father or the child is disobedient to this law, let them be obnoxious to the charge of impiety by anyone that is willing. If a brother slays either a brother or a sister, or sister a brother or a sister, in anger, let them be purified and exiled in the same manner as parents that slay their children; and, on their return from exile, let them not eat at the same table, or join in sacred rites, with those whom they have deprived of brothers, or sisters, or sons. And if anyone is disobedient to this law, he shall with justice be obnoxious to the charge of impiety. If anyone, through incontinent anger, is so enraged with his parents as to dare to slay one of them in his insane fury, —if the dying parent, before he expires, shall voluntarily absolve his murderer from the deed, then, being purified in the same manner as those who commit murder voluntarily, and performing such other things as they perform, let him be considered as pure. But if the dying parent does not absolve him, let him be obnoxious to many laws. For he must be subject to the extreme punishments of whipping, and, in a similar manner, of impiety and sacrilege, because he has expelled the soul of his begetter. So that, if it were possible that a man could die frequently, it would be most just that a parricide or matricide should suffer many deaths. For, how is it possible that he who is not permitted by any law to destroy his parents, who led forth his nature into light, even though he should find that he was going to be slain by them, but is enjoined by the

legislator to endure all things rather than perpetrate a deed of this kind, —how is it possible, I say, that such a one can in any other way be properly punished? Let death, therefore, be ordained as the punishment of him who in anger slays either his father or mother. But if a brother slays a brother in his own defense, being attacked by him through sedition taking place between them, or any other such means, let him be pure in the same manner as one who slays an enemy. And if a citizen slays a citizen, or a stranger a stranger, in his own defense, let him be similarly pure; as, likewise, if, in defending himself, a citizen slays a stranger, or a stranger a citizen, or a slave a slave. But if a slave, in his own defense, slays a free-born person, let him be obnoxious to the same laws as him who slays his father. Let the same thing also be understood respecting the absolution from murder in all these cases as was said concerning the absolution from parricide. If any dying person, therefore, among these, previous to his death, willingly absolves his murderer from voluntary murder, purifications shall be administered to the homicide, and he shall be exiled for a year. And thus we appear to have spoken sufficiently respecting murders committed by violence, involuntarily, and in anger. Let us now speak concerning such as are voluntary, and perpetrated with every kind of injustice, and from stratagems, through the tyranny of pleasures, desires, and envy.

Clinias/ You speak properly.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, therefore, in the first place, let us speak to the utmost of our power concerning the causes of these. The greatest cause, then, is desire, which has dominion in a soul rendered savage by venereal incentives. It is this which abundantly, and in the most vehement manner, inflames the minds of the multitude, and which, through a depraved nature and want of discipline, generates

ten thousand loves of infinite riches. But we say that the want of discipline is the cause why both among the Greeks and Barbarians riches are praised in a vicious manner. For they place these in the first, though they belong to the third, rank of things good; and, through this opinion, destroy both themselves and posterity. For, to speak the truth to all cities respecting riches, is the most beautiful and the best of all things. But the truth is, that riches subsist for the sake of the body, and the body subsists for the sake of the soul. Since, therefore, those things are good for the sake of which riches naturally subsist, they will rank in the third place after the virtue of the body and soul. This reason, therefore, will inform us as a teacher, that he who desires to be happy ought not to seek after wealth indiscriminately, but in a just and temperate manner. For thus murders would not be committed in cities, which require to be purified by murders. But now, as I said in the beginning of this discussion, this is one and the greatest cause of the greatest punishments of voluntary murder. The second is the habit of an ambitious soul, which generates envy; and this is bitter to those that dwell together, and especially to him by whom it is possessed, and afterwards to the best persons in the city. But cowardly and unjust fears rank in the third place, which produce many murders, when such things have been transacted by anyone, or are at present transacted, as no one wishes to be conscious have taken place, or do take place. On this account they take away by death those that might give information of such transactions, when they cannot prevent them from making a discovery by any other means. And thus much for a preface to all these particulars. To which may be added, what many who are studious respecting the mysteries have heard about things of this kind, of the truth of which they are vehemently persuaded, —I mean, that such actions are punished in Hades, and that

the perpetrators of them, again returning hither, necessarily suffer punishment according to nature, and end their days by suffering the very same kind of death which they caused another to suffer. For him, therefore, who from this preface is persuaded, and is in every respect afraid of such a punishment, there is no occasion to establish a law respecting voluntary murder: but for him who will not be persuaded by it let the following law be ordained. He who designedly and unjustly slays with his own hand his fellow-citizen, shall, in the first place, be expelled from temples, from the forum, from ports, and from every general assembly, that he may not defile any of these by his presence; and this, whether anyone forbids him from these places or not. For the law forbids him, and forbids him as a perpetual injunction to the whole city. But the male or female relative, as far as to a cousin, of the deceased, who does not prosecute such a one in a proper manner, nor expel him from these places, shall first of all receive in himself the defilement, together with the hatred of the Gods, agreeably to the imprecation of the law. And, in the second place, he shall be obnoxious to anyone who is willing to revenge the dead. He who is willing to do this, having performed everything respecting washings, and such other particulars as Divinity has caused to be legal in cases of this kind, and uttered such things as must be previously announced, let him proceed, and compel the homicide to suffer the punishment of his deed according to law. But that these things ought to take place through certain prayers and sacrifices to certain Gods, who attend to such particulars, and are careful that murder may not be perpetrated in cities, will easily be apparent to the legislator. However, who these Gods are, and in what manner these judgments may be introduced, so as to take place with the utmost rectitude with respect to a divine nature, the guardians of the laws,

together with the interpreters and diviners, must promulgate. But let the judges of these particular be those to whom we have given the power of punishing sacrilege. Let him too who is condemned, be punished with death; and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered person, on account of his having acted in an impudent, as well as an impious manner. If he makes his escape, being unwilling to stand his trial, let him be perpetually exiled. And if he is ever detected in any part of the country in which he has committed the murder, he who first meets with him, whether he was the murderer of one of his kindred, or fellow-citizens, shall slay him with impunity; or shall deliver him bound to those magistrates that preside as judges over these affairs, that he may by them be put to death. But if anyone should stand forth in his defense, he shall be bound for his appearance, and shall procure three bondsmen, whom the judges shall think sufficient, for the purpose. If he is either unwilling or incapable of doing this, he shall be bound by the magistrates, and properly secured, that he may be punished for his interference. If anyone slays another, not with his own hand, but by consultation and stratagem, and yet, though he is the cause of the murder, and not purified in his soul, shall reside in the city where the deed was committed, such a one, being condemned, shall be similarly punished, except that he shall not be permitted to procure bondsmen, but shall be allowed his proper sepulcher. Let other things respecting him take place in the same manner as above. Let the same particulars too be established respecting strangers towards strangers, citizens and strangers towards each other, and slaves towards slaves, in murder committed with the homicide's own hand; and in that which is committed by consultation and stratagem, excepting that these latter homicides shall be obliged to give bondsmen, in the same manner as those that murder with

their own hands. If a slave voluntarily murders a free-born person, whether with his own hand, or through consultation, and is condemned, the public executioner shall lead him to the tomb of the murdered person, or to a place where he may see the tomb. Here he shall be whipt as long as the person that apprehended him pleases, and if he survives the whipping, he shall be put to death. But if anyone kills a slave who has not in any respect acted unjustly, through fear lest he should disclose his base and vicious actions, or through some similar cause, he shall be punished in the same manner as if he had slain a citizen. However, if cases should happen for which it is very difficult to establish laws, at the same time that it is impossible not to deliver laws respecting them, such as the voluntary, and, in every respect, unjust, murdering of kindred, whether the homicide accomplishes this with his own hand, or by consultation and stratagem, (murders which frequently take place in cities badly inhabited and governed, and sometimes in a region where no one would expect to find them)—in such cases as these, it will be proper that what was lately mentioned by us should be repeated. For, perhaps, someone, on hearing these things, may be induced more willingly to abstain from the most impious of all murders. For a fable, or a discourse, or by whatever other name it may be proper to call it, is clearly delivered by ancient priests, that Justice, the avenger and inspector of the murdering of kindred, uses the law of which we have just now spoken. Hence, they say, she has ordained that he who commits any such action shall necessarily suffer the same things as he has committed. So that, if anyone has ever murdered his father, he shall himself, in certain periods of time, be violently put to death by his children. And, if anyone has murdered his mother, he shall, in succeeding times, partake from necessity of a feminine nature, and be deprived of life

by his offspring. For they add that, when common blood is defiled, there is not any other purification, nor can the stain be washed away by other means, than by the guilty soul suffering murder for murder, and in a similar manner, and laying asleep the anger of all the kindred of the murdered person. It is proper, therefore, that men should be restrained from crimes of this kind, through the fear of those punishments which are inflicted by the Gods. But if such a miserable calamity should happen to any, as that they should designedly and voluntarily dare to deprive father or mother, brothers or children, of life, let the following law respecting things of this kind be established by the mortal legislator. By a public declaration they shall be expelled from all sacred places, and shall be obliged to give bondsmen, in the same manner as was mentioned above. And when anyone is condemned for murder of this kind, he shall be put to death both by the servants of the judges and the magistrates, and shall be driven naked out of the city to an appointed place, where three roads meet. Then all the magistrates, for the sake of the whole city, carrying each of them a stone, shall hurl it at the head of the dead body, and thus expiate the whole city. After this, carrying the dead body to the boundaries of the region, and hurling it thence, they shall leave it unburied, according to law. —But what ought he to suffer who slays his nearest, and, as it is said, most friendly, relative? I mean the man who kills himself, and by violence deprives himself of the allotment of fate; being neither compelled to do this by the judgment of the city, nor by a grievous and inevitable chance of fortune, nor by any extreme shame or poverty; but, through indolence and effeminate timidity, unjustly punishes himself. What purifications, and what mode of interment, ought to be legally established respecting such a one, Divinity knows: but the nearest relatives of the deceased must inquire what

these are from the interpreters of the Gods, and the laws about these. As to their sepulture, let them be buried in solitary places, where no one else is buried, and in those parts of the region which are the boundaries of the twelve divisions, and which are desolate and without a name. Let them, likewise, be buried in an ignoble manner, neither making their tombs conspicuous by the erection of pillars, or the inscription of their names. If a beast of burthen, or any other animal, shall kill a man, unless this happens in some public contest, the relations of the person so killed shall avenge his death: and the præfects of the land shall do whatever the relation or relations of the deceased command. But the punishment shall consist in driving the animal beyond the boundaries of the region, and there slaying him. If any inanimate thing deprives a man of life, except thunder, or any other such-like dart sent from Divinity, by either falling on the man, or the man falling on it, he who is nearest of kin to the deceased shall appoint his neighbor to be a judge in this case, and shall make an expiation both for himself and the whole of his kindred. But the thing condemned shall be exterminated the region, in the same manner as animals that are homicides. If anyone is found dead, and it is not manifest by whom he was slain, but cannot be discovered after the most diligent search, proclamations must be employed as in other murders, and the crier must proclaim in the forum, that whoever has slain this or that person, as being guilty of murder, must not approach any sacred places, nor reside in any part of the region where the deed was committed: for, if he is detected within the boundaries of the said region, he shall be put to death, and, being hurled beyond them, left unburied. Let this one law, therefore, be established as the principal one respecting murder. And thus much may suffice about things of this kind. Let the following, then, be the particular cases

in which he who commits murder will be pure. If anyone detects a thief entering his house by night, for the purpose of robbing it, and slays him, let such an one be pure. In like manner, let him be pure who slays a highwayman in his own defense. And if anyone uses force respecting venereal concerns towards a free-born woman or boy, let him be put to death with impunity, either by the injured party, or by the father, brothers, or sons of the person so injured. Likewise, if a man meets with anyone offering violence to his wife, and kills him, let him be pure, according to law. And if anyone, in assisting his father, or mother, or children, or brothers, or wife, in doing that which is by no means unholy, should slay someone, let him be in every respect pure. And thus far we have given laws concerning that education and discipline of the living soul, which if it is fortunately endued with, it may be suffered to live, but of which if it is unfortunately deprived, it must be put to death: and we have likewise ordained such punishments as murders deserve. We have spoken too respecting the nutrition and discipline of bodies.

It now remains that we should desire, to the utmost of our power, what violent, voluntary, and involuntary actions are, and how many they are in number, and what are the punishments accommodated to each. For these, as it appears, will be properly discussed after those. But even the vilest legislator will place the consideration of wounds, and mutilations from wounds, after murder. Wounds, therefore, are to be divided in the same manner as murders. For some of them are inflicted involuntarily; others through anger; some through fear; and some voluntarily and from design. Respecting all these, the following observations must be premised. It is necessary that laws should be established for men, and that they should live according to law, or they would in no respect differ from the most savage animals. But this is owing to the nature of men, which is never found to

be sufficient of itself to know what is advantageous to a human polity; and, when it does know this, is never always able to do and wish that which is best. For it is, in the first place, difficult to know that not private but public advantage must necessarily be attended to by the political and true art; (for that which is common binds, but that which is private dilacerates, cities,) and that it is more advantageous, both to the public and individuals, that common concerns should be well established, than such as are private. In the second place, though someone should know sufficiently from art, that these things naturally subsist in this manner, yet, after this, if he should govern the city with an unrestrained authority, he would be incapable of persevering in this dogma, and of living in the opinion that common advantage should be nourished in a city, and private follow the general good. But the mortal nature will always impel him to prerogative and private advantage: for this nature avoids pain, and pursues pleasure, in an irrational manner; prefers both these to that which is more just and excellent; and, producing darkness in itself, fills at length both itself and the whole city with evils of every kind. Indeed, if any man, through a divine destiny, should be naturally sufficient to comprehend what is the public good, he would require no laws for the government of himself; for neither any law, nor any order, is better than science; nor is it lawful that intellect should be subservient and a slave to anything, but that it should be the ruler of all things, if it is thus true, and really free by nature. But now, with respect to such an intellect as this, it cannot be said, that it is not by any means anywhere to be found, but it should be said that it is but rarely seen. That which ranks, therefore, in the second place, must be chosen, viz. order and law; of which many things are indeed perceived, but it is impossible to view all that pertains to them. And thus much we have said for the sake of these

things. —Now, let us ordain what he who wounds or injures another ought to suffer or pay. For it is easy for everyone to comprehend properly, whether anyone is wounded or not, who it is that is wounded, in what part, and after what manner. For there are an innumerable multitude of particulars of this kind, and which very much differ from each other. It is, therefore, alike impossible, to refer all, or no one of these, to courts of justice. For this one thing, in all these, must necessarily be referred to the decision of justice. I mean, whether each of these was done, or not. That nothing, indeed, should be determined by courts of justice respecting the fine for injuries of this kind, but that all things, both small and great, should be determined by law, is nearly impossible.

Clinias/ What then shall we say after this?

Athenian Stranger/ That some things should be referred to courts of justice, but that others should be determined by the legislator himself.

Clinias/ What are the particulars then which the legislator must decide, and what those which must be decided by courts of justice?

Athenian Stranger/ With the greatest propriety, after these things, the following assertions may be made: That, in a city in which the courts of justice are depraved and dumb, the opinions of the judges concealed, and sentence privately passed; and in which something still more dire than this takes place, when each of the judges decides, not in silence, but in the midst of tumult, as in a theatre, the rhetoricians praising and blaming with loud exclamations; —then a heavy calamity befalls the whole city. If, therefore, from a certain necessity, anyone should be compelled to give laws to such courts of justice, it would not be a fortunate circumstance; but, at the same time, he who is forced to give

them, should commit only the smallest fines to the judges, but should clearly ordain the greatest part of them himself. But, in a city, in which courts of justice are established with as great propriety as possible, and the judges are well educated, and examined with the greatest accuracy; in such a city, it will be proper and becoming to refer many things to the decision of such judges, respecting the punishment of such as are condemned. No one, therefore, should be indignant with us, that we do not now promulgate to these, such things as are the greatest and most numerous, which judges that are educated in the vilest manner may be able to perceive; and who likewise may be capable of punishing every offence in a proper manner. But, as we are of opinion that those for whom we promulgate laws, will not be in the smallest degree inelegant judges of these things, we shall commit most things to their decision. However, as we have often said, in the former part of this discussion, that a description and formulae of punishments ought to be given as examples to judges, which are never to be transgressed, and this we ourselves have accomplished, —this was then both rightly asserted and performed, and must be observed at present, as we are again returning to the laws. Let the written law, therefore, be established respecting wounds. If anyone, thinking in conjunction with his will to slay his friend, (if his friend is one of those whom the law forbids him to injure) wounds, but is not able to kill him, such an one, as neither deserving pity nor regard, we shall compel to suffer the punishment of murder, no otherwise than if he had actually slain his friend: except we should reverence his fortune, if it should not be entirely bad, and also the dæmon who, commiserating both him and the wounded person, may become an averter of evil to both, and may cause the wound of the one not to be incurable, and the fortune and calamity of the other to be devoted to the Furies. Giving thanks,

therefore, to this dæmon, and not opposing him, we shall take away the punishment of death from him that inflicted the wound, but order him to be exiled for life in a neighboring city, and there enjoy the fruits of all his possessions. If the wounded person, however, has suffered any loss, he shall make him a proper restitution, and such an one as the court of justice shall determine. But those judges that decide in cases of murder shall decide in this case. If a child designedly wounds his parent, or a slave his master, the punishment shall be death. And if a brother designedly wounds a brother or sister, or a sister a sister or brother, the punishment shall in like manner be death. But if a woman wounds her husband with an intention of slaying him, or a husband his wife with the same design, let each be perpetually banished. And, with respect to their property, if their sons or daughters are at that time but children, let persons be appointed to manage their affairs, and take care of the orphan children. But if their sons or daughters are adults, let them not be compelled to provide for their exiled parent, but let them be permitted to take possession of his or her property. If anyone who has no children happens to fall into calamities of this kind, let his kindred, as far as to cousins, both of the male and female side, assemble, and, consulting together with the guardians of the laws and priests, in the house of the exiled person, let one family out of the five thousand and forty houses of the city be appointed as his heir: at the same time considering that no house out of this number is so much the property of its inhabitant, and his kindred, as of the city at large. It is requisite, indeed, that the city should possess its own houses, to the utmost of its power, in the most holy and prosperous manner. When any house, therefore, is at the same time both unfortunate and impious, in consequence of its possessor leaving no children behind him, and of having been condemned for voluntary

murder, or any other crime towards the Gods, or his fellow citizens, the punishment of which according to law is evidently death, or perpetual exile; —when this is the case, in the first place, let the house be purified and expiated according to law; and, in the next place, let the kindred, as we just now said, assembling together with the guardians of the laws, consider what family in the city is most renowned for virtue, and at the same time fortunate, and consisting of a numerous progeny. Let one of the children belonging to this family be adopted by the father of the deceased, and by his grandfather and great-grandfather, beseeching, at the same time, Divinity that he may be a parent, master, and minister of holy and sacred rites, with better fortune than his predecessor. Having prayed after this manner, let him be appointed heir according to law. But let the guilty person be suffered to lie without a name, without children, and without any lot, in consequence of being oppressed by such calamities as these. Boundary, however, as it appears, is not in all things mingled with boundary. But where there is a common confine, this, being previously hurled in the middle of both boundaries, subsists between both. And we have said that crimes committed through anger are of this kind, subsisting between voluntary and involuntary crimes. If then anyone is condemned for wounding another through anger, if the wound shall prove to be curable, he shall pay the double of the loss sustained; but if incurable, he shall make a four-fold restitution. If the wound shall prove to be curable, but at the same time becomes the cause of great shame and disgrace to the wounded person, he shall likewise pay a four-fold fine. But if anyone, in wounding another, not only injures the wounded person, but the city, by rendering him incapable of assisting his country against the enemy, he shall be similarly fined, and, besides this, make restitution to the city for its loss. Besides, too, his own

military duties, he shall perform those of the wounded person; or, in case of noncompliance, he shall be accused according to law, by anyone that is willing, for neglect of military duty. He shall likewise make a double, triple, or quadruple restitution, according to the decision of the judges. If one near relation in a similar manner wounds another, the parents and kindred, as far as to the male and female cousins assembling together, shall decide the case among themselves, and shall deliver the offender to his parents to be punished according to nature. But if the punishment should be doubtful, it shall be determined by the kindred on the male side. And if they are incapable of deciding the case, they shall betake themselves at last to the guardians of the laws. When children inflict any such wounds on their parents, the judges shall be those that have passed beyond their sixtieth year, and whose children are truly their own, and not such as are adopted. He that in this case is condemned shall be put to death, or suffer some greater punishment, or one that is not much less; but no one of his kindred shall be permitted to judge him, though he should be of the age prescribed by law. But if a slave wounds any free-born person in anger, his master shall deliver him to the wounded person, that he may punish him in whatever manner he pleases: but if his master does not deliver him, he himself shall make a compensation for the injury. If anyone has a suspicion that the slave and wounded person acted from mutual compact, he shall acquaint the judges with his suspicion; and if he does not prove that his suspicion was true, he shall be fined triple of the damage sustained; but if he does prove it, let him be obnoxious to slavery, who has acted thus artfully with a slave. But let him who involuntarily wounds another, pay a simple fine. For no legislator is sufficient to govern fortune. Let the judges also be such as were appointed for children when guilty of

wounding their parents, and let these determine the proper punishment. All the above-mentioned passions, indeed, are violent; and every kind of striking likewise is violent. It is necessary, therefore, that every man and every woman should always think about things of this kind, that an elderly person is to be honored in no small degree beyond a younger person; that they are so by the Gods; and must be so by men who design to be saved and be happy. To see, therefore, an elderly struck by a young man in a city, is shameful, and odious to Divinity. But it seems fit that every young man, when struck by an old man, should patiently endure it, through a reverence of his age. Let it, therefore, be thus: Everyone shall reverence both in word and deed a person older than himself; and in such a manner, that whoever is more than twenty years of age, whether male or female, may be reverenced as a father or mother; and so that every young person may abstain from offering violence to any who are capable of begetting or bringing forth children, through regard to the Gods that preside over births. In a similar manner, let no violence be offered to a stranger, whether he has resided for some time in the city, or has but recently taken up his abode in it. For, whether he excites contention, or resists an injury, let no one dare to chastise him with blows. But if a stranger should dare wantonly to strike a citizen, let him who thinks he ought to be punished bring him before the præfects of the city, but not strike him himself, that, by thus refraining from a stranger, he may be far from daring to strike a fellow-citizen. The præfects of the city, reverencing the hospitable God, shall examine the affair; and if it shall appear that the stranger has acted unjustly, the citizen shall give him as many lashes with a whip, as the blows which he received from him, that he may prevent him from daring to do the like in future. But if it shall appear that the stranger has not acted unjustly, after

threatening and disgracing the person that brought him before the præfects of the city, let both be dismissed. If one person strikes another of the same age with himself, or who is a little older, but without children, or if an old man strikes an old man, or one youth another, the injured parties may defend themselves according to nature, without weapons, with their naked hands. But if anyone who is more than forty years of age shall dare to strike another, either while the person he strikes is attacking another, or defending himself, let him be called rustic, illiberal, and servile; and he may be considered as sufficiently punished by this reproach. And if anyone is obedient to these admonitions, he will be of a tractable disposition: but let him who cannot be persuaded by them, and who despises this exordium, receive with alacrity the following law: If anyone strikes another who is older than himself by twenty years or more, —in the first place, let him who happens to be present at the time, if he is neither of an equal age, nor younger, prevent any further violence; or, if he does not prevent it, let him be considered as unworthy according to law. But if he is of the same age with, or younger than, the person struck, let him defend him as if he was his brother or father, or as if he was his superior. And, besides this, let him be obnoxious to judicial punishment, who, as we have said, dares to strike a person older than himself: and if he is condemned, let him be punished with bonds, for not less than a year; or for a longer time, if it shall seem proper to the judges by whom he is condemned. If a stranger or an inhabitant shall strike one who is twenty years older than himself, let the same law have the same power, with respect to those that are present giving him assistance. And let him who in this case shall be condemned, if he is a stranger, and not an inhabitant of the city, be punished with bonds for the space of two years. But if he is an inhabitant of the city, and is not obedient to the

laws, let him be punished with bonds for three years, if the court of justice does not determine that he shall be punished for a longer time. Let whoever happens to be present on this occasion, and does not give assistance according to law, be fined. And if he possesses one of the first and largest estates, let him be fined a mina; but if his estate is of the second rank, fifty drachms; if of the third, thirty; and if of the fourth, twenty. Let the court of justice too respecting all such particulars consist of the generals of the army, the præfects of the military orders, the governors of tribes, and the masters of the horse. But with respect to laws, as it appears, some are instituted for the sake of worthy men, that they may be instructed by them, how they may associate with each other in a benevolent manner; but others for the sake of those who, avoiding discipline, and being of an intractable nature, are disposed to rush into every kind of vice. It is for these that what follows is asserted, and that the legislator necessarily establishes laws; at the same time wishing, that there may never be any occasion to use them. Whoever, therefore, dares to strike his father or mother, or the progenitors of these, neither dreading the anger of the Gods above, nor the punishments which are said to be inflicted under the earth, but, as one who thinks he knows that of which he is perfectly ignorant, despises assertions which are both ancient and assented to by all men, and in consequence of this acts unlawfully, —such a one requires the most extreme remedy. Death, therefore, is not the last remedy, but the punishments which are inflicted in Hades are rather ultimate remedies; and which, though they are most truly said to exist, yet are incapable of averting souls of this kind from evil. For, if they were capable, there never would be found any who would impiously dare to strike their parents. It is requisite, therefore, that the punishments for crimes of this kind in the present life, should be as much as possible

in no respect inferior to those which are inflicted in Hades. Let the following law, therefore, be established: If anyone who is not insane shall dare to strike his father or mother, or their fathers or mothers, —in the first place, let anyone who is present (as was mentioned before) give assistance. And if it is an inhabitant that gives assistance, let him be called to take the principal seat in the games; but if he does not give assistance, let him be perpetually banished from the region. If he is not an inhabitant, but gives assistance, let him be praised; but if he does not give assistance, let him be blamed. If a slave gives assistance, let him be made free; but if he does not assist, let him receive a hundred lashes with a whip. And if this happens in the forum, let the punishment be inflicted by the præfects of the market; but if in any other part of the city, by the ædiles, In like manner, if it should happen beyond the city, let him be punished by the governors of the husbandmen. If any citizen is present when a parent is struck by his child, whether such citizen is a boy, a man, or a woman, let him give assistance, at the same time exclaiming that such conduct is impious. But if he does not give assistance, let him be obnoxious to Zeus Omognius and Patroïus. Lastly, if anyone is condemned for striking his parents, let him, in the first place, be perpetually banished from the city to some other region; and, in the next place, let him be expelled from all sacred places and ceremonies; from which if he will not abstain, let him be punished with blows by the magistrates that take care of rural affairs, and entirely in such a manner as they please. And if he returns from exile, let him be punished with death. If any free-born person shall eat or drink with such a one, or have any transactions with him, or voluntarily touch him, if he should happen to meet with him, —such a one shall neither be suffered to enter into any temple, or forum, nor in short into the city, till he is purified; for he should think that he has had

communication with an execrable fortune. But if, being unpersuaded by the law, he illegally defiles sacred places, and the city, —whatever magistrate, perceiving this, does not punish such an one, let him be accused as guilty of one of the greatest crimes. If a slave strikes a free-born person, whether he is a stranger or a citizen, let anyone who is present give assistance, or be punished with the above-mentioned fine, according to the value of his estate. Those who are present, therefore, shall succor the injured person, and deliver to him the offender bound. Then the injured person, receiving him in this condition, shall give him as many lashes with a whip as he pleases; observing, at the same time, not to injure his master, to whom he shall afterwards deliver him, to be possessed according to law. But let the law be this: If a slave strikes a free-born person, without being ordered to do so by the magistrates, his master, on receiving him bound from the person he has injured, shall not free him from his bonds till the slave has persuaded the injured person that he deserves to be released from them. Let the same laws, be adopted for women, in their conduct towards each other, with respect to all these particulars; and for women towards men, and men towards women.

THE END OF THE NINTH BOOK.

Book 10.

Athenian Stranger/ After the laws respecting wounds, let the following general law be established respecting violence of every kind; that no one shall carry or take away anything belonging to another, or use his neighbor's property, if he has not obtained the consent of its possessor. For all the above-mentioned evils have depended, depend at present, and will depend on a thing of this kind but the greatest of the remaining evils are the intemperance and insolence of young men. The first of these consists in insolent and injurious behavior towards sacred concerns. And the intemperance and insolence of young men are particularly mighty evils when they take place in public and holy affairs, or in any common part of the tribes, or any other communions of this kind. But the second of these crimes, and which rank in the second place, are those committed towards private sacred concerns and sepulchers. Those of the third rank, separate from the above-mentioned particulars, consist in insolent behavior towards parents. The fourth kind of insolence takes place when anyone, despising the magistrates, takes away or uses anything belonging to them, contrary to their intention. The fifth consists in unjustly calling to account the political conduct of any citizen. And for each of these a common law must be established. For, with respect to sacrilege, we have summarily said in what manner it ought to be punished, if it is committed with violence and secrecy. Let us now speak concerning the punishment which those ought to suffer who speak or act in an insolent manner towards the Gods, premising first of all the following particulars, as an atonement. He who believes that there are Gods, conformably to the laws, will never at any time voluntarily act in an impious manner, or speak illegally. But he who does so will suffer one of these three things: either he will

not believe that there are Gods; or he will believe that there are, but that they take no care of human affairs; or, in the third place, he will believe that they are easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers.

Clinias/ What then shall we do, and what shall we say to them?

Athenian Stranger/ O good man! let us, in the first place, hear what I prophesy they will jocosely say in contempt of us.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ They will, perhaps, in a reviling manner thus address us: —O Athenian guest, you Lacedæmonian, and you Cnossian, you speak the truth. For some of us are by no means of opinion that there are Gods; others among us believe that they take no care of human affairs; and others, that they may easily be appeased by sacrifices and prayers, agreeably to what you said. But we think it proper, in the same manner as it appeared proper to you respecting laws, that before you threaten us severely you should endeavor to persuade and teach us that there are Gods, adducing for this purpose sufficient arguments; and likewise, that they are beings too excellent to be allured in an unjust manner by any gifts. For, now often hearing these, and other such particulars, asserted by the best of poets, rhetoricians, prophets, priests, and ten thousand others, the greater part of us do not turn from acting unjustly, but we endeavor by such conduct to obtain a remedy for our evils. But from legislators who confess themselves not to be rustic, but mild, we think it reasonable to expect that they should endeavor to persuade us that there are Gods; so that, though they may not speak better than others respecting the existence of the Divinities, yet they may speak better with respect to truth. And perhaps, indeed, we may be persuaded

by you. If, therefore, we speak in a proper manner, comply with our request.

Clinias/ It appears therefore easy, O guest, to show the truth of this assertion, that there are Gods.

Athenian Stranger/ How?

Clinias/ In the first place, the earth and sun, all the stars, and the seasons so beautifully adorned and distinguished by months and years, evince the truth of this assertion. To which we may add, that all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, believe that there are Gods.

Athenian Stranger/ O blessed man, I am afraid for the depraved, (for I will not ever say that I am ashamed of them,) lest you should despise them. For you are ignorant with respect to the cause of the difference between them and others, and think that their souls are impelled to an impious life through the incontinence alone of pleasures and desires.

Clinias/ But what other cause is there, O guest, besides this?

Athenian Stranger/ One, of which you are nearly entirely ignorant, through living remote from such characters.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ A certain ignorance of a very grievous nature, and which appears to be the greatest prudence.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ There are certain writings among us, partly in verse and partly in prose, which, as I understand, you have not, through the virtue of your polity. The most ancient of these writings assert, respecting the Gods, that the nature of Heaven, and of the other Divinities, was first generated; and at no great distance from the beginning of these compositions, the generation of the Gods, and their discourses with each other, are related. It is not easy to

censure these writings, on account of their antiquity, whether they may be properly adapted to the hearers of them, or not. But I shall never praise them as useful, nor as in every respect speaking properly respecting the reverence and honor which is due to parents. Let us, therefore, dismiss and bid farewell to the writings of the ancients, and speak of them in such a manner as is pleasing to the Gods. But let us accuse such assertions of junior wise men as are the causes of evil. Their assertions, then, produce the following effect: —When you and I, as arguments that there are Gods, adduce the sun and moon, the stars, and the earth, as Gods and Divine natures, —others, persuaded by these wise men, will say that they are earth and stones, incapable of paying any attention to human affairs, though they are celebrated as Divinities in discourses well calculated to procure persuasion.

Clinias/ Such an assertion, O guest, would be of a dangerous nature, even if I was the only one that heard it; but now, since it is heard by many, it is still more dangerous.

Athenian Stranger/ What then ought we to say, and what ought we to do? Shall we apologize as if we were accused by some impious person for acting in a dire manner by establishing laws as if there were Gods? Or shall we bid farewell to these, and again return to the discussion of laws, that this our preface to the laws may not become more extended than is proper? For our discourse will be far from being short, if we sufficiently exhibit what is necessary to men prone to impiety; wish to deter them from wickedness; to render them indignant with what is base; and afterwards to establish laws in a proper manner.

Clinias/ But, O guest, we have often said in the course of this short time, that in the present discussion brevity is not to be preferred to prolixity. For nothing (according to the saying) pursues us urging. But it would be ridiculous, and

at the same time base, to prefer that which is shorter to that which is best. For it will be a thing of no small consequence if our discourse shall possess any persuasive arguments that there are Gods, that they are good, and that they honor justice far more than men. For this will be nearly the most beautiful and excellent preface to all our laws. Without any molestation, therefore, and delay, let us, to the utmost of our power, omit nothing which may tend to persuade that these things are so.

Athenian Stranger/ What you have just now said appears to me to call us to prayer, since you excite yourself with alacrity to the ensuing discourse, and do not admit of any further delay. But how can anyone, without anger, speak concerning the existence of the Gods, as if it was a thing of a doubtful nature? For it necessarily follows that we must be indignant with, and hate, those who are the causes to us of the present discussion. These, indeed, might be persuaded there are Gods, from what they heard while children, and while they were yet nourished with milk from their nurses and mothers, as it were in songs, both in sport and in earnest, in sacrifices and prayers. For in these they must have seen and heard in the sweetest manner their parents supplicating the Gods with the greatest earnestness for themselves and children, and proclaiming, by their prayers and supplications, that there are indubitably Gods. Besides this, too, they must have heard and seen both Greeks and Barbarians, during the rising and setting of the sun and moon, supplicating and adoring, as well when their affairs were prosperous as when they were adverse; by all which they might be led to conclude that there are Gods, without any suspicion to the contrary. But with respect to those who despise everything of this kind, though not from one sufficient argument, as everyone who possesses the least degree of intellect will acknowledge, and on this

account compel us to speak as we do at present, how shall we be able to correct them in mild language, and at the same time, in the first place, teach them that there are Gods? Let us, however, dare the attempt. For it is not proper that, at the same time they are insane through the voracity of pleasure, we should be transported through anger with such characters as these. Laying aside all anger, therefore, let us previously address those who are thus vitiated in their dianoëtic part, and mildly speak to one of them as follows: O boy, you are as yet a youth; but time, as it advances, will cause you to change your opinions, and think in many respects contrary to what you do at present. Wait, therefore, till that period, that you may be able to judge concerning things of the greatest consequence. But to possess right conceptions respecting the Gods, though to you at present it appears to be a thing of no consequence, is of the greatest importance as to living well, or the contrary. If, therefore, I announce to you what follows as one of the things of the utmost consequence, I shall by no means speak falsely. Not you alone, nor your friends, are the first that have entertained this opinion respecting the Gods, but there always have been a greater or less number who have labored under this disease. I will, therefore, tell you what happens to most of them, viz. that they do not remain in this opinion, that there are no Gods, from youth to old-age. Two opinions, indeed, respecting the Gods remain, though not in many, yet in a few, —I mean, that there are Gods, but that they take no care of human affairs; or, if they do, that they may be easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers. If, therefore, you will be persuaded by me, wait, considering whether this is the case or not, till you possess as clear information in this particular as can possibly be obtained. And in order to this, interrogate others, and particularly the legislator. But at the present time do not dare to act in any respect impious

towards the Gods. For he who establishes laws for you will endeavor, both now and hereafter, to teach you how these things subsist.

Clinias/ What has been said thus far, O guest, is most beautiful.

Athenian Stranger/ Entirely so, O Megillus and Clinias; but we are ignorant that we have fallen upon a wonderful assertion.

Clinias/ What kind of assertion do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ That which in the opinion of many is the wisest of all assertions.

Clinias/ Speak yet clearer.

Athenian Stranger/ Some then say, with respect to all things that have been, are, and will be, that some subsist from nature, others from art, and others through fortune.

Clinias/ And they speak well.

Athenian Stranger/ It is fit, indeed, that wise men should speak properly. Following them, therefore, let us consider what they meant by this assertion.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ It appears (say they) that the greatest and most beautiful things are produced by nature and fortune, but lesser things by art; which receiving from nature the generation of great and primary works, fashions and fabricates all smaller works, which we all of us denominate artificial.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ I will speak still clearer. They say that fire and water, earth and air, subsist from nature and fortune, and not from art. That the bodies also, which are posterior to these, viz. of the earth, the sun, the moon, and the stars, are generated through these, which are entirely

destitute of soul. They add, that, all things being casually borne along by the impulse of fortune, they became in a certain respect properly harmonized together, viz. the hot with the cold, the dry with the moist, the soft with the hard; and, in short, that all things of a contrary temperament were, from necessity, through fortune mingled together. That, besides this, the whole of heaven, with all that it contains, all animals and plants, and the seasons of the year, were produced after this manner: not (say they) through intellect, or any divinity, nor yet through art, but, as we have said, from nature and fortune. That afterwards mortal art was generated from these by mortals, and that through its assistance certain posterior disciplines were produced, which do not very much partake of truth, but are certain images allied to each other; such as painting, music, and the sister arts, beget. They add, that if there are any arts which produce anything of a serious nature, they are such as communicate their own power with that of nature; such as are the arts of medicine, agriculture, and gymnastic: and that the political art communicates in a certain small part with nature, but very much with art. So that, according to them, the whole of legislation does not consist from nature, but art, and its positions are not true.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ O blessed man, they say in the first place, that the Gods do not subsist from nature, but from art and certain laws, and that these are different in different nations, according as the legislators by mutual agreement have determined. They likewise assert, that things beautiful or becoming are not the same by nature as by law; and that things just have not any natural subsistence whatever, but that men always dissent among themselves respecting these, and are perpetually changing them. That, when they are changed by them, they then possess authority, deriving their

subsistence from art and laws, and not from any certain nature. These, my friends, are the particulars which are taught young men from the writings of the wise, both in prose and verse, and by which they learn that the most just is that which is obtained by violence. Hence, young men fall into impiety so as to believe that there are not Gods, such as the law ordains us to conceive have an existence. Hence, too, seditions arise, through which men are drawn to a life consisting in vanquishing others, and refusing subjection to others according to law, as if it was a life naturally proper.

Clinias/ O guest, what a circumstance have you related, and what a pest to young men, both publicly to cities, and to private families!

Athenian Stranger/ You speak truly, O Clinias. What then ought a legislator to do in this case? Ought he only to threaten everyone in the city, that they shall be punished unless they assert and believe that there are Gods, such as the law says there are; and unless they conceive they ought to act in such a manner with respect to things beautiful and just, and everything else of the greatest consequence, and whatever pertains to virtue and vice, as the writings of the legislator enjoin? If, therefore, any refuse to obey his laws, ought he to punish some with death, others with stripes and bonds, others with infamy, and others with poverty and exile? but ought he to pay no attention to persuasion and gentle methods, at the same time that he is establishing laws?

Clinias/ By no means, O guest. But if any persuasion, though small, respecting things of this kind can be obtained, a legislator who is of the least worth ought by no means to be weary, but, as it is said, with the most strenuous exertions of his voice, should give assistance to the ancient law, by asserting that there are Gods, and such other things as you have discussed; and should give his suffrage both to

nature and art, that they have a natural subsistence, or a subsistence not inferior to that of nature, since they are the progeny of intellect, according to the dictates of right reason, as you appear to me to assert, and as I believe.

Athenian Stranger/ O most prompt Clinias, is it not difficult to follow by a reasoning process things asserted by the multitude, and which are of a very extended nature?

Clinias/ But what, O guest? Shall we patiently endure to discourse in so prolix a manner about intoxication and music, and shall we not be equally ready to speak about the Gods, and such-like particulars? Besides, such an undertaking will be of the greatest assistance to legislation, when prudently conducted, since those written mandates pertaining to the laws, which have always been subject to reprehension, will thus entirely remain undisturbed. So that we ought not to be terrified if those things should at first be difficult to hear, which, when often repeated, may be apprehended even by one whom, from his inaptitude to learning, it is difficult to instruct. These things, therefore, though they may be prolix, yet, if they are useful, they are not to be considered as of no consequence; nor does it appear to me to be holy not to assist these assertions to the utmost of our power.

Megillus/ O guest Clinias, you appear to me to speak most excellently.

Athenian Stranger/ He does very much so indeed.

Megillus/ Let us, therefore, do as he says. For, if assertions of this kind were not, as I may say, scattered among all men, there would be no occasion of arguments to prove that there are Gods: but now this is necessary. Since, therefore, the greatest laws are corrupted by vicious men, to whom does it pertain to give assistance to them more than to the legislator?

Clinias/ To no one.

Athenian Stranger/ But inform me again, O Clinias, (For it is proper that you should partake of this discourse,) does it not appear that he who asserts the above-mentioned particulars considers fire and water, earth and air, as the first of all things, and that he denominates these very things nature, but is of opinion that soul was produced afterwards from these? Indeed, it not only appears to be so, but is truly signified to us by the very assertions themselves.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether or no, therefore, by Zeus, have we found, as it were, a certain fountain of the stupid opinion of those men who have ever touched upon physical inquiries? Consider, investigating the whole affair. For it will be of no small consequence if it shall appear that those who meddle with impious assertions, and thus rule over others, do not employ good, but vicious arguments. To me, therefore, this appears to be the case.

Clinias/ You speak well: but endeavor to show that it is so.

Athenian Stranger/ But I shall appear to employ unusual arguments.

Clinias/ Let not this make you sluggish, O guest. For I understand that you are of opinion we shall wander from the business of legislation, if we engage in a disputation of this kind. But if it is not possible to show by any other method than this that the laws speak properly concerning the Gods, let us, O wonderful man, adopt it.

Athenian Stranger/ I will enter, therefore, on this discourse, which, as it appears, is so unusual. Those discourses, then, which render the soul impious, assert that the first cause of the generation and corruption of all things is not the first, but was produced afterwards; and that what

was posterior is prior. On this account they err respecting the true essence of the Gods.

Clinias/ I do not yet understand.

Athenian Stranger/ Almost all men, O my associate, appear to be ignorant what the soul is, and what power it possesses, both with respect to other things and its generation; I mean, that it ranks among things first, that it had a subsistence prior to all bodies, and that more than any other nature it rules over the mutation and all the ornament of bodies. If this is the case, does it not necessarily follow, that things allied to soul will have an origin prior to those pertaining to body, soul itself being more ancient than body?

Clinias/ It is necessary.

Athenian Stranger/ Opinion, therefore, diligent attention, intellect, art, and law, will be prior to things hard and soft, heavy and light. Besides this, too, great and primary works and actions, which are produced by art, will rank among things first; but natural productions, and nature herself, (which they do not properly denominate,) will be things posterior, and in subjection to art and intellect.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ They are not willing to say that the generation about things first is nature, though it would be right to call it so; and they place bodies in the first rank of beings. But if soul shall appear to belong to the first order of things, and not fire or air, it may nearly be said with the greatest rectitude, that soul was generated prior to body; that, if these things subsist in this manner, they will subsist naturally, viz. if anyone evinces that soul is more ancient than body; but that this will by no means be the case if they subsist otherwise.

Clinias/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we, therefore, after this manner proceed to what follows?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But let us by all means guard against and avoid fraudulent arguments, lest these, which are of a juvenile nature, should deceive by false persuasion us who are advanced in years, and thus render, us ridiculous; and lest we should appear to attempt greater things, and wander from such as are smaller. Consider, therefore, if it were necessary that we three should pass over a very rapid river, and I, who am the youngest of the three, and have tried many rivers, should say it is proper that I should first of all endeavor to pass over it by myself, leaving you in safety, and should consider whether or not it may be passed over by you, who are more aged than myself; that afterwards, this being agreeable to you, I should either call you to ford the river in conjunction with me, or, if it should be too steep for you, encounter the danger by myself; —consider, I say, if in this case I should not appear to speak to the purpose. In like manner, since the discourse we are now entering on is of a more vehement nature, and perhaps nearly inaccessible by your strength, lest it should cause in you a dark giddiness, by leading you to questions to which you are unaccustomed, and afterwards overwhelm you with disgrace and sorrow, it appears to me that I ought, in the present case, first to interrogate myself, while you hear in safety, and, after this, again answer myself; proceeding in this manner till the whole of this discourse respecting the soul is finished, and it is shown that soul is prior to body.

Clinias/ You appear to us, O guest, to speak most excellently: do, therefore, as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, let us invoke Divinity; for, if it is ever proper to do so, it will be requisite in the present

case; and let us beseech the Gods with the greatest earnestness to assist us in demonstrating their existence. Holding, therefore, as by a certain secure rope, let us ascend into the present reasoning. And it appears to me that, by the following interrogations respecting these things, I shall most securely answer my opponent. If anyone then should ask me, O guest, do all things stand still, and is nothing moved? Or, does the very contrary to this take place? Or, are some things moved, but others stand still? To this I should reply, Some things are moved, and others stand still. Do not, therefore, the things which stand still, abide in a certain place, and are not the things which are moved, moved in a certain place? Undoubtedly. And some things do this in a certain respect in one seat, but others in more than one. Do you mean we shall say that some things which abide, receiving the power in the middle, are moved in one, in the same manner as the periphery of circles, which are said to stand still, revolves? I do. But we understand that in this revolution a motion of this kind, leading round the greatest and the least circle, distributes itself analogously in small and large circles, and is itself, according to proportion, less and more. On this account it becomes the fountain of all wonderful things, proceeding homologous according to slowness and swiftness, in large and small circles, and thus accomplishing what to someone it might appear impossible to accomplish. You speak most true. But by things moving in many things, you appear to me to mean such as are moved locally, always passing from one place to another. And sometimes, indeed, they obtain the basis of one certain center, and sometimes of more than one, by being rolled round. Each too meeting with each, they are cut by those that stand still. But when they meet with each other, and are borne along in an opposite direction, then the parts situated in the middle, and those between these, becoming

one, they are mingled together. I acknowledge that these things are as you say. Besides this, too, the things which are mingled together are increased; but when they are separated, they are then corrupted, when the permanent habit of each remains; but when it does not remain, it is dissolved through both. But the generation of all things takes place when a certain passion is produced, viz. when the principle receiving increase arrives at a second transition, and from this to that which is near it; and when it has arrived as far as to three, it possesses sense in things sentient. Everything, therefore, is generated by this mutation and transition. However, a thing truly is, when it abides: and when it is changed into another habit, it becomes entirely corrupted. Have we not therefore, O friends, enumerated all the forms of motion, except two?

Clinias/ Of what kind are those?

Athenian Stranger/ They are nearly those, O excellent man, for the sake of which the whole of our present discussion is undertaken.

Clinias/ Speak more clearly.

Athenian Stranger/ Was not the present discussion undertaken for the sake of soul?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Let one motion then be that which is able to move other things, but is always incapable of moving itself: but let the other be that which is always able to move both itself and other things, by mingling and separating, by increase, and the contrary, and by generation and corruption; and this motion is different from all the other motions.

Clinias/ Be it so, therefore.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we not, then, place that motion as the ninth, which always moves another, and is moved by

another; but call that the tenth motion, which moves both itself and others, which is adapted to all actions and passions, and which is truly denominated the mutation and motion of all things?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But which of the ten motions shall we with the greatest rectitude judge to be the most robust, and by far the most efficacious of all motions?

Clinias/ It is necessary to say, that the motion which is able to move itself is infinitely to be preferred to the rest, and that all the others are posterior to this.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak well. Must not, therefore, one or two of the things which have not at present been rightly asserted by us be transposed?

Clinias/ What things do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ We did not altogether speak properly respecting the tenth motion.

Clinias/ Why so?

Athenian Stranger/ Because, according to reason, it is the first in generation and strength; but that which follows this is the second, though it has been just now absurdly called by us the ninth.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ Thus. When one thing moves another, and something else always moves this, will there ever among such things as these be anything which is first moved? But how is it possible that a thing which is moved by another can ever be the first of things changed? It is certainly impossible. But when a thing moving itself causes mutation in something else, and this latter in some other, and ten thousand things are thus moved in succession, — whether or no in this case will there be any other principle

of all the motion than the mutation of that which moves itself?

Clinias/ You speak most excellently. These things, therefore, must be granted.

Athenian Stranger/ Further still, let us thus interrogate and answer ourselves. If all generated natures should, after a manner, stand still, as many of those we are now addressing dare to say they do, which among the above-mentioned motions would necessarily first take place?

Clinias/ Doubtless that which moves itself. For the motion depending on another could not by any means take place till it had previously undergone some mutation.

Athenian Stranger/ We must say, therefore, that the principle of all motions, and which first subsists in things abiding and in motion, is that which moves itself; and that this is necessarily the most ancient and the most powerful mutation of all things: but that the second is that which is changed by another, and at the same time moves others.

Clinias/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ Since we have, therefore, arrived thus far in our discourse, let us also answer the following question.

Clinias/ What is that?

Athenian Stranger/ If we should see this first motion taking place in a terrene, aquatic, or fiery-formed body, whether simple or mixed, what passion should we say was inherent in a thing of this kind?

Clinias/ Do you ask me, whether that which moves itself should be said to live?

Athenian Stranger/ I do.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly it should.

Athenian Stranger/ But what? When we see soul inherent in anything, do we admit that it lives through anything else than this?

Clinias/ Through nothing else.

Athenian Stranger/ Consider then, by Zeus, are you willing to understand three things respecting everything?

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ One of these is essence, another the reason or definition of essence, and a third the name. And likewise the interrogations respecting every being are two.

Clinias/ How two?

Athenian Stranger/ Sometimes each of us, when a name is proposed, inquires the reason of the denomination; and sometimes, when the reason is proposed, we inquire after the name. Are you, therefore, willing that we should now speak of a thing of this kind?

Clinias/ Of what kind?

Athenian Stranger/ A two-fold distinction is found in other things, and in number. Thus, for instance, in number, the name indeed is the even, but the definition is one number divided into two equal parts.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ My meaning is this. Do we signify the same thing in each, when, being asked concerning the name, we assign the reason, or, when, being asked the reason, we assign the name; since we denominate one and the same thing by name, even, but, by reason or definition, a number divided into two equal parts?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ But what is the definition of that which is called soul? Have we any other than that which was

just now mentioned by us, I mean a motion capable of moving itself?

Clinias/ Do you say, that the being moved by itself is the definition of that essence which we all denominate soul?

Athenian Stranger/ I do say so. But if this be the case, do we yet desire it should be more sufficiently shown, that soul is the same with the first generation and motion of things which now are, have been, and shall be; and, again, of all the contraries to these; since it appears that soul is the cause of all mutation and motion to all things?

Clinias/ Certainly not. For it has been sufficiently shown, that soul is the most ancient of all things, and is the principle of motion.

Athenian Stranger/ Will not, therefore, the motion which subsists through another in another, but which is never the cause of a thing moving itself, be the second in order? and ought it not to be placed after the former motion, by whatever interval of numbers anyone may choose to assign, since it is truly the mutation of an inanimate body?

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ We have said, therefore, with rectitude, propriety, and in the most perfect manner, that soul was generated prior to body, but that body is posterior and secondary, soul naturally possessing dominion, and body subjection.

Clinias/ With the greatest truth, therefore.

Athenian Stranger/ But do we recollect, that it was acknowledged by us above, that if soul should appear to be more ancient than body, the things pertaining to soul would also be more ancient than those pertaining to body?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Disposition, therefore, manners, volitions, reasonings, true opinions, attention, and memory, must have been generated prior to the length, breadth, depth, and strength of bodies, on account of the priority of soul to body.

Clinias/ Necessarily so.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it not, therefore, after this necessary to acknowledge, that soul is the cause of things good and beautiful, evil and base, just and unjust, and of all contraries, since we establish it to be the cause of all things?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Is it not also necessary to assert, that soul, which governs all things, and which resides in all things that are in any respect moved, governs likewise the heavens?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But does one soul, or many, govern them?

Megillus/ Many: for I will answer for you.

Athenian Stranger/ We should not, therefore, establish less than two, one beneficent, and the other of a contrary nature.

Clinias/ You speak with the utmost rectitude.

Athenian Stranger/ Soul, therefore, by its motions, leads everything in heaven, earth, and the sea; and the names of these motions are—to will, to consider, take care of, consult, form true and false opinions, rejoicing, grieving, daring, fearing, hating, loving; together with all such primary motions as are allied to these, and which, receiving the secondary motions of bodies, lead all things to increase and decay, separation and concretion, and to things consequent to these, such as heat and cold, gravity and levity, the hard

and the soft, the white and the black, the four, sweet, and bitter; and, lastly, to all things which, soul employing, when it perpetually receives a divine intellect, as being in this case a goddess, disciplines all things with rectitude and felicity; but when it is conjoined with folly, it produces everything contrary to these. Shall we admit that these things subsist in this manner, or shall we yet doubt whether they do not in a certain respect subsist differently?

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether, therefore, shall we say, that the genus of soul which is prudent, and full of virtue, governs heaven and earth, and the whole period of generated nature, or that which possesses neither of these? Are you willing, therefore, that we should answer this question as follows?

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ Thus, O wonderful man. If the whole path of the heavens, and the local motion of all the natures it contains, possess a nature similar to the motion, circulation, and reasonings of intellect, and proceed in a manner allied to these, it must evidently be granted, that the most excellent soul takes care of the whole world, and leads it according to a path of this kind.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ But if it proceeded in a mad and disordered manner, it must be led by an evil soul.

Clinias/ And this also is rightly asserted.

Athenian Stranger/ What nature, then, does the motion of intellect possess? To this question indeed, O friends, it is difficult to answer prudently. It is, therefore, just, that I should now answer for you.

Clinias/ You speak well.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us not, therefore, looking as it were to the sun in an opposite direction, and thus introducing night in midday, answer the present question, as if we could ever sufficiently behold and know intellect with mortal eyes: for, by looking to the image of the object of our interrogation, we shall see with greater security.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ Let us receive from among those ten motions, as an image, that to which intellect is similar. This motion I will recall into your memory, and answer for you in common.

Clinias/ You speak in the most beautiful manner.

Athenian Stranger/ We must remember, therefore, it was asserted by us above, that of all things that exist, some are moved, and others abide.

Clinias/ It was so.

Athenian Stranger/ But, of things which are moved, some are moved in one place, but others are borne along in more than one.

Clinias/ They are so.

Athenian Stranger/ But it is necessary that these motions, which are always borne along in one, should be moved about a certain middle, in imitation of circles fashioned by a wheel, and that they should be, in every respect; as much as possible allied and similar to the circulation of intellect.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ That both of them are moved according to the same, in a similar manner, in the same, about the same, and towards the same, according to one reason and order. If, therefore, we should say that intellect, and the motion which is borne along in one, are similar to

the local motions of a sphere fashioned by a wheel, we should not by any means be bad artificers in discourse of beautiful images.

Clinias/ You speak with the utmost rectitude.

Athenian Stranger/ The motion, therefore, which is never borne along in a similar manner, nor according to the same, nor in the same, nor about the same, nor towards the same, neither in ornament, nor in order, nor in one certain reason, will be allied to all folly.

Clinias/ It will, with the greatest truth.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, therefore, it will be no longer difficult to assert openly, that since it is soul which leads all things in a circular manner, it must necessarily follow that the circulation of the heavens must be led round, taken care of, and adorned, either by the most excellent soul, or the contrary.

Clinias/ O guest, from what has been said, it is not holy to say otherwise than that either one soul, or many souls, possessing every virtue, cause the circulation of the heavens.

Athenian Stranger/ You understand my arguments, O Clinias, most excellently: but listen still further to this.

Clinias/ To what?

Athenian Stranger/ If soul convolves the sun, moon, and the other stars, is not each of these convolved by a soul of its own?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ We shall, therefore, discourse about one soul, in such a manner, that what we say may be accommodated to all the stars.

Clinias/ What soul is that?

Athenian Stranger/ Every man perceives the body of the sun, but no one its soul; nor, indeed, does anyone perceive the soul of any other body, either of a living or of a dead animal; but there is every reason to believe that this genus of things is naturally incapable of being seen by any of the corporeal senses, but is of an intelligible nature. Let us, therefore, by intellect alone, and the dianoëtic energy, apprehend this respecting it.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ If soul is the leader of the sun, we shall perhaps not err in asserting, that it accomplishes this by one of these three modes.

Clinias/ What modes?

Athenian Stranger/ That either, residing within this apparent circular body, it entirely rolls it along, in the same manner as our soul moves us, or that, in a certain respect being situated externally, and connecting itself with a body of fire or air, according to the assertions of some, it violently impels body with body; or, in the third place, being itself destitute of body, it governs this visible orb through possessing certain other powers transcendently admirable.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ This then is necessary, —that all things should be governed by this soul, according to one of these modes. But whether this soul residing in the sun, as in a chariot, imparts light to all things, or whether it is situated externally, or in whatever other manner it may be connected with this visible orb, it is better that all men should consider it as a God. Or, how shall we say?

Clinias/ *This must certainly be acknowledged by everyone who has not arrived at the extremity of folly*.

Athenian Stranger/ *But with respect to all the stars, and the moon, years, months, and the seasons, shall we speak in*

any other manner than this—That since a soul and souls, good from the possession of every virtue, appear to be the causes of all these, they should be called Gods, whether being resident in bodies, and thus becoming animals, they adorn all heaven, or in whatever other manner they may accomplish this? And, in the next place, can he who assents to these things deny that all things are full of Gods?

Clinias/ No one, O guest, is so insane as to deny this.

Athenian Stranger/ Assigning, therefore, certain boundaries at present to him, O Clinias and Megillus, who does not believe that there are Gods, let us dismiss him.

Clinias/ What boundaries do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Either that he must teach us we do not speak rightly, in asserting that soul is the first generation of all things, together with such other particulars as are consequent to this; or, if he is incapable of asserting anything better than we have asserted, that he shall be persuaded by us, and live for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are Gods. Let us, therefore, now see whether we have spoken sufficiently or not, in our arguments that there are Gods, to those who deny their existence.

Clinias/ Your arguments, O guest, are very far from being insufficient.

Athenian Stranger/ Let this, then, be the conclusion of our discourse to these. But let us cure, in the following manner, him who believes that there are Gods, but that they take no care of human affairs. —O most excellent man! we shall say, because you think that there are Gods, a certain nature allied to Divinity leads you to honor, and believe in that which is connate with yourself; but the prosperous condition of evil and unjust men, both in private and public, who, though they are not truly happy, yet are considered to be so in the highest degree in the inelegant opinion of the

multitude, and are improperly celebrated as such in poetical, and a variety of other compositions; —this it is which leads you to impiety. Or, perhaps, on seeing impious men leaving behind them, after having arrived at old-age, grandchildren in the greatest honors, you are disturbed: Or from hearing, or perhaps being yourself an eye-witness, of some who, though they have acted in a most impious and dire manner, yet, by means of such actions, have arrived from slender possessions and small power to tyrannies and the greatest wealth. It is evident that, in all such cases as these, you are unwilling to blame the Gods as the causes of them, through your alliance with their nature, but, at the same time, being led by a certain privation of reason, and not being able to be indignant with the Gods, you have arrived at the present condition, so as to believe in their existence, but that they despise and neglect human affairs. That the present dogma, therefore, may not lead you to greater impiety, but that you may be removed further from it, we shall endeavor, to the utmost of our power, to convince you of its fallacy, conjoining the following discourse with the former, which we employed against those who entirely denied the existence of the Gods. But do you, O Megillus and Clinias, take upon you to answer for the young man, as you did before; and if anything difficult should happen to take place in our discourse, I, taking hold of you as I just now did, will pass over the river.

Clinias/ Rightly said. Do you, therefore, act in this manner; and we to the utmost of our power will do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ But, perhaps, it will not be difficult to evince that the Gods pay no less attention to small things than to such as transcend in magnitude. For it was just now asserted by us, that they are good from the possession of every virtue, and that, in consequence of this, a providential

concern for all things is in the highest degree accommodated to their nature.

Clinias/ This was vehemently asserted.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us, therefore, in common investigate that which follows this, —I mean, what the virtue of the Gods is, since we acknowledge that they are good. Do we not then say, that to be temperate, and to possess intellect, are things pertaining to virtue, but the contraries of these to vice?

Clinias/ We do say so.

Athenian Stranger/ But what? Does not fortitude belong to virtue, and timidity to vice?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ And do not we say that some of these are base, and others beautiful?

Clinias/ It is necessary we should.

Athenian Stranger/ And must we not say that such among these as are base belong to us, but that the Gods participate neither anything great, nor anything small, of such-like particulars?

Clinias/ And this also everyone will acknowledge.

Athenian Stranger/ But what? Do we place negligence, indolence, and luxury, as belonging to the virtue of the soul? Or how do you say?

Clinias/ How can we?

Athenian Stranger/ As belonging, therefore, to the contrary?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ The contraries, therefore, to these belong to that which is contrary?

Clinias/ To that which is contrary.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Will not he who possesses these contraries be considered by all of us as luxurious, negligent, and indolent, and, according to the poet, similar to a drone bee, without a sting?

Clinias/ The poet speaks with the utmost rectitude.

Athenian Stranger/ It must not, therefore, be said, that Divinity possesses manners that are odious to him, nor must we permit anyone to make such an assertion.

Clinias/ By no means. For how can it be said?

Athenian Stranger/ But will he to whom it belongs in the most eminent degree to do and take care of anything, will the intellect of such a one take care of great, but neglect small things? And shall we not in every respect err by praising such an assertion? But let us consider as follows: Will not he who acts in this manner, whether he is a God or a man, be influenced by two species of action?

Clinias/ What are those two?

Athenian Stranger/ I will tell you: Either because he thinks the neglect of small things is of no consequence to the whole; or, if he thinks it is of consequence, yet he pays no attention to them, through indolence and luxury. Or is it possible that negligence can take place in any other way? For, when anyone is incapable of taking care of all things, and, in consequence of this, neglects either such as are small, or such as are great, he is not in this case said to be negligent, whether it is a man or a God who is thus destitute of power.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly not.

Athenian Stranger/ But now let those two answer us three, who, though they both of them acknowledge there are Gods, yet one of them considers the divinities as easy to be appeased, but the other as neglecting small affairs. Let us, therefore, thus address these in the first place: You both

acknowledge that the Gods know, see, and hear all things, and that nothing which is either an object of sense or science can be concealed from them. Do you not say that this is the case? Or how do you say?

Clinias/ That this is the case.

Athenian Stranger/ But what? Are they not able to accomplish all things which both mortals and immortals are able to accomplish?

Clinias/ How is it possible they should not acknowledge this?

Athenian Stranger/ We, that are five in number, also agree that the Gods are good and most excellent.

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Must we not, therefore, acknowledge that it is impossible for them ever to act in an indolent and luxurious manner, since they are such as we have granted them to be? For, in us, indolence is the offspring of timidity, but sluggishness, of indolence and luxury.

Clinias/ You speak most true.

Athenian Stranger/ But the Gods cannot be negligent through indolence and sluggishness; for timidity is not present with them.

Clinias/ You speak with the utmost rectitude.

Athenian Stranger/ It remains, therefore, that if they neglect a few things, and such as are small in the universe, they must either do so because they know that things of this nature ought by no means to be taken care of, or because they are ignorant that they ought to be taken care of; for, can there be any other alternative?

Clinias/ None.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether, therefore, O most excellent and best of men, shall we, consider you as saying that the

Gods neglect these in consequence of being ignorant that they ought to be taken care of; or that, like the most depraved of men, they know that this is proper, but are prevented from acting agreeably to their knowledge, through being vanquished by certain pleasures or pains?

Clinias/ But how could this be possible?

Athenian Stranger/ Besides, human affairs participate of an animated nature, and at the same time man is the most religious of all animals.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ We likewise say that all mortal animals are the possessions of the Gods, in the same manner as all heaven.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ Whether, therefore, anyone says, that these things are considered either as small or great by the Gods, it is not proper, since they are the most provident and best of beings, that they should neglect their possessions. But further still, in addition to these things, let us consider this.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Respecting sense and power, whether they are not naturally contrary to each other, with reference to facility and difficulty.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ Small things are seen and heard with greater difficulty than such as are large. But to carry, govern, and take care of a few things, and such as are small, is in every respect more easy than to carry, govern, and take care of the contraries to these.

Clinias/ It is by far more easy.

Athenian Stranger/ But since it is the province of a physician to take care of a certain whole, and he is both willing and able to do this, will this whole ever be in a good condition if he neglects parts, and such things as are small?

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ But neither will things numerous and mighty ever be well conducted either by pilots, or commanders of an army, or certain political characters, or any others similar to these, without an attention to things few and small. For builders say, that great stones cannot be well placed without small ones.

Clinias/ For how can they?

Athenian Stranger/ We ought not, therefore, to think that divinity is more vile than mortal artificers: for these, by how much the more skillful they are, by so much the more accurately and perfectly, from one art, do they accomplish things small and great pertaining to their peculiar works. Since this is the case, can it be supposed that divinity, who is most wise, and who is both willing and able to energize providentially, will alone take care of great things, but by no means of such as are small, which it is easy to take care of, like one indolent, or timid, or sluggish through labor?

Clinias/ We can by no means admit this opinion, O guest, concerning the Gods; for this would be forming a conception neither holy nor true.

Athenian Stranger/ It appears, therefore, to me, that we have now sufficiently spoken to him who accuses the Gods of negligence.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But we have hitherto forced him by our arguments to change his opinion.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ It appears, however, to me that he yet requires so be enchanted by certain words.

Clinias/ What words, O good man?

Athenian Stranger/ We should persuade the young man, that he who takes care of the whole has constituted all things with a view to the safety and virtue of the whole, every part of which, as much as possible, suffers and acts in a manner accommodated to its nature; that over each of these parts rulers are placed, who always cause that which is smallest in every action and passion to receive its ultimate distribution; among which parts, O miserable creature, thou art one, and which, though diminutive in the extreme, continually directs its views to The All. But you are ignorant that every generated nature subsists for the sake of the whole, that the universe may enjoy a blessed life, and not for your sake, but that you subsist for the sake of the universe. For every physician, and every artificial fabricator, effects all things for the sake of the whole, and regards that which is best in common; fashioning a part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of a part. You, however, are indignant, in consequence of not knowing how that which is best with respect to yourself happens both to the universe and yourself, according to the power of common generation. But since a soul which is connected at different times with different bodies undergoes all-various mutations, either through itself, or through some other soul, nothing else remains to be done by the dice-player than to transfer manners when they become better, into a better place, but, when they become worse, into a worse place, according to the proper condition of each, that they may obtain convenient allotments.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ I appear to myself to speak with reference to the facility with which the Gods take care of all things. For if anyone, always looking to the whole, fashions anything, and transforms all things, with a view to this, such as animated water from fire, and not many things from one, or one thing from many, participating of a first, second, or third generation, there will be an infinite multitude of transposed ornaments. But now there is an admirable facility in the power that provides for the universe.

Clinias/ How, again, do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ Thus. Since our king beholds all our actions, and these are animated, containing much virtue and much vice, and since both soul and body are generated indestructible, though not eternal, like the Gods according to law, (for there never would be any generation of animals if either soul or body was destroyed,) and besides, since that which is good in the soul is always naturally disposed to assist, but that which is evil in it to injure, —our king, perceiving all these things, devised in what manner each of the parts should be situated, so that virtue might vanquish in the universe, but vice be subdued, in the most eminent degree, and in the best and most facile manner. He devised, therefore, how each particular should be generated with reference to the universe, what seat it should reside in, and what places it should be allotted: but he left to our will the causes of this or that generation. For where the desire of any soul is, and such as is its condition, there each of us nearly resides, and such for the most part each of us subsists.

Clinias/ It is likely.

Athenian Stranger/ Everything, therefore, that participates of soul is changed, and possesses in itself the cause of this mutation; but, when changed, it is borne along according to the order and law of fate. And those souls whose

manners are less changed, have a less extended progression; for they proceed no further than the superficies of the region. But those whose manners are more changed, and are more unjust, fall into depth, and into the places beneath, which are denominated Hades, and the like, where they are vehemently terrified, and conversant with dreams, both living and when freed from body, A greater soul, however, when it participates either of virtue or vice, becoming in this case strong, through its own will, and converse with other natures, if, mingling with divine virtue, it becomes eminently divine, then it is translated into another better place, which is entirely holy: but if it mingles itself with the contrary to divine virtue, then its life is transferred into a contrary place. This then, O boy and young man, who think that you are neglected by the Gods, is the judgment of the Olympian divinities; —that he who is more depraved shall depart to more depraved souls, but he who is better, to such as are better, both in life, and in all deaths, and that he shall both suffer and do such things as ought to be done by similars to similars. But neither you nor any other should pray that you may be exempt from this judgment of the Gods. For those who ordained this established it more firmly than all judgments, and as that which ought to be venerated in every respect. Indeed, you will never be neglected by this judgment; not though you were so small, that you could descend into the profundities of the earth, or so elevated, that you could fly into heaven. But you will suffer from these divinities the punishment which is your due, whether you abide here, or depart to Hades, or whether you are removed to a place still more rustic than these. My discourse to you, likewise, will be the same respecting those impious men whom you have seen rising into consequence from small beginnings, and whom you have considered as having passed from felicity to misery. For it has appeared to you

that, in the actions of these, as in a mirror, the negligence of all the Gods was visible; and this, from your being ignorant in what manner the end of such characters contributes to the good of the whole. But can you think, O most courageous of all men, that it is not necessary to know this, which he who is ignorant of, will neither be able to perceive, nor discourse about, the felicity of life, and an unhappy fortune. If, therefore, Clinias, and the whole of this aged company, are able to persuade you that you do not know what you say respecting the Gods, divinity will assist you in a beautiful manner; but if you still require some further reason, hear, if in any respect you possess intellect, what we shall say to our third antagonist. For, that there are Gods, and that they take care of men, I should say, has been not altogether badly demonstrated. But that the Gods can be moved by the gifts of certain unjust men, must not be granted to anyone, but confuted in every possible way to the utmost of our power.

Clinias/ You speak most beautifully; and we shall do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Come, then, by the Gods themselves, if they are moved by gifts, in what manner are they moved; and what kind of beings must they in this case be? For it is necessary that they must possess sovereign authority who continually govern all heaven.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But to what rulers are they similar, or what rulers are similar to them, that we may be able to compare small things with great? Whether will the charioteers of two-yoked cars that contend in the course be such as these, or the pilots of ships? Perhaps, however, they may be assimilated to certain commanders of armies, or to physicians, who are cautious respecting the war of diseases about bodies, or to husbandmen, who fear for their plants

during the stormy seasons, or to shepherds and herdsmen. For, since we have granted that the universe is full of much good, and much evil, though not of more evil than good, we say that a thing of this kind is an immortal war, and requires an admirable defense. But the Gods, and, at the same time, dæmons, fight for us; and we are the possession both of Gods and dæmons. Injustice and insolence, however, together with imprudence, corrupt us. And, on the contrary, justice and temperance, in conjunction with prudence, which reside in the animated powers of the Gods, preserve us. But that something of these resides in us, though for a short time, may be clearly seen from this; for certain souls residing on the earth, and possessing an unjust gift, are evidently savage towards the souls of guardians, whether they are dogs, or shepherds, or in every respect the highest of all rulers. These they attack, persuading them by flattering words and specious enchantments, (according to the rumors of the wicked,) that it is lawful for them to usurp an unjust authority among men, without any disagreeable consequences to themselves. This fault, which we denominate, prerogative, is called, in fleshly bodies, disease; in the seasons of the year, pestilence; and in cities and polities, by changing the word, injustice.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ According to this reasoning, therefore, it is necessary to say, that he who asserts that the Gods always pardon unjust men, when a part of their unjust acquisitions is offered to them, asserts at the same time that they are like dogs, to whom wolves give a small portion of their rapine, and who, becoming mild by gifts, permit them to plunder the herds. Is not this the assertion of those who consider the Gods as easily appeased?

Clinias/ It is.

Athenian Stranger/ But will not he be the most ridiculous of all men, who assimilates the Gods to any of the above-mentioned guardians? Shall we say, therefore, that they resemble pilots, who giving themselves up to the libation of wine, and the odor of flesh, destroy both the ships and the sailors?

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ But neither do they resemble charioteers, who, when orderly arranged in the course, through being corrupted by gifts, yield the victory to the two-yoked cars of their opponents.

Clinias/ For such an assertion produces a dire image.

Athenian Stranger/ But neither do they resemble the commanders of an army, nor physicians, nor husbandmen, nor shepherds, nor certain dogs seduced by wolves.

Clinias/ Prophesy better things. For how is it possible they can resemble any of these?

Athenian Stranger/ But are not all the Gods the greatest of all guardians, and guardians of the greatest affairs?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ Shall we say, then, that those who are the guardians of the most beautiful things, and who, as guardians, are transcendent in virtue, are worse than dogs, and men of a moderate character, who never betray justice by receiving in an unholy manner gifts from unjust men?

Clinias/ By no means; for such an assertion is not to be borne. And he who entertains such an opinion may most justly be considered as the worst and most impious of men.

Athenian Stranger/ We may say, then, that we have sufficiently demonstrated the three things which we proposed to evince, viz. that there are Gods; that they take

care of all things; and that they are not in any respect to be moved by gifts, contrary to what is just.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly; and we assent to these reasons.

Athenian Stranger/ And besides this, in a certain respect we have spoken more vehemently, through the contention of vicious men. But, O friend Clinias, we have employed a discourse of a contentious nature, left our adversaries, thinking that they had vanquished, should imagine they had a license to do whatever they pleased, conformably to their conceptions respecting the Gods. Through an earnest desire of preventing this, we have spoken in a more novel manner. But if, during this short time, we have offered anything calculated to persuade these men that they should hate themselves, and embrace contrary manners, the exordium of our laws respecting impiety will have been beautifully delivered.

Clinias/ Let us hope that this will be the case; but if it should not, the legislator is not to be accused for this kind of discourse.

Athenian Stranger/ After the preface, therefore, the discourse which is the interpreter of the laws will properly follow, proclaiming to all impious persons, that they must depart from their depraved manners, and betake themselves to such as are pious. But for those who will not be persuaded by these arguments, let the following law of impiety be established: —If anyone speaks or acts impiously, let anyone who is present defend the cause of piety, and give information to the magistrates of the affair: and those magistrates that are first made acquainted with it, shall bring the offender before the court of justice appointed by law for the determination of such cases. But if any magistrate, on hearing the affair, does not act in this manner, let him be accused of impiety by anyone who is

willing to punish him, for the sake of the laws. And if anyone is condemned, let the court of justice punish him for the several impieties he has committed. Let bonds, then, be the punishment of all impious conduct. And let there be three prisons in the city: one common for most crimes about the forum, for the sake of securing a multitude of persons; another situated about the place where a nocturnal assembly is held, and which is to be denominated the prison for the correction of manners; and a third in the middle of the region, and in that part which is most solitary and rustic, calling it by the name of the prison of punishment. With respect to impiety, there are three causes of it, as we have already mentioned; and since two things take place from each of such-like causes, there will be six genera of crimes against the Gods, which require neither an equal nor a similar punishment. For some, who though they do not in any respect believe there are Gods, yet, from naturally possessing a just disposition, hate the vicious, and, through being indignant with injustice, neither commit unjust actions themselves, nor associate with, but avoid, unjust men, and love the just. But others, besides the opinion that all things are destitute of the Gods, fall into incontinence of pleasures and pains, at the same time possessing strong memories and acuteness with respect to disciplines. The opinion that there are no Gods, is a passion common to both these; but they differ in this, that the one is the cause of less, and the other of more, evil than other men. The one of these speaks with the greatest freedom concerning the Gods, sacrifices and oaths; and, as he ridicules others, will perhaps render others like himself, unless he is punished. But the other who is of the same opinion, is considered by the vulgar as ingenious, and is full of fraud and stratagem. From these characters many diviners are produced, and such as are excited to every kind of incantation. Sometimes,

too, from these tyrants, public speakers, and commanders of armies, are formed; and those who in their private mysteries act insidiously, and deceive men by sophistical devices. Of these, indeed, there are many species; but two of them deserve the establishment of laws: of which the ironic produces crimes that deserve more than one or two deaths; but the other requires admonition and bonds. In a similar manner, too, the opinion that the Gods are negligent, produces two characters; and the opinion that they are easily appeased, another two. Since, therefore, the impious are thus distinguished, those who become such through folly, without a vicious disposition and corrupt manners, the judge shall confine in the prison for correction, for not less than five years. But, during this time, let no one of the citizens converse with them, except those that participate of the nocturnal assembly, who associate for the purpose of admonishing and procuring safety to the soul. When the period arrives that they are to be liberated from their bonds, if anyone among them shall appear to be more modest in his manners, let him dwell together with the modest; but if it appears that he is not, and he is again condemned for the same crime, let him be punished with death. With respect to such as, in addition to their believing that there are no Gods, or that they are negligent, or easily appeased, are of a savage disposition, despising mankind, alluring the souls of many while living, and asserting that they can allure the souls of the dead; likewise, pretending that they can persuade the Gods by sacrifices, prayers, and incantations, and endeavoring by these means to destroy private persons, whole families, and cities, for the sake of their riches, — among such as these, whoever shall be condemned, let him be fettered in the prison which is in the middle of the region, and let no free-born person be ever allowed to visit him, but let the food appointed for him by the guardians of the laws

be brought to him by servants. But, when he dies, let him be hurled beyond the boundaries of the region, and left without a tomb. And, if any free-born person shall bury him, let him sustain the punishment of impiety by anyone who is willing to inflict it. If he leaves behind him children sufficient for the purposes of the city, let the guardians of orphans take no less care of these than of others, and from the very day on which their father was condemned. But it is proper that a common law should be established for all these, which may cause the multitude to behave less impiously towards the Gods, both in word and deed, and may render them less void of intellect, through not permitting them to make innovations in sacred concerns. Let the following law, then, be simply established for all of them: —No one shall have a temple in any private house. But when anyone intends to sacrifice, let him go to public buildings raised for this purpose, and present his offerings to those priests and priestesses who take care of these particulars in a pure and holy manner. Here let him pray, together with these, and any other who is willing to join him in prayer. Let these things be adopted, because it is not easy to establish temples and statues of the Gods; but to effect a thing of this kind properly, is the work of a mighty dianoëtic power. But it is usual, with women particularly, and all such as are imbecile, or in danger, or want, or, on the contrary, when they receive an abundance of anything, always to consecrate that which is present, vow sacrifices, and promise statues to the Gods, dæmons, and the sons of the Gods; being terrified by specters when awake, and, in a similar manner, recollecting many visions in dreams; for all which they endeavor to obtain remedies, and for this purpose fill all the pure places in houses and streets with altars and temples. For the sake of all these particulars, it is requisite that the law we have just mentioned should be established; and besides this, for

the sake of the impious, lest they, fraudulently usurping these in their actions, and raising temples and altars in private houses, should think to make the Gods propitious by sacrifices and prayers; thus infinitely increasing their injustice, and provoking the indignation of the Gods, both against themselves, and those that permitted them to act in this manner, though men of a better character. For by this means the whole city becomes subject to the punishment of impiety, and, in a certain respect, justly. Divinity, indeed, does not blame the legislator; for the law established by him says, that no one shall possess temples of the Gods in private houses. But if it shall appear that anyone possesses temples, and performs orgies in any other places than such as are public, he who detects him shall announce the affair to the guardians of the laws. And if such a one, whether a man or a woman, shall be found not to have committed any great or impious crimes, he man be obliged to carry his private sacred concerns to public temples: and if he does not immediately comply with the law, let him be fined till he does. But, if anyone acting impiously shall appear to have committed, not the impious deed of boys, but of impious men, whether by sacrificing to the Gods in private or in public temples, let him be condemned to death, as one who has sacrificed impurely. However, the guardians of the laws must judge whether his impiety is puerile or not, and thus, when he is brought before a court of justice, must inflict on him the punishment of impiety.

THE END OF THE TENTH BOOK.

Book 11.

Athenian Stranger/ It now remains that we should speak of mutual compacts, and the order which they ought to receive. But a thing of this kind is, in a certain respect, simple. I mean, that no one shall touch my property, nor move the least thing belonging to me, without my consent. And I, if I am endued with a sound mind, shall act in the same manner with respect to the property of others. In the first place, then, we shall speak about such treasures, as someone may deposit both for himself and those belonging to him, who is not descended from my parents, and which I should never pray that I might find, nor, if I did find, should move, nor be induced to partake of, by those who are called diviners. For I should never be so much benefited by the possession of riches, when obtained after this manner, as I should excel in the virtue of the soul, and in justice, by not receiving them. For thus I should acquire one possession instead of another, a better in that which is better; preferring the prior possession of justice in the soul, to wealth. For it is well said of many particulars, that things immovable should not be moved; and it may be said of this, as being one of them. It is likewise proper to be persuaded by what is commonly asserted about these things, that such particulars do not contribute to the procreation of children. But he who takes no care of children, and neglects the legislator, and, therefore, takes away that which neither he nor his grandfather deposited, such a one corrupts the most beautiful and simple law, which was established by a man by no means ignoble, and which says, You shall not take away that which you have not deposited. What then ought he to suffer, who despises these two legislators, and who takes away that which he did not himself deposit, and which is not a small affair, but a mighty treasure? Divinity, indeed, knows what punishment he ought to suffer from the Gods.

But let us declare what he ought to suffer from men. Let him who first perceives him, give information of the affair: —if it happens in the city, to the ædiles; if in the forum, to the præfects of the markets; and, if in any other part of the region, to those that take care of the land, and the governors of these. When the affair becomes apparent, let the city send to Delphi, and let what the God determines, both respecting the money and him that has moved it, be performed by the city conformable to the oracle. And if he who gives the information is free-born, let him be considered as a virtuous character; but, if he does not give information, as a vicious character. If he who reveals the affair is a slave, it will be proper that he should be made free by the city, and that the city should pay his master the price of his manumission; but, if he does not reveal it, let him be punished with death. Let a similar law follow this, respecting things small and great. If a man leaves any property, whether willingly or unwillingly, let him who may happen to meet with it suffer it to remain; considering that the dæmon who presides over roads defends things of this kind, which are dedicated to Divinity by law. When anyone, being unpersuaded by this law, takes away such properly to his own house, if he is but of little worth, being a slave, let him receive many lashes with a whip, from anyone not less than thirty years of age who may happen to meet him. But, if he is free-born, besides being considered as illiberal, and void of law, let him pay as a fine ten times the worth of what he took away to its proper owner. When anyone accuses another of holding his property, whether it be much or little, and the person who detains it acknowledges that it is in his possession, but denies that it is his who demands it, —if a written account of the affair is given to the magistrates according to law, he who detains it shall be called before a magistrate, and if it shall appear to be the property of the accuser, it shall be

restored to him. But if it shall be found to belong to neither, but to some absent person, if its possessor will not engage to restore it to the absent person, let him be compelled to deposit it. If a written account of the affair is not given to the magistrates, let the property be deposited with the three oldest magistrates till sentence is passed. And, if the subject of dispute is an animal, let him who upon trial is cast, pay the magistrates the expense of its keeping; but let the affair be decided by the magistrates within the space of three days. If anyone leads away another as a slave, who is going to be manumitted, let him who leads him be dismissed; but he who is thus led away, if he can procure three respectable bondsmen, shall be considered as free; but otherwise not. But if anyone is led away in any other manner, let him by whom he is thus led be obnoxious to the charge of using violence, and be condemned to restore double the loss to the person led away. Everyone, too, may be permitted to lead away his free-man, if he is not served by him, or not sufficiently. The attention, however, which such a one ought to pay his master consists, in the first place, in going thrice every month to his master's house, and announcing that he is prepared to do whatever is just, and in his power; and, in the second place, that he may perform, with respect to matrimony, whatever shall appear requisite to his master. But it shall not be lawful for him to possess greater wealth than the person by whom he was liberated: but, if he does possess more, let the excess be given to his master. Let a freed person not remain in the city more than twenty years, but, in the same manner as strangers, let him after this period depart, taking with him the whole of his property, unless he can persuade the magistrates and his liberator to the contrary. But if the possessions of a freed person, or of any other stranger, exceed those of the third state, let him, on the thirtieth day after this has been discovered to be the

case, take his property and depart; and let him not, though he should request it, be permitted by the magistrates to stay any longer. Let him who disobeys this law be brought before a court of justice; when condemned, be punished with death; and let his riches become public property. Let the judges of the tribes take cognizance of these cases, unless the litigants have previously settled the affair among themselves by means of their neighbors or arbitrators. If anyone asserts that a certain animal, or anything else, is his own property, let him who possesses it take it either to the seller, or to him who properly and justly gave it, or who after some other manner delivered it of his own authority. And let it remain with a citizen, or an inhabitant of the city, for thirty days, but with a stranger for five months, so that the middle of these may be that month in which the sun is turned from the summer to the winter tropic. Let whatever one person changes with another through buying or selling, be exchanged in a place appointed for each in the forum, and let everything pertaining to buying and selling be transacted in this place, and nowhere else. Likewise, let there be no delay either in buying or selling. But, if the commutation is made in other places, let no judgment according to law be passed upon it. With respect to feasts, in which every man pays his own share, if any difference should arise in settling the payment of the shares, let the parties so transact with each other as about a thing which is not noticed by the courts of justice. Let a seller, who receives no less than fifty drachms as the price of his commodity, be obliged to wait ten days in, the city, and let the buyer know the place of his abode; and this for the sake of those complaints and legitimate abatements which usually happen about things of this kind. But let lawful and unlawful abatements take place as follows: When anyone sells a slave who labors under a consumption, or the stone, or the strangury, or that which

is called the sacred disease, or any other disease which is immanifest to many, is of long, continuance and difficult to cure, whether of the body or mind, if a physician or a master of gymnastic buys him, no abatement shall be made; nor yet when the seller informs the buyer of the true condition of the article of sale. But if an artist sells to an ignorant person anything of this kind, the buyer shall be permitted to return the person bought by him, who labors under any disease but the sacred, within six months: but if he labors under this disease, he shall be permitted to return him within a year. Affairs of this kind shall be decided by physicians chosen by the common consent of the litigants. He who in these cases is condemned, shall pay to the buyer double the price for which he sold him. But if one ignorant person sells anything to another, let the return and judgment be made in the same manner as was mentioned above; and let him who is condemned pay a simple fine. If anyone sells a homicide to another, if the transaction takes place between two skillful persons, let no return be made; but if between a skillful and ignorant person, let a return then be made when the buyer perceives the case. But let the affair be decided by the five youngest guardians of the laws. If it shall appear that the seller was not ignorant that the person he sold was a homicide, let the house of the buyer be purified according to the law of the interpreters, and let the seller pay him triple the price of the homicide. Let him who changes money for money, or for animals, or anything else, give and receive everything unadulterated, agreeably to the injunctions of law. About the whole of this vice, however, it is requisite to lay down a preface, in the same manner as in other laws. Every man, indeed, ought to consider adulteration, lying, and deception, as forming one genus, about which it is usual for the multitude to say, though very erroneously, that when each of these is opportunely adopted, the result is frequently

proper. But as they leave the occasion, the where, and the when, disorderly and indefinitely, they often by this assertion both injure themselves and others. The legislator, however, should not suffer this indefinite to be unnoticed, but greater or lesser boundaries ought always to be clearly determined. Let them, therefore, now be determined. Let no one tell a lie, or deceive, or adulterate anything, calling at the same time on the Gods, unless he is desirous of becoming odious to Divinity. This, however, will be the case with him, in the first place, who, swearing falsely, despises the Gods; and, in the second place, with him who speaks falsely before those that are better than himself. But the good are more excellent than the bad, and, in short, the elder than the younger. On this account, parents are better than their offspring, men than women and children, and governors than the governed. All these ought to be reverenced in every government, and especially in political governments, for the sake of which we have engaged in the present discussion. For he who adulterates anything in the forum, lies and deceives, and, calling on the Gods, swears falsely before the guardians of the forum, and violates their laws, neither fearing men, nor reverencing the Gods. To be careful, indeed, not to contaminate the names of the Gods, is in every respect beautiful; for they ought not to be used in common like other names, but everything pertaining to the Gods should be preserved in a pure and holy manner. Let the following law, therefore, be established for those who will not be persuaded to act in this manner: —He who sells anything in the forum shall not be suffered to fix two prices to any article; but when he has fixed a simple price, if he does not sell it, he shall take it away, and be allowed to bring it back again on the same day, without valuing it at a higher price than before. Let praise, and taking an oath, never be employed in selling. And if anyone is disobedient to this law,

any citizen, not less than thirty years of age, who detects him in swearing, shall strike him with impunity; and if he neglects to do this, let him be considered as a betrayer of the laws. But let him who detects anyone selling an adulterated article, and incapable of being persuaded by what we have now said, expose the fraud of such a one, if he is able, before a magistrate; and let a slave, or an inhabitant, bring with him the adulterated article. Let a citizen, who neglects to accuse such a one, be pronounced a bad man, as one who defrauds the Gods: but, if he accuses him, let him dedicate the adulterated article to the Gods who preside over the forum. Let him who openly sells things of this kind, besides being deprived of the adulterated article, receive publicly as many lashes with a whip as there are drachms in the sum for which he sold the article; a crier at the same time proclaiming in the forum the cause of his being whipped. Let the præfects of the markets, and the guardians of the laws, endeavor to detect all the adulterations and evil practices of the sellers, by making inquiry of men skilled in vendible articles, and cause to be written on a pillar before the forum what a seller ought to do, and what not, so that men of this kind may clearly know how to act according to law in disposing of their respective articles. As to the particulars relating to the ædiles, we have spoken of these sufficiently above. But if it should appear that anything is wanting to these, let them supply the deficiency by communicating with the guardians of the laws, and afterwards let them write their first and second legal institutions on a pillar.

After adulteration it follows that we should speak of cauponation. But about the whole of this we shall first of all give our advice, and the reasons for such advice, and afterwards establish a law respecting it. For all cauponation in a city does not subsist for the sake of injuring the city, but naturally for the sake of the contrary. For how is it

possible that he should not benefit the city who causes money, from being possessed in an incommensurate and anomalous manner, to be possessed equably, and with commensuration? It is requisite to say, that the power of money, the merchant, the mercenary character, and the inn-keeper, will accomplish this for us. For these, and others of this kind, whether they act in a more becoming or a more base manner, endeavor to supply the indigence of others, and render possessions equal. But let us consider the reason why this appears neither beautiful nor becoming, and why it is calumniated; that though we may not procure a remedy for the whole by law, yet we may for a part.

Clinias/ This affair, as it appears, is of no trifling nature, and requires no small degree of virtue.

Athenian Stranger/ How do you say, O friend Clinias? A small part of mankind naturally, and who are educated in the best manner, are able, when they are in want, or influenced by the desire of certain things, to conduct themselves with moderation, and, when they have it in their power to acquire great wealth, behave soberly, and prefer moderation to excess. But the vulgar conduct themselves in a manner perfectly contrary to these. For they desire without measure; and when it is permitted them to become moderately, they choose to become immensely rich. On this account, all such as are conversant with cauponation and merchandize are calumniated, and subject to shameful disgrace. For, if anyone (which never did take place, nor ever will) should compel (though indeed it is ridiculous to mention it) the best of men to keep an inn for a certain time, or victualling-house, or do anything of this kind; or if certain most excellent women, through the necessity of fate, should engage in such employments we should know that they were honest and laudable, and that, when they are conducted according to uncorrupt reason, all such characters as these

should be honored as sustaining the part of mothers and nurses. But now, since inns and victualling-houses are raised in solitary places, and at a great distance from cities, they serve as places of shelter for those that are caught in a storm, and afford a cool retreat to those that are oppressed with heat. They do not, however, dismiss those that take refuge in them like friends, with hospitable gifts, but cruelly compel them to ransom themselves, as if they were enemies and captives, and plunder them of all their possessions. These, and other base actions of this kind, subject those employments to calumny which are calculated to assist the indigent. A legislator, therefore, ought always to devise a remedy for these. For it is a true and ancient saying, that it is difficult to fight against two things, as is evident in diseases, and many other particulars. And in the present case, indeed, there is an opposition against two things, poverty and riches; the latter of which corrupt the soul of men through luxury, and the former leads them through pain to impudence. What remedy, therefore, can be devised for this disease in a polity endued with intellect? In the first place, we must endeavor to the utmost, that it may use cauponation in the smallest degree; and, in the next place, we must assign cauponation to those men whose manners, when corrupt, will be no great pest to the city; and, in the third place, some method must be devised by which the souls of these men may not easily be filled with impudence and illiberality. But, after what has now been said, a certain law respecting these things presents itself to us, with good fortune. The city of the Magnesians, which Divinity first raised, is by Divinity again inhabited. Among these there is a law, that no husbandmen who belong to the forty-five thousand houses shall either voluntarily or involuntarily be an inn-keeper or a merchant, or act in the capacity of a servant to any private person, unless that person becomes

in his turn a servant to him; a father and mother, with their progenitors, all his elders, and such as being free live in an independent manner, being excepted. It is not, however, easy to determine by law who is free, or the contrary; yet such as these are distinguished from the nobles by the hatred and love which they bear towards them. But let him who through a certain art is engaged in illiberal cauponation be accused before those who hold the first rank in virtue, by anyone that is willing, as a disgrace to his family. And if it shall appear that he has defiled his paternal house by any unworthy employment, let him, after having been fettered for a year, abstain from such employment. If, after this, he engages in it again, let him be fettered for two years. And let him always be confined in bonds as often as he is detected, twice as long as the preceding time. But a second law orders that all such as are not citizens, together with foreigners, shall exercise cauponation. And a third law ordains, that the foreigner or inhabitant who engages in this art, shall either be a most excellent character, or vicious in the smallest degree. It is proper, likewise, that the guardians of the law should consider that they are not only guardians of those who are easily prevented from acting in an illegal and vicious manner, viz. those who are well-born and educated; but that they are much more guardians of those who are different from these, and who engage in employments by which they are strongly impelled to improbity. Since, however, cauponation is abundantly various, the guardians of the laws should assemble together with those that are skilled in the several species of it; and, as we observed a little before concerning adulteration, which is allied to this art, they should, in the first place, establish such things as appear necessary to the city. Afterwards, having inquired into the cost and emolument attending this art, they should attend to the moderate gain resulting from it, and establish its

expenses and emoluments. And some particulars should be attended to by the præfects of the markets, others by the ædiles, and others by the præfects of the land. After this manner nearly will cauponation be advantageous to everyone, and injure those by whom it is exercised in the city in the smallest degree. The genus of artificers is sacred to Vulcan and Minerva, who furnish our lives by their arts. But those individuals are sacred to Mars and Minerva who preserve the works of artificers by other arts of an assistant and defensive nature. The genus of these is, indeed, justly sacred to these Gods: and all these providentially take care of the region and people. Some of them, too, preside over warlike contests; but others effect the generation of instruments, and works for hire. Reverencing, therefore, the Gods that are the authors of these arts, it will not be proper to deceive them, by lying about things of this kind. If any artificer does not complete his work in a prefixed time, through a vicious disposition, but, paying no reverence to the divinity who is the giver of life, through a blindness of intellect, thinks that his kindred God will pardon him, such a one, in the first place, will be punished by the God himself; and, in the second place, let it be established by law, that he shall be fined the worth of the work which he has not finished in the proper time, and that, beginning again, he shall complete it in the time first agreed upon. Let the same law too consult for the artificer as for the seller of vendible articles. Let care be taken, therefore, that he does not ask more than the worth of his work, but let his demand be most simple, and accommodated to its worth. For an artist knows the worth of his work. In cities, therefore, consisting of free men, it is not proper that an artist should endeavor to deceive the simple by art, which is naturally clear and void of falsehood. Hence, when this is the case, the injurer shall make a proper recompense to the injured person. If anyone,

in paying an artist for his work, does, not pay him according to the agreement, despising Zeus the guardian of the city, and Minerva who communicates with the polity, and, being influenced by a little gain, dissolves mighty communions; in this case, let the law assist the union of the city, in conjunction with the Gods. Let him, therefore, who, having ordered a work to be executed for him, does not pay for it in the appointed time, be fined double the price agreed upon. And let judgment be passed on things of this kind in the courts of justice belonging to the tribes. As we have, however, made mention of artificers, and as commanders of armies and military arts are artificers of safety to a city, it is but just that we should also speak of these. If, therefore, anyone of these undertakes any public work, whether voluntarily or from command, and executes it in a becoming manner, let the law confer upon him the honor of unceasing praise, which is the reward of warlike men. But the law may be justly blamed which does not reward him who conducts himself well in military affairs. Let the following law, therefore, be established for these, mingled with praise, and which does not compel, but consults the multitude of the citizens: that such good men shall be honored in the second place, as have been saviors of the whole city, whether by their velour, or by warlike devices; for the first honor must be given to those who have been remarkably obedient to the written laws of good legislators. We have, therefore, now nearly spoken sufficiently of the greatest compacts among men, except those pertaining to orphans, and the guardians of orphans. It is, therefore, necessary in the next place to speak of these. The beginning of all these is the desire of the testator, and the fortune of those that make no will. I have said it is necessary to speak of these, O Clinias, in consequence of looking to the difficulty respecting them: For it is not possible to leave them in a disordered manner. For

testators would desire many things differing from each other, and contrary to the laws, to the manners of the living, and to their ancestors, if anyone should simply give them permission to make their wills in whatever manner they pleased, and should ordain, that every will made near the end of life shall be properly executed. For most men, when they consider themselves as about to die, are affected with stupidity and remissness.

Clinias/ What induces you to say this, O guest?

Athenian Stranger/ A man when about to die, O Clinias, is morose, and is full of such language as is terrible to legislators, and difficult for them to endure.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Desiring to be the lord of all things, it is usual for him to speak with anger.

Clinias/ What does he say at this time?

Athenian Stranger/ It is a dire thing, says he, O Gods, if it is not permitted me to leave my property in whatever manner I please, and to bequeath some more, and others less, according as they were evidently well or ill affected towards me in my diseases, in my old-age, and in other all-various fortunes.

Clinias/ Does he not therefore, O guest, appear to you to speak well?

Athenian Stranger/ Ancient legislators, O Clinias, appear to me to have been effeminate, and to have looked to a trifling part of human affairs in the establishment of laws.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ That, being terrified at this language of the dying man, they made a law, that everyone should be permitted to make his will as he pleased. But both you and

I could answer the dying in your city in a more elegant manner.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ O friends, (we should say) who have but a short time to live, it is difficult for you to know your affairs, and likewise to know yourselves, according to the inscription of the Delphic temple. I, therefore, being a legislator, consider that neither yourselves, nor these possessions, are your own, but that they belong to the whole of your race, both past and to come, and that both the whole of your race and possessions, by a much greater priority, belong to the city. This being the case, if anyone, through flattery, either when you are diseased, or in your old-age, should persuade you to make your will in an improper manner, I should not admit such a will to be voluntarily made. But, looking to that which is best both for the whole city, and the whole of your race, I shall establish laws in such a manner as that the advantage of individuals may give way, as it is fit it should, to that of the public. Do you, therefore, be mild and benevolent towards us, as human nature requires you should. It will be our part to take care to the utmost of our power of everything belonging to you, and not in a partial manner, by neglecting some things and attending to others. Let this then, O Clinias, be the consolation which we address in a prefatory manner to the living and the dead. But let the law be as follows: —Let him who makes a will, and has children, in the first place appoint that child his heir whom he thinks most deserving. And, in the next place, let him signify which of his children he chooses to consign over to the care of another person. If anyone of his children shall remain without an hereditary portion, and there is reason to expect that this child will be sent into a colony according to law, let the father be permitted to leave him from his other possessions as much

as he pleases, except the paternal allotment, and everything pertaining to it. But if there are many children thus circumstanced, let the father bequeath them, as he pleases, whatever remains beyond the allotment. However, if anyone of these possesses a house, let him not leave such a one any money. In like manner, let him not bequeath a daughter anything if she is betrothed to a man; but let him bequeath her something if she is not betrothed. If any allotment in the region belonging to sons or daughters shall be found after the will has been made, let it be left to the heir of the person that made the will. If the testator has no sons, but daughters, let him signify in writing what men he would wish as husbands for his daughters, and as sons for himself. And if the son of anyone, whether natural or adopted, happens to die before he has arrived at manhood, let the testator mention this circumstance in the will, and signify who he wishes should be his son in his stead, with more auspicious fortune. If anyone who has no children makes a will, let him be permitted to leave the tenth part of his possessions, beyond the allotment, to anyone that he pleases. Let him bequeath all the rest benignantly, without blame, and according to law, to the son whom he adopts. If the children of any dying person require tutors, and the father in his will has mentioned those whom he wishes to undertake this office, let such persons enter on this employment according to his wish, if it is agreeable to them. But, if such a one has either died intestate, or has not mentioned the tutors in his will, let the next of kin undertake this office, —two on the father's side, two on that of the mother, and one from among the friends of the deceased. In this case, too, let the guardians of the law appoint the tutors. And let the whole care pertaining to orphans devolve on fifteen of the guardians of the laws that are older than the rest. And this number being divided into three parts, let three of them

every year undertake this office, till the five periods are accomplished in a circle. Let the greatest care likewise be taken that this mode may never fail. If anyone dies intestate, and leaves behind him children that require a guardian, let them be provided for by the same laws. But if anyone dies unexpectedly, and leaves behind him daughters, let him pardon the legislator if he disposes of his daughters in consequence of looking to two things, viz. proximity of race, and the preservation of the allotment. The third thing which a father ought to attend to is, the choosing a proper son for himself, and a husband for his daughter: but this be omits, because the consideration of it belongs to impossibilities. Let the following law, therefore, be established about things of this kind: —If anyone, dying intestate, leaves behind him daughters, let the brother on the father's or mother's side, if he is without an allotment, take care both of the daughter and the allotment of the deceased. But, if his brother is not living, let his brother's son undertake this office, if his age is sufficient for the purpose. If no one of these survives, let the charge devolve on the son of his sister; and let the fourth after these be his father's brother, the fifth, the son of this brother; and the sixth, the son of his father's sister. Let a similar process be always adopted when a man leaves behind him daughters, viz. through brothers and cousins; first, the males, and afterwards the females, in the same family. But let the judge determine the fitness or unfitness of the time of marriages, by looking at the males naked, and at the females naked, as far as to the navel. If there is a want of kindred, as far as to the sons of brothers and grandfathers, whatever citizen the girl shall choose, with the consent of her tutors, shall become the heir of the deceased, and the husband of his daughter. Further still, if there should happen to be but few inhabitants in the city, and the virgin should wish to make someone who is sent into a

colony her father's heir, let this person, if he belongs to her family, proceed to the allotment according to the order of law. But if he is a citizen, but not related to her, let him marry her if he pleases, according to her own choice, and that of her guardians; and, returning home, let him take possession of the hereditary estate. If anyone dies intestate, and without children, either of the male or female sex, let other particulars take place according to the above-mentioned law, but let the males and females of the family enter as kindred the desolate house, as those to whom the allotment properly belongs. In the first place, let the sister enter; afterwards the daughter of the brother; in the third place, the daughter of the sister; in the fourth place, the sister of the father; in the fifth place, the daughter of the father's brother; and, in the sixth place, the daughter of the father's sister. Let these live together with those according to proximity and what is right, in the manner we have established above. But let not the weighty nature of laws of this kind escape us, and let us not be insensible to the difficulty of ordering a relation of a deceased person to marry a relation. For he who introduces such a law as this, does not appear to consider that ten thousand impediments may arise respecting mandates of this kind, so as to render persuasion to a compliance with them ineffectual. For many had rather suffer anything than marry a person whose body is either diseased or maimed, and whose dianoëtic part is not in a sound state. The legislator, therefore, will, perhaps, appear to some, though improperly, to pay no attention to these. Let this, then, be as it were a common preface, both for the legislator, and those that are governed by his laws. Those, indeed, for whom laws are made, ought to pardon the legislator, because, while he is taking care of public concerns, he cannot at the same time attend to private calamities. We should also pardon those for whom laws are

made, if they are sometimes incapable of perfectly complying with the mandates of the legislator, through his ignorance of private calamities.

Clinias/ In what manner then, O guest, will it be most proper to act in this case?

Athenian Stranger/ Arbiters, O Clinias, must necessarily be chosen for laws of this kind, and for those that are governed by them.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ It will sometimes happen, that a rich young man given to luxury will be unwilling to marry the daughter of his father's brother, though rich, in consequence of aspiring after a greater marriage; and sometimes he will necessarily be unwilling to comply with the law which forces him to marry a girl who is disordered either in body or mind, considering this as the greatest of all calamities. Let, therefore, the following law respecting these particulars be established by us: —If any accuse the established laws on account of wills or marriages, or anything else, asserting that the legislator, if he were living, would not compel them to act in such a manner, or to marry such a person; and if any relation or tutor should affirm that the legislator left fifteen guardians of the laws as arbiters and fathers of the orphans, —in this case, let the litigants apply to these, and abide by their decision. But, if it shall appear that the guardians of the law exercise greater authority than they ought, let the affair be brought before select judges; and, when determined, let him who is condemned be branded with infamy, —this being a punishment, to him who possesses intellect, of a more weighty nature than a very considerable fine. After this, a second generation, as it were, follows with respect to orphans. For education and discipline follow the first generation, of which we have spoken. But,

after the second, it is necessary to devise some means by which orphans may be oppressed with calamity as little as possible. In the first place, then, we say, that guardians of the laws should be appointed for them in the place of parents, and not worse than these; and that they should take care of them every year as if they were their own offspring. Let this, then, be our preface respecting the education of orphans, and the appointment of tutors for them. For we appear to me to have spoken opportunely above, when we asserted, that the souls of the dead possessed a certain power, through which they bestowed a providential attention to human affairs. This, indeed, is true, but the confirmation of it requires a long discourse. It is likewise proper to believe in other traditions respecting things of this kind, which are both numerous and very ancient. Legislators, too, unless they are perfectly insane, ought to believe in the truth of these traditions. Since, therefore, these things naturally subsist after this manner, those that attend to the desolate condition of orphans should, in the first place, fear the Gods above; and, in the next place, the souls of the deceased, who naturally take a particular care of their offspring, and who are, therefore, propitious to those that honor them, but hostile towards those that despise them. Add, too, that the souls of those that are living, but are in old-age, and who in a city happy through good laws possess the greatest honors, and whose children and grandchildren live a pleasant life, through paying them a proper attention, —these acutely hear and perceive things of this kind, and are benevolent to those that behave justly to orphans, but in the highest degree indignant with those that injure them. For they consider the deposit of orphans as the greatest and most holy of all deposits. It is requisite, therefore, that the tutor and magistrate who possesses the smallest degree of intellect, should direct his

attention to these particulars, and bestow as much care on the discipline and education of orphans as of his own offspring. He, therefore, who is persuaded by this preface to the law, and who acts in no respect unjustly towards orphans, will evidently be exempt from all anger of the legislator about things of this kind. But let him who is unpersuaded by it, and injures anyone who is deprived of either father or mother, suffer twice the punishment he would have sustained from injuring one, both of whose parents were living.

The laws which follow relate to the tutors of orphans, and the attention which magistrates should pay to the tutors. If, therefore, they possessed a paradigm of the education of free children, the tutors both taking care of these and their own concerns, and if they had laws respecting these sufficiently distinct, we should not without reason establish certain laws for tutors, as very much differing from others, and distinguish, by various pursuits, the life of orphans from that of those who are not orphans. But now, with respect to everything of this kind, the privation of parents does not with us differ much from paternal government, but is unwilling to equalize honor, dishonor, and providential care. Hence the law, through its attention to orphans, consoles and threatens. And further still, it will be very opportune for it to threaten as follows: —He who takes care either of a female or a male, and who from among the guardians of the law is appointed to observe the tutor of these, shall possess the same affection for the orphans entrusted to his care as if they were his own offspring; nor shall he bestow less attention to their affairs, but even more, than to his own. Let everyone, therefore, take care of orphans conformably to this law. But, if anyone acts contrary to this law in affairs of this kind, let such a tutor be condemned by a magistrate. And if it shall appear to the kindred of the orphans, or to any other

of the citizens, that the tutor has acted negligently or viciously, let him be brought before a court of judgment, and make a four-fold restitution of the loss sustained, and let one half be given to the boy, and the other to the accuser. When an orphan arrives at puberty, if he thinks that he has been neglected by his tutor, let him be permitted to call his tutor to an account for five years from the time that his tutorship is finished. And if any tutor is condemned, let a court of justice determine what he ought to suffer, or what fine he ought to pay. If any magistrate shall appear to have injured an orphan through negligence, let a court of justice determine the restitution which he ought to make. But, if he shall appear to have injured the orphan through injustice, besides making a restitution, let him be deprived of the office of a guardian of the law; and let another common guardian of the city be appointed in his place by the region and the city. Greater discord takes place between fathers and sons, and sons and fathers, than is proper, in which fathers think that the legislator ought to permit them to renounce their sons by a public crier, so as that they may no longer be their sons according to law: and sons are of opinion that they ought to be allowed to accuse their fathers of madness, when they are disgracefully circumstanced through disease or old-age. These things usually take place when the manners of men are perfectly corrupt. For, if the half only of these evils took place, as that the parents alone, or the children alone, were vicious, calamities which are the progeny of such a mighty hatred would have no existence. Indeed, in any other polity, a son, when abandoned by his father, would not necessarily be deprived of the city. But, in a city governed by these laws, he who is given up by his father must necessarily take up his abode in some other place. For no one is allowed to unite himself with any family of the five thousand and forty houses. On this account it is necessary, that the son

who is abandoned by his father should not only be driven from his father, but from his whole race. It is proper, therefore, in things of this kind, to act according to the following law: —When anyone, through anger by no means fortunate, whether he is justly enraged or not, desires to be liberated from an alliance with him whom he has begotten and educated, let him not be permitted to accomplish his desire either in an improper manner or directly. But, in the first place, let him assemble his own relations, as far as to his cousins, and, in a similar manner, those of his son on the mother's side. When they are assembled, let him accuse his son to them, and show them that he deserves to be expelled from all his kindred. Let the son also be permitted to defend himself, and endeavor to prove that he does not deserve to suffer anything of this kind. And if the father persuades them that his accusation is just, and all the relations, both male and female, except the father, mother, and the son himself, vote for his being abandoned; when this is the case, let a father be permitted to renounce his son, but by no means when this is not the case. If any citizen wishes to adopt a son whom his father abandons, let him not be restrained from adopting him by any law. For the manners of youth naturally sustain many mutations in life. But, if no one in the space of ten years wishes to adopt such a son, let those whose province it is to send offspring into a colony, take care that this rejected son is made an inhabitant of such a colony in a proper manner. If a certain disease, old-age, of severity of manners, or all these together, more than anything else, render a man insane, and this is concealed from everyone except his domestics; and if such a one dissipates his substance, as being the master of it, but his son is unwilling to accuse his father of madness, in this case let the following law be established: —In the first place, let the son go to the oldest guardians of the law, and inform

them of his father's calamity. Afterwards, let these, when they have sufficiently considered the affair, consult whether the father should be proscribed, or not: and, if they agree that he should be proscribed, let them be both witnesses and patronizers of the cause. But, if the father is condemned, let him not afterwards possess any authority over his own affairs, but dwell at home for the rest of his life like a child. If a husband and wife, through the wretchedness of their manners, live in discord with each other, let ten men who subsist in the middle of the guardians of the laws, and, in a similar manner, ten women who are curators of marriages, take care of things of this kind. And if they are able to procure a reconciliation, let their decision be valid. But, if their minds are too vehemently inflamed to admit of a reconciliation, let them seek, to the utmost of their power, after such persons as are adapted to reside with each. It appears, indeed, that the manners of such as these are far from being mild; and, on this account, we should endeavor to adapt to them more profound and gentle manners. And such, indeed, as are without children, or have but a few, and disagree, let these be compelled to marry again, for the sake of procreating children. But let such as, having a sufficient number of children, disagree, be divorced, and united with others, for the sake of that attention which old-age requires. If a woman dies, and leaves behind her male and female children, let the law not compel, but persuade, the husband to educate his children without marrying again. But if there are no children, let him be compelled to marry again, till he has procreated children sufficient both for his family and the city. But, if a man dies, and leaves behind him a sufficient number of children, let the mother of the children educate them, remaining a widow. If she appears, however, to be too young to live in a state of health without a husband, let her kindred, in conjunction with the women that take care of

marriages, consult what is fit to be done both for her and the children. And if both these are in want of children, let them marry for the sake of having children. But let an accurate sufficiency of children be a male and female according to law. When it is allowed that any offspring is the progeny of the begetter, but it is necessary to have recourse to a court of justice in order to know which of the parents the child ought to follow, let the following mode be adopted: —If a female slave has connection with a slave, or with a free-born person, or with a freedman, let the offspring be the property of the master of the female slave. But if a free-born woman is with child from a slave, let the master of the slave, in a similar manner, be the master of the offspring. If any master has a child by his own slave, or any mistress is pregnant from her slave, and this becomes apparent, let the women send the offspring of the woman, together with the father, into another region: but let the guardians of the law banish the offspring of the man, together with the mother of such offspring. However, neither will Divinity, nor any man who is endued with intellect, ever advise anyone to neglect his parents. Indeed, the assertion, that it is proper to know how to worship the Gods, will be a proper preface with respect to the honoring and dishonoring of parents. Ancient laws concerning the Gods are among all men established in a two-fold manner. For, clearly perceiving some of the Gods, we honor them; but we fabricate images of others; and while we rejoice in these images though inanimate, we think that the animated Gods themselves will be benevolent and propitious to us for the attention which we pay to these. He, therefore, whose father or mother, or the fathers or mothers of these, reside in his house, worn out with old-age, like precious furniture, such a one will never think that any other such image, or one more efficacious, can ever reside in his house, if he pays that reverential regard to it which he ought.

Clinias/ Of what proper reverential regard are you speaking?

Athenian Stranger/ I will tell you. For things of this kind, O friends, deserve to be heard.

Clinias/ Only speak.

Athenian Stranger/ We say that Oedipus, being dishonored by his children, imprecated on them those things which everyone is perfectly acquainted with, and has heard were inflicted by the Gods. Amyntor, too, is said to have cursed his son Phœnix in anger, and Theseus, Hippolytus, and innumerable other fathers, innumerable other sons. From which it becomes apparent, that the Gods hear the prayers of parents against their children. For it is most just that nothing should be so noxious to a child as the imprecation of his parent. Nor let anyone think that the prayers of his father and mother are alone heard by the Gods according to nature, when they are despised by him, for they are also heard when they are honored by, and are vehemently dear to, him. On this account, when in their prayers they earnestly invoke the Gods to bless their children, ought we not to think that they are similarly heard by them, and that the Gods equally impart to them such things as are good? For otherwise they would not be just distributors of what is good, which we say becomes the Gods the least of all things.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ We should think, therefore, as we observed a little before, that we cannot possess any image which is more honored by the Gods, than our fathers and grandfathers, mothers and grandmothers, when worn out with age. When anyone honors these, divinity rejoices: for, otherwise, he would not hear their prayers. The image, indeed, of our progenitors ought to be considered by us, as

far more wonderful than inanimate images. For animated images when they are reverenced by us, pray for us, but do the very contrary when they are despised by us. But inanimate images do neither of these. So that he who behaves properly to his father, grandfather, and all of this kind, such a one possesses the most powerful of all images with respect to procuring divine benevolence.

Clinias/ You speak most beautifully.

Athenian Stranger/ Everyone, therefore, endued with intellect will fear and honor the prayers of his parents, as knowing that they have often been profitable and noxious to many. These things, then, are thus established by nature. By good men, therefore, their aged progenitors when living to the extremity of life, will be considered as a treasure; and, if they die before they arrive at that period, they will be vehemently desired by them. On the contrary, they will be terrible in the extreme to the vicious. Let everyone, therefore, persuaded by these assertions, honor his parents according to law. But if anyone is deaf to these exordia, for such the following law will be properly established. If anyone then, in this city, reverences his parents less than he ought, and does not pay them more attention than he does his sons, grandsons, and himself neglecting to comply with their will in all things beyond that of others, let parents who are so neglected, give information of the affair themselves, or by some other, to three of the oldest guardians of the law, and likewise to three of the women that have the care of marriages, And let these, after they have investigated the affair, punish the offender; if he is a young man, indeed, with stripes and bonds, if he is not more than thirty years of age; and let the same punishment be inflicted on a woman, if she is forty years of age. But if they are older than this, and yet do not cease to neglect their parents, but afflict them, let them be brought before a court of justice, and be tried by

those citizens who surpass all the rest in age: and, if they are condemned, let the court of justice determine what they ought to suffer, without omitting any punishment which ought to be inflicted on such an occasion. If anyone, however, who is afflicted by his children, is unable to tell his condition, let any free person who hears of his case, announce it to the governors; or let him, if he omits to do this, be considered as a vicious person, and be accused by anyone that is willing of the injury sustained. But if a slave gives information of this affair, let him be made free. And if he is the slave either of the afflicting or afflicted person, let him be made free by the magistrate who is acquainted with the affair. But if he is the slave of any other citizen, let his ransom be paid for to his master, by the public. Let the magistrates, likewise, be careful that no one injures a person of this kind, on account of his giving information, With respect to injuries by poisons, we have already made a division of such of these as are deadly: but we have not yet distinguished other injuries, whether they are committed by means of drink or meat, or unctions, voluntarily, and with premeditation. For there are two kinds of poisons pertaining to the human species. For, as we just now clearly said, bodies are naturally injured by bodies: and, in the next place, by enchantments, incantations and bindings, some who dare to injure others, are persuaded that they are able to accomplish their purpose through these, and others, that nothing is so easy as to be injured by those that possess the power of witchcraft. These particulars, therefore, and all that pertains to things of this kind, it is neither easy to know how they naturally subsist, nor, if anyone does know, to persuade others. But the minds of men being dubious as to things of this kind, it is not worthwhile to endeavor to persuade them that, if at any time they see waxen images, whether in gates, in places where three roads meet, or on

the tombs of their parents, they should despise everything of this kind, as they have no clear notions concerning them. Giving a two-fold division, therefore, to the law respecting enchantments, in the first place, we shall exhort, admonish, and advise men, not to attempt anything of this kind; nor terrify the multitude, who are frightened like children; nor compel the legislator and judge to procure a remedy for such fears of mankind. For, in the first place, he who endeavors to hurt another by poison, if he does not possess medical science, cannot know what he does with respect to bodies. The same maybe said of him who endeavors to injure another by enchantment, unless he happens to be a diviner, or an interpreter of portents. Let the following law, therefore, be established respecting poisons. He who employs poison, not for the purpose of killing a man, but cattle, or swarms of bees, or in order to injure them some other way than by procuring their death, if he happens to be a physician, and is condemned for poisoning, let him be punished with death; but if he is unskilled in medicine, let a court of justice determine what he ought to suffer, or what fine he ought to pay. But if anyone by bonds, or allurements, or certain incantations, or such like enchantments, is found endeavoring to injure another, if he is a diviner, or an interpreter of prodigies, let him be put to death. But if anyone is accused of witchcraft, without being a diviner, let his punishment in a similar manner be determined by a court of justice. Let him who injures another by fraud or force, pay a great fine, if the injury is great, but a smaller fine, if the injury is small; and let restitution in all cases be equivalent to the loss sustained. And, in all injuries, let the injurer be fined till he is amended. If it shall appear that anyone was impelled to injure another, by a folly foreign to his nature, through the imprudence of youth, let him be sentenced to pay a lighter fine; but if by his own proper folly,

or through the incontinence of pleasures and pains, or through fear, envy, certain desires, or anger difficult to cure, a heavier fine. At the same time observing, that offenders are not to be punished because they have acted ill, (for what is done, can never become undone,) but that afterwards both offenders, and those that see them punished, may hate injustice, or may be in a considerable degree liberated from a calamity of this kind. For the sake of all these particulars, and looking to all these, the laws, like good archers, should consider this as a mark, viz. the magnitude of punishment, and the proper desert in each offence. A judge, therefore, ought to act in this manner, as the minister of the legislature, since it is permitted him by law to establish what punishment offenders ought to suffer: and, like a painter, he should diligently copy his original. This, indeed, O Megillus and Clinias, should be done by us at present, in the most beautiful and best manner; and we should establish what punishments ought to be inflicted, both on base actions committed by fraud, and those committed by violence; and this in such a manner as the Gods, and the sons of the Gods, will permit us to establish. Let no one then who is insane be openly seen in the city, but let the relations of the insane person keep him secure at home, in the best manner they are able. If they do not, let them be fined. And let him who possesses the largest estate be fined a hundred drachms, if he is negligent in securing an insane person, whether he be a slave, or free. But let him who possesses the next estate to this, be fined four out of five parts of a mina; he who possesses a third estate, three parts of a mina: and, he who possesses a fourth estate, four parts. Many, indeed, are rendered insane by various means. Some, as those of whom we have just spoken, through disease. Others through anger, and the vicious education of a depraved nature; who, being incited by a trifling enmity, talk loudly, and blaspheme

each other. But nothing of this kind ought to take place in a city governed by good laws. With respect to every kind of slander, therefore, let the following law be established. Let no one slander another. But when one person in discourse with another is doubtful of any particular, let him with whom he discourses instruct both him and those that are present in the truth of the case, and entirely abstain from slander. For men, when they slander each other with base words, are to be considered as effeminate. And, in the first place, from words, which are a light thing, hatred and grievous enmities are often produced in reality. For he who is gratified with anger, which is a thing of an unpleasant nature, and is filled with it as with noxious aliment, —such a one, being rendered as rustic and savage in this part of his soul as he was once gentle and mild through discipline, leads a morose life, and receives from anger this bitter grace. Hence, nearly all men from things of this kind, utter something ridiculous to their adversaries; and he who accustoms himself to a thing of this kind, either errs in every respect, or destroys many parts of magnanimity. On this account, therefore, let no one ever speak in this manner in a temple, or where public sacrifices are performed; or in places of contest, or the forum, or in a court of justice, or in any common assembly. But let the magistrate, who is present at the time, freely punish anyone who acts in this manner: and, if he neglects to do so, let him be considered as one who pays no attention to the laws nor the mandates of the legislator, and let him never be permitted to contend for the rewards which are conferred on virtue. But, if anyone uses slander in other places, either by provoking, or answering, let any more elderly person who is present, in defense of the law, restrain with blows those who are incited by a foreign and vicious anger; or, if they do not, let them be punished in the manner mentioned above. We say, too, at

present, that he who is entangled with slander will not be able to refrain from sometimes speaking ridiculously; and this is what we condemn when it takes place through anger. But what then? Shall we admit the jests and ridiculous slanders which comedians employ against the citizens, if they are not accompanied with anger? Or shall we give this affair a two-fold division, viz. into the jocose and the serious? And, indeed, anyone may be permitted jocosely to employ ridicule without anger. But let no one be allowed to employ it, as we said before, when inflamed with anger. Let us now, therefore, establish by law to whom this may be allowed, and to whom not. Let not then a composer of comedies, or of iambic or musical melody, be permitted either in words or images to slander any citizen, either in anger or without anger. And, if anyone disobeys this law, let those that determine the rewards of contests drive him from the region the very same day, or they shall be fined three minæ, sacred to the God to whom the contest belongs. But let the others, whom we mentioned above, be permitted to employ ridicule without anger, and in sport; but let them not be permitted to do this seriously, and in anger. Let the determination, too, of this affair be committed to him who takes care of the whole discipline of youth. And let him who composes anything be permitted to make it public, if it is approved of by this curator of youth: but if he does not approve of it, let not the author be permitted to show it to anyone, or instruct in it either a slave or a free-born person. Or, if he does, let him be considered as a vicious character, and as one who disobeys the laws. But he deserves commiseration who, when temperate, or possessing some other virtue, or a part of virtue, is oppressed with a certain calamity, either from hunger, or something of a similar kind; but this cannot be said universally of anyone who falls into such-like misfortunes. Hence it will, indeed, be a wonderful

circumstance if a man of this kind is so entirely neglected as to arrive at extreme poverty, whether he is a slave, or free, in a polity and city which is moderately inhabited. On this account, the following law may be safely established by the legislator. Let there be no beggars in the city. But if anyone attempts to procure food by prayers which cannot be satisfied, let the præfects of the forum expel him from the forum, and the governor of the ways and buildings from the city: and let the magistrate who presides over the lands expel him from every other part of the region, that the whole country may be pure from an animal of this kind. If a male or a female slave injures the property of another person undeservedly, whether through inexperience, or intemperate conduct, let the master of such slave either make satisfaction to the injured person, or deliver up to him the injurer. But if the master of the slave contends that the affair happened through the mutual craft of the injurer and injured, that the slave might be taken from him, let him charge with the crime of malice the person who says he has been injured; and, if he convicts him, let him receive from him double the price at which a court of justice had valued the slave. If the master of the slave is convicted, let him both make the injured person a recompense for his loss, and deliver up the slave. And, if a heifer, horse, or dog, or any other animal, injures any neighboring property, let the master of the animal in a similar manner make restitution for the loss. If anyone refuses to bear witness willingly, let him be cited by him who is in want of his evidence; and when cited, let him attend at a proper time, and bear witness to the best of his knowledge. But if he says that he is ignorant of the affair, let him swear that he is ignorant of it by the three Gods, Zeus, Apollo, and Themis, and be dismissed. Let him who, when called to bear witness, does not attend, be obnoxious to the injury, according to law. If any judge is

cited to give evidence, let him not, in giving evidence, pass sentence on the case. Let a free woman be permitted to bear witness, defend a cause, and obtain justice, if she is more than forty years of age, and is unmarried. But, if she is married, let her be permitted to bear witness only. Let a male and female slave, and a boy, be alone permitted to bear witness and defend a cause in cases of murder, if they can give sufficient security for their appearance at the trial, if they should happen to be accused of bearing false witness. If anyone accuses another of bearing false witness, let each of the litigants consider the testimony, both in whole and part, before sentence is passed. But let the magistrates preserve in writing the accusations of bearing false witness made by both, and bring them forward for the purpose of determining the false witnesses. If anyone shall be found to have given false witness twice, let the law no longer compel him to bear witness again. But if he shall be found to have given false witness thrice, let him not be permitted ever to bear witness again. And if he dares after this to bear witness, let anyone who is willing give information of him to a magistrate. Afterwards, let the magistrate deliver him to a court of justice, and, if he is convicted, let him be put to death. When in any lawsuit false witnesses are detected, and are found to be the means of an opponent gaining his cause, if more than half of the witnesses are condemned, let no judgment be passed from their evidence. But it is proper in this case diligently to inquire, whether or not any sentence should be passed; that, in whatever manner the cause may be determined, by this means justice may be done. Since, however, there are many beautiful things in the life of man, in most of them dire calamities are, as it were, naturally inherent, through which they are stained and defiled. But why should not justice among men be beautiful, which renders all human affairs mild? And this being beautiful,

why should it not be beautiful to patronize the cause of another? This, then, being the case, a certain evil calumny gives a beautiful name to an art, which, it says, was first devised in judicial affairs; by means of which, in litigations, and the patronizing of causes, anyone may vanquish another, whether the cause is just or not. They add, that the gift of this art, and of the arguments proceeding from it, consists in bestowing rewards from money. This, therefore, whether it is an art, or a certain exercise void of art, must by no means be planted in our city; but, reverencing the legislator, it should be persuaded not to speak contrary to justice, and should be sent to some other region. Those, then, that are persuaded by these arguments we pass over in silence: but let the following law be announced for those that are unpersuaded by them: —If it shall appear that anyone endeavors to give a contrary direction to the power of justice in the souls of the judges, and either excites or patronizes many unseasonable law suits, let anyone who is willing charge him with acting basely in judicial matters, or with patronizing a bad cause. And let the cause be tried in a select court of justice. If, too, he is condemned, let the court of justice determine whether he acted in this manner through avarice or love of contention. And if through a love of contention, let the judges appoint him a certain time, beyond which he shall neither plead any cause himself, nor patronize that of another. But if through avarice, if he is a stranger, let him depart from the city without ever returning to it again, or if he neglects to do this, let him be put to death. If he is a citizen, in consequence of thus improperly honoring money, let him be immediately put to death. Likewise, let him be put to death who has been found by a court of justice to have acted twice in this manner.

THE END OF THE ELEVENTH BOOK.

Book 12.

Athenian Stranger/ If an ambassador or a crier deceives the city in anything committed to his charge, or does not announce what he is sent to proclaim; or again, when returning from friends or enemies, does not truly relate the message he received from them, let a written information be drawn up against such a one, as irreligiously despising, contrary to law, the denunciations and mandates of Hermes and Zeus. And if he is condemned, let the judges determine what he ought to suffer, or what fine he ought to pay. The theft of money is, indeed, illiberal, but rapine is base. But no one of the sons of Zeus will ever do anything of this kind, in consequence of being delighted either with fraud or force. Let no one, therefore, acting in a disorderly manner through poets, or certain mythologists, be falsely persuaded that if he thieves either by fraud or force, he does not act basely, but does that which the Gods themselves have done. For this is neither true nor becoming: but he who illegally acts in this manner, is neither a God, nor a son of the Gods. But it is proper that these things should be known by the legislator rather than by all poets. He, therefore, who is persuaded by this our discourse, is happy, and will be happy through the whole of time; but he who is unpersuaded by it, must be restrained by the following law If anyone commits any public theft, whether it is great or small, he ought to suffer the same punishment. For he who takes away a thing of small consequence, thieves with the same desire, though with less force. But he who moves anything of greater consequence, and does not restore it to its proper place, is wholly unjust. The law, however, thinks it proper that the one should be less punished than the other, not on account of the smallness of the theft, but because, perhaps, one of these characters may be cured, but the other is incurable. If a slave, or a stranger, is accused and condemned of any public

theft, let sentence be passed on him what he ought to suffer, or what fine he ought to pay, as if it were probable that he might be cured. But if any citizen, who has been properly educated, is convicted of having committed any public theft, or violence, whether he is detected in the fact or not, let him be punished with death, as one who is nearly incurable. For the sake of war, indeed, many consultations and many laws are very properly instituted. The greatest of all things, however, consists in this, that neither any male or female be at any time without a governor, nor the soul of any citizen be ever accustomed, either seriously or in sport, to do anything from itself alone; but that in all war, and in all peace, it perpetually looks to a governor, and lives following his mandates, so as to comply with them in the smallest particular; to stand when he commands, walk, engage in gymnastic exercises, wash, eat, rise by night for the purpose of keeping guard and giving signals; and in dangers themselves, neither to pursue nor give way to anyone, without the mandate of the governors. And, in one word, that it should never be taught to do or know anything separate from others; but that the life of all men should, in the highest degree, in all things be collected into one, subsist together, and be common. For nothing will ever be more excellent, better, or more artificial than this, for the purpose of procuring safety and victory in war. In peace, too, men should be accustomed from their childhood to govern others, and to be governed by others. But anarchy should be expelled from all life, both from that of men, and of beasts that are in subjection to men. All choirs, too, should be celebrated, with a view to the best mode of conducting war; and all facility, dexterity, and promptitude, should be studied for the sake of this. On this account, too, we ought to accustom ourselves to endurance of hunger and thirst, cold and heat, and a hard best. And, what is greatest of all,

for the sake of this we should be careful not to corrupt the power of the head and feet by the tegument of foreign clothing, which destroys the generation and nature of our proper hairs and shoes. For these extremities, when preserved, possess the greatest power of the whole body, but the contrary when they are not preserved. And one of these is in the highest degree subservient to the whole body; but the other is endued with a principal authority, naturally possessing all its principal senses. And this praise of a warlike life ought to be heard by young men. But the law is as follows: —Let everyone engage in war who is chosen for this purpose, or is deputed a certain part. But, if anyone, through a certain vice, deserts his post without leave from his commander, let him be accused of desertion, when he returns, to the principal officers of the army. Let him be judged, too, by all the military orders, by the horse and the foot separately, and in a similar manner by the rest. And let the foot be introduced to the foot, the horse to the horse, and each of the other orders to those of the same rank with themselves. If anyone is condemned, let him afterwards be prohibited from engaging in any military contest, or accusing another of neglect of military duty. And besides this, let a court of justice determine what he ought to suffer, or what fine he ought to pay. After this, when the trial for desertion is finished, let the commanders again assemble each of these orders, that military rewards may be conferred on those who have conducted themselves strenuously in battle. But anyone who is willing may judge of the victory among those of the same rank with himself, so as that he neither produces arguments nor witnesses of any former battle, but alone considers the battle which has then been fought. Let a crown of olive, too, be the reward of the military champion. And afterwards, let those that have obtained these crowns suspend them in the temples of the warlike Gods, with any

inscription they please, that they may be a testimony through the whole of life of the military virtue of the most valiant, and those that were valiant in the second and third degree. But, if anyone engages in battle, and leaves the army before he is dismissed by his commanding officers, let him be tried by the same judges as the deserter was tried by, whom we mentioned above, and, if condemned, let him be similarly punished. It is proper, however, that one man, when he is about to judge another, should be fearful lest he should either voluntarily or involuntarily inflict punishment falsely. For justice is said, and is truly said, to be a bashful virgin. But falsehood is naturally odious to bashfulness and justice. In other things, therefore, it is requisite to be cautious with respect to judging erroneously, but particularly as to throwing away armor in battle. For, it may happen that someone may be erroneously considered as base for an action of this kind, and may be punished for it undeservedly. For it is by no means easy to determine properly in this case. At the same time it is necessary that the law should endeavor to desire according to parts. Employing a fable, therefore, we say, if Patroclus should have been carried to his tent without arms, and scarcely alive, as is frequently the case, and if his arms, which, as the poet says, were given to Peleus by the Gods on his marriage with Thetis, should be in the possession of Hector, would evil men in this case reproach the son of Menœtius, as if he had thrown away his arms? Further still, if any persons, being hurled from lofty places, either into the sea, or into places consisting of an abundant conflux of water produced through tempests, or into many other places of this kind, which might easily be adduced to free them from a suspicion of cowardice, —if, being hurled into these, they should lose their arms, ought they in this case to be blamed? But we ought to endeavor, to the utmost of our power, to

separate the greater and the most grievous evil from the contrary. In slandering, therefore, the very words employed for the purpose, possess a certain division. For, as the throwing away arms cannot be justly asserted in all cases, but the losing them may; in like manner, he is not to be similarly called a thrower away of his shield who loses it by force, as he who voluntarily throws it away. For they totally and universally differ from each other. Let the following law, therefore, be established: —If anyone, being assaulted by enemies, and having arms, does not defend himself against them, but voluntarily drops them, or throws them away, preferring a base life, in conjunction with infamy, to a beautiful and happy death, accompanied with fortitude, let sentence be passed on such a one, as a thrower away of arms, but let the judge neglect to consider the losing of arms mentioned above. For it is requisite always to punish the vicious, that they may become better, but not the unfortunate. For no advantage would be derived from an action of this kind. But what punishment will be adapted to him who is condemned for throwing away his arms in a cowardly manner? For, it is impossible to change a man of this kind into a contrary character, as they report Divinity once changed the Thessalian Cæneus from the nature of a woman into that of a man. For a contrary generation would, after a manner, be the most adapted of all others to him who throws away his shield, —I mean, that he should be punished by being changed from a man into a woman. But now, since this is impossible, let us devise a punishment which approaches the nearest to this, I mean that, in consequence of his great love of life, he shall never afterwards engage in any dangerous enterprise, but, as being a vicious character, live as long as possible, covered with disgrace. Let, then, the following law be established for these: —When a man is condemned for shamefully throwing

away his warlike arms, let neither any general of an army, nor any other military officer, ever employ him as a soldier, nor admit him into the army. But if any such officer does admit him, let the judge who inquires into the reasons of conduct punish him as follows: If he possesses the largest estate, let him be fined ten minæ; if the second in rank, five minæ; if the third, three; and, if the fourth, one mina, But he who was condemned for throwing away his armor, besides being excluded from engaging in manly dangers, through his cowardice, shall, if he possesses the largest estate, be in like manner fined ten minæ; if the second, five; if the third, three; and, if the fourth, one mina. But, with respect to those magistrates who inquire into the reasons of conduct, what ought we to determine; some magistrates being chosen by a yearly lot, but others for many years, and by selection? For who will be a sufficient judge of the reasons of conduct, if it should happen that any magistrate, being bent by the weight of his government, should say or do anything unworthy of his office? It is, indeed, by no means easy to find one adequate to the purpose. For, since one magistrate surpasses another in virtue, how shall we discover him who transcends all the rest. At the same time, we should endeavor to find certain divine men who may act for us as judges of the reasons of conduct. For the case is as follows: —There are many occasions for dissolving a polity, as there are of a ship, or a certain animal, of which, though there is one dispersed nature, yet we denominate them tones, transverse enclosures, extensions of nerves, and call them by many other names. But this is an occasion, by no means the smallest, of the preservation and dissolution of a polity. For, if the judges who require of the magistrates the reason of their conduct, are better than the magistrates, and this is managed in such a manner as to take away all occasion of complaint, the whole region and city will thus

flourish and be happy. But, if an inquiry is made into the conduct of the magistrates in a different manner, then, that judgment being dissolved by which all political affairs are connected in one, a divulsion of all government takes place, and magistrates no longer verging to the same thing, they cause the city from being one, to be many, and filling it with seditions, bring it rapidly to destruction. On this account, it is necessary that those who inquire into the reasons of conduct should, in a wonderful manner, be endued with every virtue. We shall, therefore, thus devise the fabrication of these. Let the whole city assemble every year after the summer solstice, to a sacred grove common to the Sun and Apollo, in order to elect three men, which everyone shall judge to excel all others except himself; and let these be not less than fifty years of age. Afterwards, let the half of those who are chosen by the greatest number of votes be selected, if they form an even number; but if they form an odd number, then, leaving out one who had the fewest votes, let the half of the remainder be taken, and a judgment formed by the number of votes. If some happen to have an equal number of votes, and the half of these is more than three, let the excess be taken away, and the juniors rejected. Afterwards, out of these, let an election be made by votes, till three, whose votes are unequal, are obtained. But if all these, or two of them, have equal votes, then, committing the affair to good fate and fortune, let the three be distinguished by lot; and let him who is victor, together with the second and third, be crowned with leaves of olive. Afterwards, the rewards being conferred, let it be proclaimed to all men, that the city of the Magnesians having again obtained safety from Divinity, consecrates three of its best citizens as common first fruits to Apollo and the Sun, conformably to an ancient law. Let these, too, in the first year, choose twelve examiners of the reasons of conduct, and continue to do this till each

has accomplished his seventy-fifth year; and afterwards, let three always be added every year. Let these accurately observe all the magistrates, who are to be divided into twelve parts, with all possible free examination. Let them reside, too, at the time in which they act as examiners of the reasons of conduct, in the grove sacred to the Sun and Apollo, in which they were elected. Here, each inquiring into everything by himself, and all examining in common, let them signify by public writings in the forum what each of the magistrates ought to suffer, or be fined, according to their decision. But if anyone of the magistrates does not acknowledge that he has been condemned justly, let him go to the chosen judges appointed to examine the reasons of conduct, and if he is acquitted by these, let him accuse, if he is willing, the examiners of the reasons of conduct; but, if he is condemned by the chosen judges also, and was before by the other judges condemned to death, let him die, as necessity requires. But if he was sentenced by them to pay a fine, the double of which he is capable of paying, let him be fined the double of it.

It is, however, now requisite to hear what the accusations of these judges will be, and after what manner they will take place. The first places, then, in all public spectacles should always be given to those who are appointed by the common content of the whole city to preside over all others as long as they live. And further still, when it is found necessary to send magistrates to inspect the common sacrifices, spectacles, and other sacred rites of the Greeks, let them be sent from these. Likewise, let these alone in the city be adorned with a crown of laurel; and let them all be priests of Apollo and the Sun. Let him, too, be the high-priest every year from among these, who in the former year was judged to excel the other priests; and let his name every year, as long as the city is inhabited, become the measure of the

number of time. But when these priests die, let care be taken that their funerals and sepulchers surpass those of the other citizens. Let everyone, too, on this occasion have a white robe, and let there be no weeping and lamentation. Let there be also two choirs, one consisting of fifteen girls, and the other of as many boys; and let each of these surround the bier, praising the priests, as it were, in a hymn, and each by turns celebrating their felicity in songs through the whole day. On the morning following, let a hundred young men, who are engaged in gymnastic exercises, carry the bier to the sepulcher which the relations of the deceased have chosen. And, in the first place, let the unmarried young men march before the bier armed in a warlike manner, together with horses and horsemen; the foot with their light arms, and others in a similar manner. But let boys, going before the bier, sing a paternal song; and let them be followed by girls, and women who are no longer capable of bearing children. After these, let priests and priestesses follow, as to a pure sepulcher, though they are forbidden to go to other sepulchers; if the Pythian deity likewise assents. Let the sepulcher, too, for these be built under the earth; and let it be a long arch composed of valuable and undecaying stones, and containing on each side beds of stone. In this let them place the blessed deceased, and plant a grove of trees in a circular order round the monument, except in one part, that the sepulcher may be always enlarged when it is requisite. Every year too, let musical, gymnastic and equestrian contests be instituted in honor of these deceased priests. And such are the honors which ought to be paid to those whose judgments concerning the reasons of conduct are not condemned. But, if anyone of these, consisting too much in his decision, should make the imbecility of human nature apparent, and become depraved after his decision, let him be accused by anyone who is willing; and let the following

law respecting the mode of his accusation be established: — In the first place, let him be brought before a court of justice, and let the guardians of the laws at the same time be present. Afterwards, let the colleagues of the accused be present; and, lastly, let the court of justice be composed of select judges. Then, let his accuser signify in writing that he who is accused is an unworthy character, and that he does not deserve either the rewards, or to act in the capacity, of a magistrate. If, therefore, he is condemned, let him be deprived of magistracy, of a sepulcher, and of those other rewards which pertain to his office. But if his accuser has not a fifth part of votes, let him who possesses the largest estate be fined twelve minæ; he who possesses the second, eight; the third, six; and the fourth, two minæ. Rhadamanthus, indeed, deserves to be admired with respect to his decision of judicial affairs. For he perceived that the men of that time evidently believed that there were Gods, and this very properly, because at that time many of them were the progeny of the Gods; and he is said to have been one of these. He appears, therefore, to have conceived that causes ought not to be referred to any human judge, but to the Gods; and, on this account, causes were decided by him in a simple and rapid manner. For, causing the litigants in every case to take an oath, he determined causes rapidly and with safety. But now, as we have said, a certain part of mankind denies that there are Gods; others conceive that they take no care of us; and the opinion of the greatest and worst part is, that they may be appealed by trifling sacrifices and abundance of flattery, and that those who thus appease them, may with impunity defraud others of great sums of money. Hence, the art of Rhadamanthus in judicial affairs will not be adapted to men of the present time. The opinions of men, therefore, respecting the Gods being changed, it is necessary that laws also should be changed. A prudent

legislator, therefore, in judicial contests, will not suffer the litigants to take an oath, that as well the intention of the accuser, as the entreaty of the defendant, may be committed to writing without an oath. For if everyone in the city should be freely permitted to take an oath, in consequence of many cases being every day brought before the judges, almost everyone would be perjured, through connections arising from feasting together, and other associations, and from private meetings. Let it, therefore, be established by law, that he who is about to be judged shall swear to the judge, and that he who appoints the public magistrates shall either appoint them through oaths, or by suffrages. Likewise, that the judge of choirs, and all music, together with the presidents and those that confer rewards on gymnastic and equestrian exercises, shall take an oath; and, in short, in all cases in which, according to the opinion of men, perjury is not attended with gain. But let those cases in which anyone may derive great advantage from perjury be judged without an oath. Likewise, in judicial cases, let not the litigants by any means be permitted either to swear for the sake of persuading, or imprecate themselves and their family, or employ base supplications or feminine excitations to pity; but let them always in an honorable manner teach and learn that which is just. But if they do not act in this manner, let the magistrates again bring them back to the affair in hand, as those who speak foreign to the purpose. When strangers, like us, quarrel among themselves, let them be permitted, if they are willing, to take an oath. For, as they are not allowed to grow old in the city, there is no reason to fear lest they should corrupt others. In the same manner, let justice be executed among free men, if anyone of these is not persuaded by the city in things which are neither punished with blows, nor bonds, nor death. If anyone does not attend at the celebration of a choir, or solemn procession, or any

other common adornings of this kind, or public office, such as take place for the sake of pacific sacrifice or warlike tributes, —in all these cases let the damage be repaired as soon as possible; or let the pledge be taken to him to whom the city and law have committed it, and when the limited time is expired let the pledge be sold, and the money applied to public use. But, if there is occasion for a greater fine, let the magistrates bring those that refuse to pay it before a court of justice, and compel them to pay the fine enacted by the laws. It is necessary, however, to consult what ought to be done with a city which does not apply itself to the acquisition of wealth, except that which arises from agriculture, since it neither exports nor ports commodities, nor admits foreigners. The legislator, therefore, ought to consult about these particulars, employing, in the first place, persuasion to the utmost of his power. The mixture, indeed, of different nations naturally causes a mixture of all-various manners; and the association of strangers with strangers produces innovations which injure in the highest degree cities that are well governed through good laws. But, to the greater part of cities, as being by no means well governed, it is of no consequence if as well the old as the young travel into other countries whenever they please, and receive foreigners in their own country. But, on the contrary, in these never to receive strangers, and never to visit foreign countries, would appear rustic and savage to other men, who would call the city by opprobrious names, such as, that it is the enemy of strangers, and that its manners are arrogant and morose. The appearing, however, to be good, or not good, to others, ought never to be considered as a thing of small importance. For the multitude, though deprived of virtue themselves, are capable of distinguishing the worthy from the unworthy: and in certain vicious characters there is something divine, and a power of

conjecturing well. So that many, and even some that are vicious in the extreme, are able to distinguish, both in words and opinions, the better from the worse sort of men. On this account, the multitude of cities are very properly exhorted not to despise the good opinion of the multitude. For it is a thing of the greatest rectitude and magnitude, when a man is truly good himself, that he should aspire after a renowned life; since, without this, a man will by no means become perfect. On this account, it will be proper that the city which is to be inhabited about Crete should endeavor to obtain the most beautiful and excellent reputation for virtue among other men. But there is every reason to hope, that this city in a short time will be beheld both by the Sun and other Gods, in well-governed cities and regions, living according to reason. Let the following law, therefore, be established respecting travelling into other regions and places, and the reception of guests: —In the first place, let it not be lawful for him who is less than forty years of age by any means to travel; and further still, let no person be permitted to travel privately; but let criers, ambassadors, or certain speculators, be allowed to travel publicly. Leaving a country, however, in order to wage war, is not to be considered as political travelling. It is likewise requisite that certain persons should be sent to Pythian Apollo, to Olympian Zeus, and also to Nemea and Isthmus, for the purpose of communicating in the sacrifices and contests sacred to these Gods. But let as much as possible many, and these such as are the most beautiful and the best, be sent on this occasion, who may procure for the city renown, and glory corresponding to warlike glory in sacred concerns, and things pertaining to pacific communions. And when they return home, let them teach the young men, that the legal institutions of other nations, respecting political affairs, are inferior to their own. If any speculators, likewise, who

abound in leisure, are desirous of surveying the affairs of other men, let no law belonging to the guardians of the laws restrain them from executing their desire. For a city, when ignorant of good and evil men, cannot, in consequence of being unsociable, be sufficiently mild and perfect. Nor, again, can it preserve its laws by manners alone, without a knowledge of them. For among the multitude of mankind, there are always some divine men, not indeed many, but who in the highest degree deserve to be associated with: and these do not spring up in well-governed cities, more than in their contraries. Everyone, therefore, who is an inhabitant of a well-governed city, and whose manners are uncorrupt, ought, leaving his country, to tread in the steps of these men, exploring both by land and sea, that when he returns to his country he may give stability to such legal institutions as are beautifully ordained, and correct such as are in any respect deficient. For without such a speculation and inquiry a city can never continue perfect, nor yet if the explorers speculate badly.

Clinias/ How, therefore, can both these take place?

Athenian Stranger/ Thus. In the first place, let a speculator of this kind not be more than fifty years of age. In the next place, let him be approved both in other respects, and for the purposes of war, if he intends to leave to other cities an example of the guardians of laws. But, when he is more than sixty years of age, let him no longer travel as a speculator. Let him, therefore, return when he pleases, within the space of ten years, and on his return go to the assembly of those that examine the laws. But let this assembly be composed of the old and the young; and let it be held every day from necessity, before the dawn of day, till the sun rises. And, in the first place, let it be composed of those priests who receive rewards, as being more excellent than the rest; in the next place, of twelve of the senior

guardians of the laws; and, in the last place, of the president of all erudition, together with the young, and those who no longer act in this capacity. Let not anyone of these be alone, but let him go with some young man whom he may choose, between thirty and forty years of age. Let these, when they assemble, always discourse concerning the laws and their own city; and, if they have heard anything excellent respecting these, let them communicate it to each other. Let them also discourse concerning such disciplines as appear to conduce to this speculation, and which those who are skilled in will be enabled to understand more clearly; but those who are not skilled in them will more darkly comprehend the things pertaining to laws. Afterwards, let such particulars among these as are approved of by the more aged, be learnt with the greatest assiduity by the younger. If any young man of the assembly shall appear to be an unworthy character, let the whole assembly blame him by whom he was brought thither. But let the whole city defend and honor those young men whose conduct: in the assembly is approved. If such young men as go to the assembly are worse than others, let them be more disgraced than others. Let him who speculates the legal institutions of other men immediately go to this assembly on his arrival from foreign parts; and if he has discovered anything among others, respecting the establishment of laws, or discipline, or education, or has himself found out anything pertaining to these, let him communicate it to the whole assembly. If, too, it shall appear that he has returned neither worse nor better than he was before, let him be praised for having done his best: but if he returns much better, let him while living be greatly honored, and, when dead, let all the assembly pay him those honors which are his due. But if it shall appear that he has returned corrupted, though he pretends to be wise, let him not dare to associate with any young or old

person. And if he is obedient to the magistrates, let him live as a private man; but if not, let him be put to death. Likewise, if, when he ought to be brought before a court of justice, any magistrate neglects to bring him, let such magistrate be disgraced when a contention takes place about rewards. Let him, therefore, who travels, travel in this manner, and let him be such a person as we have described. But, in the next place, foreigners ought to be kindly received. There are four kinds of foreigners, then, of whom we ought to make mention. The first is, of those who are always summerly, and most of whom, like birds, fly over the sea in summer to other cities, for the sake of acquiring riches. It is proper that these should be received in the forum, in the ports and public buildings, beyond the city, by the magistrates who preside over these places; such magistrates at the same time taking care that no innovation is made by any of these foreigners. Let justice, too, be properly distributed to them, and no association be held with them, beyond what is absolutely necessary. The second kind is, of those who travel for the sake of beholding what Muses are received by different cities. It is proper that all such as these should have habitations near the temples, properly constructed for hospitable purposes. Priests, too, and the purifiers of temples, ought to take care of these, that after they have staid a sufficient time, and have seen and heard all that they came to see and hear, they may depart without any detriment either to themselves or others. Let the priests, too, be the judges of these. And, if anyone of them commits an injury, or is injured, let the priests fine the offending party as far as to fifty drachms. But it is proper that greater offences should be punished by those that preside over the markets. The third kind of foreigner that ought to be publicly received, is he who is sent from another region on some public affair. Him let the generals of the army, the masters

of the horse, and the military tribunes, alone receive. And let him be alone taken care of by him with whom he resides together with the chief magistrates. The fourth genus of foreigners is indeed rare. Someone, however, may come from another region with the same design that our speculators travel into foreign parts. Let such a one then be received on the following conditions. In the first place, he must not be less than fifty years of age. In the next place, he must come with an intention either of beholding what is remarkably beautiful in other cities, or of instructing other cities in things of this kind. Let such a one, therefore, approach, unbidden, to the gates of the rich and the wise, since he comes under this description himself. And let him go to the house of him who takes care of the whole of discipline, believing that one who is victorious in virtue will be considered by such a character as a sufficient guest. Likewise, when he has learnt from others, and has taught others, what he considers as fit to be learnt and taught, let him depart like a friend from friends with gifts and becoming honors. All foreigners, both male and female, ought to be received according to these laws, and, in a similar manner reverencing hospitable Zeus, we should send men from our city. For foreigners ought not to be expelled with food and victims, (as the inhabitants of the Nile do at present,) nor yet are they to be driven away by savage edicts. Let every surety be responsible for another in a conspicuous manner; and let the whole transaction be acknowledged in writing, before not less than three witnesses, if the security is within a hundred drachms. But, if it is beyond a thousand, let there be five sureties at least. Let the surety, if he is a shopkeeper, be one that acts justly in his business, or else let him by no means be considered as worthy of belief. If anyone desires to search in the house of another person for something belonging to himself, let him first of all swear by the legal Gods that he

hopes to find there what he is in search of. In the next place, let him enter the house naked, or with no other clothing than a tunic, and ungirded. Then let him be permitted to search the house, and examine everything, whether sealed or unsealed. But, if anyone refuses admittance to him who desires to search his house, let him who is forbidden access bring an action against him who refuses him admittance, for the value of what he has lost; and, if such person is condemned, let him be obliged to pay twice the value of the loss sustained. If the master of the house on such an occasion happens to be absent, let those that are present permit only such things as are unsealed to be examined; and let the person that searches the house seal with his own signet the things already sealed, and leave for five days any person he pleases as a guard in the house. But if the master of the house is absent for a longer time than this, let him who desires to search the house take the ædiles along with him, break open such things as are sealed, and, after he has examined them in conjunction with the domestics and ædiles, seal them again. With respect to things of an ambiguous nature, let not a limited time for the determination of them be left dubious: for by this means there will be no altercation about houses and land. But if anyone is in possession of other things, and it appears that he has used them openly for the space of a year, in the city, in the forum, and in temples, and no one has laid claim to them during that time, in this case let no one be permitted afterwards to demand those things as his own. But if such person used such things, neither in the city, nor in the forum, but openly in the fields, and the proper owner of them is not found in five years, let no one be suffered to demand a them after the expiration of this time. But if such person uses these things at home in the city, let the period of laying claim to them be limited to three years. But if he uses them

secretly in the fields, let it be limited to ten years. And, if he used them in another district, let the person who has lost them be permitted to lay claim to them at any time. If anyone forcibly hinders another, whether a plaintiff or defendant, from having recourse to justice, if it is a slave that he hinders, whether his own or belonging to another person, let no notice be taken of the affair, and let the legal process be stopt: but if it is a free-born person, besides the legal process being stopt, let him by whom he was forcibly detained be imprisoned for a year, and let anyone who is willing accuse him of mancipation. If anyone forcibly prohibits a gymnastic or musical antagonist, or an opponent in any other contest, from contending in his art, let anyone who is willing inform those that confer rewards on the victors in these exercises, of the affair; and these shall be the means of procuring admittance to the contests to such as are willing to engage in them. But if it should happen that they are incapable of procuring them admittance, if he who impedes is himself victorious, let the reward of his victory be given to the person he impeded, and let the name of the person so impeded be inscribed as victor in whatever temples he pleases. But let not the person that impedes be suffered to suspend an offering, or make any inscription of a victory of this kind. Likewise, let him be accused of having done an injury, whether he vanquishes in contending, or is vanquished. If anyone receives stolen goods knowingly, let him suffer the same punishment as the person that stole them. Let death, too, be the punishment of him that harbors an exile. For everyone should reckon him as a friend or an enemy, who is considered as such by the city. If anyone of his own accord makes peace with, or denounces war against, certain persons, without general consent, let death be the punishment of such a one. But if any part of a city makes peace, or denounces war, by itself, let the generals of the

army bring the authors of this action before a court of justice; and, when condemned, let their punishment be death. Let those that serve their country in any respect do this without gifts. And let no occasion or arguments ever induce us to believe that we ought to receive gifts for good offices, but not for such as are bad. For it is neither easy to know when actions are good or bad, nor to endure patiently when this knowledge is obtained. It is, therefore, more safe to listen to, and be persuaded by, the law, which says that no one shall serve his country for the sake of gifts. Let him, therefore, who is unpersuaded by this law, when condemned, be punished with death. Let public tributes, too, be disposed as follows: In the first place, everyone's possessions must be considered as subsisting for the sake of many utilities. In the next place, let those of the same tribe carry a written account of the annual fruits to the præfects of the land; so that, in consequence of there being two tributes, the republic may choose every year whichever of the two they please, viz. either a part of all the estates, or the annual crop, exclusive of such things as contribute to aliment. It is likewise proper that moderate offerings to the Gods should be dedicated by moderate men. Earth, therefore, which is the hearth of habitation, is the sacred possession of all the Gods. Let no one then consecrate the same thing a second time to the Gods. But gold and silver in other cities, both privately and in temples, are an invidious possession. Ivory, too, as belonging to a body deprived of soul, is not a pure offering to the Gods. And iron and brass are the instruments of war. Let, therefore, anyone dedicate whatever he pleases, from wood, so as it is fashioned from one piece of wood, and, in a similar manner, anything formed from stone, in the common temples. With respect to things woven, let nothing of this kind be dedicated which exceeds the monthly work of a woman. White colors will to

adapted to the Gods, both in other things, and in such as are woven. But nothing dyed should be offered, except it belongs to warlike ornaments. The most divine gifts, however, are such birds and pictures as a painter has finished in one day. And let all other offerings be similar to these. Since, therefore, we have divided the parts of all the city, in such a manner as is proper, and have spoken in the best manner we are able respecting the laws which ought to be established in all the greatest compacts, it now remains that we should speak concerning judgments. In the first place, therefore, let there be select judges for the courts of justice, and such as are chosen in common by plaintiffs and defendants. These, indeed, may more properly be called arbiters than judges. In the next place, let those of the same street and tribe, when divided according to a twelfth part, be appointed as judges. Let the contending parties, if they cannot be reconciled by the former judges, go to these, and litigate with greater loss. Here, if the defendant is a second time condemned, let him pay the fifth part of the proscribed fine. But if anyone accuses these judges, and wishes to dispute the affair in a third court of justice, let him refer the cause to select judges. And if he is again condemned by these, let him pay the sum that is owing, and the half of it besides. But if the plaintiff, being repulsed by the first judgment, is not satisfied, but appeals to a second, —if he vanquishes let him receive a fifth part, but if he is vanquished let him lose the same part. And if he goes to a third court of justice, not being satisfied with the former judgments, let the defendant, if vanquished, pay (as we have said) the sum that is owing, and the half of it besides; but let the plaintiff pay the half only. With respect to the allotments of courts of justice, the perfection and establishment of things ministrant to the magistrates, the times in which each of these ought to take place, the

particulars respecting votes, the delays, terms, citations and repulses which take place in judicial affairs, and whatever else necessarily pertains to these, —all this we have already discussed. However, according to the proverb, what is beautiful and right may be spoken twice and thrice. All such legal particulars, therefore, as are small and easy to be discovered, when omitted by an aged legislator, ought to be filled up by a junior legislator. And thus much may suffice concerning private courts of justice. But such as are public and common, and which are employed by magistrates to proper purposes, are found in many cities established in no unbecoming manner by equitable men. Whence it is requisite that the guardians of the laws should procure such things as are adapted to this new polity, by reasoning, correcting, and exploring them, till they appear to them to be sufficiently established; and then bringing them to a conclusion, that they should seal them as things immovable, and use them through the whole of life. With respect to the silence of judges, the praises which are given them, or the contrary, and likewise concerning things just, good, and becoming, which differ in other cities, we have already spoken, and shall again speak in the end. But it is requisite that he who in future will be an equitable judge should look to all these particulars, and being in possession of them, when committed to writing, should make them the object of his study. For written laws are more calculated to make him who learns them better, than all other disciplines, if they are properly established. For, indeed, divine and admirable law does not rashly possess a name adapted to intellect. And besides this, the writings of the legislator afford us a perspicuous examination of the assertions of others respecting praise and blame, which are partly transmitted to us in verse, and partly in prose, and which likewise daily take place in all other associations, when men contend with

each other through emulation, and concessions which are vain in the extreme. These a good judge should always keep in his possession, as remedies against the poison of other discourses, correcting by them both himself and the city; confirming and praising the good, and recalling, to the utmost of his power, such of the evil as are curable from ignorance, intemperance, timidity, and, in short, from all injustice. For, if they are incapable of being cured, those judges, and governors of the judges, that put them to death, as the only remedy to souls in such a condition, may be often said, with justice, to deserve praise from the whole city. After annual judgments are finished, let them use the following laws: —In the first place, let the magistrate who exercises the office of a judge consign over all the money of the debtor to the victor, leaving him only sufficient for necessary uses. And let this take place immediately after the giving of votes, the affair being announced by a crier, and in the hearing of the judges. In the next place, if, after sentence is passed, one month has elapsed and a second commenced, and the vanquished person has not voluntarily paid what is due to the victor, let the judicial magistrate deliver up the money of the debtor to the victor. But if the debtor has not sufficient money to discharge the debt, and he is deficient not less than a drachm, let not the debtor be suffered to go to law with any other person till he has paid all that is due to the victor; but let any other person be permitted to go to law with him. If anyone, when condemned by a magistrate, unjustly takes anything from him, let the injured magistrate take the offender before the court of justice of the guardians of the laws. And if he is condemned by these, let him be punished with death, as one who subverts the whole city and the laws. But a man who is born and educated, and who begets and educates children, under these laws, who engages moderately in contracts, is punished if he acts unjustly, and

sees those punished that injure him, and, lastly, who grows old together with the laws, —such a one will end his days according to nature.

With respect to the funeral rites of the dead, whether male or female, and the particulars which pertain to the infernal and supernal Gods, let them be instituted according to the answers of the interpreters. Let there be no sepulchers in cultivated places, neither large nor small. But let that place alone receive the bodies of the dead which is useless for other purposes, and will in the smallest degree injure the living. For no one, either living or dying, should impede the fecundity of mother earth, and thus deprive some living person of aliment. Likewise, let no tomb be raised higher than five men are able to raise in five days. Let the stone columns, too, be no larger than are sufficient to admit an encomium of the dead in four heroic verses; and let the dead be laid out no longer a time than is sufficient to evince that they are truly dead. But, with respect to human affairs of this kind, an interval of three days before the burial will be nearly sufficient. It is likewise proper to believe the legislator in other things; and when he asserts that the soul is in every respect different from the body; and that, in the present life, it causes each of us to be that which each of us is; but, that body follows each of us like an image; and, that bodies may be beautifully said to be the images of the perfectly dead. That, besides this, each of us may be truly denominated an immortal soul, which will depart to other Gods to give an account of its conduct, as the law of our country asserts. This, however, is a circumstance which produces confidence in the good, but is terrible in the extreme to the evil; for no great assistance can be rendered them after death. Hence, it is necessary to give them all proper assistance while living, that they may live in the most just and holy manner, and that after the present life they may escape the punishments

which await the commission of crimes. Since this, then, is the case, we ought by no means to ruin our families, in consequence of thinking that this mass of flesh which is buried is truly our relative; but we should be persuaded that the son or brother, or any person for whom we have an affection, and whom we consider as buried, has departed hence in consequence of having finished and filled up his fate. We shall, therefore, act well on these occasions by employing a moderate expense, as upon an inanimate altar of terrestrial natures. But the legislator will not, in the most disgraceful manner, divine what this moderate expense should be. Let this, then, be the law: —That he who possesses the greatest estate shall not spend more than five minæ on any funeral; that he who possesses the second estate shall spend three minæ; the third, two; and the fourth, one mina. For thus the funeral expenses of every individual will be moderate. But, as the guardians of the laws ought necessarily to take care of many things, so especially of this, that their life may be employed in attending to boys and men, and to males and females of every age. And besides this, on the death of every citizen, one of the guardians of the laws, whom the relations of the deceased shall think fit to choose, should take care that everything pertaining to the funeral is conducted in a becoming and moderate, and not in an unbecoming and disgraceful manner. And let them be honored when the former, but considered as infamous when the latter, is the case. Let, therefore, everything pertaining to funerals take place according to this law. But things of the following kind ought to be committed to the care of the legislator who establishes political law: —It would be unbecoming either to order, or not, the dead to be lamented with tears; but loud lamentations on this occasion, out of the house, are to be forbidden. The dead body, likewise, should not be suffered

to be carried openly in the more frequented roads, accompanied with lamentations, nor yet out of the city before day. Let such, therefore, be the established laws respecting these particulars. And let him who is obedient to them be exempt from punishment; but let him who disobeys one of the guardians of the laws be punished by all of them in such a manner as shall appear fit to all. With respect to other particulars, which either pertain to sepulchers, or to those who through patricide and sacrilege are deprived of sepulchers, these we have spoken of before, and legally established. So that legislation has now nearly obtained its completion. But the end of all things must be considered as taking place, not from their being performed, or possessed, or inhabited, but from their being properly accomplished, and firmly established. For, in a preservation of this kind, it is proper to think, that what ought to be done is done, but that prior to this, the whole is imperfect.

Clinias/ You speak well, O guest. But inform me in a yet clearer manner what was your design in what you just now said?

Athenian Stranger/ Many things, O Clinias, are beautifully said by the ancients, and this is true, in no small degree, with respect to the names of the Fates.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ That the first of these is Lachesis, the second Clotho, and the third Atropos, who is the preserver of what has been asserted by us. These are assimilated to things conglomerated by fire, and which possess an inconvertible power. And in a city and polity these ought not only to procure health and safety to bodies, but a good establishment of laws in souls, or rather the preservation of laws. But it appears to me that this is yet wanting to laws,

—I mean, an inquiry how they may obtain an inconvertible, power according to nature.

Clinias/ You speak of no small affair, if it is possible to find how a thing of this kind may take place in every possession.

Athenian Stranger/ But this is possible, as it appears in every respect to me at present.

Clinias/ Let us not, therefore, depart hence, by any means, till we have added this to the laws we have now delivered. For it is ridiculous to labor in anything in vain, and not to lay down something stable.

Megillus/ You exhort in a proper manner: and you will also find me to be such a one.

Clinias/ You speak well. What then is this preservation, and after what manner may it be obtained in our polity and laws?

Athenian Stranger/ Have we not said that an assembly ought to be held in our city of the following kind: —That always ten of the oldest guardians of the law, together with all such as are honored with gifts, should make a part of this assembly? That, further still, those who have travelled over many regions in order that they might find something adapted to the preservation of the laws, should go to this assembly, if on their return their manners were found to be uncorrupted, and themselves worthy to be members of this assembly? That, besides this, each of these ought to bring with him young men, who are not less than thirty years of age, and who are judged to deserve this honor both by nature and education, and by the approbation of the whole assembly? And that if any unworthy young man should be brought to the assembly, the sentence which is passed should be of no moment? Lastly, that this assembly should be convened before day, when there is a perfect leisure from

all other business, both public and private? Was not something of this kind asserted by us in the preceding discourse?

Clinias/ It was.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, therefore, resuming the discourse about this assembly, we say, that if anyone hurls forth this, as an anchor of the whole city, and which contains in itself everything that can be desired, everything will be preserved which we wish to be so.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ We shall after this take occasion to speak with rectitude, and, to the utmost of our power, leave nothing unfinished.

Clinias/ You speak exceedingly well: act, therefore, agreeably to your conceptions.

Athenian Stranger/ It is proper therefore O Clinias, to understand, with respect to everything, a fit savior in every work; as in an animal, the soul and the head are naturally the greatest saviors of the whole.

Clinias/ How again do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ The virtue of these, doubtless, affords safety to the whole animal.

Clinias/ But how?

Athenian Stranger/ In soul, indeed, besides other things, intellect is inserted; and in the head, besides other things, sight and hearing. And, in short, intellect being mingled with the most beautiful senses, so as to produce one thing, the preservation of the several parts may most justly be said to be thus effected.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ Undoubtedly. But does not intellect, mingled with the senses, become the safety of ships, both in

tempests and fair weather? Or, in a ship, do not the pilot and the sailors, in consequence of mingling their senses with the piloting intellect, preserve both themselves and everything pertaining to the ship?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But there is no need of many examples about things of this kind: let us consider, therefore, in an army, and in medicine, to what mark both commanders and physicians directing their attention, become the means of preservation.

Clinias/ It will be proper to do so.

Athenian Stranger/ Do not the former of these, then, direct their attention to victory, and the strength of the enemies, but the latter to the health of the body?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ But, if the physician is ignorant of that respecting the body which we now denominate health, or the commander of victory, or of other things which we might mention, would they appear to be endued with intellect about any of these particulars?

Clinias/ How could they?

Athenian Stranger/ But what with respect to a city? If anyone is ignorant of the mark at which a politician ought to look, could he, in the first; place, be justly denominated a governor? And, in the next place, would he be able to preserve that, the scope of which he is perfectly unacquainted with?

Clinias/ How could he?

Athenian Stranger/ It is necessary therefore now, as it appears, if the establishment of this our city is to obtain its completion, that there should be someone in it who knows, in the first place, this which we call the political scope; in

the next place, after what manner it is requisite to partake of this; and, in the third place, which of the laws, and who among men, will properly or improperly consult with a view to this. For, if any city is destitute of a thing of this kind, it will not be wonderful, since it must be void of intellect and sense, if all its actions are the result of chance.

Clinias/ You speak the truth.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, therefore, are we able to say in what part of our city, or by what studies, any guard of this kind will be sufficiently obtained?

Clinias/ I cannot clearly inform you, O guest. But, if I may be allowed to jest, it appears to me that this discourse tends to that nocturnal assembly which you said ought to be instituted.

Athenian Stranger/ You have rightly conjectured, O Clinias; and, as the present reasoning announces, this assembly ought to possess every virtue; the chief of which is not to wander, by regarding a multitude of particulars, but, looking to one thing, always to emit all things like darts to this.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, therefore, we learn that it is not wonderful that the legal institutions of cities wander. For different establishments of the laws in each city look to different things. And to some, the end of what is just consists in certain persons governing in the city, whether they are better or worse than others. But, with others, the end consists in becoming rich, whether they are slaves or not. The attention of others again is directed to a life of liberty. Others establish laws for two purposes, that they may be free themselves, and that they may become the despots of other cities. And those that are most wise direct their attention to these, and to all such particulars, at once; but

they are unable to assign anyone principal thing to which the rest ought to look.

Clinias/ Hence, O guest, that which was formerly established by us is right; for we said that the whole of our laws should always look to one thing. And we granted that this might, with the greatest rectitude, be called virtue.

Athenian Stranger/ We did so.

Clinias/ And it was likewise established by us that virtue was, in a certain respect, four-fold.

Athenian Stranger/ Entirely so.

Clinias/ And that intellect, likewise, was the leader of all these, to which all other things, and three of the virtues, ought to look.

Athenian Stranger/ You have followed me in a beautiful manner, O Clinias; continue, therefore, to follow me in what remains. For we have said, that the intellect of the pilot, the physician, and the commander, looks to one thing; but, accusing the politic intellect, we have arrived thus far, and we shall now thus interrogate it as if it were a man: —O wonderful man! to what do you tend? What is that one thing which the medicinal intellect can speak of in a perspicuous manner; but you, who, as you say, excel all prudent persons, are not able to do this in your art? Or can you, O Megillus and Clinias, answer for him what this is, as I have often done to you for others?

Clinias/ By no means, O guest.

Athenian Stranger/ But should we not desire to perceive what this is, and in what things it subsists?

Clinias/ In what particular things do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ As we have said that there are four species of virtue, it is evident that each of them must necessarily be one, since they are altogether four.

Clinias/ Undoubtedly.

Athenian Stranger/ We likewise denominate all these one. For we say that fortitude is a virtue, and that prudence is a virtue; and, in a similar manner, the two others, as if this thing virtue was not in reality many things, but one thing only.

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ So far, therefore, as these two differ from each other, and receive two names, and, in a similar manner, the other two, there is no difficulty in speaking of them; but so far as we call both of them, together with the other two, one thing, viz. virtue, it is not easy to speak of them.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ There is no difficulty in explaining what I say. For let us only divide among ourselves the business of interrogating and answering.

Clinias/ How again do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Do you ask me why, denominating virtue one thing, we again give this appellation to two things, one of which is fortitude, and the other prudence? For I will tell you the cause, which is this: —One of these is conversant with fear, whence savage beasts also participate of fortitude, and the manners of very young children. For the soul may be brave from nature without reason, but without reason it never was prudent and endued with intellect, nor is, nor ever will be. So that this latter differs from the former.

Clinias/ You speak truly.

Athenian Stranger/ You, therefore, understand from my discourse in what manner these are two, and how they differ from each other; but how they are one and the same do you again inform me. But think as if you were telling me how being four they are one, and as if I afterwards should show

you how being one they are again four. And after this, let us consider, whether he who wishes sufficiently to understand anything which has both a name and a definition, ought only to know the name, but should be ignorant of the definition; or whether it is base for him who has any knowledge respecting things which transcend in magnitude and beauty, to be ignorant of all such particulars as these.

Clinias/ It appears so.

Athenian Stranger/ But is there anything greater which a legislator, a guardian of the laws, and he who is thought to surpass all others in virtue, and for this receives rewards, can possess, than fortitude, temperance, justice, and prudence?

Clinias/ How is it possible there can?

Athenian Stranger/ Ought not, therefore, interpreters, teachers, legislators, and guardians of others, to teach those who desire to know and to perceive things of this kind, or who require punishment and reproof, what power virtue and vice possess; and must they not, through information of this kind, in every respect excel others? Or will any poet coming into the city, or any instructor of youth, be considered as better than him who excels in all virtue? And, in the next place, will it appear wonderful if a city, in which the guardians have not a sufficient knowledge of virtue, in consequence of being without a guard, should suffer the same things which many cities at present suffer?

Clinias/ It will not appear wonderful.

Athenian Stranger/ What then? Shall we do what we just now spoke of? Or shall we consider how we may enable the guardians to excel others in virtue, both in words and in reality? Or after what manner our city may become similar to the head and senses of the prudent, through possessing in itself a guard of this kind?

Clinias/ How, therefore, O guest, and after what manner, shall we speak, assimilating it to a thing of this kind?

Athenian Stranger/ It is evident that the city itself will resemble the cavity of the head; and that the junior guardians, who are ingenuous and sagacious, will be placed, as it were, on the highest summit, whence they can survey, in a circle, the whole city, and, while they defend it, deliver the senses to the memory, and announce to the elders everything that takes place in the city. But these being assimilated to intellect, through understanding in the highest perfection a multitude of things which are worthy of regard, they will consult for the city, and employ the junior guardians as agents in their consultations. For thus both will truly preserve the city in common. Whether, therefore, shall we say they are to be established in this manner, or not? Or shall we say that they are all to be considered as equal, and not accurately determine the difference between them, in education and discipline?

Clinias/ But this, O wonderful man, is impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us, therefore, proceed to a more accurate discipline than the former.

Clinias/, By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ But is not that which we just now touched upon the very thing which we are in want of?

Clinias/ Entirely so.

Athenian Stranger/ We said, then, that in everything a consummate artificer and guardian ought not only to be capable of looking to many things, but should eagerly tend to one thing, and, when he has obtained a knowledge of it, orderly dispose according to this whatever he beholds.

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ Can, therefore, any speculation be assigned more accurate than that which is able to look to one idea from things many and dissimilar?

Clinias/ Perhaps not.

Athenian Stranger/ Not perhaps, but in reality, O dæmoniacal man! there is not any human method more clear than this.

Clinias/ Believing what you say, O guest, I will admit it. Let us, therefore, proceed, speaking agreeably to this assertion.

Athenian Stranger/ As it appears, therefore, the guardians of a divine polity must be compelled by us to see accurately, in the first place, what that is which is the same in all the four virtues; and which, being one thing in fortitude and temperance, justice and prudence, we very properly call by one name, virtue. Strenuously laying hold of this at present, O friends, if you are willing, we will not leave it till we have sufficiently said what that is which is to be looked to, whether as one thing, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way it may subsist. Or can we think that, if this escapes, us we can ever sufficiently possess the things pertaining to virtue, respecting which we are neither able to say whether it is many things, nor whether it is four things, nor whether it is one thing? If, therefore, you are persuaded by our advice, we shall devise some method by which this may take place in our city. Or, if it appears in every respect agreeable to you, we will dismiss it.

Clinias/ A thing of this kind, O guest, is by the hospitable God by no means to be dismissed, since you appear to us to speak with the utmost rectitude. But how can anyone devise this method?

Athenian Stranger/ We shall not yet say how this is to be devised: but, in the first place, is it requisite or not that we should firmly consent among ourselves?

Clinias/ It is doubtless requisite, if possible.

Athenian Stranger/ But what with respect to the beautiful and the good? Are our guardians to know that each of these is alone many? Or should they, likewise, know that it is one, and how it is so?

Clinias/ It nearly seems necessary, that they should know scientifically how each of these is one.

Athenian Stranger/ But what? ought they to understand this, and at the same time be incapable of evincing by arguments that they do understand it?

Clinias/ But how can this be? For you speak of a certain habit belonging to a slave.

Athenian Stranger/ But what with respect to all serious pursuits? Shall we in a similar manner say, that those who are to be truly guardians ought truly to know the particulars respecting the truth of laws, be able sufficiently to unfold them in discourse, and act agreeably to them, judging what things subsist beautifully according to nature, and what have a contrary subsistence?

Clinias/ How is it possible we should not?

Athenian Stranger/ Is not that one of the most beautiful things which we seriously discussed concerning the Gods? As that they are, that they appear to possess a mighty power, and that this ought to be known by man, as far as be is capable of knowing it? Likewise, that we should pardon the greater part of those in the city, if they only follow the mandates of the laws, but that we should not commit the guardianship of them to anyone who has not labored to acquire all possible faith in things pertaining to the Gods? And that we should never choose anyone for a guardian of

the laws, who is not a divine man, who has not labored in the study of the laws, and who does not excel in virtue?

Clinias/ It is just, therefore, as you say, that he who is sluggish, or incapable of judging respecting things of this kind, should be far removed from beautiful concerns.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we, therefore, know that there are two things which lead to a belief of the particulars concerning the Gods, which we discussed above?

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ One is that which we asserted respecting the soul, that it is the most ancient and divine of all things, of which the motion receiving generation imparts an ever-flowing essence: but the other is concerning the orderly motion of the stars, and such other things as through the dominion of intellect adorn the universe. For he who contemplates these things neither in a negligent nor in a stupid manner, can never become so impious as not to be affected in a manner perfectly contrary to the conjectures of the multitude. For these conceive that those who apply themselves to things of this kind, I mean to astronomy and other necessary arts in conjunction with it, become atheists, in consequence of beholding things subsisting from necessity, and not from the dianoëtic energies of a will by which all things are rendered good.

Clinias/ How then do these subsist?

Athenian Stranger/ They now subsist, as I have said, perfectly contrary to what they would if they were conceived to be deprived of soul. For though such as more accurately investigate these things than others, in a wonderful manner touch upon the truth, and by employing accurate reasoning evince that they are not destitute of soul and intellect; and though some of these dared to assert that it was intellect which adorned everything in the heavens; yet again erring

with respect to the nature of the soul, as not knowing that it is more ancient than body, but conceiving it to be junior, they again, as I may say, subverted all things, and, much more, themselves. For, believing that all such things as are obvious to the sight subsist in the heavens, they considered the celestial regions as full of stones and earth, and many other inanimate bodies, and attributed to these the causes of the whole world. It was owing to this, that many who touched upon such like particulars were accused of impiety, and of engaging in difficult undertakings. And, besides this, those who philosophized were reviled by poets, and compared by them to dogs barking in vain; and other things were said of them which it would be foolish to repeat. But now, as I have said, the very contrary to this takes place.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ No mortal man can ever become firmly pious who does not admit these two things: viz. that soul is the most ancient of all things which participate of generation, and is immortal; and that it rules over all bodies. But, besides this, our guardian of the laws should not be ignorant of that which has been often asserted by us, that there is a true intellect in the stars; and he should likewise possess the necessary disciplines which are previous to these things; and employ a proper Muse, in order to harmonize the pursuits of manners and legal institutions. And, lastly, he should be able to render a reason for such things as admit one, and to show why this is not possible with other things. He who has not these requisites for public virtues will nearly never be a sufficient governor of the whole city, but will be subservient to other governors. But it is now proper to consider, O Clinias and Megillus, whether we ought to establish the character we have been describing, as the future legal guardian of all the preceding laws, for the sake of the preservation of the whole city; at the same time,

that nocturnal assembly of governors, endued with all such discipline as we have mentioned above, being adopted: or how shall we act?

Clinias/ But, O best of men, why should we not to the utmost of our power establish him?

Athenian Stranger/ We certainly ought all of us to strive to accomplish this. I, indeed, will cheerfully be your helper. For perhaps through skill in, and the consideration of, things of this kind, I may find many other assistants besides myself.

Clinias/ Let us, O guest, proceed in this path rather than any other, in which Divinity himself nearly leads us. But let us now speak of and devise the method by which this may be properly accomplished.

Athenian Stranger/ Laws about things of this kind, O Megillus and Clinias, cannot be established till the city is orderly disposed; for then their authority may be legally determined. But they cannot in any other way be adopted with rectitude than by erudition and frequent examination in conjunction with others.

Clinias/ How so? Why do we again say this?

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, without doubt, a catalogue should be made of those men who are adapted to be guardians, by their age, by the power of disciplines, and by their manners and habits. In the next place, it is neither easy to find what ought to be learnt, nor to become the disciple of him who discovers this. Besides this, the times will be in vain prescribed in writing, in which the several particulars ought to take place. For neither will the learners be able to know when anything may be opportunely learnt, before science of the discipline is generated in their souls. Hence, all these particulars being spoken of occultly, will not

be spoken of properly: but they are occult, because they cannot be rendered clearer by narration.

Clinias/ Since this then is the case, O guest, what shall we do?

Athenian Stranger/ We must act, O friends, according to the proverb. For we must discuss the affair in common and publicly. And if we wish to make the dangerous trial, respecting the whole polity, we must do all things, either, as they say, throwing thrice six, or three dice. I will, however, undergo the danger with you, in speaking and explaining what appears to me respecting the discipline and education which we have now discussed. The hazardous enterprise is, indeed, neither small, nor similar to any other. But I exhort you, O Clinias, to make this the object of your care. For you, in the city of the Magnesians, or in that to which Divinity shall give a name, will obtain the greatest glory if you establish it properly. Or certainly, in this case, you cannot avoid appearing to be the bravest of all that shall succeed you. If then this divine assembly shall be established for us, O friends and companions, the city must be delivered to its care. Nor will there be any altercation, as I may say, with any of the legislators at present respecting these institutions. But, in reality, we shall nearly effect that in a vigilant state, which we touched upon in our discourse a little before, as in a dream, when we mingled together a certain image of the agreement of the head with intellect, if these men are accurately mingled together for us, are properly disciplined, and when disciplined reside in the acropolis of the region, so as to become such guardians, and possess the virtue of preservation in such a degree as we have not known any to possess it in the former part of our lives.

Megillus/ O friend Clinias, from all that has been now said by us, it follows, that we must either omit the establishment of this city, or not dismiss this our guest, but

by entreaties and all manner of devices make him a partaker with us in establishing the city.

Clinias/ You speak with the greatest truth, Megillus. And I indeed shall act in this manner; but do you also cooperate with me.

Megillus/ I will.

THE END OF THE TWELFTH AND LAST BOOK OF THE LAWS.

Laws

Translated by Trevor J. Saunders.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

An Athenian Guest, Clinias of Crete, and
Megillus of Lacedæmon.

Book 1.

Athenian Stranger/ Tell me, gentlemen, to whom do you give the credit for establishing your codes of law? Is it a god, or a man?

Clinias/ A god, sir, a god—and that's the honest truth. Among us Cretans it is Zeus; in Sparta—which is where our friend here hails from—they say it is Apollo, I believe. Isn't that right?

Megillus/ Yes, that's right.

Athenian Stranger/ You follow Homer, presumably, and say that every ninth year Minos used to go to a consultation with his father Zeus, and laid down laws for your cities on the basis of the god's pronouncements?

Clinias/ Yes, that's our Cretan version, and we add that Minos' brother, Rhadamanthus—doubtless you know the name—was an absolute paragon of justice. We Cretans would say that he won this reputation because of the scrupulously fair way in which he settled the judicial problems of his day.

Athenian Stranger/ A distinguished reputation indeed, and one particularly appropriate for a son of Zeus. Well then, since you and your companion have been raised under laws with such a splendid ancestry, I expect you will be quite happy if we spend our time together today in a discussion about constitutions and laws, and occupy our journey in a mutual exchange of views. I've heard it said that from Cnossus to Zeus' cave and shrine is quite a long way, and

the tall trees along the route provide shady resting-places which will be more than welcome in this stiflingly hot weather. At our age, there is every excuse for having frequent rests in them, so as to refresh ourselves by conversation. In this way we shall come to the end of the whole journey without having tired ourselves out.

Clinias/ And as you go on, sir, you find tremendously tall and graceful cypress trees in the sacred groves; there are also meadows in which we can pause and rest.

Athenian Stranger/ That sounds a good idea.

Clinias/ It is indeed, and it'll sound even better when we see them. Well then, shall we wish ourselves bon voyage, and be off?

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly. Now, answer me this. You have meals which you eat communally; you have a system of physical training, and a special type of military equipment. Why is it that you give all this the force of law?

Clinias/ Well, sir, I think that these customs are quite easy for anyone to understand, at any rate in our case. You see the Cretan terrain in general does not have the flatness of Thessaly: hence we usually train by running (whereas the Thessalians mostly use horses), because our land is hilly and more suited to exercise by racing on foot. In this sort of country we have to keep our armor light so that we can run without being weighed down, and bows and arrows seem appropriate because of their lightness. All these Cretan practices have been developed for fighting wars, and that's precisely the purpose I think the legislator intended them to serve when he instituted them. Likely enough, this is why he organized the common meals, too: he observed that when men are on military service they are all obliged by the pressure of events, for their own protection, to eat together throughout the campaign. In this, I think, he censured the

stupidity of ordinary men, who do not understand that they are all engaged in a never-ending lifelong war against all other states. So, if you grant the necessity of eating together for self-protection in war-time, and of appointing officers and men in turn to act as guards, the same thing should be done in peace-time too. The legislator's position would be that what most men call 'peace' is really only a fiction, and that in cold fact all states are by nature fighting an undeclared war against every other state. If you see things in this light, you are pretty sure to find that the Cretan legislator established all these institutions of ours, both in the public sphere and the private, with an eye on war, and that this was the spirit in which he gave us his laws for us to keep up. He was convinced that if we don't come out on top in war, nothing that we possess or do in peace-time is of the slightest use, because all the goods of the conquered fall into the possession of the victors.

Athenian Stranger/ You certainly have had a splendid training, sir! It has, I think, enabled you to make a most penetrating analysis of Cretan institutions. But explain this point to me rather more precisely: the definition you gave of a well-run state seems to me to demand that its organization and administration should be such as to ensure victory in war over other states. Correct?

Clinias/ Of course, and I think our companion supports my definition.

Megillus/ My dear sir, what other answer could one possibly make, if one is a Spartan?

Athenian Stranger/ But if this is the right criterion as between states, what about as between villages? Is the criterion different?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Athenian Stranger/ It is the same, then?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Well now, what about relations between the village's separate households? And between individual and individual? Is the same true?

Clinias/ The same is true.

Athenian Stranger/ What of a man's relations with himself—should he think of himself as his own enemy? What's our answer now?

Clinias/ Well done, my Athenian friend! (I'd rather not call you 'Attic', because I think it is better to call you after the goddess, as you deserve.) You have made the argument clearer by expressing it in its most elementary form. Now you will find it that much easier to realize that the position we took up a moment ago is correct: not only is everyone an enemy of everyone else in the public sphere, but each man fights a private war against himself.

Athenian Stranger/ You do surprise me, my friend. What do you mean?

Clinias/ This, sir, is where a man wins the first and best of victories—over himself. Conversely, to fall a victim to oneself is the worst and most shocking thing that can be imagined. This way of speaking points to a war against ourselves within each one of us.

Athenian Stranger/ Now let's reverse the argument. You hold that each one of us is either 'conqueror of' or 'conquered by' himself: are we to say that the same holds good of household, village and state? Or not?

Clinias/ You mean that they are individually either 'conquerors of' or 'conquered by' themselves?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes.

Clinias/ This again is a good question to have asked. Your suggestion is most emphatically true, particularly in the

case of states. Wherever the better people subdue their inferiors, the state may rightly be said to be 'conqueror of' itself, and we should be entirely justified in praising it for its victory. Where the opposite happens, we must give the opposite verdict.

Athenian Stranger/ It would take too long a discussion to decide whether in fact there is a sense in which the worse element could be superior to the better, so let's leave that aside. For the moment, I understand your position to amount to this: sometimes evil citizens will come together in large numbers and forcibly try to enslave the virtuous minority, although both sides are members of the same race and the same state. When they prevail, the state may properly be said to be 'inferior to' itself and to be an evil one; but when they are defeated, we can say it is 'superior to' itself and that it is a good state.

Clinias/ That's a paradoxical way of putting it, sir, but it is impossible to disagree.

Athenian Stranger/ But now wait a minute. Let's look at this point again: suppose a father and mother had several sons—should we be surprised if the majority of these brothers were unjust, and the minority just?

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ We could say that if the wicked brothers prevail the whole household and family may be called 'inferior to' itself, and 'superior to' itself if they are subdued—but it would be irrelevant to our purpose to labor the point. The reason why we're now examining the usage of the common man is not to pass judgment on whether he uses language properly or improperly, but to determine what is essentially right and wrong in a given law.

Clinias/ Very true, sir.

Megillus/ I agree—it's been nicely put, so far.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's look at the next point. Those brothers I've just mentioned—they' have a judge, I suppose?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Which of these judges would be the better, the one who put all the bad brothers to death and told the better ones to run their own lives, or the one who put the virtuous brothers in command, but let the scoundrels go on living in willing obedience to them? And we can probably add a third and even better judge—the one who will take this single quarrelling family in hand and reconcile its members, without killing any of them; by laying down regulations to guide them in the future, he will be able to ensure that they remain on friendly terms with each other.

Clinias/ Yes, this judge—the legislator—would be incomparably better.

Athenian Stranger/ But in framing these regulations he would have his eye on the exact opposite of war.

Clinias/ True enough.

Athenian Stranger/ But what about the man who brings harmony to the state? In regulating its life, will he pay more attention to external war, or internal? This 'civil' war, as we call it, does break out on occasion, and is the last thing a man would want to see in his own country; but if it did flare up, he would wish to have it over and done with as quickly as possible.

Clinias/ He'll obviously pay more attention to the second kind.

Athenian Stranger/ One side might be destroyed through the victory of the other, and then peace would follow the civil war; or, alternatively, peace and friendship might be the result of reconciliation. Now, which of these results would you prefer, supposing the city then had to turn its attention to a foreign enemy?

Clinias/ Everybody would prefer the second situation to the first, so far as his own state was concerned.

Athenian Stranger/ And wouldn't a legislator have the same preference?

Clinias/ He certainly would.

Athenian Stranger/ Now surely, every legislator will enact his every law with the aim of achieving the greatest good?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ The greatest good, however, is neither war nor civil war (God forbid we should ever need to resort to either of them), but peace and goodwill among men. And so the victory of a state over itself, it seems, does not after all come into the category of ideals; it is just one of those things in which we've no choice. You might just as well suppose that the sick body which has been purged by the doctor was therefore in the pink of condition, and disregard the body that never had any such need. Similarly, anyone who takes this sort of view of the happiness of a state or even an individual will never make a true statesman in the true sense—if, that is, he adopts foreign warfare as his first and only concern; he'll become a genuine lawgiver only if he designs his legislation about war as a tool for peace, rather than his legislation for peace as an instrument of war.

Clinias/ What you say, sir, has the air of having been correctly argued. Even so, I shall be surprised if our Cretan institutions, and the Spartan ones as well, have not been wholly orientated towards warfare.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, that's as may be. At the moment, however, there's no call for a stubborn dispute on the point. What we need to do is to conduct our inquiry into these institutions dispassionately, seeing that we share this common interest with their authors. So keep me company in the conversation I'm going to have. Let's put up Tyrtaeus, for

example, an Athenian by birth who became a citizen of Sparta. He, of all men, was particularly concerned with what we are discussing. He said:

'I'd not mention a man, I'd take no account of him, no matter' (he goes on) 'if he were the richest of men, no matter if he had a huge number of good things' (he enumerated pretty nearly all of them) 'unless his prowess in war were beyond compare.' Doubtless you too have heard the lines; Megillus here knows them backwards, I expect.

Megillus/ I certainly do.

Clinias/ And they have certainly got as far as Crete: they were brought across from Sparta.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, let's jointly ask our poet some such question as this: 'Tyrtaeus, you are a poet, and divinely inspired. We are quite sure of your wisdom and virtue, from the special commendation you have bestowed on those who have particularly distinguished themselves in active service. On this point we—Megillus here, Clinias of Cnossus and I—find ourselves, we think, emphatically in agreement with you; but we want to be quite clear that we are talking about the same people. Tell us: do you clearly distinguish, as we do, two sorts of war? Or what?' I fancy that in reply to this even a man far less gifted than Tyrtaeus would state the facts of the case and say 'Two'. The first would be what we all call 'civil' war, and as we were saying just now, this is the most bitterly fought of all; and we shall all agree, I think, in making the other type of war the one we fight when we quarrel with our foreign enemies from outside the state, which is a much less vicious sort of war than the other.

Clinias/ I agree.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Well now, Tyrtaeus, which category of soldiers did you shower with your praises and which did

you censure? Which was the type of war they were fighting, that led you to speak so highly of them? The war fought against foreign enemies, it would seem—at any rate, you have told us in your verses that you have no time for men who cannot "stand the sight of bloody butchery

and do not attack in close combat with the foe."

So here is the next thing we'd say: 'It looks as if you reserve your special praise, Tyrtaeus, for those who fight with conspicuous gallantry in external war against a foreign enemy.' I suppose he'd agree to this, and say 'Yes'?

Clinias/ Surely.

Athenian Stranger/ However, while not denying the courage of those soldiers, we still maintain that those who display conspicuous gallantry in total war are very much more courageous. We have a poet to bear witness to this, Theognis, a citizen of Megara in Sicily, who says:

'Cyrnus, find a man you can trust in deadly feuding:

He is worth his weight in silver and gold.'

Such a man, in our view, who fights in a tougher war, is far superior to the other—to just about the same degree as the combination of justice, self-control and good judgment, reinforced by courage, is superior to courage alone. In civil war a man will never prove sound and loyal unless he has every virtue; but in the war Tyrtaeus mentions there are hordes of mercenaries who are ready to dig their heels in and die fighting, most of whom, apart from a very small minority, are reckless and insolent rogues, and just about the most witless people you could find. Now, what conclusion does my argument lead to? What is the point I am trying to make clear in saying all this? Simply that in laying down his laws every legislator who is any use at all—and especially your legislator here in Crete, duly instructed by Zeus—will never have anything in view except the highest virtue. This means,

in Theognis' terms, loyalty in a crisis'; one might call it 'complete justice'. The virtue that Tyrtaeus praised so highly is indeed a noble one, and has been appropriately celebrated by the poet, but strictly speaking, in order of merit it comes only fourth.

Clinias/ And that, sir, is to reduce our Cretan legislator to the status of a failure.

Athenian Stranger/ No, my dear fellow, it is not. The failure was entirely on our part. We were quite wrong to imagine that when Lycurgus and Minos established the institutions of Sparta and this country the primary end they had in view was invariably warfare.

Clinias/ But what ought we to have said?

Athenian Stranger/ We had no particular axes to grind in our discussion, and I think we ought to have told the honest truth. We ought not to have said that the legislator laid down his rules with an eye on only a part of virtue, and the most trivial part at that. We should have said that he aimed at virtue in its entirety, and that the various separate headings under which he tried to frame the laws of his time were quite different from those employed by modern legal draftsmen. Each of these invents any category he feels he wants, and adds it to his code. For instance, one will come up with a category on Inheritances and Heiresses', another with 'Assault', and others will suggest other categories ad infinitum. But we insist that the correct procedure for framing laws, which is followed by those who do the job properly, is precisely the one we have just embarked upon. I am delighted at the way you set about explaining your laws: you rightly started with virtue, and explained that this was the aim of the laws the legislator laid down. However, you did say that he legislated entirely by reference to only one part of virtue, and the most inconsiderable part at that. Now

there I thought you were wrong: hence all these additional remarks. So what is this distinction I could have wished to hear you draw in your argument? Shall I tell you?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Now, Sir,' you ought to have said, 'it is no accident that the laws of the Cretans have such a high reputation in the entire Greek world. They are sound laws, and achieve the happiness of those who observe them, by producing for them a great number of benefits. These benefits fall into two classes, "human" and "divine." The former depend on the latter, and if a city receives the one sort, it wins the other too—the greater include the lesser; if not, it goes without both. Health heads the list of the lesser benefits, followed by beauty; third comes strength, for racing and other physical exercises. Wealth is fourth—not "blind" wealth, but the clear-sighted kind whose companion is good judgment—and good judgment itself is the leading "divine" benefit; second comes the habitual self-control of a soul that uses reason. If you combine these two with courage, you get (thirdly) justice; courage itself lies in fourth place. All these take a natural precedence over the others, and the lawgiver must of course rank them in the same order. Then he must inform the citizens that the other instructions they receive have these benefits in view: the "human" benefits have the "divine" in view, and all these in turn look towards reason, which is supreme. The citizens join in marriage; then children, male and female, are born and reared; they pass through childhood and later life, and finally reach old age. At every stage the lawgiver should supervise his people, and confer suitable marks of honor or disgrace. Whenever they associate with each other, he should observe their pains, pleasures and desires, and watch their passions in all their intensity; he must use the laws themselves as instruments for the proper distribution of praise and blame. Again, the

citizens are angry or afraid; they suffer from emotional disturbances brought on by misfortune, and recover from them when life is going well; they have all the feelings that men usually experience in illness, war, poverty or their opposites. In all these instances the lawgiver's duty is to isolate and explain what is good and what is bad in the way each individual reacts. Next, the lawgiver must supervise the way the citizens acquire money and spend it; he must keep a sharp eye on the various methods they all employ to make and dissolve (voluntarily or under duress) their associations with one another, noting which methods are proper and which are not; honors should be conferred upon those who comply with the laws, and specified penalties imposed on the disobedient. When the lawgiver comes to the final stages of organizing the entire life of the state, he must decide what honors should be accorded the dead and how the manner of burial should be varied. His survey completed, the author of the legal code will appoint guardians (some of whom will have rational grounds for their actions, while others rely on "true opinion"), so that all these regulations may be welded into a rational whole, demonstrably inspired by considerations of justice and self-restraint, not of wealth and ambition.' That is the sort of explanation, gentlemen, that I should have liked you to give, and still want now—an explanation of how all these conditions are met in the laws attributed to Zeus and the Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus laid down. I wish you could have told me why the system on which they are arranged is obvious to someone with an expert technical—or even empirical—knowledge of law, while to laymen like ourselves it is entirely obscure.

Clinias/ Well then, sir, where do we go from here?

Athenian Stranger/ I think we ought to go back and start again. As before, we should consider first the activities that promote courage; then, if you like, we'll work through the

other kinds of virtue, one by one. We'll take the way we deal with the first as a model, and try to while away the journey by discussing the others in the same way. Then after dealing with virtue as a whole, we shall show, God willing, that the regulations we have just listed had this in view.

Megillus/ A splendid idea! Our friend here is an admirer of Zeus, so try examining him, to start with.

Athenian Stranger/ I'll try to examine not only him, but you and myself as well—we all have a stake in the discussion. Tell me, then, you two: do we maintain that the common meals and gymnastic exercises have been invented by your legislator for the purpose of war?

Megillus/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ What about a third such institution, and a fourth? To make a full list like this will probably be the right procedure in the case of the other 'parts' of virtue, too (or whatever the right terminology is: no matter, so long as one's meaning is clear).

Megillus/ I—and any Spartan, for that matter—would mention the legislator's invention of hunting as the third item.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's have a shot at adding a fourth, and a fifth too, if we can.

Megillus/ Well, I might try to add a fourth: the endurance of pain. This is a very conspicuous feature of Spartan life. You find it in our boxing matches, and also in our 'raids', which invariably lead to a severe whipping. There is also the 'Secret Service', as it is called, which involves a great deal of hard work, and is a splendid exercise in endurance. In winter, its members go barefoot and sleep without bedclothes. They dispense with orderlies and look after themselves, ranging night and day over the whole country. Next, in the 'Naked Games', men display fantastic

endurance, contending as they do with the full heat of summer. There are a great many other practices of the same kind, but if you produced a detailed list it would go on pretty well forever.

Athenian Stranger/ You've put it all very well, my Spartan friend. But what is to be our definition of courage? Are we to define it simply in terms of a fight against fears and pains only, or do we include desires and pleasures, which cajole and seduce us so effectively? They mold the heart like wax—even the hearts of those who loftily believe themselves superior to such influences.

Megillus/ Yes, I think so—the fight is against all these feelings.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, if we remember aright what was said earlier on, our friend from Cnossus spoke of a city and an individual as 'conquered by' themselves. Isn't that right?

Clinias/ Surely.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, shall we call 'bad' only the man who is 'conquered by' pains, or shall we include the victim of pleasures as well?

Clinias/ The term 'bad' we apply, I think, to the victim of pleasures even more than to the other. When we say that a man has been shamefully 'conquered by' himself, we are all, I fancy, much more likely to mean someone defeated by pleasures than by pains.

Athenian Stranger/ But the legal code of those lawgivers (inspired as they are by Zeus and Apollo) certainly did not envisage a courage with one hand tied behind its back, able to hit out on the left, but powerless in face of the cunning and seductive blandishments from the right. Surely it was supposed to resist in both directions?

Clinias/ Yes, both, I think.

Athenian Stranger/ We ought to mention next what practices exist in your two cities that give a man a taste of pleasure rather than teach him how to avoid it—you remember how a man could not avoid pains, but was surrounded by them, and then forced, or persuaded by awards of honor, to get the better of them. Now where in your codes of law is the institution that does the same for pleasure? Could you say, please, what institution you have that makes one and the same body of citizens courageous in face of pains and of pleasures alike, so' that they conquer where they ought to conquer and never fall victims to these their most intimate and dangerous enemies?

Megillus/ I was certainly able to point to a good many laws that were designed to counteract pains, stranger, but I doubt if I should find it so easy to give striking and clear examples in the case of pleasures. I might have some success, perhaps, in finding minor cases.

Clinias/ No more would I be able to find an obvious illustration of this sort of thing in the laws of Crete.

Athenian Stranger/ My dear sirs, this should not surprise us. (I hope, by the way, that if in his desire to discover goodness and truth any of us is led to criticize some legal detail in the homeland of either of his companions, we shall receive such criticism from each other tolerantly and without truculence.)

Clinias/ You have put it quite fairly, my Athenian friend. We must do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Truculence, Clinias, would be hardly the thing for men of our age.

Clinias/ No indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ The criticisms people bring against the way Sparta and Crete are run may be right or wrong: that is another issue. At any rate, I am probably better able

than either of you to report what most people generally say. However, granted that your codes of law have been composed with reasonable success, as indeed they have been, one of the best regulations you have is the one which forbids any young man to inquire into the relative merits of the laws; everyone has to agree, with one heart and voice, that they are all excellent and exist by divine fiat; if anyone says differently, the citizens must absolutely refuse to listen to him. If an old man has some point to make about your institutions, he must make such remarks to an official, or someone of his own age when no young man is present.

Clinias/ That's absolutely right, sir—you must be a wizard! You are far removed in time from the legislator who laid down these laws, but I think you have hit on his intentions very nicely, and state them with perfect accuracy.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, there are no young men here now. In view of our age, the legislator surely grants us the indulgence of having a private discussion on these topics without giving offense.

Clinias/ So be it: don't hesitate to criticize our laws. There is no disgrace in being told of some blemish—indeed, if one takes criticism in good part, without being ruffled by it, it commonly leads one to a remedy.

Athenian Stranger/ Splendid. But criticism of your laws is not what I propose: that can wait until we have scrutinized them exhaustively. I shall simply mention my difficulties. Among all the Greek and foreign peoples who have come to my knowledge, you are unique in that you have been instructed by your lawgiver to keep away from the most attractive entertainments and pleasures, and to refrain from tasting them. Yet when it came to pains and fears, your legislator reckoned that if a man ran away from them on every occasion from his earliest years and was then faced

with hardships, pains and fears he could not avoid, he would likewise run away from any enemies who had received such a training, and become their slaves. I think this same lawgiver ought to have taken this same line in the case of pleasures too. He ought to have said to himself: 'If our citizens grow up without any experience of the keenest pleasures, and if they are not trained to stand firm when they encounter them, and to refuse to be pushed into any disgraceful action, their fondness for pleasure will bring them to the same bad end as those who capitulate to fear. Their slavery will be of a different kind, but it will be more humiliating: they will become the slaves of those who are able to stand firm against the onslaughts of pleasure and who are past-masters in the art of temptation—utter scoundrels, sometimes. Spiritually, our citizens will be part slave, part free, and only in a limited sense will they deserve to be called courageous and free.' Just consider this argument: do you think it has any relevance at all?

Clinias/ Yes, I think it has, at first blush. But it is a weighty business, and to jump to confident conclusions so quickly may well be childish and naive.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, Clinias and our friend from Sparta, let's turn to the next item we put on the agenda: after courage, let's discuss self-control. We found, in the case of war, that your two political systems were superior to those of states with a more haphazard mode of government. Where's the superiority in the case of self-control?

Megillus/ That's rather a difficult question. Still, I should think the common meals and the gymnastic exercises are institutions well calculated to promote both virtues.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, my friends, I should think the real difficulty is to make political systems reflect in practice the trouble-free perfection of theory. (The human body is

probably a parallel. One cannot rigidly prescribe a given regimen for a given body, because any regimen will invariably turn out, in some respects, to injure our bodies at the same time as it helps them in others.) For instance, these gymnastic exercises and common meals, useful though they are to a state in many ways, are a danger in their encouragement of revolution—witness the example of the youth of Miletus, Boeotia and Thurii. More especially, the very antiquity of these practices seems to have corrupted the natural pleasures of sex, which are common to man and beast. For these perversions, your two states may well be the first to be blamed, as well as any others that make a particular point of gymnastic exercises. Circumstances may make you treat this subject either light-heartedly or seriously; in either case you ought to bear in mind that when male and female come together in order to have a child, the pleasure they experience seems to arise entirely naturally. But homosexual intercourse and lesbianism seem to be unnatural crimes of the first rank, and are committed because men and women cannot control their desire for pleasure. It is the Cretans we all hold to blame for making up the story of Ganymede: they were so firmly convinced that their laws came from Zeus that they saddled him with this fable, in order to have a divine 'precedent' when enjoying that particular pleasure. That story, however, we may dismiss, but not the fact that when men investigate legislation, they investigate almost exclusively pleasures and pains as they affect society and the character of the individual. Pleasure and pain, you see, flow like two springs released by nature. If a man draws the right amount from the right one at the right time, he lives a happy life; but if he draws unintelligently at the wrong time, his life will be rather different. State and individual and every living being are on the same footing here.

Megillus/ Well, sir, I suppose that what you say is more or less right; at any rate, we're baffled to find an argument against it. But in spite of that I still think the legislator of Sparta is right to recommend a policy of avoiding pleasure (our friend here will come to the rescue of the laws of Cnossus, if he wants to). The Spartan law relating to pleasures seems to me the best you could find anywhere. It has completely eliminated from our country the thing which particularly prompts men to indulge in the keenest pleasures, so that they become unmanageable and make every kind of a fool of themselves: drinking parties, with all their violent incitements to every sort of pleasure, are not a sight you'll see anywhere in Sparta, either in the countryside or in the towns under her control. None of us would fail to inflict there and then the heaviest punishment on any tipsy merrymaker he happened to meet; he would not let the man off even if he had the festival of Dionysus as his excuse. Once, I saw men in that condition on wagons in your country, and at Tarentum, among our colonials, I saw the entire city drunk at the festival of Dionysus. We don't have anything like that.

Athenian Stranger/ My Spartan friend, all this sort of thing is perfectly laudable in men with a certain strength of character; it is when they cannot stop themselves that it becomes rather silly. A countryman of mine could soon come back at you tit for tat by pointing to the easy virtue of your women. There is one answer, however, which in Tarentum and Athens and Sparta too is apparently thought to excuse and justify all such practices. When a foreigner is taken aback at seeing some unfamiliar custom there, the reply he gets on all hands is this: There is no need to be surprised, stranger: this is what we do here; probably you handle these things differently.' Still, my friends, the subject of this conversation is not mankind in general but only the merits

and faults of legislators. In fact, there is a great deal more we ought to say on the whole subject of drinking: it is a custom of some little importance, and needs a legislator of some little skill to understand it properly. I am not talking about merely drinking wine or totally abstaining from it: I mean drunkenness. How should we deal with it? One policy is that adopted by the Scythians and Persians, as well as by the Carthaginians, Celts, Iberians and Thracians—belligerent races, all of them. Or should we adopt your policy? This, as you say, is one of complete abstention, whereas the Scythians and Thracians (the women as well as the men) take their wine neat, and tip it down all over their clothes; in this they reckon to be following a glorious and splendid custom. And the Persians indulge on a grand scale (though with more decorum) in these and other luxuries which you reject.

Megillus/ Oh, but my fine sir, when we get weapons in our hands we rout the lot of them.

Athenian Stranger/ Oh, but my dear sir, you must not say that. Many a time an army has been defeated and routed in the past, and will be in the future, without any very obvious reason. Merely to point to victory or defeat in battle is hardly to advance a clear and indisputable criterion of the merits or demerits of a given practice. Larger states, you see, defeat smaller ones in battle, and the Syracusans enslave the Locrians, the very people who are supposed to be governed by the best laws you could find in those parts; the Athenians enslave the Ceians, and we could find plenty of other similar instances. It is by discussing the individual practice itself that we should try to convince ourselves of its qualities: for the moment, we ought to leave defeats and victories out of account, and simply say that such-and-such a practice is good and such-and-such is bad. First, though,

listen to my explanation of the correct way to judge the relative value of these practices.

Megillus/ Well then, let's have the explanation.

Athenian Stranger/ I think that everyone who sets out to discuss a practice with the intention of censuring it or singing its praises as soon as it is mentioned is employing quite the wrong procedure. You might as well condemn cheese out of hand when you heard somebody praising its merits as a food, without stopping to ask about what effect it has and how it is taken (by which I mean such questions as how it should be given, who should take it, what should go with it, in what condition it should be served, and the state of health required of those who eat it). But this is just what I think we are doing in our discussion. We have only to hear the word 'drunkenness', and one side immediately disparages it while the other praises it—a pointless procedure if there ever was one. Each puts up enthusiastic witnesses to endorse its recommendations: one side thinks that the number of its witnesses clinches the matter, the other points to the sight of the teetotalers conquering in battle—not that the facts of the case are beyond dispute even here. Now, if this is the way we are going to work one by one through the other customs, I for one shall find it goes against the grain. I want to discuss our present subject, drunkenness, by following a different—and, I think, correct—procedure, to see if I can demonstrate the right way to conduct an inquiry into such matters as these in general. Thousands and thousands of states, you see, differ from your pair of states in their view of these things, and would be prepared to fight it out in discussion.

Megillus/ Certainly, if a correct method of inquiry into such matters is available, we ought not to shy away from hearing what it is.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us conduct the inquiry more or less like this: suppose somebody were to praise goat-keeping, and commended the goat as a valuable article of possession; suppose somebody else were to disparage goats because he had seen some doing damage to cultivated land by grazing on it without a goatherd, and were to find similar fault with every animal he saw under incompetent control or none at all. What do we think of the censure of someone like that? Does it carry any weight at all?

Megillus/ Hardly.

Athenian Stranger/ If a man possesses only the science of navigation, can we say that he will be a useful captain on board a ship, and ignore the question whether he suffers from seasickness or not? Can we say that, or can't we?

Megillus/ Certainly not, at any rate if, for all his skill, he's prone to the complaint you mention.

Athenian Stranger/ What about the commander of an army? Is he capable of taking command just by virtue of military skill, in spite of being a coward in face of danger? The 'seasickness' in this case is produced by being, as it were, drunk with terror.

Megillus/ Hardly a capable commander, that.

Athenian Stranger/ And what if he combines cowardice with incompetence?

Megillus/ You are describing a downright useless fellow—a commander of the daintiest of dainty women, not of men at all.

Athenian Stranger/ Take any social gathering you like, which functions naturally under a leader and serves a useful purpose under his guidance: what are we to think of the observer who praises or censures it although he has never seen it gathered together and running properly under its leader, but always with bad leaders or none at all? Given

that kind of observer and that kind of gathering, do we reckon that his blame or praise will have any value?

Megillus/ How could it, when he has never seen or joined any of these gatherings run in the proper way?

Athenian Stranger/ Hold on a moment. There are many kinds of gatherings, and presumably we'd say drinkers and drinking-parties were one?

Megillus/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Has anyone ever seen such a gathering run in the proper way? You two, of course, find the answer easy: 'Never, absolutely never'; drinking-parties are just not held in your countries, besides being illegal. But I have come across a great many, in different places, and I have investigated pretty nearly all of them. However, I have never seen or heard of one that was properly conducted throughout; one could approve of a few insignificant details, but most of them were mismanaged virtually all the time.

Clinias/ What are you getting at, sir? Be a little more explicit. As you said, we have no experience of such events, so that even if we did find ourselves at one we would probably be unable to tell off-hand which features were correct and which not.

Athenian Stranger/ Very likely. But you can try to understand from my explanation. You appreciate that each and every assembly and gathering for any purpose whatever should invariably have a leader?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ We said a moment ago that if it is a case of men fighting, their leader must be brave.

Clinias/ Yes, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ And a brave man, surely, is less thrown off balance by fears than cowards are.

Clinias/ That too is true enough.

Athenian Stranger/ If there were some device by which we could put in charge of an army a commander who was completely fearless and imperturbable, this is what we should make every effort to do, surely?

Clinias/ It certainly is.

Athenian Stranger/ But the man we are discussing now is not going to take the lead in hostile encounters as between enemies, but in the peaceful meetings of friends with friends, gathering to foster mutual goodwill.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ But we can assume that this sort of assembly will get rather drunk, so it won't be free of a certain amount of disturbance, I suppose.

Clinias/ Of course not—I imagine precisely the opposite.

Athenian Stranger/ To start with, then, the members of the gathering will need a leader?

Clinias/ Of course they will, more than anybody else.

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably we should if possible equip them with a leader who can keep his head?

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ And he should also, presumably, be a man who knows how to handle a social gathering, because his duty is not only to preserve the existing friendliness among its members, but to see that it is strengthened as a result of the party.

Clinias/ Quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ So, when men become merry with drink, don't they need someone put in charge of them who is sober and discreet rather than the opposite? If the man in charge of the revelers were himself a drinker, or young and

indiscreet, he ought to thank his lucky stars if he managed to avoid starting some serious trouble.

Clinias/ Lucky? I'll say so!

Athenian Stranger/ Consequently, an attack on such gatherings in cities where they are conducted impeccably might not in itself amount to unjustified criticism, provided the critic were attacking the institution itself. But if he abuses the institution simply because he sees every possible mistake being made in running it, he clearly does not realize, first, that this is a case of mismanagement, and secondly that any and every practice will appear in the same light if it is carried on without a sober leader to control it. Surely you appreciate that a drunken steersman, or any commander of anything, will always make a total wreck of his ship or chariot or army, or whatever else he may be directing?

Clinias/ Yes, sir, there's truth in that, certainly. But the next step is for you to tell us what conceivable benefit this custom of drinking parties would be to us, given proper management. For instance, to take our example of a moment ago, if an army were properly controlled, its soldiers would win the war and this would be a considerable benefit, and the same reasoning applies to our other instances. But what solid benefit would it be to individuals or the state to instruct a drinking party how to behave itself?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, what solid benefit are we to say it is to the state when just one lad or just one chorus of them has been properly instructed? If the question were put like that, we should say that the state gets very little benefit from just one; but ask in general what great benefit the state derives from the training by which it educates its citizens, and the reply will be perfectly straightforward. The good education they have received will make them good men, and being good they will achieve success in other ways, and even

conquer their enemies in battle. Education leads to victory; but victory, on occasions, results in the loss of education, because men often swell with pride when they have won a victory in war, and this pride fills them with a million other vices. Men have won many 'Cadmean victories', and will win many more, but there has never been such a thing as 'Cadmean education'.

Clinias/ It looks to us, my friend, as if you mean to imply that passing the time with friends over a drink—provided we behave ourselves—is a considerable contribution to education.

Athenian Stranger/ Most certainly.

Clinias/ Well then, could you now produce some justification for this view?

Athenian Stranger/ Justification? Only a god, sir, would be entitled to insist that this view is correct—there are so many conflicting opinions. But if necessary I am quite prepared to give my own, now that we have launched into a discussion of laws and political organizations.

Clinias/ This is precisely what we are trying to discover—your own opinion of the business we are now debating.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, let that be our agenda: you have to direct your efforts to understanding the argument, while I direct mine to expounding it as clearly as I can. But first listen to this, by way of preface: you'll find every Greek takes it for granted that my city likes talking and does a great deal of it, whereas Sparta is a city of few words and Crete cultivates the intellect rather than the tongue. I don't want to make you feel that I am saying an awful lot about a triviality, if I deal exhaustively and at length with such a limited topic as drinking. In fact, the genuinely correct way to regulate drinking can hardly be explained adequately and clearly except in the context of a correct theory of culture;

and it is impossible to explain this without considering the whole subject of education. That calls for a very long discussion indeed. So what do you think we ought to do now? What about skipping all this for the moment, and passing on to some other legal topic?

Megillus/ As it happens, sir—perhaps you haven't heard—my family represents the interests of your state, Athens, in Sparta. I dare say all children, when they learn they are *proxeni* of a state, conceive a liking for it from their earliest years; each of us thinks of the state he represents as a fatherland, second only to his own country. This is exactly my own experience now. When the Spartans were criticizing or praising the Athenians, I used to hear the little children say, 'Megillus, your state has done the dirty on us,' or, 'it has done us proud.' By listening to all this and constantly resisting on your behalf the charges of Athens' detractors, I acquired a whole-hearted affection for her, so that to this day I very much enjoy the sound of your accent. It is commonly said that when an Athenian is good, he is 'very very good', and I'm sure that's right. They are unique in that they are good not because of any compulsion, but spontaneously, by grace of heaven; it is all so genuine and unfeigned. So you're welcome to speak as long as you like, so far as I'm concerned.

Clinias/ I endorse your freedom to say as much as you like, sir: you'll see that when you've heard what I have to say, too. You have probably heard that Epimenides, a man who was divinely inspired, was born hereabouts. He was connected with my family, and ten years before the Persian attack he obeyed the command of the oracle to go to Athens, where he performed certain sacrifices which the god had ordered. He told the Athenians, who were apprehensive at the preparations the Persians were making, that the Persians would not come for ten years, and that when they

did, they would go back with all their intentions frustrated, after sustaining greater losses than they had inflicted. That was when my ancestors formed ties of friendship with you Athenians, and ever since then my forebears and I have held you in affection.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, on your part you are prepared to listen, apparently; on my side, I am ready and willing to go ahead, but the job will certainly tax my abilities. Still, the effort must be made. To assist the argument, we ought to take the preliminary step of defining education and its potentialities, because we have ventured on a discussion which is intended to lead us to the god of wine, and we are agreed that education is as it were the route we have to take.

Clinias/ Certainly let's do that, if you like.

Athenian Stranger/ I am going to explain how one should describe education: see if you approve of my account.

Clinias/ Your explanation, then, please.

Athenian Stranger/ It is this: I insist that a man who intends to be good at a particular occupation must practice it from childhood: both at work and at play he must be surrounded by the special 'tools of the trade'. For instance, the man who intends to be a good farmer must play at farming, and the man who is to be a good builder must spend his playtime building toy houses; and in each case the teacher must provide miniature tools that copy the real thing. In particular, in this elementary stage they must learn the essential elementary skills. For example, the carpenter must learn in his play how to handle a rule and plumb-line, and the soldier must learn to ride a horse (either by actually doing it, in play, or by some similar activity). We should try to use the children's games to channel their pleasures and desires towards the activities in which they will have to engage when they are adult. To sum up, we say that the

correct way to bring up and educate a child is to use his playtime to imbue his soul with the greatest possible liking for the occupation in which he will have to be absolutely perfect when he grows up. Now, as I suggested, consider the argument so far: do you approve of my account?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ But let's not leave our description of education in the air. When we abuse or commend the upbringing of individual people and say that one of us is educated and the other uneducated, we sometimes use this latter term of men who have in fact had a thorough education—one directed towards petty trade or the merchant-shipping business, or something like that. But I take it that for the purpose of the present discussion we are not going to treat this sort of thing as 'education'; what we have in mind is education from childhood in virtue, a training which produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands. I suppose we should want to mark off this sort of training from others and reserve the title 'education' for it alone. A training directed to acquiring money or a robust physique, or even to some intellectual facility not guided by reason and justice, we should want to call coarse and illiberal, and say that it had no claim whatever to be called education. Still, let's not quibble over a name; let's stick to the proposition we agreed on just now: as a rule, men with a correct education become good, and nowhere in the world should education be despised, for when combined with great virtue, it is an asset of incalculable value. If it ever becomes corrupt, but can be put right again, this is a lifelong task which everyone should undertake to the limit of his strength.

Clinias/ True. We agree with your description.

Athenian Stranger/ Here is a further point on which we agreed some time ago: those who can control themselves are good, those who cannot are bad.

Clinias/ Perfectly correct.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's take up this point again and consider even more closely just what we mean. Perhaps you'll let me try to clarify the issue by means of an illustration.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Are we to assume, then, that each of us is a single individual?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ But that he possesses within himself a pair of witless and mutually antagonistic advisers, which we call pleasure and pain?

Clinias/ That is so.

Athenian Stranger/ In addition to these two, he has opinions about the future, whose general name is 'expectations'. Specifically, the anticipation of pain is called 'fear', and the anticipation of the opposite is called 'confidence'. Over and against all these we have 'calculation', by which we judge the relative merits of pleasure and pain, and when this is expressed as a public decision of a state, it receives the title 'law'.

Clinias/ I can scarcely follow you; but assume I do, and carry on with what comes next.

Megillus/ Yes, I'm in the same difficulty.

Athenian Stranger/ I suggest we look at the problem in this way: let's imagine that each of us living beings is a puppet of the gods. Whether we have been constructed to serve as their plaything, or for some serious reason, is something beyond our ken, but what we certainly do know

is this: we have these emotions in us, which act like cords or strings and tug us about; they work in opposition, and tug against each other to make us perform actions that are opposed correspondingly; back and forth we go across the boundary line where vice and virtue meet. One of these dragging forces, according to our argument, demands our constant obedience, and this is the one we have to hang on to, come what may; the pull of the other cords we must resist. This cord, which is golden and holy, transmits the power of 'calculation', a power which in a state is called the public law; being golden, it is pliant, while the others, whose composition resembles a variety of other substances, are tough and inflexible. The force exerted by law is excellent, and one should always co-operate with it, because although 'calculation' is a noble thing, it is gentle, not violent, and its efforts need assistants, so that the gold in us may prevail over the other substances. If we do give our help, the moral point of this fable, in which we appear as puppets, will have been well and truly made; the meaning of the terms 'self-superior' and 'self-inferior' will somehow become clearer, and the duties of state and individual will be better appreciated. The latter must digest the truth about these forces that pull him, and act on it in his life; the state must get an account of it either from one of the gods or from the human expert we've mentioned, and incorporate it in the form of a law to govern both its internal affairs and its relations with other states. A further result will be a clearer distinction between virtue and vice; the light cast on that problem will perhaps in turn help to clarify the subject of education and the various other practices, particularly the business of drinking parties. It may well be thought that this is a triviality on which a great deal too much has been said, but equally it may turn out that the topic really does deserve this extended discussion.

Clinias/ You are quite right; we certainly ought to give full consideration to anything that deserves our attention in the 'symposium' we are having now.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, tell me: if we give drink to this puppet of ours, what effect do we have on it?

Clinias/ What's your purpose in harking back to that question?

Athenian Stranger/ No particular purpose, for the moment. I'm just asking, in a general way, what effect is had on something when it is associated with something else. I'll try to explain my meaning even more clearly. This is what I'm asking; does drinking wine make pleasures and pains, anger and love, more intense?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ What about sensations, memory, opinions and thought? Do these too become more intense? Or rather, don't they entirely desert a man if he fills himself with drink?

Clinias/ Yes, they desert him entirely.

Athenian Stranger/ So he reverts to the mental state he was in as a young child?

Clinias/ Indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ And it's then that his self-control would be at its lowest?

Clinias/ Yes, at its lowest.

Athenian Stranger/ A man in that condition, we agree, is very bad indeed.

Clinias/ Very.

Athenian Stranger/ So it looks as if it's not only an old man who will go through a second childhood, but the drunkard too.

Clinias/ That's well said, sir.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, is there any argument that could even begin to persuade us that we ought to venture on this practice, rather than make every possible effort to avoid it?

Clinias/ Apparently there is; at any rate, this is what you say, and a minute ago you were ready to produce it.

Athenian Stranger/ A correct reminder; I'm ready still, now that you have both said you would be glad to listen to me.

Clinias/ We'll be all ears, sir, if only because of your amazing paradox that a man should, on occasions, voluntarily abandon himself to extreme depravity.

Athenian Stranger/ You mean spiritual depravity, don't you?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And what about degradation of the body, my friend—emaciation, disfigurement, ugliness, impotence? Shouldn't we be startled to find a man voluntarily reducing himself to such a state?

Clinias/ Of course we should.

Athenian Stranger/ We don't suppose, do we, that those who voluntarily take themselves off to the surgery in order to drink down medicines are unaware of the fact that very soon after, for days on end, their condition will be such that, if it were to be anything more than temporary, it would make life insupportable? We know, surely, that those who resort to gymnasia for vigorous exercises become temporarily enfeebled?

Clinias/ Yes, we are aware of all this.

Athenian Stranger/ And of the fact that they go there of their own accord, for the sake of the benefit they will receive after the initial stages?

Clinias/ Most certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ So shouldn't we look at the other practices in the same light?

Clinias/ Yes indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ So the same view should be taken of time spent in one's cups—if, that is, we may think of it as a legitimate parallel.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now if time so spent turned out to benefit us no less than time devoted to the body, it would have the initial advantage over physical exercises in that, unlike them, it is painless.

Clinias/ You're right enough in that, but I'd be surprised if we could discover any such benefit in this case.

Athenian Stranger/ Then this is the point it looks as if we ought to be trying to explain. Tell me: can we conceive of two roughly opposite kinds of fear?

Clinias/ Which?

Athenian Stranger/ These: when we expect evils to occur, we are in fear of them, I suppose?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And we often fear for our reputation, when we imagine we are going to get a bad name for doing or saying something disgraceful. This is the fear which we, and I fancy everyone else, call 'shame'.

Clinias/ Surely.

Athenian Stranger/ These are the two fears I meant. The second resists pains and the other things we dread, as well as our keenest and most frequent pleasures.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ The legislator, then, and anybody of the slightest merit, values this fear very highly, and gives it

the name ‘modesty’. The feeling of confidence that is its opposite he calls ‘insolence’, and reckons it to be the biggest curse anyone could suffer, whether in his private or his public life.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ So this fear not only safeguards us in a lot of other crucial areas of conduct but contributes more than anything else, if we take one thing with another, to the security that follows victory in war. Two things, then, contribute to victory: fearlessness in face of the enemy, and fear of ill-repute among one’s friends.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ Every individual should therefore become both afraid and unafraid, for the reasons we have distinguished in each case.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Moreover, if we want to make an individual proof against all sorts of fears, it is by exposing him to fear, in a way sanctioned by the law, that we make him unafraid.

Clinias/ Evidently we do.

Athenian Stranger/ But what about our attempts to make a man afraid, in a way consistent with justice? Shouldn’t we see that he enters the lists against impudence, and give him training to resist it, so as to make him conquer in the struggle with his pleasures? A man has to fight and conquer his feelings of cowardice before he can achieve perfect courage; if he has no experience and training in that kind of struggle, he will never more than half realize his potentialities for virtue. Isn’t the same true of self-control? Will he ever achieve a perfect mastery here without having fought and conquered, with all the skills of speech and action both in work and play, the crowd of pleasures and

desires that stimulate him to act shamelessly and unjustly? Can he afford not to have the experience of all these struggles?

Clinias/ It would seem hardly likely.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, has any god given me a drug to produce fear, so that the more a man agrees to drink of it, the more the impression grows on him, after every draft, that he is assailed by misfortune? The effect would be to make him apprehensive about his present and future prospects, until finally even the boldest of men would be reduced to absolute terror; but when he had recovered from the drink and slept it off, he would invariably be himself again.

Clinias/ And what drink does that, sir? There's hardly an example we could point to anywhere in the world.

Athenian Stranger/ No. But if one had cropped up, would a legislator have been able to make any use of it to promote courage? This is the sort of point we might well have put to him about it: 'Legislator—whether your laws are to apply to Cretans or to any other people—tell us this: wouldn't you be particularly glad to have a criterion of the courage and cowardice of your citizens?

Clinias/ Obviously, every legislator would say 'Yes'.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Well, you'd like a safe test without any serious risks, wouldn't you? Or do you prefer one full of risks?'

Clinias/ They will all agree to this as well: safety is essential.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Your procedure would be to test these people's reactions when they had been put into a state of alarm, and by encouraging, rebuking and rewarding individuals you would compel them to become fearless. You would inflict disgrace on anyone who disobeyed and refused

to become in every respect the kind of man you wanted; you would discharge without penalty anyone who had displayed the proper courage and finished his training satisfactorily; and the failures you would punish. Or would you refuse point-blank to apply the test, even though you had nothing against the drink in other respects?'

Clinias/ Of course he would apply it, sir.

Athenian Stranger/ Anyway, my friend, compared with current practice, this training would be remarkably straightforward, and would suit individuals, small groups, and any larger numbers you may want. Now if a man retreated into some decent obscurity, out of embarrassment at the thought of being seen before he is in good shape, and trained against his fears alone and in privacy, equipped with just this drink instead of all the usual paraphernalia, he would be entirely justified. But he would be no less justified if, confident that he was already well equipped by birth and breeding, he were to plunge into training with several fellow drinkers. While inevitably roused by the wine, he would show himself strong enough to escape its other effects: his virtue would prevent him from committing even one serious improper act, and from becoming a different kind of person. Before getting to the last round he would leave off, fearing the way in which drink invariably gets the better of a man.

Clinias/ Yes, sir, even he would be prudent enough to do that.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's repeat the point we were making to the legislator: 'Agreed then: there is probably no such thing as a drug to produce fear, either by divine gift or human contrivance (I leave quacks out of account: they're beyond the pale). But is there a drink that will banish fear and stimulate over-confidence about the wrong thing at the wrong moment? What do we say to this?'

Clinias/ I suppose he'll say 'There is', and mention wine.

Athenian Stranger/ And doesn't this do just the opposite of what we described a moment ago? When a man drinks it, it immediately makes him more cheerful than he was before; the more he takes, the more it fills him with boundless optimism: he thinks he can do anything. Finally, bursting with self-esteem and imposing no restraint on his speech and actions, the fellow loses all his inhibitions and becomes completely fearless: he'll say and do anything, without a qualm. Everybody, I think, would agree with us about this.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now let's think back again to this point: we said that there were two elements in our souls that should be cultivated, one of them in order to make ourselves supremely confident, its opposite to make ourselves supremely fearful.

Clinias/ The latter being modesty, I suppose.

Athenian Stranger/ Well remembered! But in view of the fact that one has to learn to be courageous and intrepid when assailed by fears, the question arises whether the opposite quality will have to be cultivated in opposite circumstances.

Clinias/ Probably so.

Athenian Stranger/ So the conditions in which we naturally become unusually bold and daring seem to be precisely those required for practice in reducing our shamelessness and audacity to the lowest possible level, so that we become terrified of ever venturing to say, suffer, or do anything disgraceful.

Clinias/ Apparently.

Athenian Stranger/ Now aren't we affected in this way by all the following conditions—anger, love, pride, ignorance and cowardice? We can add wealth, beauty, strength and

everything else that turns us into fools and makes us drunk with pleasure. However, we are looking for an inexpensive and less harmful test we can apply to people, which will also give us a chance to train them, and this we have in the scrutiny we can make of them when they are relaxed over a drink. Can we point to a more suitable pleasure than this—provided some appropriate precautions are taken? Let's look at it in this way. Suppose you have a man with an irritable and savage temper (this is the source of a huge number of crimes). Surely, to make contracts with him, and run the risk that he may default, is a more dangerous way to test him than to keep him company during a festival of Dionysus? Or again, if a man's whole being is dominated by sexual pleasures, it is dangerous to try him out by putting him in charge of your wife and sons and daughters; this is to scrutinize the character of his soul at the price of exposing to risk those whom you hold most dear. You could cite dozens of other instances, and still not do justice to the superiority of this wholly innocuous 'examination by recreation'. In fact, I think neither the Cretans nor any other people would disagree if we summed it all up like this: we have here a pretty fair test of each other, which for cheapness, safety and speed is absolutely unrivaled.

Clinias/ True so far.

Athenian Stranger/ So this insight into the nature and disposition of a man's soul will rank as one of the most useful aids available to the art which is concerned to foster a good character—the art of statesmanship, I take it?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Book 2.

Athenian Stranger/ It looks as if the next question we have to ask is this: is the insight we somehow get into men's natural temperaments the only thing in favor of drinking parties? Or does a properly run drinking party confer some other substantial benefit that we ought to consider very seriously? What do we say to this? We need to be careful here: as far as I can see, our argument does tend to point to the answer 'Yes', but when we try to discover how and in what sense, we may get tripped up by it.

Clinias/ Tell us why, then.

Athenian Stranger/ I want to think back over our definition of correct education, and to hazard the suggestion now that drinking parties are actually its safeguard, provided they are properly established and conducted on the right lines.

Clinias/ That's a large claim!

Athenian Stranger/ I maintain that the earliest sensations that a child feels in infancy are of pleasure and pain, and this is the route by which virtue and vice first enter the soul. (But for a man to acquire good judgment, and unshakable correct opinions, however late in life, is a matter of good luck: a man who possesses them, and all the benefits they entail, is perfect.) I call 'education' the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, that well up in his soul are channeled in the right courses before he can understand the reason why. Then when he does understand, his reason and his emotions agree in telling him that he has been properly trained by inculcation of appropriate habits. Virtue is this general concord of reason and emotion. But there is one element you could isolate in any account you give, and this is the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain,

which makes us hate what we ought to hate from first to last, and love what we ought to love. Call this 'education', and I, at any rate, think you would be giving it its proper name.

Clinias/ Yes, sir, we entirely approve of what you have just said about education and that goes for your previous account, too.

Athenian Stranger/ Splendid. Education, then, is a matter of correctly disciplined feelings of pleasure and pain. But in the course of a man's life the effect wears off, and in many respects it is lost altogether. The gods, however, took pity on the human race, born to suffer as it was, and gave it relief in the form of religious festivals to serve as periods of rest from its labors. They gave us the Muses, with Apollo their leader, and Dionysus; by having these gods to share their holidays, men were to be made whole again, and thanks to them, we find refreshment in the celebration of these festivals. Now, there is a theory which we are always having dinned into our ears: let's see if it squares with the facts or not. It runs like this: virtually all young things find it impossible to keep their bodies still and their tongues quiet. They are always trying to move around and cry out; some jump and skip and do a kind of gleeful dance as they play with each other, while others produce all sorts of noises. And whereas animals have no sense of order and disorder in movement ('rhythm' and 'harmony', as we call it), we human beings have been made sensitive to both and can enjoy them. This is the gift of the same gods whom we said were given to us as companions in dancing; it is the device which enables them to be our chorus-leaders and stimulate us to movement, making us combine to sing and dance—and as this naturally 'charms' us, they invented the word 'chorus'. So shall we take it that this point is established? Can we

assume that education comes originally from Apollo and the Muses, or not?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ So by an 'uneducated' man we shall mean a man who has not been trained to take part in a chorus; and we must say that if a man has been sufficiently trained, he is 'educated'.

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ And of course a performance by a chorus is a combination of dancing and singing?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And this means that the well-educated man will be able both to sing and dance well?

Clinias/ So it seems.

Athenian Stranger/ Now let's see just what that word implies.

Clinias/ What word?

Athenian Stranger/ We say 'he sings well' or 'he dances well. But should we expand this and say 'provided he sings good songs and dances good dances'? Or not?

Clinias/ Yes, we should expand it.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, take a man whose opinion about what is good is correct (it really is good), and likewise in the case of the bad (it really is bad), and follows this judgment in practice. He may be able to represent, by word and gesture, and with invariable success, his intellectual conception of what is good, even though he gets no pleasure from it and feels no hatred for what is bad. Another man may not be very good at keeping on the right lines when he uses his body and his voice to represent the good, or at trying to form some intellectual conception of it; but he may be very much on the right lines in his feelings of pleasure and pain,

because he welcomes what is good and loathes what is bad. Which of these two will be the better educated musically, and the more effective member of a chorus?

Clinias/ As far as education is concerned, sir, the second is infinitely superior.

Athenian Stranger/ So if the three of us grasp what 'goodness' is in singing and dancing, we have also a sound criterion for distinguishing the educated man from the uneducated. If we fail to grasp it, we'll never be able to make up our minds whether a safeguard for education exists, or where we ought to look for it. Isn't that so?

Clinias/ Yes, it is.

Athenian Stranger/ The next quarry we have to track down, like hounds at a hunt, will be what constitutes a 'good' bodily movement, tune, song and dance. But if all these notions give us the slip and get away, it will be pointless utterly to prolong our discussion of correct education, Greek or foreign.

Clinias/ Quite.

Athenian Stranger/ Good. Now, what is to be our definition of a good tune or bodily movement? Tell me—imagine a courageous soul and a cowardly soul beset by one and the same set of troubles: do similar sounds and movements of the body result in each case?

Clinias/ Of course not. The complexion is different, to start with.

Athenian Stranger/ You are absolutely right, my friend. But music is a matter of rhythm and harmony, and involves tunes and movements of the body; this means that while it is legitimate to speak of a 'rhythmical' or a 'harmonious' movement or tune, we cannot properly apply to either of them the chorus-masters' metaphor 'brilliantly colored'. But what is the appropriate language to describe the movement

and melody used to portray the brave man and the coward? The correct procedure is to call those of brave men 'good' and those of cowards 'disgraceful'. But let's not have an inordinately long discussion about the details; can we say, without beating about the bush, that all movements and tunes associated with spiritual or bodily excellence (the real thing or a representation) are good? And conversely bad if they have to do with vice?

Clinias/ Yes, that's a reasonable proposal. You may assume we agree.

Athenian Stranger/ Here's a further point: do we all enjoy every type of performance by a chorus to the same degree? Or is that far from being true?

Clinias/ As far as it could be!

Athenian Stranger/ But can we put our finger on the cause of our confusion? Is it that 'good' varies from person to person? Or that it is thought to vary, although in point of fact it does not? No one, I fancy, will be prepared to say that dances portraying evil are better than those portraying virtue, or that although other people enjoy the virtuous Muse, his own personal liking is for movements expressing depravity. Yet most men do maintain that the power of music to give pleasure to the soul is the standard by which it should be judged. But this is an insupportable doctrine, and it is absolute blasphemy to speak like that. More likely, though, it's something else that's misleading us.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Performances given by choruses are representations of character, and deal with every variety of action and incident. The individual performers enact their roles partly by expressing their own characters, partly by imitating those of others. That is why, when they find that the speaking or singing or any other element in the

performance of a chorus appeals to their natural character or acquired habits, or both, they can't help applauding with delight and using the term 'good'. But sometimes they find these performances going against the grain of their natural character or their disposition or habits, in which case they are unable to take any pleasure in them and applaud them, and in this case the word they use is 'shocking'. When a man's natural character is as it should be, but he has acquired bad habits, or conversely when his habits are correct but his natural character is vicious, his pleasure and his approval fail to coincide: he calls the performances 'pleasant, but depraved'. Such performers, in the company of others whose judgment they respect, are ashamed to make this kind of movement with their bodies, and to sing such songs as though they genuinely approved of them. But in their heart of hearts, they enjoy themselves.

Clinias/ You are quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, does a man's enjoyment of bad bodily movements or bad tunes do him any harm? And does it do him any good to take pleasure in the opposite kind?

Clinias/ Probably.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Probably'? Is that all? Surely there must be a precise analogy here with the man who comes into contact with depraved characters and wicked people, and who does not react with disgust, but welcomes them with pleasure, censuring them half-heartedly because he only half-realizes, as in a dream, how perverted such a state is: he just cannot escape taking on the character of what he enjoys, whether good or bad—even if he is ashamed to go so far as to applaud it. In fact we could hardly point to a greater force for good—or evil—than this inevitable assimilation of character.

Clinias/ No, I don't think we could.

Athenian Stranger/ So, in a society where the laws relating to culture, education and recreation are, or will be in future, properly established, do we imagine that authors will be given a free hand? The choruses will be composed of the young children of law-abiding citizens: will the composer be free to teach them anything by way of rhythm, tune and words that amuses him when he composes, without bothering what effect he may have on them as regards virtue and vice?

Clinias/ That's certainly not sensible; how could it be?

Athenian Stranger/ But it is precisely this that they are allowed to do in virtually all states—except in Egypt.

Clinias/ Egypt! Well then, you'd better tell us what legislation has been enacted there.

Athenian Stranger/ Merely to hear about it is startling enough. Long ago, apparently, they realized the truth of the principle we are putting forward only now, that the movements and tunes which the children of the state are to practice in their rehearsals must be good ones. They compiled a list of them according to style, and displayed it in their temples. Painters and everyone else who represent movements of the body of any kind were restricted to these forms; modification and innovation outside this traditional framework were prohibited, and are prohibited even today, both in this field and the arts in general. If you examine their art on the spot, you will find that ten thousand years ago (and I'm not speaking loosely: I mean literally ten thousand), paintings and reliefs were produced that are no better and no worse than those of today, because the same artistic rules were applied in making them.

Clinias/ Fantastic!

Athenian Stranger/ No: simply a supreme achievement of legislators and statesmen. You might, even so, find some

other things to criticize there, but in the matter of music this inescapable fact deserves our attention: it has in fact proved feasible to take the kind of music that shows a natural correctness and put it on a firm footing by legislation. But it is the task of a god, or a man of god-like stature; in fact, the Egyptians do say that the tunes that have been preserved for so long are compositions of Isis. Consequently, as I said, if one could get even a rough idea of what constitutes 'correctness' in matters musical, one ought to have no qualms about giving the whole subject systematic expression in the form of a law. It is true that the craving for pleasure and the desire to avoid tedium lead us to a constant search for novelty in music, and choral performances that have been thus consecrated may be stigmatized as out-of-date; but this does not have very much power to corrupt them. In Egypt, at any rate, it does not seem to have had a corrupting effect at all: quite the contrary.

Clinias/ So it would seem, to judge from your account.

Athenian Stranger/ So, equally without qualms, we can surely describe the proper conditions for festive music and performances of choruses more or less like this. When we think things are going well for us, we feel delight; and to put it the other way round, when we feel delight, we come to think that things are going well. Isn't that so?

Clinias/ It is.

Athenian Stranger/ In addition, when we are in that state—I mean 'delight'—we can't keep still.

Clinias/ That's true.

Athenian Stranger/ Our youngsters are keen to join the dancing and singing themselves, but we old men think the proper thing is to pass the time as spectators. The delight we feel comes from their relaxation and merrymaking. Our agility is deserting us, and as we feel its loss we are only too

pleased to provide competitions for the young, because they can best stir in us the memory of our youth and re-awaken the instincts of our younger days.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So we'd better face the fact that there is a grain of truth in contemporary thought on the subject of holiday-makers. Most people say that the man who delights us most and gives us most pleasure should be highly esteemed for his skill, and deserves to be awarded first prize, because the fact that we are allowed to relax on such occasions means that we ought to lionize the man who gives most people most pleasure, so that, as I said just now, he deserves to carry off the prize. In theory that's right, isn't it? And wouldn't it be equally right in practice?

Clinias/ Maybe.

Athenian Stranger/ Ah, my fine fellow, such a conclusion 'may be' rash! We must make some distinctions, and examine the question rather like this: suppose somebody were to arrange a competition, and were to leave its character entirely open, not specifying whether it was to be gymnastic, artistic or equestrian. Assume that he gathers together all the inhabitants of the state, and offers a prize: anyone who wishes should come and compete in giving pleasure, and this is to be the sole criterion; the competitor who gives the audience most pleasure will win; he has an entirely free hand as to what method he employs, but provided he excels in this one respect he will be judged the most pleasing of the competitors and win the prize. What effect do we think such an announcement would have?

Clinias/ In what way do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Likely enough, I suppose, one competitor will play the Homer and present epic poetry, another will sing lyric songs to music, another will put on a

tragedy, and another a comedy; and it will be no surprise if somebody even reckons his best chance of winning lies in putting on a puppet-show. Now, with all these competitors and thousands of others entering, can we say which would really deserve to win?

Clinias/ That's an odd question! Who could answer it for you with authority before hearing the contestants, and listening to them individually on the spot?

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, do you want me to give you an equally odd answer?

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose the decision rests with the smallest infant children. They'll decide for the exhibitor of puppets, won't they?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ If it rests with the older children, they will choose the producer of comedies. Young men, ladies of cultivated taste, and I dare say pretty nearly the entire populace, will choose the tragedy.

Clinias/ Yes, I dare say.

Athenian Stranger/ We old men would probably be most gratified to listen to a reciter doing justice to the Iliad or Odyssey, or an extract from Hesiod: we'd say he was the winner by a clear margin. Who, then, would be the proper winner? That's the next question, isn't it?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Clearly you and I are forced to say that the proper winners would be those chosen by men of our vintage. To us, from among all the customs followed in every city all over the world today, this looks like the best.

Clinias/ Surely.

Athenian Stranger/ I am, then, in limited agreement with the man in the street. Pleasure is indeed a proper criterion in the arts, but not the pleasure experienced by anybody and everybody. The productions of the Muse are at their finest when they delight men of high caliber and adequate education—but particularly if they succeed in pleasing the single individual whose education and moral standards reach heights attained by no one else. This is the reason why we maintain that judges in these matters need high moral standards: they have to possess not only a discerning taste, but courage too. A judge won't be doing his job properly if he reaches his verdict by listening to the audience and lets himself be thrown off balance by the yelling of the mob and his own lack of training; nor must he shrug his shoulders and let cowardice and indolence persuade him into a false verdict against his better judgment, so that he lies with the very lips with which he called upon the gods when he undertook office. The truth is that he sits in judgment as a teacher of the audience, rather than as its pupil; his function (and under the ancient law of the Greeks he used to be allowed to perform it) is to throw his weight against them, if the pleasure they show has been aroused improperly and illegitimately. For instance, the law now in force in Sicily and Italy, by truckling to the majority of the audience and deciding the winner by a show of hands, has had a disastrous effect on the authors themselves, who compose to gratify the depraved tastes of their judges; the result is that in effect they are taught by the audience. It has been equally disastrous for the quality of the pleasure felt by the spectators: they ought to come to experience more elevated pleasures from listening to the portrayal of characters invariably better than their own, but in fact just the opposite happens, and they have no one to thank but themselves.

Well, then, now that we have finished talking about that, what conclusion is indicated? Let's see if it isn't this—

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ For the third or fourth time, I think, our discussion has come full circle. Once again, education has proved to be a process of attraction, of leading children to accept right principles as enunciated by the law and endorsed as genuinely correct by men who have high moral standards and are full of years and experience. The soul of the child has to be prevented from getting into the habit of feeling pleasure and pain in ways not sanctioned by the law and those who have been persuaded to obey it; he should follow in their footsteps and find pleasure and pain in the same things as the old. That is why we have what we call songs, which are really 'charms' for the soul. These are in fact deadly serious devices for producing this concord we are talking about; but the souls of the young cannot bear to be serious, so we use the terms 'recreation' and 'song' for the charms, and children treat them in that spirit. We have an analogy in the sick and ailing; those in charge of feeding them try to administer the proper diet in tasty foods and drinks, and offer them unwholesome items in revolting foods, so that the patients may get into the desirable habit of welcoming the one kind and loathing the other. That is just what the true legislator will persuade (or, failing persuasion, compel) the man with a creative flair to do with his grand and marvelous language: to compose correctly by portraying, with appropriate choreography and musical setting, men who are moderate, courageous and good in every way.

Clinias/ Good Heavens, sir, do you really think that's how they compose nowadays in other cities? My experience is limited, but I know of no such proceeding as you describe, except among us Cretans or in Sparta. In dancing and all

the other arts one novelty follows another; the changes are made not by law but are prompted by wildly changing fancies that are very far from being permanent and stable like the Egyptian tastes you're explaining: on the contrary, they are never the same from minute to minute.

Athenian Stranger/ Well said, Clinias. But if I gave you the impression that I was speaking of the present day when I referred to the procedure you mention, I expect it was my own lack of clarity in expressing my thoughts that led you astray and caused me to be misunderstood. I was only saying what I want to see happen in the arts, but perhaps I used expressions that made you think I was referring to facts. It always goes against the grain to pillory habits that are irretrievably on the wrong lines, but sometimes one has to. So, seeing that we are agreed in approving this custom, tell me this, if you will: is it more prevalent among you Cretans and the Spartans than among the other Greeks?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And what if it became prevalent among the others as well? Presumably we'd say that that was an improvement on present practice?

Clinias/ Yes, I suppose it would be a tremendous improvement if they adopted the procedure of Crete and Sparta—which is also in accordance with the recommendations you made just now.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, let's make sure we understand each other in this business. The essence of the entire cultural education of your countries is surely this: you oblige your poets to say that the good man, because he is temperate and just, enjoys good fortune and is happy, no matter whether he is big and strong, or small and weak, or rich, or poor; and that even if he is 'richer than Midas or Cinyras', and has not justice, he is a wretch, and lives a life

of misery. Td not mention a man', says your poet, and how right he is, and Td take no account of him', even if all his actions and possessions were what people commonly call 'good', if he were without justice, nor even if, with a character like that, he 'attacked in close combat with the foe'. If he is unjust, I wouldn't want him to 'stand the sight of bloody butchery' nor 'outdo in speed the north wind of Thrace', nor ever achieve any of the things that are generally said to be 'good'. You see, these things men usually call 'good' are misnamed. It is commonly said that health comes first, beauty second, and wealth third. The list goes on indefinitely: keen sight and hearing, and acute perception of all the objects of sensation; being a dictator and doing whatever you like; and the seventh heaven is supposed to be reached when one has achieved all this and is made immortal without further ado. You and I, presumably, hold that all these things are possessions of great value to the just and pious, but that to the unjust they are a curse, every one of them, from health all the way down the list. Seeing, hearing, sensation, and simply being alive, are great evils, if in spite of having all these so-called good things a man gains immortality without justice and virtue in general; but if he survives for only the briefest possible time, the evil is less. I imagine you will persuade or compel the authors in your states to embody this doctrine of mine in the words, rhythms and 'harmonies' they produce for the education of your youth. Isn't that right? Look here, now: my position is quite clear. Although so-called evils are in fact evil for the just, they are good for the unjust; and so-called 'goods', while genuinely good for the good, are evils for the wicked. Let me ask the same question as before: are you and I in agreement, or not?

Clinias/ In some ways I think we are, but certainly not in others.

Athenian Stranger/ I expect this is where I sound implausible: suppose a man were to enjoy health and wealth and permanent absolute power—and, if you like, I'll give him enormous strength and courage as well, and exempt him from death and all the other 'evils', as people call them. But suppose he had in him nothing but injustice and insolence. It is obvious, I maintain, that his life is wretchedly unhappy.

Clinias/ True, that's precisely where you fail to convince.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well, then, How should we put it now? If a man is brave, strong, handsome, and rich, and enjoys a life-long freedom to do just what he wants to, don't you think—if he is unjust and insolent—that his life will inevitably be a disgrace? Perhaps at any rate you'd allow the term 'disgrace'?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Will you go further, and say he will live 'badly'?

Clinias/ No, we'd not be so ready to admit that.

Athenian Stranger/ What about going further still, and saying he will live 'unpleasantly and unprofitably'?

Clinias/ How could we possibly be prepared to go as far as that?

Athenian Stranger/ 'How'? My friend, it looks as if it would be a miracle if we ever harmonized on this point: at the moment your tune and mine are scarcely in the same key. To me, these conclusions are inescapably true—in fact, my dear Clinias, rather more true and obvious than that Crete is an island. If I were a lawgiver, I should try to compel the authors and every inhabitant of the state to take this line; and if anybody in the land said that there are men who live a pleasant life in spite of being scoundrels, or that while this or that is useful and profitable, something else is more just, I should impose pretty nearly the extreme penalty.

There are many other things I should persuade my citizens to say, which would flatly contradict what Cretans and Spartans maintain nowadays, apparently—to say nothing of the rest of the world. Zeus and Apollo! Just you imagine, my fine fellows, asking these gods who inspired your laws, 'Is the life of supreme justice also the life that gives most pleasure? Or are there two kinds of life, one being "the supremely just," the other "the most pleasurable"?' Suppose they replied There are two.' If we knew the right question to ask, we might perhaps pursue the point: 'Which category of men should we call the most blessed by heaven? Those who live the supremely just life, or the most pleasurable?' If they said Those who live the most pleasurable life', then that would be, for them, a curious thing to say. However, I am unwilling to associate the gods with such a statement; I prefer to think of it in connection with forefathers and lawgivers. So let's suppose those first questions have been put to a forefather and lawgiver, and that he has replied that the man who lives the life of greatest pleasure enjoys the greatest happiness. This is what I'd say then: 'Father, didn't you want me to receive as many of the blessings of heaven as I could? Yet in spite of that you never tired of telling me to order my life as justly as possible'. In taking up that kind of position our forefather or lawgiver will, I think, appear in rather an odd light: it will look as if he cannot speak without contradicting himself. However, if he declared that the life of supreme justice was the most blessed, I imagine that everybody who heard him would want to know what splendid benefit, superior to pleasure, was to be found in this kind of life. What was there in it that deserved the commendation of the law? Surely, any benefit a just man got out of it would be inseparable from pleasure? Look: are we to suppose that fame and praise from gods and men are fine and good, but unpleasant (and vice versa in the case of notoriety)? ('My

dear legislator.' we'd say, 'of course not'.) Or, if you neither injure another nor are injured yourself by someone else, is that unpleasant, in spite of being fine and good? Is the opposite pleasant, but disgraceful and wicked?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Athenian Stranger/ So the argument that does not drive a wedge between 'pleasant' on the one hand and 'just' and 'fine' and 'good' on the other, even if it achieves nothing else, will do something to persuade a man to live a just and pious life. This means that any teaching which denies the truth of all this is, from the lawgiver's standpoint, a complete disgrace and his worst enemy. (Nobody would willingly agree to do something which would not bring him more pleasure than pain.)

Looking at a thing from a distance makes nearly everyone feel dizzy, especially children; but the lawgiver will alter that for us, and lift the fog that clouds our judgment: somehow or other—by habituation, praise, or argument—he will persuade us that our ideas of justice and injustice are like pictures drawn in perspective. Injustice looks pleasant to the enemy of justice, because he regards it from his own personal standpoint, which is unjust and evil; justice, on the other hand, looks unpleasant to him. But from the standpoint of the just man the view gained of justice and injustice is always the opposite.

Clinias/ So it seems.

Athenian Stranger/ And which of these judgments are we to say has a better claim to be the correct one? The judgment of the worse soul or the better?

Clinias/ That of the better, certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it is equally certain that the unjust life is not only more shocking and disgraceful, but also in fact less pleasant, than the just and holy.

Clinias/ On this argument, my friends, it certainly looks like it.

Athenian Stranger/ But just suppose that the truth had been different from what the argument has now shown it to be, and that a lawgiver, even a mediocre one, had been sufficiently bold, in the interests of the young, to tell them a lie. Could he have told a more useful lie than this, or one more effective in making everyone practice justice in everything they do, willingly and without pressure?

Clinias/ Truth is a fine thing, and it is sure to prevail, but to persuade men of it certainly seems no easy task.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, but what about that fairy story about the Sidonian? That was well-nigh incredible, but it was easy enough to convince men of it, and of thousands of other similar stories.

Clinias/ What sort of stories?

Athenian Stranger/ The sowing of the teeth and the birth of armed men from them. This remarkable example shows the legislator that the souls of the young can be persuaded of anything; he has only to try. The only thing he must consider and discover is what conviction would do the state most good; in that connection, he must think up every possible device to ensure that as far as possible the entire community preserves in its songs and stories and doctrines an absolute and lifelong unanimity. But if you see the matter in any other light, have no hesitation in disputing my view.

Clinias/ No, I don't think either of us would be able to dispute that.

Athenian Stranger/ Then it will be up to me to introduce the next point. I maintain that our choruses—all three of them—should charm the souls of the children while still young and tender, and uphold all the admirable doctrines we have already formulated, and any we may formulate in

the future. We must insist, as the central point of these doctrines, that the gods say the best life does in fact bring most pleasure. If we do that, we shall be telling the plain truth, and we shall convince those whom we have to convince more effectively than if we advanced any other doctrine.

Clinias/ Yes, one has to agree with what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ To start with, it will be only right and proper if the children's chorus (which will be dedicated to the Muses) comes on first to sing these doctrines with all its might and main before the entire city. Second will come the chorus of those under thirty, which will call upon Apollo Paean to bear witness that what they say is true, and pray that he will vouchsafe to convince the young. Thirdly, there must be the songs of those between thirty and sixty. That leaves the men who are older than this, who are, of course, no longer up to singing; but they will be inspired to tell stories in which the same characters will appear.

Clinias/ You mention these three choruses, sir: what are they? We are not very clear what you mean to say about them.

Athenian Stranger/ But the greater part of the discussion we have had so far has been precisely for their sake!

Clinias/ We still haven't seen the point. Could you try to elucidate still further?

Athenian Stranger/ If we remember, we said at the beginning of our discussion that all young things, being fiery and mettlesome by nature, are unable to keep their bodies or their tongues still—they are always making uncoordinated noises and jumping about. No other animal, we said, ever develops a sense of order in either respect; man alone has a natural ability to do this. Order in movement is called 'rhythm', and order in the vocal sounds—the

combination of high and low notes—is called 'harmony'; and the union of the two is called 'a performance by a chorus'. We said that the gods took pity on us and gave us Apollo and the Muses as companions and leaders of our choruses; and if we can cast our minds back, we said that their third gift to us was Dionysus.

Clinias/ Yes, of course we remember.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, we've mentioned the choruses of Apollo and the Muses; the remaining one, the third, must be identified as belonging to Dionysus.

Clinias/ What! You had better explain yourself: a chorus of elderly men dedicated to Dionysus sounds a weird and wonderful idea, at any rate at first hearing. Are men of more than thirty and even fifty, up to sixty, really going to dance in honor of Dionysus?

Athenian Stranger/ You are absolutely right—to show how this could be reasonable in practice does need, I think, some explanation.

Clinias/ It certainly does.

Athenian Stranger/ Are we agreed on the conclusions we have reached so far?

Clinias/ Conclusions about what?

Athenian Stranger/ About this—that every man and child, free-man and slave, male and female—in fact, the whole state—is in duty bound never to stop repeating to each other the charms we have described. Somehow or other, we must see that these charms constantly change their form; at all costs they must be continually varied, so that the performers always long to sing the songs, and find perpetual pleasure in them.

Clinias/ Agreed: that's exactly the arrangement we want.

Athenian Stranger/ This last chorus is the noblest element in our state; it carries more conviction than any other group, because of the age and discernment of its members. Where, then, should it sing its splendid songs, if it is to do most good? Surely we are not going to be silly enough to leave this question undecided? After all, this chorus may well prove to be consummate masters of the noblest and most useful songs.

Clinias/ No; if that's really the way the argument is going, we certainly can't leave this undecided.

Athenian Stranger/ So what would be a suitable method of procedure? See if this will do.

Clinias/ What, then?

Athenian Stranger/ As he grows old, a man becomes apprehensive about singing; it gives him less pleasure, and if it should happen that he cannot avoid it, it causes him an embarrassment which grows with the increasingly sober tastes of his advancing years. Isn't that so?

Clinias/ Indeed it is.

Athenian Stranger/ So naturally he will be even more acutely embarrassed at standing up and singing in front of the varied audience in a theater. And if men of that age were forced to sing in the same condition as members of choruses competing for a prize—lean and on a diet after a course of voice-training—then of course they would find the performance positively unpleasant and humiliating, and would lose every spark of enthusiasm.

Clinias/ Yes, that would be the inevitable result.

Athenian Stranger/ So how shall we encourage them to be enthusiastic about singing? The first law we shall pass, surely, is this: children under the age of eighteen are to keep off wine entirely. We shall teach them that they must treat the violent tendencies of youth with due caution, and not

pour fire on the fire already in their souls and bodies until they come to undertake the real work of life. Our second law will permit the young man under thirty to take wine in moderation, but he must stop short of drunkenness and bibulous excesses. When he reaches his thirties, he should regale himself at the common meals, and invoke the gods; in particular, he should summon Dionysus to what is at once the play-time and the prayer-time of the old, which the god gave to mankind to help cure the crabbiness of age. This is the gift he gave us to make us young again: we forget our peevishness, and our hard cast of mind becomes softer and grows more malleable, just like iron thrust in a fire. Surely any man who is brought into that frame of mind would be ready to sing his songs (that is 'charms', as we've called them often enough) with more enthusiasm and less embarrassment? I don't mean in a large gathering of strangers, but in a comparatively small circle of friends.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ As a method of inducing them to join us in our singing, there wouldn't be anything you could particularly object to in this.

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ But what sort of philosophy of music will inspire their songs? Obviously, it will have to be one appropriate to the performers.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And the performers are men of almost divine distinction. What notes would be appropriate for them? Those produced by the choruses?

Clinias/ Well, sir, we Cretans, at any rate—and the same goes for the Spartans—would hardly be up to singing any song except those we learned to sing by growing familiar with them in our choruses.

Athenian Stranger/ Naturally enough. In cold fact, you have failed to achieve the finest kind of song. You organize your state as though it were a military camp rather than a society of people who have settled in towns, and you keep your young fellows together like a herd of colts at grass. Not a man among you takes his own colt and drags him, furiously protesting, away from the rest of the herd; you never put him in the hands of a private groom, and train him by combing him down and stroking him. You entirely fail to lavish proper care on an education which will turn him out not merely a good soldier but a capable administrator of a state and its towns. Such a man is, as we said early on, a better fighter than those of Tyrtaeus, precisely because he does not value courage as the principal element in virtue: he consistently relegates it to fourth place wherever he finds it, whether in the individual or the state.

Clinias/ I suspect, sir, you are being rather rude about our legislators again.

Athenian Stranger/ If I am, my dear fellow, it is entirely unintentionally. But if you don't mind, we ought to follow where the argument leads us. If we know of any music that is of finer quality than the music of choruses and the public theaters, we ought to try to allocate it to these older people. They are, as we said, embarrassed at the other kind; but music of the highest quality is just what they are keen to take part in.

Clinias/ Yes, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ The most important point about everything that has some inherent attractive quality must be either this very quality or some kind of 'correctness' or (thirdly) its usefulness. For instance, I maintain that eating and drinking and taking nourishment in general are accompanied by the particular attractive quality that we

might call pleasure; as for their usefulness and 'correctness', we invariably speak of the 'wholesomeness' of the foods we serve, and in their case the most 'correct' thing in them is precisely this.

Clinias/ Quite.

Athenian Stranger/ An element of attractiveness—the pleasure we feel—goes with the process of learning, too. But what gives rise to its 'correctness' and usefulness, its excellence and nobility, is its accuracy.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ What about the arts of imitation, whose function is to produce likenesses? When they succeed in doing this, it will be quite proper to say that the pleasure—if any—that arises out of and accompanies that success constitutes the attractive quality of these arts.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Generally speaking, I suppose, the 'correctness' in such cases would depend not so much on the pleasure given, as on the accurate representation of the size and qualities of the original?

Clinias/ Well put.

Athenian Stranger/ So pleasure would be the proper criterion in one case only. A work of art may be produced with nothing to offer by way of usefulness or truth or accuracy of representation (or harm, of course). It may be produced solely for the sake of this element that normally accompanies the others, the attractive one. (In fact, it is when this element is associated with none of the others that it most genuinely deserves the name 'pleasure'.)

Clinias/ You mean only harmless pleasure?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, and it is precisely this that I call 'play', when it has no particular good or bad effect that deserves serious discussion.

Clinias/ Quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ And we could conclude from all this that no imitation at all should be judged by reference to incorrect opinions about it or by the criterion of the pleasure it gives. This is particularly so in the case of every sort of equality. What is equal is equal and what is proportional is proportional, and this does not depend on anyone's opinion that it is so, nor does it cease to be true if someone is displeased at the fact. Accuracy, and nothing else whatever, is the only permissible criterion.

Clinias/ Yes, that is emphatically true.

Athenian Stranger/ So do we hold that all music is a matter of representation and imitation?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ So when someone says that music is judged by the criterion of pleasure, we should reject his argument out of hand, and absolutely refuse to go in for such music (if any were ever produced) as a serious genre. The music we ought to cultivate is the kind that bears a resemblance to its model, beauty.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ These people, then, who are anxious to take part in the finest possible singing, should, apparently, look not for a music which is sweet, but one which is correct; and correctness, as we said, lies in the imitation and successful reproduction of the proportions and characteristics of the model.

Clinias/ It does indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ This is certainly so in the case of music: everyone would admit that all musical compositions are matters of imitation and representation. In fact, composers, audiences and actors would register universal agreement on this point, wouldn't they?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ So it looks as if a man who is not to go wrong about a given composition must appreciate what it is, because failure to understand its nature—what it is trying to do and what in fact it is a representation of—will mean that he gets virtually no conception of whether the author has achieved his aim correctly or not.

Clinias/ No, virtually none, naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ And if he cannot gauge the correctness of the composition, surely he won't be able to judge its moral goodness or badness? But this is all rather obscure. Perhaps this would be a clearer way of putting it.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ There are, of course, thousands of representations that strike the eye?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, imagine someone who didn't know the character of each of the objects that are imitated and represented. Would he ever be able to estimate the correctness of the finished article? This is the sort of point I have in mind: does it preserve the overall proportions of the body and the position of each of its various parts? Does it hit off the proportions exactly and keep the parts in their proper positions relative to one another? And what of their colors and contours? Have all these features been reproduced higgledy-piggledy? Do you think that if a man did not know the character of the creature represented he would ever be able to assess these points?

Clinias/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ What if we knew that the thing molded or painted is a man, and that all his parts with their colors and contours have been caught by the artist's skill? Suppose a man knows all that; is he without further ado necessarily ready to judge whether the work is beautiful or falls short of beauty in some respect?

Clinias/ In that case, sir, pretty well all of us would be judges of the quality of a representation.

Athenian Stranger/ You have hit the nail on the head. So anyone who is going to be a sensible judge of any representation—in painting and music and every other field—should be able to assess three points: he must know, first, what has been represented; second, how correctly it has been copied; and then, third, the moral value of this or that representation produced by language, tunes and rhythms.

Clinias/ Apparently so.

Athenian Stranger/ We ought not to fail to mention the peculiar difficulty about music, which is discussed much more than any other kind of artistic representation and needs much more careful handling than all the others. A man who goes wrong on this subject will suffer a good deal of harm because he feels attracted to evil dispositions; and his mistake is very difficult to detect, because the authors hardly have the same degree of creative ability as the actual Muses. The Muses would never make the ghastly mistake of composing the speech of men to a musical idiom suitable for women, or of fitting rhythms appropriate to the portrayal of slaves and slave-like people to the tune and bodily movements used to represent free men (or again of making rhythms and movements appropriate to free men accompany a combination of tune and words that conflicted

with those rhythms). Nor would they ever mix up together into one production the din of wild animals and men and musical instruments and all kinds of other noises and still claim to be representing a unified theme. But human authors, in their silly way, jumble all these things together into complicated combinations; in Orpheus' words, anyone 'whose delight in life is in its springtime', will find them a rich source of amusement. And in the midst of all this confusion, he will find that the authors also divorce rhythm and movement from the tune by putting unaccompanied words into meter, and rob tune and rhythm of words by using stringed instruments and pipes on their own without singers. When this is done, it is extraordinarily difficult to know what the rhythm and harmony without speech are supposed to signify and what worthwhile object they imitate and represent. The conclusion is inevitable: such practices appeal to the taste of the village idiot. It is this fondness for speed and dexterity (as in reproducing the noises of wild animals) which prompts the use of pipes and lyre otherwise than as an accompaniment to dancing and singing. Using either instrument on its own is in fact sheer showmanship that has nothing to do with art. But enough of theory: what we are considering is not what sort of music our citizens over thirty and fifty should avoid, but what sort they should go in for. I think our argument so far seems to point to the conclusion that the fifty-year-olds who have the duty of singing must have enjoyed an education that reached a higher standard than the music of choruses. They must, of course, have a nice appreciation of rhythms and harmonies and be able to understand them. Otherwise how could a man assess the correctness of the tunes, and tell whether the Dorian mode was appropriate or not in a given case, or judge whether the author has set the tunes to the right rhythm or not?

Clinias/ Clearly he couldn't.

Athenian Stranger/ The belief of the general public, that they can form an adequate judgment of merit and demerit in matters of harmony and rhythm, is laughable: they have only been drilled into singing to the pipes and marching in step, and they never stop to think that they do all this without the smallest understanding of it. In fact, every tune with the right elements is correct, but if it has the wrong ones, it is faulty.

Clinias/ Inevitably.

Athenian Stranger/ What about the man who doesn't even understand what the elements are? As we said, will he ever be able to decide that any aspect of the piece is correct?

Clinias/ No, how could he?

Athenian Stranger/ So it looks as if once again we are discovering that it is virtually indispensable for these singers of ours (who are not only being encouraged to sing but compelled to do it in a willing spirit, if I may put it like that), to have been educated up to at least this point: they should each be able to follow the notes of the tunes and the basic units of rhythm, so that they may examine the harmonies and rhythms and select those that men of their age and character could appropriately sing. If that is how they sing, they will give themselves harmless pleasure, and at the same time stimulate the younger generation to adopt virtuous customs with the proper enthusiasm. Assuming the education of these singers reaches that level, they will have pursued a more advanced course of training than will be given to ordinary men, or even the authors themselves. The author is more or less obliged to have a knowledge of rhythm and harmony, but there is no necessity for him to be able to assess the third point—whether the imitation is a morally good one or not. The men we are talking about, however,

must be equally competent in all three fields, so that they can isolate the primary and secondary degrees of goodness; otherwise they will never prove capable of charming the young in the direction of virtue.

Athenian Stranger/ Our argument has done its level best: we have to consider whether it has succeeded in its original intention of showing that our defense of Dionysus' chorus was justified. A gathering like that, of course, inevitably gets increasingly rowdier as the wine flows more freely. (In fact, our initial assumption in the present discussion of this business was that such a tendency is unavoidable.)

Clinias/ Yes, it is unavoidable.

Athenian Stranger/ Everyone is taken out of himself and has a splendid time; the exuberance of his conversation is matched only by his reluctance to listen to his companions, and he thinks himself entitled to run their lives as well as his own.

Clinias/ He certainly does.

Athenian Stranger/ And didn't we say that when this happens the souls of the drinkers get hot and, like iron in a fire, grow younger and softer, so that anyone who has the ability and skill to mold and educate them, finds them as easy to handle as when they were young? The man to do the molding is the same one as before—the good lawgiver. When our drinker grows cheerful and confident and unduly shameless and unwilling to speak and keep quiet, to drink and sing, at the proper times, the lawgiver's job will be to lay down drinking laws which will be able to make this fellow willing to mend his ways; and to do battle with this disgraceful over-confidence as soon as it appears, they will be able to send into the arena, with the blessing of justice, this divine and splendid fear we have called 'modesty' and 'shame'.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ The cool-headed and sober should guard and co-operate with these laws by taking command of those who are not sober; fighting the enemy without cool-headed leaders is actually less dangerous than fighting drink without such help as this. If a man cannot show a willing spirit and obey these commanders and the officials of Dionysus (who are upwards of sixty years of age), the dishonor he incurs must equal or even exceed that incurred by the man who disobeys the officials of the god of war.

Clinias/ Precisely.

Athenian Stranger/ So, if they drank and made merry like that, the revelers who took part in the proceedings would surely benefit? They would go their way on better terms with each other than they were before, instead of loathing each other, which is what happens nowadays; and this would be because they had rules to regulate the whole of their intercourse and had followed every instruction given by the sober to the tipsy.

Clinias/ Precisely—if indeed the party were to go as you describe.

Athenian Stranger/ So let's not abuse the gift of Dionysus any longer in the old unqualified terms, saying that it is bad and does not deserve to be received into the state. One could, indeed, enlarge on its benefits even more. But in front of the general public I would be chary of mentioning the main benefit conferred by the gift, because people misconstrue and misunderstand the explanation.

Clinias/ What is the benefit?

Athenian Stranger/ There is a little-known current of story and tradition which says that Dionysus was robbed of his wits by his stepmother Hera, and that he gets his revenge by stimulating us to Bacchic frenzies and all the mad

dancing that results; and this was precisely the reason why he made us a present of wine. This sort of story, however, I leave to those who see no danger in speaking of the gods in such terms. But I am quite certain of this: no animal that enjoys the use of reason in its maturity is ever born with that faculty, or at any rate with it fully developed. During the time in which it has not yet attained its characteristic level of intelligence, it is completely mad: it bawls uncontrollably, and as soon as it can get on its feet it jumps about with equal abandon. Let's think back: we said that this situation gave rise to music and gymnastics.

Clinias/ We remember, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And also that this was the source of man's appreciation of rhythm and harmony, and Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus were the gods who co-operated to implant it in us.

Clinias/ Yes, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ In particular, it seems that according to the common story wine was given to men as a means of taking vengeance on us—it was intended to drive us insane. But our interpretation is entirely the opposite: the gift was intended to be a medicine and to produce reverence in the soul, and health and strength in the body.

Clinias/ Yes, sir, that's a splendid recapitulation of the argument.

Athenian Stranger/ We are now half-way through our examination of singing and dancing. Shall we carry on with the other half in whatever way recommends itself, or shall we pass it over?

Clinias/ What halves do you mean? Where do you put your dividing-line?

Athenian Stranger/ We found that singing and dancing, taken together, amounted, in a sense, to education as a

whole. One part of it—the vocal part—was concerned with rhythms and 'harmonies'.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ The second part concerned the movement of the body. Here too we had rhythm, a feature shared with the movement of the voice; but the body's movements were its own particular concern, just as in the other half the tune was the special job of the vocal movements.

Clinias/ True enough.

Athenian Stranger/ When the sound of the voice penetrates the soul, we took that to be an education in virtue, and we hazarded the term 'music' to describe it.

Clinias/ And quite rightly.

Athenian Stranger/ When the movements of the body, which we described as 'dancing in delight', are such as to result in a fine state of physical fitness, we ought to call the systematic training which does this 'gymnastics'.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ So much, then, for music, which is roughly the half of the subject of choruses that we said we had examined and finished with; so that's that. Shall we discuss the other half? Or what method should we follow now?

Clinias/ Really, my dear fellow! You are having a conversation with Cretans and Spartans, and we have discussed music thoroughly—leaving gymnastics still to come. What sort of answer do you think you'll get to that question, from either of us?

Athenian Stranger/ I should say that question was a pretty unambiguous answer. I take it that your question, as

I said, amounts in fact to a reply, an order even, to finish off our examination of gymnastics.

Clinias/ You understand me perfectly: do just that.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, I must. Of course, discussing a subject so familiar to you both is not very difficult. You see, you have had much more experience of this particular skill than of the other.

Clinias/ True enough.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, the origin of this form of recreation too lies in the fact that every animal has the natural habit of jumping about. The human animal, as we said, acquired a sense of rhythm, and that led to the birth of dancing. The tune suggested rhythm and awakened the memory of it, and out of the union of the two was born choral singing and dancing as a recreation.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ We have already discussed one of these two; now we are going to set about the discussion of the other.

Clinias/ Yes, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ However, if you are agreeable, let's give our discussion of the use of drink its final flourish.

Clinias/ What flourish do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Suppose a state takes this practice we are now discussing sufficiently seriously to control it by a set of rules and use it to cultivate moderate habits; suppose it permits a similar enjoyment of other pleasures on the same principle, seeing it simply as a device for mastering them. In each and every case, our method will be the one that must be followed. But if the state treats a drink as recreation pure and simple, and anybody who wants to can go drinking and please himself when and with whom he does

it, and do whatever else he likes at the same time, then my vote would be in favor of never allowing this state or individual to take wine at all. I would go further than Cretan and Spartan practice: I would support the law of the Carthaginians, which forbids anyone on military service to take a drink of wine, and makes water the only permissible beverage during the entire campaign. As for civilians, it forbids slaves, male and female, ever to touch wine; it forbids magistrates during their year of office; steersmen and jurymen on duty are absolutely prohibited from touching it, and so too is any councilor who is going to take part in an important discussion; nobody at all is permitted to drink wine during the day, except for reasons of training or health, nor at night if they intend to procreate children (this prohibition applying to men and women alike); and one could point to a great many other situations in which any sensible person with a respect for the law would find it proper not to drink wine. This kind of approach would mean that no state would need many vines and as part of the regulations covering agriculture in general and the whole question of diet, the production of wine in particular would be restricted to the most modest quantities. With your permission, gentlemen, let's take that as the final flourish to our discussion of wine.

Clinias/ Splendid! Permission granted.

Book 3.

Athenian Stranger/ We can take that as settled, then. But what about political systems? How are we to suppose they first came into existence? I feel sure that the best and easiest way to see their origins is this.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ To use the same method that we always have to adopt when we look into a state's moral progress or decline.

Clinias/ What method have you in mind?

Athenian Stranger/ We take an indefinitely long period of time and study the changes that occur in it.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Look, do you think you could ever grasp how long it is that states have existed and men have lived under some sort of political organization?

Clinias/ No, not very easily.

Athenian Stranger/ But at any rate you realize it must be an enormously long time?

Clinias/ Yes, I see that, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ So surely, during this period, thousands upon thousands of states have come into being, while at least as many, in equally vast numbers, have been destroyed? Time and again each one of them has adopted every type of political system. And sometimes small states have become bigger, and big ones have grown smaller; superior states have deteriorated and bad ones have improved.

Clinias/ Inevitably.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's try to pin down just why these changes took place, if we can; then perhaps we shall discover how the various systems took root and developed.

Clinias/ Admirable! Let's get down to it. You must do your best to explain your views, and we must try to follow you.

Athenian Stranger/ Do you think there is any truth in tradition?

Clinias/ What sort of tradition do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ This: that the human race has been repeatedly annihilated by floods and plagues and many other causes, so that only a small fraction of it survived.

Clinias/ Yes, of course, all that sort of thing strikes everyone as entirely credible.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, let's picture just one of this series of annihilations—I mean the effect of the flood.

Clinias/ What special point are we to notice about it?

Athenian Stranger/ That those who escaped the disaster must have been pretty nearly all hill-shepherds—a few embers of mankind preserved, I imagine, on the tops of mountains.

Clinias/ Obviously.

Athenian Stranger/ Here's a further point: such men must have been in general unskilled and unsophisticated. In particular, they must have been quite innocent of the crafty devices that city-dwellers use in the rat-race to do each other down; and all the other dirty tricks that men play against one another must have been unknown.

Clinias/ Quite likely.

Athenian Stranger/ And we can take it, can't we, that the cities that had been built on the plains and near the sea were destroyed root-and-branch?

Clinias/ Yes, we can.

Athenian Stranger/ So all their tools were destroyed, and any worthwhile discovery they had made in politics or any other field was entirely lost? You see, my friend, if their

discoveries had survived throughout at the same level of development as they have attained today, it is difficult to see what room there can ever have been for any new invention.

Clinias/ The upshot of all this, I suppose, is that for millions of years these techniques remained unknown to primitive man. Then, a thousand or two thousand years ago, Daedalus and Orpheus and Palamedes made their various discoveries, Marsyas and Olympus pioneered the art of music, Amphion invented the lyre, and many other discoveries were made by other people. All this happened only yesterday or the day before, so to speak.

Athenian Stranger/ How tactful of you, Clinias, to leave out your friend, who really was born 'yesterday'!

Clinias/ I suppose you mean Epimenides?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, that's the man. His discovery, my dear fellows, put him streets ahead of all the other inventors. Hesiod had foreshadowed it in his poetry long before, but it was Epimenides who achieved it in practice, so you Cretans claim.

Clinias/ We certainly do claim that.

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps we can describe the state of mankind after the cataclysm like this: in spite of a vast and terrifying desolation, plenty of fertile land was available, and although animals in general had perished it happened that some cattle still survived, together with perhaps a small stock of goats. They were few enough, but sufficient to maintain the correspondingly few herdsmen of this early period.

Clinias/ Agreed.

Athenian Stranger/ But at the moment we are talking about the state, and the business of legislation and political organization. Is it conceivable that any trace at all of such things survived—even, so to speak, in the memory?

Clinias/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ So out of those conditions all the features of our present-day life developed: states, political systems, technical skills, laws, rampant vice and frequent virtue.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ My dear sir, can we really suppose that the men of that period, who had had no experience of city life in all its splendor and squalor, ever became totally wicked or totally virtuous?

Clinias/ A good point. We see what you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ So it was only as time went on, and the numbers of the human race increased, that civilization advanced and reached its present stage of development?

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ The process was probably not sudden, but gradual, and took a considerable time.

Clinias/ Yes, that's perfectly plausible.

Athenian Stranger/ I imagine men were all numbed with fear at the prospect of descending from the hills to the plains.

Clinias/ Naturally enough.

Athenian Stranger/ And what a pleasure it must have been to see each other, there being so few of them at that time! However, pretty well all vehicles they might have used to visit each other by land or sea had been destroyed, and the techniques used to construct them had been lost, so that I suppose they found getting together none too easy. They suffered from a scarcity of timber, because iron, copper and mineral workings in general had been overlaid with sludge and had been lost to sight, so that it was virtually impossible to refine fresh supplies of metal. Even if there was the odd

tool left somewhere on the mountains, it was quickly worn down to nothing by use. Replacements could not be made until the technique of mining sprang up again among men.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And how many generations later did that happen, on our calculation?

Clinias/ A good many, obviously.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, during that period, or even longer, all techniques that depend on a supply of copper and iron and so on must have gone out of use?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ For several reasons, then, war and civil war alike came to an end.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, men's isolation prompted them to cherish and love one another. Second, their food supply was nothing they needed to quarrel about. Except perhaps for a few people in the very early stages, there was no shortage of flocks and herds, which is what men mostly lived on in that age. They always had a supply of milk and meat, and could always add to it plenty of good food to be got by hunting. They also had an abundance of clothes, bedding, houses, and equipment for cooking and other purposes. (Molding pottery and weaving, skills that have no need of iron, were a gift from God to men—his way, in fact, of supplying them with all that kind of equipment. His intention was that whenever the human race was reduced to such a desperate condition it could still take root and develop.) Because of all this, they were not intolerably poor, nor driven by poverty to quarrel with each other; but presumably they did not grow rich either, in view of the prevailing lack of gold and silver. Now the community in which neither wealth nor poverty exists will generally

produce the finest characters because tendencies to violence and crime, and feelings of jealousy and envy, simply do not arise. So these men were good, partly for that very reason, partly because of what we might call their 'naïveté'. When they heard things labeled 'good' or 'bad', they were so artless as to think it a statement of the literal truth and believe it. This lack of sophistication precluded the cynicism you find today: they accepted as the truth the doctrine they heard about gods and men, and lived their lives in accordance with it. That is why they were the sort of people we have described.

Clinias/ Megillus and I, at least, agree with your account.

Athenian Stranger/ If we compare them with the era before the flood and with the modern world, we shall have to say that the many generations which lived in that way were inevitably unskilled and ignorant of techniques in general, and particularly of the military devices used on land and sea nowadays. They must also have been innocent of the techniques of warfare peculiar to city-life—generally called 'lawsuits' and 'party-strife'—in which men concoct every possible device to damage and hurt each other by word and deed. Weren't our primitive men simple and manlier and at the same time more restrained and upright in every way? We have already explained why.

Clinias/ Yes, you're quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's remind ourselves that this reconstruction, and the conclusions we shall draw from it, are supposed to make us appreciate how early man came to feel the need of laws, and who their lawgiver was.

Clinias/ Well reminded!

Athenian Stranger/ Presumably they felt no need for legislators, and in that era law was not yet a common phenomenon. Men born at that stage of the world cycle did

not yet have any written records, but lived in obedience to accepted usage and 'ancestral' law, as we call it.

Clinias/ Quite likely.

Athenian Stranger/ But this is already a political system, of a sort.

Clinias/ What sort?

Athenian Stranger/ Autocracy—the name which everyone, I believe, uses for the political system of that age. You can still find it in many parts of the world today, both among Greeks and non-Greeks. I suppose this is what Homer is describing in his account of the household of the Cyclopes:

No laws, no councils for debate have they:

They live on the tips of lofty mountains In hollow caves; each man lays down the law To wife and children, with no regard for neighbor.

Clinias/ That poet of yours sounds as if he was a charming fellow. I have gone through other verses of his, and very polished they were too. Not that I know his work to any great extent—we Cretans don't go in for foreign poetry very much.

Megillus/ But we at Sparta do, and we think Homer is the prince of epic poets, even though the way of life he describes is invariably Ionian rather than Spartan. In this instance he certainly seems to bear you out when he points in his stories to the wild life of the Cyclopes as an explanation of their primitive customs.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, he does testify in my favor. So let's take him as our evidence that political systems of this kind do sometimes develop.

Clinias/ Very well.

Athenian Stranger/ And they arise among these people who live scattered in separate households and individual families in the confusion that follows the cataclysms. In such a system the eldest member rules by virtue of having inherited power from his father or mother; the others follow his lead and make one flock like birds. The authority to which they bow is that of their patriarch: they are governed, in effect, by the most justifiable of all forms of kingship.

Clinias/ Yes, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ The next stage is when several families amalgamate and form larger communities. They turn their attention to agriculture, initially in the foot-hills, and build rings of dry stones to serve as walls to protect themselves against wild animals. The result now is a single large unit, a common homestead.

Clinias/ I suppose that's quite probable.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, isn't this probable too?

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ As these original relatively tiny communities grew bigger, each of the small constituent families lived under its own ruler—the eldest member—and followed its own particular customs which had arisen because of its isolation from the others. The various social and religious standards to which people had grown accustomed reflected the bias of their ancestors and teachers: the more restrained or adventurous the ancestor, the more restrained or adventurous would be the character of his descendants. Consequently, as I say, the members of each group entered the larger community with laws peculiar to themselves, and were ready to impress their own inclinations on their children and their children's children.

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ And of course each group inevitably approved of its own laws and looked on those of other people with rather less favor.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ So it looks as if we have unwittingly stumbled on the origin of legislation.

Clinias/ We certainly have.

Athenian Stranger/ At any rate the next and necessary step in this amalgamation is to choose some representatives to review the rules of all the families, and to propose openly to the leaders and heads of the people—the 'kings', so to speak—the adoption of those rules that particularly recommend themselves for common use. These representatives will be known as lawgivers, and by appointing the leaders as officials they will create out of the separate autocracies a sort of aristocracy, or perhaps kingship. And while the political system passes through this transitional stage they will administer the state themselves.

Clinias/ Yes, that sort of change would certainly come about by stages.

Athenian Stranger/ So we can now go on to describe the birth of a third type of political system, one which in fact admits all systems and all their modifications and exhibits equal variety and change in the actual states as well.

Clinias/ What type is this?

Athenian Stranger/ The one which Homer too listed as the successor of the second. This is how he describes the origin of the third: 'He founded Dardania'—I think this is how it goes—'when holy Ilium, A town upon the plain for mortal men, had not been built:

For still they lived upon the lower slopes of many-fountained Ida.'

He composed these lines, as well as those about the Cyclopes, under some sort of inspiration from God. And how true to life they are! This is because poets as a class are divinely gifted and are inspired when they sing, so that with the help of Graces and Muses they frequently hit on how things really happen.

Clinias/ They do indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's carry on with the story we are telling: it may suggest something to our purpose. I take it this is what we ought to do?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Ilium was founded, according to us, when men had descended from the hills to a wide and beautiful plain. They built their city on a hill of moderate height near several rivers which poured down from Ida above.

Clinias/ So the story goes.

Athenian Stranger/ I suppose we may assume that this descent of theirs took place many ages after the flood?

Clinias/ Yes, naturally, many ages later.

Athenian Stranger/ I mean that apparently the disaster we've just described must have been forgotten to a quite remarkable degree if they founded their city on the lower reaches of several rivers flowing down from the mountains, and put their trust in hills that were none too high.

Clinias/ Yes, a clear proof that they were far removed in time from any such experience.

Athenian Stranger/ With the increase in the human population many other cities, one supposes, were already being founded.

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ These cities also mounted an expedition against Ilium, probably by sea as well, because by then all mankind had overcome its fear and had taken to ships.

Clinias/ So it seems.

Athenian Stranger/ And after a siege of about ten years the Achaeans sacked Troy.

Clinias/ Indeed they did.

Athenian Stranger/ They besieged Ilium for ten years, and during this period the domestic affairs of the individual attackers took a turn for the worse. The younger generation revolted, and the ugly and criminal reception they gave the troops when they returned to their own cities and homes led to murder, massacre and expulsion on a large scale. When the exiles came back again they adopted a new name, and were now known as Dorians instead of Achaeans, in honor of Dorieus, who had rallied them while they were in exile. A full and exhaustive account of subsequent events can be found in your traditional Spartan stories.

Megillus/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ When we were starting to discuss legislation, the question of the arts and drinking cropped up, and we made a digression. But now we really do have a chance to come to grips with our subject. As if God himself were guiding us, we've come back to the very point from which we digressed: the actual foundation of Sparta. You maintained that Sparta was established on the right lines, and you said the same of Crete, because it has laws that bear a family resemblance to Sparta's. We have had a rather random discussion about various foundations and political systems, but we have achieved at least this much: we have watched the first, second and third type of state being founded in succession over a vast period of time, and now

we discover this fourth state (or 'nation', if you like) whose historical foundation and development we are tracing down to its maturity today. After all this, perhaps we can get some idea of what was right and wrong in the way these foundations were established. Can we see what kind of laws are responsible for continued preservation of the features that survive and the ruin of those that collapse? What detailed alterations will produce happiness in a state? If we can understand all this, Clinias and Megillus, we shall have to discuss the whole business all over again: it will be like making a fresh start. However, we may be able to find some fault in our account so far.

Megillus/ Well, sir, if some god were to give us his word that if we do make a second attempt to look at the problem of legislation, we shall hear an account of at least the quality and length of the one we have just had, I for one would willingly extend our journey, and the present day would seem not a moment too long—though it is in fact more or less the day when the Sun-god turns past summer towards winter.

Athenian Stranger/ So it looks as if we must press on with the investigation.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's imagine that we are living at the time when the territory of Sparta, Argos and Messene, and the districts nearby, had in effect come under the control of your ancestors, Megillus. Their next decision, or so the story goes, was to split their forces into three and establish three states—Argos, Messene and Sparta.

Megillus/ That's quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ Temenos became king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene, and Procles and Eurysthenes of Sparta.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ And all their contemporaries swore to them that they would go to their help if anybody tried to subvert their thrones.

Megillus/ Precisely.

Athenian Stranger/ Now when a monarchy is overthrown (and indeed when any other type of authority has been destroyed at any time) surely no one but the rulers themselves are to blame? That was the line we took when the subject cropped up a little time ago—or have we forgotten by now?

Megillus/ No, of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ So now we can put our thesis on a firmer footing, because it looks as if our study of history has led us to the same conclusion as before. This means we shall carry on our investigation on the basis of the actual facts rather than conjecture. The facts are, of course, as follows: each of the three royal families, and each of the three royal states they ruled, exchanged oaths in accordance with mutually binding laws which they had adopted to regulate the exercise of authority and obedience to it. The kings swore never to stiffen their rule as the nation continued down the years; the others undertook, provided the rulers kept to their side of the bargain, never themselves to overthrow the kingships nor tolerate an attempt to do so by others. The kings would help the kings and peoples if they were wronged, and the peoples would help the peoples and the kings likewise. That's right, isn't it?

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now whether it was the kings or someone else who laid down laws for this political system thus established in the three states, the crucial provision, surely, was this—

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Whenever a given state broke the established laws, an alliance of the other two would always be there to take the field against it.

Megillus/ Obviously.

Athenian Stranger/ Of course, most people only ask their legislators to enact the kind of laws that the population in general will accept without objection. But just imagine asking your trainer or doctor to give you pleasure when he trains or cures your body!

Megillus/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ In fact, you often have to be satisfied if you can restore your body to health and vigor without undue pain.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ In another respect too, the people of that time were particularly well placed to make legislation a painless process.

Megillus/ What respect?

Athenian Stranger/ Their legislators' efforts to establish a certain equality of property among them were not open to one particularly damaging accusation which is frequently made in other states. Suppose a legal code is being framed and someone adopts the policy of a change in the ownership of land and a cancellation of debts, because he sees that this is the only way in which equality can be satisfactorily achieved. 'Hands off fundamentals' is the slogan everybody uses to attack a legislator who tries to bring in that kind of reform, and his policy of land-redistribution and remission of debts earns him only curses. It's enough to make any man despair. So here is another tremendous advantage the Dorians enjoyed: the absence of resentment. No one could

object to the way the land was parceled out, and large long-standing debts did not exist.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Then why on earth, my friends, did this foundation and its legislation turn out such a dismal failure?

Megillus/ What do you mean by that? What's your objection?

Athenian Stranger/ Three states were founded but in two of them the political system and the legal code were quickly corrupted. Only the third settlement survived—that of your state, Sparta.

Megillus/ A pretty difficult problem you're posing!

Athenian Stranger/ Nevertheless, it demands our attention. So now let's look into it, and while away the journey, as we said when we set out, by amusing ourselves with laws—it's a dignified game and it suits our time of life.

Megillus/ Of course. We must do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ No laws could form a better subject for our investigation than those by which these states have been administered. Or are there any bigger or more famous states whose foundation we might examine?

Megillus/ No, it's not easy to think of alternatives.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, it's pretty obvious that they intended the arrangements they made to protect adequately not only the Peloponnese but the Greeks in general against any possible attack by non-Greeks—as for example occurred when those who then lived in the territory of Ilium trusted to the power of the Assyrian empire, which Ninos had founded, and provoked the war against Troy by their arrogance. You see, a good deal of the splendor of the Assyrian empire still remained, and the dread of its united

organization was the counterpart in that age of our fear of the Great King of Persia today. The Assyrians had a tremendous grudge against the Greeks: Troy, which was part of the Assyrian empire, had been captured for a second time. To meet such dangers the Dorian army formed a single unified body, although at that period it was distributed among the three states under the command of the kings (who were brothers, being sons of Hercules). It seemed to be excellently conceived and equipped—better even than the army which sailed against Troy. For a start, people thought the sons of Hercules were, as commanders, a cut above the grandsons of Pelops; secondly, they rated the prowess of the army itself higher than that of the expedition which went to Troy. After all, they calculated, that had consisted of Achaeans, the very people the Dorians had defeated. So may we take it that this was the nature and purpose of the arrangements they made?

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And for various reasons they probably expected these arrangements would be permanent and last a long time. They had been comrades in a great many toils and dangers in the past, and now they had been brought under the control of a single family (the kings being brothers); and they had also consulted a large number of prophets, notably Apollo's at Delphi.

Megillus/ Yes, that's probable enough, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ But apparently these large expectations evaporated pretty quickly, except, as we said a minute ago, in the case of just one small part of the alliance—your state, Sparta. And right up to the present day Sparta has never stopped fighting the other two members. But if they had done as they intended and had agreed on a

common policy, their power would have been irresistible, militarily speaking.

Megillus/ It certainly would.

Athenian Stranger/ So just how did their plans misfire? This is surely a problem we ought to look into: why was such a vast and tremendous organization unlucky enough to be destroyed?

Megillus/ True: this is the right direction to look. Neglect these, and you'll never find any other laws or political systems preserving (or eliminating) such remarkable and important features.

Athenian Stranger/ What a stroke of luck! It looks as if we've somehow got on to a crucial point.

Megillus/ No doubt about it.

Athenian Stranger/ Well now, my fine fellow, what hackneyed thoughts we've been having, without realizing it! When people see some tremendous achievement, they always think to themselves, 'What terrific results it would have led to, if someone had known how to set about putting it to proper use!' Here and now, perhaps our ideas on the topic we are discussing are just as wrong and unrealistic as anybody else's who looks at anything in that sort of way.

Megillus/ Well really, what do you mean? What are we supposed to think you're driving at when you say that?

Athenian Stranger/ I was poking fun at no one but myself, my friend. I was thinking about the army we are discussing and it occurred to me how splendid it was and what a marvelous tool (as I said) had been put into the hands of the Greeks—if only someone had put it to the proper use at the time!

Megillus/ And you were quite right and sensible in everything you said, and we heartily agreed with you—equally rightly and sensibly.

Athenian Stranger/ Maybe so. Still, my view is that everyone who sets eyes on something big and strong and powerful immediately gets the feeling that if the owner knew how to take advantage of its size and scale he would get tremendous results and be a happy man.

Megillus/ And this again is surely right and proper. Or do you see it differently?

Athenian Stranger/ Well now, just consider what criteria a man ought to employ if he is going to be 'right' to give such praise in an individual case. What about the one we are discussing, for a start? Suppose those who undertook the organization of the army in that age had known their job: somehow, they would have succeeded in it—but the question is how. They ought, of course, to have consolidated their army and kept it on a permanent footing; this would have ensured them their own freedom while they ruled over anybody else they liked, and in general it would have enabled them to do whatever they or their children wanted all over the world, among Greeks and non-Greeks indifferently. This is what men would praise them for, isn't it?

Megillus/ It is indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Again, anyone who notices a case of great wealth or exceptional family distinction or something like that takes precisely the same line. He assumes that just because a man enjoys these advantages his every wish will be granted—or at any rate most of them, and the most important ones.

Megillus/ Quite likely.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, this shows that there is one specific desire common to all mankind. Isn't this the upshot of our discussion?

Megillus/ What desire?

Athenian Stranger/ That events should obey whatever orders one feels like giving—invariably, if possible, but failing that, at least where human affairs are concerned.

Megillus/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So seeing that this is the constant wish of us all, right from childhood to old age, isn't it inevitably what we are always praying for too?

Megillus/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And I suppose our prayers on behalf of those whom we love will be for precisely what they themselves pray for on their own behalf?

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ A man who is a father loves the child who is his son?

Megillus/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Yet there is a good deal in the son's prayers that the father will beg the gods never to grant.

Megillus/ You mean when the son who prays is still young and irresponsible?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, and I'm thinking too of when the father is senile or even unduly impulsive because of second childhood, and has lost all sense of what is right and proper. He gets into the same state as Theseus when he dealt with Hippolytus, who died so wretchedly, and his prayers become very vehement indeed. But if the son understands the situation, do you think he will join in his father's prayers, given those circumstances?

Megillus/ I know what you mean. Your point, I take it, is that you should demand your own way in your prayers only if your wishes are supported by your rational judgment—and this, a rational outlook, should be the object of the prayers and efforts of us all, states and individuals alike.

Athenian Stranger/ It should indeed, and in particular—let me remind myself—it should always be the aim of a state's legislator when he frames the provisions of his laws. And I remind you again—to recollect the beginning of our discussion—of what you two recommended: you said that the good legislator should construct his entire legal code with a view to war; for my part, I maintained that this was to order him to establish his laws with an eye on only one virtue out of the four. I said he ought to keep virtue as a whole in mind but especially and preeminently the virtue that heads the list—judgment and wisdom, and a strength of mind such that desires and appetites are kept under control. Our discussion has come full circle, and being the speaker at the moment I make the same point as before. You can treat it as a joke if you like, but if you prefer, you can take it seriously: I maintain that, if you lack wisdom, praying is a risky business, because you get the opposite of what you want. If you like to suppose that I am in earnest, do so: I'm confident that if you follow the line of argument we opened up a moment ago you'll soon discover that the cause of the ruin of the kings and the whole enterprise was not cowardice nor a lack of military expertise in the commanders or in those whose role it was to obey them. The disaster was caused by every other sort of vice, and in particular ignorance about mankind's most vital concerns. And if that was true then it is even more so today; and precisely the same will be true in the future. If you like, I'll try to press on with the next stages in the argument and develop the point. As you are my friends, I'll do my very best to make it clear.

Clinias/ To make a speech in your praise, sir, would be a tasteless thing to do. Our actions rather than our words will show our regard for you: we shall give you our closest attention. This is the best way to tell whether a gentleman approves or not.

Megillus/ Well said, Clinias. Let's do as you say.

Clinias/ And so we shall, God willing. Now let's have your explanation.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, to go back on to the track of the argument, we maintain that crass ignorance destroyed that great empire, and that it has a natural tendency to produce precisely the same results today. If this is so, it means that the legislator must try to inspire states with as much good sense as possible, and eradicate folly, as far as he can.

Clinias/ Obviously.

Athenian Stranger/ So what kind of ignorance would deserve the title 'crass'? See if you agree with my description. I suggest this kind.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ The kind involved when a man thinks something is fine and good, but loathes it instead of liking it, and conversely when he likes and welcomes what he believes is wicked and unjust. I maintain that this disaccord between his feelings of pleasure and pain and his rational judgment constitutes the very lowest depth of ignorance. It is also the most 'crass', in that it affects the most extensive element in the soul (the element that experiences pleasure and pain, which corresponds to the most extensive part of a state, the common people). So when the soul quarrels with knowledge or opinion or reason, its natural ruling principles, you have there what I call 'folly'. This applies both to the state in which people disobey their rulers and laws, and to the individual, when the fine principles in which he really believes prove not only ineffective but actually harmful. It's all these examples of ignorance that I should put down as the worst kind of discord in a state and individual, not the

mere professional ignorance of a workman. I hope you see what I mean, gentlemen.

Clinias/ We do, my friend, and we agree with what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ So let's adopt this as an agreed statement of policy: no citizens who suffer from this kind of ignorance should be entrusted with any degree of power. They must be reproved for their ignorance, even if their ability to reason is outstanding and they have worked hard at every nice accomplishment that makes a man quick-witted. It is those whose characters are at the other extreme who must be called 'wise', even if, as the saying is, 'they cannot read, they cannot swim'; and it is these sensible people who must be given the offices of state. You see, my friends, without concord, how could you ever get even a glimmer of sound judgment? It's out of the question. But we should be entirely justified in styling the greatest and most splendid concord of all 'the greatest wisdom'. Anyone who lives a rational life shares in this wisdom, but the man who lacks it will invariably turn out to be a spendthrift and no savior to the city—quite the reverse, because he suffers from this particular kind of ignorance. So as we said just now, let's adopt this as the statement of our views.

Clinias/ Adopted it is.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, I take it that states must contain some people who govern and others who are governed?

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ Good. Well then, what titles are there to either rank? Can we count them? (I mean both in the state and in the family, in each case irrespective of size.) One claim, surely, could be made by father and mother; and in general the title of parents to exercise control over their

children and descendants would be universally acknowledged, wouldn't it?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Close behind comes the title of those of high birth to govern those of low birth. Next in order comes our third demand: that younger people should consent to be governed by their elders.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ The fourth is that slaves should be subject to the control of their masters.

Clinias/ No doubt about it.

Athenian Stranger/ And I suppose the fifth is that the stronger should rule and the weaker should obey.

Clinias/ A pretty compelling claim to obedience, that!

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, and one which prevails throughout the animal kingdom—by decree of nature, as Pindar of Thebes once remarked. But it looks as if the most important claim will be the sixth, that the ignorant man should follow the leadership of the wise and obey his orders. In spite of you, my clever Pindar, what I'd called the 'decree of nature' is in fact the rule of law that governs willing subjects, without being imposed by force; I'm certainly not prepared to say it's unnatural.

Clinias/ Quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ And we persuade a man to cast lots, by explaining that this, the seventh title to authority, enjoys the favor of the gods and is blessed by fortune. We tell him that the fairest arrangement is for him to exercise authority if he wins, but to be subject to it if he loses.

Clinias/ That's very true.

Athenian Stranger/ 'So you see, O legislator' (as we might jocularly address someone who sets about legislation with

undue optimism), 'you see how many titles to authority there are, and how they naturally conflict with each other. Now here's a source of civil strife we've discovered for you, which you must put to rights. First, though, join us in trying to find out how the kings of Argos and Messene went astray and broke these rules, and so destroyed themselves and the power of Greece, for all its splendor at that time. Wasn't it because they didn't appreciate the truth of Hesiod's remark that the half is often greater than the whole? He thought that when it is harmful to get the whole, and the half is enough, then enough is better than a feast, and is the preferable alternative.'

Clinias/ True enough.

Athenian Stranger/ So where do we suppose this destructive process invariably starts? Among kings or people?

Clinias/ Most instances suggest that this is probably a disease of kings whose life of luxury has made them arrogant.

Athenian Stranger/ So it is clear that it was the kings of that era who were first infected by the acquisitive spirit in defiance of the law of the land. The precise point to which they had given their seal of approval by their word and oath became the ground of their disagreement, and this lack of harmony (which is, in our view, the 'crassest' stupidity, though it looks like wisdom) put the whole arrangement jarringly off key and out of tune: hence its destruction.

Clinias/ Quite likely.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well. Then what precautions ought a contemporary legislator to have taken in his code to nip this disease in the bud? God knows, the answer's not difficult nowadays, and the point is quite simple to understand—though if anyone had foreseen the problem

then, assuming it was possible to do so, he'd have been wiser than we are.

Megillus/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Hindsight, Megillus! In the perspective of today it's easy to understand what should have been done then, and once understood it's equally easy to explain.

Megillus/ You' better be even clearer than that.

Athenian Stranger/ The clearest way of putting it would be this.

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ If you neglect the rule of proportion and fit excessively large sails to small ships, or give too much food to a small body, or too high authority to a soul that doesn't measure up to it, the result is always disastrous. Body and soul become puffed up: disease breaks out in the one, and in the other arrogance quickly leads to injustice. Now, what are we getting at? Simply this: the mortal soul simply does not exist, my friends, which by dint of its natural qualities will ever make a success of supreme authority among men while it is still young and responsible to no one. Full of folly, the worst of diseases, it inevitably has its judgment corrupted, and incurs the enmity of its closest friends; and once that happens, its total ruin and the loss of all its power soon follow. A first-class lawgiver's job is to have a sense of proportion and to guard against this danger. Nowadays it is a reasonable guess that this was in fact done at that time. However, it looks as if there was…

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ …some god who was concerned on your behalf and saw what was going to happen. He took your single line of kings and split it into two, so as to restrict its powers to more reasonable proportions. After that, a man

who combined human nature with some of the powers of a god observed that your leadership was still in a feverish state, so he blended the obstinacy and vigor of the Spartans with the prudent influence of age by giving the twenty-eight elders the same authority in making important decisions as the kings. Your 'third savior' saw that your government was still fretting and fuming with restless energy, so he put a kind of bridle on it in the shape of the power of the ephors—a power which came very close to being held by lot. This is the formula that turned your kingship into a mixture of the right elements, so that thanks to its own stability it ensured the stability of the rest of the state. If things had been left to the discretion of Temenus and Cresphontes and the legislators of that time, whoever in fact they were, not even Aristodemus' part would have survived. You see, they were tiros in legislation: otherwise it would never have occurred to them to rely on oaths to restrain the soul of a young man who had taken over power from which a tyranny could develop. But the fact is that God has demonstrated the sort of thing a position of authority ought to have been then and should be now, if it is to have any prospects of permanency. As I said before, we don't need any great wisdom to recognize all this now—after all, it's not difficult to see the point if you have a historical example to go by. But if anyone had seen all this then, and had been able to control the various offices and produce a single authority out of the three, he would have saved all the splendid projects of that age from destruction, and neither the Persians nor anyone else would ever have sent a fleet to attack Greece, contemptuously supposing that we were people who counted for very little.

Clinias/ That's true.

Athenian Stranger/ After all, Clinias, the way the Greeks repulsed them was a disgrace. In saying this, I don't mean that those who won the battles of that war by land and sea

did not do so magnificently. By 'disgrace' I mean that, to start with, only one of those three states fought to defend Greece. The other two were rotten to the core. One of them even hindered Sparta's attempts to help the defense, and fought her tooth and nail, while the other, Argos (which used to be paramount when the territory was first divided up), although called upon to repel the barbarian, ignored the request and failed to contribute to the defense. A detailed history of the course of that war would have some pretty ugly charges to make against Greece: indeed, there is no reason why it should report that Greece made any defense at all. If it hadn't been for the joint determination of the Athenians and the Spartans to resist the slavery that threatened them, we should have by now virtually a complete mixture of the races—Greek with Greek, Greek with barbarian, and barbarian with Greek. We can see a parallel in the nations whom the Persians lord it over today: they have been split up and then horribly jumbled together again into the scattered communities in which they now live. Well now, Clinias and Megillus, why are we making these accusations against the so-called 'statesmen' and legislators of that day and this? Because if we find out why they went wrong we shall discover what different course of action they ought to have followed. That is what we were doing just now, when we said that legislation providing for powerful or extreme authority is a mistake. One should always remember that a state ought to be free and wise and enjoy internal harmony, and that this is what the lawgiver should concentrate on in his legislation. (It ought not to surprise us if several times before now we have decided on a number of other aims and said they were what a lawgiver should concentrate on, so that the aims proposed never seem to be the same from minute to minute. When we say that the legislator should keep self-control or good judgment or friendship in view, we

must bear in mind that all these aims are the same, not different. Nor should we be disconcerted if we find a lot of other expressions of which the same is true.)

Clinias/ Yes, when we think back over the argument we'll certainly try to remember that. But you wanted to explain what the legislator ought to aim at in the matter of friendship and good judgment and liberty. So tell us now what you were going to say.

Athenian Stranger/ Listen to me then. There are two mother-constitutions, so to speak, which you could fairly say have given birth to all the others. Monarchy is the proper name for the first, and democracy for the second. The former has been taken to extreme lengths by the Persians, the latter by my country; virtually all the others, as I said, are varieties of these two. It is absolutely vital for a political system to combine them, if (and this is of course the point of our advice, when we insist that no state formed without these two elements can be constituted properly)—if it is to enjoy freedom and friendship applied with good judgment.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ One state was over-eager in embracing only the principle of monarchy, the other in embracing only the ideal of liberty; neither has achieved a balance between the two. Your Spartan and Cretan states have done better, and time was when you could say much the same of the Athenians and Persians, but things have changed since then. Let's run through the reasons for this, shall we?

Clinias/ Yes, of course—if, that is, we mean to finish what we have set out to do.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let's listen to the story. Under Cyrus, the life of the Persians was a judicious blend of liberty and subjection, and after gaining their own freedom they

became the masters of a great number of other people. As rulers, they granted a degree of liberty to their subjects and put them on the same footing as themselves, with the result that soldiers felt more affection for their commanders and displayed greater zeal in the face of danger. The king felt no jealousy if any of his subjects was intelligent and had some advice to offer; on the contrary, he allowed free speech and valued those who could contribute to the formulation of policy; a sensible man could use his influence to help the common cause. Thanks to freedom, friendship, and the practice of pooling their ideas, during that period the Persians made progress all along the line.

Clinias/ It does rather look as if that was the situation in the period you describe.

Athenian Stranger/ So how are we to explain the disaster under Cambyses, and the virtually complete recovery under Darius? To help our reconstruction of events, shall we have a shot at some inspired guessing?

Clinias/ Yes, because this topic we've embarked on will certainly help our inquiry.

Athenian Stranger/ My guess, then, about Cyrus, is that although he was doubtless a good commander and a loyal patriot, he never considered, even superficially, the problem of correct education; and as for running a household, I'd say he never paid any attention to it at all.

Clinias/ And what interpretation are we to put on a remark like that?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean that he probably spent his entire life after infancy on campaign, and handed over his children to the women to bring up. These women reared them from their earliest years as though they were already Heaven's special favorites and darlings, endowed with all the blessings that implies. They wouldn't allow anyone to thwart

‘their Beatitudes’ in anything, and they forced everybody to rhapsodize about what the children said or did. You can imagine the sort of person they produced.

Clinias/ And a fine old education it must have been, to judge from your account.

Athenian Stranger/ It was a womanish education, conducted by the royal harem. The teachers of the children had recently come into considerable wealth, but they were left all on their own, without men, because the army was preoccupied by wars and constant dangers.

Clinias/ That makes sense.

Athenian Stranger/ The children’s father, for his part, went on accumulating herds and flocks for their benefit—and many a herd of human beings too, quite apart from every other sort of animal; but he didn’t know that his intended heirs were not being instructed in the traditional Persian discipline. This discipline (the Persians being shepherds, and sons of a stony soil) was a tough one, capable of producing hardy shepherds who could camp out and keep awake on watch and turn soldier if necessary. He just didn’t notice that women and eunuchs had given his sons the education of a Mede and that it had been debased by their so-called ‘blessed’ status. That is why Cyrus’ children turned out as children naturally do when their teachers have never corrected them. So, when they succeeded to their inheritance on the death of Cyrus, they were living in a riot of unrestrained debauchery. First, unwilling to tolerate an equal, one of them killed the other; next, he himself, driven out of his senses by liquor and lack of self-control, was deprived of his dominions by the Medes and ‘the Eunuch’ (as he was then called), to whom the idiot Cambyses was an object of contempt.

Clinias/ So the story goes, and it seems probable enough.

Athenian Stranger/ And it goes on, I think, to say that the empire was regained for the Persians by Darius and 'the Seven'.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now let's carry on with this story of ours and see what happened. Darius was no royal prince, and his upbringing had not encouraged him to self-indulgence. When he came and seized the empire with the aid of the other six, he split it up into seven divisions, of which some faint outlines still survive today. He thought the best policy was to govern it by new laws of his own which introduced a certain degree of equality for all; and he also included in his code regulations about the tribute promised to the people by Cyrus. His generosity in money and gifts rallied all the Persians to his side, and stimulated a feeling of community and friendship among them; consequently his armies regarded him with such affection that they added to the territory Cyrus had bequeathed at least as much again. But Darius was succeeded by Xerxes, whose education had reverted to the royal pampering of old. ('Darius'—as perhaps we'd be entitled to say to him—'you haven't learned from Cyrus' mistake, so you've brought up Xerxes in the same habits as Cyrus brought up Cambyses.') So Xerxes, being a product of the same type of education, naturally had a career that closely reproduced the pattern of Cambyses' misfortunes. Ever since then, hardly any king of the Persians has been genuinely 'great', except in style and title. I maintain that the reason for this is not just bad luck, but the shocking life that the children of dictators and fantastically rich parents almost always lead: no man, you see, however old or however young, will ever excel in virtue if he has had this sort of upbringing. We repeat that this is the point the legislator must look out for, and so must we here and now. And in all fairness, my Spartan friends, one

must give your state credit for at least this much: rich man, poor man, commoner and king are held in honor to the same degree and are educated in the same way, without privilege, except as determined by the supernatural instructions you received from some god when your state was founded. A man's exceptional wealth is no more reason for a state to confer specially exalted office on him than his ability to run, his good looks, or his physical strength, in the absence of some virtue—or even if he has some virtue, if it excludes self-control.

Megillus/ What do you mean by that, sir?

Athenian Stranger/ Courage, I take it, is one part of virtue.

Megillus/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ So now that you've heard the story, use your own judgment: would you be glad to have as a resident in your house or as a neighbor a man who in spite of considerable courage was immoderate and licentious?

Megillus/ Heaven forbid!

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, what about a skilled workman, knowledgeable in his own field, but unjust?

Megillus/ No, I'd never welcome him.

Athenian Stranger/ But surely, in the absence of self-control, justice will never spring up.

Megillus/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ Nor indeed will the 'wise' man we put forward just now, who keeps his feelings of pleasure and pain in tune with right reason and obedient to it.

Megillus/ No, he certainly won't.

Athenian Stranger/ Now here's another point for us to consider, which will help us to decide whether civic

distinctions are, on a given occasion, conferred correctly or incorrectly.

Megillus/ And what is that?

Athenian Stranger/ If we found self-control existing in the soul in isolation from all other virtue, should we be justified in admiring it? Or not?

Megillus/ I really couldn't say.

Athenian Stranger/ A very proper reply. If you had opted for either alternative it would have struck an odd note, I think.

Megillus/ So my reply was all right, then.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes. But if you have something which in itself deserves to be admired or execrated, a mere additional element isn't worth talking about: much better pass it over and say nothing.

Megillus/ Self-control is the element you mean, I suppose.

Athenian Stranger/ It is. And in general, whatever benefits us most, when this element is added, deserves the highest honor, the second most beneficial thing deserves the second highest honor, and so on: as we go down the list, everything will get in due order the honor it deserves.

Megillus/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, shan't we insist again that the distribution of these honors is the business of the legislator?

Megillus/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Would you prefer us to leave the entire distribution to his discretion and let him deal with the details of each individual case? But as we too have something of a taste for legislation, perhaps you'd like us to

try our hands at a three-fold division and distinguish the most important class, then the second and the third.

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ We maintain that if a state is going to survive to enjoy all the happiness that mankind can achieve, it is vitally necessary for it to distribute honors and marks of disgrace on a proper basis. And the proper basis is to put spiritual goods at the top of the list and hold them—provided the soul exercises self-control—in the highest esteem; bodily goods and advantages should come second, and third those said to be provided by property and wealth. If a legislator or a state ever ignores these guidelines by valuing riches above all or by promoting one of the other inferior goods to a more exalted position, it will be an act of political and religious folly. Shall we take this line, or not?

Megillus/ Yes, emphatically and unambiguously.

Athenian Stranger/ It was our scrutiny of the political system of the Persians that made us go into this business at such length. Our verdict was that their corruption increased year by year; and the reason we assign for this is that they were too strict in depriving the people of liberty and too energetic in introducing authoritarian government, so that they destroyed all friendship and community of spirit in the state. And with that gone, the policy of rulers is framed not in the interests of their subjects the people, but to support their own authority: let them only think that a situation offers them the prospect of some profit, even a small one, and they wreck cities and ruin friendly nations by fire and sword; they hate, and are hated in return, with savage and pitiless loathing. When they come to need the common people to fight on their behalf, they discover the army has no loyalty, no eagerness to face danger and fight. They have millions and millions of soldiers—all useless for fighting a

war, so that just as if manpower were in short supply, they have to hire it, imagining that mercenaries and foreigners will ensure their safety. Not only this, they inevitably become so stupid that they proclaim by their very actions that as compared with gold and silver everything society regards as good and valuable is in their eyes so much trash.

Megillus/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ So let's have done with the Persians. Our conclusion is that the empire is badly run at the moment because the people are kept in undue subjection and the rulers excessively authoritarian.

Megillus/ Precisely.

Athenian Stranger/ Next we come to the political system of Attica. We have to demonstrate, on the same lines as before, that complete freedom from all authority is infinitely worse than submitting to a moderate degree of control.

At the time of the Persian attack on the Greeks—on virtually everyone living in Europe, is perhaps a better way of putting it—we Athenians had a constitution, inherited from the distant past, in which a number of public offices were held on the basis of four property-classes. Lady Modesty was the mistress of our hearts, a despot who made us live in willing subjection to the laws then in force. Moreover, the enormous size of the army that was coming at us by land and sea made us desperately afraid, and served to increase our obedience to the authorities and the law. For all these reasons we displayed a tremendous spirit of co-operation. You see, about ten years before the battle of Salamis, Datis had arrived at the head of a Persian army; he had been sent by Darius against the Athenians and the Eretrians with explicit instructions to make slaves of them and bring them home, and he had been warned that failure would mean death. With his vast numbers of soldiers, Datis

made short work of the Eretrians, whom he completely overpowered and captured. He then sent to Athens a bloodcurdling report that not a single Eretrian had got away—propaganda which asked us to believe that Datis' soldiers, hand in hand in a long line, had combed over every inch of Eretria. Well, whatever the truth or otherwise of this tale, it terrified the Greeks; the Athenians were particularly scared, and they sent off envoys in all directions, but no one was prepared to help them except the Spartans—who were, however, prevented by the Messenian war, which was going on at that time, or perhaps by some other distraction (I'm not aware of any information being given on the point). However that may be, the Spartans arrived at Marathon one day too late for the battle. After this, reports of vast preparations and endless threats on the part of the king came thick and fast. The years went by, and then we were told that Darius was dead, but that his son, young and impetuous, had inherited the kingdom and was determined not to give up the invasion. The Athenians reckoned that all these preparations were directed against themselves, because of what had happened at Marathon;

and when they heard of the canal that had been dug through Athos, the bridging of the Hellespont and the huge number of Xerxes' ships, they calculated that neither land nor sea offered any prospects of safety. No one, they thought, would come to help them. They remembered the previous attack and the success of the Persians in Eretria: no one had assisted the Athenians then, no one had faced the danger by fighting at their side. On land they expected the same thing to happen this time; and as for the sea, they realized that escape by this route was out of the question, in view of the thousand or more ships coming to the attack. They could think of only one hope, and a thin, desperate hope it was; but there was simply no other. Their minds went back to the

previous occasion, and they reflected how the victory they won in battle had been gained in equally desperate circumstances. Sustained by this hope, they began to recognize that no one but they themselves and their gods could provide a way out of their difficulties. All this inspired them with a spirit of solidarity. One cause was the actual fear they felt at the time, but there was another kind too, encouraged by the traditional laws of the state. I mean the 'fear' they had learned to experience as a result of being subject to an ancient code of laws. In the course of our earlier discussion we have called this fear 'modesty' often enough, and we said that people who aspire to be good must be its slave. A coward, on the other hand, is free of this particular kind of fear and never experiences it. And if 'ordinary' fear had not overtaken the cowards on that occasion, they would never have combined to defend themselves or protected temples, tombs, fatherland, and friends and relatives as well, in the way they did. We would all have been split up and scattered over the face of the earth.

Megillus/ Yes, sir, you are quite right, and your remarks reflect credit both on your country and yourself.

Athenian Stranger/ No doubt, Megillus; and it is only right and proper to tell you of the history of that period, seeing that you've been blessed with your ancestors' character. Now then, you and Clinias, consider: have these remarks of ours any relevance at all to legislation? After all, this is the object of the exercise—I'm not going through all this simply for the story. Look: in a way, we Athenians have had the same experience as the Persians. They, of course, reduced the people to a state of complete subjection, and we encouraged the masses to the opposite extreme of unfettered liberty, but the discussion we have had serves well enough

as a pointer to the next step in the argument, and shows us the method to follow.

Megillus/ Splendid! But do try to be even more explicit about what you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well. When the old laws applied, my friends, the people were not in control: on the contrary, they lived in a kind of 'voluntary slavery' to the laws.

Megillus/ Which laws have you in mind?

Athenian Stranger/ I'm thinking primarily of the regulations about the music of that period (music being the proper place to start a description of how life became progressively freer of controls). In those days Athenian music comprised various categories and forms. One type of song consisted of prayers to the gods, which were termed 'hymns'; and there was another quite different type, which you might well have called laments'. 'Paeans' made up a third category, and there was also a fourth, called a 'dithyramb' (whose theme was, I think, the birth of Dionysus). There existed another kind of song too, which they thought of as a separate class, and the name they gave it was this very word that is so often on our lips: 'nomes' ('for the lyre', as they always added). Once these categories and a number of others had been fixed, no one was allowed to pervert them by using one sort of tune in a composition belonging to another category. And what was the authority which had to know these standards and use its knowledge in reaching its verdicts, and crack down on the disobedient? Well, certainly no notice was taken of the catcalls and uncouth yelling of the audience, as it is nowadays, nor yet of the applause that indicates approval. People of taste and education made it a rule to listen to the performance with silent attention right through to the end; children and their attendants and the general public could always be disciplined and controlled by

a stick. Such was the rigor with which the mass of the people was prepared to be controlled in the theatre, and to refrain from passing judgment by shouting. Later, as time went on, composers arose who started to set a fashion of breaking the rules and offending good taste. They did have a natural artistic talent, but they were ignorant of the correct and legitimate standards laid down by the Muse. Gripped by a frenzied and excessive lust for pleasure, they jumbled together laments and hymns, mixed paeans and dithyrambs, and even imitated pipe tunes on the lyre. The result was a total confusion of styles. Unintentionally, in their idiotic way, they misrepresented their art, claiming that in music there are no standards of right and wrong at all, but that the most 'correct' criterion is the pleasure of a man who enjoyed the performance, whether he is a good man or not. On these principles they based their compositions, and they accompanied them with propaganda to the same effect. Consequently they gave the ordinary man not only a taste for breaking the laws of music but the arrogance to set himself up as a capable judge. The audiences, once silent, began to use their tongues; they claimed to know what was good and bad in music, and instead of a 'musical meritocracy', a sort of vicious 'theatrocracy' arose. But if this democracy had been limited to gentlemen and had applied only to music, no great harm would have been done; in the event, however, music proved to be the starting point of everyone's conviction that he was an authority on everything, and of a general disregard for the law. Complete license was not far behind. The conviction that they knew made them unafraid, and assurance engendered effrontery. You see, a reckless lack of respect for one's betters is effrontery of peculiar viciousness, which springs from a freedom from inhibitions that has gone much too far.

Megillus/ You're absolutely right.

Athenian Stranger/ This freedom will then take other forms. First people grow unwilling to submit to the authorities, then they refuse to obey the admonitions of their fathers and mothers and elders. As they hurtle along towards the end of this primrose path, they try to escape the authority of the laws; and the very end of the road comes when they cease to care about oaths and promises and religion in general. They reveal, reincarnated in themselves, the character of the ancient Titans of the story, and thanks to getting into the same position as the Titans did, they live a wretched life of endless misery. Again I ask: what's the purpose of saying all this? My tongue has been galloping on and obviously I ought to curb it constantly; I must keep a bridle in my mouth and not let myself be carried away by the argument so as to 'take a toss from the hoss', as the saying is. Let me repeat the question: what's the point of this speech I've made?

Megillus/ Well asked!

Athenian Stranger/ The point is one we've made before.

Megillus/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ We said that a lawgiver should frame his code with an eye on three things: the freedom, unity and wisdom of the city for which he legislates. That's right, isn't it?

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ That was why we selected two political systems, one authoritarian in the highest degree, the other representing an extreme of liberty; and the question is now, which of these two constitutes correct government? We reviewed a moderate authoritarianism and a moderate freedom, and saw the result: tremendous progress in each case. But when either the Persians or the Athenians pushed things to extremes (of subjection in the

one case and its opposite in the other), it did neither of them any good at all.

Megillus/ You're quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ We had precisely the same purpose when we looked at the settlement of the Dorian forces, Dardanus' dwellings in the foothills, the foundation by the sea, and the original survivors of the flood; earlier, we discussed music and drink from the same point of view, as well as other topics before that. The object was always to find out what would be the ideal way of administering a state, and the best principles the individual can observe in running his own life. But has it been worth our while? I wonder, Clinias and Megillus, if there's some test of this that we could set ourselves?

Clinias/ I think I can see one, sir. As luck would have it, I find that all the subjects we have discussed in our conversation are relevant to my needs here and now. How fortunate that I've fallen in with you and Megillus! I won't keep you in the dark about my position—indeed, I think that meeting you is a good omen for the future. The greater part of Crete is attempting to found a colony, and has given responsibility for the job to the Cnossians; and the state of Cnossus has delegated it to myself and nine colleagues. Our brief is to compose a legal code on the basis of such local laws as we find satisfactory, and to use foreign laws as well—the fact that they are not Cretan must not count against them, provided their quality seems superior. So what about doing me—and you—a favor? Let's take a selection of the topics we have covered and construct an imaginary community, pretending that we are its original founders. That will allow us to consider the question before us, and it may be that I'll use this framework for the future state.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, Clinias, that's certainly welcome news! You may take it that I for my part am entirely at your disposal, unless Megillus has some objection.

Clinias/ Splendid!

Megillus/ Yes, I too am at your service.

Clinias/ I'm delighted you both agree. Now then, let's try—initially only in theory—to found our state.

Book 4.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, now, how should we describe our future state? I don't mean just its name: I'm not asking what it's called now, nor what it ought to be called in the future. (This might well be suggested by some detail of the actual foundation or by some spot nearby: perhaps a river or spring or some local gods will give the new state their own style and title.) This is my real question: is it to be on the coast, or inland?

Clinias/ The state I was talking about a moment ago, sir, is approximately eighty stades from the sea.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, what about harbors? Are there any along the coast on that side of the state, or are they entirely absent?

Clinias/ No, sir. The state has harbors in that direction which could hardly be bettered.

Athenian Stranger/ A pity, that. What about the surrounding countryside? Does it grow everything or are there some deficiencies?

Clinias/ No, it grows practically everything.

Athenian Stranger/ Will it have some nearby state for a neighbor?

Clinias/ Absolutely none—that's just why it's being founded. Ages ago, there was a migration from the district, which has left the land deserted for goodness knows how long.

Athenian Stranger/ What about plains and mountains and forests? How is it off for each of these?

Clinias/ Very much like the rest of Crete in general.

Athenian Stranger/ Rugged rather than flat, you mean?

Clinias/ Yes, that's right.

Athenian Stranger/ Then the state will have tolerably healthy prospects of becoming virtuous. If it were going to be founded near the sea and have good harbors, and were deficient in a great number of crops instead of growing everything itself, then a very great savior indeed and lawgivers of divine stature would be needed to stop sophisticated and vicious characters developing on a grand scale: such a state would simply invite it. As it is, we can take comfort in those eighty stades. Even so, it lies nearer the sea than it should, and you say that it is rather well off for harbors, which makes matters worse; but let's be thankful for small mercies. For a country to have the sea nearby is pleasant enough for the purpose of everyday life, but in fact it is a 'salty-sharp and bitter neighbor' in more senses than one. It fills the land with wholesaling and retailing, breeds shifty and deceitful habits in a man's soul, and makes the citizens distrustful and hostile, not only among themselves, but also in their dealings with the world outside. Still, the fact that the land produces everything will be some consolation for these disadvantages, and it is obvious in any case that even if it does grow every crop, its ruggedness will stop it doing so in any quantity; if it yielded a surplus that could be exported in bulk, the state would be swamped with the gold and silver money it received in return—and this, if a state means to develop just and noble habits, is pretty nearly the worst thing that could happen to it, all things considered (as we said, if we remember, earlier in our discussion).

Clinias/ Of course we remember, and we agree that our argument then was right, and still is now.

Athenian Stranger/ The next point is this: how well is the surrounding district supplied with timber for building ships?

Clinias/ There are no firs or pines worth mentioning, and not much by way of cypress, though you'll find a small

quantity of plane and Aleppo pine, which is, of course, the standard material shipwrights must have to construct the interior parts of a boat.

Athenian Stranger/ That too is a feature of the country which will do it no harm.

Clinias/ Oh?

Athenian Stranger/ It's a good thing that a state should find it difficult to lower itself to copy the wicked customs of its enemies.

Clinias/ And what on earth has been said to prompt that remark?

Athenian Stranger/ My dear sir, cast your mind back to the beginning of our discussion and watch what I'm up to. Do you remember the point we made about the laws of the Cretans having only one object, and how in particular the two of you asserted that this was warfare? I took you up on the point and argued that in so far as such institutions were established with virtue as their aim, they were to be approved; but I took strong exception to their aiming at only a part of virtue instead of the whole. Now it's your turn: keep a sharp eye on this present legislation, in case I lay down some law which is not conducive to virtue, or which fosters only a part of it. I'm going on the assumption that a law is well enacted only if it constantly aims, like an archer, at that unique target which is the only object of legislation to be invariably and uninterruptedly attended by some good result; the law must ignore everything else (wealth or anything like that), if it happens not to meet the requirements I have stipulated. This 'disgraceful copying of enemies' to which I was referring occurs when people live by the sea and are plagued by such foes as Minos, who once forced the inhabitants of Attica to pay a most onerous tribute (though of course in saying this I've no wish at all to hark

back to our old grudges against you). Minos exercised tremendous power at sea, whereas the Athenians had not yet acquired the fighting ships they have today, nor was their country so rich in supplies of suitable timber that they could readily construct a strong fleet; consequently they couldn't turn themselves into sailors at a moment's notice and repel the enemy by copying the Cretan use of the sea. Even if they had been able to do that, it would have done them more good to lose seven boys over and over again rather than get into bad habits by forming themselves into a navy. They had previously been infantrymen, and infantrymen can stand their ground; but sailors have the bad habit of dashing at frequent intervals and then beating a very rapid retreat indeed back to their ships. They see nothing disgraceful at all in a craven refusal to stand their ground and die as the enemy attacks, nor in the plausible excuses they produce so readily when they drop their weapons and take to their heels—or, as they put it, 'retreat without dishonor'. This is the sort of terminology you must expect if you make your soldiers into sailors; these expressions are not 'beyond praise' (far from it): men ought never to be trained in bad habits, least of all the citizen-elite. Even from Homer, I suspect, you can see that this is bad policy. He has Odysseus pitching into Agamemnon for ordering the ships to be put to sea just when the Achaeans were being hard put to it in their fight with the Trojans. In his anger, Odysseus says to him:

> Why bid the well-benched ships be put to sea,
> When in our ears the noise of battle rings?
> Do you want the Trojans' dearest wish fulfilled,
> and utter ruin send us to the grave?
> Put the ships to sea, and watch the Achaeans
> buckle to the fight! No: they'll scuttle off
> and shrink away from battle. The advice you give

will mean the end of us.

So Homer too realized that it is bad tactics to have triremes lined up at sea in support of infantry in the field. This is the sort of habit-training that will soon make even lions run away from deer. And that's not all. When a state which owes its power to its navy wins a victory, the bravest soldiers never get the credit for it, because the battle is won thanks to the skill of steersman, boatswain and rower and the efforts of a motley crowd of ragamuffins, which means that it is impossible to honor each individual in the way he deserves. Rob a state of its power to do that, and you condemn it to failure.

Clinias/ I suppose that's more or less inevitable. But in spite of that, sir, it was by fighting at sea at Salamis against the barbarians that the Greeks saved their country—according to us Cretans, anyway.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, that's what most people say, Greek and non-Greek alike. Still, my friend, we—Megillus here and myself—are arguing in favor of two battles fought on land: Marathon, which first got the Greeks out of danger, and Plataea, which finally made them really safe. We maintain that these battles improved the Greeks, whereas the fighting at sea had the opposite effect. I hope this isn't too strong language to use about battles that at the time certainly helped to ensure our survival (and I'll concede you the battle at Artemisium as well as the one at Salamis). That's all very well, but when we examine the natural features of a country and its legal system, our ultimate object of scrutiny is of course the quality of its social and political arrangements. We do not hold the common view that a man's highest good is to survive and simply continue to exist. His highest good is to become as virtuous as possible and to continue to exist in that state as long as life lasts. But I think we've already taken this line before.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we need consider only one thing: is the method we are following the same as before? Can we assume it is the best way to found a state and legislate for it?

Clinias/ Yes, it's by far the best.

Athenian Stranger/ Now for the next point. Tell me, what people will you be settling? Will your policy be to accept all comers from the whole of Crete, on the grounds that the population in the individual cities has exceeded the number that can be supported by the land? I don't suppose you're taking all comers from the Greeks in general—though in fact I notice that some settlers from Argos and Aegina and other parts of Greece have come to settle in your country. But tell me what you intend on this occasion: where do you think your citizen body will come from this time?

Clinias/ They will probably come from all over Crete; as for the other Greeks, I imagine settlers from the Peloponnese will be particularly welcome. You are quite right in what you said just now, that there are some here from Argos: they include the Gortynians, the most distinguished of the local people, who hail from the well-known Gortyn in the Peloponnese.

Athenian Stranger/ So it won't be all that easy for the Cretan states to found their colony. The emigrants, you see, haven't the unity of a swarm of bees: they are not a single people from a single territory settling down to form a colony with mutual goodwill between themselves and those they have left behind. Such migrations occur because of the pressures of land-shortage or some similar misfortune: sometimes a given section of the community may be obliged to go off and settle elsewhere because it is harassed by civil war, and on one occasion a whole state took to its heels after

being overcome by an attack it could not resist. In all these cases to found a state and give it laws is, in some ways, comparatively easy, but in others it's rather difficult. When a single people speaks the same language and observes the same laws you get a certain feeling of community, because everyone shares the same religious rites and so forth; but they certainly won't find it easy to accept laws or political systems that differ from their own. Sometimes, when it's bad laws that have stimulated the revolt, and the rebels try in their new home to keep to the same familiar habits that ruined them before, their reluctance to toe the line presents the founder and lawgiver with a difficult problem. On the other hand, a miscellaneous combination of all kinds of different people will perhaps be more ready to submit to a new code of laws—but to get them to 'pull and puff as one' (as they say of a team of horses) is very difficult and takes a long time. There's no escaping it: founding a state and legislating for it is a superb test that separates the men from the boys.

Clinias/ I dare say; but what do you mean? Please be a little clearer.

Athenian Stranger/ My dear fellow, now that I'm going back to considering legislators again, I think I'm actually going to insult them: but no matter, so long as the point is relevant. Anyway, why should I have qualms about it? It seems true of pretty nearly all human affairs.

Clinias/ What are you getting at?

Athenian Stranger/ I was going to say that no man ever legislates at all. Accidents and calamities occur in a thousand different ways, and it is they that are the universal legislators of the world. If it isn't pressures of war that overturn a constitution and rewrite the laws, it's the distress of grinding poverty; and disease too forces us to make a great

many innovations, when plagues beset us for years on end and bad weather is frequent and prolonged. Realizing all these possibilities, you may jump to conclusions and say what I said just now, that no mortal ever passes any law at all, and that human affairs are almost entirely at the mercy of chance. Now of course this same view could equally plausibly be taken of the profession of the steersman or doctor or general—but at the same time there's another point that could be made about all these examples, and with no less justification.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That the all-controlling agent in human affairs is God, assisted by the secondary influences of 'chance' and 'opportunity'. A less uncompromising way of putting it is to acknowledge that there must be a third factor, namely 'skill', to back up the other two. For instance, in a storm the steersman may or may not use his skill to seize any favorable opportunity that may offer. I'd say it would help a great deal if he did, wouldn't you?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ So the same will apply in the other cases too, and legislation in particular must be allowed to play the same role. If a state is to live in happiness, certain local conditions must be present, and when all these coincide, what the community needs to find is a legislator who understands the right way to go about things.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So a professional man in each of the fields we've enumerated could hardly go wrong if he prayed for conditions in which the workings of chance needed only to be supplemented by his own skill.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And all the other people we've instanced would of course be able to tell you what conditions they were praying for, if you asked them.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And I fancy a legislator would do just the same.

Clinias/ I agree.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Well now, legislator,' let's say to him, 'tell us your requirements. What conditions in the state we are going to give you will enable you to run it properly on your own from now on?' What's the right answer to a question like that? (We're giving the legislator's answer for him, I take it.)

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ Then this is what he'll say: 'Give me a state under the absolute control of a dictator, and let the dictator be young, with a good memory, quick to learn, courageous, and with a character of natural elevation. And if his other abilities are going to be any use, his dictatorial soul should also possess that quality which was earlier agreed to be an essential adjunct to all the parts of virtue.'

Clinias/ I think the 'essential adjunct' our companion means, Megillus, is self-control. Right?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, Clinias—but the everyday kind, not the kind we speak of in a heightened sense, when we compel self-control to be good judgment as well. I mean the spontaneous instinct that flowers earlier in life in children and animals and in some cases succeeds in imposing a certain restraint in the search for pleasure, but fails in others. We said that if this quality existed in isolation from the many other merits we are discussing, it was not worth consideration. You see my point, I take it.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ This is the innate quality our dictator must have, in addition to the others, if the state is going to get, as quickly and efficiently as possible, a political system that will enable it to live a life of supreme happiness. You see, there is no quicker or better method of establishing a political system than this one, nor could there ever be.

Clinias/ Well sir, how can a man convince himself that he is talking sense in maintaining all this? What arguments are there for it?

Athenian Stranger/ It's easy enough, surely, to see that the very facts of the case make the doctrine true.

Clinias/ What do you mean? If we were to get a dictator, you say, who is young, restrained, quick to learn, with a retentive memory, courageous and elevated—

Athenian Stranger/ —and don't forget to add 'lucky' too, in this one point: he should be the contemporary of a distinguished lawgiver, and be fortunate enough to come into contact with him. If that condition is fulfilled, God will have done nearly all that he usually does when he wants to treat a state with particular favor. The next best thing would be a pair of such dictators; the third best would be several of them. The difficulties are in direct proportion to the numbers.

Clinias/ It looks as if your position is this: the best state will be the product of a dictatorship, thanks to the efforts of a first-rate legislator and a well-behaved dictator, and this will be the quickest and easiest way to bring about the transformation. The second best will be to start with an oligarchy—is that your point, or what? —and the third to start with a democracy.

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly not. The ideal starting point is dictatorship, the next best is constitutional kingship, and the third is some sort of democracy. Oligarchy comes fourth,

because it has the largest number of powerful people, so that it admits the growth of a new order only with difficulty. And we maintain, of course, that such a growth takes place when circumstances throw up a genuine lawgiver who comes to share a degree of power with the most influential persons in the state. Where the most influential element is both extremely powerful and numerically as small as it could be, as in a dictatorship, you usually get a rapid and trouble-free transition.

Clinias/ How? We don't understand.

Athenian Stranger/ We've made the point more than once, I think. Perhaps you two have not so much as seen a state under the control of a dictator.

Clinias/ No, and I don't particularly want to, either.

Athenian Stranger/ Still, suppose you did: you'd notice something we remarked on just now.

Clinias/ What's that?

Athenian Stranger/ That when a dictator wants to change the morals of a state, he doesn't need to exert himself very much or spend a lot of time on the job. He simply has to be the first to set out on the road along which he wishes to urge the citizens—whether to the practice of virtue or vice—and give them a complete moral blueprint by setting his own personal example; he must praise and commend some courses of action and censure others, and in every field of conduct he must see that anyone who disobeys is disgraced.

Clinias/ And why should we expect the citizens to obey, with such alacrity, a man who combines persuasion with compulsion like that?

Athenian Stranger/ My friends, there's no quicker or easier way for a state to change its laws than to follow the leadership of those in positions of power; there is no other way now, nor will there be in the future, and we shouldn't

let anyone persuade us to the contrary. Actually, you see, it's not simply this that is impossible or difficult to achieve. What is difficult, and a very rare occurrence in the history of the world, is something else; but when it does occur, the state concerned reaps the benefit on a grand scale—indeed, there's no blessing that will pass it by.

Clinias/ What occurrence do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ A situation in which an inspired passion for the paths of restraint and justice guides those who wield great power. The passion may seize a single supreme ruler, or perhaps men who owe their power to exceptional wealth or high birth; or you may get a reincarnation of Nestor, who, superior as he was to all mankind for the vigor of his speech, is said to have put them in the shade even more by his qualities of restraint. In Trojan times, they say, such a paragon did exist, but he is certainly unheard of today. Still, granted someone like that did in fact exist in the past or is going to in the future, or is alive among us now, blessed is the life of this man of moderation, and blessed they who listen to the words that fall from his lips. And whatever the form of government, the same doctrine holds true: where supreme power in a man joins hands with wise judgment and self-restraint, there you have the birth of the best political system, with laws to match; you'll never achieve it otherwise. So much for my somewhat oracular fiction! Let's take it as established that though in one sense it is difficult for a state to acquire a good set of laws, in another sense nothing could be quicker or easier—granted, of course, the conditions I've laid down.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ What about pretending the fiction is true of your state, Clinias, and having a shot at making up its laws? Like children, we old men love a bit of make-believe.

Clinias/ Yes, what are we waiting for? Let's get down to it.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us therefore summon God to attend the foundation of the state. May he hear our prayers, and having heard, come graciously and benevolently to help us settle our state and its laws.

Clinias/ May he come indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Well now, what political system do we intend to impose on the state?

Clinias/ Please be a little more explicit about what you really mean by that question. Do you mean we have to choose between a democracy, an oligarchy, and an aristocracy? Presumably you're hardly contemplating a dictatorship—or so we'd think, at any rate.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, which of you would be prepared to answer first and tell us which of these terms fits the political system of your homeland?

Megillus/ Isn't it right and proper for me to answer first, as the elder?

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Megillus/ Very well. When I consider the political system in force at Sparta, sir, I find it impossible to give you a straight answer: I just can't say what one ought to call it. You see, it really does look to me like a dictatorship (it has the ephors, a remarkably dictatorial institution), yet on occasions I think it gets very close to being run democratically. But then again, it would be plain silly to deny that it is an aristocracy; and there is also a kingship (held for life), which both we and the rest of the world speak of as the oldest kingship of all. So when I'm asked all of a sudden like this, the fact is, as I said, that I can't distinguish exactly which of these political systems it belongs to.

Clinias/ I'm sure I'm in the same predicament as you, Megillus. I find it acutely difficult to say for sure that the constitution we have in Cnossus comes into any of these categories.

Athenian Stranger/ And the reason, gentlemen, is this: you really do operate constitutions worthy of the name. The ones we called constitutions just now are not really that at all: they are just a number of ways of running a state, all of which involve some citizens living in subjection to others like slaves, and the state is named after the ruling class in each case. But if that's the sort of principle on which your new state is to be named, it should be called after the god who really does rule over men who are rational enough to let him.

Clinias/ What god is that?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, perhaps we ought to make use of this fiction a little more, if we are going to clear up the question at issue satisfactorily.

Clinias/ Yes, that will be the right procedure.

Athenian Stranger/ It certainly will. Well now, countless ages before the formation of the states we described earlier, they say there existed, in the age of Cronus, a form of government and administration which was a great success, and which served as a blueprint for the best run of our present-day states.

Clinias/ Then I think we simply must hear about it.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, I agree. That's just why I introduced it into the discussion.

Clinias/ You were quite right to do so, and seeing how relevant it is, you'll be entirely justified in giving a systematic account of what happened.

Athenian Stranger/ I must try to meet your wishes. The traditional account that has come down to us tells of the wonderfully happy life people lived then, and how they were

provided with everything in abundance and without any effort on their part. The reason is alleged to be this: Cronus was of course aware that human nature, as we've explained, is never able to take complete control of all human affairs without being filled with arrogance and injustice. Bearing this in mind, he appointed kings and rulers for our states; they were not men, but beings of a superior and more divine order—spirits. We act on the same principle nowadays in dealing with our flocks of sheep and herds of other domesticated animals: we don't put cattle in charge of cattle or goats in charge of goats, but control them ourselves, because we are a superior species. So Cronus too, who was well-disposed to man, did the same: he placed us in the care of the spirits, a superior order of beings, who were to look after our interests—an easy enough task for them, and a tremendous boon to us, because the result of their attentions was peace, respect for others, good laws, justice in full measure, and a state of happiness and harmony among the races of the world. The story has a moral for us even today, and there is a lot of truth in it: where the ruler of a state is not a god but a mortal, people have no respite from toil and misfortune. The lesson is that we should make every effort to imitate the life men are said to have led under Cronus; we should run our public and our private life, our homes and our cities, in obedience to what little spark of immortality lies in us, and dignify these edicts of reason with the name of 'law'. But take an individual man, or an oligarchy, or even a democracy, that lusts in its heart for pleasure and demands to have its fill of everything it wants—the perpetually unsatisfied victim of an evil greed that attacks it like the plague—well, as we said just now, if a power like that controls a state or an individual and rides roughshod over the laws, it's impossible to escape disaster.

This is the doctrine we have to examine, Clinias, and see whether we are prepared to go along with it—or what?

Clinias/ Of course we must go along with it.

Athenian Stranger/ You realize that some people maintain that there are as many different kinds of laws as there are of political systems? (And of course we've just run through the many types of political systems there are popularly supposed to be.) Don't think the question at issue is a triviality: it's supremely important, because in effect we've got back to arguing about the criteria of justice and injustice. These people take the line that legislation should be directed not to waging war or attaining complete virtue, but to safeguarding the interests of the established political system, whatever that is, so that it is never overthrown and remains permanently in force.

They say that the definition of justice that measures up to the facts is best formulated like this.

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ It runs: 'Whatever serves the interest of the stronger'.

Clinias/ Be a little more explicit, will you?

Athenian Stranger/ The point is this: according to them, the element in control at any given moment lays down the law of the land. Right?

Clinias/ True enough.

Athenian Stranger/ 'So do you imagine,' they say, 'that when a democracy has won its way to power, or some other constitution has been established (such as dictatorship), it will ever pass any laws, unless under pressure, except those designed to further its own interests and ensure that it remains permanently in power? That'll be its main preoccupation, won't it?'

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ So the author of these rules will call them 'just' and claim that anyone who breaks them is acting 'unjustly', and punish him?

Clinias/ Quite likely.

Athenian Stranger/ So this is why such rules will always add up to 'justice'.

Clinias/ Certainly, on the present argument.

Athenian Stranger/ We are, you see, dealing with one of those 'claims to authority'.

Clinias/ What claims?

Athenian Stranger/ The ones we examined before, when we asked who should rule whom. It seemed that parents should rule children, the elder the younger, and the noble those of low birth; and there was a large number of other titles to authority, if you remember, some of which conflicted with others. The claim we're talking about now was certainly one of these: we said, I think, that Pindar turned it into a law of nature—which meant that he 'justified the use of force extreme', to quote his actual words.

Clinias/ Yes, those are the points that were made.

Athenian Stranger/ Now look: to which side in the dispute should we entrust our state? In some cities, you see, this is the sort of thing that has happened thousands of times.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ When offices are filled competitively, the winners take over the affairs of state so completely that they totally deny the losers and the losers' descendants any share of power. Each side passes its time in a narrow scrutiny of the other, apprehensive lest someone with memories of past injustices should gain some office and lead a revolution. Of course, our position is that this kind of

arrangement is very far from being a genuine political system; we maintain that laws which are not established for the good of the whole state are bogus laws, and when they favor particular sections of the community, their authors are not citizens but party-men; and people who say those laws have a claim to be obeyed are wasting their breath. We've said all this because in your new state we aren't going to appoint a man to office because of his wealth or some other claim like that, say strength or stature or birth. We insist that the highest office in the service of the gods must be allocated to the man who is best at obeying the established laws and wins that sort of victory in the state; the man who wins the second prize must be given second rank in that service, and so on, the remaining posts being allocated in order on the same system. Such people are usually referred to as 'rulers', and if I have called them 'servants of the laws' it's not because I want to mint a new expression but because I believe that the success or failure of a state hinges on this point more than on anything else. Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, the collapse of the state, in my view, is not far off; but if law is the master of the government and the government is its slave, then the situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that the gods shower on a state. That's the way I see it.

Clinias/ By heaven, sir, you're quite right. You've the sharp eye of an old man for these things.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, when we're young, we're all pretty blind to them; old age is the best time to see them clearly.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, what now? I suppose we should assume our colonists have arrived and are standing before

us. So we shall have to finish off the topic by addressing them.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, our address should go like this: 'Men, according to the ancient story, there is a god who holds in his hands the beginning and end and middle of all things, and straight he marches in the cycle of nature. Justice, who takes vengeance on those who abandon the divine law, never leaves his side. The man who means to live in happiness latches on to her and follows her with meekness and humility. But he who bursts with pride, elated by wealth or honors or by physical beauty when young and foolish, whose soul is afire with the arrogant belief that so far from needing someone to control and lead him, he can play the leader to others—there's a man whom God has deserted. And in his desolation he collects others like himself, and in his soaring frenzy he causes universal chaos. Many people think he cuts a fine figure, but before very long he pays to Justice no trifling penalty and brings himself, his home and state to rack and ruin. Thus it is ordained. What action, then, should a sensible man take, and what should his outlook be? What must he avoid doing or thinking?'

Clinias/ This much is obvious: every man must resolve to belong to those who follow in the company of God.

Athenian Stranger/ 'So what conduct recommends itself to God and reflects his wishes? There is only one sort, epitomized in the old saying "like approves of like" (excess apart, which is both its own enemy and that of due proportion). In our view it is God who is preeminently the "measure of all things," much more so than any "man," as they say. So if you want to recommend yourself to someone of this character, you must do your level best to make your own character reflect his, and on this principle the moderate

man is God's friend, being like him, whereas the immoderate and unjust man is not like him and is his enemy; and the same reasoning applies to the other vices too.

'Let's be clear that the consequence of all this is the following doctrine (which is, I think, of all doctrines the finest and truest): If a good man sacrifices to the gods and keeps them constant company in his prayers and offerings and every kind of worship he can give them, this will be the best and noblest policy he can follow; it is the conduct that fits his character as nothing else can, and it is his most effective way of achieving a happy life. But if the wicked man does it, the results are bound to be just the opposite. Whereas the good man's soul is clean, the wicked man's soul is polluted, and it is never right for a good man or for God to receive gifts from unclean hands—which means that even if impious people do lavish a lot of attention on the gods, they are wasting their time, whereas the trouble taken by the pious is very much in season. So this is the target at which we should aim—but what "missiles" are we to use to hit it, and what "bow" is best carried to shoot them? Can we name these "weapons"? The first weapon in our armory will be to honor the gods of the underworld next after those of Olympus, the patron-gods of the state; the former should be allotted such secondary honors as the Even and the Left, while the latter should receive superior and contrasting honors like the Odd. That's the best way a man can hit his target, piety. After these gods, a sensible man will worship the spirits, and after them the heroes. Next in priority will be rites celebrated according to law at private shrines dedicated to ancestral gods. Last come honors paid to living parents. It is meet and right that a debtor should discharge his first and greatest obligation and pay the debt which comes before all others; he must consider that all he has and holds belongs to those who bore and bred him, and he is meant to

use it in their service to the limit of his powers. He must serve them first with his property, then with hand and brain, and so give to the old people what they desperately need in view of their age: repayment of all that anxious care and attention they lavished on him, the longstanding "loan" they made him as a child. Throughout his life the son must be very careful to watch his tongue in addressing his parents, because there is a very heavy penalty for careless and ill-considered language; Retribution, messenger of Justice, is the appointed overseer of these things. If his parents get angry, he must submit to them, and whether they satisfy their anger in speech or in action, he must forgive them; after all, he must reflect, it's natural enough for a father to get very angry if he thinks he's being harmed by his own son. When the parents die, the most modest burial will be best, and the ceremonies should not be more elaborate than custom demands nor inferior to those with which his forefathers laid their own parents to rest. Year by year he should honor the departed by similar acts of devotion; he will honor them best by never failing to provide a perpetual memorial to them, spending on the dead a proper proportion of the money he happens to have available. If we do that, and live in accordance with these rules, each of us will get the reward we deserve from the gods and such beings as are superior to ourselves, and live in a spirit of cheerful confidence for most of the years of our life.'

The laws themselves will explain the duties we owe to children, relatives, friends and fellow citizens, as well as the service heaven demands we render to foreigners; they will tell us the way we have to behave in the company of each of these categories of people, if we want to lead a full and varied life without breaking the law. The laws' method will be partly persuasion and partly (when they have to deal with characters that defy persuasion) compulsion and

chastisement; and with the good wishes of the gods they will make our state happy and prosperous. There are a number of other topics which a legislator who thinks as I do simply must mention, but they are not easily expressed in the form of a law. So he should, I think, put up to himself and those for whom he is going to legislate an example of the way to deal with the remaining subjects, and when he has explained them all as well as he can, he should set about laying down his actual code of laws. So what's the particular form in which such topics are expressed? It's none too easy to confine one's exposition of them to a single example, but let's see if we can crystallize our ideas by looking at the matter rather like this.

Clinias/ Tell us what you have in mind.

Athenian Stranger/ I should like the citizens to be supremely easy to persuade along the paths of virtue; and clearly this is the effect the legislator will try to achieve throughout his legislation.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ It occurs to me that the sort of approach I've just explained, provided it is not made to totally uncouth souls, will help to make people more amenable and better disposed to listen to what the lawgiver recommends. So even if the address has no great effect but only makes his listener a trifle easier to handle, and so that much easier to teach, the legislator should be well pleased. People who are anxious to attain moral excellence with all possible speed are pretty thin on the ground and it isn't easy to find them: most only go to prove the wisdom of Hesiod's remark that the road to vice is smooth and can be traveled without sweating, because it is very short; but 'as the price of virtue', he says;

The gods have imposed the sweat of our brows,

And long and steep is the ascent that you have to make
And rough, at first; but when you get to the top,
Then the rugged road is easy to endure)

Clinias/ It sounds as if he hit off the situation very well.

Athenian Stranger/ He certainly did. But after this discussion I'm left with certain impressions which I want to put forward for your consideration.

Clinias/ Do so, then.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's have a word with the legislator and address him like this: 'Tell us, legislator, if you were to discover what we ought to do and say, surely you'd tell us?'

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Now didn't we hear you saying a few minutes ago that a legislator ought not to allow the poets to compose whatever happened to take their fancy? You see, they' never know when they were saying something in opposition to the law and harming the state.'

Clinias/ You're quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, if we took the poets' side and addressed the legislator, would this be a reasonable line to take?

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ This: 'There is an old proverb, legislator, which we poets never tire of telling and which all laymen confirm, to the effect that when a poet takes his seat on the tripod of the Muse, he cannot control his thoughts. He's like a fountain where the water is allowed to gush forth unchecked. His art is the art of representation, and when he represents men with contrasting characters he is often obliged to contradict himself, and he doesn't know which of the opposing speeches contains the truth. But for the legislator, this is impossible: he must not let his law say two

different things on the same subject; his rule has to be "one topic, one doctrine." For example, consider what you said just now. A funeral can be extravagant, inadequate or modest, and your choice falls on one of these three—the moderate—which you recommend with unqualified praise. But if I were composing a poem about a woman of great wealth and how she gave instructions for her own funeral, I should recommend the elaborate burial; a poor and frugal character, on the other hand, would be in favor of the cheap funeral, while the moderate man of moderate means would recommend accordingly. But you ought not to use the term "moderate" in the way you did just now: you must say what "moderate" means and how big or small it may be. If you don't, you must realize that a remark such as you made still has some way to go before it can be a law.'

Clinias/ That's quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ So should the legislator whom we appoint skip any such announcement at the beginning of his laws? Is he to say without ceremony what one should and should not do, and simply threaten the penalty for disobedience before passing on to the next law, without adding to his statutes a single word of encouragement or persuasion? It's just the same with doctors, you know, when we're ill: one follows one method of treatment, one another. Let's recall the two methods, so that we can make the same request of the legislator that a child might make of its doctor, to treat him as gently as possible. You want an example? Well, we usually speak, I think, of doctors and doctors' assistants, but of course we call the latter 'doctors' too.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And these 'doctors' (who may be free men or slaves) pick up the skill empirically, by watching and obeying their masters; they've no systematic knowledge such

as the free doctors have learned for themselves and pass on to their pupils. You' agree in putting 'doctors' into these two categories?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now here's another thing you notice. A state's invalids include not only freemen but slaves too, who are almost always treated by other slaves who either rush about on flying visits or wait to be consulted in their surgeries. This kind of doctor never gives any account of the particular illness of the individual slave, or is prepared to listen to one; he simply prescribes what he thinks best in the light of experience, as if he had precise knowledge, and with the self-confidence of a dictator. Then he dashes off on his way to the next slave-patient, and so takes off his master's shoulders some of the work of attending the sick. The visits of the free doctor, by contrast, are mostly concerned with treating the illnesses of free men; his method is to construct an empirical case-history by consulting the invalid and his friends; in this way he himself learns something from the sick and at the same time he gives the individual patient all the instruction he can. He gives no prescription until he has somehow gained the invalid's consent; then, coaxing him into continued cooperation, he tries to complete his restoration to health. Which of the two methods do you think makes a doctor a better healer, or a trainer more efficient? Should they use the double method to achieve a single effect, or should the method too be single—the less satisfactory approach that makes the invalid more recalcitrant?

Clinias/ The double, sir, is much better, I think.

Athenian Stranger/ Would you like us to see how this double method and the single work out when applied to legislation?

Clinias/ Yes, I'd like that very much.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, in heaven's name, what will be the first law our legislator will establish? Surely the first subject he will turn to in his regulations will be the very first step that leads to the birth of children in the state.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And this first step is, in all states, the union of two people in the partnership of marriage?

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ So the correct policy for every state will probably be to pass marriage laws first.

Clinias/ No doubt about it.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, to start with, let's have the simple form. It might run more or less like this:

A man must marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five.

If he does not, he must be punished by fines and disgrace—and the fines and disgrace will then be specified. So much for the simple version of the marriage law; this will be the double version:

A man must marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, reflecting that there is a sense in which nature has not only somehow endowed the human race with a degree of immortality, but also planted in us all a longing to achieve it, which we express in every way we can. One expression of that longing is the desire for fame and the wish not to lie nameless in the grave. Thus mankind is by nature a companion of eternity, and is linked to it, and will be linked to it, forever. Mankind is immortal because it always leaves later generations behind to preserve its unity and identity for all time: it gets its share of immortality by means of procreation. It is never a holy thing voluntarily to deny oneself this prize, and he who neglects to take a wife and have children does precisely that. So if a man obeys the law

he will be allowed to go his way without penalty, but if a man disobeys, and reaches the age of thirty-five without having married, he must pay a yearly fine (of a sum to be specified; that ought to stop him thinking that life as a bachelor is all cakes and ale), and be deprived too of all the honors which the younger people in the state pay to their elders on the appropriate occasions.

When one has heard this law and compared it with the other, one can judge whether in general laws should run to at least twice the length by combining persuasion and threats, or restrict themselves to threats alone and be of 'single' length only.

Megillus/ The Spartan instinct, sir, is always to prefer brevity. But if I were asked to sit in judgment on these statutes and say which of the two I'd like to see committed to writing in the state, I'd choose the longer one, and my choice would be precisely the same for every law drafted in the alternative versions of which you've given us specimens. Still, I suppose Clinias here too must approve this present legislation, seeing that it's his state that is contemplating the adoption of laws modeled on it.

Clinias/ You've put it all very well, Megillus.

Athenian Stranger/ However, it would be pretty fatuous to spend our time talking about the length or brevity of the text: it's high quality that we should value, I think, not extreme brevity or length. One of the kinds of laws we mentioned just now is twice as valuable for practical purposes as the other, but that's not all: as we said a little while ago, the two types of doctors were an extremely apt parallel: A relevant point here is that no legislator ever seems to have noticed that in spite of its being open to them to use two methods in their legislation, compulsion and persuasion (subject to the limitations imposed by the uneducated

masses), in fact they use only one. They never mix in persuasion with force when they brew their laws, but administer compulsion neat. As for myself, my dear sirs, I can see a third condition that should be observed in legislation—not that it ever is.

Clinias/ What condition do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Providentially enough, the point is brought out by the very conversation we've had today. Since we began to discuss legislation dawn has become noon and we've reached this splendid resting-place; we've talked about nothing but laws—and yet I suspect it was only a moment ago that we really got round to framing any, and that everything we've said up till now has been simply legislative preamble. Now why have I pointed this out? I want to make the point that the spoken word, and in general all compositions that involve using the voice, employ 'preludes' (a sort of limbering up, so to speak), and that these introductions are artistically designed to aid the coming performance. For instance, the 'nomes' of songs to the harp, and all other kinds of musical composition, are preceded by preludes of fantastic elaboration. But in the case of the real 'nomes', the kind we call 'administrative', nobody has ever so much as breathed the word 'prelude' or composed one and given it to the world; the assumption has been that such a thing would be repugnant to nature. But in my opinion the discussion we've had indicates that it is perfectly natural; and this means that the laws which seemed 'double' when I described them a moment ago are not really 'double' in the straightforward sense the term suggests: it's just that they have two elements, 'law' and 'preface to law'. The 'dictatorial prescription', which we compared to the prescriptions of the 'slavish' doctors, is the law pure and simple; and the part that comes before it, although in point of fact 'persuasive' (as Megillus put it), nevertheless has a function, analogous to

that of a preamble in a speech. It seems obvious to me that the reason why the legislator gave that entire persuasive address was to make the person to whom he promulgated his law accept his orders—the law—in a more co-operative frame of mind and with a correspondingly greater readiness to learn. That's why, as I see it, this element ought properly to be termed not the 'text' of the law, but the 'preamble'. So after all that, what's the next point I'd like made? It's this: the legislator must see that both the permanent body of laws and the individual sub-divisions are always supplied with preambles. The gain will be just as great as it was in the case of the two specimens we gave just now.

Clinias/ As far as I'm concerned, I'd certainly instruct our lawgiver, master of his art though he is, to legislate in no way but that.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, Clinias, I think you're right to agree that all laws have their preambles and that the first task must be to preface the text of each part of the legal code with the appropriate introduction, because the announcement it introduces is important, and it matters a great deal whether it is clearly remembered or not. However, we should be wrong to demand that both 'major' laws and minor rules should invariably be headed by a preface. Not every song and speech, after all, needs this treatment. (They all have introductions in the nature of the case, but it's not always appropriate to use them.) Still, the decision in all these cases must be left to the discretion of the orator or singer or legislator.

Clinias/ I think all this is very true. But let's not waste any more time delaying, sir. Let's get back to our theme and make a fresh start, if you are agreeable, on the subject you dealt with before, when you were not professing to compose in preamble form; let's go over the topic again ('second time lucky', as they say in games), on the understanding that we

are not talking at random, as we did just now, but composing a preface; and we should begin by agreeing that this is what we are doing. We've heard enough said just now about the worship of the gods and the services to be rendered to our ancestors; let's try to deal with the subsequent topics until you think the entire preface has been adequately put together. Then you will go on to work through the actual laws.

Athenian Stranger/ So our feeling at the moment is that we have already produced an adequate preface about the gods and the powers below them, and about parents living and dead. Your instructions now, I think, are that I should, as it were, take the covers off the remainder of the preface.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well now, the next thing is this: how far should a man concentrate or relax the efforts he devotes to looking after his soul, his body, and his property? This is a suitable topic, and it will be to the mutual advantage of both speaker and listeners to ponder it and so perfect their education as far as they can. So beyond a shadow of a doubt here's the next subject for explanation and the next topic to listen to.

Clinias/ You're quite right.

Book 5.

Athenian Stranger/ Everyone who was listening to the address just now about the gods and our dearly beloved ancestors, should now pay attention.

Of all the things a man can call his own, the holiest (though the gods are holier still) is his soul, his most intimate possession. There are two elements that make up the whole of every man. One is stronger and superior, and acts as master; the other, which is weaker and inferior, is a slave; and so a man must always respect the master in him in preference to the slave. Thus when I say that next after the gods—our masters—and their attendant spirits, a man must honor his soul, my recommendation is correct. But hardly a man among us honors it in the right way: he only thinks he does. You see, nothing that is evil can confer honor, because to honor something is to confer marvelous benefits upon it; and anyone who reckons he is magnifying his soul by flattery or gifts or indulgence, so that he fails to make it better than it was before, may think he is honoring it, but in fact that is not what he is doing at all. For instance, a person has only to reach adolescence to imagine he is capable of deciding everything; he thinks he is honoring his soul if he praises it, and he is only too keen to tell it to do what it likes. But our present doctrine is that in doing this he is not honoring but harming it; whereas we are arguing that he should honor it next after the gods. Similarly when a man thinks that the responsibility for his every fault lies not in himself but in others, whom he blames for his most frequent and serious misfortunes, while exonerating himself, he doubtless supposes he is honoring his soul. But far from doing that, he is injuring it. Again, when he indulges his pleasures and disobeys the recommendations and advice of the legislator, he is not honoring his soul at all, but dishonoring it, by filling it with misery and repentance. Or,

to take the opposite case, he may not brace himself to endure the recommended toils and fears and troubles and pains, and simply give up; but his surrender confers no honor on his soul, because all such conduct brings disgrace upon it. Nor does he do it any honor if he thinks that life is a good thing no matter what the cost. This too dishonors his soul, because he surrenders to its fancy that everything in the next world is an evil, whereas he should resist the thought and enlighten his soul by demonstrating that he does not really know whether our encounter with the gods in the next world may not be in fact the best thing that ever happens to us. And when a man values beauty above virtue, the disrespect he shows his soul is total and fundamental, because he would argue that the body is more to be honored than the soul—falsely, because nothing born on earth is to be honored more than what comes from heaven; and anyone who holds a different view of the soul does not realize how wonderful is this possession which he scorns. Again, a man who is seized by lust to obtain money by improper means and feels no disgust in the acquisition, will find that in the event he does his soul no honor by such gifts—far from it: he sells all that gives the soul its beauty and value for a few paltry pieces of gold; but all the gold upon the earth and all the gold beneath it does not compensate for lack of virtue.

To sum up, the legislator will list and classify certain things as disgraceful and wicked, and others as fine and good; everyone who is not prepared to make all efforts to refrain from the one kind of action and practice the other to the limits of his power must be unaware that in all such conduct he is treating his soul, the most holy possession he has, in the most disrespectful and abominable manner. You see, practically no one takes into account the greatest 'judgment', as it is called, on wrongdoing. This is to grow to resemble men who are evil, and as the resemblance

increases to shun good men and their wholesome conversation and to cut oneself off from them, while seeking to attach oneself to the other kind and keep their company. The inevitable result of consorting with such people is that what you do and have done to you is exactly what they naturally do and say to each other. Consequently, this condition is not really a 'judgment' at all, because justice and judgment are fine things: it is mere punishment, suffering that follows a wrongdoing. Now whether a man is made to suffer or not, he is equally wretched. In the former case he is not cured, in the latter he will ultimately be killed to ensure the safety of many others.

To put it in a nutshell, 'honor' is to cleave to what is superior, and, where practicable, to make as perfect as possible what is deficient. Nothing that nature gives a man is better adapted than his soul to enable him to avoid evil, keep on the track of the highest good, and when he has captured his quarry to live in intimacy with it for the rest of his life.

For those reasons the soul has been allotted the second rank of honor; third—as everyone will realize—comes the honor naturally due to the body. Here again it is necessary to examine the various reasons for honoring it, and see which are genuine and which are false; this is the job of a legislator, and I imagine he will list them as follows. The body that deserves to be honored is not the handsome one or the strong or the swift—nor yet the healthy (though a good many people would think it was); and it is certainly not the one with the opposite qualities to all these. He will say that the body which achieves a mean between all these extreme conditions is by far the soundest and best-balanced, because the one extreme makes the soul bold and boastful, while the other makes it abject and groveling.

The same is true of the possession of money and goods: its value is measured by the same yardstick. Both, in excess, produce enmity and feuds in private and public life, while a deficiency almost invariably leads to slavery.

No one should be keen on making money for the sake of leaving his children as rich as possible, because it will not do them any good, or the state either. A child's fortune will be most in harmony with his circumstances, and superior to all other fortunes, if it is modest enough not to attract flatterers, but sufficient to supply all his needs; to our ears such a fortune strikes exactly the right note, and it frees our life from anxiety. Extreme modesty, not gold, is the legacy we should leave our children. We imagine that the way to bequeath them modesty is to rebuke them when they are immodest, but that is not the result produced in the young when people admonish them nowadays and tell them that youth must show respect to everyone. The sensible legislator will prefer to instruct the older men to show respect to their juniors, and to take especial care not to let any young man see or hear them doing or saying anything disgraceful: where the old are shameless the young too will inevitably be disrespectful to a degree. The best way to educate the younger generation (as well as yourself) is not to rebuke them but patently to practice all your life what you preach to others.

If a man honors and respects his relatives, who all share the worship of the family gods and have the same blood in their veins, he can reasonably expect to have the gods of birth look with benevolence on the procreation of his own children. And as for friends and companions, you will find them easier to get on with in day-to-day contact if you make more of their services to you and esteem them more highly than they do, and put a smaller value on your own good turns to your friends and companions than they do

themselves. In dealings with the state and one's fellow citizens, the best man by far is the one who, rather than win a prize at Olympia or in any of the other contests in war and peace, would prefer to beat everyone by his reputation for serving the laws of his country—a reputation for having devoted a lifetime of service to them with more distinction than anyone else.

As to foreigners, one should regard agreements made with them as particularly sacrosanct. Practically all offenses committed as between or against foreigners are quicker to attract the vengeance of God than offenses as between fellow citizens. The foreigner is not surrounded by friends and companions, and stirs the compassion of gods and men that much more, so that anyone who has the power to avenge him comes to his aid more readily; and that power is possessed preeminently by the guardian spirit or god, companion of Zeus the God of Strangers, who is concerned in each case. Anyone who takes the smallest thought for the future will therefore take great care to reach the end of his days without having committed during his life any crime involving foreigners. The most serious of offenses against foreigners or natives is always that affecting suppliants; the god the victim supplicated and invoked when he won his promise becomes a devoted protector of his suppliant, who can consequently rely on the promise he received never to suffer without vengeance being taken for the wrongs done to him.

We've now dealt fairly thoroughly with a man's treatment of his parents, himself and his own possessions, and his contacts with the state, his friends, his relatives, foreigners and countrymen. The next question for consideration is the sort of person he must be himself, if he is to acquit himself with distinction in his journey through life; it's not the influence of law that we're concerned with now, but the

educational effect of praise and blame, which makes the individual easier to handle and better disposed towards the laws that are to be established.

Truth heads the list of all things good, for gods and men alike. Let anyone who intends to be happy and blessed be its partner from the start, so that he may live as much of his life as possible a man of truth. You can trust a man like that, but not the man who is fond of telling deliberate lies (and anyone who is happy to go on producing falsehoods in ignorance of the truth is an idiot). Neither state is anything to envy: no one has any friends if he is a fool or cannot be trusted. As the years go by he is recognized for what he is, and in the difficulties of old age as life draws to its close he isolates himself completely; he has just about as much contact with his surviving friends and children as with those who are already dead.

A man who commits no crime is to be honored; yet the man who will not even allow the wicked to do wrong deserves more than twice as much respect. The former has the value of a single individual, but the latter, who reveals the wickedness of another to the authorities, is worth a legion. Anyone who makes every effort to assist the authorities in checking crime should be declared to be the great and perfect citizen of his state, winner of the prize for virtue.

The same praise should also be given to self-control and good judgment, and to all the other virtues which the possessor can communicate to others as well as displaying in his own person. If a man does so communicate them, he should be honored as in the top rank; if he is prepared to communicate them but lacks the ability, he must be left in second place; but if he is a jealous fellow and churlishly wants to monopolize his virtues, then we should certainly censure him, but without holding the virtue itself in less esteem because of its possessor—on the contrary, we should

do our best to acquire it. We want everyone to compete in the struggle for virtue in a generous spirit, because this is the way a man will be a credit to his state—by competing on his own account but refraining from fouling the chances of others by slander. The jealous man, who thinks he has to get the better of others by being rude about them, makes less effort himself to attain true virtue and discourages his competitors by unfair criticism. In this way he hinders the whole state's struggle to achieve virtue and diminishes its reputation, in so far as it depends on him.

Every man should combine in his character high spirit with the utmost gentleness, because there is only one way to get out of the reach of crimes committed by other people and which are dangerous or even impossible to cure: you have to overcome them by fighting in self-defense and rigidly punishing them, and no soul can do this without righteous indignation. On the other hand there are some criminals whose crimes are curable, and the first thing to realize here is that every unjust man is unjust against his will. No man on earth would ever deliberately embrace any of the supreme evils, least of all in the most precious parts of himself—and as we said, the truth is that the most precious part of every man is his soul. So no one will ever voluntarily accept the supreme evil into the most valuable part of himself and live with it throughout his life. No: in general, the unjust man deserves just as much pity as any other sufferer. And you may pity the criminal whose disease is curable, and restrain and abate your anger, instead of persisting in it with the spitefulness of a shrew; but when you have to deal with complete and unmanageably vicious corruption, you must let your anger off its leash. That is why we say that it must be the good man's duty to be high-spirited or gentle as circumstances require.

The most serious vice innate in most men's souls is one for which everybody forgives himself and so never tries to find a way of escaping. You can get some idea of this vice from the saying that a man is in the nature of the case 'his own best friend', and that it is perfectly proper for him to have to play this role. It is truer to say that the cause of each and every crime we commit is precisely this excessive love of ourselves, a love which blinds us to the faults of the beloved and makes us bad judges of goodness and beauty and justice, because we believe we should honor our own ego rather than the truth. Anyone with aspirations to greatness must admire not himself and his own possessions, but acts of justice, not only when they are his own, but especially when they happen to be done by someone else. It's because of this same vice of selfishness that stupid people are always convinced of their own shrewdness, which is why we think we know everything when we are almost totally ignorant, so that thanks to not leaving to others what we don't know how to handle, we inevitably come to grief when we try to tackle it ourselves. For these reasons, then, every man must steer clear of extreme love of himself, and be loyal to his superior instead; and he mustn't be put off by shame at the thought of abandoning that 'best friend'.

There is a certain amount of more detailed but no less useful advice which one hears often enough, and one should go through it to oneself by way of reminder. (Where waters ebb, there is always a corresponding flow, and the act of remembering is the 'flow' of thought that has drained away.)

So then: excessive laughter and tears must be avoided, and this is the advice every man must give to every other; one should try to behave decently by suppressing all extremes of joy and grief, both when one's guardian angel brings continued prosperity and when in times of trouble our guardians face difficulties as insurmountable as a high,

sheer cliff. We should always have the hope that the blessings God sends will decrease the troubles that assail us, change our present circumstances for the better, and make us lucky enough to see our good fortune always increase. These are the hopes that every man should live by; he must remember all this advice and never spare any effort to recall it vividly to his own mind and that of others, at work and in leisure time alike.

Now then, from the point of view of religion, we've expounded pretty thoroughly what sort of activities we should pursue and what sort of person the individual ought to be; but we have not yet come down to the purely secular level. But we must, because we are addressing men, not gods.

Human nature involves, above all, pleasures, pains, and desires, and no mortal animal can help being hung up dangling in the air (so to speak) in total dependence on these powerful influences. That is why we should praise the noblest life—not only because it enjoys a fine and glorious reputation, but because (provided one is prepared to try it out instead of recoiling from it as a youth) it excels in providing what we all seek: a predominance of pleasure over pain throughout our lives. That this result is guaranteed, if it is tried out in the correct manner, will be perfectly obvious in an instant. But what is 'correctness' here? One should consider this point in the light of the following thesis. We have to ask if one condition suits our nature while another does not, and weigh the pleasant life against the painful with that question in mind. We want to have pleasure; we neither choose nor want pain; we prefer the neutral state if we are thereby relieved of pain, but not if it involves the loss of pleasure. We want less pain and more pleasure, we do not want less pleasure and more pain; but we should be hard put to it to be clear about our wishes when faced with a

choice of two situations bringing pleasure and pain in the same proportions. These considerations of number or size or intensity or equality (or their opposites) which determine our wishes all influence or fail to influence us whenever we make a choice. This being inevitably the way of things, we want a life in which pleasures and pains come frequently and with great intensity, but with pleasure predominating; if pains predominate, we reject that life. Similarly when pleasures and pains are few and small and feeble: if pain outweighs pleasure, we do not want that life, but we do when pleasure outweighs pain. As for the 'average' life, which experiences only moderate pleasures or pains, we should observe the same point as before: we desire it when it offers us a preponderance of pleasure (which we enjoy), but not when it offers us a preponderance of pain (which we abhor). In that sense, then, we should think of all human lives as bound up in these two feelings, and we must think to what kind of life our natural wishes incline. But if we assert that we want anything outside this range, we are talking out of ignorance and inexperience of life as it is really lived.

So when a man has considered his likes and dislikes, what he would willingly do and what not, and adopted that as a working rule to guide him in choosing what he finds congenial and pleasant and supremely excellent, he will select a life that will enable him to live as happily as a man can. So what are these lives, and how many are there, from which he must make this choice? Let us list them: there is the life of self-control for one, the life of wisdom for another, and the life of courage too; and let us treat the healthy life as another. As opposed to these, we have another four lives—the licentious, the foolish, the cowardly and the diseased. Now anyone who knows what the life of self-control is like will describe it as gentle in all respects, with mild pleasures and pains, light appetites, and desires without frenzy; the

licentious life he will say is violent through and through, involving extreme pleasures and pains, intense and raging appetites and desires of extreme fury. He will say that in the life of self-control the pleasures outweigh the pains, and in the licentious life the pains exceed the pleasures, in point of size, number and frequency. That is why we inevitably and naturally find the former life more pleasant, the latter more painful, and anyone who means to live a pleasant life no longer has the option of living licentiously. On the contrary, it is already clear (if our present position is correct) that if a man is licentious it must be without intending to be. It is either because of ignorance or lack of self-control, or both, that the world at large lives immoderately. The healthy and unhealthy life should be regarded in the same way: they both offer pleasures and pains, but the pleasures outweigh the pains in the healthy life, vice versa in the unhealthy. But what we want when we choose between lives is not a predominance of pain: we have chosen as the pleasanter life the one where pain is the weaker element. And so we can say that the self-controlled, the wise and the courageous, experience pleasure and pain with less intensity and on a smaller and more restricted scale than the profligate, the fool and the coward. The first category beats the second on the score of pleasure, while the second beats the other when it comes to pain. The courageous man does better than the coward, the wise man than the fool; so that, life for life, the former kind—the restrained, the courageous, the wise and the healthy—is pleasanter than the cowardly, the foolish, the licentious and the unhealthy.

To sum up, the life of physical fitness, and spiritual virtue too, is not only pleasanter than the life of depravity but superior in other ways as well: it makes for beauty, an upright posture, efficiency and a good reputation, so that if

a man lives a life like that it will make his whole existence infinitely happier than his opposite number's.

At this point we may stop expounding the preface to the laws, it being now complete. After the 'prelude' should come the 'tune', or (more accurately) a sketch of a legal and political framework. Now it is impossible, when dealing with a web or any piece of weaving, to construct the warp and the woof from the same stuff: the warp must be of a superior type of material (strong and firm in character, while the woof is softer and suitably workable). In a rather similar way it will be reasonable to distinguish between the authorities who are going to rule in a city and the citizens whose education has been slighter and less testing. You may assume, you see, that there are two elements in a political system: the installation of individuals in office, and equipping those officials with a code of laws.

But before all that, here are some further points to notice. Anyone who takes charge of a herd of animals—a shepherd or cattle-man or breeder of horses or what have you—will never get down to looking after them without first performing the purge appropriate to his particular animal-community: that is, he will weed out the unhealthy and inferior stock and send it off to other herds, and keep only the thoroughbreds and the healthy animals to look after. He knows that otherwise he would have to waste endless effort on sickly and refractory beasts, degenerate by nature and ruined by incompetent breeding, and that unless he purges the existing stock these faults will spread in any herd to the animals that are still physically and temperamentally healthy and unspoilt. This is not too serious in the case of the lower animals, and we need mention it only by way of illustration, but with human beings it is vitally important for the legislator to ascertain and explain the appropriate measures in each case, not only as regards a purge, but in

general. To purge a whole state, for instance, several methods may be employed, some mild, some drastic; and if a legislator were a dictator too he'd be able to purge the state drastically, which is the best way. But if he has to establish a new society and new laws without dictatorial powers, and succeeds in administering no more than the mildest purge, he'll be well content even with this limited achievement. Like drastic medicines, the best purge is a painful business: it involves chastisement by a combination of 'judgment' and 'punishment', and takes the latter, ultimately, to the point of death or exile. That usually gets rid of the major criminals who are incurable and do the state enormous harm. The milder purge we could adopt is this. When there is a shortage of food, and the underprivileged show themselves ready to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the privileged, they are to be regarded as a disease that has developed in the body politic, and in the friendliest possible way they should be (as it will tactfully be put) 'transferred to a colony'. Somehow or other everyone who legislates must do this in good time; but our position at the moment is even more unusual. There's no need for us here and now to have resort to a colony or arrange to make a selection of people by a purge. No: it's as though we have a number of streams from several sources, some from springs, some from mountain torrents, all flowing down to unite in one lake. We have to apply ourselves to seeing that the water, as it mingles, is as pure as possible, partly by draining some of it off, partly by diverting it into different channels. Even so, however you organize a society, it looks as if there will always be trouble and risk. True enough: but seeing that we are operating at the moment on a theoretical rather than a practical level, let's suppose we've recruited our citizens and their purity meets with our approval. After all, when we have screened the bad candidates over a suitable period and given

them every chance to be converted, we can refuse their application to enter and become citizens of the state; but we should greet the good ones with all possible courtesy and kindness.

We should not forget that we are in the same fortunate position as the Heraclids when they founded their colony: we noticed how they avoided vicious and dangerous disputes about land and cancellations of debts and distribution of property. When an old-established state is forced to resort to legislation to deal with these problems, it finds that both leaving things as they are and reforming them are somehow equally impossible. The only policy left them is to mouth pious hopes and make a little cautious progress over a long period by advancing a step at a time. (This is the way it can be done. From time to time some of the reformers should be themselves great land-owners and have a large number of debtors; and they should be prepared, in a philanthropic spirit, to share their prosperity with those debtors who are in distress, partly by remitting debts and partly by making land available for distribution. Their policy will be a policy of moderation, dictated by the conviction that poverty is a matter of increased greed rather than diminished wealth. This belief is fundamental to the success of a state, and is the firm base on which you can later build whatever political structure is appropriate to such conditions as we have described. But when these first steps towards reform falter, subsequent constitutional action in any state will be hard going.) Now as we say, such difficulties do not affect us. Nevertheless, it's better to have explained how we could have escaped them if they had. Let's take it, then, that the explanation has been given: the way to escape those difficulties is through a sense of justice combined with an indifference to wealth; there is no other route, broad or narrow, by which we can avoid them. So let's adopt this

principle as a prop for our state. Somehow or other we must ensure that the citizens' property does not lead to disputes among them—otherwise, if people have longstanding complaints against each other, anyone with any sense at all will not go any further with organizing them, if he can help it. But when, as with us now, God has given a group of people a new state to found, in which so far there is no mutual malice—well, to stir up ill-will towards each other because of the way they distribute the land and houses would be so criminally stupid that no man could bring himself to do it.

So what's the correct method of distribution? First, one has to determine what the total number of people ought to be, then agree on the question of the distribution of the citizens and decide the number and size of the subsections into which they ought to be divided; and the land and houses must be divided equally (so far as possible) among these subsections. A suitable total for the number of citizens cannot be fixed without considering the land and the neighboring states. The land must be extensive enough to support a given number of people in modest comfort, and not a foot more is needed. The inhabitants should be numerous enough to be able to defend themselves when the adjacent peoples attack them, and contribute at any rate some assistance to neighboring societies when they are wronged. When we have inspected the land and its neighbors, we'll determine these points and give reasons for the action we take; but for the moment let's just give an outline sketch and get on with finishing our legislation.

Let's assume we have the convenient number of five thousand and forty farmers and protectors of their holdings, and let the land with its houses be divided up into the same number of parts, so that a man and his holding always go together. Divide the total first by two, then by three: you'll

see it can be divided by four and five and every number right up to ten. Everyone who legislates should have sufficient appreciation of arithmetic to know what number will be most use in every state, and why. So let's fix on the one which has the largest number of consecutive divisors. Of course, an infinite series of numbers would admit all possible divisions for all possible uses, but our 5040 admits no more than 59 (including 1 to without a break), which will have to suffice for purposes of war and every peacetime activity, all contracts and dealings, and for taxes and grants.

Anyone who is legally obliged to understand these mathematical facts should try to deepen his understanding of them even in his spare time. They really are just as I say, and the founder of a state needs to be told of them, for the following reasons. It doesn't matter whether he's founding a new state from scratch or reconstructing an old one that has gone to ruin: in either case, if he has any sense, he will never dream of altering whatever instructions may have been received from Delphi or Dodona or Ammon about the gods and temples that ought to be founded by the various groups in the state, and the gods or spirits after whom the temples should be named. (Alternatively, such details may have been suggested by stories told long ago of visions or divine inspiration, which somehow moved people to institute sacrifices with their rituals—either native or taken from Etruria or Cyprus or some other country—so that on the strength of these reports they consecrated statues, altars, temples and sites of oracles, providing each with its own sacred plot of land.) The legislator must not tamper with any of this in the slightest detail. He must allocate to each division of citizens a god or spirit or perhaps a hero, and when he divides up the territory he must give these priority by setting aside plots of land for them, endowed with all the appropriate resources. Thus when the different divisions

gather together at fixed times they will have an opportunity of satisfying their various needs, and the citizens will recognize and greet each other at the sacrifices in mutual friendship—and there can be no greater benefit for a state than that the citizens should be well-known one to another. Where they have no insight into each other's characters and are kept in the dark about them, no one will ever enjoy the respect he merits or fill the office he deserves or obtain the legal verdict to which he is entitled. So every citizen of every state should make a particular effort to show that he is straightforward and genuine, not shifty, and try to avoid being hoodwinked by anyone who is.

The next move in this game of legislation is as unusual as going 'across the line' in checkers, and may well cause surprise at first hearing. But reflection and experience will soon show that the organization of a state is almost bound to fall short of the ideal. You may, perhaps—if you don't know what it means to be a legislator without dictatorial powers—refuse to countenance such a state; nevertheless the right procedure is to describe not only the ideal society but the second and third best too, and then leave it to anyone in charge of founding a community to make a choice between them. So let's follow this procedure now: let's describe the absolutely ideal society, then the second-best, then the third. On this occasion we ought to leave the choice to Clinias, but we should not forget anyone else who may at some time be faced with such a choice and wish to adopt for his own purposes customs of his native country which he finds valuable.

You'll find the ideal society and state, and the best code of laws, where the old saying 'friends' property is genuinely shared' is put into practice as widely as possible throughout the entire state. Now I don't know whether in fact this situation—a community of wives, children and all property—

exists anywhere today, or will ever exist, but at any rate in such a state the notion of 'private property' will have been by hook or by crook completely eliminated from life. Everything possible will have been done to throw into a sort of common pool even what is by nature 'my own', like eyes and ears and hands, in the sense that to judge by appearances they all see and hear and act in concert. Everybody feels pleasure and pain at the same things, so that they all praise and blame with complete unanimity. To sum up, the laws in force impose the greatest possible unity on the state—and you'll never produce a better or truer criterion of an absolutely perfect law than that. It may be that gods or a number of the children of gods inhabit this kind of state: if so, the life they live there, observing these rules, is a happy one indeed. And so men need look no further for their ideal: they should keep this state in view and try to find the one that most nearly resembles it. This is what we've put our hand to, and if in some way it could be realized, it would come very near immortality and be second only to the ideal. Later, God willing, we'll describe a third best. But for the moment, what description should we give of this second-best state? What's the method by which a state like this is produced?

First of all, the citizens must make a distribution of land and houses; they must not farm in common, which is a practice too demanding for those born and bred and educated as ours are. But the distribution should be made with some such intention as this: each man who receives a portion of land should regard it as the common possession of the entire state. The land is his ancestral home and he must cherish it even more than children cherish their mother; furthermore, Earth is a goddess, and mistress of mortal men. (And the gods and spirits already established in the locality must be treated with the same respect.)

Additional measures must be taken to make sure that these arrangements are permanent: the number of hearths established by the initial distribution must always remain the same; it must neither increase nor decrease. The best way for every state to ensure this will be as follows: the recipient of a holding should always leave from among his children only one heir to inherit his establishment. This will be his favorite son, who will succeed him and give due worship to the ancestors (who rank as gods) of the family and state; these must be taken to include not only those who have already passed on, but also those who are still alive. As for the other children, in cases where there are more than one, the head of the family should marry off the females in accordance with the law we shall establish later; the males he must present for adoption to those citizens who have no children of their own—priority to be given to personal preferences as far as possible. But some people may have no preferences, or other families too may have surplus offspring, male or female; or, to take the opposite problem, they may have too few, because of the onset of sterility. All these cases will be investigated by the highest and most distinguished official we shall appoint. He will decide what is to be done with the surpluses or deficiencies, and will do his best to discover a device to keep the number of households down to 5040. There are many devices available: if too many children are being born, there are measures to check propagation; on the other hand, a high birthrate can be encouraged and stimulated by conferring marks of distinction or disgrace, and the young can be admonished by words of warning from their elders. This approach should do the trick, and if in the last resort we are in complete despair about variations from our number of 5040 households, and the mutual love of wives and husbands produces an excessive flow of citizens that drives us to

distraction, we have that old expedient at hand, which we have often mentioned before. We can send out colonies of people that seem suitable, with mutual goodwill between the emigrants and their mother-city. By contrast, we may be flooded with a wave of diseases or by the ravages of wars, so that bereavements depress the citizens far below the appointed number. In this event we ought not to import citizens who have been brought up by a bastard education, if we can help it; but not even God, they say, can grapple with necessity.

So let's pretend our thesis can talk and gives us this advice: 'My dear sirs, don't ignore the facts and be careless enough to undervalue the concepts of likeness, equality, identity and agreement, either in mathematics or in any other useful and productive science. In particular, your first task now is to keep to the said number as long as you live; you must respect the upper limits of the total property which you originally distributed as being reasonable, and not buy and sell your holdings among yourselves. The lot by which they were distributed is a god, so there will be no support for you there, or from the legislator either. And there are two warnings the law has for the disobedient: You may choose or decline to take part in the distribution, but if you do take part you must observe the following conditions: you must acknowledge that the land is sacred to all the gods; after priests and priestesses have offered prayers for that intention at the first, second and third sacrifices;

1. Anyone buying or selling his allotted land or house must suffer the penalty appropriate to the crime.

You are to inscribe the details on pieces of cypress wood and put these written records on permanent deposit in the temples. You must appoint the official who seems to have the sharpest eyes to superintend the observance of the rule, so that the various contraventions may be brought to your

notice and the disobedient punished by the law and the god alike. What a boon this rule is to all the states that observe it, given the appropriate arrangements, no wicked men—as the saying goes—will ever understand; such knowledge is the fruit of experience and virtuous habits. Such arrangements, you see, involve very little by way of profit-making, and there is no need or opportunity for anyone to engage in any of the vulgar branches of commerce (you know how a gentleman's character is coarsened by manual labor, which is generally admitted to be degrading), and no one will presume to rake in money from occupations such as that.'

All these considerations suggest a further law that runs like this: no private person shall be allowed to possess any gold or silver, but only coinage for day-to-day dealings which one can hardly avoid having with workmen and all other indispensable people of that kind (we have to pay wages to slaves and foreigners who work for money). For these purposes, we agree, they must possess coinage, legal tender among themselves, but valueless to the rest of mankind. The common Greek coinage is to be used for expeditions and visits to the outside world, such as when a man has to be sent abroad as an ambassador or to convey some official message; to meet these occasions the state must always have a supply of Greek coinage. If a private individual should ever need to go abroad, he should first obtain leave of the authorities, and if he returns home with some surplus foreign money in his pocket he must deposit it with the state and take local money to the same value in exchange.

If he is found keeping it for himself, it must be confiscated by the state.

If anyone who knows of its concealment fails to report it, he must be liable to a curse and a reproach (and so must the importer), and in addition be fined in a sum not less than that of the foreign currency brought in.

When a man marries or gives in marriage, no dowry whatsoever must be given or received. Money must not be deposited with anybody whom one does not trust. There must be no lending at interest, because it will be quite in order for the borrower to refuse absolutely to return both interest and principal.

The best way to appreciate that these are the best policies for a state to follow is to examine them in the light of the fundamental aim. Now we maintain that the aim of a statesman who knows what he's about is not in fact the one which most people say the good legislator should have. They' say that if he knows what he's doing his laws should make the state as huge and as rich as possible; he should give the citizens gold mines and silver mines, and enable them to control as many people as possible by land and sea. And they' add, too, that to be a satisfactory legislator he must want to see the state as good and as happy as possible. But some of these demands are practical politics, and some are not, and the legislator will confine himself to what can be done, without bothering his head with wishful thinking about impossibilities. I mean, it's pretty well inevitable that happiness and virtue should come hand in hand (and this is the situation the legislator will want to see), but virtue and great wealth are quite incompatible, at any rate great wealth as generally understood (most people would think of the extreme case of a millionaire, who will of course be a rogue into the bargain). In view of all this, I'll never concede to them that the rich man can become really happy without being virtuous as well: to be extremely virtuous and exceptionally rich at the same time is absolutely out of the question. 'Why?' it may be asked. 'Because,' we shall reply, 'the profit from using just and unjust methods is more than twice as much as that from just methods alone, and a man who refuses to spend his money either worthily or shamefully

spends only half the sum laid out by worthwhile people who are prepared to spend on worthy purposes too. So anyone who follows the opposite policy will never become richer than the man who gets twice as much profit and makes half the expenditures. The former is a good man; the latter is not actually a rogue so long as he uses his money sparingly, but on some occasions he is an absolute villain; thus, as we have said, he is never good. Ill-gotten and well-gotten gains plus expenditure that is neither just nor unjust, when a man is also sparing with his money, add up to wealth; the absolute rogue, who is generally a spendthrift, is quite impoverished. The man who spends his money for honest ends and uses only just methods to come by it, will not easily become particularly rich or particularly poor. Our thesis is therefore correct: the very rich are not good; and if they are not good, they are not happy either.'

The whole point of our legislation was to allow the citizens to live supremely happy lives in the greatest possible mutual friendship. However, they will never be friends if injuries and lawsuits arise among them on a grand scale, but only if they are trivial and rare. That is why we maintain that neither gold nor silver should exist in the state, and there should not be much money made out of menial trades and charging interest, nor from prostitutes; the citizens' wealth should be limited to the products of farming, and even here a man should not be able to make so much that he can't help forgetting the real reason why money was invented (I mean for the care of the soul and body, which without physical and cultural education respectively will never develop into anything worth mentioning). That's what has made us say more than once that the pursuit of money should come last in the scale of value. Every man directs his efforts to three things in all, and if his efforts are directed with a correct sense of priorities he will give money the third and lowest

place, and his soul the highest, with his body coming somewhere between the two. In particular, if this scale of values prevails in the society we're now describing, then it has been equipped with a good code of laws. But if any of the laws subsequently passed is found giving pride of place to health in the state rather than the virtue of self-control, or to wealth rather than health and habits of restraint, then quite obviously its priorities will be wrong. So the legislator must repeatedly try to get this sort of thing straight in his own mind by asking 'What do I want to achieve?' and 'Am I achieving it, or am I off target?' If he does that, perhaps he'll complete his legislation by his own efforts and leave nothing to be done by others. There's no other way he could possibly succeed.

So when a man has drawn his lot, he must take over his holding on the terms stated. It would have been an advantage if no one entering the colony had had any more property than anyone else; but that's out of the question, and some people will arrive with relatively large fortunes, others with relatively little. So for a number of reasons, and especially because the state offers equality of opportunity, there must be graded property-classes, to ensure that offices and taxes and grants may be arranged on the basis of what a man is worth. It's not only his personal virtues or his ancestors' that should be considered, or his physical strength or good looks: what he's made of his wealth or poverty should also be taken into account. In short, the citizens must be esteemed and given office, so far as possible, on exactly equal terms of 'proportional inequality', so as to avoid ill-feeling. For these reasons four permanent property-classes must be established, graded according to wealth: the 'first', 'second', 'third', and 'fourth' classes, or whatever other names are employed. A man will either keep

his original classification, or, when he has grown richer or poorer than he was before, transfer to the appropriate class.

In view of all this, the next law I'd pass would be along the following lines. (We maintain that if a state is to avoid the greatest plague of all—I mean civil war, though civil disintegration would be a better term—extreme poverty and wealth must not be allowed to arise in any section of the citizen-body, because both lead to both these disasters. That is why the legislator must now announce the acceptable limits of wealth and poverty.) The lower limit of poverty must be the value of the holding (which is to be permanent: no official nor anyone else who has ambitions to be thought virtuous will ever overlook the diminution of any man's holding). The legislator will use the holding as his unit of measure and allow a man to possess twice, thrice, and up to four times its value. If anyone acquires more than this, by finding treasure-trove or by gift or by a good stroke of business or some other similar lucky chance which presents him with more than he's allowed, he should hand over the surplus to the state and its patron deities, thereby escaping punishment and getting a good name for himself.

If a man breaks this law, anyone who wishes may lay information and be rewarded with half the amount involved, the other half being given to the gods; and besides this the guilty person must pay a fine equivalent to the surplus out of his own pocket.

The total property of each citizen over and above his holding of land should be recorded in a public register kept in the custody of officials legally appointed for that duty, so that lawsuits on all subjects—in so far as they affect property—may go smoothly because the facts are clear.

After this, the legislator's first job is to locate the city as precisely as possible in the center of the country, provided

that the site he chooses is a convenient one for a city in all other respects too (these are details which can be understood and specified easily enough). Next he must divide the country into twelve sections. But first he ought to reserve a sacred area for Hestia, Zeus and Athena (calling it the 'acropolis'), and enclose its boundaries; he will then divide the city itself and the whole country into twelve sections by lines radiating from this central point. The twelve sections should be made equal in the sense that a section should be smaller if the soil is good, bigger if it is poor. The legislator must then mark out five thousand and forty holdings, and further divide each into two parts; he should then make an individual holding consist of two such parts coupled so that each has a partner near the center or the boundary of the state as the case may be. (A part near the city and a part next to the boundary should form one holding, the second nearest the city with the second from the boundary should form another, and so on.) He must apply to the two parts the rule I've just mentioned about the relative quality of the soil, making them equal by varying their size. He should also divide the population into twelve sections, and arrange to distribute among them as equally as possible all wealth over and above the actual holdings (a comprehensive list will be compiled). Finally, they must allocate the sections as twelve 'holdings' for the twelve gods, consecrate each section to the particular god which it has drawn by lot, name it after him, and call it a 'tribe'. Again, they must divide the city into twelve sections in the same way as they divided the rest of the country; and each man should be allotted two houses, one near the center of the state, one near the boundary. That will finish off the job of getting the state founded.

But there's a lesson here that we must take to heart. This blueprint as a whole is never likely to find such favorable

circumstances that every single detail will turn out precisely according to plan. It presupposes men who won't turn up their noses at living in such a community, and who will tolerate a moderate and fixed level of wealth throughout their lives, and the supervision of the size of each individual's family as we've suggested. Will people really put up with being deprived of gold and other things which, for reasons we went into just now, the legislator is obviously going to add to his list of forbidden articles? What about this description of a city and countryside with houses at the center and in all directions round about? He might have been relating a dream, or modeling a state and its citizens out of wax. The ideal impresses well enough, but the legislator must reconsider it as follows (this being, then, a reprise of his address to us). 'My friends, in these talks we're having, don't think it has escaped me either that the point of view you are urging has some truth in it. But I believe that in every project for future action, when you are displaying the ideal plan that ought to be put into effect, the most satisfactory procedure is to spare no detail of absolute truth and beauty. But if you find that one of these details is impossible in practice, you ought to put it on one side and not attempt it: you should see which of the remaining alternatives comes closest to it and is most nearly akin to your policy, and arrange to have that done instead. But you must let the legislator finish describing what he really wants to do, and only then join him in considering which of his proposals for legislation are feasible, and which are too difficult. You see, even the maker of the most trivial object must make it internally consistent if he is going to get any sort of reputation.'

Now that we've decided to divide the citizens into twelve sections, we should try to realize (after all, it's clear enough) the enormous number of divisors the subdivisions of each

section have, and reflect how these in turn can be further subdivided and subdivided again until you get to 5040. This is the mathematical framework which will yield you your brotherhoods, local administrative units, villages, your military companies and marching-columns, as well as units of coinage, liquid and dry measures, and weights. The law must regulate all these details so that the proper proportions and correspondences are observed. And not only that: the legislator should not be afraid of appearing to give undue attention to detail. He must be bold enough to give instructions that the citizens are not to be allowed to possess any equipment that is not of standard size. He'll assume it's a general rule that numerical division in all its variety can be usefully applied to every field of conduct. It may be limited to the complexities of arithmetic itself, or extended to the subtleties of plane and solid geometry; it's also relevant to sound, and to motion (straight up or down or revolution in a circle). The legislator should take all this into account and instruct all his citizens to do their best never to operate outside that framework. For domestic and public purposes, and all professional skills, no single branch of a child's education has such an enormous range of applications as mathematics; but its greatest advantage is that it wakes up the sleepy ignoramus and makes him quick to understand, retentive and sharp witted; and thanks to this miraculous science he does better than his natural abilities would have allowed. These subjects will form a splendidly appropriate curriculum, if by further laws and customs you can expel the spirit of pettiness and greed from the souls of those who are to master them and profit from them. But if you fail, you'll find that without noticing it you've produced a 'twister' instead of a man of learning—just what can be seen to have happened in the case of the Egyptians and Phoenicians, and many other races whose approach to wealth and life in

general shows a narrow-minded outlook. (It may have been an incompetent legislator who was to blame for this state of affairs, or some stroke of bad luck, or even some natural influences that had the same effect.)

And that's another point about the choice of sites, Clinias and Megillus, that we mustn't forget. Some localities are more likely than others to produce comparatively good (or bad) characters, and we must take care to lay down laws that do not fly in the face of such influences. Some sites are suitable or unsuitable because of varying winds or periods of heat, others because of the quality of the water; in some cases the very food grown in the soil can nourish or poison not only the body but the soul as well. But best of all will be the places where the breeze of heaven blows, where spirits hold possession of the land and greet with favor (or disfavor) the various people who come and settle there. The sensible legislator will ponder these influences as carefully as a man can, and then try to lay down laws that will take account of them. This is what you must do too, Clinias. You're going to settle a territory, so here's the first thing you have to attend to.

Clinias/ Well said, sir. I must follow your advice.

Book 6.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, now that I've got all that off my chest, your next job will be to appoint officials for the state.

Clinias/ It certainly will.

Athenian Stranger/ There are two stages involved in organizing a society. First you establish official positions and appoint people to hold them: you decide how many posts there should be and how they ought to be filled. Then each office has to be given its particular laws: you have to decide which laws will be appropriate in each case, and the number and type required. But before we make our choice, let's pause a moment and explain a point that will affect it.

Clinias/ And what's that?

Athenian Stranger/ This. It's obvious to anyone that legislation is a tremendous task, and that when you have a well-constructed state with a well-framed legal code, to put incompetent officials in charge of administering the code is a waste of good laws, and the whole business degenerates into farce. And not only that: the state will find that its laws are doing it damage and injury on a gigantic scale.

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ Now let's notice the relevance of this to your present society and state. You appreciate that if your candidates are to deserve promotion to positions of power, their characters and family background must have been adequately tested, right from their childhood until the moment of their election. Furthermore, the intending electors ought to have been well brought up in law-abiding habits, so as to be able to approve or disapprove of the candidates for the right reasons and elect or reject them according to their deserts. But in the present case we are dealing with people who have only just come together and

don't know each other—and they're uneducated too. So how could they ever elect their officials without going wrong?

Clinias/ It's pretty well impossible.

Athenian Stranger/ But look here, 'once in the race, you've no excuses', as the saying is. That's just our predicament now: you and your nine colleagues, you tell us, have given an undertaking to the people of Crete to turn your energies to founding this state; I, for my part, have promised to join in with this piece of fiction I'm now relating. Seeing that I've got on to telling a story, I'd be most reluctant to leave it without a head: it would look a grim sight wandering about like that!

Clinias/ And a fine story it's been, sir.

Athenian Stranger/ Surely, but I also intend to give you actual help along those lines, so far as I can.

Clinias/ Then let's carry out our program, certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, we shall, God willing, if we can keep old age at bay for long enough.

Clinias/ 'God willing' can probably be taken for granted.

Athenian Stranger/ Of course. So let's be guided by him and notice something else.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That we'll find we've been pretty bold and foolhardy in launching this state of ours.

Clinias/ What's made you say that? What have you in mind?

Athenian Stranger/ I'm thinking of the cheerful way we're legislating for people who'll be new to the laws we've passed, without bothering how they'll ever be brought to accept them. It's obvious to us all, Clinias, even if we're not very clever, that at the start they won't readily accept any at all. Ideally, we'd remain on the spot long enough to see people

getting a taste of the laws while they're still children; then when they've grown up and have become thoroughly accustomed to them, they can take part in the elections to all the offices of the state. If we can manage that (assuming acceptable ways and means are available), then I reckon that the state would have a firm guarantee of survival when its 'schooldays' are over.

Clinias/ That's reasonable enough.

Athenian Stranger/ So let's see if we can find ways and means. Will this do? I maintain, Clinias, that of all the Cretans, the citizens of Cnossus have a special duty. They must not be content with simply doing all that religion demands for the mere soil of your settlement: they must also take scrupulous care to see that the first officials are appointed by the best and safest methods. And it's absolutely vital to give your best attention to choosing, first of all, Guardians of the Laws. (Less trouble need be taken over the other officials.)

Clinias/ So can we find a reasonable way of going about it?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes. 'Sons of Crete' (I say), 'as the Cnossians take precedence over your many cities, they should collaborate with the newly arrived settlers in choosing a total of thirty-seven men from the two sides, nineteen from the settlers, the rest from Cnossus itself'—the gift of the Cnossians to this state of yours, Clinias. They should include you in the eighteen, and make you yourself a citizen of the colony, with your consent (failing which, you'll be gently compelled).

Clinias/ But why on earth, sir, haven't you, and Megillus too, enrolled as joint administrators?

Athenian Stranger/ Ah, Clinias, Athens is a high and mighty state, and so is Sparta; besides, they're both a long

way off. But it's just the right thing for you and the other founders, and what I said a moment ago of you applies equally to them. So let's take it we've explained how to deal with the present situation. But as time goes on and the constitution has become established, the election of these officials should be held more or less as follows. Everyone who serves in the cavalry or infantry, and has fought in the field while young and strong enough to do so, should participate.

They must proceed to election in the temple which the state considers to be the most venerable; each elector should place on the altar of the god a small tablet on which he has written the name of the person he wishes to vote for, adding the candidate's father, tribe, and deme; and he should append his own name with the same details. For at least thirty days anyone who wishes should be allowed to remove any tablet bearing a name he finds objectionable and put it on display in the market-place. Then the officials must exhibit to the state at large the three hundred tablets that head the list; on the basis of this list the voters must then again record their nominations, and the hundred names that lead this second time must be publicly displayed as before. On the third occasion anyone who wishes should walk between the victims of a sacrifice and record which of these three hundred he chooses. The thirty-seven who receive most votes must then submit to scrutiny and be declared elected.

Well then, Clinias and Megillus, who will make all these arrangements about these officials in our state, and their scrutiny? We can surely appreciate that as the state apparatus is as yet only rudimentary such people have to be on hand; but they could hardly be available before any officials at all have been appointed. Even so, we must have them, and these two hundred persons mustn't be feeble

specimens, either, but men of the highest caliber. As the proverb says, 'getting started is half the battle', and a good beginning we all applaud. But in my view a good start is more than 'half', and no one has yet given it the praise it deserves.

Clinias/ That's quite true.

Athenian Stranger/ So as we acknowledge the value of a good beginning, let's not skip discussion of it in this case. Let's get it quite clear in our own minds how we can tackle it. I've no particular points to make, except one, which is vitally relevant to the situation.

Clinias/ And what's that?

Athenian Stranger/ Apart from the city which is founding it, this state we are about to settle has, so to speak, no father or mother. I'm quite aware, of course, that many a foundation has quarreled repeatedly with its founder-state, and will again, but in the present circumstances we have, as it were, the merest infant on our hands. I mean, any child is going to fall out with his parents sooner or later, but while he's young and can't help himself, he loves them and they love him; he's forever scampering back to his family and finding his only allies are his relatives. That's exactly the way I maintain our young state regards the citizens of Cnossus and how they regard it, in virtue of their role as its guardians. I therefore repeat what I said just now—there's no harm in saying a good thing twice—that the citizen of Cnossus should choose colleagues from among the newly arrived colonists and take charge of all these arrangements; they should choose at least a hundred of them, the oldest and most virtuous they can find; and they themselves should contribute another hundred. They should enter the new state and collaborate in seeing that the officials are designated according to law, and after designation,

scrutinized. When they've done all that, the citizens of Cnossus should resume living in Cnossus and leave the infant state to work out its own salvation and flourish unaided.

The duties for which the members of the body of thirty-seven should be appointed are as follows (not only here and now, but permanently): first, they are to act as Guardians of the Laws; second, they are to take charge of the documents in which each person has made his return to the officials of his total property. (A man may leave four hundred drachmas undeclared if he belongs to the highest property-class, three hundred if to the second, two hundred if to the third, and one hundred if he belongs to the fourth.)

If anyone is found to possess anything in addition to the registered sum, the entire surplus should be confiscated by the state, and on top of that anyone who wants to should bring a charge against him—and an ugly, discreditable and disgraceful charge it will be, if the man is convicted of being enticed by the prospect of gain to hold the laws in contempt. The accuser, who may be anyone, should accordingly enter a charge of 'money-grubbing' against him, and prosecute in the court of the Law-Guardians themselves.

If the defendant is found guilty, he must be excluded from the common resources of the state, and when a grant of some kind is made, he must go without and be limited to his holding; and for as long as he lives his conviction should be recorded for public inspection by all and sundry.

A Law-Guardian must not hold office for longer than twenty years; he should be not less than fifty years old on appointment, and if he is appointed at sixty, his maximum tenure must be ten years, and so on. And if a man survives beyond seventy, he should no longer expect to hold such an important post as membership of this board.

That gives us three duties to assign to the Guardians of the Laws. As the legal code is extended, every new law will give this body of men additional duties to perform, over and above the ones we've mentioned. Now for the election of the other officials, one by one.

Next, then, we have to elect Generals and their aides-de-camp, so to speak: Cavalry-Commanders, Tribe-Leaders, and controllers of the tribal companies of infantry ('Company-Commanders' will be a good name for these officers, which is in fact what most people do call them).

Generals. The Guardians of the Laws must compile a preliminary list of candidates, restricted to citizens, and the Generals should then be elected from this list by all those who have served in the armed forces at the proper age, or are serving at the time. If anybody thinks that someone not on the preliminary list is better qualified than someone who is, he must name his proposed substitute, and say whom he should replace; then, having sworn his oath, he must propose the alternative candidate.

Whichever of the two the voting favors should be a candidate in the election. The three candidates who receive most votes should become Generals and take over the organization of military affairs, after being scrutinized in the same way as the Guardians of the Laws.

Company-Commanders. The elected Generals should make their own preliminary list of twelve Company-Commanders, one for each tribe; the counter-nominations, the election and the scrutiny must be conducted as they were for the Generals themselves.

The Elections. For the moment, before a council and executive committees have been chosen, your assembly must be convened by the Guardians of the Laws in the holiest and most capacious place they can find; and they

must seat the heavy-armed soldiers, the cavalry, and finally all other ranks, in separate blocks. The Generals and Cavalry-Commanders should be elected by the whole assembly, the Company-Commanders by the shield-bearers, and their Tribe-Leaders by the entire cavalry; as for light-armed troops, archers, or whatever other ranks there may be, the appointment of their leaders should be left to the Generals' discretion.

Cavalry-Commanders. That will leave us with the appointment of the Cavalry-Commanders. The preliminary list must be drawn up by the same persons as drew up the list of Generals, and the election and counterproposals should be conducted in the same way; the cavalry must hold the election watched by the infantry, and the two candidates with the most votes must become leaders of the entire mounted force.

Disputed Votes. Votes may be disputed no more than twice. If anyone contests the vote on the third occasion, the tellers must decide the issue by voting among themselves.

The council should have thirty dozen members, as three hundred sixty will be a convenient number for subdivision. The total will be divided into four sections of ninety, this being the number of members to be elected from each property-class. The first step in the election is to be compulsory for all: everyone must take part in the nomination of members of the highest class, and anybody who neglects his duty must pay the approved fine. When the nominations are completed, the names must be noted down.

On the next day, using the same procedure as before, they will nominate members of the second class.

On the third day, nominating for Councilors from the third class will be optional, except for voters of the first three classes: voters of the fourth and lowest class will be

exempted from the fine if they do not care to make a nomination.

The fourth day will see the nomination for representatives of the fourth and lowest class; everyone must take part, but voters of the third and fourth class who do not wish to nominate should not be fined—unlike voters of the second and first classes, who must be fined treble and quadruple the standard fine respectively if they do not make a nomination.

On the fifth day the officials must display to the entire citizen body the names duly noted down, and on the basis of these lists every man must cast his vote or pay the standard fine. One hundred eighty must be selected from each property-class, and half of them finally chosen by lot. These, after scrutiny, are to be Councilors for the year.

A system of selection like that will effect a compromise between a monarchical and a democratic constitution, which is precisely the sort of compromise a constitution should always be. You see, even if you proclaim that a master and his slave shall have equal status, friendship between them is inherently impossible. The same applies to the relations between an honest man and a scoundrel. Indiscriminate equality for all amounts to inequality, and both fill a state with quarrels between its citizens. How correct the old saying is, that 'equality leads to friendship'! It's right enough and it rings true, but what kind of equality has this potential is a problem which produces ripe confusion. This is because we use the same term for two concepts of 'equality', which in most respects are virtual opposites. The first sort of equality (of measures, weights and numbers) is within the competence of any state and any legislator: that is, one can simply distribute equal awards by lot. But the most genuine equality, and the best, is not so obvious. It needs the wisdom and judgment of Zeus, and

only in a limited number of ways does it help the human race; but when states or even individuals do find it profitable, they find it very profitable indeed. The general method I mean is to grant much to the great and less to the less great, adjusting what you give to take account of the real nature of each—specifically, to confer high recognition on great virtue, but when you come to the poorly educated in this respect, to treat them as they deserve. We maintain, in fact, that statesmanship consists of essentially this—strict justice. This is what we should be aiming at now, Clinias: this is the kind of 'equality' we should concentrate on as we bring our state into the world. The founder of any other state should also concentrate on this same goal when he frames his laws, and take no notice of a bunch of dictators, or a single one, or even the power of the people. He must always make justice his aim, and this is precisely as we've described it: it consists of granting the 'equality' that unequals deserve to get. Yet on occasion a state as a whole (unless it is prepared to put up with a degree of friction in one part or another) will be obliged to apply these concepts in a rather rough and ready way, because complaisance and toleration, which always wreck complete precision, are the enemies of strict justice. You can now see why it was necessary to avoid the anger of the man in the street by giving him an equal chance in the lot (though even then we prayed to the gods of good luck to make the lot give the right decisions). So though force of circumstances compels us to employ both sorts of equality, we should employ the second, which demands good luck to prove successful, as little as possible.

So much, my friends, for the justification of our policy, which is the policy a state must follow if it means to survive. The state is just like a ship at sea, which always needs someone to keep watch night and day: as it is steered

through the waves of international affairs, it lives in constant peril of being captured by all sorts of conspiracies. Hence the need of an unbroken chain of authority right through the day and into the night and then on into the next day, guard relieving guard in endless succession. But a large body will never be able to act quickly enough, and most of the time we have to leave the majority of council members free to live their private lives and administer their own establishments. We must therefore divide the members of the council into twelve groups, one for each month, and have them go on guard by turns. They must be available promptly, whenever anyone from abroad or from within the state itself approaches them wishing to give information or inquire about those topics on which a state must arrange to answer the questions of other states and receive replies to its own. They must be particularly concerned with the constant revolutions of all kinds that are apt to occur in a state; if possible, they must prevent them, but failing that they must see that the state gets to know as soon as possible, so that the outbreak can be cured. That is why this executive committee has to be in charge of convening and dissolving not only statutory meetings but also those held in some national emergency. The authority that should see to all this—a twelfth of the council—will of course be off duty for eleven-twelfths of the year: it's the section of the council on duty that must co-operate with other officials and keep a watchful eye on the state.

That will be a reasonable arrangement for the city, but what about the rest of the country? How should it be superintended and organized? Well now, the entire city and the entire country have been divided into twelve sections; there are the roads of the central city; there are houses, public buildings, harbors, the market, and fountains; there are, above all, sacred enclosures and similar places.

Shouldn't all these things have officials appointed to look after them?

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ We can say, then, that the temples should have Attendants and Priests and Priestesses. Next, there are the duties of looking after streets and public buildings, ensuring that they reach the proper standards, stopping men and animals doing them damage, and seeing that conditions both in the suburbs and the city itself are in keeping with a civilized life. All these duties require three types of officials to be chosen: the 'City-Wardens' (as they will be called) will be responsible for the points we've just mentioned, and the 'Market-Wardens' for the correct conduct of the market.

Priests or Priestesses of temples who have hereditary priesthoods should not be turned out of office. But if (as is quite likely in a new foundation) few or no temples are thus provided for, the deficiencies must be made good by appointing Priests and Priestesses to be Attendants in the temples of the gods. In all these cases the appointments should be made partly by election and partly by lot, so that a mixture of democratic and non-democratic methods in every rural and urban division may lead to the greatest possible feeling of solidarity. In electing Priests, one should leave it to the god himself to express his wishes, and allow him to guide the luck of the draw. But the man whom the lot favors must be screened to see that he is healthy and legitimate, reared in a family whose moral standards could hardly be higher, and that he himself and his father and mother have lived unpolluted by homicide and all such offenses against heaven.

They must get laws on all religious matters from Delphi, and appoint Expounders of them; that will provide them with

a code to be obeyed. Each priesthood must be held for a year and no longer, and anyone who intends to celebrate our rites in due conformity with religious law should not be less than sixty years old. The same rules should apply to Priestesses too.

There should be three Expounders. The tribes will be arranged in three sets of four, and every man should nominate four persons, each from the same set as himself; the three candidates who receive most votes should be scrutinized, and nine names should then be sent to Delphi for the oracle to select one from each group of three. Their scrutiny, and the requirement as to age, should be the same as in the case of the Priests; these three must hold office for life, and when one dies the group of four tribes in which the vacancy occurs should make nominations for a replacement.

The highest property-class must elect Treasurers to control the sacred funds of each temple, and to look after the temple-enclosures and their produce and revenues; three should be chosen to take charge of the largest temples, two for the less large, and one for the very small. The election and scrutiny of these officials should be conducted as it was for the Generals.

So much by way of provision for the holy places.

As far as practicable, nothing should be left unguarded. The protection of the city is to be the business of the Generals, Company-Commanders, Cavalry-Commanders, Tribe-Leaders and members of the Executive—and the City-Wardens and Market-Wardens too, once we have them elected and satisfactorily installed in office. The whole of the rest of the country should be protected as follows. Our entire territory has been divided as exactly as possible into twelve equal sections, and every year one tribe must be allocated by lot to each of them. Every tribe must provide five

‘Country-Wardens’ or ‘Guards-in-Chief’, each of whom will be allowed to choose from his own tribe twelve young men who must be not younger than twenty-five nor older than thirty. The effect of the lot will be that each group will take a different section every month, so that they all get experience and knowledge of the entire country. The guards and their officers in charge are to hold their respective commissions for two years. Starting from the original sections (i.e., districts of the country) assigned by lot, the Guards-in-Chief are to take their groups round in a circle, transferring them each month to the next district on the right (‘on the right’ should be understood to mean ‘to the East’). But it’s not enough that as many of the guards as possible should get experience of the country at only one season of the year: we want them to add to their knowledge of the actual territory by discovering what goes on in every district at every season. So their leaders for the time being should follow up the first year by spending a second leading them back through the various districts, moving this time to the left. For the third year, a tribe must choose other Country-Wardens, and five new Guards-in-Chief, each in charge of twelve assistants.

While stationed in the various districts, their duties should be as follows. To start with, they must see that the territory is protected against enemies as thoroughly as possible. They must dig ditches wherever necessary, and excavate trenches and erect fortifications to check any attempt to harm the land and the livestock. They will requisition the beasts of burden and slaves of the local residents for these purposes, and employ them at their discretion, picking as far as possible times when they are not required for their normal duties. The wardens must arrange that the enemy would be impeded at every turn, whereas movement by our own side (by men or beasts of burden or

cattle) would be facilitated; and they must see that every road is as easy for the traveler as can be managed.

The rain God sends must do the countryside good, not harm, so the wardens must see that the water flowing off the high ground down into any sufficiently deep ravines between the hills is collected by dikes and ditches, so that the ravines can retain and absorb it, and supply streams and springs for all the districts in the countryside below, and give even the driest of spots a copious supply of pure water. As for water that springs from the ground, the wardens must beautify the fountains and rivers that form by adorning them with trees and buildings; they must use drains to tap the individual streams and collect an abundant supply, and any grove or sacred enclosure which has been dedicated nearby must be embellished by having a perennial flow of water directed by irrigation into the very temples of the gods. The young men should erect in every quarter gymnasia for themselves and senior citizens, construct warm baths for the old folk, and lay up a large stock of thoroughly dry wood. All this will help to relieve invalids, and farmers wearied by the labor of the fields—and it will be a much kinder treatment than the tender mercies of some fool of a doctor.

All these and similar projects will beautify and improve a district, and permit some welcome recreation into the bargain. The Wardens' really serious duties should be as follows. Each squad of sixty must protect its own district not only from enemies, but from those who profess to be friends. If a slave or a free man injures a neighbor or any other citizen, the Wardens must try the case brought by the plaintiff. The five leaders should deal with the trivial cases on their own authority, but in the more important cases (when one man sues another for any sum up to three minas) they should sit in judgment with one group of twelve assistants as a bench of seventeen. Apart from the officials

whose decisions (like those of kings) are final, no judge shall hold court, and no official shall fill his position, without being liable to be called to account for his actions. The Country-Wardens are to be no exception, if they treat the people in their care at all high-handedly by giving them unfair orders or by trying to grab and remove any agricultural equipment without permission, or allow their palms to be greased, or go so far as to deliver unjust verdicts. For giving way to boot-lickers they must be publicly disgraced. When the actual injury they have done to an inhabitant of their district does not exceed one mina in value, they should voluntarily submit to a trial before the villagers and neighbors. Whenever larger sums are involved (or even smaller sums, if the accused is not prepared to submit to trial because he's confident that by moving to a fresh district every month he will get away and 'get off' too), the injured party should file suit against him in the common courts.

If the plaintiff wins the day, then this elusive fellow who was not prepared to pay a penalty with a good grace must pay him double the amount at issue.

The way of life of the Country-Wardens and their officers during their two years on duty will be something like this. First, in every district of the country there should be communal restaurants, at which everyone will have to eat together.

If a Warden fails to turn up at these meals even for one day, or sleeps away from his quarters at night, except on the express orders of his superiors or because of some unavoidable necessity, the five leaders may post his name in the market-place as a deserter from his post; if they do, he will have to bear the disgrace of having turned traitor to the state, and everyone who happens to meet him will be entitled

to give him a beating if he wants to, without being punished for it.

If one of the actual officers goes so far as to commit this sort of offense, all his fifty-nine colleagues must look into the business.

If one of them notices (or is told) what is going on and fails to bring a case, the same laws should be invoked against him, and he must be punished with greater severity than his juniors: that is, he is to be stripped of his right to exercise any authority over the young.

The Guardians of the Laws should keep a sharp eye on these offenses and try to stop them being committed at all; failing that, they must see that the proper penalties are inflicted.

No one will ever make a commendable master without having been a servant first; one should be proud not so much of ruling well but of serving well—and serving the laws above all (because this is the way we serve the gods), and secondly, if we are young, those who are full of years and honor. It is vital that everyone should be convinced that this rule applies to us all. The next point, then, is that when someone who has joined the Country-Wardens gets to the end of his two years, he ought to be no stranger to a meager daily ration of uncooked food. In fact, after being selected, the groups of twelve assistant Wardens must assemble with the five officers and resolve that, being servants, they will not possess other servants and slaves for themselves, nor employ the attendants of other people (the farmers and villagers) for their own private needs, but only for public tasks. With that exception, they must expect to double as their own servants and fend for themselves; and on top of all that they must reckon to investigate the entire country, summer and winter, in arms, to protect and get to know

every district in succession. Everyone should be closely familiar with his own country: probably no study is more valuable. This is the real reason why the youths must go in for hunting with dogs, and other types of chase—quite apart from the pleasure and profit that everyone gets out of such activities.

So much for these 'secret-service men' or 'Country-Wardens' (call them what you will), and their regimen—a regimen into which everyone who means to play his part in keeping his country safe must throw himself heart and soul.

The next election on our list was that of the Market-Wardens and City-Wardens. There are to be three of the latter, who will divide the twelve sections of the city into three groups, and like their counterparts (the Country-Wardens), will look after the roads, both the streets within the city boundaries and the various routes that extend into the capital from the country; and they must also supervise the buildings, to see that they are constructed to the statutory standards. In particular, they must ensure that the water which the Guards-in-Chief have transmitted and sent on to them in good condition reaches the fountains pure and in sufficient quantities, so that it enhances the beauty and amenities of the city. So these officials too must be men of some caliber, with time to go in for public affairs, which means that every citizen nominating City-Wardens must confine his choice to members of the highest property-class. When they have held the election and produced a short list of six candidates with the most votes, the officials responsible are to select three of them by lot; and these, after scrutiny, should hold office in accordance with the laws provided for them.

Next, five Market-Wardens must be elected from the first and second property-classes. In general, their election should be conducted as for the City-Wardens: ten should be

selected from the list of candidates by voting, and then five selected by lot, who after due scrutiny should be appointed to office. (Voting is compulsory for all in every election, and everyone who fails in his duty and is denounced to the authorities should be fined fifty drachmas and get the reputation of being a scoundrel. Attendance at the assembly (the general meeting of the state) is to be optional, except for members of the first and second property-classes, who will be fined ten drachmas if their absence from such a meeting is proved. But the third and fourth classes will not be forced to attend and should not be subject to any penalty unless the authorities, for some pressing reason, instruct everyone to come.) To get back to the Market-Wardens: they are to maintain due order in the market, and look after the temples and fountains, to see that no one damages them. They must punish anyone who commits an offense, a slave or foreigner by whipping him and putting him in chains; but if a native citizen misbehaves himself in this way, the Market-Wardens should be authorized to decide the case on their own and fine the culprit up to a hundred drachmas, the limit being increased to two hundred if they sit in association with the City-Wardens. In their own sphere, the City-Wardens too should have the same power of fining and punishing, and inflict fines up to one mina on their own, and up to two minas in association with the Market-Wardens.

The right thing to do next will be to appoint officials in charge of culture and physical training—two categories of them in each case, one to handle the educational side and the other to organize competitions. By 'education officials' the law means superintendents of gymnasia and schools, who see that they are decently run, supervise the curriculum and organize such related matters as the attendance and accommodation of the boys and girls. 'Officials in charge of competitions' means judges of competitors in athletics and

contests of the arts (there being here again two categories (AB) of officials, one for the arts, one for athletics). Men and horses in athletic contests can have the same judges, but in the arts, choruses should properly have (Aa) one set of judges, while solo dramatic performances (given by reciters of poetry, lyre-players, pipe-players and such people) ought to have another (Ab). So I suppose a good start will be to select (Aa) the authority to supervise children, men and girls as they enjoy themselves in choruses by dancing and every other type of cultural activity. One official, who is to be not less than forty years old, will suffice, and one of not less than thirty (Ab) will also be enough to present the solo performances and give an adequate decision between the contestants. The Chief Organizer of the Choruses (Aa) must be chosen in some such way as this. All those who are keen on such things should attend the election meeting and be liable to a fine if they don't (this is a point for the Guardians of the Laws to decide), whereas others who do not wish to attend should not be compelled. In proposing their choice the electors should confine themselves to the experts, and in the scrutiny there must be only one reason for accepting or rejecting the candidate the lot has favored: that he is experienced or inexperienced as the case may be. One of the ten nominees with the most votes must be selected by lot, scrutinized, and be in charge of the choruses for the year according to law. Similarly with the year's entrants for solo performances and combined pieces on the pipes: only after the application of the same criterion should the candidate (Ab) favored by the lot take charge of them and decide between them, having referred the decision in his own case to his judges. Next, Umpires for athletic contests and exercises of horses and men must be chosen from the second and also the third property-class; it will be compulsory for members of the first three classes to take part in the election,

but the lowest class may be let off without a fine. The Umpires should number three, chosen by lot from the twenty candidates who head the poll, and duly sanctioned by the scrutineers.

If anyone is judged and found wanting in the scrutiny after being drawn by lot for any office, another person must be chosen in his place by the same methods, and his scrutiny conducted in the same way.

The remaining official in this field is the director of the entire education of the boys and girls. Here too there should be one official in charge under the law. He must be not younger than fifty years old, and the father of legitimate children—preferably both sons and daughters, though either alone will do. The chosen candidate himself and those who choose him should appreciate that this is by far the most important of all the supreme offices in the state. Any living creature that flourishes in its first stages of growth gets a tremendous impetus towards its natural perfection and the final development appropriate to it, and this is true of both plants and animals (tame and wild), and men too. Man is a 'tame' animal, as we put it, and of course if he enjoys a good education and happens to have the right natural disposition, he's apt to be a most heavenly and gentle creature; but his upbringing has only to be inadequate or misguided and he'll become the wildest animal on the face of the earth. That's why the legislator should not treat the education of children cursorily or as a secondary matter; he should regard the right choice of the man who is going to be in charge of the children as something of crucial importance, and appoint as their Minister the best all-round citizen in the state. So all the officials except the council and members of the Executive should meet at the temple of Apollo and hold a secret ballot, each man voting for whichever Guardian of the Laws he

thinks would make the best Minister of Education. The one who attracts the largest number of votes should be scrutinized by the officials who have elected him, the Guardians of the Laws standing aside. The Minister should hold office for five years, and in the sixth he should be replaced by his successor after an election held under the same rules.

If any public official dies in office and there are more than thirty days of his tenure left to run, the officials concerned must follow the same procedure as before and appoint a replacement. If a guardian of orphans dies, the relatives on both the mother's and the father's side (as far as the children of first cousins), provided they are living in the state, should appoint a successor within ten days, or be fined a drachma for every day they let pass without appointing the children's new guardian.

Of course, any state without duly established courts simply ceases to be a state. If a judge is silent, and (as in arbitration) has no more to say than the litigants in a preliminary hearing he'll never be able to come to a satisfactory decision on the cases before him. That's why a large bench finds it difficult to return good verdicts—and so does a small one, if its members are of poor caliber. The point in dispute between the parties must always be made crystal clear, and leisurely and repeated interrogation over a period of time helps a lot to clarify the issues. That is the justification for making litigants bring their charges initially before a court of neighbors, who will be their friends and understand best the actions which provoke the dispute. If a litigant is dissatisfied with the judgment of this court, he may apply to a second, but if the first two courts are both unable to settle the argument, the verdict of the third must close the case.

In a sense, to establish a court is to elect officials. Every official, you see, sometimes has to set up as a judge as well; and a judge, although strictly he has no official position, becomes in a way an official of considerable importance during the day on which he sits in judgment and gives his verdict. So on the assumption that judges too are officials, let's specify what judges will be appropriate, the disputes they will decide, and how many should sit on each case. The court appointed by the common choice of the litigants themselves for their own private cases should have absolute authority. Cases may be brought before the other courts for two reasons: one private person may charge another with having done him wrong, and bring him to court so that the issue can be decided; or someone may believe that one of the citizens is acting against the public interests and wish to come to the community's assistance. Now we must specify the character and identity of the judges.

First, let's set up a common court for all private persons who are contesting an issue with each other for the third time. It is to be formed in some such way as this. All officials whose tenure lasts for a year or longer should assemble in a single temple on the day just before the new year opens in the month after the summer solstice; then, after swearing to the god, they must offer him their choicest fruit, so to speak: each board of officials should contribute one judge, the man who appears to be the outstanding member of his board and seems likely to judge the cases of his fellow citizens during the coming year in the best and most god-fearing manner. When the judges have been chosen, their scrutiny should be conducted before their very electors, and if anyone of them is rejected, a replacement should be chosen under the same rules. Those who pass the scrutiny are to sit in judgment on the cases of the litigants who refuse to accept the decision of the other courts. They are to vote openly, and it will be

compulsory for the Councilors and the other officials who elected the judges to watch and listen to the trials; others may attend if they wish.

If anyone accuses a man of having knowingly returned a false verdict, he must go to the Guardians of the Laws to prefer the charge.

If the accused is found guilty as charged, he will have to pay to the injured party half the damages awarded; if he is thought to deserve a stiffer punishment, his judges must calculate the additional penalty he should suffer or additional fine he ought to pay to the state and his prosecutor.

As for charges of crimes against the state, the first need is to let the man in the street play his part in judging them. A wrong done to the state is a wrong done to all its citizens, who would be justifiably annoyed if they were excluded from deciding such cases. But although we should allow the opening and closing stages of this kind of trial to be in the hands of the people, the detailed examination should be conducted by three of the highest officials, chosen by agreement between prosecutor and defendant. If they are unable to reach agreement themselves, the council should decide between their respective choices.

Everyone should have a part to play in private suits too, because anyone excluded from the right to participate in trying cases feels he has no stake in the community whatever. Hence we must also have courts organized on a tribal basis, where the judges, being chosen by lot as occasion arises, will give their verdicts uncorrupted by external pressures. But the final decision in all these cases is to be given by that other court which deals with litigants who cannot settle their case either before their neighbors or in the tribal courts, and which for their benefit has been

made (we claim) as incorruptible a court as can be assembled by human power.

So much for our courts (and we admit that to call their members either 'officials' or 'non-officials' without qualification raises difficulties of terminology). We've given a sort of superficial sketch, which in spite of including a number of details, nevertheless omitted a good many, because a better place for presenting an exact legal procedure and classification of suits will be towards the end of our legislation. So this theme may be dismissed till we are finishing off. We have already explained most of the rules for establishing official posts, but we still can't get a completely clear and exact picture of every individual detail of the entire constitutional organization of the state: for that, we need to take every single topic in proper sequence and go through the whole subject from beginning to end. So far, then, we've described the election of officials, and that brings us to the end of our introduction. Now to start the actual legislation: there's no need to postpone or delay it any longer.

Clinias/ I very much approve of your introduction, sir, and I'm even more impressed by the way you've rounded it off so that it leads into the opening of the next theme.

Athenian Stranger/ So far, then, these ideas we old men have been tossing about have given us splendid sport.

Clinias/ Splendid indeed, but I fancy you really meant they were 'a splendid challenge for men in their prime of life'.

Athenian Stranger/ I dare say. But here's another point. I wonder if you agree with me?

Clinias/ What about? What point?

Athenian Stranger/ You know how painting a picture of anything seems to be a never-ending business. It always looks as if the process of touching up by adding color or relief (or whatever it's called in the trade) will never finally get to

the point where the clarity and beauty of the picture are beyond improvement.

Clinias/ Yes, I too get much the same sort of impression, though only from hearsay—I've never gone in for that sort of skill.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, you haven't missed anything. But we can still use this passing mention of it to illustrate the next point. Suppose that one day somebody were to take it into his head to paint the most beautiful picture in the world, which would never deteriorate but always improve at his hands as the years went by. You realize that as the painter is not immortal, he won't achieve anything very permanent by lavishing such care and attention on his picture unless he leaves some successor to repair the ravages of time? Won't his successor also have to be able to supplement deficiencies in his master's skill and improve the picture by touching it up?

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, don't you think the legislator will want to do something similar? First of all he'll want to write his laws and make them as accurate as he can; then as time goes on and he tries to put his pet theories into practice—well, do you think there's any legislator so stupid as not to realize that his code has many inevitable deficiencies which must be put right by a successor, if the state he's founded is to enjoy a continuous improvement in its administrative arrangements, rather than suffer a decline?

Clinias/ Yes, I think—indeed I'm sure—that this is the sort of thing any legislator will want to do.

Athenian Stranger/ So if a legislator were able to discover a way of doing this—that is, if by instruction or pointing to concrete examples he could make someone else understand

(perfectly or imperfectly) how to keep laws in good repair by amending them—I suppose he'd never give up explaining his method until he'd got it across?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ So isn't this what you two and I ought to be doing now?

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Now that we (in the evening of life) are on the point of framing laws, for which we have guardians already chosen (our juniors), oughtn't we to combine our law-giving with an attempt to turn them into law-'givers' as well as law-'guardians', as far as we can?

Clinias/ Of course we ought, assuming we're up to it.

Athenian Stranger/ Anyhow, we ought to try, and do our level best.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's address them as follows: 'Colleagues and protectors of our laws, we shall—inevitably—leave a great many gaps in every section of our code. However, we shall certainly take care to outline a sort of sketch of the complete system with its main points, and it will be your job to take this sketch and fill in the details. You ought to hear what your aims should be when you do this. Megillus and Clinias and I have mentioned it to each other more than once, and we are agreed that our formula is a good one. We want you to be sympathetic to our way of thinking and become our pupils, keeping in view this aim which the three of us are unanimous a giver and guardian of laws should have. The central point on which we agree amounted to this. "Our aim in life should be goodness and the spiritual virtue appropriate to mankind. There are various things that can assist us: it may be some pursuit we follow, a particular habit, or something we possess; we may

get help from some desire we have or some opinion we hold or some course of study; and all this is true of both male and female members of the community, young or old. Whatever the means, it's this aim we've described that we must all strain every muscle to achieve throughout our lives. No man, whoever he is, should ever be found valuing anything else, if it impedes his progress—not even, in the last resort, the state. Rather than have the state tolerate the yoke of slavery and be ruled by unworthy hands, it may be absolutely necessary to allow it to be destroyed, or abandon it by going into exile. All that sort of hardship we simply have to endure rather than permit a change to the sort of political system which will make men worse." This, then, is the agreed statement; now it's up to you to consider this double aim of ours and censure the laws that can do nothing to help us; but you must commend and welcome the effective ones with enthusiasm, and cheerfully live as they dictate. You must have no truck with other pursuits which aim at different "goods" (as people call them).'

The best way to start the next section of our code will be to deal with matters of religion. First, we should go back to the figure of 5040 and reflect again how many convenient divisors we found both in this total and its subdivision the tribe (which is one-twelfth of the total, as we specified, i.e., exactly the product of twenty-one multiplied by twenty). Our grand total is divisible by twelve, and so is the number of persons in a tribe and in each case this subdivision must be regarded as holy, a gift of God, corresponding to the months of the year and the revolution of the universe. This is exactly why every state is guided by innate intuition to give these fractions the sanction of religion, though in some cases the divisions have been made more correctly than in others and the religious backing has proved more successful. So for our part we claim that we had every justification for preferring

5040, which can be divided by every number from one to twelve, except eleven (a drawback that's very easily cured: one way to remedy it is simply to omit two hearths). The truth of this could be demonstrated very briefly in any idle moment. So let's trust to the rule we've just explained, and divide our number along those lines. We must allocate a god, or child of a god, to each division and subdivision of the state and provide altars and the associated equipment; we must establish two meetings per month for the purposes of sacrifice, one in each of the twelve tribes into which the state is divided, and another in each of the twelve local communities that form the divisions of each tribe. This arrangement is intended to ensure, first, that we enjoy the favor of the gods and heaven in general, and secondly (as we'd be inclined to stress) that we should grow familiar and intimate with each other in every kind of social contact.

You see, when people are going to live together as partners in marriage, it is vital that the fullest possible information should be available about the bride and her background and the family she'll marry into. One should regard the prevention of mistakes here as a matter of supreme importance—so important and serious, in fact, that even the young people's recreation must be arranged with this in mind. Boys and girls must dance together at an age when plausible occasions can be found for their doing so, in order that they may have a reasonable look at each other; and they should dance naked, provided sufficient modesty and restraint are displayed by all concerned.

The controllers and organizers of the choruses should be in charge of all these arrangements and maintain due order; and in conjunction with the Guardians of the Laws they will settle anything we leave out. As we said, it's inevitable that a legislator will omit the numerous details of such a topic; those who administer his laws from year to year will have to

learn from experience and settle the details by annual refinements and amendments, until they think they've made the rules and procedures sufficiently precise. In the case of sacrifices and dances, a reasonable and adequate period to allow for experiment, in general and in detail, will be ten years. So long as the original legislator is alive, the various officials should bring him into the consultations, but when he is dead they must use their own initiative in putting up to the Guardians of the Laws proposals for remedying the deficiencies in their respective spheres. This process should continue until every detail is thought to have received its final polish. After that, they must assume that the rules are immutable, and observe them along with the rest of the code which the legislator laid down and imposed on them originally. Not a single detail should be altered, if they can help it; but if they ever believe that the force of circumstances has become irresistible, they must consult all the officials, the entire citizen body and all the oracles of the gods. If the verdict is unanimously in favor, then they may amend, but never in any other conditions whatever; the law will be that the opposition must always win the day.

To resume, then: when a man of twenty-five has observed others and been observed by them and is confident that he has found a family offering someone to his taste who would make a suitable partner for the procreation of children, he should get married, and in any case before he reaches thirty. First, however, he ought to hear the correct method of trying to find a suitable and congenial partner. As Clinias says, the appropriate preface should stand at the head of every law.

Clinias/ Well reminded, sir—and at just the right moment in our conversation, I fancy.

Athenian Stranger/ Quite so. 'My boy,' let's say to this son of a good family, 'you must make a marriage that will be approved by sensible folk. They will advise you not to be over

keen to avoid marrying into a poor family or to seek to marry into a rich one; other things being equal, you should always prefer to marry somewhat beneath you. That will be best both for the state and the union of your two hearths and homes, because it is infinitely better for the virtue of a man and wife if they balance and complement each other than if they are both at the same extreme. If a man knows he's rather headstrong and apt to be too quick off the mark in everything he does, he ought to be anxious to ally himself to a family of quiet habits, and if he has the opposite kind of temperament he should marry into the opposite kind of family. One general rule should apply to marriage: we should seek to contract the alliance that will benefit the state, not the one that we personally find most alluring. Everyone is naturally drawn to the person most like himself, and that puts the whole state off balance, because of discrepancies in wealth and character, and these in turn generally lead, in most states, to results we certainly don't want to see in ours.'

If we give explicit instructions in the form of a law—'no rich man to marry into a rich family, no powerful person to marry into a powerful house, the headstrong must be forced to join in marriage with the phlegmatic and the phlegmatic with the headstrong'—well, it's ludicrous, of course, but it will also annoy a great many people who find it hard to understand why the state should be like the mixture in a mixing-bowl. When you pour in the wine it seethes furiously, but once dilute it with the god of the teetotalers, and you have a splendid combination which will make you a good and reasonable drink. Very few people have it in them to see that the same principle applies to the alliance that produces children. For these reasons we are forced to omit such topics from our actual laws. However, we must resort to our 'charms' and try to persuade everybody to think it more important to produce well-balanced children than to marry

his equal and never stop lusting for wealth. Anyone who is set on enriching himself by his marriage should be headed off by reproaches rather than compelled by a written law.

So much for marriage: these exhortations should be added to our previous account of how we should become partners in eternity by leaving a line of descendants to serve God forever in our stead. A correctly composed preface would have all that and more to say about the obligation to marry.

If anyone disobeys (except involuntarily), and unsociably keeps himself to himself so that he is still unmarried at the age of thirty-five, he must pay an annual fine: one hundred drachmas if he belongs to the highest property-class, seventy if to the second, sixty if to the third, and thirty if to the fourth; the sum to be consecrated to Hera.

If he refuses to pay his annual fine, his debt must be increased ten times.

(The fine is to be collected by the treasurer of the goddess.

If he fails to collect it, he will have to owe the sum himself.

Every treasurer must give an account of himself in this respect at the scrutiny.) So much for the financial penalty to be paid by anyone refusing to marry, but he should also be barred from receiving the respect due to him from his juniors, none of whom should ever readily take the slightest notice of him. If the bachelor tries to chastise a man, everyone should take the victim's side and protect him.

If a bystander fails to give the victim help, the law should see that he gets the reputation of being a rotten, lily-livered citizen.

We've already discussed dowries, but we ought to repeat that even if the poor do have to marry and give in marriage on limited resources, it will not affect their prospects of a long life one way or the other, because in this state no one

will go without the necessities of life. Nor will wives be so inclined to give themselves airs, and their husbands will be less humiliated by kowtowing to them for financial reasons. If a man obeys this law, so much to his credit.

If he does not, and gives or receives more than fifty drachmas for the trousseau in the case of the lowest property-class (or more than a hundred or a hundred and fifty or two hundred according to class), he must owe as much again to the treasury, and the amount given or received must be dedicated to Hera and Zeus.

The treasurers of these gods are to exact these sums in the same way as we said the treasurers of Hera had to collect the fines in every case of refusal to marry, or pay out of their own pockets.

The right to make a valid betrothal should rest initially with the bride's father, secondly with her grandfather, thirdly with her brothers by the same father. If none of these is available, the right should belong to the relatives on the mother's side in the same order. If any exceptional misfortune occurs, the nearest relatives shall be authorized to act in conjunction with the girl's guardians.

That leaves us with the pre-marriage sacrifices and any other relevant rites that should be performed before, during or after the wedding. A citizen should ask the Expounders about these matters, and be confident that if he does as they tell him, everything will be in order.

As for the wedding-feast, neither family should invite more than five friends of both sexes, and the number of relatives and kinsmen from either side should be limited similarly. No one should incur expense beyond his means: that is, no more than a mina in the case of the wealthiest class, half a mina for the next and so on down the scale according to class. Everyone should commend the man who

obeys the regulation, but. The Guardians of the Laws must chastise the disobedient as a philistine who has never been trained to appreciate the melodies of the Muses of marriage.

To drink to the point of inebriation is improper whatever the place (except at the feasts of the god who made us the gift of wine), and it's dangerous too, especially if you want to make your marriage a success. On the day of their wedding particularly, when they are at a turning-point in their lives, bride and groom ought to show restraint, so as to make as sure as they can (it being practically impossible to tell the day or night in which by the favor of God conception will take place) that any child they may have should have parents who were sober when they conceived him. Apart from that, children should not be conceived when the parents' bodies are in a state of drunken relaxation; the fetus should be compactly formed and firmly planted, and its growth should be orderly and undisturbed. But when he's drunk a man reels about all over the place and bumps into things, and a raging passion invades his body and soul; this means that as a sower of his seed a drunkard will be clumsy and inefficient, and he'll produce unbalanced children who are not to be trusted, with devious characters, and in all probability with misshapen bodies too. That's why all the year round, throughout his life (but particularly during the age of procreation), a man must take great care to do nothing to injure his health, if he can help it, and nothing with any hint of insolence or injustice, which will inevitably rub off on to the souls and bodies of his children, and produce absolutely degenerate creatures who have been stamped with the likeness of their father. At the very least, he must shun such vices on the day of his wedding and the following night, because if a human institution gets off to a good and careful start, there is a sort of divine guarantee that it will prosper.

The bridegroom must regard one of the two homes included in the lot as the nest in which he will bring up his brood of young; here he must be married, after leaving his father and mother, and here he must make his home and become the breadwinner for himself and his children. You see, when people feel the need of absent friends, the ties that bind them are strengthened, but when they overdo it and are too much together so that they're not apart long enough to miss each other, they drift apart. That's why the newly-weds must leave their father and mother and the wife's relatives in the old home and live somewhere else, rather as if they had gone off to a colony; and each side should visit, and be visited by, the other. The young couple should produce children and bring them up, handing on the torch of life from generation to generation, and always worshipping the gods in the manner prescribed by law.

Now for the question of property: what will it be reasonable for a man to possess? Mostly, it's not difficult to see what it would be, and acquire it; but slaves offer difficulties at every turn. The reason is this. The terms we employ are partly correct and partly not, in that the actual language we use about slaves is partly a reflection and partly a contradiction of our practical experience of them.

Megillus/ Oh? What do you mean? We don't yet see your point, sir.

Athenian Stranger/ No wonder, Megillus. The Spartan helot-system is probably just about the most difficult and contentious institution in the entire Greek world; some people think it's a good idea, others are against it (though less feeling is aroused by the slavery to which the Mariandynians have been reduced at Heraclea, and by the race of serfs to be found in Thessaly). Faced with these and similar cases, what should our policy be on the ownership of slaves? The point I happened to bring up in my discussion

of the subject, and which naturally made you ask what I meant, was this: we know we'd all agree that a man should own the best and most docile slaves he can get—after all, many a paragon of a slave has done much more for a man than his own brother or son, and they have often been the salvation of their masters' persons and property and entire homes. We know quite well, don't we, that some people do tell such stories about slaves?

Megillus/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And don't others take the opposite line, and say that a slave's soul is rotten through and through, and that if we have any sense we won't trust such a pack at all? The most profound of our poets actually says (speaking of Zeus) that

> If you make a man a slave, that very day
> Far-sounding Zeus takes half his wits away.

Everyone sees the problem differently, and takes one side or the other. Some people don't trust slaves as a class in anything: they treat them like animals, and whip and goad them so that they make the souls of their slaves three times—no, a thousand times—more slavish than they were. Others follow precisely the opposite policy.

Megillus/ True.

Clinias/ Well then, sir, in view of this conflict of opinion, what should we do about our own country? What's our line on the possession of slaves, and the way to punish them?

Athenian Stranger/ Look here, Clinias: the animal 'man' quite obviously has a touchy temper, and it looks as if it won't be easy, now or in the future, to persuade him to fall neatly into the two categories (slave and freeman master) which are necessary for practical purposes. Your slave, therefore, will be a difficult beast to handle. The frequent and repeated revolts in Messenia, and in the states where people

possess a lot of slaves who all speak the same language, have shown the evils of the system often enough; and we can also point to the various crimes and adventures of the robbers who plague Italy, the 'Rangers', as they're called. In view of all this you may well be puzzled to know what your general policy ought to be. In fact, there are just two ways of dealing with the problem open to us: first, if the slaves are to submit to the condition without giving trouble, they should not all come from the same country or speak the same tongue, as far as it can be arranged; secondly, we ought to train them properly, not only for their sakes but above all for our own. The best way to train slaves is to refrain from arrogantly ill-treating them, and to harm them even less (assuming that's possible) than you would your equals. You see, when a man can hurt someone as often as he likes, he'll soon show whether or not his respect for justice is natural and unfeigned and springs from a genuine hatred of injustice. If his attitude to his slaves and his conduct towards them are free of any taint of impiety and injustice, he'll be splendidly effective at sowing the seeds of virtue. Just the same can be said of the way in which any master or dictator or person in any position of authority deals with someone weaker than himself. Even so, we should certainly punish slaves if they deserve it, and not spoil them by simply giving them a warning, as we would free men. Virtually everything you say to a slave should be an order, and you should never become at all familiar with them—neither the women nor the men. (Though this is how a lot of silly folk do treat their slaves, and usually only succeed in spoiling them and in making life more difficult—more difficult, I mean, for the slaves to take orders and for themselves to maintain their authority.)

Clinias/ You're quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ So now that the citizen has been supplied with a sufficient number of suitable slaves to help

him in his various tasks, the next thing will be to outline a housing-plan, won't it?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Our state is new, and has no buildings already existing, so it rather looks as if it will have to work out the details of its entire architectural scheme for itself, particularly those of the temples and city walls. Ideally, Clinias, this subject would have been dealt with before we discussed marriage, but as the whole picture is theoretical anyway, it's perfectly possible to turn to it now, as we are doing. Still, when we put the scheme into practice, we'll see to the buildings, God willing, before we regulate marriage, and marriage will then crown our labors in this field. But here and now, let's just give a swift sketch of the building program.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Temples should be built all-round the marketplace and on high ground round the perimeter of the city, for purposes of protection and sanitation. Next to them should be administrative offices and courts of law. This is holy ground, and here—partly because the legal cases involve solemn religious issues, partly because of the august divinities whose temples are nearby—judgment will be given and sentence received. Among these buildings will be the courts in which cases of murder, and all other crimes which deserve the death penalty, may properly be heard.

As for city walls, Megillus, I'd agree with the Spartan view that they should be left lying asleep and undisturbed in the ground. My reasons? As the poet neatly puts it, in those words so often cited, 'a city's walls should be made of bronze and iron, not stone'. Besides, what fools people would take us for, and rightly, if we sent our young men out into the countryside every year to excavate trenches and ditches and

various structures to ward off the enemy and stop them coming over the boundaries at all—and then were to build a wall round the city! A wall never contributes anything to a town's health, and in any case is apt to encourage a certain softness in the souls of the inhabitants. It invites them to take refuge behind it instead of tackling the enemy and ensuring their own safety by mounting guard night and day; it tempts them to suppose that a foolproof way of protecting themselves is to barricade themselves in behind their walls and gates, and then drop off to sleep, as if they were brought into this world for a life of luxury. It never occurs to them that comfort is really to be won by the sweat of the brow, whereas the only result of such disgusting luxury and idleness is a fresh round of troubles, in my view. However, if men are to have a city wall at all, the private houses should be constructed right from the foundations so that the whole city forms in effect a single wall: that is, all the houses should be easy to defend because they present to the street a regular and unbroken front. A whole city looking like a single house will be quite a pretty sight, and being easy to guard it will be superior to any other for safety. The job of seeing that the buildings always keep to the original scheme should properly belong to their occupants, but the City-Wardens should keep an eye on them and even impose fines to force any negligent person to do his duty. They should also supervise all the sanitary arrangements of the town and stop any private person encroaching on public land by buildings or excavations. The same officials must take particular care to see that rainwater flows away properly, and in general they must make all the appropriate arrangements inside and outside the city. To deal with all these points, and to supplement any other deficiency in the law (which cannot be exhaustive), the Guardians of the Laws are to make additional rules in the light of experience.

So much for these buildings, together with those round the marketplace, and gymnasia and all the schools: they are now ready and waiting to be entered, and the theaters are prepared for the arrival of their audiences. Now let's pass on to the next item in our legislation, the time after the wedding.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's suppose the ceremony is over, Clinias; between then and the birth of a child there may well be a complete year. Now, in a state which sets its sights higher than others, how this year is to be spent by a bride and groom (you remember we broke off when we got to this point) is not the easiest thing in the world to specify. We've had knotty problems like this before, but the common man will find our policy this time more difficult to swallow than ever. However, we should never shrink from speaking the truth as we see it, Clinias.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Take someone who proposes to promulgate laws to a state about the correct conduct of the public life of the community. What if he reckons that in principle one ought not to use compulsion—even in so far as one can use it in private affairs? Suppose he thinks that a man ought to be allowed to do what he likes with the day, instead of being regulated at every turn. Well, if he excludes private life from his legislation, and expects that the citizens will be prepared to be law-abiding in their public life as a community, he's making a big mistake. Now, what's made me say this? It's because we are going to assert that our newly-marrieds ought to attend communal meals no more and no less than they did before their wedding. I know that this custom of eating together caused eyebrows to be raised when it was introduced in your parts of the world, but I suppose it was dictated by war or some other equally serious

emergency that pressed hard on a small people in a critical situation. But once you had had this enforced experience of communal meals, you realized just how much the custom contributed to your security. It must have been in some such way that the practice of communal feeding established itself among you.

Clinias/ That sounds plausible enough.

Athenian Stranger/ As I was saying, it was once an astonishing custom and some people were apprehensive about imposing it. But if a legislator wanted to impose it today, he wouldn't have half so much trouble. But the custom points to another measure, which would probably prove equally successful, if tried. Today, it's absolutely unheard-of, and that's what makes the legislator 'card his wool into the fire', as the saying is, and make so many efforts fruitlessly. This measure is neither easy to describe nor simple in execution.

Clinias/ Well then, sir, what's the point you're trying to make? You seem to be awfully reluctant to tell us.

Athenian Stranger/ Listen to me, then: let's not waste time lingering over this business. The blessings that a state enjoys are in direct proportion to the degree of law and order to be found in it, and the effects of good regulations in some fields are usually vitiated to the extent that things are controlled either incompetently or not at all in others. The point is relevant to the subject in hand. Thanks to some providential necessity, Clinias and Megillus, you have a splendid and—as I was saying—astonishing institution: communal meals for men. But it is entirely wrong of you to have omitted from your legal code any provision for your women, so that the practice of communal meals for them has never got under way. On the contrary, half the human race—the female sex, the half which in any case is inclined

to be secretive and crafty, because of its weakness—has been left to its own devices because of the misguided indulgence of the legislator. Because you neglected this sex, you gradually lost control of a great many things which would be in a far better state today if they had been regulated by law. You see, leaving women to do what they like is not just to lose half the battle (as it may seem): a woman's natural potential for virtue is inferior to a man's, so she's proportionately a greater danger, perhaps even twice as great. So the happiness of the state will be better served if we reconsider the point and put things right, by providing that all our arrangements apply to men and women alike. But at present, unhappily, the human race has not progressed as far as that, and if you're wise you won't breathe a word about such a practice in other parts of the world where states do not recognize communal meals as a public institution at all. So when it comes to the point, how on earth are you going to avoid being laughed to scorn when you try to force women to take their food and drink in public? There's nothing the sex is likely to put up with more reluctantly: women have got used to a life of obscurity and retirement, and any attempt to force them into the open will provoke tremendous resistance from them, and they'll be more than a match for the legislator. Elsewhere, as I said, the very mention of the correct policy will be met with howls of protest. But perhaps this state will be different. So if you want our discussion about political systems to be as complete as theory can ever be, I'd like to explain the merits and advantages of this institution—that is, if you are equally keen to listen to me. If not, then let's skip it.

Clinias/ No, no, sir: we're very anxious to hear the explanation.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's listen, then. But don't be disconcerted if I appear to be starting a long way back. We've

time to spare, and there's no compelling reason why we shouldn't look into the business of legislation from all possible angles.

Clinias/ You're quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's go back to what we said at the beginning. Here's something that everyone must be perfectly clear about: either mankind had absolutely no beginning in time and will have no end, but always existed and always will, or it has existed for an incalculably long time from its origin.

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, now we may surely assume that in every part of the world cities have been formed and destroyed, and all sorts of customs have been adopted, some orderly, some not, along with the growth of every sort of taste in food, solid and liquid. And the various changes in the seasons have developed, which have probably stimulated a vast number of natural changes in living beings.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, we believe, don't we, that at a certain point virtues made their appearance, not having existed before, and olives likewise, and the gifts of Demeter and Kore, which Triptolemus, or whoever it was, handed on to us? So long as these things did not exist, we can take it that animals resorted to feeding on each other, as they do now?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ We observe, of course, the survival of human sacrifice among many people today. Elsewhere, we gather, the opposite practice prevailed, and there was a time when we didn't even dare to eat beef, and the sacrifices offered to the gods were not animals, but cakes and meal soaked in honey and other 'pure' offerings like that. People

kept off meat on the grounds that it was an act of impiety to eat it, or to pollute the altars of the gods with blood. So at that time men lived a sort of 'Orphic' life, keeping exclusively to inanimate food and entirely abstaining from eating the flesh of animals.

Clinias/ So it's commonly said, and it's easy enough to believe.

Athenian Stranger/ Then the question naturally arises, why have I related all this to you now?

Clinias/ A perfectly correct assumption, sir.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, Clinias, I'll try to explain the next point, if I can.

Clinias/ Carry on, then.

Athenian Stranger/ Observation tells me that all human actions are motivated by a set of three needs and desires. Give a man a correct education, and these instincts will lead him to virtue, but educate him badly and he'll end up at the other extreme. From the moment of their birth men have a desire for food and drink. Every living creature has an instinctive love of satisfying this desire whenever it occurs, and the craving to do so can fill a man's whole being, so that he remains quite unmoved by the plea that he should do anything except satisfy his lust for the pleasures of the body, so as to make himself immune to all discomfort. Our third and greatest need, the longing we feel most keenly, is the last to come upon us: it is the flame of the imperious lust to procreate, which kindles the fires of passion in mankind. These three unhealthy instincts must be canalized away from what men call supreme pleasure, and towards the supreme good. We must try to keep them in check by the three powerful influences of fear, law, and correct argument; but in addition, we should invoke the help of the Muses and

the gods who preside over competitions, to smother their growth and dam their tide.

The topic which should come after marriage, and before training and education, is the birth of children. Perhaps, as we take these topics in order, we shall be able to complete each individual law as we did before, when we approached the question of communal meals—I mean that when we've become intimate with our citizens, perhaps we shall be able to see more clearly whether such gatherings should consist of men only or whether, after all, they should include women. Similarly, when we've won control of certain institutions that have never yet been controlled by law, we'll use them as 'cover', just as other people do, with the result I indicated just now: thanks to a more detailed inspection of these institutions, we may be able to lay down laws that take account of them better.

Clinias/ Quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ So let's bear in mind the points we've just made, in case we find we need to refer to them later on.

Clinias/ What points in particular are you telling us to remember?

Athenian Stranger/ The three impulses we distinguished by our three terms: the desire for 'food' (I think we said) and 'drink', and thirdly 'sexual stimulation'.

Clinias/ Yes, sir, we'll certainly remember, just as you tell us.

Athenian Stranger/ Splendid. Let's turn our attention to the bridal pair, and instruct them in the manner and method by which they should produce children. (And if we fail to persuade them, we'll threaten them with a law or two.)

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ The bride and groom should resolve to present the state with the best and finest children they

can produce. Now, when human beings co-operate in any project, and give due attention to its planning and execution, the results they achieve are always of the best and finest quality; but if they act carelessly, or are incapable of intelligent action in the first place, the results are deplorable. So the bridegroom had better deal with his wife and approach the task of begetting children with a sense of responsibility, and the bride should do the same, especially during the period when no children have yet been born to them. They should be supervised by women whom we have chosen (several or only a few—the officials should appoint the number they think right, at times within their discretion). These women must assemble daily at the temple of Eileithuia for not more than a third of the day, and when they have convened each must report to her colleagues any wife or husband of childbearing age she has seen who is concerned with anything but the duties imposed on him or her at the time of the sacrifices and rites of their marriage. If children come in suitable numbers, the period of supervised procreation should be ten years and no longer. But if a couple remain childless throughout this period, they should part, and call in their relatives and the female officials to help them decide terms of divorce that will safeguard the interests of them both. If some dispute arises about the duties and interests of the parties, they must choose ten of the Guardians of the Laws as arbitrators, and abide by their decisions on the points referred to them. The female officials must enter the homes of the young people and by a combination of admonition and threats try to make them give up their ignorant and sinful ways. If this has no effect, they must go and report the case to the Guardians of the Laws, who must resort to sterner methods. If even the Guardians prove ineffective, they should make the case

public and post up the relevant name, swearing on their oath that they are unable to reform so-and-so.

Unless the person whose name is posted up succeeds in convicting in court those who published the notice, he must be deprived of the privilege of attending weddings and parties celebrating the birth of children.

If he persists in attending, anyone who wishes should chastise him by beating him, and not be punished for it.

If a woman misbehaves and her name is posted up, and she fails to win the day in court, the same regulations are to apply to her too: she must be excluded from female processions and distinctions, and be forbidden to attend weddings and parties celebrating the birth of children.

When children have been produced as demanded by law, if a man has intercourse with another woman, or a woman with another man, and the other party is still procreating, they must suffer the same penalty as was specified for those who are still having children.

After the period of child-bearing, the chaste man or woman should be highly respected; the promiscuous should be held in the opposite kind of 'repute' (though disrepute would be a better word).

When the majority of people conduct themselves with moderation in sexual matters, no such regulations should be mentioned or enacted; but if there is misbehavior, regulations should be made and enforced after the pattern of the laws we've just laid down.

Our first year is the beginning of our whole life, and every boy's and girl's year of birth should be recorded in their family shrines under the heading 'born'. Alongside, on a whitened wall, should be written up in every brotherhood the sequence-numbers of the officials who facilitate the numbering of the years. The names of the living members of

the brotherhood should be inscribed nearby, and those of the deceased expunged.

The age limits for marriage shall be: for a girl, from sixteen to twenty (these will be the extreme limits specified), and for a man, from thirty to thirty-five. A woman may hold office from the age of forty, a man from thirty. Service in the armed forces shall be required of a man from twenty to sixty. As for women, whatever military service it may be thought necessary to impose (after they have finished bearing children) should be performed up to the age of fifty; practicable and appropriate duties should be specified for each individual.

Book 7.

Athenian Stranger/ Now that the boys and girls have been born, I suppose their education and training will be the most suitable topic to deal with next. This is not something we can leave on one side: that would be out of the question. However, we shall clearly do better to confine our remarks to advice and instruction, and not venture on precise regulations. In the privacy of family life, you see, a great many trivial activities never get publicity, and under the stimulus of feelings of pleasure or pain or desire they can all too easily fly in the face of the lawgiver's recommendations and produce citizens whose characters are varied and conflicting, which is a social evil. Now although these activities are so trivial and so common that one cannot decently arrange to punish them by law, they do tend to undermine the written statutes, because men get into the habit of repeatedly breaking rules in small matters. That's why in spite of all the difficulties of legislating on such points, we can't simply say nothing about them. But I must try to clarify my point by showing you some samples, as it were. At the moment, I expect it looks as if I'm rather concealing my meaning.

Clinias/ You're quite right, it does.

Athenian Stranger/ I take it we were justified in asserting that if an education is to qualify as 'correct', it simply must show that it is capable of making our souls and bodies as fine and as handsome as they can be?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And I suppose (to take the most elementary requirement), that if a person is going to be supremely good-looking, his posture must be as erect as possible, right from his earliest years?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well now, we observe, don't we, that the earliest stages of growth of every animal are by far the most vigorous and rapid? That's why a lot of people actually maintain that in the case of man, the first five years of life see more growth than the next twenty.

Clinias/ That's true.

Athenian Stranger/ But we're aware that rapid growth without frequent and appropriately graded exercises leads to a lot of trouble for the body?

Clinias/ Yes, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ And isn't it precisely when a body is getting most nourishment that it needs most exercise?

Clinias/ Good Heavens, sir, are we going to demand such a thing of new-born babies and little children?

Athenian Stranger/ No—I mean even earlier, when they're getting nourishment in their mother's body.

Clinias/ What's that you say? My dear sir! Do you really mean in the womb?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, I do. But it's hardly surprising you haven't heard of these athletics of the embryo. It's a curious subject, but I'd like to tell you about it.

Clinias/ Do so, of course.

Athenian Stranger/ It's something it would be easier to understand in Athens, where some people go in for sport more than they should. Not only boys, but some elderly men as well, rear young birds and set them to fight one another. But they certainly don't think just pitting them one against another will give such creatures adequate exercise. To supplement this, each man keeps birds somewhere about his person—a small one in the cup of his hand, a larger one under his arm—and covers countless stades in walking about, not for the sake of his own health, but to keep these

animals in good shape. To the intelligent person, the lesson is obvious: all bodies find it helpful and invigorating to be shaken by movements and joltings of all kinds, whether the motion is due to their own efforts or they are carried on a vehicle or boat or horse or any other mode of conveyance. All this enables the body to assimilate its solid and liquid food, so that we grow healthy and handsome and strong into the bargain. In view of all this, can we say what our future policy should be? If you like, we could lay down precise rules (and how people would laugh at us!): A pregnant woman should go for walks, and when her child is born she should mold it like wax while it is still supple, and keep it well wrapped up for the first two years of its life. The nurses must be compelled under legal penalty to contrive that the children are always being carried to the country or temples or relatives, until they are sturdy enough to stand on their own feet. Even then, the nurses should persist in carrying the child around until it's three, to keep it from distorting its young limbs by subjecting them to too much pressure. The nurses should be as strong as possible, and there must be plenty of them—and we could provide written penalties for each infringement of the rules. But no! That would lead to far too much of what I mentioned just now.

Clinias/ You mean …

Athenian Stranger/ … the tremendous ridicule we'd provoke. And the nurses (women and slaves, with characters to match) would refuse to obey us anyway.

Clinias/ Then why did we insist that the rules should be specified?

Athenian Stranger/ For this reason. A state's free men and masters have quite different characters to the nurses', and there's a chance that if they hear these regulations they may be led to the correct conclusion: the state's general code

of laws will never rest on a firm foundation as long as private life is badly regulated, and it's silly to expect otherwise. Realizing the truth of this, they may themselves spontaneously adopt our recent suggestions as rules, and thereby achieve the happiness that results from running their households and their state on proper lines.

Clinias/ Yes, that's all very reasonable.

Athenian Stranger/ Still, let's not abandon this style of legislation yet. We started to talk about young children's bodies: let's use the same sort of approach to explain how to shape their personalities.

Clinias/ Good idea.

Athenian Stranger/ So let's take this as our basic principle in both cases: all young children, and especially very tiny infants, benefit both physically and mentally from being nursed and kept in motion, as far as practicable, throughout the day and night; indeed, if only it could be managed, they ought to live as though they were permanently on board ship. But as that's impossible, we must aim to provide our new-born infants with the closest possible approximation to this ideal.

Here's some further evidence, from which the same conclusions should be drawn: the fact that young children's nurses, and the women who cure Corybantic conditions, have learned this treatment from experience and have come to recognize its value. And I suppose you know what a mother does when she wants to get a wakeful child to sleep. Far from keeping him still, she takes care to move him about, rocking him constantly in her arms, not silently, but humming a kind of tune. The cure consists of movement, to the rhythms of dance and song; the mother makes her child 'pipe down' just as surely as the music of the pipes bewitches the frenzied Bacchic reveler.

Clinias/ Well then, sir, have we any particular explanation for all this?

Athenian Stranger/ The reason's not very hard to find.

Clinias/ What is it?

Athenian Stranger/ Both these conditions are a species of fear, and fear is the result of some inadequacy in the personality. When one treats such conditions by vigorous movement, this external motion, by canceling out the internal agitation that gives rise to the fear and frenzy, induces a feeling of calm and peace in the soul, in spite of the painful thumping of the heart experienced by each patient. The result is very gratifying. Whereas the wakeful children are sent to sleep, the revelers (far from asleep!), by being set to dance to the music of the pipes, are restored to mental health after their derangement, with the assistance of the gods to whom they sacrifice so propitiously. This explanation, brief as it is, is convincing enough.

Clinias/ Yes, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, seeing how effective these measures are, here's another point to notice about the patient. Any man who has experienced terrors from his earliest years will be that much more likely to grow up timid. But no one will deny that this is to train him to be a coward, not a hero.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Contrariwise, we'd agree that a training in courage right from infancy demands that we overcome the terrors and fears that assail us?

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ So we can say that exercising very young children by keeping them in motion contributes a great deal towards the perfection of one aspect of the soul's virtue.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Further, good humor and bad humor will be a conspicuous element in a good or bad moral character respectively.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ So how can we instill into the new-born child, right from the start, whichever of these two characteristics we want? We must try to indicate how far they are within our control, and the methods we have to use.

Clinias/ Quite so.

Athenian Stranger/ I belong to the school of thought which maintains that luxury makes a child bad-tempered, irritable, and apt to react violently to trivial things. At the other extreme, unduly savage repression turns children into cringing slaves and puts them so much at odds with the world that they become unfit to be members of a community.

Clinias/ So how should the state as a whole set about bringing up children who are as yet unable to understand what is said to them or respond to any attempt to educate them?

Athenian Stranger/ More or less like this. Every new-born animal is apt to give a sort of loud yell—especially the human child, who in addition to yelling is also exceptionally prone to tears.

Clinias/ He certainly is.

Athenian Stranger/ So if a nurse is trying to discover what a child wants, she judges from these reactions to what it is offered. Silence, she thinks, means she is giving it the right thing, whereas crying and bawling indicate the wrong one. Clearly these tears and yells are the child's way of signaling his likes and dislikes—and ominous signs they are, too, because this stage lasts at least three years, and that's quite a large part of one's life to spend badly (or well).

Clinias/ You're right.

Athenian Stranger/ Now don't you two think that a morose and ungenial fellow will on the whole be a more of a moaner and a grumbler than a good man has any right to be?

Clinias/ Yes, I think so, at any rate.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, suppose you do your level best during these years to shelter him from distress and fright and any kind of pain at all. Shouldn't we expect that child to be educated into a more cheerful and genial disposition?

Clinias/ Certainly, and especially, sir, if one surrounded him with lots of pleasures.

Athenian Stranger/ Now here, my dear sir, is just where Clinias no longer carries me with him. That's the best way to ruin a child, because the corruption invariably sets in at the very earliest stages of his education. But perhaps I'm wrong about this: let's see.

Clinias/ Tell us what you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ I mean that we're now discussing a topic of great importance. So you too, Megillus, see what your views are, and help us to make up our minds. My position is this: the right way of life is neither a single-minded pursuit of pleasure nor an absolute avoidance of pain, but a genial (the word I used just now) contentment with the state between those extremes—precisely the state, in fact, which we always say is that of God himself (a conjecture that's reasonable enough, supported as it is by the statements of the oracles). Similarly if one of us aspires to live like a god, this is the state he must try to attain. He must refuse to go looking for pleasure on his own account, aware that this is not a way of avoiding pain; nor must he allow anyone else to behave like that, young or old, male or

female—least of all newly-born children, if he can help it, because that's the age when habits, the seeds of the entire character, are most effectively implanted. I'd even say, at the risk of appearing flippant, that all expectant mothers, during the year of their pregnancy, should be supervised more closely than other women, to ensure that they don't experience frequent and excessive pleasures, or pains either. An expectant mother should think it important to keep calm and cheerful and sweet-tempered throughout her pregnancy.

Clinias/ There's no need to ask Megillus which of us two has made the better case, sir. I agree with you that everyone should avoid a life of extreme pleasure and pain, and always take the middle course between them. Your point has been well and truly put, and you've heard it well and truly endorsed.

Athenian Stranger/ Admirable, Clinias! Well then, here's a related point that the three of us should consider.

Clinias/ What's that?

Athenian Stranger/ That all the rules we are now working through are what people generally call 'unwritten customs', and all this sort of thing is precisely what they mean when they speak of 'ancestral law'. Not only that, but the conclusion to which we were driven a moment ago was the right one: that although 'laws' is the wrong term for these things, we can't afford to say nothing about them, because they are the bonds of the entire social framework, linking all written and established laws with those yet to be passed. They act in the same way as ancestral customs dating from time immemorial, which by virtue of being soundly established and instinctively observed, shield and protect existing written law. But if they go wrong and get 'out of true'—well, you know what happens when carpenters' props

buckle in a house: they bring the whole building crashing down, one thing on top of another, stays and superstructure (however well built) alike—all because the original timberwork has given way. So you see, Clinias, this is what we have to bear in mind in thoroughly binding your state together while it is still a new foundation; we must do our best not to omit anything, great or small, whether 'laws', 'habits' or 'institutions', because they are all needed to bind a state together, and the permanence of the one kind of norm depends on that of the other. So we ought not to be surprised to see a flood of apparently unimportant customs or usages making our legal code a bit on the long side.

Clinias/ You're quite right, and we'll keep the point in mind.

Athenian Stranger/ Up to the age of three the early training of a boy or girl will be helped enormously by this regimen, provided it is observed punctiliously and systematically. In the fourth, fifth, sixth and even seventh year of life, a child's character will need to be formed while he plays; we should now stop spoiling him, and resort to discipline, but not such as to humiliate him. We said, in the case of slaves, that discipline should not be enforced so high-handedly that they become resentful, though on the other hand we mustn't spoil them by letting them go uncorrected; the same rule should apply to free persons too. When children are brought together, they discover more or less spontaneously the games which come naturally to them at that age. As soon as they are three, and until they reach the age of six, all children must congregate at the village temples—the children of each village to assemble at the same place. They should be kept in order and restrained from bad behavior by their nurses, who should themselves be supervised, along with their groups as a whole, by the twelve women elected for the purpose, one to be in charge of

one group for a year at a time, the allocations to be made by the Guardians of the Law. The twelve must be elected by the women in charge of supervising marriage, one must be chosen from each tribe, and they must be of the same age as their electors. The woman allotted to a given tribe will discharge her duties by visiting the temple daily and punishing any cases of wrongdoing. She may use a number of state slaves to deal with male and female slaves and aliens on her own authority; however, if a citizen disputes his punishment, she must take the case to the City-Wardens, but if he does not dispute it, she may punish him too on her own authority. When the boys and girls have reached the age of six, the sexes should be separated; boys should spend their days with boys, and girls with girls. Each should attend lessons. The males should go to teachers of riding, archery, javelin-throwing and slinging—and the females too, if they are agreeable, may attend at any rate the lessons, especially those in the use of weapons. In this business, you see, pretty nearly everyone misunderstands the current practice.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ People think that where the hands are concerned right and left are by nature suited for different specialized tasks—whereas of course in the case of the feet and the lower limbs there is obviously no difference in efficiency at all. Thanks to the silly ideas of nurses and mothers we've all been made lame-handed, so to speak. The natural potential of each arm is just about the same, and the difference between them is our own fault, because we've habitually misused them. Of course, in activities of no consequence—using the left hand for the lyre and the right for the plectrum and so on—it doesn't matter in the slightest. But to take these examples as a model for other activities too, when there's no need, is pretty stupid. The Scythian practice is an illustration of this: a Scythian doesn't use his

left hand exclusively to draw his bow and his right hand exclusively to fit in the arrow, but uses both hands for both jobs indifferently. There are a lot of other similar examples to be found—in driving chariots, for instance, and other activities—from which we can see that when people train the left hand to be weaker than the right they are going against nature. As we said, that doesn't matter when it's a case of plectra of horn and similar instruments. But it matters enormously when one has to use iron weapons of war (javelins, arrows or whatever), and it matters most of all when you have to use your weapons in fighting hand to hand. And what a difference there is between a man who has learned this lesson and one who has not, between the trained and the untrained fighter! You know how a trained pancratiast or boxer or wrestler can fight on his left, so that when his opponent makes him change over and fight on that side, he doesn't stagger round as though he were lame, but keeps his poise. And I reckon we have to suppose that precisely the same rule applies to the use of weapons and to all other activities: when a man has two sets of limbs for attack and defense, he ought to leave neither of them idle and untrained if he can help it. In fact, if you were born with the body of a Geryon or a Briareus, you ought to be able to throw a hundred shafts with your hundred hands. All these points should come under the supervision of the male and female officials, the latter keeping an eye on the training the children get at play, the former superintending their lessons. They must see that every boy and girl grows up versatile in the use of both hands and both feet, so that they don't ruin their natural abilities by their acquired habits, so far as they can be prevented.

In practice, formal lessons will fall into two categories, physical training for the body, and cultural education to perfect the personality. Physical training can be further

subdivided into two branches: dancing and wrestling. Now when people dance, they are either acting the words of the composer, and a dignified and civilized style is their prime concern, or they are aiming at physical fitness, agility and beauty. In this case they are preoccupied with bending and stretching in the approved fashion, so that each limb and other part of the body can move with its own peculiar grace—a grace which is then carried over and infused into dancing in general. As for wrestling, the kind of trick introduced as part of their technique by Antaeus and Cercyon because of their wretched obsession with winning, and the boxing devices invented by Epeius and Amycus, are absolutely useless in a military encounter and don't merit the honor of being described. But if the legitimate maneuvers of regular wrestling—extricating the neck and hands and sides from entanglement—are practiced for the sake of strength and health with a vigorous desire to win and without resort to undignified postures, then they are extremely useful, and we mustn't neglect them. So when we reach the proper place in our legal code we must tell the future teachers to present all this kind of instruction in an attractive way, and the pupils to receive it with gratitude. Nor should we omit to mention the chorus-performances that may appropriately be imitated: for instance, here in Crete the 'games in armor' of the Curetes, and those of the Dioscuri in Sparta. And at Athens our Virgin Lady, I believe, charmed by the pleasure of performing in a chorus, and disapproving of empty hands in recreation, thought she should perform the dance only when arrayed in full armor. Our boys and girls should imitate her example wholeheartedly, and prize the gift which the goddess has made them, because it increases their fighting skill and embellishes their festivals. Young boys, right from the early stages up to the age of military service, should be equipped with weapons and horses whenever they

parade and process in honor of any god; and when they supplicate the gods and sons of gods they must dance and march in step, sometimes briskly, sometimes slowly. Even contests and preliminary heats, if they are to prove their worth in war and peace to the state and private households, must be conducted with these purposes in view and no other. Other kinds of physical exercise, Megillus and Clinias, whether serious or by way of recreation, are beneath the dignity of a gentleman.

I've now pretty well described the sort of physical education which needed to be described, as I said early on. So there it is, in all its detail. If you know of a better system than that, let's have it.

Clinias/ No sir, if we cry off these ideas of yours a better program of competitions and physical training won't be easy to find.

Athenian Stranger/ The next subject is the gifts of Apollo and the Muses. When we discussed this before, we thought we'd exhausted the topic, and that physical training alone remained for discussion. But it's clear now that a number of points were omitted—points which everyone ought in fact to hear first. So let's go through them in order.

Clinias/ Yes, they should certainly be mentioned.

Athenian Stranger/ Listen to me then. You've done that before, of course, but such a curious eccentricity calls for extreme caution in the speaker and his audience. You see, I'm going to spin a line that almost makes me afraid to open my mouth; still, I'll pluck up my courage and go ahead.

Clinias/ What is this thesis of yours, sir?

Athenian Stranger/ I maintain that no one in any state has really grasped that children's games affect legislation so crucially as to determine whether the laws that are passed will survive or not. If you control the way children play, and

the same children always play the same games under the same rules and in the same conditions, and get pleasure from the same toys, you'll find that the conventions of adult life too are left in peace without alteration. But in fact games are always being changed and constantly modified and new ones invented, and the younger generation never enthuses over the same thing for two days running. They have no permanent agreed standard of what is becoming or unbecoming either in deportment or their possessions in general; they worship anyone who is always introducing some novelty or doing something unconventional to shapes and colors and all that sort of thing. In fact, it's no exaggeration to say that this fellow is the biggest menace that can ever afflict a state, because he quietly changes the character of the young by making them despise old things and value novelty. That kind of language and that kind of outlook is—again I say it—the biggest disaster any state can suffer. Listen: I'll tell you just how big an evil I maintain it is.

Clinias/ You mean the way the public grumbles at old-fashioned ways of doing things?

Athenian Stranger/ Exactly.

Clinias/ Well, you won't find us shutting our ears to that kind of argument—you couldn't have a more sympathetic audience.

Athenian Stranger/ So I should imagine.

Clinias/ Go on then.

Athenian Stranger/ Well now, let's listen to the argument with even greater attention than usual, and expound it to each other with equal care. Change, we shall find, except in something evil, is extremely dangerous. This is true of seasons and winds, the regimen of the body and the character of the soul—in short, of everything without

exception (unless, as I said just now, the change affects something evil). Take as an example the way the body gets used to all sorts of food and drink and exercise. At first they upset it, but then in the course of time it's this very regimen that is responsible for its putting on flesh. Then the regimen and the flesh form a kind of partnership, so that the body grows used to this congenial and familiar system, and lives a life of perfect happiness and health. But imagine someone forced to change again to one of the other recommended systems: initially, he's troubled by illnesses, and only slowly, by getting used to his new way of life, does he get back to normal. Well, we must suppose that precisely the same thing happens to a man's outlook and personality. When the laws under which people are brought up have by some heaven sent good fortune remained unchanged over a very long period, so that no one remembers or has heard of things ever being any different, the soul is filled with such respect for tradition that it shrinks from meddling with it in any way. Somehow or other the legislator must find a method of bringing about this situation in the state. Now here's my own solution of the problem. All legislators suppose that an alteration to children's games really is just a 'game', as I said before, which leads to no serious or genuine damage. Consequently, so far from preventing change, they feebly give it their blessing. They don't appreciate that if children introduce novelties into their games, they'll inevitably turn out to be quite different people from the previous generation; being different, they'll demand a different kind of life, and that will then make them want new institutions and laws. The next stage is what we described just now as the biggest evil that can affect a state—but not a single legislator takes fright at the prospect. Other changes, that affect only deportment, will do less harm, but it is a very serious matter indeed to keep changing the criteria for praising or censuring

a man's moral character, and we must take great care to avoid doing so.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, are we still happy about the line we took earlier, when we said that rhythms and music in general were means of representing the characters of good men and bad? Or what?

Clinias/ Yes, our view remains exactly the same.

Athenian Stranger/ So our position is this: we must do everything we possibly can to distract the younger generation from wanting to try their hand at presenting new subjects, either in dance or song; and we must also stop pleasure-mongers seducing them into the attempt.

Clinias/ You're absolutely right.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, does any of us know of a better method of achieving such an object than that of the Egyptians?

Clinias/ What method is that?

Athenian Stranger/ To sanctify all our dances and music. The first job will be to settle the festivals by drawing up the year's program, which should show the dates of the various holidays and the individual gods, children of gods, or spirits in whose honor they should be taken. Second, it has to be decided what hymn should be sung at the various sacrifices to the gods and the type of dancing that should dignify the ritual in question. These decisions should be taken by some authority or other, and then the whole body of the citizens together should ratify them by sacrificing to the Fates and all the other gods, and by pouring a libation to consecrate the various songs to their respective divinities and other powers.

If anybody disobeys and introduces any different hymns or dances in honor of any god, the priests and priestesses,

in association with the Guardians of the Laws, will have the backing of sacred and secular law in expelling him.

If he resists expulsion, he must be liable to a charge of impiety for the rest of his life at the hands of anyone who wishes to bring it.

Clinias/ And serve him right.

Athenian Stranger/ Now seeing that we've got on to this topic, we must watch our step and behave ourselves.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ No young man, much less an old one, on seeing or hearing anything paradoxical or unfamiliar, is ever going to brush aside his doubts all in a hurry and reach a snap decision about it. More probably, like a traveler who has come to a crossroads, alone or with others, and is rather uncertain about the right road, he'll pause, and put the problem to himself or his companions; and he won't continue his journey until he's pretty sure of his direction and bearings. That's precisely what we must do now. Our discussion has led us to a legal paradox, and naturally we must go into it in details and not—at our age—rashly claim to pontificate in such an important field off the cuff.

Clinias/ You're absolutely right.

Athenian Stranger/ So we won't hurry over the problem, and only when we've looked into it properly shall we draw any firm conclusions. Still, there's no point in being deterred from completing the formal presentation of these 'laws' we're dealing with now, so let's press on till we get to the end of them. God willing, the completion of the whole exposition may perhaps point to an adequate solution of our present problem.

Clinias/ You've put it very well, sir; let's do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ So let's assume we've agreed on the paradox: our songs have turned into 'nomes' (apparently the

ancients gave some such name to tunes on the lyre—perhaps they had some inkling of what we're saying, thanks to the intuition of someone who saw a vision either in his sleep or while awake). However that may be, let's adopt this as our agreed policy: no one shall sing a note, or perform any dance-movement, other than those in the canon of public songs, sacred music, and the general body of chorus performances of the young—any more than he would violate any other 'nome' or law. If a man obeys, he shall go unmolested by the law; but if he disobeys, the Guardians of the Laws and the priests and priestesses must punish him, as we said just now. Can we accept this as a statement of policy?

Clinias/ We can.

Athenian Stranger/ Then how could one put these rules in proper legal form, without being laughed to scorn? Well now, there's a new point we ought to notice: in this business, the safest method is to sketch a few model rules. Here's one for you: imagine a sacrifice has been performed and the offerings burnt as demanded by law and someone standing in a private capacity near the altar and offerings—a son or brother, say—breaks out into the most extreme blasphemy: wouldn't his words fill his father and his other relations with alarm and despondency and forebodings of despair? Isn't that what we'd expect?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ But it is hardly an exaggeration to say that in our corner of the world this is exactly what happens in pretty nearly every state. When an official has performed a public sacrifice, a chorus—or rather a mob of choruses—arrives and takes up position not far from the altar and sometimes right next to it. Then they swamp the holy offerings with a flood of absolute blasphemy. With words and

rhythms and music of the most morbid kind they work up the emotions of their audience to a tremendous pitch, and the prize is awarded to the chorus which succeeds best in making the community burst into tears—the very community which has just offered sacrifice. Well, that's certainly a 'nome' on which we must pass an unfavorable verdict, isn't it? If there is ever any real need for the public to listen to such lugubrious noises, on days that are unclean and unlucky, it will be much better, and entirely appropriate, to hire some foreign choruses to sing such songs (just as one hires mourners to accompany funerals with Carian dirges). In particular, the costume appropriate for such funeral dirges will not be garlands or trappings of gilt, but—to polish off the topic as quickly as possible—quite the opposite kind of thing. I merely repeat the question we're always asking ourselves: are we happy to adopt this, for a start, as one of our model rules of singing?

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ The rule of auspicious language. This is the characteristic that is absolutely vital for our kind of song. Or shall I simply lay down the rule without repeating the question?

Clinias/ Lay it down by all means: your law's been approved without a single vote against it.

Athenian Stranger/ After auspicious language, then, what will be the second law of music? Surely this: that the gods to whom we sacrifice should always be offered our prayers.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And the third law, I suppose, will be this: poets should appreciate that prayers are requests for something from the gods, so they must take great care that they never inadvertently request an evil under the

impression that it is a benefit. What a ludicrous calamity it would be to offer that kind of prayer!

Clinias/ It certainly would.

Athenian Stranger/ Now didn't our remarks a short time ago persuade us that 'Gold and Silver, the gods of Wealth, ought to have neither temple nor home in our state'?

Clinias/ Absolutely.

Athenian Stranger/ So what lesson can we say this doctrine holds for us? Surely this: that authors in general are quite unable to tell good from bad. We conclude that a composer who embodies this error in his words or even in his music, and who produces mistaken prayers, will make our citizens pray improperly when it comes to matters of importance—and, as we were saying, we shan't find many more glaring mistakes than that. So can we establish this as one of our model laws of music?

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ That a poet should compose nothing that conflicts with society's conventional notions of justice, goodness and beauty. No one should be allowed to show his work to any private person without first submitting it to the appointed assessors and to the Guardians of the Laws, and getting their approval. (In effect, we've got our assessors already appointed—I mean the legislators we chose to regulate the arts, and the person we elected as Minister of Education.) Well then, here's the same question yet again: are we satisfied to adopt this as our third principle and our third model law? Or what do you think?

Clinias/ Of course we'll adopt it.

Athenian Stranger/ The next point is that it will be proper to sing hymns and panegyrics, combined with prayers, in honor of the gods. After the gods, we may similarly give the

spirits and heroes their meed of praise, and pray to each of them as appropriate.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And the next law, which should be adopted quite ungrudgingly, will run as follows: deceased citizens who by their physical efforts or force of personality have conspicuous and strenuous achievements to their credit, and who have lived a life of obedience to the laws, should be regarded as proper subjects for our panegyrics.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ But to honor a man with hymns and panegyrics during his lifetime is to invite trouble: we must wait until he has come to the end of the course after running the race of life successfully. (Men and women who have shown conspicuous merit should qualify for all these honors without distinction of sex.)

The following arrangements should be made with regard to singing and dancing. Among the works we've inherited from the past there are a great many grand old pieces of music—dances too, for occasions when we want to exercise our bodies—from which we should not hesitate to choose those suitable and appropriate for the society we are organizing. Censors of at least fifty years of age should be appointed to make the selection, and any ancient composition that seems to come up to standard should be approved; absolutely unsuitable material must be totally rejected, and substandard pieces revised and re-arranged, on the advice of poets and musicians. (Although we shall exploit the creative talents of these people, we shan't—with rare exceptions—put our trust in their tastes and inclinations. Instead, we shall interpret the wishes of the lawgiver and arrange to his liking our dancing and singing and chorus performances in general.) Music composed in an

undisciplined style is always infinitely improved by the imposition of form, even if that makes it less immediately attractive. But music doesn't have to be disciplined to be pleasant. Take someone who has right from childhood till the age of maturity and discretion grown familiar with a controlled and restrained style of music. Play him some of the other sort, and how he'll loathe it! 'What vulgar stuff!' he'll say.

Yet, if he's been brought up to enjoy the strong appeal of popular music, it's the disciplined kind he'll call frigid and repellent. So as I said just now, on the score of pleasure or the lack of it, neither type is superior nor inferior to the other. The difference is simply this: the one musical environment is invariably a good influence, the other a bad.

Clinias/ Well said!

Athenian Stranger/ In addition, we shall have to distinguish, in a rough and ready way, the songs suitable for men and those suitable for women, and give each its proper mode and rhythm. It would be terrible if the words failed to fit the mode, or if their meter were at odds with the beat of the music, which is what will happen if we don't match properly the songs to each of the other elements in the performance—elements which must therefore be dealt with, at any rate in outline, in our legal code. One possibility is simply to ensure that the songs men and women sing are accompanied by the rhythms and modes imposed by the words in either case; but our regulations about female performances must be more precise than this and be based on the natural difference between the sexes. So an elevated manner and courageous instincts must be regarded as characteristic of the male, while a tendency to modesty and restraint must be presented—in theory and law alike—as a peculiarly feminine trait.

Now to deal with how this doctrine should be taught and handed on. What method of instruction should we use? Who should be taught, and when should the lessons take place? Well, you know that when a shipwright is starting to build a boat, the first thing he does is to lay down the keel as a foundation and as a general indication of the shape. I have a feeling my own procedure now is exactly analogous. I'm trying to distinguish for you the various ways in which our character shapes the kind of life we live; I really am trying to 'lay down the keel', because I'm giving proper consideration to the way we should try to live—to the 'character-keel' we need to lay if we are going to sail through this voyage of life successfully. Not that human affairs are worth taking very seriously—but take them seriously is just what we are forced to do, alas. Still, perhaps it will be realistic to recognize the position we're in and direct our serious efforts to some suitable purpose. My meaning? —yes, you'd certainly be right to take me up on that.

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ I maintain that serious matters deserve our serious attention, but trivialities do not; that all men of good will should put God at the center of their thoughts; that man, as we said before, has been created as a toy for God; and that this is the great point in his favor. So every man and every woman should play this part and order their whole life accordingly, engaging in the best possible pastimes—in a quite different frame of mind to their present one.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ The usual view nowadays, I fancy, is that the purpose of serious activity is leisure—that war, for instance, is an important business, and needs to be waged efficiently for the sake of peace. But in cold fact neither the

immediate result nor the eventual consequences of warfare ever turn out to be real leisure or an education that really deserves the name—and education is in our view just about the most important activity of all. So each of us should spend the greater part of his life at peace, and that will be the best use of this time. What, then, will be the right way to live? A man should spend his whole life at 'play'—sacrificing, singing, dancing—so that he can win the favor of the gods and protect himself from his enemies and conquer them in battle. He'll achieve both these aims if he sings and dances in the way we've outlined; his path, so to speak, has been marked out for him and he must go on his way confident that the poet's words are true;

> Some things, Telemachus, your native wit will tell you,
> And Heaven will prompt the rest. The very gods, I'm sure,
> Have smiled upon your birth and helped to bring you up.

And those we bring up, too, must proceed in the same spirit. They must expect that although our advice is sound as far as it goes, their guardian deity will make them further suggestions about sacrifices and dancing—telling them the various divinities in whose honor they should hold their various games, and on what occasions, so as to win the gods' good will and live the life that their own nature demands, puppets that they are, mostly, and hardly real at all.

Megillus/ That, sir, is to give the human race a very low rating indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ Don't be taken aback, Megillus. You must make allowances for me. I said that with my thoughts on God, and was quite carried away. So, if you like, let's take it that our species is not worthless, but something rather important.

To resume, then. So far, we have provided for the public gymnasia and the state schools to be housed in three groups of buildings at the center of the city; similarly, on three sites in the suburbs, there should be training grounds for horses, and open spaces adapted for archery and the discharge of other long-range missiles, where the young may practice and learn these skills. Anyway, if we haven't explained all this adequately before, let's do so now, and put our requirements into legal form.

Foreign teachers should be hired to live in these establishments and provide the pupils with complete courses of instruction in both military and cultural subjects. Children must not be allowed to attend or not attend school at the whim of their father; as far as possible, education must be compulsory for 'every man and boy' (as the saying is), because they belong to the state first and their parents second.

Let me stress that this law of mine will apply just as much to girls as to boys. The girls must be trained in precisely the same way, and I'd like to make this proposal without any reservations whatever about horse-riding or athletics being suitable activities for males but not for females. You see, although I was already convinced by some ancient stories I have heard, I now know for sure that there are pretty well countless numbers of women, generally called Sarmatians, round the Black Sea, who not only ride horses but use the bow and other weapons. There, men and women have an equal duty to cultivate these skills, so cultivate them equally they do. And while we're on the subject, here's another thought for you. I maintain that if these results can be achieved, the state of affairs in our corner of Greece, where men and women do not have a common purpose and do not throw all their energies into the same activities, is absolutely stupid. Almost every state, under present conditions, is only

half a state, and develops only half its potentialities, whereas with the same cost and effort, it could double its achievement. Yet what a staggering blunder for a legislator to make!

Clinias/ I dare say. But a lot of these proposals, sir, are incompatible with the average state's social structure. However, you were quite right when you said we should give the argument its head, and only make up our minds when it had run its course. You've made me reproach myself for having spoken. So carry on, and say what you like.

Athenian Stranger/ The point I'd like to make, Clinias, is the same one as I made a moment ago, that there might have been something to be said against our proposal, if it had not been proved by the facts to be workable. But as things are, an opponent of this law must try other tactics. We are not going to withdraw our recommendation that so far as possible, in education and everything else, the female sex should be on the same footing as the male. Consequently, we should approach the problem rather like this. Look: if women are not to follow absolutely the same way of life as men, then surely we shall have to work out some other program for them?

Clinias/ Inevitably.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, if we deny women this partnership we're now prescribing for them, which of the systems actually in force today shall we adopt instead? What about the practice of the Thracians and many other peoples, who make their women work on the land and mind sheep and cattle, so that they turn into skivvies indistinguishable from slaves? Or what about the Athenians and all the other states in that part of the world? Well, here's how we Athenians deal with the problem: we 'concentrate our resources', as the expression is, under one roof, and let our

women take charge of our stores and the spinning and wool-working in general. Or we could adopt the Spartan system, Megillus, which is a compromise. You make your girls take part in athletics and you give them a compulsory education in the arts; when they grow up, though dispensed from working wool, they have to 'weave' themselves a pretty hard-working sort of life which is by no means despicable or useless: they have to be tolerably efficient at running the home and managing the house and bringing up children—but they don't undertake military service. This means that even if some extreme emergency ever led to a battle for their state and the lives of their children, they wouldn't have the expertise to use bows and arrows, like so many Amazons, nor could they join the men in deploying any other missile. They wouldn't be able to take up shield and spear and copy Athena, so as to terrify the enemy (if nothing more) by being seen in some kind of battle-array gallantly resisting the destruction threatening their native land. Living as they do, they' never be anything like tough enough to imitate the Sarmatian women, who by comparison with such femininity would look like men. Anyone who wants to commend your Spartan legislators for this state of affairs, had better get on with it: I'm not going to change my mind. A legislator should go the whole way and not stick at half-measures; he mustn't just regulate the men and allow the women to live as they like and wallow in expensive luxury. That would be to give the state only half the loaf of prosperity instead of the whole of it.

Megillus/ What on earth are we to do, Clinias? Are we going to let our visitor run down Sparta for us like this?

Clinias/ Yes, we are. We told him he could be frank, and we must give him his head until we've properly worked through every section of our legal code.

Megillus/ Very well.

Athenian Stranger/ So I suppose I should try to press straight on with the next topic?

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ Now that our citizens are assured of a moderate supply of necessities, and other people have taken over the skilled work, what will be their way of life? Suppose that their farms have been entrusted to slaves, who provide them with sufficient produce of the land to keep them in modest comfort; suppose they take their meals in separate messes, one for themselves, another nearby for their families, including their daughters and their daughters' mothers; assume the messes, are presided over by officials, male and female as the case may be, who have the duty of dismissing their respective assemblies after the day's review and scrutiny of the diners' habits; and that when the official and his company have poured libations to whatever gods that day and night happen to be dedicated, they all duly go home. Now, do such leisured circumstances leave them no pressing work to do, no genuinely appropriate occupation? Must each of them get plumper and plumper every day of his life, like a fatted beast? No: we maintain that's not the right and proper thing to do. A man who lives like that won't be able to escape the fate he deserves; and the fate of an idle fattened beast that takes life easy is usually to be torn to pieces by some other animal—one of the skinny kind, who've been emaciated by a life of daring and endurance. (Our ideal, of course, is unlikely to be realized fully so long as we persist in our policy of allowing individuals to have their own private establishments, consisting of house, wife, children and so on. But if we could ever put into practice the second-best scheme we're now describing, we'd have every reason to be satisfied.) So we must insist that there is something left to do in a life of leisure, and it's only fair that the task imposed, far from being a light or trivial one, should be the most

demanding of all. As it is, to dedicate your life to winning a victory at Delphi or Olympia keeps you far too busy to attend to other tasks; but a life devoted to the cultivation of every physical perfection and every moral virtue (the only life worth the name) will keep you at least twice as busy. Inessential business must never stop you taking proper food and exercise, or hinder your mental and moral training. To follow this regimen and to get the maximum benefit from it, the whole day and the whole night is scarcely time enough.

In view of this, every gentleman must have a timetable prescribing what he is to do every minute of his life, which he should follow at all times from the dawn of one day until the sun comes up at the dawn of the next. However, a lawgiver would lack dignity if he produced a mass of details about running a house, especially when he came to the regulations for curtailing sleep at night, which will be necessary if the citizens are going to protect the entire state systematically and uninterruptedly. Everyone should think it a disgrace and unworthy of a gentleman, if any citizen devotes the whole of any night to sleep; no, he should always be the first to wake and get up, and let himself be seen by all the servants. (It doesn't matter what we ought to call this kind of thing—either 'law' or 'custom' will do.) In particular, the mistress of the house should be the first to wake up the other women; if she herself is woken by some of the maids, then all the slaves—men, women and children—should say 'How shocking!' to one another, and so too, supposing they could, should the very walls of the house. While awake at night, all citizens should transact a good proportion of their political and domestic business, the officials up and down the town, masters and mistresses in their private households. By nature, prolonged sleep does not suit either body or soul, nor does it help us to be active in all this kind of work. Asleep, a man is useless; he may as well be dead.

But a man who is particularly keen to be physically active and mentally alert stays awake as long as possible, and sets aside for sleep only as much time as is necessary for his health—and that is only a little, once that little has become a regular habit. Officials who are wide awake at night in cities inspire fear in the wicked, whether citizens or enemies, but by the just and the virtuous they are honored and admired; they benefit themselves and are a blessing to the entire state. And an additional advantage of spending the night in this way will be the courage thus inspired in individual members of the state.

When dawn comes up and brings another day, the children must be sent off to their teachers. Children must not be left without teachers, nor slaves without masters, any more than flocks and herds must be allowed to live without attendants. Of all wild things, the child is the most unmanageable: an unusually powerful spring of reason, whose waters are not yet canalized in the right direction, makes him sharp and sly, the most unruly animal there is. That's why he has to be curbed by a great many 'bridles', so to speak. Initially, when he leaves the side of his nurse and mother, and is still young and immature, this will be his tutor's duty, but later on it will devolve on his instructors in the various subjects—subjects which will be an extra discipline in themselves. So far, he will be treated as a young gentleman deserves. However, both the boy and his tutor or teacher must be punished by any passing gentleman who finds either of them misbehaving, and here the child must be treated as though he were a slave.

Any passer-by who fails to inflict due punishment, must for a start be held in the deepest disgrace, and the Guardian of the Laws who has been put in charge of the young must keep under observation this fellow who has come across miscreants of the kind we mentioned and has either failed to

inflict the necessary punishment, or not inflicted it in the approved fashion.

Our sharp-eyed and efficient supervisor of the education of the young must redirect their natural development along the right lines, by always setting them on the paths of goodness as embodied in the legal code.

But how will the law itself adequately convey its teaching to this Guardian? So far, the instruction he has had from the law has been cursory and obscure, because only a selection of topics has been covered. But nothing, as far as possible, should be omitted; the Guardian should have every point explained to him so that he in turn may enlighten and educate others. Now, the business of choruses has already been dealt with: we've seen what types of song and dance should be selected or revised, and then consecrated. But what type of prose works should be put in front of your pupils? How should they be presented? Now here, my dear Director of Youth, is something we've not explained. Of course, we've told you what military skills they must practice and learn, but what about literature, playing the lyre, arithmetic? We stipulated that they must each understand enough of these subjects to fight a war and run a house and administer a state; for the same reasons they must acquire such knowledge about the heavenly bodies in their courses—sun, moon and stars—as will help them with the arrangements that every state is forced to make in this respect. You ask what arrangements we are referring to? We mean that the days must be grouped into months, and the months into years, in such a way that the seasons, along with their various sacrifices and festivals, may each receive proper recognition by being duly observed in their natural sequence. The result will be to keep the state active and alert, to render the gods due honor, and to make men better informed on these matters. All this, my friend, has not yet

been adequately explained to you by the legislator. So pay attention to the points which are going to be made next.

We said that you have insufficient information about literature, for a start. Now, what's our complaint against the instructions you were given? It's simply that you've not yet been told whether a complete mastery of the subject is necessary before one can become a decent citizen or whether one shouldn't attempt it at all; and similarly in the case of the lyre. Well, we maintain that these subjects do have to be tackled. About three years will be a reasonable time for a child of ten to spend on literature, and a further three years, beginning at the age of thirteen, should be spent on learning the lyre. These times must be neither shortened nor lengthened: neither the child nor its father must be allowed to extend or curtail these periods of study out of enthusiasm for, or distaste of, the curriculum; that will be against the law.

Cases of disobedience must be punished by disqualification from the school prizes we shall have to describe a little later.

First, though, you yourself must grasp just what must be taught by the teachers and learned by the pupils in those periods of time. Well, the children must work at their letters until they are able to read and write, but any whose natural abilities have not developed sufficiently by the end of the prescribed time to make them into quick or polished performers should not be pressed.

The question now arises of the study of written works which the authors have not set to music. Although some of these works are in meter, others lack any rhythmical pattern at all—they are writings that simply reproduce ordinary speech, unadorned by rhythm and music. Some of the many authors of such works have left us writings that constitute

a danger. Now, my splendid Guardians of the Laws, how are you going to deal with these works? What will be the right instructions for the lawgiver to give you about coping with them? I reckon he's going to be very much at a loss.

Clinias/ What is the difficulty you're talking about, sir? It looks as if you're faced by a genuine personal problem.

Athenian Stranger/ Your assumption is quite right, Clinias. But the two of you are my partners in legislation, and I'm obliged to tell you when I think I anticipate a difficulty and when I do not.

Clinias/ Oh? What makes you bring up that aspect of the business at this point? What's the matter?

Athenian Stranger/ I'll tell you: the idea of contradicting many thousands of voices. That's always difficult.

Clinias/ Well, bless my soul! Do you really imagine that your existing legislative proposals flout popular prejudices in just a few tiny details?

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, that's fair comment. The point you're making, I take it, is that although a lot of people set their face against the path we are following in our discussion, just as many are enthusiastic about it (or even if they are fewer in number, they're not inferior in quality)—and you're telling me to rely on the support of the latter and proceed with boldness and resolution along the legislative path opened up for us by our present discussion, and not to hang back.

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ Best foot forward, then. Now, what I say is this. We have a great many poets who compose in hexameters and trimeters and all the standard meters; some of these authors try to be serious, while others aim at a comic effect. Over and over again it's claimed that in order to educate young people properly we have to cram their

heads full of this stuff; we have to organize recitations of it so that they never stop listening to it and acquire a vast repertoire, getting whole poets off by heart. Another school of thought excerpts the outstanding work of all the poets and compiles a treasury of complete passages, claiming that if the wide knowledge of a fully informed person is to produce a sound and sensible citizen, these extracts must be committed to memory and learned by rote. I suppose you're now pressing me to be quite frank and show these people where they are right and where they've gone wrong?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, in a nutshell, what sort of estimate will do them all justice? I imagine everybody would agree if I put it rather like this. Each of these authors has produced a lot of fine work, and a lot of rubbish too—but if that's so, I maintain that learning so much of it puts the young at risk.

Clinias/ So what recommendation would you give the Guardian of the Laws?

Athenian Stranger/ What about?

Clinias/ The model work that will enable him to decide what material all the children may learn, and what not. Tell us, without any hesitation.

Athenian Stranger/ My dear Clinias, I suspect I've had a bit of luck.

Clinias/ How's that?

Athenian Stranger/ Because I haven't got far to look for a model. You see, when I look back now over this discussion of ours, which has lasted from dawn up till this very moment—a discussion in which I think I sense the inspiration of heaven—well, it's come to look, to my eyes, just like a literary composition. Perhaps not surprisingly, I was overcome by a feeling of immense satisfaction at the

sight of my 'collected works', so to speak, because, of all the addresses I have ever learned or listened to, whether in verse or in this kind of free prose style I've been using, it's these that have impressed me as being the most eminently acceptable and the most entirely appropriate for the ears of the younger generation. So I could hardly commend a better model than this to the Guardian of the Laws in charge of education. Here's what he must tell the teachers to teach the children, and if he comes across similar and related material while working through prose writings, or the verse of poets, or when listening to unwritten compositions in simple prose that show a family resemblance to our discussion today, he must on no account let them slip through his fingers, but have them committed to writing. His first job will be to compel the teachers to learn this material and speak well of it, and he must not employ as his assistants any teachers who disapprove of it; he should employ only those who endorse his own high opinion, and entrust them with the teaching and education of the children. That, then, is my doctrine on literature and its teachers, so let me finish there.

Clinias/ Well, sir, as far as I can judge from our original program, we've not strayed off the subjects we set out to discuss. But is our general policy the right one, or not? I suspect it would be difficult to say for sure.

Athenian Stranger/ That, Clinias, as we have often remarked, is something which will probably become clearer of its own accord when we've completely finished expounding our laws.

Clinias/ True enough.

Athenian Stranger/ After the teacher of literature, surely, we have to address the lyre-master?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now when we allocate these masters the duties of teaching this instrument and giving instruction in the subject in general, I think we ought to remember the line we took earlier.

Clinias/ What line do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ We said think, that the sixty-year-old singers of Dionysus should be persons who are particularly sensitive to rhythm and the way in which 'harmonies' are constructed, so that when faced with good or vicious musical representations, and the emotions aroused by them, they may be able to select the works based on good representation and reject those based on bad. The former they should present and sing to the community at large, so as to charm the souls of the young people, encouraging each and every one of them to let these representations guide them along the path that leads to virtue.

Clinias/ You're absolutely right.

Athenian Stranger/ With this object in view, here's how the lyre-master and his pupil must employ the notes of their instruments. By exploiting the fact that each string makes a distinct sound, they must produce notes that are identical in pitch to the words being sung. The lyre should not be used to play an elaborate independent melody: that is, its strings must produce no notes except those of the composer of the melody being played; small intervals should not be combined with large, nor quick tempo with slow, nor low notes with high. Similarly, the rhythms of the music of the lyre must not be tricked out with all sorts of frills and adornments. All this sort of thing must be kept from students who are going to acquire a working knowledge of music in three years, without wasting time. Such conflict and confusion makes learning difficult, whereas the young people should above all be swift learners, because they have a great many important

compulsory subjects laid down for them as it is—and in due time, as our discussion progresses, we shall see what these subjects are. But all these musical matters should be controlled, according to his brief, by our official in charge of education. As regards the actual singing, and the words, we have explained earlier what tunes and style of language the chorus-masters must teach: we said—remember? —that these things should be consecrated and each allocated to a suitable festival, so as to benefit society by the welcome pleasure they give.

Clinias/ Here again you've spoken the truth —

Athenian Stranger/ —the whole truth and nothing but the truth! So these are the regulations the person appointed as our Director of Music must adopt and enforce: let's wish him the best of luck in his task.

We, however, must supplement our previous regulations about dancing and the training of the body in general. We've filled in the gaps in our tuition in the case of music, so now let's deal with physical training in the same way. Both boys and girls, of course, must learn to dance and perform physical exercises?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ So it won't come amiss if we provide dancing masters for the boys and dancing mistresses for the girls, so as to facilitate practice.

Clinias/ Agreed.

Athenian Stranger/ So now let's summon once again the official that has the hardest job of all—the Director of Children. He'll be in charge both of music and of physical training, so he won't get much time off.

Clinias/ How then will a man of his advancing years be able to supervise so much?

Athenian Stranger/ There is no problem here, my friend. The law has already given him permission, which it will not withdraw, to recruit as assistant supervisors any citizens he may wish, of either sex. He will know whom to choose, and a sober respect for his office and a realization of its importance will make him anxious not to choose wrongly, because he'll be well aware that only if the younger generation has received and goes on receiving a correct education shall we find everything is 'plain sailing', whereas if not—well, it would be inappropriate to describe the consequences, and as the state is young we shall refrain from doing so, out of respect for the feelings of the excessively superstitious.

Well then, on these topics too—I mean dances and the entire range of movements involved in physical training—we have already said a great deal. We are establishing gymnasia for all physical exercises of a military kind—archery and deployment of missiles in general, skirmishing, heavy-armed fighting of every variety, tactical maneuvers, marches of every sort, pitching camp, and also the various disciplines of the cavalryman. In all these subjects there must be public instructors paid out of public funds; their lessons must be attended by the boys and men of the state, and the girls and women as well, because they too have to master all these techniques. While still girls, they must practice every kind of dancing and fighting in armor; when grown women, they must play their part in maneuvering, getting into battle formation and taking off and putting on weapons, if only to ensure that if it ever proves necessary for the whole army to leave the state and take the field abroad, so that the children and the rest of the population are left unprotected, the women will at least be able to defend them. On the other hand—and this is one of those things we can't swear is impossible—suppose a large and powerful army, whether

Greek or not, were to force a way into the country and make them fight a desperate battle for the very existence of the state. It would be a disaster for their society if its women proved to have been so shockingly ill-educated that they couldn't even rival female birds, who are prepared to run every risk and die for their chicks fighting against the most powerful of wild animals. What if, instead of that, the women promptly made off to temples and thronged every altar and sanctuary, and covered the human race with the disgrace of being by nature the most lily-livered creatures under the sun?

Clinias/ By heaven, sir, no state in which that happened could avoid disgrace—quite apart from the damage that would be caused.

Athenian Stranger/ So let's lay down a law to the effect that women must not neglect to cultivate the techniques of fighting, at any rate to the extent indicated. These are skills which all citizens, male and female, must take care to acquire.

Clinias/ That gets my vote, at least.

Athenian Stranger/ Now for wrestling. We've partly dealt with this already, but we haven't described what in my eyes is its most important feature. But it's not easy to find words to explain it unless at the same time someone gives an actual demonstration with his body. So we'll postpone a decision on this point till we can support our statements with concrete examples and prove, among other points we've mentioned, that of all physical movements, those involved in our kind of wrestling are the most closely related to those demanded in warfare, and in particular that we should practice wrestling for the sake of military efficiency, rather than cultivate the latter in order to be better wrestlers.

Clinias/ You're right in that, at least.

Athenian Stranger/ So let's accept what we've said so far as an adequate statement of what wrestling can do for a man. The proper term for most of the other movements that can be executed by the body as a whole is 'dancing'. Two varieties, the decent and the disreputable, have to be distinguished. The first is a representation of the movements of graceful people, and the aim is to create an effect of grandeur; the second imitates the movements of unsightly people and tries to present them in an unattractive light. Both have two subdivisions. The first subdivision of the decent kind represents handsome, courageous soldiers locked in the violent struggles of war; the second portrays a man of temperate character enjoying moderate pleasures in a state of prosperity, and the natural name for this is 'dance of peace'. The dance of war differs fundamentally from the dance of peace, and the correct name for it will be the 'Pyrrhic'. It depicts the motions executed to avoid blows and shots of all kinds (dodging, retreating, jumping into the air, crouching); and it also tries to represent the opposite kind of motion, the more aggressive postures adopted for shooting and discharging javelins and delivering various kinds of blows. In these dances, which portray fine physiques and noble characters, the correct posture is maintained if the body is kept erect in a state of vigorous tension, with the limbs extended nearly straight. A posture with the opposite characteristics we reject as not correct. As for the dance of peace, the point we have to watch in every chorus-performer is this: how successfully—or how disastrously—does he keep up the fine style of dancing to be expected from men who've been brought up under good laws? This means we'd better distinguish the dubious style of dancing from the style we may accept without question. So can we define the two? Where should the line be drawn between them? 'Bacchic' dances and the like, which (the dancers allege) are a

‘representation’ of drunken persons they call Nymphs and Pans and Sileni and Satyrs, and which are performed during ‘purifications’ and ‘initiations’, are something of a problem: taken as a group, they cannot be termed either ‘dances of peace’ or ‘dances of war’, and indeed they resist all attempts to label them. The best procedure, I think, is to treat them as separate from ‘war-dances’ and ‘dances of peace’, and put them in a category of their own which a statesman may ignore as outside his province. That will entitle us to leave them on one side and get back to dances of peace and war, both of which undeniably deserve our attention.

Now, what about the non-combatant Muse? The dances she leads in honor of the gods and children of gods will comprise one broad category of dances performed with a sense of well-being. This is how we shall distinguish between the two forms this feeling may take: the particularly keen pleasure felt by people who have emerged from trouble and danger to a state of happiness; the quieter pleasures of those whose past good fortune has not only continued but increased. Now, take a man in either of these situations. The greater his pleasure the brisker his body’s movements; more modest pleasures make his actions correspondingly less brisk. Again, the more composed the man’s temperament, and the tougher he has been trained to be, the more deliberate are his movements; on the other hand, if he’s a coward and has not been trained to show restraint, his actions are wilder and his postures change more violently. And in general, when a man uses his voice to talk or sing, he finds it very difficult to keep his body still. This is the origin of the whole art of dancing: the gestures that express what one is saying. Some of us make gestures that are invariably in harmony with our words, but some of us fail. In fact, one has only to reflect on many other ancient terms that have come down to us, to see that they should be

commended for their aptness and accuracy. One such term describes the dances performed by those who enjoy prosperity and seek only moderate pleasures: it's just the right word, and whoever coined it must have been a real musician. He very sensibly gave all such dances the name 'emmeleiai,' and established two categories of approved dancing, the 'war-dance' (which he called 'Pyrrhic') and 'dance of peace' ('emmeleiai,') thus giving each its apt and appropriate title. The lawgiver should give an outline of them, and the Guardian of the Laws should see where they are to be found; then, after hunting them out, he must combine the dance-sequences with the other musical elements, and allocate each sacrifice and feast in the calendar the style of dance that is appropriate. After thus consecrating the whole list of dances, he must henceforth refrain from altering any feature either of the dancing or the singing: the same state and the same citizens (who should all be the same sort of people, as far as possible), should enjoy the same pleasures in the same fashion: that is the secret of a happy and a blessed life.

So much for the way men of superior physique and noble character should perform in choruses of the kind we've prescribed. We are now obliged to examine and pronounce on the misshapen bodies and degraded outlook of those performers who have turned to producing ludicrous and comic effects by exploiting the opportunities for humorous mimicry offered by dialogue, song and dance. Now anyone who means to acquire a discerning judgment will find it impossible to understand the serious side of things in isolation from their ridiculous aspect, or indeed appreciate anything at all except in the light of its opposite. But if we intend to acquire virtue, even on a small scale, we can't be serious and comic too, and this is precisely why we must learn to recognize buffoonery, to avoid being trapped by our

ignorance of it into doing or saying anything ridiculous when there's no call for it. Such mimicry must be left to slaves and hired aliens, and no one must ever take it at all seriously. No citizen or citizeness must be found learning it, and the performances must always contain some new twist. With that law, and that explanation of it, humorous amusements—usually known as 'comedy'—may be dismissed.

But what about our 'serious' poets, as they're called, the tragedians? Suppose some of them were to come forward and ask us some such question as this: 'Gentlemen, may we enter your state and country, or not? And may we bring our work with us? Or what's your policy on this point?' What would be the right reply for us to make to these inspired geniuses?

This, I think: 'Most honored guests, we're tragedians ourselves, and our tragedy is the finest and best we can create. At any rate, our entire state has been constructed so as to be a "representation" of the finest and noblest life—the very thing we maintain is most genuinely a tragedy. So we are poets like yourselves, composing in the same genre, and your competitors as artists and actors in the finest drama, which true law alone has the natural powers to "produce" to perfection (of that we're quite confident). So don't run away with the idea that we shall ever blithely allow you to set up stage in the market-place and bring on your actors whose fine voices will carry further than ours. Don't think we'll let you declaim to women and children and the general public, and talk about the same practices as we do but treat them differently—indeed, more often than not, so as virtually to contradict us. We should be absolutely daft, and so would any state as a whole, to let you go ahead as we've described before the authorities had decided whether your work was fit to be recited and suitable for public performance or not.

So, you sons of the charming Muses, first of all show your songs to the authorities for comparison with ours, and if your doctrines seem the same as or better than our own, we'll let you produce your plays; but if not, friends, that we can never do.'

So as regards chorus performances in general and the question of learning a part in them, custom will march hand in hand with law—dealing with slaves and their masters separately, if you are agreeable.

Clinias/ How could we fail to agree, at any rate for the moment?

Athenian Stranger/ For gentlemen three related disciplines still remain: computation and the study of numbers; measurements of lines, surfaces and solids; the mutual relationship of the heavenly bodies as they revolve in their courses. None of these subjects must be studied in minute detail by the general public, but only by a chosen few (and who they are, we shall say when the time comes, when our discussion is drawing to a close). But what about the man in the street? It would certainly be a disgrace for him to be ignorant of what people very rightly call the 'indispensable rudiments'; but it will be difficult—impossible, even—for him to make a minute study of the entire subject. However, we can't dispense with the basic necessities, which was probably the point in the mind of the coiner of that saying about God, to the effect that 'not even God will be found at odds with necessity'—presumably divine necessities, because if you interpret the remark as referring to necessities in the mortal realm, as do most people who quote such things, it's by far the most naive remark that could be made.

Clinias/ Well, then, sir, what necessities, divine rather than the other sort, are relevant to these studies?

Athenian Stranger/ These, I think: the necessities of which at least some practical and theoretical knowledge will always be essential for every god, spirit or hero who means to take charge of human beings in a responsible fashion. A man, at any rate, will fall a long way short of such godlike standards if he can't recognize one, two and three, or odd and even numbers in general, or hasn't the faintest notion how to count, or can't reckon up the days and nights, and is ignorant of the revolutions of the sun and moon and the other heavenly bodies. It's downright stupid to expect that anyone who wants to make the slightest progress in the highest branches of knowledge can afford to ignore any of these subjects. But what parts of them should be studied, and how intensively, and when? Which topics should be combined, and which kept separate? How will they be synthesized? These are the first questions we have to answer, and then with these preliminary lessons to guide us we may advance to the remaining studies. This is the natural procedure enforced by the necessity with which we maintain no god contends now, or ever will.

Clinias/ Yes, sir, those proposals of yours, put like that, seem natural and correct.

Athenian Stranger/ They certainly are, Clinias, but such a preliminary statement of them is difficult to put into legal form. If you like, we'll postpone more precise legislation till later.

Clinias/ It looks to us, sir, as if you're deterred by the way our countrymen commonly neglect this sort of subject. But your fears are quite groundless, so try to tell us what you think, without keeping anything back on that account.

Athenian Stranger/ I am indeed deterred, for the reasons you mention, but I am even more appalled at those who have actually undertaken those studies, but in the wrong

manner. Total ignorance over an entire field is never dangerous or disastrous; much more damage is done when a subject is known intimately and in detail, but has been improperly taught.

Clinias/ You're right.

Athenian Stranger/ So we should insist that gentlemen should study each of these subjects to at least the same level as very many children in Egypt, who acquire such knowledge at the same time as they learn to read and write. First, lessons in calculation have been devised for tiny tots to learn while they are enjoying themselves at play: they divide up a given number of garlands or apples among larger or smaller groups, and arrange boxers or wrestlers in an alternation of 'byes' and 'pairs', or in a sequence of either, and in the various further ways in which 'byes' and 'pairs' naturally succeed each other. Another game the teachers play with them is to jumble up bowls of gold and bronze and silver and so on, or distribute whole sets of one material. In this way, as I indicated, they make the uses of elementary arithmetic an integral part of their pupils' play, so that they get a useful introduction to the art of marshaling, leading and deploying an army, or running a household; and in general they make them more alert and resourceful persons. Next, the teacher puts the children on to measuring lengths, surfaces and solids—a study which rescues them from the deep-rooted ignorance, at once comic and shocking, that all men display in this field.

Clinias/ What sort of ignorance do you mean, in particular?

Athenian Stranger/ My dear Clinias, even I took a very long time to discover mankind's plight in this business; but when I did, I was amazed, and could scarcely believe that

human beings could suffer from such swinish stupidity. I blushed not only for myself, but for Greeks in general.

Clinias/ Why so? Go on, sir, tell us what you're getting at.

Athenian Stranger/ I'll explain—or rather, I'll make my point by asking you a few questions. Here's a simple one: you know what's meant by a 'line', I suppose?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well. What about 'surface'?

Clinias/ Surely.

Athenian Stranger/ You appreciate that these are two distinct things, and that 'volume' is a third?

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ And you regard all these as commensurable?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ And one length, I suppose, is essentially expressible in terms of another length, one surface in terms of another surface, and one volume in terms of another volume?

Clinias/ Exactly.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, what if some of these can't be thus expressed, either 'exactly' or approximately. What if some can, and some cannot, in spite of your thinking they all can? What do you think of your ideas on the subject now?

Clinias/ They're worthless, obviously.

Athenian Stranger/ What about the relationship of line and surface to volume, or surface and line to each other? Don't all we Greeks regard them as in some sense commensurable?

Clinias/ We certainly do.

Athenian Stranger/ But if, as I put it, 'all we Greeks' believe them to be commensurable when fundamentally they are incommensurable, one had better address these people as follows (blushing the while on their behalf): 'Now then, most esteemed among the Greeks, isn't this one of those subjects we said it was disgraceful not to understand—not that a knowledge of the basic essentials was much to be proud of?'

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now there are a number of additional and related topics which are a fertile breeding-ground for mistakes similar to those we've mentioned.

Clinias/ What sort of topics?

Athenian Stranger/ The real relationship between commensurables and in-commensurables. We must be very poor specimens if on inspection we can't tell them apart. These are the problems we ought to keep on putting up to each other, in a competitive spirit, when we've sufficient time to do them justice; and it's a much more civilized pastime for old men than checkers.

Clinias/ Perhaps so. Come to think of it, checkers is not radically different from such studies.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, Clinias, I maintain that these subjects are what the younger generation should go in for. They do no harm, and are not very difficult: they can be learned in play, and so far from harming the state, they'll do it some good. But if anyone disagrees, we must listen to his case.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ However, although obviously we shall sanction them if that proves to be their effect, we shall reject them if they seem to disappoint our expectations.

Clinias/ Obviously indeed. No doubt about it.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, sir, so that our legal code shall have no gaps, let's regard these studies as an established but independent part of the desired curriculum—independent, that is, of the rest of the framework of the state, so that they can be 'redeemed' like 'pledges', in case the arrangements fail to work out to the satisfaction of us the depositors or you the pledgees.

Clinias/ Yes, that's a fair way to present them.

Athenian Stranger/ Next, consider astronomy. Would a proposal to teach it to the young meet with your approval, or not?

Clinias/ Just tell us what you think.

Athenian Stranger/ Now here's a very odd thing, that really is quite intolerable.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ We generally say that so far as the supreme deity and the universe are concerned, we ought not to bother our heads hunting up explanations, because that is an act of impiety. In fact, precisely the opposite seems to be true.

Clinias/ What's your point?

Athenian Stranger/ My words will surprise you, and you may well think them out of place on the lips of an old man. But it's quite impossible to keep quiet about a study, if one believes it is noble and true, a blessing to society and pleasing in the sight of God.

Clinias/ That's reasonable enough, but what astronomy are we going to find of which we can say all that?

Athenian Stranger/ My dear fellows, at the present day nearly all we Greeks do the great gods—Sun and Moon—an injustice.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ We say that they, and certain other heavenly bodies with them, never follow the same path. Hence our name for them: 'planets.'

Clinias/ Good heavens, sir, that's absolutely right. In the course of my life I've often seen with my own eyes how the Morning and the Evening Star, and a number of others, never describe the same course, but vary from one to another; and we all know that the sun and moon always move like that.

Athenian Stranger/ Megillus and Clinias, this is precisely the sort of point about the gods of the heavens that I am insisting our citizens and young men must study, so as to learn enough about them all to avoid blasphemy, and to use reverent language whenever they sacrifice and offer up their pious prayers.

Clinias/ Right enough—if it's possible, in the first place, to acquire the knowledge you mention. On the assumption that investigation will enable us to correct any errors in our present statements, I too agree that this subject must be studied, in view of its grandeur and importance. So do your level best to convince us of the case you're making, and we'll try to follow you and take in what you say.

Athenian Stranger/ My point is not an easy one to appreciate, but it's not unduly difficult either, and won't take up a lot of time, as I'll prove to you by my ability to keep my explanation brief—even though it wasn't so very long ago, when I was no youngster, that I heard of these things. If the subject were difficult, I'd never be able to explain it to you, old men that we all are.

Clinias/ You're right. But what is this subject you say is so wonderful, so suitable for young men to learn, yet unknown to us? Try to tell us that much about it, at any rate, as clearly as you can.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, try I must. This belief, my dear fellows, that the moon and sun and other heavenly bodies do in fact 'wander', is incorrect: precisely the opposite is true. Actually, each of them perpetually describes just one fixed orbit, although it is true that to all appearances its path is always changing. Further, the quickest body is wrongly supposed to be the slowest, and vice versa. So if the facts are as stated, and we are in error, we're no better than spectators at Olympia would be, if they said that the fastest horse in the race or the fastest long-distance runner was the slowest, and the slowest the fastest, and composed panegyrics and songs extolling the loser as the winner. I don't suppose the praises showered on the runners would be at all apt or welcome to them—they're only men, after all! At Olympia, such a mistake would be merely ludicrous. But what are we to think of the analogous theological errors we're committing nowadays? In this field such mistakes are not funny at all; and it certainly gives the gods no pleasure to have us spread false rumors about them.

Clinias/ Very true—if you're right about the facts.

Athenian Stranger/ So if we can prove I am right, all such topics as these must be studied to the level indicated, but in the absence of proof they must be left alone. May we adopt this as agreed policy?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ So it's high time to call a halt to our regulations about the subjects to be studied in the educational curriculum, and turn our attention to hunting and all that sort of thing. Here too we must adopt the same procedure as before, because the legislator's job is not done if he simply lays down laws and gets quit of the business. In addition to his legislation, he must provide something else, which occupies a sort of no-man's land between admonition

and law. This is a point, of course, that we've come across often enough as we talked of this and that, as for instance when we dealt with the training of very young children. We hold that although education at that level is certainly the sort of topic on which suggestions are needed, it would be plain silly to think of these suggestions as formal laws. Even when the actual laws and the complete constitution have been thus formally committed to writing, you don't exhaust the praises of a supremely virtuous citizen by saying 'Here's a good man for you, a devoted and utterly obedient servant of the laws'. Your praise will be more comprehensive if you can say, 'He's a good man because he has given a lifetime of unswerving obedience to the written words of the legislator, whether they took the form of a law, or simply expressed approval or disapproval'. There is no truer praise of a citizen than that. The real job of the legislator is not only to write his laws, but to blend into them an explanation of what he regards as respectable and what he does not, and the perfect citizen must be bound by these standards no less than by those backed by legal sanctions.

We can cite our present subject as a kind of witness to demonstrate the point more clearly. You know how 'hunting' takes a great many forms, almost all of which are nowadays covered by this one term. There is a variety of ways of hunting water animals, and the same goes for the birds of the air, and the animals that live on land too—and not only the wild ones, either: we also have to take into account the hunting of men, not merely by their enemies in war (such as the raids carried out by robbers and the pursuit of army by army), but by their lovers, who 'pursue' their quarry for many different reasons, some admirable, some execrable. When the legislator comes to lay down his laws about hunting he cannot leave all this unexplained, but neither can he produce a set of menacing regulations by imposing

rules and punishments for all cases. So how are we going to tackle this kind of thing? He—the legislator—having asked himself 'Are these suitable exercises and activities for the young, or not?', must then approve or condemn the various forms of hunting. The young men, for their part, must listen to the lawgiver and obey him, without being seduced by the prospect of pleasure or deterred by vigorous effort; and they should pay much more attention to carrying out warm recommendations than to the detailed threats and punishment of the formal law.

With those preliminaries, we may now put in due form our approval or disapproval of the various forms of hunting, commending the kind that is a good influence on the younger generation and censuring the other sort. So let's now follow up with a talk to the young people, and address them in this idealistic vein:

Friends, we hope you'll never be seized by a desire or passion to fish in the sea or to angle or indeed to hunt water animals at all; and don't resort to creels, which a lazybones will leave to catch his prey whether he's asleep or awake. We hope you never feel any temptation to capture men on the high seas and take to piracy, which will make you into brutal hunters and outlaws; and we hope it never so much as occurs to you to turn thief in town or country. Nor should any young man ever be seduced by a fancy to trap birds—away with such an uncivilized desire! That leaves only land animals for the athletes of our state to hunt and capture. Now sometimes this is done by what is called "night-hunting," when the participants, sluggards that they are, take it in turn to sleep. This sort of hunting is not to be recommended, nor is the sort that offers periods of rest from exertion, where the savage strength of the animals is subdued by nets and traps, rather than because a hunter who relishes the fight has got the better of them. All men

who wish to cultivate the “divine” courage have only one type of hunting left, which is the best: the capture of four-footed animals with the help of dogs and horses and by your own exertions, when you hunt in person and subdue all your prey by chasing and striking them and hurling weapons at them.’

This address may be taken as an explanation of what we approve and condemn in this entire business. Here’s the actual law:

No one should restrain these genuinely ‘holy’ hunters from taking their hounds where they like and as they like; but the night-trapper, who relies on nets and snares, must not be allowed by anyone, at any time or place, to hunt his prey.

The fowler is not to be restrained on fallow-land or on the mountain side, but any passer-by should chase him off cultivated or holy ground.

The fisherman is to be allowed to fish anywhere except in harbors and sacred rivers, ponds and lakes, provided only that he does not make the water turbid by using noxious juices.

So here’s where we have to say that our regulations about education are finally complete.

Clinias/ That’s good news!

Book 8.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, the next job is to enlist the aid of the oracles reported from Delphi to draw up a program of festivals to be established by law, and discover what sacrifices the state will find it 'meet and right' to offer and which gods should receive them. It will probably be within our own discretion to decide the number and the occasions.

Clinias/ Yes, I dare say the number will be up to us.

Athenian Stranger/ So let's deal with that first. There are to be no less than three hundred and sixty-five of them, so as to ensure that there is always at least one official sacrificing to some god or spirit on behalf of the state, its citizens and their property. The Expounders, Priests, Priestesses and Prophets are to hold a meeting with the Guardians of the Laws and fill in the details the legislator has inevitably omitted (in fact, this same combined board will also have to spot where such deficiencies exist in the first place). The law will provide for twelve festivals in honor of the twelve gods who give their names to the individual tribes. Every month the citizens should sacrifice to each of these gods and arrange chorus performances and cultural and gymnastic contests, varied according to the deity concerned and appropriate to the changing seasons of the year; and they must divide festivals for women into those that must be celebrated in the absence of men, and those that need not be. Further, they must not confuse the cult of the gods of the underworld with that of the 'heavenly' gods (as we must style them) and their retinue. They are to keep the two kinds of celebration separate, and put the former by law in the twelfth month, which is sacred to Pluto. Men of battle should feel no horror for such a god as this—on the contrary, they should honor him as a great friend of the human race. The union of body and soul, you see, can never

be superior to their separation (and I mean that quite seriously).

There's a further point they will have to appreciate if they are going to allocate these events satisfactorily. Although on the score of leisure-time and abundance of all necessities our state has no rivals at the present day, it still has to live the good life, just like the individual person; and the first requirement for a happy life is to do yourself no injury nor allow any to be done to you by others. Of course, the first half of the requirement presents no great problem; the difficulty lies in becoming strong enough to be immune to injury—and the one and only thing that brings such immunity is complete virtue. The same applies to a state: if it adopts the ways of virtue, it can live in peace; but if it is wicked, war and civil war will plague it. That's the situation in a nutshell, and it means that each and every citizen must undertake military training in peace-time, and not leave it till war breaks out. So a state that knows its business should reserve at least one day per month (and more than one, if the authorities think fit) for military maneuvers, to be held without regard for the weather, come rain come shine. Men, women and children should participate, and the authorities will decide from time to time whether to take them out on maneuvers en-masse or in sections. They must never fail to mount a program of wholesome recreation, accompanied by sacrifices; and the program ought to include 'war-games' which should simulate the conditions of actual fighting as realistically as possible. On each field-day they should distribute prizes and awards of merit, and compose speeches in commendation or reproof of each other according to the conduct of individuals not only in the contests but in daily life too: those who are deemed to have acquitted themselves particularly well should be honored, while the failures should be censured. But not everyone should produce such

compositions. For a start, a composer must be at least fifty years old, and he must not be one of those people who for all their poetical and musical competence have not a single noble or outstanding achievement to their credit. The compositions that ought to be sung (even if in terms of art they leave something to be desired) are those of citizens who have achieved a high standard of conduct and whose personal merits have brought them distinction in the state. The official in charge of education, together with the other Guardians of the Laws, are to select them and grant them alone the privilege of giving their Muses free rein; other people are to be entirely forbidden. No one should dare to sing any unauthorized song, not even if it is sweeter than the hymns of Orpheus or of Thamyras. Our citizens must confine themselves to such pieces as have been given the stamp of approval and consecrated to the gods, and to compositions which on the strength of their authors' reputation are judged to be suitable vehicles for commendation or censure. (I intend the same regulations to apply to men and women alike, both as regards military excursions and freedom to compose unsupervised.)

The legislator should think things over and employ this sort of analogy: 'Let's see, now, once I've organized the state as a whole, what sort of citizen do I want to produce? Athletes are what I want—competitors against a million rivals in the most vital struggles of all. Right?' 'Very much so', one would reply, correctly. Well then, if we were training boxers or pancratiasts or competitors in some other similar contest should we go straight into the ring unprepared by a daily work-out against an opponent? If we were boxers, surely we'd have spent days on end before the contest in strenuous practice, learning how to fight, and trying out all those maneuvers we intended to use when the time came to fight to win? We'd come as close as we could to the real

conditions of the contest by putting on practice-gloves instead of thongs, so as to get as much practice as possible in delivering and dodging punches. And if we ran particularly short of sparring partners then we'd go to the trouble of hanging up a lifeless dummy to practice against; and we certainly wouldn't be put off by the idiots who might laugh at us. Come to that, if one day we ran out of sparring partners completely, living or otherwise, and had no one to practice with at all, we'd go so far as to box against our own shadows—shadow-boxing with a vengeance! After all, how else can you describe a practice-session in which you just throw punches at the air?

Clinias/ No, sir, there's no other term for it than the one you've just used.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well. So when the fighting force of our state comes to brace itself to face the most important contest of all—to fight for life and children and property and the entire state—is it really to be after less intensive training than combatants such as these have enjoyed? Is our citizens' legislator going to be so scared that their practice against each other may look silly to some people that he will neglect his duty? I mean his duty of instructing that maneuvers on a small scale, without arms, should be held every day, if possible (and for this purpose he should arrange teams to compete in every kind of gymnastic exercise), whereas the 'major' exercises, in which arms are carried, should be held not less than once per month. The citizens will compete with each other throughout the entire country, to see who is best at occupying positions and laying ambushes, and they must reproduce the conditions of every kind of battle (that will give them real practice, because they will be aiming at the closest possible approximation to the real targets). And they should use missiles that are moderately dangerous: we don't want the competitions they hold against each other to be entirely

unalarming, but to inspire them with fear and do something to reveal the brave man and the coward; and the legislator should confer honors or inflict disgrace as appropriate, so as to prepare the whole state to be an efficient fighter in the real struggle that lasts a lifetime. In fact, if anyone is killed in such circumstances, the homicide should be regarded as involuntary, and the legislator should decree that the killer's hands are clean when once he has been purified according to law. After all, the lawgiver will reflect, even if a few people do die, others who are just as good will be produced to replace them, whereas if fear dies (so to speak), he'll not be able to find in all these activities a yardstick to separate the good performers from the bad—and that would be a bigger disaster for the state than the other.

Clinias/ Yes, sir, we'd agree that this is the sort of law that every state should pass and observe.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we all know, don't we, the reason why this kind of teamwork and competition is not to be found in any state at the present time, except on a very modest scale indeed? I suppose we'd say it was because the masses and their legislators suffer from ignorance?

Clinias/ Maybe so.

Athenian Stranger/ Not a bit of it, my dear Clinias! We ought to say there are two causes, and pretty powerful ones at that.

Clinias/ What are they?

Athenian Stranger/ The first is a passion for wealth which makes men unwilling to devote a minute of their time to anything except their own personal property. This is what every single citizen concentrates on with all his heart and soul; his ruling passion is his daily profit and he's quite incapable of worrying about anything else. Everyone is out for himself, and is very quick off the mark indeed to learn

any skill and apply himself to any technique that fills his pocket; anything that doesn't do that he treats with complete derision. So we can treat this as one reason why states are not prepared to undertake this or any other praiseworthy activity in a serious spirit, whereas their insatiable desire for gold and silver makes them perfectly willing to slave away at any ways and means, fair or foul, that promise to make them rich. It doesn't matter whether something is sanctioned by heaven, or forbidden and absolutely disgusting—it's all the same to them, and causes not the slightest scruple, provided it enables them to make beasts of themselves by wallowing in all kinds of food and drink and indulging every kind of sexual pleasure.

Clinias/ You're quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ So I've described one cause: let's treat this obsession as the first obstacle that prevents states from following an adequate course of training, either for military or for any other purposes: naturally decent folk are turned into traders or merchant-venturers or just plain servants, and bold fellows are made into robbers and burglars, and become bellicose and overbearing. Quite often, though, they are not naturally corrupt: they're simply unlucky.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, if you have to live out your life with a continual hunger in your soul, aren't you 'unlucky' to a degree? What other term could I use?

Clinias/ Very well, that's one reason. What's your second, sir?

Athenian Stranger/ Ah, yes, thank you for jogging my memory.

Clinias/ According to you, one cause is the insatiable and lifelong acquisitive urge which obsesses us all and stops us

undertaking military training in the proper way. All right—now tell us the second.

Athenian Stranger/ I dare say it looks as if I'm putting off getting round to it because I don't know what to say?

Clinias/ No, but you do seem to be such a 'good hater' of this sort of character that you're berating it more than the subject in hand requires.

Athenian Stranger/ That's a very proper rebuke, gentlemen. So you're all ready for the next point, it seems.

Clinias/ Just tell us, that's all!

Athenian Stranger/ The cause I want to put forward are those 'non-constitutions' that I've often mentioned earlier in our conversation—democracy, oligarchy and tyranny. None of these is a genuine political system: the best name for them all would be 'party rule', because under none of them do willing rulers govern willing subjects: that is, the rulers are always willing enough, but they never hold power with the consent of the governed. They hold it by constant resort to a degree of force, and they are never prepared to allow any of their subjects to cultivate virtue or acquire wealth or strength or courage—and least of all will they tolerate a man who can fight. So much for the two main roots of pretty nearly all evil, and certainly the main roots of the evils we're discussing. However, the political system which we are now establishing by law has avoided both of them. Our state enjoys unparalleled leisure, the citizens live free of interference from each other, and I reckon these laws of ours are quite unlikely to turn them into money-grubbers. So it's a reasonable and natural supposition that a political system organized along these lines will be unique among contemporary constitutions in finding room for the military training-cum-sport that we've just described—and described in the detail it deserves, too.

Clinias/ Splendid.

Athenian Stranger/ The next thing we have to bear in mind about any athletic contest is this: if it helps us to train for war we must go in for it and put up prizes for the winners, but leave it strictly alone if it does not. Isn't that right? It will be better to stipulate from the start the contests we want, and provide for them by law. First, I take it we should arrange races, and contests of speed in general?

Clinias/ Yes, we should.

Athenian Stranger/ At any rate, what makes a man a fine soldier more than anything else is general agility, a ready use of his hands as well as his feet. If he's a good runner, he can make a capture or show a clean pair of heels, and versatile hands will stand him in good stead in tangling with the enemy in close combat, where strength and force are essential.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ But if he hasn't any weapons, neither ability will help him as much as it might.

Clinias/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ So in our contests the first competitor our herald will summon will be (as now) the single-length runner, and he will come forward armed; we shan't put up any prizes for competitors who are unarmed. So, as I say, the competitor who intends to run one length will come on first, carrying his arms; second will come the runner over two lengths, and third the middle-distance runner; the long-distance man will come on fourth. The fifth competitor we shall call the 'heavy-armed' runner, from his heavier equipment. We shall start by sending him in full armor over a distance of sixty lengths to some temple of Ares and back. His course will be over comparatively level ground, whereas the other runner, an archer in full archer rig, will run a

course of lengths over hills and constantly changing terrain to a temple of Apollo and Artemis. While we're waiting for these runners to return, we'll hold the other contests and finally award the prizes to the winners of each event.

Clinias/ Fine.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's arrange these contests in three groups, one for boys, one for youths, and one for men. When youths and boys compete as archers and heavy-armed runners, we shall make the course for youths two-thirds of the full distance and for the boys one-half. As for females, girls below the age of puberty must enter (naked) for the single-length, double-length, middle and long-distance races, their competition being confined to the stadium. Girls from thirteen till the marriage-age must enter till they are at least eighteen, but not beyond the age of twenty. (They, however, must put on some suitable clothing before presenting themselves as competitors in these races.)

So much for men's and women's races; now to deal with trials of strength. Instead of wrestling and other he-man contests that are the fashion nowadays, we'll have our citizens fight each other armed—man to man, two a side, and any number per team up to ten. We ought to take our cue from the authorities in charge of wrestling, who have established criteria which will tell you whether a wrestler's performance is good or bad. We must call in the leading exponents of armed combat and ask them to assist us in framing rules about the blows one needs to avoid or inflict to win in this sort of contest, and similarly the points we need to look for to decide the loser. The same set of rules should also apply to the female competitors (who must be below the age of marriage). To replace the pancration we shall establish a general contest of light-infantry; the weapons of the competitors are to be bows, light shields, javelins, and stones cast by hand and sling. Here too we'll

lay down rules, and give the honor of victory to the competitor who reaches the highest standard as defined by the regulations.

The next thing for which we must provide rules is horse-racing. In Crete, of course, horses are of rather limited use and you don't find very many of them, so that the comparatively low level of interest in rearing and racing them is inevitable. No one in this country keeps a team of horses for a chariot, nor is ever likely to covet such a thing, so that if we established contests in something so foreign to the local customs, we'd be taken for idiots (and rightly). The way to modify this sport for the local Cretan terrain is to put up prizes for skill in riding the animals—as foals, when half-grown, and when fully grown. So our law should provide for contests in which jockeys can compete with each other in these categories; Tribe-Leaders and Cavalry-Commanders should be entrusted with the job of deciding the actual courses and deciding which competitor has won (in full armor, of course: just as in the athletic events, if we established contests for unarmed competitors we'd be failing in our duty as legislators). And since your Cretan is no fool at archery and javelin-throwing in the saddle, people should amuse themselves by competing in this sort of contest too. As for women, there's no point in making it legally compulsory for them to join in all this, but if their previous training has got them into the habit, and girls and young women are in good enough shape to take part without hardship, then they should be permitted to do so and not discouraged.

That brings us to the end of our discussion of competitions and the teaching of physical training, and we've seen what strenuous efforts are involved in the contests and the daily sessions with instructors. In fact, we've also dealt pretty thoroughly with the role of the arts,

although arrangements about reciters of poetry and similar performers, and the chorus-competitions obligatory at festivals, can wait till the gods and the minor deities have had their days and months and years allocated to them; then we can decide whether festivals should be held at two-year or four-year intervals, or whether the gods suggest some other pattern. On these occasions we must also expect the various categories of competitions in the arts to be held. This is the province of the stewards of the games, the Minister of Education and the Guardians of the Laws, who should all meet as an ad hoc committee and produce their own regulations about the date of each chorus-competition and dance, and specify who should compete and who may watch. The original legislator has often enough explained the sort of thing each of these performances should be, and has dealt with the songs, the spoken addresses and the musical styles that accompany the rhythmical movements of the dancers. His successors must emulate his example in their own legislation and match the right contests with the right sacrifices at the right times, and so provide festivals at which the state may make merry.

Athenian Stranger/ It's not difficult to see how to cast these and similar matters in the form of a law, and making this or that alteration won't help or harm the state very much. But now for something which is not a triviality at all. It's a point on which it is difficult to convince people, and God himself is really the only person to do it—supposing, that is, we could in fact somehow get explicit instructions from him. Since that's impossible, it looks as if we need some intrepid mortal, who values frankness above all, to specify the policy he believes best for the state and its citizens, give a firm 'no' to our most compelling passions, and order his audience of corrupted souls to observe standards of conduct in keeping with, and implied by, the whole organization of

the state. There will be no one to back him up. He'll walk alone, with reason alone to guide him.

Clinias/ What new topic is this, sir? We don't see what you're getting at.

Athenian Stranger/ That's not surprising. Well, I'll try to put the point more explicitly. When I came to discuss education, I envisaged young men and women associating with each other on friendly terms. Naturally enough, I began to feel some disquiet. I wondered how one would handle a state like this, with everyone engaged on a life-long round of sacrifices and festivals and chorus-performances, and the young men and women well-nourished and free of those demanding and degrading jobs that damp down lust so effectively. Reason, which is embodied in law as far as it can be, tells us to avoid indulging the passions that have ruined so many people. So how will the members of our state avoid them? (Actually, most desires may well be kept in check by the regulations we have already framed. If so, we needn't be surprised. After all, the law against excessive wealth will do a great deal to encourage self-control, and the educational curriculum is full of sound rules designed for the same purpose. The officials too, who have been rigorously trained to watch this point closely, and to keep the young people themselves under constant surveillance, will do something to restrain ordinary passions, as far as any man can.) But there are sexual urges too—of boys and girls and heterosexual love among adults. What precautions should one take against passions which have had a such a powerful effect on public and private life? What's the remedy that will save us from the dangers of sex in each? It's a great problem, Clinias. We're faced with the fact that though in several other respects Crete in general and Sparta give us pretty solid help when we frame laws that flout common custom, in affairs of the heart (there's no one listening, so let's be frank) they are

totally opposed to us. Suppose you follow nature's rule and establish the law that was in force before the time of Laius. You' argue that one may have sexual intercourse with a woman but not with men or boys. As evidence for your view, you'd point to the animal world, where (you'd argue) the males do not have sexual relations with each other, because such a thing is unnatural. But in Crete and Sparta your argument would not go down at all well, and you'd probably persuade nobody. However, another argument is that such practices are incompatible with what in our view should be the constant aim of the legislator—that is, we're always asking 'which of our regulations encourages virtue, and which does not?' Now then, suppose in the present case we agreed to pass a law that such practices are desirable, or not at all undesirable—what contribution would they make to virtue? Will the spirit of courage spring to life in the soul of the seduced person? Will the soul of the seducer learn habits of self-control? No one is going to be led astray by that sort of argument—quite the contrary. Everyone will censure the weakling who yields to temptation, and condemn his all-too-effeminate partner who plays the role of the woman. So who on earth will pass a law like that? Hardly anyone, at any rate if he knows what a genuine law really is. Well, how do we show the truth of this? If you want to get these things straight, you have to analyze the nature of friendship and desire and 'love', as people call it. There are two separate categories, plus a third which is a combination of both. But one term covers all three, and that causes no end of muddle and confusion.

Clinias/ How's that?

Athenian Stranger/ When two people are virtuous and alike, or when they are equals, we say that one is a 'friend' of the other; but we also speak of the poor man's 'friendship' for the man who has grown rich, even though they are poles

apart. In either case, when the friendship is particularly ardent, we call it 'love'.

Clinias/ Yes, we do.

Athenian Stranger/ And a violent and stormy friendship it is, when a man is attracted to someone widely different to himself, and only seldom do we see it reciprocated. When men are alike, however, they show a calm and mutual affection that lasts a lifetime. But there is a third category, compounded of the other two. The first problem here is to discover what this third kind of lover is really after. There is the further difficulty that he himself is confused and torn between two opposing instincts: one tells him to enjoy his beloved, the other forbids him. The lover of the body, hungry for his partner who is ripe to be enjoyed, like a luscious fruit, tells himself to have his fill, without showing any consideration for his beloved's character and disposition. But in another case physical desire will count for very little and the lover will be content to gaze upon his beloved without lusting for him—a mature and genuine desire of soul for soul. That body should sate itself with body he'll think outrageous; his reverence and respect for self-control, courage, high principles and good judgment will make him want to live a life of purity, chaste lover with chaste beloved. This combination of the first two is the 'third' love we enumerated a moment ago.

So there's your list of the various forms love can take: should the law forbid them all, and keep them out of our community? Or isn't it obvious that in our state we'd want to see the virtuous kind spring up—the love that aims to make a young man perfect? It's the other two we'll forbid, if we can. Or what is our policy, Megillus, my friend?

Megillus/ Indeed, sir, I heartily endorse what you've said on the subject.

Athenian Stranger/ So it looks as if I've won you over, my dear fellow, as I guessed I would, and there's no call for me to inquire what line the law of Sparta takes on this topic: it is enough to note your assent to my argument. Later on I'll come back to the subject and try to charm Clinias also into agreeing with me. Let's assume you've both conceded my point, and press on with our laws without delay.

Megillus/ Fair enough.

Athenian Stranger/ I want to put the law on this subject on a firm footing, and at the moment I'm thinking of a method which is, in a sense, simplicity itself. But from another point of view, nothing could be harder.

Megillus/ What are you getting at?

Athenian Stranger/ We're aware, of course, that even nowadays most men, in spite of their general disregard for the law, are very effectively prevented from having relations with people they find attractive. And they don't refrain reluctantly, either—they're more than happy to.

Megillus/ What circumstances have you in mind?

Athenian Stranger/ When it's one's brother or sister whom one finds attractive. And the same law, unwritten though it is, is extremely effective in stopping a man sleeping—secretly or otherwise—with his son or daughter, or making any kind of amorous approach to them. Most people feel not the faintest desire for such intercourse.

Megillus/ That's perfectly true.

Athenian Stranger/ So the desire for this sort of pleasure is stifled by a few words?

Megillus/ What words do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ The doctrine that 'these acts are absolutely unholy, an abomination in the sight of the gods, and that nothing is more revolting'. We refrain from them

because we never hear them spoken of in any other way. From the day of our birth each of us encounters a complete unanimity of opinion wherever we go; we find it not only in comedies but often in the high seriousness of tragedy too, when we see a Thyestes on the stage, or an Oedipus or a Macareus, the clandestine lover of his sister. We watch these characters dying promptly by their own hand as a penalty for their crimes.

Megillus/ You're right in this, anyway, that when no one ventures to challenge the law, public opinion works wonders.

Athenian Stranger/ So we were justified in what we said just now. When the legislator wants to tame one of the desires that dominate mankind so cruelly, it's easy for him to see his method of attack. He must try to make everyone—slave and free, women and children, and the entire state without any exception—believe that this common opinion has the backing of religion. He couldn't put his law on a securer foundation than that.

Megillus/ Very true. But how on earth it will ever be possible to produce such spontaneous unanimity—

Athenian Stranger/ I'm glad you've taken me up on the point. This is just what I was getting at when I said I knew of a way to put into effect this law of ours which permits the sexual act only for its natural purpose, procreation, and forbids not only homosexual relations, in which the human race is deliberately murdered, but also the sowing of seeds on rocks and stone, where it will never take root and mature into a new individual; and we should also have to keep away from any female 'soil' in which we'd be sorry to have the seed develop. At present, however, the law is effective only against intercourse between parent and child, but if it can be put on a permanent footing and made to apply effectively, as it

deserves to, in other cases as well, it'll do a power of good. The first point in its favor is that it is a natural law. But it also tends to check the raging fury of the sexual instinct that so often leads to adultery; it discourages excesses in food and drink, and inspires men with affection for their own wives. And there are a great many other advantages to be gained, if only one could get this law established.

But suppose some impatient young man were standing here, bursting with seed, and heard us passing this law. He'd probably raise the echoes with his bellows of abuse, and say our rules were stupid and unrealistic. Now this is just the sort of protest I had in mind when I remarked that I knew of a very simple—and yet very difficult—way of putting this law into effect permanently. It's easy to see that it can be done, and easy to see how: if the rule is given sufficient religious backing, it will get a grip on every soul and intimidate it into obeying the established laws. But in fact we've reached a point where people still think we'd fail, even granted those conditions. It's just the same with the supposed impossibility of the common meals: people see no prospect of a whole state keeping up the practice permanently. The proven facts of the case in your countries do nothing to convince your compatriots that it would be natural to apply the practice to women. It was this flat disbelief that made me remark on the difficulty of turning either proposal into an established law.

Megillus/ You're absolutely right.

Athenian Stranger/ Even so, I could put up quite a convincing case for supposing that the difficulties are not beyond human powers, and can be overcome. Do you want me to try to explain?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ When will a man find it easier to keep off sex, and do as he's told in a decent and willing spirit? When he's not neglected his training and is in the pink of condition, or when he's in poor shape?

Clinias/ He'll find it a great deal easier if he's in training.

Athenian Stranger/ Now of course we've all heard the story of how Iccus of Tarentum set about winning contests at Olympia and elsewhere. He was so ambitious to win, they say, and his expertise was strengthened by a character of such determination and self-discipline, that he never had a woman or even a boy during the whole time he was under intensive training. In fact, we are told very much the same about Crison, Astylus, Diopompus, and a great many others. And yet, Clinias, their characters were far less well educated than the citizens you and I have to deal with, and physically they were much lustier.

Clinias/ Yes, you're right—our ancient sources are quite definite that these athletes did in fact do as you say.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, they steeled themselves to keep off what most people regard as sheer bliss, simply in order to win wrestling matches and races and so forth. But there's a much nobler contest to be won than that, and I hope the young people of our state aren't going to lack the stamina for it. After all, right from their earliest years we're going to tell them stories and talk to them and sing them songs, so as to charm them, we trust, into believing that this victory is the noblest of all.

Clinias/ What victory?

Athenian Stranger/ The conquest of pleasure. If they win this battle, they'll have a happy life—but so much the worse for them if they lose. That apart, the fear that the act is a ghastly sin will, in the end, enable them to tame the passions that their inferiors have tamed before them.

Clinias/ Quite likely.

Athenian Stranger/ So thanks to the general corruption, that's the predicament we've got into at this point in our consideration of the law about sex. My position, therefore, is that the law must go ahead and insist that our citizens' standards should not be lower than those of birds and many other wild animals which are born into large communities and live chaste and unmarried, without intercourse, until the time comes for them to breed. At the appropriate age they pair off; the male picks a wife, and female chooses a husband, and forever afterwards they live in a pious and law-abiding way, firmly faithful to the promises they made when they first fell in love. Clearly our citizens ought to reach standards higher than the animals'. But if they are corrupted by seeing and hearing how most other Greeks and non-Greeks go in for 'free' love on a grand scale, they may prove unable to keep themselves in check. In that case, the law-guardians must turn themselves into law-makers and frame a second law for people to observe.

Clinias/ So if they find it impossible to enforce the ideal law now proposed, what other law do you advise them to pass?

Athenian Stranger/ The second best, Clinias, obviously.

Clinias/ Namely?

Athenian Stranger/ My point is that the appetite for pleasures, which is very strong and grows by being fed, can be starved (you remember) if the body is given plenty of hard work to distract it. We'd get much the same result if we were incapable of having sexual intercourse without feeling ashamed; our shame would lead to infrequent indulgence, and infrequent indulgence would make the desire less compulsive. So in sexual matters our citizens ought to regard privacy—though not complete abstinence—as a

decency demanded by usage and unwritten custom, and lack of privacy as disgusting. That will establish a second legal standard of decency and indecency—not the ideal standard, but the next to it. People whose characters have been corrupted (they form a single group we call the 'self-inferior') will be made prisoners of three influences that will compel them not to break the law.

Clinias/ What influences do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Respect for religion, the ambition to be honored, and a mature passion for spiritual rather than physical beauty. 'Pious wishes!' you'll say; 'what romance!' Perhaps so. But if such wishes were to come true, the world would benefit enormously.

However, God willing, perhaps we'll succeed in imposing one or other of two standards of sexual conduct. Ideally, no one will dare to have relations with any respectable citizen woman except his own wedded wife, or sow illegitimate and bastard seed in courtesans, or sterile seed in males in defiance of nature. Alternatively, while suppressing sodomy entirely, we might insist that if a man does have intercourse with any woman (hired or procured in some other way) except the wife he wed in holy marriage with the blessing of the gods, he must do so without any other man or woman getting to know about it. If he fails to keep the affair secret, I think we'd be right to exclude him by law from the award of state honors, on the grounds that he's no better than an alien. This law, or 'pair' of laws, as perhaps we should say, should govern our conduct whenever the sexual urge and the passion of love impel us, wisely or unwisely, to have intercourse.

Megillus/ Speaking for myself, sir, I'd be very glad to adopt this law of yours. Clinias must tell us his view on the subject himself.

Clinias/ I'll do that later, Megillus, when I think a suitable moment has arrived. For the nonce, let's not stop our friend from going on to the next stage of his legislation.

Megillus/ Fair enough.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, this is the stage we've reached now. We can assume that communal meals have been established (a thing that would be a problem in other countries, we notice, but not in Crete, where no one would think of doing anything else). But how should they be organized? On the Cretan model, or the Spartan? Or is there some third type that would suit us better than either? I don't think this is a difficulty, and there's not much to be gained from settling the point. The arrangements we have made are quite satisfactory as they are.

The next question is the organization of a food-supply in keeping with our communal meals. In other states the sources of supply are many and varied—in fact, at least twice as many as in ours, because most Greeks draw on both the land and the sea for their food, whereas our citizens will use the land alone. For the legislator, this makes things simpler. It's not just that half the number of laws or even substantially fewer will do, but they'll be more suitable laws for gentlemen to observe. Our state's legislator, you see, need not bother his head very much about the merchant-shipping business, trading, retailing, inn-keeping, customs duties, mining, money-lending and compound interest. Waving aside most of these and a thousand other such details, he'll legislate for farmers, shepherds, beekeepers, for the protectors of their stock and the supervisors of their equipment. His laws already cover such major topics as marriage and the birth and rearing of children, as well as their education and the appointment of the state's officials, so the next topic to which he must turn in his legislation is

their food, and the workers who co-operate in the constant effort to produce it.

Let's first specify the 'agricultural' laws, as they're called. The first law—sanctioned by Zeus the Protector of Boundaries—shall run as follows:

No man shall disturb the boundary stones of his neighbor, whether fellow citizen or foreigner (that is, when a proprietor's land is on the boundary of the state), in the conviction that this would be 'moving the immovable' in the crudest sense. Far better that a man should want to try to move the biggest stone that does not mark a boundary, than a small one separating friend's land from foe's, and established by an oath sworn to the gods. Zeus the God of Kin is witness in the one case, Zeus the Protector of Foreigners in the other. Rouse him in either capacity, and the most terrible wars break out. If a man obeys the law he will escape its penalties, but if he holds it in contempt he is to be liable to two punishments, the first at the hands of the gods, the second under the law. No man, if he can help it, must move the boundary stones of his neighbor's land, but if anyone does move them, any man who wishes should report him to the farmers, who should take him to court.

If anyone is found guilty of such a charge, he must be regarded as a man who has tried to reallocate land, whether clandestinely or by force; and the court must bear that in mind when assessing what penalty he should suffer or what fine he should pay.

Next we come to those numerous petty injuries done by neighbor to neighbor. The frequent repetition of such injuries makes feelings run high, so that relations between neighbors become intolerably embittered. That's why everyone should do everything he can to avoid offending his neighbor; above all, he must always go out of his way to

avoid all acts of encroachment. Hurting a man is all too easy, and we all get the chance to do that; but it's not everyone who is in a position to do a good turn.

If a man oversteps his boundaries and encroaches on his neighbor's land, he should pay for the damage, and also, by way of cure for such uncivilized and inconsiderate behavior, give the injured party a further sum of twice that amount.

In all these and similar cases the Country-Wardens should act as inspectors, judges and assessors (the entire divisional company in the graver cases, as indicated earlier, and the Guards-in-Chief in the more trivial).

If a man lets his cattle graze on someone else's land, these officials must inspect the damage, reach a decision, and assess the penalty.

If anyone takes over another man's bees, by making rattling noises to please and attract them, so that he gets them for himself, he must pay for the injury he has done.

If anyone burns his own wood without taking sufficient precautions to protect his neighbor's, he must be fined a sum decided by the officials.

If when planting trees a man fails to leave a suitable gap between them and his neighbor's land, the same regulation is to apply.

These are points that many legislators have dealt with perfectly adequately, and we should make use of their work rather than demand that the grand architect of our state should legislate on a mass of trivial details that can be handled by any run-of-the-mill lawgiver. For instance, the water supply for farmers is the subject of some splendid old-established laws—but there's no call to let them overflow into our discussion! It is fundamental that anyone who wants to conduct a supply of water to his own land may do so, provided his source is the public reservoirs and he does

not intercept the surface springs of any private person. He may conduct the water by any route he likes, except through houses, temples and tombs, and he must do no damage beyond the actual construction of the conduit. But in some naturally dry districts the soil may fail to retain the moisture when it rains, so that drinking water is in short supply. In that case the owner must dig down to the clay, and if he fails to strike water at that depth he should take from his neighbors sufficient drinking water for each member of his household. If the neighbors too are short of water, he should share the available supply with them and fetch his ration daily, the amount to be fixed by the Country-Wardens. A man may injure the farmer or householder next door on higher ground by blocking the flow of rainwater; on the other hand he may discharge it so carelessly as to damage the man below. If the parties are not prepared to co-operate in this matter, anyone who wishes should report the matter to an official—a City-Warden in the city, and a Country-Warden in the country—and obtain a ruling as to what each side should do. Anyone refusing to abide by the ruling must take the consequences of being a grudging and ill-tempered fellow:

If found guilty, he should pay twice the value of the damage to the injured party as a penalty for disobeying the officials.

Everyone should take his share of the fruit harvest on roughly the following principles. The goddess of the harvest has graciously bestowed two gifts upon us, the fruit which pleases Dionysus so much, but which won't keep, and the produce which nature has made fit to store. So our law about the harvest should run as follows.

Anyone who consumes any part of the coarse crop of grapes or figs, whether on his own land or another's, before the rising of Arcturus ushers in the vintage, must owe fifty drachmas, to be presented to Dionysus, if he takes the fruit

from his own trees, one hundred if from his neighbor's, and sixty-six and two-thirds drachmas if from anyone else's trees.

If a man wants to gather in the 'dessert' grapes or figs (as they are called nowadays), he may do so whenever and however he likes, provided they come from his own trees; but if he takes them from anyone else's trees, without permission, he must be punished in accordance with the provisions of the law which forbids the removal of any object except by the depositor.

If a slave fails to get the landowner's permission before touching any of this kind of fruit, he must be whipped, the number of lashes to be the same as the number of grapes in the bunch or figs picked off the fig tree.

A resident alien may buy dessert fruit and gather it in as he wishes. If a foreigner on a visit from abroad feels inclined to eat some fruit as he travels along the road, he may, if he wishes, take some of the dessert crop gratis, for himself and one attendant, as part of our hospitality. But foreigners must be prevented by law from sharing with us the 'coarse' and similar fruits.

If a foreigner, master or slave, touches such fruit in ignorance of the law, the slave is to be punished with a whipping; the free man is to be dismissed with a warning and told to stick to the crop that is unsuitable to be kept in store in the form of raisins, wine, or dried figs.

There should be nothing to be ashamed of in helping oneself inconspicuously to apples and pears and pomegranates and so on, but, if a man under thirty is caught at it, he should be cuffed and driven off, provided he suffers no actual injury.

A citizen should have no legal redress for such an assault on his person. (A foreigner is to be entitled to a share of these

fruits too, on the same terms as he may take some of the dessert grapes and figs.) If a man above thirty years of age touches some fruits, consuming them on the spot and taking none away with him, he shall share them all on the same terms as the foreigner, but if he disobeys the law, he should be liable to be disqualified from competing for awards of merit, if anyone draws the attention of the assessors to the facts when the awards are being decided.

Water is the most nourishing food a garden can have, but it's easily fouled, whereas the soil, the sun and the winds, which co-operate with the water in fostering the growth of the plants that spring up out of the ground, are not readily interfered with by being doctored or channeled off or stolen. But in the nature of the case, water is exposed to all these hazards. That is why it needs the protection of a law, which should run as follows.

If anyone deliberately spoils someone else's water supply, whether spring or reservoir, by poisons or excavations or theft, the injured party should take his case to the City-Wardens and submit his estimate of the damage in writing.

Anyone convicted of fouling water by magic poisons should, in addition to his fine, purify the spring or reservoir, using whatever method of purification the regulations of the Expounders prescribe as appropriate to the circumstances and the individuals involved.

A man may bring home any crop of his own by any route he pleases, provided he does no one any damage, or, failing that, benefits to at least three times the value of the damage he does his neighbor. The authorities must act as inspectors in this business, as well as in all other cases when someone uses his own property deliberately to inflict violent or surreptitious damage on another man or some piece of his property without his permission. When the damage does not

exceed three minas, the injured party must report it to the magistrates and obtain redress; but if he has a larger claim to bring against someone, he must get his redress from the culprit by taking the case to the public courts.

If one of the officials is judged to have settled the penalties in a biased fashion, he must be liable to the injured person for double the damages.

Offenses committed by the authorities in handling any claim should be taken to the public courts by anyone who may wish to do so. (There are thousands of procedural details like this that must be observed before a penalty can be imposed: the complaint has to be lodged, the summonses issued and served in the presence of two witnesses, or whatever the proper number is. All this sort of detail must not be left to look after itself, but it is not important enough for a legislator who is getting on in years. Our younger colleagues must settle these points, using the broad principles laid down by their predecessors as a guide for their own detailed regulations, which they must apply as need arises. They must thus proceed by trial and error until they think they have got a satisfactory set of formalities, and once the process of modification is over, they should finalize their rules of procedure and render them lifelong obedience.)

As for craftsmen in general, our policy should be this. First, no citizen of our land nor any of his servants should enter the ranks of the workers whose vocation lies in the arts and crafts. A citizen's vocation, which demands a great deal of practice and study, is to establish and maintain good order in the community, and this is not a job for part-timers. Following two trades or two callings efficiently—or even following one and supervising a worker in another—is almost always too difficult for human nature. So in our state this must be a cardinal rule: no metal worker must turn to carpentry and no carpenter must supervise workers in metal

instead of practicing his own craft. We may, of course, be met with the excuse that supervising large numbers of employees is more sensible—because more profitable—than just following one's own trade. But no! In our state each individual must have one occupation only, and that's how he must earn his bread. The City-Wardens must have the job of enforcing this rule.

If a citizen born and bred turns his attention to some craft instead of to the cultivation of virtue, the City-Wardens must punish him with marks of disgrace and dishonor until they've got him back on the right lines.

If a foreigner follows two trades, the Wardens must punish him by prison or fines or expulsion from the state, and so force him to play one role, not many.

As for craftsmen's pay, and cases of refusal to take delivery of their work, or any other wrong done to them by other parties or by them to others, the City-Wardens must adjudicate if the sum at issue does not exceed fifty drachmas; if more, the public courts must decide the dispute as the law directs.

In our state no duties will have to be paid by anyone on either imports or exports. No one must import frankincense and similar foreign fragrant stuff used in religious ritual, or purple and similar dyes not native to the country, or materials for any other process which only needs imports from abroad for inessential purposes; nor, on the other hand, is anyone to export anything that it is essential to keep in the state. The twelve Guardians of the Laws next in order of seniority after the five eldest must act as inspectors and supervisors in this entire field. But what about arms and other military equipment? Well, if we ever need, for military purposes, some technique, vegetable product, mineral, binding material or animal that has to be obtained from

abroad, the state will receive the goods and pay for them, and the Cavalry-Commanders and the Generals are to be in charge of importing them and exporting other goods in exchange. The Guardians of the Laws will lay down suitable and adequate regulations on the subject. Nowhere in the whole country and whole state are these—or any other—goods to be retailed for profit.

It looks as if the right way to organize the food supply and distribute agricultural produce will be to adopt something like the regulations in force in Crete. Every citizen must divide each crop into twelve parts corresponding to the twelve periods in which it is consumed. Take wheat or barley, for instance (though the same procedure must be followed for all the other crops too, as well as for any livestock there may be for sale in each district): each twelfth part should be split proportionately into three shares, one for the citizens, one for their slaves, and the third for workmen and foreigners in general (i.e., communities of resident aliens in need of the necessities of life, and occasional visitors on some public or private business). It should be necessary to sell only this third share of all the necessities of life; there should be no necessity to sell any part of the other two. So what will be the right way to arrange the division? It's obvious, for a start, that the shares we allocate will in one sense be equal, but in another sense unequal.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, the land will grow a good crop of one thing and a bad crop of another. That's inevitable, I take it.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ None of the three shares—for masters, slaves and foreigners—must be better than the

others: when the distribution is made, each group should be treated on an equal footing and get the same share. Each citizen must take his two shares and distribute them at his discretion to the slaves and free persons in his charge (quality and quantity being up to him). The surplus should be distributed by being divided up according to the number of animals that have to be supported by the produce of the soil, and rationed out accordingly.

Next, the population should have houses grouped in separate localities. This entails the following arrangements. There should be twelve villages, one in the middle of each of the twelve divisions of the state; in each village the settlers should first select a site for a market-place with its temples for gods and their retinue of spirits. (Local Magnesian gods, and sanctuaries of other ancient deities who are still remembered, must be honored as they were in earlier generations.) In each division they must establish shrines of Hestia, Zeus, Athena, and the patron deity of the district; after this their first job must be to build houses on the highest ground in a circle round these temples, so as to provide the garrison with the strongest possible position for defense.

Thirteen groups of craftsmen must be formed to provide for all the rest of the territory. One should be settled in the central city and the others distributed all round it on the outskirts in twelve further sub-groups corresponding to the twelve urban districts; and the categories of craftsmen useful to farmers must be established in each village. They must all be under the supervision of the chief Country-Wardens, who must decide the number and type required in each district and say where they should settle in order to prove their full worth to the farmers and cause them as little trouble as possible. Similarly the board of City-Wardens

must assume permanent responsibility for the craftsmen in the city.

The detailed supervision of the market must naturally be in the hands of the Market-Wardens. Their first job is to ensure that no one does any damage to the temples round the marketplace; secondly, to see whether people are conducting their business in an orderly or disorderly fashion, and inflict punishment on anyone who needs it. They must ensure that every commodity the citizens are required to sell to the aliens is sold in the manner prescribed by law. The law will be simply this. On the first day of the month the agents (the foreigners or slaves who act for the citizens) must produce the share that has to be sold to the aliens, beginning with the twelfth part of corn. At this first market an alien must buy corn and related commodities to last him the whole month. On the tenth day the respective parties must buy and sell a whole month's supply of liquids. The third market should be on the twentieth, when they should hold a sale of the livestock that individuals find they need to buy or sell, and also of all the equipment or goods sold by the farmers, and which aliens cannot get except by purchase—skins, for example, and all clothing, woven material, felt, and all that sort of thing. But these goods (and barley and wheat ground into flour and every other kind of food) should never be bought by, or sold to, a citizen or his slave through retail channels. The proper place for 'retail' trading (as it's generally called) in corn and wine is the foreigners' market, where foreigners are to sell these goods to craftsmen and their slaves; and when the butchers have cut up the animals, it is to foreigners that they must dispose of the meat. Any foreigner who wishes may buy any kind of firewood wholesale any day from the district agents and sell it to other foreigners whenever he likes and in whatever quantity he pleases.

All other goods and equipment needed by various people should be brought to the general market and put up for sale in the place allotted them. (The Guardians of the Laws and the Market-Wardens, in conjunction with the City-Wardens, will have marked out suitable spaces and decided where each article is to be sold.) Here they must exchange money for goods and goods for money, and never hand over anything without getting something in return; anyone who doesn't bother about this and trusts the other party must grin and bear it whether or not he gets what he's owed, because for such transactions there will be no legal remedy. If the amount or value of the object bought or sold is greater than is allowed by the law which forbids increase or diminution of a man's property above or below a given limit, the excess must immediately be registered with the Guardians of the Laws; but if there is a deficiency, it must be cancelled. The same rules are to apply to the registration of the property of resident aliens.

Anyone who wishes may come to live in the state on specified conditions. There will be a community of foreigners open to anyone willing and able to join it. The alien must have a skill and not stay longer than twenty years from the date of registration, He need pay no alien-tax, even a small one (apart from behaving himself), nor any tax on any purchase or sale, (e) When his time has expired, he is to collect his possessions and depart, (f) If during this period he has distinguished himself for some notable service to the state, and is confident he can persuade the council and the assembly to grant his request for an official extension of his stay, either temporarily or for life, he should present himself and make out his case; and he must be allowed to enjoy to the full whatever concessions the state grants him. (g) Children of resident aliens must be craftsmen, and (h) their period of residence must be deemed to have started when

they reach the age of fifteen. On these conditions they may stay for twenty years, after which they must depart to whatever destination they like. If they wish to stay longer, they may do so provided they obtain permission as already specified, Before a departing alien leaves he must cancel the entries that he originally made in the records kept in the custody of the officials.

Book 9.

Athenian Stranger/ Next, in accordance with the natural arrangement of our legal code, will come the legal proceedings that arise out of all the occupations we have mentioned up till now. To some extent, so far as agricultural affairs and related topics are concerned, we have already listed the acts that should be prosecuted, but the most serious have yet to be specified. Our next task is to enumerate these one by one, mentioning what penalty each should attract and to which court it should be assigned.

Clinias/ That's right.

Athenian Stranger/ The very composition of all these laws we are on the point of framing is, in a way, a disgrace: after all, we're assuming we have a state which will be run along excellent lines and achieve every condition favorable to the practice of virtue. The mere idea that a state of this kind could give birth to a man affected by the worst forms of wickedness found in other countries, so that the legislator has to anticipate his appearance by threats—this, as I said, is in a way a disgrace. It means we have to lay down laws against these people, to deter them and punish them when they appear, on the assumption that they will certainly do so. However, unlike the ancient legislators, we are not framing laws for heroes and sons of gods. The lawgivers of that age, according to the story told nowadays, were descended from gods and legislated for men of similar stock. But we are human beings, legislating in the world today for the children of humankind, and we shall give no offense by our fear that one of our citizens will turn out to be, so to speak, a 'tough egg', whose character will be so 'hard-boiled' as to resist softening; powerful as our laws are, they may not be able to tame such people, just as heat has no effect on tough beans. For their dismal sake, the first law I shall

produce will deal with robbery from temples, in case anyone dares to commit this crime. Now in view of the correct education our citizens will have received, we should hardly want any of them to catch this disease, nor is there much reason to expect that they will. Their slaves, however, as well as foreigners and the slaves of foreigners, may well make frequent attempts at such crimes. For their sake principally—but still with an eye on the general weakness of human nature—I'll spell out the law about robbery from temples, and about all the other similar crimes which are difficult or even impossible to cure.

Following the practice we agreed earlier, we must first compose preambles, in the briefest possible terms, to stand at the head of all these laws. Take a man who is incited by day and kept awake at night by an evil impulse which drives him to steal some holy object. You might talk to him and exhort him as follows:

'My dear fellow, this evil impulse that at present drives you to go robbing temples comes from a source that is neither human nor divine. It is a sort of frenzied goad, innate in mankind as a result of crimes of long ago that remained unexpiated; it travels around working doom and destruction, and you should make every effort to take precautions against it. Now, take note what these precautions are. When any of these thoughts enters your head, seek the rites that free a man from guilt; seek the shrines of the gods who avert evil, and supplicate them; seek the company of men who have a reputation in your community for being virtuous. Listen to them as they say that every man should honor what is fine and just—try to bring yourself to say it too. But run away from the company of the wicked, with never a backward glance. If by doing this you find that your disease abates somewhat, well and good;

if not, then you should look upon death as the preferable alternative, and rid yourself of life.'

These are the overtures we make to those who think of committing all these impious deeds that bring about the ruin of the state. When a man obeys us, we should silently omit the actual law; but in cases of disobedience, we must change our tune after the overture and sing this resounding strain:

If a man is caught thieving from a temple and is a foreigner or slave, a brand of his misfortune shall be made on his face and hands, and he shall be whipped, the number of lashes to be decided by his judges. Then he shall be thrown out beyond the boundaries of the land, naked.

(Perhaps paying this penalty will teach him restraint and make him a better man: after all, no penalty imposed by law has an evil purpose, but generally achieves one of two effects: it makes the person who pays the penalty either more virtuous or less wicked.)

If a citizen is ever shown to be responsible for such a crime—to have perpetrated, that is, some great and unspeakable offense against the gods or his parents or the state, the penalty is death.

The judge should consider him as already beyond cure; he should bear in mind the kind of education and upbringing the man has enjoyed from his earliest years, and how after all this he has still not abstained from acts of the greatest evil. But the very tiniest of evils will be what the offender suffers, indeed, he will be of service to others, by being a lesson to them when he is ignominiously banished from sight beyond the borders of the state. And if the children and family escape taking on the character of the father, they should be held in honor and win golden opinions for the spirit and persistence with which they have shunned evil and embraced the good.

In a state where the size and number of the farms are to be kept permanently unaltered, it would not be appropriate for the state to confiscate the property of any of these criminals. But if a man commits a crime and is thought to deserve a penalty in money, then provided he possesses a surplus over and above the basic equipment of his farm, he must pay his fine. The Guardians of the Laws must scrutinize the registers and discover the precise facts in these cases, and make an exact report to the court on each occasion, so as to prevent any farm becoming unworked because of a shortage of money. If a man appears to deserve a stiffer fine, and if some of his friends are not prepared to bail him out by contributing the money to set him free, his punishment should take the form of a prolonged period of imprisonment (which should be open to public view), and various humiliations. But no one, no matter what his offense, is ever to be deprived of his citizen rights completely, not even if he has gone into exile beyond our frontiers for it. The penalties we impose will be death, imprisonment, whipping, or various degrading postures (either standing or sitting), or being rusticated and made to stand before temples on the boundaries of the state; and payments of money may be made in certain cases which we have just mentioned, where such a punishment is appropriate. In cases involving the death penalty the judges are to be the Guardians of the Laws, sitting in conjunction with the court whose members are selected by merit from the officials of the previous year. The method of bringing these cases to court, the serving of the summonses and similar procedural details must be the concern of the legislators who succeed us; what we have to do is legislate about the voting. The vote should be taken openly, but before this our judges should have ranged themselves according to seniority and sat down close together facing the prosecutor and defendant; all citizens

who have some spare time should attend and listen carefully to such trials. First, the prosecutor should deliver a single speech, then the defendant; the most senior judge should follow these addresses by cross-questioning, and continue until he has gone into the arguments in sufficient detail. One by one, the other judges should follow the most senior and work through any points on which either litigant has left him dissatisfied by some kind of error or omission. A judge who feels no such dissatisfaction should hand on the interrogation to his colleague. All the judges should endorse those arguments that appear pertinent by appending their signatures and then depositing the documents on the altar of Hestia. The next day they must reconvene in the same place, and after similar interrogation and examination again append their signatures to the depositions. Having followed this procedure three times, after giving due consideration to the evidence and witnesses, each judge should cast a sacred vote, swearing in the name of Hestia to give, as far as lies in him, a judgment just and true. In this way they should conclude this category of trial.

We come next, after these matters of religion, to cases of political subversion. We should treat as the biggest enemy of the entire state the man who makes the laws into slaves, and the state into the servant of a particular interest, by subjecting them to the diktat of mere men. This transgressor of the law uses violence in all that he does and stirs up sedition. Second in the scale of wickedness, in our estimation, should come the holder of some high state office, who while not an accessory to any such crimes, nevertheless fails to detect them and exact the vengeance of his fatherland (or, if he does detect them, holds back through cowardice). Every man who is any good at all must denounce the plotter to the authorities and take him to court on a charge of violently and illicitly overthrowing the constitution. The

court should consist of the same judges as for robbers from temples, and the procedure of the entire trial should be the same as it was for them, a majority vote being sufficient for the death penalty.

As a rule, penalties and disgrace incurred by a father should not be passed on to any of his children, except where a man's father, grandfather and great-grandfather have all in turn been sentenced to death. The state should deport such cases to the state and city from which their family originally came; and they should take their property with them, apart from all the basic equipment of their farm. Next, sons of citizens who have more than one son over ten years of age should be nominated by their father or grandfather on either the mother's or the father's side. Ten of them should be chosen by lot, and the names of those whom the lot selects should be reported to Delphi. The god's choice should then be installed as heir to the abandoned property—and he, we hope, will have better luck.

Clinias/ Splendid.

Athenian Stranger/ The same regulations about the judges that should try the case, and the procedure to be followed at the trial, will apply in yet a third instance, when a man is brought to court on a charge of treason. In the same way, a single law should apply to all three cases and decide whether the children of these criminals (traitor, temple-robber, and the violent wrecker of the laws of the state) should remain in their fatherland or leave it.

Again, a single law and legal penalty should apply to every thief, no matter whether his theft is great or small: if he has not, he must be kept in prison until he pays up or persuades the man who has had him convicted to let him off.

If a man is convicted of stealing from public sources, he shall be freed from prison when he has either persuaded the state to let him off or paid back twice the amount involved.

Clinias/ How on earth can we be serious, sir, in saying that it makes no odds whether his theft is large or small, or whether it comes from sacred or secular sources? And what about all the other different circumstances of a theft? Shouldn't a legislator vary the penalties he inflicts, so that he can cope with the various categories of theft?

Athenian Stranger/ That's a good question, Clinias: I have been walking in my sleep, and you have bumped into me and woken me up. You have reminded me of something that has occurred to me before, that the business of establishing a code of law has never been properly thought out—as we can see from the example that has just cropped up. Now, what am I getting at? It wasn't a bad parallel we made, you know, when we compared all those for whom legislation is produced today to slaves under treatment from slave doctors. Make no mistake about what would happen, if one of those doctors who are innocent of theory and practice medicine by rule of thumb were ever to come across a gentleman doctor conversing with a gentleman patient. This doctor would be acting almost like a philosopher, engaging in a discussion that ranged over the source of the disease and pushed the inquiry back into the whole nature of the body. But our other doctor would immediately give a tremendous shout of laughter, and his observations would be precisely those that most 'doctors' are always so ready to trot out. 'You ass,' he would say, 'you are not treating the patient, but tutoring him. Anybody would think he wanted to become a doctor rather than get well again.'

Clinias/ And wouldn't he be right to say that?

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps he would—if he were to bear in mind this further point, that anyone who handles law in the way we are now, is tutoring the citizens, not imposing laws on them. Wouldn't it be equally right to say that?

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Athenian Stranger/ However, at the moment, we are in a fortunate position.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean the lack of any necessity to legislate. We are simply carrying out our own review of every kind of political system and trying to see how we could put into effect the absolutely ideal kind, as well as the least good sort that would still be acceptable. This is particularly true of our legislation, where it looks as if we have a choice: either we can examine ideal laws, if we want to, or again, if we feel like it, we can look at the minimum standard we are prepared to put up with. So we must choose which course we want to take.

Clinias/ This is a ridiculous choice to give ourselves, my friend: it's not as if we were legislators forced by some irresistible necessity to legislate at a minute's notice, without being allowed to put the business off till tomorrow. We, God willing, can do as bricklayers do, or workmen starting some other kind of erecting. We can gather our materials in no particular order and then select—and select at leisure—the items which are appropriate for the forthcoming construction. Our assumption should be, therefore, that we are constructing something, but not under any constraint; we work at our convenience and spend part of the time preparing our material, part of the time fitting it together. So it would be quite fair to describe our penal code as already partially laid down, while other material for it lies ready to hand.

Athenian Stranger/ At any rate, Clinias, this will be the more realistic way to conduct our review of legislation. Well then, may we please notice this point that concerns legislators?

Clinias/ What point?

Athenian Stranger/ I suppose literary compositions and written speeches by many other authors are current in our cities, besides those of the legislator?

Clinias/ Of course they are.

Athenian Stranger/ To whose writings ought we to apply ourselves? Are we to read the poets and others who have recorded in prose or verse compositions their advice about how one should live one's life, to the neglect of the compositions of the legislators? Or isn't it precisely the latter that deserve our closest attention?

Clinias/ Yes, it certainly is.

Athenian Stranger/ And I suppose the legislator, alone among writers, is to be denied permission to give advice about virtue and goodness and justice? Is he alone to be prevented from explaining their nature and how they should be reflected in our conduct, if we aim to be happy?

Clinias/ No, of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ Then is it really more scandalous in the case of Homer and Tyrtaeus and the other poets to have composed in writing bad rules for the conduct of life, but less so for Lycurgus and Solon, and all others who have turned legislator and committed their recommendations to writing? The proper view, surely, is this: a city's writings on legal topics should turn out, on being opened, to be the finest and best of all those it has in circulation; the writings of other men should either sound in harmony with them, or provoke ridicule by being out of tune. So what is the style in which a state's laws ought to be written, in our opinion? Should the

regulations appear in the light of a loving and prudent father and mother? Or should they act the tyrant and the despot, posting their orders and threats on walls and leaving it at that? Clearly, then, at this stage, we must decide whether we are going to try to talk about laws in the right spirit. Succeed or no, we shall at any rate show our good intentions. If we take this course and have to face some difficulties en route, then let's face them. Good luck to us, and God willing, we shall succeed.

Clinias/ You've put it splendidly. Let's do as you suggest.

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, we must continue the attempt we've just made: we must scrutinize our law about robbers of temples, theft in general, and every variety of crime. We should not let it daunt us if in the full spate of our legislation we find that although we have settled some matters, our inquiry into others has still to be completed. We are still aiming at the status of legislators, but we haven't achieved it yet; perhaps eventually we may succeed. So now let's look at these topics I've mentioned—if, that is, you are prepared to look at them in the way I have explained.

Clinias/ Certainly we are prepared.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, on the whole subject of goodness and justice, we ought to try to see quite clearly just where we agree, and where there are differences of opinion between us. Again, how far do ordinary men agree? What differences are there between them? (Naturally, we should claim that we wanted there to be at least a small 'difference between' us and ordinary men!)

Clinias/ What sort of 'differences between us' have you in mind when you say that?

Athenian Stranger/ I'll try to explain. When we talk about justice in general—just men, just actions, just arrangements, we are, after a fashion, unanimous that all

these things are ‘good’. One might insist that even if just men happen to be shocking in their physical appearance, they are still preeminently ‘good’ because of their supremely just character. No one would think a man was talking nonsense in saying that.

Clinias/ Wouldn’t that be right?

Athenian Stranger/ Perhaps. But if everything that has the quality of justice is ‘good’, we ought to note that we include in that ‘everything’ even the things done to us, which are about as frequent, roughly speaking, as the things we do to others.

Clinias/ What now, then?

Athenian Stranger/ Any just action we do has the quality of being ‘good’ roughly in proportion to the degree to which it has the quality of justice.

Clinias/ Indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ So surely, anything done to us, which has the quality of justice, is to that extent agreed to be ‘good’? This wouldn’t involve our argument in any contradiction.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ If we agree that something done to us is just, but at the same time shocking, the terms ‘just’ and ‘good’ will be in conflict with each other—the reason being that we have termed ‘just’ actions ‘most shameful’.

Clinias/ What are you getting at?

Athenian Stranger/ It’s not difficult to understand. The injunctions of the laws we laid down a little while ago would seem to be in flat contradiction to what we are saying now.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Our ruling was, I think, that the temple-robber and the enemy of properly established laws

would suffer a 'just' death. But then, on the brink of establishing a great many such rules, we held back. We saw ourselves becoming involved with penal suffering of infinite variety and on a grand scale. Of all sufferings, these were particularly just; but they were also the particularly shocking ones. Thus, surely, one minute we shall find 'just' and 'good' invariably turning out to be the same, and the next moment discover they are opposites.

Clinias/ Likely enough.

Athenian Stranger/ This is the source of the inconsistency in the language of the ordinary man: he destroys the unity of the terms 'good' and 'just'.

Clinias/ That is indeed how it looks, sir.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, Clinias, we ought to examine our own position again. How far is it consistent in this business?

Clinias/ Consistent? What consistency do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Earlier in our discussion I think I have said quite categorically—or if I haven't before, assume I'm saying it now—that…

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ …all wicked men are, in all respects, unwillingly wicked. This being so, my next argument necessarily follows.

Clinias/ What argument?

Athenian Stranger/ That the unjust man is doubtless wicked; but that the wicked man is in that state only against his will. However, to suppose that a voluntary act is performed involuntarily makes no sense. Therefore, in the eyes of someone who holds the view that injustice is involuntary, a man who acts unjustly would seem to be doing so against his will. Here and now, that is the position

I have to accept: I allow that no one acts unjustly except against his will. (If anyone with a disputatious disposition or a desire to attract favorable notice says that although there are those who are unjust against their will, even so many men do commit unjust acts voluntarily, I would reject his argument and stick to what I said.) Well then, how am I to make my own arguments consistent? Suppose the two of you, Clinias and Megillus, were to ask me, 'If that's so, sir, what advice have you for us about laying down laws for the city of the Magnesians? Do we legislate, or don't we?' 'Of course we legislate', I'd say, and you'd ask: 'Are you going to make a distinction for the Magnesians between voluntary and involuntary acts of injustice? Shall we impose stiffer penalties on voluntary wrongdoing and acts of injustice, and smaller penalties on the involuntary? Or shall we treat them all on an equal footing, on the grounds that there simply is no such thing as an act of voluntary injustice?'

Clinias/ You are perfectly right, sir. So what use shall we make of this position we have just taken up?

Athenian Stranger/ That's a good question. First of all, we shall make this use of it—

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ Let's cast our minds back. A few minutes ago we were quite right to say that in the matter of justice we were in a state of great muddle and inconsistency. With that in mind, we may go back to asking questions of ourselves. 'We have not yet found a way out of our confusion in these things. We have not defined the difference between these two categories of wrongs, voluntary and involuntary. In all states, every lawgiver who has ever appeared treats them as distinct, and the distinction is reflected in his laws. Now, is the position we took up a moment ago to overrule all dissent, like a decision handed down from God? Shall we

make just this one assertion and dismiss the topic, without adducing any reasons to show that our position is correct?' Impossible. What we must do, before we legislate, is somehow make clear that there are two categories, but that the distinction between them is a different one. Then, when one imposes the penalty on either, everybody will be able to appreciate the arguments for it, and make some kind of judgment whether it is the appropriate penalty to have imposed or not.

Clinias/ We think you state the position fairly, sir. We must do one of two things, either stop insisting that unjust acts are always involuntary, or, before going any further, demonstrate its validity by means of a preliminary distinction.

Athenian Stranger/ The first of the two alternatives, denying the proposition when I believe it to represent the truth, is absolutely unacceptable to me. I should be breaking the laws of both God and man. But if the two things do not differ by virtue of being 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', how do they differ? What other factor is involved? That is what we have to try, somehow or other, to show.

Clinias/ It is surely impossible, sir, to approach the problem in any way.

Athenian Stranger/ So this is what we shall try to do. Look: when citizens come together and associate with each other, they obviously inflict many injuries; and to these the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' can be freely applied.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ But no one should describe all these injuries as acts of injustice, and conclude that therefore the unjust acts committed in these cases of injury fall into two categories, involuntary (because if we add them all up, you see, the involuntary injuries are no less numerous and no

less great than the voluntary ones), and voluntary as well Rather than do that, consider the next step I am going to take in my argument: am I on to something or just driveling? My position, Clinias and Megillus, is not that, if someone hurts someone else involuntarily and without intending it, he is acting unjustly but involuntarily. I will not legislate so as to make this an involuntary act of injustice. Ignoring its relative seriousness or triviality, I shall refuse to put down such an injury under the heading of 'injustice' at all. Indeed, if my view is sustained, we shall often say of a benefactor that 'he is committing the injustice of conferring a benefit'—an improper benefit. You see, my friends, in effect we should not simply call it 'just' when one man bestows some object on another, nor simply 'unjust' when correspondingly he takes it from him. The description 'just' is applicable only to the benefit conferred or injury inflicted by someone with a just character and outlook. This is the point the lawgiver has to watch; he must keep his eyes on these two things, injustice and injury. He must use the law to exact damages for damage done, as far as he can; he must restore losses, and if anyone has knocked something down, put it back upright again; in place of anything killed or wounded, he must substitute something in a sound condition. And when atonement has been made by compensation, he must try by his laws to make the criminal and the victim, in each separate case of injury, friends instead of enemies.

Clinias/ So far, so good.

Athenian Stranger/ Now to deal with unjust injuries (and gains too, as when one man's unjust act results in a gain for someone else). The cases that are curable we must cure, on the assumption that the soul has been infected by disease. We must, however, state what general policy we pursue in our cure for injustice.

Clinias/ What is this policy?

Athenian Stranger/ This: when anyone commits an act of injustice, serious or trivial, the law will combine instruction and constraint, so that in the future either the criminal will never again dare to commit such a crime voluntarily, or he will do it a very great deal less often; and in addition, he will pay compensation for the damage he has done. This is something we can achieve only by laws of the highest quality. We may take action, or simply talk to the criminal; we may grant him pleasures, or make him suffer; we may honor him, we may disgrace him; we can fine him, or give him gifts. We may use absolutely any means to make him hate injustice and embrace true justice—or at any rate not hate it. But suppose the lawgiver finds a man who's beyond cure—what legal penalty will he provide for this case? He will recognize that the best thing for all such people is to cease to live—best even for themselves. By passing on they will help others, too: first, they will constitute a warning against injustice, and secondly they will leave the state free of scoundrels. That is why the lawgiver should prescribe the death penalty in such cases, by way of punishment for their crimes—but in no other case whatever.

Clinias/ In one way, what you have said seems eminently reasonable. However, we should be glad to hear a clearer explanation of two points: first, the difference between injustice and injury, and secondly the various senses of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' that you distinguished so elaborately in the course of your argument.

Athenian Stranger/ I must try to meet your request and explain these points. Doubtless in the course of conversation you make at least this point to each other about the soul: one of the constituent elements (whether 'part' or 'state' is not important) to be found in it is 'anger', and this innate impulse, unruly and difficult to fight as it is, causes a good deal of havoc by its irrational force.

Clinias/ Yes, indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ The next point is the distinction we make between 'pleasure' and 'anger'. We say Pleasure wields her power on the basis of an opposite kind of force; she achieves whatever her will desires by persuasive deceit that is irresistibly compelling.

Clinias/ Quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ Thirdly, we would be saying nothing but the truth if we named ignorance as a cause of wrongdoing. The lawgiver would, in fact, do a better job if he divided ignorance into two: 'simple' ignorance, which he would treat as the cause of trivial faults, 'double' ignorance, which is the error of a man who is not only in the grip of ignorance but on top of that is convinced of his own wisdom, believing that he has a thorough knowledge of matters of which, in fact, his ignorance is total. When such ignorance is backed up by strength and power, the lawgiver will treat it as the source of serious and barbarous wrongdoing; but when it lacks power, he will treat the resultant faults as the peccadilloes of children and old men. He will of course regard these deeds as offenses, and will legislate against these people as offenders, but the laws will be of the most gentle character, full of understanding.

Clinias/ Your proposals are perfectly reasonable.

Athenian Stranger/ Most of us agree that some people are 'conquerors of' their desire for pleasure and feelings of anger, while others are 'conquered' by them. And that is in fact the situation.

Clinias/ It certainly is.

Athenian Stranger/ But we have never heard anyone say that some people are 'conquerors of' their ignorance, while others are 'conquered by' it.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ But we do say that each of these influences often prompts every man to take the opposite course to the one which attracts him and which he really wishes to take.

Clinias/ Yes, times without number.

Athenian Stranger/ May I now clearly distinguish for you, without elaboration, what in my view the terms 'just' and 'unjust' mean. My general description of injustice is this: the mastery of the soul by anger, fear, pleasure, pain, envy and desires, whether they lead to any actual damage or not. But no matter how states or individuals think they can achieve the good, it is a conception of what the good is that should govern every man and hold sway in his soul, even if he is a little mistaken. If it does, every action done in accordance with it, and any part of a man's nature that becomes subject to such control, we have to call 'just', and best for the entire life of mankind—and this in spite of the popular belief that damage done in such circumstances is an 'involuntary' injustice. However, we are not engaging now in a captious dispute about terminology. But since it has become clear that there are three kinds of basic faults, we ought first to impress these upon our memory even more firmly. Our first kind is a painful one, and we call it anger and fear.

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ The second kind consists of pleasures and desires. The third, which is a distinct category, consists of hopes and opinion—a mere shot at the truth about the supreme good. If we divide this last category twice, we get three types; and that makes, according to our present argument, a total of five in all. We must enact different laws for the five kinds, and we must have two main categories.

Clinias/ And what are these?

Athenian Stranger/ The first category covers every occasion when crimes are committed openly with violence; secondly, we have crimes that take place under cover of darkness, involving secrecy and fraud. Sometimes we find a combination of both methods, in which case our laws will have to be very harsh indeed, if they are going to do their job.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now let's go back to the point where we started to digress, and carry on with our enactment of the legal code. Our regulations about those who pillage from the gods, and about traitors, had, I think, already been made; we had also dealt with those who do violence to the laws in order to subvert the existing constitution. A man who commits one of these crimes might be suffering from insanity, or be as good as insane either because of disease, or the effects of advanced senility, or because he is still in the years of childhood.

If clear proof of any of these states is ever shown to the judges selected in each case, on the submission of either the criminal or his counsel, and in the opinion of the court the man was in that condition when he committed his crime, he must pay, without fail, simple recompense for any damage he may have inflicted on anyone, but the other details of the penalty should be waived, if he has killed someone and his hands are polluted by murder, he must depart to a place in another country and live there in exile for a year.

If he comes back before the legally appointed time, or even puts a foot into any part of his native country, he must be imprisoned in the public jail by the Guardians of the Laws for two years, after which he shall be released.

The start we have made points the way forward: we need not scruple to lay down a comprehensive set of laws that will

cover every category of murder. First we should deal with those committed with the use of force, but unintentionally:

If anyone has unintentionally killed a man who is not an enemy in a contest or public games—whether death occurs immediately, or later as a result of the wounds, in war similarly, in military training, whether in javelin-exercises without the protection of armor, or when some weapons are being carried in imitation of wartime usage, the offender shall be free of pollution when he has been purified in accordance with the relevant law from Delphi.

All doctors, if their patient dies as an unintended result of their treatment, are to be free of pollution according to law.

If one man kills another by his own act, but unintentionally, by his own hand, without weapons, or by tool, weapon, administration of food or drink, application of fire or cold, or deprivation of air, whether (he does the deed himself, or through the agency of others, in all cases it must be reckoned his own act and he must pay penalties as under:

If he kills a slave, he must indemnify the dead man's master against the damage, reflecting what the loss would be if his own slave had been killed.

If he fails to indemnify the master, he must pay a penalty of twice the value of the dead man, the judges making an estimate of it, and he must resort to greater and more numerous purifications than those who have killed in contests; and such expounders as are chosen by the oracle are to be in charge of these purifications.

If he kills a slave of his own, let him purify himself, and be quit of the murder according to law.

If he kills a free man, inadvertently, he must undergo the same purifications as the killer of a slave.

He should not take lightly an old story that comes from our collection of ancient tales. It runs as follows: Having lived in the full proud spirit of freedom, the man murdered by violence, freshly dead, turns his fury on the person responsible. The dead man is full of fear and loathing at his own violent sufferings; he abominates the sight of his own murderer going about localities once familiar to himself; to the full limit of his powers he visits his own anguish on the perpetrator of the crime, the man and his deeds; and his allies are the memories that haunt the murderer. Therefore, A killer must keep clear of his victim for all the seasons of an entire year, by staying away from the dead man's usual haunts and the whole of his native country.

If the deceased is a foreigner, the killer should keep clear of the foreigner's homeland as well for an identical period.

If a man obeys this law without demur, the deceased's next of kin, who will take note of his compliance with these requirements, will grant him pardon and will be entirely correct to live on peaceable terms with him.

If the killer disobeys, by daring to enter temples and perform sacrifices, polluted as he is, and then by refusing to complete the above-mentioned period abroad, the deceased's next of kin must prosecute the killer on a charge of murder. In case of conviction, all penalties are to be doubled.

If the next of kin does not prosecute the crime, the pollution must be deemed to have arrived at his own door, owing to the murdered man's supplications for atonement. Anyone who wishes may bring a charge against the next of kin and force him to keep away from his native country for five years, according to law.

If a foreigner kills a foreigner who is living in the state, anyone who wishes should prosecute under the same laws.

If the killer is a resident alien, he must go abroad for a year; a non-resident alien, he must keep away, for the whole of his life, from the country that lays down these laws, in addition to performing the purifications; this is to apply whether he kills a non-resident alien, a resident alien, or a citizen.

If he returns illegally, the Guardians of the Laws must punish him by death, and if he has any property, they must present it to his victim's nearest relative; unintentionally, being shipwrecked on the coast, he must camp out where the sea washes by his feet and await an opportunity to sail away; being forcibly brought in overland by someone, the first official of the state that comes across him must set him free and dispatch him unharmed beyond the border.

If someone kills a free man by his own hand, but the deed is done in anger, we must first make an internal distinction within this type of crime. Anger is common to those who kill a man by blows or similar means, owing to a sudden impulse: here the action is immediate, there is no previous intention to kill, and regret for the deed follows at once; those who have been stung by insults or opprobrious actions and who pursue their vengeance until, sometime later, they kill somebody: they intend to kill, and the deed causes no repentance. So it looks as if we have to establish two categories of murder; broadly speaking, both are done in anger, but a proper description would be 'falling somewhere midway between "voluntary" and "involuntary" '; however, each type comes closer to one or other of these extremes. The man who nurses his anger and takes his vengeance later—not suddenly, on the spur of the moment, but with premeditation—approximates to the voluntary murderer. The man whose anger bursts forth uncontrollably, whose action is instant, immediate, and without premeditation, resembles the involuntary killer. Yet even so, he is not an

entirely involuntary killer: he only resembles one. It is therefore sometimes difficult to categorize murders done under the influence of anger, and to know whether to treat them in law as voluntary or involuntary. The best course, which corresponds most closely to reality, is to classify them both under what they most resemble, and to distinguish them by the presence or absence of premeditation. We should lay down comparatively severe penalties for those who have killed in anger and with premeditation, and lighter ones for those who have killed on the spur of the moment without previous intent. Something which resembles a greater evil should attract a greater punishment, whereas a lesser penalty should be visited on that which resembles a lesser evil. This, then, is the course our laws should take.

Clinias/ Indeed it is.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let's go back to our subject and carry on as follows:

If someone kills a free man with his own hand, and the deed is done in a fit of anger, without previous intent, his penalty should in general be that appropriate to a man who has killed without anger; but in addition he should be obliged to go into exile for two years, by way of a curb for his anger.

If a man kills in anger, but with premeditation, his penalty should in general be that inflicted in the previous instance; but his exile should be for three years as against the other's two, the period of punishment being longer because of the greater violence of his passion.

In such cases, regulations for the return from exile should run as follows. (It is not easy to make hard and fast rules: sometimes the fiercer criminal as defined by the law may turn out easier to manage, whereas the man who is supposedly more manageable may turn out to be a more

difficult case, having committed a murder with some savagery; the other, conversely, may have dispatched his victim without brutality. However, my account does describe the cases you'll find are typical.)

The Guardians of the Laws should act as assessors of all these points, and when the period of exile prescribed for either category has come to an end, they should send twelve of their number, as judges, to the borders of the country. During the time that has elapsed these twelve should have made a still more exact investigation into what the exiles did, so as to decide whether to grant pardon and permission to return; and the exiles are bound to acquiesce in the judgment of these authorities.

If a returned exile of either category is ever again overcome by anger and commits the same offense, he must go into exile and never come back.

If he does come back, his penalty will be the same as that imposed on the foreigner who returns.

If a man kills his own slave, he must purify himself.

If he kills another's slave, in anger, he must pay double damages to the owner.

If a killer in any category flouts the law and in his unpurified state pollutes the market-place, the sports stadium, and other holy places, anyone who wishes should prosecute both the killer and the relative of the dead man who allows the killer to do this, and compel the relative to exact payment of twice the fine and the other expenses; and the prosecutor shall be legally entitled to take for himself the money so paid.

If a slave kills his own master, in anger, the relatives of the deceased shall treat the killer in whatever way they like (except that under no circumstances whatever may they let him go on living), and be free of pollution.

If a slave murders a free man who is not his master, in anger, his master shall deliver him up to the relatives of the deceased, who will be obliged to kill him, the manner of the execution being within their discretion.

(This is a rare occurrence, but not unknown.)

If a father or mother kills a son or daughter in anger by beating them or by using some other form of violence, the murderers must undergo the same purifications as apply in the other cases, and go into exile for three years.

When they come back, the female killer must be separated from her husband and the male from his wife, and they must have no more children; and they must never again share hearth and home with those whom they have robbed of a son or brother, or join in religious ceremonies with them.

If someone is impious enough to disobey these regulations, he shall be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who wishes.

If a man kills his wedded wife in a fit of anger, or a wife her husband, they must undergo the same purifications and spend three years in exile, On his return, a person who has done such a deed must never join his children in religious ceremonies nor eat at the same table with them.

If the parent or the child disobeys, he shall equally be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who wishes.

If in anger a brother kills a brother or a sister, or a sister kills a brother or a sister, the same purifications and periods of exile as applied to parents and children should be specified as applying in these cases too. (That is, they should never share hearth and home with the brothers whom they have deprived of their fellow brothers nor with parents whom they have deprived of children, nor join in religious ceremonies with them.)

If anyone disobeys this law, he will be subject to the relevant law of impiety already laid down, as is only right and proper.

If anyone gets into such an ungovernable temper with his parents and begetters that in his insane fury he dares to kill one of them, and is let off responsibility for murder by a voluntary statement of the deceased before death, he must perform the same purifications as those who commit involuntary murder; and when he has followed the rest of the procedure prescribed for those cases, he may be considered purified.

If he is not let off, the perpetrator of such a crime will be indictable under many laws. He will be subject to the most huge penalties for assault, and likewise for impiety for temple-robbery—he has plundered the shrine that is his parent's body, and deprived it of life. Consequently if one man could die many times, the murderer of his father or mother who has acted in anger would deserve to die the death over and over again. To this one killer no law will allow the plea of self-defense; no law will permit him to kill his father or mother, who brought him into the world. The law will instruct him to put up with all manner of suffering before he does such a thing. But what other penalty than death could the law appropriately lay down for this criminal? The law, then, should run: the penalty for the murderer of a father or mother is to be death.

If a brother kills his own brother in a political brawl or some similar circumstances, in self-defense when his victim had struck first, he should be regarded as free of pollution (as though he had killed an enemy).

The same applies if a citizen kills a citizen, or a foreigner kills a foreigner.

If in self-defense a citizen kills a foreigner, or a foreigner kills a citizen, the culprit should be in the same position with regard to the freedom from pollution, and likewise if a slave kills a slave.

If however a slave, in self-defense, kills a free man, he should be subject to the same laws as the parricide.

The regulations stated about the acquittal from responsibility for murder granted by a father are to apply to every acquittal in such cases (when, that is, one man voluntarily absolves another of responsibility, on the grounds that the murder has been committed involuntarily): the criminal must undergo the purifications and spend one year away from the country according to law.

Let this more or less suffice as a description of involuntary murders, which involve violence and anger. Our next task is to speak of voluntary murders, which are premeditated and spring from sheer injustice—the lack of control over the desire for pleasure and over one's lusts and jealous feelings. Clinias: True.

Athenian Stranger/ First of all, we ought again to make as complete a list as possible of these sources of crime.

The chief cause is lust, which tyrannizes a soul that has gone wild with desire. This lust is most usually for money, the object of most men's strongest and most frequent longing. Because of the innate depravity of men and their misdirected education, money has the power to produce in them a million cravings that are impossible to satisfy—all centering on the endless acquisition of wealth. The cause of this incorrect education is the pernicious praise given to wealth by the public opinion of Greeks and non-Greeks alike. In fact, wealth takes only third place in the scale of goodness; but they make it preeminent, to the ruination of posterity and themselves. The best and the noblest policy for

all cities to follow is to tell the truth about wealth, namely that it exists to serve the body, just as the body should be the servant of the soul. Although the ends which wealth naturally serves are indeed 'good', wealth itself will take third place, coming after the perfection of the soul and the body. Taking, therefore, this argument as our guide, we shall find that the man who means to be happy should not seek simply to be wealthy, but to be wealthy in a way consistent with justice and self-control. Murders needing still more murders in expiation would not occur in cities that had taken this lesson to heart. But as things are, as we said when we embarked on this topic, we have here one cause, and an extremely prominent cause at that, of the most serious charges of deliberate murder.

Second, an ambitious cast of mind: this breeds feelings of jealousy, which are dangerous companions to live with, particularly for the person who actually feels jealous, but potentially harmful to the leading citizens of the state as well.

In the third place, many a murder has been prompted by the cowardly fears of a guilty man. When a man is committing some crime, or has already committed it, he wants no one to know about it, and if he cannot eliminate a possible informer in any other way, he murders him.

These remarks should constitute the preface applying to all these crimes. In addition, we must tell the story which is so strongly believed by so many people when they hear it from those who have made a serious study of such matters in their mystic ceremonies. It is this:

Vengeance is exacted for these crimes in the after-life, and when a man returns to this world again he is ineluctably obliged to pay the penalty prescribed by the law of nature—to undergo the same treatment as he himself meted out to

his victim, and to conclude his earthly existence by encountering a similar fate at the hands of someone else.

If a man obeys and heartily dreads such a penalty after merely hearing the overture, there is no need to play over the relevant law. But in case of disobedience the following law should be stated in writing:

If a man by his own hand viciously kills a fellow citizen, with premeditation, he must be excluded from the places where people usually gather, and not pollute temples or market or harbors or any other common place of assembly, whether or not someone makes a proclamation against the culprit in these terms. (The reason is that the law itself makes the proclamation. It makes a permanent and public proclamation on behalf of the whole state, and always will.)

If a man fails in his duty to prosecute the culprit or bar him by proclamation, and is a relative (no more distant than a cousin) of the deceased on either the father's side or the mother's, the pollution, together with the enmity of the gods, should arrive at his own door. (The curse imposed by the law turns the edict of heaven against him.) He must be subject to prosecution at the hands of any man who wishes to take vengeance for the deceased, and the man who thus wishes to take vengeance must scrupulously perform all the appropriate ablutions and all the other ritual details the god prescribes for such cases; and when he has published the proclamation, he must go and make the criminal submit to the imposition of the penalty, under the law.

It is easy for a legislator to demonstrate that all this should be accompanied by a number of prayers and sacrifices to those gods who make it their business to prevent murders occurring in society. The Guardians of the Laws, in association with expounders, soothsayers, and the god, should rule who these gods are to be, and specify the

procedure for bringing such cases that would be most in harmony with the requirements of religion; they should then follow it themselves in bringing these cases to court, which should be the same as the one given final authority over temple-robbers.

If a man is found guilty, he must be punished by death and be deprived of burial in the country of his victim. (In this way we can show he has not been forgiven, and avoid impiety.)

If the defendant makes off and refuses to submit to trial, he must remain in exile permanently.

If such a person sets foot within the country of the murdered man, the first of the relatives of the deceased who comes across him, or indeed any citizen, should either kill him with impunity, or tie him up, and hand him over to the judges who tried the case for them to carry out the execution.

When a man undertakes a prosecution, he should immediately demand sureties from the accused. The latter must duly provide his sureties, who must be deemed, in the eyes of the judges who constitute the court in these cases, to be credit-worthy; and these three credit-worthy sureties must pledge themselves to produce the accused at his trial. If a man refuses, or is unable, to produce sureties, the authorities must arrest him and keep him bound and under guard, so that they can produce him at the hearing of the case.

If a man does not actually kill with his own hands, but simply plans the murder, and although responsible for it by virtue of plotting arrangements, continues to live in the state with his soul polluted by homicide, his trial for this crime should proceed along the same lines as before, except as regards the bail. If he is convicted, he may be granted burial

in his native land, but the other details of the punishment should conform with the regulations previously laid down for this category.

These same regulations about the actual commission and mere plotting of a murder should apply when foreigners prosecute foreigners, citizens prosecute foreigners and foreigners citizens, and slaves prosecute slaves.

But an exception should be made in the business of the surety. Just as it was said that actual murderers should provide sureties, the person who proclaims the ban arising from the murder should simultaneously demand sureties in these cases too.

If a slave intentionally kills a free man, whether he did the deed himself or planned it, and is convicted, the public executioner should haul him off in the direction of the deceased's grave to a point from which the culprit can see the tomb. He should then scourge him, giving as many strokes as the successful prosecutor instructs. If the homicide survives the scourging, he is to be executed.

H. If a man kills an innocent slave, fearing that he will inform against his own shocking and disgraceful conduct, or prompted by some similar motive, he should submit to trial, when a slave has died in these circumstances, precisely as he would have submitted to trial for murder if he had killed a citizen.

Certain crimes, which may occur, make the mere composition of laws for them an unpleasant and distasteful business, but it is impossible to omit them from our code. I mean deliberate and wholly wicked murders of relatives, whether the murderer commits the crime in person or merely plots it. Generally speaking, these killings occur in states that are badly administered or have a defective system of education, but occasionally one of them might crop up

even in a country where one would hardly look for it. What we have to do is to repeat our explanation of a moment ago, hoping that anyone who hears it will be more willing and able to avoid committing murders that are absolutely the most detestable in the sight of Heaven. The 'myth', or 'explanation', or whatever the right word is, has come down to us in unambiguous terms from the lips of priests of long ago.

Justice stands on guard to exact vengeance for the spilling of the blood of relatives; she operates through the law we have just mentioned, and her decree is that a man who has done something of this kind is obliged to suffer precisely what he has inflicted. If ever a man has murdered his father, in the course of time he must suffer the same fate from violent treatment at the hands of his children. A matricide, before being reborn, must adopt the female sex, and after being born a woman and bearing children, be dispatched subsequently by them. No other purification is available when common blood has been polluted; the pollution resists cleansing until, murder for murder, the guilty soul has paid the penalty and by this appeasement has soothed the anger of the deceased's entire line.

Thus the fear of such vengeance, exacted by the gods, should hold a man in check. But this is the law the human legislator will lay down in case some people should be overwhelmed by the terrible misfortune of committing such a crime:

If they should dare to tear the soul from the body of their father, mother, brothers or children, deliberately and with premeditation, the proclamations of banishment from places of public resort, and the sureties, should be identical to those detailed in previous cases.

If a man is convicted of such a murder, having killed one of the aforementioned persons, the court-assistants and the officials shall execute him, and throw him out, naked, at a specified place where three roads meet outside the city. All the officials, on behalf of the entire state, must take a stone and throw it at the head of the corpse, and thus purify the entire state. After this, they must carry the corpse to the borders of the land and eject it, giving it no burial, as the law instructs.

But what about the killer of the person who is, above all, his 'nearest and dearest', as the expression is? What penalty ought he to undergo? I am talking about the man who kills himself who uses violence to take his fate out of the hands of destiny, is not acting in obedience to any legal decision of his state, whose hand is not forced by the pressure of some excruciating and unavoidable misfortune, has not fallen into some irremediable disgrace that he cannot live with, and imposes this unjust judgment on himself in a spirit of slothful and abject cowardice. In general, what ritual observances should take place with regard to purification and interment in this case, are matters known to God; the relatives must seek guidance from expounders and the relevant laws, and act in these instances according to their instructions. But, people who perish in this way must be buried individually, with no one to share their grave.

They must be buried in disgrace on the boundaries of the twelve territorial divisions, in deserted places that have no name.

The graves must not be identifiable, either by headstone or title.

If a beast of burden or any other animal kills anyone (except when the incident occurs while they are competing in one of the public contests), the relatives must prosecute

the killer for murder; the next of kin must appoint some Country-Wardens (whichever ones he pleases, and as many as he likes), and they must try the case: if the animal is found guilty, they must kill it and throw it out beyond the frontiers of the country.

If some inanimate object causes loss of human life (but not if it is a stroke of lightning or some similar weapon wielded by God—it must be one of the other things that kill a man by falling on him, or because he falls on it), the next of kin must appoint the nearest neighbor to sit in judgment on the object, and thus effect the purification of himself and the deceased's entire line; the condemned object must be thrown over the frontiers, in the way specified in the case of animals.

If someone is found dead, and the killer is not known and cannot be discovered by diligent efforts to trace him, the proclamations should be the same as laid down in former cases, being made, however, against 'the murderer': when the prosecutor has established his case, he must give notice in the market-place to the killer and convicted murderer of so-and-so, that he must not enter holy places nor any part of the country of the deceased; he must threaten that if he does turn up and is recognized, he will be executed, denied burial, and his body ejected from the country of his victim.

So much, then, for the law on that sort of murder. In the following conditions, however, it will be right to regard the killer as innocent:

If he catches a thief entering his home at night to steal his goods, and kills him, he shall be innocent.

If he kills a footpad in self-defense, he shall be innocent.

If anyone sexually violates a free woman or boy, he may be killed with impunity by the victim of the violence, or by the victim's father or brothers or sons.

If a husband discovers his wedded wife being raped and kills the attacker, the law will regard him as innocent.

If a man kills someone while saving the life of his father (provided the latter is not committing a crime), or while rescuing his mother or children or brothers, or the mother of his children, he shall be completely innocent.

Athenian Stranger/ Let us assume we have completed our legislation concerning the training and education that the soul needs during a man's life (a life that is worth the living if these needs are met, but not if they are not), and the penalties that should apply in cases of death by violence. We have discussed, too, the training and education of the body, and the related topic in this case is the violent treatment, voluntary or involuntary, of one man by another. So far as we can, we must distinguish the various categories, see how many there are, and say what penalties will be appropriate for each. It looks as if this could properly form the next subject of our legislation.

Even the biggest bungler you could find among would-be legislators will put cases of wounding and mutilation immediately after cases of murder. Woundings ought to be distinguished as murders were: some are inflicted involuntarily, some in anger, some through fear, while others are committed voluntarily and with premeditation. A preliminary address must be given about all these categories as follows:

It is vital that men should lay down laws for themselves and live in obedience to them; otherwise they will be indistinguishable from wild animals of the utmost savagery. The reason is this: no man has sufficient natural gifts both to discern what benefits men in their social relationships and to be constantly ready and able to put his knowledge to the best practical use. The first difficulty is to realize that the

proper object of true political skill is not the interest of private individuals but the common good. This is what knits a state together, whereas private interests make it disintegrate. If the public interest is well served, rather than the private, then the individual and the community alike are benefited.

The second difficulty is that even if a man did get an adequate theoretical grasp of the truth of all this, he might then attain a position of absolute control over a state, with no one to call him to account. In these circumstances he would never have the courage of his convictions; he would never devote his life to promoting the welfare of the community as his first concern, making his private interests take second place to the public good. His human nature will always drive him to look to his own advantage and the lining of his own pocket. An irrational avoidance of pain and pursuit of pleasure will dominate his character, so that he will prefer these two aims to better and more righteous paths. Blindness, self-imposed, will ultimately lead the man's whole being, and the entire state, into a morass of evil. But if ever by the grace of God some natural genius were born, and had the chance to assume such power, he would have no need of laws to control him. Knowledge is unsurpassed by any law or regulation; reason, if it is genuine and really enjoys its natural freedom, should have universal power: it is not right that it should be under the control of anything else, as though it were some sort of slave. But as it is, such a character is nowhere to be found, except a hint of it here and there. That is why we need to choose the second alternative, law and regulation, which embody general principles, but cannot provide for every individual case.

I have pointed this out because we are now going to settle the penalty or fine to be imposed on someone who has wounded or harmed someone else. Anyone could quite easily

and properly take us up on any point and ask: 'What attacker, what wound, what victim do you mean? How was the attack made, and when? The circumstances of these cases differ in a thousand and one different ways.' Now to leave all these details to the judgment of the courts is impracticable, and equally impracticable to leave them none. In every case, however, one point in particular simply must be left to the courts: in each separate instance, they must decide whether the crime did in fact take place, or not. But on the other hand it is hardly feasible to produce laws oneself to cover every case, serious or trivial; one can scarcely leave the courts no discretion at all about the fine or punishment that ought to be imposed on a criminal of this kind.

Clinias/ Well, then, where do we go from here?

Athenian Stranger/ We conclude that some details ought to be left to the courts, but not others; these should be regulated by the legislator.

Clinias/ Which points, then, ought to be in the legal code, and which ought to be referred to the judgment of the courts?

Athenian Stranger/ In this connection, here's the next thing to notice: sometimes we find in a state that the juries are useless, dumb things; the individual jurymen keep their opinions a mystery known only to themselves and give their decisions by secret ballot. It's even more serious when so far from keeping silent when they hear a case they make a tremendous disturbance as though they were in a theatre, and hurl shouts of applause or disapproval at the speaker on either side in turn. All this puts the state at large into an awkward predicament. It is a wretched business to be forced to lay down laws for courts of that type, but if one is forced, the right thing to do is to hand over to them the assessment

of penalties only in very trivial cases, providing for the majority in explicit laws of one's own—if, that is, one ever does legislate for a state organized in this way. But in a country where the regulation of the courts is as satisfactory as can be achieved and the jurymen-to-be have received a good education and been examined by all kinds of tests, it is right and proper to grant them complete discretion on all points to do with the punishments or fines that convicted criminals should suffer. In the present case we cannot be blamed if we leave to their discretion the most frequent and important points that arise, because they are points which even inadequately educated jurymen could grasp and apply when they have to give each individual crime a penalty appropriate both to the damage done and to the wickedness which is at the root of the actual deed. We believe, in fact, that the people for whom we are legislating may well turn out quite conspicuously able judges of these matters, so we should leave most decisions to them. Even so, in enacting earlier parts of our legal code, we mentioned the practice of sketching some examples of penalties—models for the judges to imitate, to stop them exceeding the due limits of justice. We suited the action to the word; it was the right course then and it is the right course now, as I once again resume our legislation.

Our law on wounding, then, should be written in the following terms:

If a man deliberately intends to kill a fellow citizen (unless the latter is one of those whose death is sanctioned by the law [(a-e)]), and wounds him without being able to kill him, no pity should be wasted on the man who has inflicted a wound with that sort of intention: he should be treated with no more respect than a killer, and made to stand trial for murder.

But we should have due respect for the luck that has saved him from total ruin, and for his guardian angel too, who in pity for the attacker and the wounded man has stopped the injury of the latter from proving fatal, and prevented the disastrous ill luck of the former from bringing a curse down upon his head. We should duly thank his guardian spirit and not obstruct its wishes:

He who has inflicted the wound shall be spared the death penalty, but he must suffer life-long banishment to some neighboring state, with full freedom to enjoy all the income from his property; he must pay full compensation for whatever injury he has done the wounded man, the sum to be assessed by the court that tries the case. (The court will consist of the same people who would have tried him for murder if his victim had died of the wounds sustained.)

If with similar premeditation a child wounds his parents, or a slave wounds his master, death is to be the penalty.

If similarly a brother wounds a brother or a sister, or a sister wounds a brother or a sister, and is convicted of wounding with premeditation, death is to be the penalty.

If with intent to kill a wife wounds her husband, or a husband wounds his wife, he or she must go into permanent exile. If they have sons or daughters who are still in their minority, the trustees must administer their property in trust, and care for the children as though they were orphans. If the offspring are adult, they should themselves take possession of the property, and be under no obligation to support the exile. If anyone who succumbs to such misfortune is childless, the relatives of the exile, as far as the children of the cousins on both the male and female side, must hold a meeting, and in consultation with the Guardians of the Laws appoint an heir for this property, the 5040th in the state.

(They should look at the matter in the following light: none of the 5040 farms belongs to its occupant or his family in general as much as to the state, which is entitled to it not only as a piece of public property but also as its own private possession; and the state ought to do its best to keep its own properties as holy and prosperous as possible.) Therefore:

When one of the properties falls away from this condition of holiness and prosperity to such an extent that the possessor leaves no children to succeed him, being unmarried, or married but childless, and meets his end convicted of deliberate murder, or some other crime against gods or citizens for which the death penalty is specifically laid down by law, or if someone without male issue goes into permanent exile, first of all, this property must be cleansed and purified according to law; then the relatives must hold the meeting we mentioned just now, and in consultation with the Guardians of the Laws pick out a family that has the best reputation for virtue of all the families in the state and is at the same time fortunate enough to have produced several children. One of these they must adopt on behalf of the deceased's father and forebears, who will receive him as their son; from them he will take his name, which should be an omen of good fortune. The relatives should pray that as a result of his adoption he will bring them children, and guard the hearth and look after the family affairs, both sacred and secular, with greater success than his adoptive father enjoyed. In this way they should install him, according to law, as heir to the property.

When such disasters as we have mentioned overwhelm the sinner, they should let him lie nameless in his grave, childless and deprived of his family estate.

We can see that it is not universally true that one district extends right up to the boundary of another. In some cases there is a no man's land in between, which will extend so as

to touch either boundary and occupy an intermediate position between the two. This, we said, was true of an act done in anger: it falls somewhere between voluntary and involuntary. Our regulations concerning wounding inflicted in anger should therefore run as follows:

If a man is found guilty, and the wound turns out to be curable, he must pay double damages; if it is incurable, he must pay quadruple damages.

If he has inflicted a wound which, though curable, makes the wounded man feel acutely embarrassed and ashamed, he must pay triple damages.

If one man wounds another and injures not only his victim but the state, by rendering him unable to defend his fatherland against the enemy, he must, in addition to the other penalties, make restitution to the state for the loss it has sustained, viz. he must perform not only his own military service but that of the incapacitated person as well by serving in the army on his behalf.

If he fails so to serve, he shall be liable under the law to a charge of evading military service, at the hands of anyone who wishes.

The assessment of the damages, double, triple, or quadruple, must be made by the judges who found him guilty.

If one relative wounds another in any of these ways, the fellow clansmen and close relatives, male and female, as far as sons of cousins on both the male and female side, must hold a meeting, and when they have reached their verdict, they must entrust the assessment to the natural parents. If the assessment is challenged, the assessment of the relatives on the male side must be taken as final. If they cannot agree themselves, they must, in the end, hand over the matter to the Guardians of the Laws.

When children inflict this kind of wound on their parents, it is essential for the judges to be parents over sixty years of age who have children of their own and not merely adopted ones. If a man is found guilty, these judges must decide whether a man who could do such a thing as this should die, or whether the penalty should be something even more severe, or perhaps something a trifle less severe. None of the relations of the culprit should act as a judge, not even if he is of the age required by law.

If a slave wounds a free man in anger, the owner must hand him over to the wounded man, who may treat him in whatever way he likes.

If the owner fails to hand him over, he must remedy the damage himself.

If anyone alleges that the affair is the result of collusion between the slave and the wounded party, he must contest the point at law. If he does not win the case, he must pay triple damages.

If he does win, he must prosecute the author of the collusion with the slave on a charge of kidnapping.

If anyone involuntarily wounds someone else, he must pay simple damages. (No legislator is capable of regulating the workings of chance.) The judges are to be the same as those appointed to try children who wound their parents; and they will have the duty of assessing the amount of the damages.

Athenian Stranger/ All the injuries we have so far mentioned involve the use of violence, and so too do the various kinds of assault. In these cases, the point that every man, woman and child should bear in mind is this:

Age is always very much more highly regarded than youth, and this is so both among the gods and among men, if they intend to live in security and happiness. Therefore,

the assault of an older man by a younger in public is a disgusting sight, and the gods hate to see it. No young man who is struck by an old man should ever make a fuss, but put up with his bad temper, and so establish a claim to similar respect when he himself grows old.

Our law, then, should run as follows:

Everyone in our community must show, by his words and actions, respect for his senior. A man should avoid crossing any person (male or female) who is twenty years older than himself, regarding him or her in the same way as he would his father or mother. For the sake of the gods of birth, he must always keep himself from striking anyone old enough to have been his parent. Similarly, he must refrain from striking a foreigner, whether the latter is a long-established resident or a recent immigrant. He must never go so far as to punish such a person by hitting him, either by attacking him first, or in self-defense.

If he thinks the foreigner is unruly and insolent in an attack on himself, and needs to be punished, he must arrest him and take him, without hitting him, to the court of the City-Wardens, so that the foreigner may learn to banish all thoughts of ever striking a citizen again. The City-Wardens must take the man and interrogate him, with proper respect for the god who is the protector of foreigners. If in fact the foreigner seems to have been in the wrong in striking the citizen, the City-Wardens must put a stop to this unruliness, so characteristic of a foreigner; they must give him as many strokes of the lash as will equal the number of blows he himself inflicted.

If he is not in the wrong, they must warn and rebuke the man who made the arrest, and dismiss the pair of them.

If one man strikes another who is about the same age, or is older, but has no children, whether the attacker is an old

man striking an old man, or a young man striking a young man, the man attacked must defend himself by natural means—with his own bare hands, without a weapon. But if a man over forty years of age has the face to fight someone, whether he strikes the first blow, or fights in self-defense, he will get the reputation of being an uncivilized boor with the manners of a slave, and this ignominious punishment will serve him right.

A man who is easily persuaded by these words of exhortation will give us no trouble; but stubborn people, who ignore the preamble, ought to be ready to take more notice of the following regulations:

If anyone strikes a man twenty years or more his senior, any bystander, if he is neither of the same age nor younger than the combatants, should separate them, or be treated under the law as a wretched coward. If he is of the same age as the person attacked, or younger, he should go to his assistance as if it were his own brother or father being wronged, or some still more senior relative.

In addition, the man who dares to strike his senior as defined must stand trial for assault. If he loses the case, he must be imprisoned for not less than a year. If the court fixes a longer imprisonment, the period it decides on shall stand.

If a foreigner, or a resident alien, strikes a man twenty years or more his senior, the same regulation about assistance from passers-by shall be enforced in the same way as before.

A man found guilty of such a charge, if he is a foreigner not resident in the state, must pay his penalty by spending two years in prison.

If it is a resident alien who is in breach of these regulations, he must go to prison for three years, except that the court may specify a longer period by way of penalty.

The passer-by who comes across any of these cases of assault and does not give assistance as required by law must be fined: a member of the first property-class one hundred drachmas, a member of the second fifty drachmas, a member of the third thirty drachmas, and a member of the fourth twenty drachmas. The court in such cases is to consist of the Generals, Company-Commanders, Tribe-Leaders and Cavalry-Commanders.

Some laws, it seems, are made for the benefit of honest men, to teach them the rules of association that have to be observed if they are to live in friendship; others are made for those who refuse to be instructed and whose naturally tough natures have not been softened enough to stop them turning to absolute vice. It will be they who have prompted the points I am just going to make, and it is for their benefit that the lawgiver will be compelled to produce his laws, although he would wish never to find any occasion to use them. Consider a man who will dare to lay hands on his father or mother or their forebears by way of violent assault. He will fear neither the wrath of the gods above nor the punishments said to await him in the grave; he will hold the ancient and universal tradition in contempt, on the strength of his 'knowledge' in a field where he is in fact a total ignoramus. He will therefore turn criminal, and will stand in need of some extreme deterrent. Death, however, is not an extreme and final penalty; the sufferings said to be in store for these people in the world to come are much more extreme than that. But although the threat of these sufferings is no idle one, it has no deterrent effect at all on souls like these. If it did, we should never have to deal with assaults on mothers, and wicked and presumptuous attacks on other forebears. I conclude, therefore, that the punishments men suffer for these crimes here on earth while they are alive should as far

as possible equal the penalties beyond the grave. Our next enactment, then, should run as follows:

If a man who is not in the grip of insanity dares to strike his father or mother, or their father or mother, the first point is that the passerby must render assistance as provided in former cases.

If the resident alien renders assistance, he shall be invited to a front seat at the games; if he does not render assistance, he must go into permanent exile from the land.

If the non-resident alien renders assistance, he shall be commended.

If he does not render assistance, he must be reprimanded.

If a slave renders assistance, he shall be set free.

If he does not render assistance, he must receive a hundred strokes of the lash.

If the crime was committed in the market-place, the whipping should be administered by the Market-Wardens; if in the city but not in the market, by the City Warden in residence; if somewhere in the countryside, by the chief Country-Wardens.

Everyone of citizen birth who passes by, whether man, woman or child, must shout 'you wicked monster' at the attacker, and repel him. If the passer-by makes no attempt to repel him, he must be liable under the law to a curse from Zeus, guardian of the family and protector of parents.

If a man is convicted of an assault on his parents, he must be permanently rusticated from the city to some other part of the country, and be banned from all sacred places.

If he returns to the city, he must be punished by death.

If he does not keep away from sacred places, the Country-Wardens must punish him by a whipping, and by any other method at their discretion.

If any free man eats or drinks in company with such a person, or associates with him in some other similar fashion, even by deliberately failing to cut him on meeting, he must not enter any temple, or market-place, or any part of the city, before he has been purified, bearing in mind that he has come into contact with a misfortune that brings a curse upon a man.

If he disobeys the law and in defiance of it pollutes temples and city, any official who discovers the fact and does not take the man to court will find that this is one of the most serious charges against him at his scrutiny.

If a slave strikes a free man, foreigner or citizen, the passer-by who does not render assistance must pay the penalty prescribed for his property-class.

The passers-by in conjunction with the person attacked must bind the slave and hand him over to his victim; the victim must take him, put him in chains, and give him as many strokes of the whip as he likes, provided He does not diminish the value of the slave to his master; he should then hand him over to the latter's legal ownership. This legal ownership must be subject to the following provision. Any slave who has struck a free man, other than on the orders of the officials, must be tied up; his master must receive him from the assaulted person and not release him before the slave persuades his victim that he deserves to live free of constraint.

The same regulations should apply in all cases of women against each other, of women against men, and of men against women.

Book 10.

Athenian Stranger/ So much for cases of assault. Now let's state a single comprehensive rule to cover acts of violence. It will run more or less like this. No one may seize or make off with other people's property, nor use any of his neighbor's possessions without getting the permission of the owner. Contempt for this principle has always been (and still is and always will be) the source of all the evils just mentioned. But there are other acts of violence, too, of which the worst are the insolence and outrageous actions of the young. These actions are most serious when they affect sacred objects; and the damage is particularly grave when it is done to sacred property that also belongs to the public, or is held in common by the members of a sub-division of the state, such as a tribe or some similar association. Second, and second in order of gravity, comes wanton damage to sacred objects that are privately owned, particularly tombs; third come attacks (apart from those already dealt with) on parents. A fourth category of outrageous conduct is when someone ignores the wishes of the authorities and seizes or removes or uses something belonging to them without their permission; and any violations of the civil rights of the private citizen which demand legal redress will constitute a fifth class. We have to frame a comprehensive law that will cover each individual case. As for robbery from temples, whether clandestine or open and violent, we have already specified in general terms the appropriate punishment; but our statement of the penalty for offensive remarks about the gods or outrageous actions against their interests should be prefaced by these words of exhortation: No one who believes in gods as the law directs ever voluntarily commits an unholy act or lets any lawless word pass his lips. If he does, it is because of one of three possible misapprehensions: either, as I said, he believes the gods do not exist, or that

they exist but take no thought for the human race, or that they are influenced by sacrifices and supplications and can easily be won over.

Clinias/ So what's the right thing for us to do or say to these people?

Athenian Stranger/ My friend, let's listen to the ridicule and scorn with which I imagine they put their case.

Clinias/ What ridicule?

Athenian Stranger/ They'll probably go in for bantering, and address us like this: 'Gentlemen of Athens, of Sparta and of Crete, you are quite right. Some of us are indeed absolute atheists, whereas others do believe in such gods as you describe. So we demand of you what you yourselves demanded of the laws, that before you resort to threats and bullying, you should try to convince us by argument and cogent proofs that gods do exist, and that they are in fact above being seduced by gifts into turning a blind eye to injustice. But you see, it's precisely in these and similar terms that we hear them spoken of by the most highly thought-of poets and orators and prophets and priests and thousands of other people too. That's why most of us make little effort to avoid crime, but commit it first and try to put things right afterwards. So from lawgivers who profess to use the velvet glove rather than the iron fist we claim the right to be tackled by persuasion first. Even if, when you state your case for the existence of gods, your elegance of expression is only marginally superior to your opponents', persuade us that your argument is a better expression of the truth, and then perhaps we'll believe you. Isn't that fair enough? Well then, try to reply to our challenge.'

Clinias/ Well sir, don't you think that the gods' existence is an easy truth to explain?

Athenian Stranger/ How?

Clinias/ Well, just look at the earth and the sun and the stars and the universe in general; look at the wonderful procession of the seasons and its articulation into years and months! Anyway, you know that all Greeks and all foreigners are unanimous in recognizing the existence of gods.

Athenian Stranger/ My dear sir, when I think of the contempt these scoundrels will probably feel for us, I'm overcome with embarrassment—no, I withdraw that word: let's say they 'alarm' me—because you don't appreciate the real grounds of their opposition to you. You think it's just because they can't resist temptation and desire that they are attracted to the godless life.

Clinias/ What other reason could there be, sir?

Athenian Stranger/ A reason which you two, living rather off the beaten track as you do, simply wouldn't appreciate. It will have completely passed you by.

Clinias/ What are you talking about now?

Athenian Stranger/ A form of ignorance that causes no end of trouble, but which passes for the height of wisdom.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ In Athens a number of written works are current which are not found in your states (which are, I understand, too well run to tolerate them). The subject of these writings (some of which are in verse, others in prose) is theology. The most ancient accounts, after relating how the primitive substances—the sky and so on—came into being, pass rapidly on to a description of the birth of the gods and the details of how once born they subsequently treated each other. On some subjects, the antiquity of these works makes them difficult to criticize, whatever their influence—good or bad—on their audience; but when it comes to the respect and attention due to parents, I for one shall never recommend them either as a good influence or as a

statement of the honest truth. Still, there's no need to bother with this old material: we may freely allow it to be arranged and recounted in any way the gods find amusing. But the principles of our modern pundits do need to be denounced as a pernicious influence. Just look at the effects of their arguments! When you and I present our proofs for the existence of gods and adduce what you adduced—sun, moon, stars and earth—and argue they are gods and divine beings, the proselytes of these clever fellows will say that these things are just earth and stones, and are incapable of caring for human affairs, however much our plausible rhetoric has managed to dress them up.

Clinias/ Even if it were unique, sir, that theory you've just described would make trouble. But as similar doctrines in fact exist in their thousands, the situation is even worse.

Athenian Stranger/ What now, then? What's our reply? What must we do? It's as though we were on trial before a bench of godless judges, defending ourselves on a charge arising out of our legislation. 'It's monstrous,' they say to us, 'that you should pass laws asserting that gods exist.' Shall we defend ourselves? Or shall we ignore them and get back to our legislation, so that the mere preface doesn't turn out longer than the actual code? You see, if we're going to postpone passing the appropriate legislation until we've proved properly to those with a taste for impiety all the points they insisted we had to cover, so that they feel uneasy and begin to find their views going sour on them, our explanation will be anything but brief.

Clinias/ Even so, sir, as we've often said in the comparatively short time we've been talking, there's no reason at the moment to prefer a brief explanation to a full one: after all, no one's 'breathing down our neck' (as they say). It would be an awful farce, if we appeared to be putting brevity first and quality second. It's vital that somehow or

other we should make out a plausible case for supposing that gods do exist, that they are good, and that they respect justice more than men do. Such a demonstration would constitute just about the best and finest preamble our penal code could have. So let's overcome our reluctance and unhurriedly exert what powers of persuasion we have in this field, devoting ourselves wholeheartedly to a full exposition of our case.

Athenian Stranger/ How keen and insistent you are! I take it you're suggesting we should now offer up a prayer for the success of our exposition, which we certainly can't delay any longer.

Well now, how can one argue for the existence of gods without getting angry? You see, one inevitably gets irritable and annoyed with these people who have put us to the trouble, and continue to put us to the trouble, of composing these explanations. If only they believed the stories which they had as babes and sucklings from their nurses and mothers! These almost literally 'charming' stories were told partly for amusement, partly in full earnest; the children heard them related in prayer at sacrifices, and saw acted representations of them—a part of the ceremony a child always loves to see and hear; and they saw their own parents praying with the utmost seriousness for themselves and their families in the firm conviction that their prayers and supplications were addressed to gods who really did exist. At the rising and setting of the sun and moon the children saw and heard Greeks and foreigners, in happiness and misery alike, all prostrate at their devotions; far from supposing gods to be a myth, the worshippers believed their existence to be so sure as to be beyond suspicion. When some people contemptuously brush aside all this evidence without a single good reason to support them (as even a half-wit can see) and oblige us to deliver this address—well, how could

one possibly admonish them and at the same time teach them the basic fact about gods, their existence, without using the rough edge of one's tongue? Still, we must make the best of it: we don't want both sides maddened at once, they by their greed for pleasure, we by our anger at their condition. So our address to men with such a depraved outlook should be calm, and run as follows. Let's use honeyed words and abate our anger, and pretend we're addressing just one representative individual.

'Now then, my lad, you're still young, and as time goes on you'll come to adopt opinions diametrically opposed to those you hold now. Why not wait till later on to make up your mind about these important matters? The most important of all, however lightly you take it at the moment, is to get the right ideas about the gods and so live a good life: —otherwise you'll live a bad one. In this connection, I want first to make a crucial and irrefutable point. It's this: you're not unique. Neither you nor your friends are the first to have held this opinion about the gods. It's an illness from which the world is never free, though the number of sufferers varies from time to time. I've met a great many of them, and let me assure you that none of them who have been convinced early in life that gods do not exist have ever retained that belief into old age. However, it is true that some men (but not many) do persist in laboring under the impression either that although the gods exist they are indifferent to human affairs, or alternatively that they are not indifferent but can easily be won over by prayers and sacrifices. Be guided by me: you'll only see this business in its truest light if you wait to gather your information from all sources, particularly the legislator, and then see which theory represents the truth. In the meantime, don't venture any impiety where gods are concerned. You may take it that it will be up to your lawgiver,

now and in the future, to try to enlighten you on precisely these topics.'

Clinias/ So far, sir, that's very well said.

Athenian Stranger/ Certainly, Megillus and Clinias, but what an amazing doctrine we've got involved in, without noticing it!

Clinias/ What doctrine do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I mean the one which many people regard as the highest truth of all.

Clinias/ Please be more explicit.

Athenian Stranger/ Some people, I believe, account for all things which have come to exist, all things which are coming into existence now, and all things which will do so in the future, by attributing them either to nature, art, or chance.

Clinias/ Isn't that satisfactory?

Athenian Stranger/ Oh, I expect they've got it more or less right—they're clever fellows. Still, let's keep track of them, and see what's really implied in the theories of that school of thought.

Clinias/ By all means.

Athenian Stranger/ The facts show—so they claim—that the greatest and finest things in the world are the products of nature and chance, the creations of art being comparatively trivial. The works of nature, they say, are grand and primary, and constitute a ready-made source for all the minor works constructed and fashioned by art—artifacts, as they're generally called.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I'll put it more precisely. They maintain that fire, water, earth and air owe their existence to nature and chance, and in no case to art, and that it is by means of these entirely inanimate substances that the

secondary physical bodies—the earth, sun, moon and stars—have been produced. These substances moved at random, each impelled by virtue of its own inherent properties, which depended on various suitable amalgamations of hot and cold, dry and wet, soft and hard, and all other haphazard combinations that inevitably resulted when the opposites were mixed. This is the process to which all the heavens and everything that is in them owe their birth, and the consequent establishment of the four seasons led to the appearance of all plants and living creatures. The cause of all this, they say, was neither intelligent planning, nor a deity, nor art, but—as we've explained—nature and chance. Art, the brain-child of these living creatures, arose later, the mortal child of mortal beings; it has produced, at a late stage, various amusing trifles that are hardly real at all—mere insubstantial images of the same order as the arts themselves (I mean for instance the productions of the arts of painting and music, and all their ancillary skills). But if there are in fact some techniques that produce worthwhile results, they are those that co-operate with nature, like medicine and farming and physical training. This school of thought maintains that government, in particular, has very little to do with nature, and is largely a matter of art; similarly legislation is never a natural process but is based on technique, and its enactments are quite artificial.

Clinias/ What are you driving at?

Athenian Stranger/ My dear fellow, the first thing these people say about the gods is that they are artificial concepts corresponding to nothing in nature;

they are legal fictions, which moreover vary very widely according to the different conventions people agree on when they produce a legal code. In particular, goodness according to nature and goodness according to the law are two different

things, and there is no natural standard of justice at all. On the contrary, men are always wrangling about their moral standards and altering them, and every change introduced becomes binding from the moment it's made, regardless of the fact that it is entirely artificial, and based on convention, not nature in the slightest degree. All this, my friends, is the theme of experts—as our young people regard them—who in their prose and poetry maintain that anything one can get away with by force is absolutely justified. This is why we experience outbreaks of impiety among the young, who assume that the kind of gods the law tells them to believe in do not exist; this is why we get treasonable efforts to convert people to the 'true natural life', which is essentially nothing but a life of conquest over others, not one of service to your neighbor as the law enjoins.

Clinias/ What a pernicious doctrine you've explained, sir! It must be the ruin of the younger generation, both in the state at large and in private families.

Athenian Stranger/ That's very true, Clinias. So what do you think the legislator ought to do, faced with such a long-established thesis as this? Is he simply to stand up in public and threaten all the citizens with punishment if they don't admit the existence of gods and mentally accept the law's description of them? He could make the same threat about their notions of beauty and justice and all such vital concepts, as well as about anything that encourages virtue or vice; he could demand that the citizens' belief and actions should accord with his written instructions, and insist that anyone not showing the proper obedience to the laws must be punished either by death, or by a whipping and imprisonment, deprivation of civic rights, or by being sent into exile a poorer man. But what about persuading them? When he establishes a legal code for his people, shouldn't he

try to talk them into being as amenable as he can make them?

Clinias/ Certainly, sir. If even limited persuasion can be applied in this field, no legislator of even moderate ability should shrink from making the effort. On the contrary, he should argue 'till the cows come home', as the saying is, to back up the old doctrine that the gods exist, and to support the other arguments you ran through just now. In particular, he should defend law itself and art as either part of nature or existing by reason of some no less powerful agency—being in fact, to tell the truth, creations of reason. That, I think, is the point you're making, and I agree.

Athenian Stranger/ Really, Clinias, you are enthusiastic! But when these themes are presented as you suggest, in addresses composed for a popular audience, aren't they found rather difficult to understand? And don't the addresses tend to go on forever?

Clinias/ Well, sir, we put up with one long discussion, about inebriation in the cause of culture, so surely we can tolerate another, about theology and so forth. And of course this helps intelligent legislation tremendously, because legal instructions, once written down, remain fixed and permanent, ready to stand up to scrutiny forever. So there's no reason for alarm if at first they make difficult listening, because your slow learner will be able to go back again and again and examine them. Nor does their length, provided they're useful, justify any man in committing what seems to me, at least, an impiety: I mean refusing to facilitate these explanations as best he can.

Megillus/ Yes, sir, I entirely approve of what Clinias says.

Athenian Stranger/ As well you may, Megillus, and we must do as he suggests. Of course, if this sort of argument had not been disseminated so widely over pretty well the

entire human race, there would be no call for arguments to prove the existence of gods. But in present circumstances we've no choice. When the most important laws are being trampled underfoot by scoundrels, whose duty is it to rush to their defense, if not the legislator's?

Megillus/ Nobody's.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, Clinias, you must take your share in the explanation, so tell me your opinion again. I assume the upholder of this doctrine thinks of fire and water, earth and air as being the first of all substances, and this is precisely what he means by the term 'nature'; soul, he thinks, was derived from them, at a later stage. No, I do more than 'assume': I'd say he argues the point explicitly.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, by heaven, haven't we discovered the fountain-head, so to speak, of the senseless opinions of all those who have ever undertaken investigation into nature? Scrutinize carefully every stage in their argument, because it will be crucial if we can show that these people who have embraced impious doctrines and lead others on are using fallacious arguments rather than cogent ones—which I think is in fact the case.

Clinias/ You're right, but try to explain their error.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, it looks as if we have to embark on a rather unfamiliar line of argument.

Clinias/ Don't hesitate, sir. I realize you think we'll be straying outside legislation if we attempt such an explanation, but if this is the only way to reach agreement that the beings currently described as gods in our law are properly so described, then this, my dear sir, is the kind of explanation we must give.

Athenian Stranger/ So it looks as if I must now argue along rather unfamiliar lines. Well then, the doctrine which

produces an impious soul also 'produces', in a sense, the soul itself, in that it denies the priority of what was in fact the first cause of the birth and destruction of all things, and regards it as a later creation. Conversely, it asserts that what actually came later, came first. That's the source of the mistake these people have made about the real nature of the gods.

Clinias/ So far, the point escapes me.

Athenian Stranger/ It's the soul, my good friend, that nearly everybody seems to have misunderstood, not realizing its nature and power. Quite apart from the other points about it, people are particularly ignorant about its birth. It is one of the first creations, born long before all physical things, and is the chief cause of all their alterations and transformations. Now if that's true, anything closely related to soul will necessarily have been created before material things, won't it, since soul itself is older than matter?

Clinias/ Necessarily.

Athenian Stranger/ Opinion, diligence, reason, art and law will be prior to roughness and smoothness, heaviness and lightness. In particular, the grand and primary works and creations, precisely because they come in the category 'primary', will be attributable to art. Natural things, and nature herself—to use the mistaken terminology of our opponents—will be secondary products from art and reason.

Clinias/ Why do you say 'mistaken'?

Athenian Stranger/ When they use the term 'nature', they mean the process by which the primary substances were created. But if it can be shown that soul came first, not fire or air, and that it was one of the first things to be created, it will be quite correct to say that soul is preeminently natural. This is true, provided you can demonstrate that soul is older than matter, but not otherwise.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ So this is precisely the point we have to tackle next?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ It's an extremely tricky argument, and we old men must be careful not to be taken in by its freshness and novelty, so that it eludes our grasp and makes us look like ridiculous fools whose ambitious ideas lead to failure even in little things. Just consider. Imagine the three of us had to cross a river in spate, and I were the younger and had plenty of experience of currents. Suppose I said, 'I ought to try first on my own account, and leave you two in safety while I see if the river is fordable for you two older men as well, or if not, just how bad it is. If it turns out to be fordable, I'll then call you and put my experience at your disposal in helping you to cross; but if in the event it cannot be crossed by old men like yourselves, then the only risk has been mine.' Wouldn't that strike you as fair enough? The situation is the same now: the argument ahead runs too deep, and men as weak as you will probably get out of your depth. I want to prevent you novices in answering from being dazed and dizzied by a stream of questions, which would put you in an undignified and humiliating position you'd find most unpleasant. So this is what I think I'd better do now: first I'll ask questions of myself, while you listen in safety; then I'll go over the answers again and in this way work through the whole argument until the soul has been thoroughly dealt with and its priority to matter proved.

Clinias/ We think that's a splendid idea, sir. Please act on your suggestion.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, if ever we needed to call upon the help of God, it's now. Let's take it the gods have been most pressingly invoked to assist the proof of their own

existence, and let's rely on their help as if it were a rope steadying us as we enter the deep waters of our present theme. Now when I'm under interrogation on this sort of topic, and such questions as the following are put to me, the safest replies seem to be these. Suppose someone asks 'Sir, do all things stand still, and does nothing move? Or is precisely the opposite true? Or do some things move, while others are motionless?' My reply will be 'I suppose some move and others remain at rest.' 'So surely there must be some space in which the stationary objects remain at rest, and those in motion move?' 'Of course.' 'Some of them, presumably, will do so in one location, others in several?' 'Do you mean', we shall reply, 'that "moving in one location" is the action of objects which are able to keep their centers immobile? For instance, there are circles which are said to "stay put" even though as a whole they are revolving.' 'Yes.' 'And we appreciate that when a disk revolves like that, points near and far from the center describe circles of different radii in the same time; their motion varies according to these radii and is proportionately quick or slow. This motion gives rise to all sorts of wonderful phenomena, because these points simultaneously traverse circles of large and small circumference at proportionately high or low speeds—an effect one might have expected to be impossible.' 'You're quite right.' 'When you speak of motion in many locations I suppose you're referring to objects that are always leaving one spot and moving on to another. Sometimes their motion involves only one point of contact with their successive situations, sometimes several, as in rolling.

'From time to time objects meet; a moving one colliding with a stationary one disintegrates, but if it meets other objects traveling in the opposite direction they coalesce into a single intermediate substance, half one and half the other.' 'Yes, I agree to your statement of the case.' 'Further, such

combination leads to an increase in bulk, while their separation leads to diminution—so long as the existing states of the objects remain unimpaired; but if either combination or separation entails the abolition of the existing state, the objects concerned are destroyed.

'Now, what conditions are always present when anything is produced? Clearly, an initial impulse grows and reaches the second stage and then the third stage out of the second, finally (at the third stage) presenting percipient beings with something to perceive. This then is the process of change and alteration to which everything owes its birth. A thing exists as such so long as it is stable, but when it changes its essential state it is completely destroyed.'

So, my friends, haven't we now classified and numbered all forms of motion, except two?

Clinias/ Which two?

Athenian Stranger/ My dear chap, they are the two which constitute the real purpose of every question we've asked.

Clinias/ Try to be more explicit.

Athenian Stranger/ What we really had in view was soul, wasn't it?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ The one kind of motion is that which is permanently capable of moving other things but not itself; the other is permanently capable of moving both itself and other things by processes of combination and separation, increase and diminution, generation and destruction. Let these stand as two further distinct types in our complete list of motions.

Clinias/ Agreed.

Athenian Stranger/ So we shall put ninth the kind which always imparts motion to something else and is itself

changed by another thing. Then there's the motion that moves both itself and other things, suitable for all active and passive processes and accurately termed the source of change and motion in all things that exist. I suppose we'll call that the tenth.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now which of our (roughly) ten motions should we be justified in singling out as the most powerful and radically effective?

Clinias/ We can't resist the conclusion that the motion which can generate itself is infinitely superior, and all the others are inferior to it.

Athenian Stranger/ Well said! So shouldn't we correct one or two inaccuracies in the points we've just made?

Clinias/ What sort of inaccuracy do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ It wasn't quite right to call that motion the 'tenth'.

Clinias/ Why not?

Athenian Stranger/ It can be shown to be first, in ancestry as well as in power; the next kind—although oddly enough a moment ago we called it 'ninth'—we'll put second.

Clinias/ What are you getting at?

Athenian Stranger/ This: when we find one thing producing a change in another, and that in turn affecting something else, and so forth, will there ever be, in such a sequence, an original cause of change? How could anything whose motion is transmitted to it from something else be the first thing to effect an alteration? It's impossible. In reality, when something which has set itself moving effects an alteration in something, and that in turn effects something else, so that the motion is transmitted to thousands upon thousands of things one after another, the entire sequence

of their movements must surely spring from some initial principle, which can hardly be anything except the change effected by self-generated motion.

Clinias/ You've put it admirably, and your point must be allowed.

Athenian Stranger/ Now let's put the point in a different way, and once again answer our own questions: 'Suppose the whole universe were somehow to coalesce and come to a standstill—the theory which most of our philosopher-fellows are actually bold enough to maintain—which of the motions we have enumerated would inevitably be the first to arise in it?' 'Self-generating motion, surely, because no antecedent impulse can ever be transmitted from something else in a situation where no antecedent impulse exists. Self-generating motion, then, is the source of all motions, and the primary force in both stationary and moving objects, and we shan't be able to avoid the conclusion that it is the most ancient and the most potent of all changes, whereas the change which is produced by something else and is in turn transmitted to other objects, comes second.'

Clinias/ You're absolutely right.

Athenian Stranger/ So now we've reached this point in our discussion, here's another question we should answer.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ If we ever saw this phenomenon—self-generating motion—arise in an object made of earth, water or fire (alone or in combination) how should we describe that object's condition?

Clinias/ Of course, what you're really asking me is this: when an object moves itself, are we to say that it is 'alive'?

Athenian Stranger/ That's right.

Clinias/ It emphatically is alive.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, when we see that a thing has a soul, the situation is exactly the same, isn't it? We have to admit that it is alive.

Clinias/ Yes, exactly the same.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, for heaven's sake, hold on a minute. I suppose you'd be prepared to recognize three elements in any given thing?

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ The first point is what the object actually is, the second is the definition of this, and the third is the name. And in addition there are two questions to be asked about every existing thing.

Clinias/ Two?

Athenian Stranger/ Sometimes we put forward the mere name and want to know the definition, and sometimes we put forward the definition and ask for the name.

Clinias/ I take it the point we want to make at the moment is this.

Athenian Stranger/ What?

Clinias/ In general, things can be divided into two, and this is true of some numbers as well. Such a number has the name 'even' and its definition is 'a number divisible into two equal parts'.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, that's the sort of thing I mean. So surely, in either case—whether we provide the name and ask for the definition or give the definition and ask for the name—we're referring to the same object? When we call it 'even' and define it as 'a number divisible into two', it's the same thing we're talking about.

Clinias/ It certainly is.

Athenian Stranger/ So what's the definition of the thing we call the soul? Surely we can do nothing but use our formula of a moment ago: 'motion capable of moving itself'.

Clinias/ Do you mean that the entity which we all call 'soul' is precisely that which is defined by the expression 'self-generating motion'?

Athenian Stranger/ I do. And if this is true, are we still dissatisfied? Haven't we got ourselves a satisfactory proof that soul is identical with the original source of the generation and motion of all past, present and future things and their contraries? After all, it has been shown to be the cause of all change and motion in everything.

Clinias/ Dissatisfied? No! On the contrary, it has been proved up to the hilt that soul, being the source of motion, is the most ancient thing there is.

Athenian Stranger/ But when one thing is put in motion by another, it is never thereby endowed with the power of independent self-movement. Such derived motion will therefore come second, or as far down the list as you fancy relegating it, being a mere change in matter that quite literally 'has no soul'.

Clinias/ Correctly argued.

Athenian Stranger/ So it was an equally correct, final and complete statement of the truth, when we said that soul is prior to matter, and that matter came later and takes second place. Soul is the master, and matter its natural subject.

Clinias/ That is indeed absolutely true.

Athenian Stranger/ The next step is to remember our earlier admission that if soul were shown to be older than matter, the spiritual order of things would be older than the material.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ So habits, customs, will, calculation, right opinion, diligence and memory will be prior creations to material length, breadth, depth and strength, if (as is true) soul is prior to matter.

Clinias/ Unavoidably.

Athenian Stranger/ And the next unavoidable admission, seeing that we are going to posit soul as the cause of all things, will be that it is the cause of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice and all the opposites.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ And surely it's necessary to assert that as soul resides and keeps control anywhere where anything is moved, it controls the heavens as well.

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ One soul, or more than one? I'll answer for you both: more than one. At any rate, we must not assume fewer than two: that which does good, and that which has the opposite capacity.

Clinias/ That's absolutely right.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well, then. So soul, by virtue of its own motions, stirs into movement everything in the heavens and on earth and in the sea. The names of the motions of soul are: wish, reflection, diligence, counsel, opinion true and false, joy and grief, cheerfulness and fear, love and hate. Soul also uses all related or initiating motions which take over the secondary movements of matter and stimulate everything to increase or diminish, separate or combine, with the accompanying heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, roughness and smoothness, white and black, bitter and sweet.

These are the instruments soul uses, whether it cleaves to divine reason (soul itself being, if the truth were told, a divinity), and guides everything to an appropriate and

successful conclusion, or allies itself with unreason and produces completely opposite results. Shall we agree this is the case, or do we still suspect that the truth may be different?

Clinias/ By no means.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, what kind of soul may we say has gained control of the heavens and earth and their entire cycle of movement? Is it the rational and supremely virtuous kind, or that which has neither advantage? Would you like our reply to run like this?

Clinias/ How?

Athenian Stranger/ 'If, my fine fellow' (we should say) 'the whole course and movement of the heavens and all that is in them reflect the motion and revolution and calculation of reason, and operate in a corresponding fashion, then clearly we have to admit that it is the best kind of soul that cares for the entire universe and directs it along the best path.'

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ 'If however these things move in an unbalanced and disorganized way, we must say the evil kind of soul is in charge of them.'

Clinias/ That too is true.

Athenian Stranger/ 'So what is the nature of rational motion?' Now this, my friends, is a question to which it is difficult to give an answer that will make sense, so you're justified here in calling me in to help with your reply.

Clinias/ Good.

Athenian Stranger/ Still, in answering this question we mustn't assume that mortal eyes will ever be able to look upon reason and get to know it adequately: let's not produce darkness at noon, so to speak, by looking at the sun direct.

We can save our sight by looking at an image of the object we're asking about.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ What about selecting from our list of ten motions the one which reason resembles, and taking that as our image? I'll join you in recalling it, and then we'll give a joint answer to the question.

Clinias/ Yes, that's probably your best method of explanation.

Athenian Stranger/ Do we still remember at any rate this from the list of points we made earlier, that all things are either in motion or at rest?

Clinias/ Yes, we do.

Athenian Stranger/ And some of those in motion move in a single location, others in a succession of locations?

Clinias/ That is so.

Athenian Stranger/ Of these two motions, that taking place in a single location necessarily implies continuous revolution round a central point, just like wheels being turned on a lathe; and this kind of motion bears the closest possible affinity and likeness to the cyclical movement of reason.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Take reason on the one hand, and motion in a single location on the other. If we were to point out that in both cases the motion was determined by a single plan and procedure and that it was regular, uniform, always at the same point in space, around a fixed center, in the same position relative to other objects, and were to illustrate both by the example of a sphere being turned on a lathe, then no one could ever show us up for incompetent makers of verbal images.

Clinias/ You're quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ Now consider the motion that is never uniform or regular or at the same point in space or round the same center or in the same relative position or in a single location, and is neither planned nor organized nor systematic. Won't that motion be associated with every kind of unreason?

Clinias/ Absolutely true, it will.

Athenian Stranger/ So now there's no difficulty in saying right out that since we find that the entire cycle of events is to be attributed to soul, the heavens that we see revolving must necessarily be driven round—we have to say—because they are arranged and directed either by the best kind of soul or by the other sort.

Clinias/ Well, sir, judging from what has been said, I think it would be rank blasphemy to deny that their revolution is produced by one or more souls blessed with perfect virtue.

Athenian Stranger/ You've proved a most attentive listener, Clinias. Now attend to this further point.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ If, in principle, soul drives round the sun, moon and the other heavenly bodies, does it not impel each individually?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Let's take a single example: our results will then obviously apply to all the other heavenly bodies.

Clinias/ And your example is…?

Athenian Stranger/ …the sun. Everyone can see its body, but no one can see its soul—not that you could see the soul of any other creature, living or dying. Nevertheless, there are

good grounds for believing that we are in fact held in the embrace of some such thing though it is totally below the level of our bodily senses, and is perceptible by reason alone. So by reason and understanding let's get hold of a new point about the soul.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ If soul drives the sun, we shan't go far wrong if we say that it operates in one of three ways.

Clinias/ And what are they?

Athenian Stranger/ Either the soul resides within this visible spherical body and carries it wherever it goes, just as our soul takes us around from one place to another, or it acquires its own body of fire or air of some kind (as certain people maintain), and impels the sun by the external contact of body with body, or it is entirely immaterial, but guides the sun along its path by virtue of possessing some other prodigious and wonderful powers.

Clinias/ Yes, it must necessarily be by one of these methods that the soul manages the universe.

Athenian Stranger/ Now, just wait a minute. Whether we find that it is by stationing itself in the sun and driving it like a chariot, or by moving it from outside, or by some other means, that this soul provides us all with light, every single one of us is bound to regard it as a god. Isn't that right?

Clinias/ Yes, one would be absolutely stupid not to.

Athenian Stranger/ Now consider all the stars and the moon and the years and the months and all the seasons: what can we do except repeat the same story? A soul or souls—and perfectly virtuous souls at that—have been shown to be the cause of all these phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence in matter that they direct all the heavens, or by some other means, we shall insist that these

souls are gods. Can anybody admit all this and still put up with people who deny that 'everything is full of gods'?

Clinias/ No sir, nobody could be so mad.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, Megillus and Clinias, let's delimit the courses of action open to anyone who has so far refused to believe in gods, and get rid of him.

Clinias/ You mean…

Athenian Stranger/ …either he should demonstrate to us that we're wrong to posit soul as the first cause to which everything owes its birth, and that our subsequent deductions were equally mistaken, or, if he can't put a better case than ours, he should let himself be persuaded by us and live the rest of his life a believer in gods. So let's review the thesis we argued for the existence of gods against the non-believers: was it cogent or feeble?

Clinias/ Feeble, sir? Not in the least.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well. So far as atheists are concerned, we may regard our case as complete. Next we have to use some gentle persuasion on the man who believes in gods but thinks they are unconcerned about human affairs. 'My splendid fellow,' we'll say, 'your belief in the existence of gods probably springs from a kind of family tie between you and the gods that draws you to your natural kin and makes you honor them and recognize their existence. What drives you to impiety is the good fortune of scoundrels and criminals in private and public life—which in reality is not good fortune at all, although it is highly admired as such by popular opinion and its misplaced enthusiasms: poetry and literature of every kind invest it with a pernicious glamour. Or perhaps you observe men reaching the end of their lives, full of years and honor, leaving behind them their children's children, and your present disquiet is because you've discovered (either from

hearsay or personal observation) a few of the many ghastly acts of impiety which (you notice) are the very means by which some of these people have risen from humble beginnings to supreme power and dictatorships. The result is that although by virtue of your kinship with the gods you'd clearly be reluctant to lay such things at their door, your mental confusion and your inability to find fault with them has brought you to your present predicament where you believe they exist, but despise and neglect human affairs. Now, we want to prevent your thoughts from becoming more impious than they are already: let's see if argument will ward off the disease while it is still in its early stages. We must also try to make use of the original thesis we argued so exhaustively against the absolute atheist, by linking the next step in the exposition on to it.' So you, Clinias and Megillus, must do what you did before: take the young man's place and answer on his behalf. If any difficulty crops up in the argument, I'll take over from you two as I did just now, and conduct you across the river.

Clinias/ Good idea. You play your part, and we'll carry out your suggestions to the best of our ability.

Athenian Stranger/ Still, perhaps it won't be too difficult to show our friend that gods are just as attentive to details as to important matters—more so, in fact. You see, he was here a moment ago and heard that their special job—an expression of their perfect virtue—is to watch over the universe.

Clinias/ Yes, he certainly did hear that said.

Athenian Stranger/ The next thing is for our opponents to join us in asking this question: what particular virtue have we in mind when we agree that the gods are good? Now then: don't we regard moderation and the possession of

reason as a mark of virtue, and their opposites as marks of vice?

Clinias/ We do.

Athenian Stranger/ What about courage and cowardice? Are we agreed they come under virtue and vice respectively?

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ And we'll label the one set of qualities 'disgraceful' and the other 'admirable'?

Clinias/ Yes, we must.

Athenian Stranger/ And if the base qualities are characteristic of anyone, they are characteristic of us; the gods, we shall say, are not affected by them, either radically or slightly.

Clinias/ No one would disagree with that either.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, then, shall we regard neglect and idleness and riotous living as part of the soul's virtue? Or what's your view?

Clinias/ Really!

Athenian Stranger/ As part of vice, then?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ So it's the opposite qualities that will be ascribed to virtue?

Clinias/ Right.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well then. In our view all idle and thoughtless bons vivants will be just the kind of people the poet said were 'like nothing so much as stingless drones'.

Clinias/ Very apt, that.

Athenian Stranger/ So we mustn't say that God has precisely the sort of character he himself detests, and we mustn't allow any attempt to maintain such a view.

Clinias/ Of course not; it would be intolerable.

Athenian Stranger/ Take someone who has the special job of looking after some particular sphere of action, and who is preoccupied with his major duties to the neglect of the small. Could we possibly commend him, except for reasons that would ring quite hollow? Let's consider the point in this light: doesn't this sort of conduct—divine or human—fall into two categories?

Clinias/ Two categories, do we say?

Athenian Stranger/ Either a man thinks it makes no difference to his job as a whole if he neglects the details, or important though they are, he nevertheless lives in idleness and self-indulgence and neglects them. Or is there some other possible reason for his neglecting them? (Of course, if it is simply impossible to look after everything, and a god or some poor mortal fails to take care of something when he has not the strength and therefore the ability, no question of positive neglect of either major or minor duties will arise.)

Clinias/ No, of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ Now let our two opponents answer the questions of the three of us. They both admit gods exist, but one thinks they can be bought off, the other that they are careless about details. 'First of all, do you both admit that the gods know and see and hear everything, and that nothing within the range of our senses or intellect can escape them? Is this your position, or what?

Clinias/ 'It is.'

Athenian Stranger/ 'And also, that they can do anything which is within the power of mortals and immortals?'

Clinias/ Yes, of course they'll agree to that too.

Athenian Stranger/ Further, the five of us have already agreed that the gods are good—supremely so, in fact.

Clinias/ Emphatically.

Athenian Stranger/ So surely, given they're the sort of beings we've admitted, it's absolutely impossible to agree that they do anything out of sloth and self-indulgence. Among us mortals, you see, laziness springs from cowardice, and sloth from laziness and self-indulgence.

Clinias/ That's very true.

Athenian Stranger/ Then no god neglects anything because of sloth and laziness, because no god, presumably, suffers from cowardice.

Clinias/ You're quite right.

Athenian Stranger/ Now if in fact they do neglect the tiny details of the universe, the remaining possibilities are surely these: either they neglect them because they know that no such detail needs their attention, or—well, what other explanation could there be, except a lack of knowledge?

Clinias/ None.

Athenian Stranger/ So, my dearest sir, are we to interpret you as saying that the gods are ignorant, and display negligence where it is necessary to be solicitous, because they don't know? Or alternatively that they realize the necessity, but do what the most wretched of men are said to do, namely fail in their duty because they are somehow overcome by temptation or pain, even though they know that there are better options than the one they've in fact chosen?

Clinias/ Indeed not.

Athenian Stranger/ Now surely human life has something to do with the world of the soul, and man himself is the most god-fearing of all living creatures, isn't he?

Clinias/ I dare say.

Athenian Stranger/ And we regard all mortal creatures as possessions of gods, like the universe as a whole.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ So whether you argue these possessions count for little or much in the sight of the gods, in neither case would it be proper for our owners to neglect us, seeing how very solicitous and good they are. You see, there's another point we ought to consider here.

Clinias/ What?

Athenian Stranger/ It's a point about perception and physical strength. Aren't they essentially at opposite poles, so far as ease and difficulty are concerned?

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Although little things are more difficult to see or hear than big, they are much easier, when there are only a few of them, to carry or control or look after.

Clinias/ Yes, much easier.

Athenian Stranger/ Take a doctor who has been given the entire body to treat. Will he ever get good results if he neglects the individual limbs and tiny parts, in spite of being willing and able to look after the major organs?

Clinias/ No, never.

Athenian Stranger/ Nor yet will helmsmen or generals or householders, nor 'statesmen' or anybody of that ilk, succeed in major day-to-day matters if they neglect occasional details. You know how even masons say the big stones don't lie well without the small ones.

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ So let's not treat God as less skilled than a mortal craftsman, who applies the same expertise to all the jobs in his own line whether they're big or small, and gets more finished and perfect results the better he is at his work. We must not suppose that God, who is supremely wise, and willing and able to superintend the world, looks to major matters but—like a faint-hearted lazybones who

throws up his hands at hard work—neglects the minor, which we established were in fact easier to look after.

Clinias/ No sir, we should never entertain such notions about gods. It's a point of view that would be absolutely impious and untrue.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, it looks to me as if we've given a pretty complete answer to this fellow who's always going on about the negligence of heaven.

Clinias/ Yes, we have.

Athenian Stranger/ At any rate, our thesis has forced him to admit he was wrong. But I still think we need to find a form of words to charm him into agreement.

Clinias/ Well, my friend, what do you suggest?

Athenian Stranger/ What we say to the young man should serve to convince him of this thesis: The supervisor of the universe has arranged everything with an eye to its preservation and excellence, and its individual parts play appropriate active or passive roles according to their various capacities. These parts, down to the smallest details of their active and passive functions, have each been put under the control of ruling powers that have perfected the minutest constituents of the universe. Now then, you perverse fellow, one such part—a mere speck that nevertheless constantly contributes to the good of the whole—is you, you who have forgotten that nothing is created except to provide the entire universe with a life of prosperity. You forget that creation is not for your benefit: you exist for the sake of the universe. Every doctor, you see, and every skilled craftsman always works for the sake of some end-product as a whole; he handles his materials so that they will give the best results in general, and makes the parts contribute to the good of the whole, not vice versa. But you're grumbling because you don't appreciate that your position is best not only for the

universe but for you too, thanks to your common origin. And since a soul is allied with different bodies at different times, and perpetually undergoes all sorts of changes, either self-imposed or produced by some other soul, the divine checkers-player has nothing else to do except promote a soul with a promising character to a better situation, and relegate one that is deteriorating to an inferior, as is appropriate in each case, so that they all meet the fate they deserve.'

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ I fancy I could explain how easy it could be for gods to control the universe. Suppose that in one's constant efforts to serve its interests one were to mold all that is in it by transforming everything (by turning fire into water permeated by soul, for instance), instead of producing variety from a basic unity or unity from variety, then after the first or second or third stage of creation everything would be arranged in an infinite number of perpetually changing patterns. But in fact the supervisor of the universe finds his task remarkably easy.

Clinias/ Again, what do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ This. Our King saw that all actions are a function of soul and involve a great deal of virtue and a great deal of vice, that the combination of body and soul, while not an eternal creation like the gods sanctioned by law, is nevertheless indestructible (because living beings could never have been created if one of these two constituent factors had been destroyed), that one of them—the good element in soul—is naturally beneficial, while the bad element naturally does harm. Seeing all this he contrived a place for each constituent where it would most easily and effectively ensure the triumph of virtue and the defeat of vice throughout the universe. With this grand purpose in view he has worked out what sort of position, in what regions,

should be assigned to a soul to match its changes of character; but he left it to the individual's acts of will to determine the direction of these changes. You see, the way we react to particular circumstances is almost invariably determined by our desires and our psychological state.

Clinias/ Likely enough.

Athenian Stranger/ So all things that contain soul change, the cause of their change lying within themselves, and as they change they move according to the ordinance and law of destiny. Small changes in unimportant aspects of character entail small horizontal changes of position in space, while a substantial decline into injustice sets the soul on the path to the depths of the so-called "under" world, which men call "Hades" and similar names, and which haunts and terrifies them both during their lives and when they have been sundered from their bodies. Take a soul that becomes particularly full of vice or virtue as a result of its own acts of will and the powerful influence of social intercourse. If companionship with divine virtue has made it exceptionally divine, it experiences an exceptional change of location, being conducted by a holy path to some superior place elsewhere. Alternatively, opposite characteristics will send it off to live in the opposite region. And in spite of your belief that the gods neglect you, my lad, or rather young man;

> This is the sentence of the gods that dwell upon Olympus.

—to go to join worse souls as you grow worse and better souls as you grow better, and alike in life and all the deaths you suffer to do and be done by according to the standards that birds of a feather naturally apply among themselves. Neither you nor anyone else who has got into trouble will ever be able to run fast enough to boast that he has escaped this sentence—a sentence to which the judges have attached

special importance, and which should take every possible care to avoid. Make yourself ever so small and hide in the depths of the earth, or soar high into the sky: this sentence will be ever at your heels, and either while you're still alive on earth or after you've descended into Hades or been taken to some even more remote place, you'll pay the proper penalty of your crimes. You'll find the same is true of those whom you imagine have emerged from misery to happiness because you've seen them rise from a humble position to high estate by acts of impiety, or some similar wickedness. These actions, it seemed to you, were like a mirror which reflected the gods' total lack of concern. But you didn't appreciate how the role of the gods contributes to the total scheme of things. What a bold fellow you must be, if you think you've no need of such knowledge! Yet without it no one will ever catch so much as a glimmer of the truth or be able to offer a reasoned account of happiness or misery in life. So if Clinias here and this whole group of old men convince you that you don't really understand what you're saying about the gods, then the divine assistance will be with you. But it may be that you need some further explanation, so if you have any sense you'll listen while we address our third opponent.

Now as far as I'm concerned, we've proved, not too inadequately, that gods exist and care for mankind. However, there remains the view that they can be bought off by the gifts of sinners. No one should ever assent to this thesis, and we must fight to the last ditch to refute it.

Clinias/ Well said. Let's do as you suggest.

Athenian Stranger/ Look—in the name of the gods themselves! —how would they be bought off, supposing they ever were? What would they have to be? What sort of being would do this? Well, if they are going to run the entire universe forever, presumably they'll have to be rulers.

Clinias/ True.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, what sort of ruler do the gods in fact resemble? Or rather, what rulers resemble them? Let's compare small instances with great, and see what rulers will serve our purpose. What about drivers of competing teams of horses, or steersmen of boats in a race? Would they be suitable parallels? Or we might compare the gods to commanders of armies. Again, it could be that they're analogous to doctors concerned to defend the body in the war against disease, or to farmers anxiously anticipating the seasons that usually discourage the growth of their crops, or to shepherds. Now since we've agreed among ourselves that the universe is full of many good things and many bad as well, and that the latter outnumber the former, we maintain that the battle we have on our hands is never finished, and demands tremendous vigilance. However, gods and spirits are fighting on our side, the gods and spirits whose chattels we are. What ruins us is injustice and senseless aggression; what protects us is justice and sensible moderation—virtues that are part of the spiritual characteristics of the gods, although one can find them quite clearly residing among us too, albeit on a small scale. Now there are some souls living on earth in possession of ill-gotten gains, who in their obviously brutish way throw themselves before the souls of their guardians (whether watch-dogs, shepherds, or masters of the utmost grandeur) and by wheedling words and winning entreaties try to persuade them of the truth of the line put about by scoundrels—that they have the right to feather their nest with impunity at mankind's expense. But I suppose our view is that this vice we've named—acquisitiveness—is what is called 'disease' when it appears in flesh and blood, and 'plague' when brought by the seasons or at intervals of years; while if it occurs in the state and

society, the same vice turns up under yet another name: 'injustice'.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Thus anyone who argues that gods are always indulgent to the unjust man and the criminal, provided they're given a share in the loot, must in effect be prepared to say that if wolves, for instance, were to give watch-dogs a small part of their prey, the dogs would be appeased by the gift and turn a blind eye to the plundering of the flock. Isn't this what people are really suggesting when they say that gods can be squared?

Clinias/ It certainly is.

Athenian Stranger/ So consider all those guardians we instanced a moment ago. Can one compare gods to any of them, without making oneself ridiculous? What about steersmen who are turned from their course 'by libations and burnt offerings', and wreck both the ship and its crew?

Clinias/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ And presumably they are not to be compared to a charioteer lined up at the starting point who has been bribed by a gift to throw the race and let others win.

Clinias/ No sir, to describe the gods like that would be a scandalous comparison.

Athenian Stranger/ Nor, of course, do they stand comparison with generals or doctors or farmers, or herdsmen, or dogs beguiled by wolves.

Clinias/ What blasphemy! The very idea!

Athenian Stranger/ Now aren't all the gods the most supreme guardians of all, and don't they look after our supreme interests?

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ So are we really going to say that these guardians of the most valuable interests, distinguished as they are for their personal skill in guarding, are inferior to dogs, or the mere man in the street, who'll never abandon justice, in spite of the gifts that the unjust immorally press upon him?

Clinias/ Of course not. That's an intolerable thing to say. There's no sort of impiety that men won't commit, but anyone who persists in this doctrine bids fair to be condemned—and with every justification—as the worst and most impious of the impious.

Athenian Stranger/ Can we now say that our three theses—that the gods exist, that they are concerned for us, and that they are absolutely above being corrupted into flouting justice—have been adequately proved?

Clinias/ Certainly, and we endorse these arguments of yours.

Athenian Stranger/ Still, I fancy that being so anxious to get the better of these scoundrels, we've put our case rather polemically. But what prompted this desire to come out on top, my dear Clinias, was a fear that the rogues should think that victory in argument was a license to do as they please and act on any and every theological belief they happen to hold. Hence our anxiety to speak with some force. However, if we've made even a small contribution to persuading those fellows to hate themselves and cherish the opposite kind of character, then this preface of ours to the law of impiety will have been well worth composing.

Clinias/ Well, there is that hope. But even without those results, the lawgiver will not be at fault for having discussed such a topic.

Athenian Stranger/ Now then, after the preface we'll have a form of words that convey the purpose of our laws—a

general promulgation to all the ungodly that they should abandon their present habits in favor of a life of piety. Then in cases of disobedience the following law of impiety should apply: Anyone who comes across a case of impiety of word or deed should go to the aid of the law by alerting the authorities. The first officials to be notified should bring the matter, in due legal form, before the court appointed to try this category of case.

If an official who hears of the incident fails to perform this duty, he must himself be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who wishes to champion the cause of the laws.

When verdicts of 'guilty' are returned, the court is to assess a separate penalty for each impious act of each offender. Imprisonment is to apply in all cases. (The state will have three prisons: a public one near the market-place for the general run of offenders, where large numbers may be kept in safe custody, one called the 'reform center', near the place where the Nocturnal Council assembles, and another in the heart of the countryside, in a solitary spot where the terrain is at its wildest; and the title of this prison is somehow to convey the notion of 'punishment'.)

Now since impiety has three causes, which we've already described, and each is divided into two kinds, there will be six categories of religious offenders worth distinguishing; and the punishment imposed on each should vary in kind and degree. Consider first a complete atheist: he may have a naturally just character and be the sort of person who hates scoundrels, and because of his loathing of injustice is not tempted to commit it; he may flee the unjust and feel fondness for the just. Alternatively, besides believing that all things are 'empty of' gods, he may be a prey to an uncontrollable urge to experience pleasure and avoid pain, and he may have a retentive memory and be capable of

shrewd insights. Both these people suffer from a common failing, atheism, but in terms of the harm they do to others the former is much less dangerous than the latter.

The former will talk with a complete lack of inhibition about gods and sacrifices and oaths, and by poking fun at other people will probably, if he continues unpunished, make converts to his own views. The latter holds the same opinions but has what are called 'natural gifts': full of cunning and guile, he's the sort of fellow who'll make a diviner and go in for all sorts of legerdemain; sometimes he'll turn into a dictator or a demagogue or a general, or a plotter in secret rites; and he's the man who invents the tricks of the so-called 'sophists'. So there can be many different types of atheist, but for the purpose of legislation they need to be divided into two groups. The dissembling atheist deserves to die for his sins not just once or twice but many times, whereas the other kind needs simply admonition combined with incarceration. The idea that gods take no notice of the world similarly produces two more categories, and the belief that they can be squared another two. So much for our distinctions.

Those who have simply fallen victim to foolishness and who do not have a bad character and disposition should be sent to the reform center by the judge in accordance with the law for a term of not less than five years, and during this period no citizen must come into contact with them except the members of the Nocturnal Council, who should pay visits to admonish them and ensure their spiritual salvation.

When his imprisonment is over, a prisoner who appears to be enjoying mental health should go and live with sensible people; but if appearances turn out to have been deceptive, and he is reconvicted on a similar charge, he should be punished by death.

There are others, however, who in addition to not recognizing the existence of gods, or believing they are unconcerned about the world or can be bought off, become subhuman. They take everybody for fools, and many a man they delude during his life; and then by saying after his death that they can conjure up his spirit, and by promising to influence the gods through the alleged magic powers of sacrifices and prayers and charms, they try to wreck completely whole homes and states for filthy lucre.

If one of these people is found guilty, the court must sentence him to imprisonment as prescribed by law in the prison in the center of the country; no free man is to visit him at any time, and slaves must hand him his ration of food fixed by the Guardians of the Laws. When he dies the body must be cast out over the borders of the state unburied.

If any free man lends a hand in burying him, he must be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of anyone who cares to prosecute.

If the prisoner leaves children suitable for citizenship, the guardians of orphans must look after them too, from the day of their father's conviction, no less than ordinary orphans.

All these offenders must be covered by one general law, which by forbidding illegal religious practices will cause most of them to sin less in word and deed against religion, and which in particular will do something to enlighten them. The following comprehensive law should be enacted to deal with all these cases.

No one is to possess a shrine in his own private home. When a man takes it into his head to offer sacrifice, he is to go to the public shrines in order to do so, and he should hand over his offerings to the priests and priestesses responsible for consecrating them; then he, and anyone else he may wish to participate, should join in the prayers. The

grounds for these stipulations are as follows. To establish gods and temples is not easy; it's a job that needs to be very carefully pondered if it is to be done properly. Yet look at what people usually do—all women in particular, invalids of every sort, men in danger or any kind of distress, or conversely when they have just won a measure of prosperity: they dedicate the first thing that comes to hand, they swear to offer sacrifice, and promise to found shrines for gods and spirits and children of gods. And the terror they feel when they see apparitions, either in dreams or awake—a terror which recurs later when they recollect a whole series of visions—drives them to seek a remedy for each individually, with the result that on open spaces or any other spot where such an incident has occurred they found the altars and shrines that fill every home and village. The law now stated must be observed not only for all these reasons but also in order to deter the impious from managing to conduct these activities too in secret, by establishing shrines and altars in private houses, calculating to win the favor of the gods on the quiet by sacrifices and prayers. This would make their wickedness infinitely worse, and bring the reproach of heaven both on themselves and on the virtuous people who tolerate them, so that, by a sort of rough justice, the whole state would catch the infection of their impiety. Still, God won't blame the legislator, because this is the law to be enacted:

The possession of shrines in private houses is forbidden. If a man is proved to possess and worship at shrines other than the public ones, and the injustice committed is not an act of serious impiety (whether the possessor is a man or a woman), anyone who notices the fact must lay information before the Guardians of the Laws, who should give orders for the removal of the private shrines to public temples.

If the culprits disobey, they must be punished until they carry out the removal.

But if a man is proved guilty of a serious act of impiety typical of an adult, and not just the peccadillo of a child, either by establishing a shrine on private land or by sacrificing on public land to gods not included in the pantheon of the state, he must be punished by death for sacrificing with impure hands.

The Guardians of the Laws, after deciding whether the crime was a childish peccadillo or not, must then take the matter straight to court, and exact from the culprits the penalty for their impiety.

Book 11.

Athenian Stranger/ The next subject needing to be reduced to due order will be our transactions with each other. I suppose something like this will serve as a general rule. Ideally, no one should touch my property or tamper with it, unless I have given him some sort of permission; and if I am sensible I shall treat the property of others with the same respect.

Let's take as our first example treasure which someone who was not one of my ancestors stored away for himself and his family. I should never pray to the gods to come across such a thing; and if I do, I must not disturb it nor tell the diviners, as they are called, who (I shall find) can always invent some reason for advising one to remove something deposited in the ground. The financial benefit I'd get from removing it could never rival what I'd gain by way of virtue and moral rectitude by leaving it alone; by preferring to have justice in my soul rather than money in my pocket, I'd get—treasure for treasure—the better bargain, and for a better part of myself, too.

'Hands off immovables' is aptly applied to a great many situations, and this is one of them. And we should put our trust in the traditional view of such conduct—that it injures our descendants. Suppose a man takes no thought for his children and becomes indifferent to the legislator, and removes what neither he himself nor his father nor any of his fathers before him deposited, without the consent of the depositor; suppose he thus undermines the finest law there is, that simple rule of thumb, formulated as it was by a man of great nobility, 'Don't pick up what you didn't put down'—well, when a man treats these two legislators so contemptuously and picks up something he had not put down (and sometimes no bagatelle, either, but a huge

treasure trove), what penalty should he suffer? God knows the penalty of heaven; but the first person to notice such an occurrence in the city should report it to the City-Wardens; if somewhere in the city's market, to the Market-Wardens; and if in some place in the country, he should inform the Country-Wardens and their Chiefs. On receiving the information the state should send to Delphi and in submission to the oracles of the god do whatever he ordains about the objects and the person who removed them. If the informant is a free man, he should acquire a reputation for virtue, but if a free man fails to inform, he must get a reputation for vice.

If the informant is a slave, then as a reward he will deservedly be presented with freedom by the state, which will give his master what he is worth, but if a slave fails to inform, he must be punished by death.

The natural thing to do next is to apply this same rule to all objects, important or trivial. If a man leaves some piece of his own property somewhere, deliberately or inadvertently, anyone who finds it should let it be, on the assumption that such things are under the protection of the goddess of the wayside, to whom they are consecrated by law.

If in defiance of this rule someone picks up an object of no great value and takes it home, and he is a slave, he should be soundly beaten by any passer-by who is not less than thirty years of age; if he is a free man, in addition to being thought ungentlemanly and lawless, he must pay the person who left the article ten times its value.

If one man accuses another of being in possession of some piece of his own property, whether valuable or not, and the accused person admits he has it but denies that it belongs to the complainant, the latter should—if the object has been

registered with the authorities according to law—summon the person in possession of it before the authorities, and the possessor must produce it; then if on being presented for inspection it proves to have been recorded in the registers as the property of one of the disputants, the owner must take it and depart; but if it belongs to some other party not present, then whichever disputant furnishes a credit-worthy guarantor should exercise the absent party's right of removal and take the article away on his behalf for delivery into his possession. If on the other hand the article in dispute has not been registered with the authorities, it must be left with the three oldest officials pending settlement of the case; and if it is an animal that is thus kept in safe custody, the loser of the suit must pay the officials for its keep. The officials are to settle the case within three days.

Anyone who wishes—provided he's in his right mind—may seize his own slave, and (within the permitted limits) treat him as he likes. He may also arrest a runaway slave, in order to stop him escaping, on behalf of a relative or friend. If anyone demands the release of someone who is being taken for a slave and arrested, the captor must let him go, but the releaser must furnish three credit-worthy sureties. On these terms and on no other the man may be released.

If a man secures a release except on these conditions, he must be liable to a charge of violence and if convicted, he must pay to the captor twice the damages claimed in the suit.

Freedmen too may be arrested if they fail to perform their services to their manumitter, or perform them inadequately. (The services are these: three times a month a freedman must proceed to the home of his manumitter and offer to do anything lawful and practicable; and as regards marrying he must do whatever his former master thinks right.) He must not grow more wealthy than his manumitter; if he does, the

excess must become the property of the master. The freedman must not stay in the state longer than twenty years, but like the other aliens he must then take all his property and leave, unless he has gained permission from the authorities and his manumitter to remain. If a freedman or one of the other aliens acquires property in excess of the limit allowed the third property-class, then within thirty days of this event he must pack up and be off, without any right to ask the authorities to extend his stay.

If a freedman disobeys these regulations and is taken to court and convicted, he must be punished by death and his property confiscated by the state.

Such cases should be tried in the tribal courts, unless the litigants have previously settled their charges against each other before their neighbors—that is, judges they have chosen themselves.

If a man formally seizes as his own any animal or some other piece of property of any other man the person in possession must return it to the warrantor or donor, provided the latter is suable and solvent, or to the person who validly transferred it to him by some other procedure. If he received it from a citizen or a resident alien, he must do so within thirty days; but if he took delivery from a complete alien, he must return it within the five months of which the third shall be the month in which the summer solstice occurs.

When one person makes an exchange with another by buying or selling, the transfer must be made by handing over the article in the appointed part of the market-place (and nowhere else), and by receiving the price on the nail; no payment for delivery later or sale on credit is to be allowed. If a man exchanges one thing for another in any other place or under any other arrangement, trusting to the honesty of

the other party to the exchange, he must do so on the understanding that when sales are made other than under the rules now stated the law does not permit him to sue. (Anyone may collect contributions to clubs on a friendly basis, but if some disagreement arises over the collection he must do so on the understanding that in this business no one under any circumstances will be allowed to go to law.)

A seller of an article who receives a price of fifty drachmas or more must be obliged to remain in the state for ten days, and the buyer (in view of the complaints that people are apt to make in this connection, and so that, if necessary, restitution may be made according to law) must be informed of his address. Here are the rules under which legal restitution may be demanded or refused. If someone sells a slave suffering from consumption or stone or strangury or the so-called 'sacred' disease or some other mental or physical complaint that is chronic and difficult to cure and which the ordinary man could not diagnose, and if the purchase was made by a doctor or trainer, or if the facts were pointed out before the time of sale, the buyer shall have no right to return him to the vendor. But if a layman is sold such a slave by a professional, the purchaser may return him within six months, except in the case of the 'sacred' disease, when the period for restitution is to be extended to a year. The case should be heard before a bench of three doctors appointed by joint nomination of the parties, and if the vendor loses he must pay twice the selling price. If a layman sells to a layman there should be a right of restitution and a hearing as in the previous instance, but the loser should pay only the simple price. If the slave is a murderer, and both buyer and seller are aware of the fact, there shall be no right of restitution for the purchase; but if the buyer acted in ignorance he shall have a right of restitution as soon as he realizes the situation, and the case

should be tried before the five youngest Guardians of the Laws; if the vendor is judged to have known the facts, he must purify the house of the buyer under the Expounders' rules and pay him three times the price.

Anyone exchanging money for money or for anything else, animate or inanimate, should always give and receive full value as the law directs. Let's do as we did in other parts of our legislation and allow ourselves a preface dealing with the whole range of crimes that arise in this connection.

Everyone should think of adulteration as essentially the same sort of thing as lying and deceit—which in fact people commonly describe as quite respectable. But they are wrong to defend this sort of conduct as 'frequently justified, on appropriate occasions', because what they mean by the 'appropriate' place and occasion they leave vague and indefinite, and their dictum does nothing but harm both to themselves and to others. Now a legislator cannot afford to leave this vague: he must always lay down precise limits, however wide or narrow they may be. So let's define some limits now: a man must tell no lie, commit no deceit, and do no fraud in word or deed when he calls upon the gods, unless he wants to be thoroughly loathed by them—as anyone is who snaps his fingers at them and swears false oaths, or (though they find this less offensive) tells lies in the presence of his superior. Now the 'superiors' of bad men are the good, and of the young their elders (usually)—which means that parents are the superiors of their offspring, men are (of course) the superiors of women and children, and rulers of their subjects. All these people in positions of authority deserve the respect of us all, and the authorities of the state deserve it in particular. This is in fact what prompted these remarks. Anyone who is so lacking in respect for men and reverence for the gods as to pull off some swindle of the market-place by swearing oaths and calling heaven to

witness (even though the rules and warnings of the Market-Wardens stare him in the face), is a liar and a cheat. So in view of the low level of religious purity and holiness most of us generally achieve, let me emphasize what a good habit it is to think twice before taking the names of the gods in vain.

If any cases of disobedience arise, the following law should be invoked: the seller of any article in the market must never name two prices for his goods, but only one, and if he doesn't get it, he will (quite rightly) remove his wares without raising or lowering his price that day; and he must not push anything he has for sale, or take an oath on its quality.

If a man disobeys these regulations, any citizen passing by, provided he is not less than thirty years of age, should punish the taker of the oath and beat him with impunity.

If the passer-by ignores these instructions and disobeys them, he must be liable to the reproach of having betrayed the laws.

If a man proves to be beyond persuasion by our present address and sells a faulty article, the passer-by who has the knowledge and ability to expose him should prove his case before the authorities, and, if a slave or resident alien, may then take the faulty article for himself; a citizen, however, should dedicate it to the gods of the marketplace.

If a citizen fails to expose the offender, he should be pronounced a rogue, as he has cheated the gods.

Anyone discovered selling such adulterated merchandise, apart from being deprived of it, must be whipped (one lash for every drachma of the asking price of the object he was selling), after a herald has announced in the market-place the reason why the culprit is going to be flogged.

The Market-Wardens and the Guardians of the Laws, having ascertained from experts the details of the

adulterations and malpractices of sellers, should record in writing rules which specify what vendors must and must not do; these regulations should then be inscribed on a pillar and displayed in front of the Market-Wardens' office for the information of those who transact business in the market-place. (As for the City-Wardens, we have already given an adequate description of their duties, but if it seems some additional rules are needed, the wardens should consult the Guardians of the Laws, write out what they think missing, and record both the new and the old rules of their office on a pillar in front of their quarters.)

Hard on the heels of tricks of adulteration come the practices of retail trade. First we should give a word of advice on the whole subject, then lay down legislation for it. The natural function in the state of retail trading in general is not to do harm, but quite the opposite. When goods of any kind are distributed disproportionately and unequally, anyone who makes the distribution equal and even cannot fail to do good. It needs to be stated that this redistribution, in which money too plays an effective role, is precisely the purpose the trader is meant to serve. Hired laborers, innkeepers and other workmen of varying degrees of respectability all perform the function of satisfying the needs of the community by ensuring an even distribution of goods. Why then is trading thought to be such a low and disreputable occupation? Why has it come to be so abused? Let's see if we can discover the reason, so that we can use our legislation to reform at any rate some branches of commerce, even if not the whole institution. This looks like an important task that calls for exceptional resource.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ My dear Clinias, only a small part of mankind—a few highly-educated men of rare natural talent—is able to steel itself to moderation when assailed by

various needs and desires; given the chance to get a lot of money, it's a rare bird that's sober enough to prefer a modest competence to wealth. Most people's inclinations are at the opposite pole: their demands are always violent demands, and they brush aside the opportunity of modest gain in favor of insatiable profiteering. That's why all branches of retailing, trade and inn-keeping suffer from abuse and extreme unpopularity. Now here's something I'm determined to mention, ludicrous though it is; it'll never happen, and Heaven help us if it did. But just picture to yourselves some eminently virtuous men forced for a time to go in for inn-keeping or retailing or some similar occupation, or some eminently virtuous women similarly forced by some stroke of fate to take up that kind of life. We'd soon realize how desirable and pleasing each of these trades really is, and if they were carried on according to honest standards we'd value them all as highly as we do our mother or our nurse. But what happens? A man goes off to some remote point on a road running through the middle of nowhere and sets up his establishment to sell provisions; he receives the weary traveler with welcome lodging—peace and quiet for the victim of violent storms, cool refreshment for the sufferer from stifling heat—but then instead of greeting them as friends and offering them in addition to his hospitality some gifts as a token of goodwill, he treats them like so many enemy prisoners that have fallen into his hands, and holds them up to ransom for a monstrously steep and iniquitous sum. It's these and similar swindles, which are practiced in all branches of the trade, that have given the occupation of helping the worn-out traveler such a bad name, and in every case the legislator has to find a remedy. The old saying is quite right: it's difficult to fight against two enemies, especially when they are fundamentally different (as with diseases, for instance, and there are a lot of other examples).

Our present battle is a case in point: it is a battle against two foes, wealth and poverty—wealth that corrupts our souls by luxury, poverty that drives us by distress into losing all sense of shame. So what remedy for this disease will be open to an enlightened community? First, it should keep its trading class as small as possible; second, trade should be made over to a class of people whose corruption will not harm the state unduly; third, some means must be found to prevent those engaging in such activities from slipping too easily into an utterly shameless and small-minded way of life.

After these remarks, our law on the subject should run like this, with Heaven's blessing: God is now re-establishing and re-founding Magnesia, and no inhabitant who holds one of the 5040 hearths must ever, willingly or otherwise, become a retailer or a wholesaler, or perform any service whatever for private individuals who are not his equals in status, with the exception of those services that a free man will naturally render to his father and mother and remoter ancestors, and to all free persons older than himself. Of course, it is not easy to lay down in a law precisely what is consistent with the dignity of a free man and what is not, and the point will have to be determined by those who have won distinctions for their aversion to the latter and devotion to the former. Anyone who by some trick goes in for retail trading in a way forbidden to a gentleman should be indicted by anyone who wishes before a court of judges with a high reputation for virtue, on a charge of disgracing his clan.

If he is judged to be sullying his paternal hearth by following an unworthy calling, he must be imprisoned for a year and so be taught to refrain from such conduct.

If he does not then refrain, he must be imprisoned for two years, and the period of imprisonment must be doubled indefinitely on each subsequent conviction.

Now for a second law: anyone who intends to go in for retail trading must be either a resident alien or a temporary visitor. Thirdly, as a third law, such people must behave with as much virtue and as little vice as possible while they share in the life of the state. To that end, the Guardians of the Laws must not simply be regarded as guardians of those whom it is easy to keep from wickedness and crime thanks to their good birth and education. There are those who do not enjoy such advantages, and need more careful supervision, because they engage in pursuits which are very powerful inducements to vice. So since retail trading is an occupation of great variety and embraces many cognate activities, the Guardians of the Laws must hold a meeting about it, or at any rate about such branches of it as they have concluded are unavoidable and essential to the state, after the others have been eliminated; and just as we ordered in the case of adulteration—a closely connected matter—experts in each branch should be in attendance. The meeting must see what ratio of expenditure to receipts will give the retailer a decent profit, and the ratio arrived at must be recorded in writing, put on display, and then imposed on the various traders by the Market-Wardens, City-Wardens and Country-Wardens.

Perhaps thus retail trade will benefit the population at large and do minimum harm to those members of society who engage in it.

If a man fails to fulfill an agreed contract—unless he had contracted to do something forbidden by law or decree, or gave his consent under some iniquitous pressure, or was involuntarily prevented from fulfilling his contract because of some unlooked-for accident—an action for such an unfulfilled agreement should be brought in the tribal courts, if the parties have not previously been able to reconcile their differences before arbitrators (their neighbors, that is).

The class of craftsmen who have enriched our lives by their arts and skills will have Athena and Hephaestus as its patrons, while Ares and Athena will be patrons of those who protect the products of these craftsmen by skills of a different order—the techniques of defense. (The consecration of this latter class to these gods is perfectly justified, in that both classes are in the continuous service of land and people, the latter by taking the lead in the struggles of war, the former by producing tools and goods in return for pay.) So if they respect their divine ancestors, they will think it a disgrace to break their word in a professional matter.

If one of the craftsmen culpably fails to complete his work within the stipulated time, out of disrespect for the god from whom he wins his bread, fondly thinking that he can count on the indulgence of the divinity with whom he has some personal relationship, first he will pay a penalty to the god, and secondly, under the provisions of the law applicable to his case, he must owe the price of the works of which he has cheated his employer, and perform his task all over again within the stipulated period, free of charge.

And the law will give the contractor for a work the same advice as it gave a seller, not to take advantage by setting too high a price on his services, but to name their actual value without further ado. The contractor has precisely the same duty, because as a craftsman he knows what the job is worth. In a state of gentlemen a workman must never use his craft, which is at bottom accurate and straightforward, to take 'craft' advantage of laymen, and anyone who is thus imposed upon shall be able to sue the culprit. But if anyone lets a contract to a workman and fails to pay him the price stipulated in a valid legal agreement, and snaps his fingers at those partners in our social framework, Zeus the patron of the state, and Athena, so that his delight at being in pocket wrecks the fundamental bonds of society, then the

following law, with the backing of the gods, must reinforce the cohesion of the state:

If a man takes delivery of a piece of work and fails to pay for it within the agreed time, he must be charged double; if a whole year elapses, then notwithstanding the rule that loans in general do not bear interest, he must pay an obol per drachma for every month in arrear.

Actions in these cases should be brought before the tribal courts.

Now that we have broached the subject of craftsmen in general, we ought in all fairness to glance at those whose job it is to keep us safe in war, such as generals and other experts in military techniques. These persons are just as much craftsmen as ordinary workmen, though of a different kind, so when one of them undertakes some public task, voluntarily or under orders, and performs it well, the law will never tire of praising anyone who pays him the honor he deserves—honor being in effect a military man's pay. But if anyone receives the benefit of some splendid military action and fails to pay that price, the law will censure him. For the benefit of the military, then, let us enact following regulation-cum-commendation, by way of advising rather than compelling the people at large. Those fine men who safeguard the whole state either by exploits of valor or by military expertise must be accorded honor—but honor of the second rank, because the highest honor should be given first and foremost to those who have proved conspicuously conscientious in respecting the written regulations of the good legislator.

Athenian Stranger/ We've now pretty well completed our provisions for the most important agreements that men make with each other, with the exception of those relating to orphans and the care and attention due to them from their

guardians. So now we've more or less provided for the first topic, here's the next thing on which we are obliged to impose some sort of order. All our regulations must start from two basic facts: people at the point of death like to settle their affairs by a will, sometimes, by chance, they die intestate. What a difficult and contentious business it is, Clinias! That's what I had in mind when I said we were 'obliged' to deal with it: to leave it unregulated is quite out of the question. If you allow a will unchallengeable validity whatever condition a man near the end of his life may have been in when he drew it up, he might make any number of mutually inconsistent provisions that contradicted not only the spirit of the laws but also the inclinations of those who survive him, and indeed his own earlier intentions before he set out to make his will. After all, most of us, when we think death is at hand, just go to pieces and can't think straight.

Clinias/ How do you mean, sir?

Athenian Stranger/ When a man is about to die, Clinias, he becomes refractory, and keeps harping on a principle that spreads alarm and despondency among legislators.

Clinias/ How's that?

Athenian Stranger/ In his anxiety for complete authority he's apt to express himself with some warmth.

Clinias/ To what effect?

Athenian Stranger/ 'Ye gods!' says he, 'it's a fine thing if I'm not going to be allowed to give—or not give—my own property to anyone I please! Why shouldn't I give more to one man and less to another depending on whether they have shown themselves good or bad friends to me? My illnesses, my old age and all my other various misfortunes have sorted them out well enough.'

Clinias/ Well, sir, don't you think that's well said?

Athenian Stranger/ Clinias, my view is that the ancient lawgivers were too easygoing, and legislated on the basis of a superficial and inadequate appreciation of the human condition.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ My dear fellow, because they feared the line of argument I have mentioned, they passed the law allowing a man to dispose of his own property in his will exactly as he pleases. But when people have come to death's door in your state, you and I will make a rather more appropriate response:

'Friends, you "creatures of a day" in more senses than one, it's difficult for you in your present circumstances to know the truth about your own property and also "know yourselves," as the Delphic inscription puts it. Therefore, I, as legislator, rule that neither you nor this property of yours belongs to yourselves, but to your whole clan, ancestors and descendants alike; and your clan and its property in turn belong, even more absolutely, to the state. That being so, I should be reluctant to tolerate someone worming himself into your good graces when you are smitten with illness or old age, and wheedling you into making a will that is not for the best. I shall legislate with a view to nothing except the interest of your clan and the entire state, relegating (as is only right) that of the individual to second place. So as you go on your journey, which is the way of all flesh, show restraint and goodwill towards us: we will look after your affairs for the future and guard your interests with the utmost care, down to the smallest detail.'

Let that stand by way of preamble and consolation for both the living and the dying, Clinias. Here's the actual law:

Anyone who settles his property by writing a will should first, if he has had children, write down the name of that son

who in his opinion deserves to be his heir, and he should also record precisely which, if any, of his other children he offers for adoption by someone else. If, however, he is still left with one of his sons not adopted into an estate, who will presumably be dispatched by law to a colony, the father should be permitted to present him with as much of his property as he likes, apart from the family estate and all its associated equipment; and if there is more than one son in that position, his father is to distribute his property among them—excluding the estate—in whatever proportion he pleases. But he should not distribute any part of his property to any son who has a home. He should treat a daughter analogously: if she is promised in marriage, he should not let her share his goods, but only if she is not promised. If subsequent to the will one of the sons or daughters is discovered to have come into possession of an estate in Magnesia, he or she should abandon his or her legacy to the testator's heir. If the testator is leaving no male offspring but only female, he should select whichever of his daughters he pleases and in his will provide someone to be a husband for her and a son for himself, and record this person as his heir. And here's another disaster a man should allow for when drawing up his will: if his son (his own or adopted) dies in infancy before he can reach man's estate, the will should specify in writing a child who is to take his place—and who, one hopes, will have better luck. When a man who has no children at all writes a will, he may reserve one tenth of his acquired property and give it to anyone he wishes; all the rest he should leave to his adopted heir, so that in making him his son with the blessing of the law he gains his goodwill by treating him fairly. When a man's children need guardians, and the deceased has made a will and stated in writing the number of guardians he wants his children to have and who they should be (provided they are

ready and willing to undertake the office), the choice of guardians put on record in this way should be binding. But if a man dies absolutely intestate or without selecting guardians, then the two nearest relatives on the father's side and the two nearest on the mother's, together with one of the deceased's friends, must be authorized to act as guardians; and the Guardians of the Laws should appoint them for any orphan who stands in such need. Everything to do with guardianship and orphans should be the concern of the fifteen eldest Guardians of the Laws, who should divide themselves by seniority into groups of three, one group to act one year and another the next, until the five terms of office have been completed in rotation; and so far as possible there should be no gaps in the sequence.

When a man dies absolutely intestate and leaves children in need of guardians, these same laws must be brought into operation to relieve their distress. But if he meets with some unforeseen accident and leaves just daughters, he must forgive the lawgiver if he arranges the giving of them in marriage with an eye on only two out of three possible considerations: close kinship, and the security of the estate. The third point, which a father would have taken into account—namely to select from among the entire citizen body someone whose character and habits qualify him to be his own son and his daughter's bridegroom—these considerations, I say, will have to be passed over, because it's impracticable to weigh them. So here's how the best law we can manage in such a field should run. If a man fails to make a will, and leaves only daughters, then on his death a brother on his father's side (or, if without an estate of his own, a brother on his mother's side) should take the daughter and the estate of the deceased.

If there is a brother's son available, but no brother, then if the parties are of a similar age the same procedure is to

apply. In the absence of all these, a sister's son is to benefit under the same regulations, Next in line is to be the brother of the deceased's father, next (e) that brother's son, and finally (f) the son of the sister of the deceased's father. And in all cases where a man leaves only female offspring, the succession is to pass through the family according to the same rules of kinship, through brothers and brothers' and sisters' sons, the males in anyone generation always taking precedence over the females. As for age, the assessor must determine the propriety or otherwise of the marriage by inspection, viewing the males naked and the females stripped down to the navel. If the family suffers from such a dearth of relatives that not even a grandson either of the deceased's brother or of the son of the deceased's grandfather exists, then in consultation with her guardians the girl may single out of her own free choice any other citizen, provided he does not object, who should then become the deceased's heir and the daughter's bridegroom. However, 'flexibility above all': sometimes suitable candidates from within the state itself may be in unusually short supply, so if a girl is hard put to it to find a husband among her compatriots, and has in view someone who has been dispatched to a colony whom she would like to inherit her father's property, then if the man is related to her, he should enter into the estate under the provisions of the law; if he is not of her clan, then provided there are no near kin living in the state, he shall be entitled by virtue of the choice of the daughter of the deceased and that of her guardians to marry her and return to his homeland to take over the establishment of the intestate father.

When a man dies intestate and leaves neither male nor female issue, the situation should in general be met by the foregoing law, and a man and a woman from the clan should 'go in harness' and enter into the deserted establishment

with full title to the estate. The order of precedence on the female side is to be: (a) the deceased's sister, (b) his brother's daughter, (c) the sister's son, (d) the sister of the deceased's father, (e) the daughter of the father's brother, and (f) the daughter of the father's sister. A woman from this list should set up home with a man from the other list according to the degrees of kinship and the demands of religion for which we made provision earlier.

But let's not forget the severity of such laws. It can sometimes be hard for a near relative of the deceased to be instructed to marry his kinswoman, by a law that to all appearances takes no account of the thousands of social difficulties that deter people from obeying such instructions in a willing spirit, so that they invariably prefer to put up with anything rather than comply—I mean difficulties like physical or mental illnesses or defects in the man or woman one is told to marry. I dare say some people imagine the lawgiver is not bothered about these things at all, but they're wrong.

So in the interests of the lawgiver and those for whom he legislates, let's compose a sort of impartial preamble begging those who are subject to the legislator's orders to forgive him if in his concern for the common good he finds it hardly possible to cope with the personal inconvenience experienced by individuals; and the people for whom the lawgiver's regulations are intended should also be forgiven for their occasional understandable inability to carry out the orders which, in all ignorance, he gives them.

Clinias/ Well then, sir, what would be the most reasonable way of dealing with such cases?

Athenian Stranger/ It is essential, Clinias, to choose people to arbitrate between laws of that sort and the persons affected by their provisions.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Sometimes a nephew with a wealthy father might be reluctant to take his uncle's daughter because he fancies his chances and is bent on making a better marriage; in another case a man would have no choice but to disobey the law because the instructions devised by the lawgiver would lead to untold trouble—as for instance if they tried to compel him to marry someone suffering from lunacy or some other terrible physical or mental defect that would make the life of the partner not worth living. This policy should be embodied in a law with the following provisions:

If in practice people attack the established laws about wills on any point whatever, but especially where a marriage is concerned, and swear that if the legislator were alive and present in person he would never have forced them to either of the courses to which they are in fact being forced (to marry this man or that woman), but one of the relatives or a guardian takes the opposite line, then we must remember that the fifteen Guardians of the Laws have been bequeathed to orphan boys and girls by the legislator to act as their fathers and arbitrate on their behalf; so litigants on any of these matters must go to them to get disputes settled, and carry out their decisions as binding. But if a litigant believes that this is too great an authority to be vested in the Guardians of the Laws, he should take them before the court of the Select Judges and get a decision on the points at issue.

If he loses the day, the lawgiver should visit him with censure and disgrace, a punishment which any sensible person will regard as more severe than a huge fine.

The effect of this will be to give our orphan children a sort of second birth. We have already described the training and education they should all receive after their first; after this

second and parentless birth we have to see that these children who have had the ill luck to be bereaved and made orphans are to be pitied as little as possible for their misfortune. In the first place, the Guardians of the Laws—substitute parents at least as good as the original ones—should lay down rules for them; in particular, we instruct the three Guardians on duty for the year to look after them as though they were their own children; and for the guidance of these officials and the guardians we shall compose a suitable preamble on the education of orphans. And luckily enough, I fancy, we have described already how after death the souls of the departed enjoy certain powers which they use to take an interest in human affairs. The stories which tell of these things are true, but long, so one should trust to the ancient and widely disseminated common traditions on the point, and also take the legislator's word for it that the doctrine is true—unless, of course, one believes them to be arrant fools. Now if this is really the way of things, a guardian should fear, in the first place, the gods above, who are aware how deprived orphans are, and secondly the souls of the departed, whose natural instinct is to watch with particular care over their own children, showing benevolence to people who respect them and hostility to those who treat them badly. And he should also fear the reactions of those who, full of years and honor, are still living, because in a state which thrives under good laws their grandchildren will show them glad and tender affection, and old men have sharp eyes and ears for such things: if you do the right thing by an orphan, they'll be kind to you, whereas they'll soon show you their displeasure if you take advantage of an orphan's exposed position, because they regard orphans as a supreme and sacred trust. A guardian or official with even the slightest sense has a duty to give close attention to all these warnings, and take great care over the training and

education of orphans, helping them in every possible way, just as if he were contributing to the good of his own self and family.

A man who complies with the preface to the law and refrains from any ill-treatment of an orphan will be spared first-hand experience of the legislator's fury against such actions, but. if a man refuses to comply, and harms a child deprived of its father or mother, he must pay double the damages that he would have to pay for a crime committed against a child with both parents living.

But do we really need precise rules to control a guardian's treatment of an orphan, and an official's supervision of a guardian? They already possess a pattern of how to bring up free-born children, in the education they themselves give up their own, and in the way they manage their private possessions—and of course the rules they have to guide them on those matters are pretty exact. If they were not, it would be reasonable to lay down rules of guardianship as a special and separate category, and make an orphan's life different from that of ordinary children by working out a detailed regime of its own. But in fact in our state being an orphan doesn't differ very much from living under one's own father, although in public esteem, and the amount of attention the children get, orphanhood is usually much less desirable. That is why in dealing with this topic—rules about orphans—the law has gone to such lengths in encouraging and threatening. And here's the sort of threat that will come in very handy indeed. Anyone acting as a guardian of a boy or girl, and any Guardian of the Laws who supervises that guardian by virtue of being appointed to control him, must show this child who has had the misfortune of bereavement no less affection than his own children, and be just as zealously concerned for his ward's property as he is for his own—more so, in fact; and everyone who acts as a guardian

will have just that one law to observe on the subject of orphans. But, if this law is contravened in such respects, a guardian should be punished by his official, an official should be summoned before the court of Select Judges by the guardian and punished by a fine of twice the damages as estimated by the court.

If a guardian is suspected by the relatives or indeed by any other citizen of neglect or malpractice, he should be summoned before the same court.

He must be fined four times the sum he is found to have taken, half the fine going to the child and half to the successful prosecutor.

If once he has grown up an orphan concludes that he was badly treated by his guardian, he may bring a suit for incompetent guardianship, provided he does so within five years of its expiry.

If a guardian is found guilty, the court is to estimate what he is to suffer or pay; if an official is found guilty of injuring the orphan through negligence, the court must assess how much he is to pay to the child; by criminal conduct, then in addition to paying the sum assessed, he must be ejected from the office of Guardian of the Laws, and the government must supply the state and country with a fresh Guardian of the Laws to take his place.

The bitterness with which fathers quarrel with their children and children with their fathers is often excessive. A father is apt to think that the legislator ought to give him legal authority, if he wishes, to make a public proclamation through a herald that under the provisions of the law his son is his son no longer; for their part, sons believe that if they have a father whose suffering from disease or old age has become a disgrace, they are entitled to prosecute him on a charge of lunacy. Such disputes are usually found where

men's characters are irredeemably corrupt, because when the corruption is confined to one party—as when the son is corrupt but not the father, or the other way round—the bad feeling is not sufficient to lead to trouble. Now in any other state a child repudiated by his father would not necessarily find himself a stateless person, but in the case of Magnesia, to which these laws will apply, a man disowned by his father will be obliged to migrate to another country, because the 5040 homes cannot be increased even by one. Consequently before this punishment can be legally inflicted on him, he must be repudiated not only by his father but by the entire clan. Procedure in such cases is to be governed by some such law as this: anyone who has the extreme misfortune to want—justifiably or not—to expel from the clan the child he has fathered and reared, must not be allowed to do so casually and on the spur of the moment. First of all he must assemble all the relatives on his own side and all the relatives of the son on the mother's side, as far as cousins in each case, and accuse his son before them, explaining why he deserves to be drummed out of the clan by its united action. The son shall have the right of reply, to argue that none of these penalties is called for. If the father carries his point, and wins the vote of more than half the relatives (he himself and the mother and the accused son being excluded from the voting, as well as those males and females who are not yet of adult age), then by this procedure and on these terms he shall be entitled to repudiate his son, but in no other way whatever. If some other citizen wishes to adopt the repudiated son, no law is to stop him (a young man's character is by nature bound to change frequently enough in the course of his life), but if after ten years no one has been moved to adopt the disowned person, the supervisors of surplus children intended for the colony must take him

too under their wing so that he may be suitably established in the same colony as the others.

Now suppose illness or old age or a cantankerous temper or all three make a man more wayward than old men usually are, unbeknown to all except his immediate circle; and suppose he squanders the family resources on the grounds that he can do as he likes with his own property, so that his son is driven to distraction but hesitates to bring a charge of lunacy. This is the law the son must observe. First of all he must go to the eldest Guardians of the Laws and explain his father's misfortune, and they, after due investigation, must advise him whether to bring the charge or not. If they advise that he should, they must come forward as witnesses for the prosecution and plead on his behalf.

If the case is proved, the father must lose all authority to manage his own affairs, even in trivialities, and be treated like a child for the rest of his days.

Whenever a man and his wife find it impossible to get on with each other because of an unfortunate incompatibility of temperament, the case must come under the control of ten men—middle-aged Guardians of the Laws—and ten of the women in charge of marriage, of the same age. Any arrangements they make which reconcile the couple should stand, but if feelings are too exacerbated for that they must do their best to find each some other congenial partner. It's quite likely that the existing partners are people of rough temper, so one should try to fit them in harness with mates of a more phlegmatic and gentle disposition. And when the quarreling couple have no children or only a few, the procreation of children must be kept in view in the setting up of the new homes; where sufficient children already exist, the divorce and the remarriages should facilitate companionship and mutual help in the evening of life.

If a wife dies and leaves male and female children, we'll lay down a law advising, though not compelling, the husband to bring up his existing children without importing a stepmother; but if there are no children, he must be obliged to remarry so as to beget sufficient children for his home and for the state. If the husband dies, leaving an adequate number of children, their mother should remain in her position and bring them up; but if it is judged that she is too young to live unmarried without injuring her health, her relatives should report the facts to the women in charge of marriages and do whatever seems advisable to both sides; and if there have been no children born as yet, they should bear that in mind too. (The minimum acceptable number of children is to be fixed by law as one of each sex.)

Whenever there is no dispute about the parentage of a child, but a ruling is required as to which parent it should follow, the offspring of intercourse between a slave woman and a slave or a free man or a freedman should become the absolute property of the woman's owner; if a free woman has intercourse with a slave, the issue should belong to his master. If a free man has a child by his own slave woman, or a free woman by her own slave, and the facts are crystal clear, the female officials are to send the free woman's child along with its father to another country, and the Guardians of the Laws must similarly send away the free man's child with its mother.

No god or any man with his wits about him will ever advise anyone to neglect his parents. On the contrary, we should be quick to appreciate how very relevant the following preface on the subject of worshipping gods will be to the respect or disrespect in which we hold our father and mother.

Time-honored cult observances all over the world fall into two categories. Man exalts some of the gods because he can

see them with his own eyes, others he represents, by setting up statues of them, and believes that his worship of these inanimate 'gods' ensures him the abundant gratitude and benevolence of their real and living counterparts. This means that no one who has living in his house his father or mother, or their mothers and fathers, treasures old and frail, must ever forget that so long as he possesses such a 'shrine' at his hearth and looks after it properly, no other objects of worship will ever do him as much good.

Clinias/ What do you mean by 'properly'?

Athenian Stranger/ I'll tell you. After all, my friends, such themes are worth a hearing.

Clinias/ Tell us, then.

Athenian Stranger/ Our version of the story of Oedipus is that when he was insulted by his sons he called down a curse on them—and you know how people have never stopped relating how the gods heard and answered his prayer. And Amyntor fell into a rage with his son Phoenix and cursed him; Theseus did the same to Hippolytus, and there are thousands of similar cases, which all go to show that the gods take the parents' side against the children: no man, you'll find, can curse anyone as effectively as a parent can curse his child; and that's absolutely right. So if it is true that the gods listen to the prayers of fathers or mothers who have been wantonly insulted by their children, isn't it reasonable to suppose that when by contrast the respect we show our parents delights them so much that they pray hard to heaven for a blessing on their children, the gods will be just as ready to listen as before, and grant us it? If not, they' be conferring blessings unjustly—which we maintain is a peculiarly inappropriate thing for a god to do.

Clinias/ Very much so.

Athenian Stranger/ So as we said just now, we must reckon that the most precious object of worship a man can have is his father or grandfather, weak with age, or his mother in a similar condition, because when he honors and respects them God is delighted—if he weren't, he wouldn't listen to their prayers. These 'living shrines', in the shape of our forefathers, affect us far more wonderfully than lifeless ones, because when we look after them they invariably join their prayers to ours, whereas if we insult them, they oppose us. As ordinary statues do neither of these things, a man who treats his father and grandfather and so on as they deserve will have objects of worship that are much more effective than any others in winning him the favor of heaven.

Clinias/ Excellently put.

Athenian Stranger/ Anyone with his wits about him holds the prayers of his parents in fear and respect, knowing that the cases in which such prayers have been brought to pass have been many and frequent. This being the way of things, a good man will regard his elderly forebears as a veritable god-send, right up till they breathe their last; and when they pass on, they will be sorely missed by the next generation, and be a terror to the wicked. Let everyone be convinced by this argument and do their parents all the honor enjoined by law.

But if even so a man gets the reputation of being deaf to such prefaces, then the right law to pass to deal with him will run as follows.

If anyone in this state of ours looks after his parents less diligently than he should and fails to carry out their wishes in all respects with more indulgence than he shows to those of his sons and descendants in general, and indeed to his own desires too, the neglected parent must report the fact, either in person or by messenger, to the three most senior

Guardians of the Laws and three of the women in charge of marriages. These officials must take the matter in hand, and provided the offender is still a young man under the age of thirty, chastise him with a whipping and imprisonment. (In the case of a woman, the same chastisement may be inflicted until she is forty.) Older persons, if they persist in neglecting (and perhaps actually ill-treating) their parents, should be summoned before a court consisting of the most elderly citizens of the state.

If a man is found guilty, the court is to assess what penalty or fine is to be exacted, and absolutely no fine or penalty that a man can pay must be excluded from consideration.

If ill-treatment prevents a parent from complaining, any free man who discovers the situation should alert the authorities.

If he does not, he must be regarded as a scoundrel and be liable to a suit for damage at the hands of anyone who wishes.

If the informant is a slave, he should be given his freedom; if he belongs to the criminal or his victim, he must be released by the authorities; and if he belongs to some other citizen, the public treasury is to see that the owner is reimbursed. Official action must be taken to stop anyone injuring him in revenge for giving information.

We have already dealt with fatal injuries inflicted by the use of drugs, but we have not yet discussed any of the less harmful cases of voluntary and premeditated injury, inflicted by giving food or drink or by applying ointments. Full treatment of the question is hindered by the fact that so far as human beings are concerned, poisoning is of two kinds. First there is the sort we have just explicitly mentioned: the injury a body suffers from some physical

substance by natural processes. The other kind is a matter of spells and charms and 'enchantments': not only are the victims persuaded that they are being seriously injured by people with magic influence, but even the perpetrators themselves are convinced that it really is in their power to inflict injury by these methods. It is not easy to know the truth about these and similar practices, and even if one were to find out, it would be difficult to convince others; and it is just not worth the effort to try to persuade people whose heads are full of mutual suspicion, that even if they do sometimes catch sight of a molded waxen figure in a doorway or at a junction of three roads or on their parents' grave, they should ignore it every time, because they cannot be sure these things work. All this means that our law about drugs must be a double law, reflecting the two methods by which poisoning may be attempted. But first, by entreaty, exhortation and advice, we'll explain that no such thing should ever be attempted, that one should not alarm and terrify the common man, like an impressionable child, and that legislators and judges should not be put to the necessity of curing men of such fears. We shall point out for a start that unless the person who tries to use poison happens to be a diviner or soothsayer, he acts in ignorance of how his spells will turn out, and unless he happens to be an expert in medicine, he acts in ignorance of the effect he will have on the body. So the wording of our law about the use of poisons should be as follows:

If a doctor poisons a man without doing either him or any member of his household fatal injury, or injures his cattle or bees (fatally or otherwise), and is found guilty on a charge of poisoning, he must be punished by death.

If the culprit is a layman, the court is to decide the proper penalty or fine to be inflicted in his case.

If a diviner or soothsayer is deemed to be in effect injuring someone, by spells or incantations or charms or any other poison of that kind whatever, he must die.

If someone with no knowledge of divination is found guilty of this kind of poisoning, the same procedure is to be followed as with the other laymen [.(b)]—that is, the court is to decide what it thinks is the appropriate penalty or fine for him to pay.

When one man harms another by theft or violence and the damage is extensive, the indemnity he pays to the injured party should be large, but smaller if the damage is comparatively trivial. The cardinal rule should be that in every case the sum is to vary in proportion to the damage done, so that the loss is made good. And each offender is to pay an additional penalty appropriate to his crime, to encourage him to reform. Thus if a man has been led to do wrong by the folly of someone else, being over-persuaded because of his youth or some similar reason, his penalty should tend to be light; but it is to be heavier when his offense is due to his own folly and inability to control his feelings of pleasure and pain—as when he has fallen victim to cowardice and fear, or some deep-rooted jealousy or lust or fury. This additional penalty is to be inflicted not because of the crime (what's done can't be undone), but for the sake of the future: we hope that the offender himself and those that observe his punishment will either be brought to loathe injustice unreservedly or at any rate recover appreciably from this disastrous disease. All these reasons and considerations make it necessary for the law to aim, like a good archer, at a penalty that will both reflect the magnitude of the crime and fully indemnify the victim. The judge has the same aim, and when he is faced by his legal duty of assessing what penalty or fine the defendant must pay, he must follow closely in the legislator's footsteps; and the latter

must turn himself into a sort of artist and sketch some specimen measures consistent with his written prescriptions. That, Clinias and Megillus, is the job to which we must now devote our best efforts; we have to describe what type of penalty is called for in all categories of theft and violence—granted, of course, that the gods and children of gods are prepared to see us legislate in this field.

Lunatics must not be allowed to appear in public; their relations must keep them in custody in private houses by whatever means they can improvise.

If they fail to do so, they must pay a fine: one hundred drachmas for a member of the highest property-class (whether it is a slave or a free man that he fails to keep an eye on), eighty for a member of the second class, sixty for the third, and forty for the lowest.

There are several kinds of madness, brought on by several causes. The cases we have just mentioned are the result of illness, but there are some people with an unfortunate natural irritability, made worse by poor discipline, who in any trivial quarrel will shout their heads off in mutual abuse. Such a thing is highly improper in a well-run state. So this single law should apply to all cases of defamation: no one is to defame anybody. If you are having an argument you should listen to your opponent's case, and put your own to him and the audience, without making any defamatory remarks at all. When men take to damning and cursing each other and to calling one another rude names in the shrill tones of women, these mere words, empty though they are, soon lead to real hatreds and quarrels of the most serious kind. In gratifying his ugly emotion, anger, and in thus disgracefully stoking the fires of his fury, the speaker drives back into primitive savagery a side of his character that was once civilized by education, and such a splenetic life makes him no better than a wild beast; bitter indeed, he finds, are

the pleasures of anger. Besides, on such occasions all men are usually quick to resort to ridicule of their opponents, and no one who has indulged that habit has ever acquired the slightest sense of responsibility or remained faithful to many of his principles. That is why no one must ever breathe a word of ridicule in a temple or at a public sacrifice or at the games or in the marketplace or in court or in any public gathering, and the relevant official must always punish such offenses.

If he fails to do so, he must be disqualified from competing for awards of merit, as being a man who disregards the laws and fails to perform the duties imposed upon him by the legislator.

If in other localities someone fails to refrain from abusive language, whether he resorts to it first or by way of reply, the passer-by, provided he is older than the offender, should lend his support to the law and eject by force this fellow who has shown such indulgence to anger, that bad companion.

If the passer-by fails to do so, he must be liable to the appointed penalty.

The view we are putting forward now is that when a man is embroiled in a slanging-match he is incapable of carrying on the dispute without trying to make funny remarks, and when such conduct is motivated by anger we censure it. Well then, what does this imply? That we are prepared to tolerate a comedian's eagerness to raise a laugh against people, provided that when he sets about ridiculing our citizens in his comedies, he is not inspired by anger? Or shall we divide comedy into two kinds, according to whether it is good-natured or not? Then we could allow the playful comedian to joke about something, without anger, but forbid, as we've indicated, anyone whatever to do so if he is in deadly earnest and shows animosity. We must certainly insist on this

stipulation about anger; but we still have to lay down by law who ought to receive permission for ridicule and who not. No composer of comedies, or of songs or iambic verse, must ever be allowed to ridicule either by description or by impersonation any citizen whatever, with or without rancor. Anyone who disobeys this rule must be ejected from the country that same day by the presidents of the games.

If the latter fail to take this action, they must be fined three hundred drachmas, to be dedicated to the god in whose honor the festival is being held.

Those who have earlier been licensed to compose verse against each other should be allowed to poke fun at people, not in savage earnest, but in a playful spirit and without rancor. The distinction between the two kinds must be left to the minister with overall responsibility for the education of the young; an author may put before the public anything the minister approves of, but if it is censored, the author must not perform it to anyone personally nor be found to have trained someone else to do so, whether a free man or a slave.

If he does, he must get the reputation of being a scoundrel and an enemy of the laws.

It is not the starving tout court or the similarly afflicted who deserve sympathy, but the man who in spite of his moderation or some other virtue or progress towards it, nevertheless experiences some misfortune. That being so, it will be a matter for surprise if a virtuous person, whether slave or free, even if the state and society he lives in is run with only average skill, is ever so grossly neglected as to be reduced to abject poverty.

So the legislator will be quite safe if he lays down a law running more or less like this. No one is to go begging in the state. Anyone who attempts to do so, and scrounges a living

by never-ending importunities, must be expelled from the market by the Market-Wardens, from the city by the City-Wardens, and from the surrounding country conducted by the Country-Wardens across the border, so that the land may rid itself completely of such a creature.

If a slave man or woman damages any piece of someone else's property, then provided the person who suffers the loss was not himself partly to blame because of inexperience or careless conduct, the slave's owner must either make good the damage in full, or hand over the actual offender. But if the owner counter-claims that the prosecution has been brought as a result of the injured person and the culprit putting their heads together to rob him of his slave, he must sue the allegedly injured party on a charge of collusion. If he wins the day, he is to receive twice the value of the slave as assessed by the court.

If he loses, he must both make good the damage and hand over the slave.

If a beast of burden or a horse or dog or some other animal damages a piece of a neighbor's property, its owner is to pay for the damage on the same basis.

If anyone deliberately refuses to appear as a witness, the person who needs his evidence must serve a summons on him; and on being duly summoned the man is to present himself at the trial. If he knows something and is prepared to testify, he should give evidence accordingly; if he claims he knows nothing, he must swear an oath to three gods, Zeus, Apollo and Themis, to the effect that quite definitely he has no information, and thus be dismissed from the proceedings. If a man is summoned to give evidence and fails to answer the summons, he must be liable by law to a suit for damage. No juryman is to vote in a trial in which he has been put up as a witness and given evidence. A free woman

is to be allowed to be a witness and to speak in support of a litigant, provided she is over forty years of age, and to bring prosecutions, provided she has no husband; but if she has a husband living, she must be limited to acting as a witness. Slaves (male and female), and children, should be allowed to support a case by giving evidence, but only in a trial for murder and provided a credit-worthy surety is put up to guarantee their appearance at the trial if their evidence is objected to as false. If either disputant claims someone has borne false witness, he should enter an objection to all or part of the testimony before a verdict in the case is decided on. The objections, under the seal of both parties, should be placed in official custody and produced at the trial for perjury. If anyone is convicted twice on this charge, he may not be compelled under any law to bear witness again; if he is convicted a third time, he must never be allowed to be a witness in the future; and if he does have the face to give testimony on a further occasion after a third conviction, anyone who wishes should report him to the authorities, who should haul him before a court.

If he is found guilty, he must be punished by death.

When a court decides to throw out evidence on the ground that the winning side has triumphed because certain witnesses have perjured themselves, and more than half the evidence is condemned, the suit lost on the strength of it should come up for retrial, and after due inquiry a ruling should be given that the false evidence was, or was not, the decisive influence on the verdict; and this ruling, whichever way it goes, will automatically settle the original action.

Although human life is graced by many fine institutions, most of them have their own evil genius, so to speak, which pollutes and corrupts them. Take justice, for instance, which has civilized so much of our behavior: how could it fail to be a blessing to human society? And granted justice is a

blessing, can advocacy fail to be a blessing too? But valuable though they are, both these institutions have a bad name. There is a certain kind of immoral practice, grandly masquerading as a 'skill', which proceeds on the assumption that a technique exists—itself, in fact—of conducting one's own suits and pleading those of others, which can win the day regardless of the rights and wrongs of the individual case; and that this skill itself and the speeches composed with its help are available free—free, that is, to anyone offering a consideration in return. Now it is absolutely vital that this skill—if it really is a skill, and not just a knack born of casual trial and error—should not be allowed to grow up in our state if we can prevent it. The lawgiver will have nothing to say to those who obey his command that one should either listen to justice and not contradict her, or leave for some other country; but if anyone disobeys him, the law shall pronounce as follows: if anyone seems to be trying to misrepresent to the judges where the course of justice lies, and to enter one plea after another in support of either his own or someone else's case, when equity would call a halt, then anyone who wishes should indict him on a charge of perverse pleading or criminal advocacy. He should be tried in the court of select judges and if he is found guilty the court should decide whether it thinks his motive is avarice or pugnacity.

If the court believes his motive is pugnacity, it must determine how long he must refrain from prosecuting anyone or helping someone else to do so.

If the motive appears to be avarice, a foreigner must leave the country and never return, on pain of death; a citizen must die, for letting a love of money become the obsession of his life.

If a man is convicted twice of committing such an offense through pugnacity, he must die.

Book 12.

Athenian Stranger/ If a man passes himself off as an ambassador or herald of the state and enters into unauthorized negotiations with a foreign power, or, when actually sent on such a mission, delivers a message other than the one with which he was sent—or contrariwise if he is shown to have misreported, in his capacity as an ambassador or herald, the communications which enemy or friendly states have given him, he must be open to prosecution for violating the law by impiety against the pronouncements and instructions of Hermes and Zeus.

If he is convicted, the penalty or fine he must pay will have to be assessed.

Theft of property is uncivilized, and robbery with violence an act of brazen insolence. The sons of Zeus take no pleasure in fraud and force, and none of them has ever committed either of these crimes. So no one who commits such an offense should be seduced into believing the lies of poets or other story-tellers: the thief or thug mustn't think There's no shame in this—after all, the gods do it themselves.' That is neither plausible nor true, and no one who breaks the law by such an act can possibly be a god or child of gods. The lawgiver is in a much better position to understand these things than all the poets in the world. Anyone who is convinced by this doctrine of ours is a happy man, and long may he so continue; but anyone who refuses to listen should have some such law as this to contend with: all theft of public property, great or small, should attract the same punishment. The greed of the pilferer is just as great as any other thief's—it's only his efficiency that's inferior; whereas anyone who makes off with some valuable object he did not deposit indulges his criminal tendencies to the full. In the eyes of the law, the one deserves a lighter penalty than the

other not because of the amount of the theft, but because he is probably curable while the other is not. Thus if anyone successfully prosecutes in court a foreigner or slave on a charge of theft of some piece of public property, a decision must be reached as to the fine or penalty he should pay in view of the fact that he can probably be cured.

If a citizen, in spite of the education he will have enjoyed, is convicted of plundering or attacking his fatherland, whether he is caught in the act or not, he must be punished by death, as being virtually beyond cure.

Military service is a subject on which we need to give a great deal of advice and have a large number of regulations. The vital point is that no one, man or woman, must ever be left without someone in charge of him; nobody must get into the habit of acting alone and independently, either in sham fighting or the real thing, and in peace and war alike we must give our constant attention and obedience to our leader, submitting to his guidance even in tiny details. When the order is given we should stand, march, exercise, wash, feed, stay awake at night on duty as guards or messengers, and even in the midst of dangers not pursue the enemy or yield without a sign from our commander. In short, we must condition ourselves to an instinctive rejection of the very notion of doing anything without our companions; we must live a life in which we never do anything, if possible, except by combined and united action as members of a group. No better or more powerful or efficient weapon exists for ensuring safety and final victory in war, and never will. This is what we must practice in peacetime, right from childhood—the exercise of authority over others and submission to them in turn. Freedom from control must be uncompromisingly eliminated from the life of all men, and of all the animals under their domination.

In particular, all choruses should be calculated to encourage prowess in the field, and for the same reason people must learn to put a brave and cheerful face on it when they have to put up with poor food and drink, extreme cold and heat, and rough bedding. Most important, they must not ruin the natural powers of head and feet by wrapping them round with artificial protection, so discouraging the spontaneous growth of the cap and shoes that nature provides. When these two extremities are in sound condition they help to keep the whole body at the peak of efficiency, whereas their ruin is its ruin too. The feet are the most willing servants the body has, and the head is the organ of supreme control, the natural seat of all the principal senses of the body.

That's the praise of military life that ought, in my view, to ring in a young man's ears. Here are the regulations. When a man is called up, or detailed for some special duty, he is obliged to perform his military service. If he is a coward and fails to present himself, without the permission of his commanders, a prosecution for failure to serve should be brought before the military authorities after return from the field. Such cases must be judged by the soldiers who have fought in the campaign; the various categories (infantry, cavalry and the other branches of the armed forces) should meet separately, infantrymen being brought before infantrymen, cavalrymen before cavalrymen, and the others before their own comrades similarly.

If a defendant is found guilty, he must in future be debarred from competing for any kind of military distinction, bringing a charge against anyone else for refusing to perform military service, and the court must assess the additional penalty or fine he is to pay.

Afterwards, when the charges of refusal to serve have been decided, the commanders must reconvene each arm of

the forces and in the presence of the candidates' fellow soldiers seek decisions on those applying for awards of distinction. Supporting statements by eye-witnesses and other evidence adduced by the candidates must not relate to any previous campaign, but only to the one they have just fought. The prize in each case is to be a wreath of olive, which the winner should take to the temple of whichever god of war he pleases and dedicate it, suitably inscribed, as life-long evidence that the first, second or third prize was awarded to him.

If a man does go on active service, but returns home before the commanders withdraw the troops, he should be prosecuted on a charge of desertion before the same court as is concerned with refusal of service.

If he is found guilty, the same penalties should apply as before.

Naturally, everyone who brings a prosecution ought to be very wary of inflicting an unjustified punishment, whether in cold blood or by accident. Justice is said—and well said—to be the daughter of Respect, and both are the natural scourges of falsehood. So in general we must be careful not to offend against justice, and particularly as regards the abandonment of weapons in the field: we mustn't reproach an enforced abandonment in mistake for an ignominious one, and so inflict penalties as undeserved as the victims are undeserving of them. Although it is by no means easy to tell the two cases apart, a rough and ready distinction must be attempted in the legal code. We can explain the point with the help of a story. If Patroclus had pulled round after being carried to his tent without his weapons (as has happened in thousands of other cases)—the weapons which the poet tells us were presented to Peleus by the gods as a dowry when he married Thetis, and which had been taken by Hector—then it would have been open to all the scoundrels of the time to

reproach the son of Menoetius for abandoning his arms. Again, sometimes men have lost their weapons because of being thrown down from a height, or when at sea, or when suddenly caught up by a tremendous onrush of water during their struggles in a storm. There are countless similar circumstances one could plausibly adduce to excuse and palliate a disaster that positively invites denigration. So we must do our best to distinguish the more serious and reprehensible disasters from the other kind, and in a rough and ready way the distinction can be expressed by varying our expressions of rebuke. Thus 'he abandoned his shield' can sometimes be properly replaced by 'he lost his weapons'. When you are robbed of your shield with some force, you have not 'abandoned' it in the same way as if you had thrown it away deliberately: the two cases are fundamentally different. The distinction should be written into the legal code in the following terms:

If a man finds the enemy at his heels and instead of turning round and defending himself with the weapons he has, deliberately lets them drop or throws them away, preferring a coward's life of shame to the glorious and blessed death of a hero, then there should certainly be a penalty for losing his weapons by abandonment. But when he has lost his weapons in the other way we've described the judge must not fail to take the fact into account. It is the criminal you need to punish, to reform him, not someone who's simply been unlucky—that's useless. So what will be the right penalty when someone has made good his escape by throwing away the weapons that could have protected him? Unfortunately, it's beyond the power of man to do the opposite of what people say some god did to Caeneus of Thessaly—that is, change him from a woman into a man. If only we could inflict the reverse transformation, from man to woman, that would be, in a sense, the most appropriate

punishment for a man who has thrown away his shield. But what we can do is to reward him for saving his skin by giving him the closest possible approximation to such a penalty: we can make him spend the rest of his days in utter safety, so that he lives with his ghastly disgrace for as long as possible. Here's the law that will deal with such people:

If a man is convicted on a charge of shamefully dropping his weapons of war; no general or any other army officer must employ him as a soldier again, or appoint him to any position whatever; and in addition to being thus permitted, like the natural coward he is, to avoid the risks that only real men can run, the guilty man must also pay a sum of money: one thousand drachmas if he belongs to the highest property-class, five hundred if to the second, three hundred if to the third, and one hundred if to the lowest.

If an officer disobeys and posts the coward again, the officers Scrutineer is to condemn him to pay the same fine: one thousand drachmas if he belongs to the highest property-class, five hundred if to the second, three hundred if to the third, and one hundred if to the fourth.

Well then, what will be the proper policy for us to adopt on the subject of Scrutineers? So far, we simply have a corps of officials, some appointed for a single year by the luck of the draw, others chosen from a preliminary slate of selected candidates to serve for several years. What if one of them proves so inadequate to the dignity and weight of his office that he gets 'out of true' and does something crooked? Who will be capable of making a man like that go straight again? It is desperately difficult to find someone of high moral standards to exercise authority over the authorities, so to speak, but try we must. So where are our god-like 'straighteners' to be found? The point is this: a state has many crucial parts that prevent it from disintegrating, just as a ship has its stays and bracing ropes and a body its

tendons and associated sinews. (Features of this kind are a very widespread phenomenon, and in spite of the many different names we give them in different contexts, they are basically the same sort of thing.) Now the office of Scrutineer is the single most crucial factor determining whether a state survives or disintegrates. If the Scrutineers are better men than the officials they scrutinize, and display irreproachable impartiality and integrity, the entire state and country flourishes and prospers. But if their investigation of the officials is conducted badly, then the sense of justice that unites all the interests in the state is destroyed, with the result that all the officials go their different ways and refuse to pull together any longer; they fragment the state into lots of smaller states by filling it with the party-strife that so speedily wrecks it. That is why it is absolutely vital that the moral standards of the Scrutineers should be exemplary. So let's try to produce these officials by some such procedure as this:

Every year after the summer solstice the entire state should congregate in a precinct dedicated jointly to Apollo and the Sun, in order to present to the god three out of their number. Each citizen is to propose that person, apart from himself, whom he believes to be perfect in every way; the candidate is to be at least fifty years of age. This preliminary list should be divided into two halves (on the assumption that the total is an even number; if not, the person with the fewest votes should be excluded before the division is made), and the half consisting of those with the most votes should be selected to proceed to the next stage after the other half with fewer votes have been eliminated. If some names receive the same number of votes, so that the selected candidates are too numerous, the excess should be removed by eliminating the youngest candidates. The selected candidates that remain should be voted for again until only

three are left, each with a different number of votes. If two of them, or all three, attract equal support, then the decision should be left to chance and the gods of good luck: the first, second and third choices must be determined by lot, crowned with olive and given the rewards of their success. Next, a public proclamation must be made to the effect that the state of the Magnesians, now by the grace of God securely re-established, presents to the Sun-god her three best men; and these, her choicest fruits, in accordance with the law of old, she consecrates for the term of their judicial office as a joint gift to Apollo and the Sun. In the first year twelve such Scrutineers are to be appointed, each to retain office till the age of seventy-five; thereafter three more are to be added every year.

The Scrutineers are to divide all the officials into twelve groups and look into their conduct by making all such inquiries as are consistent with the dignity of a gentleman. During their period of office as Scrutineers they are to live in the precinct of Apollo and the Sun where they were elected. When they have sat in judgment, either privately and individually, or in association with colleagues, on those at the end of their term of office in the service of the state, they must make known, by posting written notice in the market-place, what penalty or fine in their opinion each official ought to pay. Any official who refuses to admit that he has been judged impartially should haul the Scrutineers before the Select Judges, and if he is deemed innocent of the accusations he should accuse the Scrutineers themselves, if he so wishes. But, if he is convicted, and the Scrutineers had decided on death as his penalty, he must die (a penalty which in the nature of the case cannot be increased); but if his penalty is one that it is possible to double, then double he must pay.

Now we ought to hear about the scrutiny of the Scrutineers themselves. What will it be, and how will it be organized?

During their lifetime these men, whom the whole state has thought fit to dignify with the highest honors, should sit in the front seat at all the festivals; moreover, when the Greeks assemble to perform sacrifices or see spectacles together, or congregate for other sacred purposes, the leaders of the delegations sent by the state should be chosen from the Scrutineers; and the Scrutineers are to be the only citizens whose heads may be graced by a crown of laurel. They should all be priests of Apollo and the Sun; the chief priesthood should be an annual office, held by the Scrutineer who has come top of the list of those appointed that year—which must be recorded under his name, so as to provide a framework for the calendar for as long as the state endures.

After the death of a Scrutineer, his laying-out, his last journey and his tomb must be on a grander scale than for ordinary citizens. All cloth used must be white, dirges and laments must be banned, and a chorus of fifteen girls and another of fifteen youths must stand one on each side of the bier and sing alternately a kind of hymn of praise to the dead priest, celebrating his glory in song throughout the day. As dawn comes up the following day the bier shall be taken to the tomb escorted by a hundred of the youths who attend the gymnasia, chosen by the relatives of the dead man. In front must go the young men who are as yet unmarried, each rigged out in his own military equipment; the cavalry should bring their horses, the infantry their weapons, and so on. Around the bier itself, towards the front, will be boys chanting the traditional strains, followed by girls, and women who have finished bearing children. The Priests and Priestesses will bring up the rear; they are of course banned

from other funerals, but provided the oracle at Delphi also approves, they shall attend this one, as it will not defile them. The Scrutineer's tomb shall be an oblong crypt built of choice stone of the most indestructible kind obtainable; in this, on benches of stone set side by side, they will lay him who has gone to his reward. On top of the tomb they will pile a circular mound, and plant a sacred grove of trees around it—except on one side, to allow for the indefinite extension of the tomb, where more earth will have to be piled up to cover subsequent burials. Every year the citizens will hold competitions in the Scrutineers' honor, one athletic, one equestrian, and one of the arts. All these honors will be bestowed on Scrutineers whose conduct has borne scrutiny.

If a Scrutineer relies on his election to protect him and goes to the bad, thus showing he's only too human after all, the law will order a charge to be brought against him by anyone who feels inclined to prosecute. The trial should be held in court according to the following procedure. Guardians of the Laws, and all the Scrutineers, active or retired, must sit in conjunction with the court of the Select Judges, and the charge brought by the prosecutor against the defendant must be to the effect that 'so-and-so is a disgrace to his distinctions and his office.'

If the defendant is convicted, he must be ejected from his office, denied the special tomb, and stripped of the honors he has already received.

If the prosecutor fails to win one fifth of the votes, he must pay a fine of twelve hundred drachmas if he belongs to the highest property-class, eight hundred if to the second, six hundred if to the third, and two hundred if to the lowest.

Rhadamanthus should be admired for the way in which, according to report, he decided the suits that came before him. He realized that his contemporaries were absolutely

convinced of the existence of gods—and not surprisingly, as most people alive then were actually descended from them, and this is traditionally true of Rhadamanthus himself. I suppose it was because he thought that no mere man should be given the task of judging, but only gods, that he managed to make his judgments so swift and straightforward. Whatever the subject of dispute, he made the litigants take an oath, a device which enabled him to get through his list of cases rapidly and without making mistakes. Nowadays, however, some people (as we remarked) don't believe in gods at all, while others believe they are not concerned about mankind; and there are others—the worst and most numerous category—who hold that in return for a miserable sacrifice here and a little flattery there, the gods will help them to steal enormous sums of money and rescue them from all sorts of heavy penalties. So in the modern world the legal procedure used by Rhadamanthus will hardly do. The climate of opinion about the gods has changed, so the law must change too, and a legislator who knows his business ought to abolish the oaths sworn by each side in a lawsuit. When a man brings a charge against someone, he should put his accusations in writing without taking an oath; the defendant should similarly write out his denial and hand it to the officials unsworn. It would be dreadful, you see, to know quite well, in view of the frequent lawsuits that occur in the state, that although pretty nearly half our citizens have perjured themselves, they go on mixing with each other at common meals and other public and private gatherings without the slightest qualms.

There should therefore be a law requiring a juryman to take an oath before setting about his job. The law should also apply to anyone who votes in the election of officials to public positions: he must do so either under oath or with a ballot-pebble he has obtained from a temple; so too should

the judge of a chorus or any other artistic performance, and also the supervisor or umpire of any athletic or equestrian competition—and indeed the judge in any matter where there is nothing to 'gain' (as it seems to human eyes) from perjury. But whenever there is clearly much to be 'gained' from denials and oaths to back them up, then the question at issue between the disputants must be judged at a trial in which oaths are not taken.

And more generally, the presiding officials at a trial are not to give a man a hearing if he tries to win belief by swearing oaths, or imprecating himself or his family, or by groveling appeals for clemency, or effeminate wailing, but only if he states his lawful claims, and listens to those of the other side, with decency and decorum. Otherwise, the officials will ignore his remarks as irrelevant and instruct him to return to the issue before the court.

However, aliens should be entitled, as at present, to offer and accept binding oaths from each other, if they so wish—after all, they're not going to grow old in the state, nor, as a rule, build a nest in it to produce others entitled to live in the country and behave in the same way as themselves. And whenever an alien prosecutes an alien, the trial should be held under the same rules.

Sometimes a free man may defy the state in something not serious enough to deserve a whipping or imprisonment or death—by refusing to take part in a chorus or procession, for instance, or some public ceremony, or to pay some contribution for such communal purposes as a sacrifice in time of peace, or a special levy in war. The first thing to be done in all these cases is to assess the damages; then the culprit is to give a pledge to those officials who have the duty of exacting it under the law of the land. If he still refuses to obey even after the seizure of the pledge, it should be sold and the proceeds confiscated by the state. If a more severe

punishment is called for, the official concerned shall impose the appropriate fine on this stubborn fellow and haul him through the courts until he's prepared to do as he's told.

A state which does not go in for trading and whose only source of wealth is the soil is obliged to have some settled policy regarding the foreign travel of its own citizens and the admission of aliens from abroad. The legislator, who has to give advice on these problems, must start by being as persuasive as he can.

In the nature of the case, contact between state and state produces a medley of all sorts of characters, because the unfamiliar customs of the visitors rub off on to their hosts—and this, in a healthy society living under sound laws, is an absolute disaster. Most states, however, are not well run at all, so it makes no difference to them if their citizens fraternize with foreigners by welcoming them into the state and by going for trips abroad themselves whenever they feel like it and wherever their wanderlust takes them, whatever their age. On the other hand a policy of complete exclusion and complete refusal to go abroad is just not feasible, and in any case the rest of the world would think us churlish and uncivilized: we'd get the reputation of being a truculent and surly people who have 'Deportations of Aliens', as the term is—and a brutal one it is, too. Whether the figure you cut in the eyes of others is good or bad, you should never underestimate its importance. You see, people in general don't fall so far short of real goodness that they can't recognize virtue and vice when they see it in others; even wicked people have an uncanny instinct that usually enables even an absolute villain to understand and describe accurately enough what distinguishes a good man from a bad. That is why most states find it an excellent precept to value their good standing with the rest of the world. But the soundest and most important rule is this: if you mean to be

perfect, you should seek to live in good repute only if you are really good in the first place, but not otherwise. And so it will be entirely right and proper if the state we are now founding in Crete wins among men a brilliant and glorious reputation for virtue, and if things go according to plan there is every reason to expect that, out of all the states and countries which look upon the Sun and the other gods, Magnesia will be one of the few that are well administered.

So what should we do about the admission of aliens and our own journeys to places in foreign countries? First of all, no young person under forty is ever to be allowed to travel abroad under any circumstances; nor is anyone to be allowed to go for private reasons, but only on some public business, as a herald or ambassador or as an observer of one sort or another. (Of course, absence abroad on military service in wartime doesn't deserve to be mentioned in the same breath: it's not one of those journeys which are 'for diplomatic reasons'!) We must send representatives to take part in the sacrifices and games held at Delphi in honor of Apollo and at Olympia in honor of Zeus, and to Nemea and the Isthmus; and we must send as many representatives as we can, the finest and noblest of our citizens, who will do credit to our state in these sacred gatherings of peace, and win it renown to match that of her armies on the field of battle. And when they return, they will tell the younger generation that the social and political customs of the rest of the world don't measure up to their own.

But there are other kinds of observers who should be dispatched, provided the Guardians of the Laws give permission. If any citizen would like to spend rather longer surveying at his leisure the life lived by foreigners, no law should prevent him, because no state will ever be able to live at a properly advanced level of civilization if it keeps itself to itself and never comes into contact with all the vices and

virtues of mankind; nor will it be able to preserve its laws intact if it just gets used to them without grasping their raison d'être. In the mass of mankind you'll invariably find a number—though only a small number—of geniuses with whom it is worth anything to associate, and they crop up just as often in badly-ruled states as in the well-ruled. So the citizen of a well-run state, provided he's incorruptible, should go out and range over land and sea to track them down, so that he can see to the strengthening of the customs of his country that are soundly based, and the refurbishing of any that are defective. Without this observation and research a state will never stay at the peak of perfection; nor will it if the observers are incompetent.

Clinias/ So how can we ensure that both these requirements are met?

Athenian Stranger/ Like this. In the first place, anyone who goes observing for us in this fashion must be over fifty; and since the Guardians of the Laws are going to send him abroad as a specimen Magnesian, he must be one of those citizens who have gained a good reputation generally, and particularly in war; and on passing sixty he must go off observing no longer. When he has spent as many of his ten years as he pleases making his observations, he should come home and present himself before the council which muses on legislation. (This council, which should consist partly of young men and partly of old, must have a strict rule to meet daily from dawn until the sun is well up in the sky. Its membership is to be: those Priests who have won high distinction, the ten Guardians of the Laws who are currently the most senior, the Minister of Education for the time being, together with his predecessors in office. No member should attend alone: each is to bring a young man of his own choice, aged between thirty and forty. The discussion at their meetings must always center round their own state, the

problems of legislation, and any other important point relevant to such topics that they may discover from external sources. They must be particularly concerned with those studies which promise, if pursued, to further their researches by throwing light on legislative problems that would otherwise remain difficult and obscure. Whichever of these studies are sanctioned by the older members should be pursued with all diligence by the younger. If one of the proteges invited to attend is judged to be inadequate, the whole council is to censure the man who invited him; but any that get a good name should be fostered and watched with particular care by the state at large, and if they do what's wanted of them, they are to be specially honored, but if they turn out worse than most other young men they should suffer correspondingly worse disgrace.) To this council, then, the observer of foreign customs must proceed as soon as he gets back. If he has come across people who were able to give him some information about any problems of legislation or teaching or education, or if he actually comes back with some discoveries of his own, he should make his report to a full meeting of the council. If he seems to be not a whit better or worse for his journey, he should be congratulated at any rate for his energy; if he is thought to have become appreciably better, even higher recognition should be given him during his lifetime, and after his death he must be paid appropriate honors by authority of the assembled council. But if it seems that he has returned corrupted, this self-styled 'expert' must talk to no one, young or old, and provided he obeys the authorities he may live as a private person; but if not, and he is convicted in court of meddling in some educational or legal question, he must die.

If none of the authorities takes him to court when that is what he deserves, it should count as a black mark against them when distinctions are awarded.

So much for the way foreign travel should be undertaken and the sort of persons who should venture on it. But what about our duty to welcome foreign visitors? There are four categories of them worth discussing. Those in the first turn up every year without fail, usually in summer, with the regularity of migrating birds. Most of them are on business trips in search of profit, and throughout the summer they 'wing' their way like so many birds across the sea to foreign parts. They must be received at trading posts and harbors and in public buildings outside but not far from the state by officials appointed for the purpose, who should take good care that none of this category of visitor introduces any novel custom, handle with proper impartiality the lawsuits that affect them, and keep intercourse with them down to the unavoidable minimum. The second type are 'observers' in the most basic sense: they come to see the sights, and to listen, too, at festivals of the arts. All such visitors should be received in hospitable lodgings near temples, by whose priests and custodians they are to be looked after and attended to. Then, when they have stayed for a reasonable length of time, and seen and heard what they came to see and hear, they should take their leave without having inflicted or suffered any harm. If anyone injures them, or they injure anyone else, the Priests are to act as judges, provided no more than fifty drachmas are involved. If the claim is for a greater sum, the trial must be held before the Market-Wardens.

The third type of visitor, who arrives from another country on some matter of state, should be received at public expense, and by no one except Generals, Cavalry-Commanders and Company-Commanders. Together with the executive for the time being, the official by whom he is put up and entertained should have the sole responsibility for him.

Sometimes, though rarely, a fourth kind of visitor arrives. If ever a counterpart to our own observers comes from a foreign country, we shall first of all require that he should be not less than fifty years old, and in addition he should profess to be coming to view something whose excellence surpasses that of anything in the rest of the world, or to report on some such feature to another state. Such a man may dispense with invitations, and present himself at the doors of the wise and rich, because that is the class of man he is himself. In the full confidence that he is the right sort of guest for such a distinguished host, he should go to the home of (say) the Minister of Education, or of someone who has won an award for virtue. He should spend his time in the company of one or other of these, and after an exchange of information take his leave, duly honored as a friend by friends with fitting presents and tokens of esteem.

These are the laws that should govern the reception of all our visitors from abroad, of either sex, and the dispatch of our own people to other countries. We must show respect for Zeus the God of Strangers, and not keep aliens at arm's length by uncongenial food and offensive sacrifices (like the sons of Old Father Nile do nowadays), or by uncivilized proclamations.

Anyone who stands surety should do so in precise terms, by specifying all the details of the agreement in a written contract, before not less than three witnesses if the sum involved is less than one thousand drachmas, and not less than five in the case of greater sums. (Also, a warrantor is surety for a vendor who is insolvent or cannot be sued, and is to have the same liability in law.)

When a man wants to search someone else's premises, he should do so clad in only his tunic, without a belt, and after swearing to the gods specified by law that he really does expect to find what he's looking for. The other party is to

open up his home, including all its sealed and unsealed property, to be searched; if he refuses permission to search to anyone requesting it, the party thus hindered must go to law, giving his estimate of the value of the object he is looking for.

If the defendant is convicted, he must pay double the estimated value as damages.

If the owner of the house happens to be away, the residents must make unsealed property available for search; sealed property should be countersealed by the searcher, who should then post anyone he likes to guard it for a period of five days. If the householder stays away for longer than that, the other party should fetch the City-Wardens and make the search, opening up sealed property as well and sealing it up again afterwards in the same way in the presence of the household and the City-Wardens.

Now for cases when title is in dispute. After a certain period has elapsed, it must be no longer possible to challenge the rights of the person in possession. In Magnesia, of course, dispute about land or houses is out of the question. But as for other possessions, if a man has used something openly in town or market-place or temple, and no one has tried to recover it and claimed to have been looking for it all the time the other man has obviously made no attempt at concealment, then provided the ownership of the one party and the search of the other have continued for a year, after the expiry of that period no claim for recovery is to be permitted. If a man uses an object openly, not indeed in town or market-place, but in the countryside, and no one confronts him with a claim to it for five years, then on the expiry of that period no one is to be allowed to attempt repossession. If the article is used in a man's town house, the time limit is to be three years; if it is kept in a building in the country, ten years; and if it is used abroad, then there

is to be no time limit for recovery at all, however long the claimant may take to find it.

Sometimes a man may forcibly prevent a litigant or witness from appearing at a trial. If he prevents a slave, his own or another's, the suit should be null and void.

If he prevents a free man, he must be imprisoned for a year and be liable to a suit for kidnapping at the hands of anyone who cares to prosecute, and the suit will be null in any case.

If a man forcibly prevents a rival competitor from participating in an athletic or cultural or any other contest, anyone who wishes should report the fact to the supervisors of the games, who should set the would-be contestant free to enter the competition. If they prove unable to do so, and the man responsible for the competitor's absence wins, the prize should be awarded to the person prevented from competing, and he should be recorded as the winner in any temple he pleases.

The person who has hindered him must not be allowed to make any dedication or record relating to that contest, and he must be liable to a prosecution for damages whether he wins or loses.

If a man receives stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, he must suffer the same penalty as the thief.

The penalty for harboring an exile should be death.

Everyone is to have the same friends and enemies as the state.

If a man makes a private peace or wages private war with anyone without the backing of the state, he too must be punished by death.

If any sectional interest in the state makes peace or war with any parties on its own account, the Generals must haul those responsible for the affairs before a court.

If the defendants are convicted, death should be the penalty.

Members of the public service should perform their duties without taking bribes. Such a practice must never be extenuated by an approving reference to maxims like 'One good turn deserves another'. It is not easy for an official to reach his decisions impartially and stick to them, and the safest thing he can do is to listen to the law and obey its command to take no gifts for his services.

If a man disobeys and is convicted in court, the only penalty permitted is to be death.

Now to deal with payments to the public treasury. For a variety of reasons, an assessment must be made of each man's property, and the members of the tribes must make a written return of the year's produce to the Country-Wardens. The treasury will thus be able to use whichever of the two methods of exacting payment it finds convenient—that is, every year the authorities will decide to levy a proportion either of the sum total of the individual assessments or of the revenues accruing that particular year. (Payment for the common meals should be excluded from the calculations.)

The offerings a reasonable man makes to the gods should be on a correspondingly reasonable scale. As the earth and every household's hearth are already sacred to all the gods, no one should consecrate them a second time. The gold and silver that you find in temples and private houses in other states encourage jealousy; ivory, taken as it is from a lifeless body, is an unclean offering; and iron and bronze are instruments of war. A man may offer at the public temples any objects he likes made of wood or stone, provided that in either case it consists of no more than a single piece; if he offers woven material, it should not exceed what one woman can produce in a month. In general, and particularly in the

case of woven material, white is the color appropriate to the gods; dyes must not be employed, except for military decorations. The gifts the gods find most acceptable are birds and pictures, provided they do not take a painter more than a single day to complete. All this should serve as a pattern for all our other offerings.

Now that we have described the nature and number of the parts into which the whole state is divided, and done what we can to frame laws for all the most important agreements men make, we're left with the question of legal procedure. The court of first resort will consist of judges—arbitrators, in fact, but 'judges' is really a more appropriate title—chosen by agreement between prosecutor and defendant. If the case is not settled in the first court, the litigants should go and contest it again before the second (composed of villagers and tribesmen, duly divided into twelve groups), but at the risk of an enhanced penalty: if the defendant loses for the second time, he must be mulcted an additional fifth of the penalty previously assessed and recorded. If he is still aggrieved with his judges and wants to fight the case for the third time, he must take it to the Select Judges, and if he is defeated again, he is to pay one and a half times the original penalty. As for the prosecutor, if he is not prepared to lie down under defeat in the first court, and goes before the second, he should be awarded the extra fifth of the penalty if he wins, but be fined that amount if he loses. If the litigants refuse to acquiesce in the earlier decision and go before the third court, and the defendant loses, he must pay one and a half times the penalty as already stated; if the prosecutor loses, he must be fined one half of it.

But what about the balloting for jurors, and the procedure for making up the juries? What about the appointment of attendants for the various officials, the fixing of times at which the various formalities should be completed, voting

methods, adjournments, and all the other similar inescapable details of legal procedure, such as putting cases early or late in the calendar, the enforcement of attendance and of replies to interrogation, and suchlike? Well, we've made the point before, but the truth is all the better for being stated two or even three times. All these minor rules are perfectly easy to invent, and the senior legislator may skip them and leave it to his young successor to fill in the gaps. But although that will be reasonable enough in the case of the courts that are appointed privately, the common public courts, and those that the various officials need to use in the performance of their duties, need a rather different approach. Sensible people in several states have framed a good many decent regulations which our Guardians of the Laws should adapt for the state that we are now founding. The Guardians should examine them and touch them up after trying them out in practice, until they think they have licked each single one into shape; then they should finalize them, ratify them as immutable, and render them lifelong obedience. Then there is the question of the silence of the judges, and the restraint or otherwise of their language, as well as all the other details in which our standards of justice and goodness and decorum differ from those you find in such variety in other states. We've already had something to say on this topic, and we shall have more to say towards the end. The judge who wants to act with proper judicial impartiality should bear all these points in mind and get hold of books in which to study the subject. The study of laws, provided they are good laws, is unsurpassed for its power to improve the student. (It can't be an accident that the name of this god-given and wonderful institution, law, is so suggestive of reason.) And other compositions, such as eulogies or censures in verse or prose, in the latter case either taking written form or being simply spoken during our

day-to-day contacts when we indulge in contentious argument or (sometimes thoughtlessly) express our agreement—all these will be measured against a clear criterion: the writings of the legislator, which the good judge will treasure as a kind of antidote against the others, so as to ensure his own moral health and that of the state. He will confirm and strengthen the virtuous in the paths of righteousness, and do his best to banish ignorance and incontinence and cowardice and indeed every sort of injustice from the hearts of those criminals whose outlook can be cured. However—and this is a point that deserves constant repetition—when a man's soul is unalterably fixed in that condition by decree of fate, our erudite judges and their advisers will deserve the commendation of the whole state if they cure him by imposing the penalty of death.

When the suits for the year have been finally decided, the following laws must apply to the execution of judgment. First of all, immediately after the voting in each case, and by proclamation of a herald in the hearing of the judges, the official who has pronounced sentence should assign all the property of the convicted party, except the minimum he must retain, to the successful prosecutor. If after the expiry of the month following that in which the case was tried the loser has not settled the business with the victor to the satisfaction of both, the official who gave judgment must at the request of the victorious party hand over the goods of the loser. If the latter lacks the means to pay, and the deficiency amounts to a drachma or more, he must not be allowed to prosecute other people (they however, being entitled to prosecute him), until he has paid his debt in full to his opponent. If someone who has received an adverse verdict obstructs the bench that condemned him, the officials thus obstructed should haul him before the court of the Guardians of the Laws.

If he is convicted on such a charge, he must be punished by death, on the grounds that his conduct is wrecking the entire state and its laws.

Now here's the next point. A man is born and brought up, and begets and rears his own children in turn; he deals fairly in his business transactions, paying the penalty if he has done anyone injury and exacting one if others have wronged him; and finally, as destiny decrees, after an old age spent in obedience to the laws, the course of nature will bring him to the end of his life. So what should we do when a man or woman has died? First, we must bow to the absolute authority of the Expounders' instructions about the sacred rites to be observed in honor of the nether gods and those of this world. No tomb, whether its mound is large or small, should be constructed anywhere on land that can be farmed; graves must take up space only where nature has made the ground good for nothing except the reception and concealment of the bodies of the dead with minimum detriment to the living, because no one, alive or dead, must ever rob the living of any land which—thanks to the natural fertility of Mother Earth—will grow food for the human race. The soil must not be piled higher than five men can manage by working for five days. Stone slabs must not be made bigger than they need to be to accommodate a eulogy of the deceased's career of not more than the usual four hexameters. The laying-out at home should not last longer than is necessary to confirm that the person really is dead and not just in a faint; in average cases, it will be reasonable for the body to be taken to the tomb after two days.

We should, of course, trust whatever the legislator tells us, but especially his doctrine that the soul has an absolute superiority over the body, and that while I am alive I have nothing to thank for my individuality except my soul, whereas my body is just the likeness of myself that I carry

round with me. This means we are quite right when we say a corpse 'looks like' the deceased. Our real self—our immortal soul, as it is called—departs, as the ancestral law declares, to the gods below to give an account of itself. To the wicked, this is a terrifying doctrine, but a good man will welcome it. And once he's dead, there's not a great deal we can do to help a man: all his relatives should have helped him while he was still in the land of the living, so that he could have passed his life in all possible justice and holiness; and then after death he could have escaped the penalty visited on evil deeds in the life to come. This all goes to show that we should never squander our last penny, on the fanciful assumption that this lump of flesh being buried really is our own son or brother or whoever it is we mournfully think we are burying. We ought to realize that in fact he has departed in final consummation of his destiny, and that it is our duty to make the best of what we have and spend only a moderate sum on the body, which we may now think of as a kind of altar to the gods below, now deserted by its spirit; and as for what is meant by 'moderate' in this matter, the most respectable ideas will be those of the legislator. The law, then, should specify a reasonable level of expenditure as follows. In the case of a member of the highest property-class, the whole funeral should not cost more than five hundred drachmas; three hundred may be spent on a member of the second class, two hundred on a member of the third, and one hundred on a member of the fourth.

The Guardians of the Laws will have to shoulder a great many burdens and responsibilities, but their overriding duty will be to devote their lives to the care of children and adults and indeed persons of all ages. In particular, when a man is nearing his end his household should invite one Guardian to take charge of him, and if the funeral arrangements pass

off decorously and without extravagance, this Guardian-in-charge will get the credit, but if not, then the blame will be at his door. The laying-out and other matters should take place according to usage, but usage must be modified by the following directions of our legislator-statesman. 'Tasteless though it is to forbid or instruct people to weep over the dead, dirges should be forbidden; and cries of mourning should be allowed only inside the house. The mourners must not bring the corpse on to the open street nor make their procession a noisy one, and they must be outside the city by day-break.' So much for the regulations on the subject. The person who obeys them will never be punished, but, if a man disobeys a single Guardian of the Laws, he must be punished by them all with whatever penalty recommends itself to their united judgment.

The other methods of burying the dead, and the kind of criminals to whom we deny burial, such as parricides, temple-robbers and all similar categories, have already been specified and provided for in the legal code. And that means, I suppose, that we have pretty well come to the end of our legislation.

Athenian Stranger/ However, even when you have achieved or gained or founded something, you have never quite finished. Only when you have ensured complete and perpetual security for your creation can you reckon to have done everything that ought to have been done. Until then, it's a case of 'unfinished business'.

Clinias/ Well said, sir—but what's the particular point you had in mind in saying that? Could you be a little clearer?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, you know, Clinias, a lot of old expressions are extraordinarily apt. I'm thinking particularly of the names of the Fates.

Clinias/ What names?

Athenian Stranger/ Lachesis for the first, Clotho for the second, and Atropos for the third fulfiller of destiny—the last so called from her likeness to a woman making the threads on her spindle irreversible. That is precisely the situation we want to see in our state and its citizens—not merely physical health and soundness, but the rule of law in their souls and (more important than all that) the preservation of the laws themselves. In fact, it seems to me that the service we've still not done for the laws is to discover how to build into them a resistance to being reversed.

Clinias/ That's serious, because I don't suppose there's a way of giving anything that sort of property.

Athenian Stranger/ But there is. I see that quite clearly now.

Clinias/ Well then, we mustn't abandon our task till we've achieved this for the legal code we've expounded. It would be silly to waste our labor on something by failing to construct it on a firm foundation.

Athenian Stranger/ You're right to encourage me, and you'll find me as keen as you are.

Clinias/ Splendid! So what is this safety device for our political system and legal code going to be, according to you? And how can we construct it?

Athenian Stranger/ We said that we ought to have in the state a council with the following range of membership. The ten Guardians of the Laws who are currently the eldest were to convene together with all persons who had won awards of distinction and the travelers who had gone abroad to see if they could discover any special method of keeping a legal code intact. When these observers got back safe and sound, they were to be accepted as suitable associates of the council, provided they had first passed the scrutiny of its members. In addition, each member had to bring a young

man of at least thirty years of age, but only after selecting him as particularly well qualified by natural abilities and education; on these terms the young man was to be introduced to the other members of the council, and if they approved of him, he was to join them; if not, they were not to breathe a word to anyone about the fact that he was considered, least of all to the rejected candidate himself. The council was to meet before dawn, when people are least beset by other business, public or private. That was more or less the description we gave earlier, wasn't it?

Clinias/ Certainly it was.

Athenian Stranger/ So I'm going to resume the subject of this council, and here's the point I want to make about it. I maintain that if one were to lower it as a sort of 'anchor' for the whole state, then provided conditions were suitable, it would keep safe everything we wanted it to.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Now at this crucial moment, we must strain every muscle to get things right.

Clinias/ That's a fine sentiment. Now do what you have in mind.

Athenian Stranger/ The question we have to ask about anything, Clinias, is this: what is it that has the special power of keeping it safe in each of its activities? In a living creature, for instance, this is the natural function of the soul and the head, in particular.

Clinias/ Again, what's your point?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, when these two are functioning satisfactorily, they ensure the animal's safety, don't they?

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ Because no matter what else is true of either, the soul is the seat of reason and the head enjoys

the faculties of sight and hearing. In short, the combination of reason with the highest senses constitutes a single faculty that would have every right to be called the salvation of the animal concerned.

Clinias/ That's likely enough, I suppose.

Athenian Stranger/ Of course it is. But how do reason and the senses combine to ensure the safety of a ship, in fair weather or foul? Isn't it because captain and crew interpret sense-data by reason, as embodied in the expertise captains have, that they keep themselves and the whole ship safe?

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ We've no need to multiply examples, but take a general in command of his army, or any doctor tending a human body. What will they each aim at, on the assumption that they intend, as they should, to preserve their charges safe and sound? Won't the general aim at victory and control over the enemy, and won't doctors and their attendants aim to keep the body in a healthy condition?

Clinias/ Of course.

Athenian Stranger/ Now consider a doctor who can't recognize the state of the body we've just called 'health', or a general who doesn't know what's meant by 'victory' and the other terms we reviewed. Could either of them possibly be judged to have a rational knowledge of his field?

Clinias/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ And if the ruler of a state were obviously ignorant of the target at which a statesman should aim, would he really deserve his title 'ruler'? Would he be capable of ensuring the safety of an institution whose purpose he entirely failed to appreciate?

Clinias/ Certainly not.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, in the present circumstances, if our settlement of this territory is to be finished off properly, it looks as if we shall have to provide it with some constituent that understands this target we have mentioned—the target, whatever we find it is, of the statesman, how to hit it, and which laws (above all) and which persons have helpful advice to give and which not. If a state lacks some such constituent, no one will be surprised to see it staggering from one irrational and senseless expedient to another in all its affairs.

Clinias/ That's true.

Athenian Stranger/ So is there any institution or constituent part of our state qualified and prepared to function as an organ of protection? Can we name one?

Clinias/ No, sir, not with much assurance, anyway. But if guess I must, I think your remarks point to the Council you said just now had to convene during the night.

Athenian Stranger/ You've caught my meaning splendidly, Clinias. As the drift of our present argument shows, that body must possess virtue in all its completeness, which means above all that it will not take erratic aim at one target after another but keep its eye on one single target and shoot all its arrows at that.

Clinias/ Certainly.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we can see why it is hardly surprising that rules and regulations fluctuate so much from state to state: it is because legislation has a different aim in each. Nor is it surprising that in most cases you find that some people think of justice as nothing but the subjection of the state to the rule of this or that type of person without regard to their vice or virtue, while others think of it as the opportunity to become rich, no matter whether they are thereby enslaved or not; others again are bent hell for leather

on a life of ‘freedom’. Some legislators keep both ends in view, and their laws have the dual purpose of securing control over other states and freedom for their own. The cleverest legislators of all (as they like to think of themselves), so far from aiming at one single end, look not only to these but all others like them, simply because they cannot identify any supremely valuable end to which all others ought, in their view, to contribute.

Clinias/ Well then, sir, the line we took so long ago was the right one. We said that every detail of our legislation ought to have a single end in view, and the proper name to call it was, I think we agreed, Virtue’.

Athenian Stranger/ Yes.

Clinias/ And I think we maintained that the virtues were four.

Athenian Stranger/ Indeed we did.

Clinias/ The leading one, to which not only the other three but everything else should be orientated, was reason.

Athenian Stranger/ You take the point admirably, Clinias. Now follow the rest of the argument. As far as the captain, doctor and general are concerned, we have already indicated that their intellect aims at some appropriate single end. Now it is the turn of the statesman’s reason to be investigated. Let’s personify it and ask it the following question: “My good sir, what aim do you have in view? What’s your single overriding purpose? The intelligent doctor can identify his accurately enough, so can’t you, with all your superior wisdom (as I suppose you'd claim), identify yours?” Or can you two, Clinias and Megillus, answer for him and tell me precisely what your notion of his aim is, just as I’ve often given you detailed accounts of the notions of many other people on their behalf?

Clinias/ No, sir, we certainly cannot.

Athenian Stranger/ What about replying, 'I think he should make every effort to get an overall understanding of his aim, as well as see it in its various contexts'?

Clinias/ What contexts, for example?

Athenian Stranger/ Well, when we said there were four species of virtue, obviously the very fact that there were four meant that each had to be thought of as somehow distinct from the others.

Clinias/ Surely.

Athenian Stranger/ Yet in fact we call them all by a single name. We say courage is virtue, wisdom is virtue, and the other two similarly, on the ground that really they are not several things but just one—virtue.

Clinias/ Very true.

Athenian Stranger/ It's not hard to explain how these two 'virtues' and the rest differ from each other and how each has acquired a different name. The real problem is this: why, precisely, have we described both of them (as well as the others) by this common term 'virtue'?

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ My point is perfectly easy to explain. Shall we let one of us ask the questions, and the other answer them?

Clinias/ Again, what do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Here's the question for you to put to me: "Why is it that after calling both by the single term 'virtue', in the next breath we speak of two 'virtues', courage and wisdom?" I'll tell you why. One of them, courage, copes with fear, and is found in wild animals as well as human beings, notably in the characters of very young children. The soul, you see, becomes courageous by a purely natural process, without the aid of reason. By contrast, in this

absence of reason a wise and sensible soul is out of the question. That is true now, has always been true, and always will be true; the two processes are fundamentally different.

Clinias/ That's true.

Athenian Stranger/ So there's your explanation of why there are two different virtues. Now it's your turn: you tell me why they are one and the same thing. Your job, you understand, is to tell me why the four of them nevertheless form a unity; and when you have demonstrated that unity, ask me to show you again in what sense they are four.

Next after that we ought to ask ourselves what constitutes adequate knowledge of any object that has a name and a definition: is it enough to know only the name and not the definition? On the contrary, if a man is worth his salt, wouldn't it be a disgrace in him not to understand all these points about a topic so grand and so important?

Clinias/ Presumably it would.

Athenian Stranger/ And as for a giver or guardian of laws, and indeed anyone who thinks of his own virtue as superior to the rest of the world's, and has won awards for his achievement, is there anything more important than the qualities we are now discussing—courage, restraint, justice and wisdom?

Clinias/ Of course not.

Athenian Stranger/ So in such circumstances what role should the expounders, teachers and lawgivers—the guardians of the rest of the community—play when a criminal needs enlightenment and instruction, or perhaps correction and punishment? Should they not prove better than anyone else at giving him a full explanation and description of the effects of virtue and vice? Or is some poet-visitor to the state, or some self-styled 'educationalist', going to put up a better show than the winner of the palm for every

kind of virtue? Where there are no efficient and articulate guardians with an adequate understanding of virtue, it will be hardly surprising if the state, precisely because it is unguarded, meets the fate of so many states nowadays.

Clinias/ No, hardly surprising at all, I suppose.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, shall we carry out these proposals, or what? Shall we make sure our guardians are more highly qualified than the man in the street to explain what virtue is, and to put it into practice? How else could our state function like the head and sense of a wise man, now that it possesses within itself something analogous to protect it?

Clinias/ Where is this resemblance, sir? How do we draw such a comparison?

Athenian Stranger/ Obviously the state itself corresponds to the trunk, and the junior guardians, chosen for their natural gifts and the acuteness of their mental vision, live as it were at the summit and survey the whole state; they store up in their memory all the sensations they receive while on guard, and act as reporters for their elder colleagues of everything that takes place in the state; and the old men—we could compare them to the intellect, for their high wisdom in so many vital questions—take advantage of the assistance and advice of their juniors in debating policy, so that the joint efforts of both ranks effectively ensure the safety of the entire state. Now is this the sort of organization we want to see, or some other? Should the state, in fact, keep all its citizens on the same level, without giving some a more specialized training and education than others?

Clinias/ My dear sir! That's quite impracticable.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we have to pass on to a more advanced education than the one we described earlier.

Clinias/ Perhaps so.

Athenian Stranger/ What about the education we touched on a moment ago? Would that answer our needs?

Clinias/ Certainly it would.

Athenian Stranger/ Didn't we say that a really skilled craftsman or guardian in any field must be able not merely to see the many individual instances of a thing, but also to win through to a knowledge of the single central concept, and when he's understood that, put the various details in their proper place in the overall picture?

Clinias/ We did, and rightly.

Athenian Stranger/ So what better tool can there be for a penetrating investigation of a concept than an ability to look beyond the many dissimilar instances to the single notion?

Clinias/ Probably none.

Athenian Stranger/ 'Probably!' No, my dear fellow, this is most certainly the surest method we can follow, no matter who we are.

Clinias/ I trust you, sir, and I agree, so let's carry on with the discussion on that basis.

Athenian Stranger/ So it looks as if we have to compel the guardians of our divine foundation to get an exact idea of the common element in all the four virtues—that factor which, though single, is to be found in courage, restraint, justice and wisdom, and thus in our view deserves the general title 'virtue'. This element, my friends, if only we have the will, is what we must grip until we can explain adequately the essence of what we have to contemplate, whether it is a single entity, a composite whole, or both, or whatever. If this point eludes us, can we ever expect to attain virtue—when we can't say whether it comprises a great number of things or just four, or whether it is a unity? Never—not if we believe our own advice, anyway, and we'll have to ensure the growth of virtue in the state by some other means. But if in the

circumstances we decide we ought to abandon the attempt entirely, abandon it we must.

Clinias/ No, sir, in the name of the gods of hospitality, we must never abandon such a project: you seem to us to be absolutely right. So now then: how is one to tackle the problem?

Athenian Stranger/ Let's postpone the question of method. The first thing we have to settle and decide among ourselves is whether the attempt should be made at all.

Clinias/ Indeed it should, if possible.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, do we take the same line about goodness and beauty? Should the guardians know no more than that both these terms are a plurality, or should they understand the senses in which they are unities?

Clinias/ It looks as if they are more or less obliged to comprehend that too—how they are unities.

Athenian Stranger/ But what if they understood the point, but couldn't find the words to demonstrate it?

Clinias/ How absurd! That's the condition of a slave.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, isn't our doctrine going to be the same about all serious questions? If our guardians are going to be genuine guardians of the laws they must have genuine knowledge of their real nature; they must be articulate enough to explain the real difference between good actions and bad, and capable of sticking to the distinction in practice.

Clinias/ Naturally.

Athenian Stranger/ And surely one of the finest fields of knowledge is theology, on which we've already lavished a great deal of attention. It's supremely important to appreciate—so far as it's given to man to know these things—the existence of the gods and the obvious extent of their

power. The man in the street may be forgiven if he simply follows the voice of the law, but if any intended guardian fails to work hard to master every theological proof there is, we must certainly not grant him the same indulgence; in other words, we must never choose as a Guardian of the Laws anyone who is not preternaturally gifted or has not worked hard at theology, or allow him to be awarded distinctions for virtue.

Clinias/ It's fair enough, as you say, that the idle or incompetent in this business should never be allowed to get anywhere near such honors.

Athenian Stranger/ Now we know, don't we, that among the arguments we've already discussed, there are two in particular which encourage belief in the gods?

Clinias/ Which two are they?

Athenian Stranger/ One is the point we made about the soul, when we argued that it is far older and far more divine than all those things whose movements have sprung up and provided the impulse which has plunged it into a perpetual stream of existence. Another argument was based on the systematic motion of the heavenly bodies and the other objects under the control of reason, which is responsible for the order in the universe. No one who has contemplated all this with a careful and expert eye has in fact ever degenerated into such ungodliness as to reach the position that most people would expect him to reach. They suppose that if a man goes in for such things as astronomy and the essential associated disciplines, and sees events apparently happening by necessity rather than because they are directed by the intention of a benevolent will, he'll turn into an atheist.

Clinias/ Well, what would happen, in fact?

Athenian Stranger/ Today, as I said, the situation is quite different from the time when thinkers regarded these bodies as inanimate. Even then, men were overcome with wonder at them, and those who studied them really closely got an inkling of the accepted doctrines of today, that such remarkably accurate predictions about their behavior would never have been possible if they were inanimate, and therefore irrational; and even in those days there were some who had the hardihood to stick their neck out and assert it was reason that imposed regularity and order on the heavens. However, these same thinkers went sadly astray over the soul's natural priority to matter: regarding soul as a recent creation, they turned the universe upside down, so to speak, and their own theories to boot. They concluded from the evidence of their eyes that all the bodies that move across the heavens were mere collections of stone and earth and many other kinds of inanimate matter—inanimate matter which nevertheless initiated a chain of causation responsible for all the order in the universe. These views brought down on the philosophers' heads a great many accusations of atheism, and provoked a lot of hostility; poets, in particular, joined in the chorus of abuse and among other inanities compared the philosophers to bitches baying at the moon. But today, as I said, the situation is fundamentally different.

Clinias/ How so?

Athenian Stranger/ No mortal can ever attain a truly religious outlook without risk of relapse unless he grasps the two doctrines we're now discussing: first, that the soul is far older than any created thing, and that it is immortal and controls the entire world of matter; and second (a doctrine we've expounded often enough before) that reason is the supreme power among the heavenly bodies. He also has to master the essential preliminary studies, survey with the eye

of a philosopher what they have in common, and use them to frame consistent rules of moral action; and finally, when a reasoned explanation is possible, he must be able to provide it. No one who is unable to acquire these insights and rise above the level of the ordinary virtues will ever be good enough to govern an entire state, but only to assist government carried on by others. And that means, Clinias and Megillus, that we now have to consider whether we are going to add yet another law to the code we've already expounded, to the effect that the Nocturnal Council of the Authorities, duly primed by the course of studies we've described, shall be constituted the legal protector of the safety of the state. Or is there some alternative course for us to take?

Clinias/ Oh, but my dear sir, there's no question of refusing to add this law, if we can manage it, even if our success is only partial.

Athenian Stranger/ Then let's make every effort to win the struggle. I've had a lot of experience of such projects and have studied the field for a long time, so I'll be more than happy to help you—and perhaps I shall find others to join me.

Clinias/ Well, sir, we must certainly stick to the path on which—it is hardly an exaggeration to say—God himself is guiding us. But the question to which we need an answer at the moment is this: what will be the correct procedure on our part?

Athenian Stranger/ Megillus and Clinias, it is impossible to lay down the council's activities until it has been established. Its curriculum must be decided by those who have already mastered the necessary branches of knowledge—and only previous instruction and plenty of intimate discussion will settle such matters as that.

Clinias/ How so? How are we supposed to understand that remark?

Athenian Stranger/ First of all, of course, we shall have to compile a list of candidates qualified for the office of guardian by age, intellectual attainments, moral character and way of life. Then there's the question of what they have to learn. It is difficult to find out this for oneself, and it is not easy either to discover somebody else who has already done so and learn from him. Quite apart from that, it will be a waste of time to produce written regulations about the order in which the various subjects should be tackled and how long should be spent on each, because even the students, until they have thoroughly absorbed a subject, won't realize why it comes at just that point in the curriculum. So although it would be a mistake to treat all these details as inviolable secrets, it would be fair to say that they ought not to be divulged beforehand, because advance disclosure throws no light at all on the questions we're discussing.

Clinias/ Well then, sir, if that's the case, what are we to do?

Athenian Stranger/ My friends, we must 'chance our arm', as the saying is. If we are prepared to stake the whole constitution on a throw of 'three sixes' or 'three ones', then that's what we'll have to do, and I'll shoulder part of the risk by giving a full explanation of my views on training and education, which we've now started to discuss all over again. However, the risk is enormous and unique. So I bid you, Clinias, take the business in hand: establish the state of the Magnesians (or whatever other name God adopts for it), and if you're successful you'll win enormous fame; at any rate you'll never lose a reputation for courage that will dwarf all your successors'. And if, my good companions, if this wonderful council of ours can be formed, then the state must be entrusted to it, and practically no modern legislator will

want to oppose us. We thought of our combined metaphor of head and intellect, which we mentioned a moment ago, as idealistic dreaming—but it will all come true, provided the council members are rigorously selected, properly educated, and after the completion of their studies lodged in the citadel of the country and made into guardians whose powers of protection we have never seen excelled in our lives before.

Megillus/ My dear Clinias, judging from what we've heard said, either we'll have to abandon the project of founding the state or refuse to let our visitor leave us, and by entreaties and every ruse we can think of enroll him as a partner in the foundation of the state.

Clinias/ You're quite right, Megillus. That's what I'm going to do. May I enlist your help too?

Megillus/ You may indeed.



Axiochus.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

or

On Death.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Clinias, Axiochus.

Socrates/ When I had gone out on the road to Cynosarges, and had arrived at the Ilissus, the voice of someone reached me, calling out;

Clinias/ "Socrates, Socrates."

Socrates/ And when on turning towards the sound I looked round to see from whence it might be, I beheld Clinias, the son of Axiochus, running towards the fountain Callirrhoe, together with Damon the musician, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon. Of these, one was the other's music-master, and the other was, from a feeling of friendship, at once the loving and beloved. I determined therefore to give up the direct road, and to meet them, that we might come together in the easiest manner. And Clinias, with tears in his eyes, said—

Clinias/ Now, Socrates, is the time for you to exhibit the wisdom ever bruited by you. For my father has at some sudden season become powerless, and is at the end of life, and with pain supports the idea of dissolution; although at a former period he used to ridicule those, who were afraid of the bugbear of death, and to rebuke them mildly. Come then, and console him as you are wont, in order that he may without a groan proceed on the road of fate, and that, together with the remaining acts of piety, this too may be done by me.

Socrates/ In no moderate matter, Clinias, shall you be disappointed in me; especially as you are inviting me to do a holy act. Let us then make haste; for if such is the state of affairs, there is a need of haste.

Clinias/ On merely seeing you, Socrates, he will rally; for often has he been on his legs again after a serious symptom.

Socrates/ When we had traversed rather quickly the road along the wall, at the Itonian gates—for he dwells near there, close to the pillar of the Amazon—we came upon him, when he had already recovered his senses, and his body some strength, although his mind was weak, and he stood greatly in need of consolation; and frequently did he raise himself up, and give vent to moans, together with the shedding of tears, and the noisy beating of his hands. On beholding him;

Why is this, Axiochus? Where are your former boastings and frequent praises of virtue, and your boldness not to be broken down? since, like a cowardly combatant, you have exhibited yourself of noble bearing in the place of exercise, but have failed in the fight. Will not you, a man of so long a life, and the hearer of the finest reasonings, and, if nothing else, at least an Athenian, after surveying nature consider that this is surely a common saying, and bruited amongst all, that life is a kind of sojourn upon earth; and that we must pass through it in a reasonable and good-tempered manner, and take our departure, only not singing paeans on the road to fate; while to conduct yourself in so cowardly a manner, and to be torn with difficulty from existence, is to exhibit, like a child, a period of life not over-wise.

Axiochus/ This, Socrates, is true; and you appear to me to speak correctly. And yet I know not how, when I am at the very point of what is dreadful, those powerful and very clever reasonings unconsciously fall away, and are held in no honor; while in their stead a fear lays hold of me, tearing my

mind in various ways, if I am to be deprived of this light here, and of the good things of life, and to lie rotting, wherever it may be, unseen and unheard of, after passing into worms and nondescript creatures.

Socrates/ Through your own ignorance, Axiochus, you are combining sensation with the want of sensation; and you are acting and speaking in a manner at variance with yourself; and you do not consider that you are at one and the same time lamenting your want of sensation, and pained at the idea of your rotting away, and of being deprived of what is pleasant, as if you are to die and live in another state, and not to pass into insensibility complete, and the same as that before you were born. As then none of the mischief during the political period of Draco and Clisthenes pertained to yourself—for you, to whom it might have pertained, did not exist at all—so it will not after death occur to you; for you, to whom it might occur, will not be in existence. Throw aside then all silliness of this kind, and think upon this, that, after the union of soul with body has been once dissolved by the former being settled in its own home-place, what is left of the latter is of the earth and devoid of reason, nor is it a man. For we are soul, a thing of life and immortal, pent up in a mortal prison. And nature has for some mischief fitted round this tabernacle, to which pleasant things are in a recess, and on the wing, and mixed up with the majority of pains; but the things of sorrow are unmixed, and last a long time, and have no share in what is pleasant; I say nothing of diseases and inflammations in the sensoria and of internal ills, with which the soul, as if sown with pores, does, when it sympathizes, of necessity desire its congenial atmosphere of heaven, and feels a thirst for the life that is there, and a hankering after its dancing; so that a removal from this life is but a change from an evil to a good.

Axiochus/ Since then, Socrates, you consider life to be an ill, why do you remain in it? and this too, when you are a person of reflection, and excel us, the mass, in mind.

Socrates/ You do not, Axiochus, testify truly in my case; but you conceive, as the mass of Athenians do, that, since I am searcher after facts, I am acquainted with something. And indeed I would pray to know all things of even a common kind, so much am I deficient in what are superior. But what I am now saying are the proclaimed doctrines of Prodicus the wise, that have been bought, some for half a drachm, others for two drachms, and others for four; for that person never teaches anything for nothing, but his custom is perpetually to proclaim the sentiment of Epicharmus—

> Hand hand washes; give then something, and get something in return.

And lately, when he was making a display at the house of Callias, the son of Hipponicus, he spoke so much against living, that I drew a line through the word life as a thing of the least value; and from that time, Axiochus, my soul yearned for death.

Axiochus/ And what was said then?

Socrates/ I will tell you all I can remember. For what part of life, said he, is free from pain? Does not the infant cry at its first birth, beginning to live from pain? Nor is it deficient in any suffering, but is affected painfully either by the want of something, or excessive cold or heat, or a blow; and being unable to tell what it is suffering, it cries continually, possessing this voice alone of its discontentment. And when it reaches its seventh year, after having gone through many troubles, there are boy-leaders, and teachers of grammar, and drilling-masters tyrannizing over him. And as he grows bigger, there is a still larger number of despots, who teach him correctness in composition, and geometry, and military

tactics. And when he is registered amongst the young men, there are, what is a worse fear, the Lyceum and Academy, and the Gymnasiarchs and their staves, and a measureless amount of ills. And the whole period of youth is under Moderators and the selection of those placed over young persons by the Council of the Areopagus. And when he is forced from them, cares straightway come upon him in secret, and considerations as to what road of life he is to tread; and compared with the after difficulties the first appear to be childish, and the terrors in truth of infants; for there are campaigns, and wounds, and continuous contests. And then old age stealthily and unconsciously comes on, to which flow together all that is on the verge of death and hard to be remedied. And should a person not pay, as a debt, his life rather quickly, Nature, like an usurer, stands near and takes as a pledge from one his eye-sight, and from another his hearing, and frequently both; and should he still delay, she brings on a paralysis, or a mutilation or a distortion of limbs; while they, who on the threshold of old age are still vigorous, in mind, become twice children, though grown old. And hence even the gods, who take cognizance of human affairs, release more quickly from life those, on whom they set the greatest value. For example, Agamedes and Trophonius, who built up the close, sacred to the god at Pytho, did, after praying that the best thing might befall them, lay themselves on their bed and never rise from it again. So too the sons of the priestess at Argos, after their mother had in like manner prayed for some honor to be paid them by Hera in return for their piety, when, through the pair of mules being too late, they undressed themselves, and drew her in the car to the temple, they did, after the prayer, change, during the night, their existence. And long would be the story to go through of the poets, who, with their more divine mouths, have told in holy hymns the tales relating to

life, how they utter lamentations against living. Of one alone I will however remember me, the most worthy to be spoken of, who says;

> The gods for mortals, in a hapless state
> To live, in sorrow wove the web of fate—

and;

> Of all that breathe and creep upon the earth,
> There's naught than man more wretched from his birth.

And what does he say of Amphiraus?

> Him heartily the Ægis-bearing Zeus
> Loved, and Apollo with the feelings all.
> Of friendship; yet he did not of old age
> The threshold reach.

And what does he appear to you, who bids us;

> Weep for the ills, to which the new-born comes.

But I will stop here, lest, contrary to my engagement, I become prolix by making mention of others likewise. With what pursuit or art does not he, who has chosen it, find fault, and is discontented with his present state? Let us go to handicraftsmen and workers at a furnace, who labor from night to night, and with difficulty procure the necessaries of life, and let us hear them bewailing their fate and filling up their sleepless hours with lamentations and tears. Or let us reckon up the sailor's life, passed in the midst of so many dangers, and which, as Bias has shown, is neither amongst the living nor the dead; for the man who belongs to earth, has, as if he were amphibious, thrown himself upon the sea, and become wholly in the power of fortune. But farming is at least a pleasant thing. Clearly so. But is it not wholly a sore, forever finding for itself a pretext for sorrow? crying now at a drought; now at a continued rain; now at a burning up; now at a mildew; now at unseasonable heat or cold. And

the much-honored statesmanship—for many things I pass over—through revolutions how great is it driven, while it possesses a pleasure, like that of a state of fever, in its quiverings and palpitations, but a failure, full of pain, and worse than a thousand deaths. Who then living for the mob can be happy? even if he has been favorably received with a gentle buzz, or noisy hubbub, as the plaything of the people, but afterwards rejected, hissed, fined, put to death, and pitied. Tell me this, thou statesman, Axiochus, where died Miltiades? where Themistocles? where Ephialtes? and where recently the ten army-leaders? when I did not put the question to the vote; for it did not seem to me a solemn act to hold office in union with a maddened mob; whereas Theramenes and Callixenus did on the day after introduce secretly fictitious chairmen of the meeting, and got against the men a vote of death without a trial; and yet did you Axiochus lawfully defend them and Euryptolemus likewise, while thirty thousand were at the general meeting.

Axiochus/ It is so, Socrates. And from that time I have had enough of the platform, and nothing has seemed to me more disagreeable than statesmanship. And this is plain to those who have been engaged in the business. And you indeed speak thus, as taking a view from a look-out; but we, who have made the experiment, know it more accurately. For the mob, my dear Socrates, is a thing ungrateful, satiated with the mere touch, cruel, envious, uneducated, as being made up of a mass of persons brought together, violent and triflers; while he, who acts the courtesan to it, is more miserable by far.

Socrates/ Since then, Axiochus, you lay down the science, which is the most free, as the least to be prayed for amongst the rest, what shall we think of the remaining pursuits? Are they not to be avoided? I once indeed heard

Prodicus saying that death does not exist as regards either the living or those, who have changed their existence.

Axiochus/ How say you, Socrates?

Socrates/ That as regards the living, it does not exist; while they, who are dead, do not exist; so that neither, as regards you, does it exist; for you are not dead; nor, should you suffer aught, will it exist, as regards you; for you will then not exist. Vain then is the sorrow in Axiochus grieving for Axiochus, touching a thing that neither is nor will be; and it is just the same, as if a person were to grieve for Scylla or the Centaur, which, as regards you, do not exist now, nor will they, after your close of life, exist. For what is fearful is so to those, who exist; but to those, who do not exist, how can it be so?

Axiochus/ These clever things you have said from the talkativeness, which is floating on the surface of society just now. For from thence is this idle speaking, which has been cleverly got up for the young men. But the deprivation of the good things of life is what gives me pain, even should you rattle out reasons, Socrates, still more plausible than those just now. For the mind, when it is wandering, thinks nothing of fine-spoken words; nor do these touch even its surface, which affect indeed a mere pomp and splendor of diction, but are wanting in truth. Now sufferings do not endure sophisms; and upon those things alone, that can reach the soul, rests there any aid.

Socrates/ You are putting together, Axiochus, words without reason, in bringing the perception of things that are bad as opposed to the deprivation of things that are good, through your forgetting that you are dead. For the counter-suffering of ill pains him who is deprived of good; but he, who does not exist, does not lay hold even of deprivation. How then should there be a grief for that, which is about to

furnish no knowledge of the things that will cause pain? For had you, Axiochus, at the beginning laid down with me, in some way that there is no perception to the dead, you would not, through your ignorance, have shuddered at death. But now you are turning yourself round, while fearing that you shall be deprived of soul, and place a soul round deprivation; and you fear that you shall not have a perception; and yet you imagine that you shall by perception comprehend a perception, that will not exist. In addition to their being many and beautiful reasons for the immortality of the soul. For a mortal nature would surely not have proceeded and been lifted up to such a greatness in action, as to despise the violence of superior wild animals, and to pass over seas, and to build cities, and to lay down forms of polity, and to look up to heaven and behold the revolutions of the stars, and the courses of the sun and moon, and their eclipses, and rapid return to their former state, and the equality of days, and the two tropical movements, during winter and summer, and the rising and setting of the Pleiades, and the winds, and the fall of rain, and the ill-fated trailing along of fiery meteors, and to lay down on a tablet what the universe is to undergo for ages, unless there had been in the soul some breath of divinity, through which he possessed the power of thinking upon and knowing subjects of so vast a kind; so that you are not, Axiochus, changing your existence for death, but for immortality; nor will you have a deprivation of good things, but a still purer enjoyment of them; nor pleasures mixed up with a mortal body, but unmixed with every pain. For you will, when released from this prison, depart thither, where all is without trouble, and moanings, and old age, and life is a calm, and with no taste of ill, and where in a mild atmosphere of unruffled tranquility you will dwell, looking round upon Nature, and

acting the philosopher not before a mob and a theatre, but in the presence of Truth, blooming around.

Axiochus/ You have by your discourse brought me round to a contrary point. For I have no longer a fear of death, but already a desire to say myself, in imitation of the orators, something still more; and for a long time I have been thinking upon things on high, and I will go through the eternal and divine course, since after my weakness I have collected my strength and am become a new man.

Socrates/ Hear too, if you are willing, another account which Gobryas related to me—a man of the Magi, who said that during the expedition of Xerxes, his grandfather, who was his namesake, was sent to Delos to watch over the island, where the two deities presided, according to some brazen tablets, that Opis and Hecaergus had brought from the Hyperboreans; and that he learnt that after the soul was released from the body, it departed to the uncertain spot, and some dwelling under ground, where is the royal palace of Pluto, not less than the hall of Zeus, inasmuch as the earth possesses the middle portion of the world, and the pole of heaven is spherical; of which the gods of heaven have obtained by lot one portion of the hemisphere, and the gods below the other, being some of them brothers, and others the children of brothers; and that the gates before the road to Pluto's domain are fast bound by iron locks and keys; and that the river Acheron receives him, who has opened them, and, after it, Cocytus, both of which it is necessary for him to pass over, and to be led to Minos and Rhadamanthus, where is what is called the plain of Truth. There are they seated as judges to sift each of the comers as to what life he had led, and in what pursuits he had dwelt in the body; and that to tell a falsehood is out of his power. On such then as a kind dæmon has breathed during life, these are located in the region of the pious. There without stint the seasons

bloom with every kind of produce, and fountains of pure water flow; and everywhere are meadows made beautiful by flowers of varied hues, and places of discussions for philosophers, and theatres of poets, and cyclic choirs, and the hearing of music, and elegant banquets, and feasts self-furnished, and an unmixed freedom from pain, and a delightful mode of living. Nor is produced there violent cold or heat, but a well-tempered air is diffused around, mixed with the sun's mild beams. There is the seat of honor to those, who have shared in the Mysteries; for they perform together their holy rites even thither. How then is there not to you first a share in the honor, as being of the family of the goddesses? And there is a report that Heracles and Dionysus descended to Hades after having previously shared in the Mysteries here; and that they put on a boldness for the journey thither from the Eleusinian rites. But they, whose life has been passed in a course of evil doings, are driven by the Furies to Erebus and Chaos through Tartarus, where is the region of the impious, and the unfilled urns of the daughters of Danaus, and the thirst of Tantalus, and the entrails of Tityus, and the uncompleted stone of Sisyphus;

To whom begins again his labour's end.

There too are persons licked round by wild beasts, and terrified by the torches of the Furies glaring around them; and enduring every kind of ignominious treatment, they are by eternal punishments worn down. This account did I hear from Gobryas; and you, Axiochus, can decide upon it. For carried along myself by reason I know firmly this alone, that the soul is wholly immortal, and that, when it is removed from this spot, it is there without pain; so that it must needs be, Axiochus, that, if you have lived piously, you will be happy either below or above.

Axiochus/ I am ashamed, Socrates, to say a word. For so far am I from fearing death, that already I feel a desire for it;

so greatly has this beautiful discourse of yours persuaded me, as if it were a heavenly one. And even now I have a contempt for life, as being about to remove to a better home. For the present then I will cast up quietly with myself what has been said; and at mid-day you will be with me, Socrates.

Socrates/ I will do as you say. And for a while I will go back for a walk to Cynosarges, from whence I was sent for hither.

Axiochus

Translated by Jackson P. Hershbell.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Clinias, Axiochus.

Socrates/ While I was on my way to the Cynosarges and getting near the Ilisus, I heard the voice of someone shouting;

Clinias/ "Socrates, Socrates!"

Socrates/ When I turned around to find out where it was coming from, I saw Clinias the son of Axiochus, running toward the Callirhoe, together with Damon the musician, and Charmides the son of Glaucon. (Damon was Clinias' music teacher; Charmides and Clinias were companions, and in love with one another.) So I decided to turn off the main road to meet up with them and get together as quickly as possible. With tears in his eyes, Clinias said:

Clinias/ "Socrates, now's your chance to show off the wisdom they're always saying you have! My father has been unwell for a while, and is near the end of his life; and he's miserable on his deathbed, even though he used to laugh at people who had a phobia about death, and tease them a little. So come and reassure him in your usual way, so that he may meet his fate without complaining, and so that I and the rest of the family can also perform the proper rituals."

Socrates/ "Well, Clinias, you won't find me refusing such a reasonable request, especially since what you ask involves religion. Let's go; if that's the situation, speed is essential."

Clinias/ "Just seeing you, Socrates, will revive him; in fact he's often before managed to rally from this condition."

Socrates/ After hurrying along the wall to the Itonian gates—he lived near the gates by the Amazon column—we found that Axiochus had already collected his senses and was

strong in body, though weak in spirit, very much in need of consolation, sobbing and groaning, again and again, as well as weeping and clapping his hands. I looked down at him and said:

"Axiochus, what's all this? Where's your former self-confidence, and your constant praise of manly virtues, and that unshakable courage of yours? You're like a feeble athlete who put on a brave show in training exercises and lost the actual contest! Consider who you are—a man of such an advanced age, who listens to reason, and, if nothing else, an Athenian! —don't you realize that life is a kind of sojourn in a foreign land (indeed, that's a commonplace, on everybody's lips), and that those who have led a decent life should go to meet their fate cheerfully, almost singing a paean of praise? Being so faint-hearted and unwilling to be torn from life is childish and inappropriate for someone old enough to think for himself."

Axiochus/ "True enough, Socrates, I think you're right. And yet, somehow or other, now that I'm very close to that awful moment, all those powerful and impressive arguments mysteriously lose their strength and I can't take them seriously; and a certain fear remains which assails my mind in various forms: that I will lose this light of day and these good things, and will lie somewhere or other, unseen and forgotten, rotting, and turning into maggots and wild beasts."

Socrates/ "In your distraction, Axiochus, you're confusing sensibility with insensibility, without realizing it. What you say and do involves internal self-contradiction; you don't realize that you're simultaneously upset by your loss of sensations and pained by your decay and the loss of your pleasures—as if by dying you entered into another life, instead of lapsing into the utter insensibility that existed before your birth. Just as during the government of Draco or Cleisthenes there was nothing bad at all that concerned you (because you

did not exist then for it to concern you), nor will anything bad happen to you after your death (because you will not exist later for it to concern you).

"Away, then, with all such nonsense! Keep this in mind: once the compound is dissolved and the soul has been settled in its proper place, the body which remains, being earthly and irrational, is not the human person. For each of us is a soul, an immortal living being locked up in a mortal prison; and Nature has fashioned this tent for suffering—its pleasures are superficial, fleeting, and mixed with many pains; but its pains are undiluted, long-lasting, and without any share of pleasure. And while the soul is forced to share with the sense organs their diseases and inflammations and the other internal ills of the body (since it is distributed among its pores), it longs for its native heavenly aether, nay, thirsts after it, striving upwards in hopes of feasting and dancing there. Thus being released from life is a transition from something bad to something good."

Axiochus/ "Well, Socrates, if you think that living is bad, why do you remain alive? Especially since you puzzle your brain about these things and you're much cleverer than most of us."

Socrates/ "Axiochus, you don't give a true account of me; you think, like most Athenians, that just because I'm an inquirer I'm also an expert on something. I wish I knew these ordinary things, so far am I from knowing the extraordinary ones! My remarks are but echoes of the wise Prodicus, some purchased for half a drachma, others for two, and still others for four. (That fellow teaches nobody for free and is always repeating the saying of Epicharmus: "One hand washes the other"—give something and take something.) Anyway, just recently he gave a performance at the house of Callias son of Hipponicus, in which he denounced living, so much so that I

came within a hair's-breadth of writing it off; and since then, Axiochus, my soul has wanted to die."

Axiochus/ "What did he have to say?"

Socrates/ "I'll tell you what I remember: What part of a lifetime is without its portion of misery? Doesn't the baby begin his life in pain, and cry from the first moment of birth? Certainly he lacks no occasion for suffering; hunger and thirst and cold and heat and hard knocks distress him, and he can't yet say what the problem is; crying is his only way of expressing discomfort. When he reaches the age of seven, after having endured much physical pain, he is set upon by tyrannical tutors, teachers, and trainers; and as he grows older there are scholars, mathematicians and military instructors, all a great crowd of despots. When he is enrolled among the Ephebes there is the Commander, and fear of beatings; then comes the Lyceum and the Academy and the gymnasium-masters with their canings and excessive punishments; and his entire youth is spent under Supervisors of Young Men and the Committee for Young Men of the Council of the Areopagus.

"After he's free of all that, worries immediately steal upon him, and considerations about his career in life present themselves to him. And the earlier troubles seem like child's play, the bogey-men of babies, so to speak, compared with the later ones: military campaigns, wounds, and constant battles.

"Then old age creeps upon you unawares, into which flows everything in nature that is mortal and life-threatening. And unless you repay your life quickly, like a debt, nature stands by like a money-lender, taking security, sight from one man, hearing from another, and often both. And if you survive that, you'll be paralyzed, mutilated, crippled. Some people are physically in their prime in great old age—and their old minds enter a second childhood.

“And that is why the gods, who understand the human condition, give a quick release from life to those they hold in highest regard. For example, Agamedes and Trophonius, who built the temple of the Pythian god, after praying for the best thing that might happen to them, fell asleep and never woke up. And there were also the sons of the Argive priestess, for whom their mother likewise prayed for some reward from Hera for their piety, since when the team of mules was late they yoked themselves to the cart and took her to the temple; that night after their mother’s prayer they passed away.

“It would take too long to go through the works of the poets, who prophesy with inspired voices the events of life while deploring life itself.

I shall quote only one of them, the most important one, who said;

> Such is the way the gods spun life for unfortunate mortals,
> that we live in unhappiness.

and;

> Since among all creatures that breathe on earth and crawl on it
> there is not anywhere a thing more dismal than man is.

“And what does he say about Amphiaraus?

> Whom Zeus of the aegis loved in his heart, as did Apollo,
> with every favor, but he never came to the doorsill of old age.

“And he who bids us, ‘Sing a dirge for the newly born; he faces so much misery’—what do you think of that? But I’ll stop now, so as not to break my promise and lengthen my speech by mentioning other examples.

“What pursuit or trade has anyone ever chosen without criticizing it and chafing at its conditions? Shall we discuss the jobs of tradesmen and laborers, toiling from dawn to dusk,

barely able to provide for their needs, deploring their lot and spoiling all their sleepless nights with lamentation and tears? Well, shall we talk about the job of the merchant, who sails through so many perils and is, as Bias has shown, neither among the dead nor the living: terrestrial man throws himself into the sea as if he were amphibious, and is entirely at the mercy of chance. Well, is farming a pleasant occupation? Really! Isn't it just one big blister, as they say, which always finds an excuse for pain? Now it's drought, now it's too much rain, now it's blight, now it's too much heat or frost, that makes the farmer weep.

"Well, how about highly respected politics? (I'm skipping over many cases.) How many dreadful things is it dragged through, feverishly quivering and throbbing, sometimes with joy, sometimes with painful failure, worse than a thousand deaths? How could anyone be happy living for the masses, when he is whistled for and lashed, like the electorate's pet horse, driven from office, jeered, fined, and killed? Well then, Mr. Politician Axiochus, how did Miltiades die? How did Themistocles die? How did Ephialtes die? How did the ten commanders recently die, when I refused to refer the question to the people? didn't think it was proper for me to preside over a mad mob, yet on the next day the party of Theramenes and Callixenus suborned the presiding officers of the meeting and secured a condemnation against the men without a trial. Indeed, you and Euryptolemus were the only ones to defend them, of the thirty thousand citizens in the Assembly."

Axiochus/ "That's quite right, Socrates, and since then I've had enough of the speaker's platform, and I think that nothing is more irksome than politics. That's clear to everyone involved. You speak, of course, as a distant observer, but those of us who go through the experience know it perfectly well. The electorate, my dear Socrates, is an ungrateful, fickle, cruel, malicious, and boorish thing: a club, so to speak, of

violent fools, drawn from the rabble in the street. And he who associates himself with it is even more contemptible by far."

Socrates/ "Well, Axiochus, since you regard the most reputable calling of all as more to be rejected than all the others, what are we to think of life's other pursuits? Shall we not escape from them?

"Once I also heard Prodicus say that death concerns neither the living nor those who have passed away."

Axiochus/ "What do you mean, Socrates?"

Socrates/ "As far as the living are concerned, death does not exist; and the dead do not exist. Therefore death is of no concern to you now, for you are not dead, nor, if something should happen to you, will it concern you, for you will not exist. To be upset for Axiochus, about what neither does nor will concern Axiochus, is pointless distress, just as if you were to be upset about Scylla, or the Centaur, which, as far as you're concerned, neither exist now, nor will exist later, after your death. What is fearful exists for those who exist; how could it exist for those who don't?"

Axiochus/ "You've taken those clever ideas from the nonsense that everybody's talking nowadays, like all this tomfoolery dreamed up for youngsters. But it distresses me to be deprived of the goods of life, even if you marshal arguments more persuasive than those, Socrates. My mind doesn't understand them and is distracted by the fancy talk; they go in one ear and out the other; they make for a splendid parade of words, but they miss the mark. My suffering is not relieved by ingenuity; it's satisfied only by what can come down to my level."

Socrates/ "That's because, Axiochus, you're confusing the perception of fresh evils with the deprivation of goods, without realizing it, forgetting that you will have died. What distresses someone who is deprived of good things is having them

replaced by bad things, and someone who doesn't exist cannot even conceive of the deprivation. How could anyone feel distress whose condition provides no awareness of anything distressing? If you hadn't started out, Axiochus, by ignorantly supposing, somehow or other, that the dead also have some sensation, you could never have been alarmed by death. But in fact you refute yourself; because you're afraid to be deprived of your soul, you invest this deprivation with a soul of its own; and you dread the absence of perception, but you think you will perceptually grasp this perception that is not to be.

"As well as many other fine arguments for the immortality of the soul, a mortal nature would surely not have risen to such lofty accomplishments that it disdains the physical superiority of wild animals, traverses the seas, builds cities, establishes governments, and looks up at the heavens and sees the revolutions of the stars, the courses of sun and moon, their risings and settings, their eclipses and swift restorations, the twin equinoxes and solstices, and Pleiades storms, summer winds, torrential downpours, and the violent course of tornadoes, and establishes for all eternity a calendar of the states of the universe, unless there really were some divine spirit in the soul which gives it comprehension and insight into such vast subjects.

"And so, Axiochus, you pass away, not into death, but into immortality, nor will you have good things taken from you, but a purer enjoyment of them, nor pleasures mixed with the mortal body, but entirely undiluted by pains. For once you are released from this prison cell, you will set forth yonder, to a place free from all struggle, grief, and old age, a tranquil life untroubled by anything bad, resting in undisturbed peace, surveying Nature and practicing philosophy, not for a crowd of spectators, but in the bountiful midst of Truth."

Axiochus/ "Your argument has converted me to the opposite point of view. I no longer have any fear of death—I

almost long for it, if I may imitate the orators and use a hyperbole. I have traveled the upper regions for ages past and shall complete the eternal and divine circuit. I was being weak, but I've got a grip on myself and become a new man."

Socrates/ "Then perhaps you'd like another argument, which was related to me by Gobryas, a Persian sage: he said that his grandfather Gobryas (who, when Xerxes made his crossing, was sent to Delos to guard the island sanctuary where two deities were born) learned from some bronze tablets, which Opis and Hecaerge had brought from the Hyperboreans, that the soul, after its release from the body, goes to the Place Unseen, to a dwelling beneath the earth. Here the palace of Pluto is not inferior to the court of Zeus, since the earth occupies the center of the universe and the vault of heaven is spherical, and half of this sphere fell to the celestial gods, and the other half to the gods under the earth, some of them brothers, others children of brothers. The gates on the way to Pluto's palace are protected by iron bolts and bars. When the gates swing open, the river Acheron, and then the river Cocytus, receives those who are to be ferried across to Minos and Rhadamanthus, in what is called the Plain of Truth. There sit judges who interrogate everyone who arrives about what kind of life he has lived and what sorts of activities he engaged in while he dwelled in his body. It is impossible to lie.

"Now those who were inspired by a good daemon during their lifetimes go to reside in a place for the pious, where the ungrudging seasons teem with fruits of every kind, where fountains of pure water flow, where all sorts of meadows bloom with many kinds of flowers, with philosophers discoursing, poets performing, dances in rings, musical concerts, delightful drinking-parties and self-furnished feasts, undiluted freedom from pain and a rich diet of pleasure; nor

does fierce cold or heat ever occur, but through it wafts a temperate breeze, infused with the gentle rays of the sun.

"There is a certain place of honor for those who are initiated, and there they perform their sacred rites. Why should you not be the first in line for this privilege, you who are 'kin to the gods'? Legend tells us that Heracles and Dionysus, before their descents into the realm of Hades, were initiated in this world, and supplied by the Eleusinian goddess with courage for their journeys yonder.

"But those who have wasted their lives in wickedness are led by the Erinyes to Erebus and Chaos through Tartarus, where there is a place for the impious, and the ceaseless water-fetching of the Danaids, the thirst of Tantalus, the entrails of Tityus eternally devoured and regenerated, and the never-resting stone of Sisyphus, whose end of toil is a new beginning. Here, too, are people being licked clean by wild beasts, set on fire constantly by the Avengers, and, tortured with every kind of torture, consumed by everlasting punishment.

"That is what I heard from Gobryas, but you must decide for yourself, Axiochus. I am moved by argument, and I know only this for sure: every soul is immortal, and also, when removed from this place, free from pain. So whether above or below, Axiochus, you ought to be happy, if you have lived piously."

Axiochus/ "I'm too embarrassed to say anything to you, Socrates. I'm so far from fearing death that now I actually passionately desire it. That's how much I've been affected by this argument, as well as by the one about the heavens. Now I despise life, since I'm moving to a better home.

"And now I'd like to go over what you've said, quietly and by myself. But after midday, Socrates, please visit me."

Socrates/ “I will do what you ask. And now I’ll go back to my walk to the Cynosarges, where I was going when I was summoned here.”

Clitopho.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates And Clitopho.

Socrates/ A certain person has lately told me that Clitopho, the son of Aristonymus, has been conversing with Lysias, and blaming the passing the time with Socrates, but been praising immoderately the intercourse with Thrasymachus.

Clitophon/ Whoever he was, Socrates, he has not accurately related to you the conversation I had with Lysias about you. For in some things indeed I did not praise you, but in others I did. But since you are evidently blaming me, although you pretend to care nothing about the matter, I will most willingly go through the conversation myself, especially since we happen to be alone, in order that you may the less imagine that I am ill disposed towards you. For now perhaps you have not heard correctly; so that you appear to be more harshly disposed towards me than is fitting. But if you will grant me the liberty of speech I shall most cheerfully accept it, and am willing to speak.

Socrates/ Nay it would be disgraceful for myself, when you are willing to benefit me, not to bear with you. For it is evident that, when I know in what respect I am better and worse, I shall pursue some things, and avoid others, to the utmost of my power.

Clitophon/ You shall hear then. For while I am with you, Socrates, I am often astonished on hearing you; and you appear to me, as compared with other men, to speak most beautifully, when, reproving men, you exclaim like a god upon a machine—“Whither are ye borne along? And—Are ye

ignorant, that ye are doing nothing that ye ought, ye, who make every exertion how ye may get money, but neglect your children, to whom ye are to leave it, and the means whereby they may know how to use it justly; and do not find for them teachers of justice, if indeed it can be taught, and who, if it is to be made the subject of meditation and exercise, may sufficiently exercise them in it. Nor yet do ye previously attend to yourselves; but, seeing that both ye and your children have learnt sufficiently grammar, and music, and the gymnastic arts, which ye have considered as the perfect discipline of virtue, yet afterwards that ye become no less depraved with respect to riches, why do ye not despise the present mode of education, and seek after those, who will cause you to cease from this illiberal line of life? And yet it is through this neglect of what is right, and indolence, and not through the foot being out of time with the lyre, that brother himself arrays himself against brother, and states against states, and, out of all measure and harmony, are stirring up strife and war upon each other, and do and suffer the extreme of ill. But ye say, that they, who are unjust, are unjust not through the want of instruction, nor through ignorance, but voluntarily; and again, ye dare to assert that injustice is disgraceful and hateful to the gods. How then can anyone voluntarily choose so great an evil? He does so ye say, through being conquered by pleasure. Is not this then an involuntary act, since to conquer is a voluntary one? So that reason perfectly convinces us, that to act unjustly is involuntary; and that every man privately, and all cities publicly, ought to pay more attention than they do at present to their conduct."

When therefore, Socrates, I hear you perpetually Speaking so, I am greatly delighted with you, and pay you in a wonderful manner the tribute of praise. And when you Say what follows in order upon this, that they, who cultivate

their bodies, but neglect their soul, do something different of this kind, in neglecting that which is to govern, but busily attending to what is to be governed; and when you assert that it is better for him, who does not know how to use a thing, to leave alone the use of it; for if a person does not know how to use his eyes or ears, or his whole body, it is better for him not to hear, nor see, nor to use his body for any need, than to use it in any way; and in a similar manner with respect to art. For it is evident as you say that he, who does not know how to use his own lyre, will not know how to use that of his neighbor; nor will he, who knows not how to use the lyre of others, know how to use his own, nor any other instrument or chattel whatever; and this your discourse ended beautifully by inferring, that for him, who does not know how to use his soul, it is better to be at rest with respect to his soul, and not to live, than to live and act according to his own caprice; but, if there is any necessity for such a person to live, that it is better for him to lead the life of a slave, than of a freeman. For that this is to deliver the rudder of the mind, like that of a ship, to another, who has learnt the art of governing men; which, Socrates, you have often called the statesman's art, and said it is the same as that of the judge and justice. To these, and many other and very beautiful reasonings, in which it is asserted that virtue can be taught, and that a person ought above all things to pay attention to himself, I have scarcely at any time said a word in opposition, nor do I think that I shall ever say. For I deem them to be very exhortatory and useful, and really awakening us, as if we were asleep. I have therefore given my mind to them, as one about to hear what is to follow; and I have asked at first, not yourself, Socrates, but your equals in age, or fellow-thinkers, or friends, or in whatever name one must call the party thus disposed towards you. For among them, I have first of all asked those, who are thought

by you to be something, by inquiring what would be the discourse after this; and laying down a subject after your manner, I have said to them—How are we to receive for the present, O best of men, the exhortation of Socrates to virtue? as being merely a word, but that it is not in our power to follow it up in deed, and to comprehend it thoroughly? And will this be our employment through the whole of life, to exhort those who have not been exhorted as yet? and for them to exhort others? Or is it requisite for us after this to inquire of Socrates and each other, since we confess that this should be done, what is to come next? How, say we, ought we to begin the discipline relating to justice? As if someone had exhorted us to pay attention to the body, on perceiving that we, like boys, had no notion that the care of the body belongs to the gymnastic and medical arts, and afterwards reproached us by saying, that it was disgraceful to pay every attention to wheat and barley, and vines, and such other things as we labor to Obtain for the sake of the body, but that we search after no art or device, so that the body may be rendered in the best condition, and this too when there is such an art. If then we inquired of the person so exhorting us—Do you say there are such arts as these? perhaps he would say, There are the gymnastic and medical arts. And what now, we said, is the art that relates to the virtue of the soul? Let it be mentioned. But he, who seemed to be of the greatest strength for giving an answer to these questions, said to myself, that the very art, which you have heard Socrates mention, is no other than justice. And on my saying—Tell me not merely the name of the art, but explain it further in this way. There is an art called the medical. By this two things are effected; one, that physicians are always forming other physicians in addition to those already existing; the other, to effect health. Now of these one is no longer an art, but the work of the art, which teaches and is

taught, which we call health. And in the case of carpentry, there is the building and the art; one the effect, and the other the teaching. So too of justice, one part is to make persons just, as each of the arts mentioned above makes artists. But what shall we say is the other work, which a just man is able to do for us? State it. One person has, I think, said in answer to us, that it is "the conducive;" another, that it is "the becoming;" another, that it is "the useful;" and another, that it is "the profitable." But I rejoined by saying, that these very names exist in each of the arts, namely, to act rightly, profitably, usefully, and the like. But that, to which all these tend, each art will state itself. Thus, the art of carpentry will say, that "the right," "the beautiful," "the becoming," tend to this, that wooden furniture may be aptly made; which is not art, but the work of art. Let in like manner be mentioned the work of justice. At last one of your friends, Socrates, who appeared to speak most elegantly, answered me, that this was the work peculiar to justice, which does not belong to any other science, namely, to cause a friendship amongst states. But he, on the other hand, on being interrogated, said that friendship was a good, and by no means an evil. But on being asked about the friendships of boys and of wild animals, for by that name we call their attachments, he did not admit that they are friendships; for it happened that such friendships of theirs were for the greater part hurtful rather than advantageous; and that those, who call them so, call them falsely; but that friendship existing really and truly was most clearly an union of sentiment. But on being asked whether he meant by an union of sentiment, an agreement in opinion or science, he repudiated the agreement in opinion; for many and hurtful agreements in opinion are compelled to take place amongst men; but he conceded that friendship was entirely a good, and the work of justice; so that he said, an agreement in sentiment was the same as

science really existing, but not opinion. But when we were at this part of our discourse, the parties present being in a state of doubt were competent to find fault with him, and to say, that the reasoning had run round to the point first mooted; and they affirmed that the medical art is a certain agreement in sentiment; and so are all the other arts; and that they are able to state about what they are conversant; but that the art called by you justice, or an agreement in sentiment, it had escaped them as to whither it tends, and that it is not manifest what is its work. At last I inquired of yourself, Socrates, upon these points; and you told me that it is the work of justice to injure enemies, and benefit friends; but afterwards it appeared to you, that the just man will never injure anyone, but will act to the advantage of everyone in all things. Having endured this not once, nor even twice, but for a length of time, and being urgent with you, Socrates, I was tired out; thinking, indeed, that you effected in the best manner of all men, the exhortation to the study of virtue; but that one of two things must take place, either that you are able to effect thus much alone, but nothing further—which might happen in the case of any other art—as, for instance, that he who is not a pilot, may exercise himself in praising the pilot's art, as a thing of great value to man; and similarly in the case of other arts—so a person may perhaps apply the same remark on the subject of justice to yourself, as not having a greater knowledge than others of its nature, because you praise it in a beautiful manner. Such however is not my opinion, but as I say, one of two things take place; either that you do not know what justice is, or that you are unwilling to impart the knowledge of it to me. On this account then, I think I shall go to Thrasymachus, and wherever else I can, as being in doubt, and where I hope I shall be freed from doubts; nor should I betake myself elsewhere, if you were willing to finish your

exhortatory discourses to me. Now, for instance, if I had been exhorted on the subject of the gymnastic art, that I ought not to neglect the body, you would state to me what comes next after the exhortation-speech, what is the nature of my body, and what attention it requires. And let this be done at present. Lay it down then that Clitopho acknowledges it to be ridiculous to pay attention to other things, but to neglect the soul, for the sake of which we labor in other things; and imagine that I have really spoken upon all other points, next in order to those, which I have just now gone through. I beg of you not to act in any respect otherwise, that I may not hereafter, as at present, partly praise you before Lysias and the rest, and blame you likewise in part. For I will say, Socrates, that you are worth everything to the man, who is not yet exhorted; but to him who has been exhorted, you are nearly an impediment to his arriving at the end of virtue, and becoming happy.

Clitophon

Translated by Francisco J. Gonzalez.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates And Clitophon.

Socrates/ We have recently been informed that Clitophon the son of Aristonymos, in discussion with Lysias, has been criticizing the conversations and speeches of Socrates, while greatly praising the instruction of Thrasymachus.

Clitophon/ Whoever told you that, Socrates, misrepresented what I said to Lysias about you. Though it's true that I didn't praise you for some things, I did praise you for others. Since you're obviously scolding me right now, though you're pretending you don't care, I'd be very glad to tell you myself what I said—especially since we happen to find ourselves alone—so you won't so readily suppose that I have anything against you. In fact, you probably didn't hear the truth, which is why I think you're being needlessly hard on me. So if you'd let me speak freely, I'd gladly do so—I want to tell you what I said.

Socrates/ By all means; it would be shameful for me not to submit to you when your intention is to help me; for clearly, once I know my good and bad points, I will make it my practice to pursue and develop the former while ridding myself of the latter to the extent that I am able.

Clitophon/ Listen, then. Socrates, when I was associating with you I was often struck with amazement by what you said. You appeared to me to rise above all other men with your magnificent speeches when you reproached mankind and, like a god suspended above the tragic stage, chanted the following refrain:

O mortals, whither are you borne? Do you not realize that you are doing none of the things you should?! You men spare no pains in procuring wealth for yourselves, but you neither see to it that your sons, to whom you are leaving this wealth, should know how to use it justly, nor do you find them teachers of justice (if justice can be taught), nor anybody to exercise and train them adequately (if it is acquired by exercise and training)—nor indeed have you started by undergoing such treatment yourselves!

But when you see that you and your children have had a thorough education in grammar, gymnastics and the arts—which you consider to be a complete education in virtue—and that you still have turned out to be no good at using wealth, how can you fail to despise our present education, and seek those who will rescue you from this lack of culture?! Yet it is this dissonance, this carelessness, not dancing the wrong measures to the lyre, that makes measure and harmony disappear between brother and brother, city and city, as they oppose each other, clash and fight, inflicting and suffering the utmost horrors of war.

You say that men are unjust because they want to be, not because they are ignorant or uneducated. But then you have the effrontery to say, on the other hand, that injustice is shameful and hateful to the gods. Well, then, how could anyone willingly choose such an evil?! "Perhaps he is defeated by pleasure," you say. But isn't this defeat involuntary if conquering is voluntary?

Thus every way you look at it, the argument shows that injustice is involuntary, and that every man privately and every city publicly must devote to this matter greater care than is presently the norm.

When, Socrates, I hear you say such things time and time again, I'm very impressed and I praise you to the skies; and

also when you go on to the next point, that those who discipline the body while neglecting the soul are doing something else of the same sort, neglecting that which should rule while busying themselves with that which should be ruled; and also when you say that it's better to leave unused what you don't know how to use: if someone doesn't know how to use his eyes or his ears or his whole body, it would be better for him not to use it all, whether for seeing or hearing or anything else, rather than use it in some haphazard way. In fact, the same applies to skills; for someone who doesn't know how to use his own lyre will hardly be able to use his neighbor's lyre, nor will someone who doesn't know how to use the lyre of others be capable of using his own lyre, nor any other instrument or possession whatsoever. Your speech delivers a wonderful coup de grace when it concludes that someone who doesn't know how to use his soul is better off putting his soul to rest and not living at all rather than leading a life in which his actions are based on nothing but personal whim. If for some reason he must live, it would be better for such a man to live as a slave than to be free, handing over the rudder of his mind, like that of a ship, to somebody else who knows that skill of steering men which you, Socrates, often call politics, the very same skill, you say, as the judicial skill and justice.

I dare say I never objected nor, I believe, ever will object to these arguments, nor to many other eloquent ones like them, to the effect that virtue is teachable and that more care should be devoted to one's self than to anything else. I consider them to be extremely beneficial and extremely effective in turning us in the right direction; they can really rouse us as if we'd been sleeping. I was therefore very interested in what would come next after such arguments; at first I asked not you, Socrates, but your companions and fellow enthusiasts, or friends, or whatever we should call their relationship to you.

And I first questioned those who are thought by you to be really something; I asked them what argument would come next and put my case to them in a style somewhat like your own: O you most distinguished gentlemen, what are we actually to make of Socrates' exhorting of us to pursue virtue? Are we to believe that this is all there is, and that it is impossible to pursue the matter further and grasp it fully? Will this be our life-long work, simply to convert to the pursuit of virtue those who have not yet been converted so that they in turn may convert others? Even if we agree that this is what a man should do, should we not also ask Socrates, and each other, what the next step is? How should we begin to learn what justice is? What do we say?

It's as if we were children with no awareness of the existence of such things as gymnastics and medicine, and somebody saw this and exhorted us to take care of our bodies and reproached us, saying that it's shameful that we devote such care to cultivating wheat, barley, vines and all the other things which we work hard to acquire for the sake of the body, while we fail to discover any skill or other means of making the body itself as good as possible, even though such skills exist. Now, if we were to ask the man who gave us this exhortation, "Which skills are you talking about?," he would presumably reply, "Gymnastics and medicine." Now what about us? What do we say is the skill which concerns the virtue of the soul? Let's have an answer.

The man who appeared the most formidable among your companions answered these questions by telling me that this skill is "the very skill which you hear Socrates talking about, namely, justice itself." Then I said, "Don't just give me the name; try it this way. Medicine is surely a kind of skill. It has two results: it produces other doctors in addition to those who are already doctors, and it produces health. Of these, the second result is not itself a skill, but rather the product of a

skill, the product we call 'health'; the skill itself is what teaches and what's taught. Likewise, carpentry has as its results a house and carpentry itself; the first is the product while the second is what's taught. Let's assume that one result of justice is also to produce just men, just as in the case of each of the skills a goal is to produce men with that skill—but what, then, are we to call the other thing, the product which the just man produces for us? Tell me."

He, I think, replied, "the beneficial," somebody else said, "the appropriate," someone else, "the useful" and someone else, "the advantageous." But returned to the point and said, "All those words, such as 'acting correctly', 'advantageously', 'usefully' and the like, are to be found in each of the skills as well. When asked, however, what these all aim at, each skill will mention some product peculiar to itself. So, for example, when carpentry uses the words 'well', 'properly' and 'appropriately', it is speaking of the production of wooden artifacts, which are products distinct from the skill itself. What, then, is the peculiar product of justice? Give me that sort of answer."

Finally, Socrates, one of your friends answered—and he really seemed quite clever in saying this—that the product peculiar to justice and not shared by any of the other skills is to produce friendship within cities. When questioned, he said that friendship is always good and never bad. When questioned further, he wouldn't allow that what we call the "friendships" of children and animals are really friendships, since he was led to the conclusion that such relationships are more often harmful than good. So in order to avoid saying that this is true of friendship, he claimed that these relationships are not friendships at all and that those who call them that are wrong; instead, real and true friendship is most precisely agreement. When asked whether he considered this agreement to be shared belief or knowledge, he rejected the

former suggestion since he was forced to admit that many men's shared beliefs are harmful, whereas he had agreed that friendship is entirely good and is the product of justice; so he said that agreement is the same, being knowledge, not belief.

Now by the time we reached this point in the argument, having really made no progress, the bystanders were able to take him to task and say that the argument had gone around in a circle back to where it began.

"Medicine too," they said, "is a sort of agreement, as is every skill, and they all can say what they're about. But what you call 'justice' and 'agreement' has no idea what it's aiming at, and so it's not clear what its product could be."

So, Socrates, finally I asked you yourself these questions and you told me that the aim of justice is to hurt one's enemies and help one's friends. But later it turned out that the just man never harms anyone, since everything he does is for the benefit of all.

When I had endured this disappointment, not once or twice but a long time, I finally got tired of begging for an answer. I came to the conclusion that while you're better than anyone at turning a man towards the pursuit of virtue, one of two things must be the case: either this is all you can do, nothing more—as might happen with any other skill, for example, when someone who's not a pilot rehearses a speech in praise of the pilot's skill as being something of great worth to men; the same could also be done for any other skill. And someone might accuse you of being in the same position with justice, that your ability to praise it so well does not make you any more knowledgeable about it. Now that's not my own view, but there are only two possibilities: either you don't know it, or you don't wish to share it with me.

And this is why, I suppose, I go to Thrasymachus and to anyone else I can: I'm at a loss. But if you're finally ready to

stop exhorting me with speeches—I mean, if it had been about gymnastics that you were exhorting me, saying that I must not neglect my body, you would have proceeded to give me what comes next after such an exhortation, namely, an explanation of the nature of my body and of the particular kind of treatment this nature requires—that's the kind of thing you should do now.

Assume that Clitophon agrees with you that it's ridiculous to neglect the soul itself while concerning ourselves solely with what we work hard to acquire for its sake. Suppose now that I have also said all the other things which come next and which I just went through. Then, please, do as I ask and I won't praise you before Lysias and others for some things while criticizing you for others, as I do now. For I will say this, Socrates, that while you're worth the world to someone who hasn't yet been converted to the pursuit of virtue, to someone who's already been converted you rather get in the way of his attaining happiness by reaching the goal of virtue.

The Clitopho.

Translated by Taylor, Thomas.

Persons of the Dialog.

SOCRATES and CLITOPHO.

Socrates/ A certain person lately informed me that Clitopho, the son of Aristonymus, conversing with Lysias, blamed the pursuits of Socrates, but praised immoderately the conversation of Thrasymachus.

Clitophon/ Whoever he was, Socrates, he has not accurately related to you my discourse with Lysias about you. For in some things I did not praise you, but in others I did. But since you evidently blame me, though you pretend to care nothing about this report, I will most willingly relate to you my conversation with Lysias, especially since we happen to be alone, that you may see I am not so ill disposed towards you as you might be induced to suppose. For now perhaps you have not rightly heard, and on that account are more exasperated with me than is proper. But if you will permit me to speak freely, I shall most cheerfully relate the affair to you.

Socrates/ But it would be shameful, when you are willing to benefit me, that I should not suffer you. For it is evident that when I know in what respect I am better and worse, I shall pursue some things, and avoid others, to the utmost of my power.

Clitophon/ Hear then. For when I am with you, Socrates, I am often astonished on hearing you discourse, and you appear to me, compared with other men, to speak most beautifully, when reproving men, you exclaim like a god from a tragic machine, “Whither are you borne along? Of this you are ignorant, and your conduct is in no respect becoming.

For all your attention is employed in the acquisition of wealth; but you neglect the children to whom you are to leave it, and are not at all anxious that they may know how to use it justly; nor that they may acquire this knowledge, do you procure for them teachers of justice, if justice can be taught, and who may sufficiently exercise them in it, if it is to be obtained by meditation and exercise. Nor yet, prior to this, do you thus cultivate your own minds: but perceiving that you and your children have sufficiently learnt grammar, music, and gymnastic (which you consider as the perfect discipline of virtue), though afterwards you are no less depraved with respect to riches than before, yet you do not despise the present mode of education, nor inquire after those who might liberate you from this unskillful and inelegant condition of life. Though through this confusion and indolence, and not through the discordant motion of the foot to the lyre, brother rises against brother, and city against city, immoderately and unharmoniously; and warring on each other, both do and suffer all that is lawless and dire. But you say, that those who are unjust, are unjust voluntarily, and not through want of discipline, nor through ignorance; and again, you dare to assert that injustice is base, and odious to divinity. How then can anyone voluntarily choose this which is so great an evil. It is chosen by him, you say, who is vanquished by pleasure. Is not this therefore involuntary, since to vanquish is voluntary? So that reason perfectly convinces us, that to act unjustly is involuntary. Every man, therefore, privately, and all cities publicly, ought to pay more attention to justice than at present."

When therefore, Socrates, I hear you perpetually asserting these things, I am very much delighted, and praise you in a wonderful manner. This is likewise the case with me, when you say as follows: That those who cultivate their

bodies, but neglect their soul, pay attention to that which is naturally in a state of subjection, but neglect that which governs. Likewise, when you assert that it is better for him who does not know how to use a thing to dismiss the consideration of its utility. And that for him who does not know how to use his eyes, ears, and his whole body, it is better neither to hear, nor see, nor to use his body in any respect, than to use it. In a similar manner too, with respect to art. For it is evident, as you say, that he who does not know how to use his own lyre, will not know how to use that of his neighbor. Nor will he who is ignorant of the use of any other instrument or possession belonging to another, know how to use that which belongs to himself. And, in the last place, you beautifully add, that for him who does not know how to use his soul, it is better to be at rest with respect to his soul, and not to live, than to live and act from himself. But if there is any necessity for such a one to live, that it is better for him to lead the life of a slave, than of one free born. This however is to deliver the helm of the dianoëtic part as of a ship to another, who has learnt how to govern men; viz. who has learnt what you, Socrates, have often called the political science; and which is likewise judicial and justice. To these, and many other all-beautiful sentences, in which you assert that virtue can be taught, and that a man ought above all things to pay attention to himself, I have never at any time been adverse, nor do I think that I ever shall be. For I think that these assertions are most exhortatory and useful, and vehemently excite us, as if we were asleep. I have attended, therefore, as one who is to hear what follows, and I have asked, not you, in the first place, Socrates, but your equals in age, those who have the same desires with you, or your companions, or in whatever manner it may be proper to call those that are thus disposed towards you. For among these I have first of all asked those that are most esteemed

by you, what will be the discourse after this, and proposing to them to dispute after your manner, I have said to them, O best of men, how are we to receive the present exhortation of Socrates to virtue? Are we to receive it as nothing more than an exhortation, and not apply it to practice? But this will be our employment through the whole of life, to exhort those who are not yet incited. Or is it requisite, after this, that we should ask Socrates and each other, since we confess this conduct should be adopted, what is next to be done? How ought we to begin respecting the discipline of justice? For just as if someone should exhort us to pay attention to the body, who like boys do not in any respect perceive that the care of the body is gymnastic and medicinal, and should afterwards reproach us by saying, that we paid every attention to wheat and barley, and such other things as we labor to obtain for the sake of the body, but that we search after no art nor device, by which the body may be rendered in the best condition, though there is such an art, —should anyone thus reproach us, might not we ask him, Do you say there are such arts as these? perhaps he would say that there are, and that these are the gymnastic and medicinal arts. After the same manner, let someone now inform us what that art is which we consider as conversant with the virtue of the soul. But he who appears to be most robust in answering such questions as these, will say, This art which you have heard Socrates mention, is no other than justice. To this I reply, You should not only tell me the name of the art, but thus explain the art itself. Medicine is said to be a certain art. But by this, two things are effected: for physicians are always formed by physicians; and health is produced by medicine. But one of these is no longer art, but the work of the medical art teaching and acquired; and this work we denominate health. After a similar manner, two things are effected by the tectonic art, viz. an edifice, and the

tectonic art, one of which is a work, and the other a document. Thus too, with respect to justice, one of its effects is to make men just, in the same manner as each of the above-mentioned arts makes artists; but what shall we say the other is, which a just man is able to accomplish for us? One person will, I think, answer us, that it is the profitable; another, that it is the becoming; another, that it is the useful; and another, that it is the convenient. But I in answering to this have objected, that these very names are to be found in each of the arts, viz. to act rightly, conveniently, profitably and the like. But that to which all these tend, is the peculiarity of each art. Thus, in the tectonic art, the right, the beautiful, and the becoming, tend to this, that wooden furniture may be aptly made, which is not art, but the work of art. In like manner, let someone answer me, respecting the work of justice. Lastly, one of your associates, Socrates, who appeared to speak most elegantly, answered me that the peculiar work of justice is this, which is not effected by any other science, viz. to produce friendship in cities. But he being again interrogated, replied, that friendship was a thing good, and by no means evil: and being asked respecting the friendships of boys and wild beasts, as we denominate the attachments of these, he would not admit that such attachments should be called friendships, because they more frequently happen to be noxious than good. He likewise said, that they were falsely called friendships, but that real and true friendship was most clearly concord. But being asked whether he called concord agreement in opinion, or science, he despised the former, because there is a necessity that there should be many and noxious agreements in opinion among men; but he had granted that friendship was a thing perfectly good, and the work of justice. So that he said, concord was the same with science, and not with opinion. But when we were

at this part of our discourse, those who were present, doubting the truth of these assertions, called to him, and said, that the discourse revolved to what was at first advanced. Their likewise affirmed that the medicinal art is a certain concord; that this is the case with all the other arts; and that they are able to declare what the subject is with which they are conversant. But with respect to that which is called by you justice, or concord, we know not whither it tends, and it is not manifest what is its work.

Concerning these things, Socrates, I have at length asked you; and you tell me that the work of justice is to injure our enemies, and benefit our friends. But afterwards it appeared to you, that the just man will never injure anyone, but will act to the advantage of everyone in all things. These things have been the subject of discussion, not once, nor twice only; but having assiduously attended you, Socrates, for a long time, I became at length weary; thinking, indeed, that you, in the most excellent manner of all men, exhorted to the study of virtue, but that one of these two things must take place, either that you are able to effect thus much alone, but nothing further, which may happen to be the case respecting any other art; as for instance, he who is not a pilot may endeavor to praise the pilot's art, as a thing most worthy the attention of mankind; and in a similar manner with respect to the other arts. This may perhaps apply to you concerning justice, viz. that you have not a greater knowledge than others of its nature, because you praise it in a beautiful manner. However, I do not think that this is the case. But as I said, one of these two things must take place, either that you do not know what justice is, or that you are unwilling to impart this knowledge to me. On this account, I think I shall betake myself to Thrasymachus, and wherever else I am able, in order that I may be liberated from my doubts. Not indeed, that I should apply to anyone else, if you were willing

to finish your exhortatory discourses to me. I mean, if, as you have exhorted me to that care of the body which belongs to gymnastic, and which it is not proper to neglect, you would unfold to me, after an exhortation of this kind, what the nature is of my body, and what the attention which it requires. Let this be done at present. Take it for granted, that Clitopho acknowledges it to be ridiculous, to pay attention to other things, and in the meantime neglect the soul, for the sake of which we labor in other things; and suppose me to admit everything else which is consequent to this, and which we have now discussed. I request you not to act in any respect otherwise, that I may not be obliged hereafter, as at present, partly to praise and partly to blame you before Lysias and others. For I say, Socrates, that you are inestimably valuable to the man who is not yet exhorted; but that to him who has been exhorted, you are nearly an impediment; since you prevent him from becoming happy, by arriving at the end of virtue.

THE END OF THE CLITOPHO.

Critias.

Translated by A. E. Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

Critias. Timaeus.

Hermocrates. Socrates.

Timaeus/ Well, Socrates, at last I am barely in port after my voyage on the seas of discourse, and with what a sense of relief! I feel like some traveler at the end of a weary journey. So I make it my prayer to the god who has been born but now in our tale, though so long ago in fact, that he will of his grace vouchsafe us retention of what has been spoken to purpose and visit us with the proper penalty for any false note we have unwittingly struck in our treatment of these matters. Now the right penalty is that he who strays from tune should be brought back to it. To the end, then, that our discourses of the making of gods may be rightly uttered hereafter, I call on him to grant us that surest and best of medicines, knowledge, and with this prayer I hand over the further continuance of the tale to Critias, as we agreed I should do.

Critias/ Aye, Timaeus, and I accept the task. But I, too, must once more make the same request you yourself advanced before me. I must crave indulgence on the score of the magnitude of the subject, and I think I have an even better claim than yourself to a still further measure of consideration for what yet remains to be told. To be sure, I am well aware that my request will seem vastly presumptuous and unduly tactless; yet made it must be. What man in his sound senses, indeed, could venture to dispute the excellence of your exposition? What I must try to show, as I can, is that the theme still to be expounded is

more difficult to handle and consequently calls for yet more generous allowances. In fact, Timaeus, upon an audience of human beings it is easier to produce the impression of adequate treatment in speaking of gods than in discoursing of mortals like ourselves. The combination of unfamiliarity and sheer ignorance in an audience makes the task of one who is to treat a subject toward which they are in this state easy in the extreme, and in this matter of gods, we know, of course, how the case stands with us. But to make my meaning still clearer, kindly follow an illustration. All statements made by any of us are, of course, bound to be an affair of imagery and picturing. Now, suppose we consider the ease or difficulty with which an artist's portraiture of figures divine and human, respectively, produces the impression of satisfactory reproduction on the spectator. We shall observe that in the case of earth, mountains, rivers, woodland, the sky as a whole, and the several revolving bodies located in it, for one thing, the artist is always well content if he can reproduce them with some faint degree of resemblance, and, for another, that since our knowledge of such objects is never exact, we submit his design to no criticism or scrutiny, but acquiesce, in these cases, in a dim and deceptive outline. But when it is our own human form that the artist undertakes to depict, daily familiar observation makes us quick to detect shortcomings and we show ourselves severe critics of one who does not present us with full and perfect resemblance. Well, we should recognize that the same is true of discourses. Where the subjects of them are celestial and divine, we are satisfied by mere faint verisimilitudes; where mortal and human, we are exacting critics. So with our present unrehearsed narrative; if we do not succeed in reproducing the proper touches perfectly, allowances should be made. In fact, we ought to understand that to depict

human life impressively is hard, not easy. It is to remind you all of this, Socrates, and to plead for a greater, not a lesser, measure of indulgence for what I am now to relate, that I have made this long speech. If you all feel that my appeal for this favor is justified, pray grant it without demur.

Socrates/ To be sure we will, Critias. What is more, the same favor may be taken as granted by anticipation to Hermocrates after you. For I see plainly enough that by and by, when it comes to his turn to speak, he will make the same request as his precursors. As I would have him cast about for a fresh exordium and not be driven to repeat the old one, he may make his speech with the assurance that consideration is guaranteed him when the time comes. Still, I would warn you, my dear Critias, of the temper of your auditory; the composer who preceded you made a wonderfully favorable impression, and you will need the most generous indulgence if you are to prove equal to succeeding him.

Hermocrates/ That, Socrates, is a warning as much to me as to our friend. Still, Critias, 'faint heart never yet set up trophy,' so you must launch out into your narrative like a man, calling Paean and the Muses to aid you in displaying and lauding the worth of your fellow Athenians of ancient days.

Critias/ Ah, my dear Hermocrates, your post is in the rear rank, under cover of another; that is why your spirits are still undashed. Well, you may very possibly discover what the situation is like for yourself, in the course of events; meanwhile I must, at any rate, follow your encouraging advice and invoke the gods at large, including those you have mentioned, but above all Memory. She is the power on whom the whole fortune of my discourse most depends. If I can only sufficiently recall and repeat the story as it was once told by the priests and brought home to this country by

Solon, I am confident that my present audience will pronounce me to have discharged my task with reasonable credit. Well, I must proceed to the story itself at once, without further delay.

In the very first place, let us remind ourselves that it is in all nine thousand years since a general war, of which we are now to relate the course, was declared between those who dwelt without and those who dwelt within the Pillars of Heracles. The command of the latter was taken, and the war conducted throughout, as the story ran, by our own city; the leaders of the other party were the kings of the island of Atlantis. Atlantis, as you will recollect, was once, we said, an island larger than Libya and Asia together; it has now been engulfed by earthquakes and is the source of the impassable mud which prevents navigators from this quarter from advancing through the straits into the open ocean. As for the mass of the barbarian peoples and the Hellenic communities of those days, the various details will become plain on occasion as the course of the narrative unfolds. But we shall have to begin with a preliminary review of the respective resources and polities of the Athenians of the time and the antagonists against whom the war was waged, and of the two parties we must give the precedence to our own countrymen.

Of old, then, the gods distributed the whole earth by regions, and that without contention. That gods know not their several dues, or if they know them, yet some seek by contention to engross to themselves what more properly belongs to others—these are perverse imaginations. They apportioned to each his own by righteous allotment, settled their territories, and, when they had settled them, fell to feeding us, their bestial and flocks there, as herdsmen do their cattle. Only they would not coerce body with body in the fashion of shepherds who drive their flocks to pasture with

blows; they set the course of the living creature from that part about which it turns most readily, its prow, controlling its soul after their own mind by persuasion as by a rudder, and so moving and steering the whole mortal fabric. Thus diverse gods received diverse districts as their portions and reigned over them. But Hephaestus and Athena, as they had one nature, being brother and sister by the same father, and at one, moreover, in their love of wisdom and artistry, so also obtained one lot in common, this our land, to be a home meet for prowess and understanding. They produced from the soil a race of good men and taught them the order of their polity; their names have been preserved, but their deeds forgotten by reason of the destructions of their successors and the lapse of time. For the remnant of survivors, as has, indeed, been already said, was ever left unlettered among its mountains, and had heard no more than the names of the country's rulers and a few of their deeds. So they were well pleased to give the names to their sons, but as for the virtues and laws of older generations, they knew nothing of them beyond some dim reports, but were, for many generations, themselves and their children, in want of bare necessaries. So they gave their minds to their own needs and made their discourses of them, forgetting the story of faraway early days. For legendary lore and inquiry into ancient things both visit cities in the train of leisure, when they see men already provided with the necessaries of life, and not before. Thus it has come about that the names of the ancients have been preserved without any memorial of their deeds. My warrant for what I say is this. Cecrops, Erechtheus, Erichthonius, Erysichthon, and most of the recorded names before Theseus are, in the main, the very names given, as Solon said, by the priests in their tale of that distant war, as are also the names of the women. And in especial, the figure and image of the goddess, whom they of

old set up in armor, according to the custom of their time, when exercises of war were common to woman and man alike, signify that in all living creatures that company together, female with male, nature ever grants it to both to practice the excellence proper to their kind.

Now, at that time most sorts of citizens who dwelt in this land were busied with handicrafts and tillage of the soil, but the fighting sort had been set apart at the first by godlike men and dwelt by themselves, furnished with all that was proper for their sustenance and training. None of them had any private possession of his own; they looked on all things as the common store of all, seeking to receive from their fellow citizens nothing beyond sufficient sustenance; in short, they followed all the practices we spoke of yesterday when we talked of those feigned guardians. In particular, there is truth and credibility in what we said of the territory, as first that its boundaries were then drawn at the Isthmus and, on the side of the mainland, at the summits of Cithaeron and Parnes, and its borders came down to the sea with Oropia on the right, and the Asopus shut out on the left, and again, that the soil far surpassed all others, which, indeed, is why the district could then maintain a great army exempt from all tasks of husbandry. And here is good evidence of its excellence. The remnant now left of it is a match for any soil in the world in the variety and quality of its harvests and the pasturage it yields to all sorts of cattle. But of old its yield was most copious as well as excellent. What proof is there of this, and why are we right to call it a remnant of the land of those days? It is one long projection running out from the main body of the continent into the open sea, like a headland, and, as we know, the marine basin that borders it is extremely deep. So, while there have been many formidable deluges in the course of the nine thousand years—that is the interval between the date we are

speaking of and the present—the soil washed away from the higher levels in these periodic convulsions does not deposit any notable sediment, as in some other regions, but is regularly carried off and lost in the depths. Consequently that has happened which happens in little islets. By comparison with the original territory, what is left now is, so to say, the skeleton of a body wasted by disease; the rich, soft soil has been carried off and only the bare framework of the district left. At the time we are speaking of these ravages had not begun. Our present mountains were high crests, what we now call the plains of Phelleus were covered with rich soil, and there was abundant timber on the mountains, of which traces may still be seen. For some of our mountains at present will only support trees, but not so very long ago trees fit for the roofs of vast buildings were felled there and the rafters are still in existence. There were also many other lofty cultivated trees which provided unlimited fodder for beasts. Besides, the soil got the benefit of the yearly 'water from Zeus,' which was not lost, as it is today, by running off a barren ground to the sea; a plentiful supply of it was received into the soil and stored up in the layers of nonporous potter's clay. Thus the moisture absorbed in the higher regions percolated to the hollows and so all quarters were lavishly provided with springs and rivers. Even to this day the sanctuaries at their former sources survive to prove the truth of our present account of the country.

This, then, was the natural condition of the district at large, and it had received cultivation such as might be expected from true husbandmen, with no other vocation, who were also lovers of all that is noble and men of admirable natural parts, possessed of an excellent soil, a generous water supply and an eminently temperate climate. As for the town, its plan at that time was as follows.

To begin with, the Acropolis was not then as it is now. At present it has been washed bare of soil by one night of extraordinary floods in which an earthquake and the third terrible deluge before that of Deucalion befell together. But in other and earlier days it was so large that it reached to the Eridanus and Ilissus, enclosing the Pnyx and bounded on the side facing it by Lycabettus; the whole was covered with soil and, save here and there, the surface was level. Without, directly under its slopes, were the dwellings of the craftsmen and the husbandmen who tilled the adjoining fields; higher up the fighting force had its abode by itself round the temple of Athena and Hephaestus, girdled by a single wall, like the garden of one house. On the northern side they had fashioned their common dwelling houses and winter messrooms, with all that was proper for their mode of life in common in the way of buildings for themselves and temples, but no gold nor silver, for they made no use of these metals for any purpose. They aimed at the mean between splendor and meanness, dwelling in decent houses where they grew old, themselves and their children's children, each succeeding generation leaving them to another like itself. As for the southern side, in the summer, as was natural, they forsook their gardens, gymnasiums, and messrooms and used it for these purposes. There was only one fountain, on the site of the present Acropolis. This has been choked by the earthquake and today only shrunken rills remain in the vicinity. Then it provided all with an abundant supply of water equally wholesome in winter and summer. Such was their manner of life, then; they were at once guardians of their fellow citizens and freely followed leaders of the Hellenes at large; the number of both sexes already qualified and still qualified to bear arms they were careful to keep, as nearly as possible, always the same, roughly some twenty thousand.

With such personalities and such a standing method of administering Hellas and their own commonwealth in righteousness, they were famous throughout Europe and Asia alike for the comeliness of their persons and for every virtue of the soul, and had the greatest name of the time. As for the condition and early history of their antagonists, if my memories of the tale I heard as a boy do not play me false, I will now impart the story freely to you as friends.

But before I begin my narrative, I must make a brief explanation, or you may be surprised to hear of so many barbarians with Hellenic names. So I will give you the reason for this. Solon had a fancy to turn the tale to account in his own poetry; so he asked questions about the significance of the names and discovered that the original Egyptian authors of the narrative had translated them into their own speech. In his turn, as he learned the sense of a name, he translated it back again, in his manuscript, into our own language. His actual papers were once in my father's hands, and are in my own, to this day, and I studied them thoroughly in my boyhood. So if you hear names like those of our own countrymen, you must not be surprised; I have given you the explanation. Well, then, the story—and a long story it is—began much in this fashion. As we said before, when we were speaking of the 'lots,' the gods divided the whole earth into lots, some larger, some smaller, and established their temples and sacrifices in them. Poseidon, then, thus receiving as his lot the isle of Atlantis, settled his sons by a mortal woman in a district of it which must now be described. By the sea, in the center of the island, there was a plain, said to have been the most beauteous of all such plains and very fertile, and, again, near the center of this plain, at a distance of some fifty stadia, a mountain which was nowhere of any great altitude. In this mountain lived one of the original earthborn men of that region, named

Evenor, with his wife Leucippe. The pair had an only daughter, Clito, who was just husband-high when her mother and father both died. Poseidon desired this damsel, had to do with her, and fortified the hill where she had her abode by a fence of alternate rings of sea and land, smaller and greater, one within another. He fashioned two such round wheels, as we may call them, of earth and three of sea from the very center of the island, at uniform distances, thus making the spot inaccessible to man, for there were as yet no ships and no seafaring. The island left at their center he adorned with his own hand—a light enough task for a god—causing two fountains to flow from underground springs, one warm, the other cold, and the soil to send up abundance of food plants of all kinds. He then begot five twin births of male offspring and divided the whole isle of Atlantis into ten parts. On the earliest-born of the first pair he bestowed their mother's dwelling place with the lot of land surrounding it, the best and largest of all, and appointed him king over his brethren. The rest he made princes, granting each of them the sovereignty over a large population and the lordship of wide lands. Further, he gave names to them all. Their king, the eldest, received a name from which the ocean, as well as the whole island, got its

designation; it is called Atlantic, because the name of the first king of old times was Atlas. His younger twin brother, to whose share fell the extremity of the island off the Pillars of Heracles, fronting the region now known as Gadira, from the name of his territory, was called in Greek Eumelus, but in the language his own country Gadirus, and no doubt his name was the origin of that of the district. One of the second pair was called Ampheres, the other Evaemon, the elder of the third Mneseus and his junior Autochthon, the elder of the fourth Elasippus, the younger Mestor; Azaes was the name of the elder of the fifth pair, that of his brother

Diaprepes. All these and their descendants for many generations reigned as princes of numerous islands of the ocean besides their own, and were also, as has been already said, suzerains of the population of the hither or inner side of the straits, as far as Egypt and Tyrrhenia.

Now from Atlas sprang a prolific and illustrious house which retained the throne for many generations, the eldest being always king and transmitting the succession to his eldest descendant. They possessed wealth such as had never been amassed by any royal line before them and could not be easily matched by any after, and were equipped with all resources required for their city and dominions at large. Though their empire brought them a great external revenue, it was the island itself which furnished the main provision for all purposes of life. In the first place it yielded all products of the miner's industry, solid and fusible alike, including one which is now only a name but was then something more, orichalch, which was excavated in various parts of the island, and had then a higher value than any metal except gold. It also bore in its forests a generous supply of all timbers serviceable to the carpenter and builder and maintained a sufficiency of animals wild and domesticated; even elephants were plentiful. There was ample pasture for this the largest and most voracious of brutes, no less than for all the other creatures of marsh, lake and river, mountain and plain. Besides all this, the soil bore all aromatic substances still to be found on earth, roots, stalks, canes, gums exuded by flowers and fruits, and they throve on it. Then, as for cultivated fruits, the dry sort which is meant to be our food supply and those others we use as solid nutriment—we call the various kinds pulse—as well as the woodland kind which gives us meat and drink and oil together, the fruit of trees that ministers to our pleasure and merriment and is so hard to preserve, and that we serve as

welcome dessert to a jaded man to charm away his satiety—all these were produced by that sacred island, which then lay open to the sun, in marvelous beauty and inexhaustible profusion. So the kings employed all these gifts of the soil to construct and beautify their temples, royal residences, harbors, docks, and domain in general on the following plan.

They first bridged the rings of sea round their original home, thus making themselves a road from and to their palace. This palace they originally built at the outset in the dwelling place of the god and their ancestors, and each monarch, as he inherited it in his turn, added beauties to its existing beauties, always doing his utmost to surpass his predecessor, until they had made the residence a marvel for the size and splendor of its buildings. They began on the seaside by cutting a canal to the outermost ring, fifty stadia long, three hundred feet broad, and a hundred feet deep; the 'ring' could now be entered from the sea by this canal like a port, as the opening they had made would admit the largest of vessels. Further, at these bridges they made openings in the rings of land which separated those of water, just sufficient to admit the passage of a single trireme, and covered the openings in so that the voyage through them became subterranean, for the banks of the rings of earth were considerably elevated above the sea level. The breadth of the largest ring of water, that to which the canal from the sea had been made, was three stadia and a half, and that of the contiguous ring of land the same. Of the second pair, the ring of water had a breadth of two stadia and that of land was once more equal in breadth to the water outside it; the land which immediately surrounded the central islet was in breadth one stadium; the islet on which the palace stood had a diameter of five stadia. So they enclosed this islet with the rings and bridge, which had a breadth of a hundred feet, completely by a stone wall, building towers and gates on the

bridges at either end of each passage for the sea water. The stone, black, white, and red, they quarried beneath the whole central islet and outer and inner rings, thus, by the same process, excavating a pair of interior basins for shipping with a roofing of native rock. Some of their buildings were of a single color; in other cases they entertained themselves by intermingling the stones to produce variegated surfaces of an inherently agreeable character. The whole circuit of the outermost wall they covered with a coat, a ceruse [ointment], as one might say, of copper, the inner with melted tin, and the wall of the actual acropolis with orichalch, which gleamed like fire.

Within the acropolis was the palace with the following design. In the very center, surrounded by a golden railing, which it was forbidden to enter, was an untrodden sanctuary sacred to Clito and Poseidon, the very place where the race of the ten princes had been first conceived and begotten; here, too, the seasonable offerings were made yearly to each of them from all the ten lots. Poseidon himself had a temple, a stadium long and half a stadium broad, with a proportionate height, but something un-Hellenic in its aspect. The whole exterior of this temple was coated with silver, except the figures on the pediments; these were covered with gold. Within, the roof was of ivory throughout, ornamented with gold, silver, and orichalch, and all the rest, walls, columns, pavement, were covered with orichalch.

It contained golden statues of the god standing in a chariot drawn by six winged horses, and on such a scale that his head touched the roof, and of a hundred Nereids round him riding on dolphins, for that was then believed to be the number of the Nereids. It also contained many other statues dedicated by private persons. Outside the temple there stood golden statues of all the wives of those who had been of the number of the ten kings and of themselves, and many other

great statues, dedicated by kings and private persons of the country itself and the foreign nations over whom they were suzerain. There was an altar of size and workmanship to match the edifice; the palace, too, was no less worthy of the grandeur of the empire and the magnificence of its temples.

Uses were found for the waters of the two springs, the cold and the warm. The supply from both was copious and the natural flavor and virtues of their waters remarkable. So they were surrounded by buildings and plantations of appropriate trees as well as with a number of basins, some open to the air and others, which were used as warm baths in winter, covered. Of these there were several sets, for the kings, for private citizens, and for women, and yet others for horses and other beasts of burden, each set with its own appropriate equipment. The waste from them was conducted to the grove of Poseidon, where the trees were of every kind and, thanks to the excellence of the soil, of incredible size and beauty, and then let into the outer rings of water by conduits at the bridges. Here, besides numerous temples to different gods, they had constructed a variety of gardens and gymnasiums. Some of the latter were for men; there were others on each of the two islands formed by the rings, specially for horses. In particular, they had a space reserved as a racecourse in the center of the larger of these islands; its breadth was a stadium and the whole length of the circumference was left free for the contests. Round this racecourse on both sides were barracks for the main body of the bodyguards; a number of the more trusty were stationed in the smaller ring, nearer the citadel; to the most eminently trustworthy of all, quarters were assigned within the citadel about the persons of the kings. The dockyards were filled with triremes and their appropriate equipment, all in excellent order. So much, then, for the appointments

of the royal residence. When one had passed the three outer harbors, a wall ran all round, starting at the sea, at a uniform distance of fifty stadia from the greatest ring and its harbor, returning on itself at the mouth of the canal from the sea. This wall was completely filled by a multitude of closely set houses, and the large harbor and canal were constantly crowded by merchant vessels and their passengers arriving from all quarters, whose vast numbers occasioned incessant shouting, clamor, and general uproar, day and night.

I have now given you a pretty faithful report of what I once learned of the town and the old palace, and must do my best to recall the general character of the territory and its organization. To begin with, the district as a whole, so I have heard, was of great elevation and its coast precipitous, but all round the city was a plain, enclosing it and itself enclosed in turn by mountain ranges which came right down to the sea. The plain itself was smooth, level, and of a generally oblong shape; it stretched for three thousand stadia in one direction, and, at its center, for two thousand inland from the coast.

All through the island this level district faced the south and was thus screened from the cold northerly winds. In those times it was famous for its encircling mountains, which were more numerous, huge, and beautiful than any that exist today. These mountains contained numerous villages with a wealthy population, besides rivers, lakes, and meadows which provided plentiful sustenance for all sorts of animals, wild or domestic, and timber of different kinds in quantities amply sufficient for manufactures of every type.

Well, this plain, in consequence partly of its original structure, partly of the long-continued exertions of a succession of kings, had assumed an aspect which I shall now describe. From the first, it was naturally quadrangular,

oblong, and nearly rectangular; departures from that shape had been corrected by the carrying of a fosse round it. As to the depth, breadth, and length of this fosse, it sounds incredible that any work of human hands should be so vast by comparison with other achievements of the kind, but I have to tell the tale as I heard it. It had been dug to the depth of a hundred feet, had everywhere a stadium in breadth, and, as it was carried completely round the plain, its length came to ten thousand stadia. It received the watercourses which came down from the mountains, made the tour of the plain, meeting the city in both directions, and was thence allowed to discharge into the sea. Beyond the city, straight canals of some hundred feet in width, terminated once more at the fosse on the seaside, were drawn across the plain, with a distance of a hundred stadia between every two. They were used for the floating of timber down to the town from the mountains and the conveyance by boat of natural produce generally, oblique channels of cross-communication being cut from these canals to one another and the city. There were actually two harvests in the year; in the winter the husbandmen trusted to the sky for their irrigation, in the summer they looked to the earth, and released the waters of the canals. As to their numbers, each allotment of land was under an injunction to furnish one leader of a military detachment, the area of the allotment was ten stadia by ten, and the total number of these allotments mounted to sixty thousand. The number of units supplied by the mountains and the territory at large was said to be enormous, and all were regularly assigned to the different allotments and leaders according to their districts or villages. Each leader was then enjoined to furnish the army with the following contribution: one-sixth part of a war chariot, up to the full complement of ten thousand such chariots; two chargers

with their riders; a pair of horses without car but supplied with a dragoon with light shield and a driver for the pair, to stand behind the combatant; two hoplites, a pair of archers, and the same number of slingers; three light-armed throwers of stones and the same number of javelin men; four marines, up to the full complement of twelve hundred vessels. This was the war equipment of the royal city; in the other nine there were various arrangements which would take much time to describe.

The distribution of power and prerogative was, and had from the first, been this. Each of the ten kings was, in his own territory and government, supreme over persons and, for the most part, over the laws, and could chastise and put to death at his pleasure. But their authority over and intercourse with one another was regulated by the commands of Poseidon, as they were informed by the law and by an inscription left by the earliest kings on a column of orichalch preserved in the sanctuary of Poseidon in the center of the island. Here, in fact, they were accustomed to assemble at alternate intervals of four and five years, thus showing equal respect for even number and odd; in these sessions, they deliberated on their common affairs, made inquiry whether any of them were transgressing the law, and pronounced judgment. When they were to give judgment, they first exchanged pledges in this fashion. In the sanctuary of Poseidon consecrated bulls roamed at large. So the ten came unattended and made prayer to the god that they might capture the victim of his preference. Then they gave chase with wooden clubs and cords only, but no implement of iron; what bull so-ever they took they brought him to the column and slew him over it, wetting the inscription with his blood. Now there was written on the column, besides the laws, an oath calling down grievous curses on the disobedient. So when they had offered sacrifice after their own ritual and

were devoting all the bull's members, they would mingle a bowl of wine, casting in one clot of the blood for each man; the rest of the blood they cast into the fire, first cleansing the column. Then they drew the wine from the bowl in golden beakers, made a libation over the fire, and swore on oath that they would give judgment according to the laws upon the column, would chastise any who had heretofore transgressed, and hereafter transgress none of these ordinances wittingly, neither giving nor obeying commandment save according to the laws of their father. When each had taken this vow for himself and his house after him, he drank and dedicated his beaker in the god's sanctuary, and so betook himself to the banquet and necessary business. When dark fell and the fire of the offerings was burned down, all vested themselves in fair robes of deep blue, and seated themselves so by the embers of their sacrifice, on the bare earth, and by night, quenching all fire in the sanctuary. Thus they gave and received judgment, if any charged any with transgression. Judgment given, when the morning came, they wrote the judgments on a plate of gold and dedicated it and their robes for a memorial. Now there were many more special laws concerning the rights of the several kings, but the chief of these were that they should bear no arms one against another and that if any should essay to overthrow the royal house of any city, all should come to its help—but ever in accord with the rule of their ancestors—they should take counsel in common for war and all other affairs, and the chief command should be given to the house of Atlas. Also, the king should have no power over the life of any of his kinsmen, save with the approval of more than half of the ten.

Now this mighty and wondrous power, which then was in that region, the god arrayed and brought against this our own region, the cause, as the tale goes, being this. For many

generations, while the god's strain in them was still vigorous, they gave obedience to the laws and affection to the divine whereto they were akin. They were indeed truehearted and greathearted, bearing themselves to one another and to their various fortunes with judgment and humbleness. They thought scorn of all things save virtue and counted their present prosperity a little thing. So they found the weight of their gold and other possessions a light load. Wealth made them not drunken with wantonness; their mastery of themselves was not lost, nor their steps made uncertain. They perceived with the clear vision of the sober that even these things all receive increase from virtue and mutual love, whereas where the first are sought and held in honor, they decay themselves and the others perish with them. So by reason of such thoughts and the divine strain that persisted in them, their wealth in the things of which we have told was still further increased. But when the god's part in them began to wax faint by constant crossing with much mortality, and the human temper to predominate, then they could no longer carry their fortunes, but began to behave themselves unseemly. To the seeing eye they now began to seem foul, for they were losing the fairest bloom from their most precious treasure, but to such as could not see the true happy life, to appear at last fair and blessed indeed, now that they were taking the infection of wicked coveting and pride of power. Zeus, the god of gods, who governs his kingdom by law, having the eye by which such things are seen, beheld their goodly house in its grievous plight and was minded to lay a judgment on them, that the discipline might bring them back to tune. So he gathered all the gods in his most honorable residence, even that that stands at the world's center and overlooks all that has part in becoming, and when he had gathered them there, he said—

Critias

Translated by Diskin Clay.

Persons of the Dialog.

Critias. Timaeus.

Hermocrates. Socrates.

Timaeus/ What a pleasure it is, Socrates, to have completed the long march of my argument. I feel the relief of the traveler who can rest after a long journey. Now I offer my prayer to that god who had existed long before in reality, but who has now been created in my words. My prayer is that he grant the preservation of all that has been spoken properly; but that he will impose the proper penalty if we have, despite our best intentions, spoken any discordant note. For the musician who strikes the wrong note the proper penalty is to bring him back into harmony. To assure, then, that in the future we will speak as we should concerning the origin of the gods we pray that he will grant the best and most perfect remedy—understanding. And, now that we have offered our prayer, we will keep our agreement and hand over to Critias the speech that is to follow ours in its proper sequence.

Critias/ Very well, Timaeus. I will accept the task, but I will make the same plea as you made at the beginning of your speech, when you asked for our sympathy and understanding on account of the magnitude of the argument you were undertaking. I make this same entreaty now too, but I ask to be granted even greater understanding for what I am going to say. And I must admit that I realize that what I am pleading for is self-indulgent and a less polite request than it should be. But I must make it nonetheless. Now, who in his senses would undertake to maintain that your speech was not an excellent speech? As for the speech you are about to hear, I

must somehow bring home to you the fact that it requires greater indulgence, given the difficulty of my subject. It is easier, Timaeus, for someone to give the impression that he is a successful speaker when he speaks of gods to an audience of mortals. The audience's lack of experience and sheer ignorance concerning a subject they can never know for certain provide the would-be speaker with great eloquence. We know how we stand when it comes to our knowledge of the gods. To make my meaning plainer, let me ask you to follow me in this illustration.

It is inevitable, I suppose, that everything we have all said is a kind of representation and attempted likeness. Let us consider the graphic art of the painter that has as its object the bodies of both gods and men and the relative ease and difficulty involved in the painter's convincing his viewers that he has adequately represented the objects of his art. We will observe first that we are satisfied if an artist is able to represent—even to some small extent—the earth and mountains and rivers and forests and all of heaven and the bodies that exist and move within it, and render their likeness; and next that, since we have no precise knowledge of such things, we do not examine these paintings too closely or find fault with them, but we are content to accept an art of suggestion and illusion for such things, as vague and deceptive as this art is. But, when a painter attempts to create a likeness of our bodies, we are quick to spot any defect, and, because of our familiarity and life-long knowledge, we prove harsh critics of the painter who does not fully reproduce every detail. We must view the case of speeches as precisely the same. We embrace what is said about the heavens and things divine with enthusiasm, even when what is said is quite implausible; but we are nice critics of what is said of mortals and human beings.

Now, with these reflections in mind, which I have offered for the present occasion, if we are unable to speak fully and fittingly in representing our theme, we deserve your sympathy. You must realize that human life is no easy subject for representation, but is rather one of great difficulty, if we are to satisfy people's opinions. I wanted to remind you of this, Socrates, to make my plea not for less but for greater sympathy and understanding as you listen to what I am about to say. If you find that I made a just claim on this favor, grant it with good will.

Socrates/ Why, Critias, would we hesitate to grant it? Let this favor of ours be granted to Hermocrates as well who will follow you as the third to speak. It is clear that a little later, when it comes his turn to speak he will make the same entreaty as have you and Timaeus. So to make it possible for him to invent another preamble and not compel him to repeat what Timaeus and Critias have said, let him speak when his turn comes, knowing that he has our sympathy. But now, my dear Critias, I must caution you about the attitude of your audience in this theater: the first of the poets to compete in it put on such a glorious performance that you will need a great measure of sympathy if you are going to be able to compete after him.

Hermocrates/ The injunction you made to Critias here applies to me, Socrates, as well. But, even so, Critias, the faint hearted have never yet set up a victory monument. You must march bravely forward to encounter your speech, and, as you invoke Paeon and the Muses, display in your hymn of praise the bravery of your ancient citizens.

Critias/ Dear Hermocrates, you stand last in rank, but, since there is someone standing in front of you, you are still confident. That courage is needed, you will discover yourself, when you take my place. But I must pay attention to your exhortation and encouragement, and, in addition to the gods

you just named, invoke the other gods and make a special prayer to Mnemosyne. The success or failure of just about everything that is most important in our speech lies in the lap of this goddess. For, if we can sufficiently recall and relate what was said long ago by the priests and brought here to Athens by Solon, you the audience in our theater will find, I am confident, that we have put on a worthy performance and acquitted ourselves of our task. So much said. Now we must act. Let us delay no more.

We should recall at the very beginning that, in very rough terms, it was some nine thousand years since the time when a war is recorded as having broken out between the peoples dwelling outside the pillars of Heracles and all those dwelling within. This war I must now describe. Now they said that this city of Athens was the ruler of the [Mediterranean] peoples and fought for the duration of the entire war. They said, too, that the kings of the island of Atlantis were the rulers of the other peoples. This island, as we were saying, was at one time greater than both Libya and Asia combined. But now because of earthquakes it has subsided into the great Ocean and has produced a vast sea of mud that blocks the passage of mariners who would sail into the great Ocean from Greek waters and for this reason it is no longer navigable.

In its progress, our tale will describe, as if it were unrolled, the many barbarian nations and all the different Greek peoples of that time, encountering them as they emerge from place to place. It is first necessary at the beginning of this tale to describe the condition of the Athenians of that age and the adversaries with whom they waged war: their respective power and their respective constitutions. But of these themes, pride and place must go to the condition of Athens before this war.

At one time, the gods received their due portions over the entire earth region by region—and without strife. To claim that gods did not recognize what was proper to each would not be

fitting, nor would it be right to say that, although they recognized what belonged by just title to others, some would attempt to take possession of this for themselves—in open strife. But, as they received what was naturally theirs in the allotment of justice, they began to settle their lands. Once they had settled them, they began to raise us as their own chattel and livestock, as do shepherds their sheep. But they did not compel us by exerting bodily force on our bodies, as do shepherds who drive their flocks to pasture by blows, but rather, by what makes a creature turn course most easily; as they pursued their own plans, they directed us from the stern, as if they were applying to the soul the rudder of Persuasion. And in this manner they directed everything mortal as do helmsmen their ships.

Now, as the gods received their various regions lot by lot, they began to improve their possessions. But, in the case of Hephaestus and Athena, since they possessed a common nature, both because she was his sister of the same father and because they had entered the same pursuits in their love of wisdom and the arts, they both received this land as their portion in a single lot, because it was congenial to their character and was naturally suited to them in its excellence and intelligence. And they fashioned in it good men sprung from the land itself and gave them a conception of how to govern their society. The names of these first inhabitants have been preserved, but their deeds have perished on account of the catastrophes that befell those who succeeded them and the long passage of time intervening.

Those of their race who survived these successive destructions were, as I said before, left as an illiterate mountain people who had only heard the tradition of the names of the rulers of their country and beyond these only little of their deeds. Now, they were pleased to give their descendants the names of these rulers, even though they were

unaware of their ancestors' virtues and institutions—except for some dim legends concerning each of them. Then, for many generations, these survivors and their children lived in distress for their survival and gave thought to their needs; they spoke only of supplying these needs, and had no interest in the events of the distant past. For it is in the train of Leisure that Mythology and Inquiry into the Past arrive in cities, once they have observed that in the case of some peoples the necessities of life have been secured, but not before.

This is why the names of the ancients have been preserved but not their deeds. I make this claim and cite as my evidence the statement of Solon, who said that, in their account of the war of that time, the Egyptian priests gave for the most part names such as Cecrops and Erechtheus, and Erichthonius, and Erysichthon, and the names of most of the others which have come down in tradition before the generation of Theseus. And the same is true of the names of the women. Consider too the attributes of the goddess Athena and her statue. At that time the military training of women and men was common. For this reason the people of that time fashioned the statue of the goddess as armed to reflect that ancient custom—an indication that all the female and male creatures that live together in a flock can very well pursue in common, as much as is possible, the special talents that are suited to each species.

Now, at that time, the other classes of citizens who dwelt in our city were engaged in manufacture and producing food from the earth, but the warrior class that had originally been separated from them by god-like men lived apart. They had all that was appropriate to their training and education. None of them had any private possession, but they thought of all their possessions as the common property of all, and they asked to receive nothing from the other citizens beyond what they needed to live. Their activities were all of the activities that

were spoken of yesterday, when the guardians proposed by our theory were discussed.

The report of the Egyptian priests concerning our territory was plausible and true. First of all, at that time its boundaries extended to the Isthmus of Corinth, and, on the mainland to the north, they extended to the summits of Cithaeron and Parnes. And, descending to the east, the boundaries extended down to the region of Oropus to the north and they were defined by the Asopus river down to the sea. In its great fertility our land far surpassed every other, for it was then capable of supporting a great army of men who did not work the land. There is impressive evidence for this excellence. What has now survived of this land can rival any other land in the variety and quality of its crops and the pasture it offers all species of animals. But, at that time, our land produced all this not only of high quality but in great abundance. You might ask how this is credible and how our present land could possibly be called a vestige of our earlier land.

From the interior this entire land extends a great distance into the sea, as if it jutted out as a promontory. It so happens that the entire basin of the sea that surrounds falls off precipitously. Many and great were the floods that occurred in the space of nine thousand years—for this is the number of years between that time and the present—and during this succession of natural disasters the soil was washed down from the high places. It did not form any considerable alluvial deposits, as in other regions, but it disappeared into the deep, as in flood after flood it was continuously washed into the sea from all sides. What actually remains is like our small and barren islands, and, compared to the land it once was, Attica of today is like the skeleton revealed by a wasting disease, once all the rich topsoil has been eroded and only the thin body of the land remains. But in that age our land was undiminished and had high hills with soil upon them; what

we now call the Rocky Barrens were covered with deep rich soil. And in the mountains there were dense forests of which there still survives clear evidence. Some of our mountains can now grow just barely enough for bees, but it was not so long ago that [lofty trees grew there]. There can still be found intact rafters cut from trees that were felled and brought down to be used for the greatest building projects. And there were many trees that were cultivated for their fruit and they provided limitless fodder for flocks of sheep and goats.

Every year there was a harvest of Zeus-sent rain. It was not lost, as it is now, as it flows off the hard surface of the ground into the sea, but the deep soil absorbed the rain and it stored it away as it created a reservoir with a covering of clay soil above it; and, as it distributed the water it had absorbed from the high places into its hollows, it produced an abundant flow of water to feed springs and rivers throughout every region of the country. There are even today some sacred monuments at these ancient springs that are evidence of the truth of what we are now saying about our country.

This was the nature of the countryside. The land was cultivated with great skill, as we can reasonably conjecture, by farmers who were farmers in the true sense of the word and who devoted themselves to this single occupation—but farmers who had an eye for beauty and were of a truly noble nature, and who in addition possessed a most fertile land and water in abundance, and above this land a climate and seasons that were most temperate.

As for the city itself, it was laid out at that time in a plan that I will now describe. First of all, the acropolis was very different then than it is now. A single night of torrential rain stripped the acropolis of its soil and reduced it to bare limestone in a storm that was accompanied by earthquakes. Before the destructive flood of Deucalion, this was the third such cataclysmic storm. In the past, the acropolis extended to

the Eridanus and Ilisus and held within its circuit the Pnyx and Mt. Lycabettus that faces the Pnyx. It was entirely covered by soil and, except for some small outcroppings, level on top. Outside the acropolis and under its slopes there lived the class of artisans and those of the farmers who worked the neighboring land. But on the heights the class of warriors lived in isolation, as if they belonged to a single household, around the sanctuary of Athena and Hephaestos, which they had enclosed by a single garden wall. On the far northern edge of the acropolis they inhabited common dwellings and ate together in common messes in buildings they had constructed for their winter quarters. And they had a supply of all that was needed for their communal institutions—both in buildings for themselves and for the priests. They made no use of gold or silver—possessions they never had any need of. But, in pursuing a mean between ostentation and servility, they built for themselves tasteful houses and they grew old in them in the company of their grandchildren; and for generation after generation they passed these dwellings down to descendants who were like themselves. As for the south of the acropolis, when they left their orchards, gymnasia, and common messes, as they would for the summer season, they converted it to these uses.

There was a single spring in the location of the present acropolis, but it has been choked by the debris of the earthquakes [of that night], and its waters now flow only in a trickle about the circuit wall. But it provided the men of that age with an abundant supply of water, since it was situated in a location that made it neither too cold in the winter nor too hot in the summer.

This was the manner of their life: they were the guardians of their own citizens and the leaders of the rest of the Greek world, which followed them willingly. And they kept their population stable as far as they could—both of men and

women—for generation after generation, maintaining the population of those who had reached military age or were still of military age at close to twenty thousand at most.

Such, to conclude, was the character of this people and such was their life generation after generation as they directed the life of their city and of Greece with justice. Their fame for the beauty of their bodies and for the variety and range of their mental and spiritual qualities spread through all of Asia and all of Europe. And the consideration in which they were held and their renown was the greatest of all the nations of that age.

As for the state of those who went to war against them and the origins of that state, we will now openly reveal its history to you our friends, as the common property of friends, if we have not lost the memory of what we heard when we were still boys. I must explain one small point before I enter into my history so that you will not be astonished as you hear Greek names frequently used for people who are not Greek. You will now learn the origins of these names. Solon, when he was contemplating his own poetic version of this legend and was inquiring into the meaning of these names, discovered that his Egyptian sources had been the first to record them, once they had translated their meaning into their own language. He, in his turn, recovered the meaning of each of these names and recorded it as he translated them into Greek. These very manuscripts were in the possession of my grandfather and they now remain in my possession. When I was a boy, I studied them carefully. Consequently, do not be astonished if you hear names that sound like Greek names; you now know their explanation.

What follows, approximately, was the introduction to the long account I heard then. As I said before concerning the distribution of lands among the gods, in some regions they divided the entire earth into greater apportionments and in

others into lesser apportionments, as they established sanctuaries and sacrifices for themselves. So it was that Posidon received as one of his domains the island of Atlantis and he established dwelling places for the children he had fathered of a mortal woman in a certain place on the island that I shall describe.

Now seaward, but running along the middle of the entire island, was a plain which is said to have been the loveliest of all plains and quite fertile. Near this plain in the middle of the island and at about fifty stades' distance was a uniformly low and flat hill. Now, there lived on this hill one of the people of this island who had originally sprung up from the earth. His name was Evenor and he dwelt there with his wife Leucippe. They had an only child, a daughter by the name of Clito. When this girl grew to marriageable age, both her mother and father died. It was then that Posidon conceived a desire for her and slept with her. To make the hill on which she lived a strong enclosure he broke it to form a circle and he created alternating rings of sea and land around it. Some he made wider and some he made more narrow. He made two rings of land and three of sea as round as if he had laid them out with compass and lathe.

They were perfectly equidistant from one another. And so the hill became inaccessible to humans. For at that time ships and the art of navigation had not yet come into existence.

And the god himself greatly beautified the island he had created in the middle to make it a dwelling suitable for a god. Because he was a god, he did this with little effort. He drew up two subterranean streams into springs. One gushed out in a warm fountain and the other in a cold fountain. And from the earth he produced all varieties of crops that were sufficient to his island. He sired five pairs of twin sons and he raised them to manhood. He divided the entire island of Atlantis into ten districts: to the first born of the first set of twins he gave

as his portion the dwelling of his mother and the circular island, since it was the largest and the best. And he made him king over the others. The other sons he made governors and to each of these he gave the rule over many men and a great extent of land.

And he gave each of his sons names. To the son who was oldest and king he gave the name from which the entire island and its surrounding sea derive their names, because he was the first of the kings of that time. His name was Atlas; the island is called Atlantis and the sea Atlantic after him. To the twin born after him, who had received as his portion the cape of the island facing the pillars of Heracles opposite what is now called the territory of Gadira after this region, he gave the name that translates into Greek as Eumelos, but in the language of Atlantis, it is Gadirus. It would seem that he gave his name to the region of Cadiz. The two brothers of the second set of twins he called Ampheres and the Euaemon. To the third set he gave the name Mneseas to the first-born and Autochthon to the second-born. Of the fourth set Elasippus was the first-born, Mestor the second. For the fifth set he gave the name Azaes to the first-born and the name Diaprepes to the second. Now all of these sons inhabited the island, as did their sons and descendants over many generations. They were the rulers of many other islands in the Atlantic and, as I have said, they even extended their rule into the Mediterranean as near to us as Etruria and Egypt.

The race of Atlas increased greatly and became greatly honored. And they maintained their kingdom through many generations, as the oldest king would hand his kingship on to his oldest son. They amassed more wealth than had ever been amassed before in the rule of any previous kings or could easily be amassed after them. And they provided for everything that was needed, both in the city and in the rest of the island. For their empire brought them many imports from

outside, and the island itself provided most of what was needed for their livelihood. First, there were the mines that produced both hard and fusible ore. And in many regions of the island they exploited that metal which is now only a name to us, but which was then more than a name—oreichalkos. In that age it was valued only less than gold. And the island provided all trees to be hewn and worked by builders and this in great abundance. It also produced abundant animal life, both domestic and wild. In addition to these there was a great population of elephants. There was pasture land for the other animals who graze in marshlands and along lakes and rivers and on mountainsides and plains, and there was plenty for them and for this the greatest of animals, which consumes the most fodder.

The island produced in addition all the aromatic plants the earth produces now—sweet smelling roots and greens, herbs, trees, and gums from flowers and fruits as well, and they flourished there. The island also produced the domesticated crop of grains on which we live and all the other crops on which we depend for our food. It also produced the kinds of crops we call "pulse" and the trees that give us our drink, food, and oils—and the crop that sprung up for the sake of our entertainment and pleasure, is hard to preserve, and comes from tree tops; it produced the side dishes we offer the weary guest as a relief after he has eaten his fill and that refresh him after dinner. All of these did that sacred island once bear in that age under a fostering sun—products lovely, marvelous, and of abundant bounty. And they took all these products from the earth and from their proceeds they constructed their sanctuaries and their palaces, their harbors and their ship-sheds, and they improved the rest of their land according to the plan I will now describe.

First, they constructed bridges joining the rings of sea, which surrounded the ancient metropolis, making a road out

from the palace and in to the palace. Their first project was to build a palace in the dwelling of the god and of their ancestors. One king inherited the project from his predecessor, and, as he improved on the beauty of what had already been improved, he would surpass to the extent of his resources what his predecessor had been able to achieve. They continued this progress until they had created for themselves a dwelling astonishing in its size and in its manifold beauty. And starting at the sea they excavated a canal three plethra in width, one hundred feet in depth, and fifty stades in length up to the outermost sea ring. They then made passage from the sea into the interior possible by opening a channel into the sea ring that was wide enough for the largest ships to sail into it as if it were a harbor. And, as for the land rings that separated the rings of sea, they pierced them at the point of the bridges, and thus joined them by water. The resulting canal was wide enough for a single trireme to sail through as it passed into a ring of water. They constructed a roof over the channel to protect the passage of ships, for the walls of the canal through the land rings were high enough from the sea to the bridge above to allow ships to pass under. The largest of the water rings into which the passage from the sea had been excavated was three stades in width and the next land ring was equal to it. Of the next rings of water and land, the ring of water was two stades wide and, as in the first case, the land ring was equal to it as well. And, finally, the ring of water running around the island in the middle was a stade wide.

The island where the palace was located had a diameter of five stades. They threw up an unbroken stone circuit wall around this island, and they also walled the land rings, and the bridge, which was a plethron wide. They built towers and gates at the point where the bridges crossed over the rings of water. They quarried stone from under the circular island that formed the center ring and from the inner and outer land rings

as well. There were three colors of stone: white, black, and red. As they quarried this stone, they fashioned ship sheds for two ships in the rock roofed by the stone of the quarry itself.

Some of their buildings they constructed of stones of uniform color. But to delight themselves they made of others a tapestry of stones of different colors, variegating the colors to bring out their natural charm. And they invested the entire circuit wall of the outermost land ring with bronze, as if the bronze revetment were a bright dye. The interior of the land wall they invested with tin. And the wall surrounding the acropolis itself they invested with oreichalkos, which glittered like darting fire.

I will now describe the palace buildings erected within the acropolis. At its center was the shrine of Clito and Posidon. It was kept consecrated and no one was permitted to enter it. It was surrounded by a wall of gold. It was here that Posidon and Clito first begot and produced the race of the ten kings. It was to this shrine that each of the ten divisions came to offer their first fruits to each of these original kings in a yearly festival. The temple of Posidon was in this area. It was one stade long, three plethra wide, and of a height that appeared to be proportional to its length and width, but it had something barbaric about its appearance. They invested the entire exterior of the temple with silver, except for the acroteria, which they gilded with gold. The interior presented a roof of solid ivory inlaid with gold, silver, and oreichalkos; and they plated all the other areas of the temple with this same metal—the cella walls, the interior columns, and the floors. They placed gold statues within the temple. There was a statue of Posidon standing in a chariot with a team of six winged horses. This statue was so tall that his head touched the rafter of the temple roof; there were a hundred Nereids riding dolphins and arranged in a circle about him, for men of that age thought that the Nereids were a hundred in number;

and there were many other statues inside which were the offerings of private individuals.

Outside and surrounding the temple there stood gold statues of all the descendants of the ten kings and their wives and many other dedications of great size made by the kings and private individuals who came from the city of Atlantis itself and from the subject peoples elsewhere. There was an altar on the same scale as the temple and its workmanship was equally lavish. The palace was magnificent in its monumental architecture and it was worthy of the greatness of their empire and the adornment of the temple and shrines.

They drew their water from two springs—a spring of cold water and a spring of hot water. Both had an abundant flow and in the amazing natural freshness and quality of its waters each had its own use. They built fountain houses around them and plantations of trees suitable to the temperature of the waters. And they also built reservoirs around the springs. Some they left open, but to the north they covered the reservoirs to convert them to warm baths. The reservoirs of the kings were separate from those of the rest of the population. Some reservoirs were reserved for the use of women, others for watering horses and other draft animals, and each they fashioned appropriately to its use. The overflow they channeled into the grove of Posidon, where, thanks to the fertility of the soil, there grew all varieties of trees of extraordinary beauty and height. They also irrigated the outer land rings by means of canals that crossed over along the bridges joining them.

Here there were constructed numerous shrines to numerous gods and the land was laid out for many orchards and gymnasia. There were gymnasia for men on each of the two ring islands and tracks for horses were set apart as well. And, remarkably, through the middle of the greatest of the islands they laid out a separate race course for horses, one

stade wide, and it extended in a circle around the entire island. Located on each side of the central race course were quarters for the palace guard.

The garrison of the most reliable soldiers was established on the smaller of the ring islands, the island situated nearest to the acropolis. And quarters were built on the acropolis for the most reliable soldiers of all, surrounding the palaces of the kings themselves. The ship-sheds were filled with triremes and all the fittings needed for triremes, and all were in good working order. Such, then, were the buildings they constructed around the [dwellings of the] kings themselves.

Now, once you had crossed over the three rings of water, you would come to a circuit wall that began at the sea and surrounded the greatest of the land rings on all sides at a uniform distance of fifty stades from the greatest land ring and its harbor. It began at the point where the channel had been dug through to the sea. The entire area within was settled by a dense population whose houses were crowded close together. The waterway into the interior and the greatest harbor was teeming with ships and crowds of merchants who had arrived from all over the world and whose voices and bustle produced a commotion and hubbub that could be heard day and night.

I have recalled this description of the capital and the ancient dwelling of the kings pretty much as it was told [to Solon] at that time. But now I must attempt to recall the nature of the rest of the country and the manner in which it was improved. To begin with, the priests said that the entire country was very high and that it rose sheer from the sea. The entire plain that surrounded the capital was itself surrounded by a ring of mountains that sloped down as far as the sea. The plain was smooth and level and entirely rectangular. On its long sides it extended for three thousand stades and, as measured from the sea, it was over two thousand stades

across. The slope of the island was to the south and it was protected from the northerly winds. The mountains surrounding the plain were legendary for their number and size and beauty. None of the mountain ranges that exist today can compare with them. They contained on their slopes and in their valleys many populous and wealthy villages. And they contained rivers and lakes and meadows that supplied enough to feed all the animals there, both domesticated and wild. In their abundance and variety, the shrubs and trees were plentiful for all kinds of constructions and uses.

I will now relate how this plain had been developed by nature, and by many kings and over a long period of time. For the most part, the plain was naturally rectangular, regular, and oblong. Where it was not perfectly straight and even they evened it out by excavating a Great Canal around it. As described, its depth and width and length provoke disbelief, since it was the work of human hands and so vast when compared to the other building projects. Nevertheless, I must repeat precisely what we heard then. The Great Canal was excavated to the depth of a plethron, it measured a stade wide along its entire length, and as it framed the entire plain it came to a total length of ten thousand stades. As it received the flow of water that came off the mountains, and as this water circulated and reached the city on two sides, the trench allowed the water to flow out to the sea. Towards the interior, canals were cut in straight lines from the city over the plain a hundred feet broad at most and these emptied their waters into the Great Canal facing the sea. These were spaced at an interval of a hundred stades. They also cut horizontal connecting channels linking one canal with another and with the city, and it is by these canals that they transported timber and the other products of the land on barges from the mountains to the city.

They harvested their crops twice a year. In the winter season they relied on the water of Zeus-sent rains, and in the summer season they used the waters stored in the earth drawing it into their canal system to irrigate the crops.

Now, as for the numbers of the men of the plain who were fit to serve in the army: each military district was assigned to contribute one commander. The area of each district was as much as a hundred stades. The total of these districts came to sixty thousand. And as far as the population of the mountainous regions and the rest of the country goes, it was said to be too large to calculate. But, counted by regions and villages, all men fit for military service were assigned to one of the sixty thousand military districts and they served under the commander of each district. In times of war each commander was assigned to have in readiness a sixth part of the complement of a war chariot as a contribution to a force of ten thousand chariots; and in addition, two horses and two riders, a pair of horses without a chariot, with its complement of two riders, a runner, a rider who could fight on foot armed with a small shield, and serving as a charioteer a rider who could mount either horse, two hoplites, two archers, and two sling men; three light armed soldiers with stones and three with javelins. He also had to contribute four sailors to the crews manning twelve thousand ships. These were the principles for raising an army in the royal city. The formulas varied in the nine other cities, and it would take a long time to describe them.

The original ordering of powers and honors in Atlantis was as follows. Within his own patrimony and in his own city, each of the ten kings held power over the inhabitants and over most of the laws, and he could punish or put to death whomever he wished. But, as for their common empire and federation, the kings were regulated by the laws of Posidon as these had been passed down by tradition and according to an inscription

which the first kings had cut on a stele of oreichalkos. This inscription was placed in the middle of the island in the sanctuary of Posidon. Here in every fifth or sixth year, and in alternating sequence, it was their custom to gather. To both the even and to the odd they accorded an equal share. Once they had assembled, they deliberated on matters of common concern and held an assize to determine if anyone of them had broken the law, and they gave judgment. Whenever they were about to declare judgment, they first offered one another pledges in this manner: as all ten kings were alone in the sanctuary of Posidon, where bulls had been allowed to run free, they joined in prayer to ask the god to be allowed to capture the bull which would be the most acceptable offering to him. They pursued the bulls with staffs and nooses—but with no iron weapon, and they led the bull they had captured to the stele. There they slaughtered it on the crest of the stele and let its blood spill down over the inscription. In addition to the laws written on the stele there was an oath inscribed calling terrible curses down upon those who broke them. And, when they had then sacrificed the bull following this ritual, they would burn all the limbs of the bull and, mixing his blood in a mixing-bowl, they would pour a clot of his blood over the head of each of them, and, once they had scrubbed the stele clean, they would bring the remaining blood over to the fire.

After this, they would draw the blood from the mixing-bowl into gold pouring vessels. Pouring the blood over the fire they would take an oath to render justice according to the laws inscribed on the stele and to punish anyone who had violated these laws since last they met. They swore that in the future they would not willingly violate any of the provisions of the inscription and that they would neither rule nor obey a ruler if either they or he did not issue commands that were in conformity with the laws of their father. When each of the kings had made this oath and engaged both himself and his

descendants, they drank and dedicated their pouring-vessels in the sanctuary of the god. And, once they had finished with their dinner and everything else they had to do and night had fallen and the fire about the sacrificial offerings had subsided, they all put on a deep blue robe of the most splendid appearance and, sitting on the ground next to the embers of the sacrificial victim, at night, they put out the fire still flickering in the sanctuary and judged anyone accused of violating any of their laws and were judged themselves. Once they had passed judgment, when day dawned, they recorded their judgments on a gold tablet which they dedicated as a memorial offering along with their robes.

There were many other particular laws concerning the prerogatives of each of the kings, but the most important of these were those forbidding them to bear arms against one another and commanding them to help one another should anyone in any of their cities make an attempt to overturn the divine family; that they should deliberate together, as had their ancestors before them, over their decisions concerning war and their other actions, but that they should cede leadership to the royal family of Atlantis; and, finally, that the king should have power to put none of his kinsmen to death, if he could not obtain the approval of the majority of the ten kings.

Now, this was the power, so great and so extraordinary, that existed in that distant region at that time. This was the power the god mustered and brought against these [Mediterranean] lands. It was said that his pretense was something like what I shall describe. For many generations and as long as enough of their divine nature survived, they were obedient unto their laws and they were well disposed to the divinity they were kin to. They possessed conceptions that were true and entirely lofty. And in their attitude to the disasters and chance events that constantly befall men and in

their relations with one another they exhibited a combination of mildness and prudence, because, except for virtue, they held all else in disdain and thought of their present good fortune of no consequence. They bore their vast wealth of gold and other possessions without difficulty, treating them as if they were a burden. They did not become intoxicated with the luxury of the life their wealth made possible; they did not lose their self-control and slip into decline, but in their sober judgment they could see distinctly that even their very wealth increased with their amity and its companion, virtue. But they saw that both wealth and concord decline as possessions become pursued and honored. And virtue perishes with them as well.

Now, because these were their thoughts and because of the divine nature that survived in them, they prospered greatly as we have already related. But when the divine portion in them began to grow faint as it was often blended with great checkers of mortality and as their human nature gradually gained ascendancy, at that moment, in their inability to bear their great good fortune, they became disordered. To whoever had eyes to see they appeared hideous, since they were losing the finest of what were once their most treasured possessions. But to those who were blind to the true way of life oriented to happiness it was at this time that they gave the semblance of being supremely beauteous and blessed. Yet inwardly they were filled with an unjust lust for possessions and power. But as Zeus, god of the gods, reigning as king according to law, could clearly see this state of affairs, he observed this noble race lying in this abject state and resolved to punish them and to make them more careful and harmonious as a result of their chastisement. To this end he called all the gods to their most honored abode, which stands at the middle of the universe and looks down upon all that has a share in

generation. And when he had gathered them together, he said…

The Critias.

Translated by Davis, Henry

Persons of the Dialog

Timæus, Critias, Socrates, Hermocrates.

Timaeus/ I am just as pleased, Socrates, as one at rest after a long journey, that I have now at length been happily released from my protracted discourse! And now I implore that God the universe, long, long ago created in fact, though only just recently in our discussion, to establish in security what we have properly stated, but as respects aught that we have even involuntarily stated that is not to the purpose, to inflict on us a suitable punishment: —and the right punishment for one out of tune is to make him play in tune. In order then, that for the future we may speak correctly respecting the generation of the gods, we beseech him who is the best and most perfect to give us a scientific knowledge of medicine; and having thus prayed, we hand over to Critias, as we agreed, the succeeding discourse.

Critias/ Yes, Timæus, I receive it: —and as you acted at first, in requesting indulgence as one about to speak on momentous matters, the same also do I now entreat; and I think that I ought the more to obtain it for what I am about to say. Yet I know full well that I am making a very ambitious request, and of a more rustic kind than is proper; still we must proceed. That what you have now said has not been well said, who in his senses will pretend to say? I must try to show then, that what I am about to say needs greater indulgence on account of its greater difficulty: —for it is easier, Timæus, to speak and appear to speak rightly about the gods to men, than about mortals to us men; inasmuch as the inexperience and extraordinary ignorance of the hearers about things of this nature, both furnish great

facilities to one intending to speak concerning them; but as respects the gods, we know how we are situated. In order, however, that I may clearly show my meaning, follow me in what I am about to say. What has been said by the whole of us was necessarily only imitation and resemblance; and now, as regards the representation by painters of divine and heavenly objects, we see with what facility or difficulty they contrive that they shall seem to the spectators to be apt imitations; and we shall see also, that with respect to earth, mountains, rivers, woods, and the whole of heaven, and all therein, as well as what moves about it, we are satisfied if a person is able to produce even a slight resemblance of them; —but beyond this, as we have no accurate knowledge concerning such matters, we neither examine nor find fault with the paintings, but use a mere obscure and deceitful sketch of them. But when on the other hand anyone attempts to represent our bodies, we quickly perceive any omissions, through our familiar apprehension of them, and become severe critics on anyone who does not perfectly exhibit their resemblances. The same also we see, to be the case in arguments, —that we are content with even slightly resembling statements about heavenly and divine things, while we accurately examine things mortal and human. As regards then what we are now immediately saying, if we cannot fully exhibit what is desired, you ought to forgive us, because you must reflect that to form approved resemblances of mortal things is no easy task, but very difficult. Now I have said all this, Socrates, wishing to remind you of these things, and asking not for less, but more indulgence respecting what is about to be said. If then I seem to be fairly asking the favor, grant it with all cheerfulness.

Socrates/ Why should we hesitate to grant it, Critias? — And besides, we must grant this same indulgence to our third friend, Hermocrates: —for it is evident, as we shall see

presently, that when he has to speak, he will make the same request as you. That he then may furnish with a different commencement and not be compelled to say the same, let him at once speak, as if this indulgence were granted him. I must inform you, however, of the sense of the audience, that the former poet Timæus has obtained a wonderful deal of applause; —so that you will need a vast quantity of indulgence if you intend to be an able successor to him.

Hermocrates/ You are making the same announcement to me, Socrates, as to him. Faint-hearted men, however, never yet erected a trophy, Critias: —so you must proceed manfully to your discourse, and, invoking Pæan and the Muses, exhibit and celebrate these primitive and best of citizens.

Critias/ Ah, friend Hermocrates, you are to speak afterwards and have another before you; —and so you are vastly courageous. What the nature of the task is, however, the fact itself will speedily declare: —and we will therefore be persuaded by your encouragement and exhortation, and in addition to the gods that you have mentioned, will call on others besides, and most of all on Memory: for all the most important points of our discourse concern that goddess, —inasmuch as it is by suitably calling to mind and relating the narratives of the Egyptian priests brought hither by Solon, that I feel satisfied of our being thought by this auditory to have fairly accomplished our part. This therefore we must now do, and without further delay.

First of all then let us recollect, that it is about nine thousand years, since war was proclaimed between those dwelling outside the Pillars of Hercules and all those within them, —which war we must now describe. Of the latter party, then, this city was the leader, and conducted the whole war; and of the former the kings of the Atlantic Island, which we said was once larger than Libya and Asia, but now,

sunk by earthquakes, a mass of impervious mud, which hinders all those sailing on the vast sea from effecting a passage hither; —and then our story will, as it were, unfold to your view the many barbarous tribes, and such of the Greek nations as then existed, as each may happen to present itself: —but the wars of the then Athenians and their adversaries we must first describe, as well as the power and government of each. Of these our own people, however, we must be anxious first to speak.

To the gods was once locally allotted the whole earth, and that, too, without contention; —for it would not be reasonable to suppose that the gods are ignorant of what suits each of themselves, or that, fully aware of what is rather the property of others, they would try to get possession of it through strife. Obtaining then a country agreeable to them by just allotment, they chose these regions for their habitation; and, after settling, they like shepherds reared us, as their possessions, flocks and herds, —not however by forcing body against body, as shepherds in grazing drive their cattle with blows; but they treated us as an easily-governed animal, and piloting, as it were, with persuasions for a rudder, and working on the soul, they governed the entire mortal by leading him according to their own mind. Different gods, therefore, having received by lot different regions, proceeded to cultivate or set in order those that they had received; —but Hephaæstus and Athéné having a common nature, not only related by brotherhood from having the same father, but united also in philosophy and love of art, both received this one region as their common allotment, as being naturally familiar with and well adapted to virtue and wisdom; and after producing worthy men, —natives of the soil αὐτόχθονες arranged to their mind the order of their government: —of which men, indeed, the names are preserved; though their deeds have become

extinct through the death of those that handed them down and the long lapse of time. The race, indeed, that survived, as it has been before observed, were a set of unlettered mountaineers, who had heard the names only of the ruling people in the land, and very little about their deeds. The names they out of affection gave to their children, though unacquainted with the virtues and laws of those before them, except through certain dark rumors concerning them; and being themselves and their children for many generations in want of necessaries, with which, with all their wit, they were unprovided, they bestowed their chief attention on this, to the neglect of events that had taken place in times long gone by: —for mythology and the inquiry into ancient affairs both visit states at a time of leisure, when they see that the necessaries of life have been procured, but not before. In this way, then, the names of the ancients have been preserved without their deeds: —and I infer this to be the case, as Solon said, that the priests in describing the war then waged gave those engaged in them many names, such as Cecrops, Erechtheus, Erichthonius, Erysichthon, and most of the other names which are recorded prior to the time of Theseus; —and they gave the names of women likewise. Besides, the figure and image of the goddess shows that at that time both men and women entered in common on the pursuits of war; as in compliance with that custom an armed statue was dedicated to the goddess by the people of that day, —a proof that all animals that consort together, females as well as males, have a natural ability to pursue in common every suitable virtue.

At that time, indeed, there dwelt in this country many other tribes of citizens engaged in crafts and the culture of the soil; but the warrior-tribe, being set apart from the first by divine men, lived separately, having all the requisites for food and training, none of them possessing anything in

private, but considering all their possessions as common, and not deigning to receive anything from the rest of the citizens beyond a sufficiency of food, occupying themselves moreover in all the pursuits that we yesterday described as those of appointed state-guardians. Moreover, as respects this country of ours, it was stated with probability and truth, that in early times it had boundaries fixed at the Isthmus and on the side of the other continent as far as the heights of Cithæron and Parnes, these boundaries coming down, with Oropia on the right, and with the Asopus as a seaward limit on the left: —and by the velour of this region it was said that the whole earth was vanquished, because it was then able to support the numerous army raised from the surrounding people. A great proof of their virtue also was this, —that what now remains of it may vie with any other whatever in the general productiveness of the soil, in the excellence of its fruits, and in pastures suited to every kind of animals. Then, however, it produced all these not only excellent in quality, but in the greatest possible abundance. How then can we believe this; —and in what way can if the present country rightly be termed a remnant of the former land? The whole from the other continent *i.e.* the western side extends seaward like a long promontory, and is wholly surrounded by the steep-shored basin of the sea. As therefore many and extensive deluges happened in that period of nine thousand years, —for so many years have elapsed from that to the present time, —the earth, that was loosened and fell from the heights at these times and under these circumstances, did not, as elsewhere, aggregate to form any elevation worth mentioning, but ever eddying round, at length vanished in the deep; and the heights have been left, as is the case in small islands, like the bones of a diseased body, compared with those of former times, all the earth that was soft and fat being washed away, leaving only

a thin body of soil. At that time, however, being undisturbed, it comprised mountains which are now only high hills; and the country, now termed the plains of Phelleus, was then full of fat earth. The mountains also abounded with woods, of which even now there are evident signs: —for there are some of the mountains, which now furnish food for bees only, though at no very distant period the houses were still standing, and in good preservation, that were constructed of the timber cut from the trees thereon, and suitable for the largest buildings. There were many lofty trees also, raised by cultivation ἥμερα, and an incalculable amount of pasture for cattle. Prolific rain especially this land yearly enjoyed, not, as now, losing it by its quick passage over the bare earth down to the sea; but received an abundance of it, which it could keep within itself to dispense over the clayey soil which holds it: —and thus sending down the absorbed water from the heights into the hollows, it diffused over all these regions abundant streams of springs and rivers, —the truth of which is even now attested by the sacred remains observable in the ancient fountains.

Such was once the natural state of this country; —and it was cultivated, as it was likely it would be, by real husbandmen, actually practicing their calling—lovers of honor and generous-minded, having a most excellent soil, great abundance of water, and an admirably attempered climate. It was at this time that the city was founded here as follows: —The form of the Acropolis was not then, as it is now; —for in later times *lit.* now a single rainy night softened it, and to a great degree bared it of soil, —there being earthquakes at the same time, and a fatal deluge—the third before that of Deucalion. Before this, in primitive times, it extended in size to the Eridanus and Ilissus, and comprised the Pnyx, having the Lycabetus as its limit opposite the Pnyx, —the whole being well covered with soil, except some

level spots in the higher part. Its outer parts down the flanks were inhabited by craftsmen and husbandmen who tilled the neighboring land, —the warrior-classes living separately by themselves in the more elevated parts around the temple of Athéné and Hephæstus, which they had formed, as it were, into the garden of a single dwelling by encircling it with one enclosure: —for on the northern side lived those, who erected public buildings and common banquets for the winter, and whatever else was suited to a common polity, buildings as well as temples being unadorned with gold or silver; for they never at any time used these metals, but pursuing a middle course between extravagance and meanness, built neat dwellings, in which both they and their children's children grew old, and then left them to others like themselves, —while as regards the south side, they removed thither their gardens, gymnasia, and common rooms of entertainment, which they fixed here during the summer. There was also one single fountain on the spot now occupied by the Acropolis, since the extinction of which by earthquakes only a few small streams have been left round it; although at that time it furnished to every part an abundant supply of water, well attempered both for winter and summer. Such was the way of life pursued by the guardians of their own state, who also were leaders of the rest of the Greeks—such at least as required them; and as to their number they paid special attention, that they should always have the same number of men and women that might both then and in future be able to serve in war, —the whole being about twenty thousand. These men then, being personally such as I have described, and ever in some such way justly administering both their own affairs and those of Greece, were the most noted and renowned of all the people of that day over all Europe and Asia, both for the beauty of their bodies and the general virtue of their souls.

In the next place then, as respects the adversaries of these men, what was their character, and how they first arose, we will now impart this in common to you our friends, if at least we have not lost the recollection of what we heard in our childhood. Yet before we narrate this, we must briefly warn you not to be surprised at hearing Hellenic names given to barbarians: —and the cause of this you shall now hear. Solon, intending to make use of this story in his poetry, made an investigation into the power of names, and found that the early Egyptians who committed these facts to writing transferred these names into their own language; and he again receiving the meaning of each name, introduced it by writing into our language. These very writings, indeed, were in the possession of my grandfather, and are now in mine, having been made the subject of much study during my boyhood. If therefore you hear such names as these in this narrative, be not surprised; —for you know the reason. Of a long story, then, let such be the introduction.

As we remarked at first concerning the allotment of the gods, that they distributed the whole earth here into larger and there into smaller portions, procuring for themselves temples and public sacrifices, —so, Poseidon in particular, taking as his lot the Atlantic island, begot children by a mortal woman, and settled in some such spot of the island as we are about to describe. Towards the sea, but in the center of the whole island, was a plain, which is said to have been the fairest of all plains, and distinguished for the excellence of its soil. Near this plain, and at its center, about fifty stadia distant, was a mountain with short acclivities on every side. On this dwelt one of those men who in primitive times sprang from the earth, by name Evenor, who lived with a wife, Leucippe; and they had an only daughter, Clito. Now when this girl arrived at marriageable age, and her mother

and father were dead, Poseidon becoming enamored, made her his mistress, and circularly enclosed the hill on which she dwelt, forming the sea and land into alternate zones, greater and less, —turning, as it were, two out of land and three out of sea, from the center of the island, all equally distant, so as to be inaccessible to men: —for at that time ships and navigation were not known. And he himself, with his divine power, agreeably adorned the center of the island, causing two fountains of water to shoot upwards from beneath the earth, one cold and the other hot, and making every variety of food to spring abundantly from the earth. He also begat and brought up five twin-male children; and after distributing all the Atlantic island into ten parts, he bestowed on the first-born of the eldest pair his mother's dwelling and the allotment about it, —this being the largest and best; and he appointed him king of all the rest, making the others governors, and giving to each the dominion over many people and an extensive territory. He likewise gave all of them names, —to the eldest, who was the king, the name of *Atlas*, from whom, as the first sovereign, both the island and sea were termed *Atlantic*; —and to the twin born after him, who had received for his share the extreme parts of the island towards the Pillars of Hercules, as far as the region which now in that country is called *Gadeirica*, he gave the titular name, which we Greeks call Eumelus, but which the people of that country term *Gadeirus*. Of the second-born twins he called the first Ampheres, the second, Euæmon; —of the third, he called the first-born, Musæus, and the second, Autochthon; —of the fourth, the first, Elasippus, and the younger, Mestor; —and among the fifth, to the former was given the name Azaes, and to the latter, Diaprepes.

All these, then, and their descendants, dwelt for many generations, as rulers in the sea of islands, and as we before

said, yet further extended their empire to all the country as far as Egypt and Tyrrhenia. By far the most distinguished, however, was the race of Atlas; and among these the oldest king in succession always handed down the power to his eldest son, all of them successively possessing wealth in such abundance as never was before found among regal dynasties, nor will easily be found hereafter; and all things were provided for them, which in a city, or elsewhere, are worth such provision. Many possessions, indeed, accrued to them through their power from foreign countries; but the greatest part of what they stood in need was provided for them by the island itself, —first, such ores as are dug out of mines in a solid *i.e.* virgin state, or require smelting; —and especially that metal *orichalcum*, which is now known only by name, but formerly of high celebrity, was dug out of the earth in many parts of the island, being considered the most valuable of all the metals then known, except gold; —and it produced an abundance of wood for builders, and furnished food also for tame and wild animals. Moreover, there were comprised within it vast numbers of elephants: —for there were abundant means of support for all animals that feed in marshes and lakes, on mountains and plains, and so likewise for this animal, which by nature is the largest and most voracious of all. Besides these, whatever odorous plants the earth now hears, whether roots or grass, or woods or distilling gums, or flowers or fruits, —these it bore and produced them to perfection. And yet, further, it bore cultivated fruits, and dry edible fruits, such as we use for food; —all these kinds of food we call vegetables, —together with all that trees bear, as drinks, meats, and ointments; and those also, whose fruits, such as acorns, being used in sport and pleasure, are with difficulty hoarded up, together with certain dainty fruits for dessert that might provoke the satiated palate, or please the sick; —all these that once

existing and warmly-acclimated island bore, sacred, beautiful, wonderful, and infinite in quantity. Receiving all these, then, from the earth, the inhabitants employed themselves also in erecting temples, royal habitations, ports and docks over the whole region, disposing them in the following manner: —

First of all, those residing about that ancient metropolis bridged over those zones of the sea before mentioned, making a passage both outwards and to the royal palace. And the palace they constructed immediately from the first in this habitation of the god and their ancestors; and each in turn receiving it from his predecessor, and further embellishing the ornamental parts, continually surpassed the one before him, until they made the building quite admirable to the sight for the size and beauty of its works. They dug a trench indeed, beginning from the sea, three plethra broad, a hundred feet deep, and fifty stadia in length, as far as the outermost zone, and thus made a passage thither from the sea, as into a harbor, by enlarging its mouth sufficiently to admit the largest vessels. Besides this, they separated by bridges those zones of land which separated those of the sea, so that with one trireme a passage could be effected from one zone to another, covering the zones above, so as to allow a water-way beneath them; —for the banks of the zones of earth rose to a height considerably above the sea. And the greatest of these zones into which the sea penetrated was three stadia in breadth, and the zone of land next in order equal to the first-of the second pair, the watery circle was two stadia in breadth, and that of earth again, equal to the preceding one of water; lastly, the zone running round the center of the island had the breadth only of one stadium, and the island in which the king's palace stood had a diameter of five stadia. This island, as well as the zones, and the bridge which was a plethrum in breadth, they

enclosed on both sides with a stone wall, raising towers and gates at intervals on the bridges at the places where the sea passes through them *i.e.* the zones. The stone for it they quarried beneath the circuit of the island, both in the center and also within and without the zones, one kind of it white, a second black, and a third red; and by thus quarrying they at the same time made cavities that served for two docks, having likewise a covering of rock. Of the buildings, some were of simple structure; —others they put together in a variegated style, by mixing the different kinds of stone by way of amusement, thus realizing a pleasure suitable to their natures: —and they surrounded with brass the whole circuit of the wall round the extreme outer zone, applying it like plaster; that of the next inside they covered with melted tin, and the wall round the citadel itself with orichalcum that has a fiery resplendence.

Next, the royal palace within the citadel was constructed as follows: —In its center was planted a temple, difficult of access, sacred to Clito and Poseidon, surrounded with an enclosure of gold; —and it was that, in which they first generated and produced the race of the ten kings; where also, making annual collections from all the ten allotments, they celebrated seasonable sacrifices to each. The temple of Poseidon himself was a stadium in length, three plethra in breadth, and of a height to correspond, having something of a barbaric appearance. All the outside of the temple, except the pinnacles, they lined with silver, but the pinnacles with gold: —and as to the interior, the roof was formed wholly of ivory variegated with gold and orichalcum; and as to all the parts—the walls, pillars, and pavements, they lined them with orichalcum. They also placed in it golden statues, the god himself being represented as standing on a chariot holding the reins of six winged horses, of such size as to touch the roof with his head, and round him a hundred

nereids on dolphins; —for those of that day thought that such was their number; and it contained also many other statues dedicated to private individuals. Round the outside of the temple likewise golden images were placed of all the men and women that were descended from the ten kings, and many other large statues both of kings and private people, both from the city itself, and the foreign countries over which they had dominion. There was an altar, too, of corresponding size and workmanship with these ornaments; and the excellence of the palace was proportioned to the magnitude of the government and also to the order observed in the sacred ceremonies.

Next, they used fountains both from the cold and hot springs, of which there was a great abundance, either of which was wonderfully well adapted for use from its sweetness and excellence; and round them they fixed their habitations and excellently-watered plantations, together with their water-tanks, some open to the heaven, but others for winter use roofed over for warm baths, the kings' baths and those of private persons being apart, with separate baths for women, and others for horses and other draught-cattle, providing each with the requisite means of cleanliness. The stream hence flowing they led to the grove of Poseidon, where there were all varieties of trees, reaching a wonderful height, owing to the excellence of the soil, and then conducted it by channels over the bridges to the external circles. And here, indeed, there had been constructed numerous temples dedicated to many different gods, and many gardens and gymnasia, one for men, and others separately for horses in either island of the zones; —and for the latter, in particular, there was a race-course plotted out in the center of the largest island, a stadium in breadth, and extending in length through the whole circumference for a contest of speed between the horses. And

around it on all sides were barracks for the household troops corresponding with their number; —to the more faithful of whom were assigned quarters in the smaller zone closer to the citadel, while those who excelled all in loyal faithfulness had dwellings given them inside the citadel near the kings themselves. The docks likewise were filled with triremes and the fittings requisite for triremes; and they were all satisfactorily provided. Such were the arrangements for the provision of the kings' dwelling: —but on crossing the three exterior harbors, one was met by a wall which went completely round, beginning from the sea, everywhere fifty stadia distant from the greatest or outermost zone and harbor, and enclosed in one the entrance to the canal and the entrance to the sea. The whole of this part indeed was covered with many and densely-crowded dwellings; —and the canal and largest harbor were full of vessels and merchants coming from all parts, causing from their multitude all kinds of shouting, tumult, and din all day long and the night through.

We have now related from memory a description of the city and its ancient habitations; and now we must try to describe the nature of the rest of the country, and its mode of employment. First, then, the whole region was said to be exceedingly lofty and precipitous towards the sea, and the plain about the city, which encircles it, is itself surrounded by mountains sloping down to the sea, being level and smooth, all much extended, three thousand stadia in one direction, and the central part from the sea above two thousand. And this district of the whole island was turned towards the south, in an opposite direction from the north. The mountains around it, too, were at that time celebrated, as exceeding in number, size, and beauty all those of the present time, —having in them many hamlets enriched with villages, as well as rivers, lakes, and marshes, furnishing

ample supplies of food for all cattle both tame and wild, with timber of various descriptions, and in abundant quantity for every individual purpose. The plain then being thus by nature, was improved as follows by many kings in a long course of time. It was of square shape, mostly straight and oblong; and where it ended, they bounded it by a trench dug round it, —the depth, breadth, and length of which, for a work of man's making, besides the other connected undertakings, we can scarcely believe, though still we must report what we heard. It was excavated to the depth of a plethrum, and the breadth was a stadium in every part, —the whole excavation made round the plain being ten thousand stadia in length. This, receiving the streams coming down from the mountains, and conducted all round the plain, approached the city in some parts, and in this way was allowed to flow out to the sea. From above, likewise, straight canals were cut about a hundred feet broad along the plain, back into the ditch near the sea, distant from one another about one hundred stadia: —and it was by this that they brought down the timber from the mountains to the city, and carried on the rest of their shipping-traffic, cutting transverse canals of communication into each other, and towards the city. Their harvest, also, they gathered twice in the year; in winter availing themselves of the rains, and in summer introducing on the land the streams from the trenches.

As to the quantity of land, it was ordered, that of the men on the plain fit for service, each individual leader should have his allotment, each allotment amounting in extent to a hundred stadia, and the total of the lots being sixty thousand; —and of those from the mountains and the rest of the country there was said to be an incalculable number of men, to all of whom, according to their dwellings and villages, were assigned certain lots by their respective

leaders. To each leader, likewise, the task was appointed of furnishing for war the sixth portion of a war-chariot to make up a total of ten thousand, two riding horses, and a two-horse car without a driver's seat, haying a mounted charioteer to direct the horses, with another to dismount and fight at the side, —also two heavy-armed soldiers, two archers, two slingers, three each of light-armed men, stone-shooters and javelin-men, with four sailors to make up a complement of one thousand two hundred ships. Thus were the military affairs of this city arranged. And as respects the nine others, there were different other arrangements, which it would be tedious to narrate.

And as respects official situations and honors, the following were the arrangements made from the commencement: —Of the ten kings, each individually in his own district and over his own city ruled supreme over the people and the laws, constraining and punishing whomever he pleased: —and the government and commonwealth in each was regulated by the injunctions of Poseidon, as the law handed them down; and inscriptions were made by the first kings on a column of orichalcum, which was deposited in the center of the island in the temple of Poseidon, where they assembled every fifth year, which they afterwards changed to every sixth year, taking an equal part both for the entire state and its supernumeraries; and thus collected they consulted concerning the common weal, and inquired what transgressions each had committed, judging them accordingly. And when they were about to judge, they previously gave each other pledges, according to the following fashion: —As there were bulls grazing at liberty in the temple of Poseidon, ten men only of the whole number, after invoking the god to receive their sacrifice propitiously, went out to hunt swordless, with staves and chains, and whichever of the bulls they took, they brought it to the

column and slaughtered it at its head under the inscriptions: —and on the column, besides the laws, there was an oath written, invoking curses on the disobedient. When, therefore, in compliance with their laws, they sacrificed and burnt all the limbs of the bull, they filled a goblet with clots of blood, and threw the rest into the fire, by way of purifying the column: —and after this, dipping out of the goblet with golden cups, they poured libations down on the fire, and swore to do justice according to the laws on the column, to punish anyone who had previously transgressed them, and besides that, never afterwards willingly to transgress the inscribed laws, nor ever to rule or obey any ruler governing otherwise than according to his father's laws. Then after invoking these curses on themselves and their descendants, and after drinking and depositing the cup in the temple of the God, and abiding a necessary time at supper, as soon as it was dark, and the fire round the sacrifice had been cooled, all of them dressed themselves in beautiful dark-blue robes, and sitting on the ground near the embers of the sacrifice on which they had sworn, extinguished during the night all the fire about the temple, and then mutually judged each other as respects any accusations of transgressing the laws; —and after their acts of judgment were over, when day came, they inscribed their decisions on a golden tablet and deposited them as memorials, together with their dresses. There were many other individual laws also respecting the privileges of the kings, —the chief being, that they should never wage war on each other, and that all should lend their aid, in case that anyone in any of their cities should try to destroy the royal race, —consulting in common, as their ancestors did before them, as to the right course both in war and other concerns, and assigning the empire to the Atlantic race. They did not allow the king, however, any authority to put to death any of

his kinsmen, unless approved of by more than half of the ten.

Such then, and so great being the power at that time in those places, the Deity transferred it to these regions, as report goes, on the following pretexts: —For many generations, as long as the natural power of the god sufficed them, they remained obedient to the laws and kindly affected towards the divine nature to which they were allied: —for they possessed true and altogether lofty ideas, and practiced mildness united with wisdom, in reference to the casual occurrences of life and towards each other. Hence, looking above everything except virtue, they considered things present as of small importance, and contentedly bore, as a burden, the mass of gold and other property; nor were they deceived by the intoxication of luxury, or rendered intemperate through wealth; —but on the other hand being sober, they acutely perceived that all these things are increased through common friendship mingled with virtue, and that by too anxiously pursuing and honoring them, these goods themselves are corrupted, and with them friendship itself likewise perishes. To such a mode of reasoning then, and the abiding of such a nature, was it owing that they made all the progress that we before described. But when the divine portion within them became extinct through much and frequent admixture of the mortal nature, and the manners of men began to hold sway, then, through inability to bear present events, they began to exhibit unbecoming conduct and to the intelligent beholder appeared base, destroying the fairest among their most valuable possessions, —though all the while held by those who were unable to see a true life of happiness based on truth, to be in the highest degree worthy and blessed, though filled with avarice and unjust power. Zeus, however, the god of gods, who rules according to the laws, and is able to see

into such things, perceiving an honorable race in a condition of wretchedness, and wishing to inflict punishment on them, that they might become more diligent in the practice of temperance, collected all the gods into their own most ancient habitation, which indeed, being situated in the center of the whole world, beholds all things that have had a share in generation: —and having assembled them, he said,…

Critias.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Critias. Timaeus.

Hermocrates. Socrates.

Timaeus/ How thankful I am, Socrates, that I have arrived at last, and, like a weary traveler after a long journey, may be at rest! And I pray the being who always was of old, and has now been by me revealed, to grant that my words may endure in so far as they have been spoken truly and acceptably to him; but if unintentionally I have said anything wrong, I pray that he will impose upon me a just retribution, and the just retribution of him who errs is that he should be set right. Wishing, then, to speak truly in future concerning the generation of the gods, I pray him to give me knowledge, which of all medicines is the most perfect and best. And now having offered my prayer I deliver up the argument to Critias, who is to speak next according to our agreement.

Critias/ And I, Timaeus, accept the trust, and as you at first said that you were going to speak of high matters, and begged that some forbearance might be shown to you, I too ask the same or greater forbearance for what I am about to say. And although I very well know that my request may appear to be somewhat ambitious and discourteous, I must make it nevertheless. For will any man of sense deny that you have spoken well? I can only attempt to show that I ought to have more indulgence than you, because my theme is more difficult; and I shall argue that to seem to speak well of the gods to men is far easier than to speak well of men to men: for the inexperience and utter ignorance of his hearers about any subject is a great assistance to him who has to

speak of it, and we know how ignorant we are concerning the gods. But I should like to make my meaning clearer, if you will follow me. All that is said by any of us can only be imitation and representation. For if we consider the likenesses which painters make of bodies divine and heavenly, and the different degrees of gratification with which the eye of the spectator receives them, we shall see that we are satisfied with the artist who is able in any degree to imitate the earth and its mountains, and the rivers, and the woods, and the universe, and the things that are and move therein, and further, that knowing nothing precise about such matters, we do not examine or analyze the painting; all that is required is a sort of indistinct and deceptive mode of shadowing them forth. But when a person endeavors to paint the human form we are quick at finding out defects, and our familiar knowledge makes us severe judges of anyone who does not render every point of similarity. And we may observe the same thing to happen in discourse; we are satisfied with a picture of divine and heavenly things which has very little likeness to them; but we are more precise in our criticism of mortal and human things. Wherefore if at the moment of speaking I cannot suitably express my meaning, you must excuse me, considering that to form approved likenesses of human things is the reverse of easy. This is what I want to suggest to you, and at the same time to beg, Socrates, that I may have not less, but more indulgence conceded to me in what I am about to say. Which favor, if I am right in asking, I hope that you will be ready to grant.

Socrates/ Certainly, Critias, we will grant your request, and we will grant the same by anticipation to Hermocrates, as well as to you and Timaeus; for I have no doubt that when his turn comes a little while hence, he will make the same request which you have made. In order, then, that he may

provide himself with a fresh beginning, and not be compelled to say the same things over again, let him understand that the indulgence is already extended by anticipation to him. And now, friend Critias, I will announce to you the judgment of the theatre. They are of opinion that the last performer was wonderfully successful, and that you will need a great deal of indulgence before you will be able to take his place.

Hermocrates/ The warning, Socrates, which you have addressed to him, I must also take to myself. But remember, Critias, that faint heart never yet raised a trophy; and therefore you must go and attack the argument like a man. First invoke Apollo and the Muses, and then let us hear you sound the praises and show forth the virtues of your ancient citizens.

Critias/ Friend Hermocrates, you, who are stationed last and have another in front of you, have not lost heart as yet; the gravity of the situation will soon be revealed to you; meanwhile I accept your exhortations and encouragements. But besides the gods and goddesses whom you have mentioned, I would specially invoke Mnemosyne; for all the important part of my discourse is dependent on her favor, and if I can recollect and recite enough of what was said by the priests and brought hither by Solon, I doubt not that I shall satisfy the requirements of this theatre. And now, making no more excuses, I will proceed.

Let me begin by observing first of all, that nine thousand was the sum of years which had elapsed since the war which was said to have taken place between those who dwelt outside the pillars of Heracles and all who dwelt within them; this war I am going to describe. Of the combatants on the one side, the city of Athens was reported to have been the leader and to have fought out the war; the combatants on the other side were commanded by the kings of Atlantis, which, as I was saying, was an island greater in extent than

Libya and Asia, and when afterwards sunk by an earthquake, became an impassable barrier of mud to voyagers sailing from hence to any part of the ocean. The progress of the history will unfold the various nations of barbarians and families of Hellenes which then existed, as they successively appear on the scene; but I must describe first of all the Athenians of that day, and their enemies who fought with them, and then the respective powers and governments of the two kingdoms. Let us give the precedence to Athens.

In the days of old, the gods had the whole earth distributed among them by allotment. There was no quarrelling; for you cannot rightly suppose that the gods did not know what was proper for each of them to have, or, knowing this, that they would seek to procure for themselves by contention that which more properly belonged to others. They all of them by just apportionment obtained what they wanted, and peopled their own districts; and when they had peopled them they tended us, their nurslings and possessions, as shepherds tend their flocks, excepting only that they did not use blows or bodily force, as shepherds do, but governed us like pilots from the stern of the vessel, which is an easy way of guiding animals, holding our souls by the rudder of persuasion according to their own pleasure; —thus did they guide all mortal creatures. Now different gods had their allotments in different places which they set in order. Hephaestus and Athene, who were brother and sister, and sprang from the same father, having a common nature, and being united also in the love of philosophy and art, both obtained as their common portion this land, which was naturally adapted for wisdom and virtue; and there they implanted brave children of the soil, and put into their minds the order of government; their names are preserved, but

their actions have disappeared by reason of the destruction of those who received the tradition, and the lapse of ages.

For when there were any survivors, as I have already said, they were men who dwelt in the mountains; and they were ignorant of the art of writing, and had heard only the names of the chiefs of the land, but very little about their actions. The names they were willing enough to give to their children; but the virtues and the laws of their predecessors, they knew only by obscure traditions; and as they themselves and their children lacked for many generations the necessaries of life, they directed their attention to the supply of their wants, and of them they conversed, to the neglect of events that had happened in times long past; for mythology and the enquiry into antiquity are first introduced into cities when they begin to have leisure, and when they see that the necessaries of life have already been provided, but not before. And this is the reason why the names of the ancients have been preserved to us and not their actions. This I infer because Solon said that the priests in their narrative of that war mentioned most of the names which are recorded prior to the time of Theseus, such as Cecrops, and Erechtheus, and Erichthonius, and Erysichthon, and the names of the women in like manner. Moreover, since military pursuits were then common to men and women, the men of those days in accordance with the custom of the time set up a figure and image of the goddess in full armor, to be a testimony that all animals which associate together, male as well as female, may, if they please, practice in common the virtue which belongs to them without distinction of sex.

Now the country was inhabited in those days by various classes of citizens; —there were artisans, and there were husbandmen, and there was also a warrior class originally set apart by divine men. The latter dwelt by themselves, and had all things suitable for nurture and education; neither

had any of them anything of their own, but they regarded all that they had as common property; nor did they claim to receive of the other citizens anything more than their necessary food. And they practiced all the pursuits which we yesterday described as those of our imaginary guardians. Concerning the country the Egyptian priests said what is not only probable but manifestly true, that the boundaries were in those days fixed by the Isthmus, and that in the direction of the continent they extended as far as the heights of Cithaeron and Parnes; the boundary line came down in the direction of the sea, having the district of Oropus on the right, and with the river Asopus as the limit on the left. The land was the best in the world, and was therefore able in those days to support a vast army, raised from the surrounding people. Even the remnant of Attica which now exists may compare with any region in the world for the variety and excellence of its fruits and the suitableness of its pastures to every sort of animal, which proves what I am saying; but in those days the country was fair as now and yielded far more abundant produce. How shall I establish my words? and what part of it can be truly called a remnant of the land that then was? The whole country is only a long promontory extending far into the sea away from the rest of the continent, while the surrounding basin of the sea is everywhere deep in the neighborhood of the shore. Many great deluges have taken place during the nine thousand years, for that is the number of years which have elapsed since the time of which I am speaking; and during all this time and through so many changes, there has never been any considerable accumulation of the soil coming down from the mountains, as in other places, but the earth has fallen away all round and sunk out of sight. The consequence is, that in comparison of what then was, there are remaining only the bones of the wasted body, as they may be called, as

in the case of small islands, all the richer and softer parts of the soil having fallen away, and the mere skeleton of the land being left. But in the primitive state of the country, its mountains were high hills covered with soil, and the plains, as they are termed by us, of Phelleus were full of rich earth, and there was abundance of wood in the mountains. Of this last the traces still remain, for although some of the mountains now only afford sustenance to bees, not so very long ago there were still to be seen roofs of timber cut from trees growing there, which were of a size sufficient to cover the largest houses; and there were many other high trees, cultivated by man and bearing abundance of food for cattle. Moreover, the land reaped the benefit of the annual rainfall, not as now losing the water which flows off the bare earth into the sea, but, having an abundant supply in all places, and receiving it into herself and treasuring it up in the close clay soil, it let off into the hollows the streams which it absorbed from the heights, providing everywhere abundant fountains and rivers, of which there may still be observed sacred memorials in places where fountains once existed; and this proves the truth of what I am saying.

Such was the natural state of the country, which was cultivated, as we may well believe, by true husbandmen, who made husbandry their business, and were lovers of honor, and of a noble nature, and had a soil the best in the world, and abundance of water, and in the heaven above an excellently attempered climate. Now the city in those days was arranged on this wise. In the first place the Acropolis was not as now. For the fact is that a single night of excessive rain washed away the earth and laid bare the rock; at the same time there were earthquakes, and then occurred the extraordinary inundation, which was the third before the great destruction of Deucalion. But in primitive times the hill of the Acropolis extended to the Eridanus and Ilissus, and

included the Pnyx on one side, and the Lycabettus as a boundary on the opposite side to the Pnyx, and was all well covered with soil, and level at the top, except in one or two places. Outside the Acropolis and under the sides of the hill there dwelt artisans, and such of the husbandmen as were tilling the ground near; the warrior class dwelt by themselves around the temples of Athene and Hephaestus at the summit, which moreover they had enclosed with a single fence like the garden of a single house. On the north side they had dwellings in common and had erected halls for dining in winter, and had all the buildings which they needed for their common life, besides temples, but there was no adorning of them with gold and silver, for they made no use of these for any purpose; they took a middle course between meanness and ostentation, and built modest houses in which they and their children's children grew old, and they handed them down to others who were like themselves, always the same. But in summer-time they left their gardens and gymnasia and dining halls, and then the southern side of the hill was made use of by them for the same purpose. Where the Acropolis now is there was a fountain, which was choked by the earthquake, and has left only the few small streams which still exist in the vicinity, but in those days the fountain gave an abundant supply of water for all and of suitable temperature in summer and in winter. This is how they dwelt, being the guardians of their own citizens and the leaders of the Hellenes, who were their willing followers. And they took care to preserve the same number of men and women through all time, being so many as were required for warlike purposes, then as now, —that is to say, about twenty thousand. Such were the ancient Athenians, and after this manner they righteously administered their own land and the rest of Hellas; they were renowned all over Europe and Asia for the beauty of their

persons and for the many virtues of their souls, and of all men who lived in those days they were the most illustrious. And next, if I have not forgotten what I heard when I was a child, I will impart to you the character and origin of their adversaries. For friends should not keep their stories to themselves, but have them in common.

Yet, before proceeding further in the narrative, I ought to warn you, that you must not be surprised if you should perhaps hear Hellenic names given to foreigners. I will tell you the reason of this: Solon, who was intending to use the tale for his poem, enquired into the meaning of the names, and found that the early Egyptians in writing them down had translated them into their own language, and he recovered the meaning of the several names and when copying them out again translated them into our language. My great-grandfather, Dropides, had the original writing, which is still in my possession, and was carefully studied by me when I was a child. Therefore if you hear names such as are used in this country, you must not be surprised, for I have told how they came to be introduced. The tale, which was of great length, began as follows: —

I have before remarked in speaking of the allotments of the gods, that they distributed the whole earth into portions differing in extent, and made for themselves temples and instituted sacrifices. And Poseidon, receiving for his lot the island of Atlantis, begat children by a mortal woman, and settled them in a part of the island, which I will describe. Looking towards the sea, but in the center of the whole island, there was a plain which is said to have been the fairest of all plains and very fertile. Near the plain again, and also in the center of the island at a distance of about fifty stadia, there was a mountain not very high on any side. In this mountain there dwelt one of the earth-born primeval men of that country, whose name was Evenor, and he had a

wife named Leucippe, and they had an only daughter who was called Cleito. The maiden had already reached womanhood, when her father and mother died; Poseidon fell in love with her and had intercourse with her, and breaking the ground, enclosed the hill in which she dwelt all round, making alternate zones of sea and land larger and smaller, encircling one another; there were two of land and three of water, which he turned as with a lathe, each having its circumference equidistant every way from the center, so that no man could get to the island, for ships and voyages were not as yet. He himself, being a god, found no difficulty in making special arrangements for the center island, bringing up two springs of water from beneath the earth, one of warm water and the other of cold, and making every variety of food to spring up abundantly from the soil. He also begat and brought up five pairs of twin male children; and dividing the island of Atlantis into ten portions, he gave to the first-born of the eldest pair his mother's dwelling and the surrounding allotment, which was the largest and best, and made him king over the rest; the others he made princes, and gave them rule over many men, and a large territory. And he named them all; the eldest, who was the first king, he named Atlas, and after him the whole island and the ocean were called Atlantic. To his twin brother, who was born after him, and obtained as his lot the extremity of the island towards the pillars of Heracles, facing the country which is now called the region of Gades in that part of the world, he gave the name which in the Hellenic language is Eumelus, in the language of the country which is named after him, Gadeirus. Of the second pair of twins he called one Ampheres, and the other Evaemon. To the elder of the third pair of twins he gave the name Mneseus, and Autochthon to the one who followed him. Of the fourth pair of twins he called the elder Elasippus, and the younger Mestor. And of the fifth pair he gave to the

elder the name of Azaes, and to the younger that of Diaprepes. All these and their descendants for many generations were the inhabitants and rulers of divers islands in the open sea; and also, as has been already said, they held sway in our direction over the country within the pillars as far as Egypt and Tyrrhenia. Now Atlas had a numerous and honorable family, and they retained the kingdom, the eldest son handing it on to his eldest for many generations; and they had such an amount of wealth as was never before possessed by kings and potentates, and is not likely ever to be again, and they were furnished with everything which they needed, both in the city and country. For because of the greatness of their empire many things were brought to them from foreign countries, and the island itself provided most of what was required by them for the uses of life. In the first place, they dug out of the earth whatever was to be found there, solid as well as fusile, and that which is now only a name and was then something more than a name, orichalcum, was dug out of the earth in many parts of the island, being more precious in those days than anything except gold. There was an abundance of wood for carpenter's work, and sufficient maintenance for tame and wild animals. Moreover, there were a great number of elephants in the island; for as there was provision for all other sorts of animals, both for those which live in lakes and marshes and rivers, and also for those which live in mountains and on plains, so there was for the animal which is the largest and most voracious of all. Also whatever fragrant things there now are in the earth, whether roots, or herbage, or woods, or essences which distil from fruit and flower, grew and thrived in that land; also the fruit which admits of cultivation, both the dry sort, which is given us for nourishment and any other which we use for food—we call them all by the common name of pulse, and the fruits having

a hard rind, affording drinks and meats and ointments, and good store of chestnuts and the like, which furnish pleasure and amusement, and are fruits which spoil with keeping, and the pleasant kinds of dessert, with which we console ourselves after dinner, when we are tired of eating—all these that sacred island which then beheld the light of the sun, brought forth fair and wondrous and in infinite abundance. With such blessings the earth freely furnished them; meanwhile they went on constructing their temples and palaces and harbors and docks. And they arranged the whole country in the following manner: —

First of all they bridged over the zones of sea which surrounded the ancient metropolis, making a road to and from the royal palace. And at the very beginning they built the palace in the habitation of the god and of their ancestors, which they continued to ornament in successive generations, every king surpassing the one who went before him to the utmost of his power, until they made the building a marvel to behold for size and for beauty. And beginning from the sea they bored a canal of three hundred feet in width and one hundred feet in depth and fifty stadia in length, which they carried through to the outermost zone, making a passage from the sea up to this, which became a harbor, and leaving an opening sufficient to enable the largest vessels to find ingress. Moreover, they divided at the bridges the zones of land which parted the zones of sea, leaving room for a single trireme to pass out of one zone into another, and they covered over the channels so as to leave a way underneath for the ships; for the banks were raised considerably above the water. Now the largest of the zones into which a passage was cut from the sea was three stadia in breadth, and the zone of land which came next of equal breadth; but the next two zones, the one of water, the other of land, were two stadia, and the one which surrounded the

central island was a stadium only in width. The island in which the palace was situated had a diameter of five stadia. All this including the zones and the bridge, which was the sixth part of a stadium in width, they surrounded by a stone wall on every side, placing towers and gates on the bridges where the sea passed in. The stone which was used in the work they quarried from underneath the center island, and from underneath the zones, on the outer as well as the inner side. One kind was white, another black, and a third red, and as they quarried, they at the same time hollowed out double docks, having roofs formed out of the native rock. Some of their buildings were simple, but in others they put together different stones, varying the color to please the eye, and to be a natural source of delight. The entire circuit of the wall, which went round the outermost zone, they covered with a coating of brass, and the circuit of the next wall they coated with tin, and the third, which encompassed the citadel, flashed with the red light of orichalcum. The palaces in the interior of the citadel were constructed on this wise: —In the center was a holy temple dedicated to Cleito and Poseidon, which remained inaccessible, and was surrounded by an enclosure of gold; this was the spot where the family of the ten princes first saw the light, and thither the people annually brought the fruits of the earth in their season from all the ten portions, to be an offering to each of the ten. Here was Poseidon's own temple which was a stadium in length, and half a stadium in width, and of a proportionate height, having a strange barbaric appearance. All the outside of the temple, with the exception of the pinnacles, they covered with silver, and the pinnacles with gold. In the interior of the temple the roof was of ivory, curiously wrought everywhere with gold and silver and orichalcum; and all the other parts, the walls and pillars and floor, they coated with orichalcum. In the temple they placed

statues of gold: there was the god himself standing in a chariot—the charioteer of six winged horses—and of such a size that he touched the roof of the building with his head; around him there were a hundred Nereids riding on dolphins, for such was thought to be the number of them by the men of those days. There were also in the interior of the temple other images which had been dedicated by private persons. And around the temple on the outside were placed statues of gold of all the descendants of the ten kings and of their wives, and there were many other great offerings of kings and of private persons, coming both from the city itself and from the foreign cities over which they held sway. There was an altar too, which in size and workmanship corresponded to this magnificence, and the palaces, in like manner, answered to the greatness of the kingdom and the glory of the temple.

In the next place, they had fountains, one of cold and another of hot water, in gracious plenty flowing; and they were wonderfully adapted for use by reason of the pleasantness and excellence of their waters. They constructed buildings about them and planted suitable trees; also they made cisterns, some open to the heaven, others roofed over, to be used in winter as warm baths; there were the kings' baths, and the baths of private persons, which were kept apart; and there were separate baths for women, and for horses and cattle, and to each of them they gave as much adornment as was suitable. Of the water which ran off they carried some to the grove of Poseidon, where were growing all manner of trees of wonderful height and beauty, owing to the excellence of the soil, while the remainder was conveyed by aqueducts along the bridges to the outer circles; and there were many temples built and dedicated to many gods; also gardens and places of exercise, some for men, and others for horses in both of the two

islands formed by the zones; and in the center of the larger of the two there was set apart a race-course of a stadium in width, and in length allowed to extend all round the island, for horses to race in. Also there were guard-houses at intervals for the guards, the more trusted of whom were appointed to keep watch in the lesser zone, which was nearer the Acropolis; while the most trusted of all had houses given them within the citadel, near the persons of the kings. The docks were full of triremes and naval stores, and all things were quite ready for use. Enough of the plan of the royal palace.

Leaving the palace and passing out across the three harbors, you came to a wall which began at the sea and went all round: this was everywhere distant fifty stadia from the largest zone or harbor, and enclosed the whole, the ends meeting at the mouth of the channel which led to the sea. The entire area was densely crowded with habitations; and the canal and the largest of the harbors were full of vessels and merchants coming from all parts, who, from their numbers, kept up a multitudinous sound of human voices, and din and clatter of all sorts night and day.

I have described the city and the environs of the ancient palace nearly in the words of Solon, and now I must endeavor to represent to you the nature and arrangement of the rest of the land. The whole country was said by him to be very lofty and precipitous on the side of the sea, but the country immediately about and surrounding the city was a level plain, itself surrounded by mountains which descended towards the sea; it was smooth and even, and of an oblong shape, extending in one direction three thousand stadia, but across the center inland it was two thousand stadia. This part of the island looked towards the south, and was sheltered from the north. The surrounding mountains were celebrated for their number and size and beauty, far beyond

any which still exist, having in them also many wealthy villages of country folk, and rivers, and lakes, and meadows supplying food enough for every animal, wild or tame, and much wood of various sorts, abundant for each and every kind of work.

I will now describe the plain, as it was fashioned by nature and by the labors of many generations of kings through long ages. It was for the most part rectangular and oblong, and where falling out of the straight line followed the circular ditch. The depth, and width, and length of this ditch were incredible, and gave the impression that a work of such extent, in addition to so many others, could never have been artificial. Nevertheless I must say what I was told. It was excavated to the depth of a hundred feet, and its breadth was a stadium everywhere; it was carried round the whole of the plain, and was ten thousand stadia in length. It received the streams which came down from the mountains, and winding round the plain and meeting at the city, was there let off into the sea. Further inland, likewise, straight canals of a hundred feet in width were cut from it through the plain, and again let off into the ditch leading to the sea: these canals were at intervals of a hundred stadia, and by them they brought down the wood from the mountains to the city, and conveyed the fruits of the earth in ships, cutting transverse passages from one canal into another, and to the city. Twice in the year they gathered the fruits of the earth—in winter having the benefit of the rains of heaven, and in summer the water which the land supplied by introducing streams from the canals.

As to the population, each of the lots in the plain had to find a leader for the men who were fit for military service, and the size of a lot was a square of ten stadia each way, and the total number of all the lots was sixty thousand. And of the inhabitants of the mountains and of the rest of the

country there was also a vast multitude, which was distributed among the lots and had leaders assigned to them according to their districts and villages. The leader was required to furnish for the war the sixth portion of a war-chariot, so as to make up a total of ten thousand chariots; also two horses and riders for them, and a pair of chariot-horses without a seat, accompanied by a horseman who could fight on foot carrying a small shield, and having a charioteer who stood behind the man-at-arms to guide the two horses; also, he was bound to furnish two heavy-armed soldiers, two archers, two slingers, three stone-shooters and three javelin-men, who were light-armed, and four sailors to make up the complement of twelve hundred ships. Such was the military order of the royal city—the order of the other nine governments varied, and it would be wearisome to recount their several differences.

As to offices and honors, the following was the arrangement from the first. Each of the ten kings in his own division and in his own city had the absolute control of the citizens, and, in most cases, of the laws, punishing and slaying whomsoever he would. Now the order of precedence among them and their mutual relations were regulated by the commands of Poseidon which the law had handed down. These were inscribed by the first kings on a pillar of orichalcum, which was situated in the middle of the island, at the temple of Poseidon, whither the kings were gathered together every fifth and every sixth year alternately, thus giving equal honor to the odd and to the even number. And when they were gathered together they consulted about their common interests, and enquired if anyone had transgressed in anything, and passed judgment, and before they passed judgment they gave their pledges to one another on this wise: —There were bulls who had the range of the temple of Poseidon; and the ten kings, being left alone in the temple,

after they had offered prayers to the god that they might capture the victim which was acceptable to him, hunted the bulls, without weapons, but with staves and nooses; and the bull which they caught they led up to the pillar and cut its throat over the top of it so that the blood fell upon the sacred inscription. Now on the pillar, besides the laws, there was inscribed an oath invoking mighty curses on the disobedient. When therefore, after slaying the bull in the accustomed manner, they had burnt its limbs, they filled a bowl of wine and cast in a clot of blood for each of them; the rest of the victim they put in the fire, after having purified the column all round. Then they drew from the bowl in golden cups, and pouring a libation on the fire, they swore that they would judge according to the laws on the pillar, and would punish him who in any point had already transgressed them, and that for the future they would not, if they could help, offend against the writing on the pillar, and would neither command others, nor obey any ruler who commanded them, to act otherwise than according to the laws of their father Poseidon. This was the prayer which each of them offered up for himself and for his descendants, at the same time drinking and dedicating the cup out of which he drank in the temple of the god; and after they had supped and satisfied their needs, when darkness came on, and the fire about the sacrifice was cool, all of them put on most beautiful azure robes, and, sitting on the ground, at night, over the embers of the sacrifices by which they had sworn, and extinguishing all the fire about the temple, they received and gave judgment, if any of them had an accusation to bring against anyone; and when they had given judgment, at daybreak they wrote down their sentences on a golden tablet, and dedicated it together with their robes to be a memorial.

There were many special laws affecting the several kings inscribed about the temples, but the most important was the following: They were not to take up arms against one another, and they were all to come to the rescue if anyone in any of their cities attempted to overthrow the royal house; like their ancestors, they were to deliberate in common about war and other matters, giving the supremacy to the descendants of Atlas. And the king was not to have the power of life and death over any of his kinsmen unless he had the assent of the majority of the ten.

Such was the vast power which the god settled in the lost island of Atlantis; and this he afterwards directed against our land for the following reasons, as tradition tells: For many generations, as long as the divine nature lasted in them, they were obedient to the laws, and well-affectioned towards the god, whose seed they were; for they possessed true and in every way great spirits, uniting gentleness with wisdom in the various chances of life, and in their intercourse with one another. They despised everything but virtue, caring little for their present state of life, and thinking lightly of the possession of gold and other property, which seemed only a burden to them; neither were they intoxicated by luxury; nor did wealth deprive them of their self-control; but they were sober, and saw clearly that all these goods are increased by virtue and friendship with one another, whereas by too great regard and respect for them, they are lost and friendship with them. By such reflections and by the continuance in them of a divine nature, the qualities which we have described grew and increased among them; but when the divine portion began to fade away, and became diluted too often and too much with the mortal admixture, and the human nature got the upper hand, they then, being unable to bear their fortune, behaved unseemly, and to him who had an eye to see, grew visibly debased, for they were

losing the fairest of their precious gifts; but to those who had no eye to see the true happiness, they appeared glorious and blessed at the very time when they were full of avarice and unrighteous power. Zeus, the god of gods, who rules according to law, and is able to see into such things, perceiving that an honorable race was in a woeful plight, and wanting to inflict punishment on them, that they might be chastened and improve, collected all the gods into their most holy habitation, which, being placed in the center of the world, beholds all created things. And when he had called them together, he spoke as follows: —

The Critias.

or

Atlanticus.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

TIMÆUS, CRITIAS.

SOCRATES, HERMOCRATES.

Timaeus/ AS pleasant, Socrates, as is rest after a long journey, so pleasing to me is the present liberation from an extended discourse. But I beseech the world, that God, which was in reality generated formerly, though but recently in our discussion, to preserve those things which we have asserted with rectitude, but to inflict on us a becoming punishment if we have involuntarily said anything discordant. But the proper punishment of him who acts disorderly and inelegantly, is to make him act with order and elegance. That we may, therefore, after this speak rightly respecting the generation of the Gods, let us beseech that divinity, the world, to impart to us the medicine science, which is the most perfect and best of all medicines. But having prayed, let us deliver, according to our agreement, the following discourse to Critias.

Critias/ I receive it, O Timæus: and as you, at the beginning of your discussion, entreated pardon, as being about to speak of great things; in like manner, I at present entreat the same. Indeed I think that I ought to solicit pardon in a still greater degree for the ensuing discourse, though I nearly know that this my request is very ambitious, and more rustic than is proper; but, at the same time, let us begin the discourse. For who endued with a sound mind will attempt to say that the things which have been asserted by

you have not been well said? But that the particulars which remain to be discussed require greater indulgence, as being more difficult, this I will endeavor to show. For he, O Timæus, who discourses concerning the Gods to men, may more easily appear to speak all that is sufficient than he who discourses concerning mortals to you. For the unskillfulness and vehement ignorance of the auditors about things of this kind afford a great copia verborum to him who enters on the discussion of them: but we know how we are circumstanced with respect to the Gods. However, that I may more plainly evince what I say, thus attend to me in what follows: —It is requisite that all we shall say should become in a certain respect an imitation and a resemblance. But we see the facility and subtilty which take place in the representation exhibited by pictures of divine and human bodies, in order that they may appear to the spectators to be apt imitations. We likewise see, with respect to the earth, mountains, rivers, woods, all heaven, and the revolving bodies which it contains, that at first we are delighted if anyone is able to exhibit but a slender representation to our view; but that afterwards, as not knowing anything accurately about such-like particulars, we neither examine nor blame the pictures, but use an immanifest and fallacious adumbration respecting them. But when anyone attempts to represent our bodies, we acutely perceive what is omitted, through our continual and familiar animadversion of them, and we become severe judges of him who does not perfectly exhibit all the requisite similitudes. It is likewise necessary to consider the same thing as taking place in discourse. For, with respect to things celestial and divine, we are delighted with assertions concerning them that are but in a small degree adapted to their nature; but we accurately examine things mortal and human. And hence it is requisite to pardon whatever in the ensuing discourse may be delivered

in an unbecoming manner. For it is proper to think, that to assimilate mortal concerns to opinion, is not an easy but a difficult talk. I have said all this, Socrates, being willing to remind you, and to solicit not less but greater pardon for the following discourse. But if my request shall appear to you to be just, do you willingly impart this gift.

Socrates/ Why should we not, O Critias, impart it? And besides this, the same pardon must be granted by us to a third. For it is evident that Hermocrates, Hermocrates, who is to speak shortly after, will make the same request. That he, therefore, may make a different exordium, and may not be obliged to repeat what you have said, let him know that pardon is granted him, and let him, therefore, prepare to speak. But I previously announce to you, friend Critias, the conceptions of the theatre. For the poet has approved in a wonderful manner the person who spoke in it before; so that you will require abundant pardon in attempting to discharge the office of his successor.

Hermocrates/ You announce the same thing to me, Socrates, as to him. But desponding men, Critias, never erect a trophy. It is, therefore, requisite to proceed in a virile manner to the discourse, and, invoking Pæan and the Muses, to exhibit and celebrate antient citizens who were excellent men.

Critias/ O friend Hermocrates, as you are to speak on the following day, having another to speak before you, on this account you are courageous. But he will, perhaps, manifest to you how this is to be accomplished. You, therefore, thus exhorting and encouraging me, I shall obey; and besides those Gods which you have mentioned, I shall invoke others, and especially Mnemosyne. For nearly the greatest reasons and discussions are contained for us in this Divinity. If, then, we can sufficiently remember and relate the narration which was once given by the Egyptian priests, and brought

hither by Solon, you know that we shall appear to this theatre to have sufficiently accomplished our part. This, therefore, must now be done, and without any further delay.

But first of all we must recollect, that the period of time from which a war is said to have subsisted between all those that dwelt beyond and within the pillars of Hercules, amounts to nine thousand years: and this war it is now requisite for us to discuss. Of those, therefore, that dwelt within the pillars of Hercules, this city was the leader, and is said to have fought in every battle; but of those beyond the pillars, the kings of the Atlantic island were the leaders. But this island we said was once larger than Libya and Asia, *but is now a mass of impervious mud*, *through concussions of the earth*; *so that those who are sailing in the vast sea can no longer find a passage from hence thither*. The course of our narration, indeed, will unfold the many barbarous nations and Grecian tribes which then existed, as they may happen to present themselves to our view: but it is necessary to relate, in the first place, the wars of the Athenians and their adversaries, together with the power and the polities of each. And in discoursing of these we shall give the preference to our own people.

The Gods, then, once were locally allotted the whole earth, but not with contention: For it would be absurd that the Gods should be ignorant of what is adapted to everyone, or that, knowing that which rather belongs to others, they should endeavor, through strife, to possess what is not their own. Likewise, receiving places agreeable to them, from the allotments of justice, they inhabited the various regions of the earth. In consequence of this, too, like shepherds, they nourished us as their possessions, flocks, and herds; with this exception, however, that they did not force bodies to bodies in the same manner as shepherds, who, when feeding their cattle, compel them to come together with blows: but

they considered us as a docile and obedient animal; and, as if piloting a pliant ship, employed persuasion for the rudder; and with this conception as the leader, they governed the whole mortal race. Different Gods, therefore, being allotted, adorned different places. But Vulcan and Minerva, who possess a common nature, both because they are the offspring of the same father, and because, through philosophy and the study of arts, they tend to the same things; —these, I say, in consequence of this, received one allotment, viz. this region, as being naturally allied and adapted to virtue and prudence. But these Divinities having produced worthy, earth-born men, arranged in their intellectual part the order of a polity. Of these men the names are preserved; but their works, through the extinction of those that received them, and length of time, have disappeared. For the surviving race of men, as has been observed before, are always mountaineers, and void of discipline, who have only heard the names of men that were powerful in the region, and who, besides this, have been acquainted but with few of the transactions of the country. In consequence, therefore, of loving these antient men, they gave the names of them to their children: but they were ignorant of the virtues and laws of those before them; for of these they knew nothing, but what they gathered from certain obscure rumors; and as for many generations they were in want of necessaries, both they and their children directed their attention to the particulars of which they were destitute, discoursed about these, and neglected past and antient transactions. For mythology, and an investigation of antient affairs, commence in cities in conjunction with leisure, when the necessaries of life are procured; but not before. On this account the names of antient transactions were preserved, without any account of the transactions themselves. But I infer that this was the case, said Solon,

because those priests, in their narration of the war at that period, inferred many names similar to those that were adopted afterwards, such as Cecrops, Erechtheus, Erichthonius, Erisichthon, and many other of those names which are commemorated prior to Theseus. This was likewise the case with the names of the women. The figure too and statue of Minerva evinced, that at that period the studies of women and men with respect to war were common, as an armed image was then dedicated to the Goddess; this serving as a document, that among animals of the same species both male and female are naturally able to pursue in common every virtue, which is adapted to their species. But at that time many other tribes of citizens dwelt in this region, who were skilled in the fabricative arts, and in agriculture. The warlike tribe, however, lived from the first separate from divine men, and possessed everything requisite to aliment and education. None of them, however, had any private property; for all of them considered all things as common. They likewise did not think it worthwhile to receive from other citizens beyond a sufficiency of nutriment; and they engaged in all those pursuits which we related yesterday as pertaining to the guardians of our republic. It was likewise plausibly and truly said of our region, that, in the first place, at that time its boundaries extended, on one side to the Isthmus, and on the other to Epirus, as far as to Cithæron and Parnethe. These boundaries are on the descent, having Oropia on the right hand, and limiting Asopus toward the sea on the left. It is likewise said that the whole earth was vanquished by the velour of this region; and that on this account it was at that time able to support the numerous army formed from the surrounding inhabitants. But this it is said was a mighty proof of virtue. For what is now left of this country may contend with any other in fertility of soil, in the goodness of its fruits, and in pastures

accommodated to every species of animals. But then it produced all these, not only thus beautiful, but likewise in the greatest abundance. But how is this credible? And by what arguments can it be shown that these are the remains of the land that then existed? The whole of this region is situated like a long promontory, extending into the sea, from the other continent. This the profound receptacle of the sea every way surrounds. *As, therefore many and mighty deluges happened in that period of nine thousand years* (*for so many years have elapsed from that to the present time*), the defluxions of the earth at these times, and during these calamities, from elevated places, did not, as they are elsewhere wont to do, accumulate any hillock which deserves to be mentioned, but, always flowing in a circle, at length vanished in a profundity. The parts, therefore, that are left at present are but as small islands, if compared with those that existed at that time; and may be said to resemble the bones of a diseased body; such of the earth as was soft and sat being washed away, and a thin body of the country alone remaining. But at that time the land, being unmingled, contained mountains and lofty hills; and the plains, which are now denominated Phellei, were then full of fat earth; and the mountains abounded with woods, of which there are evident tokens even at present. For there are mountains which now only afford nutriment for bees, but formerly, and at no very distant period, the largest trees were cut down from those mountains, as being adapted for buildings; and of these edifices, the coverings still remain. There were likewise many other lofty domestic trees; and most fertile pastures for cattle. This region, too, every year enjoyed prolific rain, which did not then, as now, run from naked earth into the sea, but, being collected in great abundance from lofty places, and preserved for use in certain cavities of the earth, diffused copious streams of fountains and rivers

to every part of the country; the truth of which is confirmed by certain sacred remains which are still to be seen in the antient fountains. And such was the natural condition of this region formerly; besides which, it was cultivated, as it is reasonable to suppose it would be, by real husbandmen, who were men of elegant manners, and of a disposition naturally good; who possessed a most excellent soil, most abundant streams of water, and a most salubrious temperament of air.

But the city at that time was built in the following manner: In the first place, the Acropolis was not then, as it is at present. For now one rainy night having softened the bare land round about, in a remarkable degree, at the same time produced an earthquake; *and thus there happened a* THIRD *fatal inundation of water*, PRIOR *to the deluge of Deucalion*. But prior to this, the magnitude of the Acropolis extended as far as to Eridanus and Ilissus, comprehended within itself Pnyx, and Lycabetus, and was bounded in a direction opposite to Pnyx. All the land too was glebous, except a few places in a more elevated situation which were plain. Its exterior parts on the left hand were inhabited by artists and husbandmen, who cultivated the neighboring land. But the warlike tribe alone inhabited the elevated parts, about the temple of Minerva and Vulcan, being distributed in one enclosure round the garden as it were of one edifice. For those who raised public buildings, and common banquets for the winter season, together with whatever is adapted to a common polity, and who furnished both these, and temples themselves, without gold and silver, all of this description dwelt in the northern parts of this region. For gold and silver were not employed by anyone at any time; but, pursuing a middle course between arrogance and illiberality, they built moderate houses, in which both they, and the offspring of their offspring growing old, they

always left them to others like themselves. But in summer they used gardens, gymnasia, and public banquets, in places situated towards the south. There was likewise one fountain in the place where the Acropolis is now situated, which having been exhausted by earthquakes, small circulating streams alone remain at present. But at that time every part was abundantly supplied with springs of water, which were of a salutary temperament both in summer and winter. In this manner, then, these places were formerly inhabited; and the men of whom we have been speaking were guardians of their own citizens, but leaders of the other willing Greeks. They likewise were especially careful that there might always be the same number of men and women who by their age are able to fight, and that this number might not be less than twenty thousand. These men, therefore, being such as we have described, and always justly administering in this manner both their own affairs and those of all Greece, they were esteemed and renowned beyond every other nation by all Europe and Asia, both for the beauty of their bodies and the all-various virtue of their souls.

In the next place, I shall communicate to you from the beginning the particulars respecting the adversaries of these men, if I am able to recollect what I heard when I was a boy. But, somewhat prior to this narration, it is proper to observe, that you must not be surprised at often hearing me mention Grecian names of barbarous men. For the cause of this is as follows: —Solon intending to insert this narration into his verses, investigated for this purpose the power of names, and found that those first Egyptians who committed these particulars to writing transferred these names into their own tongue. He, therefore, again receiving the meaning of every name, introduced that meaning into our language. And these writings were in the possession of my grandfather, and

are now in mine: they were likewise the subject of my meditation while I was a boy. If, therefore, in the course of this narration you hear such names as subsist among us at present, you must not be surprised; for you know the cause. But it will require a long discourse to speak from the beginning, as I did before, concerning the allotment of the Gods, and to show how they distributed the whole earth, here into larger, and there into lesser allotments, and procured temples and sacrifices for themselves, Neptune, indeed, being allotted the Atlantic island, settled his offspring by a mortal woman in a certain part of the island, of the following description. Towards the sea, but in the middle of the island, there was a plain, which is said to have been the most beautiful of all plains, and distinguished by the fertility of the soil. Near this plain, and again in the middle of it, at the distance of fifty stadia, there was a very low mountain. This was inhabited by one of those men who in the beginning sprung from the earth, and whole name was Evenor. This man living with a woman called Leucippe had by her Clites, who was his only daughter. But when the virgin arrived at maturity, and her father and mother were dead, Neptune being captivated with her beauty had connection with her, and enclosed the hill on which she dwelt with spiral streams of water; the sea and the land at the same time alternately forming about each other lesser and larger zones. Of these, two were formed by the land, and three by the sea; and these zones, as if made by a turner's wheel, were in all parts equidistant from the middle of the island, so that the hill was inaccessible to men. For at that time there were no ships, and the art of sailing was then unknown. But Neptune, as being a divinity, easily adorned the island in the middle; caused two fountains of water to spring up from under the earth, one cold and the other hot; and likewise bestowed all-various and sufficient aliment

from the earth. He also begat and educated five male twins; and having distributed all the Atlantic island into ten parts, he bestowed upon his first-born son his maternal habitation and the surrounding land; this being, the largest and the best division. He likewise established this son king of the whole island, and made the rest of his sons governors. But he gave to each of them dominion over many people, and an extended tract of land Besides this, too, he gave all of them names. And his first-born son, indeed, who was the king of all the rest, he called Atlas, whence the whole island was at that time denominated Atlantic. But the twin son that was born immediately after Atlas, and who was allotted the extreme parts of the island, towards the pillars of Hercules, as far as to the region which at present from that place is called Gadiric, he denominated according to his native tongue Gadirus, but which we call in Greek Eumelus. Of his second twin offspring, he called one Ampheres, and the other Eudæmon. The first-born of his third offspring he denominated Mneseus, and the second Autochthon. The elder of his fourth issue he called Elasippus, and the younger Mestor. And, lastly, he denominated the first-born of his fifth issue Azaes, and the second Diaprepes. All these and their progeny dwelt in this place, for a prodigious number of generations, ruling over many other islands, and extending their empire, as we have said before, as far as to Egypt and Tyrrhenia. But the race of Atlas was by far the most honorable; and of these, the oldest king always left the kingdom, for many generations, to the eldest of his offspring. These, too, possessed wealth in such abundance as to surpass in this respect all the kings that were prior to them; nor will any that may succeed them easily obtain the like. They had likewise everything provided for them which both in a city and every other place is sought after as useful for the purposes of life. And they were supplied, indeed, with

many things from foreign countries, on account of their extensive empire; but the island afforded them the greater part of everything of which they stood in need. In the first place, the island supplied them with such things as are dug out of mines in a solid state, and with such as are melted: and orichalcum, which is now but seldom mentioned, but then was much celebrated, was dug out of the earth in many parts of the island, and was considered as the most honorable of all metals except gold. Whatever, too, the woods afford for builders the island produced in abundance. There were likewise sufficient pastures there for tame and savage animals; together with a prodigious number of elephants. For, there were pastures for all such animals as are fed in lakes and rivers, on mountains, and in plains. And, in like manner, there was sufficient aliment for the largest and most voracious kind of animals. Besides this, whatever of odoriferous the earth nourishes at present, whether roots, or grass, or wood, or juices, or gums, flowers, or fruits, — these the island produced, and produced them well. Again, the island bore mild and dry fruits, such as we use for food, and of which we make bread, (aliment of this kind being denominated by us leguminous,) together with such meats, drinks, and ointments, as trees afford. Here, likewise, there were trees, whose fruits are used for the sake of sport and pleasure, and which it is difficult to conceal; together with such dainties as are used as the remedies of satiety, and are grateful to the weary. All these an island which once existed, bore sacred, beautiful, and wonderful, and in, infinite abundance. The inhabitants, too, receiving all these from the earth, constructed temples, royal habitations, ports, docks, and all the rest of the region, disposing them in the following manner: —In the first place, those who resided about the antient metropolis united by bridges those zones of the sea which we before mentioned, and made a road both to the

external, parts and to the royal abode. But the palace of the king was from the first immediately raised in this very habitation of the God and their ancestors. This being adorned by one person after another in continued succession, the latter of each always for passing the former in the ornaments he bestowed, the palace became at length astonishingly large and beautiful. For they dug a trench as far as to the outermost zone, which commencing from the sea extended three acres in breadth, and fifty stadia in length. And that ships might sail from this sea to that zone as a port, they enlarged its mouth, so that it might be sufficient to receive the largest vessels. They likewise divided by bridges those zones of the earth which separated the zones of the sea, so that with one three-banked galley they might sail from one zone to the other; and covered the upper part of the zones in such a manner that they might sail under them. For the lips of the zones of earth were higher than the sea. But the greatest of these zones, towards which the sea directed its course, was in breadth three stadia: the next in order was of the same dimension. But, of the other two, the watery circle was in breadth two stadia; and that of earth was again equal to the preceding circle of water: but the zone which ran round the island in the middle was one stadium in breadth. The island which contained the palace of the king was five stadia in diameter. This, together with the zones, and the bridge which was every way an acre in breadth, they enclosed with a wall of stone, and raised towers and gates on the bridges according to the course of the sea. Stones, too, were dug out from under the island, on all sides of it, and from within and without the zones: some of which were white, others black, and others red: and these stone quarries, on account of the cavity of the rock, afforded two convenient docks. With respect to the edifices, some were of a simple structure, and others were raised from

stones of different colors; thus by variety pursuing pleasure, which was allied to their nature. They likewise covered the superficies of the wall which enclosed the most outward zone with brass, using it for this purpose as an ointment; but they covered the superficies of that wall which enclosed the interior zone with tin: and lastly, they covered that which enclosed the acropolis with orichalcum, which shines with a fiery splendor.

The royal palace within the acropolis was constructed as follows: —In the middle of it there was a temple, difficult of access, sacred to Clites and Neptune, and which was surrounded with an enclosure of gold. In this place assembling in the beginning, they produced the race of ten kings; and from the ten divisions of the whole region here collected every year, they performed seasonable sacrifices to each. But the temple of Neptune was one stadium in length, and three acres in breadth; and its altitude was commensurate to its length and breadth. There was something, however, barbaric in its form. All the external part of the temple, except the summit, were covered with silver; for that was covered with gold. With respect to the internal parts, the roof was entirety formed from ivory, variegated with gold, silver, and orichalcum; but as all the other parts, such, as the walls, pillars, and pavement, these were adorned with orichalcum. Golden statues, too, were placed in the temple; and the God himself was represented standing on a chariot, and governing six-winged horses; while, at the same time, through his magnitude, he touched the roof with his head. An hundred Nereids upon dolphins were circularly disposed about him; for at that time this was supposed to be the number of rile Nereids. There were likewise many other statues of private persons dedicated within the temple. Round the temple, on the outside, stood golden images of all the women and men that had descended

from the ten kings: together with many other statues of kings and private persons, which had been dedicated from the city, and from foreign parts that were in subjection to the Atlantic island. There was an altar, too, which accorded in magnitude and construction with the other ornaments of the temple; and in like manner, the palace was adapted to the magnitude of the empire, and the decorations of the sacred concerns. The inhabitants, likewise, used fountains both of hot and cold water, whole streams were copious, and naturally salubrious and pleasant in a wonderful degree. About the fountains, too, edifices were constructed, and trees planted, adapted to these fontal waters. Receptacles of water, likewise, were placed round the fountains, some of which were exposed to the open air, but others were covered, as containing hot baths for the winter season. Of these receptacles, some were appropriated to the royal family, and others, apart from these, to private individuals; and again, some were set apart for women, and others for horses and other animals of the yoke; a proper ornament at the same time being distributed to each. They likewise brought diffluent streams to the grove of Neptune, together with all-various trees of an admirable beauty and height, through the fecundity of the soil: and thence they derived these streams to the exterior circles, by conducting them through channels over the bridges. But in each island of these exterior circles there were many temples of many Gods, together with many gardens, and gymnasia apart from each other, some for men, and others for horses. But about the middle of the largest of the islands there was a principal hippodrome, which was a stadium in breadth, and the length of which extended round the whole circle, for the purpose of exercising the horses. On all sides of the hippodrome stood the dwellings of the officers of the guards. But the defense of the place was committed to the more faithful soldiers, who dwelt in the smaller circle,

and before the acropolis; and the most faithful of all the soldiers were assigned habitations within the acropolis, and round the royal abodes. The docks, likewise, were full of three-banked galleys, and of such apparatus as is adapted to vessels of this kind. And in this manner the parts about the royal palaces were disposed. But having passed beyond the external ports, which were three in number, a circular wall presented itself to the view, beginning from the sea, and every way distant from the greatest of the circles and the port by an interval of fifty stadia. This wall terminated in the mouth of the trench which was towards the sea. The whole space, too, enclosed by the wall was crowded with houses; and the bay and the greatest harbor were full of ships and merchants that came from all parts. Hence, through the great multitude that were here assembled, there was an all-various clamor and tumult both by day and night. And thus we have nearly related the particulars respecting the city and the antient habitation, as they were then unfolded by the Egyptian priests. In the next place, we shall endeavor to relate what was the nature, and what the arrangement, of the rest of the region.

First, then, every place is said to have been very elevated and abrupt which was situated near the sea; but all the land round the city was a plain, which circularly inverted the city, but was itself circularly enclosed by mountains which extended as far as to the sea. This plain too was smooth and equable; and its whole length, from one side to the other, was three thousand stadia; but, according to its middle from the sea upwards, it was two thousand stadia. The whole island, likewise, was situated towards the south, but from its extremities was exposed to the north. Its mountains were then celebrated as surpassing all that exist at present in multitude, magnitude, and beauty; and contained many villages, whose inhabitants were wealthy. Here, too, there

were rivers, lakes, and meadows, which afforded sufficient nutriment for all tame and savage animals; together with woods, various both in multitude and kind, and in abundance adequate to the several purposes to which they are subservient. This plain, therefore, both by nature and the labors of many kings in a long period of time, was replete with fertility. Its figure, too, was that of a square, for the most part straight and long; but on account of the trench which was dug round it, it was deficient in straightness. The depth, breadth, and length of this trench are incredible, when compared with other labors accomplished by the hands of men: but, at the same time, we must relate what we have heard. Its depth was one acre; and its breadth everywhere a stadium. And as it was dug round the whole plain, its length was consequently ten thousand stadia. This trench received the streams falling from the mountains, and which, circularly flowing round the plain towards the city, and being collected from different parts, at length poured themselves from the trench into the sea. Ditches one hundred feet in breadth, being cut in a right line from this part, were again sent through the plain into the trench near the sea: but these were separated from each other by an interval of one hundred stadia. The inhabitants brought wood to the city from the mountains, and other seasonable articles, in two-fold vessels, through the trenches; for the trenches intersected each other obliquely, and towards the city. Every year, too, they twice collected the fruits of the earth; in winter using the waters from Zeus, and in summer bringing the productions of the earth through the streams deduced from the trenches. With respect to the multitude of men in the plain useful for the purposes of war, it was ordered that a commander in chief should be taken out of each allotment. But the magnitude of each allotted portion of land was ten times ten stadia; and the number of all the allotments was

sixty thousand. There is said to have been an infinite number of men from the mountains and the rest of the region; and all of them were distributed according to places and villages into these allotments, under their respective leaders. The commander in chief, therefore, of each division was ordered to bring into the field of battle a sixth part of the war-chariots, the whole amount of which was ten thousand, together with two horses and two charioteers: and again, it was decreed that he should bring two horses yoked by the side of each other, but without a seat, together with a man who might descend armed with a small shield, and who after the charioteer might govern the two horses: likewise, that he should bring two heavy-armed soldiers, two slingers, three light-armed soldiers, three hurlers of stones, and three jaculators, together with four sailors, in order to fill up the number of men sufficient for one thousand two hundred ships. And in this manner were the warlike affairs of the royal city disposed. But those of the other nine cities were disposed in a different manner, which it would require a long time to relate. The particulars respecting the governors were instituted from the beginning as follows: —Each of the ten kings possessed absolute authority both over the men and the greater part of the laws in his own division, and in his own city, punishing and putting to death whomsoever he pleased. But the government and communion of these kings with each other were conformable to the mandates given by Neptune; and this was likewise the case with their laws. These mandates were delivered to them by their ancestors inscribed on a pillar of orichalcum, which was erected about the middle of the island, in the temple of Neptune. These kings, therefore, assembled together every fifth, and alternately every sixth year, for the purpose of distributing an equal part both to the even and the odd; and, when assembled, they deliberated on the public affairs, inquired if

anyone had acted improperly, and, if he had, called him to account for his conduct. But when they were about to sit in judgment on anyone, they bound each other by the following compact. As, prior to this judicial process, there were bulls in the temple of Neptune, free from all restraint, they selected ten of these, and vowed to the God, they would offer a sacrifice which should be acceptable to him, viz. a victim taken without iron, and hunted with clubs and snares. Hence, whatever bull was caught by them they led to the pillar, and cut its throat on the summit of the column, agreeably to the written mandates. But on the pillar, besides the laws, there was an oath, supplicating mighty imprecations against those that were disobedient. When, therefore, sacrificing according to their laws, they began to burn all the members of the bull, they poured out of a full bowl a quantity of clotted blood for each of them, and gave the rest to the fire; at the same time lustrating the pillar. After this, drawing out of the bowl in golden cups, and making a libation in the fire, they took an oath that they would judge according to the laws inscribed on the pillar, and would punish anyone who prior to this should be found guilty; and likewise that they would never willingly transgress anyone of the written mandates. They added, that they would neither govern, nor be obedient to anyone who governed, contrary to the prescribed laws of their country. When everyone had thus supplicated both for himself and those of his race, after he had drunk, and had dedicated the golden cup to the temple of the God, he withdrew to the supper, and his necessary concerns. But when it was dark, and the fire about the sacrifice was abated, all of them, inverted with a most beautiful azure garment, and sitting on the ground near the burnt victims, spent the whole night in extinguishing the fire of the sacrifice, and in judging and

being judged, if any person had accused some one of them of having transgressed the laws.

When the judicial process was finished, and day appeared, they wrote the decisions in a golden table, which together with their garments they dedicated as monuments, in the temple of the God. There were also many other laws respecting sacred concerns, and such as were peculiar to the several kings; but the greatest were the following: —That they should never wage war against each other, and that all of them should give assistance if any person in some one of their cities should endeavor to extirpate the royal race. And as they consulted in common suspecting war and other actions, in the same manner as their ancestors, they assigned the empire to the Atlantic family. But they did not permit the king to put to death any of his kindred, unless it seemed fit to more than five out of the ten kings. Such then being the power, and of such magnitude, at that time, in those places, Divinity transferred it from thence to these parts, as it is reported, on the following occasion. For many generations, the Atlantics, as long as the nature of the God was sufficient for them, were obedient to the laws, and benignantly affected toward a divine nature, to which they were allied. For they possessed true, and in every respect magnificent conceptions and employed mildness in conjunction with prudence, both in those casual circumstances which are always taking place, and towards each other. Hence, despising everything except virtue, they considered the concerns of the present life as trifling, and therefore easily endured them; and were of opinion that abundance of riches and other possessions was nothing more than a burthen. Nor were they intoxicated by luxury, nor did they fall into error, in consequence of being blinded by incontinence; but, being sober and vigilant, they acutely perceived that all these things were increased through

common friendship, in conjunction with virtue; but that, by eagerly pursuing and honoring them, these external goods themselves were corrupted, and, together with them, virtue and common friendship were destroyed. From reasoning of this kind, and from the continuance of a divine nature, all the particulars which we have previously discussed, were increased among them. But when that portion of divinity, or divine destiny, which they enjoyed, vanished from among them, in consequence of being frequently mingled with much of a mortal nature, and human manners prevailed, —then, being no longer able to bear the events of the present life, they acted in a disgraceful manner. Hence, to those who were capable of seeing, they appeared to be base characters, men who separated things most beautiful from such as are most honorable: but by those who were unable to perceive the true life, which conducts to felicity, they were considered as then in the highest degree worthy and blessed, in consequence of being filled with an unjust desire of possessing, and transcending in power. But Zeus, the God of Gods, who governs by law, and who is able to perceive everything of this kind, when he saw that an equitable race was in a miserable condition, and was desirous of punishing them, in order that by acquiring temperance they might possess more elegant manners, excited all the Gods to assemble in their most honorable habitation, whence, being seated as in the middle of the universe, he beholds all such things as participate of generation: and having assembled the Gods, he thus addressed them:**********

THE END OF THE CRITIAS, OR ATLANTICUS.

Demodocus

Translated by Jonathan Barnes.

I

Socrates/ You invite me, Demodocus, to give you advice on the matters you are meeting to discuss; but I am inclined rather to ask what is the point of your assembly and of the readiness of those who think to give you advice and of the vote which each of you intends to cast.

Suppose, on the one hand, that it is impossible to give good and informed advice on the matters you are meeting to discuss: then surely it is ridiculous to meet to discuss matters on which it is impossible to give good advice. Suppose, on the other hand, that it is possible to give good and informed advice on such matters: then surely it would be absurd if there were no knowledge on the basis of which it is possible to give good and informed advice on these matters—and if there is some knowledge on the basis of which it is possible to give good advice about such matters, then there must be some people who in fact know how to give good advice on such matters; and if there are some people who know how to give advice on the matters you are meeting to discuss, then necessarily in your own case either you know how to give advice on these matters, or you do not know how to do so, or else some of you know and others do not know. Now if you all know, why do you still need to meet to discuss the question? Each one of you is competent to give advice. If none of you know, then how can you discuss the question? And what will you gain from this assembly if you cannot discuss the question? If some of you know and others do not know, and if the latter need advice, then—supposing that it is possible for a man of sense to give advice to those who are uninformed—surely one man is enough to give advice to those of you who lack knowledge?

For presumably those who know how to give advice all give the same advice, so that you ought to hear one man and then be done with it. But this is not what you are actually doing: rather, you want to hear several advisers. You are assuming that those who are undertaking to give you advice do not know about the matters on which they are giving advice; for if you assumed that your advisers did know, then you would be satisfied when you had heard just one of them. Now it is surely absurd to meet to hear people who do not know about these matters, with the thought that you will thereby gain something.

This, then, is what perplexes me about your assembly. As for the readiness of those who think to give you advice, there is the following perplexity.

Suppose that, although they are giving advice on the same matters, they do not give the same advice: then how can all of them be giving sound advice if they are not giving the advice given by someone who gives good advice? And is it not absurd for people to be ready to give advice on matters about which they are uninformed? For if they are informed they will not choose to give advice which is not good. But if they give the same advice, why need they all give advice? It will be enough for one of them to give this advice. Now surely it is absurd to be ready to do something which will gain nothing. Thus the readiness of those who are uninformed cannot fail to be absurd, given what it is; while men of sense will not be ready in such a case, knowing as they do that anyone of their number will have the same effect if he gives advice as he ought to. Hence I am at a loss to discover how the readiness of those who think to give you advice can be anything but ridiculous.

I am particularly perplexed to grasp the point of the votes which you intend to cast. Are you judging men who know how to give advice? —No more than one of them will give advice, nor will they give different advice on the same matters. Hence

you will not need to cast any votes about them. Or are you judging men who are uninformed and do not give the advice they should? —You ought not to allow such people, any more than madmen, to give advice. But if you are going to judge neither the informed nor the uninformed, then who are you judging?

In any case, why need other men give you advice at all if you are competent to judge such matters? And if you are not competent, what is the point of your votes? Surely it is ridiculous for you to meet to take advice, which implies that you need advice and are not yourselves competent, and then, having met, to think that you ought to vote, which implies that you are competent to judge. For it can hardly be the case that as individuals you are ignorant and yet having met you become wise; or that in private you are perplexed and yet having come to the same place you are no longer perplexed but become competent to see what you ought to do—all this without learning from anyone or finding things out for yourselves. This is the most extraordinary thing of all: given that you cannot see what ought to be done, you will not be competent to judge anyone who gives you good advice on these matters. Nor will this adviser of yours, being just one man, say that he will teach you to see what you ought to do and also to judge those who give you bad or good advice, given that he has so little time and you are so numerous—this would plainly be no less extraordinary than the previous supposition. But if neither the meeting nor your adviser makes you competent to judge, what is the use of your votes?

Surely your meeting is inconsistent with your voting and your voting with the readiness of your advisers? For your meeting implies that you are not competent but need advisers, while the casting of votes implies that you do not need advisers but are capable of judging and of giving advice. And the readiness of your advisers implies that they have

knowledge, while your casting votes implies that the advisers do not have knowledge.

Moreover, suppose that, after you had voted and after he had given you advice on whatever you were voting about, someone were to ask whether you knew if the goal for the sake of which you intended to put into action what you had voted on would come about: I do not think that you would say that you did know. Again, if the goal for the sake of which you intend to act were to come about, do you know that it would be in your interest? I do not think that either you or your adviser would say that you do. And if someone were to ask you further whether you thought that any man knew anything of these matters, I do not think you would admit that you did.

Now when the sort of matters about which you are giving advice are unclear to you, and when the voters and the advisers are uninformed, it stands to reason, as you yourselves will agree, that men often lose confidence and change their minds about whatever they took advice on and voted about. But such a thing ought not to happen to good men. For they know what the matters on which they are giving advice are like, and that those whom they have persuaded will surely attain the goal for the sake of which they give advice, and that neither they nor those whom they have persuaded will ever change their minds.

Thus I thought that it was proper for a sensible man to give advice on topics of this sort and not on the matters on which you invite me to give advice. For advice on the former topics ends in success, nonsense on the latter in failure.

II

I witnessed a man upbraiding his companion because he believed the plaintiff when he had not heard the defendant but only the plaintiff. He said that he was doing something appalling: he was condemning the man in advance when he

had neither witnessed the affair himself nor heard the man's friends who had witnessed it and whose words he might reasonably trust; and, without hearing both sides he had rashly trusted the plaintiff. Justice required hearing the defendant, too, as well as the plaintiff, before giving praise or blame. How could anyone decide a case fairly or judge men properly if he had not heard both parties? As with purple, or with gold coins, so with arguments it was good to judge by comparison. And why was time allotted to both parties, or why did the jurors swear to hear both impartially, unless the lawgiver had thought that cases would be more justly and better judged by the jurors in this way?

"You seem to me not even to have heard the popular saying."

"Which one?" he asked.

" 'O, never judge in a case until you have heard both the stories'. This would hardly circulate so widely if it were not a right and proper saying.

So I advise you," he said, "in the future not to blame or praise men so rashly."

His companion replied that it seemed quite clear to him that it would be absurd if it were impossible to tell whether one speaker was speaking truly or falsely and yet possible to tell whether two speakers were; or if it were impossible to learn from someone who spoke the truth and yet possible to be instructed in the same matters by the same man together with someone else who spoke falsely; or if one man who spoke correctly and truly could not make clear what he was saying and yet two men, one of whom spoke falsely and not correctly, could make clear what the man who spoke correctly could not make clear.

"I am perplexed," he said, "by the following point too: how will they ever make the matter clear? By being silent or by

speaking? If they make it clear by being silent, then there will be no need to hear either, let alone both. If they both make it clear by speaking and yet certainly do not both speak together (each is required to speak in turn), how can they both make it clear at the same time? If they are both to make it clear at the same time, then they will speak at the same time—and this is not allowed. Hence if they make it clear by speaking, it can only be that each of them makes it clear by speaking, and that when each of them speaks, each of them then makes it clear. Hence one will speak first and the other second, and one will make it clear first and the other second. Yet if each in turn makes the same thing clear, why do you still need to hear the later speaker? The matter will already have been cleared up by the man who spoke first. Moreover," he said, "if both make it clear, then surely each of them makes it clear. For if one of a pair does not make something clear, how could they both make it clear? But if each of them makes it clear, plainly the one who speaks first will also make it clear first. So isn't it possible to tell how things stand after listening to him alone?"

When I heard them I myself was perplexed and could not come to a judgment—though the others who were present said that the first man spoke the truth. So help me with the matter if you can: when one man speaks can you assess what he says, or do you need his opponent too if you are to know whether he is telling the truth? Or is it unnecessary to hear both sides? What do you think?

III

The other day someone was criticizing a man because he had been unwilling to trust him and lend him money. The man who was being criticized was defending himself, and someone else who was present asked the critic whether it was the man who did not trust him and lend him money who was in the wrong. "Or haven't you gone wrong," he said, "in not persuading him to lend to you?"

“Where did I go wrong?,” he replied.

“Who seems to you to go wrong,” he said, “—someone who fails to get what he wanted or someone who gets it?”

“Someone who fails,” he replied.

“And you failed,” he said, “since you wanted the loan, whereas he wanted not to give it and didn’t fail in that.”

“Yes,” he replied, “but, granted that he didn’t give me the money, where did I go wrong?”

“Well,” he said, “if you asked him for what you ought not to have asked, then surely you realize that you were in the wrong, whereas he, who did not give it, was in the right. And if you asked him for what you ought to have asked, then surely in failing to get it you must have gone wrong.”

“Perhaps,” he replied. “But surely he was wrong in not trusting me?”

“Well,” he said, “if you had dealt with him as you should, you would not have gone wrong at all, would you?”

“No indeed.”

“In fact, then, you didn’t deal with him as you should.”

“Apparently not,” he said.

“So if he wasn’t persuaded because you didn’t deal with him as you should, how can you justly criticize him?”

“I can’t say.”

“And can’t you say either that one needn’t be considerate to people who behave badly?”

“I can certainly say that,” he replied.

“But don’t those who don’t treat people as they should seem to you to behave badly?”

“They do,” he replied.

“Then what did he do wrong if he wasn’t considerate to you when you behaved badly?”

“Nothing at all, it seems,” he said.

“Then why on earth,” he said, “do men criticize one another in this way, blaming people they have not persuaded for not having been persuaded but never criticizing themselves in the least for not having persuaded them?”

Someone else who was present said: “Suppose you’ve behaved well to someone and helped him, and then when you ask him to behave in the same way to you he refuses—surely in these circumstances you might reasonably blame him?”

“The man you are asking to behave in the same way,” he said, “is either able or unable to behave fairly towards you, isn’t he? If he’s not able to, surely you’re not making a fair request in asking him to do what he’s not able to do; and if he is able to, how did you fail to persuade such a man? How can it be fair for people to say such things?”

“Damn it,” he replied, “he ought to criticize such conduct in order that in future he’ll behave better towards him—and his other friends, too, who have heard his criticisms.”

“Do you think that people behave better,” he asked, “if they hear someone speaking properly and making proper requests or if they hear someone going wrong?”

“Someone speaking properly,” he replied.

“But you thought that he was not making a proper request?”

“True,” he said.

“Then surely people won’t behave better when they hear such criticisms?”

“No, they won’t,” he replied.

“Then what is the point of such reproaches?”

He said that he could not find an answer.

IV

Someone was accusing a man of naivete because he was quick to trust anyone who spoke to him.

"It's reasonable to trust your fellow citizens and your relations; but to trust men you've never seen or heard before, when you're well aware that most men are rogues and liars—that's no small sign of simplicity."

One of those present said: "I thought that you would esteem someone who grasped things quickly, no matter what they were, rather than someone who did so slowly?"

"Indeed I do," the first man replied.

"Then why do you criticize him," he asked, "if he is quick to trust anyone who speaks the truth?"

"But I'm not criticizing him for that," he replied; "rather, it's because he's quick to trust people who don't tell the truth."

"But suppose he had taken longer to give his trust and hadn't trusted just anybody, and had then been deceived—wouldn't you have criticized him all the more?"

"I would," he replied.

"Because he was slow to trust and didn't trust just anybody?"

"Of course not," he replied.

"No," he said, "I'm sure you don't think it's right to criticize a man for that reason, but rather because he trusts people who say what's not trustworthy?"

"Yes indeed," he said.

"Do you think then," he said, "that it's not right to criticize him for being slow to trust people and for not trusting just anybody, but that it is right to criticize him for being quick to trust and for trusting just anybody?"

"No, I don't," he replied.

"Then why are you criticizing him?" he asked.

“Because he’s wrong to trust just anybody and to trust them quickly, before considering the question.”

“But if he trusted them slowly before considering the question he wouldn’t be wrong?”

“Of course he would,” he replied “—in that case he'd be just as wrong. I think, rather, that he shouldn’t trust just anybody.”

“If you think that he shouldn’t trust just anybody,” he said, “then surely he shouldn’t be quick to trust strangers? Rather, you think that he should first consider whether they’re telling the truth?”

“I do,” he replied.

“And if they’re friends and relations, needn’t he consider whether they’re telling the truth?”

“I should say that he does need to,” he replied.

“For perhaps even some of these people say what’s not trustworthy?”

“Yes indeed,” he replied.

“Then why,” he said, “is it reasonable to trust your friends and relations rather than just anybody?”

“I can’t say,” he replied.

“Again, if you should trust your relations rather than just anybody, shouldn’t you also think them more trustworthy than just anybody?”

“Of course,” he replied.

“Then if they’re relations of some people and strangers to others, surely you’ll have to think them more trustworthy than themselves? For you shouldn’t think that relations and strangers are equally trustworthy, or so you say.”

“I can’t accept that,” he replied.

“Equally,” he said, “some will trust what they say and others will deem it untrustworthy, and neither party will be wrong.”

“That too is absurd,” he replied.

“Again,” he said, “if relations say the same thing as just anybody, surely what they say will be equally trustworthy or untrustworthy?”

“Necessarily so,” he replied.

“Then shouldn’t you give equal trust to anyone who says these things when he says them?”

“That’s plausible,” he replied.

While they argued in this way I was perplexed as to who on earth I should and shouldn’t trust, and whether I should trust the trustworthy and people who know what they’re talking about, or rather relations and acquaintances. What do you think about this?

Demodocus.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Socrates/ You are, Demodocus, requesting me to advise you on the matters, about which you are come together to deliberate. But it has come into my mind to consider, what avails this meeting of yours, and the eagerness of those, who. think to advise with you, and the vote, which each of you thinks of giving. For, in the first place, unless it be possible to advise correctly and skillfully on the points, respecting which ye are come to deliberate, how is it not ridiculous for you to come together to deliberate on points, respecting which it is not possible to advise correctly? And in the second place, if it be possible to advise correctly and skillfully upon matters of this kind, still the knowledge, by which it is possible to advise correctly on them, is none. How then is it not out of place? But if there be any knowledge, by which it is possible to advise correctly on such matters, is it not necessary that there should be certain persons skilled to advise correctly on matters of this kind? And if there are certain persons, skilled to advise on those points, about which you are come together to deliberate, is it not necessary for you likewise to know how to advise on these matters, or not to know? Or that some persons should know, and some not? If then all of you know, what need is there for you to come together to deliberate? for each of you is competent to advise. But if, on the other hand, all of you do not know, how will you be able to deliberate? Or what advantage would there be to you in this meeting together, if you are not able to deliberate? But if some of you know, and others do not know, but these are in want of counsel, whether it is possible for an intellectual person to advise the unskilled, even a single person is sufficient to advise with those of you, who

do know. Or do not all, who know, advise the same thing? so that it is fitting, after you have heard that person, to separate. But now you do not this; but you wish to hear many giving their advice; for you do not take upon yourselves to know those, who are attempting to advise with you on points, on which they are advising. For if you had taken upon yourselves to know those, who were advising with you, it would have been sufficient for you to have heard one person alone. To come together then with the view of hearing those, who do not know, as if you were doing something of importance, how is it not a thing out of place? Respecting then this meeting of yours, I am in this way at a loss.

And that too is a thing of difficulty relating to the eagerness of those, who think they can advise with you. For if, while advising, they do not give the same advice upon the same points, how can they all advise correctly, when they do not advise what he, who advises correctly, would advise? Or how can the eagerness of those, who are eager to advise on points, in which they are unskilled, not be out of place? for being skilled, they would not choose to advise incorrectly. But if, on the other hand, they advise the same, what need is there for them all to advise? for a single one of them would, if advising the same, be sufficient. To be eager then on such matters, as would be of no importance, how is it not ridiculous? Neither then would the eagerness of the unskilled be not out of place, when it is of such a kind; nor would men of sense feel an eagerness on such matters, knowing that even one of them would do the same thing by advising what was fitting; so that I am unable to discover how the eagerness of those, who fancy they are advising, is not ridiculous.

But as regards the vote which you are thinking to give, I am the most at a loss, what it can avail. For whether are you

giving a judgment upon those, who know how to advise? But more persons will not advise at all any better than one, nor some one way and others another correctly upon the same matter; so that respecting them there will be no need for you to give a vote. But are you giving a judgment upon some, who are unskilled and who ought not to advise any persons? Surely it is not fitting to entrust to such persons, as if they were madmen, to advise. But if you are to give a judgment upon neither the skilled nor the unskilled, upon whom are you to give it? But what need is there for other persons to advise with you at all, if you are competent to give a judgment upon such matters? But if on the other hand you are not competent, of what avail are your votes? Or how is it not ridiculous for you to come together, as if about to consult, when you yourselves are in want of advice, and are incompetent, and yet fancy that you ought to come together and give a vote, as if competent to form a judgment? For neither by being taken singly are you ignorant, and become sensible by being taken together; nor, on the other hand, are you at a loss individually, but by coming together are no longer at a loss. But do you become competent to see together what things are to be done by you? and this too, when you have neither learnt them from anyone, nor discovered them yourselves; which is the most shocking thing of all. For being unable to see together, what is to be done, you will not be competent to give a judgment upon the party, who is advising you correctly upon these matters; nor, if a person, standing alone, as an adviser, should say this, that he himself will teach you what is to be done, is it in your power to form a correct judgment upon those, who are advising you correctly or not. Now this would be a state not less shocking than that. If then neither the meeting nor the single adviser is able to make you competent to give a judgment, what need is there to you for voting? Or how is

this meeting of yours not opposed to your votes, and the vote to the eagerness of those advising you? For this meeting of yours is that of persons not competent, but in need of advisers; while the votes are given as of persons not wanting advisers, but able to form a judgment, and to advise; and the eagerness of those advising you, is as of persons who know; but the votes are given by you, as if the persons advising did not know. Now if anyone were to ask you, who have voted, and the person advising you, respecting the matters on which you have voted—do you know what will that be, for the sake of which you think of doing what you have voted? you would not, I think, be able to say. And even if that should take place, for the sake of which you have it in your thoughts to do everything, do you know how it will benefit you? I think that neither you nor the party advising you would be able to tell this. But you conceive that some of those with intellect know somehow this. But if a person should ask you who is the party, I do not think you would agree on this point. When therefore both the things, about which you are consulting, are such as not to be manifest, and the persons likewise, who vote and advise, are unskilled, reasonably will you say that it often falls out that persons have no faith in, and repent of, those things, for which they have taken counsel and voted. Now such events it is not becoming to fall out to the sensible. For they know the things, about which they give advice, both of what kind they are, and that they exist firmly to the parties persuaded, for the sake of whom they give the advice, and that neither to themselves nor to the parties persuaded will there be a repentance for anything senseless. On matters then of this kind I conceive that those, who possess any sense, should think it fit to give advice; but not about the matters on which you are requesting me to advise; for from their advice the result is good fortune, but from the trifling of these misfortune.

I was once present with a person while he was admonishing his friend, because the latter had trusted to an accuser, not having heard the other party making an apology for himself, but hearing only the accuser. He said that the friend had done a terrible thing, in deciding against the party without having been present himself, or having heard from the friends of the party, to whose statements it was reasonable for him to trust. For, after having heard both, he would not have so hastily trusted to the accuser; but that it was just, before conferring praise or blame, to hear the party make his defense, as well as the accuser. For how could anyone decide correctly a suit, or judge in a proper manner between persons, without hearing the opposite parties? for that it is better that assertions, like a purple color and gold-money, should be judged of by being placed side by side. Or for what purpose has time been allowed to both the opposite parties in a suit? or the judges sworn to hear both sides equally? unless the lawgiver conceived that suits would be decided more justly and better by the judges. But you seem to me to have not even heard of what is said by the multitude. What is it? said the other.

Decide no suit, till both accounts you've heard.

And yet this would not have been thus circulated, if it had not been well said, and as is fitting. I advise you therefore, said he, for the future not to blame or praise persons so hastily. The other then said that it appeared to him an absurd thing, if it were impossible to know, when one person was speaking, whether he was telling the truth or a falsehood, and yet possible to know, when two persons were speaking; and impossible to learn from a person, when telling the truth, but possible to be taught by that very person and another, when telling a falsehood; and if one by speaking straightforwardly and truly should be unable to show what he is saying clearly, but that two, one of whom

should tell a falsehood, and not speak straightforwardly, should be able to show clearly that, which the party speaking straightforwardly was not able to show clearly. And I am at a loss, said he, on this point likewise, how they are to show it clearly; whether by being silent, or speaking. For if they are to show it clearly by being silent, there would be a need of hearing neither, much less both. But if by speaking both are to show it clearly, and both parties speak according to no regular manner and time—for both think they have a right to speak in turn—how is it possible for both to show the matter clearly? For if both are showing the matter clearly at the same time, both will be speaking together at the same time. But this they are not wont to do, nor do the laws permit it; so that if they are to show the matter clearly by speaking, each of them will do so by speaking; and when either party speaks, then either party will show the matter clearly; so that they will speak one before and the other after; and they will show the matter clearly, one before and the other after. Now if each party in turn shows the same matter clearly, what need is there to hear the latter? for the matter will have become clear by the party first speaking. But if both parties show clearly that matter, said he, how will not either of them have done so? for how would both be able to show clearly that, which one of them shall not have done so? But if either shall have shown it clearly, it is evident that the former will have spoken of it, and the former will have shown it clearly; so that how is it not possible for the person hearing him alone to know all correctly? On hearing them I was at a loss, and unable to decide. For the others, who were present, said that the first reasoning was true. If then you can advise me on this matter, whether it is possible, when one person is saying anything, to know correctly what he is saying, say so; or whether there is need of a speaker on the opposite side, if a person would know which is speaking straightforwardly.

Or whether it is not necessary to hear both parties? Or how do you think?

The day before yesterday a person was finding fault with another, because he was unwilling to lend money or to trust him; and the party, with whom he was finding fault, was defending himself; whereupon another person amongst those, who were present, inquired of the party finding fault—whether he, who had not trusted nor lent the money, had erred? and have not you too, said he, who did not persuade him to lend, erred? In what, said the other party, have I erred? Which of the two, said the inquirer, seems to you to err? the person, who fails in what he wishes, or he, who does not fail? The person who fails, said he. Have you then not failed in wishing to borrow; while he, who did not wish to give up his money, has not failed in that point. Truly so, said he; but in what have I erred, even if he has not given it me? Because, said the inquirer, if you have begged the things which you ought not, how do you think that you have not erred? while he has acted correctly in not giving them up; but if, on the other hand, you have begged what you ought, and failed in this point, how have you not of necessity erred? Perhaps so, said he; but how has he not erred, who did not trust me? If you had treated with him, said the inquirer, as was fitting, you would not have erred at all. Not at all. But now you have not treated with him, as was fitting. I appear so, said he. If then he was not persuaded, when you were treating with him, as was not fitting, how can you justly find fault with him? I am unable to say. Nor can you say that one must not pay attention to those, who conduct themselves ill? This I can say very much, said he. Do not then those persons seem to you to conduct themselves ill, who treat with a party in a manner that is not fitting? To me at least they seem so, said he. In what then did he err, if he paid no attention to

you, when conducting yourself ill? It appears, said he, in nothing. Why then, said the inquirer, do persons find fault on such matters with each other, and blame those, who are not persuaded by them, because they are not persuaded, but do not find fault with themselves at all, because they have not persuaded them? Hereupon another party who was present, observed—When a person has conducted himself well towards anyone, and has assisted him, and subsequently requests that party to conduct himself in a similar manner towards him, but does not meet with such conduct, how does he not reasonably find fault? Is not, said the inquirer, the person whom the party requests to conduct himself in a similar manner, either able to conduct himself well, or unable? Yes. And if he is unable, how can he properly make the request, who requests him to perform what he cannot? but if he is able, how did he not persuade him to do so? or how do persons, who speak in this way, speak correctly? But, said the other, it is requisite, by Zeus, to find fault with such a person, in order that both he may for the remainder of his life conduct himself better, and the other mean fellows, who hear the party finding fault. Think you, said the inquirer, that any persons will conduct themselves better when they hear a party speaking correctly, or when in error? When speaking correctly, said he. Now the party, who was speaking not correctly, did not seem to you to make a request correctly? Truly so, said he. How then will those, who hear a person finding fault in this way, conduct themselves better. Not at all, said he. For what purpose, then, would a person find fault in this way? He confessed he could not discover.

Someone was accusing a person of stupidity, because he had given credence quickly even to parties he happened to meet with, while they were speaking. To fellow-citizens and

familiar friends, when speaking, it is reasonable to trust. But to persons of that kind, whom he had never seen nor heard of before, to give credence, and this too when he was not ignorant that the majority of men are braggarts and knaves, was no little proof of silliness. When one of those present observed—For my part I thought that you considered a person of greater value, who could quickly understand even anyone he met with, rather than him, who did so slowly. And so I do consider, said the other. Why then, said the former, do you find fault, if a person gives credence quickly, even to those he meets with, when they speak the truth? But, said the other, I do not find fault with this, but because he gives credence to those, who tell falsehoods. But, if after a longer period even to those not accidentally met with he had given credence, and suffered annoyance, would you not have found fault with him still more? Yes; I should have done so, said he. Is it, because he gave credence slowly, even to those not accidentally met with? No, by Zeus, said he. For I suppose, said the other, you do not conceive that it is right to find fault with a person on this account, but because he gives credence to those, who state what is not credible. I do so, said he. Whether then, said the other, do you think it is not right to find fault with him for giving credence slowly even to those not accidentally met with, but right to do so for giving credence quickly even to those accidentally met with? Not I indeed, said he. Why then do you find fault with him? said the other. Because he errs in giving credence to persons accidentally met with, previous to making an inquiry. But if he had slowly given credence, previous to making an inquiry, he would not have erred. Not so, by Zeus, said he; but he would have erred even thus not the less; but I think one ought not to give credence to persons accidentally met with. But if, said the other, you think one ought not to give credence to persons accidentally met with,

how is it fitting to give credence quickly to persons unknown? and do you think that it is requisite to make an inquiry, whether they are speaking the truth? I think so, said he. Say then, said the other, is it not requisite to make inquiry about familiar friends and acquaintances, whether they are speaking the truth? I should say so, said he. For perhaps, said the other, some of these state what is not credible. And very much so, said he. Why then, said the other, is it more reasonable to give credence to familiar friends and acquaintances than to persons accidentally met with? I cannot tell, said he. What then, if it is requisite not to give more credence to familiar friends than to persons accidentally met with, is it not requisite to consider them less trustworthy than persons accidentally met with? How not? said he. If then there are familiar friends to some persons, and persons unknown to others, how will it not be necessary to consider the same persons more trustworthy than the same? For it is requisite to consider familiar friends and persons unknown, as not equally trustworthy, as you say yourself. This does not please me, said he. Equally, said the former, do some believe what is stated by them, but others disbelieve? And this too is strange, said he. If then, said the other, both familiar friends and persons accidentally met with state the same things, would not all things stated equally to all be credible or incredible equally? Necessarily so, said he. Must we not give credence then equally to those who state the same things? It is probable, said he.

On their conversing in this way, I was at a loss to whom one ought to give credence and to whom not, and whether to the trust-worthy and those who know what they are speaking about, or to familiar friends and acquaintances. Upon these matters then how think you?

Epinomis.

Translated by A. E. Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog

Clinias of Crete, Athenian Visitor, Megillus of Sparta

Clinias/ Well, sir, here we are, all three of us—you, myself, and our friend Megillus—duly convened, as we had agreed, to discuss wisdom. We are to consider in what terms to describe that which, if we can only discover it, will, in our mind, best fit humanity for such a degree of understanding as man can compass. We have already, we hold, discussed all other considerations relevant to legislation. But there is one question to which we have neither found nor stated the answer, and it is the supreme question for solution and determination. What are the studies which will lead a mortal man to wisdom? And that is the problem we must do our best not to leave unanswered today. To do so, in fact, would be to fail in the purpose we all had in mind at the outset, when we hoped to make everything so clear from start to finish.

Athenian Stranger/ Well said, my dear Clinias, though I fancy the statement to which you are to listen will be a strange one. And yet, in a way, it is not so strange after all. It is one only too often propounded as the lesson of experience of life—that mankind will never attain bliss or felicity. So please follow me and consider whether you find me right in agreeing with others on the point. My thesis is that attainment of bliss and felicity is impossible for mankind, with the exception of a chosen few. I would limit the statement to the term of a lifetime; when life is over, there is a fair hope that a man may achieve all that prompts us to live as nobly as we may, and to crown such a life by a corresponding end. What I want to say is nothing recondite,

but only a truth which all of us, Greeks or non-Greeks, recognize in one way or another. To begin with, birth itself is a painful experience for any living creature. One has first to make acquaintance with life in the womb, then to be actually born, and then further to be reared and educated, all processes, as we all confess, involving untold discomforts. 'Twill be but a brief time we shall take into account if we reckon not the miseries of life but only what all would regard as its satisfactory part. This is generally hold to form a kind of breathing space in the middle years of life, but old age has us soon in its clutch, and must make any man whose head is not stuffed with childish fancies unwilling to live his time over again, when he considers what his life has been. Do you ask me for my proof of this? It is that the same thing is true of the object of our present inquiry. That inquiry, in fact, is how we are to get wisdom, and the implication is that all of us have the capacity for acquiring it. Yet it eludes us altogether, as soon as we turn to any of the branches of understanding which make up the so-called arts, forms of understanding, or other such fancied sciences. It is as though none of them all deserved the name of wisdom in the affairs of man's life; yet the soul has a confident trust, a prophetic divination, that she possesses such a native capacity, though what it is, when come by, or how, she can hardly discover. Does not the case stand much thus with our desperate search for wisdom, a search so much more difficult than might be expected by those of us who can examine themselves and others intelligently and coherently by means of discourse of all and every kind? Are we to confess that this is our situation, or are we not?

Clinias/ Doubtless, sir, we shall make the confession, but in the hope, naturally born of time spent in converse with you, that we may yet arrive at the soundest view of the matter.

Athenian Stranger/ Then we must first review the other so-called sciences, acquisition and possession whereof do not make a man wise, with a view to setting them on one side and then trying to bring before our view and understand those which we really need. To begin with, then, we must observe of those which are mortality's earliest need that while they cannot be dispensed with and come first in a real sense, though the man who is versed in them may have been counted wise long ago, in the beginning of things, he has certainly not the reputation today; his knowledge of such things is rather made a reproach to him.

We will name them, then, with the remark that everyone—I mean everyone who makes it his great concern to be esteemed a man of the best kind—avoids them for the sake of achieving understanding and the exercise of it. We may give the first place to that which sets a check to our devouring the flesh of animals, absolutely prohibiting the consumption of some—so the legend runs—and confining us to a lawful consumption of others. Now may the good will of the spirits of old be with us, as indeed it is; whoever they were 'who gave the rule,' they still have our first blessing! But, after all, the production of barley and wheat and the making of food from them, admirable things though they are, will never make a man wholly wise—why, the very word *produce* might tend to create a certain repugnance to the product—and the same thing is true of all husbandry. It is not so much from science as from a native instinct implanted by God that we all seem to have taken the soil in hand. We may say so much of the construction of dwellings, building in its various forms, and the manufacture of all sorts of furniture, smith-work, carpentry, pottery, weaving, and equally of the provision of tools of every sort; all this is serviceable enough to a populace, but it is not imputed as virtue. It is true, again, of the chase in all its forms; various

as they are, and high as is the skill for which they call, they result in no grandeur of soul nor wisdom. The art of the prophet or his interpreter, again, fails us entirely; he knows only what his oracle says—whether it is true is more than he can tell.

Now since, as we see, our necessities are provided by art, but by arts none of which can make a man wise, all that is left over is play, imitative play for the most part, but of no serious worth. For imitation is effected by a great variety of instruments, and likewise of attitudes, and those none too dignified, of the body itself in declamation and the different forms of music and all the offshoots of the art of drawing, with the numerous variegated patterns they produce in fluid or solid mediums, but none of these branches of imitation makes the practitioner in the least wise, no matter how earnestly he labors.

When all is done, what is left on our hands proves to be defense, defense of a host of clients by a host of means. Its most highly considered and most comprehensive form, the science of war, as we call it, the art of the general, stands highest in repute for its usefulness, but is most dependent on good fortune, and, from the nature of the case, is assigned rather to courage than to wisdom. As for what is known as the art of medicine, it also is, of course, a form of defense against the ravages committed on the living organism by the seasons with their untimely cold and heat and the like. But none of their devices can bestow reputation for the truest wisdom; they are at sea on an ocean of fanciful conjecture, without reduction to rule. We may also give the name of defender to sea captains and their crews, but I would have no one encourage our hopes by the proclamation that any of them is wise. None of them can *know* of the fury or kindness of the winds, and that is the knowledge coveted by every navigator. Nor yet can we give the title to those who

profess to defend us by their eloquence in the law courts, and devote themselves to a study of human character based on memories and empirical fancies, while they are far astray from true comprehension of genuine rights.

We have still left one claimant to the title of wisdom—a curious capacity which would commonly be spoken of rather as native endowment than as wisdom—that seen in the man who learns whatever he studies with facility, has a capacious and trustworthy memory, recalls the relevant and appropriate steps in every situation, and does so without delay. All this will be ascribed by some to native endowment, by others to wisdom, by others to natural sagacity, but no right-judging man will ever consent to call a person wise on the strength of any of these gifts. And yet there must be some knowledge or other, the possession whereof will bestow wisdom which is wisdom in very deed, and not in mere report. So let us look into the matter. 'Tis an argument of the highest difficulty on which we are now entering—this discovery of a wisdom, over and above those we have named, which shall be really and truly worthy of the name. He that can win it is to be neither mechanic nor fribble; it must make him a wise and good citizen of his state, in the fullest sense of the terms, as magistrate and subject, and a modest man to boot. Let us then first consider what single science there is, of all those we have, such that were it removed from mankind, or had it never made its appearance, man would become the most thoughtless and foolish of creatures. Now the answer to this question at least is not over hard to find. For, if we, so to say, take one science with another, 'tis that which has given our kind the knowledge of number that would affect us thus, and I believe I may say that 'tis not so much our luck as a god who preserves us by his gift of it. I should explain what god I am thinking of—an odd one to mention, and yet, in a way, not so odd after all. How can we

but believe that the cause of all the blessings we enjoy is likewise the cause of that which is far the greatest of all, understanding? Well, and what god is it, Megillus and Clinias, of whom I speak in this solemn fashion? Why, Uranus, to be sure, whom it is our bounden duty to honor, as it is to honor all divinities and gods, and to whom we are specially bound to pray. All of us will confess that he is the source of all the other good things we enjoy, and we in particular assent that 'tis he who has in very deed given us number, and will renew the gift if men will only follow his leading. If a man will but come to the right contemplation of him, he may call him by the name of Cosmos, Olympus, or Uranus as he pleases; only let him follow him in his course as he bespangles himself and wheels his stars through all their courses in the act of providing us all with seasons and daily food. Aye, and with the gift of the whole number series, so we shall assume, he gives us likewise the rest of understanding and all other good things. But this is the greatest boon of all, if a man will accept his gift of number and let his mind expatiate over the whole heavenly circuit.

But we must still go forth a little on our argument and recall our very just observation, that if number were banished from mankind, we could never become wise at all. For a creature's soul could surely never attain full virtue if the creature were without rational discourse, and a creature that could not recognize two and three, odd and even, but was utterly unacquainted with number, could give no rational account of things whereof it had sensations and memories only, though there is nothing to keep it out of the rest of virtue, valor, and sobriety. But without true discourse a man will never become wise, and if he has not wisdom, the chiefest constituent of full virtue, he can never become perfectly good, and therefore not happy. Thus there is every necessity for number as a foundation, though to explain why

this is necessary would demand a discourse still longer than what has gone before. But we shall also be right if we say of the work of all the other arts which we recently enumerated, when we permitted their existence, that nothing of it all is left, all is utterly evacuated, if the art of number is destroyed.

Perhaps when a man considers the arts, he may fancy that mankind need number only for minor purposes—though the part it plays even in them is considerable. But could he see the divine and the mortal in the world process—a vision from which he will learn both the fear of God and the true nature of number—even so 'tis not any man and every man who will recognize the full power number will bestow on us if we are conversant with the whole field of it—why, for example, all musical effects manifestly depend upon the numeration of motions and tones—or will take the chief point of all, that 'tis the source of all good things, but, as we should be well aware, of none of the ill things which may perhaps befall us. No, unregulated, disorderly, ungainly, unrhythmical, tuneless movement, and all else that partakes of evil, is destitute of all number, and of this a man who means to die happy must be convinced. And as for the right, the good, the noble, and the like, no man who has given his adherence to a true belief, but without *knowledge,* will ever enumerate them in a way to bring conviction to himself and to others.

Well then, let us go on to face the real point we are to consider. How did we learn to count? How, I ask you, have we come to have the notions of *one* and *two,* the scheme of the universe endowing us with a native capacity for these notions? There are many other creatures whose native equipment does not so much as extend to the capacity to learn from our Father above how to count. But in our own case, God, in the first place, constructed us with this faculty of understanding what is shown us, and then showed us the

scene he still continues to show. And in all this scene, if we take one thing with another, what fairer spectacle is there for a man than the face of day, from which he can then pass, still retaining his power of vision, to the view of night, where all will appear so different? Now as Uranus never ceases rolling all these objects round, day after day, and night after night, neither does he ever cease teaching men the lore of one and two until even the dullest scholar has sufficiently learned the lesson of counting. For any of us who sees this show will form the notion of *three, four,* and *many.* And among these bodies of God's fashioning there is one, the moon, which goes its way, now waxing, now waning, as it lights up one day after another, until it has fulfilled fifteen days and nights, and they, if one will treat its whole orbit as a unity, constitute a period, such that the very slowest creature, if I may say so, on which God has bestowed the capacity to learn, may learn it. Thus so far, and within these limits, every creature with the requisite capacity is skilled enough in counting by observation of the units. But when I consider that all these creatures are always making calculations in their dealings with each other, I fancy it was for some greater purpose, as well as for this, that when God had made the moon in the sky, waxing and waning, as we have said, he combined the months into a year and so all the creatures, by a happy providence, began to have a general insight into the relations of number with number. 'Tis thus that earth conceives and yields her harvest so that food is provided for all the creatures, if winds and rains are neither unseasonable nor excessive; but if anything goes amiss in the matter, 'tis not deity we should charge with the fault, but humanity, who have not ordered their life aright. However that may be, in our inquiry into jurisprudence we took the view that in general to know what is best for man is an easy thing, and that any of us can become competent to

understand what he is told of the matter and act on his knowledge, if only he could tell what may be expected to be to his advantage and what to his hurt. Whence we held, as we still hold. that there is no great difficulty in other studies; the supreme difficulty is to know how we are to become good men. Again, to get all other 'good things,' as they are proverbially called, is both possible and not too difficult—to get all the property we need, or do not need, the bodily vigor we need or do not need. And as for the soul, there is universal agreement that it must be good and must be good in a certain way. That it must be just, sober, and valiant, there again we are all agreed; that it must be *wise* is a thing all men say, but on the question what wisdom it needs, as we have just explained, the multitude are hopelessly at variance. We have now discovered, over and above all the forms of wisdom we mentioned first, another which is of no small account in one respect—I mean, that he who has learned the lessons we have described has certainly a *repute* for wisdom. Whether the man who has this knowledge really *is* wise and good is the question we hope to determine.

Clinias/ How right you were, sir, when you said you were trying to express grave thoughts on a grave theme!

Athenian Stranger/ Indeed, Clinias, they are no trivialities. But what makes the task harder is that I am trying to make the expression perfectly and precisely true.

Clinias/ To be sure, sir. Still you must not let weariness make you give up your exposition.

Athenian Stranger/ So be it, but you and your friend too must not weary of listening.

Clinias/ No, I promise you, and I give you the pledge for both of us.

Athenian Stranger/ I thank you. Then, I take it, we must begin for preference, if only we can find a single name for it,

by stating what wisdom this is which we hold to be wisdom indeed. As a second-best course, if the other prove quite impossible, we must say what and how many are the forms of wisdom by gaining which a man will be wise by our account of the matter.

Clinias/ Say on, then.

Athenian Stranger/ Then next, we can raise no objection if our legislator goes on to an imaginative presentation of the gods nobler and better than those which have been given in the past. He may make the adoration of them, so to say, a noble pastime, and so pass his own life in worshiping them with hymns of happiness.

Clinias/ Finely said, sir. May the end of your laws be this, to sing the glad praises of the gods, to lead the life of higher piety, and then to come to the best and worthiest close!

Athenian Stranger/ Then where is our talk leading us, Clinias? Suppose we offer the gods the worship of a heartfelt hymn, and a prayer that we may be moved to speak of them in the best and worthiest strains? May I take it you agree?

Clinias/ With all my heart. Make your prayer, my dear sir, in faith, and then go on with such fair discourse of gods and goddesses as you are moved to utter.

Athenian Stranger/ And so I will, if God himself will vouchsafe us his guidance. Only you must join in the prayer.

Clinias/ And now proceed with your discourse.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, since the men of old gave such a bad version of the generation of gods and creatures, my first business, I presume, must be to imagine the process better, on the lines of my former discourse, and to embody the points which I tried to make against unbelievers, when I argued that there are gods, that their care extends to all things great or small, and that no entreaties can win them to depart from the path of justice. I presume you remember,

Clinias, for you both actually took notes of what was said. Now all I said then was perfectly true, but the chief point of all was this, that soul, all soul, is older than body, all body. You recall the point? Surely you must recollect so much? For surely we may well believe the better, more primitive, more divine, older than the [worse], more recent, baser, the ruler everywhere older than the subject, the leader than the led. So much, then, we will take as settled, that soul is older than body. But since this is so, it follows that the starting point of our story of creation is more credible than the starting point of theirs. We may take it, then, that our beginning is more seemly than the other, and that we are taking the right path to the great branch of wisdom which treats of the creation of the gods.

Clinias/ Yes, we may take this as established to the best of our powers.

Athenian Stranger/ Then to proceed. May we say that the name giving creature' is most properly used in the case when a single complex of soul and body gives birth to a single form?

Clinias/ We may.

Athenian Stranger/ Such a being, in fact, has a perfect title to that name?

Clinias/ It has.

Athenian Stranger/ And solid bodies from which things can best and most fairly be molded are, by the most probable account, of five sorts, while the whole of being of the other kind has one single type. For nothing can be incorporeal and wholly and always devoid of color, save only being of the divinest type, soul, and ‘tis the proper and exclusive function of this to mold and make. To body it pertains, as I say, to be molded, be made, be seen, but to the other—we may repeat it, for it needs to be said more than once—to be unseen, to

know, to be apprehended by thought, and to have its part in memory and computation of the interchanges of odd and even. Now as the number of these forms of body is five, they should be enumerated as fire, water, third air, fourth earth, and fifth aether. It is as they predominate that all the creatures are fashioned in all their multitude and variety. The matter should be expounded in detail as follows. We may take the earthy first as one single type comprising all mankind as well as all creatures with many feet or with none, alike those which travel from place to place and those which are fixed to one spot, fast bound by their roots; their unity, so we should hold, lies in this, that though all five forms of body are found in the structure of them all, their principal stuff is earth, the hard and resistant substance. Then secondly we must assume another kind of creature, likewise visible because it mainly consists of fire, though it contains some small portions of earth, air, and all the rest. From these constituents, then, we must hold, there arise visible creatures of many kinds, whom we must further take to be the kinds of creatures which people the skies. Collectively, of course, we must call them the divine host of the stars—endowed with the fairest of bodies and the happiest and best of souls. And we are fairly bound to assign them one or other of two lots. Either every one of them is imperishable, immortal, and divine, and that of utter and absolute necessity, or each of them has his sufficient term of life, covering many ages, beyond which there is nothing more for him to desire.

We will begin then, as we say, by conceiving these two sorts of creature, both, to repeat ourselves, visible—the one composed, as might be imagined, wholly of fire and the other of earth, the earthy sort moving in disorderly fashion, that of fire with utter uniformity. Now the sort which moves in disorderly wise—as the kind of creature which includes

ourselves mostly does—we must take to be unintelligent, but as for that which holds its course uniformly through the sky, we should count this abundant proof of its intelligence; in the unbroken regularity and uniformity of its path, and of all it does and has done to it, it provides convincing evidence of intelligent life. And of all necessitation, that which comes from a soul endowed with intelligence is far the mightiest, seeing she imposes her law as a sovereign who is subject to none, and when a soul has decided for the best with faultless wisdom, the utterly irreversible result falls out entirely to its mind. Adamant itself could be no stronger nor more inflexible, and 'tis no more than the truth to say that a triple Fate ensures and watches over the full accomplishment of all that each and every god has determined with perfect good counsel. For mankind it should have been proof that the stars and their whole procession have intelligence, that they act with unbroken uniformity, because their action carries out a plan resolved on from untold ages; they do not change their purpose confusedly, acting now thus, and again thus, and wandering from one orbit to another. Yet most of us have imagined the very opposite; because they act with uniformity and regularity, we fancy them to have no souls. Hence the mass has followed the leading of fools; it imagines that man is intelligent and alive because he is so mutable, but deity, because it keeps to the same orbits, is unintelligent. Yet man might have chosen the fairer, better, more welcome interpretation; he might have understood that that which eternally does the same acts, in uniform way and for the same reasons, is for that very reason to be deemed intelligent, and that this is the case with the stars. They are the fairest of all sights to the eye, and as they move through the figures of the fairest and most glorious of dances they accomplish their duty to all living creatures. And for further proof that we have the right to ascribe souls to them, let us,

in the first place, but think of their magnitude. They are not really the tiny things they look to be; the bulk of any star is enormous; that we must believe, for the proofs are convincing. Why, we may rightly think of the sun as a whole as larger than the earth as a whole, and every one of the moving stars is, in fact, of amazing magnitude. So let us but consider how anything can be made to cause so vast a bulk to revolve perpetually in the same period, as the stars in fact revolve. Why, I say, God will be found to be the cause; the thing is impossible on other terms, for, as you and I have proved, soul can be imparted by God, and by God alone. And since God has this power, 'tis perfectly easy for him first to give life to anybody or any bulk, and then to set it moving as he judges best. For the present we may affirm one truth about them all. It cannot be that earth and sky, with all the stars and masses formed of them, if no soul had been connected with, or perhaps lodged in, each of them should move so accurately, to the year, month, or day, to confer all the blessings they bestow on us all.

Now the poorer creature a man is, the more necessary that his words should be manifestly not spoken at random, but have definite meaning. But to talk of the swirl or the structures of moving bodies, or the like, as causes is to say nothing definite; so we must by all means repeat our own earlier statement, and ask ourselves whether 'tis a reasonable one or is hopelessly at fault. We maintain, first, that there are two sorts of being, soul being one and body the other; that there are many of either kind, all different from one another, and either sort from the other; that there is no *tertium quid* common to both; that soul is more excellent than body. The first we shall, of course, take to be intelligent, the second unintelligent; the first sovereign, the second subject; the first the universal cause, the second a cause of no effect whatsoever. Hence to say that all we

behold in the heavens is due to some other source, and not produced in the fashion we describe by soul and body, is pure folly and unreason. And thus, if our account of the whole matter is to be victorious, and all these creatures to be convincingly proved divine, one or other of two things must be said of them. Either it must be right to hymn them as very gods, or we must believe them to be likenesses of gods—images, as it were, fashioned by the gods themselves. They are the work of no foolish or trivial authors. As we have said, one of these two views must be adopted and the images thus set up must be worshiped with higher honors than all others. For none can ever be found fairer and more accessible to all mankind, or set in a more excellent region and more eminent in purity, majesty, and fullness of life than has been shown in the fashioning of them all. As concerns gods, then, at present we will attempt no more than this. Now that we have discovered two kinds of creature, both visible, the one, so we say, immortal, the other—that made of earth—mortal, we shall try to give the most faithful account warranted by reasonable conjecture of the three intermediate sorts out of the five, which lie between these extremes. Next to fire we will place aether, assuming that soul fashions from it creatures which, as with the other kinds, have in the main the character of its own substance, though with lesser portions of the other kinds as bonds of union, and that after aether soul fashions another sort of creature out of air, and a third from water. By the fabrication of them all, we may suppose, soul has filled the universe throughout with living things, making all possible use of all the kinds of body, and communicating life to all; the series of creations begins with the visible divinities, and has its second, third, fourth, and fifth terms, closing in ourselves, mankind.

As for such gods as Zeus, Hera, and the rest, a man may give them any rank he pleases, so long as he conforms to this law of ours and holds fast to our principle. But, it is, of course, the stars and the bodies we can perceive existing along with them that must be named first as the visible gods, and the greatest, most worshipful, and clear-sighted of them all; after them and below them, come in order the daemons and the creatures of the air, who hold the third and midmost rank, doing the office of interpreters, and should be peculiarly honored in our prayers that they may transmit comfortable messages. Both sorts of creature, those of aether and those of air, who hold the rank next to them, we shall say, are wholly transparent; however close they are to us, they go undiscerned. Being, however, of a kind that is quick to learn and of retentive memory, they read all our thoughts and regard the good and noble with signal favor, but the very evil with deep aversion. For *they* are not exempt from feeling pain, whereas a god who enjoys the fullness of deity is clearly above both pain and pleasure, though possessed of all-embracing wisdom and knowledge. The universe being thus full throughout of living creatures, they all, so we shall say, act as interpreters, and interpreters of all things, to one another and to the highest gods, seeing that the middle ranks of creatures can flit so lightly over the earth and the whole universe. As for the fifth and last of our substances, water, the safest guess would be that what is formed from it is a demigod, and that it is sometimes to be seen, but anon conceals itself and becomes invisible, and thus perplexes us by its indistinct appearance. Since, then, these five sorts of creatures must surely exist, when it comes to beliefs of individuals or whole societies originating in the intercourse of some of them with us—appearances in dreams of the night, oracular and prophetic voices heard by the whole or the sick, or communications in the last hours

of life—and these have been, as they will be hereafter, the sources of many a widespread cult—when it comes to these, I say, no legislator of even the slenderest sense will presume to innovate, and so divert his city to a devoutness with no sure foundations. Nor yet a will he prohibit obedience to the inherited usages about sacrifices, since in this matter he has no knowledge whatsoever, as, indeed, 'tis impossible that mankind should have any. But it follows, does it not, from the same argument that men are cravens if they have not the courage to tell us of the gods who are really visible, and make it plain that these other deities go unworshipped and miss the honors which rightly belong to them? And yet something of the kind actually happens among us. Suppose, for example, one of us had actually seen sun or moon coming into being and watching over all of us, and had never spoken of it, from some inability to tell the story, or suppose he saw them left without their due honors, and yet felt no eagerness to do his part to bring them into a position of conspicuous honor, no anxiety to cause festivals and sacrifices to be appointed for them, or to set apart a time for each of them and assign them their periods of greater, or maybe, lesser 'years.' If such a man were called a coward, would not the name be pronounced by himself, or by any man of understanding, to be fairly earned?

Clinias/ Why, surely, sir, a craven and nothing else.

Athenian Stranger/ Well, friend Clinias, I must confess that this is plainly my case at this moment.

Clinias/ And how so?

Athenian Stranger/ Let me tell you that so far as I have been able to discover—my achievements are nothing wonderful, but readily attainable by anyone else—there are to be found in the whole compass of heaven eight sister powers. Three of them belong, one to the sun, one to the

moon, and the third to the stars of which we have lately spoken, and there are five others. Now of all these powers, and the beings who march in them of their own motion, or, if you will, make the journey in their chariots, I would have none of us fondly believe that some are gods, but others not so, or that some are true-begotten, but others what it would be blasphemy for any of us to call them. All—so we must one and all declare and affirm—are brothers, and each has a brother's portion. When we appoint them their honors, we are not to give the year to one and the month to another, but leave the rest without a portion or a time in which each completes his circuit, and so does his part to perfect the order which law, divinest of things that are, has set before our eyes. In the happy man this order awakens first wonder, and then the passion to learn all of it that mortality may, for 'tis thus, as he believes, he will spend his days best and with most good fortune, and after his decease reach the proper abodes of virtue. As he has been initiated into the true and real mysteries by receiving wisdom in her unity in a mind which is itself a unity, he will henceforth have face to face fruition of the most glorious of realities so far as his vision can reach. The task still left on our hands at present is to say how many and who these divinities are, for our statement will assuredly never be found false. Now I can affirm for certain no more than this. There are, as I repeat, eight powers, of which three have been named and five are still left. The fourth orbit, or circuit, as likewise the fifth, is roughly of equal speed with the sun and, on the whole account, neither slower nor faster. Of the three the leader must be that which has a mind equal to the work. We will call them the orbits of the sun, the morning star, and of a third, whose name I cannot state, as it is unknown—the reason of this being that the first man to observe these bodies was a non-Hellene. The first observers were made so

by the excellence of their summer climate, which in Egypt and Syria is so notable; they had a full view of the stars, we may say, all the year round, as clouds and rains are perpetually banished from their quarter of the world. Their observations have been universally diffused, among ourselves as well as elsewhere, and have stood the test a vast, indeed incalculable, lapse of years. So we may confidently give these bodies their place in our legislation—'tis surely not for men of sense to honor some divinities but disregard others—and if they have received no names, the fact must be explained as we have explained it. Though they have at least been designated after certain gods—the morning star, which is also the evening star, is commonly reputed to be that of Aphrodite, a most appropriate name for a Syrian legislator to choose, and that which keeps pace at once with it and with the sun, the star of Hermes. We are further to reckon three other orbits of bodies which, like moon and sun, revolve to the right. There is still one to be spoken of, the eighth, which may be called in a special sense the Cosmos, and this god moves in the opposite sense to all the others, carrying round the rest with him, as might be supposed by men whose knowledge in these matters is slender. But as much as we know for certain, we are bound to declare, as we are doing, for the true and genuine wisdom can be seen even by one who enjoys but a little sound and divine insight to lie along these lines. There are thus three stars left. One of them, the slowest-moving of all, is called by some that of Cronus, that which is next slowest we should call the star of Zeus, and the next slowest after him the star of Ares, and his has the ruddiest color of them all. All this is easy enough to remark when someone has pointed it out, but, as I say, someone who has discerned it has to lead the way.

There is another thing of which any Greek should be aware. We Greeks enjoy a geographical situation which is exceptionally favorable to the attainment of excellence. Its merit should be sought in the fact that it lies midway between winter and summer; it is our deficiency in respect of summer by comparison with the peoples of the other region which, as we said, has made us later than they in discerning the order of these gods. But we may take it that whenever Greeks borrow anything from non-Greeks, they finally carry it to a higher perfection. So we should hold the same view of the subject now under discussion. Such matters are hard to discover with certainty, but there is every ground for the splendid hope that though the news of these gods and their worship has come to us from non-Greeks, the Greeks will learn to worship them all in a truly nobler and more righteous fashion than they, by the help of teaching from the oracle of Delphi and the cultus enjoined by our laws. And there is one fear no Greek should harbor, the fear that 'tis a forbidden thing for mortality to concern itself with the study of divinity. No, we should believe the clean contrary—that deity is neither unintelligent, nor ignorant of man's nature, but knows that, with itself for teacher, he will follow where he is led and learn the lessons he is taught. And deity is, of course, aware that this lesson of number and counting is the very thing that it teaches and we learn. Deity unaware of this would be the most unintelligent of things; the proverb about not knowing one's own identity would be true of it to the letter, if it felt wrath against the capable learner, and not rather a joy pure of all envy at seeing him growing in goodness by God's aid. Now it is widely and reasonably held that in the old days, when men first began to have thoughts about the gods, their origin and character, and in some cases—about the acts to which they first addressed themselves, tales were told which the sober-

minded could neither accept nor relish any more than they could the later versions in which the priority was given to fire, water, and other bodies, and only a secondary place to soul and its marvels, and the mightier and more worshipful motion was said to be that into which it is native to body to put itself under the influence of heat and cold and other such causes, not that which soul imparts to body and to herself. But now that we teach that soul, once implanted in body, quite naturally imparts motion and revolution to the body and to herself, we have left no rational ground for her to distrust her power to set any weight whatsoever in revolution. And thus, as we hold that soul is the universal cause, and that since the cause of good is always of the same nature as itself, and that of evil again always of *its* nature, 'tis only natural that soul should be universally the cause of revolution and movement, the best soul causing motion and revolution in the direction of good and the other sort of soul that in the opposite direction, good must be, and ever has been, triumphant over its contrary. Now in all we have said we have been pleading the cause of that justice which takes vengeance on the wicked. And as to the point under consideration, we can have no doubt left that we are to account the good man wise. But as concerns this wisdom of which we have been so long in quest, we must see whether after all we cannot discover it in some form of education or in some science such that defective acquaintance with it leaves us ignorant of our just rights, so long as the deficiency subsists. Well, I think we shall make the discovery, and I must tell you what it is. I have sought the vision of it in the heights and in the depths and will now do my best to set it clearly before you. The source of the trouble, as I am strongly persuaded by our recent discussion, is that our practice in the very chief point of virtue is amiss. There is no human virtue—and we must never let ourselves be argued out of

this belief—greater than *piety,* and piety, I must tell you, thanks to our incredible folly, has failed to show itself in the most nobly endowed natures. By the most nobly endowed I mean those which are most difficult of production, but once produced, of the highest service to mankind. A soul which admits alike, in due measure, and with an easy grace, influences which make for the slow and sure, and for its opposite, the impetuous, may be expected to be debonair, to adore valor, to be readily led to sobriety of life; what is more than all, if it combines capacity to learn and retentive memory with these gifts we may expect it to take such delight in all this that it will prove a lover of learning. Though it is hard for such characters to make their appearance, when they do appear and get the nurture and education they require, they will be able to keep the more numerous and worser sort in all due subjection, ordering all their relations with the gods, in all matters of sacrifices and purity toward God and man rightly and reasonably, in thought, word, and deed; men will thus be no formal hypocrites but true worshipers of virtue, and this, of course, is the point of chief concern for the whole community. This section of society, then, as I say, has a native supreme authority and is equal to the learning of the highest and noblest truth, if there were but one to teach them. But there will be no such teacher unless God leads the way, or even if there were, but he did his work amiss, 'twould be better not to go to school to him. Yet it follows with necessity from all we have said that I for one must enjoin the learning of these lessons on what we have described as the noblest natures. So we must do what we can to enumerate the subjects to be studied and explain their nature and the methods to be employed, to the best of the abilities of myself who am to speak and you who are to listen—to say, in fact, how a man should learn piety, and in what it consists. It may seem odd to the ear, but the name

we give to the study is one which will surprise a person unfamiliar with the subject—astronomy. Are you unaware that the true astronomer must be a man of great wisdom? I do not mean an astronomer of the type of Hesiod and his like, a man who has just observed settings and risings, but one who has studied seven out of the eight orbits, as each of them completes its circuit in a fashion not easy of comprehension by any capacity not endowed with admirable abilities. I have already touched on this and shall now proceed, as I say, to explain how and on what lines the study is to be pursued. And I may begin the statement thus.

The moon gets round her circuit most rapidly, bringing with her the month, and the full moon as a first period. Next we must observe the sun, his constant turnings throughout his circuit, and his companions. Not to be perpetually repeating ourselves about the same subjects, the rest of the orbits which we enumerated above are difficult to comprehend, and to train capacities which can deal with them we shall have to spend a great deal of labor on providing preliminary teaching and training in boyhood and youth. Hence there will be a need for several sciences. The first and most important of them is likewise that which treats of pure numbers—not numbers concreted in bodies, but the whole generation of the series of odd and even, and the effects which it contributes to the nature of things. When all this has been mastered, next in order comes what is called by the very ludicrous name *mensuration* (γεωμετρία (geometrya)), but is really a manifest assimilation to one another of numbers which are naturally dissimilar, effected by reference to areas. Now to a man who can comprehend this, it will be plain that this is no mere feat of human skill, but a miracle of God's contrivance. Next, numbers raised to the third power and thus presenting an analogy with three-dimensional things. Here again he assimilates the dissimilar

by a second science, which those who hit on the discovery have named *stereometry* [the gauging of solids], a device of God's contriving which breeds amazement in those who fix their gaze on it and consider how universal nature molds form and type by the constant revolution of potency and its converse about the double in the various progressions. The first example of this ratio of the double in the advancing number series is that of 1 to 2; double of this is the ratio of their second powers [1 : 4], and double of this again the advance to the solid and tangible, as we proceed from 1 to 8 [1, 2, 2^2, 2^3]; the advance to a mean of the double, that mean which is equidistant from lesser and greater term [the arithmetical], or the other mean [the harmonic] which exceeds the one term and is itself exceeded by the other by the same fraction of the respective terms these ratios of 3 : 2 and 4 : 3 will be found as means between 6 and 12—why, in the potency of the mean between these terms [6, 12], with its double sense, we have a gift from the blessed choir of the Muses to which mankind owes the boon of the play of consonance and measure, with all they contribute to rhythm and melody.

So much, then, for our program as a whole. But to crown it all, we must go on to the generation of things divine, the fairest and most heavenly spectacle God has vouchsafed to the eye of man. And, believe me, no man will ever behold that spectacle without the studies we have described, and so be able to boast that he has won it by an easy route. Moreover, in all our sessions for study we are to relate the single fact to its species; there are questions to be asked and erroneous theses to be refuted. We may truly say that this is ever the prime test, and the best a man can have; as for tests that profess to be such but are not, there is no labor so fruitlessly thrown away as that spent on them. We must also grasp the accuracy of the periodic times and the precision

with which they complete the various celestial motions, and this is where a believer in our doctrine that soul is both older and more divine than body will appreciate the beauty and justice of the saying that ‘all things are full of gods' and that we have never been left unheeded by the forgetfulness or carelessness of the higher powers. There is one observation to be made about all such matters. If a man grasps the several questions aright, the benefit accruing to him who thus learns his lesson in the proper way is great indeed; if he cannot, ‘twill ever be the better course to call on God. Now the proper way is this—so much explanation is unavoidable. To the man who pursues his studies in the proper way, all geometric constructions, all systems of numbers, all duly constituted melodic progressions, the single ordered scheme of all celestial revolutions, should disclose themselves, and disclose themselves they will, if, as I say, a man pursues his studies aright with his mind's eye fixed on their single end. As such a man reflects, he will receive the revelation of a single bond of natural interconnection between all these problems. If such matters are handled in any other spirit, a man, as I am saying, will need to invoke his luck. We may rest assured that without these qualifications the happy will not make their appearance in any society; this is the method, this the pabulum, these the studies demanded; hard or easy, this is the road we must tread. And piety itself forbids us to disregard the gods, now that the glad news of them all has been duly revealed. Him who has mastered all these lessons I account in truth as wisest; of him I dare affirm—'tis a fancy, and yet I am in earnest with it too—that such a one, when death has put the end to his allotted term, if he may be said still to endure beyond death, will no longer be subject, as he is now, to a multitude of perceptions; he will have but one allotted portion, even as he has reduced the manifold within himself to unity, and in it will be happy, wise, blessed, all in

one. Whether the life of bliss has Islands' or continents for its scene, such will be his happy portion forevermore, and further, whether the life he has spent here in such pursuits be that of public man or private citizen, the reward from the gods will be the same and no other. Thus we are brought back once more to the same very truth with which we began; rightly did we say that perfect bliss and happiness are impossible for all men save a few. 'Tis only they who are at once of godlike parts, sober of soul, endowed by nature with all other virtue, and have moreover mastered the whole contents of the blissful science—what that is, we have explained—'tis they, and they only who have received in full possession all deity has to give. And therefore we declare by our personal voices and enact it in our public law that those who have labored in these studies, when they reach advanced age at last, shall be invested with our chief magistracies, that others shall follow their leading in reverence of speech toward all gods of either sex, and that we shall do very right, now that we fully understand what this wisdom is and have put its claim to a proper test, to call upon all the members of our nocturnal council to take their part in it.

The Epinomis.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

or

THE PHILOSOPHER.

Persons of the Dialog.

An Athenian Guest, Clinias a Cretan, and

Megillus a Lacedæmonian.

Clinias/ According to our agreement, we have all of us, guest, come correctly, being three, I, and you, and Megillus here, to consider the question of intellect, in what manner it is meet to go through in a discourse that, which we say belongs to the constitution of man, and which, when it has been thought upon, causes it to be in the best state with regard to itself, as far as it is possible for man to possess it. For, as we assert, we have gone through all the other matters, that existed, relating to the laying down of laws. But that, which is of the greatest moment to discover and to speak of, namely, by learning what will a mortal man become wise, this we have neither spoken of nor discovered. Now then let us endeavor not to leave this behind. For we should nearly do that imperfectly, for the sake of which we have all rushed onwards, with the view of making clear everything from the beginning to the end.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak well, friend Clinias. But I think you will now hear a strange discourse, and on the other hand in a certain respect not strange. For many, who meet us in life, tell the same story, that the human race will be neither blessed nor happy. Follow me, then, and see whether to you I likewise appear together with them to speak correctly on a point like this. I assert then that it is not possible for men, except a few, to be blessed and happy; I

limit this to as long as we live; but there is a fair hope that a person will after death obtain everything, for the sake of which he would desire, when alive, to live in the best manner he could, and dying to meet with such an end. And I assert nothing very wise, but what all of us, both Greeks and Barbarians, after a certain manner know, that to be produced is at the beginning difficult for every animal. In the first place, it is difficult to partake of the state of conception, next to be born, and, further still, to be brought up and educated; for all these things take place, as we all say, through ten thousand troubles. The time too would be short, not only with respect to the calculation of annoyances, but what everyone would imagine to be moderate; and this seems to make almost a kind of breathing-time in the middle of the life of man. Old age however, quickly overtaking a person, would make him not at all willing to live his life over again, after he has considered the life he has lived, unless he happens to be full of the thoughts of a child. Now of this what is to me the proof? It is, because what is sought for in our discourse exists naturally in this way. Now we are seeking by what manner we shall become wise, as if there were to each of us some such power as this. But it flies quickly away then, when anyone proceeds to an investigation of the so-called arts or notions, or any other things of that kind, which we imagine to be sciences; whereas not one of them is worthy to be called by the name of that wisdom, which is conversant with the affairs of man; while on the other hand, the soul is very confident, and divines, as if this wisdom were existing in her by some gift of nature; but what it is, and when, and how it exists, it is wholly unable to discover. Does not then in this manner our difficulty about, and search after, wisdom, seem somehow greatly to be full of the hope, which exists to each of those amongst us, who are able to examine both themselves

prudently, and others harmoniously, through reasonings of all kinds and spoken in every manner? Shall we agree that these things are not thus, or thus?

Clinias/ We will agree in this, O guest, in the hope perhaps, which will arise in the course of time, of having hereafter with you opinions the most true on these points.

Athenian Stranger/ We must then first go through the other sciences, as they are called, but which do not render him wise, who receives and possesses them, in order that, by putting them out of the way, we may endeavor to place by our side those, of which we are in want, and, after placing them by our side, learn them.

Let us, then, first look into the sciences, of which the race of man is first in want; since these are nearly the most necessary, and truly the first. Now he, who becomes skilled in these, even though he seemed at first to be wise, yet now he is not considered to be wise, but obtains rather a disgrace by a science of this kind. We will therefore mention what they are, and show that nearly everyone, to whom is proposed the contest of seeming to become the best man, avoids them through the possession of intellect and study. Let the first art then be that, which, withdrawing us from eating human flesh, that, as the story goes, took place formerly amongst mankind after the manner of savage animals, has recalled us to a more lawful food. And may those before be propitious to us, and they are. For whosoever we are, who have spoken, let them be bidden the first farewell. The manufacture of wheaten flour and barley meal and moreover the food is indeed beautiful and good; but it will never be able to work out the man completely wise. For this very thing, under the appellation of a manufacture, would produce a difficult handling of the things manufactured. Nor would the cultivation of nearly the whole country do so; for we all appear to take in hand the earth,

not by art, but by nature, according to a god. Nor yet would the weaving together of dwellings nor the whole of house-building, and the manufacture of all kinds of utensils, and copper-work, and the preparing of instruments for carpenters and molders, and weavers, and trades in general, although possessing what is useful for the common people, be suited for virtue. Nor yet does the whole of hunting, although various and full of art, contribute what is greatly becoming together with what is wise. Nor yet does the diviner's and interpreter's art at all; for such merely knows what is said, but has not learnt whether it is true. Since then we see that the possession of necessaries is worked out indeed by art, but that not one of these arts makes any person wise, there would be left after this a certain sport, imitative for the most part, but by no means a serious pursuit. For persons do with many instruments, and with many imitations, effected by their own bodies, not altogether graceful, make an imitation of things, expressed in prose and verse, and of those, of which painting is the mother, while colors many and various are worked out, by many substances moist and dry; by operating upon none of which with the greatest care does the imitative art render a person wise. And when all has been done, there would be something remaining in the assistance without number given to persons without number; the greatest of which and for the most numerous occasions is the art of war, called by the name of generalship, of the highest repute in the case of need, but requiring the greatest good fortune, and that which is assigned naturally rather to bravery than wisdom. And what persons call the medical art is surely itself an assistance nearly of such ills as the seasons cause by cold and unseasonable heat, and make by all such matters, the nature of animals their spoil. But not one of these arts is in good repute for the truest wisdom; for being made the

subject of conjecture, they are carried along without measure by opinions. And assistants we will call pilots and sailors likewise. But not one of these let any person, by cheating us with words, proclaim a wise man on every ground. For not one of them would know the rage of the winds or their kindness, which is the most acceptable thing in the whole of the pilot's art. Nor yet such as say they are assistants in lawsuits by their power in speaking, and, by their memory and practice, give their minds to unusual opinions, but stumble outside the truth in cases of real justice. There still remains a certain strange power with respect to the opinion of wisdom, which the many would then call by the name of nature rather than wisdom, when anyone perceives that he is easily learning, what even a child could learn, and is remembering many things and firmly so, and can call to mind what is suited to each thing, and quickly do it, when it would be becoming, if it took place. Now all this some will place under nature, others under wisdom, and others under a cleverness of nature. But no prudent person, would ever be willing to call anyone of these a truly wise man.

It is however necessary for a certain science to become apparent, by which he, who possesses it, would be wise in reality, and not be so in opinion merely. Let us, then, consider. For we are endeavoring by a reasoning, difficult in every way, to find some other science beyond those already mentioned, which may be truly and with propriety called wisdom; while he, who receives it, will be a person neither vulgar nor silly, but wise and good through it; and, whether he governs or is governed by the state, in justice become an elegant person.

Let us, therefore, consider that science first, which singly proceeds from human nature, and which, amongst all that are present, would, by not being present, render the race of

man of all animals the most senseless and thoughtless. Now this it is not very difficult for anyone to consider. For that, which has given number to the whole race of man, would, so to say, being compared one against one, effect this. I conceive however that a certain god himself, rather than a certain accident, gave it to us to preserve us; but whom I conceive to have been the god, it is necessary to state, strange although it be, and, on the other hand, somehow not strange. For how must we not conceive that he, who is the cause to us of every good thing, should not have been the cause likewise of intellect, the greatest good by far? Now what god am I speaking of, Megillus and Clinias, and making an object of worship? It is almost Heaven, whom it is most just we should honor, as all the other dæmons and gods do, and pray pre-eminently to it. For all of us would confess that it is the cause of all good things to us. And we assert to boot that it has given us number, and will give it us still, if anyone is willing to follow us. For if a person will proceed to a right view of it, whether it be the pleasure of anyone to call it the World, or Olympus, or Heaven, let him so call it; but let him follow, wherever it assumes a varied form, when it causes the stars in it to revolve along all their courses, and when it imparts the seasons and food for all, and the remaining gift of intellect, as we should say, together with all number, and every other good. Now this is the greatest thing, when anyone, receiving from it the gift of number, proceeds through every period. Returning back still a little in our discourse, let us call to mind that we have conceived very correctly, that if we take away number from human nature, we should be intellectual not at all. For the soul of the animal, from whom reason is absent, would scarcely any longer be able to receive every virtue. Now the animal, which does not know two and three, even and odd, and is entirely ignorant of number, would never be able to give a reason

respecting those things, of which it alone possesses sensation and memory; but nothing hinders it from possessing the other virtues, fortitude and temperance. But he, who is deprived of true reason, will never become wise; and he, to whom wisdom is not present, which is the greatest part of the whole of virtue, would never be perfectly good, nor happy. In this way there is every necessity for number to be laid down as a principle. But why it is necessary, there would be a discourse longer than all that has been spoken. And correctly will the present one have been stated likewise, that of the things, mentioned as belonging to the other arts, which we have gone through, and permitted them all to be arts, not even one would remain, but all perish entirely, when anyone takes away the science of numbers. But to some of those, who have looked to the arts, the race of man would appear sufficiently for the sake of some small matters to have no need of number. And yet is it a thing of moment. And if anyone looks to what is divine and mortal in generation, in which piety towards the gods and true number are known, he could not mention the person, who knows the whole of number, and of what power it is when present, the cause; since it is evident that what relates to all music, requires numbered motion and sound; and, what is the greatest, that it number is the cause of all good things, but of nothing evil, this must be known well, which would perhaps take place by another road; for the movement, which is without reason, and order, and shape, and rhythm, and harmony, and all such things as partake of any evil, is deficient in nearly all number. And this it is meet for him to conceive in this way, who is about to end his days happily; and no one, except him, who knows the just, the good, the beautiful, and all such things, and has laid hold of a true opinion respecting them, will through number know how

with regard to anything to persuade himself and others at all.

Let us then proceed to consider this very thing, how we learnt to number. Say, from whence did it arise that we have understood one and two? Do persons possess from the creator a nature of this kind towards their being able to understand them? Nature, indeed, has not been present to many other animals for this very purpose, so that they are able to learn from their father to number; but the deity has established within us this very thing first, so as to be competent to understand what is shown to us; and afterwards he showed it and is still showing; of which things what can a person see one, as compared with one, more beautiful than the birth of day? and then, when he comes to the portion of night, he will have a sight, from whence everything will appear to him quite different. And when he ceases not revolving upon these very matters for many days and many nights, he will see how Heaven ceases not in teaching men one and two, until even the most hard to learn shall learn sufficiently how to number. For thus each of us, on perceiving these, would understand three and four and many. And amongst these the deity has formed one thing, the Moon; which at one time appearing greater, and at another less, proceeds through her path, showing continually another day up to fifteen days and nights. And this is a period, if anyone is willing to establish the whole circle as one; so that the most indocile animal, so to say, would learn to number, if it were one, to whom the deity had imparted the nature of being able to learn. And up to these points, and in these matters, the whole mass of animals have the power to become skilled in numbers, by considering one thing, itself by itself. But always to reckon up all numbers, when compared with each other, I think is a greater work. And for the sake of this, the deity having formed, as we have

said, the Moon, increasing and decreasing, has put together months into the year, and caused us to compare every number with number, with a prosperous fortune. Hence, there are fruits for us, and the earth has become pregnant, so that there is food for all animals; while winds and showers take place, neither out of season nor measure. But if anything occurs contrary to this on the side of evil, it is meet to accuse not the divine, but human, nature, as unjustly distributing its own life. Now to us, while we were investigating the laws, it appeared, that the other things, which are nearly the best for man, are easy for us to know; and that everyone would be competent to understand what was said, and to do it, if he knew what is that, which is likely to be a benefit, and what is not. But it has appeared, and now appears still, that all the other pursuits are not very difficult; but in what manner it is meet for men to become good, is very difficult. And, again, to acquire all the rest of good things, as the saying is, it is both possible and not difficult; but with respect to substance, how much is requisite and not requisite, and with respect to the body, how much is requisite and not requisite, and with respect to the soul, that it ought to be good, everyone agrees with everyone. But in what manner it ought to be good, everyone when asked answers, by being just, and temperate, and brave, and this; but in what manner to be wise, or what wisdom is, not one, as we just now observed, agrees at all with one of the many. Now therefore, besides all the previous kinds of wisdom, we have discovered one, by no means vile for this very purpose, that he, who has learnt what we have discussed, will seem to be wise; but whether he, who is skilled on these points, is wise and good, on this it is requisite to hold a discussion.

Clinias/ How reasonably, guest, did you say, that you are endeavoring to speak greatly about great things!

Athenian Stranger/ For they are not trifling things, Clinias; and, what is still more difficult, they are in every respect and entirely true.

Clinias/ Very much so, guest; but do not however be fainthearted in stating what you mean.

Athenian Stranger/ Truly so; nor do you in hearing.

Clinias/ This shall be; for I will speak to you for both of us.

Athenian Stranger/ It is well. But it is necessary, as it seems, to speak first of all from the beginning, especially if we are able to comprehend in one name what is that, which we consider to be wisdom; but if we are quite unable, to consider in the second place, what and how many are the arts through which he, who receives them, will, according to our story, be a wise man.

Clinias/ Say on.

Athenian Stranger/ What follows after this will be without blame to the legislator; who, making a conjecture about the gods, speaks more beautifully and better than those, who have spoken before; and who passes his life in making use, as it were, of a beautiful discipline, and honoring the gods, and exalting them with hymns, and felicity, and thus passes through life.

Clinias/ Well and beautifully are you speaking, guest; and may the end of your laws be this, that after falling down before the gods, and passing a life the most pure, you may meet with its close the best and the most beautiful.

Athenian Stranger/ How then shall we speak, Clinias? Does it not seem to you that we honor the gods greatly by hymning them, and by praying that it may come into your minds to say things the most beautiful and the best respecting them? Say you in this way, or how?

Clinias/ In this way, wonderfully. But do thou, O godlike man, confiding in the gods, offer up a prayer, and speak the one amongst your beautiful speeches that comes into your mind relating to the gods and goddesses.

Athenian Stranger/ This shall be, if the deity himself be our leader. Do you only pray with me.

Clinias/ Say then what is to follow this.

Athenian Stranger/ It is necessary then, as it seems, for me, since those, who have gone before, have represented improperly the generation of gods and of animals, to give in the first place, according to our former reasoning, a better representation, by resuming the discourse, which I took in hand against impious assertions, and to assert that there are gods, who have a care for all things both small and great; and that they are not to be softened down by those, who are engaged in unjust acts, if you remember, Clinias; for you took down a memorandum of it; for what was then said was very true. But this was the greatest, that every soul is older than everybody. Do you not remember this? or this at least perfectly, that what is better, and older, and more divine, is credibly prior to that, which is worse, and younger, and less honorable; and in every way that what governs, is prior to what is governed; and that what leads, to what is led. Let us then receive this at least, that soul is older than body. Now if this be the case, it is more credible that, what is first in the generation of the first, would be almost the beginning; and let us lay down that the beginning exists in a more becoming manner than a beginning, and that we have most correctly come upon the greatest parts of wisdom, relating to the generation of the gods.

Clinias/ Let these things be stated to the best of our power.

Athenian Stranger/ Come, then, let us assert that an animal is said most truly to exist according to nature then, when one combination of soul and body coming together produces one form.

Clinias/ Correctly so.

Athenian Stranger/ A thing of this kind then is most justly called an animal.

Clinias/ It is.

Athenian Stranger/ Now it is requisite, according to a probable account, for five solid bodies to be mentioned, from which a person might model the most beautiful and best of things; but the whole of the other genus possesses one form. For there is nothing else, which can be generated without a body, and possessing in no respect and at no time color, except the really most divine genus of soul. Now this is nearly that alone, to which it pertains to mound and fabricate; but it belongs to body, as we call it, to be molded and produced, and to be visible. But to the other soul—for let us say it again, since it is to be said not merely once, —it pertains to be invisible, and to know and to be intelligible, and to have a share of memory and of the reasoning power in the changes of even and odd. As there are, therefore, five bodies, it is requisite to say that fire is the first, and water the second, and air the third, and earth the fourth, and æther the fifth; and in the dominions of each of these there is produced many an animal and of every kind. Now it is meet to learn this singly, thus. Let us, in the first place, lay down the whole of the things of earth as one, namely, all human beings, and all such animals as are with many feet, or none, and such as can move on, and such as are stationary, as being held down by roots. And it is requisite to consider the one thing belonging to it as this, that all these are formed of all those genera, but that the greater part is of

the earth and the nature of solidity. It is, however, requisite to lay down another kind of animal, which is generated, and, at the same time, able to be seen. For it consists for the most part of fire; but contains likewise a small portion of earth and air, and of all the other things. Hence, it is requisite to assert that animals of every kind and visible are generated from them. It is necessary likewise to think that all in the heavens are these genera of animals, which it is necessary to say is the whole divine race of the stars, consisting of a most beautiful body, and of a soul the most happy and the best. It is requisite moreover to impart to them, at least in opinion, one of two fates. For each of them is either indestructible and immortal, and altogether, from every necessity, divine, or possesses some long-aged life of life, sufficient for each, than which there would be never any need of more.

Let us then consider first, that there are, as we have said, these two kinds of animals; and let us say again that both of them are visible, the one being, as it would seem, wholly of fire, and the other of earth, and that the earthy is moved in a disorderly manner, but the fiery in all order. Now it is meet to consider that, what is moved without order, is senseless, as the animal, which is around us, acts for the most part; but that, what has its going in order and in the heavens, it is meet to make for ourselves as a great proof of its being intellectual; for it goes on ever according to the same and in a similar manner; and by doing and suffering it would afford a sufficient proof of its living intellectually. Now the necessity of a soul possessing intellect would be by far the greatest of all necessities. For it lays down laws as governing, and not governed. But when soul, which is a thing the best, deliberates according to the best intellect, that, which is not to be changed by turning, comes out perfect in reality according to intellect; and even adamant would not be

superior to such a soul, and less to be changed by turning. But in reality the three Fates hold and guard, so as to be perfect, that, which has been deliberated upon by each of the gods with the best counsel. It was necessary therefore that there should be to man a proof that the stars are endued with intellect through the whole of their progression, because they always do the same things, through its having been planned of old that they are to do so for some wondrous length of time, and through a change not taking place in the plan, by their doing some things at one time, and others at another, and by wandering up and down and altering their orbit. Now the very reverse of this has appeared to the majority of us, that, by their doing the same things and in a similar manner, they have not a soul. The masses, too, have followed persons so senseless, as to conceive that the human race is intellectual and vital, as being moved, but the divine race unintellectual, as remaining in the same movements. But it is allowable for the man, who places himself on the side of what is more beautiful, and better, and more agreeable to the gods, to conceive that he ought, on this very account, to consider as intellectual that, which does always the same things according to the same and in a similar manner; and that this is the nature of the stars, most beautiful to behold, and which by a progression and dance, the most beautiful and magnificent of all choirs, completes for all animals what is needful. Now to show that we are justly saying they possess a soul, let us consider first their size. For they are not in reality so small, as they appear to be; but each of them is of immense bulk, as is worthy to be believed; for this is admitted by competent demonstrations. For it is possible to conceive correctly that the whole Sun is larger than the whole earth, and that all the stars, which are borne along, possess a wonderful size. Let us then take into our thoughts what would be the method of any nature in

causing so great a bulk to revolve for ever for the same time that it revolves at present. Now I assert that a god would be the cause, and that it could not be possible otherwise. For it would not otherwise become animated than through a god, as we have shown. But since a god is able in this respect, to him there has been every facility for every animal, in the first place, to be produced, and everybody, and every bulk; and next, to cause them to move in that way, which he conceived to be the best. And now upon all these points we will make one true assertion. It is impossible for the earth and heavens and all the stars and all the bulky bodies made from them to subsist, unless a soul were present to each, or in each, so that they proceed with such accuracy according to years, and months, and days, and for every good, which is produced, to be produced for us all. But it is requisite that, by how much the more vile is man, the less ought he to be seen to trifle, but to assert something clear concerning them. Should then anyone assert that certain violent motions of bodies or natures or anything of this kind are the causes, he will say nothing that is clear.

It is however requisite to reconsider seriously what we have said, whether our discourse has a reason for it, or altogether comes after it. In the first place then, we said, there are two things, the one, soul, and the other, body, and that many things pertain to each; but that all are different from one another, and each from each; and that there is no other third thing common to anyone; and that soul differs from body; and that the former is intellectual, but the latter unintellectual; and that the one rules, but the other is ruled; and that the one is the cause of all that happens, but the other is not the cause of any accident; so that to assert that the things in heaven were generated by something else, and that the productions of soul and body do not exist in this way, is a great folly and a want of reason. If then it is

requisite for the reasons, relating to all such matters, to be victorious, and for all things of this kind to seem confidently to be divine, we must lay down one or the other of these two points; we must either hymn those things most correctly, as being gods themselves, or we must consider them, like images, to be resemblances of the gods, the gods themselves having manufactured them. For they are the works of artificers neither senseless nor of little worth. But, as we have said, we must lay down one or the other of these points. And what is laid down, we must honor pre-eminently before all statues. For never will there be seen statues more beautiful and more common of all men, or put up in pre-eminent places, and excelling for their purity, and solemnity, and the whole of life, than are these, how they have been generated altogether in this way. Let us then endeavor to prove so much, at least, relating to the gods, by perceiving that these are the two visible animals, of which we have spoken, one immortal; but the whole of the other has been created of the earth, mortal; and let us attempt to speak of the three, which are in the midst of the five between them, and exist according to reasonable opinion, most clearly. For after fire let us place æther; and let us lay down that from it the soul molds animals, which possess a power, like some other genera, the greater portions from their own nature, but the smaller portions, for the sake of a link, from other genera; and after the æther that soul molds from air another genus of animals, and a third from water. And it is probable that soul, after it had fabricated all these, filled the whole of heaven with living matter, by making use, to the best of its power, of all genera, since all of them exist, partakers of life; but that the second and the third, and the fourth and the fifth, beginning their generation from the gods, who are manifest, end in us, who are men.

The gods, then, Zeus and Hera, and all the rest, let anyone place where he pleases, according to the same law; and let him consider this reasoning as fixed.

We must call therefore the nature of the stars, and such things as we perceive existing together with the stars, the visible gods, the greatest and the most worthy of honor, and who as seeing on every side the most acutely, are the first in rank. And after them, and under them in due order, it is very meet to honor with prayers the dæmons, for the sake of their silent going to and fro, an aerial genus, that occupies a third and middle seat, and is the cause of interpreting. But of these two kinds of living beings, one formed of æther, and the other in due order of air, neither of them is entirely visible; and though present and near at hand, they do not become manifest to us; but let us say that, participating in a wonderful intelligence, as being docile and of a good memory, they know all our thoughts; and that in a wonderful manner they love the honorable and good man amongst us, and hate excessively the wicked, as being himself a sharer in pain; for the deity, who possesses the completion of a divine allotment, is placed beyond these two, pleasure and pain, but has had a share in thinking upon and knowing, according to all things. And as the heaven is full of living beings, they interpret to each other and the highest gods all things and in all ways, through the living beings in the middle being carried to earth and through the whole of heaven with a light and rapid motion. But he, who assimilates the fifth genus of living beings, which is from water, to a demigod, will assimilate rightly; and this genus is sometimes visible, and sometimes concealed from view; but when visible, it exhibits a wonder through an obscure vision. Since then there are these five kinds of living beings really existing, in whatever manner any of us meets with them, falling in with them in a dream, in an interpretation

of a dream, or spoken by oracles and prophecies to some in hearing, healthy or sick, or being met with at the close of life, and opinions being present privately and publicly, from whence many sacred rites of many have taken place, and some will take place; of all these the legislator, who possesses even the smallest particle of mind, will never dare, by making innovations towards a god-worship, which does not possess something clear, to overturn his own state; nor will he, knowing nothing at all himself, forbid any portion of what the law of his country has spoken, on the subject of the gods. For it is not possible for human nature to know anything on points of this kind. And does not the same reason hold good, that those are the worst of men, who do not dare to speak to us of the gods really existing in a manifest form, and to make them manifest, by permitting the other gods to be without sacred rites, and not to receive the honors that are due to them? But now there happens a thing of this kind to take place, as if someone of us had seen the Sun and Moon existing and looking upon all of us; and, although able to speak, had not said that they remained still sharing in no honors; nor was he anxious for his part to bring them into a place of honor, nor to cause festivals and sacrifices to take place for them; nor, through the computed time, to distribute to each of them the seasons of frequently longer and shorter years. Would not such a one, if he were said to be bad both to himself and to any other, who knew him, be justly said to be so?

Clinias/ How not, O guest, as being the worst of men?

Athenian Stranger/ Know then, friend Clinias, that this very thing has now happened respecting myself.

Clinias/ How say you?

Athenian Stranger/ Know that amongst those, relating to the whole heaven, there are eight powers, sisters to each

other, on which I have looked; and yet I have done nothing of consequence; for this is easy even to another person. Of these there are three, one of the Sun, one of the Moon, and one of the not-wandering stars, which I mentioned a little before, and there are five others. With respect to all these, and the gods in them, whether they move of themselves, or are carried along in cars, let not one of us all think even that some are gods, and others not; nor yet, that some of them are genuine, but others such as it is not lawful for any of us to mention; but let us all say that they are all of them brothers, and live in fraternal allotments; and let us honor them, not one for a year, and another for a month, nor let us ordain for others any allotment or time, in which each proceeds through its revolution, and completes the arrangement, which reason, the most divine of all, has ordained to be visible; and which he, who is under a good dæmon, has first wondered at, and then felt a desire to learn, as much as it is possible for a mortal nature, from thinking that he shall thus pass through life in the best and most fortunate manner, and after death arrive at places adapted to virtue; and being thus truly initiated and in reality participating in prudence, one in one, will pass the rest of his time as a holy spectator of things the most beautiful, as far as sight is concerned.

It now remains for us to state after this how many and what they are. For we shall not be seen to be false. Thus far at least I firmly insist upon. For I say again, that of these there are eight; and that of the eight, three have been already spoken of, and there are five still remaining. Now the fourth and fifth onward movement and oblique path are nearly equal in velocity with the Sun, and are neither slower nor swifter. And let us say that he, who possesses intellect, is altogether competent to lead these three; and that these movements belong to the Sun, and Lucifer. But the third it

is not possible to speak of by name, through its not being known; and the reason of this, that the person, who first saw it, was a Barbarian. For an ancient place was the nurse of those, who first thought of these matters, in consequence of the beauty of the summer season, which Egypt and Syria possess sufficiently, enabling persons to look upon all the stars, visible, so to say, perpetually; inasmuch as they dwelt in a part of the world at a distance from clouds and rain. Hence to everywhere else and hither too has reached what has been tested by the time of thousands of years, and even infinite; and on this account it is meet with confidence to lay down these matters as laws. For to think that divine natures are not to be held in honor, or that these are not divine, is clearly the province of persons not endued with intellect. It is necessary however for this to be assigned as the reason, why they have no names with the masses; for they have appellations with some divine persons. For Lucifer and Hesperus, being the same, have the appellation almost of Venus, and are very well suited to a Syrian name-giver. But the star, which revolves with an equal velocity with the Sun and this Lucifer, has the name almost of Mercury. And further, let us speak of three onward movements of those stars, that take their course to the right hand, together with the Sun and Moon. But it is requisite to call the eighth orb one, which a person may most correctly call the upper world, which proceeds contrary to all those, and draws the others along with it, as it would appear to persons who know little on these matters; but what we know sufficiently, it is necessary to speak of, and we do speak. For wisdom really existing is somehow in this way apparent to him, who has a share, although a small one, of consciousness correct and divine. Three stars then remain, one of which differs from the rest by the slowness of its motion. Some call it by the name of Phænon Saturn; but that, which is after this in

slowness, it is meet to call Phaethon Zeus; and after this follows Puroeis, Mars, which has the reddest color of all. Of these things when a person is speaking, it is not difficult to have a notion; but after learning, it is requisite to think of them, as we have said.

This however it is necessary for every Greek to have in his thoughts, that we inhabit a spot, belonging to the Greeks, nearly the best, as regards virtue. But it is proper to say that it deserves praise for being situated in the middle of the natural qualities of summer and winter. But though its nature, as regards summer, falls short of that, which belongs to the region there, as I have stated, it gave subsequently to them the mental perception relating to these gods of the world. Let us then admit that, whatever the Greeks have received from the Barbarians, they work it out to a more beautiful end. And the very same notion we ought to have with respect to what has been said now, that it is difficult to discover all matters of this kind without feeling a doubt. There is however a hope, both much and glorious, that the Greeks will respect all these divinities in a manner more beautiful and more just than the tradition, which has come from the Barbarians, by employing both discipline and the Delphic oracles and every attention according to the laws. Nor let any Greek be afraid of this, that mortals ought not to busy themselves about divine matters; but to think quite the contrary of this, that the deity is not senseless, nor ignorant of human nature; but knows that, where he teaches, man will follow, and learn what has been taught; and that he surely knows that he does teach us this very thing, and that we learn both number and to number. For being ignorant of this, he would be the most stupid of all beings. For, according to the saying, he would in reality be ignorant of himself, if he were annoyed at a person able to learn, and did not rejoice without a feeling of envy at a

person becoming good through a god. Now there is a reason great and good for supposing that, when men had their first notions about the gods, how they existed, and of what kind they were, and what actions they took in hand, ideas were then broached, not to the mind of the moderate, nor agreeable to them, nor even of those, who were next after them; amongst whom what relates to fire and water and the other bodies, was said to be the most ancient; but posterior to them the wonderful soul; and that the movement, which the body has obtained by lot, is better and of more value for carrying on both itself and soul by the aid of heat and cold, and all things of that kind; but that the soul could not do so to body and itself. But now, when we say that soul exists, if it exists in body, it would be not at all wonderful for it to move and carry about both the body and itself; nor would, according to any reason, soul be believed to be unable to carry about a weight. Since then soul is the cause of the universe, and of all good things being such, and on the other hand of evil things being such, it is not at all wonderful that soul should be the cause of every bearing on and movement; but that the bearing on and movement towards the good belongs to the best soul, but the bearing on and movement towards the contrary, to a contrary soul; and that it is necessary for the good to have vanquished, and to vanquish still, what are not of this kind. Hence let these be the assertions of us, now thinking in this way; all of which has been stated with reference to Justice, the punisher of the impious. With respect however to that, which has been brought to a test, it is not possible for us to disbelieve, that we ought not to consider the good to be wise.

Let us then see, whether to this wisdom, of which we were of old in search, we can direct our mind either by education or art; and being wanting in the knowledge of which we should be ignorant of things just. Being such we seem to me,

and we must speak. For after seeking up and down, I will endeavor to make it at the end plain to you in the way it has become very plain to myself. The greatest part of virtue, when it is not practiced correctly, becomes the cause of ignorance, as, from what has been said, the thing itself seems to me to signify forcibly. But let no one persuade us, that there is any part of virtue belonging to the race of mortals greater than piety. Now that this does not exist in the best natures through ignorance, we must declare; since the best are those, which are produced with the greatest difficulty, and which, when produced, are of the greatest benefit. For the soul, that receives moderately and mildly what belongs to a nature slow and the reverse, would be of an easy disposition; and admiring fortitude, and being obedient towards temperance, and, what is the greatest in these natures, able to learn, and with a good memory, it would be able to rejoice much in things of this kind, so as to be a lover of learning. For these things are not easy to be produced; and when they are produced, and meet with the nurture and education of which there is a need, they would be able to keep down most correctly the most part of their inferiors, by instructing them to do and say respecting the gods each of the matters that are requisite, and when they are requisite, relating to sacrifices and purifications, connected with gods and men, and not to make use of artifice in outward shows, but to honor virtue in truth, which is of all things of the greatest moment to every state. This part, therefore, we say is naturally the most important; and if there be a person to teach, it is able to be learnt in the most beautiful and best manner possible. But no one can be a teacher unless a god leads the way. If however a person teaches anything correctly, but does not perform anything of this kind in a fitting manner, it is better not to learn. However, from what has been said, it is necessary to learn

these things, and for me to say that a nature of this kind is the best. Let us then endeavor to go through by a discourse what these are, and of what kind, and how it is requisite to learn them, both according to my ability, who am the speaker, and the ability of those, who are able to hear, in what manner a person may learn some things about god-worship. It is a thing almost absurd for the hearer. But we mention its name, which is, what a person through his ignorance of the subject would not imagine, astronomy. Are you then ignorant that the person, who is truly an astronomer, is necessarily the most wise? Not, indeed, he, who is an astronomer according to Hesiod, and all such, and looks to risings and settings, but he, who looks to the circle of the eight orbits, and the seven under the first, while each is going through its own orbit in such a way, that no nature would be competent to contemplate them easily, unless it partook of a wonderful nature, as we have just now said, and say to those, to whom we are stating what it is meet to learn, and how. Let this be mentioned first by us.

The Moon goes through its orbit the quickest, and first leads on the month and the full moon. The second it is meet to consider is the Sun, that leads on the solstices through the whole of its orbit, and those that describe their course together with it. But that we may not frequently converse in the same way about the same things, the other orbits, which we mentioned before, and which it is not easy to comprehend, we ought to contemplate; and for these objects it is requisite to prepare natures, such as can exist, by teaching them many things beforehand, and accustoming the party, while a boy or youth, to labor thoroughly at what is requisite. On this account there would be a need of mathematics; but the greatest and first need is of numbers in the abstract, and not of such as are connected with bodies, but of the whole generation and power of the even

and the odd, and so much as they contribute to the nature of things that exist. Now to him, who learns this, there comes in due order what we call very ridiculously by the name of geometry. But the similitude of numbers, that are naturally not similar to each other, becomes conspicuous, when applied to the properties of plain surfaces; which wonderful thing, not of human but divine origin, will appear very clear to him, who is able to think. And after this, those numbers, that are increased by a triple ratio, and are similar to the nature of a solid, and those, that are on the other hand dissimilar, and are by another art similar to this, which those, who are conversant with it, call stereometry, to be considered: which is indeed a thing divine and wonderful to those, who look into it; that, while the power is ever revolving about the double, and that which is from the opposite to this, according to each analogy does every nature fashion out for itself a species and genus. Now the first power of the double, according to number, proceeds, according to proportion through one to two, possessing a double by power. But that, which, as regards the solid and tangible, is again a double, proceeds from one to eight. But that of the double quantity to the middle, and perhaps, what is more than the less, and less than the greater; while the other by the same part surpasses, and is surpassed by the extremes. But in the middle of six to twelve, there is found the sesquialter and sesquitertian proportions. And in the middle of these, a power, turned to both, has distributed to men a use, where voice and measure are combined, for the sake of sports, rhythm, and harmony, after having been granted to the happy dancing of the Muses.

Let all these then be held to take place in this way, and let them exist. But as regards the finish to this, let us proceed to the divine generation and the most beautiful and divine nature of things visible, as far as a deity has granted

to man to look upon them; which nature, no one, after having beheld, will boast of having received with facility without the particulars mentioned above. Besides this, in our several intercourse we must refer every individual thing to its species, and all things to one, by asking questions and disproving what has been not correctly asserted. For this is truly a touchstone the most beautiful and thoroughly the first amongst men; but in the case of such, as are not touchstones, and only pretend to be, there is a labor the most vain of all.

Further still, the accuracy of time must be considered by us, and how exactly it completes all that takes place in heaven; so that he, who believes the assertion to be true, that soul is a thing older and more divine than body, would also conceive it has been very beautifully and sufficiently said, that all things are full of gods; and that we have never been neglected through the forgetfulness or carelessness of superior beings. But as regards all such things as these, we should bear this in mind, that, if anyone apprehends correctly each of these matters, there will be a great benefit to him, who has apprehended them; but if not, that it will be better for him to be ever calling upon a god, according to method. And let this be the method—for it is necessary to say so much at least as this—Every diagram, system of number, and composition of harmony, together with the one agreement of all the stars in their revolutions, ought to be apparent to him, who learns in a proper manner. And that, of which we are speaking, will become apparent, if a person rightly learns, looking to one thing. For to those, who think upon the matter, there will appear to be naturally one bond to all of these. But if a person will take the matter in hand in any other way, he must, as we have said, call upon fortune. For, without these, no nature will become lucky in states. But this is the method, and this the nurture, and

through these subjects of instruction we must proceed, whether they are difficult or easy. Nor is it lawful to neglect the gods; since the happy report, relating to all of them, has, according to a manner, become apparent. And I call him, who thus apprehends all these points, the man the most truly wise; who, I stoutly affirm, both in jest and earnest, will, when he shall have filled up by death his allotted portion in things of this kind, if he be still almost dying, neither share any longer in many of his senses then, as at present; and he will, after being a partaker of one destiny alone, and becoming one out of many, be fortunate, and, at the same time, most wise and blessed; whether anyone lives blessed on the continent, or in islands; and that he will participate in a fortune, which ever happens to be of this kind; and that, whether anyone studies these questions, living a public or a private life, he will meet with the same fate and in a similar manner from the gods. But what we said at the beginning, the same assertion appears even now to be really true; that it is not possible for men to be perfectly blessed and happy, except a few. And this is rightly asserted by us. For such as are divine and at the same time prudent men, and naturally participate in the rest of virtue, and in addition have acquired all, that is closely connected with a blessed instruction, and such things as we have mentioned, to these alone have the gifts of fortune fallen by lot, and are in a sufficient state. To those then, who have labored in this way upon such points, we say privately and lay down publicly as a law, that the greatest offices ought to be given to those, who have arrived at the period of an old man; and that all the others ought to follow them, and with good words hymn all the gods and goddesses; and lastly, that all of us, after having known and sufficiently examined the nocturnal assembly, most correctly exhort it to this wisdom.

Epinomis.

[or NOCTURNAL COUNCIL or PHILOSOPHER]

Translated by George Lamb.

Persons of the Dialog

Clinias of Crete, Athenian Visitor, Megillus of Sparta

Clinias/ True to our agreement, good sir, we have come all three—you and I and Megillus here—to consider the question of wisdom, and in what terms we ought to describe that which we say produces, when comprehended, the most excellent disposition of the human being for as much wisdom as is possible for man. For we claim that we have described all the other matters connected with law-giving; but the most important thing for us to discover and state—what it is that mortal man should learn in order to be wise—this we have neither stated nor discovered. Let us, however, now try to make good this defect: else we shall practically leave incomplete the quest on which we all set out, with the purpose of making our subject clear from beginning to end.

Athenian Stranger/ My dear Cleinias, you are quite right, yet I think you are about to hear a strange statement; and, in a sense, one that is not so strange either. For many on becoming acquainted with life have the same account to give—that the human race will not be blessed or happy. So follow me now and apprehend if you conceive me, as well as them, to be giving a proper account of this matter. I say it is impossible for men to be blessed and happy, except a few; that is, so long as we are living: I limit it to that. But one may rightly hope to attain after death all the things for whose sake one may strive both in life to live as nobly as one can and in death to find a noble end. What I say is no subtle doctrine, but a thing that all of us, Greeks and foreigners

alike, in some way perceive—that from the beginning existence is difficult for every live creature: first, partaking of the state of things conceived, then again, being born, and further, being reared and educated—all these processes involve a vast amount of toil, we all agree. And our time must be a short one, I do not say by a reckoning of our miseries, but of any supposition of what is tolerable. This seems in a way to give some breathing-space about the middle of human life: yet swiftly old age is upon us, and must make any of us loth ever to come to life again, when one reckons over the life one has lived—unless one happens to be a bundle of childish notions. And what can be my evidence for this? It is that such is the nature of the matter now under inquiry in our discussion. We are inquiring, you know, in what way we shall become wise, presuming that each of us has this power in some sort or other: but it evades and escapes us as soon as we attempt any knowledge of reputed arts or knowledges or any of the ordinary sciences, as we suppose them to be; for none of them seems worthy to be called by the title of the wisdom that pertains to these human affairs. Yet the soul firmly believes and divines that somehow in nature she has it, but what it is that she has, or when, or how, she is quite unable to discover. Is not this a fair picture of our puzzle about wisdom and the inquiry that we have to make—a greater one than any of us could expect who are found able to examine ourselves and others intelligently and consistently by every kind and manner of argument? Shall we not agree that this, or the like, is the case?

Clinias/ We shall probably agree with you on that, my good sir, in the hope which in time your aid will surely give us of forming hereafter the truest opinion on these matters.

Athenian Stranger/ Then first we must go through the other sciences, which are reputed as such, but do not render

him wise who acquires and possesses them; in order that, having put them out of the way, we may try to bring forward those that we require, and having brought them forward, to learn them.

First, therefore, let us observe that while the sciences which are first needs of the human race are about the most necessary and truly the first, yet he who acquires a knowledge of them, though in the beginning he may have been regarded as wise in some sort, is now not reputed wise at all, but rather incurs reproach by the knowledge he has got. Now we will mention what they are, and that almost everyone who makes it his goal to be thought likely to prove himself in the end as good a man as possible avoids them, in order to gain the acquirements of understanding and study. So first let us take that which removed us from the practice among animate beings of eating each other and, as the story goes, has made us refrain entirely from some, while it has settled us in the lawful eating of others. May the men of old time be gracious to us, as they are: for we must take our leave of whatever men were the first of those we were just mentioning; but at any rate the making of barley-meal and flour, with the sustenance thereof, is fine and good indeed, yet it is never like to produce a perfectly wise man. For this very name of making must produce an irksomeness in the actual things that are made. Nor can it well be husbandry of land in general: for it is not by art but by a natural gift from Heaven, it seems, that we all have the earth put into our hands. Nor again is it the fabrication of dwellings and building in general, nor the production of all sorts of appliances—smiths' work, and the supply of carpenters', molders' and platters' work, and, in fine, all kinds of implements; for this is of advantage to the public, but is not accounted for virtue. Nor again the whole practice of hunting, which although grown extensive and a matter of

skilled art, gives no return of magnificence with its wisdom. Nor surely can it be divination or interpretation as a whole; for these only know what is said, but have not learnt whether it be true.

And now that we see that the acquisition of necessaries is achieved by means of art, but that no such art makes any man wise, there may be some diversion remaining after this—imitative for the most part, but in no way serious. For they imitate with many instruments, and with many imitative acts, not altogether seemly, of their very bodies, in performances of speech and of every Muse, and in those whereof painting is mother, and whereby many and most various designs are elaborated in many sorts, moist and dry; and though a man ply his craft in these with the greatest zeal, in nothing is he rendered wise by such imitation.

And when all these have been performed, there may yet remain assistance, in countless forms and countless cases: the greatest and most useful is called warfare, the art of generalship; most glorified in time of need, requiring most good fortune, but in nature assigned rather to velour than to wisdom. And that which they call medicine is likewise, of course, an assistance in almost every case towards things of which animal nature is deprived by seasons of untimely cold and heat and all such visitations. But none of these aids is of high repute for the truest wisdom: for they are borne along by opinion, as inaccurate matter of conjecture. We may, I suppose, speak of pilots and sailors also as giving assistance: yet you shall not report, to appease us, a single wise man from amongst them all; for none of them can know the wrath or amity of the wind, a desirable thing for all piloting. Nor again all those who say they can give assistance in law-suits by their powers of speech, men who by memory and skill in opinion pay attention to human character, but are far astray from the truth of what is really just.

There still remains, as a claimant to the name of wisdom, a certain strange power, which most people would call a natural gift rather than wisdom, appearing when one perceives someone learning this or that lesson with ease, and remembering a great many things securely; or when a man recalls what is suitable to each case, as what should properly be done, and does it quickly. Some people will describe all this as nature, others as wisdom, and others as a natural readiness of mind: but no sensible person will ever call a man really wise for any of these gifts.

But surely there must be found some science, the possession of which will cause the wisdom of him who is really wise and not wise merely in men's opinion. Well, let us see: for in this laborious discussion we are trying our hardest to find some other science, apart from those we have mentioned, which can really and reasonably be termed wisdom; such an acquirement as will not make one either a drudge or a witling, but will enable one to be a wise and good citizen, —just ruler and just subject—of his city, and also decorous. So let us look for this one first, and see what single science it is of those that we now have which, by removing itself or being absent from human nature, must render mankind the most thoughtless and senseless of creatures. Well, there is no great difficulty in making that out. For if there is one more than another, so to speak, which will do this, it is the science which gave number to the whole race of mortals; and I believe God rather than some chance gave it to us, and so preserves us. And I must explain who it is that I believe to be God, though he be a strange one, and somehow not strange either: for why should we not believe the cause of all the good things that are ours to have been the cause also of what is far the greatest, understanding? And who is it that I magnify with the name of God, Megillus and Cleinias? It must be Heaven, which has full claim, no

less than all other spirits and gods also, to our honor, and especially to our prayers. That it has been the cause of all the other good things we have, we shall all admit; that it really gave us number also, we assert, and that it will add to this gift, if we will but follow its lead. For if one enters on the right theory about it, whether one be pleased to call it World-order or Olympus or Heaven—let one call it this or that, but follow where, in bespangling itself and turning the stars that it contains in all their courses, it produces the seasons and food for all. And thence, accordingly, we have understanding in general, we may say, together with all number, and all other good things: but the greatest of these is when, after receiving its gift of numbers, one explores the whole circuit.

Moreover, let us turn back some little way in our discussion and recall how entirely right we were in conceiving that if we should deprive human nature of number we should never attain to any understanding. For then the soul of that creature which could not tell things would never any more be able, one may say, to attain virtue in entirety; and the creature that did not know two and three, or odd or even, and was completely ignorant of number, could never clearly tell of things about which it had only acquired sensations and memories. From the attainment of ordinary virtue—courage and temperance—it is certainly not debarred: but if a man is deprived of true telling he can never become wise, and he who has not the acquirement of wisdom—the greatest part of virtue as a whole—can no more achieve the perfect goodness which may make him happy. Thus it is absolutely necessary to postulate number; but to show why this is necessary would need a still fuller argument than any that has been advanced. Yet here is one that will be particularly correct—that of the attributes of the other arts, which we granted them just now in going through the list of all the arts, not a

single one can remain, but all of them are utterly discarded, when once you remove numeration.

And one may judge, perhaps, that the human race needs number for but slight uses, by glancing at the arts—and yet even that is a great matter—but if one could see the divinity of birth, and its mortality, in which awe of the divine will be taught, and number in its reality, still it is not anybody who could tell how great is the power we should owe to the accompaniment of number as a whole—for it is clear that everything in music needs a distinct numeration of movement and notes—and above all, how it is the cause of all good things; and that it is the cause of no evil thing that may haply befall is a point that must be well understood. Nay, the motion that we may call unreasoned and unordered, lacking grace and rhythm and harmony, and everything that has a share of some evil, is deficient in number altogether; and in this light must the matter be regarded by him who means to end his life in happiness. And no one who does not know the just, the good, the honorable and all the rest of such qualities will ever, by grasping true opinion, number them off so as fully to persuade both himself and his neighbor.

Now let us go on to inquire into the actual question of how we learnt to count in numbers. Tell me, whence have we got the conception of one and two, a natural gift that we have from the All to enable us to conceive of such things? Then again, many other living creatures are not endowed by nature even to the mere point of being enabled by the Father to learn to count; whereas in us, in the first place, God implanted this very faculty, so that we might be equal to comprehending a thing shown to us, and in the second place, he showed, and shows. Among such things, what one more singularly beautiful can a man behold than the world of day? Then he comes to the province of night with his

vision; and there he will find quite another sight before him. And so the heaven, revolving these very objects for many nights and many days, never ceases to teach men one and two, until even the most unintelligent have learnt sufficiently to number; for that there are also three and four and many, each of us must further conceive on seeing those objects. And among them God made one thing that he wrought, the moon, which shows herself at one time larger, at another smaller, and runs her course, showing ever a new shape, until fifteen days and nights are passed: this is her circuit, if one chooses to sum her orbit, as one and entire, in one; so that, we may say, even the least intelligent creature must learn it, among those on whom God has bestowed the natural gift of being able to learn. Within these limits, and in this sphere, every creature so enabled has been made fully apt for numeration, —when it considers any unit by itself. But as to reckoning number, as they all do in their relations to each other, I think that God, not only for a greater reason, but to this end installed, as we mentioned, the waxing and waning of the moon, and combined the months to make up the year, and they all began to comprehend number in relation to number by a happy fortune. Hence it Is that we have fruits and the teeming of the earth, so that there may be food for all creatures, with no inordinate or immoderate occurrences of winds and rains: but if in spite of this something does occur in an evil way, we ought not to charge it upon the divine but upon the human nature, for not disposing our own lives aright.

Now in our inquiry about laws, you know we decided that all other things that are best for men are easy to discover, and that everyone may become competent both to understand and to perform what he is told, if he discovers what is that which is likely to profit him, and what is not profitable: well, we decided, and we are still of the same

mind, that all other studies are not very difficult, but that this of learning in what way we should become good men is one of the utmost difficulty. Everything else, again, that is good, as they say, Is both possible and not difficult to acquire, and the amount of property that is wanted or not wanted, and the state of body that is wanted or not: everyone agrees that a good soul is wanted, and agrees, moreover, as to the manner of its goodness, that here again it must be just and temperate and brave; but whereas everyone says it must be wise, no one any longer agrees at all with anyone else, in most cases—we have just now explained—as to what its wisdom should be. So now we are discovering, besides all those former kinds, a wisdom of no mean worth for this very purpose of showing how he is wise who has learnt the things that we have set forth. But whether he is wise who has knowledge of these things and is good at them, is what we must now examine.

Clinias/ Good sir, how properly you said that you are undertaking to speak great things on great subjects!

Athenian Stranger/ Yes, for they are not small, Cleinias: but what is more difficult is to make sure that they are entirely and in every sense true.

Clinias/ Very much so, good sir: but still, do not weary of the task of stating your views.

Athenian Stranger/ I will not, and therefore you two must not weary either of listening to me.

Clinias/ Agreed: I give you my word for us both.

Athenian Stranger/ Thank you. To begin with, then, we must necessarily state first, it would seem—best of all, in a single word, if we are able so to put it—what is that which we suppose to be wisdom; but if we are utterly unable to do this, we must say in the second place what and how many

kinds of it there are that a man must have acquired, if he is to be wise according to our story.

Clinias/ Pray speak on.

Athenian Stranger/ And as to the next step, it will be no offence in the lawgiver that he speaks finer and higher things than have been previously said about the gods in his portrayal, making as it were a noble sport and honoring the gods, with high tribute of his hymns and happiness throughout the period of his own life.

Clinias/ Well spoken, indeed, good sir. Yes, may you have this consummation of your laws, after making fine sport in praising the gods and having passed a purer life, to find thereby the best and fairest end!

Athenian Stranger/ Then how, Cleinias, do we mean it? Should we honor the gods, think you, to the utmost with our hymns, praying that we may be moved to speak the fairest and best things about them? Do you mean it so, or how?

Clinias/ Nay, absolutely so. Now, my excellent friend, pray to the gods with confidence, and utter the fine specimen of a speech that you are moved to make about the gods and goddesses.

Athenian Stranger/ It shall be done, if the god himself will be our guide. Do but join in my prayer.

Clinias/ Speak what follows next.

Athenian Stranger/ It is necessary, then, it seems, that I should first portray in better terms, according to our previous statement, the generation of gods and of living creatures, which has been ill portrayed by those before us; I must resume the statement which I have attempted in speaking against the impious, declaring that there are gods who have a care for all things, small and greater, and who are well-nigh inexorable in maintaining the claims of justice: that is, if you remember, Cleinias; for you did take

memoranda besides, and indeed what then was spoken was very true. And the most important part of it was that every soul was senior to each body: do you remember? Or in any case, surely, this must be so? For that which is better and more ancient and more godlike is credibly so in comparison with the…, the junior, and the less honored; and everywhere, a thing governing is senior to a thing governed, and the driver every way senior to the driven. So much, then, let us conclude—that soul is senior to body; and if this is the case, our first of first things in creation may be taken as a more credible foundation. So let us take it that our beginning of the beginning is more appropriate, and that we are most correctly entering upon the principal parts of wisdom relating to the generation of the gods.

Clinias/ Let this be so, in the best statement that we can give.

Athenian Stranger/ Come then, shall we say that a living creature is most truly described by its nature, as a case of one combination of soul and body so uniting as to beget one shape?

Clinias/ Correct.

Athenian Stranger/ And such a thing is most justly called a living creature?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ On the most likely account there are to be reckoned five solid bodies, from which one might fashion things fairest and best; but all the rest of creation has a single shape, for there is nothing that could come to be without a body and never possessing any color at all, except only that really most divine creature, the soul. And this alone, one may say, has the business of fashioning and manufacturing, whereas the body, as we call it, has that of being fashioned and created and seen. But the other—-let

us repeat it, for not once only be it said—has the properties of being unseen, of knowing and being thought, and of being endowed with memory and reckoning by alternations of odd and even.

The bodies, then, being five, we must name them as fire, water, and thirdly air, earth fourth, and ether fifth; and by predominance of these are each of the many varieties of creatures perfected. We should learn this by single instances in the following way. Let us take first the earthy as one sort—all men, all things that have many feet or none, and those that move along and that stay still, held in place by roots; but we must conceive its unity thus, —though all these things are the outcome of all kinds, yet for the most part it is of earth and of solid substance. And another kind of creature we must regard as second in birth as well as one that can be seen: for its greatest part is of fire, though it has some earth and air, and has slight portions of all the others also, wherefore we must say that all sorts of creatures are born of them, things that are seen, and these again we must conceive to be the heavenly kinds of creatures, which altogether, we must agree, have been born as the divine race of stars, endowed with the fairest body as also with the happiest and best soul. One or other of two lots we may very well, in our opinion, assign to them: for each of them is either imperishable and immortal, and by all necessity wholly divine, or has a certain longevity sufficient for the life of each, such that nothing could ever require a longer one.

Let us therefore first observe that, as we state it, such creatures are of two sorts—for let us state it again—both visible, the one of fire, as would appear, entirely, and the other of earth; and the earthy moves in disorder, whereas that of fire has its motion in perfect order. Now that which has motion in disorder we should regard as unintelligent, acting like the animal creatures about us for the most part;

but that which has an orderly and heavenly progress must be taken as strongly evincing its intelligence. For in passing on and acting and being acted upon always in the same respects and manner it must provide sufficient evidence of its intelligent life. The necessity of a soul that has acquired mind will prove itself by far the greatest of all necessities; for it makes laws as ruler, not as ruled; and this inalterable state, when the soul has taken the best counsel in accord with the best mind, comes out as the perfect thing in truth and in accord with mind, and not even adamant could ever prove stronger than it or more inalterable; but in fact the three Fates have taken hold, and keep watch that what has been decided by each of the gods with the best counsel shall be perfect. And men ought to have found proof of the stars and the whole of that travelling system being possessed of mind in the fact that they always do the same things because they do what has been decided long ago for an incalculable time, not deciding differently this way and that, and doing sometimes one thing, sometimes another, in wanderings and changes of circuit. Most of us have thought just the opposite—that because they do the same things in the same way they have no soul: the multitude followed the lead of the unintelligent so far as to suppose that, whereas humanity was intelligent and living because it moved about, divinity was unintelligent because it abode in the same courses. But if man had sided with the fairer and better and friendly part, he might have concluded that he ought to regard as intelligent—and for this very reason—that which acts always in the same respects, in the same way, and from the same causes; and that this is the nature of the stars, fairest to see, and passing along, dancing the fairest and most magnificent of all dances in the world, they perform their service to all living creatures. And now, to see how justly we speak of their living spirit, let us first consider their great size. For they are

not actually those small things that they appear to be, but each of them is immense in its bulk; we should do well to believe this, because there are ample proofs of such a conclusion. For we can rightly consider the whole of the sun as larger than the whole of the earth, and all the travelling stars are of amazing size. Let us conclude then how it can possibly be that any natural force revolves this great mass always in the same time as that in which it is now being revolved. God, then, I say, will be the cause, and never in any other way is it possible. For never can a thing get living spirit by any other means than by the act of God, as we have explained; and since God is able to do this, he has found it a perfectly easy matter, firstly that anybody and a whole mass should be made a living creature, and secondly to move it in the course he considers best. So now I trust we may make one true statement about all these things: it cannot be that earth and heaven and all the stars and all the masses they comprise, without soul attached to each or resident in each, should pass along as they do, so exactly to year and month and day, and that all the good things that happen should happen for us all.

And according as man is a meaner creature, he should show himself, not a babbler, but a speaker of clear sense. If, then, anyone shall speak of certain onrushes or natural forces of bodies or the like as causes, he will say nothing clear: but we must certainly recall what we have said, and see whether our statement is reasonable or is utterly at fault—namely, in the first place, that existence is of two kinds, the one soul, and the other body, and that many things are in either, though all are different from each other and those of the one kind from those of the other, and that there is no other third thing common to any of them; and that soul excels body. Intelligent, of course, we shall hold it to be, and the other unintelligent; the one governs, the other

is governed; and the one is cause of all things, while the other is incapable of causing any of its experiences: so that to assert that the heavenly bodies have come into existence through anything else, and are not the offspring, as we have said, of soul and body, is great folly and unreason. However, if our statements on all such existences are to prevail, and the whole order of them is to be convincingly shown to be divine by their origin, we must certainly class them as one or the other of two things: either we must in all correctness glorify them as actual gods, or suppose them to be likenesses produced, as so many images, of the gods, creations of the gods themselves. For they are the work of no mindless or inconsiderable beings but, as we have said, we must class them as one or other of these things; and, if classed as the latter, we must honor them far above all images: for never will fairer or more commonly owned images be found among all mankind, none established in more eminent places, none more eminent in purity, majesty, and life altogether, than in the way in which their existence is altogether fashioned. Well then, for the present let us attempt so much in treating of the gods, as to try—after observing the two living creatures visible to us, of which we call one immortal, and the other, the earthy, all a mortal creation—to tell of the three middle things of the five, which come most evidently, according to the probable opinion, between those two. For let us consider ether as coming next after fire, and let us hold that soul fashions from it live creatures with their faculties, —as in the creatures of the other kinds, —belonging for the most part to that one substance, but in the lesser parts derived from the other elements for the sake of combination. After ether, there is fashioned by soul another kind of creature from air, and the third kind from water; and by having produced all these it is likely that soul filled the whole heaven with creatures, having made use of all the kinds so

far as it could, and all the creatures having been made participators in life; but the second, third, fourth, and fifth kinds, starting from the birth of the manifest gods, end finally in us men.

Now the gods—Zeus and Hera and all the rest—each man must regard in what light he pleases, though according to the same law, and must take this account as reliable. But as our visible gods, greatest and most honorable and having keenest vision every way, we must count first the order of the stars and all else that we perceive existing with them; and after these, and next below these, the divine spirits, and air-borne race, holding the third and middle situation, source of interpretation, which we must specially honor with prayers for the sake of an auspicious journey across. We must say of each of these two creatures—that which is of ether and, next to it, that of air—that it is not entirely plain to sight: when it is nearby, it is not made manifest to us; but partaking of extraordinary intelligence, as belonging to an order which is quick to learn and strong in memory, we may say that they understand the whole of our thoughts, and show extraordinary kindness to anyone of us who is a good man and true, and hate him who is utterly evil, since they can have a feeling of pain. For we know that God, who has the privilege of the divine portion, is remote from these affections of pain and pleasure, but has a share of intelligence and knowledge in every sphere; and the heaven being filled full of live creatures, they interpret all men and all things both to one another and to the most exalted gods, because the middle creatures move both to earth and to the whole of heaven with a lightly rushing motion. The kind which is of water, the fifth, we shall be right in representing as a semi-divine product of that element, and it is at one time seen, but at another is concealed through becoming obscure, presenting a marvel in the dimness of vision. So

these five being really existent creatures, wherever any of us came upon them, either happening upon them in the dream-world of sleep, or by something spoken to persons listening in health, or equally in sickness, through ominous utterances and prophecies, or again when they have met them at the end of life—opinions that occur to us both in private and in public, whence many sanctities of many beings have arisen, and others shall arise—in regard to all these the lawgiver who possesses even the slightest degree of mind will never dare by innovations to turn his city to a divine worship which is lacking in certainty. Nor indeed will he hinder men from what ancestral custom has ordained regarding sacrifices, when he knows nothing at all of the matter, just as it is not possible for mortal nature to know about such things. But of the gods who are really manifest to us the same argument must surely hold—that those men are most evil who have not courage to tell us of them and make manifest that these are likewise gods, but without any frenzied rites, or any tribute of the honors that are their due. But as things are, we have a strange conjunction of proceedings: for suppose that one of us had seen the sun or moon being born and observing all of us, and uttered no word through some impotence of speech, and should not also at the same time be zealous, so far as in him lay, when they lacked their share of honor, to bring them in all evidence to an honored place, and cause festivals and sacrifices to be offered to them, and apportion to each a reserved space of time for the greater or lesser length of its year, as may happen: would it not be agreed both by himself and by another who observed it that he would justly be described as an evil man?

Clinias/ To be sure he would, my good sir; nay, most evil.

Athenian Stranger/ Well then, this, my dear Cleinias, is what, you may take it, is evidently happening to me now.

Clinias/ How do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ Let me tell you, there are eight powers of those contained in the whole heaven which are cognate to each other: these I have observed, and it is no great achievement; for it is easy enough for anybody. Three of them are that of the sun, for one, that of the moon for another, and a third that of the stars which we mentioned a little while ago; and there are five others besides. Now in regard to all these and those beings who either have their own motion in these, or are borne in vehicles so as to make their progress thus, let none of us all ever idly suppose that some of them are gods, while others are not, or that some are legitimate, while others are of a certain kind which it is not permissible to any of us even to express; but let us all declare and say that they are all cognate and have cognate lots, and let us render them due honor, and not, while giving to one a year, to another a month, to others appoint neither a certain lot nor a certain time in which each travels through its particular orbit, completing the system which the divinest reason of all appointed to be visible. At this first the man who is blest marvels, and then he feels a passion for understanding so much as is possible for mortal nature, believing that thus he will best and most happily pass through life, and at the end of his days will arrive at regions meet for virtue; and having been truly and really initiated, and, himself one, partaken of wisdom that is one, he will continue for the rest of time to be a spectator of what is fairest, so far as sight can go. And now after this it remains for us to say how many and who these beings are: for we shall never be found to be deceivers. So much, at least, I asseverate with certainty: I say, once more, that there are eight of them, and that while three of the eight have been told, five yet remain. The fourth motion and transit together with the fifth, are almost equal to the sun in speed, and on

the whole are neither slower nor swifter. Of these three, the one who has sufficient mind must be leader. So let us speak of them as powers of the sun and of Lucifer, and of a third, which we cannot express in a name because it is not known; and he is to blame for this who first observed these things, since he was a foreigner: for it was an ancient custom that nurtured those who first remarked these things owing to the fairness of the summer season which Egypt and Syria amply possess, so that they constantly beheld the whole mass of stars, one may say, revealed to their sight, since they had got them continually without obstruction of, clouds and rains in the sky; whence they have spread abroad in every direction and in ours likewise, after the testing of thousands of years, nay, of an infinite time. And therefore we should not hesitate to include them in the scope of our laws; for to say that some divine things should have no honor, while others should have it, is clearly a sign of witlessness; and as to their having got no names, the cause of it should be stated as we have done. For indeed they have received titles of gods: thus, that Lucifer, or Hesperus (which is the same), should belong to Aphrodite, we may take as reasonable, and quite befitting a Syrian lawgiver; and that that which follows the same course as the sun and this together may well belong to Hermes. Let us also note three motions of bodies travelling to the right with the moon and the sun. One must be mentioned, the eighth, which we may especially address as the world-order, and which travels in opposition to the whole company of the others, not impelling them, as might appear to mankind who may have scant knowledge of these matters. But we are bound to state, and do state, so much as adequate knowledge tells us. For real wisdom shows herself in some such way as this to him who has got even a little share of right and divine meditation. And now there remain three stars, of which one is distinguished from the others by

its slowness, and some speak of it under the title of Saturn; the next after it in slowness is to be cited as Zeus; and the next after this, as Mars, which has the ruddiest hue of all. Nothing in all this is hard to understand when someone expresses it; but it is through learning, as we declare, that one must believe it.

But there is one point which every Greek should bear in mind—that of all Greeks we have a situation which is about the most favorable to human excellence. The praiseworthy thing in it that we have to mention is that it may be taken as midway between a wintry and a summery climate; and our climate, being inferior in its summer to that in the region over there, as we said, has been so much later in imparting the cognizance of the order of these deities. And let us take it that whatever Greeks acquire from foreigners is finally turned by them into something nobler; and moreover the same thing must be borne in mind regarding our present statements—that although it is hard to discover everything of this kind beyond dispute, there is hope, both strong and noble, that a really nobler and juster respect than is in the combined repute and worship which came from foreigners will be paid to all these gods by the Greeks, who have the benefit of their various education, their prophecies from Delphi, and the whole system of worship under their laws. And let none of the Greeks ever be apprehensive that being mortals we should never be concerned with divine affairs; they should rather be of the quite opposite opinion, that the divine is never either unintelligent or in any ignorance of human nature, but knows that if it teaches us we shall follow its guidance and learn what is taught us. That it so teaches us, and that we learn number and numeration, it knows of course: for it would be most utterly unintelligent if it were ignorant of this; since it would truly, as the saying is, be ignorant of itself, vexed with that which was able to learn,

instead of whole-heartedly rejoicing with one who became good by God's help. And indeed there is much good reason to suppose that formerly, when men had their first conceptions of how the gods came to exist and with what qualities, and whence, and to what kind of actions they proceeded, they were spoken of in a manner not approved or welcomed by the prudent, nor were even the views of those who came later, among whom the greatest dignity was given to fire and water and the other bodies, while the wonderful soul was accounted inferior; and higher and more honored with them was a motion assigned to the body for moving itself by heat and chills and everything of that kind, instead of that which the soul had for moving both the body and itself. But now that we account it no marvel that the soul, once it is in the body, should stir and revolve this and itself, neither does our soul on any reckoning mistrust her power of revolving any weight. And therefore, since we now claim that, as the soul is cause of the whole, and all good things are causes of like things, while on the other hand evil things are causes of other things like them, it is no marvel that soul should be cause of all motion and stirring—that the motion and stirring towards the good are the function of the best soul, and those to the opposite are the opposite—it must be that good things have conquered and conquer things that are not their like.

All this we have stated in accordance with justice, which wreaks vengeance on the impious: but now, as regards the matter under examination, it is not possible for us to disbelieve that we must deem the good man to be wise; and let us see if we may perhaps be able to perceive this wisdom which we have all this while been seeking in either education or some art, which if we fail to perceive among those that are just, our condition will be that of ignorant persons. We can succeed, it seems to me, and I must say how: for I have

sought this wisdom high and low, and so far as it has been revealed to me I will try to render it plain to you. Now the fact that the greatest part of virtue is not properly practiced is the cause of our condition: this is just now indicated—it seems clear to me—by what has been said. For let no one ever persuade us that there is a greater part of virtue, for the race of mortals, than piety; and I must say it is owing to the greatest stupidity that this has not appeared in the best natures. And the best are they which can only become so with the greatest difficulty, but the benefit is greatest if they do become so: for a soul that admits of slowness and the opposite inclination moderately and gently will be good-tempered; and if it admires courage, and is easily persuaded to temperance, and, most important of all, in natures of this sort, has the strength to learn and a good memory, it will be able to rejoice most fully in these very things, so as to be a lover of learning. For these things are not easily engendered, but when once they are begotten, and receive due nourishment and education, they will be able to restrain the multitude of men, their inferiors, in the most correct way by their every thought, every action, and every word about the gods, in due manner and due season, as regards both sacrifices and purifications in matters concerning gods and men alike, so that men contrive no life of pretense, but truly honor virtue, which indeed is the most important matter of all for the whole state. That section of us, then, we say is naturally the most sovereign, and supremely able to learn the best and noblest lessons that it may be taught: but it cannot get this teaching either, unless God gives his guidance. If, however, it should be so taught, but should fail to get the proper instruction, it were better for it not to learn. Nevertheless it follows of necessity from our present statements, that I also state that the nature which is of this kind—the best—should learn these things. Let us try, then,

to set forth in our statement what things these are, and of what kind, and how one should learn them, so far as our ability permits both me the speaker and those who are able to hear in what manner one will learn the proper reverence of the gods. It is, indeed, a rather strange thing to hear; but the name that we, at any rate, give it—one that people would never suppose, from inexperience in the matter—is astronomy; people are ignorant that he who is truly an astronomer must be wisest, not he who is an astronomer in the sense understood by Hesiod and all the rest of such writers, the sort of man who has studied settings and risings; but the man who has studied the seven out of the eight orbits, each travelling over its own circuit in such a manner as could not ever be easily observed by any ordinary nature, that did not partake of a marvelous nature. As to this, we have now told it, and shall tell, as we propose, by what means and in what manner it ought to be learnt; and first let us make the following statement.

The moon travels through its orbit very swiftly, bringing the month and the full-moon first; and in the second place we must remark the sun, bringing his solstices as he travels the whole of his orbit, and with him his satellites. But to avoid repeating again and again the same things on the same subjects in our discussion, the other courses of these bodies that we have previously set forth are not easily understood: we must prepare our faculties, such as they may possibly be, for these matters; and so one must continually strive hard to teach the pupil many things beforehand, and habituate him in childhood and youth. And therefore there will be need of studies: the most important and first is, in fact, of numbers in themselves; not of those which are corporeal, but of the whole origin of the odd and the even, and the greatness of their influence on the nature of reality. When he has learnt these things, there comes next after

these what they call by the very ridiculous name of geometry when it proves to be a manifest likening of numbers not like one another by nature by reference to the province of planes; and this will be clearly seen by him who is able to understand it to be a marvel not of human, but of divine origin. And then, after that, the numbers thrice increased and like to the solid nature, and those again which have been made unlike, he likens by another art, namely, that which its adepts called stereometry; and a divine and marvelous thing it is to those who envisage it and reflect how the whole of nature molds off species and class, as power and its opposite continually turn upon the double according to each analogy. Thus the first analogy is of the double, passing by numerical scale in the proportion of one to two, and that which is according to power is double; that which passes to the solid and tangible is likewise again double, having proceeded from one to eight; but that passing to a mean of the double, as much more than the less as it is less than the greater, while the other mean exceeds and is exceeded by the same portion of the extremes themselves—between six and twelve comes the whole-and-a-half (9 = 6 + 3) and whole-and-a-third (8 = 6 + 2)—turning between these very two, to one side or the other, this analogy assigned to men an accordant and proportioned use for the purpose of rhythm and harmony in their pastimes, and has been bestowed by the blessed dance of the Muses.

In this way then let all these things come to pass, and so let them be. But as to their crowning point, we must go to divine generation and therewith the fairest and divinest nature of visible things, so far as God has granted the vision of it to men; a vision that none of us may ever boast of having received at his ease without the conditions here laid down. And besides these requirements, one must refer the particular thing to its generic form in our various

discussions, questioning and disproving what has been wrongly stated; for it is rightly found to be altogether the finest and first of tests for the use of men, while any that pretend to be tests, without being so, are the vainest of all labors. And further, we must mark the exactness of the time, how exactly it completes all the processes of the heavens; for here he. who is convinced of the truth of the statement which has been made—that the soul is at once older and more divine than the body—will hold it a most admirable and satisfactory saying that all things are full of gods, and that we have never been disregarded in the least by any forgetfulness or neglect in these our superiors. And our view about all such matters must be that, if one conceives of each of them aright, it turns out a great boon to him who receives it in a proper way; but failing this, he had better always call on God. The way is this—for it is necessary to explain it thus far: every diagram, and system of number, and every combination of harmony, and the agreement of the revolution of the_ stars must be made manifest as one through all to him who learns in the proper way, and will be made manifest if, as we say, a man learns aright by keeping his gaze on unity; for it will be manifest to us, as we reflect, that there is one bond naturally uniting all these things: but if one goes about it in some other way, one must call on Fortune, as we also put it. For never, without these lessons, will any nature be happy in our cities: no, this is the way, this the nurture, these the studies, whether they be difficult or easy, this is the path to pursue: to neglect the gods is not permissible, when the happiness that is properly referred to the fame of them all has been made manifest. And the man who has acquired all these things in this manner is he whom I account the most truly wisest: of him I also assert, both in jest and in earnest, that when one of his like completes his allotted span with death, let me say if he still exists, though

dead, he will not partake any more of the many sensations then as he does now, but having alone partaken of a single lot and having grown from many into one, will be happy and at the same time most wise and blessed, whether one has a blessed life in continents or in islands; and that such a man will partake always of the like fortune, and whether his life be spent in a public or in a private practice of these studies he will get the same treatment, in just the same manner, from the gods. And what we said at the beginning stands now also unchanged as a really true statement, that it is not possible: for men to be completely blessed and happy, except a few—this has been correctly spoken. For as many as are divine and temperate also, and partakers of the rest of virtue in their nature, and have acquired besides all that pertains to blessed study—and all this we have explained—are the only persons by whom all the spiritual gifts are fully obtained and held. Those then who have thus worked through all these tasks we speak of privately, and publicly establish by law, as the men to whom, when they have attained the powers of seniority, the highest offices should be entrusted, while the rest should follow their lead, giving reverent praise to all gods and goddesses; and ordain that we most rightly incite all the Nocturnal Council to this wisdom, as we have now sufficiently distinguished and approved it.

Epinomis

Translated by Richard D. McKirahan, Jr.

Persons of the Dialog

Clinias of Crete, Athenian Visitor, Megillus of Sparta

Clinias/ My friend, all three of us—you, I and Megillus here—have come to do what we agreed: to consider what account we ought to give in explaining the nature of wisdom, as well as to discuss the course of studies that we say makes a person who engages in thought as wise as a human can be. And rightly so, since although we have set out in detail everything else that has to do with legislation, we have neither stated nor discovered the most important thing: what a mortal must learn in order to be wise. We must not abandon this now, since to do so would be to leave largely unachieved the goal of our labors, which was to make things clear from start to finish.

Athenian Stranger/ That is a good idea, Clinias, but I fear you are about to hear an account that is strange, though yet in a way not strange: the human race is, as a rule, neither blessed nor happy. Many people, through their experience in life, offer this same account. Pay attention then and consider closely whether you find that I too, following them, am correct on this point. I claim that people cannot become blessed and happy; there are but a few exceptions to this rule. (I limit this claim to the duration of our lives. Those who strive to live as nobly as they can during their life and at their end to die a noble death have a good hope of attaining after they die everything for which they have striven.) I am not saying anything clever, but only what we all know in some way, both Greeks and foreigners: from the start the terms of life are harsh for every living thing. First we have to go through the stage of being embryos. Then we have to be born and then be

brought up and educated, and we all agree that every one of these stages involves countless pains. In fact, if we don't count hardships, but only what everyone would consider tolerable, the time involved turns out to be quite brief—a period round about the middle of a person's life, which is thought to provide a kind of breathing-space. But then old age quickly overtakes us and tends to make anyone who takes his whole life into account unwilling ever to go through life again, unless he is full of childish thoughts.

What proof do I have of this? That what we are now investigating points in this direction. We are investigating how to become wise, as if this capacity were found in everyone. But it takes to its heels whenever anyone achieves any expertise in any of the so-called arts or branches of wisdom or in any of the other fields usually considered to be sciences—which suggests that none of them deserves the title of wisdom about these human concerns. On the other hand, while the soul is strongly convinced and divines that it is somehow its nature to have wisdom, it is wholly unable to find out what this is, and when and how it is attained. In these circumstances, isn't our difficulty about wisdom entirely appropriate, and our investigation as well? This turns out to be a larger project than any of us expect who are capable of examining themselves and others intelligently and consistently through arguments of all kinds and sorts. Shall we not agree that this is so?

Clinias/ Perhaps we shall, my friend, since over time we have come to share your hope that we may reach the full truth in these matters.

Athenian Stranger/ First we must go through all the other subjects that are called sciences but that do not make those who understand and possess them wise. After getting these out of the way, we will try to identify the ones we need, and then learn them.

To begin, let us consider how it is that the sciences that have to do with the first needs of a mortal race are most necessary and truly first, but also how it happens that those who have knowledge of them, though in early times they were considered wise, nowadays are not reputed for wisdom, but rather are reproached for such knowledge. We shall identify them and show that virtually everyone with an ambition for a reputation of having developed into as good a person as possible avoids them in order to acquire wisdom and practice it.

First there is the knowledge that has to do with animals' eating one another. The story goes that this is what has made it customary to eat some kinds of animals while entirely keeping us from eating others. May the men of former times be kindly to us, as indeed they are; but let the first persons we leave aside be the experts at the knowledge just mentioned. Next, the production of barley meal and wheat flour, in combination with the knowledge of how to use them for nourishment, though it is a noble and excellent pursuit, will never succeed in making anyone completely wise, since this very thing—labelling production as wisdom—would lead to disgust at the products themselves. Nor will cultivation of the entire earth make anyone completely wise: it is clearly not by art but by a natural capacity we have from God that we have all put our hands to working the earth. Moreover, neither will the "weaving together" of dwellings, or construction as a whole, or the art of making all kinds of furnishings and implements, which includes bronze-working, building, molding and weaving, as well as the manufacture of all instruments. This knowledge has practical utility for the masses, but it is not because it is thought to confer virtue that it is called knowledge. Nor does the art of hunting in all its various forms make anyone noble and wise, though it has come to have many forms and involves great skill. Nor do

prophetic inspiration or the ability to interpret divine messages have this effect in the least. The prophet only knows what he says; he does not understand if it is true.

We now see that these arts enable us to possess the necessities of life, but that none of them makes anyone wise. Next in order is a kind of play, which is mostly imitative and in no way serious. Its practitioners make use of many instruments and many bodily gestures—and not wholly becoming ones at that. This includes skills that employ words, all the arts of the Muses, and the genres of visual representation, which are responsible for producing many varied figures in many media, both wet and dry. But the imitative art makes no one wise in any of these things, even those who practice their craft with the utmost seriousness.

Now that all these subjects have been dealt with, the next group turns out to be kinds of defense, which come in many different forms and which benefit many people. The chief and most widespread of these, the art of war, which is known as military strategy, has the highest reputation for utility, but requires the greatest amount of good luck and is granted to people through courage more than wisdom. The art called medicine too is surely a defense, in this case against all the ravages the climate inflicts upon animals through cold, unseasonable heat, and other things of the sort. But none of these arts is distinguished for wisdom of the truest sort. They lack measure, are carried along by opinion, and proceed by guesswork. We will also call both sea-captains and sailors defenders, but no one should encourage us by proclaiming any single one of these men wise. No one could know the anger or friendship of the wind, even though the art of sailing would find this knowledge most agreeable. Nor are those men wise who claim to be defenders in lawsuits by virtue of their speaking ability. Their attention to people's characters is

based on memory and rote acquaintance with opinion, and they stray wide of the truth about what is genuinely just.

As a candidate for the reputation of wisdom there still remains a certain strange ability, which most would call not wisdom, but a natural gift. Some people easily learn whatever they are learning and accurately remember a great number of things, and some can call to mind what is useful for each person—what would be fitting if it were to take place—and quickly bring it about. When we notice such people, some will regard all these traits as a natural gift, while others will call them wisdom and still others a natural agility of mind. But no intelligent person will ever be willing to call anyone genuinely wise for having any of them.

But surely there must turn out to be some science whose possession makes a wise person genuinely wise and not merely wise by reputation. Let us see, then. We are tackling an extremely difficult subject—to discover a different science from the ones we have discussed, one which may be both genuinely and plausibly called wisdom, and which will make its possessor neither vulgar nor foolish, but a wise and good citizen of his city, a just ruler and subject, and in tune with himself and the world as well. First let us identify this science. Of all the sciences that now exist, which one would render humans the most unintelligent and senseless of living things if it completely disappeared from the human race or had not been developed? In point of fact, it is not at all hard to identify. If we compare, so to speak, one science with another, we will see that the one that has given the gift of number would have this effect upon the entire mortal race.

It is God himself, I believe, and not some good fortune that saves us by making us this gift. But I must say which god I mean, though it will seem strange, though yet in a way not strange. How can we keep from believing that what causes all things that are good for us is also the cause of the good that

is by far the greatest, namely, wisdom? So, Megillus and Clinias, what god am I speaking of with such solemnity? Uranus (i.e., the heaven), the god whom above all others it is most just to pray to and to honor, as all the other divinities and gods do. We will unanimously agree that he has been the cause of all other good things for us. But we declare that he is really the one who gave us number too, and he will continue to give it, supposing that we are willing to follow him closely. If we come to contemplate him in the right way—whether we prefer to call him Cosmos or Olympus or Heaven [Uranus]—let us call him as we like, but let us notice carefully how by decorating himself and making the stars revolve in himself through all their orbits, he brings about the seasons and provides nourishment for all. Together with the entirety of number, he also furnishes, we would insist, everything else that involves intelligence and everything that is good. But this is the greatest thing, for a person to receive from him the gift of numbers and go on to examine fully the entire revolution of the heavens.

Next, let us return to a point made a little while ago and recall that we were very right to observe that if the human race were deprived of number, we would never come to be intelligent in anything. We would be animals unable to give a rational account, and our soul would never obtain the whole of virtue. An animal that does not know two and three or odd and even, one that is completely ignorant of number, could never give an account of the things it has grasped by the only means available to it—perception and memory. But while nothing prevents it from possessing the remainder of virtue—courage and moderation—no one deprived of the ability to give a true account can ever become wise, and anyone lacking wisdom, which is the greatest part of all virtue, can never become completely good or, in consequence, happy. Thus it is altogether necessary to employ number as a basis, though

why this is necessary would require a still longer account than all I have said. But we will also be right in stating the present point, that regarding the achievements attributed to the other arts, the ones we recently surveyed when we allowed all the arts to exist, not a single one remains. They are all completely eliminated when we take away the science of number.

If we reflect upon the arts, we might well suppose that there are a few purposes for which the human race needs numbers—although even this concession is important. Further, if we contemplate the divine and the mortal elements in the generated world, we will discover reverence for the divine and also number in its true nature. But even so, not everyone of us will yet understand either how great a power intimate knowledge of the whole of number can confer upon us (since in addition to what I have mentioned, all musical phenomena clearly require movement and sounds that are based on number), or—the most important thing—that number causes all good things. We must also understand well that it causes no evil that may occur. By contrast, movement that is irrational, disorderly, unseemly, unrhythmical and inharmonious is wholly lacking in number, as is everything that shares in any evil. This is how anyone who is going to die happy must think. And as regards justice, goodness, beauty, and all such things, without knowledge no one who has attained true opinion will ever give a numerical account that is at all likely to persuade either himself or anyone else.

Now let us go on to take up this very topic, number. How did we learn to count? How did we come to have the concepts of one and two? The Universe has endowed us with the natural capacity to have concepts, whereas many other living things lack even the capacity to learn from the Father how to count. With us humans, the first thing God caused to dwell in us was the capability to understand what we are shown, and then he proceeded to show us, and he still does. And of the things he

shows us, taken one by one, what can we behold more beautiful than the day? Later, when we come to see the night, everything appears different to our vision. Since Heaven never stops making these bodies ply their course night after night and day after day, he never stops teaching humans one and two, until even the slowest person learns well enough to count. For each of us who sees them will also form the concepts of three, four, and many. Out of these many, God made a unit by constructing a moon which goes through its course sometimes appearing larger and sometimes smaller, thus always revealing each day as different until fifteen days and nights have passed. This is a period, if one is willing to treat the entire cycle as a unit. As a result, even the stupidest of the animals God has endowed with the ability to learn is able to learn it. Every living being that can has become quite knowledgeable in numbers this far [i.e., up to fifteen] and in these numbers, by considering each thing individually. Next, for the purpose of reckoning on each occasion all things in relation to one another as numbers and also for a purpose which I regard as greater—after creating the moon, waxing and waning as we said, God established months in relation to the year, and so all the living beings who could began to comprehend number in relation to number, with the blessing of Good Fortune. Thanks to these celestial events we have crops, the earth bears food for all living things, and the winds that blow and the rains that fall are not violent or without measure. If on the contrary anything turns out for the worse, we must not blame God, but humans, for not rightly managing their own lives.

Now in our inquiry about Laws we found that the other things that are best for humans are easy to know, and that we are all competent both to understand what we are told and to act on that basis, as long as we know what is likely to be advantageous and the reverse. Indeed, we found then and we

still maintain that none of the other pursuits is particularly difficult, but how to become good people is an extremely difficult problem. Also, to acquire everything else that is good—property in the right amount and a body of the right sort—is, as the saying goes, both possible and not difficult. Further, everyone will grant that the soul should be good, and as to how it should be good, everyone says it must be just, moderate, brave, and wise as well. But when it comes to the precise form of wisdom it must have, as we have recently shown in detail, there is no longer any agreement, at least among the many. But as a matter of fact we have just now discovered over and above all the former kinds of wisdom one that is by no means insignificant, at least in that anyone who masters the material we have outlined is guaranteed a reputation for wisdom. But are those who know these things really wise and good? This is precisely what requires a satisfactory account.

Clinias/ How right you were, my friend, to say that you were setting out to say important things on important subjects!

Athenian Stranger/ Indeed, they are not trivial, Clinias. But—and this is even more difficult—I am attempting to say things that are wholly and universally true.

Clinias/ I agree completely. But even so, please don't get weary of telling me your ideas.

Athenian Stranger/ Of course, but don't you two get tired of listening, either.

Clinias/ Don't worry—and I am speaking on behalf of the two of us.

Athenian Stranger/ Very well. We must begin from the beginning. In the first place, it appears that above all we must find a single name, if we can, for this thing we hold to be wisdom. If we simply cannot do this, our second objective will

be to determine what and how many kinds of wisdom a person must know in order to be wise according to our account.

Clinias/ Please go on.

Athenian Stranger/ The next point is that no one can blame the lawgiver for fashioning an account of the gods that is finer and better than those given up to now, engaging, so to speak, in noble play and honoring the gods, and for him to pass his whole life celebrating them with hymns of happiness.

Clinias/ Well said, my friend! I hope that this is the goal of your laws, that people will sing hymns to the gods and live purer lives, and then meet with the end that is at once best and finest.

Athenian Stranger/ What are we saying, then, Clinias? Does it seem that by singing hymns to the gods we are honoring them greatly, praying that we will be led to say the finest and best things about them? Is this what you mean, or something else?

Clinias/ Precisely that. But pray to the gods with confidence and state the account that it occurs to you to offer about the fine things that concern the gods and goddesses.

Athenian Stranger/ This will happen if God himself guides me. Only please join in my prayer.

Clinias/ Please go on to the next point.

Athenian Stranger/ Since people in the past have failed badly in describing the generation of gods and living things, it appears that I must begin by constructing an account based on my previous one, taking up again my attack on impious accounts, and declaring that there are gods who care for all things, great and small, who are inexorable in matters of justice. I suppose you remember, Clinias, since you have even received a written record. What we said then was quite true. The most important point was that as a whole, soul is older than anybody. Do you recall? You surely must remember. For

what is superior, older and more godlike is obviously so in relation to what is inferior, younger and less honorable, and what rules or leads is in every way older than what is ruled or led. Let us accept this point, then, that soul is older than body. But if this is so, the first step in our first account of generation will be more plausible. Let us take it, then, that the beginning of our beginning is more seemly and that we are taking exactly the right steps in approaching the most important part of wisdom, the generation of gods.

Clinias/ Anyone must grant that we are stating these matters the best we can.

Athenian Stranger/ Next, when a soul and a body come together to form a single structure and produce a single form, do we assert that this is most truly said to be a living thing, in virtue of its nature?

Clinias/ Yes.

Athenian Stranger/ So this kind of thing is most correctly called a living being?

Clinias/ Indeed.

Athenian Stranger/ We must identify solid bodies, five in number on the most plausible account, from which the things that are finest and best can be fashioned. The remaining kind of entity, all of it, has but a single form, for soul, the truly most divine type of entity, is the only thing that could possibly have no body or be without any color at all. This is the only entity naturally suited for fashioning and creating, while body, we maintain, is suited for being fashioned, for becoming, and being seen. The former type (let us say it again, since it should not be stated just once) is naturally suited to be invisible, and intelligent and intelligible as well, sharing in memory and calculation that involves the vicissitudes of odd and even. There being five bodies, then, we declare that they are fire, water, air, earth, and ether, and that each of the many and

varied kinds of living things is brought to perfection with one of these playing the chief role.

But we need to learn this for each kind individually, as follows. As the first kind we discuss, let us take up the earthy one. This includes all humans, and in addition all living things with many legs and those with none, and all that move and the ones that are stationary, held fast by roots. What makes this a single kind, we should believe, is the fact that although all kinds of living beings are composed of all the five bodies, the greatest part of this kind is made of earth with its solid nature.

We ought further to suppose there is a second, different kind of living thing that comes to be and moreover is visible. Its largest portion is fire, but it has portions of earth and air along with small amounts of all the rest. This is why we should declare that from these bodies arise visible living things of all kinds. We must further suppose that the kinds of living things in the heavens—which is what we should claim the divine stars to be—have come to be, endowed with the finest body and the best and happiest soul. But as to their destiny, which might be either of two sorts, we must allow opinion a role. Either they are all entirely and of absolute necessity indestructible, immortal and divine, or else each of them is content to possess such a vast length of life that they could never possibly demand more.

To repeat, let us first suppose that these are two kinds of living things, that both are visible, the one made entirely, as it might seem, of fire, the other of earth, and that the earthy kind moves in disorder, while the one of fire moves in perfect order. Now what moves in disorder (which is exactly how the kind of living things around us behaves for the most part) we ought to consider unintelligent. But if something has an orderly path in the heavens we should treat that as powerful evidence of its intelligence. For if it always proceeds in its

course uniformly and without variation, and always acts and is affected in the same way, it gives ample evidence of intelligent life. The necessity of the soul that possesses intelligence is far the most powerful of all necessities. For it is a ruler, not a subject, and so ordains its decrees. When a soul reaches the best decision in accordance with the best intelligence, the result, which is truly to its mind, is perfectly unalterable. Not even adamant could ever be mightier or more unalterable. Truly, three Fates hold fast whatever has been decided through the best counsel by each and all of the gods, and guarantee that it is brought to pass. Humans should admit as evidence of the intelligence of the stars and this entire movement of theirs, the fact that they always do the same things, because they are doing what was decided an astonishingly long time ago and do not change their decision back and forth, sometimes doing one thing and at others doing something else, wandering and changing their orbits. This opinion of ours is the exact opposite of what most people believe—that because they do the same things uniformly they do not possess soul. The crowd has followed the fools in supposing that the human race is intelligent and alive because it undergoes change, whereas the divine is unintelligent because it remains in the same orbits. But in fact anyone could have adopted views that are finer, better and acceptable, and could have understood that whatever always operates uniformly, without variation, and through the same causes is for that very reason to be regarded as intelligent. Such a person could also understand that this is the nature of the stars, the finest of all things to behold, and further that moving through their march and dance, the finest and most magnificent dance there is, they bring to pass what all living things need.

In fact, we are right to say they possess soul. First, consider their size. They are not as small as they appear; the mass of

each is inconceivably large. This point should be accepted with confidence since it is based on adequate proofs. For we can correctly reason that the sun is larger than the earth, and indeed, all the moving stars have an amazing size. How can any being cause so vast a mass to revolve always in the same period? I declare that God is the cause and that it could never be otherwise. For nothing could ever come to be alive except through God, as we have shown. And since God is capable of this, it is perfectly easy for him first to make any body and any mass of material into a living being and then make it move however he thinks best. I hope the single account I am now stating may hold true for them all. Unless a soul is attached to each of them or even in each, earth, heaven and all the stars and all the masses made of these things cannot move with such precision in their annual, monthly and daily courses, making all that takes place turn out good for us all.

Since man is so sorry a thing, it is important to avoid speaking nonsense and to be clear in what we say. If anyone is going to identify as causes certain bodies in rushing movement, or kinds of matter or anything of the sort, he will not succeed in saying anything clear. As for the account we have given, we really must take it up again, to see whether it is reasonable or wholly deficient. We hold first that there are two kinds of entities, soul and body, and many individuals of each kind, each one different from others of its kind and from those of the other kind, and there is no third kind of entity found in anything. Second, that soul is superior to body: we shall hold that the former is intelligent, the latter not, the one rules, the other is ruled, the one is the cause of everything, the other the cause of nothing that takes place. And so it is the height of folly and absurdity to say that the things in the heavens have arisen through the agency of anything else and are not the products of both soul and body, as we hold. If our theories about all the celestial beings are to win out, and if it

is to appear convincing that they are all divine, we must suppose them to be one of two things. Either they are themselves gods and it is perfectly correct to celebrate them in hymns, or we must suppose them to be likenesses of gods, something like images of them, made by the gods themselves, for their creators were not unintelligent or of little worth. As we have declared, we must suppose them to be one of these two things, and once we do this, we must honor them above all images. Assuredly no other image will ever appear more beautiful or more widely shared by all humans than these, let alone established in better locations or surpassing them in purity, awe, and their whole manner of life, since they have been made superior in all these ways.

Concerning the gods let us go no further. Now that we have identified the two kinds of living things that are visible to us, of which we declare that one is immortal, while all the other, the earthy kind, is mortal, let us try with the greatest accuracy that plausible opinion permits to describe the three intermediate kinds which fall in between the two already discussed. After fire let us take up ether. We may suppose that soul fashions living things out of it which (like the other kinds of living things) are for the most part characterized by that substance, but which also possess smaller amounts of the other kinds in order to bond them together. After ether, soul fashions a different kind of living things out of air, and a third out of water. After creating them all, it is plausible that soul filled the entire heaven with living things, employing each according to its character, since all share in life. These are the second, third, fourth and fifth kinds of living things, beginning from the visible gods and ending up with us humans.

As to the gods—Zeus, Hera and all the rest—we may legislate as we like, the same law holding for each, and we must treat this principle as firmly established. But as to the first gods, those that are visible, greatest, most honored, and

most sharply seeing everywhere, we must declare that these are the stars together with all the celestial phenomena we perceive. After them and next in order beneath them are daimons. The kind made of air, which occupies the third, middle, position, is responsible for mediation between gods and humans, and should be highly honored in our prayers for bringing words of good tiding. Both these kinds of living beings—the one made of ether and the next in order, the one made of air—are wholly imperceptible. Even when they are close by we cannot see them. They have a wonderful intelligence, being of kinds that learn quickly and have good memories, and we should say that they know all our thoughts and both love those of us who are noble and good and hate those who are extremely evil, since already with these kinds we are discussing beings that experience pain. (By contrast, God, who enjoys the perfection of divine nature, is removed from pain and pleasure, and is entirely occupied in thinking and knowing.) Since the heaven is completely filled with living beings, we should say that they communicate with one another and with the highest gods about all humans and all other things. They do so through the movements of the middle ranks of living beings, which are wafted lightly towards the earth and also towards the whole heaven. It would be correct to represent the fifth kind of living thing, that made of water, as a demigod made of that substance, sometimes seen, sometimes hidden and invisible, provoking wonder through its dim appearance.

These five kinds of beings really are living things, and some of them have had various types of encounters with humans, whether through dreams in sleep or in audible communications through divine voices or prophecies to certain people whether healthy or ill or even at the point of death. The resulting beliefs affect both individuals and communities and have been the origin of many religious rites

for many people and will be in the future as well. Anyone who legislates on all these matters and has even the least intelligence will never dare to make innovations and turn his own city towards a piety which lacks any clear foundation. On the other hand, in his complete lack of knowledge he will not forbid what ancestral law has declared about sacrifices, since it is impossible for mortals to have knowledge about such things.

On the same reasoning, the worst people are those that do not dare to declare to us the gods that really do appear to us, or to reveal them as being other gods, ones who do not receive worship or the honors they are due. But in fact, this is exactly what is taking place. It is as if at some point one of us had seen a sun or a moon coming into existence and looking down at us all, and through some inability failed to report it, and further was not eager to do his part to bring them from their dishonored state into a place of honor and make them conspicuous, and also to institute festivals and sacrifices for them and to determine their periods of longer or, in several cases, shorter years, setting apart a time for each of them.

Wouldn't such a person himself, as well as anyone else who was aware of the situation, agree that it would be right to call him evil?

Clinias/ Absolutely so, my friend, most evil.

Athenian Stranger/ But, my dear Clinias, I want you to know that this is precisely my situation now.

Clinias/ What do you mean?

Athenian Stranger/ There are eight powers [i.e., orbits] of the celestial beings, that are brothers of one another. I myself have observed them. This is no special accomplishment; others can do it easily too. Three of them are the ones we mentioned a little while ago: those belonging to the sun, to the moon, and to all the stars. But there are five more. Now

regarding all these orbits and the beings which move in them (whether they move of their own accord or proceed in their courses borne on chariots), none of us must ever rashly suppose that some of them are gods and others are not or that some are legitimate while others are what it is wrong for any of us even to utter. Instead, we must declare and assert that they are all brothers and have brothers' shares. We must not attribute the year to one of them and the month to another, while refusing to assign to the rest any share or any time in which it completes its own orbit, contributing to the perfection of the visible cosmos established by the most divine law of all.

Anyone who is happy began by being struck with awe at this cosmos, and then conceived a passion for learning all that a mortal can, believing that this is how to live the best and most fortunate life and that when he dies he will go to places where virtue is at home. Further, once he is really and truly initiated and has achieved perfect unity and a share of the one true wisdom, he continues for the rest of his days as an observer of the fairest things that sight can see.

The next thing is to say how many and who these gods are. For we must make it clear that we never go back on our word. In fact, I insist with certainty on just the following. I repeat that they are eight, and of the eight, three have been discussed and five still remain. The fourth orbit and period of revolution and the fifth as well are nearly equal in speed to the sun, neither faster nor slower overall. Of these three, the one with sufficient intelligence must be the leader. These three orbits belong to the sun, the morning star, and a third body which I cannot call by name since its name is not known. The reason is that the first person to observe them was a foreigner. Egypt and Syria have a marvelously beautiful summer season. In consequence it was an ancient practice there that led people to reflect on these matters for the first time. They were always observing the entire totality of the visible stars, as it were,

since their part of the world has no clouds or rain. From there, after being closely examined for thousands of years, in fact an infinite time, this knowledge spread everywhere including Greece. Therefore we must be bold and enact this into law. It is clearly not for people of intelligence to hold some divine things in dishonor and others in honor. As to why they have not got names, this is the reason that should be given. Instead, they have taken as their appellations the names of [the traditional] gods. The morning star, which is also the evening star, is accounted as Aphrodite's star [i.e., Venus], a name highly appropriate for a Syrian law-giver to choose. The star that more or less accompanies both the sun and Aphrodite's is Hermes' [Mercury]. We have yet to speak of three more orbits that move to the right like the moon and the sun. But we should mention one, the eighth, which above all should be called the cosmos. It moves in the opposite direction to all the others and carries them, as should be obvious even to humans who know a little about these things. But all that we know well we must tell, and we are telling it. For to anyone with even a small amount of understanding that is correct and divine, what is genuinely wisdom appears to be somewhat along these lines. Of the remaining three stars, one is particularly slow, and some call it by the name "Cronus' " [Saturn]. The next slowest we should call Zeus' [Zeus], and the next one Ares' [Mars]; this one has the reddest color of them all. None of this is hard to comprehend if someone explains it, but once a person learns it, we say, he must believe it.

Every Greek ought to bear in mind that the location we Greeks possess is absolutely best for virtue. Its merit is that it is intermediate between winter and summer. Since our summer is inferior to the summer in those other places, as we said, we were late in coming to observe the ordering of these gods. But let us take it for granted that whatever Greeks receive from foreigners they improve in the end—a point that

we must suppose holds for the present subject in particular. In fact, it is difficult to find out all these things for certain, but there is high and good hope that even though the tradition about all these gods and also their worship have come from abroad, the Greeks, on account of their forms of education, the oracles from Delphi, and their whole legally codified system of worship, will succeed in worshiping them better and in a real sense more justly.

Let no Greek ever fear that being mortal we should never concern ourselves with the divine. We should have quite the opposite thought; the divine [i.e., the cosmos] is never without intelligence nor is it at all ignorant of human nature, but it knows that if it teaches we will follow along and learn what we are taught. And of course it knows that the very thing that it teaches us and that we learn is number and how to count. If it did not know this it would be the least intelligent thing of all. It would really not "know itself," as the proverb goes, if it were angry at those who are able to learn and did not instead rejoice without envy along with the ones who become good through God's help.

Now it makes much good sense that when humans first had thoughts about how the gods came to be and what they were like and what deeds they did once they came to be, what they said was not acceptable or pleasing to sensible people. Nor were the later accounts, in which fire, water and the other bodies were declared oldest and the wonderful soul younger, and which also maintained that that motion was superior and more valuable which belongs to body and which body produces in itself by heat, cold, and all things of that sort, and that the soul does not move both body and soul itself. But now, when we say that it is no surprise that if a soul comes to be in a body it causes both the body and itself to move and revolve, on no account does our soul disbelieve that it has the capacity to make any weight revolve, no matter how large.

Therefore, since as we now claim, soul is the cause of the whole cosmos, and all good things have causes that are good, while evil things have different causes, which are evil, it is no wonder that soul is the cause of every orbit and motion, and the best kind of soul causes orbits and motions that tend toward the good, while the opposite kind of soul causes those that tend toward the opposite. It follows that the good must always have defeated and must always defeat the evil.

All that we have said is in accord with Justice, who takes vengeance on the unholy. Consequently, getting back to the object of our investigation, we cannot but believe that the good person, at least, is wise. But as for the wisdom for which we have long been searching, let us see whether we can discover any discipline or art such that ignorance of it would make us lack all judgment about justice. In fact, I think we can. Let me say what it is. I shall try to make clear to you how it dawned upon me as I searched high and low. The cause of our failure is that we do not practice the most important part of virtue in the right way. What I just said seems to me to indicate this strongly. For no one will ever persuade us that there is a more important part of virtue for mortals than reverence towards the gods, although it must be admitted that through ignorance of the worst kind this quality has been absent from the people with the best natures.

Such natures hardly ever occur, but if they do they are an outstanding benefit. For a soul that possesses both quickness and slowness in a mild and moderate degree will tend to be good-natured. It will be inclined towards courage, readily induced to moderation, and—the most important feature in such cases—since it will be good at learning and remembering, it can greatly enjoy these activities, and so will have a love of learning. These are not easily produced, but when they are born and are nurtured and trained in the necessary way, it is absolutely right for such people to be able

to hold the inferior majority in subjection by thinking, doing and saying all that concerns the gods in the right ways at the right times, not hypocritically performing sacrifices and purification rites for violations against gods and humans, but in truth honoring virtue. In fact, honoring virtue is the single most important thing for the entire city. Now we hold that this segment of the population is by nature best suited to authority and is capable of learning the noblest and finest studies, if anyone will teach them. But no one could do so unless God leads the way. Indeed, if someone were to teach, but not in the right way, it would be better not to learn. Even so, it follows from what I am now saying that people with this kind of nature, the best, must learn these things and that I must tell them to.

I must try, then, to give a detailed account of what those things are, what they are like, and how to learn them, given my ability as a speaker and the ability of those who can hear me: what things a person is to learn about reverence towards the gods and how he is to learn them. When you hear what it is, you will find it strange. I say its name is astronomy, an answer no one would ever expect through unfamiliarity with the subject. People do not know that the true astronomer must be the wisest person. I do not mean anyone practicing astronomy the way Hesiod did and everyone else of that sort, by observing risings and settings of stars, but the one who has observed seven of the eight circuits, each of them completing its own orbit in a way no one can easily contemplate who is not endowed with an extraordinary nature. We have now said what we must learn. We shall go on to state, as we say, how we must and should learn it. My first point is the following.

The moon completes its circuit most quickly, bringing the month [the new moon] and before it the full moon. Next we must attain knowledge of the sun, which brings the solstices as it completes its entire circuit, and then the planets that

accompany it [i.e., Venus and Mercury]. To avoid repeating ourselves many times about the same things, since the remaining orbits which we discussed earlier are not easy to understand, we should make continuous efforts in preparing for this knowledge the people whose natures can understand it, to teach them many preliminary subjects and accustom them to learning when they are boys and youths. For this reason they need to study mathematics.

First and foremost is the study of numbers in their own right, as opposed to numbers that possess bodies. This is the study of the entire nature and properties of odd and even—all that number contributes to the nature of existing things. After learning this, next in order is what goes by the extremely silly name of geometry [literally, "earth measurement"]. In fact, it is absolutely clear that this subject is the assimilation by reference to plane surfaces of numbers that are not by nature similar to one another. That this miracle is of divine, not human origin should be obvious to anyone who can understand it. After this is the study of numbers with three factors, which are similar in virtue of their nature as solids. Another art, called stereometry by those acquainted with it, assimilates numbers that are dissimilar. But what people who look into these matters and understand them find divine and miraculous is how nature as a whole molds sorts and kinds according to each proportion, with reference to the power that is always based on the double and the power opposite to this [the half]. The first sequence of the double is the one carried out in numbers in the ratio one to two [i.e., the sequence 1,2,4,...]. The sequence determined by squares [sc. of these numbers: the sequence 1, 4, 16,...] is the double of this. Double of this is the one [the sequence 1, 8, 53,...] that reaches what is solid and tangible, after proceeding from one to eight. The sequence that gives the mean of the double involves both the mean that exceeds the smaller and is

exceeded by the larger by an equal amount [i.e., the arithmetic mean], and the mean that exceeds one of the extremes by the same fraction of that extreme as the fraction of the other extreme by which it is exceeded by that extreme [i.e., the harmonic mean]. (The means of 6 in relation to 12 are determined by the ratios 3:2 and 4:3.) The sequence based on both of these means has been granted to the human race by the blessed choir of the Muses and has bestowed upon us the use of concord and symmetry to promote play in the form of rhythm and harmony.

Let us take it that all these things are as we have said. But what is the point of learning them? To ascertain this we must refer to the divine element in the generated world, which consists of the finest and most divine sort of visible things God has permitted humans to observe. No one who has observed them can ever claim to have learned them in any easy way that does not involve the sciences that I just described. In addition, in all our discussions we must fit the individual to the species by asking questions and refuting errors. This method is the first and finest touchstone for humans to use, whereas all the tests that are not genuine but pretend to be so involve everyone in totally useless labor. We must also have an accurate knowledge of how time brings to pass all celestial events precisely. If we do, then everyone who has confidence in the truth of our account that soul is both older and more divine than body should believe that the saying "all things are full of gods" is entirely right and sufficient, and further that we are never slighted through the forgetfulness or neglect of our superiors.

In all these studies, though, the following point must be kept in mind: anyone who comprehends each of them through the right method is greatly benefited in doing so; otherwise, it is better to call on God for help. The right method is this—I must say this much at least. To the person who learns in the

right way it will be revealed that every diagram and complex system of numbers, and every structure of harmony and the uniform pattern of the revolution of the stars are a single thing applying to all these phenomena. And it will be revealed to anyone who learns correctly, as we say, fixing his eye on unity. To one who studies these subjects in this way, there will be revealed a single natural bond that links them all. But anyone who is going to pursue these studies in any other way must "call on Good Fortune for help" as we say too. For without them, no one in cities will ever become happy. This is the right way, this is the upbringing, these are the studies. Whether they are difficult, whether they are easy, this is the way we must proceed.

It is not right to neglect the gods once it is obvious that our story about them all has been told in the right way and blessed by Good Fortune. Anyone who has grasped all these things in this way I say is truly the wisest. I maintain also, both in jest and in earnest, that when any of these people fulfills his destiny by dying (if indeed he still exists in death), he will no longer be affected by a multitude of perceptions as he is now but will participate in a destiny of unity. Having become one from many, he will be happy, most wise, and blessed—whether in his blessed state he dwells on continents or islands [the Isles of the Blest]—and he will enjoy this fortune forever. And whether he lives his life engaging in these pursuits in private or in public, the gods will grant him to experience the same things in the same way. But as to what we asserted at the outset, the identical account is now at hand again, and it is genuinely true—that with but a few exceptions, humans are incapable of becoming perfectly blessed and happy. This has been stated correctly. Only those who are by nature godlike and moderate, who also possess the rest of virtue, and have understood all the subjects connected with the blessed science [astronomy] (and we have stated what these are) have

obtained and possess all the gifts of the divinity in adequate measure.

In private we say and in public we enact into law that the highest offices must be bestowed upon those individuals who have mastered these studies in the right way, with much labor, and have arrived at the fullness of old age. The others must obey them and speak in praise of all gods and goddesses. Now that we have come to know this wisdom well enough and have tested it, we are all bound, most rightly, to urge the Nocturnal Council to pursue it.

The Epinomis.

or

THE PHILOSOPHER.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

An ATHENIAN GUEST, CLINIAS the Cretan, and MEGILLUS the Lacedæmonian.

Clinias/ According to our agreement, O guest, we are all of us rightly assembled, being three, I, and you, and Megillus here, for the purpose of considering after what manner we should investigate prudence; which when understood, we say that it causes the human habit to subsist in the most beautiful manner possible to man, with respect to itself. For we have discussed everything else respecting the establishment of laws. But we have not yet related and discovered, that which it is the greatest thing to discover and relate, I mean, what that is by the learning of which mortal man will become wise. We should now endeavor not to leave this uninvestigated: for, if we do, we shall nearly leave that imperfect, for the sake of rendering which apparent from the beginning to the end we have all of us proceeded thus far.

Athenian Stranger/ You speak well, friend Clinias. But I think you will now hear a wonderful discourse, though again in a certain respect it is not wonderful. For many that we meet with in life assert, that the human race can neither be blessed nor happy. Attend, therefore, and see, whether it appears to you as well as to me, that by speaking as follows about this affair we shall speak well. For I say it is not possible for men in this life, except a few, to become blessed and happy. But the hope is beautiful that after death we shall obtain everything, for the sake of which we cheerfully

live and die in the best manner we are able. Nor is my assertion novel, but that which we all after a certain manner know, as well Barbarians as Greeks. For the production of every animal is in the beginning difficult. In the first place, the participation of the fetal habit is difficult; and, in the next place, to be nourished and educated. And, as we all say, these things are accomplished through ten thousand labors. The time, too, is short, not only with respect to the endurance of calamities, but everything else which causes human life to take breath, as it were, about a medium. For old age swiftly arriving makes everyone who is not full of puerile opinion unwilling to return to life again, when he considers the life he has lived. And is not the subject of our present investigation an argument of the truth of these assertions? For we investigate how we may become wise, taking it for granted that there is in each of us a power by which this may be accomplished. But wisdom then flies from us, when we apply ourselves to any of those things which are called by the name of art or prudence, or to any other such particulars as we rank among the sciences; because no one of these, as being conversant with human affairs, deserves to be called by the appellation of wisdom. The soul, however, vehemently confides and prophesies, that she naturally possesses this power: but what it is, and when, and how it subsists, she is not altogether able to discover. But do not our doubting and investigation respecting wisdom refer to this exceedingly, viz. that there is abundance of hope for such as are able to examine both themselves and others prudently, and in an according manner, through every kind of reasoning and disputation? Shall we say that these things are so, or not?

Clinias/ We admit that they are, O guest, hoping that we shall in time, together with you, entertain the most true opinions respecting them.

Athenian Stranger/ In the first place, then, let us discuss those other pursuits which are, indeed, called sciences, but do not render him wise who receives and possesses them; that, removing these out of the way, we may endeavor to assign the particulars of which we are in want, and, when assigned, to learn them. Let us, therefore, first consider the things which the mortal genus first requires: for these are nearly most necessary, and truly such as are first. But he who is knowing in these, though at first he may appear to be wise, yet now he is not considered as such, but is rather disgraced by science of this kind. We shall mention, therefore, what they are, and shall show that everyone who proposes to appear to others to be a most excellent man, will avoid these through the possession of prudence and accurate study. Let the first art then be that which orders us to abstain from the eating of human flesh; this, according to the fable, being the practice of mankind formerly, after the manner of savage animals, and which recalls us to legal nutriment. The ancients, indeed, were and are benevolent to us. Let us, however, bid farewell to those whom we call the first men. The preparation, indeed, and nutriment of Cerealian food is beautiful and good, but will never render a man completely wise: For it is attended with molestation. Nor yet will the whole of agriculture be able to accomplish this. For we all of us appear to undertake the cultivation of the earth, not from art but nature, through the favor of Divinity. But neither can the construction of houses, the whole of architecture, the making of every kind of furniture, the art of the coppersmith, and the apparatus of tectonic, plastic, plectic, and, in short, of all instruments which are accommodated to the vulgar, but are not subservient to virtue, accomplish this. Nor, again, can the whole of hunting, though it is various and artificial, confer magnificence on the wise man. Nor yet divination, or the

interpreting art; for these alone know that which is asserted, but they do not understand whether it is true or not. Since then we see that none of those arts by which necessaries are procured can make anyone wise, after this that discipline remains which is for the most part imitative, but by no means serious. For imitation is here effected by means of many instruments, and through many gestures of bodies not altogether graceful. In discourse, too, there is imitation in every Muse; and in things of which the graphic art is the mother, where things, many and all-various, are expressed in moist and dry bodies; none of which, though fabricated with the greatest diligence, can in any respect render a man wise. After imitation, those arts remain which afford innumerable helps to men on innumerable occasions. The greatest of these and the most useful is the warlike art; but it is in want of abundance of felicity, and naturally rather requires fortitude than wisdom. But that which they call the medicinal art affords us assistance in unseasonable cold and heat, and in all those circumstances by which the nature of animals is injured; at the same time that no one of these contributes to the most true wisdom, for they proceed by uncertain conjectures and opinions. We likewise acknowledge that pilots and sailors afford us assistance; but at the same time we do not permit anyone of these to be called a wise man. For none of them knows the rage, or the friendship, of the winds, which is the most acceptable thing in the whole of the pilot's art. Nor yet do we call those wise who by the power of eloquence afford assistance in courts of justice; for these pay attention to the manners of opinion, through memory and experience, but wander from the truth of things just in reality. There still remains a certain absurd power with respect to the opinion of wisdom, which many denominate nature rather than wisdom. This takes place when anyone easily understands a thing which he is

learning, and firmly remembers a multitude of things; and can rapidly attribute to anything that which is accommodated to it, when it is proper so to do. For all these some denominate nature, others wisdom, and others sagacity of nature. But no prudent person will ever be willing to call anyone of these a truly wise man. It is however necessary, that a certain science should be rendered, apparent, which he who possesses will be truly wise, and not only so in opinion. But let us consider; for we are attempting a thing in every respect difficult, as we are endeavoring to find something different from the above-mentioned particulars, which may be truly and with propriety called wisdom, and which he who receives will neither be vile, nor stupid, but be rendered through it wise and good, and become an elegant man in a city, whether he governs or is governed.

Let us, therefore, consider this in the first place, investigating that one science belonging to human nature, which not existing, man would become most stupid and unwise. But this is not very difficult to perceive. For, as I may say, referring one to one, that which number imparts to the mortal race will accomplish this. I think, however, that a God himself, rather than a certain fortune, gave us this for our preservation. It is proper, however, to inform you what God I think it was, though my opinion will appear wonderful, and yet in a certain respect not wonderful. For, how is it possible that he who is the cause to us of everything good should not also be the cause of by far the greatest good, prudence? But what God am I celebrating, O Megillus and Clinias? Nearly *Heaven*, whom it is most just we should, in the highest degree, honor, and fervently pray to, since this is done by all other Dæmons and Gods. That *Heaven*, indeed, is the cause to us of all other good, we all acknowledge. But we must also assert that, at the same

time, he has given us number, and still imparts it to us, if anyone is willing to follow us in what we say. For he will ascend to the right contemplation of this divinity (whether we may be allowed to call him the World, or Olympus, or Heaven,) who attends to the variety it contains, and how, by the courses of the stars which revolve in it, it imparts the seasons and nutriment to all things; and besides these, prudence, as we have said, together with all number, and every other good. But this is the greatest thing, when anyone, receiving from him the gift of number, proceeds through every circulation. Again, recurring back a little, let us call to mind that we very rightly conceived that, by taking away number from human nature, we should be deprived of prudence. For the soul of this animal would scarcely any longer be able to receive every virtue, if deprived of reason. But the animal which does not know two and three, the even and the odd, and is entirely ignorant of number, will never be able to give a reason respecting those things of which it alone possesses sensation and memory; but nothing hinders it from possessing the other virtues, I mean fortitude and temperance, without this knowledge. However, he who is void of true reason can never become wise. And he to whom wisdom is not present, which is the greatest part of the whole of virtue, as in this case he will not be perfectly good, so he will never be happy. So that there is the greatest necessity that number should be established as a principle: but to show that this is necessary, a discourse longer than the preceding is requisite. It was, however, just now rightly asserted by us, that all the other arts which we a little before enumerated, must be entirely subverted if the arithmetical science is taken away. But someone who looks to the arts may be of opinion, that there are but few things in which mankind are indigent of number; yet, even here its utility is great. But if anyone looks to that which is divine and mortal

in generation, in which the cultivation of divinity and true piety are known, he will find that no prophet can comprehend the mighty power which the whole of number possesses. For it is evident that everything pertaining to music requires numbered motion and sound. And, which is the greatest thing, it may be easily known that number is the cause of everything good, but of nothing evil, because every irrational, disordered, inelegant, and unharmonious lation, and all such things as participate of a certain evil, are deprived of all number. And this ought to be thus understood by him who is to be finally happy. To which we may add, that he who is ignorant of the just, the good, the beautiful, and all such things, and who has not received a true opinion respecting them, cannot employ the power of number in order to persuade himself and others.

But let us now proceed to consider how we learnt to number: —Whence, then, came we to perceive one and two; so that we might understand that in order to the knowledge of which we received this power from the universe? Nature, indeed, has not imparted to many animals the power of numbering, derived from their parents; but Divinity first implanted in us the, ability of understanding number in that which is pointed out to us. Afterwards he rendered it more apparent to us; in which unfolding of things nothing can be seen more beautiful, if one thing is compared with another, than the genus of day. In the next place behold the night, which possesses the greatest diversity. For, by continually revolving these things, you will see many days, and many nights, in which the heavens, without ceasing, teach men one and two, so that even the most indocile may hence learn to number. For thus each of us, on perceiving these things, may understand three and four, and the many. And from these, Divinity fabricating, made one thing the moon, which at one time appearing greater, and at another less,

continually varies as far as to fifteen days and nights. And this is a period, if anyone is willing to establish the whole circle as one. So that, as I may say, the most indocile animal may learn to number, if he is one to whom Divinity has imparted the ability of learning. And, as far as to these, and in these particulars, every animal has the ability of becoming skilled in arithmetic, by considering one thing itself, by itself. But always to reason about all numbers, when compared with each other, appears to be a more arduous undertaking. And for the sake of this, Divinity having made, as we have said, the moon, increasing and decreasing, fabricated months for the purpose of constituting the year, and caused us to compare every number with number, with prosperous fortune. Hence, earth bears fruit for us, and becomes prolific, so that she is the nurse of all animals; and winds and showers are produced, neither immoderate nor immense. But if anything evil happens in these, it is proper to accuse not a divine, but human, nature, as unjustly distributing its own life. To us, therefore, investigating laws, it has appeared, that other things which are best for men, are easy to be known, and that everyone can sufficiently understand and perform what we asserted respecting them, if he understands what is advantageous and what is not so. It has been shown by us, indeed, and at present it appears, that all other pursuits are not difficult in the extreme; but to assign the manner in which men may be rendered good, is perfectly difficult. And again, to possess other goods in a proper manner is, as has been said, possible, and not difficult, —I mean riches, and the body. Likewise, everyone acknowledges it is requisite that the soul should be good; and everyone will say that it becomes good through temperance, fortitude, and the like. Everyone, too, will say that the soul ought to be wise; but what the wisdom is which it ought to acquire, is not, as we just now observed,

determined by any of the multitude. Now, therefore, besides the above-mentioned kinds of wisdom, we have discovered a wisdom by no means vile; so that he who learns what we have discussed will appear to be wise. But whether he who learns these things will be in reality wise and good, must become the subject of our discourse.

Clinias/ How justly, O guest, you said that you should endeavor to speak greatly about great things!

Athenian Stranger/ They are not trifling things, Clinias; and what is of still greater consequence, they are in every respect true.

Clinias/ Exceedingly so, O guest; but, at the same time, do not yield to labor, but continue your discourse.

Athenian Stranger/ I will. Neither do you, therefore, be weary of hearing.

Clinias/ We shall not: for I will be answerable to you for both of us.

Athenian Stranger/ It is well. But it is necessary, as it appears, to speak first of all from the beginning; and especially, if we are able, we should comprehend in one name that which we consider as wisdom. But if we are very incapable of accomplishing this, we should consider that which ranks in the second place, the quality and number of those arts, which he who receive, will, according to our doctrine, be a wise man.

Clinias/ Proceed, then, in this manner.

Athenian Stranger/ In the next place, then, the legislator will be without envy who speaks better respecting the Gods than the ancients, and who employing, as it were, beautiful discipline, honors the Gods with hymns, extols their felicity, and thus passes through life.

Clinias/ You speak well, O guest; since the proposed end of your laws consists in acquiring the best and most

beautiful end of life, through reverencing the Gods, and purity of conduct.

Athenian Stranger/ How, therefore, shall we speak, Clinias? Does it appear to you) that we should vehemently honor by hymning the Gods, and that we should beseech them that we may proceed to speak things the most beautiful and the best respecting their divinities? Or how do you say?

Clinias/ Thus, in a wonderful manner. But, O dæmoniacal man, consisting in the Gods, pray, and begin your discourse on the beautiful things respecting; the Gods and Goddesses.

Athenian Stranger/ Be it so. if Divinity himself is pleased to be our leader. Do you only pray with me.

Clinias/ Now, therefore, proceed with your discourse.

Athenian Stranger/ As the ancients, then, as it seems, have badly delivered in image, the generation of Gods and animals, it is proper, in the first place, according to our former assertion, to accomplish: this in a better manner, by resuming our discourse to the impious. For, if you remember, Clinias, we have shown that there are Gods, that their providence extends to all things both, small and great, and that they are not to be appeased by any unjust supplications or gifts. These things, indeed, you should call to mind, because they are highly true. But the greatest among those assertions is this, that every soul is more antient than everybody. Do you remember? or, rather, do you not perfectly remember this? For that which is better, more antient, and more divine, is prior to that which is worse, junior, and less honorable. And, universally, that which governs is more antient than that which is governed, and that which leads than that which is led. We must admit this, therefore, that soul is more antient than body. But, if

this be the case, it is probable that what is first in the generation of the first must take the lead. We lay down this position, then, that the principle of a principle subsists in a more becoming manner, and that thus we shall most rightly ascend to the wisdom respecting the generation of the Gods.

Clinias/ Let these things be so, which are asserted in the best manner we are able.

Athenian Stranger/ Come, then, do we not say that an animal then subsists most truly according to nature, when one composition of soul and body produces by its junction one form?

Clinias/ We do.

Athenian Stranger/ A thing of this kind, then, is most justly called an animal.

Clinias/ It is.

Athenian Stranger/ But it is requisite, according to assimilative reasoning, to say, that there are five solid bodies, from which the most beautiful and best things may be fashioned. But the whole of the other genus possesses one form. For there is not anything else which can be generated immortal, and in no respect at any time possess color, except the truly most divine genus of soul. But this is nearly that alone to which it pertains to fashion and fabricate; but it belongs to body to be fashioned, generated, and become object of sight. And we again assert (for it must not be said once only) that it is the property of soul to be invisible, endued with knowledge, intelligible, and to partake of memory and the reasoning power in even and odd mutations. As there are, therefore, five bodies, it is requisite to say that two of them are fire and water, that the third is air, the fourth earth, and the, fifth æther. But in the several principalities of these many and all various animals are produced. The truth of this we may thus learn in one of these

bodies. For let us, in the first place, consider the terrene genus of animals, viz. all the human kind, all such animals as have many feet, and are without feet, such as have a progressive motion, and such as are stable and connected by roots. But this one thing ought to be attended to, that though all animals are constituted from all these genera, yet the terrene genus abounds with earth and solidity. It is, however, requisite to place another genus of animals, which is generated, and, at the same time, capable of being seen. For it consists for the most part of fire; but likewise contains small parts of earth and air, and of all other things. Hence, it is requisite to assert that all-various and visible animals are generated from this genus. It is likewise necessary to think that these genera of animals constitute all that the heavens contain; or, in other words, that they are the divine genus of the stars, consisting of a most beautiful body, and of a soul the most happy and the best. It is also requisite to consider this respecting these two genera of animals. For each of them is, from the greatest necessity, either indestructible, immortal and divine, or the life of each is so extended as not to require any longer period of duration. In the first place, therefore, as we have said, we must consider that there are these two genera of animals. And we again say that both of them are visible; the one, as it appears, consisting wholly of fire, and the other of earth. We must likewise assert, that the earthly genus is moved in a disorderly manner, but that which consists from fire, in perfect order. It is proper, therefore, to consider that which is moved without order, as stupid. But it is requisite to establish this as a great argument, that the natures which revolve in the heavens are endued with intellect, —I mean, that they always proceed according to the same and in a similar manner, and both do and suffer the same. But the necessity of a soul possessing intellect is by far the greatest

of all necessities. For it promulgates laws governing and not governed. But when soul, which is a thing of the most excellent nature, deliberates according to the most excellent intellect, then that which is perfect according to intellect takes place in reality, nor can an adamant be more firm and inconvertible than such a soul. Indeed, the three fates preserve perfect that which is deliberated by each of the Gods with the best counsel. It is requisite, therefore, men should be convinced that the stars, and the whole of this progression, are endued with intellect, from this circumstance, that they always perform the same things. For in the past time they have deliberated for a wonderfully extended period respecting their actions. But they are not, in deliberating, agitated upwards and downwards, nor do they wander and revolve in a disorderly manner, acting differently at different times. The contrary of this, however, appears to many of us, —I mean, that because they perform the same things, and in a similar manner, they are without a soul. The vulgar, too, embracing this insane opinion, conceive that the human genus is intellectual and vital, because it is moved, but that the divine genus is destitute of intellect, because it abides in the same lations. But it becomes the man who attributes to the Gods things more beautiful, more excellent, and more friendly to their natures, to conceive that it is necessary to consider them as possessing intellect, because they always accomplish the same things, according to the same, and in a similar manner. And that this is the nature of the stars, most beautiful to the sight, and which by a progression and musical dance, the most beautiful and magnificent of all choirs, produces in all animals everything that, is proper and becoming. But that we justly consider them as animated, may, in the first place, be evinced by their magnitude. For they are not in reality so small as they

appear to be; but it deserves to be believed, that each of them is of an immense magnitude, as this may be shown by sufficient demonstrations. For we may rightly think that the whole sun is larger than the whole earth; and that all the stars possess a wonderful magnitude. We should consider, therefore, after what manner so great a bulk can be made to revolve by a certain nature perpetually in the same time. I say, therefore, that Divinity is the cause of this, and that it cannot in any other manner be accomplished. For it can no otherwise become animated than through a God, as we have evinced. As Divinity, therefore, is the cause of its animation, and all things are easy to a God, in the first place, he generated everybody and every bulk in the heavens an animal; and, in the next place, he caused it to move in that manner which he conceived, by a dianoëtic energy, to be the best. And now, respecting all these particulars, we shall make one true assertion, viz. It is impossible that earth, heaven, all the stars, and all the bulks composed from these, could subsist, unless a soul is either present with each, or resident in each, enabling them to revolve with such accuracy according to years, and months, and days, and thus procuring for all of us every good. But it is requisite that, by how much more vile man is than celestial animals, by so much the less should he trifle, but assert something conspicuous concerning them. He, therefore, who assigns certain fluxions of bodies, or natures, or anything of this kind, as the causes of the celestial convolutions, will not assert anything conspicuous.

It is, however, requisite to reconsider what we have said with the utmost attention, that it may appear whether our assertions were reasonable, or altogether futile. In the first place, then, we said, that there were two things, the one soul, and the other body; and that there were many things pertaining to each. We likewise asserted, that all these

mutually differed from each other; and that there was no other third thing common to anyone of them: but that soul differed from body in this, that the former possessed, and the latter was destitute of, intellect; that the one governed, and the other was in a state of subjection; and that the one was the cause of all the passions of bodies, but that the other was not the cause of anyone of these. So that he who asserts that celestial natures were generated by anything else, and that they do not consist, in the manner we have said, from soul and body, must be very stupid and irrational. If, therefore, it is requisite that the arguments respecting all such particulars as these should be victorious, and that every nature of this kind should be believed to be divine, one of these two things must follow, viz. we must either celebrate the celestial orbs as Gods, and in so doing we shall act most rightly; or we must consider them as images of the Gods, fabricated as statues by the Gods themselves. For these two consequences are neither absurd nor of small importance, but, as we have said, one of these must ensue; and these statues are to be honored beyond all other statues. For no statues will ever be found more beautiful and more common to all men than these, nor any that are established in more excellent places, or which so transcend in purity, venerableness, and all life, as these, which are throughout generated the same. Now, therefore, we should also endeavor to assert this respecting the Gods, viz. Since we perceive two species of visible animals, one of which we say is immortal, and the whole of the other which is terrene, mortal, we should endeavor to unfold, according to probable opinion, three species of animals which subsist between these five. After fire, then, we place æther; and we assert, that from it soul fashions animals which possess, like other genera, an abundant power from their own nature, but the smallest degree of power for the sake of a mutual bond, from other

genera. But, after æther, soul fashions from air another genus of animals; and a third genus from water. Soul, therefore, having fabricated all these, filled the whole of heaven with animals, employing, to the utmost of its power, all the genera, as all these participate of life. But the second, third, fourth, and fifth, beginning from the generation of the visible Gods, at length end in us men. Respecting the Gods, Zeus, Hera, and all the rest, let anyone assign them such places as he pleases, if he only distributes them according to the same law, and considers this reasoning as stable.

We must call, therefore, the nature of the stars, and such things as we perceive together with the stars, the visible Gods, the greatest and the most honorable, perceiving every way most acutely, and ranking among such things as are first. But after, and under these, in a following order, dæmons subsist, an aerial genus, possessing a third and middle seat, who unfold the will of the Gods to men, and whom it is highly fit we should honor by prayers, for the sake of obtaining their propitious intercession. We cannot, however, wholly perceive either of these two kinds of animals, one of which subsists in other, and the other in a following order in air. For, though these dæmons are by their situations near us, yet they never become manifest to us; but they participate of an admirable prudence, as being docile and of a good memory; and they know all our thoughts. They likewise love in a wonderful manner worthy and good men, and vehemently hate such as are vicious, as being themselves participants of pain. For the Gods, indeed, who possess the end of a divine allotment, are situated beyond the reach of all pleasure and pain, and participate, in the utmost perfection, of prudence and knowledge. And, as the heavens are full of animals, these dæmons, and the highest Gods, mutually interpret all things to each other. For the middle animals are borne to earth and the whole heaven

with a light and rapid impetus. But he who assimilates the fifth genus of animals, which is from water to a demigod, will assimilate rightly. And this genus is sometimes visible, and sometimes concealed from our sight; and, when it is visible, is seen in a wonderful and obscure manner. As, therefore, there are these five kinds of animals, whatever occurs to us in dreams, oracles, and divinations, and such things as we hear through the voice of the healthy or diseased, or which happen to us at the close of life, whence many sacred rites are instituted, both privately and publicly, and will be instituted hereafter, —*with respect to all these, the legislator who possesses the smallest degree of intellect, will never make innovations in any of them, lest he should turn his city to a religion which possesses nothing conspicuous*. Nor will he forbid anything respecting sacrifices which the law of his country has established, as being convinced that it is not possible for a mortal nature to know anything about such like particulars. And for the same reason MUST NOT THOSE BE THE WORST OF MEN WHO DO NOT CELEBRATE THE TRULY APPARENT GODS, AND WHO SUFFER THE OTHER GODS TO REMAIN DEPRIVED OF THEIR SACRED RITES, AND THE HONORS WHICH ARE THEIR DUE? For this is just as if someone should perceive the sun and moon inspecting without receiving any honors from the whole of the human race, and at the same time should not be anxious for the celebration of their divinities by mankind, that festivals and sacrifices may be instituted, and that certain parts of greater and lesser years may be often distributed in honor of them. Would not such a one, if he should be said to be evil both to himself and to any other by whom he is known, be justly said to be so?

Clinias/ Undoubtedly, O guest: for such a one must be the word of men.

Athenian Stranger/ Know assuredly then, friend Clinias, that this very thing has now happened respecting myself.

Clinias/ How do you say?

Athenian Stranger/ Know that there are eight powers revolving round the whole heaven, which are sisters to each other, and which I have beheld without paying them any great attention: for this is easy for another to accomplish. Of these, the following are three; one of the sun, another of the moon, and another of all the stars, which I mentioned a little before: and besides these there are five others. With respect to all these, and such natures as are contained in these, whether they have a progressive motion themselves, or are borne along in vehicles, no one of us should at any time think that some of them are Gods, and others not; nor yet, that some of them are legitimate, but others such as it is not lawful for any of us to mention; but we should say that they are all of them brothers, and that they live in fraternal allotments. We should likewise honor them, not ordaining for some a year, for others a month, and for others no allotted portion of time, in which they accomplish their revolutions, and at the same time give perfection to a world, which reason determines to be the most divine of all visible things. This world a happy man will in the first place admire; and, in the next place, he will ardently desire to learn as much respecting it as is possible to a mortal nature; thinking that he shall thus pass through life in the best and most fortunate manner, and after death arrive at places adapted to virtue; and thus being truly initiated, and participating in reality of prudence, and becoming one, will pass the rest of his time in the contemplation of things the most beautiful of all such as pertain to the sight.

It now remains that we should relate, in the next place, what and how many these are. For we may without falsehood strenuously assert as follow? I again say, then, that there are eight of these, three of which we have already discussed, and consequently five remain. But the fourth and fifth lation

and transition are nearly equal in swiftness with the sun, and are neither slower nor swifter. And of these three, intellect is always a sufficient leader, I mean of the sun, Lucifer, and that third which cannot be denominated because it is not known. But the reason of this is, because a Barbarian was the first spectator of these. For an antient region is the nurse of those who first understood these particulars through the beauty of the summer season. And such was Egypt, and Syria, where, as I may say, all the stars are perpetually apparent, because clouds and rain are always far remote from that part of the world. Hence, both here, and in every other place, these things are found by the experience of an infinite length of time to be true; and on this account they ought boldly to be established by the laws. For to think that divine natures are not honorable, or that these things are not divine, is clearly the province of one not endued with intellect. But it is requisite to assign this as the reason why they have no names, though indeed they are denominated by certain persons. For Lucifer is called Vesper, or the star of Venus, by which it is probable that the author of this appellation was a Syrian. But the star which revolves with an equal velocity with the sun and Lucifer, is called Stillborn, or Mercury. And, besides these, there are three lations of those stars, whole course is to the right hand, in conjunction with the sun and moon. But it is requisite to call the eighth orb one, which may with the greatest propriety be denominated the upper world. This orb moves contrary to the rest, and draws the others along with it, according to the opinion of those who have some skill in these affairs. But it is necessary to speak of such things as we sufficiently know. For true wisdom will thus in a certain respect appear to him who participates, though in a small degree, of right and divine intelligence. Three stars then remain, one of which differs from the rest by the slowness of

its motion. This star is called by some Phænon, or Saturn. That which is next to this in slowness is called Phæthon, or Zeus: and, after this follows Puroeis, or Mars, who has the most red color of them all. These things, when explained by anyone, are not difficult to be understood; but, when understood, we should frame such conceptions respecting them as we have mentioned above. This, also, ought to be known by every Grecian, that we inhabit a region which is nearly the best of all others for the acquisition of virtue. But it is proper to assert that its praise consists in being situated between the nature of summer and winter. However, as we have said, because we are more distant from the nature of summer than the Barbarians we understood posterior to them the orderly arrangement of these Gods; yet we must assert, that whatever the Greeks receive from the Barbarians, is by them carried to greater perfection. This, too, we should conceive to be the case with respect to the subject of the present discourse. For, though it is difficult to discover without ambiguity all such particulars as the present, yet the hope is both beautiful and great, that the Greeks will reverence all these divinities with a more excellent mode of worship than that which they received from the Barbarians, and that they will employ both discipline and the Delphic oracle, and every legitimate observance, for this purpose. Nor should any Greek be at any time fearful, that mortals ought not busily to employ themselves about divine concerns; but, on the contrary, he should think that neither is a divine nature destitute of intellect, nor ignorant of human nature. For he knows that, in consequence of Divinity acting as a teacher, those that are taught follow and learn: and he likewise certainly knows that he teaches us number and to numerate. For he would be the most stupid of all beings if he were ignorant of this. For, as it is said, he would truly be ignorant of himself, if he were

indignant, and not delighted with those that are able to learn, and who are rendered good through Divinity. But it is highly reasonable to suppose that the first conceptions of men, respecting the nature and actions of the Gods, were neither such as wise men would frame, nor those that succeeded them. For they asserted, that fire and water, and the other bodies, were the most antient of all things; but that the particulars belonging to that wonderful thing soul were of posterior origin. Hence, they considered the lation of body as better and more honorable, and as moving itself through heat and cold, and everything else of this kind: but they asserted that soul neither moved body nor itself. But, now since we say, if soul subsists in body, that it is not at all wonderful it should move and carry about both the body and itself, there can be no reason to disbelieve its ability to carry about a certain weight. Hence, as we now think proper to assert, that soul is the cause of the universe; and as of things, some are good and others evil, it is not at all wonderful, that soul should be the cause of every lation and motion, but that a lation and motion which tends to good should proceed from the best soul, and a lation and motion to the contrary, from a contrary soul. But it is necessary that things good should have vanquished, and should continue to vanquish, things which are not so. All these particulars have been asserted by us according to Justice, the avenger of the impious. With respect, however, to that which we have just now examined, we ought not to hesitate in asserting, that a good man is a wise man.

Let us however see, whether this wisdom, of which we were some time since in search, can be acquired by discipline or art. For, if we are destitute of the knowledge of this, we shall be ignorant of things just. Thus it appears to me, and therefore I assert this to be the case. For, having explored upwards and downwards, I will endeavor to evince

to you that which has become apparent to me. For, when the greatest part of virtue is negligently attended to, it becomes the cause of ignorance, as what we have just now said appears to me most perspicuously to signify. But no one shall persuade us, that there is any part of virtue belonging to the mortal race, greater than piety. We must likewise assert that this is not produced in the most excellent natures through the greatest ignorance. But those are the most excellent natures which are most rarely found, and which when found benefit others in the highest degree. For the soul which, moderately and mildly receives a flow? or the contrary nature, is simple and ingenuous: it likewise admires fortitude, and is obedient to temperance: and, what is the greatest of all in these natures, it is able to learn, is of a good memory, is a lover of literature, and is very much delighted with things of this kind. For these things are not easily implanted by nature; and when they are innate, and obtain proper education and discipline, their possessors obtain such authority over most part of their inferiors as to cause them to think, speak, and act, in such a manner as is requisite, and when it is requisite, towards the Gods; prevent them from employing artifice in the sacrifices and purifications which are performed both to Gods and men; and dispose them to honor virtue in reality, which is the most important of all things to every city. This part, therefore, we say is naturally the most principal, and, when instructed, is capable of learning in the greatest degree, and in the best manner. But no one can teach, unless Divinity leads the way. It is better, therefore, not to learn from one who teaches, but at the same time does not act after this manner. However, from what we have now said, it is necessary to learn these things; and I have asserted that a nature of this kind is the most excellent. Let us then endeavor to explain what these particulars are, and how it

is requisite to learn them; and this both according to my ability, who am the speaker, and the ability of those who are able to hear, that we may know after what manner certain things pertaining to the culture of divinity may be learnt. Perhaps, therefore, what you will hear is unusual: we shall, however, mention the name of the thing which, to him who is ignorant of it, would never appear to be the name. Are you then ignorant of astronomy, and that a true astronomer is necessarily the wisest of men? Not, indeed, that he is so who astronomizes according to Hesiod, and all such as consider the rising and setting of the stars; but this must be affirmed of him who contemplates the eight periods, and how seven of these are contained under the first, and in what order each revolves. But no one will easily contemplate these things, unless he participates of a wonderful nature, as we have just now said, and as we shall again say, unfolding what is to be learnt, and the manner of learning it. In the first place, therefore, let this be said by us, that the moon accomplishes its period most swiftly, and thus, first of all, leads forth month and full moon. In the second place, it is requisite to consider the sun who produces the solstices through the whole of his period, and, together with the sun, those that revolve in conjunction with him. But that we may not often assert the same things about the same, the revolutions of all those natures which we mentioned before, and which it is not easy to understand, must be made the subject of contemplation; preparing human nature for this purpose by disciplines pertaining to these speculations, and this by long exercise and labor, while it is in a juvenile state. On this account, the mathematical disciplines will be necessary; of which the first and the greatest is that which respects numbers, but not those that possess a body, but which contain the whole of the generation and power of the even and the odd, as these two contribute to the knowledge

and nature of things. That which is very ridiculously called geometry follows these in an orderly succession. But the similitude of numbers naturally dissimilar to planes, becomes conspicuous by comparison. This circumstance, however, to him who is capable of understanding it, will evidently appear to be not a human, but a divine miracle. After this, those numbers which receive a triple increase, and are similar to the nature of a solid, are to be considered, and likewise those that are dissimilar to this nature, which is called by those that are conversant with it, geometry. But this, to those that are capable of understanding it, is a divine and wonderful thing, that as the power of things always revolves about that which is double, and in its own opposite, according to each proportion, every nature is fashioned according to genera and species. The first power, therefore, of the double proceeds according to number, in the ratio of one to two, being double according to power. But in that which is solid and tangible, the double again proceed, from one to eight. Another power of the double proceeds to the middle, but perhaps into that which is more than the less, and less than the greater; while again, another power by the same part surpasses, and is surpassed by the extremities. But in the middle, of the proportion of six to twelve, the sesquialter and sesquitertian proportion subsists. And in the middle of these, a power revolving to both distributes to men an according and apt utility, which is imparted by the blessed choir of the Muses for the sake of sports, rhythm, and harmony. All these things, therefore, are produced and subsist after this manner. But their end is this, that we may betake ourselves to divine generation, and the most beautiful and divine nature of things visible, as far as divinity has conferred on men the ability of beholding them. These, however, we shall never behold without the above-mentioned discipline, Besides this, in our several

conversations we must refer every individual thing to its species, by interrogating and confuting when anything is improperly asserted. For this may be rightly said to be the most beautiful and the first touch-stone which men can employ. But where only a pretended examination takes place, it is of all labors the most vain.

Further still, the accuracy of time must be considered by us, and the exactness with which it causes all the revolutions of the heavenly bodies to be accomplished; that he who believes the assertion to be true, that soul is more antient and more divine than body, may also think it was beautifully and sufficiently said, that all things are full of Gods, and that no one of the natures more excellent than mankind, at any time forget, or pay but little attention to our concerns. But in all such things as these we should thus consider, that he who rightly apprehends each of these particulars will be benefited by them; but that it will be better for him who does not, to invoke Divinity. The manner, however, in which these particulars may be rightly apprehended is as follows: (For it is necessary to relate this also)—Every diagram, system of number, and composition of harmony, together with the one concord of all the stars in, their revolutions, ought to be beheld by him who learns in a proper manner. But that of which we are speaking will become apparent to him who rightly learns looking to one thing. *For, to those who reason scientifically, there will appear to be naturally one bond of all these*. But he who attempts to apprehend these in any other way ought, as we have said, to invoke Fortune. For, without these, it is not possible that any nature in cities can be happy. But this is the mode, this is the education, these are the disciplines; and through these we must proceed, whether they are difficult or easy. But it is not lawful to neglect the Gods; since the prosperous conception of all the above-mentioned

particulars becomes apparent by an orderly progression. And I call him who rightly apprehends all these, most truly the wisest of men. I likewise strenuously affirm, both in jest and seriously, that such a one, when he has by death filled up his allotted time, will no longer participate of many senses, as at present, but will be a partaker of one destiny alone; and becoming one, instead of a multitude of things, will be happy, and, at the same time, most wise and blessed. And again, whether anyone lives blessed on the continent, or in islands, I affirm that he will always participate a fortune of this kind; and that, whether anyone living a public or a private life studies these things, he will, in like manner, obtain the same destiny from the Gods. But, as we have said in the beginning, and now the assertion appears to be most true, *it is only possible for a few of mankind to be perfectly blessed and happy*. And this is rightly asserted by us. For those that are divine and at the same time prudent men, who naturally participate of the other virtues, and who besides this have acquired all such portions of blessed discipline as we have mentioned, these alone can sufficiently receive and possess all that pertains to a divine destiny. We legally, therefore, ordain, that those who thus labor in these things, both privately and publicly, when they have arrived at old-age, ought to possess the greatest authority in cities; and that others should follow these, and should celebrate all the Gods and Goddesses; and lastly, that all of us, in consequence of having examined these things, may, with the greatest propriety, exhort the nocturnal assembly to the pursuit of this wisdom.

THE END OF THE EPINOMIS.

Menexenus.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and Menexenus.

Socrates/ From the Forum, or from whence, Menexenus?

Menexenus/ From the Forum, Socrates, and from the Council-Hall.

Socrates/ What business had you especially at the Council-Hall? Or is it indeed evident that you deem yourself to have finished your course of learning and philosophy, and as being now all-sufficient, you think of turning yourself to matters of greater moment, and to become, O wonderful man, a ruler at your age over us your elders, so that your family may never fail in supplying us with some person as a guardian?

Menexenus/ If you, Socrates, will permit it, and advise me how to rule, I should be ready to do so; but if otherwise, not. However I went just now to the Council-Hall, on hearing that the Council were about to select the party who is to speak an oration over the dead. For you know they are about to ordain a public funeral.

Socrates/ I know it very well. And whom have they selected?

Menexenus/ No one. But they have put it off till to-morrow. I think, however, Archinus or Dion will be selected.

Socrates/ In good truth, Menexenus, it appears on many accounts to be very nearly a beautiful thing to fall in battle. For if a person dies so, although poor, he meets with a fine and gorgeous burial, and with praise, if he be a person of no mark, from men at once clever, and not extolling at random; but who, having had their speeches prepared for a long time,

eulogize so very beautifully that, by saying what is and is not to the purpose upon each point, and making a beautiful tissue of words, they bewitch our very souls, pouring forth in every way encomiums upon the state, and upon those who have died during the war, and upon all our ancestors, who have lived before us, and bestowing praise upon us ourselves, who are still living, so that I feel myself, Menexenus, vastly ennobled in being praised by them, and I stand constantly on tip-toe, and am charmed; fancying that I have become on the instant taller, and nobler, and handsomer than before; and as is wont, ever some strangers accompany me, and are fellow-hearers; to whom I appear to be immediately a greater object of respect. For they too seem to be affected in the same way as I am, both towards myself and the rest of the state, being persuaded by the speaker that it is more worthy of wonder than before. And this feeling of self-importance remains with me for more than three days; so greatly does the speech and even the tone of the orator ring in and sink into my ears, that scarcely on the fourth or fifth day do I recollect myself, and perceive where upon earth I am; and for awhile fancy myself only not living in the isles of the blessed. So clever are our orators!

Menexenus/ You are always, Socrates, making fun with the orators. For the present however I think the person selected will have no easy task, for the choice is made altogether on a sudden, so that the orator will be compelled to speak perhaps off-hand.

Socrates/ How so, my good friend? The speeches of each of these are ready prepared. Besides it is not difficult to speak off-hand upon such topics. But if it were requisite to speak well of the Athenians amongst Peloponnesians, or of Peloponnesians amongst Athenians, there would be need of a good speaker to persuade others and gain for himself renown. But when a man enters upon such a contest before

those whom he is praising, it seems not a great thing to speak well.

Menexenus/ Do you think it is not, Socrates?

Socrates/ It is not, by Zeus.

Menexenus/ Do you think that you would be able to speak yourself, if it were requisite, and the Council were to select you?

Socrates/ It would, Menexenus, be nothing wonderful, if even I were able to speak, whose teacher happens to be a woman by no means contemptible in oratory; but who has made many other persons good speakers, and, one superior to all the Greeks, Pericles, the son of Xanthippus.

Menexenus/ Who is she? Or rather, it is plain that you mean Aspasia.

Socrates/ I do mean her; and Connus too, the son of Metrobius. For these two are my masters, he in music, and she in oratory. Now that a man thus educated should be a skillful speaker is nothing wonderful; since even he, who has been worse educated than myself, having learnt music from Lamprus, and oratory from Antipho of Rhamnous, would be able to gain a reputation by praising Athenians, at least in the presence of Athenians.

Menexenus/ And what would you have to say, were it requisite to speak?

Socrates/ Myself perhaps nothing from myself. But only yesterday I heard Aspasia going through a funeral oration on these very persons. For she had heard what you tell me, that the Athenians were going to choose the person to speak. And then she went through partly on the instant what it would be proper to say, and partly what she had formerly thought of, when it seems she was composing the funeral oration that Pericles pronounced, and was gluing together some scraps from that.

Menexenus/ Could you remember what she said?

Socrates/ Unless I do her wrong. At least I learnt it from her, and I almost received some cuffs, because I was forgetting it.

Menexenus/ Why then do you not repeat it?

Socrates/ I fear my mistress may be offended, if I make her discourse public.

Menexenus/ Fear not, Socrates, at all; but tell it, and you will gratify me greatly, whether you choose to call it the speech of Aspasia, or of anyone else; only speak it.

Socrates/ But you will perhaps laugh at me, if I, an elderly man, appear to be still acting the boy.

Menexenus/ Not at all, Socrates: but do speak it by all means.

Socrates/ Since then I must gratify you, so as even, should you order me, to undress myself and dance, I will gratify you; since we are alone. Listen then; for she spoke, commencing, as I think, with the mention of the dead themselves in this manner.

As regards our acts, these here have received all the honors due to them; and after receiving them, are now proceeding on their fated road, having been sent onward by the state in common, and individually by their families and friends. But as regards our words, the honor still left undone the law enjoins us to pay to the men; and it is meet to do so. For of deeds performed nobly the remembrance by a well-spoken speech is an honor paid to those, who have acted, from those who hear. There is need then of such a discourse, as shall praise sufficiently the dead, and kindly advise the living, by exhorting the descendants and brethren of the dead to imitate their valor, and by comforting their fathers and their mothers, and whoever of their ancestors more remote are still alive. How then shall such an oration present

itself? Or from whence shall we rightly begin to praise those brave men, who, when living, delighted their friends with their velour, and bartered their death for the safety of those who survive.

To me it seems that we must praise them on the ground of their nature, as they were by nature good. Now they were good by being sprung from the good. Let us then celebrate, in the first place, their noble birth; in the second, their nurture and education; and afterwards let us show forth their conduct in practice, how they proved it to be honorable and worthy of those advantages. In the first place, the commencement of their nobility was in the birth of their ancestors, not being in-comers, nor exhibiting their descendants as foreign settlers in the land, themselves coming from elsewhere, but sprung from the earth, and dwelling and living in their own country really; and nursed, not like other nations, by a step-mother, but a parent, the very land which they inhabited, and in which they now lie dead; in the places of the mother which begat and nursed them, and received them again beneath her. Most just then is it to celebrate first the mother herself; for thus at the same time it results that the noble birth of these here is made their adornment.

And worthy is this land to be praised by all men, and not by ourselves alone, on many other grounds, but on this the first and greatest, that she has the good fortune to be loved by the gods. And to this my assertion the quarrel of the gods, who contended for her, and their decision, bear testimony. Whom then the gods have praised, how is it not just for her to be praised by all mankind? Her second praise would be justly this, that at the very time when the whole earth sent up and produced animals of all kinds, both wild beasts and cattle, this land of ours was seen to be unprolific of, and free from, savage beasts; and of all animals selected and

produced man, who surpasses all the others in intellect, and alone acknowledges Justice and the Gods. Now of this assertion there is a great proof in that this land has produced the ancestors of these men, and ours also. Now everything that brings forth, possesses food fitted for that which it may bring forth; by which fact is clearly shown what woman is really the mother, and who is not, but merely a supposititious one, should she not possess the fountain of nourishment for the child. This very sufficient proof does our land and mother afford of her having produced men; for at that time she alone and first brought forth the corn of wheat and barley, as the food of man, and by which the human race is nourished in the best and easiest manner, as having in reality produced that very animal. And such proofs it is fitting to receive rather in favor of the earth than of the woman. For the earth did not in conceiving and producing imitate woman, but woman imitated the earth; neither did this land enviously withhold these her fruits, but distributed them to others. In the next place, she sent up for her offspring the olive, an assistance in toil; and after she had nourished and reared them up to manhood, she introduced to them gods for their rulers and teachers, whose names it is fitting upon such an occasion to omit. For we know who have given the materials for life, by teaching us first the arts requisite for our daily subsistence, and instructed us in the acquirement and the use of arms for the protection of our country.

Thus born, and educated, lived the ancestors of these persons, after having framed a polity, which it is well to bring in a few words to your recollection. For a polity is the nurse of men; a good one of good men, and the contrary of bad. It is necessary then to show, that our ancestors were brought up under a good polity, through which both they became good, and those also who are now; amongst whom the dead

here happen to be a part. The same polity was then, as it now is, an aristocracy; under which we still live as citizens, and for the most part have done so from that time to this. One person calls it a democracy, another by another name, such as he pleases. But it is in truth a government by the best, combined with a good opinion of the people. For kings have ever existed with us, at one time hereditary, at another elected, but the people possessing for the most part the power of the state, has delegated the offices and government to those, who were successively deemed to be the best; and no man has ever been excluded from the want of influence or wealth, or his ignorance of his parentage, nor held in honor for the contrary qualities, as is done in other cities; but there was only one limitation; that he, who was deemed to be wise and good, should possess the power and office. Now the cause of this polity is the equality of birth. For other states are made up of men of every country, and of unequal conditions; so that their polities, as well tyrannies as oligarchies, are of unequal character. They therefore live, some considering each other as slaves, and some as masters. But we and ours, born all brethren, from one mother, consider ourselves neither the slaves nor the lords of each other; but that the equality of our births, according to nature, compel us to seek an equality of government, according to law, and to yield to each other upon no other ground, except the reputation of valor and of mind. Hence it is that the fathers of these men, and ours also, and themselves too, being thus nurtured in all freedom, and nobly born, have exhibited before all men many and glorious deeds, both in private and public, deeming it their duty to fight for freedom and in behalf of Greeks even against Greeks, and against barbarians in defense of Greeks combined. But how when Eumolpus and the Amazons brought an army against the country, and enemies even still

before them, they defended themselves, and how they defended the Argives against the Cadmeans, and the Heracleidæ against the Argives, the time is too short to relate worthily; and poets too have already hymned sufficiently their valor in verse, and pointed it out to all; and should we now attempt to adorn the same subject in a prose discourse, we should perhaps appear to be only second to them. For such reasons then it seems right to pass over these matters, especially since they have received their due. But such acts, as no poet has yet thrown round them a renown suited to their worth, and which are still in remembrance, all these it seems I ought by praising to call to mind, and by introducing them to others make them a subject for songs and other kind of poetry in a manner becoming the actors. Now of those to which I am alluding, the chief are these. When the Persians were taking the lead in Asia and attempting to enslave Europe, the children of this soil and our forefathers arrested their course; whom it is both just and necessary to remember first and to praise their valor. He however who would praise it properly, ought to have been born in word, and lived an eye-witness at that very period, when the whole of Asia was subject to its then third monarch. The first of these was Cyrus; who after effecting the freedom of the Persians, his countrymen, did through his high spirit reduce the Medes his former masters to slavery, and became the ruler of the rest of Asia, as far as Egypt. His son Cambyses subdued Egypt, and as much of Libya as it was possible to march against. The third, Darius, made Scythia the boundary of his empire by land, and by his fleet commanded the sea and islands, so that no one presumed to be his opponent. The very thoughts of all men were enslaved; so many, and great, and warlike nations did the Persian power reduce to subjection.

Now Darius having accused us and the Eretrians of plotting against Sardis, made it a pretense for sending an army of five hundred thousand men in ships and transports, and a fleet of three hundred sail, and ordered Datis, their commander, to return and bring back the Eretrians and Athenians captive, if he wished to keep his own head on. Datis sailing to Eretria against a people, who amongst the Greeks of that time were in the highest repute for the affairs of war, and not few in number, got these very men into his power in three days; and that none might escape, he searched through the whole country after this fashion. His troops having marched to the boundaries of Eretria, and extending themselves from sea to sea, they joined their hands, and thus went through the country, that they might be able to say to the king, that not a person had escaped. With the same design they sailed down from Eretria to Marathon, as being an easy thing for them to unite in the same fate the Athenians with the Eretrians, and to carry them off. During these transactions, some of which were done and others attempted, none of the Greeks gave any assistance to the Eretrians; nor, except the Lacedæmonians, to the Athenians; and they did not arrive till the day after the battle. All the rest, struck with terror, and contented with their present safety, kept themselves quiet. Now a person living at that period would have known what men of valor they were, who at Marathon sustained the strength of the Barbarians and punished the pride of all Asia, and first erected trophies over the Barbarians, and became the leaders and teachers to the rest of Greeks, that the power of Persia was not invincible, and that all wealth and all numbers must yield to valor. I say then that these men were the fathers, not only of our bodies, but of the liberty likewise of ourselves and of all together on this continent. For by looking upon that exploit did the Greeks dare to hazard

subsequent battles for their own preservation, and to become the pupils of those at Marathon. To these, then, must we in reason assign the first honors; and the second to those, who fought and conquered in the sea-fights at Salamis and Artemisium. Now of the deeds of those men, one would have much to tell, both as to what masses of troops, advancing by sea and land, they stood up against, and how they repelled them. But that, which seems to me to be their noblest act, I will bring to your recollection; because they worked out the deeds that followed upon those of Marathon. For they at Marathon only proved thus much to the Greeks, that it was possible for a few of them to repel many of the Barbarians; but by sea it was still uncertain. For the Persians had the reputation of being invincible at sea, through their superiority in numbers, and wealth, and skill, and strength. Truly then was this deed worthy of praise on the part of those men, who then fought at sea; inasmuch as they dispelled the dread, by which the Greeks had been fast bound, and caused them no longer to fear a multitude of ships and men; and it resulted from those, who fought at Marathon and Salamis, that the other Greeks were taught; and by learning from one party on land, and from the other at sea, they became accustomed to feel no fear of the Barbarians. The action at Platæa was the third, I assert, in number and in valor, that took place for the safety of Greece; in which the Lacedæmonians and Athenians had a common share. Now this the greatest and most difficult exploit did they all assist; and for this their valor they are both now celebrated by us, and will be by those hereafter in the time to come. Subsequent to this, many states of Greece still sided with the Barbarian; and the king himself was reported to have a design of making an attempt once more upon the Greeks.

It is just then for us to bear in remembrance those, who to the exploits of their forefathers put the finish in our deliverance, by clearing themselves from, and driving away, the whole Barbarian power from the sea. Now these were they, who fought in the naval battle at Eurymedon, and they, who were in the expedition to Cyprus, and who sailed to Egypt? and to many other places. Of these we ought to have a recollection, and to acknowledge our thanks to them; because they caused the king to fear for, and to attend to, his own safety, and not to be plotting for the destruction of the Greeks. Now the whole of this war was endured to the end by the whole power of the state in behalf of ourselves and others, speaking a common language, in opposition to the Barbarians. But when peace was made, and the city held in honor, there fell, as is wont, upon the successful, first rivalry from men, and after rivalry envy, which placed this city, although unwilling, in a state of hostility with the Greeks. Hereupon a war breaking out, the Athenians came in collision with the Lacedæmonians at Tanagra, and fought in defense of the liberties of Boeotia; and as the battle was undecisive, the action afterwards brought matters to a decided issue. For some went away, leaving the Bœotians, whom they had been assisting; while our troops, after obtaining a victory, on the third day, at Œnophyta, justly brought back those, who had been unjustly driven out. These then were the first after the Persian war, who, in behalf of liberty, gave their assistance to Greeks against Greeks; and being men of bravery, they freed those whom they were assisting; and, held in honor by the state, were buried in this cemetery here the first. After this, a great war arose, and all the Greeks brought an army against us, ravaged our country, and unworthily repaid the obligation they owed to the state. But our troops, after defeating them in a sea-fight, and taking the Lacedæmonian leaders

prisoners in the island of Sphagia, did, when it was in their power to destroy, spare and give them up, and made a peace, conceiving that in a war with a fellow-tribe one ought to carry on the contest only to the point of victory, and not, through the resentment of a particular state, to destroy the common interest of Greece; but against the Barbarians to war even to utter destruction. Fitting then is it to praise such men, who after being engaged in that war, now lie buried here; because they showed that, if anyone doubted whether in the former war against the Barbarians some others were or not superior to the Athenians, he doubted without reason. For they there proved, when Greece was in a state of dissension, their superiority in war, by their getting into their hands even those, who had stood forward in defense of the other Greeks, and by defeating single-handed those, with whom formerly they had conjointly overcome the Barbarians. After this peace, there was a third war, unexpected and terrible, in which many brave men fell, who lie buried here; and many too about Sicily, after they had erected very many trophies in behalf of the liberty of the Leontines, to assist whom in accordance with their oaths they sailed to those regions; but when, through the length of the voyage, the state was in difficulties, and unable to minister to their wants, their hearts failed them, and they were unsuccessful; of whose temperate conduct and valor their enemies and antagonists have poured forth greater praise than have friends on the conduct of the others. Many likewise fell in the Hellespont, after having taken all the ships of the enemy in one day, and gaining many other victories. But what I said as to the terrible and unexpected nature of the war, by that I mean, that the other Greeks carried to such an extent their feeling of animosity to this state, as to dare to make overtures by an embassy to the king of Persia, their greatest foe, and to bring in again for their particular interests that person against the

Greeks, whom they had, in common with us, driven out, and to collect an allied army of all the Greeks and Barbarians against this city. Upon which occasion the strength and valor of the state became very conspicuous. For when our enemies fancied it to be already beaten down in war, and had intercepted oar ships at Mitylene, then did these men, confessedly the bravest, go in person on board the vessels, and giving assistance with sixty sail, gained a victory over the enemy, and delivered their own friends; but meeting with unmerited misfortune in not having their bodies picked up at sea, they lie where they ought not. These it is our duty ever to remember and to praise. For by their valor we were victorious, not in that engagement only, but through the rest of the war; for through them the state gained the reputation, that it would not be beaten down in war, not even by all men combined. And the reputation was founded in truth. We have been beaten by our dissensions, not by others. By them at least we are even now unsubdued. But we have subdued ourselves, and in turn have been subdued. After these transactions a calm ensuing, and peace made with all the others, a domestic war was carried on in such a manner, that were it fated for men to fall into dissensions, every person would pray that his country might be no otherwise in disorder. For how delightedly and familiarly did the people of the Piræus, and those of the city, mingle with each other! And contrary to the expectations of the other Greeks, with how much moderation did they lay aside their hostility against those at Eleusis! And for all these acts there was no other cause than their real consanguinity, producing a firm friendship and clanship, not in words, but deeds.

It is meet then to hold in remembrance those too who died in that war by each other's hands, and to reconcile them, as we best can, by offering prayers and sacrifices on these occasions to the deities, who now have them in their power,

forasmuch as we ourselves are also reconciled. For not through malice and hatred did they lay hands upon each other, but through their evil fortune. And of these facts we are ourselves the living witnesses; for, being of the same family with them, we have forgiven each other for what we have done and suffered. After this the city had rest, and enjoyed a profound peace, pardoning the Barbarians, who, having been ill enough treated by this state, defended themselves not insufficiently; but she felt a resentment against the Greeks, when she remembered what a return they had made, after they had been well treated by her, by uniting with the Barbarians, and depriving us of the very fleet, which had formerly saved them, and by pulling down our walls, by which we had prevented their own from falling. The city then having determined not to assist Greeks, enslaved by each other or the Barbarians, remained thus. While then we were in this mood, the Lacedæmonians, fancying that we, the aiders of freedom, were fallen, and that now was the time for them to enslave the rest, attempted to do so. But what need is there to be prolix? For I should speak of subsequent events that are not of old date, nor before the time of many men still living. For we know that, to obtain the aid of this city, there came terror-struck the leading men amongst the Greeks, Argives, and Bœotians, and Corinthians; and, what was the greatest miracle of all, how even the king came into such a difficulty, as to think there was no safety from any other quarter than from this very city, which he had previously, with great eagerness, attempted to destroy. And indeed, should anyone wish to accuse the state on just grounds, he would rightly accuse her by stating this alone; that she is ever too full of pity, and the hand-maid of the weaker party. For at that very time she was not able to be firm, and to keep to her resolution, of not assisting those, when in the act of being enslaved, who had

injured her own citizens: but she was bent from her purpose, and did give assistance; and by such aid so delivered them from slavery, that they were free men, until they again made themselves slaves. She did not however dare to assist the king, through a feeling of reverence for the trophies of Marathon, and Salamis, and Platæa; but, by permitting merely the exiles and volunteers to assist, she did confessedly preserve him; and after building her walls and fleets, and undertaking a war, when compelled to do so, she carried on hostilities with the Lacedæmonians for the protection of the people of Paros.

The king however being afraid of the city, when he saw the Lacedæmonians declining a war by sea, and desirous to withdraw himself, made a demand for the Greek colonists on the continent, whom the Lacedæmonians had previously consented to give up, if he were to join with us and our allies in war; conceiving that, as we should not comply with it, there would be a pretense for withdrawing himself. In the case of the other allies he was deceived; for the Corinthians, and Argives, and Bœotians, were willing to give them up, and entered into a treaty, and confirmed it by oaths, to give up the Greeks on the continent, if he would furnish the money supplies. But we alone did not dare to give them up, nor to be a party to the oaths. To such an extent was carried the noble and liberal conduct of the state, at once solid and sound, and naturally a hater of Barbarians, through our being of pure Greek blood, with no mixture of Barbarian. For neither the Pelopses, Cadmuses, Ægyptuses, Danauses, and many others, Barbarians by birth, but Greeks by law, are dwelling with us; but we are very Greeks; not a mixed Barbarian breed; and hence the genuine hatred of a foreign nature has been instilled into the state. Designedly, then, we were again left alone, from our unwillingness to do a deed disgraceful and unholy by giving up Greeks to Barbarians.

Returning then to the same condition as when we were formerly beaten down in war, we did, with a god's assistance, lay down hostilities more successfully than at that period. For we were freed from it, possessing ships, and walls, and our own colonies; and so too, contentedly, were our enemies freed from it. We lost, however, in this war some brave men, who met with a difficult country in Corinth, and with treachery at Lechæum. Brave, too, were those, who freed the king, and drove the Lacedæmonians from the sea. These are the men I am bringing to your recollection; and such as these it becomes all of you to join in praising and investing with honors.

Such were the exploits of the men who lie buried here, and of the rest, who have died for the state. But though many and honorable are the deeds already related, still many more and more honorable are those, that have been left untold; for many days and nights would not suffice for him, who should go through them all. It is the duty then of every man to bear those deeds in mind; and, as in battle, to exhort the offspring of such men not to leave the ranks of their ancestors, nor, yielding to cowardice, to retire rearwards. And I do myself both now exhort you, the children of brave men, and shall hereafter, wherever I may meet with any of you, remind and exhort you to be ever ready to be the bravest of men. But for the present, I feel justified in telling you what the fathers of these men enjoined me to proclaim to their survivors, if they themselves suffered aught, when they had determined to encounter danger. I will tell you then what I heard from them, and what, if they possessed the power, they would now gladly say to you themselves, as I conjecture from what they said then. Imagine, then, you hear them speaking what I now relate as their messenger. These were their words.

O children! that ye are indeed the offspring of courageous fathers the present deed itself declares. For when it was in our power to live with dishonor, we chose to die with honor, rather than bring you and those after you into disgrace, and shame our own fathers and all our ancestors, conceiving that to him, who dishonors his family, life is no life; and that to such a fellow there is no man or god upon earth a friend, while living, nor under it, when dead. It behooves you then to keep these our words in remembrance; and if you practice anything else, to practice it with valor, well knowing that, deficient in this, all other possessions and pursuits are base and wrong. For neither does wealth bring honor to him, who possesses it with a want of manliness, since such a one is rich for another and not for himself; nor do beauty and strength of body, when they dwell with the coward and the knave, appear becoming, but unbecoming rather, and make the possessor more conspicuous, and show off his cowardice. Moreover, all knowledge, when separated from justice and the other parts of virtue, appears to be knavery and not wisdom. On this account then endeavor to have, as the first and last aim, through all time and by all means, every readiness to surpass to the utmost ourselves and ancestors in glory. For if not, rest assured that, should we conquer you in valor, the victory brings disgrace upon us; but defeat, if we are defeated, a state of blessedness. Now we shall be vanquished the most, and you obtain the victory, if you prepare yourselves not to abuse the glory of your ancestors, nor to expend it wastefully; being convinced that, for a person who thinks himself to be something, there is nothing more disgraceful, than to exhibit himself as held in honor, not on his own account, but the renown of his forefathers. For hereditary honor is to descendants a treasure honorable and magnificent. But to use up the treasure of riches and renown, and from the want of one's

own wealth and good repute, not to hand it down to posterity is an act both disgraceful and unmanly. Should you then pursue these objects, you will come to us as friends to friends, whenever your destined fate shall bring you below; but if you disregard them and become debased, not one of us will receive you kindly. Thus much let it be told to our children. But our fathers and mothers, that are surviving, it is very meet to soothe into the supporting as easily as possible their calamity, should any such happen to arise, and not to lament with them—for they do not need anything to pain them—for their present misfortune is sufficient to produce that—but to heal and mitigate their sorrow, by reminding them, that the gods have hearkened to what they especially prayed for. Since they did not pray for their children to be immortal, but to be brave and renowned, both of which, the greatest of all blessings, they have obtained; although it is not easy for everything to turn out in the case of a mortal in this life according to his wishes. By bearing too their misfortunes like men, they will be thought to be in reality the parents of manly children, and to be such themselves; whereas by giving way they will raise a suspicion that they are none of ours, or that the persons who praise us are telling an untruth; neither of which things ought to be; but they ought rather to be themselves our eulogizers, exhibiting by their acts themselves as seeming to be in reality the fathers, men of men. For the old proverb, “Nothing too much,” seems to be well said; and in fact is well said. For by what person so ever all that leads to happiness, or nearly so, is made to depend upon himself, and not upon others, by whose well or ill doing his own acts are compelled to waver, by such a one has the best preparation been made for living well. This is the man of moderation; this the man of courage and prudence; and this is he, who, whether his property and children exist or are destroyed, will best obey

the proverb; for through trusting to himself, he will be seen to indulge neither in joy nor sorrow overmuch. Such men do we hold, and wish, and assert our relatives to be; and such we now exhibit ourselves, by not feeling too much of reluctance, nor too much of fear, should it be needful to die on the instant. We entreat then both our fathers and mothers to pass the remainder of their lives in adopting the very same sentiment; and to be assured that they will gratify us the most by not lamenting and bewailing us; and that if the dead have any feeling for the living, they will be the least agreeable to us by disfiguring themselves and bearing ill their misfortunes, but that they will please us the most by supporting them lightly and with moderation. For our state is about to have an end, which is the most honorable among men; so that it is becoming rather to glorify than to lament it. By acting then as guardians and nurses to our wives and children, and by turning their minds to such employments, they will in the best way become forgetful of their misfortune, and lead a life more honorable and more correct, and more agreeable to us. Such does it suffice to tell our relatives from us. But we would exhort the state to be the guardian of our parents and children, by giving to the youth of the latter a well-regulated education, and to the old age of the former a worthy support; although we are well assured, that even if we did not so exhort, there would be taken a sufficient care.

Such then, ye children and parents of the dead, did they enjoin us to tell you; and I have, with the greatest readiness possible, told you their message. And I do myself beseech some of you to imitate your relatives, and others to feel a confidence in yourselves, that we are all, in our private and public capacities, about to support the old age of some, and to be the guardians of others, wherever each one may meet with any of them. And surely ye know yourselves the carefulness of the state, how that by laying down laws

respecting those who have died in war, it takes charge of their parents and children; and how it has been enjoined upon the magistracy, that is the greatest, to watch over them especially, above all the other citizens, so that the fathers and mothers of such may receive no injury; while it brings up together the children, through its great desire that their orphanhood may be as little conspicuous as possible; since it stands in the place of a father to them, while they are still children; and when they come to man's estate, sends them to their own homes, having first dressed them in a complete suit of armor, thus pointing out and reminding them of the pursuits of their fathers, and giving them the instruments of their fathers' valor; and at the same time, by way of a good omen, bidding them commence their return to the paternal hearth, about to command with strength, as having been decked in arms. The dead too it never fails to honor, by performing each year the established rites for all in common, which have taken place, as is fitting, individually for each; and in addition to this, by appointing games both gymnastic and equestrian, and of all kinds of poetry; and by standing really in the place of an heir and son to the. dead, and in that of a father to children, and in that of a guardian to parents and such-like relatives, it takes upon itself all care of all for all time. Keeping then these things in mind, you ought to bear your calamity more lightly; for thus you will be the most dear to the dead and living, and most ready to give and to receive comfort. And now do you and all the rest, having in common, according to custom, wept fully the dead, depart.

Such, Menexenus, is the speech of Aspasia of Miletus.

Menexenus/ By Zeus, Socrates, you proclaim Aspasia to be a happy person, if, being a woman, she is able to compose such speeches as these.

Socrates/ If you do not credit it, follow me, and you shall hear her speak it herself.

Menexenus/ I have often, Socrates, met with her, and know what kind of woman she is.

Socrates/ What then, do you not admire her, and owe you no thanks to her for this oration?

Menexenus/ I owe indeed, Socrates, many thanks either to her or to him, whoever was the person who told it you; and before all others, to him who has now spoken it.

Socrates/ All will be well; but see that you do not say a word against me, in order that I may hereafter tell you many and beautiful discourses on state affairs.

Menexenus/ Be full of confidence. I will say nothing. Do you only tell them.

Socrates/ So shall it be.

Menexenus.

Translated by Benjamin Jowett.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Menexenus

Socrates/ Whence come you, Menexenus? Are you from the Agora?

Menexenus/ Yes, Socrates, I have been at the Council.

Socrates/ And what might you be doing at the Council? And yet I need hardly ask, for I see that you, believing yourself to have arrived at the end of education and of philosophy, and to have had enough of them, are mounting upward to things higher still, and, though rather young for the post, are intending to govern us elder men, like the rest of your family, which has always provided someone who kindly took care of us.

Menexenus/ Yes, Socrates, I shall be ready to hold office, if you allow and advise that I should, but not if you think otherwise. I went to the Council Chamber because I heard that the Council was about to choose someone who was to speak over the dead. For you know that there is to be a public funeral?

Socrates/ Yes, I know. And whom did they choose?

Menexenus/ No one. They delayed the election until tomorrow, but I believe that either Archinus or Dion will be chosen.

Socrates/ O Menexenus! Death in battle is certainly in many respects a noble thing. The dead man gets a fine and costly funeral, although he may have been poor, and an elaborate speech is made over him by a wise man who has long ago prepared what he has to say, although he who is praised may not have been good for much. The speakers

praise him for what he has done and for what he has not done—that is the beauty of them—and they steal away our souls with their embellished words. In every conceivable form they praise the city, and they praise those who died in war, and all our ancestors who went before us, and they praise ourselves also who are still alive, until I feel quite elevated by their laudations, and I stand listening to their words, Menexenus, and become enchanted by them, and all in a moment I imagine myself to have become a greater and nobler and finer man than I was before. And if, as often happens, there are any foreigners who accompany me to the speech, I become suddenly conscious of having a sort of triumph over them, and they seem to experience a corresponding feeling of admiration at me, and at the greatness of the city, which appears to them, when they are under the influence of the speaker, more wonderful than ever. This consciousness of dignity lasts me more than three days, and not until the fourth or fifth day do I come to my senses and know where I am—in the meantime I have been living in the Islands of the Blessed. Such is the art of our rhetoricians, and in such manner does the sound of their words keep ringing in my ears.

Menexenus/ You are always making fun of the rhetoricians, Socrates. This time, however, I am inclined to think that the speaker who is chosen will not have much to say, for he has been called upon to speak at a moment's notice, and he will be compelled almost to improvise.

Socrates/ But why, my friend, should he not have plenty to say? Every rhetorician has speeches ready-made, nor is there any difficulty in improvising that sort of stuff. Had the orator to praise Athenians among Peloponnesians, or Peloponnesians among Athenians, he must be a good rhetorician who could succeed and gain credit. But there is

no difficulty in a man's winning applause when he is contending for fame among the persons whom he is praising.

Menexenus/ Do you think not, Socrates?

Socrates/ Certainly not.

Menexenus/ Do you think that you could speak yourself if there should be a necessity, and if the Council were to choose you?

Socrates/ That I should be able to speak is no great wonder, Menexenus, considering that I have an excellent mistress in the art of rhetoric—she who has made so many good speakers, and one who was the best among all the Hellenes, Pericles, the son of Xanthippus.

Menexenus/ And who is she? I suppose that you mean Aspasia.

Socrates/ Yes, I do, and besides her I had Connus, the son of Metrobius, as a master, and he was my master in music, as she was in rhetoric. No wonder that a man who has received such an education should be a finished speaker. Even the pupil of very inferior masters—say, for example, one who had learned music of Lamprus and rhetoric of Antiphon the Rhamnusian—might make a figure if he were to praise the Athenians among the Athenians.

Menexenus/ And what would you be able to say if you had to speak?

Socrates/ Of my own wit, most likely nothing, but yesterday I heard Aspasia composing a funeral oration about these very dead. For she had been told, as you were saying, that the Athenians were going to choose a speaker, and she repeated to me the sort of speech which he should deliver—partly improvising and partly from previous thought, putting together fragments of the funeral oration which Pericles spoke, but which, as I believe, she composed.

Menexenus/ And can you remember what Aspasia said?

Socrates/ I ought to be able, for she taught me, and she was ready to strike me because I was always forgetting.

Menexenus: Then why will you not rehearse what she said?

Socrates/ Because I am afraid that my mistress may be angry with me if I publish her speech.

Menexenus/ Nay, Socrates, let us have the speech, whether Aspasia's or anyone else's, no matter. I hope that you will oblige me.

Socrates/ But I am afraid that you will laugh at me if I continue the games of youth in old age.

Menexenus/ Far otherwise, Socrates. Let us by all means have the speech.

Socrates/ Truly I have such a disposition to oblige you that if you bid me dance naked I should not like to refuse, since we are alone. Listen then. If I remember rightly, she began as follows, with the mention of the dead.

There is a tribute of deeds and of words. The departed have already had the first, when going forth on their destined journey they were attended on their way by the state and by their friends; the tribute of words remains to be given to them, as is meet and by law ordained. For noble words are a memorial and a crown of noble actions, which are given to the doers of them by the hearers. A word is needed which will duly praise the dead and gently admonish the living, exhorting the brethren and descendants of the departed to imitate their virtue, and consoling their fathers and mothers and the survivors, if any, who may chance to be alive of the previous generation. What sort of a word will this be, and how shall we rightly begin the praises of these brave men? In their life they rejoiced their own friends with their valor, and their death they gave in exchange for the salvation of the living. And I think that we should praise them in the

order in which nature made them good, for they were good because they were sprung from good fathers. Wherefore let us first of all praise the goodness of their birth, secondly, their nurture and education, and then let us set forth how noble their actions were, and how worthy of the education which they had received.

And first as to their birth. Their ancestors were not strangers, nor are these their descendants sojourners only, whose fathers have come from another country, but they are the children of the soil, dwelling and living in their own land. And the country which brought them up is not like other countries, a stepmother to her children, but their own true mother; she bore them and nourished them and received them, and in her bosom they now repose. It is meet and right, therefore, that we should begin by praising the land which is their mother, and that will be a way of praising their noble birth.

The country is worthy to be praised, not only by us, but by all mankind—first, and above all, as being dear to the gods. This is proved by the strife and contention of the gods respecting her. And ought not the country which the gods praise to be praised by all mankind? The second praise which may be fairly claimed by her is that at the time when the whole earth was sending forth and creating diverse animals, tame and wild, she our mother was free and pure from savage monsters, and out of all animals selected and brought forth man, who is superior to the rest in understanding, and alone has justice and religion. And a great proof that she brought forth the common ancestors of us and of the departed is that she provided the means of support for her offspring. For as a woman proves her motherhood by giving milk to her young ones—and she who has no fountain of milk is not a mother—so did this our land prove that she was the mother of men, for in those days she

alone and first of all brought forth wheat and barley for human food, which is the best and noblest sustenance for man, whom she regarded as her true offspring. And these are truer proofs of motherhood in a country than in a woman, for the woman in her conception and generation is but the imitation of the earth, and not the earth of the woman. And of the fruit of the earth she gave a plenteous supply, not only to her own, but to others also, and afterward she made the olive to spring up to be a boon to her children, and to help them in their toils. And when she had herself nursed them and brought them up to manhood, she gave them gods to be their rulers and teachers, whose names are well known, and need not now be repeated. They are the gods who ordered our lives, and instructed us, first of all men, in the arts for the supply of our daily needs, and taught us the acquisition and use of arms for the defense of the country.

Thus born into the world and thus educated, the ancestors of the departed lived and made themselves a government, which I ought briefly to commemorate. For government is the nurture of man, and the government of good men is good, and of bad men bad. And I must show that our ancestors were trained under a good government, and for this reason they were good, and our contemporaries are also good, among whom our departed friends are to be reckoned. Then as now, and indeed always, from that time to this, speaking generally, our government was an aristocracy—a form of government which receives various names, according to the fancies of men, and is sometimes called democracy, but is really an aristocracy or government of the best which has the approval of the many. For kings we have always had, first hereditary and then elected, and authority is mostly in the hands of the people, who dispense offices and power to those who appear to be most deserving

of them. Neither is a man rejected from weakness or poverty or obscurity of origin, nor honored by reason of the opposite, as in other states, but there is one principle—he who appears to be wise and good is a governor and ruler. The basis of this our government is equality of birth, for other states are made up of all sorts and unequal conditions of men, and therefore their governments are unequal—there are tyrannies and there are oligarchies, in which the one party are slaves and the others masters. But we and our citizens are brethren, the children all of one mother, and we do not think it right to be one another's masters or servants, but the natural equality of birth compels us to seek for legal equality, and to recognize no superiority except in the reputation of virtue and wisdom.

And so their and our fathers, and these, too, our brethren, being nobly born and having been brought up in all freedom, did both in their public and private capacity many noble deeds famous over the whole world. They were the deeds of men who thought that they ought to fight both against Hellenes for the sake of Hellenes on behalf of freedom, and against barbarians in the common interest of Hellas. Time would fail me to tell of their defense of their country against the invasion of Eumolpus and the Amazons, or of their defense of the Argives against the Cadmeans, or of the Heraclidae against the Argives. Besides, the poets have already declared in song to all mankind their glory, and therefore any commemoration of their deeds in prose which we might attempt would hold a second place. They already have their reward, and I say no more of them, but there are other worthy deeds of which no poet has worthily sung, and which are still wooing the poet's Muse. Of these I am bound to make honorable mention, and shall invoke others to sing of them also in lyric and other strains, in a manner becoming the actors.

And first I will tell how the Persians, lords of Asia, were enslaving Europe, and how the children of this land, who were our fathers, held them back. Of these I will speak first, and praise their valor, as is meet and fitting. He who would rightly estimate them should place himself in thought at that time, when the whole of Asia was subject to the third king of Persia. The first king, Cyrus, by his valor freed the Persians, who were his countrymen, and subjected the Medes, who were their lords, and he ruled over the rest of Asia, as far as Egypt. And after him came his son, who ruled all the accessible part of Egypt and Libya. The third king was Darius, who extended the land boundaries of the empire to Scythia, and with his fleet held the sea and the islands. None presumed to be his equal; the minds of all men were enthralled by him—so many and mighty and warlike nations had the power of Persia subdued.

Now Darius had a quarrel against us and the Eretrians, because, as he said, we had conspired against Sardis, and he sent half a million men in transports and vessels of war, and three hundred ships, and Datis as commander, telling him to bring the Eretrians and Athenians to the king, if he wished to keep his head on his shoulders. He sailed against the Eretrians, who were reputed to be among the noblest and most warlike of the Hellenes of that day, and they were numerous, but he conquered them all in three days. And when he had conquered them, in order that no one might escape, he searched the whole country after this manner. His soldiers, coming to the borders of Eretria and spreading from sea to sea, joined hands and passed through the whole country, in order that they might be able to tell the king that no one had escaped them. And from Eretria they went to Marathon with a like intention, expecting to bind the Athenians in the same yoke of necessity in which they had bound the Eretrians.

Having effected one half of their purpose, they were in the act of attempting the other, and none of the Hellenes dared to assist either the Eretrians or the Athenians, except the Lacedaemonians, and they arrived a day too late for the battle, but the rest were panic-stricken and kept quiet, too happy in having escaped for a time. He who has present to his mind that conflict will know what manner of men they were who received the onset of the barbarians at Marathon, and chastened the pride of the whole of Asia, and by the victory which they gained over the barbarians first taught other men that the power of the Persians was not invincible, but that hosts of men and the multitude of riches alike yield to valor. And I assert that those men are the fathers not only of ourselves, but of our liberties and of the liberties of all who are on the continent, for that was the action to which the Hellenes looked back when they ventured to fight for their own safety in the battles which ensued—they became disciples of the men of Marathon.

To them, therefore, I assign in my speech the first place, and the second to those who fought and conquered in the sea fights at Salamis and Artemisium, for of them, too, one might have many things to say—of the assaults which they endured by sea and land, and how they repelled them. I will mention only that act of theirs which appears to me to be the noblest, and which followed that of Marathon and came nearest to it. For the men of Marathon only showed the Hellenes that it was possible to ward off the barbarians by land, the many by the few, but there was no proof that they could be defeated by ships, and at sea the Persians retained the reputation of being invincible in numbers and wealth and skill and strength. This is the glory of the men who fought at sea, that they dispelled the second terror which had hitherto possessed the Hellenes, and so made the fear of numbers, whether of ships or men, to cease among them.

And so the soldiers of Marathon and the sailors of Salamis became the schoolmasters of Hellas—the one teaching and habituating the Hellenes not to fear the barbarians at sea, and the others not to fear them by land.

Third in order, for the number and valor of the combatants, and third in the salvation of Hellas, I place the Battle of Plataea. And now the Lacedaemonians as well as the Athenians took part in the struggle. They were all united in this greatest and most terrible conflict of all, wherefore their virtues will be celebrated in times to come, as they are now celebrated by us. But at a later period many Hellenic tribes were still on the side of the barbarians, and there was a report that the Great King was going to make a new attempt upon the Hellenes, and therefore justice requires that we should also make mention of those who crowned the previous work of our salvation, and drove and purged away all barbarians from the sea. These were the men who fought by sea at the river Eurymedon, and who went on the expedition to Cyprus, and who sailed to Egypt and diverse other places, and they should be gratefully remembered by us, because they compelled the king in fear for himself to look to his own safety instead of plotting the destruction of Hellas.

And so the war against the barbarians was fought out to the end by the whole city on their own behalf, and on behalf of their countrymen. There was peace, and our city was held in honor. And then, as prosperity makes men jealous, there succeeded a jealousy of her, and jealousy begot envy, and so she became engaged against her will in a war with the Hellenes. On the breaking out of war, our citizens met the Lacedaemonians at Tanagra, and fought for the freedom of the Boeotians; the issue was doubtful, and was decided by the engagement which followed. For when the Lacedaemonians had gone on their way, leaving the

Boeotians, whom they were aiding, on the third day after the Battle of Tanagra, our countrymen conquered at Oenophyta, and righteously restored those who had been unrighteously exiled. And they were the first after the Persian War who fought on behalf of liberty in aid of Hellenes against Hellenes. They were brave men, and freed those whom they aided, and were the first too who were honorably interred in this sepulcher by the state.

Afterward there was a mighty war, in which all the Hellenes joined, and devastated our country, which was very ungrateful of them. And our countrymen, after defeating them in a naval engagement and taking their leaders, the Spartans, at Sphagia, when they might have destroyed them, spared their lives, and gave them back, and made peace, considering that they should war with their fellow countrymen only until they gained a victory over them, and not because of the private anger of the state destroy the common interest of Hellas—but that with barbarians they should war to the death. Worthy of praise are they also who waged this war, and are here interred, for they proved, if anyone doubted the superior prowess of the Athenians in the former war with the barbarians, that their doubts had no foundation—showing by their victory in the civil war with Hellas, in which they subdued the other chief state of the Hellenes, that they could conquer single-handed those with whom they had been allied in the war against the barbarians.

After the peace there followed a third war, which was of a terrible and desperate nature, and in this many brave men who are here interred lost their lives—many of them had won victories in Sicily, whither they had gone over the seas to fight for the liberties of the Leontines, to whom they were bound by oaths, but owing to the distance the city was unable to help them, and they lost heart and came to

misfortune, their very enemies and opponents winning more renown for valor and temperance than the friends of others. Many also fell in naval engagements at the Hellespont, after having in one day taken all the ships of the enemy, and defeated them in other naval engagements. And what I call the terrible and desperate nature of the war is that the other Hellenes, in their extreme animosity toward the city, should have entered into negotiations with their bitterest enemy, the king of Persia, whom they, together with us, had expelled—him, without us, they again brought back, barbarian against Hellenes, and all the hosts, both of Hellenes and barbarians, were united against Athens. And then shone forth the power and valor of our city. Her enemies had supposed that she was exhausted by the war. and our ships were blockaded at Mytilene. But the citizens themselves embarked, and came to the rescue with sixty other ships, and their valor was confessed of all men, for they conquered their enemies and delivered their friends. And yet by some evil fortune they were left to perish at sea, and therefore are not interred here. Ever to be remembered and honored are they, for by their valor not only that sea fight was won for us, but the entire war was decided by them, and through them the city gained the reputation of being invincible, even though attacked by all mankind. And that reputation was a true one, for the defeat which came upon us was our own doing. We were never conquered by others, and to this day we are still unconquered by them, but we were our own conquerors, and received defeat at our own hands.

Afterward there was quiet and peace abroad, but there sprang up war at home, and if men are destined to have civil war, no one could have desired that his city should take the disorder in a milder form. How joyful and natural was the reconciliation of those who came from the Piraeus and those

who came from the city. With what moderation did they order the war against the tyrants in Eleusis, and in a manner how unlike what the other Hellenes expected! And the reason of this gentleness was the veritable tie of blood, which created among them a friendship as of kinsmen, faithful not in word only, but in deed. And we ought also to remember those who then fell by one another's hands, and on such occasions as these to reconcile them with sacrifices and prayers, praying to those who have power over them, that they may be reconciled even as we are reconciled. For they did not attack one another out of malice or enmity, but they were unfortunate. And that such was the fact we ourselves are witnesses, who are of the same race with them, and have mutually received and granted forgiveness of what we have done and suffered.

After this there was perfect peace, and the city had rest. And her feeling was that she forgave the barbarians, who had severely suffered at her hands and severely retaliated, but that she was indignant at the ingratitude of the Hellenes, when she remembered how they had received good from her and returned evil, having made common cause with the barbarians, depriving her of the ships which had once been their salvation, and dismantling our walls, which had preserved their own from falling. She thought that she would no longer defend the Hellenes, when enslaved either by one another or by the barbarians, and did accordingly. This was our feeling, while the Lacedaemonians were thinking that we who were the champions of liberty had fallen, and that their business was to subject the remaining Hellenes. And why should I say more? For the events of which I am speaking happened not long ago and we can all of us remember how the chief peoples of Hellas, Argives and Boeotians and Corinthians, came to feel the need of us, and, what is the greatest miracle of all, the Persian king himself was driven

to such extremity as to come round to the opinion, that from this city, of which he was the destroyer, and from no other, his salvation would proceed.

And if a person desired to bring a deserved accusation against our city, he would find only one charge which he could justly urge—that she was too compassionate and too favorable to the weaker side. And in this instance she was not able to hold out or keep her resolution of refusing aid to her injurers when they were being enslaved, but she was softened, and did in fact send out aid, and delivered the Hellenes from slavery, and they were free until they afterward enslaved themselves, whereas to the Great King she refused to give the assistance of the state, for she could not forget the trophies of Marathon and Salamis and Plataea, but she allowed exiles and volunteers to assist him, and they were his salvation. And she herself, when she was compelled, entered into the war, and built walls and ships, and fought with the Lacedaemonians on behalf of the Parians. Now the king fearing this city and wanting to stand aloof, when he saw the Lacedaemonians growing weary of the war at sea, asked of us, as the price of his alliance with us and the other allies, to give up the Hellenes in Asia, whom the Lacedaemonians had previously handed over to him—he thinking that we should refuse, and that then he might have a pretense for withdrawing from us. About the other allies he was mistaken, for the Corinthians and Argives and Boeotians, and the other states, were quite willing to let them go, and swore and covenanted that, if he would pay them money, they would make over to him the Hellenes of the continent, and we alone refused to give them up and swear. Such was the natural nobility of this city, so sound and healthy was the spirit of freedom among us, and the instinctive dislike of the barbarian, because we are pure Hellenes, having no admixture of barbarism in us. For we

are not like many others, descendants of Pelops or Cadmus or Aegyptus or Danaus, who are by nature barbarians, and yet pass for Hellenes, and dwell in the midst of us, but we are pure Hellenes, uncontaminated by any foreign element, and therefore the hatred of the foreigner has passed unadulterated into the lifeblood of the city. And so, notwithstanding our noble sentiments, we were again isolated, because we were unwilling to be guilty of the base and unholy act of giving up Hellenes to barbarians. And we were in the same case as when we were subdued before, but, by the favor of heaven, we managed better, for we ended the war without the loss of our ships or walls or colonies; the enemy was only too glad to be quit of us. Yet in this war we lost many brave men, such as were those who fell owing to the ruggedness of the ground at the Battle of Corinth, or by treason at Lechaeum. Brave men, too, were those who delivered the Persian king, and drove the Lacedaemonians from the sea. I remind you of them, and you must celebrate them together with me, and do honor to their memories. Such were the actions of the men who are here interred, and of others who have died on behalf of their country; many and glorious things I have spoken of them, and there are yet many more, and more glorious, things remaining to be told—many days and nights would not suffice to tell of them. Let them not be forgotten, and let every man remind their descendants that they also are soldiers who must not desert the ranks of their ancestors, or from cowardice fall behind. Even so I exhort you this day, and in all future time, whenever I meet with any of you, shall continue to remind and exhort you, O ye sons of heroes, that you strive to be the bravest of men. And I think that I ought now to repeat what your fathers desired to have said to you who are their survivors, when they went out to battle, in case anything happened to them. I will tell you what I heard them say, and

what, if they had only speech, they would fain be saying, judging from what they then said. And you must imagine that you hear them saying what I now repeat to you.

Sons, the event proves that your fathers were brave men, for we might have lived dishonorably, but have preferred to die honorably rather than bring you and your children into disgrace, and rather than dishonor our own fathers and forefathers—considering that life is not life to one who is a dishonor to his race, and that to such a one neither men nor gods are friendly, either while he is on the earth or after death in the world below. Remember our words, then, and whatever is your aim let virtue be the condition of the attainment of your aim, and know that without this all possessions and pursuits are dishonorable and evil. For neither does wealth bring honor to the owner, if he be a coward; of such a one the wealth belongs to another, and not to himself. Nor do beauty and strength of body, when dwelling in a base and cowardly man, appear comely, but the reverse of comely, making the possessor more conspicuous, and manifesting forth his cowardice. And all knowledge, when separated from justice and virtue, is seen to be cunning and not wisdom; wherefore make this your first and last and constant and all-absorbing aim—to exceed, if possible, not only us but all your ancestors in virtue, and know that to excel you in virtue only brings us shame, but that to be excelled by you is a source of happiness to us. And we shall most likely be defeated, and you will most likely be victors in the contest, if you learn so to order your lives as not to abuse or waste the reputation of your ancestors, knowing that to a man who has any self-respect, nothing is more dishonorable than to be honored, not for his own sake, but on account of the reputation of his ancestors. The honor of parents is a fair and noble treasure to their posterity, but to have the use of a treasure of wealth

and honor, and to leave none to your successors, because you have neither money nor reputation of your own, is alike base and dishonorable. And if you follow our precepts you will be received by us as friends, when the hour of destiny brings you hither, but if you neglect our words and are disgraced in your lives, no one will welcome or receive you. This is the message which is to be delivered to our children.

Some of us have fathers and mothers still living, and we would urge them, if, as is likely, we shall die, to bear the calamity as lightly as possible, and not to condole with one another, for they have sorrows enough, and will not need anyone to stir them up. While we gently heal their wounds, let us remind them that the gods have heard the chief part of their prayers, for they prayed, not that their children might live forever, but that they might be brave and renowned. And this, which is the greatest good, they have attained. A mortal man cannot expect to have everything in his own life turning out according to his will, and they, if they bear their misfortunes bravely, will be truly deemed brave fathers of the brave. But if they give way to their sorrows, either they will be suspected of not being our parents, or we of not being such as our panegyrists declare. Let not either of the two alternatives happen, but rather let them be our chief and true panegyrists, who show in their lives that they are true men, and had men for their sons. Of old the saying, 'Nothing too much,' appeared to be, and really was, well said. For he whose happiness rests with himself, if possible, wholly, and if not, as far as possible, who is not hanging in suspense on other men, or changing with the vicissitude of their fortune, has his life ordered for the best. He is the temperate and valiant and wise, and when his riches come and go, when his children are given and taken away, he will remember the proverb, 'Neither rejoicing overmuch nor grieving overmuch,' for he relies upon himself.

And such we would have our parents to be—that is our word and wish, and as such we now offer ourselves, neither lamenting overmuch, nor fearing overmuch, if we are to die at this time. And we entreat our fathers and mothers to retain these feelings throughout their future life, and to be assured that they will not please us by sorrowing and lamenting over us. But, if the dead have any knowledge of the living, they will displease us most by making themselves miserable and by taking their misfortunes too much to heart, and they will please us best if they bear their loss lightly and temperately. For our life will have the noblest end which is vouchsafed to man, and should be glorified rather than lamented. And if they will direct their minds to the care and nurture of our wives and children, they will soonest forget their misfortunes, and live in a better and nobler way, and be dearer to us.

This is all that we have to say to our families, and to the state we would say, Take care of our parents and of our sons—let her worthily cherish the old age of our parents, and bring up our sons in the right way. But we know that she will of her own accord take care of them, and does not need any exhortation of ours.

This, O ye children and parents of the dead, is the message which they bid us deliver to you, and which I do deliver with the utmost seriousness. And in their name I beseech you, the children, to imitate your fathers, and you, parents, to be of good cheer about yourselves, for we will nourish your age, and take care of you both publicly and privately in any place in which one of us may meet one of you who are the parents of the dead. And the care of you which the city shows, you know yourselves, for she has made provision by law concerning the parents and children of those who die in war; the highest authority is specially entrusted with the duty of watching over them above all

other citizens, and they will see that the fathers and mothers have no wrong done to them. The city herself shares in the education of the children, desiring as far as it is possible that their orphanhood may not be felt by them. While they are children she is a parent to them, and when they have arrived at man's estate she sends them to their several duties, in full armor clad; and bringing freshly to their minds the ways of their fathers, she places in their hands the instruments of their fathers' virtues. For the sake of the omen, she would have them from the first begin to rule over their own houses arrayed in the strength and arms of their fathers. And as for the dead, she never ceases honoring them, celebrating, in common for all, rites which become the property of each, and in addition to this, holding gymnastic and equestrian contests, and musical festivals of every sort. She is to the dead in the place of a son and heir, and to their sons in the place of a father, and to their parents and elder kindred in the place of a guardian—ever and always caring for them. Considering this, you ought to bear your calamity the more gently, for thus you will be most endeared to the dead and to the living, and your sorrows will heal and be healed. And now do you and all, having lamented the dead in common according to the law, go your ways.

You have heard, Menexenus, the oration of Aspasia the Milesian.

Menexenus/ Truly, Socrates, I marvel that Aspasia, who is only a woman, should be able to compose such a speech—she must be a rare one.

Socrates/ Well, if you are incredulous, you may come with me and hear her.

Menexenus/ I have often met Aspasia, Socrates, and know what she is like.

Socrates/ Well, and do you not admire her, and are you not grateful for her speech?

Menexenus/ Yes, Socrates, I am very grateful to her or to him who told you, and still more to you who have told me.

Socrates/ Very good. But you must take care not to tell of me, and then at some future time I will repeat to you many other excellent political speeches of hers.

Menexenus/ Fear not. Only let me hear them, and I will keep the secret.

Socrates/ Then I will keep my promise.

Menexenus

Translated by Paul Ryan.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Menexenus

Socrates/ Where is Menexenus coming from? The market place?

Menexenus/ Yes, Socrates—the Council Chamber, to be exact.

Socrates/ You at the Council Chamber? Why? I know—you fancy that you're finished with your schooling and with philosophy, and intend to turn to higher pursuits. You think you're ready for them now. At your age, my prodigy, you're undertaking to govern us older men, so that your family may carry on with its tradition of providing someone to look after us.

Menexenus/ Socrates, with your permission and approval I'll gladly hold public office; otherwise I won't. Today, however, I went to the Chamber because I heard that the Council was going to select someone to speak over our war-dead. They are about to see to the public funeral, you know.

Socrates/ Certainly I do. Whom did they choose?

Menexenus/ Nobody. They put if off until tomorrow. But I think Archinus or Dion will be chosen.

Socrates/ Indeed, dying in war looks like a splendid fate in many ways, Menexenus. Even if he dies a pauper, a man gets a really magnificent funeral, and even if he was of little account, he gets a eulogy too from the lips of experts, who speak not extempore but in speeches worked up long beforehand. They do their praising so splendidly that they cast a spell over our souls, attributing to each individual man, with the most varied and beautiful verbal embellishments, both

praise he merits and praise he does not, extolling the city in every way, and praising the war-dead, all our ancestors before us, and us ourselves, the living. The result is, Menexenus, that I am put into an exalted frame of mind when I am praised by them. Each time, as I listen and fall under their spell, I become a different man—I'm convinced that I have become taller and nobler and better looking all of a sudden. It often happens, too, that all of a sudden I inspire greater awe in the friends from other cities who tag along and listen with me every year. For they are affected in their view of me and the rest of the city just as I am: won over by the speaker, they think the city more wonderful than they thought it before. And this high-and-mighty feeling remains with me more than three days. The speaker's words and the sound of his voice sink into my ears with so much resonance that it is only with difficulty that on the third or fourth day I recover myself and realize where I am. Until then I could imagine that I dwell in the Islands of the Blessed. That's how clever our orators are.

Menexenus/ You're forever making fun of the orators, Socrates. This time, though, I don't think that the one who's chosen is going to have an easy time of it; the selection is being made at the last minute, so perhaps the speaker will be forced practically to make his speech up as he goes.

Socrates/ Nonsense, my good man. Every one of those fellows has speeches ready-made, and, besides, even making up this kind of speech as you go isn't hard. Now if he were obliged to speak well of the Athenians among the Peloponnesians or the Peloponnesians among the Athenians, only a good orator could be persuasive and do himself credit; but when you're performing before the very people you're praising, being thought to speak well is no great feat.

Menexenus/ You think not, Socrates?

Socrates/ No, by Zeus, it isn't.

Menexenus/ Do you think that you could deliver the speech, if that were called for, and the Council were to choose you?

Socrates/ In fact, Menexenus, there would be nothing surprising in my being able to deliver it. I happen to have no mean teacher of oratory. She is the very woman who has produced—along with a multitude of other good ones—the one outstanding orator among the Greeks, Pericles, son of Xanthippus.

Menexenus/ What woman is that? But obviously you mean Aspasia?

Socrates/ Yes, I do—her and Connus, son of Metrobius. These are my two teachers, he of music, she of oratory. Surely it's no surprise if a man with an upbringing like that is skilled in speaking! But even someone less well educated than I—a man who learned music from Lamprus and oratory from Antiphon the Rhamnusian—even he, despite these disadvantages, could do himself credit praising Athenians among Athenians.

Menexenus/ And what would you have to say if the speech were yours to make?

Socrates/ On my own, very likely nothing; but just yesterday in my lesson I heard Aspasia declaim a whole funeral oration on these same dead. For she heard that the Athenians, just as you say, were about to choose someone to speak. Thereupon she went through for me what the speaker ought to say, in part out of her head, in part by pasting together some bits and pieces thought up before, at the time when she was composing the funeral oration which Pericles delivered, as, in my opinion, she did.

Menexenus/ And can you remember what Aspasia said?

Socrates/ I think I can. Certainly I was taught it by the lady herself—and I narrowly escaped a beating every time my memory failed me.

Menexenus/ So why don't you go ahead and repeat it?

Socrates/ I'm afraid my teacher will be angry with me if I divulge her speech.

Menexenus/ Have no fear, Socrates. Speak. I shall be very grateful, whether you're pleased to recite Aspasia's speech or whosever it is. Only speak.

Socrates/ But perhaps you will laugh at me if I seem to you, old as I am, to go on playing like a child.

Menexenus/ Not at all, Socrates. In any case, just speak the speech.

Socrates/ Well, certainly you're a man I'm so bound to gratify that I would even be inclined to do so if you asked me to take off my clothes and dance—especially since we are alone. All right, listen. To begin with she spoke, I think, on the dead themselves—as follows:

"As for deeds, these men have just received at our hands what they deserve, and with it they are making the inevitable journey, escorted at the outset communally by the city and privately by their families. Now we must render them in words the remaining recognition that the law appoints for them and duty demands. For when deeds have been bravely done, it is through an eloquent speech that remembrance and honor accrue to their doers from the hearers. Clearly, what is required is a speech that will praise the dead as they deserve but also gently admonish the living, urging their sons and brothers to imitate the valor of these men, and consoling their fathers, their mothers and any of their grandparents who may remain alive.

"Well then, what speech on our part would display that effect? Where would it be right for us to begin our praise of

brave men, who in their lives gladdened their families and friends through their valor and by their death purchased safety for their survivors? I think it appropriate to present their praises in an order the same as that in which they became brave—the order of nature: they became brave by being sons of brave fathers. Let us, therefore, extoll first their noble birth, second their rearing and education. After that, let us put on view the deeds they performed, showing that they were noble and worthy of their birth and upbringing.

"The nobility of these men's origin is rooted in that of their ancestors. The latter were not immigrants and did not, by arriving from elsewhere, make these descendants of theirs live as aliens in the land, but made them children of the soil, really dwelling and having their being in their ancestral home, nourished not, as other peoples are, by a stepmother, but by a mother, the land in which they lived. Now they lie in death among the familiar places of her who gave them birth, suckled them, and received them as her own. Surely it is most just to celebrate the mother herself first; in this way the noble birth of these men is celebrated at the same time.

"Our land is indeed worthy of being praised not merely by us but by all of humanity. There are many reasons for that, but the first and greatest is that she has the good fortune to be dear to the gods. The quarrel of the gods who disputed over her and the verdict that settled it bear witness to what we say. How could it not be just for all humankind to praise a land praised by the gods? The second commendation that is due her is that in the age when the whole earth was causing creatures of all kinds—wild animals and domestic livestock—to spring up and thrive, our land showed herself to be barren of savage beasts and pure. Out of all the animals she selected and brought forth the human, the one creature that towers over the others in understanding and alone acknowledges justice and the gods.

"The fact that everything that gives birth is supplied with the food its offspring needs is weighty testimony for this assertion that the earth hereabouts gave birth to these men's ancestors and ours. For by this sign it can be seen clearly whether or not a woman has really given birth: she is foisting off an infant not her own, if she does not have within her the wellsprings of its nourishment. The earth here, our mother, offers precisely this as sufficient testimony that she has brought forth humans. She first and she alone in that olden time bore food fit for humans, wheat and barley, which are the finest and best nourishment for the human race, because she really was the mother of this creature. And such testimonies are to be taken more seriously on earth's behalf than a woman's, inasmuch as earth does not mimic woman in conceiving and generating, but woman earth.

"She was not miserly with this grain; she dispensed it to others too. Later she brought olive oil to birth for her children, succor against toil. And when she had nourished them and brought them to their youthful prime, she introduced the gods to rule and teach them. They (it is fitting to omit their names on an occasion like this: we know them) equipped us for living, by instructing us, earlier than other peoples, in arts for meeting our daily needs, and by teaching us how to obtain and use arms for the defense of the land.

"With the birth and education I have described, the ancestors of these men lived under a polity that they had made for themselves, of which it is right to make brief mention. For a polity molds its people; a goodly one molds good men, the opposite bad. Therefore I must show that our ancestors were molded in a goodly polity, thanks to which both they and the present generation—among them these men who have died—are good men. For the polity was the same then and now, an aristocracy; we are now governed by the best men and, in the main, always have been since that remote

age. One man calls our polity democracy, another some other name that pleases him; in reality, it is government by the best men along with popular consent. We have always had kings; at one time they were hereditary, later elected. Yet in most respects the people have sovereign power in the city; they grant public offices and power to those who are thought best by them at a given time, and no one is excluded because of weakness or poverty or obscurity of birth, nor is anyone granted honors because of the corresponding advantages, as happens in other cities. There is, rather, one standard: he who is thought wise or good exercises power and holds office.

"The reason we have this polity is our equality in birth. The other cities have been put together from people of diverse origin and unequal condition, so that their polities also are unequal—tyrannies and oligarchies. Some of their inhabitants look on the others as slaves, while the latter look on the former as masters. We and our fellows-citizens, all brothers sprung from one mother, do not think it right to be each other's slaves or masters. Equality of birth in the natural order makes us seek equality of rights in the legal and defer to each other only in the name of reputation for goodness and wisdom.

"Because of this splendid polity of ours, the fathers of these men—our fathers—and the men themselves, brought up in complete freedom and well-born as they were, were able to display before all humanity, in both the private and the public spheres, many splendid deeds. They thought that they were obliged to fight on the side of freedom both for Greeks against Greeks and against barbarians for Greece as a whole. My time is too brief to narrate as the matter deserves how they defended their country against Eumolpus and the Amazons and even earlier invaders, or how they defended the Argives against the Cadmeans and the sons of Heracles against the Argives. Besides, poets have already hymned the valorous exploits of the ancients in splendid song and made them

known to all; so if we should try to elaborate the same subjects in prose, we would perhaps finish a clear second.

"I think it best to pass those deeds by for that reason as well as because they already have a reward worthy of them. But in regard to deeds for which no poet has yet received glory worthy of worthy themes, and which remain in virgin state—those I think I ought to mention with praise and woo out of seclusion for others to put into choral odes and poems of other kinds in a manner that befits the men who performed them.

Here are the first among the deeds I mean. When the Persians held dominion over Asia and were trying to enslave Europe, the sons of this land checked them—our fathers, whose valor it is both right and necessary to mention first in praise. Clearly one who is to praise it well must contemplate it after he has, in thought, been transported into that time when the whole of Asia was already subject to a third Persian king. Cyrus, the first of them, when by his keen spirit he liberated his fellow citizens, the Persians, enslaved the Medes, their masters, at the same time and became lord over the rest of Asia as far as Egypt; his son over as much of Egypt and Libya as it was possible to penetrate. Darius, third of the line, with his land forces set the bounds of his sway as far as Scythia, and with his ships gained so much control over the sea and its islands that no one presumed to oppose him. The minds of all humankind were in bondage: so many, such great and warlike, peoples had the realm of Persia enslaved.

"Now Darius denounced us and the Eretrians. On the pretext that we had plotted against Sardis he dispatched five hundred thousand men in transport and combat ships, with three hundred ships of war, and ordered Datis, their commander, to come back with the Athenians and Eretrians in tow if he wanted to keep his head on his shoulders.

“Datis sailed to Eretria, against men who were the most highly esteemed in warfare of the Greeks of that time and were quite numerous besides. He overpowered them in three days. He also scoured their whole country to keep anyone from escaping. This he accomplished in the following way: his soldiers proceeded to the border of Eretria’s territory and posted themselves at intervals from sea to sea; they then joined hands and passed through the entire country, so that they would be able to tell the king that no one had escaped them.

“Datis and his force left Eretria and came ashore at Marathon with the same intention, confident that it would be easy for them to force the Athenians under the same yoke as they had the Eretrians and lead them captive too. Even though the first of these operations had been accomplished and the second was underway, none of the Greeks came to aid either the Eretrians or the Athenians except the Lacedaemonians—and they arrived on the day after the battle. All the others were panic-stricken and lay low, cherishing their momentary safety.

“By being transported into that situation, I say, one might realize just how great the valor really was of those men who withstood the might of the barbarians at Marathon, chastened the arrogance of all Asia, and were first to erect a trophy over the barbarians. They showed the way and taught the rest that Persian power is not invincible and that there is no multitude of men and mass of money that does not give way to valor. I declare that those men were fathers not only of our bodies but of our freedom, ours and that of everyone on this continent. For it was with eyes on that deed that the Greeks dared to risk the battles for their deliverance that followed—pupils of the men who fought at Marathon.

“So the highest rank in honor must be assigned to them by my speech, but the second to the men who fought and won at

sea off Salamis and at Artemisium. For one could give a lengthy account of those men, too—the kind of assaults they withstood on land and sea, and how they fought them off. But I shall mention what I think is their finest achievement: they accomplished the successor to the task accomplished at Marathon. The men there showed the Greeks only that a few of them could fight off many barbarians by land; by sea there was still doubt, and the Persians had a reputation for invincibility because of their numbers, wealth, skill, and strength. This in particular is what merits praise in the men who fought the sea battles of those times: they freed the Greeks from this second terror and made them stop fearing preponderance in ships and men. So it turns out that the other Greeks were educated by both—by those who fought at Marathon and those who took part in the naval battle at Salamis: as pupils of the former by land and the latter by sea, they lost their habit of fearing the barbarians.

"And of the exploits for the deliverance of Greece that at Plataea was, I maintain, the third, both in number and in valor—at last an effort shared by both the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians.

"So all the men in those battles fought off a very great and formidable danger. They are being eulogized for their valor now by us, and will be eulogized in the future by posterity. Afterwards, though, many Greek cities were still subject to the barbarian, and it was reported that the king himself had a new attempt on the Greeks in mind. Therefore, it is right for us to mention those, too, who, by cleansing the sea and driving from it the entire barbarian force, brought to completion what their predecessors had done for our deliverance. These were the men who fought in the naval battle at Eurymedon, those who made the expedition to Cyprus, and those who sailed to Egypt and many other places. They must be mentioned with gratitude, because they instilled

fear in the king and forced him to ponder his own safety rather than plot the destruction of the Greeks.

"Well, this war against the barbarians was endured to the end by the whole city in defense of ourselves and our fellow speakers of Greek. But when peace prevailed and the city was held in honor, there came upon her what people generally inflict on the successful: jealousy and—through jealousy—ill-will. And that involved her, reluctantly, in fighting against Greeks. When war had broken out, the Athenians did battle with the Lacedaemonians at Tanagra for the freedom of the Boeotians, and although the issue of the battle was unclear, the action that followed was decisive. For the Lacedaemonians withdrew and abandoned those whom they had come to aid, but our men were victorious at Oenophyta two days later and justly restored those who were unjustly in exile. They were the first after the Persian War to fight for the freedom of Greeks in the new way—against Greeks; and since they proved to be brave men and liberated those to whose aid they came, they were the first to be buried in this tomb with civic honors.

"Later, when a great war had broken out, and all the Greeks attacked our city, ravaged her land, and made sorry recompense for the services she had done them, our countrymen, who had been victorious over them at sea and had captured their Lacedaemonian leaders on Sphacteria, spared the latter, sent them home, and made peace, even though they could have killed them. They thought that against men of their own race it is right to make war as far as victory rather than bring the common interests of Greece to ruin through resentment against one city, but against the barbarians it is right to make total war. The men who fought in that war and now lie here deserve praise, because they showed that if anyone maintained that in the former war, the one against the barbarians, any other people were braver than the Athenians, that was not true. By prevailing when Greece

was in discord, by getting the better of the foremost among the other Greeks, they showed on this occasion that they could conquer by themselves those with whom they had once conquered the barbarians in a common effort.

"After this peace a third war broke out—a war that defied all expectations and was terrible. Many brave men who died in it lie here. Many fell on Sicilian shores after they had set up a great many trophies in battles for the freedom of the people of Leontini. Bound by oaths, they had sailed to those parts to defend them, but when their city found herself thwarted on account of the length of the voyage and could not reinforce them, they gave out and came to grief. Their enemies, even though they fought on the other side, have more praise for their self-control and valor than have the friends of other men. Many fell, too, in naval battles on the Hellespont, after capturing all the enemy ships in one engagement, and coming off victorious in many others.

"As for my saying that the war was terrible and defied all expectations, what I mean is that the other Greeks arrived at such a pitch of jealous rivalry against our city that they brought themselves to send an embassy to their worst enemy, the king, whom they had as our allies expelled in a common effort, to bring him back on their own, a barbarian against Greeks, and to muster everyone, Greeks and barbarians, against our city.

"And at just that point her strength and valor shone bright. For when her enemies supposed that she was already beaten, and when her ships were blockaded at Mytilene, the citizens themselves embarked and went to the rescue with sixty ships. After they had, as everyone agrees, behaved most heroically in overcoming their enemies and rescuing their friends, they met with undeserved calamity: their dead were not picked up from the sea and do not lie here. We ought to remember and praise those men forever, because by their valor we won not only that

naval engagement, but also the rest of the war. For it was through them that the opinion gained currency that our city could never be defeated in war, not even by all mankind. And that belief was true. We were overcome by our own quarrels, not by other men; by them we remain undefeated to this day, but we conquered ourselves and suffered defeat at our own hands.

"Afterwards, when tranquility reigned and we were at peace with our neighbors, there was civil war among us, fought in such a way that, if people had to engage in internal strife, no one would pray for his city to be stricken in any other. So readily and naturally—so much contrary to the expectations of the other Greeks—did the citizens from the Piraeus and those from the city deal with each other! So moderately did they bring the war against the men at Eleusis to a conclusion!

"And the sole cause for all that was their genuine kinship, which provided them, not in word but in fact, with a firm friendship based on ties of blood. We must also remember those who died at each other's hands in that war and try to reconcile them in ceremonies such as today's by what means we have—prayers and sacrifices—praying to the gods below who have power over them, since we ourselves are reconciled as well. For they did not lay hands on each other through wickedness or enmity, but through misfortune. And we, the living, are witnesses of this ourselves, since we, who are of the same stock, have forgiven each other for what we did and for what we suffered.

"After that we got general peace, and the city enjoyed tranquility. She forgave the barbarians; she had done them harm, and they gave as good as they got. But the Greeks aroused her indignation, because she recalled the thanks they had returned for the good she had done them—by making common cause with the barbarians, stripping her of the ships that had once been their salvation, and dismantling walls

once sacrificed by us to keep theirs from falling. The city formed a policy of no longer protecting Greeks from being enslaved, either by each other or by barbarians, and conducted herself accordingly. So, since this was our policy, the Lacedaemonians, thinking that we, the champions of freedom, had fallen and all they had to do now was enslave the other Greeks, set about that very task.

"And why should I prolong the tale? From here on I wouldn't be speaking of things that happened in the past to former generations. We ourselves know how the foremost among the Greeks—the Argives and the Boeotians and Corinthians—came, in a state of panic, to feel a need for our city, and—wonder of wonders! —even the king reached such a point of perplexity that his deliverance came full circle to arising from nowhere other than this city, which he had kept zealously trying to destroy.

"In fact, if one should wish to lay a just charge against our city, one would rightly blame her only by saying that she is always too compassionate and solicitous of the underdog. And during this time in particular, she was not able to persevere and stick to the policy she had decided on—namely, to aid against enslavement none of the cities that had treated her people unfairly. On the contrary, she relented, came to the rescue, and released the Greeks from slavery by coming to their aid herself, with the result that they remained free until they once more enslaved themselves. On the other hand—out of respect for the trophies at Marathon and Salamis and Plataea—she could not stomach aiding the king in person; but merely by allowing exiles and mercenaries to assist him, she was, by common consent, his salvation. And after she had rebuilt her walls and fleet, she took the war upon herself, when she was forced to do so, and fought with the Lacedaemonians in the Parians' behalf.

“The king came to fear our city, when he saw that the Lacedaemonians were giving up the war at sea. Out of a wish to disengage himself, he demanded, as his price for continuing to fight on our side and that of the other allies, the Greeks on the Asian mainland whom the Lacedaemonians had previously made over to him. He did so because he believed that we would refuse and give him an excuse for disengaging. He was mistaken about the other allies; the Corinthians, the Argives, the Boeotians, and the rest were willing to hand them over to him and made a sworn treaty on terms that if he would give them money, they would hand over the Greeks on the mainland. We alone could not bring ourselves to betray them or swear the oath. That is how firm and sound the high-mindedness and liberality of our city are, how much we are naturally inclined to hate the barbarians, through being purely Greek with no barbarian taint. For people who are barbarians by birth but Greeks by law—offspring of Pelops, Cadmus, Aegyptus, Danaus and many others—do not dwell among us. We dwell apart—Greeks, not semi-barbarians. Consequently, our city is imbued with undiluted hatred of foreignness.

“For all that, we found ourselves once again isolated, because we refused to commit a shameful and sacrilegious deed by betraying Greeks to barbarians. So we arrived in the same circumstances that had led to our defeat before, but this time, with divine help, we managed the war better: we disengaged ourselves while still in possession of our ships, walls, and colonies. That is how glad the enemy, too, were to make peace! But we lost brave men in this war also, victims of rough terrain at Corinth and treason at Lechaeum. Brave, too, were those who extricated the king from his difficulties and banished the Lacedaemonians from the sea. I remind you of those men, and it is fitting for you to praise them with me and do them honor.

“And these, in truth, were the deeds of the men who lie here and of others who have died for Athens. Many fine words have been spoken about them, but those that remain unsaid are a great deal more numerous and finer still; many days and nights would not suffice for one who sets out to complete the enumeration. Therefore we must remember the fallen, and every man, just as in war, must encourage their descendants not to desert the ranks of their ancestors and not to yield to cowardice and fall back. So then, I myself both so encourage you today, sons of brave men, and in the future, whenever I meet any of you, I will remind you and exhort you to do your utmost to be as brave as can be.

“On this occasion, though, it is my duty to repeat the words that our fathers commanded us to report to those left at home every time they were about to put their lives at risk, in case they lost them. I will tell you what I heard from them and what—judging by what they said then—they would gladly say to you now, if only they could. Whatever I report you must imagine you are hearing from them in person. And this is what they said:

“‘Sons, the present circumstance itself reveals that you are sprung from brave fathers. Free to live on ignobly, we prefer to die nobly rather than subject you and your descendants to reproach and bring disgrace on our fathers and all our ancestors. We consider the life of one who has brought disgrace on his own family no life, and we think that no one, human being or god, is his friend, either on the earth or beneath it after his death.

“‘Therefore, you must remember what we say and do whatever you do to the accompaniment of valor, knowing that without it all possessions and all ways of life are shameful and base. For neither does wealth confer distinction on one who possesses it with cowardice (the riches of a man like that belong to another, not himself) nor do bodily beauty and

strength, when they reside in a worthless and cowardly man, seem to suit him. On the contrary, they seem out of character; they show up the one who has them for what he is and reveal his cowardice. Moreover, all knowledge cut off from rectitude and the rest of virtue has the look of low cunning, not wisdom.

"Tor these reasons, make it your business from beginning to end to do your absolute utmost always in every way to surpass us and our ancestors in glory. If you do not, be sure that if we excel you in valor, our victory, as we see it, brings us shame, but if we are excelled by you, our defeat brings happiness. And the surest way to bring about our defeat and your victory would be if you would prepare yourselves not to abuse and waste the good repute of your ancestors, because you are aware that for a man with self-respect nothing is more disgraceful than to make himself honored not through himself, but through his ancestors' glory. Honors that come from ancestors are a noble and magnificent treasure for their descendants, but it is shameful and unmanly to enjoy the use of a treasure of wealth and honors and fail to hand it on to the following generation because of a lack of acquisitions and public recognition on one's own part. And if you will live as we advise you to live, you will come to us as friends to friends, when your destiny conveys you here; but if you have neglected our advice and behaved as cowards, no one will welcome you. So ends what is to be reported to our sons.

"'And as for those of our fathers and mothers who still live, one ought ceaselessly to encourage them to bear the sorrow, should it fall to their lot, as easily as they can, instead of joining them in lamentations. For they will stand in no need of a stimulus for grief; the misfortune that has befallen them will be enough to provide that. A better course is to try to heal and soothe them, by reminding them that the gods have answered their most earnest prayers. For they prayed for their sons to live not forever, but bravely and gloriously. And that—

the greatest of boons—is what they received. It is not easy for a mortal to have everything in his life turn out as he would have it.

"'If they bear their sorrows courageously, they will seem to be really fathers of courageous sons—and just as courageous themselves; but if they succumb to grief, they will provide grounds for suspicion that either they are not our fathers or the people who praise us are mistaken. Neither of these must happen. On the contrary, they above all must be our encomiasts in action, by showing themselves to be true men, with the look of truly being the fathers of true men. Nothing too much has long been thought an excellent adage—because it is, in truth, excellent. For that man's life is best arranged for whom all, or nearly all, the things that promote happiness depend on himself. Such a man does not hang from other men and necessarily rise or fall in fortune as they fare well or badly; he is the temperate, he is the brave and wise man. He above all, when wealth and children come and when they go, will pay heed to the adage: because he relies on himself, he will be seen neither to rejoice nor to grieve too much.

"That is the sort of men we expect our fathers to be, the sort we wish them to be, and the sort we say they are. It is, moreover, how we now comport ourselves—neither too much vexed nor too fearful if the time of our death is upon us. And we beg our fathers and mothers to pass the rest of their lives with these same sentiments. We want them to know that they will give us no special pleasure by singing dirges and wailing over us. On the contrary, if there is among the dead any perception of the living, that is how they would most displease us—by doing themselves injuries and bearing their sorrows heavily. They would please us most by bearing them lightly and with moderation. By that time our lives will have come to the conclusion that is noblest for human beings, so that it is more fitting to celebrate them than to lament them. But by

caring for our wives and children and nourishing them, and by turning their minds to the concerns of the living, they would most readily forget their troubles and live more nobly, more uprightly, and more in harmony with our wishes.

"That is enough to report from us to our parents. As for the city—we would exhort her to care for our parents and children, educating the latter decently and cherishing the former in their old age as they deserve, if we did not, in fact, know that she will care for them well enough with no exhortation from us.'

"Children and parents, the dead commanded me to report those words, and I report them with all my heart. And on my own part, in these men's name I beg their sons to imitate them, and I beg their fathers to be confident about themselves, knowing that we will, as individuals and as a community, cherish you in your old age and care for you, anywhere anyone of us comes upon anyone of you. No doubt you yourselves are aware of the concern shown by the city: she has made laws relating to the families of men who have died in war, and she takes care of their children and parents. More than in the case of other citizens, it is the official duty of the highest magistracy to see to it that their fathers and mothers are protected from injustice. The city herself assists in bringing up their children, eager to keep their orphaned condition as hidden from them as it can be. She assumes the role of father to them while they are still children. When they attain manhood, she decks each of them out in hoplite's armor and sends him out on his life's business, showing him and reminding him of his father's pursuits, by giving him the tools of his father's valor and, at the same time, allowing him, for the sake of the omen, to go for the first time to his ancestral hearth, there to rule in might, arrayed in arms.

"The dead themselves she never fails to honor: every year she herself celebrates for all publicly the rites that are

celebrated for each in private, and in addition she holds contests in athletic prowess and horsemanship and in music and poetry of every kind. Quite simply, for the dead she stands as son and heir, for their sons as a father, for their parents as a guardian; she takes complete and perpetual responsibility for all of them.

"With this in mind, you ought to bear your sorrow more patiently; in that way you would best please both the dead and the living and would most easily heal and be healed. And now that you and all the others have, according to the custom, publicly lamented the dead, take your departure."

There you have it, Menexenus—the speech of Aspasia of Miletus.

Menexenus/ By Zeus, Socrates, your Aspasia is indeed lucky if, woman though she be, she can compose speeches like that one.

Socrates/ If you doubt it, come to class with me and hear her speak.

Menexenus/ I have often talked with Aspasia, and I know what she is like, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well then, don't you admire her and aren't you grateful to her for her speech now?

Menexenus/ Yes, Socrates, I'm very grateful for that speech—to her or whoever it was who recited it to you. Furthermore, I'm grateful to him who recited it to me, for that and many other favors besides.

Socrates/ Very well, but make sure you don't give me away, so that I may report to you many fine, statesmanlike speeches from her in the future.

Menexenus/ Don't worry. I won't. Just be sure to report them.

Socrates/ Yes, I'll be sure to.

The Menexenus.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and Menexenus.

Socrates/ From the Forum, Menexenus? Or whence come you?

Menexenus/ From the Forum, Socrates, and from the Senate-house.

Socrates/ What particular business called you to the Senate-house? Is it that you think yourself, O wonderful young man, arrived at the summit of learning and philosophy, and as being every way sufficiently qualified, you are purposing to turn yourself to affairs of greater importance; and that we may never want a supply of magistrates out of your family, you yourself are thinking, young as you are, of governing us old fellows.

Menexenus/ Indeed, Socrates, I should most readily entertain such an ambition, encouraged by your permission and advice; but otherwise, I would by no means think of it. The occasion of my going to the Senate-house today was the having heard that they intended to make choice of the orator who is to speak the funeral oration in praise of the dead. For you know they are now preparing to celebrate their obsequies.

Socrates/ Entirely so. But whom have they chosen?

Menexenus/ No one as yet. They have deferred that consideration till tomorrow: but I think that either Dion or Archinus will be appointed.

Socrates/ Sure, Menexenus, it must needs be a fine thing for a man to die in battle; for be he ever so poor and in considerable, he will have the good fortune at least to be

buried with splendor and magnificence, and to have his praises set forth by wise and ingenious men; not in crude and extemporary panegyrics, but in discourses well considered and prepared for a long time before. And indeed so magnificent, so copious, and even exuberant upon every topic, and so beautifully variegated with fine names and words are the panegyrics which our orators give us upon these occasions, that they as it were bewitch our souls; and what with the encomiums which they so plentifully pour out upon the city, upon those who have at any time died in battle, upon the whole series of our ancestors, even to the remotest ages, and what with those which they bestow upon the audience, I myself, Menexenus, have often been very generously disposed; and, listening to their panegyrics, have for the time been charmed into an opinion that I was grown greater, more noble, and more illustrious, and have fancied that not only I myself appeared more considerable in the eyes of those strangers, who at any time accompanied me upon those occasions, but that they also were affected in the same manner, and persuaded by the orator to look upon me and Athens with more admiration than before. And this veneration of myself has often remained upon me for more than three days. Nay, with so powerful a charm has the discourse and even the voice of the speaker sunk into my ears, that for four or five days I have scarcely been able to recollect: myself, or perceive in what part of the earth I was; but imagined myself sometimes an inhabitant of the Fortunate Islands. So dexterous are our orators!

Menexenus/ You are always, Socrates, rallying the orators. However, I am afraid the person they shall now appoint will not perform his part very well; for, as he will be chosen on a sudden, he will be obliged to speak without any preparation.

Socrates/ How so, my good friend? Each of these has orations ready prepared. Besides, it is no difficult matter to speak extempore upon such topics. For if it were requisite to celebrate the praises of the Athenians, in an assembly of Peloponnesians, or of the Peloponnesians in an assembly of Athenians, a man must be an excellent orator indeed to gain the assent and approbation of his auditory. But when a man is to perform before an audience, whose praises are the subject of his discourse, it seems to be no great affair to make a good speech.

Menexenus/ Is that your opinion, Socrates?

Socrates/ It is, by Zeus.

Menexenus/ Do you think that you should be able to make a speech if it were requisite, and the senate should appoint you?

Socrates/ If I should, O Menexenus, it would not be wonderful, considering I have been instructed by a mistress, who is by no means contemptible in rhetoric, but who has made many good orators, one in particular who excelled all the Greeks, Pericles, the son of Xanthippus.

Menexenus/ Who is she? I suppose you mean Aspasia.

Socrates/ I mean her, and Connus, the son of Metrobius, also. For these two are my masters: he in music, she in rhetoric. That a man thus educated should be a skillful speaker is nothing wonderful, since, even one who has been worse educated than I have, and who has indeed learnt music from Lamprius, but rhetoric from Antiphon the Rhamnusian; —I say, it is not impossible even for such a one to gain the good opinion of the Athenians when he makes their praises the theme of his oration.

Menexenus/ And what would you have to say were you to speak?

Socrates/ From myself perhaps nothing. But yesterday I heard Aspasia pronounce a funeral oration concerning these very persons; for she had heard what you tell me, that the Athenians were going to choose an orator for the occasion: upon which she immediately ran over to me such things as it would be proper to say; and what she had formerly made use of, when she composed the funeral oration spoken by Pericles; out of the scraps of which she patched up this discourse.

Menexenus/ Can you remember what she said?

Socrates/ Else I should be unjust; for I learnt it from her, and there wanted but little of my being beaten for forgetfulness.

Menexenus/ Why then do you not repeat it?

Socrates/ My mistress may be offended, if I make her discourses public.

Menexenus/ By no means, Socrates: however, speak and oblige me; whether you are willing to speak what Aspasia said, or anything else, it is of no consequence if you will but speak.

Socrates/ But you will perhaps laugh at me, if I, being an elderly man, should appear to you still to jest.

Menexenus/ Not at all, Socrates: speak, I entreat you, by all means.

Socrates/ Well, I find I must gratify you, though you should even order me to fall a dancing. Besides, we are alone. Attend then. She began her oration, I think, with mentioning the deceased in the following manner: Whatever was requisite to be done for these brave men, has been performed on our part. They have received their dues, and are now proceeding on their fated journey, dismissed with these public honors, paid them as well by the whole state as by their own families and friends. But to make these honors

complete, something remains to be said; which not only the laws require to be rendered to them, but reason also. For an eloquent and well-spoken oration impresses on the mind of the audience a lasting admiration of great and virtuous actions. But the present occasion demands an oration of a particular kind; an oration that may at one and the same time do justice to the dead; benevolently admonish the living; excite the children and brethren of the deceased to an imitation of their virtues; and administer comfort to the fathers and the mothers, and whoever of their remoter ancestors are yet alive. Where then shall we find such an oration as this? Or whence shall we rightly begin the praises of those brave men, who when living made their friends happy by their virtues, and by their deaths procured the safety of those who survive. As they were naturally good, it is in my opinion necessary to begin their panegyric with an account of their original: for that they were virtuous was owing to their being descended from virtuous ancestors. Let us then celebrate, in the first place, their noble birth; in the second, their nurture and education; and afterwards, by exhibiting their actions to view, make it appear that these also were virtuous, and such as corresponded to all those advantages. First, then, as to the nobility of their descent: they are sprung from a race of ancestors, not adventitious, not transplanted from I know not where, but natives of the soil, dwelling and living really and properly in their own country; nursed, not like other nations, by a step-mother, but a parent, the very land which they inhabited, in which they now lie buried; the soil which bred, which nursed them, and which, as her own, has again received them into her bosom. It is most just, therefore, to bestow some encomiums, in the first place, on this mother; for thus the nobility of these her children will at the same time be adorned. This country, indeed, deserves to be celebrated by

all mankind, not only by us, and that upon many accounts; but principally because she is dear to divinity, of which the strife of the gods, who contended for her, and the decision that followed thereupon, is a clear evidence. And how is it possible that it should not be just for all men to celebrate that which the gods have praised? Another topic of deserved praise is this, that at the very time when the earth bred and produced animals of all kinds, both wild and tame, this country of ours preserved her purity; was unprolific of savage beasts; and among all animals chose to produce man only, who surpasses the rest in understanding, and who alone legally cultivates justice and the gods. As a great argument in confirmation of what I here advance, that this earth is the genuine parent of our forefathers, I must observe that everything that brings forth is provided with nourishment adapted to what it has produced; and that a woman is proved to be really and in fact a mother, from her being supplied with native fountains of nourishment for the sustenance of the child. In like manner our country and mother affords a sufficient argument of her having procreated men; for she alone at that time and first produced the grain of wheat and barley, the proper and the best food of man; as being in reality the parent of this species of animals; and to her these proofs apply more strongly than to a woman. For the earth did not in breeding and producing imitate woman, but woman imitated earth: neither did she enviously withhold these her fruits, but distributed them to others. For her offspring, in the next place, she produced the olive, the support of toil; and after she had thus nourished and reared them up to manhood, she introduced to them gods for their governors and instructors, whose names it is unnecessary to mention in this place. We all know who furnished us with the necessaries and securities of life; who instructed us in the arts requisite for our daily support; who

gave us and who taught us the use of arms for the defense of our country. Our ancestors, thus born, and thus brought up, framed a polity of which it may not be improper to speak a few words. For a polity is the nurse of men; a good one of virtuous men, a bad one of wicked men. That those who went before us, therefore, were educated under a good polity, it is necessary to show; for indeed it was owing to this that both they and their descendants, the fathers of the deceased, became virtuous. The polity then was, as it now is, an aristocracy. Under this form of government we still live, and for the most part have done so from that time to this. Let others call it a democracy, or by what name they please: it is in truth an aristocracy accompanied with renown. We have always had magistrates invested with kingly power, some of whom were hereditary, others elective: but the people were generally the most powerful; and they always bestowed the authority and power of the state upon those whom they judged most worthy. No man was excluded for the meanness, the obscurity, or the poverty of his family; nor advanced for the contrary qualifications of his ancestors, as is practiced in other cities. Their choice was confined by one boundary. Whoever was esteemed to be wise and good, he had the authority, and he the power. The cause of this our polity was the equality of our original. For other states are composed of men of every country, and of different extractions; whence their governments are unequal, tyrannies, or oligarchies; in which one part of the people consider the other as their slaves, and those who are considered as slaves look upon the other part as their masters. But we, who are all brethren, born of one mother, do not think it fit that we should be the slaves or the lords of one another. On the contrary, the natural equality of our births compelled us to seek after a legal equality in our government; and forbade us to yield subjection to anything,

except to the opinion of virtue and wisdom. Hence it came to pass that all our ancestors, the fathers of the deceased, and they themselves, being thus excellently born, thus nurtured in all liberty, exhibited to all men many and beautiful deeds, both privately and publicly, thinking it their duty as well to protect Grecians against Grecians, as to maintain the general liberty of Greece against the Barbarians. How they repelled the invasions of Eumolpus, of the Amazons, and of other enemies before them, and in what manner they defended the Argives against the Thebans, and the Heracleide against the Argives, the time will not permit me fully to relate: besides, their virtues having been finely celebrated by the poets in their melodious songs, they have been made public to all men; so that we should but disgrace ourselves in attempting the same subject in simple prose. For these reasons, therefore, I think proper to pass over these matters. Justice has been done to their merits. But I think myself obliged to recall the memory of those exploits which, worthy as they were, the poets have not thought worthy of their notice, and which are now almost buried in oblivion; that by setting forth the praises of the great men who performed them, I may woo the poets to admit them into their songs and verses. The chief of these are the actions of our forefathers, the progeny of this soil, who held the hands of those lords of Asia, the Persians, when they attempted to enslave Europe; whose virtue, therefore, in the first place deserves to be commemorated and to be praised. To praise them as they deserve, We ought to take a view of it in that period of time, when all Asia was in subjection to the third king of the Persian race. The first of these was Cyrus, who by his own great abilities freed his countrymen the Persians, enslaved the Medes his masters, and brought under his dominion the rest of Asia, as far as Egypt. His son subdued Egypt, and as much of Lybia as was accessible, by his arms.

Darius, the third king, extended the limits of his empire by his land forces as far as Scythia, and by his fleets made himself master of the sea and of the islands; so that no one durst oppose him. The very opinions of all mankind seem to have been subdued: so many, so powerful, and so warlike were the nations which the government of the Persians involved. This Darius accusing us and the Eretrians of an attempt upon Sardis, made that a pretense for sending an army of five hundred thousand men on board his ships and transports, and a fleet of three hundred sail, over which he appointed Datis to be general, ordering him, under the forfeiture of his head, to bring back the Eretrians and Athenians captive. Datis sailing to Eretria, against a nation which of all the Greeks had at that time the greatest reputation for valor, and was moreover very numerous, subdued them in three days; and that none of them might escape, he took this method of searching the whole island. Causing his troops to march to the utmost limits of the Eretrians, and extend themselves from sea to sea, he ordered them to join their hands, and sweep the country, that he might be able to assure the king that not a man had escaped him. With the like design he passed from Eretria to Marathon, imagining he had nothing to do but to place the same inevitable yoke upon the neck of the Athenians, and carry them off as he had done the Eretrians. During these transactions, part of which were accomplished and part attempted, no nation of the Greeks came to the assistance either of the Eretrians or the Athenians, except the Lacedæmonians, and they did not join us till the day after the battle. The rest, struck with terror, and preferring their present safety, kept quiet at home. By this a judgment may be formed of the bravery of those men who received the attack of the Barbarians at Marathon, chastised the arrogance of all Asia, and were the first who erected trophies

for their victory over a barbarous enemy; by their example instructing others that the power of Persia was not invincible, and that wealth and numbers must yield to virtue. I call these men, therefore, not only the fathers of our bodies, but also of our liberty, and of the liberty of all Europe. For the Grecians, surveying this day's work, were taught by their Marathonian masters to hazard new battles in the defense of their country. Upon these, therefore, ought we in reason to bestow the first palm, and give the second to them who afterwards fought and conquered in the sea-fights of Salamis and Artemisium. He who would discuss the several actions of these brave men, enumerate the many difficulties they had to encounter both by sea and land, and tell how they surmounted them, would have much to say. But I shall only mention what appears to me to be the greatest exploit after that of Marathon: for by that victory the Greeks had been only taught, that upon land it was possible for a small number of Grecians to overcome a multitude of Barbarians; but that at sea they were able to effect the same thing was not yet evident. The Persians had the reputation of being invincible at sea, by the superiority of their numbers, their riches, their naval skill, and strength. Now what is most praise-worthy in those brave men, who signalized themselves at sea, is, that they did thereby, as it were, loosen those bands of terror, what had held the Grecians so fast bound, and caused them no longer to stand in awe of numbers, whether of ships or men. From these two actions, this of Salamis, and that of Marathon, all Greece was entrusted and accustomed not to be afraid of the Barbarians, either by land or sea. The third great exploit for the deliverance of Greece, as well in order as in degree, is the action of Platæa; in the glory of which the Lacedæmonians and Athenians had an equal part. This great, this arduous enterprise was achieved, I say, by these two nations; and for

this their merit are they now celebrated by us, and will be by our posterity to the latest times. After this, many states of Greece still sided with the Barbarian, and the king himself was reported to have a design of invading Greece once more. It would then be highly unjust not to take notice of those also, who completed the work of their forefathers, and put the finishing hand to our deliverance, by scouring and expelling from the sea everything that had the name of Barbarian. These were they, who were engaged in the naval fight at Eurymedon, in the expeditions to Cyrus, to Egypt, and many other places. These ought we therefore, to commemorate, and to acknowledge our obligations to them, for having taught the great king to fear; to attend to his own safety, and not to be plotting the overthrow of Greece. This war against the Barbarians did our commonwealth, with her own forces only, draw out to the very dregs, for her own security, and that of her allies. Peace being made, and the city honored, there came upon her that which usually falls on each that are successful, first emulation, and from emulation envy, which drew this city, though unwilling, into a war against the Grecians: upon the breaking out of which war the Athenians fought a battle with the Lacedæmonians at Tanagra, for the liberties of Boeotia. Though the issue of this battle was doubtful, yet the following action proved decisive: for some of the allies of the Bœotians having deserted those, to whose assistance they came, our countrymen having on the third day after obtained a victory, we recovered to a sense of their duty those who, without reason, had fallen off from it. These brave men having fought against Grecians for the liberties of Grecians, and delivered those whose cause they had undertaken to defend, were the first, after the Persian war, upon whom the commonwealth conferred the honor of being buried in this public cemetery. After this the war became more general; all Greece attacked

us at once, and ravaged our country, ill requiting the favors they had received from this city. But. the Athenians, having defeated their enemies in a sea-fight, and taken prisoners in the island of Sphacteria their leaders the Lacedæmonians, when it was in their power to have put them to death, spared their lives, forgave them, and made peace with them; thinking, that although in a war against Barbarians nothing less than their utter ruin should be aimed at, yet that in a war between Grecians and Grecians the contest should be carried on as far as victory indeed, but that the common interest of Greece ought not to be sacrificed to any particular resentment. Are not these brave men, therefore, worthy to be praised who were engaged in that war, and who now lie buried here? They who made it appear, if indeed it was a question, whether in the first Persian war another nation was not at least equal to the Athenians: they, I say, who made it appear that such a question was entirely groundless. These men made the superiority of the Athenians sufficiently evident, by being victorious in that war, in which all Greece took part against them, and vanquishing in battle, with the forces of Athens only, those who had set themselves up for the chiefs of Greece, though they could pretend to no more than an equal share with the Athenians in their victories gained over the Barbarians. After the peace, arose a third dreadful and unexpected war, in which many brave men fell, who here lie buried. Some of these erected many trophies in Sicily; to which country they had failed in order to protect the Leontines in their liberties, whom we were by oath bound to assist. But before they could arrive, the passage being long, the Leontines were reduced to extremities, and disabled from yielding them any assistance; for which reason they gave over the attempt, and were unfortunate; though it must be owned, their enemies, those against whom they came to fight, behaved with such virtue and

moderation, that they deserved far greater praise than some who were only confederates in that war. Others signalized themselves in the Hellespont, by taking all the ships of the enemy in one day, and by several other victories. I called this a dreadful and unexpected war, because some of the states of Greece carried their enmity to this city so far, as to presume to send an embassy to the king of Persia, their and our most inveterate enemy, to invite, upon their own particular views, that barbarian into Greece, whom, for the common cause, they had formerly joined with us to drive out of Europe; thus uniting in a league against Athens all the Greeks and Barbarians. Upon which occasion the strength and valor of this state became most conspicuous. For our enemies considering Athens as already vanquished, and having seized some of our ships at Mitylene, these gallant men (for so they confessedly were) whom we now commemorate, went to their relief with sixty sail, and boarding the enemy's ships, gained a victory over them, and delivered their own allies, but met with a lot unworthy of their valor; for their bodies were nor, as they ought to have been, taken up out of the sea, but had their burial there. And surely they deserve to be remembered ever with praise and honor. For by their valor we became victorious, not in that engagement only, but throughout the whole war; and through their bravery was it that our city gained the reputation of being invincible, though attacked by the united forces of all mankind. Neither has this reputation been falsified in fact. For we were conquered not by our enemies, but by our own dissensions. As to them, we remain invincible even to this day. But we have vanquished, have subdued ourselves. After these transactions a calm ensuing, and a peace between us and all other nations, a civil war broke out, which was carried on in such a manner, that if, by the decrees of fate, dissensions must necessarily arise, a

man would pray that his country might be so and no otherwise distempered. For how benevolently and familiarly did the people of the Piræus, and those of the city, mingle with each other! And with how much moderation did they lay aside their hostility against those of Eleusis, contrary to the expectations of all Greece! All which is to be ascribed to no other cause than their real consanguinity, which imparts firm friendship not in words but in deeds, We ought not, therefore, to pass over in silence even those, who in this war were slain on either side, but as far as in us lies endeavor to reconcile them to each other; praying and sacrificing upon these occasions to those powers who have the command and direction over them, in as much as we ourselves are reconciled. For they did not attack each other out of hatred and malice, but from the malignity of their fortune. Of this we ourselves are living evidences; who, being of the same common original with them, have forgiven each other, both what we did and what we suffered. After this the city had rest, and enjoyed a profound peace, easily pardoning the Barbarians, who having, been ill enough treated by this state, returned it but as they ought. But she was indignant with the Greeks, when she called to mind the benefits they had received, and the retribution they made, by uniting with the Barbarians, depriving us of our ships, to which they formerly owed their own deliverance, and pulling down our walls, in return for our having saved theirs from ruin. The city then having taken the resolution not to give for the future any assistance to the Greeks, whether oppressed by Grecians or Barbarians, remained quiet: upon which the Lacedæmonians, imagining that Athens, the patroness of liberty, was fallen, and that now was the time for them to pursue their proper business, the enslaving of others, set immediately about it. I need not enlarge upon what followed. Those transactions are neither of an antient state, nor

perplexed by the variety of actors. We all know in what a consternation the chief states of Greece, the Argives, the Bœotians, the Corinthians, applied to this city for succor; and what was the most divine of all, that the king of Persia himself was reduced to such a strait, as to have no hopes of safety from any other quarter than from this very city, whose destruction he had so eagerly pursued. And, indeed, if Athens can be justly accused of anything, it is of having been always too compassionate, too much inclined to heal the wounds of the fallen. For at this very time she was not able to persevere, and to keep to her resolution, of not assisting those in the preservation of their liberties, who had maliciously and designedly injured her. She yielded, she assisted them, and by that assistance rescued them from slavery, and gave them their liberty, till they should think fit to enslave themselves again. She had not indeed the assurance to act so preposterous a part as to send the king of Persia any succors; she bore too great a reverence to the trophies of Marathon, of Salamis, and Plataea: yet, by conniving at the assistance given him by fugitives, and such as voluntarily entered into his service, she was confessedly the cause of his preservation. At this time she repaired her fortifications and her fleets, and prepared again for war; finding herself under the necessity of entering into one with the Lacedæmonians for the protection of the Parians. The king of Persia, on his part, as he saw the Lacedæmonians had given over all thoughts of carrying on a war by sea, took umbrage at the Athenians, and resolving to break the peace, demanded those Grecian states which were upon the continent of Asia to be delivered up to him (those very states which the Lacedæmonians had formerly consented to give up) as the condition of his continuing his amity with us and our allies. This demand he did not imagine would be complied with, and he made it only that he might, upon its

being rejected, have a fair pretense for breaking the treaty. But he was mistaken as to some of his allies; for the Corinthians, the Argives, and the Bœotians, determined to comply with his demand, and even entered into a treaty with him, which they confirmed by oath, to give up the Greeks upon the continent of Asia, provided he would furnish them with money. But we, and we alone, had not the assurance to abandon those states, much less to swear to such a treaty. That the city of Athens is so generous, free, and firm, that she is so sound, and as it were by nature so averse to the Barbarian, must be ascribed to her being wholly Greek, and unmingled with Barbarians. For none of your foreign heroes, Pelops, Cadmus, Egyptus, Danaus, and many others, who, though living under Grecian laws, were Barbarians by extraction; none of these, I say, are of the number of our citizens. We are genuine Greeks, no half-barbarians. Hence proceeds the genuine and unadulterated enmity of Athens to all barbarians. Wherefore we were once more left alone, for resisting to do an action so infamous, and so impious as that of delivering up Grecians into the hands of Persians. But being restored to what we had been deprived of in the former war, by the assistance of divinity, we prosecuted this with more success. For, becoming once again masters of a fleet, having rebuilt our walls, and recovered our colonies, we were soon freed from a war, from which our enemies were very glad to be liberated. In this war we lost indeed many gallant men, some at Corinth, by the disadvantage of their situation, others at Lechaeum by treachery. Nor were they less gallant, who saved the king of Persia, and drove the Lacedæmonians out of the seas. These are the men I would recall to your remembrance, and in honoring and praising such as these it becomes, all of you to join.

Such were the exploits of those brave men who here lie buried; such were the exploits of those others also who,

though unhappily deprived of burial, died like them in the service of their country exploits many and great indeed, as has been related: but more and still greater yet remain untold; to enumerate all which many whole days and nights would scarce suffice. It is the duty, therefore, of all and of every particular man to bear these things in mind, and as in battle, to exhort the children of such fathers not to quit the rank, in which their ancestors have placed them, by a base and cowardly retreat. Accordingly, I myself, O ye sons of virtuous men, do now exhort you, and as long as I shall remain among you will never cease reminding and exhorting you, to use your utmost endeavors to become the best of men. But upon this occasion it is my duty to tell you what your fathers, when they were going to expose their lives for their country, commanded us to say to those whom they left behind, in case any accident should befall themselves. I will repeat to you what I heard from their own mouths, and what, if I may judge from the discourse they then held, they would now gladly say to you themselves, were it in their power. Imagine, therefore, you hear them speaking what I shall now relate. These were their words: O children! that ye are the sons of virtuous fathers is evident from our present circumstances. For having it in our option to live with dishonor, we have generously made it our choice to die, rather than bring ourselves and our posterity into disgrace, and reflect infamy back upon our parents and forefathers; persuaded as we were, that the life of one who dishonors his family is not worth living, and that such a man can have no friend either here upon earth among mankind, or among the gods hereafter in the realms beneath. It behooves you, therefore, to bear these our words in remembrance, to the end that all your undertakings may be accompanied with virtue; assuring yourselves that without virtue every acquisition, every pursuit, is base and infamous. For wealth

can add no splendor to an unmanly mind. The riches of such an one are for others, not for himself. Neither are beauty, and strength of body, when joined with baseness and cowardice, to be deemed ornamental, but disgraceful: since if they make a man more conspicuous, they at the same time make the baseness of his soul conspicuous also. Science too, when separated from justice and the rest of the virtues, is not wisdom but cunning. Wherefore, in the first place, and in the last, and throughout the whole course of your lives, it is incumbent upon you to labor with all your faculties to surpass us and your progenitors in glory. Otherwise be assured that, in this contest of virtue, if we remain victorious, the victory will cover us with confusion, which, on the contrary, if obtained by you, will make us happy. The most effectual way for you to surpass us, and obtain this victory, is so to order your conduct, as neither to abuse nor waste the glory left you by your ancestors. For can anything be more ignominious for a man, who would be thought something, than to receive honor, not from his own merit, but from the reputation of his forefathers. Hereditary honor is indeed a beautiful and magnificent treasury. But to enjoy a treasury of riches and honors, and, for want of a proper supply of wealth and glory of your own, not to be able to transmit it to your posterity, is infamous and unmanly. If you endeavor after these things, you will be welcome to us and we to you, whenever your respective fates shall conduct you to us in the world below: but if you disregard them and become profligate, not one of us shall be willing to receive you. Thus much be spoken to our children: but to our fathers and mothers, if any of them should survive us, and it should be thought necessary to administer comfort to them, say, that it is their duty patiently to bear misfortunes, whenever they happen, and not give themselves up to grief: otherwise they will never be without sorrow; for the ordinary

occurrences of life will afford sufficient matter for affliction, They should seek to heal and mitigate their troubles in the remembrance, that as to the most considerable point the gods have heard their prayers, For they did not pray that their children might be immortal, but virtuous and renowned. And this, the greatest of all blessings, they have obtained. It is not easy for mortal man to have everything happen according to his wishes in this life. Besides, by bearing their misfortunes with resolution and fortitude, they will gain the opinion of being the genuine parents of magnanimous children, and of being themselves men of courage and magnanimity; whereas by striking under their sorrows, they will raise a suspicion of their not being our fathers, or those who shall praise us will be thought to have spoken falsely; neither of which things ought to come to pass. They themselves rather should bear chief testimony to our praise, showing by their actions that they are indeed men, and the fathers of men. The old proverb, "Not too much of anything," seems to be well said, and in fact it is so. For he who has within himself all that is necessary to happiness, or nearly so, and who does not so depend upon other men, as to have himself and his affairs in a perpetual fluctuation, according to their good or ill conduct, he, I say, is best provided for this life; he is moderate, he is prudent, he is brave; and he, upon all occasions whether he obtains or loses an estate or children, will pay the greatest regard to this proverb: for placing all his confidence in himself, he will neither be too much elevated with joy, nor depressed with sorrow. Such men we should think worthy to be our fathers; such we wish them to be, and such we affirm they are; such likewise are we now proved to be, by neither murmuring nor trembling at death, though we were to meet it this instant. And this same state of mind do we recommend to our fathers and our mothers; entreating them to make use of such

sentiments as these through the remaining part of their lives; and to be persuaded that they will do us the greatest pleasure by not weeping and lamenting for us; that if the dead have any knowledge of what passes among the living, their afflicting themselves, and bearing their misfortunes heavily, will be very unacceptable to us; whereas, on the contrary, by bearing their afflictions lightly, and with moderation, they will be most pleasing to us. Our lives and actions are now going to have an end; but such an end as among men is deemed most glorious, and which therefore ought rather to be graced with honor than sullied with lamentations. By taking care of our wives and children; by educating the latter, and turning themselves and their minds wholly to such-like employments, they will the more readily forget their misfortunes, and lead a life more exemplary, more agreeable to reason, and more acceptable to us. Let this suffice to be spoken on our part to our relations and friends. To the commonwealth we recommend the care of our parents and children; beseeching her to give these an honorable education, and to cherish those in their old-age, in a manner worthy of them: but we are sensible that without this recommendation, all proper care will be taken of both."

These things, O ye children, and ye parents of the deceased, have they given me in charge to say to you on their part; and I have most willingly, and to the best of my power, executed their commands. On my own part and for their sakes I beseech you, ye sons! to imitate your fathers: you fathers, to take comfort for the loss of these your sons; assuring yourselves, that both in our public and private capacities, we will take care of you, and cherish your old-age, as the respective duties and relations of every one of us may require. You yourselves well know what provisions the commonwealth has made; that by express laws she has

ordered care to be taken of the children and parents of those who die in battle; and has given it in charge to the chief magistrate, to take them, above all others, into his particular protection; that the latter may be guarded from all injuries, and the former not be sensible of their orphan state, nor feel the want of a father; whose place the commonwealth supplies, by assisting in the care of their education while they are children, and when they are grown up to manhood, dismissing them to their several vocations with an honorable present of a complete suit of armor. And this she does, not only with a view of intimating to them, and reminding them of the occupations of their fathers, by presenting them with those implements of valor which their fathers had so gloriously employed; but also that being arrived to the full strength, and furnished with the armor of a man, when they first go to take possession of their household gods, they may set out with a good omen. Moreover, she fails not from time to time to pay these anniversary honors to the deceased; taking upon her to perform in general, with regard to them, whatever is due to each from their respective relations; and to complete all, by exhibiting games of different kinds, equestrian and gymnastic, musical and poetical, she effectually supplies the office of sons and heirs to fathers; of fathers to sons; and that of guardians and protectors to their parents and kindred; discharging at all times all and every part of the duties that belong to all. Learn, therefore, by respecting upon these things, to bear your afflictions with more patience; for by so doing you will act the most friendly part as well to the dead as to the living, and be better able to give and receive comfort, to cherish and assist each other. And now, having jointly paid the tribute of your sorrow to the deceased, as the law directs, you may all depart. This, Menexenus, is the speech of Aspasia the Milesian.

Menexenus/ By Zeus, Socrates, you say that Aspasia is blessed, if being a woman she can make such speeches as these.

Socrates/ If you doubt it, come along with me, and you shall hear her herself.

Menexenus/ I have often been in her company, and know what she is.

Socrates/ Well then, do you not admire her, and are you not obliged to her for this Oration?

Menexenus/ I am greatly obliged, Socrates, either to her or to him, whoever was the author of it, but more particularly to you, who have repeated it to me.

Socrates/ Very well: but remember not to speak of it, that I may hereafter be at liberty to communicate to you some more of her fine political discourses.

Menexenus/ You may depend upon my not betraying you. Do you only relate them.

Socrates/ I will not fail.

THE END OF THE MENEXENUS.

Philebus.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus.

Socrates/ See then, Protarchus, what is the doctrine which you are about to receive from Philebus, and against what reasoning of mine to contend, unless it has been stated according to your mind. Do you wish me to present each question in a summary way?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Philebus then asserts, that the chief good to all animals is joy, and pleasure, and delight, and whatever else harmonizes with such kind of things. But what I contend for is, that it is not those things, but to be wise, and to understand, and to remember, and whatever is of a kindred nature, both correct opinion, and true reasonings, are better and more acceptable than pleasure to all who are able to partake in them; and that to those who are able to partake, it is of all things the most advantageous so to partake, and not only to those already existing, but to those who are to come. Say we not, Philebus, each of us thus?

Philebus/ Most assuredly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you then, Protarchus, receive the view thus given of the questions?

Protarchus/ I must receive it. For Philebus, the handsome, shrinks from speaking.

Socrates/ By every means then the truth respecting those questions must be arrived at.

Protarchus/ It must indeed.

Socrates/ Come then, let us in addition to these points agree in this.

Protarchus/ In what?

Socrates/ That each of us should endeavor to set forth some habit and disposition of the soul, which is able to procure for every man a happy life. Is it not so?

Protarchus/ It is so.

Socrates/ You then assert it is that of rejoicing; we, of thinking rightly.

Protarchus/ Such is the fact.

Socrates/ But what if there should appear some other habit superior to both of these? Should we not, if it appeared more related to pleasure, be both of us vanquished by a life, which possesses those very things firmly; and a life of pleasure would be superior to one of intellect?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if that superior state be more nearly allied to intellect, a life of intellect would be superior to one of pleasure, and the last would be forced to yield. Say ye that it is so agreed, or how?

Protarchus/ To me, at least, it seems.

Socrates/ But how seems it to Philebus? What say you?

Philebus/ To me it seems, and will always seem, that pleasure is altogether the superior. And you, Protarchus, will be convinced of it yourself.

Protarchus/ Having resigned, Philebus, to myself the debate, you can no longer be the master of what should be yielded to Socrates, and the contrary.

Philebus/ You say what is true. But, however, I have discharged my duty; and I here call the goddess herself to witness it.

Protarchus/ We too would be witnesses on these very points, that you have said what you are saying. But now let us endeavor, Socrates, to go through in order what is to follow after this, whether with Philebus being willing, or however he may be willing.

Socrates/ Let us endeavor, beginning from, the very goddess herself, whom this person says is called Aphrodite, but whose truest name is Pleasure.

Protarchus/ Perfectly right.

Socrates/ The dread, which I always feel as regards the names of the gods, is not after the manner of men; but is beyond even the greatest fear. And now I speak of Aphrodite by whatever name may be agreeable to her. But how various a thing is pleasure I know well; and, as I just now said, we ought to begin from it, by considering upon and seeing into its nature. For one may hear it called simply by one single name. It has assumed however all sorts of forms, and even such as are in a certain manner unlike to one another. For, observe, we say that the intemperate man has pleasure; and the temperate man has pleasure likewise in being temperate. Again, we say that the thoughtless man is pleased in being full of silly opinions and hopes; and that on the other hand, the thoughtful man is pleased with his thinking wisely. Now, how could anyone, who asserts that each of these pleasures are like to each other, not justly appear to be silly?

Protarchus/ These pleasures, Socrates, are indeed from contrary acts; but not in themselves contrary to each other. For how could pleasure not be of all things the most similar to pleasure, this thing itself to itself?

Socrates/ Color, too, thou happy fellow, differs not from color, at least in this respect, that it is universally color. And yet we all know that black, besides being different from white, happens to be also the most opposite to it. So, too,

figure is taken singly the same with figure, in the general; but as to its parts, some are the most opposite to others, and some happen to possess an infinite diversity. And many other things we shall find to be thus circumstanced; so that do not you trust to the reasoning, that makes things the most opposite to be one? And I fear that we shall find some pleasures to us quite opposite to others.

Protarchus/ Perhaps so. But how will that injure my argument?

Socrates/ Because, we will say, you call things, dissimilar in themselves, by another name. For you call all pleasant things good. Now that pleasant things are not pleasant, no one disputes. But though the most of them are evil, and some good, as we assert, yet all of them you call good, although confessing them to be dissimilar, when one compels you by reasoning to do so. By what name then do you call that, which, existing in evil pleasures equally with good, causes all to be a good?

Protarchus/ How say you, Socrates? Think you that any person, after having laid down that pleasure is the good, will agree with you? or will bear with you, while asserting that some pleasures are good, but others evil?

Socrates/ But you will at least acknowledge that pleasures are unlike to one another, and some even opposite to others?

Protarchus/ By no means, as far as they are pleasures.

Socrates/ We are now brought back again to the same position, Protarchus. We will say then that a pleasure does not differ from a pleasure, but that all are alike; and the instances, just now produced, inflict no wound upon us. But we will make an endeavor, and say, what the meanest of speakers and mere novices in argument do.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean, that if by imitating you, and defending myself, I should dare to assert that the thing the most unlike is of all things the most like to the most unlike, I should say the same as you do; and both of us would appear to be more of novices than is fitting; and the subject of dispute would thus slip away and fall to the ground. Let us therefore back water; and perhaps by returning to similitudes, we may come to an agreement with each other.

Protarchus/ Say how.

Socrates/ Suppose me to be questioned by yourself, Protarchus.

Protarchus/ Concerning what?

Socrates/ Will not intelligence, and science, and mind, and all that I laid down at the commencement, and spoke of as being good, when I was asked what sort of thing was a good, be under the very same circumstances as is your argument?

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ The sciences, taken together, will seem to be both many, and some of them dissimilar to each other. Now if some are opposite also, should I be worthy of holding a conversation with you, if, fearful of admitting this very point, I should assert that no science was unlike another science? For then the very question would be, as if it were a mere tale, destroyed, and vanish, and we be saved upon some absurdity.

Protarchus/ But this ought not to happen, except so far as the being saved. And now with the equality in your assertion and mine I am well pleased. Let then pleasures be many and dissimilar; and let the sciences likewise be many and different.

Socrates/ The difference then between your good, Protarchus, and mine, let us not conceal; but, placing them

between us, let us venture to discuss, if reasons on being examined will indicate anything, whether we ought to pronounce pleasure or intellect the chief good, or whether there is any other third thing. For we surely do not now desire to enter into a contest, in order that what I lay down, or what you do, may gain the victory; but we ought both of us to unite in fighting for what is the most true.

Protarchus/ We ought to do so.

Socrates/ Let us then fix still more firmly this point by means of a mutual agreement.

Protarchus/ What point?

Socrates/ That, which gives trouble to all persons who are willing, and sometimes to some who are unwilling.

Protarchus/ Speak more clearly.

Socrates/ I am speaking of that, which has just how fallen by our side, of a nature somehow full of wonders. For that many are one, and one many, is a thing wonderful to be asserted; and it is easy to controvert a person laying down either of these points.

Protarchus/ Do you mean, that when anyone says that I, Protarchus, being by nature one, am again many, laying down that the one, and persons opposite to each other, great and little, and heavy and light, are the same, and a thousand other things?

Socrates/ The wonders, Protarchus, which you have now spoken of, relating to the one and many, have become vulgarized; but by the common agreement, so to say, of all men, it is laid down that it is needless to touch upon such things; since they consider them to be childish and easy to be seen through, and great impediments to rational discourses; since not even such things anyone ought to say, when, after having in a discourse divided the members and parts of each thing, he shall confute the party, who has

confessed that all these are that one, and ridicule him, because he has been compelled to make such monstrous assertions, as that a single one is many and infinite, and many only one.

Protarchus/ Of what other things are you speaking, Socrates, which have not, as being universally agreed upon, become vulgarized, relating to the very same subject?

Socrates/ When, young man, a person lays down that the one does not belong to things generated and destroyed, as we have lately said. For in that case, as we just now stated, it has been agreed that we need not confute a oneness of such a kind. But when a person attempts to lay down a oneness, as in the case of one man, and one ox, one beauty, one goodness, respecting these and such-like onenesses, much of attention, together with a division, becomes a controversy.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ In the first place, whether a person ought to consider such onenesses as truly existing. In the next place, how it is that these, every one of them being always the same, and never receiving generation or destruction, are, notwithstanding, with the greatest stability this one. And after this, we must lay down whether oneness is dispersed amongst things generated again and infinite, as having become many, or is a whole itself, from itself apart; which would appear the most impossible of all, for the same and one to exist in one and in many at the same time. These are the questions relating to such things as the one and many, and not those, Protarchus, mentioned by you, are, through their being not well agreed upon, the cause of all difficulty in our path; but, by being properly agreed upon, they would on the other hand be the cause of our easy progress.

Protarchus/ It is necessary, then, for us to labor at this point the first.

Socrates/ So at least I should say.

Protarchus/ Understand then that all of us agree with you on these points; and it is best, perhaps, not to stir up just now by interrogations Philebus, who is well put to rest.

Socrates/ Be it so; but from whence shall one begin, the battle-field for controversy being so wide and various? Shall it be from hence?

Protarchus/ From whence?

Socrates/ We surely assert, that one and many, being made by reasonings the same, run round everywhere according to each of the things made the subject of reasoning always and formerly and now; and this shall never have an end, nor has it ever had a beginning at the present time. But there is, as it appears to me, some such feeling in us, relating to reasonings themselves, of an immortal and ageless kind. For when a youth has first tasted it, he is delighted, as having found a treasure of wisdom, and being transported with delight, he tosses about every reasoning; and at one time he rolls it from this side to that, and mixes all of it into one; at another unrolling it back again, and separating it into parts, he throws himself first and foremost into a difficulty, and next the person ever nearest at hand, whether he happens to be younger, or older, or equal in age, sparing neither father nor mother, nor anyone else, who will listen, and scarcely the rest of animals, not men alone; since he would spare not even one of the barbarians, could he but find some where an interpreter.

Protarchus/ Do you not, Socrates, see the great number of us, and that we are all young? And are you not afraid that, if you rail at us, we shall, with Philebus, fall upon you all together? However, for we understand what you mean, if

there is any method or contrivance for this confusion to depart from us, somehow with a good will, out of the way of our reasoning, and for discovering a road to reasoning better than this, do direct your thoughts to it, and we will to the best of our power follow. For the present debate, Socrates, is not a little matter.

Socrates/ Indeed it is not, boys, as Philebus calls you. There is and can be no better way than that of which I am ever a lover; but often before now has it fled away, and left me deserted and at a loss.

Protarchus/ What is it? Let it only be mentioned.

Socrates/ That, which to point out is not very difficult, but to make use of is very difficult. For all the things that, connected with art, have been ever discovered, have become manifest through it. Consider then the way which I am speaking of.

Protarchus/ Only tell it.

Socrates/ A gift, as it appears to me, from gods to men, was, through a certain Prometheus, cast down from some quarter by the gods along with a certain fire the most luminous; and the men of old, being better than us, and dwelling nearer to the gods, have handed down this story, that, since the beings, said to be forever, are produced from one and many, and have in themselves bound and the boundless born with them, we must therefore, since things have been so arranged, ever lay down the existence of someone idea respecting everything, and on every occasion seek for it; for being there, we shall find it; and if we lay hold of it, we must after one look for two, if two there are; but if not, three, or some other number; and again, in like manner each of those that are one; until at length a person perceives that the one at the beginning is not only one, and many, and infinite, but also how many it is: but that a man should

never bring the idea of infinity to multitude, before he shall have fully seen all its number, which lies between the infinite and the one; and then having dismissed each one of the all into infinity, we must bid them farewell. The gods then, as I said, have granted us to consider things in this way, and to learn them, and teach them to each other. But the wise men of the present time introduce, as it may happen, one, and many, more quickly and slowly than is fitting, and immediately after the one, infinity, but all the intermediate escape them; by which are kept apart the methods of our carrying on with each other disputations in a logical and contentious manner.

Protarchus/ A part, Socrates, I seem somehow to understand; but of the other part I beg I may hear more clearly what you mean.

Socrates/ What I mean, Protarchus, will be evident in the case of letters; and in these, through which you have been taught, accept my meaning.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ The voice, that issues through the mouth, is surely one, and on the other hand infinite, not only in that of all, but of each.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Now we are skilled in voice by neither of these considerations, whether we know that it is infinite or one; but to know how many and of what kind are its parts, this it is which produces in each of us the grammar-art.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ And further, that which produces the music-art, is the very same thing.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Musical sound, and the thing according to that art is one in it.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ And let us suppose two kinds, the grave and the acute, and a third, the homotonous; or how?

Protarchus/ In this way.

Socrates/ But by knowing these facts alone you would not be skilled in music; although by not knowing you would be, on these points, worth, so to say, nothing.

Protarchus/ Yes, nothing.

Socrates/ But, my friend, when you shall have correctly comprehended the intervals of sounds, with respect to their being acute and grave, how many they are in number, and of what kinds, and the limits of the intervals, and how many combinations are produced from them, which our predecessors have remarked and handed down to us, who come after them, by the name of harmonies, and such other circumstances as are in, and produced by, the motions of the body, and in words, which being measured by numbers, they say again we ought to call them rhythms and meters, and at the same time to consider that we ought to thus look into everything that is one and many—when I say you shall have comprehended all these things, in this manner, then will you have become skilled; and when by considering in this way any other kind whatsoever of being, you shall have comprehended it, you will have thus become intelligent respecting it. But the infinite multitude of, and in, individuals causes you to be infinitely far off from thinking correctly, and to be of no account or number, as you never look to any number in anything whatever.

Protarchus/ Most beautifully, Philebus, does Socrates appear to me to have spoken in what he has now said.

Philebus/ And to me likewise the very same thing appears. But how has this speech been spoken as regards us, and what does it mean?

Socrates/ Correctly indeed, Protarchus, has Philebus proposed this question.

Protarchus/ Very much so; and do you give an answer.

Socrates/ This I will do, after I have gone through yet a little more respecting these very points. For, as we said, that should a person lay hold of anyone thing whatever, he ought not to look at once upon the nature of the infinite, but upon some number; so, on the other hand, when a man is compelled to lay hold of the infinite, he ought not to look at once upon the one, but to a certain number, possessing some multitude of individual things, and to think upon it; and to end from all in one. Let us then again lay hold of what I have now said, in the case of letters.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ From the time when some god, or godlike man, as the story in Egypt goes, by saying it was some Theuth, first thought upon sound as being without limit, the person has been mentioned in history, who perceived that in the limitless there were vocal letters, not one but more; and again, other letters not having a part of the voice, but of some kind of sound; and that of these also there was a certain number. A third kind of letters he set apart; those which are now called mutes by us. After this he separated both the letters which are without any vocal sound, clear or not clear, as far as each one, and the vowels also and those in the middle in the same manner, until having comprehended their number, he gave to each one, and to all together, the name of an element. But perceiving that none of us could understand any of them by itself alone, without learning them all, he considered this bond between them as being

one, and as making all these in a manner but one thing; and to them he applied the name of the grammar-art, calling it so as being one.

Philebus/ These, taken by themselves and in relation to each other, Protarchus, I understand more clearly than what was said before. But there is still at present wanting, as before, the very same trifling part of the discourse.

Socrates/ Is it not this, Philebus? what have these matters to do with the subject?

Philebus/ Yes. This is the very thing which I and Protarchus are for a long while in search of.

Socrates/ You are then for a long while, as you say, in search, when you have just now arrived at it.

Philebus/ How so?

Socrates/ Was not the question originally between us relating to intellect or pleasure, which was the more eligible?

Philebus/ How not?

Socrates/ We admit, however, that each of them is one thing?

Philebus/ By all means.

Socrates/ This then does the previous subject demand of us; how is each of them one and many? and how is it that they are not at once infinite; but that each possesses somehow a certain number before it becomes infinite?

Protarchus/ Into no trivial a question, Philebus, has Socrates thrown us, after having led us, I know not how, a round-about road. And now consider, which of us two shall reply to the question proposed. Perhaps, however, it would be ridiculous in me, who have stood as a reinforcement to your argument, to order you again to this business, through my being unable to reply to the present question; but I think it would be much more ridiculous for neither of us to be able.

Consider, then, what we are to do. For Socrates seems to interrogate us respecting the different kinds of pleasure, whether they do or do not exist; and how many and of what kind they are; and in like manner and touching the same points as regards intellect.

Socrates/ You speak, son of Callias, most truly. For since we are unable to do this, as regards everything, as being one, similar, and same, and the contrary, as the past reasoning has pointed out, not one of us would in any matter ever be worth anything at all.

Protarchus/ Such, Socrates, very nearly seems to be the case. But though it is a fine thing for a prudent person to know all things, yet it seems to be a second step for a person not to be ignorant of himself. Why then have I now said this? I will tell you. This conversation, Socrates, you have granted to us all, and have given yourself up to us, for the purpose of deciding what is the greatest good to man. For, after Philebus had said, that it is pleasure, and delight, and joy, and all things of the like nature, you said in opposition to this, that it was not these things, but those which we often willingly call to our recollection; and we are right in so doing, in order that each question, being laid up in our memory, may be put to the test. You assert then, it seems, that, what is to be spoken of correctly, there is a good, superior to pleasure, in mind, science, intelligence, art, and all things allied to them, which one ought to possess, and not the others. Now these positions being laid down severally on each side, as the subjects of dispute, we in a jocose way threatened, that we would not suffer you to go home, before, of the questions so defined, a sufficient limit had been reached. To this you assented, and to these points you gave yourself up to us. We assert then, as children say, that of what has been given fairly, there is no taking away. Forbear then to meet us on what has been now said in this manner.

Socrates/ In what manner?

Protarchus/ By throwing us into a difficulty, and propounding questions, to which we should not be able on the instant to give a sufficient answer. For let us not fancy that the present difficulty of us all is a finish to the inquiry; but if we are unable to do this, you must do it, for so you promised. Wherefore advise yourself, whether you must distinguish the kinds of pleasure, as of knowledge; or leave them alone, if perchance you are able and willing by some other method to render plain somehow else the question now in dispute between us.

Socrates/ Nothing dreadful then need I fear any longer for myself, since you have said this. For the expression, "if you are willing," relieves me from all fear respecting each thing. But, in addition to this, there seems some god, I think, to have given me a recollection of some things.

Protarchus/ How, and of what things?

Socrates/ Having formerly heard, either in a dream or broad awake, certain sayings respecting pleasure and intellect, I have them now again present to my mind, that neither of them is of itself the good, but some other third thing, different from them, and better than both. Now if this should appear to us clearly, pleasure is then removed from victory. For the good would no longer be the same with it; or how say you?

Protarchus/ Just so.

Socrates/ We shall have no need then, in my opinion, to distinguish the kinds of pleasure. And the thing itself, as it progresses, will show itself more clearly.

Protarchus/ Having begun so happily, proceed with the same success.

Socrates/ Let us previously agree still upon a few little points.

Protarchus/ What are those?

Socrates/ Is it necessary for the condition of the good to be perfect or not perfect?

Protarchus/ The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.

Socrates/ What then? Is the good self-sufficient?

Protarchus/ How not? and in this respect it excels all other things existing.

Socrates/ And this too, I think, it is of all things the most necessary to state about it, that every being that knows of it hunts after it, and desires to catch it, and to have it about itself, and cares for nothing else except such as are brought to perfection in conjunction with good things.

Protarchus/ There is no gainsaying this.

Socrates/ Let us then consider, and judge of the life of pleasure, and that of intellect, viewing them separately.

Protarchus/ How say you?

Socrates/ In the life of pleasure, let there be no intellect; nor in that of intellect, pleasure. For, if either of them be the good, it need not want anything additional from any other quarter. But, if either of them appears to be indigent of aught, this can no longer be the good.

Protarchus/ For how could it?

Socrates/ Let us then endeavor with you to try them by a touchstone.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Answer, then.

Protarchus/ Say on.

Socrates/ Would you, Protarchus, accept the offer to live through the whole of life enjoying pleasures the most exquisite?

Protarchus/ Why not?

Socrates/ If you possessed this completely, would you not think that you still wanted something else?

Protarchus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ See now, is it not for the things that are wanting in thought, and mind, and reasoning powers, and whatever are the sisters of these, to see not even something?

Protarchus/ And why? for I should in a manner possess all things, in possessing joy.

Socrates/ Living thus continually through life, would you not feel a joy in the most exquisite pleasures?

Protarchus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Possessing neither mind, nor memory, nor science, nor a true opinion, it is surely necessary for you, in the first place, to be ignorant, whether you had any joy, or not, being void of all intellect.

Protarchus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Being moreover in a similar manner not in possession of memory, there is surely a necessity for you not even to remember that you ever had any joy, or for not even the least memorial to remain of a joy coming upon you on the instant; and not possessing a true opinion, a necessity for you to think that, when you are feeling a joy, you do not feel it; and deprived of the reasoning power, to be not even able to calculate that you shall feel a joy in a time to come; and thus you would live the life, not of a man, but of an animal called lungs, or of such marine substances as are endued with life, together with an oyster-like body. Are these things so? or can we think otherwise concerning them?

Protarchus/ And how?

Socrates/ Would, then, such a life be eligible?

Protarchus/ This reasoning, Socrates, has imposed upon me silence altogether for the present.

Socrates/ Let us not become cowards, but changing the view, look upon the life of intellect.

Protarchus/ What kind of life do you mean?

Socrates/ Whether any of us would choose to live, possessing intellect, and mind, and science, and a perfect memory of all things, but partaking of pleasure, neither much nor little; nor, on the other hand, of pain; but being wholly exempt from all things of such kind.

Protarchus/ To me, Socrates, neither life is eligible; nor would it, I think, ever appear so to any other person.

Socrates/ What seems to you, Protarchus, a life mixed up with, and common to both together?

Protarchus/ Do you mean of pleasure, and of mind and intellect?

Socrates/ In this way; and of such a life am I speaking.

Protarchus/ Every person would certainly prefer such a kind of life to either of those, and, moreover, not one this, and another that.

Socrates/ Perceive we now what is the result of our previous reasoning?

Protarchus/ Perfectly well; that three lives have been placed before us, and that of the two, neither one is self-sufficient or eligible for anyone man, or animal.

Socrates/ Is it not evident then with regard to these, that neither of them possess the good? for otherwise it would have been all-sufficient, and perfect, and eligible for all plants and animals, that are capable of living ever thus through life. But if anyone should prefer other things, than what we do, he would take it contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, not willingly, but through ignorance, or from some unhappy necessity.

Protarchus/ Such seems to be the case.

Socrates/ That we ought not therefore to consider that goddess of Philebus and the good to be the same, seems to have been stated sufficiently.

Philebus/ Neither, Socrates, is that intellect of yours the good; but it will somehow have the same charge made against it.

Socrates/ Mine perhaps, Philebus, may; but not, I think, that intellect which is at the same time both divine and true; but it will be somehow in a different state. However, I do not contend for the prize of victory, in behalf of the life of intellect, against the common one. But what we are to do with the second prize, it is meet to see and to consider. For the cause of the happiness of the common life, we each assign to be, one of us, intellect, the other, pleasure. And thus neither of these two would be the good. And yet a person might suppose one or other of them to be the cause. Now on this point I would still more earnestly contend against Philebus, that in this mixed life, whatever is the thing, by possessing which that life becomes eligible and good, it is not pleasure, but intellect, which is more allied and similar to it. And according to this reasoning it could not be truly said that pleasure has any share in the first, nor even the second prize; and it is still further from the third prize, if any credit may be given for the present to that intellect of mine.

Protarchus/ It seems to me in good truth, Socrates, that pleasure has fallen to the ground, struck down, as it were, by your present reasoning; for after fighting for the prize, it lies there vanquished. But of mind, it seems, it must be said, that it has prudently laid no claim for the prize; for it would otherwise have suffered the same fate. But pleasure, should it lose also the second prize, would meet altogether with some dishonor from her lovers: for not even to them would she appear any longer to be beautiful.

Socrates/ Why then is it not better to dismiss her directly, and not to pain her, by bringing to her the most accurate touchstone, and convicting her?

Protarchus/ You are saying nothing, Socrates, to the purpose.

Socrates/ Is it because I spoke, what is impossible, of giving pain to pleasure?

Protarchus/ Not on that account only, but because you are ignorant that none of us will dismiss you, before you have come to the end of these disputes by reasoning.

Socrates/ Ho! ho! Protarchus; for though the remaining discourse is plentiful, yet scarcely is any part of it very easy now. For it seems that he, who marches out in defense of mind, has need of another stratagem, and must have, as it were, arrows different from those of former reasoning; perhaps, however, some are the same. Is not this requisite?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Let us then endeavor, when laying down the principle, to act with caution.

Protarchus/ Of what principle are you speaking?

Socrates/ All things existing in the universe let us divide into two, or rather, if you please, into three parts.

Protarchus/ You should state, why so.

Socrates/ Let us take some of the subjects already mentioned.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ We said somehow that of things existing, the deity has exhibited the limitless, and also the limit.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Let us then take these two of the species of things, and for a third, someone composed of those two mixed together. But I am, it seems, to be laughed at as a

person sufficiently distinguishing and enumerating things according to their species.

Protarchus/ What say you, my good man?

Socrates/ It seems again that there is need of a fourth kind.

Protarchus/ Say, what?

Socrates/ Of the combination of these with each other consider then the cause; and to these three species set me down this for a fourth.

Protarchus/ Will there not be wanting a fifth too, able to produce the separation of something?

Socrates/ Perhaps there may; but not, I think, at present. However, should there be a want of it, you will pardon me, if I go in pursuit of a fifth life.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Having, in the first place, of these four species, divided the three, let us, after having seen each of two cut into many parts and dispersed, endeavor by collecting again each into one, to understand those two, in what manner each of them is, at the same time, one and many.

Protarchus/ If you would speak more plainly respecting them, I might perhaps follow you.

Socrates/ I say then that the two, which I lay before you, are those which I just now spoke of; one the limitless, and the other limit. Now, that the limitless is in some manner many, I will attempt to show; but let that, which has a limit, wait for us a while.

Protarchus/ It shall wait.

Socrates/ Consider now; for what I order you to consider is a thing difficult and doubtful. Consider it, however. With regard to things hotter and colder, first see if you can conceive any limit to them. Or would not the more and the

less, residing in the genera themselves of things, enjoin, so long as they resided there, an end to be not in them? For if there were an end, they are at an end themselves.

Protarchus/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ And we say that in the hotter and colder there is the more and the less.

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Reason then ever points out to us that the colder and the hotter have no end; and being thus without any end, they are altogether limitless.

Protarchus/ Vehemently so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well have you answered, friend Protarchus, and reminded me, that the "vehemently," which you now pronounced, and the "gently," have the same power as the "more" and the "less." For, wherever they reside, they suffer not anything to be just "so much;" but infusing something more vehement than the more gentle into every action, and the contrary, they effect either "the more" or "the less;" but cause the "just so much" to disappear. For, as it was just now stated, if they did not cause the "just so much" to disappear, but permitted both it and "the moderate" to be in the seat of "the more" and "the less," or of "the vehement" and "the gentle," these very things would flow out of their own place in which they were; for if they admitted the "just so much," "the hotter" and "the colder" would not exist. For "the hotter," and in like manner "the colder," is always advancing forward, and never abides in the same spot; but the "just so much" stops, and ceases to progress. According then to this reasoning, "the hotter" must be limitless; and so must also be "the colder."

Protarchus/ So indeed, Socrates, it appears. But, as you said, these things are not easy to follow. But subjects spoken

of again and again would perhaps show the questioner and the questioned agreeing sufficiently together.

Socrates/ You say well; and let us try so to do. But for the present, see whether we will receive this as a sign of the nature of the limitless, in order that, by going through all, we may not be prolix.

Protarchus/ What mark do you mean?

Socrates/ Whatever things appear to us to be growing more or less, or to admit of the vehement, and the gentle, and the too much, and all such attributes, we ought to refer all these to the genus of the limitless, as to one thing, according to the previous remark which we made, that whatever things were torn and cut into parts, we ought to collect, to the best of our power, and put a mark on them as being of someone nature, if you remember.

Protarchus/ I remember it.

Socrates/ Those things then, which do not admit these attributes, but admit their contraries, in the first place, the equal and equality, and, after the equal, the double, and whatever other relation one number bears to another, and one measure to another, by reckoning up all these as relating to limit, should we seem to do right? or how say you?

Protarchus/ Perfectly right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Be it so. But the third thing, made up of the other two, what idea shall we say it possesses?

Protarchus/ Yourself, as I conceive, will tell me.

Socrates/ A deity might; if any of the gods will hearken to my prayers.

Protarchus/ Pray, then, and take a survey.

Socrates/ I do survey: and some deity, Protarchus, seems now to have become favorable to us.

Protarchus/ How say you this? and of what proof do you make use?

Socrates/ I will tell you plainly: but do you follow my reasoning.

Protarchus/ Only speak.

Socrates/ We mentioned just now the hotter and the colder; did we not?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ To these then add the drier and the moister, the more numerous and the fewer, the swifter and the slower, the larger and the smaller, and whatever things beside that we previously ranked under the one head of a nature, that admits of the more and the less.

Protarchus/ You mean of the limitless.

Socrates/ Yes: and do you combine into this that which we spoke of next afterward, the genus of limit.

Protarchus/ What genus?

Socrates/ That, which, when we should just now have brought together as the genus of the limit, formed in the same manner, as we brought together the genus of the limitless, we did not bring together. But now perhaps you will do the same. When both these are brought together, that too will become manifest.

Protarchus/ Of what genus are you speaking? and how?

Socrates/ I speak of that relating to the equal and the double, and whatever else causes things to cease at variance with each other, and by introducing number, molds them into what are symmetrical and harmonize with each other.

Protarchus/ I understand. You seem to me to say that if these are combined certain productions would somehow arise in the case of each.

Socrates/ Yes. For I seem to have spoken correctly.

Protarchus/ Say on then.

Socrates/ In the case of diseases, does not the right combination of those two produce the state of health?

Protarchus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And in the acute and the grave, the swift also and the slow, all being limitless, do not the very same thing, being introduced, effect at the same time a limit and render most perfect all the Muse's art?

Protarchus/ Yes, most beautifully.

Socrates/ Moreover it being introduced into cold weather and hot, it takes off the very much, the too much, and the infinite, but it effects the moderate and the symmetrical.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ And are not produced from them mild seasons, and all whatever is lovely for us, the limitless and those which have a limit being combined together?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ A thousand other things I omit to state; as, for instance, together with health, beauty and strength; and in the soul other properties very many and very beautiful. For the goddess herself, O thou handsome Philebus, looking down upon lust, and all manner of vice in all persons, and seeing no limit existing in them of pleasures and their full enjoyment, has laid down a law and order, having a limit. And you said that she would wear down; but I maintain, on the contrary, that she would preserve. But how, Protarchus, does it now appear to you?

Protarchus/ This, Socrates, is quite to my mind.

Socrates/ I have mentioned then those three things, if you comprehend.

Protarchus/ I think I do. For one you seem to call the limitless, and one, the second, the limit in all things; but what you mean by the third, I do not very well comprehend.

Socrates/ Because the multitude, O thou wondrous man, of the generation of the third, has amazed you. And yet the limitless has afforded you many genera; but as they were all of them marked with the seal of the genus of the more and its opposite they appeared one.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And yet neither did limit contain many, nor did we bear it ill that it was not by nature one.

Protarchus/ How could we?

Socrates/ By no means. But do thou say that by the third I mean this one, laying down all their progeny, from the measures which have effected together with limit a generation into being.

Protarchus/ I understand you.

Socrates/ Now besides these three, we then said we must look for some fourth kind, and that the looking for it was common to us both. See then whether it seems to you necessary for all things, which are produced, to be produced through some cause.

Protarchus/ So it seems to me; for without that thing, how should they be produced?

Socrates/ The nature then of the thing making differs from the cause in nothing but the name: so that the thing making and the cause may be rightly deemed one.

Protarchus/ Rightly.

Socrates/ So, likewise, the thing made, and the thing produced, we shall find, as just now said, to differ in nothing but the name; or how?

Protarchus/ Just so.

Socrates/ According to nature, does not the thing making ever lead the way? and the thing made follow it into being?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Cause then, and that which is the slave of cause for production, is another thing, and not the same.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Have not the things which are produced, and the things out of which they are all produced, exhibited to us the three genera?

Protarchus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ The fourth then, which is the artificer of all these, let us call the cause; as it has been sufficiently shown to be different from those.

Protarchus/ Let us call it.

Socrates/ The four sorts having been now defined, it is well, for the sake of remembering each one, to enumerate them in order.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ The first then I call limitless; the second, limit; the third, what is mixed and generated from these; and in saying that the cause of this mixture and this production is the fourth, should I do aught amiss?

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Well now, what is the reasoning after this? and with what design have we come to this? Was it not this? We were inquiring whether the second prize was due to Pleasure or Intellect. Was it not so?

Protarchus/ It was so.

Socrates/ Since then we have thus divided these things, may we not now better form a finished judgment about the first and the second, respecting which we disputed at first.

Protarchus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Come now, we laid down, as the conqueror, the combined life of Pleasure and Intellect. Was it not so?

Protarchus/ It was.

Socrates/ Do we not perceive then somehow what this life is, and of what genus?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ And I think we shall say, that it is a part of the third. For it is not combined with some two, but with all the limitless linked by a chain with limit; so that this life, the winner of the victory, may be rightly said to be a part of the third.

Protarchus/ Most rightly.

Socrates/ Be it so. But that life of yours, Philebus, being pleasant and uncombined, to which of the three can it be rightly said to belong? But before you pronounce, answer me first this question.

Philebus/ Propose it then.

Socrates/ Have Pleasure and Pain a limit? or are they amongst the things which admit "the more" and "the less?"

Philebus/ Assuredly, Socrates, amongst those that admit "the more." For Pleasure would not be wholly a good, if it were not by nature limitless with respect to multitude and "the more."

Socrates/ Nor would Pain, Philebus, be wholly an evil; so that we must think of something else than the nature of the limitless, which is to impart any good to pleasures. Let then this be the issue of the limitless. But to which of the before-mentioned may we, Protarchus and Philebus, refer Intellect, and Science, and Mind, and not be impious? For there seem to me to be no little danger to us, whether we are right or not respecting the present question.

Philebus/ You magnify, Socrates, that god of yours.

Socrates/ So do you, my friend, that goddess of yours. The question, however, ought to be answered by us.

Protarchus/ Socrates speaks correctly, Philebus, and we must obey him.

Philebus/ Have not you, Protarchus, taken upon yourself to speak on my part?

Protarchus/ Certainly. But in the present case I am nearly at a loss; and I request of you, Socrates, to become yourself a speaker for us, in order that we may not, by a mistake respecting the combatant, say something contrary to the measure.

Socrates/ We must obey, Protarchus. For you enjoin nothing difficult. But when I was magnifying, as Philebus says, a deity by way of a joke, I did in reality confuse you, by asking of what genus were Mind and Science.

Protarchus/ Altogether so, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet it was an easy question. For all the wise, in reality extolling themselves, agree that Mind is to us a king of heaven and earth. And perhaps they say well. But let us, if you are willing, make our examination of this genus rather more at length.

Protarchus/ Speak as you wish, taking no account of the length, as you will not be disagreeable to us.

Socrates/ You have spoken fairly. Let us begin, then, by asking a question in such way as this.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Whether shall we say that the power of an irrational principle governs all things, and that, which is called the universe, at random, and as may happen? or, on the contrary, as our predecessors asserted, that Mind and a certain wonderful Intellect, arranges things together, and governs throughout?

Protarchus/ Alike in nothing, Socrates, are the two tenets. For what you have just now mentioned seems to me to be impious. But, to say that Intellect disposes all things in order, is worthy of our view of the world, and of sun, and the moon, and the stars, and the whole revolution of heaven; nor would I ever say, or even think, otherwise respecting them.

Socrates/ Do you wish then for us to say something in accordance with our predecessors, that such is the case, and for us not merely to think that we ought to speak the sentiments of others without danger to ourselves, but that we should run the risk together, and share in the censure, should a man of mighty power assert that these things are not in this state, but in that of disorder?

Protarchus/ How should I not wish it?

Socrates/ Come now, look to the reasoning, which is advancing towards us respecting these matters.

Protarchus/ Only say it.

Socrates/ The things that surround the nature of all the bodies of animals, namely, fire, and water, and air, and earth, we somehow descry, as persons tossed in a storm say of land, existing in the constitution of the universe.

Protarchus/ And truly so; for we are really tossed about in our present reasonings.

Socrates/ Come then, respecting each of those things in us, conceive some such thing as this.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ That each of those in us is little and inconsiderable, and is nowhere and in no manner pure, and possessing a power worthy of its nature. Take them in the case of one element, and understand the same respecting all. Fire in some manner exists in us, and it exists also in the universe.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Now the fire, which is in us, is weak and inconsiderable; but that which is in the universe is wonderful for its multitude and beauty, and for every power which belongs to fire.

Protarchus/ What you say is very true.

Socrates/ What then? Is the fire of the universe generated, and fed, and ruled by that which we have in us? or, on the contrary, does mine and yours, and that in the rest of animals, receive all these things from it?

Protarchus/ You ask this question, which does not deserve an answer.

Socrates/ True. For you will say the same, I think, of the earth, which exists here in animals, and of that in the universe; and so will you answer touching all the other things, about which I inquired a little before.

Protarchus/ For who in his senses would ever be seen answering in another way?

Socrates/ Scarcely not anyone whatever. But follow us to what comes next in order. Have we not, looking to all those things just now mentioned, and brought to one point, called them body?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Conceive the same thing then with regard to this, which we call the world. For in the same manner, being composed of the same elements, it would be body.

Protarchus/ You speak most correctly.

Socrates/ Whether from that body wholly is nourished the body with us, or that body from the one with us? and has it received and does it keep whatever properties we have just now mentioned respecting them?

Protarchus/ And this too is another point, Socrates, not deserving a question.

Socrates/ What then? Is this deserving? Or how will you say?

Protarchus/ Say what it is.

Socrates/ Shall we not affirm that the body with us possesses a soul?

Protarchus/ It is evident, we shall affirm it.

Socrates/ From whence, friend Protarchus, did it obtain it, unless the body of the universe happens to be with a soul, and possessing the same things as this, but in every way more beautiful?

Protarchus/ It is evident, Socrates, from no other source.

Socrates/ For we cannot surely, Protarchus, expect that, while there are these four things, limit, the limitless, the combination of both, and the genus of the cause, amongst all the four, it is permissible for that, which furnishes the soul in us, and makes the body a tabernacle for it, and, when the body has met with a stumbling-block, cures it by the medical art, and on other occasions frames other constitutions, these should be addressed by the name of wisdom, whole and of every kind; but that, while these very same things exist in the whole of heaven, and according to its great parts, and, moreover, while they are lovely and without blemish, in these there should not have been planned the nature of things the most beautiful and held in the highest honor.

Protarchus/ This would indeed have no reason on its side.

Socrates/ If this then be irrational, we may the better assert, by following that reasoning of ours, that there is, what we have often said, in the universe many a limitless, and a limit sufficient, and besides these, a cause, not

inconsiderable which puts into order and arranges the years, and seasons, and months, —a cause, which may most justly be called Wisdom and Mind.

Protarchus/ Most justly, indeed.

Socrates/ Wisdom however and Mind could not exist without Soul.

Protarchus/ By no means.

Socrates/ You will say then that in the nature of Zeus there is a kingly soul in a kingly mind, through the power of the cause; and that in the other gods there are other beautiful attributes, according as it is agreeable for each to be called.

Protarchus/ Certainly I shall.

Socrates/ Do not think, Protarchus, that we have spoken this discourse at all in vain. For it fights on the side of those persons of the olden time, who showed that Mind is ever the ruler of the universe.

Protarchus/ It does so very much.

Socrates/ Besides it has furnished an answer to my inquiry, —that Mind is a relation of that, which was said to be the cause of all things; for of the four this was one. For now at length you surely have the answer.

Protarchus/ I have, and very sufficiently. But it lay hid from me that you were giving the answer.

Socrates/ For play is sometimes, Protarchus, a remission from serious study.

Protarchus/ Well have you said this.

Socrates/ And thus, my friend, of what genus Mind is, and of what power it is possessed, has been now shown tolerably well for the present.

Protarchus/ It has, completely.

Socrates/ Moreover in like manner the genus of Pleasure has appeared before.

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Concerning these two then let us remember this also; —that Mind is a relation to cause, and is nearly of that genus; but that Pleasure is both limitless itself, and is of that genus which, of itself, neither has nor ever will have in itself, either a beginning, or a middle, or an end.

Protarchus/ We will remember. How not?

Socrates/ Now we ought to consider next, in which genus either of these two exists, and through what circumstance they are produced, when they come into being, first in the case of Pleasure; for, as we previously tried by a touchstone its genus, so, with regard to these points, we must try them previously. For, apart from Pain, we should never be able fully to try Pleasure.

Protarchus/ Nay, if we must proceed in this way, let us proceed.

Socrates/ Does it seem to you, as to me, as regards production?

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Pain and Pleasure appear to me to be produced naturally at the same time as a common genus.

Protarchus/ Remind us, friend Socrates, which of the genera mentioned before, you wish to indicate by the word common.

Socrates/ This shall be done, O thou wondrous man, to the best of my power.

Protarchus/ You have spoken fairly.

Socrates/ By common, then, let us understand that, which we reckoned as the third of the four.

Protarchus/ That which you mentioned after both the limitless and limit; in which you ranked health, and also, as I think, harmony.

Socrates/ You have said perfectly right. Now give me all possible attention.

Protarchus/ Only speak.

Socrates/ I say, then, that whenever the harmony in the frame of any animal is loosened, a loosening is made in its nature, and at that very time the production of pains takes place.

Protarchus/ You say what is very probable.

Socrates/ But when the harmony is properly fitted, and it returns to its own nature, we must say that pleasure is produced, if it is requisite for arguments on matters of the greatest moment to be dispatched as quickly as possible in a few words.

Protarchus/ I think, Socrates, you speak correctly; but let us endeavor to speak of these same things still more clearly.

Socrates/ Is it not most easy to understand things of common occurrence and seen all around?

Protarchus/ What kind of things?

Socrates/ Hunger, surely, is a loosening and a pain.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And by eating, a filling-up is, on the other hand, a pleasure.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Thirst also, again, is a corruption and pain, and a loosening; but the power of a liquid, by replenishing the part dried up, is a pleasure. Again, the suffering a preternatural heat, being a separation and dissolving, is a pain: but, on the other hand, according to nature, a giving way and cooling is a pleasure.

Protarchus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And the coagulation of animal moisture through cold, contrary to its nature, is a pain: but, on the other hand, a return to the same state, according to nature, of what had departed and been separated from it, is a pleasure. And, in one word, consider whether the reasoning is in moderation, which says, that when the species, naturally produced with a soul from the limitless and limit, as I previously stated, is corrupted, to it corruption is a pain; but that the road into their being, and the return back again, is of all a pleasure.

Protarchus/ Be it so; for it seems to have some stamp of likelihood.

Socrates/ Let us then lay down this as one kind of pain and pleasure as existing under each of those conditions.

Protarchus/ Let it so lie.

Socrates/ Lay down now the expectation of the soul itself, regards the nature of these circumstances; one antecedent to pleasures enjoyed, a matter hoped for, agreeable and full of confidence; the other, antecedent to pains endured, a thing of fear and anxiety.

Protarchus/ This is, therefore, a different species of pleasure and pain, independent of the body, and produced through an expectation of the soul herself.

Socrates/ You have understood the matter rightly. Now in these feelings, I think, according to my opinion at least, being each of them, as it seems, sincere and unmixed, of pain and pleasure, there will be manifest that respecting pleasure, whether the whole genus is to be embraced, or this is to be assigned to some genus different from those before-mentioned; but that to pleasure and pain it is allowable, like heat and cold, and all other things of this sort, for us to sometimes embrace them, and at other times not to

embrace, as being not good in themselves, but admitting only sometimes, and some of them, the nature of the good.

Protarchus/ You say most correctly that it is requisite for the thing now pursued to be caused to go somewhere in this road.

Socrates/ Let us then look together at this part first. Since, if what has been said is really the fact, when those things are being destroyed, there would be pain, but being preserved, pleasure, let us now consider respecting those which are neither being destroyed, nor being preserved, what condition must there then be to each animal, when such is the case. Give your earnest attention to this point, and tell me, is there not every necessity for every animal at that time to be neither pained nor pleased, either greatly or little?

Protarchus/ There is a necessity.

Socrates/ There is then some third disposition of this kind beside that of being delighted and that of being grieved.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Come then, be ready to remember this decision. For towards the verdict respecting pleasure, it will be not a little thing for us to remember it or not, But let us, if you please, go through this point in few words.

Protarchus/ Say, what?

Socrates/ To a person preferring a life of intellect, you know there is no hindrance to his living in that manner.

Protarchus/ Do you mean in the state of being neither pleased nor pained?

Socrates/ Yes; for it was stated in our comparison of the lives, that there was no necessity for the person, preferring the life of mind and intellect, to be delighted either much or little.

Protarchus/ It was altogether said so.

Socrates/ In this way therefore it would be to him. And perhaps it would be by no means out of the way, if that life were of all the most godlike.

Protarchus/ To me at least it seems unlikely that the gods feel neither pleasure nor its opposite.

Socrates/ It is highly, indeed, unlikely. For each of these things is unseemly. But let us consider further this point afterwards, if it should be to the purpose; and we will apply it towards winning the second prize for mind, should we be unable to apply it for winning the first.

Protarchus/ You speak most correctly.

Socrates/ Now that other species of pleasures, which we said is peculiar to the soul herself, is all produced through memory.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ What memory is, we ought, it seems, to previously remember: and prior to memory, what perception is, methinks; if, what relates to these points, is about to become, as is fitting, clear to us.

Protarchus/ How say you?

Socrates/ Of those circumstances, which are on every occasion surrounding our body, lay down that some are extinguished, before they enter thoroughly the soul, and leave it unscathed; others going through both, bring on them, as it were, a kind of earthquake, peculiar to each and common to both.

Protarchus/ Be it laid down.

Socrates/ If we should say that those, which do not go through both, lie hid from our soul, but that those which do go through both, do not lie hid, should we speak most correctly?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ By no means understand that I am speaking of lying hid, as being in that case somehow the production of forgetfulness. For forgetfulness is the departure of memory. But that has not as yet, in what has been said, been produced. Now of that, which neither is nor has been, it is absurd to say there is any loss. Is it not?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Only then alter the terms.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Instead then of saying that a thing lies hid from the soul, when it is unscathed by any violent shakings of the body, call that insensibility, which you just now called forgetfulness.

Protarchus/ I understand.

Socrates/ In the soul and the body, when affected, in common by one circumstance, being moved also in common, you would not speak wide of the mark by naming that motion a sensation.

Protarchus/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ Now then do we not understand, what we mean to call sensation?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ And a person saying that memory is a preservation of sensation, would correctly say so in my opinion.

Protarchus/ He would correctly.

Socrates/ Do we not say that memory differs from recollection?

Protarchus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Is it not in this?

Protarchus/ In what?

Socrates/ When, what the soul has once together with the body suffered, this it does itself by itself without the body, as much as possible, recover, we say that it then recollects. Do we not?

Protarchus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Moreover, when the soul, after losing the memory of a thing perceived or learnt, brings it back again, itself by itself, in all these instances too we speak of recollections, and memories.

Protarchus/ You speak correctly.

Socrates/ The reason, for which all this has been said, is this.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ That we may at the same time understand as clearly as possible the pleasure of the soul apart from that of the body, and, at the same time, desire. For both of these seem likely to be made clear through those.

Protarchus/ Let us then, Socrates, now speak of what is to follow.

Socrates/ In treating of the generation of pleasure, and of its every form, it is necessary it seems for us to look to many points. For even now we must, it appears, consider, what desire is, and where it is produced.

Protarchus/ Let us then consider; for we shall lose nothing by it.

Socrates/ Nay, Protarchus, we shall lose our doubt about them, and this too, after having found what we are in search of.

Protarchus/ You have well defended yourself. Let us then try to discuss what is next in order to these.

Socrates/ Did we not assert just now, that hunger, and thirst, and many other things of the like kind, were certain desires?

Protarchus/ Yes, strongly.

Socrates/ Looking, then, to what thing, the same in all, do we call those differing so much from one another by one name?

Protarchus/ By Zeus, Socrates, it is, perhaps, not easy to say; it must, however, be told.

Socrates/ Let us from thence take up the inquiry again from the same points.

Protarchus/ From whence?

Socrates/ Do we not constantly say that thirst is something?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Is not this, to have an emptiness?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Is not thirst a desire?

Protarchus/ Yes, for drink.

Socrates/ For drink? or for a repletion from drink?

Protarchus/ For repletion, I suppose.

Socrates/ Whoever of us then is emptied, desires, it seems, what is contrary to what he is suffering. For being emptied, he desires to be filled.

Protarchus/ Most clearly so.

Socrates/ What then, is it possible that the person, who is empty for the first time, should apprehend, from any quarter, either from sense or memory, a filling of that, by which he neither is at the present time affected, nor ever was affected heretofore.

Protarchus/ How can it be?

Socrates/ But, however, the person who desires, desires something.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Now he does not desire that which he is suffering. For he is suffering thirst, and that is emptiness; but he desires repletion.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Something, therefore, of those belonging to the thirsty person, would have a perception in some manner of repletion.

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Now the body is unable; for it is suffering emptiness.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ It is plain then that it is left for the soul to have a perception, by means of memory, of repletion; for by what means could the soul have such perception?

Protarchus/ Nearly by none.

Socrates/ Learn we then, what follows from this reasoning?

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ This reasoning shows us that desire is not produced from the body.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Because it shows that the endeavor of every animal is opposed to its sufferings.

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Now the inclination, leading to a point opposite to the sufferings, indicates somehow the remembrance of things opposite to those sufferings.

Protarchus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ The reasoning then, having shown that memory leads to the things desired, discovers the general inclination and desire, and the ruling power of the soul in every animal.

Protarchus/ Most correctly.

Socrates/ The reasoning then proves that by no means does our body thirst, or hunger, or suffer any of such affections.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Let us further observe likewise this, respecting these very same things. For the reasoning appears desirous of indicating a certain kind of life in those very things.

Protarchus/ In what things? and of what kind of life are you speaking?

Socrates/ I mean in the being filled, and emptied, and in all the other things, which relate to the preservation and the destruction of animals; and whether one of us, being in either of these states, at one time feels pain and another pleasure, according to the changes of circumstances.

Protarchus/ It is so.

Socrates/ But what when a person is in the middle of them?

Protarchus/ How in the middle?

Socrates/ When on account of a suffering he is pained, and yet has a remembrance of pleasures past, a part indeed of his pain ceases; but pleasant things have not been filled up at that time. Shall we affirm, or deny, that he is in the midst of two contrary states?

Protarchus/ Let us affirm it.

Socrates/ That he is pained or pleased wholly?

Protarchus/ By Zeus, he is afflicted by some double pain; according to the body, by his suffering; according to the soul, by a certain longing from an expectation.

Socrates/ How, Protarchus, have you spoken of a doubled pain? Is it not, that at one time one of us, being empty, is in the clear hope of being filled? and at another time, on the contrary, is in a hopeless state?

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Does not the person, who hopes to be filled, seem to you to feel a joy through the recollection of fullness? and yet, being empty, at the same time to be in pain?

Protarchus/ He must be so.

Socrates/ At that time, then, man and other animals are at the same time pained and pleased.

Protarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But what, when a person, being empty, is hopeless of obtaining repletion? will there not be then that doubled state respecting his pains, on which you just now looked, and thought it was simply doubled.

Protarchus/ Most true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now of this inquiry into these feelings let us make this use.

Protarchus/ What use?

Socrates/ Shall we say that these pains and pleasures are true, or false? or that some of them are true, and others false?

Protarchus/ But how can pleasures or pains, Socrates, be false?

Socrates/ How then, Protarchus, could fears be true or false? or expectations, true or not? or opinions, true or false?

Protarchus/ Opinions, I would somehow concede, may be; but I would not the others.

Socrates/ How say you? We are however in danger of, raising up a disquisition of not a little kind.

Protarchus/ You say true.

Socrates/ But whether it relates to what has passed by, O son of that illustrious father, this must be considered.

Protarchus/ Perhaps it ought.

Socrates/ It is meet then to bid farewell to the rest of the disquisition, and to whatever is said beside the purpose.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Tell me then, for a wonderment ever continuously seizes me respecting those very doubts, which we have now brought forward.

Protarchus/ How say you?

Socrates/ Are not some pleasures false, but others true?

Protarchus/ How could they be?

Socrates/ Neither then is there a dream by night or by day as you hold, nor in fits of madness or silliness is there a person, who thinks he is pleased, when he is pleased not at all; nor on the other hand, thinks he is pained, when he is not pained.

Protarchus/ All of us, Socrates, have conceived that all this is the case.

Socrates/ But have they done so correctly? Or must we consider whether this has been said correctly or not?

Protarchus/ We must consider, as I would say.

Socrates/ Let us then define still more clearly what was just now said respecting pleasure and opinion. For it is surely possible for us to hold an opinion?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And to feel a delight.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Moreover that which is held as an opinion, is something.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ And something too that, in which the thing delighted feels a delight.

Protarchus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ The thing then that holds an opinion, whether it holds the opinion rightly or not rightly, never loses the reality of holding an opinion.

Protarchus/ For how could it?

Socrates/ The thing therefore that feels a delight, whether it feels a delight rightly or not rightly, it is evident it will never lose the reality of feeling a delight.

Protarchus/ Certainly; and such is the case.

Socrates/ In what manner then is opinion wont to be to us false and true; but pleasure only true? for to hold an opinion and to feel a delight, have both equally received the property of a reality.

Protarchus/ This we must consider.

Socrates/ Is it that falsehood and truth are incident to opinion? and that through them it not only becomes opinion, but also of what kind each opinion is? Say you that we must consider this?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And in addition to this, whether some things are altogether of certain qualities; but that only pleasure and pain are, what they are, and do not become certain qualities, must we agree upon this point likewise?

Protarchus/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ But it is not difficult to perceive this, that they too are of certain qualities. For we said of old, that pains and

pleasures become great and little, and each of them vehemently so.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And if to anyone of these there be added the quality of evil, shall we not say that opinion has thus become evil, and pleasure likewise evil?

Protarchus/ Why not, Socrates?

Socrates/ What then, if rectitude, or the opposite to rectitude, is added to any of them, shall we not say, that opinion is right, if it possess rectitude; and say the same of pleasure?

Protarchus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ But if what is held as an opinion be mistaken by us, must we not acknowledge that the opinion is erroneous, and not right, and not rightly holding an opinion?

Protarchus/ For how could we?

Socrates/ But what, if we discover any pain or pleasure mistaken about that, in which it is pained, or effected contrariwise, shall we give to it the epithet of right, or good, or any other of honorable appellations?

Protarchus/ It is impossible, if pleasure shall have been mistaken.

Socrates/ And yet pleasure seems often to be produced in us, accompanied, not with a right opinion, but with a false one.

Protarchus/ How not? And the opinion, Socrates, in that case, and at that time, we say is a false opinion; but the pleasure itself, no man would ever call it false.

Socrates/ You very readily, Protarchus, support your argument about pleasure on the present occasion.

Protarchus/ I do nothing else but say what I hear.

Socrates/ With us, my friend, makes there no difference the pleasure, accompanied with right opinion and science, and that which is often produced in each of us, accompanied with a false opinion and ignorance.

Protarchus/ It is probable there is no little difference.

Socrates/ Let us then come to the view of the difference between them.

Protarchus/ Lead by whatever road it seems good.

Socrates/ I lead then by this.

Protarchus/ By what?

Socrates/ We say there is a false opinion, and there is likewise a true one.

Protarchus/ There is.

Socrates/ Upon them, as we just now said, pleasure and pain oftentimes attend; I mean, upon opinion true and false.

Protarchus/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ From memory and sensation is not opinion and the attempt to hold an opinion thoroughly produced on every occasion?

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Do we, then, deem it necessary for us to have ourselves thus?

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Would you say that it often happens to a person looking from a distance, on things not very clearly discerned, to be willing to form a judgment of them?

Protarchus/ I would say so.

Socrates/ Upon this, would not the person question himself thus?

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ What is that, which appears to be standing under a tree by the cliff there? Does it not seem to you that a person would speak these words to himself, looking at some such things as perchance appeared to him?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Hereupon would not such a person, as if giving an answer, say to himself, speaking conjecturingly, It is a man?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But carried beside the truth, he would perhaps say of the figure clearly discerned, that it is the work of some shepherds.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if anyone were present, he would express by his voice to the person present, what he had said to himself, and repeat the very same words; and thus, what we lately termed an opinion, becomes a speech.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ But if he were alone, thinking continuously within himself upon this very same thing, he walks on keeping it in his mind sometimes for even a rather long period.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Well then, does that, which takes place respecting these things, appear to you as it does to me?

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ The soul in that case seems to me to resemble some book.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ The memory coinciding with our sensations, and those affections which are about them, seem to me almost at that time to write in our souls speeches. And when

this suffering writes what is true, there result from it true opinions, and true speeches are produced within us; but when such a scribe, within us writes what is false, there results what is contrary to the truth.

Protarchus/ So it seems entirely to me; and I receive what has been stated.

Socrates/ Admit likewise, that there is another workman existing at that time within us.

Protarchus/ Who is he?

Socrates/ A painter, who, after the writer of what has been mentioned, paints of such things the representations in the soul.

Protarchus/ How and when say we this person does so?

Socrates/ It is when a person, having taken away from sight, or from any other sense, what have been imagined by and mentioned to himself, sees somehow within himself the representations of what have been imagined by and spoken to himself. Or does this not take place within us?

Protarchus/ It takes place very much so.

Socrates/ The representations then of true thoughts and speeches are true; but those of the false are false.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Now if we have spoken thus far correctly, let us still consider in addition likewise this.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Whether it is necessary for us to be affected thus, with respect to things present and past, but not the future.

Protarchus/ With respect to all time in a similar manner.

Socrates/ Were not the pleasures and pains, felt by the soul alone, asserted before to be such, that they would arise prior to those felt by the body; so that it happens to us to

feel antecedently pain and pleasure, about the time about to be produced?

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Do then the writings and the pictures, which we laid down a little before, as being produced within us, have regard to the past and present time, but not to the future?

Protarchus/ Very much about the future.

Socrates/ Do you strongly assert that all these things are expectations of the future; and that we are, through all life, full of expectations?

Protarchus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Now then, in addition to what has been said, answer this likewise.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ A man just, and pious, and entirely good, is he not god-loved?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ What then, is not a man unjust and entirely wicked, the reverse of the other?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Now every man, as we said just now, is full of many expectations.

Protarchus/ Why not?

Socrates/ There are speeches within each of us, which we call expectations.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And fantasies also are painted in us. For one often sees a deal of money belonging to himself, and many pleasures in addition to it, and he views himself painted within himself, as highly delighted.

Protarchus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Of these fantasies, shall we say that the true are painted and placed before the good, for the most part, on account of these persons being god-loved, but the contrary before the bad, for the most part? or shall we deny it?

Protarchus/ We must assert it strongly.

Socrates/ To wicked men, then, likewise pleasures are present painted within them; but these are of the false kind.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Wicked men, therefore, for the most part delight in false pleasures; but the good, in the true.

Protarchus/ You assert what is most necessary.

Socrates/ According then to this reasoning, there are in the souls of men false pleasures; imitating however, in a ridiculous way, the true; and similar is the case with pains.

Protarchus/ There are.

Socrates/ It is possible then for a person, who holds upon everything an opinion, to hold always an opinion really upon things which are not, nor have been, and, sometimes, on such as will never be?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And these are they that effect at that time a false opinion, and the thinking falsely. Is it not?

Protarchus/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Well then, must we not attribute in return to pains and pleasures a state in them the counterpart of that in the others?

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ That it is possible for a person, who feels a delight upon everything, in any manner whatever, and at random, to feel always really a delight, not only from things which are not, and sometimes from things which never were,

but frequently too, and, perhaps, the most frequently, from things which are never about to be?

Protarchus/ This, too, must of necessity be the case.

Socrates/ Would there not be the same reasoning as regards fears and desires, and all things of that kind, that all such are sometimes false?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, can we say of opinions, that they are evil, and advantageous, any otherwise than as being false?

Protarchus/ Not otherwise.

Socrates/ And pleasures, I think, we conceive are bad on no other account, except by their being false.

Protarchus/ It is quite the contrary, Socrates, to what you have said. For hardly would any man attribute to falsehood that pains and pleasures are very evil, but that they fall in with wickedness much and of many-kind by some other way.

Socrates/ Of pleasures that are evil, and are such through wickedness, we will speak shortly afterwards, if so it seem good to us. But of those that are false and many and oftentimes existing and produced in us in yet another way, we must say a word. For perhaps we shall make use of it for our decisions.

Protarchus/ How not? if indeed they exist.

Socrates/ And there are such, Protarchus, at least in my opinion. But as long as this doctrine lies by us unexamined, it is impossible for it to be disproved.

Protarchus/ Fairly said.

Socrates/ Let us then stand up, like combatants, against this reasoning.

Protarchus/ Let us come on.

Socrates/ We said, if we remember, a little while before, that, when what are the so-called desires remain in us, the

body is at that time laid hold of by its affections in two ways, and apart from the soul.

Protarchus/ We remember; for so it was said.

Socrates/ The soul therefore was that which desired a condition contrary to that of the body; but that, which imparted any pain or pleasure through any circumstance, was the body.

Protarchus/ It was so.

Socrates/ Now reckon together what takes place in these.

Protarchus/ Say what.

Socrates/ It takes place then, when such is the case, that at the same time pains and pleasures lie by each other's side; and that at the same time the sensations respecting these, being contrary, are by the side of each other as has just now appeared.

Protarchus/ It appears so.

Socrates/ Has not this also been said, and is laid down, as having been agreed upon as before?

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ That pain and pleasure, both of them receive "the more" and "the less and that they belong to the limitless.

Protarchus/ It has been said; what then?

Socrates/ There is then some plan for judging of these correctly.

Protarchus/ Where, and how?

Socrates/ Does not the design of our decision respecting them aim at distinguishing them on each occasion by such marks as these, which of them as compared with each other is the greater, and which the less; and which is more and which less intense pain, as compared with pleasure, and pain with pain, and pleasure with pleasure?

Protarchus/ Such these things are, and such is the design of our decision.

Socrates/ Well now, in the case of vision, to see magnitudes far off and near causes the truth to disappear, and makes us to have false opinions. And does not the very same thing happen in the case of pains and pleasures?

Protarchus/ Rather much more, Socrates.

Socrates/ What has happened now is surely contrary to what occurred a little before.

Protarchus/ Of what are you speaking?

Socrates/ In that case the opinions themselves, being false and true, infected at the same time pains and pleasures with their own state of suffering.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But now, through being on each occasion changed in position, and viewed far off and near, and at the same time placed by each other, the pleasures appear greater and more intense as compared with the pains; and the pains, on the other hand, compared with the pleasures appear the contrary to those.

Protarchus/ For such things to arise through such means, is a matter of necessity.

Socrates/ As far therefore as each appear greater and less than they really are, if you cut off what each appears to be, but is not, you will neither say that it appears correctly, nor, on the other hand, will you dare to say that the additional part of pain and pleasure is correct and true.

Protarchus/ By no means.

Socrates/ Next then in order after these we will look, if we can meet with them here, upon pleasures and pains still more false than those, which both appear to be and are in animals.

Protarchus/ Of what are you speaking, and how?

Socrates/ It has been often said, that when the nature of each thing is being destroyed by mixtures and separations, by repletions and evacuations, by increase and decrease, pains, and aches, and throes, and everything else that bear suchlike names, do happen to be produced.

Protarchus/ Yes, this has been said frequently.

Socrates/ But that when things return to their natural state, we have received this recovery as a pleasure from ourselves.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ But how is it, when none of these things shall have taken place?

Protarchus/ When could this be, Socrates?

Socrates/ The question, Protarchus, which you have now asked is nothing to the purpose.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Because it does not hinder me from putting again my question to you.

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ If nothing of this kind, I will say, Protarchus, took place, what must of necessity result to us from it?

Protarchus/ Do you mean when the body is not moved either way?

Socrates/ Exactly so.

Protarchus/ It is plain, Socrates, that in such case there would be neither pleasure nor any pain at all.

Socrates/ You have spoken extremely well. But I suppose you mean this, that it is necessary for some of these things to happen to us continually, as say the wise. For all things, going upwards and downwards, are in a perpetual flow.

Protarchus/ So they say indeed, and seem to speak not badly.

Socrates/ For how should they speak badly, not being bad themselves. But from this reasoning, which is rushing against us, I wish to secretly withdraw. I design then to run away by this road; and do you fly with me.

Protarchus/ Say by what road?

Socrates/ Let us say, then, to these wise men, “Be it so.” But do you give an answer to this—Whatever any animal suffers, does it, while suffering, perceive that continually? and neither while growing, or suffering any such change, are we unconscious of it? or is it quite the reverse? for almost everything of this kind has lain hid from us.

Protarchus/ Quite the reverse.

Socrates/ That therefore which was just now said, was said by us not correctly, that all changes, which take place up and down, produce pains or pleasures.

Protarchus/ Why not?

Socrates/ In this way the assertion will be better, and less liable to censure.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ That great changes produce in us pains and pleasures; but the moderate and trifling neither of them at all.

Protarchus/ In this manner it is more correctly said than in the other, Socrates.

Socrates/ If then these things are so, the life mentioned just now would come back again.

Protarchus/ What life?

Socrates/ That which we said was without pain and pleasures.

Protarchus/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ From hence let us lay down for ourselves three kinds of life, one pleasant, another painful, and one neutral. Or how would you say respecting them?

Protarchus/ Not otherwise myself than in this way, that there are three kinds of life.

Socrates/ To feel no pain therefore cannot be the same thing as to feel a pleasure.

Protarchus/ How can it?

Socrates/ When therefore you hear that to live through all life without pain, is the most pleasant of all things, what do you understand that a person so saying means?

Protarchus/ Such a person seems to me at least to mean that it is a pleasure not to feel a pain.

Socrates/ Of any three things, whatever you like, existing, lay down, in order that we may adopt the names of things rather pretty, one gold, another silver, and another neither gold nor silver.

Protarchus/ It is so laid down.

Socrates/ Is it possible for that which is neither, to become either gold or silver?

Protarchus/ No; for how could it?

Socrates/ The middle life then being said to be pleasant or painful, would not be correctly thought to be so, should any so think it; nor, should anyone so speak of it, would it be so spoken of according at least to a correct reasoning.

Protarchus/ No; for how could it?

Socrates/ And yet, my friend, we perceive there are those, who thus speak and think.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do then those persons feel pleasure at the time, when they are not pained?

Protarchus/ So they say.

Socrates/ They think therefore they are pleased then; for otherwise they would not say so.

Protarchus/ It nearly seems so.

Socrates/ They have then a false opinion of pleasure, if the natures of the two things, to be not pained and to be pleased, are separate from each other.

Protarchus/ And different indeed they were.

Socrates/ Shall we choose then that there are, as we said just now, three things, or that only two are to be mentioned, pain, an evil to man, and deliverance from pain, a pleasure, as being the good itself.

Protarchus/ How is it, Socrates, that we are asked this by ourselves at the present time? for I do not understand.

Socrates/ In fact, Protarchus, you do not understand who are the enemies of Philebus here.

Protarchus/ Whom do you call such?

Socrates/ They, who are said to be very skilled in natural philosophy, assert that pleasures do not exist at all.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ They say that all those things, which the partisans of Philebus call pleasures, are but escapes from pain.

Protarchus/ Do you then advise us, Socrates, to hearken to them? or how?

Socrates/ Not so; but to use them as a kind of diviners; who divine not by any art, but, from the austerity of the not ignoble nature of those, who had a great hate of the power of pleasure, and have held nothing in her to be sound; so that her attraction is merely a witchcraft and not true pleasure. In this way then we should use them, especially if we consider their other austerities. But afterwards you shall hear what seem to me to be true pleasures, in order that,

after viewing from both accounts her power, we may place ourselves so as to come to a decision.

Protarchus/ You speak correctly.

Socrates/ Let us then go after them, as our allies, along the track of their austerity. For I suppose they assert some such thing as this, beginning from some point above, that, if we wish to know the nature of any species whatever of things, for instance, of the hard, whether by looking to the hardest things, should we thus better understand than to those endued with hardness in the least. Now, Protarchus, you must give an answer, as if to myself, to these austere persons likewise.

Protarchus/ By all means; and I say to them, that we must look to the first in magnitude.

Socrates/ If then we wish to know the genus of pleasure, and what kind of nature it has, we must look not to the least, but to those called the extreme and violent.

Protarchus/ On this point everyone would agree with you for the present.

Socrates/ Do not the pleasures then, which are within reach, and still more the greatest, as we often say, belong to the body?

Protarchus/ Yes; for how not?

Socrates/ Are then the pleasures, which exist in, and are generated about, persons in bad health, greater than those about persons in good health? Now let us take care, lest we stumble by answering precipitately.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ For perhaps we might say those about persons in good health.

Protarchus/ Probably.

Socrates/ But what, are not those pleasures the superior, which the strongest desires precede.

Protarchus/ This indeed is true.

Socrates/ But do not both they, who are in a fever, and those afflicted with diseases of that kind, thirst more, and shiver more, and suffer more all that persons are wont to do in the body, and are more conversant with the want of those things, in which, being supplied, they feel a greater pleasure? Or shall we deny all this to be true?

Protarchus/ It appears to be altogether as now stated.

Socrates/ What then, should we appear to speak correctly by saying, that, if anyone would know what are the greatest pleasures, he must not go and look upon the healthy, but upon the sick? But be careful not to conceive that I am designing to ask you this, whether those in very ill health feel more pleasures than those in good health; but conceive that I am inquiring about the greatness of pleasure, and where and when the intensity belonging to such a feeling is on every occasion produced. For we are to consider, we say, what is the nature of pleasure, and what they call it, who assert that it does not exist at all.

Protarchus/ But I nearly follow your argument.

Socrates/ Perchance, Protarchus, you will show it not the less. For answer me—In a life of riot do you see greater pleasures—I do not mean more in number, but exceeding in intensity and vehemence—than those in a life of temperance? Give your mind to the question, and tell me.

Protarchus/ Nay, but I understand what you mean; and I see the one that is greatly superior. For the saying that has become a proverb, and which exhorts to “nothing too much,” on every occasion restrains somehow the temperate who obey it. But intense pleasure possesses even to madness the race of the silly and riotous, and makes them in bad repute.

Socrates/ Excellent. For if this be the case, it is evident that the greatest pleasures, and likewise the greatest pains, are produced in some wickedness of the soul and of the body, and not in their virtuous state.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Ought then one not to select some of the pleasures, and to consider what condition they had, when we called them the greatest?

Protarchus/ It is necessary.

Socrates/ Consider now what condition have the pleasures arising from maladies of such a kind.

Protarchus/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ The unseemly; which they, whom we called the austere, thoroughly hate.

Protarchus/ What pleasures?

Socrates/ For instance, the curing the itch by scratching, and such others of a kind as need no other remedy; for as to this affection, forsooth, what, by the gods, shall we call it, pleasure or pain?

Protarchus/ This, Socrates, seems to be a kind of mixed evil.

Socrates/ It was not however for the sake of Philebus that I brought forward this argument; but without these pleasures and those that follow them, unless they were seen, we should have scarcely been able to decide upon the object of the present inquiry.

Protarchus/ We must then proceed to such as have an affinity with them.

Socrates/ Do you mean those, that have some communion by their mixture?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Of these mixtures then, some belonging to the body, are in the bodies alone; others belonging to the soul alone, are in the soul; but those of the soul and body we shall find to be pains mixed with pleasures, called unitedly at one time pleasures, at another time pains.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ When a person in a restored or decaying state suffers at the same time two contrary affections, and when shivering warms himself, and sometimes cools himself when heated, seeking, I presume, to enjoy the one and to be relieved from the other, the so-called sweet mixed with bitter being present with a difficulty of deliverance causes an impatience, and a fierce standing together.

Protarchus/ And very true is what has been now said.

Socrates/ Are not the mixtures of this kind composed some of pain and pleasure in equal proportion, and others of either in a greater one?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Say then that, when the pains are more than the pleasures, those, which have been just now mentioned, belong to the itch and to tinglings. When there is within that, which boils and is inflamed, and a person by rubbing and scratching does not reach it, but only diffuses what is on the surface, then those inflaming the laboring parts, and by that very thing, through the want of remedies, changing to the contrary, at one time they procure immense pleasures, at another, on the contrary, from the internal parts they bring to the pains of the external parts, pleasures mixed with pains, according as a thing inclines this way or that; because things mixed together violently disjoin, or separated violently unite, and at the same time place pains by the side of pleasures.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Hence, when on the other hand more pleasure is mingled, according to all such things, the slightly-mingled portion of pain tickles and causes there to be a slight uneasiness: but, on the other hand, the much greater pleasure being infused, puts on the stretch, and sometimes causes to leap, and working out all kinds of color, all kinds of posture, and all kinds of breathings, it works out every stupor and exclamations accompanied with madness.

Protarchus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And it causes, my friend, a person to say of himself, and another likewise to say, that, delighted with such pleasures, he is, as it were, dying. And these pleasures by all means and forever is he pursuing, so much the more, as he happens to be more unrestrained, and less prudent; and he calls them the greatest, and reckons him the happiest of men, who lives the most in them.

Protarchus/ You have gone through, Socrates, all that happens to the bulk of mankind, according to their own estimate.

Socrates/ At least, Protarchus, as regards the pleasures which are in the common affections of the body alone, those on the superficies and the body having been mingled. But with regard to those in the soul, the contrary confer with the body, both pain towards pleasure, and pleasure towards pain, so that both come to one mixture; these we have detailed before, as when a person, on the other hand, is emptied, he desires repletion, but being emptied he is pained. To these points we did not then appeal as evidence; but we now say, that in all those cases, infinite in number, where the soul is different from the body, one mixture of pain and pleasure is produced and comes together.

Protarchus/ You appear nearly to speak most correctly.

Socrates/ There is then among the mixtures of pain and pleasure, still one remaining.

Protarchus/ Of what kind are you speaking?

Socrates/ The mixture which we said the soul alone oftentimes receives from itself.

Protarchus/ How then do we say the same thing again?

Socrates/ Anger, and fear, and desire, and lamentation, and love, and emulation, and envy, and all other such passions, do you not lay down these as certain pains of the soul alone?

Protarchus/ I do.

Socrates/ And shall we not find these very passions fraught with boundless pleasures? Or need we be reminded of that, which leads a very prudent person to be harsh through his passion and rage;

And which than honey dropping is more sweet;

and that in our lamentations and regrets, pleasures have been mixed up with pains?

Protarchus/ No we need not. But in this way and in no other would these happen to be produced.

Socrates/ And do you not remember at the representations of tragedies, when persons weep in the midst of joy?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ And have you perceived the disposition of your soul during a comedy, how that there a mixture of pain and pleasure is found?

Protarchus/ I do not well comprehend.

Socrates/ For it is not altogether easy, Protarchus, at such a time, to understand a feeling of this kind in every case.

Protarchus/ To me at least it is not at all easy.

Socrates/ Let us, however, lay hold of it so much the more, as it is the more obscure, in order that one may be able in other cases to discover more easily the mixture of pain and pleasure.

Protarchus/ Say on.

Socrates/ The name just now mentioned of envy, will you set it down as a sort of pain in the soul, or how?

Protarchus/ Just so.

Socrates/ And yet the man who envies will plainly appear to be delighted with the evils of his neighbors.

Protarchus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Now ignorance is an evil; and so is the condition which we term stupidity.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ From hence perceive what is the nature of the ridiculous.

Protarchus/ Do you only tell it.

Socrates/ A certain depravity is so called, in a few words, after some habit. But of the total depravity, the contrary is that affection, which is mentioned in the inscription at Delphi.

Protarchus/ You mean, Socrates, the “Know thyself.”

Socrates/ I do. And the contrary to that saying would be, it is plain, if mentioned in any writing, “Not to know oneself in any respect at all.”

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Try now, Protarchus, to divide this very thing self-ignorance into three kinds.

Protarchus/ How, say you? for I shall not be able to do it.

Socrates/ Do you say that I must make this division for the present?

Protarchus/ I say it, and in addition to saying, I request you.

Socrates/ Is it not necessary then for each of those, who do not know themselves, to be subject to this condition in three ways?

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ First, with respect to property, to fancy themselves wealthier than according to their substance.

Protarchus/ Many persons, truly, there are, who are suffering this.

Socrates/ Yet more numerous are they, who fancy themselves to be taller and more handsome, and, in all the things excelling, that relate to the body, beyond the real truth itself.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ But the most numerous, I think, have, as regards the third kind of those things in the soul, made a mistake, by fancying themselves rather virtuous, although not being so.

Protarchus/ Greatly so.

Socrates/ Among the virtues, is it not wisdom, that the multitude clutch at, through being full of contention, and of a false opinion about wisdom?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Should anyone then say that all such feeling is an evil, he would say what is true?

Protarchus/ Perfectly so.

Socrates/ This then, Protarchus, must still be divided into two parts, if we are about, on beholding that child-like envy, to see the strange mixture of pleasure and of pain.

Protarchus/ How then shall we cut them, say you?

Socrates/ All such as foolishly hold this false opinion of themselves, it necessarily happens that upon some of these, as it does in the case of all men in general, strength and power follow; but upon others the reverse.

Protarchus/ It does so necessarily.

Socrates/ In this way then divide them. For whoever of them are accompanied by weakness, and being such are unable, when laughed at, to revenge themselves, in saying that these are open to ridicule, you will speak the truth. But in calling those, who are able to take their revenge, persons to be dreaded, and powerful, and hostile, you would give to yourself the most correct account of them. For ignorance, accompanied with power, is hostile and base; for it is hurtful to everyone, both itself and whatever are its likenesses. But ignorance, without power, has obtained the rank and nature of what is an object of ridicule.

Protarchus/ You speak most correctly. But in these remarks the mixture of pain and pleasure is not to me very apparent.

Socrates/ Understand then first the force of envy.

Protarchus/ Only tell it.

Socrates/ There is an unjust pain surely, and an unjust pleasure?

Protarchus/ There is so of necessity.

Socrates/ There is then neither injustice, nor envy, in rejoicing at the ills of our enemies.

Protarchus/ Certainly. How not?

Socrates/ But sometimes, on beholding the ills of our friends, to feel no pain, but on the contrary, a pleasure, is not an act of injustice?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Did we not say that ignorance was an evil to all?

Protarchus/ Correctly so.

Socrates/ Shall we say that the false notion in our friends of their wisdom, and beauty, and of whatever else we mentioned, while stating that they belonged to three kinds, is an object of ridicule when weak, but of hatred when powerful? or shall we deny, what I just now said, that this habit of our friends, when a person possesses it harmless to others, is an object of ridicule?

Protarchus/ Yes, very much.

Socrates/ And do we not acknowledge this false notion to be an evil, as being ignorance?

Protarchus/ Heartily.

Socrates/ Do we feel pleasure or pain, when we laugh at it?

Protarchus/ It is plain that we feel pleasure.

Socrates/ Did we not say, that it is envy, which produces in us pleasure at the ills of our friends?

Protarchus/ It must be envy.

Socrates/ Our reasoning then shows, that, when we laugh at what is ridiculous in our friends, by mixing delight with envy we mix together pleasure and pain. For envy was acknowledged long ago to be a pain to the soul, but laughing a pleasure; but in these cases they arise, both of them, at the same time.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Our argument then points out, that in laments and songs of joy, and not only in dramas, but in the whole tragedy and comedy of life, and in a ten-thousand other cases, pains and pleasures are mingled together.

Protarchus/ It would be impossible, Socrates, for a man not to acknowledge this, were he ever so fond of dispute against an opposite opinion.

Socrates/ We have proposed to consider anger, and regret, and lamentation, and fear and love, and jealousy and envy, and such other passions, in which we said we should find those mixed feelings, that have been so often mentioned. Did we not?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do we understand that all, which relates to grief, and envy, and anger, has been now dispatched?

Protarchus/ How do we not understand?

Socrates/ Is there not much yet remaining?

Protarchus/ Yes, very much.

Socrates/ On what account, principally, do you suppose it was that I explained to you the mixture of feelings in a comedy? Was it not from a belief, that it was easy to show the mixture in fear, in love, and in the other passions? and that, after you had admitted this to yourself, it would be meet to dismiss me, and by no longer proceeding to the rest, that I might not prolong the argument; but that you might receive, without exception, this doctrine, —that the body without the soul, and the soul without the body, and both together likewise, are, in the things affecting them, full of pleasure mingled with pain. Now therefore say whether you will dismiss me, or make it midnight before I finish. But I imagine that, after speaking a little more, I shall obtain from you my dismissal. For of all these things I shall be willing to give you an account tomorrow; but at present I wish to proceed on my course to what remains towards the decision, which Philebus enjoins.

Protarchus/ Well have you spoken, Socrates; and as to what remains, go through it in whatever way is agreeable to yourself.

Socrates/ According to nature, then, after the mixed pleasures, we will proceed in turn by a kind of necessity to the unmixed.

Protarchus/ You have spoken most beautifully.

Socrates/ These I will endeavor in turn to point out to you. For to those, who assert that all pleasures are but a cessation from pain, I do not altogether give credit. But, as I said before, I make use of these persons as to the fact, — that some pleasures seem to be, but are by no means so in reality; and that some others appear to be many and great, but are mixed up with pains, and a cessation from the greatest pains, touching the difficulties of the body and the soul.

Protarchus/ But what pleasures are those, Socrates, which a person, deeming to be true, would rightly think so?

Socrates/ Those which relate to what are called beautiful colors, and to figures, and to the generality of odors, and to sounds, and to whatever that possesses wants unperceived, and that without pain yields a repletion perceived, and pleasant, and unmixed with pain.

Protarchus/ How, Socrates, speak we thus again of these things?

Socrates/ What I am saying is not, indeed, directly obvious. I must therefore try to make it clear. For I will endeavor to speak of the beauty of figures, not as the majority of persons understand them, such as of animals, and some paintings to the life, but as reason says, I allude to something straight and round, and the figures formed from them by the turner's lathe, both superficial and solid, and those by the plumb-line and angle-rule, if you

understand me. For these, I say, are not beautiful for a particular purpose, as other things are; but are by nature ever beautiful by themselves, and possess certain peculiar pleasures, not at all similar to those from scratchings; and colors possessing this form beautiful and pleasures. But do we understand? or how?

Protarchus/ I endeavor to do so, Socrates; but do you endeavor likewise to speak still more clearly.

Socrates/ I say then that sounds gentle and clear, and sending out one pure strain, are beautiful, not with relation to another strain, but singly by themselves, and that inherent pleasures attend them.

Protarchus/ Such is indeed the fact.

Socrates/ The kind of pleasures arising from odors is less divine than those; but through pains being not of necessity mixed with them, and their happening to be produced for us by any means and in anything, I lay down all this as opposed to those. But, if you observe, these are two kinds of pleasures spoken of.

Protarchus/ I do observe.

Socrates/ To these then let us still add the pleasures connected with learning; if indeed they seem to us not to have a hunger after learning, nor pains arising at the commencement, through the hunger after learning.

Protarchus/ But so it seems to me.

Socrates/ What then if there should be to those, who have been filled with learning, losses subsequently through forgetfulness, do you perceive any pains in those losses?

Protarchus/ Not naturally, but through some reasonings respecting the suffering, when, after being deprived, a person feels a pain through a want.

Socrates/ At present however, blessed man, we are going through the feelings arising only from nature, independent of any reasonings.

Protarchus/ You are right then, in saying, that, in learning, a forgetfulness frequently takes place, without any pain to us.

Socrates/ These pleasures, then, of learning, we must say are unmixed with pains. But by no means do they belong to the majority of mankind, but to the very few.

Protarchus/ How must we not say so?

Socrates/ Since, then, we have tolerably well distinguished between the pure pleasures and those which are almost rightly called impure, let us in our account attribute to vehement pleasures immoderation; to those that are not so, the contrary moderation; and those that admit the great and the intensely, and contrariwise the little and the mildly, such, let us say, do all of them ever belong to the limitless genus, namely, the more and the less, borne along through the body and soul; but that those, which do not admit of these properties, belong to the moderate.

Protarchus/ You speak most correctly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Still further, in addition to these, we must look thoroughly subsequently into this belonging to them.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ What it is meet to say contributes to truth. Is it the pure, and sincere, and sufficient, or the violent, and the many, and the much?

Protarchus/ What do you mean, Socrates, in asking this?

Socrates/ That I may omit proving nothing relating to pleasure and knowledge, whether in either of them a part is pure, and a part not pure, in order that each being pure may

come to a trial, and enable myself and you and all these here to form a decision more easily.

Protarchus/ Most correctly said.

Socrates/ Come then, let us consider in this way respecting all the kinds which we say are pure; and having first selected someone from among them, look at it thoroughly.

Protarchus/ What then shall we select?

Socrates/ Let us look, if you will, at the white kind amongst the first.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ How then, and what would be the purity of white? whether, where there is the greatest and most, or where it is the least mixed in that substance, in which there is no portion of any other color?

Protarchus/ Evidently, where it is the most sincere.

Socrates/ Rightly said. Shall we then, Protarchus, not lay down this as the truest, and at the same the most beautiful of all whites; but not that, where it is the largest, and most.

Protarchus/ Most correctly.

Socrates/ If then we should say, that a little of pure white is more white, and more beautiful, and more truly white, than a great quantity of mixed white, we should say what is entirely correct.

Protarchus/ Most correctly.

Socrates/ Well then, we shall assuredly be not wanting in any such examples in favor of our reasoning respecting pleasure; but it is sufficient for us to perceive from thence, that in the case of pleasure in general, a portion small in size and little in quantity, yet unmixed with pain, would be more sweet, more true, and more beautiful, than a portion large in size, and great in quantity, mixed with pain.

Protarchus/ Greatly so, and quite sufficient is the example.

Socrates/ But what is one of this kind? Have we not heard respecting pleasure, that it is a thing always generating, and that of pleasure there is no existence at all? For some clever persons, forsooth, to whom we owe thanks, attempt to point out to us this kind of reasoning.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Shall I go through it before you, friend Protarchus, and interrogate you?

Protarchus/ Only tell it, and interrogate.

Socrates/ There are some two things; one itself by itself; the other always desirous of something else.

Protarchus/ How say you this? and of what are you speaking?

Socrates/ The one is by nature most worthy of respect; the other falls short of it.

Protarchus/ Speak a little more clearly.

Socrates/ We have beheld young persons, beautiful and good, and seen their admirers.

Protarchus/ Often.

Socrates/ Similar then to these two seek two others, according to all those things, which we say is the third to another.

Protarchus/ State more plainly, Socrates, what you mean.

Socrates/ It is nothing subtle, Protarchus. But our present argument is playing with us; and says, that of things existing one thing is ever for the sake of something; and the other, for the sake of which there is on every occasion produced that, which is produced always for the sake of something.

Protarchus/ I scarcely understand you, through the being said oftentimes.

Socrates/ Perhaps, however, we shall better understand, boy, as the reasoning proceeds.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Let us now take these two different things.

Protarchus/ Of what kinds?

Socrates/ The generating of all things is one kind; the existence, another.

Protarchus/ I acknowledge these two, existence and generating.

Socrates/ Most correctly. Now, which of these shall we say is for the sake of which? Shall we say, generating is for the sake of existence, or existence for the sake of generating?

Protarchus/ Are you now inquiring whether that, which is called existence, is what it is for the sake of generating?

Socrates/ I appear so.

Protarchus/ By the gods, would you be asking me in addition?

Socrates/ I mean, Protarchus, something of this kind. Would you say that ship-building exists for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of ship-building? and whatever things there are of the like kind, Protarchus, I mean by this very question.

Protarchus/ Why then, Socrates, do you not give an answer to it yourself?

Socrates/ There is no reason why not. Do you however take a share with me in the discourse.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ I say then, that, for the sake of generating, medicines, and all instruments, and all matter is placed by the side of all; but that each act of generating is for the sake

of some individual existence, one for one kind and another for another; but that generating taken universally is for the sake of existence taken universally.

Protarchus/ Most clearly.

Socrates/ Pleasure then, if it be a generating, will of necessity be for the sake of some existence.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Now that, for the sake of which the thing generated for the sake of something would be always generated, is in the portion of the good; but that which is generated for the sake of anything, must, my friend, be placed in another portion.

Protarchus/ It is most necessary.

Socrates/ If then pleasure be a generating, shall we not in placing it in an allotment different from that of the good, correctly place it?

Protarchus/ Most correctly.

Socrates/ Hence, as I said at the beginning of this argument, we owe many thanks to the person, who pointed out, respecting pleasure, that it is a generating, but that its existence is not anything whatever. For it is plain that this person would laugh at those who assert that pleasure is a good.

Protarchus/ Very heartily.

Socrates/ And this very same person would certainly on every occasion laugh at those, who place their ultimate end in generatings.

Protarchus/ How, and what kind of men, do you mean?

Socrates/ Such as those curing hunger or thirst, or any of such things as by generating cures are delighted on account of generating being a pleasure; and who declare they would not choose to live without being thirsty and

hungry, and suffering those other things, which one might mention as following such kinds of feelings.

Protarchus/ They are likely to do so.

Socrates/ Would not all of us say that destruction is the contrary of generation?

Protarchus/ It is of necessity so.

Socrates/ Whoever then chooses this, would choose destruction and generation, but not that third life, in which it is possible for a person to be neither pleased nor pained, but to have thoughts the purest possible.

Protarchus/ Much absurdity, as it seems, Socrates, would result, should anyone lay down that pleasure is a good.

Socrates/ Much; since let us discourse still in this way.

Protarchus/ In what?

Socrates/ How is it not absurd for nothing good or beautiful to exist, neither in the body nor in many other things, except in the soul, and there only pleasure; and that neither fortitude, nor temperance, nor mind, nor any of the good things, which the soul has obtained by lot, should exist of that kind? And still in addition to this, that the person not delighted, but in pain, should be compelled to say that he is then wicked, when he is in pain, although he be the best of all men; and on the other hand, that the person delighted excels in virtue so much the more, as he is the more delighted then, when he is delighted.

Protarchus/ All these suppositions, Socrates, are absurdities, the greatest possible.

Socrates/ Let us then not endeavor to make an examination of pleasure at all; nor appear to be, as it were, very chary of mind and science; but let us spiritedly strike everything all round, if perchance it gives a cracked sound,

until coming to the view of that, which is naturally the most free from a flaw, we may use it for our decision, suited alike both to the truest parts of these and of pleasure likewise.

Protarchus/ Rightly said.

Socrates/ Is there not, I think, one part of the sciences relating to learning in general, connected with handicraft trades, and another with instruction and nurture?

Protarchus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Now in the manual arts, let us consider, first, whether there is one part more closely connected with science, and another part less so; and whether it is meet to reckon the former as the most pure, but the latter as the most impure.

Protarchus/ It is meet.

Socrates/ We must therefore take the leading arts apart from each individual one.

Protarchus/ What arts? and how?

Socrates/ As if a person should, for example, separate from all arts arithmetic, and mensuration, and weighing, the remainder of each would become, so to say, inconsiderable.

Protarchus/ Inconsiderable indeed.

Socrates/ For after these there would be left for those only to conjecture, and to exercise the senses by experience and practice, who by making use of the power of guessing, which the many call art, have worked out their strength by assiduity and labor.

Protarchus/ You say what is most necessarily true.

Socrates/ In the first place, is not the musical art full of conjecture, while adapting the harmony not by a fixed measure, but by practice? and of it taken universally do not hautboy-playing and harp-playing hunt out the measure suited to each by the aid of a mouth-piece and string

through guessing merely, so that it has a great deal mixed, which is not very certain, and only a little, that is sure.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Moreover we shall find that the medical, and agricultural, and naval, and military arts are in a similar condition.

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ But the art of building we shall find, I think, making use of very many measures and instruments; which, giving to it great accuracy, make it more scientific than the majority of arts.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ So too in ship-building, and house-building, and in many other works of carpentry. For in these, I think, the art uses the straight rule, and the turning-lathe, and the compass, and the plumb-line, and the marking-line, and the level properly formed.

Protarchus/ You say very correctly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let us then place the arts so called into two kinds; some following music, and possessing in their works a less share of accuracy; others, building, possessing a larger share.

Protarchus/ Let them be so placed.

Socrates/ And of these arts, that those are the most accurate which we lately said were the prime or leading.

Protarchus/ You seem to me to be speaking of arithmetic, and those other arts, which together with it you mentioned just now.

Socrates/ Just so. But, Protarchus, must we not say that each of these, again, is twofold? or how?

Protarchus/ What arts do you mean?

Socrates/ Must we not say, in the first place, that the arithmetic of the many is of one kind, but that of philosophers another?

Protarchus/ By dividing in what way, can a person lay down the one and the other?

Socrates/ The boundary, Protarchus, is not trifling. For of the things relating to number, the many calculate by unequal units; as two armies, two oxen, two things the smallest, or two the greatest of all things. But philosophers could not follow them, unless a person should lay down an unit, differing in no respect from each of the units in ten thousand.

Protarchus/ Indeed you say very correctly that there is no little difference amongst those, who occupy themselves in arithmetic; so as to make it reasonable that there are two kinds.

Socrates/ And what of calculation in trade, and of mensuration in building? Do these differ from the geometry and the calculations made by students in philosophy? Shall we say that each of them is one art? or shall we set down each as two?

Protarchus/ Following out the preceding remarks, I should, according to my vote, lay down that each of these is two.

Socrates/ Correctly so. But do you understand for what reason we have brought forward these matters between us?

Protarchus/ Perhaps I do. But I would wish yourself to lay open the question just asked.

Socrates/ To me at least then this reasoning seems no less, than when we commenced detailing it by seeking something the counterpart to pleasures, to have reached to that point, where it is possible to consider what science is

more pure than another science, as one pleasure was more so than another pleasure.

Protarchus/ This at least is very clear, that it attempted those things for the sake of these.

Socrates/ What then, has it discovered, in what has gone before, that over others one art is clearer than another, and one less clear than another?

Protarchus/ Entirely.

Socrates/ And has not in these instances the reasoning, after speaking of some art, of the same name as another, led to the opinion of both being one; and does it not then inquire, as if being two, their clearness and purity, whether the opinion of those who philosophize, or those who do not, is the more accurate respecting them?

Protarchus/ And it appears to me to make this inquiry very correctly.

Socrates/ What answer then, Protarchus, shall we give it?

Protarchus/ To a wonderful extent of difference have we, Socrates, arrived, touching a clear view of the sciences.

Socrates/ We shall therefore answer more easily.

Protarchus/ How not? And let it be said, that these leading arts differ greatly from the others; and that from these themselves differ those, which engage the exertions of persons philosophizing really with accuracy and truth on the subject of measures and numbers.

Socrates/ Let this be according to your views; and trusting to you, let us boldly give an answer to those, who are terrible in tearing arguments to pieces.

Protarchus/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ That there are two kinds of arithmetic, and two of mensuration, and many others of the same kind, following

these and possessing this duality, but having one name in common.

Protarchus/ Let us, Socrates, with good luck give to those, whom you say are terrible, that very answer.

Socrates/ Do we then affirm, that these sciences are the most accurate.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ But the dialectic power, Protarchus, would repudiate us, if we preferred any other science to hers.

Protarchus/ Whom must we call by that name?

Socrates/ Plainly, Protarchus, her, who perceives all the knowledge just now mentioned. For I am entirely of opinion, that all persons, to whom even a small particle of mind has been apportioned, must deem the knowledge, which relates to the really existing, and that which is ever by nature according to the same, to be by far the most true notion. But what and how would you, Protarchus, decide?

Protarchus/ I have often, Socrates, heard from Gorgias on each occasion, that the art of persuasion excels by much all other arts. For it would make all things its slaves willingly, and not by violence; and therefore it would be of all arts by far the best. Now I should not be willing to lay down what is opposed to you or him.

Socrates/ You seem to me to say that, having wished for arms, you are ashamed of having deserted them.

Protarchus/ Let these matters be in the place, where it seems good to you.

Socrates/ Am I the cause of your not correctly understanding?

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ I did not, friend Protarchus, inquire this—what art or what science is superior to all, by its being the

greatest, and best, and benefiting us the most; but what is that, which looks upon the clear, the accurate, and the most true, although it may be little and benefit but little. This it is which we are now seeking. Look to it. For you will not become hateful to Gorgias, if you allow his art to be of use to the ruling of mankind, but, what I just now said, to the busy occupation, as I then said respecting white, that if there be a little but pure, it excels a large quantity that is not such, by the very circumstance of its being the most true. And now, having thought greatly upon this, and reasoned about it sufficiently, and looking to neither the utility of sciences nor to their high repute, but, if there be any power inherent in our soul to love the truth, and for its sake to do everything, of this let us speak; and having thoroughly searched out the purity of mind and intellect, let us seek whether we can say that in all probability we possess this, or any other power more powerful than this.

Protarchus/ Nay, I do consider, and I think it is difficult to admit that any other science or art lays hold of truth more than this.

Socrates/ Have you said what you have said now, after perceiving something of this kind, that the majority of arts, and such as busy themselves about matters here, make use in the first place of opinions, and with the mind on the stretch are in search of what relates to opinions; and if a person thinks fit to pry into the phenomena of Nature, you know that through life he merely searches into the matters relating to this world, how it has been produced, and in what way it suffers, and in what way it acts. Shall we say this, or how?

Protarchus/ Thus.

Socrates/ Such a person then has undertaken this study, not about the things which exist always, but about those that are in the course of being, and will be, and have been.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ What clearness then can we say exists in truths the most exact respecting those things, not one of which has possessed ever, or will possess, or possesses at present, the state of sameness?

Protarchus/ How can we?

Socrates/ How then respecting things, which do not possess any stability whatever, can there be anything stable in us?

Protarchus/ By no means, I imagine.

Socrates/ Nor is there mind, nor any knowledge possessing the greatest truth respecting them.

Protarchus/ It is probable there is not?

Socrates/ We ought then, both you and I, to leave and bid farewell frequently to Gorgias and Philebus, and in our reasoning to appeal to this as a testimony.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ That there either is respecting those matters the stable, and the pure, and the true, and what we lately called the immaculate, as regards the things, which have the property of existing ever in the same manner, and similarly perfectly unmixed; or secondly, whatever has the most affinity with them; but that of all the rest we must speak as secondary and subsequent.

Protarchus/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ With respect then to things of this kind, is it not most just to give the most beautiful names to things the most beautiful?

Protarchus/ It is at least reasonable.

Socrates/ Are not mind and intellect and wisdom the names which a person would hold in the highest honor?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ These then, after having been formed accurately, may be correctly given to the notions conversant about the things really existing.

Protarchus/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ And the things, which I formerly brought for our decision, are not other than these names.

Protarchus/ How not, Socrates?

Socrates/ Be it so. If then a person were to say that, what relates to intellect and pleasure, touching their mutual mixture, is placed before us, as before workmen, from which or in which they must fabricate something, he would make a comparison suitable to our discourse.

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Must we not in the next place attempt to mix them?

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Would it not be best to mention beforehand, and call to remembrance things of this kind?

Protarchus/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ Those we have mentioned before. For the proverb seems to be well, “Twice and thrice what is well to turn over” in our discourse is meet.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Come then, by Zeus; for I think that what has been stated previously, was said in this wise.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Philebus affirms that pleasure has been established as the proper aim for all animals, and that all

persons ought to aim at it; that this very thing is to all universally the good; and that the two terms “good” and “pleasant” have been correctly assigned to one thing and to one nature. But Socrates denies this; and says that in the first place the things are, like the terms, two; and secondly, that the good and the pleasant possess a nature different from each other; and that intellect partakes in a share of the good more than pleasure does. Is not this now, and was it not then, stated so, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ Strongly so.

Socrates/ And was not this agreed upon then, and should we not agree upon it now?

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ That the nature of the good differs from the rest of things in this?

Protarchus/ In what?

Socrates/ That whatever animal possesses it forever, perfectly, and under all circumstances of time and place, such a being has no want of anything beside, but has what is sufficient and most complete. Is it not so?

Protarchus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Have we then not endeavored in this discourse, by placing each apart from each as regards the life of each, to leave pleasure unmixed with intellect, and in like manner intellect possessing not the smallest particle of pleasure?

Protarchus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Did either of those lives seem to us at that time to be sufficient for any person?

Protarchus/ How could it?

Socrates/ But if at that time we were carried in any respect beside the mark, let any person whatever, taking up again the subject, say what is more correct, laying down that

memory, and intellect, and science, and correct opinion belong to the very same species, and considering whether anyone would without those choose that anything whatever should happen to him, much less pleasure, be it the greatest in quantity and most intense in kind, provided he had neither a true conception of being delighted, nor knew at all by what things he was affected, nor had a recollection of the circumstance for any period whatever. And let him say the same respecting intellect likewise, whether anyone would choose without all pleasures, or even the least, to possess intellect, rather than with some pleasures, or all pleasures without intellect, rather than with some intellect.

Protarchus/ There is no one, Socrates. And there is no need to ask these questions frequently.

Socrates/ Neither one of these then would be the perfect, and all-eligible, and consummate good.

Protarchus/ For how could it?

Socrates/ This good then we must comprehend clearly, or at least some form of it, in order that we may have something to give the second prize.

Protarchus/ You speak most correctly.

Socrates/ Have we not taken then some kind of road to the good?

Protarchus/ What road?

Socrates/ As if a person in search of another should first hear of his dwelling where he resides, he would surely have something great towards the discovery of the person sought.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ And now a reasoning has pointed out to us, as at the commencement, not to seek the good in the unmixed life, but in the mixed one.

Protarchus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ There is moreover a hope that the thing sought for will be more conspicuous in the mixed than in the not mixed.

Protarchus/ Much more.

Socrates/ Let us then, Protarchus, make a mixing after praying to the gods; whether Dionysus, or Hephoestus, or whatever else of the gods, has obtained by lot the honor of presiding over the mixing.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And now, to us, as it were to butlers, stand two fonts; the one of pleasure a person might guess to be of honey; but that of intellect, hard and healthful, sober and wineless, to be of water; which let us be ready to mix together in the best manner we can.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ Come then and say whether by mingling all pleasure with all intellect we may in the best way obtain the doing it well.

Protarchus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ But it is not safe. But how we may make a mixing with less danger, I seem to myself to be able to put out a notion.

Protarchus/ Say what.

Socrates/ There was formerly, as we truly thought, one pleasure more pure than another; and one art more accurate than another.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly so.

Socrates/ One science too differs from another; one in looking to things that are produced and perish; another to things which are neither produced nor perish, but exist with the properties of the same, the similar, and the eternal. And

looking to the truth, we deemed this science to be more true than the other.

Protarchus/ Very correctly so.

Socrates/ If then, in the first place, after having mixed together the truest particles of each, when we look upon them, shall we say, that these, being mixed together, are sufficient to enable us to work out the most desirable life? or do we still want something, and not of such a kind?

Protarchus/ To me it seems we must act thus.

Socrates/ Let there be then a man having a notion of justice itself, and knowing what it is, and having a language following upon his notions, and thinking thoroughly in like manner upon everything else in existence.

Protarchus/ Let there be such a person.

Socrates/ Will now this man have a sufficiency of science by knowing the nature of the circle, and of the divine sphere itself, while, ignorant of the sphere, and of the circles made by man, he is making a bad use in building, and in other things similarly, of straight-rules and circles.

Protarchus/ Ridiculous we should call our position here, Socrates, if it existed only in the sciences relating to things divine.

Socrates/ How say you? Must we throw and mix together in common the art neither stable nor pure of the false straight-rule and mason's chisel, and mix them with the other ingredients?

Protarchus/ Yes; for it is necessary, if any of us is about on each occasion to find the way home.

Socrates/ And music too, which we said a little before was wanting in purity, as being full of conjecture and imitation?

Protarchus/ To me it seems necessary, if our life is to be in any manner whatever a life.

Socrates/ Are you then willing, like a door-keeper, jostled and forced by a throng of people, to yield and throw open the doors, and suffer all the sciences to rush in, and to be mixed together the wanting in purity with the pure.

Protarchus/ I cannot perceive, Socrates, how anyone would be hurt by receiving all the other sciences, if possessing already the leading.

Socrates/ Let me then admit them all to come pouring into the receptacle of Homer's poetical mingling of the waters in a valley.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ They are admitted. And let us now return to the font of pleasure. For when we thought of mixing them together, the portions of the true had not been produced; but, from our love of all science, we sent them in a crowd to the same spot, and even before the pleasures.

Protarchus/ You speak most truly.

Socrates/ It is now time for us to consult about the pleasures; whether we should let them all come thronging in, or whether we should admit those, that are true, the first.

Protarchus/ It makes a great difference in point of safety, to let in first the true.

Socrates/ Let these then be admitted. But what after this? Must we not, if some are necessary, mix together these as we did those?

Protarchus/ Why not? at least the necessary, surely.

Socrates/ But if, as we held it harmless and useful to know through life all the arts, we now assert the same of pleasures likewise, we must mix them all together, if indeed it is conducive to us and harmless for all to enjoy all kinds of pleasures through life.

Protarchus/ How shall we say then on these very points? and how act?

Socrates/ It is not proper, Protarchus, to ask us this question; but the pleasures themselves, and intellect, by inquiring respecting each other, some such thing as this.

Protarchus/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ Ye friends, whether we must call you Pleasures, or by any other name whatever, would ye choose to dwell with all Intellect, or without Intellect? To this I think it is most necessary to say thus.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ That, as was said before, for any pure kind to be alone and deserted, it is neither very possible nor useful. We deem it however that the best of all kinds should, one above others, dwell with us; —that one, which is able to know both all the rest and itself likewise, and at the same time each of us as perfectly as possible.

Protarchus/ And well have ye now answered, we will say to them.

Socrates/ Correctly so. After this then we must inquire of Intellect and Mind. Have ye any need of Pleasure in your mixture? we will say on the other hand, interrogating Mind and Intellect. What pleasures? they would perhaps reply.

Protarchus/ Probably.

Socrates/ To such a question our language would be this. Beside those true pleasures, we will say, do ye further want pleasures the greatest and most intense to dwell with you? How, Socrates, they would say, should we want those, which give a thousand hindrances to us by disturbing the souls, where we dwell with maddening pleasures, and do not permit us to exist, and entirely spoil our children, there born, by introducing for the most part carelessness through forgetfulness? But the other pleasures, of which you have

spoken, the true and the pure, do thou consider as nearly related to us; and beside these, such as are accompanied with health and sobriety, and such also as are in the train of all Virtue in general, as if of a goddess, and everywhere follow her, all these do thou mix with us. But those that always accompany folly, and the rest of depravity, it is a great absurdity for a man to mix with Intellect, who desires to see a mixture the most beautiful, and the least disturbed, and to try to learn from it what good is naturally, not only in man, but in the universe; and to divine what is the idea of good itself. Shall we not say that Mind has, in answering thus, spoken prudently, and with self-possession, in behalf of itself and memory, and right opinion?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And this moreover is necessary, for not a single thing could ever otherwise exist.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That, with which we cannot mix truth, could never be in existence truly, nor ever have been.

Protarchus/ For how could it?

Socrates/ By no means. But if anything further be yet wanting for the mixture, do you and Philebus mention it. For to me our present reasoning appears, like some incorporeal world about to rule correctly over an animated body, to have been worked out.

Protarchus/ And to me say, Socrates, it has seemed thus.

Socrates/ Should we then, in saying that we are now standing at the very vestibule of the good, and the residence of a thing of such a kind, correctly perhaps in a certain manner say so?

Protarchus/ To me at least it seems so.

Socrates/ What then would appear to us to be in this mixture the thing most valuable, and especially the cause of such a disposition being agreeable to all? For after having seen this, we will subsequently consider whether to pleasure or to mind it adheres the closer, and the more intimately, in the constitution of the universe.

Protarchus/ Right. For this will conduce the most to our decision.

Socrates/ And there is, indeed, no difficulty in discovering the cause of mixture in general, through which it is worth everything or nothing.

Protarchus/ How say you?

Socrates/ No man is surely ignorant of this.

Protarchus/ Of what?

Socrates/ That every mixture, whatever it be, and whatever its quantity, if it does not meet with measure and a symmetrical nature, does of necessity destroy both the ingredients and itself. For there exists not a tempering, but a certain unmixed bringing together, and confused truly of this kind on every occasion in reality to those who possess it.

Protarchus/ Most truly so.

Socrates/ The power then of the good has fled from us into the nature of the beautiful. For surely everywhere moderation and symmetry happen to be a beauty and a virtue.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now we have said that truth also was an ingredient in the mixture.

Protarchus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ If then we are not able to hunt out the good in one form, yet, taking it in three together, beauty, and

symmetry, and truth, let us say that we can most justly consider these as one cause of the ingredients in the mixture, and that through this, as being good, the mixture is itself produced of such a kind.

Protarchus/ Most truly indeed.

Socrates/ Now then, Protarchus, any person whatever would be a competent judge respecting pleasure and intellect, as to which of the two is more closely allied to the greatest good, and in higher honor both amongst men and gods.

Protarchus/ The decision is clear indeed; yet it is better to go through it in our discourse.

Socrates/ Let us then compare each of the three severally with pleasure and with intellect. For we are to see to which of the two we must assign each of the three as being the nearer related.

Protarchus/ Are you speaking of beauty, and truth, and moderation?

Socrates/ Yes. Now lay hold in the first place, Protarchus, of truth; and having laid hold of it, look at the three, mind, and truth, and pleasure; and after waiting a considerable time, answer to yourself, whether pleasure or mind is nearer related to truth.

Protarchus/ What need is there of time? for I think they differ greatly. For of all things pleasure is the greatest braggart; and as the saying is, in the pleasures of Venus, which seem to be the greatest, even perjury has obtained pardon from the gods; since pleasures, like children, possess not the least particle of mind. But mind is either the same thing as truth, or of all things the most like to it, and the most truthful.

Socrates/ Consider then after this in the same manner moderation, whether pleasure possesses more of it than intellect, or intellect more of it than pleasure.

Protarchus/ And this inquiry too which you have proposed, is easy to be considered. For I imagine no person will find anything more immoderate than pleasure and extravagant joy; nor a single thing of more moderation than mind and intellect.

Socrates/ You have spoken well. But however still mention the third thing. Has mind partaken of beauty more than any kind of pleasure, so that mind is more beautiful than pleasure, or the reverse?

Protarchus/ Has then, Socrates, any man in a day-dream or night-dream seen or imagined that intellect and mind is in any matter or in any manner a thing that has been, or is, or will be unhandsome?

Socrates/ Right.

Protarchus/ But whenever we see any person whatever delighted with pleasures, and those too the greatest, and behold the ridiculous, or what is the most disgraceful of all things, following upon them, we are ashamed ourselves, and by putting them out of sight, conceal them by giving them, as far as possible, to night and darkness, all such things as not being fit for the light to look on.

Socrates/ To all then and everywhere Protarchus, you will declare, sending by messengers to the absent, and speaking to those present, that pleasure is a possession, neither the first nor the second in worth, but that the first relates to moderation, and that the moderate and seasonable, and all that it is meet to consider as such, have obtained the eternal nature.

Protarchus/ It appears so from what has been said already.

Socrates/ And that the second relates to symmetry and beauty, the perfect and the sufficient, and whatever else is of that family.

Protarchus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ In placing, as my divination says, mind and intellect the third, you would not greatly pass by the truth.

Protarchus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ And are not the fourth those things, which we assigned to the soul herself, called sciences and arts, and right opinions? that these are the fourth in addition to those three; if, indeed, they are more nearly related to the good than to pleasure.

Protarchus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ That the fifth are what we laid down as pleasures, having defined them as painless, and denominated them pure; and following not the knowledge of the soul, but its sensations.

Protarchus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/

Of the song the order in the sixth race close.

says Orpheus. And our discourse seems to be now closed with the sixth decision. After this, nothing remains for us but to affix a head, as it were, to what has been said.

Protarchus/ It is fit that we should.

Socrates/ Come, then, let us proceed in calling upon the same reason, as if it were the third cup to the savior god, to bear witness.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Philebus has laid down that the good was wholly and entirely a pleasure.

Protarchus/ The third you have, it seems, Socrates, said, just now, ought to resume the original argument.

Socrates/ Yes. But let us hear what follows. I, having seen thoroughly what I have just now gone through, and disliking the doctrine not of Philebus only, but of other thousands frequently, asserted, that mind was a thing far better, and better for the life of man than pleasure.

Protarchus/ That is the fact.

Socrates/ But then, suspecting that there were many other things, I stated that if something should appear better than both of those, I would combat for the second prize, in behalf of mind against pleasure; and that pleasure would be deprived of the second prize.

Protarchus/ So you said.

Socrates/ Afterwards it very sufficiently appeared that neither of these were sufficient.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ By this reasoning then both mind and pleasure were dismissed from being either of them the good itself, being deprived of self-sufficiency, and the power belonging to the sufficient and perfect.

Protarchus/ Very right.

Socrates/ But when a third was discovered, superior to either of those two, mind appeared a thousand-fold nearer related and more closely adhering to the form of the conqueror than pleasure did.

Protarchus/ How not?

Socrates/ The fifth then would be, according to the decision, which the reasoning has declared, the power of pleasure.

Protarchus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But the first place I would not yield up, not if all the bulls and horses, and all wild beasts whatever should assert it, to the pursuit of pleasure; trusting to whom, just

as augurs do to birds, the multitude decide that pleasures avail the most for living well; and think that the loves of wild animals are a stronger evidence, than the sayings of those who have spoken prophetically on every occasion in the Muse of Philosophy.

Protarchus/ That the greatest truth has been spoken by you, Socrates, we all now assert.

Socrates/ Now then ye dismiss me.

Protarchus/ There is, Socrates, still a little left. For you will surely not march off before us; and I will put you in mind of what is left unsaid.

Philebus

Translated by Dorothea Frede.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus

Socrates/ Well, then, Protarchus, consider just what the thesis is that you are now taking over from Philebus—and what our thesis is that you are going to argue against, if you find that you do not agree with it. Shall we summarize them both?

Protarchus/ Yes, let's do that.

Socrates/ Philebus holds that what is good for all creatures is to enjoy themselves, to be pleased and delighted, and whatever else goes together with that kind of thing. We contend that not these, but knowing, understanding, and remembering, and what belongs with them, right opinion and true calculations, are better than pleasure and more agreeable to all who can attain them; those who can, get the maximum benefit possible from having them, both those now alive and future generations. Isn't that how we present our respective positions, Philebus?

Philebus/ Absolutely, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you agree, Protarchus, to take over this thesis that's now offered you?

Protarchus/ I am afraid I have to. Fair Philebus has given up on us.

Socrates/ So we must do everything possible to get through somehow to the truth about these matters?

Protarchus/ We certainly must.

Socrates/ Come on, then. Here is a further point we need to agree on.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That each of us will be trying to prove some possession or state of the soul to be the one that can render life happy for all human beings. Isn't that so?

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ You, that it is pleasure; we, that it is knowledge?

Protarchus/ That is so.

Socrates/ What if it should turn out that there is another possession, better than either of them? Would the result not be that, if it turns out to be more closely related to pleasure, we will both lose out against a life that firmly possesses that, but the life of pleasure will defeat the life of knowledge?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if it is closer to knowledge, then knowledge wins over pleasure, and pleasure loses? Do you accept this as agreed?

Protarchus/ It seems agreeable to me.

Socrates/ But also to Philebus? Philebus, what do you say?

Philebus/ To my mind pleasure wins and always will win, no matter what. But you must see for yourself, Protarchus.

Protarchus/ But now you have handed over the argument to us, Philebus, you can no longer control the agreements we make with Socrates nor our disagreements.

Philebus/ You are right. I absolve myself of all responsibility and now call the goddess herself as my witness.

Protarchus/ We will be your witnesses, too, —that you did say what you are now saying. As to what follows, Socrates, let us go ahead and try to push through to a conclusion, with Philebus' consent or not.

Socrates/ We must do our best, making our start with the goddess herself—this fellow claims that though she is called Aphrodite her truest name is pleasure.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I always feel a more than human dread over what names to use for the gods—it surpasses the greatest fear. So now I address Aphrodite by whatever title pleases her. But as to pleasure, I know that it is complex and, just as I said, we must make it our starting point and consider carefully what sort of nature it has. If one just goes by the name it is one single thing, but in fact it comes in many forms that are in some way even quite unlike each other. Think about it: we say that a debauched person gets pleasure, as well as that a sober-minded person takes pleasure in his very sobriety. Again, we say that a fool, though full of foolish opinions and hopes, gets pleasure, but likewise a wise man takes pleasure in his wisdom. But surely anyone who said in either case that these pleasures are like one another would rightly be regarded as a fool.

Protarchus/ Well, yes, Socrates—the pleasures come from opposite things. But they are not at all opposed to one another. For how could pleasure not be, of all things, most like pleasure? How could that thing not be most like itself?

Socrates/ Just as color is most like color! Really, you surprise me: Colors certainly won't differ insofar as every one of them is a color; but we all know that black is not only different from white but is in fact its very opposite. And shape is most like shape in the same way. For shape is all one in genus, but some of its parts are absolutely opposite to one another, and others differ in innumerable ways. And we will discover many other such cases. So don't rely on this argument which makes a unity of all the things that are most opposed. I am afraid we will find there are some pleasures that are contrary to others.

Protarchus/ Maybe so. But how will this harm our thesis?

Socrates/ Because you call these unlike things, we will say, by a different name. For you say that all pleasant things are good. Now, no one contends that pleasant things are not pleasant. But while most of them are bad but some good, as we hold, you nevertheless call them all good, even though you would admit that they are unlike one another if someone pressed the point. What is the common element in the good and bad pleasures that allows you to call them all good?

Protarchus/ What are you saying, Socrates? Do you think anyone will agree to this who begins by laying it down that pleasure is the good? Do you think he will accept it when you say that some pleasures are good but others are bad?

Socrates/ But you will grant that they are unlike each other and that some are opposites?

Protarchus/ Not insofar as they are pleasures.

Socrates/ But really, Protarchus, this takes us back to the same old point. Are we, then, to say that pleasure does not differ from pleasure, but all are alike? Don't the examples just given make the slightest impression on us? Are we to behave and speak in just the same way as those who are the most incompetent and at the same time newcomers in such discussions?

Protarchus/ What way do you mean?

Socrates/ This: Suppose I imitate you and dare to say, in defense of my thesis, that the most unlike thing is of all things most like the most unlike; then I could say the same thing as you did. But this would make us look quite childish, and our discussion would founder on the rock. Let us therefore set it afloat again. Perhaps we can reach a mutual accommodation if each side accepts a similar stance toward its candidate.

Protarchus/ Just tell me how.

Socrates/ Let me be the one questioned in turn by you.

Protarchus/ About what?

Socrates/ About wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and all the things that I laid down at the beginning as good, when I tried to answer the question what is good. Won't my answer suffer the same consequences as your thesis did?

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Taken all together, the branches of knowledge will seem to be a plurality, and some will seem quite unlike others. And if some of them turn out in some way actually to be opposites, would I be a worthy partner in a discussion if I dreaded this so much that I would deny that one kind of knowledge can be unlike another? That way our whole discussion would come to an end like that of a fairy tale—with us kept safe and sound through some absurdity.

Protarchus/ We must not let that happen, except the part about our being kept safe and sound. But I am rather pleased by the fact that our theses are on the same footing. So let it be agreed that there can be many and unlike kinds of pleasures, but also many and different kinds of knowledge.

Socrates/ Well, then, let us not cover up the difference between your good and mine, Protarchus, but put it right in the middle and brave the possibility that, when put to a closer scrutiny, it will come to light whether pleasure should be called the good, or wisdom, or yet a third thing. For we are not contending here out of love of victory for my suggestion to win or for yours. We ought to act together as allies in support of the truest one.

Protarchus/ We certainly ought to.

Socrates/ Let us then give even stronger support to our principle by an agreement.

Protarchus/ What principle?

Socrates/ The one that creates difficulties for everyone, for some willingly, for some, sometimes, against their will.

Protarchus/ Explain this more clearly.

Socrates/ It is this principle that has turned up here, which somehow has an amazing nature. For that the many are one and the one many are amazing statements, and can easily be disputed, whichever side of the two one may want to defend.

Protarchus/ Do you mean this in the sense that someone says that I, Protarchus, am one by nature but then also says that there are many 'me's' and even contrary ones, when he treats me, who am one and the same, as tall and short, heavy and light, and endless other such things?

Socrates/ You, dear Protarchus, are speaking about those puzzles about the one and many that have become commonplace. They are agreed by everybody, so to speak, to be no longer even worth touching; they are considered childish and trivial but a serious impediment to argument if one takes them on. No more worthy is the following quibble: when someone who first distinguishes a person's limbs and parts asks your agreement that all these parts are identical with that unity, but then exposes you to ridicule because of the monstrosities you have to admit, that the one is many and indefinitely many, and again that the many are only one thing.

Protarchus/ But what other kinds of such puzzles with respect to the same principle do you have in mind, Socrates, that have not yet admittedly become commonplace?

Socrates/ When, my young friend, the one is not taken from the things that come to be or perish, as we have just done in our example. For that is where the sort of one belongs that we were just discussing, which we agreed is not worthy of scrutiny. But when someone tries to posit man as one, or ox as one, or the beautiful as one, and the good as one, zealous concern with divisions of these unities and the like gives rise to controversy.

Protarchus/ In what sense?

Socrates/ Firstly, whether one ought to suppose that there are any such unities truly in existence. Then again, how they are supposed to be: whether each one of them is always one and the same, admitting neither of generation nor of destruction; and whether it remains most definitely one and the same, even though it is afterwards found again among the things that come to be and are unlimited, so that it finds itself as one and the same in one and many things at the same time. And must it be treated as dispersed and multiplied or as entirely separated from itself, which would seem most impossible of all? It is these problems of the one and many, but not those others, Protarchus, that cause all sorts of difficulties if they are not properly settled, but promise progress if they are.

Protarchus/ Is this the first task we should try our hands at right now, Socrates?

Socrates/ So I would say at least.

Protarchus/ Take it, then, that we all here are agreed with you about this. As for Philebus, it might be best not to bother him with questions any further, but let sleeping dogs lie.

Socrates/ Quite so. Now, where should we make our entry into that complex and wide-ranging battle about this controversial issue? Is it not best to start here?

Protarchus/ Where?

Socrates/ By making the point that it is through discourse that the same thing flits around, becoming one and many in all sorts of ways, in whatever it may be that is said at any time, both long ago and now. And this will never come to an end, nor has it just begun, but it seems to me that this is an "immortal and ageless" condition that comes to us with discourse. Whoever among the young first gets a taste of it is as pleased as if he had found a treasure of wisdom. He is quite beside himself with pleasure and revels in moving every

statement, now turning it to one side and rolling it all up into one, then again unrolling it and dividing it up. He thereby involves first and foremost himself in confusion, but then also whatever others happen to be nearby, be they younger or older or of the same age, sparing neither his father nor his mother nor anyone else who might listen to him. He would almost try it on other creatures, not only on human beings, since he would certainly not spare any foreigner if only he could find an interpreter somewhere.

Protarchus/ Careful, Socrates, don't you see what a crowd we are and that we are all young? And are you not afraid that we will gang up against you with Philebus if you insult us? Still, we know what you want to say, and if there are some ways and means to remove this kind of disturbance from our discussion in a peaceful way, and to show us a better solution to the problem, then just go ahead, and we will follow you as best we can. For the present question is no mean thing, Socrates.

Socrates/ It certainly is not, my boys, as Philebus is wont to address you. Indeed, there is not, nor could there be, any way that is finer than the one I have always admired, although it has often escaped me and left me behind, alone and helpless.

Protarchus/ What is this way? Let us have it.

Socrates/ It is not very difficult to describe it, but extremely difficult to use. For everything in any field of art that has ever been discovered has come to light because of this. See what way I have in mind.

Protarchus/ Please do tell us.

Socrates/ It is a gift of the gods to men, or so it seems to me, hurled down from heaven by some Prometheus along with a most dazzling fire. And the people of old, superior to us and living in closer proximity to the gods, have bequeathed us this

tale, that whatever is said to be consists of one and many, having in its nature limit and unlimitedness. Since this is the structure of things, we have to assume that there is in each case always one form for every one of them, and we must search for it, as we will indeed find it there. And once we have grasped it, we must look for two, as the case would have it, or if not, for three or some other number. And we must treat every one of those further unities in the same way, until it is not only established of the original unit that it is one, many and unlimited, but also how many kinds it is. For we must not grant the form of the unlimited to the plurality before we know the exact number of every plurality that lies between the unlimited and the one. Only then is it permitted to release each kind of unity into the unlimited and let it go. The gods, as I said, have left us this legacy of how to inquire and learn and teach one another. But nowadays the clever ones among us make a one, haphazardly, and a many, faster or slower than they should; they go straight from the one to the unlimited and omit the intermediates. It is these, however, that make all the difference as to whether we are engaged with each other in dialectical or only in eristic discourse.

Protarchus/ Some of what you said I think I understand in some way, Socrates, but of some I still need further clarification.

Socrates/ What I mean is clear in the case of letters, and you should take your clue from them, since they were part of your own education.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ The sound that comes out of the mouth is one for each and every one of us, but then it is also unlimited in number.

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Neither of these two facts alone yet makes us knowledgeable, neither that we know its unlimitedness nor its unity. But if we know how many kinds of vocal sounds there are and what their nature is, that makes everyone of us literate.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And the very same thing leads to the knowledge of music.

Protarchus/ How is that?

Socrates/ Sound is also the unit in this art, just as it was in writing.

Protarchus/ Yes, right.

Socrates/ We should posit low and high pitch as two kinds, and equal pitch as a third kind. Or what would you say?

Protarchus/ Just that.

Socrates/ But you could not yet claim knowledge of music if you knew only this much, though if you were ignorant even about that, you would be quite incompetent in these matters, as one might say.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But you will be competent, my friend, once you have learned how many intervals there are in high pitch and low pitch, what character they have, by what notes the intervals are defined, and the kinds of combinations they form—all of which our forebears have discovered and left to us, their successors, together with the names of these modes of harmony. And again the motions of the body display other and similar characteristics of this kind, which they say should be measured by numbers and called rhythms and meters. So at the same time they have made us realize that every investigation should search for the one and many. For when you have mastered these things in this way, then you have

acquired expertise there, and when you have grasped the unity of any of the other things there are, you have become wise about that. The boundless multitude, however, in any and every kind of subject leaves you in boundless ignorance, and makes you count for nothing and amount to nothing, since you have never worked out the amount and number of anything at all.

Protarchus/ For my part, I think that Socrates has explained all this very well, Philebus.

Philebus/ I agree as far as this question itself goes. But of what use is all this talk to us, and what is its purpose?

Socrates/ Philebus is right, Protarchus, when he asks us this question.

Protarchus/ Good, so please answer him.

Socrates/ I will do so when I have gone a little further into the subject matter. Just as someone who has got hold of some unity or other should not, as we were saying, immediately look for the unlimited kind but first look for some number, so the same holds for the reverse case. For if he is forced to start out with the unlimited, then he should not head straight for the one, but should in each case grasp some number that determines every plurality whatever, and from all of those finally reach the one. Let us again make use of letters to explain what this means.

Protarchus/ In what way?

Socrates/ The way some god or god-inspired man discovered that vocal sound is unlimited, as tradition in Egypt claims for a certain deity called Theuth. He was the first to discover that the vowels in that unlimited variety are not one but several, and again that there are others that are not voiced, but make some kind of noise, and that they, too, have a number. As a third kind of letters he established the ones we now call mute. After this he further subdivided the ones

without sound or mutes down to every single unit. In the same fashion he also dealt with the vowels and the intermediates, until he had found out the number for each one of them, and then he gave all of them together the name “letter,’ And as he realized that none of us could gain any knowledge of a single one of them, taken by itself without understanding them all, he considered that the one link that somehow unifies them all and called it the art of literacy.

Philebus/ Protarchus, I understood this even better than what came before, at least how it hangs together. But I still find that this explanation now suffers from the same defect as your earlier one.

Socrates/ You are wondering again what the relevance of it all is, Philebus?

Philebus/ Right, that is what I and Protarchus have been wanting to see for quite a while.

Socrates/ But have you not already under your nose what you both, as you say, have long wanted to see?

Philebus/ How could that be?

Socrates/ Did we not embark on an investigation of knowledge and pleasure, to find out which of the two is preferable?

Philebus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ And we do say that each of them is one.

Philebus/ Right.

Socrates/ This is the very point in question to which our preceding discussion obliges us to give an answer: to show how each of them is one and many, and how instead of becoming unlimited straightaway, each one of them acquires some definite number before it becomes unlimited.

Protarchus/ Socrates has plunged us into a considerable problem, Philebus, by leading us around, I don’t know how,

in some kind of circle. But make up your mind which of us should answer the present question. It would seem quite ridiculous that I, who had volunteered to take over the thesis from you as your successor, should now hand it back to you because I don't have an answer to this question. But it would be even more ridiculous if neither of us could answer it. So what do you think we should do? Socrates seems to be asking whether there are kinds of pleasures or not, and how many there are, and of what sort they are. And the same set of questions applies to knowledge.

Socrates/ You speak the truth, son of Callias. Unless we are able to do this for every kind of unity, similarity, sameness, and their opposite, in the way that our recent discussion has indicated, none of us will ever turn out to be any good at anything.

Protarchus/ I am afraid that this is so. But while it is a great thing for the wise man to know everything, the second best is not to be mistaken about oneself, it seems to me. What prompts me to say that at this point? I will tell you. You, Socrates, have granted this meeting to all of us, and yourself to boot, in order to find out what is the best of all human possessions. Now, Philebus advocated that it is pleasure, amusement, enjoyment, and whatever else there is of this kind. You on the contrary denied this for all of them, but rather proposed those other goods we willingly and with good reason keep reminding ourselves of, so that they can be tested as they are lying side by side in our memory. You claim, it seems, that the good that should by right be called superior to pleasure, at least, is reason, as well as knowledge, intelligence, science, and everything that is akin to them, which must be obtained, rather than Philebus' candidates. Now, after both these conflicting positions have been set up against each other, we threatened you in jest that we would not let you go home before the deliberation of these questions

had reached its satisfactory limit. But since you made a promise and committed yourself to us, we therefore insist, like children, that there is no taking back a gift properly given. So give up this way of turning against us in the discussion here.

Socrates/ What way are you talking about?

Protarchus/ Your way of plunging us into difficulties and repeating questions to which we have at present no proper answer to give you. But we should not take it that the aim of our meeting is universal confusion; if we cannot solve the problem, you must do it, for you promised. It is up to you to decide whether for this purpose you need to divide off different kinds of pleasure and knowledge or can leave that out, if you are able and willing to show some other way to settle the issues of our controversy.

Socrates/ At least there is no longer anything terrible in store for poor me, since you said it this way. For the clause "if you are willing" takes away all further apprehension. In addition, some memory has come to my mind that one of the gods seems to have sent me to help us.

Protarchus/ How is that and what about?

Socrates/ It is a doctrine that once upon a time I heard in a dream—or perhaps I was awake—that I remember now, concerning pleasure and knowledge, that neither of the two is the good, but that there is some third thing which is different from and superior to both of them. But if we can clearly conceive now that this is the case, then pleasure has lost its bid for victory. For the good could no longer turn out to be identical with it. Right?

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ So we will not have to worry any longer, I think, about the division of the kinds of pleasure. But further progress will show this more clearly.

Protarchus/ Very well said; just push on.

Socrates/ There are some small matters we ought to agree on first, though.

Protarchus/ What are they?

Socrates/ Whether the good is necessarily bound to be perfect or not perfect.

Protarchus/ But surely it must be the most perfect thing of all, Socrates!

Socrates/ Further: must the good be sufficient?

Protarchus/ How could it fail to be that? This is how it is superior to everything else there is.

Socrates/ Now, this point, I take it, is most necessary to assert of the good: that everything that has any notion of it hunts for it and desires to get hold of it and secure it for its very own, caring nothing for anything else except for what is connected with the acquisition of some good.

Protarchus/ There is no way of denying this.

Socrates/ So let us put the life of pleasure and the life of knowledge on trial, and reach some verdict by looking at them separately.

Protarchus/ In what way do you mean?

Socrates/ Let there be neither any knowledge in a life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in that of knowledge. For if either of the two is the good, then it must have no need of anything in addition. But if one or the other should turn out to be lacking anything, then this can definitely no longer be the real good we are looking for.

Protarchus/ How could it be?

Socrates/ So shall we then use you as our test case to try both of them?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then answer me.

Protarchus/ Go ahead.

Socrates/ Would you find it acceptable to live your whole life in enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

Protarchus/ Why, certainly!

Socrates/ And would you see yourself in need of anything else if you had secured this altogether?

Protarchus/ In no way.

Socrates/ But look, might you not have some need of knowledge, intelligence, and calculation, or anything else that is related to them?

Protarchus/ How so? If I had pleasure I would have all in all!

Socrates/ And living like that you could enjoy the greatest pleasures throughout your life?

Protarchus/ Why should I not?

Socrates/ Since you would not be in possession of either reason, memory, knowledge, or true opinion, must you not be in ignorance, first of all, about this very question, whether you were enjoying yourself or not, given that you were devoid of any kind of intelligence?

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Moreover, due to lack of memory, it would be impossible for you to remember that you ever enjoyed yourself, and for any pleasure to survive from one moment to the next, since it would leave no memory. But, not possessing right judgment, you would not realize that you are enjoying yourself even while you do, and, being unable to calculate, you could not figure out any future pleasures for yourself. You would thus not live a human life but the life of a mollusk or of one of those creatures in shells that live in the sea. Is this what would happen, or can we think of any other consequences besides these?

Protarchus/ How could we?

Socrates/ But is this a life worth choosing?

Protarchus/ Socrates, this argument has left me absolutely speechless for the moment.

Socrates/ Even so, let us not give in to weakness; let us in turn rather inspect the life of reason.

Protarchus/ What kind of life do you have in mind?

Socrates/ Whether anyone of us would choose to live in possession of every kind of intelligence, reason, knowledge, and memory of all things, while having no part, neither large nor small, of pleasure or of pain, living in total insensitivity of anything of that kind.

Protarchus/ To me at least neither of these two forms of life seems worthy of choice, nor would it to anyone else, I presume.

Socrates/ But what about a combination of both, Protarchus, a life that results from a mixture of the two?

Protarchus/ You mean a mixture of pleasure with reason and intelligence?

Socrates/ Right, those are the ingredients I mean.

Protarchus/ Everybody would certainly prefer this life to either of the other two, without exception.

Socrates/ Do we realize what the upshot of this new development in our discussion is?

Protarchus/ Certainly, that of the three lives offered to us, two are not sufficient or worthy of choice for either man or animal.

Socrates/ As far as they are concerned, is it then not clear at least, that neither the one nor the other contained the good, since otherwise it would be sufficient, perfect, and worthy of choice for any of the plants and animals that can sustain them, throughout their lifetime? And if anyone among us should choose otherwise, then he would do so involuntarily,

in opposition to what is by nature truly choice-worthy, from ignorance or some unfortunate necessity.

Protarchus/ It certainly looks that way.

Socrates/ Enough has been said, it seems to me, to prove that Philebus' goddess and the good cannot be regarded as one.

Philebus/ Nor is your reason the good, Socrates, and the same complaint applies to it.

Socrates/ It may apply to my reason, Philebus, but certainly not to the true, the divine reason, I should think. It is in quite a different condition. But now I am not arguing that reason ought to get first prize over and against the combined life; we have rather to look and make up our minds about the second prize, how to dispose of it. One of us may want to give credit for the combined life to reason, making it responsible, the other to pleasure. Thus neither of the two would be the good, but it could be assumed that one or the other of them is its cause. But I would be even more ready to contend against Philebus that, whatever the ingredient in the mixed life may be that makes it choice-worthy and good, reason is more closely related to that thing and more like it than pleasure; and if this can be upheld, neither first nor second prize could really ever be claimed for pleasure. She will in fact not even get as much as third prize, if we can put some trust in my insight for now.

Protarchus/ By now it seems to me indeed that pleasure has been defeated as if knocked down by your present arguments, Socrates. In her fight for victory, she has fallen. And as for reason, we may say that it wisely did not compete for first prize, for it would have suffered the same fate. But if pleasure were also deprived of second prize, she would definitely be somewhat dishonored in the eyes of her own lovers, nor would she seem as fair to them as before.

Socrates/ What, then? Had we not better leave her alone now, rather than subject her to the most exacting test and give her pain by such an examination?

Protarchus/ You talk nonsense, Socrates.

Socrates/ Why, because I said the impossible, “giving pain to pleasure”?

Protarchus/ Not only that, but because you don’t realize that not one among us would let you go before you have carried the discussion of these questions to its end.

Socrates/ Oh dear, Protarchus, then a long discussion lies ahead of us, and not exactly an easy one either at this point. For it seems that, in the battle about the second prize for reason, a different device will be needed, different armament as it were, from that used in our previous discussion, though it may partly be the same. Are we to proceed?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Let us be very careful about the starting point we take.

Protarchus/ What kind of starting point?

Socrates/ Let us make a division of everything that actually exists now in the universe into two kinds, or if this seems preferable, into three.

Protarchus/ Could you explain on what principle?

Socrates/ By taking up some of what has been said before.

Protarchus/ Like what?

Socrates/ We agreed earlier that the god had revealed a division of what is into the unlimited and the limit.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us now take these as two of the kinds, while treating the one that results from the mixture of these two as our third kind. But I must look like quite a fool with my distinctions into kinds and enumerations!

Protarchus/ What are you driving at?

Socrates/ That we seem to be in need of yet a fourth kind.

Protarchus/ Tell us what it is.

Socrates/ Look at the cause of this combination of those two together, and posit it as my fourth kind in addition to those three.

Protarchus/ Might you not also be in need of a fifth kind that provides for their separation?

Socrates/ Perhaps, but I do not think so, at least for now. But if it turns out that I need it, I gather you will bear with me if I should search for a fifth kind.

Protarchus/ Gladly.

Socrates/ Let us first take up three of the four, and since we observe that of two of them, both are split up and dispersed into many, let's make an effort to collect those into a unity again, in order to study how each of them is in fact one and many.

Protarchus/ If you could explain all that more clearly, I might be able to follow you.

Socrates/ What I mean is this: The two kinds are the ones I referred to just now, the unlimited and what has limit. That the unlimited in a way is many I will try to explain now. The treatment of what has limit will have to wait a little longer.

Protarchus/ Let it wait.

Socrates/ Attention, then. The matter I am asking you to attend to is difficult and controversial, but attend to it nevertheless. Check first in the case of the hotter and the colder whether you can conceive of a limit, or whether the 'more and less' do not rather reside in these kinds, and while they reside in them do not permit the attainment of any end. For once an end has been reached, they will both have been ended as well.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ We are agreed, then, that the hotter and the colder always contain the more and less.

Protarchus/ Quite definitely.

Socrates/ Our argument forces us to conclude that these things never have an end. And since they are endless, they turn out to be entirely unlimited.

Protarchus/ Quite strongly so, Socrates.

Socrates/ You have grasped this rather well, Protarchus, and remind me rightly with your pronouncement of 'strongly' that it and equally its counterpart 'gently' are of the same caliber as the more and less. Wherever they apply, they prevent everything from adopting a definite quantity; by imposing on all actions the qualification 'stronger' relative to 'gentler' or the reverse, they procure a 'more and less' while doing away with all definite quantity. We are saying now, in effect, that if they do not abolish definite quantity, but let quantity and measurement take a foothold in the domain of the more and less, the strong and mild, they will be driven out of their own territory. For once they take on a definite quantity, they would no longer be hotter and colder. The hotter and equally the colder are always in flux and never remain, while definite quantity means standstill and the end of all progression. The upshot of this argument is that the hotter, together with its opposite, turn out to be unlimited.

Protarchus/ That seems to be its result, Socrates, although, as you said yourself, it is difficult to follow in these matters. But if they are repeated again and again, perhaps both questioner and respondent may end up in a satisfactory state of agreement.

Socrates/ A good idea; let us carry it out. But consider whether, to avoid the needless length of going through a

complete survey of all cases, the following indication may serve to mark out the nature of the unlimited.

Protarchus/ What indication do you have in mind?

Socrates/ Whatever seems to us to become 'more and less', or susceptible to 'strong and mild' or to 'too much' and all of that kind, all that we ought to subsume under the genus of the unlimited as its unity. This is in compliance with the principle we agreed on before, that for whatever is dispersed and split up into a multitude, we must try to work out its unifying nature as far as we can, if you remember.

Protarchus/ I do remember.

Socrates/ But look now at what does not admit of these qualifications but rather their opposites, first of all 'the equal' and 'equality' and, after the equal, things like 'double', and all that is related as number to number or measure to measure: If we subsume all these together under the heading of 'limit', we would seem to do a fair job. Or what do you say?

Protarchus/ A very fair job, Socrates.

Socrates/ Very well, then. But what nature shall we ascribe to the third kind, the one that is the mixture of the two?

Protarchus/ You will have to answer that question for me, I think.

Socrates/ A god rather, if any of them should listen to my prayers.

Protarchus/ So say your prayer, and wait for the result.

Socrates/ I am waiting, and indeed I have the feeling that one of the gods is favorably disposed to us now, Protarchus.

Protarchus/ What do you mean by that, and what evidence have you?

Socrates/ I certainly will tell you, but you follow closely what I say.

Protarchus/ Just go on.

Socrates/ We called something hotter and colder just now, didn't we?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now add dryer and wetter to them, and more and less, faster and slower, taller and shorter, and whatever else we have previously collected together as the one kind that has the nature of taking on the 'more and less'.

Protarchus/ You mean the nature of the unlimited?

Socrates/ Yes. Now take the next step and mix with it the class of the limit.

Protarchus/ Which one?

Socrates/ The very one we have so far omitted to collect together, the class that has the character of limit, although we ought to have given unity to it, just as we collected together the unlimited kind. But perhaps it will come to the same thing even now if, through the collection of these two kinds, the unity of the former kind becomes conspicuous too.

Protarchus/ What kind do you mean, and how is this supposed to work?

Socrates/ The kind that contains equal and double, and whatever else puts an end to the conflicts there are among opposites, making them commensurate and harmonious by imposing a definite number on them.

Protarchus/ I understand. I have the impression that you are saying that, from such mixture in each case, certain generations result?

Socrates/ Your impression is correct.

Protarchus/ Then go on with your explanation.

Socrates/ Is it not true that in sickness the right combination of the opposites establishes the state of health?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And does not the same happen in the case of the high and the low, the fast and the slow, which belong to the unlimited? Is it not the presence of these factors in them which forges a limit and thereby creates the different kinds of music in their perfection?

Protarchus/ Beautiful!

Socrates/ And once engendered in frost and heat, limit takes away their excesses and unlimitedness, and establishes moderation and harmony in that domain?

Protarchus/ Quite.

Socrates/ And when the unlimited and what has limit are mixed together, we are blessed with seasons and all sorts of fine things of that kind?

Protarchus/ Who could doubt it?

Socrates/ And there are countless other things I have to pass by in silence: With health there come beauty and strength, and again in our soul there is a host of other excellent qualities. It is the goddess herself, fair Philebus, who recognizes how excess and the overabundance of our wickedness allow for no limit in our pleasures and their fulfillment, and she therefore imposes law and order as a limit on them. And while you may complain that this ruins them, I by contrast call it their salvation. How does this strike you, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ This fits my own intuitions, Socrates.

Socrates/ These, then, are the three kinds I spoke of, if you see what I mean.

Protarchus/ I think I've got it. It seems to me that you are referring to the unlimited as one kind, to the limit within things as the other, second kind. But I still do not sufficiently understand what you mean by the third.

Socrates/ You are simply overwhelmed by the abundance of the third kind, my admirable friend. Although the class of the unlimited also displays a multiplicity, it preserved at least the appearance of unity, since it was marked out by the common character of the more and less.

Protarchus/ That is true.

Socrates/ About limit, on the other hand, we did not trouble ourselves, neither that it has plurality nor whether it is one by nature.

Protarchus/ Why should we have done so?

Socrates/ No reason. But see what I mean by the third kind: I treat all the joint offspring of the other two kinds as a unity, a coming-into-being created through the measures imposed by the limit.

Protarchus/ I understand.

Socrates/ But now we have to look at the fourth kind we mentioned earlier, in addition to these three. Let this be our joint investigation. See now whether you think it necessary that everything that comes to be comes to be through some cause?

Protarchus/ Certainly, as far as I can see. How could anything come to be without one?

Socrates/ And is it not the case that there is no difference between the nature of what makes and the cause, except in name, so that the maker and the cause would rightly be called one?

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ But what about what is made and what comes into being, will we not find the same situation, that they also do not differ except in name?

Protarchus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And isn't it the case that what makes is always leading in the order of nature, while the thing made follows since it comes into being through it?

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ Therefore the cause and what is subservient to the cause in a process of coming to be are also different and not the same?

Protarchus/ How should they be?

Socrates/ It follows, then, that what comes to be and that from which it is produced represent all three kinds?

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ We therefore declare that the craftsman who produces all these must be the fourth kind, the cause, since it has been demonstrated sufficiently that it differs from the others?

Protarchus/ It certainly is different.

Socrates/ Now that the four kinds have been distinguished, it seems right to go through them one by one, for memory's sake.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ As the first I count the unlimited, limit as the second, afterwards in third place comes the being which is mixed and generated out of those two. And no mistake is made if the cause of this mixture and generation is counted as number four?

Protarchus/ How could there be one?

Socrates/ Now, let's see, what is going to be our next point after this, and what concern of ours got us to this point? Was it not this? We were wondering whether second prize should be awarded to pleasure or to knowledge, wasn't that it?

Protarchus/ It was indeed.

Socrates/ On the basis of our fourfold distinction we may now perhaps be in a better position to come to a decision about the first and the second prize, the issue that started our whole debate.

Protarchus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Let us continue, then. We declared the life that combines pleasure and knowledge the winner. Didn't we?

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ Should we not take a look at this life and see what it is and to which kind it belongs?

Protarchus/ Nothing to prevent us.

Socrates/ We will, I think, assign it to the third kind, for it is not a mixture of just two elements but of the sort where all that is unlimited is tied down by limit. It would seem right, then, to make our victorious form of life part of that kind.

Protarchus/ Very right.

Socrates/ That is settled, then. But how about your kind of life, Philebus, which is pleasant and unmixed? To which of the established kinds should it by right be assigned? But before you make your pronouncement, answer me the following question.

Philebus/ Just tell me!

Socrates/ Do pleasure and pain have a limit, or are they of the sort that admit the more and less?

Philebus/ Certainly the sort that admit the more, Socrates! For how could pleasure be all that is good if it were not by nature boundless in plenty and increase?

Socrates/ Nor would, on the other hand, pain be all that is bad, Philebus! So we have to search for something besides its unlimited character that would bestow on pleasures a share of the good. But take note that pleasure is thereby assigned to the boundless. As to assigning intelligence, knowledge, and

reason to one of our aforesaid kinds, how can we avoid the danger of blasphemy, Protarchus and Philebus? A lot seems to hinge on whether or not we give the right answer to this question.

Philebus/ Really now, you are extolling your own god, Socrates.

Socrates/ Just as you extol that goddess of yours, Philebus. But the question needs an answer, nevertheless.

Protarchus/ Socrates is right in this, Philebus; we must obey him.

Philebus/ Didn't you choose to speak instead of me?

Protarchus/ Quite. But now I am at a loss, and I entreat you, Socrates, to act as our spokesman, so that we do not misstate the case of your candidate and thus introduce a false note into the discussion.

Socrates/ Your obedient servant, Protarchus, especially since it is not a very difficult task. But did my playful exaltation really confuse you, as Philebus claims, when I asked to what kind reason and knowledge belonged?

Protarchus/ It certainly did, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is easy to settle, nevertheless. For all the wise are agreed, in true self-exaltation, that reason is our king, both over heaven and earth. And perhaps they are justified. But let us go into the discussion of this class itself at greater length, if you have no objections.

Protarchus/ Discuss it in whichever way you like, Socrates, and don't be apologetic about long-windedness; we will not lose patience.

Socrates/ Well said. Let us proceed by taking up this question.

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ Whether we hold the view that the universe and this whole world order are ruled by unreason and irregularity, as chance would have it, or whether they are not rather, as our forebears taught us, governed by reason and by the order of a wonderful intelligence.

Protarchus/ How can you even think of a comparison here, Socrates? What you suggest now is downright impious, I would say. The only account that can do justice to the wonderful spectacle presented by the cosmic order of sun, moon, and stars and the revolution of the whole heaven, is that reason arranges it all, and I for my part would never waver in saying or believing it.

Socrates/ Is this what you want us to do, that we should not only conform to the view of earlier thinkers who professed this as the truth, repeating without any risk what others have said, but that we should share their risk and blame if some formidable opponent denies it and argues that disorder rules?

Protarchus/ How could I fail to want it?

Socrates/ Well, then, now face up to the consequences of this position that we have to come to terms with.

Protarchus/ Please tell me.

Socrates/ We somehow discern that what makes up the nature of the bodies of all animals—fire, water, and air, "and earth!," as storm-battered sailors say—are part of their composition.

Protarchus/ Very much so. We are indeed battered by difficulties in our discussion.

Socrates/ Come, now, and realize that the following applies to all constituents that belong to us.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ That the amount of each of these elements in us is small and insignificant, that it does not possess in the very

least the purity or the power that is worthy of its nature. Take one example as an illustration representative for all. There is something called fire that belongs to us, and then again there is fire in the universe.

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And is not the fire that belongs to us small in amount, feeble and poor, while the fire in the universe overwhelms us by its size and beauty and by the display of all its power?

Protarchus/ What you say is very true.

Socrates/ But what about this? Is the fire in the universe generated, nourished, and ruled by the fire that belongs to us, or is it not quite the reverse, that your heat and mine, and that in every animal, owe all this to the cosmic fire?

Protarchus/ It is not even worth answering that question.

Socrates/ Right. And I guess you will give the same answer about the earth here in the animals when it is compared to earth in the universe, and likewise about the other elements I mentioned a little earlier. Is that your answer?

Protarchus/ Who could answer differently without seeming insane?

Socrates/ No one at all. But now see what follows. To the combination of all these elements taken as a unit we give the name “body,” don’t we?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now, realize that the same holds in the case of what we call the ordered universe. It will turn out to be a body in the same sense, since it is composed of the same elements.

Protarchus/ What you say is undeniable.

Socrates/ Does the body of the universe as a whole provide for the sustenance of what is body in our sphere, or is it the

reverse, and the universe possesses and derives all the goods enumerated from ours?

Protarchus/ That too is a question not worth asking, Socrates.

Socrates/ But what about the following, is this also a question not worth asking?

Protarchus/ Tell me what the question is.

Socrates/ Of the body that belongs to us, will we not say that it has a soul?

Protarchus/ Quite obviously that is what we will say.

Socrates/ But where does it come from, unless the body of the universe which has the same properties as ours, but more beautiful in all respects, happens to possess a soul?

Protarchus/ Clearly from nowhere else.

Socrates/ We surely cannot maintain this assumption, with respect to our four classes (limit, the unlimited, their mixture, and their cause—which is present in everything): that this cause is recognized as all-encompassing wisdom, since among us it imports the soul and provides training for the body and medicine for its ailments and in other cases order and restitution, but that it should fail to be responsible for the same things on a large scale in the whole universe (things that are, in addition, beautiful and pure), for the contrivance of what has so fair and wonderful a nature.

Protarchus/ That would make no sense at all.

Socrates/ But if that is inconceivable, we had better pursue the alternative account and affirm, as we have said often, that there is plenty of the unlimited in the universe as well as sufficient limit, and that there is, above them, a certain cause, of no small significance, that orders and coordinates the years, seasons, and months, and which has every right to the title of wisdom and reason.

Protarchus/ The greatest right.

Socrates/ But there could be no wisdom and reason without a soul.

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ You will therefore say that in the nature of Zeus there is the soul of a king, as well as a king's reason, in virtue of this power displayed by the cause, while paying tribute for other fine qualities in the other divinities, in conformity with the names by which they like to be addressed.

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Do not think that we have engaged in an idle discussion here, Protarchus, for it comes as a support for the thinkers of old who held the view that reason is forever the ruler over the universe.

Protarchus/ It certainly does.

Socrates/ It also has provided an answer to my query, that reason belongs to that kind which is the cause of everything. But that was one of our four kinds. So there you already have the solution to our problem in your hands.

Protarchus/ I have indeed, and quite to my satisfaction, although at first I did not realize that you were answering.

Socrates/ Sometimes joking is a relief from seriousness.

Protarchus/ Well said.

Socrates/ By now, dear friend, we have arrived at a satisfactory explanation of the class that reason belongs to and what power it has.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And as to pleasure, it became apparent quite a while ago what class it belongs to.

Protarchus/ Definitely.

Socrates/ Let us firmly keep it in mind about both of them, that reason is akin to cause and is part of that family, while

pleasure itself is unlimited and belongs to the kind that in and by itself neither possesses nor will ever possess a beginning, middle, or end.

Protarchus/ We will keep it in mind, how could we help it?

Socrates/ After this we must next find out in what kind of thing each of them resides and what kind of condition makes them come to be when they do. Let us take pleasure first, for just as we searched for the class it belongs to first, so we start our present investigation with it. But again, we will not be able to provide a satisfactory examination of pleasure if we do not study it together with pain.

Protarchus/ If that is the direction we have to take, then let's go that way.

Socrates/ Do you share my view about their generation?

Protarchus/ What view?

Socrates/ Pleasure and pain seem to me by nature to arise together in the common kind.

Protarchus/ Could you remind us once again, Socrates, which of those you mentioned you called the common kind?

Socrates/ As far as I can, my most esteemed friend.

Protarchus/ That is noble of you.

Socrates/ By the common kind, we meant the one that was number three on our list of four.

Protarchus/ You mean the one you introduced after the unlimited and the limited, the one that included health, and also harmony, I believe?

Socrates/ Excellently stated. But now try to put your mind to this as much as possible.

Protarchus/ Just go on.

Socrates/ What I claim is that when we find the harmony in living creatures disrupted, there will at the same time be a disintegration of their nature and a rise of pain.

Protarchus/ What you say is very plausible.

Socrates/ But if the reverse happens, and harmony is regained and the former nature restored, we have to say that pleasure arises, if we must pronounce only a few words on the weightiest matters in the shortest possible time.

Protarchus/ I believe that you are right, Socrates, but why don't we try to be more explicit about this very point?

Socrates/ Well, is it not child's play to understand the most ordinary and well-known cases?

Protarchus/ What cases do you mean?

Socrates/ Hunger, I take it, is a case of disintegration and pain?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And eating, the corresponding refilling, is a pleasure?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But thirst is, once again, a destruction and pain, while the process that fills what is dried out with liquid is pleasure? And, further, unnatural separation and dissolution, the affection caused by heat, is pain, while the natural restoration of cooling down is pleasure?

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And the unnatural coagulation of the fluids in an animal through freezing is pain, while the natural process of their dissolution or redistribution is pleasure. To cut matters short, see whether the following account seems acceptable to you. When the natural combination of limit and unlimitedness that forms a live organism, as I explained before, is destroyed, this destruction is pain, while the return towards its own nature, this general restoration, is pleasure.

Protarchus/ So be it, for it seems to provide at least an outline.

Socrates/ Shall we then accept this as one kind of pleasure and pain, what happens in either of these two kinds of processes?

Protarchus/ Accepted.

Socrates/ But now accept also the anticipation by the soul itself of these two kinds of experiences; the hope before the actual pleasure will be pleasant and comforting, while the expectation of pain will be frightening and painful.

Protarchus/ This turns out then to be a different kind of pleasure and pain, namely the expectation that the soul experiences by itself, without the body.

Socrates/ Your assumption is correct. In both these cases, as I see it at least, pleasure and pain will arise pure and unmixed with each other, so that it will become apparent as far as pleasure is concerned whether its whole class is to be welcomed or whether this should rather be the privilege of one of the other classes which we have already discussed. Pleasure and pain may rather turn out to share the predicament of hot and cold and other such things that are welcome at one point but unwelcome at another, because they are not good, but it happens that some of them do occasionally assume a beneficial nature.

Protarchus/ You are quite right if you suggest that this must be the direction to take if we want to find a solution to what we are looking for now.

Socrates/ First, then, let us take a look together at the following point. If it truly holds, as we said, that their disintegration constitutes pain, but restoration is pleasure, what kind of state should we ascribe to animals when they are neither destroyed nor restored; what kind of condition is this? Think about it carefully, and tell me: Is there not every necessity that the animal will at that time experience neither pain nor pleasure, neither large nor small?

Protarchus/ That is indeed necessary.

Socrates/ There is, then, such a condition, a third one, besides the one in which one is pleased or in which one is in pain?

Protarchus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Make an effort to keep this fact in mind. For it makes quite a difference for our judgment of pleasure whether we remember that there is such a state or not. But we had better give it a little more consideration, if you don't mind.

Protarchus/ Just tell me how.

Socrates/ You realize that nothing prevents the person who has chosen the life of reason from living in this state.

Protarchus/ You mean without pleasure and pain?

Socrates/ It was one of the conditions agreed on in our comparison of lives that the person who chooses the life of reason and intelligence must not enjoy pleasures either large or small.

Protarchus/ That was indeed agreed on.

Socrates/ He may then live in this fashion, and perhaps there would be nothing absurd if this life turns out to be the most godlike.

Protarchus/ It is at any rate not likely that the gods experience either pleasure or the opposite.

Socrates/ It is certainly not likely. For either of these states would be quite unseemly in their case. But this is a question we had better take up again later if it should be relevant to our discussion, but let us count it as an additional point in favor of reason in the competition for second prize, even if we cannot count it in that for first prize.

Protarchus/ A very good suggestion.

Socrates/ But now as for the other kind of pleasure, of which we said that it belongs to the soul itself. It depends entirely on memory.

Protarchus/ In what way?

Socrates/ It seems we have first to determine what kind of a thing memory is; in fact I am afraid that we will have to determine the nature of perception even before that of memory, if the whole subject matter is to become at all clear to us in the right way.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ You must realize that some of the various affections of the body are extinguished within the body before they reach the soul, leaving it unaffected. Others penetrate through both body and soul and provoke a kind of upheaval that is peculiar to each but also common to both of them.

Protarchus/ I realize that.

Socrates/ Are we fully justified if we claim that the soul remains oblivious of those affections that do not penetrate both, while it is not oblivious of those that penetrate both?

Protarchus/ Of course we are justified.

Socrates/ But you must not so misunderstand me as to suppose I meant that this 'obliviousness' gave rise to any kind of forgetting. Forgetting is rather the loss of memory, but in the case in question here no memory has yet arisen. It would be absurd to say that there could be the process of losing something that neither is nor was in existence, wouldn't it?

Protarchus/ Quite definitely.

Socrates/ You only have to make some change in names, then.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Instead of saying that the soul is oblivious when it remains unaffected by the disturbances of the body, now

change the name of what you so far called obliviousness to that of nonperception.

Protarchus/ I understand.

Socrates/ But when the soul and body are jointly affected and moved by one and the same affection, if you call this motion perception, you would say nothing out of the way.

Protarchus/ You are right.

Socrates/ And so we know by now what we mean by perception?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So if someone were to call memory the 'preservation of perception', he would be speaking correctly, as far as I am concerned.

Protarchus/ Rightly so.

Socrates/ And do we not hold that recollection differs from memory?

Protarchus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Does not their difference lie in this?

Protarchus/ In what?

Socrates/ Do we not call it 'recollection' when the soul recalls as much as possible by itself, without the aid of the body, what she had once experienced together with the body? Or how would you put it?

Protarchus/ I quite agree.

Socrates/ But on the other hand, when, after the loss of memory of either a perception or again a piece of knowledge, the soul calls up this memory for itself, we also call all these events recollection.

Protarchus/ You are right.

Socrates/ The point for the sake of which all this has been said is the following.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ That we grasp as fully and clearly as possible the pleasure that the soul experiences without the body, as well as the desire. And through a clarification of these states, the nature of both pleasure and desire will somehow be revealed.

Protarchus/ Let us now discuss this as our next issue, Socrates.

Socrates/ It seems that in our investigation we have to discuss many points about the origin of pleasure and about all its different varieties. For it looks as if we will first have to determine what desire is and on what occasion it arises.

Protarchus/ Let us determine that, then. We have nothing to lose.

Socrates/ We will certainly lose something, Protarchus; by discovering what we are looking for now, we will lose our ignorance about it.

Protarchus/ You rightly remind us of that fact. But now let us try to return to the further pursuit of our subject.

Socrates/ Are we agreed now that hunger and thirst and many other things of this sort are desires?

Protarchus/ Quite in agreement.

Socrates/ But what is the common feature whose recognition allows us to address all these phenomena, which differ so much, by the same name?

Protarchus/ Heavens, that is perhaps not an easy thing to determine, Socrates, but it must be done nevertheless.

Socrates/ Shall we go back to the same point of departure?

Protarchus/ What point?

Socrates/ When we say “he is thirsty,” we always have something in mind?

Protarchus/ We do.

Socrates/ Meaning that he is getting empty?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But thirst is a desire?

Protarchus/ Yes, the desire for drink.

Socrates/ For drink or for the filling with drink?

Protarchus/ For the filling with drink, I think.

Socrates/ Whoever among us is emptied, it seems, desires the opposite of what he suffers. Being emptied, he desires to be filled.

Protarchus/ That is perfectly obvious.

Socrates/ But what about this problem? If someone is emptied for the first time, is there any way he could be in touch with filling, either through sensation or memory, since he has no experience of it, either in the present or ever in the past?

Protarchus/ How should he?

Socrates/ But we do maintain that he who has a desire desires something?

Protarchus/ Naturally.

Socrates/ He does, then, not have a desire for what he in fact experiences. For he is thirsty, and this is a process of emptying. His desire is rather of filling.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Something in the person who is thirsty must necessarily somehow be in contact with filling.

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ But it is impossible that this should be the body, for the body is what is emptied out.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The only option we are left with is that the soul makes contact with the filling, and it clearly must do so

through memory. Or could it make contact through anything else?

Protarchus/ Clearly through nothing else.

Socrates/ Do we understand, then, what conclusions we have to draw from what has been said?

Protarchus/ What are they?

Socrates/ Our argument forces us to conclude that desire is not a matter of the body.

Protarchus/ Why is that?

Socrates/ Because it shows that every living creature always strives towards the opposite of its own experience.

Protarchus/ And very much so.

Socrates/ This impulse, then, that drives it towards the opposite of its own state signifies that it has memory of that opposite state?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ By pointing out that it is this memory that directs it towards the objects of its desires, our argument has established that every impulse, and desire, and the rule over the whole animal is the domain of the soul.

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Our argument will, then, never allow that it is our body that experiences thirst, hunger, or anything of that sort.

Protarchus/ Absolutely not.

Socrates/ There is yet a further point we have to consider that is connected with these same conditions. For our discussion seems to me to indicate that there is a form of life that consists of these conditions.

Protarchus/ What does it consist of, and what form of life are you talking about?

Socrates/ It consists of filling and emptying and all such processes as are related to both the preservation and the destruction of animals. And when one of us is in either of the two conditions, he is in pain, or again he experiences pleasure, depending on the nature of these changes.

Protarchus/ That is indeed what happens.

Socrates/ But what if someone finds himself in between these two affections?

Protarchus/ What do you mean by “in between”?

Socrates/ When he is pained by his condition and remembers the pleasant things that would put an end to the pain, but is not yet being filled. What about this situation? Should we claim that he is then in between these two affections, or not?

Protarchus/ We should claim that.

Socrates/ And should we say that the person is altogether in pain or pleasure?

Protarchus/ By heaven, he seems to me to be suffering a twofold pain; one consists in the body’s condition, the other in the soul’s desire caused by the expectation.

Socrates/ How do you mean that there is a twofold pain, Protarchus? Does it not sometimes happen that one of us is emptied at one particular time, but is in clear hope of being filled, while at another time he is, on the contrary, without hope?

Protarchus/ It certainly happens.

Socrates/ And don’t you think that he enjoys this hope for replenishment when he remembers, while he is simultaneously in pain because he has been emptied at that time?

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ This is, then, the occasion when a human being and other animals are simultaneously undergoing pain and pleasure.

Protarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But what if he is without hope of attaining any replenishment when he is emptied? Is not that the situation where this twofold pain occurs, which you have just come across and simply taken to be twofold?

Protarchus/ That is quite undeniable, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now let us apply the results of our investigation of these affections to this purpose.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Shall we say that these pains and pleasures are true or false, or rather that some of them are true, but not others?

Protarchus/ But how could there be false pleasures or pains, Socrates?

Socrates/ Well, how could there be true or false fears, true or false expectations, true or false judgments, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ For judgments I certainly would be ready to admit it, but not for the other cases.

Socrates/ What is that you are saying? I am afraid we are stirring up a weighty controversy here.

Protarchus/ You are right.

Socrates/ But if it is relevant to what we were discussing before, you worthy son of that man, it ought to be taken up.

Protarchus/ Perhaps, in that case.

Socrates/ We have to forego any excursions here or any discussion of whatever side issues are not directly relevant to our topic.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ But tell me this, for I have lived in continued perplexity about the difficulty we have come across now. What is your view? Are there not false pleasures, as well as true ones?

Protarchus/ How should there be?

Socrates/ Do you really want to claim that there is no one who, either in a dream or awake, either in madness or any other delusion, sometimes believes he is enjoying himself, while in reality he is not doing so, or believes he is in pain while he is not?

Protarchus/ We all assume that this is indeed the case, Socrates.

Socrates/ But rightly so? Should we not rather take up the question whether or not this claim is justified?

Protarchus/ We should take it up, as I at least would say.

Socrates/ Let us try to achieve more clarity about what we said concerning pleasure and judgment. Is there something we call judging?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And is there also taking pleasure?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But there is also what the judgment is about?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And also what the pleasure is about?

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ But what makes a judgment, whether it judges rightly or not, cannot be deprived of really making a judgment.

Protarchus/ How should it?

Socrates/ And what takes pleasure, whether it is rightly pleased or not, can obviously never be deprived of really taking pleasure.

Protarchus/ Yes, that is also the case.

Socrates/ But what we have to question is how it is that judgment is usually either true or false, while pleasure admits only truth, even though in both cases there is equally real judgment and real pleasure.

Protarchus/ We have to question that.

Socrates/ Is it that judgment takes on the additional qualification of true and false and is thus not simply judgment, but also has either one of these two qualities? Would you say that is a point we have to look into?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And furthermore, whether quite generally certain things allow extra qualifications, while pleasure and pain are simply what they are and do not take on any qualifications. About that we also have to come to an agreement.

Protarchus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ But at least it is not difficult to see that they, too, take on qualifications. For we said earlier that both of them, pleasures as well as pains, can be great and small, and also have intensity.

Protarchus/ We certainly did.

Socrates/ But if some bad state should attach itself to any of them, then we would say that the judgment becomes a bad one, and the pleasure becomes bad too, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ Naturally, Socrates.

Socrates/ But what if some rightness or the opposite of rightness are added to something, would we not call the judgment right, if it were right, and the pleasure too?

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And if a mistake is made about the object of judgment, then we say that the judgment that makes that mistake is not right and does not judge rightly?

Protarchus/ How could it?

Socrates/ But what if we notice that a pain or pleasure is mistaken in what it is pleased or pained about, shall we then call it right or proper or give it other names of praise?

Protarchus/ That would be impossible, if indeed pleasure should be mistaken.

Socrates/ As to pleasure, it certainly often seems to arise in us not with a right, but with a false, judgment.

Protarchus/ Of course. But what we call false in this case at that point is the judgment, Socrates; nobody would dream of calling the pleasure itself false.

Socrates/ You certainly put up a spirited defense for pleasure now, Protarchus!

Protarchus/ Not at all; I only repeat what I hear.

Socrates/ Is there no difference between the pleasure that goes with right judgment and knowledge and the kind that often comes to any of us with false judgment and ignorance?

Protarchus/ There's probably no small difference.

Socrates/ So let us turn to inspect the difference between them.

Protarchus/ Lead on where you like.

Socrates/ I lead you this way.

Protarchus/ What way?

Socrates/ Of our judgment we say that it is sometimes false, and sometimes true?

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ And as we said just now, these are often accompanied by pleasure and pain. I am talking of true and false judgment.

Protarchus/ That's right.

Socrates/ And is it not memory and perception that lead to judgment or the attempt to come to a definite judgment, as the case may be?

Protarchus/ Indeed.

Socrates/ Do we agree that the following must happen here?

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Wouldn't you say that it often happens that someone who cannot get a clear view because he is looking from a distance wants to make up his mind about what he sees?

Protarchus/ I would say so.

Socrates/ And might he then not again raise another question for himself?

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ "What could that be that appears to stand near that rock under a tree?"—Do you find it plausible that someone might say these words to himself when he sets his eyes on such appearances?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And might he not afterwards, as an answer to his own question, say to himself, "It is a man," and in so speaking, would get it right?

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ But he might also be mistaken and say that what he sees is a statue, the work of some herdsmen?

Protarchus/ Very likely.

Socrates/ But if he were in company, he might actually say out loud to his companion what he had told himself, and so what we earlier called judgment would turn into an assertion?

Protarchus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Whereas if he is alone, he entertains this thought by himself, and sometimes he may even resume his way for quite a long time with the thought in his mind?

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ But look, do you share my view on this?

Protarchus/ What view?

Socrates/ That our soul in such a situation is comparable to a book?

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ If memory and perceptions concur with other impressions at a particular occasion, then they seem to me to inscribe words in our soul, as it were. And if what is written is true, then we form a true judgment and a true account of the matter. But if what our scribe writes is false, then the result will be the opposite of the truth.

Protarchus/ I quite agree, and I accept this way of putting it.

Socrates/ Do you also accept that there is another craftsman at work in our soul at the same time?

Protarchus/ What kind of craftsman?

Socrates/ A painter who follows the scribe and provides illustrations to his words in the soul.

Protarchus/ How and when do we say he does this work?

Socrates/ When a person takes his judgments and assertions directly from sight or any other sense-perception and then views the images he has formed inside himself, corresponding to those judgments and assertions. Or is it not something of this sort that is going on in us?

Protarchus/ Quite definitely.

Socrates/ And are not the pictures of the true judgments and assertions true, and the pictures of the false ones false?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ If we have been right with what we have said so far, let us in addition come to terms about this question.

Protarchus/ What about?

Socrates/ Whether these experiences are necessarily confined to the past and the present, but are not extended into the future.

Protarchus/ They should apply equally to all the tenses: past, present, and future.

Socrates/ Now, did we not say before, about the pleasures and pains that belong to the soul alone, that they might precede those that go through the body? It would therefore be possible that we have anticipatory pleasures and pains about the future.

Protarchus/ Undeniably.

Socrates/ And are those writings and pictures which come to be in us, as we said earlier, concerned only with the past and the present, but not with the future?

Protarchus/ Decidedly with the future.

Socrates/ If you say 'decidedly', is it because all of them are really hopes for future times, and we are forever brimful of hopes, throughout our lifetime?

Protarchus/ Quite definitely.

Socrates/ Well, then, in addition to what has been said now, also answer this question.

Protarchus/ Concerning what?

Socrates/ Is not a man who is just, pious, and good in all respects, also loved by the gods?

Protarchus/ How could he fail to be?

Socrates/ But what about someone who is unjust and in all respects evil? Isn't he that man's opposite?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And is not everyone, as we just said, always full of many hopes?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ There are, then, assertions in each of us that we call hopes?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But there are also those painted images. And someone often envisages himself in the possession of an enormous amount of gold and of a lot of pleasures as a consequence. And in addition, he also sees, in this inner picture himself, that he is beside himself with delight.

Protarchus/ What else!

Socrates/ Now, do we want to say that in the case of good people these pictures are usually true, because they are dear to the gods, while quite the opposite usually holds in the case of wicked ones, or is this not what we ought to say?

Protarchus/ That is just what we ought to say.

Socrates/ And wicked people nevertheless have pleasures painted in their minds, even though they are somehow false?

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ So wicked people as a rule enjoy false pleasures, but the good among mankind true ones?

Protarchus/ Quite necessarily so.

Socrates/ From what has now been said, it follows that there are false pleasures in human souls that are quite ridiculous imitations of true ones, and also such pains.

Protarchus/ There certainly are.

Socrates/ Now, it was agreed that whoever judges anything at all is always really judging, even if it is not about anything existing in the present, past, or future.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ And these were, I think, the conditions that produce a false judgment and judging falsely, weren't they?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But should we not also grant to pleasures and pains a condition that is analogous in these ways?

Protarchus/ In what ways?

Socrates/ In the sense that whoever has any pleasure at all, however ill-founded it may be, really does have pleasure, even if sometimes it is not about anything that either is the case or ever was the case, or often (or perhaps most of the time) refers to anything that ever will be the case.

Protarchus/ That also must necessarily be so.

Socrates/ And the same account holds in the case of fear, anger, and everything of that sort, namely that all of them can at times be false?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, do we have any other way of distinguishing between bad and good judgments than their falsity?

Protarchus/ We have no other.

Socrates/ Nor, I presume, will we find any other way to account for badness in the case of pleasures unless they are false.

Protarchus/ What you say is quite the opposite of the truth, Socrates! It is not at all because they are false that we regard pleasures or pains as bad, but because there is some other grave and wide-ranging kind of badness involved.

Socrates/ But let us discuss bad pleasures and what badness there is in their case a little later, if we still feel like it. Now we have to take up false pleasures in another sense and show that there is a great variety that arise and are at

work in us. This argument will perhaps come in handy later, when we have to make our decisions.

Protarchus/ That may well be so, at least if there are any such pleasures.

Socrates/ There certainly are, Protarchus; I at least am convinced. But until this is our accepted opinion, we cannot leave this conviction unexamined.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ So let us get ready like athletes to form a line of attack around this problem.

Protarchus/ Here we go.

Socrates/ We did say a short while ago in our discussion, as we may recall, that when what we call desires are in us, then body and soul part company and have each their separate experiences.

Protarchus/ We do remember, that was said before.

Socrates/ And wasn't it the soul that had desires, desires for conditions opposite to the actual ones of the body, while it was the body that undergoes the pain or the pleasure of some affection?

Protarchus/ That was indeed so.

Socrates/ Draw your conclusions as to what is going on here.

Protarchus/ You tell me.

Socrates/ What happens is this: Under these circumstances pains and pleasures exist side by side, and there are simultaneously opposite perceptions of them, as we have just made clear.

Protarchus/ Yes, that is clear.

Socrates/ But did we not also discuss this point and come to an agreement how to settle it earlier?

Protarchus/ What point?

Socrates/ That the two of them, both pleasure and pain, admit the more and less and belong to the unlimited kind?

Protarchus/ That was what we said. What about it?

Socrates/ Do we have any means of making a right decision about these matters?

Protarchus/ Where and in what respect?

Socrates/ In the case where we intend to come to a decision about any of them in such circumstances, which one is greater or smaller, or which one is more intensive or stronger: pain compared to pleasure, or pain compared to pain, or pleasure to pleasure.

Protarchus/ Yes, these questions do arise, and that is what we want to decide.

Socrates/ Well, then, does it happen only to eyesight that seeing objects from afar or close by distorts the truth and causes false judgments? Or does not the same thing happen also in the case of pleasure and pain?

Protarchus/ Much more so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But this is the reverse of the result we reached a little earlier.

Protarchus/ What are you referring to?

Socrates/ Earlier it was true and false judgments which affected the respective pleasures and pains with their own condition.

Protarchus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ But now it applies to pleasures and pains themselves; it is because they are alternately looked at from close up or far away, or simultaneously put side by side, that the pleasures seem greater compared to pain and more intensive, and pains seem, on the contrary, moderate in comparison with pleasures.

Protarchus/ It is quite inevitable that such conditions arise under these circumstances.

Socrates/ But if you take that portion of them by which they appear greater or smaller than they really are, and cut it off from each of them as a mere appearance and without real being, you will neither admit that this appearance is right nor dare to say that anything connected with this portion of pleasure or pain is right and true.

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Next in order after these, we will find pleasures and pains in animals that are even falser than these, both in appearance and reality, if we approach them in this way.

Protarchus/ What are they, and what is the way?

Socrates/ It has by now been said repeatedly that it is a destruction of the nature of those entities through combinations and separations, through processes of filling and emptying, as well as certain kinds of growth and decay, that gives rise to pain and suffering, distress, and whatever else comes to pass that goes under such a name.

Protarchus/ Yes, that has often been said.

Socrates/ But when things are restored to their own nature again, this restoration, as we established in our agreement among ourselves, is pleasure.

Protarchus/ Correct.

Socrates/ But what if nothing of that sort happens to our body, what then?

Protarchus/ When could that ever happen, Socrates?

Socrates/ Your objection is not to the point, Protarchus.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Because you do not prevent me from putting my question to you again.

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ If in fact nothing of that sort took place, I will ask you, what would necessarily be the consequence of this for us?

Protarchus/ You mean if the body is not moved in either direction, Socrates?

Socrates/ That is my question.

Protarchus/ This much is clear, Socrates, that in such a case there would not be either any pleasure or pain at all.

Socrates/ Very well put. But I guess what you meant to say is that we necessarily are always experiencing one or the other, as the wise men say. For everything is in an eternal flux, upward and downward.

Protarchus/ They do say that, and what they say seems important.

Socrates/ How else, since they themselves are important people? But I do want to avoid this argument which now assails us. I plan to escape it in this way, and you'd better make your escape with me.

Protarchus/ Just tell me how.

Socrates/ "So be it," we will reply to them. But as for you, answer me this question: whether all living creatures in all cases notice it whenever they are affected in some way, so that we notice when we grow or experience anything of that sort, or whether it is quite otherwise.

Protarchus/ It is indeed quite otherwise. Almost all of these processes totally escape our notice.

Socrates/ But then what we just agreed to was not well spoken, that the changes 'upwards and downwards' evoke pleasures and pains.

Protarchus/ How could it?

Socrates/ But if it is stated in this way, it will be better and become unobjectionable.

Protarchus/ In what way?

Socrates/ That great changes cause pleasures and pains in us, while moderate or small ones engender neither of the two effects.

Protarchus/ That is more correct than the other statement, Socrates.

Socrates/ But if this is correct, then we are back with the same kind of life we discussed before.

Protarchus/ What kind?

Socrates/ The life that we said was painless, but also devoid of charm.

Protarchus/ Undeniably.

Socrates/ So we end up with three kinds of life, the life of pleasure, the life of pain, and the neutral life. Or what would you say about these matters?

Protarchus/ I would put it in the same way, that there are three kinds of life.

Socrates/ But to be free of pain would not be the same thing as to have pleasure?

Protarchus/ How could it be the same?

Socrates/ If you hear someone say that it is the most pleasant thing of all to live one's whole life without pain, how do you understand the speaker's intention?

Protarchus/ To my understanding he seems to identify pleasure with freedom from pain.

Socrates/ Now, imagine three sorts of things, whichever you may like, and because these are high-sounding names, let us call them gold, silver, and what is neither of the two.

Protarchus/ Consider it done.

Socrates/ Is there any way conceivable in which this third kind could turn out to be the same as one of our other two sorts, gold or silver?

Protarchus/ How could it?

Socrates/ That the middle kind of life could turn out to be either pleasant or painful would be the wrong thing to think, if anyone happened to think so, and it would be the wrong thing to say, if anyone should say so, according to the proper account of the matter?

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ But we do find people who both think so and say so, my friend.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do they really believe they experience pleasure when they are not in pain?

Protarchus/ They say so, at any rate.

Socrates/ They believe therefore that they are pleased at that time. Otherwise they would not say that they are.

Protarchus/ It looks that way.

Socrates/ But they hold a false judgment about pleasure, if in fact freedom from pain and pleasure each have a nature of their own.

Protarchus/ But they do have their own.

Socrates/ What decision shall we make? That there are three states in us, as we said just now, or that there are only two: pain being an evil in human life, and liberation from pain, also called pleasure, being the good as such?

Protarchus/ But why is it that we are asking ourselves this question now, Socrates? I don't get the point.

Socrates/ That is because you don't really understand who the enemies of our Philebus here are.

Protarchus/ What enemies do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean people with a tremendous reputation in natural science who say that there are no such things as pleasures at all.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ They hold that everything the followers of Philebus call pleasures are nothing but escape from pain.

Protarchus/ Do you suggest we should believe them, Socrates, or what is it you want us to do?

Socrates/ Not that, but to use them as seers who make their prophecies, not in virtue of any art but in virtue of a certain harshness in their nature. It is a nature not without nobility, but out of an inordinate hatred that they have conceived against the power of pleasure, they refuse to acknowledge anything healthy in it, even to the point that they regard its very attractiveness itself as witchcraft rather than pleasure. You may now make use of them for our purposes, taking notice of the rest of their complaints that result from their harshness. After that you will hear what I, for my part, regard as true pleasures, so that through an examination of these two opposed points of view, we can reach a decision about the power of pleasure.

Protarchus/ A fair proposal.

Socrates/ Let us attach ourselves to them as to allies and follow their traces in the direction in which their dour arguments point us. I think they employ reasoning of this kind, starting from some such basic principle: If we wanted to know the nature of any character, like that of hardness, would we get a better understanding if we looked at the hardest kinds of things rather than at what has a low degree of hardness? Now, it is your task, Protarchus, to answer these difficult people, just as you answered me.

Protarchus/ Gladly, and my answer to them will be that I would look at hardness of the first degree.

Socrates/ But again if we wanted to study the form of pleasure, to see what kind of nature it has, in that case we

ought not to look at low-level pleasures, but at those that are said to be the strongest and most intensive.

Protarchus/ Everyone would grant you this point.

Socrates/ Now, aren't the most immediate and greatest among the pleasures the ones connected with the body, as we have often said?

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And is it the case that pleasures are more intensive or set in with greater intensity when people suffer from an illness than when they are healthy? We have to beware of a hasty answer here, lest we get tripped up. Perhaps we might be inclined to affirm this rather for the healthy people?

Protarchus/ Quite likely.

Socrates/ But what about this? Are not those pleasures overwhelming which are also preceded by the greatest desires?

Protarchus/ That is certainly true.

Socrates/ And when people suffer from fever or any such disease, aren't they more subject to thirst, chill, and whatever else continues to affect them through the body? Do they not feel greater deprivations, and also greater pleasures at their replenishment? Or shall we deny that this is true?

Protarchus/ It seems undeniable as you explained it now.

Socrates/ Very well. Are we justified, then, if we claim that whoever wants to study the greatest pleasures should turn to sickness, not to health? Now, mind you, my question was not whether the very sick have more pleasures than healthy people; my concern is rather with the size and intensity of the condition when it takes place. Our task, as we said, is to comprehend both what its true nature is and how those

conceive of it who deny that there is any such thing as pleasure at all.

Protarchus/ I am following quite well what you say.

Socrates/ You might as well be its guide, Protarchus. Now, tell me. Do you recognize greater pleasures in a life given to excesses—I do not say more pleasures, but pleasures that exceed by their force and intensity—than in a moderate life? Think carefully about it before you answer.

Protarchus/ I quite understand what you are after; I see indeed a huge difference. The moderate people somehow always stand under the guidance of the proverbial maxim "nothing too much" and obey it. But as to foolish people and those given to debauchery, the excesses of their pleasures drive them near madness and to shrieks of frenzy.

Socrates/ Good. But if this is how it stands, then it is obvious that it is in some vicious state of soul and body and not in virtue that the greatest pleasures as well as the greatest pains have their origin.

Protarchus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ So we must pick out some of them to find out what characteristic of theirs made us call them the greatest.

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Now, look at the pleasures that go with these types of maladies, what kinds of conditions they are.

Protarchus/ What types do you mean?

Socrates/ Those pleasures of a rather repugnant type, which our harsh friends hate above all.

Protarchus/ What kinds?

Socrates/ For example, the relief from itching by rubbing, and all of that sort that needs no other remedy. But if this condition should befall us, what in heaven's name should we call it, pleasure or pain?

Protarchus/ That really would seem to be a mixed experience, with a bad component, Socrates.

Socrates/ I did not raise this question with the intention of alluding to Philebus. But without a clarification of these pleasures and of those who cultivate them, we could hardly come to any resolution of our problem.

Protarchus/ Then let us take up the whole tribe of these pleasures.

Socrates/ You mean the ones that have that mixed nature?

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ There are mixtures that have their origin in the body and are confined to the body; then, there are mixtures found in the soul, and they are confined to the soul. But then we will also find mixtures of pleasures and pains in both soul and body, and at one time the combination of both will be called pleasure; at other times it will be called pain.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ When someone undergoes restoration or destruction he experiences two opposed conditions at once. He may feel hot while shivering or feel chilled while sweating. I suppose he will then want to retain one of these conditions and get rid of the other. But if this so called bittersweet condition is hard to shake, it first causes irritation and later on turns into wild excitement.

Protarchus/ A very accurate description.

Socrates/ Now, isn't it the case that some of those mixtures contain an even amount of pleasures and pain, while there is a preponderance of either of the two in others?

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ Take the case that we just mentioned, of itching and scratching, as an example where the pains outweigh the pleasures. Now, when the irritation and infection are inside

and cannot be reached by rubbing and scratching, there is only a relief on the surface. In case they treat these parts by exposing them to fire or its opposite—they go from one extreme to the other in their distress—they sometimes procure enormous pleasures. But sometimes this leads to a state inside that is opposite to that outside, with a mixture of pains and pleasures, whichever way the balance may turn, because this treatment disperses by force what was mixed together or mixes together what was separate, so that pains arise besides the pleasures.

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Now, in all those cases where the mixture contains a surplus of pleasure, the small admixture of pain gives rise only to a tickle and a mild irritation, while the predominant part of pleasure causes contractions of the body to the point of leaping and kicking, color changes of all sorts, distortion of features, and wild palpitations; it finally drives the person totally out of his mind, so that he shouts aloud like a madman.

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And this state causes him and others to say of him that he is almost dying of these pleasures. And the more profligate and mindless he is, the more will he pursue them by any means possible, and he calls them supreme and considers as the happiest of all mortals whoever lives in continuous enjoyment of them, as much as that is possible.

Protarchus/ Your description fits exactly the preconceptions of the common run of people, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yes, as far as concerns the pleasures that arise when there is a mixture of the external and internal state of the body, Protarchus. But take now the cases where the soul's contributions are opposed to the body's: When there is pain over and against pleasures, or pleasure against pain, both are

finally joined in a mixed state. We have talked about them earlier and agreed that in these cases it is the deprivation that gives rise to the desire for replenishment, and while the expectation is pleasant, the deprivation itself is painful. When we discussed this we did not make any special mention, as we do now, of the fact that, in the vast number of cases where soul and body are not in agreement, the final result is a single mixture that combines pleasure and pain.

Protarchus/ I suspect that you are right.

Socrates/ But here we are still left with one further kind of mixture of pleasure and pain.

Protarchus/ Tell me what it is.

Socrates/ The case, a common one, where the mixture is the product of affections within the soul itself, as we said before.

Protarchus/ What was it again that we said?

Socrates/ Take wrath, fear, longing, lamentations, love, jealousy, malice, and other things like that; don't you regard them as a kind of pain within the soul itself?

Protarchus/ I certainly do.

Socrates/ And don't we find that they are full of marvelous pleasures? Or do we need the famous lines as a reminder about wrath:

> … That can embitter even the wise
>
> … But much sweeter than soft-flowing honey …

Similarly, in the case of lamentations and longing, aren't there also pleasures mixed in with the pain?

Protarchus/ No need for further reminders; in all these cases it must be just as you said.

Socrates/ And the same happens in those who watch tragedies: There is laughter mixed with the weeping, if you remember.

Protarchus/ How could I forget?

Socrates/ Now, look at our state of mind in comedy. Don't you realize that it also involves a mixture of pleasure and pain?

Protarchus/ I don't quite see that yet.

Socrates/ It is indeed not quite so easy to see that this condition applies under those circumstances.

Protarchus/ It certainly is not to me!

Socrates/ Since it is such an obscure matter, let us be all the more careful. For this will help us to recognize more easily when there is a mixture of pain and pleasure in other cases as well.

Protarchus/ Please tell me.

Socrates/ Since we just mentioned the word "malice": Do you treat malice as a pain of the soul, or what?

Protarchus/ I do.

Socrates/ On the other hand, will not the malicious person display pleasure at his neighbor's misfortunes?

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Now, ignorance is a vice, and so is what we call stupidity?

Protarchus/ Decidedly!

Socrates/ What conclusions do you draw from this about the nature of the ridiculous?

Protarchus/ You tell me.

Socrates/ It is, in sum, a kind of vice that derives its name from a special disposition; it is, among all the vices, the one with a character that stands in direct opposition to the one recommended by the famous inscription in Delphi.

Protarchus/ You mean the one that says "Know thyself," Socrates?

Socrates/ I do. The opposite recommendation would obviously be that we not know ourselves at all.

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Go on and make a subdivision of this disposition into three, Protarchus.

Protarchus/ What do you mean? I am afraid I don't know how to.

Socrates/ Are you saying that it is up to me to make this division now?

Protarchus/ That is indeed what I am saying, but in addition I beg you to do so.

Socrates/ Are there not necessarily three ways in which it is possible not to know oneself?

Protarchus/ What are they?

Socrates/ The first way concerns money, if someone thinks himself richer than he in fact is.

Protarchus/ Many people certainly share that condition.

Socrates/ Even more consider themselves taller and handsomer than they in fact are, and believe they have other such physical advantages.

Protarchus/ Definitely.

Socrates/ But an overwhelming number are mistaken about the third kind, which belongs to the soul, namely virtue, and believe that they are superior in virtue, although they are not.

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And, again, among the virtues, is it not especially to wisdom that the largest number of people lay claim, puffing themselves up with quarrels and false pretensions to would-be knowledge?

Protarchus/ Undeniably so.

Socrates/ It would therefore be quite justified to say that all these conditions are bad.

Protarchus/ Quite justified.

Socrates/ So we must continue with our division of ignorance, Protarchus, if we want to find out what a strange mixture of pleasure and pain this comic malice is. How would you suggest that we should further subdivide? In the case of all those who have such a false opinion about themselves, is it not most necessary, as it is for all mankind, that it be combined either with strength and power, or with its opposite?

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ So make this the point of division. All those who combine this delusion with weakness and are unable to avenge themselves when they are laughed at, you are justified in calling ridiculous. But as for those who do have the power and strength to take revenge, if you call them dangerous and hateful, you are getting exactly the right conception about them. For ignorance on the side of the strong and powerful is odious and ugly; it is harmful even for their neighbors, both the ignorance itself and its imitations, whatever they may be. Ignorance on the side of the weak, by contrast, deserves to be placed among the ridiculous in rank and nature.

Protarchus/ You are right about this division. But I am still not quite clear about where there is a mixture of pleasure and pain in these cases.

Socrates/ So take first the nature of malice.

Protarchus/ Please explain.

Socrates/ It contains a kind of unjust pain and pleasure.

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Now, if you rejoice about evils that happen to your enemy, is there any injustice or malice in your pleasure?

Protarchus/ How should there be?

Socrates/ But is there any occasion when it is not unjust to be pleased rather than pained to see bad things happen to your friends?

Protarchus/ Clearly not.

Socrates/ But we just agreed that ignorance is bad for everyone?

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ Let us take now the ignorance of friends which we said came in three versions, would-be wisdom and would-be beauty, and the other sort we just mentioned, each of which is ridiculous if weak, but odious if strong. Now, are we ready to affirm of our friends' state what we just said, namely, that it is ridiculous if it is harmless to others?

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ But did we not agree that it is bad if it is ignorance?

Protarchus/ We certainly did.

Socrates/ But if we laugh about it, are we pleased or pained by it?

Protarchus/ We are pleased, obviously.

Socrates/ But this pleasure in the face of the misfortunes of friends—did we not say that it was the product of malice?

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Our argument leads to the conclusion that if we laugh at what is ridiculous about our friends, by mixing pleasure with malice, we thereby mix pleasure with pain. For we had agreed earlier that malice is a pain in the soul, that laughing is a pleasure, and that both occur together on those occasions.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ The upshot of our discussion, then, is that in lamentations as well as in tragedies and comedies, not only

on stage but also in all of life's tragedies and comedies, pleasures are mixed with pains, and so it is on infinitely other occasions.

Protarchus/ It would be impossible not to agree with this, even for the most ambitious defense of the opposite position, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now, we had on our list of examples wrath, longing, lamentations, fear, love, jealousy, malice, and whatever else, and we said that in these cases we would discern the mixture that we have already mentioned so frequently, right?

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ So we understand, then, that our whole explanation also applies to longing, malice, and wrath?

Protarchus/ How could we fail to understand that?

Socrates/ And there are many other such cases to which it applies?

Protarchus/ A great many.

Socrates/ Now, what precisely do you think was the purpose for which I pointed out to you this mixture in comedy? Don't you see that it was designed to make it easier to persuade you that there is such a mixture in fear and love and other cases? I hoped that once you had accepted this you would release me from a protracted discussion of the rest—once the main point was understood, that there exists the possibility, for the body without the soul, for the soul without the body, and for both of them in a joint affection, to contain a mixture of pleasure and pain.

Now, tell me whether you will let me go now or whether you will keep us up till midnight. One further remark will gain me my release, I hope. I will gladly give you a full account of the rest tomorrow, but for now I want to steer towards the

remaining points needed to make the decision Philebus demands of us.

Protarchus/ Well spoken, Socrates. Discuss the rest any way you like.

Socrates/ It seems natural, somehow, that we must proceed from the mixed pleasures to the discussion of the unmixed ones.

Protarchus/ A very good point.

Socrates/ I will now try to explain them in turn. Although I am not really in agreement with those who hold that all pleasures are merely release from pain, I nevertheless treat them as witnesses, as I said before, to prove that there are certain kinds that only seem to be pleasures, but are not so in reality, and furthermore, that there are others that have the appearance of enormous size and great variety, but which are in truth commingled with pain or with respite from severe pains suffered by soul and body.

Protarchus/ But, Socrates, what are the kinds of pleasures that one could rightly regard as true?

Socrates/ Those that are related to so-called pure colors and to shapes and to most smells and sounds and in general all those that are based on imperceptible and painless lacks, while their fulfillments are perceptible and pleasant.

Protarchus/ But really, Socrates, what are you talking about?

Socrates/ What I am saying may not be entirely clear straightaway, but I'll try to clarify it. By the beauty of a shape, I do not mean what the many might presuppose, namely that of a living being or of a picture. What I mean, what the argument demands, is rather something straight or round and what is constructed out of these with a compass, rule, and square, such as plane figures and solids. Those things I take it are not beautiful in a relative sense, as others are, but are

by their very nature forever beautiful by themselves. They provide their own specific pleasures that are not at all comparable to those of rubbing! And colors are beautiful in an analogous way and import their own kinds of pleasures. Do we now understand it better, or how do you feel?

Protarchus/ I am really trying to understand, Socrates, but will you also try to say this more clearly?

Socrates/ What I am saying is that those among the smooth and bright sounds that produce one pure note are not beautiful in relation to anything else but in and by themselves and that they are accompanied by their own pleasures, which belong to them by nature.

Protarchus/ That much is true.

Socrates/ Then there is also the less divine tribe of pleasures connected with smells. But because there is no inevitable pain mixed with them, in whatever way or wherever we may come by them, for this reason I regard them as the counterpart to those others. So, if you get my point, we will then treat those as two species of the kinds of pleasures we are looking for.

Protarchus/ I do get your point.

Socrates/ Then let us also add to these the pleasures of learning, if indeed we are agreed that there is no such thing as hunger for learning connected with them, nor any pains that have their source in a hunger for learning.

Protarchus/ Here, too, I agree with you.

Socrates/ Well, then, if after such filling with knowledge, people lose it again through forgetting, do you notice any kinds of pain?

Protarchus/ None that could be called inherent by nature, but in our reflections on this loss when we need it, we experience it as a painful loss.

Socrates/ But, my dear, we are here concerned only with the natural affections themselves, apart from reflection on them.

Protarchus/ Then you are right in saying that the lapse of knowledge never causes us any pain.

Socrates/ Then we may say that the pleasures of learning are unmixed with pain and belong, not to the masses, but only to a very few?

Protarchus/ How could one fail to agree?

Socrates/ But now that we have properly separated the pure pleasures and those that can rightly be called impure, let's add to our account the attribution of immoderation to the violent pleasures, but moderation, in contrast, to the others. That is to say, we will assign those pleasures which display high intensity and violence, no matter whether frequently or rarely, to the class of the unlimited, the more and less, which affects both body and soul. The other kinds of pleasures we will assign to the class of things that possess measurement.

Protarchus/ Quite right, Socrates.

Socrates/ But we have also to look into the following question about them.

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ The question of their relation to truth. What is closer to it: the pure, unadulterated, and sufficient or the violent, multiform, and enormous?

Protarchus/ Just what are you after in asking this question, Socrates?

Socrates/ I want to omit nothing in the investigation of both pleasure and knowledge. I want to ask if one part of them is pure, another impure, so that both of them may come to trial in their pure form, and so make it easier for you and me and all those present to come to a verdict in this trial.

Protarchus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Then let us go on and see whether all items that belong in the pure kind display the following qualification. But let us first pick out one of them and study it.

Protarchus/ Which one shall we choose?

Socrates/ Let us take whiteness first, if you have no objection.

Protarchus/ That is fine with me.

Socrates/ Now, how can there be purity in the case of whiteness, and what sort of thing is it? Is it the greatest quantity or amount, or is it rather the complete lack of any admixture, that is, where there is not the slightest part of any other kind contained in this color?

Protarchus/ It will obviously be the perfectly unadulterated color.

Socrates/ Right. But shall we not also agree that this is the truest and the most beautiful of all instances of white, rather than what is greatest in quantity or amount?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ So we are perfectly justified if we say that a small portion of pure white is to be regarded as whiter than a larger quantity of an impure whiteness, and at the same time more beautiful and possessed of more truth?

Protarchus/ Perfectly justified.

Socrates/ Well, now, we don't need to run through many more examples to justify our account of pleasure, but this example suffices to prove that in the case of pleasure, too, every small and insignificant pleasure that is unadulterated by pain will turn out to be pleasanter, truer, and more beautiful than a greater quantity and amount of the impure kind.

Protarchus/ Quite definitely so, and the example is sufficient.

Socrates/ But what about the following point? Have we not been told that pleasure is always a process of becoming, and that there is no being at all of pleasure? There are some subtle thinkers who have tried to pass on this doctrine to us, and we ought to be grateful to them.

Protarchus/ What does it mean?

Socrates/ I will indeed try to explain it to you, my friend Protarchus, by resuming my questioning.

Protarchus/ You have only to keep on asking.

Socrates/ Suppose there are two kinds of things, one kind sufficient to itself, the other in need of something else.

Protarchus/ How and what sort of things do you mean?

Socrates/ The one kind by nature possesses supreme dignity; the other is inferior to it.

Protarchus/ Express this more clearly, please.

Socrates/ We must have met handsome and noble youths, together with their courageous lovers.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now, try to think of another set of two items that corresponds to this pair in all the relevant features that we just mentioned.

Protarchus/ Do I have to repeat my request for the third time? Please express more clearly what it is you want to say, Socrates!

Socrates/ Nothing fanciful at all, Protarchus; this is just a playful manner of speaking. What is really meant is that all things are either for the sake of something else or they are that for whose sake the other kind comes to be in each case.

Protarchus/ I finally managed to understand it, thanks to the many repetitions.

Socrates/ Perhaps, my boy, we will understand better as the argument proceeds.

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ So let's take another pair.

Protarchus/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ Take on the one hand the generation of all things, on the other their being.

Protarchus/ I also accept this pair from you, being and generation.

Socrates/ Excellent. Now, which of the two do you think exists for the other's sake? Shall we say that generation takes place for the sake of being, or does being exist for the sake of generation?

Protarchus/ Whether what is called being is what it is for the sake of generation, is that what you want to know?

Socrates/ Apparently.

Protarchus/ By heavens, what a question to ask me! You might as well ask: "Tell me, Protarchus, whether shipbuilding goes on for the sake of ships or whether ships are for the sake of shipbuilding," or some such thing.

Socrates/ That is precisely what I am talking about, Protarchus.

Protarchus/ What keeps you from answering your questions yourself, Socrates?

Socrates/ Nothing, provided you take your share in the argument.

Protarchus/ I am quite determined to.

Socrates/ I hold that all ingredients, as well as all tools, and quite generally all materials, are always provided for the sake of some process of generation. I further hold that every process of generation in turn always takes place for the sake

of some particular being, and that all generation taken together takes place for the sake of being as a whole.

Protarchus/ Nothing could be clearer.

Socrates/ Now, pleasure, since it is a process of generation, necessarily comes to be for the sake of some being.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But that for the sake of which what comes to be for the sake of something comes to be in each case, ought to be put into the class of the things good in themselves, while that which comes to be for the sake of something else belongs in another class, my friend.

Protarchus/ Undeniably.

Socrates/ But if pleasure really is a process of generation, will we be placing it correctly, if we put it in a class different from that of the good?

Protarchus/ That too is undeniable.

Socrates/ It is true, then, as I said at the beginning of this argument, that we ought to be grateful to the person who indicated to us that there is always only generation of pleasure and that it has no being whatsoever. And it is obvious that he will just laugh at those who claim that pleasure is good.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But this same person will also laugh at those who find their fulfillment in processes of generation.

Protarchus/ How so, and what sort of people are you alluding to?

Socrates/ I am talking of those who cure their hunger and thirst or anything else that is cured by processes of generation. They take delight in generation as a pleasure and proclaim that they would not want to live if they were not subject to hunger and thirst and if they could not experience

all the other things one might want to mention in connection with such conditions.

Protarchus/ That is very like them.

Socrates/ But would we not all say that destruction is the opposite of generation?

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ So whoever makes this choice would choose generation and destruction in preference to that third life which consists of neither pleasure nor pain, but is a life of thought in the purest degree possible.

Protarchus/ So a great absurdity seems to appear, Socrates, if we posit pleasure as good.

Socrates/ An absurdity indeed, especially if we go on to look at it this way.

Protarchus/ In what way?

Socrates/ How is this not absurd: that there should be nothing good or noble in bodies or anywhere else except in the soul, but in the soul pleasure should be the only good thing, so that courage or moderation or reason or any of the other goods belonging to the soul would be neither good nor noble? In addition, we would have to call the person who experiences not pleasure but pain bad while he is in pain, even if he were the best of all men. By contrast, we would have to say of whoever is pleased that the greater his pleasure whenever he is pleased, the more he excels in virtue!

Protarchus/ All that is as absurd as possible, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now, let us not undertake to give pleasure every possible test, while going very lightly with reason and knowledge. Let us rather strike them valiantly all around, to see if there is some fault anywhere. So we'll learn what is by nature purest in them. And seeing this, we can use the truest

parts of these, as well as of pleasure, to make our joint decision.

Protarchus/ Fair enough.

Socrates/ Among the disciplines to do with knowledge, one part is productive, the other concerned with education and nurture, right?

Protarchus/ Just so.

Socrates/ But let us first find out whether within the manual arts there is one side more closely related to knowledge itself, the other less closely; secondly, whether we should treat the one as quite pure, as far as it goes, the other as less pure.

Protarchus/ That is what we ought to do.

Socrates/ So let us sort out the leading disciplines among them.

Protarchus/ Which disciplines, and how are we to do it?

Socrates/ If someone were to take away all counting, measuring, and weighing from the arts and crafts, the rest might be said to be worthless.

Protarchus/ Worthless, indeed!

Socrates/ All we would have left would be conjecture and the training of our senses through experience and routine. We would have to rely on our ability to make the lucky guesses that many people call art, once it has acquired some proficiency through practice and hard work.

Protarchus/ Undeniably so.

Socrates/ This is clear, to start with, in the case of flute-playing. The harmonies are found not by measurement but by the hit and miss of training, and quite generally music tries to find the measure by observing the vibrating strings. So there is a lot of imprecision mixed up in it and very little reliability.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And will we not discover that medicine, agriculture, navigation, and strategy are in the same condition?

Protarchus/ Definitely.

Socrates/ But as to building, I believe that it owes its superior level of craftsmanship over other disciplines to its frequent use of measures and instruments, which give it high accuracy.

Protarchus/ In what way?

Socrates/ In shipbuilding and house-building, but also in many other woodworking crafts. For it employs straightedge and compass, as well as a mason's rule, a line, and an ingenious gadget called a carpenter's square.

Protarchus/ You are quite right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let us, then, divide the so-called arts into two parts, those like music, with less precision in their practice, and those like building, with more precision.

Protarchus/ Agreed.

Socrates/ And let's take those among them as most accurate that we called primary just now.

Protarchus/ I suppose you mean arithmetic and the other disciplines you mentioned after it.

Socrates/ That's right. But don't you think we have to admit that they, too, fall into two kinds, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ What two kinds do you mean?

Socrates/ Don't we have to agree, first, that the arithmetic of the many is one thing, and the philosophers' arithmetic is quite another?

Protarchus/ How could anyone distinguish these two kinds of arithmetic?

Socrates/ The difference is by no means small, Protarchus. First there are those who compute sums of quite unequal

units, such as two armies or two herds of cattle, regardless whether they are tiny or huge. But then there are the others who would not follow their example, unless it were guaranteed that none of those infinitely many units differed in the least from any of the others.

Protarchus/ You explain very well the notable difference among those who make numbers their concern, so it stands to reason that there are those two different kinds of arithmetic.

Socrates/ Well, then, what about the art of calculating and measuring as builders and merchants use them and the geometry and calculations practiced by philosophers—shall we say there is one sort of each of them or two?

Protarchus/ Going by what was said before, I ought to vote for the option that they are two of each sort.

Socrates/ Right. But do you realize why we have brought up this question here?

Protarchus/ Possibly, but I would appreciate it if you answered the question yourself.

Socrates/ The aim of our discussion now seems to be, just as it was when we first set out, to find an analogue here to the point we made about pleasure. So now we ought to find out whether there is a difference in purity between different kinds of knowledge in the same way as there was between different kinds of pleasures.

Protarchus/ This obviously was the purpose of our present question.

Socrates/ But what next? Have we not discovered before that different subject matters require different arts and that they have different degrees of certainty?

Protarchus/ Yes, we did.

Socrates/ It is questionable, then, whether an art that goes under one name and is commonly treated as one should not rather be treated as two, depending on the difference in certainty and purity. And if this is so, we must also ask whether the art has more precision in the hands of the philosopher than its counterpart in the hands of the nonphilosopher.

Protarchus/ That is indeed the question here.

Socrates/ So what answer shall we give to it, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ Socrates, we have come across an amazing difference between the sciences, as far as precision is concerned.

Socrates/ Will that facilitate our answer?

Protarchus/ Obviously. And let it be said that these sciences are far superior to the other disciplines, but that those among them that are animated by the spirit of the true philosophers are infinitely superior yet in precision and truth in their use of measure and number.

Socrates/ Let us settle for this doctrine, and trusting you, we will confidently answer those powerful makers of word traps.

Protarchus/ What answer shall we give them?

Socrates/ That there are two kinds of arithmetic and two kinds of geometry, and a great many other sciences following in their lead, which have the same twofold nature while sharing one name.

Protarchus/ Let us give our answer, with best wishes, to those powerful people, as you call them, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do we maintain that these kinds of sciences are the most precise?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But the power of dialectic would repudiate us if we put any other science ahead of her.

Protarchus/ What science do we mean by that again?

Socrates/ Clearly everybody would know what science I am referring to now! For I take it that anyone with any share in reason at all would consider the discipline concerned with being and with what is really and forever in every way eternally self-same by far the truest of all kinds of knowledge. But what is your position? How would you decide this question, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ On many occasions, Socrates, I have heard Gorgias insist that the art of persuasion is superior to all others because it enslaves all the rest, with their own consent, not by force, and is therefore by far the best of all the arts. Now I am reluctant to take up a position against either him or you.

Socrates/ I suspect that at first you wanted to say "take up arms," but then suppressed it in embarrassment.

Protarchus/ You may take this whatever way pleases you.

Socrates/ But am I to blame for a misunderstanding on your part?

Protarchus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ What I wanted to find out here, my dear friend Protarchus, was not what art or science excels all others by its grandeur, by its nobility, or by its usefulness to us. Our concern here was rather to find which one aims for clarity, precision, and the highest degree of truth, even if it is a minor discipline and our benefit is small. Look at it this way: You can avoid making an enemy of Gorgias so long as you let his art win as far as the actual profit for human life is concerned.

But as to the discipline I am talking about now, what I said earlier about the white also applies in this case: Even in a small quantity it can be superior in purity and truth to what

is large in quantity but impure and untrue. We must look for this science without concern for its actual benefit or its prestige, but see whether it is by its nature a capacity in our soul to love the truth and to do everything for its sake. And if thorough reflection and sufficient discussion confirms this for our art, then we can say that it is most likely to possess purity of mind and reason. Otherwise we would have to look for a higher kind of knowledge than this.

Protarchus/ Well, thinking it over, I agree that it would be difficult to find any other kind of art or any other science that is closer to the truth than this one.

Socrates/ When you gave this answer now, did you realize that most of the arts and sciences and those who work at them are in the first place only concerned with opinions and make opinions the center of their search? For even if they think they are studying nature, you must realize that all their lives they are merely dealing with this world order, how it came to be, how it is affected, and how it acts? Is that our position or not?

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ So such a person assumes the task of dealing, not with things eternal, but with what comes to be, will come to be, or has come to be?

Protarchus/ Undeniably.

Socrates/ So how could we assert anything definite about these matters with exact truth if it never did possess nor will possess nor now possesses any kind of sameness?

Protarchus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And how could we ever hope to achieve any kind of certainty about subject matters that do not in themselves possess any certainty?

Protarchus/ I see no way.

Socrates/ Then there can be no reason or knowledge that attains the highest truth about these subjects!

Protarchus/ At least it does not seem likely.

Socrates/ We must therefore dismiss entirely you and me and also Gorgias and Philebus, but must make this declaration about our investigation.

Protarchus/ What declaration?

Socrates/ Either we will find certainty, purity, truth, and what we may call integrity among the things that are forever in the same state, without anything mixed in it, or we will find it in what comes as close as possible to it. Everything else has to be called second-rate and inferior.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Would not strict justice demand that we call the noblest things by the noblest names?

Protarchus/ That's only fair.

Socrates/ And aren't reason and knowledge names that deserve the highest honor?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ So, in their most accurate sense and appropriate use, they are applied to insights into true reality?

Protarchus/ Definitely.

Socrates/ But these were the very names that I put forward at the beginning for our verdict.

Protarchus/ The very ones, Socrates.

Socrates/ Good. But as to the mixture of intelligence and pleasure, if one likened our situation to that of builders with ingredients or materials to use in construction, this would be a fitting comparison.

Protarchus/ Very fitting.

Socrates/ So next we ought to try our hands at the mixture?

Protarchus/ Definitely.

Socrates/ But had we not better repeat and remind ourselves of certain points?

Protarchus/ What are they?

Socrates/ Those we kept reminding ourselves of before. The proverb fits well here that says that good things deserve repeating 'twice or even thrice'.

Protarchus/ Definitely.

Socrates/ On, then, by the heavens! This is, I think, the general drift of what we said.

Protarchus/ What was it?

Socrates/ Philebus says that pleasure is the right aim for all living beings and that all should try to strive for it, that it is at the same time the good for all things, so that good and pleasant are but two names that really belong to what is by nature one and the same. Socrates, by contrast, affirms that these are not one and the same thing but two, just as they are two in name, that the good and the pleasant have a different nature, and that intelligence has a greater share in the good than pleasure. Isn't that the matter at issue now, just as it was before, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And are we also agreed on this point now, just as we were before?

Protarchus/ What point?

Socrates/ That the difference between the nature of the good and everything else is this?

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Any creature that was in permanent possession of it, entirely and in every way, would never be in need of

anything else, but would live in perfect self-sufficiency. Is that right?

Protarchus/ It is right.

Socrates/ But didn't we try to give them a separate trial in our discussion, assigning each of them a life of its own, so that pleasure would remain unmixed with intelligence, and, again, intelligence would not have the tiniest bit of pleasure?

Protarchus/ That's what we did.

Socrates/ Did either of the two seem to us self-sufficient at that time for anyone?

Protarchus/ How could it?

Socrates/ If some mistake was made then, anyone now has the opportunity to take it up again and correct it. Let him put memory, intelligence, knowledge, and true opinion into one class, and ask himself whether anybody would choose to possess or acquire anything else without that class. Most particularly, whether he would want pleasure, as much and as intensive as it can be, without the true opinion that he enjoys it, without recognizing what kind of experience it is he has, without memory of this affection for any length of time. And let him put reason to the same test, whether anyone would prefer to have it without any kind of pleasure, even a very short-lived one, rather than with some pleasures, provided that he does not want all pleasures without intelligence rather than with some fraction of it.

Protarchus/ Neither of them will do, Socrates, and there is no need to raise the same question so often.

Socrates/ So neither of these two would be perfect, worthy of choice for all, and the supreme good?

Protarchus/ How could they?

Socrates/ The good therefore must be taken up precisely or at least in outline, so that, as we said before, we know to whom we will give the second prize.

Protarchus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Have we not discovered at least a road that leads towards the good?

Protarchus/ What road?

Socrates/ It's as if, when you are looking for somebody, you first find out where he actually lives. That would be a major step towards finding him.

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Similarly here. There is this argument which has now indicated to us, just as it did at the beginning of our discussion, that we ought not to seek the good in the unmixed life but in the mixed one.

Protarchus/ Quite.

Socrates/ But there is more hope that what we are looking for will show itself in a well-mixed life rather than in a poorly mixed one?

Protarchus/ Much more.

Socrates/ So let us pray to the gods for assistance when we perform our mixture, Protarchus, whether it be Dionysus or Hephaestus or any other deity who is in charge of presiding over such mixtures.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ We stand like cup-bearers before the fountains—the fountain of pleasure, comparable to honey, and the sobering fountain of intelligence, free of wine, like sober, healthy water—and we have to see how to make a perfect mixture of the two.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But let's look first into this: Will our mixture be as good as it can be if we mix every kind of pleasure with every kind of intelligence?

Protarchus/ Maybe.

Socrates/ It is not without risk, however. But now I have an idea how we might procure a safer mixture.

Protarchus/ Tell us what it is.

Socrates/ Didn't we find that one pleasure turned out to be truer than another, just as one art was more precise than the other?

Protarchus/ Definitely.

Socrates/ But there was also a difference between different sciences, since one kind deals with a subject matter that comes to be and perishes, the other is concerned with what is free of that, the eternal and self-same. Since we made truth our criterion, the latter kind appeared to be the truer one.

Protarchus/ That was certainly so.

Socrates/ If we took from each sort the segments that possess most truth and mixed them together, would this mixture provide us with the most desirable life, or would we also need less-true ones?

Protarchus/ We should do it this way, it seems to me.

Socrates/ Suppose, then, there is a person who understands what justice itself is and can give the appropriate definitions and possesses the same kind of comprehension about all the rest of what there is.

Protarchus/ Let that be presupposed.

Socrates/ Will he be sufficiently versed in science if he knows the definition of the circle and of the divine sphere itself but cannot recognize the human sphere and these our circles, using even in house-building those other yardsticks and those circles?

Protarchus/ We would find ourselves in a rather ridiculous position if we were confined entirely to those divine kinds of knowledge, Socrates!

Socrates/ What are you saying? Ought we at the same time to include the inexact and impure science of the false yardstick and circle, and add it to the mixture?

Protarchus/ Yes, necessarily so, if anyone of us ever wants to find his own way home.

Socrates/ But how about music: Ought we also to mix in the kind of which we said a little earlier that it is full of lucky hits and imitation but lacks purity?

Protarchus/ It seems necessary to me, if in fact our life is supposed to be at least some sort of life.

Socrates/ Do you want me, then, to yield like a doorkeeper to the pushing and shoving of a crowd and to throw open the doors and let the flood of all sorts of knowledge in, the inferior kind mingling with the pure?

Protarchus/ I for my part can't see what damage it would do to accept all the other kinds of knowledge, as long as we have those of the highest kind.

Socrates/ Shall I, then, let the lot of them flow into the vessel like Homer's very poetical "commingling of mountain glens"?

Protarchus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ In they go! But now we have to return again to the fountain of pleasure. We cannot any longer carry out our original intention of first mixing only the true parts of each of them together. Our love for every kind of knowledge has made us let them all in together, before any of the pleasures.

Protarchus/ What you say is true.

Socrates/ Now it is time for us to decide about pleasures, too, whether we ought to admit the whole tribe in their cases or whether we should at first admit the true ones only.

Protarchus/ It is much safer if we let the true in first!

Socrates/ Let them in, then. But what next? If some turn out to be necessary, should we not mix them in also, as we did in the other case?

Protarchus/ No reason why not, at least if they really are necessary.

Socrates/ But having decided that it was innocuous or even beneficial to spend our lives in the pursuit of all the arts and crafts, we may now come to the same conclusion about the pleasures. If it is beneficial and harmless to live our lives enjoying all the pleasures, then we should mix them all in.

Protarchus/ So what are we to say in their case, and what are we to do?

Socrates/ We should not turn to ourselves with this question, Protarchus, but to the pleasures themselves, as well as to the different kinds of knowledge, and find out how they feel about each other by putting the question in this way.

Protarchus/ What way?

Socrates/ "My friends, whether you ought to be called 'pleasures' or some other name, would you prefer to live together with every kind of knowledge or rather to live without it entirely?"—To this I think they cannot help giving this answer.

Protarchus/ What answer?

Socrates/ What has been said already: "It is neither possible nor beneficial for one tribe to remain alone, in isolation and unmixed. We would prefer to live side by side with that best kind of knowledge, the kind that understands

not only all other things but also each one of us, as far as that is possible."

Protarchus/ "An excellent answer," we will reply to them.

Socrates/ With justice. But after that we have to raise the question with intelligence and reason. "Do you have any need for any association with the pleasures?" That is how we would address reason and knowledge. "What kinds of pleasures?" they might ask in return.

Protarchus/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Our discussion would then continue as follows: "Will you have any need to associate with the strongest and most intensive pleasures in addition to the true pleasures?" we will ask them. "Why on earth should we need them, Socrates?" they might reply, "They are a tremendous impediment to us, since they infect the souls in which they dwell with madness or even prevent our own development altogether. Furthermore, they totally destroy most of our offspring, since neglect leads to forgetfulness. But as to the true and pure pleasures you mentioned, those regard as our kin. And besides, also add the pleasures of health and of temperance and all those that commit themselves to virtue as to their deity and follow it around everywhere. But to forge an association between reason and those pleasures that are forever involved with foolishness and other kinds of vice would be totally unreasonable for anyone who aims at the best and most stable mixture or blend. This is true particularly if he wants to discover in this mixture what the good is in man and in the universe and to get some vision of the nature of the good itself." When reason makes this defense for herself, as well as for memory and right opinion, shall we not admit that she has spoken reasonably and in accord with her own standards?

Protarchus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ But see whether the following is also necessary and without it not a single thing could come to be?

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Wherever we do not mix in truth nothing could truly come to be nor remain in existence once it had come to be.

Protarchus/ How should it?

Socrates/ In no way. But now, if there is anything else missing in our mixture, it is up to you and Philebus to say so. To me at least it seems that our discussion has arrived at the design of what might be called an incorporeal order that rules harmoniously over a body possessed by a soul.

Protarchus/ Count me as one who shares that opinion, Socrates.

Socrates/ Would there be some justification to our claim that we are by now standing on the very threshold of the good and of the house of every member of its family?

Protarchus/ It would seem so, to me at least.

Socrates/ What ingredient in the mixture ought we to regard as most valuable and at the same time as the factor that makes it precious to all mankind? Once we have found it, we will inquire further whether it is more closely related and akin to pleasure or to reason, in nature as a whole.

Protarchus/ You are right. This would certainly be very useful in bringing us closer to our final verdict.

Socrates/ But it is certainly not difficult to see what factor in each mixture it is that makes it either most valuable or worth nothing at all.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ There is not a single human being who does not know it.

Protarchus/ Know what?

Socrates/ That any kind of mixture that does not in some way or other possess measure or the nature of proportion will necessarily corrupt its ingredients and most of all itself. For there would be no blending in such cases at all but really an unconnected medley, the ruin of whatever happens to be contained in it.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ But now we notice that the force of the good has taken refuge in an alliance with the nature of the beautiful. For measure and proportion manifest themselves in all areas as beauty and virtue.

Protarchus/ Undeniably.

Socrates/ But we did say that truth is also included along with them in our mixture?

Protarchus/ Indeed.

Socrates/ Well, then, if we cannot capture the good in one form, we will have to take hold of it in a conjunction of three: beauty, proportion, and truth. Let us affirm that these should by right be treated as a unity and be held responsible for what is in the mixture, for its goodness is what makes the mixture itself a good one.

Protarchus/ Very well stated.

Socrates/ Anyone should by now be able to judge between pleasure and intelligence, which of the two is more closely related to the supreme good and more valuable among gods and men.

Protarchus/ Even if it is obvious, it is better to make it explicit in our discussion.

Socrates/ So now let us judge each one of the three in relation to pleasure and reason. For we have to see for which of those two we want to grant closer kinship to each of them.

Protarchus/ You mean to beauty, truth, and measure?

Socrates/ Yes. Take up truth first, Protarchus, and, holding it in front of you, look at all three: reason, truth, and pleasure. Then, after withholding judgment for a long time, give your answer, whether for you pleasure or reason is more akin to truth.

Protarchus/ What need is there for any length of time? I think there is an enormous difference. For pleasure is the greatest impostor of all, by general account, and in connection with the pleasures of love, which seem to be the greatest of all, even perjury is pardoned by the gods. Pleasures are perhaps rather like children who don't possess the least bit of reason.

Reason, by contrast, either is the same as truth or of all things it is most like it and most true.

Socrates/ Next look at measure in the same way, and see whether pleasure possesses more of it than intelligence or intelligence more than pleasure.

Protarchus/ Once again you are setting me a task I am well prepared for. I don't think that one could find anything that is more outside all measure than pleasure and excessive joy, while nothing more measured than reason and knowledge could ever be found.

Socrates/ Well argued. But now go on to the third criterion. Does reason contain more beauty than the tribe of pleasures in our estimate, so that reason is more beautiful than pleasure, or is it the other way round?

Protarchus/ Why, Socrates, no one, awake or dreaming, could ever see intelligence and reason to be ugly; no one could ever have conceived of them as becoming or being ugly, or that they ever will be.

Socrates/ Right.

Protarchus/ In the case of pleasures, by contrast, when we see anyone actively engaged in them, especially those that are most intense, we notice that their effect is quite ridiculous, if

not outright obscene; we become quite ashamed ourselves and hide them as much as possible from sight, and we confine such activities to the night, as if daylight must not witness such things.

Socrates/ So you will announce everywhere, both by sending messengers and saying it in person to those present, that pleasure is not a property of the first rank, nor again of the second, but that first comes what is somehow connected with measure, the measured and the timely, and whatever else is to be considered similar.

Protarchus/ That seems at least to be the upshot of our discussion now.

Socrates/ The second rank goes to the well-proportioned and beautiful, the perfect, the self-sufficient, and whatever else belongs in that family.

Protarchus/ That seems right.

Socrates/ If you give the third rank, as I divine, to reason and intelligence, you cannot stray far from the truth.

Protarchus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Nor again if, beside these three, you give fourth place to those things that we defined as the soul's own properties, to the sciences and the arts, and what we called right opinions, since they are more closely related to the good than pleasure at least.

Protarchus/ Maybe so.

Socrates/ The fifth kind will be those pleasures we set apart and defined as painless; we called them the soul's own pure pleasures, since they are attached to the sciences, some of them even to sense-perception.

Protarchus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ "With the sixth generation the well-ordered song may find its end," says Orpheus. So it seems that our

discussion, too, has found its end at the determination of the sixth ranking. There remains nothing further to do for us except to give a final touch to what has been said.

Protarchus/ We have to do that.

Socrates/ Come on, then, "the third libation goes to Zeus the Savior," let us call the same argument to witness for the third time.

Protarchus/ Which one?

Socrates/ Philebus declares that every pleasure of any kind is the good....

Protarchus/ By the "third libation" you appear to mean, as you just stated, that we have to repeat the argument all over from the beginning!

Socrates/ Yes, but let's also hear what follows. In view of all the considerations laid out here and out of distaste for Philebus' position pronounced by countless others on many occasions, I maintained that reason is far superior to pleasure and more beneficial for human life.

Protarchus/ That is correct.

Socrates/ Suspecting that there are many other goods, I said that if something turned out to be better than these two, then I would fight on the side of reason for the second prize against pleasure, so that pleasure would be deprived even of the second rank.

Protarchus/ You did say that.

Socrates/ Afterwards it became most sufficiently clear that neither of those two would suffice.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And did it not become clear at this point in our discussion that both reason and pleasure had lost any claim that one or the other would be the good itself, since they were

lacking in autonomy and in the power of self-sufficiency and perfection?

Protarchus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then, when a third competitor showed up, superior to either of them, it became apparent that reason was infinitely more closely related and akin to the character of the victor.

Protarchus/ Undeniably.

Socrates/ And did not pleasure turn out to receive fifth position, according to the verdict we reached in our discussion?

Protarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ But not first place, even if all the cattle and horses and the rest of the animals gave testimony by following pleasure. Now, many people accept their testimony, as the seers do that of the birds, and judge that pleasures are most effective in securing the happy life; they even believe that the animal passions are more authoritative witnesses than is the love of argument that is constantly revealed under the guidance of the philosophic muse.

Protarchus/ We are all agreed now that what you said is as true as possible, Socrates.

Socrates/ So will you let me go now?

Protarchus/ There is still a little missing, Socrates. Surely you will not give up before we do. But I will remind you of what is left!

Philebus.

Translated by R. Hackforth.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus

Socrates/ Now, Protarchus, consider what the two theories are the one which you mean now to take over from Philebus, and the other which I and my friends maintain, and which you are to dispute if you don't find it to your liking. Would you like us to summarize them both?

Protarchus/ Yes, do.

Socrates/ Well, Philebus says that the good for all animate beings consists in enjoyment, pleasure, delight, and whatever can be classed as consonant therewith, whereas our contention is that the good is not that, but that thought, intelligence, memory, and things akin to these, right opinion and true reasoning, prove better and more valuable than pleasure for all such beings as can participate in them, and that for all these, whether now living or yet to be born, nothing in the world is more profitable than so to participate. That, I think, Philebus, is the substance of our respective theories, is it not?

Philebus/ Yes, Socrates, that is perfectly correct.

Socrates/ Well, Protarchus, will you take over this argument now offered to you?

Protarchus/ I must. Our fair friend Philebus has cried off.

Socrates/ Then ought we to do everything we can to get at the truth of the matter?

Protarchus/ Indeed we ought.

Socrates/ Well then, I want us to reach agreement on one further point.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ What you and I are now to attempt is to put forward a certain state or condition of the soul which can render the life of every man a happy life. Am I right?

Protarchus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Then you people put forward the state of enjoyment, whereas we put forward that of intelligence?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But suppose some other state better than these be found; then, if it were found more akin to pleasure, I imagine that while we both of us yield to the life that securely possesses the features in question, the life of pleasure overcomes that of intelligence.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But if it were found more akin to intelligence, then intelligence is victorious over pleasure, and it is pleasure that is worsted. What do you two say? Is that agreed?

Protarchus/ I think so, for my part.

Socrates/ And you, Philebus? What do you say?

Philebus/ What I think, and shall continue to think, is that pleasure is victorious whatever happens. But you must decide for yourself, Protarchus.

Protarchus/ Now that you have handed over the argument to us, Philebus, you are no longer in a position to agree with Socrates or to disagree.

Philebus/ True, but no matter. I wash my hands of the affair, and hereby call the goddess herself to witness that I do so.

Protarchus/ You can have ourselves too as additional witnesses to one point, namely that you have said what you have. And now, Socrates, we must attempt—and Philebus

may choose to help us or do as he likes—to come to a conclusion on what comes next.

Socrates/ Yes, we must make the attempt, and plainly we shall begin with the goddess herself, who, according to our friend, is called Aphrodite, though her truest name, he tells us, is Pleasure.

Protarchus/ Excellent.

Socrates/ For myself, Protarchus, in the matter of naming the gods I am always more fearful than you would think a man could be; nothing indeed makes me so afraid. So in this case I call Aphrodite by any name that is pleasing to her, but as for pleasure, I know that it is a thing of variety and, as I said, it is with pleasure that we must start, turning our thoughts to an examination of its nature. Of course the mere word ‘pleasure' suggests a unity, but surely the forms it assumes are of all sorts and, in a sense, unlike each other. For example, we say that an immoral man feels pleasure, and that a moral man feels it too just in being moral; again, we say the same of a fool whose mind is a mass of foolish opinions and hopes; or once again an intelligent man, we say, is pleased just by being intelligent. Now if anyone asserts that these several kinds of pleasure are like each other, surely he will deserve to be thought foolish?

Protarchus/ They are unlike, because they arise from opposite sources, Socrates; nevertheless in themselves they are not opposites. How could pleasure be opposite to pleasure? Surely nothing in the world could be more completely similar than a thing to itself.

Socrates/ As, of course, color to color. What a man you are! Certainly, in respect simply of its all being color there will be no difference, but for all that everyone recognizes that black is not merely different from white, but in fact its absolute opposite. Then again the same applies as between

figure and figure; taken as a class all figure is one, but of its divisions some are absolutely opposite to each other, while others have countless points of difference, and we can find many other instances of the same thing. So you mustn't put any faith in this argument that makes all sorts of absolutely opposite things into one thing. I am afraid we are going to find pleasures in some cases opposite to pleasures.

Protarchus/ Maybe, but what harm will that do to the argument of our side?

Socrates/ This, that though the things in question are unlike you designate them by a name other than their own; that is what we shall reply. You say, I mean, that all pleasant things are good. Now of course nobody attempts to maintain the thesis that pleasant things are not pleasant, but though they are in some cases, indeed in most, bad and in others good—so those who think with me maintain—nevertheless you designate them all as good, although you would agree that they are unlike if anyone were to press you in argument. What then is the identical element present alike in the bad pleasures and in the good that makes you use the term ‘good' in reference to them all?

Protarchus/ What do you mean, Socrates? Do you imagine that anyone will agree, after maintaining that pleasure is the good—that having done that he will endure to be told by you that certain pleasures are good, and certain others bad?

Socrates/ Well, at all events you will allow that they are unlike, and in some cases opposite to, each other.

Protarchus/ Not in so far as they are just pleasures.

Socrates/ We are drifting back to the old position, Protarchus; it seems that we are not going to allow even that one pleasure differs from another, all being alike. The examples given just now cause us no compunction; our

beliefs and assertions will be those of the most commonplace persons, and most puerile in discussion.

Protarchus/ What exactly are you referring to?

Socrates/ I mean this. Supposing that I were to retort by copying your method and were brazen enough to maintain that a pair of completely dissimilar things are completely similar; then I could say just what you say, with the result that we should be shown up as extraordinarily puerile, and our discussion would ‘stranded be and perish.' Let us get it back again, then, into the water; then I dare say we shall be able to get fairly to grips and possibly come to agreement with each other.

Protarchus/ Tell me how, will you?

Socrates/ You must be the questioner this time, Protarchus, and I will answer.

Protarchus/ What question precisely?

Socrates/ When I was asked originally what the good is, I suggested intelligence, knowledge, mind, and so on, as being good. Now won't they be in the same case with your own suggestion?

Protarchus/ Will they? Why?

Socrates/ Knowledge taken in its entirety will seem to be a plurality in which this knowledge is unlike that—even, it may be, this knowledge opposite to that, but, if it were, should I be a fit person to carry on this present discussion if I took alarm at the point in question and maintained that knowledge is never unlike knowledge, thereby bringing our discussion to an end like a tale that is told, while we ourselves escaped from the wreck on a quibble?

Protarchus/ Well, of course, we've got to escape, but it mustn't be like that. However, I am attracted by having your thesis on all fours with my own. Let us take it that there are

this plurality and unlikeness, or difference, in pleasure as in knowledge.

Socrates/ Well then, Protarchus, don't let us shut our eyes to the variety that attaches to your good as to mine. Let us have the varieties fairly before us and make a bold venture in the hope that perhaps they may, on inspection, reveal whether we ought to give the title of the good to pleasure or to intelligence or to some third thing. For I imagine we are not striving merely to secure a victory for my suggestions or for yours; rather we ought both of us to fight in support of the truth and the whole truth.

Protarchus/ We ought indeed.

Socrates/ Then let us come to an agreement that will give us a still surer basis for this assertion.

Protarchus/ To what assertion do you refer?

Socrates/ The one that causes everybody trouble, whether they want it to, as some people sometimes do, or not, as others sometimes do not.

Protarchus/ I wish you would be plainer.

Socrates/ I am referring to the assertion which came our way just now, and which is of a truly remarkable character. For really it is a remarkable thing to say that many are one, and one is many; a person who suggests either of these things may well encounter opposition.

Protarchus/ Do you mean a person who says that I, Protarchus, though I am one human being am nevertheless many Protarchuses of opposite kinds, making me out to be both tall and short, both heavy and light, and so on and so forth, though I am really always the same person?

Socrates/ That isn't what I mean, Protarchus; the remarkable instances of one and many that you have mentioned are commonplace. Almost everyone agrees nowadays that there is no need to concern oneself with

things like that, feeling that they are childish, obvious, and a great nuisance to argument; for that matter, the same applies to another class of instances, in which you discriminate a man's several limbs and members, get your opponent to admit that the individual in question is all those limbs and members, and then make him look ridiculous by showing that he has been compelled to make the incredible assertions that the one is many and indeed infinitely many, and that the many are only one.

Protarchus/ Then if these are commonplace instances, Socrates, and everyone agrees about them, what are the other sort that you speak of involving this same assertion?

Socrates/ The one that is taken, my dear boy, may be something that comes into being and perishes, as it was in the cases we have just been speaking of; with such cases, with a one like that, it is admitted, as we said a moment ago, that there is no need to thrash the matter out. But suppose you venture to take as your one such things as man, ox, the beautiful, the good; then you have the sort of unities that involve you in dispute if you give them your serious attention and subject them to division.

Protarchus/ What sort of dispute?

Socrates/ First, whether we ought to believe in the real existence of monads of this sort; secondly, how we are to conceive that each of them, being always one and the same and subject neither to generation nor destruction, nevertheless is, to begin with, most assuredly this single unity and yet subsequently comes to be in the infinite number of things that come into being—an identical unity being thus found simultaneously in unity and in plurality. Is it torn in pieces, or does the whole of it, and this would seem the extreme of impossibility, get apart from itself? It is not your questions, Protarchus, but these questions, where

the one and many are of another kind, that cause all manner of dissatisfaction if they are not properly settled, and satisfaction if they are.

Protarchus/ Then there, Socrates, is the first task for us to achieve here and now.

Socrates/ That is what I should say.

Protarchus/ Well then, you may regard all of us here as agreeing with you herein. As for Philebus, perhaps we had better not put him any more questions at present, but let the sleeping dog lie.

Socrates/ Very well. Now what is to be our first move in the great battle of all arms that rages on this issue? Here's a suggestion.

Protarchus/ Yes?

Socrates/ We'll put the thing like this. We get this identity of the one and the many cropping up everywhere as the result of the sentences we utter; in every single sentence ever uttered, in the past and in the present, there it is. What we are dealing with is a problem that will assuredly never cease to exist; this is not its first appearance. Rather it is, in my view, something incidental to sentences themselves, never to pass, never to fade. As soon as a young man gets wind of it, he is as delighted as if he had discovered an intellectual gold mine; he is beside himself with delight, and loves to try every move in the game. First he rolls the stuff to one side and jumbles it into one; then he undoes it again and takes it to pieces, to the confusion first and foremost of himself, next of his neighbors at the moment, whether they be younger or older or of his own age. He has no mercy on his father or mother or anyone else listening to him—a little more, and he would victimize even animals, as well as human beings in general, including foreigners, to whom of course he would

never show mercy provided he could get hold of an interpreter.

Protarchus/ Let me call your attention, Socrates, to the fact that there are plenty of us here, all young people. Aren't you afraid that we shall join with Philebus in an assault on you, if you keep abusing us? Well, well, we realize what you mean. Perhaps there is some way, some device for getting this bothersome business to oblige us by removing itself from our discussion, and we might discover some more attractive method of approach to the subject; if so, pray do your best about it, and we will keep you company—to the best of our power, that is, for we have a big subject in front of us, Socrates.

Socrates/ Big indeed, my boys, if I may adopt Philebus' style of addressing you. Nevertheless there is not, and cannot be, a more attractive method than that to which I have always been devoted, though often in the past it has eluded me so that I was left desolate and helpless.

Protarchus/ Do tell us what it is.

Socrates/ It is a method quite easy to indicate, but very far from easy to employ. It is indeed the instrument through which every discovery ever made in the sphere of the arts and sciences has been brought to light. Let me describe it for your consideration.

Protarchus/ Please do.

Socrates/ There is a gift of the gods—so at least it seems evident to me—which they let fall from their abode, and it was through Prometheus, or one like him, that it reached mankind, together with a fire exceeding bright. The men of old, who were better than ourselves and dwelt nearer the gods, passed on this gift in the form of a saying. All things, so it ran, that are ever said to be consist of a one and a many, and have in their nature a conjunction of limit and

unlimitedness. This then being the ordering of things we ought, they said, whatever it be that we are dealing with, to assume a single form and search for it, for we shall find it there contained; then, if we have laid hold of that, we must go on from one form to look for two, if the case admits of there being two, otherwise for three or some other number of forms. And we must do the same again with each of the 'ones' thus reached, until we come to see not merely that the one that we started with is a one and an unlimited many, but also just how many it is. But we are not to apply the character of unlimitedness to our plurality until we have discerned the total number of forms the thing in question has intermediate between its one and its unlimited number. It is only then, when we have done that, that we may let each one of all these intermediate forms pass away into the unlimited and cease bothering about them. There then, that is how the gods, as I told you, have committed to us the task of inquiry, of learning, and of teaching one another, but your clever modern man, while making his one—or his many, as the case may be—more quickly or more slowly than is proper, when he has got his one proceeds to his unlimited number straightaway, allowing the intermediates to escape him, whereas it is the recognition of those intermediates that makes all the difference between a philosophical and a contentious discussion.

Protarchus/ I think I understand, more or less, part of what you say, Socrates, but there are some points I want to get further cleared up.

Socrates/ My meaning, Protarchus, is surely clear in the case of the alphabet; so take the letters of your school days as illustrating it.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ The sound that proceeds through our mouths, yours and mine and everybody's, is one, isn't it, and also an unlimited variety?

Protarchus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And we have no real understanding if we stop short at knowing it either simply as an unlimited variety, or simply as one. What makes a man ‘lettered' is knowing the number and the kinds of sounds.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then again, it is just the same sort of thing that makes a man musical.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ If you take the art of music, don't you get, as before, a sound that is one?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And may we put down a distinction between low, high, and the level in pitch?

Protarchus/ That's right.

Socrates/ But you wouldn't be a person of real understanding in music if you knew no more than these three terms, though indeed if you didn't know them you' be of practically no account in musical matters.

Protarchus/ I should indeed.

Socrates/ But when you have grasped, my dear friend, the number and nature of the intervals formed by high pitch and low pitch in sound, and the notes that bound those intervals, and all the systems of notes that result from them, the systems which we have learned, conformably to the teaching of the men of old days who discerned them, to call ‘scales,' and when, further, you have grasped certain corresponding features of the performer's bodily movements, features that must, so we are told, be numerically

determined and be called ‘figures' and ‘measures,' bearing in mind all the time that this is always the right way to deal with the one-and-many problem—only then, when you have grasped all this, have you gained real understanding, and whatever be the ‘one' that you have selected for investigating, that is the way to get insight about it. On the other hand, the unlimited variety that belongs to and is inherent in the particulars leaves one, in each particular case, an unlimited ignoramus, a person of no account, a veritable back number because he hasn't ever addressed himself to finding number in anything.

Protarchus/ Philebus, I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent good sense.

Philebus/ What he's saying now, yes, so do I. But why, may I ask, is it addressed to us, and what is its purpose?

Socrates/ A very proper question that, Protarchus, which Philebus has asked us.

Protarchus/ Indeed it is; so do you give him an answer.

Socrates/ I will do so, but first a small additional point to what I have been saying. When you have got your ‘one,' you remember, whatever it may be, you must not immediately turn your eyes to the unlimited, but to a number; now the same applies when it is the unlimited that you are compelled to start with. You must not immediately turn your eyes to the one, but must discern this or that number embracing the multitude, whatever it may be; reaching the one must be the last step of all. We might take our letters again to illustrate what I mean now.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ The unlimited variety of sound was once discerned by some god, or perhaps some godlike man; you know the story that there was some such person in Egypt called Theuth. He it was who originally discerned the

existence, in that unlimited variety, of the vowels—not ‘vowel' in the singular but ‘vowels' in the plural—and then of other things which, though they could not be called articulate sounds, yet were noises of a kind. There were a number of them too, not just one, and as a third class he discriminated what we now call the mutes. Having done that, he divided up the noiseless ones or mutes until he got each one by itself, and did the same thing with the vowels and the intermediate sounds; in the end he found a number of the things, and affixed to the whole collection, as to each single member of it, the name ‘letter.' It was because he realized that none of us could ever get to know one of the collection all by itself, in isolation from all the rest, that he conceived of ‘letter' as a kind of bond of unity, uniting as it were all these sounds into one, and so he gave utterance to the expression ‘art of letters,' implying that there was one art that dealt with the sounds.

Philebus/ Comparing the illustrations with one another, Protarchus, I understand the last one even more clearly than the others, but I still feel the same dissatisfaction about what has been said as I did a while ago.

Socrates/ You mean, Philebus, what is the relevance of it all?

Philebus/ Yes, that is what Protarchus and I have been trying to find out for a long time.

Socrates/ Yet surely this that you tell me you have been long trying to find out is already right in front of you.

Philebus/ How so?

Socrates/ Our discussion started, didn't it, with the question which of the two should be chosen, intelligence or pleasure?

Philebus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And of course we can say that each of them is one thing.

Philebus/ Undoubtedly So.

Socrates/ Then what the foregoing discourse requires of us is just this, to show how each of them is both one and many, and how—mind you, we are not to take the unlimited variety straightaway—each possesses a certain number before the unlimited variety is reached.

Protarchus/ Philebus, it's no easy problem that Socrates has plunged us into with his curiously roundabout methods. Which of us, do you think, should answer the present question? Perhaps it is a trifle ridiculous that I, after giving a full undertaking to replace you in the discussion, should require you to take the business on again because of my inability to answer the question now put, but it would be far more ridiculous, I think, if neither of us could do so. So what shall we do, do you think? Socrates, I take it, is now raising the question of kinds of pleasure. Has it different kinds, or has it not, and if it has, how many are there and what are they like? And exactly the same question arises with regard to intelligence.

Socrates/ Precisely, son of Callias. If we are incapable of doing this in respect of everything that is one, like, identical, and is also, as our foregoing account revealed, the opposite, then none of us will ever be any good at anything.

Protarchus/ That's about how it stands, Socrates. Still, though the ideal for a sensible person is to know everything, I fancy it's not such a bad alternative to realize one's own position. Now why do I say that at this moment? I'll tell you. You made all of us a free offer of this discussion, in which you yourself, Socrates, were to share, for the purpose of deciding what is the best of all things possessed by man. When Philebus said pleasure, delight, enjoyment, and so

forth, you rejoined that it was not those, but a different kind of things, which we have been glad frequently to remind ourselves of, as we were right to do, so as to have the two kinds of things side by side in our memory while we subject them to examination. What you, I gather, maintain is that there is something which may properly be called a better good than pleasure at all events—namely, reason, knowledge, understanding, skill, and all that is akin to these things—and that it is these, not pleasure and so on, that we ought to acquire. Now when these two views had been put forward, one maintained against the other, we threatened you by way of a joke that we would not let you go home until the discussion had been worked out and brought to a satisfactory termination, upon which you agreed to the demand, and allowed us to keep you for that purpose. What we tell you now is, as children say, that you can't take back a present once you have duly given it. So stop your present method of dealing with the questions before us.

Socrates/ What method do you mean?

Protarchus/ That of plunging us into difficulties, and putting questions that it is impossible for us to answer satisfactorily here and now. We ought not to imagine that the object of our present endeavors is to get ourselves all into difficulties; no, if we are incapable of doing the job, it's for you to do it, since you gave your promise. And that being so, please make up your mind for yourself whether you must classify the kinds of pleasure and of knowledge or may pass them over—supposing, that is, that you are able and willing to follow another method and clear up our points of dispute in some other way.

Socrates/ Well, as you put it like that, there's no need for your poor victim to expect any further terrors; that 'if you are willing' banishes all my fears on every score. And what's

more, I fancy some god has recalled to my mind something that will help us.

Protarchus/ Really? What is it?

Socrates/ I remember a theory that I heard long ago—I may have dreamed it—about pleasure and intelligence, to the effect that neither of them is the good, but that it is something else, different from either and better than both. Now, you know, if we could get a clear sight of this third thing now, then a victory for pleasure is out of the question; it couldn't continue to be identical with the good, could it?

Protarchus/ No.

Socrates/ No, and as to methods for classifying the kinds of pleasure, we shan't need them any longer, I imagine. However, we shall see better as we go on.

Protarchus/ That's good, and may your conclusion be so too.

Socrates/ Well, I should be glad if we could settle a few small points first.

Protarchus/ What are they?

Socrates/ Must that which ranks as the good be perfect or imperfect?

Protarchus/ The most perfect of all things, Socrates, of course.

Socrates/ And must the good be adequate also?

Protarchus/ Yes indeed. In fact it must surpass everything in that respect.

Socrates/ And surely there is one more feature of it that needs stressing, namely that every creature that recognizes it goes in pursuit of it, and makes quest of it, desiring to capture it and secure it for its very own, and caring for nothing save such things as involve this or that good in the course of their realization.

Protarchus/ I cannot but agree with that.

Socrates/ Now if we're going to have a critical inspection of the life of pleasure and the life of intelligence, let us see them separately.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Let us have no intelligence in the life of pleasure, and no pleasure in the life of intelligence. For if either of them is the good it must have no need of anything else to be added to it, and if we find that either has such a need, presumably it ceases to be possible for it to be our true good.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then shall we take you as the subject on which to try our experiment?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then here's a question for you.

Protarchus/ Yes?

Socrates/ Would you care, Protarchus, to live your whole life in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then you wouldn't think you needed anything else, if you had that in the fullest measure?

Protarchus/ I'm sure I shouldn't.

Socrates/ Now be careful, are you sure you wouldn't need anything in the way of thought, intelligence, calculating what is fitting, and so on?

Protarchus/ Why should I? If I had my enjoyment what more could I want?

Socrates/ Then if you lived your whole life long like that you would be enjoying the greatest pleasures, would you?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But if you were without reason, memory, knowledge, and true judgment, you would necessarily, I imagine, in the first place be unaware even whether you were, or were not, enjoying yourself, as you would be destitute of all intelligence.

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ And surely again, if you had no memory you would necessarily, I imagine, not even remember that you had been enjoying yourself; of the pleasure you encountered at one moment not a vestige of memory would be left at the next. Once more, if you had no true judgment you couldn't judge that you were enjoying yourself when you were; if you were bereft of the power of calculation you couldn't even calculate that you would enjoy yourself later on. You would be living the life not of a human being but of some sort of sea lung or one of those creatures of the ocean whose bodies are incased in shells. Am I right, or can we imagine the situation to be otherwise?

Protarchus/ We cannot.

Socrates/ Then is a life like that one that we can desire?

Protarchus/ Your argument, Socrates, has reduced me for the moment to complete speechlessness.

Socrates/ Well, don't let us lose heart yet; let us turn our attention to the life of reason, and have a look at that.

Protarchus/ What is the 'life of reason'?

Socrates/ Imagine one of us choosing to live in the possession of intelligence, thought, knowledge, and a complete memory of everything, but without an atom of pleasure, or indeed of pain, in a condition of utter insensibility to such things.

Protarchus/ Neither of these lives seems desirable to me, Socrates, and unless I'm very much mistaken, nobody else will think them so either.

Socrates/ And what about the combined life, Protarchus, the joint life consisting in a mixture of the two?

Protarchus/ You mean of pleasure, on the one hand, and reason with intelligence on the other?

Socrates/ Yes, those are the sorts of ingredients I mean.

Protarchus/ Anybody, I imagine, will prefer this mixed life to either of those others. Indeed I will go further—everybody will.

Socrates/ Then do we realize what result now emerges in our discussion?

Protarchus/ Yes, to be sure. Three lives were offered us, and of the first two neither is sufficient or desirable for any human being or any animal.

Socrates/ Then surely it is obvious by this time that, if you take these two lives, neither of them proves to contain the good. If it did, it would be sufficient and complete and desirable for all plants and animals that had the capacity of living their lives under such conditions from start to finish, and if any of us preferred something else, he would be mistaking the nature of what is truly desirable, and taking what he never meant to take, as the result of ignorance or some sort of unhappy necessity.

Protarchus/ It certainly looks as if that were so.

Socrates/ Well then, I think we've said all that needs saying to show that Philebus' goddess must not be conceived of as identical with the good.

Philebus/ No, and your ‘reason' isn't the good either, Socrates; the case against it looks like being just the same.

Socrates/ That may well apply to my reason, Philebus—not, however, to the true, divine reason which, I fancy, is in rather a different position. Still I am not arguing at present for the claim of reason to win the first prize, as against the

combined life, but certainly we ought to look and see what we are going to do about the second prize. For as to the cause that makes this combined life what it is, very likely one of us will say it is reason, and the other pleasure, so that while neither of the two would, on this showing, be the good, one of them might very possibly be that which makes the good what it is. This then is the point for which I will contend with Philebus even more warmly than before—that whatever it is which, by its inclusion in this mixed life, makes that life both desirable and good, it is something to which reason is nearer and more akin than pleasure. If that be so, pleasure cannot rightly be said to have any sort of claim either to the first prize or to the second; it misses even the third, if we may put any faith in my reasoning at this moment.

Protarchus/ Well yes, Socrates, it does look to me now as if pleasure had been given a knockout blow by your last arguments; in the fight for the victor's prize she has fallen. But I think we may say that it was prudent of reason not to put in for the first prize, as it would have meant a similar defeat. But if pleasure were to be disappointed of even second prize, she would undoubtedly find herself somewhat slighted by her own admirers; even they wouldn't think her as fair as they did.

Socrates/ In that case hadn't we better leave her alone, and not cause her pain by subjecting her to the ordeal of a stringent examination?

Protarchus/ That's nonsense, Socrates.

Socrates/ You mean it's impossible to talk of ‘paining pleasure'?

Protarchus/ Not so much that, as that you don't realize that none of us will let you go until you have argued this matter out to the end.

Socrates/ Phew! A considerable business still in front of us, Protarchus, and not exactly an easy one, I should say, to deal with now. It really looks as though I need fresh tactics. If my objective is to secure the second prize for reason I must have weapons different from those of my previous arguments, though possibly some may be the same. Is it to be, then?

Protarchus/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ Let us try to be very careful what starting point we take.

Protarchus/ Starting point?

Socrates/ Of all that now exists in the universe let us make a twofold division, or rather, if you don't mind, a threefold.

Protarchus/ On what principle, may I ask?

Socrates/ We might apply part of what we were saying a while ago.

Protarchus/ What part?

Socrates/ We said, I fancy, that God had revealed two constituents of things, the unlimited and the limit.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then let us take these as two of our classes, and, as the third, something arising out of the mixture of them both, though I fear I'm a ridiculous sort of person with my sortings of things into classes and my enumerations.

Protarchus/ What are you making out, my good sir?

Socrates/ It appears to me that I now need a fourth kind as well.

Protarchus/ Tell me what it is.

Socrates/ Consider the cause of the mixing of these two things with each other, and put down that, please, as number four to be added to the other three.

Protarchus/ Are you sure you won't need a fifth to effect separation?

Socrates/ Possibly, but not, I think, at the moment. But should the need arise, I expect you will forgive me if I go chasing after a fifth.

Protarchus/ Yes, to be sure.

Socrates/ Well then, let us confine our attention in the first place to three out of our four, and let us take two of these three, observing how each of them is split into many and torn apart, and then collecting each of them into one again, and so try to discern in what possible way each of them is in fact both a one and a many.

Protarchus/ Could you make it all a little clearer still? If so, I dare say I could follow you.

Socrates/ Well, in putting forward 'two of the three' I mean just what I mentioned a while ago, the unlimited, and that which has limit. I will try to explain that in a sense the unlimited is a many; the limited may await our later attention.

Protarchus/ It shall.

Socrates/ Your attention now, please. The matter which I request you to attend to is difficult and controversial, but I request you nonetheless. Take 'hotter' and 'colder' to begin with, and ask yourself whether you can ever observe any sort of limit attaching to them, or whether these kinds of thing have 'more' and 'less' actually resident in them, so that for the period of that residence there can be no question of suffering any bounds to be set. Set a term, and it means the term of their own existence.

Protarchus/ That is perfectly true.

Socrates/ And in point of fact 'more' and 'less' are always, we may assert, found in 'hotter' and 'colder.'

Protarchus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Our argument then demonstrates that this pair is always without bounds, and being boundless means, I take it, that they must be absolutely unlimited.

Protarchus/ I feel that strongly, Socrates.

Socrates/ Ah yes, a good answer, my dear Protarchus, which reminds me that this ‘strongly' that you have just mentioned, and ‘slightly' too, have the same property as ‘more' and ‘less,' When they are present in a thing they never permit it to be of a definite quantity, but introduce into anything we do the character of being ‘strongly' so-and-so as compared with ‘mildly' so-and-so, or the other way round. They bring about a ‘more' or a ‘less,' and obliterate definite quantity. For, as we were saying just now, if they didn't obliterate definite quantity, but permitted definite and measured quantity to find a place where ‘more and less' and ‘strongly and slightly' reside, these latter would find themselves turned out of their own quarters. Once you give definite quantity to ‘hotter' and ‘colder' they cease to be; ‘hotter' never stops where it is but is always going a point further, and the same applies to ‘colder,' whereas definite quantity is something that has stopped going on and is fixed. It follows therefore from what I say that ‘hotter,' and its opposite with it, must be unlimited.

Protarchus/ It certainly looks like it, Socrates, though, as you said, these matters are not easy to follow. Still, if things are said again and yet again, there is some prospect of the two parties to a discussion being brought to a tolerable agreement.

Socrates/ Quite right. That's what we must try to do. However, for the present, to avoid going over the whole long business, see whether we can accept what I shall say as a mark of the nature of the unlimited.

Protarchus/ What is it then?

Socrates/ When we find things becoming ‘more' or ‘less' so-and-so, or admitting of terms like ‘strongly,' ‘slightly,' ‘very,' and so forth, we ought to reckon them all as belonging to a single kind, namely that of the unlimited; that will conform to our previous statement, which was, if you remember, that we ought to do our best to collect all such kinds as are torn and split apart, and stamp a single character on them.

Protarchus/ I remember.

Socrates/ Then things that don't admit of these terms, but admit of all the opposite terms like ‘equal' and ‘equality' in the first place, and then ‘double' and any term expressing a ratio of one number to another, or one unit of measurement to another, all these things we may set apart and reckon—I think we may properly do so—as coming under the limit. What do you say to that?

Protarchus/ Excellent, Socrates.

Socrates/ All right. Now what description are we going to give of number three, the mixture of these two?

Protarchus/ That, I think, will be for you to tell me.

Socrates/ Or rather for a god to tell us, if one comes to listen to my prayers.

Protarchus/ Then offer your prayer, and look to see if he does.

Socrates/ I am looking, and I fancy, Protarchus, that one of them has befriended us for some little time.

Protarchus/ Really? What makes you believe that?

Socrates/ I'll explain, of course. Please follow what I say.

Protarchus/ Pray go on.

Socrates/ We spoke just now, I believe, of ‘hotter' and ‘colder,' did we not?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Now add to these ‘drier and wetter,' ‘higher and lower,' ‘quicker and slower,' ‘greater and smaller,' and everything that we brought together a while ago as belonging to that kind of being which admits of ‘the more' and ‘the less.'

Protarchus/ You mean the kind that is unlimited?

Socrates/ Yes. And now, as the next step, combine with it the family of the limit.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ The one we omitted to collect just now; just as we collected the family of the unlimited together, so we ought to have collected that family which shows the character of limit, but we didn't. Still perhaps it will come to the same thing in spite of that, if in the process of collecting these two kinds the family we have spoken of is going to become plain to view.

Protarchus/ What family? Please explain.

Socrates/ That of ‘equal' and ‘double,' and any other that puts an end to the conflict of opposites with one another, making them well-proportioned and harmonious by the introduction of number.

Protarchus/ I see. By mixing in these you mean, apparently, that we find various products arising as they are respectively mixed.

Socrates/ You take my meaning aright.

Protarchus/ Then continue.

Socrates/ In cases of sickness does not the right association of these factors bring about health?

Protarchus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ And in the case of high and low in pitch, or of swift and slow, which are unlimited, does not the

introduction of these same elements at once produce limit and establish the whole art of music in full perfection?

Protarchus/ Admirably put.

Socrates/ And then again, if they are introduced where there is severe cold and stifling heat they remove all that is excessive and unlimited, and create measure and balance.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then it is here that we find the source of fair weather and all other beautiful things, namely in a mixture of the unlimited with that which has limit?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And indeed there are countless more things which I may omit to enumerate, such as beauty and strength along with health, besides a whole host of fair things found in our souls. For that goddess of ours, fair Philebus, must have observed the lawlessness and utter wickedness of mankind due to an absence of limit in men's pleasures and appetites, and therefore established among them a law and order that are marked by limit. You maintain that she thereby spoiled them. I assert that on the contrary she preserved them. What do you think about it, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ I am thoroughly satisfied, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, there are the three things I have spoken of, if you follow me.

Protarchus/ Yes, I think I see what you mean. You are asserting, I gather, two factors in things—first the unlimited, second the limit. But I can't altogether grasp what you mean by the third thing that you mention.

Socrates/ The reason for that, my dear good sir, is that you are confused by the multiplicity of that third kind. And yet a plurality of forms was presented by the unlimited too, and in spite of that we stamped on them the distinguishing

mark of ‘the more' and its opposite, and so saw them as a unity.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Then again we did not complain about the limit, either that it exhibited a plurality, or that it was not a real unity.

Protarchus/ No, there was no reason to do so.

Socrates/ None whatever. And now as to the third kind, I am reckoning all this progeny of our two factors as a unity, and you may take me to mean a coming-into-being, resulting from those measures that are achieved with the aid of the limit.

Protarchus/ I understand.

Socrates/ And now to continue. We said that besides the three kinds there is a fourth kind to be considered, and it is for our joint consideration. Now I expect you regard it as necessary that all things that come to be should come to be because of some cause.

Protarchus/ Yes, I do. Without that how could they come to be?

Socrates/ Well, is there anything more than a verbal difference between a cause and a maker? Wouldn't it be proper to call that which makes things and that which causes them one and the same?

Protarchus/ Quite proper.

Socrates/ And further, shall we find that between that which is made and that which comes to be there is, once again, a mere verbal difference?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And isn't it natural that that which makes should have the leading position, while that which is made follows in its train when coming into being?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Hence a cause and that which, as a condition of coming to be, is subservient to a cause are not the same but different?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now our three kinds gave us all things that come to be, and the constituents from which they come to be, did they not?

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And this fourth kind that we are speaking of, which fashions all these things, this cause, is pretty clearly different from them?

Protarchus/ Yes, different certainly.

Socrates/ But now that the four kinds have been discriminated it will do no harm to enumerate them in order, so that we may remember each by itself.

Protarchus/ I agree.

Socrates/ The first, then, I call the unlimited, the second the limit, and the third the being that has come to be by the mixture of these two; as to the fourth, I hope I shall not be at fault in calling it the cause of the mixture and of the coming-to-be?

Protarchus/ No indeed.

Socrates/ Come along now, what is our next point, and what was our purpose in getting where we have got? Wasn't it that we were trying to find out whether the second prize would go to pleasure or to intelligence? Was not that it?

Protarchus/ Yes, it was.

Socrates/ Then shall we perhaps be in a better position, now that we have discriminated these kinds as we have, to achieve our decision about the first place and the second? For that of course was what we started to dispute about.

Protarchus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Come on then. We laid it down, I think, that victory went to the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence. Was that so?

Protarchus/ It was.

Socrates/ Then of course we can see what kind of life this is and to which kind it belongs?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ In fact we shall assert, I suppose, that it is a part of our third kind. For that kind does not consist of just two things, but of all unlimited things bound fast by the limit; hence it is correct to make our victorious life a part of it.

Protarchus/ Yes, perfectly correct.

Socrates/ Very well. And what about your pleasant unmixed life, Philebus? Under which of the kinds that we have mentioned should we be correct in saying that that falls? But before you express your view let us have your answer to a question I will put.

Philebus/ Please put it.

Socrates/ Do pleasure and pain contain a limit, or are they among the things that admit of ‘the more' and ‘the less'?

Philebus/ They are, Socrates; they admit of ‘the more.' Pleasure would not be supremely good, if it were not of its very nature unlimited both in quantity and degree.

Socrates/ And similarly, Philebus, pain would not be supremely bad; hence we must look for something other than the character of being unlimited to explain how an element of good attaches to pleasures. Well, we may leave that topic, if you please, as one of unlimited speculation. But I will ask both of you, in which of our above-mentioned kinds may we now reckon intelligence, knowledge, and reason,

without sinning against the light? I fancy a great deal turns on our present inquiry, according as we give the right answer or the wrong.

Philebus/ You are glorifying your own god, Socrates.

Socrates/ And you your own goddess, my friend; still we ought to give an answer to our question.

Protarchus/ Socrates is right, you know, Philebus; we must do as he tells us.

Philebus/ Well, you have volunteered to speak on my behalf, have you not, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ Certainly, but at the moment I am rather at a loss, and beg you, Socrates, to state the case to us yourself; otherwise you may find us striking a false note and making mistakes about your candidate.

Socrates/ I must do as you say, Protarchus; as a matter of fact it is no difficult task you impose on me. But did I really cause you alarm by my playful glorification, as Philebus has called it, when I asked you to which kind reason and knowledge belong?

Protarchus/ Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ But really it's an easy question. For all the wise agree, thereby glorifying themselves in earnest, that in reason we have the king of heaven and earth. And I fancy they are right. But I should like us, if you don't mind, to make a fuller investigation of the kind in question itself.

Protarchus/ Proceed as you like, Socrates, and please feel no concern about being lengthy; we shan't quarrel with you.

Socrates/ Thank you. Then let us begin, shall we, by putting the following question.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Are we to say, Protarchus, that the sum of things or what we call this universe is controlled by a power

that is irrational and blind, and by mere chance, or on the contrary to follow our predecessors in saying that it is governed by reason and a wondrous regulating intelligence?

Protarchus/ A very different matter, my dear good Socrates. What you are suggesting now seems to me sheer blasphemy. To maintain that reason orders it all does justice to the spectacle of the ordered universe, of the sun, the moon, the stars, and the revolution of the whole heaven, and for myself I should never express nor conceive any contrary view on the matter.

Socrates/ Then are you willing that we should assent to what earlier thinkers agree upon, that this is the truth? And ought we not merely to think fit to record the opinions of other people without any risk to ourselves, but to participate in the risk and take our share of censure when some clever person asserts that the world is not as we describe it, but devoid of order?

Protarchus/ I am certainly willing to do so.

Socrates/ Come then, and direct your attention to the point that confronts us next.

Protarchus/ What is it, please?

Socrates/ We can discern certain constituents of the corporeal nature of all animals, namely, fire, water, breath, and ‘earth too like storm-tossed sailors we discern,' as the saying goes; these are all present in their composition.

Protarchus/ Quite so, and storm-tossed in truth we are by difficulty in our present discussion.

Socrates/ Well now, let me point out to you something that applies to each of these elements in our make-up.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ In each case it is only an inconsiderable fragment that is in us, and that too very far from being pure

in quality or possessing a power befitting its real nature. Let me explain to you in one instance, which you must regard as applying to them all. There is fire, is there not, belonging to ourselves, and again fire in the universe?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And isn't the fire that belongs to ourselves small in quantity and weak and inconsiderable, whereas the fire in the universe is wonderful in respect of its mass, its beauty, and all the powers that belong to fire?

Protarchus/ What you say is perfectly true.

Socrates/ And to continue, is the universal fire sustained and produced and increased by the fire that belongs to us, or is the opposite true, that my fire and yours and that of all other creatures owe all this to that other?

Protarchus/ That question doesn't even merit an answer.

Socrates/ You are right; indeed I imagine you will say the same about the earth that we have here in creatures and the earth in the universe, and in fact about all the elements that I mentioned in my question a moment ago. Will your answer be as I suppose?

Protarchus/ Could anyone giving a different answer be deemed right in his head?

Socrates/ I hardly think so, whoever he were. But come with me now to the next point. If we regard all these elements that I have been speaking of as a collective unity we give them, do we not, the name of body?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, let me point out that the same holds good of what we call the ordered universe; on the same showing it will be a body, will it not, since it is composed of the same elements?

Protarchus/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ Then, to put it generally, is the body that belongs to us sustained by this body of the universe, has it derived and obtained therefrom all that I referred to just now, or is the converse true?

Protarchus/ That is another question, Socrates, that doesn't deserve to be put.

Socrates/ Well, does this one then? I wonder what you will say.

Protarchus/ Tell me what it is.

Socrates/ Shall we not admit that the body belonging to us has a soul?

Protarchus/ Plainly we shall.

Socrates/ And where, Protarchus my friend, could it have got it from, if the body of the universe, which has elements the same as our own though still fairer in every respect, were not in fact possessed of a soul?

Protarchus/ Plainly there can be no other source, Socrates.

Socrates/ No, for surely we cannot suppose, Protarchus, that those four kinds, limit, unlimited, combined, and cause, which is present in all things as a fourth kind—we cannot suppose that this last-named, while on the one hand it furnishes the elements that belong to our bodies with soul, maintains our physique and cures a body when it has come to harm, and provides all sorts of arrangements and remedial measures, in virtue of all which we recognize it as wisdom in all her diverse applications, has nevertheless failed in the case of the elements of the universe—although they are these same elements that pervade the whole heaven on a great scale, fair moreover and untainted—failed, I say, there to contrive that which is fairest and most precious.

Protarchus/ No, to suppose that would be utterly unreasonable.

Socrates/ Discarding that, then, we should do better to follow the other view and say, as we have said many times already, that there exist in the universe much 'unlimited' and abundance of 'limit,' and a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and regulates the years, the seasons, and the months, and has every claim to the names of wisdom and reason.

Protarchus/ Every claim indeed.

Socrates/ But wisdom and reason cannot come into existence without soul.

Protarchus/ They cannot.

Socrates/ Hence you will say that in the nature of Zeus a royal soul and a royal reason come to dwell by virtue of the power of the cause, while in other gods other perfections dwell, according to the names by which they are pleased to be called.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Now don't suppose, Protarchus, that we have spoken of this matter purposelessly; on the contrary it supports those ancient thinkers that we mentioned, who declared that reason always rules all things.

Protarchus/ Yes indeed it does.

Socrates/ And, what's more, it has provided an answer to my inquiry, to the effect that mind belongs to the family of what we called the cause of all things. By this time, I imagine, you grasp what our answer is.

Protarchus/ Yes, I grasp it completely, though indeed I hadn't realized you had given it.

Socrates/ Well, Protarchus, playfulness is sometimes a relief from seriousness.

Protarchus/ You are right.

Socrates/ I think, my friend, that we have now arrived at a fairly satisfactory demonstration of what kind reason belongs to, and what function it possesses.

Protarchus/ I am sure of it.

Socrates/ And as for pleasure's kind, that we found some time ago.

Protarchus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Then let us have these points in mind about the pair of them, namely that reason was found akin to cause and belonging, we may say, to that kind, whereas pleasure is itself unlimited and belongs to the kind that does not and never will contain within itself and derived from itself either beginning, or middle, or end.

Protarchus/ We shall bear that in mind, naturally.

Socrates/ And now what we must do next is to see in what each of them is found, and what happens to bring it about that they occur whenever they do. Take pleasure first; we took it first when examining its kind, and we will do the same in the present case. However, we shall never be able properly to examine pleasure apart from pain.

Protarchus/ Well, if that ought to be our line of approach, let us take it.

Socrates/ Now I wonder if you share my view as regards their occurrence?

Protarchus/ What is your view?

Socrates/ That both pleasure and pain are natural experiences that occur in the 'combined' class.

Protarchus/ Will you remind us, my dear Socrates, which of our previously mentioned classes you allude to by the term 'combined'?

Socrates/ Really, Protarchus! Well, I'll do my best.

Protarchus/ Thank you.

Socrates/ Let us understand ‘combined’ as the third of our four classes.

Protarchus/ The one you spoke of after the unlimited and the limit, and in which you put health and harmony, I think, also.

Socrates/ Perfectly right. Now please give me your most careful attention.

Protarchus/ Continue, please.

Socrates/ I maintain that, when we find a disturbance of the harmony in a living creature, that is the time at which its natural condition is disturbed and distress therewith occurs.

Protarchus/ That sounds very probable.

Socrates/ Conversely, when the harmony is being restored and a return is made to its natural condition, we may say that pleasure occurs. I am permitting myself a very brief and rapid statement of a most important fact.

Protarchus/ I think you are right, Socrates, but let us try to express this same truth even more clearly.

Socrates/ Well, I suppose commonplace, obvious instances will be the easiest to understand.

Protarchus/ Such as?

Socrates/ Hunger, say, is a form of disturbance, of pain, isn’t it?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And eating, as the corresponding restoration, is a form of pleasure?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then again, thirst is a form of destruction, of pain, whereas the restoration effected by a liquid acting on that which has become dried up is a form of pleasure. Or

once again, the unnatural disruption or dissolution brought about by stifling heat is a pain, whereas the coolness which restores us to our natural state is a pleasure.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the disturbance of a creature's natural state consequent on the freezing of its liquids by cold is a pain, while the reverse process, which restores that state when that which is frozen breaks up and returns to its former condition, is a pleasure. Now consider whether this statement is satisfactory, which puts the thing in a general formula. When the natural state of a living organism, constituted, as I have maintained, of the unlimited and the limit, is destroyed, that destruction is pain; conversely, when such organisms return to their own true nature, this reversion is invariably pleasure.

Protarchus/ So be it; I think that gives us at least an outline.

Socrates/ Well then, may we take it that one kind of pleasure and pain consists in this pair of experiences?

Protarchus/ We may.

Socrates/ Now take what the soul itself feels when expecting these experiences, the pleasant, confident feeling of anticipation that precedes a pleasure, and the apprehensive, distressful feeling that precedes a pain.

Protarchus/ Yes, of course, that is a different kind of pleasure and pain, which belongs to the soul itself, apart from the body, and arises through expectation.

Socrates/ You grasp what I mean. I think, if I may put my own view, that by taking these two experiences pure and without any admixture of pain in the one case and pleasure in the other—I think that we shall get a clear answer to the question about pleasure, the question whether everything classed as pleasure is to be welcomed, or whether we ought

to grant that to some other of those classes that we previously distinguished, while with pleasure and pain the case stands as with hot and cold and all things like that, namely that sometimes they are to be welcomed and sometimes are not—the reason being that they are not in themselves good, though some of them sometimes and somehow acquire the character of good things.

Protarchus/ You are quite right; that is the proper sort of way to thrash out the subject of our present quest.

Socrates/ First, then, let us look together into the following point. If what we are maintaining is really true, if there is distress at the time of deterioration and pleasure at the time of restoration, then let us consider any such creatures as are experiencing neither deterioration nor restoration, and ask what their condition must be at the time in question. Please pay careful attention to what I ask, and tell me, is it not beyond all doubt that at such a time a creature feels neither pleasure nor pain in any degree whatever?

Protarchus/ Yes, it is beyond doubt.

Socrates/ So this is a third sort of condition that we have, distinct alike from the condition of one who feels pleasure and from that of one who feels pain?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come along then, and do your best to bear it in mind; it will make a big difference as regards our judgment of pleasure whether you do bear it in mind or do not. Now there is a small point in this connection that we had better settle, if you please.

Protarchus/ Tell me what it is.

Socrates/ You know that for one who has chosen the life of intelligence there is nothing to prevent him living in this fashion.

Protarchus/ A life, you mean, of neither pleasure nor pain?

Socrates/ Yes, for when we were comparing the lives just now we said, I believe, that for one who had chosen the life of reason and intelligence there must be no experiencing of any pleasure, great or small.

Protarchus/ That was certainly what we said.

Socrates/ Then he at all events has it in his power to live after this fashion, and perhaps it is not a wild surmise that this is of all lives the most godlike.

Protarchus/ Certainly it is not to be supposed that the gods feel either pleasure or its opposite.

Socrates/ No, of course it is not; it would be unseemly for either feeling to arise in them. But to that question we will give further consideration later on, if it should be relevant, and we will set down the point to the score of intelligence in the competition for second prize, if we cannot do so in the competition for the first.

Protarchus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Now to continue, pleasure of this second kind, which belongs, as we said, to the soul alone, always involves memory.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ I fancy that we must first take up the inquiry what memory is, or perhaps even, before memory, what sensation is, if we mean to get properly clear about these matters.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ You must take it that among the experiences that are constantly affecting our bodies some are exhausted in the body before passing through to the soul, thus leaving the latter unaffected, while others penetrate both body and

soul and set up a sort of disturbance which is both peculiar to each and common to both.

Protarchus/ Let us take it to be so.

Socrates/ Now shall we be right if we say that those which do not penetrate both are undetected by the soul, while those which do penetrate both are not undetected thereby?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ You must not suppose that by 'being undetected' I mean that a process of forgetting is involved; forgetting is the passing away of memory, whereas in the case we are discussing memory has not as yet come to be, and it would be absurd to talk of the loss of what does not exist and never has existed, would it not?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then just alter the names.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Instead of speaking, as you now do, of 'forgetting' what is undetected by the soul when it is unaffected by the disturbances of the body, you must substitute the term 'nonsensation.'

Protarchus/ I understand.

Socrates/ And if you apply to that movement, which occurs when soul and body come together in a single affection and are moved both together, the term 'sensation,' you will be expressing yourself properly.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then we understand already what we mean by sensation.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Memory it would, in my opinion, be right to call the preservation of sensation.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then by ‘recollection’ we mean, do we not, something different from memory?

Protarchus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ I will suggest the point of difference.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ When that which has been experienced by the soul in common with the body is recaptured, so far as may be, by and in the soul itself apart from the body, then we speak of ‘recollecting’ something. Is that not so?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And further, when the soul that has lost the memory of a sensation or what it has learned resumes that memory within itself and goes over the old ground, we regularly speak of these processes as ‘recollections.’

Protarchus/ I agree.

Socrates/ And now I will tell you the point of all we have been saying.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ To get the clearest notion that we possibly can of the pleasure of soul apart from body, and of desire as well. I think that the procedure we are adopting promises to explain them both.

Protarchus/ Let us proceed then, Socrates.

Socrates/ Our examination will necessarily, I think, involve saying a good deal about the origin of pleasure and the various shapes it takes. And in point of fact it seems necessary to preface that with an understanding of the nature of desire and the seat of its occurrence.

Protarchus/ Then let us examine that; we shan’t be the losers.

Socrates/ Oh yes we shall, Protarchus, and I'll tell you of what; if we find what we are now looking for, we shall be the losers of the very perplexity that now besets us.

Protarchus/ A good retort! Then let us try to deal with our next point.

Socrates/ Were we not saying just now that hunger, thirst, and so on and so forth, are desires of some sort?

Protarchus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ What was the identical feature, then, that we had in view that makes us call such widely different things by one name?

Protarchus/ Upon my word, Socrates, I'm afraid it is not easy to answer that; still, answer it we must.

Socrates/ Then let us go back to where we were and start afresh.

Protarchus/ Go back where?

Socrates/ We talk commonly, do we not, of a man 'having a thirst'?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Meaning that he is becoming empty?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then is his thirst a desire?

Protarchus/ Yes, a desire for drink.

Socrates/ For drink, or for a replenishment by drink?

Protarchus/ For a replenishment, I should think.

Socrates/ When one becomes empty then, apparently he desires the opposite of what he is experiencing; being emptied, he longs to be filled.

Protarchus/ Obviously.

Socrates/ Well now, is it possible that one who is emptied for the first time could apprehend replenishment whether by

means of a perception or a memory, replenishment being something that he is neither experiencing in the present nor has ever experienced in the past?

Protarchus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Nevertheless we must admit that one who desires, desires something.

Protarchus/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ Then it is not what he is experiencing that he desires, for he is thirsty, and thirst is an emptying, whereas what he desires is replenishment.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then there must be something in the make-up of a thirsty man which apprehends replenishment.

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Arid it cannot be the body, for that of course is being emptied.

Protarchus/ No.

Socrates/ Hence the only alternative is that the soul apprehends the replenishment, and does so obviously through memory. For through what else could it do so?

Protarchus/ It's hard to point to anything else.

Socrates/ Then do we realize what has emerged from this discussion?

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ It has told us that desire does not belong to the body.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Because it has revealed that the effort of every creature is opposed to that which its body is experiencing.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Moreover, the fact that impulse leads the creature in a direction opposite to its experience proves, I fancy, the existence of a memory of something opposite to that experience.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Our discussion then, inasmuch as it has proved that memory is what leads us on to the objects of our desire, has made it plain that it is to the soul that all impulse and desire, and indeed the determining principle of the whole creature, belong.

Protarchus/ You are perfectly right.

Socrates/ Then there can be no gainsaying that our bodies cannot possibly feel thirst or hunger or anything of that sort?

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now here is a further point that calls for our remark in this same connection. It seems to me that our argument aims at revealing a certain sort of life amidst these very things we have been speaking of.

Protarchus/ What things? What kind of life are you speaking of?

Socrates/ The processes of replenishment and being emptied, in fact all processes concerned with the preservation or decay of living beings, and our alternating feelings of distress and pleasure, according as we pass from one of these processes to the other.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And what about such times as we are in an intermediate state?

Protarchus/ Intermediate?

Socrates/ When we feel distress by reason of what we are experiencing, and at the same time remember the pleasures

whose occurrence would relieve our distress, though the replenishment in question is still in the future. How do we stand then? May we say that we are in an intermediate state, or may we not?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And is the state as a whole one of distress or of pleasure?

Protarchus/ Pleasure! No, indeed, rather a state of twofold pain, pain of the body in respect of its actual experience, and pain of the soul in respect of an unsatisfied expectation.

Socrates/ What makes you call it twofold pain, Protarchus? Is it not the case that sometimes the emptying process is associated with a distinct hope of coming replenishment, while at other times there is no such hope?

Protarchus/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ Then don't you think that when hoping for replenishment we feel pleasure through what we remember, though nevertheless we feel pain simultaneously because of the emptying process going on at the times in question?

Protarchus/ Yes, no doubt.

Socrates/ At such a time then men, and animals too, feel both pain and pleasure at once.

Protarchus/ It looks like it.

Socrates/ Now take the case when we are being emptied and have no hope of attaining replenishment. Is it not then that there occurs that twofold feeling of pain which you descried just now, though you thought the pain to be 'simply double,' drawing no distinctions?

Protarchus/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now let me suggest a use to which we may put our examination of these experiences.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Shall we say that these pains and pleasures are true or false? Or that some are true, and others not?

Protarchus/ But how, Socrates, can pleasures or pains be false?

Socrates/ How can fears be true or false, Protarchus? Or expectations, or opinions?

Protarchus/ For myself, I should be inclined to allow it in the case of opinions, but not in the other cases.

Socrates/ What's that? It really looks as if we were raising a question of no small magnitude.

Protarchus/ That is true.

Socrates/ But is it relevant to what has preceded? Philebus the younger should ask himself that question.

Protarchus/ That question perhaps, yes.

Socrates/ Anyhow, we ought to have nothing to do with extraneous disquisitions, or with anything in the way of irrelevant discussion.

Protarchus/ You are right.

Socrates/ Now tell me this. I have felt curious ever so long about these same problems that we raised just now. What do you maintain? Are there not false, as opposed to true, pleasures?

Protarchus/ How could that be?

Socrates/ Then, according to you, no one, be he dreaming or waking, or insane or deranged, ever thinks that he feels pleasure but does not really feel it, or thinks he feels pain, but does not really feel it.

Protarchus/ All of us, Socrates, regard all that as holding good.

Socrates/ Well, are you right? Ought we not to consider whether what you say is right or wrong?

Protarchus/ I think we ought.

Socrates/ Then let us state in even plainer terms what you were just now saying about pleasure and opinion. There is such a thing, I imagine, as holding an opinion?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And as feeling a pleasure?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is there also that about which the opinion is held?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And that in which the pleasure is felt?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then the subject holding an opinion, whether it be rightly or wrongly held, is always in the position of really holding an opinion?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And similarly the subject feeling pleasure, whether it be rightly or wrongly felt, will obviously be always in the position of really feeling a pleasure?

Protarchus/ Yes, that is so too.

Socrates/ The question then must be faced, how it is that whereas we commonly find opinion both true and false, pleasure is true only, and that though in respect of reality holding an opinion and feeling a pleasure are on the same footing.

Protarchus/ Yes, that question must be faced.

Socrates/ Is the point this, do you think, that in the case of opinion falsehood and truth supervene, with the result that it becomes not merely an opinion but a certain sort of opinion, true or false, respectively?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But then we have got a further question on which we must come to an agreement, namely whether it is at all possible that, as against other things that have quality, pleasure and pain never have qualities but are simply what they are.

Protarchus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ But in point of fact it is easy to see that actually they do have qualities; we spoke a while ago of their being great, small, and intense, pains and pleasures alike.

Protarchus/ To be sure we did.

Socrates/ And what's more, Protarchus, if badness is added to any of the things in question, shall we not say that it thereby becomes a bad opinion, and similarly a bad pleasure?

Protarchus/ Why, of course, Socrates.

Socrates/ Once again, if rightness or its opposite is added to any of them, presumably we shall say that an opinion, if it has rightness, is right, and the same with a pleasure?

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ But if the content of an opinion that is held be mistaken, then must we not agree that the opinion, inasmuch as it is making a mistake, is not right, not opining rightly?

Protarchus/ No, it cannot be.

Socrates/ Well then, if we observe a pain or a pleasure making a mistake in regard to the object arousing the respective feelings, shall we attach to it any term of commendation such as 'right' or 'sound'?

Protarchus/ Impossible, if the pleasure is ex hypothesi mistaken.

Socrates/ Now look here, I fancy we often experience pleasure in association with an opinion that is not right, but false.

Protarchus/ Of course, and then, that being so, Socrates, we call the opinion false, but the pleasure itself nobody could ever term false.

Socrates/ Well, Protarchus, you are putting up a gallant defense of the cause of pleasure by what you say now.

Protarchus/ Oh no, I am merely repeating what I have heard.

Socrates/ But do we find no difference, my friend, between a pleasure associated with right opinion and knowledge and one associated, as is constantly happening to every one of us, with false opinion and ignorance?

Protarchus/ I should say they differ considerably.

Socrates/ Then let us proceed to contemplate the difference.

Protarchus/ Pray take the road on which you descry it.

Socrates/ Very well, I will take you along this one.

Protarchus/ Yes?

Socrates/ Opinion, we agree, is sometimes false, sometimes true?

Protarchus/ That is so.

Socrates/ And, as we said just now, pleasure and pain frequently accompany these true and false opinions.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Now is it not always memory and perception that give rise to opinion and to the attempts we make to reach a judgment?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let me suggest what we must believe to occur in this connection.

Protarchus/ Well?

Socrates/ If a man sees objects that come into his view from a distance and indistinctly, would you agree that he commonly wants to decide about what he sees?

Protarchus/ I should.

Socrates/ Then the next step will be that he puts a question to himself.

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ 'What is that object which catches my eye there beside the rock under a tree?' Don't you think that is what he would say to himself, if he had caught sight of some appearance of the sort?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And then he would answer his own question and say, if he got it right, 'It is a man.'

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Or again, if he went astray and thought what he was looking at was something made by shepherds, he might very likely call it an image.

Protarchus/ He might quite well.

Socrates/ And if he had someone with him, he would put what he said to himself into actual speech addressed to his companion, audibly uttering those same thoughts, so that what before we called opinion has now become assertion.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Whereas if he is alone he continues thinking the same thing by himself, going on his way maybe for a considerable time with the thought in his mind.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Well now, I wonder whether you share my view on these matters.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ It seems to me that at such times our soul is like a book.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ It appears to me that the conjunction of memory with sensations, together with the feelings consequent upon memory and sensation, may be said as it were to write words in our souls. And when this experience writes what is true, the result is that true opinion and true assertions spring up in us, while when the internal scribe that I have suggested writes what is false we get the opposite sort of opinions and assertions.

Protarchus/ That certainly seems to me right, and I approve of the way you put it.

Socrates/ Then please give your approval to the presence of a second artist in our souls at such a time.

Protarchus/ Who is that?

Socrates/ A painter, who comes after the writer and paints in the soul pictures of these assertions that we make.

Protarchus/ How do we make out that he in his turn acts, and when?

Socrates/ When we have got those opinions and assertions clear of the act of sight, or other sense, and as it were see in ourselves pictures or images of what we previously opined or asserted. That does happen with us, doesn't it?

Protarchus/ Indeed it does.

Socrates/ Then are the pictures of true opinions and assertions true, and the pictures of false ones false?

Protarchus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ Well, if we are right so far, here is one more point in this connection for us to consider.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Does all this necessarily befall us in respect of the present and the past, but not in respect of the future?

Protarchus/ On the contrary, it applies equally to them all.

Socrates/ We said previously, did we not, that pleasures and pains felt in the soul alone might precede those that come through the body? That must mean that we have anticipatory pleasures and anticipatory pains in regard to the future.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now do those writings and paintings, which a while ago we assumed to occur within ourselves, apply to past and present only, and not to the future?

Protarchus/ Indeed they do.

Socrates/ When you say 'indeed they do," do you mean that the last sort are all expectations concerned with what is to come. and that we are full of expectations all our life long?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Well now, here is a further question for you to answer.

Protarchus/ Yes?

Socrates/ Isn't a man who is just, pious, and in every way good dear to the gods?

Protarchus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And may not the opposite be said of one who is unjust and altogether bad?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But every human being, as we said just now, is full of expectations?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But what we call expectations are in fact assertions that each of us makes to himself.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ To which must be added the representations produced by our painter. People often have visions of securing great quantities of gold, and pleasure upon pleasure in consequence; indeed they behold themselves in the picture immensely delighted with themselves.

Protarchus/ I know.

Socrates/ Now may we say that what is written in the minds of the good is as a rule a true communication, since they are dear to the gods, while with the evil the opposite as a rule is the case? What do you think?

Protarchus/ Certainly we should say so.

Socrates/ So the evil, no less than the good, have pleasures painted in their minds, but these pleasures, I imagine, are false.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Bad men, then, delight for the most part in false pleasures, good men in true ones.

Protarchus/ Inevitably so.

Socrates/ Hence we reach the result that false pleasures do exist in men's souls, being really a rather ridiculous imitation of true pleasures, and the same applies to pains.

Protarchus/ Yes, they do exist.

Socrates/ Now we found that, though a person holding any opinion at all must hold it in fact, yet it might sometimes have reference to what was not a fact, either of the present, the past, or the future.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And there, I think, lay the source of our false opinion, of our holding opinions falsely. Did it not?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well then, should we not ascribe a corresponding condition, as regards these references, to pains and pleasures?

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that though anyone who feels pleasure at all, no matter how groundless it be, always really feels that pleasure; yet sometimes it has no reference to any present or past fact, while in many cases, perhaps in most, it has reference to what never will be a fact.

Protarchus/ That too must be so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now will not the same principle hold good in respect of fear, anger, and all such feelings, namely that all of them are sometimes false?

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Tell me now, can we distinguish bad opinions from good in any other respect than their falsity?

Protarchus/ No.

Socrates/ Then neither can we detect any other sense in which pleasures are bad, save in that they are false.

Protarchus/ No, Socrates, what you say is just the opposite of the truth. Surely it is not at all because they are false that we set down pains and pleasures as bad, but because they involve some serious and considerable badness of another sort.

Socrates/ Well, these bad pleasures whose character is due to badness we will speak of a little later on, if we still think fit to do so. We must, however, discuss those false pleasures—and they are numerous and frequent—which

exist or come to exist in us in another way. Maybe we shall find this useful for the decisions we have to make.

Protarchus/ Yes, of course, if there are any.

Socrates/ Well, Protarchus, as I see it, there are. But of course we must not allow this belief to go unexamined until we have got it established.

Protarchus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Then let us take up our positions for this next round in the argument.

Protarchus/ On we go.

Socrates/ Well now, we said a while back, if our memory is correct, that when we have within us what we call 'desires,' the body stands aloof from the soul and parts company with it in respect of its affections.

Protarchus/ Our memory is correct; we did say so.

Socrates/ It was the soul, was it not, that desired a condition opposite to that of the body, and it was the body that caused our distress, or our pleasure, because of the way it was affected?

Protarchus/ It was.

Socrates/ Then draw the inference in regard to what is happening.

Protarchus/ Tell me.

Socrates/ Well, what happens at such a time is this. Pains and pleasures exist side by side; opposite as they are, we experience them simultaneously, one beside the other, as appeared just now.

Protarchus/ It appears so, certainly.

Socrates/ There is a further point that we have mentioned and agreed upon already as established, is there not?

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That pain and pleasure, both of them, admit of the more and the less, that is they belong to what is unlimited.

Protarchus/ We did say so. What then?

Socrates/ What means have we of getting a right decision about these things?

Protarchus/ Decision? In what sense do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean that our resolve to get a decision in these matters regularly takes some such form as seeking to determine the comparative magnitude, or degree, or intensity, of a pain and a pleasure, or of one pain or pleasure as against another.

Protarchus/ Yes, those are the kind of questions; that is what we want to decide.

Socrates/ Well now, if it is true that, in the case of vision, to observe magnitudes from a distance and from close at hand obscures the truth and engenders false judgment, does not the same hold good in the case of pains and pleasures?

Protarchus/ Yes, Socrates, and to a much greater degree.

Socrates/ So here we have the reverse of what we spoke of a little while ago.

Protarchus/ Have we? How?

Socrates/ Just now it was the falsity or truth of those opinions that infected the pains and pleasures with what they had caught themselves.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ But now the reason why pleasures appear greater and more intense when compared with something painful, or again, in the reverse case; pains appear so by being compared with pleasures, is found in the pleasures and pains per se, according as we pass from a distant to a close observation of them, and set them beside one another.

Protarchus/ The reason for what you describe must necessarily be as you say.

Socrates/ Then if you subtract from each that unreal and only apparent excess which makes them look respectively greater or smaller than they really are, you will acknowledge the subtracted portion to be an incorrect appearance, and you will refrain from asserting that such pleasure or pain as is felt in respect of that portion is correct and true.

Protarchus/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ And next, if we take the road ahead of us, we shall discern pleasures and pains in living beings that appear false and are false, even more so than this last kind.

Protarchus/ What do you mean? What are they?

Socrates/ It has often been said, I think, that when the natural state of an organism is impaired by processes of combination and separation, of filling and emptying, and by certain kinds of growth and decay, the result is pain, distress, suffering—in fact everything that we denote by names like these.

Protarchus/ Yes, that has often been said.

Socrates/ And when the organisms are being established in their natural state, we satisfied ourselves that that establishment is a pleasure.

Protarchus/ And rightly so.

Socrates/ But suppose none of these processes is going on in our body.

Protarchus/ When could that be so, Socrates?

Socrates/ There, Protarchus, you have put a question that is not to the point.

Protarchus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because you don't prevent me from repeating my own inquiry.

Protarchus/ What inquiry?

Socrates/ What I shall say is, supposing, Protarchus, that nothing of the kind were to be going on, what inference should we have to draw?

Protarchus/ You mean, if the body is not experiencing movement in either direction?

Socrates/ Yes.

Protarchus/ Then one thing at all events is plain, Socrates; in such a case there can be no pleasure and no pain.

Socrates/ You are perfectly right. But I expect you are going to tell me that we are assured by the wise that one of these processes must always be going on in us, since all things are always flowing up and down.

Protarchus/ Yes, they do assert that, and it is thought to carry some weight.

Socrates/ Naturally. They are weighty persons. But as a matter of fact I should like to dodge this argument that is advancing upon us. Here is my intended line of retreat, on which I hope you will accompany me.

Protarchus/ Please explain the direction.

Socrates/ Let us reply to them 'so be it,' but here is a question for yourself. Is a living being always conscious of everything that happens to it? Do we invariably notice that we are growing, and so on, or is that quite the reverse of the truth?

Protarchus/ Surely it is absolutely the reverse; almost all such processes pass unnoticed by us.

Socrates/ Then we are not right in what was said just now, to the effect that changes up and down produce pains and pleasures.

Protarchus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ I will suggest a better formula, and one less open to attack.

Protarchus/ Yes?

Socrates/ Great changes cause us pains and pleasures, but moderate and small ones cause no pain or pleasure whatsoever.

Protarchus/ You are nearer the truth than you were, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then, if that be so, here we are back again at the life we mentioned a while ago.

Protarchus/ What life?

Socrates/ The one we described as painless, and devoid of joys.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ In view of this, let us recognize three sorts of life, the pleasant, the painful, and that which is neither one nor the other. Or how do you see the matter?

Protarchus/ I see it precisely as you put it; the lives are three in number.

Socrates/ Then to be without pain will not be the same as to feel pleasure?

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ So when you hear someone say that the pleasantest of all things is to live one's whole life long without pain, what do you take his meaning to be?

Protarchus/ He appears to me to mean that being without pain is pleasant.

Socrates/ Well now, let us take any three things you like, and, to give them more attractive names, call the first gold, the second silver, and the third neither gold nor silver.

Protarchus/ I accept that.

Socrates/ Now can we possibly identify the third with either of the others, with gold or silver?

Protarchus/ No, of course not.

Socrates/ Similarly then, it cannot be right either to hold the intermediate life to be pleasant or painful, if it is a question of holding an opinion, or, to speak of it so, if it is a question of speaking, unless indeed we desert right reasoning.

Protarchus/ It cannot.

Socrates/ Still, my friend, we do observe people saying and thinking so.

Protarchus/ We do, certainly.

Socrates/ Do they then think that at such times as they are not feeling pain they are feeling pleasure?

Protarchus/ They say so at all events.

Socrates/ Then they do think so; otherwise they would not say so, I imagine.

Protarchus/ Maybe.

Socrates/ Nevertheless their opinion about their feeling of pleasure is false, if not being pained and feeling pleasure are really two different things.

Protarchus/ And different they have certainly proved.

Socrates/ Then are we to take the line that these things are three in number, as we said just now, or that they are only two, pain being an evil for mankind, and release from pain being called pleasant as in itself a good?

Protarchus/ How can we put that question to ourselves, Socrates, at this stage? I don't understand.

Socrates/ The fact is, Protarchus, you don't understand what enemies Philebus here has.

Protarchus/ What enemies do you mean?

Socrates/ People with a great reputation for natural science, who maintain that pleasures do not exist at all.

Protarchus/ Oh, how So?

Socrates/ What Philebus and his friends call pleasures are, according to them, never anything but escapes from pains.

Protarchus/ And do you recommend that we should believe them, Socrates, or what do you think?

Socrates/ Not believe them, but avail ourselves of their gift of divination, which rests not on science but on the dourness, if I may call it so, of a nature far from ignoble. They are men who have come to hate pleasure bitterly, to regard it as thoroughly unsound; its very attractiveness they regard, not as real pleasure, but as trickery. Well, you may avail yourself of their doctrine on this point, having regard at the same time to their other dour characteristics, and next you shall learn what pleasures I regard as true, so that when we have examined the nature of pleasure from both points of view we may have a comparative basis for our decision.

Protarchus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Then let us follow up the track of these allies of ours, and see where their dour footsteps lead us. I fancy that their basic position is stated something like this. If we want to see the true nature of any form, whatever it may be, for example that of hardness, should we understand it best by fixing our attention on the hardest things there are or on those that have a minimum of hardness? Now, Protarchus, you must answer our dour friends just as you would answer me.

Protarchus/ Quite so, and I tell them that our attention must be fixed on what has the maximum amount.

Socrates/ Then if the form or kind whose true nature we wanted to see were pleasure, we should have to fix our

attention not on minimum pleasures but on such as are said to be the highest and intensest.

Protarchus/ Everyone would agree with what you say now.

Socrates/ Now are not our obvious pleasures, which are in fact by common admission the greatest, the pleasures of the body?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And are they, or do they become, greater with those who are suffering from sickness or with healthy people? Now let us be careful not to take a false step by answering hastily. I dare say we shall be inclined to say, with healthy people.

Protarchus/ Probably.

Socrates/ But tell me, are not the outstanding pleasures those which are preceded by the greatest desires?

Protarchus/ That is true.

Socrates/ And isn't it the man suffering from a fever or some similar complaint who feels thirst and cold and all the common bodily troubles more than others, who is more than others acquainted with want, and who when the want comes to be satisfied has greater pleasures? Shall we not admit that to be true?

Protarchus/ Yes, it certainly seems true, now you put it so.

Socrates/ Well then, should we be plainly right if we said that anyone wishing to see the greatest pleasures should direct his attention not to health, but to sickness? You must be careful not to take me as intending to ask you whether the extremely sick have *more* pleasures than the healthy; you must realize that it is the magnitude of pleasure that I am concerned with. I am asking where instances of the

extreme in point of magnitude are to be found. We must, as we said, understand the true nature of pleasure, and what account they give who maintain that there is no such thing at all.

Protarchus/ I follow your meaning pretty well.

Socrates/ I dare say, Protarchus, you will do just as well as my guide. Tell me this. In a profligate existence do you find greater pleasures—not *more* pleasures, mind you, but pleasures that stand out as extreme or in point of degree—than in a life of temperance? Give your mind to it, and tell me.

Protarchus/ I understand your point, and I find a wide difference. The temperate man, surely, is regularly restrained by the proverbial warning, 'Never too much,' and heeds it, whereas the senseless profligate is mastered by his extreme pleasure, which ultimately drives him insane and makes him the talk of the town.

Socrates/ Right. Then if that is so, clearly the greatest pleasures, and the greatest pains too, occur not when soul and body are good, but when they are bad.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And now we ought to select some of these and consider what characteristic made us call them the greatest.

Protarchus/ Yes, we must.

Socrates/ Well, here is a type of malady, with pleasures whose characteristics I should like you to examine.

Protarchus/ What type is it?

Socrates/ The offensive type, with its pleasures which are so thoroughly distasteful to the dour people we were speaking of.

Protarchus/ What pleasures are they?

Socrates/ Relieving an itch, for example, by rubbing, and anything that calls for that sort of remedy. When we find ourselves experiencing that kind of thing, what, in heaven's name, are we to call it? Pleasure or pain?

Protarchus/ Well that, Socrates, I really think might be described as a mixed experience.

Socrates/ Of course I did not introduce the subject with any reference to Philebus, but without a look at these pleasures and others associated with them I hardly think we shall be able to settle the question before us.

Protarchus/ Then we must proceed to attack the kindred pleasures.

Socrates/ You mean those that share that characteristic of mixture?

Protarchus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Well, some of the mixtures concern the body and are found in the body alone, while others are found in the soul and belong to the soul alone, and thirdly we shall discover cases of pains being mixed with pleasures that involve both soul and body, where the total experience is sometimes called pleasure, sometimes pain.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ When the natural state of an organism is being established or impaired, it may be subject to two opposite experiences at once. It may be warmed while shivering, or again cooled while burning. It is seeking, I imagine, to attain one thing and get rid of the other, and the 'bittersweet' mixture, if I may use the current phrase, when it is hard to get rid of the thing, causes an uneasiness which develops into fierce excitement.

Protarchus/ What you are now saying is very true.

Socrates/ Now in mixtures like these are not the pains and pleasures sometimes equal, while sometimes one or the other predominates?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ In the class in which the pains predominate over the pleasures you must count those pleasures of itching that we were speaking of, and of tickling. When the irritation or inflammation is internal, and by rubbing and scratching you fail to reach it and merely tear the surface skin, then, by bringing the parts affected near a fire and seeking to reverse your condition by means of the heat it gives out, you procure at one moment immense pleasure, at another a contrast between interior and exterior, a combination of pains with pleasures, the balance tilting now this way now that, this being due to the forcible tearing apart of what was compact or the compressing of what was diffused.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ On the other hand when anything of this kind is happening and pleasure preponderates in the mixture, although the slight element of pain causes a tickling and a mild uneasiness, yet the inflowing stream of pleasure, which is much stronger, excites you and sometimes makes you jump for joy; it produces all manner of varieties in your complexion, in your attitude, in the very breath you draw, and drives you clean out of your wits, shouting aloud like a lunatic.

Protarchus/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ And what's more, my friend, it makes people say of themselves, and makes others say of them, that they are almost dying of delight in these pleasures, and I would add that the more of a fool and profligate a man is, the more wholeheartedly is he sure to pursue them, calling them the

greatest pleasures and accounting such as have the greatest amount thereof in their lives the happiest of beings.

Protarchus/ Everything, Socrates, that most people agree in thinking, is covered by your exposition.

Socrates/ Yes, Protarchus, as far as concerns those pleasures in which it is merely the body's superficial and internal parts that are interconnected in mutual affections. But there are cases in which the soul's contribution is opposed to that of the body, whether it be pain as against the body's pleasure or pleasure as against the body's pain, so that the two unite to form a single compound. These we discussed previously, showing that at such times as we are emptied we desire replenishment, and that we delight in the expectation of replenishment but are distressed by the process of emptying, but there is one thing that we did not declare then but assert now, namely that in all these innumerable instances in which soul is at variance with body, we find a single type of the mixture of pain and pleasure.

Protarchus/ I am inclined to think you are quite right.

Socrates/ And now we have still left one more mixture of pain and pleasure.

Protarchus/ Which is that?

Socrates/ That mingling which, as we mentioned, the soul alone takes to itself.

Protarchus/ In what sense do we maintain that?

Socrates/ Anger, fear, longing, lamenting, love, emulation, malice, and so forth—don't you class these as pains of the soul itself?

Protarchus/ I do.

Socrates/ And shall we not find them replete with immense pleasures? Or need we remind ourselves of that feature of passion and anger—of the lines:

> Wrath that spurs on the wisest mind to rage,
> Sweeter by far than stream of flowing honey.

or of the pleasures mixed up with the pains in lamentation and longing?

Protarchus/ No, what you say is precisely what must happen.

Socrates/ Then again do you remember how spectators of a tragedy sometimes feel pleasure and weep at once?

Protarchus/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ And if you take the state of our minds when we see a comedy, do you realize that here again we have a mixture of pain and pleasure?

Protarchus/ I don't quite take your meaning.

Socrates/ No, Protarchus, for it is by no means easy to understand that we are regularly affected in this way on such an occasion.

Protarchus/ It certainly does not seem easy to me.

Socrates/ Still, the obscurity of the matter ought to make us all the more eager to grasp it; we may make it easier for people to realize the mixture of pain and pleasure in other cases.

Protarchus/ Pray go on.

Socrates/ We mentioned malice just now. Would you call that a pain of the soul, or what?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Nevertheless one will find the malicious man pleased at his neighbors' ills.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Now ignorance, or the condition we call stupidity, is an ill thing.

Protarchus/ Well?

Socrates/ That being so, observe the nature of the ridiculous.

Protarchus/ Be kind enough to tell me.

Socrates/ Taking it generally it is a certain kind of badness, and it gets its name from a certain state of mind. I may add that it is that species of the genus 'badness' which is differentiated by the opposite of the inscription at Delphi.

Protarchus/ You mean, 'Know thyself,' Socrates?

Socrates/ I do. Plainly the opposite of that would be for the inscription to read, 'By no means know thyself.'

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, Protarchus, that is what you must split up into three parts; see if you can.

Protarchus/ How do you mean? I am quite sure I can't.

Socrates/ Do you then mean that I must make this division, here and now?

Protarchus/ That is what I mean, and indeed I beg you to do so.

Socrates/ If anyone does not know himself, must it not be in one of three ways?

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ First, in respect of wealth, he may think himself richer than his property makes him.

Protarchus/ Plenty of people are affected that way, certainly.

Socrates/ But there are even more who think themselves taller and more handsome and physically finer in general than they really and truly are.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But far the greatest number are mistaken as regards the third class of things, namely possessions of the soul. They think themselves superior in virtue, when they are not.

Protarchus/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ And is it not the virtue of wisdom that the mass of men insist on claiming, interminably disputing, and lying about how wise they are?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And certainly we should be justified in calling all such behavior as this evil.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Well now, Protarchus, it is this that we must once more divide, by bisection, if we mean to see that curious mixture of pleasure and pain that lies in the malice that goes with entertainment. How then, you will ask, do we make our bisection? All persons who are foolish enough to hold this false opinion about themselves fall, I think, like mankind in general, into two classes, those who are strong and powerful and those who are the reverse.

Protarchus/ Indubitably.

Socrates/ Then make that your principle of division. Those whose delusion is accompanied by weakness, who are unable to retaliate when laughed at, you will be right in describing by the epithet ‘ridiculous'; to those that have the ability and strength to retaliate you will most appropriately accord the epithets ‘formidable' and ‘hateful.' For ignorance in the strong is hateful and ugly; it is fraught with mischief to all around, and so are its copies on the stage, but weak ignorance ranks as the ridiculous, which in fact it is.

Protarchus/ You are perfectly right. All the same, I am not yet clear about the mixture of pleasures and pains here.

Socrates/ Well, take first the nature of malice.

Protarchus/ Pray continue.

Socrates/ Both pain and pleasure can be wrongful, I imagine?

Protarchus/ Unquestionably.

Socrates/ And to delight in our enemies' misfortunes is neither wrongful nor malicious?

Protarchus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Whereas to feel delight, as we sometimes do, instead of pain, when we see friends in misfortune, is wrongful, is it not?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now we said that ignorance is always an evil?

Protarchus/ That is so.

Socrates/ Then if we find in our friends that imaginary wisdom and imaginary beauty, and the other delusions which we enumerated in our threefold classification just now, delusions that are ridiculous in the weak and hateful in the strong—if we find this disposition in its harmless form in our friends, shall we adhere, or shall we not, to my statement of a moment ago, namely that it is ridiculous?

Protarchus/ Certainly we shall.

Socrates/ And do we not agree that, being ignorance, it is evil?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And when we laugh at it, are we pleased or pained?

Protarchus/ Plainly we are pleased.

Socrates/ And did we not say that it is malice that makes us feel pleasure in our friends' misfortunes?

Protarchus/ It must be.

Socrates/ The upshot of our argument then is that when we laugh at what is ridiculous in our friends, we are mixing pleasure this time with malice, mixing, that is, our pleasure with pain, for we have been for some time agreed that malice is a pain in the soul, and that laughter is a pleasure, and both occur simultaneously on the occasions in question.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Hence our argument now makes it plain that in laments and tragedies and comedies—and not only in those of the stage but in the whole tragicomedy of life—as well as on countless other occasions, pains are mixed with pleasures.

Protarchus/ The most determined of opponents could not but agree with what you say, Socrates.

Socrates/ Moreover we made a list including anger, longing, lamentation, fear, love, malice, and so on, in all of which we said that we should find our oft-repeated mixture, did we not?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then do we realize that what we have just discussed was all concerned with lamentation, malice, and anger?

Protarchus/ I am sure we do.

Socrates/ That being so, is there still much left to discuss?

Protarchus/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ Now what exactly do you suppose was my purpose in pointing out the mixture in comedy? Was it not to give you a ground for believing that it would be easy

enough to demonstrate the same mingling in the case of fear, love, and the rest? I hoped that, having grasped the first example, you would relieve me of the necessity of entering upon a long argument about the others, and would grasp the general principle, that whether the body be affected apart from the soul, or the soul apart from the body, or both of them together, we constantly come upon the mixture of pleasure with pain. So tell me now, are you going to relieve me or will you keep me up till midnight? I fancy I shall secure your consent to release me if I just add this, that I shall be willing to go into the whole question with you tomorrow, but for the present I want to address myself to the matters which are still outstanding if we are to settle the problem set us by Philebus.

Protarchus/ Very good, Socrates, deal with the outstanding points as you fancy.

Socrates/ Well, after the mixed pleasures we shall naturally go on in turn—indeed we can hardly avoid it—to the unmixed.

Protarchus/ Excellent.

Socrates/ Then I will start afresh and try to indicate, to you and to myself, which they are. With those who maintain that all pleasures are a cessation of pains I am not altogether inclined to agree, but, as I said, I avail myself of their evidence that some pleasures are apparent and quite unreal, while others present themselves to us as being great and numerous, but are in fact jumbled up with pains and processes of relief from such severe suffering as besets both body and soul.

Protarchus/ But which, Socrates, should we be justified in regarding as true?

Socrates/ Those that attach to colors that we call beautiful, to figures, to most odors, to sounds, and to all

experiences in which the want is imperceptible and painless, but its fulfillment is perceptible and pleasant.

Protarchus/ In what sense, Socrates, does what you say hold good of these?

Socrates/ Well, what I mean is not quite obvious immediately; however, I must try to explain it. The beauty of figures which I am now trying to indicate is not what most people would understand as such, not the beauty of a living creature or a picture; what I mean, what the argument points to, is something straight, or round, and the surfaces and solids which a lathe, or a carpenter's rule and square, produces from the straight and the round. I wonder if you understand. Things like that, I maintain, are beautiful not, like most things, in a relative sense; they are always beautiful in their very nature, and they carry pleasures peculiar to themselves which are quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colors too which have this characteristic. Do we grasp this? What do you say?

Protarchus/ I am trying to do so, Socrates. Perhaps you too would try to put it still more plainly.

Socrates/ Very well. Audible sounds which are smooth and clear, and deliver a single series of pure notes, are beautiful not relatively to something else, but in themselves, and they are attended by pleasures implicit in themselves.

Protarchus/ Yes, certainly that is so.

Socrates/ Odors provide pleasures of a less sublime type, but the fact that no necessary pains are mixed with them, as well as the general character and source of the experience, induces me to class them as cognate with those just mentioned. Here then, if you follow me, are two of the types of pleasure we are now concerned with.

Protarchus/ I follow you.

Socrates/ Now let us proceed to add to them the pleasures of learning, if we do in fact think that they involve no hunger, that no initial distress is felt owing to a hunger for learning.

Protarchus/ I share that view.

Socrates/ But suppose one who has been filled with learning loses it afterward by forgetting it, do you find that such loss involves distress?

Protarchus/ No, at least not to a man's natural self, but by way of his reflection upon what has happened, when he feels pain because of the usefulness of what he has lost.

Socrates/ But you know, my dear fellow, we are concerned at present only with the actual experiences of the natural self, apart from any reflections about them.

Protarchus/ Then you are right in saying that in cases of forgetting what we have learned we feel no pain.

Socrates/ So we must assert that these pleasures of learning are unmixed with pains, and that they belong not to the general run of men but only to the very few.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, we have reached the point of drawing a satisfactory line between pure pleasures and those that may with fair justification be called impure, and now let us add to our statement that those pleasures that are intense are marked by immoderateness, those that are not by moderation. Pleasures that can go to great lengths or to an intense degree, whether they actually do so often or seldom, let us class as belonging to that ‘unlimited' kind of which we spoke, which penetrates body and soul alike in greater or in less degree, but the other sort let us class among things moderate.

Protarchus/ You are quite right, Socrates.

Socrates/ And now there is yet another feature of them which we must look into.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ What are we to reckon as making for truth? That which is pure, perfectly clear, and sufficient, or that which is extreme, vast, and huge?

Protarchus/ What is the object of your question, Socrates?

Socrates/ My object, Protarchus, is to do all I can to determine whether some sorts of pleasure, and some sorts of knowledge also, are pure and others not pure, for if, in deciding about them, we can get each in its pure form, that will facilitate the decision which you and I and all of us here have to make.

Protarchus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Well then, I will suggest a general method for the consideration of anything we call pure—namely, that we should begin by examining one selected example.

Protarchus/ And what are we to select?

Socrates/ First and foremost, if you like, let us contemplate whiteness.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ How shall we get a pure white? What will it be? The greatest possible quantity or bulk of it, or the white with the least possible admixture, with no portion of any other color in its composition?

Protarchus/ Plainly it will be the most perfectly clear color.

Socrates/ You are right. Then shall we not reckon that, Protarchus, as the truest of all white things, and the fairest too, rather than a great quantity or bulk of the color?

Protarchus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Then we shall be absolutely right in saying that a small quantity of pure white is not only whiter, but also fairer and truer, than a large quantity of mixed white.

Protarchus/ Yes, perfectly.

Socrates/ What then? I imagine we shall not need numerous examples of the same sort to make a pronouncement about pleasure, but are now in a position to realize that any and every sort of pleasure that is pure of pain will be pleasanter, truer, and fairer than one that is not, whatever be their comparative bulk or quantity.

Protarchus/ Unquestionably so. The example before us is sufficient.

Socrates/ And now to pass to another point. Are we not told that pleasure is always something that comes to be, that there is no such thing as a pleasure that is? There again you have a theory which certain subtle thinkers endeavor to expound to us, and we should be grateful to them.

Protarchus/ Why SO?

Socrates/ That is precisely the point which I shall treat at some length in my questions to you, my dear Protarchus.

Protarchus/ Pray continue, and put them.

Socrates/ There are, as you know, two kinds of thing—that which exists independently, and that which is always aiming at something else.

Protarchus/ How do you mean? What are they?

Socrates/ The one has always pride of place, and the other is its inferior.

Protarchus/ Will you put it still more plainly?

Socrates/ We have observed before now, I imagine, manly lovers together with the fair and excellent recipients of their admiration?

Protarchus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Then see if you can find counterparts to such pairs throughout the world of existence, as we call it.

Protarchus/ May I say yet a third time, 'Please make your meaning plainer, Socrates'?

Socrates/ It's nothing abstruse, Protarchus; our discussion has been taking a playful turn, but its meaning is that things are always of two kinds, namely those which are with a view to something else, and those for the sake of which the first sort come to be, whenever they do come to be.

Protarchus/ I understand more or less, thanks to your repetitions.

Socrates/ I dare say we shall understand better before long, my boy, when the argument has made more progress.

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Now let us take another pair.

Protarchus/ Yes?

Socrates/ All becoming on the one hand, and all being on the other.

Protarchus/ I accept your pair, being and becoming.

Socrates/ Very good. Now which of these shall we say is for the sake of which? Becoming for the sake of being, or being for the sake of becoming?

Protarchus/ Are you now inquiring whether what you call being is what it is for the sake of becoming?

Socrates/ Clearly I am.

Protarchus/ Good heavens! Are you asking me something of this sort—'Tell me, Protarchus, do you maintain that shipbuilding goes on for the sake of ships, rather than that ships are for the sake of shipbuilding?'—and so on and so forth?

Socrates/ That is precisely what I mean, Protarchus.

Protarchus/ Then why haven't you answered your own question, Socrates?

Socrates/ I might well do so, but you must take your share in the discussion.

Protarchus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Now I hold that while it is with a view to something coming into being that anyone provides himself with medicine, or tools of any kind, or any sort of material, the becoming always takes place with a view to the being of this or that, so that becoming in general takes place with a view to being in general.

Protarchus/ Yes, clearly.

Socrates/ Then there must be some being with a view to which pleasure comes to be, if it is true that pleasure is becoming.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But where there is this regular relation of means to end, the end falls under the heading of good, while the means, my excellent friend, must find a place under another heading.

Protarchus/ Most decidedly.

Socrates/ Hence if pleasure is becoming, we shall be right in setting it under some other heading than that of good?

Protarchus/ Yes, perfectly right.

Socrates/ And so, as I said at the beginning of our present argument, we ought to be grateful to the author of the doctrine that pleasure is something that comes to be, but in no case ever is, for plainly he laughs to scorn those who assert that pleasure is good.

Protarchus/ Quite So.

Socrates/ And what's more, this same thinker will not fail to include in his scorn those who find their satisfaction in these becomings.

Protarchus/ How do you mean? To whom are you referring?

Socrates/ To people who, when they find relief for their hunger or thirst or such other troubles as becoming relieves, are delighted on account of the becoming, which they regard as a pleasure, saying that they would not care to live without hungering and thirsting and having all the rest of the experiences that might be enumerated as going with hunger and thirst.

Protarchus/ Your description fits them, certainly.

Socrates/ Well now, we should all admit that the opposite of becoming is passing away.

Protarchus/ Necessarily.

Socrates/ Hence it is an alternation of passing away and becoming that will be chosen by those who choose a life like that in preference to the third life we spoke of, the life which included neither pleasure nor pain, but the purest possible activity of thought.

Protarchus/ It appears, Socrates, that a number of untenable consequences follow from the proposal to make pleasure our good.

Socrates/ Yes, and for that matter we might reinforce the argument.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Surely it is untenable that there should be nothing good nor admirable in our bodies, nor yet in anything else whatever except in our souls, and that there it should be pleasure alone that is good, not courage nor temperance nor reason nor any of the goods proper to soul—

these being no good at all—and, what is more, that one who feels not pleasure, but distress, should be forced to admit that every time he feels distress he is evil, though he be in fact the best of men, and conversely that one who feels pleasure should gain an additional excellence proportionate to his pleasure, every time he feels that pleasure.

Protarchus/ The whole idea, Socrates, is as untenable as it well could be.

Socrates/ Well now, we have been trying every possible method of reviewing pleasure, but don't let us show ourselves over-tender toward reason and knowledge. Rather let us test their metal with a good honest ring, to see if it contains any base alloy, for by so doing we shall detect what is really the purest element in them, and so use, for the purpose of our joint decision, their truest parts together with the truest parts of pleasure.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ Now we may, I think, divide the knowledge involved in our studies into technical knowledge, and that concerned with education and culture, may we not?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then taking the technical knowledge employed in handicraft, let us first consider whether one division is more closely concerned with knowledge, and the other less so, so that we are justified in regarding the first kind as the purest, and the second as relatively impure.

Protarchus/ Yes, we ought so to regard them.

Socrates/ Should we then mark off the superior types of knowledge in the several crafts?

Protarchus/ How so? Which do you mean?

Socrates/ If, for instance, from any craft you subtract the element of numbering, measuring, and weighing, the remainder will be almost negligible.

Protarchus/ Negligible indeed.

Socrates/ For after doing so, what you would have left would be guesswork and the exercise of your senses on a basis of experience and rule of thumb, involving the use of that ability to make lucky shots which is commonly accorded the title of art or craft, when it has consolidated its position by dint of industrious practice.

Protarchus/ I have not the least doubt you are right.

Socrates/ Well now, we find plenty of it, to take one instance, in music when it adjusts its concords not by measurement but by lucky shots of a practiced finger—in the whole of music, flute playing and lyre playing alike, for this latter hunts for the proper length of each string as it gives its note, making a shot for the note, and attaining a most unreliable result with a large element of uncertainty.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then again we shall find the same sort of thing in medicine and agriculture and navigation and military science.

Protarchus/ Quite So.

Socrates/ Building, however, makes a considerable use of measures and instruments, and the remarkable exactness thus attained makes it more scientific than most sorts of knowledge.

Protarchus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ I am thinking of the building of ships and houses, and various other uses to which timber is put. It employs straightedge and peg-and-cord, I believe, and

compasses and plummet, and an ingenious kind of set-square.

Protarchus/ You are perfectly right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let us then divide the arts and crafts so called into two classes, those akin to music in their activities and those akin to carpentry, the two classes being marked by a lesser and a greater degree of exactness, respectively.

Protarchus/ So be it.

Socrates/ And let us take those arts, which just now we spoke of as primary, to be the most exact of all.

Protarchus/ I take it you mean the art of numbering, and the others which you mentioned in association with it just now.

Socrates/ To be sure. But ought we not, Protarchus, to recognize these themselves to be of two kinds? What do you think?

Protarchus/ What two kinds do you mean?

Socrates/ To take first numbering or arithmetic, ought we not to distinguish between that of the ordinary man and that of the philosopher?

Protarchus/ On what principle, may I ask, is this discrimination of two arithmetics to be based?

Socrates/ There is an important mark of difference, Protarchus. The ordinary arithmetician, surely, operates with unequal units; his ‘two' may be two armies or two cows or two any things from the smallest thing in the world to the biggest, while the philosopher will have nothing to do with him, unless he consents to make every single instance of his unit precisely equal to every other of its infinite number of instances.

Protarchus/ Certainly you are right in speaking of an important distinction among those who concern themselves

with number, which justifies the belief that there are two arithmetics.

Socrates/ Then as between the calculating and measurement employed in building or commerce and the geometry and calculation practiced in philosophy—well, should we say there is one sort of each, or should we recognize two sorts?

Protarchus/ On the strength of what has been said I should give my vote for there being two.

Socrates/ Right. Now do you realize our purpose in bringing these matters onto the board?

Protarchus/ Possibly, but I should like you to pronounce on the point.

Socrates/ Well, it seems to me that our discussion, now no less than when we embarked upon it, has propounded a question here analogous to the question about pleasures. It is inquiring whether one kind of knowledge is purer than another, just as one pleasure is purer than another.

Protarchus/ Yes, it is quite clear that that has been its reason for attacking this matter.

Socrates/ Well now, in what preceded had it not discovered that different arts, dealing with different things, possessed different degrees of precision?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And in what followed did it not first mention a certain art under one single name, making us think it really was one art, and then treat it as two, putting questions about the precision and purity of those two to find out whether the art as practiced by the philosopher or by the nonphilosopher was the more exact?

Protarchus/ I certainly think that is the question which it puts.

Socrates/ Then, Protarchus, what answer do we give it?

Protarchus/ We have got far enough, Socrates, to discern an astonishingly big difference between one kind of knowledge and another in respect of precision.

Socrates/ Well, will that make it easier for us to answer?

Protarchus/ Of course, and let our statement be that the arts which we have had before us are superior to all others, and that those among them which involve the effort of the true philosopher are, in their use of measure and number, immensely superior in point of exactness and truth.

Socrates/ Let it be as you put it; then relying on you we shall confidently answer the clever twisters of argument—

Protarchus/ Answer what?

Socrates/ That there are two arts of numbering and two arts of measuring, and plenty of other kindred arts which are similarly pairs of twins, though they share a single name.

Protarchus/ Let us give that answer, Socrates, with our blessing to those clever folk, as you style them.

Socrates/ Then these are the kinds of knowledge which we maintain to be preeminently exact?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But we, Protarchus, are likely to be repudiated by the art of dialectic, if we prefer any other to her.

Protarchus/ Then how ought we to describe her, in her turn?

Socrates/ Plainly everyone will recognize her whom we now speak of. The cognition of that which is, that which exists in reality, ever unchanged, is held, I cannot doubt, by all people who have the smallest endowment of reason to be far and away truer than any other. What is your view? How would you, Protarchus, decide about this question?

Protarchus/ On the many occasions when I used to listen to Gorgias, he regularly said, Socrates, that the art of persuasion was greatly superior to all others, for it subjugated all things not by violence but by willing submission, and was far and away the best of all arts, but on this occasion I should not care to take up a position against either you or him.

Socrates/ 'Take up arms,' I fancy you meant to say, but you dropped them out of modesty.

Protarchus/ Well, have it as you choose.

Socrates/ I wonder if I am to blame for your misconception.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ What I wanted to discover at present, my dear Protarchus, was not which art or which form of knowledge is superior to all others in respect of being the greatest or the best or the most serviceable, but which devotes its attention to precision, exactness, and the fullest truth, though it may be small and of small profit—that is what we are looking for at this moment. What you must consider—and you won't give offense to Gorgias, if you allow his art the property of doing paramount service to mankind, while assigning to the procedure to which I have just referred just that property of possessing paramount truth which I illustrated by showing that a small quantity of pure white color was superior to a large quantity of impure in that respect—what you must consider is, whether the art we have in mind may reasonably be said to possess in fullest measure reason and intelligence in their purity, or whether we ought to look for some other art with a better claim. The question calls for great thought and ample reflection, and we must have no regard for any benefits a science may confer or any repute it may enjoy. But if there is a certain faculty

in our souls naturally directed to loving truth and doing all for the sake of truth, let us make diligent search and say what it is, and when we have done so you must consider the question I have put to you.

Protarchus/ Well, I have been thinking it over, and in my opinion it would be difficult to concede that any other science or art has more of a hold on truth than this one.

Socrates/ Now does it occur to you, in saying what you have just said, that the majority of arts, as also those who are busied therewith, are in the first place concerned with opinions and pursue their energetic studies in the realm of opinion? And are you aware that those of them who do consider themselves students of reality spend a whole lifetime in studying the universe around us, how it came to be, how it does things, and how things happen to it? May we say that is so? What do you think?

Protarchus/ We may.

Socrates/ Then the task which such students among us have taken upon themselves has nothing to do with that which always is, but only with what is coming into being, or will come, or has come.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And can we say that any precise and exact truth attaches to things, none of which are at this present, or ever were, or ever will be free from change?

Protarchus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ And how can we ever get a permanent grasp on anything that is entirely devoid of permanence?

Protarchus/ No how, I imagine.

Socrates/ It follows then that reason too, and knowledge that gives perfect truth, are foreign to them.

Protarchus/ So it would seem.

Socrates/ Then we should have done for good and all with your illustrious self, and mine, and with Gorgias and Philebus, and make the following reasoned declaration.

Protarchus/ Let us have it.

Socrates/ That we find fixity, purity, truth, and what we have called perfect clarity, either in those things that are always, unchanged, unaltered, and free of all admixture, or in what is most akin to them; everything else must be called inferior and of secondary importance.

Protarchus/ What you say is very true.

Socrates/ Then as regards names for what we have been discussing, will it not be fittest to assign the fairest names to the fairest things?

Protarchus/ I suppose So.

Socrates/ And are not reason and intelligence the names that command the greatest respect?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then these names can be properly established in usage as precisely appropriate to thought whose object is true being.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But I may point out that it was just these names about which I originally suggested that we had to make our decision.

Protarchus/ To be sure, Socrates.

Socrates/ Very well. Then here, one may say, we have at hand the ingredients, intelligence and pleasure, ready to be mixed, the materials in which, or out of which, we as builders are to build our structure—that would not be a bad metaphor.

Protarchus/ Quite a good one.

Socrates/ Next then, I suppose, we must set to work to mix them.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ I suggest that there are points which we might do well to remind ourselves of first.

Protarchus/ What are they?

Socrates/ Points we mentioned before, but I think there is a lot in the proverb about the need for repeating a good thing ‘once and twice and once again.'

Protarchus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Come along, then, I beg and beseech you. I think I can give you the gist of what we said.

Protarchus/ Yes?

Socrates/ Philebus maintains that pleasure is the proper quest of all living creatures, and that all ought to aim at it; in fact he says that the good for all is pleasure and nothing else, these two terms, pleasure and good, being properly applied to one thing, one single existent. Socrates on the other hand maintains that they are not one thing, but two, in fact as in name; ‘good' and ‘pleasant' are different from one another, and intelligence has more claim to be ranked as good than pleasure. Are not those the assertions, Protarchus, now as before?

Protarchus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And is there not a further point on which we should agree, now as then?

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That the good differs from everything else in a certain respect.

Protarchus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ A creature that possesses it permanently, completely, and absolutely, has never any need of anything else; its satisfaction is perfect. Is that right?

Protarchus/ Yes, that is right.

Socrates/ And we went on, by way of experiment, to imagine the individual lives corresponding to them when each was isolated from the other—that of pleasure unmixed with intelligence, and that of intelligence similarly devoid of any particle of pleasure.

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ And did we find that either of them was satisfactory to anybody?

Protarchus/ No indeed.

Socrates/ But if we made any slip before, now is the time for anyone who likes to take the matter up and restate it more correctly. Let him class together memory, intelligence, knowledge, and true opinion, and ask himself whether there is anything whatever that he would choose to have, or to get, without these—anything, let alone a pleasure which, for all its magnitude or extreme intensity, he felt without any true opinion that he felt it, without any recognition whatever of the character of his experience, without even a momentary memory of it. And then let him put the same question about intelligence, whether anyone would choose to have intelligence unaccompanied by any pleasure, even of the most fleeting character, in preference to its accompaniment by some, [or to have every pleasure without any intelligence in preference to its accompaniment by some].

Protarchus/ Impossible, Socrates. There is no need to put that question more than once.

Socrates/ Then neither of the two can be the perfect thing that everyone desires, the absolute good.

Protarchus/ No.

Socrates/ Then we shall have to grasp the good, either precisely or at least in rough outline, if we are to know to what we must give, as we put it, the second prize.

Protarchus/ You are quite right.

Socrates/ And haven't we in a sense found a way toward the good?

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ If you were looking for somebody and began by ascertaining correctly where he lived, I imagine that would be a big step toward discovering the man you looked for.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, so it is here. Our discussion has made it plain to us, now as at the outset, that we must not look for the good in the unmixed life, but in the mixed.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But there is more hope of what we are looking for coming to light in what is well mixed than in what is badly mixed?

Protarchus/ Much more.

Socrates/ Then let us mingle our ingredients, Protarchus, with a prayer to the gods, to Dionysus or Hephaestus or whichever god has been assigned this function of mingling.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Why, it's just as if we were supplying drinks, with two fountains at our disposal; one would be of honey, standing for pleasure, the other standing for intelligence, a sobering, unintoxicating fountain of plain, salubrious water. We must get to work and make a really good mixture.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Come then. To begin with, are we most likely to attain a good result by mixing all pleasure with all intelligence?

Protarchus/ Possibly.

Socrates/ No, it's not safe. I think I can show you what seems a less dangerous method of mixture.

Protarchus/ Tell me, please.

Socrates/ One pleasure, so we thought, had a truer being than another, and again this art was more exact than that?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And knowledge differed from knowledge—one having regard to the things that come into being and perish, the other to those that do not come into being nor perish, but are always, unchanged and unaltered. Reviewing them on the score of truth, we concluded that the latter was truer than the former.

Protarchus/ Perfectly right.

Socrates/ Then if we were to see which were the truest portions of each before we made our mixture, would the fusion of these portions suffice to constitute and provide us with the fully acceptable life, or should we still need something different?

Protarchus/ My own opinion is that we should act as you say.

Socrates/ Now let us imagine a man who understands what justice itself is, and can give an account of it conformable to his knowledge, and who moreover has a like understanding of all else that is.

Protarchus/ Very well.

Socrates/ Will such a man be adequately possessed of knowledge, if he can give his account of the divine circle and the divine sphere themselves, but knows nothing of these human spheres and circles of ours, so that, when he is building a house, the rules that he uses, no less than the circles, are of the other sort?

Protarchus/ I am moved to mirth, Socrates, by this description we are giving of ourselves confined to divine knowledge.

Socrates/ What's that? Are we to throw in alongside of our other ingredients the art of the false rule and false circle, with all the lack of fixity and purity it involves?

Protarchus/ We must, if we are going to find the way home when we want it.

Socrates/ And music too, which we said a while ago was so completely dependent on lucky shots and imitation, and so deficient in purity?

Protarchus/ I think we are bound to do so, if our life is ever to be a life at all.

Socrates/ Do you want me, may I ask, to give way like a porter jostled and knocked about by the crowd, to fling open the doors and allow every sort of knowledge to stream in, the inferior mingling with the pure?

Protarchus/ I don't really see, Socrates, what harm one would suffer by taking all those other sorts of knowledge, providing one had the first sort.

Socrates/ Then I am to allow the whole company to stream in and be gathered together in a splendid Homeric mingling of the waters?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It is done. And now we must return to our fount of pleasures. The method of mixing our ingredients which we intended, namely taking parts of the true sorts first, has broken down; our acquiescence in every sort of knowledge has made us admit the whole of it at one swoop before admitting any pleasure.

Protarchus/ That is quite true.

Socrates/ Hence it is time for us to raise the same question about pleasures, whether we are to let them all loose at once or should allow passage first to such of them as are true.

Protarchus/ It is most important in the interest of safety to let loose the true ones first.

Socrates/ Then let that be taken as done. And what next? Ought we not to do as we did in the other case, and include in our mixture any necessary pleasures there may be?

Protarchus/ Oh yes, the necessary ones of course.

Socrates/ Yes, but we found it harmless and useful to spend our lives in the knowledge of all the arts, and if we say the same about pleasures, if, that is, it is advantageous and harmless to us all to spend our lives in the enjoyment of all pleasures, then we must mix in all of them.

Protarchus/ Then what are we to say on this particular point? How are we to act?

Socrates/ The question ought to be addressed not to us, Protarchus, but to the pleasures themselves and the intelligences, and here is the sort of inquiry we should make about their mutual relations.

Protarchus/ Yes?

Socrates/ Dear Pleasures—if that is the name by which I should call you, or whatever it ought to be—would you not choose to live in company with all intelligence rather than apart from any?' I imagine there can be no doubt about the reply they would make to that.

Protarchus/ What would it be?

Socrates/ Conformably to what was previously said, it would be as follows : 'It is disadvantageous and hardly possible that one family should be kept in solitude and isolation, perfectly clear of all others, but our view is that,

family for family, we cannot do better than have the family of knowledge to live with us, knowledge of all things in general and of each of ourselves in particular to the fullest extent possible.'

Protarchus/ 'An excellent answer that,' we shall tell them.

Socrates/ So we should. Then next we must put a question to intelligence and reason. 'Do you require any pleasures to be added to the mixture?' And when we ask that of reason and intelligence, they may possibly rejoin, 'What sort of pleasures?'

Protarchus/ I dare say.

Socrates/ To which our rejoinder is this. 'Over and above the true pleasures that you know of, do you further require the greatest and intensest pleasures for your associates?' And they may well reply, 'Is that likely, Socrates, seeing that they put countless obstacles in our way, disturbing with frenzy the souls in which we dwell, and prevent us from ever coming into existence, while as to our offspring, they utterly ruin them in most cases, so careless and forgetful do they make us. No, the pleasures you have spoken of as true and pure you may regard as more or less related to us, and besides them you may add to the mixture those that consort with health and temperance, and in fact all that attend upon virtue in general, following her everywhere as their divinity. But to mix with reason the pleasures that always go with folly and all other manner of evil would surely be the most senseless act for one who desired to see a mixture and fusion as fair and peaceable as might be, so that he might try to learn from it what the good is, in man and in the universe, and what form he should divine it to possess.'

Shall we not say that in the words that reason has here used it has answered wisely and 'reasonably' on behalf of itself and memory and right opinion?

Protarchus/ Completely so.

Socrates/ But there is still a certain thing we must have, and nothing in the world could come into being without it.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Reality, for a thing with which we don't mean to mix reality will never really come into being, and if it ever did it wouldn't continue in being.

Protarchus/ No, of course not.

Socrates/ No indeed. And now do you and Philebus tell me if there are any additional ingredients required. To me it appears that in our present discussion we have created what might be called an incorporeal ordered system for the rightful control of a corporeal subject in which dwells a soul.

Protarchus/ You may assure yourself, Socrates, that my own conclusion is the same.

Socrates/ Then perhaps we should be more or less right in saying that we now stand upon the threshold of the good and of that habitation where all that is like thereto resides?

Protarchus/ I at least think So.

Socrates/ And what, may I ask, shall we regard as the most valuable thing in our mixture, that which makes an arrangement of this sort commend itself to us all? If we discover that, we can go on to consider whether this factor in the whole scheme of things is closer and more akin to pleasure, or to reason.

Protarchus/ Very good, what you propose will do much to a help us toward our decision.

Socrates/ As a matter of fact, it is easy enough to see the cause that makes any mixture, be it what it may, possess high value or no value whatever.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Surely anyone in the world can recognize that.

Protarchus/ Recognize what?

Socrates/ That any compound, whatever it be, that does not by some means or other exhibit measure and proportion, is the ruin both of its ingredients and, first and foremost, of itself; what you are bound to get in such cases is no real mixture, but literally a miserable mass of unmixed messiness.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ So now we find that the good has taken refuge in the character of the beautiful, for the qualities of measure and proportion invariably, I imagine, constitute beauty and excellence.

Protarchus/ Yes indeed.

Socrates/ And of course we said that truth was included along with these qualities in the mixture.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then if we cannot hunt down the good under a single form, let us secure it by the conjunction of three, beauty, proportion, and truth, and then, regarding these three as one, let us assert that *that* may most properly be held to determine the qualities of the mixture, and that because *that* is good the mixture itself has become so.

Protarchus/ Yes, that is quite proper.

Socrates/ Well, Protarchus, by this time anyone would be competent to decide whether it is pleasure or intelligence that is more akin to the highest good, and more valuable with men and gods alike.

Protarchus/ The answer is clear, but for all that it would be as well to formulate it explicitly.

Socrates/ Then let us examine each of our three forms separately in relation to pleasure and reason, for we must

see to which of the two we shall assign each of them on the ground of closer kinship.

Protarchus/ By ‘each of them' you mean beauty, truth, and measuredness?

Socrates/ Yes, and in the first place, Protarchus, take hold of truth, and having done so, have a look at the three things, reason, truth, and pleasure, and then, taking your time, answer your own question whether pleasure or reason is the more akin to truth.

Protarchus/ What need for time? I think they differ widely. Pleasure is the worst of all impostors, and according to the accounts, when it is a question of the pleasures of love, which are commonly reckoned as the greatest, even perjury is forgiven by the gods—pleasures being presumably, like children, completely destitute of reason. Reason, on the other hand, if not identical with truth, is of all things the most like it, the truest thing in the world.

Socrates/ Next then give a similar consideration to measuredness. Has pleasure more of it than intelligence, or is the reverse the case?

Protarchus/ There you set me another easy problem to consider. I don't think you could discover anything whatsoever more unmeasured in its character than pleasure and intense enjoyment, nor anything more measured than reason and knowledge.

Socrates/ Well said. However, there is still a third thing I want you to tell me. Has reason more part in beauty than pleasure, that is to say is reason more beautiful than pleasure, or is the opposite the case?

Protarchus/ Well, of course, Socrates, no one whether in his waking hours or in his dreams has had a vision of intelligence and reason as ugly; no one can ever possibly

have conceived them as being or becoming ugly, or ever going to be so.

Socrates/ Right.

Protarchus/ But I fancy that when we see someone, no matter whom, experiencing pleasures—and I think this is true especially of the greatest pleasures—we detect in them an element either of the ridiculous or of extreme ugliness, so that we ourselves feel ashamed, and do our best to cover it up and hide it away, and we leave that sort of thing to the hours of darkness, feeling that it should not be exposed to the light of day.

Socrates/ Then your message, Protarchus, to be sent out to the world at large and announced to your immediate listeners, will be this. Pleasure is not the first of all possessions, nor yet the second; rather, the first has been secured for everlasting tenure somewhere in the region of measure—of what is measured or appropriate, or whatever term may be deemed to denote the quality in question.

Protarchus/ So at least it appears on our present showing.

Socrates/ And the second lies in the region of what is proportioned and beautiful, and what is perfect and satisfying and so forth—whatever terms denote that kind of quality.

Protarchus/ That seems right.

Socrates/ And if you accept what I divine, and put reason and intelligence third, you won't be very wide of the truth.

Protarchus/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ Nor again, if beside these three you put as fourth what we recognized as belonging to the soul itself, sciences and arts and what we called right opinions, inasmuch as these are more akin than pleasure to the good.

Protarchus/ You may be right.

Socrates/ And as fifth, the pleasures which we recognized and discriminated as painless, calling them pure pleasures of the soul itself—some of them attaching to knowledge, others to sensation.

Protarchus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ 'But cease at sixth descent,' as Orpheus puts it, 'your ordered song'; really it looks as though our discussion, like the song, has ceased at the sixth choice. And now the only thing left for us to do is to crown our story with a capital.

Protarchus/ That is what we must do.

Socrates/ Come along then, let us have the 'third libation to the deliverer,' and repeat for the third time the same pronouncement that we made before.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Philebus maintained that we find the good in the sum total and entirety of pleasure.

Protarchus/ I understand you, Socrates, to have meant by your 'third libation' just now that we were to recapitulate our original statement.

Socrates/ Yes, and let us listen to what came next. I, having in view the considerations which I have now detailed, and feeling distaste for the assertion which is not only that of Philebus but also frequently made by countless other people, maintained that reason is far better and more valuable than pleasure for human life.

Protarchus/ So you did.

Socrates/ Moreover, while suspecting that many other things are so too, I said that if anything were to come to light that was better than both of these I should fight to the end

on the side of reason against pleasure for the second prize, and that pleasure would be disappointed even of that.

Protarchus/ Yes, you did say so.

Socrates/ And subsequently we were completely satisfied that neither of them was satisfying.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Then in that part of our argument had reason and pleasure alike been dismissed as being, neither of them, the good itself, inasmuch as they came short of self-sufficiency and the quality of being satisfying and perfect?

Protarchus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ But now that we have found a third thing better than either of them, reason has been found ever so much nearer and more akin than pleasure to the character of the victor.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then according to the decision now pronounced by our argument, pleasure will take fifth place.

Protarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And not first place, no, not even if all the oxen and horses and every other animal that exists tell us so by their pursuit of pleasure. It is the animals on which the multitude rely, just as diviners rely on birds, when they decide that pleasures are of the first importance to our living a good life, and suppose that animals' desires are authoritative evidence, rather than those desires that are known to reasoned argument, divining the truth of this and that by the power of the Muse of philosophy.

Protarchus/ The point has been reached, Socrates, at which we all agree that your conclusions are completely true.

Socrates/ Then will you let me go?

Protarchus/ There is only a little still left to be done, Socrates. I am sure you won't give up sooner than we do; so I will remind you of the tasks that remain.

Philebus.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates. Protarchus. Philebus.

Socrates/ Observe, Protarchus, the nature of the position which you are now going to take from Philebus, and what the other position is which I maintain, and which, if you do not approve of it, is to be controverted by you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, and the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living being, whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and intelligence and memory, and their kindred, right opinion and true reasoning, are better and more desirable than pleasure for all who are able to partake of them, and that to all such who are or ever will be they are the most advantageous of all things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of the argument?

Philebus/ Nothing could be fairer, Socrates.

Socrates/ And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned to you?

Protarchus/ I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left the field.

Socrates/ Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to be ascertained.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Shall we further agree—

Protarchus/ To what?

Socrates/ That you and I must now try to indicate some state and disposition of the soul which has the property of making all men happy.

Protarchus/ Yes, by all means.

Socrates/ And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a state?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And what if there be a third state, which is better than either? Then both of us are vanquished—are we not? But if this life, which really has the power of making men happy, turn out to be more akin to pleasure than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage over the life of wisdom.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated; —do you agree?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what do you say, Philebus?

Philebus/ I say, and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the conqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus.

Protarchus/ You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have no longer a voice in the matter?

Philebus/ True enough. Nevertheless I would clear myself and deliver my soul of you; and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do so.

Protarchus/ You may appeal to us; we too will be the witnesses of your words. And now, Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we will proceed with the argument.

Socrates/ Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure.

Protarchus/ Very good.

Socrates/ The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the gods is more than human—it exceeds all other fears. And now I would not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance, —that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would anyone be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!

Protarchus/ Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring from opposite sources, but they are not in themselves opposite. For must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure, —that is, like itself?

Socrates/ Yes, my good friend, just as color is like color; —in so far as colors are colors, there is no difference between them; and yet we all know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed to white: or again, as figure is like figure, for all figures are comprehended under one class; and yet particular figures may be absolutely opposed to one another, and there is an infinite diversity of them. And we might find similar examples in many other things; therefore do not rely upon this argument, which would go to prove the

unity of the most extreme opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a similar opposition among pleasures.

Protarchus/ Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument?

Socrates/ Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to them a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good; now although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, as we are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good; but you call them all good, and at the same time are compelled, if you are pressed, to acknowledge that they are unlike. And so you must tell us what is the identical quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which makes you designate all of them as good.

Protarchus/ What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that anyone who asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some pleasures are good and others bad?

Socrates/ And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one another, and sometimes opposed?

Protarchus/ Not in so far as they are pleasures.

Socrates/ That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are to say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures, but that they are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do not pierce our dull minds, but we go on arguing all the same, like the weakest and most inexperienced reasoners?

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Why, I mean to say, that in self-defense I may, if I like, follow your example, and assert boldly that the two things most unlike are most absolutely alike; and the result will be that you and I will prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing; and the argument will be blown away and lost. Suppose that we put back, and return to the old

position; then perhaps, we may come to an understanding with one another.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you?

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind, and those other qualities which I, when asked by you at first what is the nature of the good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case with the pleasures of which you spoke.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ The sciences are a numerous class, and will be found to present great differences. But even admitting that, like the pleasures, they are opposite as well as different, should I be worthy of the name of dialectician if, in order to avoid this difficulty, I were to say (as you are saying of pleasure) that there is no difference between one science and another; —would not the argument founder and disappear like an idle tale, although we might ourselves escape drowning by clinging to a fallacy?

Protarchus/ May none of this befall us, except the deliverance! Yet I like the even-handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let us assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and different sciences.

Socrates/ And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the differences between my good and yours; but let us bring them to the light in the hope that, in the process of testing them, they may show whether pleasure is to be called the good, or wisdom, or some third quality; for surely we are not now simply contending in order that my view or that yours may prevail, but I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting for the truth.

Protarchus/ Certainly we ought.

Socrates/ Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish the principle on which the argument rests.

Protarchus/ What principle?

Socrates/ A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty, and some men sometimes against their will.

Protarchus/ Speak plainer.

Socrates/ The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel of nature; for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful propositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack.

Protarchus/ Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and also many, dividing the single 'me' into many 'me's,' and even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten thousand other ways?

Socrates/ Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes about the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this time agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true course of thought; and no more favor is shown to that other puzzle, in which a person proves the members and parts of anything to be divided, and then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof of his own words: Why, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, and the many are only one.

Protarchus/ But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected with this subject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and acknowledged?

Socrates/ When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things that are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving, for in those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as I was saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed; but when the assertion

is made that man is one, or ox is one; or beauty one, or the good one, then the interest which attaches to these and similar unities and the attempt which is made to divide them gives birth to a controversy.

Protarchus/ Of what nature?

Socrates/ In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real existence; and then how each individual unity, being always the same, and incapable either of generation or of destruction, but retaining a permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and multiplied in the infinity of the world of generation, or as still entire and yet divided from itself, which latter would seem to be the greatest impossibility of all, for how can one and the same thing be at the same time in one and in many things? These, Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is the one and many to which they relate; they are the source of great perplexity if ill decided, and the right determination of them is very helpful.

Protarchus/ Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions.

Socrates/ That is what I should wish.

Protarchus/ And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear them discussed; Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move, and we had better not stir him up with questions.

Socrates/ Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we begin thus?

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ We say that the one and many become identified by thought, and that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of every word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never cease, and is

not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of thought itself, which never grows old. Any young man, when he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no stone, or rather no thought unturned, now rolling up the many into the one, and kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbors, whether they are older or younger, or of his own age—that makes no difference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no human being who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian would have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only be found.

Protarchus/ Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all set upon you, if you abuse us? We understand what you mean; but is there no charm by which we may dispel all this confusion, no more excellent way of arriving at the truth? If there is, we hope that you will guide us into that way, and we will do our best to follow, for the enquiry in which we are engaged, Socrates, is not unimportant.

Socrates/ The reverse of unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favorite way, which has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me helpless in the hour of need.

Protarchus/ Tell us what that is.

Socrates/ One which may be easily pointed out, but is by no means easy of application; it is the parent of all the discoveries in the arts.

Protarchus/ Tell us what it is.

Socrates/ A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among men by the hands of a new Prometheus, and there, with a blaze of light; and the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the gods than we are, handed down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be are composed of one and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted in them: seeing, then, that such is the order of the world, we too ought in every enquiry to begin by laying down one idea of that which is the subject of enquiry; this unity we shall find in everything. Having found it, we may next proceed to look for two, if there be two, or, if not, then for three or some other number, subdividing each of these units, until at last the unity with which we began is seen not only to be one and many and infinite, but also a definite number; the infinite must not be suffered to approach the many until the entire number of the species intermediate between unity and infinity has been discovered, —then, and not till then, we may rest from division, and without further troubling ourselves about the endless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, as I was saying, is the way of considering and learning and teaching one another, which the gods have handed down to us. But the wise men of our time are either too quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity. Having no method, they make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass at once to infinity; the intermediate steps never occur to them. And this, I repeat, is what makes the difference between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.

Protarchus/ I think that I partly understand you, Socrates, but I should like to have a clearer notion of what you are saying.

Socrates/ I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet, Protarchus, which you were made to learn as a child.

Protarchus/ How do they afford an illustration?

Socrates/ The sound which passes through the lips whether of an individual or of all men is one and yet infinite.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound is infinite are we perfect in the art of speech, but the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same kind.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Sound is one in music as well as in grammar?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And there is a higher note and a lower note, and a note of equal pitch may we affirm so much?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you knew; though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of music.

Protarchus/ Nothing.

Socrates/ But when you have learned what sounds are high and what low, and the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or proportions, and the systems compounded out of them, which our fathers discovered, and have handed down to us who are their descendants under the name of harmonies; and the affections corresponding to them in the movements of the human body, which when measured by numbers ought, as they say, to be called rhythms and measures; and they tell us that the same principle should be applied to everyone and many; —when, I say, you have learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are

perfect; and you may be said to understand any other subject, when you have a similar grasp of it. But the infinity of kinds and the infinity of individuals which there is in each of them, when not classified, creates in every one of us a state of infinite ignorance; and he who never looks for number in anything, will not himself be looked for in the number of famous men.

Protarchus/ I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent, Philebus.

Philebus/ I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon the argument?

Socrates/ Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus.

Protarchus/ Indeed he is, and you must answer him.

Socrates/ I will; but you must let me make one little remark first about these matters; I was saying, that he who begins with any individual unity, should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a definite number, and now I say conversely, that he who has to begin with infinity should not jump to unity, but he should look about for some number representing a certain quantity, and thus out of all end in one. And now let us return for an illustration of our principle to the case of letters.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said to have been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then other letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e. the semivowels); these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he distinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes, without voice and without sound, and divided these, and likewise the two other classes of vowels and semivowels, into the individual

sounds, and told the number of them, and gave to each and all of them the name of letters; and observing that none of us could learn anyone of them and not learn them all, and in consideration of this common bond which in a manner united them, he assigned to them all a single art; and this he called the art of grammar or letters.

Philebus/ The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding the original statement, but I still feel the defect of which I just now complained.

Socrates/ Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the argument?

Philebus/ Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long asking.

Socrates/ Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the question which, as you say, you have been so long asking?

Philebus/ How so?

Socrates/ Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?

Philebus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And we maintain that they are each of them one?

Philebus/ True.

Socrates/ And the precise question to which the previous discussion desires an answer is, how they are one and also many [i.e. how they have one genus and many species], and are not at once infinite, and what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into infinity.

Protarchus/ That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us shall answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable to answer, and

therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have undertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were able to answer, the result methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let us consider, then, what we are to do: — Socrates, if I understood him rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom.

Socrates/ Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest use in any enquiry.

Protarchus/ That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him is that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will tell you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing with you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment and the like were the chief good, you answered—No, not those, but another class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves of what you said, and very properly, in order that we may not forget to examine and compare the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are to be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art, and the like. There was a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully threatened that you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled; and you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And now, as children say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken back; cease then to fight against us in this way.

Socrates/ In what way?

Philebus/ Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which we have not as yet any sufficient answer to give; let us not imagine that a general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if we are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have promised. Consider, then, whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge according to their kinds; or you may let the matter drop, if you are able and willing to find some other mode of clearing up our controversy.

Socrates/ If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words 'if you are willing' dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to have recalled something to my mind.

Philebus/ What is that?

Socrates/ I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the good, but some third thing, which was different from them, and better than either.

If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified with her: — Am I not right?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more clearly as we proceed.

Protarchus/ Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose.

Socrates/ But, let us first agree on some little points.

Protarchus/ What are they?

Socrates/ Is the good perfect or imperfect?

Protarchus/ The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.

Socrates/ And is the good sufficient?

Protarchus/ Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things.

Socrates/ And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by good.

Protarchus/ That is undeniable.

Socrates/ Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of wisdom, and pass them in review.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want anything, then it cannot really be the chief good.

Protarchus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And will you help us to test these two lives?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then answer.

Protarchus/ Ask.

Socrates/ Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

Protarchus/ Certainly I should.

Socrates/ Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight?

Protarchus/ Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.

Socrates/ Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures?

Protarchus/ I should.

Socrates/ But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or 'pulmo marinus.' Could this be otherwise?

Protarchus/ No.

Socrates/ But is such a life eligible?

Protarchus/ I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away from me the power of speech.

Socrates/ We must keep up our spirits; —let us now take the life of mind and examine it in turn.

Protarchus/ And what is this life of mind?

Socrates/ I want to know whether anyone of us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings?

Protarchus/ Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by anyone else.

Socrates/ What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two?

Protarchus/ Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?

Socrates/ Yes, that is the life which I mean.

Protarchus/ There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in addition to them.

Socrates/ But do you see the consequence?

Protarchus/ To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man or for animal.

Socrates/ Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity.

Protarchus/ Certainly that seems to be true.

Socrates/ And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus' goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good?

Philebus/ Neither is your 'mind' the good, Socrates, for that will be open to the same objections.

Socrates/ Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my 'mind'; but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, I will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed life; but we must come to some understanding about the second place. For

you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life; and in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to Philebus, that the element which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind, attain even to the third.

Protarchus/ Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall; in fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim. And if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second place, she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to them would she still appear as fair as before.

Socrates/ Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her?

Protarchus/ Nonsense, Socrates.

Socrates/ Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which is an impossibility?

Protarchus/ Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be aware that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the argument.

Socrates/ Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and just at present not at all an easy one. For in going to war in the cause of mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have weapons of another make from

those which I used before; some, however, of the old ones may do again. And must I then finish the argument?

Protarchus/ Of course you must.

Socrates/ Let us be very careful in laying the foundation.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you do not object, into three classes.

Protarchus/ Upon what principle would you make the division?

Socrates/ Let us take some of our newly-found notions.

Protarchus/ Which of them?

Socrates/ Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of existence, and also an infinite?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which is compounded out of them; but I fear that I am ridiculously clumsy at these processes of division and enumeration.

Protarchus/ What do you mean, my good friend?

Socrates/ I say that a fourth class is still wanted.

Protarchus/ What will that be?

Socrates/ Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a fourth class to the three others.

Protarchus/ And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of resolution as well as a cause of composition?

Socrates/ Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some future time you shall allow me to have it.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us begin with the first three; and as we find two out of the three greatly divided and dispersed, let us

endeavor to reunite them, and see how in each of them there is a one and many.

Protarchus/ If you would explain to me a little more about them, perhaps I might be able to follow you.

Socrates/ Well, the two classes are the same which I mentioned before, one the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter discussed.

Protarchus/ I agree.

Socrates/ And now consider well; for the question to which I invite your attention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter and colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end? for if they had an end, the more and less would themselves have an end.

Protarchus/ That is most true.

Socrates/ Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a more and a less.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and being endless they must also be infinite.

Protarchus/ Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true.

Socrates/ Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such an expression as 'exceedingly' which you have just uttered, and also the term 'gently' have the same significance as more or less; for whenever they occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity—they are always introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison of a more or a less excessive or a more or a less gentle, and at each creation of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now saying, if quantity and

measure did not disappear, but were allowed to intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, these last would be driven out of their own domain. When definite quantity is once admitted, there can be no longer a 'hotter' or a 'colder' (for these are always progressing, and are never in one stay); but definite quantity is at rest, and has ceased to progress. Which proves that comparatives, such as the hotter and the colder, are to be ranked in the class of the infinite.

Protarchus/ Your remark certainly has the look of truth, Socrates; but these subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at first. I think, however, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or twice, there would be a substantial agreement between us.

Socrates/ Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather not waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars, let me know whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite—

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit of more or less, or are denoted by the words 'exceedingly' 'gently' 'extremely' and the like, may not be referred to the class of the infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous argument, all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if possible, set upon them—do you remember?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit their opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal, or again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure—all these may, I think, be

rightly reckoned by us in the class of the limited or finite; what do you say?

Protarchus/ Excellent, Socrates.

Socrates/ And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound kind?

Protarchus/ You, I think, will have to tell me that.

Socrates/ Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen to my prayers.

Protarchus/ Offer up a prayer, then, and think.

Socrates/ I am thinking, Protarchus, and I believe that some God has befriended us.

Protarchus/ What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what you are saying?

Socrates/ I will tell you, and do you listen to my words.

Protarchus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, slower, greater, smaller, and all that in the preceding argument we placed under the unity of more and less.

Protarchus/ In the class of the infinite, you mean?

Socrates/ Yes; and now mingle this with the other.

Protarchus/ What is the other?

Socrates/ The class of the finite which we ought to have brought together as we did the infinite; but, perhaps, it will come to the same thing if we do so now; —when the two are combined, a third will appear.

Protarchus/ What do you mean by the class of the finite?

Socrates/ The class of the equal and the double, and any class which puts an end to difference and opposition, and by

introducing number creates harmony and proportion among the different elements.

Protarchus/ I understand; you seem to me to mean that the various opposites, when you mingle with them the class of the finite, take certain forms.

Socrates/ Yes, that is my meaning.

Protarchus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Does not the right participation in the finite give health—in disease, for instance?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And whereas the high and low, the swift and the slow are infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principles aforesaid introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music?

Protarchus/ Yes, certainly.

Socrates/ Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the introduction of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse moderation and harmony?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the seasons, and all the delights of life?

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: O my beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal wantonness and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no limit to pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and order, whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, delivers the soul. —What think you, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ Her ways are much to my mind, Socrates.

Socrates/ You will observe that I have spoken of three classes?

Protarchus/ Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that the infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of existences; but what you would make the third I am not so certain.

Socrates/ That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too much for you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with the infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them were sealed with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we readily acknowledged it to be by nature one?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand me to mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being, effected by the measure which the limit introduces.

Protarchus/ I understand.

Socrates/ Still there was, as we said, a fourth class to be investigated, and you must assist in the investigation; for does not everything which comes into being, of necessity come into being through a cause?

Protarchus/ Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no cause?

Socrates/ And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name; the agent and the cause may be rightly called one?

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name—shall we not?

Protarchus/ We shall.

Socrates/ The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or effect naturally follows it?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation are not the same, but different?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of which they were generated, furnish all the three classes?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven to be distinct from them, —and may therefore be called a fourth principle?

Protarchus/ So let us call it.

Socrates/ Quite right; but now, having distinguished the four, I think that we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them in order.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and the second the finite or limited; then follows the third, an essence compound and generated; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in speaking of the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth.

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And now what is the next question, and how came we hither? Were we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom?

Protarchus/ We were.

Socrates/ And now, having determined these points, shall we not be better able to decide about the first and second place, which was the original subject of dispute?

Protarchus/ I dare say.

Socrates/ We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the conqueror—did we not?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to what class it is to be assigned?

Protarchus/ Beyond a doubt.

Socrates/ This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class; which is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the elements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may therefore be truly said to comprehend the conqueror life.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer?

Philebus/ Let me hear.

Socrates/ Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

Philebus/ They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.

Socrates/ Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now—admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite—in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind?

And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point.

Philebus/ You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favorite god.

Socrates/ And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favorite goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question.

Protarchus/ Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must submit to him.

Philebus/ And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place?

Protarchus/ Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must entreat you, Socrates, to be our spokesman, and then we shall not say anything wrong or disrespectful of your favorite.

Socrates/ I must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose a difficult one; but did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you with my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to what class mind and knowledge belong?

Protarchus/ You did, indeed, Socrates.

Socrates/ Yet the answer is easy, since all philosophers assert with one voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth—in reality they are magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should like to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more fully.

Philebus/ Take your own course, Socrates, and never mind length; we shall not tire of you.

Socrates/ Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a question.

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the guidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvelous intelligence and wisdom.

Protarchus/ Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, for that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy; but the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the aspect of the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars and of the whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think otherwise.

Socrates/ Shall we then agree with them of old time in maintaining this doctrine, —not merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk to ourselves, —but shall we share in the danger, and take our part of the reproach which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares that all is disorder?

Protarchus/ That would certainly be my wish.

Socrates/ Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument.

Protarchus/ Let me hear.

Socrates/ We see that the elements which enter into the nature of the bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor cries, 'land' [i.e. earth], reappear in the constitution of the world.

Protarchus/ The proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm gathers over us, and we are at our wit's end.

Socrates/ There is something to be remarked about each of these elements.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Only a small fraction of anyone of them exists in us, and that of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or

having any power worthy of its nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is fire within us, and in the universe.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power that fire has.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and ruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other animals, dependent on the universal fire?

Protarchus/ That is a question which does not deserve an answer.

Socrates/ Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, and you would give a similar reply about all the other elements?

Protarchus/ Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his senses?

Socrates/ I do not think that he could—but now go on to the next step. When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in one, did we not call them a body?

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same reason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same elements.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which we were just now speaking?

Protarchus/ That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to be asked.

Socrates/ Well, tell me, is this question worth asking?

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ May our body be said to have a soul?

Protarchus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?

Protarchus/ Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.

Socrates/ Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes of wisdom; —we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things?

Protarchus/ Such a supposition is quite unreasonable.

Socrates/ Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?

Protarchus/ Most justly.

Socrates/ And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul?

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the cause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are pleased to be called.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said of old time that mind rules the universe.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that mind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause of all; and I think that you now have my answer.

Protarchus/ I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had answered.

Socrates/ A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts earnest.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago discovered?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was akin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite and belongs to the class which

neither has, nor ever will have in itself, a beginning, middle, or end of its own.

Protarchus/ I shall be sure to remember.

Socrates/ We must next examine what is their place and under what conditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since her class was first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart from pain.

Protarchus/ If this is the road, let us take it.

Socrates/ I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of pleasure and pain.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class.

Protarchus/ And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the aforesaid classes is the mixed one?

Socrates/ I will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability.

Protarchus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we placed third in the list of four.

Protarchus/ That which followed the infinite and the finite; and in which you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony.

Socrates/ Capital; and now will you please to give me your best attention?

Protarchus/ Proceed; I am attending.

Socrates/ I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain.

Protarchus/ That is very probable.

Socrates/ And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak

in the fewest and shortest words about matters of the greatest moment.

Protarchus/ I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be a little plainer?

Socrates/ Do not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest illustration?

Protarchus/ What phenomena do you mean?

Socrates/ Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure: once more, the unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their own nature is pleasure?

Protarchus/ Granted; what you say has a general truth.

Socrates/ Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the two processes which we have described?

Protarchus/ Good.

Socrates/ Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an expectation of pain, fearful and anxious.

Protarchus/ Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation.

Socrates/ Right; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure, methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good.

Protarchus/ You say most truly that this is the track which the investigation should pursue.

Socrates/ Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether any animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small?

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure and of pain?

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And do not forget that there is such a state; it will make a great difference in our judgment of pleasure,

whether we remember this or not. And I should like to say a few words about it.

Protarchus/ What have you to say?

Socrates/ Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there is no reason why he should not live in this neutral state.

Protarchus/ You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing?

Socrates/ Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be necessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom.

Protarchus/ Yes, certainly, we said so.

Socrates/ Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of all lives?

Protarchus/ If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have either joy or sorrow.

Socrates/ Certainly not—there would be a great impropriety in the assumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if in any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion we will place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second place, should she have to resign the first.

Protarchus/ Just so.

Socrates/ The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is purely mental, is entirely derived from memory.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ I must first of all analyze memory, or rather perception which is prior to memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to be properly cleared up.

Protarchus/ How will you proceed?

Socrates/ Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock to both and to each of them.

Protarchus/ Granted.

Socrates/ And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but not of the second?

Protarchus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in this case has not yet entered; and to speak of the loss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction; do you see?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then just be so good as to change the terms.

Protarchus/ How shall I change them?

Socrates/ Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say unconsciousness.

Protarchus/ I see.

Socrates/ And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and motion would be properly called consciousness?

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then now we know the meaning of the word?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the preservation of consciousness?

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ But do we not distinguish memory from recollection?

Protarchus/ I think so.

Socrates/ And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced when in company with the body?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of some consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and reminiscence?

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ There is a reason why I say all this.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and desire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the previous analysis helps to show the nature of both.

Protarchus/ Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point.

Socrates/ There are certainly many things to be considered in discussing the generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must determine the nature and seat of desire.

Protarchus/ Ay; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing.

Socrates/ Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the answer.

Protarchus/ A fair retort; but let us proceed.

Socrates/ Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of desires?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And yet they are very different; what common nature have we in view when we call them by a single name?

Protarchus/ By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is not easily answered; but it must be answered.

Socrates/ Then let us go back to our examples.

Protarchus/ Where shall we begin?

Socrates/ Do we mean anything when we say 'a man thirsts'?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ We mean to say that he 'is empty'?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And is not thirst desire?

Protarchus/ Yes, of drink.

Socrates/ Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink?

Protarchus/ I should say, of replenishment with drink.

Socrates/ Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full?

Protarchus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain either by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment, of which he has no present or past experience?

Protarchus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ And yet he who desires, surely desires something?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ He does not desire that which he experiences, for he experiences thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires replenishment?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some way apprehends replenishment?

Protarchus/ There must.

Socrates/ And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be emptied?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the replenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other way can there be?

Protarchus/ I cannot imagine any other.

Socrates/ But do you see the consequence?

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ That there is no such thing as desire of the body.

Protarchus/ Why so?

Socrates/ Why, because the argument shows that the endeavor of every animal is to the reverse of his bodily state.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is experiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And the argument, having proved that memory attracts us towards the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires and the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or thirsts or has any similar experience.

Protarchus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to me to imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these affections.

Protarchus/ Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you speaking?

Socrates/ I am speaking of being emptied and replenished, and of all that relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as well as of the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the pleasure which succeeds to it.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And what would you say of the intermediate state?

Protarchus/ What do you mean by 'intermediate'?

Socrates/ I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers past pleasures which, if they would only return, would relieve him; but as yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an intermediate state?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased?

Protarchus/ Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body there is the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and expectation.

Socrates/ What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other times be quite in despair?

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then man and the other animals have at the same time both pleasure and pain?

Protarchus/ I suppose so.

Socrates/ But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there will be the double experience of pain. You observed this and inferred that the double experience was the single case possible.

Protarchus/ Quite true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the occasion of raising a question?

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false?

Protarchus/ But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains?

Socrates/ And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions?

Protarchus/ I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures.

Socrates/ What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very serious enquiry.

Protarchus/ There I agree.

Socrates/ And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus' boys, the point to be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument.

Protarchus/ Surely.

Socrates/ No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is said should be pertinent.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true?

Protarchus/ To be sure I do.

Socrates/ Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or waking, mad or lunatic?

Protarchus/ So we have always held, Socrates.

Socrates/ But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your opinion?

Protarchus/ I think that we should.

Socrates/ Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And such a thing as pleasure?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And an opinion must be of something?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And a man must be pleased by something?

Protarchus/ Quite correct.

Socrates/ And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference; it will still be an opinion?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, will always have a real feeling of pleasure?

Protarchus/ Yes; that is also quite true.

Socrates/ Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real?

Protarchus/ Yes; that is the question.

Socrates/ You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this is what you think should be examined?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality?

Protarchus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us.

Protarchus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure?

Protarchus/ Quite true, Socrates.

Socrates/ And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak of a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse of rightness?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honorable name?

Protarchus/ Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we?

Socrates/ And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which is not true, but false?

Protarchus/ Certainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as we were saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure false.

Socrates/ How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defense of pleasure!

Protarchus/ Nay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear.

Socrates/ And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance?

Protarchus/ There must be a very great difference between them.

Socrates/ Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference.

Protarchus/ Lead, and I will follow.

Socrates/ Well, then, my view is—

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ We agree—do we not? —that there is such a thing as false, and also such a thing as true opinion?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often consequent upon these—upon true and false opinion, I mean.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And do not opinion and the endeavor to form an opinion always spring from memory and perception?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature?

Protarchus/ Of what nature?

Socrates/ An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees.

Protarchus/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Soon he begins to interrogate himself.

Protarchus/ In what manner?

Socrates/ He asks himself—'What is that which appears to be standing by the rock under the tree?' This is the question which he may be supposed to put to himself when he sees such an appearance.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ To which he may guess the right answer, saying as if in a whisper to himself—'It is a man.'

Protarchus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Or again, he may be misled, and then he will say—'No, it is a figure made by the shepherds.'

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in articulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a proposition.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him, he may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in my explanation of this phenomenon.

Protarchus/ What is your explanation?

Socrates/ I think that the soul at such times is like a book.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant feelings seem to me almost to write down words in the soul, and when the inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions which are the expressions of opinion, come into our souls—but when the scribe within us writes falsely, the result is false.

Protarchus/ I quite assent and agree to your statement.

Socrates/ I must bespeak your favor also for another artist, who is busy at the same time in the chambers of the soul.

Protarchus/ Who is he?

Socrates/ The painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws images in the soul of the things which he has described.

Protarchus/ But when and how does he do this?

Socrates/ When a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense certain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the subjects of them; —is not this a very common mental phenomenon?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the images answering to true opinions and words are true, and to false opinions and words false; are they not?

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ If we are right so far, there arises a further question.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also?

Protarchus/ I should say in relation to all times alike.

Socrates/ Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones; from which we may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do with the future?

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ And do all those writings and paintings which, as we were saying a little while ago, are produced in us, relate to the past and present only, and not to the future?

Protarchus/ To the future, very much.

Socrates/ When you say 'Very much,' you mean to imply that all these representations are hopes about the future, and that mankind are filled with hopes in every stage of existence?

Protarchus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Answer me another question.

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he not?

Protarchus/ Certainly he is.

Socrates/ And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with hopes?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which exist in the minds of each of us?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may often have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good fortune.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false pictures?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures.

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures?

Protarchus/ Doubtless.

Socrates/ Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of a similar character?

Protarchus/ There are.

Socrates/ And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the past, present, or future?

Protarchus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not right?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory character?

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased about things which neither have nor have ever had any real existence, and, more often than not, are never likely to exist.

Protarchus/ Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable.

Socrates/ And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like; are they not often false?

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are true or false?

Protarchus/ In no other way.

Socrates/ Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as they are false.

Protarchus/ Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of the truth; for no one would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason of some other great corruption to which they are liable.

Socrates/ Well, of pleasures which are corrupt and caused by corruption we will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the present I would rather show by another argument that there are many false pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist our final decision.

Protarchus/ Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures.

Socrates/ I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion which should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion.

Protarchus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new argument.

Protarchus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart from the soul—do you remember?

Protarchus/ Yes, I remember that you said so.

Socrates/ And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was experienced.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Then now you may infer what happens in such cases.

Protarchus/ What am I to infer?

Socrates/ That in such cases pleasures and pains come simultaneously; and there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond to them, as has been already shown.

Protarchus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ And there is another point to which we have agreed.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that they are of the class of infinites.

Protarchus/ Certainly, we said so.

Socrates/ But how can we rightly judge of them?

Protarchus/ How can we?

Socrates/ Is it our intention to judge of their comparative importance and intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and pleasure against pleasure?

Protarchus/ Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them accordingly.

Socrates/ Well, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine falsely; and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of pleasures and pains?

Protarchus/ Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater.

Socrates/ Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were saying before.

Protarchus/ What was that?

Socrates/ Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the pleasures and pains with their own falsity.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison; the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when placed side by side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by side with the pleasures.

Protarchus/ Certainly, and for the reason which you mention.

Socrates/ And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are: you will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never say that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or true.

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are still more false than these.

Protarchus/ What are they, and how shall we find them?

Socrates/ If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and aches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and repletions, and evacuations, and also by growth and decay?

Protarchus/ Yes, that has been often said.

Socrates/ And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural state is pleasure?

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body experiences none of these changes.

Protarchus/ When can that be, Socrates?

Socrates/ Your question, Protarchus, does not help the argument.

Protarchus/ Why not, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine.

Protarchus/ And what was that?

Socrates/ Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were?

Protarchus/ You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed either for good or bad?

Socrates/ Yes.

Protarchus/ Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be neither pleasure nor pain.

Socrates/ Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that we must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise tell us; for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down.

Protarchus/ Yes, and their words are of no mean authority.

Socrates/ Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ To them we will say: 'Good; but are we, or living things in general, always conscious of what happens to us—for example, of our growth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly unconscious of this and similar phenomena?' You must answer for them.

Protarchus/ The latter alternative is the true one.

Socrates/ Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going up and down cause pleasures and pains?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be—

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains, but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither.

Protarchus/ That, Socrates, is the more correct mode of speaking.

Socrates/ But if this be true, the life to which I was just now referring again appears.

Protarchus/ What life?

Socrates/ The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of joy.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and the third which is neither; what say you?

Protarchus/ I should say as you do that there are three of them.

Socrates/ But if so, the negation of pain will not be the same with pleasure.

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live without pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand him to mean by that statement?

Protarchus/ I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain.

Socrates/ Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a little and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a third which is neither.

Protarchus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver?

Protarchus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful.

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons who say and think so.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free from pain?

Protarchus/ They say so.

Socrates/ And they must think or they would not say that they have pleasure.

Protarchus/ I suppose not.

Socrates/ And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct natures, they are wrong.

Protarchus/ But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures.

Socrates/ Then shall we take the view that they are three, as we were just now saying, or that they are two only—the one being a state of pain, which is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of itself a good, and is called pleasant?

Protarchus/ But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all? I do not see the reason.

Socrates/ You, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies of our friend Philebus.

Protarchus/ And who may they be?

Socrates/ Certain persons who are reputed to be masters in natural philosophy, who deny the very existence of pleasure.

Protarchus/ Indeed!

Socrates/ They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are all of them only avoidances of pain.

Protarchus/ And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them?

Socrates/ Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, who divine the truth, not by rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance and extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of pleasure, in which they

think that there is nothing sound, and her seductive influence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. This is the use which you may make of them. And when you have considered the various grounds of their dislike, you shall hear from me what I deem to be true pleasures. Having thus examined the nature of pleasure from both points of view, we will bring her up for judgment.

Protarchus/ Well said.

Socrates/ Then let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers and follow in the track of their dislike. I imagine that they would say something of this sort; they would begin at the beginning, and ask whether, if we wanted to know the nature of any quality, such as hardness, we should be more likely to discover it by looking at the hardest things, rather than at the least hard? You, Protarchus, shall answer these severe gentlemen as you answer me.

Protarchus/ By all means, and I reply to them, that you should look at the greatest instances.

Socrates/ Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a class, we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most extreme and most vehement?

Protarchus/ In that everyone will agree.

Socrates/ And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we have often said, are the pleasures of the body?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we are sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our answer, or we shall come to grief.

Protarchus/ How will that be?

Socrates/ Why, because we might be tempted to answer, 'When we are in health'

Protarchus/ Yes, that is the natural answer.

Socrates/ Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind have the greatest desires?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness, feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely? Am I not right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the satisfaction of their want?

Protarchus/ That is obvious as soon as it is said.

Socrates/ Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a person would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look, not at health, but at disease? And here you must distinguish: —do not imagine that I mean to ask whether those who are very ill have more pleasures than those who are well, but understand that I am speaking of the magnitude of pleasure; I want to know where pleasures are found to be most intense. For, as I say, we have to discover what is pleasure, and what they mean by pleasure who deny her very existence.

Protarchus/ I think I follow you.

Socrates/ You will soon have a better opportunity of showing whether you do or not, Protarchus. Answer now, and tell me whether you see, I will not say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness than in temperance? Reflect before you speak.

Protarchus/ I understand you, and see that there is a great difference between them; the temperate are restrained by the wise man's aphorism of 'Never too much,' which is their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing the minds of fools and wantons becomes madness and makes them shout with delight.

Socrates/ Very good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures and pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body, and not in a virtuous state.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and see what makes them the greatest?

Protarchus/ To be sure we ought.

Socrates/ Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain disorders.

Protarchus/ What disorders?

Socrates/ The pleasures of unseemly disorders, which our severe friends utterly detest.

Protarchus/ What pleasures?

Socrates/ Such, for example, as the relief of itching and other ailments by scratching, which is the only remedy required. For what in Heaven's name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us? —Pleasure or pain?

Protarchus/ A villainous mixture of some kind, Socrates, I should say.

Socrates/ I did not introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any personal reference to Philebus, but because, without the consideration of these and similar pleasures, we shall not be able to determine the point at issue.

Protarchus/ Then we had better proceed to analyze this family of pleasures.

Socrates/ You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain?

Protarchus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in the body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul; while there are other mixtures of pleasures

with pains, common both to soul and body, which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains.

Protarchus/ How is that?

Socrates/ Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, a man experiences two opposite feelings; for example, when he is cold and is growing warm, or again, when he is hot and is becoming cool, and he wants to have the one and be rid of the other; —the sweet has a bitter, as the common saying is, and both together fasten upon him and create irritation and in time drive him to distraction.

Protarchus/ That description is very true to nature.

Socrates/ And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Of cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example is afforded by itching, of which we were just now speaking, and by the tingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within, and the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not reach the parts affected; then if you put them to the fire, and as a last resort apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense pleasure or pain in the inner parts, which contrasts and mingles with the pain or pleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts; and this is due to the forcible separation of what is united, or to the union of what is separated, and to the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the slight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle, and causes a gentle irritation; or again, the excessive

infusion of pleasure creates an excitement in him, —he even leaps for joy, he assumes all sorts of attitudes, he changes all manner of colors, he gasps for breath, and is quite amazed, and utters the most irrational exclamations.

Protarchus/ Yes, indeed.

Socrates/ He will say of himself, and others will say of him, that he is dying with these delights; and the more dissipated and good-for-nothing he is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every way; of all pleasures he declares them to be the greatest; and he reckons him who lives in the most constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of mankind.

Protarchus/ That, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions of the majority about pleasures.

Socrates/ Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which arise out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the body; there are also cases in which the mind contributes an opposite element to the body, whether of pleasure or pain, and the two unite and form one mixture. Concerning these I have already remarked, that when a man is empty he desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity. But now I must further add what I omitted before, that in all these and similar emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they are innumerable), pleasure and pain coalesce in one.

Protarchus/ I believe that to be quite true.

Socrates/ There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures and pains.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ The union which, as we were saying, the mind often experiences of purely mental feelings.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful pleasures? need I remind you of the anger;

> 'Which stirs even a wise man to violence,
> And is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb?'

And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and bereavement?

Protarchus/ Yes, there is a natural connection between them.

Socrates/ And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the spectators smile through their tears?

Protarchus/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a mixed feeling of pain and pleasure?

Protarchus/ I do not quite understand you.

Socrates/ I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in recognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy.

Protarchus/ There is, I think.

Socrates/ And the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable is the examination of it, because the difficulty in detecting other cases of mixed pleasures and pains will be less.

Protarchus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of the soul?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of his neighbors at which he is pleased?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an evil?

Protarchus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ From these considerations learn to know the nature of the ridiculous.

Protarchus/ Explain.

Socrates/ The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to describe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general it is that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at Delphi.

Protarchus/ You mean, Socrates, 'Know thyself.'

Socrates/ I do; and the opposite would be, 'Know not thyself.'

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three.

Protarchus/ Indeed I am afraid that I cannot.

Socrates/ Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you?

Protarchus/ Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will.

Socrates/ Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be shown?

Protarchus/ What are they?

Socrates/ In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy himself richer than he is.

Protarchus/ Yes, that is a very common error.

Socrates/ And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he really has not.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are.

Protarchus/ Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion.

Socrates/ And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of wisdom?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And may not all this be truly called an evil condition?

Protarchus/ Very evil.

Socrates/ But we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if we would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure and pain.

Protarchus/ How can we make the further division which you suggest?

Socrates/ All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of themselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two classes—one having power and might; and the other the reverse.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be more truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in the powerful is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth is, ridiculous.

Protarchus/ That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the admixture of pleasures and pains.

Socrates/ Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy.

Protarchus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous pain?

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies?

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends' misfortunes—is not that wrong?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we enumerated—the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous?

Protarchus/ They are ridiculous.

Socrates/ And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortune?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it?

Protarchus/ Clearly we feel pleasure.

Socrates/ And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes of friends?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant; and so we envy and laugh at the same instant.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only on the stage, but on the greater stage of human life; and so in endless other cases.

Protarchus/ I do not see how anyone can deny what you say, Socrates, however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion.

Socrates/ I mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, and similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a mixture of the two elements so often named; did I not?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference only to sorrow and envy and anger.

Protarchus/ I see.

Socrates/ Then many other cases still remain?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the admixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that there was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love and similar affections; and I thought that when I had given you the illustration, you would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a general truth that the body without the soul, and the soul without the body, as well as the two united, are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains; and so further

discussion would have been unnecessary. And now I want to know whether I may depart; or will you keep me here until midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my release without many words; —if I promise that to-morrow I will give you an account of all these cases. But at present I would rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters which remain to be settled, before the judgment can be given which Philebus demands.

Protarchus/ Very good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course.

Socrates/ Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their turn; this is the natural and necessary order.

Protarchus/ Excellent.

Socrates/ These, in turn, then, I will now endeavor to indicate; for with the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as witnesses, that there are pleasures which seem only and are not, and there are others again which have great power and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled with pains, and are partly alleviations of agony and distress, both of body and mind.

Protarchus/ Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in conceiving to be true?

Socrates/ True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of color and form, and most of those which arise from smells; those of sound, again, and in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with pain.

Protarchus/ Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean.

Socrates/ My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavor to be plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane or solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colors which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning?

Protarchus/ I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will try to make your meaning clearer.

Socrates/ When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have natural pleasures associated with them.

Protarchus/ Yes, there are such pleasures.

Socrates/ The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they have no necessary admixture of pain; and all pleasures, however and wherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures.

Protarchus/ I understand.

Socrates/ To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them.

Protarchus/ And this is the case.

Socrates/ Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his knowledge, are there not pains of forgetting?

Protarchus/ Not necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, when he feels grief at the loss of his knowledge.

Socrates/ Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection.

Protarchus/ In that case you are right in saying that the loss of knowledge is not attended with pain.

Socrates/ These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain; and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few.

Protarchus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that those which are not in excess have measure; the great, the excessive, whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less, which pours through body and soul alike; and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure.

Protarchus/ Quite right, Socrates.

Socrates/ Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth?

Protarchus/ Why do you ask, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for judgment, and then they

will be more easily judged of by you and by me and by all of us.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Let us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for consideration a single instance.

Protarchus/ What instance shall we select?

Socrates/ Suppose that we first of all take whiteness.

Protarchus/ Very good.

Socrates/ How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colors?

Protarchus/ Clearly that which is most unadulterated.

Socrates/ True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed.

Protarchus/ Perfectly right.

Socrates/ There is no need of adducing many similar examples in illustration of the argument about pleasure; one such is sufficient to prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure or unalloyed with pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind.

Protarchus/ Assuredly; and the instance you have given is quite sufficient.

Socrates/ But what do you say of another question: — have we not heard that pleasure is always a generation, and

has no true being? Do not certain ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be grateful to them?

Protarchus/ What do they mean?

Socrates/ I will explain to you, my dear Protarchus, what they mean, by putting a question.

Protarchus/ Ask, and I will answer.

Socrates/ I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and the other ever in want of something.

Protarchus/ What manner of natures are they?

Socrates/ The one majestic ever, the other inferior.

Protarchus/ You speak riddles.

Socrates/ You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of them.

Protarchus/ I should think so.

Socrates/ Search the universe for two terms which are like these two and are present everywhere.

Protarchus/ Yet a third time I must say, Be a little plainer, Socrates.

Socrates/ There is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in play, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something else (relatives), and that other things are the ends to which the former class subserve (absolutes).

Protarchus/ Your many repetitions make me slow to understand.

Socrates/ As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning will become clearer.

Protarchus/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Here are two new principles.

Protarchus/ What are they?

Socrates/ One is the generation of all things, and the other is essence.

Protarchus/ I readily accept from you both generation and essence.

Socrates/ Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake of essence, or essence for the sake of generation?

Protarchus/ You want to know whether that which is called essence is, properly speaking, for the sake of generation?

Socrates/ Yes.

Protarchus/ By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question.

Socrates/ I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me that ship-building is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of ship-building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question.

Protarchus/ Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates?

Socrates/ I have no objection, but you must take your part.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, material, are given to us with a view to generation, and that each generation is relative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence, and that the whole of generation is relative to the whole of essence.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sake of some essence?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And that for the sake of which something else is done must be placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of something else, in some other class, the class of my good friend.

Protarchus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in some other class than that of good?

Protarchus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had no true being at all; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of pleasure being a good.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation their highest end.

Protarchus/ Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean?

Socrates/ I am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted at the process as if it were pleasure; and they say that they would not wish to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which might be mentioned.

Protarchus/ That is certainly what they appear to think.

Socrates/ And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite of generation?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation and destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we were saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible thought.

Protarchus/ He who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is involved in great absurdities, Socrates.

Socrates/ Great, indeed; and there is yet another of them.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the soul only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure; and that courage or temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul, is not really a good? —and is there not yet a further absurdity in our being compelled to say that he who has a feeling of pain and not of pleasure is bad at the time when he is suffering pain, even though he be the best of men; and again, that he who has a feeling of pleasure, in so far as he is pleased at the time when he is pleased, in that degree excels in virtue?

Protarchus/ Nothing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this.

Socrates/ And now, having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let us not appear to be too sparing of mind and knowledge; let us ring their metal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part, until we have found out what in them is of the purest nature; and then the truest elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up for judgment.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ Knowledge has two parts, —the one productive, and the other educational?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And in the productive or handicraft arts, is not one part more akin to knowledge, and the other less; and may not the one part be regarded as the pure, and the other as the impure?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of them.

Protarchus/ What are they, and how do you separate them?

Socrates/ I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing be taken away from any art, that which remains will not be much.

Protarchus/ Not much, certainly.

Socrates/ The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of the senses which is given by experience and practice, in addition to a certain power of guessing, which is commonly called art, and is perfected by attention and pains.

Protarchus/ Nothing more, assuredly.

Socrates/ Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism; for sounds are harmonized, not by measure, but by skillful conjecture; the music of the flute is always trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating note, and is therefore mixed up with much that is doubtful and has little which is certain.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ And the same will be found to hold good of medicine and husbandry and piloting and generalship.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ The art of the builder, on the other hand, which uses a number of measures and instruments, attains by their help to a greater degree of accuracy than the other arts.

Protarchus/ How is that?

Socrates/ In ship-building and house-building, and in other branches of the art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, compass, line, and a most ingenious machine for straightening wood.

Protarchus/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then now let us divide the arts of which we were speaking into two kinds, —the arts which, like music, are less exact in their results, and those which, like carpentering, are more exact.

Protarchus/ Let us make that division.

Socrates/ Of the latter class, the most exact of all are those which we just now spoke of as primary.

Protarchus/ I see that you mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of weighing and measuring.

Socrates/ Certainly, Protarchus; but are not these also distinguishable into two kinds?

Protarchus/ What are the two kinds?

Socrates/ In the first place, arithmetic is of two kinds, one of which is popular, and the other philosophical.

Protarchus/ How would you distinguish them?

Socrates/ There is a wide difference between them, Protarchus; some arithmeticians reckon unequal units; as for example, two armies, two oxen, two very large things or two very small things. The party who are opposed to them insist that every unit in ten thousand must be the same as every other unit.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly there is, as you say, a great difference among the votaries of the science; and there may be reasonably supposed to be two sorts of arithmetic.

Socrates/ And when we compare the art of mensuration which is used in building with philosophical geometry, or the art of computation which is used in trading with exact calculation, shall we say of either of the pairs that it is one or two?

Protarchus/ On the analogy of what has preceded, I should be of opinion that they were severally two.

Socrates/ Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject?

Protarchus/ I think so, but I should like to be told by you.

Socrates/ The argument has all along been seeking a parallel to pleasure, and true to that original design, has

gone on to ask whether one sort of knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another.

Protarchus/ Clearly; that was the intention.

Socrates/ And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of certainty?

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And just now did not the argument first designate a particular art by a common term, thus making us believe in the unity of that art; and then again, as if speaking of two different things, proceed to enquire whether the art as pursued by philosophers, or as pursued by non-philosophers, has more of certainty and purity?

Protarchus/ That is the very question which the argument is asking.

Socrates/ And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry?

Protarchus/ O Socrates, we have reached a point at which the difference of clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous.

Socrates/ Then the answer will be the easier.

Protarchus/ Certainly; and let us say in reply, that those arts into which arithmetic and mensuration enter, far surpass all others; and that of these the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure philosophic impulse are infinitely superior in accuracy and truth.

Socrates/ Then this is your judgment; and this is the answer which, upon your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of misinterpretation?

Protarchus/ What answer?

Socrates/ That there are two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration; and also several other arts which in like manner have this double nature, and yet only one name.

Protarchus/ Let us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you speak, Socrates, and hope for good luck.

Socrates/ We have explained what we term the most exact arts or sciences.

Protarchus/ Very good.

Socrates/ And yet, Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us, if we do not award to her the first place.

Protarchus/ And pray, what is dialectic?

Socrates/ Clearly the science which has to do with all that knowledge of which we are now speaking; for I am sure that all men who have a grain of intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of all. But how would you decide this question, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art of persuasion far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far the best of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their own free will. Now, I should not like to quarrel either with you or with him.

Socrates/ You mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were not ashamed?

Protarchus/ As you please.

Socrates/ May I not have led you into a misapprehension?

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Dear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best or usefullest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and accuracy, and the greatest amount of

truth, however humble and little useful an art. And as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that his art has the advantage in usefulness to mankind, he will not quarrel with you for saying that the study of which I am speaking is superior in this particular of essential truth; as in the comparison of white colors, a little whiteness, if that little be only pure, was said to be superior in truth to a great mass which is impure. And now let us give our best attention and consider well, not the comparative use or reputation of the sciences, but the power or faculty, if there be such, which the soul has of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of it; let us search into the pure element of mind and intelligence, and then we shall be able to say whether the science of which I have been speaking is most likely to possess the faculty, or whether there be some other which has higher claims.

Protarchus/ Well, I have been considering, and I can hardly think that any other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this.

Socrates/ Do you say so because you observe that the arts in general and those engaged in them make use of opinion, and are resolutely engaged in the investigation of matters of opinion? Even he who supposes himself to be occupied with nature is really occupied with the things of this world, how created, how acting or acted upon. Is not this the sort of enquiry in which his life is spent?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ He is laboring, not after eternal being, but about things which are becoming, or which will or have become.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor have been nor will be unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule of truth ever become certain?

Protarchus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no fixedness?

Protarchus/ How indeed?

Socrates/ Then mind and science when employed about such changing things do not attain the highest truth?

Protarchus/ I should imagine not.

Socrates/ And now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or Philebus or Gorgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single point.

Protarchus/ What point?

Socrates/ Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has; and that all other things are to be placed in a second or inferior class.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to be given to the fairest things?

Protarchus/ That is natural.

Socrates/ And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honored most?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And these names may be said to have their truest and most exact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of pleasure?

Protarchus/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ In the next place, as to the mixture, here are the ingredients, pleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who have their materials ready to their hands.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And now we must begin to mix them?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our memories?

Protarchus/ Of what?

Socrates/ Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb, that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is good.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I believe to be a fair summary of the argument.

Protarchus/ Let me hear.

Socrates/ Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief good of all, and that the two names 'good' and 'pleasant' are correctly given to one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins by denying this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are two, and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was not this what we were saying, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And is there not and was there not a further point which was conceded between us?

Protarchus/ What was it?

Socrates/ That the good differs from all other things.

Protarchus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of anything else.

Protarchus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ And did we not endeavor to make an imaginary separation of wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part whatever in pleasure?

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient?

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And if we erred in any point, then let anyone who will, take up the enquiry again and set us right; and assuming memory and wisdom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire, —I will not say pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection, however momentary, of the feeling, —but would he desire to have anything at all, if these faculties were wanting to him? And about wisdom I ask the same question; can you conceive that anyone would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than with a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than with a certain degree of wisdom?

Protarchus/ Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any more?

Socrates/ Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good cannot possibly be either of them?

Protarchus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be duly assigned?

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ Have we not found a road which leads towards the good?

Protarchus/ What road?

Socrates/ Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover in what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the discovery of the man himself?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning, that we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in the life which is well mixed than in that which is not?

Protarchus/ Far greater.

Socrates/ Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who presides over the ceremony of mingling.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Are not we the cup-bearers? and here are two fountains which are flowing at our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a fountain of honey; the other, wisdom, a sober draught in which no wine mingles, is of water unpleasant but healthful; out of these we must seek to make the fairest of all possible mixtures.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Tell me first; —should we be most likely to succeed if we mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom?

Protarchus/ Perhaps we might.

Socrates/ But I should be afraid of the risk, and I think that I can show a safer plan.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and one art to be more exact than another.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; some of them regarding only the transient and perishing, and others the permanent and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when judged by the standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, were truer than the former.

Protarchus/ Very good and right.

Socrates/ If, then, we were to begin by mingling the sections of each class which have the most of truth, will not the union suffice to give us the loveliest of lives, or shall we still want some elements of another kind?

Protarchus/ I think that we ought to do what you suggest.

Socrates/ Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and has reason as well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other things.

Protarchus/ We will suppose such a man.

Socrates/ Will he have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only with the divine circle and sphere, and knows nothing of our human spheres and circles, but uses only divine circles and measures in the building of a house?

Protarchus/ The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is ridiculous in man.

Socrates/ What do you mean? Do you mean that you are to throw into the cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false measure and the false circle?

Protarchus/ Yes, we must, if any of us is ever to find his way home.

Socrates/ And am I to include music, which, as I was saying just now, is full of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity?

Protarchus/ Yes, I think that you must, if human life is to be a life at all.

Socrates/ Well, then, suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper who is pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door wide, and let knowledge of every sort stream in, and the pure mingle with the impure?

Protarchus/ I do not know, Socrates, that any great harm would come of having them all, if only you have the first sort.

Socrates/ Well, then, shall I let them all flow into what Homer poetically terms 'a meeting of the waters'?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ There—I have let them in, and now I must return to the fountain of pleasure. For we were not permitted to begin by mingling in a single stream the true portions of both according to our original intention; but the love of all knowledge constrained us to let all the sciences flow in together before the pleasures.

Protarchus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ And now the time has come for us to consider about the pleasures also, whether we shall in like manner let them go all at once, or at first only the true ones.

Protarchus/ It will be by far the safer course to let flow the true ones first.

Socrates/ Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle them?

Protarchus/ Yes; the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to mingle.

Socrates/ The knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent and useful always; and if we say of pleasures in like manner that all of them are good and innocent for all of us at all times, we must let them all mingle?

Protarchus/ What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take?

Socrates/ Do not ask me, Protarchus; but ask the daughters of pleasure and wisdom to answer for themselves.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Tell us, O beloved—shall we call you pleasures or by some other name? —would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of opinion that they would certainly answer as follows:

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ They would answer, as we said before, that for any single class to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether possible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with another and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of things in general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that may be, of ourselves in every respect.

Protarchus/ And our answer will be: —In that ye have spoken well.

Socrates/ Very true. And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and mind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they will reply: —'What pleasures do you mean?'

Protarchus/ Likely enough.

Socrates/ And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have the greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition to the true ones? 'Why, Socrates,' they will say, 'how can we? seeing that they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us; they trouble the souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness; they prevent us from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of the children which are born to us, causing them to be forgotten and unheeded; but the true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our family, and also those pleasures which accompany health and temperance, and which every Virtue, like a goddess, has in her train to follow her about wherever she goes, —mingle these and not the others; there would be great want of sense in anyone who desires to see a fair and perfect mixture, and to find in it what is the highest good in man and in the universe, and to divine what is the true form of good—there would be great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the cup'—Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well as on the behalf of memory and true opinion?

Protarchus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And still there must be something more added, which is a necessary ingredient in every mixture.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be created or subsist.

Protarchus/ Impossible.

Socrates/ Quite impossible; and now you and Philebus must tell me whether anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking the argument is now

completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which is going to hold fair rule over a living body.

Protarchus/ I agree with you, Socrates.

Socrates/ And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule of the habitation of the good?

Protarchus/ I think that we are.

Socrates/ What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by all? When we have discovered it, we will proceed to ask whether this omnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind.

Protarchus/ Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge.

Socrates/ And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders any mixture either of the highest value or of none at all.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ Every man knows it.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture whatever must always of necessity be fatal.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world over.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with three we may catch our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the three, and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of the mixture, and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion of them.

Protarchus/ Quite right.

Socrates/ And now, Protarchus, any man could decide well enough whether pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more honorable among gods and men.

Protarchus/ Clearly, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to the end.

Socrates/ We must take each of them separately in their relation to pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to which of the two they are severally most akin.

Protarchus/ You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure?

Socrates/ Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after passing in review mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to yourself, —as to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth.

Protarchus/ There is no need to pause, for the difference between them is palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and it is said that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest, perjury is excused by the gods; for pleasures, like children, have not the least particle of reason in them; whereas mind is either the same as truth, or the most like truth, and the truest.

Socrates/ Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure?

Protarchus/ Here is another question which may be easily answered; for I imagine that nothing can ever be more

immoderate than the transports of pleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge.

Socrates/ Very good; but there still remains the third test: Has mind a greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer of the two?

Protarchus/ No one, Socrates, either awake or dreaming, ever saw or imagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly, at any time, past, present, or future.

Socrates/ Right.

Protarchus/ But when we see someone indulging in pleasures, perhaps in the greatest of pleasures, the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the action makes us ashamed; and so we put them out of sight, and consign them to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day.

Socrates/ Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere, by word of mouth to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and wide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second, but that in measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the like, the eternal nature has been found.

Protarchus/ Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said.

Socrates/ In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom, you will not be far wrong, if I divine aright.

Protarchus/ I dare say.

Socrates/ And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we were affirming to appertain specially to the

soul—sciences and arts and true opinions as we called them? These come after the third class, and form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is.

Protarchus/ Surely.

Socrates/ The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us as painless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed them, which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses.

Protarchus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ And now, as Orpheus says;

> 'With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song.'

Here, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to set the crown on our discourse.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said, thus offering the third libation to the savior Zeus.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely the good.

Protarchus/ I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you spoke, meant a recapitulation.

Socrates/ Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just been saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, which is maintained, not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind was far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than pleasure.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ But, suspecting that there were other things which were also better, I went on to say that if there was anything better than either, then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure would lose the second place as well as the first.

Protarchus/ You did.

Socrates/ Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the unsatisfactory nature of both of them.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good have been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both wanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But, though they must both resign in favor of another, mind is ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror than pleasure.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And, according to the judgment which has now been given, pleasure will rank fifth.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ But not first; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and animals in the world by their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her to be so; —although the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, determine that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts of animals to be better witnesses than the inspirations of divine philosophy.

Protarchus/ And now, Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you have been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us.

Socrates/ And will you let me go?

Protarchus/ There is a little which yet remains, and I will remind you of it, for I am sure that you will not be the first to go away from an argument.

Philebus.

Translated by F. A. Paley.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus

Socrates/ Mind, now, Protarchus, what argument you are going to take up from Philebus on the present occasion, and against what on my part you are going to dispute, if it should not suit your own view when fairly put before you. What say you to our making a general summary of each?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Well then, Protarchus says that gratification, —that is, their pleasure and delight, and other emotions of that sort in harmony with them, —is regarded as good by all creatures. And our contention on the other side is, that good does not consist in these; but sense, mind, memory, and the mental qualities allied to them, —right judgment and true reasonings, —that all such qualities are better than and therefore preferable to mere pleasure at least, to all creatures that are capable of taking part in them; and to those that are so, it is and ever will be the most useful thing in the world. Is it not in some such form as this that we state our case on each side, Philebus?

Philebus/ Quite as you have put it, Socrates.

Socrates/ Such then is the proposition, Protarchus, that is now offered to you. Do you accept it?

Protarchus/ I am obliged to do so; Philebus (pretty fellow that he is) has given it up.

Socrates/ On matters so important then the truth should somehow be arrived at by every means in our power. "What say you?

Protarchus/ I certainly think so.

Socrates/ Come then, besides these concessions, let as come to an agreement between us on another matter also.

Protarchus/ "What is that?

Socrates/ That, as Philebus has now given it up, each of us shall try to show Some particular state and disposition of mind that is able to make life happy for all mankind. Is not this the course we should pursue?

Protarchus/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ Very well, then: your party says it is the state of enjoyment, and my party says it is that of intellectuality.

Protarchus/ Yes, that is so.

Socrates/ But what if yet another habit of mind should be made clear to us, better than both of these; should we not say, —supposing this should appear to be more nearly allied to pleasure, —that though, of course, both our claims must yield to the life which contains these conditions of happiness in a manner likely to last, —yet the life of pleasure will have the advantage over that of intellect?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But, if more nearly allied to intellect, then intellect beats pleasure, and pleasure is beaten. Do you admit these conclusions, or how say you?

Protarchus/ For my own part, I do.

Socrates/ What then does Philebus think? Come, what say you?

Philebus/ Oh, I think, and ever shall think, that under all possible circumstances pleasure stands first! As for you, Protarchus, you must decide for yourself.

Protarchus/ Remember, Philebus, you resigned the argument to us, and you can have no further right to express your agreement with Socrates, or the contrary.

Philebus/ What you state is true. I only mean to say, that I make my peace with pleasure, and now appeal to the goddess herself (that I advocate her cause).

Protarchus/ Then Socrates and the rest of us will join in attesting to her that you said what you say. However, the considerations that follow next upon these premises let us try to bring to a conclusion anyhow, whether Philebus approves of our view or whatever he may think of it.

Socrates/ We must try then, commencing with the goddess herself, who, as our friend here says, is known to all under the name of Aphrodite, though the most proper name for her is Pleasure.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ The awe which always feel, Protarchus, in mentioning the gods by name is not a mere human sentiment, but goes far beyond the greatest fear. So now I give to Aphrodite any name that may be pleasing to that goddess. But I am quite aware that pleasure Ls a Proteus that assumes many aspects; and, as I said, if we begin with her we are bound to consider well and see what kind of nature she has. For though Pleasure is, so far as mere name goes, abstractedly one, yet we all know that it takes forms many and varied, and in some sense, unlike to each other. For observe: we talk of the pleasures of the dissolute man; the pleasure that a sober man takes in the mere fact of his soberness; the pleasures of one who talks nonsense, and is brimful of nonsensical notions and hopes; the pleasures again that the Thinker takes in the act of thinking; and if we venture to say that these two classes of pleasures are like each other, surely we shall justly be thought to have very little sense ourselves.

Protarchus/ Very true, Socrates; but that is because these pleasures that you enumerate come from things that

are opposite; yet it does not follow that the pleasures themselves are opposed to each other. For how can pleasure be anything else than as like as possible to pleasure, —the thing itself to itself?

Socrates/ Well, my good friend, so is color as like as possible to color; so far as the mere fact is concerned, there will be no difference as to its being all color. But we all know that black, besides being different from, is also most directly opposed to white. And so indeed is shape most like to shape, for the matter of that. It is all one in kind; but, parts compared with parts, some of them are most directly opposite to each other, and others, we know, have a very wide difference. Many other things too we shall find in the same position; so that you must rot too far trust this kind of argument, which classes all the most opposite things under one head. I am afraid, indeed, that we shall find some pleasures to stand in direct opposition to others.

Protarchus/ Perhaps so; but what harm will that do to our argument?

Socrates/ Because, we shall reply, you call them, as being unlike by a wrong name. You assert that all that is pleasant is also good. Now, that things pleasant are pleasant, no reasoner denies; but, though some of thorn, —the greater part, I fear, —are bad, and some, as we admit, good, you call them all 'good,' though you are willing to allow that the pleasures themselves are unlike, if one should press you hard in the argument. What one condition or quality, then, is there in the bad and the good pleasures alike, that makes you say all pleasures are a good?

Protarchus/ What, Socrates! Do you think any man would grant, when he has taken as his axiom that 'Pleasure is the Chief Good,'—I say, do you suppose that anyone will

tolerate your assertion, that some pleasures only are good, and that there are some others which are bad?

Socrates/ Well, you will at least allow that pleasures are unlike each other, and some even contrary.

Protarchus/ No, not in so far as they are pleasures.

Socrates/ We come back to the same assertion, my Protarchus. For if so, we must say that neither is pleasure different from pleasure, but all are alike; and the instances just cited do not affect us at all. Thus we shall have to boar a defeat from making random assertions, like the weakest and most inexperienced of reasoners.

Protarchus/ What do you. mean?

Socrates/ Why, if I, following your example, and determined to fight it out, venture to assert that nothing is so like its opposite as what is most unlike it, I shall be able to avail myself of your argument of 'it's all the same.' And thus we shall prove ourselves to be rather too young, and our reasoning will drift out of its course and be lost. So let us beat back, and perhaps if we start again from the point we began with, we may hope to come to an understanding with each other.

Protarchus/ Tell me how you mean.

Socrates/ Conceive me again questioned by you, Protarchus.

Protarchus/ On what point?

Socrates/ Whether intellect, exact knowledge, mind, and all those qualities which I at first assumed in my thesis as 'good,' when I was asked what 'The Good' can be, —will not be open to the very same conclusions as your argument about pleasure.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ All the kinds of knowledge, taken together, will seem so many, that some of them must be unlike to each other. And if some are even in some way opposed, surely I should not deserve the name of a sound reasoner on the present occasion, if through fear of this result of 'contraries,' I were to assert that no one kind of knowledge is unlike another, and so were to let this argument be lost, as if it were mere idle talk, and we ourselves were to get safe to the shore on the plank of a paradox.

Protarchus/ "Well, certainly that must not happen, — except indeed the getting off safe. However, I like the fairness of terms presented by your argument and mine. Granted that pleasures are many and unlike, and the kinds of knowledge many and diverse.

Socrates/ This diversity then, Protarchus, in The good which you and I respectively advocate, I propose that we should try not to disguise or conceal. Let us rather bring it forward to the notice of all, and not shrink from the conclusion, if our arguments on being examined should give evidence to show conclusively whether we ought to call Pleasure 'The Good.' or Intellect, or some other third thing. For now, of course, we are not contending with this object, that my view, or your view, shall be the winner; both of us, I suppose, are bound to aid that cause which is the truest.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then let us put this proposition on a still firmer footing by coming to an agreement upon it.

Protarchus/ What proposition?

Socrates/ One which causes much trouble to all, whether they like or (as is sometimes the case with some people) dislike it.

Protarchus/ Express yourself more clearly.

Socrates/ I mean, a proposition which has just now presented itself, by a kind of chance, to our notice, and the nature of ¦which is very strange; for it is strange, when so stated, that 'Many are One' and 'One is Many'; and it is easy to argue against anyone who takes either as his thesis.

Protarchus/ Is this then your meaning, —when somebody says that I, Protarchus, who am by nature one, and also on the other hand several, thus assuming that there are ever so many me's, and some of them even contrary to each other, —the tall and the little, and the heavy and the light, in one and the same individual, and so on in numerous other relations?

Socrates/ What you have mentioned, Protarchus, is only the popular notion of the marvelous on the subject of the 'One and Many.' Such a notion now-a-days it is allowed, one might say, by all, that we ought not to take up; they regard it as puerile and obvious, and rather a hindrance than a help to argument. Indeed, they tell us that we should not entertain even such questions as this, —as when someone separately specifies the members or other parts of a particular thing, and then gets another to admit that all these members together form that original 'One'; since he only laughs at him as he proves that he has been forced to make the portentous statements, that the One is many and infinite, and the Many but one!

Protarchus/ And pray what other kinds of 'One and Many' are there, which have not as yet been given up or become hackneyed on this same subject?

Socrates/ "When, my son, we apply this doctrine of Unity not to things that are born and die, as in the case we just now took, —for in this instance, and in Unity of this sort, as I just now said, it is generally admitted that we should not take up such a subject for inquiry; —but when one essays

to view Man as One, or Ox, or Beauty or Goodness, it is about these and suchlike unities that all the pains are taken, with careful sub-division, and all the real difficulty is felt.

Protarchus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ In the first place, whether we must conceive that any such units have a real existence at all; in the next, in what sense, if each of these is One and ever the same, (that is, not admitting of either birth or destruction,) we can conceive it still in the most unchangeable manner to remain this One and no other; then, whether we are to assume such a unit as separated into many parts and dispersed through the infinity of things created, or existing as a whole outside of itself, —which, of course, would seem the greatest impossibility of all, that what is One and the same should at the same time be in One and in Many. These, Protarchus, are the cases of 'One and Many,' viz. in abstracts, and not in those others, the concretes, which are the causes of all perplexity, if not carefully defined and understood, and on the other hand, if they are so, a source of great facility and convenience.

Protarchus/ If so, Socrates, it is our duty first to work out this argument thoroughly in our present discussion.

Socrates/ I should myself certainly be inclined to say so.

Protarchus/ Then take it for granted that all of us, the present company, are willing to accept your views on these subjects. As for Philebus, indeed, it is best perhaps not to rouse him by putting any question, since he is well out of the discussion.

Socrates/ Very well, then. Where shall one take up the fight that has raged so long and with such different results on the matters in dispute? Shall we say at this point?

Protarchus/ Which?

Socrates/ We say, if I mistake not, that this same 'One and Many,' called into being by discussions, goes the round of every subject of conversation, whether new or old. And as this did not begin in our time, so there is no chance of its ever ceasing; but something of this sort, as it seems to me, is an unfailing and eternal property of the subjects themselves that arises in our minds. And when any of our young men on any occasion has first tried it, he is as delighted with it as if he had discovered a treasury of wisdom, nay, he is transported with pleasure, and would fain allow no subject to rest, at one time giving it a tern in this direction, and lumping it together into one, at another, pulling it to pieces again and separating it into parts, thus perplexing himself first and principally, and next, whoever happens to be near him at the time, whether younger or older or of the same age with himself. And in doing this he spares neither father nor mother nor any other of his hearers, —I might almost say, of the animals in general, and not merely the human kind. For, of course, he would not be likely to spare any of the foreign people, if he could but get someone to make them understand him.

Protarchus/ Do you not see, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are young? Have you no fear lest we should set upon you with Philebus, if you go on abusing us thus? However, we know what you mean; and if there is any way or any shift by which the confusion we are now in would good-naturedly go and leave the argument to ourselves, or if we could find any better way than this for discovering the truth, do you take up the cause with zeal, and we will go with you to the best of our power. For the subject before us is no trifling one, Socrates.

Socrates/ Indeed it is not, my dear boys, as Philebus styles you in his address. There is, however, no better way, nor is there ever likely to be, than the one of which have ever

been an ardent admirer, though many a time 'ere now it has escaped from me and left me friendless and forlorn.

Protarchus/ What way is this? Only let us hear it.

Socrates/ It is one which it is not very difficult to make intelligible to you, but which it is very hard indeed to adopt. It is one by which all the discoveries that were ever made in art have become known to us. Now mind what way I am speaking of.

Protarchus/ Only tell us.

Socrates/ It was a gift of the gods to men, as it seems to me, that was flung down from some store-house in heaven by one Prometheus, together with very bright fire. And our fore-fathers, —better men than ourselves, and in closer converse with the gods, —have handed down to us this tradition, that all things which are said by us to le, are composed of both One and Many, and have in them the finite and the infinite as part of their nature. With this constitution then of things before us, it became our duty in all cases to propose to ourselves someone general view for investigation, since we are sure to find it at the bottom of every subject. When we have got hold of this, after one we should consider two, should there be two, or if not, then three, or some other number, and again each of these units in the same way, till we have clearly perceived the true nature of the original one, viz. not only that it is One and Many, and contains an indefinite number of parts, but also how many that can be counted up. But the note or character of infinity we must not apply to plurality, till one has fully seen all the number that plurality has between the original one and infinity. Then we may let each unit in them all pass into infinity, and concern ourselves no further with it. The gods then, as I said, so taught us to consider, to learn, and to inform each other. But the present degenerate race of philosophers arrive at the

One and the Many too quickly and superficially; for after the One they immediately get to the Infinite, and take no account of intervening numbers. But it is in these very numbers that the difference consists between our conversing with each other like logicians, or on the other hand, like mere disputants.

Protarchus/ Some of these views of yours I think, Socrates, that I begin to understand; but on other points I should like to hear more plainly what you mean.

Socrates/ Well, what I mean is clear enough, surely, in the letters of the alphabet. You may therefore get an idea of it from the very rudiments of your own education.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Articulate sound, you will grant, is one, as it proceeds from the mouth; and yet again it is infinite in the number of variations in each and from every individual.

Protarchus/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ And yet we are not fully informed by knowing either of these facts, viz. that there is Infinity or that there is Oneness in sound. No; it is the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds that makes each of us a grammarian.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ And surely what mates a man a musician is this very same knowledge.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Sound, we said, according to the former science, is One in itself.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Now then let us assume two general kinds, the low-pitch and the high-pitch, and a third, the homotone, or note in unison. Is it not so?

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Well, but you would not as yet be an accomplished musician if you knew only these facts. While, if you did not know thorn, you would be, one might almost say, good for nothing in musical science.

Protarchus/ Assuredly so.

Socrates/ But when, my friend, have mastered the number and the nature of the Intervals in sound, in respect of treble and bass, and the limits of the intervals, and the combinations that are made from them, with a perfect knowledge of all which our predecessors taught us, their followers, to call them 'harmonies'; when too, in the various movements of the body, you have discovered that other corresponding effects are produced, (which, numerically measured, they tell us we should call by other terms, 'Time' and 'Meter':) and when at the same time you begin to perceive that this is the view you ought to take about every 'One and Many'; —when, I repeat, you have fairly realized all these facts and in this way, then you become an adept.; and when, by careful thought, you have apprehended any other truth, so too you are made intelligent in that. But this Infinity of number of and in each subject of thought makes you stray infinitely far from the right view, and does not allow you to become distinguished, or to make a figure in the world, as never having looked to any figures in anything.

Protarchus/ It seems to me, Philebus, that Socrates has admirably put what he has just now said.

Philebus/ So it seems to me also; as far as this subject goes. But why in the world is the argument addressed to us, and what is its purport?

Socrates/ That indeed, Protarchus, Philebus has very properly asked.

Protarchus/ He has, in sooth; and therefore do you answer him.

Socrates/ I will do so after a few more remarks on the subject itself. For as, when one has taken some one genus, he ought not, according to our view, to look at once to the nature of the Infinite, but to some number; so conversely, when one is obliged to take the Infinite first, he ought not to look to One immediately, but in this case too to a certain number containing in each term a certain plurality, and so try to take in that view, thus ending in One from all? But let us again illustrate our meaning by taking the case of letters.

Protarchus/ In what way?

Socrates/ When Voice was found to be unlimited, —whether it was a god who perceived this first or some god-like man, as there is a tradition in Egypt which says that it was Theuth; for he seems to have been the first to notice the vowel-sounds in that infinite, not as a One, but as a plurality, and again, other sounds, not of the vowel-kind, yet partaking of the nature of voice,' and to observe that these too had a certain number of their own; when moreover he had distinguished a third kind of letters which we now call mutes. —he next proceeded to class by themselves the consonants and the mutes, so far as to make each class One, and the vowels and the medials in the same way, until he had ascertained their precise number, and so gave the name of letter' to each and all the primary sounds. Seeing however that none of us would ever comprehend anyone genus of sound by itself, and without them all, he again considered this group or combination a One, and as making all these various sounds One, and so sounded the praise of one art by calling it Grammar.

Philebus/ I understand this more clearly than your former remarks, Protarchus, to compare the statements themselves with each other. But the same defect seems to present itself in the argument as I felt some time ago.

Socrates/ Mean you, Philebus, again to ask, 'What has this to do with the subject?

Philebus/ Aye, that is what Protarchus and I have been asking ourselves for some time.

Socrates/ And yet you have teen all the time close to what you say you have long been trying to find.

Philebus/ How is that?

Socrates/ Was it not Intellectuality and pleasure that we first undertook to discuss, in order to decide which of them we should prefer?

Philebus/ Certainly it was.

Socrates/ But we affirm, I think, that each of these is a One in itself.

Philebus/ "We do.

Socrates/ Well then, this is the very point that our former argument requires us to determine; first, how each of them is at the same time One and Many; next, how it is that they do not pass at once into infinity, but what number of parts each of them has, before they become infinite in their forms or manifestations.

Protarchus/ It is indeed no ordinary question, Philebus, that Socrates has somehow brought us into, by his round-about introduction. And now it is for you to say which of us two is to answer what he now asks. It may perhaps seem ridiculous for me, who have engaged without any reserve to take up the argument from you, to impose it on you again from being myself unable to give a reply. But surely it is far more ridiculous that neither of us should be able. Consider therefore what we are to do. It seems to me that Socrates is now asking us about certain species of pleasure, —first, whether or not there are such; next, how many and of what kind. And similarly with respect to Intellectuality.

Socrates/ You say rightly, son of Callias. If we cannot give an answer on everything that has unity, similarity, and identity, i.e. on any Notion, and its contrary, the Many which it contains; it is plain from our former discussion that none of us is ever likely to become good for anything on any subject whatever.

Protarchus/ This, Socrates, seems to me to be pretty nearly the ease. But, good as it is, in the opinion of a man of sense, to have a knowledge on subjects in general, the next best course is to be fully aware of one's own powers. Now what is the bearing of this remark on the present occasion? I will explain. You, Socrates, freely gave us all the opportunity of conversing with you, and your own services for defining what is the best of all human possessions. For when Philebus had stated this to consist in pleasure, delight, joy, and other emotions of that sort, you argued against this view, and insisted that the chief good did not lie in these, but in those other mental qualities which we so often purposely remind ourselves of, and very properly so, in order that each of these subjects may be kept before our minis and so be thoroughly sifted. Now what you say, as it appears to me, is the good which we shall properly call 'superior to pleasure at least,' is mind, science, intelligence, art, and all such kindred acquirements: that these are what we ought to acquire, and not those others. Well, when these two propositions had been severally stated and debated on in the former conversation, we, in joke, uttered this threat: 'We won't let you go, till a satisfactory conclusion has been reached by the determination of these questions.' You agreed to this, and lent us your company for this purpose: and we, you see, affirm, as school-boys do, that a present rightly given cannot be taken away again. So do not go on meeting us at every point of the discussion in the way that you are doing.

Socrates/ What way do you mean?

Protarchus/ Why, throwing us into perplexity and asking such questions as we have no chance of properly answering at present. At present, I say; for let us not suppose that) even if we are all puzzled alike, the subjects now before us will come to a conclusion. No! if we cannot find an answer, you must; you promised. Therefore, take your own counsel in the matter, whether you will distinguish the kinds of pleasure and science, or give up classification, if there is any other way by which you are able and willing to make clear the present subject of discussion between us.

Socrates/ After such a speech as that there is no serious harm to be expected by my illustrious self; for that if you are willing is a phrase that removes all fear on any subject. But I have another motive for complying: it seems to me that some god has furnished us with a memory in this matter.

Protarchus/ How so? Memory of what?

Socrates/ It was a long time ago that I heard, and now bethink myself of it, in a dream or waking, some talk about pleasure and intellect, —that neither of these is the good, but some other third thing, different from them and better than both. Now surely, if this view should clearly present itself to us now, pleasure must resign all claim to the first prize; for the chief good can no longer be identical with pleasure. How say you?

Protarchus/ As you say.

Socrates/ Then, according to my view, we shall no longer require in addition the disquisitions necessary for distinguishing the kinds of pleasure. And this will appear still more clearly as we advance.

Protarchus/ You have said well; and conduct the discussion accordingly.

Socrates/ First, then, let us come to an agreement on some other minor points.

Protarchus/ "What are these?

Socrates/ Must the good have the condition of being final and complete, or is that not essential to it?

Protarchus/ I should say, Socrates, that if anything is an end in itself, it is the 'good.'

Socrates/ Well, is it also self-satisfying?

Protarchus/ Of course it is; it must surpass all other things in this respect.

Socrates/ But this, I presume, we are especially bound to say of it, —that every created thing that has any knowledge of it pursues and hankers after it, with an eager desire to get hold of it and to keep it for itself. Nay, it cares not in the least for anything else than what results in good.

Protarchus/ There is no gainsaying this.

Socrates/ Then let us consider and decide between the life of pleasure and the life of intelligence, viewing each separately.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Let there be no intelligence in the life of pleasure, and no pleasure in that of intelligence. For, if either of them is to be the good, it should, require nothing in addition. If it should appear that either one or the other does stand in need of anything else, it will cease, I presume, to be our real Good.

Protarchus/ Certainly it will.

Socrates/ Shall we try it in your own case, by way of testing these views?.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Answer then.

Protarchus/ Say on.

Socrates/ Would you, Protarchus, like to live your whole lifetime in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

Protarchus/ Indeed, I should.

Socrates/ Would you then think that anything further was wanted, if you possessed this fully and entirely?

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Mind, now. Do you really mean that you would not at all require thought, intelligence, right reason, and other faculties akin to these?

Protarchus/ Surely not. I should have everything, I take it, in having the feeling of joy.

Socrates/ Then if you lived thus you would always and throughout your life be in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But surely, if you had not mind, memory, knowledge, and right judgment, in the first place you would necessarily be ignorant about the very fact, whether you are or are not enjoying yourself, —I mean, if you are to be destitute of all intelligence.

Protarchus/ It could not be otherwise.

Socrates/ Well, but in the same manner if you did not possess memory, of course you could not even remember that you once felt pleasure; and no recollection at all would remain of the pleasure that occurred at the present time. So too, if you had not right opinion, you could not think you were rejoicing when you really were; if you had no reasoning power, you could not possibly calculate for the future either, whether you Trill fool joy. In a word, you. would have to live the life, not of a human creature, but of a jelly-fish, or some other of those living things with shelly bodies that inhabit

the sea. Is this so, or can we form some other idea of the matter beside this?

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Is then such a life as this worthy of our choice?

Protarchus/ This way of putting it, Socrates, makes me unable to give any reply at present.

Socrates/ Then do not let us give in just yet, but take on the other side the life of Mind, and see into that.

Protarchus/ What sort of life dc you. mean by that?

Socrates/ I mean to ask whether anyone of us would on the other hand be content to live in the possession of intelligence, mind, and science, and with perfect recollection of everything, but without any share at all, either great or small, of pleasure, or on the other hand of pain, but with a complete absence of feeling in all such matters.

Protarchus/ Neither of these lives, Socrates, seems to me to be desirable; nor is it likely, as I think, to appear so to anyone else.

Socrates/ But what shall we say, Protarchus, of the two together, —of the life that is common by being made up of both?

Protarchus/ You mean, of pleasure and mind or intellect?

Socrates/ That is the kind of life I allude to.

Protarchus/ Why anyone, of course, will choose this in preference to either of the others; and not only anyone, but everyone.

Socrates/ Do we then begin to see what is the result that we are coming to in the present argument?

Protarchus/ Certainly: that three kinds of life are proposed for our choice, but of two of these neither is sufficient in itself, nor choice worthy for man or any other creature.

Socrates/ Then about these, at least, it is now clear that neither contains the Good. For in that case it would have been sufficient, and final, and choice-worthy to all plants and animals, that could so live during their whole term of existence. And if any of us made any other choice, it would be contrary to the nature of the really desirable; he would accept it without full conviction, either from ignorance or from a constraint very far removed from happiness.

Protarchus/ Well, it does seem that this is so.

Socrates/ Then I think we have proved to your satisfaction that Philebus' goddess, at least, cannot be regarded by us as identical with the Good.

Philebus/ For the matter of that, Socrates, neither is that mind of yours the good. If I mistake not, the same objections can be brought against it.

Socrates/ Perhaps they may, Philebus, against my mind, though not, I think, against the genuine godlike mind, which is quite another thing. As yet, then, I put in no claim for the first prize on behalf of mind as against the common or mixed life. But we have still to see and consider what is to be done about the second prize. For it is possible that one of us may say, that the reason why the mixed life is desirable is because it contains mind; the other, because it contains pleasure. And thus, though neither mind nor pleasure is the good in itself, it may still be thought that one or the other of them is the cause of good in the joint life. On this point then I would yet more strongly maintain against Philebus, that in this mixed life, whatever the quality or condition is, by the reception of which it is made at once desirable and good, to that quality not pleasure, but mind is more akin and more like. And so, according to this view, pleasure cannot justly be said to have any better claims even to the second prize than it has to the first. Nay, its place is further off than even

the third, if this 'mind' of mine can be trusted by us in this discussion.

Protarchus/ 'Well, certainly, Socrates, pleasure does seem to me to have been fairly knocked down by the present argument; for it was in fighting for the first prize that it met with an overthrow. As for intellect, I suppose we must say it showed its good sense in not putting in its claim to the first prize; for it would have met with no better fate. But I am afraid that if pleasure loses the second prize, it will be held by its admirers to have downright disgraced itself. For not even they will any longer think it as beautiful as it seemed before.

Socrates/ Well, had we not better let her alone now, and not vex her by applying the most accurate test of all, and so proving her inferiority?

Protarchus/ That is all nonsense, Socrates.

Socrates/ What! because I said what was impossible, 'to give pleasure pain'?

Protarchus/ Yes; and not only so, but because you seem not to be aware that not one of us intends to let you go yet, before you have got to the end of these difficulties by reasoning them out.

Socrates/ Then, Protarchus, alack for the long dreary talk that remains! Put in fact, it is by no means easy at present to finish the discussion. If I mistake not, you require some other shift. If you go in for the second prize on behalf of mind, you must have weapons different from your former arguments. Some of them indeed, it may be, are the same. Must we then proceed.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ But let us try to use mutual caution in laying down its first principle.

Protarchus/ What principle do you mean?

Socrates/ Let us divide all things in creation into two classes, —or rather, if you please, into three.

Protarchus/ Explain how you mean.

Socrates/ Let us take as examples some points in our late discussions.

Protarchus/ Which points?

Socrates/ We said, if I mistake not, that the god had shown to mankind that there was both an Infinite in things, and also a Finite.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us then assume these as two of the classes, and a third as a One made up of them both. —But I am, as it seems, myself sufficiently ridiculous in my attempt to divide and count up by classes.

Protarchus/ What mean you, my good friend?

Socrates/ Why, that we require yet a fourth kind.

Protarchus/ Tell us what.

Socrates/ Consider what can be the cause of this blending the infinite and the finite, and set down this as a fourth in addition to the other three.

Protarchus/ Don't you think you will require a fifth also, implying the principle of separation?

Socrates/ Possibly: but not, I think, just yet. If we should require it, you, no doubt, will make due allowance for me in seeking for a fifth.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ First, then, let us separately take three of the four, and endeavor, with respect to two of them, by viewing each, when split up and divided, as many, and then again uniting the parts of each into one, to comprehend how each of them is, as we said, One and Many.

Protarchus/ If you would speak a little plainer about them, perhaps I might follow you.

Socrates/ I mean by the two that I now put forward first, those which I just before named, the Infinite and the Limited. And that, in some sense, the Infinite is not only One but Many, I will try to show. As for the Limited, that must await our convenience.

Protarchus/ It shall do so.

Socrates/ Sow consider. I warn you that what I ask you to think about is difficult and open to dispute, but think. And first, with respect to 'hotter' and 'colder'; can you conceive any limit to them? Or must we rather say that the qualities of 'more' or 'less,' residing in the very nature of the things themselves, will never allow a limit to be placed to them, so long as they are so resident? For, of course, if an end or limit is put to them, the 'more and the less' themselves come to an end.

Protarchus/ What you say is very true.

Socrates/ And we further say that in 'hotter' and 'colder' this 'more' and 'less' is invariably found.

Protarchus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Then our argument goes to show that these are always without a limit; and if they have no limit, then they are, of course, altogether infinite.

Protarchus/ I fully agree.

Socrates/ And you have well reminded me by your reply, that this very word 'fully' which you have uttered, and indeed a 'gentle' utterance also, have the very same force as 'more' and 'less.' For wherever they come in, they prevent a thing from being of definite proportion; and so by producing in all actions a more vehement than some previous more gentle, and the converse, they in effect make up a 'more' and a 'less,' and get rid of definite quantity. For, as we said just now, if

they did not get rid of this definite proportion, but allowed not only it, but the measurable to have existence in the place of the more and the less, and the violent and the gentle, —if so, I say, these infinites are driven from their rightful place, which they hitherto occupied; since they could no longer be 'more hot' or 'more cold,' if they admitted definite quantity. For the very notion of 'hotter,' as well as of 'colder,' is progressive; while 'only so hot or cold' stops there, and ceases to advance. According to this argument then, the 'hotter' would at the same time be finite and infinite.

Protarchus/ It certainly seems so, Socrates; but, as you remarked, these inquiries are not easy to follow. Perhaps, if on some future occasion they are again proposed to our notice, they will show that the questioner and the questioned do not differ materially in their views.

Socrates/ There you speak well, and we will endeavor so to act. At present, however, consider whether we are to accept this proof of the nature of the infinite, that we may not protract the discussion too far by going at length into every point.

Protarchus/ Well, what proof do you allude to?

Socrates/ Whatever things appear to us capable of becoming more or less, —that is, to admit of violent, or gentle, and excessive, and all such qualities as these, —all these we should put in the category of the infinite, as class One, according to our former argument by which we said, if you remember, that we should bring under one head things that have been divided and dispersed, and mark them as terming one natural genus, according to their peculiar property.

Protarchus/ I remember it.

Socrates/ Then whatever does not admit of the above conditions, but does admit their opposites, —first, of the

equal and equality, next to the equal, of the double, and everything which is either number in relation to some other number, or measure with another measure, —all things of this sort, I say, we should seem to be doing right in putting down in the class of the finite. How say you to this?

Protarchus/ Your division is an excellent one, Socrates.

Socrates/ Very well. But what character must we assign to the third, —that, I mean, which is made up of both finite and infinite?

Protarchus/ It will be for you, I expect, to tell me that.

Socrates/ Say rather some god, if any god condescends to hear my prayers.

Protarchus/ Make your prayer then, and look out for divine aid.

Socrates/ That I am doing; and indeed it seems to me that some god has already become our friend.

Protarchus/ How mean you, and what proof have you?

Socrates/ I shall explain, of course, —and mind you follow my argument closely.

Protarchus/ Only state it.

Socrates/ We spoke of a 'hotter' just now, I think, and a 'colder,' did we not?

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ Add to them then degrees of wet and dry, much and little, quick and slow, great and small, and all such qualities as we before set down under one head, as a class of things naturally admitting of a 'more' and a 'less.'

Protarchus/ That of the Infinite, you mean?

Socrates/ I do. And now bring into connection with it, as the next step, the family of those things which, on the other hand, admit of the finite.

Protarchus/ What class is that?

Socrates/ The class of things which we ought to have united under one genus of the finite kind, but did not do so, as we did to that of the Infinite. Perhaps, however, it will do as well even now; by bringing both into a class of their own, the third kind will also become plain to us.

Protarchus/ What class, I repeat, and how do you moan?

Socrates/ The class of the equal and the double, and generally of that which stops contraries from remaining at variance with each other, and makes them commensurable and in harmony by introducing number.

Protarchus/ I understand you. You seem to me to mean, by proposing to unite these, that certain products will result in each of them.

Socrates/ You are right in your supposition.

Protarchus/ Go on, then.

Socrates/ Is it not, in the case of diseases, the right union of these opposite principles which produces the natural state of health?

Protarchus/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ And in treble and bass, quick and slow time, which are in themselves infinite, the introduction of the same limiting agents produces the finite, and the most perfect musical composition generally.

Protarchus/ Yes, and with the most charming effects.

Socrates/ Well, you will also grant that, in seasons of too great cold or heat, the same agents come in and take away the excessive and the infinite, and produce an internal and external agreement.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Is it not then by these that seasonable weather and all else that is enjoyable are brought into existence for

us, that is to say, from the limiting influences in union with the unlimited?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And there are other similar results without number, of which I say nothing, such as the beauty and strength that attend health, besides many other admirable mental qualities. It was this goddess Harmony, my handsome friend Philebus, that first saw riot and the general badness of all men, and when no moderation was to be found among them either in their pleasures or in their surfeits, she enacted Law and Order, which brought with them Limit. And you, Philebus, say that she utterly spoils life; I, on the contrary, say that she preserves it. What do you, Protarchus, think of her?

Protarchus/ That, Socrates, is quite my view of the matter.

Socrates/ Now, then, I have described these three classes, if you understand me.

Protarchus/ Well, I think that I do. You seem to me to say that one of these is the Infinite, one, and next in order, the limiting principle, in. all existing things. As for the third, I do not quite comprehend what you mean by it.

Socrates/ I see, my friend; what puzzled you was the great number of the results produced by this third. But the Infinite also presented many kinds; and yet, as registered under the general class of 'the more and the less,' they all appeared to us as One.

Protarchus/ That is true.

Socrates/ But the Finite, as it had not so many forms, did not cause us the same difficulty in making it naturally One.

Protarchus/ How should it?

Socrates/ In no respect. Suppose me then to mean by the third, —putting in this class as one everything resulting from the union of the other two, —'Birth into Being from those medium states which, by union with the Finite, are brought about from the Infinite.'

Protarchus/ I understand you.

Socrates/ Well, but we said that besides these three a fourth class would have to be considered. In this consideration you must take a part. See now, whether you think it a necessary law, that 'Everything created is created by some Cause.'

Protarchus/ do. For how, without it, could anything be created at all?

Socrates/ Then the producer, in its true nature, differs not, except in name, from the cause; and thus 'what makes' and 'what causes' would rightly be called one and the same thing.

Protarchus/ It would.

Socrates/ But again, 'what is made' and what is 'brought into being' we shall And to differ only in name, like the instance mentioned just above. What say you?

Protarchus/ As you say.

Socrates/ Does not then that which makes always naturally precede, and what is made come into existence subsequently to that?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then 'cause,' and that which obeys cause for production, are by no means the same, but different.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then the results produced, and the conditions from which all states are produced, present to us these three kinds?

Protarchus/ They do.

Socrates/ May we then call that which is the producer of all these results a fourth principle, viz. cause? For we have sufficiently shown that it is different from the others.

Protarchus/ It is different, certainly.

Socrates/ It is proper, however, now that the four have been distinguished, with a view to remembering each, to count them, up one after another.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Well, then; the first I call the Infinite, the second the Finite; next, and thirdly, existence resulting from a union of these two; and if I venture to call the cause of this 'union and consequent production a fourth kind, I should not, I think, be unreasonable.

Protarchus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Come then, what is the nest step in the argument? And with what object in view have we got so far? Was it not this: we were inquiring whether the second prize would fall to pleasure or to intellect. Was it not so?

Protarchus/ It was.

Socrates/ Then now that we have arrived at this classification, we are in a position to form a better opinion as to the result about the second as before about the first, for it was about these two first that, as you know, we raised a doubt.

Protarchus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Now go on. We put down the mixed life, I think, of pleasure and intellect, as entitled to the first prize. Was it so?

Protarchus/ If was.

Socrates/ Very well. Then we now perceive what this mixed life is, and to what class it belongs.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And we shall further assert, if I mistake not, that it is but a part of a general third class; for that third is not made up of two particular things, but of all the infinites together tied down by a limiting influence. So that with perfect propriety this life that has got the first prize would be made but a part of that other more general one.

Protarchus/ Most properly so.

Socrates/ Very good. But what must we say, Philebus of your life, which, is wholly of pleasure unmixed with anything else? In what class of those described above must it be put to be rightly reckoned? And before you deliver your opinion, answer me on this! point.

Philebus/ You have only to say what.

Socrates/ Are pleasure and pain limited, or do they belong to the class of things that admit of a more and a less?

Philebus/ Certainly to those that allow a more. For pleasure would not be full and complete good, if it were not in its very nature unlimited both in quantity and in the power of becoming yet more.

Socrates/ Nor, Philebus, would pain be complete evil; so that we must look for some other agency than the nature of the Infinite, to account for a part of the good that pleasures possess. Let this therefore be taken by you as one of the points not yet fully determined. Put tell me, both Protarchus and Philebus, under which of the classes we have mentioned we are now to reckon intellect, knowledge, and mind, so as not to offend by our impiety? For, as it seems to me, the stake is by no means a small one between failure and success in the present inquiry.

Philebus/ Ah! you, Socrates, exaggerate the merits of your god.

Socrates/ 'Well, and so do you, my friend, those of yours. Nevertheless, it is our bounden duty to answer the question that is asked.

Protarchus/ Socrates is certainly right, Philebus, and we must do as he bids us.

Philebus/ You know that you have elected to speak for me.

Protarchus/ So I have: but at present I am well-nigh perplexed, and I want you, Socrates, to be our mouthpiece, in order that we may fall into no mistake respecting the rival divinity by giving utterance to some incongruous sentiment.

Socrates/ suppose I must comply, Protarchus; for after all, the task you impose is not very difficult. But tell me, —did I really, by exaggerating, as Philebus said, my νους, in my joking way, cause you the perplexity you describe, in asking to what class Mind and Knowledge belonged?

Protarchus/ Indeed, Socrates, you did.

Socrates/ Well, there really was no difficulty. All philosophers agree, —making themselves in good earnest of great importance, —that mind is the ruling power of both heaven and earth. And perhaps they are right in the assertion. But let us, if you please, inquire somewhat more at length into this very subject, to what class mind belongs.

Protarchus/ Say on as you think proper, and do not concern yourself on our account about the length of the discussion. For be assured, Socrates, that we shall not quarrel with you on that account.

Socrates/ You say well. Let us then commence with some such question as this.

Protarchus/ As what?

Socrates/ Whether we are to that all existing things, and this fair scene which we call the Universe, are governed by

the influence of the irrational, the random, and the mere chance; or, on the contrary, as our predecessors affirmed, are kept in their course by the control of mind and u certain wonderful regulating intelligence.

Protarchus/ None of these same [random principles that you mention], my respected friend Socrates; for what you have just suggested seems to me downright impious. But the doctrine that mind regulates them all is worthy of the grand spectacle of the universe, the sun, moon, stars, and all the revolving heavens; and for my own part, I am not the man ever to speak or even think about them in any other way.

Socrates/ Do you propose then that we on our parts should join in affirming a doctrine maintained by our predecessors, viz. that the facts are as just stated, —in other words, that we should not only think ourselves bound to quote, without risk on our side, the opinions of others, but should take the risk on ourselves, and share the blame that must fall on us when some able disputant asserts that the universe is not governed by any such law, but proceeds on no fixed principle.

Protarchus/ Certainly, I should be glad to do this.

Socrates/ Proceed then to consider the point that next suggests itself to us in the present discussion.

Protarchus/ You. have only to state it.

Socrates/ Those elements which are found in the nature of the bodies of all created things without exception, —fire, water, and air, we get a glimpse of, and land too, (as sailors say iii a storm,) as existing also in the constitution of the Universe.

Protarchus/ You may well use that expression; for we are in good earnest thrown out of our reckonings by the difficulties in our present subject.

Socrates/ And now further remark this about each of the component elements in us.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Why, that each of these elements in ourselves here on earth is small, insignificant, and existing by no means in a pure and genuine state, and that the power it possesses bears no proportion to the grandeur of its nature. Take a single element as an instance, and draw the same conclusion respecting them all. There is, you will grant, fire existing in ourselves, and also fire in the universe.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Then you will also grant that they are in us is small, weak, and of inferior power, while that in the universe is wonderful both in respect of quantity and beauty, and, indeed, in every property that fire can have.

Protarchus/ What you say is very true.

Socrates/ Well, now, is the fire of the universe fed, lit, and ruled by this. —I mean, by the fire that is resident with us on earth; or, on the contrary, is the fire in me, in you, and in all other creatures, possessed of all these conditions from the fire that is above us.

Protarchus/ That is a question that does not deserve an answer at all.

Socrates/ Well said; for the remark will equally apply, if I mistake not, to the element of earth subsisting in the creatures here, and that in the worlds without; and so, in fact, you will reply about all the other ingredients which I named in my questions a little before.

Protarchus/ No one who wishes to be thought sane can give any other answer.

Socrates/ No one, certainly. But now follow me in the next matter for consideration. All the elements we have just

enumerated we comprehended under one general view, and applied to them the term 'body.' Was it not so?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Take the same remark to apply to this that we call 'the universe.' For, of course, on the very same principle it must be a 'body,' since it is composed of the same elements.

Protarchus/ Nothing can be more true.

Socrates/ I want to know then, whether it is from this body, in its entirety, that our human bodies are supported, and have received and hold the other conditions that we stated respecting them, or from our bodies that this universe is maintained?

Protarchus/ This is another question, Socrates, that is hardly worth the asking.

Socrates/ Well, is this then worth, —or what will you say to it?

Protarchus/ Say what question you mean.

Socrates/ Shall we not affirm that this human body of ours possesses a soul?

Protarchus/ We certainly shall.

Socrates/ Then from what source, friend Protarchus, did it get it, unless indeed the body of the universe had a soul also r For the universe certainly has all the properties of our bodies, and those of a kind more beautiful in every respect.

Protarchus/ It is clear, Socrates, that our bodies have the animating principle from no other source.

Socrates/ True; we do not, of course, suppose, Protarchus, that the four kinds we mentioned, viz. the limiting, the unlimited, a kind made up of both, and a fourth representing Cause, which exists beside the others in all things, —that this fourth, I mean, which imparts life to the

creatures we see, and enables them to exercise their bodies, and when those bodies receive any damage, provides a means of curing it, —that this, which in its arrangement and combination of various bodies and its healing powers is called perfect and universal wisdom, —that this, co-existing with the other like principles in the heavens as a whole, and in vast portions of them, and that too in a pure and perfect state, should not have been the contriver in the world without of Nature's most beautiful and most highly prized works.

Protarchus/ Why certainly that would be quite unreasonable.

Socrates/ Then, if we should be wrong in this, we should perhaps state the case better by holding with that other conclusion, viz. that there are in the universal those principles we have so often specified, —the infinite, wide in its prevalence, the finite, sufficient to form with it a third, and besides these an almighty Cause, that orders and appoints years, seasons, and months, and which therefore would most justly be called Wisdom.

Protarchus/ Most justly indeed.

Socrates/ But wisdom and mind there never can be apart from soul.

Protarchus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ You will allow then that in the nature of Zeus a kingly soul and a kingly mind are implanted, on account of its influence as a Cause; while other gods have other gifts and prerogatives, as they may severally please to have them called.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now don't suppose, Protarchus, that we have advanced this argument without due reason. It is in defense

of those philosophers who long ago declared their conviction that Mind is ever the ruling principle in the Universe.

Protarchus/ Well, it certainly is in their favor.

Socrates/ And it is also one that has already provided an answer to my inquiry, by telling us that Mind is the real originator of that which we called 'Universal cause'; and this cause is one of the four kinds. So now, I think, you have got from us our reply.

Protarchus/ I have, and in a manner that quite satisfies me. And yet, I really was not aware that you had given your answer.

Socrates/ Why, sometimes a little pleasantry furnishes an agreeable rest from serious thought.

Protarchus/ Well said.

Socrates/ Then to what class, my friend, Mind belongs, and what property it possesses, has now been fairly well explained by us.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ But the class to which Pleasure belonged was in the same way ascertained some time ago.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Let us then keep in mind these facts among others, about both, —that Mind is, as we said, allied to Cause, and may be referred tolerably well to that class of things; whereas pleasure is not only in itself infinite, but of a kind that neither has nor ever can have beginning, middle, or end in itself or of itself.

Protarchus/ We shall remember that, of course.

Socrates/ Now then we are bound in the next place to see not only in what part of us each of them resides, but from what state or condition they are produced, when they exist at all. And first, of pleasure; as we took first for examination

the class that it belonged to, so now let us take first these inquiries respecting it. —But here again I must remark, that we shall never be able to examine pleasure thoroughly, if we take it apart from pain.

Protarchus/ If that is the road we should pursue, by all means let us pursue it.

Socrates/ Have you then the same view as myself respecting the origin of them?

Protarchus/ What view is that?

Socrates/ It appears to me that pleasure and pain taken together belong naturally in their origin to the mixed class.

Protarchus/ Refresh our memories, dear Socrates, if you please, as to which of the before-mentioned classes you mean by 'the mixed.'

Socrates/ That shall be done to the best of my power, my much esteemed friend.

Protarchus/ Thank you.

Socrates/ Well then, let us conceive by the term 'mixed kind,' that which we before said was the third of four.

Protarchus/ That which you mentioned next after the infinite and the finite? That in which you put health, and (if I mistake not) harmony also?

Socrates/ Well said. Anil now apply that 'mind! of yours as well as you can.

Protarchus/ You have only to say on.

Socrates/ I say then that whenever we find this harmony violated in living things, a breaking up of the natural condition and a production of pains occur at that same time.

Protarchus/ What you say is quite reasonable.

Socrates/ But when the harmony is restored, and gets back into its normal state, we may say that then pleasure

arises, —to use as few words and as brief an expression as is allowable on a subject of such importance.

Protarchus/ I dare say you are right, Socrates; but let us try and set these views in a yet clearer light.

Socrates/ Well then, it is easiest, I suppose, to comprehend common-place and obvious sensations.

Protarchus/ Of what kind?

Socrates/ Hunger, I presume, may be said to undo the harmony, and so to be a pain.

Protarchus/ It is so.

Socrates/ And eating, which is the filling up again of a void, is a pleasure.

Protarchus/ It is so.

Socrates/ And so again thirst is a spoiling of the harmony and a pain, ¦while the effect of liquid is to fill again what had lost its moisture, and so to cause pleasure. And still further, any secretion and dispersion of moisture that is unnatural to us, which are the effects of close heat, is a pain; while the restoring of it and cooling down again to a natural state, is a pleasure.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And the congealing of moisture by cold, beyond what is natural in an animal, is a pain, while the natural course of the moist particles, as they get back to their former state and become dissolved, is a pleasure. Or, to put the matter in one form, consider if the proposition be not a sound one, in respect of the particular class of things resulting, by the natural law of vital production, from the union of the infinite with the finite, as I before said, —that whenever this state suffers a break up, that breaking up is a pain, while the return to its own essential properties, in

the going back of all the elements to their places, is on the other hand a pleasure.

Protarchus/ That may be granted: it appears to me to be probable in a general way.

Socrates/ Shall we then put down this as one kind of combined pleasure and pain in affections of this sort in each case?'

Protarchus/ So let it be considered.

Socrates/ Now then assume that, as an emotion of the mind alone, —i.e. in reference to the expectation of these feelings, —that the pleasure hoped for before the actual pleasure is felt, is pleasing and cheering, while the prospect before the actual pain felt is alarming and painful.

Protarchus/ Unquestionably, this is a second sort of combined pleasure and pain, —the feeling that is produced in the mind itself, through expectation, apart from the body.

Socrates/ You are right in your surmise, For in these expectances, —which, as I view it, are each wholly independent of body, and so unmixed with actual pain and pleasure, —I think that we shall find a clear proof, whether the class of pleasure, as a whole, is worthy of our chief regard as the good; or that is rather to be made over by us to some other of the fore-mentioned classes, while in respect of pleasure and pain, —just as ire might say of hot and cold, and all such natural conditions, —we must only occasionally take up with them, at other times rejecting them as not constituting the good in themselves, yet sometimes and in some particular instances admitting the nature of the good.

Protarchus/ You are quite right in saying that the object we are now in quest of has passed by some such track as that we are now upon.

Socrates/ Then first let us consider this: If what we have just said is really the case, viz. that from the disarrangement

of the elements in us comes pain, but pleasure follows from their being got safely back again, let us, I say, proceed to contemplate the negative state, when there is no such disarrangement or consequent restoration, and see what ought to be the condition of living creatures under these circumstances. And now attend very carefully to the question and say, Is it not certain that at that particular time every creature must be without the sense of either pain or pleasure, either in a small or a great degree?

Protarchus/ It must certainly be so.

Socrates/ There is then, beside the other two, a disposition in us such as I have described; that is, beside that of a person in a state of joy, and that of one in pain.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now, then, be careful to remember this; for in judging of pleasure the keeping clearly in mind or not this third state is a matter of great importance. And so, if you please, let us discuss one little point connected with it.

Protarchus/ It is for you to say what.

Socrates/ You are aware that if a man has chosen a life of intellect, there is no reason why he should not live always in this way.

Protarchus/ Do you mean that of having neither joy nor sorrow?

Socrates/ Yes. We said before, in our comparison of lives, that one who had chosen the life of thought and intellect need not feel pleasure in any degree, small or great.

Protarchus/ Certainly we affirmed that.

Socrates/ Very well; then this will be the life of the thinker; and perhaps of all lives it is the most god-like.

Protarchus/ Why, it certainly does not seem likely that the gods have any sense either of pleasure or pain.

Socrates/ Certainly it is not at all likely; either would be undignified if it did happen to them. However, this question we will consider on a future occasion, if it should serve our argument. We will assign this advantage to intellect for the second prize, if we should not be able to give it for the first.

Protarchus/ You say well.

Socrates/ But you will grant that the other kind of pleasure, viz. that which we said was purely mental, takes place in us solely through memory.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ It appears we must first take up afresh the subject of memory, and ascertain what that is. Nay, it may be that we ought even to make a preliminary inquiry Into sensation before 'memory,' if the arguments on this subject are to be properly made clear to our minds.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Assume that of the various bodily feelings that we from time to time experience, some stop at and cease in the body, before they reach the mind at all, and leave it wholly unaffected; while others go through both, and impart a thrill, as it were, at once peculiar to each and common to both.

Protarchus/ That may be conceded.

Socrates/ Then if we affirm that the sensations which do not pervade both do not gain the notice of the mind, while those which pervade both do obtain such, notice, we shall state the argument in its most correct form.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Now you are not to take my expression 'not gaining notice' as having anything to do in this particular case with the origination of forgetfulness. Forgetfulness is the departure of something that was retained in the mind.

But that something in the case we now speak of has not yet existed; and to talk of there 'being a loss' of what neither is nor hitherto has been, is absurd. Is it not so?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then all you have to do is to make a change in the terms.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Don't talk of the soul having 'no memory,' when she has no feeling of the bodily shocks; rather call that 'insensateness' which you are at present disposed to call 'forgetfulness.'

Protarchus/ I understand.

Socrates/ But that other emotion, —when the soul and the body in partnership with it is moved by one and the same feeling, and therefore has a part with it in the movement, —you may not unreasonably term sensation.'

Protarchus/ Nothing can be more true than this.

Socrates/ Now then we begin to understand what we mean by the term 'sensation'.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Well then, if anyone chose to define memory 'the retention of an impression,' he would, in my judgment, speak correctly.

Protarchus/ Quite correctly.

Socrates/ But when we speak of recollection, we mean something different from mere memory; is it not so?

Protarchus/ Perhaps it is.

Socrates/ Is not this then also true?

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ When the mind recalls by itself, —as far as possible in itself, —feelings that it once shared with the

body, then, I presume, we talk of its 'remembering' thorn. Do we not?

Protarchus/ We certainly do.

Socrates/ But surely there is another sort of memory. For when the soul has lost the remembrance of some former experience—be it of something felt or something learnt, —and afterwards goes over the same ground again in itself, all those results so regained we call 'recollections' and 'memories'.

Protarchus/ That is rightly stated.

Socrates/ The object then of all these preliminary remarks is this.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Why, that we might realize in the fullest and clearest manner the pleasure which the mind feels independently of that of the body, and at the same time, what we mean by 'desire.' For it is by such considerations, as it seems, that the nature of bodily pleasure and mental pleasure becomes known to us.

Protarchus/ Now then, Socrates, let us proceed to the next step in the discussion.

Socrates/ Indeed there are. many considerations about the origin of pleasure and its general aspect that we are bound to enter upon, as it seems. Even at the present point of the argument we should first, I suspect, take up yet another topic, —the nature of desire, and in what part of us it is felt.

Protarchus/ Let us, by all means, consider it; for we shall lose nothing by it.

Socrates/ Yes, we shall lose, —and that, Protarchus, by the finding of what we are now looking for, —the perplexity we have hitherto felt on these very subjects.

Protarchus/ You are right in your rejoinder.' However, let us proceed to the next point, and try to state what that is.

Socrates/ Well, did we not ray just now that hunger and thirst and many other sensations of the like kind were examples of desires?

Protarchus/ To be sure we did.

Socrates/ To what one character, then, or principle of identity, do we appeal when we call things so very different by the same name?

Protarchus/ Upon my word, Socrates, that may prove difficult. to answer; however, we must give some reply.

Socrates/ Then let us resume the discussion from the same examples.

Protarchus/ Which do you mean?

Socrates/ We say, you know, very often, 'he is thirsty'; and this must mean something.

Protarchus/ We do, of course.

Socrates/ And this means, in effect, 'he feels a void.'

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, is not this thirst a desire?

Protarchus/ It is, of drink.

Socrates/ Of drink, or of the satisfaction caused by drink?'

Protarchus/ Well, I suppose it is of the satisfaction.

Socrates/ It seems then that when any of us begins to feel a void, he desires something that is contrary to that feeling: he is getting empty, and he wants to get filled.

Protarchus/ Most clearly.

Socrates/ Very good. Now suppose a man feels that void for the first time: is there any conceivable source from which, either by the actual sensation of being satisfied or the

memory of it, he could realize a feeling' that he is neither now conscious of nor has ever before been aware of?

Protarchus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ But surely he who desires must desire something, if language means anything.

Protarchus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Then he does not desire that which he feels; for he is thirsty, which is an exhaustion, but what he wants is a replenishing.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then it must be some part of the thirsty man that in some way realizes repletion.

Protarchus/ It must.

Socrates/ It cannot be the body then; for that, you know, is suffering from a void.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It remains therefore for the mind to realize repletion, that is, of course, by an act of memory. For what else is there by which it could realize it?

Protarchus/ Hardly anything.

Socrates/ Do we now begin to see what result we have arrived at from these admissions?

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Why, our present argument tends to prove that bodily desire can never take place in us.

Protarchus/ How can it prove that?

Socrates/ By showing that the effort of every creature is always in the contrary direction to the feelings of the body.

Protarchus/ It certainly is so.

Socrates/ But surely this impulse, leading as it does to something contrary to the actual feelings, shows that memory belongs to faculties opposite to those feelings.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then our reasoning, by proving that it is memory that leads us to the objects of our desire, makes it clear that all impulse and desire are mental, and also the governing principle of the whole living creature.

Protarchus/ Rightly said.

Socrates/ Then this same reasoning does not allow that it is the body which feels thirst or hunger, or has any sensations of this kind.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Now then let us further understand the following point on this same subject. It seems to me that our argument tends to show us a particular kind of life under such states and feelings.

Protarchus/ What states do you mean, and of what life are you speaking?

Socrates/ I mean the states of getting full and empty, and all others that are connected with the preservation of creatures or their impaired state, —m a word, when any of us, accordingly as he is placed in either of the said states, feels pain at the one, or pleasure at the other, according to the alternations he undergoes.

Protarchus/ That is so.

Socrates/ But what shall we say when he is between these two conditions?

Protarchus/ How between them?

Socrates/ Why, when he feels pain from his empty state, and has a recollection of former pleasures, knowing that by their occurrence he would now be relieved from his suffering,

but as yet is not getting his fill. What are we to say of him then? That he is, or is not, between these two states?

Protarchus/ That he is.

Socrates/ With an entire feeling of pain, or one of pleasure?

Protarchus/ Not pleasure, certainly, but rather oppressed with a two-fold pain; bodily, in the actual suffering, mental, in a certain longing resulting from the expectation.

Socrates/ Are you sure you are right, Protarchus, in your view about a twofold pain? Does it not sometimes happen that one of us who is getting empty is so situated that he has a sure hope of being filled, and sometimes on the contrary he feels it to be quite hopeless?

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Then does it not seem to you that, so far as he hopes to be filled, he has pleasure at the memory of what he before was, while simultaneously, as he feels a void, he has pain at such times.

Protarchus/ It cannot be otherwise.

Socrates/ Then under these circumstances not only man but every other creature feels at the same moment both pain and pleasure.

Protarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But what, when he has no hope at all that, in getting empty, he will have the means of getting full again? Is not this rather the case in which the double feeling of pain would occur? You perceived just now that there was such a feeling, but fancied it was simply double.

Protarchus/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let us then employ this inquiry into these feelings for the following purpose.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Whether we are to call these combined pains and pleasures true or false; or some of them true, others not.

Protarchus/ Why how can there be, Socrates, false pleasures or pains?

Socrates/ You might as well ask, Protarchus, how there can be true or false fears, —or true expectations or opinions, or such as are not true?

Protarchus/ Perhaps I might grant the possibility of this in respect of opinions; but not of the rest.

Socrates/ What say you? We seem indeed to be mooting a subject by no means small.

Protarchus/ You say truly.

Socrates/ But whether it has anything to do with our former discussion, that, son of a distinguished sire, is the question to be considered.

Protarchus/ Well, perhaps that question is so.

Socrates/ Then we must bid farewell to those other interminable topics, and, indeed, to any of the subjects that it not relevant to enter upon.

Protarchus/ Bight.

Socrates/ Then tell me: —for I, at least, am always in a state of wonderment about these very difficulties that we have now brought forward for consideration.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Are there not some pleasures false, and others that are true?

Protarchus/ How can that be?

Socrates/ Then, according to you, neither in dreams nor in sober earnest, —in mad fits nor in delusions, —is it possible for anyone ever to fancy he is enjoying himself, though he is not, or to fancy he feels pain, though he does not.

Protarchus/ We all, Socrates, suppose all such cases to be possible.

Socrates/ Are we right then in supposing it, or must we consider whether this is correctly said, or not?

Protarchus/ I should say, Socrates, that is a matter for consideration.

Socrates/ Then let us come to a still clearer definition in what we now say about pleasure and opinion. You will grant, I suppose, that there is such a thing as our having an opinion about something.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And also feeling pleasure.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But surely the subject of our opinion is something.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And also that in which the pleased takes pleasure.

Protarchus/ O certainly!

Socrates/ Then that which holds an opinion, —be it rightly or wrongly, —never loses the property of really having an opinion.

Protarchus/ How can it?

Socrates/ Then that also which feels pleasure, rightly or not, can never, it is plain, lose the reality of being pleased.

Protarchus/ Yes; this also is as you say.

Socrates/ Then how in the world does it happen that an opinion can become false or true, while it is the nature of pleasure alone to be true? For both dike have the property of really fancying as well as being pleased.

Protarchus/ That question requires consideration.

Socrates/ Is it that opinion is followed by the discovery of its falsehood or truth, and so becomes not a mere opinion but a certain kind of opinion in either case, —is this the point that you say you must consider?

Protarchus/ That is so.

Socrates/ But there is yet another point beside this that we must come to an agreement upon, —whether it really is the case at all, that some things have certain qualities, while pleasure and pain alone are simply what they are, and do not admit of a particular character.

Protarchus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ But surely it is not difficult to see this, that they have certain qualities. We said long before, that both do decidedly become great and small, —pains, I mean, as well as pleasures.

Protarchus/ Assuredly so.

Socrates/ And further, if the condition of badness attaches to any of these, we shall say that an opinion thus becomes a bad one, and so likewise a pleasure.

Protarchus/ Why, of course, Socrates.

Socrates/ But what if rightness, or the opposite to rightness, attaches to any of them? Shall we not then talk of 'right opinion,' if it has rightness, and of pleasure in the same way?

Protarchus/ It must be so.

Socrates/ And further, if the opinion we have formed is mistaken, we must surely allow that such opinion then, —erroneous as it is, —is not right, and does not take a right view.

Protarchus/ How can it?

Socrates/ Well, if we perceive, in the other case, that some pain or pleasure is mistaken in the matter about which one

is either pained or pleased, —shall we give it the epithet of 'right,' 'good,' or any other term of approbation?

Protarchus/ Of course, that is not possible, since the pleasure will be a mistaken one.

Socrates/ Yet surely it may often happen that a pleasure is felt, not based on sound judgment, but involving some fallacy.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly; and the judgment, Socrates, in that ease and under such circumstances, we do call false; but no one would ever think of calling the pleasure a false one.

Socrates/ Well, you stand up stoutly for the argument for pleasure, Protarchus, by your present reply.

Protarchus/ Not at all; I only say what I hear.

Socrates/ And is there no difference at all, my friend, between the pleasure based on right judgment and accurate knowledge, and that which often arises in all or any of us with false notions and ignorance?

Protarchus/ Why, it does seem likely that there is a considerable difference.

Socrates/ Let us then proceed to a consideration of this difference between the two.

Protarchus/ Proceed in whatever way you think best.

Socrates/ Should I then take this direction?

Protarchus/ Which?

Socrates/ There is, we say, false opinion and true opinion also.

Protarchus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Well, now, these views, —true or false opinion, —are often attended, as we said just before, by pleasure or pain.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is it not then from memory and perception that judgment, and the attempt to discern by a judgment, come to us in every case?

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Then must we not think that our position in regard to matters of this kind is of the following kind?

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Would you not say that it often occurs to one who sees an object from a distance not very clearly, to wish, to get a correct knowledge of what he sees?

Protarchus/ I should say so.

Socrates/ Then, as the next step, such an one would be likely to put this question to himself.

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ 'What in the world is that object that seems to be standing by that rock under a tree?' Is not this what you think a man would say to himself, if he saw some such objects presented to him on any occasion?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Then, after that, our friend, by way of answer to himself, might say, 'Yes! it is a man,' by a correct guess.

Protarchus/ Host certainly.

Socrates/ Or on the other hand, from a perverse notion that what he saw was the work of some shepherds, he might perhaps call it a statue.

Protarchus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Well, and if he has a friend with him, it may happen that he expresses audibly to his neighbor what he before said to himself, and so gives actual utterance to the very same conviction, and thus that becomes a statement that we before called a judgment formed.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And if he chances to be alone, thinking in his own mind on this same subject, he sometimes goes about keeping it for a long time to himself.

Protarchus/ No doubt he does.

Socrates/ What then? Do you take the same view as I do of what results in this case?

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ It seems to me that our minds under such circumstances resemble a book.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ The memory coinciding with the impressions, and those feelings which are closely allied to such coincidence, seem to me, one might almost say, to write in our minds at that time certain words. And when this feeling has written what is really true, then a true judgment and true propositions result from it in us; but when this scribe of ours writes falsehoods, the contrary to the truth is the result.

Protarchus/ This is just my view. I quite accept what you have stated in this way.

Socrates/ Then further accept another artist who at that time arises in our minds.

Protarchus/ Who is that?

Socrates/ A painter who comes after the writing-master and makes pictures on the soul of what we had said to ourselves.

Protarchus/ How and when are we to say that this other artist is produced in us?

Socrates/ When a man removes from the ken of the eye, or any other sense, what he then thought or said, and sees in the mirror of his own mind the images of what had been thought or said. Is not this a case that often occurs in us?

Protarchus/ Most certainly it is.

Socrates/ Then the portraits of true judgments and statements are true, and those of false ones are false.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ If then we have rightly asserted this, let us further consider the following point.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Whether such feelings are necessarily limited to events present and past, and do not extend to the future.

Protarchus/ I should rather say they apply to all times without exception.

Socrates/ Well, did we not before say that the pleasures and pains that were felt only in the mind might precede those of the body? If so, it follows that such foretaste of pleasure or pain must in its very nature have reference to future time.

Protarchus/ That is very true.

Socrates/ Are we then to say that the letter-writing and the painting, which a little while ago we assumed to take place in us, relate to past and present time, but not to future:

Protarchus/ To future, most certainly.

Socrates/ Do you assent thus heartily, because all these impressions are, in effect, hopes in respect of the future, and we always, and all our lives through, are full of hopes?

Protarchus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Now then, beside what you have already stated, answer me on this other point.

Protarchus/ What point?

Socrates/ Is not an honest and religious and good man under all circumstances, beloved of the gods?

Protarchus/ Of course he is.

Socrates/ Well, a dishonest and thoroughly bad man is, you will allow, just the reverse?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ That every man, as we said just now, is filled with many hopes.

Protarchus/ To be sure he is.

Socrates/ And there are in all of us certain propositions, which we called hopes.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And also the fantasies of hopes depicted in us. For instance, a man often in fancy sees a great store of gold coming to him, and many pleasures attending it; and as part of the picture he sees himself very much delighted at his own good luck.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Must we then assert, or rather deny, that in these cases, speaking generally, the writings and paintings presented to the mind of the good are true, through their being favorites of heaven, but the bad not true, quite in the other way?

Protarchus/ We ought without doubt to assert this.

Socrates/ Well, now, the bad have in no less degree pleasures depicted in fancy, only these, I suppose, are false.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Generally, then, the pleasures which the bad delight in are unreal, but those of good men are real.

Protarchus/ It is impossible to state the case otherwise.

Socrates/ Then according to our present views there are such things as unreal pleasures in the souls of men, though bearing a resemblance to true ones as a low parody. And similarly in the case of pains.

Protarchus/ There are so.

Socrates/ Then in this case—according to our former statement—a man who forms notions at all must always have real notions, but sometimes on matters that are not, never were, and never will be realized.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And it was the non-existence of these, I suppose, that caused his notions to be false at that particular time, and therefore himself to form a false opinion. Is it not so.

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Well, then, must we not allow equally to our pains and our pleasures, that the condition which these have find a counterpart in the former.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ That it must be allowed that a man rejoices really at any time when he feels joy at all and under any circumstances, even without being able to say why; but that he sometimes does so at things that do not and never did exist, and often, or perhaps most frequently, at things that are not likely ever to happen at all.

Protarchus/ This too, Socrates, must be as you say.

Socrates/ Will not then the very same argument hold about fears and all strong impulses and emotions of that sort, —that all these are also false in certain cases?

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Well, can we call opinions unbound in any other respect than by their proving false?

Protarchus/ In no other way.

Socrates/ Nor can we understand pleasures, I suppose, being-bad in any other way but in being false.

Protarchus/ Rather, it is just the contrary to what you have said. For one might pretty safely affirm that it is not at

all through their falseness that pains and pleasures are bad, but because they involve some other serious badness.

Socrates/ Well, bad pleasures, and such as are so through their badness, we will speak of a little later on, should it still seem to us both advisable. But those which are false, and which exist or arise in us on many subjects and on many occasions, we have yet to discuss in a different way; for perhaps we shall find this useful in making our decisions.

Protarchus/ Of course, —that is, if there are false pleasures.

Socrates/ There certainly are, Protarchus, in my view at least. But, so long as this opinion has a place in our minds, of course it cannot be allowed to remain unquestioned.

Protarchus/ Rightly said.

Socrates/ Let us then stand to our new argument like athletes.

Protarchus/ Proceed we.

Socrates/ Well, now, we said, if our memories are correct, a little while ago, that when what we call desires are on us, then the body separately by itself, and the soul also independently, are doubly affected by these feelings.

Protarchus/ We remember, —this teas said before.

Socrates/ Then that part of us which desired states contrary to those of the body, was the soul; while the part of us that manifested the pain, or some degree of pleasure from actual impression, was the body.

Protarchus/ Yes, it was.

Socrates/ Now then gum up the result of what happens under these circumstances.

Protarchus/ Say what it is.

Socrates/ Why, that m this case both pains and pleasures are present to us at once; and that at the same time there occurs a consciousness of these feelings, each of which is contrary to the other; as, indeed, appeared to us just now.

Protarchus/ It seems so, certainly.

Socrates/ Has not this also been stated by us, and may we not now take it for granted, as we have already agreed about it?

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ That both these feelings, pain and pleasure, admit of a more and a less, and so belong to the class of infinites.

Protarchus/ That has been stated, of course.

Socrates/ Then what way is there of coming to a right decision about this?

Protarchus/ In what respect, an how do you mean?

Socrates/ If our intention in judging these feelings, in any cases of this sort, aims in each instance at deciding which of the sensations of pain or pleasure is greater, and which less, —which is felt in a greater and which in a stronger degree; that is to say, pain compared with pleasure, or pain with pain, or pleasure with pleasure, —

Protarchus/ Well, this is so, and such is the object of oar judgment.

Socrates/ What then? must we conclude, that though in matters of sight the seeing the sizes of things from a distance [or near] tends to make their reality uncertain, and causes us to form false notions of them; yet in pains and pleasures this same result does not occur?

Protarchus/ I say, Socrates, in the latter case it occurs all the more.

Socrates/ Then our present conclusion proves to be contrary to that we arrived at just before.

Protarchus/ What do you allude to?

Socrates/ We then said that the judgments, accordingly as they were themselves false or true, infected both the pains at the same time Mid the pleasures with their own falsehood or truth.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ But now it seems that the pleasures themselves, by being viewed from far and near by frequent alternations, and at the same time by being set side by side with each other, appear, the pleasures as contrasted with the painfulness greater and more intense, and the pains on the other hand, through their being put along side of pleasures, to be that which is contrary to them.

Protarchus/ It cannot be but that this does take place, and for the reasons you give.

Socrates/ Then the amount by which pleasures and pains severally seem greater than the realities, viz. so much as depends on mere appearance, cut off from each; and you will not say that it was a right appearance, nor venture to affirm that such part of the pleasure and the pain as depended on such mere appearance, was itself right or true.

Protarchus/ No, indeed.

Socrates/ Next then to this, and with the hope of getting to the truth in this way, we will view pleasures and pains, that both seem to be and really are still more false than those we have just spoken of, in the case of animals.

Protarchus/ What pleasures do you speak of, and how do you mean?

Socrates/ We have said, if I mistake not, more than once, that when the normal state of any animal is disturbed by

congestions or looseness, surfeits or deficiencies, and by certain conditions of increase or decrease, pains, aches and discomforts, and all the feelings that we designate by such names, follow as the result.

Protarchus/ Yes, that has been affirmed several times.

Socrates/ And further, when they get back into their natural state, this restoration, we accepted as our conclusion, was what constituted pleasure.

Protarchus/ Rightly said.

Socrates/ But what are we to call it, when none of these processes take place in our bodies.

Protarchus/ And when can that happen. Socrates?

Socrates/ The question you just now asked, Protarchus, is irrelevant.

Protarchus/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because it does not prevent me from putting my question to you again.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ If, I shall repeat, such a case of neutrality should occur, what must necessarily be the consequence in us?

Protarchus/ Do you mean, when the body is not moved in the direction of either pleasure or pain?

Socrates/ That is my meaning.

Protarchus/ Why, this of course is plain, that in such a case neither pleasure could ever occur nor any pain.

Socrates/ Admirably answered. But, I imagine, you mean this by your question, that it is a necessity that some of these processes should be going on In us, as the philosophers say; for everything is ever in a state of flux either up or down.

Protarchus/ Yes, they do say that; and I don't think they state an unimportant doctrine.

Socrates/ How could they, unless, indeed, they were of no importance themselves? However, my wish is to get clear away from this subject which is bearing down upon us and I am thinking to avoid it in this way; so do you join me in the attempt.

Protarchus/ Only say how.

Socrates/ 'Granted that this is so,' let us say to the philosophers. And now do you answer me. When anything affects the state of any living creature, is it always aware of everything that goes on in it, —that is, are we never unconscious that we grow, or have any such change taking place in us, —or is it quite the other way, that such changes are almost unperceived?

Protarchus/ It is quite this other way.

Socrates/ Then we are wrong in what we just now stated, that the changes that take place in us one way or the other produce in us pains and pleasures.

Protarchus/ Of course we were wrong.

Socrates/ Then what we say will be better stated, and less liable to cavil, in this way.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ That great changes do cause in us pains and pleasures, but moderate or trifling ones do not cause either in the least degree.

Protarchus/ This is a more correct way of stating it than that, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then if this is so, we come back to the life we just before spoke of.

Protarchus/ What life was that?

Socrates/ The life that we said was devoid of pain and without joys.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then from these data let us set down three kinds of life, one that of pleasure, the next that of pain, and one that is neutral. Or how would you state the case on this matter?

Protarchus/ In no other way than this, —that the kinds of life are three.

Socrates/ Then the mere absence of pain can never be identical with the active sense of pleasure.

Protarchus/ How can it be?

Socrates/ Then whenever you are told, that there is nothing in the world so delightful as to pass your whole life without pain, what do you suppose is meant by the person who says this?

Protarchus/ Why, such an one appears to me to assert that the not feeling pain is pleasure.

Socrates/ Theft, that we may use terms of better omen, of any three things whatever belonging to us that you please, take one to be gold, another to be silver, and a third to be neither this nor that.

Protarchus/ I assume this.

Socrates/ Can then the 'neither this nor that' become either this or that, —gold or silver?

Protarchus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Then neither would the middle life become pleasant or painful, according to the true view of the matter; it could not rightly be thought so, if anyone chanced to think it such, nor rightly called so, it he used such a term.

Protarchus/ How indeed could it?

Socrates/ Well but, my friend, there are, we know, some who say and think this.

Protarchus/ There certainly are.

Socrates/ Do they then really think they feel joy at that time, viz. when they are without pain?

Protarchus/ Why, they say they do.

Socrates/ Then they do think they are then pleased, or they would not say so, I presume.

Protarchus/ It may be so.

Protarchus/ But they hold a false opinion about being in a state of joy, if, as we say, the nature of not being pained and of feeling joy is distinct.

Protarchus/ But we did say they were so.

Socrates/ Must we then assume in our reasonings that these states are three, as we just now did, or only two, — pain, an evil to mankind, and riddance from pains, which, as in itself a good, gets the name of pleasure?

Protarchus/ How is it, Socrates, that after our former agreement we are asking ourselves this question? don't understand.

Socrates/ The fact is, Protarchus, you do not understand the enemies that our friend Philebus has.

Protarchus/ And whom do you mean by them?

Socrates/ Men who are said to be very clever in physics, and who deny that pleasures are pleasures at all.

Protarchus/ Then what do they say they are?

Socrates/ They maintain that what Philebus and hits party call pleasures, are all so many escapes from pains.

Protarchus/ Then do you advise us to follow these, or how, Socrates?

Socrates/ Not to follow them, certainly, but to use them as guessers at truth, who make their guesses not by art, but by a well-intentioned yet stem natural dislike of pleasure, — the dislike of those who heartily detest the influence that pleasure has, and believe there is no good in it, and so come

to the conclusion that its very seductiveness is a mere juggle and not really pleasure. Well then, you may use these men for such purposes, as guessers, when you have well considered some more of their dislikes; and after that you shall hear what seem to me to be true pleasures, in order that we may fully see from both of our statements the influence that pleasure possesses, and make a comparison of our views for the purpose of judging.

Protarchus/ You say well.

Socrates/ Then let us go in quest of these, by way of allies, by following the course of their dislikes. I suppose then that they argue in some such way as this, beginning with first principles. If, they would ask, we wanted to understand the true nature of any class of things, as of 'hard,' should we look at once to the hardest objects for better realizing the idea, or to those which are scarcely hard at all? So now, Protarchus, you are bound to give an answer to these dissatisfied gentry, as you would to me.

Protarchus/ O certainly! I tell them, that should look to examples first in magnitude.

Socrates/ Then if we wished to understand also the class of things to which pleasure belongs, we must not look to small pleasures, but to those that are called the highest and most intense.

Protarchus/ Anyone would concede this so far.

Socrates/ Are not then the ready pleasures, —those which, as we are often saying, are also the greatest, —these bodily indulgences of ours?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Are these then greater, or do they become so, in persons suffering from illnesses, or in healthy subjects? And now mind, lest by a hasty answer we make a blunder.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Why, we might perhaps say, in healthy subjects.

Protarchus/ Likely enough.

Socrates/ Well, but do not those pleasures exceed in intensity, for which also the strongest longings previously arise in us?

Protarchus/ That is true.

Socrates/ And do not fever-patients, and persons suffering from the like ailments, feel thirst or cold in o greater degree, and all the other ordinary bodily affections; and are they not more familiar with the sense of want, and have they not greater pleasures in being satisfied? Ur must we say that this is not really the case?

Protarchus/ Rather, as you put it now, it seems quite true.

Socrates/ Well then, should we seem to be right in saying, that if one wanted to see examples of the greatest pleasures, we should go to the sick bed rather than to the healthy in order to view them? And mind that you don't suppose I mean by the question, whether those who are seriously ill feel more joys than those in health; but imagine me to be inquiring about the greatness of pleasure, and in what subjects excess in the feeling of delight occurs at any time. For we are bound, according to our view, to comprehend what is the true nature of pleasure, and what it is according to those who deny its existence at all.

Protarchus/ I think I follow your argument pretty well.

Socrates/ Presently, Protarchus, you will show that you understand me not less well; for you will give an answer to my question. Do you perceive greater pleasures, —mind, I don't say more, but exceeding in intensity and capability of increase, —in a life of lewdness, or in one of self-restraint? And consider well before you reply.

Protarchus/ Yes, I understand your meaning; I do perceive a great difference. The virtuous are constantly kept in check by the mere force of the proverb which recommends *ne quid nimis*, to which they give ear; but as for your lewd and immodest sensualists, the excess of pleasure that holds them in thrall makes them notorious.

Socrates/ Rightly answered. And if this is so, it is clear that it is in a vitious condition both of mind and body, and not in virtue, that the greatest pleasures and also the greatest pains are produced.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then one is bound to take some of these pleasures by way of example, in order to see what nature and effect these have that we called greatest.

Protarchus/ That is what we must do.

Socrates/ Consider then the pleasures from diseases of this kind, and see what their effects are.

Protarchus/ To what diseases do you allude?

Socrates/ The pleasures from disorders of a less decent kind, such as the stem opponents we have spoken of thoroughly detest.

Protarchus/ What pleasures?

Socrates/ Why, the ways of curing the itch by friction, and similar sensations which require no very different treatment. For tell me, in heaven's name, what are we to call such feeling when it arises in men? A pleasure, or a pain?

Protarchus/ Why this, Socrates, seems to be a kind of evil of mixed character.

Socrates/ Now don't suppose that it was on Philebus' account that brought forward this subject; the fact is, without these pleasures, and such as follow in their wake, —that is, without these being fully seen into, —we might

well-nigh despair of deciding, for ourselves the matter we are inquiring into.

Protarchus/ Then we must proceed to the pleasures akin to those.

Socrates/ Do you moan those which in their mixed nature partake of both pleasure and pain?

Protarchus/ Certainly I do.

Socrates/ Weft now, there are some mixtures that are bodily, and in our bodies only, others that are mental, and only in the mind. But we shall find other mixed pleasures and pains that are common to both mind and body, and which get called, taken together, sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains.

Protarchus/ How is that?

Socrates/ Whenever a person, in the restoration or disturbance of the harmonies, is sensible of two opposite feelings at once, —as when he is cold and warms himself, or is hot and is getting cool, with the wish, I presume, to have the one sensation, but to get rid of the other; then what we call 'sweet mixed with bitter' is so present that he cannot easily get rid of the discomfort; and so it causes first a feeling of impatience, and then fierce excitement.

Protarchus/ What you now say is singularly true.

Socrates/ Then mixed feelings of this kind are made up, some of equal pains and pleasures, some of one or the other in excess.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Then say that the one sort, —when pains are felt greater than the pleasures, —is that which we before said belonged to the itching and the ticklings; —that is, when the boiling and scalding sensation is inside, and one cannot reach it by the rubbing and the scratching, but relieves only

the surface; then, by bringing the parts to the fire, and in despair of relief changing the seat of the affection, they produce, sometimes very great pleasure, sometimes, on the contrary, to the inward parts, by contrast with the pain of the outer, mixed pains and pleasures, —to whichever aide they may incline, —by forcibly separating and diffusing what has become clogged, or by bringing together and blending in one what is too diffuse, and by thus bringing pains into direct contrast with pleasures.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Then whenever, on the other hand, the pleasure prevails in the combination in all such eases, while the small admixture of the pain just tickles us and makes us feel slightly uncomfortable, the greater amount of the pleasure that is poured in intensifies our feelings and sometimes makes us unable to sit still, and by causing all sorts of changes of color, of posture, and of breathing, produces in us complete ecstasy, and even utterances aloud when the fit is upon us.

Protarchus/ 'Tis so, indeed.

Socrates/ And it makes a man say too about himself, and about others, that through the delight of these pleasures he almost dies; and, of course, he pursues these at all times, and so much the more, as he is without self-restraint and has a weakness towards vice. Of course, also, he calls these the greatest, and the man who lives most in the indulgence of them he reckons the happiest.

Protarchus/ You have described all that happens, Socrates, according to the opinion of most men.

Socrates/ Yes, as far as the pleasures are concerned which consist in the mixed feelings of the body alone, when these feelings are combined, those within with those without. But with respect to those in the mind, which have

joint effects contrary to those of the body, mental pleasure at the same time in contrast with bodily pain, and pain with pleasure, so that both combinations form one mixture, — these we discussed a little while ago, and remarked, that when a man gets empty he longs for repletion, and that in his hope he feels joy, while in getting empty he feels pain. But there is another point that we did not then ask you to notice, and therefore we now say it, that whenever the mind is at variance with the body, in all such cases, which are endless, the union of pain and pleasure is always one and the same.

Protarchus/ What you say appears to be most true.

Socrates/ There still remains one more instance of the mixtures of pain and pleasure.

Protarchus/ Which, do you say?

Socrates/ The combination which we asserted the mind often admitted by and within itself.

Protarchus/ How can that be, and what do we moan by this particular case?

Socrates/ Take anger, fear, desire, outbursts of grief, love, jealousy, envy, and similar emotions, —do you not reckon, all these to be certain painful feelings in the mind alone?

Protarchus/ To be sure I do.

Socrates/ Shall we not then find that they are filled to the brim with exceeding joys? Or do we require to be reminded of what Homer says, “the anger that allows even a prudent man to be vexed, and which is much sweeter than honey poured down the throat;” and of the pleasures that exist, mixed with pains, in violent grief and longing desire?

Protarchus/ We do not require to be told this; it is so, and it is not likely ever to be otherwise.

Socrates/ Of course, too, you remember scenes in the tragedies, when the spectators rejoice and weep at one and the same moment?

Protarchus/ Of course I do.

Socrates/ And can you be ignorant of the disposition of our minds in the acting of the comedies, —that even here there is a mixture of pain and pleasure.

Protarchus/ I don't quite see that.

Socrates/ Perhaps not. It certainly is not easy, Protarchus, in this case to comprehend in every instance the existence of such a mixed feeling.

Protarchus/ It is not, as it seems to me.

Socrates/ But let us get an idea of it all the more because it is obscure; in order that in other instances one may more easily understand what is meant by a mixture of pain and pleasure.

Protarchus/ Say on.

Socrates/ The term envy we just now used, —will you define it to be a distress of mind, or how?

Protarchus/ As you state it.

Socrates/ But surely the envious man will be found to feel a sudden pleasure when he hears of the misfortunes of others.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ Well, ignorance, and what we call a stupid state of mind, is a misfortune.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ From these considerations then see what the real nature of the sense of the ridiculous is.

Protarchus/ You have only to state it.

Socrates/ There is, then, a kind of ill-nature, speaking generally, which takes its name from a particular habit; and of this general ill-nature ridicule is a part, that has for its subject the contrary to the injunction of the inscription at Delphi.

Protarchus/ You mean 'Know yourself,' Socrates.

Socrates/ I do. But it is clear that, if the very opposite were said by the inscription, it would be 'Not to know oneself at all.'

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Now try, Protarchus, to divide this very fault of self-ignorance into three.

Protarchus/ How do you mean? I am afraid I shall not be able.

Socrates/ You mean then that I must make the division for the present?

Protarchus/ I do; and I not only say it, but I ask it.

Socrates/ Must not then each one of the self-ignorant have this affection in one of three respects?

Protarchus/ How is that?

Socrates/ First in respect of property, —they must think they are richer than in proportion to their real means.

Protarchus/ No doubt there are many who have that weakness.

Socrates/ But there are still more, I suppose, who think themselves taller or better looking, and that all the other bodily accomplishments exist in them in a degree much surpassing the reality.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But by far the greatest number, I suppose, err in the third respect, that of the mental qualities; they fancy themselves superior in virtue when they are not so.

Protarchus/ Very true indeed.

Socrates/ And of these virtues is it not on the subject of wisdom that, by laying claim to it under all circumstances and conditions, the mass of mankind is most full of rivalries and vain conceit?

Protarchus/ Of course that is so.

Socrates/ Then if one called all and any feeling of this kind bad, one would not be far wrong.

Protarchus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ This feeling then, Protarchus, we must again subdivide into two, if we intend, by considering the childish form of envy, to get sight of a less obvious combination of pleasure and pain.

Protarchus/ How do you mean that we are to cut it in two?

Socrates/ All, who foolishly hold this false opinion about themselves, —these, I say, (which indeed is true of all men generally,) must, in some cases have bodily strength and power, in other cases, I suppose, the contrary.

Protarchus/ That must be so.

Socrates/ Then take this as your rule m dividing. Those who are conceited with weakness of body, and are unable when laughed at to resent it, you will not be wrong in calling ridiculous. But those who are able to avenge themselves you may call formidable and burly bullies, and not men of peace; and you will give thus to yourself the best possible account of such men. For the self-ignorance of the strong is aggressive and discreditable, injurious as it is to others both in its reality, and as represented in action on the stage; but the self-ignorance with weakness takes rather the rank and the nature of the ridiculous.

Protarchus/ You speak quite lightly; but I must confess the mixture of pleasures and pains in these instances has not yet become clear to me.

Socrates/ First then take the property of envy.

Protarchus/ Only say on.

Socrates/ I suppose it is 'an unjust grief and pleasure.'

Protarchus/ That is certainly so.

Socrates/ In saying unjust, you will grant that it is neither unjust nor invidious to take pleasure in the misfortunes of enemies.

Protarchus/ Of course it is not.

Socrates/ But can we say the same, —that it is 'not unjust' not to be grieved, but to feel pleasure when we see occasionally the misfortunes of friendly persons?

Protarchus/ Of course that must be unjust.

Socrates/ Welt, we said that self-ignorance was a misfortune to all, did we not?

Protarchus/ Rightly stated.

Socrates/ Then we are right too in saying that the fancied cleverness and comeliness and the other kinds of conceit' that we spoke of in friends, occur under three forms; and those attended with bodily weakness are ridiculous, those backed by strength are odious. Or shall we deny the truth of what I lately said, that this habit in friendly persons, when a man has it in a way not to harm others, is ridiculous?

Protarchus/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ And must we not allow that it is a misfortune, as it is a kind of ignorance?

Protarchus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ And do we feel delight, or rather sorrow when we laugh at it?

Protarchus/ It is clear that we feel delight.

Socrates/ But pleasure at the misfortunes of friends, — do we not say it is envy that is the cause of this?

Protarchus/ Necessarily so.

Socrates/ Then our argument tells us, that when we laugh at what is ridiculous in friends, in introducing the element of pleasure into envy, we do in effect blend together this pleasure with pain; since it reminds us that it was some time ago agreed, that envy was a mental pain, and that laughing was a pleasure; and thus that these two feelings were produced in U together at those particular times.

Protarchus/ That is true.

Socrates/ Then our argument now tends to show us, that in outbursts of grief and in tragedies, —and not in stage-acting only, but in the general tragedy and comedy of life, — pains are mixed up with pleasures, and in countless other instances besides.

Protarchus/ It is impossible not to admit that, Socrates, even if' one is ever so earnest in maintaining the opposite views.

Socrates/ Well, now, we instanced anger, regret, passionate grief, fear, love, jealousy and envy, and other feelings of that sort, and said that we should find blended in them those two emotions we have so often had occasion to repeat.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Do we understand then that all we have hitherto argued about are grief, envy, and anger?

Protarchus/ Of course we are aware of it.

Socrates/ Are there not many topics yet remaining?

Protarchus/ Indeed there are.

Socrates/ What now do you suppose was my principal object in pointing out to you the mixed feelings in comedy? Was it not for the sake of proving that it would be easy to show the mixture incidental to fears, loves, and the other emotions; and therefore that, when you had fully realized the nature of this one, you were bound to let me off and not' to protract the conversation by proceeding to the other questions, but (as said) to comprehend just this, that both body independently of soul, and soul of body, and the two together in their joint affections, are full of pleasure blended with, pains. Now therefore say, whether you intend to let me off, or to go on till midnight. However, by a brief promise I expect I shall get you to let me go: I shall be quite willing tomorrow to give you an account of all these other emotions; but at present I am desirous to pass on to the remaining points of the argument for the decision which Philebus orders me to make.

Protarchus/ You have said well, Socrates, but pray take your own way in going through the rest.

Socrates/ Pursuing then the natural course, next after the mixed pleasures by a kind of necessity we should proceed in turn to those which are unmixed.

Protarchus/ You have said very well.

Socrates/ It shall be my endeavor then by this change in our subject to make you see what they are. As for those who contend that there is no pleasure except in cessation from pains, I don't at all agree with them, though, as I said, I use their evidence to prove that there are some pleasures which seem to be such, but are not so id reality, and some others, neither few nor small, that we fancy to be such, but which are inseparably connected with pains and with intervals of rest from pains of the severest kind in bodily and mental distresses.

Protarchus/ And what pleasures on the other hand, Socrates, ¦would one rightly conceive to be true?

Socrates/ Those connected with what we call beautiful colors, with forms and outlines, with very many of the odors, with sounds, and all those things which, involving no consciousness nor discomfort in the want of them, afford us satisfactions at once perceptible and agreeable, and free from any mixture of pain.

Protarchus/ What do we mean, Socrates, by this new account of objects of pleasure?

Socrates/ Certainly, what I mean is not at once clear, but I will try to make it so. "What I am now trying to describe as beauty of form is not what most people would imagine by it, such as that of animals or pictures, —but I mean (says our argument) the straight and the circular; and of these, such as are formed by the instrument for making rounds, both as circles and globes, and such rectangles as are made by rules and squares; —you understand my meaning? Tor these, I affirm, are not relatively beautiful, like other things, but are beautiful at all times by themselves and in their very nature, and possess pleasures peculiarly their own, not at all resembling those of the scratchings we spoke of. So, too, the colors I refer to are those which are beautiful because they are of the same general character, and the same in the pleasures they produce. Do we understand what our argument points to, or not?

Protarchus/ I endeavor to do so, Socrates; but try on your part to state your meaning still more plainly.

Socrates/ Well, then, I am speaking of such sounds as are smooth and distinct, which give expression to one clear melodious note; and I say these are not merely relatively but absolutely beautiful; and further, that they are attended by congenial pleasures in hearing them.

Protarchus/ Well, no doubt this is so also.

Socrates/ As for the kind of pleasures connected with scents, it has less of the divine in it than those of sound; still, the fact of their having in them no necessary admixture of pains, in whatever way and in whatever part of us these arise, —I regard as entirely on the side of correspondence with those I have mentioned above. "Well now, these, if you see my meaning, are two kinds of what we are wont to call pleasures.

Protarchus/ I understand you.

Socrates/ Now then let us add to these the pleasures attendant; on learning, if, as I suppose, these appear to us not to involve any previous hunger after knowledge, nor, consequently, any discomforts originating from such a feeling as want of information.

Protarchus/ Yes, I agree with that view.

Socrates/ Well, now, if men have been filled with knowledge and some losses of it occur afterwards through forgetfulness, are you aware of any feelings of distress in them?

Protarchus/ No, not naturally so, but perhaps there may be in certain reflections about such a mishap, —when a man has lost something and is pained from the want of it.

Socrates/ But at present, my good Sir, our discussion is only about the actual feelings of nature, apart from any reflection.

Protarchus/ Then you say with truth that sometimes forgetfulness does occur to us in learning without any feeling of pain.

Socrates/ Then we must say that these pleasures of learning are unmixed with pains, and by no means the lot of the many, but of the very few.

Protarchus/ Of course we must admit that.

Socrates/ Then, as we have now distinguished with sufficient care the pure pleasures and those which might fairly take some such name as 'impure,' let us add to our statement, that the excessive pleasures are immoderate, but those which are not excessive have the contrary quality of moderation. So also with respect to greatness and intensity, and to pleasures which become such either often or only seldom, let us attach to them the condition of belonging to the class of the infinite which more or less pervades both body and mind; but those which are not so, let us place in the category of the proportional.

Protarchus/ What you say is quite correct, Socrates.

Socrates/ Then beside these points there are yet these others in them which we have next to get a clear view of.

Protarchus/ What do you mean?

Socrates/ The question, which we should say has relation to truth, the pure and the unmixed, or the violent, the excessive, the great, and the satisfying?

Protarchus/ With what object do you ask that, Socrates?

Socrates/ Because, Protarchus, I wish to omit no characteristic of pleasure and knowledge in testing their real worth, if it should appear that one part in each of them is pure, and the other not pure; in order that each may come pure and unmixed to the trial, and so make it easier for me and you and all the company here present.

Protarchus/ Rightly said.

Socrates/ Come then, let us take this view about all the kinds of things that we call pure, —let us take one of them first as an example and examine it thoroughly.

Protarchus/ What then must we take?

Socrates/ Among the first, if you please, we will consider the kind to which white belongs.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ In what way then can pure whiteness, and under what condition, be best presented to us? Shall we say the purity of it consists in the greatest degree and quantity, or in its being least mixed, —that is, when no other particle of any color is in it?

Protarchus/ Clearly, in the white which is most genuine and pure.

Socrates/ Rightly answered. So then we are to account this the truest, Protarchus, and at the same time the most beautiful of all the whites, and not that which is most in quantity, or the largest in surface?

Protarchus/ Most correctly said.

Socrates/ Then we shall make no mistake at all in affirming, that a little pure white is whiter, as well as prettier and more genuine, than much white of a mixed sort.

Protarchus/ So; your statement will be quite right.

Socrates/ What then? Surely we shall not require many examples of this kind for our argument about pleasure, but it is enough for us to understand from the instance now before us that, in the most inclusive sense, all pleasure, if unmixed with pain, would be sweeter, truer, and better in its kind, even a small than a great one, or little than much.

Protarchus/ Assuredly it would; and we want no other example to prove it.

Socrates/ What then are we to say of another theory of pleasure? Have we not been told respecting it that it is in all cases a process of production, and that there is no real existence in pleasure at all? For there are subtle reasoners

who undertake to show the truth of this other view, and we are bound to thank them for it.

Protarchus/ How is that?

Socrates/ I will discuss with you this very question more at length, by asking a few further questions, friend Protarchus.

Protarchus/ You have only to state the case and put your questions.

Socrates/ There are, then, two correlative principles, one existing independently, the other whichever has something else for its aim.

Protarchus/ What are the principles you mean, and in what sense do you speak of them?

Socrates/ One which in its very nature ever ranks first in dignity, and the other which falls far short of that.

Protarchus/ Say what you mean still more clearly.

Socrates/ We have noticed, I suppose, handsome and 'well-born boys accompanied by manly admirers.

Protarchus/ Certainly have.

Socrates/ Now, as these are two, so try and find two other principles resembling them in all things of which we predicate Relativity.

Protarchus/ Say clearer, Socrates, what you mean.

Socrates/ Nothing very subtle, Protarchus; it is only the subject that is teasing us. What it asserts is, that there is always one kind of thing that exists for the sake of another, and something else, for the sake of which whatever at any time takes place with a view to some result must be considered to take place.

Protarchus/ At last I understand your meaning, but only through its having been several times repeated.

Socrates/ And perhaps soon, my dear boy, we shall understand still better, as the argument proceeds.

Protarchus/ That is sure to be the case.

Socrates/ Let us then get hold of these other principles.

Protarchus/ "What are they?

Socrates/ One, the process of becoming in all things, the other, the state of being.

Protarchus/ I take on your word then the two facts of Existence and Production.

Socrates/ Most rightly said. And which of these, must we say, is for the sake of which, —production for existence, or existence, for production?

Protarchus/ Do you mean by your present question to ask, whether what we call existence is what it is (i.e. existence) for the sake of production?

Socrates/ That seems the drift of my question.

Protarchus/ In Heaven's name, is this what you ask me; 'Tell me, Protarchus, whether you say shipbuilding is for the sake of ships, or rather are ships for shipbuilding? And so of all matters of that sort.'

Socrates/ That, Protarchus, is precisely what I do mean.

Protarchus/ Then why don't you answer your own question, Socrates?

Socrates/ There is no reason why I should not. Do you however take part in the reply.

Protarchus/ Oh, of course.

Socrates/ Very well, then; I say that it is for the purpose of producing some result that drugs and implements of every kind, and all material, are placed at everyone's disposal; and further, that every act of production takes place for the sake of bringing into existence some special thing, some for one

and some for another; in a word, that production in general is for the sake of being in general.

Protarchus/ Nothing can be clearer than that.

Socrates/ Then surely pleasure, if it is a production at all, must needs be so for the sake of something produced.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ But certainly that for which whatever is at any time done, for the sake of another, is done, that stands in the condition of the good; while that done for the sake of something must, my excellent friend, be put in another category.

Protarchus/ That must be so, indeed.

Socrates/ Then, if Pleasure is a production, we must, to class it correctly, place it in some other position than that of the good.

Protarchus/ Such will be the most correct placing.

Socrates/ Then, as I said at the beginning of this discussion, we are bound to feel grateful to anyone who shall have explained to us the nature of pleasure, and proved that there is no real existence in it at all, since it is only a coming into being. For it is clear that such a one throws ridicule on those who say Pleasure is a Good.

Protarchus/ Decidedly.

Socrates/ But surely this same person will ridicule sometimes those who make the end consist in such productions.

Protarchus/ How? Whom do you mean?

Socrates/ Those who take pleasure in trying to cure hunger or thirst or any affection of that sort, such as can be cured by producing another state, —and who are pleased at the producing it, as if that were pleasure itself. So, they say they would not care to live at all if they could not feel hunger

and thirst, and had no experience of all those other passions that usually go with such sensations, but which we need not specify.

Protarchus/ They certainly seem to say this.

Socrates/ Should not all of us admit, now, that the opposite to becoming is the gradually ceasing to be?

Protarchus/ That must be so.

Socrates/ Then one who chooses this kind of life virtually chooses a state of destruction and production, and not that third kind of life, in which there is neither joy nor grief, but the purest use of the intellect?

Protarchus/ Much inconsistency, as it seems, Socrates, is the result, if one regards Pleasure as our good.

Socrates/ Much indeed; and let as state this in another way, thus.

Protarchus/ What way?

Socrates/ Surely it is unreasonable that there should be no good at all and no beauty either in bodies or in many other things, but only in the soul; and that even there no other good should exist but pleasure, and that manliness, self-control, intellect, or any of the fine qualities which the soul claims as its own, should be neither good nor beautiful! It is unreasonable too to be forced to say, that one who does not feel joy, but grief, is bad at the particular time when he is in grief, though, in fact, he may be the very best of men. Or again, that one in a state of joy, in proportion as he rejoices, is superior in respect of virtue at the particular time when he rejoices.

Protarchus/ All these suppositions, Socrates, are as unreasonable as they can possibly be.

Socrates/ Well, now, don't let us endeavor at all costs to make a full and thorough investigation of pleasure, but at

the same time show ourselves to be, as it were, very niggardly of mind and science. Rather let us, like men in earnest, ring our theory all round, to find if it has any weak point in it, till we discover the purest forms that pleasure and mind present, and so are able to use the most genuine portions of mind and science, as well as those of pleasure, for the decision to be made between them.

Protarchus/ You say rightly.

Socrates/ Then, if I mistake not, one department of mathematical science is employed in the service of the arts, another in that of education and culture, —or how say you.?

Protarchus/ As you do.

Socrates/ Let us then consider first, in the case of the manual arts, whether one part of them be not more directly allied to science, and another part less so; and whether we ought not to regard the former sort as the purest possible, the other as less pure.

Protarchus/ Yes, we ought.

Socrates/ In each of these then we should take separately the leading arts.

Protarchus/ "What arts, and in what way do you mean?

Socrates/ Thus: that if one separates from all the arts counting,)measuring, and weighing, the residue in each, so to say, would be quite insignificant.

Protarchus/ It would indeed.

Socrates/ For surely there would remain only conjecture for the rest, and to exorcise our senses by a kind of knack or tact, by calling in the aid of the faculties of guessing, which, indeed, many persons call arts, whereas their strength has really been produced by practice and exercise.

Protarchus/ That certainly is the case.

Socrates/ Then, to take music first: I presume it is full of such haphazard, since it often makes a tune not by measured time, but by guess-work resulting from practice. All flute-playing especially is full of it, as it tries to catch the precise time of each string in the lute, as the sound proceeds from it, by conjecture, so as to involve much that is uncertain, and but little that is fixed and settled.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Well, and we shall find medicine and farming and steering and the command of armies to follow precisely the same principle.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But the art of building, I presume, makes use of measures and tools more than any Other; and as these impart to it a great degree of exactness, they cause it to be more really an art than most of the sciences are.

Protarchus/ In what way?

Socrates/ Why, it is so in ship building and house-building and many other departments of carpentry. It employs, if I mistake not, a straight rule, and an instrument for drawing circles, a level and a line, and an ingenious contrivance for applying the plummet.

Protarchus/ Indeed, Socrates, you speak quite correctly.

Protarchus/ Then let us class under two heads the so-called arts; those which go with music, and have less exactness in the performance; and those of building, which have more.

Protarchus/ Let that be assumed.

Socrates/ And of these let us allow that those are the most exact which we lately called leading arts.

Protarchus/ I suppose you mean arithmetic, and such other arts as you lately spoke of in connection with it.

Socrates/ Assuredly. But must we not, Protarchus, describe these also in their turn us two-fold? How say you?

Protarchus/ Of what sorts are you speaking?

Socrates/ In the first place, must we not speak of arithmetic as of one sort, as employed by the many, but another, as applied to philosophy?

Protarchus/ By what distinction can one set down one kind of arithmetic under one head, another under a different one?

Socrates/ The distinction, Protarchus, is by no means a small one; some mathematicians count up unequal units in such things as pertain to number, e.g. two camps, two cows, two very small or two very large things; the other will never go a step along with them, unless one allows that no unit differs from any other single unit out of all the countless number of them that exist.

Protarchus/ You say very properly that there is no small difference in those who are engaged on numbers; so that it seems reasonable that the sciences are two.

Socrates/ Well, now, calculation and measurement, in building or in buying and selling, as respectively differing from the geometry of the scientific and the carefully computed reckonings, —must we say that each of these is one, or must we consider them as two?

Protarchus/ For my own part, following the same course as before, I should affirm that each of these was two, as far as I have a vote in the matter.

Socrates/ Right: and now do you understand why we have brought forward these illustrations?

Protarchus/ Perhaps I do; yet withal I should like you to give your own views on the question just proposed.

Socrates/ Well, then, it seems to me that the present argument has advanced thus far in looking for some counterpart to pleasures, which was its aim when we commenced it, and to be now inquiring whether there is a kind of science, as there is also a kind of pleasure, that is more pure than another. Protarchus: This, indeed, is very plain, that the argument has taken up these inquiries with this object in view.

Socrates/ Tory good. And did not the same argument try to make out, by tie agreement we came to above, that there are different branches of art in the various departments of knowledge, some more, others less plain and definite?

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ And does it not now, in the last example? we took, after specifying an art that bears the same name as another, and so bringing us to regard it as one, again put the question to us as if there were two, and ask whether there is not a more definite clearness and purity in such matters in the art as employed by scientific men, than by the unscientific?

Protarchus/ It does indeed appear to put this question.

Socrates/ What reply then, Protarchus, are we to give to it?

Protarchus/ Why, Socrates, we have arrived at a surprisingly great difference between the sciences in respect of clearness.

Socrates/ Shall we not then give the answer more easily?

Protarchus/ Of course; and let that answer be, that not only do these arts surpass greatly the others, but even in these such as are employed in the studies of your genuine philosopher are immensely superior in exactness and truth respecting measures and numbers.

Socrates/ Let this then be taken as your view; and in faith in you let us confidently reply to those who are so clever at dragging words, —

Protarchus/ Well, what?

Socrates/ That there really are two arithmetics and two mensurations, and many other branches of learning of the like kind, which have this doubleness, though they share in a common name.

Protarchus/ By all means let us give this answer to the clever people you mention, and may luck attend it.

Socrates/ Those sciences then we affirm to be in an especial manner exact.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But, Protarchus, the faculty of dialectic would disown us, if we preferred any other to her.

Protarchus/ And what are we call this other science?

Socrates/ Evidently, one that should have cognizance of all that we now call 'exact science.' For I imagine, on my own part, that all the world, —that is, all who have the smallest sense belonging to them, —fully believe that knowledge to be far the truest, which deals with abstract existence, and the real, and the naturally unchangeable. What do you think? What decision would you, Protarchus, arrive at?

Protarchus/ I did hear, more than once, Gorgias saying, my dear Socrates, that the art of persuading far surpassed all arts, in that it brought everything into subjection to itself not by putting constraint on the hearers, but by their own consent; and that thus it was by far the best of all the arts. But now I should not care to oppose either you or that distinguished rhetorician.

Socrates/ By force of arms, you wanted to say; but I fancy you dropped them through shame at making such an attack.

Protarchus/ At present, you shall have it all your own way.

Socrates/ I wonder if am to blame for your not rightly understanding me.

Protarchus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ I had not yet got, friend Protarchus, to asking this, what art or what science surpasses all in being the greatest and best and most beneficial to us; but which has for its aim certainty, exactness, and strict truth, even though it be small in itself and confer but small benefits, —that is the purport of my present inquiry. But now consider this point well, without fear of offending Gorgias, if you concede to his art the condition of being the best in respect of its serviceableness to men; while in respect to the profession of dialectic I have just mentioned, —as I said then about white, viz. that if there was but little of it, but still pure, it surpassed much white that was not pure, in this very quality of being the most genuine, —so now let us take this subject seriously in mind, and sufficiently consider the arguments both for and against it, without looking at any special benefits conferred by the sciences, nor to the repute in which any of them are held; but, if there is any natural faculty in our minds for loving truth and for doing everything for it, let us say, after a thorough search into it, if we can assert that this faculty above all others does, in all probability, possess this purity of mind and intellect, or if we must look for some other that has higher claims than this has in this respect.

Protarchus/ Well, I have given it due consideration, and I think it is difficult to allow that any other science or art has a greater hold on the truth than this has.

Socrates/ I presume you have made the present statement with the knowledge of this fact, that most of the arts, and those who are engaged in them; in the first place

make use of mere opinions, and inquire intently into matters of opinion; and if a man thinks he is inquiring into the nature of things, you are aware that the study of his life is about this world of ours, how it was created, how it is affected by or how it affects others, may we say this, or how must we state the case?

Protarchus/ As you have put it.

Socrates/ Then the labor which such a person takes up with is not about things ever existent, but about things that are being produced, or that have been or will be produced.

Protarchus/ That is very true.

Socrates/ Can we then affirm that there is any certainty, in the strictest truth of the word, in things, none of which ever were, or will be, or at this present are, in the same unchangeable state?

Protarchus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Then in matters that possess no fixedness nor permanency at all. how can any reasoning ever become fixed or settled to us?

Protarchus/ In no way at all, I should say.

Socrates/ Then they are not the objects of thought or science that deals in perfect truth.

Protarchus/ It is not likely, I think.

Socrates/ Then you and I, who take this view, are bound to give both Gorgias and Philebus a hearty farewell, and to call attention to this point in our argument.

Protarchus/ "What point do you mean?

Socrates/ That we have either in those abstract subjects of contemplation the fixed, the pure, the true, and what we call the genuine, —I mean, in those which always exhibit precisely the same conditions, without the least admixture with any other thing; or, as the next best resource, whatever

is nearest akin to them; while all other things must be called secondary and be said to come after them.

Protarchus/ What you say is very true.

Socrates/ Ought we not then, of the terms that are applied to such subjects, to assign the fairest to those which are themselves the fairest?

Protarchus/ It seems reasonable.

Socrates/ Are not then 'Mind' and 'Intellect' such terms as one would specially hold in honor?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Then such terms, in abstract conceptions, may, if rightly given, be called fitly applied.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Well, but the claimants which were before brought forward by me for the decision, were none other than what we express in these very terms.

Protarchus/ Of course they were, Socrates.

Socrates/ Very good; then if someone were to talk to us as artisans, and tell us that Intellect and Pleasure were set before us as materials from which and on which we were to manufacture something by blending the two together, he would not use an inappropriate figure of speech.

Protarchus/ That is very true.

Socrates/ Ought we not then, as the next step, to try to combine them?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Would not then our success be better secured by first mentioning, by way of reminding ourselves, these further points?

Protarchus/ What are they?

Socrates/ They are what we had in mind some time ago; but the proverb seems a good one which says that 'A. sound view should be turned over twice and even thrice in discussion.'

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Come then, I conjure you in heaven's name; for believe what we did say then was expressed in, some such terms as these.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Thus: 'Philebus says pleasure is rightly the object of all creatures, and all ought to aim at it; that this, in fact, and no other, is the good to all without exception; and that these two terms, 'good' and 'pleasant,' are rightly given to what is in truth one, and forms one natural class. But Socrates, in the first place, says this is not so, and affirms that as in their names, so in their nature, the two qualities 'good' and 'pleasant' are different from each other; and that Intellect has a better claim to the conditions of the Good than Pleasure has.' Is not this, and nothing but this, what we then said, Protarchus

Protarchus/ Yes, it certainly is.

Socrates/ Should we not then still agree between ourselves on the following point?

Protarchus/ What point is that?

Socrates/ That 'the Good' has in its nature this superiority over all other things.

Protarchus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ That if any creature possesses this always, fully, in every way and under all circumstances, it never requires, anything in addition, but has in the most perfect manner all that satisfies its wants. Is it not so?

Protarchus/ It is so, certainly.

Socrates/ And did we not essay in our argument to take each of these apart from the other, and assign to the life of one set of beings Pleasure unmixed with Intellect, and similarly to another Intellect without the least particle of Pleasure in it?

Protarchus/ That was so.

Socrates/ We did not then conclude that either the one or the other of them was sufficient in itself for anyone, did we?

Protarchus/ Indeed we did not.

Socrates/ And if we then went at all astray from the truth, let someone else now take up the matter again, and tell us what is the more correct view, classing under one general head memory, intellect, knowledge, and right judgment, and considering whether anyone, without these, would care to have or to come into possession of anything whatever, —to say nothing of pleasure, be it as much or as intense as possible, —since in that case he could have no correct notion that he felt joy, no knowledge at all of what the feeling is that is upon him, and no recollection whatever of that feeling for any moment of time. And the same you 'may say of Intellect; the question being whether, with the absence of all pleasure, even the briefest and smallest, a man would care to possess intellect, rather than have it in conjunction with some pleasures, or all pleasures without intellect, rather than with some intellect.

Protarchus/ That cannot be, Socrates: there really is no use in asking such questions many times over again.

Socrates/ Then perfect and thorough good, and such as all would choose, can be found in neither of these alternatives.

Protarchus/ How can it be?

Socrates/ Then we must get a notion what is 'the good,' either distinctly or in some general way, in order, as we said, to have some claimant to give the second prize to.

Protarchus/ What you say is very right.

Socrates/ Then we have now come upon a way that will lead us to 'the good.'

Protarchus/ What way?

Socrates/ Much as if a person, wanting to find out where somebody lived, were in the first instance to be correctly informed of the place of his residence. I suppose he would have one great aid towards finding what he was looking for.

Protarchus/ Of course he would.

Socrates/ Just so a course of reasoning has informed us, as indeed we were warned at first, not to look for the Good in the unmixed, but in the mixed life.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But surely there is more hope that what we are seeking will become plain to us in the life that is well and properly mixed than in that which is not.

Protarchus/ Very much more, Indeed.

Socrates/ Then let us proceed to make this mixture with a prayer to the gods, —Diorysus or Hephaestus, or whichever of the celestials holds this special prerogative of blending things together.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ And now we may fancy ourselves wine-servers, and that we have sources at hand to draw from That of Pleasure one may fairly compare to honey; that of intellect, a sober and wineless fount, to a wholesome water with no sweetness in it; and these we must endeavor to mix together in the best possible way.

Protarchus/ Certainly we must.

Socrates/ Tell me then, before we begin, are we likely to hit the right result by combining pleasure generally with intellect generally?

Protarchus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ But that would not be safe; I think I can put forward a notion of mine whereby we can mix with less risk.

Protarchus/ Tell me what that is.

Socrates/ One kind of pleasure, we said, is more truly pleasure than another; just as one art is more exact than another art.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly it is.

Socrates/ And one kind of knowledge is superior to another kind, the one looking only to things that are born and perish, the other, to those which do not, but which are entities ever the same. This knowledge then we, having regard to the truth of each, considered more true than that other.

Protarchus/ And you rightly so considered it.

Socrates/ Then if we first see the result of the mixing together these truest portions of each, pleasure and knowledge, [we may ask,] will these, when so blended, be sufficient to produce and furnish, us with this most desirable kind of life; or do we further require some of those ingredients that are not quite so pure and genuine?

Protarchus/ It appears to me, we had better do as you say.

Socrates/ Let us then suppose that we have a man who has an intelligent perception of the true nature of abstract justice; with reasoning powers on a par with his natural intuitions, and with similar views on all other abstract subjects whatever.

Protarchus/ Well, let that be assumed.

Socrates/ Shall we then say that such a person has science enough if he can give an account only of circles and globes as mentally conceived, but has no knowledge at all of the sphere and the circles that are used by men on this earth, —and if he uses in house-building, in the same abstract and unpractical way, not only the circles but all other rules and measures?

Protarchus/ The disposing of our time and trouble, as we now speak of it, on the abstract sciences alone, Socrates, would be absurd.

Socrates/ Do you mean then to say, that we should throw in, and mix up together with the abstract, this variable and not really pure art of the fallacious measure and circle of the practical builder?

Protarchus/ Why, that must be done, if anyone of us expects even to find his way home on any occasion.

Socrates/ And must we also mix up music, —mean the practice of it which we said, a little while ago, was full of guesswork and mere imitation, and deficient in pureness?

Protarchus/ To me it appears necessary, if our life is to be really life in any conceivable way.

Socrates/ Would you then have me follow the example of a door-keeper who is hustled and overpowered by a crowd, and so, as being beaten, open wide the doors, and then let go the whole lot of sciences, to pour in and mix together, the less perfect with the pure?

Protarchus/ For my own part, Socrates, I don't know what harm one can get from taking in all the other sciences, if one has already those which stand first.

Socrates/ Then must I let them all loose together, to flow into the bed of Homer's very poetical meeting of the waters?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Then there they go! And now we have to return to the source from whence we drew pleasures: for, though we had intended to mix them and the sciences in a certain way, by taking first portions of those only which were true, we failed in doing this. Our fondness for Science generally caused us to let loose at once all the kinds of science, and that before the pleasures.

Protarchus/ "What you say is very true.

Socrates/ Then now is the time for you and me to take into consideration the question about pleasures also; whether we are to let go the whole of these also in a body, or should send off first only those of them which are true.

Protarchus/ Certainly it is far better, as a measure of safety, to let go the true pleasures first.

Socrates/ Then let them go on their way. But what next? Must we not, as in the case of the Sciences, if some pleasures are necessary for our condition, mix in these also?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly; such as are necessary at all events.

Socrates/ But surly if, as we said it was not only harmless but even useful to possess a practical knowledge of all the arts through life, so we now assert the same about the pleasures, —that is, if we assume that it is beneficial to us, as well as Harmless to all men generally, to be in the enjoyment of all pleasures all our lives, —then we are bound not to omit any of them in making the mixture.

Protarchus/ How then are we to speak of these same pleasures, and how are we to act with respect to them?

Socrates/ You should not put the question to us, Protarchus, but to the pleasures themselves and the intellectual faculties, by an inquiry of this sort about their mutual relation.

Protarchus/ What is the nature of the inquiry?

Socrates/ 'My friends, whether I am to call you Pleasures, or to address you by some other name, would you not be quite willing and content to live in company with all intellectual exercise, or would you rather live without it?' For my part, I think they could not possibly avoid giving this reply to the question.

Protarchus/ What reply?

Socrates/ 'That, as was before said, it is neither possible nor beneficial for one solitary class, unmixed with any other, to exist by itself apart from the rest. We think, however, that of all the various kinds, weighing one against another, that is the best for residing with us, which consists in the comprehensive knowledge not only of things generally, but also of each of us Pleasures in as perfect a manner as is possible.'

Protarchus/ 'And a very proper answer you have now given us,' we shall say to them.

Socrates/ Rightly so. And now in turn we must put a similar question to Mind and Intellect. 'Do you feel any want of pleasures in combining yourselves?' we should say to them. 'Pleasures indeed!' they would perhaps say in contempt.

Protarchus/ I dare say they would.

Socrates/ And our address to them after this would run thus: 'In addition to those pleasures which are genuine,' we should say, 'do you further require that those which are the greatest and the most intense should reside with you?' 'Of course not, Socrates,' they would say, 'when they do but cause us endless interruptions, by disturbing the thoughts in which we are wrapt by insane delights, and do not only prevent us, the intellectual faculties, from being called into play at all, but totally ruin and spoil, in nearly every Instance, the offspring that may be born of us, by causing

forgetfulness of them consequent on neglect? No! those other pleasures that you have mentioned, —those which are pure and genuine, —regard, if you like, as almost a natural part of us; and beside them, such as are associated with bodily health and a well-ordered mind, and, indeed, all which put themselves in the train of Virtue generally, as of a goddess, and accompany her everywhere, —these, too, you may combine with us. But, of course, it would be utterly unreasonable to mix up with Mind any pleasures, be they what they may, that go with lewdness and vice of any kind, if one desires to see such effects of a mixture and a combination as are as beautiful and as harmonious as possible, and to try to learn in and by them what is the real nature of Good both in man and in the universe, and what eternal principle we must conceive it to be.' Shall we not say that Mind gives by this reply a sensible answer and one worthy of itself, in its own behalf and that of Memory and Bight Judgment?

Protarchus/ Host certainly.

Socrates/ Well, but surely this too is a necessity, and nothing but this can ever occur as a result?

Protarchus/ What may that be?

Socrates/ If we do not mix up truth, no true result can be produced, nor, if produced, exist.

Protarchus/ How can it?

Socrates/ It is impossible. But, if anything more is wanted for a mixture of this kind, do you and Philebus say so. For myself, I regard the conclusion we have now arrived at as a kind of invisible order made for the good government of a body endued with a living soul.

Protarchus/ Add, then, Socrates, that such is my opinion also.

Socrates/ Perhaps then we should not be very far wrong in saying that we now take our stand at the front door of 'the Good,'—the fore-court of the abode where such true Good resides.

Protarchus/ Such, at least, is my opinion.

Socrates/ What principle then is there in this mixture, that would seem at once the most valuable, and the chief cause of such a disposition being acceptable to all? For, if we succeed in getting a view of this, we will next proceed to consider whether it is more congenial and more allied to Pleasure or to Mind, In its place in our system of 'a general order.'

Protarchus/ We shall be right in doing so; for such a rule will be most useful for us in making our decision.

Socrates/ Well, now, it is not difficult, in mixture generally, to perceive the cause that makes this or that kind of it worth either all or absolutely nothing.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ No one, I suppose, is ignorant of that.

Protarchus/ Of what?

Socrates/ That all mixture, be it what it may and however made, that has not measure and a natural proportion, necessarily brings with it the spoiling not only of the ingredients used, but of itself in the first place. It would be no mixture, a process like that, —it becomes in reality a mere jumble that has nothing like mixture it, —a bringing together that actually brings loss on the owners whenever it is made.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Now, therefore, we find this property of 'the good' has taken refuge in the nature of 'the beautiful.' For measure and proportion, of course, are coincident all the world over with beauty and excellence.

Protarchus/ Indeed they are.

Socrates/ But we further said that truth was associated with them in the combination.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then, if we cannot get hold of The Good under one general principle, let us take it with three, Beauty, Symmetry, and Truth, and say, that we shall most properly regard them as One, and the real cause of the ingredients in the mixture remaining good, and through that, as being a good, that the mixture itself is also good.

Protarchus/ Yes, that is quite correct.

Socrates/ By this time then, Protarchus, any man will have become a competent judge of pleasure and intellect, and able to say which of the two is more akin to the Supreme Good, and held in higher esteem among gods as well as men.

Protarchus/ It is clear, no doubt; but still it will be better to argue the question fully out.

Socrates/ Let us then judge each of the three severally in comparison with Pleasure and Mind; for we are bound to see to which of the two we should assign each as being nearer of kin to it.

Protarchus/ You mean by the three Beauty, Truth, and Pleasure, I presume?

Socrates/ Yes; and take Truth first, my Protarchus. And when you have got it before you, fix your mind's eye upon the trio, Mind, Truth, and Pleasure; then take some time to think, and answer yourself, Is Pleasure or Mind more akin to truth?

Protarchus/ Why should we take time? In respect of truth, I suppose, there is a great difference between Mind and Pleasure. That is the most vainly pretentious of things; and there is even a saying, that in the pleasures of love,

(which, you know, are considered the greatest,) even perjury holds a general pardon from the gods, on the ground that these pleasures are like children, and possess not an atom of sense. "Whereas Mind is either the Fame as Truth, or more like it than anything else, and the truest.

Socrates/ Next, then, make the same comparison with regard to moderateness, and consider if Pleasure has in itself more of it than Intellect, or Intellect than Pleasure.

Protarchus/ This subject that you have proposed for consideration is not more difficult than the last. I suppose one could find nothing in the world that is in its nature more devoid of moderation than pleasure and ecstatic enjoyment, and nothing that has more of it than mind and science.

Socrates/ You have answered well. But still say about the third quality, Beauty, —has Mind a larger share of it, or the class of things to which Pleasure belongs, so that Mind is more beautiful than Pleasure, or the converse?

Protarchus/ Why certainly, Socrates, no man ever yet either conceived in his dreams or saw when awake that science and mind ever were, in any way at all, or are, or ever will be, things of moral ugliness.

Socrates/ You say rightly.

Protarchus/ But surely, when we see anyone, be he who he may, enjoying pleasures, and those of about the most ecstatic sort; observing that either ridicule or the greatest disgrace follows the indulgence of them, we are ashamed of them ourselves, and try to hide and put thorn out of sight as much as possible, reserving all such acts for night, as if it were not proper that they should see the light.

Socrates/ You will proclaim then all the world over, Protarchus, sending word by messengers and telling it to all present, that Pleasure is a possession that stands neither first in value nor even second; that the first is surely that

connected with measure and the moderate, with right time and place, and with all those qualities and conditions which we must suppose that, as being of the like kind, the Eternal Nature has chosen for its own.

Protarchus/ It seems so, certainly, from the course of our present argument.

Socrates/ The second, then, is that which has symmetry, beauty, perfection, sufficiency, and all the qualities which belong to this other class.

Protarchus/ It seems likely.

Socrates/ If then you set down as the third, —as far as I can divine—Mind and Intellect, you would not stray very far from the path of truth.

Protarchus/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ Must we not then allow that there are yet others that stand fourth. —those which we put down as purely mental, the sciences, arts, and right opinions, as they are called? Are not, I repeat, these fourthly to be added to the former three, if, as we assert, they are more akin to The Good than to Pleasure?

Protarchus/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Then, fifthly, we must put those pleasures which we distinguished as painless, calling them pure pleasures of the soul itself, some attending on sciences, some on perceptions.

Protarchus/ It may be so.

Socrates/ 'But at the sixth class' (as Orpheus says) 'bring to a close the order in the song.' And in fact, our argument, too, seems to be closed with the determining of the sixth place. After this then nothing remains for us but to add what we may call the finishing touch to all that we have hitherto said.

Protarchus/ Then let that be done.

Socrates/ Come then, as a third cup to the saving god, let us once again bring before the notice of the company and discuss the same proposition as before.

Protarchus/ What proposition do you mean?

Socrates/ Philebus reckoned Pleasure, in its completeness and entirety, to be to us 'The Good.'

Protarchus/ By using just now the phrase 'third cup,' you meant, as it seems, that we must take up once again from the beginning the original subject.

Socrates/ Yes; and to what follows after this let us give our attention. I, having a clear view of the truths I have now expounded, and feeling' a dislike of Philebus' account of the nature of Good, —and not only his, but that of others, many thousands in number, —affirmed that Mind was a far better and more profitable thing than at least Pleasure was to the life of men.

Protarchus/ That was so.

Socrates/ Suspecting too that there were many other things better than Pleasure, I said that, if something should prove to be better than both these, I would take the side of Mind in the contest with Pleasure for the second prize; and that Pleasure would be deprived even of second-class honors.

Protarchus/ Yes, that you did say.

Socrates/ Well, after this it was shown by most sufficient proofs that neither of these two was sufficient for us.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ In this discourse then both Mind and Pleasure were quite put out of the question, as not being either of them in itself the good, since they were found wanting in the

self-sufficing quality, and in the property that should characterize the satisfying and the complete.

Protarchus/ You have stated it quite correctly.

Socrates/ And now that another and a third claimant has come forward, better than either of these; again Mind has proved to be infinitely more nearly related and more suited to it than Pleasure, in all the conditions that characterize a superior.

Protarchus/ Assuredly so.

Socrates/ Then, according to the verdict which our argument has at last delivered, the real value of Pleasure will prove fifth in order.

Protarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ And not first; no, not even if all the cows and horses and all the rest of the brute creation put together should affirm it by the fact of their pursuing enjoyment. Yet people in general rely on the evidence of these creatures as seers do on. that of birds; and thus they conclude that our pleasures are decidedly the best for us as the object of life. They think, in fact, that the loves of brutes are witnesses of weight, more so even than a love of those reasonings which ever make their Guesses at Truth by the guidance of the goddess of Philosophy.

Protarchus/ That the Truth and nothing but the Truth has been spoken by you, Socrates, we are all of us now prepared to admit.

Socrates/ Then do you allow me to leave you now?

Protarchus/ There is a little matter that yet remains, Socrates; and I assume that you will not be weary of the discussion sooner than we. (If you will stay), I will remind you of the points which are left.

Philebus.

Translated by Edward Poste.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus.

Socrates/ Just observe now, Protarchus, what the proposition is which you are going to take up from Philebus, and what the other is that I maintain, and that you are to controvert if you disallow its truth. Should you like me to state them both concisely?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Philebus asserts the goodness for all sentient beings of Enjoyment, and Pleasure, and Gratification, and all that is denoted by that sort of term. I maintain, in opposition, that Wisdom, and Reason, and Memory, and their kindred, Right Opinion and True Reasonings, are, compared with Pleasure, the better and more desirable acquisition for all that have them in their power; and, indeed, the very greatest acquisition to all such in these or any future times. Our respective positions are something like these, are they not?

Philebus/ Precisely these.

Socrates/ Do you, Protarchus, adopt this tenet that is now handed over to you to advocate?

Protarchus/ I needs must, for Philebus,' our handsome friend, is quite exhausted.

Socrates/ Whatever it may cost, we must somehow arrive at the true decision of this question, I suppose?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Let us agree on another point.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ We are both to indicate a state and a disposition of soul able to make the life of all men happy, are we not?

Protarchus/ We are.

Socrates/ And you assert this of a state of Enjoyment, I of Wisdom?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ How if some third state prove better than either? In that case, if it turn out more nearly allied to Pleasure, we are both vanquished by the life that really has such beatific power, and the life of Pleasure vanquishes the life of Wisdom?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Should it, however, turn out more akin to Wisdom, Wisdom wins, and Pleasure loses the day. Do you accede to these preliminaries, or not?

Protarchus/ I accede.

Socrates/ And, Philebus, how say you?

Philebus/ Whatever the conditions of the contest, Pleasure is victorious, I think, and always shall. You, Protarchus, must judge for yourself.

Protarchus/ You have resigned the argument to me, Philebus, so you are no longer competent to agree with Socrates, or to disagree.

Philebus/ True; but I wash my hands of his doctrine, and call the goddess herself to witness.

Protarchus/ Yes; and all of us, too, will bear you witness that you asserted what you say you do. But let us try to make the next step, Socrates, with or without the consent of Philebus.

Socrates/ Yes; and our point of departure must be the goddess herself, who our friend here says is called Aphrodite, though her truest name is Pleasure.

Protarchus/ Good.

Socrates/ But my awe in naming the gods is more than human, and greater than the greatest fear. Be Aphrodite, therefore, spoken of as she vouchsafes. Pleasure, I am sure, is multiform; and, as I said, we must make her our point of departure, and consider and inquire into her nature. For uniform as the oneness of her name at first might lead us to suppose her, she assuredly has multitudinous and somewhat dissimilar shapes. For consider, we ascribe Pleasure to uncontrolled self-indulgence, and Pleasure to the act of self-control; Pleasure to folly, full of irrational opinions and hopes, and Pleasure to the exercise of wisdom; and can anyone think these Pleasures similar without being justly held to want the faculty of discrimination?

Protarchus/ They spring from opposite sources, Socrates, but are not opposite themselves. For how can Pleasure be other than the likest thing in the world to Pleasure, —that is, to itself?

Socrates/ Why no one color differs from another color, thou acute reasoner, so far as both are colors; but black, we all know, is not only different, but most contrary to white. And to the same extent no figure will differ from another figure, for all are the same in genus: but surely of the species of this genus some are quite contrary to one another, and others have ten thousand points of difference. And so we shall find it stands with many other things. So you must not rely on this argument, by which the most opposite things may be proved to be one and identical, and I fear we shall find an opposition between Pleasures.

Protarchus/ Possibly; but if we do, how will this damage my position?

Socrates/ Because the predicate you propose to apply to them, in spite of their dissimilarities, is a term, I answer, distinct from their genus. You assert that all Pleasures are Good. Now that all the pleasant is pleasant no one denies. But I maintain that some pleasant things, and indeed the greater number, are bad, and yet you call all of them Good, though you acknowledge their dissimilarity when you are pressed. What is there identical in good and bad pleasures which you designate when you call all of them Good?

Protarchus/ What, Socrates, do you think anyone will concede when he has asserted that Pleasure is the Good—do you think he will then tolerate your assumption that some are good and others bad?

Socrates/ Why you own they are dissimilar, and some of them opposite.

Protarchus/ Not in so far as they are Pleasures.

Socrates/ We are relapsing into our old argument, Protarchus. We deny any difference between Pleasure and Pleasure, and maintain that all are alike; and the examples just cited miss their aim, and we are going to lay ourselves open to objections, and content ourselves with retorting them, like the sorriest and youngest reasoners.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Why, if I copy you and retaliate, I may maintain that the most unlike things are of all the likest, and defend it by the arguments you use; and we shall convict ourselves of puerility, and our discussion will be driven from its course on to the rocks and wrecked. Let us stop rowing then and back water, and perhaps if we do as wrestlers do and start again from our former grip, we may come to some indisputable result.

Protarchus/ In what way?

Socrates/ Suppose, Protarchus, you retorted the same questions on me.

Protarchus/ What questions?

Socrates/ Are not Wisdom, and Science, and Reason, and the things that I originally maintained in my thesis to be Good, when I was asked the nature of the Good, all open to the same criticism as that which you propose?

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ They are a numerous class, and present great dissimilarities. But if they even presented contrarieties, should I deserve to be reasoned with if alarm at this fact made me deny there was any difference between Sciences, and thus our discussion should go to pieces, and dissolve, like an idle tale, while we ourselves only escaped from the wreck by breaking the laws of logic?

Philebus/ Heaven forbid—barring the escape. However, I like the evenhanded dealing with both our propositions. Agreed that there are many unlike Pleasures, and many unlike Sciences.

Socrates/ The heterogeneous character of both of our rival Goods must not be disguised, but boldly displayed, in the hope that some test may reveal whether Pleasure or Wisdom, or something different from either, is to be called the Good. For I assume we are not merely emulous for the triumph of the doctrine that I uphold, or the doctrine that you uphold, but the truest doctrine commands the allegiance of both.

Protarchus/ It does.

Socrates/ Let us still further ratify this principle by more explicit agreement.

Protarchus/ What principle?

Socrates/ That which causes such universal trouble, to some men with their will, and to some occasionally against their will. I mean the principle paradoxical enough that just now started up in the discussion. For though the proposition that the Many are One and the One is Many may have a paradoxical sound, it is easily maintained by the advocate of either clause.

Protarchus/ Do you mean when a man says that I the one and individual Protarchus am many, and even proves the many Me's to be opposites of one another, the same individual being great and small, heavy and light, and ten thousand other opposites?

Socrates/ These, Protarchus, are the trite paradoxes about the One and Many, banished by almost unanimous consent from discussion as puerile and obvious and great impediments to true speculation; as also is the artifice of dividing a thing into its parts and members, and on the admission that they are all that original One triumphing over your opponent for holding the monstrous tenet that what is One is Many and infinite, and what are Many are only One.

Protarchus/ And what are the other aspects of this proposition, Socrates, that are not yet trite and banished from discussion?

Socrates/ When, boy, the One assumed is not a thing born and perishing as in the former instances: for then, as I said, and about this kind of One men are agreed not to argue; but if you assume one universal Man or Ox, or Beautiful or Good, such unities earnestly examined and split into pluralities soon kindle genuine controversy.

Protarchus/ On what questions?

Socrates/ First, whether we ought to believe in the veritable existence of such monads; secondly, how each can be one and unchangeable without generation or decay and

indubitably single, and yet in the infinite individuals of the phenomenal world is either broken up and divided, or whole in each and sundered from itself; which latter hypothesis would seem the most impossible, for how can one identical thing be simultaneously in one thing and in a multitude of others? These problems, Protarchus, about this kind of unity and multiplicity, not the kind that you mentioned, cast nothing but darkness when wrongly decided, and, when rightly solved, abundance of light.

Protarchus/ Must we work at this question now, Socrates?

Socrates/ So I for one should say.

Protarchus/ And all the rest of us concur; perhaps we had better not wake with queries a sleeping Philebus.

Socrates/ So be it. How shall we begin the long and various battle on the disputed points? Shall it be thus? —

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ I say that the transformations by logic of unity into plurality and plurality into unity meet us at every comer in every matter to which language is applied, and are neither a transitory nor a modem apparition, but apparently an undying and unaging phenomenon of reason itself. And from age to age the youth who first detects it is delighted as if he had lit on a treasure of wisdom, and with eager enthusiasm leaves not a syllogism unturned, but now coils and ravels up multiplicity into unity, now unrolls and disperses unity into plurality, to the utter confusion first and foremost of himself, next of any chance neighbor younger, older, or his equal in years, without mercy to father, mother, or any other listener, and hardly to the brutes, let alone mankind, for of course no barbarian would receive any quarter if an interpreter were to be had.

Protarchus/ Socrates, do you see how many we are and all of us young? Have you no fear of our falling on you, Philebus at our head, if you make us the mark of your gibes? However, as there is a grain of truth in what you say, if there is any contrivance or spell to lay this spirit of wild confusion or charm it from the discussion, or any better path to the solution of our problem, pray, do your best to find it out, and we will do our best to follow in your steps. For it is an important question, Socrates.

Socrates/ It is indeed, boys, to use the title sanctioned by Philebus. However, there is not nor can there be a more excellent way than one with which I have long been fascinated, but which has often eluded my quest and left me baffled and forlorn.

Protarchus/ What way do you mean? Describe it.

Socrates/ One easy to point out but very hard to follow. For every kind of art that has ever been invented was disclosed by it. However, listen to my description.

Protarchus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ A gift of gods to men, such at least is my conviction, was flung from some quarter of heaven by some Prometheus along with a most luminous fire; and the men of old, who were better than we and dwelt nearer heaven, transmitted this oracle, that unity and multiplicity constitute what we call Being, and limit and infinity are inwoven in its nature; that, as this is the law of the cosmos, unity should be assumed in every province and proposed for discovery, and the search will not be vain; and after discovering unity we next should look to find within it a duad or triad, or some other number; and in each unit of these latter a further number; until the original One has been not only seen to have unity, multiplicity, and infinity, but has had its multiplicity counted; and that infinity should be kept

away from the multiplicity until we have counted the multiplicity that intervenes between infinity and unity; then each unit of the multiplicity may be let go into infinity, and we may rest from our labors. The gods, as I said, sent down a tradition that this is the right method of inquiring and learning and teaching; but the wise of our day are too quick or too slow, as may happen, in making out the Manifold One, and introduce infinity immediately after unity, without ascertaining the intermediates, which is the distinction between dialectical and sophistical reasoning.

Protarchus/ I think I partly understand what you mean, Socrates, but I should like you to explain it more clearly.

Socrates/ The letters of the alphabet which you learnt as a child are an illustration of what I mean. Let us view it as exemplified in them.

Protarchus/ How do they exemplify it?

Socrates/ The sound emitted from the mouth of a man, or of the human race, is one, and yet infinite.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the knowledge neither of the unity nor of the infinity of sound makes us scientific; but we must know the number and the nature of the kinds of sound in order to be grammarians.

Protarchus/ We must.

Socrates/ And so to be musicians.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Sound, the subject of music as well as of grammar, is here, also, one and many.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Shall we divide it into base, treble, and unison, or how?

Protarchus/ As you have done.

Socrates/ You would not be a musician if this were all you knew about it; though, if you did not know this, you would be an utter stranger to the science of sound.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But supposing, my friend, you came to know the number and nature of the intervals between sounds distinguished as acute and grave, and of the notes separated by the intervals, and the number of systems they produce, which the men of old who discovered them taught us, their successors, to denominate harmonies; and supposing you saw in bodily motions similar elements and systems, which as being measured arithmetically they would have us denominate measures and rhythms, and understand that this is the right method of investigating all unity and multiplicity; —supposing, I say, you know these details, you are master of the theory; and similar inquiries and discoveries are requisite for the attainment of any other science. But the infinite multiplicity of each set of individuals and their properties leaves you unscientific, and of no account or class on the rolls of learning, as no number or class in any sphere of inquiry have owed you their discovery.

Protarchus/ What Socrates is now saying seems to me admirable, Philebus.

Philebus/ And so it does to me, taken by itself; but what is its relevance or drift?

Socrates/ Philebus is right in asking this question, Protarchus.

Protarchus/ He is, indeed. Will you give him an answer?

Socrates/ I will, after a little further explanation of the principle. As the man who starts from unity ought not to pass at once to infinity, but through definite number, so when he unavoidably starts from infinity he ought not to

pass at once to unity, but first look for a number, and distinguish the several multitudes that compose the infinity, and so finally proceed to unity. We may exemplify this by the alphabet.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ On a survey of the infinite variety in voices, some god or godlike man, according to the Egyptian story, in which he bears the name of Theuth, first perceived vowels in this infinity, not one but a multiplicity; and afterwards other elements, neither vocal nor quite devoid of noise, numerous like the former; and lastly the class that we denominate mutes. He then divided first the voiceless and noiseless class, and then the vocal and semi-vocal classes, into their ultimate units. After thus ascertaining their number, he called each and every separate elementary sound a letter; and observing that we cannot take cognizance of anyone of them apart from all, in consideration of this common bond and the sort of unity it gives them, he assigned them all to a single theory, and named it the Grammatical art.

Philebus/ This is still clearer than the other statement, Protarchus; but I look in vain for the same point as before.

Socrates/ You mean its relevancy, Philebus?

Philebus/ Yes; this is what I and Protarchus have been long trying to discover.

Socrates/ And yet you were all the time close to what you say you have long been trying to find.

Philebus/ How?

Socrates/ Was not our original debate about Pleasure and Wisdom, and which is to be preferred to the other?

Philebus/ It was.

Socrates/ This is the point which my principle bids us explain: how they each are One and Many and not immediately multiplied to Infinity, and into what Number they are developed before they pass to Infinity.

Protarchus/ This is not an easy question, Philebus, which Socrates has led us into by some circuitous route, I cannot say how. And tell me which of us shall answer the question. Perhaps, indeed, it is absurd, after unreservedly undertaking to be your successor in the controversy, that now, because I am at a loss, I should require you to answer the question; and it would be much more absurd, I think, if neither of us could do so. So consider what we had better do. Socrates asks us about the species of Pleasure, I think; their existence, number, and character: and similarly of Wisdom.

Socrates/ Most true, son of Callias. For unless, as we said just now, we can indicate this in every case of unity, similarity, and identity, and their opposites, we shall be of no account in any inquiry.

Protarchus/ This seems to be nearly the truth, Socrates. However a moderate-minded man holds universal knowledge in high estimation, but next on the list of good, in default of the first, the consciousness of his own ignorance. What is the drift of my remark? I will tell you. You were so obliging as to grant us a conference, and promise your assistance in deciding what is the best of human possessions. Philebus said it was Pleasure and the gratification of desire and Delight and all that sort of thing; and you affirmed in opposition it was not this, but that other group which we keep repeatedly naming, purposely and rightly, that it may be present to our memory, and ready for examination. And you assert, it seems, that what would rightly be called a better Good than Pleasure is to be found in Intellect, Science, Perception, Art, and the tribe akin to

these, and these, therefore, not those, should be our aim. As these rival doctrines produced a controversy, we threatened in sport not to let you go home till the question had received some adequate determination and solution. You agreed, and placed yourself at our command. So now we plead the nursery proverb, 'Fairly given not retaken.' Cease, then, this way of dealing with the matter.

Socrates/ What way?

Protarchus/ Puzzling us, and putting questions to which we cannot directly give a satisfactory answer. For our general perplexity must not be taken as a termination of the debate; but, if we cannot solve the difficulty, you must solve it yourself. Decide, therefore, for yourself, whether it is necessary to divide Pleasures and Sciences into their species, or whether this may be let alone, if you are able and willing to decide the question in any other way.

Socrates/ Your words release an intimidated man from his apprehensions. The clause, 'If you are willing,' quite puts me at my ease. Besides, some god, I think, has refreshed my memory.

Protarchus/ Of what, and how?

Socrates/ I now recollect that I once long ago, waking or dreaming, heard some reasonings about Pleasure and Wisdom, proving that neither is the supreme Good, but something else excelling both.

Now, if we should be convinced of this, Pleasure, in the first place, is vanquished, for she cannot be identified with the Good; and secondly, we shall not want the division of Pleasure into species. But the progress of the inquiry will show whether this is so.

Protarchus/ I am glad to hear what you say. Pray, take this way of settling the question.

Socrates/ Let us first agree on a few other points.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Must the Good be Perfect ox not Perfect?

Protarchus/ Most Perfect, of course, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, is it Sufficient?

Protarchus/ It must be so, and must surpass everything else in this respect.

Socrates/ And, I suppose, we plainly must allow that all percipient beings Desire, and pursue, and strive to seize and possess it, and do not care for anything except as means and instruments of Good?

Protarchus/ Plainly.

Socrates/ Now, let us examine and test the lives of Pleasure and Wisdom, taking them separately.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Suppose the life of Pleasure has no particle of Wisdom in it, and the life of Wisdom no particle of Pleasure, for if either of these is the Good, it must not need the supplementary addition of anything else; and if either prove to stand in need of anything else, it can no longer be imagined the real Good.

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well, let us try and assay them on the touchstone of your volition.

Protarchus/ Agreed.

Socrates/ Well, answer then.

Protarchus/ Put your question.

Socrates/ Would you, Protarchus, consent to pass all your life in the fruition of the greatest Pleasures?

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Should you still consider that you needed something else, if your life was perfectly pleasurable?

Protarchus/ No.

Socrates/ Reflect. Would not Wisdom, or Insight, or the power of planning, or anything of the sort, still be necessary?

Protarchus/ Why should they? I should have everything I wanted in having Joy.

Socrates/ In living thus you would constantly enjoy the greatest Pleasures. But wanting Reason, and Memory, and Knowledge, and True Opinion, you in the first place would not even know whether you were pleased or not, having, as you would have, no grain of Wisdom.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And similarly wanting Memory you would remember no past Pleasure, and no present Pleasure would leave a trace: and wanting True Opinion when pleased you would have no apprehension of Pleasure: and wanting reasoning power you could not anticipate a future Pleasure: and your life would not be the life of a man but of a zoophyte, or one of ocean's animated shells. Is this true, or can we conceive it otherwise?

Protarchus/ It is true.

Socrates/ Well, then, is such a life Desirable?

Protarchus/ I am altogether embarrassed by what you have said, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let us not flinch from our task, but next examine the life of Reason.

Protarchus/ What sort of life?

Socrates/ Would anyone of us consent to live in the full possession of Reason, and Science, and Memory, a perfect stranger to Pleasure and Pain, and absolutely insensible to this class of emotions?

Protarchus/ Neither of these lives seems Desirable to me, or to anybody else, I believe.

Socrates/ But what think you of the Double life, the mixture and union of both?

Protarchus/ You mean the life combining Pleasure, and Reason, and Wisdom?

Socrates/ Yes, that is the kind of life I mean.

Protarchus/ Everyone, of course, would prefer this to either of those, and all without exception would desire it in addition to either.

Socrates/ Do you perceive the result of our inquiry?

Protarchus/ Certainly. Three lives have been proposed, and two of these are not Sufficient or Desirable for man or any other living creature.

Socrates/ Is it not already clear, then, about these, at least, that neither of them contains the Good? For if it did it would be Sufficient, and Perfect, and Desirable to all vegetables and animals that had it in their power. And if any of us chose anything else, he would choose unnaturally what is not a true object of choice: his act would be involuntary, and proceed from ignorance, or some unblest necessity.

Protarchus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ So, I think, it has been sufficiently shown that the goddess of Philebus, at all events, cannot be thought identical with the Good.

Philebus/ Nor your Reason, either, Socrates, and for the same defects of title.

Socrates/ Not my Reason, perhaps, Philebus: but the true and divine Reason, I fancy, is of a different character. However, I no longer claim the highest rank for Reason against the Mixed life, but we must examine and decide what to do with the second prize. For, perhaps, the cause of the goodness of this Composite life may be ascribed by one of us to Reason, and by the other to Pleasure, and thus though

the Good is identical with neither, the causation of the Good may be due to one or other of the two. This point I would contest with Philebus, and still more this, that whatever it is in the Balanced life which makes it desirable and good has more affinity and similarity to Reason 'than to Pleasure. And if so, Pleasure cannot be said to have a claim to the second prize any more than to the first. And if I may trust my Reason, her rank is even lower than the third.

Protarchus/ Well, Socrates, Pleasure appears to have already fallen before you struck to the earth by the shafts of your logic; for she entered the lists for the first prize, and is overthrown. And it would seem we must say that Reason was wise in not aspiring to the first prize, for he would have met a similar fate. But now, if Pleasure failed to win even the second prize, she really would be disgraced in the eyes of her lovers, for even they could no longer think her so fair.

Socrates/ Well, well! would it not be better to let her alone now, and not pain her by putting her to the last ordeal, and exposing the emptiness of her pretensions?

Protarchus/ Idle words, Socrates.

Socrates/ Why? Because I talked of an impossibility—paining Pleasure?

Protarchus/ Not only because of this, but also because you are not aware that we shall not release you till you have reasoned out the question to a conclusion.

Socrates/ Heavens! then, Protarchus, what an amount of reasoning remains, and perhaps more than we can exhaust. For we clearly need another plan if we lay claim to the second rank for Reason, and must fight with different weapons to those we have used. Some, however, of the old ones perhaps may be serviceable. Must it be done, then?

Protarchus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Let us try to be very careful in laying the foundation.

Protarchus/ What foundation?

Socrates/ Let us divide all things that now exist in the universe into two classes, or rather, if you please, into three.

Protarchus/ Pray explain the principle of division.

Socrates/ Let us employ again some of the statements we recently made.

Protarchus/ Which statements?

Socrates/ The divinity, I think we said, revealed that existence was composed of two elements, an Unlimited and Limit.

Protarchus/ We said so.

Socrates/ Let these be two of the classes, and the third class one produced by the Mixture of these. But it seems I fail ridiculously in attempting an exhaustive division and enumeration.

Protarchus/ What do you mean, my good friend?

Socrates/ That I now want a fourth class.

Protarchus/ Of what nature?

Socrates/ Look at the Cause of the composition of the first two, and add it as a fourth to the former three.

Protarchus/ Will you want a fifth class as an agent of decomposition?

Socrates/ Possibly; but not, I think, now. However, if we should, you will pardon me for asking for a fifth.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ From these four we will separate the three first, and after we have observed how two of these are rent and broken into pieces, and have reunited the fragments, we will

try to discover in what manner they were both of them one and many.

Protarchus/ If you explained yourself more fully, perhaps I might understand you.

Socrates/ By the two first to be examined I mean the two that I mentioned just now—the Unlimited and the Limited or Mixed: And I will first try to show the multiplicity of the Unlimited, and meanwhile the Limited may wait.

Protarchus/ It may wait.

Socrates/ Consider; for what I want you to notice is hard to see and open to dispute. Observe, however. Have Hotter and Colder, if you will first look at them, any Limit that you can find; or do not More and Less indwell in their essence, and as long as they dwell there, is not End excluded? For with the admission of End their own existence is ended.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ But the More and the Less are ever inherent in Hotter and Colder.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ This consideration shows that Hotter and Colder are endless, and therefore absolutely Unlimited.

Protarchus/ Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well answered, Protarchus; and you remind me that the Very Much and the Very Little resemble the More and the Less. Wherever they are found, they tolerate no Definite Quantity; gradations in the force of action are introduced, the Greater and the Smaller follow in their train, and Definite Quantity is exterminated. For, as I said, if they did not exterminate Definite Quantity, but allowed it and Due Measure to invade the seat of More and Less, and Very Much and Very Little, these last would themselves perish from their abiding place. For Hotter and Colder could not

survive the admission of Definite Quantity. For they are fugitive and never stay, but Definite Quantity stops, and has its progress arrested. This proves the Unlimited character of Hotter and his antagonist.

Protarchus/ So it seems, Socrates. But as you said, the matter is not easy to grasp. Perhaps, however, explanation and re-explanation may bring questioner and answerer to agree.

Socrates/ True, and so we must try to do. Now, however, not to linger on every detail, see whether this may be taken for a mark of the Unlimited.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Whatever things change through the degrees of More and Less, and admit Very Much, and Very Little, and Excess, and that sort of character, must be put in the genus of the Unlimited as their unity, in accordance with the rule we laid down, that we must join, to the best of our power, all that is scattered and broken, and stamp it with a single impress. Do you remember?

Protarchus/ I do.

Socrates/ Good; and whatever things do not admit of these characters, but their opposites, first Equal and Equality, next Double and the other proportions of number to number, or magnitude to magnitude, shall we do right if we reckon all these in the genus of Limit, or how say you?

Protarchus/ We shall do right.

Socrates/ Well, and what character shall we assign to the third class that is Compounded of these two?

Protarchus/ You, I think, can tell me.

Socrates/ No. Some god may, if he is propitious to my prayers.

Protarchus/ Pray, then, for divine assistance, and reflect.

Socrates/ I do; and I think some god is propitious to us.

Protarchus/ How? and why do you think so?

Socrates/ I will tell you. And mark me well.

Protarchus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ We spoke just now of Hotter and Colder, did we not?

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ Add to them Dryer and Moister, More and Fewer, Quicker and Slower, Greater and Smaller, and all that we recently united and joined together in the class admitting More or Less.

Protarchus/ You mean the Unlimited class?

Socrates/ Yes; and next mix with them the tribe of Limit.

Protarchus/ What tribe?

Socrates/ The Limitative tribe, that we ought to have assembled a little while ago, as we did the Unlimited, but forgot. Perhaps, however, it will be just the same if we do it now. When these two are blended, the third that results from them will be plain.

Protarchus/ What is the second tribe, and how can we blend them?

Socrates/ The Equal and the Double, and whatever terminates the war of contraries and produces symmetry and concord by introducing Number.

Protarchus/ I understand you. I think you say that by their conjunction all Productions are formed?

Socrates/ You conjecture truly.

Protarchus/ Continue then.

Socrates/ In disease does not their due composition restore health?

Protarchus/ It does.

Socrates/ Are not the acute and grave, quick and slow, originally Unlimited, and does not the advent of this other tribe, by introducing Limit, create out of them the whole world of music?

Protarchus/ It does, perfectly.

Socrates/ And when they enter into cold and heat they expel the excessive and Unlimited, and produce the measured and proportionate.

Protarchus/ They do.

Socrates/ And are not the seasons, and all that is beautiful, the result of this union of Unlimited and Limitant?

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ And there are ten thousand other instances which I omit, as health, and beauty, and strength, and many most beautiful things in the soul. For this goddess, excellent Philebus, seeing that license and vice are devoid of Limit in pleasures and indulgences, established the limitations and restraints of law and order, cramping and crippling the soul, as thou sayest, effecting, as I say, its salvation. But how say you, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ I entirely agree with you.

Socrates/ I have now mentioned three classes, if you observe.

Protarchus/ I think I understand which you mean. For one I think you mean the Unlimited: for another Limit. For the third I am not quite sure what you mean.

Socrates/ Because its multiplicity bewilders you, my friend. However, the Unlimited was a numerous family too, and yet when it was stamped with the generic impress of More and Less, we had no doubt of its unity. Limit, to be sure, did not include many members, and we had no difficulty in admitting its unity.

Protarchus/ How could we have?

Socrates/ How, indeed? However, when I speak of a third class, I reduce to unity the Offspring of the other two, all births into being from the introduction of Limit and Measure.

Protarchus/ Now I understand.

Socrates/ It remains to be inquired what the fourth class is that we spoke about. And you must help me in the inquiry; and tell me if you think that whatever is produced must he produced by a Cause?

Protarchus/ I do. How else could it be produced?

Socrates/ And Cause only differs in name from Maker? And Cause and Maker may be said to be one?

Protarchus/ They may.

Socrates/ And similarly we shall find that what is produced and what is made only differ in name?

Protarchus/ We shall.

Socrates/ And the Maker naturally precedes, and the birth of what is made follows?

Protarchus/ It does.

Socrates/ Cause, then, and what contributes to production as the slave of Cause, are distinct, and not identical?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ The things that are produced and the things out of which they are produced made up together the three classes?

Protarchus/ They did.

Socrates/ Shall we call the artificer of them, the Cause, a fourth class, assuming its distinctness proved?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ As we have distinguished four classes, it may be as well to impress them on our memory by recounting them in order.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ I make the Unlimited the first class, Limit the second, Compound and Produced Being the third, and shall I be wrong if I call the Cause of composition and production the fourth?

Protarchus/ Ton will not be wrong.

Socrates/ Come now, what is next to be said, and what was our design in taking this line of inquiry? Was it not this? We were inquiring whether the second prize would belong to Pleasure or to Wisdom, were we not?

Protarchus/ We were.

Socrates/ Will the classification we have made assist ns in deciding the first and second prize we were disputing about?

Protarchus/ Perhaps.

Socrates/ Come: we assigned the first prize to the Mixed life, combining both Pleasure and Wisdom, did we not?

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ Well, of course we can have no difficulty about the character of this life, and the class to which it belongs?

Protarchus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ And we shall put it with others into the third class, I imagine. For that class is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the Limitless class subdued and coerced by Limit. So that the victor life will only be one of its members.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Good; and how about your life, Philebus, pleasant and unmixed? In which class should it be placed?

But before giving your opinion, first answer me these questions.

Philebus/ Put them.

Socrates/ Is Limit inherent in Pleasure and Pain, or are they of the class susceptible of augmentation and diminution?

Philebus/ Yes, Socrates, they are of the class susceptible of augmentation. For were Pleasure Limited in number or degree she could not be the absolute Good.

Socrates/ Nor Pain, Philebus, absolute evil. So we must find something else than its Unlimited character to impart goodness to Pleasure. Well; let Pleasure be reckoned of the class of the Limitless: to which class, Protarchus and Philebus, can we refer Wisdom, and Science, and Reason, without impiety? For it seems to me of momentous import whether we make a right or wrong decision.

Philebus/ You magnify your god, Socrates.

Socrates/ And so do you yours, Philebus. Still this query must be answered.

Protarchus/ Socrates says truly, Philebus, and we must do as he bids.

Philebus/ Well, have hot you undertaken to be spokesman in my stead, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ I have. However, I now am fairly at a loss; and I beg you, Socrates, to perform the function of prophet yourself, that we may pronounce no false judgment on this claimant, or say anything that should not be said.

Socrates/ I must do as you bid me, Protarchus; and, indeed, you do not impose a difficult task. But did my jocose magnifying, as Philebus called it, really discompose you, Protarchus, when I asked you what is the class of Reason and Science?

Protarchus/ Indeed it did, Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet the answer is easy. For all the wise agree, magnifying themselves indeed, that Reason is the lord of heaven and earth. And, peradventure, they say truly. But if you like, we will investigate its class at greater length.

Protarchus/ Proceed as you think best, and never mind the length on our account, for we shall not quarrel with you, Socrates.

Socrates/ Very well, then let us begin with some such question as this: —

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Shall we hold, Protarchus, that the All and what we call the universe is subject to an irrational and undesigning power and the play of chance, or, as older generations said, is arranged and controlled by some Reason and marvelous Wisdom?

Protarchus/ Surely we need not merely re-echo what others have said. The first alternative, I think, is absolutely profane; but that Reason orders everything is a doctrine proclaimed by the aspect of the world, and sun, and moon, and stars, and revolving heavens; and I will never utter or believe any other.

Socrates/ Shall we, then, make a profession of faith, and say, with former generations, that it is so; and, not content with merely repeating the assertions of others without risk to ourselves, shall we take our share of danger and reproach attaching to the creed when talented men contradict it, and teach that the universe is destitute of arrangement?

Protarchus/ Yes, we will.

Socrates/ Now observe the next stage of the argument.

Protarchus/ Point it out.

Socrates/ The elements in the bodies of all animals, water, and fire, and air, and earth, may be discovered like land in a storm, as the saying is, in the frame of the universe.

Protarchus/ They may; and in truth I am out of my reckonings, and tost in a storm of perplexity.

Socrates/ Well, next remark this about all the elements of our bodies.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ They all exist in us small in quantity, base in quality, and impure in condition, and by no means with powers commensurate to their nature. Observe this in anyone instance, and then generalize. For instance, there is fire in our bodies and fire in the universe.

Protarchus/ There is.

Socrates/ Well, ours is small, and weak, and base; but that in the universe is marvelous in mass and beauty and every igneous virtue.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Well now, is the fire of the universe fed, and lit, and governed by the fire in us, or, on the contrary, is the fire in you, and me, and other animals, dependent on the fire in the universe?

Protarchus/ Such a question does not merit an answer.

Socrates/ You are right. And you will answer the same, doubtless, as to the earth in our bodies and the earth of the universe: and so of all the other elements which I just now asked about.

Protarchus/ Who could answer otherwise and be thought in his senses?

Socrates/ Who, indeed? But observe what follows. When we found these elements united in a single mass, we called the mass a body.

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ Do the same with this that we call the world. For by parity of reason it must be a body, being a composition of the same elements.

Protarchus/ Doubtless.

Socrates/ Was our body originally, and is it still, indebted for nutriment, and the other influences that we mentioned, to the body of the universe; or, on the contrary, is that indebted for them to ours?

Protarchus/ This is another question, Socrates, that does not merit an answer.

Socrates/ Well, does this, then, or does it not?

Protarchus/ First ask it.

Socrates/ Shall we say that our body has a soul?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And whence could it derive it, Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, composed, as it is, of the same elements as ours, and those in all respects more beautiful, also has a soul?

Protarchus/ Clearly nowhere else but hence, Socrates.

Socrates/ For I imagine, Protarchus, we do not believe that Cause, which enters everywhere as a fourth principle along with Limit, Unlimited, and Composition, gave our own bodies soul, and the art of maintaining health and of curing disease, and is elsewhere present organizing and repairing in various ways under the various names of Wisdom; and yet that, though these same principles exist both in the whole heavens and in large divisions of them, exist, too, beautiful and pure, in these regions Cause has not assumed the form of Wisdom contriving what is most beautiful and excellent.

Protarchus/ That would be very improbable.

Socrates/ Well, if this is not true, it will be better to hold, as we have several times suggested, that there is not only much Unlimited in the universe, and Limitation commensurate, but also a presiding Cause of no contemptible power, that orders and arranges years, and seasons, and months, and may justly be named Reason and Wisdom.

Protarchus/ Most justly.

Socrates/ But Wisdom and Reason can only be imparted to soul.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ In the frame of Jove, then, you will say the might of Cause engenders a kingly soul and a kingly Reason, and other gods will be rightly called by such names as they may choose.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Do not think these remarks idle; for on the one hand they justify those men of old who proclaimed Reason the ruler of the universe: —

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ And on the other they furnish an answer to my question, namely, that Reason is of the family of the universal Cause, which was one of our four classes. For now, of course, you have my answer.

Protarchus/ So I have; and yet I did not notice that you had given it.

Socrates/ It is refreshing, Protarchus, to intermix work with occasional play.

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ We now then have tolerably explained the class and function of Reason.

Protarchus/ We have.

Socrates/ And we had before ascertained the class to which Pleasure belongs.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Let us then remember that Reason is akin to. Cause and seemingly of this class, and Pleasure is Unlimited and of the class that neither has nor can have in itself beginning, middle, or end.

Protarchus/ We cannot help remembering this.

Socrates/ Well, we must next inquire where each is seated, and what produces them. And first of Pleasure. For as we investigated her class first, so on these points we must begin with her; and we cannot adequately investigate Pleasure without also investigating Pain.

Protarchus/ If this is the right road, let us take it.

Socrates/ Do you agree with me about their origin?

Protarchus/ In what?

Socrates/ I think both Pain and Pleasure naturally have their seat in the Mixed class.

Protarchus/ Pray, remind us, my friend, which you mean by the Mixed.

Socrates/ I will, my fine fellow, as well as I can.

Protarchus/ Thanks.

Socrates/ By the Mixed class let us understand the one we placed third on the list.

Protarchus/ The one you mentioned after the Unlimited and Limit, and in which you included health and harmony, I think?

Socrates/ Quite right, and now give me your attention.

Protarchus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ I say the dissolution of harmony in an animal frame is the dissolution of its being and the birth of Pain.

Protarchus/ Very likely.

Socrates/ And the restoration of harmony and the reintegration of its being is the origin of Pleasure, to resume the greatest matters in the shortest space and the fewest words.

Protarchus/ I believe you are right, Socrates; but be plainer if you can.

Socrates/ Well; are not the commonest phenomena the plainest?

Protarchus/ Which?

Socrates/ Is not hunger a disintegration and a Pain?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And eating a reintegration and a Pleasure?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And thirst is a desiccation and a Pain, and the re-irrigation of what was dried by thirst a Pleasure, and the dispersion by heat and dissolution of what was naturally united is a Pain, and its recombination in the natural state by cold is a Pleasure.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the unnatural solidification of the animal liquids by cold is a Pain, and the fusion by heat and return of the elements to their natural position is a Pleasure. And is it not a universal truth that the disorganization of the animated world, formed as we said of a Limitless and Limit, is Pain, and the renovation of the normal state is Pleasure?

Protarchus/ We will assume it to be so. It is at all events an approximation to the truth.

Socrates/ Let us then reckon one kind of Pleasure the result of the processes we have described.

Protarchus/ Agreed.

Socrates/ Let us next assume that the expectation of Pleasure, when the soul in its separate action anticipates these processes, is hope and pleasurable, and the expectation of Pain is fear and painful.

Protarchus/ Yes. Here we have another kind of Pleasure and Pain, confined to the soul, and produced by expectation.

Socrates/ Right. And I believe that the examination of these two kinds, unalloyed, as is supposed, and not mixtures of Pleasure and Pain, will show whether the whole genus of Pleasure is desirable, or whether we must ascribe such a character to some other genus; and to Pleasure and Pain the same as to heat and cold, and things of this kind—namely, that of being sometimes desirable, and sometimes undesirable; as being not Good, but occasionally, in some instances, susceptible of goodness.

Protarchus/ You are right, I think, that the solution we are hunting for is to be found in this track.

Socrates/ First, let us observe that if it really happens, as I said, that Pain follows upon the dissolution of the vital harmony, and Pleasure upon its restoration; let us consider what is the state of those whose frame is neither impaired nor renovated. And think before you answer. Is it not an inevitable conclusion that an animal in that case feels neither Pain nor Pleasure, great or small?

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Here, then, is a state of mind distinct from Pleasure and Pain.

Protarchus/ There is.

Socrates/ Well, try to remember this. It will be of no small moment whether we remember it or not, when we come to judge of Pleasure. And, if you please, we will determine a point about it.

Protarchus/ What, pray?

Socrates/ Do you see that there is nothing to prevent a man who chooses a life of Wisdom from Living in this condition?

Protarchus/ Neither rejoicing nor pained, you mean?

Socrates/ Yes. For we observed when we were comparing the two lives, that he who chose the life of Reason and Wisdom must forego every Pleasure, great and small.

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ Well, this would be the manner of his life, and perchance it would not be strange if of all lives it were the most godlike.

Protarchus/ At all events, it is not likely that gods feel Pleasure or Pain.

Socrates/ It is not. For both are unseemly. But we will consider this hereafter, if it is relevant to the discussion, and will reckon it among the claims of Reason to the second rank, if we must renounce its claim to the first.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ Now, the second kind of Pleasure which we ascribed to the soul alone owes its origin entirely to Memory.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ It seems we must first inquire what Memory, and, previously, what Sensation is, if we mean to investigate the matter thoroughly.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Assume that the affections that happen from time to time to the body sometimes expire before they reach the soul and leave her unaffected, at other times traverse both soul and body, and communicate a shock to both and each.

Protarchus/ Assumed.

Socrates/ If we say that whatever does not permeate both escapes the notice of the soul, and what permeates both strikes her notice, shall we be right?

Protarchus/ We shall.

Socrates/ By escape from notice, do not take me to mean the fact of being forgotten. For forgetting is losing a Remembrance; but in what we have mentioned as yet, we have not shown the birth of Remembrance, and to talk of the loss of that which is not yet born or in existence would be premature, would it not?

Protarchus/ It would.

Socrates/ Then merely change the term.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ When the soul is unaffected by the shock of the body, do not talk of its escaping the notice of the soul, which you say would mean being forgotten, but say the soul is insensible to the shock.

Protarchus/ I see what you mean.

Socrates/ And if you call the impression on the soul, when it shares the affection and shock of the body, Sensation, you will be right.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now, then, we understand what we mean by Sensation.

Protarchus/ We do.

Socrates/ If a man call Memory the retention of a Sensation, he will define it rightly, I think.

Protarchus/ He will.

Socrates/ And we distinguish between Recollection and Memory, do we not?

Protarchus/ I think we do.

Socrates/ And this is what we mean by the former: —

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ When the soul alone, and as far as possible without the intervention of the body, revivifies the impression she shared with the body, we say she recollects, do we not?

Protarchus/ We do.

Socrates/ And when she loses the Remembrance of a Sensation or a perception, and afterwards recovers it without assistance, we call the recovery Recollection and Remembrance, I fancy.

Protarchus/ Just so.

Socrates/ The object of all these remarks is this: —

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ To see mental Pleasure as pure from bodily influence, and as distinctly as possible, and also Desire; for they will assist us in both these endeavors.

Protarchus/ Let us go on, Socrates.

Socrates/ We have, indeed, many questions to consider when we discuss the origin of Pleasure and her general character. For now apparently we have first to ascertain the nature and locality of Desire.

Protarchus/ Let us make the inquiry, for we can lose nothing by it.

Socrates/ On the contrary, Protarchus, we shall lose, and that by succeeding in our quest, our present ignorance.

Protarchus/ Well rejoined; but let us try to make another step.

Socrates/ Well, we said just now that hunger and thirst, and many other things of the sort, are Desires..

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ What is it that we recognize as identical in things so widely different when we call them by the same name?

Protarchus/ By Jove, it is not easy, though necessary, to say.

Socrates/ Let us start from the same point and the same examples.

Protarchus/ From what point?

Socrates/ We speak of a creature thirsting sometimes.

Protarchus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And that means being empty?

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And thirst is a Desire?

Protarchus/ Yes, of liquid.

Socrates/ Liquid, or replenishment with liquid?

Protarchus/ Replenishment, I imagine.

Socrates/ So, then, a man is empty, and desires the condition opposite to his actual condition. For inanition is his actual condition, and he desires replenishment.

Protarchus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ Well; can he who is empty for the first time have either by Sensation or Remembrance any apprehension of replenishment, an affection that he neither now experiences nor ever before?

Protarchus/ How can he?

Socrates/ But we allow that he who desires, desires some object.

Protarchus/ He does.

Socrates/ He therefore does not desire what he feels, for he feels thirst, and this is inanition, and what he desires is replenishment.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ It must be that something in the thirsty man apprehends replenishment.

Protarchus/ It must.

Socrates/ The body cannot, for it is empty.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ It remains, then, that the mind apprehends it, and that by Remembrance; for how else can it?

Protarchus/ In no other way, I think.

Socrates/ Do you see what follows?

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ What we have said proves that Desire is not in the body.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Because it shows that every living being desires the opposite condition to the actual condition of the body.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And Desire, in aiming at the opposite of the bodily affection, indicates a Remembrances of that opposite.

Protarchus/ It does.

Socrates/ And these considerations, by showing that it is Remembrances which presents to us the object of Desire, prove that Volition, and Desire, and the government of the body, belong entirely to the soul.

Protarchus/ They do.

Socrates/ Our argument by no means admits that thirst, or hunger, or any other affection of the sort, belongs to the body.

Protarchus/ No.

Socrates/ Now, let us make another observation on the same matter. Our inquiry seems to me to aim at elucidating a peculiar kind of life made up of these very affections.

Protarchus/ What affections and life do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean the affections of repletion and inanition, and all processes tending to the conservation or destruction of the animal frame, and the Pleasures or Pains that may be felt in these processes.

Protarchus/ Such is its aim.

Socrates/ And what happens when a man is in an intermediate state?

Protarchus/ What intermediate state?

Socrates/ Why, pained by the affection, and remembering the pleasant process by which he might be relieved, but not as yet relieved. How is he then? Shall we say he is in the intermediate state?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Wholly pained or wholly pleased?

Protarchus/ Not the latter, by Jove, but doubly pained, in body by the affection, in mind by an expectant craving.

Socrates/ How doubly pained, Protarchus? When any of us is in a state of inanition, has he not sometimes a sure hope of repletion, and sometimes none?

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Well, when he hopes to be filled, do you not suppose that he is pleased by the remembrance, though at the same time he is pained by the inanition?

Protarchus/ No doubt he is.

Socrates/ Under these circumstances, then, man and other animals are simultaneously pained and pleased.

Protarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ But how if a man is in a state of inanition with no hope of repletion? Is not that the occasion of the double pang which just now you foresaw and thought was the single result?

Protarchus/ It is, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let us apply our insight into these affections thus.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Shall we say that these Pains and Pleasures are true or false, or sometimes true and sometimes false?

Protarchus/ How can Pleasures or Pains be false, Socrates?

Socrates/ How, Protarchus, can fears be true or false, or expectations true or false, or opinions true or false?

Protarchus/ Opinions may be, I allow, of course, but not the rest.

Socrates/ What is that you say? We seem to be mooting a serious question.

Protarchus/ We are.

Socrates/ But is it relevant to our previous discussion, oh disciple of the philosopher yonder? That is the question.

Protarchus/ Perhaps it is.

Socrates/ Irrelevant discussions, long or short, must be absolutely declined.

Protarchus/ They must.

Socrates/ Now tell me; for I have always wondered about this very question that we have raised.

Protarchus/ What question do you mean?

Socrates/ Is it true that Pleasures cannot be false?

Protarchus/ How can they?

Socrates/ Is it true, as you say, that no one asleep or awake, mad or beside himself, ever fancies he is pleased when he is not, or fancies he is pained when he is not?

Protarchus/ We all think it is true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Are you right, or shall we discuss whether it is true or not?

Protarchus/ We had better discuss it, I should say.

Socrates/ Let us define, then, the question about Pleasure and Opinion more exactly. We have an Opinion sometimes, have we not?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And are pleased?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And Opinion implies a proposition?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And Pleasure a cause?

Protarchus/ It does.

Socrates/ Well, he that has an Opinion, be it true or false, still has a real Opinion.

Protarchus/ He has.

Socrates/ So, too, he that is pleased, whether rightly or wrongly, is clearly nevertheless really pleased.

Protarchus/ He is.

Socrates/ How is it, then, that Opinion can be true or false, but Pleasure only true, though both are equally real?

Protarchus/ We must examine.

Socrates/ Do you say we must examine because Opinion admits of truth and falsehood and is thus not merely Opinion, but Opinion with a certain quality?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we must convince ourselves whether in general it is only other things that have qualities, but Pleasure and Pain are solely what they are, and absolutely devoid of quality.

Protarchus/ We must.

Socrates/ However it is clear that they have qualities, for we agreed just now that both Pleasures and Pains are great and small, and keen and dull.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And if badness should attach to either, Protarchus, we will say there is such a thing as a bad Opinion or a bad Pleasure.

Protarchus/ Of course, Socrates.

Socrates/ And how if rightness or the opposite attaches to either, shall we not call the Opinion to which rightness attaches a right Opinion, and so of Pleasure? And if a proposition is wrong, we cannot say that Opinion which wrongly adopts it is right or opines rightly.

Protarchus/ How can we?

Socrates/ Well now, if we find that any Pain or Pleasure is wrong in respect of its cause, can we call it right or good, or by any eulogistic name?

Protarchus/ We cannot, if a Pleasure can be wrong.

Socrates/ Why, I suppose we often have a Pleasure accompanied with no right but a false Opinion.

Protarchus/ Granted; and we then call the Opinion false, but never the Pleasure itself.

Socrates/ Oh, oh, Protarchus! you are a zealous advocate of the cause of Pleasure.

Protarchus/ Oh, no! I only say what is the usual mode of expression.

Socrates/ But is there no difference, my friend, between Pleasure accompanied with a right Opinion and knowledge, and Pleasure attended with ignorance and false Opinion?

Protarchus/ There ought to be a considerable difference.

Socrates/ Well, let us proceed to look at the difference.

Protarchus/ Take any line you think best Socrates: Shall I take this, then?

Protarchus/ Which?

Socrates/ We agree that Opinions may be true or false?

Protarchus/ We do.

Socrates/ And both of them, true and false Opinion, I mean, are, as we just now said, accompanied with Pleasure and Pain.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well, the sources of all our Opinions and opinionative reasonings are Memory and Sensation.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Well, do you not think this is what we experience when we form an Opinion? —

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ When a man sees certain objects not very clearly from a distance, it may often happen, you will allow, that he should wish to determine what it is he sees.

Protarchus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Well; would not such a one then ask himself this question? —

Protarchus/ What question?

Socrates/ What on earth is that figure that seems to stand beside a rock yonder under a tree? Would he say this to himself, do you think, if he descried some appearance of the sort?

Protarchus/ Doubtless.

Socrates/ Well; and then he might answer himself, It is a man; and this might be true.

Protarchus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ And he might be mistaken, and think that what he saw was the workmanship of shepherds, and call it a statue.

Protarchus/ He might.

Socrates/ And if anyone were by, he might breathe what he said to himself into voice, and speak it to his neighbor, and what we called an Opinion would thus become a Speech or proposition.

Protarchus/ It would.

Socrates/ But if he is alone, sometimes he goes away with the belief in his mind, and retains it a long time.

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Well; does the occurrence appear to you in the same shape as to me?

Protarchus/ In what shape?

Socrates/ Our soul then seems to me to be like a book.

Protarchus/ Why?

Socrates/ Memory and Sensation combining, and the faculties connected with them, seem to me at such a time to write down, as it were, propositions in our minds; and when what the affection writes is true, we have true Opinions and true internal propositions; but when the scribe writes down what is false we have the opposite of the true.

Protarchus/ So I think, and I agree to what you say.

Socrates/ Agree, too, that there is also another artist then at work in the soul.

Protarchus/ What artist?

Socrates/ A painter that, after the scribe has written, paints in the soul pictures representing the subject of his statements.

Protarchus/ How and when do you mean?

Socrates/ When a man, besides carrying away from a sight or other sensation those Opinions and propositions, somehow sees in himself the picture of what he believed and said. This happens in our souls, does it not?

Protarchus/ Very often.

Socrates/ Well; the images of the true Opinions and statements are true, and those of the false ones false, are they not?

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ Well, then, let us next inquire this: —

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Do we judge thus in reference to the present and past only, and not in reference to the future?

Protarchus/ No; we make similar judgments in reference to every time.

Socrates/ Well; mental Pleasures and Pains, we said just now, sometimes precede bodily Pleasures and Pains, so that we must allow that Pleasure and Pain sometimes refer to the future.

Protarchus/ We must.

Socrates/ Do the writings and pictured then that we said just now were made in our minds relate to the past and present only, and not to the future?

Protarchus/ Very much the reverse.

Socrates/ You say, very much the reverse, I suppose, because all such pictures are Hopes, whose domain the future is, and man is all his life constantly full of Hopes.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Now answer me further.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ A righteous, and pious, and otherwise virtuous man is beloved by the gods, is he not?

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ And the unrighteous and otherwise bad is hated by them?

Protarchus/ He must be.

Socrates/ But every man, as we said just now, is full of various Hopes.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And what we called Hopes are internal propositions.

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And paintings of the fancied scenes. And a man often sees immense wealth coming to his hands and much attendant Pleasure, and sees among other figures himself pictured rejoicing greatly over his happy fortune.

Protarchus/ He does.

Socrates/ Of these characters shall we say that those traced on the souls of the virtuous are generally true, because the virtuous are loved by the gods, and those on the souls of the vicious the reverse; or how?

Protarchus/ As you say.

Socrates/ Well, the vicious have pictured Pleasures as well as the virtuous, and these, I suppose, are false.

Protarchus/ Doubtless.

Socrates/ False Pleasures, therefore, gladden the vicious, and true the virtuous.

Protarchus/ It must be so.

Socrates/ There are, then, from what has been said, false Pleasures in the souls of men, ludicrous caricatures of the true, and Pains of the same description.

Protarchus/ There are.

Socrates/ Well, we agreed that a man always has a real Opinion who has an Opinion at all, though sometimes of things that are not, nor ever have been or will be.

Protarchus/ He has.

Socrates/ And I fancy these are the things that then cause false Opinion and false opining.

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ Well, must we not, to complete the parallel, ascribe an analogous position to Pleasure and Pain in respect of those predicates?

Protarchus/ What position?

Socrates/ The man really rejoices who rejoices at all, and anyhow, and on whatever ground, though occasionally at what are not realities, past or present, and often, and most frequently, perhaps, at what never will become realities.

Protarchus/ This must also be the case, Socrates.

Socrates/ And we may say the same of fears, and angers, and all such passions: they are all occasionally mistaken.

Protarchus/ Undeniably.

Socrates/ Well; is the badness or goodness of Opinions produced by any other assignable cause than their falsity?

Protarchus/ No.

Socrates/ And for the badness of Pleasures we can detect no other reason, I fancy, than their being false.

Protarchus/ Quite the contrary, Socrates. For falsity can hardly be assigned as the cause why Pleasures and Pains are bad, but many other enormous badnesses that they are obnoxious to.

Socrates/ The bad Pleasures that are such from other badnesses shall be examined presently, if we still think proper. That false Pleasures of various kinds frequently exist, and are produced in our minds, shall now be shown by another proof. For we may perhaps use this fact in the comparison we are to make.

Protarchus/ Certainly, if there are any such.

Socrates/ Well, there are, Protarchus, in my opinion; but until this fact is ascertained, of course it must not cease to be examined.

Protarchus/ Good.

Socrates/ Then let us stand up like athletes to this new argument.

Protarchus/ Let us begin.

Socrates/ We said, if you remember, a little while ago, that in Desire the body and the mind are divided and isolated in their affections.

Protarchus/ I remember we said so.

Socrates/ Well; it was the soul that desired a condition opposite to the body's actual condition, and the Pain or Pleasure resulting from some affection was caused by the body.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Then draw the conclusion that results from this.

Protarchus/ Tell me what it is.

Socrates/ It results that, under these circumstances, there are simultaneous Pains and Pleasures in juxtaposition, and simultaneous perceptions of these opposites, as appeared just now.

Protarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Well; this was also said, and is a premise we have already agreed upon: —

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ That both of them, Pleasure and Pain, admit of degrees, and are Unlimited.

Protarchus/ So we said, no doubt.

Socrates/ How is it possible, then, to measure rightly their comparative quantity.

Protarchus/ How, and in what respect?

Socrates/ If the object of our measurement is to decide this kind of question, which is the greater, and which the less, and which more intense and violent, taking Pain and Pleasure, or Pain and Pain, or Pleasure and Pleasure.

Protarchus/ That is certainly the question and the object of comparison.

Socrates/ Now in ocular perception the distance or proximity of the bulk surveyed obscures the truth and falsifies Opinion: will the same thing happen in estimating Pains and Pleasures?

Protarchus/ Yes; in a far greater degree, Socrates.

Socrates/ The phenomenon that we now observe is the converse of the phenomenon we observed a little while ago.

Protarchus/ What do you allude to?

Socrates/ Then the Opinions were themselves true or false, and infected the Pains and Pleasures with their own quality.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Now, it is the latter whose varying proximity and distance and juxtaposition while under survey falsifies the Opinions, Pleasure appearing greater and intenser beside Pain, and Pain, in the same way, beside Pleasure.

Protarchus/ This happens from the causes you mention.

Socrates/ Now, if the excess or defect of the apparent above or below the real magnitude, the imaginary but unreal portion, be cut off from each, this imaginary Pleasure or Pain is wrong, you will allow, and no Pleasure or Pain that it causes can be right or true.

Protarchus/ It cannot.

Socrates/ If we next proceed to another point of view we shall discover apparent and real Pleasures and Pains still falser than these.

Protarchus/ What point of view and what Pleasures?

Socrates/ I think we have said more than once that when the animal frame is impaired by combination or separation, repletion or inanition, increase or decrease, Pain and uneasiness, and the things denoted by this sort of name, are the result.

Protarchus/ We have said so several times.

Socrates/ And when the normal state is restored, we agreed that the restoration is Pleasure.

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ And what results when the body undergoes neither change?

Protarchus/ When can that be, Socrates?

Socrates/ That is an irrelevant question, Protarchus, that you ask.

Protarchus/ Why so?

Socrates/ Because it does not prevent me from asking my own question again.

Protarchus/ Which?

Socrates/ Granting it never happens, Protarchus, I shall answer, what would be its necessary result if it did?

Protarchus/ If the body underwent neither change, do you mean?

Socrates/ I do.

Protarchus/ It is plain, Socrates, that under these circumstances neither Pleasure nor Pain would arise.

Socrates/ Well said. But you maintain, I suppose, that, as philosophers assert, one or other of these changes is constantly happening, as all things are whirling up and down in a ceaseless flux.

Protarchus/ So they argue, and with some force, as is thought.

Socrates/ What else would you expect from thinkers of their force? However, I would rather avoid the shock of their argument, and propose to escape by this way; and you had better escape with me.

Protarchus/ Show the way.

Socrates/ Perhaps you are right, we will say to them (and you must be their representative); but whenever a living being undergoes an affection, is it always conscious of the affection, and are we conscious of growth and all similar changes? or do not almost all these changes, on the contrary, escape our consciousness?

Protarchus/ They do.

Socrates/ It was incorrect to say that the changes upwards and downwards produce Pleasures and Pains?

Protarchus/ It was.

Socrates/ This form of the statement would be better, and less open to objection: —

Protarchus/ What form?

Socrates/ Violent changes produce Pleasures and Pains, but moderate and slight changes produce neither in the least degree.

Protarchus/ This form is more correct than the other.

Socrates/ Well, if this is so, the life we lately alluded to comes again before us.

Protarchus/ What life?

Socrates/ The life we declared to be devoid of Pain or Pleasure.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Then shall we make three lives: one pleasurable, another painful, and a third neutral; or what would you say?

Protarchus/ I say there are three lives.

Socrates/ Not to feel Pain, then, cannot be the same as to feel Pleasure.

Protarchus/ How can it?

Socrates/ But when you hear a man say that the pleasantest thing in the world is to pass one's whole life without Pain, what do you consider the speaker affirms?

Protarchus/ He seems to say that the absence of Pain is Pleasure.

Socrates/ Now take any three things you please; and, to use fair sounding names, suppose one to be gold, another to be silver, and the other neither gold nor silver.

Protarchus/ Supposed.

Socrates/ Can that which is neither gold nor silver be either gold or silver?

Protarchus/ How can it?

Socrates/ Therefore when the intermediate life is said to be pleasurable or painful, if it is thought to be so, it is not rightly thought; and, if said to be so, it is not rightly said—not, at least, in accordance with right speech.

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And yet, my friend, people both say so and think so, we see.

Protarchus/ They do.

Socrates/ Do they imagine they are actually pleased when they feel no Pain?

Protarchus/ They say so, at all events.

Socrates/ They imagine, then, that they are pleased, or else they would not say so, I presume?

Protarchus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ They have a false opinion, though, about Pleasure, if there is a difference between Pleasure and the absence of Pain.

Protarchus/ And we agreed that there was a difference.

Socrates/ Then shall we settle that they are three, as we said a little while ago, or only two—Pain, the evil of man, and freedom from Pain, identical with his Good, and synonymous with Pleasure?

Protarchus/ How can this be still an open question, Socrates? I do not understand you.

Socrates/ It is plain, Protarchus, that you are unacquainted with the adversaries of our friend Philebus.

Protarchus/ Whom do you mean?

Socrates/ Why, persons said to be very great in physical science, who deny the reality of Pleasure altogether.

Protarchus/ How can they?

Socrates/ They say that what the school of Philebus calls Pleasure is deliverance from Pain.

Protarchus/ Would you have me believe them, Socrates, or not?

Socrates/ No, but I would have you use them as a sort of diviners, not judging by rules of divination, but by the

repugnance of a noble nature, deeply hating Pleasure, and convinced that she is so far from genuine that her very power of fascinating is a magic illusion and not Pleasure. You may use them in this way, and listen to their other grounds of repugnance, and afterwards I will tell you what I think are true Pleasures; so that with both opinions to aid us we may place Pleasure in a clear light ready for the comparison.

Protarchus/ Let us do so.

Socrates/ Let us deem these persons our allies, and follow in the track of their distaste. And, I fancy, this is the sort of line they take. They set out from a maxim, and ask whether, if we wish to discover the nature of any kind of thing, of hardness, for example, we should be more likely to discover it by examining the hardest bodies, or others of a comparatively fractional degree of hardness. Give an answer, Protarchus, not only to me, but also to these fastidious spirits.

Protarchus/ I will, and I answer them that we ought to examine the highest degrees of hardness.

Socrates/ If, then, we wish to discover the nature of Pleasure, we must not examine fractional degrees of Pleasure, but what are called the extremest and intensest.

Protarchus/ Everyone will allow this.

Socrates/ Are the common Pleasures, which are proverbially the greatest, those of the body?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Are the higher degrees found and produced in sickness or in health? And beware of answering hastily and wrongly.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ We might, perhaps, answer in health.

Protarchus/ We very likely should.

Socrates/ Well, but are not those the greatest which are most desired?

Protarchus/ No doubt of that.

Socrates/ And do not persons in fever and similar sicknesses suffer more from cold and thirst, and in all their bodily affections feel not only a greater craving, but greater Pleasure when their craving is satisfied? Or do you deny the truth of this?

Protarchus/ No; it seems true as you state it now.

Socrates/ Well, does it seem true to say that he who wants to examine the greatest Pleasures must not look for them in health but in sickness? And do not suppose me to mean by my question whether a greater number of Pleasures is to be found in sickness or in health, but to ask about the magnitude of Pleasures, and where most intensity of degree is to be found. For, remember, we have to discover the nature of Pleasure, and the value of the doctrine that altogether denies her reality.

Protarchus/ I think I see what you mean.

Socrates/ You will show that better presently, Protarchus, for you shall answer me. Has a life of profligacy the greater Pleasures, I do not mean in number, but in intensity and degree, or a life of temperance? Think well before you answer.

Protarchus/ I understand you, and I find there is no comparison; for the temperate, no doubt, are checked even by the proverbial rule that forbids too much, and obey its warning; but fools arid profligates are excited even to madness by the excessive Pleasures that make them a byword.

Socrates/ Good; and if so, it clearly is in a bad state of soul and body, not in the right state, that the greatest Pleasures and the greatest Pains are to be found.

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Well, we must take some of them in hand, and see what other characters accompany the preeminent greatness that we ascribe to them.

Protarchus/ We must.

Socrates/ Examine, then, the Pleasures of this kind of malady, and observe their character: —

Protarchus/ What maladies?

Socrates/ The Pleasures of the unseemly maladies, which the fastidious ones we mentioned view with unqualified hate.

Protarchus/ Which?

Socrates/ Friction to ease cutaneous affections and other ailments that require no other surgery. For what, in heaven's name, should the sensation that is produced be called? Pleasure or Pain?

Protarchus/ Some complicated evil, Socrates, seems to be produced.

Socrates/ Of course I do not allude to them as controverting Philebus. But without looking at these and similar Pleasures, Protarchus, we shall hardly be able to solve the problem.

Protarchus/ If so, let us scrutinize the Pleasures of this sort.

Socrates/ You mean the Mixed Pleasures that partake of Pain?

Protarchus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Well, some mixtures belong exclusively to the body, others to the mind, and a third set are common to the mind and body—Mixed Pleasures and Pains, denominated collectively sometimes Pain and sometimes Pleasure.

Protarchus/ Give me an instance.

Socrates/ During the renovation or disorganization of the frame, while opposite affections are simultaneously felt, as cold yields to warmth or warmth to cold, one condition being welcome and the other unwelcome, a so-called bitter-sweet mixed sensation clings most tenaciously, and produces impatience, and finally savage excitement.

Protarchus/ There is great truth in your description.

Socrates/ Well, such mixtures are sometimes made up of equal portions of Pleasure and Pain, and sometimes of one or other in excess.

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ Class among the mixtures in which Pain predominates the sensations in cutaneous maladies that we mentioned, and those produced by internal irritation. There is an inward boiling and inflammation beyond the reach of rubbing and scratching, which only produce a separation on the surface; then, by exposing the external parts to fire, and passing in despair to the opposite extreme, the sufferer occasions to the inner parts excessive Pleasure, and sometimes the reverse, mixed with Pain or Pleasure, as the balance may incline, of the superficial parts, by separating what was united, or uniting what was separated, and bringing Pain and Pleasure into juxtaposition.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ When, however, the Pleasure predominates in any of these affections, the slight admixture of Pain tickles and irritates gently; but Pleasure entering in much larger proportions excites the man, and even makes him leap, and pass through rapid changes of color, attitude, and respiration, uttering the strangest cries, and betraying the completest mental alienation and frenzy.

Protarchus/ So it happens.

Socrates/ And, my friend, it makes himself and others say of him that the ecstasy of Pleasure kill's him, and he seeks these Pleasures by every means in proportion to his profligacy and folly. And he says these are the greatest, and reckons the man who lives in them most perpetually the happiest.

Protarchus/ The opinions of the common herd, Socrates, are quite what you describe.

Socrates/ Yes, about the Pleasures of the mixed states of the body alone, when there is a mixture of external and internal affections. But where the mind contributes a Pleasure or Pain opposite to that of the body, and both compose a single mixture, we said indeed before that emptiness makes repletion desired, and hope produces Pleasure and inanition Pain; but I did not assert what I now affirm, that in all this immense class of emotions the mixture of Pleasure and Pain results from the opposite states of body and mind.

Protarchus/ It seems perfectly true.

Socrates/ One of the mixtures of Pleasure and Pain still remains to be examined.

Protarchus/ Which do you mean?

Socrates/ The mixture, which we said was frequent, of purely mental sensations.

Protarchus/ And what do you now refer to?

Socrates/ Anger, and fear, and regret, and grief, and love, and rivalry, and envy, and similar emotions, are purely mental Pains, are they not?

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ And have you not observed that they are full of numberless Pleasures, or must you be reminded of;

That moveth e'en the wise to bitter words,
Ire far sweeter than the honey-drop:

and bereavement and melancholy, with their 'luxury of woe?'

Protarchus/ No; this is the nature of these emotions.

Socrates/ And tragic spectacles elicit tears, while they charm, you remember.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And comedies, have you observed, produce a state of mind that is a mixture of Pleasure and Pain?

Protarchus/ I cannot quite recognize the truth of that.

Socrates/ Because it is not easy, I confess, Protarchus, to detect that this is always the case.

Protarchus/ I think not.

Socrates/ Let us examine it all the more for being disguised, in order that we may easier detect the mixture of Pleasure and Pain in other emotions.

Protarchus/ Proceed.

Socrates/ Is Envy, that I just now mentioned, a Pain in the mind, or what?

Protarchus/ It is a Pain.

Socrates/ But an envious man views the ills of his neighbor with Pleasure.

Protarchus/ He does.

Socrates/ And ill is the right name for ignorance and blundering.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Remark now what the nature of the Ridiculous is.

Protarchus/ Say on.

Socrates/ It is one of the forms, to give its general character, of a certain vicious state of mind, with a

distinctive appellation; and of all the kinds of vice it is the particular disposition opposite to the one recommended by the Delphic inscription.

Protarchus/ 'Know thyself,' you mean, Socrates?

Socrates/ I do. The opposite to that would be not to know one's self, if it were recommended by the inscription.

Protarchus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Try, Protarchus, to make a triple division of this.

Protarchus/ How do you mean? I fear I cannot.

Socrates/ Do you mean to say that I must make the division?

Protarchus/ I do; and beg you to do so.

Socrates/ Well; are there not three ways of not knowing one's self?

Protarchus/ What three?

Socrates/ Either as to wealth, when a man thinks he is richer than he is.

Protarchus/ Many do labor under this delusion.

Socrates/ And as to their size, and beauty, and other bodily qualities, still more overstep the truth in their self-esteem.

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ But far the most, I fancy, as to their mental qualities, appropriating virtues to which they have no claim.

Protarchus/ By far the most.

Socrates/ And of all the virtues is not wisdom the one which the mass of people most pertinaciously pretend to, and which fills them with most strife and conceited self-delusion?

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Evil surely would be a right name to give to all this kind of disposition.

Protarchus/ It would.

Socrates/ This must be subdivided into two forms, and then we shall notice a childish Envy, and witness a strange mixture of Pain and Pleasure.

Protarchus/ How can we divide it into two, as you say?

Socrates/ When this false opinion about himself is foolishly entertained, the deluded person, like the rest of the world, is either strong and powerful, or the reverse, I imagine.

Protarchus/ He must be.

Socrates/ Let this then be the division. Those that are weak and cannot avenge themselves when laughed at are properly called Ridiculous; those who can take vengeance for derision should be called objects of fear and hate. For ignorance in the powerful is hateful and repulsive, because baneful to others, both in real life and in fictitious representation; but powerless ignorance is Ridiculous, both in fiction and reality.

Protarchus/ Very true: but the mixture of Pains and Pleasures in this province is still unapparent to me.

Socrates/ First notice what Envy is.

Protarchus/ Describe it.

Socrates/ It is an unjust Pain and Pleasure, I imagine.

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Well, enemies' misfortunes may be rejoiced at without injustice or Envy.

Protarchus/ Assuredly.

Socrates/ But friends misfortunes cannot be viewed with pleasure instead of sorrow without a breach of duty.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Our friends' self-delusions about their wisdom and beauty, and the other points we mentioned when we made the three divisions, are Ridiculous when attended with weakness, and hateful when armed with power. Or shall we retract our assertion that our friends in this state of mind, when it is not baneful to their neighbors, are Ridiculous?

Protarchus/ They are Ridiculous.

Socrates/ And misfortune, we allow, is a true description of such a state of mind.

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ And is Pleasure or Pain indicated by our laughter?

Protarchus/ Pleasure, clearly.

Socrates/ And Pleasure at friends' misfortunes indicates Envy as its root.

Protarchus/ It does.

Socrates/ When we laugh, therefore, at our friends' ridiculous condition, logic declares we mix Pleasure with Envy, and blend, therefore, Pleasure and Pain. For Envy, we have agreed already, is a mental Pain, and laughter Pleasure, and both are simultaneous in this emotion.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ It is clear from this demonstration that mournful dirges, and tragedies, and comedies, not the scenic representations only, but real life's tragedy and comedy, give mingled sensations of Pain and Pleasure in one emotion, and ten thousand other objects have a similar power.

Protarchus/ We cannot but allow this, however reluctant we may be.

Socrates/ Anger, and desire, and sorrow, and fear, and love, and emulation, and envy, and similar emotions, were

instanced just now as presenting complications of the two elements so often named, were they not?

Protarchus/ They were.

Socrates/ Do you observe that sorrow, and envy, and anger are the only emotions we have examined?

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ A great many then are still remaining?

Protarchus/ A great many.

Socrates/ What induced me, do you suppose, to point out in particular that comedy excites a mixed feeling? Was it not in order to persuade you, that fear, and love, and the other emotions, could easily be shown to be mixed, and thus induce you to dispense with my examining the rest and protracting the debate, acknowledging as a universal law, that body apart from mind, and mind apart from body, and mind and body in their joint affections, are rife with complications of Pleasure and Pain? Now then, say whether you grant the dispensation, or mean to keep me arguing here till midnight? However, I have a few words to say that I think will induce you to let me off. To-morrow these other matters shall be fully examined; now I want to embark in the other considerations requisite for the comparison that Philebus enjoins.

Protarchus/ Thank you, Socrates; deal with what remains as you like.

Socrates/ In the natural order after the Mixed Pleasures we proceed by necessary sequence to the Unmixed in their turn.

Protarchus/ We ought.

Socrates/ I will try to start in a fresh direction and point them out; for those who say that Pain alleviated is the whole of Pleasure, seem to me to be mistaken. However, I use these

persons, as I said, as witnesses that some Pleasures are apparent but unreal, and others which are seemingly great are really blended with Pain and alleviation of the pangs of bodily and mental distress.

Protarchus/ And true Pleasures, Socrates, which are they?

Socrates/ Those from beautiful colors, as they are called, and from figures, and most of those from odors, and those from sounds, and any objects whose absence is unfelt and painless, while their presence is sensible and productive of Pleasure.

Protarchus/ And what answer to this description?

Socrates/ I confess they are not obvious, but I will try to indicate them. By beautiful figures I do not mean what the mass of men might imagine, animal shapes or painted forms, "but straight and curved lines, says my theory, and the planes and solids they generate with turning-lathes, and rulers, and goniometers, if you understand. These have not a relative beauty, like other things, but are eternally and intrinsically beautiful, and attended with Pleasures of their own, to which those of scratching have no resemblance; and I refer to colors of a similar kind. Do you understand my meaning?

Protarchus/ I am trying, Socrates; but will you try to make it plainer?

Socrates/ I say that voices soft and clear, uttering a pure and simple note, are not relatively, but absolutely beautiful, and are linked to corresponding Pleasures.

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ Odors occasion less divine Pleasures than the other things, but as to freedom from admixture of pain, and the reason of this freedom, and their seat in the soul, they

may be ranked as analogous to the rest. So here, if you have followed me, are two kinds of what I call Pleasure.

Protarchus/ I have followed you.

Socrates/ To these may be added the Pleasures of knowledge, if you grant that no hunger or pangs of hunger precede their acquisition.

Protarchus/ I grant it.

Socrates/ Well, and after knowledge has filled the soul, if a man loses it by forgetfulness, do you think there is any consequent Pain?

Protarchus/ Not in the nature of things, but only from reflection, if the loss is regretted on the score of utility.

Socrates/ But, my dear friend, it is the nature of the thing that we are examining, independent of reflection.

Protarchus/ It is true, then, that no Pain attends the obliteration of knowledge.

Socrates/ Then intellectual Pleasures may be assumed to be unmixed with Pain, and the lot not of the many but of extremely few.

Protarchus/ They may.

Socrates/ Well, having broadly distinguished the pure Pleasures and the impure, as they may be named, let us call the violent devoid of Measure, and the others Measured. Only the great and violent, accordingly, belong to the class of the Unlimited and More and Less that surge through the mental and bodily world, while the others will be classed with the Measured or Limited group.

Protarchus/ This is their place.

Socrates/ This question should next be determined about them: —

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Which character implies more truth: purity, and freedom from alloy; or intensity, and multiplicity, and magnitude, and abundance?

Protarchus/ What is the object of the question, Socrates?

Socrates/ To exhaust the tests of Pleasure and Science, that if they both contain a pure and an impure element, the purest of each may be admitted into the mixture, and you and I and all this company may more easily make our comparison.

Protarchus/ Very good.

Socrates/ Now purity in general may be thus regarded. And let us select a single instance as a specimen.

Protarchus/ What shall we select?

Socrates/ Whiteness, if you please, shall be first selected.

Protarchus/ Agreed.

Socrates/ What is purity of whiteness, and what white is pure? the broadest in mass and the commonest, or the most unmixed and untinged with any particle of color?

Protarchus/ Clearly the most unsullied and immaculate.

Socrates/ Assuredly; and is it not this, Protarchus, that is the truest and fairest white, and not the commonest and broadest in mass?

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ A little pure white, then, compared with a larger mass that is mixed, is both the fairer and the truer, is it not?

Protarchus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Many similar examples, I suppose, will not be necessary to prove the proposition about Pleasure, that a small one compared with a great, and a rare one compared with a frequent, is, if unalloyed with Pain, the pleasanter, the truer, and the more beautiful.

Protarchus/ The example is sufficient.

Socrates/ Well, what do you say to this? Has not Pleasure been said to be a process of Becoming, and Being to be alien from Pleasure? Fine spirits they are that proclaim this doctrine, and deserving of our thanks.

Protarchus/ What do they mean?

Socrates/ I will explain by interrogatories, Protarchus, my friend.

Protarchus/ Begin your interrogatories.

Socrates/ Two things meet us, one self-sufficient, the other always aiming at something beyond itself.

Protarchus/ What two? and how is this their character?

Socrates/ One of sovereign state, the other of inferior rank.

Protarchus/ Explain more clearly.

Socrates/ Youthful persons, fair and good, have met your eyes, I suppose, accompanied by manly lovers.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Look for two other things related like these two in every sphere of existence.

Protarchus/ A third time I ask for explanation, Socrates.

Socrates/ I mean nothing recondite, Protarchus; the words are only a mystification, and mean that things are divided into those that are subservient to something else, and those to which something else is subservient.

Protarchus/ I just Comprehend by the help of the repetition.

Socrates/ Perhaps you will comprehend better in the progress of the discussion.

Protarchus/ It is likely.

Socrates/ Here are two other things.

Protarchus/ What are they?

Socrates/ One a process of Becoming, the other a state of Being.

Protarchus/ Two they are, I allow; Becoming and Being.

Socrates/ Well, which is subservient to the other, Being to Becoming, or Becoming to Being?

Protarchus/ Is Being subservient to Becoming, do you ask?

Socrates/ So it seems.

Protarchus/ By heavens, then, will you repeat the question?

Socrates/ This is what I ask, my Protarchus, are ships the end of naval architecture, or is naval architecture the end of ships? And wherever you find a similar relation, I ask the same question.

Protarchus/ Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates?

Socrates/ There is no reason why I should not; but you must concur in the answer. I say that some Becoming is the end of every accumulation of drugs, and instruments, and materials, and that every particular Becoming is the means to some kind of Being, and the aggregate of Becoming to the aggregate of Being.

Protarchus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ If Pleasure, therefore, is a Becoming, it must be a means to some Being.

Protarchus/ It must.

Socrates/ Only the end, that to which the rest is subservient, is to be ranked as Good: the means must be ranked under some other class.

Protarchus/ They must.

Socrates/ If Pleasure, therefore, is a Becoming, some other class must be assigned to it than Good.

Protarchus/ No doubt.

Socrates/ Therefore, as I said when I began the subject, the man who showed that Pleasure is a Becoming, and that Being is alien to its nature, deserves our thanks; for in his view those who call Pleasure the Good must be absurdly mistaken.

Protarchus/ Of course.

Socrates/ And in his eyes all who think any Becoming the highest end must be ridiculous.

Protarchus/ What opinions and persons do you allude to?

Socrates/ Those whom the medicine of hunger and thirst, and any affections to which a process of Becoming is medicinal, delights as if it were Pleasure, and who say that life would not be worth having but for thirst and hunger and the list of similar affections.

Protarchus/ He would think them ridiculous.

Socrates/ Well, the opposite to Becoming is ceasing to be, is it not?

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Ceasing to be, then, and Becoming are the choice of the man who chooses this condition instead of the third life containing neither Pleasure nor Pain, but the purest possible Wisdom.

Protarchus/ Many absurdities seem to follow, Socrates, if Pleasure is assumed to be Good.

Socrates/ Many, indeed; and here is another that I will mention.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ Is it not repugnant to reason that nothing Good or beautiful should exist in bodies or in anything else but the soul, and in the soul only Pleasure; and that velour, and temperance, and other goods of soul, should not be Good? And, again, that if instead of enjoying Pleasure, a man

suffers Pain, he must be called Bad at the time that he suffers Pain, although he be the best of men; and that if a man is delighted, his delight at that moment is a measure of his goodness?

Protarchus/ And this, Socrates, is as opposed to reason as it can be.

Socrates/ Well, after Pleasure has been subjected to a thorough examination, Reason and Science must not be treated with more tenderness, but the flaws in their metal, if they have any, must be exposed by striking on the rim; that the purest portions being ascertained, the Perfect life may be composed of those parts of Pleasure and Science that are the truest.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ Well, production is the end of one branch of Science, I imagine, and education and culture of the other.

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ Has the productive branch, we may first inquire, one element more scientific, another less, and one to be considered purer, another more impure?

Protarchus/ Let us inquire.

Socrates/ The architectonic element in each must be separated from the other.

Protarchus/ Which element? Give me an instance.

Socrates/ Separate arithmetic from any Art, and mensuration, and statics, and what remains will be insignificant, so to speak.

Protarchus/ Very insignificant.

Socrates/ The rest is guessing, and sensation sharpened by experience and practice, and a power of conjecture, sometimes denominated Art, brought by practice and assiduity to perfection.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ There is a deal of this in music, accordant strings being estimated, not by measure, but by practiced conjecture. And those who handle wind instruments measure the pitch of notes by conjecture during their vibration, with a large admixture of uncertainty and little stability of result.

Protarchus/ The fact is so.

Socrates/ And medical Science, agriculture, navigation, and strategy, resemble music in character.

Protarchus/ Perfectly.

Socrates/ The Arts of building, on the contrary, from the number of measures and implements they employ, and the amount of accuracy they thus obtain, are more artificial than the majority of Sciences.

Protarchus/ Instance some.

Socrates/ Naval and domestic architecture, and many other Arts that work in wood. The ruler, of course, and turning-lathe are used, the plummet and red-line, and a certain ingenious corrector.

Protarchus/ Very true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Let us conclude there are two divisions of so-called Art. Music and its group, with less exactness of work, and architecture, with its group, attaining to more exactness.

Protarchus/ Let us establish the division.

Socrates/ And of these the most accurate elements are the Arts which we lately called architectonic.

Protarchus/ Arithmetic you mean, I think, and the Arts you joined with it.

Socrates/ I do; but there are two kinds even of these, are there not, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ What two kinds do you mean?

Socrates/ Arithmetic, to begin with that, is divided into popular and philosophic, is it not?

Protarchus/ By what principle of division can we distinguish the two kinds?

Socrates/ There is a broad distinction, Protarchus. One arithmetician counts with unequal units—two armies, two oxen, two anythings, however large or small; the other will not move a single step along with him unless every unit in ten thousand is allowed to be the exact counterpart of every other.

Protarchus/ It is indeed a broad distinction that you mention between arithmeticians, and a ground for making two species.

Socrates/ Well, are the mensuration and theory of proportion which are employed in the constructive and mercantile Arts, and the philosophic geometry and proportion, to be regarded as one species or two?

Protarchus/ After what has preceded, I should say there are two kinds of each.

Socrates/ Right; and does the object of eliciting these facts occur to you?

Protarchus/ Perhaps it does; but I should like you to give the answer.

Socrates/ I think it was its original desire of finding a division of Sciences analogous to that of Pleasures that prompted our dialectic to advance into this region, and inquire whether the Sciences differ in purity as well as the Pleasures.

Protarchus/ This is clearly the reason why it took this direction.

Socrates/ Well, has it not already ascertained that different provinces belong to different Arts, varying in certainty?

Protarchus/ It has.

Socrates/ And now, after designating an Art by an individual name, and leading us to imagine it was one, is it not going to assume it is two, and inquire whether certainty and purity in this department belong to the philosophic or the unphilosophic branch in a higher degree?

Protarchus/ I think this is the question it is going to ask.

Socrates/ What then shall we say in answer, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ There is a wonderful difference in point of exactitude in the department we are considering.

Socrates/ Then our answer will be easier.

Protarchus/ Yes; and be it said that these Sciences far surpass the first we mentioned, and that among these latter the really philosophic branches are beyond comparison superior to the rest in accuracy and truth about measures and numbers.

Socrates/ We will assume it to be as you say, and on your authority we will boldly answer the masters of misinterpretation: —

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ That there are two arithmetics and two mensurations, and many other Arts double in nature, though single in name.

Protarchus/ We will tell them so, and may the masters you speak of profit by the answer.

Socrates/ These, then, we affirm to be the most accurate Sciences.

Protarchus/ We do.

Socrates/ But we, Protarchus, shall be disavowed by the Dialectic Art if we set anything above her.

Protarchus/ And of what Art do you speak?

Socrates/ Everyone will recognize the faculty I allude to. For the one that contemplates Being, and realities, and the immutable is allowed, I fancy, by all who have a grain of reason, to be the truest kind of cognition. But what is your decision, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ I often heard Gorgias say upon this topic, Socrates, that Oratory is very far superior to all other Arts, as it reduces all mankind to a voluntary servitude, and that it is by far the most excellent Art. But now I should not like to break with either of you.

Socrates/ Break a lance, you were going to say, I think, but humility restrained you, and made you desert your cause.

Protarchus/ As you like, Socrates.

Socrates/ Is it my fault that you misunderstand me?

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ I did not ask, my dear Protarchus, what Science or what Art is first in grandeur, excellence, or utility to man, but where most certainty and accuracy are to be found, however small the Art may be, and however slight its utility—that at present is the question; and consider, you will not offend Gorgias if his Art is allowed a pre-eminence in utility; and as to the other, we allowed that a mass of pure white, however small, surpasses in point of truth an impure mass, however great; so let us carefully examine and compare them without regard to utility or honor, and if there is any element in the soul with an inborn love of truth and an entire devotion to it, has this, let us inquire and determine, has this in all probability the purest Reason and

Wisdom, or does a more rightful pretender to these attributes remain to be discovered?

Protarchus/ Well, I have reflected, and it can hardly, I think, be conceded that any Science or Art holds truth with a more tenacious grasp than this.

Socrates/ Is your reason for saying so the fact that the common Arts and their cultivators reason from opinions, and bend all their efforts to influence opinions? Or if nature is the subject of inquiry, is it not this sensible world, its origin, affections, and forces, that are investigated?

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Not eternal Being, therefore, but transient Becoming, present, future, or past, is the subject of study.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Can any of these objects, which never were, nor are, nor ever will be permanent, have the certainty of the most perfect truth?

Protarchus/ How can they?

Socrates/ Can things devoid of stability be the subject of anything else that is stable?

Protarchus/ I imagine not.

Socrates/ They are not the objects therefore of Reason or of Science possessing the highest truth.

Protarchus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Protarchus, then, and Socrates, and Gorgias, and Philebus must be banished from our thoughts, and this testimony must be borne in aid of the inquiry: —

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ That either those things are the subject of stable, and pure, and true cognition, the immutable and unmixed I mean, or secondly, whatever has most affinity to them.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Of the names expressing cognition should not the most beautiful be assigned to the most beautiful objects?

Protarchus/ It is but reasonable.

Socrates/ Are not Reason and Wisdom the most illustrious names?

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ These names, then, may be given to the Science of real Being with a superlatively just application.

Protarchus/ They may.

Socrates/ Well, these are precisely the names that I advocated in the coming comparison.

Protarchus/ They are, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well, with Wisdom and Pleasure ready to be mixed, to say that we resemble artists with the ingredients or materials of some artistic work ready to our hands, would be a just comparison.

Protarchus/ It would.

Socrates/ The next thing is to try to mix them.

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Well, by way of prelude had we not better refresh our memory?

Protarchus/ Of what?

Socrates/ Of that which we have already once recalled to mind, for it is an approved proverb that good words deserve repeating twice and thrice.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Well then, by Jove, this is what we said, I think: —

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Philebus says Pleasure is the right aim of all that lives, and ought always to be proposed as an end, and is indeed the chief Good of the universe; and the two names Good and Pleasant only express one reality. Socrates, on the other hand, says, that they are not one but two like their names, and that Good and Pleasant are different in nature; and, secondly, that deeper participation in the nature of Good is to be ascribed to Wisdom than to Pleasure. Is not, or was not, this what we said, Protarchus?

Protarchus/ It was.

Socrates/ Well, was not and is not this a point agreed upon?

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ That the Good is distinguished from other things by this character: —

Protarchus/ What character?

Socrates/ That whatever has it constantly, completely, and thoroughly, never needs anything else, but has what is perfectly Sufficient. Is it not so?

Protarchus/ It is so.

Socrates/ Well, we attempted an ideal decomposition, did we not, confining them to separate lives, excluding Wisdom from Pleasure, and removing every iota of Pleasure from Wisdom?

Protarchus/ We did so.

Socrates/ Well, did we think either of them alone commensurate to human desire?

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And if we were mistaken let anyone stop us and set us right, Memory, Wisdom, Science, and True Opinion being assumed to belong to one class, and the question being, whether the absence of these would not mar the

possession or acquisition of anything else however excellent; and a fortiori of Pleasure, however abundant or intense, if a man neither thought he was pleased, nor knew what sensation he experienced, nor remembered it a moment afterwards; and so of Wisdom. Whether, in fact, the total absence of Pleasure lends greater attractions to Wisdom than its presence, and whether Pleasures unattended with Wisdom are more Desirable than Pleasures attended with a grain of Wisdom.

Protarchus/ It cannot be so, Socrates; and this question needs no reiteration.

Socrates/ Perfect, then, and universally Desirable, and absolutely Good, are epithets that belong to neither of them.

Protarchus/ How can they?

Socrates/ Well; the Highest Good must now be more or less accurately determined, in order, as we said, that the second rank may be duly allotted.

Protarchus/ It must.

Socrates/ Well, a road leading to the Good has been discovered, has it not?

Protarchus/ What road?

Socrates/ Supposing a man had to be found—if the house where he dwelt were ascertained, would it not be a great step towards finding him?

Protarchus/ It would.

Socrates/ Now in the present case reason bids us, and for the second time, not to look in the Unmixed life for the Good, hut in the Mixed.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Well; the chance is greater that a beautifully mixed life will disclose what we are looking for, than that any other will.

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ The gods, Protarchus, should be supplicated before we mix, either Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the tutelary lord of mixture.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ Well, we are like cupbearers standing before two fountains: one of honey, we might call that of Pleasure; and that of Wisdom, a sober and untempered fountain of austere and salubrious water. Of these we must make the most beautiful possible mixture.

Protarchus/ We must.

Socrates/ First advise me, if every kind of Pleasure and Wisdom were to be mixed together, would at beautiful mixture be most likely the result?

Protarchus/ Possibly.

Socrates/ But it would be dangerous; and there is a safer way of mixing, I think, that a certain principle indicates.

Protarchus/ What principle?

Socrates/ Pleasures differ in truth, we found, and Arts in accuracy.

Protarchus/ They do.

Socrates/ And Science differs from Science, one having for its objects things that come into being and perish, another what neither comes into being nor perishes, but exists ever the same and unchanging.

Inspecting these in reference to truth, we thought the latter the truer of the two. Suppose the truest divisions of each were first tried in combination, to see whether they are sufficient when mixed, and whether an absolutely satisfactory life is the result, or whether we must add some of the other divisions.

Protarchus/ We had better do so, I think.

Socrates/ Suppose a man is Wise about the essence of very justice, and gifted with Ratiocination worthy of his intuitions, and in all other matters endowed with a similar amount of comprehension.

Protarchus/ Supposed.

Socrates/ Will such a man have sufficient Knowledge, if the only circle and sphere he knows are the divine, the human sphere and sublunary circles escaping his ken, and his command as an architect over the other measures being as limited as his command over the circles?

Protarchus/ It is an absurd state that you describe, Socrates, this unacquaintance with any but the divine Sciences.

Socrates/ What? Ought the Arts dealing with the false circle and rule, with all their instability and impurity, to be thrown in together and added to the mixture?

Protarchus/ They must, if we are to be able when we go out of doors to find our way home.

Socrates/ Must music, too, in which we said a little while ago guessing and imitation are rife, and purity deficient?

Protarchus/ It must, I think, if our life is to be anything like a life.

Socrates/ Shall I, then, like a doorkeeper, hustled, pushed, and overborne, yield to the pressure, throw open the gates, and let all the Sciences stream in pell-mell, whether pure or alloyed?

Protarchus/ I cannot see the harm to a man, Socrates, of having all when he has the first.

Socrates/ Shall I let them all flow into the very Homeric and poetical meeting-waters' pool?

Protarchus/ Do so.

Socrates/ In they all have gone; and now for Pleasure's fountain. For our plan of first mixing the true sorts failed of execution, as from our indiscriminate love of Knowledge all its branches were admitted together before the Pleasures.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ It is now time to decide about the Pleasures, whether they, too, should be admitted indiscriminately or whether the truest should be admitted first.

Protarchus/ It would be much safer if at first only the true kinds were admitted.

Socrates/ They have been admitted then, suppose. What next? If there are any others that are necessary, must we not admit them as we did the Sciences?

Protarchus/ Of course the necessary ones.

Socrates/ And, as the Arts without exception were agreed to be innocuous and advantageous, if we think the same about the Pleasures, namely, that all Enjoyments indiscriminately are always innocent and expedient, they must all be mixed.

Protarchus/ How shall we decide, and what course shall we take?

Socrates/ It is not to us that the question should be addressed, Protarchus, but to the Pleasures and Wisdoms themselves; and we should interrogate them thus.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Friends, whether Pleasures or whatsoever else is your proper title, would ye prefer to dwell with Wisdom of every kind, or without Wisdom? I imagine this is what they would infallibly reply: —

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Why, as we said, that the lonely, and solitary, and unalloyed existence of any class is neither possible nor

expedient: but of all classes taken individually we deem that the best one to live with is the tribe of Knowledge, particularly as it includes the perfect appreciation of ourselves.

Protarchus/ Ye have said well, we will reply.

Socrates/ Right. Next Wisdom and Reason must be interrogated. Are Pleasures required in the mixture? we would say to Reason and Wisdom. 'Pleasures indeed!' they might answer, 'what Pleasures?'

Protarchus/ Perhaps they might.

Socrates/ And we then should have to say this, 'Over and above the true Pleasures, do ye need the greatest and intensest Pleasures as companions?' 'How can we need them, Socrates,' they might answer, 'impeding us as they do, in ten thousand ways, seeing that by their agency the souls where we dwell are disturbed by mad desires, our very births are prevented, and any children that may be born to us perish of neglect and forgetfulness? But the true and pure Pleasures that you mention may be claimed as our own, you must know. Those, too, by which Health and Temperance are attended, and which each particular Virtue, like a goddess, has in her train to follow her whithersoever she goes, may be included in the mixture. But those that Folly and the other Vices have for companions cannot, without the highest absurdity, be associated with Reason, if your object is to examine the most beautiful and undiscordant mixture, in order to discover in it what to man and to the universe is the Highest Good, and what character it discloses to human divination.' A wise and characteristic answer of Reason this would be, would it not, for himself, and Memory, and True Opinion?

Protarchus/ It would.

Socrates/ And another thing is indispensable, and the condition of every natural creation.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Without an admixture of truth nothing can truly be created or exist.

Protarchus/ How can it?

Socrates/ Impossible. Now whether any further admixture is wanted, do you say, Protarchus and Philebus? My own opinion is, that an ordering law, unembodied, but fit to rule an embodied soul, has been perfectly traced in this delineation.

Protarchus/ And my opinion, Socrates, is the same.

Socrates/ To affirm, then, that the Good has its vestibule and palace on the spot where we stand would not be wrong.

Protarchus/ It would not.

Socrates/ Tell me what element in the mixture is most transcendently excellent, and the principal cause of the universal love of such a state of mind; and after considering this, we next will inquire whether Pleasure or Reason is the more similar and the more nearly related to this indwelling element.

Protarchus/ Right; for so our comparison will be much facilitated.

Socrates/ Well now, the cause is clear why any mixture is of the highest value, or absolutely worthless.

Protarchus/ What cause do you mean?

Socrates/ Surely, no one but knows this.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ That if Measure and Symmetry are absent from any composition in any degree, ruin awaits both the ingredients and the composition. For it is no composition, but a discordant jumble of elements in deplorable disarray.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ We have now tracked the Good to the covert of the Beautiful, for Measure and Symmetry are Beauty and Virtue all the world over, I imagine.

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ And Truth, we said, is associated with them.

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ Well, then, if there is no single form in which we can enclose the good, let us enclose it in three—Beauty, Symmetry, and Truth, and agree that these are the truest cause of the properties of the mixture, and being Good are the reason of its goodness.

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ By this time, Protarchus, anyone is competent to judge whether Pleasure or Wisdom is more akin to the Supreme Good, and more worthy of homage from men and gods.

Protarchus/ It is clear, indeed; but still the argument had better be completed.

Socrates/ Each of the characters must be separately compared with Pleasure and Wisdom, for we must determine to which of the two they each have a greater affinity.

Protarchus/ Beauty, Truth, and Pleasure, do you mean?

Socrates/ Yes; and first take Truth, Protarchus, and fix your eyes on the three things, Reason, Truth, and Pleasure, and, after taking a long time to think, answer yourself whether Pleasure or Reason has more affinity to Truth.

Protarchus/ What need of taking time? Surely there is no comparison. Pleasure, of all things, is most prone to false exaggeration, and they say that in the Pleasures of love, the greatest as is reckoned, even perjury is winked at by the gods from the childlike irrationality of Pleasure; whereas Reason,

if not the same thing as Truth, is of all things the likest and the truest.

Socrates/ Well, does Measure, we must next examine, belong to Pleasure more than to Wisdom, or to Wisdom more than to Pleasure?

Protarchus/ It is, again, an easy problem that you propose, for I imagine that Pleasure and Enjoyment are, of all things in the world, the most void of Measure that can be found, and Reason and Science the most full of Measure.

Socrates/ Good; but tell me about the third character. Has Reason more of Beauty communicated to it or Pleasure; and is Reason fairer than Pleasure, or vice versa?

Protarchus/ Why, Wisdom and Reason, Socrates, were never in dreams or in waking thought unseemly, were they, to the eye or to imagination in any respect, degree, or time, past, present, or to come?

Socrates/ They never were.

Protarchus/ But Pleasures, and those, too, the greatest, when seen to be enjoyed, are ridiculous if not unseemly, and we ourselves are ashamed of them, and veil and hide them as much as we can, and shroud them in night as not fit for the eye of day.

Socrates/ You will proclaim, then, to all the world, by missionaries and in person, that Pleasure among possessions is neither best nor second. But first, is Measure, and the Measured, and the Due, and whatever things are like to these, and inhabit the eternal sphere; second, are the Symmetrical, and Beautiful, and Perfect, and Adequate, and all the individuals of this tribe.

Protarchus/ It seems so.

Socrates/ Third, if I divine aright, Reason and Wisdom may be ranked without much deviation from the truth.

Protarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And does not the fourth place belong to the things of the mind we spoke of—Sciences, and Arts, and Right Opinions by name? Are not these, I say, next to the first three, as the Good is more nearly related to them than to Pleasure?

Protarchus/ I think so.

Socrates/ And, fifth, are the Pleasures we recognized and distinguished as painless, calling them pure and mental, some the companions of Science, others of Sensations.

Protarchus/ Apparently.

Socrates/ And the sixth generation, says Orpheus, shall close the procession of my song. Our investigation, too, seems to terminate when the sixth rank has been awarded. And nothing now remains but to place a head upon the dialogue.

Protarchus/ Let it be done.

Socrates/ Well, a third libation to the savior god, while we again bear witness to the doctrine.

Protarchus/ What doctrine?

Socrates/ Philebus said Pleasure is the Good, without exception and without defect.

Protarchus/ The third libation that you spoke of just now was apparently the repetition of the original thesis.

Socrates/ Yes; and now listen. Being convinced of what I have just established, and having a repugnance for the doctrine of Philebus, a doctrine, indeed, that ten thousand others share, I maintained that Reason was a much higher Good than Pleasure, and more salutary to human life.

Protarchus/ You did.

Socrates/ And, suspecting the same to be true of many other things, I said that if it should appear that any third

thing was better than either, the second rank belonged to Reason rather than to Pleasure, as I was ready to prove.

Protarchus/ That is what you said.

Socrates/ And then we had sufficient evidence that both were insufficient.

Protarchus/ We had.

Socrates/ And in this investigation Reason as well as Pleasure fell decidedly short of being the Sovereign Good, failing, as they did, in Self-sufficiency, Adequacy, and Perfection.

Protarchus/ Undeniably.

Socrates/ And when a third thing proved to be more excellent than either, Reason, compared with Pleasure, appeared ten thousand times more allied and related to the victor.

Protarchus/ It did.

Socrates/ It is the fifth rank, according to the judgment that our dialectic has pronounced, that belongs to Pleasure.

Protarchus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ Not the first, though all oxen, and horses, and the whole brute creation, should proclaim so by their eagerness to gratify their lust, relying on whose testimony, as diviners on that of birds, the vulgar judge Pleasure most decisive of the goodness of life; as if brutes and their loves were more weighty witnesses than those whom a muse of philosophy has inspired with the divinations of reason.

Protarchus/ The truth of what you say, Socrates, approves itself now to all of us.

Socrates/ Am I released, then?

Protarchus/ There is a little that still remains, Socrates; for surely you will not be the first to weary of the subject, and I will remind you which part is unfinished.

The Philebus.

Translated by Sydenham.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus.

scene. —The Lyceum.

Socrates/ Consider now, Protarchus, what the doctrine of Philebus is, which you are taking upon yourself to second and support; and what things said by me you are going to controvert, if they should be found such as are not agreeable to your mind. Will you permit me to state, in a summary way, the difference between my positions and those of Philebus?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ Philebus then says, that the good of all animals is joy, and pleasure, and delight, and whatever else is congenial to them and harmonizes with all other things of the same kind. And what I contend for Is, that those things are not the best; but that to be wise, and to understand, and remember, and whatever is of kin to them right opinions, and true reasonings, are better things than pleasure, and more eligible to all beings universally, that is, to such as are capable of receiving the participation of them; and that to all beings which have that capacity, the actual partaking of them is of all things the most advantageous, not only to those beings which are, but to those also which are to come. Do we not, O Philebus, you and I, severally lay down some such hypotheses as these?

Philebus/ Exactly such, O Socrates!

Socrates/ And will you, Protarchus, take up the controversy, as I have just now stated it?

Protarchus/ Of necessity I must. For Philebus, the champion of our side, is tired and gives out.

Socrates/ Now it is right and proper for us to discover, by all means possible, the full force and meaning of both those hypotheses; and not to give over till we have determined the controversy between them.

Protarchus/ I agree with you, it is.

Socrates/ Let us agree in this too, besides.

Protarchus/ In what?

Socrates/ That we should, each of us, endeavor to set forth what state and what affection of the soul is able, according to our different hypotheses, to procure for every man a happy life. Is it not our business so to do?

Protarchus/ Certainly it is.

Socrates/ Well then: You say that it is that of rejoicing; we, that it is that of understanding and thinking rightly.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ But what if there should appear some other, preferable to both of these, but more nearly of kin to pleasure? should we not in this case be both of us confuted, and obliged to yield the preference to a life which gives the stable possession of those very things wherein you place human happiness? However, at the same time it must be agreed, that a life of pleasure would be found more eligible than a life of knowledge or intellection.

Protarchus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ But if that better state of the soul should appear to be more nearly, allied to knowledge, in that case, knowledge would be found to have the advantage over pleasure, and pleasure must give place. Do you not agree with me, that these things are so? or how otherwise say you that they are?

Protarchus/ To me, I must confess, they seem to be as you represent them.

Socrates/ But to Philebus how seem they? What say you, Philebus?

Philebus/ To me pleasure seems, and will always seem, to be the superior, whatever it be compared with. And you, Protarchus, will be at length convinced of it yourself.

Protarchus/ After having resigned to me the management of the debate, you can no longer be the master of what should be yielded to Socrates, and what should not.

Philebus/ You are in the right. But, however, I have discharged my duty; and I here call the Goddess herself to witness it.

Protarchus/ We too are witnesses of the same; and can testify your making of the assertion which you have just made. But now, as to that examination, O Socrates! which is to follow after what you and I have agreed in, whether Philebus be willing to consent, or however he may be disposed, let us try to go through with it, and bring it to a conclusion.

Socrates/ By all means, let us; beginning with that very Goddess who, according to him, is called Venus, but whose true name is Pleasure.

Protarchus/ Perfectly right.

Socrates/ The fear which I have always in me concerning the proper names of the Gods, is no ordinary kind of fear; but surpasses the greatest dread. Hence, in the present case, with regard to Venus, whatever name be agreeable to the Goddess, by that would I choose to call her. But as to pleasure, how various a thing it is, I well know. And with this, as I just now said, ought we to begin, by considering and inquiring into the nature of pleasure first. For we hear it called, indeed, by one single name, as if it were one simple

thing: it assumes, however, all sorts of forms, even such as are the most unlike one to another. For observe: we say that the intemperate man has pleasure; and that the temperate man has pleasure also, —pleasure in being what he is, that is, temperate. Again: we say that pleasure attends on folly, and on the man who is full of foolish opinions and foolish hopes; that pleasure attends also on the man who thinks wisely, —pleasure in that very mental energy, his thinking wisely. Now any person who would affirm these pleasures to be of similar kind, would be justly deemed to want understanding.

Protarchus/ The pleasures which you mention, O Socrates, are indeed produced by contrary causes; but in the pleasures themselves there is no contrariety. For how should pleasure not be similar to pleasure, itself to itself, the most similar of all things?

Socrates/ Just so, color too, my friend, differs not from color in this respect, that it is color, all. And yet, we all of us know that black, besides being different from white, happens to be also its direct contrary. So figure, too, is all one with figure, after the same manner, in the general. But as to the parts of that one general thing, some are directly contrary to others; and between the rest there happens to be a kind of infinite diversity. And many other things we shall find to be of this nature. Believe not then this portion, that things the most contrary are all of them one. And I suspect that we shall also find some pleasures quite contrary to other pleasures.

Protarchus/ It may be so. But how will that hurt my side of the question?

Socrates/ In that you call them dissimilar as they are, by another name; (shall we say?) for all pleasant things you call good. Now that all pleasant things are pleasant, admits of no

dispute. But though many of them are evil, and many indeed good, as I readily acknowledge, yet all of them you call good; and at the same time you confess them to be dissimilar in their natures, when a man forces you to this confession. What then is that, the same in every pleasure, in the evil pleasures equally with the good, from which you give to all pleasures the denomination of good?

Protarchus/ What is that, O Socrates, which you say? Do you imagine that any person, after having asserted that pleasure is the good, will admit your supposition? or will suffer it to pass uncontradicted, that only some pleasures are good, but that other pleasures are evil?

Socrates/ However, you will acknowledge that pleasures are unlike one to another, and some even contrary to others?

Protarchus/ By no means; so far as they are pleasures, every one of them.

Socrates/ We are now brought back again to the same position, O Protarchus! There is no difference between pleasure and pleasure; all pleasures are alike, we must say: and the similar instances, just now produced, in colors and in figures, have had, it seems, no effect, upon us. But we shall try, and talk after the manner of the meanest arguers, and mere novices in dialectic.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ I mean, that if I, to imitate you, and dispute with you in your own way, should dare to assert that two things, the most unlike, are of all things the most like to each other, I should say nothing more than what you say: to that both of us would appear to be rawer disputants than we ought to be; and the subject of our dispute would thus flip out of our hands, and get away. Let us resume it, therefore, once more: and, perhaps, by returning to similitudes, we

may be induced to make some concessions each of us to the other.

Protarchus/ Say how.

Socrates/ Suppose me to be the party questioned; and suppose yourself, Protarchus, to interrogate me.

Protarchus/ Concerning what?

Socrates/ Concerning prudence, and science, and intelligence, and all the rest of those things which in the beginning of our conversation I said were good, when I was asked what sort of a thing good was; must I not acknowledge these to be attended with the same circumstance which attends those other things celebrated by you?

Protarchus/ What circumstance?

Socrates/ The sciences, viewed all of them together, will seem to both of us not only many, and of diverse kinds, but dissimilar too, some to others. Now if besides there should appear a contrariety in any way, between some of them and others, should I deserve to be disputed with any longer, if, fearful of admitting contrariety between the sciences, I were to assert that no one science was dissimilar to any other science? For then the matter in debate between us, as if it were a mere fable, being destroyed, would vanish: while we saved ourselves by an illogical retreat. But such an event ought not to happen, except this part of it, —the saving of ourselves. And now the equality, which appears thus far between your hypothesis and mine, I am well enough pleased with. The pleasures happen to be found many and dissimilar; many also and diverse are the sciences. The difference, however, between your good and mine, O Protarchus, let us not conceal: but let us dare to say it fairly and openly before us both; that we may discover, (if those who are closely examined will make any discovery,) whether pleasure or wisdom ought to be pronounced the chief good

of man, or whether any third thing, different from either: since it is not, as I presume, with this view that we contend, that my hypothesis, or that yours, may prevail over its antagonist; but that which hath the truth on its side, we are both of us to contend for and support.

Protarchus/ This is certainly our duty.

Socrates/ But this point further we should, both of us together, settle on the surest ground.

Protarchus/ What point do you mean?

Socrates/ That which puzzles and perplexes all persons who choose to make it the subject of their conversation: nay, sometimes some others, who have no such intention, are led to it unawares in conversation upon other subjects.

Protarchus/ Express what you mean in plainer terms.

Socrates/ I mean that which fell in our way but just now, the nature of which is so full of wonders. For that many are one, and that one is many, is wonderful to have it said; and either of those positions is easy to be controverted.

Protarchus/ Do you mean such positions as this, —that I Protarchus, who am by nature one person, am also many? and such as these others, —that myself, and other persons the reverse of me, —the great also and the little, the heavy and the light, are one and the same? with a thousand positions more which might be made of like kind?

Socrates/ The wonders, O Protarchus, which you have now spoken of, relating to the one and many, have been hackneyed in the mouths of the vulgar; but by the common agreement, as it were, of all men, they are now said aside, and are never to be mentioned: for they are considered as childish and easy objections, and great impediments also to discourse. It is now also agreed, never to introduce into conversation, as an instance of one and many, the members or parts into which any single thing may be considered as

divisible. Because, when a respondent has once admitted and avowed, that all these [members or parts] are that one thing, which is thus at the same time many, he is refuted and laughed at by his questioner, for having been driven to assert such monstrous absurdities as these, —that a single one is an infinite multitude, and an infinite multitude only one.

Protarchus/ What other things, then, not hackneyed among the vulgar, nor as yet universally agreed on, do you mean, O Socrates, relating to this point?

Socrates/ I mean, young man, when a thing is proposed to be considered, which is one, but is not of the number or nature of things generated and perishable. For as to the ones of this latter sort, it is agreed, as I just now said, to reject them as unworthy of a serious confutation. The ones which I mean are such as man, or, beauty, good. When these *henads*, or such as these, are proposed for subjects of debate, much serious attention is given them; and when they come to be divided, anyone of them into many, much doubt and controversy arises.

Protarchus/ Upon what points?

Socrates/ In the first place, whether such monads should be deemed to have true being. In the next place, how it is that these monads, every one of them being always the same, and never generated, nor ever to be destroyed, have, notwithstanding, one and the same stability common to them all. And lastly, Whether we should suppose every such monad to be dispersed and spread abroad amongst an infinity of things generated or produced, and thus, from being one, to become many; or whether we should suppose it to remain entire, itself by itself, separate and apart from that multitude. But, of all suppositions, this might appear the most impossible, that one and the same thing should be

in a single one, and in many, at the same time. These points, O Protarchus, which regard such instances as I have mentioned, and not such as were mentioned by you, these are they, which, for want of being rightly settled, create all the difficulties and doubts we meet with in discourse; but when once they are settled rightly, they clear the way with ease.

Protarchus/ Then, it seems, we are to labor these points first.

Socrates/ I should think we ought.

Protarchus/ And that we consent to it, you may take for granted, all of us here. Philebus, indeed, it is best perhaps, at present, not to discompose by asking him questions, now that he is quiet.

Socrates/ Very well; but in what way shall we begin the discussion of these points in so wide a field of controversy? Shall we begin thus?

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ We say, in speaking of these monads, (each of which is one, but, on a logical examination of it, appears to be divisible into many,) that they run throughout every sentence in our discourse, everywhere and always; and that, as their being shall never have an end, so neither does it first begin in the present age. Now this perpetual attendant upon all speech proceeds, as it seems to me, from something immortal and undecaying within ourselves. And hence it is, that the youth everywhere, when they have thus had a taste of it, are overjoyed at their having thus found a treasure of wisdom. Transported, therefore, with the delight it gives them they apply it to every subject of discourse: sometimes they collect particulars from all quarters, and roll them into one; then they unroll them again, and part them asunder. After having in this way puzzled themselves in the first place,

they question and puzzle the person next at hand, whether he be their equal in age, or younger than themselves, or older, sparing neither father nor mother, nor anyone else who will attend to them scarcely other animals more than man: it is certain they would not exempt any who speak a foreign language only, could they but find somewhere an interpreter.

Protarchus/ Do you not see, O Socrates, how numerous we are, and that all of us are young? and are you not afraid that, if you rail at us, we shall all join Philebus, and attack you jointly? However (for we apprehend your meaning), if you can by any means or contrivance easily rid of us of these perplexities, which hinder the progress of our inquiry, and can devise some better way of managing the argument, do you but give your mind to the prosecution of it, and we shall do our utmost to follow and attend you. For the present debate is of no trifling concern, Socrates.

Socrates/ Indeed it is not, O boys! as Philebus called you. No better way, then, is there, nor can there be, than that, which I am always a great lover of; but often before now it has slipped away from my sight, and has left me, as it were, in a desert, at a loss whither to turn me.

Protarchus/ Let us but know what way you mean.

Socrates/ To point out the way is not very difficult; but to travel in it, is the most difficult of all things. For all such human inventions as depend on art are, in this way, discovered and said open. Consider then the way which, I am speaking of.

Protarchus/ Do but tell it us then.

Socrates/ A gift of the Gods to men, as it appears to me, by a certain Prometheus hurled from the Gods along with a fire the most luminous. From the men of ancient times, men better than we are, and dwelling nigher to the Gods, this

tradition of it hath descended to us, —that those beings said to be forever derive their essence from one and many; and therefore have in themselves bound and infinity connatural to them: that, being in the midst of things so constituted as they are, we ought to suppose and to search for someone idea in everything around us; for that, since it is there, we shall, on searching, be sure to find it: that, after we have found it, we are next to look for two, if two only are next; otherwise three, or some other number: again, that everyone of this number we are to examine in like manner: until at length a man not only perceives, that the one, with which he began, is one, and many, and infinite, but discovers also how many it contains: for, that a man never should proceed to the idea of infinite, and apply it immediately to any number, before he has fully discovered all the definite number which lies between the infinite and the one: but that, having completed this discovery, we should then finish our search; and dismissing into infinity everyone of all those numbers, we should bid farewell to them. The Gods, as I before said, have given us to consider things in this way, and in this way to learn them and teach them one to another. But the wise men of these days take any monad whatever, and divide it into many with more conciseness than they ought, and with more prolixity too, since they never come to an end: for immediately after the monad they introduce infinity, overlooking all the intermediate numbers; the express mention of which, or the omission of them distinguishes such dialectical and fair debates as ours, from such as are contentious and sophistical.

Protarchus/ Part of what you say, Socrates, I seem to apprehend tolerably well: but the meaning of some things which you have now said, I should be glad to hear you express in plainer terms.

Socrates/ The whole of what I have said, Protarchus, is evident in letters. In these, therefore, which have been taught you from your childhood, you may easily apprehend my meaning.

Protarchus/ How in letters?

Socrates/ Voice, that issues out of the human mouth, may be considered as one general thing, admitting of an infinite number of articulations, not only in all men taken together, but also in every individual man.

Protarchus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Now we are not made knowing in speech, or sound articulate, through the knowledge either of the infinity or of the oneness of its nature: but to know how many, and what, are the parts into which it is naturally divided, —this it is which makes any of us a grammarian, or skilled in grammar.

Protarchus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And further, that by which a man comes to be skilled in music is this very thing.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Musical sound, which is the subject matter of this art, may be considered in itself as one general thing.

Protarchus/ Without dispute.

Socrates/ And let us suppose two kinds of it, the grave and the acute, and a third kind between those two, the homotonous, or how otherwise?

Protarchus/ Musical sound in general is so to be distinguished.

Socrates/ But with the knowledge of this distinction only, you would not yet be skilled in music; though without knowing it you would be, as to music, quite worthless.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ But, my friend, when you have learnt the intervals between all musical sounds, from the more acute to the more grave, how many they are in number, and into what sorts they are distinguished; when you have also learnt the bounds of these intervals, and how many systems are composed out of them; (which our predecessors having discovered, delivered down to us, who come after them by the name of harmonies; and having discovered other such affections in the motions of the body, and in words, measuring these by numbers, they have taught us to call them rhythms and meters; bidding us to infer from hence, that everyone and many ought to be searched into and examined in the same way;) when you have learnt all those things, and comprehend them in this ample manner, with all their several diversities and distinctions, then are you become skilled in music. And by considering in the same way the nature of any other kind of being, when you thus fully comprehend it, you are become in that respect intelligent and wise. But the infinite multitude of individuals, their infinite variety, and the infinite changes incident to each, keep you infinitely far off from intelligence and wisdom: and as they make you to be behind other men in every path of knowledge, they make you inconsiderable, and of no account, not to be numbered amongst the knowing in any subject; because you never consider anything thoroughly, and are unable to give a true account of it, never looking at the definite number which it contains.

Protarchus/ Excellently well, O Philebus, as it appears to me, has Socrates spoken in what he has now said.

Philebus/ It appears so too to me myself. But how does all this speech of his concern our controversy? What was the design or drift of it?

Socrates/ A very pertinent question, O Protarchus, this, proposed to us by Philebus.

Protarchus/ Indeed it is: and by all means give it an answer.

Socrates/ That will I do, as soon as I have gone through the little yet remaining of the subject on which I have been speaking. For, as the man who applies himself to the consideration of any kind of things whatever ought not, as I have said, to throw his eye at once upon the infinite, but upon some definite number in the first place; so, on the other hand, when a man is obliged to set out from the infinite, he ought not to mount up immediately to the one, but to some certain number, in each of whose ones a certain multitude is contained; and thus gradually rising from a greater to a less number, to end in one. As an instance of what I have now said, let us resume the consideration of letters.

Protarchus/ In what way?

Socrates/ Whoever it was, whether some God, or some divine man, (the Egyptian reports say that his name was Theuth,) who first contemplated the infinite nature of the human voice, he observed, that amongst the infinity of the sounds it uttered the vowel sounds were more than one, they were many. Again, other utterances he observed, which were not indeed, vowels, but partook, however, of some kind of vocal sound; and that of these also there was a certain number. A third sort of letters also he set apart, those which are now called mutes by us. After this he distinguished every one of these letters which are without any vocal sound, whether perfect or imperfect: the vowels also, and those of middle sort, every one of them he distinguished in the same manner: and when he had discovered how many letters there were of each sort, to everyone, and to all of them together, he gave the name of element. But perceiving that none of us could understand anyone of them by itself alone, without learning them all, he considered that this connection, or

common bond between them was one; and that all these letters made in a manner but one thing: and as he perceived that there was one art in all these, he called it, from its subject matter, the art of letters.

Philebus/ This which Socrates now says, O Protarchus, I understand still more plainly than what he said just before; and am at no loss to apprehend what relation each of the subjects about which he has spoken has to the other. But as to that article in which his argument on the first of those subjects appeared to me to be defective, I am at a loss still.

Socrates/ To know what those instances are to the purpose; is not this your meaning?

Philebus/ Just so. This very thing it is that Protarchus and myself are all this while in search of.

Socrates/ In search still, do you say, when you are just now arrived at it?

Philebus/ How so?

Socrates/ Was not the point originally in dispute between us this: Whether wisdom or pleasure was the more eligible?

Philebus/ Certainly it was.

Socrates/ And do we not admit that each of them is one thing?

Philebus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Now then must come this question, arising naturally from what was said a little before the mention of music and grammar, —In what way (or by what division) are wisdom and pleasure, each of them one and many? or how is it, that neither of them breaks into infinite multitude directly; but that each contains some certain number before it pass into infinity?

Protarchus/ Upon no trivial question, O Philebus, on a sudden has Socrates, after having led us a large roundabout

way, I know not how, thrown us. And now consider, which of us two shall answer to the question he has proposed. It would be ridiculous in me, who have undertaken the support of your argument, to make an absolute revolt on account of my disability in regard to the present question; and so to remit over again to you the talk of giving an answer to it: but I think it would be much more ridiculous for both of us to fail. Consider, then, what we shall do in this case, where Socrates seems to interrogate us concerning the species of pleasure; —whether it is divisible into different species, or not; and, if it be, what is the number of these species, and how they differ in their nature: and the like questions he seems to put to us concerning knowledge and intelligence.

Socrates/ Your conjecture is perfectly right, O son of Callias! and, if we are not able to answer to these questions upon every monad, as to its likeness, sameness, and contrariety, —unless, I say, we can do this, —the instances just now produced have shown, that none of us, in any matter we had to handle, would ever be of any worth at all.

Protarchus/ The case, O Socrates, seems indeed to be not very different from your representation of it. Well, it is certainly a fine thing to know all things, for a wise and prudent person: but I think the best thing, next to that is for a man not to be ignorant of himself. With what design I have now said this, I shall proceed to tell you. This conversation, O Socrates, you have granted to us all, and have given yourself up to us, for the purpose of investigating what is the best of human goods. For, when Philebus had said that it consisted in pleasure, and delight, and joy, and all things of the like nature, you opposed him on this point, and said, it consisted not in these things, but in those which we often repeat the mention of; and we are right in so doing, that the opinions on each side, being always fresh in our memories, may the more easily be examined. You then, it seems, say,

what I shall be right in again repeating, that intellect, science, art, and whatever is allied to them are better things than Pleasure with her allies; and therefore, that the possession, not of these, but of those greater goods, ought to be the object of our aim. Now these positions being said down severally on each side, as subject-matters of our debate, we in a jocose way threatened, that we would not suffer you to go home quietly before it was brought to a fair determination. You complied, and promised us to contribute all you could towards the accomplishment of that end. We insist therefore that, as children say, you must not take away again what is fairly given. But, in the present inquiry, forbear proceeding in your usual way.

Socrates/ What way do you mean?

Protarchus/ Bringing us into straits and embarrassments; propounding questions to which we should not be able on the sudden to give a proper answer. For we are not to imagine that our present inquiry is brought to a conclusion, merely because all of us are at a loss what to answer. If, therefore, we are unable to extricate ourselves from these difficulties, you must help us out; for so you promised. Consider, then, what to do on this occasion; whether to distinguish pleasure and knowledge, each of them into their proper species; or whether to pass it by, if you choose to take a different way, and can find some other means of deciding the matter now controverted between us.

Socrates/ No harm then need I be afraid of any longer to myself, since you have said this. For your leaving to my own choice what ways and means to make use of, frees me from all apprehensions on my own private account. But, to make it still easier to me, some God, I think, has brought things to my remembrance.

Protarchus/ How do you mean? What things?

Socrates/ Having formerly heard, either in a dream, or broad awake, certain sayings, I have them now again present to my mind; —sayings concerning pleasure and knowledge, that neither of them is of itself good, but some third thing, different from both of those, and better than either. Now if this should discover itself to us clearly, pleasure is then to be dismissed from any pretensions to the victory. For we should then no longer expect to find that pleasure and good are the same thing: or how say you?

Protarchus/ Just so.

Socrates/ We shall have no occasion then, in my opinion, for distinguishing the several species of pleasure. And in the progress of our inquiry it will appear more evidently still that I am in the right.

Protarchus/ Having begun so happily, proceed, and finish with the same success.

Socrates/ Let us, first, agree upon a few little points beside.

Protarchus/ What are those?

Socrates/ In what condition or state of being is the good? Must it of necessity be perfect? or may it want perfection?

Protarchus/ Of all things, O Socrates, it is the most perfect.

Socrates/ Well; and is it also sufficient?

Protarchus/ Without doubt: and in this respect it excels all other things.

Socrates/ But further: This also, I presume, is of all things the most necessary to say of it, that every being to whom it is known, hunts after, and desires it, as choosing the possession of it above all things; and, indeed, caring for no other things, except such as are constantly attended with the enjoyment of good.

Protarchus/ There is no possibility of contradicting this.

Socrates/ Now, then, let us consider and judge of the life of pleasure and the life of knowledge: and to do this the better, let us view them each apart from the other.

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ Thus: Let us suppose a life of pleasure, unaccompanied by intelligence; and, on the other hand, a life of intelligence, unaccompanied by pleasure. For, if either of them be good, it must be complete and sufficient, in want of no aid from any other quarter. But, if either of them should appear to be indigent of aught, or insufficient, we are no longer to imagine this to be that real and true good we are in search of.

Protarchus/ In such a case, how could we?

Socrates/ Shall we then examine their pretensions thus separately, making your own mind the judge?

Protarchus/ With all my heart.

Socrates/ Answer then to my questions.

Protarchus/ Propose them.

Socrates/ Would you, Protarchus, accept the offer, were it made you, to live all your life with a sense and feeling of pleasures the most exquisite?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly. Why not?

Socrates/ Suppose you were in full possession of this, would you not think that something beside was still wanting to you?

Protarchus/ I certainly should not.

Socrates/ Consider now, whether you would not be in want of wisdom, and intelligence, and reasoning, and such other things as are the sisters of these; at least whether you would not want to see something.

Protarchus/ Why should I, when I had in a manner all things, in having continual joy?

Socrates/ Living thus then continually all your life, would the most exquisite pleasures give you any joy?

Protarchus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Having neither intellect, nor memory, nor science, nor opinion, —in the first place of this very thing, your possession of joy, you must of necessity be ignorant, and unable to say whether you then had any joy, or not, being void of all just discernment or knowledge of things present.

Protarchus/ I must.

Socrates/ Being also void of memory, it would be impossible for you to remember that you ever had any joy; or to preserve even the least memorial of a joy then present: wanting also right opinion, you could not so much as think you had any joy, though in the midst of it: unable also to reason or draw consequences, you could not possibly conclude that ever you should have any joy to come. Thus you would live the life, not of a man, but of a sea-sponge, or of an oyster Are these things so? or ought we to think otherwise concerning them?

Protarchus/ A life of mere pleasure must be such as you have described it.

Socrates/ Do we think, then, that such a life is eligible?

Protarchus/ The description of it, O Socrates, has silenced me entirely for the present.

Socrates/ Nay; let us not shrink so soon from pursuing our inquiries; but proceed to the consideration of that other life, the life of intellect.

Protarchus/ What kind of life is that?

Socrates/ Let us consider, whether any of us would choose to live with wisdom, and intellect, and science, and a perfect memory of all things; but without partaking of pleasure, whether great or small; and, on the other hand, without partaking of pain; wholly exempt from all feelings of either kind.

Protarchus/ To me, O Socrates, neither of these lives appears eligible; and I think never would appear so to any other man.

Socrates/ What think you of a middle life, where both of them are mixed together—a life composed of the other two?

Protarchus/ Composed of pleasure do you mean, on the one hand, and of intellect and wisdom on the other hand?

Socrates/ Just so: such a life do I mean.

Protarchus/ Every man would certainly prefer such a kind of life to either of the other two.

Socrates/ Perceive we now what the result is of our discoursing thus far on the subject now before us?

Protarchus/ Perfectly well; it is this: that three lives have been proposed for our consideration, and that neither of the two first-mentioned appears sufficient or eligible for anyone, neither for man, nor any other animal.

Socrates/ Is it not evident, then, with regard to the point in controversy, that neither of those two lives can give the possession of the good? for, whichever of them had such a power, that life would be sufficient, perfect, and eligible also to all those animals who are capable of living in the continual enjoyment of the good all their lives. And whoever of us should give any other life the preference to that, would make his election contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, though not willingly, because through ignorance, or some unhappy necessity.

Protarchus/ What you say is highly probable indeed.

Socrates/ That we ought not to think that Goddess of Philebus to be the same thing with the good, has been shown, I think, sufficiently.

Philebus/ Neither is that intellect of yours, O Socrates, the good; for it will be found deficient in the same respects.

Socrates/ Mine perhaps, O Philebus, may; but not that intellect which is divine and true; for it is otherwise, I presume, with this. However, I do not contend for the chief prize of victory, in behalf of the life of intellect against the middle or mixed life. But what to do with the second prize, and which life to bestow it on, is next to be considered. For the cause of that happiness which the mixed life affords, one of us, perhaps, may ascribe to intellect, the other of us to pleasure. And thus, neither of these two would be man's sovereign good, and yet one or other of them may perhaps be supposed the cause of it. Now on this point I would still more earnestly contend against Philebus, —that not pleasure, but intellect, is the nearest allied, and the most similar to that, whatever it be, by the possession of which the mixed life becomes eligible and good. And if this account be true, pleasure can never be said to have any just pretentions either to the first or to the second prize of excellence. Still further is she from coming in for the third prize, if any credit may be given for the present to that intellect of mine.

Protarchus/ Indeed, O Socrates, it seems to me that Pleasure is now fallen: your reasons have been like so many blows given her; under the force of which, fighting for the master-prize, she lies vanquished. But I think, however, that we must say it was prudent in Intellect, not to contend for that prize; for she would otherwise have met with the same fate. Now if Pleasure should also lose the prize of second value, as already she has lost the highest, she must entirely fall into disgrace with her own lovers: for even to them she

would no longer appear to merit such honor as they paid to her before.

Socrates/ Well then; is it not the better way to dismiss her now directly, and not give her pain, by inspecting into her too nicely, and discovering all her imperfections?

Protarchus/ What you now say goes for nothing, Socrates.

Socrates/ Do you mean, because I supposed an impossible thing when I supposed that pain might be given to pleasure?

Protarchus/ Not on that account only, but because you are sensible that none of us will give you a discharge before you have brought these arguments to a conclusion.

Socrates/ Ah! the copious matter of argument, O Protarchus, still behind! and scarcely is any part of it very manageable on the present occasion. For, whoever stands forth as the champion of Intellect to win the second prize for her, must, as it appears to me, take another way of combating, and has need of other weapons different from those reasons I before made use of: some, however, of the same may, perhaps, be of use again. Must we then, proceed in that manner?

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ But let us begin cautiously, and endeavor to lay down right principles.

Protarchus/ What principles do you mean?

Socrates/ All things which are now in the universe let us divide into two sorts, or rather, if you please, into three.

Protarchus/ You should tell us what difference between things it is, with respect to which you make that division.

Socrates/ Some things which have been already mentioned let us reassume.

Protarchus/ What things?

Socrates/ God, we said, has exhibited the infinite, and also the bound of beings.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Let us take these for two of the species of things; and for a third let us take that, which is composed of those two mixed together. But I deserve, methinks, to be laughed at for pretending thus to distinguish things, and to enumerate their several species.

Protarchus/ Why so, my good friend?

Socrates/ A fourth kind appears to have been omitted by me.

Protarchus/ Say, What?

Socrates/ Of that commixture, the combination of the former two, consider the cause: and beside those three species, set me down this cause for a fourth.

Protarchus/ Will you not want a fifth species too, for a cause of disunion and separation?

Socrates/ Perhaps I may; but not, I believe, at present. However, should there be occasion For it, you will pardon me, if I go in pursuit of a fifth life.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Of these four species, then, in the first place dividing the three, and perceiving that two of these, when both are divided, and their divisions separated, are, each of them many; —then, gathering together the many of each, and uniting them again, let us endeavor to understand in what manner each of them is, at the same time, one and many.

Protarchus/ Would you but express your meaning more plainly, I might, perhaps, apprehend it.

Socrates/ I mean, then, by the two, which I propose to be now considered, the same which I mentioned at the first; one of them the infinite, and the other bound. That the infinite is, in. some manner, many, I will attempt to show: and let bound wait a while.

Protarchus/ It shall.

Socrates/ Give me now your attention. It is, I confess, a difficult and doubtful thing, that, which I would have you to consider. Consider it, however. First, with regard to hotter and colder, in things, see if you can think of any bound. Or would not the more and the less, residing in the kinds themselves of things, hinder, so long as they reside there, an end from being fixed to them? For, if ever they receive an end, to an end also are their very beings then brought.

Protarchus/ Most certainly true.

Socrates/ And in speaking of either the colder or the hotter of any two things, we constantly attribute to them the more and the less.

Protarchus/ And very much so.

Socrates/ Reason then constantly suggests to us that the colder and the hotter have no end: and being thus without any end, they are altogether boundless.

Protarchus/ I am strongly inclined to agree with you, Socrates in this point.

Socrates/ Well have you answered, my friend Protarchus; and well have you reminded me, that the strongly, which you mentioned, and the faintly, have the same power as the more and the less. For, wherever they reside, they suffer not anything to be just so much; but infusing either the more intense or the more remiss into every action, they always produce in it either the more or the less; while the just so much flies away and vanishes from before them. For, as it was just now observed, were they not to drive away the just

so much, or did they permit this, and the moderate, to enter into the regions of the more and the less, or of the intense and the remiss, these very beings must quit their own places: because, if they admitted the just so much, the hotter and the colder would be gone. For the hotter, and in like manner the colder, is always advancing forward, and never abides in the same spot: but the just so much stops, and stays, having finished its progress. Now, according to this reasoning, the hotter must be boundless; and so must also be the colder.

Protarchus/ So it appears indeed, Socrates. But, as you rightly said, it is not easy to apprehend these things. Questions, however, relating to them again and again repeated, might perhaps show that the questioner and the respondent were tolerably well agreed in their minds concerning them.

Socrates/ You say well: and we should try so to do. But at present, to avoid lengthening out this argument, by enumerating every infinite, consider, whether we may take this for the characteristic mark of the nature of all infinites.

Protarchus/ What mark do you mean?

Socrates/ Whatever things appear to us to be increasing or diminishing, or to admit of intenseness and remission, or the too much, and all other such attributes, we ought to refer all these to the genus of the infinite; collecting, as it were, all of them in one, agreeably to what was before said; that whatever things were divided and separated we ought to assemble together and combine, as well as we are able, affixing to all of them the mark of someone nature; —if you remember.

Protarchus/ I remember it well.

Socrates/ Everything, then, which rejects all such attributes, and admits only such as are quite the contrary,

—in the first place, the equal and equality, and, after the equal, the double, and every other relation which one number bears to another, and one measure to another, —all these things, I say, in summing up, and referring them to bound, think you not that we should do right? or how say you?

Protarchus/ Perfectly right, O Socrates.

Socrates/ Well: but the third thing made up, and consisting of the other two, what characteristic shall we assign to this?

Protarchus/ You, as I presume, will show it to me.

Socrates/ Divinity indeed may; if any of the Gods will hearken to my prayers.

Protarchus/ Pray, then, and survey.

Socrates/ I survey: and some God, O Protarchus, is now, methinks, become favorable to us.

Protarchus/ How do you mean? and by what sign do you know it?

Socrates/ I will tell you in plain words: but do you follow them closely.

Protarchus/ Only speak.

Socrates/ We mentioned just now the hotter and the colder; did we not?

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ To these then add the drier and the moister; the more numerous and the fewer; the swifter and the slower; the larger and the smaller; and whatever things beside, in our late account of them we ranked under one head, —that which admits of the nature of the more and the less.

Protarchus/ You mean the infinite.

Socrates/ I do: and mingle together with this that which we spoke of next afterward, —the race of bound.

Protarchus/ What race do you mean?

Socrates/ Those things which we did not (as we ought to have done) assemble together under one head, in the same manner as we assembled together the race of the infinite. But you will now, perhaps, do what was then omitted. And when both the sorts are assembled, and viewed together, the race of bound will then become manifest.

Protarchus/ What things do you speak of? and how are they to be assembled?

Socrates/ I speak of that nature in which are comprised the equal and the double; and whatever else puts an end to contest between contrary things; and, introducing number, makes them to be commensurate one with another, and to harmonize together.

Protarchus/ I apprehend your meaning to be, that, from the commixture of those two, a certain progeny will arise between them in every one of their tribes.

Socrates/ You apprehend me rightly.

Protarchus/ Relate then the progeny of these commixtures.

Socrates/ In diseases, does not the right commixture of those two produce the *recovery of health*?

Protarchus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ And in the acute and the grave, in the swift also and the slow, which are all of them infinite, does not the other sort, received among them and begetting bounds, constitute the perfection of all the Muse's art?

Protarchus/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ And in weather excessively either cold or hot, does not the entrance of that other kind take off the excess,

the vehement, and the infinite, —generating in their stead, not only the moderate and the measured, but symmetry also, and correspondence between their measures?

Protarchus/ Without dispute.

Socrates/ And do not propitious seasons, and all their fair productions, arise to us from hence, from the mixture of things which are infinite with things which have a bound?

Protarchus/ Doubtless.

Socrates/ A thousand other things I forbear to mention; as, for instance, strength and beauty, the attendants upon health of body; and in the soul other excellencies, very many and very noble. For Venus herself, O good Philebus! observing lawless lust, and all manner of vice everywhere reigning, the love of pleasure being in all men boundless, and their desires of it insatiable, she herself established a law and an order, setting bounds to pleasure and desire. This you said was to lessen and to impair pleasure; but I maintain, that, on the contrary, it preserved pleasure from decay. And you, Protarchus! what think you of it?

Protarchus/ For my part, I am entirely of your mind, Socrates.

Socrates/ I have shown you then those three kinds, if you apprehend my meaning.

Protarchus/ Partly, I suppose, I do. By one of those three, I suppose, you mean the infinite; by another, the second sort, you mean that which in all beings is the bound; but what you mean by the third sort, I have no strong apprehension of.

Socrates/ Because the care of that third sort, my friend, has amazed you with its multitude. And yet, the infinite also appeared to contain many tribes: but as they were all of them stamped with the character of more and less, they were seen clearly to be one.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Then, as to bound; that neither contained many, nor found we any difficulty in admitting the nature of it to be one.

Protarchus/ How could we?

Socrates/ It was not at all possible, indeed. Of those two sorts, then, all the progeny, —all the things produced into being through those measures, which are effected in the immoderate, when bounds are set to the infinite, —in summing up all these things together, and comprehending them in one, understand me to mean, by the third sort, this one.

Protarchus/ I understand you.

Socrates/ Now, besides these three, we are further to consider, what that kind is which we said was the fourth. And as we are to consider it jointly, see whether you think it necessary, that all things which are produced into being should have some cause of their production.

Protarchus/ I think it is: for, without a cause, how should they be produced?

Socrates/ The nature then of the efficient differs from the cause in nothing but in name: so that the efficient and the cause may be rightly deemed one.

Protarchus/ Rightly.

Socrates/ So, likewise, the thing effected, and the thing produced into being, we shall find to differ in the same manner, in nothing but in name, or how?

Protarchus/ Just so.

Socrates/ In the nature of things, does not the efficient lead the way? and does not the effect follow after it into being?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Cause, therefore, is not the same thing with that which is subservient to cause in the producing of its effect, but a thing different.

Protarchus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Did not the things which are produced into being, and the things out of which they are all of them produced, exhibit to us the three genera?

Protarchus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ That, then, which is the artificer of all these, the cause of them let us call the fourth cause; as it is fully shown to be different from those other three.

Protarchus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ But the four sorts having been now described, every one of them distinctly, we should do well, for memory's sake, to enumerate them in order.

Protarchus/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ The first then I call infinite; the second bound; the third essence mixt and generated from these: and in saying that the cause of this mixture and this production is the fourth, should I say aught amiss?

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Well now: what is next? How proceeds our argument? and with what design came we along this way? Was it not this? We were inquiring who had a right to the second prize of victory; whether Pleasure had, or Wisdom: was it not so?

Protarchus/ It was.

Socrates/ Now then, since we have thus divided these genera, may we not happily form a more finished judgment concerning both the very best and the second-best of those things which originally were the subjects of dispute between us?

Protarchus/ Perhaps we may.

Socrates/ We made no difficulty, I think, of setting down for conqueror, the mixt life, the life of pleasure and wisdom together. Was it not so?

Protarchus/ It was.

Socrates/ We perceive then of what sort the mixt life is, and to which kind it is to be referred.

Protarchus/ Evidently.

Socrates/ And I think we shall agree, that it is part of the third sort. For the mixt life is not to be referred solely to anyone of the infinites, mixed with someone only of the bounds: it is a life of all such things together as are infinite in their own nature, but are under the restraint of bound. So that the mixt life, this winner of the prize, may be rightly said to be a part of the third sort.

Protarchus/ Most rightly.

Socrates/ It is well. But that life of yours, O Philebus, a life of pleasure simple and unmixed, to which of the three sorts may we rightly say that it belongs? But before you pronounce, answer me first to this question.

Philebus/ Propose it then.

Socrates/ Concerning pleasure and pain; have they in their own nature any bounds? or are they among those things which admit the more and the less?

Philebus/ Pleasure, O Socrates! to be sure, admits the more. For it would, not comprehend every good in it, if it were not by nature infinite, with respect to the multitude which it contains, and the increase which it is capable of.

Socrates/ Nor can pain be imagined, O Philebus, to comprehend every evil. So that we must consider of some other thing, different from the nature of the infinite, for the imparting of any good to pleasures. It is admitted, that your

life of pleasure is the issue of things unbounded, and belongs, therefore, to the infinite. But to which of the sorts before mentioned, O Protarchus and Philebus, may we refer wisdom, and science, and intellect, without being guilty of impiety? For it appears to me that we incur no trifling danger in answering the present question, whatever be our answer, whether right or wrong.

Philebus/ You magnify that God of yours, O Socrates, very highly, methinks.

Socrates/ So do you, my friend, that Goddess of yours. The question, however, ought to be answered by us.

Protarchus/ Socrates says what is right, O Philebus, and we must do as he says we ought.

Philebus/ Have not you, Protarchus, taken upon yourself my part in the debate?

Protarchus/ It is true that I have. But in the present case I find myself much at a loss how to answer. I must therefore request, O Socrates, that you yourself will take the office of prophet to us; lest, by some mistake, I should offend the combatant whom you favor, and by singing out of tune should spoil the harmony.

Socrates/ You must be obeyed, Protarchus. Indeed there is nothing difficult in your injunctions. But, in asking you to which of the two above-mentioned kinds intellect and science were to be referred, —when I was magnifying, as Philebus says, the subject of my question, —the joke, which I intended to soften the solemnity of it, confused your thoughts, I find, in good earnest.

Protarchus/ Very thoroughly so, I confess, O Socrates.

Socrates/ And yet it was an easy question. For, on this point, there is a consent and harmony among all the wise, dignifying thus themselves, —that Intellect is king of heaven and earth. And this which they say is perhaps well said. But

let us, if you are willing, consider the nature of this genus more amply, and not in so concise a manner.

Protarchus/ Consider it in what manner you think best, without regarding the length of the inquiry: for the length will not be disagreeable to us.

Socrates/ Fairly spoken. Let us begin, then, by proposing this question.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ Whether shall we say that the power of the irrational principle governs all things in the whole universe, fortuitously and at random? or shall we, on the contrary, agree with our ancestors and predecessors, in affirming that a certain admirable intellect and wisdom orders all things together, and governs throughout the whole?

Protarchus/ Alike in nothing, O Socrates, are these two tenets. That which you mentioned just now is, in my opinion, impious. But, to hold that Intellect disposes all things in a beautiful order, is agreeable to that view which we have of the world, of the celestial bodies, and of the whole circumvolution of the heavens. For my own part, I should never speak nor think any otherwise on this subject.

Socrates/ Is it then your pleasure that we add our voices to those of the ancients, and openly avow that tenet to be ours; not contenting ourselves with a bare repetition of the sayings of others, in hopes of escaping danger to ourselves; but resolved to run all risk together, and to share in undergoing the censures of some great and formidable man, when he asserts that in the whole of things there is no order?

Protarchus/ How can I do otherwise than join with you in this?

Socrates/ Attend now to the argument which comes on next to be considered.

Protarchus/ Propose it then.

Socrates/ In the bodies of all animals, somehow, we discover that fire, water, and air, must be in their composition by nature; and earth, which gives support to the other ingredients in their frame, we see plainly: as mariners say, when they are tossed about in a thunder-storm at sea, and descry land.

Protarchus/ True: and tossed about indeed are we too in these discourses; but for a port to anchor in we are entirely at a loss.

Socrates/ Let us proceed then: Concerning each of those elementary ingredients in our frame, understand this.

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ That which there is in us of each element is small and inconsiderable; nowhere in any part of our frame have we it at all unmixed and pure; neither has it in us a power worthy of its nature. Take one of them for a sample, by which you may estimate all the rest. Fire in some manner there is in us; fire there is also in the universe.

Protarchus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ Now the fire which is in our composition is weak and inconsiderable: but that which is in the universe is admirable for the multitude of it, for the beauty which it exhibits, and for every power and virtue which belong to fire.

Protarchus/ Perfectly true.

Socrates/ Well then: is the fire of the universe generated, fed, and ruled by the fire which we have in us? or, on the contrary, does my fire, and yours, and that of every other living thing, receive its being, support, and laws, from the fire of the universe?

Protarchus/ This question of yours does not deserve an answer.

Socrates/ Rightly said. And you would answer in the same manner, I suppose, if your opinion was asked concerning the earthy part of every animal here, compared with the earth in the universe; and just so concerning the other elementary parts of animal bodies mentioned before.

Protarchus/ What man, who made a different answer, would ever appear to be of sound mind?

Socrates/ Scarcely would any man. But attend to what follows next. Wherever we find these four elements mixed together and united, do we not give to this composition the name of body?

Protarchus/ We do.

Socrates/ Apprehend the same thing then with regard to this, which we call the world. This should be considered as a body in the same manner, being composed of the same elements.

Protarchus/ You are perfectly in the right.

Socrates/ To the whole of this great body, then, does the whole of that little body of ours owe its nourishment, and whatever it has received, and whatever it possesses? or is the body of the universe indebted to ours for all which it is and has?

Protarchus/ There is no reason, O Socrates, for making a question of this point, neither.

Socrates/ Well: what will you say to this point then?

Protarchus/ What point?

Socrates/ Must we not affirm these bodies of ours to be animated with souls?

Protarchus/ It is evident that we must.

Socrates/ But from whence, O my friend Protarchus, should our bodies derive those souls of theirs, if that great body of the universe, which has all the same elements with

our bodies, but in much greater purity and perfection, was not, as well as ours, animated with a soul?

Protarchus/ It is evident, O Socrates, that from no other origin could they derive them.

Socrates/ Since, therefore, O Protarchus, we acknowledge these four genera, bound, infinite, the compound of both those, and the genus of cause, to be in all bodies; and since we find, that in this part of the universe to which we belong there are beings of that fourth sort, —causes, which produce souls, build up bodies for those souls to dwell in, and heal those bodies when diseased; —causes, also, which create and frame other compositions, and amend them when impaired; —causes these, to every one of which we gave a particular name, betokening a particular kind of wisdom or skill: —since, I say, we are persuaded of these things, surely we can by no means think that the whole heaven, in the larger parts of which are the same four genera, and these undepraved and pure, can have any other cause than a nature who is full of contrivance and design, and in whom the most beautiful and noble things all unite.

Protarchus/ It would not be at all reasonable to think it can.

Socrates/ If this then be absurd, we may the better assert, as a consequence of our reasoning, that in the universe there are, what we have several times repeated, infinite in great quantity, and bound sufficient; and besides these, a cause, not inconsiderable or mean, which, by mixing them properly together, marshals and regulates the years, the seasons, and the months, —a cause, which with the greatest justice we may term wisdom and intellect.

Protarchus/ With the greatest justice, indeed.

Socrates/ But further, wisdom and intellect could never be without soul.

Protarchus/ By no means.

Socrates/ You will affirm, then, that in the nature of Zeus there is a kingly soul and a kingly intellect, through the power of cause; and that in the other Gods there are other beautiful things, whatever they are, by which their Deities love to be distinguished, and from which they delight in taking their respective denominations.

Protarchus/ Certainly I shall.

Socrates/ The discourse we have now had together on this subject, O Protarchus, think it not idle, and to no purpose. For it supports that doctrine of our ancestors, that the universe is forever governed by intellect.

Protarchus/ Indeed it does.

Socrates/ And besides, it has furnished us with an answer to my question, —to what genus intellect is to be referred; in making it appear that intellect is allied to that which we said was the cause of all things, one of our four genera. For now at length you plainly have our answer.

Protarchus/ I have; and a very full and sufficient answer it is: but I was not aware what you were about.

Socrates/ A man's attention to serious studies, O Protarchus, is sometimes, you know, relaxed by amusements.

Protarchus/ Politely said.

Socrates/ And thus, my friend, to what genus intellect belongs, and what power it is possessed of, has been now known tolerably well for the present.

Protarchus/ It has, indeed.

Socrates/ And to what genus also belongs pleasure, appeared before.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Concerning these two, then, let us remember these conclusions. that intellect is allied to cause, and is nearly of this genus; and that pleasure is infinite in her own nature, and belongs to that genus which, of itself, neither has nor ever will, have in it either a beginning, or a middle, or an end.

Protarchus/ We shall not fail to remember them both.

Socrates/ Now we ought to consider next, in which genus either of those two things, intelligence and pleasure, is found to have a seat; and in what state or condition those beings must be in whom either of them is produced, at the time of its production. And first in the case of pleasure: for, as we inquired to which genus she belonged, before we considered of which sort was intellect; so, with regard to the points also now proposed, she is the first to be examined. But, separately from the consideration of pain, we should never be able fully to explore the nature of pleasure.

Protarchus/ Well: if we are to proceed in this way, let us then in this way proceed.

Socrates/ Are you of the same opinion with me concerning their rise and production?

Protarchus/ What opinion is that?

Socrates/ Pain and pleasure appear to me, both of them to arise, according to nature, in that which is a common genus.

Protarchus/ Remind us, friend Socrates, which of the genera mentioned before is meant by the term common.

Socrates/ What you desire, O wonderful man! shall be done, to the best of my ability.

Protarchus/ Fairly said.

Socrates/ By this common genus, then, we are to understand that which, in recounting the four sorts, we reckoned as third.

Protarchus/ That which you mentioned next after both the infinite and bound: that in which you ranked health, and also, as I think, harmony.

Socrates/ Perfectly right. Now give me all possible attention.

Protarchus/ Only speak.

Socrates/ I say, then, that whenever the harmony in the frame of any animal is broken, a breach is then made in its constitution and at the same time rise is given to pains.

Protarchus/ You say what is highly probable.

Socrates/ But when the harmony is restored, and the breach is healed, we should say that then pleasure is produced: if points of so great importance may be dispatched at once in so few words.

Protarchus/ In my opinion, O Socrates, you say what is very true: but let us try if we can show these truths in a light still clearer.

Socrates/ Are not such things as ordinarily happen, and are manifest to us all, the most easy to be understood?

Protarchus/ What things do you mean?

Socrates/ Want of food makes a breach in the animal system, and at the same time gives the pain of hunger.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ And food, in filling up the breach again, gives a pleasure.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ Want of drink also, interrupting the circulation of the blood and humors, brings on us corruption, together with the pain of thirst; but the virtue of a liquid, in

moistening and replenishing the parts dried up, yields a pleasure. In like manner, preternatural suffocating heat, in dissolving the texture of the parts, gives a painful sensation: but a cooling again, a refreshment agreeable to nature, affects us with a sense of pleasure.

Protarchus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ And the concretion of the animal humors through cold, contrary to their nature, occasions pain: but a return to their pristine state of fluidity, and a restoring of the natural circulation, produce pleasure. See, then, whether you think this general account of the matter not amiss, concerning that sort of being which I said was composed of infinite and bound, —that, when by nature any beings of that sort become animated with soul, their passage into corruption, or a total dissolution, is accompanied with pain; and their entrance into existence, the assembling of all those particles which compose the nature of such a being, is attended with a sense of pleasure.

Protarchus/ I admit your account of this whole matter; for, as it appears to me, it bears on it the stamp of truth.

Socrates/ These sensations, then, which affect the soul by means only of the body, let us consider as one species of pain and pleasure.

Protarchus/ Be it so.

Socrates/ Consider now the feelings of the soul herself, in the expectation of such a pain or of such a pleasure, —antecedent to the pleasure expected, an agreeable feeling of hope and alacrity, —antecedent to the pain expected, the uneasiness of fear.

Protarchus/ This is, indeed, a different species of pleasure and pain, independent of the body, and produced in the soul herself through expectation.

Socrates/ You apprehend the matter rightly. Now the consideration of these feelings of pain and pleasure, which immediately affect the soul herself, (and seem to be produced in her, each of them unmixed and genuine,) will, as I imagine, clear up that doubt concerning pleasure, —whether the whole kind be eligible, or whether a particular species of it be the proper object of our choice. And in the latter case, pleasure and pain (in general), like heat and cold, and all other things of this sort, will deserve sometimes to be embraced, and at other times to be rejected; as not being good in themselves, but admitting the nature of good to be superadded to them only at some times, and some of them only.

Protarchus/ You are perfectly in the right. It must be in some such way as this that we ought to investigate the things we are in pursuit of.

Socrates/ If, then, what we agreed in be true, —that animal bodies feel pain, when anything befalls them tending to their destruction, —pleasure, when they are using the means of their preservation, —let us now consider what state or condition every animal is in, when it is neither suffering aught that tends to its destruction, nor is engaged in any action, or in the midst of any circumstances, tending to its preservation. Give your earnest attention to this point, and say, whether it is entirely necessary, or not, that every animal at that time should feel neither pain nor pleasure, in any degree, great or small.

Protarchus/ It is quite necessary.

Socrates/ Besides the condition then of an animal delighted, and besides the opposite condition of it under uneasiness, is not this a different, a third, state or condition of an animal?

Protarchus/ Without dispute.

Socrates/ Be careful then to remember this judgment of ours. For on the remembering of it, or not, greatly will depend our judgment concerning the nature of pleasure. But, to go through with this point, let us, if you please, add a short sentence more.

Protarchus/ Say what.

Socrates/ You know, nothing hinders a man who prefers the life of wisdom from living all his life in that state.

Protarchus/ In the state, do you mean, of neither pleasure nor uneasiness?

Socrates/ I do: for, when we compared together the different lives, it was supposed, that whoever should choose the life of intellect and wisdom was not to have pleasure either in a great or in a small degree.

Protarchus/ That was the supposition.

Socrates/ He must live, therefore, such a life. And perhaps it is by no means absurd, to deem that life to be of all lives the most God-like.

Protarchus/ It is not indeed probable, that the Gods feel either the pleasurable sensation, or its opposite.

Socrates/ Highly, indeed, is it improbable. For neither of them is consistent with the divine nature. But we shall consider further of this point afterwards, if it should appear to be of any service to our argument; and shall apply it to the purpose of winning the second prize for intellect, though we should not be able to make use of it so as to win for her the first.

Protarchus/ Very justly said.

Socrates/ Now that species of pleasure which we said is proper to the soul herself, is all produced in her by means of memory.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ But, before we consider of this point, I think we should premise some account of memory, —what it is: and still prior to an account of memory, some mention too, methinks, ought to be made of sense, if we are to have this subject appear tolerably plain to us.

Protarchus/ Explain your meaning.

Socrates/ Of those things which are incident to our bodies in every part, coming from all quarters around us, and affecting us in various ways, —some spend all their force upon the body, without penetrating to the soul, leaving this entirely untouched and free; others extend their power through the soul as well as through the body; and some of this latter sort excite a vehement agitation in them both, jointly and severally. Do you admit this?

Protarchus/ Be it admitted.

Socrates/ If we should say of those things, the power of which is confined to the body, and reaches not the soul, that the soul is deprived of knowing them; but of other things which befall us, and have a power to pervade both the body and the soul, that of these the soul hath the knowledge; should we not thus say what is most true?

Protarchus/ Without dispute.

Socrates/ But when I say that the soul is deprived of knowing the former sort, do not suppose my meaning to be, that oblivion happens to her in this case. For oblivion is the departure of memory. But of the accidents now spoken of the soul never had a memory. And of that which neither is nor ever was, it is absurd to say that any loss can happen to us. Is it not?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Only then alter the terms.

Protarchus/ In what manner?

Socrates/ Instead of saying that the soul is deprived of knowing what the body suffers, when she is not affected by any motions produced in the body by those ordinary occurrences, —what we termed a privation of knowledge, let us now term insensibility.

Protarchus/ I apprehend your meaning.

Socrates/ But when the soul and the body are affected, both of them in common, by any of those occurrences, and in common also are moved or agitated, —in giving to this motion the name of sensation, you would not speak improperly.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now then do we not apprehend what it is which is commonly called sense or sensation?

Protarchus/ What should hinder us?

Socrates/ And of memory, if one should say that it was the retaining of sensations, it would not be ill defined, in my opinion.

Protarchus/ I think so too.

Socrates/ Do we not hold, that memory differs from remembrance?

Protarchus/ Perhaps it does.

Socrates/ Do they not differ in this respect?

Protarchus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ When the soul alone, unaided by the body, recovers and resumes within herself as much as possible the state which heretofore she was in, when she was affected jointly with the body, we say that the soul then remembers. Do we not?

Protarchus/ Certainly we do.

Socrates/ So we do also, when the soul, after having lost the memory of something which she had sensibly perceived,

or of something which she had learnt, recalls and recollects the memory of it again, herself within herself: and all this we term remembrance, and a recovery of things slipt out of our memory.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Now the end for the sake of which we have been considering these faculties of the soul is this.

Protarchus/ For the sake of what?

Socrates/ That we may apprehend, as well and as clearly as we are able, what is the pleasure of the soul abstracted from the body, and at the same time may apprehend also what is desire. For the nature of both these things seems to be discovered in some measure by showing the nature of memory and of remembrance.

Protarchus/ Let us then, O Socrates, now explain how such a discovery follows from perceiving the nature of these faculties of ours.

Socrates/ In treating of the rise of pleasure, and of the various forms which she assumes, it will be necessary for us, I believe, to consider a great variety of things. But, before we enter on so copious a subject, we should now, I think, in the first place, consider the nature and origin of desire.

Protarchus/ Let us then: for we must not lose anything.

Socrates/ Nay, Protarchus! we shall lose one thing, when we shall have found the objects of our inquiry; we shall lose our uncertainty about them.

Protarchus/ You are right in your repartee. Proceed we then to what is next.

Socrates/ Was it not just: now said, that hunger, and thirst, and many other things of like kind, were certain desires?

Protarchus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ What is it, then, which is the same in all these things, —that, with respect to which we give to all of them notwithstanding the great difference between them one and the same appellation?

Protarchus/ By Zeus, Socrates! it is, perhaps, not easy to say: it ought, however, to be declared.

Socrates/ Let us resume the mention of that with which we began the consideration of this subject.

Protarchus/ Of what in particular?

Socrates/ Do we not often speak of being thirsty?

Protarchus/ We do.

Socrates/ And do we not mean by it some kind of emptiness?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is not thirst a desire?

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ A desire of drink is it?

Protarchus/ Of drink.

Socrates/ Of being replenished by drink: is it not?

Protarchus/ I suppose it is.

Socrates/ Whoever of us then is emptied, desires, it seems, a condition the reverse of what has befallen him. For whereas he is emptied, he longs to be filled again.

Protarchus/ Most evidently so.

Socrates/ Well now: is it possible that a man, who at the first is empty, should apprehend, either by sense or by memory, what it is to be full, —a condition, in which he neither is at the time, nor ever was heretofore.

Protarchus/ How can he?

Socrates/ We are agreed, that the man who desires has a desire of something.

Protarchus/ Without dispute.

Socrates/ Now it is not the condition in which he is that he desires. For he suffers thirst, that is, an emptiness: but he desires to be full.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Something, therefore, belonging to the man who is thirsty must apprehend in some manner what it is to be full.

Protarchus/ It must, of necessity.

Socrates/ But it is impossible that this should be his body: for his body is supposed to suffer emptiness.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ It remains, therefore, that his soul apprehends what it is to be full, by means of her memory.

Protarchus/ Plainly so.

Socrates/ For, indeed, by what other means could his soul have such an apprehension?

Protarchus/ Hardly by any other.

Socrates/ Perceive we now, what consequence follows from this reasoning of ours?

Protarchus/ What consequence?

Socrates/ It proves that desire doth not a rise in the body.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ Because it shows that the aim and endeavor of every animal is to be in a condition opposite to the feelings with which the body is at that time affected.

Protarchus/ It certainly shows this.

Socrates/ And the inclination by which it moves toward this opposite condition, shows the remembrance of a condition opposite to those present feelings and affections.

Protarchus/ Clearly.

Socrates/ Our reasoning, then, in proving that memory leads us toward the objects of our desire, shows at the same time what is the general inclination and desire of the soul; and what is the moving principle in every animal.

Protarchus/ Perfectly right.

Socrates/ Our conclusion, therefore, will by no means admit of an opinion that the body suffers hunger, or thirst, or is affected with any other such desire.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Let us observe this also further, regarding these very subjects now under consideration. Our reasoning seems to me as if it meant to exhibit in those very things a certain kind of life.

Protarchus/ What things do you mean? and what kind of life do you speak of?

Socrates/ I mean the being filled, and the being emptied, and all other things tending either to the preservation of animal life, or to the destruction of it; and whatever things ordinarily give pain, —yet, coming in a change from things contrary, are sometimes grateful.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ But what when a man is in the midst of these contrary conditions, and is partaking of them both?

Protarchus/ How do you mean in the midst?

Socrates/ When he is afflicted with an anxious sense of his present bad condition, but at the same time has a remembrance of past delights; he may enjoy an intermission of his pain, without having as yet the cause of it removed; now do we affirm, or do we deny, that he is at that time in the midst of two contrary conditions?

Protarchus/ It must be affirmed.

Socrates/ Is he afflicted or delighted wholly?

Protarchus/ By Zeus, he is in a manner afflicted doubly: in his body, from his present condition; in his soul, from a tedious expectation, longing for relief.

Socrates/ How is it, O Protarchus, that you suppose his affliction to be doubled? Is not a man whose stomach is empty sometimes in a state of hopefulness, with assurance of having it filled? and on the contrary, is he not at other times in a condition quite hopeless?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Do you not think that, when he is in hopes of being filled, he is delighted with the remembrance of fullness? and yet that, being empty at the same time, he is in pain?

Protarchus/ He must be so.

Socrates/ In such a state, therefore, man and other animals are at the same time afflicted and delighted.

Protarchus/ It seems so to be.

Socrates/ But what think you when a man is empty, and hopeless of obtaining fullness? must he not, in such a condition, suffer double pain? with a view to which particular condition it was, that just now you supposed the memory of past delight, in all cases, to double the present pain.

Protarchus/ Most true, Socrates.

Socrates/ Now of this inquiry into these feelings of ours we shall make this use.

Protarchus/ What use?

Socrates/ Shall we say that all these pains and pleasures are true? or that they are all false? or that some of them are true, and others false?

Protarchus/ How should pleasures or pains, O Socrates, be false?

Socrates/ Show is it then, O Protarchus, that fears may be either true or false? that expectations may be true, or not? Or, of opinions, how is it that some are true, and others false?

Protarchus/ Opinions, I admit, may be of either kind: but I cannot grant you this of those other feelings.

Socrates/ How say you? We are in danger of starting a disquisition of no small importance.

Protarchus/ That is true.

Socrates/ But whether it has any relation to the subjects which have preceded, this, O son of an illustrious father! ought to be considered.

Protarchus/ Perhaps, indeed, it ought.

Socrates/ Tell me then: for, as to myself, I am continually in a state of wonderment about these very difficulties now proposed.

Protarchus/ What difficulties do you mean?

Socrates/ False pleasures are not true; nor true pleasures false.

Protarchus/ How is it possible they should?

Socrates/ Neither in a dream, then, nor awake, is it possible, as you hold, not even if a man is out of his senses through madness, or has lost the soundness of his judgment any other way, is it possible for him ever to imagine that he feels delight, when he is by no means sensibly delighted; or to imagine that he feels pain, when actually the man feels none.

Protarchus/ All of us, O Socrates, constantly suppose these facts to be as you have now stated them.

Socrates/ But is it a right supposition? or should we examine whether it is right, or not?

Protarchus/ We ought to examine it, I must own.

Socrates/ Let us then explain a little more clearly what was just now said concerning pleasure and opinion. Do we not hold the reality of our having an opinion?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the reality of our having pleasure?

Protarchus/ To be sure.

Socrates/ Further: it is something, that which is the object of our opinion.

Protarchus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ And something also that is with which whatever feels a pleasure is delighted.

Protarchus/ Most certainly.

Socrates/ In the having, then, of an opinion, whether we are right or wrong in entertaining that opinion, the reality of our having it abides still.

Protarchus/ How can a man lose an opinion whilst he has it?

Socrates/ In the enjoying also of any pleasure, whether we do right or wrong to enjoy it, it is certain that the reality of the enjoyment still remains.

Protarchus/ To be sure, these things are so.

Socrates/ On what account is it, then, that we are used to call some opinions true, and others false; yet to pleasures only we allow the attribute of true; notwithstanding that pleasure and opinion, both of them equally admit reality in the having of them?

Protarchus/ This ought to be considered.

Socrates/ Is it that falsehood and truth are incident to opinion? so that, by the supervening of one or other of these, opinion becomes something beside what in itself it is; and every opinion is thus made to have the quality of being either false or true. Do you say that this ought to be considered?

Protarchus/ I do.

Socrates/ And beside this: supposing that opinions universally do admit of attributes and qualities; whether only pleasure and pain are what they are in themselves simply, and never admit any quality to arise in them; ought we not to settle this point also by agreement between us?

Protarchus/ It is evident that we ought.

Socrates/ But it is easy enough to perceive, that these also admit the accession of some qualities. For of pleasures and pains we agreed awhile since, that some are great, others little; and that each sort admits of vehemence and of intension.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And if either to any pleasure, or to any opinion, there be added the quality of evil, shall we not affirm the opinion thus to become evil, and the pleasure evil in the same manner?

Protarchus/ Without doubt, O Socrates.

Socrates/ And what, if rectitude, or the opposite to rectitude, accede to any of them shall we not say, that the opinion is right, if rectitude be in it? and shall we not ascribe the same quality to pleasure, on the same supposition?

Protarchus/ Of necessity we must.

Socrates/ And if the object of our opinion be mistaken by us, must we not in such a case acknowledge that our opinion is erroneous, and not right; and that we are not right ourselves in entertaining such an opinion?

Protarchus/ Certainly we must.

Socrates/ But what, if we discover ourselves to be mistaken in the object of our grief or of our pleasure, shall we give to this grief or to this pleasure, the epithet of right, or good, or any other which is fair and honorable?

Protarchus/ We certainly cannot, where a mistake is in the pleasure.

Socrates/ And surely pleasure is apt to arise in us oftentimes, accompanied, not with a right opinion, but with an opinion which is false.

Protarchus/ Indisputably so. And the opinion, O Socrates, then and in that case, we should say was a false opinion. But to the pleasure itself no man would ever give the appellation of false.

Socrates/ You are very ready, O Protarchus, at supporting the plea made use of by Pleasure on this occasion.

Protarchus/ Not at all so. I only repeat what I have heard.

Socrates/ Do we make no difference, my friend, between such a pleasure as comes accompanied with right opinion or with science, and that kind of pleasure which often arises in every one of us at the same time with false opinion or ignorance?

Protarchus/ It is probable, I own, that no little difference is between them.

Socrates/ Let us now come to the consideration of what the difference is.

Protarchus/ Proceed in whatever way you think proper.

Socrates/ I shall take this way then.

Protarchus/ What way?

Socrates/ Some of our opinions are false, and others of them are true: this is agreed.

Protarchus/ It is.

Socrates/ Pleasure and pain, as it was just now said, oftentimes attend on either of them indifferently; on opinions, I mean, either true or false.

Protarchus/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ Is it not from memory and from sense that opinion is produced in us, and that room is given for a diversity of opinions on every subject?

Protarchus/ Most undoubtedly.

Socrates/ I ask you, then, whether or no, as to these things, we deem ourselves to be of necessity affected thus?

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Oftentimes, when a man looks at something which he discovers at a great distance, but does not discern very clearly, will you admit that he may have an inclination to judge of what he sees?

Protarchus/ I do admit the case.

Socrates/ Upon this, would not the man question himself in this manner?

Protarchus/ In what manner?

Socrates/ What is that which appears as if it was standing under some tree by the cliff there? Do you not suppose that he would speak those words to himself, looking at some such appearances before him, as I have mentioned?

Protarchus/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ Hereupon, might not this man then, making a conjecture, say to himself, by way of answer, —It is a man?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But walking on, perhaps he might discern it to be but the work of some shepherds, and would say again to himself, —It is only a statue.

Protarchus/ Most certainly he would.

Socrates/ And if he had any companion with him, he would speak out aloud what he had first spoken within himself, and repeat the very same words to his companion: so that what we lately termed an opinion would thus become a speech.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ But if he were alone, this very thing would be a thought still within him; and he might walk on, keeping the same thought in his mind, a considerable way.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Well now: does this matter appear to you in the same light as it does to me?

Protarchus/ How is that?

Socrates/ The soul in that case seems to me to resemble some book.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ The memory, coinciding with the senses, together with those passions of the soul which attend this memory and the present sensation, seem to me as if they concurred in writing sentences at that time within our souls. And when the scribe writes what is true, true opinions and true sentences are by him produced within us: but when our scribe writes what is false, then what we think, and what we say to ourselves, is contrary to the truth.

Protarchus/ I heartily agree to your account of this matter, and acknowledge those joint scribes within the soul.

Socrates/ Acknowledge also another workman within us, operating at that time.

Protarchus/ What is he?

Socrates/ An engraver, who follows after the scribe; engraving within the soul images of those thoughts, sentences, and sayings.

Protarchus/ How and when is this done?

Socrates/ It is, when that which a man thinks and says to himself, concerning the object, of his sight, or of any other outward sense, he separates from the sensation which he has of it; and views somehow within himself the image of

that thought, and of that saying. Or is there no such thing as this ever produced within us?

Protarchus/ Nothing is more certain.

Socrates/ The images of true thoughts and true sentences, are they not true? and the images of those which are false, are they not themselves also false?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ Now if we have pronounced thus far rightly, let us proceed to the consideration of one point further.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Whether all the operations of this kind, such as are naturally performed within our souls, regard only things present and things past, but not things to come; or whether any of them have a reference to these also.

Protarchus/ Difference of time makes no difference in these matters.

Socrates/ Did we not say before, that pleasures and pains of the soul, by herself, arise in us prior to those pleasures and pains which affect the body? so as that we feel antecedent joy and grief in the prospect of things to come hereafter.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Those writings, then, and those engravings, which, as we held just now, are performed within us, do they respect the past and the present time only? and have they no concernment with the future?

Protarchus/ About the future very much are they concerned, and chiefly.

Socrates/ In saying this, do you mean that all these things are expectations of the future; and that we are, all of us, throughout life, full of expectations?

Protarchus/ The very thing I mean.

Socrates/ Now, then, since we are thus far agreed, answer to this further question.

Protarchus/ What is it?

Socrates/ A man who is just, and pious, and entirely good, is he not beloved by Divinity?

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ And what of the unjust and entirely bad man? is not the reverse of it true of him?

Protarchus/ How can it be otherwise?

Socrates/ Now every man, as we said just now, is full of a multitude of expectations.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ Sayings there are, written within every one of us, to which we give the name of expectations.

Protarchus/ There are.

Socrates/ And fantasies also, engraven in us. Thus, for instance, a man often sees in imagination plenty of money flowing into him, and by those means many pleasures surrounding him; and views himself, engraven within himself, as highly delighted.

Protarchus/ That often is the case.

Socrates/ Of these engravings, shall we say that good men, because of the divine favor, have generally those which are true; and bad men, generally those of the contrary sort? or shall we deny it?

Protarchus/ It cannot be denied.

Socrates/ Bad men, then, have pleasures engraven within them also; but these are of the false sort.

Protarchus/ No doubt of it.

Socrates/ Wicked men, therefore, delight mostly in false pleasures; the good, in pleasures which are true.

Protarchus/ It must of necessity be so.

Socrates/ According to this account, there are, in the souls of men, such pleasures as are false; though in a most ridiculous manner they imitate, and would fain pass for, true pleasures: pains also there are with the like qualities.

Protarchus/ Such pleasures and such pains there are.

Socrates/ May not a man who indulges fancy at random, and embraces opinions of any kind whatever, always really think and believe some things to be, which neither are nor ever were, and sometimes such as never will be?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And they are the false semblances and seemings of these unreal things, which produce in him those false opinions, and occasion him to think thus falsely. Are they not?

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ Well then: should we not say of the pains and pleasures felt by those bad men, that their condition corresponds with the case of false opinions?

Protarchus/ How do you mean?

Socrates/ May not a man who courts and embraces pleasure at random, pleasure in general, of any kind whatever, may not such a man always really feel delight from things which are not, and sometimes from things which never were, —often too, and perhaps the most frequently, from things which will never be?

Protarchus/ This must of necessity be granted.

Socrates/ Should not the same be said of fears and desires, and all things of the like sort, that these also are sometimes false?

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Well now: can we say of opinions, that they are bad, or that they are good, any otherwise than as they prove to be false, or prove to be true?

Protarchus/ No otherwise.

Socrates/ And I should think, that pleasures too we apprehend not to be bad on any other account, than as they are false.

Protarchus/ Quite the contrary, O Socrates. For hardly would any man put to the account of falsehood any of the evils brought on by pain and pleasure; since many and great evils accede to them from other quarters.

Socrates/ Pleasures which are evil, through the evil they occasion, we shall speak of by and by, if we shall continue to think it requisite: but we are now to speak of a multitude of pleasures felt by us, and frequently arising in us, — pleasures which are false in yet another way. And this other way of considering pleasure we shall have occasion, perhaps, to make use of in forming a right judgment of the several sorts of it.

Protarchus/ By all means let us speak of these, if any such pleasures there are.

Socrates/ And there are such, O Protarchus, in my opinion. But as long as this opinion lies by us unexamined, it is impossible For it to become certain or incontestable.

Protarchus/ Fairly said.

Socrates/ Now, therefore, let us advance to this other argument, like champions to the combat.

Protarchus/ Come we on then.

Socrates/ We said, if we remember, a little while since, that as long as the wants of the body, which are called desires in us, remain unsatisfied, the body all that time will

be affected distinctly, and in a different manner from the soul.

Protarchus/ We remember that it was so held.

Socrates/ In such a case, that within us, which desired, would be the soul, desiring to have her body in a state contrary to its present condition; and that which felt uneasiness or pain from the condition it was in, would be the body.

Protarchus/ Things would be thus with us.

Socrates/ Now compute these things together, and consider the amount.

Protarchus/ Say what.

Socrates/ In such a case, it comes out that pains and pleasures are placed together, each by the other's side; and that together, each by the other's side, arise in us a feeling of emptiness, and a desire of its contrary, fullness: for so it has just now appeared.

Protarchus/ It is indeed apparent.

Socrates/ Has not this also been said? and does it not remain with us a point settled between us by agreement?

Protarchus/ What?

Socrates/ That pain and pleasure, both of them admit of the more and of the less; and that they both are of the infinites.

Protarchus/ It was so said and agreed.

Socrates/ Is there not, then, some way in which we may judge of pain and pleasure rightly?

Protarchus/ What way, and how do you mean?

Socrates/ In judging of them are we not wont, in every case, readily to try them by these marks, —which of them is the greater, and which is the less, —which of them hath the nature of its kind the most, —and which is more intense

than the other, —in comparing either a pain with a pleasure, or one pain with another pain, or one pleasure with another pleasure?

Protarchus/ Such comparisons are often made: and from these comparisons we are wont to form our judgment and our choice.

Socrates/ Well now: in the case of magnitudes, does not the distance of visible objects, some of which are seen remote, and others near, render their real magnitudes uncertain, obscuring the truth of things, and producing false opinions? and does not the same thing hold true with regard to pains and pleasures? is not the same effect produced by the same means in this case also?

Protarchus/ Much more feelingly, O Socrates.

Socrates/ But in this case it happens contrary to what was in the case mentioned a little before.

Protarchus/ What happens, say you?

Socrates/ In that case, the true and the false opinions entertained by us impart to the pains and pleasures which attend them their own qualities of truth and falsehood.

Protarchus/ Very right.

Socrates/ But, in the case which I am now speaking of, the pains and pleasures being viewed afar off and near, continually changing [their aspects with their distances], and being set in comparison together, [it happens that] the pleasures [at hand] compared with the [remote] pains, appear greater and more intense [than they really are], and [that] the pains, compared with the pleasures, [have an appearance] quite the contrary.

Protarchus/ Such appearances must of necessity arise by these means.

Socrates/ As far, therefore, as the pains and pleasures appear less or greater than they really are, if from the reality you separate this appearance of what neither of them is, and take it by itself thus separated, you will not say that it is a right appearance; nor will you venture to assert, that this additional part of pain and pleasure is right and true.

Protarchus/ By no means.

Socrates/ After these discoveries, let us look if we can meet with pleasures and pains still falser, and more remote from truth, than those already mentioned, which are not only in appearance what they are called, but are felt also by the soul.

Protarchus/ What pleasures and pains do you speak of?

Socrates/ We have more than once said, that when the frame of any animal is on its way to dissolution, through mixtures and separations, repletions and evacuations, the increase of some, and the diminution of other parts of it, that in such a condition of its body, pains, aches, and oppressions, with many other uneasy feelings, to which are given various names, are wont to arise in us.

Protarchus/ True: this observation has been again and again repeated.

Socrates/ And that, when all things in our bodily frame return to their natural and sound state, together with this recovery, we receive some pleasure from within ourselves.

Protarchus/ Right.

Socrates/ But how is it when none of these changes are operating in our bodies?

Protarchus/ At what times, O Socrates, may this be?

Socrates/ The question, O Protarchus, which you have now put to me is nothing to the purpose.

Protarchus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because it will not hinder me from putting again my question to you.

Protarchus/ Repeat it then.

Socrates/ I shall put it thus: If at any time none of those things were passing within us, what condition should we of necessity be in, as to pleasure and pain, at such a time?

Protarchus/ When no motion was in the body either way, do you mean?

Socrates/ Exactly so.

Protarchus/ It is plain, O Socrates, that we should feel neither any pleasure nor any pain at such a time.

Socrates/ Perfectly well answered. But now in your question I suppose you meant this, —that some or other of those things were of necessity passing within us continually at all times; agreeably to this saying of the wise, —"that all things are in perpetual flow, going upward and downward."

Protarchus/ So they tell us: and this saying of theirs is, methinks, worthy of regard.

Socrates/ Undoubtedly it is: For it is said by men who are worthy, themselves, to be regarded. But this subject, which we have thus lighted on, I would willingly decline. Now I have it in my thoughts to avoid it this way; but you must accompany me.

Protarchus/ What way?

Socrates/ Be it so, then, let us say to these wise men: but you, Protarchus, answer me to this question: Do animals feel all the alterations which they continually undergo? or, whilst we are growing, or suffering in any part of our bodies any other change, are we sensible of these internal motions? Is not quite the contrary true? for almost everything of this kind passing within, us passes without our knowledge.

Protarchus/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ It was, therefore, not right in us to say, as we did just now, that all the alterations which happen to our bodies, and all the motions within them produce either pains or pleasures.

Protarchus/ Certainly not right.

Socrates/ And it would be better, and less liable to censure, to lay down this position.

Protarchus/ What position?

Socrates/ That great changes within give us pains and pleasures; but that such as are inconsiderable, or only moderate, produce neither pleasures nor pains.

Protarchus/ This is more justly said than the other sentence, indeed, Socrates.

Socrates/ If, then, these things are so, we meet with the life mentioned before recurring to us here again.

Protarchus/ What life?

Socrates/ That which is exempt from all sensations, both of pain and pleasure.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ Hence, we find there are three kinds of life proposed to our consideration: one of them full of pleasure, another full of pain; the third neutral, and free from both. Or how otherwise would you determine upon these points?

Protarchus/ No otherwise I, for my part: for three different kinds of life appear to me in what has been said.

Socrates/ To have no pain, therefore, cannot be the same thing as to have pleasure.

Protarchus/ Certainly it cannot.

Socrates/ But whenever you hear a man say, that it is the most pleasurable of all things to live all one's life free from pain, what do you take to be his thought and meaning?

Protarchus/ He means and thinks, as I take it, that it is a pleasure not to have any pain.

Socrates/ Well now: let there be any three things whatever: to instance in things of honorable name, let us suppose one of them to be gold, another to be silver, and the third to be neither gold nor silver.

Protarchus/ We shall suppose so.

Socrates/ That which is neither, is it possible For it any way to become either gold or silver?

Protarchus/ By no means.

Socrates/ The middle life, therefore, if it were said to be pleasurable, or if it were said to be painful, would not be spoken of in either way, rightly and agreeably to the true nature of things; nor would any person who entertains either of those opinions concerning it think rightly.

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ And yet, my friend, we find that there are persons who actually speak and think thus amiss.

Protarchus/ It is very evident.

Socrates/ Do these persons really feel pleasure whenever they are free from pain?

Protarchus/ So they say.

Socrates/ They must imagine, then, that they are pleased; for otherwise they would not say so.

Protarchus/ They do, it seems, imagine it.

Socrates/ They have a wrong opinion then of pleasure; if it be true that pleasure, and freedom from pain, have each a distinct nature, different from that of the other.

Protarchus/ Different, indeed, we have concluded them to be.

Socrates/ And are we willing to abide by our late conclusion, that the subjects still under examination are

three distinct things? or do we choose to say that they are only two? Do we now say that pain is man's evil, and that deliverance from pain is man's good, and is that to which is given the appellation of pleasure?

Protarchus/ How come we, O Socrates, to propose this point to be reconsidered by us now? for I do not apprehend your drift.

Socrates/ In fact, O Protarchus, you do not apprehend who are the direct enemies to Philebus.

Protarchus/ To whom do you give that character?

Socrates/ To persons who are said to have a profound knowledge of nature: these persons say that pleasures have no reality at all.

Protarchus/ What do they mean?

Socrates/ They say that all those things which Philebus and his party call pleasures are but deliverances from pain.

Protarchus/ Is it your advice, then, O Socrates, that we should hearken to these persons? or how otherwise?

Socrates/ Not so: but to consider them as a kind of diviners, who divine not according to any rules of art; but, from the austerity of a certain genius in them not ignoble, have conceived an aversion to the power of Pleasure, and deem nothing in her to be solid; but all her attractive charms to be mere illusions, and not [true] pleasure. It is thus that we should regard these persons, especially if we consider their other harsh maxims. You shall in the next place hear what pleasures seem to me to be true pleasures: so that, from both the accounts compared together, we may find out the nature of Pleasure, and form our judgment of her comparative value.

Protarchus/ Rightly said.

Socrates/ Let us then follow after them as our allies, wherever their austerity shall lead us. For I suppose they would begin their argument with some general principle, and propound to us some such question as this, —whether, if we had a mind to know the nature of any particular quality of things, for instance, the nature of the hard, whether or no we should not comprehend it better by examining the hardest things, than we should by scrutinizing a various multitude of the less hard. Now, Protarchus, you must make an answer to these austere persons, as if you were making it to me.

Protarchus/ By all means: and I make this answer to them. —that to examine such bodies as exceed all others in hardness is the better way.

Socrates/ In like manner, then, if we had a mind to know the nature of pleasure in general, we are not to consider the multitude of little or mean pleasures, but those only which are called extreme and exquisite.

Protarchus/ Every man would grant you the truth of this your present argument.

Socrates/ The pleasures which are always within our reach, those which we often call the greatest, do they not belong to the body?

Protarchus/ There is no doubt of it.

Socrates/ Are the [bodily] pleasures which are produced in those persons who labor under diseases, greater than the pleasures [of the same kind] felt by those who are in health? Now let us take care not to err, by making too precipitate an answer.

Protarchus/ What danger is there of erring?

Socrates/ Perhaps we might pronounce in favor of those who are in health.

Protarchus/ Probably we should.

Socrates/ But what? are not those pleasures the most excessive which are preceded by the strongest desires?

Protarchus/ This cannot be denied.

Socrates/ The afflicted with fevers, or with diseases of kin to fevers, are they not more thirsty than other persons? do they not more shake with cold? and suffer they not in a greater degree other evils which the body is subject to? Do they not feel their wants more pressing? and feel they not greater pleasures when they have those wants supplied? Or shall we deny all this to be true?

Protarchus/ Your representation of those cases clearly is right.

Socrates/ Well then: should we not be clearly right in saying, that whoever would know what pleasures are the greatest must not go to the healthy, but to the sick, to look for them? Be careful now not to imagine the meaning of my question to be this, —whether the sick enjoy pleasures more, in number, than the healthy: but consider me as inquiring into high degrees of pleasure; and by what means, and in what subjects, the vehemence or extreme of it always is produced. For we are to find out, we say, what the nature is of pleasure, and what those persons mean by pleasure who pretend that no such thing as pleasure has any being at all.

Protarchus/ Tolerably well do I apprehend your argument.

Socrates/ And possibly, O Protarchus, you will equally well show the truth of it. For, tell me; in a life of boundless luxury see you not greater pleasures (I do not mean more in number, but more intense and vehement,) than those in the life of temperance? Give your mind to the question first, and then, answer.

Protarchus/ I apprehend what you say: and the great superiority of the pleasures enjoyed in a luxurious life I

easily discern. For sober and temperate persons are on all occasions under the restraint of that maxim, now become a proverb, which advises them to avoid the too much of anything; to which advice they are obedient. But an excess of pleasure, even to madness, possessing the souls of the unwise and intemperate, as it makes them frantic, it makes them conspicuous, and famed for being men of pleasure.

Socrates/ Well said. If this, then, be the case, it is evident that the greatest pleasures, as well as the greatest pains, are produced in a morbid and vicious, disposition of the soul or of the body; and not when they are in their sound and right state.

Protarchus/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ Ought we not then to instance in some of these pleasures, and to consider what circumstances attend them on account of which it is that they are styled the greatest?

Protarchus/ That must be done.

Socrates/ Consider now what circumstance attends the pleasures which are produced in certain maladies.

Protarchus/ In what maladies?

Socrates/ In those of the base or indecent kind; — pleasures, to which the persons whom we termed austere have an utter aversion.

Protarchus/ What pleasures do you mean?

Socrates/ Those which are felt in curing the itch, for instance, by friction; and in other maladies of like kind, such as need no other medicine. Now the sensation thence arising in us, in the name of the Gods, what shall we say of it? Pleasure is it? or shall we term it pain?

Protarchus/ A mixt sort of sensation, O Socrates, seems to arise from this malady, partaking of both pain and pleasure.

Socrates/ It was not, however, for the sake of Philebus that I brought this last subject into our discourse: it was because we should never be able to determine the point now before us, unless we had taken a view of these mixt pleasures, and of others also which depend on these. Let us proceed, therefore, to consider such as have an affinity with them.

Protarchus/ Such, do you mean, as partake of pleasure and pain by means of their commixture?

Socrates/ That is my very meaning. Of these mixt feelings, then, some belong to the body; and in the body are these generated. Others are of the soul; and these have in the soul their residence. We shall find also pleasures mingled with pains, where the soul and the body have, each of them a share. Now these mixtures [though composed of contraries] are, in some cases, termed only pleasures; in other cases, only pains.

Protarchus/ Express yourself more fully.

Socrates/ When a man, whether in a sound or in a decaying state of his body, feels two contrary sensations at the same time; as when, chilled with cold, he is warming himself; or sometimes, when overheated, he is cooling himself; with a view, I suppose, to his enjoying one of those sensations, and to his deliverance from the other: in such cases, what is called the bitter-sweet, through the difficulty met with in driving away the bitter part, causes a struggle within, and a fierce meeting together of opposite qualities and sensations.

Protarchus/ It is perfectly true, what you have now said.

Socrates/ Are not some of these mixt sensations composed of pain and pleasure in equal proportion? and in others is not one of them predominant?

Protarchus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Among those, then, in which there is an overplus of pain, I reckon that of the malady termed the itch, and all other pruriencies and itchings, when nothing more than a slight friction or motion is applied to them such as only dissipates what humors are at the surface, but reaches not the fermentation and turgescence of those humors which lie deep within. In this condition, the diseased often apply heat to the parts which pain them and then the opposite extreme, through impatience, and uncertainty which way to take. Thus they excite inexpressible pleasures first, and then the contrary, in the interior parts, compared with the pains felt in the exterior, which yet are mixed with pleasures, according as the humors are driven outwardly or inwardly. For by violently dispersing the morbific matter where it is collected, and by compelling it together from places where it lies dispersed, pleasures and pains are at once excited, and arise by each other's side.

Protarchus/ Most true.

Socrates/ Now wherever, in any case of this kind, a greater quantity of pleasure is mingled, the smaller quantity of pain creates but a slight uneasiness, no more than what serves to tickle: whilst, on the other hand, the great excess of pleasure spread throughout convulses the whole frame, and sometimes causes involuntary motions; operating also every change of color in the countenance, every variety of posture in the limbs, and every different degree of respiration; —and within the soul it energizes in transports, uttered madly in exclamations.

Protarchus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ Further: a man in such a condition, O my friend! is apt to say of himself, and others are apt to say of him, that he is dying, as it were, through excess of pleasure. From this time for ever after he is wholly intent on pursuing

the like pleasures; and the more so, the more he happens to be intemperate, and less under the government of prudence. Thus he calls these pleasures the greatest, and accounts him the happiest of men who spends his whole time, as far as possible, in the enjoyment of them.

Protarchus/ You have described all this, O Socrates, just as it happens to the bulk of mankind, according to their own sense and opinion.

Socrates/ But all this, O Protarchus, relates only to such pleasures mixed with pains as arise solely in the body, in its superficial parts and interior parts alternately. And as to those feelings of the soul which meet with a contrary condition of the body, when pleasure in the one is mixed with pain in the other, so as that both are ingredients in one composition, we spoke of those before; such as a desire of fullness, under a sense of emptiness in the body; when hope administers delight, while the emptiness gives a pain. We did not, indeed, consider them at that time as evidences of the present point; but we now say, that in all those cases (and the number of them is infinite) where the condition of the soul is different from that of the body, a mixture of pain and pleasure happens to be produced.

Protarchus/ You are, I believe, perfectly in the right.

Socrates/ Among the mixtures of pain and pleasure, there is a third kind remaining, yet unmentioned.

Protarchus/ What kind is that?

Socrates/ That where such pleasures and pains as we said arise frequently in the soul, herself by herself, are mixed together.

Protarchus/ In what cases, say we, are these mixtures found?

Socrates/ Anger, fear, and desire, and lamentation, love, emulation, and envy, and all other such passions of the soul

herself, do you not suppose them to give pain and uneasiness to the soul?

Protarchus/ I do.

Socrates/ And shall we not find these very passions fraught with wondrous pleasures? In the passions of resentment and anger, do we need to be reminded of what the poet says, —that

> ————————though resentment raise
> Choler, like smoke, in even the prudent breast;
> The luscious honey from its waxen seat
> Distills not half such sweetness.

And do we not remember, in lamentations and desires, the pleasures we have felt mingled with the pains which those passions produce?

Protarchus/ It is true: our passions do affect us in the manner you have mentioned, and no otherwise.

Socrates/ And have you not observed, at tragic spectacles presented on the stage, with how much pleasure the spectators shed tears?

Protarchus/ I certainly have.

Socrates/ But have you attended to the disposition of your soul at the acting of a comedy? Do you know that there also we feel pain mixed with pleasure?

Protarchus/ I do not perfectly well comprehend that.

Socrates/ It is not perfectly easy, O Protarchus, at such a time, to comprehend what mixed passions possess the soul in every case of that kind.

Protarchus/ Not at all easy, I believe.

Socrates/ However, let us consider what our feelings are at that time; and the more attentively, on account of their obscurity; that we may be able to discover with the greater ease what mixture there is of pain and pleasure in other cases.

Protarchus/ Say on, then.

Socrates/ The passion known by the name of envy, will you set it down for a sort of pain in the soul, or how?

Protarchus/ Even so.

Socrates/ And yet the man who envies another will plainly appear to be delighted with the evils which befall him.

Protarchus/ Clearly so.

Socrates/ Now ignorance is an evil; and so is what we term want of sense.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ From these premises you may perceive what is the nature of ridicule and the ridiculous.

Protarchus/ You must tell me what it is.

Socrates/ Every particular vice takes its name from some particular bad habit in the soul. But total viciousness, the habit of wickedness in all respects, is the direct contrary of that habit which the Delphic inscription advises us to acquire.

Protarchus/ That of knowing one's self do you mean, O Socrates?

Socrates/ I do. And the contrary to this advice of the oracle would be not to know one's self in any respect at all.

Protarchus/ Certainly it would.

Socrates/ Try now to divide this ignorance of ourselves into three kinds.

Protarchus/ How, say you, should this be done? for I am not able to do it.

Socrates/ Do you say that I should make this division in your stead?

Protarchus/ I not only say it, but desire you so to do.

Socrates/ Well then: whoever is ignorant of himself, must he not be thus ignorant, in one or other of these three respects?

Protarchus/ What three?

Socrates/ First, with respect to external possessions, in imagining himself wealthier than he really is.

Protarchus/ Many persons there are who labor under this sort of ignorance.

Socrates/ Yet more numerous are they, in the next place, who imagine themselves handsomer in their persons, nobler in their air, or graced with some other corporeal advantage in a higher degree than actually they are.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ But the number is by far the greatest, I presume, of such as are mistaken in themselves, with respect to the third kind of excellence, that which belongs to the soul, by fancying themselves possessed of more virtue than in truth they have.

Protarchus/ Nothing is more certain.

Socrates/ Among the virtues and excellencies of the soul, is not wisdom that to which the generality of mankind lay claim with the greatest earnestness, and in regard to which they are full of contention, opinionativeness, and false notions?

Protarchus/ Evidently so.

Socrates/ Now the man who should say that ignorance and error, in any of these respects, were evils, would say what is true.

Protarchus/ Very right.

Socrates/ But we are to make still another division of this ignorance of a man's self, O Protarchus, if we would discover

the odd mixture of pain and pleasure in that mirthful envy which is excited by comedy, —a division into two sorts.

Protarchus/ Into what two sorts do you mean?

Socrates/ To those persons who foolishly entertain any such false opinion of themselves it necessarily happens, as it does to all men in general, that strength and power attend on some; while the fate of others is quite the contrary.

Protarchus/ It must be so.

Socrates/ According to this difference then between them distinguish those ignorant persons into two sorts. And all those whose self-ignorance is attended with weakness, and with a want of power to be revenged on such as laugh at them you may justly say that they are open to ridicule, and may call their characters properly ridiculous. But as to the others, who have power to take their revenge, if you should say that these are to be dreaded, as being powerful and hostile, you would give a very right account of them. For such ignorance, armed with power, is powerful to do mischief; and not only itself is hostile and hurtful to all persons within its reach, but so likewise are all its images and representatives. But self-ignorance, without strength and power, is to be ranked among the things which are ridiculous, and is a proper object of ridicule.

Protarchus/ There is much of truth in what you say. But I do not as yet perceive clearly what mixture there is of pain and pleasure in our feelings on such occasions.

Socrates/ You are, in the first place, to apprehend the force of envy in these cases.

Protarchus/ Show it me then.

Socrates/ Is not sorrow, on some occasions, felt unjustly? and is it not the same case with joy and pleasure?

Protarchus/ No doubt can be made of it.

Socrates/ There is neither injustice, nor envy, in rejoicing at the evils which befall our enemies.

Protarchus/ Certainly there is not.

Socrates/ But if at any time, when we see an evil happening to our friends, we feel no sorrow, —if, on the contrary, we rejoice at it, —are we not guilty of injustice?

Protarchus/ Without dispute.

Socrates/ Did we not say that it was an evil to any person to be ignorant of himself?

Protarchus/ We did, and justly too.

Socrates/ If there be in any of our friends a false conceit of their own wisdom, or of their own beauty, or of whatever else we mentioned, when we divided ignorance of one's self into three kinds, is not this conceit an object of ridicule, where it is attended with impotence and weakness; but an object of hatred, if power and strength are joined with it? or do we deny, what I just now said, that the having of such a false opinion, if it be not hurtful to others, is an object of ridicule?

Protarchus/ You said what is entirely true.

Socrates/ And do we not acknowledge this false conceit to be an evil, as being built on ignorance?

Protarchus/ Most heartily.

Socrates/ Whether do we feel delight or sorrow when we laugh at it?

Protarchus/ It is plain that we feel delight.

Socrates/ Did we not say, that whenever we feel delight from the evils which happen to our friends, it is envy which operates in us that unjust delight?

Protarchus/ It must be envy.

Socrates/ Our reasoning then shows, that when we laugh at what is ridiculous in a friend, mixing thus delight with

envy, we mix together pleasure and pain. For we acknowledged long ago that envy gives uneasiness and pain to the soul; and we have admitted, that laughing yields delight. Now in these cases they arise, both of them at the same time.

Protarchus/ True.

Socrates/ We see, then, from the conclusion of our argument, that in mournful spectacles, and no less in comedies, not only as they are acted on the stage, but as they are presented to us also in the tragedy and comedy of real life, and in a thousand intermediate occurrences, pains and pleasures are blended together.

Protarchus/ It would be impossible, O Socrates, for a man not to acknowledge this, were he ever so zealous an advocate for the opposite side.

Socrates/ When we entered on the present subject, we proposed to consider anger, desire and grief, fear and love, jealousy and envy, and such other passions of the soul; promising ourselves to find in them those mixed feelings which again and again we had been speaking of: did we not?

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ Do we perceive that we have dispatched already all which relates to grief, and envy, and anger?

Protarchus/ We perceive it clearly.

Socrates/ But there is much yet remaining.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ For what reason, principally, do you suppose it was that I explained to you the mixed feeling which a comedy occasions in us? Do you not conceive, that it was to show myself able to explain to you with much more ease, the like mixture of pain and pleasure in fear, in love, and in the other passions? and that after you had seen the truth of it in one

instance, you might discharge me from the necessity of proceeding to the rest, or of lengthening out the argument any further; but might receive it for a truth, without limitation or exception, that the body without the soul, and the soul without the body, and both together likewise, are, in many things, which affect them severally or jointly, full of a sense of pleasures mingled with pains. Say, then, whether you will dismiss me, or make it midnight before we finish. But I imagine that, after I shall have added a few things more, I shall obtain from you my dismission: for I shall be ready to give you an account of all these things at large tomorrow; but at present am desirous of proceeding to what remains on this subject; that we may come to a decision of the point in controversy, as Philebus hath enjoined us.

Protarchus/ You have well spoken, O Socrates; and as to what remains, go through with it in whatever way it is agreeable to yourself.

Socrates/ Well then: after the mixed pleasures we are to proceed, by a kind of natural necessity, to the several pleasures which are unmixed and pure.

Protarchus/ Perfectly well said.

Socrates/ The nature of these I shall endeavor to explain to you, by converting to my own use, with a little alteration, what is said of them by others. For I do not entirely give credit to those persons who tell us, that all pleasure consists in a cessation from uneasiness and pain. But, as I said before, I make use of these persons as witnesses, in confirmation of this truth, —that some things there are which seem to be pleasures, but by no means are so in reality; and of this also, —that some other pleasures there are, many and great in imagination, accompanied with pains, but at the same time with relief from greater pains, amid the distresses of the body and of the soul.

Protarchus/ But what pleasures are those, O Socrates, which a man would deem rightly of, in supposing them to be true?

Socrates/ The pleasures which are produced in us from seeing beauteous colors and beauteous figures; many pleasures also of the smell, and many others arising in us from the hearing of sounds; in a word, whatever pleasures we feel from perceiving the presence of anything, whose absence we are insensible of, or at least occasions no pain in us, all these are unmixed and pure.

Protarchus/ How do you explain this general account, O Socrates?

Socrates/ The meaning of it, indeed, is not directly obvious: but we must endeavor to make it evident. I mean, then, by beauteous figures, not, as most men would suppose I meant, the beauty of living forms, or their statues; but the straight and the round, whether in surfaces, or in solids; according to which are fashioned the turner's works, and those of the carpenter, by means of his rules and angles. For the figures which I mean, if you apprehend me, have no relative beauty, like those other beauteous forms; but in their own nature, separately considered, are always absolutely beautiful; and the beholding of them gives us certain peculiar pleasures, not at all similar to the pleasures excited in us by any kind of motion. And as to colors, I mean such as bear the like stamp of absolute beauty, and yield also pleasures of a peculiar nature. But do we apprehend these things? or what say we to them?

Protarchus/ I endeavor, O Socrates, to comprehend your full meaning: but endeavor you yourself to explain thoroughly the whole of it.

Socrates/ As to sounds, I mean such as are smooth, clear, and canorous, conveying some pure and simple melody,

without relation to any other sounds, but singly of themselves musical: of such I speak, and of the connatural pleasures which attend them.

Protarchus/ That such pleasures also there are, I readily acknowledge.

Socrates/ The pleasures felt by us from certain odors are, indeed, of a kind less divine than the pleasures just now mentioned; but in respect of their being equally pure, and not, of necessity, mixed with pains, I rank them all under the same head. For in whatever pleasures there happens to be found this quality of entire freedom from pain, all these I oppose to those other pleasures with which pain is complicated. Now, if you observe, we have already spoken of two different kinds of pleasure.

Protarchus/ I do observe.

Socrates/ To these let us now add the pleasures taken in the mathematical sciences; unless we are of opinion that such pleasures are of necessity preceded by a thirst of learning them; and that, when tasted and enjoyed, they raise a thirst of more and more; so that, from our beginning to learn them„ they are all along attended with uneasiness.

Protarchus/ I think that such uneasiness is not at all necessary.

Socrates/ Well: but suppose that, having attained to full possession of them, we happen afterwards to lose some part through forgetfulness, do you see no uneasiness arising hence?

Protarchus/ None at all from the nature of the thing itself: but when the knowledge is wanted to be applied to some use in human life, then a man is uneasy at having lost it, on account of its usefulness.

Socrates/ And we are at present, my friend, actually concerned about those feelings only which arise in us from

the nature of the knowledge itself, without any regard to the usefulness of it in computing or measuring.

Protarchus/ You are right then in saying, that, in mathematical knowledge, a forgetfulness frequently befalls us, without giving us any uneasiness.

Socrates/ These pleasures, therefore, the pleasures of science, we must acknowledge to be unmixed with pains. But these pleasures belong not to the vulgar multitude, being enjoyed only by a very few.

Protarchus/ All this must certainly be acknowledged.

Socrates/ Now, then, that we have tolerably well distinguished between the pure pleasures and those which are rightly called impure, let us further add these distinctions between them. —that the vehement pleasures know not moderation nor measure; while those of the gentler kind admit of measure, and are moderate: and that greatness and intenseness, and the contrary qualities, the frequency also and the rareness of repetition, are attributes of such pleasures only as belong to the boundless genus, — to that which is perpetually varying in its quantities and motions through the body and through the soul, —while the pleasures to which the like variations never happen, belong to the contrary genus, and are allied to all things wherein symmetry is found.

Protarchus/ Perfectly right, O Socrates.

Socrates/ The pleasures, beside these assortments of them are to be further distinguished thus.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ We should consider whether the purity and the simplicity of pleasures serve to discover what true pleasure is: or whether the truth of pleasures may best be known from their intenseness, their multitude, their greatness and their abundance.

Protarchus/ What is your view, Socrates, in proposing this to be considered?

Socrates/ To omit nothing by which the nature of pleasure, and that of knowledge, may be set in the clearest light; and not to leave it undiscovered, whether or no some kinds of each of them are pure, while other kinds are impure; that thus, what is pure and simple in each being brought before us to be judged of, you and I, and all this company, may the more easily form a right judgment.

Protarchus/ Very rightly said.

Socrates/ Well then: all those kinds of things which we commonly say are pure, let us consider of in the following way: but first let us choose out someone among them for an instance to consider of.

Protarchus/ Which would you have us choose?

Socrates/ Among the principal of those kinds, let us, if you please, consider the white kind of things.

Protarchus/ By all means.

Socrates/ In what way, then, might we have anything which is called white, with the most perfect and pure whiteness? whether by having the greatest number of things which are white, and the largest of the kind in size, or by having what is white in the highest degree, and not tinged with the least degree of any other color?

Protarchus/ Evidently, by having what is of the most simple and unmixed whiteness.

Socrates/ Rightly said. Shall we not then determine that this pure white is the truest, and at the same time the most beautiful of all whites; and not that which is of the largest size, and whose number is the greatest?

Protarchus/ Most certainly we shall.

Socrates/ In pronouncing, then, that a little of purely white is whiter, and of a more beautiful and true whiteness, than a great quantity of the mixed white, we shall say what is entirely right.

Protarchus/ Without the least doubt.

Socrates/ Well then: I suppose we shall have no occasion to produce many such instances to prove the truth of our conclusion concerning pleasure; the instance already brought seems sufficient for us to perceive at once, that a little of pleasure, pure, and free from pain, is more pleasant, more true, and perfect, as well as more comely, than pleasure where pain is mingled, be there ever so much of it, or be it ever so vast and vehement.

Protarchus/ By all means: the instance you gave in whiteness, is an argument from analogy, sufficient for the proof of it.

Socrates/ But what think you now of this? Have we not heard it said concerning pleasure, that it is a thing always in generation, always produced anew, and having no stability of being, cannot properly be said to be at all? For some ingenious persons there are who endeavor to show us, that such is the nature of pleasure; and we are much obliged to them for this their account of it.

Protarchus/ Why so?

Socrates/ I shall recount to you the whole of their reasoning on this point, my friend Protarchus, by putting a few questions to you.

Protarchus/ Do so: and begin your questions.

Socrates/ Are there not in nature two very different kinds of things: this, in itself alone complete; that, desirous always of the other?

Protarchus/ How do you mean? and what things do you speak of?

Socrates/ One of them is by nature always of high dignity and value; the other, falling far short of it, and always indigent.

Protarchus/ Express yourself a little more clearly.

Socrates/ Have we not seen some of the fair sex who excelled in beauty and in virtue? and have we not seen their lovers and admirers?

Protarchus/ Often.

Socrates/ Analogous then to these two different sorts of persons, see if you cannot discover two different kinds of things, to one or other of which different kinds belongs everything, commonly said to have a being: the third be to the savior.

Protarchus/ Speak your meaning, O Socrates, in plainer terms.

Socrates/ I mean nothing, O Protarchus, but what is very simple and easy to be seen. But our present argument is pleased to sport itself. However, it means no more than this, —that there is a kind of things which are always for the sake of some other; and there is also a kind of things for whose sake always is produced whatever hath any final cause of its production.

Protarchus/ I find it difficult to understand your meaning, after your many explanations of it.

Socrates/ Perhaps, young man, it will be understood better as we proceed in the reasoning on this subject.

Protarchus/ I make no doubt of it.

Socrates/ Let us now make another division of things into two different kinds.

Protarchus/ What kinds are they?

Socrates/ The generation of all things is one kind of things; and the being of all is a different kind.

Protarchus/ I admit your difference between being and generation.

Socrates/ You are perfectly in the right. Now, whether of these two is for the sake of the other? Shall we say that generation is for the sake of being? or shall we say that being is for the sake of generation?

Protarchus/ Whether or no that which is termed being, is what it is for the sake of generation, is this your present question?

Socrates/ Apparently it is.

Protarchus/ In the name of the Gods, how can you ask so strange a question?

Socrates/ My meaning in that question, O Protarchus, is of such a kind as this other; —whether you would choose to say that ship-building is for the sake of shipping, rather than you would say that shipping is for the sake of ship-building: and all other things of like kind, O Protarchus, I include in the question which I ask you.

Protarchus/ But for what reason, O Socrates, do you not give an answer to it yourself?

Socrates/ I have no reason to refuse that office; do you but go along with me in my answer.

Protarchus/ Certainly I shall.

Socrates/ I say, then, that for the sake of generation, it is true, that medicines are composed; the instrumental parts, prepared by nature, and all the materials of it, provided: but that every act of generation is for the sake of some being; generation in every species, for the sake of some being belonging to that species; and universally, all generation, for the sake of universal being.

Protarchus/ Most evidently so.

Socrates/ If pleasure, then, be of such a nature as to be generated always anew, must not the generating of it be always for the sake only of some being?

Protarchus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ Now that, for the sake of which is always generated whatever is generated for some end, must be in the rank of things which are good: and that which is generated for the sake of any other thing, must of necessity, my friend, be placed in a different rank of things.

Protarchus/ Certainly it must.

Socrates/ Shall we not be right, then, in placing pleasure in a rank of things different from that of good; if it be true, that pleasure has no stable being, but is always generated anew?

Protarchus/ Perfectly right.

Socrates/ Therefore, as I said in beginning this argumentation, we are much obliged to the persons who have given us this account of pleasure, —that the essence of it consists in being always generated anew, but that never has it any kind of being. For it is plain, that these persons would laugh at a man who asserted, that pleasure and good were the same thing.

Protarchus/ Certainly they would.

Socrates/ And these very persons would certainly laugh at those men, wherever they met with them who place their chief good and end in generation.

Protarchus/ How, and what sort of men do you mean?

Socrates/ Such, as in freeing themselves from hunger, or thirst, or any of the uneasinesses from which they are freed by generation, are so highly delighted with the action of removing those uneasinesses, as to declare they would not choose to live without suffering thirst and hunger, nor

without feeling all those other sensations which may be said to follow from such kinds of uneasiness.

Protarchus/ Such, indeed, there are, who seem to be of that opinion.

Socrates/ Would not all of us say that corruption was the contrary of generation?

Protarchus/ It is impossible to think otherwise.

Socrates/ Whoever, then, makes such a life his choice, must choose both corruption and generation, rather than that third kind of life, in which he might live with the clearest discernment of what is right and good, but without the feeling of either pain or pleasure.

Protarchus/ Much absurdity, as it seems, O Socrates, is to be admitted by the man who holds that human good consists wholly in pleasure.

Socrates/ Much, indeed. For let us argue further thus.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Since no good nor beauty is in bodies, nor in any other things beside the soul; is it not absurd to imagine, that in the soul pleasure should be the only good; and that neither fortitude, nor temperance, nor understanding, nor any of the other valuable attainments of the soul, should be numbered among the good things which the soul enjoys? Further too, is it not highly irrational to suppose, that a man afflicted with pain, without feeling any pleasure, should be obliged to say that evil only, and no good, was with him at the time when he was in pain, though he were the best of all men? And is it not equally absurd, on the other hand, to suppose that a man in the midst of pleasures must be, during that time, in the midst of good; and that the more pleasure he feels, the more good he is filled with, and is so much the better man?

Protarchus/ All these suppositions, O Socrates, are absurdities in the highest degree possible.

Socrates/ It is well. But now let us not employ ourselves wholly in searching into the nature of pleasure; as if we industriously declined the examination of intellect and science; but in these also, if there be anything putrid or unsound, let us have the courage to cut it all off, and throw it aside; till, coming to a discovery of what is entirely pure and sound therein, the discovery may be of use to us in comparing the truest parts of intellect and science with the truest parts of pleasure, and in forming our judgment concerning the superiority of either from that comparison.

Protarchus/ Rightly said.

Socrates/ Do we not hold, that mathematical science is partly employed in the service of the mechanic arts, and partly in the liberal education and discipline of youth? or how think we on this subject?

Protarchus/ Exactly so.

Socrates/ Now, as to the manual arts, let us consider, in the first place, whether some of these depend not on science more than others; and whether we ought not to look on those of the former sort as the more pure, and on these others as the more impure.

Protarchus/ Certainly we ought.

Socrates/ And in each of these we should distinguish and separate the leading arts from the arts which are led and governed by them.

Protarchus/ What arts do you call the leading arts? and why do you give that epithet to them?

Socrates/ I mean thus: from all the arts were a man to separate and say aside those of numbering, of measuring, and of weighing, what remained in every one of them would became comparatively mean and contemptible.

Protarchus/ Contemptible, indeed.

Socrates/ For room would be then left only for conjecture, and for exercise of the senses, by experience and habitual practice; and we should then make use of no other faculties beside those of guessing and aiming well, (to which, indeed, the multitude give the name of arts) increasing the strength of those faculties by dint of assiduity and labor.

Protarchus/ All which you have now said must, of necessity, be true.

Socrates/ The truth of it is evident in all musical performances throughout. For, in the first place, harmony is produced, and one sound is adapted to another, not by measuring but by that aiming well which arises from constant exercise. It is evident too in musical performances on all wind-instruments: for in these the breath, by being well aimed as it is blown along, searches and attains the measure of every chord beaten. So that music has in it much of the uncertain, and but a little of the fixed and firm.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And we shall find the case to be the same in the arts of medicine and agriculture, in the art of navigation also, and the military art.

Protarchus/ Most clearly so.

Socrates/ But in the art of building we shall find, as I presume, many measures made use of, and many instruments employed; by which it is made to surpass in accuracy many things which are called sciences.

Protarchus/ How so?

Socrates/ It is so in ship-building, and house-building, and in many other works of carpentry. For in these, I think, the art uses the straight-rule, and the square, the turning-lath and the compasses, the plummet and the marking-line.

Protarchus/ You are entirely right, O Socrates: it is so as you say.

Socrates/ The arts, therefore, as they are called, let us now distinguish into two sorts; —those which music is at the head of, as they are less accurate than? some others; and these others which partake of accuracy the most, at the head of which is architecture.

Protarchus/ This distinction is allowed of.

Socrates/ And let us set down those arts for the most accurate which we lately said were the prime or leading arts.

Protarchus/ You mean, if I mistake not, arithmetic, and those other arts which you mentioned together with it but just now.

Socrates/ The very same. But, O Protarchus, must we not say that each of these arts is two-fold? or how otherwise?

Protarchus/ What arts do you speak of?

Socrates/ Arithmetic, in the first place. Must we not say of this, that the arithmetic of the multitude is of one sort, and that the arithmetic of those who apply themselves to philosophy is of another sort?

Protarchus/ What is the difference by which the one may be distinguished from the other?

Socrates/ The difference between them O Protarchus, is far from being inconsiderable. For the multitude in numbering, number by unequal ones put together; as two armies of unequal force; two oxen of unequal size; two things, the smallest of all, —or two, the greatest, —being compared with others of the same kind. But the students in philosophy would not understand what a man meant, who, in numbering, made any difference between some and other of the ones which composed the number.

Protarchus/ You are perfectly right in saying that no inconsiderable difference lies in the different manner of studying and using numbers; so as to make it probable that two different sorts there are of arithmetic.

Socrates/ Well: and what of calculation in trade, and of mensuration in building? Does the latter of these arts not differ from mathematical geometry? nor the other from calculations made by the students in pure mathematics. Shall we say that they are, each of them but one art? or shall we set down each of them for two?

Protarchus/ For my part, I should give my opinion agreeably to your division of arithmetic; and should say that each of these arts also was two-fold.

Socrates/ You would give a right opinion. But with what design I brought these distinctions on the carpet do you conceive?

Protarchus/ Perhaps I do. But I could wish that you yourself would declare what was your design.

Socrates/ These distinctions seem to me to have shown to us, that in science there is that very circumstance attending it which we had before discovered to be in pleasure; the one thus answering to the other. For, having found that some sort of pleasure was purer than some other sort, we were inquiring whether the same difference was to be found with regard to science; and whether one sort of this also was purer than some other.

Protarchus/ It is very manifest that your distinctions between the several arts were introduced for this very purpose.

Socrates/ Well then: have we not discovered, in what has been said, that some arts are clearer than others, having more light within them; and that others are more involved in obscurity and darkness?

Protarchus/ Evidently so.

Socrates/ And has not the course of our argument led us to take notice of some art, bearing the same name with some other art; and first, to suppose them both to be, as they are commonly imagined, but one art; then, to consider them as two different arts; to examine each with regard to its clearness and purity; and to inquire which of the two has in it the most accuracy, whether that which is cultivated by students in philosophy, or that which is exercised by the multitude?

Protarchus/ Our argument seems to bring on this inquiry.

Socrates/ And what answer, O Protarchus, should we make to such a question?

Protarchus/ O Socrates, we are now advanced so far as to discover an amazingly wide difference between the parts of our knowledge in point of clearness.

Socrates/ It will, therefore, be the easier for us to answer to that question.

Protarchus/ Without doubt. And let us affirm, that those leading arts greatly excel the others with regard to clearness; and that such of those brighter arts themselves as are studied by real students in philosophy, display, in measures and in numbers, their vast superiority to all other arts, with regard to accuracy and truth.

Socrates/ Granting these things to be what you say they are, let us, on the credit of what you have said, boldly answer to those persons who are so formidable in argumentation, thus:

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ That there are two sorts of arithmetic; and that, dependent on these, there is a long train of arts, each of them in like manner, two-fold under one denomination.

Protarchus/ Let us give to the persons whom you call formidable that very answer, O Socrates, with a confidence of its being right.

Socrates/ Do we then affirm, that in these sciences there is an accuracy thee highest of all.

Protarchus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ But the power of dialectic, O Protarchus, if we gave to any other science the preference above her, would deny that superiority.

Protarchus/ What power is it to which we are to give that name?

Socrates/ Plainly that power, O Protarchus, by which the mind perceives all that accuracy and clearness of which we have been speaking. For I am entirely of opinion, that all persons, endued with even the smallest portion of understanding, must deem the knowledge of the real essence of things—the knowledge of that kind of being whose nature is invariable—to be by far the most certain and true knowledge. But you, Protarchus, to what Art or science would you give the distinction of preeminence?

Protarchus/ As to me, O Socrates, I have often heard Gorgias maintaining in all places, that the art of persuasion has greatly the advantage over all other arts in overruling all things, and making all persons submit to it, not by constraint, but by a voluntary yielding; and therefore, that of all arts it is by far the most excellent. Now I should not choose to contradict, or oppose either you or him.

Socrates/ As much as to say, if I apprehend your meaning rightly, that you cannot for shame desert your colors.

Protarchus/ Let your opinion of these matters now prevail; and the ranks of the several arts be settled as you would have them.

Socrates/ Am I now to blame for your making a mistake?

Protarchus/ What mistake have I made?

Socrates/ The question, my friend Protarchus, was not which art, or which science, is superior to all the rest, with regard to greatness, and excellence, and usefulness to us; but of which art the objects are the brightest, the most accurate, and true, though the art itself brought us little or no gain: this it is, which is the present subject of our inquiry. Observe, then, Gorgias will have no quarrel with you: for you may still allow to his art the preference above all others, in point of utility and profit to mankind. But, as I said before concerning white, that be there ever so little of it, so it be pure, it excels a large quantity of an impure white, with regard to the truth of whiteness; just so is it with the study which I have been commending; it excels all others with regard to truth itself. And now that we have considered this subject attentively, and discussed it sufficiently, laying aside all regards to the usefulness of the sciences and arts, as well as to the reputation which they bear in the world, and thoroughly sifting them to find out the purity of intellect and wisdom, —if there be in the soul any faculty of loving truth above all things, and of doing whatever she does for the sake of truth, —let us consider whether it is right to say that we have this faculty improved chiefly by dialectic, or whether we must search for some other art fitter for that purpose, and making it more her proper business.

Protarchus/ Well: I do consider the point proposed; and I imagine it no easy matter to admit that any other science or art seeks and embraces truth so much as this.

Socrates/ Say you this from having observed that many of the arts, even such as profess a laborious inquiry after truth, are, in the first place, conversant only with opinions, and exercise only the imagination; and that methodically, and according to a set of rules, they then search into things which are the subjects only of such opinions? and do you

know, that the persons who suppose themselves to be inquiring into the nature of things are, all their lives, inquisitive about nothing more than this outward world, how it was produced, what causes the changes which happen therein, and how those changes operate their effects? Should we acknowledge all this so to be, or how otherwise?

Protarchus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Whoever of us then addicts himself to the study of nature in this way, employs his time and care, not about the things which always are in being, but about things which are either newly come into being, or which are to come, or which have been already, and are past.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ What clearness, therefore, what certainty, or exact truth, can we expect to find in these things, none of which had ever any stability or sameness in them nor ever will have any, nor have such of them as now exist any, even during their existence?

Protarchus/ How can it be expected?

Socrates/ Concerning things in which there is not the least stability, how can we form any stable notions?

Protarchus/ I suppose it not possible.

Socrates/ Of those things, then, there is neither intelligence, nor any sort of science to be acquired; at least not such as contains the highest degree of certainty.

Protarchus/ It is not probable that there is.

Socrates/ We ought, therefore, both you and I, to lay aside the consideration of what Gorgias or Philebus said, and to establish on a firmer basis this truth.

Protarchus/ What truth?

Socrates/ This: —Whatever is in us of stable, pure, and true, it has for the objects of it—either the beings which

always are, and remain invariable, entirely pure and unadulterate; or [if these are beyond the reach of our sight] then such as are the nearest allied to them and are second in the ranks of being: for all other things come after those first beings; second, and so on in order.

Protarchus/ Perfectly right.

Socrates/ The noblest, therefore, of the names given to things of this kind, is it not perfectly right to assign to those of this kind, which are the noblest?

Protarchus/ It is reasonable so to do.

Socrates/ Are not intellect and wisdom the noblest of those names?

Protarchus/ They are.

Socrates/ Rightly then are these names in accurate speech appropriated to the intelligence and contemplation of real being.

Protarchus/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ And the things for the excellency of which I at the first contended, are the very things to which we give these names.

Protarchus/ Clearly are they, O Socrates.

Socrates/ Well now: were a man to say that the nature of intellect and the nature of pleasure lay severally before us, like two different sorts of materials before some workman, for him to mix or join together, and from them and in them to compose his designed work, —would he not make a fair comparison suitable to the task which our inquiry has engaged us in?

Protarchus/ A very fair comparison.

Socrates/ Should we not, then, in the next place, set about mixing them together?

Protarchus/ Why should we not?

Socrates/ Would it not be our best way to begin this work by recollecting and repeating those things over again?

Protarchus/ What things?

Socrates/ Those we have often mentioned before. For, I think, the proverb says well: —"Again and again that which is right, by repeating it, to recall into our minds."

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly.

Socrates/ In the name of Zeus, then, come on. The whole of our controversy began, I think, with stating the point in question, to this effect.

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ Philebus affirms that pleasure is the right mark set up by nature for all animals to aim at; that they all ought to pursue pleasure; that the good of them all is this very thing, pleasure; and that good and pleasant, these two attributes, belong but to one subject, as they both have but one and the same nature: on the other hand, Socrates denies this to be true; and maintains, in the first place, that as the two names, good and pleasant, are two different names, different also are the things so denominated; in the next place, that the nature of good differs from that of pleasure; and that intelligence, or mind, partakes of the properties of good more than pleasure does, and is allied nearer to its nature. Were not some such positions as these, O Protarchus, severally laid down by us?

Protarchus/ They were.

Socrates/ But was not this point agreed on between us at that time, and do we not still agree in it?

Protarchus/ What point?

Socrates/ That the nature of good itself is more excellent than the nature of any other thing in this respect?

Protarchus/ In what respect?

Socrates/ This: that whatever animal being hath the constant, entire, and full possession of good itself, such a being has no want of anything beside, having always a most perfect and complete sufficiency. Is it not so?

Protarchus/ It certainly is.

Socrates/ Have we not endeavored to consider separately a life of pleasure and a life of intellect, each unmixed with the other, —a life of pleasure without intellect, and in like manner, a life of intellect without the smallest degree of pleasure?

Protarchus/ We have.

Socrates/ Did either of those lives appear to us at that time to be sufficient for the happiness of any man?

Protarchus/ How was it possible?

Socrates/ But if at that time any mistake was committed, let it be now revised and rectified. In order to which, let us take memory, science, wisdom, and right opinion, comprehending them all in one idea, and consider whether any man, without having something of that kind, would accept of pleasure, were it offered to him, either in the greatest abundance, or in the most exquisite degree; whether, indeed, he would regard the having or the receiving of anything whatever; as he would not, in that case, have a right thought or opinion of his having any pleasure; neither would he know what he felt or had at present; nor would he remember in what condition or circumstances he had been at any time before. In like manner concerning wisdom, consider, whether a man would choose to have it without a mixture of any pleasure in the least, rather than to have the same wisdom attended with pleasures of certain kinds; and whether a man would prefer the having of all possible pleasures, without wisdom, to the having of them accompanied with some portion of wisdom.

Protarchus/ It is impossible, O Socrates, for a man to make any such choice as you have supposed. And there is no occasion to repeat these questions again and again.

Socrates/ Not pleasure, then, nor wisdom, either of them alone, can be the perfect and consummate good, eligible to all men, that which we are inquiring after.

Protarchus/ Certainly not.

Socrates/ Of this good, then, we are to give a clear and full description, or at least some sketch, that we may know where the second prize of excellence, as we called it, ought to be bestowed.

Protarchus/ Perfectly right.

Socrates/ Have we not, then, taken away by which we may find out our chief good?

Protarchus/ What way do you mean?

Socrates/ As if we were in search of any particular man, and were already well informed of the place of his abode, we should have made a great progress toward finding the man himself.

Protarchus/ Without doubt.

Socrates/ And our reasoning has now declared to us clearly, what it pointed to before, that, not in the unmixed life, but in the mixed, we are to seek for happiness.

Protarchus/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ But in a proper and well-tempered mixture we may reasonably hope to discover what we are in search of with more certainty than we could by an ill-made composition.

Protarchus/ With much more.

Socrates/ Let us, then, set about mixing and making the composition, first praying to the Gods for their assistance;

whether it be Bacchus, or Vulcan, or some other of the Gods, who presides over the mixture of these ingredients.

Protarchus/ Let us, by all means, do so.

Socrates/ And now, as it were, two cisterns, or vases, are set before us; the vase of pleasure, as of honey; and the vase of intellect, cool and sober, as of some hard and healthful water. These, then, we are to mix together in the best manner we are able.

Protarchus/ With all my heart.

Socrates/ Come, then: but first say, whether by mingling all pleasure with all wisdom we may best obtain our end, the having of a proper and due mixture.

Protarchus/ Perhaps we might.

Socrates/ But it is dangerous to make the experiment. And I believe that I can point out a way to mix them with more safety.

Protarchus/ Say what way.

Socrates/ Concerning pleasures, I think, we held, that some more truly deserved that name than others of them; and of arts, that some were more accurate and exact than others.

Protarchus/ Undoubtedly so.

Socrates/ And that the sciences also differed one from another in like manner: for that some kinds of science have for their objects only such things as arise into being and afterwards perish; whereas another kind directs its view to things which are neither generated nor destroyed, but always are in being, always have the same properties, and preserve always the same relations. And this kind of science, with regard to the truth of it, we deemed more excellent than the other kinds.

Protarchus/ Entirely right.

Socrates/ In the first place, therefore, mixing together the purest parts of pleasure and of wisdom, when they have been thus distinguished from the less pure, if we view those purest parts of each in combination, are they not, thus combined, sufficient to furnish out, and present us with, an ample view of that life which is desirable? or is anything further, any ingredient of a different kind, wanting to perfect the composition?

Protarchus/ So as you propose, and only so, it seems to me necessary for us to do.

Socrates/ Let us, then, suppose a man to have in his mind the idea of justice itself, so as to know what it is in its own essence, and to be able to give an account of it in consequence of that knowledge. Let us also suppose him to have the like knowledge of all other beings.

Protarchus/ Be such a man supposed.

Socrates/ Will this man now sufficiently possess science by knowing the nature of the circle, and of the divine sphere itself; whilst he is ignorant of that sphere, and of those circles with which the eyes of men are conversant? Will that knowledge of his be sufficient for his use in building, and in other arts where lines and circles are to be drawn?

Protarchus/ Ridiculous we should call our condition here, O Socrates, if our knowledge were thus confined to things ideal and divine.

Socrates/ How do you say? Arts which are neither certain nor pure, using untrue rules, and conversant with untrue circles, are we to throw such arts into the composition, and mix them with the other ingredients?

Protarchus/ It is necessary for us; if, whenever we are anywhere abroad, we are desirous of finding our way home.

Socrates/ Are we to add music too? —an art which, not long since we said, is wanting in purity, as being full of conjecture and imitation?

Protarchus/ Of necessity we must, as it appears to me, if the life which we are to lead shall ever deserve to be called life, or be at all worth the having.

Socrates/ Would you, then, like a doorkeeper, when he is pushed and pressed by a throng of people, yield to them set the doors wide open, and suffer all the sciences to rush in, the less pure mingling themselves among the perfectly pure?

Protarchus/ I see not, O Socrates, for my part, how any man would be hurt by receiving all the other sciences, if he was already in possession of the firsts and highest.

Socrates/ I may safely then admit them all to come pouring in, like the torrents of water in that fine poetical simile of Homer's, rushing down into a valley from the mountains which surround it.

Protarchus/ By all means, let them be all admitted.

Socrates/ Let us now return to the vase of pleasure. For when we thought of mixing pleasure and knowledge together, the purer parts of pleasure did not present themselves immediately to our minds: but, from our affectionate regard to science, we suffered all kinds of it to crowd in before any of the pleasures.

Protarchus/ Very true.

Socrates/ It is now time for us to consult about the pleasures; whether we should let them all come thronging in, or whether we should admit those of the true sort first.

Protarchus/ It makes a great difference in point of safety, to let in, the first, such only as are true.

Socrates/ Let these, then, be admitted. But how shall we proceed? Must we not do, as we did with the several kinds

of science, admit as many pleasures also as are of the necessary sort?

Protarchus/ Without doubt, the necessary pleasures also, by all means.

Socrates/ But now, as we held it both base and advantageous in going through life to be acquainted with every art, —if we are of the same opinion with regard to pleasures, —if we hold it conducive to our good, and at the same time harmless, to enjoy every sort of pleasure in the course of our lives, —in this case, we are to intermix all sorts of pleasure with all the kinds of science.

Protarchus/ What say we then as to this point? and how ought we to act?

Socrates/ This question, O Protarchus, should not be put to us. But the pleasures themselves, and the other assembly also, that of the sciences and arts, are to be examined, each party concerning the other, in this manner.

Protarchus/ In what manner?

Socrates/ Friends, we shall say, [addressing our question to the pleasures first] whether we ought to call you pleasures, or whatever is your right name, would you choose to live in the same place with all kinds of wisdom, or to live without wisdom? To this interrogatory they must, I think, answer thus:

Protarchus/ How?

Socrates/ That seeing, as was said before, were wisdom and pleasure to be left, each of them alone, single, and destitute of aid, neither of them would have any virtue or power at all, nor would any advantage arise from either, —we deem it best that all the kinds of wisdom should dwell with us, one kind of wisdom with each of us, one who is suitable to the peculiar nature of its companion, and is perfectly acquainted with her power and influence.

Protarchus/ And well have you now answered, we shall say to them.

Socrates/ After this, we are to demand of wisdom and intellect, in the same manner, thus: —Have you any occasion for pleasures to be mixed among you? On the other side, we may suppose wisdom and intellect to interrogate us; and what sort of pleasures, they would perhaps say, is it that you mean?

Protarchus/ Probably they would.

Socrates/ And to this question of theirs our answer would be this: —Beside those true pleasures, we should say, do you further want the pleasures of the intense and exquisite kind to dwell with you? How is it possible, O Socrates, they would then perhaps say, that we should want these? These, who give a thousand hindrances to all our proceedings; and who, by their fury and madness, are always creating disturbance in the souls where we dwell; —those, who had they been there first, would never have suffered us to have admittance; and who entirely spoil our children, there born, by letting forgetfulness in upon them for want of care to guard the dwelling-place. But the other pleasures mentioned by you, the true and the pure, you are to know that they are nearly related to us, and belong to our family: and beside these, the pleasures who are accompanied by health and sobriety; such, also, as are the followers of all virtue, like the train of some Goddess, everywhere attending her; let all of these come and mix amongst us. But those pleasures who are always found in company with folly, and with all kinds of vice, it is very absurd for a man to mingle with intellect, —if he desires to see a mixture as clear, untroubled, and well-attempered as possible to be made; —and if he would from thence try to discover what the nature is of good, not only in man, but also in the universe; from which discovery some notion is to be gained, by a sort of divination, of what the

idea is of good itself. Shall we not say that intellect and science, in thus answering, have spoken prudently and confidently with themselves, pleading in their own cause, and at the same time in behalf of memory and right opinion?

Protarchus/ By all means ought we.

Socrates/ But in our mixture it is necessary to add this also; for without it no one thing could ever be.

Protarchus/ What is that?

Socrates/ Whatever has not truth mixed with it in the composing of it, can never be produced into true existence; or, could it be produced, it never can be lasting.

Protarchus/ How is it possible that it should?

Socrates/ Certainly no way. Now if anything further be yet wanting to perfect our composition, declare it, you and Philebus. For the mixture which we have now made in speculation, appears to me to have been as perfectly well composed as if it were some incorporeal world meant for the good government of an animated body.

Protarchus/ And be assured, O Socrates, that to me it has had the same appearance.

Socrates/ Might we not, then, rightly say, that we were now arrived at the dwelling-place of the good, and were standing in its vestibules?

Protarchus/ I think we might.

Socrates/ And now what should we deem to be the greatest excellence in the composition, and to be also the chief cause that such a mixture must be grateful to all? For when we shall have discerned what this is which is so grateful and so excellent, we shall then consider to which of the two, to pleasure or to intellect, it is related the most nearly, and familiar the most intimately, in the constitution of the universe.

Protarchus/ Right: it will be of the greatest service to us in determining this point.

Socrates/ And there is, indeed, no difficulty in discovering the cause, why some mixtures are most valuable, and others good for nothing.

Protarchus/ Explain your meaning.

Socrates/ No person is ignorant of this.

Protarchus/ Of what?

Socrates/ That in every mixture, whatever it be, and whatever be the quantity of it, if measure pervades it not, and if thence it obtains not symmetry and proportion, all the ingredients must of necessity be spoiled, besides the spoiling of the whole composition. For, in such a case, no one thing is really tempered by any other thing; but a confused and disorderly assemblage is made of various things jumbled together; which, like a concurrence of bad accidents in life, is a real misfortune to the persons who are to use it.

Protarchus/ It is very true.

Socrates/ The power of the good then is transferred, we find, into that province where dwells the nature of the beautiful. For everywhere, from measure and mediocrity, and from symmetry and proportion, arise beauty and virtue.

Protarchus/ Certainly so.

Socrates/ And we said before that truth also was an ingredient in the composition.

Protarchus/ We did.

Socrates/ If, then, we are not able to discover the nature of good itself in one single idea, —yet, taking it in three ideas together, in beauty, symmetry, and truth, we may conceive it as one thing; and most justly attributing to it the cause of whatever is graceful or agreeable in the composition, we may most truly say, that by means of this, as being good itself,

the whole proves to be such as it is, thus agreeable, and thus graceful.

Protarchus/ Most truly, indeed.

Socrates/ Now then, O Protarchus, any person may be a competent judge between pleasure and wisdom to decide, whether of the two is nearest allied to the supreme good, and of higher value than the other is, both to men and Gods.

Protarchus/ What the decision must be is clear. However, it is the better way to go through the recital of it in explicit words.

Socrates/ Each of those three, then, let us compare, severally, with pleasure, and again with intellect. For we are to see and determine whether of these two it is that each of those three is most congenial to, and to give sentence accordingly.

Protarchus/ Do you speak of beauty, and truth, and mediocrity?

Socrates/ I do. Now take, in the first place, O Protarchus, truth; and look at all the three together, intellect, truth, and pleasure: and after you have considered them a sufficient time, say whether, in your opinion, intellect, or whether pleasure, is nearer of kin to truth.

Protarchus/ What need is there of time to consider of this point? for, I presume, that very great is the difference between intellect and pleasure in this respect. Of all things in the world, pleasure is the most addicted to lying: and it is said, that in the pleasures of Venus, which seem to be the greatest, even perjury is pardoned by the Gods; it being supposed that pleasures, like children, have not the least intellect in them to know what they say. But intellect is either the same thing with truth, or it is of all things the most like to it, and the truest.

Socrates/ Next, then, consider mediocrity in the same manner; and say whether you think that pleasure possesses more of it than wisdom, or that wisdom possesses more of it than pleasure.

Protarchus/ This which you have now proposed for a subject of consideration is not less easy than the other. For there cannot, in my opinion, be found anything more immoderate in its nature than pleasure and extravagant joy; nor anything which has more of measure in it than intellect and science.

Socrates/ You have well said. But proceed further now to the third. Do you say that intellect partakes of beauty more than any species of pleasure partakes of it? and that intellect is more excellent than pleasure in this respect? or that the contrary is true?

Protarchus/ Did ever any man then, O Socrates, whether awake or dreaming, see or imagine wisdom and intellect, to be in any matter, or in any manner, unhandsome or unbecoming, whether in respecting on the past, or in perceiving the present, or in looking forward to the future?

Socrates/ Right.

Protarchus/ But whenever we see any person immersed in pleasures, in those pleasures too which are of all perhaps the greatest, —when we behold what a ridiculous figure the man makes in the very act of enjoying them. —or view what is of all spectacles the most unseemly, the consequence of his enjoyment, —we ourselves are ashamed; and all such things, as far as possible, we conceal, veiling them with night and darkness, as not being fit objects for the light to look on.

Socrates/ Everywhere then, O Protarchus, you will declare, speaking yourself to all persons about you, and publishing abroad by messengers, that the possession of pleasure is neither of supreme nor of secondary worth: but

that whatever is of all things the most excellent and valuable, is to be found in measure, in the moderate, and the seasonable, and in all things of that kind, whose nature and essence we ought to deem eternal.

Protarchus/ Their supreme excellence appears from what has been said and proved.

Socrates/ And that the next in value are symmetry and beauty, the perfect and the sufficient, and whatever else is congenial to these.

Protarchus/ So it seems.

Socrates/ In the third degree of excellence, if I divine aright, you would not greatly mistake the truth if you were to place intellect and wisdom.

Protarchus/ Perhaps I should not.

Socrates/ And is not the fourth rank due to those things which we assigned to the soul herself, as her own proper goods, sciences, and arts, and right opinions, a fourth order of goods, following next after the first three? ought we not here to place them if they are more nearly related to the good than they are to pleasure?

Protarchus/ Perhaps we ought.

Socrates/ Then follow, fifth in order, the pleasures of that sort which we described to be unmixed with pain, and denominated pure, such as those consequent to sensation, but belonging to the soul herself when she is engaged in the sciences.

Protarchus/ It may be so.

Socrates/

> With the sixth race——(says Orpheus)
> Close we the finish'd series of our song.

Our disquisition, too, seems to be now finished, and to close with passing our sixth sentence. After all this, nothing

remains for us to do but to affix a head, as it were, to the whole body of our inquiry.

Protarchus/ It is fit that we should.

Socrates/ Come, then: the third to the savior. Let us commemorate him whose aid brought the argument to a conclusion; calling him to witness the truth of it.

Protarchus/ Whom do you mean?

Socrates/ Philebus laid down this position: that the good was all and every kind of pleasure in full abundance.

Protarchus/ By commemorating the savior, it seems then, Socrates, you meant that we should resume the original argument of our inquiry.

Socrates/ Well: but let us observe what followed. I, viewing with dislike that position just now mentioned, —the tenet, not of Philebus only, but of thousands beside in all ages, —on the other hand asserted, that intellect was a thing far better and more beneficial to human life than pleasure.

Protarchus/ That was your position.

Socrates/ But then, suspecting that many other things had pretentions to the same character of being the good, I engaged, if something should appear better than both of those, to combat for the second prize, in behalf of intellect against pleasure; that pleasure, in her claim to so much as this, might be defeated.

Protarchus/ You did engage so to do.

Socrates/ Afterwards, on trial, it was very sufficiently proved that neither of our favorites answered the character of complete good.

Protarchus/ Perfectly true.

Socrates/ Intellect, therefore, and pleasure, were, both of them quite dismissed from having anything to do in the controversy concerning good itself; as each of them wanted

self-sufficience, and that power which attends the sufficient and perfect.

Protarchus/ Very right.

Socrates/ But after we had discovered a third thing preferable to either of those two, we found the nature of intellect to approach nearer to the nature of this conqueror, and to be much more familiar with this form than pleasure.

Protarchus/ We certainly did.

Socrates/ The sixth and lowest place, then, according to the judgment now given as the result of this inquiry, belongs to the power of pleasure unbounded.

Protarchus/ So it appears.

Socrates/ But the first place belongs to her, as bulls would say, and horses, and all beasts whatever of the savage kind: For it appears so from the manner in which they pursue pleasure. And on the credit of these animals, just as the judgment of diviners depends on the flight of birds, sentence is pronounced by the multitude, that pleasures have the greatest power in making our lives happy. For the loves and joys of brute animals they deem a stronger evidence, and fitter to be credited, than the sayings of men prophetically uttered in all places though inspiration of the philosophic muse.

Protarchus/ That you have said what is most agreeable to truth, O Socrates, we are, all of us, now agreed.

Socrates/ Now then you will dismiss me.

Protarchus/ There is a little, O Socrates, still remaining to be considered. For you must not quit the company before it breaks up: and I will put you in mind of what you have left unsaid.

THE END OF THE PHILEBUS.

Sisyphus.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

UPON TAKING COUNSEL.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and Sisyphus.

Socrates/ And we too waited a long time for you yesterday, Sisyphus, at the display made by Stratonicus, in order that you might, together with us, hear a clever man, who both by word and deed exhibited many and beautiful things; and when we thought you would no longer be present, we were by ourselves the hearers of the man.

Sisyphus/ Truly by Zeus. For a want of leisure of rather a compulsory kind occurred to me, so that I neglected the display. For our rulers had a consultation yesterday, and they compelled me to consult with them. Now with us Pharsalians it is a law to obey the rulers, should they order any of us to consult with them.

Socrates/ And honorable it is to obey the law and to be reputed by fellow-citizens to be a good counsellor, as you are reputed to be a good counsellor as one of the Pharsalians. But, Sisyphus, although I should not be able to enter upon a discussion against you on the subject of consulting correctly, conceiving it to be a work requiring much leisure, and a lengthy argument, still I would endeavor to converse with you first about consulting in the abstract, what it is. Can you then tell me what it is to consult in the abstract? Do not tell me what it is to do so well or ill or in any manner, but what kind of thing it is alone by itself. For you could well and easily tell, being so good a counsellor. But I fear lest it is a superfluous work for me to make of you the inquiry.

Sisyphus/ Is it then unknown to you what it is to consult?

Socrates/ It is, Sisyphus, to myself at least, if it be anything else than for a person, who does not know anything of those matters respecting which it is requisite to do some act, to speak like a diviner and off-handed, whatever may present itself, and to make a guess according to the same things for himself; like persons playing at odd and even, who, knowing nothing about the even and odd, which they hold in their own hands, nevertheless happen by accident to say what is true about the same things. To consult then is oftentimes a thing of this kind, that a person, although knowing nothing of the matters, about which he is consulting, yet happens by accident to say what is the truth. If then it is a thing of this kind, I know what to consult is; if however it is not a thing of this kind, I should not know it at all.

Sisyphus/ It is not of such a kind as not to know in reality anything at all, but to know partly something of the matter in hand, and partly not to know at all.

Socrates/ Do you mean that to consult is, by Zeus, a thing of this kind; that, as I seem to myself to divine somewhat your notions relating to the act of consulting well, it is the seeking to discover the best things for a person, to employ himself in for his own benefit, but not to know them clearly, but for this to be, as it were, in some form of a thought? Do you not mean somehow in this way.

Sisyphus/ I do.

Socrates/ Whether do men seek such things as they know, or such as they do not know?

Sisyphus/ Both.

Socrates/ Do you mean by this something of this kind, that men seek both what they know and what they do not know? just as if a person should know Callistratus, who he

is; but not know to find where he is, not who is Callistratus. Do you mean that to seek both is after this manner.

Sisyphus/ I do.

Socrates/ He then, who knows Callistratus, would not seek that matter, namely, to know him.

Sisyphus/ He would not.

Socrates/ But he would, where he might be.

Sisyphus/ It seems so to myself at least.

Socrates/ Nor would he seek even this, namely, where it was possible to find him, if he knew already; but he would find him forthwith.

Sisyphus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Men then do not seek the things, which they know, but, as it seems, what they do not know. But if this reasoning appears to you to be of a captious kind, and to have been spoken, not for the sake of a practical purpose, but for conversation merely, consider the matter in this way, if the case seems to be such as has been just now stated. Do you not know that this takes place in geometry? that by geometricians the diameter is not unknown, whether it be a diameter or not, —for this I well know is not sought to be discovered by them, —but how great it is in measurement in proportion to the sides of the space which it intersects? Is not this the very thing which is sought respecting it?

Sisyphus/ So it seems at least to me.

Socrates/ For it is that, which is unknown. Is it not so?

Sisyphus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Know you not that the doubling of the cube is sought to be discovered by geometricians, how great it is by calculation? But the cube itself is not sought for by them, whether it is a cube, or not; for that at least they know well. Is it not so?

Sisyphus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Respecting the air likewise, do you not know that Anaxagoras and Empedocles, and the rest of those, who talk about meteorology, are all seeking whether it is boundless or has a limit?

Sisyphus/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ But not the question, whether it is air. Is it not so?

Sisyphus/ It is.

Socrates/ Will you then agree with me that such is the case with all other things now that to no person is there any seeking after the things he knows, but rather after those which he does not know?

Sisyphus/ I will.

Socrates/ Did not the consulting appear to us to be this very thing, namely, that a person is seeking after the best things relating to what he would require to employ himself in for his own benefit.

Sisyphus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And the seeking was, like the consulting, about things to be done. Is it not so?

Sisyphus/ Entirely.

Socrates/ Must we not consider then at present, what impediment is in the way of those, who are seeking, to the discovery of the things, about which they are making the search?

Sisyphus/ So it seems at least to me.

Socrates/ Could we say that anything else was an impediment to them except a want of knowledge?

Sisyphus/ Nothing else.

Socrates/ Let us, by Zeus, consider the matter very much, letting out, as the saying is, every rope, and sending out

every voice. And view thou this point with me. Think you that a man could consult about music, who knows nothing of music; or how he ought to play on the guitar, or to perform anything according to the musician's art?

Sisyphus/ Not I indeed.

Socrates/ What then, as regards generalship, or piloting? Do you think that the person, who knows neither of those arts, would have it in his power to consult about either of those matters, as to what is to be done by him, and how, who knows not to act the general or pilot?

Sisyphus/ I do not.

Socrates/ Do you think then that the case is so respecting all other matters, of which a person knows nothing; that it is not possible for him even to consult, who knows nothing about them?

Sisyphus/ I do.

Socrates/ But it is possible for him to seek to know. Is it not?

Sisyphus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ To seek then would not be the same as to consult.

Sisyphus/ How could it?

Socrates/ Because to seek is surely applied to the matters, which a person does not know; but it seems to be not possible for a person to consult about those matters, of which he is ignorant. Or has not this been said correctly?

Sisyphus/ Very much so.

Socrates/ Ye were then yesterday seeking to discover what was best for the state; but ye did not know it. For if ye had known, ye would not surely have been seeking it, just as we do not seek anything amongst those which we know. Is it not so?

Sisyphus/ It is.

Socrates/ Whether does it seem to you, Sisyphus, if a person does not know, that he ought to seek or to learn?

Sisyphus/ To myself at least it seems, by Zeus, to learn.

Socrates/ And correctly does it seem so. But does it seem to you that he ought to learn rather than seek on this account, because a person would discover more quickly and easily, if he learnt from those, who know, than if he were to seek himself what he did not know? Or is it on some other account?

Sisyphus/ On no other than this.

Socrates/ Why did ye not then yesterday, disregarding the act of consulting about matters, of which ye knew nothing, and of seeking to do the best for the state, learn from some one of those, who did know, how ye might do the best for the state? But ye seem to me to have been sitting the whole of yesterday and speaking off-hand, and prophesying about matters, of which ye were ignorant, and neglecting to learn, both the rulers of the state and you together with them. But perhaps you will say that this has been played off by myself against you for the sake of a conversation merely, and it has not been proved to you seriously. Consider then, by Zeus, this question at least for the present with seriousness. If it were conceded that to consult is something, and not, as now discovered, to be nothing else than a knowledge according to conjecture, and a speaking off-hand, making use of merely a more solemn name, but nothing else, do you think, that as regards the act of consulting well and being good counsellors, persons differ one from another on that point, as persons differ one from another on all the other kinds of knowledge, such as carpenters from carpenters, physicians from physicians, and hautboy-players from hautboy-players, and all the rest of handicraftsmen differ from each

other? As then those engaged in these arts differ, think you that in the act of consulting persons would differ at all in this manner, one from another?

Sisyphus/ Yes I do.

Socrates/ Now tell me, do not all, both those who consult well, and those who do so ill, consult about matters that are about to be?

Sisyphus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Is the future anything else than what is not as yet?

Sisyphus/ It is not.

Socrates/ For if it were, it would not surely be still about to be, but it would be already. Is it not so?

Sisyphus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Therefore that, which is not yet, in reality has not been produced.

Sisyphus/ It has not.

Socrates/ Therefore that, which is not and has not been produced, has no existence in reality.

Sisyphus/ It has not.

Socrates/ Do not all, then, who consult well or ill, consult about things which neither are, nor have been, and which have no existence, when they consult respecting things about to be?

Sisyphus/ At least they seem so.

Socrates/ Does it seem to you possible for a person to hit well or ill a thing, that does not exist?

Sisyphus/ How say you this?

Socrates/ I will explain, what I mean to say. Consider then. How would you distinguish out of many archers, which of them was the good and which the bad?

Sisyphus/ Surely this is not difficult to know.

Socrates/ For perhaps you would bid them shoot at some mark. Is it not so?

Sisyphus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Would you not decide that he is the conqueror, who hits most often the mark in a direct way.

Sisyphus/ Yes, I would.

Socrates/ But if there were no mark laid down for them to shoot at, but each shot where he liked, how could you distinguish between the good and bad archer?

Sisyphus/ Not at all.

Socrates/ Would you then not be at a loss to distinguish between those consulting well or ill, if they did not know what they were consulting about?

Sisyphus/ Yes, I should.

Socrates/ Do not those then, who consult respecting things about to be, consult respecting things not in existence?

Sisyphus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ It is not therefore possible for any person to hit the thing not in existence. For how does anyone seem to you to be able to hit, what is not in existence?

Sisyphus/ Not at all. '

Socrates/ Since then it is not possible to hit, what is not in existence, no one would be able to hit anything of those not in existence by consulting. For things that are about to be belong to those not in existence. Is it not so?

Sisyphus/ So it seems at least to me.

Socrates/ He then, who does not hit things about to be, would be amongst men neither a good counsellor, nor a bad counselor.

Sisyphus/ It seems he would not.

Socrates/ Nor is a person said to be either a better counsellor, or a worse counsellor, not even if he should be more successful or less successful in hitting, what is not in existence.

Sisyphus/ He is not.

Socrates/ Looking then to what circumstance men call certain persons by the name of good counsellors, or bad counsellors, is it not worthy, Sisyphus, to think again upon this matter?

Sisyphus/ I say so.

Sisyphus

Translated by David Gallop.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Sisyphus

Socrates/ We waited a long time for you yesterday as well, Sisyphus, before Stratonicus' show, so that you could join us in hearing a real master giving a performance full of splendid material, both in theory and in practice; but after we gave up thinking you were coming, we went to hear the man by ourselves.

Sisyphus/ Yes, that's absolutely right—some business arose, you see, which was fairly urgent, so I couldn't ignore it. Our authorities were in conference yesterday, so they required me to join their deliberations; and if the authorities summon any of us to join their deliberations, we citizens of Pharsalus are legally bound to comply.

Socrates/ Well, it's a splendid thing to obey the law, and also to be considered a good deliberator by one's fellow citizens—as you yourself are considered to be one of the good deliberators in Pharsalus. Still, I'm not in a position to take issue with you about good deliberation, Sisyphus, at the moment; that, I think, would call for a lot of leisure and a long argument—but I'd like to propose a discussion with you about deliberation itself, first of all, about what it is.

What could deliberation itself be? Could you tell me that? —not how to do it well or badly or splendidly, but just what sort of thing deliberation itself is? Surely you could do that quite easily, being such a good deliberator yourself? I hope I'm not being too inquisitive by questioning you on the subject.

Sisyphus/ Can it really be that you don't know what deliberation is?

Socrates/ Indeed I don't, Sisyphus, at least if it differs at all from what's done by a man who lacks understanding on some matter calling for action, guessing his answer by divining or making it up: he says whatever comes into his head, just like people who play odds-and-evens; they have no idea, of course, whether they're holding an even or an odd number of things in their hands, yet when they say which it is, they hit upon the truth. Perhaps deliberation is also something like that: someone who has no understanding of what he's deliberating about is just lucky in what he says, and hits upon the truth. If it's something like that, then I do know roughly what deliberation is; but if it's not like that, then I don't understand it at all.

Sisyphus/ But surely, it's not like being utterly and completely ignorant of some matter, but like being familiar with part of it, while not yet understanding the rest.

Socrates/ Perhaps you mean that deliberation is—Heaven help me! I feel as if I'm almost divining your view about good deliberation—do you mean it's something like this? Someone is trying to find out what would be the best course of action to take, and doesn't yet clearly understand it, but is rather in the process of thought, as it were? Is that more or less what you mean?

Sisyphus/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Which do people try to find out—matters which they know, or ones which they don't know?

Sisyphus/ Both.

Socrates/ When you say that people try to find out both—things they do know as well as things they don't—perhaps you mean something like this: one might, for example, be acquainted with Callistratus—know who he was—yet not know where he was to be found. Is that what you mean by trying to find out both?

Sisyphus/ Yes, it is.

Socrates/ Now you wouldn't try to find out the former, knowing Callistratus, at least if you knew him?

Sisyphus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ But you might try to find out where he was.

Sisyphus/ Yes, I think you might.

Socrates/ Nor, again, would you try to discover where the man was to be found, if you knew that; in that case, you would go and find him right away, wouldn't you?

Sisyphus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Apparently, then, it isn't things which people know that they try to find out, but things they don't know.

But that argument may strike you as captious, Sisyphus, put forward not with a view to the truth of the matter, but merely as a debating point. If so, look at it this way, and see if you agree with what was just said. You know, don't you, what happens in geometry: the diagonal is unknown to geometers, yet there's no question whether it is or is not a diagonal—that's not what they're trying to find out at all—but rather, how long it is in relation to the sides of the areas it bisects. Isn't that what they're trying to find out about the diagonal?

Sisyphus/ I believe so.

Socrates/ And that is something unknown, isn't it?

Sisyphus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ Or again, take the doubling of the cube. You know, don't you, that geometers try to find out, by reasoning, how big it is? As for the cube itself, they don't try to find out whether it's a cube or not. That much they know, don't they?

Sisyphus/ Yes.

Socrates/ Or again, consider the upper air. You surely know that what Anaxagoras and Empedocles and all the rest

of the cosmologists are trying to find out is whether it's infinite or finite.

Sisyphus/ Yes.

Socrates/ But they don't ask whether it is air, do they now?

Sisyphus/ Of course not.

Socrates/ In all such cases, then, our conclusion is as follows: nobody can ever try to find out anything that he knows, only what he doesn't know. Would you agree with me about that?

Sisyphus/ I would.

Socrates/ Now isn't this what deliberation seemed to us to be—somebody trying to find out the best course to follow in matters requiring him to take action?

Sisyphus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we thought that deliberation was trying to find out something concerning practical matters, didn't we?

Sisyphus/ Yes, of course.

Socrates/ So now it's time for us to consider what it is that prevents people from finding out what they're trying to find out.

Sisyphus/ I think it is.

Socrates/ And what should we say it is that prevents them, if not incomprehension?

Sisyphus/ Let's look into it, for Heaven's sake.

Socrates/ Absolutely! —we must let out every reef, as they say, and raise full cry.

So now let's examine the following question together: do you think it's possible for a man to deliberate about music if he has no knowledge of music, and knows neither how to play the cithara nor how to perform any other kind of music?

Sisyphus/ No, I don't.

Socrates/ And what about military or nautical expertise? Would someone who knew neither of those subjects be able to deliberate at all about what he should do in either field? Would he be able to deliberate about how to command a force or captain a vessel if he lacked all knowledge of military or nautical matters?

Sisyphus/ No.

Socrates/ And would you expect the same to hold in all other fields? It is quite impossible for someone who doesn't understand something either to know or to deliberate about what he doesn't understand.

Sisyphus/ I agree.

Socrates/ But it is possible to try to find out what one doesn't know; isn't that right?

Sisyphus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ Then trying to find out can no longer be identified with deliberating.

Sisyphus/ Why not?

Socrates/ Because what one tries to find out is evidently something one doesn't know, whereas apparently no human being can deliberate about what he doesn't know. Wasn't that what we just said?

Sisyphus/ It certainly was.

Socrates/ And isn't that what you Pharsalians were doing yesterday, trying to find out the best things for your city to do, yet not knowing them? Because if you knew them, you surely wouldn't still have been trying to find them out—just as we don't try to find out anything else we already know, do we?

Sisyphus/ No, we don't.

Socrates/ And if one doesn't know something, Sisyphus, which do you think one should do: try to find it out or learn it?

Sisyphus/ Learn it, for Heaven's sake; that's what I think.

Socrates/ And there you're right. But tell me, is it for the following reason that you think one should learn it rather than try to find it out? One can discover it more quickly and easily by learning it from those who understand it, than by trying to find it out on one's own, when one doesn't know it. Or is there some other reason?

Sisyphus/ No, that is the reason.

Socrates/ Well then, why did you people take the trouble to deliberate yesterday on matters you don't understand, and try to find out the best course of action for the city to take? Why weren't you learning those things, rather, from someone who understands them, so that you could take the best course of action for the city? Instead, it seems to me that you spent the whole day yesterday sitting there, making things up and divining about matters you didn't understand, instead of taking the trouble to learn them—I mean those who govern your city, including you.

Perhaps you'll say that I've been jesting at your expense merely for the sake of having a discussion, but that you think nothing has been seriously proved. Yet you'll certainly have to take this next point seriously, Sisyphus. Suppose it be granted that there is such a thing as deliberation; suppose it does not, as was discovered just now, prove identical with sheer incomprehension, guesswork, or making things up, no different, but just using a grander name for it. In that case, don't you think there's a difference between some people and others with respect to deliberating well or being good deliberators, just as some people differ from others in all other areas of expertise—as, for example, some carpenters differ from others, or some doctors from others, or some pipers from others, or as tradesmen in general differ from one another? Just as those experts differ in their respective skills, don't you

think the same applies to deliberating—that there's a difference between some people and others?

Sisyphus/ Yes, I do.

Socrates/ Now tell me, don't all those who deliberate either well or badly deliberate about things that are going to exist in the future?

Sisyphus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what's in the future doesn't exist yet. Isn't that right?

Sisyphus/ Of course.

Socrates/ Because otherwise, presumably, it wouldn't still be going to exist in the future, but would exist already, wouldn't it?

Sisyphus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And if it doesn't exist yet, it hasn't yet come into being either.

Sisyphus/ No, it hasn't.

Socrates/ But if it hasn't even yet come into being, then it doesn't yet possess any nature of its own either, does it?

Sisyphus/ None at all.

Socrates/ Then those who deliberate well and those who do it badly are all deliberating about matters that neither exist nor have come into being nor possess any nature, whenever they deliberate about what's in the future. Isn't that right?

Sisyphus/ It does appear to be.

Socrates/ Now do you think it's possible for anyone to hit upon the nonexistent either well or badly?

Sisyphus/ What do you mean by that?

Socrates/ I'll show you what I'm suggesting. Consider a number of archers. How would you distinguish which of them was a good marksman and which was a poor one? That's not

hard to tell, is it? You would presumably ask them to aim at some target.

Sisyphus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And the one who most often succeeded in hitting the target you would judge the winner?

Sisyphus/ I would.

Socrates/ But if there were no target set up for them to aim at, and each just shot wherever he pleased, how could you distinguish between the good marksman and the poor one?

Sisyphus/ I couldn't.

Socrates/ And wouldn't you also be at a loss to distinguish good deliberators from bad ones, if they didn't understand what they were deliberating about?

Sisyphus/ I would.

Socrates/ And if those who deliberate are deliberating about matters in the future, they're deliberating about matters that don't exist, aren't they?

Sisyphus/ Absolutely.

Socrates/ And it's impossible, isn't it, for anyone to hit upon the nonexistent. How do you think anyone could ever hit upon what doesn't exist?

Sisyphus/ It can't be done.

Socrates/ And since it's impossible to hit upon the nonexistent, no one who's deliberating about the nonexistent could actually hit upon it. For the future is something that doesn't exist, isn't it?

Sisyphus/ So I believe.

Socrates/ Then since nobody can hit upon what's in the future, no human being can actually be good or bad at deliberation.

Sisyphus/ Apparently not.

Socrates/ Nor can one person be either a better or a worse deliberator than another, if one cannot, in fact, be more or less successful at hitting upon the nonexistent.

Sisyphus/ Indeed not.

Socrates/ So what standard could people possibly have in mind when they call certain people good or bad deliberators? Don't you think, Sisyphus, that it would be worth delving into this again some time?

The Timaeus of Plato

Translated by R. D. Archer-Hind, M.A. 1888

Persons of the Dialog:

Sokrates, Timaeus, Hermokrates, Kritias.

Socrates/ One, two, three—what is become of the fourth, my dear Timaeus, of our yesterday's guests and our entertainers of to-day?

Timaeus/ He has fallen sick, Sokrates: he would not willingly have been missing at this gathering.

Socrates/ Then it is for you and your companions, is it not, to fulfil the part of our absent friend?

Timaeus/ Unquestionably; and we will omit nothing that lies in our power. For indeed it would not be fair, seeing how well we were entertained by you yesterday, that the rest of us should not heartily requite you with a fitting return of hospitality.

Socrates/ Do you remember the extent and scope of the subjects I appointed for your discussion?

Timaeus/ In part we remember; and whatever we have forgotten, you are here to aid our memory. But I should prefer, if it is not troublesome, that you should briefly recapitulate them from beginning to end, that they may be more firmly fixed in our minds.

Socrates/ I will. The main subject of my discourse yesterday was a political constitution, and the kind of principles and citizens which seemed to me likely to render it most perfect.

Timaeus/ Yes, and what you said, Sokrates, was very much to the satisfaction of us all.

Socrates/ Was not our first step to separate the agricultural class and tradesmen in general from those who were to be the defenders of our state?

Timaeus/ It was.

Socrates/ And in assigning on natural principles but one single pursuit or craft which was suited to each citizen severally, we declared that those whose duty it was to fight on behalf of the community must be guardians only of the city, in case anyone whether without or within her walls should seek to injure her, and that they should give judgment mercifully to their subjects and natural friends, but show themselves stern to the enemies they met in battle.

Timaeus/ Quite true.

Socrates/ For we described, I think, a certain temperament which the souls of our guardians must possess, combining in a peculiar degree high spirit and thoughtfulness, that they might be able to show a due measure of mildness or sternness to friend or foe.

Timaeus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And what of their training? were they not to have been trained in gymnastic and music and all studies which are connected with these?

Timaeus/ Just so.

Socrates/ And those who had undergone this discipline, we said, must not consider that they have any private property in gold or silver or anything else whatsoever, but as auxiliaries drawing from those whom they preserved so much pay in return for their protection as was sufficient for temperate men, they were to spend it in common and pass their lives in company with one another, devoting themselves perpetually to the pursuit of virtue and relieved from all other occupations.

Timaeus/ That also is the way it was put.

Socrates/ Moreover with regard to women we observed that their natures must be brought into harmonious similarity with those of men, and that the same employments must be assigned to them all both in war and in their general mode of life.

Timaeus/ Yes, that was what we said.

Socrates/ And what were our rules concerning the procreation of children? This, I think, is easy of recollection because of the novelty of our scheme. We ordained that the rights of marriage and of children should be common to all, to the end that no one should ever know his own offspring, but that each should look upon all as his kindred, regarding as sisters and brethren all such as were between suitable limits of age, and those of the former and previous generations as parents and grandparents, and those after them as children and children's children.

Timaeus/ Yes, it is very easy to remember this too as you describe it.

Socrates/ Next with a view to securing immediately the utmost possible perfection in their natures, do we not remember that it was incumbent on the rulers of both sexes to make provision for the contraction of marriages by some secret mode of allotment, that to the good and bad separately might be allotted mates of their own kind, and so no ill-feeling should arise among them, supposing as they would that chance governed the allotment?

Timaeus/ We remember that.

Socrates/ And the offspring of the good we said must be reared, while that of the bad was to be secretly dispersed among the other classes of the state; and continually observing them as they grew up, the rulers were to restore to their rank such as were worthy, and in the places of those so promoted substitute the unworthy in their own rank.

Timaeus/ Quite so.

Socrates/ Have we now said enough for a summary recapitulation of yesterday's discourse? or do we feel that anything is lacking, my dear Timaeus, to our account?

Timaeus/ Not at all:- you have exactly described what was said, Sokrates.

Socrates/ Listen then and I will tell you in the next place what I feel about the constitution which we described. My feeling is something like this: suppose a man, on beholding beautiful creatures, whether the work of the painter or really alive but at rest, should conceive a desire to see them in motion and putting into active exercise the qualities which seemed to belong to their form—this is just what I feel about our city which we described: I would fain listen to one who depicted her engaged in a becoming manner with other countries in those struggles which cities must undergo, and going to war, and when at war showing a result worthy of her training and education, both when dealing in action and parleying in speech with other cities. Now, Kritias and Hermokrates, my own verdict upon myself is that I should never be capable of celebrating the city and her people according to their merit. So far as concerns me indeed, that is no marvel; but I have formed the same opinion about the poets, both past and present; not that I disparage the poetic race, but anyone can see that the imitative tribe will most easily and perfectly imitate the surroundings amid which they have been brought up, but that which lies outside the range of each man's experience is hard to imitate correctly in actions and yet harder in words. As to the class of sophists on the other hand, I have always held them to be well furnished with many fine discourses on other subjects; yet I am afraid, seeing they wander from city to city and have never had dwellings of their own to manage, they may somehow fall short in their conception of philosophers and

statesmen, as to what in time of war and battles they would do and say in their dealings and converse with divers people. One class then remains, those who share your habit of mind, having by nature and training a capacity for both philosophy and statecraft. Timaeus for instance, belonging to an admirably governed state, the Italian Lokris, and one of the foremost of its citizens in wealth and birth, has filled offices of the highest authority and honor in his native city, and has also in my judgment climbed to the topmost peak of all philosophy: while at Athens we all know that Kritias is no novice in any of the questions we are discussing: of Hermokrates too we must believe on the evidence of many witnesses that his genius and acquirements qualify him to deal with all such matters. This was in my mind yesterday when I willingly complied with your request that I should repeat the conversation concerning the ideal polity; for I knew that no men were more competent than you, if you were willing, to supply the sequel: no one else indeed at the present day could, after engaging our city in an honorable war, render her conduct worthy of her in all respects. So after saying all that was enjoined on me I in my turn enjoined upon you the task of which I now remind you. Accordingly you consulted together and agreed to entertain me at this time with a return 'feast of reason'. I am here then ready for it in festal array, and never was there a more eager guest.

Hermocrates/ Indeed, Sokrates, as Timaeus said, there will be no lack of zeal on our part, nor can we attempt to excuse ourselves from performing the task. In fact yesterday immediately on leaving this spot, when we reached the guest-chamber at the house of Kritias where we are staying, and even before that on our way thither, we were discussing this very matter. Kritias then told us a story from an old tradition, which you had better repeat now, Kritias, to

Sokrates, that he may help us to judge whether it will answer the purpose for our present task or not.

Critias/ So be it, if our third partner Timaeus agrees.

Timaeus/ I quite agree.

Critias/ Listen then, Sokrates, to a tale which, strange though it be, is yet perfectly true, as Solon, the wisest of the seven, once affirmed. He was a relation and dear friend of Dropides, my great-grandfather, as he says himself in many passages of his poems: and Dropides told my grandfather Kritias, who when advanced in life repeated it to us, that there were great and marvelous exploits achieved by Athens in days of old, which through lapse of time and the perishing of men have vanished from memory: and the greatest of all is one which it were fitting for us to narrate, and so at once discharge our debt of gratitude to you and worthily and truly extol the goddess in this her festival by a kind of hymn in her honor.

Socrates/ A good proposal. But what was this deed which Kritias described on the authority of Solon as actually performed of old by this city, though unrecorded in history?

Critias/ I will tell an ancient story that I heard from a man no longer young. For Kritias was then, as he said, hard upon ninety years of age, while I was about ten. It happened to be the 'children's day' of the Apaturia; and then as usual the boys enjoyed their customary pastime, our fathers giving us prizes for reciting poetry. A great deal of poetry by various authors was recited, and since that of Solon was new at the time, many of us children sang his poems. So one of the clansmen said, whether he really thought so or whether he wished to please Kritias, he considered that Solon was not only in other respects the wisest of mankind but also the noblest of all poets The old man—how well I recollect it—was extremely pleased and said smiling, Yes, Amynandros, if he

had not treated poetry merely as a by-work, but had made a serious business of it like the rest, and if he had finished the legend which he brought hither from Egypt, instead of being compelled to abandon it by the factions and other troubles which he found here on his return, my belief is that neither Hesiod nor Homer nor any other poet would have enjoyed greater fame than he. What was the legend, Kritias? asked Amynandros. It concerned a mighty achievement, he replied, and one that deserved to be the most famous in the world; a deed which our city actually performed, but owing to time and the destruction of the doers thereof the story has not lasted to our times. Tell us from the beginning, said the other, what was the tale that Solon told, and how and from whom he heard it as true.

There is in Egypt, said Kritias, in the Delta, at the apex of which the stream of the Nile divides, a province called the Saitic; and the chief city of this province is Sais, the birthplace of Amasis the king. The founder of their city is a goddess, whose name in the Egyptian tongue is Neith, and in Greek, as they aver, Athena: the people are great lovers of the Athenians and claim a certain kinship with our countrymen. Now when Solon travelled to this city he said he was most honorably entreated by the citizens; moreover when he questioned concerning ancient things such of the priests as were most versed therein, he found that neither he nor any other Grecian man, one might well-nigh say, knew aught about such matters. And once, when he wished to lead them on to talk of ancient times, he essayed to tell them of the oldest legends of Hellas, of Phoroneus who was called the first man, and of Niobe; and again he told the tale of Deukalion and Pyrrha, how they survived after the deluge, and he reckoned up their descendants, and tried, by calculating the periods, to count up the number of years that passed during the events he related. Then said one of the

priests, a man well stricken in years, O Solon, Solon, ye Greeks are ever children, and old man that is a Grecian is there none. And when Solon heard it, he said, What meanest thou by this? And the priest said, Ye are all young in your souls; for ye have not in them because of old tradition any ancient belief nor knowledge that is hoary with old. And the reason of it is this: many and manifold are the destructions of mankind that have been and shall be; the greatest are by fire and by water; but besides these there are lesser ones in countless other fashions. For indeed that tale that is also told among you, how that Phaethon, the child of the Sun, yoked his father's chariot, and for that he could not drive in his father's path, he burnt up all things upon earth and himself was smitten by a thunderbolt and slain—this story, as it is told, has the fashion of a fable; but the truth of it is a deviation of the bodies that move round the earth in the heavens, whereby comes at long intervals of time a destruction with much fire of the things that are upon earth. Thus do such as dwell on mountains and in high places and in dry perish more widely than they who live beside rivers and by the sea. Now the Nile, which is in all else our preserver, saves us then also from this distress by releasing his founts: but when the gods send a flood upon the earth, cleansing her with waters, those in the mountains are saved, the neatherds and shepherds, but the inhabitants of the cities in your land are swept by the rivers into the sea. But in this country neither then nor at any time does water fall from on high upon the fields, but contrariwise all rises up by nature from below. Wherefore and for which causes the legends preserved here are the most ancient that are told: but the truth is that in all places, where exceeding cold or heat does not forbid, there are ever human beings, now more, now fewer. Now whether at Athens or in Egypt, or in any other place whereof we have tidings, anything noble or

great or otherwise notable has occurred, we have all written down and preserved from ancient times in our temple here. But with you and other nations the commonwealth has only just been enriched with letters and all else that cities require: and again after the wonted term of years like a recurring sickness comes rushing on them the torrent from heaven; and it leaves only the unfettered and untaught among you, so that as it were ye become young again with a new birth, knowing naught of what happened in the ancient times either in our country or in yours. For instance the genealogies, Solon, which you just now recounted, concerning the people of your country, are little better than children's tales. For in the first place ye remember but one deluge, whereas there had been many before it; and moreover ye know not that the fairest and noblest race among mankind lived once in your country, whence ye sprang and all your city which now is, from a very little seed that of old was left over. Ye however know it not, because the survivors lived and died for many generations without utterance in writing. For once upon a time, Solon, far back beyond the greatest destruction by waters, that which is now the city of the Athenians was foremost both in war and in all besides, and her laws were exceedingly righteous above all cities. Her deeds and her government are said to have been the noblest among all under heaven whereof the report has come to our ears. And Solon said that on hearing this he was astonished, and used all urgency in entreating the priests to relate to him from beginning to end all about those ancient citizens. So the priest said, I grudge thee not, O Solon, and I will tell it for thy sake and for the sake of thy city, and chiefly for the honor of the goddess who was the possessor and nurse and instructress both of your city and of ours; for she founded yours earlier by a thousand years, having taken the seed of you from Earth and Hephaistos; and ours in later

time. And the date of our city's foundation is recorded in our sacred writings to be eight thousand years ago. But concerning the citizens of Athens nine thousand years ago I will inform you in brief of their laws and of the noblest of the deeds which they performed: the exact truth concerning everything we will examine in due order hereafter, taking the actual records at our leisure.

Consider now their laws in comparison with those of our country; for you will find here at the present day many examples of the laws which then existed among you: —first the separation of the priestly caste from the rest; next the distinction of the craftsmen, that each kind plies its own craft by itself and mingles not with another; and the class of shepherds and of hunters and of husbandmen are set apart; and that of the warriors too you have surely noticed is here sundered from all the other classes; for on them the law enjoins to study the art of war and naught else. Furthermore there is the fashion of their arming with spears and shields, wherewith we have been the first men in Asia to arm ourselves; for the goddess taught this to us, as she did first to you-in that country of yours. Again as regards knowledge, you see how careful our law is in its first principles, investigating the laws of nature till it arrives at divination and medicine, the object of which is health, drawing from these divine studies lessons useful for human needs, and adding to these all the sciences that are connected therewithal. With all this constitution and order the goddess established you when she founded your nation first; choosing out the spot in which ye were born because she saw that the mild temperament of its seasons would produce the highest intelligence in its people. Seeing then that the goddess was a lover of war and of wisdom, she selected the spot that should bring forth men likest to herself, and therein she first founded your race. Thus then did ye dwell

governed by such laws as I have described, ay and even better still, surpassing all men in excellence, as was meet for them that were offspring and nurslings of gods.

Many and mighty are the deeds of your city recorded here for the marvel of men; but one is there which for greatness and nobleness surpasses all the rest. For our chronicles tell what a power your city quelled of old, that marched in wanton insolence upon all Europe and Asia together; issuing yonder from the Atlantic ocean. For in those days the sea there could be crossed, since it had an island before the mouth of the strait which is called, as ye say, the pillars of Herakles. Now this island was greater than Libya and Asia together; and therefrom there was passage for the sea-farers of those times to the other islands, and from the islands to all the opposite continent which bounds that ocean truly named. For these regions that lie within the strait aforesaid seem to be but a bay having a narrow entrance; but the other is ocean verily, and the land surrounding it may with fullest truth and fitness be named a continent. In this island Atlantis arose a great and marvelous might of kings, ruling over all the island itself, and many other islands, and parts of the mainland; and besides these, of the lands east of the strait they governed Libya as far as Egypt, and Europe to the borders of Etruria. So all this power gathered itself together, and your country and ours and the whole region within the strait it sought with one single swoop to enslave. Then, O Solon, did the power of your city shine forth in all men's eyes glorious in valor and in strength. For being foremost upon earth in courage and the arts of war, sometimes she was leader of the Hellenes, sometimes she stood alone perforce, when the rest fell away from her; and after being brought into the uttermost perils, she vanquished the invaders and triumphed over them: and the nations that were not yet enslaved she preserved from slavery; while the rest of us who

dwell this side the pillars of Herakles, all did she set free with ungrudging hand. But in later time, after there had been exceeding great earthquakes and floods, there fell one day and night of destruction; and the warriors in your land all in one body were swallowed up by the earth, and in like manner did the island Atlantis sink beneath the sea and vanish away. Wherefore to this day the ocean there is impassable and unsearchable, being blocked by very shallow shoals, which the island caused as she settled down.

You have heard this brief statement, Sokrates, of what the ancient Kritias reported that he heard from Solon: and when you were speaking yesterday about the polity and the men whom you described, I was amazed as I called to mind the story I have just told you,- remarking how by some miraculous coincidence most of your account agreed unerringly with the description of Solon. I was unwilling however to say anything at the moment, for after so long a time my memory was at fault. I conceived therefore that I must not speak until I had thoroughly gone over the whole story by myself. Accordingly I was quick to accept the task you imposed on us yesterday, thinking that for the most arduous part of all such undertakings, I mean supplying a story fitly corresponding to our intentions, we should be fairly well provided. So then, as Hermokrates said, as soon as ever I departed hence yesterday, I began to repeat the legend to our friends as I remembered it; and when I got home I recovered nearly the whole of it by thinking it over at night. How true is the saying that what we learn in childhood has a wonderful hold on the memory. Of what I heard yesterday I know not if I could call to mind the whole: but though it is so very long since I heard this tale, I should be surprised if a single point in it has escaped me. It was with much boyish delight that I listened at the time, and the old man was glad to instruct me, (for I asked a great many

questions); so that it is indelibly fixed in my mind, like those encaustic pictures which cannot be effaced. And I narrated the story to the rest the first thing in the morning, that they might share my affluence of words. Now therefore, to return to the object of all our conversation, I am ready to speak, Sokrates, not only in general terms, but entering into details, as I heard it. The citizens and the city which you yesterday described to us as in a fable we will transfer to the sphere of reality and to our own country, and we will suppose that ancient Athens is your ideal commonwealth, and say that the citizens whom you imagined are those veritable forefathers of ours of whom the priest spoke. They will fit exactly, and there will be nothing discordant in saying that they were the men who lived in those days. And dividing the work between us we will all endeavor to render an appropriate fulfilment of your injunctions. So you must consider, Sokrates, whether this story of ours satisfies you, or whether we must look for another in its stead.

Socrates/ How could we change it for the better, Kritias? It is specially appropriate to this festival of the goddess, owing to its connexon with her; while the fact that it is no fictitious tale but a true history is surely a great point. How shall we find other such citizens if we relinquish these? It cannot be: so with Fortune's favor do you speak on, while I in requital for my discourse of yesterday have, in my turn the privilege of listening in silence.

Critias/ Now consider, Sokrates, how we proposed to distribute your entertainment. We resolved that Timaeus, who is the best astronomer among us, and who has most of all made it his business to understand universal nature, should speak first, beginning with the origin of the universe, and should end with the birth of mankind: and that I should follow, receiving from him mankind brought to being in theory, and from you a portion of them exceptionally

cultivated; and that in accordance with Solon's laws, no less than with his statement, I should introduce them before our tribunal and make them our fellow-citizens, as being the Athenians of bygone days, whom the declaration of the sacred writings has delivered from their oblivion; and thenceforward we shall speak as if their claim to Athenian citizenship were fairly established.

Socrates/ Ample and splendid indeed, it seems, will be the banquet of discourse which I am to receive in my turn. So it would seem to be your business to speak next, Timaeus, after you have duly invoked the gods.

Timaeus/ Yes indeed, Sokrates, that is what all do who possess the slightest share 'of judgment; at the outset of every work, great or small, they always call upon a god: and seeing that we are going to enter on a discussion of the universe, how far it is created or perchance uncreate, unless we are altogether beside ourselves, we must needs invoke the gods and goddesses and pray above all that our discourse may be pleasing in their sight, next that it may be consistent with itself. Let it suffice then thus to have called upon the gods; but we must call upon ourselves likewise to conduct the discourse in such a way that you will most readily comprehend me, and I shall most fully carry out my intentions in expounding the subject that is before us.

First then in my judgment this distinction must be made. What is that which is eternally and has no becoming, and again what is that which comes to be but is never? The one is comprehensible by thought with the aid of reason, ever changeless; the other opinable by opinion with the aid of reasonless sensation, becoming and perishing, never truly existent. Now all that comes to be must needs be brought into being by some cause: for it is impossible for anything without a cause to attain to birth. Of whatsoever thing then the Artificer, looking ever to the changeless and using that

as his model, works out the design and function, all that is so accomplished must needs be fair: but if he look to that which has come to be, using the created as his model, the work is not fair. Now as to the whole heaven or order of the universe—for whatsoever name is most acceptable to it, be it so named by us—we must first ask concerning it the question which lies at the outset of every inquiry, whether did it exist eternally, having no beginning of generation, or has it come into being, starting from some beginning? It has come into being: for it can be seen and felt and has body; and all such things are sensible, and sensible things, apprehensible by opinion with sensation, belong, as we saw, to becoming and creation. We say that what has come to be must be brought into being by some cause. Now the maker and father of this All it were a hard task to find, and having found him, it were impossible to declare him to all men. However we must again inquire concerning him, after which of the models did the framer of it fashion the universe, after the changeless and abiding, or after that which has come into being? If now this universe is fair and its Artificer good, it is plain that he looked to the eternal; but if—nay it may not even be uttered without impiety, —then it was to that which has come into being. Now it is manifest to everyone that he looked to the eternal: for the universe is fairest of all things that have come to be, and he is the most excellent of causes. And having come on this wise into being it has been created in the image of that which is comprehensible by reason and wisdom and changes never. Granting this, it must needs be that this universe is a likeness of something. Now it is all-important to make our beginning according to nature: and this affirmation must be laid down with regard to a likeness and its model, that the words must be akin to the subjects of which they are the interpreters: therefore of that which is abiding and sure and discoverable by the aid

of reason the words too must be abiding and unchanging, and so far as it lies in words to be incontrovertible and immovable, they must in no wise fall short of this; but those which deal with that which is made in the image of the former and which is a likeness must be likely and duly corresponding with their subject: as being is to becoming, so is truth to belief. If then, Sokrates, after so many men have said divers things concerning the gods and the generation of the universe, we should not prove able to render an account everywhere and in all respects consistent and accurate, let no one be surprised; but if we can produce one as probable as any other, we must be content, remembering that I who speak and you my judges are but men: so that on these subjects we should be satisfied with the probable story and seek nothing further.

Socrates/ Quite right, Timaeus; we must accept it exactly as you say. Your prelude is exceedingly welcome to us, so please proceed with the strain itself.

Timaeus/ Let us declare then for what cause nature and this All was framed by him that framed it. He was good, and in none that is good can there arise jealousy of aught at any time. So being far aloof from this, he desired that all things should be as like unto himself as possible. This is that most sovereign cause of nature and the universe which we shall most surely be right in accepting from men of understanding. For God desiring that all things should be good, and that, so far as this might be, there should be naught evil, having received all that is visible not in a state of rest, but moving without harmony or measure, brought it from its disorder into order, thinking that this was in all ways better than the other. Now it neither has been nor is permitted to the most perfect to do aught but what is most fair. Therefore he took thought and perceived that of all things which are by nature visible, no work that is without

reason will ever be fairer than that which has reason, setting whole against whole, and that without soul reason cannot dwell in anything. Because then he argued thus, in forming the universe he created reason in soul and soul in body, that he might be the maker of a work that was by nature most fair and perfect. In this way then we ought to affirm according to the probable account that this universe is a living creature in very truth possessing soul and reason by the providence of God.

Having attained thus far, we must go on to tell what follows: after the similitude of what animal its framer fashioned it. To none of these which naturally belong to the class of the partial must we deign to liken it: for nothing that is like to the imperfect could ever become fair; but that of which the other animals severally and in their kinds are portions, to this above all things we must declare that the universe is most like. For that comprehends and contains in itself all ideal animals, even as this universe contains us and all other creatures that have been formed to be visible. For since God desired to liken it most nearly to what is fairest of the objects of reason and in all respects perfect, he made it a single visible living being, containing within itself all animals that are by nature akin to it. Are we right then in affirming the universe to be one, or had it been more true to speak of a great and boundless number? One it must be, if it is to be created according to its pattern. For that which comprehends all ideal animals that are could never be a second in company of another: for there must again exist another animal comprehending them, whereof the two would be parts, and no longer to them but to that which comprehended them should we more truly affirm the universe to have been likened. To the end then that in its solitude this universe might be like the all-perfect animal, the maker made neither two universes nor an infinite

number; but as it has come into being, this universe one and only-begotten, so it is and shall be forever.

Now that which came into being must be material and such as can be seen and touched. Apart from fire nothing could ever become visible, nor without something solid could it be tangible, and solid cannot exist without earth: therefore did God when he set about to frame the body of the universe form it of fire and of earth. But it is not possible for two things to be fairly united without a third; for they need a bond between them which shall join them both. The best of bonds is that which makes itself and those which it binds as complete a unity as possible; and the nature of proportion is to accomplish this most perfectly. For when of any three numbers, whether expressing three or two dimensions, one is a mean term, so that as the first is to the middle, so is the middle to the last; and conversely as the last is to the middle, so is the middle to the first; then since the middle becomes first and last, and the last and the first both become middle, of necessity all will come to be the same, and being the same with one another all will be a unity. Now if the body of the universe were to have been made a plane surface having no thickness, one mean would have sufficed to unify itself and the extremes; but now since it behooved it to be solid, and since solids can never be united by one mean, but require two—God accordingly set air and water betwixt fire and earth, and making them as far as possible exactly proportional, so that fire is to air as air to water, and as air is to water, water is to earth, thus he compacted and constructed a universe visible and tangible. For these reasons and out of elements of this kind, four in number, the body of the universe was created, being brought into concord through proportion; and from these it derived friendship, so that coming to unity with itself it became indissoluble by any force save the will of him who joined it.

Now the making of the universe took up the whole bulk of each of these four elements. Of all fire and all water and air and earth its framer fashioned it, leaving over no part nor power without. Therein he had this intent: first that it might be a creature perfect to the utmost with all its parts perfect; next that it might be one, seeing that nothing was left over whereof another should be formed; furthermore that it might be free from age and sickness; for he reflected that when hot things and cold and all such as have strong powers gather round a composite body from without and fall unseasonably upon it, they undermine it, and bringing upon it sickness and age cause its decay. For such motives and reasons he fashioned it as one whole, with each of its parts whole in itself, so as to be perfect and free from age and sickness. And he assigned to it its proper and natural shape. To that which is to comprehend all animals in itself that shape seems proper which comprehends in itself all shapes that are. Wherefore he turned it of a rounded and spherical shape, having its bounding surface in all points at an equal distance from the center: this being the most perfect and regular shape; for he thought that a regular shape was infinitely fairer than an irregular. And all roundabout he finished off the outer surface perfectly smooth, for many reasons. It needed not eyes, for naught visible was left outside; nor hearing, for there was nothing to hear; and there was no surrounding air which made breathing needful. Nor must it have any organ whereby it should receive into itself its sustenance, and again reject that which was already digested; for nothing went forth of it nor entered in from anywhere; for there was nothing. For by design was it created to supply its own sustenance by its own wasting, and to have all its action and passion in itself and by itself: for its framer deemed that were it self-sufficing it would be far better than if it required aught else. And hands,

wherewith it had no need to grasp aught nor to defend itself against another, he thought not fit idly to bestow upon it, nor yet feet, nor in a word anything to serve as the means of movement. For he assigned it that motion which was proper to its bodily form, of all the seven that which most belongs to reason and intelligence. Wherefore turning it about uniformly in the same spot on its own axis, he made it to revolve round and round; but all the six motions he took away from it and left it without part in their wanderings. And since for this revolution there was no need of feet he made it without legs and without feet.

So the universal design of the ever-living God, that he planned for the God that was some time to be, made its surface smooth and even, everywhere equally distant from the center, a body whole and perfect out of perfect bodies. And God set soul in the midst thereof and spread her through all its body and even wrapped the body about with her from without, and he made it a sphere in a circle revolving, a universe one and alone; but for its excellence it was able to be company to itself and needed no other, being sufficient for itself as acquaintance and friend. For all these things then he created it a happy god.

But the soul was not made by God younger than the body, even as she comes later in this account we are essaying to give; for he would not when he had joined them together have suffered the elder to be governed by the younger: but we are far too prone to a casual and random habit of mind which shows itself in our speech. God made soul in birth and in excellence earlier and elder than body, to be its mistress and governor; and he framed her out of the following elements and in the following way. From the undivided and ever changeless substance and that which becomes divided in material bodies, of both these he mingled in the third place the form of Essence, in the midst between

the Same and the Other; and this he composed on such wise between the undivided and that which is in material bodies divided; and taking them, three in number, he blended them into one form, forcing the nature of the Other, hard as it was to mingle, into union with the Same. And mingling them with Essence and of the three making one, again he divided this into as many parts as was meet, each part mingled of Same and of Other and of Essence. And he began his dividing thus: first he took one portion from the whole; then he went on to take a portion double of this; and the third half as much again as the second and triple of the first; the fourth double of the second; the fifth three times the third; the sixth eight times the first, the seventh twenty-seven times the first. After that, he filled up the interval between the powers of two and of three by severing yet more from the original mass and placing it between them in such a manner that within each interval were two means, the first exceeding one extreme in the same proportion as it was exceeded by the other, the second by the same number exceeding the one as it was exceeded by the other. And whereas by these links there were formed in the original intervals new intervals of 3/2 and 4/3 and 9/8, he went on to fill up all the intervals of 4/3 with that of 9/8, leaving in each a fraction over; and the terms of the interval forming this fraction are in the numerical proportion of 256 to 243. By this time the mixture, whence he cut off these portions, was all used up. Next he cleft the structure so formed lengthwise into two halves, and laying the two so as to meet in the center in the shape of the letter X, he bent them into a circle and joined them, causing them to meet themselves and each other at a point opposite to that of their original contact: and he comprehended them in the motion that revolves uniformly on the same axis, and one of the circles he made exterior and one interior. The exterior motion he named the motion

of the Same, the interior that of the Other. And the circle of the Same he made revolve to the right by way of the side, that of the Other to the left by way of the diagonal. And he gave the supremacy to the motion of the same and uniform, for he left that single and undivided; but the inner circle he cleft into seven unequal circles in the proportion of the double and triple intervals severally, each being three in number; and he appointed that the circles should move in opposite directions, three at the same speed, the other four differing in speed from the three and among themselves, yet moving in a due ratio.

Now after that the framing of the soul was finished to the mind of him that framed her, next he fashioned within her all that is bodily, and he drew them together and fitted them middle to middle. And from the midst even unto the ends of heaven she was woven in everywhere and encompassed it around from without, and having her movement in herself she began a divine beginning of endless and reasonable life forever and ever more. Now the body of the universe has been created visible; but she is invisible, and she, even soul, has part in reason and in harmony. And whereas she is made by the best of all whereunto belong reason and eternal being, so she is the best of all that is brought into being. Therefore since she is formed of the nature of Same and of Other and of Being, of these three portions blended, in due proportion divided and bound together, and turns about and returns into herself, whenever she touches aught that has manifold existence or aught that has undivided, she is stirred through all her substance, and she tells that wherewith the thing is same and that wherefrom it is different, and in what relation or place or manner or time it comes to pass both in the region of the changing and in the region of the changeless that each thing affects another and is affected. This word of hers is true alike, whether it deal

with Same or with Other, without voice or sound in the Self-moved arising; and when she is busied with the sensible, and the Circle of the Other, being true, announces it throughout all the soul, then are formed sure opinions and true beliefs; and when she is busy with the rational, and the circle of the Same declares it, running smoothly, then 'reason and knowledge cannot but be made perfect. And in whatsoever existing thing these two are found, if a man affirm it is aught but soul, what he says will be anything rather than the truth.

And when the father who begat it perceived the created image of the eternal gods, that it had motion and life, he rejoiced and was well pleased; and he bethought him to make it yet more nearly like its pattern. Now whereas that is a living being eternally existent, even so he essayed to make this All the like to the best of his power. Now so it was that the nature of the ideal was eternal. But to bestow this attribute altogether upon a created thing was impossible; so he bethought him to make a moving image of eternity, and while he was ordering the universe he made of eternity that abides in unity an eternal image moving according to number, even that which we have named time. For whereas days and nights and months and years were not before the universe was created, he then devised the generation of them along with the fashioning of the universe. Now all these are portions of time, and *was* and *shall be* are forms of time that have come to be, although we wrongly ascribe them unawares to the eternal essence. For we say that it was and is and shall be, but in verity is alone belongs to it: and was and shall be it is meet should be applied only to Becoming which moves in time; for these are motions. But that which is ever changeless without motion must not become elder or younger in time, neither must it have become so in the past nor be so in the future; nor has it to do with any attributes

that Becoming attaches to the moving objects of sense: these have come into being as forms of time, which is the image of eternity and revolves according to number. Moreover we say that the become *is* the become, and the becoming *is* the becoming, and that which shall become is that which shall become, and not-being-*is* not-being. In all this we speak incorrectly. But concerning these things the present were perchance not the right season to inquire particularly.

Time then has come into being along with the universe, that being generated together, together they may be dissolved, should a dissolution of them ever come to pass; and it was made after the pattern of the eternal nature, that it might be as like to it as was possible. For the pattern is existent for all eternity; but the copy has been and is and shall be throughout all time continually. So then this was the plan and intent of God for the generation of time; the sun and the moon and five other stars which have the name of planets have been created for defining and preserving the numbers of time. And when God had made their several bodies, he set them in the orbits wherein the revolution of the Other was moving, in seven circles seven stars. The moon he placed in that nearest the earth, and in the second above the earth he set the sun; and the morning-star and that which is held sacred to Hermes he assigned to those that moved in an orbit having equal speed with the sun, but having a contrary tendency: wherefore the sun and Hermes and the morning star in like manner overtake and are overtaken one by another. And as to the rest, were we to set forth all the orbits wherein he put them and the causes wherefore he did so, the account, though only by the way, would lay on us a heavier task than that which was our chief object in giving it. These things perhaps may hereafter, when we have leisure, find a fitting exposition.

But when each of the beings which were to join in creating time had arrived in its proper orbit, and had been generated as animate creatures, their bodies secured with living bonds, and had learnt their appointed task; then in the motion of the Other, which was slanting and crossed the motion of the Same and was thereby controlled, whereas one of these planets had a larger, another a smaller circuit, the lesser orbit was completed more swiftly, the larger more slowly: but because of the motion of the Same those which revolved most swiftly seemed to be overtaken by those that went more slowly, though really they overtook them. For the motion of the Same, twisting all their circles into spirals, because they have a separate and simultaneous motion in the opposite way, being of all the swiftest displays closest to itself that which departs most slowly from it. And that there might be some clear measure of the relative swiftness and slowness with which they moved in their eight revolutions, God kindled a light in the second orbit from the earth, which we now have named the sun, in order that it might shine most brightly to the ends of heaven, and that living things, so many as was meet, should possess number, learning it from the motion of the same and uniform. Night then and day have been created in this manner and for these causes; and this is one revolution of the undivided and most intelligent circuit; and a month is fulfilled when the moon, after completing her own orbit, overtakes the sun; a year, when the sun has completed his own course. But the courses of the others men have not taken into account, save a few out of many; and they neither give them names nor measure them against one another, comparing them by means of numbers—nay I may say they do not know that time arises from the wanderings of these, which are incalculable in multitude and marvelously intricate. None the less however can we observe that the perfect number of time fulfils the

perfect year at the moment when the relative swiftnesses of all the eight revolutions accomplish their course together and reach their starting-point, being measured by-the circle of the same and uniformly moving. In this way then and for these causes were created all such of the stars as wander through the heavens and turn about therein, in order that this universe may be most like to the perfect and ideal animal by its assimilation to the eternal being.

Now up to the generation of time all else had been accomplished in the likeness of that whereunto it was likened: but in that it did not yet contain all living creatures created within it, herein it was still unlike. So he went on to complete this that remained unfinished, molding it after the nature of the pattern. So many forms then as Mind perceived to exist in the ideal animal, according to their variety and multitude, such kinds and such a number did he think fit that this universe should possess. These are fourfold: first the race of the heavenly gods, next the winged tribe whose path is in the air, third whatso dwells in the water, and fourth that which goes upon dry land. The visible form of the deities he created chiefly of fire, that it might be most radiant and most fair to behold; and likening it to the All he shaped it like a sphere and assigned it to the intelligence of the supreme to follow after it; and he disposed it throughout all the firmament of heaven, to be an adornment of it in very truth, wrought cunningly over the whole expanse. And he bestowed two movements upon each, one in the same spot and uniform, whereby it should be ever constant to its own thoughts concerning the same thing; the other forward, but controlled by the revolution of the same and uniform: but for the other five movements he made it motionless and still, that each star might attain the highest completeness of perfection. From which cause have been created all the stars that wander not but abide fast forever, living beings divine

and eternal and in one spot revolving: while those that move in a circle and wander as aforesaid have come into being on those principles which in the foregoing we have declared.

And the earth our foster-mother, that is' globed round the axis stretched from pole to pole of the universe, her he fashioned to be the guardian and creator of night and day, the first and most august of the gods that have been created within the heavens. But the circlings of them and their crossings one of another, and the manner of the returning of their orbits upon themselves and their approximations, and which of the deities meet in their conjunctions and which are in opposition, and how they pass before and behind each other, and at what times they are hidden from us and again reappearing send to them who cannot calculate their motions panics and portents of things to come—to declare all this without visible illustrations of their very movements were labor lost. So let thus much suffice on this head and let our exposition concerning the nature of the gods visible and created be brought to an end.

But concerning the other divinities, to declare and determine their generation were a task too mighty for us: therefore we must trust in those who have revealed it heretofore, seeing that they are offspring, as they said, of gods, and without doubt know their own forefathers. We cannot then mistrust the children of gods, though they speak without probable or inevitable demonstrations; but since they profess to announce what pertains to their own kindred, we must conform to usage and believe them. Let us then accept on their word this account of the generation of these gods. Of Earth and Heaven were born children, Okeanos and Tethys; of these Phorkys and Kronos and Rhea and all their brethren: and of Kronos and Rhea, Zeus and Hera and all whom we know to be called their brothers; and they in their turn had children after them.

Now when all the gods had come to birth, both those who revolve before our eyes and those who reveal themselves in so far as they will, he who begat this universe spoke to them these words: Gods of gods, whose creator am I and father of works, which by me coming into being are indissoluble save by my will: Behold, all which hath been fastened may be loosed, yet to loose that which is well fitted and in good case were the will of an evil one. Wherefore, forasmuch as ye have come into being, immortal ye are not, nor indissoluble altogether; nevertheless shall ye not be loosed nor meet with the doom of death, having found in my will a bond yet mightier and more sovereign than those that ye were bound withal when ye came into being. Now therefore hearken to the word that I declare unto you. Three kinds of mortal beings are yet uncreate. And if these be not created, the heaven will be imperfect; for it will not have within it all kinds of living things; yet these it must have, if it is to be perfect. But if these were created by my hands and from me received their life, they would be equal to gods. Therefore in order that they may be mortal, and that this All may be truly all, turn ye according to nature unto the creation of living things, imitating my power that was put forth in the generation of you. Now such part of them as is worthy to share the name of the immortals, which is called divine and governs in the souls of those that are willing ever to follow after justice and after you, this I, having sown and provided it, will deliver unto you: and ye for the rest, weaving the mortal with the immortal, shall create living beings and bring them to birth, and giving them sustenance shall ye increase them, and when they perish receive them back again.

Thus spoke he; and again into the same bowl wherein he mingled and blended the universal soul he poured what was left of the former, mingling it somewhat after the same

manner, yet no longer so pure as before but second and third in pureness. And when he had compounded the whole, he portioned off souls equal in number to the stars and distributed a soul to each star, and setting them in the stars as though in a chariot, he shewed them the nature of the universe and declared to them its fated laws; how that the first incarnation should be ordained to be the same for all, that none might suffer disadvantage at his hands; and how they must be sown into the instruments of time, each into that which was meet for it, and be born as the most god-fearing of all living creatures; and whereas human nature was twofold, the stronger was that race which should hereafter be called man. When therefore they should be of necessity implanted in bodily forms, and of their bodies something should ever be coming in and other passing away, in the first place they must needs all have innate one and the same faculty of sense, arising from forcible affections; next love mingled with pleasure and pain; and besides these fear and wrath and all the feelings that accompany these and such as are of a contrary nature: and should they master these passions, they would live in righteousness; if otherwise, in unrighteousness. And he who lived well throughout his allotted time should be conveyed once more to a habitation in his kindred star, and there should enjoy a blissful and congenial life: but failing of this, he should pass in the second incarnation into the nature of a woman; and if in this condition he still would not turn from the evil of his ways, then, according to the manner of his wickedness, he should ever be changed into the nature of some beast in such form of incarnation as fitted his disposition, and should not rest from the weariness of these transformations, until by following the revolution that is within him of the same and uniform, he should overcome by reason all that burden that afterwards clung around him of fire and water

and air and earth, a troublous and senseless mass, and should return once more to the form of his first and best nature.

And when he had ordained all these things for them, to the end that he might be guiltless of all the evil that should be in each of them, God sowed some in the earth, some in the moon, and some in the other instruments of time. And what came after the sowing he gave into the hands of the young gods, to mold, mortal bodies, and having wrought all the residue of human soul that needed yet to be added, to govern and guide as nobly and perfectly as they could the mortal creature, in so far as it brought not evil upon its own head.

So when he had made all these ordinances for them God was abiding after the manner of his own nature: and as he so abode, the children thinking on the command of their father were obedient to it, and having received the immortal principle of a mortal creature, imitating their own artificer, they borrowed from the universe portions of fire and of earth and of water and of air, on condition that they should be returned again, and they cemented together what they took, not with the indissoluble bonds wherewithal they themselves were held together, but welding it with many rivets, invisible for smallness, and making of all the elements one body for each creature, they confined the revolutions of the immortal soul in a body in flowing and out-flowing continually. And they, being confined in a great river, neither controlled it nor were controlled, but bore and were borne violently to and fro; so that the whole creature moved, but advanced at random without order or method, having all the six motions: for they moved forward and backward and again to right and to left and downward and upward, and in every way went straying in the six directions. For great as was the tide sweeping over them and flowing off which brought them

sustenance, a yet greater tumult was caused by the effects of the bodies that struck against them; as when the body of anyone came in contact with some alien fire that met it from without, or with solid earth, or with liquid glidings of water, or if he were caught in a tempest of winds borne on the air, and so the motions from all these elements rushing through the body penetrated to the soul. This is in fact the reason why these have all alike been called and still are called sensations (αισθησεις). Then too did they produce the most wide and vehement agitation for the time being, joining with the perpetually streaming current in stirring and violently shaking the revolutions of the soul, so that they altogether hindered the circle of the Same by flowing contrary to it, and they stopped it from governing and from going; while the circle of the Other they displaced, so that the double and triple intervals, being three of each sort, and the means and junctures of 3/2 and 4/3 and 9/8, since they could not be utterly undone save by him that joined them, were forced by them to turn in all kinds of ways and to admit all manner of breaking and twisting of the circles, in every possible form, so that they can barely hold to one another, and though they are in motion, it is motion without law, sometimes reversed, now slanting, and now inverted. It is as though a man should stand on his head, resting it on the earth and supporting his feet against something aloft; in this case the man in such condition and the spectators would reciprocally see right and left reversed in the persons of each other. The same and similar effects are produced with great intensity in the soul's revolutions: and when from external objects there meets them anything that belongs to the class of the Same or to that of the Other, then they declare its relative sameness or difference quite contrariwise to the truth, and show themselves false and irrational; and no circuit is governor or leader in them at that time. And whenever

sensations from without rushing up and falling upon them drag along with them the whole vessel of the soul, then the circuits seem to govern though they really are governed. On account then of all these experiences the soul is at first bereft of reason, now as in the beginning, when she is confined in a mortal body. But when the stream of growth and nutriment flows in with smaller volume, and the revolutions calming down go their own way and become settled as time passes on, then the orbits are reduced to the form that belongs to the several circles in their natural motion, and declaring accurately the Other and the Same, they set their possessor in the way to become rational. And if any just discipline of education help this process, he becomes whole altogether without a blemish, having made his escape from the most grievous of plagues; but if he neglect it, he passes the days of his life halt and maimed, and unhallowed and unreasonable he comes again to Hades. These things however belong to a later time: we must discuss more exactly the subject immediately before us. And as to the matters which are previous to this, concerning the generation of the body in all its parts and concerning soul, and the reasons and designs of the gods whereby they have come into being, we must cling to the most probable theory, and by proceeding in this way so give an account of all.

Imitating the shape of the universe, which was spherical, they confined the two divine revolutions in a globe-shaped body, the same that we now call the head, which is the divinest part of us and has dominion over all our members. To this the gods gave the whole body, when they had put it together, to minister to it, reflecting that it possessed all the motions that should be. In order then that it might not have to roll upon the earth, which has hills and hollows of all kinds, nor be at a loss to surmount the one and climb out of the other, they gave it the body for a conveyance and for ease

of going: whence the body was endowed with length and grew four limbs that could be stretched and bent, which the god devised for it to go withal, and by means of which clinging and supporting itself it is enabled to pass through every place, bearing at the top of us the habitation of the most divine and sacred element. In this way then and for these reasons were legs and hands added to all mankind; and the gods, deeming that the front was more honorable than the back and more fit to lead, made us to move for the most part in this direction. So it behooved man to have the front part distinguished and unlike the back. Therefore having set the face upon the globe of the head on that side, they attached to it organs for all the forethought of the soul, and they ordained that this which had the faculty of guidance should be by nature the front. And first of the organs they wrought light-giving eyes, which they fixed there on the plan I shall explain. Such sort of fire as had the property of yielding a gentle light but not of burning, they contrived to form into a substance akin to the light of every day. The fire within us, which is akin to the daylight, they made to flow pure smooth and dense through the eyes, having made close the whole fabric of the eyes and especially the pupils, so that they kept back all that was coarser and suffered only this to filter through unmixed and pure. Whenever then there is daylight surrounding the current of vision, then this issues forth as like into like, and coalescing with the light is formed into one uniform substance in the direct line of vision, wherever the stream issuing from within strikes upon some external object that falls in its way. So the whole from its uniformity becomes sympathetic; and whenever it comes in contact with anything else, or anything with it, it passes on the motions thereof over the whole body until they reach the soul, and thus causes that sensation which we call seeing. But when its kindred fire departs into night, the visual

current is cut off: for issuing into an alien element it is itself changed and quenched, having no longer a common nature with the surrounding air, which has in it no fire. Therefore it ceases from seeing and moreover becomes an allurement to sleep. For the gods had devised as a safeguard of the sight the structure of the eyelids; and when these are closed, they shut up the force of fire within; and this smoothes and calms the motions within; and when these are calmed, quiet ensues. And if the quiet is profound, sleep with few dreams falls on us; but if some of the stronger motions are left, according to their nature and the places where they remain, they engender visions corresponding in kind and in number; which are images within us, and when we awake are remembered as outside us. Now the explanation of reflections in mirrors and all bright smooth surfaces is no longer hard to discern. For because of the communion of the internal and external fire, which again is united on the smooth surface and in manifold ways deflected, all these reflections take place; the fire that belongs to the face coalescing with the fire of the visual current upon the surface of the smooth bright object. And left appears right and right left, because mutually opposite particles of the visual current and of the object seen come into contact, contrary to the wonted mode of collision. On the other hand right appears as right and left as left, when in the act of combination with that wherewith it combines the ray changes sides. This happens when the smooth surface of the mirror is curved upwards on each side and so throws the right portion of the visual current to the left side and the converse. But if it is turned lengthwise to the face, it makes this same reflection appear completely upside down, thrusting the lower portion of the ray to the upper end and the upper to the lower.

All these things are among the secondary causes which God uses to serve him in carrying out the idea of the best so far as is possible. But the multitude regard them not as secondary but as primary causes, which act by cooling and heating, condensing and rarefying, and all such processes. Yet they are incapable of all reason or thought for any purpose. For the only existing thing to which belongs the possession of reason we must affirm to be soul: and this is invisible, whereas fire and water and air and earth are all visible creations. Now the lover of reason and knowledge must first seek for the causes which belong to the rational order; and only in the second place those which belong to the class of things which are moved by others and move others in turn. This then is what we must also do: we must declare both classes of causes, distinguishing between those which with the aid of reason are the creators of fair things and good, and those which being destitute of reason produce from time to time chance effects without design. Enough then of the auxiliary causes which combine in giving the eyes the power they now possess; but the great result, for the sake of which God bestowed them on us, must be our next theme. Sight, according to my judgment, has been the cause of the greatest blessing to us, inasmuch as of our present discourse concerning the universe not one word would have been uttered had we never seen the stars and the sun and the heavens. But now day and night, being seen of us, and months and the revolution of the years have created number, and they gave us the notion of time and the power of searching into the nature of the All; whence we have derived philosophy, than which no greater good has come neither shall come hereafter as the gift of heaven to mortal man. This I declare to be the chiefest blessing due to the eyes: on the rest that are meaner why should we descant? let him who loves not wisdom, if he be blinded of these,

lament with idle moan. But on our part let this be affirmed to be the cause of vision, for these ends: God discovered and bestowed sight upon us in order that we might observe the orbits of reason which are in heaven and make use of them for the revolutions of thought in our own souls, which are akin to them, the troubled to the serene; and that learning them and acquiring natural truth of reasoning we might imitate the divine movements that are ever unerring and bring into order those within us which are all astray. And of sound and hearing again the same account must be given: to the same ends and with the same intent they have been bestowed on us by the gods. For not only has speech been appointed for this same purpose, whereto it contributes the largest share, but all such music as is expressed in sound has been granted, for the sake of harmony: and harmony, having her motions akin to the revolutions in our own souls, has been bestowed by the Muses on him who with reason seeks their help, not for any senseless pleasure, such as is now supposed to be its chiefest use, but as an ally against the discord which has grown up in the revolution of our soul, to bring her into order and into unison with herself: and rhythm too, because our habit of mind is mostly so faulty of measure and lacking in grace, is a succor bestowed on us by the same givers for the same ends.

Now in our foregoing discourse, with few exceptions, we have been declaring the creations wrought through mind: we must now set by their side those things which come into being through necessity. For the generation of this universe was a mixed creation by a combination of necessity and reason. And whereas reason governed necessity, by persuading her to guide the greatest part of created things to the best end, on such conditions and principles, through necessity overcome by reasonable persuasion, this universe was fashioned in the beginning. If then we would really

declare its creation in the manner whereby it has come to be, we must add also the nature of the Errant Cause, and its moving power. Thus then let us return upon our steps, and when we have found a second fitting cause for the things aforesaid, let us once more, proceeding in the present case as we did in the former, begin over again from the beginning. Now we must examine what came before the creation of the heavens, the very origin of fire and water and air and earth, and the conditions that were before them. For now no one has declared the manner of their generation; but we speak as if men knew what is fire and each of the others, and we treat them as beginnings, as elements of the whole; whereas by one who has ever so little intelligence they could not plausibly be represented as belonging even to the class of syllables. Now however let our say thus be said. The first principle or principles or whatever we may hold it to be which underlies all things we must not declare at present, for no other reason but that it is difficult according to the present method of our exposition to make clear our opinion. You must not then deem that I ought to discourse of this, nor could I persuade myself that I should be right in essaying so mighty a task. But holding fast the principle we laid down at the outset, the value of a probable account, I will strive to give an explanation that is no less probable than another, but more so; returning back to describe from the beginning each and all things. So now again at the outset of our quest let us call upon God to pilot us safe through a strange and unfamiliar discourse to the haven of probability; and thus let us begin once more.

Our new exposition of the universe then must be founded on a fuller classification than the former. Then we distinguished two forms, but now a third kind must be disclosed. The two were indeed enough for our former discussion, when we laid down one form as the pattern,

intelligible and changeless, the second as a copy of the pattern, which comes into being and is visible. A third we did not then distinguish, deeming that the two would suffice: but now, it seems, by constraint of our discourse we must try to express and make manifest a form obscure and dim. What power then must we conceive that nature has given it? something like this. It is the receptacle, and as it were the nurse, of all becoming. This saying is true, but we must put it in clearer language: and this is hard; especially as for the sake of it we must needs inquire into fire and the substances that rank with fire. For it is hard to say which of all these we ought to call water any more than fire, or indeed which we ought to call by any given name, rather than all and each severally, in such a way as to employ any truthful and trustworthy mode of speech. How then are we to deal with this point, and what is the question that we should properly raise concerning it? In the first place, what we now have named water, by condensation, as we suppose, we see turning to stones and earth; and by rarefying and expanding this same element becomes wind and air; and air when inflamed becomes fire: and conversely fire contracted and quenched returns again to the form of air; also air concentrating and condensing becomes cloud and mist; and from these yet further compressed comes flowing water; and from water earth and stones once more: and so, it appears, they hand on one to another the cycle of generation. Thus then since these several bodies never assume one constant form, which of them can we positively affirm to be really this and not another without being shamed in our own eyes? It cannot be: it is far the safest course when we make a statement concerning them to speak as follows. What we see in process of perpetual transmutation, as for instance fire, we must not call this, but suck-like is the appellation we must confer on fire; nor must we call water this, but always

such; nor must we apply to anything, as if it had any stability, such predicates as we express by the use of the terms this and that and suppose that we signify something thereby. For it flees and will not abide such terms as this and that and relative to this, and every phrase which represents it as stable. The word this we must not use of any of them; but such, applying in the same sense to all their mutations, we must predicate of each and all: fire we must call that which universally has that appearance; and so must we name all things such as come into being. That wherein they come to be severally and show themselves, and from whence again they perish, in naming that alone must we use the words that and this; but whatever has any quality, such as white or hot or any of two opposite attributes, and all combinations of these, we must denote by no such term.

But we must try to speak yet more clearly on this matter. Suppose a man having molded all kinds of figures out of gold should unceasingly remold them, interchanging them all with one another, it were much the safest thing in view of truth to say that it is gold; but as to the triangles or any other shapes that were impressed on it, never to speak of them as existing, seeing that they change even as we are in the act of defining them; but if it will admit the term such with any tolerable security, we must be content. The same language must be applied to the nature which receives into it all material things: we must call it always the same; for it never departs from its own function at all. It ever receives all things into it and has nowhere any form in any wise like to aught of the shapes that enter into it. For it is as the substance wherein all things are naturally molded, being stirred and informed by the entering shapes; and owing to them it appears different from time to time. But the shapes which pass in and out are likenesses of the eternal

existences, being copied from them in a fashion wondrous and hard to declare, which we will follow up later on. For the present however we must conceive three kinds: first that which comes to be, secondly that wherein it comes to be, third that from which the becoming is copied when it is created. And we may liken the recipient to a mother, the model to a father, and that which is between them to a child; and we must remember that if a molded copy is to present to view all varieties of form, the matter in which it is molded cannot be rightly prepared unless it be entirely bereft of all those forms which it is about to receive from without. For were it like anyone of the entering shapes, whenever that of an opposite or entirely different nature came upon it, it would in receiving it give the impression badly, intruding its own form. Wherefore that which shall receive all forms within itself must be utterly without share in any of the forms; just as in the making of sweet unguents, men purposely contrive, as the beginning of the work, to make the fluids that are to receive the perfumes perfectly scentless: and those who set about molding figures in any soft substance do not suffer any shape to show itself therein at the beginning, but they first knead it smooth and make it as uniform as they can. In the same way it behooves that which is fitly to receive many times over its whole extent likenesses of all things, that is of all eternal existences, to be itself naturally without part or lot in any of the forms. Therefore the mother and recipient of creation which is visible and by any sense perceptible we must call neither earth nor air nor fire nor water, nor the combinations of these nor the elements of which they are formed: but we shall not err in affirming it to be a viewless nature and formless, all-receiving, in some manner most bewildering and hard to comprehend partaking of the intelligible. But so far as from what has been said we may arrive at its nature,

this would be the most just account of it. That part of it which is enkindled from time to time appears as fire, and that which is made liquid as water, and as earth and air such part of it as receives the likenesses of these.

But in our inquiry concerning these we must deliver a stricter statement. Is there an absolute idea of fire, and do all those absolute ideas exist to which in every case we always ascribe absolute being? Or do those things which we actually see or perceive with any other bodily sense alone possess such reality? and is it true that there are no manner of real existences beyond these at all, but we talk idly when we speak of an intelligible idea as actually existent, whereas it was nothing but a conception? Now it does not become us either to dismiss the present question unjudged and undecided, simply asserting that the ideas exist, nor yet must we add to our already long discourse another as long which is subordinate. But if we could see our way to a great definition couched in brief words, that would be most seasonable for our present purpose. Thus then do I give my own verdict: if reason and true opinion are of two different kinds, then the ideas do surely exist, forms not perceptible by our senses, the objects of thought alone; but if, as some hold, true opinion differs nothing from reason, then all that we apprehend by our bodily organs we must affirm to be the most real existence. Now we must declare them to be two, because they are different in origin and unlike in nature. The one is engendered in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is ever accompanied by right understanding, the other is without understanding; the one is not to be moved by persuasion, the other yields to persuasion; true opinion we must admit is shared by all men, but reason by the gods alone and a very small portion of mankind. This being so, we must agree that there is first the unchanging idea, unbegotten and imperishable, neither

receiving aught into itself from without nor itself entering into aught else, invisible, nor in any wise perceptible—even that whereof the contemplation belongs to thought. Second is that which is named after it and is like to it, sensible, created, ever in motion, coming to be in a certain place and again from thence perishing, apprehensible by opinion with sensation. And the third kind is space everlasting, admitting not destruction, but affording place for all things that come into being, itself apprehensible without sensation by a sort of bastard reasoning, hardly matter of belief. It is with this in view that dreaming we say that all which exists must be in some place and filling some space, and that what is neither on earth nor in heaven anywhere is naught. All these and many kindred fancies have we even concerning that unsleeping essence and truly existing, for that by reason of this dreaming state we become impotent to arouse ourselves and affirm the truth; namely, that to an image it belongs, seeing that it is not the very model of itself, on which itself has been created, but is ever the fleeting semblance of another, in another to come into being, clinging to existence as best it may, on pain of being nothing at all; but to the really existent essence reason in all exactness true comes as an ally, declaring that so long as one thing is one and another thing is other, neither of them shall come to be in the other, so that the same becomes at once one and two.

Such then is the statement for which I give my sentence, as we have briefly reasoned it out: that there are Being and Space and Becoming, three in number with threefold nature, even before the heavens were created. And the nurse of becoming, being made liquid and fiery and putting on the forms of earth and air, and undergoing all the conditions that attend thereupon, displays to view all manner of semblances; and because she is filled with powers that are not similar nor equivalent, she is at no part of her in even

balance, but being swayed in all directions unevenly, she is herself shaken by the entering forms, and by her motion shakes them again in turn: and they, being thus stirred, are carried in different directions and separated, just as by sieves and instruments for winnowing corn the grain is shaken and sifted, and the dense and heavy parts go one way, and the rare and light are carried to a different place and settle there. Even so when the four kinds are shaken by the recipient, which by the motion she has received acts as an instrument for shaking, she separates the most dissimilar elements furthest apart from one another, and the most similar she draws chiefly together; for which cause these elements had different regions even before the universe was ordered out of them and created. Before that came to pass all these things were without method or measure; but when an essay was being made to order the universe, first fire and water and earth and air, which had certain vestiges of their own nature, yet were altogether in such a condition as we should expect for everything when God is not in it, being by nature in the state we have said, were then first by the creator fashioned forth with forms and numbers. And that God formed them to be most fair and perfect, not having been so heretofore, must above all things be the foundation whereon our account is forever based. But now the disposition of each and their generation is what. I must strive to make known to you in speech unwonted: but seeing ye are no strangers to the paths of learning, through which my sayings must be revealed to you, ye will follow me.

In the first place, that fire and earth and water and air are material bodies is evident to all. Every form of body has depth: and depth must be bounded by plane surfaces. Now every rectilinear plane is composed of triangles. And all triangles are derived from two triangles, each having one right angle and the others acute: and one triangle has on

each side a moiety of a right angle marked off by equal sides, the other has it divided into unequal parts by unequal sides. These we conceive to be the basis of fire and the other bodies, following up the probable account which is concerned with necessity: but the principles yet more remote than these are known but to God and to whatsoever man is a friend of God. Now we must declare what are the four fairest bodies that could be created, unlike one another, but capable, some of them, of being generated out of each other by their dissolution: for if we succeed in this, we have come at the truth concerning earth and fire and the intermediate proportionals. For we will concede to no one that there exist any visible bodies fairer than these, each after its own kind. We must do our diligence then to put together these four kinds of bodies most excellent in beauty, and so we shall say that we have a full comprehension of their nature.

Now of the two triangles the isosceles has but one kind, but the scalene an endless number. Out of this infinite multitude then we must choose the fairest, if we are to begin upon our own principles. If then any man can tell of a fairer kind that he has selected for the composition of these bodies, it is no enemy but a friend who vanquishes us: however of all these triangles we declare one to be the fairest, passing over the rest; that namely of which two conjoined form an equilateral triangle. The reason it were too long to tell: but if any man convict us in this and find that it is not so, the palm is ready for him with our right good will. Let then two triangles be chosen whereof the substance of fire and of the other elements has been wrought; the one isosceles, the other always having the square on the greater side three times the square on the lesser. And now we must more strictly define something which we expressed not quite clearly enough before. For it appeared as though all the four classes had generation through each other and into each

other, but this appearance was delusive. For out of the triangles we have chosen arise four kinds, three from one of them, that which has unequal sides, and the fourth one alone composed of the isosceles triangle. It is not then possible for all of them by dissolution to pass one into another, a few large bodies being formed of many small, and the converse: but for three of them it is possible. For since they all arise from one basis, when the larger bodies are broken up, a number of small ones will be formed from the same elements, putting on the shapes proper to them; and again when a number of small bodies are resolved into their triangles, they will become one in number and constitute a single large body of a different form. So much for their generation into one another: the next thing will be to say what is the form in which each has been created, and by the combination of what numbers. We will begin with the form which is simplest and smallest in its construction. Its element is the triangle which has the hypotenuse double of the shorter side in length. If a pair of these are put together so that their hypotenuses coincide, and this is done three times, in such a way that the hypotenuses and the shorter sides meet in one point as a center, thus one equilateral triangle has been formed out of the other six triangles: and if four equilateral triangles are combined, so that three plane angles meet in a point, they make at each point one solid angle, that which comes immediately next to the most obtuse of plane angles; and when four such angles are produced there is formed the first solid figure, dividing its whole surface into four equal and similar parts. The second is formed of the same triangles in sets of eight equilateral triangles, bounding every single solid angle by four planes; and with the formation of six such solid angles the second figure is also complete. The third is composed of 120 of the elementary triangles united, and of twelve solid angles, each

contained by five plane equilateral triangles; and it has twenty equilateral surfaces. And the first element, when it had generated these figures, had done its part: the isosceles triangle generated the fourth, combined in sets of four, with the right angles meeting at the center, thus forming a single square. Six of these squares joined together formed eight solid angles, each produced by three plane right angles: and the shape of the body thus formed was cubical, having six square planes for its surfaces. And whereas a fifth figure yet alone remained, God used it for the universe in embellishing it with signs.

Now if any man, reflecting upon all these things, should fairly ask himself whether the number of cosmic systems is indefinite or definite, he would deem that to believe them indefinite was the opinion of one who thought very indefinitely on a matter where he ought to be most definitely informed: but whether we ought to say that there is but one, or that there are really in nature five, he might, if he stopped short there, with more justice feel doubtful. Our verdict declares that according to the probable theory it is by nature one; another however, looking to some other guide, may have a different view. But no more of him; let us assign the figures that have come into being in our theory to fire and earth and water and air. To earth let us give the cubical form; for earth is least mobile of the four and most plastic of bodies: and that substance must possess this nature in the highest degree which has its bases most stable. Now of the triangles which we assumed as our starting-point that with equal sides is more stable than that with unequal; and of the surfaces composed of the two triangles the equilateral quadrangle necessarily is more stable than the equilateral triangle, both in its parts and as a whole. Therefore in assigning this to earth we preserve the probability of our account; and also in giving to water the least mobile and to

fire the most mobile of those which remain; while to air we give that which is intermediate. Again we shall assign the smallest figure to fire, and the largest to water and the intermediate to air: and the keenest to fire, the next to air, and the third to water. Now among all these that which has the fewest bases must naturally in all respects be the most cutting and keen of all, and also the most nimble, seeing it is composed of the smallest number of similar parts; and - the second must have these same qualities in the second degree, and the third in the third degree. Let it be determined then, according to the right account and the probable, 'that the solid body which has taken the form of the pyramid is the element and seed of fire; and the second in order of generation let us say to be that of air, and the third that of water. Now all these bodies we must conceive as being so small that each single body in the several kinds cannot for its smallness be seen by us at all; but when many are heaped together, their united mass is seen: and we must suppose that the due proportion in respect of their multitude and motions and all their other powers, when God had completed them with all perfection, in so far as the nature of necessity, consenting and yielding to persuasion, suffered, were everywhere by him ordained in fitting measure.

From all that we have already said in the matter of these four kinds, the facts would seem to be as follows. When earth meets with fire and is dissolved by the keenness of it, it would drift about, whether it were dissolved in fire itself, or in some mass of air or water, until the parts of it meeting and again being united became earth once more; for it never could pass into any other kind. But when water is divided by fire or by air, it may be formed again and become one particle of fire and two of air: and the divisions of air may become for every particle broken up two particles of fire. And again when fire is caught in air or in waters or in earth, a

little in a great bulk, moving amid a rushing body, and contending with it is vanquished and broken up, two particles of fire combine into one figure of air: and when air is vanquished and broken small, from two whole and one half particle one whole figure of water will be composed. Let us also reckon it once again thus: when any of the other kinds is intercepted in fire and is divided by it through the sharpness of its angles and its sides, if it forms into the shape of fire, it at once ceases from being divided: for a kind which is uniform and identical, of whatever sort it be, can neither be the cause of any change nor can it suffer any from that which is identical and uniform with itself; but so long as passing into another kind a lesser bulk contends with the greater, it ceases never from being broken. And when the smaller figures few in number are caught in a multitude of larger figures and are being broken in pieces and quenched, if they consent to combine into the form of the stronger they then and there cease from being quenched; and from fire arises air, from air water. But if they assail the others, and another sort meet and contend with them, they cease not from being shattered until, being entirely repelled and dissolved, they find refuge with some of their own kind, or being overcome, form from many of their own figures one similar to the victorious element, and there remain and abide with it. Moreover on account of these conditions they all are changing their places; for the bulk of every kind are sorted into separate regions of their own through the motion of the recipient: and those which are altered from their own nature and made like some other are carried by reason of this movement to the region proper to the element to which they are assimilated.

All unmixed and primary bodies have thus come into being through the causes we have described: but for the fact that within the several classes different kinds exist we must

assign as its cause the structure of the elementary triangles; it does not originally produce in each kind of triangle one and the same size only, but some greater and some less; and there are just so many sizes as there are kinds in the classes: and when these are mixed up with themselves or with one another, an endless diversity arises, which must be examined by those who would put forward a probable theory concerning nature.

Now concerning rest and motion, how they arise and under what conditions, we must come to an agreement, else many difficulties will stand in the way of our argument that is to follow. This has been already in part set forth, but we have yet to add that in uniformity no movement will ever exist. For that what is to be moved should exist without that which is to move it, or what is to move without that which is to be moved, is, difficult or rather impossible: but without these there can be no motion, and for these to be uniform is not possible. So then let us always assign rest to uniformity and motion to its opposite. Now the opposite of uniformity is caused by inequality; and of inequality we have discussed the origin. But how it comes to pass that all bodies are not sorted off into their several kinds and cease from passing through one another and changing their place, this we have not explained. Let us put it again in this way. The revolution of the whole, when it had embraced the four kinds, being circular, with a natural tendency to return upon itself, compresses everything and suffers no vacant space to be left. Therefore fire penetrates most of all through all things, and in the second degree air, since it is second in fineness, and the rest in proportion. For the substances which are formed of the largest parts have the most void left in their structure, and those made of the smallest have the least. Now the constriction of this contracting force thrusts the small particles into the interspaces between the larger: so that

when small are set side by side with great, and the lesser particles divide the greater, while the greater compress the smaller, all things keep rushing backwards and forwards to their own region; since in changing its bulk each changes its proper position in space. Thus owing to these causes a perpetual disturbance of uniformity is always kept up and so preserves the perpetual motion of matter now and henceforth without cessation.

Next we must remember that of fire there are many kinds: for instance flame and that effluence from flame, which burns not but gives light to the eyes, and that which remains in the embers when the flame is out. And so with air: the purest is that which is called by the name of aether, and the most turbid is mist and gloom; and there are other kinds which have no name, arising from the inequality of the triangles. Of water there are two primary divisions, the liquid and the fusible kind. The liquid sort owes its nature to possessing the smaller kinds of watery atoms, unequal in size; and so it can readily either move of itself or be moved by something else, owing to its lack of uniformity and the peculiar shape of its atoms. But that which consists of larger and uniform particles is more stable than the former and heavy, being stiffened by its uniformity: but when fire enters into it and breaks it up, it loses its uniformity and gains more power of motion: and as soon as it has become mobile, it is thrust by the surrounding air and spread out upon the earth: and it has received names descriptive of either process, melting of the dissolution of the mass, flowing of the extension on the ground. But when the fire goes forth from it again, seeing that it does not issue into empty space, the neighboring air receives a thrust, and while the liquid mass is still mobile, it forces it to fill up the vacant places of the fire and unites it with itself. And being thus compressed and recovering its uniformity, seeing that fire the creator of

inequality is quitting it, it settles into its normal state. And the departure of fire we call cooling, and the contraction that ensues on its withdrawal we class as solidification. Of all the substances which we have ranked as fusible kinds of water, that which is densest and formed of the finest and most uniform particles, a unique kind, combining brightness with a yellow hue, is gold, a most precious treasure, which has filtered through rocks and there congealed: and the 'offspring of gold', which is extremely hard owing to its density and has turned black, is called adamant. Another has particles resembling those of gold, but more than one kind; in density it even surpasses gold and has a small admixture of fine earth, so that it is harder, but lighter, because it has large interstices within; this formation is one of the shining and solid kinds of water and is called bronze. The earth which is mingled with it, when the two through age begin to separate again, becomes visible by itself and is named rust. And it were no intricate task to explain all the other substances of this kind, following the outline of our probable account. For if we pursue this as a recreation, and while laying down the principles of eternal being" find in plausible theories of becoming a pleasure that brings no remorse in its train, we may draw from it a sober and sensible amusement during our life. Now therefore setting out in this way let us go on to discuss the probabilities that lie next on the same subject.

Water mingled with, fire, such as is rare and liquid (owing to its mobility and its way of rolling along the ground, which gets it the name of liquid), and is also soft, because its bases give way, being less stable than those of earth, —when relinquished by fire and deserted of air, becomes more uniform and is compressed by the outgoing elements; thus it is congealed, and when above the earth this process takes place in an extreme degree, the result is hail; if upon the

earth, it is ice: but when the process has not gone so far but leaves it half-congealed, above the earth it is snow, and when congealed from dew upon the earth, it is called hoarfrost. Most forms of water, which are intermingled with one another, filtered through the plants of the earth, are called by the class-name of saps; but owing to their intermixture they are all of diverse natures and the great multitude of them are accordingly unnamed: four kinds however which are of a fiery nature, being more conspicuous, have obtained names: one that heats the soul and body together, namely wine; next a kind which is smooth and divides the visual current and therefore appears bright and shining to view and glistening, I mean the class of oils, resin and castor oil and olive oil itself and all others that have the same properties; thirdly that which expands the contracted pores of the mouth to their natural condition, and by this property produces sweetness to the taste, —of this honey is the most general appellation; lastly that which corrodes the flesh by burning, a sort of frothy substance, distinct from all the other saps, which has been named verjuice.

Of the different kinds of earth, that which is strained through water becomes a stony mass in the following way. When the commingled water is broken up in the mixing, it changes into the form of air; and having become air it darts up to its own region. Now there was no void surrounding it; accordingly it gives a thrust to the neighboring air. And the air, being weighty, when it is thrust and poured around the mass of earth, presses it hard and squeezes it into the spaces which the new-made air quitted. Thus earth, when compressed by air into a mass that will not dissolve in water, forms stone; of which the transparent sort made of equal and uniform particles is fairer, while that of the opposite kind is less fair. But that which is suddenly deprived of all its moisture by the rapid action of fire and is become more

brittle than the first forms the class to which we have given the name of earthenware. Again when some moisture is left behind, earth, after having been fused by fire and again cooled, becomes a certain stone of a black color. There are also two sorts which in the same manner after the admixture are robbed of a great part of the water, being formed of the finer particles of earth with a saline taste, and becoming only half solid and soluble again by water; of these what purifies from oil and earth is alkali; while that which easily blends with all the combinations of tastes on the palate is, in the words of the ordinance, the god-beloved substance of salt. The bodies which are composed of earth and water combined cannot be dissolved by water, but by fire alone for the following reason. A mass of earth is resolved neither by fire nor by air, because their atoms are smaller than the interstices in its structure, so that they have abundant room to move in and do not force their way, wherefore instead of breaking it up they leave it undissolved: but whereas the parts of water are larger, they make their passage by force and dissolve the mass by breaking it up. Earth then, when it is not forcibly solidified, is thus dissolved by water only; but when it is solidified, only by fire, for no entrance is left except to fire. And of water the most forcible congelation is melted by fire alone, but the more feeble both fire and air break up; the latter by the interstices, the former by the triangles as well. Air, when forcibly condensed, can only be resolved into the elementary triangles, and when uncondensed fire alone dissolves it. In the case of a substance formed of water and earth combined, so long as water occupies the spaces in it that are forcibly compressed, the particles of water arriving from without find no entrance but simply flow round and leave the whole bulk undissolved; but those of fire enter into the interstices of the water, and acting upon it as water does upon earth, can alone cause the

combined mass to melt and become liquid. In this class those which have less water than earth are all kinds of glass and all stones that are called fusible; and those which contain more water include all formations like wax and frankincense.

Now all the manifold forms that arise from diverse shapes and combinations and changes from one to another have been pretty fully set forth; next we must try to explain their affections and the causes that lead to them. First we must assign to all the substances we have described the property of causing sensation. But the origin of flesh and all that belongs to it and of the mortal part of soul we have not yet discussed.

Now this cannot be adequately dealt with apart from the affections of sense, nor yet can the latter without the former; yet to treat them both at once is hardly possible. We must assume one side then, and afterwards we will return to examine what we assumed. In order then that the properties of the several elements may be discussed in due order, let us first assume the nature of body and soul. First then let us see what we mean by calling fire hot; which we must consider in the following way, remembering the power of dividing and cutting which fire exercises upon our body. That the sensation is a sharp one we are all well enough aware: and the fineness of the. edges and sharpness of the angles, besides the smallness of its particles and the swiftness of its motion, all of which qualities combine to render it so vehement and piercing as keenly to cut whatever meets it—all this we must take into account, remembering the nature of its figure, that this more than any other kind penetrates our body and minutely divides it, whence the sensation that we now call heat justly derives its quality and its name. The opposite condition," though obvious enough, still must not lack an explanation. When the larger particles

of moisture which surround the body enter into it, they displace the smaller, and because they are not able to pass into their places, they compress the moisture within us; and whereas it was irregular and mobile, they render it immovable owing to uniformity and contraction, and so it becomes rigid. And what is against nature contracted in obedience to nature struggles and thrusts itself apart; and to this struggling and quaking has been given the name of trembling and shivering: and both the effect and the cause of it are in all cases termed 'cold'.

'Hard' is the name given to all things to which our flesh yields; and 'soft' to those which yield to the flesh; and so also they are termed in their relation to each other. Those which yield are such as have a small base of support; and the figure with square surfaces, as it is most firmly based, is the most stubborn form; so too is whatever from the intensity of its compression offers the strongest resistance.

Of 'heavy' and ' light' we shall find the clearest explanation if we examine them together with the so-called 'below' and ' above'. That there are naturally two opposite regions, dividing the universe between them, one the lower, to which sink all things that have material bulk, the other upper, to which everything rises against its will, is altogether a false opinion. For since the form of the universe is spherical, all the extreme points, being equally distant from the center, are by their very nature equally extreme; and the center, being equally distant from all the extremes, ought to be regarded as opposite to all such points. This being the nature of the universe, how can one describe any of the said points as upper or lower, without justly being censured for using irrelevant terms? For the center cannot properly be described as being above or below, but simply at the center; while the circumference is neither itself central nor has any difference between the points on its surface, so that one has

a different relation to the center from an opposite point. Since then it is everywhere uniform, how and in what sense can we suppose we are speaking correctly if we use terms which imply opposition? For suppose in the midst of the universe there were a solid body in equilibrium, it would have no tendency towards any point in the circumference, owing to the absolute uniformity of the whole: indeed if we were to walk round the sphere, frequently, as we stood at the antipodes of our former position, we should call the same point on its surface successively 'above' and 'below'. For this universe being spherical, as we just now said, no rational man can speak of one region as upper, of another as lower: however whence these names were derived and under what conditions we use them to express this division of the entire universe, we may explain on the following hypothesis. In that region of the universe which is specially allotted to the element of fire, where indeed the greatest mass would be collected of that to which it is attracted, if one should attain to this place, and, acquiring the needful power, should separate portions of fire and weigh them in scales, when he raises the balance and forcibly drags the fire into the alien air, evidently he overpowers the smaller portion more easily than the larger: for when two masses are raised at once by the same force, necessarily the smaller yields more readily to the force, the larger, owing to its resistance, less readily: hence the larger mass is said to be heavy and to tend downwards, the smaller to be light and to tend upwards. This is exactly what we ought to detect ourselves doing in our own region. Moving as we do on the earth, we separate portions of earthy substances or sometimes earth itself, and drag them into the alien air with unnatural force, for each portion clings to its own kind. Now the smaller mass yields more readily to our force than the larger and follows quicker into the alien element; therefore we call it ' light', and the

place into which we force it 'above'; while to the opposite conditions we apply the terms 'heavy' and 'below'. Now that these mutual relations should vary is inevitable, because the bulk of the several elements occupy contrary positions in space. For as between a body that is light in one region and a body that is light in the opposite region, or as between two that are heavy, as well as upper and lower, all the lines of attraction will be found to become and remain relatively contrary and transverse and different in every possible way. But with all of them this one principle is to be borne in mind, that in every case it is the tendency towards the kindred element that makes us call the falling body heavy, and the place to which it falls, below; while to the reverse relations we apply the opposite names. So much then for the causes of these conditions. Of the qualities of smooth and rough anyone could perceive the cause and explain it to another: the latter is produced by a combination of hardness and irregularity, the former by a combination of uniformity and density.

We have yet to consider the most important point relating to the affections which concern the whole body in common; that is, the cause of pleasure and pain accompanying the sensations we have discussed: and also the affections which produce sensation by means of the separate bodily organs and which involve attendant pains and pleasures. This then is how we must conceive the causes in the case of every affection, sensible or insensible, recollecting how we denned above the source of mobility and immobility: for this is the way we must seek the explanation we hope to find. When that which is naturally mobile is impressed by even a slight affection, it spreads abroad the motion, the particles one upon another producing the same effect, until coming to the sentient part it announces the property of the agent: but a substance that is immobile is too stable to spread the motion

round about, and thus merely receives the affection but does not stir any neighboring part; so that as the particles do not pass on one to another the original impulse which affected them, they keep it untransmitted to the entire creature and thus leave the recipient of the affection without sensation. This takes place with our bones and hair and all the parts we have which are formed mostly of earth: while the former conditions apply in the highest degree to sight and hearing, because they contain the greatest proportion of fire and air. The nature of pleasure and pain must be conceived thus: an affection contrary to nature, when it takes place forcibly and suddenly within us, is painful; a sudden return to the natural state is pleasant; a gentle and gradual process is imperceptible; and one of an opposite character is perceptible. Now a process which takes place with perfect facility is perceptible in a high degree, but is accompanied neither by pleasure nor by pain. An example will be found in the affections of the visual current, which we said above was in the daytime a material body cognate with ourselves. In this cutting and burning and any other affection cause no pain; nor does pleasure ensue when it returns to its normal state: but its perceptions are most vivid and accurate of whatsoever impresses it or whatsoever itself meets and touches. For its dilation and contraction are ‘ entirely free from violence. On the other hand bodies formed of larger particles, reluctantly yielding to the agent, and spreading the motions through the whole frame, cause pleasure and pain; when they are disturbed giving pain, and pleasure in being restored to their proper state. Those things which suffer a gradual withdrawing and emptying, but have their replenishment sudden and on a large scale, are insensible to the emptying but sensible of the replenishment; so that while they cause no pain to the mortal part of the soul, they produce very intense pleasure. This is to be observed in the

case of sweet smells. But when the parts are disturbed suddenly, but gradually and laboriously restored to their former condition, they afford exactly the opposite result to the former: this may be seen in the case of burns and cuts on the body.

Now the affections common to the body as a whole and the names that have been given to the agents which produce them have been well-nigh expounded: next we must try to explain, if we can, what takes place in the separate parts of us, both as to the affections of them and the causes on the part of the agents. First then we must set forth to the best of our power all that we left unsaid concerning tastes, which are affections peculiar to the tongue. It appears that these, like most other things, are brought about by contraction and dilation, besides which they have more to do than other sensations with roughness and smoothness in the agents. For whenever earthy particles enter in by the little veins which are a kind of testing instruments of the tongue, stretched to the heart, and strike upon the moist and soft parts of the flesh, these particles as they are being dissolved contract and dry the small veins; and if they are very rough, they are termed 'astringent'; if less so 'harsh'. Such substances again as are detergent and rinse the whole surface of the tongue, if they do this to an excessive degree and encroach so as to dissolve part of the structure of the flesh, as is the property of alkalies—all such are termed 'bitter': but those which fall short of the alkaline quality and rinse the tongue only to a moderate extent are saline without bitterness and seem to us agreeable rather than the reverse. Those which share the warmth of the mouth and are softened by it, being simultaneously inflamed and themselves in turn scorching that which heated them, and which owing to their lightness fly upward to the senses of the head, penetrating all that is in their path—owing to these

properties all such substances are called ‘pungent’. But sometimes these same substances, having been already refined by decomposition, enter into the narrow veins, being duly proportioned to the earthy particles and the particles of air which are there, so that they set them in motion and mingle them together, and thereby cause them to jostle against one another and taking up other positions to form new hollows extended round the entering particles—which hollows consist of a film of moisture, sometimes earthy, sometimes pure, embracing a volume of air; and thus they form moist capsules containing air: —in some cases the films are of pure moisture and transparent and are called bubbles; in others they are of earthy liquid which effervesces and rises all together, when the name of seething and fermentation is given to it: and the cause of all these conditions is termed ‘acid’. The opposite affection to all those which have been described is produced by an opposite cause: when the structure of the entering particles amid the moisture, having a natural affinity to the tongue’s normal condition, smooths it by mollifying the roughened parts, and relaxes or contracts what is unnaturally contracted or expanded, and settles everything as much as possible in its natural state. Every such remedy of violent affections is to all of us pleasant and agreeable, and has received the name of ‘sweet’.

Enough of this subject. As regards the faculty of the nostrils no classification can be made. For smells are of a half-formed nature: and no class of figure has the adaptation requisite for producing any smell, but our veins in this part are formed too narrow for earth and water, and too wide for fire and air: for which cause no one ever perceived any smell of these bodies; but smells arise from substances which are being either liquefied or decomposed or dissolved or evaporated: for when water is changing into air and air into

water, odors arise in the intermediate condition; and all odors are vapor or mist, mist being the conversion of air into water, and vapor the conversion of water into air; whence all smells are subtler than water and coarser than air. This is proved when any obstacle is placed before the passages of respiration, and then one forcibly inhales the air: for then no smell filters through with it, but the air bereft of all scent alone follows the inhalation. For this reason the complex varieties of odor are unnamed, and are ranked in classes neither numerous nor simple: only two conspicuous kinds are in fact here distinguished, pleasant and unpleasant. The latter roughens and irritates all the cavity of the body that is between the head and the navel; the former soothes this same region and restores it with contentment to its own natural condition.

A third organ of sensation in us which we have to examine is that of hearing, and we must state the causes whence arise the affections connected with it. Let us in general terms define sound as a stroke transmitted through the ears by the air and passed through the brain and the blood to the soul; while the motion produced by it, beginning in the head and ending in the region of the liver, is hearing. A rapid motion produces a shrill sound, a slower one a deeper sound; regular vibration gives an even and smooth sound, and the opposite a harsh one; if the movement is large, the sound is loud; if otherwise, it is slight. Concerning accords of sound we must speak later on in our discourse.

A fourth faculty of sense yet remains, the intricate varieties of which it is our part to classify. To these we have given the name of colors, which consist of a flame streaming off from every object, having its particles so adjusted to those of the visual current as to excite sensation. We have already set forth the causes which gave origin to vision: thus therefore it will be most natural and fitting for a rational

theory to treat of the question of colors. The particles which issue from outward objects and meet the visual stream are some of them smaller, some larger, and some equal in size to the particles of that stream. Those of equal size cause no sensation, and these we call transparent; but the larger and smaller, in the one case by contracting, in the other by dilating it, produce effects akin to the action of heat and cold on the flesh, and to the action on the tongue of astringent tastes and the heating sensations which we termed pungent. These are white and black, affections identical with those just mentioned, but occurring in a different class and seeming to be different for the causes aforesaid. We must then classify them as follows. What dilates the visual stream is white, and the opposite thereof is black. A swifter motion belonging to a different kind of fire, which meets and penetrates the visual stream quite up to the eyes, and forcibly displaces and decomposes the pores of the eyes themselves, draws from thence a combined body of fire and water, which we call a tear: and whereas this agent is itself fire, meeting the other from the opposite direction, and one fire leaps forth as lightning from the eyes, while the other enters in and is quenched in the moisture, all manner of colors arise in this commixture; and to the sensation we give the name of dazzling, and the agent which produces it we call bright and shining. A kind of fire which is intermediate between the two former, when it reaches the moisture of the eye and is mingled with it, but does not flash, produces a blood-like color by the mixture of fire with the gleam of the moisture, and the name we give it is red. Bright combined with red and white makes yellow. In what proportion they are mingled, it were not reasonable to say, even if we knew; for there is neither any inevitable law nor any probable account thereof which we might properly declare. Red mingled with black and white becomes purple, which turns

to dark violet when these ingredients are more burnt and a greater quantity of black is added. Chestnut arises from the mixture of yellow and grey, and grey from white and black: pale buff is from white mixed with yellow. When bright meets white and is steeped in intense black, a deep blue color is the result; and deep blue mingled with white produces pale blue; and chestnut with black makes green. And for the remaining colors, it is pretty clear from the foregoing to what combinations we ought to assign them so as to preserve the probability of our account: but if a man endeavor to make practical trial of these theories he will prove himself ignorant of the difference between divine and human intelligence: that God has sufficient understanding and power to blend the many into one and again to resolve the one into many; but no man is able to do either of these, now or henceforth forever.

All these things being thus constituted by necessity, the creator of the most fair and perfect in the realm of becoming took them over, when he was generating the self-sufficing and most perfect god, using the forces in them as subservient causes, but himself working out the good in all things that come into being. Wherefore we must distinguish two kinds of causes, one of necessity and one of God: and the divine we must seek in all things for the sake of winning a happy life, so far as our nature admits of it; and the necessary for the sake of the divine, reflecting that without these we cannot apprehend by themselves the other truths, which are the object of our serious study, nor grasp them nor in any other way attain to them.

Now therefore that the different kinds of causes lie ready sorted to our hand, like wood prepared for a carpenter, of which we must weave the web of our ensuing discourse, let us in brief speech return to the beginning and proceed once more to the spot whence we arrived at our present point; and

so let us endeavor to add an end and a climax to our story conformable with what has gone before.

As was said then at the beginning, when God found these things without order either in the relation of each thing to itself or of one to another, he introduced proportion among them, in as many kinds and ways as it was possible for them to be proportionate and harmonious. For at that time neither had they any proportion, except by mere chance, nor did any of the bodies that now are named by us deserve the name, such as fire and water and the other elements: but first he ordered all these, and then out of them wrought this universe, a single living creature containing within itself all living creatures, mortal and immortal, that exist. And of the divine he himself was the creator; but the creation of mortals he delivered over to his own children to work out. And they, in imitation of him, having received from him the immortal principle of soul, fashioned round about her a mortal body and gave her all the body to ride in; and beside her they built in another kind of soul, even that which is mortal, having within itself dread and inevitable passions—first pleasure, the strongest allurement of evil, next pains, that scare good things away; confidence moreover and fear, a yoke of thoughtless counselors; wrath hard to assuage and hope that lightly leads astray; and having mingled all these perforce with reasonless sensation and love that ventures all things, so they fashioned the mortal soul. And for this cause, in awe of defiling the divine, so far as was not altogether necessary, they set the mortal kind to dwell apart from the other in another chamber of the body, having built an isthmus and boundary between the head and the breast, setting the neck between them to keep them apart. So in the breast, or the thorax as it is called, they confined the mortal kind of soul. And whereas one part of-it was nobler, the other baser, they built a party-wall across the hollow of the chest,

as if they were marking off an apartment for women and another for men, and they put the midriff as a fence between them. That part of the soul which shares courage and anger, seeing that it is warlike, they planted nearer the head, between the midriff and the neck, that it might be within hearing of the reason and might join it in forcibly keeping down the tribe of lusts, when they would in no wise consent to obey the order and word of command from the citadel. And the heart, which is the knot of the veins and the fount of the blood which rushes vehemently through all the limbs, they made into the guardhouse, that whensoever the fury of anger boiled up at the message from the reason, that some unrighteous dealing is being wrought around them, either without, or, it may be, by the lusts within, swiftly through all the narrow channels all the sensitive power in the body might be aware of the admonitions and threats and be obedient to them and follow them altogether, and so permit the noblest part to be leader among them all.

For the throbbing of the heart in the anticipation of danger or the excitement of wrath, since they foreknew that all such swelling of passion should come to pass by means of fire, they devised a plan of relief, and framed within us the structure of the lungs, which in the first place is soft and void of blood, and next is perforated within with cavities like those of a sponge, in order that receiving the breath and the drink it might cause coolness and give rest and relief in the burning. Wherefore they made the windpipe for a channel to the lungs, which they set around the heart, as it were a soft cushion to spring upon; so that when wrath was at its height therein, the heart might leap upon a yielding substance and become cooled, and thus being less distressed it might together with the emotions be better enabled to obey the reason.

But that part of the soul which lusts after meat and drink and all things whereof it has need owing to the body's nature, this they set between the midriff and the navel as its boundary, constructing in all this region as it were a manger for the sustenance of the body: and here they chained it like a wild beast, which must yet be reared in conjunction with the rest, if a mortal race were to be at all. To the end then that always feeding at its stall and dwelling as far as possible from the seat of counsel, it might produce the least possible tumult and uproar and allow the noblest part to consult in peace for the common weal, here they assigned it its place. And knowing that it would have no comprehension of reason, and that even if it did in some way gain any perception of rational thoughts, it was not in its nature to take heed to any such things, but that it would be entirely led away by images and shadows both by night and by day, God devised as a remedy for this the nature of the liver, which he constructed and set in its dwelling place: and he made it a body dense and smooth and bright and sweet with a share of bitterness. This he did to the end that the influence of thoughts proceeding from the brain, when the liver received outlines of them, as if in a mirror, and exhibited reflections to view, might strike terror into the appetitive part, whenever making use of the bitter element akin to its own dark nature and threatening with stern approach, diffusing the bitterness swiftly throughout the whole liver it displayed a bilious color, and contracting it made it all rough and wrinkled, and reaching the lobe and the vessels and the inlet, twisted the first from its right position and contorted it, while at the same time it obstructed and closed up the two latter, thereby producing pain and nausea: and on the other hand in order that, whenever a breath of mildness from the reason copied off on the liver visions of an opposite kind, giving relief from the

bitterness, because it will not excite a nature opposite to its own nor have dealing with it, but using upon the liver the sweetness that exists therein and soothing everything till all is straight and smooth and free, it might render gentle and calm that part of the soul which is settled about the liver, and might enable it to secure a sober amusement at night, enjoying divination during sleep, in recompense for its deprivation of intelligence and wisdom. For our creators, because they remembered the behest of their father, when he commanded them to make the mortal race as perfect as they were able, in this wise redeeming even the baser part of us, that it might have in some way a hold on the truth, placed in this region the seat of divination.

Now that divination is the gift of God to human folly, this is a sufficient proof. No man in his sound senses deals in true and inspired divination, but when the power of his understanding is fettered in sleep or by sickness, or if he has become distraught by some divine possession. The part of the sane man is to remember and interpret all things that are declared, dreaming or waking, by the prophetic and inspired nature; and whatsoever visions are beheld by the seer, to determine by reason in what way and to whom they betoken good or ill in the future or the present or the past: but it is not for him who has become mad and still is in that state to judge his own visions and utterances; the old saying remains true, that only for the sane man is it meet to act and to be the judge of his own actions and of himself. Whence has arisen the custom of setting up interpreters as judges of inspired prophecy: these are themselves called prophets by some who are altogether unaware that they are but the expounders of mystic speech and visions, and ought not in strict accuracy to be called prophets, but interpreters of the prophecies.

Such is the nature of the liver and its situation that we have described, for the purpose of prophecy as aforesaid. And while each body has life, this organ displays the signs clearly enough; but when deprived of life, it is become blind and gives the token too dimly to afford any plain meaning. And the structure of the neighboring organ and its position on the left has been planned for the sake of the liver, in order to keep it always bright and clean, as a napkin is prepared and laid ready for the cleansing of a mirror. Wherefore whenever any impurities arise in the region of the liver owing to sickness of the body, all is received and purified by the fine substance of the spleen, which is woven hollow and void of blood. This, when it is filled with the impurities from the liver, waxes swollen and festered; and again, when the body is purged, it is reduced and sinks again to its natural state.

Now as concerning soul, how far she has a mortal, how far a divine nature, and in what wise and with what conjunctions and for what causes she has her separate habitations, only when God has confirmed our statement can we confidently aver that it is true: nevertheless that we have given the probable account we may venture to say even now and still more on further meditation, and so let it be said. But what follows upon the foregoing is the next object of our research: this was the manner wherein the rest of the body has come into being.

The following is the design on which it were most fitting to conceive that it is constructed. They who framed our race knew the intemperance in meat and drink that would prevail in us, and that for greed we should use far more than was moderate or necessary. In order then that swift destruction through sickness might not fall upon us, and that the mortal race might not perish out of hand before coming to completion, foreseeing the danger they made the abdomen, as it is called, a receptacle to contain the superfluity of food

and drink, and coiled the bowels round about therein, lest the food passing speedily through should compel the body quickly to stand in need of a fresh supply, and thus producing an insatiable craving should render the whole race through gluttony devoid of philosophy and letters and disobedient to the highest part of our nature.

Concerning the bones and flesh and all such substances the case stands thus. The foundation of all these is the marrow: for the bonds of life whereby the soul is bound to the body were fastened in it throughout and planted therein the roots of human nature. But the marrow itself comes from other sources. Such of the primal triangles as were unwarped and smooth and thus able to produce fire and water and air and earth of the purest quality, these God selected and set apart, each from its own class, and mingling them in proportion one with another, to make a common seed for all the race of mortals, he formed of them the marrow; and thereafter he implanted and fastened in it the several kinds of soul; and according to the number and fashion of the shapes that the soul should have corresponding to her kinds, into so many similar forms did he divide the marrow at the very outset of his distribution. And that which should be as it were a field to contain in it the divine seed he molded in a spherical form all round; and this part of the marrow he called the brain, with the view that, when each animal was completed, the vessel containing it should be the head. But that which was to have the mortal part of soul which remained he distributed into molds that were at once round and elongated: but he called all these forms marrow; and from these, as though from anchors, he put forth bonds to fasten all the soul, and then he wrought the entire body round about it, first building to fence it a covering of bone. And bone he formed in this way: having sifted out earth that was pure and smooth he

kneaded and soaked it with marrow, and after that he placed it in fire; and next he set it in water, and again in fire, and once more in water: and thus having shifted it many times from one to another he made it indissoluble by either. Making use of this, he carved a bony sphere thereof to surround the brain, but on one side he left a narrow outlet; and around the marrow of the neck and back he made vertebrae of bone and set them to serve as pivots, beginning at the head and carrying them through the whole length of the body. Thus to preserve all the seed he enclosed it in a strong envelope, and he made joints in it, using the power of the Other as an intermediary between the parts, for the sake of moving and bending them. But deeming that the structure of bone was too rigid and inflexible, and that should it be inflamed and cooled again, it would rot away and quickly destroy the seed within it, for this cause God devised the sinews and the flesh, that binding all the limbs together with the former he might by their tension and relaxation round their pivots enable the body to bend and extend itself; while the flesh he designed as a defense against heat and a shelter from cold; and moreover that it might be, like coverings of felt, a protection against falls, gently and easily yielding to external bodies; and containing a warm moisture within itself, in summer it might exude this, and spreading dampness on the surface might diffuse a natural coolness over all the body; but in winter on the other hand it might by its own fire afford a fair protection against the frost that assailed and surrounded it from without. Considering this, he that molded us like wax made a mixture and blending of water and fire and earth; and compounding a ferment of acid and salt he mingled it with them and produced soft flesh full of sap: the sinews he composed of bone and unfermented flesh, a separate substance having an intermediate function; and to this he added a yellow color. Accordingly the sinews

received a power more firm and tenacious than the flesh, but more soft and flexible than the bones.

With these God covered the bones and marrow; and after he had bound one part to another with sinews, he enveloped them over all with flesh. Those bones which were chiefly inhabited by soul, he enclosed with the smallest amount of flesh; but those wherein was least soul he covered most abundantly and densely with it: moreover at the joints of the bones, save where reason showed that it ought to be there, he put but little flesh, that neither it might render the body unwieldy by hindering its flexions and impeding its motions, nor again that a dense mass of flesh piled together, producing by its hardness a dullness of sensation, might render the faculties of the mind too slow of memory and hard of apprehension. Wherefore the thighs and the shins and the parts about the hips and the bones in the upper arms and the fore-arms and all parts of our limbs which are without joints, and all bones which are devoid of intelligence owing to the small amount of soul inhering in marrow within them, all these are abundantly furnished with flesh; but those which are the seat of intelligence have less: except in cases where God has formed the flesh to be in itself an organ of sensation, as for instance the tongue: in most however it is as aforesaid; for this material nature which comes into being by the law of necessity and is reared with us does not allow dense bone and much flesh to be accompanied by ready and keen perception. For had these two conditions consented to combine, the structure of the head would have displayed them in the highest degree; and the human being, bearing upon it a fleshy head, sinewy and strong, would have enjoyed a life twice, nay many times as long as now, besides being much more healthy and free from pain. But as it is, the creators who brought us to being considered whether they should make a long-lived race that was inferior, or one

more short-lived which was nobler, and they agreed that everyone must by all means choose a shorter and nobler life in preference to a longer but baser. Therefore they covered the head with thin bone, but not with flesh nor sinews, since it has no flexions. On all these grounds the head that is set upon the body of every man is much quicker of apprehension and understanding, but much weaker. For these reasons and in this manner God placed the sinews all-round the base of the head about the neck and cemented them with uniformity; and he fastened the extremities of the jaw-bones to them just under the face; and the rest he distributed over all the limbs, uniting joint to joint. And our framers ordained the functions of the mouth, furnishing it with teeth and tongue and lips, in the way it is now arranged, combining in their purpose the necessary and the best; for they devised the incoming with the necessary in view, but the outgoing with the most excellent. For all that enters in to give sustenance to the body is of necessity; but the stream of speech which flows out and ministers to understanding is of all streams the most noble and excellent. But as to the head, it was neither possible to leave it of bare bone, owing to the extremes of heat and cold in the seasons; nor yet by covering it over to allow it to become dull and senseless through the burden of flesh. Of the fleshy material as it was drying a larger film formed on the surface and separated itself; this is what is now called skin. This by the influence of the moisture of the brain combined and grew up and clothed the head all round: and the moisture rising up under the sutures saturated and closed it in on the crown, fastening it together like a knot. Now the form of the sutures is manifold, owing to the power of the soul's revolutions and of the aliment; if these contend more vehemently one with another, the sutures are more in number; but if less so, they are fewer. Now the whole of this skin was pricked all about with fire by

the divine part: and. when it was pierced and the moisture issued forth through it, all the moisture and heat which was pure vanished away; but that which was mingled with the substances whereof the skin was formed, being lifted up by the impulse, stretched far outwards, in fineness equaling the size of the puncture; but owing to the slowness of its motion it was thrust back by the surrounding air, and being forced in and rolled up under the skin it took root there. Under these conditions hair grows up in the skin, being of similar nature but of threadlike appearance, and made harder and denser by the contraction of cooling: for every hair in being separated from the skin was cooled and contracted. Hereby has our creator made our head hairy, using the means aforesaid, and conceiving that this instead of flesh should be a covering for the protection of the brain, being light and capable of affording shade from heat and shelter from cold, while it would be no hindrance in the way of ready apprehension. The threefold combination of sinew skin and bone in the fabric of the fingers, when dried, forms out of all a single hard skin, for the construction of which these substances served as means, but the true cause and purpose of its formation was the welfare of races not yet existing. For our creators were aware that men should pass into women, and afterwards into beasts; and they knew that many creatures would need the aid of nails for many purposes: wherefore at the very birth of the human race they fashioned the rudiments of nails. On such reasoning and with such purposes did they form skin and hair, and on the extremities of the limbs nails.

Now when all the parts and members of the mortal being were created in union, and since his life was made perforce dependent upon fire and air, and therefore his body suffered waste through being dissolved and left void by these, the gods devised succor for him. They engendered another

nature akin to the nature of man, blending it with other forms and sensations, so as to be another kind of animal. These are the cultivated trees and plants and seeds, which are now trained by culture and domesticated with us; but formerly there existed only the wild kinds, which are older than the cultivated. For indeed everything which partakes of life may with perfect justice and fitness be termed an animal; but the kind of which we are now speaking shares only the third form of soul, which our theory says is seated between the midriff and the navel, and which has nothing to do with opinion and reasoning and thought, but only with sensation, pleasant or painful, with appetites accompanying. For it ever continues passively receptive of all sensations, and having its circulation in itself about its own center, it rejects all motion from without and uses only its own; but its nature has not bestowed upon it any power of observing its own being and reflecting thereon. Wherefore it is indeed alive and in no wise differs from an animal, but it is stationary and rooted fast, because it has been denied the power of self-motion.

Thus did the higher powers create all these kinds as sustenance for us who were feebler; and next they made canals in the substance of our body, as though they were cutting runnels in a garden, that it might be irrigated as by an inflowing stream. And first they carried like hidden rills, under the place where the skin and the flesh are joined, two veins down the back, following the twofold division of the body into right and left. These they brought down on either side of the spine and the seminal marrow, first in order that this might be most vigorous, next that the current might have an easy flow downwards and render the irrigation regular. After that, they cleft the veins around the head, and interweaving them crossed them in opposite directions, carrying these from the right side of the body to the left and

those from the left to the right. This they did, partly in order that together with the skin they might form a bond to fasten the head to the body, seeing that it was not set round with sinews on the crown; and also that this might be a means of distributing from each side throughout the whole body the sensation due to the perceptions. And next to this they designed the irrigation on a kind of plan which we shall better discern by assuming the following premises. All bodies which are composed of smaller particles exclude the larger, but the larger cannot exclude the smaller. Fire is composed of finer particles than any other element, whence it penetrates through water and earth and air and whatever is composed of them, and nothing can keep it out. This rule must also be applied to the human belly; when food and drink enter into it, it keeps them in; but air and fire, being finer than its own structure, it cannot keep in. Accordingly „ God used these two elements for the conveyance of liquid from the belly to the veins, weaving of air and fire a network like a fish-trap or weel, having two lesser weels within with a double inlet; one of which inlets he again wove with two passages; and from the lesser weels he stretched as it were cords on all sides to the extremities of the network. All the inner part of the net he constructed of fire, but the lesser weels and the envelope he made of airy substance; and he took the net and wrapped it in manner following about the animal he had molded. The structure of the lesser weels he carried into the mouth: and, these being twofold, he let down one of them by the windpipe into the lungs, the other past the windpipe into the belly. The one weel he split in two, and let both inlets meet by the passages of the nostrils, so that when the first inlet was not in action by way of the mouth, all its currents also might be replenished from the second. But with the general surface, of the network he enveloped all the hollow part of our body; and all this, seeing it was air, he

now caused to flow gently into the lesser weels, now made them flow back upon it; and since the body is of porous texture, the network passes through it inward and again outward, and the beams of fire which are confined within follow the air as it moves in either direction: and this never ceases to go on so long as the mortal creature holds together. To this process he who appointed names gave, we say, the titles of inspiration and expiration: and from this condition, both active and passive, it has come about that our body, deriving moisture and coolness, has its sustenance and life. For when, as the respiration passes in and out, the interwoven fire within follows it and entering the belly swings up and down and meets the food and drink, it dissolves them, and reducing them to small particles, drives them along the channels through which it flows, pumping them into the veins like spring-water into conduits, and so it makes the current of the veins flow through the body as through an aqueduct.

Let us once more examine the process of respiration and the causes which have led to its present conditions. These are as follows. Since there is no void into which any-moving body could enter, and since the breath issues forth from us, the consequence is clear to everyone: instead of entering into a void space it thrusts the neighboring matter out of its place. And this, yielding to the thrust, drives before it that which is immediately nearest; and all being driven round by this compulsion enters into the place whence the breath came forth, and replenishing the same follows after the breath; and this whole process goes on like the rotation of a wheel, because there is no void. Therefore when the cavity of the chest and the lungs send forth the breath, they are again replenished by the air surrounding the body, which penetrates inwards through the flesh, seeing it is porous, and is forced round in a circuit. And again when the air

returns and passes forth through the body, it thrusts the breath back again inwards through the passages of the mouth and nostrils. The cause which sets this principle in action we may describe thus. In every animal the inner parts about the blood and veins are the hottest, as if there were a fount of fire contained in it. This is what we compare to the network of the weel, supposing that all the part extending from the middle to the sides is woven of fire, but the outer part of air. Now we must, admit that the heat naturally tends outwards to its own region and its own kin. And whereas there are two means of egress, one out through the body, the other by way of the mouth and nostrils, when it makes for one exit, it impels the air round towards the other. And the air so impelled falling into the fire is heated, but that which passes out is cooled. So the heat changes its position and the parts about the other outlet become warmer; therefore the heat now has a stronger tendency in the new direction, seeking its own affinity, and impels the air by the other passage: and this, undergoing the same change and reproducing the same process, is thus by these two impulses converted into a wheel swaying backwards and forwards, and so it gives rise to respiration.

In the same direction are we to look for the explanation of the phenomena of medical cupping-glasses and of swallowing and of projected bodies, whether cast through the air or moving along the ground; and of sounds too, which from their swiftness and slowness seem to us shrill or deep, sometimes having no harmony in their movements owing to the irregularity of the vibrations they produce in us, sometimes being harmonious through regularity. For the slower sounds overtake the motions of the first and swifter sounds, when these are already beginning to die away and have become assimilated to the motions which the slower on their arrival impart to them: and on overtaking them they do

not produce discord by the intrusion of an alien movement, but adding the commencement of a slower motion, which corresponds to that of the swifter now that the latter is beginning to cease, they form one harmonious sensation by the blending of shrill and deep. Thereby they afford pleasure to the foolish, but to the wise joy, through the imitation of the divine harmony which is given by mortal motions. And the flowing of all waters, the fall of thunderbolts, and-the wonderful attracting power of amber and of the loadstone—all these are due to no drawing power, but to two causes: first there is no void, and the atoms jostle one upon another; secondly when they are divided or contracted they change places and move severally towards their own region; and by the complication of such conditions all these wonders arise, as will be plain to him who examines them by the proper method.

The process of respiration then, whence this discussion arose, rests on the principles and causes which have been set forth: fire divides the food, following the air as it sways up and down within; and through this oscillation it replenishes the veins from the belly by pumping into them from thence the comminuted food. In this way throughout the whole body of all animals the streams of nourishment are kept constantly supplied. And the particles of food, being freshly severed and from kindred substances—some from fruits and some from herbs, which God planted just to be our sustenance, —have all manner of colors owing to their intermixture; but a red hue pervades them most of all, through the natural contrivance whereby the fire divides the food and imprints its own hue upon it: whence the color of the fluid that circulates through the body has the appearance we have described. This we call blood, which is the sustenance of the flesh and of all the body, and from which all parts draw moisture to fill up the places that are

left void. And the mode of replenishment and evacuation is like the motion of all things in the universe, whereby all kindred substances seek each other. The elements that surround us without are constantly dissolving our substance and distributing it to its several kinds, returning each to its own kindred: and again the particles of blood, being minutely- divided within us and enveloped in every creature by the body, as though by a heaven surrounding them, are forced to copy the universal motion. Therefore each of the divided particles within us is carried to its own kind and thus replenishes again what was left void. Now when the loss is greater than the replenishment, everything diminishes, but when less, it increases. The young frame then of the entire creature, having the triangles of its elements still as if fresh from the workshop, has them firmly linked one to another; but the whole mass is soft in substance, seeing that it has been newly formed out of marrow and nurtured upon milk. Now forasmuch as the triangles of the substances composing the food and drink, which enter from without and are received within the young creature, are older and feebler than those of the latter, it divides and subdues them with its new triangles, and by the assimilation of a large number nourishes and increases the animal: but when the exact outline of the triangles is blunted, because they have been for a long time struggling with many others, they are not able as of old to comminute and assimilate the entering aliment, but are themselves easily divided by the incoming particles. At such a time every living thing is enfeebled and wastes away; and this condition is termed old age. Finally when the bonds of the triangles belonging to the marrow no longer hold to their fastenings but snap asunder with the stress, they loose in their turn the bonds of the soul; and she, being in the course of nature released, flies away with gladness. For all that is contrary to

nature is painful; but whatsoever takes place in the natural way is pleasant. On the same principle death which ensues upon sickness or wounds is painful and violent; but that which draws to the natural end in the course of old age is of all deaths the least distressing and is accompanied rather by pleasure than by pain.

Now the cause whence sicknesses arise is doubtless evident to all. For seeing there are four elements of which the body is composed, earth fire water and air, any unnatural excess or defect of these or change of position from their own to an alien region, and also—since there are more than one kind of fire and the other elements—the reception by each of an unfitting kind, and other such causes, all combine to produce discord and disease. For when any of them changes its nature and position, the parts that formerly were cool are heated, and those that were dry become afterwards moist, and the light become heavy, and all undergo every kind of change. The only way we allow in which one and the same substance can remain whole and unchanged and sound is that the same element should be added to it or taken away from it on the "same principle and in the same manner and proportion; and whatsoever errs in any of these points in its outgoings or incomings causes a vast diversity of vicissitudes and diseases and destructions. Next in the secondary structures which are in a natural state of union a second class of diseases may be discerned by one who would scrutinize them. For whereas marrow and bone and flesh and sinew are composed of the four elements, and blood is formed of the same though in a different way, most of the diseases arise in the manner before explained, but the gravest afflict them with especial severity in the following way: that is to say, when the order of their generation is reversed, these structures are then destroyed. For in the course of nature flesh and sinews arise from blood, the

sinews from the fibrine, owing to their affinity; the flesh from the clots which are formed when the fibrine is separated. From the sinews and flesh again proceeds a glutinous and oily fluid, which not only cements the flesh to the structure of the bones and itself gives nourishment and growth to the bone which encloses the marrow, but also so much of it as filters through the dense substance of the bones, being formed of the purest and smoothest and most slippery kind of the triangles, as it distils and oozes from the bones, irrigates the marrow. When these structures are produced in this order, health is the result as a rule; but when this is reversed, sickness ensues. For when the flesh decomposes and returns the deliquescent matter to the veins, then is mingled with air in the veins much blood of manifold kinds, with diverse hues and bitter qualities, as well as acid and saline properties; and this contains all kinds of bile and serum and phlegm. For as all these are going the wrong way and have become corrupt, first they ruin the blood itself, and furnishing no nutriment to the body rush in all directions through the veins, paying no heed to the periods appointed by nature, but at war one with another, because they have no good of each other; at war also with all that is established and fixed in the body, which they corrupt and dissolve. Now when the oldest part of the flesh is decomposed, being hard to soften, it turns black through long-continued burning, and through being everywhere corroded it is bitter and dangerous to whatever part of the body it attacks which is not yet corrupted. Sometimes this black sort is acid instead of bitter, when the bitterness is more refined away; and again the bitter sort being steeped in blood gains a redder hue; and when black is mingled with this, it is greenish: sometimes too a yellow color is added to the bitterness, when new flesh is decomposed by the fire of the inflammation. To all these symptoms the general name of bile has been given,

either by physicians, or by someone who in looking at many dissimilar appearances was able to see one universal quality pervading them all which deserved a name. All other kinds of bile which are reckoned have their several descriptions according to their color. Of lymph, one kind is the mild serum of blood, —the other is an acrid secretion of black and acid bile, when that is blended through inflammation with a saline property: this kind is called acid phlegm. But that which is formed in conjunction with air by the liquefaction of new and tender flesh, —when it is inflated with air enveloped by moisture, and through this condition bubbles are formed, invisible separately because of their smallness, but all together becoming visible in the mass and presenting a white color to view by the formation of froth—this liquefaction of tender flesh in combination with air we term white phlegm. And the serum of freshly formed phlegm is sweat and tears, and whatever other secretions purify the body from day to day. All these become a means of disease, when the blood is not replenished from the food and drink in the natural way, but receives its volume in the contrary manner in despite of nature's laws. Now when the flesh is anywhere pierced by disease, but the foundations of it remain intact, the malady has only half its power; for there is still the prospect of ready recovery. But when that which unites' the flesh to the bones is diseased, and in turn no longer by distilling both from the fibers and sinews nourishes the bones and cements the flesh to them, but instead of being oily and smooth and glutinous becomes harsh and saline and shriveled through an unhealthy habit of life, under these conditions all that substance crumbles away under the flesh and the sinews and separates from the bones; while the flesh, falling away from its foundations, leaves the sinews bare and full of brine, and itself falling back into the current of the blood aggravates the diseases

that have been described. But distressing as are these symptoms which affect the body, yet more serious are those which are prior in order; when the bones, owing to denseness of the flesh, cannot get sufficient air and becoming moldy and heated decay away, and while they will not receive their nourishment, crumble down and return by a reversed process into their nourishing fluid, and that in its turn passing into flesh, and the flesh into blood, they render all the diseases more virulent than those already mentioned. The most desperate case of all is when the substance of the marrow becomes diseased by any defect or excess: this produces the most serious and fatal disorders, seeing that the whole nature of the body is forced to proceed in a backward course.

A third class of diseases we must conceive as occurring in three ways: one by the agency of air, the second of phlegm, the third of bile. For when the lungs, which are the dispensers of air to the body, do not keep their passages clear, because they are impeded by catarrhs, the air, failing to pass through some, and in others entering with a volume unduly great, causes the decomposition of the parts which lack their supply of air, and forces its way through the channels of the veins and dislocates them, and dissolving the body it is confined amid its substance, occupying the midriff; and so countless painful diseases are produced from these causes, accompanied by excessive sweat. Often too when the flesh is broken up, air is formed in the body, and being unable to find an exit it produces the same torments as are caused by the air which enters in; the most severe of all, when gathering and swelling up around the sinews and the blood-vessels in these parts it strains the tendons of the shoulders and the muscles attached to them in a backward direction: and owing to the intense strain produced in this condition these affections are called tetanus and

opisthotonus. For these the remedy is severe: for in fact fevers supervening chiefly give relief in such cases. The white phlegm when intercepted is dangerous owing to the air in the bubbles: but when it finds an escape to the surface of the body it is more mild; yet it disfigures the person by engendering scabs and leprosies and kindred maladies. Sometimes it is mingled with black bile and is shed upon the revolutions in the head, which are the most divine, and confounds them; and if this occurs during sleep, the effects are milder, but if in the waking hours, it is harder to relieve. This, as affecting the sacred part, is justly called the sacred disease. Acid and saline phlegm is the source of all diseases that take the form of catarrh: and these have received manifold names according to the diverse places in which the discharge takes place. Inflammations in various parts of the body, so called from the heat and burning that occurs, are all due to bile. When they have egress, they seethe up and send forth all kinds of pustules; but if they are suppressed within, they cause many inflammatory diseases; of which the worst is when the inflammation entering into pure blood carries away from its proper place the fibrine which was distributed through the blood in order that it might preserve a due measure of thinness and thickness and neither be so much liquefied by heat as to flow out through the porous texture of the body, nor become sluggish from excessive density and circulate with difficulty in the veins. Now the fibrine by the nature of its composition preserves the due mean in these respects. For if from blood that is dead and beginning to cool the fibrine be gathered apart, the rest of the blood is dissipated; but if the fibrine be allowed to remain, by the help of the cold air surrounding, it quickly congeals it. The fibrine then in the blood having this property, bile which is naturally formed of old blood and is dissolved again into blood out of the flesh, enters warm and

liquid into the blood, at first gradually, and is condensed by the power of the fibrine; and as it is condensed and forced to cool, it produces internal chill and shivering. But when a greater quantity flows in, it subdues the fibrine with its heat, and boiling up scatters it abroad; and if it is able to obtain the mastery to the end, it penetrates to the substance of the marrow, and consuming it looses from thence the bonds of the soul, as it were the moorings of a ship, and sets her free. But when the bile is too feeble for this, and the body holds out against the dissolution, itself is vanquished, and cither is expelled by an eruption over the whole body, or is driven through the veins into the lower or upper belly, like an exile banished from a city that has been at civil war; and as it issues forth from the body, it causes diarrhea and dysentery and all diseases of that kind.

When a body has been stricken with sickness chiefly through excess of fire, it exhibits continued inflammations and fevers; excess of air causes quotidian fevers; excess of water tertian, because it is more sluggish than air or fire; excess of earth, which is by four measures most sluggish of all, being purged in a fourfold period of time, gives rise to quartan fevers, and is with difficulty banished.

Such are the conditions connected with diseases of the body; those of the soul depend upon bodily habit in the following way. We must allow that disease of the soul is senselessness; and of this there are two forms, madness and stupidity. Every condition then in which a man suffers from either of these must be termed a disease. We must also affirm that the gravest maladies of the soul are excessive pleasures or pains. For if a man is under the influence of excessive joy, or, on the other hand, of extreme pain, and is eager unduly to grasp the one or shun the other, he is able neither to see nor to hear anything aright; he is delirious, and at that moment entirely unable to obey reason.

In whomsoever the seed in the region of the marrow is abundant and fluid and like a tree that is fruitful beyond due measure, he feels from time to time many a sore pang and many a delight amid his passions and their fruits; and he becomes mad for the greater part of his life owing to the intensity of pleasures and pains, keeping his soul in a state of disease and derangement through the power of the body; he is not however regarded as sick, but as willingly vicious. But the truth is that incontinence in sensual pleasures is a disease of the soul for the most part arising from the fluid and moist condition of one element in the body owing to porousness of the bones. So it is too with nearly all intemperance in pleasure; and the reproach attaching thereto, as if men were willingly vicious, is incorrectly brought against them. For no one is willingly wicked; but it is owing to some bad habit of body and unenlightened training that the wicked man becomes wicked; and these are always unwelcome and imposed against his will. And where pains are concerned, the soul likewise derives much evil from the body. For where the humors of acid and salt phlegms and those that are bitter and bilious roam about the body and find no outlet to the surface, but being pent up within and blending their own exhalations with the movement of the soul are mingled therewith, they induce all kinds of mental diseases, more or less violent and serious: and rushing to the three regions of the soul, in the part which each attacks they multiply manifold forms of moroseness and melancholy, of rashness and timidity, of forgetfulness and dullness. And when, besides these vicious conditions, there are added bad governments and bad principles maintained in public and private speech; when moreover no studies to be an antidote are pursued from youth "up, then it is that all of us who are wicked become so, owing to two causes entirely beyond our own control. The

blame must lie rather with those who train than with those who are trained, with the educators than the educated: however we must use our utmost zeal by education, pursuits, and studies to shun vice and embrace virtue. This subject however belongs to a different branch of inquiry.

The counterpart to what has been said, the treatment of body and mind and the principles by which they are preserved, were the proper and fitting complement of our discourse: for it is more just to dwell upon good than upon evil. All that is good is fair, and what is fair is not disproportionate. Accordingly an animal that is to be fair must, we affirm, be well-proportioned. Now the smaller proportions we discern and reason upon them; but of the greatest and most momentous we take no account. For in view of health and sickness and virtue and vice no proportion or disproportion is more important than that existing between body and soul themselves: yet we pay no heed to these, nor do we reflect that if a feebler and smaller frame be the vehicle of a soul that is strong and mighty in all respects; or if the relation between the two be reversed, then the entire creature is not fair; for it is defective in the most essential proportions. But the opposite condition Is to him who can discern it of all sights the fairest and loveliest. For example, a body which possesses legs of excessive length or which is unsymmetrical owing to any other disproportion, is not only ugly, but in taking its share of labor brings infinite distress on itself, suffering frequent fatigue and spasms, and often falling in consequence of inability to control its motions: the same then we must suppose to hold good of the combination of soul and body which we call an animal; when the soul in it is more powerful than the body and of ardent temperament, she agitates it and fills it from within with sickness; and when she impetuously pursues some study or research, she wastes the body away: and in

giving instruction and conducting discussions private or public in a spirit of contention and rivalry, she inflames and weakens its fabric and brings on chills; and thus deceiving most of the so-called physicians induces them to assign causes for the malady which are really in no way concerned with it. When on the other hand a large body, too great for the soul, is joined with a small and feeble mind, —two kinds of appetites being natural to mankind, on account of the body a craving for nourishment and on account of the divinest part of us for knowledge—the motions of the stronger prevail and strengthen their faculty, but that of the soul they render dull and slow of learning and of recollection, and so produce stupidity, the most grievous of maladies. There is but one safeguard against both these misfortunes: neither should the soul be exercised without the body nor the body without the soul, in order that they may be a match for each other and attain balance and health. So the mathematician, or whosoever is intensely absorbed in any intellectual study, must allow corresponding exercise to his body, submitting to athletic training; while he who is careful in forming his body must in turn give due exercise to his soul, calling in the aid of art and of all philosophy, if he is justly to be called at once fair and in the true sense good. The same treatment too should be applied to the separate parts, in imitation of the fashion of the All. For as the body is inflamed and cooled within by the particles that enter, and again is dried and moistened by those that are outside, and by the agency of these two forces suffers all that ensues upon these conditions, if "we submit the body passively to the forces aforesaid, it is overcome and destroyed: but if we imitate what we have called the fostress and nurse of the All, and allow the body, if possible, never to be inactive, but keep it astir and, exciting continual vibrations in it, furnish it with the natural defense against the motions from without and

within; and by moderately exercising it bring into orderly relation with each other according to their affinities the affections and particles that are going astray in the body; then, as we have already described in speaking of the universe, we shall not suffer mutually hostile particles to be side by side and to engender discord and disease in the body, but we shall set friend beside friend so as to bring about a healthy state. Of all motions that which arises in any body by its own action is the best (for it is most nearly allied to the motion of thought and of the All), but that which is brought about by other agency is inferior; and the worst of all is that which, while the body is lying still, is produced by other agents which move it piecemeal. Accordingly of all modes of purifying and restoring the body gymnastic is the best; the next best is any swinging motion such as of sailing or any other conveyance of the body which does not tire it: a third kind is useful sometimes under absolute necessity, but in no other circumstances should be employed by a judicious person, I mean medical purgation effected by drugs. No disease, not involving imminent danger, should be irritated by drugs. For every form of sickness has a certain correspondence to the nature of living creatures. Their constitution is so ordered as to have definite periods of life both for the kind and for the individual, which has its own fixed span of existence, always excepting inevitable accidents. For the triangles of each creature are composed at the very outset with the capacity of holding out for a certain definite time; beyond which its life cannot be prolonged. The same applies also to the constitution of diseases; if these are interfered with by medicine to the disregard of their appointed period, it often happens that a few slight maladies are rendered numerous and grave. Wherefore we should guide all such sicknesses by careful

living, so far as we have time to attend to it, and not provoke a troublesome mischief by medical treatment.

Now so far as concerns the animate creature and the bodily part of it, how a man, guiding the latter and by himself being guided, should live a most rational life, let this discussion suffice. But the part which is to guide the body must beforehand be trained with still greater care to be most perfect and efficient for education. To deal with this subject minutely would in itself be a sufficient task: but if we may merely touch upon it in conformity with our previous discourse, we should find a consistent answer to the question from the following reflections. As we have often said, three forms of soul with threefold functions are implanted in us, and each of these has its proper motions. Accordingly we may say as briefly as possible that whichever of these continues in idleness and keeps its own motions inactive, this must needs become the weakest; but that which is in constant exercise waxes strongest: wherefore we must see that they exercise their motions in due proportion. As to the supreme form of soul that is within us, we must believe that God has given it to each of us as a guiding genius—even that which we say, and say truly, dwells in the summit of our body and raises us from earth towards our celestial affinity, seeing we are of no earthly, but of heavenly growth: since to heaven, whence in the beginning was the birth of our soul, the diviner part attaches the head or root of us and makes our whole body upright. Now whoso is busied with appetites or ambitions and labors hard after these, all the thoughts of his heart must be altogether mortal; and so far as it is possible for him to become utterly mortal, he falls no whit short of this; for this is what he has been fostering. But he whose heart has been set on the love of learning and on true wisdom, and has chiefly exercised this part of himself, this man must without fail have

thoughts that are immortal and divine, if he lay hold upon the truth; and so far as it lies in human nature to possess immortality, he lacks nothing thereof; and seeing that he ever cherishes the divinest part and keeps in good estate the guardian spirit that dwells in him, he must be happy above all. And the care of this is always the same for every man, to wit that he assign to every part its proper exercise and nourishment. To the divine part of us are akin the thoughts and revolutions of the All: these every man should follow, restoring the revolutions in the head, that are marred through our earthly birth, by learning to know the harmonies and revolutions of the All, so as to render the thinking soul like the object of its thought according to her primal nature: and when he has made it like, so shall he have the fulfilment of that most excellent life that was set by the gods before mankind for time present and time to come.

Thus then the task laid upon us at the beginning, to set forth the nature of the universe down to the generation of man, seems well-nigh to have reached its fulfilment. For the manner of the generation of other animals we may deal with in brief, so there be no need to speak at length: thus shall we in our own eyes preserve due measure in our account of them. Let us then state it in this way. Of those who were born as men, such as were cowardly and spent their life in unrighteousness, were, according to the probable account, transformed into women at the second incarnation. At that time the gods for these reasons invented the love of sexual intercourse, in that they created one kind of animate nature in men and another in women, which two they formed in the following way. To the channel of the drink, where it receives the fluid passing down through the lungs beneath the kidneys into the bladder and sends it forth by pressure of the air, they opened a passage into the column of marrow which runs from the head down the neck and along the

spine, and which we have already termed the seed. This, being quick with soul and finding an outlet, gave to the part where it found the outlet a lively desire of egress and produced a longing to generate. Wherefore the nature of the generative part in man is disobedient and headstrong, like a creature that will not listen to reason, and endeavors to have all its will because of its frantic passions; and again for the same reason what is called the matrix and womb in women, which is in them a living nature appetent of child-bearing, when it is a long time fruitless beyond the due season, is distressed and sorely disturbed, and straying about in the body and cutting off the passages of the breath it impedes respiration and brings the sufferer into the extremest anguish and provokes all manner of diseases besides; until the passion and love of both unite them, and, as it were plucking fruit from a tree, sow in the womb, as if in a field, living things invisible for smallness and unformed, and again separating them nourish them within till they grow large, and finally bringing them to light complete the birth of a living creature. Such is the nature of women and all that is female. The tribe of birds was transformed, by growing feathers instead of hair, from men that were harmless but light-minded; who were students of the heavenly bodies, but fancied in their simpleness that the demonstrations were most sure concerning them which they obtained through the sight. And the race of brutes that walk on dry land comes from those who sought not the aid of philosophy at all nor inquired into the nature of the universe, because they used no longer the revolutions in the head, but followed as their guides the parts of the soul that are in the breast. From these practices their front limbs and their heads were by their natural affinity drawn towards the ground and there supported; and their heads were lengthened out and took all sorts of forms, just as the orbits in each were crushed out of

shape through disuse. For the same reason such races were made four-footed and many-footed; for God gave many props to the more senseless creatures, that they might the more be drawn earthward. As to the most senseless of all, whose whole bodies were altogether stretched at length on the earth, seeing they had no longer any need of feet, God made them footless to crawl upon the ground. And the fourth class that lives in the water was formed of the most utterly foolish and senseless of all, whom they that transfigured them thought not worthy even of pure respiration, because their soul was polluted with all manner of iniquity; but in place of inhaling the fine pure element of air they were thrust into the turbid and lowly respiration of water. Hence is the tribe of fishes and of all shell-fish that live in the water; which have the uttermost dwelling-place in penalty for the uttermost folly. In such manner then and now all creatures change places one with another, rising or falling with the loss or gain of understanding or of folly.

And now let us declare that our discourse concerning this All has reached its end. Having received all mortal and immortal creatures and being therewithal replenished, this universe hath thus come into being, living and visible, containing all things that are visible, the image of its maker, a god perceptible, most mighty and good, most fair and perfect, even this one and only-begotten world that is.

The Timaeus.

Translated by Henry Davis.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Timæus, Critias, Hermocrates.

Socrates/ One, two, three: —but where, dear Timæus, is that fourth of us who yesterday were your guests, but are entertainers now?

Timæus/ Some illness has befallen him, Socrates; for he would not willingly have missed such a meeting as the present.

Socrates/ It is your business, then, of yourself, and that of these present, to fill up the place of the absent guest.

Timæus/ Quite so, Socrates; and, as far as we can, we will not fail to do so: for it would be unjust for the rest of us, whom you yesterday so handsomely entertained, not to treat you with readiness in return.

Socrates/ Do you recollect, then, the magnitude and nature of the things on which I charged you to speak?

Timæus/ Some, indeed, we do recollect; but what we do not, you, who were present, can recall to our memory: or rather, if it be not too much trouble, once more briefly run over the whole from the beginning, that it may be the more firmly established in our minds.

Socrates/ Be it so. The sum of yesterday's discussion respecting a republic was, what form I thought the best, and of what sort of men it should be composed.

Timæus/ And indeed, Socrates, all that you said was quite according to our mind.

Socrates/ Did we not in the first place separate the class of husbandmen, and ever so many other artificers, from that of those who fight in defense of the state?

Timæus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when we had assigned to everyone that single employment which was suited to his own nature, and had prescribed to each his particular art, we bade the military caste confine themselves to the simple duty of protecting the state from the hostile incursions both of internal and external foes; —mildly to administer justice to their subjects, as being naturally friends, but fiercely to combat with such foes as might fall in their way.

Timæus/ Quite so, of course.

Socrates/ We asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should be naturally high-spirited, and at the same time remarkably philosophic, so as to enable them towards either friends or foes respectively to be gentle or severe.

Timæus/ You did so.

Socrates/ But what about their training? Did we not say that they ought to be instructed in gymnastic exercises, music, and other suitable branches of science?

Timæus/ Yes.

Socrates/ With respect at least to those thus trained, it was somehow said, that they should regard neither gold nor silver nor any such property, as their own private possession, but rather, like subordinates, should receive the wages of their guardianship from those whom they defend and preserve, their recompense being no more than sufficient for temperate men, and that they should spend their income in common, with a view only to mutual subsistence, bestowing their attention wholly on virtue, in preference to every other pursuit.

Timæus/ This too was so stated.

Socrates/ Respecting women, too, we asserted that their nature should be aptly conformed to resemble that of men, and that they should all engage in common with them, both in the duties of war and the other employments of life.

Timæus/ This too you alleged.

Socrates/ But what about the procreation of children? This perhaps you easily remember, on account of the novelty of the proposal; for we ordered that marriage-unions and children should be in common to all persons whatsoever, special care being taken also that no one should be able to distinguish his own children individually, but all consider all as their kindred; regarding those of an equal age, and in the prime of life, as their brothers and sisters, —those prior to them, and yet further back, as parents and grandsires, —and those below them, as their children and grandchildren.

Timæus/ Aye, —these things too, in the way you describe them, are easily remembered.

Socrates/ That they might at once acquire then the best possible natural disposition, I recollect that we decreed that the rulers, male and female, whom we placed over the marriage contract, should secretly contrive, through certain lots, that the worthy should assort only with the worthy, the base with the base, —and that no discord might arise from this connection, we should refer all the blame of the union to fortune alone.

Timæus/ This, too, we remember.

Socrates/ We ordered, moreover, that the children of the good should be properly trained, but those of the bad secretly sent to the other part of the state, while of those who are constantly arriving at manhood, such as are found to be of a good disposition, should be recalled from exile; those, among them, on the contrary, who have proved themselves

unworthy, being in their turn banished to the place occupied by those just promoted.

Timæus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Have we, then, sufficiently summed up yesterday's discussion; or do we need anything further, friend Timæus, that has been omitted?

Timæus/ By no means, Socrates; for these were the very things discussed.

Socrates/ You shall now hear some further details respecting the republic that we have described, and how I feel towards it. The feeling, then, seems to me somewhat similar to this, —as if someone, on beholding beautiful animals, either wrought by the gravers art, or really alive, but in a state of perfect rest, were to entertain a desire to behold them in motion, struggling, as it were, in those exercises which seem best suited to their bodies. Just the same do I feel towards that form of state which we have described; for I should gladly listen to anyone who recited the story of the contests that one state engages in with others, when it ventures becomingly on war, and exhibits in the course of it a conduct worthy of its nurture and training, as regards both active encounters and verbal negotiations with individual states. On these points, indeed, Critias and Hermocrates, I am conscious of my own inability to praise the men and the state according to their desert; and that I should be so incapable is no wonder, is I have formed the same opinion respecting the poets both of the past and present age; —not that I despise the poet-tribe, but still everyone must see, that being an imitative race, they most easily and in the best manner imitate those things in which they have been trained; while, on the contrary, whatever is unconnected with their training, is hard for them to imitate well even in actions, and in words even yet more difficult.

And as for the tribe of Sophists, I deem them indeed mighty clever, both in multiplying words and many other fine accomplishments; yet I fear, as they have no settled abode, but wander through various cities, and dwell in no abode of their own, they will form false conjectures respecting both philosophers and politicians, as to the magnitude and nature both of the actions which they achieve in war, and of the words they employ in their mutual intercourse. The only people remaining, then, to whom I can apply, are those of your character and habit, versed both by nature and training in philosophy and political science. For Timæus here of Locris, in Italy, which is governed by the best of laws, being withal not inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in wealth and nobility, has in his own state attained to the highest official honors, and has likewise in my opinion reached the summit of all philosophy. Critias, too, as we all know, is not ignorant of the particulars that we are now mentioning; —and respecting Hermocrates also, we have ample testimony for the belief that he is both by nature and education well suited to all these pursuits. Hence, when I perceived yesterday your great anxiety to discuss the formation of a republic, I was much pleased at it, being well aware, that if you pleased, none could better unfold the successive points for discussion; —inasmuch as, by properly adapting the state for warlike purposes, you would be the only person in the present age who could supply it with all things becoming its constitution. Having spoken, then, in compliance with your request, I now require you, in your turn, to comply with mine; and, as a matter of course, you have agreed to carry on the discussion among yourselves in common and so forthwith repay my hospitality with the feast of reasoning. Here, therefore, am I arrayed for the purpose, and readiest of all to partake of the promised banquet.

Hermocrates/ Aye, truly, Socrates, as Timæus here just observed, neither will we lack zeal in fulfilling your desire; nor will we offer any excuse for neglecting it; since only yesterday, just after leaving this, when we went to the lodging of Critias, where both there and before that on the way thither, we discussed this very subject. He here then unfolded to us a story from ancient tradition, which—prythee, Critias, even now repeat to Socrates, that he may judge whether or not it concerns his demand.

Critias/ This we must surely do, if agreeable to Timæus, our third partner in this discussion.

Timæus/ I, for my part, fully consent.

Critias/ Listen now then, Socrates, to a story very strange indeed, yet in every respect true, as it was once related by Solon, the wisest of the seven sages of Greece. He was the kinsman and intimate friend of our great-grandfather Dropides, as he himself often tells us in his poems; and he Dropides informed our grandfather Critias as the old man himself in turn told us, that this state had formerly achieved great and admirable actions, the knowledge of which nevertheless had been lost through lapse of time and the decay of mankind, —one act in particular being more illustrious than the rest, —in remembrance of which it were fitting, that we should not only return you thanks, but also in full assembly hymn forth to the goddess our true and just acclaim of praise.

Socrates/ Well observed: —but what is this achievement, which Critias described as having been net only related by Solon, but really accomplished by this state in days of yore?

Critias/ I will acquaint you with that ancient story, which I indeed received from no mere youth; for at that time Critias, as he himself said, was almost ninety years old, and I myself about ten; and it chanced then to be the time of the *Cureotis*

Apaturiorum The boys indeed were then going through the ceremonies customary with them at this festival; —for our parents proposed prizes for singing verses; and therefore a multitude of verses of many poets were recited, and many of us especially sang the poems of Solon, as being at that time new. Then one of our tribe, whether it was his real opinion or he wished to gratify Critias, said he thought Solon not only the wisest of men in matters generally, but as regards poetry the most noble of all poets. On hearing this, the old man for I well remember it was exceedingly pleased, and said, laughing—'If Solon, oh Amynander, had not considered poetry as a mere amusement, but made it, as others do, a serious employment, and so completed the history which he had brought from Egypt; and, had not been forced to relinquish it by the seditions and numerous other troubles in which he found his country involved, I do not think that either Hesiod, Homer, or any other poet, would have acquired more distinguished renown.' 'And what was that story, Critias?' asked he. 'One about an action,' replied he, 'the greatest and most celebrated, which this state ever achieved; although, through lapse of time and the death of those by whom it was undertaken, its fame has not descended to our own day.' 'Tell it,' said he, 'from the beginning; and say what that was, which Solon asserted as true, as well as how and from whom he heard it.'

'In Egypt.' said he, 'in the Delta, about the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided, is the district νομός surnamed Saitical; the chief city of which is Sais, whence also came the king Amasis; and it had a presiding divinity, whose name is in the Egyptian tongue Neith, which they say corresponds with the Greek Athena; and the people profess to be great friends of the Athenians, and united with them in a sort of close alliance. Solon said that on his arrival thither, he was very honorably received; and, especially, on

his inquiring about ancient affairs of those priests who possessed superior knowledge in such matters, he perceived that neither himself nor anyone of the Greeks so to speak had any antiquarian knowledge at all. And once on a time desirous of inducing them to narrate their ancient stories, he undertook to describe those events which had formerly happened among us in days of yore, —those about the first Phoroneus and Niobe, and again after the deluge of Deucalion and Pyrrha as described by the mythologists, together with their posterity, paying due attention to the different ages in which these events are said to have occurred: —on which one of their extremely ancient priests exclaimed, "Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, and aged Greek there is none." Solon, on hearing this, replied, "How can you say this?" To whom the priest, "You are all youths in intelligence; for you hold no ancient opinions derived from remote tradition, nor any system of discipline that can boast of a hoary old age: —and the cause of this is the multitude and variety of destructions that have been and will be undergone by the human race, the greater indeed arising from fire and water, others of less importance from ten thousand other contingencies. The story, for instance, that is current among you, that Phaeton, the offspring of the Sun, once attempting to drive his father's chariot, and not being able to keep the track observed by his parent, burnt up the surface of the earth, and perished himself, blasted by lightning, is generally regarded as fabulous, but in point of fact it refers to a declination or parallax of the heavenly bodies revolving round the earth, and indicates that, at certain long intervals of time, the earth's surface is destroyed by mighty fires. When this occurs, then those who dwell either on mountains, or in lofty and dry places, perish in greater numbers than those dwelling near rivers, or on the sea-shore; —whereas to us

the Nile is not only our safeguard from all other troubles, but liberates and preserves us also from this in particular; —and again when the gods, to purify the earth, deluge its surface with water, then the herdsmen and shepherds on the mountains are preserved in safety, while the inhabitants of your cities are hurried away to the sea, by the impetuosity of the rivers. In this our country, on the other hand, the waters neither then fell, nor ever have fallen from above upon the plains, but on the contrary are naturally driven upwards from the earth's interior: —and to these causes it is owing, that the most ancient things are said to be here preserved. The truth is, however, that in all places where there is neither intense cold nor immoderate heat, the race of man is always found to exist, sometimes in less, sometimes in greater number. And all the noble, great, or otherwise distinguished achievements, performed either by ourselves, or by you, or elsewhere, of which we have heard the report, —all these have been engraven in our temples in very remote times, and preserved to the present day; while, on the contrary, with you and all other nations, they are only just committed to writing, and all other modes of transmission which states require, —when again, at the usual period, a current from heaven rushes on them like a pestilence, and leaves the survivors among you both destitute of literary attainments and unacquainted with music; —and thus you become young again, as at first, knowing nothing of the events of ancient times, either in our country or yours. As for the transactions, indeed, Solon, which you have just related from your antiquities, they differ but little from puerile fables: —for in the first place you only mention one deluge of the earth, whereas there had been many before; and in the next place you are unacquainted with that most noble and excellent race of men, who once inhabited your country, from whom you and your whole

present state are descended, though only a small remnant of this admirable people is now remaining, —your ignorance in this matter resulting from the fact that their posterity for many generations died without the power of speech through the medium of letters; for long before the chief deluge, a city of Athenians existed, regulated by the best laws both in military and all other matters, whose noble deeds and civil institutions are said to have been the most excellent of all that we have heard to exist under heaven."

'Solon, on hearing this, expressed his admiration, and exhibited the most ardent desire, entreating the priests to relate to him accurately and in order the whole history of his ancient fellow-citizens. And then one of the priests replied, "I have no objection, Solon; and for your sake, and that of your city, I will relate the whole, and more particularly on account of that goddess, to whom is assigned the guardianship both of your state and ours, and by whom both have been founded and fostered; yours indeed having a priority over ours of a thousand years, from having received its origin from Hephæstus and the Earth; and the annals even of our own city Sais have been preserved eight thousand years in our sacred writings. I will briefly describe, then, the laws and more illustrious actions of those states which have existed nine thousand years; and when we are more at leisure, we will take the sacred writings themselves, and recount an exact history of every particular.

'"Now, consider the laws of these people, as compared with those prevailing here; for you will find here even at the present day many examples of institutions that formerly existed in your city. First of all, the priests passed their life separate from all the rest; and next, the artificers so exercised their crafts, that each followed his own employment without mingling with any other class of workmen. The same method was likewise adopted with

shepherds, hunters, and husbandmen. The soldiers, too, you will find, were separated from other kinds of men, and were enjoined by the laws to engage in nothing but war. The armor, too, which each employed, such as shields and darts, resembled that which we used first of all the Asiatics, —the goddess in those places, as she did to you, first pointing out their use. Again, with respect to wisdom, you may perceive what attention the law paid to it even from the first, as likewise to all that respects the universe, including even divination and medicine, that conduces to the preservation of health; and from these, which are divine things, the inquiry proceeds to human affairs and all other branches of learning therewith connected. Such then was the principle of distribution and arrangement on which the goddess first founded and established your state, choosing for that purpose the place in which you were born; because she foresaw that from its excellent temperature, the region would produce men of the most consummate wisdom; and, the goddess, of course, being a lover both of wisdom and war, selected a spot likely to produce men most resembling herself; and fixed on this first as their settled abode. You proceeded to settle, then, under the protection of such like laws, and what is more, under good government, surpassing all men likewise in every virtue, as becomes the descendants and disciples of the gods.

"'Many and mighty deeds of your state, then, are here recorded in writing in our sacred records, and call forth our admiration; nevertheless there is one in particular, which in magnitude and valor surpasses them all; —for these writings relate what a prodigious force your city once overcame, when a mighty warlike power, rushing from the Atlantic sea, spread itself with hostile fury over all Europe and Asia. That sea indeed as then navigable, and had an island fronting that mouth which you in your tongue call the Pillars of

Hercules; and this island was larger than Libya and Asia put together; and there was a passage hence for travelers of that day to the rest of the islands, as well as from those islands to the whole opposite continent that surrounds that the real sea. For as respects what is within the mouth here mentioned, it appears to be a bay with a kind of narrow entrance; and that sea is indeed a true sea, and the land that entirely surrounds it may truly and most correctly be called a continent. In this Atlantic island, then, was formed a powerful league of kings, who subdued the entire island, together with many others, and parts also of the continent; besides which they subjected to their rule the inland parts of Libya, as far as Egypt, and Europe also, as far as Tyrrhenia. The whole of this force, then, being collected in a powerful league, undertook at one blow to enslave both your country and ours, and all the land besides that lies within the mouth. This was the period, Solon, when the power of your state was universally celebrated for its virtue and strength; —for, surpassing all others both in magnanimity and military skill, sometimes taking the lead of the Greek nation, at others left to itself by the defection of the rest, and brought into the most extreme danger, it still prevailed, raised the trophy over its assailants, kept from slavery those not as yet enslaved, insured likewise the most ample liberty for all of us without exception who dwell within the Pillars of Hercules. Subsequently, however, through violent earthquakes and deluges which brought desolation in a single day and night, the whole of your warlike race was at once merged under the earth; and the Atlantic island itself was plunged beneath the sea, and entirely disappeared; —whence even now that sea is neither navigable nor to be traced out, being blocked up by the great depth of mud which the subsiding island produced."

The above, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated from the narration of Solon: —and when yesterday you were discoursing about a republic and the citizens composing it, I was reminded to my surprise of what I have now mentioned; for I perceived how divinely, as it were, by a kind of good luck, and without wandering from the mark, you in most respects coincided with Solon's statement. Still I was unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately; since, from the long lapse of time since I first heard them, I did not remember them with sufficient accuracy for repetition. I considered, therefore, that I ought, before relating it, first of all to rehearse the whole diligently to myself. And this was why I yesterday speedily complied with your demands, conceiving, as is most important in such matters, that we ought not to lack ability to present a discourse suited to the object in view. Hence was it, as Hermocrates here observed, that as soon as we left here yesterday, I brought up the subject before my friends here, in order to refresh my memory; and by afterwards meditating on it at night, I acquired nearly a complete recollection of the whole story. According to the proverb, indeed, what we learn in childhood takes a wonderful hold on the memory: —for with respect to myself, for instance, I am not certain that I could recall the whole of yesterday's discourse, though I should be very much astonished if anything that I had heard a very long time ago were to escape my remembrance. What I then heard, indeed, was listened to with great pleasure and delight; and the old man very readily recounted it, even when I frequently asked for a repetition; and thus the story became like the brands of indelible writing fixed in my memory. Well then, as soon as it was day I repeated the narrative to my friends, that they might aid me in fairly recounting my story. Now, therefore, as respects the object of all that has been said, Socrates, I am prepared to relate, not only the general

heads, but the particulars also of all that I heard. As for the citizens and state which you described to us yesterday as in a fable, we will now convert it into a reality, and consider the state established by you as no other than this of Athens, and the citizens which you described as no other than those real ancestors of ours, alluded to by the Egyptian priests. Indeed they will harmonize in every respect; and we shall not be far from the mark in asserting that your citizens are the very people who existed at that time. Each taking our share then in this discussion, we will try our utmost to bestow suitable attention to the task that you have assigned us. It is requisite therefore to consider, O Socrates, whether this narrative answers our purpose, or we should seek some other in its stead.

Socrates/ And what other, O Critias, can we receive in preference to this, which, from its affinity, is extremely suitable to the festival of the goddess, and has the all-important merit of being not a cunningly devised fable, but a true history? It is impossible, therefore, to say, how and whence, if we abandon your narrative, we should find another more suitable. We cannot; but must acknowledge that you have been happy in your narration; and, as for me, after my discourse of yesterday, I will now rest, and be in my turn a listener.

Critias/ Consider then, Socrates, the arrangement of this banquet of yours, how we settled it. For we think it right that Timæus, who is the most astronomical of us all, and has bestowed much pains in acquainting himself with the nature of the universe, should be the first to discourse to us, beginning from the creation of the world, and ending with the nature of men; —and also that I after him, receiving from him, as it were, the men which have been ideally produced—and some of them, too, excellently educated by you, —should introduce them among us here, according to the word and

law of Solon, as to proper judges, and make them members of this city; as being really those very Athenians of bygone days, which were described as unknown to us in the report of the sacred writings; —and so, in future, we will treat them in our discourse as citizens and Athenians.

Socrates/ I am now, it seems, to be plentifully and splendidly entertained in my turn with a banquet of arguments: —it is for you, then, O Timæus, to begin the discourse, having first of all invoked the gods according to the usual custom.

Timæus/ Well, Socrates, this at any rate is true, —that those who have even the least share of wisdom, always invoke the deity on entering every undertaking, whether small or great; and so we likewise unless we be in every respect unwise who are now about to speak concerning the universe, whether it be generated or without generation, shall if we be not very unwise make it our first duty to invoke the gods and goddesses, and pray that what we speak may be first of all pleasing to them, and also in consistence with ourselves. And as respects the invocation of the gods, so have I acted for myself; while as respects ourselves, we must lead you by that way which you may most easily understand, and which will best enable me to explain my meaning about the proposed subjects of discussion.

I think we ought, in the first place, to define what that is which is ever-existent, and has no generation; and what that is which is in a state of generation or becoming, but never really is. The former of these, indeed, which is apprehended by reflection united with reason, always subsists according to sameness; —while the latter is perceived by opinion united with irrational perception; since it subsists in a state of generation and corruption, and never really is. And, again, whatever is generated is necessarily generated from a certain cause; for it is wholly impossible that anything should be

generated without a cause. An artificer, therefore, of anything, if he looks to that which always subsists according to sameness, and from this as a sort of pattern, works out the form and nature of his work, he must thus, necessarily, produce something wholly beautiful: —but where he employs for his pattern only what is generated, it cannot be beautiful.

Let this universe then be called *heaven*, or *the world*, or by any other name that it usually receives; and let us, in the first place, consider respecting it, what ought to be investigated at the very outset of our proposed inquiry about the universe, —whether it always existed, having no beginning, or was generated, beginning from some certain commencement. It is generated; —for this universe is palpable, and has a body; and all such things are perceptible *i.e.* are to be apprehended by the senses; and things perceptible being apprehended by opinion, in conjunction with perception, appear to be in a state of becoming, and subject to generation. Again, with reference to what exists, it must necessarily have arisen from some cause.

To discover then the *Creator* and *Father* of this universe, as well as his work, is indeed difficult; and when discovered, it is impossible to reveal him to mankind at large. And this too, we must consider respecting him, according to which of two patterns he modelled the world; whether with reference to one subsisting ever in a state of sameness and similarly affected, or with reference to one that is only generated. If this world then is beautiful and its artificer good, he evidently looked to an eternal pattern; but if it be without beauty, and what it is not lawful to mention, he must have looked to one that is generated. It is evident, however, to everyone that he looked to one that was eternal; —for the universe is the most beautiful of generated things, and its artificer the best of causes. Being thus generated, then, it

has been framed according to principles that can be comprehended by reason and reflection, and ever abides in sameness of being. This, then, being the case, this world must necessarily be the resemblance of something; — although to describe its origin according to nature is the greatest of all undertakings. We should distinguish between an image and its pattern; just as words are connected with the things of which they are the interpreters: —and so when we speak of that which is stable and firm, and mentally intelligible, our language should be in like manner stable and immutable, and as far as possible unrefutable and immovable, having in this respect no deficiency; whereas, in speaking concerning its image only, and as compared to it, we should use probable arguments, that are in strict analogy thereto. Moreover, precisely as essence or true being is to generation, so is truth to faith or mere conjecture. You must not wonder, then, O Socrates, since different people differ so much in opinion about the gods and the formation of the universe, if I should be unable to put forth generally approved and scrupulously exact statements on so difficult a subject; but even if we should only advance reasons not less probable than those of others, you should still be content, remembering that both I who am speaking, and you who are my judges, possess a common human nature; and you must be satisfied therefore, if my assertions are but probable statements, and should inquire no farther.

Socrates/ Capitally well said, Timæus; and we must proceed wholly as you recommend. As regards the prelude then of your discourse, we wonderfully approve of it: and now proceed to the strain or main subject itself.

Timaeus/ Let us declare then on what account the framing Artificer settled the formation of this universe. He was good; and in the good, envy is never engendered about anything whatever. Hence, being free from this envy, he

desired that all things should as much as possible resemble himself. Anyone, therefore, who receives this as the leading principle of generation and the universe from intelligent men, will receive it most correctly. For as the deity desired, as far as possible, that all things should be good, and nothing evil, —he accordingly took everything that was visible and not in a state of rest, but in excessive agitation and disorder, and then reduced it from disorder into order, conceiving the latter to be far better than the former. It is not, indeed, and never was, lawful to do anything else but what is most honorable; and accordingly, he found by reasoning that of things naturally visible, nothing without intelligence could be more beautiful than what is wholly endowed with intellect, and besides this, that apart from the soul no one could possess intelligence. In pursuance of this reasoning, placing intellect in soul and soul in body, he constructed the universe; that thus it might be a work naturally the most beautiful and the best. Hence, therefore, we have a reasonable motive for calling the world an animal with a soul, truly intellectual, and created through the providence of the deity.

This being the case, let us next consider, in the likeness of what animals the composing artificer framed the universe. We must by no means then think, that he would deign to fashion it like animals subsisting as a part of anything *i.e.* in an incomplete form: for nothing resembling an imperfect animal can possibly be beautiful. But we may consider it on the other hand, as most nearly of all resembling what contains the other animals both separately and collectively as parts of a whole—for it the universe comprises within itself all intelligible animals, just as this world contains us and all other visible creatures. The deity, indeed, desirous of making it in all respects resemble the most beautiful and entirely perfect of intelligible objects, formed it into one

visible animal, containing within itself all the other animals with which it is naturally allied. Are we not, then, right in concluding that there is but one heaven or universe; or is it more correct to assert that there are many and infinite? One only, I answer, if it has been fabricated according to the original pattern. For that which comprehends all intelligible animals whatever, can never be second to any other: —for there would be need of another animal again to comprise these two, of which they would both be parts; and it would be more proper to assert that the universe resembles this comprehending third, rather than the other two. In order, therefore, that the world may in its substantive existence κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν resemble the all-perfect animal—on this account the framer of the worlds produced neither two nor an infinite number; but this, the solely-begotten heaven or universe having been generated, now exists and ever will exist.

Now, whatever has been generated, must necessarily have bodily shape, and be visible as well as tangible. But nothing can be visible without the aid of fire, and nothing tangible without something solid, and nothing solid without earth, —owing to which, the deity at the beginning of his constructive labor composed the body of the universe from fire and earth. But it is not possible for two things alone to cohere, without the intervention of a third; for a certain bond is necessary between the two. And the best of all bonds is that, which, as nearly as possible, unites into one both itself and the natures bound with it. But proportion will naturally best show this effect; —for whenever, either in three numbers, or solids, or powers, the middle bears the same ratio to the last, as the first to the middle—and again also, as the last is to the middle, so is the middle to the first; then the middle or mean term becoming both first and last, and the last and first again each become means, they must thus all

necessarily become the same relatively to each other, and having become the same with each other, will all be one. If then the body of the universe had been a superficies only without thickness, one medium alone would have sufficed, both for binding it and all that belongs to it; —but in the present case, as it was doomed to be a solid—and solids are never one only, but always jointed together by two media, —whence the deity placed water and air between fire and earth; —and by thus placing them as far as possible in proportion to each other, so that fire should be to air as air to water, and as air to water so water to earth, —he thus bound and framed together the world visible and tangible. On this account also, and from such elements, which are four in number, the body of the universe was confessedly generated by a certain proportion; and hence has resulted such an intimacy, that all its parts aptly cohere, and are indissoluble except by its uniting artificer.

Of these four elements, then, the composition of the world received one whole of each: —for its composing artificer constituted it from entire elements of fire, water, air, and earth; leaving no part of anyone of them, nor any extraneous power, —considering that it would thus be a whole animal, in the highest degree perfect and of perfect parts; and besides this, that it would be one, as nothing would be left, from which any other such element could be produced; and lastly, that it would be free from old age and disease, —and perceiving also that the principles composing bodies, as heat and cold, and all possess vigorous powers, when they surround bodies externally and interfere with them unseasonably, dissolve their union, and bring on diseases and old age, whereby they decay and perish. Owing to such causes and reasonings, then, he framed this universe, as one whole, an united series of perfect wholes, perfect, undecaying, and without disease. He gave it also a figure

becoming and allied to its nature: —and to the animal destined to comprehend all others within itself, that figure as the most becoming, which includes within itself every sort of figure whatever. Hence he fashioned it in the shape of a sphere, perfectly round, having its center everywhere equally distant from the bounding extremities, as being the most perfect of all figures, and most resembling himself; —and be did this, considering the similar to be infinitely more beautiful than the dissimilar.

Next, he most carefully polished the external circumference of this sphere, —and this for many reasons. It needed, indeed, neither eyes, nor ears, as there was nothing externally either visible or audible: —neither was it surrounded with air, as if it required respiration; —nor, again, did it require any organ, through which it might receive its nutriment, and discharge it again when digested: for nothing was either added to or taken from it, that being impossible. Indeed the universe is artfully made to provide itself with nutriment through its own decay, as well as to suffer and do all things in itself, and by its own operations; —because, indeed, its creator conceived that it would be much more excellent, if independent in action, than if it required extraneous aid. And he did not think fit to give it hands either, as it had nothing either to receive or reject; nor yet of feet, or any other members suited to locomotion: —for he assigned to it a motion peculiar to itself, being that of all the seven kinds of motion, which chiefly belongs to intellect and reflection. Hence, making the world to turn constantly on itself and on the same point, he gave it a circular motion, and took from it all the other six, without giving it any power of progression: and as this revolution required no feet, he created the world without legs and feet.

Thus was it, that the intelligence of the eternal Deity, after due reflection, conceived the form of the god about to come

into existence; and he made it smooth, equable, and even from its center in every direction, —a body whole and perfect, wholly composed out of perfect bodies. As for the soul, he fixed it in the middle, extended it throughout the whole, and likewise surrounded with it its entire surface: —and so, causing a circle to revolve in a circle, he established the world as one substantive, solitary object, self-sufficient through its own excellence, requiring nothing external, but sufficiently known and friendly to itself. By this procedure, then, he produced the Universe, a blessed god. The Deity, however, did not, as we now undertake to say, form the soul posterior and junior to the body: for he who conjoined these, would never have allowed the more ancient nature to be governed by the younger: —and yet we, who are exposed to the blind chances of fortune, are apt to speak somehow in this silly fashion; whereas the Deity constituted the soul both in age and excellence prior to and older than the body, as being the proper mistress and ruler of its subject the body; and that, too, from the following sources, and in the following manner.

From one essence indivisible, and always the same, and from another again that is divisible and corporeal, he composed—by admixture from both—a third form of essence intermediate between the two; and again, between what is indivisible and divisible as respects bodies, he placed the nature of *same* and *different* or mutable; —and taking these three, he mingled them all into one idea, joining them together by force, as the different would not freely mingle with the same. And after mingling them with essence, and producing one from the three, he again distributed this whole into suitable parts; each composed of a mixture of same, different, and essence. He next began to divide as follows: —In the first place, he took away one part from the whole; then he separated a second part, double of the first:

and again, a third, one-and-a-half times as much as the second, but triple of the first; then a fourth, double of the second; in the next place a fifth, triple of the third: a sixth, octuple of the first: and lastly a seventh, twenty-seven times greater than the first. After this, he filled up the double and triple intervals, still taking off parts therefrom, and so placed them between the intervals, that there might be two media between every interval; one of which might, in the same degree, exceed one of the extremes, and be exceeded by the other, while the other part might in an equal degree exceed one of the extremes, and be exceeded by the other. But as by the intermediate links between the above-mentioned spaces the sesquialter, sesquitertian, and sesquioctave intervals were produced, he filled with a sesquioctave all the sesquitertian intervals, leaving a part of each, the interval between which and the following would have to each other the same ratio as the numbers 256 and 243; and in truth he thus exhausted the whole mixture—from which these were separated. He split the whole of this composition, then, along its entire length into two parts, joining them mutually across like the letter X, afterwards bending them into a circle, and connecting them both with themselves and each other, in such a way that their extremities might meet directly opposite the point of their mutual intersection, externally comprehending them in an uniform motion around the same center; besides which, he made one of the circles external, the other internal. The motion of the exterior circle he proclaimed to be that of sameness, and that of the interior the motion of difference. He caused also the circle of sameness to revolve laterally towards the right, and that of difference diagonally towards the left. And the superiority he gave to the circulation of same and similar; for this alone he suffered to remain undivided; —while, as to that within, after dividing into six parts, and forming therefrom seven unequal

circles, divided by double and triple intervals, three of each, he bade these circles travel in contrary directions to each other, —three of the seven to revolve at equal velocities, the remaining four with a velocity unequal as respects either of the former three, yet in a certain proportion as to their respective periods.

After, therefore, the whole composition of the universal soul had been completed according to the intention of God who framed it, he in the next place formed within it the whole of a corporeal nature; and he aptly jointed them, by uniting center to center. The former the soul, being interwoven throughout from the middle to the very extremities of space, and covering it even all around externally, though at the same time herself revolving within herself, originated the divine commencement of an unceasing and wise life throughout all time. And indeed the body of the universe was generated in visible shape; while the soul, though invisible, was made to partake of reason and harmony, and rendered the best of created things by Him—the best of eternal intelligences. The soul, then, being composed from the admixture of the three parts, same, different, and essence, classified as well as bound together in certain proportions, and itself revolving inwardly on itself, whenever it comes in contact either with anything mutable or indivisible, at once declares by its intrinsic energy with what anything is identical, and from what it differs, and also with reference to what, where, how, and when it happens, both as regards its own separate essence and its external affections, either in things generated, or such as possess an eternal sameness. When our talk, then, is about truth, and consistent with itself, —whether, on the one hand, it be about things mutable or things constant, and is silently and noiselessly borne onward by its own motion, or when it is concerned about things sensible, and the circle of difference reports on

its onward passage to every part of the soul, then arise fixed and true opinions and persuasions: —but when, on the other hand, it is concerned about the merely rational, and the glibly-whirling circle of sameness makes its indications, —then intellect and science are thus necessarily brought to full perfection. And as respects the real essence in which these two qualities are engendered, if anyone asserts that it is any other than the soul, he will assert everything rather than the truth.

When the parent Creator perceived that this created image of the eternal gods had life and motion, he was delighted with his work, and by this very delight he was led to consider how he might make it still more to resemble its exemplar. Hence, as the *intelligible* universe was an eternal animal, he tried to make this the *sensible* universe, as far as he could, similarly perfect. The nature indeed of the animal itself was eternal, and this nature could not be entirely adopted into anything subject to generation; —hence God resolved to form a certain moveable image of eternity; and thus, while he was disposing the parts of the universe, he, out of that eternity which rests in unity, formed an eternal image on the principle of numbers; —and to this we give the appellation of *Time*. But besides this, he contrived the days and nights, months and years, which had no existence prior to the universe, but rose into being contemporaneously with its formation. All these are but the parts of time; and the terms *it was* and *it will* be are generated *i.e.*, varying and evanescent forms of time, which we have wrongly and unawares transferred to an eternal essence. For we say that a thing was, is, and will be; while according to truth, the term *it is*, is alone suitable, —*was* and *will be* being expressions only suitable to generation, which proceeds through time, —both of them being certain motions: —whereas, what exists eternally, the same and immoveable,

neither becomes at any time older or younger; neither has it been generated in the past, nor will be in the future, nor is it subject to those accidents which generation imposes on sensible objects, —all of which are nothing more than forms of time imitating eternity, and moving in a circle measured by number. And besides this, in making such assertions as these, —that what has been generated is generated, —that what is becoming, is in generation, —that what will be is to be, —and that non-being is not; —in all this we state what is not accurately true. But this is perhaps not the place for a minute discussion of these matters.

Time, then, was generated with the universe, in order that, being produced together, they might together be dissolved, if their dissolution should ever happen: —and it was formed on the model of an eternal nature, that it might as far as possible resemble it; for this model exists through all eternity, while the world, on the other hand, has been generated, now exists, and will exist, throughout all time. With this design, then, and after such reflection on the generation of time, the Deity, in order that it might be produced in full operation, created the sun, moon, and the five other stars, which are denominated planets, to distinguish and guard over the numbers of time. And as soon as he had produced the bodies of these stars, God placed them, seven in number, in the seven orbits whose revolutions are according to difference; —the Moon, indeed, in the first orbit nearest about the earth; the Sun in the second beyond the earth; then Lucifer *i.e.* Venus, and the star sacred to Hermes *i.e.* Mercury, revolving in their orbits as swiftly as the sun, but on a different principle of motion, owing to which these stars, the Sun, Lucifer, and Mercury, mutually overtake and are overtaken by each other in their respective courses. As respects the other stars, however, the labor of investigating their revolutions, and the causes that

gave them origin, would surpass that of the discourse itself which caused their mention. These subjects, then, may hereafter, perhaps, when we have leisure, meet with the investigation they deserve.

When, therefore, each of the stars necessary for the constitution of time had obtained a motion adapted to its condition, and their bodies, bound by living chains, had become vital beings and learned their prescribed duty, they pursued their course according to the movement of difference, passing obliquely through the orbit of sameness, to which the former is subordinate, one circle being larger and the other smaller, one moving quicker and the other more slowly; those that revolved the quickest on the principle of sameness appearing ever to overtake and be overtaken by those that travelled at slower velocities. And the revolutions of all these circles in their orbits with a spiral motion, proceeding at one and the same time in two contrary directions, make it appear that the one moving at the slowest pace from that which was the most swift is the nearest of all. And in order that there might be a certain apparent measure of slowness and swiftness in the relative velocities of these spheres, and an evident uniformity in all the eight movements, the Deity enkindled a light, which we now denominate the sun, in the second of these orbits, in order that it might fully display all things in the universe, and that such animals as required it might have their share in number, becoming acquainted therewith from the revolution of sameness and similarity. Thus, then, and on these accounts, arose night and day; being the period of the one and most skillfully-contrived movement. The month, too, was generated, when the moon had run through her orbit, and passed into conjunction with the sun, —and the year, when the sun had completely travelled through his own orbit. As to the periods of the other stars, however, they are

not understood, except by a very few; nor are they distinguished by any peculiar name or relatively measured on the principle of numbers: —and hence it may be said, they are ignorant that these movements really constitute time, infinite as they are in number and of wonderful variety. Still it is by no means impossible to conceive, how the perfect number of time completes a perfect year, when the courses of the eight orbits return at their completion to the same place of commencement, and have their revolution measured on the principle of sameness. In this manner, indeed, and for this purpose, were formed such of the stars as moved circularly through the universe, —that this the visible animal, *i.e.* the universe might resemble as nearly as possible the most perfect intelligible animal, in the imitation of an eternal nature.

The Creator constructed all the rest at the same time as the generation of time, according to the similitude of that which has been portrayed; but still, as the universe did not yet comprise within it the entire animal race, in this respect there was a dissimilarity. This defect, therefore, the Creator supplied by impressing it with forms corresponding with the nature of its pattern. Wherever, therefore, the intellect beholds ideas of a certain quality, and quantity in that which possesses life, such and so many he conceived that this the universe should contain; and these are four: —One, the heavenly race of gods; another, winged and air-wandering race; a third, that which dwells in the water; and a fourth, that which has feet and walks on the ground. The chief idea, indeed, of deity, he formed from fire, that it might be as far as possible splendid and fair to behold; and in adapting it to the universe, he rendered it circular; made it to consist in the knowledge of that good which it is to follow, and distributed it round the entire heavens, that it might be a true world, fully adorned with that race in its every part. To

each of the divine bodies, also, he adapted two motions; —one of them taking place on the same spot and on the principle of sameness, corresponding with that intelligence which contemplates what is the same with itself; the other, a progressive motion subordinate to the motion that is constantly the same and similar: —but as respects the other five motions, it was fixed immoveable, that each of them might become as far as possible the best. And for this reason also the fixed stars were formed, as being divine and eternal animals, ever abiding and revolving in the same place and on the principle of sameness; and the stars, which both revolve and have the kind of motion above described, were formed on those principles. Next, he formed the earth our common nourisher, which, being confined round the axis that extends through the universe, is the guardian and artificer of night and day, as well as the first and most ancient of the gods that have been generated within the universe. With respect, however, to the dances or rhythmical motions of these divinities, and the mutual intersection of their circles, as well as their relative revolutions and progressive motions in their conjunctions and oppositions, whether in progressive or retrograde motion, at what times and in what manner they are in turn eclipsed, and afterwards reappear to our view, causing terror and presaging future events to such as are able to understand them; —to attempt an explanation of all this, without having a plan of them before us, would be a labor in vain. But of this enough; and this is all that we shall say concerning the nature of the visible and generated gods.

Again, to speak concerning the other gods or dæmons, and to know their generation, is more than we can perform; and we must trust to the reports of those ancient men, who being, as they said, the descendants of the gods, must have a clear knowledge of their parents. It is impossible, therefore,

to discredit the children of the gods; and even though they should speak without probable and cogent proofs, yet as they declare that they are relating matters with which they are familiarly acquainted, we ought, in compliance with the law, to assent to their tradition. In this manner, then, according to them, the generation of these gods took place, and is described.

Ocean and Tethys were the progeny of Heaven and Earth; and from these sprang Phorcys, Kronos, and Rhea, and ever so many more with them; —and from Kronos and Rhea sprang Zeus, Hera Zeus, Hera, and all that we know are called their brethren, together with others still who were their progeny. When therefore all such gods as visibly revolve, and show themselves when they please, were generated, the Artificer of the universe thus addressed them: "Gods of gods, of whom I am the creator and father, all things formed by me are by my will indissoluble. Indeed, what is bound is of course dissoluble; nevertheless, to desire to dissolve what is beautifully harmonized and well disposed, is the mark of an evil nature. Now, inasmuch as you have been generated, you are hence not immortal, nor wholly indissoluble; yet you shall never be dissolved, nor become subject to the fatality of death; because you have got my will that it shall be so, which is a much greater and more powerful bond than those by which you were bound when first created. Learn, therefore, what I now say to you by way of information. Three classes of mortals yet remain uncreated. Unless these be created, then, the universe will be imperfect; for it will not contain within it every kind of animal, though it ought, in order to be quite perfect. Yet if these are generated, and partake of life through me, they will become equal to the gods. In order, then, that mortal natures may subsist, and the universe may be truly all, turn yourselves, according to your nature, to the formation of

animals, imitating the power which I employed in the creation of yourselves. And so far as any part of these is suited to have the same name as immortals to be called divine, and destined to take the lead among those who willingly pursue justice, and reverence you—of these I myself will deliver the seeds and beginnings; and for the rest do you weave together the mortal and immortal nature, constructing and generating animals, and promote their growth too by supplying them with food, and receive them back again into your bosom when fallen to decay."

Thus spoke the Creator; and again into the same bowl, in which he had by mingling tempered the soul of the universe, he poured into it likewise what was left of the former mixture, somewhat indeed after the same manner, yet not equally pure as at first, but less so by two or three degrees. And after having thus framed the universe, he allotted to it souls equal in number to the stars, inserting each in each; and then, as it were, placing them on a vehicle whereon to travel through the heavens, he pointed out the nature of the universe, and announced to them the laws of fate; showing them that the first generation would be allotted in common to all, so that no particular soul should have less than its due portion, and that after they had been distributed through the several instruments of time adapted to each, there would then be produced that animal which is of all the most suited for religious worship; and as human nature was of two kinds, male and female, he showed them that the more excellent was that which would afterwards be called man. As souls, therefore, are from necessity engrafted in bodies that are constantly gaining and losing their composing particles, he declared to them that in the first place all persons must necessarily have one connate ξύμφυτον sense produced by violent emotions, —secondly, love mingled with pleasure and pain; and besides these, fear

and anger, together with all their consequences and natural opposites; and that such as subdued these would live justly, those overcome by them unjustly. And he declared also, that after living well for the time appointed to him, each one should once more return to the habitation of his associate star, and spend a blessed and suitable existence; but failing in these points, he should be changed in his second generation into the nature of a woman; and should he not cease from evil even under these circumstances, whatever the shape his wickedness had taken, so also the soul should be changed into the nature of some brute corresponding thereto, and when changed never cease from labor, until, following the revolution of sameness and difference peculiar to itself, and having overcome by reason its turbulent and irrational part, which is a mass, as it were, composed of fire, water, air, and earth, it should at length return to the first and best disposition of its nature.

Having thus legislated for souls in all these particulars, in order that he might be in no respect the cause of the future wickedness of each, he planted some of them on the earth, others in the moon, and others in the remaining different instruments of time; and after this planting, he charged the junior gods with the duty of constructing mortal bodies, as well as everything additional that was required for the human soul, giving them dominion also over these and all things consequent thereon, and bidding them rule over the mortal creature as nobly and honorably as they could, that it might not become the cause of evil to itself.

The Creator, after arranging all these particulars, then retired to his accustomed repose; and while he thus abode, his children forthwith obeyed their father s order, and, taking the immortal principle of a mortal animal, they, in imitation of their own creator, borrowed from the world portions of fire and earth, water and air, as things which

they should one day restore; and firmly united them together, not with the same indissoluble bonds by which they themselves were held together, but fixing them with thickly-set nails, invisible through their smallness, constructing from these different elements each particular body, and placing the revolutions of the immortal soul in a body subject both to renewal and decay. These, however, —merged, as it were, in a deep river, —had no power of governing themselves, but violently hurried forward both themselves and others, so that the whole animal was moved—confusedly however, just as chance carried it forward, and without any reason, according to the whole six kinds of motion—backwards and forwards, to the right and left, upwards and downwards, and so on, according to the six differences of place. And great as was the advancing and retiring wave which furnished nutrition, yet it was still more agitated by the impulses which it received from without, when the body came into collision with external and foreign fire, or the solidity of earth, liquid waterfalls, or whirling blasts of air; from all which the various movements fell through the body on to the soul; which on this account were afterwards, and are still, called perceptions *i.e.* general sensations. And these, moreover, instantly giving rise to an exceedingly great and powerful motion, by moving with that constantly flowing stream, and vehemently disturbing the revolutions of the soul; wholly stopped the revolution according to sameness by their contrary current, hindering it either from commencing or continuing its course; —and even the movement according to difference they so far disturbed, as to turn from their circular orbits and throw into all possible disorder the three intervals of double and triple, together with the mean terms and conjoining links of the sesquitertian, sesquialter, and sesquioctave ratios, which cannot be dissolved by anyone but the artificer by

whom they were bound; —and thus, though scarcely connected with each other, they are borne along, though quite in disorder, —at one time straight forwards, at another obliquely, and then again upside down, just as if one were to fix his head on the earth and raise his feet on high, in which case, both to the inverted person and the spectators, the parts on the right would seem to be on the left, and the left on the right. These circles likewise greatly disturbed in these and similar ways, when they fall in externally with either sameness or difference, and call objects either same or different, contrary to truth, become false and unreasonable; nor is there any revolution among them which has a controlling and directing power; —and if, again, any of the external sensations are hurried forward and join in doing violence to the soul's whole receptacle, they then seem to prevail, though in reality they are still in subjection.

And it is owing to all these affections, that even now as in the beginning, the soul, when first united to a mortal body, is without intelligence; but when the stream of growth and nutrition flows along with diminished speed, the circles of the soul, restored to tranquility, proceed in their proper path, gaining steadiness as time goes on, and then the orbits of the circles are regulated in their course agreeably to those that travel according to nature; and they call both same and different by their proper appellations, assigning wisdom to the person by whom they are possessed. If anyone, therefore, receives both proper food and education, he must become perfectly sound and healthy, escaping every important disease; whereas he who neglects his soul will pass lamely through life's existence, and again pass into Hades aimless and unserviceable. Of these matters, however, more hereafter. It is our business at present to treat more accurately of what we before proposed, —namely, the generation of body in connection with soul, and owing to

what causes and divine foresight it has taken place, resting for our proofs chiefly on the argument of analogy.

First, then, the gods, in imitation of the spherical shape of the universe, bound the two divine circles of the soul in a spherical body, —that, namely, which we now call the head, which is man's most divine member, and the ruler of our whole composition. And to this the gods who framed it gave the whole body for its service, conceiving that it would thus partake of every possible motion; and moreover, lest the head, in rolling over the various elevations and depressions, should be unable to overcome the heights, or get out of the cavities, the gods gave it the body to be its locomotive vehicle. Hence the body was endued with length, and furnished by Divine contrivance with four members, naturally capable of extension and flexion, to enable it to seize objects, to give it a stable support, and to allow it to pass from place to place; and above this body was placed the head, the abode of our most divine and sacred portion. This was why we were furnished with legs and hands; —and as the gods considered that the fore parts are more honorable and fitter to rule than those behind, they gave us a motion chiefly progressive. Beside this, it was requisite, that man's front should be distinct and dissimilarly formed from the other side; and on this account they first placed about the vessel of the head a face provided with organs to express all the energies of the soul, and assigned to this anterior part the natural government of man. And of these organs, the first that they constructed were the light-bearing eyes, fixing them in from some such cause as the following: The body of these eyes they formed to consist of fire, not enough indeed to burn, but to give a gentle light suitable to each day; for the pure fire contained within us and related to it, they caused to flow smoothly through the eyes, and in dense quantities throughout, but condensing it more especially in the middle

of the eyes, so as to conceal all the grosser part within, and allow the pure only to filter through. When, therefore, the light of day surrounds the stream of vision, then, by the mutual falling of similar bodies on each other, one well-adapted body is constituted, according to the direction of the eyes, wherever the light proceeding from within resists that which falls on it from without. But the whole becoming similarly affected through similitude, when it either touches anything else or is itself touched by another, then the motion thus produced, diffusing itself through the whole body even as far as the soul, causes that sensation which we denominate sight. But when this kindred fire within us departs into night, the sight is cut off; for in this case, by proceeding into a dissimilar nature, it becomes estranged, and is extinguished: since it has no longer any relation to the proximate surrounding air, which is naturally destitute of fire. Hence it ceases from seeing, and besides this, becomes the introducer of sleep; for the gods constructed the eyelids to be a preservative of the sight, and thus by their compression restrain the power of its inward fire, and besides that, scatter and smooth over its internal motions; and when they are thus calmed, rest ensues; which rest, when profound, produces a sleep attended with few dreams; —but on the other hand, if certain unusually vehement motions remain, then, according to their nature and the places in which they occur, they will engender corresponding phantasms within, which will come to our recollection as soon as we wake. With respect, also, to the formation of images on mirrors, and all lucid, smooth surfaces, there is nothing in these difficult of solution; for all such phenomena necessarily result from the mutual affinity of the external and internal fire, and again from one in particular that subsists about smooth bodies individually, and is many times reflected, because the fire around the face gradually

becomes united on the smooth and shining surface with the fire coming from the eyes. The parts on the right, too, appear to be on the left, because there is a mutual contact of the contrary parts of the sight with the contrary parts of the object, different from their accustomed mode of approach. On the contrary, the parts on the right appear on the right, and the left on the left, when there is a reflection of the light composed of the mingled fires, both exterior and interior; and secondly, the smoothness of the mirrors, which are convex, reflect that which is to the right on the left, and the left to the right. But if the mirror be concave, it presents an image wholly inverted, by sending the lower part of the image upwards, and again the upper part downwards. All these phenomena, therefore, are only some of the concurring causes which the divinity brings to his aid in rendering the idea of that which is best as far as possible complete, — whereas the multitude are of opinion that these are not the concurring but the real causes of all things, —such, namely, as those producing cold and heat, freezing and thawing, and such like, but which are wholly incapable of exercising reason and intellect; for the soul may be said to be the only one of all beings that can acquire intellect; and this is invisible, whereas fire and water, air and earth, are all visible bodies. As for the lover of intellect and science, however, he should explore the first causes of intellectual nature, and consider, respecting second causes, how many arise from the motion of other bodies, and yet necessarily give motion again to others. This, then, is what we ought to do: we should speak concerning both kinds of causes, but separately of such as engage the intellect in forming things fair and good; and of such, also, as, abandoning wisdom, produce the things they form just as it may chance, and without any regard to order.

Respecting the second causes of the eyes, therefore, so far as they possess the power which falls to their lot, let what has been already said suffice; and we will next speak of their greatest and most useful employment, for which, indeed, they were expressly bestowed on us by the Deity. The sight, indeed, is in my opinion the cause of the greatest benefit to man, —since even in our present discussion about the universe, not one argument could ever have been adduced without surveying the stars, the sun, and the heavens. Now, however, both day and night, months and periods of years, have been seen and arithmetically calculated; and they give us a conception of time, and means of investigating the nature of the universe; from all which we have gained that kind of learning termed philosophy, a better gift than which never was nor ever will be conferred by the gods on our mortal race. This, then, is what I call the greatest benefit of the eyes; and as for the others that are of less consequence, why should I celebrate them, to make those who are blind and unphilosophic mourn and regret them in vain? This, however, we may assert, that God invented and bestowed sight on us for this express purpose, that on surveying the circles of intelligence in the heavens, we might properly employ those of our own minds, which, though disturbed when compared with the others that are uniform, are still allied to their circulations; and that having thus learned and being naturally possessed of a correct reasoning faculty, we might by imitating the uniform revolutions of divinity set right our own silly wanderings and blunders.

As respects voice and hearing, we may say again, that they were bestowed on us by the gods for the same objects and on the same account; for speech was ordained for the very same purpose as the sight, which it greatly aids in its office; —and it is with a view also to harmony that the hearing has an aptitude for musical sounds. That harmony,

moreover, which consists in motions analogous to the revolutions of our soul, does not seem advantageous to him who wisely devotes himself to the Muses on the mere ground of its being pleasurable without reason, as it seems at present; but it was given us by the Muses to aid us in reducing the disturbed circulation of our soul to mutual order and accordance; —and again, they gave us rhythm for the same purpose, as the means of reforming the irregular and ungracious habits that prevail in the majority of our race.

Thus far, with only a few exceptions, our past remarks have had reference to the creations of intellect; and we ought to speak likewise of things that come of necessity: for the generation of this world results wholly from the co-operation of intellect and necessity. Intellect indeed, ruling over necessity, persuaded it to bring to the highest perfection the majority of created things; and in this way, by the persuasive power of wisdom over necessity, this universe was first created. Now, correctly to explain in what way it was created, we must refer in our explanation to the form of a variable cause, as the nature of the case requires. Let us then recall our steps, and take up the subject afresh, going back to first principles, as we did before. Let us investigate then the nature and affections of fire and water, air and earth, prior to the generation of the heavens; for up to the present time no one has yet unfolded their generation: —and yet we speak of fire and other things as principles and elements of the universe, just as if the nature of each was known; —whereas at the same time anyone with the least intelligence must be aware that they cannot be compared even to letters or parts of which syllables are formed. As respects ourselves, this is what we propose: —we will not speak of the principle or principles, or whatever other denomination they may receive, of all things; —and this for no other reason than the

difficulty of stating what are my sentiments according to our present method of discussion. Do not expect me then to speak thus, for I cannot persuade myself that I have the ability to undertake so difficult a subject. Keeping, therefore, to the line of argument laid down at the beginning, on the force of probability, I will endeavor to make statements not less probable than those of others, and beginning the subject once more from its commencement to discourse on the matter both in detail and as a whole. First, then, invoking the divinity who has now from the first been the guardian of our discourse, to defend us from an absurd and unusual exposition and lead us to a doctrine founded on probability—let us again begin to speak.

This fresh commencement then, of our present discussion requires a more ample division than the former. For then we distinguished only two species; but we must now admit a third. In the former discussion two were sufficient; —one set forth as a species of model, apprehensible by the intellect, and always subsisting on the principle of sameness, —the second an imitation of the model, generated and visible; and we did not then distinguish a third, because we deemed these two sufficient. But now the subject of discourse seems to compel me to introduce and explain a new species which is both difficult and obscure. Of what natural power, then, are we to conceive it possessed? It is indeed in some sort the special receptacle, and, as it were, the nurse of all generation. Such indeed is the truth: —but we must speak more clearly concerning it. And this will certainly be an arduous undertaking on many accounts, but principally on account of the questions that must previously be settled concerning fire and the rest of the elements, —why one should be called water rather than fire, or air rather than earth, or why anyone of them should bear one name in particular rather than all the rest; thus rendering it a

difficult matter to use a language about it that is fixed and stable. How then, and by what means, are we to arrive at a probable conclusion in this dilemma?

In the first place, then, what we now denominate water, on becoming condensed, seems to take the form of stones and earth, —and when melted and dispersed, that of vapor and air; —air also, when burnt up, becomes fire, while the latter again, on becoming condensed and extinct, resumes the form of air; and again air, when collected and condensed, produces mists and clouds, from which, when still more compressed, rain descends; and from water again are formed earth and stones; —the whole of them, as it seems, exchanging all round their mutual generation.

As these, then, never maintain any constancy of existence, who will have the assurance to maintain that anyone of them is *this* rather than *that*? No one: —and it would be far the safest plan to speak about them as follows: —When we see anything constantly passing from one state of existence to another, as fire for instance, we should not say that it is fire absolutely, but something fiery, —and again, that what we call water is not absolutely so, but something watery; without assigning to them any names that would give the idea of stability, as we think people do, when they express it by this and that τόδε καὶ τοῦτο; —for not being of an abiding nature, it cannot endure to have applied to it such terms as, this thing, of this nature, belonging to this; and any such others as would show it to have a substantive existence. Hence we should not give anyone of them an individual name, but call it something such-like, but ever fluctuating; and especially with respect to fire, we should assert that it is wholly such-like, and similarly likewise, everything endued with generation. That receptacle, however, in which each of these appears successively to grow up and decay, that alone is entitled to

be termed this and that; —whereas anything of any kind soever, as hot, white, or their contraries, and all therefrom proceeding, cannot be so denominated. But let us again try more clearly to explain our meaning. If anyone, in modelling all kinds of figures out of gold, were unceasingly to transform them one by one into all the others, and someone present were to point to one of them and inquire what it was, it would be by far the safest and most correct to say that is gold; but as for its being a triangle, or any other figure that might be given to it, not to speak of them as being so in reality, inasmuch as they are in process of change, even while we make such assertion; but to be content if it may safely be denominated such-like, or of such a nature. The same remark applies to that which receives all bodies; —and we should ever call it by the same name, as it never abandons its own proper power, but perpetually receives all things, and never anywhere or in any way assumes any of those shapes that enter into it, —being in fact a natural receptacle for everything, receiving both motion and form from what enters therein; and this is why it exhibits a different aspect at different times. But as for the representations of the objects that enter and depart hence, they are modelled after them in a manner wonderful and difficult to describe, as we shall hereafter relate.

For the present, then, we must consider three things: —first, that which is produced, —the second, that in which it is produced, —and the third, that of which the thing produced is the natural resemblance. And especially is it proper to compare that which receives to the mother *i.e.* which supplies the model, that from which it receives to the father, and the nature intermediate between these to the child; and to consider, also, that as the image should present every possible variety of forms, that in which the model is formed cannot well be prepared for the purpose, unless

those forms have been erased from it which it used to receive from other quarters. Indeed, if it were like any of the objects that enter into it, if aught were to present itself of a nature contrary and wholly different, it would produce a bad likeness thereof. And hence from presenting at the same time its own image, that which is destined to receive within itself all the different species possible, should itself be destitute of all form whatever; —just as those preparing sweet-smelling unguents take all pains to render wholly inodorous the liquids that are to receive the perfume, —and as those also who wish to impress figures on a soft substance carefully remove from it any previous impression, and make it, as far as they can, exquisitely smooth and well-polished. In the same way, then, that which is intended properly to receive through its entire extent the resemblances of eternal beings, should be naturally without any form whatever of its own. Hence, as to this mother and receptacle of things created, which is visible and every way perceptible, we cannot term it either earth, air, fire, or water, —nor again, anyone of their compounds, or any of the elements from which they were produced; but we should not be at all wrong in calling it a certain invisible and shapeless essence, which receives all things and has a certain share of intelligence, —though how it has it, is a matter very obscure and difficult of apprehension. So far, however, as it is possible to arrive at its nature from what has been previously said, we may very correctly say that fire appears to be something inflamed, water something moist, —and so in like manner, earth and air, so far as it receives the images of these bodies.

Let us, then, be somewhat more minute in resolving the following question, —whether there is a certain fire subsisting in itself, —and so also, as respects other things which we always say have a separate existence in

themselves, whether the objects alone that we see, and which are perceived through the bodily organs, possess reality of being, and nothing besides these has any existence at all, —or whether we are wrong in asserting that each of them has its corresponding idea, when after all it is nothing but idle talk. The present question, therefore, we must not decide without much judicious examination; neither should we add to our present discourse any great length of matter not strictly belonging to the subject: —but if there should appear to be any limit, by which it can be contained within a small compass, that would of all things be the most opportune to our present design.

Thus, then, will I state my opinion. If intellect and true opinion are two separate kinds of things, there must necessarily be self-existing ideas not perceptible by the senses, and to be apprehended only by the intellect; but if, as appears to some, true opinion differs in no respect from intellect, everything perceived through the body should be considered perfectly real. We must consider them, then, as two distinct things, because they both have a separate origin and character, one of them produced in us by learning, the other through persuasion, —one always based on true reason, the other irrational, —the one not to be moved by persuasion, the other subject to such mutation: —and lastly, of true opinion every man has a share; but of intellect only the gods, and some small portion of mankind.

Such being the case, we must acknowledge that there is an idea which subsists according to sameness, unproduced and not subject to decay; receiving nothing into itself from elsewhere, and itself never entering into any other nature, but invisible and imperceptible by senses, and to be apprehended only by pure intellect; while the second, on the other hand, which is like it, and bears the same name, is perceptible by the senses, the effect of production, ever in

motion, coming into being in a certain spot, and then again hastening to decay, being apprehended by opinion united with perception. Again, there is a third class of being, —that of eternal place; which is never destroyed, but becomes a seat or receptacle for everything created, being perceptible of itself without the interference of the senses, by a sort of bastard reason, though scarcely to be relied on; and hence seeing it, as in a dream, we assert that every being must necessarily be somewhere, and in a certain place, and that nothing can exist which is neither on earth or in the heavens. With regard to all these, and such like opinions and the ideas which are entertained in a waking state and have a positive existence, we cannot, owing to this dreaminess, clearly distinguish the one from the other, and state what is the fact, —that the image, which cannot claim as its own that even for which it is formed, but is ever borne along as the specter of something else, must consequently be formed in something else, and somehow vindicate to itself a separate essence, if it has any existence at all; —whereas, with regard to real being, true and accurate reason aids it by affirming, that as long as two things differ from each other, they cannot so exist one in another, as to be at the same time two things and one only.

This, then, is a summary of my opinion, —that there are three distinct things which existed before the formation of the universe, *being*, *place*, and *generation*; —that the nurse of generation, moistened and inflamed, receiving the forms of earth and air, and experiencing all the other accidents thereon consequent, appeared under many various aspects; but as it was contained by powers neither similar nor equally balanced, it could not possibly be balanced itself, and through the want of such balance, became itself impelled by these forces, to which it again in turn gave impulse; while the parts in motion were separately hurried along in different

directions, like things shaken and winnowed by sieves πλοκάνων and machines used for the cleansing of corn, the dense and heavy particles in one direction, those that are light settling in another quite different. Thus when these four classes were agitated by their receptacle, which was itself moved as by the shaking of the above-mentioned instrument, there was a separation of the dissimilar parts, and a crowding together of those most alike; in consequence of which these other things also occupied a different position, before the universe was created and from such materials reduced to order. Before this, indeed, they all subsisted irrationally, and without measure; —but when the Creator undertook to arrange the universe, he first gave shapes with forms and numbers to fire and earth, water and air, which possessed indeed certain traces of their true essence, though, nevertheless, wholly so situated, as everything would probably be, in the absence of its god. And let us above all things hold, and ever hold, that the Deity made them as far as possible the most beautiful and the best, when before they were in a totally different condition. Now, then, I will try to show you the distribution and generation of these things individually by a somewhat unusual mode of proof; but yet, as you have trodden the paths of mathematical learning, through which we must necessarily make our demonstration, you will not fail to follow me.

First, then, that fire and earth, water and air, are bodies, is evident surely to everyone. But every species of body possesses solidity; and every solid must necessarily be contained by planes. Again, a base formed of a perfectly plane surface is composed from triangles. But all triangles are originally of two kinds, each of them having one angle a right angle, and the two others acute: —and one of these has an equal part of a right angle divided by the equal sides;

while in the other, two unequal parts of a right angle are divided by the unequal sides. This, then, we lay down, according both to probability and necessity, as the origin and principle of fire and all other bodies; —but as for the heavenly principles thereof, these indeed are known only to the Deity, and to those among men who enjoy God's favor.

We must relate, then, of what kind those four most beautiful bodies were that thus came into being, and which, however unlike each other, may yet be produced from each other by dissolution. By accomplishing this, indeed, we shall ascertain the truth about the generation of earth and fire, as well those elements *i.e.* water and air which in their just proportion hold an intermediate position; for then we shall allow no one to assert that there are visible bodies more beautiful than these, each of which belongs to a separate class. It must be our endeavor, therefore, to unite together these four kinds of bodies so excellent in beauty, and so prove to you that we have sufficiently apprehended their nature. Of the two triangles, indeed, the isosceles has but one form, while the oblong or scalene admits of infinite variety. We must select, therefore, the most beautiful among the infinites, if we would begin and proceed in due order: —still if anyone can prove that he has found any form yet better and more suitable for the composition of these bodies, he shall be treated not as an enemy but a friend, and his opinion shall prevail. As for us, however, we fix on one only as the most beautiful of all the many triangles, passing over all the rest; —that out of which is formed a third, the equilateral triangle. To explain the reason of this would indeed require a somewhat lengthened proof: —nevertheless we propose a handsome reward for him who by a diligent investigation finds this not to be the case. We select, therefore, two triangles out of many, from which the bodies of fire and the other elements have been constructed, —one

being an isosceles, the other one always having the square of its longer side the triple of that of the shorter.

But what we formerly asserted rather obscurely, we must now more accurately define. For all the four kinds of elements seemed to be mutually generated among each other from not being correctly represented; for there are generated from the triangles which we have just chosen, four kinds of solid figures—three of them, indeed, from one having unequal sides, and the fourth alone constructed from the isosceles triangle. All of them, therefore, cannot, by dissolution into each other, produce from many small things a few that are large, —this being effected only by three of them; for all things whatever naturally arise from one only, and when the greater parts are dissolved, many small parts will be formed out of them, receiving figures suitable to each; and again, when the numerous small parts are dispersed into triangles, a single number is formed, and the entire bulk constitutes one separate body of large size. Thus much then may suffice concerning their mutual generation.

We must speak next in order concerning the quality of each class individually, and show from what composition of numbers each was formed. The first, then, indeed, is that composed from the smallest triangles, its element being that which has its subtending side twice the length of the shorter. Now, two of these triangles being mutually brought together to form a diagonal diameter, and this being thrice repeated, so that the diagonals and shorter sides shall meet in the same point, as in a center, the result will be one equilateral triangle composed of six triangles. But four equilateral triangles form by the union of three plane angles one solid angle, the size of which exceeds that of the most obtuse plane angle; and thus by forming a figure that comprises four of these angles, we constitute that first species of solid, the tetrahedron, which divides into equal and similar parts

the entire sphere in which it is inscribed. The second species of solid, the octahedron, is formed from the same triangles, which unite to form eight equilateral triangles, and form one solid angle from four plane angles, six solid angles being requisite to constitute this second class of solids. The third, the icosahedron, is formed from the union of one hundred and twenty elements, so united as to form twelve solid angles, each formed by five plane equilateral triangles, and it has for its bases or faces twenty equilateral triangles. These are the only solids that can be formed from this element, viz. the scalene triangle. It was the isosceles triangle, however, that produced the fourth elementary figure, —four of them being so united with their right angles at the center, as to form one equilateral four-sided plane; and six of these again united forming eight solid angles, each of which is formed by the combination of three plane right angles; —the figure of the body thus composed being cubical, having six plane quadrangular equilateral bases. There was yet a certain fifth combination, the regular dodecahedron; and this the Deity employed in tracing the plan of the universe.

Should anyone then, after careful consideration of all these points, be at a loss to determine whether the number of worlds is infinite or finite, let him consider that to admit an infinite number thereof, would be the notion only of one who is ignorant of all that he should best know. Still it may with much propriety be questioned whether there is in reality only one world, or whether there are five. According to our opinion, indeed, which is founded on probable reasoning, there is but one world; though others perhaps, regarding the question in another point of view, may be of a different opinion. Let us now leave alone further speculations of this kind, and returning to the elementary forms that have now been created in our discussion, let us

assign them respectively to fire, earth, water, and air. To earth, indeed, let us assign a cubical form; for of all the four kinds earth is the most immoveable, and is of all bodies the most easy to model, —such being necessarily the case with that which has the most secure bases. Among the triangles, then, that we originally mentioned, that which has equal sides possesses firmer bases than one having unequal sides; and of the two equilateral plane figures thus formed, the square has necessarily a firmer base than the triangle, whether considered with reference to its parts or the whole. On this account, in assigning this figure to the earth, we still preserve probability; —and we shall do this also by assigning to water that figure which is the least moveable of the whole, to fire that which is most so, and to air that which is intermediate between the two, —assigning also the smallest body to fire, the greatest to water, and to air one of a size intermediate between fire and water; —and again, the most subtle body to fire, the next in this respect to air, and the third to water. Among all these then, that body which possesses the fewest bases must necessarily be the most easily moveable, as well as most penetrating, and in every way most acute, being also exceedingly light, from being composed of the smallest possible number of elements: —and so also the second has these properties in a secondary degree, and the third in the third degree. Let it be agreed then, that, according both to strict and probable reasoning, the solid form of the pyramid is the element and germ of fire; that the second form described is air; and the third water. All these elements then, we must conceive to be so minutely small, that the individual parts of each kind may from their smallness escape notice, and yet when many of them are collected together, they become from their bulk the objects of our perception. Moreover, as respects their relative proportions, numbers, motions, and other properties, the

Deity, so far as the nature of necessity has willingly and obediently given way, has firmly established and united them together in just proportion.

From all then that we have before said about the nature of these bodies, the following account seems to be the most probable: —Earth, when it meets with fire, and is dissolved by its subtility, is borne along hither and thither in a dissolved state either in the fire itself, or in the air, or in the water, —till its parts, meeting together, and again mutually harmonizing, once more become earth; for they can never take any other form. But water, when divided by fire or air, may, by the re-composition of its parts, become either one body of fire, or two bodies of air; —and as for the air, when it is decomposed, one only of its particles will produce two of fire. And again, likewise, when fire receives into itself either air or water or earth, though in small quantities relatively to the mass which contains it, if it be dragged along by the movements of these bodies and overcome in spite of all resistance, and at last be decomposed and broken in pieces, these two bodies of fire will coalesce into one of air; and if again the air is overcome and separated into parts, then from two wholes and a half there will be formed one whole body of water. Again, let us consider this matter as follows: —When anyone of the other forms is enclosed by fire, and is cut by the acuteness of its angles and sides, it escapes further division by passing into the nature of fire: —for among bodies that are uniform and similar to each other, no one by itself can cause any change in one of the same class, or experience any itself, with respect to that which it resembles; whereas, when one class of bodies is contained within another, and the weak one contends with the stronger, it will not fail to be destroyed. And again, when the smaller, being comprehended in the greater, and the few by the many, are broken in pieces and extinguished, if they be

disposed to adopt the form of the prevailing nature, they cease to be extinguished; and air becomes generated from fire, —water from air: —but if they attack and fall into contention with any of the rest that they may meet, the agitated parts continue to be dissolved, till being every way repulsed and dissolved, they fly to their kindred nature; or else, being overcome, and joined into one out of many similar to the prevailing power, they abide there in familiar union. And especially, as the result of these affections, all things whatever are mutually changing their positions; —for the numerous individuals of each class are distinguished according to their respective places through the motion of their receptacle, while those that are mutually dissimilar, but yet resemble others, are hurried on by the concussion of other bodies to the place occupied by the bodies they resemble. All unmixed and primary bodies then are generated from such causes as these: —but that other classes of bodies are naturally inherent in these forms, is owing to the composition of each rudimental part στοιχεῖον; which not only at first produces one triangle, possessed of a certain magnitude, but others also, both greater and smaller, equal in number to the various classes existing in the forms themselves; —and hence, these being mingled with themselves and each other, are infinite in their variety, —a fact which everyone should consider, who means to argue with probability respecting the nature of things.

Concerning motion, then, and position, unless a person can clearly understand in what manner and in conjunction with what these two take place, he will meet with many hindrances in the subsequent part of this discourse. This matter indeed we have already partly discussed; but besides this, we must still inquire whether it be true, that motion never willingly resides in smoothness, inasmuch as it is difficult, or rather impossible, to conceive the existence of

anything moving without a mover, or of a mover without something in motion; —motion being impossible while these are away, and it being equally impossible that these should be equable and smooth. Thus, then, we must assign a state of rest to smoothness, and motion to that which is unequal and rough; inequality indeed being the cause again of a rough uneven nature. Now, as regards the generation of inequality, that we have already discussed; but how the several bodies, when divided according to their classes, do not cease from their mutual courses and motions, this we did not explain: —and so we will once more make it the subject of inquiry. The revolution of the universe, since it comprehends the various classes of things, and is of circular shape and naturally desirous of uniting with itself, compresses all things together, and suffers no place to remain void. On this account is it, that fire most of all penetrates through everything, and air, in the next degree, being second to the former in subtility and tenuity; —and the rest in the same way according to their degree—for such as are composed of very large parts have a very large vacuity in their composition, —those, on the contrary, that are very small, a very small vacuity. The union, then, resulting from compression drives together the small parts into the intervals of the larger; and thus, the small parts being placed side by side with the large, the smaller dividing the greater, while the latter compress the smaller, they are all borne upwards and downwards to the places respectively suitable to each; —for each, on changing its magnitude, changes its position likewise: and so, from these causes the production of diversity is constantly maintained, giving that perpetual motion to these bodies, which both now subsists and ever will continue.

In the next place, we must understand that there are many kinds of fire; —as for instance, flame, —that which

emanates from flame, which without burning furnishes light to the eyes, —and that which abides in ignited bodies, even after the flame has been extinguished. In like manner, with respect to air, one kind is of the greatest purity, that denominated æther—a second most turbulent, cloudy, and dark; and besides these, there are other nameless kinds formed by the inequality of the triangles. As respects water, again, it admits of a twofold division, one kind being liquid, the other fusible. The liquid kind, therefore, being composed of very small and unequal parts of water, becomes moveable, both of itself and by other bodies, through the inequality of its com position and peculiar shape of its figure; whereas the fusible kind, which is composed of large and smooth parts, is more stable than the former, as well as heavier and more compact, owing to its smoothness; —and when fire enters into and dissolves its substance, it becomes more moveable, from losing its uniformity; and when it is thus rendered easily moveable, and is repelled by the surrounding air, and extended on the earth, it is said to be liquefied, by way of expressing the division of its masses, and is said to *flow* also, in order to show its extension over the earth: —and these two words express both the changes which it undergoes. Again, when fire escapes from this body, it does not retire into a vacuum, but the surrounding air repelled by the fire drives the easily-moveable mass of moisture into the place before occupied by the fire, with which at the same time it becomes mingled; —but when the mass by close compression once more becomes equable and smooth, it then resumes its smoothness and consistency, because fire, the artificer of inequality, has taken its departure; —and this departure of fire we denominate cooling, while the union that takes place without the presence of fire is termed a *condensation* or hardening. But among all those which we term fusible fluids, there is one that becomes most dense,

though formed from the most subtle and equable parts, and is of an uniform character, and partaking of a lustrous yellow color: —it is that most highly prized possession, —gold, which is produced by filtration through a rock. And a node ἕζος of gold, rendered by its density very hard and turned black, is called adamant. But that which consists of parts greatly resembling gold, and has more than one species, which surpasses gold in density, and that it may become the harder, contains but a small and insignificant portion of earth, though at the same time it is lighter, owing to the great intervals between its internal atoms; —this is a separate kind of lustrous and dense fluids, termed *brass*. But an earthy nature is therewith mingled, which, when through age the two parts become separated soon becomes visible of itself, and is denominated *rust*. All other such matters also, it would be no hard task further to discuss by pursuing the plan of probable arguments; —and anyone, who by way of recreation interrupts for a while his reasonings on eternal being, and enters into probable speculations about the generation of material things, will by these means acquire a pleasure of which he need not repent, and establish for himself a moderate and wise recreation during life.

Thus indulging ourselves, let us next recount certain probable reasons concerning what next follows of the same subject. Water that is mingled with fire, which being very thin and moist, takes its name ὑγρὸν from its motion and the manner in which it rolls on the earth, and which is which acquire a luster from the equality and smoothness of their parts, the opposite being the case with those that are ugly and valueless. But when all the moisture is thrown off by the violence of fire, and the body is thus unusually dried up, then is formed the kind of earth that we call clay. Sometimes also, even without losing its moisture, the earth is fused by

the fire, and on cooling becomes a stone of a black color. In the same manner, when this earth is deprived of the water it holds in mixture, but yet has small particles and is of a saline nature, it forms a half-solid body, still capable of solution in water, —either niter, which purifies both oil and earth, or else salt, a substance so well adapted to give flavors pleasing to the palate, and deemed by the law as agreeable to the gods. The compounds of these two substances are not soluble by water, but yet can be melted by fire, for the following reasons. Neither fire nor air liquefies masses of earth; because, being naturally composed of elements smaller than the interstices or pores of earth, they easily penetrate through these capacious pores without subjecting it either to dissolution or liquefaction. The parts of water, on the other hand, as they are larger, strive to force a passage, and so dissolve and liquefy the earthy mass: —and hence, when the earth has no strong consistency, water alone will dissolve it, whereas if in a compact state, nothing will affect it but fire, which is the only body that can find an entrance. As for water, again, its strong cohesiveness of parts, when frozen, can be overcome only by fire, whereas, when the cohesion is less strong, it can be equally decomposed by fire and air, the latter entering its interstices and the former separating even its constituent triangles. Nothing, however, can dissolve air strongly condensed, without attacking its composing elements; though when it coheres less strongly, it may be dissolved, though only by fire. Again, in bodies composed of water and earth, while the water occupies all the interstices in its state of compression, the particles of water from without, not finding egress, flow round the entire mass without suffering decomposition; whereas the particles also called soft and yielding, because its bases are less stable than those of earth, —this, when separated from fire and bereft of air, acquires more uniformity, and through their

departure *i.e.* of air and fire is compressed into itself; —and when it is thus condensed above the earth, it becomes hail, if on the earth, ice; but when there is less of it and only half the amount of freezing, the water so condensed above the earth becomes snow, and that on the earth, which is formed from dew, is called hoar-frost. When again the numerous kinds of water are mingled together, the entire liquid thus formed, which is filtered from the earth through plants, takes the name of juices or saps. Owing, however, to their mode of admixture, these individual fluids present through their dissimilarity many different undescribed varieties, although four of them, which are of a fiery character, and particularly transparent, have obtained appropriate appellations; —that which heats the soul as well as the body being called wine, —secondly, that which is smooth, and dazzling to the sight, and hence bright, glittering, and apparently of an oily nature, such as pitch, the gum of the kiki-plant, oil, and other things having similar properties; —again, that which possesses a power, as far as nature permits, of diffusing the substances of nutrition over the palate, and by this property presents the idea of sweetness, has obtained the general name of honey; —and lastly, that frothy fluid, which dissolves the flesh by burning, has been distinguished from all the other juices by the name of *opium* ὀπός.

As respects the different kinds of earth, one of them, stone, is produced by the filtration of water in the manner following. The commingled water, when it loses its coherence, passes into the form of air, but, on becoming air, rises to its appropriate place. As, however, there is no vacuum, it presses on the surrounding air; and this, being weighty, and impelled against the mass of earth that it surrounds, violently compresses it, driving it into the vacant spaces whence the new air had before ascended. The earth,

also, by the compression of the air into indissoluble union with water, is formed into stones; the more beautiful sorts of fire that enter into the interstices of water, as water into those of earth, and have the same effect on water that fire has on air, alone possess the power of dissolving and liquefying the compound body. And among these, some contain less water than earth; such as all kinds of glass, and such stones as are termed fusible; while others, on the contrary, contain more water, such as wax and aromatic substances.

Having thus then enumerated the several figures and classes of bodies variously formed by admixtures and mutual changes, we must now try to explain the causes of the feelings with which they impress us. First, then, the bodies here spoken of must be always perceptible. As yet, however, we have not discoursed on the generation of flesh, and what belongs to flesh, nor on that part of the soul which is mortal. This nevertheless cannot be suitably explained without at the same time explaining the sensations and impressions produced by external objects; and although one subject cannot be unfolded without a knowledge of the other, yet the two cannot be explained together. We must settle one first, and then proceed to the other. In order, then, in speaking of impressions, to observe the same order as in speaking of the bodies producing them, let our first inquiry be into those that concern the body and soul.

First, then, let us inquire why fire is called *hot*, the reason of which we shall perceive by considering its penetrating and cutting power about our bodies. Now, that this affection is a certain sharpness is nearly evident to all; and as regards the tenuity of its sides, the sharpness of its angles, the smallness of its particles, and the velocity of its motion, through all which it becomes violent, penetrating and capable of instantly dividing whatever it meets; this we

should carefully consider, recalling to mind the generation of its figure; —inasmuch as it is this, and no other nature, which separates and parcels out our bodies into small portions, and produces in us that affection which is very properly denominated heat. Now the contrary to this is sufficiently manifest; but still we must not pass it without explanation: —for in truth, among the humid particles surrounding the body, those that have the largest elementary parts enter and drive out the smaller; but being unable to occupy their places, they compress our bodily humors, and from being uneven and in a state of agitation, fix them and render them motionless through their evenness and density; —whereas things brought into contact against nature are naturally opposed and mutually repel each other. From this contest and agitation then there resulted a certain trembling and numbness; and the whole of this affection, as well as the cause that produces it, has the name of cold. Again we call those bodies hard to which our flesh yields; and those soft, which yield to the pressure of our flesh; —thus using the terms comparatively, with reference to each other. Bodies also yield to pressure when placed on a small base, while those resting on quadrangular bases are the least impressible, owing to their very firm position, and because from their own extreme density they strongly resist all opposing pressure.

Again, the nature of heavy and light will become most evident, if investigated with that of up and down; —for it is by no means right to assert that there are naturally two distinct places opposite one to the other; —one termed *down*, to which all bodies tend that are endued with bulk, but the other up, to which bodies ascend contrary to their inclination. The whole universe, indeed, being spherical, all such things as are at the extremities or circumference and equally distant from the center must all in like manner

naturally belong to the extremities, while the center, being in the same proportion distant from all these extremities, must be said to occupy quite an opposite position. Such then being the nature of the world, would not anyone who reversed the position of the above-mentioned objects be fairly thought to apply names to them that are quite unsuitable? For the middle place in it cannot be fairly said to be either naturally down or up, but only the center itself; and the circumference is neither the middle, nor does it contain within it any parts more distant than the rest either from the center, or any of the opposite extremities. But when all the parts are naturally so similar, how can anyone with propriety assign to them contrary names? —For supposing there were any regular solid body in the center of the universe, it would never be carried to any of the extremities, owing to their entire uniformity but on the other hand, if anyone were to move in a circle round this solid, he would often stand with his feet opposite to where they before were, and so call the same part of himself both the upside and down. Since the universe, therefore, as we have just observed, is of a spherical figure, no prudent man should assert that it has any part which is absolutely either up or down; —yet, as regards the origin and usual application of these terms which we thus transfer to the universe, this we agree to be a proper subject of investigation. If, in that spot of the universe which specially belongs to fire, and where the principal mass is collected with which it has a tendency to unite, anyone were to ascend thither and being possessed of the requisite power, were to take up the particles, place them in a balance, and raising the scale, were forcibly to draw the fire towards the air, with which it has no affinity, it is clear that in this case the smaller mass would be more easily impelled than the larger. Indeed, when two things are simultaneously raised by one and the same power, the

smaller quantity must of course yield more readily than the greater to the impulsive force by which they are constrained; and hence, the one is called heavy and gravitating downwards, the other light and tending upwards. The same thing also is observable in what we ourselves do, who inhabit this place the earth. For when, in walking on the earth, we separate particles of an earthy nature, and sometimes even portions of the earth itself, forcibly and unnaturally drawing them towards the air which is dissimilar, —then that which is smaller yielding more readily to our impulse is sooner attracted towards the foreign element: —this then we call light and the place towards which it is drawn, up or above, giving to their contraries the terms heavy and down or below respectively. Hence these must mutually differ from each other, owing to the contrary positions that the several elements occupy: —for that which is light in one place is contrary to one corresponding with it in an opposite position, and so also to a heavy body another that is heavy, and to bodies placed above or below ethers, opposed to them in their respective positions; —and they will all be found, whether in a state of becoming or actually existing, to be contrary, transverse, and every way differing from each other. This one thing, moreover, is to be understood concerning all these matters, that the tendency of each towards a body of similar nature gives to the body so attracted the name heavy, and the place to which it tends, down or below; and thus to contrary things are assigned contrary appellations. Such are the causes that we assign to these phenomena. And again, as to the cause of the impression of smoothness and roughness, everyone who has investigated it will be able to disclose it to others; for roughness comes from hardness joined with unevenness, while smoothness is the united effect of uniformity and density.

It remains for us now to consider what is most important in those affections common to the whole body, which are the chief causes of pleasure and pain, and to inquire how it is that certain impressions excite through the parts of the body certain sensations invariably attended by pleasure and pain. Thus then let us examine all our impressions, whether sensible or not, calling to mind the distinctions that we before made between bodies moved with ease and those with difficulty; —for this is the way to arrive at the point that we wish to determine. When a body by nature easily moveable has received an impression ever so slight, the several parts communicate it to the parts placed around them, producing on these parts the same effect, until at length they reach the intellect itself, to which they announce the power of the agents producing such impression; —whereas a body, which on the contrary is firm and stable and has no circular motion, is simply affected by itself without moving any of the surrounding bodies; and hence, as their components do not mutually communicate the first received impression, the entire animal remains unmoved, and experiences no sensation. This is the case indeed as respects the bones and hair, and such other parts of the body as are chiefly of an earthy nature; whereas the phenomena above described principally refer to the organs of sight and hearing, which contain an abundance of fire and air. This is what we should hold then concerning pleasure and pain: —an impression produced in us contrary to nature, and with violence, causes pain, —one that is conformable to our nature, however strong, pleasure; —whereas an impression that is gentle and gradual is unperceived, while the contrary to these produces contrary effects. An impression, again, the whole of which is easily produced, is pre-eminently an object of sensation, but is not affected by pleasure and pain: —and of this kind are the affections belonging to the sight; which indeed, as we

have above asserted, is a body of a nature daily becoming allied to ourselves. For in this way the impressions caused by cuttings and burnings, and other similar accidents, do not cause pain to the sight; nor again, does it experience pleasure, from returning to its previous condition: —whereas the sensations that are strongest and most clear do this, so far as anyone is affected by any object; and this is the reason why there is no violence whatever either in its expansion or contraction. But bodies composed from larger parts, which yield with difficulty to impelling agents, and distribute their motion over the whole body, do experience pleasure and pain; pain indeed, when they are often alienated from their own nature, but pleasure when restored to their former condition. Again, all bodies that admit of very gradual withdrawals, and, as it were, emptyings of their own nature, and at the same time receive supplies on a large scale, have no perception of loss, though they have of what accrues to them; and hence, they do not give pain to the mortal part of the soul, but on the contrary the greatest delight: —and the truth of this is manifest from the sensation of pleasant odors. But such bodies, on the other hand, as suffer excessive variation, and can scarcely be restored even gradually to their pristine condition, are affected in a manner quite the reverse of those we have just described; the truth of which is manifest in the case of burnings and wounds inflicted on the body.

Having thus then pretty fully discussed the common affections of the whole body, and the appellations assigned to their effective causes, we must now endeavor to explain, as far as we can, the affections that arise in particular parts of us, as well as the causes by which they are induced. In the first place then, let us if possible complete the explanation of what we before left unfinished about those of the juices, —namely, the particular affections subsisting

about the tongue. And these, as well as most others, appear to be produced by certain expansions and contractions, the impressions formed thereby depending more on smoothness and roughness than all other circumstances; because, whenever anything falls on the small veins round the tongue which are the arbiters, as it were, of the taste stretching to the heart, in such a way as to penetrate the moist and delicate texture of the flesh, which through its earthy nature is in a melting state, it contracts and dries up the veins: —and where these penetrating substances are rougher than usual, they have an acrid taste στρυφνά, if less so, only one of sourness αὐστηρά. Those on the contrary which purge, and wash away whatever adheres to the tongue, if they do this to such an immoderate degree, as somewhat to liquefy its nature, as niter does; —all such as these are termed bitter; while substances of inferior power to niter, which purge only moderately, we conceive to be salt, without that rough bitterness, and to be more friendly to our nature. Again, things heated by the temperature of the mouth, and thereby softened—which reciprocally heat and are heated by it—and which through their lightness are elevated towards the senses of the head, dividing at the same time whatever comes in their way; —all these, owing to such properties, are termed pungent δριμέα. But when these same particles, thinned by putrefaction, enter into the narrow veins, and there come into contact with earthy and airy particles of a suitable size, and by making them mutually revolve, so mix them together as to cause a confusion of their elements, and thus by entering other veins form interstices in which the liquid, sometimes earthy, sometimes quite pure, forms, as it were, certain air-cavities enclosed by water, some of which formed of pure liquid are transparent, and called bubbles, while those composed of earthy liquid and in a state of agitation have received the name of seething or boiling, and

yeast or leaven; —the effective cause of all this being termed acid ὀξύ. And an affection contrary to all that has been asserted about these, proceeds from a contrary cause; for, when the liquid compounds that enter the mouth are naturally suited to the quality of the tongue, they lubricate its asperities, as well as contract or relax such parts as were before unnaturally dilated or compressed, and restore them, as far as possible, to their proper and natural habit. Hence all such substances are pleasant and friendly to everyone, become the remedies of violent passions, and are denominated *sweet*. And thus much may suffice concerning particulars of this kind.

As respects the faculty of the nostrils, it admits of no classification: for all odors whatever are but half-begotten, —there being no substances so proportioned, as to give forth any particular smell. Besides, our veins surrounding the nose are too narrow to admit the various kinds of earth and water, and too broad for those of fire and air; and hence no one ever perceives an odor from any of these, —odors being produced from bodies that are damp, putrefying, liquid, or vaporous; —for odors are generated by the change of water into air, or air into water; and all these are either smoke or vapor. And of these, that which passes from air into water is vapor, —that which is changed from water into air, smoke; —whence it comes to pass that all odors are more subtle than water, and denser than air. And these facts are clearly shown, when anyone, owing to any obstruction of the respiration, draws his breath inwards; for then no odor filters through, but breath only—unattended by any odors. This is why these two varieties of them are without a name, being formed neither from many nor from a simple species, the only two distinct terms respecting them, being pleasant or unpleasant; the latter of which irritate and violently disturb the whole cavity lying between the top of the head

and the navel, while the former soothe the same part, and kindly restore it to its natural condition.

Let us next speak of and investigate the third kind of sense, —the hearing, and the causes giving rise to the affections peculiar thereto. Now we may generally define voice as a certain pulsation of the air, penetrating through the ears, brain, and blood, as far as the soul; and the motion hence arising, which commences from the head and ends in the seat of the liver, *hearing*; —and that when this motion is swift, it emits a sharp sound, when slow, a flat one, —-the former being uniform and smooth, the latter quite the reverse and rough: —likewise, that when the motion is on a large scale it will produce a loud sound, and when on a small scale only a low one. But respecting the harmony of these sounds we must speak in the subsequent part of this discourse.

The fourth kind of sense, which is still left for us to discuss, comprises a very large variety of what we generally term colors, which consist of a flame emanating from individual bodies, and having parts proportioned to the sight for producing sensation. But we have already considered the effective causes of sight. Here then we ought to speak of colors, and what seems to us the most probable theory respecting them.

Among the particles that fall from other bodies on the sight, some are greater, others less than, and others equal to, those of the visual fire. Such as are equal, then, are imperceptible, and are termed transparent; while, as for those that are larger or smaller, the former contract, the latter dilate the sight, having a power resembling that of heat and cold on the flesh, or of things acrid, heating and pungent, on the tongue. Particles affecting the sight in this manner are called black and white; —having the property, indeed, of producing the same modifications in bodies,

though, being produced in different parts of the organ, they still appear to produce different impressions. It is thus, then, that we ought to term them, —white, that which dilates the sight; and that which is opposite in its effect, black; —whereas, when a sharper motion, and that, too, from a foreign fire, falls on and divides the sight even as far as the eyes themselves, and both separates and moistens the openings of the eyes, so as to force from them that united flow of fire and water that we call tears, and which are of a fiery nature coming from without, —these two fires meeting together with a force like that of lightning, and then saturated and extinguished by moisture, produce a great variety of colors, the impressions from which we term *flashings* μαρμαρυγάς, and the objects producing them *bright* and *lustrous*. Another kind of fire, intermediate between those just mentioned, and which reaches the moisture of the eyes, and mingles with it, though by no means lustrous, and in which the rays of fire are mingled with moisture, and form a bloody color; this we denominate red. A bright hue mingled with red and white forms the color called yellow; but as regards the measure in which they mingle respectively, even a wise and thinking person could not explain it, were he ever so well informed on the matter, as he could not adduce concerning them any satisfactory reason, either necessary or probable. Again, red, when mingled with black and white, produces a purple color; and a very deep color is the result of their being mingled and burnt together, with a further addition of black. A *tawny red* is produced from the mixture of yellow and brown, and brown from the mixture of black and white; and a pale color from the mingling of white and yellow. A brilliant white, falling on a large quantity of black, constitutes a *dark blue* κυανοῦν; a deep blue mingled with white, a *grey* color; and a tawny red mingled with black forms a *green*. All the other

tints it will be easy to conjecture from the above examples, if one only reasons fairly from analogy. Nevertheless, anyone who would prove them by the test of experiment evinces great ignorance of the difference between a divine and human nature; for a god indeed may be able to mingle many things into one, and again dissolve the one into many, through his united power and intelligence; but no man living can accomplish either of these tasks, nor will anyone in time to come.

All these things which thus naturally subsist from necessity, the artificer of what is most beautiful and best took for his elements of creation, in producing a self-sufficient and most perfect god; employing secondary causes indeed, but at the same time performing his work well on all created beings. For this reason we must distinguish two species of causes; the one necessary, the other divine. And in all things we should inquire after the divine cause, with the view of obtaining a blessed life in the highest degree of which our nature admits, for the sake of which also we should investigate the necessary cause as well, —convinced, that without these two classes of causes, we can neither understand nor apprehend, nor otherwise engage in the several objects of our anxious pursuit. Since, then, we have now before us the various classes of causes, laid out like materials for our labor, and which will serve as the matter from which we are to interweave the remainder of our discourse, let us again briefly recur to our first observations, and thence pass rapidly on to the place at which we are now arrived; thus endeavoring to annex such an end and close to our discourse, as may harmonize with its beginning.

Just as we stated in the opening of our discourse, —when all sensible things were in disorder, the Deity made each individually to harmonize with itself and mutually with all the rest, so far as things could possibly be brought into

symmetry and proportion; because formerly, nothing had any order except by accident, nor did anything whatever deserve the names that things receive at present; such, for instance, as fire, water, and the rest of the elements. All these, however, the Creator put in order first of all, and then out of these constructed the universe, as a single animal, containing within itself different kinds of animals, mortal and immortal, —he himself being the artificer of Divine natures, but committing to his offspring the junior gods the charge of producing those that are mortal. The latter, in imitation of their father, receiving the immortal principle of the soul, next fashioned the mortal body, making it entirely to be a vehicle thereto, and forming within it a separate mortal kind of soul, possessed of certain dire and necessary passions: first, pleasure, the chief lure to evil; next, pain, the desertion of what is good; —after these again, temerity and fear, both mad advisers; anger, hard to be appeased; hope, which is easily misled both by irrational sense, and all-daring love. By mingling these together, they the junior gods necessarily composed the mortal race. And on this account, fearing to defile the Divine nature more than was absolutely necessary they lodged man's mortal portion separately from the Divine, in a different receptacle of the body; forming the head and breast, and placing the neck between, as an isthmus and limit to separate the two extremes. In the breast, indeed, and what is called the thorax or trunk, they seated the mortal part of the soul. And as one part of it was naturally better, and another worse, they formed the cavity of the thorax into two divisions resembling the separate dwellings of our men and women, placing the midriff as a partition between them. That part of the soul, therefore, which partakes of fortitude and spirit, and loves contention, they seated nearer the head, between the midriff and the neck; as it is the business of the reason to unite with it in

forcibly repressing the desires, whenever they will not obey the mandate and word issuing from the citadel above.

The heart, which is the head and principle of the veins, as well as the fountain of the blood that impetuously circulates through all the members, they placed in a kind of sentry-house, that, in case of any outburst of anger, being informed by the reason of any evil committed in its members, owing either to some foreign cause, or else internal passions, it the heart might transmit through all its channels the threatenings and exhortations of reason, so as once more to reduce the body to perfect obedience, and so permit what is the best within us to maintain supreme command.

But as the gods foreknew, with respect to the palpitation of the heart under the dread of danger and the excitements of passion, that all such swellings of the inflamed spirit would be produced by fire, they formed the lungs to be a sort of protection thereto; first, of all, soft and bloodless, and next, internally provided with cavities perforated like a sponge, in order to cool the breath which they receive, and give the heart easy respiration and repose in its excessive heat. On this account then, they led the channels of the windpipe into the lungs, which they placed like a soft cushion round the heart, in order that when anger rises in it to an extreme height, it might fall on some yielding substance, and so getting cool, yield cheerfully and with less trouble to the authority of reason.

That part of the soul next, which has a desire for meats, drinks, and all else that is necessary for the natural supplies of the body, they placed between the midriff and the region of the navel; forming, as it were, in all this place a sort of manger for the nutriment of the body; and then they bound it on to it, like some savage animal, annexed as necessary to nourish the mortal race afterwards to be brought into existence. This place of course the gods assigned it, in order

that ever feeding at its manger, and dwelling as far off as possible from the deliberative part of the soul, it might make the least possible degree of tumult and noise, and permit the best portion of our nature to consult in quiet for the common benefit of the whole. Knowing also that this part would not acquiesce with the reason, and, even if it had any faculty of sense, yet would not regard the processes of reasoning, but be chiefly lured away, both day and night, by images and phantasms, —reflecting on this, the Deity formed the liver, assigning it the place it occupies. And he made it compact and smooth, shiny and sweet, and yet somewhat bitter, —in order that the multitude of thoughts falling on it from the intellect as on a mirror that receives and presents images to the view, might on the one side terrify it by employing a bitterness akin to its nature; and proceeding to dreadful threats, gradually mingle this bitterness with the whole liver so as to present the dark hues of bile, and by contracting it, render it throughout rough and wrinkled; —or on the other, partly by removing the liver from its right place and contracting it, partly by obstructing and closing its ventricles and gates, cause impressions of pain and disgust: —whereas, on the contrary, when a gentle inspiration—the result of intelligence—depicts on it images of quite an opposite character, softens its bitterness by avoiding to agitate or touch anything contrary to its own nature, —it then gives it a softness peculiarly its own, and makes all its parts regular, polished, and free, —giving joy and peace to that part of the soul which resides near the liver, and making it enjoy a suitable repose at night, with the power of divination during sleep, to make up for its want both of reason and wisdom.

Those, forsooth, who created us, calling to mind their father's command, when he bid them make the mortal race as good as they possibly could, formed even the inferior part

of us to have some connection with truth, by establishing within it the faculty of divination. And a sufficiently clear proof, that the Deity assigned prophetic power to human madness, is found in the fact that no one in his right senses has any concern with divinely inspired and true prophecy, which takes place only when the reasoning faculty is fettered by sleep, or alienated by disease or enthusiasm; while, on the other hand, it requires a person of considerable wisdom to understand the recorded sayings, whether sleeping or waking, of a prophetic and divinely-inspired nature, and so to distinguish all the phenomena it beholds as to be able to explain in what way and to whom they portend any future, past, or present good or evil; it being by no means the office of one who either has been, or is still mad, to judge respecting things seen or spoken by himself: —and it has been well observed by the ancients, that to transact and know one's own concerns and oneself is alone the province of a prudent man; —whence, indeed, the law directs that the race of prophets or interpreters should preside as judges over divine predictions, —whom some indeed call diviners, through entire ignorance that they are only the representers of enigmas and visions, and not at all entitled to be called diviners, —being, strictly speaking, interpreters of prophecies.

The liver then was constructed for this purpose, and seated where we have mentioned, for the sake of prediction. And besides, in every living individual, this organ gives forth unusually clear indications; but in those deprived of life, it becomes blind and delivers oracles too obscure for their meaning to be made intelligible. The nature and position of the intestines, again, which is next to it the liver, is on the left side, for the purpose of always, like a sponge, keeping it clean and bright, ready to reflect images; on which account, therefore, when certain impurities are produced in the liver

by bodily disease, then the spleen, by its rarity, receives and purifies them all, from being of a hollow and bloodless texture; —and hence, is it, that when filled with unclean matter, it grows to a large size and becomes wholly unsound. And again, when the body is purified, it subsides into its natural condition, as before.

As respects the soul, then, including both its mortal and divine portion, in what way it existed, and in what way and why it was consigned to a separate habitation, the truth can be firmly established only by the consent of the Deity: —still, that we have stated what is near the truth, we will now, quite open to investigation, venture the assertion; and here accordingly it is made. And what next follows we must treat in a similar manner; and this is no other, than how the rest of the body was produced. It is, therefore, in the most eminent degree becoming that they should be composed as follows: —Those who formed our race were aware, that we should be intemperate in eating and drinking, and that through madness we should use far more than is either necessary or moderate. For fear then of rapid destruction induced by disease, and lest our mortal race should perish without fulfilling its end, —to provide against this, the gods formed for the reception of the superfluous food a receptacle beneath, called a belly, and formed in it the convolutions of the intestines to prevent the food from passing so quickly as to require fresh and rapid supplies of nutriment for the body, and so by insatiable gluttony making our whole race unphilosophical and unmusical, insubordinate to the most godlike part of our composition.

The nature of the bones and flesh, and other parts of this kind, was constituted as follows: —The first principle of all these is the generation of the marrow; for the life-bonds of the soul that united it with the body being herein woven together, constitute the foundation of the mortal race. The

marrow itself, however, has a different origin; for among the triangles, those of the first order, that are unbent and smooth, were specially adapted by their accuracy for producing fire and water, air and earth: —these the Deity, separating each apart from its own class, and mingling them together in fixed proportions, composed by these means an all-varying mixture of seeds for the whole mortal race, and from these produced the marrow; —and he afterwards implanted this marrow, binding therein the various classes of souls; and as respects the number of figures and what individual forms the marrow was to receive, he divided it, both as regards the quality and quantity of the particles, at the original distribution, —giving to that part of it which was to be the field for containing the divine seed a completely globular shape; and this he called the *brain*, because in every animal that has arrived at its perfect form, the vessel containing this substance is called the *head*. But as respects the part destined to contain the remaining and mortal part of the soul, to this he gave both round and oblong shapes, giving to the whole the name of *marrow*; and from these, as from anchors, casting the bonds of the entire soul, he built around it our whole body, after first fixing round it a complete covering of bones.

The bones he composed as follows: —Having sifted pure and smooth earth, he mingled and moistened it with marrow; and after this he placed it in fire, then plunged it in water, once more placed it in fire, and after this dipped it in water: and thus by frequent transfers of each, he made it insoluble by either. With this bone, then, he fashioned a sphere, as on a lathe, placing it round the brain, and only leaving a narrow hole therein. At the same time also he formed of the same substance certain vertebrae about the marrow of the neck and back, extending them like hinges, from the head downwards through the whole trunk; —and

thus he preserved all its seed, by fortifying it round with a stony covering, —forming in it joints also, for motion and flexion, employing the power of difference in their formation, as being possessed of a certain middle quality. Then, considering that the bone would have a tendency to become dry and inflexible, and that when heated and again cooled, it would become carious, and quickly corrupt the seed it contained, he on this account formed the sinews and flesh; that the former, by binding all the parts of the body, and being stretched and loosened about the vertebrae, might give the body a facility for either flexion or extension, as occasion required; while the flesh would serve as a covering from the heat and defense from the cold; —as likewise for a protection against falls, in the same manner as cushions do it, by gently and easily yielding to external bodies: and he implanted in it also a hot moisture, which perspires in summer, and gives forth an external dew, to impart a coolness to the whole body, —and again in winter, gently keeps out by its own fire the cold brought from without.

Our plastic Creator, reflecting on all this then, mingled and united water, fire, and earth, gradually mixing therewith a ferment of acid and salt; —and thus he composed a pulpy, soft flesh: —And as for the tendons, he formed them of a mixture of bone and unfermented flesh, so as to have the properties of both, tinging them also with a yellow color. And on this account is it, that the tendons are firmer and more viscous than the flesh, but softer and moister than the bones. With these God bound together the bones and marrow, afterwards enshrouding the whole of them with the covering of the flesh. Such of the bones, then, as were most ensouled, he covered with the smallest quantity of flesh, —such as were least so, with the most and the densest flesh. And besides this, except where reason evinced the need of the contrary, he placed only a small quantity of flesh on the

joints of the bones; lest they should make the body uneasy by impeding its flexions and motion; or else, from being many and frequent, and strongly pressed together, cause by their solidity a dullness of perception, imperfection of memory, and a sort of intellectual blindness. On this account then, the bones of the groin, legs, loins, the shoulders and the arms from the elbow to the wrist, and such other parts of our bodies as have no joints, and such inward bones as have no thought, owing to the scarcity of soul in the marrow, are fully provided with flesh; —whereas those that have thought, he covered with less, except the flesh were for perception, as in the case of the tongue. In other respects, the case is as we have described. For a being born and nurtured under necessity, does not receive a hard bone united with plenty of flesh, and with it also a quickness of sensation. And yet the head would have been thus constructed, if the two had exercised any will in thus coalescing; and the human race, having a fleshy, tendinous, and robust head, would enjoy healthy and unmolested a life twice as long as the present, or even yet longer than that: but the artificers of our race, after thoroughly considering whether they had better make it more lasting and of worse condition, or shorter but of a more excellent character, were agreed that a shorter but better life was wholly preferable to one longer, but inferior: —and this was why they covered the head with a thin bone, and not with flesh and fiber, —because it had no joints. On all these accounts, then, the body was provided with a head, which was the more perceptive and reflecting, in proportion as it was physically weaker than all the rest of man's structure. From these causes, then, and in this manner, the Deity placing tendons round the lower extremity of the head, glued them, as it were, round the neck, and bound with them the lofty cheek-bones placed under the forehead; —and as for all the rest,

he scattered them through all the members, connecting joint with joint.

We were next provided by those who formed us with the organs of the mouth, teeth, tongue, and lips, —arranged as they now are for purposes both necessary and the best; giving ingress for necessaries, and egress to what is best, —everything, indeed, that enters to feed the body being necessary—while the stream of words flowing outwards, if guided by wisdom, is by far the fairest and best of all streams whatever.

Again, it was not possible that the head could bear a mere covering of thin bone, owing to the extremes of the different seasons; nor again, could it be allowed to become clouded, blind, and unperceptive, through the overcrowding of flesh. Hence a fleshy membrane, not dried, was left separate from the rest, —that now termed cuticle or scalp. This, then, being brought into union with itself by the moisture about the brain, grows around and circularly invests the head. And it is the moisture flowing under the sutures that moistens this membrane, and causes it to close at the crown, connecting it as in a knot. But as for the ever-varying classes of sutures, these are generated through the power of the periodic changes caused by nutriment in the flesh; the variety becoming greater, when they struggle with each other more violently—less so, when less violently. All this membrane the Divine Being pierced all round with fire: —and hence, as it was wounded, and the moisture externally flowed through it, all that was pure of the moisture and heat was carried off, while that which was mixed, and of a nature allied to that of the membrane itself, being raised by the motion, was stretched outwards to a great size, having also a tenuity equal to the amount of puncture, —whereas, on the other hand, when continually thrust back through the slowness of its motion by the spirit surrounding it externally, it again

revolves under the membrane and there becomes firmly rooted. And owing to these affections is it, that the hair springs up on the membrane of the head, being naturally allied, and serving as a rein to this membrane, but at the same time becoming harder and denser through the pressure of the cold, which hardens each hair, as it proceeds beyond the skin. Thus, then, by the means above mentioned, did our Creator plant the head with hairs, reflecting at the same time that instead of flesh a light covering was needed to guard the brain, and give it shade and protection from the extremes of heat and cold without hindering its acuteness of sensation.

But the mass of tendon, skin, and bone that is interwoven about the fingers, being a mixture of three substances, becomes, when dried, one common hard membrane composed of all in common—fashioned indeed with these as instrumental causes, but effectively produced by that reflection which ever has an eye to the future: —for those who formed us well knew, that women and other animals would someday be generated from men, and that nails would be of the greatest use in several respects to many of the animals: —and this was the reason, why they stamped in men the pattern of the nails at their first birth. It was from these causes, then, and with these intentions, that they implanted skin, hairs, and nails at the extremities of the limbs.

As the parts and members of the mortal animal however were all allied in nature, and their life necessarily resulted from fire and spirit, the decay and exhaustion of which would cause it to perish quickly, the gods provided for it the following remedy: —Intermingling a nature resembling that of man with other forms and senses, they planted as it were other animals, —such as kindly-disposed trees, plants, and seeds, which are made useful to us by the nurture and

training of agriculture; though before there were only those of a rustic kind, which are more ancient than those that are cultivated. Everything indeed that partakes of life we may justly and most correctly call an animal; —but that in particular, of which we are now speaking, is possessed of the third species of soul, which we place between the midriff and the navel: and which has no share either in opinion, reason, or intellect, though possessing a sense of pleasure and pain, as well as desire. It effects all things indeed by passion or appetite; and it does this by the evolution of its internal power and the employment of its own motion to the exclusion of every other, as it has not been formed with a nature capable of reasoning on its own concerns. It thus lives in no way different from an animal, except in being firmly rooted in a fixed position and deprived of original motion.

Now after the directing artificers of our structure had implanted all these organs for giving nutriment to our inferior nature, they directed various channels through our body, so as to water it like a garden, by the constant accession of flowing moisture. And first, they cut two hidden channels beneath the juncture of the skin and flesh, viz. two veins going down the back to correspond with the double figure of the body, both on the right and left sides. These they placed close to the back-bone, so as to receive between them the marrow, the growth of which might be thus promoted, and that the flood supplied thence to other parts, might give an equable irrigation; —and then, dividing the veins about the head, and mutually interweaving them, they distributed them in opposite directions, —inclining some from the right to the left of the body, and some from the left to the right, that there might be a chain formed by the skin to unite the head to the body, there being no interlacing of tendons round the head, —and besides this, that the

affection of sensation might from each of these parts pass round and through the body. It was in some such way as this, then, that they prepared the channel, of which we speak; and its truth we shall easily perceive by assenting to our previous position, —that all things composed of greater parts may envelop such as are less, while those consisting of less cannot envelop the greater. But fire is, of all classes of things, composed of the smallest parts; and hence it penetrates through water, earth, and air, and their several compounds, —and this to such an extent that nothing can retain it. The same remark is true of our belly, which is able to retain any food that has been introduced, but cannot hold spirit and fire, because they consist of smaller particles than those composing the belly.

These channels therefore the Deity employed for the purpose of distributing moisture from the belly into the veins, by weaving with fire and air a network resembling basket-nets or weeds, with two curved passages of entrance, —one of which he again twisted and divided into two branches, winding the continuations of these curved passages like coils of rope in every direction as far as the ends of the net. Now all the inner parts of the network he composed of fire, but the great flexures and the receptacle itself of air; —and lastly, he took and placed them in the new-formed animal, as follows. One of the curved passages he placed in the mouth; but, as this part has two flexures, he caused one *i.e.* the trachea to pass along the arteries into the lungs, the other *i.e.*. the esophagus by the side of the arteries into the belly. The other curved part he divided into two separate passages, making them pass in common to the channels of the nose, so that when the one does not reach the mouth, all the streams of the other might still be filled from this. But as for the remaining part of the hollow network, he made it extend all over the concavity of the body,

and the whole of it flow gently together into the curved passages, as being of an airy texture, and at another time to flow through them backwards. But the net, which is of a thin structure, he so disposed as to make it penetrate through and again emerge. Besides this, he ordered that the interior rays of fire should follow in constant succession, the air at the same time passing into each, and that this should never cease to be the case, as long as the mortal animal's life continued. And as respects the name of this kind of motion, we call it expiration and inspiration. Now this whole action and affection that it produces in our nature, is caused by certain bodily moistenings and coolings, alike conducive to our nutriment and life: —for as the breath passes in and out, an interior fire attends it in its course; and when it is diffused through the belly and meets with solid and liquid food, it reduces them both to a state of moisture, and by dividing them into very small parts, carries them along in its course; pouring them, as from a fountain, into the veins, and so cutting channels through the body as through an aqueduct.

But again let us consider the affection of breathing, and investigate the causes which gave it its present nature. We should reason on it, therefore, as follows—As there is no such thing in nature as a vacuum into which a moving body can enter, and as breath passes from us outwards, everyone is aware that it cannot escape into void space, but must thrust out whatever is nearest; again, that the body must always repel that ever nearest, and that from a necessity of this kind, everything impelled into the place vacated by the emitted breath must, after entering and filling up this space, attend on the breath as it travels. And all this must take place like the revolution of a wheel, through the impossibility of a vacuum. Hence, the breast and lungs, after dismissing the breath outwards, are again inflated by the entrance of the air surrounding the body into and around the cavities of

the flesh. And when the air is again sent outwards and flows round the body, it drives the breath inwards through the mouth and nostrils.

And as regards the cause from which they derive their origin, we may propose the following. In every animal in the universe those of its internal parts are the hottest which surround the veins and blood, just as if they contained a fountain of fire; and this heat we compared to a bow-net, extending through the middle of the body, and woven wholly of fire; all outside of it being composed of air. Yet heat, it must be agreed, naturally proceeds outward into a region with which it is allied. But as there are two passages for the heat, —one through the body outwards, the other again through the mouth and nostrils; hence, when the breath is impelled towards the latter, it in turn repels that latter. But that which is drawn into the fire becomes heated by so falling, while what is exhaled becomes cooled; —and so, owing to the change of temperature, they pass again into their former condition, whether hot or cold, through the mutual repulsion of each other; and as the same influence is constant and mutually operating, its circular agitation gives birth to the expiration and inspiration of the breath.

To the same causes may we ascribe the impressions produced by medical cupping-glasses, by swallowing drink, by the violent hurlings of bodies, whether upwards or on the ground, together with such sounds as appear swift or slow, sharp or flat, —and which at one time are discordant, owing to the dissimilitude of the motion which they cause within us, and at another harmonize, through the similitude of that motion. For the slower sounds catch up those antecedent and swifter, because the latter slacken their pace to one like their own; and by so following the swifter, they still urge them onward, —though without disturbing the motion by introducing another, but making their slower rate to

approach gradually to that of the swifter; —and this mixed impression from the sharp and flat *i.e.* the quick and slow forms a single note; whence results the pleasure felt even by the unwise, but really entertained by the wise, which is owing to the imitation of Divine harmony that exists in mortal motions. And, indeed, with respect to all the motions of water, the fallings of thunder, and the wonderful circumstances observed in the attraction of amber, and the Herculean stone, —in all these, no real attraction takes place at all; but as a vacuum can nowhere be found, the particles are mutually impelled by each other; hence, as they all individually, both in a separate and mingled state, have an attraction for their own proper seats, it is by the mutual intermingling of these affections, that such admirable effects present themselves to the view of the accurate investigator.

It is specially owing to this cause, that respiration whence our discourse originated is generated; and after the manner that we have before shown; —namely, that as fire divides the food and rises internally to attend on the breath, the veins from the belly become filled by this joint elevation, in consequence of drawing thence the divided portions of the food; so that by these means, through every animal body the streams of nutriment are abundantly diffused. But the parts which are recently cut apart and separated from their kindred natures, —some of them fruits and others grasses, and produced by the Deity for bodily food, acquire varieties of color through their mutual admixture; though for the most part the red predominates, as its nature consists of fire combined with a lump of moist mud. Hence also the color of that which flows about the body is just what it seems, and is also called *blood*, being the nurturing principle of the flesh and whole body; and so by everywhere diffusing its moisture, it copiously replenishes all the exhausted parts.

As for the manner of impletion and depletion, it is produced in the same way as the change of everything in the universe; viz. from the circumstance of all kindred natures having a common attraction: —for the natures with which we are clothed externally, are perpetually melting and being distributed, each form of matter departing to that with which it is allied. But the particles of blood which are contained in, and distributed throughout our bodies, as is the case with every animal created under heaven, necessarily imitate the motion of the universe. Each, therefore, of the divided parts within us, being borne along to its kindred nature, again replenishes what is void. But when the decretions exceed the accessions, the whole animal falls into decay; but in the contrary case, it acquires growth.

The new composition therefore of every animal, as it has new triangles, *i.e.* elementary principles, formed as it were from fresh timbers, causes them to lock closely within each other, —the whole of its bulk being of a delicate structure, formed of fresh marrow and fed on milk. Those triangles, therefore, that compose the bodily aliment, having entered it from without and been received into the animal, from being older and weaker than the simple original triangles therewith agreeing, are overpowered and destroyed by the new triangles; and the animal grows to a large size, because it is supplied from a multitude of similar parts. But when the root of these triangles is relaxed by fatigue and dullness, brought on by the repulsion of many particles during a long period of time, then the food received can no longer cut into its own similitude; but they are themselves easily separated by the bodies that enter from without. Overcome by this, the whole animal at length decays; and this state is what we call old age: —and at last, when the jointed chains of the triangles about the marrow can no longer hold, but through long employment get unfastened and set free the bonds of

the soul, —the soul thus loosened naturally flies off with pleasure and delight; for everything contrary to nature is painful, while the natural is pleasant. Hence the death caused by wounds and disease is painful and violent, —while that which follows old age, as the end agreeable to nature, is of all deaths the least irksome, and attended rather by pleasure than pain.

As to the origin of diseases, that must be obvious to everyone: —for as there are four component elements of the body, viz. earth, fire, water, and air, the unnatural overabundance or defect of these, and their removal from their own to a different position, —those of fire, we mean, and the other classes, for there are more than one, —these are the causes why they do not each receive what suits their peculiar nature, and they necessarily produce disturbances and diseases: for as these are severally generated and transferred in a way contrary to nature, such things as were formerly heated become cold, what were once dry moist, the light heavy—all things, in short, undergo all possible mutations. For we assert that it is only when the same thing approaches to and departs from the same in the same manner and according to analogy, that it will allow what is the same with itself to abide in health and safety: and should any of them be in discordance, whether approaching or departing, it will cause all varieties of alienations, as well as unnumbered diseases and corruptions. But having now found the second set of conditions suitable to nature, the second mode of considering diseases also is now open to anyone desirous of so doing. For as the marrow, bone, flesh, and sinew are composed of those elements, as likewise the blood in another way, though from a similar origin, so also most other diseases owe their severity to the causes we have mentioned; though the greatest of them are to be traced to the following cause: —When the generation of these various

bodily substances takes place inversely, then they become subject to corruption: —for the flesh and sinews are naturally formed from blood, —the sinews indeed from fibers, through the connection between these, but the flesh from its union with that which when in a separate state becomes solid: —while the glutinous and fatty substance again which is formed from sinews and flesh, at once unites the flesh to the bone, and itself feeds the growth of the bone itself, with which the marrow is surrounded. And again, that which filters through the solid part of the bones, being the purest kind of the triangles, as well as most smooth and unctuous, moistens the marrow by falling drop by drop from the bones.

When these several things are the case, health mostly ensues; but when the contrary happens—disease. For when the flesh becomes liquefied and sends back what it loses into the veins, then the blood mingled with spirit flows abundantly, and of all kinds, through the veins, with different degrees of colors and bitterness; and yet further, from its acid and salt qualities, it generates all kinds of bile, lymph, and phlegm; —for as they are all generated and corrupted in an opposite way, they first of all destroy the blood itself; and the fluids that can no longer afford nutriment to the body, are borne along the veins without any natural order of circulation; at variance, indeed, with each other, because they derive no mutual advantages from the properties of each, but positively hostile to the constitution of the body, and its maintenance in health, —in short, destroying it and bringing it to putrefaction.

Such, therefore, of the flesh as becomes liquefied by its great age, being indisposed to putrefy, grows black from long burning; and from having been entirely macerated it becomes bitter, and falls into discontent with the other parts of the body not yet infected with corruption. And then,

indeed, instead of bitterness, the black part assumes an acidity, if the bitter becomes more attenuated: but when the bitterness is tinged with blood, it becomes still redder; and when mixed with black, it assumes the nature of bile: —and yet further, to the bitterness is added a yellow color through the melting of new flesh on the fire surrounding the flame. And this common name for all these some of the physicians assigned them, —or at any rate some who were able to consider many things dissimilar, and to detect in a single class a great number of particulars all deserving a special name. But all else that may be called kinds of bile, receive, according to color, a name peculiar to each. As for *lymph* ἴχωρ the whey of the blood, it is gentle and mild: while the sediment of black, acid bile, is fierce and wild; —and when mingled by heat with anything of a saline quality, it is called acid *phlegm*. Again, the moisture running from new and tender flesh mingled with the air, which is afterwards inflated and enclosed by moisture, produces bubbles, which separately are invisible, owing to their small size, but when collected in a large bulk become visible, and acquire a white color from the generation of froth. And all this liquefaction of delicate flesh, when woven together with spirit, we term white phlegm, —the sediment of recent phlegm, *tears* and *sweat*; together with all such secretions that the body sends forth for its purification.

All these indeed become the instruments of disease, when the blood is not supplied naturally from liquid and solid food, but gains bulk from contraries in violation of the laws of nature., When any part of the flesh therefore becomes separated by disease, letting its first principles remain, half the trouble is removed; for it admits of an easy recovery. But when that which binds the flesh to the bones becomes diseased, and the blood flowing from the fibers and sinews no longer serves as food to the bones and a bond to the flesh,

but, instead of being fat, smooth and glutinous, becomes rough and salt from being parched by bad diet; then, in consequence of suffering all this and being separated from the bones, it is itself crumbled down under the flesh and sinews; —while the flesh falling at the same time from its roots, leaves the sinews bare and saturated with salt; and thus, entering once more the circulation of the blood, it increases the number of the aforesaid maladies. And if these bodily ailments be severe, still more afflicting and troublesome are those that precede them; when the bone, owing to the density of the flesh, does not allow sufficient respiration, but becoming heated through rottenness, falls into decay, and will receive no nutriment, but on the contrary gradually crumble away, —bone falling on flesh, and flesh again on blood, diseases being by these means produced that are of a severer character than the former. By far the worst of all maladies however is, —when the marrow becomes diseased through some defect or excess; —because it is then productive of the most vehement and fatal diseases, the whole nature of the body being necessarily reversed and destroyed.

Again, as to the third species of diseases, we ought to consider them as divided into three classes, —one produced by spirit, a second by phlegm, and a third by bile. For when the lungs, the great guardian of the breath, through being obstructed by defluxions, will not allow a free passage to the breath, which thus has no egress one way, and in another enters in larger supplies than it ought, those parts which are not cooled by it become putrid, while those that receive too much of it, passing violently through the veins, distort them and become liquefied, being shut out with the diaphragm in the middle of the body: and thus ten thousand severe ailments hence arise, together with an abundance of sweat. And frequently, when the flesh becomes separated within

the body, breath is produced, which not finding escape externally, causes the same torments as the breath entering from without. The greatest pains that it produces, however, are, when it surrounds and swells out the sinews and neighboring veins, stretching and distorting the tendons and sinews continued from the back. Now these diseases, from their disposition to extension, are termed tensions and contortions from behind, —the cure of which it is difficult to find; because fevers supervene and generally bring them to a close. But the white phlegm, when it becomes troublesome through the formation of air-bubbles, being shut out by having breathing-vents outside the body, is of a milder kind, and variegates the body with white spots, generating other diseases also of a similar character. But when mingled with black bile, and dispersed about the most divine circulations of the head, it acts as a disturbing agent, though with less violence during sleep; but if it come to those who are awake, it cannot be expelled without difficulty; and as this is a disease of a sacred nature or organ, *i.e.* the head, it is most justly called sacred. An acid and salt phlegm again is the source of all those diseases which are produced by a defluxion of humors: and because the places into which this phlegm flows are of infinite variety, it produces all kinds of diseases. But whatever parts of the body are said to be inflamed, all become so from being burnt and inflamed by bile.

Now this bile, whenever it makes an expiration, boils and sends up all kinds of tumors, and when inwardly restrained, generates many inflammatory diseases, —but the greatest of all, when mingled with pure blood it disturbs the order of the fibers, which are scattered in the blood for this purpose, —namely, of giving it certain measures of tenuity and density, and that it may neither through heat as being moist flow from the thin body, nor from its density become unadapted

to motion, and so experience difficulty in flowing back in the veins. The just temperament, then, of these things is under the natural guardianship of the fibers; because if anyone collects them together in the blood when dead and in a state of coldness, all the remaining blood becomes diffused; and when let out quickly, it coagulates in consequence of the cold surrounding it. The fibers possessing this influence over the blood, the bile, which is of the nature of ancient blood, and again changed into it from flesh by liquefaction, first gradually falls in a warm, moist state, and becomes coagulated through the power of the fibers; though when coagulated and violently extinguished, it causes a tempest and tremor within. When it flows with still greater force, it overcomes the fibers by its own proper heat, and by its ebullition drives them into disorder; and if it retains its prevalence to the end, it penetrates into the marrow, and burning the bonds of the soul, as if they were the cables of a ship, dissolves their union, and sets it wholly free; but, on the other hand, when it flows less abundantly, and the body on becoming liquefied opposes its passage, it then, on finding itself overcome, either escapes through the whole body, or being driven through the veins into the upper or lower belly, escapes from the body like a fugitive from a seditious city, and introduces defluxions, dysenteries, or gripings of the intestines, and all diseases of a similar kind. When the body, therefore, is unusually diseased by an excess of fire, it then labors under continued burnings and fever; but when through excess of air, under quotidian fevers: under tertian through water, because water is less active than fire and air; and under quartan, through excess of earth; —for earth, being of all of them the least active, becomes purified in quadruple periods of time, and hence introduces quartan fevers, which are with difficulty dispelled.

In the above manner are the diseases of the body produced; but the diseases of the soul, resulting from the habit of the body, are as follows. We must admit that the disease of the soul is folly, or a privation of intellect; and that there are two kinds of folly; the one madness, the other ignorance. Whatever passion, therefore, a person experiences that induces either of them, must be called a disease. Excessive pleasures and pains, however, are what we should deem the greatest diseases of the soul: —for when a man is over-elevated with joy or unduly depressed with grief, and so hastens immoderately either to retain the one or fly from the other, he can neither perceive nor hear anything properly, but is agitated with fury, and very little capable of exercising the reasoning power. But he who possesses a great quantity of fluid-seed about the marrow, and is by nature like a tree over-laden with fruit, such a one having many throes, and also many pleasures in his desires and their attendant offspring, —being maddened too during most of his life by the greatest pleasures and pains, having a soul also rendered morbid and unwise by the body, is wrongly deemed to be—not diseased, but voluntarily bad. In truth, however, sexual intemperance generally becomes a disease of the soul, through a particular state of fluidity and moisture caused by the tenuity of the bones. And indeed it may almost be asserted, that all intemperance in any kind of pleasure, and all disgraceful conduct, is not properly blamed as the consequence of voluntary guilt. For no one is voluntarily bad: but he who is depraved becomes so through a certain bad habit of body and an ill-governed education; and to everyone these are inimical, as they result in a certain evil. And again, in the matter of pain, the soul suffers much depravity through the body. For where acid and salt phlegm, and likewise bitter and bilious humors, wandering through the body, get no external vent, but revolve inwardly, and

mingle their exhalations with the circulation of the soul; they in this case produce within it an infinite variety of diseases, greater or less in degree, —more or less in numbers. They are introduced, indeed, to three seats of the soul; and according to the diversity of the place, each begets every variety of difficulty and sorrow, rashness and timidity, and still further of oblivion and indocility. Besides this also, the vicious manners of cities, and discourses both private and public, often contribute to increase this malady; nor are any branches of learning taught in early life which tend to serve as remedies for such mighty ills; —and thus all the vicious are vicious through two most involuntary causes, which we should always ascribe rather to the planters than the things planted, and to the trainers rather than those trained; but still it should be our anxious endeavor, as far as we can, by education, studies, and learning, to fly from vice, and acquire its contrary—virtue. These particulars, however, require another mode of argument.

Again, as respects the contrary of these, it is quite fit and proper to explain concerning the cultivation both of the body and the intellect, by what means each is to be healthfully preserved. For it is more just to take account of good things, rather than of the evil. Now everything good is beautiful; and the beautiful is not without measure: —an animal therefore destined to be such, must possess symmetry. Of symmetries, however, we perceive and understand those which are small; but as for the greatest and most important, of these we are quite ignorant. For indeed, no symmetry or want of measure is of more importance with respect to health and disease, virtue and vice, than that of the soul towards the body: —and yet into these we make no inquiry, nor do we reflect that when a weaker and inferior form is the vehicle of a strong and every way mighty soul, and when on the contrary these two pass into a state of compact union, then

the animal is not wholly beautiful; for it is without symmetry in the most important points of symmetry, while an animal of opposite character is the fairest of all sights that can be beheld. Just therefore, as a body has immoderately long legs, or indeed any other superfluity of parts that hinders its internal symmetry, it at once becomes base, in the participation of labor suffers many afflictions and many convulsions, and through suffering an aggregation of accidents, becomes the cause to itself of innumerable ills. The same too must be understood concerning that compound essence of body and soul, which we term an animal: —as, for instance, when the soul in this compound is stronger than the body, and greatly prevails over it, then the soul, agitating the whole of it inwardly, fills it with diseases; and, by ardent application to learned pursuits and investigations, causes it to waste away. Lastly, when the soul employs itself in didactic pursuits and logomachies, publicly as well as in private, through a certain ambitious strife, it then inflames the body and dissolves its constitution, and by introducing distillations of humors, deceives the great part of those who are called physicians, inducing them to consider these effects as proceeding from contrary causes.

Also, when a body that is large and superior to the soul in power is joined with a small and weak intellect, —there being naturally two classes of desires in man, one of aliment on account of the body, the other of wisdom for the sake of our most divine part; —in this case, the motions of the more powerful prevailing and enlarging what is their own, but making the reflective part of the soul deaf, indocile, and oblivious, thus induce ignorance—the greatest of all diseases. There is one safety then for both—neither to move the soul without the body, nor the body without the soul; in order that by mutually resisting each other they may be equally balanced and in perfect health. The mathematician

then, or anyone else who ardently devotes himself to any intellectual pursuit, should at the same time engage the body in gymnastic exercises; —and the man, again, who is careful in rightly forming his body, should at the same time therewith unite the motions of the soul in the exercises of music and all philosophy; if at least he intends to be one, that may justly be called beautiful and at the same time right good.

In this very same manner we ought to attend even to the parts of the body, that they may imitate the form of the whole: —for when the body is inwardly burnt and cooled by the things that enter it, and again, is moistened by things external, and suffers all the consequences of these affections; then if anyone gives up his body when quiescent to these kinds of motions, he is overcome and perishes. But if anyone will imitate what we called the tutor and nurse of the universe, and never allow the body to be at rest, but perpetually move it and assist its natural motions both within and without, by ever implanting in it certain agitations, and also by moderate agitation bring into order according to their mutual relations the wandering passions and parts of the body, he will not, as we said in our former discourse about the universe, place foe against foe, and suffer war and disease to be produced in the body, —but, on the other hand, combining friend with friend, will contrive to induce a state of sound health. Of all motions, again, that is the best which takes place in itself from itself: for this is particularly allied to intellect and the motion of the universe, —that produced by another being inferior: —whereas that is the worst of all motions, which, when the body is recumbent and at ease, moves it by means of others and only partially. Hence, therefore, of all modes of cleansing and giving consistence to the body, the best is that effected by gymnastics, —the second is that caused by easy conveyance,

either in a ship or other suitable vehicle; but the third kind of motion, however useful perhaps to one in extreme need, must on no account be otherwise used by anyone endued with intellect; and this is that medical kind of motion produced by pharmaceutical purgation: —for diseases, unless they are extremely dangerous, must not be irritated by medicines. Indeed, every form of disease in some respect resembles the nature of animals; —for the condition of the latter has allotted to it stated periods of life, both as respects individuals and entire races, and each animal separately of itself has its fated life apart from the affection arising from necessity: —because the triangles, which from the very first have power over each, are so composed, as to suffice only for a certain time: beyond which period no animal can extend its life. The same condition of things also takes place in the case of diseases; for if anyone destroys them by medicine before the fated time, he will only produce great diseases out of small, and many out of few. On this account we must discipline all such maladies by proper diet, according as each has leisure, and not irritate by medicines an obstinate complaint. —And thus much may suffice to have been said concerning the common animal and its corporeal part, —how each governing himself and governed by himself, may pursue a life regulated by reason.

That part, however, which is to have the government of the animal, should, as far as possible, be better provided, and earlier also, with the power of being the fairest and best in the art of ruling. To treat accurately indeed of these matters, would require a separate work of itself: but even pursuing it by way of mere by-work ἐν παρέργῳ in accordance with what has preceded, we shall not be inconsistent, nor fail in the end of our inquiries. We have often then before asserted that there are three kinds of soul within us, in three parts of the body, each having its peculiar

motions; and so in the same way we must now briefly affirm, that when anyone of them is in a torpid state and rests from its own proper motions, it must necessarily become extremely weak, and only by constant exercise attains the highest degree of strength: —we should be careful therefore that each may preserve its own motions in symmetry with all the rest.

But with respect to the highest and most leading part of our soul, *i.e.* the human soul, we should conceive as follows: —that the Deity assigned this to each as a dæmon; —that, namely, which we say, and say correctly too, resides at the summit of the body and raises us from earth to our cognate place in heaven: —for we are plants, not of earth, but heaven; and from the same source whence the soul first arose, a divine nature, raising aloft our head and root, directs our whole corporeal frame. In him, therefore, who has eagerly striven to satisfy the cravings of desire and ambition, all the conceptions engendered in his soul must necessarily be mortal; and he will necessarily, as much as possible, become entirely mortal, omitting no effort to improve such a nature. For one, however, who is sedulously employed in the acquisition of knowledge and true wisdom, and is chiefly practiced in this one pursuit, it is altogether necessary, if he would touch on the truth, that he should be endued with wisdom about immortal and divine concerns; and as far as human nature is capable of immortality, he should leave no part neglected; and thus, as he ever cultivates that which is divine, and has a dæmon most excellently adorned residing within him, he will be exceedingly happy. But the culture of all the parts is one only, —that of assigning to each their proper nutriment and motion. But the motions allied to the divine part of our nature, are the reflective energies and circulations of the universe. These, then, each of us should pursue; restoring

the revolutions in our head that have been corrupted through being employed on generation, by a diligent investigation of the harmonies and circulations of the universe, with the view of assimilating the reflective power to the object of reflection according to its ancient nature; for, by this assimilation, we shall obtain the end of the best life proposed by the gods to men, both present and future.

And now the discussion which we announced at the beginning concerning the universe, as far at least as concerns the generation of man, is very nearly completed; for as to the rest of the animals, how they were generated, we will only briefly describe them, except where necessity bids us enlarge: for a person may think that he is thus more in measure as concerns such an inquiry. On this subject, then, let us speak as follows: —Of the men that were born, such as are timid, and have passed through life unjustly, are, we suppose, changed into women in their second generation. At that time, then, and for that reason, the gods devised the love of copulation; constructing an animated substance, and placing one in us men, another in the women, —forming each in the following manner: —That passage for the drink, by which these liquids run through the lungs under the reins into the bladder, and which sends them forth as it receives them, by the pressure of the breath, —this the gods made to pass into the condensed marrow, from the head, along the neck, and through the back-bone; and this we called seed in a former part of this discourse: —and this the marrow, in consequence of being animated and endued with respiration, produces in the part where it respires a lively desire of emission, —thus perfecting in us the love of procreation. On this account, the nature of men, as respects their private parts, becoming insubordinate and imperious, like an animal not obedient to reason, tries through raging desire to gain absolute sway. The same is the

case with the wombs, and other connected parts of women, —so called, as forming an animal desirous of procreating children. This, when it remains without fruit long beyond its proper time, becomes discontented and indignant; and wandering every way through the body, it obstructs the passage of the breath, and throws women into extreme difficulties, causing all varieties of diseases, till at length the desire and love of both parties *i.e.* the man and woman cause the emission of seed, like fruit from a tree; by which emission, they sow in the womb, as in a field, animals invisible from their minute size, and yet unformed, which, as they become larger, they nourish within; and lastly, by bringing them to light, perfect the generation of animals.

Such is the process of generation in women and every female. Next succeeded the tribe of birds having feathers instead of hair, which were fashioned from men without vice indeed, but light-minded and curious about things on high, yet conceiving in their folly that the strongest proofs of these things are received through the sight *i.e.* the senses. Again, the race of wild animals with feet was generated from men, who made no use of philosophy, nor ever inquired into anything that concerned the nature of the universe, —and this, because they no longer employed the circulations in the head, but followed the guidance of those parts of the soul that reside about the breast. Owing to these pursuits, therefore, they fixed their fore-legs and head earthwards, as suited their nature, —having also long and variously-shaped heads, where the circulations of each were compressed by inactivity: —and hence their race became quadruped and multiped, the Deity giving a greater number of feet to those more than usually unwise, that they might be the more drawn towards the earth. But as regards the most unwise of these, which extend all their body along the ground, as if they had no longer any need for feet, the gods formed them

without feet to creep on the earth. The fourth class is that living in the water, which was produced from such men as were to the last degree unthinking and ignorant, and whom those transformers of our nature did not think deserving of a pure medium of respiration, because they possessed a soul rendered impure by extreme transgression, —but drove them from the attenuated and pure atmosphere into the turbid and deep breathing-medium of water: —and hence arose the tribe of fishes and oysters, and all other aquatic animals, which have received the most remote habitations, as a punishment of their extreme ignorance. After this manner then, both formerly and now, animals migrate into each other; experiencing their changes through either the loss or acquisition of intellect and folly. We are now at length to say, that our discourse about the universe has reached its conclusion; —for not only containing, but full of mortal and immortal animals, it has thus been formed *a visible animal embracing things visible*, *a sensible god of the intelligible*, *the greatest*, *best*, *and most perfect*, —*this one only-begotten* **UNIVERSE**.

The end of the Timæus.

Timaeus.

Translated by Jowett 3rd ed.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Critias.

Timaeus, Hermocrates.

Socrates/ One, two, three; but where, my dear Timaeus, is the fourth of those who were yesterday my guests and are to be my entertainers to-day?

Timaeus/ He has been taken ill, Socrates; for he would not willingly have been absent from this gathering.

Socrates/ Then, if he is not coming, you and the two others must supply his place.

Timaeus/ Certainly, and we will do all that we can; having been handsomely entertained by you yesterday, those of us who remain should be only too glad to return your hospitality.

Socrates/ Do you remember what were the points of which I required you to speak?

Timaeus/ We remember some of them, and you will be here to remind us of anything which we have forgotten: or rather, if we are not troubling you, will you briefly recapitulate the whole, and then the particulars will be more firmly fixed in our memories?

Socrates/ To be sure I will: the chief theme of my yesterday's discourse was the State—how constituted and of what citizens composed it would seem likely to be most perfect.

Timaeus/ Yes, Socrates; and what you said of it was very much to our mind.

Socrates/ Did we not begin by separating the husbandmen and the artisans from the class of defenders of the State?

Timaeus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And when we had given to each one that single employment and particular art which was suited to his nature, we spoke of those who were intended to be our warriors, and said that they were to be guardians of the city against attacks from within as well as from without, and to have no other employment; they were to be merciful in judging their subjects, of whom they were by nature friends, but fierce to their enemies, when they came across them in battle.

Timaeus/ Exactly.

Socrates/ We said, if I am not mistaken, that the guardians should be gifted with a temperament in a high degree both passionate and philosophical; and that then they would be as they ought to be, gentle to their friends and fierce with their enemies.

Timaeus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And what did we say of their education? Were they not to be trained in gymnastic, and music, and all other sorts of knowledge which were proper for them?

Timaeus/ Very true.

Socrates/ And being thus trained they were not to consider gold or silver or anything else to be their own private property; they were to be like hired troops, receiving pay for keeping guard from those who were protected by them—the pay was to be no more than would suffice for men of simple life; and they were to spend in common, and to live together in the continual practice of virtue, which was to be their sole pursuit.

Timaeus/ That was also said.

Socrates/ Neither did we forget the women; of whom we declared, that their natures should be assimilated and brought into harmony with those of the men, and that common pursuits should be assigned to them both in time of war and in their ordinary life.

Timaeus/ That, again, was as you say.

Socrates/ And what about the procreation of children? Or rather was not the proposal too singular to be forgotten? for all wives and children were to be in common, to the intent that no one should ever know his own child, but they were to imagine that they were all one family; those who were within a suitable limit of age were to be brothers and sisters, those who were of an elder generation parents and grandparents, and those of a younger, children and grandchildren.

Timaeus/ Yes, and the proposal is easy to remember, as you say.

Socrates/ And do you also remember how, with a view of securing as far as we could the best breed, we said that the chief magistrates, male and female, should contrive secretly, by the use of certain lots, so to arrange the nuptial meeting, that the bad of either sex and the good of either sex might pair with their like; and there was to be no quarrelling on this account, for they would imagine that the union was a mere accident, and was to be attributed to the lot?

Timaeus/ I remember.

Socrates/ And you remember how we said that the children of the good parents were to be educated, and the children of the bad secretly dispersed among the inferior citizens; and while they were all growing up the rulers were to be on the look-out, and to bring up from below in their turn those who were worthy, and those among themselves

who were unworthy were to take the places of those who came up?

Timaeus/ True.

Socrates/ Then have I now given you all the heads of our yesterday's discussion? Or is there anything more, my dear Timaeus, which has been omitted?

Timaeus/ Nothing, Socrates; it was just as you have said.

Socrates/ I should like, before proceeding further, to tell you how I feel about the State which we have described. I might compare myself to a person who, on beholding beautiful animals either created by the painter's art, or, better still, alive but at rest, is seized with a desire of seeing them in motion or engaged in some struggle or conflict to which their forms appear suited; this is my feeling about the State which we have been describing. There are conflicts which all cities undergo, and I should like to hear someone tell of our own city carrying on a struggle against her neighbors, and how she went out to war in a becoming manner, and when at war showed by the greatness of her actions and the magnanimity of her words in dealing with other cities a result worthy of her training and education. Now I, Critias and Hermocrates, am conscious that I myself should never be able to celebrate the city and her citizens in a befitting manner, and I am not surprised at my own incapacity; to me the wonder is rather that the poets present as well as past are no better—not that I mean to depreciate them; but everyone can see that they are a tribe of imitators, and will imitate best and most easily the life in which they have been brought up; while that which is beyond the range of a man's education he finds hard to carry out in action, and still harder adequately to represent in language. I am aware that the Sophists have plenty of brave words and fair conceits, but I am afraid that being only wanderers from one

city to another, and having never had habitations of their own, they may fail in their conception of philosophers and statesmen, and may not know what they do and say in time of war, when they are fighting or holding parley with their enemies. And thus people of your class are the only ones remaining who are fitted by nature and education to take part at once both in politics and philosophy. Here is Timaeus, of Locris in Italy, a city which has admirable laws, and who is himself in wealth and rank the equal of any of his fellow-citizens; he has held the most important and honorable offices in his own state, and, as I believe, has scaled the heights of all philosophy; and here is Critias, whom every Athenian knows to be no novice in the matters of which we are speaking; and as to Hermocrates, I am assured by many witnesses that his genius and education qualify him to take part in any speculation of the kind. And therefore yesterday when I saw that you wanted me to describe the formation of the State, I readily assented, being very well aware, that, if you only would, none were better qualified to carry the discussion further, and that when you had engaged our city in a suitable war, you of all men living could best exhibit her playing a fitting part. When I had completed my task, I in return imposed this other task upon you. You conferred together and agreed to entertain me to-day, as I had entertained you, with a feast of discourse. Here am I in festive array, and no man can be more ready for the promised banquet.

Hermocrates/ And we too, Socrates, as Timaeus says, will not be wanting in enthusiasm; and there is no excuse for not complying with your request. As soon as we arrived yesterday at the guest-chamber of Critias, with whom we are staying, or rather on our way thither, we talked the matter over, and he told us an ancient tradition, which I wish, Critias, that you would repeat to Socrates, so that he may

help us to judge whether it will satisfy his requirements or not.

Critias/ I will, if Timaeus, who is our other partner, approves.

Timaeus/ I quite approve.

Critias/ Then listen, Socrates, to a tale which, though strange, is certainly true, having been attested by Solon, who was the wisest of the seven sages. He was a relative and a dear friend of my great-grandfather, Dropides, as he himself says in many passages of his poems; and he told the story to Critias, my grandfather, who remembered and repeated it to us. There were of old, he said, great and marvelous actions of the Athenian city, which have passed into oblivion through lapse of time and the destruction of mankind, and one in particular, greater than all the rest. This we will now rehearse. It will be a fitting monument of our gratitude to you, and a hymn of praise true and worthy of the goddess, on this her day of festival.

Socrates/ Very good. And what is this ancient famous action of the Athenians, which Critias declared, on the authority of Solon, to be not a mere legend, but an actual fact?

Critias/ I will tell an old-world story which I heard from an aged man; for Critias, at the time of telling it, was, as he said, nearly ninety years of age, and I was about ten. Now the day was that day of the Apaturia which is called the Registration of Youth, at which, according to custom, our parents gave prizes for recitations, and the poems of several poets were recited by us boys, and many of us sang the poems of Solon, which at that time had not gone out of fashion. One of our tribe, either because he thought so or to please Critias, said that in his judgment Solon was not only the wisest of men, but also the noblest of poets. The old man,

as I very well remember, brightened up at hearing this and said, smiling: Yes, Amynander, if Solon had only, like other poets, made poetry the business of his life, and had completed the tale which he brought with him from Egypt, and had not been compelled, by reason of the factions and troubles which he found stirring in his own country when he came home, to attend to other matters, in my opinion he would have been as famous as Homer or Hesiod, or any poet.

And what was the tale about, Critias? said Amynander.

About the greatest action which the Athenians ever did, and which ought to have been the most famous, but, through the lapse of time and the destruction of the actors, it has not come down to us.

Tell us, said the other, the whole story, and how and from whom Solon heard this veritable tradition.

He replied: —In the Egyptian Delta, at the head of which the river Nile divides, there is a certain district which is called the district of Sais, and the great city of the district is also called Sais, and is the city from which King Amasis came. The citizens have a deity for their foundress; she is called in the Egyptian tongue Neith, and is asserted by them to be the same whom the Hellenes call Athene; they are great lovers of the Athenians, and say that they are in some way related to them. To this city came Solon, and was received there with great honor; he asked the priests who were most skillful in such matters, about antiquity, and made the discovery that neither he nor any other Hellene knew anything worth mentioning about the times of old. On one occasion, wishing to draw them on to speak of antiquity, he began to tell about the most ancient things in our part of the world—about Phoroneus, who is called 'the first man' and about Niobe; and after the Deluge, of the survival of Deucalion and Pyrrha; and he traced the genealogy of their

descendants, and reckoning up the dates, tried to compute how many years ago the events of which he was speaking happened. Thereupon one of the priests, who was of a very great age, said: O Solon, Solon, you Hellenes are never anything but children, and there is not an old man among you. Solon in return asked him what he meant. I mean to say, he replied, that in mind you are all young; there is no old opinion handed down among you by ancient tradition, nor any science which is hoary with age. And I will tell you why. There have been, and will be again, many destructions of mankind arising out of many causes; the greatest have been brought about by the agencies of fire and water, and other lesser ones by innumerable other causes. There is a story, which even you have preserved, that once upon a time Phaethon, the son of Helios, having yoked the steeds in his father's chariot, because he was not able to drive them in the path of his father, burnt up all that was upon the earth, and was himself destroyed by a thunderbolt. Now this has the form of a myth, but really signifies a declination of the bodies moving in the heavens around the earth, and a great conflagration of things upon the earth, which recurs after long intervals; at such times those who live upon the mountains and in dry and lofty places are more liable to destruction than those who dwell by rivers or on the seashore. And from this calamity the Nile, who is our never-failing savior, delivers and preserves us. When, on the other hand, the gods purge the earth with a deluge of water, the survivors in your country are herdsmen and shepherds who dwell on the mountains, but those who, like you, live in cities are carried by the rivers into the sea. Whereas in this land, neither then nor at any other time, does the water come down from above on the fields, having always a tendency to come up from below; for which reason the traditions preserved here are the most ancient. The fact is, that

wherever the extremity of winter frost or of summer sun does not prevent, mankind exist, sometimes in greater, sometimes in lesser numbers. And whatever happened either in your country or in ours, or in any other region of which we are informed—if there were any actions noble or great or in any other way remarkable, they have all been written down by us of old, and are preserved in our temples. Whereas just when you and other nations are beginning to be provided with letters and the other requisites of civilized life, after the usual interval, the stream from heaven, like a pestilence, comes pouring down, and leaves only those of you who are destitute of letters and education; and so you have to begin all over again like children, and know nothing of what happened in ancient times, either among us or among yourselves. As for those genealogies of yours which you just now recounted to us, Solon, they are no better than the tales of children. In the first place you remember a single deluge only, but there were many previous ones; in the next place, you do not know that there formerly dwelt in your land the fairest and noblest race of men which ever lived, and that you and your whole city are descended from a small seed or remnant of them which survived. And this was unknown to you, because, for many generations, the survivors of that destruction died, leaving no written word. For there was a time, Solon, before the great deluge of all, when the city which now is Athens was first in war and in every way the best governed of all cities, and is said to have performed the noblest deeds and to have had the fairest constitution of any of which tradition tells, under the face of heaven. Solon marveled at his words, and earnestly requested the priests to inform him exactly and in order about these former citizens. You are welcome to hear about them, Solon, said the priest, both for your own sake and for that of your city, and above all, for the sake of the goddess who is the common

patron and parent and educator of both our cities. She founded your city a thousand years before ours, receiving from the Earth and Hephaestus the seed of your race, and afterwards she founded ours, of which the constitution is recorded in our sacred registers to be 8000 years old. As touching your citizens of 9000 years ago, I will briefly inform you of their laws and of their most famous action; the exact particulars of the whole we will hereafter go through at our leisure in the sacred registers themselves. If you compare these very laws with ours you will find that many of ours are the counterpart of yours as they were in the olden time. In the first place, there is the caste of priests, which is separated from all the others; next, there are the artificers, who ply their several crafts by themselves and do not intermix; and also there is the class of shepherds and of hunters, as well as that of husbandmen; and you will observe, too, that the warriors in Egypt are distinct from all the other classes, and are commanded by the law to devote themselves solely to military pursuits; moreover, the weapons which they carry are shields and spears, a style of equipment which the goddess taught of Asiatics first to us, as in your part of the world first to you. Then as to wisdom, do you observe how our law from the very first made a study of the whole order of things, extending even to prophecy and medicine which gives health; out of these divine elements deriving what was needful for human life, and adding every sort of knowledge which was akin to them. All this order and arrangement the goddess first imparted to you when establishing your city; and she chose the spot of earth in which you were born, because she saw that the happy temperament of the seasons in that land would produce the wisest of men. Wherefore the goddess, who was a lover both of war and of wisdom, selected and first of all settled that spot which was the most likely to produce men likest herself.

And there you dwelt, having such laws as these and still better ones, and excelled all mankind in all virtue, as became the children and disciples of the gods.

Many great and wonderful deeds are recorded of your state in our histories. But one of them exceeds all the rest in greatness and valor. For these histories tell of a mighty power which unprovoked made an expedition against the whole of Europe and Asia, and to which your city put an end. This power came forth out of the Atlantic Ocean, for in those days the Atlantic was navigable; and there was an island situated in front of the straits which are by you called the pillars of Heracles; the island was larger than Libya and Asia put together, and was the way to other islands, and from these you might pass to the whole of the opposite continent which surrounded the true ocean; for this sea which is within the Straits of Heracles is only a harbor, having a narrow entrance, but that other is a real sea, and the surrounding land may be most truly called a boundless continent. Now in this island of Atlantis there was a great and wonderful empire which had rule over the whole island and several others, and over parts of the continent, and, furthermore, the men of Atlantis had subjected the parts of Libya within the columns of Heracles as far as Egypt, and of Europe as far as Tyrrhenia. This vast power, gathered into one, endeavored to subdue at a blow our country and yours and the whole of the region within the straits; and then, Solon, your country shone forth, in the excellence of her virtue and strength, among all mankind. She was preeminent in courage and military skill, and was the leader of the Hellenes. And when the rest fell off from her, being compelled to stand alone, after having undergone the very extremity of danger, she defeated and triumphed over the invaders, and preserved from slavery those who were not yet subjugated, and generously liberated all the rest of us who

dwell within the pillars. But afterwards there occurred violent earthquakes and floods; and in a single day and night of misfortune all your warlike men in a body sank into the earth, and the island of Atlantis in like manner disappeared in the depths of the sea. For which reason the sea in those parts is impassable and impenetrable, because there is a shoal of mud in the way; and this was caused by the subsidence of the island.

I have told you briefly, Socrates, what the aged Critias heard from Solon and related to us. And when you were speaking yesterday about your city and citizens, the tale which I have just been repeating to you came into my mind, and I remarked with astonishment how, by some mysterious coincidence, you agreed in almost every particular with the narrative of Solon; but I did not like to speak at the moment. For a long time had elapsed, and I had forgotten too much; I thought that I must first of all run over the narrative in my own mind, and then I would speak. And so I readily assented to your request yesterday, considering that in all such cases the chief difficulty is to find a tale suitable to our purpose, and that with such a tale we should be fairly well provided.

And therefore, as Hermocrates has told you, on my way home yesterday I at once communicated the tale to my companions as I remembered it; and after I left them, during the night by thinking I recovered nearly the whole of it. Truly, as is often said, the lessons of our childhood make a wonderful impression on our memories; for I am not sure that I could remember all the discourse of yesterday, but I should be much surprised if I forgot any of these things which I have heard very long ago. I listened at the time with childlike interest to the old man's narrative; he was very ready to teach me, and I asked him again and again to repeat his words, so that like an indelible picture they were branded into my mind. As soon as the day broke, I rehearsed them

as he spoke them to my companions, that they, as well as myself, might have something to say. And now, Socrates, to make an end of my preface, I am ready to tell you the whole tale. I will give you not only the general heads, but the particulars, as they were told to me. The city and citizens, which you yesterday described to us in fiction, we will now transfer to the world of reality. It shall be the ancient city of Athens, and we will suppose that the citizens whom you imagined, were our veritable ancestors, of whom the priest spoke; they will perfectly harmonize, and there will be no inconsistency in saying that the citizens of your republic are these ancient Athenians. Let us divide the subject among us, and all endeavor according to our ability gracefully to execute the task which you have imposed upon us. Consider then, Socrates, if this narrative is suited to the purpose, or whether we should seek for some other instead.

Socrates/ And what other, Critias, can we find that will be better than this, which is natural and suitable to the festival of the goddess, and has the very great advantage of being a fact and not a fiction? How or where shall we find another if we abandon this? We cannot, and therefore you must tell the tale, and good luck to you; and I in return for my yesterday's discourse will now rest and be a listener.

Critias/ Let me proceed to explain to you, Socrates, the order in which we have arranged our entertainment. Our intention is, that Timaeus, who is the most of an astronomer amongst us, and has made the nature of the universe his special study, should speak first, beginning with the generation of the world and going down to the creation of man; next, I am to receive the men whom he has created, and of whom some will have profited by the excellent education which you have given them; and then, in accordance with the tale of Solon, and equally with his law, we will bring them into court and make them citizens, as if

they were those very Athenians whom the sacred Egyptian record has recovered from oblivion, and thenceforward we will speak of them as Athenians and fellow-citizens.

Socrates/ I see that I shall receive in my turn a perfect and splendid feast of reason. And now, Timaeus, you, I suppose, should speak next, after duly calling upon the Gods.

Timaeus/ All men, Socrates, who have any degree of right feeling, at the beginning of every enterprise, whether small or great, always call upon God. And we, too, who are going to discourse of the nature of the universe, how created or how existing without creation, if we be not altogether out of our wits, must invoke the aid of Gods and Goddesses and pray that our words may be acceptable to them and consistent with themselves. Let this, then, be our invocation of the Gods, to which I add an exhortation of myself to speak in such manner as will be most intelligible to you, and will most accord with my own intent.

First then, in my judgment, we must make a distinction and ask, What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and never is? That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is. Now everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be created by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be created. The work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair and perfect; but when he looks to the created only, and uses a created pattern, it is not fair or perfect. Was the heaven then or the world, whether called by this or by any other more appropriate name—assuming the

name, I am asking a question which has to be asked at the beginning of an enquiry about anything—was the world, I say, always in existence and without beginning? or created, and had it a beginning? Created, I reply, being visible and tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible; and all sensible things are apprehended by opinion and sense and are in a process of creation and created. Now that which is created must, as we affirm, of necessity be created by a cause. But the father and maker of all this universe is past finding out; and even if we found him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible. And there is still a question to be asked about him: Which of the patterns had the artificer in view when he made the world, —the pattern of the unchangeable, or of that which is created? If the world be indeed fair and the artificer good, it is manifest that he must have looked to that which is eternal; but if what cannot be said without blasphemy is true, then to the created pattern. Everyone will see that he must have looked to the eternal for the world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of causes. And having been created in this way, the world has been framed in the likeness of that which is apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and must therefore of necessity, if this is admitted, be a copy of something. Now it is all-important that the beginning of everything should be according to nature. And in speaking of the copy and the original we may assume that words are akin to the matter which they describe; when they relate to the lasting and permanent and intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unalterable, and, as far as their nature allows, irrefutable and immovable—nothing less. But when they express only the copy or likeness and not the eternal things themselves, they need only be likely and analogous to the real words. As being is to becoming, so is truth to belief. If then, Socrates, amid the many opinions about the gods and the generation

of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are altogether and in every respect exact and consistent with one another, do not be surprised. Enough, if we adduce probabilities as likely as any others; for we must remember that I who am the speaker, and you who are the judges, are only mortal men, and we ought to accept the tale which is probable and enquire no further.

Socrates/ Excellent, Timaeus; and we will do precisely as you bid us. The prelude is charming, and is already accepted by us—may we beg of you to proceed to the strain?

Timaeus/ Let me tell you then why the creator made this world of generation. He was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like himself as they could be. This is in the truest sense the origin of creation and of the world, as we shall do well in believing on the testimony of wise men: God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable. Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he brought order, considering that this was in every way better than the other, Now the deeds of the best could never be or have been other than the fairest; and the creator, reflecting on the things which are by nature visible, found that no unintelligent creature taken as a whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole; and that intelligence could not be present in anything which was devoid of soul. For which reason, when he was framing the universe, he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature fairest and best. Wherefore, using the language of probability, we may say that the world became a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God.

This being supposed, let us proceed to the next stage: In the likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world?

It would be an unworthy thing to liken it to any nature which exists as a part only; for nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect thing; but let us suppose the world to be the very image of that whole of which all other animals both individually and in their tribes are portions. For the original of the universe contains in itself all intelligible beings, just as this world comprehends us and all other visible creatures. For the Deity, intending to make this world like the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings, framed one visible animal comprehending within itself all other animals of a kindred nature. Are we right in saying that there is one world, or that they are many and infinite? There must be one only, if the created copy is to accord with the original. For that which includes all other intelligible creatures cannot have a second or companion; in that case there would be need of another living being which would include both, and of which they would be parts, and the likeness would be more truly said to resemble not them, but that other which included them. In order then that the world might be solitary, like the perfect animal, the creator made not two worlds or an infinite number of them; but there is and ever will be one only-begotten and created heaven.

Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal, and also visible and tangible. And nothing is visible where there is no fire, or tangible which has no solidity, and nothing is solid without earth. Wherefore also God in the beginning of creation made the body of the universe to consist of fire and earth. But two things cannot be rightly put together without a third; there must be some bond of union between them. And the fairest bond is that which makes the most complete fusion of itself and the things which it combines; and proportion is best adapted to effect such a union. For

whenever in any three numbers, whether cube or square, there is a mean, which is to the last term what the first term is to it; and again, when the mean is to the first term as the last term is to the mean, —then the mean becoming first and last, and the first and last both becoming means, they will all of them of necessity come to be the same, and having become the same with one another will be all one. If the universal frame had been created a surface only and having no depth, a single mean would have sufficed to bind together itself and the other terms; but now, as the world must be solid, and solid bodies are always compacted not by one mean but by two, God placed water and air in the mean between fire and earth, and made them to have the same proportion so far as was possible (as fire is to air so is air to water, and as air is to water so is water to earth); and thus he bound and put together a visible and tangible heaven. And for these reasons, and out of such elements which are in number four, the body of the world was created, and it was harmonized by proportion, and therefore has the spirit of friendship; and having been reconciled to itself, it was indissoluble by the hand of any other than the framer.

Now the creation took up the whole of each of the four elements; for the Creator compounded the world out of all the fire and all the water and all the air and all the earth, leaving no part of any of them nor any power of them outside. His intention was, in the first place, that the animal should be as far as possible a perfect whole and of perfect parts: secondly, that it should be one, leaving no remnants out of which another such world might be created: and also that it should be free from old age and unaffected by disease. Considering that if heat and cold and other powerful forces which unite bodies surround and attack them from without when they are unprepared, they decompose them, and by bringing diseases and old age upon them, make them waste

away—for this cause and on these grounds he made the world one whole, having every part entire, and being therefore perfect and not liable to old age and disease. And he gave to the world the figure which was suitable and also natural. Now to the animal which was to comprehend all animals, that figure was suitable which comprehends within itself all other figures. Wherefore he made the world in the form of a globe, round as from a lathe, having its extremes in every direction equidistant from the center, the most perfect and the most like itself of all figures; for he considered that the like is infinitely fairer than the unlike. This he finished off, making the surface smooth all round for many reasons; in the first place, because the living being had no need of eyes when there was nothing remaining outside him to be seen; nor of ears when there was nothing to be heard; and there was no surrounding atmosphere to be breathed; nor would there have been any use of organs by the help of which he might receive his food or get rid of what he had already digested, since there was nothing which went from him or came into him: for there was nothing beside him. Of design he was created thus, his own waste providing his own food, and all that he did or suffered taking place in and by himself. For the Creator conceived that a being which was self-sufficient would be far more excellent than one which lacked anything; and, as he had no need to take anything or defend himself against anyone, the Creator did not think it necessary to bestow upon him hands: nor had he any need of feet, nor of the whole apparatus of walking; but the movement suited to his spherical form was assigned to him, being of all the seven that which is most appropriate to mind and intelligence; and he was made to move in the same manner and on the same spot, within his own limits revolving in a circle. All the other six motions were taken away from him, and he was made not to partake of their

deviations. And as this circular movement required no feet, the universe was created without legs and without feet.

Such was the whole plan of the eternal God about the god that was to be, to whom for this reason he gave a body, smooth and even, having a surface in every direction equidistant from the center, a body entire and perfect, and formed out of perfect bodies. And in the center he put the soul, which he diffused throughout the body, making it also to be the exterior environment of it; and he made the universe a circle moving in a circle, one and solitary, yet by reason of its excellence able to converse with itself, and needing no other friendship or acquaintance. Having these purposes in view he created the world a blessed god.

Now God did not make the soul after the body, although we are speaking of them in this order; for having brought them together he would never have allowed that the elder should be ruled by the younger; but this is a random manner of speaking which we have, because somehow we ourselves too are very much under the dominion of chance. Whereas he made the soul in origin and excellence prior to and older than the body, to be the ruler and mistress, of whom the body was to be the subject. And he made her out of the following elements and on this wise: Out of the indivisible and unchangeable, and also out of that which is divisible and has to do with material bodies, he compounded a third and intermediate kind of essence, partaking of the nature of the same and of the other, and this compound he placed accordingly in a mean between the indivisible, and the divisible and material. He took the three elements of the same, the other, and the essence, and mingled them into one form, compressing by force the reluctant and unsociable nature of the other into the same. When he had mingled them with the essence and out of three made one, he again divided this whole into as many portions as was fitting, each

portion being a compound of the same, the other, and the essence. And he proceeded to divide after this manner: — First of all, he took away one part of the whole [1], and then he separated a second part which was double the first [2], and then he took away a third part which was half as much again as the second and three times as much as the first [3], and then he took a fourth part which was twice as much as the second [4], and a fifth part which was three times the third [9], and a sixth part which was eight times the first [8], and a seventh part which was twenty-seven times the first [27]. After this he filled up the double intervals [i.e. between 1, 2, 4, 8] and the triple [i.e. between 1, 3, 9, 27], cutting off yet other portions from the mixture and placing them in the intervals, so that in each interval there were two kinds of means, the one exceeding and exceeded by equal parts of its extremes [as for example 1, $\frac{4}{3}$, 2, in which the mean $\frac{4}{3}$ is one-third of 1 more than 1, and one-third of 2 less than 2], the other being that kind of mean which exceeds and is exceeded by an equal number. Where there were intervals of $\frac{3}{2}$ and of $\frac{4}{3}$ and of $\frac{9}{8}$, made by the connecting terms in the former intervals, he filled up all the intervals of $\frac{4}{3}$ with the interval of $\frac{9}{8}$, leaving a fraction over; and the interval which this fraction expressed was in the ratio of 256 to 243. And thus the whole mixture out of which he cut these portions was all exhausted by him. This entire compound he divided lengthways into two parts, which he joined to one another at the center like the letter X, and bent them into a circular form, connecting them with themselves and each other at the point opposite to their original meeting-point; and, comprehending them in a uniform revolution upon the same axis, he made the one the outer and the other the inner circle. Now the motion of the outer circle he called the motion of the same, and the motion of the inner circle the motion of the other or diverse.

The motion of the same he carried round by the side to the right, and the motion of the diverse diagonally to the left. And he gave dominion to the motion of the same and like, for that he left single and undivided; but the inner motion he divided in six places and made seven unequal circles having their intervals in ratios of two and three, three of each, and bade the orbits proceed in a direction opposite to one another; and three [Sun, Mercury, Venus] he made to move with equal swiftness, and the remaining four [Moon, Saturn, Mars, Zeus] to move with unequal swiftness to the three and to one another, but in due proportion.

Now when the Creator had framed the soul according to his will, he formed within her the corporeal universe, and brought the two together, and united them center to center. The soul, interfused everywhere from the center to the circumference of heaven, of which also she is the external envelopment, herself turning in herself, began a divine beginning of never-ceasing and rational life enduring throughout all time. The body of heaven is visible, but the soul is invisible, and partakes of reason and harmony, and being made by the best of intellectual and everlasting natures, is the best of things created. And because she is composed of the same and of the other and of the essence, these three, and is divided and united in due proportion, and in her revolutions returns upon herself, the soul, when touching anything which has essence, whether dispersed in parts or undivided, is stirred through all her powers, to declare the sameness or difference of that thing and some other; and to what individuals are related, and by what affected, and in what way and how and when, both in the world of generation and in the world of immutable being. And when reason, which works with equal truth, whether she be in the circle of the diverse or of the same—in voiceless silence holding her onward course in the sphere of the self-

moved—when reason, I say, is hovering around the sensible world and when the circle of the diverse also moving truly imparts the intimations of sense to the whole soul, then arise opinions and beliefs sure and certain. But when reason is concerned with the rational, and the circle of the same moving smoothly declares it, then intelligence and knowledge are necessarily perfected. And if anyone affirms that in which these two are found to be other than the soul, he will say the very opposite of the truth.

When the father and creator saw the creature which he had made moving and living, the created image of the eternal gods, he rejoiced, and in his joy determined to make the copy still more like the original; and as this was eternal, he sought to make the universe eternal, so far as might be. Now the nature of the ideal being was everlasting, but to bestow this attribute in its fullness upon a creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to have a moving image of eternity, and when he set in order the heaven, he made this image eternal but moving according to number, while eternity itself rests in unity; and this image we call time. For there were no days and nights and months and years before the heaven was created, but when he constructed the heaven he created them also. They are all parts of time, and the past and future are created species of time, which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal essence; for we say that he 'was,' he 'is,' he 'will be,' but the truth is that 'is' alone is properly attributed to him, and that 'was' and 'will be' are only to be spoken of becoming in time, for they are motions, but that which is immovably the same cannot become older or younger by time, nor ever did or has become, or hereafter will be, older or younger, nor is subject at all to any of those states which affect moving and sensible things and of which generation is the cause. These are the forms of time, which imitates eternity and revolves according to a law of number.

Moreover, when we say that what has become is become and what becomes is becoming, and that what will become is about to become and that the nonexistent is non-existent, — all these are inaccurate modes of expression. But perhaps this whole subject will be more suitably discussed on some other occasion.

Time, then, and the heaven came into being at the same instant in order that, having been created together, if ever there was to be a dissolution of them, they might be dissolved together. It was framed after the pattern of the eternal nature, that it might resemble this as far as was possible; for the pattern exists from eternity, and the created heaven has been, and is, and will be, in all time. Such was the mind and thought of God in the creation of time. The sun and moon and five other stars, which are called the planets, were created by him in order to distinguish and preserve the numbers of time; and when he had made their several bodies, he placed them in the orbits in which the circle of the other was revolving, —in seven orbits seven stars. First, there was the moon in the orbit nearest the earth, and next the sun, in the second orbit above the earth; then came the morning star and the star sacred to Hermes, moving in orbits which have an equal swiftness with the sun, but in an opposite direction; and this is the reason why the sun and Hermes and Lucifer overtake and are overtaken by each other. To enumerate the places which he assigned to the other stars, and to give all the reasons why he assigned them, although a secondary matter, would give more trouble than the primary. These things at some future time, when we are at leisure, may have the consideration which they deserve, but not at present.

Now, when all the stars which were necessary to the creation of time had attained a motion suitable to them, and had become living creatures having bodies fastened by vital

chains, and learnt their appointed task, moving in the motion of the diverse, which is diagonal, and passes through and is governed by the motion of the same, they revolved, some in a larger and some in a lesser orbit, —those which had the lesser orbit revolving faster, and those which had the larger more slowly. Now by reason of the motion of the same, those which revolved fastest appeared to be overtaken by those which moved slower although they really overtook them; for the motion of the same made them all turn in a spiral, and, because some went one way and some another, that which receded most slowly from the sphere of the same, which was the swiftest, appeared to follow it most nearly. That there might be some visible measure of their relative swiftness and slowness as they proceeded in their eight courses, God lighted a fire, which we now call the sun, in the second from the earth of these orbits, that it might give light to the whole of heaven, and that the animals, as many as nature intended, might participate in number, learning arithmetic from the revolution of the same and the like. Thus, then, and for this reason the night and the day were created, being the period of the one most intelligent revolution. And the month is accomplished when the moon has completed her orbit and overtaken the sun, and the year when the sun has completed his own orbit. Mankind, with hardly an exception, have not remarked the periods of the other stars, and they have no name for them, and do not measure them against one another by the help of number, and hence they can scarcely be said to know that their wanderings, being infinite in number and admirable for their variety, make up time. And yet there is no difficulty in seeing that the perfect number of time fulfils the perfect year when all the eight revolutions, having their relative degrees of swiftness, are accomplished together and attain their completion at the same time, measured by the rotation of

the same and equally moving. After this manner, and for these reasons, came into being such of the stars as in their heavenly progress received reversals of motion, to the end that the created heaven might imitate the eternal nature, and be as like as possible to the perfect and intelligible animal.

Thus far and until the birth of time the created universe was made in the likeness of the original, but inasmuch as all animals were not yet comprehended therein, it was still unlike. What remained, the creator then proceeded to fashion after the nature of the pattern. Now as in the ideal animal the mind perceives ideas or species of a certain nature and number, he thought that this created animal ought to have species of a like nature and number. There are four such; one of them is the heavenly race of the gods; another, the race of birds whose way is in the air; the third, the watery species; and the fourth, the pedestrian and land creatures. Of the heavenly and divine, he created the greater part out of fire, that they might be the brightest of all things and fairest to behold, and he fashioned them after the likeness of the universe in the figure of a circle, and made them follow the intelligent motion of the supreme, distributing them over the whole circumference of heaven, which was to be a true cosmos or glorious world spangled with them all over. And he gave to each of them two movements: the first, a movement on the same spot after the same manner, whereby they ever continue to think the same thoughts about the same things; the second, a forward movement, in which they are controlled by the revolution of the same and the like; but by the other five motions they were unaffected, in order that each of them might attain the highest perfection. And for this reason the fixed stars were created, to be divine and animals, ever-abiding and revolving after the same manner and on the same spot; and the other

stars which reverse their motion and are subject to deviations of this kind, were created in the manner already described. The earth, which is our nurse, clinging around the pole which is extended through the universe, he framed to be the guardian and artificer of night and day, first and eldest of gods that are in the interior of heaven. Vain would be the attempt to tell all the figures of them circling as in dance, and their juxtapositions, and the return of them in their revolutions upon themselves, and their approximations, and to say which of these deities in their conjunctions meet, and which of them are in opposition, and in what order they get behind and before one another, and when they are severally eclipsed to our sight and again reappear, sending terrors and intimations of the future to those who cannot calculate their movements—to attempt to tell of all this without a visible representation of the heavenly system would be labor in vain. Enough on this head; and now let what we have said about the nature of the created and visible gods have an end.

To know or tell the origin of the other divinities is beyond us, and we must accept the traditions of the men of old time who affirm themselves to be the offspring of the gods—that is what they say—and they must surely have known their own ancestors. How can we doubt the word of the children of the gods? Although they give no probable or certain proofs, still, as they declare that they are speaking of what took place in their own family, we must conform to custom and believe them. In this manner, then, according to them, the genealogy of these gods is to be received and set forth.

Oceanus and Tethys were the children of Earth and Heaven, and from these sprang Phorcys and Cronos and Rhea, and all that generation; and from Cronos and Rhea sprang Zeus and Herè, and all those who are said to be their brethren, and others who were the children of these. Now,

when all of them, both those who visibly appear in their revolutions as well as those other gods who are of a more retiring nature, had come into being, the creator of the universe addressed them in these words: 'Gods, children of gods, who are my works, and of whom I am the artificer and father, my creations are indissoluble, if so I will. All that is bound may be undone, but only an evil being would wish to undo that which is harmonious and happy. Wherefore, since ye are but creatures, ye are not altogether immortal and indissoluble, but ye shall certainly not be dissolved, nor be liable to the fate of death, having in my will a greater and mightier bond than those with which ye were bound at the time of your birth. And now listen to my instructions: — Three tribes of mortal beings remain to be created—without them the universe will be incomplete, for it will not contain every kind of animal which it ought to contain, if it is to be perfect. On the other hand, if they were created by me and received life at my hands, they would be on an equality with the gods. In order then that they maybe mortal, and that this universe maybe truly universal, do ye, according to your natures, betake yourselves to the formation of animals, imitating the power which was shown by me in creating you. The part of them worthy of the name immortal, which is called divine and is the guiding principle of those who are willing to follow justice and you—of that divine part I will myself sow the seed, and having made a beginning, I will hand the work over to you. And do ye then interweave the mortal with the immortal, and make and beget living creatures, and give them food, and make them to grow, and receive them again in death.'

Thus he spoke, and once more into the cup in which he had previously mingled the soul of the universe he poured the remains of the elements, and mingled them in much the same manner; they were not, however, pure as before, but

diluted to the second and third degree. And having made it he divided the whole mixture into souls equal in number to the stars, and assigned each soul to a star; and having there placed them as in a chariot, he showed them the nature of the universe, and declared to them the laws of destiny, according to which their first birth would be one and the same for all, —no one should suffer a disadvantage at his hands; they were to be sown in the instruments of time severally adapted to them, and to come forth the most religious of animals; and as human nature was of two kinds, the superior race would hereafter be called man. Now, when they should be implanted in bodies by necessity, and be always gaining or losing some part of their bodily substance, then in the first place it would be necessary that they should all have in them one and the same faculty of sensation, arising out of irresistible impressions; in the second place, they must have love, in which pleasure and pain mingle; also fear and anger, and the feelings which are akin or opposite to them; if they conquered these they would live righteously, and if they were conquered by them, unrighteously. He who lived well during his appointed time was to return and dwell in his native star, and there he would have a blessed and congenial existence. But if he failed in attaining this, at the second birth he would pass into a woman, and if, when in that state of being, he did not desist from evil, he would continually be changed into some brute who resembled him in the evil nature which he had acquired, and would not cease from his toils and transformations until he followed the revolution of the same and the like within him, and overcame by the help of reason the turbulent and irrational mob of later accretions, made up of fire and air and water and earth, and returned to the form of his first and better state. Having given all these laws to his creatures, that he might be guiltless of future evil in any of them, the creator

sowed some of them in the earth, and some in the moon, and some in the other instruments of time; and when he had sown them he committed to the younger gods the fashioning of their mortal bodies, and desired them to furnish what was still lacking to the human soul, and having made all the suitable additions, to rule over them, and to pilot the mortal animal in the best and wisest manner which they could, and avert from him all but self-inflicted evils.

When the creator had made all these ordinances he remained in his own accustomed nature, and his children heard and were obedient to their father's word, and receiving from him the immortal principle of a mortal creature, in imitation of their own creator they borrowed portions of fire, and earth, and water, and air from the world, which were hereafter to be restored—these they took and welded them together, not with the indissoluble chains by which they were themselves bound, but with little pegs too small to be visible, making up out of all the four elements each separate body, and fastening the courses of the immortal soul in a body which was in a state of perpetual influx and efflux. Now these courses, detained as in a vast river, neither overcame nor were overcome; but were hurrying and hurried to and fro, so that the whole animal was moved and progressed, irregularly however and irrationally and anyhow, in all the six directions of motion, wandering backwards and forwards, and right and left, and up and down, and in all the six directions. For great as was the advancing and retiring flood which provided nourishment, the affections produced by external contact caused still greater tumult—when the body of anyone met and came into collision with some external fire, or with the solid earth or the gliding waters, or was caught in the tempest borne on the air, and the motions produced by any of these impulses were carried through the body to the soul. All such motions have consequently

received the general name of ‘sensations’ which they still retain. And they did in fact at that time create a very great and mighty movement; uniting with the ever-flowing stream in stirring up and violently shaking the courses of the soul, they completely stopped the revolution of the same by their opposing current, and hindered it from predominating and advancing; and they so disturbed the nature of the other or diverse, that the three double intervals [i.e. between 1, 2, 4, 8], and the three triple intervals [i.e. between 1, 3, 9, 27], together with the mean terms and connecting links which are expressed by the ratios of 3 : 2, and 4 : 3, and of 9 : 8, —these, although they cannot be wholly undone except by him who united them, were twisted by them in all sorts of ways, and the circles were broken and disordered in every possible manner, so that when they moved they were tumbling to pieces, and moved irrationally, at one time in a reverse direction, and then again obliquely, and then upside down, as you might imagine a person who is upside down and has his head leaning upon the ground and his feet up against something in the air; and when he is in such a position, both he and the spectator fancy that the right of either is his left, and the left right. If, when powerfully experiencing these and similar effects, the revolutions of the soul come in contact with some external thing, either of the class of the same or of the other, they speak of the same or of the other in a manner the very opposite of the truth; and they become false and foolish, and there is no course or revolution in them which has a guiding or directing power; and if again any sensations enter in violently from without and drag after them the whole vessel of the soul, then the courses of the soul, though they seem to conquer, are really conquered.

And by reason of all these affections, the soul, when encased in a mortal body, now, as in the beginning, is at first

without intelligence; but when the flood of growth and nutriment abates, and the courses of the soul, calming down, go their own way and become steadier as time goes on, then the several circles return to their natural form, and their revolutions are corrected, and they call the same and the other by their right names, and make the possessor of them to become a rational being. And if these combine in him with any true nurture or education, he attains the fullness and health of the perfect man, and escapes the worst disease of all; but if he neglects education he walks lame to the end of his life, and returns imperfect and good for nothing to the world below. This, however, is a later stage; at present we must treat more exactly the subject before us, which involves a preliminary enquiry into the generation of the body and its members, and as to how the soul was created, —for what reason and by what providence of the gods; and holding fast to probability, we must pursue our way.

First, then, the gods, imitating the spherical shape of the universe, enclosed the two divine courses in a spherical body, that, namely, which we now term the head, being the most divine part of us and the lord of all that is in us: to this the gods, when they put together the body, gave all the other members to be servants, considering that it partook of every sort of motion. In order then that it might not tumble about among the high and deep places of the earth, but might be able to get over the one and out of the other, they provided the body to be its vehicle and means of locomotion; which consequently had length and was furnished with four limbs extended and flexible; these God contrived to be instruments of locomotion with which it might take hold and find support, and so be able to pass through all places, carrying on high the dwelling-place of the most sacred and divine part of us. Such was the origin of legs and hands, which for this

reason were attached to every man; and the gods, deeming the front part of man to be more honorable and more fit to command than the hinder part, made us to move mostly in a forward direction. Wherefore man must needs have his front part unlike and distinguished from the rest of his body. And so in the vessel of the head, they first of all put a face in which they inserted organs to minister in all things to the providence of the soul, and they appointed this part, which has authority, to be by nature the part which is in front. And of the organs they first contrived the eyes to give light, and the principle according to which they were inserted was as follows: So much of fire as would not burn, but gave a gentle light, they formed into a substance akin to the light of every-day life; and the pure fire which is within us and related thereto they made to flow through the eyes in a stream smooth and dense, compressing the whole eye, and especially the center part, so that it kept out everything of a coarser nature, and allowed to pass only this pure element. When the light of day surrounds the stream of vision, then like falls upon like, and they coalesce, and one body is formed by natural affinity in the line of vision, wherever the light that falls from within meets with an external object. And the whole stream of vision, being similarly affected in virtue of similarity, diffuses the motions of what it touches or what touches it over the whole body, until they reach the soul, causing that perception which we call sight. But when night comes on and the external and kindred fire departs, then the stream of vision is cut off; for going forth to an unlike element it is changed and extinguished, being no longer of one nature with the surrounding atmosphere which is now deprived of fire: and so the eye no longer sees, and we feel disposed to sleep. For when the eyelids, which the gods invented for the preservation of sight, are closed, they keep in the internal fire; and the power of the fire

diffuses and equalizes the inward motions; when they are equalized, there is rest, and when the rest is profound, sleep comes over us scarce disturbed by dreams; but where the greater motions still remain, of whatever nature and in whatever locality, they engender corresponding visions in dreams, which are remembered by us when we are awake and in the external world. And now there is no longer any difficulty in understanding the creation of images in mirrors and all smooth and bright surfaces. For from the communion of the internal and external fires, and again from the union of them and their numerous transformations when they meet in the mirror, all these appearances of necessity arise, when the fire from the face coalesces with the fire from the eye on the bright and smooth surface. And right appears left and left right, because the visual rays come into contact with the rays emitted by the object in a manner contrary to the usual mode of meeting; but the right appears right, and the left, left, when the position of one of the two concurring lights is reversed; and this happens when the mirror is concave and its smooth surface repels the right stream of vision to the left side, and the left to the right. Or if the mirror be turned vertically, then the concavity makes the countenance appear to be all upside down, and the lower rays are driven upwards and the upper downwards.

All these are to be reckoned among the second and cooperative causes which God, carrying into execution the idea of the best as far as possible, uses as his ministers. They are thought by most men not to be the second, but the prime causes of all things, because they freeze and heat, and contract and dilate, and the like. But they are not so, for they are incapable of reason or intellect; the only being which can properly have mind is the invisible soul, whereas fire and water, and earth and air, are all of them visible bodies. The lover of intellect and knowledge ought to explore causes of

intelligent nature first of all, and, secondly, of those things which, being moved by others, are compelled to move others. And this is what we too must do. Both kinds of causes should be acknowledged by us, but a distinction should be made between those which are endowed with mind and are the workers of things fair and good, and those which are deprived of intelligence and always produce chance effects without order or design. Of the second or co-operative causes of sight, which help to give to the eyes the power which they now possess, enough has been said. I will therefore now proceed to speak of the higher use and purpose for which God has given them to us. The sight in my opinion is the source of the greatest benefit to us, for had we never seen the stars, and the sun, and the heaven, none of the words which we have spoken about the universe would ever have been uttered. But now the sight of day and night, and the months and the revolutions of the years, have created number, and have given us a conception of time, and the power of enquiring about the nature of the universe; and from this source we have derived philosophy, than which no greater good ever was or will be given by the gods to mortal man. This is the greatest boon of sight: and of the lesser benefits why should I speak? even the ordinary man if he were deprived of them would bewail his loss, but in vain. Thus much let me say however: God invented and gave us sight to the end that we might behold the courses of intelligence in the heaven, and apply them to the courses of our own intelligence which are akin to them, the unperturbed to the perturbed; and that we, learning them and partaking of the natural truth of reason, might imitate the absolutely unerring courses of God and regulate our own vagaries. The same may be affirmed of speech and hearing: they have been given by the gods to the same end and for a like reason. For this is the principal end of speech, whereto

it most contributes. Moreover, so much of music as is adapted to the sound of the voice and to the sense of hearing is granted to us for the sake of harmony; and harmony, which has motions akin to the revolutions of our souls, is not regarded by the intelligent votary of the Muses as given by them with a view to irrational pleasure, which is deemed to be the purpose of it in our day, but as meant to correct any discord which may have arisen in the courses of the soul, and to be our ally in bringing her into harmony and agreement with herself; and rhythm too was given by them for the same reason, on account of the irregular and graceless ways which prevail among mankind generally, and to help us against them.

Thus far in what we have been saying, with small exceptions, the works of intelligence have been set forth; and now we must place by the side of them in our discourse the things which come into being through necessity—for the creation is mixed, being made up of necessity and mind. Mind, the ruling power, persuaded necessity to bring the greater part of created things to perfection, and thus and after this manner in the beginning, when the influence of reason got the better of necessity, the universe was created. But if a person will truly tell of the way in which the work was accomplished, he must include the other influence of the variable cause as well. Wherefore, we must return again and find another suitable beginning, as about the former matters, so also about these. To which end we must consider the nature of fire, and water, and air, and earth, such as they were prior to the creation of the heaven, and what was happening to them in this previous state; for no one has as yet explained the manner of their generation, but we speak of fire and the rest of them, whatever they mean, as though men knew their natures, and we maintain them to be the first principles and letters or elements of the whole, when

they cannot reasonably be compared by a man of any sense even to syllables or first compounds. And let me say thus much: I will not now speak of the first principle or principles of all things, or by whatever name they are to be called, for this reason, —because it is difficult to set forth my opinion according to the method of discussion which we are at present employing. Do not imagine, any more than I can bring myself to imagine, that I should be right in undertaking so great and difficult a task. Remembering what I said at first about probability, I will do my best to give as probable an explanation as any other, —or rather, more probable; and I will first go back to the beginning and try to speak of each thing and of all. Once more, then, at the commencement of my discourse, I call upon God, and beg him to be our savior out of a strange and unwonted enquiry, and to bring us to the haven of probability. So now let us begin again.

This new beginning of our discussion of the universe requires a fuller division than the former; for then we made two classes, now a third must be revealed. The two sufficed for the former discussion: one, which we assumed, was a pattern intelligible and always the same; and the second was only the imitation of the pattern, generated and visible. There is also a third kind which we did not distinguish at the time, conceiving that the two would be enough. But now the argument seems to require that we should set forth in words another kind, which is difficult of explanation and dimly seen. What nature are we to attribute to this new kind of being? We reply, that it is the receptacle, and in a manner the nurse, of all generation. I have spoken the truth; but I must express myself in clearer language, and this will be an arduous task for many reasons, and in particular because I must first raise questions concerning fire and the other elements, and determine what each of them is; for to say,

with any probability or certitude, which of them should be called water rather than fire, and which should be called any of them rather than all or some one of them, is a difficult matter. How, then, shall we settle this point, and what questions about the elements may be fairly raised?

In the first place, we see that what we just now called water, by condensation, I suppose, becomes stone and earth; and this same element, when melted and dispersed, passes into vapor and air. Air, again, when inflamed, becomes fire; and again fire, when condensed and extinguished, passes once more into the form of air; and once more, air, when collected and condensed, produces cloud and mist; and from these, when still more compressed, comes flowing water, and from water comes earth and stones once more; and thus generation appears to be transmitted from one to the other in a circle. Thus, then, as the several elements never present themselves in the same form, how can anyone have the assurance to assert positively that any of them, whatever it may be, is one thing rather than another? No one can. But much the safest plan is to speak of them as follows: —Anything which we see to be continually changing, as, for example, fire, we must not call 'this' or 'that,' but rather say that it is 'of such a nature;' nor let us speak of water as 'this,' but always as 'such;' nor must we imply that there is any stability in any of those things which we indicate by the use of the words 'this' and 'that,' supposing ourselves to signify something thereby; for they are too volatile to be detained in any such expressions as 'this,' or 'that,' or 'relative to this,' or any other mode of speaking which represents them as permanent. We ought not to apply 'this' to any of them, but rather the word 'such;' which expresses the similar principle circulating in each and all of them; for example, that should be called 'fire' which is of such a nature always, and so of everything that has

generation. That in which the elements severally grow up, and appear, and decay, is alone to be called by the name 'this' or 'that;' but that which is of a certain nature, hot or white, or anything which admits of opposite qualities, and all things that are compounded of them, ought not to be so denominated. Let me make another attempt to explain my meaning more clearly. Suppose a person to make all kinds of figures of gold and to be always transmuting one form into all the rest; —somebody points to one of them and asks what it is. By far the safest and truest answer is, That is gold; and not to call the triangle or any other figures which are formed in the gold 'these,' as though they had existence, since they are in process of change while he is making the assertion; but if the questioner be willing to take the safe and indefinite expression, 'such,' we should be satisfied. And the same argument applies to the universal nature which receives all bodies—that must be always called the same; for, while receiving all things, she never departs at all from her own nature, and never in any way, or at any time, assumes a form like that of any of the things which enter into her; she is the natural recipient of all impressions, and is stirred and informed by them, and appears different from time to time by reason of them. But the forms which enter into and go out of her are the likenesses of real existences modelled after their patterns in a wonderful and inexplicable manner, which we will hereafter investigate. For the present we have only to conceive of three natures: first, that which is in process of generation; secondly, that in which the generation takes place; and thirdly, that of which the thing generated is a resemblance. And we may liken the receiving principle to a mother, and the source or spring to a father, and the intermediate nature to a child; and may remark further, that if the model is to take every variety of form, then the matter in which the model is fashioned will not be duly prepared,

unless it is formless, and free from the impress of any of those shapes which it is hereafter to receive from without. For if the matter were like any of the supervening forms, then whenever any opposite or entirely different nature was stamped upon its surface, it would take the impression badly, because it would intrude its own shape. Wherefore, that which is to receive all forms should have no form; as in making perfumes they first contrive that the liquid substance which is to receive the scent shall be as inodorous as possible; or as those who wish to impress figures on soft substances do not allow any previous impression to remain, but begin by making the surface as even and smooth as possible. In the same way that which is to receive perpetually and through its whole extent the resemblances of all eternal beings ought to be devoid of any particular form. Wherefore, the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any way sensible things, is not to be termed earth, or air, or fire, or water, or any of their compounds, or any of the elements from which these are derived, but is an invisible and formless being which receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is most incomprehensible. In saying this we shall not be far wrong; as far, however, as we can attain to a knowledge of her from the previous considerations, we may truly say that fire is that part of her nature which from time to time is inflamed, and water that which is moistened, and that the mother substance becomes earth and air, in so far as she receives the impressions of them.

Let us consider this question more precisely. Is there any self-existent fire? and do all those things which we call self-existent exist? or are only those things which we see, or in some way perceive through the bodily organs, truly existent, and nothing whatever besides them? And is all that which we call an intelligible essence nothing at all, and only a

name? Here is a question which we must not leave unexamined or undetermined, nor must we affirm too confidently that there can be no decision; neither must we interpolate in our present long discourse a digression equally long, but if it is possible to set forth a great principle in a few words, that is just what we want.

Thus I state my view: —If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and apprehended only by the mind; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm them to be distinct, for they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is implanted in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by true reason, the other is without reason; the one cannot be overcome by persuasion, but the other can: and lastly, every man may be said to share in true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men. Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to intelligence only. And there is another nature of the same name with it, and like to it, perceived by sense, created, always in motion, becoming in place and again vanishing out of place, which is apprehended by opinion and sense. And there is a third nature, which is space, and is eternal, and admits not of destruction and provides a home for all created things, and is apprehended without the help of sense, by a kind of spurious reason, and is hardly real; which we beholding as in a dream, say of all existence that it must of necessity be

in some place and occupy a space, but that what is neither in heaven nor in earth has no existence. Of these and other things of the same kind, relating to the true and waking reality of nature, we have only this dreamlike sense, and we are unable to cast off sleep and determine the truth about them. For an image, since the reality, after which it is modelled, does not belong to it, and it exists ever as the fleeting shadow of some other, must be inferred to be in another [i.e. in space], grasping existence in some way or other, or it could not be at all. But true and exact reason, vindicating the nature of true being, maintains that while two things [i.e. the image and space] are different they cannot exist one of them in the other and so be one and also two at the same time.

Thus have I concisely given the result of my thoughts; and my verdict is that being and space and generation, these three, existed in their three ways before the heaven; and that the nurse of generation, moistened by water and inflamed by fire, and receiving the forms of earth and air, and experiencing all the affections which accompany these, presented a strange variety of appearances; and being full of powers which were neither similar nor equally balanced, was never in any part in a state of equipoise, but swaying unevenly hither and thither, was shaken by them, and by its motion again shook them; and the elements when moved were separated and carried continually, some one way, some another; as, when grain is shaken and winnowed by fans and other instruments used in the threshing of corn, the close and heavy particles are borne away and settle in one direction, and the loose and light particles in another. In this manner, the four kinds or elements were then shaken by the receiving vessel, which, moving like a winnowing machine, scattered far away from one another the elements most unlike, and forced the most similar elements into close

contact. Wherefore also the various elements had different places before they were arranged so as to form the universe. At first, they were all without reason and measure. But when the world began to get into order, fire and water and earth and air had only certain faint traces of themselves, and were altogether such as everything might be expected to be in the absence of God; this, I say, was their nature at that time, and God fashioned them by form and number. Let it be consistently maintained by us in all that we say that God made them as far as possible the fairest and best, out of things which were not fair and good. And now I will endeavor to show you the disposition and generation of them by an unaccustomed argument, which I am compelled to use; but I believe that you will be able to follow me, for your education has made you familiar with the methods of science.

In the first place, then, as is evident to all, fire and earth and water and air are bodies. And every sort of body possesses solidity, and every solid must necessarily be contained in planes; and every plane rectilinear figure is composed of triangles: and all triangles are originally of two kinds, both of which are made up of one right and two are acute angles; one of them has at either end of the base the half of a divided right angle, having equal sides, while in the other the right angle is divided into unequal parts, having unequal sides. These, then, proceeding by a combination of probability with demonstration, we assume to be the original elements of fire and the other bodies; but the principles which are prior to these God only knows, and he of men who is the friend of God. And next we have to determine what are the four most beautiful bodies which are unlike one another, and of which some are capable of resolution into one another; for having discovered thus much, we shall know the true origin of earth and fire and of the proportionate and intermediate elements. And then we shall not be willing to

allow that there are any distinct kinds of visible bodies fairer than these. Wherefore we must endeavor to construct the four forms of bodies which excel in beauty, and then we shall be able to say that we have sufficiently apprehended their nature. Now of the two triangles, the isosceles has one form only; the scalene or unequal-sided has an infinite number. Of the infinite forms we must select the most beautiful, if we are to proceed in due order, and anyone who can point out a more beautiful form than ours for the construction of these bodies, shall carry off the palm, not as an enemy, but as a friend. Now, the one which we maintain to be the most beautiful of all the many triangles (and we need not speak of the others) is that of which the double forms a third triangle which is equilateral; the reason of this would be long to tell; he who disproves what we are saying, and shows that we are mistaken, may claim a friendly victory. Then let us choose two triangles, out of which fire and the other elements have been constructed, one isosceles, the other having the square of the longer side equal to three times the square of the lesser side.

Now is the time to explain what was before obscurely said: there was an error in imagining that all the four elements might be generated by and into one another; this, I say, was an erroneous supposition, for there are generated from the triangles which we have selected four kinds—three from the one which has the sides unequal; the fourth alone is framed out of the isosceles triangle. Hence they cannot all be resolved into one another, a great number of small bodies being combined into a few large ones, or the converse. But three of them can be thus resolved and compounded, for they all spring from one, and when the greater bodies are broken up, many small bodies will spring up out of them and take their own proper figures; or, again, when many small bodies are dissolved into their triangles, if they become one,

they will form one large mass of another kind. So much for their passage into one another. I have now to speak of their several kinds, and show out of what combinations of numbers each of them was formed. The first be the simplest and smallest construction, and its element is that triangle which has its hypothenuse twice the lesser side. When two such triangles are joined at diagonal, and this is repeated three times, and the triangles rest their diagonals and shorter sides on the same point as a center, a single equilateral triangle is formed out of six triangles; and four equilateral triangles, if put together, make out of every three plane angles one solid angle, being that which is nearest to the most obtuse of plane angles; and out of the combination of these four angles arises the first solid form which distributes into equal and similar parts the whole circle in which it is inscribed. The second species of solid is formed out of the same triangles, which unite as eight equilateral triangles and form one solid angle out of four plane angles, and out of six such angles the second body is completed. And the third body is made up of 120 triangular elements, forming twelve solid angles, each of them included in five plane equilateral triangles, having altogether twenty bases, each of which is an equilateral triangle. The one element [that is, the triangle which has its hypothenuse twice the lesser side] having generated these figures, generated no more; but the isosceles triangle produced the fourth elementary figure, which is compounded of four such triangles, joining their right angles in a center, and forming one equilateral quadrangle. Six of these united form eight solid angles, each of which is made by the combination of three plane right angles; the figure of the body thus composed is a cube, having six plane quadrangular equilateral bases. There was yet a fifth combination which God used in the delineation of the universe.

Now, he who, duly reflecting on all this, enquires whether the worlds are to be regarded as indefinite or definite in number, will be of opinion that the notion of their indefiniteness is characteristic of a sadly indefinite and ignorant mind. He, however, who raises the question whether they are to be truly regarded as one or five, takes up a more reasonable position. Arguing from probabilities, I am of opinion that they are one; another, regarding the question from another point of view, will be of another mind. But, leaving this enquiry, let us proceed to distribute the elementary forms, which have now been created in idea, among the four elements.

To earth, then, let us assign the cubical form; for earth is the most immoveable of the four and the most plastic of all bodies, and that which has the most stable bases must of necessity be of such a nature. Now, of the triangles which we assumed at first, that which has two equal sides is by nature more firmly based than that which has unequal sides; and of the compound figures which are formed out of either, the plane equilateral quadrangle has necessarily a more stable basis than the equilateral triangle, both in the whole and in the parts. Wherefore, in assigning this figure to earth, we adhere to probability; and to water we assign that one of the remaining forms which is the least moveable; and the most moveable of them to fire; and to air that which is intermediate. Also we assign the smallest body to fire, and the greatest to water, and the intermediate in size to air; and, again, the acutest body to fire, and the next in acuteness to air, and the third to water. Of all these elements, that which has the fewest bases must necessarily be the most moveable, for it must be the acutest and most penetrating in every way, and also the lightest as being composed of the smallest number of similar particles: and the second body has similar properties in a second degree, and the third body in the third

degree. Let it be agreed, then, both according to strict reason and according to probability, that the pyramid is the solid which is the original element and seed of fire; and let us assign the element which was next in the order of generation to air, and the third to water. We must imagine all these to be so small that no single particle of any of the four kinds is seen by us on account of their smallness: but when many of them are collected together their aggregates are seen. And the ratios of their numbers, motions, and other properties, everywhere God, as far as necessity allowed or gave consent, has exactly perfected, and harmonized in due proportion.

From all that we have just been saying about the elements or kinds, the most probable conclusion is as follows: —earth, when meeting with fire and dissolved by its sharpness, whether the dissolution take place in the fire itself or perhaps in some mass of air or water, is borne hither and thither, until its parts, meeting together and mutually harmonizing, again become earth; for they can never take any other form. But water, when divided by fire or by air, on re-forming, may become one part fire and two parts air; and a single volume of air divided becomes two of fire. Again, when a small body of fire is contained in a larger body of air or water or earth, and both are moving, and the fire struggling is overcome and broken up, then two volumes of fire form one volume of air; and when air is overcome and cut up into small pieces, two and a half parts of air are condensed into one part of water. Let us consider the matter in another way. When one of the other elements is fastened upon by fire, and is cut by the sharpness of its angles and sides, it coalesces with the fire, and then ceases to be cut by them any longer. For no element which is one and the same with itself can be changed by or change another of the same kind and in the same state. But so long as in the process of transition the weaker is fighting against the stronger, the

dissolution continues. Again, when a few small particles, enclosed in many larger ones, are in process of decomposition and extinction, they only cease from their tendency to extinction when they consent to pass into the conquering nature, and fire becomes air and air water. But if bodies of another kind go and attack them [i.e. the small particles], the latter continue to be dissolved until, being completely forced back and dispersed, they make their escape to their own kindred, or else, being overcome and assimilated to the conquering power, they remain where they are and dwell with their victors, and from being many become one. And owing to these affections, all things are changing their place, for by the motion of the receiving vessel the bulk of each class is distributed into its proper place; but those things which become unlike themselves and like other things, are hurried by the shaking into the place of the things to which they grow like.

Now all unmixed and primary bodies are produced by such causes as these. As to the subordinate species which are included in the greater kinds, they are to be attributed to the varieties in the structure of the two original triangles. For either structure did not originally produce the triangle of one size only, but some larger and some smaller, and there are as many sizes as there are species of the four elements. Hence when they are mingled with themselves and with one another there is an endless variety of them, which those who would arrive at the probable truth of nature ought duly to consider.

Unless a person comes to an understanding about the nature and conditions of rest and motion, he will meet with many difficulties in the discussion which follows. Something has been said of this matter already, and something more remains to be said, which is, that motion never exists in what is uniform. For to conceive that anything can be moved

without a mover is hard or indeed impossible, and equally impossible to conceive that there can be a mover unless there be something which can be moved; —motion cannot exist where either of these are wanting, and for these to be uniform is impossible; wherefore we must assign rest to uniformity and motion to the want of uniformity. Now inequality is the cause of the nature which is wanting in uniformity; and of this we have already described the origin. But there still remains the further point—why things when divided after their kinds do not cease to pass through one another and to change their place—which we will now proceed to explain. In the revolution of the universe are comprehended all the four elements, and this being circular and having a tendency to come together, compresses everything and will not allow any place to be left void. Wherefore, also, fire above all things penetrates everywhere, and air next, as being next in rarity of the elements; and the two other elements in like manner penetrate according to their degrees of rarity. For those things which are composed of the largest particles have the largest void left in their compositions, and those which are composed of the smallest particles have the least. And the contraction caused by the compression thrusts the smaller particles into the interstices of the larger. And thus, when the small parts are placed side by side with the larger, and the lesser divide the greater and the greater unite the lesser, all the elements are borne up and down and hither and thither towards their own places; for the change in the size of each changes its position in space. And these causes generate an inequality which is always maintained, and is continually creating a perpetual motion of the elements in all time.

In the next place we have to consider that there are divers kinds of fire. There are, for example, first, flame; and secondly, those emanations of flame which do not burn but

only give light to the eyes; thirdly, the remains of fire, which are seen in red-hot embers after the flame has been extinguished. There are similar differences in the air; of which the brightest part is called the aether, and the most turbid sort mist and darkness; and there are various other nameless kinds which arise from the inequality of the triangles. Water, again, admits in the first place of a division into two kinds; the one liquid and the other fusile. The liquid kind is composed of the small and unequal particles of water; and moves itself and is moved by other bodies owing to the want of uniformity and the shape of its particles; whereas the fusile kind, being formed of large and uniform particles, is more stable than the other, and is heavy and compact by reason of its uniformity. But when fire gets in and dissolves the particles and destroys the uniformity, it has greater mobility, and becoming fluid is thrust forth by the neighboring air and spreads upon the earth; and this dissolution of the solid masses is called melting, and their spreading out upon the earth flowing. Again, when the fire goes out of the fusile substance, it does not pass into a vacuum, but into the neighboring air; and the air which is displaced forces together the liquid and still moveable mass into the place which was occupied by the fire, and unites it with itself. Thus compressed the mass resumes its equability, and is again at unity with itself, because the fire which was the author of the inequality has retreated; and this departure of the fire is called cooling, and the coming together which follows upon it is termed congealment. Of all the kinds termed fusile, that which is the densest and is formed out of the finest and most uniform parts is that most precious possession called gold, which is hardened by filtration through rock; this is unique in kind, and has both a glittering and a yellow color. A shoot of gold, which is so dense as to be very hard, and takes a black color, is termed

adamant. There is also another kind which has parts nearly like gold, and of which there are several species; it is denser than gold, and it contains a small and fine portion of earth, and is therefore harder, yet also lighter because of the great interstices which it has within itself; and this substance, which is one of the bright and denser kinds of water, when solidified is called copper. There is an alloy of earth mingled with it, which, when the two parts grow old and are disunited, shows itself separately and is called rust. The remaining phenomena of the same kind there will be no difficulty in reasoning out by the method of probabilities. A man may sometimes set aside meditations about eternal things, and for recreation turn to consider the truths of generation which are probable only; he will thus gain a pleasure not to be repented of, and secure for himself while he lives a wise and moderate pastime. Let us grant ourselves this indulgence, and go through the probabilities relating to the same subjects which follow next in order.

Water which is mingled with fire, so much as is fine and liquid (being so called by reason of its motion and the way in which it rolls along the ground), and soft, because its bases give way and are less stable than those of earth, when separated from fire and air and isolated, becomes more uniform, and by their retirement is compressed into itself; and if the condensation be very great, the water above the earth becomes hail, but on the earth, ice; and that which is congealed in a less degree and is only half solid, when above the earth is called snow, and when upon the earth, and condensed from dew, hoar-frost. Then, again, there are the numerous kinds of water which have been mingled with one another, and are distilled through plants which grow in the earth; and this whole class is called by the name of juices or saps. The unequal admixture of these fluids creates a variety of species; most of them are nameless, but four which are of

a fiery nature are clearly distinguished and have names. First, there is wine, which warms the soul as well as the body: secondly, there is the oily nature, which is smooth and divides the visual ray, and for this reason is bright and shining and of a glistening appearance, including pitch, the juice of the castor berry, oil itself, and other things of a like kind: thirdly, there is the class of substances which expand the contracted parts of the mouth, until they return to their natural state, and by reason of this property create sweetness; —these are included under the general name of honey: and, lastly, there is a frothy nature, which differs from all juices, having a burning quality which dissolves the flesh; it is called *opos* (a vegetable acid).

As to the kinds of earth, that which is filtered through water passes into stone in the following manner: —The water which mixes with the earth and is broken up in the process changes into air, and taking this form mounts into its own place. But as there is no surrounding vacuum it thrusts away the neighboring air, and this being rendered heavy, and, when it is displaced, having been poured around the mass of earth, forcibly compresses it and drives it into the vacant space whence the new air had come up; and the earth when compressed by the air into an indissoluble union with water becomes rock. The fairer sort is that which is made up of equal and similar parts and is transparent; that which has the opposite qualities is inferior. But when all the watery part is suddenly drawn out by fire, a more brittle substance is formed, to which we give the name of pottery. Sometimes also moisture may remain, and the earth which has been fused by fire becomes, when cool, a certain stone of a black color. A like separation of the water which had been copiously mingled with them may occur in two substances composed of finer particles of earth and of a briny nature; out of either of them a half-solid body is then formed, soluble

in water—the one, soda, which is used for purging away oil and earth, the other, salt, which harmonizes so well in combinations pleasing to the palate, and is, as the law testifies, a substance dear to the gods. The compounds of earth and water are not soluble by water, but by fire only, and for this reason: —Neither fire nor air melt masses of earth; for their particles, being smaller than the interstices in its structure, have plenty of room to move without forcing their way, and so they leave the earth unmelted and undissolved; but particles of water, which are larger, force a passage, and dissolve and melt the earth. Wherefore earth when not consolidated by force is dissolved by water only; when consolidated, by nothing but fire; for this is the only body which can find an entrance. The cohesion of water again, when very strong, is dissolved by fire only—when weaker, then either by air or fire the former entering the interstices, and the latter penetrating even the triangles. But nothing can dissolve air, when strongly condensed, which does not reach the elements or triangles; or if not strongly condensed, then only fire can dissolve it. As to bodies composed of earth and water, while the water occupies the vacant interstices of the earth in them which are compressed by force, the particles of water which approach them from without, finding no entrance, flow around the entire mass and leave it undissolved; but the particles of fire, entering into the interstices of the water, do to the water what water does to earth and fire to air, and are the sole causes of the compound body of earth and water liquefying and becoming fluid. Now these bodies are of two kinds; some of them, such as glass and the fusible sort of stones, have less water than they have earth; on the other hand, substances of the nature of wax and incense have more of water entering into their composition.

I have thus shown the various classes of bodies as they are diversified by their forms and combinations and changes into one another, and now I must endeavor to set forth their affections and the causes of them. In the first place, the bodies which I have been describing are necessarily objects of sense. But we have not yet considered the origin of flesh, or what belongs to flesh, or of that part of the soul which is mortal. And these things cannot be adequately explained without also explaining the affections which are concerned with sensation, nor the latter without the former: and yet to explain them together is hardly possible; for which reason we must assume first one or the other and afterwards examine the nature of our hypothesis. In order, then, that the affections may follow regularly after the elements, let us presuppose the existence of body and soul.

First, let us enquire what we mean by saying that fire is hot: and about this we may reason from the dividing or cutting power which it exercises on our bodies. We all of us feel that fire is sharp; and we may further consider the fineness of the sides, and the sharpness of the angles, and the smallness of the particles, and the swiftness of the motion; —all this makes the action of fire violent and sharp, so that it cuts whatever it meets. And we must not forget that the original figure of fire [i.e. the pyramid], more than any other form, has a dividing power which cuts our bodies into small pieces (κερματίζει), and thus naturally produces that affection which we call heat; and hence the origin of the name (θερμὸς, κέρμα). Now, the opposite of this is sufficiently manifest; nevertheless we will not fail to describe it. For the larger particles of moisture which surround the body, entering in and driving out the lesser, but not being able to take their places, compress the moist principle in us; and this from being unequal and disturbed, is forced by them into a state of rest, which is due to equability and

compression. But things which are contracted contrary to nature are by nature at war, and force themselves apart; and to this war and convulsion the name of shivering and trembling is given; and the whole affection and the cause of the affection are both termed cold. That is called hard to which our flesh yields, and soft which yields to our flesh; and things are also termed hard and soft relatively to one another. That which yields has a small base; but that which rests on quadrangular bases is firmly posed and belongs to the class which offers the greatest resistance; so too does that which is the most compact and therefore most repellent. The nature of the light and the heavy will be best understood when examined in connection with our notions of above and below; for it is quite a mistake to suppose that the universe is parted into two regions, separate from and opposite to each other, the one a lower to which all things tend which have any bulk, and an upper to which things only ascend against their will. For as the universe is in the form of a sphere, all the extremities, being equidistant from the center, are equally extremities, and the center, which is equidistant from them, is equally to be regarded as the opposite of them all. Such being the nature of the world, when a person says that any of these points is above or below, may he not be justly charged with using an improper expression? For the center of the world cannot be rightly called either above or below, but is the center and nothing else; and the circumference is not the center, and has in no one part of itself a different relation to the center from what it has in any of the opposite parts. Indeed, when it is in every direction similar, how can one rightly give to it names which imply opposition? For if there were any solid body in equipoise at the center of the universe, there would be nothing to draw it to this extreme rather than to that, for they are all perfectly similar; and if a person were to go round

the world in a circle, he would often, when standing at the antipodes of his former position, speak of the same point as above and below; for, as I was saying just now, to speak of the whole which is in the form of a globe as having one part above and another below is not like a sensible man. The reason why these names are used, and the circumstances under which they are ordinarily applied by us to the division of the heavens, may be elucidated by the following supposition: —If a person were to stand in that part of the universe which is the appointed place of fire, and where there is the great mass of fire to which fiery bodies gather—if, I say, he were to ascend thither, and, having the power to do this, were to abstract particles of fire and put them in scales and weigh them, and then, raising the balance, were to draw the fire by force towards the uncongenial element of the air, it would be very evident that he could compel the smaller mass more readily than the larger; for when two things are simultaneously raised by one and the same power, the smaller body must necessarily yield to the superior power with less reluctance than the larger; and the larger body is called heavy and said to tend downwards, and the smaller body is called light and said to tend upwards. And we may detect ourselves who are upon the earth doing precisely the same thing. For we often separate earthy natures, and sometimes earth itself, and draw them into the uncongenial element of air by force and contrary to nature, both clinging to their kindred elements. But that which is smaller yields to the impulse given by us towards the dissimilar element more easily than the larger; and so we call the former light, and the place towards which it is impelled we call above, and the contrary state and place we call heavy and below respectively. Now the relations of these must necessarily vary, because the principal masses of the different elements hold opposite positions; for that which is

light, heavy, below or above in one place will be found to be and become contrary and transverse and everyway diverse in relation to that which is light, heavy, below or above in an opposite place.

And about all of them this has to be considered: —that the tendency of each towards its kindred element makes the body which is moved heavy, and the place towards which the motion tends below, but things which have an opposite tendency we call by an opposite name. Such are the causes which we assign to these phenomena. As to the smooth and the rough, anyone who sees them can explain the reason of them to another. For roughness is hardness mingled with irregularity, and smoothness is produced by the joint effect of uniformity and density.

The most important of the affections which concern the whole body remains to be considered, —that is, the cause of pleasure and pain in the perceptions of which I have been speaking, and in all other things which are perceived by sense through the parts of the body, and have both pains and pleasures attendant on them. Let us imagine the causes of every affection, whether of sense or not, to be of the following nature, remembering that we have already distinguished between the nature which is easy and which is hard to move; for this is the direction in which we must hunt the prey which we mean to take. A body which is of a nature to be easily moved, on receiving an impression however slight, spreads abroad the motion in a circle, the parts communicating with each other, until at last, reaching the principle of mind, they announce the quality of the agent. But a body of the opposite kind, being immobile, and not extending to the surrounding region, merely receives the impression, and does not stir any of the neighboring parts; and since the parts do not distribute the original impression to other parts, it has no effect of motion on the whole animal,

and therefore produces no effect on the patient. This is true of the bones and hair and other more earthy parts of the human body; whereas what was said above relates mainly to sight and hearing, because they have in them the greatest amount of fire and air. Now we must conceive of pleasure and pain in this way. An impression produced in us contrary to nature and violent, if sudden, is painful; and, again, the sudden return to nature is pleasant; but a gentle and gradual return is imperceptible and vice versa. On the other hand the impression of sense which is most easily produced is most readily felt, but is not accompanied by pleasure or pain; such, for example, are the affections of the sight, which, as we said above, is a body naturally uniting with our body in the day-time; for cuttings and burnings and other affections which happen to the sight do not give pain, nor is there pleasure when the sight returns to its natural state; but the sensations are clearest and strongest according to the manner in which the eye is affected by the object, and itself strikes and touches it; there is no violence either in the contraction or dilation of the eye. But bodies formed of larger particles yield to the agent only with a struggle; and then they impart their motions to the whole and cause pleasure and pain—pain when alienated from their natural conditions, and pleasure when restored to them. Things which experience gradual withdrawings and emptyings of their nature, and great and sudden replenishments, fail to perceive the emptying, but are sensible of the replenishment; and so they occasion no pain, but the greatest pleasure, to the mortal part of the soul, as is manifest in the case of perfumes. But things which are changed all of a sudden, and only gradually and with difficulty return to their own nature, have effects in every way opposite to the former, as is evident in the case of burnings and cuttings of the body.

Thus have we discussed the general affections of the whole body, and the names of the agents which produce them. And now I will endeavor to speak of the affections of particular parts, and the causes and agents of them, as far as I am able. In the first place let us set forth what was omitted when we were speaking of juices, concerning the affections peculiar to the tongue. These too, like most of the other affections, appear to be caused by certain contractions and dilations, but they have besides more of roughness and smoothness than is found in other affections: for whenever earthy particles enter into the small veins which are the testing instruments of the tongue, reaching to the heart, and fall upon the moist, delicate portions of flesh—when, as they are dissolved, they contract and dry up the little veins, they are astringent if they are rougher, but if not so rough, then only harsh. Those of them which are of an abstergent nature, and purge the whole surface of the tongue, if they do it in excess, and so encroach as to consume some part of the flesh itself, like potash and soda, are all termed bitter. But the particles which are deficient in the alkaline quality, and which cleanse only moderately, are called salt, and having no bitterness or roughness, are regarded as rather agreeable than otherwise. Bodies which share in and are made smooth by the heat of the mouth, and which are inflamed, and again in turn inflame that which heats them, and which are so light that they are carried upwards to the sensations of the head, and cut all that comes in their way, by reason of these qualities in them, are all termed pungent. But when these same particles, refined by putrefaction, enter into the narrow veins, and are duly proportioned to the particles of earth and air which are there, they set them whirling about one another, and while they are in a whirl cause them to dash against and enter into one another, and so form hollows surrounding the particles that enter—which watery vessels

of air (for a film of moisture, sometimes earthy, sometimes pure, is spread around the air) are hollow spheres of water; and those of them which are pure, are transparent, and are called bubbles, while those composed of the earthy liquid, which is in a state of general agitation and effervescence, are said to boil or ferment; —of all these affections the cause is termed acid. And there is the opposite affection arising from an opposite cause, when the mass of entering particles, immersed in the moisture of the mouth, is congenial to the tongue, and smooths and oils over the roughness, and relaxes the parts which are unnaturally contracted, and contracts the parts which are relaxed, and disposes them all according to their nature; —that sort of remedy of violent affections is pleasant and agreeable to every man, and has the name sweet. But enough of this.

The faculty of smell does not admit of differences of kind; for all smells are of a half-formed nature, and no element is so proportioned as to have any smell. The veins about the nose are too narrow to admit earth and water, and too wide to detain fire and air; and for this reason no one ever perceives the smell of any of them; but smells always proceed from bodies that are damp, or putrefying, or liquefying, or evaporating, and are perceptible only in the intermediate state, when water is changing into air and air into water; and all of them are either vapor or mist. That which is passing out of air into water is mist, and that which is passing from water into air is vapor; and hence all smells are thinner than water and thicker than air. The proof of this is, that when there is any obstruction to the respiration, and a man draws in his breath by force, then no smell filters through, but the air without the smell alone penetrates. Wherefore the varieties of smell have no name, and they have not many, or definite and simple kinds; but they are distinguished only as painful and pleasant, the one sort

irritating and disturbing the whole cavity which is situated between the head and the navel, the other having a soothing influence, and restoring this same region to an agreeable and natural condition.

In considering the third kind of sense, hearing, we must speak of the causes in which it originates. We may in general assume sound to be a blow which passes through the ears, and is transmitted by means of the air, the brain, and the blood, to the soul, and that hearing is the vibration of this blow, which begins in the head and ends in the region of the liver. The sound which moves swiftly is acute, and the sound which moves slowly is grave, and that which is regular is equable and smooth, and the reverse is harsh. A great body of sound is loud, and a small body of sound the reverse. Respecting the harmonies of sound I must hereafter speak.

There is a fourth class of sensible things, having many intricate varieties, which must now be distinguished. They are called by the general name of colors, and are a flame which emanates from every sort of body, and has particles corresponding to the sense of sight. I have spoken already, in what has preceded, of the causes which generate sight, and in this place it will be natural and suitable to give a rational theory of colors.

Of the particles coming from other bodies which fall upon the sight, some are smaller and some are larger, and some are equal to the parts of the sight itself. Those which are equal are imperceptible, and we call them transparent. The larger produce contraction, the smaller dilation, in the sight, exercising a power akin to that of hot and cold bodies on the flesh, or of astringent bodies on the tongue, or of those heating bodies which we termed pungent. White and black are similar effects of contraction and dilation in another sphere, and for this reason have a different appearance. Wherefore, we ought to term white that which dilates the

visual ray, and the opposite of this black. There is also a swifter motion of a different sort of fire which strikes and dilates the ray of sight until it reaches the eyes, forcing a way through their passages and melting them, and eliciting from them a union of fire and water which we call tears, being itself an opposite fire which comes to them from an opposite direction—the inner fire flashes forth like lightning, and the outer finds a way in and is extinguished in the moisture, and all sorts of colors are generated by the mixture. This affection is termed dazzling, and the object which produces it is called bright and flashing. There is another sort of fire which is intermediate, and which reaches and mingles with the moisture of the eye without flashing; and in this, the fire mingling with the ray of the moisture, produces a color like blood, to which we give the name of red. A bright hue mingled with red and white gives the color called auburn (ξανθόν). The law of proportion, however, according to which the several colors are formed, even if a man knew he would be foolish in telling, for he could not give any necessary reason, nor indeed any tolerable or probable explanation of them. Again, red, when mingled with black and white, becomes purple, but it becomes umber (ὄρφνινον) when the colors are burnt as well as mingled and the black is more thoroughly mixed with them. Flame-color (πυρρὸν) is produced by a union of auburn and dun (φαιὸν), and dun by an admixture of black and white; pale yellow (ὠχρὸν), by an admixture of white and auburn. White and bright meeting, and falling upon a full black, become dark blue (κυανοῦν), and when dark blue mingles with white, a light blue (γλαυκὸν) color is formed, as flame-color with black makes leek green (πράσιον). There will be no difficulty in seeing how and by what mixtures the colors derived from these are made according to the rules of probability. He, however, who should attempt to verify all this by experiment, would forget

the difference of the human and divine nature. For God only has the knowledge and also the power which are able to combine many things into one and again resolve the one into many. But no man either is or ever will be able to accomplish either the one or the other operation.

These are the elements, thus of necessity then subsisting, which the creator of the fairest and best of created things associated with himself, when he made the self-sufficing and most perfect God, using the necessary causes as his ministers in the accomplishment of his work, but himself contriving the good in all his creations. Wherefore we may distinguish two sorts of causes, the one divine and the other necessary, and may seek for the divine in all things, as far as our nature admits, with a view to the blessed life; but the necessary kind only for the sake of the divine, considering that without them and when isolated from them, these higher things for which we look cannot be apprehended or received or in any way shared by us.

Seeing, then, that we have now prepared for our use the various classes of causes which are the material out of which the remainder of our discourse must be woven, just as wood is the material of the carpenter, let us revert in a few words to the point at which we began, and then endeavor to add on a suitable ending to the beginning of our tale.

As I said at first, when all things were in disorder God created in each thing in relation to itself, and in all things in relation to each other, all the measures and harmonies which they could possibly receive. For in those days nothing had any proportion except by accident; nor did any of the things which now have names deserve to be named at all—as, for example, fire, water, and the rest of the elements. All these the creator first set in order, and out of them he constructed the universe, which was a single animal comprehending in itself all other animals, mortal and

immortal. Now of the divine, he himself was the creator, but the creation of the mortal he committed to his offspring. And they, imitating him, received from him the immortal principle of the soul; and around this they proceeded to fashion a mortal body, and made it to be the vehicle of the soul, and constructed within the body a soul of another nature which was mortal, subject to terrible and irresistible affections, —first of all, pleasure, the greatest incitement to evil; then, pain, which deters from good; also rashness and fear, two foolish counsellors, anger hard to be appeased, and hope easily led astray; —these they mingled with irrational sense and with all-daring love according to necessary laws, and so framed man. Wherefore, fearing to pollute the divine any more than was absolutely unavoidable, they gave to the mortal nature a separate habitation in another part of the body, placing the neck between them to be the isthmus and boundary, which they constructed between the head and breast, to keep them apart. And in the breast, and in what is termed the thorax, they encased the mortal soul; and as the one part of this was superior and the other inferior they divided the cavity of the thorax into two parts, as the women's and men's apartments are divided in houses, and placed the midriff to be a wall of partition between them. That part of the inferior soul which is endowed with courage and passion and loves contention they settled nearer the head, midway between the midriff and the neck, in order that it might be under the rule of reason and might join with it in controlling and restraining the desires when they are no longer willing of their own accord to obey the word of command issuing from the citadel.

The heart, the knot of the veins and the fountain of the blood which races through all the limbs, was set in the place of guard, that when the might of passion was roused by reason making proclamation of any wrong assailing them

from without or being perpetrated by the desires within, quickly the whole power of feeling in the body, perceiving these commands and threats, might obey and follow through every turn and alley, and thus allow the principle of the best to have the command in all of them. But the gods, foreknowing that the palpitation of the heart in the expectation of danger and the swelling and excitement of passion was caused by fire, formed and implanted as a supporter to the heart the lung, which was, in the first place, soft and bloodless, and also had within hollows like the pores of a sponge, in order that by receiving the breath and the drink, it might give coolness and the power of respiration and alleviate the heat. Wherefore they cut the air-channels leading to the lung, and placed the lung about the heart as a soft spring, that, when passion was rife within, the heart, beating against a yielding body, might be cooled and suffer less, and might thus become more ready to join with passion in the service of reason.

The part of the soul which desires meats and drinks and the other things of which it has need by reason of the bodily nature, they placed between the midriff and the boundary of the navel, contriving in all this region a sort of manger for the food of the body; and there they bound it down like a wild animal which was chained up with man, and must be nourished if man was to exist. They appointed this lower creation his place here in order that he might be always feeding at the manger, and have his dwelling as far as might be from the council-chamber, making as little noise and disturbance as possible, and permitting the best part to advise quietly for the good of the whole. And knowing that this lower principle in man would not comprehend reason, and even if attaining to some degree of perception would never naturally care for rational notions, but that it would be led away by phantoms and visions night and day, —to be

a remedy for this, God combined with it the liver, and placed it in the house of the lower nature, contriving that it should be solid and smooth, and bright and sweet, and should also have a bitter quality, in order that the power of thought, which proceeds from the mind, might be reflected as in a mirror which receives likenesses of objects and gives back images of them to the sight; and so might strike terror into the desires, when, making use of the bitter part of the liver, to which it is akin, it comes threatening and invading, and diffusing this bitter element swiftly through the whole liver produces colors like bile, and contracting every part makes it wrinkled and rough; and twisting out of its right place and contorting the lobe and closing and shutting up the vessels and gates, causes pain and loathing. And the converse happens when some gentle inspiration of the understanding pictures images of an opposite character, and allays the bile and bitterness by refusing to stir or touch the nature opposed to itself, but by making use of the natural sweetness of the liver, corrects all things and makes them to be right and smooth and free, and renders the portion of the soul which resides about the liver happy and joyful, enabling it to pass the night in peace, and to practice divination in sleep, inasmuch as it has no share in mind and reason. For the authors of our being, remembering the command of their father when he bade them create the human race as good as they could, that they might correct our inferior parts and make them to attain a measure of truth, placed in the liver the seat of divination. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination not to the wisdom, but to the foolishness of man. No man, when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration; but when he receives the inspired word, either his intelligence is enthralled in sleep, or he is demented by some distemper or possession. And he who would understand what he remembers to have been

said, whether in a dream or when he was awake, by the prophetic and inspired nature, or would determine by reason the meaning of the apparitions which he has seen, and what indications they afford to this man or that, of past, present or future good and evil, must first recover his wits. But, while he continues demented, he cannot judge of the visions which he sees or the words which he utters; the ancient saying is very true, that 'only a man who has his wits can act or judge about himself and his own affairs' And for this reason it is customary to appoint interpreters to be judges of the true inspiration. Some persons call them prophets; they are quite unaware that they are only the expositors of dark sayings and visions, and are not to be called prophets at all, but only interpreters of prophecy.

Such is the nature of the liver, which is placed as we have described in order that it may give prophetic intimations. During the life of each individual these intimations are plainer, but after his death the liver becomes blind, and delivers oracles too obscure to be intelligible. The neighboring organ [the spleen] is situated on the left-hand side, and is constructed with a view of keeping the liver bright and pure, —like a napkin, always ready prepared and at hand to clean the mirror. And hence, when any impurities arise in the region of the liver by reason of disorders of the body, the loose nature of the spleen, which is composed of a hollow and bloodless tissue, receives them all and clears them away, and when filled with the unclean matter, swells and festers, but, again, when the body is purged, settles down into the same place as before, and is humbled.

Concerning the soul, as to which part is mortal and which divine, and how and why they are separated, and where located, if God acknowledges that we have spoken the truth, then, and then only, can we be confident; still, we may venture to assert that what has been said by us is probable,

and will be rendered more probable by investigation. Let us assume thus much.

The creation of the rest of the body follows next in order, and this we may investigate in a similar manner. And it appears to be very meet that the body should be framed on the following principles: —

The authors of our race were aware that we should be intemperate in eating and drinking, and take a good deal more than was necessary or proper, by reason of gluttony. In order then that disease might not quickly destroy us, and lest our mortal race should perish without fulfilling its end—intending to provide against this, the gods made what is called the lower belly, to be a receptacle for the superfluous meat and drink, and formed the convolution of the bowels, so that the food might be prevented from passing quickly through and compelling the body to require more food, thus producing insatiable gluttony, and making the whole race an enemy to philosophy and music, and rebellious against the divinest element within us.

The bones and flesh, and other similar parts of us, were made as follows. The first principle of all of them was the generation of the marrow. For the bonds of life which unite the soul with the body are made fast there, and they are the root and foundation of the human race. The marrow itself is created out of other materials: God took such of the primary triangles as were straight and smooth, and were adapted by their perfection to produce fire and water, and air and earth—these, I say, he separated from their kinds, and mingling them in due proportions with one another, made the marrow out of them to be a universal seed of the whole race of mankind; and in this seed he then planted and enclosed the souls, and in the original distribution gave to the marrow as many and various forms as the different kinds of souls were hereafter to receive. That which, like a field,

was to receive the divine seed, he made round every way, and called that portion of the marrow, brain, intending that, when an animal was perfected, the vessel containing this substance should be the head; but that which was intended to contain the remaining and mortal part of the soul he distributed into figures at once round and elongated, and he called them all by the name 'marrow;' and to these, as to anchors, fastening the bonds of the whole soul, he proceeded to fashion around them the entire framework of our body, constructing for the marrow, first of all, a complete covering of bone.

Bone was composed by him in the following manner. Having sifted pure and smooth earth he kneaded it and wetted it with marrow, and after that he put it into fire and then into water, and once more into fire and again into water—in this way by frequent transfers from one to the other he made it insoluble by either. Out of this he fashioned, as in a lathe, a globe made of bone, which he placed around the brain, and in this he left a narrow opening; and around the marrow of the neck and back he formed vertebrae which he placed under one another like pivots, beginning at the head and extending through the whole of the trunk. Thus wishing to preserve the entire seed, he enclosed it in a stone-like casing, inserting joints, and using in the formation of them the power of the other or diverse as an intermediate nature, that they might have motion and flexure. Then again, considering that the bone would be too brittle and inflexible, and when heated and again cooled would soon mortify and destroy the seed within—having this in view, he contrived the sinews and the flesh, that so binding all the members together by the sinews, which admitted of being stretched and relaxed about the vertebrae, he might thus make the body capable of flexion and extension, while the flesh would serve as a

protection against the summer heat and against the winter cold, and also against falls, softly and easily yielding to external bodies, like articles made of felt; and containing in itself a warm moisture which in summer exudes and makes the surface damp, would impart a natural coolness to the whole body; and again in winter by the help of this internal warmth would form a very tolerable defense against the frost which surrounds it and attacks it from without. He who modelled us, considering these things, mixed earth with fire and water and blended them; and making a ferment of acid and salt, he mingled it with them and formed soft and succulent flesh.

As for the sinews, he made them of a mixture of bone and unfermented flesh, attempered so as to be in a mean, and gave them a yellow color; wherefore the sinews have a firmer and more glutinous nature than flesh, but a softer and moister nature than the bones. With these God covered the bones and marrow, binding them together by sinews, and then enshrouded them all in an upper covering of flesh. The more living and sensitive of the bones he enclosed in the thinnest film of flesh, and those which had the least life within them in the thickest and most solid flesh. So again on the joints of the bones, where reason indicated that no more was required, he placed only a thin covering of flesh, that it might not interfere with the flexion of our bodies and make them unwieldy because difficult to move; and also that it might not, by being crowded and pressed and matted together, destroy sensation by reason of its hardness, and impair the memory and dull the edge of intelligence. Wherefore also the thighs and the shanks and the hips, and the bones of the arms and the forearms, and other parts which have no joints, and the inner bones, which on account of the rarity of the soul in the marrow are destitute of reason—all these are abundantly provided with flesh; but

such as have mind in them are in general less fleshy, except where the creator has made some part solely of flesh in order to give sensation, —as, for example, the tongue. But commonly this is not the case. For the nature which comes into being and grows up in us by a law of necessity, does not admit of the combination of solid bone and much flesh with acute perceptions. More than any other part the framework of the head would have had them, if they could have co-existed, and the human race, having a strong and fleshy and sinewy head, would have had a life twice or many times as long as it now has, and also more healthy and free from pain. But our creators, considering whether they should make a longer-lived race which was worse, or a shorter-lived race which was better, came to the conclusion that everyone ought to prefer a shorter span of life, which was better, to a longer one, which was worse; and therefore they covered the head with thin bone, but not with flesh and sinews, since it had no joints; and thus the head was added, having more wisdom and sensation than the rest of the body, but also being in every man far weaker. For these reasons and after this manner God placed the sinews at the extremity of the head, in a circle round the neck, and glued them together by the principle of likeness and fastened the extremities of the jawbones to them below the face, and the other sinews he dispersed throughout the body, fastening limb to limb. The framers of us framed the mouth, as now arranged, having teeth and tongue and lips, with a view to the necessary and the good, contriving the way in for necessary purposes, the way out for the best purposes; for that is necessary which enters in and gives food to the body; but the river of speech, which flows out of a man and ministers to the intelligence, is the fairest and noblest of all streams. Still the head could neither be left a bare frame of bones, on account of the extremes of heat and cold in the different seasons, nor yet

be allowed to be wholly covered, and so become dull and senseless by reason of an overgrowth of flesh. The fleshy nature was not therefore wholly dried up, but a large sort of peel was parted off and remained over, which is now called the skin. This met and grew by the help of the cerebral moisture, and became the circular envelopment of the head. And the moisture, rising up under the sutures, watered and closed in the skin upon the crown, forming a sort of knot. The diversity of the sutures was caused by the power of the courses of the soul and of the food, and the more these struggled against one another the more numerous they became, and fewer if the struggle were less violent. This skin the divine power pierced all round with fire, and out of the punctures which were thus made the moisture issued forth, and the liquid and heat which was pure came away, and a mixed part which was composed of the same material as the skin, and had a fineness equal to the punctures, was borne up by its own impulse and extended far outside the head, but being too slow to escape, was thrust back by the external air, and rolled up underneath the skin, where it took root. Thus the hair sprang up in the skin, being akin to it because it is like threads of leather, but rendered harder and closer through the pressure of the cold, by which each hair, while in process of separation from the skin, is compressed and cooled. Wherefore the creator formed the head hairy, making use of the causes which I have mentioned, and reflecting also that instead of flesh the brain needed the hair to be a light covering or guard, which would give shade in summer and shelter in winter, and at the same time would not impede our quickness of perception. From the combination of sinew, skin, and bone, in the structure of the finger, there arises a triple compound, which, when dried up, takes the form of one hard skin partaking of all three natures, and was fabricated by these second causes, but designed by mind

which is the principal cause with an eye to the future. For our creators well knew that women and other animals would someday be framed out of men, and they further knew that many animals would require the use of nails for many purposes; wherefore they fashioned in men at their first creation the rudiments of nails. For this purpose and for these reasons they caused skin, hair, and nails to grow at the extremities of the limbs.

And now that all the parts and members of the mortal animal had come together, since its life of necessity consisted of fire and breath, and it therefore wasted away by dissolution and depletion, the gods contrived the following remedy: They mingled a nature akin to that of man with other forms and perceptions, and thus created another kind of animal. These are the trees and plants and seeds which have been improved by cultivation and are now domesticated among us; anciently there were only the wild kinds, which are older than the cultivated. For everything that partakes of life may be truly called a living being, and the animal of which we are now speaking partakes of the third kind of soul, which is said to be seated between the midriff and the navel, having no part in opinion or reason or mind, but only in feelings of pleasure and pain and the desires which accompany them. For this nature is always in a passive state, revolving in and about itself, repelling the motion from without and using its own, and accordingly is not endowed by nature with the power of observing or reflecting on its own concerns. Wherefore it lives and does not differ from a living being, but is fixed and rooted in the same spot, having no power of self-motion.

Now after the superior powers had created all these natures to be food for us who are of the inferior nature, they cut various channels through the body as through a garden, that it might be watered as from a running stream. In the

first place, they cut two hidden channels or veins down the back where the skin and the flesh join, which answered severally to the right and left side of the body. These they let down along the backbone, so as to have the marrow of generation between them, where it was most likely to flourish, and in order that the stream coming down from above might flow freely to the other parts, and equalize the irrigation. In the next place, they divided the veins about the head, and interlacing them, they sent them in opposite directions; those coming from the right side they sent to the left of the body, and those from the left they diverted towards the right, so that they and the skin might together form a bond which should fasten the head to the body, since the crown of the head was not encircled by sinews; and also in order that the sensations from both sides might be distributed over the whole body. And next, they ordered the water-courses of the body in a manner which I will describe, and which will be more easily understood if we begin by admitting that all things which have lesser parts retain the greater, but the greater cannot retain the lesser. Now of all natures fire has the smallest parts, and therefore penetrates through earth and water and air and their compounds, nor can anything hold it. And a similar principle applies to the human belly; for when meats and drinks enter it, it holds them, but it cannot hold air and fire, because the particles of which they consist are smaller than its own structure.

These elements, therefore, God employed for the sake of distributing moisture from the belly into the veins, weaving together a network of fire and air like a weel, having at the entrance two lesser weels; further he constructed one of these with two openings, and from the lesser weels he extended cords reaching all round to the extremities of the network. All the interior of the net he made of fire, but the lesser weels and their cavity, of air. The network he took and

spread over the newly-formed animal in the following manner: —He let the lesser weels pass into the mouth; there were two of them, and one he let down by the air-pipes into the lungs, the other by the side of the air-pipes into the belly. The former he divided into two branches, both of which he made to meet at the channels of the nose, so that when the way through the mouth did not act, the streams of the mouth as well were replenished through the nose. With the other cavity (i.e. of the greater weel) he enveloped the hollow parts of the body, and at one time he made all this to flow into the lesser weels, quite gently, for they are composed of air, and at another time he caused the lesser weels to flow back again; and the net he made to find a way in and out through the pores of the body, and the rays of fire which are bound fast within followed the passage of the air either way, never at any time ceasing so long as the mortal being holds together. This process, as we affirm, the name-giver named inspiration and expiration. And all this movement, active as following well as passive, takes place in order that the body, being watered and cooled, may receive nourishment and life; for when the respiration is going in and out, and the fire, which is fast bound within, follows it, and ever and anon moving to and fro, enters through the belly and reaches the meat and drink, it dissolves them, and dividing them into small portions and guiding them through the passages where it goes, food and pumps them as from a fountain into the channels of the veins, and makes the stream of the veins flow through the body as through a conduit.

Let us once more consider the phenomena of respiration, and enquire into the causes which have made it what it is. They are as follows: —Seeing that there is no such thing as a vacuum into which any of those things which are moved can enter, and the breath is carried from us into the external air, the next point is, as will be clear to everyone, that it does

not go into a vacant space, but pushes its neighbor out of its place, and that which is thrust out in turn drives out its neighbor; and in this way everything of necessity at last comes round to that place from whence the breath came forth, and enters in there, and following the breath, fills up the vacant space; and this goes on like the rotation of a wheel, because there can be no such thing as a vacuum. Wherefore also the breast and the lungs, when they emit the breath, are replenished by the air which surrounds the body and which enters in through the pores of the flesh and is driven round in a circle; and again, the air which is sent away and passes out through the body forces the breath inwards through the passage of the mouth and the nostrils. Now the origin of this movement may be supposed to be as follows. In the interior of every animal the hottest part is that which is around the blood and veins; it is in a manner an internal fountain of fire, which we compare to the network of a creel, being woven all of fire and extended through the center of the body, while the outer parts are composed of air. Now we must admit that heat naturally proceeds outward to its own place and to its kindred element; and as there are two exits for the heat, the one out through the body, and the other through the mouth and nostrils, when it moves towards the one, it drives round the air at the other, and that which is driven round falls into the fire and becomes warm, and that which goes forth is cooled. But when the heat changes its place, and the particles at the other exit grow warmer, the hotter air inclining in that direction and carried towards its native element, fire, pushes round the air at the other; and this being affected in the same way and communicating the same impulse, a circular motion swaying to and fro is produced by the double process, which we call inspiration and expiration.

The phenomena of medical cupping-glasses and of the swallowing of drink and of the projection of bodies, whether discharged in the air or bowled along the ground, are to be investigated on a similar principle; and swift and slow sounds, which appear to be high and low, and are sometimes discordant on account of their inequality, and then again harmonical on account of the equality of the motion which they excite in us. For when the motions of the antecedent swifter sounds begin to pause and the two are equalized, the slower sounds overtake the swifter and then propel them. When they overtake them they do not intrude a new and discordant motion, but introduce the beginnings of a slower, which answers to the swifter as it dies away, thus producing a single mixed expression out of high and low, whence arises a pleasure which even the unwise feel, and which to the wise becomes a higher sort of delight, being an imitation of divine harmony in mortal motions. Moreover, as to the flowing of water, the fall of the thunderbolt, and the marvels that are observed about the attraction of amber and the Heraclean stones, —in none of these cases is there any attraction; but he who investigates rightly, will find that such wonderful phenomena are attributable to the combination of certain conditions, —the non-existence of a vacuum, the fact that objects push one another round, and that they change places, passing severally into their proper positions as they are divided or combined.

Such, as we have seen, is the nature and such are the causes of respiration, —the subject in which this discussion originated. For the fire cuts the food and following the breath surges up within, fire and breath rising together and filling the veins by drawing up out of the belly and pouring into them the cut portions of the food; and so the streams of food are kept flowing through the whole body in all animals. And fresh cuttings from kindred substances, whether the fruits

of the earth or herb of the field, which God planted to be our daily food, acquire all sorts of colors by their intermixture; but red is the most pervading of them, being created by the cutting action of fire and by the impression which it makes on a moist substance; and hence the liquid which circulates in the body has a color such as we have described. The liquid itself we call blood, which nourishes the flesh and the whole body, whence all parts are watered and empty places filled.

Now the process of repletion and evacuation is effected after the manner of the universal motion by which all kindred substances are drawn towards one another. For the external elements which surround us are always causing us to consume away, and distributing and sending off like to like; the particles of blood, too, which are divided and contained within the frame of the animal as in a sort of heaven, are compelled to imitate the motion of the universe. Each, therefore, of the divided parts within us, being carried to its kindred nature, replenishes the void. When more is taken away than flows in, then we decay, and when less, we grow and increase.

The frame of the entire creature when young has the triangles of each kind new, and may be compared to the keel of a vessel which is just off the stocks; they are locked firmly together and yet the whole mass is soft and delicate, being freshly formed of marrow and nurtured on milk. Now when the triangles out of which meats and drinks are composed come in from without, and are comprehended in the body, being older and weaker than the triangles already there, the frame of the body gets the better of them and its newer triangles cut them up, and so the animal grows great, being nourished by a multitude of similar particles. But when the roots of the triangles are loosened by having undergone many conflicts with many things in the course of time, they are no longer able to cut or assimilate the food which enters,

but are themselves easily divided by the bodies which come in from without. In this way every animal is overcome and decays, and this affection is called old age. And at last, when the bonds by which the triangles of the marrow are united no longer hold, and are parted by the strain of existence, they in turn loosen the bonds of the soul, and she, obtaining a natural release, flies away with joy. For that which takes place according to nature is pleasant, but that which is contrary to nature is painful. And thus death, if caused by disease or produced by wounds, is painful and violent; but that sort of death which comes with old age and fulfils the debt of nature is the easiest of deaths, and is accompanied with pleasure rather than with pain.

Now everyone can see whence diseases arise. There are four natures out of which the body is compacted, earth and fire and water and air, and the unnatural excess or defect of these, or the change of any of them from its own natural place into another, or—since there are more kinds than one of fire and of the other elements—the assumption by any of these of a wrong kind, or any similar irregularity, produces disorders and diseases; for when any of them is produced or changed in a manner contrary to nature, the parts which were previously cool grow warm, and those which were dry become moist, and the light become heavy, and the heavy light; all sorts of changes occur. For, as we affirm, a thing can only remain the same with itself, whole and sound, when the same is added to it, or subtracted from it, in the same respect and in the same manner and in due proportion; and whatever comes or goes away in violation of these laws causes all manner of changes and infinite diseases and corruptions. Now there is a second class of structures which are also natural, and this affords a second opportunity of observing diseases to him who would understand them. For whereas marrow and bone and flesh and sinews are

composed of the four elements, and the blood, though after another manner, is likewise formed out of them, most diseases originate in the way which I have described; but the worst of all owe their severity to the fact that the generation of these substances proceeds in a wrong order; they are then destroyed. For the natural order is that the flesh and sinews should be made of blood, the sinews out of the fibers to which they are akin, and the flesh out of the clots which are formed when the fibers are separated. And the glutinous and rich matter which comes away from the sinews and the flesh, not only glues the flesh to the bones, but nourishes and imparts growth to the bone which surrounds the marrow; and by reason of the solidity of the bones, that which filters through consists of the purest and smoothest and oiliest sort of triangles, dropping like dew from the bones and watering the marrow. Now when each process takes place in this order, health commonly results; when in the opposite order, disease. For when the flesh becomes decomposed and sends back the wasting substance into the veins, then an oversupply of blood of diverse kinds, mingling with air in the veins, having variegated colors and bitter properties, as well as acid and saline qualities, contains all sorts of bile and serum and phlegm. For all things go the wrong way, and having become corrupted, first they taint the blood itself, and then ceasing to give nourishment to the body they are carried along the veins in all directions, no longer preserving the order of their natural courses, but at war with themselves, because they receive no good from one another, and are hostile to the abiding constitution of the body, which they corrupt and dissolve. The oldest part of the flesh which is corrupted, being hard to decompose, from long burning grows black, and from being everywhere corroded becomes bitter, and is injurious to every part of the body which is still uncorrupted. Sometimes, when the bitter element is refined

away, the black part assumes an acidity which takes the place of the bitterness; at other times the bitterness being tinged with blood has a redder color; and this, when mixed with black, takes the hue of grass; and again, an auburn color mingles with the bitter matter when new flesh is decomposed by the fire which surrounds the internal flame;—to all which symptoms some physician perhaps, or rather some philosopher, who had the power of seeing in many dissimilar things one nature deserving of a name, has assigned the common name of bile. But the other kinds of bile are variously distinguished by their colors. As for serum, that sort which is the watery part of blood is innocent, but that which is a secretion of black and acid bile is malignant when mingled by the power of heat with any salt substance, and is then called acid phlegm. Again, the substance which is formed by the liquefaction of new and tender flesh when air is present, if inflated and encased in liquid so as to form bubbles, which separately are invisible owing to their small size, but when collected are of a bulk which is visible, and have a white color arising out of the generation of foam—all this decomposition of tender flesh when intermingled with air is termed by us white phlegm. And the whey or sediment of newly-formed phlegm is sweat and tears, and includes the various daily discharges by which the body is purified. Now all these become causes of disease when the blood is not replenished in a natural manner by food and drink but gains bulk from opposite sources in violation of the laws of nature. When the several parts of the flesh are separated by disease, if the foundation remains, the power of the disorder is only half as great, and there is still a prospect of an easy recovery; but when that which binds the flesh to the bones is diseased, and no longer being separated from the muscles and sinews, ceases to give nourishment to the bone and to unite flesh and bone, and from being oily and smooth and glutinous

becomes rough and salt and dry, owing to bad regimen, then all the substance thus corrupted crumbles away under the flesh and the sinews, and separates from the bone, and the fleshy parts fall away from their foundation and leave the sinews bare and full of brine, and the flesh again gets into the circulation of the blood and makes the previously-mentioned disorders still greater. And if these bodily affections be severe, still worse are the prior disorders; as when the bone itself, by reason of the density of the flesh, does not obtain sufficient air, but becomes moldy and hot and gangrened and receives no nutriment, and the natural process is inverted, and the bone crumbling passes into the food, and the food into the flesh, and the flesh again falling into the blood makes all maladies that may occur more virulent than those already mentioned. But the worst case of all is when the marrow is diseased, either from excess or defect; and this is the cause of the very greatest and most fatal disorders, in which the whole course of the body is reversed.

There is a third class of diseases which may be conceived of as arising in three ways; for they are produced sometimes by wind, and sometimes by phlegm, and sometimes by bile. When the lung, which is the dispenser of the air to the body, is obstructed by rheums and its passages are not free, some of them not acting, while through others too much air enters, then the parts which are unrefreshed by air corrode, while in other parts the excess of air forcing its way through the veins distorts them and decomposing the body is enclosed in the midst of it and occupies the midriff; thus numberless painful diseases are produced, accompanied by copious sweats. And oftentimes when the flesh is dissolved in the body, wind, generated within and unable to escape, is the source of quite as much pain as the air coming in from without; but the greatest pain is felt when the wind gets

about the sinews and the veins of the shoulders, and swells them up, and so twists back the great tendons and the sinews which are connected with them. These disorders are called tetanus and opisthotonus, by reason of the tension which accompanies them. The cure of them is difficult; relief is in most cases given by fever supervening. The white phlegm, though dangerous when detained within by reason of the air-bubbles, yet if it can communicate with the outside air, is less severe, and only discolors the body, generating leprous eruptions and similar diseases. When it is mingled with black bile and dispersed about the courses of the head, which are the divinest part of us, the attack if coming on in sleep, is not so severe; but when assailing those who are awake it is hard to be got rid of, and being an affection of a sacred part, is most justly called sacred. An acid and salt phlegm, again, is the source of all those diseases which take the form of catarrh, but they have many names because the places into which they flow are manifold.

Inflammations of the body come from burnings and inflamings, and all of them originate in bile. When bile finds a means of discharge, it boils up and sends forth all sorts of tumors; but when imprisoned within, it generates many inflammatory diseases, above all when mingled with pure blood; since it then displaces the fibers which are scattered about in the blood and are designed to maintain the balance of rare and dense, in order that the blood may not be so liquefied by heat as to exude from the pores of the body, nor again become too dense and thus find a difficulty in circulating through the veins. The fibers are so constituted as to maintain this balance; and if anyone brings them all together when the blood is dead and in process of cooling, then the blood which remains becomes fluid, but if they are left alone, they soon congeal by reason of the surrounding cold. The fibers having this power over the blood, bile, which

is only stale blood, and which from being flesh is dissolved again into blood, at the first influx coming in little by little, hot and liquid, is congealed by the power of the fibers; and so congealing and made to cool, it produces internal cold and shuddering. When it enters with more of a flood and overcomes the fibers by its heat, and boiling up throws them into disorder, if it have power enough to maintain its supremacy, it penetrates the marrow and burns up what may be termed the cables of the soul, and sets her free; but when there is not so much of it, and the body though wasted still holds out, the bile is itself mastered, and is either utterly banished, or is thrust through the veins into the lower or upper belly, and is driven out of the body like an exile from a state in which there has been civil war; whence arise diarrheas and dysenteries, and all such disorders. When the constitution is disordered by excess of fire, continuous heat and fever are the result; when excess of air is the cause, then the fever is quotidian; when of water, which is a more sluggish element than either fire or air, then the fever is a tertian; when of earth, which is the most sluggish of the four, and is only purged away in a four-fold period, the result is a quartan fever, which can with difficulty be shaken off.

Such is the manner in which diseases of the body arise; the disorders of the soul, which depend upon the body, originate as follows. We must acknowledge disease of the mind to be a want of intelligence; and of this there are two kinds; to wit, madness and ignorance. In whatever state a man experiences either of them, that state may be called disease; and excessive pains and pleasures are justly to be regarded as the greatest diseases to which the soul is liable. For a man who is in great joy or in great pain, in his unseasonable eagerness to attain the one and to avoid the other, is not able to see or to hear anything rightly; but he is mad, and is at the time utterly incapable of any participation

in reason. He who has the seed about the spinal marrow too plentiful and overflowing, like a tree overladen with fruit, has many throes, and also obtains many pleasures in his desires and their offspring, and is for the most part of his life deranged, because his pleasures and pains are so very great; his soul is rendered foolish and disordered by his body; yet he is regarded not as one diseased, but as one who is voluntarily bad, which is a mistake. The truth is that the intemperance of love is a disease of the soul due chiefly to the moisture and fluidity which is produced in one of the elements by the loose consistency of the bones. And in general, all that which is termed the incontinence of pleasure and is deemed a reproach under the idea that the wicked voluntarily do wrong is not justly a matter for reproach. For no man is voluntarily bad; but the bad become bad by reason of an ill disposition of the body and bad education, things which are hateful to every man and happen to him against his will. And in the case of pain too in like manner the soul suffers much evil from the body. For where the acid and briny phlegm and other bitter and bilious humors wander about in the body, and find no exit or escape, but are pent up within and mingle their own vapors with the motions of the soul, and are blended with them, they produce all sorts of diseases, more or fewer, and in every degree of intensity; and being carried to the three places of the soul, whichever they may severally assail, they create infinite varieties of ill-temper and melancholy, of rashness and cowardice, and also of forgetfulness and stupidity. Further, when to this evil constitution of body evil forms of government are added and evil discourses are uttered in private as well as in public, and no sort of instruction is given in youth to cure these evils, then all of us who are bad become bad from two causes which are entirely beyond our control. In such cases the planters are

to blame rather than the plants, the educators rather than the educated. But however that may be, we should endeavor as far as we can by education, and studies, and learning, to avoid vice and attain virtue; this, however, is part of another subject.

There is a corresponding enquiry concerning the mode of treatment by which the mind and the body are to be preserved, about which it is meet and right that I should say a word in turn; for it is more our duty to speak of the good than of the evil. Everything that is good is fair, and the fair is not without proportion, and the animal which is to be fair must have due proportion. Now we perceive lesser symmetries or proportions and reason about them, but of the highest and greatest we take no heed; for there is no proportion or disproportion more productive of health and disease, and virtue and vice, than that between soul and body. This however we do not perceive, nor do we reflect that when a weak or small frame is the vehicle of a great and mighty soul, or conversely, when a little soul is encased in a large body, then the whole animal is not fair, for it lacks the most important of all symmetries; but the due proportion of mind and body is the fairest and loveliest of all sights to him who has the seeing eye. Just as a body which has a leg too long, or which is unsymmetrical in some other respect, is an unpleasant sight, and also, when doing its share of work, is much distressed and makes convulsive efforts, and often stumbles through awkwardness, and is the cause of infinite evil to its own self—in like manner we should conceive of the double nature which we call the living being; and when in this compound there is an impassioned soul more powerful than the body, that soul, I say, convulses and fills with disorders the whole inner nature of man; and when eager in the pursuit of some sort of learning or study, causes wasting; or again, when teaching or disputing in private or

in public, and strifes and controversies arise, inflames and dissolves the composite frame of man and introduces rheums; and the nature of this phenomenon is not understood by most professors of medicine, who ascribe it to the opposite of the real cause. And once more, when a body large and too strong for the soul is united to a small and weak intelligence, then inasmuch as there are two desires natural to man, —one of food for the sake of the body, and one of wisdom for the sake of the diviner part of us—then, I say, the motions of the stronger, getting the better and increasing their own power, but making the soul dull, and stupid, and forgetful, engender ignorance, which is the greatest of diseases. There is one protection against both kinds of disproportion: —that we should not move the body without the soul or the soul without the body, and thus they will be on their guard against each other, and be healthy and well balanced. And therefore the mathematician or anyone else whose thoughts are much absorbed in some intellectual pursuit, must allow his body also to have due exercise, and practice gymnastic; and he who is careful to fashion the body, should in turn impart to the soul its proper motions, and should cultivate music and all philosophy, if he would deserve to be called truly fair and truly good. And the separate parts should be treated in the same manner, in imitation of the pattern of the universe; for as the body is heated and also cooled within by the elements which enter into it, and is again dried up and moistened by external things, and experiences these and the like affections from both kinds of motions, the result is that the body if given up to motion when in a state of quiescence is overmastered and perishes; but if anyone, in imitation of that which we call the foster-mother and nurse of the universe, will not allow the body ever to be inactive, but is always producing motions and agitations through its whole extent, which form the

natural defense against other motions both internal and external, and by moderate exercise reduces to order according to their affinities the particles and affections which are wandering about the body, as we have already said when speaking of the universe, he will not allow enemy placed by the side of enemy to stir up wars and disorders in the body, but he will place friend by the side of friend, so as to create health. Now of all motions that is the best which is produced in a thing by itself, for it is most akin to the motion of thought and of the universe; but that motion which is caused by others is not so good, and worst of all is that which moves the body, when at rest, in parts only and by some external agency. Wherefore of all modes of purifying and re-uniting the body the best is gymnastic; the next best is a surging motion, as in sailing or any other mode of conveyance which is not fatiguing; the third sort of motion may be of use in a case of extreme necessity, but in any other will be adopted by no man of sense: I mean the purgative treatment of physicians; for diseases unless they are very dangerous should not be irritated by medicines, since every form of disease is in a manner akin to the living being, whose complex frame has an appointed term of life. For not the whole race only, but each individual—barring inevitable accidents—comes into the world having a fixed span, and the triangles in us are originally framed with power to last for a certain time, beyond which no man can prolong his life. And this holds also of the constitution of diseases; if anyone regardless of the appointed time tries to subdue them by medicine, he only aggravates and multiplies them. Wherefore we ought always to manage them by regimen, as far as a man can spare the time, and not provoke a disagreeable enemy by medicines.

Enough of the composite animal, and of the body which is a part of him, and of the manner in which a man may train

and be trained by himself so as to live most according to reason: and we must above and before all provide that the element which is to train him shall be the fairest and best adapted to that purpose. A minute discussion of this subject would be a serious task; but if, as before, I am to give only an outline, the subject may not unfitly be summed up as follows.

I have often remarked that there are three kinds of soul located within us, having each of them motions, and I must now repeat in the fewest words possible, that one part, if remaining inactive and ceasing from its natural motion, must necessarily become very weak, but that which is trained and exercised, very strong. Wherefore we should take care that the movements of the different parts of the soul should be in due proportion.

And we should consider that God gave the sovereign part of the human soul to be the divinity of each one, being that part which, as we say, dwells at the top of the body, and inasmuch as we are a plant not of an earthly but of a heavenly growth, raises us from earth to our kindred who are in heaven. And in this we say truly; for the divine power suspended the head and root of us from that place where the generation of the soul first began, and thus made the whole body upright. When a man is always occupied with the cravings of desire and ambition, and is eagerly striving to satisfy them, all his thoughts must be mortal, and, as far as it is possible altogether to become such, he must be mortal every whit, because he has cherished his mortal part. But he who has been earnest in the love of knowledge and of true wisdom, and has exercised his intellect more than any other part of him, must have thoughts immortal and divine, if he attain truth, and in so far as human nature is capable of sharing in immortality, he must altogether be immortal; and since he is ever cherishing the divine power, and has the

divinity within him in perfect order, he will be perfectly happy. Now there is only one way of taking care of things, and this is to give to each the food and motion which are natural to it. And the motions which are naturally akin to the divine principle within us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe. These each man should follow, and correct the courses of the head which were corrupted at our birth, and by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the universe, should assimilate the thinking being to the thought, renewing his original nature, and having assimilated them should attain to that perfect life which the gods have set before mankind, both for the present and the future.

Thus our original design of discoursing about the universe down to the creation of man is nearly completed. A brief mention may be made of the generation of other animals, so far as the subject admits of brevity; in this manner our argument will best attain a due proportion. On the subject of animals, then, the following remarks may be offered. Of the men who came into the world, those who were cowards or led unrighteous lives may with reason be supposed to have changed into the nature of women in the second generation.

And this was the reason why at that time the gods created in us the desire of sexual intercourse, contriving in man one animated substance, and in woman another, which they formed respectively in the following manner. The outlet for drink by which liquids pass through the lung under the kidneys and into the bladder, which receives and then by the pressure of the air emits them, was so fashioned by them as to penetrate also into the body of the marrow, which passes from the head along the neck and through the back, and which in the preceding discourse we have named the seed. And the seed having life, and becoming endowed with

respiration, produces in that part in which it respires a lively desire of emission, and thus creates in us the love of procreation. Wherefore also in men the organ of generation becoming rebellious and masterful, like an animal disobedient to reason, and maddened with the sting of lust, seeks to gain absolute sway; and the same is the case with the so-called womb or matrix of women; the animal within them is desirous of procreating children, and when remaining unfruitful long beyond its proper time, gets discontented and angry, and wandering in every direction through the body, closes up the passages of the breath, and, by obstructing respiration, drives them to extremity, causing all varieties of disease, until at length the desire and love of the man and the woman, bringing them together and as it were plucking the fruit from the tree, sow in the womb, as in a field, animals unseen by reason of their smallness and without form; these again are separated and matured within; they are then finally brought out into the light, and thus the generation of animals is completed.

Thus were created women and the female sex in general. But the race of birds was created out of innocent light-minded men, who, although their minds were directed toward heaven, imagined, in their simplicity, that the clearest demonstration of the things above was to be obtained by sight; these were remodeled and transformed into birds, and they grew feathers instead of hair. The race of wild pedestrian animals, again, came from those who had no philosophy in any of their thoughts, and never considered at all about the nature of the heavens, because they had ceased to use the courses of the head, but followed the guidance of those parts of the soul which are in the breast. In consequence of these habits of theirs they had their front-legs and their heads resting upon the earth to which they were drawn by natural affinity; and the crowns of their heads

were elongated and of all sorts of shapes, into which the courses of the soul were crushed by reason of disuse. And this was the reason why they were created quadrupeds and polypods: God gave the more senseless of them the more support that they might be more attracted to the earth. And the most foolish of them, who trail their bodies entirely upon the ground and have no longer any need of feet, he made without feet to crawl upon the earth. The fourth class were the inhabitants of the water: these were made out of the most entirely senseless and ignorant of all, whom the transformers did not think any longer worthy of pure respiration, because they possessed a soul which was made impure by all sorts of transgression; and instead of the subtle and pure medium of air, they gave them the deep and muddy sea to be their element of respiration; and hence arose the race of fishes and oysters, and other aquatic animals, which have received the most remote habitations as a punishment of their outlandish ignorance. These are the laws by which animals pass into one another, now, as ever, changing as they lose or gain wisdom and folly.

We may now say that our discourse about the nature of the universe has an end. The world has received animals, mortal and immortal, and is fulfilled with them, and has become a visible animal containing the visible—the sensible God who is the image of the intellectual, the greatest, best, fairest, most perfect—the one only-begotten heaven.

The Timaeus.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates, Timæus.

Critias, Hermocrates.

Socrates/ I see one, two, three, but where, friend Timæus, is that fourth person, who being received by me yesterday at a banquet of disputation, ought now in his turn to repay me with a similar repast?

Timæus/ He labors, Socrates, under a certain infirmity; for he would not willingly be absent from such an association as the present.

Socrates/ It remains therefore for you, O Timæus, and the company present, to fill up the part of this absent guest.

Timæus/ Entirely so, Socrates. And we shall endeavor, to the utmost of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to such an employment unaccomplished. For it would be by no means just that we, who were yesterday entertained by you, in such a manner as guests ought to be received, should not return the hospitality with readiness and delight.

Socrates/ Do you recollect the magnitude and nature of the things which I proposed to you to explain?

Timæus/ Some things, indeed, I recollect; but such as I have forgotten do you recall into my memory. Or rather, if it be not too much trouble, run over the whole in a cursory manner from the beginning, that it may be more firmly established in our memory.

Socrates/ Let it be so. And to begin: The sum of yesterday's dispute was, what kind of republic appeared to me to be the best, and from what sort of men such a republic ought to be composed.

Timæus/ And by us, indeed, Socrates, all that you said was approved in the highest degree.

Socrates/ Did we not, in the first place, separate husbandmen and other artificers from those whom we considered as the defenders of the city?

Timæus/ Certainly.

Socrates/ And when we had assigned to everyone that which was accommodated to his nature, and had prescribed only one particular employment to every particular art, we likewise assigned to the military tribe one province only, I mean that of protecting the city; and this as well from the hostile incursions of internal as of external enemies; but yet in such a manner as to administer justice mildly to the subjects of their government, as being naturally friends, and to behave with warlike fierceness against their enemies in battle.

Timæus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ For we asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should be of such a nature, as at the same time to be both irascible and philosophic in a remarkable degree; so that they might be gentle to their friends, and bold and ferocious to their enemies.

Timæus/ You did so.

Socrates/ But what did we assert concerning their education? Was it not that they should be instructed in gymnastic exercises, in music, and other becoming disciplines?

Timæus/ Entirely so.

Socrates/ We likewise established, that those who were so educated should neither consider gold, or silver, or any goods of a similar kind, as their own private property; but that rather, after the manner of adjutants, they should receive the wages of guardianship from those whom they

defend and preserve; and that their recompense should be no more than is sufficient to a moderate subsistence. That, besides this, they should use their public stipend in common, and for the purpose of procuring a common subsistence with each other; so that, neglecting every other concern, they may employ their attention solely on virtue, and the discharge of their peculiar employment.

Timæus/ These things also were related by you.

Socrates/ Of women too we asserted, that they should be educated in such a manner, as to be aptly conformed similar to the natures of men; with whom they should perform in common both the duties of war, and whatever else belongs to the business of life.

Timæus/ This too was asserted by you.

Socrates/ But what did we establish concerning the procreation of children? Though perhaps you easily remember this, on account of its novelty. For we ordered that the marriages and children should be common; as we were particularly careful that no one might be able to distinguish his own children, but that all might consider all as their kindred; that hence those of an equal age might regard themselves as brothers and sisters; but that the younger might reverence the elder as their parents and grandfathers, and the elder might esteem the younger as their children and grandsons.

Timæus/ These things, indeed, as you say, are easily remembered.

Socrates/ But that they might from their birth acquire a disposition as far as possible the best, we decreed that the rulers whom we placed over the marriage rites should, through the means of certain lots, take care that in the nuptial league the worthy were mingled with the worthy; that no discord may arise in this connection when it does not

prove prosperous in the end; but that all the blame may be referred to fortune, and not to the guardians of such a conjunction.

Timæus/ We remember this likewise.

Socrates/ We also ordered that the children of the good should be properly educated, but that those of the bad should be secretly sent to some other city; yet so that such of the adult among these as should be found to be of a good disposition should be recalled from exile; while, on the contrary, those who were retained from the first in the city as good, but proved afterwards bad, should be similarly banished.

Timæus/ Just so.

Socrates/ Have we, therefore, sufficiently epitomized yesterday's disputation; or do you require anything further, friend Timæus, which I have omitted?

Timæus/ Nothing, indeed, Socrates; for all this was the subject of your disputation.

Socrates/ Hear now how I am affected towards this republic which we have described; for I will illustrate the affair by a similitude. Suppose then that someone, on beholding beautiful animals, whether represented in a picture, or really alive, but in a state of perfect rest, should desire to behold them in motion, and struggling as it were to imitate those gestures which seem particularly adapted to the nature of bodies; in such a manner am I affected towards the form of that republic which we have described. For I should gladly hear anyone relating the contests of our city with other nations, when it engages in a becoming manner in war, and acts during such an engagement in a manner worthy of its institution, both with respect to practical achievements and verbal negotiations. For indeed, O Critias and Hermocrates, I am conscious of my own inability to

praise such men and such a city according to their desert. Indeed, that I should be incapable of such an undertaking is not wonderful, since the same imbecility seems to have attended poets both of the past and present age. Not that I despise the poetic tribe; but it appears from hence evident, that, as these kind of men are studious of imitation, they easily and in the best manner express things in which they have been educated; while, on the contrary, whatever is foreign from their education they imitate with difficulty in actions, and with still more difficulty in words. But with respect to the tribe of Sophists, though I consider them as skilled both in the art of speaking and in many other illustrious arts; yet, as they have no settled abode, but wander daily through a multitude of cities, I am afraid lest, with respect to the institutions of philosophers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concerns which wise and politic men are engaged in with individuals, in warlike undertakings, both in actions and discourse. It remains, therefore, that I should apply to you, who excel in the study of wisdom and civil administration, as well naturally as through the assistance of proper discipline and institution. For Timæus here of Locris, an Italian city governed by the best of laws, exclusive of his not being inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in wealth and nobility, has arrived in his own city at the highest posts of government and honors. Besides, we all know that Critias is not ignorant of the particulars of which we are now speaking. Nor is this to be doubted of Hermocrates, since a multitude of circumstances evince that he is both by nature and education adapted to all such concerns. Hence, when you yesterday requested me to dispute about the institution of a republic, I readily complied with your request; being persuaded that the remainder of the discourse could not be more conveniently explained by

anyone than by you, if you were but willing to engage in its discussion. For, unless you properly adapt the city for warlike purposes, there is no one in the present age from whom it can acquire everything becoming its constitution. As I have, therefore, hitherto complied with your request, I shall now require you to comply with mine in the above-mentioned particulars. Nor have you indeed refused this employment, but have with common consent determined to repay my hospitality with the banquet of discourse. I now, therefore, stand prepared to receive the promised feast.

Hermocrates/ But we, O Socrates, as Timæus just now signified, shall cheerfully engage in the execution of your desire; for we cannot offer any excuse sufficient to justify neglect in this affair. For yesterday, when we departed from hence and went to the lodging of Critias, where we are accustomed to reside, both in his apartment and prior to this in the way thither we discoursed on this very particular. He therefore related to us a certain antient history, which I wish, O Critias, you would now repeat to Socrates, that he may judge whether it any way conduces to the fulfilment of his request.

Critias/ It is requisite to comply, if agreeable to Timæus, the third associate of our undertaking.

Timæus/ I assent to your compliance.

Critias/ Hear then, O Socrates, a discourse surprising indeed in the extreme, yet in every respect true, as it was once related by Solon, the most wise of the seven wise men. Solon, then, was the familiar and intimate friend of our great-grandfather Dropis, as he himself often relates in his poems. But he once declared to our grandfather Critias, (as the old man himself informed us,) that great and admirable actions had once been achieved by this city, which nevertheless were buried in oblivion, through length of time

and the destruction of mankind. In particular he informed me of one undertaking more illustrious than the rest, which I now think proper to relate to you, both that I may repay my obligations, and that by such a relation I may offer my tribute of praise to the Goddess in the present solemnity, by celebrating her divinity, as it were, with hymns, justly and in a manner agreeable to truth.

Socrates/ You speak well. But what is this antient achievement which was not only actually related by Solon, but was once really accomplished by this city?

Critias/ I will acquaint you with that antient history, which I did not indeed receive from a youth, but from a man very much advanced in years, for at that time Critias, as he himself declared, was almost ninety years old, and I myself was about ten. When, therefore, that solemnity was celebrated among us which is known by the name of *Cureotis Apaturiorum*, nothing was omitted which boys in that festivity are accustomed to perform. For, when our parents had set before us the rewards proposed for the contest of singing verses, both a multitude of verses of many poets were recited, and many of us especially sung the poems of Solon, because they were at that time entirely new. But then one of our tribe, whether he was willing to gratify Critias, or whether it was his real opinion, affirmed that Solon appeared to him most wise in other concerns, and in things respecting poetry the most ingenious of all poets. Upon hearing this, the old man (for I very well remember) was vehemently delighted; and said, laughing—If Solon, O Amynander, had not engaged in poetry as a casual affair, but had made it, as others do, a serious employment; and if through seditions and other fluctuations of the state, in which he found his country involved, he had not been compelled to neglect the completion of the history which he brought from Egypt, I do not think that either Hesiod or

Homer, or any other poet, would have acquired greater glory and renown. In consequence of this, Amynander inquired of Critias what that history was. To which he answered, that it was concerning an affair the greatest and most celebrated which this city ever performed; though through length of time, and the destruction of those by whom it was undertaken, the fame of its execution has not reached the present age. But I beseech you, O Critias, (say Amynander,) relate this affair from the beginning; and inform me what that event was which Solon asserted as a fact, and on what occasion, and from whom he received it.

There is then (says he) a certain region of Egypt called Delta, about the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided. In this place a government is established called Saitical; and the chief city of this region of Delta is Sais, from which also king Amasis derived his origin. The city has a presiding divinity, whose name is in the Egyptian tongue Neith, and in the Greek Athena, or Minerva. These men were friends of the Athenians, with whom they declared they were very familiar, through a certain bond of alliance. In this country Solon, on his arrival thither, was, as he himself relates, very honorably received. And upon his inquiring about antient affairs of those priests who possessed a knowledge in such particulars superior to others, he perceived, that neither himself, nor anyone of the Greeks, (as he himself declared), had any knowledge of very remote antiquity. Hence, when he once desired to excite them to the relation of antient transactions, he for this purpose began to discourse about those most antient events which formerly happened among us. I mean the traditions concerning the first Phoroneus and Niobe, and after the deluge, of Deucalion and Pyrrha, (as described by the mythologists,) together with their posterity; at the same time paying a proper attention to the different ages in which these events are said to have

subsisted. But upon this one of those more antient priests exclaimed, O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, nor is there any such thing as an aged Grecian among you! But Solon, when he heard this—What (says he) is the motive of your exclamation? To whom the priest: —Because all your souls are juvenile; neither containing any antient opinion derived from remote tradition, nor any discipline hoary from its existence in former periods of time. But the reason of this is the multitude and variety of destructions of the human race, which formerly have been, and again will be: the greatest of these, indeed, arising from fire and water; but the lesser from ten thousand other contingencies. For the relation subsisting among you, that Phaeton, the offspring of the Sun, on a certain time attempting to drive the chariot of his father, and not being able to keep the track observed by his parent, burnt up the natures belonging to the earth, and perished himself, blasted by thunder—is indeed considered as fabulous, yet is in reality true. For it expresses the mutation of the bodies revolving in the heavens about the earth; and indicates that, through long periods of time, a destruction of terrestrial natures ensues from the devastations of fire. Hence, those who either dwell on mountains, or in lofty and dry places, perish more abundantly than those who dwell near rivers, or on the borders of the sea. To us indeed the Nile is both salutary in other respects, and liberates us from the fear of such-like depredations. But when the Gods, purifying the earth by waters, deluge its surface, then the herdsmen and shepherds inhabiting the mountains are preserved, while the inhabitants of your cities are hurried away to the sea by the impetuous inundation of the rivers. On the contrary, in our region, neither then, nor at any other time, did the waters descending from on high pour with desolation on the plains; but they are naturally impelled upwards from the

bosom of the earth. And from these causes the most antient traditions are preserved in our country. For, indeed, it may be truly asserted, that in those places where neither intense cold nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of mankind is always preserved, though sometimes the number of individuals is increased, and sometimes suffers a considerable diminution. But whatever has been transacted either by us, or by you, or in any other place, beautiful or great, or containing anything uncommon, of which we have heard the report, everything of this kind is to be found described in our temples, and preserved to the present day. While, on the contrary, you and other nations commit only recent transactions to writing, and to other inventions which society has employed for transmitting information to posterity; and so again, at stated periods of time, a certain celestial defluxion rushes on them like a disease; from whence those among you who survive are both destitute of literary acquisitions and the inspiration of the Muses. Hence it happens that you become juvenile again, and ignorant of the events which happened in antient times, as well among us as in the regions which you inhabit.

The transactions, therefore, O Solon, which you relate from your antiquities, differ very little from puerile fables. For, in the first place, you only mention one deluge of the earth, when at the same time many have happened. And, in the next place, you are ignorant of a most illustrious and excellent race of men, who once inhabited your country; from whence you and your whole city descended, though a small seed only of this admirable people once remained. But your ignorance in this affair is owing to the posterity of this people, who were for many ages deprived of the use of letters, and became as it were dumb. For prior, O Solon, to that mighty deluge which we have just mentioned, a city of Athenians existed, informed according to the best laws both

in military concerns and every other duty of life; and whose illustrious actions and civil institutions are celebrated by us as the most excellent of all that have existed under the ample circumference of the heavens. Solon, therefore, upon hearing this, said that he was astonished; and, burning with a most ardent desire, entreated the priests to relate accurately all the actions of his antient fellow-citizens. That afterwards one of the priests replied: —Nothing of envy, O Solon, prohibits us from complying with your request. But for your sake, and that of your city, I will relate the whole; and especially on account of that Goddess who is allotted the guardianship both of your city and ours, and by whom they have been educated and founded: yours, indeed, by a priority to ours of a thousand years, receiving the seed of your race from Vulcan and the Earth. But the description of the transactions of this our city during the space of eight thousand years, is preserved in our sacred writings. I will, therefore, cursorily run over the laws and more illustrious actions of those cities which existed nine thousand years ago. For when we are more at leisure we shall prosecute an exact history of every particular, receiving for this purpose the sacred writings themselves.

In the first place, then, consider the laws of these people, and compare them with ours: for you will find many things which then subsisted in your city, similar to such as exist at present. For the priests passed their life separated from all others. The artificers also exercised their arts in such a manner, that each was engaged in his own employment without being mingled with other artificers. The same method was likewise adopted with shepherds, hunters and husbandmen. The soldiers too, you will find, were separated from other kind of men; and were commanded by the laws to engage in nothing but warlike affairs. A similar armor too, such as that of shields and darts, was employed by each.

These we first used in Asia; the Goddess in those places, as likewise happened to you, first pointing them out to our use. You may perceive too from the beginning what great attention was paid by the laws to prudence and modesty; and besides this, to divination and medicine, as subservient to the preservation of health. And from these, which are divine goods, the laws, proceeding to the invention of such as are merely human, procured all such other disciplines as follow from those we have just enumerated. From such a distribution, therefore, and in such order, the Goddess first established and adorned your city, choosing for this purpose the place in which you were born; as she foresaw that, from the excellent temperature of the region, men would arise distinguished by the most consummate sagacity and wit, For, as the Goddess is a lover both of wisdom and war, she fixed on a soil capable of producing men the most similar to herself; and rendered it in every respect adapted for the habitation of such a race. The antient Athenians, therefore, using these laws, and being formed by good institutions, in a still higher degree than I have mentioned, inhabited this region; surpassing all men in every virtue, as it becomes those to do who are the progeny and pupils of the Gods.

But, though many and mighty deeds of your city are contained in our sacred writings, and are admired as they deserve, yet there is one transaction which surpasses all of them in magnitude and virtue. For these writings relate what prodigious strength your city formerly tamed, when a mighty warlike power, rushing from the Atlantic sea, spread itself with hostile fury over all Europe and Asia. For at that time the Atlantic sea was navigable, and had an island before that mouth which is called by you the Pillars of Hercules. But this island was greater than both Libya and all Asia together, and afforded an easy passage to other neighboring islands; as it was likewise easy to pass from those islands to all the

continent which borders on this Atlantic sea. For the waters which are beheld within the mouth which we just now mentioned, have the form of a bay with a narrow entrance; but the mouth itself is a true sea. And lastly, the earth which surrounds it is in every respect truly denominated the continent. In this Atlantic island a combination of kings was formed, who with mighty and wonderful power subdued the whole island, together with many other islands and parts of the continent; and, besides this, subjected to their dominion all Libya, as far as to Egypt; and Europe, as far as to the Tyrrhene sea. And when they were collected in a powerful league, they endeavored to enslave all our regions and yours, and besides this all those places situated within the mouth of the Atlantic sea. Then it was, O Solon, that the power of your city was conspicuous to all men for its virtue and strength. For, as its armies surpassed all others both in magnanimity and military skill, so with respect to its contests, whether it was assisted by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it presided in warlike affairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies, and became situated in extreme danger, yet still it remained triumphant. In the meantime, those who were not yet enslaved it liberated from danger; and procured the most ample liberty for all those of us who dwell within the Pillars of Hercules. But in succeeding time prodigious earthquakes and deluges taking place, and bringing with them desolation in the space of one day and night, all that warlike race of Athenians was at once merged under the earth; and the Atlantic island itself, being absorbed in the sea, entirely disappeared. And hence that sea is at present innavigable, arising from the gradually impeding mud which the subsiding island produced. And this, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated from the narration of Solon.

But when yesterday you was discoursing about a republic and its citizens, I was surprised on recollecting the present history: for I perceived how divinely, from a certain fortune, and not wandering from the mark, you collected many things agreeing with the narration of Solon. Yet I was unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately, as, from the great interval of time since I first received them, my remembrance of them was not sufficiently accurate for the purpose of repetition. I considered it, therefore, necessary that I should first of all diligently revolve the whole in my mind. And on this account I yesterday immediately complied with your demands: for I perceived that we should not want the ability of presenting a discourse accommodated to your wishes, which in things of this kind is of principal importance. In consequence of this, as Hermocrates has informed you, immediately as we departed from hence, by communicating these particulars with my friends here present, for the purpose of refreshing my memory, and afterwards revolving them in my mind by night, I nearly acquired a complete recollection of the affair. And, indeed, according to the proverb, what we learn in childhood abides in the memory with a wonderful stability. For, with respect to myself, for instance, I am not certain that I could recollect the whole of yesterday's discourse, yet I should be very much astonished if anything should escape my remembrance which I had heard in some past period of time very distant from the present. Thus, as to the history which I have just now related, I received it from the old man with great pleasure and delight; who on his part very readily complied with my request, and frequently gratified me with a repetition. And hence, as the marks of letters deeply burnt in remain indelible, so all these particulars became firmly established in my memory. In consequence of this, as soon as it was day I repeated the narration to my friends, that together with

myself they might be better prepared for the purposes of the present association. But now, with respect to that for which this narration was undertaken, I am prepared, O Socrates, to speak not only summarily, but so as to descend to the particulars of everything which I heard. But the citizens and city which you fabricated yesterday as in a fable, we shall transfer to reality; considering that city which you established as no other than this Athenian city, and the citizens which you conceived as no other than those ancestors of ours described by the Egyptian priest. And indeed the affair will harmonize in every respect; nor will it be foreign from the purpose to assert that your citizens are those very people who existed at that time. Hence, distributing the affair in common among us, we will endeavor, according to the utmost of our ability, to accomplish in a becoming manner the employment which you have assigned us. It is requisite, therefore, to consider, O Socrates, whether this discourse is reasonable, or whether we should lay it aside, and seek after another.

Socrates/ But what other, O Critias, should we receive in preference to this? For your discourse, through a certain affinity, is particularly adapted to the present sacred rites of the Goddess. And besides this, we should consider, as a thing of the greatest moment, that your relation is not a mere fable, but a true history. It is impossible, therefore, to say how, and from whence, neglecting your narration, we should find another more convenient. Hence it is necessary to confess that you have spoken with good fortune; and it is equally necessary that I, on account of my discourse yesterday, should now rest from speaking, and be wholly attentive to yours.

Critias/ But now consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual banquet of disputation. For it seems proper to us that Timæus, who is the most astronomical of

us all, and is particularly knowing in the nature of the universe, should speak the first; commencing his discourse from the generation of the world, and ending in the nature of men. But that I after him, receiving the men which he has mentally produced, but which have been excellently educated by you, and introducing them to you according to the law of Solon, as to proper judges, should render them members of this city; as being in reality no other than those Athenians which were described as unknown to us in the report of the sacred writings. And that in future we shall discourse concerning them as about citizens and Athenians.

Socrates/ I seem to behold a copious and splendid banquet of disputation set before me. It is, therefore, now your business, O Timæus, to begin the discourse; having first of all, as is highly becoming, invoked the Gods according to law.

Timæus/ Indeed, Socrates, since those who participate but the least degree of wisdom, in the beginning of every undertaking, whether small or great, call upon Divinity, it is necessary that we (unless we are in every respect unwise) who are about to speak concerning the universe, whether it is generated or without generation, invoking the Gods and Goddesses, should pray that what we assert may be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with ourselves. And such is my prayer to the Gods, with reference to myself; but as to what respects the present company, it is necessary to pray that you may easily understand, and that I may be able to explain my meaning about the proposed subjects of disputation. In the first place, therefore, as it appears to me, it is necessary to define what that is which is always real being, but is without generation; and what that is *which is generated indeed*, or *consists in a state of becoming to be*, but which never *really is*. The former of these indeed is

apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, since it always subsists according to same. But the latter is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense, since it subsists in a state of generation and corruption, and never truly is. But whatever is generated is necessarily generated from a certain cause. For it is every way impossible that anything should be generated without a cause. When, therefore, an artificer, in the fabrication of any work, looks to that which always subsists according to same, and, employing a paradigm of this kind, expresses the idea and power in his work, it is then necessary that the whole of his production should be beautiful. But when he beholds that which is in generation, and uses a generated paradigm, it is alike necessary that his work should be far from beautiful.

I denominate, therefore, this universe heaven, or the world, or by any other appellation in which it may particularly rejoice. Concerning which, let us in the first place consider that which, in the proposed inquiry about the universe, ought in the very beginning to be investigated; whether it always was, having no principle of generation, or whether it was generated, commencing its generation from a certain cause. It was generated. For this universe is visible, and has a body. But all such things are sensible. And sensibles are apprehended by opinion, in conjunction with sense. And such things appear to have their subsistence in becoming to be, and in being generated. But we have before asserted, that whatever is generated is necessarily generated from some cause. To discover, therefore, the artificer and father of the universe is indeed difficult; and when found it is impossible to reveal him through the ministry of discourse to all men.

Again: this is to be considered concerning him, I mean, according to what paradigm extending himself, he fabricated

the world—whether towards an exemplar, subsisting according to that which is always the same, and similarly affected, or towards that which is generated. But, indeed, if this world is beautiful, and its artificer good, it is evident that he looked towards an eternal exemplar in its fabrication. But if the world be far from beautiful, which it is not lawful to assert, he necessarily beheld a generated instead of an eternal exemplar. But it is perfectly evident that he regarded an eternal paradigm. For the world is the most beautiful of generated natures, and its artificer the best of causes. But, being thus generated, it is fabricated according to that which is comprehensible by reason and intelligence, and which subsists in an abiding sameness of being. And from hence it is perfectly necessary that this world should be the resemblance of something. But to describe its origin according to nature is the greatest of all undertakings. In this manner, then, we must distinguish concerning the image and its exemplar. As words are allied to the things of which they are the interpreters, hence it is necessary, when we speak of that which is stable and firm, and intellectually apparent, that our reasons should be in like manner stable and immutable, and as much as possible irreprehensible, with every perfection of a similar kind. But that, when we speak concerning the image of that which is immutable, we should employ only probable arguments, which have the same analogy to the former as a resemblance to its exemplar. And, indeed, as essence is to generation, so is truth to faith. You must not wonder, therefore, O Socrates, since many things are asserted by many concerning the Gods and the generation of the universe, if I should not be able to produce the most approved and accurate reasons on so difficult a subject. But you ought to rejoice if it shall appear that I do not employ reasons less probable than others: at the same time remembering, that I who discourse,

and that you who are my judges, possess the human nature in common; so that you should be satisfied if my assertions are but assimilative of the truth.

Socrates/ You speak excellently well, Timæus; and we shall certainly act in every respect as you advise. This introduction, indeed, of your discourse we wonderfully approve: proceed, therefore, with the subsequent disputation.

Timæus/ Let us declare then on what account the composing artificer constituted generation and the universe. The artificer, indeed, was good; but in that which is good envy never subsists about anything which has being. Hence, as he was entirely void of envy, he was willing to produce all things as much as possible similar to himself. If, therefore, anyone receives this most principal cause of generation and the world from wise and prudent men, he will receive him in a manner the most perfect and true. For, as the Divinity was willing that all things should be good, and that as much as possible nothing should be evil; hence, receiving everything visible, and which was not in a state of rest, but moving with confusion and disorder, he reduced it from this wild inordination into order, considering that such a conduct was by far the best. For it neither ever was lawful, nor is, for the best of causes to produce any other than the most beautiful of effects. In consequence of a reasoning process, therefore, he found that among the things naturally visible there was nothing, the whole of which, if void of intelligence, could ever become more beautiful than the whole of that which is endued with intellect: and at the same time he discovered, that it was impossible for intellect to accede to any being, without the intervention of soul. Hence, as the result of this reasoning, placing intellect in soul and soul in body, he fabricated the universe; that thus it might be a work naturally the most beautiful and the best. In this manner,

therefore, according to an assimilative reason, it is necessary to call the world an animal, endued with intellect, and generated through the providence of Divinity.

This being determined, let us consider what follows; and, in the next place, after the similitude of what animals the composing artificer constituted the world. Indeed, we must by no means think that he fashioned it similar to such animals as subsist in the form of a part, or have a partial subsistence: for, if it had been assimilated to an imperfect animal, it certainly would not have been beautiful. But we should rather establish it as the most similar of all things to that animal, of which other animals, both considered separately and according to their genera, are nothing more than parts. For this, indeed, contains all intelligible animals comprehended in itself; just as this world contains us and the other animals which are the objects of sight. For, the Divinity being willing to assimilate this universe in the most exquisite degree to that which is the most beautiful and every way perfect of intelligible objects, he composed it one visible animal, containing within itself all such animals as are allied to its nature. Do we therefore rightly conclude that there is but one universe; or is it more right to assert that there are many and infinite? But indeed there can be but one, if it be only admitted that it is fabricated according to an exemplar. For that which comprehends all intelligible animals whatever can never be the second to any other. For another animal again would be required about these two, of which they would be parts; and it would be more proper to assert that the universe is assimilated to this comprehending third, rather than to the other two. That the world, therefore, from its being singular or alone, might be similar to all-perfect animal—on this account the artificer neither produced two nor infinite worlds; but heaven, or the universe, was generated and will be one and only-begotten.

But since it is necessary that a corporeal nature should be visible and tangible, and since nothing can be visible without fire, and nothing tangible without something solid, and nothing solid without earth—hence the Divinity, beginning to fabricate, composed the body of the universe from fire and earth. But it is impossible for two things alone to cohere together without the intervention of a third; for a certain collective bond is necessary in the middle of the two. And that is the most beautiful of bonds which renders both itself and the natures which are bound remarkably one. But the most beautiful analogy naturally produces this effect. For when either in three numbers, or masses, or powers, as is the middle to the last, so is the first to the middle; and again, as is the last to the middle, so is the middle to the first: then the middle becoming both first and last, and the last and the first passing each of them into a middle position, they become all of them necessarily the same, as to relation to each other. But, being made the same with each other, all are one. If, then, it were necessary that the universe should be a superficies only, and have no depth, one medium would indeed be sufficient, both for the purpose of binding itself and the natures which it contains. But now it is requisite that the world should be a solid; and solids are never harmonized together by one, but always with two mediums. Hence, the Divinity placed water and air in the middle of fire and earth, and fabricated them as much as possible in the same ratio to each other; so that fire might be to air as air to water; and that as air is to water so water might be to earth. And from this conjunction and composition he rendered the world visible and tangible. Hence, from things of this kind, which are four in number, it must be confessed that the body of the universe was generated through analogy, conspiring into friendship with itself from their conjunction, and so

aptly cohering in all its parts, as to be indissoluble except by its artificer, who bound it in this union and consent.

The composition of the world, therefore, received one whole of each of these four natures. For its composing artificer constituted it from all fire, water, air, and earth; leaving no part of anyone of these, nor any power external to the world. For by a reasoning process he concluded that it would thus be a whole animal, in the highest degree perfect from perfect parts: that, besides this, it would be one, as nothing would be left from which any other such nature might be produced; and lastly, that it would be neither obnoxious to old-age nor disease. For he perceived that the heat and cold from which bodies are composed, and all such things as possess vigorous powers, when surrounding bodies externally, and acceding to them unseasonably, dissolve their union, and, introducing diseases and old-age, cause them to perish by decay. Hence, through this cause and this reasoning process, he fabricated the universe one whole, composed from all wholes, perfect, undecaying, and without disease. He likewise gave to it a figure becoming and allied to its nature. For to the animal which was destined to comprehend all animals in itself, that figure must be the most becoming which contains within its ambit all figures of every kind. Hence, he fashioned it of a spherical shape, in which all the radii from the middle are equally distant from the bounding extremities; as this is the most perfect: of all figures, and the most similar to himself. For he considered that the similar was infinitely more beautiful than the dissimilar.

Besides this, he accurately polished the external circumference of the spherical world, and rendered it perfectly smooth. Nor was the addition of eyes requisite to the universe; for nothing visible remained external to itself. Nor were ears necessary; as there was nothing externally

audible. Nor was the universe inverted with surrounding air, that it might be indigent of respiration. Nor, again, was it in want of any organ through which it might receive nutriment into itself, and discharge it when concocted: for there was no possibility that anything could either accede to or depart from its nature, since there was nothing through which such changes could be produced. For, indeed, the universe affords nutriment to itself through its own consumption; and, being artificially fabricated, suffers and acts all things in itself, and from its own peculiar operations. For its composing artificer considered that it would be much more excellent if sufficient to itself, than if indigent of foreign supplies. But he neither thought that hands were necessary to the world, as there was nothing For it either to receive or reject; nor yet feet, nor any other members which are subservient to progression and rest. For from among the seven species of local motion he selected one, which principally subsists about intellect and intelligence, and assigned it to the world as properly allied to its surrounding body. Hence, when he had led it round according to same, in same, and in itself, he caused it to move with a circular revolution. But he separated the other six motions from the world, and framed it void of their wandering progressions. Hence, as such a conversion was by no means indigent of feet, he generated the universe without legs and feet. When, therefore, that God who is a perpetually reasoning divinity cogitated about the God who was destined to subsist at some certain period of time, he produced his body smooth and equable; and every way from the middle even and whole, and perfect from the composition of perfect bodies. But, placing soul in the middle of the world, he extended it through the whole; and besides this, he externally invested the body of the universe with soul; and, causing circle to revolve in a circle, established the world one single, solitary nature, able through virtue to

converse with itself, indigent of nothing external, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself. And on all these accounts he rendered the universe a happy God. But indeed the artificer did not produce soul, as we just now began to say, junior to body: for he who conjoined these would never permit that the more antient nature should be subservient to the younger. But we, as being much conversant with that which casually occurs, assert things of this kind in an assimilative way; while, on the contrary, the artificer of the world constituted soul both in generation and virtue prior to, and more antient than, body, as being the proper lord and ruler of its servile nature; and that in the following manner:

From an essence impartible, and always subsisting according to sameness of being, and from a nature divisible about bodies, he mingled from both a third form of essence, having a middle subsistence between the two. And again, between that which is impartible and that which is divisible about bodies, he placed the nature of same and different. And taking these, now they are three, he mingled them all into one idea. But as the nature of different could not without difficulty be mingled in same, he harmonized them together by employing force in their conjunction. But after he had mingled these two with essence, and had produced one from the three, he again divided this whole into becoming parts; at the same time mingling each part from same, different, and essence. But he began to divide as follows: —In the first place, he received one part from the whole. Then he separated a second part, double of the first; afterwards a third, sesquialter of the second, but triple of the first: then a fourth, double of the second; in the next place a fifth, triple of the third; a sixth, octuple of the first; and lastly a seventh, twenty-seven times more than the first. After this, he filled up the double and triple intervals, again cutting off parts from the whole; and placed them so between the

intervals, that there might be two mediums in every interval; and that one of these might by the same part exceed one of the extremes, and be exceeded by the other; and that the other part might by an equal number surpass one of the extremes, and by an equal number be surpassed by the other. But as from hence sesquialter, sesquitertian, and sesquioctave intervals were produced, from those bonds in the first spaces, he filled with a sesquioctave interval all the sesquitertian parts, at the same time leaving a part of each of these. And then again the interval of this part being assumed, a companion is from thence obtained in terms of number to number, subsisting between 256 and 243. But now the whole of that mixture from which these were separated was consumed by such a section of parts. Hence he then cut the whole of this composition according to length, and produced two from one; and adapted middle to middle, like the form of the letter X. Afterwards he bent them into a circle, connecting them, both with themselves and with each other, in such a manner that their extremities might be combined in one directly opposite to the point of their mutual intersection; and externally comprehended them in a motion revolving according to sameness, and in that which is perpetually the same. And besides this, he made one of the circles external, but the other internal; and denominated the local motion of the exterior circle, the motion of that nature which subsists according to sameness; but that of the interior one, the motion of the nature subsisting according to difference. He likewise caused the circle partaking of sameness to revolve laterally towards the right hand; but that which partakes of difference diametrically towards the left. But he conferred dominion on the circulation of that which is same and similar: for he suffered this alone to remain undivided. But as to the interior circle, when he had divided it six times, and had

produced seven unequal circles, each according to the interval of the double and triple; as each of them are three, he ordered the circles to proceed in a course contrary to each other: —and three of the seven interior circles he commanded to revolve with a similar swiftness; but the remaining four with a motion dissimilar to each other, and to the former three; yet so as not to desert order and proportion in their circulations.

After, therefore, the whole composition of the soul was completed according to the intention of its artificer, in the next place he fabricated within soul the whole of a corporeal nature; and, conciliating middle with middle, he aptly harmonized them together. But soul being every way extended from the middle to the very extremities of the universe, and investing it externally in a circle, at the same time herself revolving within herself, gave rise to the divine commencement of an unceasing and wise life, through the whole of time. And, indeed, the body of the universe was generated visible; but soul is in visible, participating of a rational energy and harmony, and subsisting as the best of generated natures, through its artificer, who is the best of intelligible and perpetual beings. Since, therefore, soul was composed from the mixture of the three parts same, different, and essence, and was distributed and bound according to analogy, herself at the same time returning by a circular energy towards herself; hence, when she touches upon anything endued with a dissipated essence, and when upon that which is indivisible, being moved through the whole of herself, she pronounces concerning the nature of each—asserts what that is with which anything is the same, from what it is different, to what it is related, where it is situated, how it subsists; and when anything of this kind happens either to be or to suffer both in things which are generated and in such as possess an eternal sameness of

being. Reason indeed, which is becoming to be true according to sameness, when it is conversant as well with different as same, evolving itself without voice or found in that which is moved by itself; when in this case it subsists about a sensible nature, and the circle characterized by difference properly revolving, enunciates any circumstance to every part of the soul with which it is connected; then stable and true opinions and belief are produced. But when again it evolves itself about that which is logistic, and the circle of sameness aptly revolving announces any particular thing, intellect and science are necessarily produced in perfection by such an operation. Whoever, therefore, asserts that this is ingenerated in any other nature than soul, asserts everything rather than the truth.

But when the generating father understood that this generated resemblance of the eternal Gods moved and lived, he was delighted with his work, and in consequence of this delight considered how he might fabricate it still more similar to its exemplar. Hence, as that is an eternal animal, he endeavored to render this universe such, to the utmost of his ability. The nature indeed of the animal its paradigm is eternal, and this it is impossible to adapt perfectly to a generated effect. Hence he determined by a dianoëtic energy to produce a certain movable image of eternity: and thus, while he was adorning and distributing the universe, he at the same time formed an eternal image flowing according to number, of eternity abiding in one; and which receives from us the appellation of time. But besides this he fabricated, the generation of days and nights, and months and years, which had no subsistence prior to the universe, but which together with it rose into existence. And all these, indeed, are the proper parts of time. But the terms it was and it will be, which express the species of generated time, are transferred by us to an eternal essence, through oblivion of

the truth. For we assert of such an essence that it was, is, and will be; while according to truth the term *it is*, is alone accommodated to its nature. But we should affirm, that to have been and to be hereafter are expressions alone accommodated to generation, proceeding according to the flux of time: for these parts of time are certain motions. But that which perpetually subsists the same and immovable, neither becomes at any time older or younger; neither has been generated in some period of the past, nor will be in some future circulation of time; nor receives any circumstance of being, which generation adapts to natures hurried away by its impetuous whirl. For all these are nothing more than species of time imitating eternity, and circularly rolling itself according to number. Besides this, we likewise frequently assert that a thing which was generated is generated: that what subsists in becoming to be, is in generation; that what will be, is to be; and that non-being is not: no one of which assertions is accurately true. But perhaps a perfect discussion of these matters is not adapted to the present disputation.

But time was generated together with the universe, that being produced together they might together be dissolved, if any dissolution should ever happen to these. And time was generated according to the exemplar of an eternal nature, that this world might be the most similar possible to such a nature. For its exemplar is permanent being, through the whole of eternity; but the universe alone was generated, is, and will be, through the whole of time. After this manner, therefore, and from such a dianoëtic energy of Divinity about the generation of time, that he might give birth to its flowing subsistence, he generated the sun and moon, and the five other stars, which are denominated planets, for the purpose of distinguishing and guarding the numbers of time. But the Divinity, as soon as he had produced the bodies of these

stars, placed them, being seven in number, in the seven circulations formed by the revolution of the nature distinguished by difference. The moon, indeed, he fixed in the first circulation about the earth; the sun in the second above the earth; the star called Lucifer, and that which is sacred to Mercury, in circulations revolving with a swiftness equal to the sun, to whom at the same time they are allotted a contrary power; in consequence of which, these stars, the Sun, Lucifer, and Mercury, mutually comprehend and are mutually comprehended by each other in a similar manner. But with respect to the other stars, if anyone should think proper to investigate their circulations, and through what causes they are established, the labor would be greater than that of the discourse itself, for the sake of which they were introduced. An accurate discussion, therefore, of these particulars may, perhaps, be undertaken by us hereafter, if convenient leisure should fall to our lot.

When, therefore, each of the natures necessary to a joint fabrication of time had obtained a local motion adapted to its condition, and their bodies became animals through the connecting power of vital bonds, they then learned their prescribed order; that according to the oblique revolution of the circle of *difference*, which moves in subjection to the circle of *sameness*, these orbs should, by their revolution, partly form a more ample and partly a more contracted circle; and that the orb which formed a lesser circle should revolve swifter; but that which produced a greater, more slow: —but that in consequence of the motion of the circle of sameness the orbs which circulate most swiftly, comprehending other orbs as they revolve, should themselves appear to be comprehended by the revolution of the more slow. But all these circles revolve with a spiral motion, because they are agitated at one and the same time in two contrary directions: and in consequence of this, the

sphere endued with the slowest revolution is nearest to that to which its course is retrograde, and which is the swiftest of all. And that these circles might possess a certain conspicuous measure of slowness and swiftness with reference to each other, and that the motion of the eight circulations might be manifest, the Divinity enkindled a light which we now denominate the Sun, in the second revolution from the earth; that the heavens might become eminently apparent to all things, and that such animals might participate of number as are adapted to its participation, receiving numerical information from the revolution of a nature similar and the same. From hence, therefore, night and day arose; and through these revolving bodies the period of one most wise circulation was produced.

And *month* indeed was generated, when the moon having run through her circle passed into conjunction with the sun. But year, when the sun had completely wandered round his orb. As to the periods of the other stars, they are not understood except by a very few of mankind; nor do the multitude distinguish them by any peculiar appellation; nor do they measure them with relation to each other, regarding the numbers adapted to this purpose. Hence, it may be said, they are ignorant that the wanderings of these bodies are in reality time; as these wanderings are endued with an infinite multitude, and an admirable variety of motions. But it is easy to conceive, that a perfect number of time will then accomplish a perfect year, when the eight circulations concurring in their courses with each other become bounded by the same extremity; being at the same time measured by the circle subsisting according to sameness. But the stars, whose revolutions are attended with a procession through the heavens, were generated, that the whole of this visible animal the universe might become most similar to the most perfect intelligible animal from an imitation of a perpetual

nature. And indeed the artificer fabricated other forms, as far as to the generation of time, according to the similitude of the world's exemplar.

But as the universe did not yet contain all animals in its capacious receptacle, in this respect it was dissimilar to its exemplar. Its artificer, therefore, supplied this defect by impressing it with forms, according to the nature of its paradigm. Whatever ideas, therefore, intellect perceived by the dianoëtic energy in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for the universe to contain. But these ideas are four: One, the celestial genus of Gods; another, winged and air-wandering; a third, the aquatic form; and a fourth, that which is pedestrial and terrene. The idea, therefore, of that which is divine, or the inerratic sphere, he for the most part fabricated from fire, that it might be most splendid and beautiful to behold. And as he meant to assimilate it to the universe, he rendered it circular; placed it in the wisdom of the best nature; ordered it to become the attendant of that which is best; and gave it a circular distribution about the heavens, that it might be a true world, adorned with a fair variety in its every part. But he adapted to each of the divine bodies two motions; one by which they might revolve in same according to same, by always cogitating the same things in themselves about same; the other through which they might be led with an advancing motion from the dominion of the same and similar circulation. He likewise rendered them immovable and stable as to the other five motions, that each of them might become in an eminent degree the best. And on this account such of the stars as are inerratic were generated, which are divine animals; and, in consequence of this, always abide revolving in that which is same. But, the stars, which both revolve and at the same time wander in the manner we have described above, were produced next to these. But he

fabricated the earth the common nourisher of our existence; which being conglobed about the pole extended through the universe, is the guardian and artificer of night and day, and is the first and most antient of the Gods which are generated within the heavens. But the harmonious progressions of these divinities, their concursions with each other, the revolutions and advancing motions of their circles, how they are situated with relation to each other in their conjunctions and oppositions, whether direct among themselves or retrograde, at what times and in what manner they become concealed, and, again emerging to our view, cause terror, and exhibit tokens of future events to such as are able to discover their signification—of all this to attempt an explanation, without inspecting the resemblances of these divinities, would be a fruitless employment. But of this enough; and let this be the end of our discourse concerning the nature of the visible and generated Gods.

But to speak concerning the other dæmons, and to know their generation, is a talk beyond our ability to perform. It is, therefore, necessary in this case to believe in antient men; who being the progeny of the Gods, as they themselves assert, must have a clear knowledge of their parents. It is impossible, therefore, not to believe in the children of the Gods, though they should speak without probable and necessary arguments: but as they declare that their narrations are about affairs to which they are naturally allied, it is proper that, complying with the law, we should assent to their tradition. In this manner, then, according to them, the generation of these Gods is to be described:

That Ocean and Tethys were the progeny of heaven and earth. That from hence Phorcys, Saturn, and Rhea, and such as subsist together with these, were produced. That from Saturn and Rhea, Zeus, Hera, and all such as we know are called the brethren of these descended. And lastly, others

which are reported to be the progeny of these. When, therefore, all such Gods as visibly revolve, and all such as become apparent when they please, were generated, the Artificer of the universe thus addressed them: “Gods of Gods, of whom I am the demiurgus and father, whatever is generated by me is indissoluble, such being my will in its fabrication. Indeed everything which is bound is dissoluble; but to be willing to dissolve that which is beautifully harmonized, and well composed, is the property of an evil nature. Hence, so far as you are generated, you are not immortal, nor in every respect indissoluble: yet you, shall never be dissolved, nor become subject to the fatality of death; my will being a much greater and more excellent bond than the vital connectives with which you were bound at the commencement of your generation. Learn, therefore, what I now say to you indicating my desire. Three genera of mortals yet remain to be produced. Without the generation of these, therefore, the universe will be imperfect; for it will not contain every kind of animal in its spacious extent. But it ought to contain them, that it may become sufficiently perfect. Yet if these are generated, and participate of life through me, they will become equal to the Gods. That mortal natures, therefore, may subsist, and that the, universe may be truly all, convert yourselves, according to your nature, to the fabrication of animals, imitating the power which I employed in your generation. And whatever among these is of such a nature as to deserve the same appellation with immortals, which obtains sovereignty in these, and willingly pursues justice, and reverences you—of this I myself will deliver the seed and beginning: it is your business to accomplish the rest; to weave together the mortal and immortal nature; by this means fabricating and generating animals, causing them to increase by supplying them with

aliment, and receiving them back again when dissolved by corruption."

Thus spoke the demiurgus; and again into the same crater, in which mingling he had tempered the soul of the universe, he poured mingling the remainder of the former mixture: in a certain respect indeed after the same manner, yet not similarly incorruptible according to the same, but deficient from the first in a second and third degree. And having thus composed the universe, he distributed souls equal in number to the stars, inserting each in each: and causing them to ascend as into a vehicle, he pointed out to them the nature of the universe, and announced to them the laws of fate; showing them that the first generation orderly distributed to all was one, lest any particular soul should be allotted a less portion of generation than another. But when he had disseminated them through the several instruments of time adapted to each, he declared to them it was necessary that an animal the most religious of all others should make its appearance. But as the human nature is two-fold, he showed them that the more excellent kind was that which would afterwards be called man. And as souls are from necessity engrafted in bodies, and as something accedes to and something departs from such bodies, he declared to them that, in the first place, one connate sense produced by violent passions was necessary to all; and, in the second place, love mingled with pleasure and grief. That after these, fear and anger were necessary, with whatever else is either consequent to these, or naturally discordant from a contrary nature. That such souls as subdue these would live justly, but such as are vanquished by them unjustly. And again, that he who lived well during the proper time of his life, should, again returning to the habitation of his kindred star, enjoy a blessed life. But that he whose conduct was depraved, should in his second generation be changed into

the nature of a woman. That both these, at the expiration of a thousand years, should return to the allotment and choice of a second life; each soul receiving a life agreeable to its choice. That in this election the human soul should pass into the life of a brute: and that in case the inclination to evil should not even then cease, but the defilement of vice remain according to a similitude of the mode of generation, then the soul should be changed into the nature of a brute correspondent to its disposition. And that it should not be freed from the allotment of labors, till, following the revolution of that same and similar nature contained in its essence, it vanquishes those abundantly turbulent affections, tumultuous and irrational, adhering to it afterwards from fire, water, air, and earth, and returns to the first and best disposition of its nature.

When he had instructed souls in all these particulars, that he might be in no respect the cause of the future evil of each, he disseminated some of them into the earth, others into the moon, and others into the remaining different instruments of time. But after this semination he delivered to the junior Gods the province of fabricating mortal bodies, and generating whatever else remained necessary to the human soul; and gave them dominion over everything consequent to their fabrications. He likewise commanded them to govern as much as possible in the best and most beautiful manner the mortal animal, that it might not become the cause of evil to itself. At the same time he who orderly disposed all these particulars remained in his own accustomed abiding habit. But in consequence of his abiding, as soon as his children understood the order of their father, they immediately became obedient to this order; and receiving the immortal principle of mortal animal, in imitation of their artificer, they borrowed from the world the parts of fire and earth, water and air, as things which they

should restore back again; and conglutinated the received parts together, not with the same indissoluble bonds which they themselves participated, but gave them a tenacious adherence from thick let nails, invisible through their smallness; fabricating the body of each, one from the composition of all; and binding the circulations of the immortal soul in the influxive and effluxive nature of body.

But these circulations, being merged in a profound river, neither govern nor are governed, but hurry and are hurried along with violence: in consequence of which, the whole animal is indeed moved, yet in a disorderly manner; since from every kind of motion its progression is fortuitous and irrational. For it proceeds backwards and forwards, to the right and left, upwards and downwards, and wanders every way according to the six differences of place. For though the inundating and effluxive waves pour along with impetuous abundance, which afford nutrition to the animal, yet a still greater tumult and agitation is produced through the passions arising from external impulsions: and this either when the body is disturbed by the sudden incursion of external fire, or by the solidity of earth, or receives an injury from the whirling blasts of the air. For from all these, through the medium of the body, various motions are hurried along, and fall with molestation on the soul. But on this account all these were afterwards, and are even now, denominated senses. And these, indeed, both at first and at present, are the sources of an abundant and mighty motion, in conjunction with that perpetually flowing river, moving and vehemently agitating the circulations of the soul, every way fettering the revolution of the nature characterized by sameness, through flowing in a contrary direction, and retraining its energies by their conquering and impetuous progressions. But they agitate and tear in pieces the circulation of the nature distinguished by difference. Hence,

they whirl about with every kind of revolution each of the three intervals of the double and triple, together with the mediums and conjoining bonds of the sesquitertian, sesquialter, and sesquioctave ratios, which cannot be dissolved by anyone except the artificer by whom they were bound: and besides this, they induce all the fractures and diversities of circles which it is possible to effect; so that, scarcely being connected with each other, they are borne along indeed, yet in an irrational manner, at one time in a contrary, at another time in an oblique, and then again in a resupine situation. Just as if anyone, in an inverted position, should fix his head on the earth and raise his feet on high; for in such a situation both the inverted person and the spectators would mutually imagine the right hand parts to be on the left, and the left to be on the right. So with respect to the circulations of the soul, the very same affections, and others of a similar kind, vehemently take place; and hence, when this is the case, if anything external occurs, characterized by the nature of same or different, they denominate things the same with, or different from, others in a manner contrary to the truth. Hence they become false, and destitute of intelligence; nor is any revolution to be found among them in such a situation which energizes with the authority of a ruler and chief.

But when certain senses, borne along externally, strike against the soul and attract the whole of its receptacle, then the circulations which are in reality in subjection appear to have dominion: and hence, in consequence of all these passions, the soul becomes insane at present, and was so from the first period of her being bound in a mortal body. However, when the river of increase and nutrition flows along with a more gentle and less abundant course, the circulations, being again restored to tranquility, proceed in their proper path; in process of time become more regular

and steady, and pass into a figure accommodated to their nature. Hence, in this case, the revolutions of each of the circles becoming direct, and calling both same and different by their proper appellations, they render the being by whom they are possessed prudent and wise. If anyone, therefore, receives a proper education in conjunction with convenient nutriment, such a one will possess perfect health, and will every way avoid the most grievous disease. But when this is neglected by any individual, such a one, proceeding along the path of life in a lame condition, will again pass into Hades imperfect and destitute of intelligence. These are particulars, however, which happen posterior to the production of mankind. But it is our business at present to discourse more accurately concerning the first composition of our nature, and to show, in the first place, from assimilative reasons, through what cause and providence of the Gods the several members of the body were accommodated to the several employments of the soul.

In the first place, then, the Gods bound the two divine circulations of the soul in a spherical body, in imitation of the circular figure of the universe: and this part of the body is what we now denominate the head; a most divine member, and the sovereign ruler of our whole corporeal composition, through the decree of the Gods, who considered that it would participate of all possible motions. Lest, therefore, the head, by rolling like a cylinder on the earth, which is distinguished by all-various heights and depths, should be unable to pass over its inequalities and asperities, the Gods subjected this upright figure of the body, as a pliable vehicle to the head. Hence, in consequence of the body being endued with length, they extended four naturally flexible members; Divinity fabricating a progression through which the body might apprehend any object, might receive a stable support, and might be able to pass through every place, bearing on

high the head, our most divine and sacred habitation. For this purpose, therefore, they furnished us with legs and hands. And as the Gods considered that the anterior parts are more honorable and adapted to rule than the posterior, they gave us a motion for the most part consisting of a forward progression. Beside this, it was requisite that the anterior parts of our body should be divided from each other, and be dissimilar: and on this account they first placed about the cavity of the head the face; fixed in it organs subservient to all the providential energies of the soul, and determined that the natural government of man should consist in this anterior part of the body. But they fabricated the luciferous eyes the first of all the corporeal organs, binding them in the face on the following account. Of that fire which does not burn, indeed, but which comprehends our proper diurnal light, the Gods fabricated the orbs of the eyes. For the fire contained within our body, and which is the genuine brother of this diurnal fire, they caused to flow through the eyes with smoothness, and collected abundance, condensed indeed in the whole, but especially in the middle of these lucid orbs; so as that the more dense fire might remain concealed within the recesses of the eyes, and the pure might find a passage and fly away. When, therefore, the diurnal light subsists about the effluxive river of the light, then, similar concurring and being mingled with similar, one domestic body is constituted according to the direct procession of the eyes; and this too in that part where the internally emitted light resists that which is externally adduced. But the whole becoming similarly passive through similitude, when it either touches anything else or is itself touched by another, then the motion produced by this contact discussing itself through the whole body of the eye, as far as to the soul, causes that sensation which we denominate sight. But when this kindred fire departs into

night, the conjunct on being dissolved, sight loses its power. For in this case, proceeding into a dissimilar nature, it is changed, and becomes extinct: since it is by no means connate with the proximate surrounding air, which is naturally destitute of fire. Hence it ceases from seeing; and, besides this, becomes the introducer of sleep. For the Gods fabricated the nature of the eyelids as a salutary guardian of the sight; that, these being compressed, the inward fiery power of the eye might be restrained from any further emission; that, besides this, they might sprinkle over and equalize the eye's internal motions; and that, when equalized, rest might be produced.

But when much rest takes place, sleep attended with few dreams is produced. On the contrary, if certain more vehement motions remain, then such as is the nature of these relics, and the places in which they were produced, such and so many will be the similar phantasms within, and of which we shall possess the remembrance when we are externally roused. But with respect to the images produced in mirrors, and all such things as are visible in that which is apparent and smooth, there is nothing in these difficult of solution. For, from the communication of the external and internal fire with each other, and from that fire which subsists about the smooth body, and becomes abundantly multiplied, all such appearances are necessarily produced as take place when the fire of the eyes mingles itself with the fire diffused about the smooth and splendid object of vision. But the right hand parts appear to be the left, because a contact takes place between the contrary parts of the sight and the contrary parts of the object, different from the accustomed mode of perception. On the contrary, the right hand parts appear on the right, and the left hand on the left, when the mingled light leaps forth, together with that with which it is mingled. When the smoothness of the mirrors

receives this here and there in an elevated manner, it repels the right hand part of the sight to the left of the mirror, and the left to the right. But if the mirror is turned according to the length of the countenance, it causes the whole face to appear resupine, by repelling the downward part of the splendor towards the upward part, and again the upper towards the downward part. All such particulars as these, therefore, are but causal assistants, which the Divinity employed as subservient to rendering the idea of that which is best as far as possible complete. *But the multitude are of opinion that these are not causal assistants, but the real causes of all things; I mean such things as are capable of giving cold and heat, rarity and density, with whatever produces such-like affections, but is incapable of possessing reason and intellect.* For soul must be considered as the only thing among beings by which intellect can be possessed. And this is in visible. But fire and water, air and earth, are all of them visible bodies. *It is, however, necessary that the lover of intellect and science should explore the first causes of prudent nature; and that he should consider such things as are moved by others, and at the same time necessarily give motion to other things, as nothing more than secondary causes.* Hence it is proper that we should speak concerning both kinds of causes; separately of such as fabricate things beautiful and good in conjunction with intellect, and of such as, being left destitute of wisdom, produce each particular in a casual and disorderly manner. Concerning the second causes of the eyes, therefore, which contribute to the possession of the power they are now allotted, what has been already said is sufficient.

But the greatest employment of the eyes, with respect to the use for which they were bestowed on us by the Divinity, we shall now endeavor to explain. For, in my opinion, the sight is the cause of the greatest emolument to us on the

present occasion; since what we are now discoursing concerning the universe could never have been discovered without surveying the stars, the sun, and the heavens. But now, from beholding day and night, we are able to determine by arithmetical calculation the periods of months and years; to acquire a conception of time, and to scrutinize the nature of the universe. But from all this we obtain the possession of philosophy; a greater good than which never was nor ever will be bestowed by the Gods on the mortal race. And this is what I call the greatest benefit of the eyes. But why should I celebrate other particulars of less consequence, which he who is not a philosopher, since destitute of sight, may attempt to explore, but will explore in vain? By us, indeed, it is asserted that Divinity bestowed sight on us for this purpose, that on surveying the circulations of intellect in the heavens we may properly employ the revolutions of our dianoëtic part, which are allied to their circulations; and may recall the tumultuous motions of our discursive energies to the orderly processions of their intellectual periods. That besides this, by learning these and participating right reason according to nature, and imitating the revolutions of Divinity which are entirely inerratic, we may give stability to the wanderings of our dianoëtic energy.

But concerning voice and hearing, we again assert that they were bestowed on us by the Gods on the same account. For the acquisition of speech pertains to these, and is of the greatest advantage to their possession. And whatever utility musical voice brings to the sense of hearing, was bestowed for the sake of harmony. But harmony, possessing motions allied to the revolutions of our soul, is useful to the man who employs the Muses in conjunction with intellect; but is of no advantage to irrational pleasure, though it appears to be so at present. Indeed, it was given us by the Muses for the purpose of reducing the dissonant circulation of the soul to

an order and symphony accommodated to its nature. Rhythm too was bestowed on us for this purpose; that we might properly harmonize that habit in our nature, which for the most part is void of measure, and indigent of the Graces. And thus far, a few particulars excepted, have we shown the fabrications of intellect. But it is likewise requisite to give a place in our discourse to the productions of necessity. For, the generation of the world being mingled, it was produced from the composition of intellect and necessity. But intellect ruling over necessity persuaded it to lead the most part of generated natures to that which is best; and hence necessity being vanquished by wise persuasion, from these two as principles the world arose. If, then, anyone truly asserts that the universe was generated according to these, he should also mingle with it the form of an erratic cause, which it is naturally adapted to receive. In this manner then let us return; and, assuming a convenient principle of these, again discourse concerning them as about the former particulars, commencing our discussion from their origin. Let us, therefore, speculate the nature and passions of fire and water, air and earth, prior to the generation of the heavens. No one, indeed, as yet has unfolded the generation of these: but we speak of fire, and the other elements, as if the nature of each was known; and place them as the principles of the universe, when at the same time they ought not to be assimilated to elements, not even as in the rank of syllables, by men who in the smallest degree merit the appellation of wise. But now we shall not speak of the principle or principles, or whatever other denomination they may receive, of all things; and this for no other reason than the difficulty of delivering what appears to be the truth about these in the present mode of disputation. Neither, therefore, is it proper that you should expect me to speak, nor that I should persuade myself into a belief of

being able to speak with perfect rectitude on so difficult a subject. But it is proper, as I told you in the beginning of this discourse, that, preserving all the force of assimilative reasons, we should endeavor to deliver that which is not less assimilative of the truth than the doctrine of others; and that in this manner we should discourse from the beginning concerning particulars and the whole. In the first place, therefore, invoking the Divinity who is the savior of discourse, and beseeching him to lead us from an absurd and unusual exposition to an assimilative doctrine, we shall again begin to speak.

But it is necessary that the beginning of our present disputation should receive a more ample division than the former one. For then we made a distribution into two species: but now a third sort must be added. In the former disputation two species were sufficient; one of which was established as the form of an exemplar, intelligible and always subsisting according to same; but the other was nothing more than the imitation of the paradigm, generated and visible. But we did not then distribute a third, because we considered these two as sufficient. However, now reason seems to urge as a thing necessary, that we should endeavor to render apparent by our discourse the species which subsists as difficult and obscure. What apprehension then can we form of its power and nature? Shall we say that it is in an eminent degree the receptacle, and as it were nurse, of all generation? Such an assertion will, indeed, be true; but it is requisite to speak more clearly concerning it. And this will certainly be an arduous undertaking on many accounts, but principally because it will be necessary to doubt previous to its discussion concerning fire and the rest of the elements, why anyone of these should be called water rather than fire, or air rather than earth; or why anyone should be denominated some definite particular rather than all. For it

is indeed difficult to frame any certain opinion, or to employ any stable discourse about such intricate forms. After what manner, then, and in what respect, and what of an assimilative nature shall we assert in this dubious inquiry?

In the first place, then, that which we now denominate water, when it loses its fluidity by concretion, appears to become stones and earth; but, when liquefied and dispersed, it forms vapor and air. Likewise, air when burnt up becomes fire. And, on the contrary, fire becoming concrete and extinct passes again into the form of air. And again, air becoming collected and condensed produces mists and clouds. But from these still more compressed rain descends. And from water, again, earth and stones derive their subsistence. And thus, as it appears, they mutually confer on each other generation in a certain circular progression. But since these never appear to be the same, who without being covered with confusion can confidently assert that anyone of these is this rather than that? Certainly, no one. Hence it will be far the most safe method of proceeding to speak about them as follows: That the nature which we always perceive becoming something different at different times, such, for instance, as fire, is not fire absolutely, but something fiery. And again, that the nature which we denominate water is not absolutely so, but such-like, or watery; and that it is not at any time anything else, as if it possessed any liability of essence. And lastly, that they cannot be distinguished by any word, such as we are accustomed to employ when endeavoring to show that any particular is either this thing or that. For they fly away, incapable of sustaining the affirmation which asserts them to be this thing, of such a nature, belonging to this; and all such appellations as would evince them to be something permanent and real. Hence, we ought not to denominate anyone of these either this, or that; but something such-like, and a perpetually-revolving similitude.

Thus, we should assert that fire is everywhere such-like, and should speak in the same manner of everything endued with generation. But we should alone distinguish by the appellations of this, or that, the subject in which each of these appears to be generated, and again to suffer a dissolution. But this subject is by no means to be denominated such-like, as for instance hot or white, or any quality belonging to contraries, or anything which contraries compose. However, let us endeavor to explain more clearly what we mean to express. For if anyone, fashioning all possible figures from gold, should without ceasing transform each figure into all; and if, during this operation, someone who is present should, pointing to one of these figures, inquire what it is; it might most safely, with respect to truth, be replied, that it was gold: but he who should assert that it is a triangle, or any other of the figures which are continually generated, and which ought by no means to be denominated beings, would fall from the truth in the midst of his assertion. But we ought to be content with that answer as most safe, which denominates it such-like, or of such a determinate nature.

In the same manner we should speak concerning that nature which is the general receptacle of all bodies. For it never departs from its own proper power, but perpetually receives all things; and never contracts any form in any respect similar to anyone of the intromitted forms. It lies indeed in subjection to the forming power of every nature, becoming agitated and figured through the supernally intromitted forms; and through these it exhibits a different appearance at different times. But the forms which enter and depart from this receptacle are the imitations of perpetually true beings; and are figured by them in a manner wonderful and difficult to describe, as we shall afterwards relate. At present, however, it is necessary to consider three

sorts of things: one, that which is generated; another, that in which it is generated; and the third, that from which the generated nature derives its similitude. But it is proper to assimilate that which receives to a mother; that from whence it receives to a father; and the nature situated between these to an offspring. It is likewise necessary to understand that the figured nature can never become distinguished with an all-possible variety of forms, unless its receptacle is well prepared for the purpose, and is destitute of all those forms which it is about to receive. For, if it were similar to anyone of the supernally intromitted forms, when it received a nature contrary to that to which it is similar, or any form whatever, it would very imperfectly express its similitude, while at the same time it exhibited the very same appearance with the supernally acceding form. And hence it is necessary, that the receptacle which is destined to receive all possible forms should itself be destitute of every form. Just as those who are about to prepare sweet-smelling unguents, so dispose a certain humid matter as the subject of the ensuing odor, that it may possess no peculiar smell of its own; and as those who wish to impress certain figures in a soft and yielding matter, are careful that it may not appear impressed with any previous figure, but render it as much as possible exquisitely smooth. In the same manner, it is necessary that the subject which is so often destined to receive in a beautiful manner, through the whole of itself, resemblances of eternal beings, should be naturally destitute of all that it receives. Hence, we should not denominate this mother and receptacle of that which is generated, visible and every way sensible, either earth, or air, or fire, or water; nor, again, anyone of the composites from these, or anything from which these are generated: but we should call it a certain invisible species, and a formless universal recipient, which in the most dubious and scarcely

explicable manner participates of an intelligible nature. Of itself, indeed, we cannot speak without deception; but so far as it is possible to apprehend its nature from what has been previously said, we may with the greatest rectitude assert as follows: that fire appears to be its inflamed part; water its moist part; and that earth and air are its parts in a similar manner, so far as it receives the imitations of these. But we ought rather thus to inquire about these, distinguishing and separating them by a reasoning process; whether there is a certain fire, itself subsisting in itself; and whether this is the case with all such particulars which we perpetually assert to subsist from themselves; or whether such things alone as are the objects of sight, and which are perceived through the ministry of the body, possess being and truth; so that nothing besides these has in any respect any subsistence; that we in vain assert there is a certain intelligible form of each of these; and that all such forms are nothing but words. Indeed, whether such a doctrine is true or not, must not be asserted rashly and without examination: nor is it proper to add to the present disputation, which is naturally prolix, anything tedious and foreign from the purpose. But if any definition can be employed in this affair, comprehending things of great moment in a short compass, such a one will be very opportune to our present design. In this manner then I shall relate my opinion on the subject.

If intellect and true opinion are two kinds of things, it is every way necessary that there should be forms, subsisting by themselves, which are not the objects of sense, but which are apprehended by intelligence alone. But if, as appears to some, true opinion differs in no respect from intellect, everything which is perceived through body is to be considered as possessing the most certain and stable nature. But in reality these ought to be denominated two distinct things, because they are generated separate from

each other, and are dissimilar. For the one of these subsists in us through learning, but the other through persuasion. And the one is indeed always attended with true reason, but the other is irrational. The one is not to be moved by persuasion; the other, on the contrary, is subject to this mutation. And lastly, of true opinion every man participates; but of intellect all the Gods, and but a few of mankind. Such then being the case, we must confess that the form which subsists according to same, is unbegotten and without decay; neither receiving anything into itself externally, nor itself proceeding into any other nature. That it is invisible, and imperceptible by sense; and that this is the proper object of intellectual speculation. But the form which is synonymous and similar to this, must be considered as sensible, generated, always in agitation, and generated in a certain place, from which it again recedes, hastening to dissolution; and which is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. But the third nature is that of place; which never receives corruption, but affords a seat to all generated forms. This indeed is tangible without tangent perception; and is scarcely by a certain spurious reasoning the object of belief. Besides, when we attempt to behold this nature, we perceive nothing but the delusions of dreams, and assert that every being must necessarily be somewhere, and be situated in a certain place: and we by no means think that anything can exist, which is neither in the earth nor comprehended by the heavens. All these, and all such opinions as are the sisters of these, we are not able to separate from our cogitation of that which subsists about a vigilant and true nature: and this because we cannot rouse ourselves from this fallacious and dreaming energy, and perceive that in reality it is proper for an image to subsist in something different from itself; since that in which it is generated has no proper resemblance of its own, but

perpetually exhibits the phantasm of something else; and can only participate of essence in a certain imperfect degree, or it would become in every respect a perfect non-entity. But to true being, true reason bears an assisting testimony, through the accuracy of its decisions; affirming, that as long as two things are different from each other, each can never become so situated in either, as to produce at the same time one thing, and two things essentially the same.

This, then, is summarily my opinion: —that, prior to the generation of the universe, these three things subsisted in a triple respect, viz. being, place, and generation. And that the nurse of generation, fiery and moist, receiving the forms of earth and air, and suffering such other passions as are the attendants of these, appeared of an all-various nature to the view but because it was neither filled with similar powers, nor with such as are equally balanced, it possessed no part in equilibrium; but through the perfect inequality of its libration it became agitated by these passions, and again through its motion gave agitation to these. But the parts in motion, being separated from each other, were impetuously hurried along in different directions, similar to the agitations and ventilations which take place in the operations of textorial instruments, and such as are employed in the purgation of corn. For in this case the dense and the heavy parts are borne along one way, and the rare and the light are impelled into a different seat. In the same manner, these four natures being agitated by their receptacle tumultuously moving like the instrument of corn, such as were dissimilar became far separated from each other, and such as were similar became again amicably united. And hence they passed into different seats before the universe was from the mixture of these distributed into beautiful order; but at the same time they all subsisted irrationally, and without the limitation of measure.

But when the artificer began to adorn the universe, he first of all figured with forms and numbers fire and earth, water and air, which possessed indeed certain traces of the true elements, but were in every respect so constituted, as it becomes anything to be from which Deity is absent. But we should always persevere in asserting that Divinity rendered them as much as possible the most beautiful and the best, when they were in a state of existence opposite to such a condition. I shall now, therefore, endeavor to unfold to you the distribution and generation of these by a discourse unusual indeed, but, to you who have trod in all the paths of erudition, through which demonstration is necessarily obtained, perspicuous and plain. In the first place, then, that fire and earth, water and air, are bodies, is perspicuous to everyone. But every species of body possesses profundity; and it is necessary that every depth should comprehend the nature of a plane. Again, the rectitude of the base of a plane is composed from triangles. But all triangles originate from two species; one of which possesses one right angle, and the other two acute angles. And one of these contains one right angle distributed with equal sides; but in the other unequal angles are distributed with unequal sides. Hence, proceeding according to assimilative reasons, conjoined with necessity, we shall establish a principle of this kind, as the origin of fire and all other bodies. The supernal principles of these indeed are known to Divinity, and to the man who is in friendship with Divinity.

But it is necessary to relate by what means four most beautiful bodies were produced; dissimilar indeed to each other, but which are able from certain dissolutions into each other to become the sources of each other's generation. For, if we are able to accomplish this, we shall obtain the truth concerning the generation of earth and fire, and of those elements which are situated according to analogy between

these. And then we shall not assent to anyone who should assert that there are visible bodies more beautiful than these, each of which subsists according to one kind. We must endeavor, therefore, to harmonize the four sorts of bodies excelling in beauty; and to evince by this means that we sufficiently comprehend the nature of these. Of the two triangles indeed the isosceles is allotted one nature, but the oblong or scalene is characterized by infinity. We ought therefore to choose the most beautiful among infinites, if we wish to commence our investigation in a becoming manner. And if anyone shall assert that he has chosen something more beautiful for the composition of these, we shall suffer his opinion to prevail; considering him not as an enemy, but as a friend. Of many triangles, therefore, we shall establish one as most beautiful (neglecting the rest); I mean the equilateral, which is composed from three parts of a scalene triangle. To assign the reason of this would indeed require a prolix dissertation; but a pleasant reward will remain for him who by a diligent investigation finds this to be the case. We have, therefore, selected two triangles out of many, from which the body of fire and of the other elements is fabricated; one of which is isosceles, but the other is that which always has its longer side triply greater in power than the shorter.

But that which we formerly asserted without sufficient security, it is now necessary more accurately to define. For it appeared to us, though improperly, that all these four natures were mutually generated from each other: but they are in reality generated from the triangles which we have just described: —three of them, indeed, from one triangle containing unequal sides; but the fourth alone is aptly composed from the isosceles triangle. All of them, therefore, are not able, by a dissolution into each other, to produce from many small things a mighty few, or the contrary. This indeed can be effected by three of them. For, as all the three

are naturally generated from one triangle, when the greater parts are dissolved, many small parts are composed from them, receiving figures accommodated to their natures. And again, when the many small parts being scattered according to triangles produce a number of one bulk, they complete one mighty species of a different kind. And thus much may suffice concerning their mutual generation.

It now remains that we should speak concerning the quality of each of their kinds, and relate from what concurring numbers they were collected together. The first species indeed is that which was composed from the fewest triangles, and is the element of that which has its longer side twice the length of the shorter side, which it subtends. But two of these being mutually placed according to the diameter, and this happening thrice, the diameters and the shorter sides passing into the same, as into a center, hence one equilateral triangle is produced from six triangles. But four equilateral triangles being composed, according to three plane angles, form one solid angle; and this the most obtuse of all the plane angles from which it is composed. Hence, from four triangles of this kind receiving their completion, the first solid species was constituted, distributive of the whole circumference into equal and similar parts. But the second was formed from the same triangles, but at the same time constituted according to eight equilateral triangles, which produced one solid angle from four planes: so that the second body received its completion from the composition of six triangles of this kind. And the third arose from the conjunction of twice sixty elements, and twelve solid angles, each of which having twenty equilateral bases is contained by five plane equilateral triangles. In this manner, then, the other elements generated these. But the isosceles triangle, being constituted according to four triangles, and collecting the right angles at the center, and forming one equilateral

quadrangle, generated the nature of the fourth element. But six such as these being conjoined produced eight solid angles, each of which is harmonized together, according to three plane right angles. Hence the figure of the body thus composed is cubical, obtaining six plane quadrangular equilateral bases. There is also a certain fifth composition, which Divinity employed in the fabrication of the universe, and when he delineated those forms the contemplation of which may justly lead someone to doubt whether it is proper to assert that the number of worlds is infinite or finite; — though indeed to affirm that there are infinite worlds, can only be the dogma of one who is ignorant about things in which it is highly proper to be skillful. But it may with much less absurdity be doubted whether there is in reality but one world, or whether there are five. According to our opinion, indeed, which is founded on assimilative reasons, there is but one world: though some one, regarding in a certain respect other particulars, may be of a different opinion. But it is proper to dismiss any further speculations of this kind.

Let us now, therefore, distribute the four sorts of things which we have generated, into fire, earth, water, and air. And to earth indeed let us assign a cubical form: for earth is the most immovable of all these four kinds, and the most plastic, or adapted to formation, of all corporeal natures. But it is in the most eminent degree necessary that this should be the case with that which possesses the most secure and stable bases. Among the triangles, indeed, established at the beginning, such as are equilateral possess firmer bases than such as contain unequal sides. And hence, among the plane figures composed from each, it will be found that the isosceles is necessarily more stable than the equilateral, and the square than the triangle, both when considered according to parts and to the whole. On this account, by distributing this figure to the earth, we shall preserve an

assimilative reason. This will be the case too by assigning to water that figure which is more difficultly movable than the other three; to fire, the most easily movable form; and to air, that figure which possesses a middle nature. Besides this, we should assign the smallest body to fire, the greatest to water, and one of a middle kind to air. And again, the most acute body to fire, the second from this to air, and the third to water. But, among all these, it is necessary that the body which possesses the fewest bases, should be the most easily movable: for, being every way the most acute, it becomes the most penetrating and incisive of all. It is likewise the most light, because composed from the fewest parts. But that which is second to this, possesses these properties in a secondary respect; and that which ranks as the third, in a third gradation. Hence, according to right and assimilative reason, the solid form of the pyramid is the element and seed of fire. But we must assign that form which is second according to generation to air; and that which is the third to water. And it is necessary to consider all these such, with respect to their smallness, that no one of the several sorts can be discerned by us, on account of its parvitude; but that, when many of them are collected together, their bulks become the objects of our perception. And besides this, all these were accurately absolved and harmonized by the Divinity, both as to their multitude, motions, and powers, in such a proportion as the willing and persuaded nature of necessity was able to receive.

But, among all those natures whose kinds we have above related, the following circumstances appear to take place. And first: with respect to earth: when it meets with fire, becoming dissolved by its acuteness, it is borne along; and remains in this dissolved state either in fire, or in the bulk of air, or in that of water—till its parts, associating themselves together, and again becoming mutually

harmonized, produce again a body of earth; for it can never pass into another form. But water, when it is distributed into parts by fire or air, when its parts become again collected, produces one body of fire, but two bodies of air. And the sections of air form from one dissolved part two bodies of fire. Again, when fire receives into itself either air or water, or a certain earth, and, being itself small, is moved in many natures; and besides this, when, through opposing, being vanquished by the agitated forms, it becomes broken in pieces, then two bodies of fire coalesce into one form of air. And when air becomes vanquished and separated into parts, then, from two wholes and a half, one whole form of water is produced. But, again, let us consider this matter as follows: When anyone of the other forms, becoming invested by fire, is cut by the acuteness of its angles and sides, then, passing into the nature of fire, it suffers no further discerption. For no species is ever able to produce mutation or passivity, or any kind of alteration, in that which is similar and the same with itself: but as long as it passes into something else, and the more imbecil contends with the more powerful, it will not cease to be dissolved.

Again, when the lesser are comprehended in the greater many, and the few being lacerated are extinguished, —if they are willing to pass into the idea of the conquering nature, they cease to be extinguished, and air becomes venerated from fire, and water from air. But if, when this transition is accomplished, the composite opposes any of the other species, the agitated parts will not cease to be dissolved, till, on account of their dissoluble subsistence being every way impelled, they fly to their kindred nature; or being vanquished, and becoming one from many, similar to their vanquisher, they abide with the victor in amicable conjunction. But, in consequence of these passions, they all of them mutually change the receptacles which they once

possessed. For the multitude of each kind is distinguished, according to its proper place, through the motion of its recipient seat. But such as become dissimilar to each other are borne along through the agitation to the place of the natures to which they are similar. Such bodies, therefore, as are unmixed, and the first, are generated from such causes as these. But that other genera are naturally inherent in these forms, is owing to the composition of each element; which not only from the first produces a triangle, together with magnitude, but also such things as are greater and less: and this so many in number as there are different kinds in the forms themselves. And hence, these being mingled in themselves, and with each other, produce an infinite variety; which it is proper he should contemplate who is about to employ assimilative reasons in the investigation of nature. He, therefore, who does not apprehend in what manner, and in conjunction with what particulars, the motion and composition of these take place, will find many impediments in the remaining part of this disputation. And these indeed we have already partly discussed; but a part still remains for our investigation.

And, in the first place, motion is by no means willing to reside in smoothness: For it is difficult, or rather impossible, that a thing in motion should subsist without a mover, or a mover without that which is in motion. Hence, it is impossible that these should be at any time equable and smooth. And, in consequence of this, we should always place an abiding nature in smoothness, and motion in that which is unequal and rough. Inequality, indeed, is the cause of roughness: and we have already treated concerning the generation of inequality. But we have by no means explained how the several sorts, being undistributed according to their kinds, cease to be moved and borne along through each other. This, therefore, must be the subject of our present

discussion. The circulation then of the universe, since it comprehends the different sorts of things in its circumference, being of a circular form, and naturally defiling to pass into union with itself, compresses all things within its spacious receptacle, and does not suffer a void place anywhere to subsist. On this account, fire in the most eminent degree penetrates through all things; and air next to this, ranking as the second to fire, on account of the subtility and tenuity of its parts. And the same reasoning must be extended to the other elements, which are posterior to these. For such as are composed from the greatest parts leave also the greatest vacuity in their composition; but, on the contrary, such as are the smallest leave the least vacuity. But the coalition of compression thrusts the small parts into the void spaces of the large; and on this account, the small parts being placed with the large, and the former separating the latter, but the larger being mingled with the smaller, all of them are borne upwards and downwards to their respective places of abode. For each, upon changing its magnitude, changes also its situation. Hence, through these causes the generation of a nature contrary to smoothness being always preserved, affords a perpetual motion of these, both at present and in all future periods of time.

But, in the next place, it is necessary to understand that there are many kinds of fire: as for instance, flame, and that which is enkindled from flame; which burns, indeed, but exhibits no light to the eyes—and which, when the flame is extinguished, abides in the ignited nature. In like manner, with respect to air, one kind is most pure, which is denominated other; but another most turbulent, and at the same time obscure and dark; and after this another nameless kind is produced, through the inequality of the triangles. But, with respect to water, it is in the first place two-fold; one kind of which is humid, but the other fusile.

The humid, therefore, through its participating such parts as are small and unequal, becomes movable, both from itself and another, through inequality and the idea of its figure. But that which is composed from large and smooth parts is more stable than this kind of water, and coalesces into a heavy body through smoothness and equality of parts, But through fire entering into and dissolving its composition, in consequence of losing its equability and smoothness, it participates more of a movable nature. Hence, becoming easily agile, driven about by the proximate air, and extended over the earth, it liquefies, which is denominated a purification of bulk, and falls upon the earth, which is called a defluxion. Again, fire flying upwards from hence, since it does not depart into a vacuum, the proximate air being agitated, impels the moist bulk as yet movable into the seats of fire, with which at the same time it mingles itself. But when the bulk becomes collectively thrust downwards, and again receives equability and smoothness of parts, then fire, the artificer of inequality, departing, the whole mass passes into a sameness with itself. And this departure of fire we denominate refrigeration; but the coalition which takes place when fire is absent we call a concretion, and cold rigidity. But among all those which we denominate fusile waters, that which, becoming most dense from the most attenuated and equable parts, is of a uniform kind, and participates a splendid and yellow color, is that most honored and valuable possession gold, which is usually impelled through a rock. And a branch of gold, on account of its density most hard and black, is called a diamond. But that which contains parts proximate to gold, which possesses more than one species, surpasses gold in density, and participates but a small and attenuated part of earth, so that it becomes of a harder nature, but from its internally possessing great intervals is lighter; —this is one kind of splendid and

concrete waters, and is denominated brass. But when an earthly nature, being mingled with this, is through antiquity separated from other parts of the brass, and becomes of itself conspicuous, it is then denominated rust. In a similar manner other particulars of this nature may be investigated without much labor by the assistance of assimilative reasons. And if anyone, for the sake of relaxation, omitting for a while the speculation of eternal beings, should pursue the assimilative arguments concerning generation, and should by this means possess a pleasure unattended with repentance, such a one will establish for himself in life a moderate and prudent diversion.

This being admitted, let us run over the assimilative reasons concerning the particulars which yet remain for discussion When such water then as is attenuated and moist is mingled with fire, (being denominated moist through its motion and rolling progression on the earth, and likewise soft, because its bases being less stable than those of earth easily yield to impulsion,) this, when separated from fire and deserted by air, becomes more equable, and through the departure of these is compelled into itself: and being thus collected, if it suffers this alteration above the earth, it becomes hail; but if upon the earth, ice; which then takes place in consequence of extreme congelation. But when it is less congealed, if this happens above the earth, it becomes snow; but when upon the earth, and this from collected dew, it then becomes frost. But when many species of water are mingled with each other, the whole kind, which is strained from the earth through plants is called moisture or liquor. These liquors, being dissimilar on account of their mixtures, exhibit many other nameless kinds: but four, which are of a fiery species, and which become in an eminent degree diaphanous, are allotted appellations. And that which heats the soul in conjunction with the body is called wine. But that

which is smooth, and segregative of the sight, and on this account splendid, refulgent, and unctuous to the view, is an oleaginous species, and is pitch, gum, oil, and other things endued with a similar power. Again, that which possesses a power of diffusing the things collected about the mouth, and this as far as nature will permit, at the same time bringing sweetness with its power, is generally denominated honey. And lastly, that which dissolves the flesh by burning, is of a frothy nature, and is secreted from all liquors, is called juice. But the species of earth strained through water produces a stony body in the following manner: —When collected water fails in mingling, it passes into the form of air; but, becoming air, it returns to its proper place. Hence, as there is no vacuum, it impels the proximate air; and this, if the impulsion is weighty, being poured round the bulk of earth, becomes vehemently compressed, and betakes itself to those seats from whence the new air ascended. But earth, when indissolubly associated with water, through the ministry of air composes stones: the more beautiful sort indeed being such as are resplendent from equal and plane parts, but the deformed being of a contrary composition. But when all the moisture is hurried away by the violence of fire, and the body by this means becomes more dry, then a species of earth which is denominated fictile is produced. Sometimes, likewise, when the moisture is left behind, and the earth becomes fusile through fire, then through refrigeration a stone with a black color is generated. But when this species of strained earth in a similar manner through mixture is deprived of much moisture, but is composed from more attenuated parts of earth, is salt and semiconcrete, and again emerges through water; then it is partly called niter, a cathartic kind of oil, and earth, and partly salt, a substance most elegantly and legitimately adapted to the common wants of the body, and most grateful to divinity. But the

parts common to both these are not soluble by water, but through some such thing are thus collected together by fire. Again, fire and air do not liquefy the bulk of earth. For since these naturally consist of parts smaller than the void spaces of earth, they permeate through its most capacious pores without any violence, and neither subject it to dissolution nor liquefaction. But the parts of water, because they are greater and pass along with violence, dissolve and liquefy the mass of earth. Hence, water alone dissolves earth when violently composed, but fire alone when it is properly composed; for an entrance in this case is afforded to nothing but fire.

Again, fire alone permeates the most violent association of the parts of water; but both fire and air diffuse themselves through its more debile collection; air through its void, and fire through its triangular spaces. But nothing is capable of dissolving air when collected, together by violence, except it operates according to an element: but when it coheres together without force, it is resolved by fire alone. Again, bodies which are so composed from water and earth that the water compressed by force obstructs the void spaces of earth, cannot in this case afford an ingress to the water externally approaching; and in consequence of this, the water flowing round such a body suffers the whole mass to remain without liquefaction. But the parts of fire entering into the void spaces of water, as water into those of earth, and influencing water in the same manner as fire influences air, become in this case the causes of liquefaction to a common body. But these partly possess less water than earth; such as the whole genus of glass, and such stones as are denominated fusile: and partly, on the contrary, they possess more of water; such as all those bodies which coalesce into waxen and vaporisic substances. And thus we have nearly exhibited all those species, which are varied by

figures, communications and mutations into each other; but it is now necessary that we should endeavor to render apparent the causes through which the passions of these are produced.

In the first place, then, sense ought always to be present with discourses of this kind. But we have not yet run through the generation of flesh, and such things as pertain to flesh, together with that part of the soul which is mortal. For all these are inseparable from the passions subsisting with sense, and cannot without these passions be sufficiently explained; though, indeed, even in conjunction with these, it is scarcely possible to unfold their production. We should, therefore, first of all establish other things; and then consider such things as are consequent to these. That in our disputation, therefore, the passions themselves may follow the genera in succession, let our first investigations be concerning such things as pertain to body and soul. Let us then first of all inquire why fire is called hot. And the reason of this we shall be able to perceive by considering the separation and division of fire about our bodies: for that this passion is a certain sharpness is nearly evident to all. But we ought to consider the tenuity of its angles, the sharpness of its sides, the smallness of its parts, and the velocity of its motion, through all which it becomes vehement and penetrating, and swiftly divides that with which it meets; calling to mind for this purpose the generation of its figure. For fire, indeed, and no other nature, separating our bodies and distributing them into small parts, produces in us that passion which is very properly denominated heat. But the passion contrary to this, though sufficiently manifest, ought not to pass without an explanation. For the moist parts of bodies larger than our humid parts, entering into our bodies, expel the smaller parts; but, not being able to penetrate into their receptacles, coagulate our moisture, and cause it

through equability to pass from an unequable and agitated state into one immovable and collected. But that which is collected together contrary to nature, naturally opposes such a condition, and endeavors by repulsion to recall itself into a contrary situation. In this contest and agitation a trembling and numbness takes place; and all this passion, together with that which produces it, is denominated cold. But we call that hard to which our flesh gives way; and soft, which yields to the pressure of our flesh. And we thus denominate them with reference to each other. But everything yields to pressure which is established on a small base. But that which rests on triangular bases, on account of its being vehemently firm, is of a most resisting nature; and, because it is dense in the highest degree, strongly repels all opposing pressure.

Again, the nature of heavy and light will become eminently apparent, when investigated together with upwards and downwards. But indeed it is by no means rightly asserted that there are naturally two certain places distant by a long interval from each other: one denominated downwards, to which all bodies tend endued with bulk, but the other upwards, to which everything is involuntarily impelled. For, the whole universe being spherical, all such things as by an equal departure from the middle become extremes, ought to become naturally extremes in a similar manner. But the middle, being separated from the extremes according to the same measures, ought to be considered as in a situation just opposite to all things. Such, then, being the natural disposition of the world, he who places anyone of the above-mentioned particulars either upwards or downwards, will justly appear by such appellations to wander from the truth. For the middle place in the universe cannot be properly called either naturally downwards or upwards, but can only be denominated that which is the

middle. But that which environs is neither the middle, nor contains any parts in itself differing from each other with reference to the middle, nor does it possess anything corresponding to an opposite direction. But to that which is every way naturally similar how can anyone with propriety attribute contrary names? For, if there be anything solid, and endued with equal powers, in the middle of the universe, it will never tend to any part of the extremities, through the perfect similitude which they everywhere possess. But if anyone moves about this solid in a circle, he will often stand with his feet in opposite directions, and will denominate the same part of himself both upwards and downwards. Since the universe, therefore, as we have just observed, is of a spherical figure, it is not the part of a prudent man to assert that it has any place which is either upwards or downwards. But from whence these names originate, and, in what things existing, we transfer them from thence to the universe, it is our business at present to investigate. If anyone then should be seated in that region of the world which for the most part belongs to the nature of fire, and to which it on all sides tends, and if such a one should acquire a power of taking away the parts of fire, and of causing them to balance; or, placing the parts in a scale, should violently seize on the beam, and, drawing out the fire, hurl it downwards into dissimilar air—it is evident that in this case a less portion of fire would be more easily compelled than a greater. For, when two things are at the same time suspended from one power, it is necessary that the less quantity should more easily, and the greater with less readiness, yield to the oppressive force. Hence, the one is called heavy, and tending downwards; but the other light, and tending upwards. The same thing happens to us who inhabit this terrestrial region. For, walking on the earth, and separating the terrene genera from each other, we sometimes violently hurl a fragment of

earth into its dissimilar the air, and this with a motion contrary to its nature; each region at the same time retaining that to which it is allied. But the less portion, being more easily impelled into a dissimilar place than the larger, first of all yields to the violence: and this we denominate light, and call the place into which it is violently hurled, upwards. But the passion contrary to this we denominate heavy and downwards. Hence it is necessary that these should mutually differ from each other; and this through the multitude of genera obtaining contrary situations. For that which is light in one place is contrary to that which is light in a contrary situation: likewise the heavy to the heavy, the downward to the downward, and the upward to the upward. For all these will be found to be contrary, transverse, and every way different from each other. One thing however is to be understood concerning all these, that the progression of each, tending to its kindred nature, renders the proceeding body heavy, and the place to which it tends, downwards. But this progression influences in a different manner such as are differently affected. And thus have I unfolded the causes of these passions.

But again, anyone who beholds the cause of the passion of smoothness and roughness may be able to disclose it to others. For hardness mingled with inequality produces the one, and equality with density the other. But among the common passions which subsist about the whole body, that is the greatest which is the cause of pleasure and pain: to which may be added, such as through the parts of the body detain the senses, and have in these pleasures and pains as their attendants. In this manner, then, we should receive the causes of every passion, both sensible and insensible, calling to mind the distinctions which we formerly established concerning the easily and difficultly movable nature. For in this manner we ought to pursue all such things as we design

to apprehend. Thus, with respect to that which is naturally easily movable, when any slender passion falls upon it, the several parts give themselves up to each other in a circular progression, producing the same effect; till, having arrived at the seat of prudence, they announce the power of that by which the passion was induced. But that which is affected in a contrary manner, being stable and without a circular progression, alone suffers; but does not move any of the parts to which it is proximate. Hence, the parts not mutually giving themselves up to each other, and the first passion in them becoming immovable with respect to the whole animal, that which suffers is rendered void of sensation. This last case indeed happens about the bones and hairs, and such other parts of our composition as are mostly terrene. But the circumstances belonging to the easily movable nature take place about the instruments of sight and hearing, through their containing the most abundant power of fire and air. But it is necessary to consider the peculiarities of pleasure and pain as follows: —When a passion is produced in us contrary to nature, and with violence and abundance, then it becomes the occasion of pain. And again, when a passion conformable to our nature is excited, and this with abundance, it causes pleasure and delight. But that which is contrary to these produces contrary effects. But a passion, the whole of which is induced with great facility, is eminently indeed the object of sensation, but does not participate of pleasure and pain. And of this kind are the passions subsisting about the sight; to which, as we have above asserted, our body is allied. For such objects as exhibit sections and burnings, and other passions of a similar kind, do not cause pain to the sight; nor, again, does the sight receive pleasure when it is restored to the same form as before. But the most vehement and clear sensations influence it with pain, so far as it suffers anything, strikes

against, or comes into contact with, any object. For no violence subsists in the separation or concretion of the sight. But such bodies as are composed from larger parts, and which scarcely yield to impulsion, when they transfer the induced motions to the whole body, contain in themselves pleasures and pains; when varied, indeed, pains, but, when restored to their pristine situation, pleasures. Again, whatever bodies in a small degree receive departures and evacuations of themselves, accompanied at the same time with abundant repletions, —since such bodies have no sense of evacuation, but are sensible of repletion, they do not affect the mortal part of the soul with any pain, but, on the contrary, influence it with the greatest delight. And the truth of this is manifest from the sensation of sweet odors. But such bodies as suffer an abundant variation, and are scarce able to be restored in a small degree to their pristine situation, are totally affected in a manner contrary to those we have just described. And the truth of this is manifest in the burnings and sections of the body. And thus have we nearly discussed the common passions of the whole body, and the appellations assigned to the causes by which they are produced.

Let us now endeavor to explain those passions which take place in particular parts of our bodies, and relate from whence they arise, and by what causes they are induced. In the first place, let us if possible complete what we formerly left unfinished concerning humors; since these are passions subsisting about the tongue. But these, as well as many other things, appear to be produced by certain separations and concretions; and, besides this, to employ smoothness and roughness more than the rest. For certain small veins extend themselves from the tongue to the heart, and are the messengers of tastes. And when anything falls upon these so as to penetrate the moist and delicate texture of the flesh,

which through its terrestrial nature is moderately liquefied, it then contracts and dries the veins. Hence, if these penetrating substances are of a more rough nature, they produce a sharp taste; but, if less rough, a sour taste. But such things as are purgative of these veins, and which wash away whatever is found adhering to the tongue, if they accomplish this in an immoderate degree, so as to liquefy something of the nature of the tongue, such as is the power of niter; —all such as these are denominated bitter. But whatever is subordinate to this property of niter, and purges in a more moderate degree, appears to us to be salt, without the roughness of bitterness, and to be more friendly to our nature. Again, such things as, communicating with the heat of the mouth, and being rendered smooth by it, heat also in their turn the mouth—and which through their lightness are elevated towards the senses of the head, at the same time dividing whatever they meet with in their ascent; —all these, through powers of this kind, are denominated sharp. But sometimes these several particulars, becoming attenuated through rottenness, enter into the narrow veins, and compel the interior parts, as well the terrene as those containing the symmetry of air, to be mingled together by moving about each other; and when mingled cause some of the parts to glide round, some to enter into, others, and when entered to render them hollow and extended; and this in the place where a hollow moisture is extended about the air. This moisture too being at one time terrene and at another pure, a moist orbicular receptacle of air is produced from the hollow water. But that which is produced from pure water is on all sides diaphanous, and is called a bubble. On the contrary, that which owes its subsistence to a more earthly moisture, and which is at the same time agitated and elevated, is denominated fervid, and a fermentation. But the cause of all these passions receives the appellation of acute.

And a passion contrary to all that has been asserted concerning these proceeds from a contrary cause. But when the composition of the things entering into moist substances is naturally accommodated to the quality of the tongue, it polishes and anoints its asperities, and collects together or relaxes such parts as were either assembled or dissipated contrary to nature, and restores them to their proper and natural habit. Hence, all such substances are pleasant and friendly to everyone, become the remedies of violent passions, and are denominated sweet. And thus much may suffice concerning particulars of this kind.

There are, however, no species about the power of the nostrils: for all odors are but half begotten. But it happens to no species to be commensurate with any odor. And our veins, with respect to particulars of this kind, are too narrow to admit the genera of earth and water, and too broad to receive those of fire and air; and hence no one ever perceives an odor of anyone of these. But odors are always produced from the malefaction, corruption, liquefaction or evaporation of the elements. For, water becoming changed into air, and air into water, odors are generated in the middle of these. And all odors are either smoke or mists. But, of these, that which passes from air into water is a mist; but that which is changed from water into air, smoke. And hence it comes to pass that all odors are more attenuated than water, and more dense than air. But the truth of this is sufficiently evident when anyone, in consequence of a disagreeable smell, violently draws his breath inwards; for then no odor is washed off, but breath alone follows unattended by smell. On this account, the varieties of these subsist without a name; as they are neither composed from many nor from simple species. But two of these alone receive an appellation, the pleasant and the disagreeable: the latter of which disturbs and violently assaults all that cavity which lies

between the top of the head and the navel; but the former allures this part of the body, and by its amicable ingress preserves it in a condition accommodated to its nature. But we ought to consider the third sensitive part of our composition, hearing, in such a manner that we may explain through what causes the passions with which it is conversant subsist. We ought, therefore, entirely to desire voice a certain pulsation of the air, penetrating through the ears, brain, and blood, as far as to the soul: and we should call the motion arising from hence, which commences from the head and ends in the seat of the liver, hearing. When this motion is swift, a sharp sound is produced; but, when slow, a flat sound. And the former of these is equal and smooth, but the latter rough. Many voices too produce a great sound, but a small sound is the result of a few. But it is necessary that we should speak about the symphonies of these in the subsequent part of this discourse. The fourth sensitive genus now remains for our discussion; which contains in itself an abundant variety, all which are denominated colors. But color is a flame flowing from bodies, and possessing parts commensurate to the sight with respect to perception. But we have already considered the causes from which sight is produced. It appears then that we may now speak of colors according to assimilative reasons as follows:

Of things which, proceeding from other parts, fall on the sight, some are greater, others less, and others equal to the parts of the sight. Such as are equal, therefore, cannot be perceived; and these we denominate diaphanous. But, among such as are larger or smaller, some of these separate, but others mingle the sight, similar to the operations of heat and cold about the flesh, or to things four, acute and hot about the tongue. But things which affect, the sight in this manner are called black and white; which are indeed the passions of those particulars we have just related, being

their sisters, as it were, and the same with them in a different genus; but which, nevertheless, through these causes appear to be different. We should, therefore, speak of them as follows: —That the color which is segregative of the light is white; but that which produces an effect contrary to this, black. But when a more acute motion, and of a different kind of fire, falls upon and separates the sight, as far as to the eyes, at the same time violently propelling and liquefying the transitions of the eyes, then a collected substance of fire and water flows from thence, which we denominate a tear; but the motion itself is a fire meeting with the sight in an opposite direction. And, indeed, when a fire, leaping as it were from a certain coruscation, becomes mingled with another fire, penetrating and extinguished by moisture, from this mixture colors of all-various kinds are produced. In this case we call the passion a vibrating splendor, and that which produces it fulgid and rutilating. But a kind of fire which subsists in the middle of these, arriving at the moisture of the eyes, and becoming mingled with it, is by no means splendid: but in consequence of the rays of fire being mingled through moisture, and producing a bloody color, we denominate the mixture red. And when splendor is mingled with red and white, it generates a yellow color. But to relate in what measure each of these is mingled with each, is not the business of one endued with intellect, even though he were well informed in this affair; since he would not be able to produce concerning these either a necessary or an assimilative reason. But red, when mingled with black and white, produces a purple color. And when to these, mingled and burnt together, more of black is added, a more obscure color is produced. A ruddy color is generated from the mixture of yellow and brown; but brown from the mixture of black and white. A pallid color arises from the mingling of white and yellow. But that which is splendid conjoined with

white, and falling upon abundance of black, gives completion to an azure color. And azure mingled with white generates a gray color. But from the temperament of a ruddy color with black, green is produced. All the rest, will be nearly evident from these, to anyone who, imitating the former mixtures, preserves assimilative reasons in his discourse. But if anyone undertakes the investigation of these, for the sake of the things themselves, such a one must be ignorant of the difference between a divine and human nature: since a God is indeed sufficient for the purpose of mingling many things into one, and of again dissolving the one into many, as being at the same time both knowing and able: but there is no man at present who is able to accomplish either of these undertakings, nor will there ever be one in any future circulation of time. But all these which thus naturally subsist from necessity, were assumed in the things which are generated by the artificer of that which is most beautiful and best, when he produced a self-sufficient and most perfect God; employing, indeed, causes which are subservient to these, but operating himself in the best manner in all generated natures. On this account it is requisite to distinguish two species of causes; the one necessary, but the other divine. And we should inquire after the divine cause in all things, for the sake of obtaining a blessed life in as great a degree as our nature is capable of receiving it; but we should investigate the necessary cause for the sake of that which is divine. For we should consider, that without these two species of causes, the objects of our pursuit can neither be understood nor apprehended, nor in any other way become participated. But since to us at present, as to artificers, matter lies in subjection, the genera, of causes serving as prepared materials from which the remaining discourse is to be woven, let us again return with brevity to our first discussions, and swiftly pass from thence

to the place at which we are now arrived; by this means endeavoring to establish an end and summit to our disputation, which may harmonize with its beginning.

Indeed, as we asserted towards the commencement of our discourse, when all sensible natures were in a disordered state of subsistence, Divinity rendered each commensurate with itself, and all with one another, and connected them as much as possible with the bands of analogy and symmetry. For then nothing participated of order except by accident; nor could anything with propriety be distinguished by the appellation which it receives at present, such for instance as fire, water, and the rest of this kind. But the demiurgus in the first place adorned all these, afterwards established the world from their conjunction, and rendered it one animal, containing in itself all mortal and immortal animals. And of divine natures, indeed, he himself became the author; but he delivered to his offspring the junior Gods the fabrication of mortal natures. Hence, these imitating their father's power, and receiving the immortal principle of the soul, fashioned posterior to this the mortal body, assigned the whole body as a vehicle to the soul, and fabricated in it another mortal species of soul, possessing dire and necessary passions through its union with the body. The first indeed of these passions is pleasure, which is the greatest allurement to evil; but the next is pain, which is the exile of good. After these follow boldness and fear, those mad advisers; anger, hard to be appeased; hope, which is easily deceived; together with irrational sense, and love, the general invader of all things. In consequence, therefore, of mingling these together, the junior Gods necessarily composed the mortal race. And religiously fearing lest the divine nature should be defiled through this rout of molestations more than extreme necessity required, they lodged the mortal part, separate from the divine, in a

different receptacle of the body; fabricating the head and breast, and placing the neck between as an isthmus and boundary, that the two extremes might be separate from each other.

In the breast, therefore, and that which is called the thorax, they seated the mortal genus of the soul. And as one part of it is naturally better, but another naturally worse, they fabricated the cavity of the thorax; distributing this receptacle in the woman different from that of the man, and placing in the middle of these the midriff or diaphragm. That part of the soul, therefore, which participates of fortitude and anger, and is fond of contention, they seated nearer the head, between the midriff and the neck; that becoming obedient to reason, and uniting with it in amicable conjunction, it might together with reason forcibly repress the race of desires, whenever they should be found unwilling to obey the mandates of reason, issuing her orders from her lofty place of abode. But they established the heart, *which is both the fountain of the veins, and of the blood, which is vehemently impelled through all the members of the body in a* CIRCULAR PROGRESSION, in an habitation corresponding to that of a satellite; that when the irascible part becomes inflamed, reason at the same time announcing that some unjust action has taken place externally, or has been performed by some one of the inward desires, then everything sensitive in the body may swiftly through all the narrow pores perceive the threatenings and exhortations, may be in every respect obedient, and may thus permit that which is the best in all these to maintain the sovereign command.

But as the Gods previously knew that the palpitation of the heart in the expectation of dreadful events, and the effervescence of anger, and every kind of wrathful inflation, would be produced by fire, they implanted in the body the

idea of the lungs, artificially producing them as a guardian to the heart. And, in the first place, they rendered them soft and bloodless, and afterwards internally perforated with hollow pipes like a sponge; that through their receiving spirit and imbibing moisture, they might become themselves refrigerated, and might afford respiration and remission to the heart in its excessive heat. Hence they deduced the arteries as so many canals through the substance of the lungs; and placed the lungs like a soft thicket round the heart, that when anger rages in it with too much vehemence it may leap into submission, and becoming refrigerated may be subject to less endurance, and may be able together with anger to yield with greater facility to the authority of reason. But they seated that part of the soul which is desiderative of meats and drinks, and such other things as it requires through the nature of body, between the præcordia and the boundary about the navel; fabricating all this place as a manger subservient to the nutriment of the body, and binding in it this part of the soul as a rustic and savage animal. But it is necessary that this part should nourish its conjoined body, if the mortal race has a necessary existence in the nature of things. That this part, therefore, might be always fed at the manger, and might dwell remote from the deliberative part, molesting it in the smallest degree with its tumults and clamors, and permitting it, as that which is most excellent in our composition, to consult in quiet for the common utility of the whole animal; on this account the Gods assigned it such a subordinate situation.

However, as the Divinity perceived that this part would not be obedient to reason, but that it would naturally reject its authority in consequence of every sensible impression, and would be animastically hurried away by images and phantasms both by day and night—considering this, he constituted the form of the liver, and placed it in the

habitation of this desiderative part; composing it dense and smooth, splendid and sweet, and at the same time mingled with bitterness; that the power of cogitations, descending from intellect into the liver as into a mirror receiving various resemblances and exhibiting images to the view, might at one time terrify this irrational nature by employing a kindred part of bitterness and introducing dreadful threats, so that the whole liver being gradually mingled might represent bilious colors, and becoming contracted might be rendered throughout wrinkled and rough; and that, besides this, it might influence its lobe, ventricle, and gates, in such a manner, that by distorting and twisting some of these from their proper disposition, and obstructing and shutting in others, it might be the cause of damages and pains. And again, that at another time a certain inspiration of gentleness from the dianoëtic power, by describing contrary phantasms and affording rest to bitterness, through its being unwilling either to excite or apply itself to a nature contrary to its own; and besides this, by employing the innate sweetness of the liver, and rendering all its parts properly disposed, smooth, and free, might cause that part of the soul which resides about the liver to become peaceful and happy, so that it might even refrain from excess in the night, and employ prophetic energies in sleep: since it does not participate of reason and prudence. For those who composed us, calling to mind the mandate of their father, that they should render the mortal race as far as possible the best, so constituted the depraved part of our nature that it might become connected with truth; establishing in this part a prophetic knowledge of future events. But that Divinity assigned divination to human madness may be sufficiently inferred from hence; that no one while endued with intellect becomes connected with a divine and true prophecy; but this alone takes place either when the power

of prudence is fettered by sleep, or suffers some mutation through disease, or a certain enthusiastic energy: it being in this case the employment of prudence to understand what was asserted either sleeping or waking by a prophetic and enthusiastic nature; and so to distinguish all the phantastic appearances as to be able to explain what and to whom anything of future, past, or present good is portended. But it is by no means the office of that which abides and is still about to abide in this enthusiastic energy, to judge of itself either concerning the appearances or vociferations. Hence it was well said by the ancients, that to transact and know his own concerns and himself, is alone the province of a prudent man. And on this account the law orders that the race of prophets should preside as judges over divine predictions; who are indeed called by some diviners—but this in consequence of being ignorant that such men are interpreters of enigmatical visions and predictions, and on this account should not be called diviners, but rather prophets of divinations. The nature, therefore, of the liver was produced on this account, and seated in the place we have mentioned, viz. for the sake of prediction. And besides this, while each of such like parts is living, it possesses clearer indications; but when deprived of life it then becomes blind, and the divination is rendered too obscure to signify anything sufficiently clear. But an intestine which subsists for the sake of the liver, is placed near it on the left hand, that it may always render the liver splendid and pure, and prepared like a mirror for the apt reception of resemblant forms. On this account, when certain impurities are produced about the liver through bodily disease, then the spleen, purifying these by its rarity, receives them into itself from its being of a hollow and bloodless contexture. Hence, being filled with purgations, it increases in bulk, and becomes inflated with corruption. And again, when the body

is purified, then becoming depressed it subsides into the same condition as before. And thus we have spoken concerning both the mortal and divine part of the soul, and have related where they are situated, in conjunction with what natures, and why they are separated from each other. That all this indeed is unfolded according to indisputable truth, can only be asserted when confirmed by the vocal attestation of a God: but that it is spoken according to assimilative reasons, we should not hesitate to evince both now and hereafter by a more diligent discussion of what remains.

It is proper to investigate in a similar manner the subsequent part of our disputation; and this is no other than to relate how the other members of the body were produced. It is becoming, therefore, in the most eminent degree that they should be composed as follows: Those artificers then of our race well knew that we should be intemperate in the assumption of meats and drinks, and that we should often through gluttony use more than was moderate and necessary. Hence, lest sudden destruction should take place through disease, and the mortal race thus becoming imperfect should presently cease to exist; the Gods previously perceiving this consequence, fabricated in the lower parts a hollow receptacle for the purpose of receiving a superabundance of solid and liquid aliment; and, besides this, inverted it with the spiral folds of the intestines, lest, the assumed nutriment swiftly passing away, the body should as swiftly require an accession of new aliment; and, by producing an insatiable appetite through gluttony, should render our whole race void of philosophy and the Muses, and unobedient to the most divine part of our composition. But the nature of the bones and flesh, and other things of this kind, was constituted as follows: In the first place, the generation of the marrow serves as a principle

to all these. For the bonds of that life which the soul leads through its conjunction with the body, being woven together in the marrow, become the stable roots of the mortal race. But the marrow itself is generated from other particulars. For, among the triangles, such as are first, being unbent and smooth, were particularly accommodated to the generation of fire and water, air and earth; and the Divinity separating each of these apart from their genera, and mingling them commensurate with each other, composing by this means an all-various mixture of seeds for the mortal race, produced from these the nature of the marrow. But afterwards disseminating in the marrow, he bound in it the genera of souls. Besides, in this first distribution, he immediately separated as many figures and of such kinds as it was requisite the marrow should possess. And he fashioned indeed that part of the marrow in which as in a cultivated field the divine seed was to be sown, every way globular, and called it εγκεφαλον, or the brain; because in every animal, when it has acquired the perfection of its form, the receptacle of this substance is denominated the head. But he distinguished with round and at the same time oblong figures, that receptacle of the body which was destined to contain the remaining and mortal part of the soul; and was willing that the whole should receive the appellation of marrow. And besides this, hurling from these as anchors the bonds of all the soul, he fabricated the whole of our body about the substance of the marrow, and inverted it on all sides with a covering of bones.

But he thus composed the nature of the bones. In the first place, bruising together pure and smooth earth, he mingled and moistened it with marrow; after this he placed it in fire, then merged it in water, then again seated it in fire, and after this dipped it in water. And thus, by often transferring it into each, he rendered it incapable of being liquefied by both.

Employing therefore this nature of bone, he fashioned like one working with a wheel a bony sphere, and placed it round the brain; leaving a narrow passage in the sphere itself. And besides this, forming certain vertebræ from bone about the marrow of the neck and back, he extended them like hinges, commencing from the head and proceeding through the whole cavity of the body. And thus he preserved all the seed, by fortifying it roundabout with a stony vestment. He likewise added joints, for the purpose of motion and inflection, employing the nature of that which is distinguished by difference in their fabrication, as this is endued with a certain middle capacity. But, as he thought that the habit of the bony nature would become more dry and inflexible than it ought to be, and that, when it became heated and again cooled, it would in consequence of ulceration swiftly corrupt the seed which it contained, on this account he fashioned the genus of nerves and flesh; that the nerves, by binding all the other members, and becoming stretched and remitted about those hinges the vertebrae, might render the body apt to become inflected and extended as occasion required: but that the flesh might serve as a covering from the heat and a protection from the cold; and, besides this, might defend it from falls, in the same manner as external supports, gently and easily yielding to the motions of the body. He likewise placed a hot moisture in the nature of the flesh, that, becoming in summer externally dewy and moist, it might afford a kindred refrigeration to the whole body; and that again in winter, through its own proper fire, it might moderately repel the externally introduced and surrounding cold. When, therefore, the plastic artificer of our bodies had perceived all this through a dianoëtic energy, having mingled and harmonized together water, fire, and earth, and added to the mixture a sharp and salt ferment, he gradually composed soft and succulent flesh.

But he mingled the nature of the nerves from bone and unfermented flesh, composing one middle substance from the power of both, and tingeing it with a yellow color. And on this account it comes to pass that the power of the nerves is more intense and viscous than that of the flesh, but more soft and moist than that of the bones. Hence, the Divinity bound the bones and marrow to each other with the nerves, and afterwards inverted them all supernally with the flesh, as with a dark concealing shade. Such of the bones, therefore, as were the most animated he covered with the least flesh; but such as were the least animated he inverted with flesh the most abundant and dense. And, besides this, he added but a small quantity of flesh to the joints of the bones, except where reason evinces the necessity of the contrary: and this lest they should be a hindrance to the inflections, and retard the motions of the body; and again, lest in consequence of their being many and dense, and vehemently compressed in one another, they should cause through their solidity a privation of sense, a difficulty of recollection, and a remission of the dianoëtic energy. On this account he inverted with abundance of flesh the bones of the groin, legs, loins, the upper part of the arms, and that part which extends from the elbow to the wrist, and such other parts of our bodies as are without articulation, together with such inward bones as through the paucity of soul in the marrow are destitute of a prudential energy. But he covered with a less quantity of flesh such bones as are endued with prudence: unless, perhaps, the fleshy substance of the tongue, which was produced for the sake of sensation, is to be excepted. In other parts, the case is such as we have described. For a nature which is generated and nourished from necessity can by no means at one and the same time receive a dense bone and abundant flesh, united with acuteness of sensation. But this would be most eminently

the case with the composition of the head, if all these were willing to coalesce in amicable conjunction: and the human race, possessing a fleshy, nervous, and robust head, would enjoy a life twice as long, or still more abundantly extended, healthy and unmolested, than that which we at present possess.

Again, in consequence of those artificers of our generation considering whether they should fabricate our race possessing a life more lasting indeed but of a worse condition, or of a shorter extent but of a more excellent condition, it appeared to them that a shorter but more excellent life was by all means to be preferred to one more lasting but of a subordinate condition. Hence they covered the head with a thin bone, but did not invert it with flesh and nerves, because it was destitute of inflections. On all these accounts, therefore, the head was added to the body as the most sensitive and prudent, but at the same time by far the most imbecil part of all the man. But through these causes, and in this manner, the Divinity placing the nerves about the extreme part of the head, conglutinated them in a circle about the neck, (after a certain similitude), and bound with them those lofty cheekbones situated under the countenance; but he disseminated the rest about all the members, connecting joint with joint. Besides, those adorners of our race ornamented us with the power of the mouth, teeth, tongue, and lips, and this for the sake of things which are at the same time both necessary and the best; producing ingression for the sake of necessaries, but egression for the sake of such as are best. Everything, indeed, which being introduced affords nutriment to the body, is necessary; but the stream of words flowing forth externally, and becoming subservient to prudence, is the most beautiful and best of all effluxion? Besides, it was not possible that the head could remain without any other

covering than that of a naked bone, through the extremities of heat and cold in the different seasons; nor, again, could it become the instrument of knowledge when invested with darkness, dulled, and without sensation, through the perturbation of flesh. Hence, a part of a fleshy nature, not entirely dried, and surpassing the residue, was separated from the rest; and which is now denominated a membrane. This membrane passing into union with itself, and blossoming about the moisture of the brain, circularly invests the head. But the moisture flowing under the sutures of the head irrigates this membrane, and, causing it to close together at the crown, connects it, as it were, in a knot. But an all-various species of futures is generated through the power of the circulations and the nutriment; the variety becoming greater when these oppose each other with greater violence, but less when they are in a state of less opposition. All this membrane the divine artificer of our bodies circularly pierced with fire. And hence, becoming as it were wounded, and the moisture externally flowing through it, whatever is moist, hot, and pure, passes away; but whatever is mingled from the same natures as the membrane itself, this, in consequence of receiving an external production, becomes extended into length, and possesses a tenuity equal to the punctuation of the membrane. But this substance, from the slowness of its motion, being continually thrust back by the externally surrounding spirit, again revolves itself under the membrane, and there fixes the roots of its progression. Hence, from these passions the race of hairs springs up in the membrane of the head, being naturally allied to, and becoming, as it were, the reins of this membrane, at the same time that they are more hard and dense through the compression of cold. For every hair, when it proceeds beyond the membrane, becomes hardened through cold. After this manner, then, the artificer planted our head with hairs,

employing for this purpose the causes which we have mentioned.

But at the same time he understood by a dianoëtic energy, that instead of flesh a light covering was necessary for the security of the brain; which might sufficiently shade and protect it like a garment from the extremities of heat and cold, but by no means hinder the acuteness of sensation. But that comprehension of nerve, skin, and bone about the fingers, being a mixture of three substances, and becoming of a drier nature, produced one common hard membrane from the whole. These indeed were the ministrant causes of its fabrication; but the most principal cause consists in that cogitation which produced this membrane for the sake of future advantage. For those artificers of our nature well knew that at some time or other women and other animals would be generated from men; and that nails would be of the greatest advantage in many respects to the bestial tribes. Hence they impressed in men the generation of nails, at the very period of their production. But from this reason, and through these causes, they planted the skin, hairs, and nails in the members situated at the extremities of the body. However, as all the parts and members of a mortal animal were generated in alliance with each other, and necessarily possessed their life in the union of fire and spirit, lest the animal becoming resolved and exhausted by these should swiftly decay, the Gods devised the following remedy: —For mingling a nature allied to the human with other forms and senses, they planted, as it were, another animal; such as those mild trees, plants, and seeds, which, being now brought to perfection through the exercise of agriculture, are friendly to our nature; though prior to this they were of a rustic kind, being more antient than such as are mild. For whatever participates of life we may justly and with the greatest rectitude denominate an animal. But this which we

are now speaking of participates the third species of soul, which we place between the præcordia and the navel: and in which there is neither anything of opinion, reason, or intellect; but to which a pleasant and painful sense, together with desires, belongs. For it continually suffers all things. But when it is converted in itself, about itself, and, rejecting external, employs its own proper motion, it is not allotted by its generation a nature capable of considering its own concerns by anything like a reasoning energy. On this account it lives, and is not different from an animal; but, becoming stably rooted, abides in a fixed position, through its being deprived of a motion originating from itself.

But when those superior artificers of our composition had implanted all these genera for the purpose of supplying nutriment to our nature, they deduced various channels in our body as in a garden, that it might be irrigated as it were by the accession of flowing moisture. And, in the first place, they cut two occult channels under the concretion of the skin and flesh, viz. two veins in the back, according to the double figure of the body on the right hand and the left. These they placed with the spine of the back, so as to receive the prolific marrow in the middle, that it might thus flourish in the most eminent degree; and, by copiously flowing from hence to other parts, might afford an equable irrigation. But after this, cutting the veins about the head, and weaving them with each other in an opposite direction, they separated them; inclining some from the right hand to the left hand parts of the body, and some from the left to the right, that the head, together with the skin, might be bound to the body, as it is not circularly divided with nerves about its summit; and besides this, that the passion of the senses might from each of these parts be deduced on all sides through the whole of the body. In this manner, then, they deduced an aqueduct from hence; the truth of which we

shall easily perceive by assenting to the following position. That all such things as are composed from lesser parts are able to contain such as are greater; but such as consist from greater cannot invest those composed from lesser parts. But fire, among all the genera of things, is constituted from the smallest parts. Hence, it penetrates through water, earth, and air, and the composites from these; and this in such a manner, that nothing can restrain its pervading power. The same must be understood of that ventricle our belly; that it is able to retain the intromitted meat and drink, but cannot stay spirit and fire, because these consist of smaller parts than those from which the belly is composed. These, therefore, the Divinity employed for the purpose of producing an irrigation from the belly into the veins; weaving, from fire and air a certain flexible substance like a bow-net, and which possesses a two-fold gibbosity at the entrance. One of these he again wove together, divided into two parts; and circularly extended these parts from the curvatures like ropes through the whole body, as far as to the extremities of the not. All the interior parts therefore of the network he composed from fire; but the gibbosities and the receptacle itself from air. And lastly, receiving these, he disposed them in the animal new formed as follows: —In the first place, one of the gibbous parts he assigned to the mouth; but, as the gibbosity of this part is two-fold, he caused one part to pass through the arteries into the lungs, but the other along with the arteries into the belly. But having divided the other gibbous part according to each of its parts, he caused it to pass in common to the channels of the nose, so that, when the one part does not reach the mouth, all its streams may be filled from this. But he placed the other cavity of this gibbous substance about the hollow parts of the body; and caused the whole of this at one time to flow together gently into the gibbous parts, as they were of an aerial texture, and

at another time to flow back again through the convex receptacles. But he so disposed the not, as being composed from a thin body, that it might inwardly penetrate and again emerge through this substance. Besides this, he ordered that the interior rays of fire should follow in continued succession, the air at the same time passing into each of the parts; and that this should never cease to take place as long as the mortal animal continued to subsist. But, in assigning an appellation to a motion of this kind, we denominate it expiration and respiration. But all this operation and the whole of this passion in our nature take place in the body by a certain irrigation and refrigeration conducive to our nutriment and life. For, when the breath passes inwardly and outwardly, an interior fire attends it in its course; and being diffused through the belly, when it meets with solid and liquid aliments, it reduces them to a state of fluidity; and, distributing them into the smallest parts, educes them as from a fountain through the avenues of its progression: pouring these small particles into the channels of the veins, and deducing rivers through the body as through a valley of veins.

But let us again consider the passion of respiration, and investigate through what causes it was generated, such as we perceive it at present. We should, consider it, therefore, as follows: —As there is no such thing as a vacuum into which anything in motion can enter, and as breath passes from us externally, it is evident to everyone that it cannot proceed into a void space, but must thrust that which is nearest to it from its proper seat; that again the repulsed nature must always expel its neighbor; and that from a necessity of this kind everything which is impelled into that seat from which the emitted breath is excluded, must, when it has entered into and filled up this space, attend on the breath in its progression. And all this must take place like

the revolution of a wheel, through the impossibility of a vacuum. Hence, when the breast and the lungs externally dismiss the breath, they are again replenished through the air which surrounds the body entering into and riding round the avenues of the flesh. But the air being again externally dismissed, and flowing round the body, impels the respiration inward, through the passages of the mouth and nostrils.

But we should establish the following as the cause from which the origin of these was derived. Every animal belonging to the universe possesses a heat in the veins and the blood, like a certain fountain of fire; and this heat we compared to a bow-net, extended through the middle of the body, and wholly woven from fire; all such things as are external being composed from air. But it must be confessed that heat naturally proceeds externally into a region to which it is allied. But as there are two progressions, one according to the body externally, but the other again according to the mouth and nostrils, hence, when the breath is impelled inward, it again thrusts back that by which it was impelled. And that which is drawn back, meeting with fire, becomes heated; while that which is exhaled becomes refrigerated. In consequence, therefore, of the heat being changed, and such things as subsist according to the other transition becoming more hot, and that again which is more fervid verging to its own nature, —hence, one thing strikes against and repels another in its course; and as they always suffer and mutually influence each other in the same manner, leaping this way and that in a circular progression, they give birth to the expiration and respiration of the breath. But in this manner also we should investigate the causes of those passions which arise from medical cupping-glasses, from drinking, from things violently hurled, whether upwards or on the ground; together with such sounds as appear swift

and slow, sharp and flat, and which are at one time borne along unharmoniously, through the dissimilitude of the motion which they cause within us, and at another time attended with harmony, through the similitude of motion which they produce. For, the motions of such sounds as are prior and swifter ceasing, and proceeding to a nature similar to their own, are comprehended by such as are slower, which now succeed to the swifter, and set them again in motion. But during their comprehension of these they do not disturb them by introducing another motion, but lead on the beginning of the slower lation in conformity to that of the swifter. And these, adapting to themselves a similitude of the ceasing motion, mingle together one passion from the union of sharp and flat. From whence they afford pleasure to the unwise, but joy to the wise, through the imitation of divine harmony subsisting in mortal motions. And, indeed, with respect to all effluxions of water, the falling of thunder, and the wonderful circumstances observed in the attraction of amber, and of the Herculean stone; —in all these, nothing in reality of attraction takes place: but, as a vacuum cannot anywhere be found, and these particulars mutually impel each other, —hence, from the individuals when separated and mingled together tending to their proper seats, and from these passions being interwoven with each other, such admirable effects present themselves to the view of the accurate investigator. And indeed respiration (from whence our discourse originated) is generated from these causes, and after this manner, as we asserted above. For fire, dividing the aliment and becoming elevated internally, attending at the same time the breath in its ascent, fills the veins from the belly by this joint elevation; and this in consequence of drawing upwards from thence the dissected parts: so that by this means, through the whole body of every animal, the streams of nutriment are abundantly diffused.

But the parts which are recently dissected and separated from their kindred natures, some of which are fruits and others grass, and which were produced by Divinity for the nourishment of our bodies, possess all-various colors through their mixture with each other: but for the most part a red color predominates in them, whose nature is fabricated from a section of fire, and an abstersion in a moist substance. And hence, the color of that which flows about the body is such as appears to the sight, and which we denominate blood; being the pasture of the flesh and of the whole body; from whence an irrigation becoming everywhere diffused, it copiously replenishes all the exhausted parts.

But the manner of impletion and evacuation is produced in the same way as in the universe the lation of everything takes place, viz. from that cause through which every kindred nature tends to itself. For the natures by which we are externally invested perpetually liquefy and distribute our bodies, dismissing every species to its kindred form. But the sanguineous parts, being distributed and comprehended within us, as is the case with every animal constituted under the heavens, are compelled to imitate the local motion of the universe. Each, therefore, of the divided parts within us, being borne along to its kindred nature, replenishes again that which is void. But when the effluxions for pass the accessions, a corruption of the whole animal ensues; and when the contrary takes place, it receives an increase. The recent composition, therefore, of every animal possessing new triangles, like ships formed from timbers unimpaired by age, causes a strong enclosure of them within each other: but the whole of its delicate bulk unites in amicable conjunction, as being generated from most recent marrow, and nourished in milk. Those triangles, therefore, from which the liquid and solid aliments are composed, approaching externally, and being received into the animal,

as they are more antient and imbecil than its own proper triangles, are vanquished and cut in pieces by the new triangles: and the animal is rendered of a large size, through its being nourished from a multitude of similar parts. But when it relaxes the root of its triangles, in consequence of becoming wearied and tamed, through many contests with many particulars in a long course of time; then it is no longer able to reduce by section the received aliment into a similitude of itself, but its own parts become easily dissipated by the natures which are externally introduced. Hence the whole animal, becoming by this means vanquished, decays; and the passion itself is denominated old-age. But the end of its existence then arrives, when the jointly harmonized bonds of the triangles about the marrow no longer possess a detaining power, but becoming separated through the weariness of labor, desert the bonds of the soul. The soul, however, in this case being concealed in a state according to nature, flies away with pleasure and delight, For everything contrary to nature is painful; but that which happens naturally is pleasant. Hence, the death which is produced through wounds and disease is painful and violent; but that which is caused from old-age, proceeding to an end according to nature, is of all deaths the most free from labor, and is rather accompanied with pleasure than pain.

But it must be obvious to everyone from whence diseases are produced. For, since there are four genera from which the body is composed, viz. earth, fire, water, and air, the unnatural abundance and defect, of these, and a translation from their own proper to a foreign seat, in consequence of which each of these does not receive that which is accommodated to its nature, together with all such circumstances as these, produce contentions and disease. For, each of these subsisting and being transferred in a

manner contrary to nature, such things as were formerly heated become cold, such as were once dry become moist, such as were light heavy, and everything receives all possible mutations. For we assert that when the same thing approaches to, and departs from, the same, in the same manner, and according to analogy, then alone it permits that which is the same to abide healthy and safe. But that which inordinately wanders, either in acceding or departing, produces all-various mutations, diseases, and infinite corruptions. Likewise a second apprehension of diseases may be obtained by anyone who is so disposed, from the second compositions of things constituted according to nature. For, since the concretion of marrow, bone, flesh, and nerve, is derived from these, as likewise the blood, though from a different mode of coalition, hence many events happen in the same manner as those we have mentioned above; but the greatest and most severe diseases subsist as follows: When the generation of these second compositions takes place inversely, then they become subject to corruption. For the flesh and nerves are naturally generated from blood: the nerves indeed from fibers, through the alliance subsisting between these; but the flesh from the coalition of that which when separated from the fibers passes into a state of concretion. But that substance again which arises from nerves and flesh, being glutinous and fat, increases at the same time by nutrition the flesh, which for the most part subsists about the nature of the bones; and likewise the bone itself, with which the marrow is surrounded. And again, that which trickles through the density of the bones, being the most pure kind of the triangles, and the most smooth and unctuous, while it drops and distils from the bones, irrigates the marrow. And hence, when each particular subsists in this manner, a healthy condition of body is produced; but a diseased condition

when the contrary is the case. For, when the flesh becoming liquefied again transmits the consumption into the veins, then the blood, together with spirit, becoming abundant and all-various in the veins, diversified with colors and density, and infected with acid and salt qualities, generates all-various bile, corruption, and phlegm. And all these, being again thus generated and corrupted, in the first place destroy the blood itself; and this, no longer affording nutriment to the body, is everywhere borne along through the veins, without observing a natural order in its circulations. But these indeed are unfriendly to each other, because they derive no mutual advantages from the properties with which each is endued. They likewise war upon the natural habit of the body, and its perseverance in its proper state, by introducing dissolutions and liquefactions.

A most antient portion of flesh, therefore, when it is liquefied and rendered difficult of digestion, grows black through antient burning; but through its being entirely macerated it becomes bitter, and adverse to all the other parts of the body which are not yet infected with corruption. And then indeed the black color possesses sharpness instead of bitterness; that which was bitter becoming more attenuated: and the bitterness, being again tinged with blood, possesses a redder color; but, from the black which is mingled with this, becomes of a bilious nature. But, besides this, a yellow color is mingled with bitterness, when the new flesh liquefies through the fire subsisting about flame. And, indeed, either some physician will assign to all these the common appellation of bile, or someone who is able to consider things many and dissimilar, and to behold one genus in many particulars deserving one denomination. But such other things as are called species of bile receive an appellation peculiar to each, according to color. But

corruption (ὁχωρ) which is the defluxion or whey of the blood, is gentle and mild: but that which is the sediment of black and sharp bile is of a ferocious and rustic nature, when it is mingled through heat with a saline power. And a substance of this kind is denominated acid phlegm. But a portion of recent and delicate flesh is often liquefied together with the air, and is after wards inflated and comprehended by moisture: and from this passion bubbles are produced, which taken separately are invisible on account of their smallness, but which, when collected into a large bulk, become conspicuous, and possess a white color on account of the generation of froth. And we denominate all this liquefaction of delicate flesh, and which is woven together with spirit, white phlegm. But we call the sediment of recent phlegm tears and sweat; together with everything of that kind into which the body is every day resolved. And all these, indeed, become the instruments of disease, when the blood does not naturally abound from liquid and solid aliment, but increases from contraries in such a manner as to violate the laws of nature. When, therefore, any part of the flesh is cut off, but at the same time the foundation of it remains, the calamity possesses but half its power; for it is capable of being easily recovered. But when that which binds the flesh to the bones becomes diseased, and the blood flowing from it and the nerves no longer nourishes the bones and binds the flesh, but, instead of being fat, smooth, and glutinous, becomes rough and salt through bad diet; then, in consequence of suffering all this, and being separated from the bones, it is refrigerated under the flesh and nerves. For the flesh, falling from its roots, leaves the nerves bare, and drenched in a salt humor; and hence, gliding again into the circulation of the blood, it increases the number of the diseases we have already described. And these passions, indeed, which subsist about the body, are of a grievous

nature: but those which precede these are still more afflictive and troublesome. But this takes place when the bone through the density of the flesh does not admit sufficient respiration, but, being heated through filthiness, becomes rotten, receives no nutriment, but falls upon the flesh, which is on the contrary refrigerated; and the flesh again falls on the blood, so that by this means diseases more severe than the former are produced. But the extremity of all maladies then happens, when the nature of the marrow becomes diseased through some defect or excess: for then it produces the most vehement and fatal diseases; as the whole nature of the body is in this case necessarily dissipated and dissolved.

But it is requisite after this to understand that the third species of diseases receives a tripartite division. For one of the divisions is produced by spirit, the other by phlegm, and the other by bile. For when the lungs, those distributive guardians of the breath, being obstructed by defluxions, cannot afford a free passage to the breath; then, as there is no emission of the breath in one part, and more is received into another part than is requisite, the parts without refrigeration become rotten; but that which is received in too great abundance passing through the veins, distorts them and liquefies the diaphragm situated in the middle of the body: and thus ten thousand grievous diseases arise from hence, together with an abundance of sweat. But often, when the flesh becomes separated within the body, breath is produced; and this being incapable of departing externally, causes the same torments as the breath when entering from without. It produces, however, the greatest pains, when surrounding the nerves and neighboring veins it inflates them, and stretches and distorts the ligaments and nerves continued from the back. And these diseases, from the stretching and inflating passion, are denominated

tensions and contortions from behind; and of which it is difficult to find a cure. For, fevers taking place dissolve these diseases in a most eminent degree. But the white phlegm possessing a difficulty of respiring externally, through the spirit of the bubbles, variegates the body indeed in a milder nature, yet sprinkles it with white spots, and generates other diseases of a similar kind. But when this white phlegm is mingled with black bile, and becomes dissipated about the circulations of the head, which are of a most divine nature, then it disturbs these circulations; and if this happens in sleep, the perturbation is less violent; but if to those who are awake, it cannot without difficulty be expelled. And as this is a disease of a sacred nature, it is most justly denominated a sacred disease.

A sharp and salt phlegm is the fountain of all such diseases as are produced by a defluxion of humors: and because the places into which this phlegm flows possess an omniform variety, it generates all-various diseases. But whatever parts of the body are said to be inflated are thus affected from the inflammation of bile: which, when it expires, produces externally various tumors from its fervid nature; but, when inwardly restrained, generates many inflammatory diseases. It is, however, then greatest, when, being mingled with pure blood, it removes the fibers from their natural order, which are scattered into the blood for this purpose, that it may possess tenuity and density in a commensurate degree; and that it may neither through heat (as it is of a moist nature) flow from the thin body, nor, when becoming more dense, and of consequence more unadapted to motion, may scarcely be able to flow back again through the veins. The fibers, therefore, are very serviceable on this occasion, which if anyone should collect together in the blood when dead, and in a state of frigidity, all the remaining blood would become diffused; and when poured forth they

would be swiftly coagulated, together with the cold by which they are surrounded. But as the fibers possess this power in the blood, and the bile naturally becomes antient blood, and is again liquefied from flesh into this, such things as are hot and moist falling gradually the first of all, hence it becomes collected together through the power of the fibers. When the bile is coagulated and violently extinguished, it causes a tempest and tremor within. But when it flows more abundantly, vanquishing the fibers by its own proper heat, and becoming fervid in an inordinate degree, it then preserves the body: and if it retains its conquering power to the end, it penetrates into the marrow; and burning the bonds of the soul, as if they were the cables of a ship, dissolves her union, and dismisses her from thence entirely free. But when it flows with less abundance, and the body becoming liquefied opposes its passage, then finding itself vanquished, it either falls through the whole body, or, being compelled through the veins into the upper or lower belly, like one flying from a seditious city, it escapes from the body and introduces defluxions, dysenteries, or gripings of the intestines, and all diseases of a similar kind. When the body, therefore, is eminently diseased through excess of fire, it then labors under continued burnings and fever; but when through excess of air, under quotidian fevers under tertian through water, because water is more sluggish than fire and air; under quartan, through excess of earth. For earth, being the most sluggish of all these, is purified in quadruple periods of time; and on this account introduces quartan fevers, which it is scarcely possible to disperse. And in this manner are the diseases of the body produced.

But the diseases of the soul, which subsist through the habit of the body, are as follow: —We must admit that the disease of the soul is folly, or a privation of intellect. But there are two kinds of folly; the one madness, the other

ignorance. Whatever passion, therefore, introduces either of these must be called a disease. And we should establish excessive pleasures and pains as the greatest diseases of the soul. For, when a man is too much elevated with joy or depressed with grief, while he hastens immoderately either to retain the one or to fly from the other, he is not able either to perceive or hear anything properly, but is agitated with fury, and is very little capable of exercising the reasoning power. But he who possesses a great quantity of fluid seed about the marrow, and who, like a tree laden with a superabundance of fruit, riots in the excess, —such a one being influenced by many pains and pleasures in desires, and their attendant offspring, will be agitated with fury for the greatest part of his life through mighty pleasures and pains: and though the soul of such a one will be diseased and unwise, from the body with which it is connected, yet it will be falsely considered not as diseased, but as voluntarily bad. But in reality venereal intemperance for the most part becomes a disease of the soul, through a habit of one kind, from the tenuity of the bones, in a body fluid and moist. And, indeed, it may be nearly asserted, that all intemperance of pleasures of whatever kind, and all disgraceful conduct, is not properly blamed as the consequence of voluntary guilt. For no one is voluntarily bad: but he who is depraved becomes so through a certain ill habit of body, and an unskillful education. But these two circumstances are inimical to all, and productive of a certain ill. And again, the soul, when influenced by pain, suffers much depravity from this through the body. For, when sharp and salt phlegm, and likewise bitter and bilious humors, wandering through the body, are prevented from passing forth externally, but, revolving inwardly, mingle their exhalations with the circulation of the soul; in this case they produce all-various diseases of the soul, in a greater and less degree, and less

and more numerous. They are introduced, indeed, to three seats of the soul; and according to the diversity of the place, each generates all-various species of difficulty and sorrow, of boldness and timidity, and, still further, of oblivion and indocility. But, besides this, the vicious manners of cities, and discourses both private and public, often contribute to increase this malady: nor are any disciplines taught in the early part of life, which might serve as remedies for such mighty ills. And thus all such as are vicious are so through two involuntary causes; the existence of which we should always rather ascribe to the planters than to the things planted, and to the educators rather than to the educated. We should, therefore, endeavor to the utmost of our ability, by education, studies, and disciplines, to fly from vice, and acquire its contrary, virtue. But these particulars, indeed, belong to another mode of discourse.

Again, therefore, with respect to the contrary of these, it is now proper to explain in a becoming manner by what culture, and from what causes, we may preserve both the body and dianoëtic energies of the soul. For it is more just to discourse concerning good things than of such as are evil. But everything good is beautiful; and that which is beautiful is not destitute of measure. An animal, therefore, which is about to be beautiful and good, must possess commensuration. But, perceiving certain small particulars of things commensurate, we syllogize concerning them; while at the same time we are ignorant of such as are greatest and the chief. For, indeed, no symmetry and immoderation is of greater consequence with respect to health and disease, virtue and vice, than that of the soul towards the body. But we consider no circumstance of these; nor do we perceive that when a more imbecil and inferior form is the vehicle of a robust and every way mighty soul, and when, on the contrary, these two pass into a state of

concretion, then the whole animal cannot subsist in a beautiful manner: For it is incommensurate through the want of the greatest symmetry. But the animal whose composition is contrary to this, affords a spectacle to him who is able to behold it, of all spectacles the most beautiful and lovely. When the body, therefore, possesses legs immoderately large, or any other member surpassing its just proportion, and becomes through this incommensurate with itself, it is rendered at the same time base, in the endurance of labor suffers many molestations and many convulsions, and through an aggregation of accidents becomes the cause of innumerable maladies to itself. The same too must be understood concerning that composition of body and soul which we denominate an animal. As, for instance, that when the soul in this composite is more robust than the body, and possesses it raging and transported, then the soul, agitating the whole of it, inwardly fills it with diseases; and, when she vehemently applies herself to certain disciplines, causes it to liquefy and waste away. Lastly, when the soul employs herself in teaching and literary contests, both in public and private, through a certain ambitious strife, then inflaming the body, she dissolves its constitution; and besides this, introducing distillations of humors, she deceives the most part of those who are called physicians, and induces them to consider these effects as proceeding from contrary causes.

But again, when a mighty body and above measure frigid is conjoined with a small and imbecil dianoëtic part, since there are naturally two-fold desires in man, one of aliment through the body, but the other of prudence through the most divine part of our nature; —in this case, the motions of that which is more powerful prevail, and increase that which is their own: but render the dianoëtic part of the soul dull, indocile, and oblivious, and thus produce ignorance, which is the greatest of all diseases. But this one thing alone is the

health and safety of both—neither to move the soul without the body, nor the body without the soul; that, being equally balanced in their mutual contentions, the health of the whole composite may be preserved. Hence, he who vehemently applies himself to the mathematics, or to any other dianoëtic exercise, should also employ the motion of the body, and be familiar with gymnastic. And again, he who is careful in forming his body aright should at the same time unite with this the motions of the soul, employing music and all philosophy; if he is to be rendered such a one as can be justly called beautiful, and at the same time truly good. In the same manner, too, we ought to take care of the parts of the body, imitating the form of the whole. For when the body, through such things as are introduced from without, is inflamed and refrigerated, and is again rendered dry and moist by externals, and suffers everything consequent to these affections; then, if anyone in a quiet state gives up his body to motions, he will be vanquished by them and dissolved. But if anyone imitates that nature which we called the nourisher of the universe, so as never to suffer the body to be in a state of rest, but perpetually moves and agitates it throughout, he will then assist the internal and external motions according to nature; and, in consequence of a moderate agitation, will reduce into order and adorn the wandering passions and parts of the body, according to their alliance with each other. Such a one, indeed, as we said in our former discourse about the universe, will not, by placing foe against foe, suffer war and disease to be produced in the body; but, combining friend with friend, will thus render the body healthy and sound. But, of all motions, that is the best in any nature which takes place in itself from itself: for this is particularly allied to the dianoëtic motion of the universe. But that motion is of the worse kind which is produced by another. And that is the worst of all motions, when the body,

being in a recumbent and quiet state, is moved by others according to parts. And hence, of all the purgations and concretions of the body, that is the best which subsists through gymnastic. The next to this is that which takes place through easy carriage, whether in a ship or any other convenient vehicle. But the third species of motion is only to be used when vehemently necessary, and at no other time by anyone endued with intellect: and this is that medical motion which is performed by pharmaceutical purgations. For diseases, unless they are extremely dangerous, are not to be irritated by medicines. For every composition of diseases is in a certain respect similar to the nature of animals. And indeed the association of the animal nature is allotted stated periods of life; both the whole genus, and every individual, containing in itself a fatal term of living, separate from the passions which necessity produces. For the triangles, which from the very beginning possessed the power of each animal, are sufficiently able to cohere together for a certain time: but life beyond this period cannot be extended to anyone. The same mode of composition likewise subsists about diseases; which if anyone destroys by medicine before the fated time, he will only produce great diseases from small ones, and many from a few. On this account it is necessary to discipline all such maladies by proper diet, according as everyone's leisure will permit; and to avoid irritating by medicines a most difficult disease. And thus much may suffice concerning the common animal and its corporeal part; and how these may be disciplined and governed in such a manner as to produce a life according to reason in the most eminent degree.

But that which is destined to govern, ought much more and by far the first to be furnished as much as possible with such materials as may render it capable, of disciplinative sway, in a manner the most beautiful and the best. To

discuss accurately indeed particulars of this kind would require a treatise solely confined to such a discussion: but if anyone slightly considers this affair in a manner consequent to what has been above delivered, such a one by thus proceeding will not unseasonably arrive at the end of his pursuit. We have often then previously asserted that there are three species of soul within us, triply distributed; and that each has its own proper motions. And we shall now, therefore, briefly affirm, that when anyone of them is in a torpid state, and rests from its own proper motions, it necessarily becomes most imbecil; but that, when it is employed in convenient exercises, it becomes most vigorous and robust. We should, therefore, be careful that the several species may preserve their motions, so as to be commensurate to each other.

But with respect, however, to the most principal and excellent species of the soul, we should conceive as follows: that Divinity assigned this to each of us as a daemon; and that it resides in the very summit of the body, elevating us from earth to an alliance with the heavens; as we are not terrestrial plants, but blossoms of heaven. And this indeed is most truly asserted. For, from whence the first generation of the soul arose, from thence a divine nature being suspended from our head and root, directs and governs the whole of our corporeal frame. In him, therefore, who vehemently labors to satisfy the cravings of desire and ambition, all the conceptions of his soul must be necessarily mortal; and himself as much as possible must become entirely mortal, since he leaves nothing unaccomplished which tends to increase his perishable part. But it is necessary that he who is sedulously employed in the acquisition of knowledge, who is anxious to acquire the wisdom of truth, and who employs his most vigorous exertions in this one pursuit; —it is perfectly necessary that

such a one, if he touches on the truth, should be endued with wisdom about immortal and divine concerns; and that he should participate of immortality, as far as human nature permits, without leaving any part of it behind. And besides, as such a one always cultivates that which is divine, and has a daemon most excellently adorned residing in his essence, he must be happy in the most eminent degree. But the culture of all the parts is indeed entirely one, and consists in assigning proper nutriment and motion to each. But the motions which are allied to the divine part of our nature are the dianoëtic energies and circulations of the universe. These, therefore, each of us ought to pursue; restoring in such a manner those revolutions in our head (which have been corrupted by our wanderings about generation), through diligently considering the harmonies and circulations of the universe, that the intellective power may become assimilated to the object of intelligence, according to its ancient nature. For, when thus assimilated, we shall obtain the end of the best life proposed by the Gods to men, both at present and in all the future circulations of time. And now that disputation which we announced at the beginning concerning the universe, as far as to the generation of man, has almost received its consummation. For we shall briefly run over the generation of other animals, and this no further than necessity requires: for thus anyone may appear to himself to preserve a convenient measure in such a disputation. Let us, therefore, speak concerning these as follows:

Those who on becoming men are timid, and pass through life unjustly, will according to assimilative reasoning be changed into women in their second generation. And at the same time through this cause the Gods devised the love of copulation; composing an animal or animated substance, and placing one in us, but another in the female nature. But

they produced each in the following manner. That procession of liquid aliment which passes through the lungs under the reins into the bladder, and which being compressed by the breath is emitted externally, —this the Gods receiving, they deduced it after the manner of a pipe into the concrete marrow, through the neck and spine of the back: and this is what we called seed in the former part of our discourse. But this, in consequence of being animated and receiving respiration, produces in the part where it respires a vital desire of effluxion; and thus perfects in us the love of begetting. On this account, that nature which subsists about the privy parts of men, becoming refractory and imperious, and as it were an animal unobedient to reason, endeavors through raging desire to possess absolute sway. In like manner the privities and matrix of women, forming an animal desirous of procreating children, when it remains without fruit beyond the flower of its age, or for a still more extended period, suffers the restraint with difficulty and indignation; and wandering every way through the body, obstructs the passage of the breath, does not permit respiration to take place, introduces other extreme difficulties, and causes all-various diseases; till the desire and love of the parts educe seed like fruit from a tree: but, when educed, they scatter it into the matrix as into a field. Hence women conceive animals invisible at first through their smallness, rude and unformed; when they become large, through dispersion of the seed, nourish them within; and, lastly, leading them into light perfect the generation of animals. In this manner, therefore, is the generation of women and everything female performed. But the tribe of birds in the next place, fashioned from men, and receiving wings instead of hairs. These are produced from such men as are indeed innocent, but inconstant and light; who are curious about things situated on high; but are so infatuated

as to think, from the testimony of the sight, that demonstrations about things of this kind are the most firm and incontrovertible of all. But the pedestrian and savage tribe of animals was generated from men, who being entirely destitute of philosophy, never elevated their eyes to any object in the heavens; and this because they never employed the circulations in the head, but followed the impulse of those parts of the soul which rule in the belly and breast. Hence from studies of this kind drawing the anterior members and head to the ground, they fix them through proximity of nature in the earth. Besides this, they possess long and all-various heads; as the circulations of each are through idleness compressed and broken: and by this means their race becomes quadruped and multiped; the Divinity assigning many feet to such as are more unwise, that they may be more strongly drawn towards the earth. But the most unwise of these, and every way extending all their body on the earth, as if there was no longer any occasion of feet, the Gods generated without feet, and destined them to creep on the earth. The fourth genus is the aquatic, which was produced from such men as were stupid and ignorant in the most remarkable degree; and whom those transformers of our nature did not think deserving of a pure respiration, on account of their possessing a soul in an unpurified state, through extreme transgression. And hence they impelled them into the turbid and profound respiration of water, instead of the attenuated and pure respiration of air: from whence the genus of fish and oysters, and the multitude of all aquatic animals arose; and who are allotted habitations in the last regions of the universe, as the punishment of extreme ignorance. And thus after this manner, both formerly and now, animals migrate into each other; while they are changed by the loss and acquisition of intellect and folly. Our discourse, therefore, concerning the

universe has now obtained its conclusion. For this world, comprehending and receiving its completion from mortal and immortal animals, is thus rendered a visible animal containing visible natures, the image of an intelligible God, sensible, the greatest and best, the most beautiful and perfect; being no other than this one and only-begotten heaven.

Timaeus

Translated by Donald J. Zeyl.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Critias, Timaeus, Hermocrates

Socrates/ One, two, three... Where's number four, Timaeus? The four of you were my guests yesterday and today I'm to be yours.

Timaeus/ He came down with something or other, Socrates. He wouldn't have missed our meeting willingly.

Socrates/ Well then, isn't it for you and your companions to fill in for your absent friend?

Timaeus/ You're quite right. Anyhow, we'll do our best not to come up short. You did such a fine job yesterday hosting us visitors that now it wouldn't be right if the three of us didn't go all out to give you a feast in return.

Socrates/ Do you remember all the subjects I assigned to you to speak on?

Timaeus/ Some we do. And if there are any we don't—well, you're here to remind us. Better still, if it's not too much trouble, why don't you take a few minutes to go back through them from the beginning? That way they'll be the more firmly fixed in our minds.

Socrates/ Very well. I talked about politics yesterday and my main point, I think, had to do with the kind of political structure cities should have and the kind of men that should make it up so as to be the best possible.

Timaeus/ Yes, Socrates, so you did, and we were all very satisfied with your description of it.

Socrates/ Didn't we begin by separating off the class of farmers and all the other craftsmen in the city from the class of those who were to wage war on its behalf?

Timaeus/ Yes.

Socrates/ And we followed nature in giving each person only one occupation, one craft for which he was well suited. And so we said that only those whose job it was to wage war on everyone's behalf should be the guardians of the city. And if some foreigner or even a citizen were to go against the city to cause trouble, these guardians should judge their own subjects lightly, since they are their natural friends. But they should be harsh, we said, with the enemies they encountered on the battlefield.

Timaeus/ Yes, absolutely.

Socrates/ That's because—as I think we said—the guardians' souls should have a nature that is at once both spirited and philosophical to the highest degree, to enable them to be appropriately gentle or harsh as the case may be.

Timaeus/ Yes.

Socrates/ What about their training? Didn't we say that they were to be given both physical and cultural training, as well as training in any other appropriate fields of learning?

Timaeus/ We certainly did.

Socrates/ Yes, and we said, I think, that those who received this training shouldn't consider gold or silver or anything else as their own private property. Like the professionals they are, they should receive from those under their protection a wage for their guardianship that's in keeping with their moderate way of life. And we said that they should share their expenses and spend their time together, live in one another's company, and devote their care above all to excellence, now that they were relieved of all other occupations.

Timaeus/ Yes, we said that as well.

Socrates/ And in fact we even made mention of women. We said that their natures should be made to correspond with those of men, and that all occupations, whether having to do with war or with the other aspects of life, should be common to both men and women.

Timaeus/ That, too, was discussed.

Socrates/ And what did we say about the procreation of children? We couldn't possibly forget that subject, because what we said about it was so unusual. We decided that they should all have spouses and children in common and that schemes should be devised to prevent anyone of them from recognizing his or her own particular child. Every one of them would believe that they all make up a single family, and that all who fall within their own age bracket are their sisters and brothers, that those who are older, who fall in an earlier bracket, are their parents or grandparents, while those who fall in a later one are their children or grandchildren.

Timaeus/ You're right. That really was an unforgettable point.

Socrates/ And surely we also remember saying, don't we, that to make their natures as excellent as possible right from the start, the rulers, male and female, should secretly arrange marriages by lot, to make sure that good men and bad ones would each as a group be separately matched up with women like themselves? And we said that this arrangement wouldn't create any animosity among them, because they' believe that the matching was due to chance?

Timaeus/ Yes, we remember.

Socrates/ And do we also remember saying that the children of the good parents were to be brought up, while those of the bad ones were to be secretly handed on to another city? And that these children should be constantly watched as they grew up, so that the ones that turned out deserving might

be taken back again and the ones they kept who did not turn out that way should change places with them?

Timaeus/ We did say so.

Socrates/ So now, Timaeus, are we done with our review of yesterday's talk—at least with its main points—or are we missing some point we made then? Have we left anything out?

Timaeus/ Not a thing, Socrates. This is exactly what we said.

Socrates/ All right, I'd like to go on now and tell you what I've come to feel about the political structure we've described. My feelings are like those of a man who gazes upon magnificent looking animals, whether they're animals in a painting or even actually alive but standing still, and who then finds himself longing to look at them in motion or engaged in some struggle or conflict that seems to show off their distinctive physical qualities. I felt the same thing about the city we've described. I'd love to listen to someone give a speech depicting our city in a contest with other cities, competing for those prizes that cities typically compete for. I'd love to see our city distinguish itself in the way it goes to war and in the way it pursues the war: that it deals with the other cities, one after another, in ways that reflect positively on its own education and training, both in word and deed—that is, both in how it behaves toward them and how it negotiates with them. Now on these matters, Critias and Hermocrates, I charge myself with being quite unable to sing fitting praise to our city and its men. That this should be so in my case isn't at all surprising. But I have come to have the same opinion of the poets, our ancient poets as well as today's. I have no disrespect for poets in general, but everyone knows that imitators as a breed are best and most adept at imitating the sort of things they've been trained to imitate. It's difficult enough for anyone of them to do a decent job of imitating in

performance, let alone in narrative description, anything that lies outside their training. And again, I've always thought that sophists as a class are very well versed in making long speeches and doing many other fine things. But because they wander from one city to the next and never settle down in homes of their own, I'm afraid their representations of those philosopher-statesmen would simply miss their mark. Sophists are bound to misrepresent whatever these leaders accomplish on the battlefield when they engage any of their enemies, whether in actual warfare or in negotiations.

So that leaves people of your sort, then. By nature as well as by training you take part in both philosophy and politics at once. Take Timaeus here. He's from Locri, an Italian city under the rule of excellent laws. None of his compatriots outrank him in property or birth, and he has come to occupy positions of supreme authority and honor in his city. Moreover, he has, in my judgment, mastered the entire field of philosophy. As for Critias, I'm sure that all of us here in Athens know that he's no mere layman in any of the areas we're talking about. And many people whose testimony must surely be believed assure us that Hermocrates, too, is well qualified by nature and training to deal with these matters. Already yesterday I was aware of this when you asked me to discuss matters of government, and that's why I was eager to do your bidding. I knew that if you'd agree to make the follow-up speech, no one could do a better job than you. No one today besides you could present our city pursuing a war that reflects her true character. Only you could give her all she requires. So now that I'm done speaking on my assigned subject, I've turned the tables and assigned you to speak on the subject I've just described. You've thought about this together as a group, and you've agreed to reciprocate at this time. Your speeches are your hospitality gifts, and so here I am, all

dressed up for the occasion. No one could be more prepared to receive your gifts than I.

Hermocrates/ Yes indeed, Socrates, you won't find us short on enthusiasm, as Timaeus has already told you. We don't have the slightest excuse for not doing as you say. Why, already yesterday, right after we had left here and got to Critias' guest quarters where we're staying—and even earlier on our way there—we were thinking about this very thing. And then Critias brought up a story that goes back a long way. Tell him the story now, Critias, so he can help us decide whether or not it will serve the purpose of our assignment.

Critias/ Yes, we really should, if our third partner, Timaeus, also agrees.

Timaeus/ Of course I do.

Critias/ Let me tell you this story then, Socrates. It's a very strange one, but even so, every word of it is true. It's a story that Solon, the wisest of the seven sages once vouched for. He was a kinsman and a very close friend of my great-grandfather Dropides. Solon himself says as much in many places in his poetry. Well, Dropides told the story to my grandfather Critias, and the old man in his turn would tell it to us from memory. The story is that our city had performed great and marvelous deeds in ancient times, which, owing to the passage of time and to the destruction of human life, have vanished. Of all these deeds one in particular was magnificent. It is this one that we should now do well to commemorate and present to you as our gift of thanks. In so doing we shall also offer the goddess a hymn, as it were, of just and true praise on this her festival.

Socrates/ Splendid! Tell me, though, what was that ancient deed our city performed, the one that Solon reported and old Critias told you about? I've never heard of it. They say it really happened?

Critias/ I'll tell you. It's an ancient story I heard from a man who was no youngster himself. In fact, at the time Critias was pretty close to ninety years old already—so he said—and I was around ten or so. As it happened, it was the day of the presentation of children during the Apaturia. On this occasion, too, we children got the customary treatment at the feast: our fathers started a recitation contest. Many compositions by many different poets were recited, and many of us children got to sing the verses of Solon, because they were new at the time. Now someone, a member of our clan, said that he thought that Solon was not only the wisest of men in general, but that his poetry in particular showed him to be the most civilized of all the poets. (The man may have been speaking his mind, or else he may have just wanted to make Critias feel good.) And the old man—how well I remember it—was tickled. He grinned broadly and said, "Yes, Amynander, it's too bad that Solon wrote poetry only as a diversion and didn't seriously work at it like the other poets. And too bad that he never finished the story he'd brought back home with him from Egypt. He was forced to abandon that story on account of the civil conflicts and all the other troubles he found here when he returned. Otherwise not even Hesiod or Homer, or any other poet at all would ever have become more famous than he. That's what I think, anyhow." "Well, Critias? What story was that?" asked the other. "It's the story about the most magnificent thing our city has ever done," replied Critias, "an accomplishment that deserves to be known far better than any of her other achievements. But owing to the march of time and the fact that the men who accomplished it have perished, the story has not survived to the present." "Please tell us from the beginning," said the other, "What was this 'true story' that Solon heard? How did he get to hear it? Who told him?"

“In Egypt,” Critias began, “in that part of the Delta where the stream of the Nile divides around the vertex there is a district called the Saitic. The most important city of this district is Sais. (This is in fact also the city from which King Amasis came.) This city was founded by a goddess whose name was ‘Neith’ in Egyptian and (according to the people there) ‘Athena’ in Greek. They are very friendly to Athens and claim to be related to our people somehow or other. Now Solon said that when he arrived there the people began to revere him. Furthermore, he said that when he asked those priests of theirs who were scholars of antiquity about ancient times, he discovered that just about every Greek, including himself, was all but completely ignorant about such matters. On one occasion, wanting to lead them on to talk about antiquity, he broached the subject of our own ancient history. He started talking about Phoroneus—the first human being, it is said—and about Niobe, and then he told the story of how Deucalion and Pyrrha survived the flood. He went on to trace the lines of descent of their posterity, and tried to compute their dates by calculating the number of years which had elapsed since the events of which he spoke. And then one of the priests, a very old man, said, ‘Ah, Solon, Solon, you Greeks are ever children. There isn’t an old man among you.’ On hearing this, Solon said, ‘What? What do you mean?’ ‘You are young,’ the old priest replied, ‘young in soul, every one of you. Your souls are devoid of beliefs about antiquity handed down by ancient tradition. Your souls lack any learning made hoary by time. The reason for that is this: There have been, and there will continue to be, numerous disasters that have destroyed human life in many kinds of ways. The most serious of these involve fire and water, while the lesser ones have numerous other causes. And so also among your people the tale is told that Phaethon, child of the Sun, once harnessed his father’s chariot, but was unable to drive it along his father’s course.

He ended up burning everything on the earth's surface and was destroyed himself when a lightning bolt struck him. This tale is told as a myth, but the truth behind it is that there is a deviation in the heavenly bodies that travel around the earth, which causes huge fires that destroy what is on the earth across vast stretches of time. When this happens all those people who live in mountains or in places that are high and dry are much more likely to perish than the ones who live next to rivers or by the sea. Our Nile, always our savior, is released and at such times, too, saves us from this disaster. On the other hand, whenever the gods send floods of water upon the earth to purge it, the herdsmen and shepherds in the mountains preserve their lives, while those who live in cities, in your region, are swept by the rivers into the sea. But here, in this place, water does not flow from on high onto our fields, either at such a time or any other. On the contrary, its nature is always to rise up from below. This, then, explains the fact that the antiquities preserved here are said to be the most ancient. The truth is that in all places where neither inordinate cold nor heat prevent it, the human race will continue to exist, sometimes in greater, sometimes in lesser numbers. Now of all the events reported to us, no matter where they've occurred—in your parts or in ours—if there are any that are noble or great or distinguished in some other way, they've all been inscribed here in our temples and preserved from antiquity on. In your case, on the other hand, as in that of others, no sooner have you achieved literacy and all the other resources that cities require, than there again, after the usual number of years, comes the heavenly flood. It sweeps upon you like a plague, and leaves only your illiterate and uncultured people behind. You become infants all over again, as it were, completely unfamiliar with anything there was in ancient times, whether here or in your own region. And so, Solon, the account you just gave of your people's lineage is

just like a nursery tale. First of all, you people remember only one flood, though in fact there had been a great many before. Second, you are unaware of the fact that the finest and best of all the races of humankind once lived in your region. This is the race from whom you yourself, your whole city, all that you and your countrymen have today, are sprung, thanks to the survival of a small portion of their stock. But this has escaped you, because for many generations the survivors passed on without leaving a written record. Indeed, Solon, there was a time, before the greatest of these devastating floods, when the city that is Athens today not only excelled in war but also distinguished itself by the excellence of its laws in every area. Its accomplishments and its social arrangements are said to have been the finest of all those under heaven of which we have received report.'

"When Solon heard this he was astounded, he said, and with unreserved eagerness begged the priests to give him a detailed, consecutive account of all that concerned those ancient citizens. 'I won't grudge you this, Solon.' the priest replied. I'll tell you the story for your own benefit as well as your city's, and especially in honor of our patron goddess who has founded, nurtured and educated our cities, both yours and ours. Yours she founded first, a thousand years before ours, when she had received from Earth and Hephaestus the seed from which your people were to come. Now our social arrangement, according to the records inscribed in our sacred documents, is eight thousand years old. Nine thousand years ago, then, did these fellow citizens of yours live, whose laws and whose finest achievement I'll briefly describe to you. At another time we'll go through all the details one by one at our leisure and inspect the documents themselves.

"'Let's compare your ancient laws with ours today. You'll discover many instances that once existed among you, existing among us today. First, you'll find that the class of

priests is marked off and separated from the other classes. Next, in the case of the working class, you'll find that each group—the herdsmen, the hunters and the farmers—works independently, without mixing with the others. In particular, I'm sure you've noticed that our warrior class has been separated from all the others. It's been assigned by law to occupy itself exclusively with matters of war. Moreover, the style of armor used is that of shields and spears, which we were the first among the peoples of Asia to use for arming ourselves. The goddess instructed us just as she first instructed you in the regions where you live. Moreover, as for wisdom, I'm sure you can see how much attention our way of life here has devoted to it, right from the beginning. In our study of the world order we have traced all our discoveries, including prophecy and health-restoring medicine, from those divine realities to human levels, and we have also acquired all the other related disciplines. This is in fact nothing less than the very same system of social order that the goddess first devised for you when she founded your city, which she did once she had chosen the region in which your people were born, and had discerned that the temperate climate in it throughout the seasons would bring forth men of surpassing wisdom. And, being a lover of both war and wisdom, the goddess chose the region that was likely to bring forth men most like herself, and founded it first. And so you came to live there, and to observe laws such as these. In fact your laws improved even more, so that you came to surpass all other peoples in every excellence, as could be expected from those whose begetting and nurture were divine.

"'Now many great accomplishments of your city recorded here are awe-inspiring, but there is one that surely surpasses them all in magnitude and excellence. The records speak of a vast power that your city once brought to a halt in its insolent march against the whole of Europe and Asia at once—a power

that sprang forth from beyond, from the Atlantic ocean. For at that time this ocean was passable, since it had an island in it in front of the strait that you people say you call the 'Pillars of Heracles.' This island was larger than Libya and Asia combined, and it provided passage to the other islands for people who traveled in those days. From those islands one could then travel to the entire continent on the other side, which surrounds that real sea beyond. Everything here inside the strait we're talking about seems nothing but a harbor with a narrow entrance, whereas that really is an ocean out there and the land that embraces it all the way around truly deserves to be called a continent. Now on this Isle of Atlantis a great and marvelous royal power established itself, and ruled not only the whole island, but many of the other islands and parts of the continent as well. What's more, their rule extended even inside the strait, over Libya as far as Egypt, and over Europe as far as Tyrrhenia. Now one day this power gathered all of itself together, and set out to enslave all of the territory inside the strait, including your region and ours, in one fell swoop. Then it was, Solon, that your city's might shone bright with excellence and strength, for all humankind to see. Preeminent among all others in the nobility of her spirit and in her use of all the arts of war, she first rose to the leadership of the Greek cause. Later, forced to stand alone, deserted by her allies, she reached a point of extreme peril. Nevertheless she overcame the invaders and erected her monument of victory. She prevented the enslavement of those not yet enslaved, and generously freed all the rest of us who lived within the boundaries of Heracles. Sometime later excessively violent earthquakes and floods occurred, and after the onset of an unbearable day and a night, your entire warrior force sank below the earth all at once, and the Isle of Atlantis likewise sank below the sea and disappeared. That is how the ocean in that region has come to be even now

unnavigable and unexplorable, obstructed as it is by a layer of mud at a shallow depth, the residue of the island as it settled.'"

What I've just related, Socrates, is a concise version of old Critias' story, as Solon originally reported it. While you were speaking yesterday about politics and the men you were describing, I was reminded of what I've just told you and was quite amazed as I realized how by some supernatural chance your ideas are on the mark, in substantial agreement with what Solon said. I didn't want to say so at the time, though. Because it had been so long ago, I didn't remember Solon's story very well. So I realized that I would first have to recover the whole story for myself well enough, and then to tell it that way. That's why I was so quick to agree to your assignment yesterday. The most important task in situations like these is to propose a speech that rewards people's expectations, and so I thought that we would be well supplied if I gave this one. And that's how—as Hermocrates has already said—the moment I left here yesterday, I began to repeat the story to him and to Timaeus as it came back to me. After I left them I concentrated on it during the night and recovered just about the whole thing. They say that the lessons of childhood have a marvelous way of being retained. How true that is! In my case, I don't know if I'd be able to recall everything I heard yesterday, but I'd be extremely surprised if any part of this story has gotten away from me, even though it's been a very long time since I heard it. What I heard then gave me so much childlike pleasure—the old man was so eager to teach me because I kept on asking one question after another—that the story has stayed with me like the indelible markings of a picture with the colors burnt in. Besides, I told the whole story to Timaeus and Hermocrates first thing this morning, so that not just I, but they, too, would have a supply of material for our speech.

I've said all this, Socrates, to prepare myself to tell Solon's story now. I won't just give you the main points, but the details, one by one, just the way I heard it. We'll translate the citizens and the city you described to us in mythical fashion yesterday to the realm of fact, and place it before us as though it is ancient Athens itself. And we'll say that the citizens you imagined are the very ones the priest spoke about, our actual ancestors. The congruence will be complete, and our song will be in tune if we say that your imaginary citizens are the ones who really existed at that time. We'll share the task among us, and we'll all try our best to do justice to your assignment. What do you think, Socrates? Will this do as our speech, or should we look for another to replace it?

Socrates/ Well, Critias, what other speech could we possibly prefer to this one? We're in the midst of celebrating the festival of the goddess, and this speech really fits the occasion. So it couldn't be more appropriate. And of course the fact that it's no made-up story but a true account is no small matter. How and where shall we find others to celebrate if we let these men go? We've no choice. Go on with your speech, then, and good luck! It's my turn now to sit back and listen to your speeches that pay back mine of yesterday.

Critias/ All right, Socrates, what do you think of the plan we've arranged for our guest gift to you? We thought that because Timaeus is our expert in astronomy and has made it his main business to know the nature of the universe, he should speak first, beginning with the origin of the universe, and concluding with the nature of human beings. Then I'll go next, once I'm in possession of Timaeus' account of the origin of human beings and your account of how some of them came to have a superior education. I'll introduce them, as not only Solon's account but also his law would have it, into our courtroom and make them citizens of our ancient city—as really being those Athenians of old whom the report of the

sacred records has rescued from obscurity—and from then on I'll speak of them as actual Athenian citizens.

Socrates/ Apparently I'll be getting a complete, brilliant banquet of speeches in payment for my own. Very well then, Timaeus, the task of being our next speaker seems to fall to you. Why don't you make an invocation to the gods, as we customarily do?

Timaeus/ That I will, Socrates. Surely anyone with any sense at all will always call upon a god before setting out on any venture, whatever its importance. In our case, we are about to make speeches about the universe—whether it has an origin or even if it does not—and so if we're not to go completely astray we have no choice but to call upon the gods and goddesses, and pray that they above all will approve of all we have to say, and that in consequence we will, too. Let this, then, be our appeal to the gods; to ourselves we must appeal to make sure that you learn as easily as possible, and that I instruct you in the subject matter before us in the way that best conveys my intent.

As I see it, then, we must begin by making the following distinction: What is that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which becomes but never is? The former is grasped by understanding, which involves a reasoned account. It is unchanging. The latter is grasped by opinion, which involves unreasoning sense perception. It comes to be and passes away, but never really is. Now everything that comes to be must of necessity come to be by the agency of some cause, for it is impossible for anything to come to be without a cause. So whenever the craftsman looks at what is always changeless and, using a thing of that kind as his model, reproduces its form and character, then, of necessity, all that he so completes is beautiful. But were he to look at a thing that has come to be and use as his model something that has been begotten, his work will lack beauty.

Now as to the whole universe or world order [kosmos]—let's just call it by whatever name is most acceptable in a given context—there is a question we need to consider first. This is the sort of question one should begin with in inquiring into any subject. Has it always existed? Was there no origin from which it came to be? Or did it come to be and take its start from some origin? It has come to be. For it is both visible and tangible and it has a body—and all things of that kind are perceptible. And, as we have shown, perceptible things are grasped by opinion, which involves sense perception. As such, they are things that come to be, things that are begotten. Further, we maintain that, necessarily, that which comes to be must come to be by the agency of some cause. Now to find the maker and father of this universe [to pan] is hard enough, and even if I succeeded, to declare him to everyone is impossible. And so we must go back and raise this question about the universe: Which of the two models did the maker use when he fashioned it? Was it the one that does not change and stays the same, or the one that has come to be? Well, if this world of ours is beautiful and its craftsman good, then clearly he looked at the eternal model. But if what it's blasphemous to even say is the case, then he looked at one that has come to be. Now surely it's clear to all that it was the eternal model he looked at, for, of all the things that have come to be, our universe is the most beautiful, and of causes the craftsman is the most excellent. This, then, is how it has come to be: it is a work of craft, modeled after that which is changeless and is grasped by a rational account, that is, by wisdom.

Since these things are so, it follows by unquestionable necessity that this world is an image of something. Now in every subject it is of utmost importance to begin at the natural beginning, and so, on the subject of an image and its model, we must make the following specification: the accounts we

give of things have the same character as the subjects they set forth. So accounts of what is stable and fixed and transparent to understanding are themselves stable and unshifting. We must do our very best to make these accounts as irrefutable and invincible as any account may be. On the other hand, accounts we give of that which has been formed to be like that reality, since they are accounts of what is a likeness, are themselves likely, and stand in proportion to the previous accounts, i.e., what being is to becoming, truth is to convincingness. Don't be surprised then, Socrates, if it turns out repeatedly that we won't be able to produce accounts on a great many subjects—on gods or the coming to be of the universe—that are completely and perfectly consistent and accurate. Instead, if we can come up with accounts no less likely than any, we ought to be content, keeping in mind that both I, the speaker, and you, the judges, are only human. So we should accept the likely tale on these matters. It behooves us not to look for anything beyond this.

Socrates/ Bravo, Timaeus! By all means! We must accept it as you say we should. This overture of yours was marvelous. Go on now and let us have the work itself.

Timaeus/ Very well then. Now why did he who framed this whole universe of becoming frame it? Let us state the reason why: He was good, and one who is good can never become jealous of anything. And so, being free of jealousy, he wanted everything to become as much like himself as was possible. In fact, men of wisdom will tell you (and you couldn't do better than to accept their claim) that this, more than anything else, was the most preeminent reason for the origin of the world's coming to be. The god wanted everything to be good and nothing to be bad so far as that was possible, and so he took over all that was visible—not at rest but in discordant and disorderly motion—and brought it from a state of disorder to one of order, because he believed that order was in every way

better than disorder. Now it wasn't permitted (nor is it now) that one who is supremely good should do anything but what is best. Accordingly, the god reasoned and concluded that in the realm of things naturally visible no unintelligent thing could as a whole be better than anything which does possess intelligence as a whole, and he further concluded that it is impossible for anything to come to possess intelligence apart from soul. Guided by this reasoning, he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, and so he constructed the universe. He wanted to produce a piece of work that would be as excellent and supreme as its nature would allow. This, then, in keeping with our likely account, is how we must say divine providence brought our world into being as a truly living thing, endowed with soul and intelligence.

This being so, we have to go on to speak about what comes next. When the maker made our world, what living thing did he make it resemble? Let us not stoop to think that it was any of those that have the natural character of a part, for nothing that is a likeness of anything incomplete could ever turn out beautiful. Rather, let us lay it down that the universe resembles more closely than anything else that Living Thing of which all other living things are parts, both individually and by kinds. For that Living Thing comprehends within itself all intelligible living things, just as our world is made up of us and all the other visible creatures. Since the god wanted nothing more than to make the world like the best of the intelligible things, complete in every way, he made it a single visible living thing, which contains within itself all the living things whose nature it is to share its kind.

Have we been correct in speaking of one universe, or would it have been more correct to say that there are many, in fact infinitely many universes? There is but one universe, if it is to have been crafted after its model. For that which contains all of the intelligible living things couldn't ever be one of a pair,

since that would require there to be yet another Living Thing, the one that contained those two, of which they then would be parts, and then it would be more correct to speak of our universe as made in the likeness, now not of those two, but of that other, the one that contains them. So, in order that this living thing should be like the complete Living Thing in respect of uniqueness, the Maker made neither two, nor yet an infinite number of worlds. On the contrary, our universe came to be as the one and only thing of its kind, is so now and will continue to be so in the future.

Now that which comes to be must have bodily form, and be both visible and tangible, but nothing could ever become visible apart from fire, nor tangible without something solid, nor solid without earth. That is why, as he began to put the body of the universe together, the god came to make it out of fire and earth. But it isn't possible to combine two things well all by themselves, without a third; there has to be some bond between the two that unites them. Now the best bond is one that really and truly makes a unity of itself together with the things bonded by it, and this in the nature of things is best accomplished by proportion. For whenever of three numbers which are either solids or squares the middle term between any two of them is such that what the first term is to it, it is to the last, and, conversely, what the last term is to the middle, it is to the first, then, since the middle term turns out to be both first and last, and the last and the first likewise both turn out to be middle terms, they will all of necessity turn out to have the same relationship to each other, and, given this, will all be unified.

So if the body of the universe were to have come to be as a two dimensional plane, a single middle term would have sufficed to bind together its conjoining terms with itself. As it was, however, the universe was to be a solid, and solids are never joined together by just one middle term but always by

two. Hence the god set water and air between fire and earth, and made them as proportionate to one another as was possible, so that what fire is to air, air is to water, and what air is to water, water is to earth. He then bound them together and thus he constructed the visible and tangible universe. This is the reason why these four particular constituents were used to beget the body of the world, making it a symphony of proportion. They bestowed friendship upon it, so that, having come together into a unity with itself, it could not be undone by anyone but the one who had bound it together.

Now each one of the four constituents was entirely used up in the process of building the world. The builder built it from all the fire, water, air and earth there was, and left no part or power of any of them out. His intentions in so doing were these: First, that as a living thing it should be as whole and complete as possible and made up of complete parts. Second, that it should be just one universe, in that nothing would be left over from which another one just like it could be made. Third, that it should not get old and diseased. He realized that when heat or cold or anything else that possesses strong powers surrounds a composite body from outside and attacks it, it destroys that body prematurely, brings disease and old age upon it and so causes it to waste away. That is why he concluded that he should fashion the world as a single whole, composed of all wholes, complete and free of old age and disease, and why he fashioned it that way. And he gave it a shape appropriate to the kind of thing it was. The appropriate shape for that living thing that is to contain within itself all the living things would be the one which embraces within itself all the shapes there are. Hence he gave it a round shape, the form of a sphere, with its center equidistant from its extremes in all directions. This of all shapes is the most complete and most like itself, which he gave to it because he believed that likeness is incalculably more excellent than

unlikeness. And he gave it a smooth round finish all over on the outside, for many reasons. It needed no eyes, since there was nothing visible left outside it; nor did it need ears, since there was nothing audible there, either. There was no air enveloping it that it might need for breathing, nor did it need any organ by which to take in food or, again, expel it when it had been digested. For since there wasn't anything else, there would be nothing to leave it or come to it from anywhere. It supplied its own waste for its food. Anything that it did or experienced it was designed to do or experience within itself and by itself. For the builder thought that if it were self-sufficient, it would be a better thing than if it required other things.

And since it had no need to catch hold of or fend off anything, the god thought that it would be pointless to attach hands to it. Nor would it need feet or any support to stand on. In fact, he awarded it the movement suited to its body—that one of the seven motions which is especially associated with understanding and intelligence. And so he set it turning continuously in the same place, spinning around upon itself. All the other six motions he took away, and made its movement free of their wanderings. And since it didn't need feet to follow this circular path, he begat it without legs or feet.

Applying this entire train of reasoning to the god that was yet to be, the eternal god made it smooth and even all over, equal from the center, a whole and complete body itself, but also made up of complete bodies. In its center he set a soul, which he extended throughout the whole body, and with which he then covered the body outside. And he set it to turn in a circle, a single solitary universe, whose very excellence enables it to keep its own company without requiring anything else. For its knowledge of and friendship with itself is enough. All this, then, explains why this world which he begat for himself is a blessed god.

As for the world's soul, even though we are now embarking on an account of it after we've already given an account of its body, it isn't the case that the god devised it to be younger than the body. For the god would not have united them and then allow the elder to be ruled by the younger. We have a tendency to be casual and random in our speech, reflecting, no doubt, the whole realm of the casual and random of which we are a part. The god, however, gave priority and seniority to the soul, both in its coming to be and in the degree of its excellence, to be the body's mistress and to rule over it as her subject.

The components from which he made the soul and the way in which he made it were as follows: In between the Being that is indivisible and always changeless, and the one that is divisible and comes to be in the corporeal realm, he mixed a third, intermediate form of being, derived from the other two. Similarly, he made a mixture of the Same, and then one of the Different, in between their indivisible and their corporeal, divisible counterparts. And he took the three mixtures and mixed them together to make a uniform mixture, forcing the Different, which was hard to mix, into conformity with the Same. Now when he had mixed these two together with Being, and from the three had made a single mixture, he redivided the whole mixture into as many parts as his task required, each part remaining a mixture of the Same, the Different, and of Being. This is how he began the division: first he took one portion away from the whole, and then he took another, twice as large, followed by a third, one and a half times as large as the second and three times as large as the first. The fourth portion he took was twice as large as the second, the fifth three times as large as the third, the sixth eight times that of the first, and the seventh twenty-seven times that of the first.

After this he went on to fill the double and triple intervals by cutting off still more portions from the mixture and placing

these between them, in such a way that in each interval there were two middle terms, one exceeding the first extreme by the same fraction of the extremes by which it was exceeded by the second, and the other exceeding the first extreme by a number equal to that by which it was exceeded by the second. These connections produced intervals of 3/2, 4/3, and 9/8 within the previous intervals. He then proceeded to fill all the 4/3 intervals with the 9/8 interval, leaving a small portion over every time. The terms of this interval of the portion left over made a numerical ratio of 256/243. And so it was that the mixture, from which he had cut off these portions, was eventually completely used up.

Next, he sliced this entire compound in two along its length, joined the two halves together center to center like an X, and bent them back in a circle, attaching each half to itself end to end and to the ends of the other half at the point opposite to the one where they had been joined together. He then included them in that motion which revolves in the same place without variation, and began to make the one the outer, and the other the inner circle. And he decreed that the outer movement should be the movement of the Same, while the inner one should be that of the Different. He made the movement of the Same revolve toward the right by way of the side, and that of the Different toward the left by way of the diagonal, and he made the revolution of the Same, i.e., the uniform, the dominant one in that he left this one alone undivided, while he divided the inner one six times, to make seven unequal circles. His divisions corresponded to the several double and triple intervals, of which there were three each. He set the circles to go in contrary directions: three to go at the same speed, and the other four to go at speeds different from both each other's and that of the other three. Their speeds, however, were all proportionate to each other.

Once the whole soul had acquired a form that pleased him, he who formed it went on to fashion inside it all that is corporeal, and, joining center to center, he fitted the two together. The soul was woven together with the body from the center on out in every direction to the outermost limit of the universe, and covered it all around on the outside. And, revolving within itself, it initiated a divine beginning of unceasing, intelligent life for all time. Now while the body of the universe had come to be as a visible thing, the soul was invisible. But even so, because it shares in reason and harmony, the soul came to be as the most excellent of all the things begotten by him who is himself most excellent of all that is intelligible and eternal.

Because the soul is a mixture of the Same, the Different and Being (the three components we've described), because it was divided up and bound together in various proportions, and because it circles round upon itself, then, whenever it comes into contact with something whose being is scatterable or else with something whose being is indivisible, it is stirred throughout its whole self. It then declares what exactly that thing is the same as, or what it is different from, and in what respect and in what manner, as well as when, it turns out that they are the same or different and are characterized as such. This applies both to the things that come to be, and to those that are always changeless. And when this contact gives rise to an account that is equally true whether it is about what is different or about what is the same, and is borne along without utterance or sound within the self-moved thing, then, whenever the account concerns anything that is perceptible, the circle of the Different goes straight and proclaims it throughout its whole soul. This is how firm and true opinions and convictions come about. Whenever, on the other hand, the account concerns any object of reasoning, and the circle of the Same runs well and reveals it, the necessary result is

understanding and knowledge. And if anyone should ever call that in which these two arise, not soul but something else, what he says will be anything but true.

Now when the Father who had begotten the universe observed it set in motion and alive, a thing that had come to be as a shrine for the everlasting gods, he was well pleased, and in his delight he thought of making it more like its model still. So, as the model was itself an everlasting Living Thing, he set himself to bringing this universe to completion in such a way that it, too, would have that character to the extent that was possible. Now it was the Living Thing's nature to be eternal, but it isn't possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten. And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity. This number, of course, is what we now call "time."

For before the heavens came to be, there were no days or nights, no months or years. But now, at the same time as he framed the heavens, he devised their coming to be. These all are parts of time, and was and will be are forms of time that have come to be. Such notions we unthinkingly but incorrectly apply to everlasting being. For we say that it was and is and will be, but according to the true account only is, is appropriately said of it. Was and will be are properly said about the becoming that passes in time, for these two are motions. But that which is always changeless and motionless cannot become either older or younger in the course of time—it neither ever became so, nor is it now such that it has become so, nor will it ever be so in the future. And all in all, none of the characteristics that becoming has bestowed upon the things that are borne about in the realm of perception are appropriate to it. These, rather, are forms of time that have come to be—time that imitates eternity and circles according

to number. And what is more, we also say things like these: that what has come to be is what has come to be, that what is coming to be is what is coming to be, and also that what will come to be is what will come to be, and that what is not is what is not. None of these expressions of ours is accurate. But I don't suppose this is a good time right now to be too meticulous about these matters.

Time, then, came to be together with the universe so that just as they were begotten together, they might also be undone together, should there ever be an undoing of them. And it came to be after the model of that which is sempiternal, so that it might be as much like its model as possible. For the model is something that has being for all eternity, while it, on the other hand, has been, is, and shall be for all time, forevermore. Such was the reason, then, such the god's design for the coming to be of time, that he brought into being the Sun, the Moon and five other stars, for the begetting of time. These are called "wanderers," and they came to be in order to set limits to and stand guard over the numbers of time. When the god had finished making a body for each of them, he placed them into the orbits traced by the period of the Different—seven bodies in seven orbits. He set the Moon in the first circle, around the earth, and the Sun in the second, above it. The Dawn-bearer (the Morning Star, or Venus) and the star said to be sacred to Hermes (Mercury) he set to run in circles that equal the Sun's in speed, though they received the power contrary to its power. As a result, the Sun, the star of Hermes and the Dawn-bearer alike overtake and are overtaken by one another. As for the other bodies, if I were to spell out where he situated them, and all his reasons for doing so, my account, already a digression, would make more work than its purpose calls for. Perhaps later on we could at our leisure give this subject the exposition it deserves.

Now when each of the bodies that were to cooperate in producing time had come into the movement prepared for carrying it and when, bound by bonds of soul, these bodies had been begotten with life and learned their assigned tasks, they began to revolve along the movement of the Different, which is oblique and which goes through the movement of the Same, by which it is also dominated. Some bodies would move in a larger circle, others in a smaller one, the latter moving more quickly and the former more slowly. Indeed, because of the movement of the Same, the ones that go around most quickly appeared to be overtaken by those going more slowly, even though in fact they were overtaking them. For as it revolves, this movement gives to all these circles a spiral twist, because they are moving forward in two contrary directions at once. As a result, it makes that body which departs most slowly from it—and it is the fastest of the movements—appear closest to it.

And so that there might be a conspicuous measure of their relative slowness and quickness with which they move along in their eight revolutions, the god kindled a light in the orbit second from the earth, the light that we now call the Sun. Its chief work would be to shine upon the whole universe and to bestow upon all those living things appropriately endowed and taught by the revolution of the Same and the uniform, a share in number. In this way and for these reasons night-and-day, the period of a single circling, the wisest one, came to be. A month has passed when the Moon has completed its own cycle and overtaken the Sun; a year when the Sun has completed its own cycle.

As for the periods of the other bodies, all but a scattered few have failed to take any note of them. Nobody has given them names or investigated their numerical measurements relative to each other. And so people are all but ignorant of the fact that time really is the wanderings of these bodies,

bewilderingly numerous as they are and astonishingly variegated. It is none the less possible, however, to discern that the perfect number of time brings to completion the perfect year at that moment when the relative speeds of all eight periods have been completed together and, measured by the circle of the Same that moves uniformly, have achieved their consummation. This, then, is how as well as why those stars were begotten which, on their way through the universe, would have turnings. The purpose was to make this living thing as like as possible to that perfect and intelligible Living Thing, by way of imitating its sempiternity.

Prior to the coming to be of time, the universe had already been made to resemble in various respects the model in whose likeness the god was making it, but the resemblance still fell short in that it didn't yet contain all the living things that were to have come to be within it. This remaining task he went on to perform, casting the world into the nature of its model. And so he determined that the living thing he was making should possess the same kinds and numbers of living things as those which, according to the discernment of Intellect, are contained within the real Living Thing. Now there are four of these kinds: first, the heavenly race of gods; next, the kind that has wings and travels through the air; third, the kind that lives in water; and fourth, the kind that has feet and lives on land. The gods he made mostly out of fire, to be the brightest and fairest to the eye. He made them well-rounded, to resemble the universe, and placed them in the wisdom of the dominant circle [i.e., of the Same], to follow the course of the universe. He spread the gods throughout the whole heaven to be a true adornment [kosmos] for it, an intricately wrought whole. And he bestowed two movements upon each of them. The first was rotation, an unvarying movement in the same place, by which the god would always think the same thoughts about the same things. The other was revolution, a forward motion under the

dominance of the circular carrying movement of the Same and uniform. With respect to the other five motions, the gods are immobile and stationary, in order that each of them may come as close as possible to attaining perfection.

This, then, was the reason why all those everlasting and unwandering stars—divine living things which stay fixed by revolving without variation in the same place—came to be. Those that have turnings and thus wander in that sort of way came to be as previously described.

The Earth he devised to be our nurturer, and, because it winds around the axis that stretches throughout the universe, also to be the maker and guardian of day and night. Of the gods that have come to be within the universe, Earth ranks as the foremost, the one with greatest seniority.

To describe the dancing movements of these gods, their juxtapositions and the back-circlings and advances of their circular courses on themselves; to tell which of the gods come into line with one another at their conjunctions and how many of them are in opposition, and in what order and at which times they pass in front of or behind one another, so that some are occluded from our view to reappear once again, thereby bringing terrors and portents of things to come to those who cannot reason—to tell all this without the use of visible models would be labor spent in vain. We will make do with this account, and so let this be the conclusion of our discussion of the nature of the visible and generated gods.

As for the other spiritual beings [daimones], it is beyond our task to know and speak of how they came to be. We should accept on faith the assertions of those figures of the past who claimed to be the offspring of gods. They must surely have been well informed about their own ancestors. So we cannot avoid believing the children of gods, even though their accounts lack plausible or compelling proofs. Rather, we

should follow custom and believe them, on the ground that what they claim to be reporting are matters of their own concern. Accordingly, let us accept their account of how these gods came to be and state what it is.

Earth and Heaven gave birth to Ocean and Tethys, who in turn gave birth to Phorcys, Cronus and Rhea and all the gods in that generation. Cronus and Rhea gave birth to Zeus and Hera, as well as all those siblings who are called by names we know. These in turn gave birth to yet another generation. In any case, when all the gods had come to be, both the ones who make their rounds conspicuously and the ones who present themselves only to the extent that they are willing, the begetter of this universe spoke to them. This is what he said:

"O gods, works divine whose maker and father I am, whatever has come to be by my hands cannot be undone but by my consent. Now while it is true that anything that is bound is liable to being undone, still, only one who is evil would consent to the undoing of what has been well fitted together and is in fine condition. This is the reason why you, as creatures that have come to be, are neither completely immortal nor exempt from being undone. Still, you will not be undone nor will death be your portion, since you have received the guarantee of my will—a greater, more sovereign bond than those with which you were bound when you came to be. Learn now, therefore, what I declare to you. There remain still three kinds of mortal beings that have not yet been begotten; and as long as they have not come to be, the universe will be incomplete, for it will still lack within it all the kinds of living things it must have if it is to be sufficiently complete. But if these creatures came to be and came to share in life by my hand, they would rival the gods. It is you, then, who must turn yourselves to the task of fashioning these living things, as your nature allows. This will assure their mortality, and this whole universe will really be a completed whole. Imitate the

power I used in causing you to be. And to the extent that it is fitting for them to possess something that shares our name of 'immortal', something described as divine and ruling within those of them who always consent to follow after justice and after you, I shall begin by sowing that seed, and then hand it over to you. The rest of the task is yours. Weave what is mortal to what is immortal, fashion and beget living things. Give them food, cause them to grow, and when they perish, receive them back again."

When he had finished this speech, he turned again to the mixing bowl he had used before, the one in which he had blended and mixed the soul of the universe. He began to pour into it what remained of the previous ingredients and to mix them in somewhat the same way, though these were no longer invariably and constantly pure, but of a second and third grade of purity. And when he had compounded it all, he divided the mixture into a number of souls equal to the number of the stars and assigned each soul to a star. He mounted each soul in a carriage, as it were, and showed it the nature of the universe. He described to them the laws that had been foreordained: They would all be assigned one and the same initial birth, so that none would be less well treated by him than any other. Then he would sow each of the souls into that instrument of time suitable to it, where they were to acquire the nature of being the most god-fearing of living things, and, since humans have a twofold nature, the superior kind should be such as would from then on be called "man." So, once the souls were of necessity implanted in bodies, and these bodies had things coming to them and leaving them, the first innate capacity they would of necessity come to have would be sense perception, which arises out of forceful disturbances. This they all would have. The second would be love, mingled with pleasure and pain. And they would come to have fear and spiritedness as well, plus whatever goes with

having these emotions, as well as all their natural opposites. And if they could master these emotions, their lives would be just, whereas if they were mastered by them, they would be unjust. And if a person lived a good life throughout the due course of his time, he would at the end return to his dwelling place in his companion star, to live a life of happiness that agreed with his character. But if he failed in this, he would be born a second time, now as a woman. And if even then he still could not refrain from wickedness, he would be changed once again, this time into some wild animal that resembled the wicked character he had acquired. And he would have no rest from these toilsome transformations until he had dragged that massive accretion of fire-water-air-earth into conformity with the revolution of the Same and uniform within him, and so subdued that turbulent, irrational mass by means of reason. This would return him to his original condition of excellence.

Having set out all these ordinances to them—which he did to exempt himself from responsibility for any evil they might afterwards do—the god proceeded to sow some of them into the Earth, some into the Moon, and others into the various other instruments of time. After the sowing, he handed over to the young gods the task of weaving mortal bodies. He had them make whatever else remained that the human soul still needed to have, plus whatever goes with those things. He gave them the task of ruling over these mortal living things and of giving them the finest, the best possible guidance they could give, without being responsible for any evils these creatures might bring upon themselves.

When he had finished assigning all these tasks, he proceeded to abide at rest in his own customary nature. His children immediately began to attend to and obey their father's assignment. Now that they had received the immortal principle of the mortal living thing, they began to imitate the craftsman who had made them. They borrowed parts of fire,

earth, water and air from the world, intending to pay them back again, and bonded together into a unity the parts they had taken, but not with those indissoluble bonds by which they themselves were held together. Instead, they proceeded to fuse them together with copious rivets so small as to be invisible, thereby making each body a unit made up of all the components. And they went on to invest this body—into and out of which things were to flow—with the orbits of the immortal soul. These orbits, now bound within a mighty river, neither mastered that river nor were mastered by it, but tossed it violently and were violently tossed by it. Consequently the living thing as a whole did indeed move, but it would proceed in a disorderly, random and irrational way that involved all six of the motions. It would go forwards and backwards, then back and forth to the right and the left, and upwards and downwards, wandering every which way in these six directions. For mighty as the nourishment-bearing billow was in its ebb and flow, mightier still was the turbulence produced by the disturbances caused by the things that struck against the living things. Such disturbances would occur when the body encountered and collided with external fire (i.e., fire other than the body's own) or for that matter with a hard lump of earth or with the flow of gliding waters, or when it was caught up by a surge of air-driven winds. The motions produced by all these encounters would then be conducted through the body to the soul, and strike against it. (That is no doubt why these motions as a group came afterwards to be called "sensations," as they are still called today.) It was just then, at that very instant, that they produced a very long and intense commotion. They cooperated with the continually flowing channel to stir and violently shake the orbits of the soul. They completely bound that of the Same by flowing against it in the opposite direction, and held it fast just as it was beginning to go its way. And they further shook the orbit

of the Different right through, with the result that they twisted every which way the three intervals of the double and the three of the triple, as well as the middle terms of the ratios of 3/2, 4/3 and 9/8 that connect them. [These agitations did not undo them, however,] because they cannot be completely undone except by the one who had bound them together. They mutilated and disfigured the circles in every possible way so that the circles barely held together and though they remained in motion, they moved without rhyme or reason, sometimes in the opposite direction, sometimes sideways and sometimes upside down—like a man upside down, head propped against the ground and holding his feet up against something. In that position his right side will present itself both to him and to those looking at him as left, and his left side as right. It is this very thing—and others like it—that had such a dramatic effect upon the revolutions of the soul. Whenever they encounter something outside of them characterizable as same or different, they will speak of it as "the same as" something, or as "different from" something else when the truth is just the opposite, so proving themselves to be misled and unintelligent. Also, at this stage souls do not have a ruling orbit taking the lead. And so when certain sensations come in from outside and attack them, they sweep the soul's entire vessel along with them. It is then that these revolutions, however much in control they seem to be, are actually under their control. All these disturbances are no doubt the reason why even today and not only at the beginning, whenever a soul is bound within a mortal body, it at first lacks intelligence. But as the stream that brings growth and nourishment diminishes and the soul's orbits regain their composure, resume their proper courses and establish themselves more and more with the passage of time, their revolutions are set straight, to conform to the configuration each of the circles takes in its natural course. They then correctly identify what

is the same and what is different, and render intelligent the person who possess them. And to be sure, if such a person also gets proper nurture to supplement his education, he'll turn out perfectly whole and healthy, and will have escaped the most grievous of illnesses. But if he neglects this, he'll limp his way through life and return to Hades uninitiated and unintelligent.

But this doesn't happen until later. Our present subject, on the other hand, needs a more detailed treatment. We must move on to treat the prior questions—the ones that deal with how bodies came to be, part by part, as well as the soul. What were the gods' reasons, what was their plan when they caused these to be? In discussing these questions we shall hold fast to what is most likely, and proceed accordingly.

Copying the revolving shape of the universe, the gods bound the two divine orbits into a ball-shaped body, the part that we now call our head. This is the most divine part of us, and master of all our other parts. They then assembled the rest of the body and handed the whole of it to the head, to be in its service. They intended it to share in all the motions there were to be. To keep the head from rolling around on the ground without any way of getting up over its various high spots and out of the low, they gave it the body as a vehicle to make its way easy. This is the reason why the body came to have length and grow four limbs that could flex and extend themselves, divinely devised for the purpose of getting about. Holding on and supporting itself with these limbs, it would be capable of making its way through all regions, while carrying at the top the dwelling place of that most divine, most sacred part of ourselves. This is how as well as why we have all grown arms and legs. And considering the front side to be more honorable and more commanding than the back, the gods gave us the ability to travel for the most part in this direction. Human beings no doubt ought to have the front sides of their

bodies distinguishable from and dissimilar to their backs, and so the gods began by setting the face on that side of the head, the soul's vessel. They bound organs inside it to provide completely for the soul, and they assigned this side, the natural front, to be the part that takes the lead.

The eyes were the first of the organs to be fashioned by the gods, to conduct light. The reason why they fastened them within the head is this. They contrived that such fire as was not for burning but for providing a gentle light should become a body, proper to each day. Now the pure fire inside us, cousin to that fire, they made to flow through the eyes: so they made the eyes—the eye as a whole but its middle in particular—close-textured, smooth and dense, to enable them to keep out all the other, coarser stuff, and let that kind of fire pass through pure by itself. Now whenever daylight surrounds the visual stream, like makes contact with like and coalesces with it to make up a single homogeneous body aligned with the direction of the eyes. This happens wherever the internal fire strikes and presses against an external object it has connected with. And because this body of fire has become uniform throughout and thus uniformly affected, it transmits the motions of whatever it comes in contact with as well as of whatever comes in contact with it, to and through the whole body until they reach the soul. This brings about the sensation we call "seeing." At night, however, the kindred fire has departed and so the visual stream is cut off. For now it exits only to encounter something unlike itself. No longer able to bond with the surrounding air, which now has lost its fire, it undergoes changes and dies out. So it not only stops seeing, but even begins to induce sleep. For when the eyelids—which the gods devised to keep eyesight safe—are closed, they shut in the power of the internal fire, which then disperses and evens out the internal motions, and when these have been evened out, a state of quietness ensues. And if this quietness

is deep, one falls into an all but dreamless sleep. But if some fairly strong motions remain, they produce images similar in kind and in number to the kind of motions they are, and the kind of regions in which they remain—images which, though formed within, are recalled upon waking as external objects.

And so there is no longer any difficulty in understanding how images are produced in mirrors or in any other smooth reflecting surfaces. On such occasions the internal fire joins forces with the external fire, to form on the smooth surface a single fire which is reshaped in a multitude of ways. So once the fire from the face comes to coalesce with the fire from sight on the smooth and bright surface, you have the inevitable appearance of all images of this sort. What is left will appear as right, because the parts of the fire from sight connect with the opposite parts of the fire from the face, contrary to the usual manner of encounter. But, on the other hand, what is right does appear as right, and what is left as left whenever light switches sides in the process of coalescing with the light with which it coalesces. And this happens whenever the mirror's smooth surface is curled upwards on both sides, thereby bending the right part of the fire from sight towards the left, and the left part towards the right. And when this same smooth surface is turned along the length of the face [i.e., vertically], it makes the whole object appear upside down, because it bends the lower part of the ray toward the top, and the upper part toward the bottom.

Now all of the above are among the auxiliary causes employed in the service of the god as he does his utmost to bring to completion the character of what is most excellent. But because they make things cold or hot, compact or disperse them, and produce all sorts of similar effects, most people regard them not as auxiliary causes, but as the actual causes of all things. Things like these, however, are totally incapable of possessing any reason or understanding about

anything. We must pronounce the soul to be the only thing there is that properly possesses understanding. The soul is an invisible thing, whereas fire, water, earth and air have all come to be as visible bodies. So anyone who is a lover of understanding and knowledge must of necessity pursue as primary causes those that belong to intelligent nature, and as secondary all those belonging to things that are moved by others and that set still others in motion by necessity. We too, surely, must do likewise: we must describe both types of causes, distinguishing those which possess understanding and thus fashion what is beautiful and good, from those which, when deserted by intelligence, produce only haphazard and disorderly effects every time.

Let us conclude, then, our discussion of the accompanying auxiliary causes that gave our eyes the power which they now possess. We must next speak of that supremely beneficial function for which the god gave them to us. As my account has it, our sight has indeed proved to be a source of supreme benefit to us, in that none of our present statements about the universe could ever have been made if we had never seen any stars, sun or heaven. As it is, however, our ability to see the periods of day-and-night, of months and of years, of equinoxes and solstices, has led to the invention of number, and has given us the idea of time and opened the path to inquiry into the nature of the universe. These pursuits have given us philosophy, a gift from the gods to the mortal race whose value neither has been nor ever will be surpassed. I'm quite prepared to declare this to be the supreme good our eyesight offers us. Why then should we exalt all the lesser good things, which a non-philosopher struck blind would "lament and bewail in vain"? Let us rather declare that the cause and purpose of this supreme good is this: the god invented sight and gave it to us so that we might observe the orbits of intelligence in the universe and apply them to the revolutions

of our own understanding. For there is a kinship between them, even though our revolutions are disturbed, whereas the universal orbits are undisturbed. So once we have come to know them and to share in the ability to make correct calculations according to nature, we should stabilize the straying revolutions within ourselves by imitating the completely unstraying revolutions of the god.

Likewise, the same account goes for sound and hearing—these too are the gods' gifts, given for the same purpose and intended to achieve the same result. Speech was designed for this very purpose—it plays the greatest part in its achievement. And all such composition as lends itself to making audible musical sound is given in order to express harmony, and so serves this purpose as well. And harmony, whose movements are akin to the orbits within our souls, is a gift of the Muses, if our dealings with them are guided by understanding, not for irrational pleasure, for which people nowadays seem to make use of it, but to serve as an ally in the fight to bring order to any orbit in our souls that has become unharmonized, and make it concordant with itself. Rhythm, too, has likewise been given us by the Muses for the same purpose, to assist us. For with most of us our condition is such that we have lost all sense of measure, and are lacking in grace.

Now in all but a brief part of the discourse I have just completed I have presented what has been crafted by Intellect. But I need to match this account by providing a comparable one concerning the things that have come about by Necessity. For this ordered world is of mixed birth: it is the offspring of a union of Necessity and Intellect. Intellect prevailed over Necessity by persuading it to direct most of the things that come to be toward what is best, and the result of this subjugation of Necessity to wise persuasion was the initial formation of this universe. So if I'm to tell the story of how it

really came to be in this way, I'd also have to introduce the character of the Straying Cause—how it is its nature to set things adrift. I shall have to retrace my steps, then, and, armed with a second starting point that also applies to these same things, I must go back once again to the beginning and start my present inquiry from there, just as I did with my earlier one.

We shall of course have to study the intrinsic nature of fire, water, air and earth prior to the heaven's coming to be, as well as the properties they had then. So far no one has as yet revealed how these four came to be. We tend to posit them as the elemental "letters" of the universe and tell people they are its "principles" on the assumption that they know what fire and the other three are. In fact, however, they shouldn't even be compared to syllables. Only a very unenlightened person might be expected to make such a comparison. So let me now proceed with my treatment in the following way: for the present I cannot state "the principle" or "principles" of all things, or however else I think about them, for the simple reason that it is difficult to show clearly what my view is if I follow my present manner of exposition. Please do not expect me to do so then. I couldn't convince even myself that I could be right to commit myself to undertaking a task of such magnitude. I shall keep to what I stated at the beginning, the virtue of likely accounts, and so shall try right from the start to say about things, both individually and collectively, what is no less likely than any—more likely, in fact, than what I have said before. Let us therefore at the outset of this discourse call upon the god to be our savior this time, too, to give us safe passage through a strange and unusual exposition, and lead us to a view of what is likely. And so let me begin my speech again.

The new starting point in my account of the universe needs to be more complex than the earlier one. Then we

distinguished two kinds, but now we must specify a third, one of a different sort. The earlier two sufficed for our previous account: one was proposed as a model, intelligible and always changeless, a second as an imitation of the model, something that possesses becoming and is visible. We did not distinguish a third kind at the time, because we thought that we could make do with the two of them. Now, however, it appears that our account compels us to attempt to illuminate in words a kind that is difficult and vague. What must we suppose it to do and to be? This above all: it is a receptacle of all becoming—its wetnurse, as it were.

However true that statement may be, we must nevertheless describe it more clearly. This is a difficult task, particularly because it requires us to raise a preliminary problem about fire and the other three:

It is difficult to say of each of them—in a way that employs a reliable and stable account—which one is the sort of thing one should really call water rather than fire, or which one, one should call some one of these rather than just any and every one of them. What problem, then, do they present for us to work through in likely fashion? And then how and in what manner are we to go on to speak about this third kind?

First, we see (or think we see) the thing that we have just now been calling water condensing and turning to stones and earth. Next, we see this same thing dissolving and dispersing, turning to wind and air, and air, when ignited, turning to fire. And then we see fire being condensed and extinguished and turning back to the form of air, and air coalescing and thickening and turning back into cloud and mist. When these are compressed still more we see them turning into flowing water, which we see turning to earth and stones once again. In this way, then, they transmit their coming to be one to the other in a cycle, or so it seems. Now then, since none of these appears ever to remain the same, which one of them can one

categorically assert, without embarrassment, to be some particular thing, this one, and not something else? One can't. Rather, the safest course by far is to propose that we speak about these things in the following way: what we invariably observe becoming different at different times—fire for example—to characterize that, i.e., fire, not as "this," but each time as "what is such," and speak of water not as "this," but always as "what is such." And never to speak of anything else as "this," as though it has some stability, of all the things at which we point and use the expressions "that" and "this" and so think we are designating something. For it gets away without abiding the charge of "that" and "this," or any other expression that indicts them of being stable. It is in fact safest not to refer to it by any of these expressions. Rather, "what is such"—coming around like what it was, again and again—that's the thing to call it in each and every case. So fire—and generally everything that has becoming—it is safest to call "what is altogether such." But that in which they each appear to keep coming into being and from which they subsequently pass out of being, that's the only thing to refer to by means of the expressions "that" and "this." A thing that is some "such" or other, however, —hot or white, say, or anyone of the opposites, and all things constituted by these—should be called none of these things [i.e., "this" or "that"].

I must make one more effort to describe it, more clearly still. Suppose you were molding gold into every shape there is, going on non-stop remolding one shape into the next. If someone then were to point at one of them and ask you, "What is it?," your safest answer by far, with respect to truth, would be to say, "gold," but never "triangle" or any of the other shapes that come to be in the gold, as though it is these, because they change even while you're making the statement. However, that answer, too, should be satisfactory, as long as

the shapes are willing to accept “what is such” as someone’s designation. This has a degree of safety.

Now the same account, in fact, holds also for that nature which receives all the bodies. We must always refer to it by the same term, for it does not depart from its own character in any way. Not only does it always receive all things, it has never in any way whatever taken on any characteristic similar to any of the things that enter it. Its nature is to be available for anything to make its impression upon, and it is modified, shaped and reshaped by the things that enter it. These are the things that make it appear different at different times. The things that enter and leave it are imitations of those things that always are, imprinted after their likeness in a marvelous way that is hard to describe. This is something we shall pursue at another time. For the moment, we need to keep in mind three types of things: that which comes to be, that in which it comes to be, and that after which the thing coming to be is modeled, and which is the source of its coming to be. It is in fact appropriate to compare the receiving thing to a mother, the source to a father, and the nature between them to their offspring. We also must understand that if the imprints are to be varied, with all the varieties there to see, this thing upon which the imprints are to be formed could not be well prepared for that role if it were not itself devoid of any of those characters that it is to receive from elsewhere. For if it resembled any of the things that enter it, it could not successfully copy their opposites or things of a totally different nature whenever it were to receive them. It would be showing its own face as well. This is why the thing that is to receive in itself all the elemental kinds must be totally devoid of any characteristics. Think of people who make fragrant ointments. They expend skill and ingenuity to come up with something just like this [i.e., a neutral base], to have on hand to start with. The liquids that are to receive the fragrances they make

as odorless as possible. Or think of people who work at impressing shapes upon soft materials. They emphatically refuse to allow any such material to already have some definite shape. Instead, they'll even it out and make it as smooth as it can be. In the same way, then, if the thing that is to receive repeatedly throughout its whole self the likenesses of the intelligible objects, the things which always are—if it is to do so successfully, then it ought to be devoid of any inherent characteristics of its own. This, of course, is the reason why we shouldn't call the mother or receptacle of what has come to be, of what is visible or perceivable in every other way, either earth or air, fire or water, or any of their compounds or their constituents. But if we speak of it as an invisible and characterless sort of thing, one that receives all things and shares in a most perplexing way in what is intelligible, a thing extremely difficult to comprehend, we shall not be misled. And in so far as it is possible to arrive at its nature on the basis of what we've said so far, the most correct way to speak of it may well be this: the part of it that gets ignited appears on each occasion as fire, the dampened part as water, and parts as earth or air in so far as it receives the imitations of these.

But we must prefer to conduct our inquiry by means of rational argument. Hence we should make a distinction like the following: Is there such a thing as a Fire by itself? Do all these things of which we always say that each of them is something "by itself" really exist? Or are the things we see, and whatever else we perceive through the body, the only things that possess this kind of actuality, so that there is absolutely nothing else besides them at all? Is our perpetual claim that there exists an intelligible Form for each thing a vacuous gesture, in the end nothing but mere talk? Now we certainly will not do justice to the question before us if we dismiss it, leaving it undecided and unadjudicated, and just

insist that such things exist, but neither must we append a further lengthy digression to a discourse already quite long. If, however, a significant distinction formulated in few words were to present itself, that would suit our present needs best of all. So here's how I cast my own vote: If understanding and true opinion are distinct, then these "by themselves" things definitely exist—these Forms, the objects not of our sense perception, but of our understanding only. But if—as some people think—true opinion does not differ in any way from understanding, then all the things we perceive through our bodily senses must be assumed to be the most stable things there are. But we do have to speak of understanding and true opinion as distinct, of course, because we can come to have one without the other, and the one is not like the other. It is through instruction that we come to have understanding, and through persuasion that we come to have true belief. Understanding always involves a true account while true belief lacks any account. And while understanding remains unmoved by persuasion, true belief gives in to persuasion. And of true belief, it must be said, all men have a share, but of understanding, only the gods and a small group of people do.

Since these things are so, we must agree that that which keeps its own form unchangingly, which has not been brought into being and is not destroyed, which neither receives into itself anything else from anywhere else, nor itself enters into anything else anywhere, is one thing. It is invisible—it cannot be perceived by the senses at all—and it is the role of understanding to study it. The second thing is that which shares the other's name and resembles it. This thing can be perceived by the senses, and it has been begotten. It is constantly borne along, now coming to be in a certain place and then perishing out of it. It is apprehended by opinion, which involves sense perception. And the third type is space,

which exists always and cannot be destroyed. It provides a fixed state for all things that come to be. It is itself apprehended by a kind of bastard reasoning that does not involve sense perception, and it is hardly even an object of conviction. We look at it as in a dream when we say that everything that exists must of necessity be somewhere, in some place and occupying some space, and that that which doesn't exist somewhere, whether on earth or in heaven, doesn't exist at all.

We prove unable to draw all these distinctions and others related to them—even in the case of that unsleeping, truly existing reality—because our dreaming state renders us incapable of waking up and stating the truth, which is this: Since that for which an image has come to be is not at all intrinsic to the image, which is invariably borne along to picture something else, it stands to reason that the image should therefore come to be in something else, somehow clinging to being, or else be nothing at all. But that which really is receives support from the accurate, true account—that as long as the one is distinct from the other, neither of them ever comes to be in the other in such a way that they at the same time become one and the same, and also two.

Let this, then, be a summary of the account I would offer, as computed by my "vote." There are being, space, and becoming, three distinct things which existed even before the universe came to be.

Now as the wetnurse of becoming turns watery and fiery and receives the character of earth and air, and as it acquires all the properties that come with these characters, it takes on a variety of visible aspects, but because it is filled with powers that are neither similar nor evenly balanced, no part of it is in balance. It sways irregularly in every direction as it is shaken by those things, and being set in motion it in turn shakes them. And as they are moved, they drift continually, some in

one direction and others in others, separating from one another. They are winnowed out, as it were, like grain that is sifted by winnowing sieves or other such implements. They are carried off and settle down, the dense and heavy ones in one direction, and the rare and light ones to another place.

That is how at that time the four kinds were being shaken by the receiver, which was itself agitating like a shaking machine, separating the kinds most unlike each other furthest apart and pushing those most like each other closest together into the same region. This, of course, explains how these different kinds came to occupy different regions of space, even before the universe was set in order and constituted from them at its coming to be. Indeed, it is a fact that before this took place the four kinds all lacked proportion and measure, and at the time the ordering of the universe was undertaken, fire, water, earth and air initially possessed certain traces of what they are now. They were indeed in the condition one would expect thoroughly god-forsaken things to be in. So, finding them in this natural condition, the first thing the god then did was to give them their distinctive shapes, using forms and numbers.

Here is a proposition we shall always affirm above all else: The god fashioned these four kinds to be as perfect and excellent as possible, when they were not so before. It will now be my task to explain to you what structure each of them acquired, and how each came to be. My account will be an unusual one, but since you are well schooled in the fields of learning in terms of which I must of necessity proceed with my exposition, I'm sure you'll follow me.

First of all, everyone knows, I'm sure, that fire, earth, water and air are bodies. Now everything that has bodily form also has depth. Depth, moreover, is of necessity comprehended within surface, and any surface bounded by straight lines is composed of triangles. Every triangle, moreover, derives from

two triangles, each of which has one right angle and two acute angles. Of these two triangles, one [the isosceles right-angled triangle] has at each of the other two vertices an equal part of a right angle, determined by its division by equal sides; while the other [the scalene right-angled triangle] has unequal parts of a right angle at its other two vertices, determined by the division of the right angle by unequal sides. This, then, we presume to be the originating principle of fire and of the other bodies, as we pursue our likely account in terms of Necessity. Principles yet more ultimate than these are known only to the god, and to any man he may hold dear.

We should now say which are the most excellent four bodies that can come to be. They are quite unlike each other, though some of them are capable of breaking up and turning into others and vice-versa. If our account is on the mark, we shall have the truth about how earth and fire and their proportionate intermediates [water and air] came to be. For we shall never concede to anyone that there are any visible bodies more excellent than these, each conforming to a single kind. So we must wholeheartedly proceed to fit together the four kinds of bodies of surpassing excellence, and to declare that we have come to grasp their natures well enough.

Of the two [right-angled] triangles, the isosceles has but one nature, while the scalene has infinitely many. Now we have to select the most excellent one from among the infinitely many, if we are to get a proper start. So if anyone can say that he has picked out another one that is more excellent for the construction of these bodies, his victory will be that of a friend, not an enemy. Of the many [scalene right-angled] triangles, then, we posit as the one most excellent, surpassing the others, that one from [a pair of] which the equilateral triangle is constructed as a third figure.

Why this is so is too long a story to tell now. But if anyone puts this claim to the test and discovers that it isn't so, his be

the prize, with our congratulations. So much, then, for the selection of the two triangles out of which the bodies of fire and the other bodies are constructed—the [right-angled] isosceles, and [the right-angled] scalene whose longer side squared is always triple its shorter side squared [i.e., the half-equilateral].

At this point we need to formulate more precisely something that was not stated clearly earlier. For then it appeared that all four kinds of bodies could turn into one another by successive stages. But the appearance is wrong. While there are indeed four kinds of bodies that come to be from the [right-angled] triangles we have selected, three of them come from triangles that have unequal sides, whereas the fourth alone is fashioned out of isosceles triangles. Thus not all of them have the capacity of breaking up and turning into one another, with a large number of small bodies turning into a small number of large ones and vice-versa. There are three that can do this. For all three are made up of a single type of triangle, so that when once the larger bodies are broken up, the same triangles can go to make up a large number of small bodies, assuming shapes appropriate to them. And likewise, when numerous small bodies are fragmented into their triangles, these triangles may well combine to make up some single massive body belonging to another kind.

So much, then, for our account of how these bodies turn into one another. Let us next discuss the form that each of them has come to have, and the various numbers that have combined to make them up.

Leading the way will be the primary form [the tetrahedron], the tiniest structure, whose elementary triangle is the one whose hypotenuse is twice the length of its shorter side. Now when a pair of such triangles are juxtaposed along the diagonal [i.e., their hypotenuses] and this is done three times,

and their diagonals and short sides converge upon a single point as center, the result is a single equilateral triangle, composed of six such triangles. When four of these equilateral triangles are combined, a single solid angle is produced at the junction of three plane angles. This, it turns out, is the angle which comes right after the most obtuse of the plane angles. And once four such solid angles have been completed, we get the primary solid form, which is one that divides the entire circumference [sc. of the sphere in which it is inscribed] into equal and similar parts.

The second solid form [the octahedron] is constructed out of the same triangles which, however, are now arranged in eight equilateral triangles and produce a single solid angle out of four plane angles. And when six such solid angles have been produced, the second body has reached its completion.

Now the third body [the icosahedron] is made up of a combination of one hundred and twenty of the elementary triangles, and of twelve solid angles, each enclosed by five plane equilateral triangles. This body turns out to have twenty equilateral triangular faces. And let us take our leave of this one of the elementary triangles, the one that has begotten the above three kinds of bodies and turn to the other one, the isosceles [right-angled] triangle, which has begotten the fourth [the cube]. Arranged in sets of four whose right angles come together at the center, the isosceles triangle produced a single equilateral quadrangle [i.e., a square]. And when six of these quadrangles were combined together, they produced eight solid angles, each of which was constituted by three plane right angles. The shape of the resulting body so constructed is a cube, and it has six quadrangular equilateral faces.

One other construction, a fifth, still remained, and this one the god used for the whole universe, embroidering figures on it.

Anyone following this whole line of reasoning might very well be puzzled about whether we should say that there are infinitely many worlds or a finite number of them. If so, he would have to conclude that to answer, "infinitely many," is to take the view of one who is really "unfinished" in things he ought to be "finished" in. He would do better to stop with the question whether we should say that there's really just one world or five and be puzzled about that. Well, our "probable account" answer declares there to be but one world, a god—though someone else, taking other things into consideration, will come to a different opinion. We must set him aside, however.

Let us now assign to fire, earth, water and air the structures which have just been given their formations in our speech. To earth let us give the cube, because of the four kinds of bodies earth is the most immobile and the most pliable—which is what the solid whose faces are the most secure must of necessity turn out to be, more so than the others. Now of the [right-angled] triangles we originally postulated, the face belonging to those that have equal sides has a greater natural stability than that belonging to triangles that have unequal sides, and the surface that is composed of the two triangles, the equilateral quadrangle [the square], holds its position with greater stability than does the equilateral triangle, both in their parts and as wholes. Hence, if we assign this solid figure to earth, we are preserving our "likely account." And of the solid figures that are left, we shall next assign the least mobile of them to water, to fire the most mobile, and to air the one in between. This means that the tiniest body belongs to fire, the largest to water, and the intermediate one to air—and also that the body with the sharpest edges belongs to fire, the next sharpest to air, and the third sharpest to water. Now in all these cases the body that has the fewest faces is of necessity the most mobile, in that it, more than any other, has edges

that are the sharpest and best fit for cutting in every direction. It is also the lightest, in that it is made up of the least number of identical parts. The second body ranks second in having these same properties, and the third ranks third. So let us follow our account, which is not only likely but also correct, and take the solid form of the pyramid that we saw constructed as the element or the seed of fire. And let us say that the second form in order of generation is that of air, and the third that of water.

Now we must think of all these bodies as being so small that due to their small size none of them, whatever their kind, is visible to us individually. When, however, a large number of them are clustered together, we do see them in bulk. And in particular, as to the proportions among their numbers, their motions and their other properties, we must think that when the god had brought them to complete and exact perfection (to the degree that Necessity was willing to comply obediently), he arranged them together proportionately.

Given all we have said so far about the kinds of elemental bodies, the following account [of their transformations] is the most likely: When earth encounters fire and is broken up by fire's sharpness, it will drift about—whether the breaking up occurred within fire itself, or within a mass of air or water—until its parts meet again somewhere, refit themselves together and become earth again. The reason is that the parts of earth will never pass into another form. But when water is broken up into parts by fire or even by air, it could happen that the parts recombine to form one corpuscle of fire and two of air. And the fragments of air could produce, from any single particle that is broken up, two fire corpuscles. And conversely, whenever a small amount of fire is enveloped by a large quantity of air or water or perhaps earth and is agitated inside them as they move, and in spite of its resistance is beaten and shattered to bits, then any two fire corpuscles may combine

to constitute a single form of air. And when air is overpowered and broken down, then two and one half entire forms of air will be consolidated into a single, entire form of water.

Let us recapitulate and formulate our account of these transformations as follows: Whenever one of the other kinds is caught inside fire and gets cut up by the sharpness of fire's angles and edges, then if it is reconstituted as fire, it will stop getting cut. The reason is that a thing of any kind that is alike and uniform is incapable of effecting any change in, or being affected by, anything that is similar to it. But as long as something involved in a transformation has something stronger than it to contend with, the process of its dissolution will continue non-stop. And likewise, when a few of the smaller corpuscles are surrounded by a greater number of bigger ones, they will be shattered and quenched. The quenching will stop when these smaller bodies are willing to be reconstituted into the form of the kind that prevailed over them, and so from fire will come air, and from air, water. But if these smaller corpuscles are in process of turning into these and one of the other kinds encounters them and engages them in battle, their dissolution will go on non-stop until they are either completely squeezed and broken apart and escape to their own likes, or else are defeated, and, melding from many into one, they are assimilated to the kind that prevailed over them, and come to share its abode from then on. And, what is more, as they undergo these processes, they all exchange their territories: for as a result of the Receptacle's agitation the masses of each of the kinds are separated from one another, with each occupying its own region, but because some parts of a particular kind do from time to time become unlike their former selves and like the other kinds, they are carried by the shaking towards the region occupied by whatever masses they are becoming like to.

These, then, are the sorts of causes by which the unalloyed primary bodies have come to be. Now the fact that different varieties are found within their respective forms is to be attributed to the constructions of each of the elementary triangles. Each of these two constructions did not originally yield a triangle that had just one size, but triangles that were both smaller and larger, numerically as many as there are varieties within a given form. That is why when they are mixed with themselves and with each other they display an infinite variety, which those who are to employ a likely account in their study of nature ought to take note of.

Now as for motion and rest, unless there is agreement on the manner and the conditions in which these two come to be, we will have many obstacles to face in our subsequent course of reasoning. Although we have already said something about them, we need to say this as well: there will be no motion in a state of uniformity. For it is difficult, or rather impossible, for something to be moved without something to set it in motion, or something to set a thing in motion without something to be moved by it. When either is absent, there is no motion, but [when they are present] it is quite impossible for them to be uniform. And so let us always presume that rest is found in a state of uniformity and to attribute motion to non-uniformity. The latter, moreover, is caused by inequality, the origin of which we have already discussed.

We have not explained, however, how it is that the various corpuscles have not reached the point of being thoroughly separated from each other kind by kind, so that their transformations into each other and their movement [toward their own regions] would have come to a halt. So let us return to say this about it: Once the circumference of the universe has comprehended the [four] kinds, then, because it is round and has a natural tendency to gather in upon itself, it constricts them all and allows no empty space to be left over.

This is why fire, more than the other three, has come to infiltrate all of the others, with air in second place, since it is second in degree of subtlety, and so on for the rest. For the bodies that are generated from the largest parts will have the largest gaps left over in their construction, whereas the smallest bodies will have the tiniest. Now this gathering, contracting process squeezes the small parts into the gaps inside the big ones. So now, as the small parts are placed among the large ones and the smaller ones tend to break up the larger ones while the larger tend to cause the smaller to coalesce, they all shift, up and down, into their own respective regions. For as each changes in quantity, it also changes the position of its region. This, then, is how and why the occurrence of non-uniformity is perpetually preserved, and so sets these bodies in perpetual motion, both now and in the future without interruption.

Next, we should note that there are many varieties of fire that have come to be. For example, there is both flame and the effluence from flame which, while it doesn't burn, gives light to the eyes. And then there is the residue of flame which is left in the embers when the flame has gone out. The same goes for air. There is the brightest kind that we call "aether," and also the murkiest, "mist" and "darkness." Then there are other, nameless sorts which result from inequality among the triangles. The varieties of water can first of all be divided into two groups, the liquid and the liquifiable. Because the former possesses water parts that are not only unequal but also small, it turns out to be mobile, both in itself and when acted upon by something else. This is due to its non-uniformity and the configuration of its shape. The other type of water, composed of large and uniform kinds, is rather more immobile and heavy, compacted as it is by its uniformity. But when fire penetrates it and begins to break it up, it loses its uniformity, and once that is lost it is more susceptible to motion. When it

has become quite mobile it is spread out upon the ground under pressure from the air surrounding it. Each of these changes has its own name: “melting” for the disintegration of its bulk and “flowing” for the spreading on the ground. But when, conversely, the fire is expelled from it, then, since the fire does not pass into a void, pressure is exerted upon the surrounding air, which in turn compresses the still mobile liquid mass into the places previously occupied by the fire and mixes it with itself. As it is being compressed, the mass regains its uniformity now that fire, the agent of non-uniformity, has left the scene, and it resettles into its own former state. The departure of the fire is called “cooling,” and the compression that occurs when the fire is gone is called “jelling.” Of all these types of water that we have called liquifiable, the one that consists of the finest, the most uniform parts and has proved to be the most dense, one that is unique in its kind and tinged with brilliant yellow, is gold, our most precious possession, filtered through rocks and thereby compacted. And gold’s offshoot, which because of its density is extremely hard and has a black color, is called adamant. Another has parts that approximate gold and comes in more than one variety. In terms of density, it is in one way denser than gold and includes a small, fine part of earth, so that it is harder. But it is actually lighter than gold, because it has large gaps inside of it. This, it turns out, is copper, one variety of the bright, jelled kinds of water. Whenever the earth part of the mixture separates off again from the rest in the passage of time, this part, called verdigris, becomes visible by itself.

As for going further and giving an account of other stuffs of this sort along the lines of the likely stories we have been following, that is no complicated matter. And should one take a break and lay aside accounts about the things that always are, deriving instead a carefree pleasure from surveying the

likely accounts about becoming, he would provide his life with a moderate and sensible diversion. So shall we, then, at this time give free rein to such a diversion and go right on to set out the next likelihoods on these subjects, as follows:

Take now the water that is mixed with fire. It is fine and liquid and on account of its mobility and the way it rolls over the ground it is called "liquid/' It is soft, moreover, in that its faces, being less firm than those of earth, give way to it. When this water is separated from its fire and air and is isolated, it becomes more uniform, and it is pressed together into itself by the things that leave it. So compacted, the water above the earth which is most affected by this change turns to hail, while that on earth turns to ice. Some water is not affected quite so much, being still only half compacted. Such water above the earth becomes snow while that on the earth becomes what is called "frost," from dew that is congealed.

Now most of the varieties of water which are mixed with one another are collectively called "saps," because they have been filtered through plants that grow out of the earth. Because they are mixed, each of them has its own degree of non-uniformity. Many of these varieties are nameless, though four of them, all with fire in them, are particularly conspicuous and so have been given names. First, there is wine, which warms not only the body but the soul as well. Second, there are the various oils, which are smooth and divide the ray of sight and for that reason glisten, appearing bright and shiny to the eye: these include resin, castor oil, olive oil and others that share their properties. And third, there is what is most commonly called honey, which includes all that relaxes the taste passages of the mouth back to their natural state, and which by virtue of this property conveys a sense of sweetness. Fourth, there is what has been named tart juice, quite distinct from all the other saps. It is a foamy stuff, and is caustic and hence hazardous to the flesh.

As for the varieties of earth, first, such earth as has been filtered through water turns into a stony body in something like the following way: When the water that is mixed with it disintegrates in the mixing process, it is transformed into the form of air, and, once it has turned into air, it thrusts its way upwards toward its own region. And since there is no void above it, it pushes aside the air next to it. And when this air, heavy as it is, is pressed and poured around the mass of earth, it squeezes it hard and compresses it to fill the places vacated by the recently formed air. When so compressed by air, earth is insoluble in water and constitutes itself as stone. The more beautiful kind of stone is stone that is transparent and made up of equal and uniform parts; the uglier kind is just the opposite. Second, there is the kind of earth from which moisture has been completely expelled by a swiftly burning fire and which thus comes to have a rather more brittle constitution than the first kind of earth. This is a kind to which the name "pottery" has been given. Sometimes, however, moisture gets left in and we get earth that is made liquifiable by fire. When it has cooled it turns to stone that is black in color (i.e., lava). Then, thirdly, there are the two varieties of earth that both alike are the residue of a mixture of a great quantity of water. They are briny, made up of the finest parts of earth, and turn out to be semi-solid and water soluble again. One of these is soda, a cleansing agent against oil and dirt; the other is salt, which is well suited to enhance various blends of flavor and has, not unreasonably, proven itself to be a stuff pleasing to the gods.

There are also compounds of earth and water which are soluble by fire but not by water. These are compacted in this way for the following sort of reason: Neither air nor fire will dissolve masses of earth, because air and fire consist of parts that by nature are smaller than are the gaps within earth. They thus pass without constraint through the wide gaps of a

mass of earth, leaving it intact and undissolved. But since the parts of water are naturally bigger, they must force their way through, and in so doing they undo and dissolve the earth. For water alone can in this way dissolve earth that isn't forcibly compressed, but when earth is compressed nothing but fire can dissolve it. That is because fire is the only thing left that can penetrate it. So also, only fire can disperse water that has been compressed with the greatest force, whereas both fire and air can disperse water that is in a looser state. Air does it by entering the gaps, and fire by breaking up the triangles. The only way in which air that has been condensed under force can be broken up is into its elemental triangles, and even when it is not forcibly compressed only fire can dissolve it.

So as for these bodies that are mixtures of earth and water, as long as the gaps within a given mass of earth are occupied by its own water which is tightly packed within the gaps, the water parts that come charging upon it from the outside have no way of getting into the mass and so flow around the whole of it, leaving it undissolved. The fire parts, however, do penetrate the gaps within the water parts and hence as fire they do to water what water did to earth. They alone, it turns out, cause this body, this partnership of earth and water to come apart and become fluid. These compounds of earth and water include not only bodies that have less water in them than earth, such as glass and generally all stone formations that can be called liquifiable, but also bodies that have more water than earth, namely all those that have the consistency of wax or of incense.

We have now pretty much completed our presentation of the kinds of bodies that are distinguished by their multifarious shapes, their combinations and their inter transformations. Now we must try to shed some light on what has caused them to come to have the properties they do. First,

we need at every step in our discourse to appeal to the existence of sense perception, but we have so far discussed neither the coming to be of flesh, or of what pertains to flesh, nor the part of the soul that is mortal. It so happens, however, that we cannot give an adequate account of these matters without referring to perceptual properties, but neither can we give an account of the latter without referring to the former, and to treat them simultaneously is all but impossible. So we must start by assuming the one or the other, and later revisit what we have assumed. Let's begin by taking for granted for now the existence of body and soul. This will allow our account of these properties to succeed the account we've just given of the elemental kinds.

First, then, let us see what we mean when we call fire hot. Let's look at it in this way: We notice how fire acts on our bodies by dividing and cutting them. We are all well aware that the experience is a sharp one. The fineness of fire's edges, the sharpness of its angles, the minuteness of its parts and the swiftness of its motion—all of which make fire severely piercing so that it makes sharp cuts in whatever it encounters—must be taken into consideration as we recall how its shape came to be. It is this substance, more than any other, that divides our bodies throughout and cuts them up into small pieces, thereby giving us the property (as well as the name [kermatizein]) that we now naturally call hot [thermon].

What the opposite property is, is quite obvious; we should not, however, keep anything left out of our account. As the larger parts of the moisture surrounding our bodies penetrate our bodies and push out the smaller parts, but are unable to take up the places vacated by those smaller parts, they compress the moisture within us and congeal it by rendering it in a state of motionlessness in place of a state of moving non-uniformity, by virtue of the uniformity and compression

so introduced. But anything which is being unnaturally compressed has a natural tendency to resist such compression, and pushes itself outward, in the opposite direction. This resistance, this shaking is called "shivering" and "chill," and the experience as a whole, as well as what brings it about, has come to have the name cold.

Hard we call whatever our flesh gives way to; soft, whatever gives way to our flesh. And this is how they are relative to each other. Whatever stands upon a small base tends to give way. The form composed of quadrangles, however, is the least liable to being displaced because its bases are very secure, and that which is compacted to its maximum density is particularly resistant to being displaced.

Heavy and light can be most clearly explained if we examine them in conjunction with what we call above and below. It is entirely wrong to hold that there are by nature two separate regions, divorced from and entirely opposite one another, the one the region "below," toward which anything that has physical mass tends to move, and the other the region "above" toward which everything makes its way only under force. For given that the whole heaven is spherical, all the points that are situated as extremes at an equal distance from the center must by their nature be extremes of just the same sort, and we must take it that the center, being equidistant from the extremes, is situated at the point that is the opposite to all the extremes. Now if this is the universe's natural constitution, which of the points just mentioned could you posit as "above" or "below" without justly giving the appearance of using totally inappropriate language? There is no justification for describing the universe's central region either as a natural "above" or a natural "below," but just as "at the center." And the region at the circumference is, to be sure, not the center, but neither is one of its parts so distinguished from any other that it is related to the center in a specific way more so than

any of the parts opposite to it. What contrary terms could you apply to something that is by nature all alike in every direction? How could you think to use such terms appropriately? If, further, there is something solid and evenly balanced at the center of the universe, it could not move to any of the extreme points, because these are all alike in all directions. But if you could travel around it in a circle, you would repeatedly take a position at your own antipodes and call the very same part of it now the part "above," and then the part "below." For the whole universe, as we have just said, is spherical, and to say that some region of it is its "above," and another its "below," makes no sense. The origin of these terms and the subjects to which they really apply, which explain how we have become accustomed to using them in dividing the world as a whole in this way, we must resolve by adopting the following supposition: Imagine a man stepping onto that region of the universe that is the particular province of fire, where the greatest mass of fire is gathered together, and toward which other fire moves. Imagine, further, that he has the power to remove some parts of the fire and place them on scales. When he raises the beam and drags the fire into the alien air, applying force to it, clearly the lesser quantity of fire somehow gives way to his force more easily than the greater. For when two things are raised by one and the same exertion, the lesser quantity will invariably yield more readily and the greater (which offers more resistance) less readily, to the force applied. And so the large quantity will be described as heavy and moving downward, and the small one as light and moving upward. Now this is the very thing we must detect ourselves doing in our own region. When we stand on the earth and weigh out one earth-like thing against another, and sometimes some earth itself, we drag these things by force, contrary to their natural tendency, into the alien air. While both of them tend to cling to what is akin to them,

nevertheless the smaller one will yield sooner and more readily than the larger one to the force we apply that introduces it into the alien stuff. Now this is what we call light, and the region into which we force it to go we call above; their opposites we call heavy and below. Now the things [having any of these designations] necessarily differ relatively to one another, because the various masses of the elemental kinds of body occupy opposite regions: what in one region is light, heavy, below or above will all be found to become, or to be, directly opposite to, or at an angle to, or in any and every different direction from, what is light, heavy, below or above in the opposite region. In fact, this is the one thing that should be understood to apply in all these cases: the path towards its own kind is what makes a thing moving along it "heavy" and the region into which it moves, "below," whereas the other set of terms ["light" and "above"] are for things behaving the other way. This, then, concludes our account of what causes [things to have] these properties.

As for smooth and rough, I take it that anyone could discern the explanation of those properties and communicate it to someone else: roughness results from the combination of hardness with non-uniformity, while smoothness is the result of uniformity's contribution to density.

The most important point that remains concerning the properties that have a common effect upon the body as a whole, pertains to the causes of pleasures and pains in the cases we have described as well as all cases in which sensations are registered throughout the bodily parts, sensations which are also simultaneously accompanied by pains and pleasures in those parts. With every property, whether perceived or not, let us take up the question of the causes of pleasure or pain in the following way, recalling the distinction made in the foregoing between what is easily moved and what is hard to move. This is the way in which we

must pursue all that we intend to comprehend. When even a minor disturbance affects that which is easily moved by nature, the disturbance is passed on in a chain reaction with some parts affecting others in the same way as they were affected, until it reaches the center of consciousness and reports the property that produced the reaction. On the other hand, something that is hard to move remains fixed and merely experiences the disturbance without passing it on in any chain reaction. It does not disturb any of its neighboring parts, so that in the absence of some parts passing on the disturbance to others, the initial disturbance affecting them fails to move on into the living thing as a whole and renders the disturbance unperceived. This is true of our bones and hair and of the other mostly earth-made parts that we possess. But the former is true of our sight and hearing in particular, and this is due to the fact that their chief inherent power is that of air and of fire.

This, then, is what we should understand about pleasure and pain: an unnatural disturbance that comes upon us with great force and intensity is painful, while its equally intense departure, leading back to the natural state, is pleasant. One that is mild and gradual is not perceived, whereas the opposite is the case with the opposite disturbance. Further, one that occurs readily can be completely perceived, more so than any other, though neither pleasure nor pain is involved. Take, for example, those involved in the act of seeing. Earlier we described the ray of sight as a body that comes into being with the daylight as an extension of ourselves. The cuttings, the burnings and whatever else it undergoes don't cause any pains in it, nor does the return to its former state yield any pleasures. Its perceptions are the more vivid and clear the more it is affected and the greater the number of things it encounters and makes contact with, for there is absolutely no violence involved when it is severed [by the cutting and

burning, etc.] and reconstituted. Bodies consisting of larger parts, on the other hand, won't easily give way to what acts upon them. They pass on the motions they receive to the entire body, and so they do get pleasures and pains—pains when they are alienated from their natural condition and pleasures when they are once again restored to it. All those bodies which experience only gradual departures from their normal state or gradual depletions but whose replenishments are intense and substantial are bodies that are unaware of their depletions but not of their replenishments, and hence they introduce very substantial pleasures in the mortal part of the soul but not any pains. This is clear in the case of fragrances. But all those bodies whose alienations are intense while their restorations to their former states are but gradual and slow, pass on motions that are entirely contrary to those mentioned just before. Again, this clearly turns out to be the case when the body suffers burns or cuts.

We have now pretty much covered those disturbances that affect the whole body in a common way, as well as all the terms that have come to be applied to the agents that produce them. We must now try to discuss, if we can, those that take place in our various particular parts, and, as before, their causes, which lie in the agents that produce them. First, then, we need to shed what light we can on what we left untreated earlier when we talked about tastes, and these are the properties specifically connected to the tongue. It seems that these, too, in common with most other properties, come about as a result of contractions and dilations, but apart from that, these tongue-related properties seem rather more than any of the others to involve roughness and smoothness. Now as earth-like parts penetrate the area around the tiny vessels that act as testers for the tongue and reach down to the heart, they impact upon the moist, soft flesh of the tongue and are melted away. In the process they contract the vessels and dry

them up. When they tend to be rather rough, we taste them as sour; when less rough, as tangy. Things that rinse the vessels and wash the entire area around the tongue are all called bitter when they do so to excess and so assault the tongue as to dissolve some of it, as soda actually can do. When they are not as strong as soda and effect only a moderate rinsing, they taste salty to us. They have none of the harsh bitterness, and we find them rather agreeable. Things that absorb the heat of the mouth, by which they are also worn smooth, are ignited and in their turn return their fire to that which made them hot. Their lightness carries them up to the senses in the head, as they cut any and everything they come up against. Because this is what they do, things of this sort have all been called pungent. On the other hand, there are those things which have been refined by the process of decomposition and which then intrude themselves into the narrow vessels. These are proportioned both to the earth parts and those of air that are contained within the vessels, so that they agitate the earth and air parts and cause them to be stirred one around the other. As these are being stirred, they surround one another, and, as parts of one sort intrude themselves into parts of another, they make hollows which envelop the parts that go inside. So when a hollow envelope of moisture, whether earthy or pure, as the case may be, is stretched around air, we get moist vessels of air, hollow spheres of water. Some of these, those that form a transparent enclosure consisting of a pure moisture are called “bubbles”; those, on the other hand, whose moisture is earthy and agitates and rises upward all at once are called by the terms “effervescence” and “fermentation.” That which causes these disturbances is called acid to the taste.

There is a disturbance that is the opposite of all the ones we have just discussed, one that is the effect of an opposite cause. Whenever the composition of the moistened parts that

enter the vessels of the tongue is such that it is congruent with the natural condition of the tongue, these entering parts make smooth and lubricate the roughened parts and in some cases constrict while in others they relax the parts that have been abnormally dilated or contracted. They decisively restore all those parts back to their natural position. As such, they prove to be a cure for the violent disturbances [just discussed], being fully pleasant and agreeable to one and all, and are called sweet.

So much for the subject of tastes. As for the power belonging to the nostrils, there are no types within it. This is because a smell is always a "half-breed." None of the elemental shapes, as it happens, has the proportions required for having any odor. The vessels involved in our sense of smell are too narrow for the varieties of earth and water parts, yet too wide for those of earth and air. Consequently no one has ever perceived any odor coming from these elemental bodies. Things give off odors when they either get damp or decay, or melt or evaporate; for when water changes to air or air to water, odors are given off in the transition. All odors collectively are either vapor or mist, mist being what passes from air to water, and vapor what passes from water to air, and this is why odors as a group turn out to be finer than water, yet grosser than air. Their character becomes clear when one strains to draw one's breath through something that obstructs one's breathing. There will be no odor that filters through. All that comes through is just the breath itself, devoid of any odor.

These variations among odors, then, form two sets, neither of which has a name, since they do not consist of a specific number of simple types. Let us draw the only clear distinction we can draw here, that between the pleasant and the offensive. The latter of these irritates and violates the whole upper body from the top of the head to the navel, while the

former soothes that area and welcomes it back to its natural state.

A third kind of perception that we want to consider is hearing. We must describe the causes that produce the properties connected with this perception. In general, let us take it that sound is the percussion of air by way of the ears upon the brain and the blood and transmitted to the soul, and that hearing is the motion caused by the percussion that begins in the head and ends in the place where the liver is situated. And let us take it that whenever the percussion is rapid, the sound is high-pitched, and that the slower the percussion, the lower the pitch. A regular percussion produces a uniform, smooth sound, while a contrary one produces one that is rough. A forceful percussion produces a loud sound, while a contrary one produces one that is soft. But we must defer discussion of harmonization in sounds to a later part of our discourse.

The fourth and remaining kind of perception is one that includes a vast number of variations within it, and hence it requires subdivision. Collectively, we call these variations colors. Color is a flame which flows forth from bodies of all sorts, with its parts proportional to our sight so as to produce perception. At an earlier point in our discourse we treated only the causes that led to the origination of the ray of sight; now, at this point, it is particularly appropriate to provide a well-reasoned account of colors.

Now the parts that move from the other objects and impinge on the ray of sight are in some cases smaller, in others larger than, and in still other cases equal in size to, the parts of the ray of sight itself. Those that are equal are imperceptible, and these we naturally call transparent. Those that are larger contract the ray of sight while those that are smaller, on the other hand, dilate it, and so are “cousin” to what is cold or hot in the case of the flesh, and, in the case of

the tongue, with what is sour, or with all those things that generate heat and that we have therefore called "pungent." So black and white, it turns out, are properties of contraction and dilation, and are really the same as these other properties, though in a different class, which is why they present a different appearance. This, then, is how we should speak of them: white is what dilates the ray of sight, and black is what does the opposite.

Now when a more penetrating motion of a different type of fire pounces on the ray of sight and dilates it right up to the eyes, and forces its way through the very passages within the eyeballs and melts them, it discharges from those passages a glob of fire and water which we call a tear. The penetrating motion itself consists of fire, and as it encounters fire from the opposite direction, then, as the one fire leaps out from the eyes like a lightning flash and the other enters them but is quenched by the surrounding moisture, the resulting turmoil gives rise to colors of every hue. The disturbance so produced we call "dazzling," and that which produces it we name bright and brilliant.

On the other hand, the type of fire that is intermediate between white and bright is one that reaches the moisture in the eyes and blends with it, but is not brilliant. As the fire shines through the moisture with which it is mixed, it yields the color of blood, which we call red. And when bright is mixed with red and white, we get orange. But it would be unwise to state the proportions among them, even if one could know them. It is impossible, even approximately, to provide a proof or a likely account on these matters.

Now red mixed with black and white is of course purple. When this combination is burnt further and more black is mixed with it, we get violet. Gray is a mixture of black and white, and the mixture of orange and gray produces amber. Beige comes from white mixed with orange. White combined

with bright and immersed in a saturated black produces a cobalt blue color, which, when blended with white, becomes turquoise. A mixture of amber with black yields green. As for the other hues, it should be fairly clear from the above cases by what mixtures they are to be represented in a way that preserves our "likely story." But if anyone in considering these matters were to put them to an actual test, he would demonstrate his ignorance of the difference between the human and the divine. It is god who possesses both the knowledge and power required to mix a plurality into a unity and, conversely, to dissolve a unity into a plurality, while no human being could possess either of these, whether at the present time or at any time in the future.

And so all these things were taken in hand, their natures being determined then by necessity in the way we've described, by the craftsman of the most perfect and excellent among things that come to be, at the time when he brought forth that self-sufficient, most perfect god. Although he did make use of the relevant auxiliary causes, it was he himself who gave their fair design to all that comes to be. That is why we must distinguish two forms of cause, the divine and the necessary. First, the divine, for which we must search in all things if we are to gain a life of happiness to the extent that our nature allows, and second, the necessary, for which we must search for the sake of the divine. Our reason is that without the necessary, those other objects, about which we are serious, cannot on their own be discerned, and hence cannot be comprehended or partaken of in any other way.

We have now sorted out the different kinds of cause, which lie ready for us like lumber for carpenters. From them we are to weave together the remainder of our account. So let us briefly return to our starting point and quickly proceed to the same place from which we arrived at our present position. Let

us try to put a final “head” on our account, one that fits in with our previous discussion.

To repeat what was said at the outset, the things we see were in a condition of disorderliness when the god introduced as much proportionality into them and in as many ways—making each thing proportional both to itself and to other things—as was possible for making them be commensurable and proportionate. For at the time they had no proportionality at all, except by chance, nor did any of them qualify at all for the names we now use to name them, names like fire, water, etc. All these things, rather, the god first gave order to, and then out of them he proceeded to construct this universe, a single living thing that contains within itself all living things, mortal or immortal. He himself fashioned those that were divine, but assigned his own progeny the task of fashioning the generation of those that were mortal.

They imitated him: having taken the immortal origin of the soul, they proceeded next to encase it within a round mortal body [the head], and to give it the entire body as its vehicle. And within the body they built another kind of soul as well, the mortal kind, which contains within it those dreadful but necessary disturbances: pleasure, first of all, evil’s most powerful lure; then pains, that make us run away from what is good; besides these, boldness also and fear, foolish counselors both; then also the spirit of anger hard to assuage, and expectation easily led astray. These they fused with unreasoning sense perception and all-venturing lust, and so, as was necessary, they constructed the mortal type of soul. In the face of these disturbances they scrupled to stain the divine soul only to the extent that this was absolutely necessary, and so they provided a home for the mortal soul in another place in the body, away from the other, once they had built an isthmus as boundary between the head and the chest by situating a neck between them to keep them apart. Inside the

chest, then, and in what is called the trunk they proceeded to enclose the mortal type of soul. And since one part of the mortal soul was naturally superior to the other, they built the hollow of the trunk in sections, dividing them the way that women's quarters are divided from men's. They situated the midriff between the sections to serve as a partition. Now the part of the mortal soul that exhibits manliness and spirit, the ambitious part, they settled nearer the head, between the midriff and the neck, so that it might listen to reason and together with it restrain by force the part consisting of appetites, should the latter at any time refuse outright to obey the dictates of reason coming down from the citadel. The heart, then, which ties the veins together, the spring from which blood courses with vigorous pulse throughout all the bodily members, they set in the guardhouse. That way, if spirit's might should boil over at a report from reason that some wrongful act involving these members is taking place—something being done to them from outside or even something originating from the appetites within—every bodily part that is sensitive may be keenly sensitized, through all the narrow vessels, to the exhortations or threats and so listen and follow completely. In this way the best part among them all can be left in charge.

The gods foreknew that the pounding of the heart (which occurs when one expects what one fears or when one's spirit is aroused) would, like all such swelling of the passions, be caused by fire. So they devised something to relieve the pounding: they implanted lungs, a structure that is first of all soft and without blood and that secondly contains pores bored through it like a sponge. This enables it to take in breath and drink and thereby cool the heart, bringing it respite and relaxation in the heat. That, then, is why they cut the passages of the windpipe down to the lungs, and situated the lungs around the heart like padding, so that when spirit

within the heart should reach its peak, the heart might pound against something that gives way to it and be cooled down. By laboring less, it might be better able to join spirit in serving reason.

The part of the soul that has appetites for food and drink and whatever else it feels a need for, given the body's nature, they settled in the area between the midriff and the boundary toward the navel. In the whole of this region they constructed something like a trough for the body's nourishment. Here they tied this part of the soul down like a beast, a wild one, but one they could not avoid sustaining along with the others if a mortal race were ever to be. They assigned it its position there, to keep it ever feeding at its trough, living as far away as possible from the part that takes counsel, and making as little clamor and noise as possible, thereby letting the supreme part take its counsel in peace about what is beneficial for one and all. They knew that this part of the soul was not going to understand the deliverances of reason and that even if it were in one way or another to have some awareness of them, it would not have an innate regard for any of them, but would be much more enticed by images and phantoms night and day. Hence the god conspired with this very tendency by constructing a liver, a structure which he situated in the dwelling place of this part of the soul. He made it into something dense, smooth, bright and sweet, though also having a bitter quality, so that the force of the thoughts sent down from the mind might be stamped upon it as upon a mirror that receives the stamps and returns visible images. So whenever the force of the mind's thoughts could avail itself of a congenial portion of the liver's bitterness and threaten it with severe command, it could then frighten this part of the soul. And by infusing the bitterness all over the liver, it could project bilious colors onto it and shrink the whole liver, making it wrinkled and rough. It could curve and shrivel up

the liver's lobe and block up and close off its receptacles and portal fissures, thereby causing pains and bouts of nausea. And again, whenever thought's gentle inspiration should paint quite opposite pictures, its force would bring respite from the bitterness by refusing to stir up or to make contact with a nature opposite to its own. It would instead use the liver's own natural sweetness on it and restore the whole extent of it to be straight and smooth and free, and make that portion of the soul that inhabits the region around the liver gracious and well behaved, conducting itself with moderation during the night when, seeing that it has no share in reason and understanding, it practices divination by dreams. For our creators recalled their father's instruction to make the mortal race as excellent as possible, and so, redeeming even the base part of ourselves in this way, they set the center of divination here, so that it might have some grasp of truth.

The claim that god gave divination as a gift to human folly has good support: while he is in his right mind no one engages in divination, however divinely inspired and true it may be, but only when his power of understanding is bound in sleep or by sickness, or when some sort of possession works a change in him. On the other hand, it takes a man who has his wits about him to recall and ponder the pronouncements produced by this state of divination or possession, whether in sleep or while awake. It takes such a man to thoroughly analyze any and all visions that are seen, to determine how and for whom they signify some future, past or present good or evil. But as long as the fit remains on him, the man is incompetent to render judgment on his own visions and voices; As the ancient proverb well puts it, "Only a man of sound mind may know himself and conduct his own affairs." This is the reason why it is customary practice to appoint interpreters to render judgment on an inspired divination. These persons are called "diviners" by some who are entirely

ignorant of the fact that they are expositors of utterances or visions communicated through riddles. Instead of "diviners," the correct thing to call them is, "interpreters of things divined."

This, then, explains why the liver's nature is what it is, and why it is situated in the region we say—it is for the purpose of divination. Now while each creature is still alive, an organ of this sort will display marks that are fairly clear, but once its life has gone, the organ turns blind and its divinations are too faint to display any clear marks. Moreover, the neighboring organ situated on its left turns out to have a structure which is meant to serve the liver in keeping it bright and clean continuously, like a dust cloth provided for wiping a mirror, placed next to it and always available. Hence, whenever impurities of one sort or another, the effects of bodily illnesses, turn up all around the liver, the spleen, a loosely-woven organ with hollow spaces that contain no blood, cleans them all away and absorbs them. In consequence it becomes engorged with the impurities it has cleaned off, swells to great size and festers. Later, when the body's cleansing is complete, the swelling subsides, and the spleen once again shrinks back to its normal size.

So, as for our questions concerning the soul—to what extent it is mortal and to what extent divine; where its parts are situated, with what organs they are associated, and why they are situated apart from one another—that the truth has been told is something we could affirm only if we had divine confirmation. But that our account is surely at least a "likely" one is a claim we must risk, both now and as we proceed to examine the matter more closely. Let that be our claim, then.

Our next topic must be pursued along the same lines. This was to describe how the rest of the body came to be. The following train of reasoning should explain its composition best of all. The creators of our race knew that we were going

to be undisciplined in matters of food and drink. They knew that our gluttony would lead us to consume much more than the moderate amount we needed. So, to prevent the swift destruction of our mortal race by diseases and to forestall its immediate, premature demise, they had the foresight to create the lower abdomen, as it's called, as a receptacle for storing the excess food and drink. They wound the intestines round in coils to prevent the nourishment from passing through so quickly that the body would of necessity require fresh nourishment just as quickly, thereby rendering it insatiable. Such gluttony would make our whole race incapable of philosophy and the arts, and incapable of heeding the most divine part within us.

As for flesh and bones and things of that nature, this is how it is. The starting point for all these was the formation of marrow. For life's chains, as long as the soul remains bound to the body, are bound within the marrow, giving roots for the mortal race. The marrow itself came to be out of other things. For the god isolated from their respective kinds those primary triangles which were undistorted and smooth and hence, owing to their exactness, were particularly well suited to make up fire, water, air and earth. He mixed them together in the right proportions, and from them made the marrow, a "universal seed" contrived for every mortal kind. Next, he implanted in the marrow the various types of soul and bound them fast in it. And in making his initial distribution, he proceeded immediately to divide the marrow into the number and kinds of shapes that matched the number and kinds of shapes that the types of soul were to possess, type by type. He then proceeded to mold the "field," as it were, that was to receive the divine seed, making it round, and called this portion of the marrow, "brain." Each living thing was at its completion to have a head to function as a container for this marrow. That, however, which was to hold fast the remaining,

mortal part of the soul, he divided into shapes that were at once round and elongated, all of which he named "marrow." And from these as from anchors he put out bonds to secure the whole soul and so he proceeded to construct our bodies all around this marrow, beginning with the formation of solid bone as a covering for the whole of it.

This is how he constructed bone. He sifted earth that was pure and smooth, kneaded it and soaked it with marrow. Next, he set this mixture in fire, and then dipped it in water, then back in fire, followed by water again. By moving it this way repeatedly from the one and then back to the other, he made it insoluble by both. He made use of this material in shaping a round, bony globe to enclose the brain, and left it with a narrow passage out. From the material he then proceeded to mold vertebrae to enclose marrow of the neck and back, and set them in place one underneath another, beginning with the head and proceeding along the whole length of the trunk, to function as pivots. And so, to preserve all of the seed, he fenced it in with a stony enclosure. In this enclosure he made joints, employing in their case the character of the Different situated between them to allow them to move and to flex.

Moreover, the god thought that bone as such was rather too brittle and inflexible, and also that repeatedly getting extremely hot and cold by turns would cause it to disintegrate and to destroy in short order the seed within it. That is why he contrived to make sinews and flesh. He bound all the limbs together with sinews that could contract and relax, and so enabled the body to flex about the pivots and to stretch itself out. The flesh he made as a defense against summer's heat and as protection against winter's cold. And, as protection against injuries, too, he made the flesh so that it would give way softly and gently to bodies like the felted coverings we wear. He made it to contain within itself a warm moisture that would come out as perspiration during summertime, when, by

moistening the body on the outside, it would impart the body's own coolness to the whole of it. And conversely, in wintertime this moisture would provide an adequate defense, by means of this fire, against the frost which surrounds it and attacks it from outside. Such were the designs of him who molded us like wax: he made a mixture using water, fire and earth, which he adjusted together, and created a compound of acid and brine, a fermented mixture which he combined with the previous mixture, and so he formed flesh, sappy and soft. The sinews he made out of a mixture of bone and unfermented flesh, to make up a single yellow stuff whose character was intermediate between them both. That is the reason the sinews came to have a stretchier and tougher character than flesh, yet softer and more moist than bone. With these the god wrapped the bones and the marrow. First he bound the bones to each other with sinews, and then he laid a shroud of flesh upon them all.

All those bones that had more soul than others he proceeded to wrap in a very thin layer of flesh, while those that contained less he wrapped in a very thick layer of very dense flesh. And indeed, at the joints of the bones, where it appeared that reason did not absolutely require the presence of flesh, he introduced only a thin layer of flesh, so that the ability of the joints to flex would not be impeded, a condition that would have made it very difficult for the bodies to move. A further reason was this: if there were a thick layer of flesh there, packed extremely densely together, its hardness would cause a kind of insensibility, which would make thinking less retentive and more obscure. This he wanted to prevent.

This explains why thighs and calves, the area around the hips, arms (both upper and lower), and all other bodily parts where there are no joints as well as all the internal bones, are all fully provided with flesh. It is because they have only small

amounts of soul in their marrow, and so are devoid of intelligence. On the other hand, all those bodily parts that do possess intelligence are less fleshy, except perhaps for a fleshy thing—the tongue, for example—that was created to be itself an organ of sensation. But in most cases it is as I said. For there is no way that anything whose generation and composition are a consequence of Necessity can accommodate the combination of thick bone and massive flesh with keen and responsive sensation. If these two characteristics had not refused their concomitance, our heads above all else would have been so constituted as to possess this combination, and the human race, crowned with a head fortified with flesh and sinews would have a life twice, or many more times as long, a healthier and less painful life than the one we have now. As it was, however, our makers calculated the pros and cons of giving our race greater longevity but making it worse, versus making it better, though less long-lived, and decided that the superior though shorter life-span was in every way preferable for everyone to the longer but inferior one. This is why they capped the head with a sparse layer of bone—and not with flesh and sinew, given that the head has no joints. For all these reasons, then, the head has turned out to be more sensitive and intelligent but also, in every man's case, much weaker than the body to which it is attached. With this in mind the god thus positioned sinews at the very edge of the head, around the neck, and welded them uniformly. To these sinews he fastened the ends of the jawbones underneath the face. The other sinews he shared out among all the limbs, fastening joint to joint.

Our makers fitted the mouth out with teeth, a tongue and lips in their current arrangement, to accommodate both what is necessary and what is best: they designed the mouth as the entry passage for what is necessary, and as the exit for what is best: for all that comes in and provides nourishment for the

body is necessary, while that stream of speech that flows out through the mouth, that instrument of intelligence, is the fairest and best of all streams.

Moreover, the head couldn't be left to consist of nothing but bare bone, in view of the extremes of seasonal heat and cold. On the other hand, any mass of flesh with which it might be veiled couldn't be allowed to make it dull and insensitive, either. And so, an outer layer, disproportionately large (the thing we now call "skin"), was separated off from the flesh [of the upper body] that wasn't drying out completely. The moisture in the area of the brain enabled this layer to draw together toward itself and grow so as to envelop the head all around. Coming up under the sutures, this moisture watered it, and closed it together upon the crown, drawing it together in a knot, as it were. The sutures varied considerably, owing to the effect of the revolutions [in the head] and of the nourishment taken: the greater the conflict among these revolutions, the more numerous the sutures—the lesser the conflict, the less numerous they were.

Now the divine part [the brain] began to puncture this whole area of skin all around with its fire. Once the skin was pierced and the moisture had exuded outward through it, all that was purely wet and hot went away. The part that was compounded of the same stuff that the skin was made up of, caught up by this motion, was stretched to a great length outside this skin, no thicker than the punctured hole [through which it passed]. However, it moved slowly, and so the surrounding air pushed it back inside to curl underneath the skin and take root there. This is the process by which hair has come to grow on the skin. Hair is something fibrous, made of the same stuff as the skin, though harder and more dense due to the felting effect of the cooling process: once a hair separates off from skin, it is cooled and so gets felted together.

With this stuff, then, our maker made our heads bushy, availing himself of the causal factors just described. His intention was that this, not bare flesh, ought to provide a protective covering for the part of the head that holds the brain: it was light, and just right for providing shade in summer, and shelter in winter, without obstructing or interfering with the head's sensitivity in any way.

Sinew, skin and bone were interwoven at the ends of our fingers and toes. The mixture of these three was dried out, resulting in the formation of a single stuff, a piece of hard skin, the same in every case. Now these were merely auxiliary causes in its formation—the preeminent cause of its production was the purpose that took account of future generations: our creators understood that one day women and the whole realm of wild beasts would one day come to be from men, and in particular they knew that many of these offspring would need the use of nails and claws or hoofs for many purposes. This is why they took care to include nails formed in a rudimentary way in their design for humankind, right at the start. This was their reason, then, and these the professed aims that guided them in making skin, hair and nails grow at the extremities of our limbs.

So all the parts, all the limbs of the mortal living thing came to constitute a natural whole. Of necessity, however, it came about that he lived his life surrounded by fire and air, which caused him to waste away and be depleted, and so to perish. The gods, therefore, devised something to protect him. They made another mixture and caused another nature to grow, one congenial to our human nature though endowed with other features and other sensations, so as to be a different living thing. These are now cultivated trees, plants and seeds, taught by the art of agriculture to be domesticated for our use. But at first the only kinds there were, were wild ones, older than our cultivated kinds. We may call these plants "living

things" on the ground that anything that partakes of life has an incontestable right to be called a "living thing." And in fact, what we are talking about now partakes of the third type of soul, the type that our account has situated between the midriff and the navel. This type is totally devoid of opinion, reasoning or understanding, though it does share in sensation, pleasant and painful, and desires. For throughout its existence it is completely passive, and its formation has not entrusted it with a natural ability to discern and reflect upon any of its own characteristics, by revolving within and about itself, repelling movement from without and exercising its own inherent movement. Hence it is alive, to be sure, and unmistakably a living thing, but it stays put, standing fixed and rooted, since it lacks self-motion.

All these varieties were planted by our masters, to whom we are subject, to nourish us. Having done that, they proceeded to cut channels throughout our bodies, like water pipes in a garden, so that our bodies could be irrigated, as it were, by an oncoming stream. First, they cut two blood veins, channels hidden underneath the skin where the flesh joins it, to go down either side of the back—the body is a twofold thing, with a right and a left side. They situated these veins alongside the spine, and between them they placed the life-giving marrow as well, to give it its best chance to flourish, and to allow the bloodstream, which courses downhill, to flow readily from this region and uniformly irrigate the other parts of the body. They next split these veins in the region of the head, and wove them through one another, crossing them in opposite directions. They diverted the veins from the right toward the left side of the body, and those from the left toward the right, so that they, together with the skin, would act as a bond to keep the head fastened to the body, seeing that there were no sinews attached to the crown to enclose the head all around. They did this especially to make sure that the stimulations

received by the senses, coming from either side of the body, might register clearly upon the body as a whole.

From here the gods proceeded to fashion the irrigation system in the following way. We'll come to see it more easily if we can first agree on this point: whatever is made up of smaller parts holds in larger parts, while what consists of larger parts is incapable of holding in smaller parts. Of all the elemental kinds, fire is made up of the smallest parts, and that is the reason it can pass through water, earth and air, and any of their compounds. Nothing can hold it in. Now we must apply the same point to our belly. When food and drink descend into it, it holds them in, but it cannot hold in air and fire, consisting as they do of smaller parts than it does. And so the god availed himself of fire and air to conduct moisture from the belly to the [two] veins. He wove together an interlaced structure of air and fire, something like a fish trap. At its entrance it had a pair of funnels, one of which in turn he subdivided into two. And from the funnels he stretched reeds, as it were, all around throughout the structure, right to its extremities. All the interior parts of this network he made of fire; the funnels and the shell he made of air.

He took this structure and set it around the living thing which he had fashioned, in the following way. The funnel part he inserted into the mouth, and, consisting as it did of two funnels, he let one of them descend into the lungs down the windpipe, and the other alongside the windpipe into the belly. He made a split in the first one and assigned each of its parts a common outlet by way of the nostrils, so that when the one part fails to provide passage by way of the mouth, all of its currents also might be replenished from that one. The shell, the other part of the trap, he made to grow around the hollow part of the body, and he made this whole thing now flow together onto the funnels [compressing them]—gently, because they are made of air—now, when the funnels flow

back [expanding again], he made the interlaced structure sink into and through the body—a relatively porous thing—and pass outside again. The interior rays of fire [inside the shell], bound from side to side, he made to follow the air as it passed in both directions. This process was to go on non-stop for as long as the mortal living thing holds together; and this, of course, is the phenomenon to which the name-giver (so we claim) assigned the names of inhalation and exhalation. This entire pattern of action and reaction, irrigating and cooling our bodies, supports their nutrition and life. For whenever the internal fire, united with the breath that passes in or out, follows it along, it surges up and down continually and makes its way through and into the belly, where it gets hold of the food and drink. These it dissolves or breaks up into tiny parts, which it then takes through the outbound passages along which it is advancing, and transfers them into the [two] veins, as water from a spring is transferred into water pipes. And so it causes the currents of the veins to flow through the body as through a conduit.

Let us, however, take another look at what happens in respiration. What explains its having the character that it now actually has? It is this. Since there is no void into which anything that is moving could enter, and since the air we breathe out does move out, away from us, it clearly follows that this air doesn't move into a void, but pushes the air next to it out of its place. As this air is pushed out, it drives out the air next to it, and so on, and so inevitably the air, displaced all around, enters the place from which the original air was breathed out and refills that place, following hard on the breath. This all takes place at once, like the rotation of a wheel, because there is no such thing as a void. Consequently even as the breath is being discharged, the area of the chest and the lungs fills up again with the air that surrounds the body, air that goes through the cycle of displacement and

penetrates the porous flesh. And again, when the air is turned back and passes outward through the body, it comes round to push respiration inward by way of the mouth and the nostrils.

How did these processes get started? The explanation, we must suppose, is this: in the case of every living thing, its inner parts that are close to the blood and the veins are its hottest parts—an inner spring of fire inside it, as it were. This, of course, is what we've been comparing to the interlaced structure of a fish trap; it is entirely woven of fire, we said, and extended throughout its middle, while the rest of it, the external parts, are woven of air. Now it is beyond dispute that what is hot has a natural tendency to move outward into its own proper region, toward that which is akin to it. In this case there are two passages out, one out through [the pores of] the body, and the other out through the mouth and nose. So whenever hot air rushes out the one passage, it pushes air around into the other, and the air so pushed around gets hot as it encounters the fire, while the air that passes out is cooled down. Now as the temperature changes and the air that enters by way of one or the other of the passages gets hotter, the hotter air is more inclined to return by way of the passage it entered, since it moves toward what is like itself, and so it pushes air around to and through the other passage. This air is affected the same way, and produces the same effect every time; and so, due to both these principles it produces an oscillation back and forth, thereby providing for inhalation and exhalation to occur.

In this connection we should pursue along these lines an inquiry into the causes of the phenomena associated with medical cupping, and of swallowing, as well as of the motion of all projectiles that are dispatched into the air and along the ground. We should also investigate all sounds, whether fast or slow—sounds that appear to us as high pitched or low.

Sometimes, when the motion they produce in us as they move towards us lacks conformity, these sounds are inharmonious; at other times, when the motion does have conformity, the sounds are harmonious. [What happens in the latter case is this.] The slower sounds catch up with the motions of the earlier and quicker sounds as these are already dying away and have come to a point of conformity with the motions produced by the slower sounds that travel later. In catching up with them, the slower sounds do not upset them, even though they introduce another motion. On the contrary, they graft onto the quicker movement, now dying away, the beginning of a slower one that conforms to it, and so they produce a single effect, a mixture of high and low. Hence the pleasure they bring to fools and the delight they afford—by their expression of divine harmony in mortal movement—to the wise.

And what is more, every kind of water current, even the descent of a thunderbolt as well as that marvelous "attraction" exercised by amber and by the lodestone, in all these cases there is no such thing as a force of attraction. As any careful investigator will discover, there is no void; these things push themselves around into each other; all things move by exchanging places, each to its own place, whether in the process of combination or of dissolution. He will discover that these "works of wizardry" are due to the interactive relationships among these phenomena.

The phenomenon of respiration, which provided the occasion for this account, is a case in point. The above are the principles and causes to which it owes its existence, as we have said before. The fire cuts up the food [in our bellies] and as it follows the breath it oscillates inside us. As the oscillation goes on, the fire pumps the cut-up bits of food from the belly and packs them into the veins. This is the mechanism by which the streams of nourishment continue to flow

throughout the bodies of all living things. The bits of food, freshly cut up and derived from things like themselves—from fruits or from vegetables which the god had caused to grow for this very purpose, to serve us as food—come to have a variety of colors as a result of being mixed together, but a reddish color pervading them predominates, a character that is the product of the cutting and staining action of fire upon moisture. This is why the color of the liquid that flows in our bodies looks the way we've described; this liquid we call blood, which feeds our flesh and indeed our whole bodies. From this source the various parts of our bodies are watered and so replenish the supports of the depleted areas. Now both processes, the replenishment and the depletion, follow the manner of the movement of anything within the universe at large: everything moves toward that which is of its own kind. In this case, our external environment continually wastes us away and distributes our bulk by dispatching each [elemental] kind toward its own sort. The ingredients in our blood, then, having been chopped up inside us and encompassed by the individual living thing as by the frame of the universe, of necessity imitate the universe's motion. And so, as each of the fragmented parts inside moves toward its own kind, it replenishes once again the area just then depleted. In every case, whenever there is more leaving a body than flowing in [to replenish it], it diminishes; whenever less, the body grows. So while a living thing's constitution is still young, and its elemental triangles are "fresh from the slips," as it were, the triangles are firmly locked together, even though the frame of its entire mass is pliable, seeing that it has just lately been formed from marrow and nourished with milk. Now when the triangles that constitute the young living thing's food and drink enter its body from the outside and are enveloped within it, the body's own new triangles cut and prevail over these others, which are older and weaker than they are. The living

thing is thus nourished by an abundance of like parts, and so made to grow big. But when the roots of the triangles are slackened as a result of numerous conflicts they have waged against numerous adversaries over a long period of time, they are no longer able to cut up the entering food-triangles into conformity with themselves. They are themselves handily destroyed by the invaders from outside. Every living thing, then, goes into decline when it loses this battle, and it suffers what we call "old age." Eventually the interlocking bonds of the triangles around the marrow can no longer hold on, and come apart under stress, and when this happens they let the bonds of the soul go. The soul is then released in a natural way, and finds it pleasant to take its flight. All that is unnatural, we recall, is painful while all that occurs naturally is pleasant. This is true of death as well: a death that is due to disease or injury is painful and forced, while a death that comes naturally, when the aging process has run its course, is of all deaths the least distressing—a pleasant, not a painful death.

How diseases originate is, I take it, obvious to all. Given that there are four kinds of stuff out of which the body has been constructed—earth, fire, water and air—it may happen that some of these unnaturally increase themselves at the expense of the others. Or they may switch regions, each leaving its own and moving into another's region. Or again, since there is in fact more than one variety of fire and the other stuffs, it may happen that a given bodily part accommodates a particular variety that is not appropriate for it. When these things happen, they bring on conflicts and diseases. For when any of these unnatural occurrences and changes take place, bodily parts that used to be cold become hot, or those that are dry go on to become moist, and so with light and heavy, too. They undergo all sorts of changes in all sorts of ways. Indeed, it is our view that only when that which arrives at or leaves a

particular bodily part is the same as that part, consistent, uniform and in proper proportion with it, will the body be allowed to remain stable, sound and healthy. On the other hand, anything that causes offense by passing beyond these bounds as it arrives or departs will bring on a multiplicity of altered states, and an infinity of diseases and degenerations.

Furthermore, since there is a class of secondary structures to be found in nature, anyone who intends to understand diseases will have a second set of subjects to study. Since marrow and bone, flesh and sinew are composed of the elemental stuffs—from which blood also has been formed, though in a different way—most of the diseases are brought on in the manner just described. But the most serious and grievous diseases are contracted when the process of generation that led to the formation of these structures is reversed. When this happens, they degenerate. It is natural for flesh and sinews to be formed from blood, the sinew from the fiber (which is of its own kind) and the flesh from the part of the blood that congeals when the sinew is separated from it. And the sticky and oily stuff that in its turn emerges from the sinew and the flesh both glues the flesh to the bone and feeds the marrow-encompassing bone itself, so causing it to grow. And because the bone is so dense, the part of this stuff that filters through, consisting as it does of the purest, smoothest and oiliest kind of triangles, forms droplets inside the bone and waters the marrow. And when this is the way it actually happens in each case, health will generally result.

Disease, however, will result if things happen the other way around. For when flesh that is wasting away passes its waste back into the veins, the veins will contain not only air but also an excess of blood of great variety. This blood will have a multitude of colors and bitter aspects, and even acidic and salty qualities, and will contain bile and serum and phlegm of every sort. These are all back-products and agents of

destruction. To begin with, they corrupt the blood itself, and then also they do not supply the body any further with nourishment. They move everywhere throughout the veins, no longer keeping to the order of natural circulation. They are hostile to one another, since none receives any advantage from any other, and they wage a destructive and devastating war against the constituents of the body that have stayed intact and kept to their posts.

Now as the oldest part of the flesh wastes away, it resists assimilation. It turns black as a result of being subjected to a prolonged process of burning, and because it is thoroughly eaten up it is bitter, and so it launches a severe attack against any part of the body that has not yet been destroyed. Sometimes the bitterness is largely refined away, and then the black color acquires an acidic quality that replaces the bitter. At other times, though, the bitterness is steeped in blood, and then it comes to have more of a reddish color, and when the black is mixed with this, it becomes a grass-like green. Further, when the flesh that is disintegrated by the fire of the inflammation is fairly young, the color that is mixed with the bitterness is a yellowish orange. Now the name "bile," common to all these varieties, was given to them either by doctors, possibly, or else by someone who had the ability to look at a plurality of unlike things and see in them a single kind that deserves to be called by a single name. As for everything that can be called a variety of bile, each has its own distinctive definition, depending on its color. In the case of serum, some of it, the watery part of the blood, is benign while that which is a part of the black, acid bile is malignant when heat causes it to be mixed with a salty quality. This kind of thing is called acid phlegm. Furthermore, when the stuff that comes from the disintegration of young, tender flesh is exposed to air and blown up with wind and enveloped in moisture, bubbles form as a result, each one too small to be seen though collectively

amounting to a visible mass. These bubbles look white, as foam begins to form. All this disintegration of tender flesh reacting with air is what we call white phlegm. Newly formed phlegm, furthermore, has a watery part which consists of perspiration and tears, as well as any other impurities that are discharged every day. So whenever the blood, instead of being replenished in the natural way by nutrients from food and drink, derives its volume from opposite sources, contrary to nature's way, all these things, it turns out, serve as instruments of disease.

Now when a certain part of the flesh is decomposed by disease, as long as the foundations of the flesh remain intact, the effect of the calamity is only half of what it would otherwise be, for there is still a chance of an easy recovery. But when the stuff that binds the flesh to the bones becomes diseased and no longer nourishes the bone or binds the flesh to the bone because it is now separated from flesh and bone as well as from sinews, it turns from being slick and smooth and oily to being rough and briny, shriveled up in consequence of its bad regimen. When this occurs, all the stuff that this happens to crumbles away back into the flesh and the sinew, and separates from the bone. The flesh, which collapses with it away from its roots, leaves the sinews bare and full of brine. And the flesh itself succumbs back into the bloodstream, where it works to aggravate the previously mentioned diseases.

Severe as these bodily processes are, those disorders that affect the more basic tissues are even more serious. When the density of the flesh prevents the bone from getting enough ventilation, the bone gets moldy, which causes it to get too hot. Gangrene sets in and the bone cannot take in its nourishment. It then crumbles and, by a reverse process, is dissolved into that nourishment which, in its turn, enters the flesh, and as the flesh lands in the blood it causes all of the

previously mentioned diseases to become more virulent still. But the most extreme case of all is when the marrow becomes diseased, either as a result of some deficiency or some excess. This produces the most serious, the most critically fatal diseases, in which all the bodily processes are made to flow backwards.

Further, there is a third class of diseases, which we should think of as arising in three ways, (a) One way is from air, (b) another from phlegm and (c) the third from bile, (a) When the lungs, the dispensers of air to the body, are obstructed by humors, they do not permit a clear passage. At some places the air cannot get in, while at others more than the appropriate amount gets in. In the former case, there will be parts of the body that don't get any breath and so begin to decay, while in the latter case the air forces its way through the veins and twists them together like strands. It makes its way into the central region of the body, the region that contains the midriff, where it is shut in, thereby causing the body to waste away. These factors produce countless painful diseases, often accompanied by profuse perspiration. And often, when flesh disintegrates inside the body, air is produced there, but is unable to get out. This air then causes just as much excruciating pain as the air that comes in from outside. The pain is most severe when the air settles around the sinews and the veins there and causes them to swell, thereby stretching backwards the "back stays" (the great sinews of the shoulder and arm) and the sinews attached to them. It is from this phenomenon of stretching, of course, that the diseases called tetanus ("tension") and opisthotonus ("backward stretching") have received their names. These diseases are difficult to cure. In fact, the onset of a fever affords the best prospects for relief from such ailments.

(b) Now as for the white phlegm, as long as it is trapped in the body, it is troublesome because of the air in its bubbles.

But if it finds a vent to the outside of the body, it is gentler, even though it does deck the body with white, leprous spots and engenders the corresponding diseases. If it is mixed with black bile and the mixture is sprayed against the divine circuits in the head, thereby throwing them into confusion, the effect is fairly mild if it comes during sleep, but should it come upon someone while awake, it is much harder to shake off. Seeing that it is a disease of the sacred part of our constitution, it is entirely just that it should be called the "sacred" disease (i.e., epilepsy).

Acid and salty phlegm is the source of all those diseases that come about by passage of fluids. These disorders have been given all sorts of different names, in view of the fact that the bodily regions into which the fluids flow are quite diverse.

(c) All inflammations in the body (so called from their being burned or "set aflame") are caused by bile. When bile finds a vent to the outside, it boils over and sends up all sorts of tumors, but when it is shut up inside, it creates many inflammatory diseases. The worst occurs when the bile gets mixed with clean blood and disrupts the disposition of the blood's fibers, which are interspersed throughout the blood. These fibers act to preserve a balance of thinness and thickness, i.e., to prevent both the blood from getting so liquid, due to the body's heat, that it oozes out from the body's pores, and, on the other hand, its getting so dense that it is sluggish and hardly able to circulate within the veins. The fibers, then, by virtue of their natural composition, preserve the appropriate state between these conditions. And even after death, when the blood cools down, if the fibers are [extracted from the blood and] collected, the residue will still be completely runny, while if they are left in the blood, they, along with the surrounding cold, congeal it in no time. Given, then, that the fibers have this effect upon the blood, though the bile—which originated as primitive blood and then from

flesh was dissolved into blood again—is hot and liquid at first as a little of it invades the blood, it congeals under the effect of the fibers, and as it congeals and is forced to extinguish its heat it causes internal cold and shivering. But as more of it flows in, it overpowers the fibers with its own heat. It boils over and shakes them up into utter confusion. And if it proves capable of sustaining its power to the end, it penetrates to the marrow and burns it up, thereby loosening the cables that hold the soul there, like a ship, and setting the soul free. But when there is rather little of it and the body resists its dissolution, the bile is itself overpowered and is expelled either by way of the body as a whole or else it is compressed through the veins into the lower or upper belly, and is expelled from the body like an exile from a city in civil strife, so bringing on diarrhea, dysentery and every disease of that kind. Bodies afflicted mostly by an excess of fire will generate continuous states of heat and fevers; those suffering from an excess of air produce fevers that recur every day; while those that have an excess of water have fevers that recur only every other day, given that water is more sluggish than air or fire. Bodies afflicted by an excess of earth, the most sluggish of the four, are purged within a fourfold cycle of time and produce fevers that occur every fourth day, fevers that are hard to get over.

The foregoing described how diseases of the body happen to come about. The diseases of the soul that result from a bodily condition come about in the following way. It must be granted, surely, that mindlessness is the disease of the soul, and of mindlessness there are two kinds. One is madness, and the other is ignorance. And so if a man suffers from a condition that brings on either one or the other, that condition must be declared a disease.

We must lay it down that the diseases that pose the gravest dangers for the soul are excessive pleasures and pains. When a man enjoys himself too much or, in the opposite case, when

he suffers great pain, and he exerts himself to seize the one and avoid the other in inopportune ways, he lacks the ability to see or hear anything right. He goes raving mad and is at that moment least capable of rational thought. And if the seed of a man's marrow grows to overflowing abundance like a tree that bears an inordinately plentiful quantity of fruit, he is in for a long series of bursts of pain, or of pleasures, in the area of his desires and their fruition. These severe pleasures and pains drive him mad for the greater part of his life, and though his body has made his soul diseased and witless, people will think of him not as sick, but as willfully evil. But the truth about sexual overindulgence is that it is a disease of the soul caused primarily by the condition of a single stuff which, due to the porousness of the bones, flows within the body and renders it moist. And indeed, just about every type of succumbing to pleasure is talked about as something reproachable, as though the evils are willfully done. But it is not right to reproach people for them, for no one is willfully evil. A man becomes evil, rather, as a result of one or another corrupt condition of his body and an uneducated upbringing. No one who incurs these pernicious conditions would will to have them.

And as for pains, once again it is the body that causes the soul so much trouble, and in the same ways. When any of a man's acid and briny phlegms or any bitter and bilious humors wander up and down his body without finding a vent to the outside and remain pent up inside, they mix the vapor that they give off with the motion of the soul and so are confounded with it. So they produce all sorts of diseases of the soul, some more intense and some more frequent than others. And as they move to the three regions of the soul, each of them produces a multitude of varieties of bad temper and melancholy in the region it attacks, as well as of recklessness and cowardice, not to mention forgetfulness and stupidity.

Furthermore, when men whose constitutions are bad in this way have bad forms of government where bad civic speeches are given, both in public and in private and where, besides, no studies that could remedy this situation are at all pursued by people from their youth on up, that is how all of us who are bad come to be that way—the products of two causes both entirely beyond our control. It is the begetters far more than the begotten, and the nurturers far more than the nurtured, that bear the blame for all this. Even so, one should make every possible effort to flee from badness, whether with the help of one's upbringing, or the pursuits or studies one undertakes, and to seize its opposite. But that is the subject for another speech.

The counterpart to the subject just dealt with, i.e., how to treat our bodies and states of mind and preserve them whole, is one that it is now fitting and right to give its turn. After all, good things have more of a claim to be the subject of our speech than bad things. Now all that is good is beautiful, and what is beautiful is not ill-proportioned. Hence we must take it that if a living thing is to be in good condition, it will be well-proportioned. We can perceive the less important proportions and do some figuring about them, but the more important proportions, which are of the greatest consequence, we are unable to figure out. In determining health and disease or virtue and vice no proportion or lack of it is more important than that between soul and body—yet we do not think about any of them nor do we realize that when a vigorous and excellent soul is carried about by a too frail and puny frame, or when the two are combined in the opposite way, the living thing as a whole lacks beauty, because it is lacking in the most important of proportions. That living thing, however, which finds itself in the opposite condition is, for those who are able to observe it, the most beautiful, the most desirable of all things to behold. Imagine a body which lacks proportion

because its legs are too long or something else is too big. It is not only ugly but also causes itself no end of troubles. As its parts try to cooperate to get its tasks done it frequently tires itself out or gets convulsive, or, because it lurches this way and that, it keeps falling down. That's how we ought to think of that combination of soul and body which we call the living thing. When within it there is a soul more powerful than the body and this soul gets excited, it churns the whole being and fills it from inside with diseases, and when it concentrates on one or another course of study or inquiry, it wears the body out. And again, when the soul engages in public or private teaching sessions or verbal battles, the disputes and contentions that then occur cause the soul to fire the body up and rock it back and forth, so inducing discharges which trick most so-called doctors into making misguided diagnoses. But when, on the other hand, a large body, too much for its soul, is joined with a puny and feeble mind, then, given that human beings have two sets of natural desires—desires of the body for food and desires of the most divine part of us for wisdom—the motions of the stronger part will predominate, and amplify their own interest. They render the functions of the soul dull, stupid and forgetful, thereby bringing on the gravest disease of all: ignorance.

From both of these conditions there is in fact one way to preserve oneself, and that is not to exercise the soul without exercising the body, nor the body without the soul, so that each may be balanced by the other and so be sound. The mathematician, then, or the ardent devotee of any other intellectual discipline should also provide exercise for his body by taking part in gymnastics, while one who takes care to develop his body should in his turn practice the exercises of the soul by applying himself to the arts and to every pursuit of wisdom, if he is to truly deserve the joint epithets of "fine and good." And the various bodily parts should also be looked

after in this same way, in imitation of the structure of the universe. For since the body is heated and cooled inside by things that enter it and is dried and moistened by things outside of it and made to undergo the consequent changes by both of these motions, it will happen that when a man subjects his body to these motions when it has been in a state of rest, the body is overcome and brought to ruin. But if he models himself after what we have called the foster-mother and nurse of the universe and persistently refuses to allow his body any degree of rest but exercises and continually agitates it through its whole extent, he will keep in a state of natural equilibrium the internal and the external motions. And if the agitation is a measured one, he will succeed in bringing order and regularity to those disturbances and those elemental parts that wander all over the body according to their affinities in the way described in the account we gave earlier about the universe. He will not allow one hostile element to position itself next to another and so breed wars and diseases in the body.

Instead, he will have one friendly element placed by another, and so bring about health.

Now the best of the motions is one that occurs within oneself and is caused by oneself. This is the motion that bears the greatest kinship to understanding and to the motion of the universe. Motion that is caused by the agency of something else is less good. Worst of all is the motion that moves, part by part, a passive body in a state of rest, and does so by means of other things. That, then, is why the motion induced by physical exercise is the best of those that purify and restore the body. Second is that induced by the rocking motion of sea travel or travel in any other kind of conveyance that doesn't tire one out. The third type of motion is useful in an occasional instance of dire need; barring that, however, no man in his right mind should tolerate it. This is medical purging by means of drugs. We should avoid aggravating with drugs

diseases that aren't particularly dangerous. Every disease has a certain makeup that in a way resembles the natural makeup of living things. In fact, the constitution of such beings goes through an ordered series of stages throughout their life. This is true of the species as a whole, and also of its individual members, each of which is born with its allotted span of life, barring unavoidable accidents. This is because its triangles are so made up, right from the beginning, as to have the capacity to hold up for a limited time beyond which life cannot be prolonged any further. Now diseases have a similar makeup, so that when you try to wipe them out with drugs before they have run their due course, the mild diseases are liable to get severe, and the occasional ones frequent. That is why you need to cater to all such diseases by taking care of yourself to the extent you are free and have the time to do that. What you should not do is aggravate a stubborn irritation with drugs.

Let these remarks suffice, then, on the subject of the living thing as a whole and its bodily parts, and how a man should both lead and be led by himself in order to have the best prospects for leading a rational life. Indeed, we must give an even higher priority to doing our utmost to make sure that the part that is to do the leading is as superbly and perfectly as possible fitted for that task. Now a thoroughgoing discussion of these matters would in and of itself be a considerable task, but if we treat it as a side issue, in line with what we have said before, it may not be out of turn to conclude our discourse with the following observations.

There are, as we have said many times now, three distinct types of soul that reside within us, each with its own motions. So now too, we must say in the same vein, as briefly as we can, that any type which is idle and keeps its motions inactive cannot but become very weak, while one that keeps exercising

becomes very strong. And so we must keep watch to make sure that their motions remain proportionate to each other.

Now we ought to think of the most sovereign part of our soul as god's gift to us, given to be our guiding spirit. This, of course, is the type of soul that, as we maintain, resides in the top part of our bodies. It raises us up away from the earth and toward what is akin to us in heaven, as though we are plants grown not from the earth but from heaven. In saying this, we speak absolutely correctly. For it is from heaven, the place from which our souls were originally born, that the divine part suspends our head, i.e., our root, and so keeps our whole body erect. So if a man has become absorbed in his appetites or his ambitions and takes great pains to further them, all his thoughts are bound to become merely mortal. And so far as it is at all possible for a man to become thoroughly mortal, he cannot help but fully succeed in this, seeing that he has cultivated his mortality all along. On the other hand, if a man has seriously devoted himself to the love of learning and to true wisdom, if he has exercised these aspects of himself above all, then there is absolutely no way that his thoughts can fail to be immortal and divine, should truth come within his grasp. And to the extent that human nature can partake of immortality, he can in no way fail to achieve this: constantly caring for his divine part as he does, keeping well-ordered the guiding spirit that lives within him, he must indeed be supremely happy. Now there is but one way to care for anything, and that is to provide for it the nourishment and the motions that are proper to it. And the motions that have an affinity to the divine part within us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe. These, surely, are the ones which each of us should follow. We should redirect the revolutions in our heads that were thrown off course at our birth, by coming to learn the harmonies and revolutions of the universe, and so bring into conformity with its objects our

faculty of understanding, as it was in its original condition. And when this conformity is complete, we shall have achieved our goal: that most excellent life offered to humankind by the gods, both now and forevermore.

And now indeed, it seems, we have all but completed our initial assignment, that of tracing the history of the universe down to the emergence of humankind. We should go on to mention briefly how the other living things came to be—a topic that won't require many words. By doing this we'll seem to be in better measure with ourselves so far as our words on these subjects are concerned.

Let us proceed, then, to a discussion of this subject in the following way. According to our likely account, all male-born humans who lived lives of cowardice or injustice were reborn in the second generation as women. And this explains why at that time the gods fashioned the desire for sexual union, by constructing one ensouled living thing in us as well as another one in women. This is how they made them in each case: There is [in a man] a passage by which fluids exit from the body, where it receives the liquid that has passed through the lungs down into the kidneys and on into the bladder and expels it under pressure of air. From this passage they bored a connecting one into the compacted marrow that runs from the head along the neck through the spine. This is in fact the marrow that we have previously called "seed." Now because it has soul in it and had now found a vent [to the outside], this marrow instilled a life-giving desire for emission right at the place of venting, and so produced the love of procreation. This is why, of course, the male genitals are unruly and self-willed, like an animal that will not be subject to reason and, driven crazy by its desires, seeks to overpower everything else. The very same causes operate in women. A woman's womb or uterus, as it is called, is a living thing within her with a desire for childbearing. Now when this remains unfruitful for an

unseasonably long period of time, it is extremely frustrated and travels everywhere up and down her body. It blocks up her respiratory passages, and by not allowing her to breathe it throws her into extreme emergencies, and visits all sorts of other illnesses upon her until finally the woman's desire and the man's love bring them together, and, like plucking the fruit from a tree, they sow the seed into the ploughed field of her womb, living things too small to be visible and still without form. And when they have again given them distinct form, they nourish these living things so that they can mature inside the womb. Afterwards, they bring them to birth, introducing them into the light of day.

That is how women and females in general came to be. As for birds, as a kind they are the products of a transformation. They grow feathers instead of hair. They descended from innocent but simpleminded men, men who studied the heavenly bodies but in their naivete believed that the most reliable proofs concerning them could be based upon visual observation. Land animals in the wild, moreover, came from men who had no tincture of philosophy and who made no study of the universe whatsoever, because they no longer made use of the revolutions in their heads but instead followed the lead of the parts of the soul that reside in the chest. As a consequence of these ways of theirs they carried their forelimbs and their heads dragging towards the ground, like towards like. The tops of their heads became elongated and took all sorts of shapes, depending on the particular way the revolutions were squeezed together from lack of use. This is the reason animals of this kind have four or more feet. The god placed a greater number of supports under the more mindless beings, so that they might be drawn more closely to the ground. As for the most mindless of these animals, the ones whose entire bodies stretch out completely along the ground, the gods made them without feet, crawling along the

ground, there being no need of feet anymore. The fourth kind of animal, the kind that lives in water, came from those men who were without question the most stupid and ignorant of all. The gods who brought about their transformation concluded that these no longer deserved to breathe pure air, because their souls were tainted with transgressions of every sort. Instead of letting them breathe rare and pure air, they shoved them into water to breathe its murky depths. This is the origin of fish, of all shellfish, and of every water-inhabiting animal. Their justly due reward for their extreme stupidity is their extreme dwelling place. These, then, are the conditions that govern, both then and now, how all the animals exchange their forms, one for the other, and in the process lose or gain intelligence or folly.

And so now we may say that our account of the universe has reached its conclusion. This world of ours has received and teems with living things, mortal and immortal. A visible living thing containing visible ones, perceptible god, image of the intelligible Living Thing, its grandness, goodness, beauty and perfection are unexcelled. Our one universe, indeed the only one of its kind, has come to be.

On Virtue.

Translated by George Burges, M. A.

Persons of the Dialog.

Socrates and a Friend.

Socrates/ Is Virtue a thing to be taught, or to be not taught? but do men become good by nature, or by any other means?

Friend/ I cannot, Socrates, state at present.

Socrates/ But let us consider the matter in this way. Come then, say, if a person wished to become good in the virtue, in which clever cooks are good, from whence would he become so?

Friend/ It is evident, if he learnt from good cooks.

Socrates/ Well then, if a person wished to become a good physician, by going to whom would he become a good physician?

Friend/ It is evident, by going to some one of the good physicians.

Socrates/ But if he wished to become good in the art, in which clever carpenters are good?

Friend/ To some one of the good carpenters.

Socrates/ If then he wished to be good in the virtue, in which men are good and clever, whither must he go and learn?

Friend/ I conceive to some one of the good men to learn this, if it is to be learnt; for from whence else?

Socrates/ Come then, say, who are the men that have become good? in order that we may see whether these are the persons, who make men good.

Friend/ Thucydides, and Themistocles, and Aristides, and Pericles.

Socrates/ Have we it in our power to say who was the teacher of each of these?

Friend/ We have not; for it is not told.

Socrates/ Well then, can we mention any pupil, either amongst strangers or citizens or anyone else, either a free man or a slave, who assigns as the cause of his having become wise and good his intercourse with them?

Friend/ This too is not told.

Socrates/ But they did not surely grudge to share their virtue with other persons.

Friend/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Was it that there might not be rival artists, just as cooks, and physicians, and carpenters feel a jealousy; since it is not to their advantage for many rival artists to exist, nor for them to dwell amongst many similar persons. Is it then in like manner not an advantage for good men to dwell amongst many similar persons?

Friend/ Perhaps so.

Socrates/ Are not the good and the just the same?

Friend/ Yes, they are.

Socrates/ Is there the individual, to whom it is an advantage to live not amongst good persons, but amongst bad?

Friend/ I cannot tell.

Socrates/ Can you not tell this too, whether it is the work of good men to do a hurt, and of bad men to do a benefit, or the reverse?

Friend/ The reverse.

Socrates/ The good then do a benefit, the bad do a hurt.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is there a person who wishes to be hurt rather than to be benefited?

Friend/ By no means.

Socrates/ No one therefore wishes to live amongst bad persons, rather than amongst good.

Friend/ It is so.

Socrates/ Not one then of the good is so jealous of another, as not to make him a good person and similar to himself.

Friend/ From this reasoning it seems so.

Socrates/ You have heard that Cleophantus was the son of Themistocles.

Friend/ I have heard it.

Socrates/ It is evident then that Themistocles was not jealous of his son becoming the best possible; who was jealous of no one else, if indeed he was a good man; and good they say he was.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ You know then that Themistocles caused his son to be taught to be a clever and a good horseman. For instance he used to remain standing upright upon horses, and upright too hurled a javelin from the backs of the horses, and did many other wonderful feats, and taught him, and made him wise in many other things, such as are closely connected with a good education. Or have you not heard so from elderly persons?

Friend/ I have heard it.

Socrates/ No one then could find fault with the son's nature as being bad.

Friend/ Not justly so at least from what you have said.

Socrates/ But what is this? that Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, became a good and wise man in the matters where his father was wise, have you ever heard from any younger or older person?

Friend/ I have not heard it.

Socrates/ Do we then conceive that he wished to instruct his own son in these matters; but in the wisdom, in which he was wise himself, not to make him better than any of his neighbors, if virtue were a thing to be taught?

Friend/ It is not likely at least.

Socrates/ Of such a kind then is this your teacher of virtue, to whom you have alluded? Let us then look to another, by name Aristides, who brought up Lysimachus, and instructed him the best of the Athenians on such subjects as are connected with good teachers; and yet he made him a man no better than anybody; for both you and I have seen and associated with him.

Friend/ It is true.

Socrates/ You know too that Pericles brought up well his sons Paralus and Xanthippus, of the latter of whom you seem to me to have been the lover. These, as you know yourself, he taught to be horsemen inferior to none of the Athenians; and he instructed them to be inferior to no one in the rest of contests, and all the other things that are learnt by art. But did he not wish to make them good men?

Friend/ But perhaps, Socrates, they would have become so, had they not died young.

Socrates/ You reasonably come to the aid of your beloved. But Pericles would have much rather made them clever in his own wisdom, than in music and contests, had virtue been a thing to be taught, and had he been able to make them good men. But I fear that it is a thing not to be taught; since Thucydides brought up well his two sons, Melesias and

Stephanus, in behalf of whom you will not have it in your power to say, what you have done in behalf of the sons of Pericles; for one of these you surely know lived to old age, and the other much beyond. And yet their father taught them well other pursuits, and they wrestled the best of the Athenians. For he put one under Xanthias, and the other under Eudorus; and these were surely thought to wrestle the best of those of that period.

Friend/ Yes, they were.

Is it not evident then, that he would not have taught his sons these things, where it was requisite to instruct them at an expense to himself, but those where without expending anything it was requisite to make them good men. Now would he not have taught them this, if it were to be taught?

Friend/ It is likely at least.

Socrates/ But perhaps Thucydides was a man of small means, and had not very many friends amongst the Athenians or their allies; and he was of a great family, and of great power in the state, and amongst the rest of the Greeks, so that if this had been a thing to be taught, he would have discovered a person amongst those of the country, or foreigners, who would have made his son a good man, if he himself had, through his attention to state affairs, no leisure. But I fear that virtue is a thing not to be taught.

Friend/ Perhaps not.

Socrates/ But if it is not to be taught, are the good naturally so from their birth? But this perhaps we shall discover by considering the matter in this way. Come then, say, do there exist the natures of good horses?

Friend/ They do exist.

Socrates/ Are there not men, who possess an art, by which they know the natures of good horses, both as regards

their body, with reference to running, and their feelings, which of them are full of spirit or devoid of it.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ What is this art, and what its name?

Friend/ Equestrian.

Socrates/ Is there not in like manner an art relating to dogs, by which persons discriminate between the good and bad natures of dogs?

Friend/ There is.

Socrates/ What is it?

Friend/ The hunter's art.

Socrates/ There are too assayers amongst us of gold and silver, who, by looking, decide upon both the better and the worse metal.

Friend/ There are.

Socrates/ And what do you call them?

Friend/ Silver assayers.

Socrates/ The boy-drillers moreover know, by examining the natures of the bodies of men, which of them are useful and which not, for each of their labours, and which of the bodies of persons older and young, are about to be worthy of note, and in which there is much hope of their executing works connected with the body.

Friend/ It is so.

Socrates/ Whether then are good horses and dogs, and other things of such a kind, of more importance in states, or good men?

Friend/ Good men.

Socrates/ Well then, do you conceive that, if the natures of men were good for virtue, that mankind would not have planned in every way to discover those natures?

Friend/ It is likely at least.

Socrates/ Can you then mention any art, which has been exhibited and applied to the natures of good men, so as to enable persons to decide upon them?

Friend/ I cannot.

Socrates/ And yet the art would be worth much, and so too the parties possessing it. For they would have pointed out the young men, who, when they were still boys, were about to be good; and whom we should have taken and kept in the Acropolis for the public use, as if it were silver, and something more beautiful, in order that they might not suffer any mischief, either in a fight or in any other danger, but be laid up as the saviors and benefactors of the state, since they should have arrived at a proper age. But it seems almost that virtue does not exist to mankind either by nature or instruction.

Friend/ How then, Socrates, would persons seem to become good, if they do not become so by nature or instruction? By what other means could the good exist?

Socrates/ This, I think, could not be shown easily; but I conjecture that the property of goodness is something especially divine, and that good men exist, as prophets do and oracle chanters. For these exist neither by nature nor by art, but become such by the inspiration of the gods. And so too good men point out to states what is about on each occasion to happen, and what is about to be, from the inspiration of a god, much more, and more clearly, than oracle chanters do: and even women somehow say that such a person is a divine man; and the Lacedæmonians too, when they praise in a very handsome manner, say that a man is divine, and often does Homer make use of the same expression, and the rest of poets likewise. When therefore a god wishes a state to do well, he causes some men in it to be

good; but when a state is about to do ill, the god takes away the good men from it. Thus then it is likely that virtue is a thing not to be taught nor derived from nature, but exists by a divine allotment to those who possess it.

On Virtue

Translated by Mark Reuter.

Persons of the Dialog

Socrates, Friend

Socrates/ Can virtue be taught? If not, do men become good by nature, or in some other way?

Friend/ I can't give you an answer right now, Socrates.

Socrates/ Well now, let's consider it. Tell me, if someone wanted to become good with the virtue that makes expert chefs good, how would he do it?

Friend/ By learning from good chefs, obviously.

Socrates/ Good. Now if he wanted to become a good doctor, to whom would he go to become a good doctor?

Friend/ That's obvious—to one of the good doctors.

Socrates/ And if he wanted to become good with the virtue that makes expert builders good?

Friend/ To one of the builders.

Socrates/ And if he had wanted to become good with the virtue that makes men wise and good, where must he go to learn it?

Friend/ This virtue, too, if it can be learned, I suppose he'd have to learn from good men. Where else?

Socrates/ Then tell me, who were the good men of our city? Let's consider if these are the ones who make men good.

Friend/ Thucydides, Themistocles, Aristides, and Pericles.

Socrates/ Can we name a teacher for each of them?

Friend/ No, we can't; I haven't heard of any.

Socrates/ Well then, can we name a student, either a foreigner or a citizen, or anybody else, either free or slave, who

is reputed to have become wise and good by associating with these men?

Friend/ I haven't heard of anybody.

Socrates/ Might they not have been too jealous to share their virtue with other men?

Friend/ Maybe.

Socrates/ Just as chefs, doctors and builders are jealous—that way they won't have any rivals. For it isn't profitable for them to have many rivals or to live among many similar professionals. Is it similarly unprofitable for good men to live among men like themselves?

Friend/ Probably.

Socrates/ But aren't they just, as well as good?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Does it profit someone to live not among good, but among bad men?

Friend/ I can't tell you.

Socrates/ Well, can you tell me this—whether it's the business of good men to harm, and of bad men to help or vice versa?

Friend/ Vice versa.

Socrates/ The good, therefore, help, and the evil harm?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Is there anyone who wants to be harmed rather than be helped?

Friend/ Of course not.

Socrates/ Therefore, no one wants to live among bad rather than good men.

Friend/ That's right.

Socrates/ Therefore, no good man will be too jealous to make another man good and similar to himself.

Friend/ Apparently not, according to that argument.

Socrates/ Have you heard that Cleophantus was the son of Themistocles?

Friend/ I've heard that.

Socrates/ Isn't it obvious that Themistocles would not have begrudged his son becoming the best—Themistocles, a man who wouldn't have begrudged that to anyone, if he really was good, which he was, as we admit.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ Did you realize that Themistocles taught his son to be an expert horseman—he could ride standing upright on his horse, he could throw a javelin from this position, and he could perform many other remarkable feats—his father taught him and made him an expert in many other things that require good teachers. Haven't you heard that from the older generation?

Friend/ I have.

Socrates/ So no one could criticize his son's natural ability as bad.

Friend/ Not rightly, at least from what you say.

Socrates/ What about this? Have you ever heard anyone—young or old—say that Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, was a wise and good man in the way that his father was wise?

Friend/ Never.

Socrates/ Are we to suppose, then, that he wanted to teach his son those things, but he didn't want to make him better than any of his neighbors in the wisdom that he himself enjoyed, if virtue can indeed be taught?

Friend/ That isn't very likely.

Socrates/ And yet he was just the sort of teacher of virtue that you suggested. But let's consider another man, Aristides, who raised Lysimachus. He gave his son the best Athenian

education in matters which require teachers, but he made him no better than anyone else. Both you and I know this, for we've spent time with him.

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ And you know that Pericles, too, raised his sons Paralus and Xanthippus—in fact, I think you were in love with one of them. As you know, he taught them horsemanship—and they were as good as any Athenian—the liberal arts, and athletic games; he brought them up to be as good as anyone at every skill for which there are teachers; and yet he didn't want to make them good men?

Friend/ But perhaps they would have been, Socrates, if they hadn't died young.

Socrates/ You're coming to the aid of your boyfriend, which is fair enough. But if virtue were teachable and if it were possible to make men good, Pericles would certainly have made his sons expert in his own virtue rather than in the liberal arts or athletic games. But it doesn't seem to be teachable, since Thucydides, as well, raised two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, and you cannot say about them what you said about the sons of Pericles, for you know very well that one lived to a ripe old age, and the other much longer. Indeed, their father taught them well, especially to be the finest wrestlers in Athens. He sent one to Xanthias and the other to Eudorus—weren't they supposed to be the finest wrestlers of the day?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ So it's clear that he would never have taught his sons what he had to spend money on, when he could have made them good without spending anything—wouldn't he have taught them to be good, if it could be taught?

Friend/ That seems likely.

Socrates/ But perhaps Thucydides was a commoner, and he didn't have many friends among the Athenians and their allies? No, but he was from a great household, and he was able to do great things here in Athens and in other Greek cities. So, if virtue could be taught, he would have found someone—either locally or abroad—who could have made his sons good, if he himself didn't have the time because of his political affairs. No, my friend, it looks as if virtue can't be taught.

Friend/ No, probably not.

Socrates/ Well then, if virtue isn't teachable, are men naturally good? If we examine this in the following way, perhaps we might find out. Now then, do we think that good horses have particular natures?

Friend/ They do.

Socrates/ And aren't there some men who have a skill by which they know the natures of the good horses, those physically fit for racing and mentally spirited or else lethargic?

Friend/ Yes.

Socrates/ What, then, is this skill? What name does it have?

Friend/ Horsemanship.

Socrates/ And likewise for hunting dogs, is there some skill by which men can discern the good and bad natures of the dogs?

Friend/ There is.

Socrates/ What is it?

Friend/ Huntsmanship.

Socrates/ And what about gold and silver? Do we think there are moneychangers who separate the good coins from the bad by looking at them?

Friend/ There are.

Socrates/ What do you call them?

Friend/ Assayers.

Socrates/ And again athletic coaches know by looking which traits of the human body are good or bad for each of the events, and in older or younger boys which are going to be their most valuable traits, where they have high hopes for them to succeed in what their bodies can perform well.

Friend/ That's true.

Socrates/ Which of these is more important for cities: good horses, good dogs, and so on, or good men?

Friend/ Good men.

Socrates/ Well? Don't you think, if men had innate characters good for virtue, that people would make every effort to recognize them?

Friend/ Very likely.

Socrates/ Now can you tell me which skill is dedicated to, and capable of judging, the natural qualities of good men?

Friend/ No, I can't.

Socrates/ And yet it would surely be worth a great deal, as would those who possess it, for they could show us which of the young, while still boys, are going to be good. We would take them and guard them in the acropolis at public expense, like silver, only more carefully, so that no harm would come to them, from battle or any other danger. They would be stored up for the city as guards and benefactors when they came of age.

But really, I dare say that it's neither by nature nor by teaching that men become virtuous.

Friend/ How then do you suppose, Socrates, that they become virtuous, if it's neither by nature nor teaching? How else could they become good?

Socrates/ I don't think it's very easy to explain this. My guess, however, is that the possession of virtue is very much a divine gift and that men become good just as the divine prophets and oracle-mongers do. For they become what they are neither by nature nor skill: it's through the inspiration of the gods that they become what they are. Likewise, good men announce to their cities the likely outcome of events and what is going to happen, by the inspiration of god, much better and much more clearly than the fortune-tellers. Even the women, I think, say that this sort of man is divine, and the Spartans, whenever they applaud someone in high style, say that he is divine. And often Homer uses this same compliment, as do other poets. Indeed, whenever a god wishes a city to become successful, he places good men in it, and whenever a city is slated to fail, the god takes the good men away from that city. So it seems that virtue is neither teachable nor natural, but comes by divine allotment to those who possess it.